Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01315/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHRISTINE MORRIS, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIV 04-1315 PHX MEA

) 

BROADWING COMMUNICATIONS LLC, ) ORDER

) 

 Defendant. )

_______________________________)

All of the parties have consented to the exercise of

magistrate judge jurisdiction over this case, including the

entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment (Docket No. 31) and Defendant’s motion

(Docket No. 50) to strike portions of Plaintiff’s statement of

facts in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The Court heard oral argument from counsel for the parties

regarding all pending motions on January 31, 2006. 

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed June 24, 2004, alleged

Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by

taking an adverse employment action against Plaintiff in

retaliation for engaging in a protected act. Defendant answered

the complaint and a scheduling order was issued February 28,

2005. The parties engaged in discovery, including the

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deposition of Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not notice any

depositions. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on

October 7, 2005, and a separate statement of facts in support of

the motion for summary judgment. On November 3, 2005, Plaintiff

filed a motion to stay Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

and a motion to compel discovery. Plaintiff filed a response to

the motion for summary judgment on November 10, 2005. Plaintiff

adopted Defendant’s statement of facts, except for one

paragraph, and also filed a statement of facts in support of her

response to the motion for summary judgment. See Docket No. 36.

On December 27, 2005, Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff’s

response to the motion for summary judgment.

Subsequent to hearing oral argument on Plaintiff’s

motion to stay summary judgment and Plaintiff’s motion to

compel, the Court granted these motions and ordered Defendant to

provide the requested evidence or a sworn statement that the

evidence did not exist. Defendant having complied with the

Court’s order subsequent to oral argument, i.e., having provided

the requested evidence, and Plaintiff and Defendant having

submitted additional briefing regarding the impact of the new

evidence on the propriety of granting or denying the motion for

summary judgment, the pleading regarding the motion for summary

judgment is now complete.

II. Defendant’s motion to strike 

Defendant contends that portions of Plaintiff’s

statement of facts in response to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment should be stricken, pursuant to Rule 56(c)(1), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, because these statements contain or

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constitute inadmissible evidence which should not be considered

when determining whether Defendant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Defendant argues that the challenged statements

of facts should be stricken as conclusory, unsupported, hearsay,

and not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants on whose

statements the challenged portions of the statement of facts are

predicated.

Striking evidence submitted in opposition to a motion

for summary judgment is a decision within the Court’s

discretion. See City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 46 F.3d

929, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1995); Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots

Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990). When considering a

motion for summary judgment, however, the Court must focus on

the admissibility of the contents of the evidence, rather than

the admissibility of the form of the evidence. See Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541

U.S. 937 (2004). 

Statements contained in an affidavit in opposition to

a motion for summary judgment, which are based on information

and belief rather than the affiant’s personal knowledge, do not

raise triable issues of fact and may be stricken from the

record. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real

Estate Inv., Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1529 (9th Cir. 1991).

Statements which are legal conclusions or speculative

assertions, and statements of hearsay evidence, do not satisfy

the standards of personal knowledge, admissibility, and

competence required by Rule 56(e). See, e.g., Vazquez v.

Lopez-Rosario, 134 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1998); Jones v.

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Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 42 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir.

1994) (stating that conclusory allegations of the complaint may

not be supplanted with conclusory allegations of an affidavit to

defeat a motion for summary judgment). However, an affiant’s

statement that the facts asserted are based on the affiant’s

personal knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the “personal

knowledge” requirement of Rule 56(e). See Sheet Metal Workers’

Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 359 v. Madison Indus., Inc., 84 F.3d

1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1996).

With regard to the challenged statements in

Plaintiff’s statement of facts which the Court cites in reaching

its decision, the affiants have asserted that these facts are

based on their personal knowledge and, therefore, the Court will

not require Plaintiff to provide additional evidence regarding

the facts for purposes of resolving Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. See Phelan v. City of Chicago, 226 F. Supp.

2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d 347 F.3d 679 (7th Cir.

2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 989 (2004). The Court will not

exercise its discretion to strike the challenged portions of

Plaintiff’s statement of facts in opposition to Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. See Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d

1260, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003)(affirming denial of motion to strike

because “the district court instead relied on the declarations

to the extent that they contained relevant and admissible

material, ignoring inadmissible and irrelevant statements”

because there was “nothing in the record that suggests an abuse

of discretion by the district court, or that it failed to ignore

inadmissible hearsay or legal conclusions within the

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declarations as submitted to it.”).

III. Standard for granting summary judgment

 Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment shall be entered if the

pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file show that there is no genuine dispute

regarding the material facts of the case and the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10

(1986). 

For purposes of deciding a motion for

summary judgment, “genuine” means that the

evidence about the fact is such that a

reasonable jury could resolve the point in

favor of the non-moving party, and

“material” means that the fact is one that

might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law. 

United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs., 960 F.2d

200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992). See also Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri

Pac. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 2001).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial

burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553

(1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden with

a properly supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,

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but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct.

at 2510. The United States Supreme Court has stated that when

a party moving for summary judgment has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), “its opponent must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586,

587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (“[I]f the factual context

renders respondents’ claim implausible ... respondents must come

forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim

than would otherwise be necessary.”). The party opposing the

motion must produce some significant, probative evidence tending

to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating

a genuine question of fact for resolution at trial. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248, 256-57; 106 S. Ct. at 2510, 2513-14 (holding

that the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment). 

The Court must consider Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment construing all alleged facts with all reasonable

inferences favoring Plaintiff. See, e.g., Genzler v.

Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 749 (2005).

IV. Statement of facts

Plaintiff has adopted Defendant’s statement of facts,

except for paragraph 61 of the statement of facts.

Plaintiff was hired by IXE Eclipse, a communications

equipment company, in June 1998 as a district sales manager

located in Phoenix. Docket No. 32 (Defendant’s statement of

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facts in support of the motion for summary judgment) (“DSOF”),

para. 1 & Attach. A (Plaintiff’s deposition testimony) at 34.

Plaintiff’s job included forecasting her team’s monthly sales

for her regional director. Id., para. 2 & Attach. A at 48. In

the process of forecasting her team’s monthly sales, Plaintiff

would get a “general feel” of accounts she believed would close

and gave a weighted forecast to her supervisor. Id., para. 3 &

Attach. A at 48. In 1999, IXE Eclipse was purchased by

Cincinnati Bell and the name of the company was changed to

Broadwing Communication Services, Inc. Id., para. 4. After the

change in ownership, Plaintiff’s job title became “branch

manager,” however, her job duties were not changed. Id., para.

5. 

In late 1999, Ken Smith became Plaintiff’s supervisor,

i.e., her regional director, at Broadwing. Id., para. 6. Mr.

Smith worked at the company’s Salt Lake City office. Id., para.

7. Plaintiff had weekly telephone conversations with Mr. Smith

and Mr. Smith visited the Phoenix office on a monthly basis.

Id., para. 8. Mr. Smith did not allow or require Plaintiff to

revise her monthly sales forecast figures if she thought she

would not be able to meet her forecasts. Id., Attach. A at 177.

Plaintiff received several commendations and awards from the

company for her performance as an employee while Mr. Smith was

her supervisor. Docket No. 36 (Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts

in Support of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment) (“PSOF”), Attach. (Plaintiff’s affidavit) at

para. 9. Prior to March of 2003, Plaintiff was viewed as a

competent, hard-working employee and supervisor, whose team

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1

 Attachment B to Defendant’s statement of facts is the

investigative summary, which states:

[In March of 2003]... [t]he manager indicated that

the issues she was about to report had gone on for a

long time, from approximately 2000-current. She

indicated that one reason she had chosen to come

forward at this time was her concern about the

potential damage caused to her professional

reputation by a recent posting on the Yahoo message

board, alleging “sexual harassment by a BSM (Branch

Sales Manager) in the Phoenix office”.

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received company awards for job performance. DSOF, paras. 4, 9,

20; PSOF, Attach. at para. 2.

Plaintiff states in her affidavit that, in January of

2002, she received complaints from several female Broadwing

employees that they had been victims of sexual harassment by Mr.

Smith, i.e., the employees complained of “events of

inappropriate sexual behavior.” PSOF, para. 3 & para. 10 &

Attach. at para. 10. In January of 2003 Plaintiff approached

Mr. Smith regarding the employees’ complaints about his

workplace behavior. DSOF, Attach. A at 125.1 On March 14, 2003,

Plaintiff reported the complaints about Mr. Smith’s behavior to

Broadwing’s Vice President of Human Resources, Ms. Figeley, and

the corporation’s Human Resources Manager. Id., para. 10.

Plaintiff testified that, prior to reporting complaints about

Mr. Smith to the corporate Human Resources division, she

notified Gary Graham that she would be making the report. Id.,

Attach. A at 85, 92-93, 131-32.

After Plaintiff reported the complaints about Mr.

Smith to the corporate office, Ms. Figeley, who was located in

the company’s Austin, Texas, office, conducted an investigation

regarding the complaints, including interviewing 33 employees in

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Phoenix, California, Colorado, and Utah. DSOF, para. 12 &

Attach. B. Ms. Figeley produced a report describing the results

of the investigation. Id., para. 13 & Attach. B. The report

did not mention Plaintiff by name and was distributed to a

“small group” of Broadwing management employees. Id., para. 14

& Attach. A at 96. The report was distributed to, inter alia,

Rick Calder, the president of sales for the company, and Gary

Graham, a regional director and Mr. Smith’s supervisor. Id.,

Attach. A at 97 & Attach. B.

As a result of the investigation, Mr. Smith was

terminated on April 25, 2003. DSOF, para. 16. After Mr. Smith

was terminated, Plaintiff temporarily reported to Gary Graham.

Id., para. 18. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Graham was a “close

friend” of Mr. Smith’s. PSOF, para. 9. Mr. Graham had been Mr.

Smith’s supervisor. DSOF, Attach. A at 85; PSOF, para. 12. In

May of 2003, Mr. Graham stated to Plaintiff: “Well it looks like

we won’t be having fun anymore, someone always has to screw

things up for everyone else.” PSOF, Attach. at para. 17. Mr.

Graham also stated that he “did not see anything wrong with two

consenting adults having a relationship.” Id., Attach. at para.

17. 

In June of 2003, Broadwing Communications Services,

Inc., was purchased by another company and the name of the

company was changed to Broadwing Communications, L.L.C. DSOF,

para. 19. After the change in ownership, on June 26, 2003, the

company restructured its sales department, i.e., the Large

Accounts Division was merged with the National Accounts

Division. Id., para. 21; PSOF, Attach. at para. 18. After the

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restructuring, Plaintiff, who had previously worked in the Large

Accounts Division, now worked in the National Accounts Division,

and Plaintiff was made a “National Account Marketing Manager.”

DSOF, para. 22. Plaintiff became responsible for national

accounts, in addition to her previous job responsibilities as

branch manager of the Phoenix office. Id., para. 23.

Also as a result of the company’s re-organization, Mr.

Putt was appointed president of sales for the company, replacing

Mr. Calder. DSOF, Attach. A at 120; PSOF, para. 9. Plaintiff

alleges Mr. Putt was “a close friend” of Mr. Smith’s. PSOF,

para. 9. Plaintiff believes Mr. Putt told Mr. Guidrey of her

involvement in the investigation of Mr. Smith. DSOF, Attach. A

at 120, 124-25, 132.

Mr. Graham was Plaintiff’s supervisor from April 25,

2003, when Mr. Smith was terminated, until approximately the end

of June of 2003. Id., Attach. A at 60; PSOF, Attach. at para.

7. In June of 2003, Mr. Guidrey replaced Mr. Graham as

Plaintiff’s supervisor. DSOF, para. 24. Mr. Guidrey had

previously managed the company’s National Accounts Division,

from the company’s Texas office, since December of 2002. Id.,

para. 24. In his new position as Western Region Vice President

for Sales, Mr. Guidrey occupied an office in the company’s

Walnut Creek, California, headquarters, adjacent to Mr. Graham’s

office. PSOF, para. 9; DSOF, Attach. A at 119-20. Prior to

June of 2003, Mr. Guidrey had met Plaintiff on two occasions and

Mr. Guidrey was pleasant to Plaintiff. PSOF, Attach. at para.

22. Plaintiff states she believes Mr. Graham told Mr. Guidrey

of her involvement in the investigation of Mr. Smith. DSOF,

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Attach. A at 131-32.

Mr. Guidrey has stated he was unfamiliar with

Plaintiff’s job performance prior to becoming her supervisor.

Id., para. 26 & Attach. D. Plaintiff states Mr. Guidrey told

her that Mr. Graham “had briefed him on each Branch and Branch

Manager” in anticipation of Mr. Guidrey assuming their

supervision. PSOF, Attach. at para. 23. 

In early July of 2003, approximately one month after

Mr. Guidrey became her supervisor, Plaintiff tried to discuss

her involvement in the investigation of Mr. Smith’s harassing

behavior with Mr. Guidrey in a telephone call. Id., para. 11;

Attach. at para. 23. Plaintiff avers Mr. Guidrey refused to

discuss the circumstances of Mr. Smith’s termination with

Plaintiff. Id., para. 11. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Guidrey “cut

[her] off” in an exasperated and angry tone of voice when she

tried to discuss Mr. Smith’s termination with Mr. Guidrey,

telling her he had “no desire to hear about the situation.”

Id., Attach. at para. 24.

 Mr. Guidrey had regular telephonic meetings with his

branch managers, including Plaintiff. DSOF, para. 27. During

weekly sales meetings, the sales managers provided their

supervisors with monthly sales forecasts for their teams. The

sales managers updated their forecasts as the month progressed.

Id., para. 29.

Plaintiff’s original sales forecast for her team for

the month of July 2003, was $50,000. Id., para. 30. Early in

July of 2003, Plaintiff revised her forecast to $43,000 because

two national accounts were not going to close as previously

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expected. Id., para. 31. On July 28, 2003, Plaintiff made a

“firm commitment” to achieving the forecast sales figure of

$43,000. Id., para. 32. After making this statement but before

the end of the month, Plaintiff told Mr. Guidrey she could not

make the forecasted sales. Id., para. 33. Plaintiff’s team’s

sales for July of 2003 were $13,227, i.e., seventy percent below

the forecasted sales figure. Id., para. 34.

On August 1, 2003, Mr. Guidrey sent Plaintiff an email

stating that her forecasting abilities were a job performance

problem and that he expected better performance in this regard

in the current month. Id., para. 36. Plaintiff responded that

she understood and that the problem would not recur. Id., para.

37. Plaintiff’s team did not make their August 2003 forecasted

sales figure. Id., para. 38. Plaintiff’s team reported

negative sales for the month of August 2003. Id., Attach. A at

187. 

On September 5, 2003, Mr. Guidrey met with Plaintiff

in Phoenix. Id., para. 40 & Attach. A at 193. Mr. Guidrey told

Plaintiff that, due to her poor performance in forecasting

sales, she was to be demoted to a non-management sales position

within the company. Id., para. 41. However, the job to which

Plaintiff was to be demoted also required forecasting sales.

PSOF, Attach. at para. 37.

Plaintiff “refused” the demotion because, she asserts,

others had missed their sales forecasts and were not terminated,

including Mr. Guidrey who had missed his forecasts for a six

month period. DSOF, Attach. A at 183; PSOF, para. 20

(“Plaintiff was offered a demotion by Defendant, but declined

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this as a result of the punitive harassment she was being

subjected to by her superiors which created an intolerable work

environment for her.”) Mr. Guidrey offered Plaintiff a

severance package as an alternative to the demotion. DSOF,

para. 42. Plaintiff refused the severance package and

terminated her employment as of September 5, 2003. Id., para.

43.

There is an affidavit from Mr. Guidrey attached to

Defendant’s statement of facts in support of their motion for

summary judgment averring he was unfamiliar with the sexual

harassment investigation in its entirety and that he considered

Plaintiff to have a “clean slate” when he became her supervisor

after the company restructured.

Mr. Guidrey states:

I was not familiar with Ms. Morris until

June 2003. Further, I was not familiar

with her involvement in an investigation of

sexual harassment that I now know occurred

in March and April of 2003. Because that

investigation did not occur within the

sales division in which I worked, I had no

involvement in the decisions resulting from

the investigation, and I was not aware of

the details regarding the termination of

Ms. Morris’ former Regional Director [Mr.

Smith]. 

DSOF, Attach. D.

Plaintiff asserts the following in her statement of

facts in response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment:

Prior to the June 2003 purchase and reorganization of

the company, if a particular branch of the sales division was

not going to meet its sales projections, Plaintiff would be

asked to produce revenue in excess of her “original forecast and

transfer the excess sales to the branch that was below their

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forecast.” PSOF, Attach. at para. 7. Because Plaintiff’s sales

team consistently performed well, she often transferred her

team’s sales to branches with shortages. Id., Attach. at para.

7. 

As a result of the restructuring of the company and

Mr. Guidrey’s promotion, Plaintiff received responsibility for

two accounts previously assigned to another branch manager who

reported these accounts to Mr. Guidrey. PSOF, Attach. at para.

30. In July of 2003, Plaintiff was called upon to forecast

sales for these two accounts. Id., para. 16. Plaintiff

consulted Mr. Guidrey about these accounts and he informed

Plaintiff that he was comfortable with the projections of the

prior account manager. Id., para. 16. These accounts comprised

fifty percent of the sales or accounts projected by Plaintiff

for July of 2003. DSOF, Attach. A at 179. The accounts did not

close in July of 2003 but did close later. Id., Attach. A at

178-184. When Plaintiff informed Mr. Guidrey that the accounts

would not close in July, he cursed at Plaintiff. Id., Attach.

A at 156.

Another branch manager employed by Defendant, Ms.

Meola, missed her sales forecasts for a period of six months and

she was not demoted or fired. PSOF, Attach. at para. 34.

Another branch manager, Mr. McGinty, missed his sales forecasts

for a period of five months, was not demoted or fired, and

received a promotion. Id., Attach. (Affidavit of Mr. McGinty) at

para. 10. 

Defendant had a “Performance Improvement Plan” in

place to assist employees with deficient job performance. Id.,

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Attach. at para. 36. The company’s policy was to provide an

opportunity for deficient employees to participate in an

improvement plan prior to disciplining the employee. Id.,

Attach. at para. 36. Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff was

not offered the opportunity to participate in an improvement

plan prior to being demoted. 

As a result of the additional discovery provided after

oral argument, Plaintiff presents evidence that Mr. Calder,

Broadwing’s President of Business Markets prior to June of 2003,

and Mr. Putt’s predecessor, and Mr. Graham, the Vice President

in Charge of Sales for the Western Region, Mr. Smith’s

supervisor, and Mr. Smith knew that Plaintiff had instigated the

investigation resulting in Mr. Smith’s termination. See Docket

No. 63.

V. Statement of relevant law

A Title VII retaliation claim is decided using the

McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting methodology. The burden is

initially on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation. The plaintiff must establish that she engaged in

activity protected by Title VII, that she was subjected to an

adverse employment action, and that there was a causal link

between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917,

928 (9th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580,

586 (9th Cir. 2000). Only the third factor of the relevant test

is disputed by the parties to this matter.

A causal link may be established by direct or

circumstantial evidence. The Ninth Circuit has held that a

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causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment

action “may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as

the employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in protected

activities and the proximity in time between the protected

action and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.”

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987), quoted

in Casumpang v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, Local 142, 269 F.3d 1042, 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).

To establish a causal link in a Title VII retaliation

claim, an employee must establish that the employer was aware of

the employee’s protected action. “Essential to a causal link is

evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had

engaged in the protected activity.” Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,

686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Raad v. Fairbanks

N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003);

Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2004)

(“[A]n employer cannot retaliate when it is unaware of any

complaints” of illegal employment practices); Goldsmith v. City

of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993) (“At a minimum,

a plaintiff must generally establish that the employer was

actually aware of the protected expression at the time it took

the adverse employment action.”); Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d

255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

If the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case of

retaliation, then the defendant must present evidence of a

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for their adverse action. To

satisfy this burden, the defendant “need only produce admissible

evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to

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conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by

discriminatory animus.” Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1096 (1981); Miller

v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986). 

If the defendant proffers a non-retaliatory reason for

the adverse action, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff

to show that the proffered reason is a pretext.

A plaintiff may not defeat a defendant’s

motion for summary judgment merely by

denying the credibility of the defendant’s

proffered reason for the challenged

employment action. [] Nor may a plaintiff

create a genuine issue of material fact by

relying solely on the plaintiff’s

subjective belief that the challenged

employment action was unnecessary or

unwarranted. []

Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1029 n.6.

(9th Cir. 2006) (stating that summary judgment is not

appropriate if a reasonable jury could conclude based on a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant took the

challenged action for an unlawful motive). 

To establish that a defendant’s

nondiscriminatory explanation is a pretext

for discrimination, plaintiffs may rely on

circumstantial evidence, which we

previously have said must be “specific” and

“substantial” to create a genuine issue of

material fact ... we have equated

“specific, substantial” evidence with

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine

issue of material fact under Rule 56(c).

Id. at 1029.

VI. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges she was punished for reporting the

harassment because, approximately four months after the

investigation was completed, she was told she was to be demoted.

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Defendant contends that the demotion was related to Plaintiff’s

unsatisfactory performance in her new position and that the

relevant decision-maker, Mr. Guidrey, did not know that

Plaintiff had instigated, or was involved in, the sexual

harassment investigation. Defendant seeks summary judgment

based on the assertion that Plaintiff has not produced

admissible evidence of Mr. Guidrey’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s

protected activity and, therefore, that Plaintiff has failed to

establish her prima facie case of retaliation. Defendant also

contends summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff

presents insufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of

material fact with regard to Defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action

against Plaintiff. 

1. Prima facie case of retaliation

The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish

a prima facie case for Title VII claims on summary judgment is

minimal, i.e., less than a preponderance of the evidence. See

Chuang v. University of Cal., Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115,

1124 (9th Cir. 2000); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885,

889 (9th Cir. 1994). To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff

need only offer evidence giving rise to an inference of an

unlawful motivation for the adverse employment action. See

Raad, 323 F.3d at 1196.

A causal link supporting a prima facie case of

retaliation may be inferred from evidence showing the adverse

action occurred shortly after the employee filed her EEOC

charge. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir.

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2000); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 505 (9th

Cir. 1989). A causal link may also be inferred from evidence

showing that the employer treated the plaintiff differently from

other employees, or that the employer’s treatment of the

plaintiff changed after the employer learned of their protected

activity. See Raad, 323 F.3d at 1197; Miller, 885 F.2d at 505-

06; Breneman v. Kennecott Corp., 799 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir.

1986); Cohen, 686 F.2d at 797. Additionally, “circumstantial

evidence of a pattern of antagonism following the protected

conduct can also give rise to the inference.” Kachmar v.

SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted). See also Porter v. California

Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2004). When

reaching a decision regarding a motion for summary judgment in

the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, the Court must

examine the totality of the circumstances, and not just the

timing of the protected act and the adverse action, to determine

if an inference of causation is possible. See Coszalter v. City

of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2003).

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff and resolving all reasonable inferences

in her favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has raised a

material issue of fact with regard to her prima facie case of

retaliation. For the purposes of withstanding a motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff has carried her burden of presenting

evidence establishing a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation

by creating a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant’s

motive for taking an adverse employment action against

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2

 Although the Court does not rely on the affiants’ statements

that “everybody” at the company knew of Plaintiff’s involvement as not being

made upon personal knowledge or conclusory, the Court notes that each

affiant, although not on the list of those receiving Ms. Figeley’s report,

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Plaintiff. Although the Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention

that, as a matter of law, one corporate officer’s knowledge of

activity may be imputed to other corporate officers, including

the specific individual officer taking the adverse action,

Plaintiff has presented circumstantial evidence that the

individual taking the adverse action did have knowledge of her

protected activity.

Plaintiff need not prove by a preponderance of the

evidence, at the summary judgment stage, that Mr. Guidrey was

aware of her involvement in the investigation of Mr. Smith; “she

must only produce evidence that would support an inference” that

Mr. Guidrey “was so aware.” Dey v. Colt, 28 F.3d 1446, 1458,

(7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has presented some

evidence that would support an inference that Mr. Guidrey “was

so aware.” Mr. Graham was aware that Plaintiff initiated the

investigation which led to Mr. Smith’s termination and a logical

inference to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, i.e.,

that Mr. Graham and Mr. Guidrey shared information regarding the

branch managers Mr. Guidrey was to supervise, is that Mr. Graham

communicated Plaintiff’s involvement in the investigation to Mr.

Guidrey. Plaintiff presents evidence that the fact that

Plaintiff was the instigator of the investigation into Mr.

Smith’s behavior was not a secret within the company, in part

because both Mr. Smith and Plaintiff made others, including Mr.

Graham, aware of Plaintiff’s involvement.2 Plaintiff has

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knew of Plaintiff’s involvement in the investigation.

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presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the minimal standard

required and to raise a genuine issue of material fact,

regarding Mr. Guidrey’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s protected

activity, for the purpose of defeating Defendant’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law. See Bergene v. Salt River Project

Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.

2001); Dey, 28 F.3d at 1458 & 1461; Hairston v. Gainesville Sun

Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 920 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Although a

defendant’s stated non-discriminatory reasons could potentially

overcome any inference of discrimination or retaliation, the

instant record is not so one-sided and is therefore not

deserving of summary judgment.”). Compare Raad, 323 F.3d at

1197; Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., Inc., 216 F.3d 707, 716

(8th Cir. 2000). 

2. Pretext

“For a plaintiff to survive summary judgment, she must

adduce enough admissable evidence to raise genuine doubt as to

the legitimacy of a defendant’s motive, even if that evidence

does not directly contradict or disprove a defendant’s

articulated reasons for its actions.” Buettner, 216 F.3d at

717. To defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiff must supply evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that the defendant’s proffered non-retaliatory

reason for the adverse action was pretextual in nature. Id.

Although summary judgment in favor of an employer is appropriate

when evidence of the employer’s unlawful intent is “totally

lacking,” it should ordinarily not be granted in cases where the

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plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation

because of the “elusive factual question” of the defendant’s

motivation. Cf. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1377; Schuler v.

Chronicle Broad. Co., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1986).

But see Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th

Cir. 1998) (“a plaintiff at the pretext stage must produce

evidence in addition to that which was sufficient for her prima

facie case in order to rebut the defendant’s showing.”).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that

a plaintiff may meet their burden of production regarding the

pretextual nature of a defendant’s reason for an adverse

employment action and survive summary judgment if they provide

specific and substantial evidence of pretext. See, e.g.,

Derendinger v. Kiewit Constr. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 850, 858 (D.

Alaska 2003), citing Bergene, 272 F.3d at 1142. Indirect

evidence “tends to show that the employer’s proffered legitimate

[] reason ‘is unworthy of credence because it is internally

inconsistent or otherwise not believable.’” Id., quoting

Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127. A plaintiff may create a disputed

issue of fact regarding the pretextual nature of an employer’s

proffered non-discriminatory reason for an adverse action by

specifically refuting facts that allegedly support the

employer’s assertion that the employee’s performance was

deficient. See Dey, 28 F.3d at 1460-61. Cf. Calmat Co. v.

United States Dep’t of Labor, 364 F.3d 1117, 1122-23 (9th Cir.

2004) (upholding finding of illegal motivation given an

unusually severe reaction to a complaint, including suspension

without pay, where other complaints had been treated less

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severely).

Plaintiff has presented specific and substantial

evidence that Defendant’s motive for disciplining or demoting

Plaintiff for failing to accurately forecast figures for two

months was a pretext for retaliating against her for instigating

a sexual harassment investigation. Plaintiff has presented

evidence that at least two other company branch managers who had

missed their monthly income forecasts were not disciplined for

this failure, as was Plaintiff. Plaintiff has stated that,

although Defendant allegedly sought to demote Plaintiff for an

inability to accurately forecast income figures, the assignment

to which Mr. Guidrey suggested she be demoted required she

forecast income figures. Plaintiff presents undisputed evidence

that Defendant had a system of stepped discipline by which

employees were to be corrected for deficient performance, which

system was not employed to address Plaintiff’s alleged

deficiencies in forecasting. Prior to March of 2003, Plaintiff

was viewed by the company as a valuable and accomplished

employee. Additionally, Plaintiff also presents evidence that

Mr. Graham and Mr. Guidrey were different in their treatment of

Plaintiff after Mr. Smith was terminated. 

Plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a genuine

issue of material fact with regard to the pretextual nature of

Defendant’s proffered reason for taking an adverse employment

action against Plaintiff. See Strother v. Southern Cal.

Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1996);

Hairston, 9 F.3d at 920. Although Defendant’s proffered reason

is plausible, taking the facts in the light most favorable to

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Plaintiff, Defendant’s proffered reason for disciplining

Plaintiff for failing to meet her sales forecasts for July and

August of 2003 is also internally inconsistent. Plaintiff has

at least created a genuine issue of material fact with regard to

whether Defendant’s reason for disciplining her for failure to

meet her sales forecasts was a pretext for retaliating against

her for instigating a sexual harassment investigation. 

VII. Conclusion

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff and resolving all reasonable inferences

in her favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has raised a

material issue of fact with regard to her prima facie case of

retaliation. Additionally, Plaintiff has created a genuine issue

of material fact with regard to whether Defendant’s reason for

disciplining her for failure to meet her sales forecasts was a

pretext for retaliating against her for instigating a sexual

harassment investigation. Accordingly, the motion for judgment

as a matter of law in favor of Defendant must be denied.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, Docket No. 31, is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to

strike, Docket No. 50, is denied.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2006.

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