Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01994/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01994-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLORIA FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY 

SERVICES, LLC dba CARDINAL 

HEALTH; BHC SIERRA VISTA 

HOSPITAL, INC. dba SIERRA 

VISTA HOSPITAL; BRAD MATHIS; 

and DOES 1 through 50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01994-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO AMEND AND REMAND

Plaintiff Gloria Freeman (“Plaintiff”) alleges that the 

pharmacy where she worked terminated her employment in 

retaliation for her complaints about patient and staff safety. 

Plaintiff now moves to amend the complaint to add the hospital 

where the pharmacy was located as a defendant. For the reasons 

stated below, the Court grants the motion and remands the case to 

state court.1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for March 25, 2015.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked for Defendant Cardinal Health Pharmacy 

Services (“Defendant”) in Sierra Vista Hospital (“Sierra Vista”) 

as Director of Pharmacy. FAC ¶ 8. At the alleged direction of

Sierra Vista’s CEO, Michael Zauner (“Zauner”), Plaintiff 

participated in “management rounds” with the hospital’s 

psychiatric patients. FAC ¶ 10. During rounds, she experienced

“violent incidents,” one of which caused her to hurt her knee. 

FAC ¶¶ 10, 21.

After the injury, Plaintiff requested that Defendant and 

Sierra Vista accommodate her by allowing her to use crutches and 

to relocate “important items” in the pharmacy. FAC ¶¶ 22, 31, 

36. These requests were denied and Plaintiff instead went on 

medical leave. See FAC ¶¶ 24, 28. Plaintiff asked to return to 

work with accommodations, but this request was also denied. FAC 

¶¶ 36-37. The next day, Plaintiff’s supervisor informed her that 

Defendant was terminating her employment at the conclusion of her 

leave. FAC ¶ 37. 

Plaintiff claims that she was terminated because of her 

complaints about dangerous hospital conditions, including 

“placing untrained staff . . . in contact with sometimes violent 

psychiatric patients” and other complaints she had made about 

salary discrepancies between men and women, improper storage of 

medications, and electrical failures. FAC ¶¶ 11, 17-20, 49, 64-

65.

Plaintiff sued Defendant, her supervisor, and Sierra Vista 

in state court alleging eight causes of action (Doc. #1). Sierra 

Vista demurred, and Plaintiff responded by voluntarily dismissing 

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Sierra Vista from the action. See Havey Decl. Exh. E. 

Plaintiff’s attorney advised opposing counsel at the time that,

“We may wish to amend the complaint again as discovery 

progresses, but at this point, your demurrer was well taken.” 

Id. 

Two months later, Defendant removed the case to this Court 

(Doc. #1). Discovery commenced, including the deposition of 

Zauner. See Boucher Decl. ¶¶ 12-15. Plaintiff represents that 

this deposition produced sufficient facts to support her original 

claim against Sierra Vista, and now moves for leave to amend to 

add Sierra Vista as a defendant (Doc. #6). Because adding Sierra 

Vista would destroy diversity, Plaintiff also moves for remand

(Doc. #6). Defendant opposes amendment and remand (Doc. #7). 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Generally, a court assesses subject matter jurisdiction as 

it existed at the time of removal. See Miller v. Grgurich, 763 

F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1985). But “[i]f after removal the 

plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 

destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, 

or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(e); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 

(9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he decision regarding joinder of a diversity 

destroying-defendant is left to the discretion of the district 

court.”). “Plaintiffs may not circumvent [section] 1447(e) by 

relying on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a) to join non-diverse 

parties.” Hardin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 

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1173 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 

1080, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). The Court therefore considers 

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment under section 1447(e) rather than 

15(a). Accord McGrath v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 601, 

607 (S.D. Cal. 2014).

Courts consider numerous factors in deciding whether to 

allow joinder under section 1447(e), including (1) whether the 

party to be joined is a necessary party under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the statute of limitations 

would prevent the plaintiff from filing a new action against the 

defendant she hopes to join; (3) whether there has been an 

“unexplained delay in seeking the joinder”; (4) whether the 

plaintiff’s purpose is solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; 

(5) whether the claim against the new defendant “seems valid”; 

(6) “possible prejudice” to the existing parties; and (7) the new 

defendant’s “notice of the pending action.” See Hardin, 813 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1173-74 (quoting Oum v. Rite Aid Corp., 2009 WL 

151510, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009)) (quotation marks 

omitted).

B. Discussion

1. Necessary Party

Plaintiff argues that Sierra Vista is a necessary party 

under Rule 19, because the matter “cannot be fully adjudicated” 

without the hospital. Reply at 1:22. Defendant counters that 

that Sierra Vista does not fall under this rule because “[t]here 

is no overlap between parties or causes of action[.]” Opp. at 

8:6. 

///

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Sierra Vista is not a necessary party. Plaintiff appears to 

argue that Sierra Vista falls under Rule 19(a)(1)(A), which 

defines a party as necessary if, “in that person’s absence, the 

court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties[.]”

“In considering the Rule 19(a)(1) analysis, the court asks 

whether the absence of the party would preclude the district 

court from fashioning meaningful relief as between the parties.” 

Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 357 F.3d 

861, 879 (9th Cir. 2004). This standard is “concerned only with 

relief as between the persons already parties, not as between a 

party and the absent person whose joinder is sought.” Brum v. 

Cty. Of Merced, 2013 WL 2404844, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2013) 

(quoting Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Ctys. Joint 

Apprenticeships & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 

1981)) (quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff here seeks only money damages. See FAC at 19. 

And she has given no indication that an order binding Sierra 

Vista is required to achieve this relief from the existing 

Defendants. See Disabled Rights Action Comm., 357 F.3d at 880 

(“These forms of relief, which are neither hollow nor 

meaningless, would be available with or without [the new party’s] 

participation.”) (citations omitted). Sierra Vista is not, 

therefore, necessary to provide complete relief among the 

existing parties. This factor weighs in favor of denying 

joinder.

2. Statute of Limitations

The parties agree that the statute of limitations has not 

yet run, such that Plaintiff could file her claims against Sierra

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Vista in a separate case. This factor too weighs against 

joinder.

3. Delay in Seeking Joinder

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff improperly delayed 

bringing this motion. Defendant contends that Plaintiff should 

have attempted to keep Sierra Vista in the action in state court 

rather than waiting until removal to file this motion. See Opp. 

at 8. Plaintiff asserts that she sought this amendment within a 

reasonable amount of time after discovery revealed the nature of 

Sierra Vista’s role in her employment and termination. See Mot. 

at 11; Reply at 2.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. The following timeline 

illustrates that Plaintiff has diligently pursued joinder: 

• In March 2014, Sierra Vista demurred in state court, 

Boucher Decl. ¶ 9;

• In June 2014, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Sierra 

Vista, advising opposing counsel by email that “your 

demurrer was well taken[,]” but Plaintiff “may wish to 

amend the complaint again as discovery progresses,” Havey 

Decl. Exh. E;

• In August 2014, Defendant removed the case, see Not. of 

Removal (Doc. #1);

• In October 2014, Plaintiff subpoenaed Zauner and the 

parties agreed to conduct his deposition in December 

2014, Boucher Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff contends that 

information learned in this deposition forms the basis of 

the proposed amended claims against Sierra Vista. Mot. 

at 11. This contention is supported by the record, in 

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that Zauner testified about the employment relationship 

between Sierra Vista and the Director of Pharmacy

position, which is now reflected in the proposed amended 

complaint. See Boucher Decl. Exh. E; Proposed SAC ¶¶ 42-

53;

• In February 2015, Plaintiff sought a stipulation to add 

Sierra Vista and file the amended complaint, Boucher 

Decl. ¶ 16;

• Three days after Defendant declined to stipulate, 

Plaintiff filed this motion to amend, see id.

This timeline evidences no unexplained delay, so this factor 

weighs in favor of allowing joinder.

4. Purpose to Defeat Jurisdiction

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s “underlying motive is to 

destroy diversity and delay the case.” Opp. at 9:24. This 

motive is apparent, according to Defendant, because Plaintiff had 

the necessary information to “raise the theory at the time she 

filed her initial pleading[.]” Opp. at 9:20-21. But as 

discussed above, the record supports Plaintiff’s contention that 

she first learned essential facts about Sierra Vista during

Zauner’s deposition. The parties’ correspondence also 

demonstrates that Plaintiff’s counsel candidly acknowledged that 

there were not enough facts to support a claim against Sierra 

Vista in June 2014, and disclosed their intention to seek facts 

supporting amendment. See Havey Decl. Exh. E; id. Exh. I (email 

from Plaintiff’s attorney dated Sept. 10, 2014) (“Be advised that 

Plaintiff may still amend, adding additional facts which may 

include Sierra [Vista] or other causes of action.”). Plaintiff 

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is now simply following through with her stated intention. This 

factor therefore supports joinder.

5. Validity of Claims

The parties urge the Court to scrutinize the proposed 

amended complaint and Zauner’s deposition testimony to determine 

whether Plaintiff can ultimately succeed in a dual-employer 

liability theory. Mot. at 16-19; Opp. at 10-14. But this is not 

a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment; under 

section 1447(e), the Court need only determine whether the claim 

“seems” valid. See Hardin, 813 F. Supp. 2d. at 1174; IBC 

Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de 

C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012-13 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Defendant 

asserts that the Court should consider whether the amended 

complaint “could be defeated by a motion to dismiss” and whether

“Plaintiff cannot prevail on the merits.” Opp. at 10. But that 

is not the standard under section 1447(e) and the cases Defendant 

cites do not interpret 1447(e). See Mot. Opp. at 10; Lockheed 

Martin Corp. v. Network Solns, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 

1999); Smith v. Commanding Officer, Air Force Accounting & 

Finance Center, 555 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1977); Weber v. Time 

Warner, Inc., 2006 WL 681032 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2006).

Applying the proper standard, the Court determines that the 

new claim against Sierra Vista “seems valid.” This claim alleges 

a violation of California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, 

which prohibits a “health facility” from “retaliat[ing], in any 

manner, against any patient, employee, member of the medical 

staff, or any other health care worker of the health facility 

because the person has . . . [p]resented a grievance, complaint 

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or report to the facility . . . or the medical staff of the 

facility . . . .” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1278(b)(1). 

Retaliation can include “discharge, demotion, suspension, or any 

unfavorable changes in, or breach of, the terms or conditions 

of a contract, employment, or privileges of the employee, member 

of the medical staff, or any other health care worker of the 

health care facility, or the threat of any of these actions.” 

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1278(d)(2). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that she reported 

unsafe conditions to Sierra Vista and because of those reports, 

Sierra Vista denied her valid requests for accommodation, and 

ultimately directed her termination. Proposed SAC ¶¶ 11, 16, 19,

22, 28, 31, 37, 45. This claim appears valid, and so this factor 

weighs in favor of granting the amendment. 

6. Prejudice

Both parties assert that they will suffer prejudice if the 

Court does not resolve the motion in their favor. Defendant 

argues that amendment would require “new and additional discovery 

after [it] has completed its written discovery.” Opp. at 15:11-

12. But Defendant has not explained what additional discovery is 

needed, or why doing additional discovery would be prejudicial 

since discovery is still open. See Pre-trial Scheduling Order at 

3. Defendant also contends that “it relied on Plaintiff’s 

statement . . . on September 10, 2014, that she would not seek a 

stipulation to add Sierra Vista back into the litigation.” Opp. 

at 15:15-16. But Defendant misconstrues the September 10th

exchange, in which Plaintiff’s counsel advised that she “may 

still amend, adding additional facts which may include Sierra 

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[Vista] or other causes of action.” Havey Decl. Exh. I. Because 

Plaintiff had made her intention to join Sierra Vista clear all 

along, the Court finds that Defendant will not suffer prejudice.

Plaintiff contends that she will be prejudiced if the court 

denies amendment because of the possibility of inconsistent 

outcomes. Mot. at 15; Reply at 5. The Court is not persuaded, 

however, that Plaintiff will suffer any such prejudice. Indeed, 

the single cause of action she seeks against Sierra Vista is 

independent of her claims against Cardinal Health.

Because neither party is likely to suffer prejudice based on 

the outcome of this motion, this factor is neutral. 

7. New Defendant’s Notice

The parties did not address this factor, but it weighs in 

favor of amendment. Sierra Vista has had notice of this action 

because it used to be a party to the state court action and 

because its CEO has already been deposed. 

* * *

As described above, four of the seven factors weigh in favor 

of allowing joinder. Two factors weigh in favor of denying 

joinder and one factor is neutral. The Court therefore exercises 

its discretion to permit joinder and remand this action to state 

court.

III. ORDER

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to amend and remand. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2015

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