Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-03180/USCOURTS-ca3-14-03180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 14-3180

_____________

IN RE: EX PARTE APPLICATION OF GLOBAL ENERGY HORIZONS 

CORPORATION

 

 Global Energy Horizons Corporation,

 Appellant

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(District Court No. 1-13-mc-00265)

District Judge: Hon. Gregory M. Sleet 

______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

October 8, 2015

______________

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: April 26, 2016)

_______________________

OPINION*

_______________________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2016
2

MCKEE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Global Energy Horizons Corporation appeals the district court’s orders 

denying its motions to compel discovery from Sheridan Production Company and for 

reargument. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the district court’s orders.1

I.

Because we write for the parties who are already familiar with the facts and 

procedural history, we set forth only the background necessary to our conclusion.2

The district court’s grant of Global’s request for discovery from Sheridan pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1782 permitted Global to subpoena a wide range of documents from Sheridan. 

Most relevant to this appeal, Global’s subpoena requested all communications between 

Sheridan’s 400 to 450 employees and Gray/RegEnersys from 2006 to present and any 

financial documents relating to certain technology used in oil and gas production. 

Thereafter, Global filed a motion to compel full compliance and offered to share in the 

associated reasonable costs.

The district court denied the motion, concluding, inter alia, that Sheridan had 

already responded to multiple burdensome and costly discovery requests from Global and 

that it was unlikely that all 400 to 450 Sheridan employees had responsive information 

regarding Gray’s ill-received profits. The court denied Global’s motion for reargument

and this appeal followed.

 

1

 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782. This court has 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

2 For a more detailed exposition of this matter’s history, see Order Denying Motion to 

Compel, A2-001086 and Order Denying Motion for Reargument, A2-001546. 

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/26/2016
3

We review a district court’s decision on a request for discovery under § 1782 for 

abuse of discretion.3 In instances where the district court “misinterpreted or misapplied 

the law,” or “relied on inappropriate factors in the exercise of its discretion,” our review 

is plenary.4 Because the district court did not commit any such errors in this case, we 

confine our review to abuse of discretion. We also review the district court’s denial of 

the motion for reargument for abuse of discretion.5 

II.

28 U.S.C. § 1782 allows district courts to authorize litigants to obtain evidence for 

use in foreign proceedings.6 In considering such requests, courts typically examine four 

factors, namely: (1) whether the discovery sought is within the foreign tribunal’s 

jurisdictional reach and therefore accessible without aid under § 1782; (2) the nature of 

the foreign litigation and the foreign jurisdiction’s receptivity to court assistance from the 

United States; (3) whether the § 1782 request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign

proof-gathering limits or other policies of the foreign country; and (4) whether the 

subpoena includes unduly intrusive or overly burdensome requests.7 

Only the fourth factor is disputed here. Section 1782 expressly incorporates the 

 

3 See In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 161 (3d Cir. 2011). 

4

Id. (quoting In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1998)).

5 See McDowell v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).

6 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (providing in relevant part that “[t]he district court of the district in 

which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to 

produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international 

tribunal”).

7 See In Re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d at 162-64; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 

Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256-61 (2004). 

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/26/2016
4

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the fourth factor aligns with Rules 26 and 45. Thus,

assessment of the fourth factor is virtually identical to the familiar “overly burdensome” 

analysis that is integral to the Federal Rules.8 Accordingly, courts only allow “discovery 

[that] appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” 

pursuant to Rule 26.9 However, discovery is circumscribed by Rule 45, which provides 

that a “party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take 

reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the 

subpoena.”10 

Global alleges that the district court committed five errors in denying its discovery 

request. We disagree. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it denied Global’s motion to compel.

The district court reasonably concluded that much of the information Global 

sought was not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as required by Rule 

26. The court found that Global’s assertion that all 400 to 450 Sheridan employees were 

 

8 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (“To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the 

testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in 

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); see Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 

173 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . 

. . are incorporated by reference into 28 U.S.C. § 1782”).

9 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (amended in 2015 after the court issued its order; Rule 

26(b)(1) now reads out “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence” in favor of discovery that is “proportional to the needs of the case”).

10 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1). 

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/26/2016
5

likely to have discoverable information was speculative. As the district court noted, 

Global did not provide any basis for this expansive assertion.11 

Additionally, the district court properly treated the apparent lack of a formal 

business relationship between Sheridan and Gray as another count against Global’s 

motion. Although not dispositive, the tenuous connection between Sheridan and Gray 

lessens the likelihood that Sheridan employees would be in possession of information 

likely to lead to discoverable evidence relating to Gray’s profits. Similarly, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in considering Sheridan’s CEO’s affidavits and deposition 

testimony regarding Sheridan’s business relationship with Gray. The fact that the court 

presiding over the foreign proceeding may have questioned the CEO’s credibility is of 

little moment since that testimony was in a different context and the validity of the 

foreign court’s determination in the district court is dubious. 

The district court was on firm ground in concluding that the discovery sought by 

Global would likely have been intrusive and burdensome in violation of Rule 45 despite 

Global’s offer to pay for reasonable costs. Rule 45 counsels against loosely tailored and 

burdensome demands for production such as Global’s. As the district court explained, 

Global’s desired discovery would likely have had a significant “collateral effect” on 

Sheridan’s operations.12 The record indicates that it would cause the disruption of each 

Sheridan employee, and not only require that they be interviewed to understand how their 

files are organized but also require that their hard drives be copied. Sheridan estimated 

 

11 See Order Denying Motion to Compel, A2-001086.

12 Order Denying Motion for Reargument, A2-001546.

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/26/2016
6

that this process would entail hundreds-of-thousands of dollars in costs that Global had 

not offered to cover. Thus, Global’s contention that the district court abused its 

discretion in failing to consider Global’s proposal to mitigate costs lacks sufficient merit. 

We realize, of course, that the district court could have modified the motion, 

however, it was under no obligation to do so.13 Sheridan had already spent thousands of 

dollars and substantial time responding to multiple discovery requests from Global since 

2008, despite not being a party to the foreign proceedings. In other words, this is not a 

case where a party has wholly failed to provide discovery.14 Sheridan had generally been

responsive to Global’s requests. Therefore, the district court’s decision not to modify the 

subpoena was reasonable. Moreover, as discussed above, the record suggests that even a 

modified discovery request would not have led to additional discoverable information.

Finally, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in finding 

that Sheridan was under no duty to preserve its emails. The record did not lead the 

district court to conclude that Sheridan should have known that litigation was imminent.15 

Sheridan was not a party to the foreign proceeding and Global never sought a litigation 

hold on Sheridan’s electronically stored information. Therefore, the district court did not 

 

13 See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 265 (2004) (noting that 

overly burdensome requests “may be rejected or trimmed”) (emphasis added).

14

 See Naviant Mktg. Sols., Inc. v. Larry Tucker, Inc., 339 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2003)

(holding that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled on a motion to compel 

without considering the good faith of the parties); Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 

633 F.3d 591, 598 (7th Cir. 2011).

15 See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/26/2016
7

demonstrate a “gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness” requiring 

reversal of its denial to compel.16

III.

Global’s motion for reargument fares no better. As a general rule, such motions 

should only be granted “sparingly.”

17 It is appropriate to grant reconsideration when at 

least one of the following can be shown: “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; 

(2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or 

prevent manifest injustice.”18 

Global’s motion rests only on the second factor. Global contends that it is entitled 

to reargument because: (1) new evidence suggests that Gray and Sheridan had a business 

relationship; (2) there are omissions in the documents that Sheridan has produced; and (3) 

the affidavits provided by Sheridan are from an individual who has a motive to mislead 

and has been found unreliable in the foreign proceeding. However, the district court 

found that Global’s motion was not based on any new evidence or newly discovered 

facts. Global simply asked the district court to revisit the same arguments it already 

considered in ruling on the motion to compel. We will not negate the limitations on 

reargument and encourage “a never ending polemic” between the parties and the court by 

validating Global’s request for reargument.

19

 

 

16 Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

17 Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 470 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 (D. Del. 2007).

18 Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). 

19 Pirelli Cable Corp. v. Ciena Corp., 988 F. Supp. 424, 446 (D. Del. 1997).

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/26/2016
8

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the district court’s orders.

Case: 14-3180 Document: 003112274249 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/26/2016