Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00114/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00114-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENITO AGUILAR,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

KIM HOLLAND, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:16-cv-00114-LJO-GSA-PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE 

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE, WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

(ECF No. 1.)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

Benito Aguilar (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. on January 25, 2016, Plaintiff 

filed the Complaint commencing this action, which is now before the Court for screening. 

(ECF No. 1.) 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are 

taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.

III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at Folsom State Prison in Represa, California, in the 

custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The events in the 

Complaint allegedly occurred at three different prisons, during the time period when Plaintiff 

was incarcerated there: (1) California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California; (2) 

Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California; and (3) Pelican Bay State Prison in Crescent 

City, California. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, which consists of 135 pages including exhibits, contains multiple 

incidents that occur over a period of several years, against fifty defendants, and appear to be 

unrelated. The Court will not summarize all of the allegations in the Complaint since it entails 

a variety of apparently unrelated claims that would not present a cohesive basis for analysis.

For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint shall be dismissed for failure to comply 

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff shall be given the opportunity to file an 

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amended complaint curing the deficiencies described by the Court in this order. In the 

paragraphs that follow, the Court will provide Plaintiff with the legal standards that appear to 

apply to his claims. Plaintiff should carefully review the standards and amend only those 

claims that he believes, in good faith, are cognizable.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Rules 18 and 20

A basic lawsuit is a single claim against a single defendant. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 18(a) allows a plaintiff to add multiple claims to the lawsuit when they are against 

the same defendant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple 

defendants to a lawsuit where the right to relief arises out of the same “transaction, occurrence, 

or series of transactions” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise 

in the action.” However, unrelated claims that involve different defendants must be brought in 

separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is not 

only intended to avoid confusion that arises out of bloated lawsuits, but also to ensure that 

prisoners pay the required filing fees for their lawsuits and prevent prisoners from 

circumventing the three strikes rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g).

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains multiple incidents that occur over a period of several 

years involving claims of violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff attempts to bring suit 

against fifty defendants. Plaintiff is advised that his claims do not arise out of the same

“transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions.” The incidents described do not involve 

common questions of fact or law. Many incidents occurred in different years and involved 

different defendants. The facts necessary to prove these claims are unique. Plaintiff is not 

permitted to raise multiple claims in a single action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

20(a)(2) simply because all the incidents occurred by prison officials in the same prison. The 

Court advises Plaintiff that each claim that is raised in his amended complaint must be

permitted by either Rule 18 or Rule 20. Plaintiff may state a single claim against a single 

defendant. Plaintiff may then add any additional claims to his action that are against the same 

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defendant under Rule 18. Plaintiff may also add any additional claims against other defendants 

if those claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions as his 

original claim. Plaintiff is advised that a claim does not arise from a common transaction, 

occurrence, or series of transactions merely by alleging retaliation. Any attempt to join claims 

that are not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may result in those claims being 

dismissed or transferred to another court, as improperly joined.

B. Rule 8

The Court advises Plaintiff of the following requirements under the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure regarding the general formatting of his Complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(d)(1). A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, 

each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 10(b). The function of the complaint is not to list every single fact relating to 

Plaintiff’s claims. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is not in compliance with Rule 8(a), the Court 

declines to expend its already taxed resources with attempting to sort out his claims. Plaintiff 

must submit a complaint to the Court that meets the requirements of Rule 8.

C. Supervisory Liability and Personal Participation

Plaintiff has named defendants who hold supervisory positions. Plaintiff is advised that 

“[l]iability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the 

defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each 

defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff=s constitutional rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, to the 

extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability upon any of the defendants in their supervisory 

capacity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 

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Thus, under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002) (emphasis added). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his or her 

own individual actions, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

D. Eighth Amendment Claims

“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions 

under which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” 

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 

(1994). However, the Eighth Amendment is not a mandate for broad prison reform or 

excessive federal judicial involvement. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745 (9th Cir. 

2002). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and 

harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 

1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996); Jordan v. 

Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Prison officials must, however, 

provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other 

grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 

731 (9th Cir. 2000); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).

1. Adverse Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions 

of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 847 and Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of 

confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and 

unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) 

(quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological 

purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 

society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and 

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citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. 

at 346. However, not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in prison represents a 

constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). 

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 

554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference standard 

involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in 

objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[R]outine discomfort 

inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Johnson, 

217 F.3d at 731. Rather, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of 

confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). The 

circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in determining whether the 

conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment 

claim. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] 

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison 

official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of 

confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that 

risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Mere negligence on the 

part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct 

must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.

2. Medical Claim

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part 

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test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’ by 

demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to 

the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 

104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)). Deliberate 

indifference is shown by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible 

medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). 

Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally 

interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians 

provide medical care.” Id. Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, 

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of 

State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ 

but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). 

“‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not 

violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A showing of medical 

malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the 

Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1060. “[E]ven gross negligence is insufficient to establish a 

constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 

1990)). 

“A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities 

regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 

1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, a plaintiff “must show that the 

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course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . 

and . . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s 

health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

E. Due Process -- Inmate Appeals Process

Plaintiff alleges that some defendants failed to respond properly to his inmate appeals. 

Defendants’ actions in responding to Plaintiff’s appeals, alone, cannot give rise to any claims 

for relief under section 1983 for violation of due process. “[A prison] grievance procedure is a 

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. 

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 

(N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty 

interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); 

Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure 

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

“Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections 

envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 

F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal, 

without more, are not actionable under section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

F. Due Process—Property Deprivation

The Due Process Clause is not violated by the random, unauthorized deprivation of 

property so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 

468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 

1994). Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law, and therefore, 

he may not pursue a due process claim arising out of the unlawful confiscation of his personal 

property. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895).

G. First Amendment—Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 

532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt 

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v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of 

First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took 

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and 

that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the 

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 

2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

H. Venue for Claims Arising at Pelican Bay State Prison

Plaintiff’s claims arise from events occurring at California Correctional Institution in 

Tehachapi, California; Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California; and Pelican Bay State 

Prison in Crescent City, California. Plaintiff’s claims arising out of events at the California 

Correctional Institution and Corcoran State Prison are proper in this district. However, venue 

for Plaintiff’s claims arising out of events at Pelican Bay State Prison is not proper in this 

district, and those claims may not be pursued in this action. If Plaintiff includes claims arising 

at Pelican Bay State Prison in the First Amended Complaint, the Court shall dismiss or transfer 

them. See Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (court may raise defective 

venue sua sponte); see also Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(courts have broad discretion regarding severance). 

I. Denial of Access to Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts and prison 

officials may not actively interfere with Plaintiff’s right to litigate. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 346 (1996); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts have traditionally 

differentiated between two types of access claims, those involving the right to affirmative 

assistance, and those involving inmate’s right to litigate without active interference. Silva v. 

De Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (emphasis added). The right to assistance is limited to direct 

criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (emphasis 

added).

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Prisoners have the right to pursue claims without active interference that have a 

reasonable basis in law or fact. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103–04 ((finding that repeatedly 

transferring the plaintiff to different prisons and seizing and withholding all of his legal files 

constituted active interference). Mere inconvenience to Plaintiff resulting from lost, misplaced, 

or confiscated legal documents will not suffice to support a constitutional claim. Id. at 1103–

04. Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 

Law libraries and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. 

Id. Because inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal 

assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s 

law library or legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense.” Id.

Defendants’ actions must have been the proximate cause of actual prejudice to Plaintiff. 

Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103–04. To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must show that he 

suffered an actual injury, which requires “actual prejudice to contemplated or existing 

litigation” by being shut out of court. Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348, 351); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 

(2002); Phillips, 588 F.3d at 655. The complaint should state the underlying claim in 

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), just as if it were being independently 

pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any remedy available under the access 

claim and presently unique to it. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

As discussed in detail above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to follow the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a 

First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies described in this order. 

The amended complaint should be brief, but must state what each named defendant did 

that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. There is no respondeat superior liability, 

and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its 

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face.’” Id. at 677 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that 

each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 

(emphasis added). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 (citations 

omitted).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purpose of adding issues arising after January 25, 2016. Plaintiff is cautioned that he 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).

With respect to exhibits, while they are permissible, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), they are not 

necessary in the federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Court strongly 

suggests to Plaintiff that they should not be submitted where (1) they serve only to confuse the 

record and burden the Court, or (2) they are intended as future evidence. If this action reaches 

a juncture at which the submission of evidence is appropriate and necessary (e.g., summary 

judgment or trial), Plaintiff will have the opportunity at that time to submit his evidence. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that it is not the duty of the court to look through all of his exhibits to 

determine whether or not he has claims cognizable under § 1983. Rather, the court looks to the 

factual allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether or not Plaintiff has 

stated a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983. 

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the prior complaints, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleadings, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in 

an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 

titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original 

signed under penalty of perjury. 

///

///

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on January 25, 2016, is dismissed for violation of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file 

a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this 

order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and 

refer to the case number 1:16-cv-00114-LJO-GSA-PC; 

5. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via his amended 

complaint and any attempt to do so will result in an order striking the amended 

complaint; and

6. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order shall result in a recommendation that 

this action be dismissed in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2016 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00114-LJO-GSA Document 12 Filed 11/14/16 Page 12 of 12