Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02073/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02073-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PROTECT OUR WATER AND

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS, 

JIMMY ABATTI, and DOES

1 through 5, inclusive,

Petitioners,

NO. CIV. S-06-2073 LKK/EFB

v.

IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

and DOES 6 through 10, 

inclusive, O R D E R

Respondents. 

 /

SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER

AUTHORITY, METROPOLITAN 

WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, and

DOES 11 through 15, inclusive,

Real Parties in Interest.

 /

Petitioners, Protect Our Water and Environmental Rights

(“POWER”) and Jimmy Abatti (“petitioners”) filed suit alleging that

Respondent, Imperial Irrigation District (“IID”) violated portions

of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”). Petitioners

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allege that IID violated CEQA by approving a project to line a

portion of the All-American Canal (“the Canal”) in Imperial County,

California. Petitioners’ complaint also names the United States

Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation (“the

United States”) as Real Parties in Interest. 

Pending before the court are two related motions. First, the

United States moves to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction and that the United States is not a

properly named party. Second, IID moves to dismiss for improper

venue, or, in the alternative, moves to transfer venue to the

Central District of California, where the Canal is located. IID

also filed a supplemental memorandum in support of dismissal based

on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. 

Upon review of the pleadings and after oral argument, it is

apparent that this case must be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts as Alleged by Petitioners 

Petitioners allege that IID violated CEQA when it approved an

addendum to the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) for the AllAmerican Canal lining project. The EIR defined the project as one

to “line a 23-mile section of the canal by constructing a concretelined canal parallel to the existing canal.” Compl. ¶ 5.

The All-American Canal was authorized by Congress in 1928 as

part of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Compl. ¶ 14. The Canal

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delivers water from the Colorado River to the Imperial Irrigation

District. Compl. ¶ 15. Although the United States retains title

to the Canal, IID operates and maintains the canal under contract

with the Secretary of the Interior.

The Canal is currently unlined, and, as a result, some of the

water is lost through seepage into the ground. Compl. ¶ 14. In

1988, the Secretary of the Interior began plans to line the canal.

Compl. ¶ 16. IID was the sole contractor for the Canal lining

project. Compl. ¶ 17.

In 1991, the Bureau of Reclamation and IID published a joint

Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA and a draft

EIR under CEQA. The Bureau of Reclamation was the lead agency

under NEPA and IID was the lead agency under CEQA. Compl. ¶ 19. The

draft EIR/EIS identified four alternative construction proposals

as well as a “no project” alternative. The Bureau of Reclamation

and IID published a final EIR/EIS in 1994. On August 22, 1994, IID

issued a Notice of Determination under CEQA for the parallel canal

as the lining project. Compl. ¶ 20-23.

After years of no action, in September 2003, the California

Legislature authorized funding for the lining of the Canal. Final

designs for the lining project were initiated in 2004. Compl. ¶

25. Subsequently, petitioners and others submitted objections to

the design of the lining project and to some of the terms in

various agreements. 

Without conducting any CEQA review, on January 10, 2006, IID

made discretionary approvals in furtherance of the project in that

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it approved and authorized the General Manager of IID to execute

an “Agreement Among the United States Department of Interior Bureau

of Reclamation, the Imperial Irrigation District, and the San Diego

County Water Authority for the Construction of the All-American

Canal Lining Project Pursuant to Title II of Public Law 100-675.”

Compl. ¶ 27. 

On July 27, 2006 IID approved an “Addendum to Final EIS/EID

and Amendment to Environmental Commitment Plan” for the Canal

pursuant to Section 15164 of CEQA. Compl. ¶ 29. Petitioners filed

the pending suit on September 15, 2006. 

B. The Complaint 

The complaint contains only one cause of action, that being

a claim against IID for violating CEQA. Petitioners allege that

“IID abused its discretion and failed to act in the manner required

by law by failing to require subsequent or supplemental

environmental review pursuant to Section 15162 or Section 1516 of

the CEQA Guidelines . . .” Compl. ¶ 34. Petitioners objected to

several changes that IID made, including, but not limited to, the

elimination of escape ridges which were to run continuously along

the Canal, steepened canal wall side slopes, and the elimination

of one hundred ninety-seven artificial habitat reefs that were to

be installed and maintained. Id. 

Petitioners seek to enjoin IID and the United States from

“engaging in any activity connected with the approvals or the

lining project unless and until this court finds that the approvals

are in full compliance with CEQA and all other applicable laws.”

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 Both IID and the United States explain at some length that 1

there are other legal challenges to the lining of the canal. Were

this court not to rule on the issue of federal question

jurisdiction, the court would have to consider the Rooker-Feldman

argument raised by IID. However, given that the court disposes of

this suit on jurisdictional grounds, a discussion of the other

pending legal challenges is not necessary. 

5

Compl. at 10-11.1

Petitioners' complaint asserts that jurisdiction is proper as

"[t]his case involves a controversy to which the United States is

a party and is within the Court's jurisdiction under the United

States Constitution, Art. III, section 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1346

and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1367, subd. (a)." Compl. ¶ 2. Petitioners do

not allege any other basis for federal jurisdiction. 

II.

STANDARDS

It is well established that the party seeking to invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of establishing

that jurisdiction exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S.

269, 278 (1936); Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.

1986). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied vary

according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge.

If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack, i.e., the

moving party contends that the allegations of jurisdiction

contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to

demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction, plaintiff is entitled

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to safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion is made. The factual allegations of the complaint are

presumed to be true, and the motion is granted only if plaintiff

fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter

jurisdiction. See 2A J. Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Moore's

Federal Practice, ¶ 12.07 (2d ed. 1987); see also Eaton v.

Dorchester Development, Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982);

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A complaint will be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (1) if the case

does not "arise under" any federal law or the United States

Constitution, (2) if there is no case or controversy within the

meaning of that constitutional term, or (3) if the cause is not one

described by any jurisdictional statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186, 198 (1962).

III.

ANALYSIS

Both IID and the United States raise several reasons why this

case should be dismissed, or, alternatively, transferred to the

Central District. As explained herein, the court finds that

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and accordingly, the suit

must be dismissed. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

dispositive and therefore, the court need not address the other

arguments raised by IID and the United States.

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A. Petitioners’ Complaint 

Petitioners’ complaint alleges that jurisdiction is proper

under “Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution,

as well as 28 U.S.C § 1346 and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1367.” Compl. ¶ 2.

These provisions do not confer jurisdiction upon this court in this

case.

First, § 1346 is inapplicable. As the United States properly

points out, § 1346 grants district courts original jurisdiction

over a variety of civil actions in which the United States is a

named defendant. For example, § 1346 confers jurisdiction for

“[a]ny . . . civil action or claim against the United States, not

exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded . . . upon any express or

implied contract with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).

Section 1346 also confers jurisdiction for tort claims against

federal employees acting in their official capacities. 

Petitioners’ complaint clearly fails to state a claim pursuant

to § 1346. Most obviously, the Department of the Interior and the

Bureau of Reclamation were not named as defendants. The complaint

also fails to make any allegation that these two agencies violated

any applicable law. The complaint, in essence, fails to make any

allegation which would properly bring this suit within § 1346. 

Petitioners also allege that jurisdiction is proper under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a). This section provides: 

Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as

expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in

any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district courts shall

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other

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claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article

III of the United States Constitution. Such

supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that

involve the joinder or intervention of additional

parties.

28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under this section, “federal courts may exercise

‘supplemental’ jurisdiction over state-law claims linked to a claim

based on federal law.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1240

(2006). However, in order to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,

the court must already have Article III jurisdiction over the case

or controversy. As explained herein, petitioners’ complaint fails

to assert any basis for original jurisdiction, and therefore, the

court cannot confer supplemental jurisdiction.

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction 

Petitioners’ complaint also states that jurisdiction is

predicated on “the United States Constitution, Art. III, Section

2.” Compl. ¶ 2. In their opposition, petitioners explain that

“this constitutional power extends to any case in which a federal

question is an ingredient of the action.” Pets.’ Opp’n to the U.S.

Mot. to Dismiss at 7. For the reasons discussed herein, federal

question jurisdiction is lacking as well. 

Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution

establishes the scope of federal court jurisdiction, which includes

“all Cases. . . arising under this Constitution. . .” This power

is not self-executing. As provided for in the United States Code,

“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all

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civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

In determining the presence or absence of federal

jurisdiction, the court applies the “‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’

which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly

pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

(1987); see also Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1,

6 (2003)(“To determine whether the claim arises under federal law,

we examine the ‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint and

ignore potential defenses.”)

Generally, a plaintiff may only invoke federal question

jurisdiction by pleading a cause of action created by federal law.

Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S.

308 (2005). In certain circumstances, however, federal question

jurisdiction exists even absent a federal cause of action. Id. at

311-312. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over

state law claims that "implicate significant federal issues." Id.

Under Grable, significant federal issues are implicated when

the state law claims (1) "necessarily raise a stated federal

issue," (2) which are "actually disputed and substantial," (3) and

which "a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any

congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial

responsibilities." Id. at 314. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court

recently described the category of cases which meet the Gable

standard as "slim[,] ... special and small." Empire Healthchoice

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Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 2137 (2006).

In the pending suit, petitioners’ complaint contains a single

cause of action, which alleges that IID violated CEQA. Petitioners

maintain that federal jurisdiction is predicated on the “permeating

federal nature underlying the case and the Boulder Canyon Project

Act.” Opp’n at 12. Specifically, petitioners allege, inter alia,

that the Canal was authorized by Congress, that the contract to

build the Canal was a contract with the United States and that the

United States assisted in building the Canal. Opp’n at 7. 

Petitioners’ allegations are insufficient to give rise to

federal question jurisdiction. The single claim under CEQA fails

to meet the standard set forth in Grable. The CEQA claim does not

“necessarily state[] a federal issue, actually disputed and

substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing

a congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial

responsibilities.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 308. Indeed, petitioners

fail to demonstrate how the CEQA claim even remotely hinges on

federal law or federal questions. 

This conclusion is consistent with other cases in which, it

could be argued, there was an even stronger case for federal

question jurisdiction. See City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon

Communications, Inc., 362 F.3d 168 (2nd Cir. 2004), Pinney v.

Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2005), Waltrip v. Brooks

Agency, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2006).

Petitioners have the burden of establishing that jurisdiction

exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936);

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Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). For the

reasons explained above, petitioners failed to meet their burden

and the court concludes that subject matter jurisdiction is

lacking. 

IV.

CONCLUSION 

1. The motion to dismiss filed by Real Parties in Interest, the

United States Department of the Interior and the Bureau of

Reclamation is GRANTED.

2. The motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, transfer of

venue, filed by defendant, Imperial Irrigation District is

DENIED as moot. 

3. The case is hereby DISMISSED and the Clerk of the Court is

directed to CLOSE the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 18, 2007.

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