Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01602/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01602-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

**E-Filed**

August 4, 2005

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JAHAN ALAMZAD, individually and dba

CA CONSULTING,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LUFTHANSA CONSULTING GMBH, ET. AL.

Defendants.

 /

NO. C04-01602 RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

EFFECT TIMELY SERVICE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jahan Alamzad ("Alamzad"), initiated this suit claiming breach of contract, breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud and deceit, and negligent misrepresentation. The suit is based

upon allegations that defendant Lufthansa Consulting GMBH ("LCG") breached a contract involving the

delivery, management, and training of a computer software package. LCG's parent corporation, Deutsche

Lufthansa AG ("DLAG") is also named as a party to this litigation. 

Defendant movesto dismissthe actioninits entirety, or, inthe alternative, requests that it be dismissed

fromthe suit, onthe groundsthat Alamzad failed to serve any ofthe defendants in a timely fashion. The motion

was fully briefed and heard by the Court on August 3, 2005. Based on all papers filed to date, as well as on

the oral argument of counsel, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion for the reasons set forth

below.

Case 5:04-cv-01602-RS Document 38 Filed 08/04/05 Page 1 of 7
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1Although a waiver of service normally waives any challenge to the timeliness or sufficiency of service, the parties

filed a stipulation which granted DLAG time to answer or respond to the complaint, and deemed their appearance not to have

waived any challenge to the timeliness of service of process. See Proposed Order Re Service of Process, Filed on May 3,

2005. 

2

II. BACKGROUND

On July 17, 2001, LCG allegedly breached its contract with Alamzad by denying payment for

consulting services he rendered onbehalf ofLCGto Mexicana Airlines. On April 27, 2004, Alamzad initiated

this suit against LCG and DLAG, its parent corporation. After failing to serve LCG in California, Alamzad

attempted to effectservice uponDLAG inGermany, believing that he must proceedaccordingtothe provisions

of the Hague Convention of 1965. In order to facilitate service, the Court granted Alamzad an extension of

time inwhichto serve defendants. However, Alamzad continued to experience trouble serving defendants, and

the Court granted a second and then a third request for an extension through to April 14, 2005.

Duringhislastattemptatservice,Alamzaddiscovered that "LufthansaGermanAirlines"is anothername

for DLAG and sought to add "LufthansaGermanAirlines"to the complaint. The Court granted leave to amend

but denied a fourth request for an extensionoftime. Thereafter, Alamzad effected service on DLAG’s office

in New York on March 23, 2005. Having received no timely response from DLAG, however, Alamzad

requested entry ofdefault judgment. In opposition to Alamzad's request, DLAG filed a waiver of service, and

argued that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2)(F) allows for the waiver to be returned up to "30 days from the day on

which the request was sent."1 Opposition to Request for Entry of Default, p. 1, line 22 (April 22, 2005).

DLAG also contended that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3), it had 60 days from the date the waiver was

executed to respond to the complaint. Subsequently, the request for entry of default judgment was denied.

DLAG now movesto dismissthis actiondue to Alamzad'sfailure to serve the summons and complaint

ina timely fashion. DLAG contends that the public nature of its contact information and, further, that precludes

a finding of good cause for Alamzad's continued failure to effect service. DLAG also argues that Alamzad

failed to serve it properly because the summons and complaint was delivered to an agent not authorized to

acceptservice. Alamzad responds that good cause exists because Arthur Molins, General Counsel for DLAG,

provided Alamzad with misleading informationand, further, that DLAG's website was circuitous in explaining

the method of effecting proper service on DLAG. Alamzad also contends that service was accomplished on

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DLAG properly throughLawrence Mullins, Mr. Molins' legal assistant. Alamzad reports that he continuesto

pursue service of process on LCG in Germany.

III. STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an action may be dismissed for

insufficiency of service of process. Motions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor, however, and are rarely

granted. Hallv. CityofSanta Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. CityofRedwood City,

640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). 

With respect to service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) states in pertinent part,

If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after

the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the

plaintiff,shall dismissthe actionwithout prejudice asto that defendant or direct thatservice be

effected within a specified time provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure,

the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

Thus, the court isrequired to extend the time for service if the plaintiff shows "good cause" forfailure. See De

Tie v. Orange County,152 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998). At minimum, "good cause" equates with the

"excusable neglect" standard under Rule 6(b). Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991)

(emphasis added).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. DLAG's Motion to Dismiss

While "good cause" is not preciselydefined,theNinthCircuit hasstated that "a plaintiffmaybe required

to show the following factors in order to bring anexcuse to the levelofgood cause: (a) the party to be served

received actual notice of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would suffer no prejudice and (c) plaintiff would be

severely prejudiced ifhis complaint were dismissed." Inre Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 512 (9thCir. 2001)(citing

Boudette, 923 F.2d at 756). 

There is no dispute with respect to the firstfactor. At oral argument, DLAG made it clear that it was

not contesting whether or not DLAG received actual notice, rather its contentions are based on Alamzad's

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2

In support of its contention that it did not receive timely service, DLAG provides an affidavit in which Lawrence

Mullins, Mr. Molin's legal assistant, states that he never represented that he was an authorized agent on behalf of Lufthansa

German Airlines. Lawrence Mullins Decl., p. 2, line 7. Alamzad, however, alleges that Mr. Mullins informed the process server

that he was an agent authorized to receive service on behalf of Lufthansa German Airlines. Certificate of Service, p. 4, line

8 (Apr. 18, 2005).

3The statute of limitations for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising

from contract claims is four years under Cal. Civ. Pro. §337. The statute of limitations for claims based on fraud, deceit, and

misrepresentation is three years under Cal. Civ. Pro. §338. 

4

failure to serve DLAG in a timely fashion. As to service, the record is unclear.2 That issue, however, is not

dispositive. The first factor in Sheehan does not ask whether the plaintiff has effected proper service, but

whether the defendant has received actual notice. Regardless of whether proper service was effected, at a

minimum, DLAG presumably was apprised of the action by Mr. Mullins. The first factor from Sheehan,

therefore, weighs in favor of Alamzad.

With respect to the second factor, beyond losing the benefit that the statute of limitations may have

expired,3there is nothing inthe record to suggestthat DLAG was prejudiced bythe grants of extensions oftime

for service ofprocess. A defendant losing the benefit of expiration of the statute of limitations has been found

not to constitute prejudice within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Boleyv. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758

(3d Cir. 1997). While not binding inthe NinthCircuit,Boleyis persuasive authority for the propositionthat the

running of the statute of limitations period does not assist DLAG for purposes of this motion.

The third factor, whether Alamzad would suffersevere prejudice, weighsinhisfavor. Dismissal of the

current actionwould severelyprejudiceAlamzadbecause, as noted, the applicable statutes oflimitations appear

to have expired. Committee Notes onAmendmentsto Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1993); De Tie, 152

F.3d at 1111 n. 5. As a result, if this action is dismissed, Alamzad may be barred from re-filing his claims

against defendants. 

DLAG contends that good cause does not exist to justify any extension of time for service because it

was easily determinable that it could have been served in East Meadow, New York. This argument hassome

merit, since mistakes by attorneys or the "inadvertence of counsel" do not constitute good cause. Wei v.

Hawaii, 763 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's counsel mistakenly had not calendared the 120 day

limit). "[A] diligent, but deficient attempt at service could be held inexcusable." Electric Specialty Co. v. Road

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4Plaintiff also argues that good cause exists because Mr. Molins made misleading representations about DLAG.

Regardless of whether Mr. Molins made misrepresentations, reliance on agents such as Mr. Molins is not grounds for good

cause. See Boudette, 923 F.2d at 757 (plaintiff's reliance on district court clerk was not reasonable); Putnam v. Morris, 833

F.2d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 1987) ("It is trial counsel’s responsibility to monitor the activity of the process server and to take

reasonable steps to assure that a defendant is timely served."). 

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and Ranch Supply, Inc., 967 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, these cases are distinguishable

from the facts presented in this action. 

Here, Alamzad’s belief that DLAG was served properly was based on a valid certificate of service.

Reliance ona swornlegaldocument is entirely different from the "inadvertence of counsel" and facts presented

in Wei. In this instance, it would be unreasonable to expect Alamzad’s counsel to verify the validity of the

certificate of service since there was no reason to suspect it was deficient. For these reasons, the Court finds

that good cause exists to extend Alamzad's time to effect proper service on DLAG or, in this case, deem

service on DLAG to have been effected.4

B. Service on LCG

With respect to LCG, good cause does not exist for any leniency. Alamzad has had more than

adequate opportunity to serve LCG in the past. In addition, there is scant evidence at this juncture that

Alamzad will be able to effect service in the near future. Hence, DLAG's motion to dismiss is granted with

respect to LCGunless Alamzad candemonstrate thatservice has beenproperly beeneffected on LCG by the

case management conference in this matter scheduled for August 17, 2005.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court deniesinpart and grantsinpart DLAG's motionto dismissforfailure

timely to serve defendants. With respect to DLAG, the motion to dismiss is denied. Alamzad has been

deemed to have effected service from the date of this order. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A), DLAG

has twenty (20) days to file an answer or other responsive pleading. With respect to LCG, the motion to

dismissis granted unless Alamzad candemonstrate thatservice has beenproperly effected on LCG by August

17, 2005. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: August 4, 2005 /s/ Richard Seeborg 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

R. King Prothro, Jr. Esq. rkprothrolaw@hotmail.com

Randall S. Farrimond rfarrimond@farrimondlaw.com 

Dated: 8/4/05 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:____DM___________________

Chambers

Case 5:04-cv-01602-RS Document 38 Filed 08/04/05 Page 7 of 7