Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00037/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter Massinga, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 12-0037-TUC-JGZ (BPV)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by United

States Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco on January 28, 2013. (Doc.25.) The

Magistrate Judge recommends denying without prejudice Petitioner’s motion to dismiss his

§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Magistrate Judge also recommends denying

Petitioner’s motion to stay his Petition. On February 14, 2013, Petitioner filed an Objection

to the pending R&R. (Doc. 26.) In his Objection, Petitioner contends that the Magistrate

Judge erred in denying his motion to stay his Petition. For the following reasons, the Court

accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and

Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for clear

error the unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. Zema

Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Conley v. Crabtree,

14 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998). 

Case 4:12-cv-00037-JGZ Document 27 Filed 06/26/13 Page 1 of 4
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 1 As the Magistrate Judge noted, it is unclear when Petitioner discovered his proposed new

IAC claim. In his Objection, Petitioner alleges that he did not receive transcripts supporting the

claim until January 16, 2013; this cannot be the date of discovery, however as the claim was

raised in the motion to stay filed on December 3, 2012.

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In his Petition, Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief: (1) his Fourteenth

Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were violated when a state statute

regarding the burden of proof for proving a self defense justification was improperly applied

at his trial; and (2) he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance

of counsel because his trial counsel incorrectly understood the law concerning the burden of

proof for a self-defense justification. In his motion to stay, Petitioner argues that this case

should be placed on inactive status in order to permit Petitioner to return to state court and

exhaust a recently-discovered ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim. This new IAC

claim would allege that during trial, a juror met with the victim’s sister, the court allowed the

juror to remain on the panel and Petitioner’s counsel failed to object or move for a mistrial.

Petitioner argues he should be permitted to return to state court to allege that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to discover or raise the juror misconduct.1

 The Magistrate Judge

recommended that Petitioner’s motion to stay be denied because Petitioner has not

demonstrated that the new claim would relate back to the original petition, or would

otherwise be considered timely upon Petitioner’s return to federal court. In the pending

Objection, Petitioner asserts that his unexhausted claims relate back to this petition and

therefore the Court should exercise its discretion to stay the proceedings and allow him time

to return to state court to exhaust his new claim. 

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Petitioner’s motion to

stay be considered pursuant to the three-step procedure set forth in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d

1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the Kelly three-step procedure (1) a petitioner amends his

petition to delete any unexhausted claims, (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the

amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state

court to exhaust the deleted claims, and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and reCase 4:12-cv-00037-JGZ Document 27 Filed 06/26/13 Page 2 of 4
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attaches the newly-exhausted claims to the original petition. King, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2009). This three-step procedure may only be invoked if the newly exhausted claims

relate back to the claims that have already been properly exhausted. Id. at 1143. A claim

relates back to the petition if the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to

a common core of operative facts. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005). In other words,

an amended petition does not relate back (and thereby escape the one-year time limit) when

it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from

those the original petition set forth. Id. at 650. Moreover, a timely filed habeas corpus

petition does not toll the statute of limitations with respect to claims not included in that

petition. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001). 

Petitioner argues that his proposed IAC claim relates back to his original petition

because “the analyses for the new claim and the Petitioner’s [original] claims are identical.”

(Doc. 26, p. 3.) Petitioner further claims that he has exercised due diligence in discovering

this new claim. (Id. pp. 2-3.) However, the test to determine whether a new claim relates

back to the petition is not whether the new claim alleges the same legal basis as the original

claim nor whether petitioner has exercised due diligence. The question is whether the

original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts.

Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664. Petitioner’s new claim does not relate back to his original Petition.

Petitioner’s new allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel differs in both time and type

from his exhausted claims. The Petition alleges errors made by counsel concerning

arguments he made, pre-trial, as to the applicable burden of proof for an affirmative defense.

The proposed new IAC claim alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a

mistrial when alerted to possible juror misconduct. The exhausted and unexhausted claims

do not arise from a common core of operative facts. Accordingly, Petitioner’s unexhausted

claim does not relate back to the claims in his petition and the Court will not grant a stay. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

(1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 25) is accepted and adopted.

(2) Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice / Motion for Inactive Status

(Doc. 22) is DENIED. 

Dated this 26th day of June, 2013.

Case 4:12-cv-00037-JGZ Document 27 Filed 06/26/13 Page 4 of 4