Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00313/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00313-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Refugio Saldana-Camacho, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-0313-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Background

On March 10, 2004, Petitioner pled guilty in state court to possession for sale and

transportation for sale of marijuana (Doc. 15 Ex. B). On March 3, 2005, the state trial court

reviewed Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief and dismissed the application on

the merits (Doc. 15 Ex. I). On February 27, 2006 a state appeals court denied review of the

trial court’s dismissal (Doc. 15 Ex. K). Petitioner did not seek review of his conviction by

the Arizona Supreme Court.

On February 12, 2007, Petitioner filed an application for Writ of Habeas Corpus with

the Court (Doc. 1), in which he alleged:

(1) “Yuma County violated the 5th Amendment by not providing a

fundamental part of the transcripts necessary to the Petitioner[’]s appeal” (Doc.

1 at 8);

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(2) “Petitioner[’]s 6th Amendment rights to a competent and free of conflict

of interest counsel were violated by his defense counsel” (Doc. 1 at 13);

(3) “Yuma County Superior Court abused its discretion, when [it] denied the

motion to withdraw as counsel, without an adequate inquiry, amounting to a

6th Amendment violation” (Doc. 1 at 18);

(4) “Arizona lacked jurisdiction to process and sentence petitioner over a load

of marijuana seized in California” (Doc. 1 at 23).

On October 28, 2008, Magistrate Judge Anderson issued a report recommending the denial

of Petitioner’s habeas application (Doc. 26). On December 22, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely

objection to the report (Doc. 29). For the following reasons, the Court will adopt Judge

Anderson’s report and recommendation in full and deny Petitioner’s application.

Discussion

1. Standard

A “district judge may refer dispositive pretrial motions and petitions for writ of habeas

corpus to a magistrate, who shall conduct appropriate proceedings and recommend

dispositions.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 141 (1985); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B);

Estate of Connors v. O'Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1993). Any party “may serve and

file written objections” to the magistrate’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. A district

judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A habeas corpus petitioner is ineligible for relief if he has not exhausted state court

remedies available to vindicate his habeas claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (“An

application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that – the applicant has

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an absence of available

State corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect

the rights of the applicant.”); see also Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 658 (9th Cir.

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Petitioner submitted a Special Action Request to a state appeals court requesting that court

to order the Yuma County Superior Court Clerk to make available Petitioner’s state trial court

transcript. However, this request did not mention either the Fifth Amendment or Due Process nor

did it allege sufficient facts that would suggest a constitutional violation (Doc. 15 Ex. M). See

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (a constitutional claim in state court that

fails to state the operative facts and legal theory of the claim did not give the state court a sufficient

opportunity to hear the claim and thus did not constitute exhaustion of the claim). 

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2005) (“A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.”) (internal citation omitted). If a petitioner’s failure to present his habeas claims to

the proper state tribunal has foreclosed the possibility of state court review, as mandated by

the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted and is precluded from

seeking federal court review of these claims. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“If a state court determines that a claim is procedurally barred, we are precluded

from reviewing the merits of the claim if the procedural bar is adequate and independent.”).

A petitioner may overcome the obstacle of a procedurally defaulted claim by showing

“cause and prejudice” for the default “or, alternatively, a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Id.

2. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim

Judge Anderson properly rejected Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment Due Process claim

because Petitioner did not raise this issue during his state post-conviction review proceedings

and thus procedurally defaulted (Doc. 15 Ex. H, J). The fact that Petitioner requested these

transcripts is irrelevant (Doc. 29 at 2).1

 Petitioner further fails to allege any legally sufficient

cause, or corresponding prejudice, to overcome his procedural default. Other than a bald

assertion that he satisfied the cause and prejudice requirement, Petitioner’s only argument

even remotely explaining his failure to prosecute his Fifth Amendment claims in state court

relies on his poor English language skills, a reason which is insufficient as a matter of law

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Petitioner did allege the operative facts of his present Sixth Amendment claims in his trial

court petition for post-conviction review (Doc. 15 Ex. H). However, Petitioner did not mention the

Sixth Amendment or Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in conjunction with these facts. See Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004) (failure to associate a habeas claim’s factual allegations with

the Sixth Amendment, or to otherwise link them to the federal Constitution, does not sufficiently

notify the state court of a constitutional claim and precludes federal habeas review). Even assuming

Petitioner’s statement of operative facts in his first petition for post-conviction review was sufficient

to raise his Sixth Amendment claim, he did not pursue this claim with the state appellate court, as

required by the exhaustion doctrine. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Recognizing that each state is entitled to formulate its own system of post-conviction relief . . . we

must credit Arizona's choice. Thus, except in habeas petitions in life-sentence or capital cases,

claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.”).

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(Doc. 29 at 2). See e.g. Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2004) (A defendant’s

“unfamiliarity with the English language is insufficient to establish cause to excuse his

procedural default”); Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1988) (A

defendant’s pro se status and lack of familiarity with the English language did not establish

cause to excuse procedure default). Judge Anderson’s recommendation is adopted and

Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed.

3. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

Judge Anderson also properly rejected Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel claims for procedural default because Petitioner failed to raise them

in his appeal, to the state court of appeals, of his post-conviction review. While Petitioner

raised a Sixth Amendment Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim in his petition for review,

he did not allege the same conflict of interest and abuse of discretion theories he is now

alleging in his habeas application (Doc. 15 Ex. J).2

 Petitioner’s subsequent discussion of

various factual aspects of his Sixth Amendment claims neither implicates the cause for his

failure to raise these issues with the state court of appeals nor suggests that his conviction

constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of justice and the Court adopts Judge Anderson’s

recommendation, dismissing these claims. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987.

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4. Petitioner’s Jurisdictional Claims

While Petitioner may arguably have raised this issue in his trial court petition for postconviction review, he completely failed to address it in his appellate court petition (Doc. 15

Ex. J) and thus procedurally defaulted the claim. See Swoopes, supra Note 2. Petitioner’s

factual discussion of his jurisdictional claim neither implicates the cause for his failure to

raise this issue with the state court of appeals nor suggests his conviction constitutes a

fundamental miscarriage of justice and the Court adopts Judge Anderson’s recommendation,

dismissing this claim. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED Petitioner’s Application For Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) IS

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

DATED this 13th day of January, 2009.

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