Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905-68/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF

E-filed: 2/10/08 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. CV-00-20905 RMW

ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL

TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE

QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

[Re Docket No. 3055]

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 3183 Filed 02/10/08 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 For purposes of this order, the court collectively refers to the Hynix, Micron, and Nanya

entities as "the Manufacturers."

ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 2

 RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00334 RMW

[Re Docket No. 1083]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., and

MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,

INC.

Defendants.

No. C-06-00244 RMW

[Re Docket No. 707]

Trial in these three consolidated cases began on January 29, 2008. The Manufacturers1

 hope

to prove that Rambus monopolized or attempted to monopolize six technology markets by enforcing

patents covering products containing features complying with standards adopted by JEDEC, a

standard setting organization. The technology markets cover various technologies essential for

making DRAMs. The Manufacturers have also alleged that Rambus committed fraud based on its

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 3

actions and statements while JEDEC was developing standards for commodity memory chips.

This order addresses Rambus's trial motion to preclude questions concerning jury

consultants. The motion seeks to prevent counsel from asking a witness about any meeting with jury

consultants, specifically regarding their meetings with jury consultants to help them prepare to

testify at trial. The court has reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of counsel. For the

following reasons, the court will allow only very circumscribed inquiry on the involvement of jury

consultants.

I. ANALYSIS

There is sparse case law on whether a court should permit cross-examination regarding how

a witness prepared for his or her testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 611(b) allows for

limited cross-examination:

Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination

and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise

of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.

The text of rule 611(b) suggests that cross-examination, as of right, has some subject matter

limitations. While cross-examination is limited to matters related to the direct examination, crossexamination is also allowed regarding any matter affecting a witness' credibility. FRE 611(b); see

also United States v. Park, 525 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (5th Cir. 1976). "The range of evidence that

may be elicited for the purpose of discrediting a witness is very liberal." United States v. Palmer,

536 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1976). Among the items included in the "very liberal" definition of

credibility are the witness' "capacity to remember, to observe, and to recount, and for the purpose of

testing his sincerity, truthfulness and motives." Id.; United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668, 672 (8th

Cir. 1976) (urging that "the court should allow counsel great latitude, particularly when

cross-examination is directed at the credibility of key adversary witnesses"); cf. Geders v. United

States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1976) (disapproving of a ban on attorney-client counseling during a trial

recess and suggesting that cross-examination could reveal any "improper coaching").

With these principles in mind, inquiry regarding a witness' preparation at the hands of a jury

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28 ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 4

consultant is permissible cross-examination and relevant, absent privilege or FRE 403 concerns of

undue prejudice. Knowledge that a jury consultant, for example, served as an acting coach, picked

the witness' clothing, rehearsed the witness's testimony, taught the witness to sit up straight, or

otherwise aided a witness in appearing more credible could affect the weight the jury gives to the

witness' testimony.

Rambus argues that the probative value of such evidence is featherlight and substantially

outweighed by unfair prejudice, and that such cross-examination should therefore be barred under

Rule 403. Rambus suggests two sources of unfair prejudice. The first is that the jury will draw

improper conclusions because of a negative connotation about jury consultants propagated by the

media and movies like Runaway Jury or because referencing jury consultants suggests one side's

size or resources. The Manufacturers do not intend to cross-examine a witness regarding jury

selection. Indeed, few witnesses other than possibly a client representative may have had contact

with a jury selection consultant. Accordingly, any prejudice from the possibility that a juror has

seen a movie such as Runaway Jury, which dealt with jury selection and jury misconduct, is too

speculative to justify precluding cross-examination regarding preparation. Rambus's argument

regarding impermissible references to a law firm's size or resources is also not persuasive. While

referencing the size of a party's law firm is not permissible because it has no relevance, see In re

WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2005 WL 375314, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2005), asking

questions about a witness' preparation is relevant and outweighs the prejudice of an inference that

one side has more resources than the other. The argument falls flat here because the jurors need

only look at the rows upon rows of counsel and trial assistants, shelves of binders, and the

admissible evidence regarding market size to know that both sides in this dispute have plenty of

money and are willing to spend it.

Rambus's better argument is that cross-examination regarding how a witness prepared to

testify treads on the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, citing In re Cendant

Corp. Securities Litigation, 343 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 2003) (Scirica, C.J.). In Cendant, the issue arose

when counsel for Ernst & Young objected to a line of questioning in deposition regarding whether

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2 Dr. McGraw is apparently "Dr. Phil," the now well-known celebrity psychologist. 

3 In a somewhat analogous context, the Southern District of New York held that documents

and communications between a grand jury target, her lawyers, and a public relations firm were protected

by the work-product doctrine because they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See In re Grand

Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury

Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Kaplan, J.).

ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 5

his client had met with Dr. Phillip C. McGraw, an expert in trial strategy and deposition preparation. 

343 F.3d at 660.2

 The discovery master in the case ruled that the deponent could be asked whether

he met with Dr. McGraw, when they met, for how long, who was present and why they met. Id.

The discovery master did not permit the parties to ask what Dr. McGraw told the deponent, whether

they practiced his testimony, and whether the deponent received any documents or notes because

these questions would violate the work-product doctrine. Id. The district court reversed this order. 

However, the Third Circuit reversed the district court and noted that the discovery master's ruling

was "essentially correct." Id. at 668.

The Third Circuit first reasoned that the work-product protection extends beyond tangible

documents to intangible conversations as well. Id. at 662-63. The court explained that the workproduct protection also extends to non-attorneys who assist in preparation of litigation and that the

litigation consultant's advice to a witness is an "opinion" that is protected under the work-product

doctrine. Id. at 665-66. Finally, the court concluded that the "frank and open discussions" between

Dr. McGraw, counsel, and the witness went "to the core of the work product doctrine" and could

only be discovered under extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 667. In its directions regarding

remand, the Third Circuit noted, "[w]e believe [the witness] may be asked whether his anticipated

testimony was practiced or rehearsed. But this inquiry should be circumscribed." Id. at 668. The

court left the definition of such boundaries to the district court. Id. The Cendant case is the only

authority that either the parties or court have been able to find related to the issues raised by the

Manufacturers desire to cross-examine Rambus's witnesses on how they prepared their testimony.3

The court agrees with Chief Judge Scirica's persuasive opinion, and adopts its reasoning as the

foundation for framing what will be permitted at trial.

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4 In an article cited favorably by the Cendant opinion, the authors distinguished the extent

to which an opposing party can conduct discovery of the preparation of a client and an expert witness.

Stanley D. Davis & Thomas D. Beisecker, Discovering Trial Consultant Work Product: A New Way to

Borrow an Adversary's Wits?, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 581, 626-31 (1994). The authors argued that

while a jury consultant's advice to a client should be beyond discovery due to the attorney-client

privilege, a jury consultant's advice to an expert witness could be discovered to prevent a "perversion

of the trial process." Id. at 630. In striking this balance, the authors suggest that "courts should not be

concerned with routine witness preparation; indeed, to do so would do violence to the principle that each

side to a lawsuit must be given some 'discovery free' zone in which to prepare the case and would thus

be inconsistent with the adversary system." Id. Only upon a preliminary showing of some impropriety

would the authors permit discovery into the expert's preparation. Id. Obviously, this case differs

because the Manufacturers are seeking only to ask questions at trial, not conduct discovery of any jury

consultant's notes or video sessions. Nonetheless, the authors' concern regarding the values inherent in

the adversarial system are informative.

5 The court makes no findings at this time as to whether any specific witness, whether a

former employee of Rambus or of one of the Manufacturers, had an attorney-client relationship with

his former employer at the time he engaged in trial preparation.

ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 6

One of the first issues regarding the scope of the Manufacturers' cross-examination is

whether the witness is part of Rambus, i.e., a "client" within the meaning of the attorney-client

privilege. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d at 668 (Garth, J., concurring).4

 If the witness is

a "client," the substance of any communication between the jury consultant, the client, and the

attorney is probably privileged. See id. This issue's difficulty stems from the fact that many of

Rambus's witnesses were not employees during trial preparation, but rather former employees who

are now paid consultants. While a variety of opinions exist going different directions, see 1 EDNA

SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 168-175

(5th ed. 2007), the court doubts that such consultants are "clients" for the attorney-client privilege

because they are no longer agents of the corporation. However, the question of whether an attorneyclient privilege continued to exist would have to be examined, if the determination were critical, on

a case by case basis.5 Indeed, some witnesses may have retained their own attorneys, despite being

"consultants" of Rambus. See, e.g., Samsung's Motion to Compel Compliance with Samsung's

Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum to Joel Karp, Docket No. 1076, C-05-334, at 7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18,

2008) (suggesting that Mr. Karp has retained separate counsel, Mike Lucey of Gordon & Rees). 

However, even if the witnesses are now only consultants with no attorney-client relationship

with Rambus, their preparation to testify may still be protected by the work-product doctrine. While

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28 ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 7

the Manufacturers argued at the hearing on this motion that any communication with a non-client

waives the work-product protection, that is not the law. See generally 2 EPSTEIN, at 1038-46. The

work-product protection continues to adhere where the non-client shares a financial or legal interest,

for example, as parties to a joint defense agreement. In this context, the court believes that

Rambus's witnesses share a sufficient interest with Rambus to preserve the work-product privilege.

The Cendant court believed that asking a witness whether they rehearsed their testimony

would be proper and not infringe on protected work-product. This court agrees. The next issue is

how to appropriately "circumscribe" the inquiry beyond this point. At the hearing, counsel for the

Manufacturers submitted that the following questions should all be "fair game":

The court: So the questions would be, if you were asking the questions?

Mr. Allan: They would be, did you meet with – who did you meet with to

prepare for your testimony? What does that person do? I think it's

fair to ask, did you meet with a jury consultant or some kind of –

what does that person do? What is their occupation? How many

meetings were there? How long did they last? Was any advice

given? Was your testimony rehearsed? I think that's another fair

question. And was any advice given on presentational aspects of

your testimony, not substantive aspects, but presentational aspects?

Your poise? Your demeanor? Your voice? Your inflection?

Whether to make eye contact with the jurors? Those sorts of

questions I think are fair game.

Tr. 796:13-797:6 (Feb. 6, 2008).

Questions going to how the consultant told the witness to improve his or her testimony seem

to intrude on the values underlying the work-product doctrine and the adversarial system. That an

attorney or jury consultant thinks a particular witness fidgets or sweats too much intrudes on their

mental impressions regarding the litigation. On the other hand, the adversarial system exists to

further truth-finding, and coaching a witness to act credible does not seem to further the goal of

arriving at the truth. Without reaching the issue of the exact boundary of the work-product doctrine

(does it cover an attorney's reminder to a witness to apply antiperspirant before cross-examination?),

it is clear that the proposed line of questioning will create a sideshow and distract the jurors from the

factual issues in this case raising FRE 403 concerns.

Accordingly, the parties may ask a witness whether he or she met with a jury consultant, the

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 3183 Filed 02/10/08 Page 7 of 10
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ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 8

purpose of any such meeting, who was present, the duration of the meeting and whether the witness

practiced or rehearsed his or her testimony. The court will not permit questioning beyond those

limited points because inquiring into work-product protected materials creates unfair prejudice and

doing so will lead to both confusion and delay. Either of these reasons justify precluding some of

the proposed questioning under Rule 403. 

II. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Rambus's motion. The

parties may only cross-examine a witness as outlined above. Specifically, the parties may ask a

witness whether he or she met with a jury consultant, the purpose of any such meeting, who was

present, the duration of the meeting and whether the witness practiced or rehearsed his or her

testimony. However, questions about counsel's or the consultant's views on important facts of the

case, trial themes or strategy, strengths or weaknesses of the witness, or advice to the witness as to

how to improve his or her appearance or credibility are forbidden.

DATED: 2/10/08 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 3183 Filed 02/10/08 Page 8 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 9

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Rambus Inc., all actions Counsel for Hynix entities, C-00-20905 and C-05-00334

Burton Alexander

Gross

Burton.Gross@mto.com Allen Ruby ruby@allenrubylaw.com

Carolyn Hoecker

Luedtke

carolyn.luedtke@mto.com Belinda Martinez Vega bvega@omm.com

Catherine Rajwani crajwani@sidley.com Daniel J. Furniss djfurniss@townsend.com

Craig N. Tolliver ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com Geoffrey Hurndall Yost gyost@thelenreid.com

David C. Yang david.yang@mto.com Jordan Trent Jones jtjones@townsend.com

Douglas A. Cawley dcawley@mckoolsmith.com Joseph A. Greco jagreco@townsend.com

Erin C. Dougherty erin.dougherty@mto.com Kenneth Lee Nissly kennissly@thelenreid.com

Gregory P. Stone gregory.stone@mto.com Kenneth Ryan O'Rourke korourke@omm.com

Jennifer Lynn Polse jen.polse@mto.com Patrick Lynch plynch@omm.com

Keith Rhoderic Dhu

Hamilton, II

keith.hamilton@mto.com Susan Gregory

VanKeulen 

svankeulen@thelenreid.com

Kelly Max Klaus kelly.klaus@mto.com Theodore G. Brown, III tgbrown@townsend.com

Miriam Kim Miriam.Kim@mto.com Tomomi Katherine

Harkey 

tharkey@thelen.com

Peter A. Detre detrepa@mto.com Counsel for Micron entities, C-06-00244

Pierre J. Hubert phubert@mckoolsmith.com Aaron Bennett Craig aaroncraig@quinnemanuel.com

Rosemarie Theresa

Ring

rose.ring@mto.com David J. Ruderman davidruderman@quinnemanuel.

com

Scott L Cole scole@mckoolsmith.com Harold Avrum Barza halbarza@quinnemanuel.com

Scott W. Hejny shejny@sidley.com Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Sean Eskovitz sean.eskovitz@mto.com John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Steven McCall

Perry 

steven.perry@mto.com Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Thomas N Tarnay ttarnay@sidley.com Linda Jane Brewer lindabrewer@quinnemanuel.co

m

William Hans

Baumgartner, Jr

wbaumgartner@sidley.com Rachael Lynn Ballard

McCracken

rachaelmccracken@quinnemanu

el.com

Robert Jason Becher robertbecher@quinnemanuel.co

m

Yonaton M Rosenzweig yonirosenzweig@quinnemanuel.

com

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ORDER ON RAMBUS'S SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MOTION TO PRECLUDE QUESTIONS CONCERNING JURY

CONSULTANTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 10

Counsel for Nanya entities, C-05-00334 Counsel for Samsung entities, C-05-00334 and C-05-

02298

Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com Ana Elena Kadala anita.kadala@weil.com

Craig R. Kaufman ckaufman@orrick.co

m

Claire Elise Goldstein claire.goldstein@weil.com

Glenn Michael Levy glevy@orrick.com David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com

Jan Ellen Ellard jellard@orrick.com Edward Robert Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.co

m

Kaiwen Tseng ktseng@orrick.com 

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com

Robert E. Freitas rfreitas@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Counsel for intervenor, Texas Instruments, Inc., C-05-00334

Kelli A. Crouch kcrouch@jonesday.com

Counsel for intervenor, United States Department of Justice, C-00-20905

Eugene S. Litvinoff eugene.litvinoff@usdoj.gov

May Lee Heye may.heye@usdoj.gov

Nathanael M. Cousins nat.cousins@usdoj.gov

Niall Edmund Lynch Niall.Lynch@USDOJ.GOV

Counsel for intervenor, Elpida Memory, Inc., C-00-20905 and C-05-00334

Eric R. Lamison elamison@kirkland.com

John J. Feldhaus jfeldhaus@foley.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program in each action.

Dated: 2/10/08 TSF

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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