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Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 5, 1999 Decided May 18, 1999

No. 98-5227

Frank Sinito, Next-of-Kin of Thomas J. Sinito,

Appellant

v.

United States Department of Justice, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 87cv00814)

James H. Lesar argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Dara A. Corrigan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney.

Before: Wald, Randolph and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: This case presents the question

whether a claim brought under the Freedom of Information

Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. s 552, can ever survive the death of

the original requestor. We hold that it may, but remand the

case to the district court to determine whether the deceased

requestor's son is the proper party for substitution within the

meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a).

I.

Thomas Sinito filed this FOIA action in 1987, seeking

disclosure of documents generated as part of an organized

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crime investigation that resulted in his conviction and imprisonment. Sinito died while still in prison in December 1997,

before this protracted litigation was completed. On January

7, 1998, appellees moved in the district court to dismiss the

case as moot based upon the death of the plaintiff. On

January 29, 1998, Sinito's counsel opposed the motion and

moved to substitute Sinito's son Frank as the plaintiff. The

district court granted appellees' motion to dismiss and denied

the motion to substitute, ruling that the FOIA statute is not

remedial and thus, that Sinito's cause of action cannot survive

his death. See Sinito v. United States, Civ. No. 87-814

(D.D.C. March 31, 1998). Sinito's son appealed the dismissal.

While we disagree with the district court's conclusion that a

FOIA cause of action can never survive the death of the

original requestor, we remand for a consideration of whether

Sinito's son qualifies under Rule 25(a) as a legal representative eligible to continue the action.

We held in Mallick v. International Bhd. of Electrical

Workers, 814 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1987), that whether a cause

of action based on a federal statute survives the death of the

plaintiff is a question of federal law. In answering this

question, a court's role is to "formulate a federal rule of

decision that best serves the goals which underlie the federal

right of action itself," and thereby "effectuate the will of

Congress as best [we] can." Id. at 677. That Congress failed

to include a specific clause in the statute providing that the

action should survive the death of the original party does not

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necessarily mean that Congress intended the action to abate

upon the party's death. Id. (citing Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207,

209 (1955)).

Mallick involved a union member's lawsuit brought under

the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of

1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. s 431(c), seeking disclosure of a

union's financial records. We held that the action survived

the original plaintiff's death and that a fellow union member

could be substituted as plaintiff in his place. We find the

instant case seeking disclosure of records under the FOIA

analogous. First, in examining the purpose of the LMRDA,

Mallick said that "deterrence of wrongful conduct is a major

goal underlying the authorization for union member lawsuits"

because Congress mandated disclosure of a union's financial

records in order to prevent union leaders from mismanaging

union funds and union affairs. Mallick, 814 F.2d at 677

(citing H.R. Rep. No. 86-741, at 8 (1959)). This deterrence

principle would not be well-served if the action abated upon

the death of the particular union member who brought the

suit for disclosure. Id. ("union officials contemplating abusive

conduct must know that they are readily accountable through

[LMRDA] lawsuits to verify the union's reports").

Similarly, "the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act [is] 'to open agency action to the light of public

scrutiny.' " Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee

for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989) (quoting

Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976))

(internal quotation omitted); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire

& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) ("The basic purpose of

the FOIA is to insure an informed citizenry, vital to the

functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against

corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the

governed."); 120 Cong. Rec. 17,038 (1974) (statement of Sen.

Weicker) ("None of the abuses [by government officials] that

we have seen come out of this system would have happened if

more people, more eyes, more ears, had been on the scene.");

H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418,

2419 (hereinafter "House Report") (the FOIA was enacted

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because "the weed of improper secrecy had been permitted to

blossom and was choking out the basic right to know").

The government argues that the FOIA statute, unlike the

LMRDA, does not serve a deterrent purpose because under

the LMRDA, "all of the other union members would be

seeking the same information to remedy the same harm as

the deceased plaintiff." Government's Brief at 6 (emphasis

added). In other words, the LMRDA redresses a "particular" harm--"a problem or aberration in the union's financial

records," id. at 6-7--whereas the FOIA "provides a window

for any individual to open into the functions and workings of

the government and an effective mechanism to ensure the

disclosure of documents." Id. at 7. From this, the government concludes that the FOIA cannot correctly be viewed as

a "remedial" statute intended to deter official misconduct, but

should instead be considered as an access right accorded to

all citizens in the interest of open government.

It is true that the FOIA allows "any person" to obtain

nonexempt records from a government agency without demonstrating any particularized interest in the material or injury stemming from its nondisclosure. See 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(3)(A). But this by no means obscures the fact that

one of its paramount goals, like that of the LMRDA, is to

deter secrecy in government and the corruption it can breed.

See, e.g., House Report at 2426 (the FOIA strengthened

previous public information statute by providing "a specific

remedy for any improper withholding of agency records by

granting the U.S. district courts jurisdiction to order the

production of agency records improperly withheld"); Anthony

T. Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of

Information Act, 9 J. Legal Studies 727, 733 (1980) (the

FOIA's goal is "promot[ing] honesty and reduc[ing] waste in

government by exposing official conduct to public scrutiny").

It is largely irrelevant that the LMRDA is aimed specifically at remedying corrupt unions, while the FOIA more

broadly targets a variety of evils stemming from secrecy in all

facets of government activity. Both statutes provide constituents with a right of access to documents that show how a

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government or union conducts its business, and both grant a

constituent who has been denied such access in violation of

the applicable law the right to seek a judgment in federal

court ordering release of the documents sought. Neither

statute provides a damages remedy, but each enables a

prevailing plaintiff to collect attorneys' fees under certain

conditions. See 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(E) (FOIA); 29 U.S.C.

s 431(c) (LMRDA). The fact that the FOIA creates a right

of access available to all citizens equally, as opposed to the

LMRDA's provision of a right of access to union information

for a defined class, does not militate in favor of different

results based on different purposes of the two acts.

We note that in this respect a FOIA case is not unlike a

Bivens1 cause of action, which also survives the death of the

plaintiff because of its deterrent purpose and effect. See

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In a Bivens suit, a

plaintiff seeks redress for the violation of a right (in Carlson,

the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment) that is also guaranteed to all citizens equally.

And just as a plaintiff in a Bivens action claims that this

universally held right was violated by a particular course of

conduct, so does a plaintiff in a FOIA case claim that his right

to nonexempt government information was violated by a

particular course of conduct--the government's refusal to

release the specific information he requested. As Mallick

indicates, that damages are available in a Bivens action but

not in an LMRDA or FOIA case is not necessarily controlling; all three actions produce strong deterrent effects that

serve to protect the rights of their intended beneficiaries.

Mallick, 814 F.2d at 677 ("The congressional goal of deterring

official abuse will be frustrated if unions can avoid disclosing

information through protracted recalcitrance....").

Moreover, we are dealing here not with a vast pool of

potential FOIA applicants, any of whom might seek to take

Thomas Sinito's place in the litigation. An original requestor

__________

1 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971) (violation of the United States Constitution may give rise to a

cause of action for damages against federal officers).

who goes to court to compel disclosure by the agency has a

stake in the legal action which transcends that of "any

person" who might seek the FOIA document. He has invested time, and in all likelihood money, in the action. Were it a

cause of action sounding in property rights, see Davis v.

Oregon State Univ., 591 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1978) (property

interest in continued employment survives death of claimant);

Cheramie v. Orgeron, 434 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1970) (action for

patent infringement survives death of party); Bilanow v.

United States, 309 F.2d 267 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (suit for damages

for wrongful separation from government employment survives death of plaintiff); Fletcher v. Grinnell Bros., 64

F. Supp. 778 (D.C. Mich. 1946) (action to recover wages under

Fair Labor Standards Act was ex contractu and survived

death of plaintiff), seeking money rather than information,

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there would be little doubt that the cause of action survived

his death and passed to his estate. Were the action seeking a

precious book or return of tangible property, the same would

be true. Here the action seeks information, which in many

cases has equal value with money or tangible property, and

there is no reason, absent statutory preclusion, why it should

not similarly survive. The fact that other citizens could have

brought a similar action originally in no way vitiates that

conclusion.

II.

However, a finding that the purposes of the FOIA may be

advanced by permitting a FOIA cause of action to survive the

death of the original requestor does not end the inquiry. We

do not agree with the plaintiff that the FOIA requires anyone

be allowed to step into the deceased plaintiff's shoes. The

federal courts have institutional interests of their own in

regulating the substitution of qualified parties even if a cause

of action survives the death of the original plaintiff. That

institutional regularity is the function of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 25(a). See 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

s 1952 (1986) ("Rule 25 is procedural. It does not provide for

the survival of rights or liabilities but merely describes the

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method by which the original action may proceed if the right

of action survives.").

Rule 25 provides, "If a party dies and the claim is not

thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the

proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by

any party or by the successors or representatives of the

deceased party...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). In the second

part of our analysis in Mallick, we held that Rule 25 did not

bar a fellow union member from substituting for the deceased

plaintiff because the language of the LMRDA showed "the

right to disclosure established by Congress is one shared

without differentiation among all union members.... Since

the union is under the same duty to all members enforceable

by any of its members, it should not matter who the particular plaintiff is at any particular point in the lawsuit." 814

F.2d at 678. We allowed the union member's substitution

because "there is no sensible basis for construing the procedural rules governing substitution of parties more rigidly

than the rules providing for joinder and intervention of

parties." See id. at 679 (citing Fed. Rules Civ. P. 20(a), 24(b),

25(a); Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)). Under the LMRDA, although

the right of access to information may be prosecuted in the

name of just one union member, it is viewed as a commonly

held right that can be pursued by other members as well. In

this case, however, Frank Sinito could not have joined his

father's original lawsuit. Thomas Sinito did not bring a

lawsuit under FOIA to acquit a right that was also violated as

to his son. In addition, the FOIA requires each requestor to

exhaust administrative remedies, see Oglesby v. United States

Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and Frank

Sinito unquestionably did not do so.

Frank Sinito might, however, substitute for his father if he

is found to be his father's legal representative under Rule 25.

We have previously held that the purpose of the 1963 amendments to Rule 25, which replaced a harsher prior rule regarding proper party plaintiffs, was " 'to liberalize the rule and to

allow flexibility in substitution of parties.' " McSurely v.

McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)

(citation omitted). Although it is generally accepted that the

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proper party for substitution must be a "legal representative"

of the deceased, see 7C Wright, Miller & Kane, at s 1956

(citing Mallonee v. Fahey, 200 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1952)

(opinion of Circuit Justice Douglas)), the addition of the word

"successor" to the rule means that a proper party need not

necessarily be the appointed executor or administrator of the

deceased party's estate. See Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986

(D.C. Cir. 1969) (compelling a plaintiff to "institut[e] machinery in order to produce some representative of the estate ad

litem" would contravene the purpose of Rule 25 as amended).

Thus, we have held not only that an executor or administrator

of a decedent's estate is a proper party for substitution, but

also that the distributee of a decedent's estate may be a

"successor" of an estate that has been distributed and thus

can be a proper party. See McSurely, 753 F.2d at 98-99

(listing cases); Rende, 415 F.2d at 985. Since there is no

record evidence on whether Frank Sinito is a proper party for

substitution under Rule 25, we remand the case to the district

court to determine if he qualifies under the Rule.

Restricting substitution to Thomas Sinito's "successor[ ] or

representative[ ]" goes a long way toward assuaging the

government's concern that allowing a FOIA case to survive

the death of the requestor would allow "any person," 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(3), to step into the shoes of the decedent. It is

axiomatic that Rule 25 limits properly substituted parties to

those individuals who can adequately represent the interests

of the deceased party. Under the FOIA, for example, a

person who requests records pertaining to himself has rights

that will sometimes--albeit rarely--differ from those of other, third-party requestors. See Reporters Committee, 489

U.S. at 771 ("Except for cases in which the objection to

disclosure is based on a claim of privilege and the person

requesting disclosure is the party protected by the privilege,

the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the

merits of his or her FOIA request."). The FOIA was "clearly

intended ... to give any member of the public as much right

to disclosure as one with a special interest [in a particular

document]," NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,

149 (1975), but a privilege or privacy exemption that would

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block disclosure of documents requested by a third party

might not always apply with equal force when the requestor

is the subject of the sought-after documents. See, e.g.,

United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)

("there is good reason to differentiate between a governmental claim of privilege for presentence reports when a third

party is making the request and such a claim when the

request is made by the subject of the report"); Reporters

Committee, 489 U.S. at 771 ("the FBI's policy of granting the

subject of a rap sheet access to his own criminal history is

consistent with its policy of denying access to all other

members of the general public"). This court has also recently

held that the death of a person who is a subject of the

requested material does not extinguish all of that person's

privacy-related interests; accordingly a court must "account

for the fact that certain reputational interests and familyrelated privacy expectations survive death." Campbell v.

United States Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33 (D.C. Cir.

1998). Moreover, the estate of a deceased requestor may

have an interest in attorneys' fees to be recovered under the

Act, as well as an interest in the waiver of any duplicating

fees for which the requestor might have been eligible under

the statute, see 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Restricting the

class of individuals who can substitute for the original requestor to "successors" and "legal representatives" strikes a

balance, limiting substitution to "proper parties" in compliance with Rule 25(a)(1) while at the same time protecting any

surviving rights of the requestor.

Finally, we take note of the government's acknowledgment

in oral argument that Rule 25 substitution would not create

extra work on the government's part or otherwise impede its

interests. Indeed, it would seem to us more expeditious from

the government's point of view to allow the appeal to be

pursued on the record already made than to begin the

process all over again with a new requestor.

Conclusion

For the reasons outlined above, we hold that a FOIA cause

of action may survive the death of the requestor, and we

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remand this case for the district court to determine whether

Frank Sinito, the requestor's son, can properly substitute for

his deceased father under Rule 25.

So ordered.

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