Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00043/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00043-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth Burnam, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dennis Smith, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. CV 12-00043-PHX-PGR (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On March 16, 2012, Petitioner Kenneth Burnam, an inmate currently incarcerated at

the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”), in Welch, West Virginia, filed a pro se

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “habeas petition”) and Brief in

Support pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, raising two claims: (1) that education staff may not

unilaterally designate common areas out of bounds to inmates without express authorization

from the Warden or Captain, and (2) the Incident Report that was issued improperly served

as a predicate for the Bureau of Prison’s revoking “good-time credit” in another case

involving a different Incident Report. (Docs. 8, at 4-5; 9, at 1.) Petitioner requests that the

incident report be expunged and good-time credit restored. (Doc. 8, at 6; 9, at 8.) 

On June 26, 2012, Respondent filed his Answer urging the Court to deny Petitioner’s

habeas petition for the reason that Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and

alternatively, for the reason that Petitioner’s claims lack merit. (Doc. 15.) On July 6, 2012,

Petitioner filed a Traverse in Opposition to Respondent’s Answer. (Doc. 16.) On May 22,

Case 2:12-cv-00043-PGR Document 19 Filed 06/28/13 Page 1 of 8
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2013, the referral of this case was reassigned from Magistrate Judge Voss to this Court for

further proceedings and a report and recommendation. (Doc. 17.) 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently an inmate housed at FCI in Welch, West Virginia, having

previously been incarcerated at the federal prison in Phoenix, Arizona, from June, 2011 until

June 6, 2013, and at the federal prison in Lompoc, California, from December 7, 2007,

through May 31, 2011. (Docs. 18; 15-1 at 2 ¶2, 24.) Petitioner is serving an 18-year and 6-

month sentence, followed by 3 years of supervised release out of the Middle District of

Pennsylvania, after sustaining convictions for Maintaining a Place for Manufacturing,

Distributing, Storing or Using Controlled Substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §856(a)(1);

Aiding and Abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2; and Criminal Forfeitures in violation of

21 U.S.C. §853(p), and is projected to complete his sentence on April 16, 2015, presuming

Petitioner earns all available good conduct time. (Doc. 15-1, at 2, 8.) 

On February 23, 2011, an Incident Report was prepared by O. Magana, Education

Specialist at the Federal Bureau of Prisons, that described the following events taking place

the same day at 7:37 a.m.:

On February 23, 2011, at approximately 7:37 am [Petitioner] entered the

Education Department. The 7:30 am movement is a work call movement and

only Education workers are allowed into the Education Department during this

move. I have told [Petitioner] to not enter the department during the work

move because he is not on the Education work crew (see attached work crew

roster). Today, [Petitioner] came into the department after being told not to

enter into the department. [Petitioner] came into the department after being

told not to enter into the department. [Petitioner] is not authorized to enter the

department during the work call movement.

(Doc. 8, at 10-11.)

The Incident Report charged Petitioner with Being in an Unauthorized Area in

violation of Code 316. (Doc. 8, at 10.) Investigator S. Duden provided Petitioner a copy

of the report and noted that Petitioner had made the following statement after being advised

of his rights in the process: “[e]veryone was informed that you can’t stay in education. I

went in to hand something off to an inmate worker there and left.” (Id., at 15.) The matter

was referred to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”). (Id.) Before the UDC, Petitioner

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admitted that he entered the education department to pass a book to another inmate, but

denied that he had previously been instructed by Magana not to enter the education

department. (Id., at 14.) The UDC determined that Petitioner had committed the prohibited

act and imposed a sanction of 90-days loss of phone/commissary/visitation. (Id., at 13.)

Petitioner appealed the UDC decision to the Warden, arguing that his conviction and

sanction should be overturned because “the Education department [had] not posted a

memorandum prohibiting inmates from dropping off books at 7:30 a.m.; the incident report

[did] not list any dates in which the Education Specialist claim[ed] to have instructed

[Petitioner] not to enter the Education department at 7:30 a.m.; and the sanctions imposed

are particularly harsh and should be reduced.” (Doc. 8, at 19.) On April 5, 2011, the Warden

determined that the “UDC’s decision was based on evidence sufficient to support a finding

of guilt and your admission that you entered the Education department. Furthermore, the

sanctions imposed were proportionate to the severity of the offense.” (Id., at 24.) 

Petitioner then filed an appeal to the Regional Director, claiming that the incident

report was vague and prepared in retaliation for Petitioner’s having reported staff impropriety

in proctoring a test, that neither the Warden nor the Education Supervisor had issued a

memorandum prohibiting inmates from entering the Education Department to return books

during the 7:30 a.m. prisoner movement, and that the incident report should be expunged.

(Doc. 8, at 20.) The Regional Director denied relief, finding that “[d]irections or orders from

staff constitute putting a certain location out of bounds if that is the subject of the order,” and

that “the reporting of alleged staff misconduct [as Petitioner had claimed] does not authorize

[Petitioner] to ignore the orders or previous commands of staff.” (Id., at 23.) The Regional

Director concluded that “the UDC substantially complied with regulations in this matter and

met the evidentiary standard.” (Id.)

Petitioner appealed the decision of the Regional Director to the General Counsel, the

final level of appeal, but his appeal was rejected June 25, 2012,for failure to include required

documentation, that is a copy of the institution’s administrative remedy request and readable

copies of BP-11. (Doc. 15-1, at 2 ¶3, 15.) The mailing address for Petitioner on the rejection

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was Phoenix, FCI. (Id., at 15) Petitioner was provided 15-days to correct these deficiencies,

but failed to do so. (Id., at 2 ¶3.) Petitioner has filed a total of 93 administrative remedies

since 2001. (Id., at 2 ¶4.) Petitioner claims that he did not receive the General Counsel’s

rejection and instruction for remedying his deficient filing, and that “[Petitioner] may not be

faulted for the Respondent’s negligences in assuring that a copy of the rejection was provided

to [Petitioner] while in transit to FCI Phoenix.” (Doc. 16, at 3-4.) Even if this were true, the

record does not reflect that Petitioner followed up with any inquiries to the General Counsel

to determine the status of his appeal when he reached his destination, or before filing his

habeas petition. 

DISCUSSION

I. Petitioner Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies.

The BOP has a formal 3-tier administrative remedy system described at 28 C.F.R.

§§542.10 et seq. The inmate must initially try to resolve the dispute informally with BOP

unit staff before formally filing an administrative grievance with the Warden. 28 C.F.R.

§§542.13(a); 542.14. The inmate may then appeal an adverse decision to the Regional

Office. 28 C.F.R. §542.15(a). He may then challenge the Regional Office’s decision by

appealing to the General Counsel, on the appropriate form (BP-11) designed for Central

Office Appeals. 28 C.F.R. §542.15(b). Appeal to the General Counsel is the final

administrative appeal. 28 C.F.R. §542.15(a). Once an inmate has completed this

administrative process, if still aggrieved, he may then file a habeas petition in the appropriate

district court. 

As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available

judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under §2241. Ward v. Chavez, 678

F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). This exhaustion requirement is “subject

to waiver in §2241 cases because it is not a ‘jurisdictional prerequisite.’” (Id.) “Typically,

exhaustion can be waived ‘if pursuing those [administrative] remedies would be futile.’” Id.

(citing Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993)).

///

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Here, Petitioner never corrected the deficiencies in his appeal to the General Counsel.

Thus, he never exhausted his administrative remedies. Petitioner claims he never received

the June, 2012, rejection notice because he was in transit at the time he filed his appeal. This

does not explain why his transfer approximately 1-year earlier from the federal prison in

Lompoc, California, would have interfered with his receipt of the rejection notice while he

was housed at FCI, Phoenix. Even if Petitioner did not receive the rejection notice, there is

nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner made any inquiries into the status of his

appeal, other than his unsupported assertion that “[a]fter arriving at FCI Phoenix repeated

request for copies were submitted but copies were not obtained.” (Doc. 9, at 3 FN2.) It bears

noting that Petitioner is not unfamiliar with the administrative process, having filed 93

administrative remedies since 2001. (Doc. 15-1 at 2 ¶4.)

Petitioner also does not demonstrate that his appeal involved the application of an

official Bureau of Prisons policy, such that exhaustion of his remedies would have been

futile. See, Fraley, 1 F.3d at 925 (exhaustion was futile where BOP policy that time spent

in on home confinement prior to sentencing does not quality as official detention would

almost certainly have resulted in the denial of further administrative appeals). Petitioner’s

charge and conviction did not involve the application of any official Bureau of Prisons

policy, but was simply a hearing on the facts and appeal of the UDC determination.

Petitioner argues that his appeal involved the authority of Educational Specialist Magana to

designate an area off-limits to Petitioner. Setting aside that Petitioner did not raise this issue

at the hearing level, Petitioner provides no authority that a specific Bureau of Prisons policy

is implicated, other than to assert that “BOP regulations do not support” this authorization.

(Doc. 9, at 7.) The Regional Director addressed this claim by noting that “[d]irections or

orders from staff constitute putting a certain location out of bounds if that is the subject of

the order.” (Doc. 8, at 23.) Petitioner has not established that proper exhaustion of his

administrative remedies would have been “futile,” and therefore this Court will recommend

that Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied and dismissed. 

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II. The UDC’s Finding was Supported by “Some Evidence.” 

The Due Process Clause requirements are satisfied if “some evidence” supports the

decision of the disciplinary committee. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution,

Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1985). Under that standard, “the relevant question

is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the disciplinary board.” Id., at 455. The standard is “minimally stringent.” Cato v. Rushen,

824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). It only requires “any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-

456, emphasis added in Cato).

The UDC stated that it based its decision on the statement contained in Section 11 of

the Incident Report that Educational Specialist Magana found Petitioner in the education

department during a work movement and she had previously warned him not to come to the

education department during a work movement. (Doc. 8, at 13.) The UDC also relied on the

statement by Petitioner to the investigating lieutenant, wherein Petitioner stated, “Everyone

was informed that you can’t stay in education. I went in to hand something off to an inmate

worker there and left.” (Id.) The UDC additionally relied on the statement by Petitioner to

the UDC that he had “entered the Educ Dept to pass inmate Kilgore a book.” (Id., at 14.) 

This Court finds that the UDC performed a detailed analysis of the facts contained in

the incident report and Petitioner’s statements, that the key relevant facts supporting the

UDC’s findings were contained in the incident report, and that the UDC’s findings and

conclusions were supported by ample, if not substantial evidence. The fact that Petitioner

later claimed that Educational Specialist Magana was without authority to designate an area

off-limits does not alter this finding, and in any event, Petitioner’s claim is not supported by

the facts in the record. The Court therefore finds that Petitioner was not deprived of his due

process rights in the finding by the UDC that Petitioner had committed a violation of Code

312, Being in an Unauthorized Area.

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 Petitioner also claims that the incident report served as a predicate for rescinding

good-time credit on a subsequently charged violation. (Docs. 8, at 5; 16, at 4.) Petitioner

asserts that the subsequently charged violation is the subject of another habeas petition filed

by Petitioner pending before this Court. See, Burnam v. Smith, 2:12-CV-0128-PGR (MHB).

Petitioner provides no basis in his habeas petition for his claim that the Incident Report in

this case served as a basis for the sanctions that were imposed in his other pending case. In

fact, the Court has reviewed the record in Burnam v. Smith, 2:12-CV-0128-PGR (MHB), and

finds no support therein for Petitioner’s claim. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative claims within the

Bureau of Prisons, that there was ample, if not substantial evidence to support the UDC’s

findings, and that Petitioner’s claim that the Incident Report in the instant case served as a

basis to revoke good-time credit in another case is without merit. Petitioner’s demand for

the expungement of the incident report and the restoration of good time credits should

therefore be denied. For these reasons the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s habeas

petition be denied and dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to

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appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 28th day of June, 2013.

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