Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-00348/USCOURTS-alnd-3_15-cv-00348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Insurance Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

ROSE BAUER, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-348-CLS

 )

THE TRAVELERS HOME AND )

MARINE INSURANCE CO., )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Rose Bauer, commenced this action in the Circuit Court of

Lauderdale County, Alabama, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith

against The Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company (“Travelers”), which

had issued a homeowners insurance policy to plaintiff.1 Travelers denied a claim for

property damages caused by vandalismto plaintiff’s home, and awarded plaintiff only

a limited amount for loss of personal property due to theft, asserting that plaintiff’s

extended vacancy of the home had rendered her ineligible for coverage under the

policy. Travelers filed a timely removal of the case, asserting federal jurisdiction

based upon satisfaction of the requirements of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C.

§1332(a).2 The controversy now is before the court on Travelers’ motion for

1

See doc. no. 1-1 (Complaint). 

2

 Doc. no. 1 (Notice of Removal). Plaintiff stated in her complaint that she is a resident of

FILED

 2017 Jan-20 AM 08:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 1 of 34
summary judgment,3

and Travelers’ motion to strike the affidavit submitted by

plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment.

4 Upon consideration of the motions,

briefs, and evidentiary submissions, the court concludes that the motion to strike

should be granted, but only in part, and that the motion for summary judgmentshould

be granted in its entirety.

I. MOTION TO STRIKE 

Travelersrequeststhe court to strike the affidavit plaintiff submitted in support

of her response to Travelers’ motion for summary judgment.

5 Without question,

plaintiff’s summary judgment response failed to comply with the Uniform Initial

Order, which requires parties opposing summary judgment to set forth their

objections to the moving party’s claimed undisputed facts, and their own proposed

disputed and undisputed facts, in separately numbered paragraphs, and to provide

precise record citations to support each disputed and proposed fact.

6 Moreover,

Alabama, and Travelers is a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in

Connecticut. Id. at 2, ¶¶ IV-V. The court notes that whether plaintiff actually is a resident of

Alabama or California is an issue int his case. In any event, plaintiff is not a resident of Connecticut,

so the parties are of diverse citizenship. Additionally, although plaintiff did not make a claim for

a specific amount of damages in her complaint, it is apparent from a review of her complaint that,

if she prevailed, her damages could easily exceed the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000. See id. at

2-6, ¶ 7. 

3

 Doc. no. 53. 

4

 Doc. no. 65. 

5

See doc. no. 65 (Motion to Strike), doc. no. 61-1 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer). 

6

See doc. no. 4 (Uniform Initial Order), at 15-16. 

2

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 2 of 34
plaintiff’s brief consists of only four pages,

7

but her attached affidavit, which contains

most of her factual contentions and legal arguments, is forty-six pages long.

8

Together, the two documents exceed the thirty-page limit for summary judgment

response briefs.

9 Even so, plaintiff unnecessarily added to the length of her affidavit

by employing wide page margins and retyping each of defendant’s proffered facts. 

Without those superfluous additions, plaintiff’s submission likely would have fallen

within the page limitation. For that reason, the court concludes that it will be more

efficient to accept plaintiff’s submission, despite its non-compliance with the

UniformInitial Order, than to require plaintiff’s attorney to re-format the submission. 

The court also does not find it necessary to address every objection raised by

defendant. To do so would take more pages than addressing the merits of plaintiff’s

claims. In addition, the court simply will disregard affidavit statements that are

conclusory, hearsay, speculation, not within plaintiff’s personal knowledge, or

improper opinion testimony. Such statements will not be stricken, but they will not

be considered in ruling on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Instead, the only objections that need to be addressed in any detail are those

based upon inconsistencies between plaintiff’s deposition and affidavit testimony. 

7

 Doc. no. 61 (Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment). 

8

See doc. no. 61-1 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer). 

9

See doc. no. 4 (Uniform Initial Order), at 13 (“Initial and response briefs are limited to thirty

pages.”). 

3

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 3 of 34
To support such objections, Travelers has invoked the “sham affidavit” rule, which

provides that a court

may determine that an affidavit is a sham when it contradicts previous

deposition testimony and the party submitting the affidavit does not give

any valid explanation for the contradiction. See Van T. Junkins &

Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir. 1984). 

However, “[t]his rule is applied sparingly because of the harsh effect it

may have on a party’s case.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb

County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007). As such, courts must

“find some inherent inconsistency between an affidavit and a deposition

before disregarding the affidavit.” Id.

Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration in

original). 

The first portion of plaintiff’s affidavit challenged by Travelers is a response

to Travelers’ statement that “[p]laintiff lived in a rental house in Los Angeles from

October 2013 to the present.”10 Plaintiff stated thatshe “did not rent the Los Angeles

house. Rather, I assisted my friend, the Los Angeles homeowner, in getting out of

foreclosure, in exchange for accommodating myself and my dogs. The cost was

approximately the same.”11 Travelers asserts that those statements contradict the

following passages from plaintiff’s previous deposition testimony:

Q. Okay. All right. We are going to go through these in detail. 

I just wanted to make sure that we’re on the same page —

10 Doc. no. 54 (Travelers’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment), at ECF 5, ¶

9 (alteration supplied). 

11

 Doc. no. 61-1 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at 9. 

4

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 4 of 34
A. Right. 

Q. — but these are your documents in support of your damages

in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. With the understanding, as you explained previously, that you

are still living in the home in California and so therefore you still are

incurring rent every month —

A. Yes.

Q. — correct? All right. What I want to do before we go through

these documents is cover some other things, okay? But we will talk

about these because I want to understand what you’ve given us here

today. 

A. Okay.

Q. Now, based on the discovery responsesthat you’ve previously

given us and filed in the case, it is my understanding that you are

currently residing at this [redacted] address?

A. Yes.

Q. And, again, that’s [redacted] in Los Angeles?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, who is Barbara S. Brody?

A. She is the elderly lady that I rent from.

Q. How long have you lived at [redacted] Avenue?

A. I moved from [redacted] to there [during] October of 2013.

5

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 5 of 34
Doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 45-46 (alterations and

emphasis supplied). Plaintiff also testified that she had paid $2,100 a month in rent

for the California property since October 1, 2013.

12 Finally, she testified that she

sometimes mailed her rent checks to the conservator who manages the estate of Ms.

Barbara S. Brody, and sometimes mailed them directly to Ms. Brody’s mortgage

company.13

Plaintiff’s affidavit testimony that she did not rent the home in Los Angeles is

inherently contradictory to her testimony that she did rent the home. Simply because

plaintiff sometimes made her payments directly to her landlord’s mortgage company

does not change the nature of the rental agreement. The challenged statements will

be stricken from plaintiff’s affidavit. 

The other portions of plaintiff’s affidavit challenged by Travelers all relate to

the contents that remained in plaintiff’s Florence, Alabama home after she moved to

California. The first contested statements are found in the following passages:

After closing my art and antiques gallery in Florence, Alabama, in 2008,

I brought many pieces of high-quality antique furniture from my gallery

to my home. However, before departing for California, when I needed

to raise funds for my business travel, my dear friend Judy Sizemore

offered to purchase my high-quality 8-seater mahogany dining roomset. 

I, who am in the business of buying and selling furniture incessantly,

12

 Doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 49. 

13

Id. at 53-54. 

6

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 6 of 34
often acquire or sell furniture, sometimes including personal furniture. 

Ms. Sizemore additionally purchased a few other items of furniture (a

sofa and chairs) from me for Ms. Sizemore and for her son’s home at

that time. Nonetheless, I continued to maintain personal property,

furniture, and other contents of my home in my home after departing for

destinations including California, and all of that personal property,

furniture, and other contentsremained inmy home in Florence, Alabama

until January 28, 2013, when my Florence home was burglarized,

resulting in the theft of many items of personal property, furniture, and

other contents of my home. Travelers recognized this and paid me

$18,749.16 for some of it.

Doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 5. 

Plaintiff also made the following statementsin response to Travelers’ assertion

that, “[i]n August 2012, Ms. [Carmen]Erdmann [plaintiff’s neighbor] and Mr. [Clint]

Pittman [a potential renter] walked through [plaintiff’s Florence] house and noted

only a few items of furniture and that the house contained no toiletries or linens”:14

Disputed that there were “only a few items of furniture” to be seen and

that there were no linens to be seen. Just prior to this period of my

medical convalescence, Deborah Ford Rogers had lived in my house for

many months. I do not know one way or another whether or not

Deborah replenished the toiletries before departing the house. I do

know Deborah used my towels and linens while staying there. Ms.

Erdman had not been present in my house for several years prior to her

visit that day with Mr. Pittman. (Ms. Erdman did not know how much

or little furniture I normally maintained in my home in this period or in

other periods.) I submit that present in the house were my queen-size

bed, my multimedia entertainment center (including television set), my

antique chest of drawers, my chairs, my writing desk, office furniture,

dishes, silverware, a very large refrigerator in the kitchen, a gourmet gas

14 Doc. no. 54 (Travelers’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment), at ECF 7, ¶

23 (alterations supplied). 

7

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 7 of 34
stove, pots and pans, and other items of personal furniture, domestic

furnishings, culinary equipment, and pieces of framed artwork and artquality framed photographs. Nonetheless, . . . I freely concede that I had

sold some personal furniture (particularly the dining room set) to my

friend Judy Sizemore, as well asitems of surplusfurniture. It is not very

surprising if the lack of a dining room set was noticed by visitors

unfamiliar with my recent financial straits.

Doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 7 (ellipsis supplied). Travelers

asserts that plaintiff’s affidavit testimony is inconsistent with both her prior

deposition testimony, and the sworn “Examination Under Oath” to which she

submitted during the claims investigation process.

During her Examination Under Oath, plaintiff was asked why she stored

jewelry in a box in her closet when she left for California if she was not planning to

be away from home for very long. She responded:

A. Because I wasliving in the den in the cottage room, and all the

other rooms, the back room was empty. Nothing was there. Nothing

was left. Judy bought most of the living room stuff. 

Q. Okay. 

A. So I was pretty much selling everything.

Q. For income? 

A. I needed to make some money. I was being foreclosed.

Q. I was just confirming.

A. And Judy can take pictures. I hated that I had to sell my

8

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 8 of 34
dining room table. I know somewhere I’ll show you. It went from my

house to Judy’s house, all my lamps, everything. But she was the only

one who was willing to buy it. And I think sometimes she brought [sic]

it just to help me. 

Q. So because you were just living basically in one room, you

decided to box items up and store them in a closet?

A. Okay. My house costs a fortune to heat. Imagine I can’t sell

anything. I’m getting sick. The only way I can do anything is to try to

get some of the antiques back to LA now. That was the only hope,

otherwise I would have nothing. 

Q. Okay.

A. So if I stayed in the two side rooms — like I stayed in the den

— the den and the little cottage room and one little bathroom, I could

keep those rooms warm because I had those little heaters. If I used the

big heater, it was like $600 a month and I didn’t have it. 

Q. Okay.

A. So eventually they were going to turn me off because I

couldn’t afford it.

Q. So you were using like little space heaters in those smaller

rooms?

A. Yes. It was great because I had the den, the sofa. She bought

all the living room sofa and all of that.

Q. Who did?

A. Judy.

Q. Judy bought all of that?

9

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 9 of 34
A. You can see all of that. She can send us pictures. She bought

that. The living room and dining room was huge [sic], and the living

room also had these huge French doors. There was all this air. It was

just so hard to keep — so I just — that is how I did it. It was the

smartest thing for me to do, to consolidate. 

Q. So when you left the home in February 2012, essentially the

only rooms that were still set up were the den?

A. Yes. Except I did have the entertainment — Deborah at one

point stayed in my cottage room butshe had her own TV. But I did then

put the big TV back into the living room.

Q. What do you call the cottage room? I don’t understand.

A. That was a little bedroom by the den in the middle of the

house.

Q. Not your bedroom?

A. That was — I made that my bedroom because I kept the den

— there was a little cottage room, a bathroom and den.

Q. Okay.

A. I just kind of — that became more of how I consolidated.

Q. You just sort of packed up everything else in the attic?

A. I sold everything I could.

Q. You sold —

A. I sold tons of things. 

Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 315-18. During plaintiff’s

10

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 10 of 34
deposition, she confirmed that she “had essentially sold all of [her] items except for

what [she] had in the cottage room.”15

The court does not find any inherent inconsistencies in plaintiff’s testimony. 

Even though plaintiff testified during her examination that she sold many of her

personal items, she never stated that she sold everything she owned. In fact, she

testified that there were still items remaining in her “cottage room.” That is not

inconsistent with her subsequent affidavit testimony that she retained a bed,

entertainment center, chest of drawers, chairs, writing desk, and office furniture,

along with other decorative items, or that she maintained “personal property,

furniture, and other contents” in her Florence, Alabama home. There is no need to

strike this portion of plaintiff’s affidavit.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In

other words, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

15

 Doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 246 (alterations supplied). 

11

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 11 of 34
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

“In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman

v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v.

City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor of the nonmoving party are not unqualified, however. “[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is

‘only a guess or a possibility,’ for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but

is pure conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d

1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party

for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis and alteration

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)

(asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law”).

III. SUMMARY OF FACTS

12

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 12 of 34
A. Plaintiff’s Policy with Travelers

Travelers issued a Homeowners Policy insuring plaintiff’s Florence, Alabama

residence on July 24, 2008 (“the policy”).16 The policy subsequently was renewed

for several one-year periods, the final one of which covered the period beginning on

July 24, 2012, and extending through the same date in the following year, 2013.

17

Plaintiff received a copy of the policy and had an opportunity to review it.

18

 

The policy provides coverage for “[t]he dwelling on the ‘residence premises’

shown in the Declarations, including structures attached to the dwelling.”

19 The

policy defines “residence premises” as “[t]he one family dwelling where you reside

. . . and which is shown as the ‘residence premises’ in the Declarations.”20 The

Declarations page of the policy identified the “residence premises” as a specific

address in Florence, Alabama, which plaintiff does not dispute is the address of the

home that is the subject of her claim.

21

 

If damage to the dwelling made “that part of the ‘residence premises’ where

16

 Doc. no. 55-31, at ECF 12 (Homeowners Policy New Business Declarations). 

17

 Doc. no. 55-21, at ECF 2 (Homeowners Policy Continuation Declarations). 

18

 Doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 123. 

19 Doc. no. 55-21, at ECF 21 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(A)(1)(a)) (alteration

supplied). 

20

Id. at ECF 21 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § 13) (alteration supplied). 

21 Doc. no. 55-21, at ECF 2 (Homeowners Policy Continuation Declarations). The actual

address of the property is redacted from the copy of the declarations page in the record.

13

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 13 of 34
[the insured] reside[s] not fit to live in,” then the policy also covered “any necessary

increase in living expenses incurred by you so that your household can maintain its

normal standard of living.”22

The policy also provided coverage for personal “property owned or used by an

‘insured’ while it is anywhere in the world.”23 However, there are limits on the

coverage available for certain categories of personal property, including a $1,500

limit “for loss by theft of jewelry, watches, furs, precious and semipreciousstones.”24

Personal property losses would be compensated “at actual cash value at the time of

loss but not more than the amount required to repair or replace.”25

Certain exclusions to coverage applied. Coverage was not provided for

damage to a structure or for a loss caused by:

(4) Vandalism and malicious mischief, and any ensuing loss

caused by any intentional and wrongful act committed in the course of

the vandalism or malicious mischief, if the dwelling has been vacant for

more than 60 consecutive days immediately before the loss. Vacant

means substantially empty of personal property necessary to sustain

normal occupancy. A dwelling being constructed is not considered

vacant;

(5) Constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam, or

the presence or condensation of humidity, moisture or vapor, that occurs

22

 Id. at ECF 20 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(D)(1)) (alterations supplied). 

23

 Id. at ECF 18 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(C)(1)). 

24

 Id. at ECF 19 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(C)(3)(e)). 

25

 Id. (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(3)(a)(1)). 

14

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 14 of 34
over a period of 14 days or more; or

(6) Any of the following:

(a) Wear and tear, marring, deterioration . . . .

Doc. no. 55-21, at ECF 25 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(A)(2)(c)(4)-(6))

(emphasis supplied). 

The policy also excluded losses caused by the neglect of an insured, which was

defined as a failure “to use all reasonable means to save and preserve property at and

after the time of a loss.”26

 Finally, the policy excluded losses caused by:

Faulty, inadequate, or defective:

a. Planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting;

b. Design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction,

renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction;

c. Materials used in repair, construction, renovation or remodeling;

or

d. Maintenance. 

Id. at ECF 29 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(B)(3)). 

A condition of any coverage under the policy was stated as follows: “The

coverage provided and the premiumcharged are based on information you have given

us. You agree to cooperate with us in determining if this information is correct and

26

Id. at ECF 28 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(A)(5)). 

15

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 15 of 34
complete and to inform us of any change in title, use or occupancy of the ‘residence

premises.’”

27 No legal action could be brought against Travelers under the policy

“unless there has been full compliance with all of terms [sic] under Section I of this

policy and the action is brought within the time limitations prescribed by Alabama

law.”28

B. Plaintiff’s Occupancy of the Insured Property

Plaintiff purchased and moved into her home in Florence, Alabama during

2003.

29 The municipal utility company, Florence Utilities, disconnected all of

plaintiff’s utilities in March of 2011, while she was traveling for business, due to her

non-payment of monthly utility bills.

30 The utilities remained disconnected until

August 19, 2011, when plaintiff decided to allow her friend Deborah Ford Rogers to

stay at her home.31 Plaintiff did not charge Ms. Rogers any rent; she only required her

to pay the utilities.

32 Even so, Florence Utilities required proof of Ms. Rogers’

residency before they would transfer the utilities to Ms. Rogers’ name, so plaintiff

27 Doc. no. 55-21, at ECF 39 (Homeowners PolicyBooklet, § I-II(2)) (alteration and emphasis

supplied). 

28

Id. at ECF 11 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(9)). 

29

 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 101, 103. 

30

 Doc. no. 55-25 (Affidavit of Kathy Anderson), at ¶¶ 3-4.

31

Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8; doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 1-2, Response to Statement

14. 

32

 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 88-90. 

16

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 16 of 34
and Ms. Rogers executed a rental agreement stating that Ms. Rogers was leasing the

property from plaintiff at a rate of $1,200 per month for a one-year period beginning

on August 15, 2011.33 Plaintiff attested that the lease agreement was a “mere ‘red

tape’ formal necessity with the understanding with Deborah [that it was] in fact not

contractually binding in any way between us [as] two longstanding friends.”34 Ms.

Rogers moved out of plaintiff’s home in January or February of the following year,

butshe continued making utility payments until April 3, 2012. On that date, all of the

utilities to the house were, once again, disconnected.

35

During the early part of 2012, plaintiff sold many of the personal items in her

Florence home in order to generate income. She retained a sofa, television set, stereo

system, entertainment center, bed, dresser, stove, oven,refrigerator, dishwasher, some

small kitchen appliances, and some artwork. To conserve energy and decrease her

heating costs, she closed off some of the rooms and began living in a bedroom by the

den in the middle of the house. She called the bedroom her “cottage room.”36

Plaintiff departed Florence in late February 2012, and drove to California on

33 Doc. no. 55-17 (Rental Agreement). See also doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella

Bauer), at 217-18. 

34

 Doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 2 (alterations supplied). 

35 Doc. no. 55-13 (Deposition of Deborah Ford Rogers), at 39; doc. no. 55-4 (Examination

Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 89-93; doc. no. 55-24 (Affidavit of Kathy Anderson), at ¶ 8.

36 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 221, 315-18; doc. no. 55-5

(Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 246; doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 5,

Response to Statement 21. 

17

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 17 of 34
a business trip for the purpose of selling antiques. After making several stops along

the way to visit family, she arrived in early March 2012 at the home of her friends

Wendy McKenzie and Gary Austin in Valley Village, California.37 Plaintiff initially

planned for her stay to last approximately six weeks, but she suffered a ruptured

appendix and required emergency surgery on April 8, 2012, while still inCalifornia.38

She spent the remainder of 2012 convalescing at the McKenzie/Austin residence

because she was unable to drive back to Alabama.39 She initially planned to return

to Alabama in December of 2012, but her friends and family in California convinced

her to stay there through the holiday season.

40 Plaintiff testified that her neighbor

Tom Matthews regularly checked on her Florence, Alabama property while she was

away, but the record does not contain any testimony from Mr. Matthews himself.41

Plaintiff applied for and received medical benefits and food stamps from the

State of California’s “Medi-Cal” program during April of 2012.42

 She also opened

37 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 25-26, 28-30, 105-06; doc. no.

61-1 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at 5, Response to Statement 5.

38 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 25-26; doc. no. 61-1 (Affidavit

of Rose Bauer), at 5, Response to Statement 5.

39 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 25-30; doc. no. 61-1 (Affidavit

of Rose Bauer), at ECF 5, Response to Statement 5.

40

 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 124-25. 

41

Id. at 79-80; doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 236; doc. no. 61-1

(Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 8, Response to Statement 7; doc. no. 61-4 (Affidavit of Rose

Bauer), at ECF 3-4, Response to Statement 48. 

42 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 66, 350-51; doc. no. 55-5

(Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 197-200; doc. no. 61-1 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF

18

Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 18 of 34
a checking account at a California bank during July of 2012, in order to fund the costs

of a film production project on which she wanted to resume work.

43 She did not

actually resume work on that project during the summer of 2012, however. Thus,

“the checking account had essentially no activity, and the account was automatically

closed by the bank some months later.”44 

Plaintiff’sfriend Judy Sizemore, who resided in Florence, Alabama, suggested

to plaintiff in August of 2012 that she rent the upstairs loft room of her house to a

man named Clint Pittman, who might be willing to perform some repairsto the home. 

Plaintiff was experiencing financial difficulty during her convalescence. 

Consequently, she and Ms. Sizemore discussed the potential arrangement with Mr.

Pittman. Plaintiff asked her neighbor Carmen Erdmann, who had a key to the house,

to show Mr. Pittman the property.

45

 Ms. Erdmann and Mr. Pittman walked through

the property during August 2012.

46 Ms. Erdmann testified that the house was in

“disarray,” with broken pipes, exterior doors left open, and old food on the

10, Response to Statement 10.

43 Doc. no. 55-6 (Continuation of Deposition of Rose Bauer), at 95-96; doc. no. 61-2

(Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 1, Response to Statement 13.

44

 Doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 1, Response to Statement 13.

45

 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 177, 182, 203; doc. no. 55-5

(Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 223; doc. no. 55-12 (Deposition of Carmen Erdmann), at

19-25; doc. no. 55-14 (Deposition of Clint Pittman), at 18-24; doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose

Bauer), at ECF 6, Response to Statement 22. 

46

 Doc. no. 55-12 (Deposition of Carmen Erdmann), at 17. 

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countertops and in the refrigerator.

47 According to Ms. Erdmann, The house

contained “minimal furniture, if any.”48 There was an armoire in the main living

room; a stove, refrigerator, and “miscellaneous kitchen items” in the kitchen; a bed

and other personal items in a back bedroom; and a large movie poster in either the

living roomor dining room.

49 Ms. Erdmann testified thatshe observed a sleeping bag

in the first bedroom,so she deduced that there were no bed linens in the house.50 She

also noticed shingles missing from the roof.51 Mr. Pittman testified that the house

was “in total discord” and “completely trashed out.”

52 He observed old food and

animal droppings in the kitchen.

53 There was no furniture in the foyer, hallway, or

dining room, a television cabinet in the living room, a non-functioning stove and

refrigerator in the kitchen, a washer and dryer on the back porch, and a restaurantstyle table and chairs in a bedroom. Mr. Pittman observed no toiletries or linens

stocked in the house, and utilities were disconnected.

54 There was a hole in the porch

screen, the valleys of the roof were full of debris, and there was a hole in the roof near

47

Id. at 29-30. 

48

Id. at 34. 

49

Id. at 30, 34. 

50

Id. at 49. 

51

Id. at 63.

52

 Doc. no. 55-14 (Deposition of Clint Pittman), at 30. 

53

Id.

54

Id. at 30-37.

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the front door that was causing a leak.

55

 

Plaintiff disputes Ms. Erdmann’s assertion that there was only “minimal

furniture” in the home, and attests that, on the date Ms. Erdmann and Mr. Pittman

walked through the house, it contained plaintiff’s

queen-size bed, . . . multimedia entertainment Center (including

television set), . . . antique chest of drawers, . . . chairs, . . . writing desk,

office furniture, dishes, silverware, a very large refrigerator in the

kitchen, a gourmet gas stove, pots and pans, and other items of personal

furniture, domestic furnishings, culinary equipment, and pieces of

framed artwork and art-quality framed photographs.

Doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 7, Response to Statement 23

(ellipses supplied). She also asserts that her roof was damaged in a hail storm that

occurred after she left town in February of 2012.

56

Plaintiff drafted a Rental Contract dated September 1, 2012, and stating that

Clint Pittman agreed to lease the property for a fixed term beginning on that date and

ending on February 30, 2014, with an option to convert to a month-to-month lease at

the end of the term. The contract required a security deposit of $300, and it specified

a monthly rent of $1,000, which included a $400 discount for “Tenant agreeing to do

all repairs, clean interior and exterior of the home, replace water heater, heating and

55

Id. at 50, 52. 

56 Doc. no. 61-2 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 8-9, Response to Statement 24; doc. no.

61-3 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 1, Response to Statement 24. As discussed on page 28, infra,

plaintiff is not seeking to recover for the damage to her roof. 

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ac unit, maintaining the grounds and over seeing [sic] the care and feeding of two

black labrador retrievers that live on the property.”57 The contract also stated that

plaintiff had the right to terminate the agreement after one year if she decided to move

back into or sell the property, and it contained a handwritten addition signed by

plaintiff, dated September 11, 2012, and stating: “If I choose to sell my home in two

years or less, Clint Pittman will have first position to make an offer.”58 This court’s

record only contains one copy of the rental contract. That copy contains plaintiff’s

typed name and the date of “9/1/2012.” Other than the handwritten addition noted

above, however, the copy does not contain the signature of either plaintiff or Mr.

Pittman.

59 Even so, Carmen Erdmann testified that she saw Mr. Pittman sign a copy

of the contract.

60 Mr. Pittman testified that, even though he never possessed or saw

a copy of the contract that contained both his signature and plaintiff’s, he thought that

he had a copy that bore plaintiff’s signature, and she had a copy that bore his

signature.61

Plaintiff never informed Travelers that she had entered into a rental agreement

57

 Doc. no. 55-18 (Rental Contract), at ECF 2. See also doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under

Oath of Rose Bauer), at 177-78; doc. no. 55-12 (Deposition of Carmen Erdmann), at 59, 67-69; doc.

no. 55-14 (Deposition of Clint Pittman), at 25, 29, 37. 

58

 Doc. no. 55-18 (Rental Contract), at ECF 3. 

59

See id. The handwritten addition dated September 11, 2012 is accompanied by plaintiff’s

signature, but the original contract, dated September 1, 2012, does not. 

60

 Doc. no. 55-12 (Deposition of Carmen Erdmann), at 67.

61

 Doc. no. 55-14 (Deposition of Clint Pittman), at 28-29. 

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with Mr. Pittman, or that Mr. Pittman would be staying in and performing repairs to

her home.62

In fact, however, Mr. Pittman never moved into plaintiff’s home, but he did

obtain a key from Ms. Erdmann, and he began cleaning the property, both inside and

out.

63 Without plaintiff’s authorization, Mr. Pittman attempted to have the utilities

reconnected, but the attempt caused a small fire at the electrical box, and no further

attempts were made.64 At the direction of the City of Florence electrical inspector,

the electrical meter for the property was removed on September 18, 2012, and all the

utilities have remained disconnected since that date, except that the water service was

reconnected on October 20, 2015.

65 Plaintiff subsequently had the locks to the house

changed and, as a consequence, Mr. Pittman could not use the key he had been

provided to gain access.

66

Plaintiff still resides in the Los Angeles, California area.67 She attests that she

remained in California through January 28, 2013, because of her convalescence and

62

 Doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 223-25. 

63 Doc. no. 55-12 (Deposition of Carmen Erdmann), at 90; doc. no. 55-14 (Deposition of

Clint Pittman), at 42, 46-49. 

64 Doc. no. 55-14 (Deposition of Clint Pittman), at 37, 44; doc. no. 61-3 (Affidavit of Rose

Bauer), at ECF 4, Response to Statement 29. 

65 Doc. no. 55-24 (Affidavit of Kathy Anderson), at ¶¶ 11-12. See also doc. no. 55-14

(Deposition of Clint Pittman), at 43-44. 

66

 Doc. no. 61-3 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 5-6, Response to Statement 31. 

67

 Doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 103. 

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holiday plans, and that she continued to stay in California after the theft because her

Florence, Alabama home was rendered uninhabitable, and, without insurance

proceeds, she lacks the funds to restore it.

68 She stayed in the home of Wendy

McKenzie and Gary Austin in Valley Village, California, until October of 2013.

69

Since October 2013, she has been residing in the Los Angeles home of an elderly

friend who had to move to a nursing home facility. Plaintiff pays $2,100 per month

to stay in that home, plusthe cost of utilities. Sometimes plaintiff makesthe payment

to the conservator of her friend’s estate, and sometimes she makes it directly to her

friend’s mortgage company, to cover the cost of her friend’s mortgage.70 

C. The January 28, 2013 Theft and Subsequent Investigation

Carmen Erdmann observed individuals breaking into, taking items from, and

vandalizing plaintiff’s home on January 28, 2013. She notified both the Florence

police and plaintiff, who still was in California.71 Plaintiff reported the break-in to

Travelers on February 1, 2013, stating that the thieves had stripped some copper pipes

from the walls and taken her air conditioning unit, stainless steel stove, refrigerator

68

 Doc. no. 61-1 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 8, Response to Statement 7. 

69

 Doc. no. 55-5 (Deposition of Rosalee Stella Bauer), at 47. 

70

Id. at 44-54. 

71 Doc. no. 55-12 (Deposition of Carmen Erdmann), at 74-84; doc. no. 55-4 (Examination

Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 195-200, 208. 

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doors, and jewelry.

72 Travelers conducted its first inspection of the property on

February 14, 2013, because plaintiff was not able to travel back to Alabama from

California until that date.73 Travelers learned during the initial inspection that

plaintiff had not stayed at the house since March of 2012, and that the utilities had

been disconnected since April of 2012.

74 Travelers agreed to pay plaintiff’s

“Alternative Living Expenses,” including hotel accommodations, for the period

February 13 to 16, 2013, when she was in Florence for the investigation, but it

declined to pay any additional Alternative Living Expenses.

75

Travelers conducted a second inspection of the property on March 10, 2013,

and a portion of that inspection report stated:

Inspection revealed deteriorated shingles that are in poor

condition. Shingles are twenty year three tab that appear to be twenty

years or older. Deteriorated pipe boots and exhaust vents were noted. 

Visible rot to dormer window and rear section of dwelling. Chimney

mortar deteriorated. Valleys clogged with debris. Interior damages

consist of mold throughout dwelling. A portion of the upstairs ceiling

had collapsed from what appears to be water entering through

deteriorated exhaust vent. A hole was noted to leftside of dwelling roof

but is not consistent with the interior water damage to ceiling upstairs. 

Contractor agreed. Wiring had been cut in several places. Motors to

units inside were not taken nor was the cooper lines leading to exterior

HVAC units. Some wiring in basement was cut but the wiring appears

72

 Doc. no. 55-2 (Travelers Claim File), at ECF 2-4. 

73

Id. at ECF 3-6. 

74

Id. at ECF 5-8.

75

 Doc. no. 55-2 (Travelers Claim File), at ECF 3-8. 

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to be from discontinued junction boxes that were no longer in use. 

There was no sign of damaged wiring to the updated/newer electric

service. Doorsto refrigerator missing[;] bed frame in bedroom and desk

in office along with boxes of contents upstairs. There were also

contents stored in shed #2[.] The outside HVAC units that were

reported stolen in HPG8680 was noted that the two exterior breaker

boxes did not have the fuse pulled or the breaker cut off disengaged. 

Both boxes were in the on position.

Doc. no. 55-3 (Travelers Claim File), at ECF 4-5 (alterations supplied). 

John Carroll, an investigator from Travelers Investigative Services, also

conducted an investigation of plaintiff’s claim during early and mid-March of 2013. 

Mr. Carroll looked into plaintiff’s financial status, including any prior lawsuits,

judgments, or liens against her, and the status of her mortgage.76 

D. Travelers’ Decisions

Travelers mailed a letter to plaintiff on May 20, 2013, informing her that her

claim for damage to her property due to vandalism and theft was denied because she

had not been using the property as her residence, and because the property had been

vacant for more than sixty days prior to the theft.

77 Travelers continued to investigate

plaintiff’s claim for loss of personal property, however,78and plaintiff submitted to

76

 Doc. no. 55-25 (Affidavit of John Carroll), at ¶¶ 1, 6-7. 

77 Doc. no. 55-29 (May 20, 2013 letter denying coverage for property damage due to

vandalism and theft). Travelers also sent another letter the same day, denying coverage on plaintiff’s

claim for roof damage. See doc. no. 55-30 (May 20, 2013 letter denying coverage for roof damage). 

Because plaintiff has abandoned her claim for roof damage recovery, it is not necessary to discuss

that letter. See infra, page 28.

78

See doc. no. 55-29 (May 20, 2013 letter denying coverage for property damage due to

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an examination under oath on January 16, 2014.

79 Travelers also agreed to reopen

plaintiff’s claim for property damage while it continued to investigate the personal

property claim.

80

Travelers mailed another letter to plaintiff a letter on May 21, 2014, informing

her that it would grant coverage for lost personal property in the amount of

$18,749.16.

81 Travelers estimated that plaintiff would be entitled to an additional

$10,088.19 in deprecation upon replacement of her lost items, but plaintiff has not

replaced any of the items she lost in the theft.

82 Plaintiff disputes that amount,

claiming instead that she should have been awarded $62,650.00.

83 Travelers mailed

another letter to plaintiff on May 21, 2014, reaffirming its prior position that no

coverage was available for physical damage to the physicalstructure of her Florence,

Alabama house, because the property had not been plaintiff’s “residence premises”

at the time of her loss.

84

vandalism and theft), at ECF 2 (“The claim for personal property damage and/or theft is still being

investigated at this time.”). 

79

See doc. no. 55-28 (January 16, 2014 letter informing plaintiff of January 22, 2014

examination under oath); doc. no. 55-4 (Examination Under Oath of Rose Bauer), at 1. 

80

See doc. no. 55-33 (May14, 2014 letter reaffirming denial of coverage for propertydamage

due to vandalism and theft), at ECF 1 (“After you requested that Travelers reconsider its coverage

decision, Travelers agreed to reopen its investigation.”). 

81

 Doc. no. 55-32 (May 2014 letter awarding coverage for loss of personal property). 

82

 Doc. no. 55-34 (Affidavit of Lynn Thornton), at ¶¶ 12-13. 

83

 Doc. no. 61-4 (Affidavit of Rose Bauer), at ECF 5, Response to Statement 51. 

84

 Doc. no. 55-33 (May 14, 2014 letter reaffirming denial of coverage for property damage

due to vandalism and theft)

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IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has withdrawn her bad faith claim, and her breach of contract claim

related to coverage for roof and mold damage.85 Thus, the only remaining claims are 

the breach of contract claims related to coverage for property damage to the physical

structure of plaintiff’s property, and for loss of (and damage to) personal property.

“In order to establish a breach-of-contract claim, a plaintiff mustshow ‘(1) the

existence of a valid contract binding the parties in the action, (2) [her] own

performance under the contract, (3) the defendant’s nonperformance, and (4)

damages.’” Ex parte Alfa Mutual Insurance Co., 799 So. 2d 957, 962 (Ala. 2001)

(quoting Southern Medical Health Systems, Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So. 2d 98, 99 (Ala.

1995)) (alteration supplied). 

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Travelers failed to perform under the

insurance contract. Travelers was not required to cover the damages to the physical

structure of plaintiff’s house because the property was not plaintiff’s “residence

premises” at the time of the loss. A dwelling house is not an insured’s residence

premises unless she resides in it, and plaintiff was not residing in her Florence,

Alabama home when it was vandalized. The policy does not define the term“reside,”

but a common, authoritative dictionary defines it as “to sit back, remain, abide”; “to

85 Doc. no. 61 (Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 2 (“The Plaintiff withdraws

her claim for roof and mold damages.”), 3 (“Plaintiff does not insist on her bad faith claim . . . .”). 

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settle oneself or a thing in a place: be stationed: REMAIN, STAY.” Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary 1931 (2002).86 When the burglary occurred in January

of 2013, plaintiff was not remaining, abiding, or settling herself into her Florence,

Alabama property. In fact, she had not set foot in the property for almost a year. 

Instead, because of her health problems, she had been residing in California since

March of 2012, first at the home of friends, then at a home she rented. She received

medical and other benefits from the State of California, and she opened a checking

account there. In the meantime, she entered into an agreement for Clint Pittman to

rent her Florence, Alabama home, even though he never moved into and occupied the

dwelling. She also kept the utilities to the property disconnected after April of 2012. 

Those facts indicate that plaintiff was residing in California, and not Alabama, when

her house was vandalized.

Plaintiff asserts that she retained residency in both Alabama and California.87

She relies upon the fact that her neighbor, Tom Matthews, looked after the property

86

 “General rules of contract law govern an insurance contract.” Safeway Insurance Co. of

Alabama v. Herrera, 912 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Ala. 2005) (citing Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Alfa

Mutual Insurance Co., 817 So. 2d 687, 691 (Ala. 2001)). “If a word or phrase is not defined in the

policy, then the court should construe the word or phrase according to the meaning a person of

ordinary intelligence would reasonably give it.” Safeway Insurance Co., 912 So. 2d at 1143 (citing

Twin City Fire Insurance Co., 817 So. 2d at 692). In determining the common meaning of the terms

of an insurance policy, [the Alabama Supreme Court] has looked to dictionary definitions.” State

Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 309 (Ala. 1999) (citing Emergency Aid

Insurance Co. v. Dobbs, 263 Ala. 594, 83 So. 2d 335 (1955)) (alteration supplied). 

87 Doc. no. 61 (Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 2 (“A person can live in two

locations.”). 

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while she was away. That fact is not persuasive, because plaintiff likely would want

a caretaker for an investment or rental property just as much as she would want one

for her own residence. In addition, and in reliance upon cases discussing jurisdiction

and venue, plaintiff asserts that the term “residence” is the same thing as “domicile,”

which indicates a permanent, fixed home to which a person intendsto return, and that

her Florence, Alabama home was her domicile because she intended to return there

after she recovered from her illness. Plaintiff relies upon Seymour v. Seymour, 597

So. 2d 1368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), but that case is limited to the context of Alabama

Code § 30-2-5, which discusses residency requirements for filing a divorce case in

the Alabama state courts.

88

See Seymour, 597 So. 2d at 1369 (“For purposes of §

30-2-5, residence is the same thing as domicile.”) (emphasis supplied). There is no

indication that the Court of Civil Appeals’statementshould be extended beyond that

specific context. In fact, the Alabama Supreme Court has explicitly stated that,

outside the context of determining the appropriate venue for a case, “the terms

‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ are not considered synonymous.” Ex parte Sides, 594 So.

2d 93, 95 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis supplied). In contrast, in the insurance context,

courts have considered the term“residence” to be more closely tied to the place where

88 That code section states: “When the defendant is a nonresident, the other party to the

marriage must have been a bona fide resident of this state for six months next before the filing of the

complaint, which must be alleged in the complaint and proved.” Ala. Code § 30-2-5.

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Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 30 of 34
a person is currently living than to the place where a person intends eventually to

return and remain; i.e., “domicile.” See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 558 (9th ed.

2009) (defining “domicile” as “[t]he place at which a person has been physically

present and that the person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, principal, and

permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though

currently residing elsewhere”) (alteration supplied); Morton v. Automobile Insurance

Co. of Hartford, Conn., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1248, 1256 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (“Courts

addressing substantiallysimilarlanguage [ i.e., the “residence premises” requirement]

under Alabama law have concluded that homeowners who rent their property but do

not reside there are not covered.”) (alteration supplied); Country Casualty Insurance

Co. v. Massey, No. 3:09CV803-MEF, 2010 WL 5579881, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 20,

2010) (holding that an insured did not “reside” at a property when she did not live

there at the time of the loss); McGrath v. Allstate Insurance Co., 802 N.W.2d 619,

622-24 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that an insured who was not living in the

insured property at the time of the loss because of an extended illness, but who

intended to return to the property, was not a “resident” of the property). 

The Court of Appeals of Michigan concisely articulated the reasoning behind

the residence requirement in a persuasive opinion, McGrath v. Allstate Insurance Co.,

802 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), in which the court stated that:

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Case 3:15-cv-00348-CLS Document 75 Filed 01/20/17 Page 31 of 34
The multiple risks assumed by an insurer in exchange for an

insurance premium are tied to an understanding that the building

structure covered is where the insured dwells either permanently or for

a considerable period because the risks assumed are clearly affected by

the presence of the insured in the dwelling and the associated activities

stemming from this presence. Unoccupied or vacant homes, with no

resident present to oversee security or maintenance, are at greater risk

for break-ins, vandalism, fire, and water damage . . . .

Id. at 624. It stands to reason that the risk of vandalism to plaintiff’s home increased

as a result of her extended absence. And, indeed, vandalism did occur during her

long absence. If Travelers had known that it was insuring the risk of damage to an

unoccupied home, it likely would have charged plaintiff a higher premium.

89 The

court understands that plaintiff’s absence from her home was unexpected, and is

sympathetic to the health issues she faced. Even so, there is no exception to the

“residence premises” requirement for unexpected or illness-related absences —

especially absences as lengthy as those involved in this case. Because the Florence,

Alabama property was not plaintiff’s residence premises at the time of the loss, she

cannot recover for damages to the structure of that property itself. 

The same reasoning applies to plaintiff’s claim for additional living expenses. 

89

See doc. no. 55-21, at ECF 39 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I-II(2)) (“The coverage

provided and the premium charged are based on information you have given us. You agree to

cooperate with us in determining if this information is correct and complete and to inform us of any

change in title, use or occupancy of the ‘residence premises.’ You agree that, if within 60 days of

the policy effective date this information changes, is incorrect or incomplete, we may adjust your

coverage and premium accordingly by giving you notice.”) (emphasis supplied).

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Plaintiff’s entitlement to additional living expensesis only triggered if her “residence

premises” are rendered “not fit to live in.”90 Because the property was not plaintiff’s

residence premises, she is not entitled to receive additional living expenses. 

Plaintiff’s ability to recover for loss of her personal property requires a separate

analysis. The policy provides coverage for plaintiff’s personal property “anywhere

in the world,”91not just at (or within) the “residence premises.” Even so, a condition

of all types of coverage under the policy is that the policy holder must “inform

[Travelers] of any change in title, use or occupancy of the ‘residence premises.’”

92

Plaintiff failed to notify Travelersthat neither she nor anyone else was occupying the

property after February of 2012. Therefore, she is not entitled to any coverage under

the policy, even coverage for loss to personal property.

93

Even if plaintiff were entitled to coverage for her personal property, she has not

submitted any proof that her damages should be more than the $18,749.16 amount

that Travelers already has paid to her. Thus, plaintiff has failed to present sufficient

evidence regarding one element of her breach of contract claim (i.e., damages), and

she accordingly is not entitled to recover any additional amountsfrom Travelers. See

90

Id. at ECF 20 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(D)(1)). 

91

Id. at ECF 18 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(C)(1)). 

92

Id. at ECF 39 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I-II(2)) (alteration and emphasis supplied).

93

See id. at ECF 11 (Homeowners Policy Booklet, § I(9) (“No action can be brought against

us unless there has been full compliance with all of terms [sic] of Section I of this policy and the

action is brought within the time limitations prescribed by Alabama law.”) (emphasis supplied). 

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State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Williams, 926 So. 2d 1008, 1015-18 (Ala. 2005). 

In summary, plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence to support any of

her breach of contract claims against Travelers, and summary judgment is due to be

entered in favor of Travelers on all of plaintiff’s claims. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing, Travelers’ motion to strike is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s affidavit testimony that she did not rent a home

in Los Angeles, California, is STRICKEN. In all other respects, the motion is

DENIED. 

Travelers’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and all of plaintiff’s

claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Costs are taxed as paid. The Clerk is

directed to close this file. 

DONE this 20th day of January, 2017.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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