Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05075/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 21, 2003 Decided February 3, 2004

No. 03-5075

LARRY FLYNT AND L.F.P., INC.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02399)

Paul J. Cambria, Jr. argued the cause for appellants.

With him on the briefs were Roger W. Wilcox, Jr. and John

G. Perazich.

Michael S. Raab, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-5075 Document #800774 Filed: 02/03/2004 Page 1 of 15
2

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S.

Department of Justice.

Before: EDWARDS, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Larry Flynt and L.F.P., Inc. (the

company that publishes Hustler magazine) (collectively

‘‘Flynt’’ or ‘‘appellants’’) sued Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary

of Defense, and the United States Department of Defense

(‘‘DOD’’) seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief against interference with its exercise of a claimed First Amendment right of

the news media to have access to U.S. troops in combat

operations, and claiming that DOD’s delay in granting Hustler’s reporter access to U.S. troops in Afghanistan infringed

that right. They further argued that DOD’s Directive controlling media access to military forces facially violates this

same constitutional right. The District Court dismissed

Flynt’s as-applied constitutional claims for lack of ripeness

and standing, and refused to exercise its discretion under the

Declaratory Judgment Act to declare the pertinent DOD

Directive facially unconstitutional. This appeal followed. Because we find that no such constitutional right exists, we will

affirm the District Court’s decision on other grounds.

I. Background

A. Hustler’s attempts to gain access

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the

United States military began combat operations in Afghanistan in support of the global war on terrorism. On October

30, 2001, Flynt wrote a letter to the Honorable Victoria

Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,

requesting that Hustler correspondents ‘‘be permitted to

accompany ground troops on combat missions and that said

correspondents be allowed free access to the theater of

United States military operations in Afghanistan and other

countries where hostilities may be occurring as part of OperaUSCA Case #03-5075 Document #800774 Filed: 02/03/2004 Page 2 of 15
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tion Enduring Freedom.’’ Two weeks later, on November 12,

2001, Flynt wrote Clarke again requesting the same access

and complaining about her failure to respond to his October

30 letter. Three days later, on November 15, Clarke sent

Flynt a fax stating that access to ground operations was not

immediately possible because ‘‘TTT the only U.S. troops on the

ground in Afghanistan are small numbers of servicemen

involved in special operations activity.’’ Clarke explained that

‘‘[t]he highly dangerous and unique nature of their work

makes it very difficult to embed media’’ with ground troops,

but also stated that there had been ‘‘extensive’’ media access

to other aspects of military operations. Specifically, ‘‘[s]cores

of reporters and photographers have covered the [air] strikes,

witnessed the humanitarian drops and interviewed dozens of

[soldiers].’’ Clarke then provided Flynt with contact information for the Fifth Fleet Public Affairs Officer so that Hustler

could have similar access.

Not satisfied with the access provided by DOD, and that

other media outlets had received, Flynt did not contact the

Fifth Fleet Public Affairs Officer; rather, he filed this lawsuit

the day after he received Clarke’s fax. Shortly after filing

suit, Flynt sent another letter to Clarke on January 15, 2002,

stating that ‘‘I did not contact [the Fifth Fleet Public Affairs

Officer] because I did not request any such access or similar

access. Rather, I specifically requested reporter access to

actual battlefield combat activities.’’ The letter also characterized Clarke’s description of special operations activities as

vague. Two weeks later, Flynt sent another letter to Clarke

requesting an immediate response to his January 15 letter.

Clarke responded by letter on February 4, 2002, reiterated

DOD’s position, and again described the access that was

currently available. Furthermore, she stated that ‘‘all [your

reporter] needs to do is work with [DOD’s] people on the

ground.’’ She also provided Flynt with an extensive list of

contact persons and explained that DOD decisions regarding

media access were controlled by Department of Defense

Directive 5122.5.

On February 19, 2002, Flynt’s lawyer sent an email to

Lieutenant Commander Bonnie Hebert, one of the contacts

USCA Case #03-5075 Document #800774 Filed: 02/03/2004 Page 3 of 15
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Clarke had provided, requesting ‘‘permission to have Hustler

magazine correspondents accompany and report on the activities of American soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan who

are engaged in combat actions.’’ Hebert responded three

days later, asking ‘‘[w]here exactly in Afghanistan would you

like to go?’’ and requesting the identity of the reporter.

This began a series of communications that ultimately resulted in David Buchbinder, a Hustler reporter, arriving at

Bagram Air Force Base by May 7, 2002. Once in Afghanistan, Buchbinder placed himself on a list of reporters awaiting access to ground units. Since his arrival in Afghanistan,

Buchbinder has filed several stories, at least one of which

shows he has accompanied troops on a search for al Qaeda

operatives.

B. The Directive

As stated above, DOD decisions regarding media access to

combat troops are guided by Department of Defense Directive 5122.5. This Directive, issued on September 27, 2000,

assigns the responsibility of ‘‘[e]nsur[ing] a free flow of news

and information to the news media’’ to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Directive 5122.5. The

Directive contains three enclosures. At issue in this case is

Enclosure 3, entitled ‘‘Statement of DOD Principles for News

Media.’’ This enclosure begins with the command that

‘‘[o]pen and independent reporting shall be the principal

means of coverage of U.S. military operations.’’ ¶ E3.1.1. It

then outlines the manner in which such coverage should

occur. It allows for media pools, limited numbers of press

persons who represent a larger number of news media organizations and share material, but states that pools are not to be

the ‘‘standard means of covering U.S. military operations.’’

¶ E3.1.2. Rather, pools are only to be used when space is

limited or areas to be visited are extremely remote. ¶ E3.1.3.

It also directs that ‘‘field commanders should be instructed to

permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft

when possible.’’ ¶ E3.1.7. In sum, the Directive represents

an attempt to facilitate broad media coverage, and contains

few restrictions, including limited restrictions on media comUSCA Case #03-5075 Document #800774 Filed: 02/03/2004 Page 4 of 15
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munications for security purposes and expulsion for members

of the media who violate the ground rules. Id. at ¶ ¶ E3.1.4.

& E3.1.8. It also includes the caveat that ‘‘[s]pecial operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.’’ ¶ E3.1.5.

C. Proceedings Below

Flynt and L.F.P., Inc., filed their initial complaint against

the DOD and Secretary Rumsfeld on November 16, 2001,

requesting preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. In

addition, Flynt challenged Directive 5122.5 on the grounds

that (1) enforcement of the policies violated his historical and

constitutional rights of access to the battlefield; (2) enforcement of the policies amounted to a content-based prior restraint that deprived him of his First Amendment rights; (3)

DOD’s denial of his request was not narrowly tailored to

further a substantial government interest; and (4) DOD’s

denial was arbitrary and capricious and made without reference to specific and objective standards.

After a hearing on Flynt’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court denied the motion, stating that it was

‘‘persuaded that in an appropriate case there could be a

substantial likelihood of demonstrating that under the First

Amendment the press is guaranteed a right to gather and

report news’’ about U.S. military operations, subject to reasonable regulations. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174,

175 (D.D.C. 2002). That being said, the District Court determined that Flynt’s likelihood of success on the merits was

‘‘far from clear,’’ id. at 176, and that because of the quickly

evolving factual situation any judicial decisions would ‘‘have to

await the development of a fuller record,’’ id. at 177.

On January 17, 2002, nine days after the District Court

denied his motion for a preliminary injunction, Flynt filed an

amended complaint. The amended claim presented ten

claims, including: (Claim 1) a request for a declaration that

the First Amendment guarantees Flynt a right of access to

the battlefield, subject to reasonable regulations for safety

and security; (Claims 2–4) a claim that DOD Directive 5122.5

fails to recognize and protect Flynt’s First Amendment right

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of access to the battlefield and DOD’s denial of his request

violated these same rights; (Claim 5) an assertion that the

Directive does not contain constitutionally required definite

and objective standards for determining press access; (Claim

6) a claim that the Directive fails to place reasonable time

limits on DOD’s decision-making process; (Claim 7) a contention that the Directive does not provide for prompt administrative appeal; (Claims 8–9) a claim that the Directive imposes an unlawful content-based prior restraint on the media’s

constitutional right to battlefield access; and (Claim 10) a

request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. By

motion filed February 7, 2002, DOD moved to dismiss the

amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

In considering DOD’s motion, the District Court grouped

appellants’ claims as follows: claims 1–3, 8–9, and portions of

claims 4–7 that alleged DOD improperly applied Enclosure 3

to Flynt’s request, were considered as ‘‘as-applied claims;’’

and claims 4–7 were considered as facial challenges to Enclosure 3. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99–100, 103

(D.D.C. 2003). The District Court also considered Flynt’s

request for injunctive relief.

With regard to the as-applied claims, the District Court

held they were unripe because the record did not reflect DOD

ever made a final decision with respect to Flynt’s request.

Id. at 102. Furthermore, Flynt would suffer no concrete

hardship by delaying review. Id. at 103. Also citing the

absence of a final decision, the District Court held Flynt had

not suffered a concrete injury-in-fact and, thus, had no standing to press the as-applied claims. Id.

Turning to the facial challenges, the District Court held

that Flynt had both constitutional and prudential standing.

Id. at 104. The Court stated that because the DOD had

already crystallized its policies in Enclosure 3, the ‘‘posture of

these particular claims ma[de] it inappropriate to dismiss on

prudential ripeness grounds.’’ Id. at 105. The District Court

also held that dismissal on political question grounds was

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inappropriate because Flynt’s claims did not ‘‘implicate the

President’s activities as Commander in Chief or the authority

of the Secretary of Defense to direct military actions,’’ nor did

they require a court to apply principles beyond normal judicial competence. Id. at 107. The District Court did, however, refuse to exercise its discretion under the Declaratory

Judgment Act to consider Flynt’s facial claims. Id. Citing

the considerable discretion the Declaratory Judgment Act

gives to district courts, the court relied on the absence of a

concrete controversy and the uncertainty surrounding Flynt’s

constitutional claims in withholding declaratory relief. Id. at

109–10. The court further refused to grant injunctive relief.

Id. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

This court reviews de novo the District Court’s dismissal of

a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Empagran

S.A. v. F. Hoffman–LaRoche, LTD., 315 F.3d 338, 343 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). In our review, we assume the truth of the

allegations made and construe them favorably to the pleader.

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). We review the

District Court’s decision to withhold declaratory relief for an

abuse of discretion. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277

(1995).

A. Appellants’ Claims

As a threshold matter, it is important to clarify the right

appellants seek to protect. In candor, it is not at all clear

from appellants’ complaint below or briefs in this court precisely what right they believe was violated or contend the

courts should vindicate. After some pressing, at oral argument it became clear that they claimed a right, protected

under the First Amendment, in their own words, to ‘‘go[ ] in

[to battle] with the military.’’ This right is different from

merely a right to cover war. The Government has no rule–at

least so far as Flynt has made known to us–that prohibits the

media from generally covering war. Although it would be

dangerous, a media outlet could presumably purchase a vehiUSCA Case #03-5075 Document #800774 Filed: 02/03/2004 Page 7 of 15
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cle, equip it with the necessary technical equipment, take it to

a region in conflict, and cover events there. Such action

would not violate Enclosure 3 or any other identified DOD

rule.

With that distinction made, appellants’ claim comes more

sharply into focus. They claim that the Constitution guarantees to the media–specifically Hustler’s correspondent–the

right to travel with military units into combat, with all of the

accommodations and protections that entails–essentially what

is currently known as ‘‘embedding.’’ Indeed, at oral argument appellants’ counsel stated that the military is ‘‘obligated

to accommodate the press because the press is what informs

the electorate as to what our government is doing in war.’’

B. Ripeness and Standing

We first consider appellees’ contention that appellants lack

standing to assert their ‘‘as applied’’ claims and that those

claims were not ripe. For the reasons set forth below, we

conclude that appellants do have standing and that the claims

are ripe.

Standing requires that plaintiffs allege ‘‘an injury in fact’’

that is ‘‘concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical.’’ Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and internal

punctuation omitted). In applying that test, we assume the

validity of appellants’ allegation of injury, although having

crossed that threshold, we may ultimately determine it to be

invalid. With that assumption, we hold that appellants do

have standing to assert their as-applied claims. They asked

for immediate access to accompany U.S. troops in combat,

which they contend is their constitutional right, and that

access was not granted. Therefore, appellants ‘‘ha[ve] suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’’

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S.

167, 180 (2000). They have standing to challenge the Directive as it was applied in this case.

USCA Case #03-5075 Document #800774 Filed: 02/03/2004 Page 8 of 15
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In order to test the ripeness and justiciability of the claims,

we again assume that they are otherwise valid. Ripeness

analysis tests whether a question has sufficiently matured to

be amenable to adjudication. The Supreme Court has explained that when considering whether an issue is ripe for

judicial review, a court must ‘‘evaluate both the fitness of the

issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties’’ of

refusing a decision. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 301

(1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, a claim is unripe if it depends on ‘‘contingent future

events.’’ Id. at 300.

Appellants’ claim is that credentialed press persons have an

immediate right, upon request, to accompany U.S. troops in

combat. So understood, the as-applied claims are ripe.

Flynt requested that Hustler reporters gain access to combat

operations, and that access was not immediately granted.

Instead, access of another sort was provided–that of covering

‘‘the [air] strikes, witness[ing] the humanitarian drops and

interview[ing]’’ soldiers. Flynt’s claim does not depend on

‘‘contingent future events.’’ He asked for immediate access,

which he contends is his constitutional right, and that access

was not granted. On these facts, the question is presented in

a concrete factual setting and is fit for judicial review.

C. Facial Challenge

With all of appellants’ claims properly before us, we now

turn to their validity. Because it is clear to us that appellants

have asserted no cognizable First Amendment claim, both the

as-applied and facial challenges fail.

The facial challenge is premised on the assertion that there

is a First Amendment right for legitimate press representatives to travel with the military, and to be accommodated and

otherwise facilitated by the military in their reporting efforts

during combat, subject only to reasonable security and safety

restrictions. There is nothing we have found in the Constitution, American history, or our case law to support this claim.

To support the position that there is such a constitutional

right, appellants first point to cases that discuss the general

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purposes underlying the First Amendment. See New York

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (‘‘[t]he

press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of

government and inform the people.’’) (Black, J., concurring);

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (the First Amendment supports the ‘‘free discussion of governmental affairs.’’).

These cases, however, say nothing about media access to the

U.S. combat units engaged in battle.

Appellants also cite cases that allow facial challenges to

statutes or regulations that vest public officials with unfettered discretion to grant or deny licenses to engage in

expressive activity, such as City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer

Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988), and Shuttlesworth v.

City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969). This is

not, however, a ‘‘license’’ decision. This appeal challenges

regulations controlling access to government information and

activity, not governmental limitation of expression. The Supreme Court has noted the difference. See, e.g., Los Angeles

Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publ’g Co., 528 U.S. 32, 40

(1999) (distinguishing government limits on access to information in its possession from a government restriction on disseminating information one already possesses).

Likewise, this Court has held that ‘‘freedom of speech [and]

of the press do not create any per se right of access to

government TTT activities simply because such access might

lead to more thorough or better reporting.’’ JB Pictures,

Inc. v. Dep’t of Defense, 86 F.3d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Appellants admit they face a ‘‘dearth of case law concerning

press access to battles.’’ From this unenviable position, they

ask us to look to Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448

U.S. 555 (1980), for guidance.

In Richmond Newspapers, a plurality of the Supreme

Court held that a constitutional right of public access to

criminal trials existed based on a long history of such access

in the United States and in England at the time our organic

laws were created. Id. at 581. According to appellants,

Richmond Newspapers established that the First Amendment may be interpreted to provide for a right of access to

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government operations, and that access is not limited to

criminal trials. They assert that we must apply a Richmond

Newspapers analysis to the facts of this case. We disagree.

In Center for National Security Studies v. Department of

Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 WL

46645 (Jan. 12, 2004), we held that there was no First

Amendment right for plaintiffs to receive the identities of

INS detainees and material witnesses who were detained in

the wake of the September 11 attacks. Indeed, we made it

clear that ‘‘[n]either the Supreme Court nor this Court has

applied the Richmond Newspapers test outside the context of

criminal judicial proceedings or the transcripts of such proceedings.’’ Id. at 934. For emphasis, we added that ‘‘neither

this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever indicated that it

would’’ do so. Id (emphasis in original). Instead, we noted

that in all areas other than criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has applied the general rule of Houchins v.

KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion), not the exception

of Richmond Newspapers. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331

F.3d at 935. Houchins held that the press have no First

Amendment right of access to prisons, and in doing so stated

that the First Amendment does not ‘‘mandate[ ] a right of

access to government information or sources of information

within the government’s control.’’ Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15.

To summarize, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has

ever applied Richmond Newspapers outside the context of

criminal proceedings, and we will not do so today.

Appellants argue that we did, however, use the analysis

underlying the Richmond Newspaper decision in JB Pictures

Inc. v. Department of Defense, 86 F.3d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir.

1996). In that case, several media and veterans organizations

challenged a Department of Defense policy. That policy

shifted ceremonies for deceased service members arriving

from overseas from Dover Air Force base to locations closer

to the service members’ homes. It also gave the families of

deceased military personnel the authority to limit press access to those ceremonies. Contrary to appellants’ assertion,

the extent of our Richmond Newspapers discussion in that

case is contained in one sentence: ‘‘[i]t is obvious that miliUSCA Case #03-5075 Document #800774 Filed: 02/03/2004 Page 11 of 15
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tary bases do not share the tradition of openness on which

the Court relied in striking down restrictions on access to

criminal court proceedings in TTT Richmond Newspapers.’’

Id. Thus J.B. Pictures not only does not support wholesale

adoption of a Richmond Newspapers analysis in every case

involving requests for access to government activities or

information, it rejects such a rule.

Even if we were to apply a Richmond Newspapers test,

which again, we do not, it would not support appellants’ facial

challenge to the Directive. As an initial matter, the history of

press access to military units is not remotely as extensive as

public access to criminal trials. Without going into great

historic detail, it is sufficient that in Richmond Newspapers

the Supreme Court relied on the ‘‘unbroken, uncontradicted

history’’ of public access to criminal trials. Id. at 573. This

includes the time when ‘‘our organic laws were adopted.’’ Id.

at 569. Indeed, even since ‘‘the ancient town meeting form of

trial,’’ the ‘‘people retained a ‘right of visitation’ which enabled them to satisfy themselves that justice was in fact being

done.’’ Id. at 572 (internal citations omitted).

No comparable history exists to support a right of media

access to U.S. military units in combat. The very article

cited by appellants for the proposition that media have traditionally had broad access to soldiers in combat does not

support this position. See John E. Smith, From the Front

Lines to the Front Page: Media Access to War in the

Persian Gulf and Beyond, 26 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 291,

292–305 (1993). Beginning with the American Revolution,

war reporting was primarily in the form of private letters

from soldiers and official reports that were sent home and

published in newspapers. Id. at 293. Indeed, the rise of the

professional war correspondent did not begin until at least

the time of the Civil War. Id. In addition, it is not entirely

clear that in any of our early wars the media was actively

embedded into units, which is the right appellants seek. In

sum, even if we were to attempt a Richmond Newspapers

analysis and consider the historical foundations of a right of

media access to combat units, appellants’ claim would fail

miserably.

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Even if Richmond Newspapers applied in this context, and

even if there was a historical basis for media access to troops

in combat, the Directive would still not violate the First

Amendment. Richmond Newspapers expressly stated that

‘‘[j]ust as a government may impose reasonable time, place,

and manner restrictions’’ in granting access to public streets,

‘‘so may a trial judge TTT impose reasonable limitations on

access to a trial.’’ 448 U.S. at 581 n.18. These limitations

could be based on the need to maintain a ‘‘quiet and orderly

setting,’’ or ‘‘courtrooms’ TTT limited capacity.’’ Id. The

Directive appellants challenge is incredibly supportive of media access to the military with only a few limitations. The

Directive begins with the command that ‘‘[o]pen and independent reporting shall be the principal means of coverage of

U.S. military operations.’’ DOD Directive 5122.5 ¶ E3.1.1. It

further orders military public affairs officers to ‘‘act as liaisons, but [ ] not [to] interfere with the reporting process.’’

Id. at ¶ E3.1.6. Additionally, ‘‘field commanders should be

instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles

and aircraft when possible.’’ Id. at ¶ E3.1.7. The restrictions

contained in the Directive are few, including: special operations restrictions; limited restrictions on media communications owing to electromagnetic operational security concerns;

use of media pools when the sheer size of interested media is

unworkable, such as at the beginning of an operation; and

expulsion for members of the media who violate the ground

rules. Id. at ¶ ¶ E3.1.2.-E3.1.8. Appellants have offered no

reason to conclude that these restrictions are unreasonable.

Even if Richmond Newspapers did apply, appellants’ argument would fail.

The District Court, therefore, was more than correct when

it stated that declaring the Directive unconstitutional would

entail announcing an uncertain, yet ‘‘significant principle of

First Amendment protection in the context of a new application of the facial challenge mechanism.’’ Flynt v. Rumsfeld,

245 F.Supp. 2d at 108. In no way did the District Court

abuse its discretion in refusing to grant declaratory relief.

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D. As-applied Challenges

We now turn to the as-applied challenges. As explained

above, the constitutional right appellants assert does not

exist, so the as-applied claim could only survive if this otherwise constitutional Directive was applied to them in some

unconstitutional way. It was not. At no time has Flynt ever

claimed that he, or Hustler, was treated differently under the

Directive than any other media outlet. Nor has he claimed

that the Directive is some sort of a sham that was not

followed.

Even if there were some underlying constitutional right of

media access to U.S. troops in battle, the Directive, and its

application to appellants in this case, certainly would not have

violated it. When Flynt made his request, Clarke explained

that ‘‘the highly dangerous and unique nature of [special

operations] work makes it very difficult to embed media’’ with

ground troops, but also said that there had been ‘‘extensive’’

media access to other aspects of military operations. Specifically, ‘‘[s]cores of reporters and photographers have covered

the [air] strikes, witnessed humanitarian drops and interviewed dozens of [soldiers].’’ Clarke then provided Flynt

with contact information for the Fifth Fleet Public Affairs

Officer so that Hustler could have similar access. The explanation was clear and consistent with the Directive, which

states that ‘‘[s]pecial operations restrictions may limit access

in some cases.’’ Directive 5122.5 ¶ E3.1.5. Indeed, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Directive, Clarke not

only explained why direct access to ground troops was not

currently possible, but she also immediately gave Flynt the

information necessary to receive the access that was available. It was Flynt who failed initially to contact the designated public affairs officer. Ultimately, Flynt’s reporter was

given broad access to troops and has filed several stories, at

least one of which shows he has accompanied troops on a

search for al Qaeda operatives.

At oral argument, appellants asserted that DOD waited too

long in making a final decision, and that they should have

been required to promptly tell him that ‘‘this is a special

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forces operation, and you can’t go.’’ According to appellants,

if this were the case, ‘‘at least there would be an answer and

[we would have been] denied.’’ This is, of course, precisely

what happened. Within 16 days of Flynt’s initial request,

DOD responded by informing him that only special operations

were underway. They also, however, advised him that access

would be expanding in the future and that substantial access

was already available. They provided him with the necessary

contact information to ensure that his Hustler reporter would

be there with other media representatives. All of this occurred within 90 days of the September 11 attacks. In sum,

there is nothing in the record that shows the otherwise

constitutional Directive was applied to appellants in any

illegal manner.

III. Conclusion

Because we hold that there is no constitutionally based

right for the media to embed with U.S. military forces in

combat, and because we further hold that the Directive was

not applied to Flynt or Hustler magazine in any unconstitutional manner, the District Court’s judgment is affirmed.

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