Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05125/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05125-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN R. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

W. SHAW, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 5125 OWW SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PARTIAL MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs. 58, 61.)

A. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John R. Martinez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant federal action on January 30, 2003. On July 30, 2003, Plaintiff

filed an Amended Complaint. On August 5, 2004, the Court issued an order finding Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint stated cognizable claims against Defendant Shaw for excessive force;

Defendants Shaw, Ybarra, Comfort, Berkeler, Cobbs, Rocha, and Holland for violating

Plaintiff’s right to due process; and Defendants Shaw, Ybarra, Comfort, Lopez and Rodriguez for

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retaliation. The Court also found that the Amended Complaint did not state a cognizable claim

against Defendant Alameida. Thus, on August 27, 2004, the Court issued Findings and

Recommendations that Defendant Alameida be dismissed from the action. The District Court

adopted the Findings and Recommendations on October 13, 2004, and Defendant Alameida was

dismissed from the action. 

On December 10, 2004, Defendants moved to dismiss Defendants Rocha and Holland

from the action on the grounds that Plaintiff did not state a cognizable constitutional claim

against them for participating in the appeals process. Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion and

instead, filed his own Motion to Dismiss Defendants Rocha and Holland from the action on

December 30, 2004. Plaintiff further requested Defendant Comfort be dismissed from the action

based on his belief he could not prevail against him for a constitutional violation. Defendants did

not oppose the Motion. On February 3, 2005, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation

that Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss be construed as a Statement of Non-Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Defendants Comfort, Rocha and Holland. The District Court adopted the

Recommendation on April 7, 2005, and Defendants Comfort, Rocha and Holland were dismissed

from the case. 

On November 18, 2005, the remaining Defendants, Cobbs, Berkeler, Shaw, Ybarra,

Rodriguez and Lopez filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. An Amended Motion for

Summary Adjudication was filed by Defendants on November 22, 2005, and is currently pending

before the Court. Plaintiff filed his Opposition to the Motion on May 22, 2006. Defendants filed

a Reply to the Opposition on June 21, 2006. Plaintiff then filed a pleading titled “Supplemental

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.” In this pleading, Plaintiff addresses Defendants’ Reply

to the Opposition. By separate Order, the Court construed the pleading as a Surreply to the Reply

and Ordered that the pleading be stricken from the record as unauthorized.

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a Summary Judgment Motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

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The following facts are undisputed for the purpose of this Motion. Plaintiff neither filed his own separate 1

statement of disputed facts nor admitted or denied the facts set forth by defendant as undisputed. Local Rule 56-

260(b). Therefore, Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts is accepted except where brought into dispute by

plaintiff’s verified complaint and opposition. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson v.

Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at

trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine

issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

1. Prior to his incarceration, Plaintiff was a member of the street gang known as “Plas.” 

Exh. A, Plaintiff’s Deposition (“Pl.’s Dep.”) at 18:24021:21. 

2. Plaintiff was convicted of second degree murder in the death of a member of another

street gang called “Alliance.” Id. 

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3. Prior to being housed at Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran,

California, Plaintiff was at Pelican Bay State Prison. Declaration of Defendant O.A.

Ybarra (“Ybarra Decl. ”), ¶ 5. 

4. While in custody of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”), Plaintiff assaulted another inmate. He was then sent to Pelican Bay State

Prison where he was housed in the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”) for assault. Pl.’s

Dep. 27:6-28:15. 

5. Plaintiff was housed with an inmate who was a validated associate of the EME

(Mexican Mafia) prison gang. Pl.’s Dep 29:2-25 

6. Plaintiff was received at SATF on March 29, 2001. In his central file at that time

was a report from Pelican Bay State Prison, dated January 2001, indicating that a

confidential informant had disclosed plans for Southern Hispanics to attack staff

members at Pelican Bay. Plaintiff was one of several inmates identified by this

informant as a member of the Southern Hispanics. Ybarra Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8. 

7. “Southern Hispanics” is the name of a group affiliated with the prison gang known

as the Mexican Mafia, also known by its initials “EME.” Northern Hispanics are a

group associated with another Latino prison gang, Nuestra Familia. Ybarra Decl.

¶ 7. 

8. There also was another report in Plaintiff’s central file from Pelican Bay when he

was received at SATF. That report detailed an interview with a different confidential

informant. Ybarra Decl. ¶ 9. 

9. In October 2001, a third informant was personally debriefed by Officer Shaw.

Declaration of W. Shaw (“Shaw Decl.”) ¶ 3. 

10. Finally, in April 2002, John Anthony Crossthwaite was debriefed by Officer Shaw. 

Crossthwaite, a former associate of the Mexican Mafia, attested to Plaintiff’s

associate with that gang. Crossthwaite has personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s

involvement, as Plaintiff was Crossthwaite’s subordinate for a time at SATF. In his

declaration, Crossthwaite describes Plaintiff’s gang activities, including drug

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trafficking and assaults. He also verified that the information he gave Defendant 

Shaw is true. Declaration of John Anthony Crossthwaite (“Crossthwaite Decl.”). 

11. Based upon the information in Plaintiff’s file, Plaintiff was placed in administrative

segregation on November 28, 2001, pending investigation of his gang status. Exh.

B, Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot. Summ. J.”); Ybarra Decl., ¶ 11. 

12. Lt. Ybarra authorized the placement and Officer Shaw served the notice upon

Plaintiff. Exh. B, Mot. Summ. J.; Ybarra Decl. ¶ 11; Shaw Decl. ¶ 4. 

13. Plaintiff admits having received this notice. Pl.’s Dep., 107:20-108:12. 

14. On December 18, 2001, Plaintiff was validated as a gang associate, and assigned an

indeterminate term in the SHU, pursuant to title 15, section 3378. Exh. C, Mot.

Summ. J.; Declaration of Keri Berkler (“Berkeler Decl.”), ¶ 3. 

15. Plaintiff was presented with a copy of three confidential information disclosure

forms (CDC form 1030), which gave him information about the nature of the charges

against him without disclosing the confidential source of that information. Plaintiff

acknowledges receiving these forms on December 27, 2001. Exh. D, Mot. Summ. J.;

Ybarra Decl., ¶ 13; Pl.’s Depo., 112:14-114:4. 

16. Plaintiff appeared at the institutional classification meeting on December 6, 2001,

and was given the opportunity to participate in the hearing, object to the proposed

validation and to ask the basis for the investigation. Pl.’s Depo., 118:3-120:12. 

17. Plaintiff was allowed to contest his gang validation though the appeal process, which

he did. Exhs. E, Mot. Summ. J.; Pl.’s Depo., 122:10-25. 

18. Plaintiff’s status is reviewed by the institutional classification committee every 6

months. The results of these hearings are placed in his central file, and he has an

opportunity to review that file. Pl.’s Depo., 139:3-140:25. 

D. ANALYSIS

1. Summary of Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility, where Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. In the Amended Complaint,

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Defendants Alameida, Rocha, Holland and Comfort were later dismissed from the action. (Docs. 19, 39.) 2

Although Plaintiff may have conceded that his Due Process claims are against Defendants Ybarra, Shaw 3

and Cobbs only, no Second Amended Complaint or Motion to Dismiss those claims has been formally filed by

Plaintiff. Plaintiff may not amend his Complaint via a deposition. Accordingly, these Defendants and claims remain

part of the action.

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Plaintiff names W. Shaw, D. A. Ybarra, R. M. Comfort, F. A. Rodriguez, Lonnie Lopez, Kerri

Berkeler, J. F. Rocha, K. Holland, J. Cobbs, Ed Alameida as Defendants. 

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Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his activities as a Men’s Advisory Council (MAC)

representative, being a jailhouse lawyer, and his pursuit of administrative grievances, Defendants

retaliated against him by placing him in administrative segregation and validating him as a gang

associate in violation of Due Process. Plaintiff states specifically that he was not afforded the 3

necessary notice of the charges, the opportunity to be heard or present witnesses and that this

resulted in the receipt of an indeterminate SHU term at California State Prison-Corcoran. 

Further, the Amended Complaint alleges that the evidence used to validate Plaintiff as a gang

member was insufficient in that it did not constitute “some evidence.” Finally, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Shaw used excessive force against him in retaliation for the verbal grievances

concerning Defendant Rodriguez and C/O Martin. 

2. Due Process - Gang Validation Process

An inmate may be identified by CDCR staff as a potential gang member or associate

based on his behavior. An Institutional Gang Investigator (“IGI”), who generally has experience

with gangs, investigates the inmate’s possible gang activities and determines whether there is

sufficient evidence to validate the inmate. 15 Cal.Code Regs. § 3378(c). The IGI also interviews

the inmate to allow him to rebut the evidence supporting the contemplated validation. 

Under California State Regulations, an inmate may be validated as a member or associate

of a gang based on a minimum of three or more source items indicating gang activity, such as

self-admission, writings, tattoos, photos, information from informants, and association or

communication with other gang members or associates. 15 Cal.Code Regs. § 3378(c)(3), (4). 

The inmate is normally placed in administrative segregation (“Ad-Seg”) pending review and if

validated, assessed an indeterminate administrative segregation term in the Secured Housing

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Unit. Id.; 15 Cal.Code Regs § 3341.5(c)(2). Once validated as a gang member/associate, an

inmate can be released under several circumstances, the most common of which are debriefing

(i.e., disassociating himself from the gang), inactivity in the gang and release from custody. 15

Cal.Code Regs. §§ 3378(c)(2)(5); 3341.5(c)(4).

3. Due Process Claim

Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from the

Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the states. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)

overruled, in part, on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 483, 484 (1995); Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27, 96 S.Ct. 2 532 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that the

hardship associated with administrative segregation is not so severe as to violate Due Process. 

See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d. 1080, 1091-91 (9 Cir. 1986). However, changes in the th

conditions of confinement may amount to a deprivation of a state-created and constitutionally

protected liberty interest, provided the liberty interest in question is one of “real substance” and

where the restraint “imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477, 484-87, 115 S.Ct. 2293

(1995). 

The placement of an inmate in the SHU indeterminately may amount to a deprivation of a

liberty interest of “real substance” within the meaning of Sandin. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125

S.Ct. 2384, 2394-95 , 162 L.Ed.2d. 174 (2005). Further, the assignment of validated gang

members to the SHU is an administrative measure rather than a disciplinary measure, and is

“essentially a matter of administrative segregation.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9 Cir. th

2003) (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9 Cir. 1997)). As such, Plaintiff is

th

entitled to the minimal procedural protections set forth in Toussaint v. McCarthy, such as notice,

an opportunity to be heard and periodic review. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (citing Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir.1986)). 

Due process also requires that there be an evidentiary basis for the prison officials'

decision to place an inmate in segregation for administrative reasons. Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985); Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-05. This standard is met if

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there is "some evidence" from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be

deduced. Id. at 1105. The standard is only “minimally stringent” and the relevant inquiry is

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

prison decision-makers. Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987). The "some

evidence" standard applies to an inmate's placement in the SHU for gang affiliation. See Bruce

v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir.2003). 

In addition, there is authority for the proposition that the evidence relied upon to confine

an inmate to the SHU for gang affiliation must have "some indicia of reliability" to satisfy due

process requirements. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1273-74 (N.D.Cal.1995); see also,

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 874, 112 S.Ct.

213 (1991) (considering accuracy of polygraph results when used as evidence to support

placement in administrative segregation); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987)

(evidence relied upon by a prison disciplinary board must have "some indicia of reliability"). 

When this information includes statements from confidential informants, as is often the case, the

record must contain “some factual information from which the committee can reasonably

conclude that the information was reliable.” Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th

Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207, 108 S.Ct. 2851 (1988). The record must also contain “a

prison official's affirmative statement that safety considerations prevent the disclosure of the

informant's name.” Id. Defendants bear the burden of showing “some evidence” in the record to

support an administrative segregation decision and that evidence must have some indicia of

reliability.” Toussaint v. Rowland, 711 F.Supp. 536, 542 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (“Toussaint V”), aff’d

in part, rev’d in part sub nom, Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800 (9 Cir. 1990) (“Toussaint th

VI”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 874, 112 S.Ct. 213 (1991). 

Here, Defendants argue and present evidence that, in accordance with Toussaint, Plaintiff

was provided with all of the process he was due under the Constitution. Specifically, Defendants

cite to evidence that Plaintiff was notified on November 28, 2001, that he was being placed in

administrative segregation pending investigation of his gang status. Ybarra Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. B,

Mot. Summ. J.; Shaw Decl. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-6; Exh. B to Pl.’s Opp’n. Plaintiff appeared at

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an institutional classification hearing on December 6, 2001, wherein he was given the

opportunity to object to the proposed validation and question the basis for the investigation. Pl.’s

Dep.; Pl.’s Opp’n at 4:15; Exh.G, Pl.s’ Opp’n, On December 18, 2001, Plaintiff was validated as

a gang associate. Exh. C, Mot. Summ. J.; Berkler Decl.; Exh. K, Opp’n. Plaintiff was provided

with copies of four CDC 1030 forms notifying Plaintiff of the charges against him without

disclosing the confidential sources of that information. Exh. D, Mot. Summ. J.; Exh. L, Pl.’s

Opp’n. Plaintiff acknowledges that he received this information. Pl.’s Dep., 112-114; Pl.’s

Opp’n at 5:20. Finally, Plaintiff has received periodic reviews of his classification to the SHU. 

Pl.’s Dep., 139:3-140:25; Am. Compl.¶ 21. The Court finds that Defendants have met their

initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for their Motion and identifying those portions

of the record which they believe demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The

burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually

does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, Plaintiff

may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but is required to tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11;

First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747,

749 (9th Cir. 1973).

In Opposition, Plaintiff merely argues that any misconduct indicating gang activity that

justifies his placement in administrative segregation constitutes a rule infraction and thus, a Rules

Violation Report must be issued and the appropriate rules and regulations followed. Plaintiff

argues that no such rules violation report issued and thus, he was denied the appropriate notice

and hearing. Pl.’s Opp’n at 20-21. Plaintiff’s procedural due process challenge is thus, to the

procedure used. This is supported by inmate appeal filed by Plaintiff concerning his validation. 

Exhibit E to the Motion for Summary judgment is a copy of a Director’s Level Appeal Decision

indicating that Plaintiff’s contention on appeal was that he was not issued a Rules Violation

Report relative to his gang activity and prior to his commitment to the SHU. Exh. E, Mot.

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Summ. J. Plaintiff was informed that a “complete disciplinary action” was not required for

placement of inmates in the SHU who have been validated as gang members. Id. Plaintiff was

also informed of the pertinent regulations, namely California Code of Regulations 3270 and

3341.5. Id. Plaintiff concedes throughout his pleadings that he was notified of his SHU

placement pending a gang investigation, provided a hearing at which he could contest the charges

and has been afforded periodic reviews. Despite Plaintiff’s firm belief that a Rules Violation

Report should have issued, the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff was afforded with the

process he was due under the law. Accordingly, the Court finds the Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the denial of the process due him under

Toussaint. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also alleges that the evidence used to validate him as a

gang member is “unreliable” and thus, does not constitute “some evidence.” Am. Compl. at

25:25-28, 28:4-6. 

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants provide the Court with copies of the

three CDC 1030 forms which were provided to Plaintiff concerning his validation as a gang

member as well as a declaration of a former gang member John Anthony Crosswaithe. The

declaration of Mr. Crossthwaite implicates Plaintiff in gang activity. The Court notes however,

that Mr. Crossthwaite did not debrief and provide Defendant Shaw with information concerning

Plaintiff’s alleged gang activity until April of 2002. Plaintiff was validated as a gang member on

December 18, 2001, prior to Mr. Crossthwaite’s debriefing. Neither the Declaration of

Defendant Keri Berkeler or the CDC 128-B-2 form validating Plaintiff indicate that information

provided by Mr. Crosswaithe’s constituted one of the three source items used to validate

Plaintiff. Berkeler Decl.; Exh. C, Mot. Summ. J. As such, the declaration provided by Mr.

Crossthwaite cannot constitute “some evidence.” 

Further, although Defendants argue that there is sufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s

validation in the form of information supplied by confidential informants, Defendants have

provided the Court with only the disclosure statements issued to Plaintiff on December 27, 2001.

Exh D, Mot. Summ. J. As stated by Defendants, the disclosure forms serve to provide Plaintiff

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with information “about the nature of the charges against him without disclosing the confidential

source of that information.” Mot. Summ. J. at 4. The disclosure forms themselves reference

confidential memoranda and debriefing statements on which the validation was based and further

that this information is contained in the “confidential Section of [Plaintiff’s] C-file.” Exh. D,

Mot. Summ. J. However, these confidential memoranda and/or debriefing statements were not

provided to the Court in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. While under some

circumstances, one source item may be sufficient to satisfy the “some evidence” standard, the

disclosure statements alone do not constitute a source item as they merely describe the source

item relied on. Because no source items are before the Court, the Court cannot render a

determination that there existed “some evidence” to support the tribunals decision to validate and

segregate Plaintiff or that the source items have an “indicia of reliability” in satisfaction of due

process. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to meet their burden on this portion of Plaintiff’s

Due Process claim and the Court will RECOMMEND that the Motion for Summary Judgment be

DENIED. 

3. Vagueness/Overbreadth

Plaintiff argues that the California Code of Regulations Section 3378(c)(4) is over broad

because Plaintiff’s “‘associations’ with fellow prisoners, some who may very well be gang

affiliated, are the result of legal assistance and lawful associations and speech.” Am. Compl. at

26. 

A challenge for vagueness may arise when the regulation fails to clearly define its

prohibitions and a challenge for overbreadth may arise when the regulation prohibits protected

conduct. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 114-115 (1972). The focus of a

vagueness claim is whether the regulation “fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a

reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits,’ or ‘ . . . . authorizes or even

encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” Gospel Missions of America v. City of

Los Angeles, 419 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9 Cir. 2005), quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 th

(2000)). The focus of a claim for overbreadth is whether a regulation “sweeps within its

prohibitions what may not be punished” under the Constitution. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115. In

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the prison context, when regulations or policies are alleged to impinge up an inmate’s protected

rights, subject to certain exceptions, the regulation is analyzed under the test set forth in Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 975-76 (9 Cir. 2004) th

(applying Turner test despite inmate’s assertion that vagueness and overbreadth claims must be

considered separate and apart from application of Turner test.) 

In this case, Defendants state that Plaintiff clarified at his deposition that his claim for

relief concerned the vagueness of the statute. However, as stated above, Plaintiff may not amend

his Complaint via his deposition. Further, a review of the Amended Complaint makes clear that

Plaintiff is alleging that the regulation is over broad in that it punishes his right of association. 

Defendants do not, however, set forth any argument that the regulations or policies satisfy the

Turner test. As such, the Court has no alternative but to RECOMMEND that Defendants’

Motion with respect to the vagueness/overbreadth of the regulation be DENIED. 

4. Retaliation

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Shaw, Ybarra, Comfort,

Lopez and Rodriguez initiated gang validation proceedings against him in “direct retaliation for

Plaintiff’s administrative grievances against Defendant Comfort, C/O Martin and Defendant

Lopez.” Am. Compl. at 23:18-23. 

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 

(9th Cir. 2003). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The

court must “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of

proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt v. Rowland,

65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). 

In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants cite to the Declaration of

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Defendant Ybarra. Defendant Ybarra states that based on the information he had regarding

Plaintiff’s association with the EME gang, he directed Plaintiff be placed in administrative

segregation on November 28, 2001, pending the investigation of Plaintiff’s gang status. Ybarra

Decl., ¶ 11; Exh. B, Mot. Summ. J. Defendant Ybarra also states that he was unaware of any

complaints initiated by Plaintiff against Officer Martin and Defendant Lopez, or any other prison

personnel and that the initiation of the investigation was made solely based on the information he 

received with regard to Plaintiff’s gang affiliation. Id. Defendants also produce documentation

that the source items reflecting some gang association by Plaintiff and used to validate him

predated the date of Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation on November 28, 2001. 

Exh. C, D, Mot. Summ. J. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Court concludes that

Defendants have met their burden of pointing to that portion of the record that demonstrates the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact on this claim. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff. 

In Opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that the “grievance” made against Defendant Lopez and

C/O Martin consisted of verbally informing two individuals on the Men’s Advisory Committee

of activities he believed constituted misconduct (a romantic affair). As a result, these two

individuals met with Defendant Rodriguez about the alleged misconduct on November 21, 2001. 

Plaintiff states that Defendant Rodriguez stated to him that he was informed of the alleged

misconduct by Defendant Rodriguez and that they “were aware of the situation and it [would] be

handled.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. Plaintiff states that three days later, on November 28, 2001, he was

issued a notice placing him in administrative segregation pending an investigation into his

alleged gang activities. Plaintiff argues that the notice issued by Defendant Ybarra on November

28, 2001 was falsified. As noted above, Plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials. 

Plaintiff is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289

(1968); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). Other than his assertions that the

placement notice was falsified by Defendant Ybarra, Plaintiff presents no such evidence to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to his being validated as a

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gang member in retaliation for protected activity. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence

shows that Plaintiff was validated based on documentation reflecting gang activity. Accordingly,

the Court will RECOMMEND that summary judgment on the retaliation claim be GRANTED

with respect to all named Defendants. 

5. Excessive Force

As noted above, prison officials may not retaliate against a prisoner for pursuing legal

actions against his custodians. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 557 (9 Cir. 1985.) When no th

impairment of the plaintiff’s rights has occurred, there is no need for the protection provided by a

cause of action for retaliation. American Civ. Liberty Union of Md. V. Wicomico County, 999

F.2d 780, slip. Op. At 8 (4 Cir. 1993). Section 1983 requires a causal connection between the th

official’s conduct and the constitutional tort, Monel v. Dep’t. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), and § 1983 “should be read against the backdrop of tort liability which makes a man

responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187

(1961.) 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shaw used excessive force against him on

November 28, 2001, when Plaintiff was taken to administrative segregation. Specifically,

Plaintiff states that Defendant Shaw “placed handcuffs on Plaintiff very tight, slammed

Plaintiff’s head against the wall and began to crush Plaintiff’s fingers.” Plaintiff states that this

action was “malicious, sadistic and to cause harm and a form to discourage Plaintiff’s

Complaints.” Am. Compl. at 8, 24. 

In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants provide the declaration of

Defendant Shaw. Defendant Shaw denies that he took any action against Plaintiff in retaliation

for any reason. Defendant Shaw further states that his actions with regard to Plaintiff were done

pursuant to his investigative activities and were done so at the direction of his superior. Shaw

Decl. at ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff did not address the excessive force claim in his Opposition to the Motion for

Summary Judgment and thus, does not present evidence to refute the allegation that there is no

disputed issue of material fact that Defendant Shaw’s actions were taken in retaliation for his

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filing grievances or making complaints. Thus, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden in demonstrating

a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to his claim against Defendant Shaw. 

The Court notes further that Plaintiff concedes in his deposition that he did not know

whether Defendant Shaw, then a gang investigator, had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s actions

regarding the conduct of Officers’ Martin and Lopez precisely because he was a gang

investigator. Pl.’s Dep. at 72: 9-16. Plaintiff also concedes that the handcuffs placed on him by

Defendant Shaw were a “bit snug” but were not cutting into him. Pl.’s Dep. at 97:21-24. 

Plaintiff then states that Defendant Shaw physically pushed him against the wall or slammed his

head against it however, that he did not voice any complaints about this conduct to anyone and

did not report any injury to the MTA upon examination for placement in Ad-Seg because there

was no blood or bruising. Pl.’s Dep. at 102-103, 106. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that

“not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Here, Plaintiff has conceded that the injuries

were not only de minimis but that he was not even sure that the actions by Defendant Shaw were

taken in retaliation for his verbal reporting of the misconduct by Officer Martin and Defendant

Lopez. Based on the above, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in establishing the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this claim. Accordingly, the Court finds

Defendant Shaw is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of excessive force in retaliation. 

E. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED with

respect to the Due Process claim concerning the procedures used, the retaliation claim against all

Defendants for Plaintiff’s validation as a gang member and the excessive force in retaliation

claim against Defendant Shaw. The Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion be DENIED with

respect to the insufficiency of the evidence used to validate Plaintiff in violation of Due Process,

and the vagueness and overbreadth claim concerning the applicable California regulation. The

Court further RECOMMENDS that Defendants be afforded the opportunity to file a second

Motion for Summary Judgment in order to cure deficiencies outlined in these Findings and

Recommendations. 

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The Court further ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to

the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States

District Court, Eastern District of California. Within FIFTEEN (15) days after being served with

a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served

and filed within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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