Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01805/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01805-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles A. Gulden, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Pete Geren, Secretary, United States

Army, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-1805-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Defendant Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army (“United States”) moves for

judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (Doc # 22.) Plaintiff Charles A.

Gulden’s (“Gulden”) appears pro se. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally

construed . . . .’” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Erickson v.

Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam)). This order addresses only the

arguments and issues briefed by the parties.

The Court dismissed Gulden’s original complaint because he had not alleged a

non-discreet act that took place within 45 days of his contacting an Equal Employment

Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor and because he had not alleged facts sufficient to raise

his retaliation claim above the speculative level. (Doc. # 14.) Gulden’s first amended

complaint is almost identical to his original complaint, but he has attached a 34 page

affidavit and 57 exhibits to strengthen his factual allegations. The United States does not

Case 2:08-cv-01805-NVW Document 27 Filed 06/16/09 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

object to Gulden’s filing, so the Court will consider his affidavit and the attached exhibits

in ruling on the United States’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(c); cf. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“[A]ttachments to a complaint are to be considered part of the complaint in deciding a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” (citing Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d

1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990))). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted

when, taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir.

1998).

In August 2005, Gulden entered into a negotiated settlement agreement (“NSA”)

to resolve an EEO complaint that he had brought against his superior at the United States

Army Proving Ground, James Wymer (“Wymer”). The NSA required that Gulden be

“temporarily promoted to the position of Mission Facilities and Requirements Manager,

GS-0301-14, step 7” and that “this temporary promotion will be converted to a permanent

promotion effective on September 10, 2006.” (Doc. # 16, Ex. 2.) Gulden was, in fact,

promoted to that position. However, he alleges that Wymer has retaliated against him for

his previous EEO activity by directing his immediate supervisors, William Rezin

(“Rezin”) and Bernice Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), to harass him with the ultimate goal of

coercing him out of his job. Specifically, Gulden alleges that, in 2006 and 2007, he

received arbitrary performance evaluations from Rezin and Gonzalez in retaliation for his

protected activity. He also alleges that Gonzalez has subjected him to a hostile work

environment by refusing to apply the job description dictated by the NSA and by

repeatedly fabricating failures or wrongdoing by Gulden to disparage his work

performance.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), a plaintiff must show “(1) involvement in a

protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the

two.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). The United States

Case 2:08-cv-01805-NVW Document 27 Filed 06/16/09 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

moves for judgment on the pleadings because none of the evidence attached to Gulden’s

complaint shows that his previous protected activity caused Rezin or Gonzalez to give

him a negative performance evaluation. The temporal relationship between Gulden’s

protected activities and the allegedly arbitrary performance reviews does not, by itself,

raise an inference of causation under the facts as alleged. Where the only proof of

causation is the temporal proximity of a protected activity and an adverse employment

action, “the temporal proximity must be ‘very close[.]’” Clark County Sch. Dist. v.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001). In this case, there was an eighteen month gap

between Gulden’s original EEO complaint and his 2006 performance review. There was

a ten month gap between his 2006 EEO complaint and his 2007 performance review. Our

circuit has held that a nine month gap was too long to infer causation from temporal

proximity alone. Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, the gap between Gulden’s protected activities and the alleged adverse

employment actions is too long to infer causation from temporal proximity alone.

Temporal proximity is not the only way to prove a causal relationship between a

protected activity and an adverse employment action. “[C]ircumstantial evidence of a

‘pattern of antagonism’ following the protected conduct can . . . give rise to the inference

[of causation].” Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3rd Cir. 1997)). In Porter, the

Plaintiff alleged a pattern of antagonism that included her supervisors “refusing to grant

Porter’s requests for vacation or holidays, requiring Porter to be tested for tuberculosis by

her own physician, threatening disciplinary action while she was on medical leave,

leaving a negative performance evaluation in her personnel file, and instructing her to

enter the work site through the back gate.” Id. at 893. Her supervisors also “ate and then

spat in Porter’s food in 1996 or 1997; . . . referred to her as a ‘fucking bitch’ . . . ; . . . told

another correctional officer that Porter was a ‘whore’ . . . and glared at her during the

investigation that commenced in October 1998.” Id. 

Case 2:08-cv-01805-NVW Document 27 Filed 06/16/09 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Gulden attempts to document such a pattern of antagonism from his immediate

supervisor, Gonzalez, using his affidavit and the attached exhibits. Gonzalez allegedly

questioned Gulden about his arrival time at work and his attendance at scheduled

meetings, repeatedly admonished Gulden not to send e-mails or project proposals outside

of the office without coordinating with her, reprimanded him for not inputting his

schedule into a computer tracking system, and confronted him about a complaint about

his behavior received from a contractor in the office. Gulden alleges that Gonzalez

entirely fabricated each of these problems with his work performance. He also alleges

that, on two occasions, Gonzalez stated that she had Wymer’s support to revoke the

promotion he obtained as a result of the NSA. 

Accepting the truth of all of these allegations, they do not indicate that the ratings

Gulden received on his 2006 and 2007 performance evaluations were caused by his

protected activities. If Gulden’s supervisors aimed to sabotage his evaluations to remove

him from his promoted position, they would have declined to make his promotion

permanent on September 10, 2006, as specified by the NSA. They did not. Gulden has

continued to work in his promoted position. Gonzalez and Rezin actually gave him a

higher performance rating in 2007 than in 2006, despite his filing of an additional EEO

complaint in September 2006. Since Gulden has maintained his promoted position and

his performance rating has improved despite his continuing EEO activity, it would be

entirely unreasonable to infer that his protected activities caused him to receive poor

performance ratings. 

Gulden’s hostile work environment claim also fails as a matter of law. To

establish a prima facie case of harassment, Gulden must show that he was subject to (1)

verbal or physical conduct that was unwelcome; (2) that the conduct was because of his

protected characteristic—in this case, Gulden’s engagement in protected activity; and (3)

that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his

employment and create an abusive work environment. Cf. Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349

F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). The United States moves for judgment as a matter of law

Case 2:08-cv-01805-NVW Document 27 Filed 06/16/09 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

because the conduct of Gulden’s supervisors, Gonzalez and Rezin, was not sufficiently

severe. “To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate

Title VII, we look at ‘all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.’” Id. (quoting Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71

(2001)). 

In addition to the reprimands and admonishments already mentioned, Gulden

alleges that Gonzalez has refused to allow him to function in his role as Mission Facilities

and Requirements Manager. Gonzalez allegedly instructed Gulden to perform tasks as a

team leader for their group, subjected him to close technical and administrative

supervision, refused to place him on the Real Property Group Planning Board and instead

made him part of a “working group,” and deprived him of independent contact with the

commander of the Yuma Proving Ground on matters pertaining to his job duties. The

Court assumes, for purposes of this motion, that Gulden is correct that these are

departures from the official job description for his position. Even so, these departures,

combined with the reprimands from Gonzalez, are not severe enough to alter the

conditions of his employment and create an abusive work environment. See Hines v. Cal.

Pub. Util. Comm., 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10066 at *17–18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009)

(holding that a supervisor’s “demanding management style . . . did not rise to the level

required to state a hostile work environment claim”). 

Gulden’s allegations are similar to the complaints of the plaintiff in Garity v.

Potter, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 81445 at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2008). There, the plaintiff

complained that her supervisor gave her illogical and unclear instructions, berated and

yelled at her, questioned the amount of time she spent on lunch breaks, constantly

scrutinized, watched, and “hovered around” her, put her in no-win situations, and

disciplined her for safety and rule violations. Assuming such allegations to be true, the

court held that the plaintiff had failed to allege offensive conduct severe enough to create

Case 2:08-cv-01805-NVW Document 27 Filed 06/16/09 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

a hostile work environment. Id. at *13–14. The same is true in Gulden’s case. His

complaints are not trivial, but the departures from his job description and the unfair

reprimands he has received are not sufficiently severe to create a hostile work

environment.

Gulden has not requested further leave to amend his complaint. Even if he had,

judgment would be entered against Gulden without further leave to amend. He has

already had one chance to amend his complaint. Given the extent of the documentation

he attached to his amended complaint, it would be futile to allow any further amendment. 

The Court has reviewed Gulden’s entire affidavit and each of the exhibits that he filed. 

Gulden has thoroughly explained and documented the facts of his case and those facts do

not amount to a violation of Title VII as a matter of law. Moreover, Gulden’s one and

one-half page response to the United States’ motion states nothing but bare conclusions. 

He has refused to substantively engage the arguments made by the United States, further

demonstrating the futility of granting him leave to amend a second time. See Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify

the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866

F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is

particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Pete Geren’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings (doc. # 22) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of Defendant

and that the Plaintiff take nothing. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

DATED this 16th day of June, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01805-NVW Document 27 Filed 06/16/09 Page 6 of 6