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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3307

CLIFTON MORGAN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11‐cv‐09271 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 — DECIDED MAY 6, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE,

Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Clifton Morgan was arrested by three

Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) officers—Lieutenant

Duane DeVries, Sergeant Christian Tsoukalas, and Sergeant

Anthony Schulz—and charged with possession of crack co‐

caine and resisting arrest. The Circuit Court of Cook County

dismissed the charges, and Mr. Morgan brought this civil ac‐

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2 No. 14‐3307

tion against the arresting officers and the City of Chicago (col‐

lectively, “the defendants”). Along with several state‐law

claims, he brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he

alleged that the officers had conspired to violate and did vio‐

late his constitutional rights during the course of the arrest.

Mr. Morgan’s claims were tried to a jury, which returned a

verdict for the defendants. Mr. Morgan filed a motion for a

new trial, arguing that the defendants had violated the Equal

Protection Clause by exercising their peremptory strikes on a

racially discriminatory basis during jury selection and that the

district court had committed multiple procedural and sub‐

stantive errors, which had deprived him of a fair trial. The

court denied the motion, and Mr. Morgan timely appealed.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judg‐

ment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

On May 2, 2011, Mr. Morgan was arrested outside a house

at 7746 South Greenwood Avenue in Chicago. The arresting

officers noticed Mr. Morgan as he crossed the street and pur‐

sued him on suspicion that he was in possession of a firearm.

The officers apprehended Mr. Morgan outside the house, us‐

ing force that Mr. Morgan would later contend was excessive

but that the officers would maintain was reasonable because

he was resisting arrest.

Mr. Morgan was charged with resisting arrest as well as

possession of a controlled substance based on a small bag of

cocaine, which the officers claimed to have found near

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Mr. Morgan after his arrest. The Circuit Court of Cook

County dismissed the possession charge on the ground that

there was not probable cause to prosecute, and the State’s At‐

torney dropped the charge for resisting arrest.

B.

In December 2011, Mr. Morgan brought this civil action

against the defendants in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois. He asserted claims against

the arresting officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the

officers had unlawfully stopped, falsely arrested, and used

excessive force against him. He also alleged that they had con‐

spired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Addition‐

ally, Mr. Morgan asserted several state‐law claims against the

officers as well as the City of Chicago.  

Mr. Morgan’s case then proceeded to trial. In September

2013, the parties filed a joint proposed pretrial order as well

as several dozen motions in limine. In particular, the defend‐

ants requested that the district court bar evidence that, at

Mr. Morgan’s preliminary hearing, the state court had en‐

tered a finding of “no probable cause” as to the possession of

a controlled substance charge because this finding rested on a

stricter standard of proof than probable cause to arrest.1

                                                 

1 R.57 at 10. Specifically, the defendants argued that “the Illinois prelimi‐

nary examination statute requires a judge to determine from the evidence

before the court ‘if it appears [that] there is probable cause to believe an

offense has been committed by the defendant ...’ 725 ILCS § 5/109–

3(a)(emphasis added), not whether there was probable cause for the ar‐

rest.” Id. (alteration in original). We have recognized this difference be‐

tween the standard set forth in the Illinois preliminary examination statute

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Mr. Morgan then moved to set a pretrial conference; the court

granted the motion but never held a pretrial conference.  

On the morning of the first day of trial, the parties brought

to the court’s attention the pending motions in limine. The

court declined to address them; it explained that “during the

course of the trial the Court will rule on motions as they are

made” and directed the parties to “avoid any issue that is the

subject of a motion in limine” during opening statements.2  

The court then proceeded to jury selection. It provided a

brief overview of the case to the venire, including the name of

the parties, the nature of the claims, and the fact that Mr. Mor‐

gan had been arrested on May 2, 2011, near 77th and South

Greenwood Avenue in Chicago. The court then called twelve

members of the venire for voir dire and questioned them

about their place of residence, marital status, number of chil‐

dren, prior jury service, and whether they were capable of be‐

ing fair and impartial. The court excused one prospective ju‐

ror on its own initiative; it then allowed the parties to ask ad‐

ditional questions of the panel.  

After the parties had completed their questioning of the

first twelve venirepersons, the court entertained challenges to

specific potential jurors and stated that each party would be

allowed three peremptory challenges. Mr. Morgan sought to

remove two prospective jurors for cause. He challenged Juror

Ten because she had several family members in law enforce‐

                                                 

and the standard for probable cause to arrest. See Williams v. Kobel, 789

F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1986).

2 R.115‐1 at 3–4; see also id. at 81–82.

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ment and had stated that she was not sure if she could be im‐

partial; the district court granted the challenge. Mr. Morgan

also challenged Juror Five, who had stated that she was

friends with a police officer who had told her “stories about

people in Chicago of color—nothing against you—white,

blacks—and what they have on them when they stop them.”3

When asked by the district court whether she could put aside

what she had heard from her friend and be fair and impartial

in this case, Juror Five had responded, “I think so.”4 After

Mr. Morgan’s challenge, the district court asked for a re‐

sponse from the defendants’ counsel, who replied, “I think

[Juror Five] indicated that despite what she ... has learned

through her friend, she could be fair and impartial.”5 The

court granted Mr. Morgan’s challenge of Juror Five for cause.

Mr. Morgan also used peremptory challenges to strike two

additional members of the first panel.  

The defendants also challenged two members of the first

panel for cause, Jurors Nine and Seven. Juror Nine lived on

the south side of Chicago; when asked if she was familiar with

the area of the 7700 block of South Greenwood Avenue, Juror

Nine stated that she was and that she “live[d] not far away.”6

Juror Seven, in response to the same question, responded, “I

know the area,” and, “I have a couple of friends that live in

                                                 

3 Id. at 36.

4 Id.

5 Id. at 48.

6 Id. at 44.

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that area. Friend.”7 The defendants argued that the two pro‐

spective jurors should be removed because “th[e] case should

be decided by people that have no familiarity with the area or

may have contacts in any way.”8 The district court denied

both challenges on the ground that a juror’s familiarity with

an area is not enough to support a challenge for cause. The

defendants then exercised two of their peremptory challenges

to strike Jurors Nine and Seven. Mr. Morgan objected to these

strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), noting that

both Jurors Nine and Seven were African‐American. The

court responded that the defendants had “already stated a

race‐neutral basis for exercising the peremptory challenge”—

familiarity with the neighborhood and contacts with neigh‐

borhood residents—and that it found this to be “a sufficient

showing of a nondiscriminatory basis for the” strikes.9 The

court therefore overruled Mr. Morgan’s Batson objection.

The court then called another eight venirepersons for voir

dire and again excused one juror on its own initiative. Both

parties used their one remaining peremptory challenge, and

the court seated the remaining jurors. Of those jurors, two—

Jurors Six and Nineteen—were African‐American, and both

were seated without objection by either party.  

Following the parties’ opening statements, Mr. Morgan

was the first to take the witness stand. He testified that he and

four of his friends arrived at his cousin’s home at 7746 South

Greenwood Avenue to watch a Chicago Bulls game shortly

                                                 

7 Id. at 45.

8 Id. at 49–50.

9 Id. at 51.

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before 7:00 p.m. on May 2, 2011. After standing outside the

front gate of the house and talking for about twenty minutes,

Mr. Morgan’s friends headed toward the house to go inside.

Mr. Morgan, however, walked across the street to his truck to

retrieve his MP3 player. Then, Mr. Morgan testified, as he was

starting to cross the street to go back to the house, he saw a

car approaching and moved quickly across the street “to

avoid from getting hit.”10 Mr. Morgan then entered through

the front gate into his cousin’s yard and closed the gate be‐

hind him. At that point, Mr. Morgan testified, he “heard a

loud screech” that “sounded like some brakes on the car” and

people yelling “[f]reeze” and telling him to open the gate.11

Mr. Morgan stated that he did not open the gate because he

was nervous and did not want to be involved with the police.

Mr. Morgan then walked on a gangway along the side of his

cousin’s house, but, after progressing half of the way, turned

around and proceeded to walk back toward the front of the

house. At this point, a police officer drew his weapon and or‐

dered Mr. Morgan to freeze. Mr. Morgan complied with the

officer’s orders to lock his hands behind his head and lay flat

on the ground.  

Mr. Morgan testified that another officer then jumped

over a chain‐link fence and onto his head while he was lying

on the ground. He stated that he lost consciousness for several

seconds and, when he regained it, realized that his lip had

been cut and his two front teeth broken. The officers then

handcuffed Mr. Morgan, lifted him over the chain‐link fence,

and placed him in the back of a police car. On the way to the

                                                 

10 Id. at 106.

11 Id. at 108–09.

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police station, Mr. Morgan testified, he was told he would be

charged with possession of crack cocaine. After spending

some time in a conference room at the police station, Mr. Mor‐

gan was taken to the hospital where he received four stitches

in his upper lip and was informed that he had two fractured

teeth. He was also given pain medication and ibuprofen.  

Mr. Morgan testified that he was next transported to the

county jail and placed in a holding cell. He then was taken to

state court and released on bond. Three weeks later, Mr. Mor‐

gan stated, he returned to state court, and the charges were

“dismissed by no probable cause.”12 Counsel for the defend‐

ants objected to this remark, and the court sustained the ob‐

jection because the state court’s finding of “no probable

cause” to prosecute the possession charge was the subject of

the defendants’ pending motion in limine.13  

Mr. Morgan then proceeded to call each of the three de‐

fendant officers to testify, and their descriptions of the en‐

counter with Mr. Morgan differed from Mr. Morgan’s testi‐

mony in several significant respects. Lt. DeVries testified that

he was driving a police car accompanied by Sgt. Schulz and

Sgt. Tsoukalas, heading southbound on the 7700 block of

South Greenwood Avenue, when he saw Mr. Morgan stand‐

ing at the rear side of a parked vehicle. According to

Lt. DeVries, Mr. Morgan then “walked into the street in front

of our vehicle ... and immediately looked in my direction and

grabbed his side” with his right hand.14 Sgt. Tsoukalas, who

                                                 

12 Id. at 130.

13 Id.; see also R.57 at 10.

14 R.115‐1 at 190–91.

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was in the front passenger seat of the police car, and

Sgt. Schulz, who was seated in the rear seat of the car, also

testified that Mr. Morgan clutched his right side near his

waistband as he crossed the street. Lt. DeVries testified that

he believed, based on his experience, that Mr. Morgan had a

weapon. Lt. DeVries stated that he sped up to thirty‐five or

forty miles per hourin orderto catch up with Mr. Morgan and

that Mr. Morgan then ran “full speed” into the yard through

the front gate, which slammed shut behind him.15 Lt. DeVries

then exited the vehicle to pursue Mr. Morgan on foot; he tried

to open the gate, but it was locked and, even after kicking the

gate handle, would not open. Lt. DeVries testified that, from

over a fence, he saw Mr. Morgan on the gangway next to the

house, drew his weapon, and yelled at Mr. Morgan to show

his hands. Sgt. Tsoukalas testified that as Mr. Morgan was

raising his hands, a small plastic bag fell to the ground.

According to Lt. DeVries, as Mr. Morgan was complying

with his commands, Sgt. Tsoukalas hopped over the

chain‐link fence and grabbed Mr. Morgan’s right arm to

handcuff him. Both Lt. DeVries and Sgt. Tsoukalas testified

that at this point Mr. Morgan was not on the ground but was

standing, that he lunged toward Sgt. Tsoukalas, and that Sgt.

Tsoukalas then performed a “take‐down” maneuver, which

caused both men to fall “face first” to the ground.16 Sgt. Schulz

testified that he saw Sgt. Tsoukalas and Mr. Morgan falling to

the ground and went to assist Sgt. Tsoukalas. At that point,

Sgt. Schulz stated, he saw on the ground next to Mr. Morgan

a clear plastic bag containing a white, rock‐like substance that

                                                 

15 Id. at 194–95.

16 Id. at 201–02, 300–01.

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he believed to be crack cocaine. Lt. DeVries testified that he

searched the area for a weapon but never found one.  

During Sgt. Schulz’s examination, the defendants’ counsel

sought to elicit testimony about the officer’s familiarity with

the location of Mr. Morgan’s arrest and the “sorts of experi‐

ences [the officer had] had in that block.”17 Mr. Morgan’s

counsel objected, and the district court overruled, stating that

“[w]hat the officers reasonably believed under the circum‐

stances is relevant.”18 At a sidebar, Mr. Morgan’s counsel ar‐

gued that such testimony was irrelevant, prejudicial, and

would be used by the jury to draw an impermissible propen‐

sity inference. The court again overruled the objection; it al‐

lowed Sgt. Schulz to testify as follows:

Q. Sergeant, I think when we took that break I

was asking you what your general knowledge

or experience is relating to 7700 South Green‐

wood. So if you could please just tell the ladies

and gentlemen of the jury?

A. In my ten‐plus years in the 6th District as a

sergeant of police, my experiences with the

block, numerous ... narcotics calls, numerous

men with a gun or person with a gun calls, foot

chases, search warrants. Things of that nature.

                                                 

17 Id. at 382.

18 Id.

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Q. So it’s fair to say that your previous experi‐

ences were relatively similar to the events that

occurred on May 2nd, 2011, is that correct?

    [Mr. Morgan’s counsel]: Objection.

    THE COURT: Overruled.

BY THE WITNESS:

A. Yes, sir.[19]

In addition to the three defendant officers, Mr. Morgan

called another four witnesses as part of his case‐in‐chief. One

of these witnesses was CPD Captain Ruth Wedster, the dis‐

trict watch commander on the night of the arrest. On cross‐ex‐

amination, Cpt. Wedster was asked about certain reports con‐

cerning Mr. Morgan’s arrest. Cpt. Wedster testified initially

that Captain Juan Morado had approved the reports, but, af‐

ter reviewing the arrest report to refresh her recollection, she

clarified that it was instead Sergeant Henry who had ap‐

proved them. When counsel for the defendants asked

Cpt. Wedster what Sgt. Henry had approved, she responded

“[p]robable cause.”20 Mr. Morgan’s counsel immediately ob‐

jected and moved to strike based on the defendants’ pending

motion in limine, and the court sustained the objection and

instructed the jury to “[d]isregard the last statement.”21

At the conclusion of the evidence, the parties rested their

cases and the court entertained several motions. Following ar‐

                                                 

19 Id. at 384.

20 Id. at 478–79.

21 Id. at 479.

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gument on the motions, the court directed the parties to con‐

fer before the next court date and then provide a set of agreed

instructions and jury forms. When the court reconvened, the

parties had reached agreement on roughly thirty instructions

but had remaining disputes on another fifteen, and the court

heard arguments on the disputed instructions. During argu‐

ment, Mr. Morgan objected to one of the defendants’ pro‐

posed instructions on the ground that it “was just proposed

last night,” to which the court responded, “you’ve ... had

months to work on this,” and overruled the objection.22

After argument on the jury instructions, the parties pre‐

sented their closing arguments. The court then instructed the

jury on the applicable law and submitted Mr. Morgan’s

claims for decision. During the second day of deliberations,

the jury sent a note asking whether, in the context of an inves‐

tigatory stop, it is necessary for an officer to reasonably sus‐

pect an individual of “being connected with a crime or mis‐

demeanor ... having committed a crime or misde‐

meanor ... having information regarding a crime or misde‐

meanor [or] ... intending to commit a crime or misde‐

meanor[.]”23 The parties submitted to the court an

agreed‐upon answer: “With respect to reasonable suspicion,

you must find that the defendant ... had reasonable suspicion

that the plaintiff had committed or was about to commit a

crime.”24 The court, however, believed that the response was

not an accurate expression of the law and declined to give it,

                                                 

22 Id. at 551–52.

23 Id. at 666.

24 Id. at 667.

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stating instead that it would give the following instruction:

An investigative stop is a brief detention which

gives police officers a chance to verify or dispel

well‐founded suspicions that a person has been,

is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.

Permissible encounters between police officers

and citizens are not limited to situations involv‐

ing possible criminal activity, but also include

situations in which persons may need help or

are in danger of harming themselves or others.

... In determining whether particular cir‐

cumstances rise to the level of a reasonable sus‐

picion, courts must look—must take into con‐

sideration the modes or patterns of operations

of certain kinds of law‐breakers which allow

trained officers to draw inferences and make de‐

ductions that might well elude an untrained

person.[25]

Mr. Morgan’s counsel objected that the jury already had been

instructed on reasonable suspicion and that the court’s in‐

struction “elaborates on things that aren’t really pertinent to

the question that the jury asked” and “goes far beyond what

they have already been instructed on.”26 The court overruled

the objection and gave its own response.

Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants

on all claims. Mr. Morgan then filed a motion for a new trial,

                                                 

25 Id. at 668.

26 Id. at 670.

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contending that (1) his right to equal protection had been vi‐

olated by the defendants’ racially motivated use of peremp‐

tory strikes, and (2) the court had committed multiple proce‐

dural and substantive errors that had deprived him of a fair

trial. The district court denied Mr. Morgan’s motion for a new

trial, explaining that it found the defendants’ rationale for the

peremptory strikes to be “credible, honest, and race‐neutral,”

and that the alleged errors did not, individually or cumula‐

tively, render his trial unfair.27  

Mr. Morgan now appeals the district court’s decision, rais‐

ing both of the arguments that he presented in his motion for

a new trial.

II

DISCUSSION

A.  Batson Claim

It is well established that “[p]urposeful racial discrimina‐

tion in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to

equal protection.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. Indeed, the racially

discriminatory exclusion of even one potential juror requires

reversal. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). Batson

has been extended to and applies identically in the civil con‐

text. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614,

616 (1991); Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1993).

When evaluating a Batson objection to a peremptory strike,

the trial court engages in a three‐step analysis. Miller‐El v.

                                                 

27 R.108 at 6, 10.

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Cockrell (“Miller‐El I”), 537 U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003). First, it de‐

termines whether the strike’s opponent has made a prima fa‐

cie showing that the strike was exercised on the basis of race.

Id. at 328; see also United States v. Stephens (“Stephens I”), 421

F.3d 503, 512 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he burden at the prima facie

stage is low, requiring only circumstances raising a suspicion

that discrimination occurred.”). If that showing has been

made, the burden of production shifts to the strike’s propo‐

nent to present a nondiscriminatory explanation for striking

the juror. Miller‐El I, 537 U.S. at 328. At this second step, nearly

“any race‐neutral reason” will suffice, “even if it is not a ‘per‐

suasive, or even plausible’ reason.” Coulter v. McCann, 484

F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.

765, 768 (1995)). Finally, at the third step, the trial court

“weigh[s] the evidence and determine[s] whether the ... non‐

discriminatory reason for the strike is credible or if the [oppo‐

nent of the strike] has shown purposeful discrimination.” Id.

At this step, the court evaluates the persuasiveness of the ten‐

dered race‐neutral justification and decides whether it is gen‐

uine or pretextual. See Miller‐El v. Dretke, (“Miller‐El II”), 545

U.S. 231, 239–41 (2005).  

The parties do not dispute that the first two steps of the

Batson inquiry were satisfied here. The district court con‐

cluded that Mr. Morgan had met his limited burden of mak‐

ing a prima facie showing of racial motivation, and the de‐

fendants do not challenge this finding. Similarly, Mr. Morgan

does not dispute the court’s conclusion that the defendants

provided a facially race‐neutral justification for striking Ju‐

rors Seven and Nine, i.e., that both jurors lived near or had

contacts with the block where Mr. Morgan was arrested. Con‐

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sequently, our focus is limited to the district court’s determi‐

nation that the defendants’ race‐neutral justification was gen‐

uine and not pretextual.

1.

In the third step of the Batson analysis, “the critical ques‐

tion ... is the persuasiveness of the [race‐neutral] justification

for [the] peremptory strike,” which “comes down

to ... credib[ility].” Miller‐El I, 537 U.S. at 338–39. In order to

assess counsel’s credibility, the trial court must “undertake a

sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence

of intent as may be available.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because this determination is in‐

herently fact intensive, it “lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s

province” and, therefore, “represents a finding of fact of the

sort accorded great deference on appeal.” Hernandez v. New

York, 500 U.S. 352, 364–65 (1991) (internal quotation marks

omitted); United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir.

2007) (“Only the district judge, who observed the voir dire

firsthand, can make that determination in the first instance.”).

Accordingly, we will reverse under step three only if the

court’s findings on the issue of credibility are clearly errone‐

ous. Taylor, 509 F.3d at 843.

Mr. Morgan contends that, in conducting the third step of

the Batson inquiry, the district court erred in two ways. First,

Mr. Morgan asserts that, as a procedural matter, the court

erred by failing to hold a separate evidentiary hearing for the

purpose of evaluating credibility. Second, Mr. Morgan chal‐

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lenges the court’s credibility determination on the merits, ar‐

guing that the court clearly erred in finding that the defend‐

ants’ proffered race‐neutral justification was genuine.

a. Batson Step Three Procedures

i. Necessity of Evidentiary Hearing

Mr. Morgan asserts that it was “procedurally improper”

for the district court not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the

issue of credibility.28 Importantly, Mr. Morgan does not con‐

tend, and the voir dire transcript does not indicate, that, at the

time he made his Batson objection, he requested and was de‐

nied the opportunity to present additional evidence of dis‐

criminatory motive. Rather, Mr. Morgan’s argument is that,

by failing to hold a hearing sua sponte at this juncture, the

court necessarily committed reversible error.

Our case law does not support Mr. Morgan’s position. At

Batson step three, the opponent of a peremptory strike is per‐

mitted to “offer additional evidence to demonstrate that the

proffered justification was pretextual.” Stephens I, 421 F.3d at

510. However, recognizing both that the scope of the credibil‐

ity inquiry is limited to an assessment of counsel’s honesty

and that “[t]here will seldom be much evidence bearing on

[the credibility] issue,” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, we have

held that “the procedures required in assessing counsel’s mo‐

tive are limited as well,” Lamon v. Boatwright, 467 F.3d 1097,

1101–02 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 (expressly

declining to “formulate particular procedures to be followed”

after a Batson objection). We therefore do not require that trial

                                                 

28 Appellant’s Br. 20.

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courts employ “evidentiary proceedings which would be un‐

likely to produce evidence bearing on counsel’s credibility.”

Lamon, 467 F.3d at 1102 (affirming denial of request to “call

stricken panelists as witnesses and question them during a

Batson hearing” because it “would not have shed light on

whether the prosecutor honestly believed” the race‐neutral rea‐

son (emphasis in original)); Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487,

491 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).29  

Here, Mr. Morgan “had the opportunity to discredit” the

defendants after they had provided their race‐neutral justifi‐

cation. Lamon, 467 F.3d at 1102. Because he did not offer any

additional evidence that would have necessitated a separate

credibility hearing—and because the district court was under

no affirmative obligation to conduct one in the absence of

such a request—there was no procedural error under Batson’s

third step.

ii. Necessity of Credibility Findings

Although our cases do not mandate an evidentiary hear‐

ing in all situations, the trial court is required to provide more

than a conclusory estimation of counsel’s credibility. Batson’s

third step represents the culmination of a framework “de‐

signed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences

that discrimination may have infected the jury selection pro‐

cess,” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (emphasis

                                                 

29 Cf. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2194, 2201 (2015) (rejecting argument

that it was procedurally improper for trial court to conduct credibility de‐

termination “outside the presence of the defense” because “there [was] no

reason to think that defense counsel could have pointed to” sufficient ev‐

idence to undermine the prosecutor’s credibility).

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added). Distinguishing the genuine from the racially pre‐

textual constitutes the “decisive question” in the analysis.

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. The trial court must, therefore, pro‐

vide us with something to review. Taylor, 509 F.3d at 845

(“Without the court’s explanation for upholding the

strike ... we have nothing to review.”); see also United States v.

Stephens (“Stephens II”), 514 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2008)

(“[D]eference is due only when a district court properly per‐

forms its task in the first instance.”). Indeed, as our colleagues

on the First Circuit have recognized,  

[i]ndicating [credibility] findings on the record

has several salutary effects. First, it fosters con‐

fidence in the administration of justice without

racial animus. Second, it eases appellate review

of a trial court’s Batson ruling. Most im‐

portantly, it ensures that the trial court has in‐

deed made the crucial credibility determination

that is afforded such great respect on appeal.

United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 1994).

There are two primary bases upon which a court may eval‐

uate the genuineness of a proffered race‐neutral justification.

First, a party may base its peremptory strike on subjective in‐

dicators, most commonly the demeanor of the juror in ques‐

tion. “Where the proffered race‐neutral reason for a strike is

limited to the juror’s demeanor,” the trial court may rely on

the demeanor of the strike’s proponent as well as “whether

the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited

the basis for the strike.” United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555,

559 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477); see also

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (“[T]he best evidence often will be

the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”).  

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Second, the trial court may consider additional, objective

evidence introduced to “demonstrate that the proffered justi‐

fication was pre‐textual or to otherwise establish that the per‐

emptory strike was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”

United States v. Corley, 519 F.3d 716, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2008)

(providing, as examples, evidence of a pattern of strikes

against a particular racial minority, disparate questioning

during voir dire, and comparative juror analysis); see also Ste‐

phens II, 514 F.3d at 711 (“Credibility may also be evaluated

by considering the offering party’s consistency in applying its

non‐discriminatory justification.”).

When the stated basis for a strike is predicated on subjec‐

tive evidence like the juror’s demeanor, we typically have

held that a trial court clearly errs by neglecting to state ex‐

pressly its credibility findings on the record. For example, in

United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009), the de‐

fendant objected under Batson to the prosecution’s exercise of

a peremptory strike based on a juror’s facial expression,

which “looked angry and not happy to be here,” and the dis‐

trict court overruled the objection “without comment on the

matter.” Id. at 661, 663. Relying on the Supreme Court’s deci‐

sion in Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), which held that

a reviewing court cannot presume that the trial court credited

a demeanor‐based rationale where the trial court simply al‐

lowed the strike without explanation, we explained that the

trial court’s failure to assess explicitly counsel’s motivation in

striking the juror created a “void in the record that d[id] not

allow us to affirm the denial.” Id. at 666. We held, therefore,

“that the district court clearly erred in denying the Batson

challenge without making findings regarding the credibility

of the proffered race‐neutral justification for the strike,” and

we remanded the case for further findings. Id.; see also Snyder,

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552 U.S. at 477 (noting that, particularly where the stated basis

for a strike “invoke[s] a juror’s demeanor (e.g., nervousness,

inattention), ... the trial court’s firsthand observations [are] of

even greater importance”); McCurdy v. Montgomery Cty., 240

F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The need for an explicit, on‐the‐

record analysis of each of the elements of a Batson challenge

is especially important when the purported race‐neutral jus‐

tification is predicated on subjective explanations like body

language or demeanor.”).30  

Where the trial court was presented objective, non‐de‐

meanor evidence that the stated rationale for a strike was ille‐

gitimate, our earlier cases exhibited an analysis tailored to the

record before us. For example, in United States v. Corley, 519

F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2008), the prosecution presented a nondis‐

criminatory basis for striking a juror, and the defendant ar‐

gued in response “that similarly‐situated white jurors were

treated differently.” Id. at 722. The trial court allowed the per‐

emptory strike but failed to articulate its reasoning. Id. at 722–

23. Affirming, we explained that  

[a]lthough it would be more helpful for the dis‐

trict courts in these Batson cases to explicitly

make credibility determinations, and perhaps

state on the record the basis for rejecting the

                                                 

30 As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[t]he circuits have disagreed on the ex‐

tent to which Snyder imposes an affirmative duty on the district court to

make record findings where the prosecutor has offered only a demeanor‐

based justification.” United States v. Thompson, 735 F.3d 291, 300 (5th Cir.

2013) (surveying circuit split and agreeing with Eleventh Circuit’s ap‐

proach “that Snyder does not require a district court to make record find‐

ings of a juror’s demeanor where the prosecutor justifies the strike based

on demeanor alone”).

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comparisons with similarly‐situated jurors,

there is no ambiguity in this record. The court

accepted the government’s argument, that de‐

termination is supported by the record, and it is

not clearly erroneous.

Id. at 723; see also U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp.,

Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he record ade‐

quately discloses a full Batson analysis, and we find that the

failure of the trial judge to articulate his analysis of step three

on the record did not constitute clear error.”). In United States

v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2007), on the other hand, we

reached the opposite conclusion. In that case, we observed

that “the defendants ha[d] made a strong case,” based on

comparative evidence, that the Government had exercised its

peremptory strike on a racially discriminatory basis. Id. at 845.

Nevertheless, because the record was “silent as to the district

court’s rationale for denying defendants’ Batson challenge,”

we remanded the case “for the limited purpose of supple‐

menting the record with [the court’s] findings about whether

the government’s stated reason for exercising a peremptory

challenge ... [was] credible.” Id. at 845–46.

Our recent decision in United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d

555 (7th Cir. 2011), made clear that, at bottom, we have a core

concern in all third‐prong Batson situations, no matter what

their particular circumstances. In Rutledge, the defendant

raised Batson objections to the prosecution’s peremptory

strikes of two African‐American venirepersons, and the pros‐

ecution offered two distinct race‐neutral justifications. The

prosecution’s reason for striking the first prospective juror

was that she exhibited an “agitated” and “frustrated” dispo‐

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No. 14‐3307 23

sition during voir dire; defense counsel disputed this de‐

meanor‐based rationale. Id. at 557. As to the second prospec‐

tive juror, the prosecution explained that the panelist had ex‐

pressed his own personal concern about being racially stere‐

otyped by other jurors, and defense counsel challenged this

rationale as pretextual. Id. The district court overruled both

Batson objections but failed to articulate its credibility deter‐

minations for either. Id. at 558.  

Addressing the demeanor‐based strike first, we explained,

building on McMath, that  

[t]he trial court must evaluate not only whether

the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discrimina‐

tory intent, but also whether the juror’s de‐

meanor can credibly be said to have exhibited

the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by

the prosecutor. These findings must be explicit;

without them there is a void that stymies appel‐

late review, gives us no finding of fact to which

we might defer, and ultimately precludes us

from affirming the denial of the Batson chal‐

lenge.

Id. at 560 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit‐

ted). We then applied this reasoning “with equal force” to the

non‐demeanor‐based second strike, explaining that in such

cases it was likewise “essential” that the trial court make an

express credibility determination. Id. at 561. In both situa‐

tions, we explained,  

if there is nothing in the record reflecting the

trial court’s decision, then there is nothing to

which we can defer. That is why the third step

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under Batson requires the court to weigh the evi‐

dence and determine whether the prosecution’s

nondiscriminatory reason for the strike is credi‐

ble or if the defense has shown purposeful dis‐

crimination.  

Id. at 559 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We therefore “conclude[d] that a

remand [was] necessary for the district court to make explicit

credibility findings for both jurors.” Id. at 560.

Given the “pivotalrole” that the trial court’s credibility de‐

termination plays in the proper functioning of the Batson

framework, Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, trial courts should state

fully their credibility determinations on the record so that

such findings may receive the substantial deference to which

they are entitled. Otherwise, “when we confront an eviden‐

tiary gap at step three,” we generally will not resolve the Bat‐

son issue without first remanding the case to “find out what

the district court perceived.” Rutledge, 648 F.3d at 560 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court, in its order denying a new trial,

considered explicitly and in detail the genuineness of the de‐

fendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory rationale—familiarity

with the block where Mr. Morgan was arrested. Specifically,

the court compared Jurors Nine and Seven, the jurors struck

by the defendants, to “similarly‐situated jurors who were per‐

mitted to serve on the” jury.31 Jurors Six and Nineteen, the

court explained, were African‐Americans who did not live ge‐

                                                 

31 R.108 at 5–6.

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No. 14‐3307 25

ographically close to the location of the arrest and were se‐

lected for the jury without challenge. Moreover, the remain‐

ing potential jurors all either “lived outside Chicago in vari‐

ous suburban municipalities” or lived in the city but “gave no

indication that they were familiar [with] the area where the

incident occurred.”32 The court therefore determined that the

defendants’ proffered rationale “only applied to the two pan‐

elists that were stricken.”33 Consequently, it found “no evi‐

dence tending to prove purposeful discrimination,” and it

concluded “that Defendants’ reasons for its peremptory

strikes, at the time they were initially challenged [were] cred‐

ible, honest, and race‐neutral.”34 We are satisfied that the

court’s analysis provides ample basis for us to afford signifi‐

cant deference to its credibility determination.  

Notably, the district court’s explanation came in its denial

of Mr. Morgan’s motion for a new trialratherthan during voir

dire. At the time Mr. Morgan raised his Batson objections, the

court said only that “[t]he defendants have already stated a

race‐neutral basis for exercising the peremptory chal‐

lenge ... which is familiarity with the neighborhood and hav‐

ing friends there. So I think that is a sufficient showing of a

non‐discriminatory basis for the peremptory challenge.”35 It

was not until Mr. Morgan filed a motion for a new trial that

                                                 

32 Id. at 6.

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 R.115‐1 at 51.

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the court actually articulated in full its rationale for finding

the race‐neutral justification credible.

We have not confronted this situation before. However,

the Sixth Circuit has held, on similar facts to the present case,

that a trial court’s posttrial articulation of its credibility deter‐

mination is sufficient. In McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240

F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001), the district court, during voir dire,

denied the plaintiff’s Batson challenge without comment. 240

F.3d at 520. In his motion for a new trial, the plaintiff restated

his Batson objection, and the court, in denying the motion, ex‐

plained that it agreed with the race‐neutral justification that

had been provided at the time of the peremptory strike. Id. at

521. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit “underscore[d] that the

district court’s initial reaction to [the plaintiff]’s Batson claim,

in which it perfunctorily accepted the County’s race‐neutral

explanation, did not conform to the requirement that the dis‐

trict court make expressed findings on each of the elements of

a Batson claim.” Id. at 521–22 (citation omitted). Nevertheless,

it held that because the court had “ultimately engaged in the

constitutionally required analysis,” it was appropriate to de‐

ferto its Batson findings. Id. at 522;see also United States v. Cecil,

615 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying McCurdy where the

district court initially denied Batson challenge in perfunctory

manner but went on to “hear[] additional argument and

ma[ke] its own findings with respect to the plausibility of the

government’s explanation”).

The approach of our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit to the

situation we now confront is, we note, compatible with our

usual approach in cases where on‐the‐record credibility find‐

ings are lacking; we remand the case and allow the trial court

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No. 14‐3307 27

to supplement the record.36 Because we are concerned solely

with the substance of the trial court’s credibility determina‐

tion, the timing of the explanation for its decision does not

bear on its adequacy.37 Nevertheless, we think it highly pref‐

erable that a trial court place its credibility analysis on the rec‐

ord at the time it initially rules on the objection. We therefore

agree with the Sixth Circuit that a trial court’s explanation in

disposing of a posttrial motion is sufficient in the situation be‐

fore us.

                                                 

36 See United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 2011) (remanding

based on district court’s denial of a Batson challenge “without making any

finding on the prosecutor’s credibility”); United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d

657, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (remanding based on district court’s “summary

denial” of Batson challenge in which it made no credibility findings);

United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding the case

“for the limited purpose of supplementing the record with” the district

court’s credibility findings).

37 Indeed, in the habeas context we have been willing to remand cases

based on inadequacies in the trial court’s Batson analysis decades after jury

selection. See,e.g., Hooper v. Ryan, 729 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (remand‐

ing for a credibility determination although “[i]t seems unlikely that this

can be done 32 years after the trial”); Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 965–66

(7th Cir. 2012) (remanding and noting that although “[w]e are well aware

that the crimes with which Harris was charged occurred almost 30 years

ago ... the passage of time is not a basis for overlooking the prosecutors’

violations of the Equal Protection Clause” (internal quotation marks omit‐

ted)); Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We therefore direct

the district court to, in its discretion, hold a hearing to reconstruct the pros‐

ecutor’s state of mind at the time of jury selection, or if the passage of nine

years since Jordan’s trial and other circumstances should have made such

a determination impossible or unsatisfactory, to order that the state grant

Jordan a new trial.”).

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In sum, we are convinced that the district court in this case

fulfilled its responsibilities under the Batson framework; we

therefore review its credibility determination under the famil‐

iar clear error standard.

b. Substantive Credibility Determination

Mr. Morgan contends that the district court clearly erred38

in finding that the defendants’ race‐neutral explanation for

striking Jurors Seven and Nine was “honest and credible” and

“not pretext for discrimination.”39 In Mr. Morgan’s view, this

determination was clearly erroneous because: (1) the defend‐

ants’ proffered nondiscriminatory rationale is inherently or

presumptively pretextual based on its racially disproportion‐

ate impact, and (2) the defendants’ differential treatment of

prospective jurors during voir dire provides sufficient evi‐

dence of their racially discriminatory purpose. We address

these contentions in turn, keeping in mind that “the ultimate

                                                 

38 In his brief, Mr. Morgan urges that “[t]he standard of review is de novo

as at the time of the strikes the District Court never made a record as to

the credibility of the defendants’ justifications.” Appellant’s Br. 7. The Su‐

preme Court has explained, however, that the credibility determination is

a “pure issue of fact,” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991), and

deference is “necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only

the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is

to make credibility determinations,” Miller‐El v. Cockrell (“Miller‐El I”), 537

U.S. 322, 339 (2003). This rationale for appellate deference applies with

equal force whether the trial court made its credibility determination at

the time of the objection or, as here, in a posttrial order.

39 R.108 at 5.

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No. 14‐3307 29

burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with,

and never shifts from,” Mr. Morgan. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.

i. Discriminatory Impact

Mr. Morgan first contends that the race‐neutral basis for

the defendants’ peremptory strikes—familiarity with the lo‐

cation of Mr. Morgan’s arrest—is inherently pretextual be‐

cause “the practical reality is this rationale would effectively

mean that Defendants would only strike African‐American

venirepersons due to the demographics of the South Side of

Chicago.”40  

At the outset, we note that Mr. Morgan’s position is diffi‐

cult to maintain in light of the Supreme Court’s pronounce‐

ment that disparate racial impact, although relevant, is alone

insufficient to establish purposeful discrimination under Bat‐

son. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359–60. Rather, “[p]roof of racially

discriminatory intent or purpose is required.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).41 Acknowledging this principle,

                                                 

40 Appellant’s Br. 10.

41 We note that some Batson claims involve the presentation of statistical

evidence concerning a party’s use of peremptory challenges as a means

through which the court may infer discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Hernan‐

dez, 500 U.S. at 363 (“[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be

inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is

true, that the [classification] bears more heavily on one race than another.”

(alterations in original) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242

(1976))); Harris, 680 F.3d at 951; see also Miller‐El I, 537 U.S. at 342 (“In this

case, the statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the

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Mr. Morgan invites our attention to United States v. Briscoe,

896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990). In Briscoe, an African‐American

venireperson testified on voir dire “that during the last five

years he had resided at three different addresses on the west

side of Chicago.” 896 F.2d at 1488. The Government sought to

peremptorily strike the panelist, arguing that all three ad‐

dresses were “geographically close” to the addresses of two

individuals scheduled to testify in the case and that it would

impair the Government’s interests to “allow[] a juror who

somehow may be personally familiar with, if not the people

involved, certainly the area involved where these events have

taken place.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The dis‐

trict court found this justification to be credible, and we af‐

firmed. Id. In doing so, we noted our “cognizan[ce] of the fact

that the west side of Chicago is predominantly black and that

exclusion of jurors based solely on their residence in this area

of the city could be a pretext for discrimination.” Id. We held,

however, that the Government’s explanation had gone “well

beyond a cursory statement that [the potential juror] resided

on the west side of Chicago” and had in fact “explicitly

stated” that his last three residences were “geographically

close to the addresses of” the scheduled witnesses. Id. at 1488–

89.

Mr. Morgan points to our brief aside in Briscoethat the “ex‐

clusion of jurors based solely on their residence ... could be a

pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 1488 (emphasis added). This

                                                 

prosecution acted with a race‐based reason when striking prospective ju‐

rors.”). Mr. Morgan has not provided any such empirical basis for his ar‐

gument.

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No. 14‐3307 31

language, he argues, places a heightened burden on “attor‐

ney[s] using residence as a rationale for striking a venireper‐

son” and, in this context at least, permits an inference of racial

motivation unless counsel provides a “juror specific” basis for

the strike.42 We cannot accept Mr. Morgan’s interpretation. In

Briscoe, we recognized that the Government had a genuine in‐

terest in removing venirepersons “personally familiar with, if

not the people involved, certainly the area involved.” 896 F.2d

at 1488. “[I]t is quite likely,” we said, “that [the potential juror]

might very well have been familiar with, if not [the witness]

herself, the individuals involved ... thus justifying the gov‐

ernment’s peremptory challenge.” Id. We therefore concluded

that the district court correctly accepted the Government’s

stated basis for striking the juror. We said nothing in Briscoe,

however, of imposing a heightened burden on parties seeking

to remove a venireperson on the basis of residency, nor could

we have, as such a burden would go inappropriately to the

accuracy of the rationale rather than the genuineness of the

motive.  

The district court in this case found that the defendants’

proffered race‐neutral reason, like the Government’s in Bris‐

coe, “went well beyond a cursory statement” concerning the

prospective jurors’residency, and, therefore, was “honest and

credible.”43 There is certainly an adequate basis for that find‐

ing. When Juror Nine was asked during voir dire whether she

                                                 

42 Appellant’s Br. 11.

43 R.108 at 5 (quoting United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.3d 1476, 1488–89 (7th

Cir. 1990)).

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32 No. 14‐3307

was familiar with the location of Mr. Morgan’s arrest, she re‐

sponded, “Yes, I am. ... I live not far away.”44 To the same

question, Juror Seven also answered in the affirmative, add‐

ing that she had “a couple of friends that live in that area.”45

The record shows that Mr. Morgan’s pretrial witness list in‐

cluded three individuals who were with him at 7746 South

Greenwood Avenue at the time of his arrest, two of whom

lived within a block of that address.46 Given their answers,

and the limited area occupied by a single city block, a signifi‐

cant possibility existed that one or both of the prospective ju‐

rors “might very well have been familiar with, if not [the wit‐

nesses themselves], the individuals involved” in Mr. Mor‐

gan’s arrest. Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1488;see also Dunham v. Frank’s

Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 1992) (af‐

firming denial of Batson challenge because “there was at least

the potential that [the prospective juror] may have been a

friend of a friend of the Plaintiffs” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).47 Indeed, it was this precise concern that counsel for

                                                 

44 R.115‐1 at 44.

45 Id. at 45.

46 R.56 at 13–14.

47 Mr. Morgan takes issue with defense counsel’s failure to inquire to

greater depth the extent of the two prospective jurors’ familiarity with the

area. Appellant’s Br. 14–15. In light of the already apparent potential for

juror bias, however, we see no reason to attach analytical significance to

counsel’s failure to pursue this line of questioning further. Cf. United States

v. Brown, 809 F.3d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 2016) (expressing “skeptic[ism] as to

whether the failure to ask a follow‐up question ... suggests pretext”).

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No. 14‐3307 33

the defendants “explicitly stated,” Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1489, to

the district court:

I think this case should be decided by people

that have no familiarity with the area or may

have contacts in any way.  

The evidence is going to show that the plain‐

tiff has a number of friends in that area, and

they were present. They were there, and [Juror

Nine] lives in that particular area, [and] may

have some knowledge through others of this

particular incident.[48]

Finally, we note that although familiarity with the block

may not have been sufficient to justify removing these pro‐

spective jurors for cause—indeed, the district court rejected

this rationale as “not enough to support a challenge for

cause”49—“[u]nlike a challenge for cause, a peremptory strike

need not be based on a strong or good reason, only founded

on a reason other than race.” United States v. Smallwood, 188

F.3d 905, 915 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omit‐

ted); accord Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (“[T]he prosecutor’s expla‐

nation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a chal‐

lenge for cause.”).  

                                                 

48 R.115‐1 at 49; see also id. at 50 (providing the same reason for striking

Juror Seven).

49 Id. at 49; see also id. at 50 (denying challenge for cause of Juror Seven

because “she hasn’t indicated that she knows any people particularly in‐

volved in the case” and “it is not enough to support a challenge for cause

based upon familiarity with the area”).

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ii. Differential Treatment  

Mr. Morgan next contends that differences in the defend‐

ants’ treatment of prospective jurors during jury selection es‐

tablishes that their facially neutral rationale for striking Jurors

Seven and Nine was merely a pretext for race. At Batson step

three, “[a]n opponent of a strike may rely on all relevant cir‐

cumstances to raise an inference of purposeful discrimina‐

tion.” Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 2012) (inter‐

nal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller‐El I, 537 U.S. at

339 (“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors,

[counsel’s] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improba‐

ble, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered ra‐

tionale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.”). For exam‐

ple, a pattern of differential questioning can show discrimina‐

tory intent when it indicates an effort to elicit disqualifying

answers from minority venirepersons. Miller‐El II, 545 U.S. at

255–60. Similarly, a “comparative juror analysis” showing

that the purported reason for striking African‐American pro‐

spective jurors was not equally applied to non‐African‐Amer‐

icans can constitute evidence of pretext. Harris, 680 F.3d at

953. Here, Mr. Morgan offers a litany of discrete comparisons

that he claims demonstrate the defendants’ underlying racial

motive during jury selection.50 Upon review of the record,

                                                 

50 We note that several of Mr. Morgan’s specific arguments concerning

differential questioning were not included in his motion for a new trial

before the district court and have been raised for the first time on appeal.

The defendants, however, do not argue waiver; they address each of

Mr. Morgan’s contentions on the merits. Accordingly, the defendants

have waived their waiver arguments, and we will address Mr. Morgan’s

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No. 14‐3307 35

however, we do not believe these examples are indicative of

purposeful discrimination.

Mr. Morgan first asserts that the defendants “target[ed]”

African‐American venirepersons for questioning during voir

dire.51 As evidence, Mr. Morgan relies on questions asked

only to Jurors Six and Nineteen, the two African‐American

prospective jurors who were eventually seated on the jury. To

Juror Six, counsel for the defendants asked several questions

regarding her level of education. To Juror Nineteen, counsel

asked whether her children were in school or employed;

when Juror Nineteen responded that her children were all of

adult age, counsel then pursued a line of questioning concern‐

ing their employment and education.  

We do not believe that these questions, when considered

in context, betray a discriminatory motive on the part of the

defendants. Counsel’s questions to Juror Six regarding her ed‐

ucation were posed in response to the prospective juror’s

statement that she worked with “medical information” as a

data entry clerk.52 Defense counsel emphasized medical train‐

ing and experience throughout voir dire, even peremptorily

striking a physical therapist; and Mr. Morgan’s medical rec‐

ords were in fact introduced at trial and discussed extensively

during closing arguments. As to Juror Nineteen, although it

is true that defense counsel did not question other venireper‐

                                                 

new arguments on the merits. See Riemer v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 148 F.3d

800, 804 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998).

51 Appellant’s Br. 13.

52 R.115‐1 at 36–37.

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sons to this degree of depth about their children, Juror Nine‐

teen was the only prospective juror who made clear during

voir dire that her children were of adult age. Without any‐

thing more, we decline to attribute invidious intent to the de‐

fendants based solely on this line of questioning. Finally, we

note that despite this additional probing, both Jurors Six and

Nineteen were ultimately seated on the jury. See United States

v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he fact that two

black jurors remained on the jury ... is a valid (if not disposi‐

tive) factor.”).

Mr. Morgan also invites our attention to the defendants’

questioning of Jurors Nine and Seven regarding their famili‐

arity with the location of the arrest, while Juror Twelve, a

non‐African‐American53 individual also from Chicago, was

not similarly questioned. See Miller‐El II, 545 U.S. at 241 (“If a

[party]’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies

just as well to an otherwise‐similar nonblack who is permitted

to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrim‐

ination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”). Again, how‐

ever, we find this difference unremarkable when examined in

context. Juror Twelve had revealed that his cousin formerly

served as Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago. Both

parties’ questioning of Juror Twelve focused on this fact.

Given the Corporation Counsel’s involvement in this case, we

see no reason to infer pretext from the defendants’ failure to

pursue other lines of questioning. See Brown, 809 F.3d at 375

                                                 

53 The racial composition of the venire was not stated on the record in the

district court, but the parties appear to agree that Juror Twelve was not

African‐American.

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(indicating “skeptic[ism] as to whether the failure to ask a fol‐

low‐up question ... suggests pretext” where the circum‐

stances of jury selection implied “that the government did not

want to interrupt the flow of the proceeding, not that it was

trying to deceive the court”).

Finally, Mr. Morgan contrasts the defendants’ peremptory

strike of Juror Seven, a security guard who “should have been

an ideal juror for defendants,” with their “significant effort to

rehabilitate” Juror Five,54 a white female who stated during

voir dire that she was friends with a police officer who had

told her stories about “people in Chicago of color.”55 The rec‐

ord will not support this argument. As we discussed previ‐

ously, the defendants provided a race‐neutral explanation for

striking Juror Seven—her familiarity with the 7700 block of

South Greenwood Avenue. With regard to Juror Five, after

Mr. Morgan challenged her for cause, the district court asked

defense counsel for a response, to which counsel replied,

“Judge, I think she indicated that despite what, she, you

know, has learned through her friend, she could be fair and

impartial to both sides in this particular case.”56 This is hardly

an “adamant defense” or a “significant effort to rehabili‐

tate.”57  

                                                 

54 Appellant’s Br. 17–19.

55 R.115‐1 at 36.

56 Id. at 48.

57 Appellant’s Br. 17, 19.

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We are satisfied that nothing in the voir dire record sug‐

gests that the defendants’ facially race‐neutral reason for

striking Jurors Seven and Nine was a pretext for race.

B. Trial Fairness

In addition to his Batson claim, Mr. Morgan also moved for

a new trial on the basis of what he believed to be seven dis‐

tinct errors committed by the district court. Mr. Morgan now

raises for our review only five of these issues.58 We review the

district court’s denial of Mr. Morgan’s motion for a new trial

for abuse of discretion. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d

632, 639 (7th Cir. 2012). We will reverse only if Mr. Morgan

can establish that the errors he alleges rendered his trial un‐

fair. See id.

1. Pretrial Matters

Mr. Morgan first contends that he was denied a fair trial

because, after the parties filed a joint pretrial order along with

several dozen motions in limine, the district court failed either

                                                 

58 The district court found that Mr. Morgan had waived four of the seven

alleged trial errors by failing to provide supporting authority and there‐

fore declined to address them. “Ordinarily, arguments not made in the

district court are waived on appeal.” Riemer, 148 F.3d at 804 n.4. However,

the defendants again have not argued that Mr. Morgan waived these is‐

sues by failing to develop them in the district court; rather, the defendants

address each of the five errors set forth in Mr. Morgan’s opening brief. We

therefore address these issues on their merits. See id.; supra note 50.

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to hold a pretrial conference or to rule on the pending mo‐

tions; the court instead chose to rule on the motions “during

the course of the trial ... as they are made.”59 Mr. Morgan ar‐

gues that, in doing so, the court “created the expectation in

the parties that its subsequent failure to address resulted in

prejudice.”60  

There is no requirement that a district court hold a pretrial

conference, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a), and courts have “broad

powers to determine the proper method of preparing a case

for trial,” Mizwicki v. Helwig, 196 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 1999)

(noting that a “court’s discretionary order should not be dis‐

turbed on review unless it is clear that no reasonable person

would rule as the district court judge did”). We see no basis

in the record for questioning the court’s decision to forego a

pretrial conference. With regard to the court’s deferral of its

motions in limine rulings until trial, we cannot accept

Mr. Morgan’s argument that this decision created an atmos‐

phere of “trial by surprise.”61 Indeed, a district court has con‐

tinuing discretion throughout the proceedings to alter earlier

rulings even when it rules on motions in limine before trial.

See Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013).

The district court’s resolution of these pretrial issues fits com‐

fortably within its broad discretion on such matters and did

not render Mr. Morgan’s trial unfair.

  

                                                 

59 R.115‐1 at 3–4.

60 Appellant’s Br. 27.

61 Id. at 28.

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2. Evidentiary Rulings

Mr. Morgan asks us to review two of the district court’s

evidentiary rulings. These rulings are entitled to “special def‐

erence,” and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Faruki, 803 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2015) (quot‐

ing Young v. James Green Mgmt., Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir.

2003)).

a.

Mr. Morgan first asserts that the district court abused its

discretion in allowing testimony regarding “the criminal

character of the neighborhood” in which Mr. Morgan was ar‐

rested.62 During trial, defense counsel sought to elicit testi‐

mony from one of the defendant officers, Sgt. Schulz, about

his familiarity with the location of Mr. Morgan’s arrest and

the “sorts of experiences [the officer had] had in that block.”63

Mr. Morgan’s counsel objected, and the district court over‐

ruled, stating that “[w]hat the officers reasonably believed

under the circumstances is relevant.”64 At a sidebar, Mr. Mor‐

gan’s counsel argued that such testimony was irrelevant, prej‐

udicial, and would be used by the jury to draw an impermis‐

sible propensity inference. The court again overruled the ob‐

jection and allowed Sgt. Schulz to testify as follows:

Q. Sergeant, I think when we took that break I

was asking you what your general knowledge

                                                 

62 Id. at 25.

63 R.115‐1 at 382.

64 Id.

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or experience is relating to 7700 South Green‐

wood. So if you could please just tell the ladies

and gentlemen of the jury?

A. In my ten‐plus years in the 6th District as a

sergeant of police, my experiences with the

block, numerous ... narcotics calls, numerous

men with a gun or person with a gun calls, foot

chases, search warrants. Things of that nature.

Q. So it’s fair to say that your previous experi‐

ences were relatively similar to the events that

occurred on May 2nd, 2011, is that correct?

    [Mr. Morgan’s counsel]: Objection.

    THE COURT: Overruled.

BY THE WITNESS:

A. Yes, sir.[65]

Because his brief does not cite specific rules of evidence, it

is not clear whether Mr. Morgan believes that the district

court should have excluded Sgt. Schulz’s testimony under

Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 404, or both. We need not define

the precise contours of Mr. Morgan’s argument, however, be‐

cause we conclude that the officer’s testimony was admissible

under both Rules 403 and 404.66

                                                 

65 Id. at 384.

66 Cf. United States v. Faruki, 803 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting appel‐

lant’s argument that evidence “was unduly prejudicial because [it] impli‐

cate[d] propensity evidence concerns” but limiting its analysis to Rule 403

framework because appellant “d[id] not make an explicit Rule 404 argu‐

ment”).

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Under Rule 403, a “court may exclude relevant evidence if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger

of ... unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here, Sgt. Schulz’s

testimony about his own decade of experience policing the

block in which Mr. Morgan was arrested had clear probative

value in understanding the officer’s evaluation of the specific

facts available to him at the time of the encounter with

Mr. Morgan. See, e.g., United States v. Zambrana, 428 F.3d 670,

675 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Police officers are entitled to make assess‐

ments of situations ‘in light [of their] specialized training and

familiarity with customs of the area’s inhabitants.’” (altera‐

tion in original) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,

276 (2002))); see also United States v. Flood, 965 F.2d 505, 510–11

(7th Cir. 1992) (“In establishing that probable cause existed for

an arrest or a search, law‐enforcement officers commonly tes‐

tify that their experience indicates a certain behavior pattern

or a particular combination of circumstances is indicative of—

as opposed to proof of—criminal activity.”).  

The question before us then is whether the court’s admis‐

sion of Sgt. Schulz’s testimony unfairly prejudiced Mr. Mor‐

gan. “Evidence is unduly prejudicial if it creates a genuine

risk that the emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational

behavior, and the risk is disproportionate to the probative

value of the offered evidence.” United States v. Loughry, 660

F.3d 965, 974 (7th Cir. 2011). The district court did not abuse

its discretion in determining that Sgt. Schulz’s testimony

would not have such an effect here; there was nothing “inher‐

ently emotional or incendiary” about the officer’s summation

of his own experiences policing the block. United States v.

Strong, 485 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 2007). By contrast, this in‐

formation was central to evaluating the lawfulness of the stop

under the Fourth Amendment. See Venson v. Altamirano, 749

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F.3d 641, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding officer’s testimony re‐

garding experience in neighborhood not prejudicial “to the

extent it addressed how [the arresting officers] would have

perceived Venson’s behavior at the time of his arrest”).

Similarly, Sgt. Schulz’s testimony certainly did not consti‐

tute impermissible character evidence. Rule 404(a) “estab‐

lishes the general proposition that evidence of a person’s

character or a trait of a character is not admissible for the pur‐

pose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular

occasion.” United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir.

2000). This prohibition, however, applies only to “evi‐

dence ... offered ‘to prove that on a particular occasion the

person acted in accordance with the character or trait.’”

United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 293 (7th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1)). Here, Sgt. Schulz’s testi‐

mony was not offered to establish that Mr. Morgan was acting

in conformity with a personal character trait. Instead, it was

introduced so that the jurors would understand the legally

relevant experience through which the officer would have fil‐

tered the facts available at the time he encountered Mr. Mor‐

gan. See id. (holding that testimony was not propensity evi‐

dence because it was introduced to show “subjective state of

mind”).

b.

Mr. Morgan also submits that the district court permitted

the defendants to “intentionally violate[] their own motion in

limine ... regarding probable cause,” thereby depriving him

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44 No. 14‐3307

of a fair trial.67 Prior to trial, the defendants filed a motion in

limine requesting that the district court bar evidence that the

state court had found “no probable cause” to prosecute

Mr. Morgan on the charge of possession of a controlled sub‐

stance.68 During trial, Mr. Morgan called the watch com‐

mander on the night of the arrest, CPD Cpt. Ruth Wedster, to

testify. On cross‐examination, Cpt. Wedsterreferenced “prob‐

able cause,” and Mr. Morgan’s counsel immediately objected

on the ground that “probable cause” was the subject of de‐

fendants’ pending motion in limine.69 Mr. Morgan’s counsel

moved to strike Cpt. Wedster’s statement, and the district

court sustained the motion and instructed the jury to “disre‐

gard the last statement.”70 The court exercised sound judg‐

ment in its response to Mr. Morgan’s objection. Nothing more

was required. See United States v. Bonner, 302 F.3d 776, 782 (7th

Cir. 2002) (“There is a very strong presumption that a jury has

understood and followed the trial court’s limiting instruction,

erasing the improper influence that might have been caused

by the stricken statement.”).

3. Jury Instruction Matters

Mr. Morgan next urges that the district court committed

multiple errors related to instructing the jury. First, he argues

                                                 

67 Appellant’s Br. 29–30.

68 R.57 at 10.

69 R.115‐1 at 478–79.  

70 Id.

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that the court abused its discretion when it allowed the de‐

fendants to offer new jury instructions after the close of evi‐

dence. At the conclusion of trial, the court directed the parties

to confer before the next court date and then provide a set of

agreed instructions and jury forms. When the court recon‐

vened, the parties had reached agreement on roughly thirty

instructions but had remaining disputes on another fifteen,

and the court heard arguments on the disputed instructions.

During argument, Mr. Morgan objected to one of the defend‐

ants’ proposed instructions on the ground that it “was just

proposed last night,” to which the court responded,

“you’ve ... had months to work on this,” and overruled the

objection.71  

Mr. Morgan argues only that the defendants’ proposed in‐

struction was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

51(a)(1), which states: “At the close of the evidence or at any

earlier reasonable time that the court orders, a party may file

and furnish to every other party written requests for the jury

instructions it wants the court to give.” Because the proposed

instruction was submitted after the close of evidence, Mr. Mor‐

gan contends that the defendants were limited to “fil[ing] re‐

quests for instructions on issues that could not reasonably

have been anticipated by an earlier time that the court set for

requests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(a)(2)(A). Mr. Morgan’s timeliness

argument, however, ignores Rule 51(a)(2)(B), which allows a

party, “with the court’s permission,” to submit “untimely re‐

quests for instructions on any issue.” Id. 51(a)(2)(B). In any

event, Mr. Morgan does not explain how the court’s ruling

caused him prejudice. See Johnson v. General Bd. of Pension &

                                                 

71 Id. at 551–52.

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Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 732

(7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that Rule 51(b) error was harmless

where appellant “ha[d] not argued, let alone shown, that

the ... error caused her independent prejudice”).

Mr. Morgan next asserts that the district court wrongly de‐

clined to give the parties’ agreed upon response to a question

posed by the jury. During the second day of jury delibera‐

tions, the jury sent a note asking whether, in the context of an

investigatory stop, it is necessary for an officer to reasonably

suspect an individual of “being connected with a crime or

misdemeanor ... having committed a crime or misde‐

meanor ... having information regarding a crime or misde‐

meanor [or] ... intending to commit a crime or misde‐

meanor[.]”72 The parties submitted to the court an

agreed‐upon answer: “With respect to reasonable suspicion,

you must find that the defendant ... had reasonable suspicion

that the plaintiff had committed or was about to commit a

crime.”73 The court, however, believed that the response was

not an accurate expression of the law and declined to give it.

The court instead gave the following instruction:

An investigative stop is a brief detention which

gives police officers a chance to verify or dispel

well‐founded suspicions that a person has been,

is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.

Permissible encounters between police officers

and citizens are not limited to situations involv‐

ing possible criminal activity, but also include

                                                 

72 Id. at 666.

73 Id. at 667.

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situations in which persons may need help or

are in danger of harming themselves or others.

... In determining whether particular cir‐

cumstances rise to the level of a reasonable sus‐

picion, courts must look—must take into con‐

sideration the modes or patterns of operations

of certain kinds of law‐breakers which allow

trained officers to draw inferences and make de‐

ductions that might well elude an untrained

person.[74]

Mr. Morgan’s counsel objected that the jury had already been

instructed on reasonable suspicion and that the court’s in‐

struction “elaborates on things that aren’t really pertinent to

the question that the jury asked” and “goes far beyond what

they have already been instructed on.”75 The court overruled

the objection and gave its own response. In his brief, Mr. Mor‐

gan submits that the court’s supplemental instruction “was

overly broad, biased, and unnecessary” and that “[t]his was a

close case.”76 We review the court’s response to the jury’s

question for abuse of discretion. United States v. Danford, 435

F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005). In so doing, we ask: “(1) whether

the instructions as a whole fairly and adequately treat the is‐

sues; (2) whether the supplemental instruction is a correct

statement of the law; and (3) whether the district court an‐

swered the jury’s questions specifically.” Id. at 688.

                                                 

74 Id. at 668.

75 Id. at 670.

76 Appellant’s Br. 33.

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The district court’s supplemental instruction accurately

stated the law and addressed directly the jury’s questions.

When read in conjunction with the original jury instruction

regarding investigatory stops and reasonable suspicion,77 the

court’s response fairly and adequately treated the issue. We

therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

in giving its supplemental instruction in lieu of the parties’

agreed upon response.  

4. Cumulative Error

Finally, Mr. Morgan urges that the cumulative effect of

the errors that he alleges deprived him of a fair trial. Because

we believe that the district court exercised sound judgment

in its rulings on all of these matters, we similarly conclude

that Mr. Morgan’s cumulative error argument is without

                                                 

77 The original instruction stated:

An investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth

Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion. Police

officers are justified in conducting a brief investigatory

stop if an officer is able to point to specific and articulable

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from

those facts, reasonably warrant the stop.

Reasonable suspicion is a common sense, nontech‐

nical concept that deals with the factual and practical con‐

siderations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not

legal technicians, act. It involves probabilities and does

not always involve hard certainties, and therefore the to‐

tality of the circumstances must be taken into account. A

reasonable, articulable suspicion requires more than a

hunch but less than probable cause.

R.115‐1 at 644–45.

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merit. See United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 942 (7th Cir.

2008).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

AFFIRMED

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