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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3522

___________________________

Great West Casualty Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

National Casualty Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck

____________

 Submitted: September 10, 2015

 Filed: December 7, 2015

____________

Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

This is a liability insurance coverage dispute. In April 2011, independent

owner-operator Steven Heinis leased his Volvo semi-tractor and Trailmobile tankertrailer to Avery Enterprises (“Avery”), a trucking firm providing services to the oil

and gas industry in the Bakken oilfields in North Dakota. On June 18, Heinis drove

the tractor-trailer rig to Avery’s shop in Powers Lake, North Dakota, to repair a crack

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in the loading valve or pipe on Heinis’s trailer. When Jesse Miller, a shop employee,

contacted the pipe with his welding torch, an explosion occurred, injuring Miller, who

received workers’ compensation benefits from the North Dakota Workforce Safety &

Insurance Organization and filed a state court negligence action against Heinis. See

N.D. Cent. Code Ch. 65-02, § 65-01-09.

At the time in question, Great West Casualty Company (“Great West”) was

Heinis’s commercial lines liability insurer, and National Casualty Company

(“National”) was Avery’s commercial motor carrier liability insurer. Great West filed

this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that National is contractually

obligated to defend and indemnify Heinis in Miller’s pending state court lawsuit and

Great West is not. National’s Amended Answer asserted contrary positions. The

district court1

 granted summary judgment in favor of Great West, concluding that

Miller’s negligence claim against Heinis was covered under National’s policy and

excluded under Great West’s policy. Great W. Cas. Co. v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 53 F. Supp.

3d 1154, 1190 (D.N.D. 2014). National appeals. Though the parties have argued

other issues, to resolve the appeal we need only determine (i) that Heinis was an

“insured” under the National policy, (ii) that neither of two exclusions in the National

policy applied, and (iii) that the exclusion in Great West’s policy applied. Reviewing

these issues de novo, we affirm. 

I. Background

The April 2011 Lease Agreement provided that Avery would dispatch Heinis

to haul fresh water to drilling sites and contaminated “flowback” water from drilling

sites to disposal facilities. Avery dispatched and paid Heinis on a per-job basis. The

lease required Heinis to remain in “constant contact” with Avery and to respond to

1

The Honorable Charles S. Miller, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of North Dakota. 

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dispatches within a reasonable amount of time. Heinis hauled only for Avery from

the commencement of the lease until the June 2011 accident. Heinis agreed to

maintain the tractor and trailer in good and safe operational condition, to comply with

federal motor carrier safety regulations, and to be responsible for the cost of repairs,

maintenance, and fuel. The lease required Avery to maintain “fleet cargo and liability

insurance” for the equipment, and required Heinis to maintain “property and casualty

insurance (bobtail) for the leased equipment.”2

 At the time of the accident, Avery’s

name and DOT motor carrier numbers were affixed to the tractor. 

Some days prior to the accident, Heinis noticed a leak from the trailer’s valve

or pipe during loading and unloading. After using a bucket to prevent spills while

loading and unloading at least one load of contaminated water, Heinis called Kevin

Avery the day before the accident and arranged to have the leak repaired at Avery’s

repair shop. It is undisputed that the repair was Heinis’s responsibility under the

Lease Agreement and that Heinis was not required to have the repair done at Avery’s

shop. The next day, Heinis testified, he backed the trailer into the shop, unhooked the

trailer before Miller undertook the repair, and rehooked the trailer after the explosion

to pull it away from the scene. Kevin Avery testified that the tractor and trailer were

hooked together when he ran out of his office after hearing the explosion. 

Miller sued Heinis to recover damages for the serious injuries Miller sustained

while undertaking, at Avery’s shop, repairs that were Heinis’s responsibility under the

lease. Whether Miller’s claims are covered under Avery’s policy with National and/or

under Heinis’s policy with Great West requires us to review de novo the district

2

A motor vehicle policy that excludes coverage when the vehicle is operating

“in the business of” a lessee is commonly known as “bobtail” insurance. Federal law

requires interstate motor carriers, but not equipment lessors, to maintain minimum

levels of liability insurance. Thus, this term of the lease agreement and the terms of

Great West’s bobtail policy are issues of state law. See Hartford Ins. Co. v.

Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 908 F.2d 235, 237 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1990).

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court’s interpretation of these insurance contracts, as well as its decision to grant

summary judgment. See Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Empl’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau, 728 F.3d

822, 827 (8th Cir. 2013). 

II. Whether National’s Policy Provided Coverage to Heinis 

National’s policy provided coverage to an insured for “‘bodily injury’ or

‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies, caused by an ‘accident’ and

resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered ‘auto.’” National

argues there was no coverage because the “Who Is An Insured” provision did not

include Heinis, and because two exclusions applied. The parties do not challenge the

district court’s determination that North Dakota law governs these issues. Great W.,

53 F. Supp. 3d at 1159. Under North Dakota law: 

The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law, fully

reviewable on appeal. Our goal when interpreting insurance policies, as

when construing other contracts, is to give effect to the mutual intention

of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting. NDCC § 9-07-03. 

Generally, we attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties through the

language of the contract itself. NDCC § 9-07-04. 

Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D. 1994) (other citations

omitted). 

A. Was Heinis a Covered Insured? Section II.A.1.c. of National’s Motor

Carrier Coverage Form provided that Who Is An Insured included:

c. The owner or anyone else from whom you [Avery] hire or

borrow a covered “auto” that is a “trailer” while the “trailer” is

connected to another covered “auto” that is a power unit, or, if not

connected, is being used exclusively in your business.

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It is undisputed that Heinis’s leased tractor was a covered auto “power unit” and that

Miller’s injuries resulted from an accident during “maintenance or use” of the leased

trailer. Great West argued that Heinis was an insured because the trailer was a

covered auto under § II.A.1.c. National argued that § II.A.1.c. did not apply because

the accident occurred when the tractor and trailer were not “connected” and the trailer

was not being used exclusively in Avery’s business. The district court concluded that

§ II.A.1.c. applied because the trailer was being used exclusively in Avery’s business

at the time of the accident. Great W., 53 F. Supp. 3d at 1162-71. We need not reach

that question because we conclude that, even if the trailer was not being used

exclusively in Avery’s business at the time of the accident,3

 it was “connected to

another covered ‘auto’ that is a power unit.”

National argues that § II.A.1.c. did not provide coverage because “connected”

required that the trailer be physically attached to a covered power unit when the

accident occurred, and Heinis testified that he unhooked the tractor and trailer before

Miller began the repairs. We agree with the district court that whether the tractor and

trailer were physically attached when the explosion occurred was at least a disputed

issue of fact. At the summary judgment stage, we must view the facts in favor of the

non-moving party, and therefore we assume the trailer was physically unhooked at the

3

The district court relied on the decision in Freed v. Travelers, 300 F.2d 395,

398 (7th Cir. 1962) (explaining that “the procurement of repairs incident to lessor’s

duty to hold the tractor ready at all times for the services of the lessee is to be regarded

as an activity exclusively in the business of the lessee”) (quotation omitted). But

Freed was premised on an Interstate Commerce Commission order mandating that

leases provide for the exclusive possession, use, and control of leased equipment by

the lessee. Id. Motor carrier transportation has been significantly deregulated, and the

regulation requiring this provision is now subject to exemptions. See 49 C.F.R.

§ 376.12(c)(1). The Lease Agreement did not contain a provision giving lessee Avery

exclusive possession, use, and control of leased equipment. Neither the parties nor the

district court addressed the significance of this omission in applying the policy term

“exclusively” to the facts of this case. 

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moment the explosion occurred. See, e.g., Watkins Inc. v. Chilkoot Distrib., Inc., 655

F.3d 802, 803 (8th Cir. 2011). But we conclude this is not a material fact dispute that

precludes the grant of summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

We are unaware of any case, from North Dakota or any jurisdiction, that has

interpreted the word “connected” in this context. Thus, we must determine how the

Supreme Court of North Dakota would resolve the issue. See, e.g., Hudson Specialty

Ins. Co. v. Brash Tygr, LLC, 769 F.3d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 2014). That Court would

“look first to the language of the insurance contract, and if the policy language is clear

on its face, there is no room for construction. If coverage hinges on an undefined

term, we apply the plain, ordinary meaning of the term in interpreting the contract.” 

Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Decker, 704 N.W.2d 857, 860 (N.D. 2005). In

conducting this analysis, “a contract may be explained by reference to the

circumstances under which it was made and the matter to which it relates.” Norgard,

518 N.W.2d at 183, citing N.D. Cent. Code § 9-07-12. 

Because National’s policy does not define the term “connected,” we must give

the term its plain, ordinary meaning. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

defines “connected” as including objects “joined or linked together,” or “having the

parts or elements logically related,” at 480 (1986). This definition includes objects

that are physically attached, but the words “linked” and “logically related” do not

require physical attachment. So the term as used in § II.A.1.c. needs to be defined by

reference to “the matter to which it relates.”

A commercial tractor and trailer need not operate as a single unit. The trailer

can be unhitched and hauled by other tractors operating for different owners or lessees

under different contracts. When the tractor is a “covered auto,” this provision was

obviously intended to exclude coverage for accidents arising from use of a companion

trailer when the trailer is operated separately from the tractor and the insured’s

business. But when a scheduled trailer is “connected,” that is, functioning as a unit

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with a scheduled tractor, both are covered autos. There clearly are times when a

trailer is briefly unhooked from a tractor for a reason that is consistent with the

trailer’s status as a covered auto. For example, the driver performing a haul for the

insured may briefly detach the trailer to save fuel while he drives to a nearby filling

station to refuel the tractor. The trailer is physically unhooked, but the tractor and

trailer are still an operating unit, and the trailer should be considered “connected” to

the tractor for purposes of § II.A.1.c. This interpretation is consistent with the parties’

intent to provide coverage to the lessor of a covered auto being used in the lessee’s

business. Therefore, whether Heinis was covered by reason of § II.A.1.c. does not

turn only on whether he unhooked the tractor and trailer to facilitate the trailer’s

repair. Rather, the Supreme Court of North Dakota would consider the relevant

question to be whether the tractor and the trailer were functioning as a paired unit

when the accident occurred.

The Lease Agreement obligated Heinis to remain in “constant contact” with

Avery’s dispatcher and to respond to dispatches within a reasonable time. The record

reflects that, every time Heinis transported a load as Avery’s lessor, he drove the same

tractor pulling the same trailer. After entering into the lease, Heinis did not use the

tractor-trailer rig for any purpose other than hauling loads for Avery. In these

circumstances, the tractor and trailer were a functional unit consisting of two types of

covered autos being used in Avery’s business. 

The lease required Heinis to maintain the trailer in safe operating condition and

to perform all repairs and maintenance in a timely manner. After discovering the leak,

Heinis used a bucket to prevent spills while loading and unloading contaminated

drilling water for Avery. He then called Kevin Avery and arranged to have the leak

fixed at Avery’s shop before the tractor and trailer would be dispatched on another

job. Thus, in repairing the tractor, Heinis was executing his contractual duties and,

as the explosion tragically confirmed, eliminating an unsafe condition before

continuing to transport loads under the Lease Agreement. The tractor and trailer

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arrived at Avery’s repair shop as a unit and were unhooked only to facilitate repair the

lease required. Momentarily unhooking the trailer to make a necessary repair did not

render the trailer “not connected” to the tractor. On these undisputed facts, we

conclude that Heinis’s tractor was “connected” to a covered auto power unit for the

purposes of § II.A.1.c. of National’s policy. Therefore, Heinis was an “insured” to

whom the liability coverage provided by National’s policy applied to Miller’s claim

that Heinis’s negligence caused the explosion. 

B. Did a Policy Exclusion Apply? National argues that, even if its policy

provided Heinis coverage for the accident that injured Miller, the “employer’s

liability” and “fellow employee” exclusions precluded coverage. Section II.B.5. of

National’s policy, the “Fellow Employee” exclusion, excluded coverage for “[b]odily

injury to . . . [a]ny fellow employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of

the fellow employee’s employment or while performing duties related to the conduct

of your business.” National argued that Heinis was an employee of Avery, and

therefore a fellow employee of Miller, because the definition of employee in the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSRs”) should replace any contrary

definitions in its policy or in state law.4

 The district court, noting that the Supreme

Court of North Dakota has not considered this question, and that other jurisdictions

have reached conflicting conclusions, held that the FMCSRs did not apply, and even

if they did, Heinis was not an employee under the FMCSRs. Great W., 53 F. Supp.

3d at 1178-88. Applying North Dakota’s rule requiring courts to construe ambiguous

exclusions strictly against the insurer, the district court found no reason to depart from

4

The FMCSRs define “employee” as “any individual, other than an employer,

who is employed by an employer and who in the course of his or her employment

directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety. Such term includes a driver of a

commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor while in the course

of operating a commercial motor vehicle), a mechanic, and a freight handler.” 49

C.F.R. § 390.5.

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the plain meaning of the definition in National’s policy or to assume that the FMCSRs

were implicitly incorporated. Great W., 53 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. 

Section II.B.4.a. of National’s policy, the “Employer’s Liability” exclusion,

excluded coverage for “[b]odily injury to . . . [a]n employee of the insured arising out

of and in the course of (1) Employment by the insured; or (2) Performing the duties

related to the conduct of the insured’s business.” National argued that, if Heinis was

an additional “insured,” this provision excluded coverage because the bodily injury

caused by the covered accident was suffered by Miller, an employee of the named

insured. National cited our decision in Farmers Elevator Mutual Insurance Co. v. Carl

J. Austad & Sons, Inc., 366 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1966), as controlling on this issue of

North Dakota law. The district court disagreed because the policy in Farmers lacked

a “severability clause,”5

 and the presence of this clause created an ambiguity that must

be resolved against National in construing this exclusion.6

 In its only decision

considering this issue, the Supreme Court of North Dakota “observed that the

jurisdictions that have attempted to reconcile severability clauses and exclusionary

clauses have not done so uniformly,” and concluded that “the ambiguity here is

resolved by applying the rules for interpreting contracts, contained in NDCC Chapter

9-07.” Norgard, 518 N.W.2d at 182-83.

We agree with the district court that neither exclusion applied. But unlike the

district court, we conclude the Supreme Court of North Dakota would apply the

5

National’s policy provided that, “Except with respect to the Limit of Insurance,

the coverage afforded applies separately to each insured who is seeking coverage or

against whom a claim or suit is brought.”

6

In so ruling, the court disregarded our decision in Universal Underwriters

Insurance Co. v. McMahon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc., 866 F.2d 1060, 1064 (8th Cir.

1989), where we concluded that, despite the policy’s severability clause, the Supreme

Court of South Dakota would not “extend[] an insurer’s liability to additional insureds

above and beyond that afforded to the named insured.” 

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analysis mandated by Norgard equally to both exclusions. National does not (and

could not) challenge the district court’s conclusion that the interpretation of the

exclusions is governed by state law. Applying North Dakota common law to the

Lease Agreement, it appears that Heinis was acting as Avery’s independent contractor,

not its employee, at the time of the accident. See generally Doan ex rel. Doan v. City

of Bismarck, 632 N.W.2d 815, 821 (N.D. 2001); Iverson v. Bronco Drilling Co., Inc.,

667 F. Supp 2d 1089, 1094 (D.N.D. 2009); see also 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(4)

(“[n]othing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section is intended

to affect whether the lessor or driver provided by the lessor is an independent

contractor or an employee of the authorized carrier lessee”). 

The fellow employee and employer’s liability exclusions limit the policy

coverage to liabilities that are not excluded by the remedy of workers’ compensation

benefits. Workers’ compensation benefits are an injured employee’s exclusive

remedy against his employer and fellow employees for an injury arising out of and in

the course of employment. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code §§ 65-01-01, 65-01-08.1;

Mitchell v. Sanborn, 536 N.W.2d 678, 683 (N.D. 1995). By statute, an “employee”

may recover workers’ compensation benefits from an “employer,” but not from “an

independent contractor under the common-law test,” § 65-01-02.17. An injured

employee may “proceed at law to recover damages” that a third person is liable to pay,

including an independent contractor of the employer. If the employee has received

workers’ compensation benefits, the North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance

Organization “is subrogated to the rights of the injured employee” and has a lien that

“attaches to all . . . insurance payable by reason of a legal liability of a third person.” 

§ 65-01-09. 

Miller’s lawsuit is premised on these statutory principles -- he received

workers’ compensation benefits as Avery’s employee and sued Heinis for negligence. 

If Heinis was acting as a common law independent contractor, North Dakota law will

apparently permit Miller to recover in the negligence action. If Heinis is denied

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coverage under National’s policy by reason of either exclusion -- because the FMCSR

definition of employee applies, or because an insurer’s liability to additional insureds

may not exceed that afforded the named insured -- and if coverage is also excluded

under Great West’s “bobtail” insurance, then Miller and the Workforce Safety &

Insurance Organization will likely find any damages recovered in the negligence

action uncollectible. Of course, no North Dakota statute or judicial precedent

precludes this result. But we conclude the Supreme Court of North Dakota would find

it inconsistent with the policies underlying the workers’ compensation statutes and

therefore with the parties’ intent reflected in the insurance contract. See Blaskowski

v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 380 N.W.2d 333, 335 (N.D. 1986) (“The purpose

of the Bureau’s subrogation rights is to reimburse the fund . . . at the expense of the

persons at fault.”). In these circumstances, applying Norgard, the Court would rule

that these exclusions, read together with the severability clause, do not apply to relieve

National of the duty to defend additional-insured Heinis from a negligence action by

the named insured’s employee.7

 National’s duty to indemnify Heinis, if any, must of

course await the outcome of Miller’s lawsuit. 

III. Whether Great West’s Policy Provided Coverage to Heinis

The district court held that Great West’s policy excluded coverage for Heinis

in Miller’s underlying state court lawsuit because the trailer was a covered auto being

used “in the business of” Avery, a person “to whom the ‘auto’ is rented, leased or

loaned.” Great W., 53 F. Supp. 3d at 1189-90. We agree. 

7

In other words, consistent with North Dakota workers’ compensation

principles, the Court would read the severability clause in National’s policy as

excluding coverage only when an injured employee brings a negligence claim against

his own employer or fellow employee. Here, under North Dakota common law,

Heinis was not Miller’s fellow employee at Avery, nor was he Miller’s employer.

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We have found no North Dakota Supreme Court decision interpreting “in the

business of” in this context. In National Continental Insurance Co. v. Empire Fire &

Marine Insurance Co., 157 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1998), the owner-operator of a tractor

under permanent lease to a trucking company was sued by persons injured in an

accident that occurred while he was driving the tractor in for scheduled maintenance. 

The trucking company’s insurer sued the operator’s “nontrucking” liability insurer to

recover settlement damages and litigation costs. Applying Oregon law, we concluded

that, in construing the defendant insurer’s exclusion for damages while a covered auto

is “used in the business of” the lessee, the question was whether the independent

contractor “was acting within the scope of the service contract with [the lessee] -- in

other words, whether he was fulfilling his bargained-for contractual duties at the time

of the accident. To the extent that he was executing his contractual duties, he was

clearly acting ‘in the business of’ [the lessee].” Nat’l Cont’l, 157 F.3d at 612, citing

Hartford, 908 F.2d at 239. 

While not controlling authorities, we agree with the district court that the

Supreme Court of North Dakota would adopt the reasoning of National Continental

and Hartford and look to the terms of the Lease Agreement between Heinis and Avery

to determine whether, at the time of the accident, Heinis was performing his

contractual duties and therefore the trailer was being used in Avery’s business.8

 The

Lease Agreement required Heinis to maintain the trailer in safe operating condition,

to perform all repairs and maintenance in a timely manner, and to comply with all

federal motor carrier safety regulations. After Heinis finished a haul for Avery in

which he used a bucket to prevent spills of contaminated water, Heinis contacted

8

National argues that South Dakota law governs this issue because Heinis is a

South Dakota resident and Great West issued its policy there. This is a dubious

choice-of-law contention given the dispute’s ties to North Dakota, but in any event we

conclude the Supreme Court of South Dakota would apply the same analysis. 

National has not argued that South Dakota law differs from North Dakota law in any

relevant respect.

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Kevin Avery and arranged to have the leak repaired before Heinis was again

dispatched. In having the tractor repaired, Heinis executed his contractual duties and

therefore was acting in Avery’s business at the time of the accident.

National argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this

issue because the phrase “in the business of” is an ambiguity that must be construed

against the insurer, Great West. National notes that various courts have interpreted

the phrase to apply when the driver is “under dispatch,” is acting at the specific

direction of the carrier, or is engaged in an “operational routine.” However, that a

contract term is subject to conflicting interpretations does not make it ambiguous as

a matter of law. Moreover, the Supreme Court of South Dakota “would be reluctant

to apply the general rule construing ambiguities liberally in favor of the insured and

strictly against an insurer in a dispute between insurance companies.” St. Paul Fire

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Schilling, 520 N.W.2d 884, 889 (S.D. 1994). 

Under North Dakota and South Dakota law, the meaning of an insurance policy

is determined based on contractual intent and the objectives of the parties as expressed

in the contract. Trucking and bobtail insurance policies are intended to ensure there

is liability coverage when leased equipment is used for both trucking and non-trucking

activities. The focus in National Continental and Hartford on the lessor’s bargainedfor contractual duties at the time of the accident is consistent with that purpose. We

conclude that the Supreme Courts of North Dakota and South Dakota would interpret

the Great West bobtail policy to exclude coverage for an accident that occurred while

the equipment was being used “in the business of” the trucking company lessee and

was covered by the lessee’s liability insurer. That is the situation presented in this

case, We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that Miller’s claim against Heinis

was not covered by the Great West policy.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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