Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00560/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00560-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wesley Ian Aaron,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-07-560-TUC-DCB (JJM)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Wesley Ian Aaron, presently incarcerated at the Great Plains Correctional

Facility, Hinton, Oklahoma, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Marshall for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the

Petition (Doc. 1), Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 10) and Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 11). The

Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record,

deny and dismiss the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 17, 2003, Petitioner was indicted on three counts of armed robbery, one

count of robbery, three counts of first degree burglary, one count of second degree burglary,

kidnaping, and four counts of aggravated assault arising out of four separate incidents that

occurred on December 29, 2002, December 30, 2002, December 31, 2002, and January 7,

Case 4:07-cv-00560-DCB Document 15 Filed 02/14/11 Page 1 of 10
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1

 Unless otherwise noted, all referenced exhibits are those attached to Respondent’s Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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2003. (Ex. A; R.T. 4/14/04.)1 The State later moved to dismiss the simple robbery and the

second degree burglary counts associated with the December 30, 2002 incident and, after trial

by jury, Petitioner was found guilty on the remaining charges on April 19, 2004. (Ex. A

(Minute Entry, April 13, 2004, p. 2); Ex. A (Verdict Forms).) On July 7, 2004, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 36.75

years. (Id. (Sentencing Order).)

Along with the Indictment, the State filed an Allegation of Offenses Not Committed

On The Same Occasion, Consolidated For Trial, which stated:

The County Attorney of the County of Pima, in the name of the State of Arizona, and by its authority, pursuant to A.R.S.

§ 13-702.02(A) and (B), alleges Count(s) One, Two, Three,

Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve and

Thirteen herein, of the Indictment, are offenses not committed

on the same occasion, consolidated for trial.

In the event the counts are severed for trial, the County Attorney of the County of Pima, in the name of the State of

Arizona, and by its authority, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604 (A)

and (B), hereby alleges each count as a prior conviction to each

other count.

(Ex. A.) On March 26, 2003, Petitioner filed a Motion to Sever Counts in which he moved

the trial court for an order severing the counts against him into four separate cases for trial.

(Ex. A (Motion to Sever Counts).) In doing so, Petitioner gave notice that “he will accept

the relief sought only on the condition that the court also rules that, upon severance, the State

is barred from alleging that a conviction obtained on any count will be a ‘historical prior

conviction’ for purposes of his sentencing under A.R.S. § 13-604 on any other count.” Id.

At the same time, Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike State’s Conditional Allegation

of Historical Prior Convictions on the basis that “the statutory scheme that mandates greater

punishment solely as a result of a severance is unconstitutional.” Id. In the Motion to Strike,

Petitioner argued at length that, “[b]ecause the statutory sentencing scheme embodied in

A.R.S. §§ 13-604 and 13-702.02 requires the imposition of a harsher sentence solely because

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the . . . charges were severed for trial, it violated constitutional equal protection principles.”

(Ex. A (Motion to Sever), p. 2.).) By Minute Entry Order dated April 24, 2003, the trial

court denied Petitioner’s motion stating that “both A.R.S. 13-702.02 and 13-604 are

constitutional, and find support for this position in State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439 which,

while not directly on point, juxtaposes the statutes with clarity and approval.” Id. The order

also reflects that, based on the court’s ruling, Petitioner did not want the counts severed for

trial. The Arizona Court of Appeals, in affirming Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal,

summarized the facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction and his Constitutional claims as

follows:

After a jury trial, appellant Wesley Ian Aaron was convicted of numerous criminal charges, which had been

consolidated for trial, arising from three armed robberies

committed on separate occasions and at separate locations.

Under the sentencing scheme established in A.R.S. §§ 13-604

and 13-702.02, Aaron faced a harsher sentence if he had decided

to seek severance of the charges under Rule 13.4(b), Ariz. R.

Crim. P., 16A A.R.S. He argues the scheme is unconstitutional

because it impermissibly burdened his Fifth Amendment rights

and violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States

and Arizona Constitutions and the doctrine of separation of

powers. 

(Ex. B, pp. 1-2.) 

In the present petition, which respondents agree is timely and fully exhausted,

Petitioner raises the same claims. As he explains it, Petitioner’s focus “is the statutory

scheme’s enactment of two alternative sentencing ranges – one milder and one harsher – for

every defendant who has convictions for felonies committed on more than one occasion,

coupled with its enactment of a discriminatory rule to determine who gets sentenced within

the milder range, and who within the harsher.” Reply, pp. 1-2. 

II. DISCUSSION

In the Petition, Petitioner alleges two grounds for relief. In Ground One he claims a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment resulted from the state

court’s application of “the statutory scheme set forth in A.R.S. § 13-604(A), (B), (C), (D),

(G), (H), (J), (K), and (S), coupled with A.R.S. § 13-702.02 . . . .” The constitutional

violation resulted from:

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discriminating arbitrarily, and/or without sufficient justification, against represented persons whose attorneys exercise their

clients’ rights to sever for resolution at separate trials joined

counts charging the clients with unrelated offenses committed

on either two, or else three or more, different occasions. The

scheme requires the imposition of harsher sentence enhancement

when a represented defendant is convicted of multi-occasion

offenses after his counsel accepts such a severance than when he

is convicted after his counsel declines such a severance.

Petitioner further explains the impact of the application of the statutory scheme:

declining a severance meant (1) that the jury deciding each

charge would hear inadmissible evidence that [Petitioner]

committed other like offenses near in time and (2) that Aaron

would be prevented from testifying about one incident while

remaining silent and un-cross-examined as to the other two, but

accepting a severance would subject [Petitioner] to statutory

“severance penalty” in the event he was convicted of all charges.

Petition, pp. 5-6.

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that the same statutory scheme violates the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “by improperly imposing a penalty for the exercise

of constitutional/statutory rights,” and thereby, “compelling an improper choice between the

exercise of constitutional rights . . . based on a specific procedural choice.” Id. at p. 7.

A. AEDPA Standards

Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 “(AEDPA”), a

federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law

either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a controlling

case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150

(9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to federal law, the

court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state court and the basis of the state court's

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judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can

be an unreasonable application of federal law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing

legal principle but applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable,

or (2) if it extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in

a way that is objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

B. Merits

There being no dispute about the underlying facts and the implications of the situation

Petitioner faced, the Court must evaluate whether the state courts’ rejection of his claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined

by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Clearly established federal law”

consists of holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Additionally, “circuit court precedent may be

persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied

that law unreasonably.” Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks

and citation omitted).

The closest relevant Supreme Court authority is United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.

114 (1979). In Batchelder, the defendant was convicted under a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h),

making it a crime for persons previously convicted of crimes punishable by more than one

year in prison to “receive any firearm . . . which has been shipped or transported in interstate

or foreign commerce.” On appeal, the defendant objected to his five year prison sentence

because another statute, the now repealed 18 U.S.C.A.App. § 1202(a), provided a two year

maximum sentence for certain felons, including the defendant, “who receives, possesses, or

transports in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm.” 442 U.S. at 116-117. The

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant and concluded he could be

sentenced to no more than the two year maximum provided under section 1202(a) due to

doubts that Congress intended that the two statutes differently penalize the same conduct.

United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1978). In so ruling, the appeals court

avoided the constitutional question of whether the application of the statutes implicated “due

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process and equal protection interest[s] in avoiding excessive discretion and in obtaining

equal justice.” Id. at 631.

The United States Supreme Court reversed and found “no constitutional infirmities”

in the statutory scheme. In relation to the question of whether the scheme left the prosecutor

with unconstitutional and “unfettered” discretion, the Court stated:

there is no appreciable difference between the discretion a

prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he

exercises when choosing one of two statutes with identical

elements. In the former situation, once he determines that the

proof will support conviction under either statute, his decision

is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context.

The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available

upon conviction, but this fact standing alone does not give rise

to a violation of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.

442 U.S. at 124-25.

In the Reply in support of the Petition, Petitioner contends that Batchelder is

distinguishable in that the statutory scheme at issue in the instant case “itself supplies the

discriminatory rule that assigns defendants to sentencing under one of the tow statutory

provisions.” Reply, p. 18. Petitioner continues:

Unlike the statutory scheme in Batchelder, once the prosecution files its notice, as it did here . . ., demanding application of

whichever enhancement provision is triggered by the procedural

circumstances under which a defendant’s convictions got

entered, the scheme itself sorts defendants into coverage by one

sentencing provision or the other.

Id.

On the other hand, the government’s contention is that:

Batchelder’s logic apples with equal force in the instant case. Like the federal statutes considered in Batchelder, §§ 13-604

and 13-702.02 provide for the possibility of different

punishments for the same conduct. See State v. Thompson, 27

P.3d 796, 798 (Ariz. 2001). Neither § 13-604 nor § 13-702.02

provides a defendant with his option as to sentencing because

charging decisions are within the prosecutor’s discretion. See

State v. Serna, 857 P.2d 384, 388 (Ariz. App. 1993). Just as equal protection was not implicated by the federal statutes, equal

protection is not implicated by the prosecutor’s discretion in

seeking punishment under § 13-604 or § 13-702.02.

Answer, p. 11. 

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As the Court sees it, the resolution of the parties’ disagreement as to the applicability

of Batchelder has two possible outcomes, both of which are unfavorable to the Petitioner.

Assuming Batchelder does not constitute clearly established precedent from the Supreme

Court addressing the issue at hand, under the AEDPA, other clearly established Supreme

Court authority must be identified and be shown to have been incorrectly applied before the

Petitioner can prevail. However, in the Petition and Reply, Petitioner fails to identify such

authority. Although he does cite to general principles for evaluating questions of due process

and equal protection, there appears to be no Supreme Court authority, other than the

Batchelder decision, that can arguably be construed as “clearly established precedent” on the

issue at hand. As the Supreme Court has explained, if habeas relief depends upon the

resolution of “an open question in [Supreme Court] jurisprudence,” section 2254(d)(1)

precludes relief. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). On this basis, this claim provides

no grounds for relief.

Alternatively, and perhaps more accurately, the Batchelder decision can be interpreted

as applying to the question at hand. Other authority has noted that “Batchelder has drawn

criticism for its apparent, although perhaps inadvertent, failure to recognize the potential

equal protection mischief that might occur when two criminal statutes are identical in every

respect except for their respective penalties.” State v. Williams, 175 P.3d 1029, 1034

(Ut.2007). While the scenario raised in Williams is not precisely what occurred here, the

criticism the decision identifies, which comes from Professors Lafave, Israel and King in

their treatise on criminal procedure, is helpful:

In assaying the Batchelder reasoning, it is useful to think about three types of situations in which a defendant’s conduct may fall

within two statutes. They are: (1) where one statute defines a

lesser included offense o the other and they carry different

penalties (e.g., whoever carries a concealed weapon is guilty of

a misdemeanor; a convicted felon who carries a concealed

weapon is guilty of a felony); (2) where the statutes overlap and

carry different penalties (e.g., possession of a gun by a convicted

felon, illegal alien or dishonorably discharged serviceman is a

misdemeanor; possession of a gun by a convicted felon, fugitive

from justice, or unlawful user of narcotics is a felony); (3) where

the statutes are identical (e.g., possession of a gun by a

convicted felon is a misdemeanor; possession of a gun by a

convicted felon is a felony). The Court in Batchelder had before

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it a situation falling into the second category, but seems to have

concluded that the three statutory schemes are indistinguishable

for purposes of constitutional analysis. But in terms of either

the difficulties which are confronted at the legislative level in

drafting statutes or in the guidance which is given to a

prosecutor by the legislation, the three schemes are markedly

different.

Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 13.7(a) (3rd ed.

2007). In the ensuing discussion, the Professors explain that the first category is “certainly

unobjectionable” and the second category is “a harder case,” and that the third category,

which is the closest to the claim Petitioner raises, is “highly objectionable.” This third

category, they explain:

is likely to be a consequence of legislative carelessness, and

even if it is not such a scheme serves no legitimate purpose.

There is nothing at all rational about this kind of statutory

scheme, as it provides for different penalties without any effort

whatsoever to explain a basis for the difference. It cannot be

explained in terms of giving assistance to the prosecutor. Where

statutes are identical except for punishment, the prosecutor finds

not the slightest shred of guidance. It confers discretion which

is totally unfettered and which is totally unnecessary. And thus

the Court in Batchelder, is less than convincing in reasoning that this third category is unobjectionable simply because in other

instances, falling into the first category, the need for

discretionary judgment by the prosecutor has not been and

cannot be totally eliminated.

Id. At least two salient points can be gleaned from this criticism of Batchelder. It suggests

that the decision is properly interpreted as applying to situations, such as the one in which

Petitioner finds himself, where a defendant can be subjected to a statutory scheme that

provides different potential penalties for the same violations without any explanation. It also

suggests that Batchelder, although “highly objectionable” on the point, concludes that such

a scheme is not constitutionally infirm. Considering this discussion and the case itself, the

Court cannot conclude that the state courts’ reliance on Batchelder constituted an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

Petitioner’s claims do add a notable wrinkle to the direct application of Batchelder to

the facts in his case. He claims that he would have testified on his own behalf in relation to

one of the charged incidents had he been able to sever the charges without subjecting himself

to increased punishment for doing so. He claims he was forced into this posture in violation

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of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In McGautha v. California, 402

U.S. 183 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld the use of unitary trial in capital cases. Id. at

220. The defendant argued that unitary trials in capital cases are unconstitutional because

they require a defendant either to remain silent and not testify about mitigation evidence in

relation to punishment or risk having his mitigation testimony used against him on the issue

of guilt. Id. at 210-11, 213. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument and noted

the hard reality that:

The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete

with situations requiring ‘the making of difficult judgments’ as

to which course to follow . . . . Although a defendant may have

a right, even of constitutional dimension, to follow whichever

course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token

always forbid requiring him to choose.

Id. at 213 (citation omitted). The Court explained that “[t]he threshold question is whether

compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights

involved.” Id. Here, Petitioner has not shown the Court that severance of the counts would

have made any difference at all. No doubt Petitioner was confronted with a difficult

decision, but nothing in this record indicates that requiring him to make the decision

constituted a violation of his constitutional rights. 

The record is also devoid of evidence that the joinder of the counts supports a claim

of constitutional proportions. Even if joinder of the counts is viewed as improper, it “rise[s]

to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a

defendant his [constitutional] right to a fair trial.” United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446

n. 8 (1986). Petitioner alludes to the testimony he would have offered had he elected to sever

the counts against him for trial, even indicating it was submitted to the trial court in camera

and under seal. He has not, however, provided the proposed testimony here. Without

knowing how innocuous or momentous the proposed testimony was, it is impossible for this

Court to determine whether the joinder of all the counts resulted in an unfair trial.

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an

order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case

number: CV-07-0560-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 14th day of February, 2011.

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