Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00168/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

---

Count 1 of the indictment alleged that Robinson, having been previously convicted of 1

several felony offenses, did knowingly possess in and affecting commerce firearms, to-wit: (1) a

Norinco, model Mak-90, 7.62mm rifle; (2) a Mossberg, 28- inch Accu-Choke 12 gauge shotgun; (3)

a Lorcin, model L-380, .380 caliber pistol; (4) a Remington, model 510, .22 caliber rifle; (5) a

Marlin, model 110M, .22 caliber rifle; (6) an Ithaca, 12 gauge shotgun; (7) a Mossberg, model 500

AG, 12 gauge shotgun; (8) a Marlin, model 60W, .22 caliber rifle; (9) a Smith and Wesson, model

442, .38 caliber revolver; (10) an SWD Derringer, model DD45, .45 caliber firearm; and (11) a

Weihrauch-Sport silencer- Nur fur “F.”

Count 2 of the indictment alleged that Robinson and his wife, Karen Kilgo Robinson, aided

and abetted each other by possessing firearms, firearm silencers, and destructive devices, to-wit: (1)

(continued...)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ADAM LAMAR ROBINSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:08cv168-MEF

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on a motion by federal inmate Adam Lamar Robinson

(“Robinson”) to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 25, 2007, in accordance with a plea agreement, Robinson pled guilty to both

counts of a two-count indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 1), and possession of an unregistered firearm,

in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d) & 5871 (Count 2). On October 30, 2007, the 1

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 1 of 19
(...continued) 1

a Weihrauch-Sport silencer- Nur fur “F”; (2) a metal cylindrical device approximately 12 inches x

1 3/4 inches; (3) a metal cylindrical device approximately 6 1/4 inches x 2 inches; (4) a metal

cylindrical device approximately 4 1⁄2 inches x 1 1⁄2 inches, all designed as a firearm muffler or

silencer; (5) a 1 1⁄2 inch nominal diameter metal pipe measuring 6 inches in length containing a

mixture of Hodgdon brand Pyrodex P and disc-shaped double base smokeless powder; (6) a 2-inch

nominal diameter metal pipe measuring 6 inches in length containing 148 grams of zinc plated BBs

and approximately 189 grams of 3/8 inch steel hunting shot and a mixture of Hodgdon brand

Pyrodex P and disc-shaped double base smokeless powder; (7) a 2-inch plastic shell containing a

primer and twelve 3/8 diameter steel hunting shot pellets and a mixture of Hodgdon brand Pyrodex

P and discshaped double base smokeless powder; and (8) a 2-inch plastic shell containing a primer

and 100 grams of zinc-plated BBs and a mixture of Hodgdon brand Pyrodex P and disc-shaped

double base smokeless powder, all designed as a destructive device, not registered in the National

Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. As part of the plea agreement, the government agreed

to move to dismiss all pending federal charges against Robinson’s wife at Robinson’s sentencing.

Although the § 2255 motion was date-stamped “received” in this court on March 11, 2008, 2

it was signed by Robinson on March 6, 2008. Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se inmate’s petition

is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing, presumptively the date it is

signed by the petitioner. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173

F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999). th

2

district court sentenced Robinson to 64 months in prison. Robinson did not appeal his

convictions or sentence. On March 6, 2008, Robinson, acting pro se, filed a § 2255 motion

(Doc. No. 1) asserting the following claims: 2

1. The warrant for the search of his residence did not identify the

place to be searched or the property to be seized with sufficient

particularity. 

2. His counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue

that the search warrant for his residence did not identify the

place to be searched or the property to be seized with sufficient

particularity.

3. He was not guilty of the offense charged in Count 2 of the

indictment because he never possessed the firearm silencer

listed in that count.

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 2 of 19
The claims in Robinson’s pleadings overlap in places, are repetitive, and are not always 3

presented in a clear and logical fashion. For organizational and analytical purposes, this court has

recast some of Robinson’s claims in a more appropriate presentation.

3

(§ 2255 Motion - Doc. No. 1 & Affidavit - Doc. No. 1-2.)

Robinson later amended his § 2255 motion to assert additional claims that his counsel

was ineffective for (a) failing to adequately consult with him prior to the suppression

hearing, failing to apprise him of his pretrial preparation, and failing to forward any

discovery materials to him; (b) failing to interview witnesses or his family members or to

conduct any other form of investigation; and (c) failing to conduct an adequate review of the

documentary evidence in the case. (Doc. No. 19.) 3

The United States answers that Robinson’s claims are either procedurally barred or

without merit. (Doc. Nos. 4 & 27.) Robinson was allowed an opportunity to respond to the

government’s answer and did so. (Doc. Nos. 15 & 29.) After due consideration of

Robinson’s § 2255 motion, all supporting and opposing submissions, and the record in this

case, the court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required and that, pursuant to

Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts,

the motion should be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Substantive Claims

Robinson presents the following two substantive claims in his § 2255 motion: (1)

the warrant for the search of his residence did not identify the place to be searched or the

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4

property to be seized with sufficient particularity; and (2) he was not guilty of the offense

charged in Count 2 of the indictment because he never possessed the firearm silencer listed

in that count. (See § 2255 Motion - Doc. No. 1 at p. 6 & Affidavit - Doc. No. 1-2 at p. 4.)

Because, he did not appeal his convictions or sentence, Robinson obviously did not

raise these substantive claims in a direct appeal. Ordinarily, if an available claim is not

advanced on direct appeal, it is deemed procedurally barred in a § 2255 proceeding unless

a petitioner can show both cause for the failure to raise the claim on direct appeal and actual

prejudice arising from that failure. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68

(1982); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (11 Cir. 1994); Greene v. United th

States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1305 (11 Cir. 1989). Robinson appears to assert ineffective th

assistance of counsel as “cause” excusing his failure to raise his substantive claims prior to

filing his § 2255 motion. (Doc. No. 15 at p. 1.) In addition, he also asserts an independent

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to challenge the

alleged deficiencies of the search warrant in the motion to suppress litigated in the trial

court. (See § 2255 Motion - Doc. No. 1 at p. 5 & Affidavit - Doc. No. 1-2.) Accordingly,

this court will address Robinson’s underlying substantive claims in the context of his related

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. These and all of Robinson’s allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed below in this Recommendation.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists to protect the fundamental right to a fair

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5

trial. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy

both prongs of the testset forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). The performance prong requires a petitioner to establish that counsel performed

outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and made errors so serious that

he failed to function as the kind of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at

687-89. The prejudice prong requires a petitioner to demonstrate that seriously deficient

performance of his counsel prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687.

Under the performance component of the Strickland inquiry, a petitioner must

establish that his attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “The proper measure of attorney performance

remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. In other words,

criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal

assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687). In any ineffective assistance analysis, scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly

deferential,” and the court indulges a “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was

reasonable. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11 Cir. 2000); see Rogers v.

th

Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11 Cir. 1994). Review of an ineffective assistance of counsel

th

claim is conducted from the perspective of defense counsel based on facts “as they were

known to counsel at the time of the representation.” United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d

1525, 1535 (11 Cir. 1992). The court will “avoid second-guessing counsel’s performance:

th

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It does not follow that any counsel who takes an approach [the court] would not have chosen

is guilty of rendering ineffective assistance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted). Thus, “[g]iven the strong presumption in favor of competence, the petitioner’s

burden of persuasion – though the presumption is not insurmountable – is a heavy one.” Id.

Under the prejudice component of Strickland, a petitioner must show that “there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The

prejudice prong does not focus only on the outcome; rather, to establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient representation rendered the result of the trial

fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)

(“[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether

the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.”).

“Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive

the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him.” Id. at

372.

Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both prongs of the Strickland

inquiry, relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, once a court

decides that one of the requisite showings has not been made, it need not decide whether the

other one has been. Id. at 697 (A court need not “address both components of the inquiry

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 6 of 19
All of Robinson’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are levied against attorney 4

Goggans, who represented Robinson through the early phase of the case, including litigation of a

motion to suppress the government’s evidence. On May 31, 2007, Goggans filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel for Robinson; that motion was granted on June 8, 2007.

Following Goggans’s withdrawal from the case, attorney Evertt M. Urech filed a notice of

appearance as counsel for Robinson on June 12, 2007. On July 23, 2007, Robinson filed a notice

of his intent to change plea, and on July 25, 2007, Robinson, represented by Urech, entered his guilty

plea. Urech also represented Robinson at sentencing. Robinson does not present any claims

concerning the representation provided by Urech.

7

if the [movant] makes an insufficient showing on one.”); Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655,

660 (11 Cir. 1998) (“[I]f a defendant cannotsatisfy the prejudice prong, the court need not th

address the performance prong.”).

1. Particularity of Search Warrant

Robinson contendsthat the warrantfor the search of his residence did not identify the

place to be searched or the property to be seized with sufficient particularity and that his

counsel, attorney Thomas M. Goggans, was ineffective for failing to assert this argument 4

in the motion to suppress the government’s evidence. (See § 2255 Motion - Doc. No. 1 at

pp. 5-6 & Affidavit - Doc. No. 1-2.)

The Fourth Amendment prohibits the issuance of a search warrant except on

“‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’”

U.S. Const. Amend. IV; see, e.g., United States v. Wuagneaux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th

Cir. 1982). In evaluating the description of the place to be searched, “it is enough if the

description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort[,]

ascertain and identify the place intended.” Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 7 of 19
8

Further, “[a] description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably

ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.” Wuagneaux, 683 F.2d at 1348;

see, e.g., United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 754-55 (11 Cir. 1982). “The manifest th

purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches.” Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). This does not, however, require the warrant’s

description of the place to be searched to meet technical requirements. Rather, “[t]he

warrant need only describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity to direct the

searcher, to confine his examination to the place described, and to advise those being

searched of his authority.” United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11 Cir. 1986); th

see also United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701, 703 (11 Cir. 1992). th

In this case, Attachment A of the search warrant specifically described the place to

be searched as follows:

ATTACHMENT A

DESCRIPTION OF THINGS TO BE SEARCHED 

The Premises

The Premises of Adam Lamar Robinson 

Address: 1708 Formosa Court

including all outbuildings and appurtenances thereto

in the City of Deatsville 

in the County of Autauga

in the Middle District of Alabama

....

Premises’ Physical Description

Stories - 1 

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 8 of 19
9

Construction Type – Brick 

Color - Red with green shutters

Garage/Carport – Attached carport on right side of residence. Shed in the rear yard

of the residence, tan in color

(Doc. No. 27 - Gov. Exh. B at p. 7.).

The items to be seized were described with particularity in Attachment B of the

search warrant, as follows:

ATTACHMENT B

DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE TO BE SEARCHED FOR AND SEIZED

FIREARMS

One Weihrauch Silencer, no serial number

Any firearms and/or ammunition as defined in Title 18, Chapter 44, Section 921.

DOCUMENTS

All documents and/or data relating to the possession, transfer or purchase of firearms,

to include computer equipment and or phone records.

INDICIA OF CONTROL OF THE PREMISES

Records that establish the persons who have control, possession, custody or dominion

over the property and vehicles searched and from which evidence seized, such as:

personal mail, checkbooks, personal identification, notes, other correspondence,

utility bills, rent receipts, payment receipts, financial documents, keys, photographs

(developed or undeveloped), leases, mortgage bills, and vehicle registration

information or ownership warranties, receipts for vehicle parts and repairs and

telephone answering machine introductions and fingerprints.

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 9 of 19
In response to this and other allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel presented in 5

Robinson’s § 2255 motion, attorney Goggans filed an affidavit explaining, in pertinent part, that

while he did file a suppression motion challenging, among other things, the search of Robinson’s

residence, he “did not assert all of the grounds urged by Mr. Robinson inasmuch as they were

inapposite, meritless or frivolous.” (Doc. No. 3 at p. 2.) 

10

(Doc. No. 27 - Gov. Exh. B at p. 8.). 

Here, the residence to be searched (Robinson’s) was identified by its exact address

and by a physical description of the residence itself. Such description was sufficiently

particular so that the officers with the search warrant could, with reasonable effort, ascertain

and identify the place intended. Further, the items to be seized were also described with

sufficient particularity to enable the searchersto reasonably ascertain and identify the things

they were authorized to be seized. Despite Robinson’s suggestion to the contrary, the

descriptions in the search warrant were more than sufficient to meet Fourth Amendment

requirements. As such, there was no basis for Robinson’s counsel to challenge the search

warrant on the grounds asserted by Robinson. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to 5

raise or pursue a meritless issue. See Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11 Cir. 2001); th

United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11 Cir. 1992). Therefore, Robinson is not th

entitled to any relief based on this claim.

2. Guilt as to Count 2 of the Indictment

Robinson maintains that he was not guilty of the offense charged in Count 2 of the

indictment because he never actually possessed the firearm silencer listed in that count. (See

Affidavit - Doc. No. 1-2 at p. 6; Doc. No. 15 at p. 6.) He then converts this otherwise

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 10 of 19
Robinson’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) summarizes the offense conduct as

6

follows:

On June 1, 2006, U.S. Customs and Border Protection in Chicago, Illinois,

intercepted a parcel coming from Maulburg, Germany. The parcel was destined for

Adam Robinson at 1708 Formosa Court, Deatsville, Alabama 36022. Upon further

investigation, the parcel was determined to be a Weihrauch silencer for a firearm.

On June 2, 2006, the parcel was transferred to Special Agent Timothy Fitzpatrick

with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Agent

Fitzpatrick then determined that the silencer had no serial number, Robinson had not

registered the silencer and any other firearm with the National Firearms Registration

and Transfer Record, and that Adam Robinson was convicted of several felony

offenses that were previously described in the indictment and are outlined in the

defendant’s criminal history. Based on this information, Agent Fitzpatrick obtained

a search warrant for Robinson’s residence and scheduled a controlled delivery of the

mail parcel containing the silencer to Robinson’s residence.

On June 15, 2006, Agent Fitzpatrick and other agents with ATF, United States Postal

Inspection Service, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated a controlled

delivery by placing the parcel in the mailbox of 1708 Formosa Court, Deatsville,

Alabama 36022. A short time later, Karen Kilgo Robinson exited the residence,

retrieved the parcel, and returned to the residence. Agent Fitzpatrick and others then

approached the residence and made contact with Karen Robinson, the defendant’s

wife. Karen Robinson advised her husband was at work and her son, Chad, was

visiting his grandmother in Decatur, Alabama. Agent Fitzpatrick then advised her

of her rights and she agreed to be interviewed. When asked about the parcel

containing the silencer, Karen Robinson stated she was not familiar with the silencer,

that she did not order it, and was unaware if her husband ordered it. While being

questioned about firearms located at their residence, Karen Robinson stated she

(continued...)

11

procedurally defaulted claim into an allegation of ineffective of assistance of counsel,

asserting that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise such a claim. (See Doc. No. 15

at pp. 1-2.)

In contending that he was not guilty under Count 2, Robinson asserts that only his

wife – and not he – was ever in actual possession of the firearm silencer that was delivered

to his residence. Robinson’s argument is not well taken. First, Count 2 of the 6

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 11 of 19
(...continued) 6

owned a pistol that she had purchased from a pawn shop and it was located in the

night stand by her bed. She further advised there was a shotgun in the office. When

the agents were recovering the firearms, Karen Robinson, was unable identify them

and stated that her father passed away in 2000 and she acquired some of the firearms

from him. When asked about the contents in the shed located near the residence,

Karen Robinson claimed there were no firearms or explosives in it. When agents

located two suspected pipe bombs in a file drawer in the office, Karen Robinson,

advised they were harmless because she knew what was in them and there was

nothing that could harm the agents or her.

In addition to the two suspected pipe bombs, agents recovered two additional

homemade explosive type devices and explosive products, ten firearms, one flare

launcher, one firearm silencer (mail parcel), three suspected firearm silencers, over

three thousand rounds of ammunition, two computers and numerous documents.

Agent Mattox with AlabamaBureau ofInvestigation assisted Agent Fitzpatrick with

collecting all suspected explosives and later performed Render Safe Procedures and

collected samples for forensic testing on July 21, 2006. Lab results confirmed two

devices were pipe bombs and two were explosive device s that were converted from

flare shells that could be shot from the flare gun. In addition, the defendant’s

computer was later searched and revealed that the defendant had purchased Tannerite

Binary Explosive Powder over the internet and had used the internet to further his

interest in firearms and other related explosive items. (See PSI at pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 4-7.)

12

indictment alleged that Robinson and his wife aided and abetted each other in the possession

of the silencer (and other firearms and destructive devices). (See Indictment at p. 2.)

Robinson could therefore have been guilty of the substantive offense charged in Count 2

even if was never in personal possession of the silencer. See United States v. Perez, 922

F.2d 782, 785 (11 Cir. 19910 (“Aiding and abetting encompasses activities intended to th

ensure the success of the underlying substantive crime....”). Moreover, as part of the plea

agreement, Robinson admitted that he knowingly possessed the silencer as charged in Count

2. (See Plea Agreement, Doc. No. 27-11, Gov. Exh. J, at pp. 6-7.) In addition, at the guilty

plea hearing, Robinson acknowledged under oath that he knowingly possessed the silencer

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The court also notes that Count 2 of the indictment charged Robinson with possessing 7

various other unregistered firearms and destructive devices in addition to the silencer.

13

and other firearms and destructive devices described in Count 2, and that he was guilty of

the charged offense. (See Change of Plea Hearing, Doc. No. 27-12, at pp. 14-15.) 7

The law is clear that “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption

of verity,” forming a “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.”

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166,

168 (11 Cir.1988). “There is a strong presumption that the statements made during the th

colloquy are true.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11 Cir. 1994). Robinson’s th

protestations of innocence are refuted by the record, including the record of his own sworn

statement. Because Robinson fails to establish the merit of his underlying substantive claim,

he likewise cannot show that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise

such a claim. Therefore, he is not entitled to any relief based on this claim.

In a variant of this claim, Robinson also asserts that he is “actually innocent” –

presumably of both counts to which he pled guilty – and suggests that it was his wife (and

not he) who had possession of the silencer and all other firearms and destructive devices

described in the indictment. (See Doc. No. 15 at pp. 7-9; Doc. No. 29 at pp. 4-5.) To

establish actual innocence, a petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence,

“‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.’” Bousley

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998), quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327

(1995). In this regard, “actual innocence” has been defined as “factual innocence, not mere

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 13 of 19
What the court is faced with in this case is a petitioner who pled guilty to the facts necessary 8

to establish his guilt and acknowledged his guilt in a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, but then

later complains that the government failed to present sufficient evidence of his guilt. It indeed seems

odd, moreover, that Robinson would now seek to suggest that his wife (and not he) possessed the

silencer and the other firearms and destructive devices described in the indictment when a part of

his plea agreement was that the government would to move to dismiss all pending federal charges

against his wife at his sentencing.

14

legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. The Supreme Court in Schlup observed:

[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an

innocent person is extremely rare.... To be credible, such a claim requires [a

movant] to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable

evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at

trial.

513 U.S. at 324.

As indicated above, Robinson acknowledged under oath in open court that he

knowingly possessed the silencer and the other firearms and destructive devices described

in Count 2 of the indictment, and that he was guilty of the charged offense. He did the same

with regard to all the firearms described in Count 1 of the indictment. Again, Robinson’s

protestations of innocence are refuted by the record, including his own sworn statements.8

Robinson has presented no facts, other than his own conclusory assertions and argument,

to support his claim of actual innocence. Mere conclusory assertions are insufficient to

support a claim of actual innocence. Without any new evidence to substantiate Robinson’s

claim of actual innocence, from a factual standpoint, the court finds that he has failed to

meet his burden of showing that he is actually innocent, i.e., that “no reasonable juror would

have convicted him.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

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15

3. Failure to Consult Prior to Suppression Hearing, to Apprise

of Pretrial Preparation, and to Forward Discovery Materials

Robinson also contends that his counsel, attorney Goggans, was ineffective because

he failed to consult with him prior to the suppression hearing, did not keep him apprised of

his pretrial preparation, and did not forward discovery materials to him. (See Doc. No. 19-2

at pp. 3-4.)

In an affidavit addressing Robinson’s allegations of ineffective assistance, Mr.

Goggans avers, in pertinent part, as follows:

Mr. Robinson and I did discuss negotiating a settlement in his case.

Unfortunately, Adam Robinson began the process with an unrealistic

assessment of his bargaining positions. His notion was that he was in a

position to assert what was tantamount to a list of demands. It took some time

to disabuse him of that notion. Once I was able to do that, I arranged a proffer

session with the government. After the proffer session, due to busy trial

schedules in my office and the prosecutor’s office, it took some time for me

to connect with the prosecutor to talk about a settlement. At that point, the

prosecutor was still waiting to hear back from one of the involved government

investigators as to his assessment of the proffer session. Before reaching that

point and getting down to the details of negotiating a plea agreement, Mr.

Robinson terminated my services.

Mr. Robinson has complained that I did not visit him at the jail as often

as he would have liked. I did not keep up with the number of times I went to

the jail to consult with Mr. Robinson. Nevertheless, I consulted with Mr.

Robinson as often as was necessary to prepare his case. I kept Mr. Robinson

apprised of all developments in his case in face-to-face meetings and in

written correspondence.

Mr. Robinson has also complained that I did not provide him with

copies of documents or go over documents with him. I reviewed all of the

discovery materials in this case. Generally, I do not like to leave any sensitive

documents in jails because they seem to have a way of finding their way into

the wrong hands – hands of persons ending up as witnesses against clients.

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 15 of 19
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In any event, asisreferenced in some of the correspondence attached, I did go

over all of the case documents with Mr. Robinson in person.

(Doc. No. 26 at p. 3.)

Weighing counsel’s averments in his affidavit against Robinson’s conclusory

allegations in his § 2255 motion, and considering that Robinson has made absolutely no

showing that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged failures in this regard, this court

concludes that Robinson is not entitled to any relief based on this claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

4. Failure to Interview Witnesses or Family Members or to

Conduct Other Investigation

Robinson says that his counsel, Mr. Goggans, rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to interview witnesses and his family members or to conduct any other form of

investigation in the case. (See Doc. No. 19-2 at p. 3.)

Addressing this allegation, Goggans avers, in pertinent part:

Adam Robinson has also complained that I did not talk with his wife

and others in the investigation of this case. There was a preliminary hearing

in this case. Witnesses testified at that hearing. I was able to obtain relevant

information at that hearing. Also, copies of reports were provided in

discovery. I also went to the ATF office in Montgomery to look at the

physical evidence. ATF agents were there and answered whatever questions

I had. Mr. Robinson also complains that I did not talk enough with his wife.

Mr. Robinson intimates that his wife would have provided information that

the firearms and other involved items in this case were hers and possess by her

not him. I would think that his statements in his guilty plea colloquy would

belie that assertion. In any event, his wife was represented by other counsel.

I did confer with her counsel during the course of my presentation and was

aware of her position or positions in the matter and her counsel’s position in

the matter.

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 16 of 19
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(Doc. No. 19-2 at pp. 3-4.)

Mr. Goggans’s affidavit indicates that he obtained relevant information from the

testimony of witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing in the case, through

discussions with ATF agents, and by examining reports and the physical evidence seized in

the case. The investigation that counsel undertook in this regard was more than sufficient.

Again, Robinson fails to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, or that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Therefore, Robinson is not entitled to any relief based

on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

5. Failure to Conduct Adequate Review of Documentary

Evidence

Robinson contends that attorney Goggans “failed to conduct an adequate review of

the government’s documentary evidence, including critical statements given to prosecutors

by the petitioner’s wife.” (See Doc. No. 19-2 at p. 4.)

As indicated above, Mr. Goggans filed an affidavit indicating that he fully reviewed

the documentary evidence in the case and that he was well aware of the position (or

positions) Robinson’s wife had taken with regard to possession and ownership of the

firearms. As Mr. Goggans also notes in his affidavit filed with this court, Robinson’s

statements in his guilty plea colloquy contradict his current assertions regarding possession

and ownership of the firearms. Finally, as counsel also states regarding his representation

of Robinson as it might relate to his current claims, “the possession issue seems to be more

of a trial issue, and I withdrew from representation before the final decision was made on

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 17 of 19
It is curious that Robinson would focus all his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 9

the actions of Mr. Goggans when he was represented by different counsel for some time after

Goggans withdrew from representation and before filing notice of intent to change his plea and

entering his guilty plea. While Goggans was obviously Robinson’s attorney during the early phase

of the case through litigation of the suppression issues, he was not Robinson’s attorney when

Robinson decided to plead guilty to the charges against him.

18

taking the case to trial or entering a plea.” (Doc. No. 26 at p. 4.) Once again, Robinson

wholly fails to show how he was prejudiced by attorney Goggans’s performance in this

regard. Consequently, he is not entitled to any relief based on this claim. 9

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed by Robinson be denied, as the claims therein entitle him to no

relief.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before February 25, 2010. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See th

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Case 2:08-cv-00168-MEF-WC Document 30 Filed 02/11/10 Page 18 of 19
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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc). th

DONE this 11 day of February, 2010. th

/s/Wallace Capel, Jr. 

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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