Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01014/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) was dissolved and its

functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. See Casas-Castrillon v. Dept. of

Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942, 945 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2008).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO MALDONADO, Civil No. 10cv1014 AJB(BLM)

Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241

JANET NAPOLITANO, et al.,

Respondents.

On May 10, 2010, Petitioner, a detainee in the custody of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”)1

, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, proceeding pro se, filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking release from immigration

custody because his detention is unlawful. After a thorough review of the papers and applicable

law, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States without

inspection prior to 1996. (Pet., Ex. C.) On October 4, 1995, he married in the United States. (Pet.,

Ex. A.) On November 30, 1995, Petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor battery on his spouse and

placed on probation for three years. (Pet., Ex. B; Resp’t Ex. 39.) On September 29, 1995, the INS

placed Petitioner in deportation proceedings. (Resp’t Ex. 39.) On December 1, 1995, the IJ granted

his request to depart the United States voluntarily before June 3, 1996 in lieu of an order of

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deportation. (Resp’t Ex. 39.) Petitioner did not appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) and he did not depart the United States, so his deportation order became effective and final

on June 3, 1996. (Resp’t Ex. 37.) On December 13, 1996, Petitioner was deported to Honduras. 

(Resp’t Ex. 39.)

In January 1997, Petitioner unlawfully returned to the United States by entering without

inspection. (Pet., Ex. C; Resp’t Ex 37.) On March 3, 2003, Petitioner was convicted of a

misdemeanor of Driving Under the Influence. (Resp’t Ex. 5.) 

Around June 22, 2001, Petitioner filed an application for temporary protected status (“TPS”)

which the INS approved. (Pet., Ex. C; Resp’t Exs. 1-4.) Because of the two misdemeanor

convictions, on April 19, 2007, the DHS withdrew his TPS status. (Pet., Ex. B; Resp’t Exs. 5-6.) 

On August 24, 2007, the superior court vacated Petitioner’s plea of his 1995 criminal case as legally

invalid. (Pet., Ex. B; Resp’t Exs. 7-8.) Petitioner filed an appeal regarding the withdrawal of his

TPS. (Pet., Ex. B.) On October 5, 2007, the DHS denied the appeal. (Pet., Ex. B; Resp’t Exs. 10-

12.) 

On July 31, 2008, Petitioner was arrested for disorderly conduct/public intoxication in

violation of California Penal Code section 647(f). (Resp’t Ex. 37.) He was transferred into the

custody of ICE on that same day and placed him in removal proceedings. (Resp’t Ex. 37.) On

September 18, 2008, the IJ granted DHS’s motion and terminated removal proceedings in order for

the DHS to reinstate the prior 1995 order of deportation to Honduras. (Resp’t Exs. 16, 37.) 

However, in response to the Court’s request for additional documents, it was realized that

Respondents have not yet reinstated the 1996 deportation order. (Gov’t Response filed on 7/29/11,

Dkt. No. 20.) On July 30, 2011, Respondent filed a first supplemental lodgment informing the Court

that on July 29, 2011, DHS reinstated the prior deportation order. (Dkt. No. 21; Ex. 58.) 

On September 26, 2008, Petitioner filed an appeal before the BIA arguing that his prior

removal order should not have been reinstated and that he should have been considered for TPS and

Adjustment of Status. (Pet. Suppl. Brief at 7; Resp’t Ex. 37.) On February 10, 2009, the BIA

dismissed the appeal. (Resp’t Exs. 13, 37.) On February 23, 2009, Petitioner petitioned for review

of the BIA’s decision and motion for stay before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Maldonado v.

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Holder, No. 09-70515. (Resp’t Exs. 13, 27.) The stay of removal was granted. (Resp’t Ex. 37.) On

July 1, 2009, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because

its direct review of immigration cases is limited to a review of final orders of removal. (Resp’t Exs.

13-14.) A stay of removal was in effect from February 23, 2009 until August 28, 2009. (Resp’t Exs.

27-28.)

In August 2009, Petitioner moved the BIA to reopen his previous 1995 deportation

proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (Pet. at 7; Pet. Suppl. Brief at 10.) On

September 10, 2009, the BIA denied the August 2009 motion to reopen for lack of jurisdiction

because jurisdiction to review any such motion remained with the IJ because no appeal was taken

from the IJ’s December 1, 1995 decision finding Petitioner removable. (Resp’t Exs. 18, 37.) On

September 18, 2009, he filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision and motion for stay with the

Ninth Circuit in Maldonado v. Holder, No. 09-72975 to review the BIA’s decision. (Resp’t Ex. 32.) 

On April 14, 2010, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review upholding the BIA’s decision

and dismissed the remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, eligibility for cancellation

of removal, whether petitioner is still a candidate for TPS and whether the prior deportation in 1995

was valid because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Resp’t Exs. 18-19.) A stay of

removal was in effect from September 18, 2009 until June 7, 2010. (Resp’t Ex. 32.) 

On September 14, 2009, the IJ held a bond hearing and determined that, because Petitioner

was subject to a final order of removal that was not subject to judicial review, there was no

jurisdiction to conduct bond review pursuant to Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.

2008) and/or Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). (Resp’t Ex. 16.) He appealed

the IJ’s decision. (Resp’t Ex. 16.) On January 27, 2010, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision and

dismissed the appeal. (Resp’t Exs. 16-17.) 

On October 7, 2009, Petitioner moved the IJ to reopen the proceedings. (Pet. at 7.) On

November 9, 2009, the IJ denied the motion to reopen as untimely. (Pet. at 7; Resp’t Ex. 21.) The

IJ specifically concluded that Petitioner did not voluntarily depart within the time allowed in

December 1, 1995 and the motion was untimely and would not be equitably tolled because he did

not show that he acted with due diligence in pursuing his claim regarding ineffective assistance of

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counsel. (Pet. Supp. Brief at 11.) He appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. (Pet. at 7.) On April

13, 2010, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision denying his motion to reopen an order of deportation for

failing to show that he exercised due diligence in pursuing his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. (Resp’t Exs. 20-22.) On April 21, 2010, Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA decision

and motion for stay before the Ninth Circuit in Maldonado v. Holder, No. 10-71252. (Resp’t Ex.

36.) On June 15, 2010, the Ninth Circuit found the petition for review to be appropriate for

summary dismissal and set a briefing schedule for an order to show cause why the petition should

not be summarily denied. (Resp’t Ex. 23.) On August 26, 2010, the Ninth Circuit granted

respondent’s motion for summary disposition. (Resp’t Suppl. Brief, Ex. 46-48.) The Court also

held that the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion to reopen because

Petitioner failed to show he acted with due diligence in pursuing his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. (Id.) Lastly, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the claim that the BIA

abused its discretion in refusing to reopen proceedings sua sponte. (Id.) A stay of removal was in

effect from April 21, 2010 until December 30, 2010. (Resp’t Suppl. Brief, Exs. 43-44.) 

In July 2010, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen with the BIA with new evidence and new

arguments. (Pet. Suppl. Brief at 13.) On December 13, 2010, the BIA construed Petitioner’s motion

as one for reconsideration of the BIA’s decision on April 13, 2010. (Pet’r Suppl. Brief at Doc. 16-1

at 2-3.) The BIA first stated that the such a motion for reconsideration was untimely and

alternatively, that on previously raised issues, Petitioner has not identified any error of fact or law in

the BIA’s previously detailed decision. (Id.) Further, the BIA concluded the motion to reopen was

untimely and he had not presented any exception to the filing requirements imposed on motion to

reopen removal proceedings; and has not demonstrated an exception situation for sua sponte

reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). (Id.) In conclusion, the BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to

reopen and a request for a stay of deportation. (Id.) 

On December 29, 2010, Petitioner filed another petition for review of the BIA’s denial of a

motion to reopen and motion for stay in Maldonado-Aguilar v. Holder, No. 10-73937. (Id., Ex. 50.) 

On July 6, 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued an order similar to the one filed on August 26, 2010. The

Court also held that the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion to reopen

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2

In his supplemental brief, Petitioner presents arguments and facts to support the claims in the

Petition; however he also presents new facts and claims. To the extent he alleges new claims, the Court

declines to consider them. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining

to consider new claims for relief in the traverse as they should be presented in an amended petition).

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because Petitioner failed to show he acted with due diligence in pursuing his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. (Ninth Circuit PACER, 10-73937, July 6, 2011.) The Court also held it lacked

jurisdiction to review the claim that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to reopen proceedings

sua sponte. (Id.) In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stated, “[t]he temporary stay of removal will

terminate upon issuance of the mandate.” (Id.) 

On May 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. (Dkt.

No. 1.) On July 19, 2010, Respondent filed a return to the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt.

No. 11.) On August 19, 2010, Petitioner filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 13.) The case was transferred to

the undersigned judge on March 25, 2011. (Dkt. No. 14.) On April 13, 2011, Petitioner filed a

supplemental brief updating the Court on developments in his case.2 (Dkt. No. 16.) In response to

the Court’s order, Respondent filed a responsive supplemental brief on June 22, 2011. (Dkt. No.

18.) On July 22, 2011, the Court issued an Order requiring Respondents to file additional

documents regarding the reinstatement order. (Dkt. No. 19.) On July 29, 2011, Respondent filed a

response. (Dkt. No. 20.) On July 30, 2011, Respondent filed a supplemental document to the

response. (Dkt. No. 21.) 

Discussion

Petitioner alleges four claims in his petition. First, he seeks to vacate the September 18,

2008 order of the IJ reinstating the previous deportation order because his deportation and reentry

occurred before the effective date of IIRIRA on April 1, 1997. (Pet. at 2-3.) Second, Petitioner

argues that the DHS, IJ and BIA erred in not granting Petitioner a bond because he was not a lawful

permanent resident. (Pet. at 3-4.) Third, he challenges his removal order as invalid due to

ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims his counsel at the time failed to file a motion to reopen

the date at the time his prior deportation order was reinstated on September 9, 2008 and an updated

E-28 form. (Pet. at 8.) Fourth, he claims that he is being unlawfully detained because he is still a

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The parties interchangeably use 1995 or 1996 deportation order. The IJ issued its order of

removal on December 1,1995 but the order was not executed until December 13, 1996. (Dkt. No. 21,

Exs. 59, 61.)

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candidate for TPS. (Pet. at 9.) 

A. Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alien detainees can properly challenge “the extent of the

Attorney’s General’s authority” to detain a removable alien under the general detention statutes. 

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001). The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and vests jurisdiction over final removal orders with the

court of appeals. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006) The Real ID Act

does not divest the district court of jurisdiction because the Act was “not intended to ‘preclude

habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders.’”

Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 43 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, Petitioner challenges

his continued detention and TPS status and not the validity of a final order of removal. Therefore,

this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider his petition. 

B. Reinstatement of the 19963 Prior Deportation Order

Petitioner argues that the reinstatement of the 1996 deportation order on September 18, 2008

was invalid because his deportation and reentry occurred before the effective date of the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) on April 1, 1997. (Pet.

at 2-3.) Respondent contends that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Fernandez-Vargas

v. Gonzalez, 548 U.S. 30 (2006) forecloses Petitioner’s argument. 

In their arguments, both parties assumed a reinstatement order was issued on September 18,

2008. However, on September 18, 2008, the IJ only terminated removal proceedings. (Resp’t Ex.

37.) The IJ did not reinstate Petitioner’s prior 1996 order of deportation to Honduras. (Id.) At the

time that the petition was filed, there was no valid deportation order as the 1996 deportation order

was executed on December 13, 1996. See Alcala v. Holder, 563 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009)

(when an alien is removed subject to a removal order, it is deemed executed and the order may not

be executed against him unless the prior order has been formally reinstated). This Court is

adjudicating the Petition filed on May 10, 2010. As there was no reinstatement order when the

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petition was filed, there is no case or controversy. See Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir.

2010) (“The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to live cases and controversies,

and as such, federal courts may not issue advisory opinions.”) “Failure to satisfy Article III’s caseor-controversy requirement renders a habeas petition moot.” Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 994

(9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court DENIES his claim regarding the alleged reinstatement of

his 1996 deportation order as moot. 

C. Bond Hearing

Petitioner also argues that the DHS, IJ and BIA erred in denying him a bond or releasing him

under supervision pursuant to Tijana v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) and Nadarajah v.

Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). He claims that he has been detained for a prolonged time

while his appeal is being processed and the United States Supreme Court has held that prolonged

detentions are impermissible. Petitioner argues he is entitled to release pending resolution of his

appeal. Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing under section

1231(a)(6). 

In order to determine whether Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, the Court needs to

determine whether the Attorney General’s authority to detain Petitioner was under section 236 or

241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1231. See Diouf v.

Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2008). As explained by the Ninth Circuit, “[w]here an alien

falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as

well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his

detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Section 1226(a) grants the Attorney General discretion to detain an alien “pending a decision

on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This section

gives the Attorney General discretionary authority to release aliens on bond or conditional parole

prior to the removal period. Id. In contrast, § 1231(a)(2) grants the Attorney General mandatory

authority to detain aliens “during” their “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Section

1231(a)(6) further grants the Attorney General with discretionary authority to detain certain classes

of aliens “beyond” the removal period or to release them subject to the terms of supervision in §

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Only recently, on July 29, 2011, DHS reinstated his prior 1996 deportation order. (See Resp’t

Suppl. Lodgment, Exs. 58-61.) 

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1231(a)(3). Id. Under this section the Attorney General must remove during the 90 day removal

period. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A). According to the statute, 

The removal period begins on the latest of the following: 

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final. 

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration

process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

“When an alien subject to removal leaves the country, the removal order is deemed to be

executed. If the alien reenters the country illegally, the order may not be executed against him

unless it has been ‘reinstated’ by an authorized official.” Alcala v. Holder, 563 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 2007)). 8 C.F.R. §

241.8(a) provides the regulation that must be met before a prior order can be reinstated. See 8

C.F.R. § 241.8(a). The removal period for reinstated removal orders begins the same time as

original removal orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). Rodriguez-Carabantes v. Chertoff, 2007 WL

1268500 at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 

Here, when Petitioner was deported on December 13, 1996, his original order of deportation

was executed. (Resp’t Ex. 39.) In January 1997, he unlawfully returned to the United States. After

being arrested in July 2008, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings. On September 18, 2008,

the IJ granted the government’s motion to terminate removal proceedings in order to reinstate the

prior order. Although the government intended to reinstate his 1996 order of deportation, the prior

deportation order was never reinstated.4

 Therefore, when Petitioner filed his petition for writ of

habeas corpus in this court, he was not subject to a deportation order. Based on the relief that

Petitioner seeks in his petition filed on May 10, 2010, the Court DENIES Petitioner request for a

bond hearing as moot. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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Aliens who are granted temporary protected status may not be removed during the period in

which that status is in effect. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A). 

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Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his deportation

proceedings in 1996; therefore his order of deportation should be vacated. Specifically, he claims

that his attorney never filed a I-485 form; I-130 petition and a motion to reopen. (Traverse at 14.) 

First, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the underlying 1996 order of

removal. As relief, Petitioner seeks to have his order of deportation vacated. Since there was no

order of deportation when he filed his petition, the Court DENIES his claim as presenting no case or

controversy. Moreover, on August 26, 2010 and again on July 6, 2011, the Ninth Circuit already

made a determination that the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion to

reopen because Petitioner failed to show that he acted with due diligence in pursuing the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. (Resp’t Suppl. Brief, Exs. 43-44; 46-48.) Accordingly, the Court

DENIES the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

E. Temporary Protected Status

Petitioner argues that his custody is unlawful because he is still eligible for TPS5

 status. He

contends that when he first applied for TPS, he was granted the status even though he had been

previously deported and had one misdemeanor. (Pet. at 9.) He claims that the conviction was

vacated pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5 which requires that before accepting a guilty plea, a

trial court must advise the defendant that if he is not a U.S. citizen, a conviction may result in

deportation and because he was falsely accused by his ex-wife. (Id.) Also, he did not exhaust

because he was legally here in the United States as he was granted TPS and DHS did not reinstate

his prior deportation until September 18, 2008. (Id. at 10-11.)

Around June 22, 2001, Petitioner filed an application for temporary protected status (“TPS”)

which the INS approved. (Pet., Ex. C; Resp’t Exs. 1-4.) On April 19, 2007, DHS withdrew his TPS

status because he had been convicted of two or more misdemeanors. (Resp’t Ex. 5-6.) On August

24, 2007, the San Diego County Superior Court vacated Petitioner’s plea of his 1995 criminal case

as “legally invalid.” (Pet., Ex. B; Resp’t Exs. 7-8.) Subsequently, Petitioner filed an appeal

regarding the withdrawal of his TPS. (Pet., Ex. B; Resp’t Exs. 10-12.) On October 5, 2007, the

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Administrative Appeals Office denied the appeal. (Pet., Ex. B; Resp’t Exs. 10-12.) DHS explained

that since the conviction had been vacated solely to relieve Petitioner of immigration hardships, the

vacatur was irrelevant for immigration purposes. (Id.)

The Ninth Circuit made a determination that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

as to the claim that he is still a candidate for TPS. (Resp’t Exs 18-19.) In addition, although

Petitioner argues that he did not exhaust because he was legally here in the United States, Petitioner

made efforts to seek TPS status when it was withdrawn in April 2007. He sought vacatur of one of

his prior misdemeanors and filed an appeal within DHS in October 2007. Petitioner’s argument why

he did not exhaust is without merit. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the claim that Petitioner is

eligible for TPS status. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that

exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 3, 2011

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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