Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02572/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02572-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH HOLDER,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 08-2572 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Petitioner Keith Holder, a state prisoner incarcerated

at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, seeks

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the

October 26, 2006 decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings

(BPH) denying him parole at his fifth parole suitability hearing. 

Doc. No. 1 at 3 & 24. At the time he was denied parole in 2006,

Petitioner had served approximately sixteen years on his seven to

life sentence, over nine years past his minimum eligible parole date

of May 13, 1997. Doc. No. 1-1 at 103. 

On September 10, 2008, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause

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why the writ should not be granted. Doc. No. 3. On January 8,

2009, Respondent filed an Answer. Doc. No. 4. On February 11,

2009, Petitioner filed a Traverse. Doc. No. 5. 

After the matter was submitted, on April 22, 2010, the Ninth

Circuit issued its decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), which addressed important issues relating

to federal habeas review of BPH decisions denying parole to

California state prisoners. On May 6, 2010, the Court ordered the

parties to file supplemental briefing explaining their views of how

the Hayward en banc decision applies to the facts presented in

Petitioner’s challenge to the BPH’s decision denying him parole. 

Doc. No. 6. Respondent filed supplemental briefing on May 28, 2010;

Petitioner filed his on June 17, 2010. Doc. Nos. 7 & 8.

Having considered the entire record before the Court and all of

the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS the Petition and

remands the matter to the BPH. Within thirty (30) days from the

date of this Order, the BPH must set a parole date for Petitioner

unless it finds new evidence, arising after the 2006 hearing, of

current dangerousness. See Pirtle v. California Board of Prison

Terms, No. 07-16097, 2010 WL 2732888 at *8 (9th Cir. July 12, 2010).

BACKGROUND

I. The Commitment Offense and Petitioner’s State Court Challenges

to His October 26, 2006 Denial of Parole

The BPH summarized the facts of Petitioner’s commitment

offense, as derived from pages two and three of the initial

probation report, as follows:

On May 17th, 1990, Kiomi Takazato . . . spent

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the day with her friend [Petitioner] Keith

Holder whom she ha[d] known for two years and

who ha[d] many lady friends in the Japanese

community. She left her baby in her home with

her live-in housekeeper and babysitter,

Mariquette Estelilla . . . . When [Takazato]

returned home with [Petitioner] at 12 or 12:30

a.m., she found the housekeeper, Estelilla bound

and gagged. She was handcuffed to a pole in the

living room. Estelilla told [Takazato] that a

man came into her room about 11 p.m., grabbed

her by the hand and led her into the living room

where he handcuffed, gagged her, and blindfolded

her. He told her not to call the police or he

would kill everyone in the house. He then took

the baby. [Petitioner] found a ransom note,

which read, [“]I want $400,000, 24 hours. I

will call. No cops or you never see baby.[”] 

They decided not to call the police. Later in

the morning, [Petitioner] told Kiomi that he had

received a call from a man who said the baby was

at the Compton Police Department and was all

right; however, because the kidnapper threatened

to return and kill everyone, they decided to

tell the police that the baby had been taken by

a friend, and that everything was okay. After

they got the baby, they would then tell the

police the truth. When they arrived at the

Compton Police Department, the police separated

[Petitioner and Takazato], and after questioning

both of them, arrested [Petitioner]. At 11:35

p.m. on May 17th 1990, witness Ronald Coleman

called the police regarding a kidnapping. He

told the police that the kidnapping was over a

mafia-type drug deal and that the baby was from

wealthy Chinese parents. He indicated that the

kidnapper was Steve Rose. With the help of the

witness, the police stopped Steve Rose at 11:45

p.m. while he was driving a blue BMW and the

victim’s baby was found in the vehicle.

Doc. No. 1-1 at 13–14. 

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of kidnap for

ransom and sentenced to seven years to life in state prison. Doc.

No. 1 at 2–3; Doc. No. 1-1 at 103. He was received by the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on March 1,

1991. Doc. No. 1-1 at 103. Prior to appearing before the BPH on

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October 26, 2006, Petitioner had been denied parole four times. Id.

at 24. 

Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the BPH’s decision denying

him parole for the fifth time in the state superior and appellate

courts. Doc. No. 1-1 at 103–08. On April 30, 2008, the California

Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

Doc. No. 4-12 at 2. This federal Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus followed. Doc. No. 1. 

II. The October 26, 2006 Parole Suitability Hearing

At Petitioner’s October 26, 2006 parole suitability hearing, 

the BPH recited the facts of Petitioner’s commitment offense and

asked him to explain his involvement. Petitioner thanked the BPH

for this opportunity and stated:

I’m totally responsible for everything that

happened with this crime. And what caused me to

. . . take part in this crime was that at the

time, . . . I was in love with Kiomi and . . . I

was running a small sight seeing tour business. 

And I knew at the time that I didn’t . . . have

the financial ability to afford the kind of

lifestyle that she was used to. And the idea

was my idea, and it was all about just trying to

scare Mr. Takazato into thinking that the baby

was going to be harmed and the baby was not

going to be returned, and we was [sic] just

actually trying to embezzle money from him, so I

[could] invest the money into my business and

try to afford a lifestyle that I know she was

used to. So, I’m not going to shift blame to

anyone. I’m fully responsible for what I’ve

done, and I’m very sorry for what I’ve done. I

think the record will reflect from the very

first Board Hearing, I’ve always been

straightforward and honest about my part in this

crime. And I know I’ve done some things wrong. 

And of course if I can make it right, if I can

change it, I would. I did that crime. It was

something that I know that I should not have

done and I was wrong for doing what I’ve done. 

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Doc. No. 1-1 at 15–16. Later in the hearing, Petitioner returned to

the subject of his remorse for the crime and gave the BPH some

insight into how his imprisonment had changed him, stating:

I know the difference between right and wrong. 

I have not lived all my life being involved in

crime. . . . I’ve worked before. I’m from a

very solid family. I understand the [gravity]

of what I have done. I know that I can be [a]

much better person, and I don’t want to live the

life of just living in prison or hurting other

people. . . . I would like to do unto others

that I would like others to do unto me. That’s

the way I’m going to live my life from the day

[you decide] to give me a second chance. I’m

not going to be in trouble anymore. I know

that. I’m almost 50 years old . . . and this

[is] not the way I want to live my life. So, I

know that when I leave here, the day I leave

here, I’m going to live my life as a productive

member of society wherever I go. I’m never

going to be in trouble again, because I don’t

want to be locked up and be away from my family. 

My mom is old. My dad is old. I don’t want to

be in prison when I lose them, you know? And I

just know that I’m never going to be in trouble

again. There’s no doubt in my mind. I’m not

from that kind of background. I got myself

involved in a crime. I got caught, I did my

time, and while I was here, I wanted to show

people that I can be here without getting

involved in the things that you know, plague

most of the prison . . . . So, I believe that

when I get out, I won’t have a problem. 

Id. at 39–40. Still later in the hearing, Petitioner added:

I’m trying my best. I’m doing my best, and I

think that in [sixteen] years that I’ve been

down in prison, I think I have proven that I can

stay out of trouble. . . . I just want you to

know that I’m going to do unto others that I’d

like others to do unto me. And I understand

that this is a serious crime. And I’ve always

come here, and the times that I’ve [sat] in

front of you, I’ve always been straightforward

with you. But, there’s nothing I can do to

change what I’ve done [sixteen] years ago

. . . . There’s nothing I can do. But I can

tell you I’m a better person today. And I just

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want to be able to get out and take care of my

mom . . . just whatever I have left. That’s all

I want to do. I’m not going to be in handcuffs

again. I know that for a fact. I know you

don’t know that because I’m sitting here,

because I did something terrible . . . to my

friend. . . . But I’m telling you, I know I’m

not going to be in trouble again, so whenever

you’re ready to give me that chance, I hope I’ll

be able to sit here in front of you and you say,

Keith, it’s your time, you know. There’s

nothing I can do. I can’t change it. I can’t

change it. I’m very sorry for what I’ve done,

and I think by just showing that I can be a

better person because I’m from that environment. 

I’m not from the environment of drugs, alcohol,

guns, killing people, you know, I’ve done

something wrong. . . . it was a bad idea. I

take full responsibility for what I’ve done. 

Full responsibility. I’m not shifting blame on

anybody. . . . . I know I did a terrible crime.

. . . In my heart, . . . I know I’m going to be

a better person . . . when I leave this

place. . . . You [will] never pick up the

newspaper and see my name in it again. 

Id. at 58–59. 

The August 2, 2006 psychological evaluation conducted in

anticipation of Petitioner’s October 26, 2006 parole suitability

hearing by psychologist W.K. Marek, upon which the BPH relied in

rendering its decision to deny Petitioner parole, substantiated his

feelings of remorse, noting: “[Petitioner] took full responsibility

for his role in the kidnapping. He exhibited remorse and had good

insight into the harm that was caused. His remorse for his crime

appears to be genuine and appropriate.” Doc. No. 1-1 at 85; see id.

at 41. The BPH also noted that Dr. Marek found Petitioner’s

potential for violence to be no higher than the average citizen in

the community. Doc. No. 1-1 at 41; see id. at 85. Further, the BPH

noted Dr. Marek’s observation that Petitioner’s involvement in the

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commitment offense was “essentially an aberration” and that “there

[were] no obvious or significant violence precursors for him.” 

Id. The BPH also observed that Dr. Marek commended Petitioner for

his “continued participation in Alcoholics Anonymous” and recent

completion of an Anger Management course, and noted that he did not

have a mental health disorder that required treatment either during

his incarceration or on parole. Doc. No. 1-1. at 85; see id. at

41–42. 

The BPH went on to discuss Petitioner’s parole plans, citing at

least fifteen recent letters of support he received from family

members and friends, which included several firm offers of

employment, and financial support, as well as a place to live should 

Petitioner be granted parole. See Doc. No. 1-1 at 44–51. 

The BPH also noted that Petitioner’s only prior contact with

the criminal justice system was in 1984 when he received two years

of summary probation for misdemeanor fraudulent use of a credit

card. Doc. No. 1-1 at 19. The evidence at the hearing also

reflected that Petitioner had not received any serious rules

violation reports throughout the entire period of his incarceration,

and that the last infraction he received was in 1999, some seven

years earlier. Id. at 69–70. Finally, the BPH noted Petitioner’s

recent programming in prison, which included completion of the “Cage

Your Rage” anger management program and Dr. Thomas Gordon’s Family

Effectiveness Training, Harmony in the Home self-help anger

management program. Doc. No. 1-1 at 25–26. The BPH also recognized

that Petitioner held several jobs while in prison, including Porter,

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1

 When asked if he had a current prison job assignment,

Petitioner explained that he has not held a job since 2004 when he was

transferred from North Facility and that he is on a waiting list for

work because the institution has no available jobs. Doc. No. 1-1 at

26–27. 

8

Adult Basic Education, Culinary and Janitorial, and that he

“maintained good work reports” while employed.1

 Id. at 27. 

Petitioner’s attorney added that Petitioner does volunteer work in

the prison. Id. at 27. The BPH also acknowledged Petitioner’s

longstanding participation in the Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics

Anonymous Twelve-Step programs since 1995. Doc. No. 1-1 at 36. 

Petitioner explained that he has never had an addiction to drugs or

alcohol, but described his participation in these programs as: 

spiritual . . . I ma[k]e amends to all. . . . I

made a list of all these people that I’ve harmed

and [am] willing to make amends to them all,

which is step eight, because I feel that [step

eight is] very important for my life; [for] what

I’ve done. And the program that I go to, NA and

AA, it’s a program that I go to and I listen to

other people’s . . . testimonies and things, and

maybe I’ll get something out of it, but I’m not

a drug user. I’ve never been in alcohol

problems, and I’ve never been involved in

anything illegal when it[] [comes] to any kind

of illegal substance. So if I go to AA, it

helps me out spiritually. It helps me out with

things . . . that I’ve done. . . . It helps

. . . because I know that I’ve done some wrong

things and I want to recognize those things. 

And I’ve recognized those things. 

Id. at 37. 

Regarding his participation in the twelve-step programs, the

BPH’s Deputy Commissioner Harmon asked Petitioner if he had

memorized all twelve steps. Petitioner explained, “I have one to

eight memorized, but I[’m] going to be truthful, I really gave more

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attention to step eight; make a list of all . . . to make amends to

them all. I thought that was very important. And on step five is

that I admit to God and to ourselves, and to other human beings the

exact nature of my wrong.” Doc. No. 1-1 at 36. Later in the

hearing, Commissioner Harmon returned to the subject of Petitioner’s

participation in the twelve-step programs, which they apparently had 

discussed at Petitioner’s prior parole suitability hearing in 2003: 

I asked you about the steps and at the time [of

your 2003 hearing], . . . I said to you, did you

ever learn the steps? And you said, some of the

steps. And I said to you, you don’t know them

all? All the years you’ve been in it and you

don’t know the steps? . . . And then you go to

explain all the steps and all, but it was

obviously a concern and all that. And we

discussed the same things. So it’s not that

we’re picking on you, it’s just that we just

can’t get an understanding of why you’re in the

program, and yet, you still can’t – 

Id. at 54. At this point, Petitioner interrupted Commissioner

Harmon, and said: 

Look, Mr. Harmon, I told you that I enjoy

going to the program. I listen to a lot of the

testimonies that the guys [give] and I feel that

it will help me in a way that, if I met someone

someday that is involved in drugs or alcohol,

and et cetera, I can share verbally the

experiences that I have heard through

testimonies from the other guys what drugs and

alcohol do to them. 

Id. Commissioner Harmon responded, “Okay, that’s wonderful. That’s

wonderful. I guess what I’m worried about is another kidnapping.” 

Id. at 55. Commissioner Harmon continued: 

No, I’m telling you right up front. What

you did was one of the most conniving serious

crimes that could happen to innocent people in

their own home; a place of shelter, a place that

should never ever be attacked. And if I have a

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person that’s sitting before me and I believe

. . . that person’s being deceptive, that’s a

real concern of mine. And so that’s why I’m

asking you these questions. Because . . . when

I look through these [prior parole suitability

hearing] transcripts, [I feel] I’m being snowed. 

That’s what I look at is that there’s a lot of

verbiage going on, but nothing’s happening. I

mean everybody knows the words remorse and

insight, and all that kind of stuff, but I want

to get down to the nitty gritty because the

crime that you committed is one of the worst

crimes that can happen in my mind to an innocent

child and people. So that’s why I’m asking you

these things. 

Id. 

At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing,

the BPH rendered its decision, and found that Petitioner was “not

suitable for parole and would pose and unreasonable risk of danger

to society or a threat to public safety is released from prison at

this time.” Doc. No. 1-1 at 76. The BPH explained the reasons for

the one-year denial: 

This was a cruel offense. Multiple victims were

involved in the same incident. It was carried

out in a pretty calculated manner . . . which

demonstrated a callous disregard for human

suffering, particularly related to the maid, Ms.

Estelilla. The conclusions are drawn from the

statement of facts, which was taken from the

probation officer’s report, pages two to three

which I’m incorporating by reference. . . . As

far as institutional behavior goes, the Panel

believes that you have not yet sufficiently

participated in beneficial self-help or therapy

programs. And we do note the misconduct while

incarcerated was sixteen 128A counseling

chronos, the last of which was August 25th , 1999 for manipulating staff, which was more than

seven years ago.

. . . . 

Other information bearing unsuitability includes

other factors of past mental state, past and

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present attitude towards the crime, signs of

remorse, involvement in any other criminal

misconduct, which is reliably documented and any

other relevant reliable information or

circumstances, which taken alone, may not firmly

establish unsuitability, but which when taken

together contribute to a pattern which results

in unsuitability at this time. 

. . . . 

We really believe you’re on the right track and

[we] really want to emphasize that with you. We

really feel that you’ve made excellent progress,

and the Panel believes you just need to develop

some further insight into your behavior related

to the life crime and remorse for all the

victims including Ms. Estelilla who was

terrorized more than anybody else in the whole

crime. 

Id. at 77.

The BPH then made the following findings: 

The prisoner needs further therapy in order to

face, discuss, understand and cope with stress

in a non-destructive manner. Until additional

progress is made, the prisoner continues to be

unpredictable and a threat to others. 

Nevertheless, the prisoner should be commended

for his recent completion of Cage Your Rage and

particularly for having no serious

disciplinaries the entire time [he’s] been in

prison, however, these positive aspects of [his]

behavior don’t outweigh the factors of

unsuitability at this time. 

Id. at 78. 

Commissioner Harmon concluded the hearing by stating the

following: 

I think I’ve been very clear to

[Petitioner] what . . . my expectations of him

would be. He can’t put that many years into

that particular program and not really gather

from it what I think he should be able to. You

know, . . . if you’re going to come back to the

Board, and I’m going to be on that Panel, I’m

sure going to expect you to be able to at least

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tell me those steps that don’t apply to drinking

and alcohol as you see them, but how the other

ones may benefit you. Other than that, I’m

wondering if the other programs you’ve been

going through, you have not picked up on what

those programs represent either. So you know,

if you’re going to come in and represent

something, I sure want to know what you’ve

learned from those programs. But other than

that, I mean you know, in the big scheme of

things, I do believe you’re on the right track

as the Commissioner said. You’ve got work to

do. I can envision you at some point being

released from prison and I encourage you to

listen to what I say . . . in terms of what my

expectations are . . . if you were going to come

back before me. I was disappointed today. You

know, you gave me the same song and dance you

gave me a few years ago, and then I pull up the

initial hearing and I see you did the same thing

then. And I can pull out the other ones too,

and I’m sure they’re also talking about the same

areas, so you know, one thing I don’t want to do

is mislead you. You’re serving a life term and

I’m not trying to play God, but I sure want to

make sure that when you walk out that door that

you’re a different person than the person who

came in. If that makes any sense to you. My

first obligation is to public safety.

Id. at 79–80. 

III. The State Court Decisions Regarding Petitioner’s Challenges to

the BPH’s October 26, 2006 Denial of Parole

The state superior court affirmed the decision of the BPH to

deny Petitioner parole. Doc. No. 1-1 at 103. The court noted:

The Board found the Petitioner unsuitable

for parole after a parole consideration hearing

held on October 26, 2006. The Petitioner was

denied parole for one year. The Board concluded

that the Petitioner was unsuitable for parole

and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society and a threat to public safety. The

board based its decision primarily upon his

commitment offense. 

The Court finds that there is some evidence

to support the Board’s findings that multiple

victims were attacked during the commitment

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offense and that the offense was carried out in

a dispassionate and calculated manner.

[Citations.] Ms. Estelilla was bound and gagged

and made to fear for her life during the

kidnapping. Additionally, Ms. Takazato’s baby

was kidnapped from his home. Although no one

was harmed during the offense, these victims

were certainly traumatized by the kidnapping. 

The Petitioner admits that he planned the

kidnapping for a couple of weeks. He and his

accomplice plotted together and committed the

offense in a dispassionate and calculated

manner. 

Id. at 103–04 (emphasis added).

The court further found, however, that there was

no evidence to support the Board’s finding that

the commitment offense demonstrated an

exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering. [Citations.] Although the

kidnapping was certainly a very serious offense,

it was not more aggravated or more violent than

an ordinary kidnapping for ransom. Therefore,

it did not demonstrate an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering. [Citation.] 

Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 

The court further observed: 

The Board also considered the Petitioner’s

prior grand theft conviction and the Board’s

perception that he needs more therapy and selfhelp in order to gain insight about his offense. 

While these factors may not justify a finding of

unsuitability, the Board may properly consider

them as relevant to a determination of whether

the Petitioner is suitable for parole. 

The Board also considered the Petitioner’s

post-conviction gains, including his

participation in several anger management and

other self-help programs; his two completed

vocations; his multitude of job offers in the

United States and Trinidad; as well as his

commendable ability to remain free of any

serious discipline throughout his incarceration. 

However, [the Board] still concluded that the

Petitioner would pose an unreasonable threat to

public safety. [Citation.] . . . The nature of

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Petitioner’s offense constitutes the modicum of

evidence required to support the Board’s finding

of unsuitability. [Citation.]

Accordingly, the petition is denied. 

Id. at 104–05 (emphasis added). 

The state appellate court also affirmed the BPH’s decision to

deny Petitioner parole. Doc. No. 1-1 at 108. The state supreme

court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Doc. No.

4-12 at 2. This federal Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

followed. Doc. No. 1. 

LEGAL STANDARD

In Hayward, the Ninth Circuit explained the law in California

as it relates to parole suitability determinations: 

The California parole statute provides that

the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release

date unless it determines that the gravity of

the current convicted offense or offenses, or

the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual.” The crucial determinant of

whether the prisoner gets parole in California

is “consideration of the public safety.”

In California, when a prisoner receives an

indeterminate sentence of fifteen years to life,

the “indeterminate sentence is in legal effect a

sentence for the maximum term, subject only to

the ameliorative power of the [parole authority]

to set a lesser term.” Under the California

parole scheme, the prisoner has a right to a

parole hearing and various procedural guarantees

and rights before, at, and after the hearing; a

right to subsequent hearings at set intervals if

the Board of Prison Terms turns him down for

parole; and a right to a written explanation if

the Governor exercises his authority to overturn

the Board of Prison Terms’ recommendation for

parole. Under California law, denial of parole

must be supported by “some evidence,” but review

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of the [decision to deny parole] is “extremely

deferential.” 

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561–62 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

The court further explained, 

Subsequent to Hayward’s denial of parole, and

subsequent to our oral argument in this case,

the California Supreme Court established in two

decisions, In re Lawrence . . . and In re

Shaputis, . . . that as a matter of state law,

“some evidence” of future dangerousness is

indeed a state sine qua non for denial of parole

in California. We delayed our decision in this

case so that we could study those decisions and

the supplemental briefs by counsel addressing

them. As a matter of California law, “the

paramount consideration for both the Board [of

Prison Terms] and the Governor under the

governing statutes is whether the inmate

currently poses a threat to public safety.”

. . . There must be “some evidence” of such a

threat, and an aggravated offense “does not, in

every case, provide evidence that the inmate is

a current threat to public safety.” . . . The

prisoner’s aggravated offense does not establish

current dangerousness “unless the record also

establishes that something in the prisoner’s

pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or

her current demeanor and mental state” supports

the inference of dangerousness. . . . Thus, in

California, the offense of conviction may be

considered, but the consideration must address

the determining factor, “a current threat to

public safety.” 

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (footnotes and citations omitted).

After providing this background on California law as it applies

to parole suitability determinations, the court then explained the

role of a federal district court charged with reviewing the decision

of either the BPH or the governor denying a prisoner parole. 

According to the Ninth Circuit, this Court must decide whether a

decision “rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the

California ‘some evidence’ requirement, or was ‘based on an

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.’” 

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562–63 (citations omitted); see also Cooke v.

Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1208, n. 2 & 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying

Hayward and explicitly rejecting the state’s argument that “the

constraints imposed by AEDPA preclude federal habeas relief” on

petitioner’s claim; noting that in Hayward, the court “held that due

process challenges to California courts’ application of the ‘some

evidence’ requirement are cognizable on federal habeas review under

AEDPA”). 

DISCUSSION

I. California Law Regarding Parole Suitability Determinations

When assessing whether California’s parole board’s suitability

determination was supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis

is framed by the “regulatory, statutory and constitutional

provisions that govern parole decisions in California.” Cooke, 606

F.3d at 1213 (citing In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (2002)); see

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561–62. Under California law, prisoners

serving indeterminate life sentences, like Petitioner, become

eligible for parole after serving minimum terms of confinement

required by statute. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1069–70

(2005). Regardless of the length of the time served, “a life

prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the

judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 2402(a). In making this determination, the BPH must consider

various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past and

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present mental state, past criminal history, the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the

crime, past and present attitude toward the crime and any other

information that bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release. 

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b)–(d).

In considering the commitment offense, the BPH must determine

whether “the prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in making that

determination include: “(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured

or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) The offense was

carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder; (C) The victim was abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense; (D) The offense was carried

out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering; (E) The motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. 

As the Ninth Circuit observed in Hayward, the California

Supreme Court has held that, “the core statutory determination

entrusted to the Board and the Governor [in determining a prisoner’s

parole suitability] is whether the inmate poses a current threat to

public safety . . . .” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1191

(2008). And, “the core determination of ‘public safety’ under the

statute and corresponding regulations involves an assessment of an

inmate’s current dangerousness.” Id. at 1205 (emphasis in original)

(citing Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 and Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

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1061). The court further explained that: 

a parole release decision authorizes the Board

(and the Governor) to identify and weigh only

the factors relevant to predicting “whether the

inmate will be able to live in society without

committing additional antisocial acts.” . . .

These factors are designed to guide an

assessment of the inmate’s threat to society, if

released, and hence could not logically relate

to anything but the threat currently posed by

the inmate.

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205–06 (citations omitted). The relevant

inquiry, therefore, is: 

whether the circumstances of the commitment

offense, when considered in light of other facts

in the record, are such that they continue to be

predictive of current dangerousness many years

after commission of the offense. This inquiry

is, by necessity and by statutory mandate, an

individualized one, and cannot be undertaken

simply by examining the circumstances of the

crime in isolation, without consideration of the

passage of time or the attendant changes in the

inmate’s psychological or mental attitude. 

In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241, 1254–55 (2008). 

The evidence of current dangerousness “must have some indicia

of reliability.” In re Scott, 119 Cal. App. 4th 871, 899 (2004)

(Scott I). Indeed, “the ‘some evidence’ test may be understood as

meaning that suitability determinations must have some rational

basis in fact.” In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th 573, 590, n. 6

(2005) (Scott II). 

Subsequent to Hayward, the Ninth Circuit issued decisions in 

Cooke, 606 F.3d 1206, and Pirtle, 2010 WL 2732888, both of which

focused on the notion that the “some evidence” of current dangerous

must be reliable. In Cooke, the court ultimately reversed the

district court’s denial of Cooke’s challenge to the BPH’s decision

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denying him parole, finding that the BPH’s stated reasons for

denying parole did not support the conclusion that Cooke posed a

current threat to public safety. Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1216. 

Specifically, the court stated:

[E]ach of the Board’s findings . . . lacked any

evidentiary basis. Nothing in the record

supports the state court’s finding that there

was “some evidence” in addition to the

circumstances of the commitment offense to

support the Board’s denial of Petitioner’s

parole. The Parole Board’s findings were

individually and in toto unreasonable because

they were without evidentiary support. When

habeas courts review the “some evidence”

requirement in California parole cases, both the

subsidiary findings and the ultimate finding of

some evidence constitute factual findings. 

Here, there was no evidence that reasonably

supports either the necessary subsidiary

findings or the ultimate “some evidence”

finding. Accordingly, we hold that the state

court decision was “‘based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the

evidence.’” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563 (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). Cooke is entitled to a

writ of habeas corpus. 

Id.; see also Pirtle, 2010 WL 2732888 at *8 (affirming the district

court’s decision to grant habeas relief, concluding, “In sum, there

is no evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding that

Pirtle poses a current threat to public safety. The Board’s stated

reasons for the denial of parole either lacked evidentiary support,

had no rational relationship to Pirtle’s current dangerousness, or

both.”) 

II. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPH’s

October 26, 2006 decision finding him unsuitable for parole on the

ground that the decision did not comport with due process. Doc. No.

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1. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief

because he has not demonstrated that the state court decision was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the California “some

evidence” standard, or that it was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Doc. Nos. 4 &

7. In its supplemental post-Hayward briefing, Respondent notes that

the state appellate court was the highest state court to address the

merits of Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. That decision

read, in its entirety, “The court has read and considered the

petition for writ of habeas corpus filed January 15, 2008. The

petition is denied. The record submitted reflects some evidence to

support the challenged decision. In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.

4th 1061, 1071, 1080; In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 616, 664-

665.” 

Because in its decision denying Petitioner relief, the state

superior court provided not just a legal conclusion and unexplained

case citations, but analysis as well, it is that decision that the

Court analyzes under AEDPA. See LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663,

669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106

(federal court may look to any lower state court decision that was

examined, and whose reasoning was adopted, by the highest state

court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim). 

As the superior court noted in upholding the BPH’s finding that

Petitioner was unsuitable for parole, the BPH “based its decision

primarily upon his commitment offense.” The superior court

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concluded that “[t]he nature of Petitioner’s offense constitutes the

modicum of evidence required to support the Board’s finding of

unsuitability.” Doc. No. 1-1 at 103 & 105. As explained below,

after careful review of the record, the Court finds that the state

courts’ approvals of the BPH’s decision to deny Petitioner parole

were an unreasonable application of the California “some evidence”

standard, and were based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state courts. See

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562–63. 

Although the BPH relied almost solely on the commitment

offense, it noted other reasons for a finding of unsuitability,

which included “past mental state, past and present attitude towards

the crime, signs of remorse and involvement in any other criminal

misconduct.” Doc. No. 1-1 at 77. But an examination of the record

shows these findings are not only unsupported by any evidence in the

record, but are, in fact, contradicted by it. See Cooke, 606 F.3d

at 1216 (when habeas courts review the “some evidence” requirement

in California parole cases, both the subsidiary findings and the

ultimate finding of some evidence must have reasonable factual

support); Pirtle, 2010 WL 2732888 at *8. 

In his August 4, 2006 psychological evaluation prepared for and

submitted as evidence at Petitioner’s October 26, 2006 parole

suitability hearing, under the heading “Current Mental

Status/Treatment Needs,” Dr. Marek observed:

[Petitioner] was oriented to time, place

and person, evincing no symptomatology. He was

not depressed and exhibited congruent affect. 

He was calm and cooperative. His behavior was

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appropriate. His is estimated to be in the

average range of intellectual functioning. He

exhibited good insight and remorse, especially

as it relates to his crime.

Doc. No. 1-1 at 84. Under the heading “Clinical Observations/

Comments/Recommendations,” the psychologist observed:

[Petitioner] is competent and responsible

for his behavior. He has the capacity to abide

by institutional standards and has done so for

the last several years. He does not have a

mental health disorder which would necessitate

treatment either during his incarceration or on

parole. He is to be commended for his continued

participation in [Alcoholics Anonymous]. Since

his last hearing, he says he has completed

another self-help group, Anger Management. No

treatment recommendations are being made because

he does not have a mental health disorder. 

Parole decisions should be based on custody

factors.

Id. at 85; see id. at 41–42. The psychologist further noted that

the “prognosis is positive for [Petitioner] to be able to maintain

his current mental state in the community upon parole.” Id. at 85. 

And, as noted above, Dr. Marek’s evaluation indicated Petitioner did

not require mental health treatment, either while in prison or on

parole, a statement that lies in direct contrast to the BPH’s

factually unsupported conclusion that Petitioner “needs further

therapy in order to face, discuss, understand and cope with stress

in a non-destructive manner.” Doc. No. 1-1 at 78. 

In the area of Assessment of Dangerousness, the psychologist

found that

[Petitioner’s] violence potential is obviously

lower than the average inmate based on his good,

recent institutional adjustment. If released to

the community, his violence potential is

estimated to be no higher than the average

citizen in the community. It appears his

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involvement in the incident offense was

essentially an aberration for him. There are no

obvious or significant violence precursors for

him.

Id. at 41; see id. at 85. 

Petitioner’s two prior psychological evaluations provided

similar conclusions regarding his mental state and lack of need for

treatment. In an evaluation dated December 5, 2002, under the

heading “Current Mental Status/Treatment Needs,” a different

psychologist observed: 

[Petitioner] was cooperative and alert. He

was appropriately dressed and groomed. His

speech was normally articulate and contextually

meaningful. His mood and affect were within

normal limits. His behavior was appropriate to

content. His intellectual functioning was

clinically estimated to be within average to

above average range. There was no evidence of a

mood or thought disorder. His judgment appeared

to be sound.

Id. at 89. This psychologist concluded: “[Petitioner’s] prognosis

is positive for being able to maintain his current mental state in

the community upon parole.” Id. In yet another psychological

evaluation dated March 27, 1996, a third psychologist concluded: 

[Petitioner] has acquired a much more

positive attitude over the past two-three years. 

There are no [serious disciplinary violations]. 

There is no diagnosable psychopathology. 

Violence potential within the institutional

setting has been much less than average and in a

less controlled setting, such as return to the

community, violence potential would continue to

be much less than average.

Id. at 93. 

Regarding Petitioner’s signs of remorse, Dr. Marek, who

conducted Petitioner’s most recent psychological evaluation,

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observed that he “took full responsibility for his role in the

kidnapping. He exhibited remorse and had good insight into the harm

that was caused. His remorse for his crime appears to be genuine

and appropriate.” Doc. No. 1-1 at 85; see id. at 41. And, as noted

earlier, at the hearing, Petitioner spoke at length regarding the

depths of his remorse over what he had done. See Doc. No. 1-1 at

15–16, 20, 39–40 & 57–59. 

In light of this evidence regarding Petitioner’s past and

present mental state and signs of remorse, as well as the

conclusions of three psychologists that Petitioner’s violence

potential was no higher than that of the average citizen in the

community, the Court finds no evidence to support the BPH’s

conclusion that Petitioner exhibited lack of remorse and poor

insight into his crime. See Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1216; Pirtle, 2010

WL 2732888 at *8 (“[t]he record contains no evidence that

contradicts [the] professional assessment [of the psychologist who

concluded the petitioner] was neither unstable [n]or potentially

dangerous”). Similarly, here, there was no reliable evidence to

suggest that if released on parole, Petitioner would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety. 

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(a). 

The Court therefore concludes that the state courts’

determinations that the BPH’s findings constituted “some evidence”

of current dangerousness was an “‘unreasonable application’ of the

California ‘some evidence’ requirement, and was ‘based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.’” 

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Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562–63 (citations omitted); see Cooke, 606 F.3d

at 1216; Pirtle, 2010 WL 2732888 at *8. As a result, Petitioner is

entitled to federal habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus is GRANTED. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this

Order, the BPH must set a parole date for Petitioner unless it finds

new evidence, arising after the 2006 hearing, of current

dangerousness. Within ten (10) days thereafter, Respondent must

file a notice with the Court confirming Petitioner’s parole date. 

Within seven (7) days after the parole date, Respondent must file a

notice informing the Court whether Petitioner was released on

parole. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce its Order. 

The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions,

enter judgment and close the file. Each party shall bear his own

costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/6/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH HOLDER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BEN CURRY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-02572 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on August 6, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Keith Holder

E87291

P.O. Box 689 - FW233

Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: August 6, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

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