Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-00363/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-00363-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONTAVIAS HAYNES,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANTHONY HEDGPETH, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-00363-JST (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; STAYING ACTION AND 

REFERRING FOR SETTLEMENT 

PROCEEDINGS; DIRECTIONS TO 

CLERK

Re: Dkt. No. 60

Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Salinas 

Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), filed the instant civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, and the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by not providing him with Friday Jumu’ah 

prayer services. Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff

did not file any opposition to the motion, and the deadline by which to do so has passed.1 For the 

reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART.

//

//

//

 

1

Plaintiff requested, and the Court granted, a 30-day extension of time to file his opposition. 

Docket Nos. 66 and 67. With the extension of time, Plaintiff’s opposition was due October 10, 

2014. Docket No. 67.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

A. Prison Staff Reduction and Redirection Plan (June 2010 – July 2011)

During the fiscal year from June 2010 to July 2011, various SVSP staff positions were not 

filled due to the severe state budget crisis. The ensuing overall shortage of correctional officers 

meant that on certain yards there were insufficient correctional officers to run the normal 

programming (e.g., yard, dayroom, religious services) and simultaneously maintain safety and 

security. Docket No. 64 (“Hatton Decl.”), ¶ 4. Rather than have irregular interruptions with the 

prison programs, CDCR requested that staff be redirected to different yards on different days to 

ensure that no one prison yard suffered interruption to normal programming for an extended 

period of time. Id., ¶ 5. Then-Warden of SVSP, Defendant Anthony Hedgpeth, initiated a 3% and 

5% Redirection Plan (“Redirection Plan”), whereby correctional officers and supervisors were 

redirected from their regular posts to fill staff vacancies on other yards on certain days. Id., ¶¶ 4–5 

and Ex. B.

Under the Redirection Plan, staff was redirected from Facility B every Friday. Hatton 

Decl., ¶ 6. As a result, inmate movement was restricted on Facility B on Fridays. Inmates were 

not allowed out of their cells except for medical and mental health care appointments; were not 

permitted to attend yard; and were not allowed to attend group worship. Id., ¶¶ 7–8. For group 

worship to take place, a yard officer must supervise inmates crossing the yard to access the chapel, 

and, because the chaplain is not a correctional officer, a correctional officer must supervise the 

group worship by standing outside the chapel door. Id., ¶ 8. Supervision is necessary because 

there are security risks associated with allowing inmates to attend group worship services 

unsupervised, including inmate violence, bartering of contraband, communication of gang orders, 

and passing of weapons. Id., ¶ 8. On Fridays, Facility B was staffed with only one floor officer 

and one control-booth officer for each building; two medical escort officers; and one sergeant. Id., 

¶ 6. These officers could not be redirected to supervise the yard and the chapel. Control-booth 

officers could not be redirected because they monitor the ingress and egress of all movement 

 

2

The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

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throughout the unit. Medical escort officers could not be redirected because they escort inmates to 

medical appointments, which could not be cancelled due to the potential risk to inmate health and 

safety. Id.

The dates and times of staff reassignment under the Redirection Plan were chosen to 

accommodate staffing schedules and programming expectations. Docket No. 1 at 13. The

Redirection Plan accommodated mandatory staff trainings, which were held on the first Monday 

and the third Friday of each month. Id. Religious religious services were conducted seven days a 

week, so it was inevitable that accommodating staff training would impact some religious group. 

Id. As an accommodation, Muslim services were being conducted on Wednesdays and Thursdays 

under normal circumstances. Id. 

Defendants do not dispute that the Redirection Plan, as applied to Facility B, only 

impacted Muslims. Inmates of other religious faiths housed in Facility B were able to continue 

group worship in the chapel under normal circumstances. Defendants claim, however, that the 

rotating schedule of program modifications under the Redirection Plan equally affected all SVSP 

inmates.

B. Inmate Riots and Modified Programs (June 23, 2010 – February 9, 2012)

Prison staff typically institute a modified program after instances of mass violence. A 

modified program significantly restricts inmate mobility and programming: inmates are escorted 

by correctional officers at all times when they move about the prison; inmates eat all meals in their 

cells instead of the dining halls; most or all programming is cancelled; dayroom and outdoor 

recreational activities are cancelled; and religious services can be either cancelled or restricted to 

in-cell worship. Hatton Decl., ¶ 9. Medical and health appointments are not cancelled. Id., ¶ 11.

Modified programs must be approved by the warden or his designee. Hatton Decl., ¶ 9. 

Prison staff strive to limit the inmates affected by the modified program and the duration of a 

modified program. Id., ¶ 10. Modified programs assist in maintaining prison security in three 

ways: (1) inmate movement is restricted, reducing the likelihood of additional violence; (2) they 

provide a cooling-off period for the involved inmates and their allies; and (3) they allow staff to 

conduct searches and interviews. Id., ¶ 10. After searches and interviews have been completed, 

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programming is phased back in through a process called “incremental release” whereby a handful 

of inmates are released to the yard each day. Id., ¶ 12. If fights break out, all inmates are returned 

to their cells and a cooling-off period of several days or longer is put into place during which no 

inmates are allowed in the yard. Id., ¶ 12. Incremental release begins again after the cooling-off 

period. Id., ¶ 12. 

From June 2010 through January 2012, there were numerous instances of prisoner riots in 

Facility B. As a result, during this time, some or all of the inmates housed in Facility B were 

placed on a modified program. On June 23, 2010, two riots between black inmates and northern 

Hispanic inmates occurred simultaneously in two buildings on Facility B. Hatton Decl., ¶ 13. At 

least 26 inmates were involved and several suffered serious injuries. Several inmate-manufactured 

weapons were discovered after the riots ended. Id. The violence included non-gang affiliated 

inmates of each ethnic or racial group. Id. In response, Warden Hedgpeth approved a modified 

program for all inmates in Facility B. Hatton Decl., ¶ 13 and Ex. D. Under the modified program, 

religious services were limited to in-cell worship. Hatton Decl., Ex. D. On September 8, 2010, 

prison staff started incremental releases of black and Northern Hispanic inmates. Hatton Decl., 

¶ 14 and Exs. F and G. That same day, a riot occurred between two black inmates and two 

Northern Hispanic inmates. Id., Ex. G. It was not until November 3, 2010 that black inmates 

returned to normal programming. Id., Ex. E. Northern Hispanic inmates remained on the 

modified program. Id.

On January 20, 2011, during an incremental release of northern Hispanic inmates, another 

riot ensured. Hatton Decl., ¶ 15 and Ex. E. Consequently, all incremental releases were rescinded 

and Warden Hedgpeth approved a modified program for black and northern Hispanic inmates in 

Facility B. Id. Under the modified program, religious services were limited to in-cell worship. 

Hatton Decl., Ex. E. 

On May 11, 2011, all black inmates resumed normal programming while northern 

Hispanic inmates remained on the modified program. Hatton Decl., ¶ 16 and Ex. F. On or about 

July 21, 2011, prison staff received information of a credible threat to Facility B. Warden 

Hedgpeth approved a modified program for all inmates to facilitate searches and interviews. Id.,

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¶ 17 and Ex. G. On August 9, 2011, incremental releases began. Id., ¶ 18. However, within 

fifteen minutes after the inmates’ release to the yard, northern Hispanic inmates attacked black 

inmates. Id. As a result, Warden Hedgpeth approved a modified program for Northern Hispanic 

inmates and normal programming was resumed for all other inmates. Id., ¶ 18 and Ex. H. 

On November 2, 2011, Northern Hispanic inmates attacked black inmates during an 

incremental release. Northern Hispanics inmates were placed on a modified program. Hatton 

Decl., ¶ 19. On December 15, 2011, during incremental releases, another riot occurred between 

Northern Hispanic and black inmates. Warden Hedgpeth approved a modified program for black 

and Northern Hispanic inmates. Hatton Decl., ¶ 20 and Ex. I. 

On December 21, 2011, all inmates, except black inmates, began incremental releases, 

because prison staff had not yet interviewed the black inmates. Hatton Decl., ¶ 21 and Ex. J. On 

January 19, 2012, incremental release began for all inmates and was completed by February 9, 

2012, resulting in the resumption of normal programming for all Facility B inmates. Hatton Decl. 

¶ 22 and Ex. K.

The modified programs instituted between June 23, 2010 and February 9, 2012 prohibited 

group worship for either all inmates or for inmates of certain racial/ethnic groups. The group 

worship restriction was not based on an inmate’s religious faith. 

C. Plaintiff’s Religious Faith and Access to Friday Group Jumu’ah Prayers 

Plaintiff is a black male and a devout Muslim practitioner of the Islamic faith. Docket No. 

46 at 1, 3. Muslims pray five times daily. Docket No. 62 (“Lawal Decl.”) at ¶ 5. This prayer may 

be performed by the practitioner alone. Id. On Friday afternoons, the Muslim religious practice 

requires adherents to attend the Jumu’ah prayer. Docket No. 46 at 3. The Jumu’ah prayer is a 

congregational prayer, consisting of a sermon by the imam followed by two units, or prayers, 

together with the congregation. Lawal Decl., ¶ 5. 

Since 1997, SVSP has provided inmates access to the chapel in their facility for group 

worship. Docket No. 62 (“Hernandez Decl.”) at ¶ 6. Access to the chapel requires passing 

through the yard. Id. Inmates who are Muslims of the Islamic faith hold Jumu’ah prayer services

in the chapel on Fridays. Docket No. 46 at 5. On Saturdays, Native American inmates have 

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access to chapel and to their special sweat lodges for their worship services. Id. Catholic, 

Protestant, and other Christian inmates hold worship services in the chapel on Sundays. Docket 

No. 46 at 4. 

Between May 20, 2010 and June 26, 2013, Plaintiff was housed in SVSP Facility B. 

Docket No. 64 (“Hatton Decl.”) at ¶ 2, Ex. A. From June 26, 2013 to July 3, 2013, Plaintiff was 

housed in SVSP Facility C. Hatton Decl., Ex. A. On July 3, 2013, Plaintiff was moved to SVSP 

Facility D, where he is currently housed. Id.

Plaintiff states that beginning in December 2010 and continuing through October 2013 (the 

date of the filing of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in this case), all Muslim inmates 

housed in Facility B were denied access to the chapel on Fridays and therefore unable to 

participate in group Jumu’ah prayer services. Docket No. 46 at 7 and 11. Defendants dispute this 

statement. Defendants provide prison records that show that Friday Jumu’ah prayer services were 

offered in Facility B’s chapel five times in May 2011, once in August 2011, and three times in 

November 2011. Docket No. 62 (“Hernandez Decl.”), ¶ 4 and Ex. A. Attendance records for 

these services show that Plaintiff attended four of the five prayer services offered in May; the one 

prayer service offered in August; and two of the three prayer services offered in November. Id. 

However, Defendants are unable to locate any other records documenting whether Friday Jumu’ah 

prayer services were offered in Facility B in the other months of 2011, and in 2012 and 2013. 

Hernandez Decl., ¶ 4. 

From April 2012 to August 2013, the position of Islamic chaplain at SVSP was vacant. 

Hernandez Decl., ¶ 6. Muhammed Lawal was hired as SVSP Islamic chaplain in August 2013. 

Id. He resumed Muslim services for all SVSP inmates in August 2013. Id., ¶ 8. Since August 

2013, Chaplain Lawal has administered Friday Jumu’ah prayer services on the 1st, 3rd, and 5th 

Friday of each month to inmates housed in the A and B facilities, and on the 2nd and 4th Friday of 

each month to inmates housed in the C and D facilities. Lawal Decl., ¶ 6. Since January 2014, 

Friday Jumu’ah prayer services have been available to Plaintiff in Facility D and Plaintiff has 

consistently attended. Lawal Decl., ¶ 8 and Ex. A. 

//

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D. Plaintiff’s Grievances Regarding the Lack of Friday Jumu’ah Services

On or about January 16, 2011, Plaintiff asked defendant Sergeant Parsons why only 

Muslims, and not Christians, Catholics, Protestants, or Native Americans, were being denied 

access to the chapel for their group prayers. Docket No. 46 at 8. Plaintiff claims that defendant 

Parsons informed him that the officer covering the chapel had been re-assigned on Fridays to 

another position. Id. On or about February 10, 2011, Plaintiff discussed with defendant Captain 

Hatton the denial of access to the chapel for Friday Jumu’ah services. Docket No. 46 at 9. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hatton also informed him that the officer covering the chapel had 

been re-assigned on Fridays to cover another position. Plaintiff further claims that defendant 

Hatton informed him that the Defendants (with the exception of G. J. Giuirbino, the SVSP 

Director of Adult Operations) had agreed that the Redirection Plan would work best with the reassignment on Fridays of the officer covering the chapel. Id. 

On or about February 28, 2011, Plaintiff spoke telephonically with defendant Medina 

about his concerns regarding denial of access to the chapel on Fridays. Docket No. 46 at 10. 

Plaintiff claims that defendant Medina also stated that Defendants agreed that the Redirection Plan 

operated better with the Friday re-assignment of the officer covering the chapel. Plaintiff further 

claims that when he asked defendant Medina to have the officer reassigned on a different day, 

Medina refused “because such re-scheduling would conflict with and deny Native Americans, or 

Christians, Catholics, or Protestants, access to the chapel on their weekly holy day of Saturday or 

Sunday.” Id. That same day, Plaintiff submitted a CDC Form GA-22 (Inmate/Parolee Request for 

Interview) to defendant Hedgpeth requesting modification of the Redirection Plan to allow access 

to the chapel for Friday Jumu’ah prayer services. Id. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Solis 

responded on behalf of defendant Hedgpeth and stated that defendant Hedgpeth would not change 

the Redirection Plan “because it would conflict with and deny Native Americans, Christians, 

Catholics and Protestants inmates their worship rights on their weekly holy days on Saturday and 

Sunday, if the chapel officer were re-assigned to cover another job duty on those days instead of 

Fridays.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Solis stated that defendant C.J. Giuirbino helped 

defendant Hedgpeth formulate and implement the Redirection Plan. Id.

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Defendants deny that the Redirection Plan was structured to protect the “worship rights” of 

Native American, Christians, Catholics, and Protestants. Defendants informed Plaintiff that the 

Redirection Plan was accommodating the mandatory staff meetings held on the first Monday and 

third Friday of each month. Docket No. 1 at 13–19. In addition, Defendants informed Plaintiff 

that because religious services were held on every day of the week, the Redirection Plan would 

inevitably conflict with a religious group’s use of the chapel. Id. During the Redirection Plan, 

services were being held on Wednesdays and Thursdays as an accommodation. Id. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is 

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. See id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the 

pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See

id. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). 

For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 

1999). The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 

Elec. Serv., Inc., v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified 

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complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, provided it is based on personal 

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 

F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint as opposing 

affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated, 

under penalty of perjury, contents were true and correct, and allegations were not based purely on 

information and belief but rather on personal knowledge). Here, Plaintiff’s verified first amended 

complaint is considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff brings suit against Warden Hedgpeth, Deputy Warden Solis, Captain Hatton, 

Sergeant Parsons, Administrator Medina, Lieutenant Gifford, and Adult Operations Director G. J. 

Giuirbino, “jointly and severally in their personal capacity while acting under color of law.” 

Docket No. 46 at 2. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court interprets his claims 

liberally as against Defendants in both their individual and official capacity. See Karim-Panahi v. 

Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1998) (“the court must construe [pro se]

pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt”). Plaintiff claims 

Defendants’ failure to provide him with Friday Jumu’ah prayer services violates his constitutional 

rights under RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as 

injunctive relief. 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the relevant time period is December 2010 

through June 26, 2013, the date Plaintiff was moved out of Facility B. The Court views the facts 

in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in evaluating Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

The Court assumes that Friday Jumu’ah prayer services were not available to Facility B Muslim 

inmates if Defendants are unable to provide evidence to the contrary. Sign-in sheets establish that 

Jumu’ah prayer services were offered in 2011 on the following dates: May 18, 19, 25, 26, and 27; 

August 12; and November 10, 16 and 18. Declarations from Chaplain Lawal and Community 

Resources Manager Hernandez attest to the resumption of regular Jumu’ah prayers starting in 

August 2013. 

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Accordingly, the Court takes the following as having been established for purposes of this 

motion: Group religious services have always been available to inmates of non-Muslim faiths 

except during modified programs. Restrictions on access to the Facility B chapel prevented 

Muslim inmates from engaging in Friday group worship during the following time periods: 

December 2010 through May 11, 2011; May 28, 2011 through August 11, 2011; August 13, 2011 

through November 9, 2011; and February 9, 2012 through June 26, 2013. 

Defendants argue that any failure to allow Muslim group worship between June 2010 and 

July 2011 was due to either the Redirection Plan implemented in 2010 in response to a severe 

budget crisis or due to modified programs instituted in response to inmate violence. Defendants 

argue that the modified program was also necessary during the following time periods: July 21, 

2011 through August 9, 2011 and December 15, 2011 though February 9, 2012. During the 

modified programs, inmates were prohibited from attending group worship services based on their 

racial/ethnic group and not their faith. Defendants do not address why Friday Jumu’ah prayer 

services were not provided during the following time periods: August 19, 2011 to November 9, 

2011; November 25, 2011 to December 14, 2011; and February 9, 2012 – June 26, 2013. 

1. RLUIPA

Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to its Spending Clause and Commerce Clause 

authority. Sossman v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1656 (2011). Under RLUIPA, government 

institutions that receive federal funding are prohibited from imposing a substantial burden on 

religious exercise of persons confined in institutions unless that burden is the least restrictive 

means of furthering a compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). RLUIPA 

authorizes private citizens to bring suit against a government for violations of RLUIPA and to 

obtain appropriate relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). 

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim fails because the relief he seeks is unavailable. Under the 

principle of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, money damages under RLIUPA are not 

available against a state or state employees acting in their official capacity. Sossman, 131 S. Ct. at 

1658–60. And, “[f]or sovereign-immunity purposes, we treat [a] suit against state officials in their 

official capacities as a suit against the state.” Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections., 599 F.3d 1108, 

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1111 (9th Cir. 2010). Nor can Plaintiff seek injunctive relief since he is currently receiving Friday 

Jumu’ah prayer services. In addition, RLUIPA does not authorize suits against state actors acting 

in their individual capacity. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014). Finally, 

Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief do not fall into the recognized exception to moot claims for 

cases which are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 

(1973). To fit within this exception, Plaintiff must show he is realistically threatened by a 

repetition of the violation, and that absent court-ordered injunctive relief preventing the harm, he 

will be subject to immediate and irreparable future injury. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 

95, 109, and 111 (1983). Plaintiff has not made such a showing. Accordingly, the Court grants 

summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim.

2. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend I. “The 

first of the two Clauses, commonly called the Establishment Clause, commands a separation of 

church and state. The second, the Free Exercise Clause, requires government respect for, and 

noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people.” Cutter v. 

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). The free exercise right is necessarily limited by the fact of 

incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain 

prison security. See O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1987). In order to establish a free 

exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant burdened the practice of his religion without 

any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 

F.3d 878, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2008).

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff had a sincerely held religious belief in the need for 

participation in Jumu’ah group prayers on Fridays. The Court therefore turns to the question of 

whether the denial of access to these group religious services was reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 

(1987)).

The Supreme Court has identified four factors for courts to consider when determining 

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whether a regulation or practice is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: 

(1) whether there is a “‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate 

governmental interest put forward to justify it,” (2) “whether there are alternative means of 

exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates,” (3) “the impact accommodation of the 

asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 

resources generally,” and (4) the “absence of ready alternatives,” or, in other words, whether the 

rule at issue is an “’exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. The 

task in considering the Turner factors is not to balance the four factors, but, rather, to determine 

whether the state shows a “reasonable” relation between the policy and legitimate penological 

objectives, as opposed to simply a “logical” one. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 533 (2006). 

While all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant prisoner’s favor with respect to 

matters of disputed fact, the Court’s inferences must accord deference to the views of prison 

authorities in disputed matters of professional judgment. See id. at 529–30. Unless a prisoner can 

point to evidence showing the policy is not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, 

sufficient to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage. 

Id. at 530.

Defendants argue that the refusal to allow Muslim group worship was due to either the 

Redirection Plan or modified programs instituted by the warden. The Redirection Plan was 

implemented in 2010 in response to a severe budget crisis. Modified programs are instituted in 

response to inmate violence. Both the Redirection Plan and the modified program seek to ensure 

prison security and inmate safety, which are legitimate penological interests. Prison security is a 

compelling government interest, see Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13 (2000), and protecting inmate 

safety is required under the Eighth Amendment, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 

 With respect to the first Turner factor, the undisputed evidence shows a rational and valid 

connection between the unavailability of Friday Jumu’ah prayer services and prison security and 

inmate safety. The undisputed evidence is that prison officials initially implemented a modified 

program for all inmates in response to a riot in June 2010 that involved inmates of all racial 

groups. There were attempts to resume normal programming throughout the fall of 2010, but the 

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reoccurrence of riots in September 2010, January 2011, and August 2011, resulted in a modified 

program for all or some racial groups, depending on who was involved in the riots. During the 

modified program, affected inmates were subject to various restrictions, including in-cell worship. 

The elimination of group worship services for affected inmates limited the security risks 

associated with inmates gathering in a group, including inmate violence, contraband bartering, 

communication of gang orders, and passing of weapons. Similarly, the undisputed evidence is that 

a severe state budget crisis resulted in a shortage of correctional officers that required a staff 

redirection plan to maintain prison safety and security. 

Restricting inmates to in-cell worship following riots and refusing to allow group worship 

on Facility B when there were insufficient correctional officers to supervise inmate traffic across 

the yard and the group prayer services in the chapel is reasonably related to prison security. To 

the extent that Plaintiff did not have access to group worship services due to either the modified 

programs or the Redirection Plan, the first Turner factor weighs in favor of finding that the 

restriction was reasonably related to a legitimate penological need. 

The second Turner factor is “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right 

that remains open to other inmates.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. During the Redirection Plan, 

Plaintiff had the option to worship alone in his cell or attend group worship services on 

Wednesday and Thursday. During modified programs, Plaintiff could worship alone in his cell. 

The denial of access to group religious services did not deprive Plaintiff of all means of exercising 

his religious beliefs. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352–53 (although there were no alternative means 

for the prisoners on work detail to attend Jumu’ah services, the prisoners nevertheless retained 

their ability to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies and practices, and that ability 

supported the reasonableness of the restriction). This second factor also weighs in favor of finding 

that the restriction was reasonably related to a legitimate penological need. 

The third Turner factor requires the Court to consider the “impact accommodation of the 

asserted constitutional right will have on guards and inmates, and on the allocation of prison 

resources generally.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Allowing Plaintiff to attend group worship services 

during modified programs defeats the purpose of modified programs. In order to stem prison 

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violence, modified programs prohibit group activities for inmates affiliated with those who have 

recently rioted. Accommodating Plaintiff’s asserted constitutional right during modified programs 

would negatively impact guards and inmates by undermining prison safety. With respect to the 

Redirection Plan, allowing Plaintiff to attend group worship would require that Facility B staff be 

redirected on a different day. Since there are religious services conducted every day of the week, 

it is likely that inmates of a different religious faith would be negatively affected. Redirecting 

Facility B staff on a different day would also impact the prison staff’s ability to attend one of the 

two monthly trainings. However, there is no evidence that the training could not have been rescheduled for a different day without negatively impacting prison operations. The third Turner

factor weighs in favor of Defendants with respect to modified programs, but not with respect to 

the Redirection Plan.

The fourth Turner factor requires the Court to consider whether there is an “absence of 

ready alternatives” to the prison policy. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The absence of ready alternatives 

is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. Id. The burden is on the prisoner 

challenging the regulation to show that there are obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation. See

O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350; see also Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff 

has not identified any alternatives to the regulation. In fact, he insists that there are no alternatives 

to group worship services on Fridays. This weighs in favor of finding that cancelling Friday 

Jumu’ah prayer services under the Redirection Plan or during a modified program was reasonable.

Having considered the various Turner factors, the Court concludes that to the extent that 

Friday Jumu’ah prayer services were unavailable due to either the Redirection Plan or the 

modified programs, this restriction was reasonably related to the legitimate penological goal of 

inmate and staff safety. 

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether 

his right to free exercise of religion was improperly impinged upon by Defendants when they 

failed to allow Friday Jumu’ah prayer services during the following time periods: August 19, 2011 

to November 9, 2011; November 25, 2011 to December 14, 2011; and February 9, 2012 to June 

26, 2013. Defendants have provided no reason as to why group worship services were not 

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provided during that time. To the extent that Defendants are claiming that the lack of group 

Jumu’ah prayers from April 2012 to June 26, 2013 was due to the lack of an Islamic chaplain,3

Defendants have not argued, much less proven, that there is a reasonable relation between the lack 

of an Islamic chaplain and the refusal to allow Friday Jumu’ah prayer services. 

In summary, with respect to Plaintiff’s free exercise claim, the Court grants in part and 

denies in part Defendants’ summary judgment motion. To the extent that Friday Jumu’ah prayer 

services were cancelled due to modified programs or the Redirection Plan, the Court finds that 

Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s right to free exercise. However, the Court denies 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the lack of Friday Jumu’ah prayer 

services from August 19, 2011 to November 9, 2011; November 25, 2011 to December 14, 2011; 

and February 9, 2012 to June 26, 2013.

3. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Equal Protection Clause requires that an inmate who is an adherent of a minority 

religion be afforded “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity 

afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts,” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972) (Buddhist prisoners must be given opportunity to pursue faith comparable to that 

given Christian prisoners), as long as the inmate’s religious needs are balanced against the 

reasonable penological goals of the prison, O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. The court must consider 

whether “the difference between the defendants’ treatment of [the inmate] and their treatment of 

[other] inmates is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 

891 (citation omitted) (finding district court erroneously applied rational basis review to plaintiff’s 

claim that defendants violated equal protection clause by providing only Jewish inmates with 

kosher meat diet and remanding claim so record could be more fully developed regarding 

 

3

The following statements by Defendants imply that Jumu’ah services are not offered when a 

chaplain is unavailable to conduct the services: “Because the chaplain is not a peace officer, it is 

necessary for at least one correctional officer to stand outside the chapel door to supervise group 

worship, by standing outside the chapel door.” Hatton Decl., ¶ 8. “[Muhammad Lawal] was 

approved by the Personnel Department [for the position of Islamic chaplain], and assumed his 

position in August of 2013. He immediately resumed Muslim services for all inmates at SVSP.” 

Hernandez Decl., ¶ 8.

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defendants’ asserted penological interests). An inmate “‘must set forth specific facts showing a 

genuine issue’ as to whether he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith as 

compared to prisoners of other faiths” and that “officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory 

manner.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 884–85. See, e.g., Hartman v. California Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 707 

F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of equal protection claim based on denial of 

request for a paid Wiccan chaplain where pleadings suggested a reasoned and vetted denial – paid 

Wiccan chaplain not necessary because a volunteer Wiccan chaplain provides services at prison 

and staff chaplains are available to provide inmates with religious assistance – rather than 

discriminatory intent).

Although prisoners are entitled to equal protection, it does not follow that a prison must 

duplicate every religious benefit it provides so that all religions are treated exactly the same. As 

the Supreme Court explained in Cruz:

We do not suggest . . . that every religious sect or group within a prison – however 

few in number – must have identical facilities or personnel. A special chapel or 

place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a 

chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand. 

But reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the 

religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear 

of penalty.

Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2. Application of the Cruz standard does not require “strict numerical 

analysis” or “create a system of ratios or quotas.” Thompson v. Commonwealth of Ky., 712 F.2d 

1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials on 

Muslim inmates’ request for access to chapel comparable to Christian inmates). It does require 

that the prison make a good faith accommodation in light of practical considerations. See

Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737; Thompson, 712 F.2d at 1082 (court should scrutinize the prison 

officials’ conduct to determine whether they deliberately discriminated against the minority 

religion or abused their discretion in distributing the prisons’ limited resources). 

Prison officials’ failure to offer Friday Jumu’ah prayer services due to a modified program 

does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because inmates of all religious faiths were equally 

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affected by the modified program. All religious programming was restricted to in-cell worship only. 

Hatton Decl., Exs. D, E, F, G, I, J, K. 

Prison officials’ failure to offer Friday Jumu’ah prayer services due to the Redirection 

Plan, however, raises a triable issue of material fact as to whether defendants violated the Equal 

Protection Clause, because only Muslim inmates were affected. Moreover, Plaintiff has set forth 

facts showing a genuine issue as to whether prison officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory 

manner in choosing to redirect Facility B staff on Fridays. Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. Plaintiff 

claims that Defendants Medina and Gifford informed him that they would not consider redirecting 

Facility B staff on another day because it would conflict with group worship services for Native 

Americans, Catholics, Christians, and Protestants. Docket No. 46 at 10. Although Defendants 

argue that the Redirection Plan sought to accommodate mandatory staff training meetings, they do 

not explain why Facility B staff could not have been redirected on a different day. 

However, prison officials’ failure to offer Friday Jumu’ah prayer services during the 

following time periods – August 19, 2011 to November 9, 2011; November 25, 2011 to December 

14, 2011; and February 9, 2012 to June 26, 2013 – does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 

Defendants are silent as to why there were no Friday Jumu’ah prayer services during the abovementioned time periods and Plaintiff has not set forth any facts showing a genuine issue as to 

whether prison officials were intentionally acting in a discriminatory manner. The FAC focuses 

solely on the discriminatory impact of the Redirection Plan. However, the Redirection Plan ended 

in July 2011. Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding prison officials’ intent in failing to provide 

Friday Jumu’ah prayer services from August 19, 2011 to November 9, 2011; November 25, 2011 

to December 14, 2011; and February 9, 2012 to June 26, 2013.

In summary, with respect to Plaintiff’s equal protection claim, the Court grants in part and 

denies in part Defendants’ summary judgment motion. To the extent that Friday Jumu’ah prayer 

services were cancelled due to modified programs, the Court finds that Defendants did not violate 

Plaintiff’s equal protections rights. The Court also finds that the failure to provide Friday Jumu’ah 

prayer services from August 19, 2011 to November 9, 2011; November 25, 2011 to December 14, 

2011; and February 9, 2012 to June 26, 2013, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because 

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Plaintiff has not set forth any facts showing a genuine issue as to whether prison officials were 

intentionally acting in a discriminatory manner. However, the Court denies Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment with respect to the lack of Friday Jumu’ah prayer services cancelled solely 

due to the Redirection Plan. 

CONCLUSION

1. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s remaining free exercise claim 

challenges the denial of Friday Jumu’ah prayer services from August 19, 2011 to November 9, 

2011; November 25, 2011 to December 14, 2011; and February 9, 2012 to June 26, 2013. 

Plaintiff’s remaining equal protections claim challenges the denial of Friday Jumu’ah prayer 

services due solely to the Redirection Plan.

2. The case is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas for settlement 

proceedings. Such proceedings shall take place within 120 days of the date this order is filed, or 

as soon thereafter as Magistrate Judge Vadas’s calendar will permit. Magistrate Judge Vadas shall 

coordinate a place, time, and date for one or more settlement conferences with all interested 

parties and/or their representatives and, within fifteen days of the conclusion of all settlement 

proceedings, shall file with the Court a report thereon.

The Clerk is directed to send Magistrate Judge Vadas a copy of this order.

3. The instant case is STAYED pending the settlement proceedings. The Clerk shall 

ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this case until further order of the Court.

This order terminates Docket No. 60.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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