Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04618/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04618-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

2

 Plaintiffs note that SM is now eight and a half years old. Opposition to Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, p. 2.

Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 6/2/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SM, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

CUPERTINO UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05-04618 JF

ORDER1(1) GRANTING DISTRICTS

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO

CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND

SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

[re: docket nos. 20, 21]

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are currently and have been residents of Cupertino, California since November,

2003. Plaintiff SM has been diagnosed with autism and, at the time the First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) was filed, was seven years old.2 In December, 2003, SM was enrolled by

Defendant Cupertino Union School District (“District”) and was placed in Dilworth Elementary

Case 5:05-cv-04618-JF Document 43 Filed 06/02/06 Page 1 of 8
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Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

School for a thirty-day administrative period. FAC, Ex. A, p. 2 (August 12, 2005 Decision of the

California Special Education Hearing Office). SM’s parents believed that this placement was

inappropriate, and chose instead to enroll SM in The Bay School, a certified California nonpublic school located in Santa Cruz, California. Id., p. 2; Complaint ¶ 8; Answer ¶ 8. For the

2004 extended school year (“ESY), the 2004-2005 school year, the 2005 ESY, and the 2005-

2006 school year, the District offered to place SM in programs at Dilworth that Plaintiffs

believed were a denial of their right to a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for SM. 

FAC, Ex. A, p. 2.

In June, 2005, Plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the District’s placement offers in a

due process hearing before the California Special Education Hearing Office (“SEHO”). 

Plaintiffs argued that because the District is unable to meet SM’s particular educational needs,

SM’s appropriate placement is The Bay School. Plaintiffs sought an order requiring

reimbursement for the costs of SM’s enrollment at The Bay School from June 2, 2004 through

the end of the 2005 ESY and additional consultation services, and placing SM at The Bay School

for the 2005-2006 school year. On August 12, 2005, SEHO Hearing Officer issued a decision

finding that the District had offered a FAPE for the 2004 ESY, the 2004-2005 school year, the

2005 ESY, and the 2005-2006 school year, except for its failure to provide additional special

services during the transition to the District’s school and on an ongoing basis. The Hearing

Officer thus denied Plaintiffs’ requests for reimbursement and placement in The Bay School.

On November 10, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a “First Amended Complaint for Violations of

Rights and Relief under IDEA; Appeal Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.” The District now

moves for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim that the District has not

implemented the Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) ordered by the SEHO Hearing

Officer. Plaintiffs move for leave to conduct discovery and supplement the record. Both

motions are opposed. The Court heard oral argument on June 2, 2006.

Case 5:05-cv-04618-JF Document 43 Filed 06/02/06 Page 2 of 8
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Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

II. DISCUSSION

A. The District’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The standard applicable to a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same

as that applicable to a motion to dismiss. In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings,

the Court views the facts presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true

all the allegations in the complaint and treating as false those allegations in the answer that

contradict the plaintiff’s allegations. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School District, 967 F.2d 1298,

1301 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992); Beery v. Hitachi Home Electronics (America), Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477,

479 (C.D. Cal. 1993).

The District argues that Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the alleged failure of the District

to implement the IEP ordered by the SEHO Hearing Officer should be dismissed for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. While Plaintiffs do not allege the District’s failure to

implement the necessary IEP as a separate claim, Plaintiffs’ FAC and appeal includes general

allegations with respect to this alleged failure and a request for relief related to these allegations. 

Plaintiffs indicate that the “subject of this appeal” is:

the DISTRICT’s failure to address and/or meet SM’S unique and individual needs

during the 2004 ESY, 2004-2005 school year, and 2005 ESY; and failure to

address SM’S unique and individual educational/behavioral needs in planning for

the 2005-2006 school year, and in appropriately implementing the 2005-06 IEP

ordered; and the hearing officer’s failures to assess and order an adequate remedy

to address the failures of the DISTRICT to plan for or to provide a FAPE to SM

during the relevant time periods herein.

FAC ¶ 11 (emphasis added). They allege that the District has not implemented the SEHO

Hearing Officer’s order and request as a remedy that this Court order an extended transitional

period at The Bay School:

The DISTRICT has failed to adequately provide or implement an appropriate

transition in a timely manner to a DISTRICT provided individualized

educational/behavioral program, in order to implement the program ordered as

appropriate for the 2005-2006 school year for SM by the Hearing Officer below;

thus the parents request from this Court an order to extend the transitional period

at The Bay School, with related services thereto, until such time as the requisite

individualized educational/behavioral program has been planned for, and new

staff have been sufficiently identified, trained and experienced in working with

SM, in order to provide the program he specifically requires at the DISTRICT

site.

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3

 Effective July 1, 2005, IDEA was generally amended by Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (Dec. 3, 2004),

4

Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

FAC ¶ 15; Request for Relief 8.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)3 allows “a party who has been

aggrieved by the findings and decision” of a due process hearing to bring a civil action in state or

federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). However, before a plaintiff may bring suit based on a

violation of his or her right to a FAPE, “a complainant must normally exhaust the due process

hearing procedures required by 20 U.S.C. § 1415.” Porter v. Board of Trustees of Manhattan

Beach Unified School Dist., 307 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). If “‘resort to the

administrative process would be either futile or inadequate,’” exhaustion may not be required. 

Id. (quoting Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir.1992)). In Robb

v. Bethel School District, the Ninth Circuit explained when exhaustion of administrative

remedies is required:

The dispositive question generally is whether the plaintiff has alleged injuries that

could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and

remedies. If so, exhaustion of those remedies is required. If not, the claim

necessarily falls outside the IDEA’s scope, and exhaustion is unnecessary. Where

the IDEA’s ability to remedy a particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be

required to give educational agencies an initial opportunity to ascertain and

alleviate the alleged problem.

Robb, 308 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002).

This Court has jurisdiction to enforce an unappealed order issued as a result of an IDEA

due process hearing. Porter, 307 F.3d at 1071 (“Requiring exhaustion of California’s CRP to file

suit based on a failure to implement an unappealed administrative order would add an additional

step of administrative exhaustion not contemplated by the IDEA. Once a due process hearing

issues an order that is not appealed by either party, the IDEA requires that the order be treated as

‘final.’ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A).”). However, this Court cannot simultaneously enforce an

administrative order and consider an appeal of that same administrative order. In Moubry v.

Independent School Dist. No. 696 (Ely), a case involving similar facts to the instant case, the

District of Minnesota dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for enforcement of the hearing officer’s

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Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

order because plaintiffs had also appealed the order. Moubry, 951 F.Supp. 867, 885-86

(D.Minn.1996). That court held that “the Plaintiff’s claim is fundamentally flawed, for it

impermissibly seeks protection from what, at this point, is only an anticipatorily adverse ruling

by this Court.” Id. at 886.

During oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the Plaintiffs no longer seek to

enforce the IEP for the 2005-2006 school year. Instead, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed the Court

that the present purpose of the instant action is to appeal the decision of the Hearing Officer,

especially in light of events that have occurred or information that has become available in the

time period since the Hearing Officer’s decision was rendered. Accordingly, based both on the

unusual procedural posture of the case and counsel’s statements at oral argument, the Court will

grant the District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs shall have leave to amend

the complaint in order to clarify that they seek only to appeal the Hearing Officer’s decision.

B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery and Supplement the Record

In a civil action brought under the IDEA, appealing an administrative decision, the court

“(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence

at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall

grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(B). The

Ninth Circuit has held that, because “additional” evidence is necessarily “supplemental,” 20

U.S.C. § 1415 “does not authorize witnesses at trial to repeat or embellish their prior

administrative hearing testimony.” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472-73 (9th

Cir. 1993). Reasons for supplementing the record “might include gaps in the administrative

transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a witness, an improper exclusion of

evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence concerning relevant events occurring

subsequent to the administrative hearing.” Id. at 1473. The court must be “careful not to allow

such evidence to change the character of the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo.” Id. 

Plaintiffs now move for leave “to conduct discovery related to an independent evaluation

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Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

of SM’s current educational needs and program provided by the District to meet those needs,”

and “to supplement the record with the results of such discovery, as well as any and all

information obtained following the hearing relevant to the transition ordered and the program

provided for the 2005-2006 school year which was the subject of the hearing and this appeal.” 

Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery and Supplement the Record, pp. 6-7. Also, Plaintiffs

move for leave “to supplement the record with the results of clinical observations of SM in the

school district placement now that he is there.” Id., p. 7. 

The District opposes the motion on two grounds. First, to the extent that Plaintiffs move

to conduct discovery and supplement the record in order to support their claim for enforcement

of the IEP for the 2005-2006 school year, the District argues that Plaintiffs’ enforcement claim is

barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because it concludes that the District’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings is well taken, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ claim for

enforcement does not justify additional discovery and supplementation of the record. 

Second, to the extent that Plaintiffs move to conduct discovery and supplement the record

in order to support their appeal of the Hearing Officer’s decision, the District argues that

Plaintiffs have not met their burden in demonstrating that additional evidence should be

admitted. The District has made a detailed and reasonable argument that Plaintiffs had a

sufficient opportunity to observe the District’s program prior to the due process hearing, that

additional testimony will simply repeat or embellish testimony offered at the due process hearing,

and that additional discovery and supplementation of the record is not necessary. In response,

Plaintiffs have not met their “threshold burden of demonstrating, at the time of the request, that

the supplemental evidence should be admitted.” Brandon H. ex rel. Richard H. v. Kennewick

Sch. Dist. No. 17, 82 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1179 (E.D. Wash. 2000); accord E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist.,

No. 196 Rosemount-Apple Valley, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs have not shown

specifically how and why additional discovery and supplementation of the record is necessary. 

Instead, they have argued generally, with very little reference to specific legal authority or

evidence and testimony already heard at the due process hearing, that discovery and

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4

 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel will be unavailable for the period beginning

June 20, 2006 and through August 1, 2006. The Court anticipates that Plaintiffs’ counsel will

have sufficient time within which to file an amended complaint. However, if Plaintiffs’ counsel

requires additional time, she may file a written request that demonstrates why such additional

time is required.

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Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

supplementation is necessary for the dual purposes of appealing the Hearing Officer’s decision

and enforcing it. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct

discovery and supplement the record, without prejudice to a renewed motion to conduct

discovery and supplement the record that is fact-specific and directed specifically to the appeal of

the Hearing Officer’s decision.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District’s motion

for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint within

thirty (30) days4 to clarify that they seek only to appeal the Hearing Officer’s decision.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct discovery and

supplement the record is DENIED without prejudice.

DATED: June 2, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-04618 JF

ORDER (1) GRANTING DISTRICTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND (2) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Kathryn E. Dobel spedlaw@comcast.net

Amy R. Levine alevine@mbdlaw.com, mhensel@mbdlaw.com; astewart@mbdlaw.com

Kathryn Elizabeth Dobel

Law Office of Kathryn Dobel

2026 Delaware St.

Berkeley, CA 94709

Case 5:05-cv-04618-JF Document 43 Filed 06/02/06 Page 8 of 8