Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00001/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00001-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e-2ra Job Discrimination (Race)

---

- 1 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SYLVESTER T. OLIVER, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

IRON WORKERS UNION LOCAL 229 et 

al., 

Defendants.

 CASE NO. 17-cv-1-LAB (MDD) 

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

 

Ironworker Sylvester Oliver sums up the heart of his case this way: “Mr. Oliver does 

not believe that he deserves any special treatment and he does not begrudge the callous 

treatment that is doled out on job sites, as life as an iron worker is not easy—but it does not 

stand that it should be made more difficult by unions and employers that engage in illegal 

retaliation with impunity.” The Court agrees. Taking Oliver’s allegations as true, and drawing 

all inferences in his favor, he’s stated a retaliation and hostile work environment claim 

against Iron Workers Union Local 229 and a retaliation claim against SME Steel. 

I. Pleading 

SME Steel argues it can’t defend this action because Oliver’s amended allegations 

collectively refer to SME and the Union. It’s true the Court instructed Oliver to be more 

specific in describing how SME and the Union violated his rights. He’s done so. His 

amended complaint provides both defendants fair notice that Oliver believes they colluded 

to blacklist him from working because he speaks up to oppose unlawful employment 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
- 2 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

practices. His detailed complaint identifies specific people, places, and dates. That’s 

sufficient. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–16 (2002) (reversing 

discrimination dismissal because more specific facts not necessary). 

II. The Union 

A. Title VII 

To state a claim for retaliation, Oliver needs to allege “he undertook a protected 

activity under Title VII, his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action, and 

there is a causal link between those two events.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 847 

F.3d 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2017). Oliver filed at least two EEOC charges against his Union for 

two adverse actions: (1) refusing to refer him to SME’s San Ysidro job three times from July 

to August 2013; and (2) firing him from SME’s San Clemente job in September 2014.1

1. San Ysidro 

Oliver alleges Cesar Cabrera, one of the Union’s business agents, intentionally failed 

to refer him to the San Ysidro job because of his history of complaints. Oliver’s alleged a 

string of protected activity: complaints made to Cabrera about gender discrimination on 

SME’s Courthouse site in 2010; complaints lodged with Cabrera after Oliver was fired from 

Borrego Springs after complaining about use of the N-word in 2012; complaints about the 

selection and treatment of black workers at SME’s Library site in 2011 and 2012; and filing 

an NLRB complaint against the Union and SME in July 2013.2 The Union contends most of 

this protected activity happened too long ago to infer it prompted Cabrera to retaliate against 

Oliver in the summer of 2013. The Court disagrees. 

The Union relies on Aloha Island where the Ninth Circuit explained, “in some cases, 

causation can be inferred from timing alone.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 

 

1 Oliver’s amended EEOC complaint also alleged the Union failed to refer him for work 

almost a year after San Clemente. That’s likely an adverse action as well, but Oliver didn’t 

plead it in his amended complaint. 

2 It doesn’t matter that some of this activity occurred before January 2013 because “the 

statute of limitations runs from the time of the alleged retaliatory act—not from the alleged 

protected activity.” Pruitt v. Genentech, 2017 WL 3641783, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017). 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
- 3 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). But Oliver isn’t alleging timing alone—he’s laid out circumstantial 

evidence that corroborates his causation argument. For example, a few months after 

complaining to Cabrera about the N-word firing, Oliver says Cabrera prompted Brandon 

Gates to file formal charges calling for Oliver’s removal as a Union Trustee. And only a few 

months after Gates’s charges, Cabrera confronted Oliver for speaking up at the Hiring Hall, 

and filed his own charges against Oliver. At the pleading stage, Oliver’s protected activity, 

combined with these allegations against Cabrera, offers plenty of “circumstantial evidence 

of a pattern of antagonism following the protected conduct.” Porter v. California Dep't of 

Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing because enough to show causation for 

retaliation claim). 

2. San Clemente 

The Union also argues Oliver can’t state a retaliation claim for San Clemente because 

the Union didn’t do anything wrong. But Oliver alleges the Union acted in partnership with 

SME by “calling him to a faraway job site with the intention of immediately sending him 

home” and then dispatching “another bolt-up worker” to take his place. In support, Oliver 

points out SME fired him on a Monday with a reimbursement check post-dated from Friday. 

The Court agrees with Oliver: It’s not a stretch to infer someone at the Union, like Cabrera, 

spoke with someone at San Clemente and arranged to fire Oliver for his past complaints. 

The Union again argues Oliver’s protected activity is too remote. That argument fails 

for the same reasons outlined above. Plus, Oliver filed an EEOC complaint against the 

Union in late 2013 that provides additional protected activity to suggest San Clemente was 

retaliatory. Oliver may uncover more evidence he doesn’t have access to now—emails, text 

messages, deposition testimony—that support his claims. But at the pleading stage, he 

doesn’t have that information. Here, the Court can’t say the time gap is too long as a matter 

of law. The motion to dismiss Oliver’s Title VII retaliation claim against the Union is denied. 

B. Section 1981 

A “union, entrusted with the enforcement of a labor contract, may violate” § 1981 “if 

by racial discrimination it interferes with its members’ ability to enforce their contract.” Woods 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
- 4 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Graphic Commc'ns, 925 F.2d 1195, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 1991). Oliver alleges the Union 

interfered with his ability to obtain work under the collective bargaining agreement with SME 

because he filed complaints about racial issues on SME sites and in the Hiring Hall. The 

Court finds his retaliation and hostile work environment claims are “cognizable under § 

1981.” Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). 

1. Retaliation 

Courts generally analyze Title VII and § 1981 claims the same, and “facts sufficient 

to give rise to a Title VII claim are also sufficient for a section 1981 claim.” Jurado v. ElevenFifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987). Since Oliver’s alleged a Title VII retaliation 

action for San Ysidro and San Clemente, those same facts support his § 1981 claim. But 

Oliver has also plausibly alleged Cabrera took adverse actions by filing charges against 

Oliver in July 2013 and directing Gates to file charges in February 2013. 

The Union argues these incidents don’t count because they turn on union politics—

not Oliver’s complaints. That’s disingenuous at best. When read as a whole, the complaint 

is clear: Cabrera had it out for Oliver because he filed complaints, and one way he retaliated, 

among others, was by filing charges. The Gates and Cabrera charges count as adverse 

actions since they would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting 

a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006). 

The motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

2. Hostile Work Environment

“A hostile work environment interferes with the enjoyment of all benefits and 

conditions of the contractual relationship of employment and is therefore actionable under 

§ 1981.” Manatt, 339 F.3d at 797. Oliver must allege the Union subjected him to unwelcome 

verbal or physical conduct because of his race and it was sufficiently severe so as to create 

an abusive work environment. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 

1122 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing trial court for tossing hostile work environment claim at the 

motion to dismiss stage). Oliver has met that burden. 

/ / / 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
- 5 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

For example, he’s alleged multiple instances of Union conduct that flow from his 

complaints about racial discrimination: from Cabrera “physically invading Mr. Oliver’s 

personal space” and asking the invective rhetorical “who the fuck do you think you are?”; to 

Juan Galvan putting “his face within inches of Mr. Oliver’s face and yell[ing] at Mr. Oliver to 

‘get out of my hall.’”3 Oliver’s sufficiently alleged that these incidents, and others, taken 

together were “part of the same actionable hostile environment claim.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger 

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120-21 (2002). The motion to dismiss this claim is denied. 

See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing where supervisors 

called plaintiff a “troublemaker” and told him to “shut up”); Woods, 925 F.2d at 1202 (9th Cir. 

1991) (union members created hostile environment). 4

3. Discrimination 

Goodman v. Lukens Steel suggests union workers could bring discrimination claims 

for violations of a collective bargaining agreement under § 1981 as early as 1987. Goodman 

v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987). Since that cause of action was available 

before Congress created a four-year federal catch-all statute of limitations in 1990, the Court 

must apply California’s two-year statute of limitations to Oliver’s discrimination claims. 

Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008). That means Oliver 

must identify adverse actions the Union took against him after January 2015. He hasn’t. His 

opposition alludes to possible adverse actions that triggered NLRB complaints in March 

2015, July 2015, and January 2016. But Oliver didn’t discuss those charges in his complaint, 

offer any details on what precipitated those charges, or explain how the Union treated him 

worse than other workers because he’s black. This claim is dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

 

3 Oliver’s opposition suggests other support, like Brandon Gates “screaming in his face in 

front of the assembled union hall ‘I can’t stand mother fuckers who file paper work.’” 

 

4 The Union argues the incidents Oliver mentions are too sporadic citing Manatt and Wilborn 

v. Ashcroft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (S.D. Cal. 2002). But both summary judgment cases are 

distinguished by their procedural posture alone. 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
- 6 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. National Labor Relations Act 

Oliver may have a fair representation claim against his Union for failing to file 

grievances against SME. See e.g., Woods, 925 F.2d at 1203–06 (9th Cir. 1991). But any 

suit against a union alleging a fair representation violation must be brought within six months 

of the violation. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983). That means 

Oliver needs to point to fair representation violations that occurred after June 2016. He 

hasn’t. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

5 

III. SME 

A. Title VII 

SME argues Oliver’s Title VII claim is untimely. Under Title VII, if a litigant fails to file 

suit within 90 days of a right-to-sue letter, his action is time-barred. Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. 

Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007). Oliver estimates he received the 

right-to-sue notice on October 1, 2016. Since he filed this action on January 3, 2017, he 

missed the 90-day window. Although it’s a ticky-tack rule, the Court is bound to follow Ninth 

Circuit precedent. Id. (affirming where Title VII suit filed three days late). 

Oliver argues he’s entitled to equitable tolling. Equitable tolling applies “when 

extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim 

on time.” Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999). Oliver’s pending FOIA 

inquiry, and his reliance on a right-to-sue notice issued for claims against the Union, aren’t 

extraordinary circumstances. This claim is dismissed without leave to amend. 

B. Section 1981 

1. Retaliation 

Oliver stated a § 1981 retaliation claim against SME for interfering with his ability to 

obtain work at San Ysidro and San Clemente under the collective bargaining agreement. 

Oliver plausibly alleged the Union and SME jointly decide who gets work. For example, 

Oliver alleges “union leadership was able to manipulate [the hiring] system by feeding 

names to the contractors and instruct[ing] the contractors to call out the specific names, as 

 

5 SME doesn’t have a duty of fair representation. Bowen v. U.S. Postal, 459 U.S. 212 (1983). 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
- 7 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

this facilitated a means to bypass the established protocols for fair and impartial job calls.” 

He also says Union “leadership provided SME with copies of every grievance brought by 

Mr. Oliver against the employer” and that “SME is also responsible for their supervisory staff 

who are dispatched from Union Local 229 [and] harbor negative feeling towards Mr. Oliver 

based on the information fed to them by Union Local 229 leadership.” SME’s letter to the 

EEOC tends to confirm these allegations by demonstrating its detailed awareness of Oliver’s 

history of complaints: 

Oliver has a long track record of filing meritless complaints. He has filed 

numerous union grievances—indeed, he attempted to form his own union of 

black ironworkers until he was enjoined by the Ironworkers. He has also filed 

prior unsuccessful complaints with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. 

Invariably, Mr. Oliver asserts that his employers are racially biased or have failed 

to include the correct number of black workers on their projects. 

Since SME coordinates with the Union to decide who gets work, and SME is well-aware of 

Oliver’s history of racial complaints, Oliver has plausibly alleged that SME is on the hook for 

retaliation as well. As discussed, there’s plenty of circumstantial evidence to support the 

causal connection between Oliver’s protected activity and his allegation SME played a part 

in denying Oliver work on the San Ysidro and San Clemente sites.

6 

SME raises several objections. First, it argues the San Ysidro and San Clemente 

adverse actions occurred outside the two-year statute of limitations under Lukovsky v. San 

Francisco. But Lukovsky involved a discrimination claim; not a retaliation claim. And “section 

1981 retaliation claims are governed by the four-year statute of limitations under § 1658.” 

Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2011). Goodman suggests a 

discrimination claim was available, but a retaliation claim under § 1981 wasn’t recognized 

until 2008. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008). 

 

6 Even if Oliver’s allegations weren’t sufficient to allege stand-alone retaliation against SME, 

he’s also plausibly alleged a conspiracy to retaliate based on “the unconstitutional actions” 

of the Union. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012); see Gilbrook v. City 

of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 857 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming verdict finding defendants 

conspired to retaliate against union members). 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
- 8 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Second, SME says it had nothing to do with San Ysidro—Oliver’s beef is with Hensel 

Phelps Construction. But Oliver specifically alleges Hensel Phleps Construction “was 

running the job site in partnership with SME.” The company also says Oliver’s San Ysidro 

claims don’t relate back to the original complaint because it “made no reference to San 

Ysidro.” That’s wrong.7

Third, SME argues Oliver’s EEOC charge states SME fired him “because there was 

no work available”; not because of his complaints. SME takes that statement out-of-context. 

Oliver wrote down SME’s proffered excuse for firing him in the EEOC charge—that doesn’t 

contradict his amended complaint’s allegation that the excuse was bogus. SME also points 

out Oliver’s charge said the Union was responsible for the firing. But that doesn’t mean SME 

wasn’t also responsible. Of course it was. SME did the firing. The motion to dismiss Oliver’s 

§ 1981 retaliation claim against SME is denied.

8

2. Hostile Work Environment 

Oliver’s alleged a number of SME job sites that could form the basis for a hostile work 

environment claim using the continuing violation doctrine. See, e.g., Molina v. Los Angeles 

Cty., Dep't of Mental Health, 58 F. App'x 311 (9th Cir. 2003). But he hasn’t pointed to any 

conduct that occurred at an SME jobsite after January 2013 that qualifies. This claim is 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

3. Discrimination 

Oliver’s discrimination claims against SME fail for the same reasons his claims 

against the Union fail: he hasn’t alleged discriminatory conduct that took place after January 

2015. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

7 See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 11, 16, 17; Dkt. 1-8 at 28–29. 

8 SME also suggests Oliver failed to plead the existence of a contract. But Oliver discussed 

the CBA throughout his complaint; the Union attaches the CBA; and SME’s letter to the 

EEOC—describing how it fired Oliver from San Clemente with “contractually agreed travel 

and turnaround pay”—belies SME’s claim. 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
- 9 - 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. State Claims 

Oliver’s amended complaint added a number of state claims, but he failed to address 

arguments against them in his opposition, and some were only in the caption of his amended 

complaint. These claims are deemed abandoned, but dismissed with leave to amend. 

See, e.g., Shull v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 2014 WL 1404877, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014). 

* * * 

Defendants urge the Court to deny leave to amend because Oliver’s already had one 

chance to fix his complaint. But “a district court abuses its discretion by 

denying leave to amend unless amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure 

the complaint’s deficiencies despite repeated opportunities.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. 

of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). Given this liberal policy, and his pro se status, 

Oliver may file an amended complaint as discussed above, but only if he can fix the 

problems identified by the Defendants and Court. He need not do so immediately. Instead, 

the parties should begin the discovery process in earnest for the live federal claims, and 

Oliver may seek leave to file an amended complaint at a later date in accordance with the 

scheduling order issued by the magistrate judge. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 6, 2018 

 

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge 

Case 3:17-cv-00001-LAB-MSB Document 40 Filed 07/06/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9