Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01256/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01256-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WITKIN, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

S. SOLIS, 

 Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01256-AWI-MJS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 

PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR A THIRTY-DAY 

EXTENSION (NUNC PRO TUNC)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

(ECF Nos. 39, 40, & 41)

CASE TO REMAIN OPEN

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Michael Witkin is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperus in 

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At all times relevant to this 

action, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) in Coalinga, 

California. This case proceeds on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed May 20, 

2013, alleging that Defendant S. Solis intentionally converted funds from Plaintiff’s 

inmate trust account and retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting the conversion by 

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denying him access to the prison law library. (ECF No. 17.) Defendant has declined 

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 28.)

Under the Court’s original scheduling order, the deadline for all dispositive 

motions, including motions for summary judgement, was August 15, 2015. On motion 

by Defendant, this deadline was continued to December 15, 2015. (ECF No. 36.) On 

December 11, 2015, Defendant filed a motion for a thirty-day extension of time to file a 

dispositive motion on the grounds that new counsel was assigned to this case on

December 2, 2015. (ECF No. 37.) The Court did not issue an order addressing 

Defendant’s request for a thirty-day extension. Defendant then filed the instant motion 

for summary judgment on January 15, 2016. (ECF No. 39.) Also on January 15, 2016, 

Defendant filed a motion requesting the Court take judicial notice of California Code of 

Regulation, Title 15, Sections 3120 to 3124. (ECF No. 40.) Plaintiff filed an opposition 

to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on February 8, 2016. (ECF No. 42.) 

Defendant filed a reply on February 16, 2016. (ECF No. 43.) This matter is submitted. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(l). 

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s claims stem from his use of the PVSP law library in 2010 and 2011. On 

October 21, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a copy request form to law librarian Defendant S. 

Solis. Although Plaintiff only intended to request 52 copied pages, he received a total of 

104 unreadable and unusable pages. The cost for all 104 pages was deducted from 

Plaintiff’s inmate trust account, $10.40 in total. 

Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Appeal Form 602 (“602”) against Defendant on 

November 8, 2010, alleging that Defendant intentionally converted the funds in 

Plaintiff’s inmate trust account. Defendant then retaliated against Plaintiff by denying 

him Priority Legal User (“PLU”) status so that he was unable to access the library on 

several occasions between the dates of February 16, 2011, and March 1, 2011, and 

again between April 11 and April 21, 2011. Because he did not have sufficient access 

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to the law library, he did not have enough time to properly research and draft his filings

in his federal habeas case. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Any party may move for summary judgment, and “[t]he [C]ourt shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Each party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be 

supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not 

limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) “showing that the 

materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that 

an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)(1). 

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies depending on 

whether the issue on which summary judgment is sought is one in which the movant or 

the nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. See Soremekun v. Thrifty 

Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the movant will have the burden of 

proof at trial, it must demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that “no reasonable trier of 

fact could find other than for the moving party.” Id. at 984. In contrast, if the nonmoving 

party will have the burden of proof at trial, “the movant can prevail merely by pointing 

out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has met its burden, the 

nonmoving party must point to "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).

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In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not make credibility 

determinations or weigh evidence. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, “[t]he 

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 

drawn in his favor.” Id. Only admissible evidence may be considered in deciding a 

motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). “Conclusory, speculative 

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact 

and defeat summary judgment.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984.

IV. FACTS1

All facts are deemed undisputed unless otherwise noted:

Plaintiff was incarcerated at PVSP, Facility C, from September 2009 to 

September 2012. Pl.’s Dep. 8:25-9:8. Defendant was employed at PVSP as a law 

librarian from August 2010 to July 2011. Solis Decl. ¶ 1.

A. Administration of Prison Law Library

Law library users at PVSP fall into two categories: General Legal Users (“GLUs”) 

and Priority Legal Users (“PLUs”).2 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3122(b). PLUs are given 

greater access to the law library than GLUs, and a prisoner achieves PLU status when 

he can show that he has an upcoming court deadline. Id. § 3122(b)(1). To achieve 

PLU status, a prisoner has to submit a form to the law librarian indicating his court 

deadline, and if the librarian approves the request, he or she will notify corrections 

 

1 Curiously, both parties cite heavily to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony as support for certain facts 

pertaining to prison administration and law library procedures. For example, each cites to this testimony 

as evidence that the law library had a maximum capacity of approximately 18 inmates and was closed on 

weekends. Pl. Dep. 30:6-14; 32:1-6; 33:24-34:2. An inmate, however, is not authorized to testify on 

prison administrative matters merely because he is subject to certain prison regulations. Fed. R. Evid. 

602, 701-703. In light of this evidentiary deficiency, the Court has painstakingly searched the record for 

other, more reliable sources to support the facts alleged. The Court has not considered facts for which it 

was unable to find independent support.

2

The Court will grant Defendant’s request for judicial notice of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, 

Sections 3120 to 3124, regarding inmate law library usage. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 

Goldstene, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1184 (E.D. Cal. 2010); see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 

F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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officers to bring the prisoner to the library during the extended PLU hours. Id. An 

inmate who does not have PLU status can still access the law library on GLU status. Id.

§ 3122(b).

B. Alleged Conversion of Plaintiff’s Inmate Trust Account Funds

On October 21, 2010, Plaintiff requested a copy job from Defendant in the law 

library. Pl. Dep. 42:24-43:9. Though Plaintiff had intended to request only one copy of a 

52 page file, he accidentally filled out the form incorrectly and requested “52” sets of 

copies. Pl. Dep. 44:20-45:18. Assuming Plaintiff meant to request only two sets of 

copies, not 52, Defendant made two copies and gave both to Plaintiff. Pl. Opp’n Ex. C, 

“D. Resp. to Interrog. No. 10.” Plaintiff’s trust account was charged a total of $10.40 to 

cover the cost of copying 104 pages. Pl. Dep. 47:24-48:4. Plaintiff contends each page 

was unclear, of poor quality, and unusable. Pl. Dep. 48:3-9. Plaintiff demanded a full 

refund of the amount charged against his account. Pl. Dep. 47:24-25. He and 

Defendant engaged in a verbal altercation over the incident. Pl. Dep. 47:13-23.

On November 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed a “602” complaint against Defendant relating 

to the October 21, 2010, copy incident and being overcharged.

3

 Pl. Dep. 53:8-12. 

Plaintiff’s 602 was reviewed by Defendant’s supervisor, Vice Principal Lopez, on or 

before February 9, 2011. Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. F, “Lopez Feb. 9, 2011 Mem.” Defendant was 

interviewed by Lopez regarding the 602 on February 9, 2011. Id.

C. Plaintiff’s Habeas Appeal

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim centers on his assertion that following the above 

events, Defendant intentionally denied Plaintiff PLU status at two different points in the 

course of Plaintiff’s federal habeas appeal. The Court therefore summarizes the

 

3

Plaintiff filed his corresponding conversion claim on May 8, 2011. Def’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4, Decl. 

of Gretchen Brooks.

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relevant procedural history of that appeal, taking judicial notice of all filings in that case: 

MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

On December 21, 2009, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging his 2005 

conviction for resisting arrest because the 2005 conviction enhanced his prison 

sentence when later, in 2009, he was convicted of attempted robbery. The habeas 

case was transferred to the Eastern District of California as case number Witkin v. 

Yates, 2:10-cv-00091-GEB-DAD (“the habeas case”). On February 11, 2011, in an 

order issued in response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, then-Magistrate Judge

(now District Court Judge) Dale A. Drozd issued findings and recommendations 

rejecting Plaintiff’s challenge to the 2005 conviction as time-barred, but construing the

petition as a challenge to the 2009 conviction (as enhanced by the 2005 conviction). 

Judge Drozd thus recommended denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss and he 

granted Respondent thirty days from the date of service of a District Court order 

adopting his findings and recommendations in which to file another motion to dismiss or 

an answer to Plaintiff’s petition. Judge Drozd also granted both parties fourteen days to 

file objections to his findings and recommendations. 

On February 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed objections to Judge Drozd’s findings and 

recommendations. On March 10, 2011, Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr., rejected Plaintiff’s 

objections and adopted the findings and recommendations in full, directing Respondent 

to file responsive pleadings to the petition within thirty days, and directing Plaintiff to file

an opposition to Respondent’s motion, if one was filed, within thirty days after its 

service.

On April 5, 2011, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, and it was served on 

Plaintiff on April 8, 2011. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss 

on May 9, 2011.

On April 4 and November 28, 2011, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of Judge 

Drozd’s February 11, 2011, findings and recommendations. He claimed that Judge 

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Drozd’s finding that the challenge to Plaintiff’s 2005 conviction was time-barred was

based on an error of fact. On December 14, 2011, Judge Drozd agreed and issued 

findings and recommendation granting Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration and 

vacating the February 11, 2011 order. On January 4, 2012, Judge Burrell adopted

Judge Drozd’s findings and recommendations in full and vacated his own March 10, 

2011, order.

D. Plaintiff’s PLU Access To Library

Typically, Defendant’s supervisor, and not Defendant, made the ultimate decision 

as to whether or not to grant an inmate PLU status. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Interrog. Set 

1, No. 8.) However, an inmate whose PLU application was still pending could be 

allowed access to the law library prior to receiving formal PLU approval. Id. Defendant 

maintains that the acting senior librarian made this latter, interim, determination, not 

Defendant. Id. Plaintiff maintains Defendant actually called inmates up to the library on 

PLU status while formal approval was pending. Pl. Dep. 40:13-17. Plaintiff contends 

that in fact up until February 16, 2011, Defendant always called Plaintiff to the library 

with other PLUs while Plaintiff’s PLU status was pending. Pl. Dep. 40:13-41:25. 

1. PLU Access February 16 to March 1, 2011

The fourteen-day filing deadline for filing objections to Judge Drozd’s February 

11, 2011, findings and recommendations in the habeas case entitled Plaintiff to fourteen 

days of PLU status. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3122(b). Sometime between February 11, 

2011, and February 16, 2011, Plaintiff submitted the judge’s order, along with his PLU 

application, to the law library. Pl. Dep. 55:12-56:18. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant did not call him up to the law library with the other 

PLUs on February 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 28, 2011. Pl. Dep. 76:3-5. Plaintiff states 

that on February 16, 2011, he went to the library during yard hours and asked 

Defendant why she did not call him up with the other PLUs that day. Pl. Dep. 75:14-17. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant responded that she was not going to call him to the 

library with the other PLUs anymore because he filed a 602 against her. Pl. Dep. 75:18-

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76:2. On that day, Plaintiff was forced to access the library on GLU status during his 

designated yard time. Pl. Dep. 76:3-7. The yard did not open again for the rest of the 

month. Pl. Dep. 75:5-7. Plaintiff then tried to use the law library as a PLU on February 

17, 24, and 28, but was denied each time by Defendant, who either refused to grant 

Plaintiff PLU access or physically blocked Plaintiff from entering the library. Pl. Dep. 

59:1-15; Pl. Ex. E at 1-3; Pl. Ex. G at 2. Plaintiff did gain PLU access on February 25, 

but only because Defendant’s supervisor instructed Defendant to let Plaintiff in. In sum, 

Plaintiff was only able to access the library on February 16, 2011, as a GLU, and again 

on February 25, 2011, as a PLU. Id.

Plaintiff contends that because his access to the law library was so limited, the 

objections he filed to Judge Drozd’s February 11, 2011 findings and recommendations 

in the habeas case were poorly researched and drafted. Pl. Second Am. Compl. at 12. 

Only after Plaintiff filed his subsequent motions for reconsideration did Judge Drozd 

ultimately vacate his February 11, 2011 order. Id. 

Defendant kept library access logs in the regular course of business as a part of 

her duties as the law librarian.4 Solis Decl. ¶ 2. These logs indicate that Plaintiff’s 

overall Facility C law library access was consistent with the amount of physical access 

 

4 While these logs are hearsay, they are admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay 

rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (business records may only be admitted as an exception to the hearsay 

rule once it is shown, through the testimony of a custodian of records or other qualified witness, or 

through certification, that the evidence is kept in the regular course of business and was made at or near 

the time of the event at issue.) Through her declaration, Defendant has sworn to the authenticity of these 

logs, affirming that as law librarian she was required to and did keep them in the regular course of prison 

business, and that the copies presented to the Court are true and correct copies of the actual logs she 

maintained during the dates in question. Solis Decl. ¶ 2.

 Plaintiff raised no objection to the authenticity of these library logs. Under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)

Commentary on 2014 Amendments “. . .[I]f the proponent has established the stated requirements of the 

exception . . . then the burden is on the opponent to show that the source of information or the method or 

circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Thus, for the purposes of this summary 

judgment motion, the logs are deemed authenticated and the Court may properly consider them in ruling 

on the motion. See Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that in 

order for documents to be considered by the court on a motion for summary judgment, they must be 

“authenticated and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

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the prison could accommodate for an inmate during this time span. Solis Decl. ¶ 5.

They are, however, partially inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claims since they demonstrate 

that Plaintiff accessed the law library on February 16, 25, and 28, without specifying 

whether that access was as a GLU or PLU.

Defendant declares that at no time did she intentionally misappropriate Plaintiff’s 

trust funds, harbor retaliatory animus against Plaintiff, retaliate against him, or deny him 

access to the law library because of his prior complaints, grievances, or other speech. 

Solis Decl. ¶ 4.

2. PLU Access April 11 to April 22, 2011

Plaintiff further alleges that once he received Respondent’s April 5, 2011 motion

to dismiss, on April 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed another PLU application along with a copy of 

Judge Burrell’s March 10, 2011, order. Pl. Opp’n Ex. D, “Inmate Appeal 602.”

However, Plaintiff was not called to the library as a PLU until April 21, 2011. Pl. Dep. 

61:21-62:23. Plaintiff states he does not remember if he accessed the library on GLU 

status between the dates of April 8 and 21, 2011. Pl. Dep. 62:24-63:6. Plaintiff 

ultimately missed his filing deadline on this habeas case. Pl. Second Am. Compl. at 7-

8.

Defendant’s logs demonstrate that Plaintiff accessed the law library on April 11, 

13, 19, 20, and 21, though again they do not indicate whether that access was as a 

GLU or PLU. Solis Decl. ¶ 5.

VI. ANALYSIS

A. Conversion Claim

Plaintiff does not dispute that he filed an untimely conversion claim by waiting 

until May 8, 2011 to file a claim that arose more than six months prior, on October 21, 

2010. Under California Government Code § 911.2, Plaintiff must have filed his claim for 

conversion not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Cal. Gov. 

Code § 911.2(a). Plaintiff offers no arguments to counter Defendant’s contention that 

his conversion claim was untimely filed, and indeed concedes that summary judgment 

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should be granted on that claim. (ECF No. 42.) Therefore, without evaluating the merits 

of Plaintiff’s conversion claim, it will be recommended that Plaintiff’s conversion claim be 

DISMISSED.

B. First Amendment Retaliation

1. Legal Standard

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials 

and to be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Within 

the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

567-68 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15; Silva, 658 at 1104; 

Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct when he filed a 602

against Defendant. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment therefore turns on the 

following issues: (1) Did Plaintiff suffer an adverse action; (2) Does Plaintiff show a 

retaliatory animus on the part of Defendant; and (3) Did Defendant’s actions further a 

legitimate penological purpose. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that 

there exist genuine issues of material fact as to each element of Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim, and so recommends that Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment on this claim be DENIED.

2. Adverse Action

a. Standard

To qualify as adverse, the action taken against Plaintiff must be sufficient to chill 

an inmate of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights. Brodheim, 

584 F.3d at 1269-70. Courts have held that even the mere threat of an adverse action 

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can be sufficient to make out a retaliation claim, regardless of whether it is carried out. 

Id. at 1270; see also Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568, n. 11; Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216, 

218 (8th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the threat need not be explicit; even an implicit threat 

may be sufficient, so long as a reasonable finder of fact could interpret the threat as

intimating that some form of punishment or adverse action would follow. Id. (citing 

Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 2003).

b. Defendant’s Argument

To support her argument in favor of summary judgment, Defendant argues that if 

any denial of access did occur, “it [was] not sufficient to rise to the level of a First 

Amendment retaliation claim” because Plaintiff accessed the law library numerous times 

during the time periods in question. D’s Mot. Summ. J. at 10. 

In support, Defendant cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rhodes v. Robinson, 

399 Fed. Appx 160 (9th Cir. 2010). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the 

defendant’s failure to return the plaintiff’s original grievance documents and failure to 

speak personally with the plaintiff about the grievance was in retaliation for plaintiff’s

filing of the grievance against said defendant. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 

court’s granting of defendants’ summary judgment motion. The Court held that as 

plaintiff’s grievance was handled by a grievance panel, he was not entitled to speak 

directly to the defendant about his grievance. Furthermore, as the plaintiff’s grievance 

was fully processed, the defendant’s actions “[were] not an adverse action sufficient 

enough to support a retaliation claim because it did not chill Rhodes’ exercise of his 

First Amendment rights.” Rhodes II, 399 Fed. Appx at 163 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Rhodes II found that the action taken against the plaintiff was not sufficiently 

adverse because the plaintiff still achieved the result he sought, that is, the processing 

of his grievance. Defendant relies on Rhodes II to argue that, here, Plaintiff likewise 

achieved the result he sought: adequate access to the law library. Defendant does not 

address Plaintiff’s entitlement to PLU status on those dates or whether Plaintiff’s access 

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to the law library was on PLU or GLU status.5

c. Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Defendant engaged in an adverse action 

when she intentionally denied Plaintiff PLU access to the library on dates when he was 

entitled to it: February 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 28, 2011, and between April 11 and 

22, 2011. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s intentional denial of PLU access limited 

Plaintiff’s ability to adequately research and draft his legal papers and forced Plaintiff to 

miss court-ordered deadlines. Pl. Opp’n at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s 

actions would have chilled a person of ordinary firmness. Plaintiff does not directly 

address Defendant’s contention that the sign-in logs indicate Plaintiff had sufficient 

access to the law library.

d. Discussion

As an initial matter, Defendant does not dispute that the intentional denial of 

access to the prison law library would constitute an adverse action. Smith v. Goss, No. 

1:10-cv-01814-LJO-JLT, 2013 WL 6070362, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (Plaintiff 

stated cognizable claim where corrections officer intentionally prohibited Plaintiff from 

accessing the law library in retaliation for Plaintiff appealing his Rules Violation 

conviction). However, Defendant and Plaintiff each seem to have different theories 

about what the “adverse action” in question actually is. Defendant focuses on the end 

result: Defendant believes Plaintiff had sufficient access to the library, hence there was 

no adverse action. Plaintiff, on the other hand, focuses on Defendant’s stated intent: 

notwithstanding that he had some, albeit reduced, actual access to the library,

Defendant’s statement of intent to deny Plaintiff PLU access because of his protected 

conduct was sufficient to constitute an adverse action. 

 

5

In her reply papers, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not entitled to PLU status. The Court will not consider 

Defendant’s argument, as discussed below in subsection (VI)(B)(5).

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Plaintiff’s interpretation of what constitutes adverse action more accurately 

reflects applicable law.

Under Brodheim, Plaintiff need not have suffered actual harm, i.e., exclusion 

from the law library, so long as he can show Defendant intimated an intent to deny him 

PLU status in retaliation for his 602. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1270.

Rhodes II, relied upon by Defendant, is inapplicable here. There, Plaintiff 

alleged as adverse actions Defendant’s refusal to communicate personally with Plaintiff 

regarding his appeal and Defendant’s failure to return to Plaintiff Plaintiff’s grievance 

paperwork. Rhodes II, 399 Fed. Appx. at 163. The Court found that neither of these 

actions interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to have his appeal fully processed, and so they 

did not constitute an adverse action sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Id. Here, it 

remains an open question whether the adverse action alleged—Defendant’s denial of 

PLU access—in fact occurred and harmed Plaintiff. 

Defendant also incorrectly focuses on the actual library access retained by 

Plaintiff. The question is not whether Plaintiff suffered a significant or insignificant 

diminishment in library access; the issue is whether Defendant threatened to deny 

Plaintiff a right of access in retaliation for his pursuit of a First Amendment right. At this 

point the evidence is equivocal and the Court cannot determine if Plaintiff was rightfully 

entitled to PLU status on the days he was denied it. If he was, Plaintiff could have 

judgment in his favor even if Defendant’s attempts to exclude him were unsuccessful or 

ineffective. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1270. (“The mere threat of harm can be an 

adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out.”) (emphasis in original).

With questions remaining as to how and under what status and circumstances 

Plaintiff had a right to access and did access the library on February 16, 25, and 28, 

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2011, and between April 11 and 21, 2011, the Court must recommend denial of 

Defendant’s summary judgment motion.

6

3. Retaliatory Animus

a. Standard

The second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim focuses on causation 

and motive. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show that 

his protected conduct was a “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant’s 

conduct,” i.e., that Defendant harbored retaliatory animus when he or she engaged in 

the adverse action. Id. (quoting Sorrano’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 

(9th Cir. 1989)). Although it can be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the 

defendant, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289 

(finding that a prisoner established a triable issue of fact regarding prison officials’ 

retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines 

v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of 

retaliatory intent”). 

In this Circuit, Plaintiff need “only put forth evidence of retaliatory motive that, 

taken in the light most favorable to him, presents a genuine issue of material fact as to” 

Defendant’s motivation. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 (citing Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 

1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires Plaintiff to 

offer either direct evidence of retaliatory motive or at least one of three general types of 

circumstantial evidence: (1) proximity in time between the protected conduct and the 

alleged retaliation, (2) expressed opposition to the conduct, or (3) other evidence that 

the reasons proffered by Defendant for the adverse action were false and pretextual. 

 

6

In so doing, the Court cannot but note in passing that even though the ruling here, if adopted, will enable 

Plaintiff to seek vindication of an important constitutional right at trial, it is difficult to anticipate that he 

sustained actual damages as a result of Defendant’s alleged actions since he ultimately prevailed on the 

habeas motion then pending. Plaintiff may want to consider this point in deciding how to proceed. 

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McCollum v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870, 882 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002)) (quotation 

marks omitted). 

b. Defendant’s Argument

Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot prove that Plaintiff’s filing of a grievance 

against Defendant was a substantial motivating factor behind Defendant’s alleged 

restriction of his access to the library. Defendant claims several months passed 

between Plaintiff’s filing of the 602 and Defendant’s alleged adverse action, a gap too 

attenuated to suggest a retaliatory animus. Defendant also points to the substantial

number of times Plaintiff accessed the law library even after between the filing of the 

602.

c. Plaintiff’s Argument

In addition to his claim that Defendant actually told Plaintiff on February 16, 2011, 

that she would no longer be calling him up with the other PLUs because he had filed a 

grievance against her7, Plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence of Defendant’s 

retaliatory animus toward: Plaintiff claims that prior to February 16, 2011, Defendant 

always called Plaintiff up with other PLUs when Plaintiff’s PLU application was pending, 

and then stopped doing so. Defendant relented and admitted Plaintiff on February 25, 

2011, only after her supervisor instructed her to do so. Finally, the investigation of 

Plaintiff’s November 8, 2010, grievance did not culminate until February 10, 2011, the 

date of the memorandum signed by Defendant’s supervisor. Thus Defendant likely did 

not even know about the grievance until just before the adverse action occurred.

d. Discussion

Viewing the evidence presently before the Court in the light most favorable to 

 

7 Without analyzing the merits, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that this statement should be stricken 

under the “bad-faith declaration” doctrine of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(h). Defendant’s doubts about the credibility of 

Plaintiff’s evidence are matters for cross-examination at trial. 

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Plaintiff, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to lead a trier of fact to conclude that 

Defendant threatened to and did limit Plaintiff’s PLU access to the law library because 

of the 602 he filed. Summary judgment is therefore not available.

4. Legitimate Penological Purpose

a. Standard

Plaintiff must also demonstrate “that there were no legitimate correctional 

purposes motivating the actions he complains of,” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808, and the Court 

must “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of 

proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Id. at 807 

(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). In evaluating the existence of a 

legitimate correctional goal, there must be a valid, rational connection between the rule, 

regulation, or action and the legitimate, neutral governmental interest put forward to 

justify it. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1272-73 (citing Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228

(2001)) (quotation marks omitted). In addition, courts should consider (1) the existence 

of alternate means of exercising the right available to inmates; (2) the impact 

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other 

inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and (3) the absence of 

ready alternatives available to the prison for achieving the governmental objectives. Id.

(citing Shaw, 532 U.S. at 228) (quotation marks omitted). 

b. Defendant’s Argument

Defendant’s argument in this regard is brief: the prison was suffering from an 

overpopulation crisis and Defendant needed to balance the limited library resources 

against the large inmate population. 

c. Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s actions were contrary to a legitimate penological 

goal because they directly violated established regulations regarding CDCR law library 

access. Under the regulations, Plaintiff was entitled to PLU status. And, Defendant’s 

overpopulation claims notwithstanding, all other PLU status prisoners were called to the 

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library throughout this period when Plaintiff was not. Pl. Dep. 58:5-21; Pl. Ex. E at 1-3.8

d. Discussion

Assuming Plaintiff can show that he suffered an adverse action and that 

Defendant harbored a retaliatory animus, the Court still must grant Defendant summary 

judgment if she can show that a reasonable trier of fact would have no choice but to find 

that Defendant was motivated by a legitimate penological purpose. Defendant has not 

made this showing.

First, Defendant proffers only Plaintiff’s deposition testimony in support for her 

contention that PVSP was experiencing a population overcrowding crisis.

9

 Defendant

similarly fails to support her claims that Plaintiff’s law library access was the most the 

prison could accommodate during that time and that access was “often” limited due to 

excess demand. Solis Decl. ¶ 5.

Defendant has therefore failed to show a “valid, rational connection between the 

[adverse] action and the legitimate, neutral governmental interest put forward to justify

it.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1272.

Taking Plaintiff’s allegation that other inmates were admitted to the library on 

PLU status on the dates in question as true, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude 

that population problems notwithstanding, the library could have accommodated Plaintiff 

on the dates in question. Therefore, Defendant’s request for summary judgment will be 

DENIED.

5. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to PLU Status

Finally, the Court notes that Defendant made a new argument for the first time in 

 

8

Plaintiff cites to his Exhibit E, the PVSP library attendance logs, to support his claim that other inmates were 

called to the library on PLU status even when Plaintiff was not. As already discussed, the logs do not distinguish

between PLUs and GLUs. Plaintiff has not provided competent evidence that the individuals whose names appear 

in the attendance logs were in fact PLUs, much less that they were all the PLUSs.

9

For the reasons stated in note 1, the Court will not rely on Plaintiff’s testimony to support facts pertaining to the 

prison and its administration. 

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her reply brief:

10

 that Plaintiff has not shown Defendant’s conduct could not “reasonably 

advance a legitimate penological goal” because Plaintiff, having failed to submit 

documentation of a pending court deadline, was properly denied PLU status.

11

 D’s 

Reply Br. at 2. Since the orders in question were favorable to Plaintiff, there was no 

need for him to file any objections and no need for him to access the library as a PLU. 

Id.

As there exists a dispute regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to PLU status, the Court 

will not consider this argument. 

VI. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME

Defendant timely filed her December 11, 2015, motion for a thirty-day extension 

of time to file a dispositive motion, but the Court failed to address it before Defendant 

filed the instant motion for summary judgment on January 15, 2016. Good cause 

having been shown, Defendant’s motion for an extension of time to file a dispositive

motion will be GRANTED, NUNC PRO TUNC to December 15, 2015. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b); see also Matthies v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 341 F.2d 243, 248 (8th Cir. 1965) 

(“All courts have inherent power to enter orders nunc pro tunc to show that a thing was 

done at one time which ought to have been shown at that time.”) Defendant’s January 

15, 2016 motion for summary judgment is therefore timely. 

VII. DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

For the reasons set forth above in note 2, Defendant’s motion requesting judicial 

notice of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Sections 3120 to 3124 (ECF No. 40) 

will be GRANTED.

 

10 Plaintiff did not file a surreply to address Defendant’s newly raised argument, nor did he request leave to do so.

11 Although Defendant advances this argument to support her “no legitimate penological purpose” claim, the Court 

believes it more appropriately applies to Defendant’s “no adverse action” claim. 

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VIII. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion for an extension of time to file a dispositive motion (ECF 

No. 37) is GRANTED, NUNC PRO TUNC to December 15, 2015; and

2. Defendant’s motion requesting judicial notice (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:

3. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 39) be GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with this Order;

4. Plaintiff’s conversion tort claim be DISMISSED with prejudice,

5. This action proceed against Defendant S. Solis on Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, any 

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within 

fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure 

to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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