Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03097/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-03097-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY WAYFER, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION,

a Washington Corporation; DOE 

1 (STORE MANAGER); and DOES 

2-50, INCLUSIVE

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-03097-JAM-AC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISQUALIFY PLAINTIFF’S 

COUNSEL

Before the Court is Costco Wholesale Corp.’s (“Defendant”) 

motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel. See Mot., ECF No. 5. 

Johnny Wayfer (“Plaintiff”) opposes. See Opp’n, ECF No. 6. 

Defendant replied, though it failed to comply with the Court’s 

order regarding filing requirements. See Reply, ECF No. 8; Order 

re Filing Requirements, ECF No. 2-2. For the following reasons, 

Defendant’s motion is DENIED.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Superior Court of 

California, County of San Joaquin. See Notice of Removal, ECF 

1This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for January 7, 2025.

Case 2:24-cv-03097-JAM-AC Document 15 Filed 01/13/25 Page 1 of 7
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No. 1. Defendant then timely removed the case to federal court 

under diversity jurisdiction. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441. 

This controversy arises out of Plaintiff’s slip and fall 

while at Defendant’s store. See Notice of Removal at 2. 

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for negligence and premises 

liability. See id. 

Defendant now moves to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel, 

Downtown L.A. Law Group (“DTLA”). See Mot. Defendant argues 

that Anthony Werbin, a DTLA attorney who previously represented

Defendant, has not been timely and effectively screened. See id.

at 1-2. Plaintiff counters that Mr. Werbin is not affiliated 

with this case and has been screened. See Opp’n at 4-5. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Motions for disqualification of counsel are governed by 

state law. In re County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th 

Cir. 2000). California law seeks to “protect the 

confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship,” and 

prohibits attorneys from accepting “employment adverse to the 

. . . former client” without the former client’s written consent 

if the attorney “has obtained confidential information material 

to the employment.” People ex rel. Dep’t of Corps. v. SpeeDee 

Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1146 (1999) (quoting 

Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 3–310(E)). A “former client may seek 

to disqualify a former attorney from representing an adverse 

party by showing the former attorney actually possesses 

confidential information adverse to the former client.” H.F. 

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Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Bros., 229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1452

(1999). 

“Once the moving party in a motion for disqualification has 

established that an attorney is tainted with confidential 

information, a rebuttable presumption arises that the attorney 

shared that information with the attorney’s law firm. The 

burden then shifts to the challenged law firm to establish that 

the practical effect of formal screening has been achieved. The 

showing must satisfy the trial court that the tainted attorney 

has not had and will not have any involvement with the 

litigation, or any communication with attorneys or employees 

concerning the litigation, that would support a reasonable 

inference that the information has been used or disclosed.” 

Kirk v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 183 Cal. App. 4th 776, 809-10 

(2010) (cleaned up).

The disqualification of counsel is “generally disfavored 

and should only be imposed when absolutely necessary.” Concat 

LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F.Supp.2d 796, 814 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 

see also Sharp v. Next Ent. Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 410, 424 

(2008). 

B. Request for Judicial Notice

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a district court may 

take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). A court “may take notice 

of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct 

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relation to matters at issue.” Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 

983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of 

other court proceedings, declarations, and complaints filed by 

Mr. Werbin when he represented Defendant. See Request for 

Judicial Notice, ECF No. 5-1. Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s 

request in its entirety, stating that the Court can take 

judicial notice only for the existence of these documents, not 

for the truth of the matters asserted therein. See Plaintiff’s 

Opposition to Judicial Notice, ECF No. 6-1. 

Because all requested documents “have a direct relation to 

matters at issue” in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

request in its entirety. See U.S. Ex. Rel. Robinson Rancheria 

Citizens Council v. Boreno, Inc., 917 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 

1992). However, as Plaintiff points out, the Court takes 

judicial notice only of the existence of these documents, not of 

the truth asserted in them. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon 

Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010).

C. Disqualification

The Court assumes arguendo that Defendant has met its 

burden of demonstrating a “substantial relationship” between 

this case and the cases in which Mr. Werbin represented 

Defendant. See Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases, 30 Cal. App. 

5th at 617. The Court therefore focuses on whether DTLA has 

screened Mr. Werbin. 

While the “elements of an effective screen” vary, two 

elements are essential: (1) the screen must be timely imposed 

before a court’s order on the disqualification motion; and 

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(2) the firm must impose “preventive measures to guarantee that 

information will not be conveyed.” Kirk, 183 Cal. App. 4th at

810. Other elements of a screen include the physical separation 

of attorneys, prohibitions on discussing confidential matters, 

established rules preventing access to confidential information, 

procedures preventing a disqualified attorney from sharing in 

the profits from the representation, and continuing education in 

professional responsibility. Id. at 810-11. 

Based on the evidence provided, DTLA has met its burden of 

showing that it has an effective screening in place. Mr. Werbin 

has never been assigned to this case. Declaration of Anthony

Werbin ¶ 14, ECF No. 6-4. He does not discuss cases concerning 

Defendant with other attorneys at DTLA. Id. He also will not 

share in any of the profits from DTLA’s representation of this 

matter. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant provides no evidence contradicting 

these statements.

Most importantly, Mr. Werbin cannot access any documents 

related to this case because DTLA implemented a software change 

in December 2021 that prohibits him from accessing any cases 

that involve Defendant. Id. ¶ 16. The only crack in this 

screen that Defendant mentions is that Mr. Werbin was 

inadvertently listed as counsel of record for a case involving 

Defendant in 2024, but even then he was not able to access any 

documents or information related to that matter. See id. ¶ 23; 

Mot. at 6-7. Another DTLA attorney, Alex Vandenberg, declares 

that he was the counsel of record for that case involving 

Defendant, and that his name and Mr. Werbin’s were mistakenly 

switched by the administrative employee who filed the 

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complaints. See Declaration of Alex Vandenberg ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 

6-2. Notably, DTLA took disciplinary action against this 

administrative employee for her mistake because it created the 

appearance of an ethical breach, and DTLA confirmed that—despite 

the mislabeling of counsel of record on the court filing—Mr. 

Werbin did not have access to the case file or any related 

documents. See Declaration of Amira Rezkallah ¶¶ 8-10, ECF No. 

6-3. 

Because these preventive measures were implemented before

this litigation started, DTLA has shown that “the practical 

effect of formal screening has been achieved” such that Mr. 

Werbin “has not had and will not have any involvement with the 

litigation, or any communication with attorneys or employees 

concerning the litigation.” See Kirk, 183 Cal. App. 4th at 810.

D. Sanctions for Failure to Comply with the Court’s Order

Defendant’s Reply exceeded the Court’s page limit. See

Order re Filing Requirements at 1. Defendant’s Reply was ten

pages, and the filing requirements limit this brief to five pages 

and call for sanctions of $50 per page exceeding the limit. See

id.; Reply. Local Rule 110 authorizes the Court to impose 

sanctions for “failure of counsel or of a party to comply with

. . . any order of the Court.” Therefore, Defendant’s counsel, 

Nathaniel Dunn, is ordered to pay $250.00 to the Clerk of the 

Court.

III. ORDER

Because the Court finds that DTLA has imposed a timely and 

effective screen, Defendant’s motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s 

counsel is DENIED.

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It is further ordered that, within ten (10) days of this 

Order, Nathaniel Dunn shall pay sanctions of $250.00 to the Clerk 

of the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2025

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