Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01030/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Christopher Adolf,

Petitioner,

v. 

Warden O’Neil, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-1030-PHX-DLR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

Pending before the Court is Thomas Christopher Adolf’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). 

Respondents have answered (Doc. 14), and Petitioner has replied (Doc. 17). The matter 

is deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises six grounds for habeas relief in the Petition. The undersigned

finds that (i) Grounds One and Four do not present cognizable habeas claims; (ii) 

Grounds Two and Three are waived by Petitioner’s guilty pleas; (iii) Ground Five is 

procedurally defaulted and alternatively without merit; and (iv) Ground Six is 

procedurally defaulted. The undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s procedural defaults 

should not be excused. It is therefore recommended that the Petition be dismissed with 

Case 2:15-cv-01030-DLR Document 19 Filed 04/21/16 Page 1 of 22
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prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The Petition concerns Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in two separate 

criminal cases filed in the Superior Court of Arizona for the County of Maricopa.

1

 In

those cases, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on a combined total of 

twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes 

against children. (Doc. 14-1 at 2-11). 

On January 4, 2012, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in each of the two 

cases. (Id. at 28-36). Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to a total of five counts of 

attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, each a class 3 felony and a dangerous crime 

against children in the second degree. (Id.). Petitioner and the State agreed that 

Petitioner would be sentenced “for no less than 20 years and no greater than 27 years” on 

two of the counts and would be placed on lifetime probation on three other counts. (Id. at 

28, 33). The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. (Id.).

On March 2, 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner in both cases. On two of 

the counts, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a combined aggravated sentence of 

twenty-seven years in prison. (Doc. 14-1 at 70-75; Doc. 14-3 at 87). The trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to lifetime probation on three other counts, and dismissed the 

remaining counts. (Doc. 14-1 at 73; Doc. 14-2 at 2-6; Doc. 14-3 at 88-89).

After sentencing, Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(“PCR”). (Doc. 14-2 at 8-11). The trial court appointed Petitioner PCR counsel, who 

was unable to find a colorable claim for relief. (Id. at 13-18). In November 2012, 

Petitioner filed his PCR Petition. (Id. at 29-43). In March 2013, the trial court 

summarily dismissed the PCR Petition. (Doc. 14-2 at 64-68). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted Petitioner’s Petition for Review, but denied relief. (Id. at 70-85; Doc. 

1 The case numbers are CR2011-115832-001 and CR2011-006200-001. Petitioner 

lists both case numbers in the section of the Petition describing the judgments of conviction being challenged. (Doc. 1 at 1). Although some grounds in the Petition 

appear to be raised only as to CR2011-115832-001, the undersigned has liberally construed the Petition as raising all six grounds as to both criminal cases.

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14-3 at 2-4). In May 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for 

further review. (Doc. 14-3 at 6-15, 20).

On June 5, 2015, Petitioner filed the Petition seeking federal habeas relief (Doc. 

1).2

 The Court required Respondents to answer. (Doc. 6). On September 25, 2015, 

Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 14). Petitioner replied on October 21, 2015 (Doc. 

17). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One, which States that the “Defendant has the Right to Challenge 

his Indictment,” is Not a Cognizable Habeas Claim 

Federal law “unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of 

habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 

1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). To plead a cognizable federal 

habeas claim, a petitioner must set forth in his or her petition the facts supporting the 

specific ground upon which relief is sought. Rule 2(c), foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

“‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point 

to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4, foll. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mayle v. 

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (noting that the rules governing pleading for 

Section 2254 habeas petitions is “more demanding” than the notice pleading allowed 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir.

1979) (concluding that a habeas petitioner “failed to satisfy the specificity requirement 

of § 2254 pleadings or to show that there is a ‘real possibility’ of constitutional error” by 

“merely alleg[ing] that he ‘ . . . was not informed of the consequences of his plea. . . .’”). 

Ground One of the Petition states: “The Defendant has the right to challenge his 

indictment.” (Doc. 1 at 6). In the “Supporting Facts” section, Petitioner challenges the 

2 Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that the Petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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State’s argument during the PCR proceeding that Petitioner waived his right to challenge 

the indictments by pleading guilty pursuant to the plea agreements. Petitioner asserts that 

“[b]ecause an indictment is jurisdictional, a defect in an indictment is not waived by a 

guilty plea . . . .” (Id.). Ground One does not allege that Petitioner is in custody in 

violation of federal law and therefore is not cognizable in this proceeding.3

 Franzen v. 

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A habeas petition must allege the petitioner's 

detention violates the constitution, a federal statute or a treaty.”); see also Middleton v. 

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 

(1982)) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) “only 

on the basis of some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts”). The 

undersigned thus recommends that the Court dismiss Ground One. 

B. Grounds Two and Three, which Challenge the Sufficiency of Petitioner’s 

Indictments, are Foreclosed By Petitioner’s Guilty Pleas

1. Legal Standards

A guilty plea made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily generally forecloses 

federal habeas review of allegations of pre-plea constitutional violations. Hudson v. 

Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 

204 (9th Cir. 1997) (an unconditional guilty plea “cures all antecedent constitutional 

defects”). “This rule is predicated on the idea that a valid guilty plea ‘removes the issue 

of factual guilt from the case.’” Lemke v. Ryan, 719 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975)). Moreover, as explained by the 

U.S. Supreme Court in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), “a guilty plea 

represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” 

A knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, however, does not foreclose all 

pre-plea constitutional violations. The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that:

3 Alternatively, Ground One may be liberally construed as presenting the same challenge to Petitioner’s indictments as presented in Grounds Two and Three. If so construed, dismissal of Ground One is warranted for the same reasons dismissal of 

Grounds Two and Three is warranted.

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[n]either Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 

36 L.Ed.2d 235, nor our earlier cases on which it relied . . . 

stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas 

inevitably “waive” all antecedent constitutional violations. 

However in Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the 

basic ingredient of this line of cases, id., 411 U.S. at 266, 93 

S.Ct., at 1607. The point of these cases is that a counseled 

plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, 

where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the 

issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual 

guilt is a sufficient basis for the State’s imposition of 

punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders 

irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically 

inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt 

and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual 

guilt is validly established.

Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2 (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit has thus held that the general rule that a guilty plea forecloses 

pre-plea claims does not apply “when the defect in question is a ‘jurisdictional’ one. . . . 

which, judged on the face of the indictment and record, the charge in question is one 

which the state may not constitutionally prosecute.” United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 

1015, 1020 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574-76 

(1989)); see also United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 

(guilty plea precludes all non-jurisdictional defect claims). For ease of reference and in 

accordance with nomenclature used by the Ninth Circuit,4 this Report and 

Recommendation refers to the exception in the preceding sentence as the “Jurisdictional 

Claim Exception.” 

The Jurisdictional Claim Exception is limited “to those cases in which the district 

court could determine that the government lacked the power to bring the indictment at the 

time of accepting the guilty plea from the face of the indictment or from the record.” 

Cortez, 973 F.2d at 766-67 (emphasis in original) (citing Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 576). 

4 In United States v. Cortez, 973 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit 

used the phrase “jurisdictional claim exception” in explaining the Supreme Court case 

Broce. 

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Although the Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is not entirely clear what claims satisfy 

the Jurisdictional Claim Exception, it has held that the Jurisdictional Claim Exception 

applies “to claims that the statute is facially unconstitutional; or that the indictment failed 

to state a valid claim; or vindictive prosecution; or possibly selective prosecution.” 

Johnston, 199 F.3d at 1020 n.3.

2. Petitioner’s Guilty Pleas were Knowingly, Intelligently, and 

Voluntarily Made

In 2012, Petitioner entered into the plea agreements in the two criminal cases filed 

against him. (Doc. 14-1 at 28-36). After reviewing the plea agreements with Petitioner 

and advising Petitioner of his constitutional rights, the trial court accepted Petitioner’s 

guilty pleas. (Doc. 14-3 at 27-43). In his Reply, Petitioner alleges that his guilty pleas 

were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made “because the court did not 

disclose element of charged crime.” (Doc. 17 at 6). Petitioner also states that he “never 

claimed understanding of the law.” (Id.). Petitioner’s allegations are meritless in light of 

the record.

At the change of plea hearing, the trial court adequately informed Petitioner of 

the consequences of his guilty pleas and all other items required to be included in a plea 

colloquy. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.2. Petitioner confirmed that he understood (i) the 

terms of the plea agreement, (ii) the nature, elements, and factual basis of the charges

to which he was pleading guilty, and (iii) all of the rights he was giving up by

pleading guilty under the terms of the plea agreements. (Doc. 14-3 at 27-43).

Movant also confirmed in the plea agreements and at the change of plea hearing that he

was entering into the plea agreements voluntarily. (Id. at 29; Doc. 14-1 at 30, 35). 

See United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 2008) (a defendant’s

contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea agreement carry

substantial weight in determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); United States v. Kaczynski,

239 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (giving “substantial weight” to defendant’s

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in-court statements). The undersigned finds that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily pled guilty to the offenses set forth in the plea agreements. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s guilty pleas foreclose all claims pertaining to alleged defects 

occurring prior to Petitioner’s guilty pleas unless the Jurisdictional Claim Exception 

applies.

3. Analysis of Grounds Two and Three

Ground Two of the Petition states: “Indictment for CR2011-115832-001 is missing 

essential elements without these elements the state failed to prove a crime took place, and 

violated the Defendant’s 1st Amendment rights.” (Id. at 7). In the “Supporting Facts” 

section, Petitioner contends the following:

A name and age are essential elements, without both there is 

no statement of a crime. It is legal under the 1st Amendment 

to possess images depicting minor engaged in sexual activity 

‘unless the minor depicted is an actual living human being’ 

. . . . The State neglected to differentiate between a 1st

Amendment right and a crime when it failed to include a name 

and age, or any proof of an actual person in the indictment.

(Id.).

Ground Three states: “The Court did not obtain jurisdiction to try the accused 

(CR2011-115832-001).” (Id. at 8). In the “Supporting Facts” section, Petitioner argues:

A guilty plea does not bar a prisoner from challenging his 

indictment on jurisdictional grounds. 

 . . . Because the challenge to the indictment is based upon 

an omission of an essential element, jurisdiction of the subject 

matter cannot be conferred by consent. Therefore, we must 

conclude that the Court acquires no jurisdiction of the subject 

matter of the alleged offense unless all the essential elements 

constituting the offense are set forth in the indictment.

(Id.). 

The crux of Grounds Two and Three is Petitioner’s claim that alleged defects in the

indictments in his cases divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to try

Petitioner 

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Petitioner on the charged felonies.5 In his Reply (Doc. 17 at 8), Petitioner argues that the:

trial court’s conclusion that the indictment was not ‘fatally 

flawed’ is contrary to state law, federal law and violates due 

process. 

 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 13.1(a) It is 

mandatory in its language that the indictment contain a 

statement of facts. A statement of facts must appear on the 

indictment. . . . State trial court’s violation of state law 

constitutes violation of federal constitutional right to Due 

Process.

First, by knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering guilty pleas, Petitioner 

has waived any claim arising from a defect in the indictments as the Jurisdictional Claim

Exception does not apply. See United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(rejecting contention that the indictment’s “failure to assert residence stripped the district 

court of jurisdiction to hear the case,” because “defects in an indictment do not deprive a 

court of its power to adjudicate a case”) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 

630 (2002)); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 66 (1951) (holding that a ruling “that 

the indictment is defective does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine 

the case presented by the indictment”); Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65, (1916) 

(noting that “[t]he objection that the indictment does not charge a crime against the United 

States goes only to the merits of the case,” rather than the court’s jurisdiction).

Second, in reviewing a habeas petition, a federal court cannot reexamine state 

court determinations on state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 

(1991). A habeas petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one 

merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 

(9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, an “[i]ndictment by grand jury is not part of the due process 

5 Although Grounds Two and Three explicitly reference only Case No. CR2011- 115832-001, the undersigned has liberally construed the grounds as also being raised as 

to Case No. CR2011-006200-011 because (i) the grounds may also apply to that case and (ii) Petitioner stated in the Petition that he is challenging his convictions and sentences in 

both cases.

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guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment that apply to state criminal defendants.” 

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The trial court’s decision, which was adopted by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

rejected Petitioner’s claim that Petitioner’s indictments were defective. (Doc. 14-2 at 67; 

Doc. 14-3 at 3). That determination is binding on the Court. Petitioner’s challenges to 

the indictments concern whether the indictments were procedurally defective under state 

law (i.e. whether the indictments complied with Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure). 

See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam) (“[A] state court's 

interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”). As such, 

the claim raised in Grounds Two and Three is not reviewable in this federal habeas

proceeding. See 4 GILLESPIE MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. § 156:28 (2d ed.) (“The failure of 

an indictment to allege a crime will not be considered in habeas corpus proceedings after 

conviction if the indictment is under a statute whose constitutionality is not questioned 

and which establishes an offense over which the sentencing court had jurisdiction.”) 

(citing Telfian v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1941)). 

For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss 

Grounds Two and Three.

C. Ground Four, which Alleges that the “Court Abused its Judicial Power,”

Does Not Present a Cognizable Habeas Claim

Ground Four of the Petition merely states that “[t]he Court abused its judicial 

power.” (Id. at 9). In the “Supporting Facts” section, Petitioner makes three contentions: 

(i) the “Court accepted a fatall [sic] flawed indictment”; (ii) “[t]he Court also violated the 

Defendant’s ‘Blakely’ rights. When the plea was signed there was no mention of any 

aggravating facts”; and (iii) “[w]hen the Judge’s impartiality was questioned, she failed to 

recuse herself violating 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(2000). . . . A neutral judge is one of the most 

basic due process protections.” (Id.). The undersigned finds that the broad and 

conclusory allegations presented in Ground Four do not adequately present cognizable

claims for habeas relief and that Ground Four therefore should be summarily dismissed. 

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See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that a petitioner’s 

conclusory suggestion that a constitutional right has been violated falls “far short of 

stating a valid claim of constitutional violation”).

Further, any cognizable habeas claim presented in the statement “the Court 

accepted a fatall [sic] indictment” has been waived by Petitioner’s guilty plea for the 

reasons explained in Section II(B) above. In addition, any cognizable habeas claim 

presented in the statement that the trial court “violated the Defendant’s ‘Blakely’ rights” 

has also been waived by Petitioner’s plea agreements. See United States v. Shedrick, 493 

F.3d 292, 303 (3rd Cir. 2007) (concluding that defendant's “Blakely-based contention,” 

was an argument that defendant “waived as part of [his] plea agreement.”). 

The U.S. Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004), held 

that “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence 

enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents 

to judicial factfinding.” Here, Petitioner initialed the statement in both plea agreements 

providing that “[t]he parties hereto fully and completely understand and agree that by 

entering into a plea agreement, the defendant consents to judicial fact finding by 

preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of the sentence and that 

any sentence [stipulated herein] is not binding on the court.” (Doc. 14-1 at 29, 34)

(emphasis added). As discussed, the undersigned finds that Petitioner knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty pursuant to the plea agreements. Petitioner 

expressly bargained for the twenty-seven year prison sentence he received and is 

foreclosed from challenging it in this proceeding. (Id. at 28). 

Finally, Petitioner’s conclusory claim that the trial judge should have recused 

herself fails to overcome the “strong presumption that a judge is not biased or 

prejudiced.” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rhoades v. 

Henry, 598 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2010)). Moreover, the federal recusal statute cited by 

Petitioner in Ground Four (28 U.S.C. § 455) does not govern state court judges. 

Petitioner’s assertion in his Reply (Doc. 17 at 13) that the trial judge violated a state ethics 

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regulation does not raise a cognizable habeas claim. To reiterate, “federal habeas corpus 

relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990).

D. Ground Five, which Alleges the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, is 

Procedurally Defaulted and is Alternatively without Merit 

1. Legal Standards

i. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

It has been settled for over a century that a “state prisoner must normally exhaust 

available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal 

courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 

U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 

734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that a

habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the available 

state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State corrective 

process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to 

protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

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federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

ii. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). A

petitioner may overcome a procedural default by proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

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iii. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, AEDPA requires federal 

courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 

1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be 

entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or 

her claims either:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or 

2. resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

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presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir.

2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

iv. Proving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

The “clearly established federal law” for an ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”) claim is the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner arguing an IAC claim must establish that his or her 

counsel’s performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting 

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, 

the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a defendant has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other).

2. Analysis of IAC Claim Presented in Ground Five

To satisfy the exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine, Petitioner, who is a pleaconvicted defendant, must have first presented his habeas claims to the trial court in a 

PCR petition. Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“to exhaust one’s 

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state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or 

collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule

32”). Then, Petitioner must have petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of

the trial court’s ruling on the PCR petition. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005) (in noncapital cases, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for 

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”) 

(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

In Ground Five of the Petition, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the U.S. Constitution.6

 (Doc. 1 at 

12). Petitioner alleges that his attorney “failed to adequately advise [Petitioner] of the 

legal elements of the charged offense, failed to investigate the validity of any sentence 

enhancements, consequently failed to conduct informed plea negotiations.” (Id.). 

Petitioner asserts that if his defense counsel “explained the definition of the statute, 

[Petitioner] would never had signed the plea.” (Id.). Ground Five may be construed as 

alleging that Petitioner’s guilty pleas were rendered involuntary due to the alleged 

ineffective assistance of Petitioner’s defense counsel. However, this claim was not fairly 

presented in Petitioner’s PCR Petition. Petitioner presented six claims in his PCR 

Petition, which the trial court described as follows:7

1. Defendant was improperly charged with twenty counts of sexual 

exploitation of a minor because he possessed only one “visual medium” or 

storage unit. Defendant alleges that as a result, the charges brought against 

him were in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the United States 

Constitution.

2. The indictments were defective in that they failed to detail each element of 

the charged offenses so as to give Defendant notice of the charges against 

him.

6 Petitioner’s additional claim that he was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel as guaranteed by the Arizona Constitution is not cognizable in this proceeding. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

7 Petitioner has not challenged the trial court’s characterization of the claims presented in the PCR Petition. 

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3. That the State failed to identify that an actual child was depicted in the 

images on the Counts to which he plead as opposed to digitally created 

images of children.

4. There was an insufficient factual basis presented for three of the offenses to 

which Defendant plead guilty in that there was no proof that these images 

actually involved children.

5. The Court exceeded its authority [in] making findings of aggravating 

circumstances because he is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial on those 

factors.

6. Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the above listed issues regarding 

the sufficiency of evidence for Defendant’s guilty pleas and for allowing 

the Court to determine the existence of aggravating factors at sentencing.

(Doc. 14-2 at 64-65).

Because Petitioner’s PCR Petition did not present a claim that the ineffectiveness 

of his defense counsel resulted in unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas, the claim is 

unexhausted. Moreover, because Petitioner would be precluded from post-conviction 

relief on the claim under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the claim 

is deemed procedurally defaulted.8

 Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally 

defaulted “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the requirement would 

now find the claims procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)). For 

the reasons discussed in Section II(F) below, the procedural default should not be 

excused.

Alternatively, Ground Five may be liberally construed as advancing the same 

claim presented in the sixth ground for relief in Petitioner’s PCR Petition as detailed

8 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 precludes a defendant from post-conviction relief based 

upon any ground (i) raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion under 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24; (ii) finally adjudicated on the merits on the appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceedings; or (iii) that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any 

previous collateral proceedings. In addition, the claim would be precluded in a post- conviction relief proceeding as untimely under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. See O’Sullivan v. 

Boerkel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (where habeas petitioner was time-barred from 

presenting his claims in state court, claims were procedurally defaulted). The applicable 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure are explained in more detail in Section II(E) below.

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above. Although the two claims are presented slightly differently, “[a]n exact duplicate 

of [petitioner’s] state court argument is not required for exhaustion. . . .” 

Odem v. Hopkins, 192 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Brian R. Means, 

POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 23:17 (“In seeking federal habeas relief, a petitioner is 

entitled to reformulate his claims to some degree, so long as the substance remains the 

same.”); Sweeney v. Carter, 361 F.3d 327, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a 

petitioner’s presentation of an IAC claim to the state courts under the Sixth Amendment 

and to the federal court under the Fifth Amendment was a mere variation in legal theory 

and the substance of the claim remained the same). In both the Petition (Doc. 1) and 

PCR Petition, Petitioner claims that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise issues concerning the sufficiency of the indictment, sufficiency of the evidence 

against Petitioner, and improper application of sentencing enhancements. The 

undersigned will therefore determine whether the Arizona state court’s rejection of the 

claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

The last state court decision reviewing the claim in Ground Five is the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ ruling that affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s PCR 

Petition. The Court of Appeals stated:

In summarily dismissing Adolf’s petition, the trial court 

clearly identified the claims Adolf raised, and resolved them 

correctly based upon a thorough, well-reasoned analysis of 

the appropriate facts and law. Because no purpose would be 

served by reiterating the trial court’s ruling in its entirety, we 

adopt it.

(Doc. 14-3 at 3). Because the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s 

reasoning, the U.S. District Court may review the trial court’s decision as part of the 

review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that when the last reasoned decision is a state appellate 

court decision which adopts or substantially incorporates lower state court decisions, the 

lower state court decisions may be reviewed as part of the review of the state appellate 

court’s decision).

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In its March 15, 2013 decision, the trial court ruled that because all of Petitioner’s 

substantive challenges to his convictions and sentences were without merit, Petitioner’s 

defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the challenges. (Doc. 14-2 at 68). 

This conclusion is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Rupe 

v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “the failure to take a futile 

action can never be deficient performance . . . .”). Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court dismiss Ground Five.

E. Ground Six, which Contends that Petitioner’s Sentence Constitutes Cruel 

and Unusual Punishment, is Procedurally Defaulted

Petitioner contends in Ground Six of the Petition that his “sentence was cruel and 

unusual punishment and violated [his] equal protection rights.” (Doc. 1 at 13). Petitioner 

did not present this claim to the trial court in his PCR Petition. Although Petitioner did 

present the claim in his Petition for Review filed in the Arizona Supreme Court, a 

petitioner cannot exhaust a habeas claim by circumventing a state’s lower courts and 

going directly to the state supreme court. For example, in Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 

915-18 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit held that a ground for habeas relief presented by 

a petitioner convicted by the State of Washington was unexhausted because the petitioner 

did not fairly present the claim to the Washington Court of Appeals. The Court rejected 

the petitioner’s argument that the exhaustion requirement was satisfied because he raised 

it in his petition for review in the Washington Supreme Court. After examining case law 

from other circuits and the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because 

the petitioner “raised his federal constitutional claims for the first and only time to the 

state’s highest court on discretionary review, he did not fairly present them.” Id. at 918. 

Further, Petitioner would be precluded from post-conviction relief on Ground Six 

under Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Doc. 36 at 14). Rules 32.2(b) and 32.4(a), Ariz. R. 

Crim. P., do not bar untimely claims that fall within the categories set forth in Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1(d) through (h):

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

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e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or 

sentence. Newly discovered material facts exist if:

(1). The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2). The defendant exercised due diligence in 

securing the newly discovered material facts.

(3). The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for 

impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence 

substantially undermines testimony which was 

of critical significance at trial such that the 

evidence probably would have changed the 

verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant’s failure to file a notice of post-conviction

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed 

time was without fault on the defendant’s part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably 

overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be 

sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would

have found defendant guilty of the underlying offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would not 

have imposed the death penalty.

Petitioner does not assert that any of the above exceptions apply to his claims. Nor does 

it appear that such exceptions would apply. Ground Six is deemed procedurally

defaulted. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted “if the petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)). Because the undersigned 

finds that Petitioner’s procedural default is not excused, as explained below, it is 

recommended that the Court dismiss Ground Six.

F. Petitioner’s Procedural Defaults Are Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims are to be 

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reviewed if the petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Petitioner’s status as a pro se litigant does not exempt Petitioner from the “cause 

and prejudice” standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 

(9th Cir. 1986). Petitioner has not shown that an objective factor external to Petitioner 

impeded with his efforts to present his procedurally defaulted claims in a properly filed 

PCR Petition. Petitioner has therefore failed to show cause for his procedural defaults. 

Where a petitioner fails to establish cause, the Court need not consider whether the 

petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner has not satisfied the “cause and prejudice” exception to excuse his procedural 

defaults.

To satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, Petitioner must show 

that “a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who 

is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Petitioner states that “[b]y definition of 

the charged offense, I am innocent.” (Doc. 17 at 5). To the extent Petitioner argues that 

the miscarriage of justice exception should be applied to excuse Petitioner’s procedural 

defaults, Petitioner does not proffer any new evidence to support actual innocence. 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (“To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.”). 

After reviewing the record, the undersigned finds no evidence showing that a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent man. The 

undersigned thus finds the miscarriage of justice exception inapplicable to this case.9 

9 In addition, it is unclear “whether the Schlup actual innocence gateway always applies to petitioners who plead guilty.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n. 9 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“We are aware of a potential incongruity between the purpose of the actual 

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Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117. Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the Court not 

excuse Petitioner’s procedural defaults.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

innocence gateway announced in Schlup and its application to cases involving guilty (or no contest) pleas. . . . For purposes of our analysis, however, we assume without deciding that the actual innocence gateway is available to [the plea-convicted habeas 

petitioner].”). Decisions in which the Ninth Circuit or United States Supreme Court have considered gateway claims of actual innocence in a plea context involved subsequent 

case law that arguably rendered the defendant’s acts non-criminal. See, e.g. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-23 (1998); Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F .3d 1131, 1134-35 

(9th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Avery, 719 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2013).

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findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 20th day of April, 2016. 

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