Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02580/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02580-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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* The appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal.  After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded

that oral argument is unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 24, 2010*

Decided March 25, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2580

WILLIAM P. LACEY,

           Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 08‐cv‐483‐JPG

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

O R D E R

In this lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971), inmate William Lacey claims that he was denied adequate medical care

while confined at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois.  The district court

screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it for failure to state a claim.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-2580 Document: 18 Filed: 03/25/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09‐2580 Page 2

For purposes here we accept as true the facts alleged by Lacey.  See Ortiz v. Downey,

561 F.3d 664, 666 n.2 (7th Cir. 2009).  Before Lacey entered Marion, he was in a car accident

and also suffered a stroke, which together impaired the functioning of his left extremities.

Lacey had been prescribed a motorized wheelchair, paid for by Medicaid, but he was not

permitted to use it at Marion.  Alternative accommodations for his disability were not

provided, Lacey continues, and he repeatedly fell and injured himself while trying to walk.

At the same time, Lacey adds, he was denied adult diapers to mitigate the effects of a

bladder condition.

The district court construed Lacey’s complaint as raising a claim under the Eighth

Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.  The court reasoned,

however, that Lacey had not connected any named defendant to the denial of his

wheelchair, and thus failed to state a claim concerning the prison’s response to his difficulty

ambulating.  And while the complaint does attribute the denial of adult diapers to one of

the defendants, a prison doctor, the court reasoned that Lacey’s allegations establish a

simple disagreement with the doctor about how best to respond to his bladder condition.

On appeal, instead of challenging the district court’s reasoning, Lacey redefines his

legal theory and analogizes his case to a successful lawsuit filed against the Bureau of

Prisons in Texas under the Federal Torts Claims Act.  See Muhammed v. United States, 6

F. Supp. 2d 582 (N.D. Tex. 1998).  But despite including the United States in the caption of

his complaint, Lacey did not sue under the FTCA, and he has failed to articulate any other

basis for disturbing the district court’s judgment.  Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

See Haxhiu v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2008); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544,

545 (7th Cir. 2001).

Case: 09-2580 Document: 18 Filed: 03/25/2010 Pages: 2