Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05403/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05403-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 150
Nature of Suit: Overpayments &amp; Enforcement of Judgments
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHINESE HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.18-cv-05403-JSC 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 7

Plaintiff Chinese Hospital Association alleges that Defendant Jacobs Engineering Group, 

Inc. breached its written agreement with Plaintiff for architectural services. Defendant moves to 

dismiss the complaint on the basis that it is barred by the statute of limitations.1 (Dkt. No. 7.) 

Having considered the papers and having had the benefit of oral argument on November 9, 2018, 

the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion. The running of the statute of 

limitations as to the entirety of Plaintiff’s claim is not apparent from the face of the Complaint.

BACKGROUND

A. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the State of 

California, that has provided healthcare services at 835 Jackson Street in San Francisco. (Dkt. No. 

1-3, ¶¶ 1, 4.2) Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (“Jacobs”) is a Delaware corporation doing 

business in the City and County of San Francisco, California providing engineering and 

architectural services. (Id. at ¶ 2.) 

 

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 10 & 16.)

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 1 of 11
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with Carter & Burgess, Inc. (“Carter”) for 

architectural services in May 2007. 3 (Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff hired Carter as the lead architect to 

design and administer the construction of a modern, eight-story hospital building that would both 

replace an existing facility and put the entire campus into compliance with current and 

forthcoming seismic requirements without interrupting Plaintiff’s ability to continue to serve the 

health care needs of the community. (Id.) In particular, Section 1.2.3.2 of the agreement 

provided:

Architect’s services called for by this Agreement shall be performed 

consistent with that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised under 

similar conditions by similar design professionals practicing at the 

same time in the same or similar locality.

(Id. ¶ 5.) The agreement also required that the design services, which included preparing 

schematic design documents through completed construction documents, be in conformity with 

the applicable California building code requirements and other governmental authority 

requirements. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Construction documents would be prepared in stages called 

increments; once approved by the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and 

Development (“OSHPD”), construction work would commence on OSHPD-approved increments 

while the design of later increments was in progress. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Increment 5 pertained to the 

floor plan of the hospital and was subject to particularly strict design requirements including, but 

not limited to, the layout of patient rooms, corridor widths, and the flow of soiled or clean 

equipment through the hospital. (Id.) 

Jacobs acquired Carter at some point after the agreement was executed. (Id. at ¶ 6.) In 

approximately mid-2010, the design work that Carter had been performing was substantially 

transferred to Jacobs’ Dallas office. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Nearly two years later, Carter, Jacobs, and 

Plaintiff entered into a novation agreement. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Pursuant to the novation, Jacobs assumed 

Carter’s duties and responsibilities under the May 2007 written agreement. (Id.) 

In September 2013, after construction of the project had commenced, OSHPD found some 

of Jacobs’ construction documents defective. (Id. at ¶ 11.) In November of 2013, Plaintiff 

 

3 Plaintiff incorporates into its complaint the agreement’s material terms. (Dkt. No.1-3 at ¶ 4) 

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 2 of 11
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

became aware of the serious defects in the construction documents and subsequently terminated 

the agreement with Jacobs. (Id.) 

In December 2013, Plaintiff and Jacobs entered into a Termination and License Agreement 

that granted Plaintiff the right to correct the designs with another architect and to continue with the 

project. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The Termination and License Agreement preserved Plaintiff’s right to bring 

claims directly against Jacobs for damages arising from work performed by Jacobs and/or Carter 

prior to the November 2013 termination. (Id.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff hired a replacement architect and completed the project with 

significantly increased design and construction expenses. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-19.) The replacement 

architect addressed or corrected specific defects in the construction documents prepared by Jacobs 

including the following:

a. The number of ADA accessible bathrooms on certain floors was fewer than required by 

the California Building Code.

b. The clear space around patient beds was insufficient to comply with the California 

Building Code. 

c. The pharmacy space violated the California Board of Pharmacy regulations because it 

did not separate the area for mixing chemotherapy drugs from the area for standard 

medication preparation.

d. The medical gas room could not be used because vendors would not deliver medical 

gases to that location.

e. The interconnections–including physical portals, electronic communications, utilities, 

and shared services–between the existing 1979 building and the new construction were 

not adequately designed and/or were omitted entirely, contrary to the requirements of 

the written agreement, the program documents developed by Carter and Jacobs, and the 

applicable law. 

(Id. at 14.) Remedying these defects delayed the construction, which also caused Plaintiff to incur 

additional costs. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18.)

In March of 2017, Plaintiff entered into a tolling agreement with Jacobs that tolled 

potential claims against Jacobs for one year. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

B. Procedural Background

On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a certificate of merit in the Superior Court of the County 

of San Francisco pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 411.35(b)(1).4 (Dkt. No. 1-5.) 

 

4 California requires that in “every action . . . arising out of the professional negligence of a person 

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 3 of 11
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The next day, Plaintiff filed this action in that same court. (Dkt. No. 1-3.) Plaintiff pled a single 

claim for breach of contract. (Id.) Defendant thereafter removed the action based on diversity 

jurisdiction and four days later filed the underlying motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

(Id.)

JURISDICTION

In federal courts, subject matter jurisdiction may arise from either “federal question 

jurisdiction” or “diversity of citizenship” when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Defendant here removed on the grounds 

of diversity jurisdiction. The “core principle of federal removal jurisdiction on the basis of 

diversity” is “that it is determined (and must exist) as of the time the complaint is filed and [as of 

the time] removal is effected.” Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n. of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 

(9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). To properly allege diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must claim 

more than $75,000 in damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In addition, “diversity jurisdiction requires 

complete diversity between the parties—each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from 

each plaintiff.” Diaz v. Davis (In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th 

Cir. 2008); 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Here, the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied as Plaintiff has pled damages in 

excess of $10,000,000. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at ¶ 25.) The diversity of citizenship requirement is 

likewise met because Plaintiff is a California corporation and Jacobs is a Delaware corporation 

with its corporate headquarters in Texas. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 5-6.) Accordingly, removal is proper 

on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

//

//

 

holding a valid architect’s certificate . . . the attorney for the plaintiff . . . shall file and serve the 

certificate specified in subdivision (b).” Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 411.35(a). Subdivision (b)(1) 

requires the attorney to review the facts of the case and consult with and receive the opinion from 

at least California-licensed architect “in the same discipline as the defendant” and to conclude “on 

the basis of this review and consultation that there is a reasonable meritorious case for filing” the 

action. Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 411.35(b)(1). Failure to do so may constitute “unprofessional 

conduct” and “grounds for discipline against the attorney,” a demurrer or motion to strike. Cal. 

Code of Civ. Pro. § 411.35(f)-(g).

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 4 of 11
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the 

sufficiency of the complaint where the action fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 

L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) a party is 

only required to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.2008). 

However, even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a 

plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels 

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of an affirmative defense is proper only if the 

defendant shows some obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” ASARCO, 

LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 

F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013)). “If, from the allegations of the complaint as well as any 

judicially noticeable materials, an asserted defense raises disputed issues of fact, dismissal under 

Rule 12(b)(6) is improper.” Id. (citing Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 5 of 11
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

If the Court concludes that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted, the “court 

should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND 

CONSIDERATION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

“[W]hen the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations is tested by a motion under Rule 

12(b)(6), [r]eview is limited to the complaint.” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a court may consider records 

outside of the complaint without converting a 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion in 

two circumstances. First, the court may consider records which are submitted as part of the 

complaint or, if not physically attached to the complaint, their authenticity is not questioned and 

the complaint necessarily relies upon the records. Second, the court may take judicial notice of 

matters of public record. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). A

“judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) 

generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and 

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(b).

Defendant requests that the Court consider the following exhibits in support of its motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint: (A) the parties’ tolling agreement, (B) the parties’ novation 

agreement, (C) the California Secretary of State Statement of Information form for Defendant, and 

(D) Plaintiff’s certificate of merit originally filed in San Francisco County Superior Court. (Dkt. 

Nos. 8, 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4.) Plaintiff does not oppose consideration of these records except as to 

the novation agreement at Exhibit B. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS notice of exhibits A, C 

and D. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688-89.

Plaintiff does oppose consideration of the novation agreement. (Dkt. No. 12 at 7:23-27.) 

However, Plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies on the novation agreement; without it, Defendant 

would not have an agreement with Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 8-2 at 2, ¶ (b)(3) (“The [Defendant] by 

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 6 of 11
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

this agreement becomes entitled to all rights, titles, and interest of the transferor in and to the 

contracts as if the transferee were the original party to the contract”)). Accordingly, the Court

finds it can consider the novation agreement without converting Defendant’s motion to one for 

summary judgment. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Although 

Plaintiff brings a single breach of contract claim, Defendant insists that to determine the applicable 

statute of limitations courts look to the gravamen and substance of the complaint rather than the 

label used by the plaintiff. Defendant contends that the gravamen and substance of Plaintiff’s 

complaint is negligence and thus subject to a shorter, two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff 

counters that its complaint is timely because it lies in contract, not tort, and is thus subject to a 

four-year statute of limitations. Before the Court can resolve which statute of limitation applies, it 

must determine which state’s law governs.

I. Whether California or Texas law Applies?

As a threshold matter, the Court must decide whether the choice of law provision in the 

underlying agreement requires the Court to apply Texas or California law. Defendant contends 

that the Court should apply Texas law based on a choice of law provision in the parties’ 

agreement. The provision states that the agreement “shall be governed by the law of the principal 

place of business of the Architect, unless otherwise provided in section 1.4.2.” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 

18, Sec. 1.3.7.1.) Neither party disputes the enforceability of this clause. Defendant has not met 

its burden of showing that, based on the complaint and the records that the Court may consider on 

the 12(b)(6) motion, the choice of law provision requires the application of Texas law. 

First, while Carter’s principal place of business was Texas at the time the agreement was 

created (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 11 (listing Carter’s address as “1420 W Mockingbird, Suite 800, Dallas, 

Texas 75247”)), Defendant has not demonstrated that it is Carter’s—rather than Defendant’s—

principal place of business that should govern. The novation agreement reincorporates the 

material terms of the original agreement, including the choice of law provision. (Dkt. No. 8-2 at 2 

& 4.) Further, the novation agreement states that Defendant Jacobs stands in the shoes of Carter 

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 7 of 11
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

as if it were the original party to the agreement. (Dkt. No. 8-2 at 2 (“[the Transferee] by this 

agreement becomes entitled to all . . . titles . . . of the Transferor in and to the contracts as if the 

Transferee were the original party to the contracts.”.) Therefore, drawing all reasonable inferences 

in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant is the Architect for the purposes of the choice of law provision. 

Second, Defendant has not proven that its principal place of business was Texas at the 

relevant time. Neither the complaint’s allegations nor the extra-complaint materials prove that at 

the time the novation was entered (and Defendant made a party to the agreement) Defendant’s 

principal place of business was Texas. To the contrary, the novation recites that Jacobs is “a 

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Delaware with its principal office in 

Pasadena, California.” 5 (Dkt. No. 8-2 at 2 (emphasis added).) Principal office may be different 

from business, but there is nothing properly before the Court that explains this apparent 

contradiction to Defendant’s argument. While Defendant’s California Secretary of State form 

suggests a Texas location in 2018, Defendant has not shown why that is the relevant time period. 

(Dkt. No. 8-3.) There is also nothing before the Court as to what the parties meant by “principal 

place of business.”

It is “solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation 

turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.” De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 56 Cal. 

App. 4th 482, 501 (1997) (quoting Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62 Cal.2d 861, 865 (1965) 

(internal citations omitted). “A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual 

intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable 

and lawful.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1636. Here, the pleadings and the novation agreement do not make 

it obvious that the parties’ intended the term “principal office” to be interchangeable with 

“principal place of business.” Nor is the agreement clear as to when the choice of law 

determination is made—when the parties entered into the agreement, when the breach occurred, or 

when the lawsuit was filed. Thus, there exists more than one plausible interpretation of the choice 

of law provision. “[W]hen two equally plausible interpretations of the language of a contract may 

 

5 The parties dispute neither the legal veracity of the novation nor that it occurred. Accordingly, 

the Court shall treat the agreement as a novation for the purposes of this motion. 

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 8 of 11
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

be made . . . parol evidence is admissible to aid in interpreting the agreement, thereby presenting a 

question of fact.” WYDA Assocs. v. Merner, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1702, 1710 (1996) (quoting Walter 

E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Tecrim Corp. 196 Cal.App.3d 149, 158 (1987)). At the pleading stage, 

the Court cannot resolve such ambiguities and instead must draw all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor 

including that Jacobs’ principal place of business was California, and thus, that California law 

applies.

II. Is the Action Time-Barred?

Having concluded that California law applies, at least for purposes of Defendant’s motion 

to dismiss, the Court must now determine whether Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of 

limitations. The first question, then, is which statute of limitations applies. Defendant insists that 

although pled as a breach of contract, Plaintiff’s claim sounds in negligence and therefore the twoyear negligence statute of limitations applies. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. The parties agree 

that if the two-year statute applies, the claim is time-barred.

“To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action it is necessary to 

identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the “gravamen” of the cause of action.” Hensler v. 

City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1, 22–23 (1994), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 22, 1994)

(citing Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 214 (1959)). “[T]he nature of the right sued upon and 

not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of 

limitations under our code.” Id. (citing Maguire v. Hibernia S.& L. Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719, 733 

(1944)). 

In its sole cause of action styled as a breach of contract, Plaintiff alleges that it “performed 

all conditions, covenants, and promises required to be performed on its part in accordance with the 

terms and conditions of the agreement,” and that Defendant breached the agreement because it 

failed to meet “the standard of care required by the agreement” and to “follow the functional 

requirements for the project.” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 23 & 24.) The gravamen of the allegation that 

Defendant failed to meet the standard of care required by the agreement is professional 

negligence. The relevant agreement provision merely restates the legal duty the law imposes on 

architects. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at ¶ 5.) The claim based on that provision therefore sounds in tort.

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 9 of 11
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

In L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal.2d 56 (1952), for example, the California 

Supreme Court held that the gravamen of a breach of contract claim against an accountant for the 

untimely filing of a return was contract and not tort. The Court reasoned:

In the instant case the complaint shows and the court found that 

defendant contracted to do a specific thing, namely, to prepare and 

file plaintiff's income tax returns in the time required by law. There is 

no equivocation or shading of the obligation. It was not limited to the 

exercise of ordinary care. It was a positive, specific duty which he 

assumed. Any justification or excuse for failure to perform it could be 

a matter of defense. It differs in that respect from an action against a 

physician who does not agree to achieve any particular result; he 

merely agrees to act in a non-negligent manner. Even in the physician 

cases it would not be doubted that if a doctor is specifically employed 

to remove a wart from the patient's foot but removes one from his 

face, there would be a breach of contract. Likewise, it is dissimilar 

from an accountant who is employed generally to audit the employer's 

books where he assumes the general obligation to exercise due care.

L. B. Labs., Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 63 (1952) (emphasis added). Here, the alleged breach 

based on the failure to “follow the standard of care in the agreement” is the same standard of care

“ordinarily exercised under similar conditions by similar design professionals practicing at the 

same time in the same or similar locality.” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at ¶ 5.) Thus, to the extent the breach of 

contract claim relies on that section of the contract, it is barred by the two-year negligence statute 

of limitations. See Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 22-23; see also Huizar v. Four Seasons Nursing Centers 

of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 264, 265-66 (1978) (“The majority rule in this country is that, despite 

allegations of contract, malpractice suits are governed by the statute of limitations applicable to 

tort actions, rather than the statute applicable to actions for breach of contract because the cause of 

action sounds in tort rather than contract.”).

However, construing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the 

Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that every alleged breach of the agreement sounds in tort, 

that is, that Plaintiff does not also allege that Defendant breached a contract to do a specific thing 

separate from merely agreeing to comply with the ordinary standard of care. For example, 

Plaintiff alleges breach by “failing to follow the functional requirements for the Project,” and a 

functional requirement of the contract was that “the new building was to work with the existing 

1979 building as a functional whole.” (Id. 1-3 at ¶ 9.) The court cannot determine on the present 

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 10 of 11
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

record that this allegation, among others, does not allege a specific breach as contemplated in L.B. 

Laboratories, Inc.. See Quintilliani v. Mannerino, 62 Cal. App. 4th 54, 66 (1998), as modified on 

denial of reh'g (Apr. 2, 1998) (“Because the nature of the duties to be performed and the nature of 

the alleged wrongful conduct are factually disputed issues, we cannot say whether the gravamen of 

the action is legal malpractice or not, i.e., we cannot say whether the legal or nonlegal functions 

were the predominate reason for the agreement, nor can we say whether the alleged wrongful 

conduct was legal or nonlegal in nature”). Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude, as a matter of 

law, that the substance and gravamen of the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint sounds in tort as 

opposed to contract as pled.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss to the 

extent Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim rests on Defendant’s ordinary obligation to perform 

work consistent with the standard of care imposed on an architect, but DENIES the motion to the 

extent Plaintiff’s claim is based on a different breach of the contract. Defendant shall answer the 

complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:18-cv-05403-JSC Document 20 Filed 11/20/18 Page 11 of 11