Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01756/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01756-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLAKE SMITH, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE )

COMPANY, INC., et al., )

)

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-1756 OWW/DLB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AND

SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION WITH

PREJUDICE AS PREEMPTED BY

L.M.R.A. § 301 (Doc. 11) 

Plaintiff Blake Smith has filed a Complaint for Wrongful

Termination. Defendants are Pacific Bell Telephone Company,

Inc., AT&T Communications of California, Inc., SBC Telecom, Inc.,

Communications Workers of America Local 9333 Union, AFL-CIO,

Communications Workers of America District 9 Union, AFL-CIO,

Shane Spencer, and Alan Brown.

Defendants Pacific Bell Telephone Company, Inc., AT&T

Communications of California, Inc., SBC Telecom, Inc. Shane

Spencer and Alan Brown move to dismiss the First and Second

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The Complaint also alleges causes of action for breach of the 1

collective bargaining agreement, breach of the duty of fair

representation, fraud, and defamation.

In addition, Defendants move to dismiss the First and Second 2

Causes of Action against Shane Spencer and Alan Brown on the ground

that neither individual is a party to any contract with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff does not respond to this ground for dismissal.

Accordingly, Plaintiff concedes that dismissal of these causes of

action against Defendants Spencer and Brown is required.

2

Causes of Action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, on the ground that they are preempted by Section

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §

185. This motion is joined by Defendant Communications Workers 1

of America Local 933 Union, AFL-CIO, and by Defendant

Communications Workers of America District 9 Union AFL-CIO.2

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED.

A. Background.

In its General Allegations, the Complaint alleges in

pertinent part:

11. From on or about September 15, 1997 to

on or about November 22, 2005, Plaintiff was

employed, pursuant to both a written and oral

employment agreement, by Defendants, PAC

BELL, INC., AT&T, INC. AND SBC, INC. AND DOES

1 through 25, as, among other positions, a

cable marker. Plaintiff and Defendants

further entered into a yearly bonus agreement

on or about January 1, 2005, including

subsequent modifications based on

performance.

12. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff

performed his duties and obligations under

the employment agreement referenced above,

and Defendants, and each of them, knew

Plaintiff had fulfilled all of the duties and

conditions under the agreement.

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The First Cause of Action of the Complaint is for breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against all

Defendants and alleges in pertinent part:

15. The employment agreement referred to

above contained an implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, which obligated

Defendants to perform the terms and

conditions of the agreement fairly and in

good faith and to refrain from doing any act

that would prevent or impede Plaintiff from

performing any and all of the conditions of

the contract that he agreed to perform, or

any act that would deprive Plaintiff of the

benefits of the contract.

16. Plaintiff performed all the duties and

conditions of the employment agreement.

17. Defendants knew that Plaintiff had

fulfilled all his duties and conditions under

the contract.

18. On or about November 22, 2005,

Plaintiff’s employment was terminated by

Defendants because, the defendants alleged,

without proof, that based solely on GPS

technology that the Defendant had lied about

dropping his keys at the rear of the SBC

Truck/Van.

19. Specifically, on or about October 17,

2005, Plaintiff locked the door on the cab of

the PAC BELL, SBC, or AT&T (hereinafter ‘SBC,

Truck/Van’) vehicle with his key to protect

his work equipment including a laptop

computer and personal valuables which

included the Plaintiff’s checkbook, car keys,

house keys and wallet, which were in his

backpack. It was necessary to use the key

because the SBC, Truck’s/Van’s are not

equipped with Power Door locks or a Solenoid

for a push button mechanism on a key ring. 

The equipment is very Low-Tech.

20. Plaintiff maintains that he dropped his

keys at the rear of his SBC Truck/Van after

grabbing necessary equipment. The Plaintiff

did not hear the keys hitting the pavement

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because the area in which he was working was

not yet developed. It was all unpaved dirt

in a new housing development. The Plaintiff

marked cables to make sure that cables were

not accidentally dug up or cut in the process

of this development. The Plaintiff then

attempted to mark cables for his employer,

which was part of the duties he was expected

to perform within the course of his

employment ....

21. Shortly thereafter, within a matter of

seconds, the Plaintiff later determined that

his keys fell out of his pocket and to the

unpaved ground. The Plaintiff wore loose

fitting jeans in order to squat down to mark

the cables and to be more effective and

efficient at his job. The Plaintiff then saw

a white male ride by him on a bicycle. (The

Plaintiff now suspect that this white male

was following PAC BELL/SBC/ATT&T employees to

steal equipment, this will be explained in

greater detail as the case progresses.)

22. The Plaintiff proceeded to carry his

cable marking equipment approximately 150-200

feet to the cable location and in so doing he

heard and then witnessed some activity by his

SBC, Truck/Van. The activity was as follows.

23. A White Male was seen near his bicycle

squatting near the ground at the rear of the

Truck/Van. Plaintiff witnessed a white male,

which the authorities will later determine to

be an ex-SBC employee, reach down at the rear

of the truck and pick up a shining object,

the keys, from the ground. This same

individual unlocked the truck and proceeded

to drive away while Plaintiff was

approximately 150-200 feet away servicing and

marking cables.

24. Plaintiff gave chase to apprehend the

vehicle but due to his distance and the ever

increasing speed of the moving truck he was

unable to close the distance between him and

the SBC AT&T Truck/Van.

25. Plaintiff immediately contacted the

authorities to apprehend the suspect and the

truck and the authorities recovered the

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vehicle unharmed with the exception of a

missing laptop computer. The Plaintiff’s

backpack with his checkbook was still in the

vehicle.

26. On October 17, 2005, Plaintiff and JOHN

MATERANGELO, former union shop steward,

overheard a cell phone conversation between

Plaintiff’s Supervisor’s [sic] Defendants

SHANE SPENCER and ALAN BROWN that SPENCER was

going to prove by Global Positioning

Satellite (hereinafter ‘GPS’) that the

Plaintiff was lying. SHANE SPENCER

apparently did not like the Plaintiff because

of previous reports that were made about

working and safety conditions. The Plaintiff

was continually subjected to a Hostile work

environment and he had to seek medical

attention for the stress that was placed on

him.

27. PAC BELL, SBC and AT&T fired the

Plaintiff purportedly on the basis of the GPS

tracking technology. PAC BELL, AT&T and SBC

and CWA had a written agreement which was

distributed to all employees and the

plaintiff as an Intended Third Party

Beneficiary of said agreement, under which it

was not to fire employees solely based on GPS

tracking technology. Despite this written

agreement the Plaintiff was fired purportedly

for lying about the location of his keys.

28. Private GPS is simply not accurate

enough to determine where one’s keys are in

relation to a vehicle. Private GPS can only

track up to 10 meters or 33 feet out of

safety concerns over government officials.

29. The Plaintiff further alleges and

intends to prove, the Defendants [sic] GPS

was not time synchronized with 9-1-1, the

Plaintiff’s cell phone provider and the Union

yard. Each of these time lines must converge

at the exact same instant for the Defendants

to have a basis to fire the Plaintiff, the

truth is that the data does not prove their

theory out. This entire case is based on a

snap shot of data which is reflected as a few

minutes or maybe even seconds because the

Defendants [sic] GPS data report rounds all

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of its data up to the nearest minute.

30. Further, the GPS and tracking devices

only collect this snap shot of data every 5-7

minutes and within this interval the

Plaintiff locked his truck, set his cones and

walked approximately 150-200 feet to the

location of the job site. There is simply no

way for the Defendants to refute this and

prove that Mr. Smith is lying and that they

acted reasonably in terminating him.

31. Thus, without good cause and

justification and in reliance on faulty and

unreliable data, PAC BELL, AT&T and SBC

wrongfully terminated Blake Smith the

Plaintiff in this suit.

32. Defendant CWA and District 9 did not

defend the Plaintiff as it was required to do

under the written contract (See Exhibit A,

CBA 2004 Contract, Article 7, remainder too

voluminous for inclusion as exhibit,

incorporated by reference as though fully

stated herein). The Plaintiff was entitled

to expedited arbitration due to his immediate

dismissal however, CWA and District 9 drug it

proverbial feet and insisted on going through

their long, ineffective, and futile grievance

process. Plaintiff has been patiently wading

through the first three stages of the

grievance process to date and now he has been

told that the last stage of arbitration will

not occur.

33. The Plaintiff cannot afford to wait and

see what the union CWA and District 9 is

going to do for him. Every day that goes by

is another day in which he has to worry about

where the money is going to come from to pay

his mounting bills.

34. In addition, Plaintiff’s bonus for the

year with Defendants AT&T and SBC was about

to be due and payable on January 1, 2006, and

Plaintiff would therefor have realized an

economic benefit, at Defendants’ expense. 

Because of his termination, Plaintiff was

unable to continue his gainful employment or

receive the bonus as agreed and consequently

he lost a substantial economic gain, which he

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had been promised and to which he was

entitled. Additionally, Plaintiff lost the

benefit of his continued employ, related

income and benefits. Because of his

termination, Plaintiff was unable to continue

in his gainful employment and the benefit of

his earned bonus and consequently he lost a

substantial economic gain, which he had been

promised and to which he was entitled. 

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and

thereon alleges, that Defendants’ motives

were malicious and extraneous to the

employment relationship and were intended to

deprive Plaintiff of the benefits thereof,

while protecting Defendants’ own economic

interests.

The Second Cause of Action is for breach of the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing not to terminate without good

cause and is alleged against all Defendants. After incorporating

the preceding averments, the Second Cause of Action alleges in

pertinent part:

36. Plaintiff was reasonably assured by

Defendants’ actions, statements and conduct

that he would not be terminated arbitrarily. 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff was led to

conclude that he and Defendants had entered

into an implied contract that Plaintiff would

not be discharged unless there was good cause

to do so.

37. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants for

approximately eight (8) years. Based on the

oral representations and promises and conduct

of Defendants, as set forth above, Plaintiff

had an employment contract with Defendants

that he would be employed by Defendants so

long as his performance was satisfactory, and

that Defendants would not discharge him

without good and just cause.

38. The employment agreement referred to

above contained an implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, which obligated

Defendants to perform the terms and

conditions of the agreement fairly and in

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good faith and to refrain from doing any act

that would prevent or impede Plaintiff from

performing any and all of the conditions of

the contract that he had agreed to perform,

or any act that would deprive Plaintiff of

the benefits of the contract.

39. Plaintiff performed all the duties and

conditions of the employment agreement. In

fact, when the alleged lie is said to have

occurred Plaintiff was working within his

scope of employment as a cable marker.

40. Defendants knew that Plaintiff had

fulfilled all his duties and conditions under

the contract.

41. Into the relationship between each

employer and employee, the State of

California implies a covenant of good faith

and fair dealing. This covenant requires

that each party to the employment agreement

act with fairness and good faith toward the

other, and that neither party should take any

action to prevent the other from reaping the

benefits of the relationship.

42. Without misconduct on the part of

Plaintiff and without good, just or

legitimate cause, Defendants breached the

subject employment agreement by engaging in

conduct separate and apart from performance

of obligations under the agreement, without

good faith and in contravention of the

implied agreement not to terminate

Plaintiff’s employ except for good cause, by

among other things: Defendants terminated

Plaintiff based on conjecture and faulty GPS

terminology ... and to prevent Plaintiff from

realizing the continued benefits of his

employ including, but not limited to, the

payment of bonuses that would have been

realized had Defendants not terminated

Plaintiff’s employ prior to the end of 2005. 

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and

thereon alleges, that Defendant’s [sic]

motives were retaliatory in nature due to his

previously reporting unsafe work conditions

as described more particularly herein, in

addition to economic in nature and extraneous

to the employment relationship and were

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intended to deprive Plaintiff of the benefits

thereof, while protecting Defendant’s [sic]

future economic interests.

Exhibit A to the Complaint referenced in these causes of action

is a partial copy of the CBA, setting forth provisions of Article

7, “Problem Resolution Procedures”.

B. Governing Standards.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is th

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). Immunities and other th

affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to dismiss only

when they are established on the face of the complaint. See

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Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9 Cir.1999); Jablon v. th

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9 Cir. 1980) When ruling th

on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged

in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents

relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity

is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial

notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th

Cir.1988).

C. Preemption.

Section 301 of the LMRA provides federal jurisdiction over

“[s]uits for violation of contracts between and employer and a

labor organization.” A suit for breach of a collective

bargaining agreement is governed exclusively by federal law under

Section 301. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation

Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). As explained in Builders &

Contractors v. Intern. of Elec. Workers, 109 F.3d 1353 (9th

Cir.1997):

Federal law exclusively governs a suit for

breach of a collective bargaining agreement

under § 301 and preempts any state cause of

action based on a collective bargaining

agreement or whose outcome depends on

analysis of the terms of the agreement ...

Though preemption under § 301 of the LMRA is

implied, not express, the policy in favor of

national uniformity in labor law is so

powerful that it displaces state law with

respect to claims involving the

interpretation or enforcement of collective

bargaining agreements ....

Although the language of § 301 is limited to

‘[s]uits for violation of contracts,’ it has

been construed quite broadly to cover most

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state-law actions that require interpretation

of labor agreements ... Many § 301 suits do

not assert breach of the collective

bargaining agreement and are nevertheless

held preempted because they implicate

provisions of the agreement ....

Id. at 1356-1357. However, despite the breadth of Section 301

preemption, not every claim which requires a court to refer to

the language of a collective bargaining agreement is necessarily

preempted. Id. at 1357. 

In Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994), the Supreme

Court distinguished between claims which require interpretation

or construction of a labor agreement and those which require a

court simply to “look at” the agreement. Id. at 123-126. 

“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of

dispute, the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement

will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly

does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Id. at 124. To

effectuate the goals of Section 301, preemption should be applied

only to “state laws purporting to determine ‘questions relating

to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal

consequences flow from breaches of that agreement’” and to tort

suits which allege “breaches of duties assumed in collective

bargaining agreements.” Id. at 123. However, Livadas reiterated

that the “pre-emption rule has been applied to assure that the

purposes animating § 301 will be frustrated neither by state laws

purporting to determine ‘questions relating to what the parties

to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were

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intended to flow from breaches of that agreement ..., nor by

parties’ efforts to renege on their arbitration promises by

‘relabeling’ as tort suits actions simply alleging breaches of

duties assumed in collective-bargaining agreements ....” Id. 

In Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683

(9 Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 692 (2002), the Ninth th

Circuit explained the demarcation between claims preempted by

Section 301 and those that are not:

If the plaintiff’s claim cannot be resolved

without interpreting the CBA - as, for

example, in Allis-Chalmers, where the suit

involved an employer’s alleged failure to

comport with its contractually established

duties - it is preempted ... Alternatively,

if the claim may be litigated without

reference to the rights and duties

established in a CBA - as, for example, in

Lingle, where the plaintiff was able to

litigate her retaliation suit under state law

without reference to the CBA - it is not

preempted ... The plaintiff’s claim is the

touchstone for this analysis; the need to

interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature

of the plaintiff’s claim. If the claim is

plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption

is not mandated simply because the defendant

refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.

Moreover, alleging a hypothetical connection

between the claim and the terms of the CBA is

not enough to preempt the claim: adjudication

of the claim must require interpretation of a

provision of the CBA. A creative linkage

between the subject matter of the claim and

the wording of the CBA is insufficient;

rather, the proffered interpretation argument

must reach a reasonable level of credulity

... The argument does not become credible

simply because the court may have to consult

the CBA to evaluate it; ‘look[ing] to’ the

CBA merely to discern that none of its terms

is reasonably in dispute does not require

preemption ....

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...

... A state law claim is not preempted under

§ 301 unless it necessarily requires the

court to interpret an existing provision of a

CBA that can reasonably be said to be

relevant to the resolution of the dispute.

Id. at 691-693. 

Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing are preempted under these standards. 

These causes of action allege that Plaintiff’s termination was

without good cause. The CBA provides that an employee may be

terminated only for good cause. See Exhibit A, § 7.12 (“If the

Arbitrator finds that a dismissal was made without just cause”,

the Arbitrator may take the steps set forth in that section). 

In Milne Employees Ass’n v. Sun Carriers, 960 F.2d 1401,

1411 (9 Cir.1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959 (1993), the Ninth th

Circuit, after noting that a claim for breach of the implied

covenant developed in the employment context under California law

to protect the job security of at-will employees, held:

No comparable lack of job security ...

generally exists for unionized employees,

whose employment relationship is governed by

the collective bargaining agreement ...

Therefore, we have generally held that

section 301 preempts the California state

cause of action for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing when

an employee enjoys comparable job security

under a collective bargaining agreement. 

Id. at 1411. 

Dismissal of these causes of action is required because

“good cause” is not an implied term in the CBA, it is an express

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term. In Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-350

(2000), the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can impose

substantive terms and conditions beyond those to which the

contract parties actually agree”:

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

implied by law in every contract, exists

merely to prevent one contracting party from

unfairly frustrating the other party’s right

to receive the benefits of the agreement

actually made ... The covenant thus cannot

‘”be endowed with an existence independent of

its contractual underpinnings.”’ ... It

cannot impose substantive duties or limits on

the contracting parties beyond those

incorporated in the specific terms of their

agreement. 

Because the Complaint requires examination of the CBA’s

terms to determine the merits of Plaintiff’s breach of covenant

claims, the First and Second Causes of Action are preempted by

Section 301.

Plaintiff argues that these causes of action are not

preempted under the authorities cited above because the causes of

action are not inconsistent with Section 301. Plaintiff contends

that the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202

(1985), cited three points in favor of preemption, none which

applies to these causes of action. 

Plaintiff points to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that

preemption under Section 301 is required because “only that

result preserves the central role of arbitration in our ‘system

of industrial self-government.” 471 U.S. at 219. Plaintiff

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argues that this concern does not apply “as the Union has

declined to proceed with arbitration.” 

However, as discussed below, that the Union declined to

proceed with arbitration is actionable under Plaintiff’s cause of

action for breach by the Unions of their duty of fair

representation. 

Plaintiff further points to the Supreme Court’s statement:

Congress has mandated that federal law govern

the meaning given to contract terms. Since

the state tort purports to give life to these

terms in a different environment, it is preempted.

471 U.S. at 218-219. Plaintiff asserts that “[i]t’s a little

difficult to say which ‘different environment’ is of concern to

the Court” because “[t]he words of the collective bargaining

agreement are not being used to define the state causes of

action” which “live in state law independent of any collective

bargaining agreement.” If, Plaintiff asserts, the Supreme Court

meant different forums by the term “different environment”, 

that problem is not here. In Allis-Chalmers,

the case originated in and was litigated

through the entire State Court system of

Wisconsin prior to reaching the U.S. Supreme

Court. Here all causes of action are

together in the same complaint before a

Federal Court in California.

This argument is without merit. There are numerous cases

applying Section 301 preemption to actions by employees filed in

federal court against the employer for breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, which causes of action have been

dismissed as preempted by Section 301.

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Plaintiff further contends that the two state law causes of

action are not intended to define the contractual relationship

between the employer and the union, citing Allis-Chalmers: “If

the state law tort purports to define the meaning of the contract

relationship, that law is preempted.” 471 U.S. at 213. 

Plaintiff argues:

That limited point is determined by federal

law. In this case, we are trying to define

the relationship between the employee on one

side and the employer and the Union, on the

other side, where the Union has decided to

cease all further efforts on behalf of the

employee.

Plaintiff further notes that Allis-Chalmers reiterated that the

“‘dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive

principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area

covered by the statute [so that] issues raised in suits of a kind

covered by § 301 [are] to be decided according to the precepts of

federal labor policy’” and that “‘in enacting § 301 Congress

intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over

inconsistent local rules.’” 471 U.S at 209-210. Plaintiff

argues:

Neither of these California causes of action

is intended to alter the meaning of the words

of the collective bargaining agreement as it

may be interpreted by the Federal courts. 

Plaintiff agrees that allowing these two

causes of action may affect the amount of

damages eventually found by a jury. But that

does not effect a ‘change in interpretation’

of the words of the collective bargaining

agreement. Nor does it ‘ ... exert a

disruptive influence upon both the

negotiation and administration of collective

bargaining agreements,’ ... Here, we argue,

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management and the union are on the same

side! There is no worry over what was

conceded and what was won in negotiations. 

All parties are simply being held to the

requirements of fairness upon which the

fabric of society lies. The fact that

California law might extract a larger

monetary judgment from the defendants than if

this case arose in Oregon is not relevant and

not important. The California causes of

action do not threaten the role of collective

bargaining in this state and do not impose

inconsistent local rules on the parties. The

only thing it might do is subject parties to

larger damage awards but only if additional

facts are proved.

Plaintiff further argues that the two causes of action are

independent of the causes of action for breach of the collective

bargaining agreement and breach of the duty of fair

representation, again contending that “[t]hat limited point is

determined by federal law.” However, Plaintiff asserts:

While the state causes of action for breach

of the implied covenants are dependent on a

finding of a breach of the collective

bargaining agreement, the inquiry does not

end there. After the plaintiff proves a

breach of the collective bargaining

agreement, which will entitle plaintiff to

damages as provided by section 301, a second

inquiry must be made, to determine whether or

not, the behavior of the employer constitutes

breach of the implied covenants. The jury

will make that determination, not by

reference to the collective bargaining

agreement, but by factual analysis of the

behaviors, actions and/or inactions of the

employer and its agents. 

In so arguing, Plaintiff cites Lingle v. Norge Division of

Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 

In Lingle, petitioner was discharged for filing an allegedly

false workers’ compensation claim. The union representing

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petitioner filed a grievance pursuant to the CBA that protected

employees from discharge except for “just” cause and provided for

arbitration of disputes between the employer and any employee

concerning the effect or interpretation of the CBA. While

arbitration was proceeding, petitioner filed a retaliatory

discharge action in state court, alleging that she had been

discharged for exercising her rights under the state workers’

compensation laws. After the action was removed to federal

court, petitioner’s action was dismissed as preempted, the

district court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the

retaliatory discharge claim was inextricably intertwined with the

CBA provision prohibiting discharge without just cause. In

reversing, the Supreme Court held in pertinent part:

We agree with the [Seventh Circuit’s]

explanation that the state-law analysis might

well involve attention to the same factual

considerations as the contractual

determination of whether Lingle was fired for

just cause. But we disagree with the court’s

conclusion that such parallelism renders the

state-law analysis dependent upon the

contractual analysis. For while there may be

instances in which the National Labor

Relations Act pre-empts state law on the

basis of the subject matter of the law in

question, § 301 pre-emption merely ensures

that federal law will be the basis for

interpreting collective bargaining

agreements, and says nothing about the

substantive rights a State may provide to

workers when adjudication of those rights

does not depend upon the interpretation of

such agreements. In other words, even if

dispute resolution pursuant to a collectivebargaining agreement, on the one hand, and

state law, on the other, would require

addressing precisely the same set of facts,

as long as the state-law claim can be

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resolved without interpreting the agreement

itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the

agreement for § 301 purposes. 

486 U.S. at 408-410. 

Relying on Lingle’s conclusion, Plaintiff “urges two

possible levels of analysis here”:

One, liability of the state causes of action

can be found by the jury by reference solely

to state law. Or, Two [sic], after finding a

breach of contract under Federal law, the

jury can, after additional deliberations,

make additional findings determining whether

or not a breach of the implied covenants

occurred.

Under this second possible level of analysis,

the state causes of action for breach of the

implied covenants are dependent on a finding

of a breach of the collective bargaining

agreement but the inquiry does not end there. 

After the plaintiff proves a breach of the

collective bargaining agreement, which will

entitle plaintiff to damages as provided by

Federal law, a second inquiry must be made to

determine whether or not, the behavior of the

employer constitutes breach of the implied

covenants. This is NOT determined by

reference to the collective bargaining

agreement. This is determined by analysis of

the behavior of the employer and its agents. 

It could be said that the state causes of

action ‘pop up’ only after the jury

determines the defendants have violated

Federal law.

Plaintiff contends that Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., supra, has

no application here because Plaintiff is alleging that both the

employer and the Union did not act fairly toward him. Plaintiff

reiterates that the fairness of the employer and the Union’s

actions/inactions toward him is a factual determination to be

made by a jury analyzing all of the conduct involved: “It is not

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‘wound up’ in the words of the collective bargaining agreement. 

There is no ‘excessive entanglement’ of these very simple causes

of action with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.”

Plaintiff is incorrect as a matter of law. As explained in

Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal.4th at 352:

A breach of the contract may also constitute

a breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing. But insofar as the

employer’s acts are directly actionable as a

breach of an implied-in-fact contract term, a

claim that merely realleges that breach as a

violation of the covenant is superfluous. 

This is because, as we explained at length in

Foley, the remedy for breach of an employment

agreement, including the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing implied by law

therein, is solely contractual. In the

employment context, an implied covenant

theory affords no separate measure of

recovery, such as tort damages ...

Allegations that the breach was wrongful, in

bad faith, arbitrary, and unfair are

unavailing; there is no tort of ‘bad faith

breach’ of an employment contract. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the employer terminated him

without good cause and that the Union failed to take Plaintiff’s

grievance to arbitration under the CBA. The CBA requires good

cause for termination. Plaintiff’s assertion that the employer

and the Union did not act fairly toward him is simply another way

of saying that his termination was not supported by good cause

and that the Union breached the duty of fair representation.

Plaintiff further argues that “public policy concerns favor

litigating the two state causes of action here because Management

and the Union claim GPS and computers are 100% accurate and can

thus fire employees based on reports from these systems”. 

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Plaintiff asserts:

It is part of Plaintiff’s case that this is

not true and is in fact so bizarre an

assertion to make itself evidence of ‘Bad

Faith’ and ‘Unfair Dealing’ that needs to be

litigated. The willingness of the powers

that be to “put all their eggs into one

basket” and to put all faith into machines

and technology shows an unwillingness to be

convinced otherwise. In other words, ‘Don’t

argue with us. Our minds are closed. Past

performance does not matter. The computer

says so, you’re fired.’

Furthermore, when the Unions had an

opportunity to stop it they sat idly by and

let management trample over the rights of the

plaintiff by stopping the arbitration process

in its proverbial tracks. The Union could

have done a number of things to preserve the

rights of the plaintiff but instead turned a

blind eye. It costs too much to fight in

arbitration was the refrain but the same

Unions will now expend large resources to

fight Mr. Smith in Court. An ironic if not

misplaced allocation of resources. Unions

purportedly exist to assist workers. If the

Unions actions, or rather, inactions are not

addressed here, there will be lasting

repercussions affecting the Public at large.

...

Imagine if management attempts to use this

technology to ‘clean house’, on a grand

scale, of any employees who could not be

fired for any other cause, but were found to

be ‘lying’ based on 100% accurate GPS and

Computer technology. The actions and

inactions of management and Unions may have

set some awful precedents in the use of

technology to monitor employees. The Unions

and the persons running the Unions have

chosen not to do so. Who will be the voice

of working men and women? Their only voice

is here in the Federal court and we ask that

their voices be heard through their

representative, the Plaintiff, Blake Smith.

Plaintiff’s arguments are not persuasive. The issue of good

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cause for termination is set forth in the CBA and is a matter of

contract negotiation, not public policy. With reference to the

alleged actions or inactions of the Unions in representing

Plaintiff in the grievance process under the CBA, the Complaint

alleges a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair

representation. “The duty of fair representation is a statutory

duty implied from the grant to the union by section 9(a) ... of

exclusive power to represent all employees of the collective

bargaining unit.” Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel and Elevator

Operators Union, Local No. 14, AFL-CIO, 453 F.2d 1018, 1021-1022

(9 Cir.1972). The exclusivity of the agency imposes on the th

union “a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all

members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to

exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and

to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177

(1967). In Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 921 (9th

Cir.1985), the plaintiff’s claim against the Union for breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was nothing

more than a recharacterization of the plaintiff’s claim for

breach of the duty of fair representation and thus preempted by

federal labor law. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that “reliance on the GPS and

Engine Monitoring technologies is not dependent on an

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement because the

union and the employer have agreed, by side letter or ancillary

agreement, not to allow GPS and Engine Monitoring technology to

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be used as the basis for termination.” This side agreement is

alleged in Paragraph 27 of the Complaint, but no copy is attached

to the Complaint. 

Paragraph 27 alleges that the side agreement was made

between the employer and the union and that Plaintiff is the

intended third party beneficiary of that side agreement. By

these allegations, Plaintiff suggests the good cause termination

provisions of the CBA were modified by this side agreement. 

Under the preemption standards set forth above, Plaintiff’s

claims based on the alleged breach of the side agreement (a

modification of the CBA) are also preempted by Section 301. 

D. Conclusion.

For the reasons discussed above, all Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the First and Second Causes of Action is GRANTED WITH

PREJUDICE on the ground of preemption pursuant to Section 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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