Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00546/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00546-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ANDRE RAMON CRAVER 

NO. CIV. S-05-0546 FCD PAN P

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

M. NORGAARD, et al., 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff, Andre Ramon Craver (“plaintiff”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action seeking

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B), and Local General Order No. 262.

On December 21, 2005, defendants filed objections to the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations (“F&Rs”), filed

December 13, 2005, granting defendant Norgaard’s motion to

Case 2:05-cv-00546-FCD-PAN Document 37 Filed 01/19/06 Page 1 of 4
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Specifically, section 1997e(1) provides that “no action 1

shall be brought . . . until . . available remedies are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(1). 

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dismiss and denying defendant Roche’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff also filed objections to the F&Rs on January 3, 2006. 

When timely objections to findings by a magistrate judge are

filed, the district court must conduct a de novo determination of

the findings and recommendations as to issues of law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The district court may adopt, reject, or modify in

part or in full the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). Upon review of the file, the court rejects the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations with respect to

the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before an

action may be brought into federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 1

A district court must dismiss a case without prejudice where

there is no presuit exhaustion, even if exhaustion is met while

the suit is pending. Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citing McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th

Cir. 2002)). The critical issue in this case is when the action

was brought for purposes of § 1997e(a). The magistrate judge

found that plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies

prior to bringing suit based upon the premise that, “where a

prisoner requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis, suit

commences when the request is granted.” (F&R, filed Dec. 13,

2005, at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). The magistrate

impliedly equated the term “brought” in § 1997e(a) with the term

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“commence” in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The court disagrees with

this interpretation. 

While the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue, the

court finds the reasoning applied by the Seventh Circuit in Ford

v. Johnson compelling. 362 F.3d 395, 398-99 (7th Cir. 2004). In

Ford, the Seventh Circuit focused on the purpose of the

exhaustion requirements imposed by the PLRA in keeping “the

courthouse doors closed” to claims until “efforts [to resolve

matters out of court] have run their course.” Id. at 398. The

court equated the term “brought” in the PLRA to any similar

phrase that means “got under way” in order to ensure that the

litigation does not start until the administrative process has

ended, and thus, to ensure that the purposes of the PLRA are

served. Ford, 362 F.3d at 399. The court further stated that

“[n]either fee collection nor notice to the adversary is at issue

when applying § 1997e(a),” which is why Congress used the term

“brought” instead of “filed” or “commenced.” Id. Therefore, the

court found that for purposes of the PLRA, the mailing of the

complaint to the court was enough to “bring” an action and thus,

was the date prior to which administrative procedures must have

been exhausted. Id.

The court agrees with the Seventh Circuit that the purposes

of the PLRA are best served by interpreting the term “brought” in

§ 1997e(a) to mean when the suit was launched. The Ninth Circuit

has recognized that the principal purposes behind the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirements are (1) “to protect an administrative

agency’s authority by giving the agency the first opportunity to

resolve a controversy before a court intervenes in the dispute;”

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and (2) “to promote judicial efficiency by either resolving the

dispute outside of the courts, or by producing a factual record

that can aid the court.” Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 624 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145-46

(1992)). The court’s interpretation of the term “brought”

ensures that a court may not intervene until the administrative

agency has had the full opportunity to resolve the matter and

that efforts to resolve the matters out of court have been made. 

In this case, the suit was launched when the complaint was

received by the court. The complaint was stamped as received by

the court on March 21, 2005. Denial of plaintiff’s claims by the

administrative agency did not occur until April 21, 2005 and

April 26, 2005. Therefore, plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. Thus,

plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. See Lira, 427 F.3d at

1170. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that defendants’ motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is GRANTED

without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 18, 2006.

 /s/Frank C. Damrell, Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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