Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02315/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02315-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS D. MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; 

THOMAS TIDWELL, Chief, United States 

Forest Service; and NANCY J. GIBSON, 

Forest Supervisor, United States Forest 

Service,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-02315-TLN-AC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT AND 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL 

COMPLAINT

Pending are motions in which Plaintiff Dennis Murphy and Defendants United States 

Forest Service; Tom Tidwell, who is sued in his official capacity as Chief of the Forest Service; 

and Nancy Gibson, who is sued in her official capacity as Forest Supervisor (collectively, “the 

Forest Service”) take opposite positions on whether “live issues [remain in this action that] supply 

the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 

497 (1969) (citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges in his Second Amended Complaint (SAC) that 

the Forest Service’s Upper Echo Lakes Hazardous Fuels Reduction Project (the “Project”) 

violates provisions of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA). The Forest Service argues this action should be dismissed as moot under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) since “the [P]roject has been withdrawn and 

the Forest Service has unequivocally stated that no further activity may take place on the 

[P]roject.” (P. & A. ISO Mot. to Dismiss as Moot (“Mot.”) 1:19–20, ECF No. 61-1.) Plaintiff 

opposes, arguing the motion should be denied since his “claims present a live, ongoing 

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controversy as to which the Court may grant effective relief.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. (“Opp’n”)

1:16–18, ECF No. 62 (footnote omitted).) 

I. BACKGROUND

The Forest Service alleges: “In November 2012, the Forest Service approved the . . . 

Project to reduce fire risk to the Eldorado National Forest and area cabin owners, such as 

Plaintiff.” (Mot. 1:23–25.) It further alleges: “The [P]roject was set to proceed in several 

phases.” (Mot. 2:7.) The parties agree that “[t]he first phase [(‘Phase One’)]—on the Northeast 

side of Echo Lake . . .—was completed in November 2013.” (Mot. 2:7–9; Opp’n 2:9–10.) The 

Forest Service states in its brief that thereafter, the Project was withdrawn on July 20, 2015,

“[d]ue to winter weather, budget constraints, and other priorities,” and consequently “the second 

phase of the [P]roject [(‘Phase Two’)] . . . never began.” (Mot. 2:10–12.)1

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to the consideration of “cases” and 

“controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “[F]ederal courts are without power to decide 

questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” N.C. v. Rice, 404 U.S. 

244, 246 (1971) (citation omitted). The focus of a mootness inquiry “is whether there can be any 

effective relief.” Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 

omitted). A case is not moot if “changes can still be made to help alleviate any adverse effects” 

of the injury suffered by plaintiff. Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).

However, “[a] case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the 

allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. 

Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). Further, “defendants in NEPA 

cases face a particularly heavy burden in establishing mootness.” Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 678; see 

also Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 170 (“The heavy burden of persuading the court that 

the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur lies with the party asserting 

 

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Plaintiff does not counter in his opposing brief the Forest Service’s averments and brief statement 

concerning why it withdrew the Project.

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mootness.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

The Forest Service seeks dismissal of this action on mootness grounds, arguing “Courts 

have often held that cases are moot when an agency withdraws its decision to proceed with a 

project.” (Mot. 4:2–3.) It further argues: 

Because the notice of withdrawal states that “No further activity 

will occur on this [P]roject,” there is nothing for the Court to do and 

no relief for the Court to order. Simply put, nothing can occur on 

the ground based upon prior approvals. . . . The withdrawal means 

the Forest Service is without legal authority to take action on this 

[P]roject, and any new [P]roject would have to be authorized by 

new authority, which would be subject to judicial review in the 

ordinary course.

(Mot. 4:15–23 (internal citations omitted).) 

In response, Plaintiff argues that although the Forest Service has withdrawn its decision to 

proceed with the Project, “[P]hase [O]ne of the Project has already been completed” which 

“increase[d] the fire risk” and “resulted in slash piles[, i.e., piles of tree and vegetation cuttings,] 

throughout the Project area.” (Opp’n 9:7–12.) Plaintiff relies on a number of cases wherein 

completion of a federally-authorized project did not render the action moot. For example, in 

Cantrell, defendants argued the case was moot since the historic buildings and habitat had already 

been destroyed. Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 678. The court found that “if required to undertake 

additional environmental review, the defendants could consider alternatives to the current reuse 

plan, and develop ways to mitigate the damage to the birds’ habitat by, for example, creating new 

nesting and foraging areas on the land that was formerly the station or utilizing other nearby land 

for mitigation purposes.” Id. at 678–79.

Plaintiff argues that effective relief can still be granted:

If the [Forest] Service is ordered to comply with NEPA, [it] would 

understand fully the environmental implications of its decisions, 

including any decision to proceed with, alter, or withdraw the 

Project prior to completion. After preparing an [Environmental 

Assessment] EA or [Environmental Impact Statement] EIS, the 

[Forest] Service could determine that mitigation is required to offset 

the damage that has resulted from the cutting of green, living brush 

and trees to create flammable, dry slash piles, it could determine 

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that those slash piles should be removed, or it could reach some 

other conclusion (for example, that actions should be taken to 

protect yellow-legged frog habitat or wetlands, or that monitoring 

should be initiated to assess the potential for ongoing effects of the 

Project on those resources).

(Opp’n 8:17–25 (footnote omitted).)

Although the Forest Service alleges it has withdrawn the entire Project, the parties’ agree

that the Forest Service has completed Phase One and withdrawn Phase Two. The Ninth Circuit 

has held that an agency’s completion of a project does not moot a challenge to the project. For 

example, the plaintiffs in Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 

585, 590 (9th Cir. 1981), sought “to enjoin the construction of a 500 kilovolt power transmission 

line across their lands” and challenged the sufficiency of an EIS prepared to review the line’s 

environmental effects. By the time of the appeal, “[a]ll 191 towers required for the line ha[d] 

been erected and the line” was operational. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded the case was not 

moot, reasoning: “The building of the towers has not made the case hypothetical or abstract 

[since] the towers still cross the fields of the Landowners, continually obstructing their irrigation 

systems and this Court has the power to decide if they may stay or if they may have to be 

removed.” Id. at 591 n.1; accord Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 

1065–66 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding challenge to timber sale not moot although logging was 

complete since the court could mitigate the impact).

Further, if withdrawal of a partially completed project rendered a case moot, an agency 

“could merely ignore the requirements of NEPA, [withdraw a project divided into two phases 

after completing the first phase] before a case gets to court, and then hide behind the mootness 

doctrine.” Columbia Basin, 643 F.2d at 591 n.1. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Columbia Basin,

“[s]uch a result is not acceptable.” Id.; see also West v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 

925–26 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The fact that [the first stage] of the interchange [project] has been 

constructed and is operational is insufficient to render the case moot.” (footnote omitted)).

Moreover, effective relief is still available to remedy ongoing harm to Plaintiff’s interests

and includes remanding for additional environmental review. “ Remand [to the agency to act in 

compliance with its statutory obligations] is usually the appropriate remedy in [cases alleging 

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agency action was ‘arbitrary and capricious’ in violation of APA] § 706(2) . . . .” Pinnacle 

Armor, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-01655 LJO, 2012 WL 2994111, at *10 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 

July 20, 2012) (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 420 F.3d 946, 978 (9th 

Cir. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 

U.S. 644 (2007)). If the Forest Service is required to undertake additional environmental review, 

it could consider ways to mitigate damage incurred on the Northeast side of Echo Lake during 

Phase One. See Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 678–79; Slockish v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin., 682 F. 

Supp. 2d 1178, 1198 (D. Or. 2010) (“The court does have the power to order defendants to carry 

out additional review of the alleged cultural and historical resources in the project area in 

compliance with[,] . . . [inter alia], NEPA . . . .”). 

B. Leave to File Supplemental Complaint

On September 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion under Rule 15(d) for leave to supplement 

his Complaint. (Notice of Mot. & Mot. for Leave to File Supplemental Compl., ECF No. 60.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to incorporate facts concerning the Forest Service’s “partial 

implementation of the Project” into its current claims under NEPA and the APA, and to add a 

claim alleging “the Forest Service’s . . . decision to withdraw its 2012 decision authorizing the

Project violates NEPA because the agency implemented an action that was not subject to any

environmental review.” (Mem. P. & A. ISO Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Supplemental Compl. 

(“Leave Mot.”) 1:1–12, ECF No. 60-1.) The Forest Service opposes the motion, arguing, inter 

alia, “Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because it addresses the liberal Rule 15 standard rather 

than the stricter Rule 16 standard.” (Opp’n to Leave Mot. 3:3–4, ECF No. 63.) This Court 

agrees.

Because Plaintiff does not address in his opening brief the “good cause” standard that 

governs a request to amend provisions of the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order (“Order”) filed on 

April 28, 2014, this motion is denied. (ECF No. 58.)2Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to address 

 

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“The Ninth Circuit has not addressed specifically whether a party seeking to file a supplemental complaint 

under Rule 15(d)—as [Plaintiff] asserts here—must meet Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard to modify the scheduling 

order where the motion to supplement is filed after the deadline for amending the complaint, and the district courts 

that have addressed the question are split.” TaiMed Biologics, Inc. v. Numoda Corp., No. C 10-03260 LB, 2011 WL 

1630041, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Global Bldg. Sys. v. Brandes, No. CV–07–1065–PHX–DGC, 

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whether any supplement to his Complaint can be effected without amending the Order. Plaintiff 

addresses Rule 16’s “good cause” standard for the first time in his reply brief. However, “[t]he 

district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani v. 

Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, this argument is disregarded.

To prevail, Plaintiff must first satisfy Rule 16’s “good cause” standard before seeking to 

amend and/or supplement the Complaint under Rule 15. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Once the district court . . . file[s] a pretrial 

scheduling order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 which establishe[s] a timetable 

for amending pleadings that rule’s [‘good cause’] standard[] control[s].”). Since Plaintiff has 

failed to demonstrate that good cause justifies amending the Order, Plaintiff’s motion filed on 

September 15, 2016 is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, the Forest Service’s motion to dismiss is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to supplement his Complaint is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2016

 

2008 WL 477876, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2008) (collecting cases)).

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