Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02755/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02755-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The Court notes that Petitioner’s Reply was received after the ordered deadline.

However, after reviewing Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. # 45), the Court

now grants that Motion and accepts the Reply as timely filed.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth W. Reed, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 04-2755-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Kenneth W. Reed’s Motion for Relief from

Judgment (Doc. # 41). Respondents have filed a Response (Doc. # 42), and Petitioner has

filed a Reply (Doc. # 46).1

 The Court has reviewed the parties’ filings and now denies

Petitioner’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 1) with this Court on

Dec. 3, 2004. This Court denied the Petition on Feb. 15, 2007 (Doc. # 26), and Petitioner

subsequently appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On Aug. 28, 2008,

the appeals court affirmed this Court’s denial of the Petition (Doc. # 36, Attachment # 1).

The appeals court then denied Petitioner’s petition for rehearing en banc on March 13, 2009

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 In Claim 9 of the Habeas Petition, Petitioner argued that relief should be granted on

the grounds that the Arizona Court of Appeals did not have a full record before it during

Petitioner’s direct appeal.

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and issued its final mandate on this matter on March 24, 2009 (Doc. # 40). Petitioner filed

his present Motion with this Court on May 6, 2009.

In his Motion, Petitioner seeks relief from this Court’s Order denying his Habeas

Petition. Petitioner argues that, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and

60(b)(6), relief should be granted because this Court “obtained by fraud” its judgment that

Claim 9 of the Habeas Petition was procedurally defaulted.2

 (Doc. #41 at 1). Specifically,

Petitioner alleges in his Motion the following:

In his Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, but yet, despite having

attached the documentary evidence which proved otherwise, the attorney who

was representing the Respondents, Assistant Arizona Attorney General Jim.

D. [Nielsen], misrepresented to this Court that the “Petitioner had a duty to

raise the claim in his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, but

failed to do so;” whereupon, Mr. [Nielsen] went on to argue that the claim was

procedurally defaulted.

(Id. at 9-10, emphasis in original, internal citation omitted). Petitioner further argues that his

attorney, Philip A. Seplow, as well as Magistrate Judge Irwin, and this Court were complicit

in this alleged fraud:

The evidence against Mr. [Nielsen] is conclusive: Mr. [Nielsen] committed a

fraud upon the Court. However, Petitioner’s evidence against Mr. Seplow,

Magistrate Judge Irwin, and District Court Judge Teilborg is not so direct:

their complicity, to cover up this fraud, must be inferred from knowledge and

acquiescence. 

(Id. at 11).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Rule 60(b)(3)

Rule 60(b)(3) states that “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing

party” may serve as grounds for relief from a final judgment. To prevail on a motion under

Rule 60(b)(3), “the moving party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct

complained of prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting the defense.”

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 Fraud on the court “embrace[s] only that species of fraud which does or attempts to,

defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial

machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are

presented for adjudication.” Appling v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir.

2003) (citation omitted). It requires a “grave miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citation omitted).

 

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Casey v. Albertson’s, Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing De Saracho v. Custom

Food Machinery, Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000)). Rule 60(b)(3) “is aimed at

judgments which were unfairly obtained, not at those which are factually incorrect.” De

Saracho, 206 F.3d at 880 (citing In re M/V Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(3) “require[s] that fraud . . . not be discoverable by due diligence

before or during the proceedings.” Casey, 362 F.3d at 1260 (citing Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Nav.

Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1991)). In the absence of fraud

on the court, a motion under Rule 60(b)(3) must be made “no more than a year after the entry

of the judgment or order.”3

 Rule 60(c)(1); see Rule 60(d)(3) (“This rule does not limit a

court’s power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”). 

Considering all frauds other than fraud on the court, here, Petitioner has failed to

provide clear and convincing evidence that this Court’s Order denying his Habeas Petition

was obtained through fraud or misconduct by the Respondents or that Petitioner was unable

to fully and fairly present his defense. Petitioner claims that Mr. Nielsen, an opposing party,

engaged in fraudulent misconduct by arguing before this Court that Claim 9 of Petitioner’s

Habeas Petition was procedurally defaulted because Petitioner had failed to raise it in his

petition to the Arizona Supreme Court. However, Petitioner presents no evidence in his

Motion of any fraud; rather, he does nothing more than offer his opinion that Respondents’

argument was not correct because Petitioner believes certain documentary evidence should

have defeated such an argument. Petitioner’s description in his Motion of Mr. Nielsen’s

alleged fraud also suggests that it could have been discovered through the due diligence of

Petitioner’s attorney, Magistrate Judge Irwin, and this Court. (Doc. # 41 at 11-12).

However, allegations pertaining solely to incorrect judgments and lack of due diligence, as

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 Petitioner also argues in his Reply that the time limitation in Rule 60(c)(1) is subject

to tolling while it was on appeal and to equitable tolling because he failed to discover the

alleged fraud until November, 2008. Both arguments are without merit. The Ninth Circuit

has a procedure that allows district courts to entertain Rule 60(b) motions while a case is on

appeal. See Davis v. Yageo Corp., 481 F.3d 661, 685 (9th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 567, 586 (9th Cir. 2004). Also, Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence to

establish that he could not have discovered the alleged fraud at an earlier date. 

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described above, are not sufficient to support a motion brought under Rule 60(b)(3). See De

Saracho, 206 F.3d at 880; Casey, 362 F.3d at 1260. 

Finally, because Petitioner’s Motion was filed more than a year after the judgment

allegedly obtained by fraud, it is untimely under Rule 60(c)(1). Petitioner argues in his Reply

that, under Rule 60(d)(3), his Motion is not subject to the one year limitation in Rule 60(c)(1)

because of alleged fraud on the court.4

 However, Petitioner fails to provide evidence of any

fraudulent conduct, let alone anything that rises to the level of fraud on the court. See supra

note 3. 

B. Rule 60(b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(6) provides that relief from a final judgment may be granted for any reason

“that justifies relief” other than those listed in 60(b)(1)-(5). Rule 60(b)(6) is thus a catch-all

provision that “‘has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice’

and ‘is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking

timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.’” United States v. Washington,

394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.,

984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, “a motion brought under clause (6) must

be for some reason other than the five reasons preceding it under the rule.” Molloy v. Wilson,

878 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). To prevail under Rule 60(b)(6), the

moving party “must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control that

prevented him from proceeding with the prosecution or defense of the action in a proper

fashion.” Washington, 394 F.3d at 1157 (citing Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164,

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 Because Petitioner’s claim of fraud on the part of Mr. Nielsen, an opposing party,

clearly fell under Rule 60(b)(3), it is precluded from consideration under Rule 60(b)(6). See

Molloy, 878 F.2d at 316. 

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1168 (9th Cir. 2002)). Finally, a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) “must be made within a

reasonable time.” Rule 60(c)(1).

Here, Petitioner’s claims that Mr. Seplow, Magistrate Judge Irwin, and this Court

participated in fraud fail under Rule 60(b)(6).5

 These claims all allege attempts to “cover up

the fraud that was perpetuated by Mr. Nielsen.” (Doc. # 41 at 12). However, since Petitioner

failed to provide any evidence of Mr. Nielsen’s alleged fraudulent conduct, see discussion

supra Part A., the Court finds these additional allegations against Mr. Seplow, Magistrate

Judge Irwin, and this Court are also without merit and certainly do not rise to the level of

extraordinary circumstances. 

Additionally, because these claims all stem from Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(3) claim of

Mr. Nielsen’s alleged fraud, the Court finds that a reasonable time for bringing these Rule

60(b)(6) claims, under Rule 60(c)(1), would closely correspond to the one-year limit that

applies to Rule 60(b)(3) claims. Petitioner filed his Motion more than two years after the

allegedly fraudulent judgment; thus, the Court finds that his Rule 60(b)(6) claims were not

brought within a reasonable time, and are therefore barred.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply

(Doc. # 45) is GRANTED and the Clerk shall file Petitioner’s lodged Reply (Doc. # 46). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Relief from Judgment

(Doc. # 41) is DENIED. 

DATED this 28th day of July, 2009.

 

 

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