Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00546/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00546-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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17-cv-546 JLS (JLB) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GARY DICKEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. STRAYHORN and D. PARAMO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-546 JLS (JLB)

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

[ECF No. 10] 

On April 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed with the Court a letter requesting that he be 

appointed counsel. (ECF No. 10.) Although not filed properly in the form of a motion, the 

Court construes Plaintiff’s letter as a motion for appointment of counsel.1 Having reviewed 

Plaintiff’s request for counsel in conjunction with the case record, and for the reasons 

below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to meet the criteria for the Court to appoint 

him counsel at this time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED without prejudice. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in § 1983 cases. 

Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the Ninth Circuit has 

 

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In addition, Plaintiff submitted letters on April 24, 2017, and May 5, 2017, regarding his request 

for the appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 8, 10.) The Court construes these letters as supplements to 

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. 

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held that “a court may under ‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent civil 

litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 906 (2010) (quoting Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 

390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom., Gerber v. Agyeman, 545 U.S. 

1128 (2005)). “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must 

consider ‘the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to 

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id.

(quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir.1983)). Neither of these 

considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together. Id. (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Plaintiff’s Likelihood of Success on the Merits of His Claim 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims of excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendant Strayhorn, a clinic officer at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility where 

Plaintiff is incarcerated, used excessive force when he handcuffed Plaintiff, slammed 

Plaintiff to the ground, and then kicked Plaintiff above his right eye with his steel-toed 

boot without provocation. (Id. at 3–7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Paramo, Warden 

of the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, violated his Eighth Amendment rights when 

he allowed Defendant Strayhorn to injure him in the way described above. (Id. at 2.) 

When a prison guard stands accused of using excessive force in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). In analyzing an Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim, courts consider the following factors: (1) the need for application 

of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (3) the extent 

of the injury inflicted; (4) the threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible officials”; 

and (5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. 

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To demonstrate that he has a likelihood of success at trial, Plaintiff must do more 

than merely allege that one of his constitutional rights was violated. He must provide 

evidence to the effect that he has a likelihood of success on the merits of his allegations. 

See Torbert v. Gore, No. 14-cv-2991 BEN (NLS), 2016 WL 1399230, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Apr. 8, 2016) (“A plaintiff that provides no evidence of his likelihood of success at trial 

fails to satisfy the first factor of the [exceptional circumstances] test.”). Here, Plaintiff 

has not offered evidence that supports a likelihood of success on the merits of the 

allegations made in his complaint. Although the medical report that Plaintiff attached to 

his complaint is some evidence of the severity of the injury that Plaintiff suffered (ECF 

No. 1 at 19), the Court has no evidence before it as to how Plaintiff was injured in general, 

much less evidence specifically relating to the other factors relevant to an excessive force 

claim, such as any threat that Defendant Strayhorn reasonably perceived and any need for 

the application of force under the circumstances.2 Without such evidence, the Court 

cannot make a determination that the force Defendant Strayhorn used on Plaintiff, if any, 

was not applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline but was instead 

applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Thus, at 

this early stage of the case, when Defendants have not yet filed a response to Plaintiff’s 

complaint and the parties have not yet engaged in discovery, the Court cannot find that 

Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. See Garcia v. Smith, No. 10-cv1187 AJB (RBB), 2012 WL 2499003, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (denying motion 

for appointment of counsel when it was too early to determine whether any of plaintiff’s 

claims would survive a motion for summary judgment). 

For the reasons above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first 

“exceptional circumstances” factor that would support his request for counsel. 

 

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 Plaintiff admits in the complaint to calling Defendant Strayhorn names and to standing up to face 

Defendant Strayhorn when he approached Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 3–7.) Thus, without any evidence as 

to the extent of Plaintiff’s actions toward Defendant Strayhorn, the Court cannot make a determination as 

to whether any threat that Plaintiff made against Defendant Strayhorn, if any, was perceived reasonably. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Ability to Articulate Claims Without the Assistance of Counsel 

Plaintiff also argues in his motion and supplemental documents that a number of 

circumstances demonstrate that he is unable to articulate his claims pro se. First, Plaintiff 

argues that the Court should appoint him counsel because he does not know how to 

represent himself (ECF No. 6 at 2), he cannot afford an attorney (ECF No. 8 at 1), and he 

is a layman with no legal experience or knowledge (id.). These burdens are common to 

most prisoners representing themselves pro se and do not establish the exceptional 

circumstances that would support the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335–36 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying appointment of counsel 

where plaintiff complained that he had limited access to law library and lacked a legal 

education). 

Second, Plaintiff argues that the Court should appoint him counsel because he 

“take[s] a lot of psych medication” and is “not mentally stable too [sic] put up a fight to 

defendant.” (Id.) While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation, this factor, on its 

own and without a showing that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims, is 

insufficient to demonstrate the type of exceptional circumstances that would necessitate 

the appointment of counsel. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and other filings 

on the docket and finds that any mental disability from which Plaintiff may suffer has not 

prevented him from effectively communicating with the Court. Plaintiff’s filings thus far 

are well written, organized, and clear, and the Court is able to understand Plaintiff’s claims 

and the relief that he seeks. In addition, this case is not extraordinarily complex. It involves 

excessive force Eighth Amendment claims against two defendants, and the facts are fairly 

straightforward. Thus, Plaintiff has shown that despite any mental disability that he may 

suffer, he has been able to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of his case. 

The Court does not doubt that Plaintiff, like most pro se litigants, finds it difficult to 

articulate his claims and would be better served with the assistance of counsel. It is for this 

reason that in the absence of counsel, federal courts employ procedures that are highly 

protective of a pro se litigant’s rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per 

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curiam) (holding that the pleadings of a pro se inmate must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers). In fact, where a plaintiff appears pro 

se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the 

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, as long as a pro se litigant is able to articulate his claims 

in light of the complexity of the issues involved, as Plaintiff is here, the exceptional 

circumstances that might support the appointment of counsel do not exist. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Viewing the exceptional circumstances factors together, Plaintiff has not shown a 

likelihood of success on the merits of his case or that he cannot articulate his claims and 

litigate this action pro se. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established the exceptional 

circumstances required for the appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), 

and Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 10) is DENIED. This denial is 

without prejudice, however, and Plaintiff is therefore not precluded from requesting the 

appointment of counsel at a later stage in this case, should he be able to make the requisite 

showing of exceptional circumstances at that time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 25, 2017

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