Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02221/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02221-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

SO HERN DISTRICT Of CALIFORNIA 

BY DEPUTY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HENRY FURIANI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02221-LAB (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 15, 18) 

18 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Larry Alan Burns, 

19 United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) and Local Civil Rule 

20 72.1 ( c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

21 On October 31, 2017, plaintiffHenry Furiani filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

22 § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security 

23 denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (ECF 

24 No. 1.) 

25 Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties' cross-motions 

26 for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

27 plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner's cross28 motion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

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1 decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

2 proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

3 

4 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

5 On May 30, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 

6 disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability 

7 commencing October 1, 2009. (Certified Administrative Record ["AR"] 143-44, 145-51.) 

8 After his claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration (AR 86-90, 96-101 ), plaintiff 

9 requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (AR 102-

10 03.) An administrative hearing was held on July 7, 2016. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing 

11 with counsel, and testimony was taken from him and a vocational expert ("VE"). (AR 38-

12 65.) 

13 As reflected in his September 28, 2016 hearing decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

14 had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 1, 2009, 

15 the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2011, the date last insured. (AR 24-33.) The 

16 ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on August 28, 2017, when 

17 the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review. (AR 1-3.) This timely civil 

18 action followed. 

19 

20 SUMMARY OF THE ALJ'S FINDINGS 

21 In rendering his decision, the ALJ initially determined that plaintiff last met the 

22 insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2011. (AR 24, 

23 26.) The ALJ proceeded to follow the Commissioner's five-step sequential evaluation 

24 process. See 20 C.F .R. § 404.1520. 1 At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not 

25 engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of 

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Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to the Commissioner's regulations 28 are to the regulations in effect at the time of the ALJ's decision. 

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1 October 1, 2009 through his date last insured of December 31, 2011. (AR 26.) 

2 At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

3 diabetes, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, peripheral neuropathy, major 

4 depressive disorder, and bipolar disorder. (AR 26.) 

5 At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

6 of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

7 in the Commissioner's Listing of Impairments. (AR 27.) 

8 Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") 

9 to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Specifically, the 

10 ALJ found that plaintiff was able to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

11 frequently, stand and/or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit six hours in an 

12 eight-hour workday; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb stairs; and have 

13 no more than casual contact with the public, and be around coworkers but not work with 

14 them. (AR 29.) 

15 For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ found that plaintiffs past work 

16 as a flagger satisfied.the regulatory requirements to constitute past relevant work. The ALJ 

17 proceeded to accept the VE's testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiffs 

18 vocational profile and RFC would be able to perform that kind of work. (AR 32-33.) 

19 Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled through December 31, 2011, 

20 the last date insured. (AR 33.) 

21 

22 DISPUTED ISSUES 

23 As reflected in plaintiffs summary judgment motion, the disputed issues that 

24 plaintiff is raising as the grounds for reversal and remand are as follows: 

25 1. Whether the ALJ's silent rejection of the opinion of treating social 

26 worker/therapist Caroline Stewart constitutes reversible error. (See ECF No. 15-1 at 3-7 .) 

27 2. Whether the ALJ properly rejected plaintiffs subjective pain and symptom 

28 testimony. (SeeECFNo.15-1 at7-11.) 

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1 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to 

3 determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

4 whether the proper legal standards were applied. Delorme v. Sullivan, 924 F .2d 841, 846 

5 (9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla" but less than a 

6 preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec'y of 

7 Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

8 "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

9 conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

10 and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

11 30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

12 the Commissioner's decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

13 (9th Cir. 1984). 

14 

15 DISCUSSION 

16 A. The Court is unable to affirm the ALJ's adverse credibility 

17 determination. 

18 In a "Function Report- Adult," which appears to have been completed on plaintiffs 

19 behalf and signed by his wife on July 22, 2016, plaintiff alleged that his physical and mental 

20 impairments negatively affected his ability to lift, squat, bend, reach, sit, climb stairs, 

21 remember, complete tasks, concentrate, understand, follow instructions, and get along with 

22 others. (See AR 178-86.) 

23 At the administrative hearing held that same month, when asked by the ALJ what 

24 kind of problems he was having that would keep him from being able to work, plaintiff 

25 responded, "Basically, getting along with people. It's anxiety." (AR 42.) He also specified 

26 "overall pain in the shoulders, back, legs." (Id.) 

27 With respect to his mental impairments, plaintiff testified that he experiences severe 

28 mood swings where he may go from happy to sad or "just pissed" to violent, and that this 

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1 causes him to be depressed 85% of the time. (AR 42-43.) He has suicidal thoughts at 

2 times, and his current medications for his bipolar disorder make him feel even more 

3 suicidal and are in the process of being changed. (AR 43-44, 50.) According to plaintiff, 

4 his ability to interact with others has worsened since he last worked, in that he has more 

5 confrontations with others now. (AR 4 7 .) He even had a violent incident with a landlord, 

6 which led to a restraining order in approximately 2009 or 2010 - prior to the date last 

7 insured. (AR 55.) Because of his anxiety and his distress when he thinks about others, he 

· 8 tries to avoid interacting with people and stays at home. (AR 48, 53.} He never does social 

9 things with friends and has lost friends because of his behaviors. (Id.) 

10 With respect to his physical impairments, plaintiff testified that his main physical 

11 problem was back pain. (AR 45.) The heaviest thing he can lift is 50 pounds, maybe two 

12 or three times. (Id.) He can stand and walk for at most one hour before needing to sit. 

13 (Id.) He experiences back and leg pain when sitting for too long. (Id.) Even when loading 

14 the dishwasher, he needs to take breaks. (Id.) 

15 It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that, ifthe claimant has produced objective 

16 medical evidence of an impairment or impairments that could reasonably be expected to 

17 produce some degree of pain and/or other symptoms and the record is devoid of any 

18 affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant's testimony 

19 regarding the severity of the claimant's pain and/or other symptoms only ifthe ALJ makes 

20 specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so. See Smolen v. Chater, 

21 80 F.3d 1273, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1996); Dodrill v. Shala/a, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); 

22 Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 

23 1407 (9th Cir. 1986). Further, it is incumbent on the ALJ to specify which statements by 

24 plaintiff concerning his or her symptoms and functional limitations were not credible 

25 and/or in what respect(s) plaintiffs statements were not credible. See Reddick v. Chater, 

26 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

27 Here, the ALJ did make the following statement: 

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"After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that 

the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record during the period at issue for the reasons explained in this decision." 

(AR31) 

Since the Commissioner has not argued that there was evidence of malingering, the 

Court will apply the "clear and convincing" standard to the ALJ's adverse credibility 

determination. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying "clear 

10 and convincing" standard where the government did not argue that a lesser standard should 

11 apply based on evidence of malingering); see also Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 

12 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). 

13 The first reason cited by the ALJ in support of his adverse credibility determination 

14 was plaintiff's daily activities, which according to the ALJ were "not limited to the extent 

15 one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations." (AR 31.) 

16 The ALJ noted in this regard that plaintiff had indicated that he was "independent with 

17 personal care although it takes longer, and he is able to prepare simple meals, do dishes, 

18 vacuum, mop, do laundry, take out trash, and drive a car. (AR 31-32.) 

19 Under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, there are "two grounds for using daily activities 

20 to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination": Evidence of the daily activities 

21 either (1) contradicts the claimant's other testimony, or (2) meets the threshold for 

22 transferable work skills. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, 

23 neither of these grounds applies. First, the ALJ failed to posit any specific testimony by 

24 plaintiff that any of the specified daily activities contradicted. Indeed, none of the specified 

25 daily activities involved getting along with or even interacting with others. Accordingly, 

26 there was no inconsistency between plaintiff's ability to engage in those daily activities 

27 and his allegations/testimony regarding his mental impairments. Likewise, the Court fails 

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1 to see any inconsistency between plaintiffs ability to engage in those daily activities and 

2 his allegations/testimony regarding his physical limitations. 

3 Second, the Commissioner does not even purport to contend that plaintiffs ability 

4 to engage in the specified daily activities constituted substantial evidence that plaintiff was 

5 able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance 

6 of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting. See, e.g., Diedrich v. Berryhill, 

7 874 F.3d 634, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2017) (claimant's ability to perform daily activities 

8 including personal hygiene, cooking, household chores, and shopping not a clear and 

9 convincing reason to find her less than fully credible); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 

10 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2001) (evidence that claimant did certain chores that did not consume a 

11 substantial part of the day did not detract from her credibility); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 

12 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The Social Security Act does not require claimants to be utterly 

13 incapacitated to be eligible for benefits, and many home activities may not be easily 

14 transferable to a work environment where it might be impossible to rest periodically or take 

15 medication.") (internal citations omitted)). 

16 The Court therefore finds that the first reason cited by the ALJ did not constitute a 

17 clear and convincing reason for not crediting plaintiffs subjective pain and symptom 

18 testimony. 

19 The second reason cited by the ALJ in support of his adverse credibility 

20 determination was the lack of objective medical evidence to support plaintiffs allegations. 

21 (See AR 32.)2 However, since the ALJ's other stated reason was legally insufficient to 

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2 The Commissioner contends that the ALJ had another reason for not crediting 24 plaintiffs subjective pain and symptom testimony, namely "plaintiffs successful 

conservative treatment." (See ECF No. 18-1at8.) However, the ALJ never characterized 

plaintiffs treatment as "conservative" or cite plaintiffs "successful conservative 

26 treatment" as a basis for his adverse credibility determination in the section of the decision 

in which he stated his reasons. (See AR 32.) Rather, in that section of his decision, the 

ALJ expressly stated that his RFC assessment contrary to plaintiffs allegations of disabling 

conditions was based on two things: plaintiffs activities of daily living and the objective 

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1 support his adverse credibility determination, this remaining reason (i.e., the lack of 

2 objective medical support) cannot be legally sufficient by itself. See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 

3 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2006) (where ALJ's initial reason for adverse 

4 credibility determination was legally insufficient, his sole remaining reason premised on 

5 lack of medical support for claimant's testimony was legally insufficient); 'v. Soc. Sec. 

6 Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A] finding that the claimant lacks credibility 

7 cannot be premised wholly on a lack of medical support for the severity of his pain."); cf 

8 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Although lack of medical evidence 

9 cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can 

10 consider in his credibility analysis.").3 

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12 B. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of the social 

13 worker/therapist regarding the functional limitations resulting from 

14 plaintiff's mental impairments. 

15 In his opening statement at the administrative hearing, plaintiffs counsel advised 

16 the ALJ that plaintiffs disability claim was based primarily on plaintiffs mental 

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19 medical evidence contained in the record. (See id.) Because the ALJ did not rely on 

"plaintiffs successful conservative treatment" as a reason for not crediting plaintiffs 

subjective pain and symptom testimony, the Court is unable to consider it as a basis for 

upholding the ALJ's adverse credibility determination. See Ceguerra v. Sec'y of Health & 

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22 Human Servs,, 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) ("A reviewing court can evaluate an 

agency's decision only on the grounds articulated by the agency."); see also Connett v. 

23 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

24 3 The Court also concurs with plaintiff that the fact he received only limited treatment 

for his mental impairments prior to his date last insured, which the ALJ cited as an example 

of the lack of support in the medical record for plaintiffs allegations (see AR 32), is not a 

clear and convincing reason for rejecting plaintiffs testimony. See Nguyen v. Chafer, 100 

F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[I]t is a questionable practice to chastise one with a 

mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation.") (citation 

omitted). 

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1 impairments, as a result of which plaintiff "has extreme difficulty in interacting with 

2 people." (AR 41.) And, as noted above, when asked by the ALJ what kind of problems 

3 he was having that would keep him from being able to work, plaintiff specified in the first 

4 instance his inability to get along with people and his anxiety. (See AR 42.) 

5 The evidence of record included a "Mental Residual Capacity Questionnaire" from 

6 plaintiffs treating social worker/therapist, Caroline Stewart, dated February 28, 2013. (AR 

7 159-65.) Ms. Stewart diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from bipolar disorder, a pain 

8 disorder, and a schizotype personality disorder. Ms. Stewart reported that plaintiff 

9 frequently presents with bizarre ideation; that he is socially anxious and weeps easily; and 

10 that he often presents as labile, even on medications. (AR 159.) 

11 Ms. Stewart assessed that plaintiff possessed limited but satisfactory ability to: ask 

12 simple questions or request assistance; be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate 

13 precautions; adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness; and use public 

14 transportation. (AR 161-62.) Plaintiff was seriously limited, but not precluded in the 

15 ability to: understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; sustain an ordinary 

16 routine without special supervision; and travel to unfamiliar places. (AR 161-62.) 

17 According to Ms. Stewart, plaintiff was unable to meet competitive standards in the 

18 ability to: maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usual strict 

19 tolerances; maintain attention for two hour segments; work in coordination with or 

20 proximity to others without being unduly distracted; make simple work related decisions; 

21 complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically 

22 based symptoms; perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length 

23 of rest periods; accept instruction and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; 

24 get along with co-workers or peers without causing them undue distraction or exhibiting 

25 behavioral extremes; respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; deal with 

26 normal stress; interact appropriately with the general public; and maintain socially 

27 appropriate behavior. He also was unable to meet competitive standards in various other 

28 areas needed to do semiskilled and skilled work. (AR 161-62.) 

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1 Ms. Stewart also assessed that plaintiff had marked restriction in activities of daily 

2 living, and difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; that he had 

3 extreme difficulties in maintaining social functioning; and that he would miss work more 

4 than four days per month as a result of his impairments or treatment. (AR 164-65.) 

5 As support for her opinion, Ms. Stewart stated inter alia that plaintiffs unpredictable 

6 mood, energy level, and motivation would impede regular attendance to a job; that he is 

7 preoccupied with bizarre thoughts; and that he does not handle stress well. (AR 161-62.) 

8 Ms. Stewart also observed that plaintiff required a high degree of shepherding as he was 

9 not internally motivated to stay on task without direct encouragement; and that he did not 

10 take criticism in a resilient way and could be "quite rigid." (AR 163.) Ms. Stewart stated 

11 that the earliest plaintiffs symptoms and limitations applied were from June 18, 2012, 

12 which was the first day plaintiff saw her for treatment. (AR 159, 165.) 

13 In general, only licensed physicians and similarly qualified specialists qualify as 

14 acceptable medical sources who can provide evidence to establish a claimant's impairment. 

15 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a).4 Social workers such as Ms. Stewart are classified as "other 

16 sources" who can provide evidence to show the severity of a claimant's impairment and 

17 how it affects his ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(3). An ALJ may not reject 

18 an opinion from an "other source" unless he provides reasons germane to that opinion. See 

19 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); Turner v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 613 

20 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). 

21 Here, the ALJ failed to even discuss Ms. Stewart's opinion regarding the functional 

22 limitations resulting from plaintiffs mental impairments, let alone provide any germane 

23 reasons for rejecting her opinion. The Commissioner contends that there was no error 

24 resulting from the ALJ's omission because Ms. Stewart's questionnaire concerned the time 

25 period after plaintiffs insured status expired. (See ECF No. 18-1 at 3-4.) The Court 

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4 The relevant version of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 is the version in effect at the time of 

28 plaintiffs benefits application. See 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5862 (Jan. 18, 2017). 

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1 disagrees. Ms. Stewart indicated that she began treating plaintiff on June 18, 2012 (AR 

2 159) and that her description of plaintiffs symptoms and limitations in the questionnaire 

3 dated back to when she began treating plaintiff (see AR 165). Absent a reason to think that 

4 plaintiff experienced a major symptom change in the six and a half months before he met 

5 Ms. Stewart, it is a fair and reasonable inference that the symptoms and limitations 

6 described by Ms. Stewart were substantially similar to the symptoms and limitations 

7 plaintiff experienced before December 31, 2011. See Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 833 

8 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[Lay witness's] statement that [claimant] was incapable of working in 

9 2001 is relevant to his ability to work in 1999, at least in the absence of any evidence that 

10 [claimant's] condition worsened between 1999 and 2001."); Turner, 613 F.3d at 1228-29 

11 ("While the ALJ must consider only impairments (and limitations and restrictions 

12 therefrom) that [the claimant] had prior to the DLI, evidence post-dating the DLI is 

13 probative of [the claimant's] pre-DLI disability."); Lester v. Chafer, 81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th 

14 Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996) ("This court has specifically held that medical 

15 evaluations made after the expiration of a claimant's insured status are relevant to an 

16 evaluation of the preexpiration condition." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 

17 Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We think it is clear that reports 

18 containing observations made after the period for disability are relevant to assess the 

19 claimant's disability."). 

20 Moreover, in response to the line on the form asking for the date of onset of the 

21 disabling condition, Ms. Stewart filled in that plaintiff had a medical history of mood 

22 swings since age 15. (See AR 159.) For this reason as well, the Court finds that Ms. 

23 Stewart's opinion did relate to the relevant time period from October 1, 2009 through 

24 December 31, 2011. See Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1232-33 

25 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding mental health assessment written eight months after ALJ' s decision 

26 relevant to period before decision because it purported to relate to plaintiffs onset date); 

27 cf Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding mental health evidence 

28 not relevant to period on or before date of ALJ's decision where it purported to describe 

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1 plaintiffs condition more than two years after date last insured), overruled on other 

2 grounds, Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 342. 

3 The Commissioner also contends that it was unnecessary for the ALJ to comment 

4 on the questionnaire completed by Ms. Stewart because her treatment notes from 

5 September 2012 through December 2015 "showed that plaintiffs symptoms came under 

6 control with conservative treatment in the form of medication and therapy." (See ECF No. 

7 18~1 at 4-5.) However, to the extent that the Commissioner is proffering this evidence in 

8 response to plaintiffs contention regarding the relevance of Ms. Stewart's February 2013 

9 opinion, the Commissioner is focusing on the wrong time period. As noted above, the 

10 relevant time period is the six and a half month period between December 31, 2011 and 

11 June 12, 2012, and the relevant question is whether there is any evidence that plaintiffs 

12 condition worsened during that period. To the extent that the Commissioner is proffering 

13 this evidence to show that the ALJ would have had a reason to accord little or no weight to 

14 Ms. Stewart's opinion, the Court is unable to consider that reason. See Connett, 340 F.3d 

15 at 874; Ceguerra, 933 F.2d at 738. 

16 The Court therefore finds that, in failing to even discuss Ms. Stewart's opinion, the 

17 ALJ erred under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. 

18 The Commissioner further contends that, even if the ALJ erred, the error was 

19 harmless under Molina. In Molina, 67 4 F .3d at 1122, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ' s 

20 failure to provide specific reasons for rejecting "other source" testimony was harmless 

21 error where "other source" testimony did not describe any more limitations than those 

22 plaintiff herself described, which the ALJ validly rejected. Here, the Court has found that 

23 the ALJ failed to validly reject plaintiffs subjective testimony regarding the severity of his 

24 mental impairments. Moreover, Ms. Stewart opined to functional limitations that were not 

25 the same as those encompassed by plaintiffs testimony, but rather went way beyond those 

26 encompassed by plaintiffs testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ's adverse credibility 

27 determination with respect to plaintiffs subjective symptom testimony, even ifthe Court 

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1 had been able to affirm it, could not render harmless the ALJ's failure to even discuss Ms. 

2 Stewart's opinion. 

3 The Court therefore finds that Molina is not applicable here. Further, this is not an 

4 instance where the Court "can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully 

5 crediting the testimony [of Ms. Stewart], could have reached a different disability 

6 determination." See Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 

7 2006). Rather, if Ms. Stewart's testimony about plaintiffs limitations was fully credited, 

8 a reasonable ALJ could have concluded that plaintiffs impairments precluded plaintiff 

9 from performing his past relevant work. See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056 (holding that ALJ's 

10 failure to consider lay witness testimony about claimant's limitations was not harmless 

11 error where a reasonable ALJ could find that such limitations would preclude gainful 

12 employment). 

13 The Court therefore finds and concludes that reversal also is warranted based on the 

14 ALJ's failure to properly consider Ms. Stewart's opinion. 

15 

16 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

17 The law is well established that the decision whether to remand for further 

18 proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., 

19 Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

20 603 (9th Cir. 1989); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). Remand for 

21 further proceedings is warranted where additional administrative proceedings could 

22 remedy defects in the decision. See, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 

23 1984); Lewin, 654 F.2d at 635. Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate where 

24 no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, Kornock v. 

25 Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980); where the record has been fully developed, 

26 Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would 

27 unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to which the disabled plaintiff is entitled, Bilby 

28 v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985). 

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The Court is mindful of Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition that, where an 

ALJ failed to properly consider either subjective symptom testimony or medical opinion 

evidence, it is sometimes appropriate to credit the evidence as true and remand the case for 

calculation and award of benefits. See, e.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-21 

(9th Cir. 2014). However, in Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1167, a case decided after Garrison, 

another Ninth Circuit panel did not apply or even acknowledge the "credit as true" rule 

where substantial evidence did not support an ALJ's rejection of treating medical opinions 

and his adverse credibility determination; instead, the panel simply remanded the case for 

further administrative proceedings. And, in Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th 

Cir. 2015), the panel did not apply or even acknowledge the "credit as true" rule where the 

ALJ had failed to even mention a treating source's opinion that the claimant was "pretty 

much nonfunctional"; instead, the panel simply remanded the case to afford the ALJ the 

opportunity to comment on the doctor's opinions. 

Here, although plaintiff conclusorily asserts that "[t]he Court should reverse the 

ALJ's decision and order payment of benefits" (see ECF No. 15-1 at 12), the Commissioner 

has argued that the proper remedy in the event of reversal is a remand for further 

administrative proceedings (see ECF No. 18-1 at 10-11). The Court deems plaintiffs 

failure to adequately briefthe issue of the appropriate remedy and failure to even reply to 

the Commissioner's legal argument in this regard as a concession to the correctness of the 

Commissioner's position. 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that plaintiffs motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant 

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Any party having objections to the Court's proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b )(2). The objections 

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should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." A party may respond 

to the other party's objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See id. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 29, 2018 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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