Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05495/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05495-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY KEVIN GOMEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALAMEIDA, et. al., 

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 5495 OWW LJO P 

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 9) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK FORM 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF 30 DAYS TO

FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Jeffrey Kevin Gomez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant action

on January 24, 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The action

was subsequently transferred and received in this court on March 29, 2004. Plaintiff initially

named Edward Alameida, Director of Corrections; Warden Scribner, Capt. J.R. Andrews,

Assistant Warden D. Ortiz, Lt. W. Villareal and Correctional Counselor T. Schrednitz as

defendants. 

On March 9, 2005, the Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend as Plaintiff

failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on May

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10, 2005. Plaintiff now names the Jeanne S. Woodford, Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, Edward Alameida, Scribner, Ortiz, Andrews, R. Lopez, Paula

Stockman, T. Schrednitz, W. Villareal, V. Yamamoto, T. Norton, Sgt. Monroe, the California

Department of Corrections and Does 1 through 20 as Defendants. In addition, where Plaintiff

made one due process claim in his original complaint, Plaintiff now lists sixteen (16) causes of

action. 

A. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

As noted above, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint adds twenty-five new Defendants

and fifteen additional claims. In addition, Plaintiff’s statement of facts consists of twenty-seven

pages of single spaced narrative. As a result, the Court here provides a summary of the

complaint as was derived from Plaintiff’s initial complaint. 

Plaintiff alleges that upon his arrival at Corcoran State Prison, defendants refused to

honor Salinas Valley State Prison’s (SVSP) classification of plaintiff as an “inactive” gang

member/associate. Plaintiff requests that he be removed from the SHU immediately, that the

reference to any gang validation be expunged and that he be provided with all information

pertaining to his validation as a gang member and compensatory damages of $100 a day for

plaintiff’s segregation from May 16, 2002 to January 6, 2004. 

B. DISCUSSION

1. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

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which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

In this case, the Court has examined Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and finds that

Plaintiff has not linked any of the named Defendants to any act or omission giving rise to any one

of the sixteen listed causes of action. Although Plaintiff provides twenty-seven pages of

narrative, he lists his claims for relief separately but does not link in each claim for relief any

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individual named in the Complaint. Plaintiff merely alleges generally that his rights under a

particular constitutional amendment was violated. It is not the Court’s duty to read Plaintiff’s

narrative and then try to identify which individuals go with each claim stated by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff must provide a brief statement of facts linking each Defendant to an a particular act or

omission giving rise to each stated claim for relief. 

3. Rule 8(a)

The Court notes further that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is quite lengthy with respect

to his recitation of facts. 

A plaintiff’s complaint must satisfy the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a), which calls for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need only

give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

Rule 8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely

upon at trial, but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47. 

In this instance, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to put any of

the Defendants on notice as to which of their actions violated his constitutional rights. As in the

case above, the Court will not attempt to link actions from the statement of facts to Plaintiff’s

allegation a particular right was violated. This responsibility lies with the Plaintiff. Further, that

Plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend does not mean that Plaintiff is granted the opportunity

continue to add new defendants and claims or make his Amended Complaint even longer than it

was originally. In order to provide the Defendants with fair notice of Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff

must conform his Amended Complaint to the rules stated above. 

4. Exhaustion Requirement

Given Plaintiff is being given the opportunity to Amend and has made numerous

additions and defendants that were not present in the prior complaint, the Court takes this

opportunity to inform Plaintiff of the exhaustion requirement. 

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995, “[n]o action shall be

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liberty interest. 

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brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Section 1997e(a)

exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435

U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of

the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the

administrative process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). "All 'available' remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need

not meet federal standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective." ' Porter, 534 U.S. at

524 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 739 n. 5). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney

v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, Plaintiff may not exhaust while the

suit is pending. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201.

In the event any of Plaintiff’s claims are unexhausted under the provisions outlined

above, Plaintiff may wish to consider their omission. 

C. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due 1

Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). 

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in a particular

classification status. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n.9 (1976). The existence of a

liberty interest created by state law is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are

generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

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the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

Under certain circumstances, labeling a prisoner with a particular classification may

implicate a liberty interest subject to the protections of due process. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d

818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex

offender’ label coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment

program whose successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of

deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.”). 

2. Conspiracy 

In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to section 1983, such a complaint

must “allege [some] facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.”

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that

defendants conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance

of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

3. Equal Protection

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that

defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of inmates

which included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (equal

protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208

F.3d 736, 740 (9 Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal th

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia,

775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that

show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren at

1194.

4. Eighth Amendment

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To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison

officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

time to file a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he

wish to do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Second Amended Complaint how the conditions

complained of resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

F.2d 227 (9 Cir. 1980). The Second Amended Complaint must specifically state how each th

Defendant is involved. Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423, U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9 Cir. 1980); th

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9 Cir. th

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference

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the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. WITHIN

THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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