Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00301/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00301-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY J. ALLEGRINO II,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant. /

No. C07-00301 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are portions of Defendants Ronald Magnuson, Timothy Byer, Alan Bloom,

Jill A. Sperber, Arne Werchick and Pat McElroy’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 3) that a previous

hearing and order left unresolved. On March 14, 2007, this Court issued an Order granting these

Defendants’ motion to dismiss in all respects, except Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages

against these six Defendants in their individual capacities. The Court ordered supplemental briefing

regarding the monetary claims based on a concern that Plaintiff had not, at that time, received an

adequate opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ Motion regarding such claims.

Having reviewed the parties’ supplemental submissions, the Court now GRANTS the

remainder of Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s remaining claims for monetary

damages, for the following reasons.

///

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff’s Complaint in C07-00301 also rehashes many of the factual allegations regarding his two state bar

disciplinary proceedings that were contained in his C06-05490 Complaint. At the April 10, 2007 oral argument in this matter,

Plaintiff clarified that his claims in C07-00301 relate solely to improper conduct in connection with the fee arbitration

proceeding. Plaintiff indicated that he included the overlapping factual allegations solely to provide the Court with context.

Accordingly, this Court limits its analysis to the Plaintiff’s allegations of improper conduct in connection with the fee

arbitration proceeding. 

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Anthony J. Allegrino II filed two separate law suits with this Court, Case No. 06-

05490 and Case No. 07-00301, against The State Bar of California (“State Bar”) and certain of its

officials and employees seeking money damages and injunctive relief. In his Case No. 06-05490

complaint – which has since been dismissed by this Court – Plaintiff alleged violations of his civil

rights in connection with his attorney disciplinary proceedings. In this matter, Plaintiff asserts

claims in connection with arbitration enforcement proceedings that were initiated against him.1

Plaintiff alleges that, in an arbitration proceeding with a former client over a fee dispute, the

client was awarded a refund. When the client sought enforcement of the award with the State Bar’s

Office of Mandatory Fee Arbitration, Defendants Bloom and Sperber filed a motion with the San

Francisco State Bar Court to place Allegrino on involuntary inactive status despite that Mr.

Allegrino is an out-of-state resident who maintains an office in San Diego. Before trial on the

motion, Allegrino settled with the State Bar and made payment to the State Bar.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and

otherwise conspired against him to either pay the fee arbitration award or be suspended. 

Specifically, Allegrino alleges that Defendants Bloom, Sperber, and Werchick knew or should have

known that the Los Angeles State Bar Court would grant Allegrino extension of time to pay any

outstanding awards, but that they nonetheless purposefully filed the motion in San Francisco even

though Los Angeles was the correct venue. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Byer and

Magnuson called Defendant Sperber on the phone and expressed their inclination to have Allegrino

disbarred. Plaintiff further alleges that McElroy conspired with Bloom, Sperber and Werchick to

rule in favor of the State Bar.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rule of Federal Procedure authorizes a party to move to dismiss

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a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The party seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction

bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th

Cir. 2001). The Court thus ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van

Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the Court

accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

ANALYSIS

Defendants Byer, Magnuson, Bloom, Sperber, Werchick, and McElroy move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s monetary claims on multiple grounds, including judicial, quasi-judicial, and arbitral

immunity, and failure to state a claim..

A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims For Damages Against McElroy,

Bloom, Sperber and Werchick.

Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendant McElroy, a State Bar Court judge, for her alleged

role in conspiring to adjudicate the fee arbitration enforcement proceeding against him. Plaintiff

also seeks damages against Defendants Bloom and Sperber (attorneys with the State Bar’s Office Of

Mandatory Fee Arbitration) and Werchick (Presiding Arbitrator) for their role in bringing a motion

with the San Francisco State Bar Court to place Allegrino on involuntary inactive status.

Plaintiff’s claims cannot stand in the face of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. 

Administrative courts and prosecutors have quasi-judicial immunity from monetary damages so long

as they perform functions similar to judges and prosecutors in a setting like that of a court. Butz v.

Economous, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17 (1978). Likewise, because the State Bar Association is an agent

of the State, the Bar Court judges and prosecutors have quasi-judicial immunity from monetary

damages insofar as they function in a court-like setting. Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of State

of California, 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995). In determining whether the prosecutors have

absolute quasi-judicial immunity, courts focus upon the functional nature of the conduct rather than

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the defendant’s status as prosecutors. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct extend solely to the actions that McElroy, Bloom,

Sperber and Werchick took arising out of their quasi-judicial functions in connection with the

arbitration enforcement proceedings. Hence, Defendants McElroy, Bloom, Sperber, and Werchick

are all entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims For Damages Against Byer And Magnuson Also Fail.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Byer and Magnuson (the State Bar prosecutors that

brought disciplinary proceedings against Plaintiff) also fail. The sole allegations related to the

arbitration enforcement proceedings (see footnote 1, above) that Plaintiff makes against these two

Defendants is that, on or about November 13, 2006, Sperber “conferr[ed] with and had been

contacted by” Byer and Magnuson “about the Rossavik Arbitration Matter and about Allegrino in

general in previous State Bar matters”, and that Sperber subsequently told Plaintiff that Byer and

Magnuson “wanted Allegrino disbarred.” (Complaint ¶¶ 64-67.) Such allegations fail to identify

any wrongdoing by these individuals that could state a claim under any of the federal or state

theories of liability asserted by Plaintiff. Even if they did, the alleged statements by Byer and

Magnuson were directly related their prosecutorial functions in Bar Court disciplinary hearings, and

are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. See Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 715.

Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s remaining claims must be dismissed for the

reasons stated above, the Court need not reach the other grounds for dismissal asserted by

Defendants.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the remainder of Defendants’ motion and

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s remaining claims. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of

Defendants and to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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