Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01605/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01605-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY J. WAYNE, CDCR #T-20904; 

NGUYEN, Civil

No. 07-1605 JM (BLM)

Plaintiffs, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF

WAYNE’S MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, ASSESSING NO INITIAL

PARTIAL FILING FEE AND

GARNISHING $350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 5]; AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT AS FRIVOLOUS

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1).

vs.

O’LEAL, Correctional Officer

Defendant.

Plaintiff Tony Wayne, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility in San Diego, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing

fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; instead, he has filed a

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding

in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus,

must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite

a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir.

1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any

reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six

months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months,

whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must collect

subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff Wayne has submitted an affidavit which complies

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff

Wayne’s trust account statement shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay

filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall

a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which

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to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based

solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Wayne’s Motion to Proceed IFP

[Doc. No. 5] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and

forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Plaintiff’s Representation 

It appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that he is seeking to represent an

additional Plaintiff who is only identified as “Nguyen.” There is no other information

with regard to Plaintiff Nguyen, Plaintiff Nguyen did not sign the Complaint, nor did

Plaintiff Nguyen file a Motion to Proceed IFP. To the extent that Plaintiff Wayne seeks

to represent Nguyen, he has no standing, for pro se litigants have no authority to represent

the interests of anyone other than themselves. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)

(“Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the

complaining party.... A federal court’s jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when

the plaintiff himself has suffered some threatened or actual injury.”) (quotations and

citation omitted); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997); see

also C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding

that while a nonattorney may represent himself, he has no authority to appear as an

attorney for others). Thus, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff Nguyen from this action for

failing to sign the Complaint and file a Motion to Proceed IFP. 

III. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

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criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss

any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th

Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua

sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130.

An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now

mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own

motion to dismiss before effecting service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte

screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of process is made on the

opposing parties”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting

that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro

se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th

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Cir. 1988), which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements

upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct

at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. §

1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v.

Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth with any specificity any allegations of a

denial of his constitutional rights. The allegations that are made in the Complaint are

virtually incomprehensible. Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant O’Leal “committed

terrorist acts on Plaintiff Wayne” on August 27, 2006. (Compl. at 1.) In addition,

Plaintiff claims that this can be proven by the use of the “Track and Record Surveillance”

otherwise known as “TARS.” (Id.) There are no other allegations in Plaintiff’s one page

Complaint. To the extent that Plaintiff intends these allegations to support an

independent constitutional claim for relief under section 1983, the Court finds they are

frivolous. A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

claims to be frivolous under 1915(e)(2)(B) because they lack even “an arguable basis

either in law or in fact,” and appear “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 325, 328.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff Nguyen is DISMISSED from this action; 

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(2) Plaintiff Wayne’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

is GRANTED.

(3) The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance

of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account

in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited

to the account and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED

TO THIS ACTION.

(4) The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James

Tilton, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(5) Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as frivolous

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” in

which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not

named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have

been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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