Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06653/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06653-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

S.M., a minor, by his parent and next

friend Carol Allen, and CAROL ALLEN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WEST CONTRA COSTA COUNTY UNIFIED

SCHOOL DISTRICT, a California

Municipality; WEST CONTRA COSTA

UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF

EDUCATION, in their official

capacities; BRUCE HARTER, in his

capacity as Superintendent; WENDELL

GREER, in his official capacity;

HARRY CULBERTSON, as an individual

and in his official capacity; STEVE

COLLINS, in his official capacity;

DARLENE JONES, in her official

capacity; KEN TALKEN, in his official

capacity; and DOES 1-10,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-6653 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants West Contra Costa County Unified School District

(the District), West Contra Costa Unified School District Board of

Education, Bruce Harter, Wendell Greer, Harry Culbertson, Steve

Collins, Darlene Jones and Ken Talken (collectively, Defendants)

move to dismiss this action, arguing that this Court lacks

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jurisdiction over the claims set forth in the complaint. 

Plaintiffs S.M., a minor, and his mother, Carol Allen,

(collectively, Plaintiffs) oppose this motion. The matter was

decided on the papers. Having considered all of the papers filed

by the parties, the Court grants Defendants' motion and dismisses

Plaintiffs' complaint.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, a minor child and his mother, filed suit against

the District, its Board and several of its current and past

employees, alleging that Defendants denied Plaintiff S.M. a free

and appropriate public education. According to their complaint,

Plaintiff S.M. has a learning disability. His special education

needs, however, were not recognized or met within the District. 

While at Hercules Middle School, a school within the District,

Plaintiff S.M. was physically, emotionally and mentally abused. 

Staff at the school harassed and discriminated against him. During

the 2005-2006 fall semester, he did not receive accommodations for

his disability. As a result, S.M. was denied access to a free

appropriate public education and suffered emotional distress. His

mother also suffered emotional distress as a result of Defendants'

actions.

Plaintiffs have brought claims against Defendants under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause. 

Plaintiffs also allege what appear to be four state law claims for

negligence, "tortous [sic] conduct of employee," "emotional

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distress," and "retaliation." Defendants contend that, due to

Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies under

the IDEA, all these claims must be dismissed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist

at the time the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission

Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th

Cir. 1988). A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter

jurisdiction until the contrary affirmatively appears. Stock West,

Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may either attack the sufficiency of

the pleadings to establish federal jurisdiction, or allege an

actual lack of jurisdiction which exists despite the formal

sufficiency of the complaint. Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. &

Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v.

Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). In deciding a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court assumes the truth of the

allegations in the complaint, unless controverted by undisputed

facts in the record. Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1177. An action should

not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without

giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend unless it is clear

that the jurisdictional deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. 

May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th

Cir. 1980). 

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1Defendants argue that, if the Court finds that it has subject

matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs' state law claims for "tortous

[sic] conduct of employee," "emotional distress," and "retaliation"

fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, requiring

dismissal. Because, as discussed below, the Court finds that it

does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, the Court need

not address this argument. 

4

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs' federal claims because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust

administrative remedies, provided by the IDEA, prior to filing suit

and, therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' federal claims

as well as their state law claims.1

 Plaintiffs respond that they

are not required to exhaust the IDEA administrative remedies and

that, even if they are, they have exhausted such remedies.

I. The IDEA and Exhaustion

As noted above, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the

IDEA. Their second cause of action states that they "seek

injunctive relief and damages due to a violation of the Individuals

with Disabilities Education Act." Complaint, ¶ 56. The IDEA was

enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have

available to them a free appropriate public education that

emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet

their unique needs . . . [and] to ensure that the rights of

children with disabilities and parents of such children are

protected.” Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. # 403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1049

(9th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400(d)). 

The IDEA requires that, if a plaintiff is "seeking relief that

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2

This subsection provides that the IDEA does not limit the

rights and remedies available under "other Federal laws protecting

the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the

filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is

also available under this subchapter, the procedures under

subsections (f)[due process hearing] and (g)[appeal] of this

section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required

had the action been brought under this subchapter." 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(l).

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is also available" under the IDEA, the plaintiff must exhaust the

administrative remedies that the IDEA provides before commencing

suit. Id. This exhaustion requirement applies to causes of action

based on the IDEA as well causes of actions based on other federal

statutes, such as the ADA or section 1983. See id. at 1048-50; 20

U.S.C. § 1415(l)2. And the Ninth Circuit has held "that when a

plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any

degree by the IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies,

exhaustion of those remedies is required." Robb, 308 F.3d at 1048. 

The Ninth Circuit explains that its "primary concern in determining

whether a plaintiff must use the IDEA's administrative procedures

relates to the source and nature of the alleged injuries for which

he or she seeks a remedy, not the specific remedy requested." Id.

at 1050. 

In determining whether a plaintiff is seeking relief available

under the IDEA, the "dispositive question" is whether the

plaintiff's alleged injuries could be redressed to any degree by

the IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies: "If so,

exhaustion of those remedies is required. If not, the claim

necessarily falls outside the IDEA's scope, and exhaustion is

unnecessary." Id. Even in situations where it is not clear

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whether the IDEA can remedy a particular injury, however,

"exhaustion should be required to give educational agencies an

initial opportunity to ascertain and alleviate the alleged

problem." Id.

If a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies

under the IDEA, but fails to do so, federal courts are without

jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims. Witte v. Clark County

Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 1999).

A. Whether Plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies

Plaintiffs contend that they need not exhaust the

administrative remedies and procedures provided by the IDEA. Their

reliance on Witte, however, is unavailing. In Witte, the plaintiff

alleged violations of section 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA

and various state laws; unlike Plaintiffs here, the plaintiff

brought no cause of action under the IDEA. The court held that,

because the plaintiff sought only monetary damages, which is not

"relief that is available under" the IDEA, "and because all

educational issues already have been resolved to the parties'

mutual satisfaction through the IEP process, Plaintiff is not

'seeking relief that is also available' under the IDEA." Id. at

1275. Therefore, the court in Witte found that exhaustion was not

required and reversed the district court's dismissal of the

plaintiff's action. Id. 

Here, however, Plaintiffs seek more than money damages for

past injuries; they also seek injunctive relief and relief for

current and future emotional damage. More importantly, all

educational issues have not been resolved to the parties'

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satisfaction through the IDEA's administrative procedures and

remedies, as they were in Witte. While some educational issues

have been resolved through administrative procedures and remedies,

not all educational issues were resolved to the parties' mutual

satisfaction. This is evident from Plaintiffs' complaint and

evidence presented by both sides, discussed below. Therefore,

Witte does not avail Plaintiffs; it is the Ninth Circuit's decision

in Robb that applies. 

In Robb, the plaintiff was a student with cerebral palsy; her

teacher had removed her from the classroom for "peer-tutoring,"

outside the supervision of a certified teacher. Her parents filed

suit under section 1983 seeking monetary damages to compensate them

for "lost educational opportunities" and "emotional distress,

humiliation, embarrassment, and psychological injuries." Robb, 308

F.3d at 1048. Although the case did not allege a cause of action

under the IDEA, the district court dismissed the case based on the

plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the

IDEA. The plaintiffs appealed and Ninth Circuit affirmed, opining:

This case is a good example of why parents should not be

permitted to opt out of the IDEA simply by making a demand for

money or services the IDEA does not provide. The Robbs seek

money to compensate them for “lost educational opportunities”

and “emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and

psychological injury.” Why do they want this money? 

Presumably at least in part to pay for services (such as

counseling and tutoring) that will assist their daughter's

recovery of self-esteem and promote her progress in school. 

Damages could be measured by the cost of these services. Yet

the school district may be able (indeed, may be obliged) to

provide these services in kind under the IDEA. The IDEA

requires a school district to provide not only education but

also “related services."

Id. at 1050. The court noted that one of these related services is

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psychological counseling for children and parents. Id. 

Because Plaintiffs' alleged injuries, like the alleged

injuries in Robb, could be redressed by the IDEA's administrative

procedures and remedies, the Court finds that Plaintiffs must

exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit under the

IDEA, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, section 1983 and the United

States Constitution. 

B. Whether Plaintiffs did exhaust administrative remedies

Plaintiffs, however, contend that they did exhaust the

administrative procedures and remedies provided by the IDEA. This

contention is without merit.

Plaintiffs point to paragraph thirty-six in their complaint. 

But this paragraph does not state that Plaintiffs exhausted

administrative procedures, nor does any other paragraph in their

complaint. Paragraph thirty-six only states, "The district ignored

the emotional needs of [S.M.] and failed to provide him the

counseling that he had won in a previous due process complaint. 

Mr. Culbertson suspended [S.M.] so often that he could not access

the services to help his emotional situation." 

Indeed, the documents Plaintiffs provide show that not all

educational issues were resolved to the parties' mutual

satisfaction and that Plaintiffs did not exhaust the administrative

remedies available to them under the IDEA. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3

is an Order Following Prehearing Conference by the Office of

Administrative Hearings, Special Education Division. As Plaintiffs

note, it provides that the issue of whether the District denied

Plaintiff S.M. a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) from

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December 14, 2005 until January 12, 2006 was resolved by an Interim

Agreement executed on December 14, 2005. But the order also

provides that the "remaining issue is as follows: Did the District

deny Student a FAPE from September 21, 2005 to December 13, 2005." 

Hodge Dec., Ex. 3. The order did not, as Plaintiffs contend, state

that all education issues were resolved; rather, the order stated

that there would be a hearing on June 1 and 2, 2006, to address the

remaining issue. That hearing, however, never took place because

Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to the Office of Administrative

Hearings stating that Plaintiff S.M. was withdrawing his request

for a hearing, for the purpose of amending his request "and adding

additional issues and removing current issues to Petitioners [sic]

judicial proceeding against West Contra Costa Unified School

District." Rowe Dec., Ex. 4. 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs did not exhaust their

administrative remedies under IDEA. Because they are required to

do so, and did not, the Court lacks jurisdiction over their federal

claims.

II. State Law Claims

As noted above, Plaintiffs bring state law claims in addition

to the federal claims. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over

the federal claims, it does not have supplemental jurisdiction over

the state law claims, and those claims must also be dismissed. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d

646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002).

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3Both parties filed motions for judicial notice. Neither

motion is opposed. Defendants' Motion for Judicial Notice (Docket

No. 16 and Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice (Docket No. 20)

are also GRANTED. 

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CONCLUSION

As the Ninth Circuit instructs, "where, as here, a plaintiff

has alleged injuries that could be redressed to some degree by the

IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies, then the courts

should require exhaustion of administrative remedies." Robb, 308

F.3d at 1054. Because Plaintiffs have not exhausted their

administrative remedies, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion To

Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

(Docket No. 14).3

 Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed without

prejudice to refiling after Plaintiffs have exhausted their claims,

as required by Ninth Circuit law. The state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. Judgment

shall enter accordingly. Defendants shall recover their costs from

Plaintiffs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/10/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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