Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-03845/USCOURTS-ca3-14-03845-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-3845

___________

KAREEM HASSAN MILLHOUSE,

Appellant,

v.

JESSICA SAGE; HOLTZAPLE; WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; MINK; 

O’SHANNESSY; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; UNITED STATES

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(M.D. Pa. Civ. Action No. 14-cv-01055)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 6, 2016

Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 11, 2016)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Kareem Hassan Millhouse, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order 

of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the 

judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.

In 2014, Millhouse filed a civil rights action in District Court against the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons and prison employees claiming the denial of mental health treatment. 

Millhouse sought to proceed IFP. The District Court denied the IFP motion on the 

grounds that Millhouse has “three strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and he 

had not shown that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury as required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice to 

refiling if Millhouse paid the court filing fee and denied Millhouse’s subsequent motion 

for reconsideration. Millhouse did not pay the fee and filed the present appeal.1 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Deutsch v. United States, 67 

F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995). Our standard of review is plenary. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 

F.3d 83, 85 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 

F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).

The “three strikes” rule prohibits a prisoner from proceeding IFP in a civil action 

or on appeal if, on three or more prior occasions, he has brought an action or appeal while 

incarcerated or detained that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Millhouse argues on appeal that he 

 

1We allowed Millhouse to proceed IFP on appeal because, contrary to the District Court’s 

decision, it did not appear that he has three strikes for purposes of § 1915(g). 

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satisfies the imminent danger exception, but he must have three strikes before that 

question is presented. 

We have held that “a strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the entire action or 

appeal is (1) dismissed explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a 

claim’ or (2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that is limited solely to 

dismissals for such reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013). We 

reasoned in Byrd that the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s purpose is best served by an 

approach that does not open the door to more litigation surrounding § 1915(g). Id. We 

declined to adopt an approach allowing courts to consider the nature of a dismissal and 

determine whether the dismissal fits within the language of § 1915(g). Id.

Appellees argue in their brief that the District Court did not err in denying 

Millhouse’s motion to proceed IFP because Millhouse has three strikes and is not in 

imminent danger of serious physical harm. Appellees contend, and the District Court 

found below, that the dismissal of Millhouse’s complaint in Milhouse v. Bledsoe, M.D. 

Pa. Civ. No. 10-cv-00053, counts as a strike.2 We agree. The District Court’s decision in 

that case reflects that the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

 

2Millhouse has spelled his last name “Milhouse” in court filings. Prison records reflect 

the spelling “Millhouse.” 

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complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The dismissal satisfies 

both categories of the rule in Byrd.

We disagree, however, with Appellees and the District Court that our dismissal of 

Millhouse’s appeal in Millhouse v. Levi, C.A. No. 07-4048, counts as a strike. Our 

opinion reflects that we dismissed this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because it lacked “legal merit.” We held in Byrd that the dismissal of an 

appeal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) because it was “without merit” does not count as a strike 

because it does not satisfy either category of our rule. Byrd, 715 F.3d at 126–27. 

Similarly, the dismissal at issue here does not count as a strike because the terms 

“frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to state a claim” were not used to dismiss the appeal in 

its entirety, and § 1915(e)(2)(B) is not limited to dismissals on these bases. See id. As 

noted above, we may not consider the nature of the dismissal and whether it fits 

§ 1915(g).

Appellees also contend that a District Court dismissal of Millhouse’s complaint in 

Milhouse v. Arbasak, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 07-cv-01442, counts as a strike. We disagree. 

The defendants in that case moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) 

and 12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court granted 

the defendants’ motion. The District Court ruled that Millhouse had not exhausted his 

administrative remedies for some of his claims and dismissed these claims without 

prejudice. The District Court dismissed Millhouse’s exhausted claims with prejudice, 

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stating that his claims failed as a matter of law and/or that his allegations failed to state a 

claim for relief.

A “dismissal based on a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies does 

not constitute a PLRA strike, unless a court explicitly and correctly concludes that the 

complaint reveals the exhaustion defense on its face and the court then dismisses the 

unexhausted complaint for failure to state a claim.” Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 460 

(3d Cir. 2013), abrogated in part by Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). 

In the case relied upon by Appellees, the District Court did not explicitly conclude that 

the complaint revealed the exhaustion defense on its face. The Court looked at the 

evidence submitted by both parties and ruled that the record contradicted Millhouse’s 

allegation that he was precluded from pursuing his remedies. It also did not explicitly 

dismiss the unexhausted part of the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court 

granted the defendants’ motion—which was brought pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 

12(b)(6) and sought, in the alternative, summary judgment—without saying which of 

these grounds formed the basis for its decision. As a result, we conclude that this case 

does not satisfy the rule in Ball for counting as a strike a dismissal for failure to exhaust. 

It is thus unnecessary to consider Appellees’ additional argument that a dismissal without 

prejudice (as opposed to with prejudice) for failure to exhaust counts as a strike, although 

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we note that Appellees’ position appears to be in conflict with Ball. See Ball, 726 F.3d at 

460 n.17.3 

The District Court relied on decisions in other actions and appeals brought by 

Millhouse in finding that he has three strikes, but these cases do not qualify as strikes.

See Millhouse v. Arbasak, C.A. Nos. 09-2709 and 09-2858 (summarily affirming 

decision below); Milhouse v. Levi, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 09-cv-05363 (granting summary 

judgment on unexhausted claims and dismissing exhausted claim for failure to 

state a claim); Milhouse v. Jordan, M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 09-cv-1365 (granting motion for 

summary judgment). Appellees do not argue otherwise. 

Because Millhouse does not have three strikes for purposes of § 1915(g), he was 

not required to show that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury in 

order to proceed IFP in District Court. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the 

District Court and remand for further proceedings.

 

3 The dismissal of the exhausted claims does not bear on our analysis. In order for a 

strike to accrue, a case must be dismissed in its entirety for one of the enumerated 

grounds. See Byrd, 715 F.3d at 126. The failure of the unexhausted claims to fall within 

one of those grounds is therefore dispositive. Additionally, we disagree with any 

contention by Appellees that our decision in Millhouse v. Arbasak, C.A. Nos. 09-2709 

and 09-2858, summarily affirming the District Court’s order, supports the conclusion that 

the District Court’s dismissal counts as a strike because we characterized the order as a 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. The question whether the dismissal counted as a strike was not 

before us.

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