Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05407/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05407-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN JOSEPH NOBLE, IV,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. ADAMS, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 5407 AWI SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Doc. 82) 

A. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Steven Joseph Noble (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed an Amended

Complaint on May 12, 2003, on which this case is proceeding. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Cuevas and Adams violated his Eighth Amendment rights by limiting Plaintiff’s access to

outdoor exercise from January 9, 2002, to April 2003, and denying him access to the courts. The

Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendants Adams, Espinoza and Pugliese violated his

First Amendment rights by interfering with Plaintiff’s right to receive mail. 

On December 3, 2004, Defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that

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Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court issued Findings and 1

Recommendations that the Motion be denied on August 19, 2005. The District Court adopted

the Findings and Recommendations on September 21, 2005. On December 7, 2006, the

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed his Opposition to the Motion

on February 27, 2007. 

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a Summary Judgment Motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied." Id. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

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In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at

trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine

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The following facts are undisputed for the purpose of the instant Motion only and do not apply to any 2

subsequently filed Motion. Plaintiff disputes numerous facts presented by the Defendants on the basis that he

disagrees with the policy, or disagrees based on his own personal opinion, with certain facts. However, such

comments do not render the facts disputed. Many of the facts listed are simply statements about what a particular

policy states. Although Plaintiff disagrees with the policy or the handling of a situation on any given day, that in and

of itself does not render a fact undisputed. 

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issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. UNDISPUTED FACTS2

1. On September 1, 2000, Plaintiff, Steve Joseph Noble, was sentenced to state

prison for the crime of grand theft of property from a person. 

2. At the times relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff was confined at the California

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”), at Corcoran, California. 

3. Plaintiff has been identified by prison officials as an ex-member of the 78 Street th

Crips, which is a street gang, considered to be a disruptive group within the state

prisons. 

4. Plaintiff filed an appeal from his criminal conviction on October 3, 2003. The

appeal was denied on June 7, 2001, and Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Review

in the California Supreme Court on July 13, 2001. Plaintiff’s Petition for Review

was denied on August 8, 2001. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in

the U.S. Supreme Court which was denied on February 26, 2002. 

5. Plaintiff filed Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus in the California Appellate

Court on November 21, 2002, and April 7, 2003. Both petitions were summarily

denied. 

6. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme

Court on June 3, 2003. The court issued an Order to Show Cause, returnable in

the Los Angeles Superior Court on July 14, 2004. 

7. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Central District of

California on April 9, 2004. This Petition was voluntarily dismissed on June 9,

2004. 

8. Plaintiff filed a second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 10,

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2004. On November 30, 2004, the Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition for

failure to exhaust the claims in state court. The Motion to Dismiss was denied on

February 25, 2005, and Respondent was ordered to file a return to the Petition. 

This habeas action is still pending. 

9. The entire population of C-Facility at SATF was placed on lockdown status on

December 31, 2001, because of a riot. On January 8, 2002, it was determined that

all inmates in C-Facility, with the exception of one disruptive group could be

released to normal program, including yard access. 

10. One day later, on January 9, 2002, a group of African-American inmates on the CFacility, yard 1 attempted to murder a correctional officer, and assaulted numerous

other correctional staff. This incident immediately followed an inmate-on-inmate

assault. 

11. After the initial assault incident was controlled, the inmates on the yard were

recalled back to their respective buildings. As part of processing the inmates into

their housing units, they were subjected to unclothed body searches. A number of

inmates who were still on the yard saw that staff were searching all inmates before

allowing them to enter the housing units and apparently decided to discard their

weapons. 

12. As inmates were being searched, an inmate, later identified as Moreno, incited a

number of African-American inmates to assault staff. Other staff responded to

stop the assault, while other inmates joined in the attack. Eventually, between 10

and 16 inmates were identified as participants in the attack. Approximately

twenty-one staff members reported injuries as a result of the inmate assaults, and

nine were taken to outside hospitals for evaluation and treatment. 

13. After the riot was controlled, the Warden declared a state of emergency and the

institution was placed on lockdown status. 

14. A State of Emergency exists when there is a suspension of any non-essential

operation, procedure, service or function and the normal time limits or schedules

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for activities for the purpose of preventing, containing or controlling a

disturbance. 

15. The suspension of normal operations of a prison is commonly called a

“lockdown” because all or a portion of the inmate population are confined to their

cells. The approval of the Director of Corrections must be obtained if; the

lockdown of all housing units exceeds 24 hours; the lockdown of less than all of

the housing units exceeds 72 hours; or the suspension of major program activities

such as academic programs, exercise, or visiting, exceeds 72 hours. 

16. During a state of emergency the warden may authorize the postponement of

nonessential administrative decisions such as classification, disciplinary and

appeal proceedings. 

17. A state of emergency is to be under constant review and evaluation. The goal is to

restore normal operations as quickly as possible. A state of emergency is

terminated when the warden determines it is safe to do so. 

18. When a disturbance or an incident of violence occurs the first actions taken are

those necessary to end the disturbance and to provide medical treatment to those

who are injured. Administrative staff, including, but not limited to, the Warden,

the Administrative Officer of the Day, the Captain and the Regional Administrator

are notified. All necessary paperwork is then completed, this may include

documentation necessary to confine inmates to administrative segregation, as well

as reports of the staff observing or involved in the control of the incident. 

19. After a lockdown is imposed an investigation of the incident(s) is initiated. The

investigation is for the purpose of determining the cause of the disturbance and to

assist in determining whether it is safe to release inmates from lockdown status. 

20. All inmates in the area in which the lockdown is imposed are interviewed. All

cells and common areas are searched. Members of the Inmate Advisory Council

(elected inmate representatives) are interviewed to both develop and substantiate

information. Central files are reviewed to verify information. When the

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investigation is complete it is the responsibility of the Captain to develop a plan

for releasing inmates from lockdown status. 

21. A lockdown can be released immediately, if it is determined that there is little or

no danger of repeated violence. These situations commonly involve a small

number of inmates with a personal dispute, such as a debt. 

22. A lockdown can continue for an extended period of time if the information

developed during the investigation indicates that there is a likelihood of continued

violence. A lengthy lockdown may involve large scale disturbances between rival

prison gangs or different ethnic groups, or large scale disturbances resulting in

violence directed towards staff. If the violence is gang related or racially

motivated the lockdown may be limited to particular ethnic groups. 

23. Every lockdown is to be continuously reevaluated in an effort to return the prison

to normal operations. Lockdowns are generally released gradually. Critical

workers, who are part of non-involved groups, are identified for release to their

work assignments, which include food services, laundry and sanitation jobs. A

schedule for showers is generally implemented within a few days of imposing a

lockdown. 

24. The investigative process and the process of releasing inmates from a lockdown

can include individual and group interviews with all inmates. It can also include

the release of inmate “representatives” for the purpose of allowing them to speak

with other inmates about the lockdown and any ongoing disputes between various

ethnic groups. Other efforts may include attempts to mediate any underlying

dispute among the inmate groups. 

25. When a determination has been made that a lockdown can be lifted the unlock is

implemented gradually. A determination is made of those inmates most likely to

program successfully. They are released first, in controlled groups making sure

that no ethnic group has numerical superiority. All inmates released to the

exercise yard are subjected to unclothed body searches and metal detectors are

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used as well. 

26. The number of inmates released from lockdown is gradually increased until all

inmates are returned to normal program. If there is any serious incident during the

unlock process the lockdown is re-instituted. 

27. The lockdown at SATF was imposed to protect the safety and security of staff, the

institution and inmates. A significant number of staff needed immediate medical

attention, including nine that were taken to outside hospitals. 

28. The investigation of the attempted murder of the correctional officer was

immediately initiated. It was critical to determine whether this was a planned or

spontaneous attack, if it was specifically directed toward the officer assaulted, or

if he was a target of opportunity. 

29. It was initially determined that the sixteen African-American inmates involved in

the assault were affiliated with the “Crips,” “415's” and “Bloods,” which are street

gangs identified by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as disruptive

groups. The mass assault on staff at SATF was an unprecedented event. It was

also unusual because of the combination of normally rival disruptive groups

acting together. 

30. All of the efforts described above were undertaken to move toward a full release

of the lockdown. On January 16, 2002, non-contact visiting was reinstated. This

allowed inmates to be out of their cells for visits. All movement was done in

restraints and by escort only. It was still unknown when the lockdown could be

released. 

31. On February 13, 2002, inmates were allowed access to the canteen, with a

spending limit of $45. 

32. On April 11, 2002, normal visiting was restored for African-American and white

inmates, however, the Northern Hispanics inmates were kept on non-contact

visiting status. The Northern Hispanic inmates were on modified program due to

an incident that occurred in December 2001. 

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33. The investigation of the incident continued until it was determined that the assault

on staff was not a pre-planned attack. A number of African-American inmates

had armed themselves on January 9, 2002, because they anticipated an assault by

Hispanic inmates. The assault by one white inmate on another apparently

prevented this anticipated assault. When the African-American inmates observed

that all inmates were being subjected to unclothed body searches, before they were

allowed to enter their housing units, some of them discarded their weapons. 

34. Inmate Moreno, who incited the other African-American inmates to attack staff

had a grudge against a particular officer, but his gang had not sanctioned an attack

on the officer. As he was waiting to be given an unclothed body search, he seized

the opportunity to assault the targeted officer. The other inmates who joined in

the attack on staff, were incited to participate by inmate Moreno. Four stabbing

weapons were found within the area of the attack. Three other weapons were

found nearby. 

35. After it was determined that the assault on staff was not pre-planned, additional

steps could be taken to gradually restore normal programing. 

36. On June 27, 2002, a meeting was held between Captain Cuevas, his staff, and

selected inmates representing the African-American inmate population in CFacility. The purpose of the meeting was to notify the inmates about the

proposals for modifying the lockdown in C-Facility. A decision was made to

open the day-room for African-American inmates who were not affiliated with a

gang or disruptive group, on July 8, 2002. 

37. The goal of this modification was to observe the controlled release of inmates, and

if the program ran without further acts of violence, the day-room would then be

opened for the remaining African-American population. If the day-room program

proved disruptive, the releases would be stopped and evaluated before another

attempt was made to start releasing inmates from the lockdown. 

38. On July 19, 2002, all African-American inmates were allowed access to the dayCase 1:03-cv-05407-SKO Document 100 Filed 03/26/07 Page 9 of 21
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room on a rotational basis. 

39. On August 1, 2002, an administrative decision was made to open the exercise yard

to all inmates for a modified program, this plan was to release one building at a

time, on a rotational basis. This plan was implemented on August 4, 2002. 

40. On August 8, 2002, the plan was modified to exclude Southern Hispanic, Fresno

Bulldogs, and Northern Hispanic inmates (inmates considered to be affiliated with

disruptive groups). The releases were then limited to one tier of one building at a

time, on a rotational basis. 

41. On November 15, 2002, C-Facility was again locked down because of a battery on

an inmate with a weapon, on November 14,2002. There had also been several

other incidents of weapons possession. 

42. The modified outdoor exercise schedule was resumed on November 27, 2002. 

Hispanic and white inmates continued to be locked down. White inmates were

released from lockdown on December 3, 2002. 

43. African-American inmates were returned to lockdown status because of a battery

on a peace officer on February 13, 2003. It was necessary to evaluate this incident

to determine if it was an isolated incident of opportunity, or was a planned,

organized assault. 

44. All of C-Facility was placed on lockdown status on March 21, 2003, to search the

entire facility for weapons. Numerous weapons had been found on two prior,

separate occasions. The searches were completed, and the continuation of the

lockdown was evaluated. 

45. It was determined on March 26, 2003, that C-Facility could resume normal

operations. 

46. On March 28, 2003, two inmates affiliated with the Fresno Bulldogs attempted to

murder a Southern Hispanic inmate. All inmates were denied access to the yard

until April 1, 2003, when normal operations were resumed for all inmates except

the Bulldogs. 

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47. On April 4, 2003, the mailroom supervisor at SATF responded to an inmate

appeal submitted by Noble regarding missing mail. Noble alleged that the

mailroom was withholding mail that was sent to him. This mail was allegedly

copies of legal work that Noble had sent out from the institution to be copied. 

48. The mailroom supervisor determined that the mailroom had no record of receiving

a package of documents for Noble, nor could any such package be located. Any

incoming mail with a tracking number is to be logged in a permanent ledger book,

and a review of the ledger did not find any record or entry for mail received for

Noble between February 11, 2003, through March 12, 2003. 

49. If the package had been received in the mailroom, there are several regulations

which would have resulted in the materials being returned to the sender. The

local mail policies at SATF provide that any mail exceeding two pounds would be

disallowed, and the incoming mail may not include more than ten photocopied

pages. 

50. These regulations serve legitimate purposes of preventing the introduction of

contraband and an equitable allocation of the available resources for processing

mail. 

51. SATF processes approximately 100,000 pieces of first class mail (excluding

periodicals, magazines, and newspapers) on a weekly basis. There are 7 staff,

including the supervisor, assigned to the mail room. 

52. All non-confidential mail is sorted, opened, and inspected for contraband before

being delivered to the housing units. Any enclosed funds are removed and

transmitted to the accounting office. All non-confidential mail is subject to being

read by staff if there is a reason to believe that it poses a danger to any person or

the security of the prison. 

53. Mail is frequently used to attempt to introduce contraband, such as drugs and

coded messages. At the times alleged in the complaint the number of allowed

photocopies was limited to ten pages pursuant to Operating Procedure 129. 

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Larger parcels (over 2 lbs.) Would be considered a package (special purchases or

quarterly), and have to be pre-approved before ordering.

D. ANALYSIS

1. Summary of Complaint

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants deprived him of access

to the law library unless he could show a court ordered deadline of thirty days or less. (Am.

Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff states that this caused a delay in sending out his habeas petitions which

were denied because they were untimely. Plaintiff states this violated his right of access to

courts. (Am. Compl. at 6) 

Plaintiff also alleges that as a result of his inability to access the law library, he was

required to send his legal documents to his father for photocopying. When the documents were

mailed back to him, he did not receive them. Plaintiff contacted Defendant Pugliese who

informed him that the mailroom did not have the documents. Plaintiff states that he is in

possession of a tracking receipt showing that the mail was delivered to the institution. Plaintiff

contacted the Defendants Adams and Espinoza regarding the mail issue and also filed an inmate

grievance to no avail. Plaintiff alleges that the mail interference also violated his constitutional

rights. (Am. Compl. at 7.) 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when during a

lockdown, he was deprived of outdoor exercise for a period of eight months - from January 9,

2002 to August 13, 2003. After August 13, 2002, and through April 2003, Plaintiff was only

provided with 16 two hour exercise periods. Plaintiff alleges that this violated his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Am. Compl. at 5.)

2. Claims for Relief

a. Access to Courts

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the Court because Defendants Adams and

Cuevas instituted a policy of allowing inmates access the prison library only if they could show

they had a court ordered deadline of thirty-days or less. Plaintiff contends that this policy

delayed his filing a habeas corpus petition by seven months and that affected the statute of

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limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition. 

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and

civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the

frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access

claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). In this instance,

plaintiff’s access claim is backward-looking, as plaintiff claims that his inability to access the

prison law library delayed the filing of his habeas petition and affected the statute of limitations

for his federal habeas petition. To prevail on his claim, plaintiff must show that he suffered an

actual injury by being shut out of court. Id. at 415; Lewis, 518 at 351. In order to establish

actual injury, the inmate must demonstrate that official acts or omissions "hindered his efforts to

pursue a [nonfrivolous] legal claim." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 351, 353, 353, 116 S.Ct. 2174

n. 3.

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish actual injury. In support of

this assertion, Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff filed a state criminal appeal of his

conviction on October 3, 2003. (Exh. B at 1-2, Motion for Summary Judgment [“Motion”].) The

California Court of Appeal denied his appeal on June 7, 2001, and he then filed a Petition for

Review in the California Supreme Court which was denied on August 8, 2001. (Exh. B at 2-3,

Motion.) Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court

which was denied on February 26, 2002. (Exh. B at 2, Motion.) 

Plaintiff filed Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal,

Second Appellate District on November 21, 2002, and April 7, 2003. (Exh. B at 4-5, Motion.) 

These Petitions were summarily denied. Plaintiff then pursued his habeas petitions in the

California Supreme Court which issued an Order to Show Cause returnable in the L.A. Superior

Court on July 13, 2004. (Exh. B at 7, Motion.) 

Plaintiff filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the U.S. District Court for

the Central District of California on April 9, 2004. (Exh. B at 8, Motion.) This Petition was

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voluntarily dismissed after Respondents moved to dismiss the action for Plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies. (Exh. B at 9, Motion.) 

Plaintiff filed a second federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Central District

on September 10, 2003. (Exh. B at 12, Motion.) The Respondents again moved to dismiss the

Petition on exhaustion grounds but the Motion was denied on February 25, 2005, and

Respondents were ordered to file a Return to the Petition. (Exh. B at 12, 13, 16-24, Motion.) 

According to the evidence presented by the Defendants, this action is still pending in the Central

District of California. (Exh. B at 15.) Thus, according to the Defendants, Plaintiff has not

suffered any adverse action and the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

The Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of informing the Court of

the basis for their Motion, and identifying those portions of the record which they believe

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to

Plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, Plaintiff

may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but is required to tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11;

First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747,

749 (9th Cir. 1973).

In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has suffered actual injury because his Petition

filed in the California Court of Appeal was denied with a “citation to authorities which mention

‘delayed petition’.” (Exh. 94-95, Opposition.) Thus, Plaintiff contends, he has suffered actual

injury because the delay stemmed from lack of access to the law library. 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s application of the facts to the law unpersuasive. As a

preliminary matter, the law clearly states that the right of access to the courts is merely the right

to bring to court a grievance the inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal

appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). It

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Plaintiff’s second state habeas petition, Case No. B 166128 (Exh. B-5, Motion), was denied on the merits 3

and on the procedural ground that Plaintiff (Petitioner in the action) did not justify his failure to present his claim and

evidence in the prior petition. (Exh. 95, Opposition.) 

The Court also cited to In re Duvall, 4 Cal.4th 464, 474-475 (1993) which signals that the Petitioner should 4

return with more complete pleadings; In re Mattson, 50 Cal.3d 826, 876 (1990), which provides that the Petition

must show a motion would have been meritorious to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Pope, 23

Cal.3d 412, 424-426 (1979), concerning ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and People v. Madaris, 122

Cal.App.3d 234, 241-242 (1981), holding the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel rests with the

Petitioner.

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is undisputed that Plaintiff was able to file his state and federal habeas petitions as is shown by

the evidence submitted by both parties. In fact, at least one of Plaintiff’s state habeas petitions

was denied on the merits. The second was summarily denied with citation to various legal 3

authorities which stand for multiple propositions including that issues heard on appeal will not be

reconsidered in habeas corpus, piecemeal litigation of claims in successive petitions is barred,

that the Petitioner has failed to provide justification for the delay in filing, and that the Petitioner

failed to present mitigating evidence sufficient to warrant relief. In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 766-

767, 774-781, 782-783, 796-798 (1993). The Court’s discussion of delay in In re Clark provides

that “any substantial delay in the filing of a petition after factual and legal bases for the claim are

known or should have been known must be explained and justified.” Id. at 784. Thus, it was

Plaintiff’s failure to explain any delay that formed one if he bases on which his second state

habeas petition was denied. Plaintiff is reminded, however, that there continued to be other

reasons apart from delay which resulted in the denial of that second state habeas petition. 

The Court is inclined to agree with the Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to establish

that he was precluded or thwarted in his efforts to present a legally or factually arguable claim to

the courts. In addition, Plaintiff is has failed to demonstrate that the dismissal was based solely

on the delay which Plaintiff attributes to the lack of law library access. As stated above, the first

4

state habeas petition was denied on the merits. The second was denied for various reasons

including that the issues raised on appeal could not be heard in habeas corpus. Accordingly,

Plaintiff fails to meet his burden in demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact that supports

his allegation that his habeas petition was denied on the basis of the statute of limitations and

delay. The Court will recommend summary judgment be granted with regard to this claim. 

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b. Mail Interference & Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff next alleges that on February 11, 2003, his father mailed copies of his legal work

to him but it was not delivered. Plaintiff states that he was told by Defendant Pugliese that the

mailroom did not have his mail. However, Plaintiff states that his father provided him with a

tracking receipt showing that the mail arrived at the facility on February 20, 2003. Plaintiff states

that the mail sent to him was necessary to “complete ongoing litigation” and notified each of the

supervisors in the mail process but his mail continued to be withheld. (Am. Compl. At 6.) 

Plaintiff alleges that this action violated his First Amendment rights. 

A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights not inconsistent with his status as a

prisoner or the legitimate penological objectives of the correctional system. Thus, a prison

official's interference with an inmate's mail may be challenged when such interference is not

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89

(1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). As a general proposition, prison officials

have an obligation to post outgoing mail and to deliver incoming mail promptly. See, e.g.,

Nicholson v. Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Ala. 1980). Nevertheless, delays

sometimes occur, and mail is occasionally lost; these delays and losses are not unconstitutional

unless they occur as a result of a systematic breakdown in the prison mail system or as a result of

either intentional interference with a prisoner's mail rights or deliberate indifference to those

rights. Grady v. Wilen, 735 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1984); Armstrong v. Lane, 771 F. Supp. 943 (C.D.

Ill. 1991) (unintentional losses and delays of plaintiff's mail, “while understandably frustrating qqq

fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation”).

The Court has re-read Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and finds that it fails to state a

cognizable claim for relief. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff only complains of one instance

where his mail was not given to him. Plaintiff names Defendant Pugliese however, he does not

allege specific facts linking Defendant Pugliese to an act or omission giving rise to a

constitutional violation. The Amended Complaint states only that Defendant Pugliese told

Plaintiff that he did not have his mail. As noted above, unintentional losses or delays of an

inmate’s mail alone fails to give rise to a constitutional violation. As noted by Defendants,

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Plaintiff’s allegation that there was no adequate post-deprivation remedy available is also unpersuasive. 

5

Plaintiff concedes in his Amended Complaint and Opposition that he grieved the failed-mail-delivery by using the

602 form and also by letter to the Warden and Supervisor. (Am. Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff’s allegation that the

postdeprivation remedy was inadequate is based solely on the fact that he did not receive the response he sought.

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Plaintiff’s claim is more like a deprivation of property claim. 

Even assuming Plaintiff’s allegation gives rise to a cognizable claim for relief,

Defendants argue that there existed regulations that would have precluded delivery of Plaintiff’s

mail as described. First, Defendants present evidence that the Defendants have no record that the

mail was ever received at SATF. (Exh. E at 2 [Decl. of Def. Pugliese], Motion.) Incoming mail

with a tracking number is logged in a permanent ledger book and the book showed no entry for

mail received for Plaintiff between February 11, 2003, through March 12, 2003. Id. at 3. 

However, even had the mail been received, incoming mail may not include more than ten

photocopied pages. Of course, the number of photocopies contained is unknown as the mail was

not delivered to Plaintiff. In any event, because Plaintiff contends that Defendant Pugliese is

responsible for the failed mail delivery, his allegations are more like a deprivation of property

claim. 

An "unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not

constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Thus, where the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation

remedy, only authorized, intentional deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due

Process Clause. An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state

procedures, regulations, or statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985);

see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). Because a

deprivation of the type alleged in plaintiff’s complaint is unauthorized, and because the state does

provide a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, plaintiff has not stated a cognizable procedural

due process claim.5

In this case, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states an unauthorized deprivation of

property as no regulation was cited for the deprivation and Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

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Pugliese withheld his property without good reason. Such allegations, however, do not give rise

to a constitutional claim for relief. Further, and contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, his mail does

not constitute “legal” correspondence. The Court’s have held that correspondence between an

attorney and a client is entitled to special protection under the attorney-client privilege. 

However, “[m]ail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal

mail.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9 Cir. 1996). “All correspondence from a court to th

a litigant is a public document, which prison personnel could if they want inspect in the court’s

files.” Id. at 1094 (citing to Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7 Cir. 1987)). Similarly, mail th

from Plaintiff’s father to him, even if legal in nature, is not “legal” mail subject to heightened

protection. 

Finally, assuming Plaintiff’s allegations give rise to an access to court claim, Plaintiff

again fails to show actual injury. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint cites limited law library access

and withholding of mail as reasons why his state habeas case was denied. (Am. Compl at 6.)

However, as discussed in the preceding section, Plaintiff’s first state habeas petition was heard

on the merits and the second denied for several other reasons including delay. As such, the Court

finds Plaintiff fails to show actual injury and there is no disputed issue of fact warranting trial on

the alleged withholding of mail against Defendant Pugliese. 

Plaintiff also fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendants Adams and Espinoza.

The Amended Complaint alleges that these Defendants failed to train or properly supervise their

employees with regard to mail delivery. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege

some facts that would support a claim that supervisory Defendants either: personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to

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prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts

must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Although Plaintiff states that he wrote to the Defendants to inform them that his mail was

being withheld, he has not alleged any facts indicating that Defendants personally participated in

the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.

Black at 646. The fact that Plaintiff informed the Defendants that his mail had been withheld

alone is insufficient to give rise to a constitutional violation. Again, even assuming it did,

Plaintiff does not present evidence to create a disputed issue of fact warranting trial on the mail

claim against Defendants Adams and Espinoza. Accordingly, the Court will recommend

summary judgment be granted with regard to the mail claim against Defendants Pugliese, Adams

and Espinoza. 

c. Eighth Amendment - Exercise

The deprivation of outdoor exercise by prison officials to prisoners can constitute cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189

(9th Cir.1979). “[S]ome form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the

psychological and physical well being of the inmates.” Id. at 199. The long-term deprivation of

outdoor exercise is a denial of a basic need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Allen v.

Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087-1088 (9th Cir.1994); see also, Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090

(9th Cir.1996) (defendants not entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff produced evidence

showing deprivation of outdoor exercise for six-month period in administrative segregation).

Regular outdoor exercise is necessary “unless inclement weather, unusual circumstances, or

disciplinary needs ma[k]e that impossible.” Spain, supra, at 199. In Hayward v. Procunier, 629

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F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1980), the Ninth Circuit found that the deprivation of outdoor exercise

and a five-month lockdown in response to a genuine emergency did not violate the Eighth

Amendment; however, plaintiffs therein “were allowed approximately the minimum exercise

mandated in Spain within a month after imposition of the lockdown.” Id. 

In this case, Defendants argue that they were not deliberately indifferent in imposing and

continuing the lockdown that resulted in the alleged deprivation of time outside Plaintiff’s cell. 

In support of this, Defendants provide numerous exhibits and declarations of the events

surrounding the lockdown in January 2002, and those events occurring after the lockdown. 

However, Defendants do not provide evidence to refute the allegations made by Plaintiff in the

Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff alleges specifically that Defendants Adams and Cuevas violated his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by depriving him of outdoor

exercise. Plaintiff alleges that he was granted “no yard, sunlight or outdoor exercise” from

January 9, 2002 through August 13, 2002, and that after August 13, 2002, to April 2003, he was

given only 16 two-hour yard periods. (Am. Compl. at 5.) Defendants Motion consists of

information and evidence generally describing the events that precipitated the lockdown in

January of 2002, and surrounding the extended lockdown that ensued thereafter. However,

Defendants point to no specific facts concerning Plaintiff and/or whether he was allotted time out

of his cell, what kind, when and for how long. As stated above, the moving party bears the

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Although Defendants provide general

background information and evidence regarding the events that resulted in the lockdown and

caused a continued lockdown, Defendants fail to address the specific allegations in the

Complaint that Plaintiff was denied time out of his cell for a period of eight months, or that he

was given only 16 two hour exercise periods in eight months. Accordingly, the Court must

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RECOMMEND that the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim be denied. 

E. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED with

respect to Plaintiff’s access to courts, mail interference and supervisory liability claims against

the Defendants, and that the Motion be DENIED without prejudice regarding the Eighth

Amendment exercise claim against Defendant Cuevas and Adams. The Court further

RECOMMENDS that Defendants be granted the opportunity to file a second Motion for

Summary Judgment addressing this remaining issue within thirty (30) days of the resolution of

these Findings should Defendants choose to do so. 

The Court further ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to

the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States

District Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with

a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served

and filed within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

b6edp0 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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