Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06721/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06721-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELY HOLDINGS LIMITED, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

O’KEEFFE’S, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06721-JCS 

FURTHER ORDER REGARDING 

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Ely Holdings Limited and Greenlite Glass Systems Inc. move for leave to file a 

second amended complaint against Defendant O’Keeffe’s, Inc. d/b/a SaftiFirst (“Safti”). The 

Court held a hearing on January 31, 2020 regarding that motion, as well as a third-party discovery 

issue that will be addressed in a separate order. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ 

motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. In the interest of avoiding a motion to dismiss that 

would lead at most to another round of amendment, Plaintiffs may file a third amended complaint 

no later than February 14, 2020. This order also addresses an issue of claim construction that 

required supplemental briefing, which is resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor as discussed below.

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II. FURTHER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

The Court previously resolved most of the parties’ claim construction disputes but 

requested supplemental briefing as to aspects of one claim. See generally Claim Construction 

Order (dkt. 112).2 The parties dispute the meaning of language in claim 24 of U.S. Patent No. 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

2 Ely Holdings Ltd. v. O’Keeffe’s, Inc., No. 18-cv-06721-JCS, 2019 WL 6911667 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 

19, 2019).

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7,694,475 (the “’475 patent”) reading “comprising a first layer of glass which is a structural 

glass and a second layer of glass which is a fire rated glass.” Plaintiffs offer the following 

construction:

Composed of (i) a multi-laminated glass sheet made up of two or more 

layers of glass capable of bearing at least some of the weight of an 

applied load, and (ii) a multi-layered glass sheet made up of two or 

more layers of glass that has a transparent intumescent material 

interspaced between at least two of the glass layers

Pls.’ Br. (dkt. 85) at 14. Safti proposes the following construction:

Composed of (i) a single or multi-laminated glass made up of two or 

more layers of glass designed to bear, and capable of bearing, the 

weight of a specified minimum load, and (ii) a multi-layered glass 

made up of at least two end layers of glass enclosing and sandwiching 

transparent intumescent material between each glass layer, which has 

been rated as fire resistant by a national recognized rating entity.

Def.’s Br. (dkt. 92) at 18. 

The Court resolved in its previous order the parties’ differing constructions of “structural 

glass,” whether “fire rated glass” must be rated by a testing authority, and whether the outer layers 

of “fire rated glass” must be glass, but withheld a ruling on “the issue of whether fire-rated glass 

may contain additional layers other than alternating glass and intumescent material” pending 

supplemental submissions of evidence. Claim Construction Order at 13–14.

Plaintiffs’ expert Tim MacFarlane states in his report that fire-rated glass consists of “a 

multi-layered glass sheet made up of two or more layers of glass having an intumescent material 

dispersed between at least two of the layers,” but does not specifically address whether fire-rated 

glass may have additional layers not separated by intumescent material. See MacFarlane Opening 

Report (dkt. 85-2) ¶¶ 120–27. Safti’s expert Dr. Glen Stevick states that “the second layer of 

glass, which is a fire rated glass, . . . is meant to describe a multilayered glass made up of at least 

two enclosing glass layers sandwiching transparent intumescent material,” and that a person 

skilled in the art “would have interpreted the term ‘fire rated glass’ to be glazing whose interior 

portion would be fire resistive layers with glazing at least on the two outer dimensions, with or 

without glazing on the interior of the glazing.” Stevick Opening Report (dkt. 85-24) ¶¶ 34, 35

The parties have now submitted supplemental evidence regarding the nature of certain fireCase 3:18-cv-06721-JCS Document 142 Filed 01/31/20 Page 2 of 8
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rated glass products referenced in the specifications of the patent. Safti’s evidence consists of 

product brochures depicting, for the most part, configurations consistent with its expert’s view that 

the fire-rated glass must be made up of alternating layers of glass and intumescent material, 

although one product not specifically mentioned in the patent (Contraflam IGU, described as an 

“insulated glass unit”) includes an aluminum spacer and empty space between two of its four 

layers of glass (with the remaining layers separated by intumescent material), and the Court notes 

that the “available options” for two such products (Contraflam Lite 60 and Contraflam 30) include 

“Double glazing” and “Triple glazing,” which could perhaps take different configurations. See

Def.’s Supp’l Exs. 1, 4, 5 (dkt. 126). Plaintiffs submit brochures for products that include some 

glass layers separated by spacers and air in addition to glass layers separated by intumescent 

material, including Contraflam CF 120-N2, Pls.’ Supp’l Ex. A (dkt. 128); Climaplus Contraflam 

CF A60-N2, id. Ex. B; Climaplus Contraflam CF Lite ISO, id. Ex. E; Climaplus Contraflam CF 

Lite Marine ISO, id. Ex. H; Climaplus Contraflam CF 30-N2 ISO, id. Ex. I; Climaplus Contraflam 

CF 60-N2 ISO, id. Ex. L; and Climaplus Contraflam CF 90-N2 ISO, id. Ex. N. While Plaintiffs 

do not claim that any of those products are the particular products or configurations identified in 

the specifications of the ’475 patent, they are in the same product families as the “Contraflam-N2” 

and “Contraflam Lite” products mentioned therein, and the specifications make clear that the 

products identified are not intended to be exclusive. See ’475 Patent at 2:14–18 (listing 

“[p]articularly suitable fire rated glass” products and noting that “other fire rated glasses can be 

used depending on their fire rating properties”); id. at 5:40–43, 6:18–19, 6:59–61,7:43–44, 8:15–

17 (identifying suitable products for certain embodiments of the patent).

A portion of the manufacturer’s website offered by Safti describes the Contraflam product 

family as “a single- or multi-chamber fire-resistant glass containing an environmentally friend 

intumescent interlayer,” and states that it is “[a]vailable as butt-joint, laminated and insulated 

glazing. Def.’s Supp’l Ex. 2. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court understands 

that description as including “insulated” products like the Contraflam IGU—which includes an air 

space rather than intumescent material between two of its four layers of glass—within the 

manufacturer’s use of the term “fire-resistant glass,” which appears to be synonymous with the 

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term “fire rated glass” in the ’475 patent. This evidence weighs against Safti’s proposed 

construction requiring intumescent material separating all layers of glass. With no evidence that 

“fire rated glass” must have intumescent material between all layers of glass, and at least some 

evidence that other configurations have been marketed as “fire-resistant glass,” the Court adopts 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of this claim term.

Based on that holding as well as the issues addressed in the Court’s previous claim 

construction order, the Court construes the language in claim 24 reading “comprising a first layer 

of glass which is a structural glass and a second layer of glass which is a fire rated glass” as 

follows:

Composed of:

(i) a laminated glass sheet made up of two or more layers of glass 

capable of bearing weight; and 

(ii) a multi-layered glass sheet meeting all of the following 

conditions:

a. made up of two or more layers of glass;

b. having a transparent intumescent material interspaced 

between at least two of the glass layers;

c. having glass as its outer layers; and

d. rated as possessing a designated fire resistance certified by 

a testing authority.

III. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

A. Background

Plaintiffs’ operative first amended complaint includes only claims for patent infringement. 

1st Am. Compl. (dkt. 49) ¶¶ 19–34. Plaintiffs move to file a second amended complaint adding 

the following new claims against Safti: (1) misrepresentations in violation of the Lanham Act; 

(2) misrepresentations in violation of section 17500 of the California Business and Professions 

Code; (3) intentional interference with business relations; and (4) negligent interference with 

business relations. All of these new proposed claims are based on four categories of purported 

misrepresentations: (1) that Safti’s product met certain project specifications when it in fact did 

not; (2) that Safti’s flooring system did not include a load bypass mechanism when in fact it did, 

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with the omission intended to conceal that Safti’s product purportedly infringes the ’475 patent; 

(3) that Plaintiffs’ product did not meet the standards of the Buy American Act; and (4) that 

Plaintiff Greenlite is not an environmentally friendly company. See Mot. at 4.

The Court’s case management order dated March 18, 2019 set a deadline of May 7, 2019 

as the “last day to seek leave to amend pleadings,” and made clear that any motion to amend must 

be filed by that deadline. Patent Case Mgmt. & Pretrial Order (dkt. 36) at 1. Plaintiffs filed their 

present motion on December 20, 2019.

B. Legal Standard

Although Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a liberal standard for 

allowing amendment, that rule “does not provide the standards” applicable to the present motion. 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992). “Once the district 

court ha[s] filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 which 

establishe[s] a timetable for amending pleadings that rule’s standards control[].” Id. at 607–08.

Rule 16 provides that scheduling orders “may be modified only for good cause and with 

the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Ninth Circuit has established a standard for 

such modification that focuses on the diligence of the party seeking relief from a deadline:

Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy . . . , Rule 16(b)’s 

“good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence of the party 

seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial 

schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the 

party seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s 

notes (1983 amendment). Moreover, carelessness is not compatible 

with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. 

Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing 

the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, 

the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 

modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (citations omitted without ellipses). Courts look to a party’s diligence 

not only in complying with the scheduling order after it has been issued, but also “in creating a 

workable Rule 16 scheduling order,” as well as “in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once 

it became apparent that [the party] could not comply with the order.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 

186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999).

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C. Plaintiffs Have Shown Good Cause to Permit Belated Amendment

Safti argues that Plaintiffs were not diligent in seeking leave to amend many months after 

the deadline because one of the documents on which Plaintiffs rely—a 2007 email from Safti to a 

third party questioning Greenlite’s qualification for “Buy American” standards—was produced in 

May of 2019, and because Safti asserted that Greenlite did not meet those standards in its May 31, 

2019 counterclaim. See Opp’n (dkt. 130) at 3–4; Shah Decl. (dkt. 115-8) ¶ 4 & Ex. 1; Answer & 

Counterclaim (dkt. 56). Looking first to Safti’s counterclaim, there are any number of reasons 

why Plaintiffs might not have been motivated to bring a misrepresentation claim based on that 

document alone—for example, the fact that it was not specifically directed to customers, the fact 

that damages would be uncertain at best in the immediate aftermath of its filing, and the potential 

application of litigation privilege doctrines. 

The 2007 email produced in May of 2019 raises a closer question, and Plaintiffs do not 

explain why that document did not put them on notice of their claims to the extent that they are 

based on representations regarding Greenlite’s status with respect to “Buy American” 

requirements. Even so, that document relates to only one of the four theories underlying 

Plaintiffs’ proposed misrepresentation claims, and demonstrates only a single representation to a 

customer in San Diego, apparently unrelated to the Transbay Terminal project that is the focus of 

Plaintiffs’ proposed new claims.

Safti also suggests that Plaintiffs may have been on notice of the representations 

underlying their claims before the onset of this action because a third party that was the recipient 

of some of the representations at issue—Crown Corr Inc.—works with Greenlite subject to a nondisclosure agreement and was represented by Plaintiffs’ counsel in moving to quash a subpoena in 

this action. Opp’n at 2–3. Safti offers no evidence, however, that Crown Corr in fact shared the 

representations that Safti made to it with Plaintiffs before those documents were produced in this 

action.

Other than the 2007 email chain produced in May of 2019 addressed above, the remaining 

documents underlying Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment were produced in August and September 

of 2019, well after the amendment deadline. See Shah Decl. ¶ 4. Safti does not argue that 

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Plaintiffs were not diligent in obtaining that discovery.3 Plaintiffs proposed in October of 2019 to 

meet and confer with Safti to seek a stipulation to allow the amendment, and the parties met and 

conferred in early November but were not able to reach an agreement. Shah Reply Decl. (dkt. 

135-1) ¶ 6. While Plaintiffs likely could have filed their motion more promptly after obtaining 

those documents, Safti does not meaningfully argue that the time between Plaintiffs obtaining 

documents in August and September and the conference in November, or the time thereafter 

before Plaintiffs filed their motion in December, evinces a lack of diligence, and the Court does 

not fault Plaintiffs for pursuing negotiations before filing their motion. The Court concludes that 

Plaintiffs have shown sufficient diligence to alter the scheduling order to allow their proposed 

amendment.

Safti also argues that allowing amendment would be both prejudicial and futile. The only 

prejudice that Safti identifies is the need to conduct additional discovery, including reissuing some 

of its own requests for discovery that were previously denied as unnecessary to the then-existing 

claims. Opp’n at 4–6. Because the same burden would occur if this motion were denied and 

Plaintiffs instead filed their new claims as a separate action, the Court affords it little weight. No 

depositions have yet occurred, and the parties have jointly requested—separately from Plaintiffs’ 

motion to amend—that the fact discovery deadline be extended to June 30, 2020. Safti does not 

suggest that it would be unable to complete discovery on Plaintiffs proposed additional claims by 

that deadline.

As for futility, while Safti might well be correct that aspects of Plaintiffs’ proposed 

amendment fail to meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), such issues are better 

addressed on a motion to dismiss, and any deficiencies would likely warrant leave to further 

amend. The same is true of questions as to what inferences could be drawn from diagrams that 

Safti shared with potential customers or from statements about Greenlite’s environmental impact 

or the source of its glass, whether Plaintiffs’ allegations of intent or knowledge are sufficiently 

3 Safti takes issue with Plaintiffs’ failure, before bringing this motion, to produce to Safti certain 

documents obtained from third parties, but that issue has no bearing on whether Plaintiffs should 

be granted leave to amend. See Opp’n at 6.

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supported, and any deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ proposed interference claims.

Plaintiffs have shown good cause to permit amendment after the deadline, and their motion 

to do so is GRANTED. In the interest of avoiding a motion to dismiss that, if successful, is likely 

to lead only to another round of amendments, Plaintiffs may file a third amended complaint no 

later than February 14, 2020, asserting at most4the claims included in Plaintiffs’ proposed second 

amended complaint, supported by any factual allegations that Plaintiffs can add to address the 

arguments presented in Safti’s brief opposing the present motion for leave to amend. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court construes the remaining disputed claim term as discussed above. Safti’s motion 

for leave to amend is GRANTED. Safti may file a third amended complaint no later than

February 14, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2020

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

4 Plaintiffs are free, of course, to withdraw any of those claims if they so choose.

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