Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00921/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00921-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United Food & Commercial Workers Local 

99; et al.

Plaintiffs, 

-andArizona Education Association, et al.

Plaintiff-Intervenors 

v. 

Ken Bennett, in his capacity as Secretary of 

the State of Arizona; et al.

Defendants. 

No. CV-11-00921-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Motion for 

Attorneys’ Fees and Related Non-Taxable Costs (Doc. 206), and (2) the State 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Supplemental Evidence and Assertions (Doc. 227). For the 

reasons stated below the Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

and Related Non-Taxable Costs is granted with respect to the various Plaintiffs and 

Plaintiff-Intervenors in the amounts listed below. The Motion to Strike Supplemental 

Evidence and Assertions is denied in part and granted in part. The motion to strike is 

denied, but the alternative motion to file the proposed sur-reply, attached as Exhibit 2 to 

that motion is granted. The Court did consider it in making this fee award. 

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BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors seek an award of their attorneys’ fees pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which allows this Court in appropriate cases, to award such fees. 

In 2011, two Arizona bills were signed into law: SB 1363 and SB 1365 (Doc. 8 at 2–3). 

Generally speaking, SB 1363 is a series of amendments and additions to existing law 

relating to harassment, trespass, assembly, and picketing in the context of labor relations. 

SB 1363, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). SB 1365 adds a new section to Chapter 

2, Title 7 of the Arizona Revised Statutes relating to paycheck deductions. SB 1365, 50th 

Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). 

 On May 9, 2011, Plaintiffs, a group of unions and their officers and members, 

filed suit for injunctive and declaratory relief (Doc. 8 at 1, 5–6), Plaintiffs challenged 

both statutes as unconstitutional (Id. at 2). Plaintiff-Intervenors, a second group of public 

sector unions and members who also wished to challenge the two statutes, were granted 

permission to intervene on June 20, 2011 (Doc. 47). 

 Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors both moved for preliminary injunctions to 

prevent SB 1365 from going into effect (Docs. 14, 77), and on September 23, 2011, this 

Court granted Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction on the ground that 

they were likely to succeed on their claim that SB 1365 violated the First Amendment 

(Doc. 99). The Court further and finally granted a permanent injunction as it pertained to 

SB 1365 on the grounds that it was pre-empted as it pertained to private sector employees 

and unions and further enjoined it on the grounds that it was viewpoint discriminatory in 

violation of the First Amendment (Doc. 192). 

ANALYSIS 

 The County was not a defendant on Plaintiffs and Intervenors claims related to SB 

1365. Nor do Defendants Bennett and Horne contest that Plaintiff-Intervenors are 

eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees in their challenge to the validity of SB 1365. To 

the extent that Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiffs, as opposed to PlaintiffIntervenors, are not eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees for their challenge to the 

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validity of SB 1365, the Court is not convinced by that argument, as it simply ignores 

Plaintiffs’ joinder in the argument of the Plaintiff-Intervenors. The Court notes, and does 

take into account, that Plaintiffs principally made the argument that SB 1365 was preempted “in its application to private sector employees and unions.” Nevertheless, 

Plainitffs are non-public unions and union members. Section 1983 provides a remedy 

for claims when federal labor law preempts state regulation and when that law was meant 

to protect “the interests of employees and employers against abridgment by a State.” 

Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); see also Golden State Transit Corp. v. 

City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1989). That is the case here. See SeaPAK v. 

Industrial, Technical and Professional Emp., Division of Nat’l Maritime Union AFLCIO, 300 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Ga. 1969). As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled as prevailing 

parties to a fee award under § 1983 for the pre-emption arguments made on behalf of 

private sector unions. 

 In arguing for a reduced fee as it relates specifically to the SB 1365 briefing, the 

Bennett and Horne Defendants note that the discovery period was stayed pending 

legislative action that might have mooted the case against SB 1365, and resumed when 

the Legislature took no such action. The case was, for all practical purposes, decided on 

cross-motions for summary judgment. Although there was some document discovery in 

this case, all such discovery occurred between the Parties Plaintiff and the State 

Defendants; the county was not involved in discovery. Thus, Defendants assert the fees 

assessed involved only briefing and little to no discovery and this should be reflected in 

the fees awarded. They also make the arguments for a reduced fee enumerated below as 

it pertains to a reduced fee award for both SB 1363 and 1365. 

 As mentioned above, SB 1363 consists of a series of amendments to pre-existing 

statutes, as well as a few new statutes. The Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors SEIU also 

sought to enjoin the provisions of SB 1363 from going into effect, but did not seek, nor 

did they receive, a preliminary injunction as to such provisions. The County was joined 

as a Defendant in this case. Nevertheless, pursuant principally to the briefing undertaken 

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by SEIU the Court did enjoin a considerable number of aspects of that statute from going 

into effect as being a violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution or pre-empted 

by the NLRA or both. 

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that A.R.S. §§ 23-1322, 23-

1325, and 23-1329 are unconstitutional on their face. Also 

unconstitutional are parts of Subsection (A)(4) and all of 

Subsection (A)(5) of § 23-1327. Plaintiffs have further 

shown that A.R.S. §23-1321 is unconstitutional insofar as it 

relies on the unconstitutional parts of § 23-1327 in prohibiting 

unlawful mass assembly. Section 23-1321 is likewise 

unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibits action with an 

improper purpose. Finally, Plaintiffs have shown that § 23-

352 and part of § 23-1321 are preempted by the NLRA. 

Plaintiffs First Amendment Constitutional and federal rights 

would be damaged if these laws were enforced against them. 

Doc. 192 at 61-62. 

 Plaintiff-Intervenors did not prevail on summary judgment as to all of their claims 

raised against SB 1363. But, in those claims in which they did not prevail, the Court 

frequently gave a narrow construction to aspects of the statute, or determined that, while 

not being subject to a facial challenge given such narrow construction, the statute was 

still subject to an as-applied challenge that was not appropriate for decision on summary 

judgment. Accordingly, in most significant aspects, Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenors 

SEIU are prevailing parties in their claims relating to SB 1363, and that the most 

significant element of those claims relates to whether the proposed statues resulting from 

SB 1363 violated the principles of the First Amendment. The Court is aware that 

Plaintiff-Intervenors SEIU carried the significant burden in the briefing on this topic, and 

will take that into account in determining a reasonable fee. Further, while there was not a 

great deal of discovery, the two bills did amend a considerable number of statutes which 

did require careful analysis in a number of different statutory settings. 

 The State Defendants further assert that in their request, counsel for Plaintiff -

Intervenors SEIU failed to sufficiently comply with the requirements of the local rule in 

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disclosing their actual rates billed to the client in this case. See, e.g., LRCiv 54.2(d)(2). 

Counsel for SEIU, Altshuler Berzon, a Bay area law firm, did indicate what their 

standard billing rate is for commercial non-contingent fee work in the San Francisco Bay 

area, and further indicated without specifying what it was, that they give SEIU a 

significant cut in the rates charged for work performed on SEIU’s behalf. They also 

provided the amount billed to and paid by SEIU for services and charges as of the end of 

August 2013 that, if not fully paid, they expected to be paid for their services in this case. 

That amount is $185,182.00 in attorneys’ fees and another $7,122.42 in costs for a total 

of $192,304.42. They also provided the amount of the fee they ask the Court to use as a 

lodestar for their various attorneys, law clerks, and paralegals who worked on the case. 

 The other attorneys who worked on the case essentially acknowledge that the fees 

they seek in setting the lodestar amount exceed the fees they actually charged their 

clients, and they supply the rate they charged their clients so that the Court may evaluate 

that. They too request fee amounts in excess of the amount they actually charged. In 

determining a lodestar amount, however, “a reasonable hourly rate is not made by 

reference to the rates actually charged the prevailing party.” United Steelworkers of 

America v. Retired Income Plan for Hourly-Rated Employees of ASARCO, Inc., 512 F.3d 

555, 564 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless the prevailing market rate is determined “in the 

forum in which the district court sits,” Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 

446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010), which in this case is Phoenix, not San Francisco. In calculating 

a lodestar rate, it is appropriate to take into account the expertise, experience and 

reputation in the field. After consideration of all the materials set forth by the parties, the 

Court awards Mr. Rubin and Mr. Barrett a lodestar rate of $400 per hour, Mr. Kahn and 

Mr. Weissglass a rate of $375 per hour, Mr. Walta, Ms. Sung and Ms. Desai a rate of 

$285 per hour, Mr. Pitts a rate of $250 per hour, with law clerks being reimbursed at 

$150 per hour, and paralegals being reimbursed at $100 per hour. 

 Defendants Horne and Bennett, occasionally with an example, also assert that the 

case was overstaffed resulting in the billing of excessive, redundant and otherwise 

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unnecessary hours, over-conferencing, top heavy billing, inappropriate block billing and 

inadequate descriptions provided within the billing. To the extent that Defendants have 

noted, and Plaintiff has acknowledged, a clerical error resulting in a 2 hour overassessment of Roopali Desai, the Court has taken it into account and made an appropriate 

reduction. Further, while the Court does see evidence of efforts to coordinate issues and 

spend time efficiently, it is the Court’s determination upon review, that there were 

instances of excessive time spent in preparing some briefs, some issues were overstaffed 

and that did result in some excessive consultation and inefficiencies. The Court accounts 

for all of those inefficiencies by generally deducting 15% of the time sought from the 

hours billed by attorneys. As a result the Court awards a total fee award of $493,804.65 

with $5,000.00 in costs (reduced to reflect excessive office charges) for a total fee award 

of $498,804.65.1

 This amount is awarded against the Bennett and Horne Defendants in 

their official capacities and, thus, against the agencies for which they are employed. See, 

e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1978). 

 After further review, the Court determines that, other than their early attempts to 

be dismissed from this lawsuit the County Defendants had only nominal involvement in 

this suit. As a result the Court finds that the County Defendants are only jointly liable for 

$15,000.00 of the above fee award. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Pursuant to Hutto, the Court awards $15,000.00 of the above fees as against the County 

Defendants in their official capacity. 

/ / / 

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 The Court calculates the amount awarded per attorney as follows: Rubin $26,990.00, Barrett $98,702.00, Kahn $67,186.13, Weissglass $39,078.75, Walta $80,669.25, Sung $116,013.52, Desai $26,362.50, Pitts, $18,168.75, law clerks, 

$16,638.75, and paralegals $3,995.00. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs’ 

attorneys’ fees and costs requests as against the State of Arizona in the amount of 

$498,804.65, and ordering that Maricopa County is jointly liable for $15,000.00 of that 

amount. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part the State 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Supplemental Evidence ad Assertions in Plaintiff and 

Plaintiff-Intervernors’ Reply in support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, or Alternatively, 

for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 227). The Clerk of Court is directed to file the SurReply attached as Exhibit 2 to the motion. 

 Dated this 6th day of March, 2014. 

Case 2:11-cv-00921-GMS Document 229 Filed 03/06/14 Page 7 of 7