Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02166/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02166-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C.S., a minor, by and through his parents

N.S. and M.S.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION, in its supervisory capacity,

the CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02166 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this declaratory relief action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Improvement Act (“IDEIA”) and state law, the parents and guardians ad litem of a disabled

minor allege their son has been denied a free appropriate public education because of

defendants’ failure to issue a timely decision in a special-education administrative proceeding. 

This order dismisses the action, for the reasons set forth below. 

STATEMENT

Plaintiff C.S. is a sixteen year-old student in the Contra Costa Country School District

(Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 1). In or around 1996, C.S. was diagnosed with Autistic Spectrum

Disorder. This disorder substantially limited his participation in major life activities, including

learning and caring for himself (Administrative Record Exh. A at 5). In addition, C.S.’s

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 SRVUSD is a school district within California and is the entity responsible for the provision and

supervision of special-education services for C.S., pursuant to the IDEIA. The Contra Costa County Office of

Education (“CCCOE”), on the other hand, provides special education services for and on behalf of students

enrolled in schools governed by school districts within Contra Costa County.

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disability entitled him to receive special education and related services through the age of 22

under the IDEIA, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 1). 

Between approximately February 4, 2005, and April 13, 2005, plaintiff was transitioning

to a program for high school opened by the San Ramon Valley Unified School District

(“SRVUSD”).1 During this time, C.S.’s parents made numerous requests to SRVUSD for an

individualized education program meeting date. In response to his parents’ assertions that C.S.

should never be left alone and recommendations that C.S. have a full-time one-on-one day aide

for safety reasons, SRVUSD offered the use of a classroom aide to escort C.S. to his classes. 

Furthermore, on or around June 28, 2005, SRVUSD agreed to pay for applied behavior-analysis

services through part of the extended school year and until the high school program commenced

on August 29, 2006. C.S. was also set to attend and did attend Monte Vista High School, which

is governed by SRVUSD, for his first academic year of high school (Compl. ¶¶ 95, 100). 

On September 22, 2005, however, C.S. was suspended from Monte Vista High School

for five days for grabbing, scratching, kicking, and attempting to choke staff (AR Exh. A at 13). 

C.S. did not receive a pre-suspension conference, which would have allowed plaintiffs to be

informed of the disciplinary reasons for the action, hear the evidence against C.S., and would

have given him the opportunity to present his version of the incident (Prop. Second Amd.

Compl. ¶ 114). After September 29, 2005, C.S.’s parents requested home services. SRVUSD

agreed to provide interim home placement but also proposed a change of placement for C.S. to

Liberty High School, a public school for severely handicapped children also governed by the

SRVUSD. On or about September 30, 2005, C.S.’s parents observed Liberty High School but

determined that the placement would be unacceptable and inappropriate for C.S’s individual

needs (Prop. Second Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 120–24). 

On November 2, 2005, C.S.’s mother observed the educational program at A Better

Chance School. A Better Chance School is a private school that provides individualized

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 The IDEIA’s stay-put provision directs that a disabled child shall remain in his or her then current

educational placement pending completion of any proceedings to review decisions concerning the child’s

education. 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(3). 

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functional academic environments for students using a multi-disciplinary approach. The next

day, C.S.’s mother received an offer to admit C.S. to A Better Chance School effective July 6,

2005. Despite this offer of admission, plaintiffs filed their administrative complaint the

following day (AR Exh. C at 1223, Exh. D). 

On November 4, 2005, as a result of a disagreement between plaintiffs and SRVUSD

over placement and services regarding Liberty High School, plaintiffs filed a request for a due

process hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). The due process

complaint named SRVUSD, Contra Costa County Office of Education (CCCOE), and Contra

Costa County Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) as respondents (AR Exh. J at 1). On

or about November 8, 2005, plaintiffs filed a motion to determine stay-put placement with

OAH. Plaintiffs requested home services and placement for C.S.2

 SRVUSD filed a response to

plaintiffs’ due process complaint and also filed a notice of insufficiency with OAH. OAH

granted SRVUSD’s notice of insufficiency request, stating that because plaintiffs’ due process

complaint was extensive, plaintiffs should state further proposed resolutions than those

plaintiffs reported as being within their knowledge at the time. Specifically, OAH stated that

plaintiffs’ administrative complaint was insufficient with regard to two of their proposed

resolutions. First, the ALJ found that plaintiffs did not adequately explain the home program

they requested for C.S. and the nexus between (1) the requested program and (2) C.S.'s

education and behavioral needs. In addition, the ALJ held that plaintiffs had not alleged why

C.S. required the services of a non-public school (AR 11-22-05 Order at 4). The ALJ, however,

permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended due process complaint to cure these deficiencies. 

Plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration, which OAH denied (Second Amd. Compl.

¶¶ 15–22). 

On or about December 6, 2005, plaintiffs filed their amended due process complaint and

amended request for stay-put placement. When SRVUSD and CCCOE filed responses to

plaintiffs’ amended complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion to strike, asserting that the responses, as

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filed, did not comply with the IDEIA. OAH denied plaintiffs’ motion, stating that it did not

possess the authority or jurisdiction to hear motions to strike improper filings by local

educational agencies. On or around January 17, 2006, meditation took place between plaintiffs

and SRVUSD, CCCOE, and SELPA. OAH subsequently scheduled a due process hearing for

February 1, 2006 (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 23–27). 

On March 28, 2006, plaintiffs filed herein an ex parte application for a temporary

restraining order, seeking to enjoin OAH from proceeding with the due process hearings for ten

days. Plaintiffs filed the temporary restraining order in an attempt to prevent the ALJ from

going forward with the administrative hearing based on its after-the-fact realization that OAH

had caused an allegedly unfair delay in proceedings up to that point. The matter was addressed

by the Court in a hearing held on March 30, 2006. Plaintiffs’ request was denied after the Court

discovered that plaintiffs had failed to serve defendants with relevant transcripts. In so holding,

the undersigned found plaintiffs’ ex parte attempt had been “unfair” (Tr. Mar. 30, 2006 at 15). 

Basically, plaintiffs had sat on their rights and then at the last minute demanded a federal

temporary restraining order without giving defendants an adequate opportunity to be heard. 

That tactic was denied. 

At OAH’s request, plaintiffs submitted several dates of availability for the postponed

schedule. OAH set plaintiffs’ due process hearing to begin on April 3, 2006. Subsequently, the

due process hearing commenced as scheduled and concluded on April 21, 2006. OAH issued

its final decision on June 1, 2006.

OAH’s administrative decision rejected plaintiffs’ claims that C.S. was denied a free

appropriate education for the school years 2002 through 2004. Alternatively, the ALJ

determined that C.S. was denied a free appropriate education in the school year of 2005 through

2006 because the transitional institutionalized education program plan into Liberty was

inadequate. In addition, the ALJ found that C.S. had been denied services, such as a one-on-one

aide, applied behavior-analysis services, and mainstreaming opportunities (AR Exh. A at 26). 

Following, the ALJ’s decision, plaintiffs entered into a “Compromise and Settlement

Agreement” with SRVUSD, CCCOE, and SELPA. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs dismissed their

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claim against the district and amended their complaint against OAH and the California

Department of Education (“Department”). 

In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs claim that C.S. was denied a free

appropriate education from the school years of 2002–2006. In particular, plaintiffs assert that

OAH’s excessive delay in scheduling plaintiffs’ due process hearing has exceeded the timeframe set forth in 34 C.F.R. 300.511 and California Education Code Section 56502(f) (Compl.

¶ 51). Since October 17, 2005, C.S. received home-based education services and was

educationally placed at home at the expense of his parents. Consequently, plaintiffs allege that

C.S. has been denied a free appropriate education in the least-restrictive environment and is thus

entitled to compensatory educational services from OAH. Plaintiffs also contend that the

Department, as the supervisor of OAH, is jointly liable for OAH’s violations for failing to

adequately ensure OAH’s compliance with state and federal laws, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1412. 

Finally, plaintiffs bring claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II

of the ADA. Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims. 

ANALYSIS

As a condition of federal financial assistance, the IDEIA requires state education

agencies to comply with its provisions in administering a free appropriate education to children

with disabilities in their jurisdictions. 20 U.S.C. 1400. In aid of this goal, IDEIA guarantees

procedural safeguards, such as the process of developing individualized education programs for

each student. 20 U.S.C. 1415(a). In compliance with the IDEIA, the California Education

Code includes procedural safeguards to guarantee that “all individuals with exceptional needs

are provided their rights to appropriate programs and services which are designed to meet their

unique needs” under the IDEIA. CAL. EDUC. CODE 56000. If parties have grievances, they may

issue complaints and request an administrative due process hearing before an independent and

impartial hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. 1415(f); 34 C.F.R. 300.506, 300.507 and 300.508 et seq.

Under these statutes and regulations, a party aggrieved by the final administrative decision may

seek review in a district court. 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(A). A district court is required to conduct

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a qualified de novo review of the evidence and “must give due weight to judgments of

education policy.” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Judicial review under the IDEIA is ordinarily available only after the complaining party

has exhausted administrative remedies. 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2). Plaintiffs and defendants are in

dispute over whether plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the

IDEIA. Although both sides state that this is the dispositive issue, it is not so. Plaintiffs have

already sought review of their claims in an OAH administrative proceeding and have received a

final ruling on their claims. Thus, the controlling issue in this case is not whether plaintiffs may

seek remedies outside the purview of administrative proceedings but whether plaintiffs can

obtain monetary damages for defendants’ alleged violation of due process, flowing from an

alleged delay of their administrative proceedings.

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Defendants bring their motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendant

OAH, however, requested that the Court take judicial notice of the OAH administrative record

pertaining to plaintiffs’ due process claim. A federal court must convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to one for summary judgment when the parties submit, and the court does not reject, material

beyond the pleadings. Cunningham v. Rothery (In re Rothery), 143 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 1998). A

party who submits matters outside the pleadings to the court and invites consideration of them

has notice that the court may use them to construe a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary

judgment. Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir. 1985). Entry of

summary judgment is proper only where the pleadings, the admissions on file, and the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 

2. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that OAH’s 123-day delay in issuing a decision

caused injury to plaintiffs by denying C.S. a free appropriate education (Opp. (OAH) 10). On

or about July 11, 2006, however, plaintiffs entered into a “Compromise and Release

Agreement” with SRVUSD, CCCOE, and SELPA, which resolves all disputes, claims and

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causes of action concerning C.S.’s education program and services for the past, present and

future. In addition, the settlement agreement required that C.S.’s parents “dismiss Federal Case

No. C06-2166 WHA with prejudice, within 5 days of full execution of this agreement” and

“waive their right to file appeal of the hearing decision” (Settlement Agmt. ¶ 2. M–P). 

Defendants OAH and the Department were both originally named as defendants in plaintiffs’

verified complaint filed on March 24, 2006. Accordingly, plaintiffs should have dismissed their

complaint in its entirety by July 16, 2006. Instead, plaintiffs attempted to circumvent this

provision of the agreement by filing a second amended complaint on July 28, 2006, naming

only OAH and the Department as defendants. By continuing to pursue their claims in this

action, plaintiffs contravene the terms of the settlement agreement they are bound to uphold. 

Plaintiffs contend that because OAH was not a party to the settlement, it therefore

cannot claim that the settlement’s provisions apply to OAH (Opp. (OAH) 20). This argument is

without merit based on the fact that the settlement agreement incorporated a broad release of all

plaintiffs’ claims. Paragraph 3 of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement includes a

detailed general release:

Parents and Respondents, and any predecessors and successors in

interest, heirs, and assigns, officers, directors, agents, employees,

partners, and trustees, hereby fully release and discharge each

other and their predecessors and successors in interest, heirs, and

assigns, officers, directors, all members of the governing board,

both former and present, agents, employees, partners and trustees,

of any and all known and unknown claims past, present, or future

related to [C.S.]’s education . . . . This general release and

settlement includes, but is not limited to, any and all known and

unknown claims related to the identification, evaluation,

educational placement, related services, and provision of a free

appropriate public education for [C.S.] by the Respondents,

including, but not limited to, reimbursement and compensatory

education, through the date [C.S.] is no longer eligible to receive

special education services. 

This order holds that this broadly stated release was meant to include defendants, as defendants

were only liable to the extent SRVUSD, CCCOE, and SELPA were liable. Although C.S.

continues to be entitled to a free appropriate education under defendants’ jurisdiction, the terms

of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement limit the school district’s liability. 

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Consequently, plaintiffs are barred from seeking relief from defendants for their claims

involving their past denials of a free appropriate education. This case is over.

3. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR MONETARY DAMAGES.

Although the foregoing is dispositive, it is worth pausing over the audacity of what

plaintiffs are demanding. They want damages from a state administrative agency for taking too

long to adjudicate their grievance. This is like suing a judge for making an erroneous ruling. 

Plaintiffs had adequate remedies by way of judicial review and/or mandamus. They cannot

collect damages from defendants. 

General monetary damages are ordinarily unavailable under the IDEIA. Witte v. Clark

County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in

School Committee of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Department of Education of Massachusetts,

471 U.S. 359 (1985), held that the IDEIA authorizes compensatory reimbursement from school

authorities to parents of disabled children for their expenditures on special education if the court

determines such placement is appropriate. Id. at 394–95. Plaintiffs, however, do not provide

any authority on point addressing the issue of whether they can seek money damages based on

defendants’ delay in rendering a decision (Reply Br. 8). Plaintiffs rely on the district court case

of Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d 71, 79 (D.D.C. 2003), in support of their

argument that administrative bodies responsible for holding due process hearings should be held

accountable for their failure to perform their duties (Opp. (OAH) 13). Blackman, however,

does not directly speak to the issue of whether a plaintiff can sue a court or adjudicative body

for damages based on a delay in rendering a decision. 

Nothing in Blackman nor any other Ninth Circuit case stands for the proposition that a

plaintiff can sue a court or administrative body for damages based on a delay in rendering a

decision. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not cite to any other authority providing guidance on this

issue. This Court will not “make law” creating a claim for damages against an agency for

allegedly taking too long to decide or for even deciding incorrectly. It is a bad idea. It is bad

policy. It is completely unsupported by the law. 

 

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4. REHABILITATION ACT AND TITLE II OF THE ADA.

The IDEIA is a comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme that provides for

students to be given a free appropriate education by the state agency. Students denied a fair

appropriate education can also bring claims based on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B). As stated

above, plaintiffs have waived their past, present, and future claims regarding the denial of C.S.’s

free appropriate education. Because plaintiffs’ IDEIA cause of action fails, plaintiffs’ claims

under Section 504 and the ADA are also defeated.

CONCLUSION

To the extent this order does not address any remaining claims or arguments asserted by

plaintiffs in their complaint or at the hearing, they are either without merit or improperly raised.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss, construed as motions for summary

judgment, are GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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