Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-08071/USCOURTS-ca10-94-08071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

...,FILED 

United States Court of Appcn!s 

Te:tth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 0 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CLAJON PRODUCTION CORPORATION; 

MARION H. SCOTT, MARY C. SCOTT, 

husband and wife; and SALT CREEK 

RANCH, L.L.C., a Wyoming limited 

liability corporation, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

PETE E. PETERA, Director of the 

Wyoming Game and Fish Department, 

in his personal capacity; JAY 

LAWSON, Chief Game Warden of the 

Wyoming Game and Fish Department; 

in his personal capacity; THE 

WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION; 

DAN KENNEDY, KEVIN DOOLEY, MIKE 

HUNZIE, HAL CORBETT, MARY FLITNER, 

KARI PRIEWE, and DAVID STEGER, 

members of the Wyoming Game and 

Fish Commission, in their personal 

capacities, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

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NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION; ) 

WYOMING WILDLIFE FEDERATION; ) 

PHYLLIS ACHISON; TAYLOR OUTFITTERS;) 

WYOMING OUTDOOR COUNCIL; DUBOIS ) 

WILDLIFE ASSOCIATION; HEART ) 

MOUNTAIN WILDLIFE ASSOCIATION; ) 

GREATER YELLOWSTONE COALITION; ) 

MEDICINE BUTTE WILDLIFE ) 

ASSOCIATION; WYOMING CHAPTER OF THE) 

SIERRA CLUB; and ORION, The Hunters) 

Institute, ) 

Intervenors-Appellees. 

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PATRICK FISHER 

Cieri' 

No. 94-8071 

Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 1 
CLAJON PRODUCTION CORPORATION; 

MARION H. SCOTT 1 MARY C. SCOTT 1 

husband and wife; and SALT CREEK 

RANCH 1 L.L.c:/ a Wyoming limited 

liability corporation/ 

Plaintiffs-Appellees/ 

v. 

PETE E. PETERA1 Director of the 

Wyoming Game and Fish Department/ 

in his personal capacity; JAY 

LAWSON 1 Chief Game Warden of the 

Wyoming Game and Fish Department/ 

in his personal capacity; THE 

WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION; 

DAN KENNEDY 1 KEVIN DOOLEY 1 MIKE 

HUNZIE 1 HAL CORBETT 1 MARY FLITNER1 

KARI PRIEWE 1 and DAVID STEGER1 

members of the Wyoming Game and 

Fish Commission/ in their personal 

capacities/ 

Defendants/ 

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NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION; ) 

WYOMING WILDLIFE FEDERATION; ) 

PHYLLIS ACHISON; TAYLOR OUTFITTERS;) 

WYOMING OUTDOOR COUNCIL; DUBOIS ) 

WILDLIFE ASSOCIATION; HEART ) 

MOUNTAIN WILDLIFE ASSOCIATION; ) 

GREATER YELLOWSTONE COALITION; ) 

MEDICINE BUTTE WILDLIFE ) 

ASSOCIATION; WYOMING CHAPTER OF THE) 

SIERRA CLUB; and ORION1 The Hunters) 

Institute 1 ) 

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Intervenors-Appellants. ) 

No. 94-8103 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-223) 

James R. Scarantino of Albuquerque/ New Mexico (John MacPherson of 

MacPherson Law Offices/ Rawlins 1 Wyoming/ Karen J. Budd-Falen of 

Budd-Falen1 Cheyenne/ Wyoming with him on the briefs) for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants-Appellees. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 2 
Ron Arnold of the Office of the Attorney General, State of 

Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming (Joseph B. Meyer, Mary B. Guthrie and 

Kristi Sansonetti, of the Office of the Attorney General, State of 

Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, with him on the brief) for DefendantsAppellees. 

Susan Morath Horner of Boulder, Colorado (James J. Tuchton of the 

National Wildlife Federation, University of Colorado, Boulder, 

Colorado, and Thomas David Lustig of Boulder, Colorado with her on 

the brief) for Intervenors-Appellees-Appellants. 

Before BALDOCK, ALARCON,* and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

This case is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging several 

Wyoming hunting regulations as violative of the federal and state 

constitutional rights of a number of Wyoming ranchers 

("Plaintiffs") who offer hunting services to out-of-state 

residents. Plaintiffs commenced this action for declaratory and 

injunctive relief against the Wyoming officials who promulgated 

the challenged regulations and who are charged with administering 

them ("State Defendants") ,1 and the National Wildlife Fund and 

* The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Court Judge for 

the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, sitting 

by designation. 

1 Plaintiffs originally sued the State of Wyoming and the 

members of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission (the "Commission") 

in their official capacity. However, after the original 

defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action on Eleventh 

Amendment grounds, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name the 

members of the Commission as well as the Director and the Chief 

Game Warden of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department as individuals 

(collectively "State Defendants"). See Clajon v. Petera, 854 F. 

Supp. 843, 846-47 (D. Wyo. 1994). Thus, the district court viewed 

the State Defendants' motion to dismiss as moot. See id. at 847 

n.3. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 3 
several environmental groups ("Intervenors") intervened in the 

case as code~endants (collectively "Defendants"). After both 

parties moved for summary judgment, the district court denied 

Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, granted 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' 

federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claims. 

See Clajon v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994). The 

district court subsequently refused to grant Intervenors' request 

for attorneys' fees. See Clajon v. Petera, No. 93-CIV-0223-B (D. 

Wyo. Nov. 7, 1994). Plaintiffs appealed the district court's 

disposition of their federal constitutional claims, and 

Intervenors appealed the district court's denial of their 

application for attorneys' fees. We exercise jurisdiction over 

these consolidated appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 

In this appeal, Plaintiffs complain that (1) Wyoming's 

restriction on the availability of hunting licenses to out-ofstate residents violates the Commerce Clause; and (2) Wyoming's 

two-license limit on supplemental hunting licenses issued to large 

landowners violates the Takings and Equal Protection Clauses.3 

2 Because the two appeals present related issues, we 

consolidated Plaintiffs' appeal of their federal constitutional 

claims, No. 94-8071, with Intervenors' appeal of their request for 

attorneys' fees, No. 94-8103. While we heard oral argument on No. 

94-8071, after examining the briefs and appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for 

a decision on the briefs on No. 94-8103. See Fed .. R. App. 

P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. That case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

3 Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of their state 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 4 
For the reasons stated below, we DISMISS Plaintiffs' Commerce 

Clause claim for lack of standing and we otherwise AFFIRM the 

district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants and its 

denial of Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 

Furthermore, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment that 

Intervenors are not entitled to attorneys' fees as a 11 prevailing 

party11 under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

BACKGROUND 

Over fifty years ago, the State of Wyoming enacted a 

comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate hunting and fishing. 

See Wyo. Stat. §§ 23-1-101 to 901 (1991). This statutory scheme 

aspired to 11 provide an adequate and flexible system for control, 

propagation, management, protection and regulation of all Wyoming 

wildlife. 11 Id. § 23-1-103; see also O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 

1144, 1148 (Wyo. 1986) (same). To implement this goal, the 

Wyoming legislature established a Game and Fish Commission ("the 

Commission 11 ), Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-201 (1991), and granted it 

"extensive powers and duties," O'Brien, 711 P.2d at 1149; Wyo. 

Stat. § 23-1-302 (Supp. 1994). These powers include the authority 

(1) to promulgate regulations governing hunting and fishing; as 

well as (2) to direct the Game and Fish Department. See Wyo. 

Stat. § 23-1-302; § 23-1-401. 

(continued from prior page) 

constitutional law claims or the dismissal of their contention 

that the state's claim to ownership of all animals in the state in 

and of itself constitutes an unconstitutional taking and violation 

of the Commerce Clause. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 5 
Pursuant to this broad mandate, the Commission annually 

determines the types of species available for hunting and the 

overall number of animals of each species that may be taken.4 The 

Commission first sets the number of licenses that can be issued in 

"limited quota areas"5 and then determines whether the number of 

applications for licenses exceeds the number of available 

licenses. If so, a random computer lottery assigns the licenses. 

See Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 848-49. 

To effectuate this system of allocating hunting licenses, the 

Commission promulgated a set of regulations entitled "Chapter 

XLIV: Regulation for Issuance of Licenses." In addition to 

outlining the criteria for licenses, these regulations 

specifically provide that landowners of 160 or more acres are 

granted two supplemental licenses in recognition of their land's 

support of wild animals, see Chapter XLIV§ 3 ("Section 3"),6 and 

4 One cannot lawfully hunt big game in Wyoming without a 

license. See Wyo. Stat. § 23-3-102 (Supp. 1994). 

5 The areas of the state subject to the challenged hunting 

limitations, including the land owned by Plaintiffs, are referred 

to as "limited quota areas." See Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 849. 

6 Wyo. G & F Dept. Chap. XLIV § 3 provides, in relevant part, 

that: 

Only two licenses per species may be issued to a 

landowner or the landowners's immediate family or a 

corporation regardless of the number of landholdings 

which meet the qualifications. 

In order to qualify for a license issued pursuant 

to this section, the deed land of the landowner or 

corporation must consist of at least 160 contiguous 

acres in Wyoming, must be assessed as agricultural land 

on the county tax roll, and must be utilized by the 

species of game for which the license is applied to the 

extent the land provides food, cover and water, and can 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 6 
it allocates between residents and nonresidents the percentage of 

hunting lice~ses that each may receive through the lottery system, 

see id. at§§ 5-6 ( 11 Sections 5 and 6 11 ) .7 

Plaintiffs commenced this action to challenge Sections 3, 5 

and 6 of the regulations contained in Chapter XLIV. Specifically, 

(continued from prior page) 

exhibit at least 2,000 days use by the species during 

the 12 months prior to application 

(a) In elk, deer, antelope or wild turkey hunt 

areas where licenses are issued totally as limited 

quota, landowners within the designated hunt area may be 

issued limited quota elk, deer, antelope or wild turkey 

licenses. Only two limited quota licenses for each 

species qualified for will be allowed to a person and 

one member of the immediate family. For lands held in 

title as a corporation, no more than two landowner 

licenses per species qualified for may be issued 

separate landholdings. When corporations own lands in 

more than one limited quota area, the corporation is 

only entitled to two licenses per species qualified for. 

They may choose two licenses in one qualified area or 

one license in each of two qualified areas. Such 

licenses shall be issued only to a member of the 

corporation of their immediate families . . . . 

Aplt. App. at 64; Aplt's Br. at 3. We note that while these 

regulations were promulgated under the Commission's plenary 

authority, see Chap. XLIV § 1, the Wyoming legislature 

specifically directed the Commission to promulgate rules governing 

the issuance of certain big game licenses to Wyoming landowners 11 without subjection to prescribed means of competitive public 

issuance [i.e., the lottery system] . 11 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-

302(h) (Supp. 1995). Thus, Section 3 also reflects the 

Commission's response to this directive. 

7 Wyo. G & F Dept. Chap. XLIV § 5 provides, in relevant part, 

that: 11 In limited quota areas, 80 percent of deer, antelope, 

mountain lion and wild turkey licenses and 84 percent of elk 

licenses are reserved for residents ... 

Wyo. G & F Dept. Chap. XLIV § 6 provides, in relevant part, 

that: 11 In limited quota areas, 20 percent of deer, antelope, 

mountain lion and wild turkey licenses are reserved for 

nonresidents, and 16 percent of elk licenses are reserved for 

nonresidents ... 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 7 
Plaintiffs contended that (1) Sections 5 and 6's restriction on 

the percentage of licenses that can be issued to nonresidents 

unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce; and 

(2) Section 3's two-license limit for large landownersB no matter 

how large the landholdings effects an unconstitutional taking and 

violates the Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected 

Plaintiffs' claims, granted Defendants' motion for summary 

judgment on all of the federal constitutional claims, and denied 

Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the Commerce 

Clause claim. Plaintiffs now appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

We review the district court's summary judgment rulings de 

novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l. Inc. 

v. First Affiliated Sec .. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 

1990). That is, we first consider if there is a genuine issue of 

material fact in dispute; if not, we then determine if the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Applied 

Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241. 

In so doing, we hold in Part A that Plaintiffs lack standing 

to challenge the nonresident hunting license allocation scheme 

because they have failed to demonstrate any injury-in-fact arising 

8 Plaintiff Clajon Corporation owns in excess of 90,000 acres, 

Plaintiff Scotts own over 8,400 acres and lease several thousand 

other acres, and Plaintiff Salt Creek Ranch owns over 40,000 

acres. See Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 846. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 8 
from the allocation scheme. We therefore dismiss that claim. In 

Parts B and C, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of Defendants' 

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Takings and Equal 

Protection Clause claims. Finally, in Part D, we AFFIRM the 

district court's ruling that Intervenors are not entitled to an 

award of attorney's fees.9 

9 Defendants not only challenge the basis of Plaintiffs' 

substantive claims and their standing to assert them, but also 

argue that (1) Plaintiffs' claims are not judicially redressable 

because the design of Wyoming's hunting licensing scheme is 

committed to other branches of government; and (2) Plaintiffs have 

not stated a claim under § 1983 because the Wyoming Game & Fish 

Commissioners cannot be sued in their individual capacities for 

executing their statutory duties. 

We reject the first argument because it misunderstands the 

role of the judiciary. Intervenors assert that the federal courts 

should not redesign the licensing scheme because "resolution of 

these complex issues involves legislative and executive decisions 

beyond the province of the federal courts." Intervenors' Br. at 

9. However, "[i]t is, emphatically, the province and duty of the 

judicial department to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 

U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), and to grant an injunction to 

prevent legislatures or executives from making or implementing 

unconstitutional decisions, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-

60 (1908). As to the second argument, we reject it because Ex 

parte Young clearly provides that state officials can be sued in 

their individual capacities--even if merely performing clear 

statutory duties--for injunctive and declaratory relief. See id. 

at 159-60 & 167 ("The State cannot [grant] official immunity from 

responsibility to the supreme authority [i.e., the 

Constitution]."). 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 9 
A. COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE 

We first address Plaintiffs' argument that Sections 5 and 6--

the regulations allocating the percentage of hunting licenses 

between residents and nonresidents--violate the Commerce Clause.10 

However, because Plaintiffs have not established that the 

regulations interfere with their ability to provide commercial 

hunting services to out-of-state residents, Plaintiffs have not 

established injury-in-fact and thus lack standing to challenge the 

regulations under the Commerce Clause.11 

The requirement that a litigant have "standing" to invoke the 

power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of the 

Article III justiciability doctrines. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 

10 The United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress 

shall have Power [t]o regulate Commerce . . among the 

several states." Art I, § 8, cl. 3. 

11 Defendants also contest Plaintiffs' standing to challenge 

Sections 5 and 6 on the ground that Plaintiffs do not have a 

"legally protected interest" within the scope of the Commerce 

Clause. Although we ultimately conclude that Plaintiffs lack 

standing, we reject Defendants' suggestion that an individual 

litigant has no legally protected interest under the Commerce 

Clause. The Commerce Clause provides a cause of action--i.e., a 

legally protected interest--to any person injured by 

discrimination against, or by an unreasonable burden upon, 

interstate commerce, Dennis v. Hiogins, 498 U.S. 439, 450 (1991), 

even if that person's injury is indirect, see Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 

112 S. Ct. 789, 797-800 (1992) (interest in collecting tax 

revenues sufficient to confer standing to bring Commerce Clause 

challenge) . Furthermore, Defendants are mistaken that the 

Commerce Clause protects only nonresidents from state regulations 

that excessively burden commerce. In-state residents may also 

assert a Commerce Clause challenge although, of course, they have 

the same burden to establish standing as have out-of-state 

residents, see Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Env. Quality, 

114 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (1994) (in-state landfill operators entitled 

to challenge their own state's regulations burdening interstate 

commerce and their ability to provide commercial services to 

nonresident customers); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560-61 (1992). 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 10 
737, 750 (1983). The constitutional minimum of standing contains 

three elements. First, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injuryin-fact." Luian v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 

(1992) . Second, the injury must be "fairly traceable to the 

defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 

"Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' 

that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). The party invoking the 

jurisdiction of the court bears the burden of establishing these 

elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Powder River Basin 

Resources Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1485 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

The injury-in-fact element requires that the plaintiff have 

suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) 

concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.'" Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations 

omitted). At the summary judgment stage, the injury-in-fact 

element requires that the plaintiff set forth by affidavit or 

other evidence specific facts which for purposes of the summary 

judgment will be taken to be true. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 

Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2891-92 n.3 (" [I]njury-in-fact at the 

summary judgment stage require[s] specific facts to be adduced by 

sworn testimony.") (emphasis in original). Thus, in order to 

withstand Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs must 

at a minimum set forth specific facts from which we could conclude 

that the Wyoming hunting license allocation scheme causes them 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 11 
some judicially cognizable injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. This 

Plaintiffs have failed to do. 

We first note that Plaintiffs do not allege injury-in-fact 

from Wyoming's decision to limit the total availability of hunting 

licenses. There is no dispute that a state has the authority 

under its police power to limit evenhandedly the overall number of 

available hunting licenses. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 

337-38 (1979) (because of the state's interest in conservation, it 

may regulate wild animals evenhandedly under the police power) ; 

see also Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 

377, 388 (1978). As a result, Plaintiffs must instead trace their 

alleged injury to what they perceive to be an unequal allocation 

of wild game licenses between resident and nonresident hunters. 

Plaintiffs' specific claim of injury is that the license 

allocation scheme denies them the ability to transact business 

with potential nonresident purchasers of their outfitting 

services. Their complaint alleges that: 

Nonresidents whom Plaintiffs have invited to hunt on their 

lands have been unsuccessful in drawing a license, and 

consequently, as the result of Defendants' laws and 

regulations, Plaintiffs have been prohibited from granting 

hunting opportunities on their lands to nonresidents of their 

own choosing. 

Aplt. App. at 9. Plaintiffs also assert that nonresident hunters 

spend disproportionately greater amounts on commercial hunting 

services and hunting rights than do Wyoming residents. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue, the license allocation scheme 

causes them injury-in-fact by denying them access to a profitable 

pool of nonresident customers. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 12 
Admittedly, the loss of an opportunity for an economic 

benefit may ~onstitute a cognizable injury. See Northeastern 

Florida Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302-03 

(1993) (denial of opportunity to compete for a public construction 

contract constitutes injury-in-fact); cf. Regents of Univ. of 

California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978) (requisite 

injury occurred when the school did not "permit Bakke to compete 

for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race.") 

(emphasis in original). However, standing requires more than 

simply an injury to a cognizable interest; it also requires that 

the injury suffered by the plaintiff be fairly traceable to the 

defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 

737, 757 (1984). Thus, in order to establish standing, Plaintiffs 

must show a causal nexus between the license allocation scheme and 

their inability to attract nonresident hunting customers. See 

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45 (1976) 

(plaintiff must "establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was 

the consequence of the defendants' actions"). 

In this regard, Plaintiffs contend that the affidavits from 

ranchers and a study from the University of Wyoming demonstrate 

that the residency-based licensing system impairs Plaintiffs' 

ability to sell their commercial hunting services in the 

potentially lucrative out-of-state market. It is clear that the 

rancher affidavits and the University of Wyoming study both attest 

to the fact that nonresidents spend more than residents both for 

the use of hunting services and for the right to hunt on 

Plaintiffs' land. See. e.g., Scott Aff. ,r 12-13, Aplt. App. at 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 13 
313; Univ. of Wyo. Study at 4, Aplt. App. at 322 (concluding that 

"the net gain_ to the state's economy is greater for outfitted 

nonresident elk hunters"); id. at 331 ("outfitters predominantly 

sell their services to nonresidents") .12 However, even if 

nonresidents spend more money than residents, Plaintiffs are 

required to present some evidence that the license allocation 

scheme between residents and nonresidents is causing fewer 

nonresidents to hunt in Wyoming. In other words, Plaintiffs must 

demonstrate that Wyoming's allocation between in-state and out-ofstate licenses disproportionately disadvantages nonresidents by 

failing adequately to approximate the ratio of demand between instate and out-of-state hunters. 

No one disputes that Wyoming can limit total hunting licenses 

as a legitimate response to the need to manage and conserve 

wildlife in the state. Yet instead of putting all applications 

(both in-state and out-of-state applicants) into a single pool 

from which the licenses are drawn, Wyoming has chosen to utilize 

two separate pools in those areas where Plaintiffs' land is 

located, with 80% of the deer, antelope, mountain lion and wild 

turkey licenses and 84% of the elk licenses reserved for residents 

and the remaining 20% and 16% of such licenses reserved for outof-state applicants. A necessary premise of Plaintiffs' argument 

that this license allocation scheme causes them injury-in-fact is 

12 Plaintiffs have also offered evidence that the scheduling of 

the permitting application process makes it difficult for 

nonresidents to plan hunting trips to Wyoming. See Scott Aff. at 

11 15, Apl t. App. at 313-14. However, as Plaintiffs have not 

challenged the timing of the general licensing scheme, we do not 

view this evidence as relevant to Plaintiffs' case. 

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that the nonresidents who are subject to their own separate 

lottery would fare better if they simply competed for the permits 

through a general lottery which included all applications for 

hunting permits; however, there is no proof of this premise. 

While the rancher affidavits offer conclusory allegations that 

Wyoming's hunting licensing scheme deters some nonresidents from 

entering Wyoming to engage in hunting, it is the inevitable nature 

of any permitting scheme when demand outstrips supply that some 

applicants will be deterred regardless of their state of 

residence. We have not found any evidence that the regulations 

impose a greater burden on nonresidents wishing to hunt in Wyoming 

than they do upon residents. Therefore, because neither the 

report nor the affidavits contain any evidence about the relative 

demand--that is, the demand for resident hunting licenses in the 

limited quota areas in relation to the nonresident demand--

Plaintiffs have failed to establish any injury that is "fairly 

traceable" to the license allocation scheme. See Allen, 468 U.S. 

at 757-58; Simon, 426 u.s. at 45.13 

The district court determined that the Plaintiffs failed to 

show a violation of the Commerce Clause because there was no 

13 Indeed, given the absence of any specific evidence of a less 

favorable success rate in receiving hunting licenses among 

nonresidents, it is possible that the separate quota scheme 

actually favors nonresidents and benefits rather than burdens both 

interstate commerce and Plaintiffs' business by reserving a higher 

percentage of the total available licenses for out-of-state 

applicants then they otherwise would receive in a single lottery. 

It is not self-evident that a nonresident quota scheme will always 

disadvantage nonresidents. See Terk v. Ruch, 655 F. Supp. 205, 

207 (D. Colo. 1987) (indicating that the success rate of 

applications for licenses to hunt mountain goats was higher for 

nonresidents than for residents) . 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 15 
indication of the nature or extent to which the allocation 

provisions b~rdened Plaintiffs' ability to provide hunting 

services to nonresidents in interstate commerce. See Clajon, 854 

F. Supp. at 862. However, because this same failure of proof also 

means that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any injury-infact flowing from Wyoming's method of allocating licenses between 

residents and nonresidents, we conclude that Plaintiffs have 

failed to demonstrate standing to assert their Commerce Clause 

challenge to this aspect of Wyoming's licensing plan. Thus, we 

dismiss that claim for lack of jurisdiction.14 

B. TAKINGS CLAUSE CLAIM 

Plaintiffs argue that Section 3 violates the Fifth 

Amendment's prohibition against taking property without just 

14 Because we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs' 

Commerce Clause challenge, we reject Plaintiffs' argument that the 

state's failure to move specifically for summary judgment on Count 

IV (the Commerce Clause claim) requires a remand for further 

proceedings. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he federal 

courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction, and standing 'is perhaps the most important of [the 

jurisdictional] doctrines.'" FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 

U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 

(1984)) (alteration in original). However, we note that while 

Defendants' summary judgment motion did not focus on Plaintiffs' 

Commerce Clause challenge to the permitting scheme, the motion was 

directed to the entire complaint, Aplt. App. at 18, and the 

memorandum in support thereof explicitly asked for "summary 

judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' amended complaint in its 

entirety .... " Aplt. App. at 35. We also note that Plaintiffs 

themselves sought summary judgment under Count IV, and although 

they focused on a different theory than did Defendants, both 

questions involved precisely the same evidence. Finally, and most 

importantly, Intervenors explicitly argued in favor of summary 

judgment against Plaintiffs on Count IV and Plaintiffs responded 

to Intervenors' argument both in a reply brief and at oral 

argument. See Aplt. App. at 522-526 (Intervenors' argument); id. 

at 534-35 (Plaintiffs' response). 

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compensation by allocating landowners no more than two licenses 

per species ?f elk, deer or antelope regardless of how many 

animals reproduced on the landowner's property.15 Although we 

first have to address ripeness and the issue of whether there 

exists a constitutionally protected property right to hunt surplus 

wild game on one's land, we ultimately conclude that Section 3 

does not constitute an unconstitutional taking because the 

regulation neither deprives Plaintiffs of all economically 

beneficial use of their land nor fails substantially to advance a 

legitimate state interest. 

1. Jurisdiction 

Intervenors initially contend that Plaintiffs' Takings and 

Equal Protection Clause claims are not ripe for consideration 

because Plaintiffs failed first to seek compensation in state 

court. We agree that if the Commission enjoyed the power to 

condemn land, see Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-501(b) (1988) (limiting the 

power of condemnation to those expressly authorized by statute) , 

then the Commission could be sued under Wyoming's inverse 

condemnation statute for just compensation, see id. § 1-26-516 

("When a person possessing power of condemnation takes possession 

of or damages land," the owner can file an action for damages). 

Moreover, if Wyoming's inverse condemnation procedure were 

available to Plaintiffs, this action would not be ripe for 

15 The Takings Clause provides "[N]or shall private property be 

taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Canst. 

amend. V. This restriction is applicable to the states through 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago B. & 0. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 

u.s. 226, 241 (1897). 

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consideration, and thus, we would lack jurisdiction over 

Plaintiffs' Takings Clause claim. s·ee Williamson County Regional 

Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-197 (1985) 

(explaining that "if a State provides an adequate procedure for 

seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a 

violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the 

procedure and been denied just compensation"); Miller v. Campbell 

County, 945 F.2d 348, 352 (lOth Cir. 1991) (failure to invoke 

Wyoming inverse condemnation procedure before seeking federal 

court relief renders case unripe for consideration), cert. denied, 

502 U.S. 1096 (1992). However, because the Commission lacks the 

power of eminent domain, see§ 23-1-302(a) (iii) (Commission 

empowered to "acquire lands in the name of Wyoming by purchase, 

lease, agreement, gift or devise, not including powers of eminent 

domain") (emphasis added), and thus, is not subject to Wyoming's 

inverse condemnation procedure, Plaintiffs' takings claim is ripe 

for review. 

2. The Right To Hunt 

At common law, a landowner traditionally had the right to 

hunt wild animals on his or her land. In fact, the commitment to 

this property right was so ingrained at common law that when the 

King, following the Norman Conquest, attempted to limit this 

right, the landowners, "vehemently objecting, quickly and 

decisively recaptured their rights and re-established the common 

law." Alford v. Finch, 155 So.2d 790, 792 (Fla. 1963) (citing 2 

Blackstone, Commentaries 415). However, even in those states that 

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recognize a property right to hunt on one's land, there is often a 

recognition that the state enjoys (and enjoyed at common law) the 

police power reasonably to regulate and control the hunting of 

game for the beneficial use of the entire state. See Harper v. 

Galloway, 51 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla. 1910). Indeed, Plaintiffs here 

recognize the right of the state reasonably to limit hunting. See 

Aplt's Br. at 31 n.4. However, Plaintiffs contend that any effort 

by the state to limit their right to hunt the "harvestable 

surplus" from their land--i.e., the excess animals available for 

hunting which were produced on their land--constitutes an 

unconstitutional taking. 

While Wyoming appears to adhere to the common law view that a 

landowner may exclude others from hunting or fishing on the 

landowner's property, see Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 

(Wyo. 1961) ("the State is without power to authorize" the public 

to fish or hunt on private lands except as incid~nt to the full 

exercise of the easement of using navigable or non-navigable 

waters) ,16 it has not explicitly addressed the issue of whether a 

landowner has a property right to hunt surplus game that may be 

found on his or her land, nor has it opined on the extent of that 

16 Montana has opined on the extent of a property owner's right 

to hunt in a somewhat similar context. Specifically, the Montana 

Supreme Court held that a statute which authorized persons using 

navigable waters to engage in big game hunting between high water 

marks was unconstitutional because it infringed on the right to 

hunt of private landowners. See Galt v. State Dep't of Fish. 

Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 916 (Mont. 1987).. The court 

explained that, because the "real property interests of private 

landowners are important as are the public's property interest in 

water," and that both are constitutionally protected, the public's 

easement in the right to use water for recreational purposes must 

be narrowly construed. Id. 

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right in light of game conservation regulations. Ordinarily, we 

would first address the extent of the Plaintiffs' property right 

before determining whether there has been an unconstitutional 

infringement of that right, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 

Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (directing courts first to determine 

issues of state law before deciding constitutional questions), and 

where the threshold state law issue is uncertain and a state 

court's clarification would make our constitutional ruling 

unnecessary, we would ordinarily abstain from deciding the case, 

Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941). 

Here, however, we assume without deciding that the Plaintiffs have 

at least a limited property interest to hunt surplus game on their 

land that is impacted by the regulations in question. There are 

several factors that cause us to address the constitutional issue 

directly while assuming that the Plaintiffs possess an underlying 

property right. First, we ultimately conclude that Wyoming's 

restrictions are constitutional and Pullman abstention is less 

appropriate when the assumed state law is upheld as 

constitutional. See Telephone News Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Bell 

Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621, 637 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (abstention less 

appropriate where the state law at issue judged to be 

constitutional), aff'd, 376 U.S. 782 (1964) (per curiam). Second, 

Plaintiffs' property rights, for purposes of the Takings Clause, 

may not totally be left to the mercies of the state, see Board of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), and the weight of the 

common law suggests that the property right assumption that we 

make is not an unreasonable one. Third, this approach enables us 

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to avoid opining on an unclear and difficult issue that has 

substantial ~nderpinnings in state law. See generally Erie R. Co. 

v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Fourth, Wyoming has not argued 

in favor of abstention and the parties have not briefed the 

Pullman abstention issue. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 

451, 467 n.16 (1987). Fifth, the delay engendered by declining to 

consider the merits of Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge at 

this time also militates against abstention. See Anderson v. 

Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 306 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980). Finally, we note 

that courts must exercise caution before abstaining from 

considering the merits of constitutional claims brought under 

section 1983. See Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th 

Cir. 1979) ("'unflagging obligation'" to exercise federal 

jurisdiction is "particularly weighty when those seeking a hearing 

in federal court are asserting . . . their right to relief under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983") (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation 

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976)). Thus, we 

proceed to consider whether the regulation at issue effects an 

unconstitutional taking. 

3. Takings Inguiry 

Based on Plaintiffs' view that they enjoy a common law 

property right to hunt surplus game on their land, Plaintiffs 

claim that Section 3 constitutes an inappropriate "leveraging of 

the police power," Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 

825, 837 n.5 (1987), to take away their property right to hunt and 

to circumvent the Takings Clause's just compensation requirement. 

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That is, Plaintiffs contend that Wyoming law requires them to 

forego the use of an important "stick[] in the bundle of rights 

that are commonly characterized as property," Dolan v. City of 

Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (quotation omitted) --i.e., 

the right to hunt on their land. Thus, Plaintiffs conclude, 

Wyoming must justly compensate them. 

Plaintiffs resist framing their argument as a "regulatory" 

takings claim (as opposed to a physical occupation). However, 

because they do not complain of a physical occupation, they must 

rely on the claim that if a "regulation goes too far [then] it 

will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 

260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). A regulation "goes too far" so as to 

effect a regulatory taking if (1) it deprives an individual of all 

economically beneficial use of his or her property; or (2) it does 

not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Dolan, 114 

S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 

260 (1980)); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 

2 8 8 6 , 2 8 9 4 ( 19 9 2 ) ( s arne ) . 

a. The "Economically Beneficial Use" Test 

If a regulation prohibits all "economically beneficial use," 

then that regulation categorically effects a taking in the same 

sense as a physical occupation. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94. 

Plaintiffs argue that the complete evisceration of a single stick 

in the bundle of property rights--i.e., the right to hunt on one's 

property--can constitute such a taking. The linchpin of this 

argument is Plaintiffs' contention that courts can and should 

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analyze each stick in the bundle of property rights separately in 

order to determine whether the regulation at issue effects a 

taking of a given stick. See Florida Rock Indus .. Inc. v. United 

States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572 n.32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (suggesting that 

the many variants of property rights should be analyzed separately 

for a regulatory taking just as is done for a physical taking) , 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995). Plaintiffs argue that we 

must focus only on Section 3's impact on their property "right to 

hunt." Therefore, Plaintiffs continue, their "right to hunt" is 

the appropriate denominator for our determination of whether 

Section 3 deprives them of complete beneficial use of their 

property.17 However, we believe that the relevant denominator 

must be derived from the entire bundle of rights associated with 

the parcel of land. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 

438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 

DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). Thus, we reject the 

Florida Rock approach and adhere to the more traditional analysis 

outlined in Penn Central. See 438 U.S. at 130 (Regulatory taking 

jurisprudence "does not divide a single parcel into discrete 

segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 

segment have been entirely abrogated."); see also Concrete Pipe & 

17 As the Supreme Court explained in Keystone Bituminous Coal 

Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987), a critical 

question in a regulatory takings inquiry is defining the unit of 

property whose value furnishes the denominator of the fraction for 

the economically beneficial use analysis. 

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Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 

2 2 9 0 ( 19 9 3 ) ( s arne) . 18 

When viewed in the context of Plaintiffs' entire bundle of 

property rights (rather than solely on their assumed right to 

hunt), Section 3 does not effect a destruction of all beneficial 

use of Plaintiffs' "parcel as a whole" because Plaintiffs still 

can "use their property for ranching, farming, and other livestock 

operations." Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 851 n.14. Therefore, we 

reject Plaintiffs' claim that Section 3 deprived them of all 

economically beneficially use of their property so as to effect an 

unconstitutional regulatory taking.19 

18 Plaintiffs' attempt to invoke Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. 

Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994), for support is unavailing as Dolan only 

discusses the importance of a single stick in the bundle of 

property rights in the context of the Court's analysis of whether 

the regulation substantially advanced a legitimate governmental 

interest. In fact, when considering the economically beneficial 

use test, Dolan clearly indicated that test must be viewed in 

light of defendant's entire property. 114 S. Ct. at 2316 n.6. 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs' reference to Webb's Fabulous 

Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), is inapposite. 

Beckwith involved the state's physical taking of all interest 

accrued from interpleader funds. Thus, Beckwith does not bear 

upon the economically beneficial use analysis of a regulatory 

takings case. 

19 Because we reject Plaintiffs' contention that the complete 

deprivation of the right to hunt could constitute a deprivation of 

all beneficial use, we do not reach Defendants' counter-arguments 

that Plaintiffs (1) were justly compensated for any deprivation of 

their right to hunt--e.g., through the two hunting licenses; and 

(2) were not deprived of their investment backed expectations in 

the property, see Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 (no taking if 

proscribed use not part of original title); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 

at 124 (investment-backed expectations are to be considered in 

discerning the value of the original title). 'However, we note 

that Plaintiffs purchased their property after the enactment by 

Wyoming of its general hunting license regulatory scheme. 

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b. The nsubstantially Advance A Legitimate Governmental 

Interestn Test 

Even if-Section 3's restriction on hunting--i.e., the two 

supplementary license limit for large landowners--does not 

completely deprive Plaintiffs of all economically beneficial use 

of their property, it still could constitute a taking if it failed 

substantially to advance a legitimate governmental interest. 

Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Supreme Court has 

declined to define precisely the nature of this analysis, 

explaining that it involves an "essentially ad hoc, factual 

inquir[y] ." Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 

(1979). However, the Supreme Court clearly has stated that the 

burden of striking down a generally applicable police power 

regulation on Takings Clause grounds "properly rests on the party 

challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an 

arbitrary regulation of property rights." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 

2320 n.8 (citing Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 

While the Supreme Court has applied Kaiser-Aetna's "ad hoc" 

inquiry to Takings Clause challenges to broad regulatory schemes, 

two recent cases applying this test in the specific context of 

development exactions,20 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n and 

Dolan v. City of Tigard, have explained further that any required 

dedication of property must have an "essential nexus" and be 

"roughly proportional" to the burdens imposed on the public by the 

20 "Development exactions" are where a governmental agency 

requires that a property owner dedicate some of his or her land 

for public use before granting that property owner a permit to 

develop the land. This "exaction" of land often involves the 

actual deeding of some of the property to the public--either in 

the form of an easement or an outright transfer of the land. 

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property owner. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 

2319-20. Th~s, before conducting the governmental interest 

inquiry, we first must determine whether the "essential nexus" and 

"rough proportionality" tests apply to all regulatory takings 

claims. Based on a close reading of Nollan and Dolan, we conclude 

that those cases (and the tests outlined therein) are limited to 

the context of development exactions where there is a physical 

taking or its equivalent. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Wichita, 

862 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D. Kan. 1994) (rejecting the application of 

Dolan to the restrictions imposed by an Airport Overlay District 

on the grounds that Dolan did not involve a legislative 

classification but rather required that the petitioner convey an 

ownership interest in the land) . 

In our judgment, both Nollan and Dolan follow from takings 

jurisprudence's traditional concern that an individual cannot be 

forced to dedicate his or her land to a public use without just 

compen~ation. That is, Nollan and Dolan essentially view the 

conditioning of a permit based on the transfer of a property 

interest--i.e., an easement--as tantamount to a physical 

occupation of one's land. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832 ("We think 

'a permanent physical occupation' has occurred, for purposes of 

that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous 

right to pass to and fro, so no particular individual is permitted 

to permanently station himself upon the premises."); Washington 

Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access To Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 

1, 8 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (classifying Dolan as a "case[] standing for 

the proposition that property owners may exclude others from their 

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real, or tangible property11 ). Thus, we believe that Nollan and 

Dolan are best understood as extending the analysis of complete 

physical occupation cases to those situations in which the 

government achieves the same end (i.e., the possession of one's 

physical property) through a conditional permitting procedure. 

See Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 379 (2d 

Cir. 1995) ( 11Dolan protects a landowner's right, in some 

circumstances, not to be required to surrender his land as a 

condition of obtaining a permit .... 11 ) .21 See also Nollan, 483 

U.S. at 841 (court will be 11 particularly careful 11 in cases 

involving a requirement that an owner deed property because of the 

likelihood that the purpose of the exaction is 11 avoidance of the 

21 It is instructive that Keystone--decided in the same year as 

Nollan--downplayed the need for any nexus requirement in 

considering the constitutionality of a general regulation and 

focused on the need for a legitimate police power justification. 

See 480 U.S. at 490. Moreover, the Nollan Court explained that 

takings jurisprudence has accepted that a 11 broad range of 

governmental purposes and regulations 11 satisfy the 11 substantially 

advance legitimate state interest 11 requirement. Nollan, 483 U.S. 

at 834-35. 

We note that commentators have also underscored that Nollan 

and Dolan are and should be limited to the context of development 

exactions. See, e.g., Christopher J. St. Jeanos, Note, Dolan v. 

Tigard And The Rough Proportionality Test: Roughly Speaking, Why 

Isn1 t A Nexus Enough, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1883, 1886 (1995) ( 11 As a 

result of the Nollan and Dolan cases, a municipality must be able 

to justify using its land-use power to demand exactions by showing 

that the exaction required is limited to a harm caused by the 

development. 11 ); Leading Cases: Takings, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 139, 

297 & n.48 (1994) (noting that the cases, reliance on the 

unconstitutional conditions doctrine suggests that courts will 

limit the tests to cases involving development exactions and that 11 [l]ower courts have already distinguished the situation in Nollan 

from regulatory schemes that did not call for any physical 

invasion. 11 ); Dwight H. Merriam & R. Jeffrey Lyman, Dolan v. 

Tigard: Study Materials, C90 ALI-ABA 321, 326 (1994) ( 11 Dolan (and 

Nollan before it) was concerned with a dedication of an interest 

in land (as in deeding an easement) , not the regulation of the use 

of land. 11 ). 

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compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power 

objective 11 ) •• Given the important distinctions between general 

police power regulations and development exactions, and the 

resemblance of development exactions to physical takings cases, we 

believe that the 11 essential nexus 11 and 11 rough proportionality11 

tests are properly limited to the context of development 

exactions. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (distinguishing earlier 

land use/zoning cases from development exaction cases on the 

ground that exactions are 11 not simply a limitation on the use 

petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that 

she deed portions of the property11 to the government) . 

While a property owner does not and should not expect to be 

forced to dedicate land unrelated to, or disproportionately 

related to, the burden that he or she imposes on the public, it is 

well established that a 11 property owner necessarily expects the 

uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by 

various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise 

of its police powers. 11 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. That is, the 

Takings Clause allows some property owners to be more burdened by 

a challenged governmental regulation than others because 11 [w]hile 

each of us is burdened somewhat by restrictions, we, in turn, 

benefit greatly from the restrictions that we place on others. 11 

Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.22 See also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 

22 In explaining why the New York City landmarks. law, which did 

not impose identical burdens on all structures, was not an 

unconstitutional taking, the Supreme Court highlighted the 

importance of a regulation serving a public purpose and noted 

that: 

It is, of course, true that the Landmarks Law has a more 

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(acknowledging that "' [g]overnment hardly could go on if to some 

extent value~ incident to property could not be diminished without 

paying for every such change in the general law'") (quoting Mahon, 

260 u.s. at 413). 

Wyoming argues that Section 3 substantially advances its 

legitimate interest in conserving its wild game population while 

affording its residents a reasonable opportunity to hunt. Because 

Wyoming's hunting licensing scheme serves a public purpose and 

promotes the public welfare--i.e., the conservation of and the 

regulation of the ability to hunt game animals, see Hughes, 441 

U.S. at 337 (conservation of wild animals is a legitimate local 

interest similar to health and safety regulation)--we must accept 

the legitimacy of the state interest behind Section 3. Section 3 

substantially advances the legitimate state interest in conserving 

game animals and affording a reasonable opportunity to hunt to its 

residents. To the extent that significant numbers of permits to 

hunt surplus animals are allocated to large landowners, that would 

substantially impair the opportunity of all Wyoming residents to 

compete successfully and on an equal basis for big game hunting 

permits. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987) ("Government 

(continued from prior page) 

severe impact on some landowners than others, but that 

in itself does not mean that the law effects a "taking." 

Legislation designed to promote the general welfare 

commonly burdens some more than others. The owners of 

the brickyard in Hadacheck, of the cedar trees in Miller 

v. Schoene, and of the gravel and sand mine in Goldblatt 

v. Hempstead, were uniquely burdened by the legislation 

sustained in those cases. 

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133. 

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has considerable latitude in regulating property rights in ways 

that may adv~rsely affect the owners.") (citing Keystone and Penn 

Central). Thus, we hold that Wyoming's landowner licensing 

regulation does not effect a regulatory taking, and therefore, we 

AFFIRM the district court's grant of Defendants' motion for 

summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Takings Clause claim. 

C. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CLAIM 

1. Jurisdiction 

Because Defendants' ripeness argument as to Plaintiffs' equal 

protection challenge mirrors their Takings' ripeness argument, we 

reject this argument for the same reasons outlined in Part B1. 

2. Egual Protection Inquiry 

Plaintiffs argue that the protection of private property is a 

fundamental right and thus the analysis of whether their property 

rights were restricted in violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause23 must be based on strict scrutiny. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs claim that the issuance of two supplemental hunting 

licenses to both large and smaller landowners does not adequately 

account for the fact that large landowners support more game 

animals, and thus, Section 3 discriminates against large 

landowners in violation of· the Equal Protection Clause. 

23 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that 

"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction 

the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Canst. amend. XIV§ 1. 

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We disagree with Plaintiffs' premise that Wyoming's 

regulations ~hould be subject to strict scrutiny. Economic 

regulations--i.e., those burdening one's property rights--have 

traditionally been afforded only rational relation scrutiny under 

the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 

Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("When social or 

economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause 

allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes 

that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by 

the democratic processes.") (citations omitted). Thus, we agree 

with the district court that Plaintiffs' equal protection claim 

must be analyzed under rational basis review rather than strict 

scrutiny. Clajon, 854 F. Supp. at 855. Because the district 

court concluded that the limitations on hunting licenses to large 

landowners could conceivably be based on the goal of balancing the 

landowners' interest in having some right to hunt on their 

property with Wyoming's interest in distributing the benefits of 

its conservationist program throughout the state, it upheld 

Section 3 under a rational basis review. Id. at 855-856. 

We must (1) strongly presume that Wyoming's regulatory scheme 

is constitutional, Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993); 

and (2) uphold Section 3 unless it "rests on grounds wholly 

irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective," id. at 

2645 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) . Moreover, 

the state need not articulate its actual objective behind ·the 

scheme or submit evidence to support the rationality of the 

regulation, provided that we can conceive of facts which 

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reasonably justify the classification at issue. FCC v. Beach 

Communicatio~s. Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-03 (1993). Under this 

deferential standard of review--which is a "paradigm of judicial 

restraint," id. at 2101--we have no difficulty in upholding the 

judgment of the district court. 

Indeed, Intervenors assist us in this task by offering two 

justifications for Wyoming's licensing scheme: (1) an overall cap 

on benefits--i.e., hunting licenses--is an acceptable method of 

conserving resources, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 

(1970) (upholding cap on welfare benefits per family on equal 

protection challenge); and (2) the hunting licensing scheme at 

issue seeks to strike a balance between conservationist policies, 

affording the public access to hunting rights through a lottery 

and offering landowners some opportunity to hunt on their land and 

providing some incentive to landowners to maintain game habitat. 

See Intervenors' Br. at 45-46. 

While Plaintiffs argue that the capping of supplemental 

licenses at two for all persons owning land over 160 acres and the 

purported balance achieved by the licensing scheme are 

illegitimate purposes, we must remember that the Equal Protection 

Clause is not meant to be a tool to second-guess legislative 

judgments concerning valid public policies or to invalidate 

classification schemes simply because they are "not made with 

mathematical nicety or because in practice [they] result[] in some 

inequality." Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 

166, 175 (1980) (" [I]n cases involving social and economic 

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Appellate Case: 94-8071 Document: 01019279179 Date Filed: 11/20/1995 Page: 32 
benefits [the Court] has consistently refused to invalidate on 

equal protec~ion grounds legislation which it simply deemed unwise 

or unartfully drawn."). While there are certainly some 

classifications that are "wholly impossible to relate to 

legitimate governmental objectives," Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 

176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)--e.g., those based on an "irrational 

prejudicen24--we view the State's effort to balance its 

conservation policies and desire to offer all of its citizens as 

well as its large landowners an opportunity to hunt as sufficient 

to withstand rational basis scrutiny. Thus, we AFFIRM the grant 

of Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' equal 

protection claim. 

D. INTERVENORS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 

We review the district court's rejection of Intervenors' 

request for attorney's fees under the abuse of discretion 

standard, Cobb v. Saturn Land Co .. Inc., 966 F.2d 1334, 1338 (lOth 

Cir. 1992); however, to the extent that the district court's 

decision was premised on an error of law, we review its judgment 

de novo, American Council of the Blind of Colorado. Inc. v. Romer, 

962 F.2d 1501, 1503 (lOth Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 

113 S. Ct. 1038 (1993). It is well settled that a "prevailing 

party" in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action may be entitled to reasonable 

costs and attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). However, a 

24 See. e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (classifications based 

on an "irrational prejudice" must be struck down as violative of 

equal protection) . 

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defendant (or an intervenor-defendant25) may only recover such 

fees in a Section 1983 action if the lawsuit was "frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in 

subjective bad faith." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) 

(quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 

(1978)) . 

Intervenors contend Plaintiffs' § 1983 action was frivolous, 

invoking Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475 (lOth Cir. 1990), for 

support. Not only is Crabtree inapposite to the instant case, but 

it underscores the rare circumstances in which a suit is truly 

frivolous so as to warrant an award of attorneys' fees to the 

defendant. In Crabtree, the plaintiffs sued a judge despite the 

protection of absolute immunity and based on a property interest 

which both a state court and federal bankruptcy court had 

determined did not exist. Id. at 1477-78. In contrast, the 

instant case presents novel and difficult legal questions whose 

meritworthiness is underlined by the close consideration that we 

afford to them. Thus, we reject Intervenors' claim for attorneys' 

fees and AFFIRM the ruling of the district court. 

25 An intervenor must also demonstrate that it played a 

"significant role" in the litigation and contributed 

"nonduplicative efforts" in order to recover its attorneys' fees. 

Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528,· 1535 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 

F.2d 1196, 1205 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. New York 

City Dept. of Human Resources v. Abbott House, 113 S. Ct. 410 

(1992). 

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, we DISMISS Plaintiffs' 

Commerce Clause claim for lack of standing. We AFFIRM the 

district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants and its 

denial of Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs' Takings and Equal Protection Clause claims. Finally, 

we AFFIRM the district court's ruling that Intervenors are not 

entitled to attorneys' fees. 

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