Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07185/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07185-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONDA AUSTIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FOODLINER, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.16-cv-07185-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS 

ACTION SETTLEMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 49

Pending before the Court is the unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class action 

settlement filed by Plaintiffs Ronda Austin, Christopher Corduck, Ernest Dial, Billy Wayne 

Gibson, and Bobby G. Smith. Dkt. No. 49. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant Foodliner, Inc. Dkt. No. 23 (First Amended 

Complaint, or “FAC”) ¶¶ 12-17. Plaintiffs worked as truck drivers for Defendant, and seek to 

bring suit on behalf of a class of “[a]ll individuals whom FOODLINER employed as truck drivers 

in California at any time during the Class Period,” id. ¶ 35, which commenced on November 3, 

2012, see id. ¶ 12. 

Plaintiffs allege that their primary duty is to haul materials from one location to another 

using Defendant’s trucks. Id. ¶ 23. Defendant controls all logistical details, like drivers’ 

schedules and what specific duties are to be performed, and pays drivers on a per-trip basis. Id. ¶¶ 

24-25. Plaintiffs allege that they 

are not paid for all hours worked, in particular, for their rest periods; 

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 1 of 14
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

for non-productive time, including but not limited to, for dead 

mileage, dead running or dead-heading (“dead-heading”) (when the 

truck driver operates without carrying any cargo or load); for work 

performed pre- and post-trip; for the time spent fueling their 

vehicles; for the time spent completing necessary paperwork; for 

standby time; and for time spent attending required safety meetings 

and trainings. Finally, Plaintiffs and other truck drivers are not paid 

separately for their missed meal and rest periods.

Id. ¶ 27. Further, Defendant allegedly failed to reimburse the putative class for certain eligible 

costs incurred while on the job, id. ¶ 30, and failed to provide accurate wage statements, id. ¶ 31.

B. Procedural Posture

Plaintiffs originally filed suit in state court on November 3, 2016. Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A. 

Defendant filed a notice of removal on December 15, 2016. Dkt. No. 1. On October 20, 2017, 

Plaintiffs filed the FAC, Dkt. No. 23, which Defendant answered on November 13, 2017, Dkt. No. 

29. On April 19, 2018, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement agreement, 

see Dkt. No. 43, after which Plaintiffs filed this unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the 

class settlement, Dkt. No. 49 (“Mot.”). 

C. Settlement Agreement

After conducting extensive discovery, the parties went to mediation on August 16, 2017. 

See Dkt. No. 49-1 (Declaration of Hunter Pyle, or “Pyle Decl.”) ¶¶ 19-22. Although the case did 

not settle at that session, the mediator later made a proposal on April 4, 2018. Id. ¶ 22. The 

parties accepted a modified version of that proposal and reached a settlement. Id.; see also Dkt. 

No. 49-2 (Settlement Agreement or “SA”). The Settlement Agreement’s key terms are as follows.

1. Class Definition

The class is defined as “all individuals employed by Foodliner as truck drivers in 

California at any time during the class period,” which “means November 3, 2012 continuing 

through and including the date of the Court’s order regarding preliminary approval of the 

Settlement.” SA ¶¶ 5-6. There is also a Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) subclass (“the 

PAGA Subclass”), “which shall consist of all Class Members who were employed at any time 

during the time period from October 31, 2015, through the date of Preliminary Approval of the

Settlement.” Id. ¶ 53(b).

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 2 of 14
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2. Settlement Benefits

Defendant agrees to pay a gross settlement amount of $1.2 million, which “is inclusive of 

all payments to Class Members, the Class Counsel Fees and Costs Payment, the Class 

Representative Service Payment, the Settlement Administration Fees, withholdings for wage 

payments made to Class Members under this Settlement, and payment to the [California Labor & 

Workforce Development Agency] for its share of PAGA penalties.” Id. ¶ 40. This amount does 

not include employer payroll taxes. Id. ¶ 15. The proceeds will be distributed as follows:

Each Participating Class Member shall receive a proportionate share 

that is equal to (i) the number of workweeks he or she worked 

during the time period from November 3, 2012, through the date of 

Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, divided by (ii) the total 

number of workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members 

during the time period from November 3, 2012, through the date of 

Preliminary Approval of the Settlement.

Id. ¶ 53(a). Furthermore, one quarter of the proceeds allocated to PAGA penalties ($81,405) will 

be distributed to the PAGA subclass as follows:

Each Participating Class Member who is a member of the PAGA 

Subclass will receive a proportionate share of money allocated to 

that subclass that is equal to (i) the number of workweeks he or she 

worked during the time period from October 31, 2015, through the 

date of Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, divided by (ii) the 

total number of workweeks worked by all Participating Class 

Members who are members of the PAGA Subclass during the time 

period from October 31, 2015, through the date of Preliminary 

Approval of the Settlement.

Id. ¶ 53(b). Class members “will not have to make a claim in order to receive a distribution.” Id.

¶ 41. No portion of the settlement fund will revert to Defendant, and any unclaimed portion of the 

fund will ultimately be paid to Legal Aid at Work. See id. ¶¶ 41, 44.

3. Release

Upon final approval of the settlement, Plaintiffs agree to “forever release, discharge, and 

. . . hold harmless Foodliner” from “all claims that were plead in the Action, including the 

Operative Complaint, or that could have been plead based on the facts alleged in the Action.” Id.

¶¶ 28, 73. “The Parties intend that the Settlement described in this Agreement will release and 

preclude any further claim, whether by lawsuit, administrative claim or action, arbitration, 

demand, or other action of any kind, by each and all of the Participating Class Members to obtain 

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 3 of 14
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

a recovery based on, arising out of, and/or related to any and all of the Released Claims.” Id. ¶ 74. 

Further, the parties intend that the Settlement Agreement act as a “general release precluding any 

further claim . . . or other action of any kind, by the Plaintiffs, to obtain a recovery based on any 

claim that could have been asserted against Foodliner as well as any other Released Party in 

connection with his or her employment with Foodliner through the date that this Settlement is 

signed by Plaintiffs.” See id. ¶ 75.

4. Class Notice

Within 30 days of this Court’s granting preliminary approval, Defendant will provide the 

settlement administrator with relevant data about the class members. See id. ¶ 59. Within 10 days 

of receipt, the settlement administrator will send the notice of proposed settlement by first-class 

mail. Id. ¶ 60; see also SA, Ex. A (proposed notice of proposed settlement, or “Notice”). The 

Notice includes the nature of the action, the terms of the proposed settlement, the recipient’s 

estimated settlement payment, and information about the release of claims against Defendant. It 

also includes information on how to opt out from and object to the settlement, as well as the

relevant deadlines.

5. Opt-Out Procedure

The parties propose that class members who wish to opt out be required to mail to the 

settlement administrator a request for exclusion, containing the member’s “full name; all other 

names used during employment with Foodliner; date of birth; the last four digits of the social 

security number or the employee identification number; and the telephone number.” Id. ¶ 62. The

parties propose that such requests be “deemed timely only if postmarked on or before forty-five 

(45) calendar days following the date of initial mailing of the Notice by the Settlement 

Administrator.” Id.

6. Incentive Award

Plaintiff Austin intends to apply for an incentive award of no more than $10,000. Id. ¶ 45. 

Plaintiffs Corduck, Dial, Gibson, and Smith intend to apply for incentive awards of no more than 

$7,500 each. Id. ¶ 46. Defendant agrees not to oppose any of those applications. See id.¶¶ 45-46.

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 4 of 14
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

7. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs intends to file an application for attorney’s fees not to exceed 33 percent of the 

gross settlement amount, id. ¶ 49, or $399,960, see Pyle Decl. ¶ 25(d). Plaintiffs further intends to 

seek costs and expenses “not to exceed reasonable actual costs incurred by Class Counsel.” SA ¶ 

49. 

II. PROVISIONAL CLASS CERTIFICATION

Provisional class certification is a prerequisite to preliminary approval of a class action 

settlement. Here, the Court finds that provisional class certification is appropriate.

A. Legal Standard

Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that class 

certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011). Class certification is a two-step process. First, the plaintiffs 

must establish that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) are met: numerosity, commonality, 

typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id. at 349. Second, the plaintiffs must establish that at 

least one of the bases for certification under Rule 23(b) is met. Where, as here, the plaintiffs seek 

to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), they must show that “questions of law or fact common to 

class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 

action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

B. Analysis

To determine whether provisional certification is appropriate, the Court considers whether 

the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) have been met. As discussed in more detail 

below, the Court finds that they have.

1. Rule 23(a)

a. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the putative class be “so numerous that joinder of all members 

is impracticable.” The Court finds that numerosity is satisfied here because joinder of the 

estimated 214 proposed class members would be impracticable. See Pyle Decl. ¶ 26; SA ¶ 77.

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 5 of 14
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

b. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” A 

contention is sufficiently common where “it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that 

determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 

the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 564 U.S at 350. Commonality exists where “the circumstances 

of each particular class member vary but retain a common core of factual or legal issues with the 

rest of the class.” Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2008). “What matters to 

class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but rather the 

capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the 

litigation.” Dukes, 564 U.S at 350 (citation omitted) (original emphasis). Even a single common 

question is sufficient to meet this requirement. See id. at 359.

Common questions of law and fact in this action include: whether Defendant paid putative 

class members “on a piece-rate basis”; whether Defendant paid putative class members for all of 

the time they worked; whether Defendant provided the appropriate rest and meal periods; whether 

Defendant provided accurate wage statements within the meaning of section 226 of the California 

Labor Code; whether Defendant “reimbursed Class Members for the work-related use of their 

personal cell phones”; whether Defendant paid proposed class members all wages owed at the 

time of their termination; and whether Defendant violated California’s Unfair Competition Law, 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., and PAGA. Mot. at 7; see also Pyle Decl. ¶ 27. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the commonality requirement is met in this case.

c. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 

of the claims or defenses of the class.” “The test of typicality is whether other members have the 

same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named 

plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” 

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). That said, under the “permissive standards” of Rule 23(a)(3), the claims “need not be 

substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998).

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 6 of 14
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, the claims raised by Plaintiffs and the putative class members are identical, and arise 

under the same provisions of the California Labor Code. See Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 

231 F.R.D. 602, 608 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Since the named Plaintiffs raise the same Labor Code 

violations as other putative class members, their claims are typical of the class.”), rev’d and 

vacated on other grounds, 737 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see also Mot. at 9; Pyle Decl. ¶ 

28. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged any individual claims. See Mot. at 9; Pyle Decl. ¶ 28. 

This is sufficient to satisfy the typicality requirement.

d. Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately represent 

the interests of the class.” The Court must address two legal questions: (1) whether the named 

Plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other putative class members, and 

(2) whether the named Plaintiffs and their counsel will prosecute the action vigorously on behalf 

of the proposed class. See In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This inquiry “tend[s] to merge” with the commonality and typicality criteria. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. 

v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982). In part, these requirements determine whether “the 

named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class 

members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Id.

The Court is unaware of any actual conflicts of interest in this matter, and no evidence in 

the record suggests that either Plaintiffs or proposed class counsel have a conflict with other class 

members. See Mot. at 10. Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel has been appointed class counsel in 

multiple class actions in state court. See Pyle Decl. ¶ 67. The Court finds that, to date, proposed 

class counsel and Plaintiffs have prosecuted this action vigorously on behalf of the putative class,

and there is no reason to suspect they will not continue to do so. The adequacy of representation 

requirement is therefore satisfied.

2. Rule 23(b)(3)

To certify a class, Plaintiffs must also satisfy the two requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). First, 

“questions of law or fact common to class members [must] predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). And second, “a class action [must 

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 7 of 14
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

be] superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id. 

The Court finds that both requirements are met in this case.

a. Predominance

“The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to 

warrant adjudication by representation.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 

(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has defined an individual question 

as “one where members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member 

to member, while a common question is one where the same evidence will suffice for each 

member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide 

proof.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (original brackets). This “inquiry asks 

whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important 

than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, as explained above, there are common questions of fact and law among Plaintiffs and 

the putative class, and both groups raise the same claims. See Mot. at 8-9. Because of this, 

Plaintiffs “will be able to establish liability for these common issues on a classwide basis,” 

applying “common standards of proof.” See Mot. at 8. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 

“common, aggregation-enabling[] issues” raised by the claims at issue are “more prevalent or 

important” than those questions affecting only individual members of the proposed class, and for 

purposes of settlement, finds the predominance inquiry satisfied. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 

1045. 

b. Superiority

The superiority requirement tests whether “a class action is superior to other available 

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The 

Court considers four non-exclusive factors: 

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 

prosecution or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 

controversy already begun by or against class members;

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 8 of 14
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Id. Here, because common legal and factual questions predominate over individual ones, and 

taking into account the substantial size of the putative class, the Court finds that the judicial 

economy achieved through common adjudication renders a class action the superior method for 

deciding these claims. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that provisional class certification for purposes of preliminary 

approval is appropriate.

C. Class Representative and Class Counsel

Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs meet the commonality, typicality, and adequacy 

requirements of Rule 23(a), the Court appoints Plaintiffs as class representatives. When a court 

certifies a class, it must also appoint class counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Factors that 

courts should consider when making that decision include:

(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating 

potential claims in the action;

(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other 

complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the 

action; 

(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and 

(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the 

class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). 

In light of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s extensive experience with wage-and-hour class actions (and 

the subject matter more generally), see Pyle Decl. ¶¶ 6-10, 12-14, and his diligence in prosecuting 

this action to date, the Court appoints Hunter Pyle and Chad Saunders of Hunter Pyle Law as class 

counsel.

III. PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

Having provisionally certified the class, the Court next turns to the question of preliminary 

approval of the settlement.

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 9 of 14
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a 

certified class may be settled . . . only with the court’s approval.” “The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to 

protect the unnamed members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” 

In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, before a district 

court approves a class action settlement, it must conclude that the settlement is “fundamentally 

fair, adequate and reasonable.” In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2008).

Where the parties reach a class action settlement prior to class certification, district courts 

apply “a higher standard of fairness and a more probing inquiry than may normally be required 

under Rule 23(e).” Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). In those situations, courts “must be particularly vigilant not only for 

explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their 

own self-interests and that of certain class members to infect the negotiations.” In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011).

Courts may preliminarily approve a settlement and direct notice to the class if the proposed 

settlement: (1) appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations; (2) has 

no obvious deficiencies; (3) does not grant improper preferential treatment to class representatives 

or other segments of the class; and (4) falls within the range of possible approval. See In re 

Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Courts lack the 

authority, however, to “delete, modify or substitute certain provisions. The settlement must stand 

or fall in its entirety.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

B. Analysis

The Court considers each factor set forth in Tableware, and finds that preliminary approval 

is appropriate.

1. Settlement Process & Obvious Deficiencies

The first factor the Court considers is the means by which the parties settled the action. 

“An initial presumption of fairness is usually involved if the settlement is recommended by class 

counsel after arm’s-length bargaining.” Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. 08-cv-5198, 2011 WL 

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 10 of 14
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1627973, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011). Here, the parties “reached a non-collusive settlement 

after discovery and extended negotiations,” ultimately accepting a “mediator’s proposal.” Pyle 

Decl. ¶ 34. As such, class counsel believes that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and 

reasonable. See Mot. at 13-19. The Court thus finds that this factor weighs in favor of 

preliminary approval.

Second, the Court finds no obvious deficiencies in the settlement agreement, which weighs 

in favor of preliminary approval.

2. Preferential Treatment

The Court next considers whether the settlement agreement provides preferential treatment 

to any class member. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that district courts must be “particularly 

vigilant” for signs that counsel have allowed the “self-interests” of “certain class members to 

infect negotiations.” Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 947. For that reason, courts in this district 

have consistently stated that preliminary approval of a class action settlement is inappropriate 

where the proposed agreement “improperly grant[s] preferential treatment to class 

representatives.” Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.

Although the Settlement Agreement authorizes Plaintiff Austin and the other named 

Plaintiffs to seek incentive awards of up to $10,000 and $7,500, respectively, for their roles as 

named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, see SA ¶¶ 45-46, the Court will ultimately determine whether they

are entitled to such an award, as well as the reasonableness of the amounts requested. Incentive 

awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to 

make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action.” Rodriguez v. W.

Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009). At the final fairness hearing, Plaintiffs will 

be required to provide sufficient evidence to allow the Court to “evaluate [a named plaintiff’s] 

award[] individually, using relevant factors includ[ing] the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect 

the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . . [and] 

the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . .” See Stanton v. 

Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (original

ellipses). The Court will consider that evidence and evaluate the reasonableness of any incentive 

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 11 of 14
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

award request accordingly. Nevertheless, because incentive awards are not per se unreasonable,

and because there are no other indications of preferential treatment at this juncture, the Court finds 

that this factor still weighs in favor of preliminary approval. See Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958 

(finding that “[i]ncentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases” and “are discretionary”) 

(emphasis omitted).

3. Range of Possible Approval

Last, the Court considers whether the settlement is within the range of possible approval. 

To evaluate whether the settlement amount is adequate, “courts primarily consider plaintiffs’ 

expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement offer.” Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1080. This requires the Court to evaluate the strength of Plaintiffs’ case.

Here, individual class members’ recovery will be proportionate relative to the claims of 

other members. See SA ¶ 53. Plaintiffs predicted the class’s “realistic total recovery” to be 

$1,117,935.53. Pyle Decl. ¶ 55; see also id. ¶¶ 35-54 (describing rationale for calculation). The 

parties subsequently agreed on a gross settlement amount of $1.2 million, which “exceeds 

Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery by a little more than 7.5%.” Id. ¶ 55. The gross

settlement amount constitutes approximately 22 percent of Plaintiffs’ maximum possible recovery 

at trial, which Plaintiffs calculated to be $5,553,480.42. See Pyle Decl. ¶¶ 36, 40, 44, 46, 50, 52. 

Given the substantial litigation risks enumerated by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that this amount 

weighs in favor of granting preliminary approval. For example, Plaintiffs acknowledge that their 

claim that Defendant failed to provide appropriate meal and rest periods “carried significant risks 

of both non-certification and reduction on the merits,” id. ¶ 41, and that there “was significant risk 

of non-recovery” on their waiting time penalties claim “given Defendant’s good-faith defenses to 

Plaintiffs’ underlying claims,” id. ¶ 47; see also id. ¶¶ 37 (highlighting risks to Plaintiffs’ claim 

that Defendant failed to pay wages for all hours worked), 45 (reimbursement claim), 51 (wage 

statements claim), 53 (PAGA claims).

Accordingly, having weighed the relevant factors, the Court preliminarily finds that the 

settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and grants preliminary approval.

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 12 of 14
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

C. Proposed Class Notice

For Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, “the court must direct to class members the best notice that 

is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 

identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 

With respect to the content of the notice itself, the notice must clearly and concisely state 

in plain, easily understood language:

(i) the nature of the action; 

(ii) the definition of the class certified; 

(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 

(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an 

attorney if the member so desires; 

(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who 

requests exclusion; 

(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 

(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members[.]

Id.

The Court approves of the parties’ proposed Notice, see SA, Ex. A, which satisfies all of 

the criteria set forth in Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and is accordingly the best practicable form of notice 

under the circumstances. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ request that the Court appoint Simpluris, Inc. as 

the third-party settlement administrator is granted. See Mot. at 1.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval 

of class action settlement in accordance with the discussion above. The Court DIRECTS the 

parties to meet and confer, and to submit to the Court a proposed schedule for further proceedings 

as follows:

//

//

//

//

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 13 of 14
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Event Date

Deadline to provide class contact information to 

Settlement Administrator

Deadline for Settlement Administrator to mail 

notice to all putative class members

Filing deadline for motion for (1) attorney’s fees 

and costs and (2) class representative incentive 

payments

Deadline for class members to opt out or object to 

settlement and/or application for attorney’s fees and 

costs and incentive payment

Filing deadline for final approval motion

Final fairness hearing and hearing on motions

The parties shall submit their proposal no later than August 25, 2018. When submitting their 

motion for final approval, the parties shall include both a joint proposed order and a joint proposed 

judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

8/17/2018

Case 4:16-cv-07185-HSG Document 51 Filed 08/17/18 Page 14 of 14