Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-16-00748/USCOURTS-ca2-16-00748-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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16‐748

Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc.  

    

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

_______________

August Term, 2016

(Argued: January 20, 2017               Decided: March 27, 2017)

Docket No. 16‐748

_______________

ANONYMOUS,

Plaintiff,

MATTHEW CHRISTIANSEN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

– v. –

OMNICOM GROUP, INCORPORATED, DDB WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP

INCORPORATED, JOE CIANCIOTTO, PETER HEMPEL, AND CHRIS BROWN,

Defendants‐Appellees.

_______________

B e f o r e:

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge, and

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.

*

                                              

* Judge Margo K. Brodie, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

New York, sitting by designation.

Case 16-748, Document 120-1, 03/27/2017, 1997698, Page1 of 14
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_______________

Plaintiff‐appellant Matthew Christiansen brought this action against his

employer under, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that he was subjected to various forms of

workplace discrimination due to his failure to conform to gender stereotypes.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Failla, J.)

construed Christiansen’s Title VII claim as an impermissible sexual orientation

discrimination claim and dismissed it pursuant to Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d

33 (2d Cir. 2000). On appeal, Christiansen argues that we should reconsider our

decision in Simonton and hold that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis

of sexual orientation. This panel lacks the authority to reconsider Simonton,

which is binding precedent. However, we hold that Christiansen’s complaint

plausibly alleges a gender stereotyping claim cognizable under the Supreme

Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Therefore, we

REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Christiansen’s Title VII claim and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the

judgment of the district court in all other respects.

  

KATZMANN, Chief Judge, and BRODIE, District Judge, concur in a separate

opinion.  

_______________

SUSAN CHANA LASK, Law Offices of Susan Chana Lask, New York,

NY, for Plaintiff‐Appellant Matthew Christiansen.

HOWARD J. RUBIN (Shira Franco and Judith Kong, on the brief), Davis

& Gilbert LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants‐Appellees

Omnicom Group Incorporated, DDB Worldwide

Communications Group Incorporated, Peter Hempel, and

Chris Brown.

RICK OSTROVE, Leeds Brown Law, P.C., Carle Place, NY, for

Defendant‐Appellee Joe Cianciotto.  

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BARBARA L. SLOAN, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C. (P.

David Lopez, General Counsel; Jennifer S. Goldstein,

Associate General Counsel; and Margo Pave, Assistant

General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C., on

the brief), for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, in support of Plaintiff‐Appellant.

Lenora M. Lapidus, Gillian L. Thomas, Ria Tabacco Mar, and Leslie

Cooper, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New

York, NY; Erin Beth Harrist, Robert Hodgson and Christopher

Dunn, New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New

York, NY, for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union;

New York Civil Liberties Union; 9to5, National Association of

Working Women; A Better Balance; American Association of

University Women; California Women’s Law Center;

Coalition of Labor Union Women; Equal Rights Advocates;

Gender Justice; Legal Momentum; Legal Voice; National

Association of Women Lawyers; National Partnership for

Women and Families; National Women’s Law Center;

Southwest Women’s Law Center; Women Employed;

Women’s Law Center of Maryland; Women’s Law Project, in

support of Plaintiff‐Appellant.

Peter T. Barbur, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New York, NY, for

Amici Curiae 128 Members of Congress, in support of Plaintiff‐

Appellant.

Shannon P. Minter and Christopher F. Stoll, National Center for

Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, CA, for Amicus Curiae National

Center for Lesbian Rights, in support of Plaintiff‐Appellant.

Michael D.B. Kavey, Brooklyn, NY; Omar Gonzalez‐Pagan, Lambda

Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York, NY;

Gregory R. Nevins, Lambda Legal Defense and Education

Fund, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal

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Defense and Education Fund, Inc., in support of Plaintiff‐

Appellant.  

_______________

PER CURIAM:  

Plaintiff‐appellant Matthew Christiansen sued his employer, supervisor,

and others affiliated with his company (collectively, “defendants”) under the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and state

and local law alleging that he was discriminated against at his workplace due to,

inter alia, his HIV‐positive status and his failure to conform to gender

stereotypes. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York (Failla, J.) dismissed Christiansen’s federal claims pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over his state and local claims. See Christiansen v.

Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 612, 616–18, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). In its

decision, the district court concluded that Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d

Cir. 2000), and Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005), holding

that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,

precluded Christiansen’s Title VII claim. Christiansen, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 618, 622.

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Christiansen primarily appeals this aspect of the district court’s decision. 1

I. BACKGROUND

Christiansen, an openly gay man who is HIV‐positive, worked as an

associate creative director and later creative director at DDB Worldwide

Communications Group, Inc., an international advertising agency and subsidiary

of Omnicom Group, Inc. Christiansen’s complaint alleged that his direct

supervisor engaged in a pattern of humiliating harassment targeting his

effeminacy and sexual orientation. According to Christiansen, in the spring and

summer of 2011, his supervisor drew multiple sexually suggestive and explicit

drawings of Christiansen on an office whiteboard. The most graphic of the

images depicted a naked, muscular Christiansen with an erect penis, holding a

manual air pump and accompanied by a text bubble reading, “I’m so pumped

for marriage equality.” J.A. at 16 ¶ 34.C; J.A. at 42. Another depicted Christiansen

in tights and a low‐cut shirt “prancing around.” J.A. at 16 ¶ 34.A; J.A. at 40. A

                                              

1 Christiansen also purports to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his ADA claim

for failure to comply with the statute of limitations. The district court, however, did not

dismiss the ADA claim on this basis and instead concluded that Christiansen did not

allege facts constituting discrimination under the ADA. Christiansen, 167 F. Supp. 3d at

613–17.  We thus need not consider Christiansen’s statute of limitations argument, and

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Christiansen’s ADA claim.  

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third depicted Christiansen‘s torso on the body of “a four legged animal with a

tail and penis, urinating and defecating.” J.A. at 16 ¶ 34.B; J.A. at 41. Later in

2011, Christiansen’s supervisor circulated at work and posted to Facebook a

“Muscle Beach Party” poster that depicted various employees’ heads on the

bodies of people in beach attire. J.A. at 13 ¶ 30. Christiansen’s head was attached

to a female body clad in a bikini, lying on the ground with her legs upright in the

air in a manner that one coworker thought depicted Christiansen as “a

submissive sissy.” J.A. at 13 ¶ 30; J.A. at 43.  

Christiansen’s supervisor also made remarks about the connection

between effeminacy, sexual orientation, and HIV status. The supervisor allegedly

told other employees that Christiansen “was effeminate and gay so he must have

AID[S].” J.A. at 15 ¶ 30. Additionally, in May 2013, in a meeting of about 20

people, the supervisor allegedly told everyone in the room that he felt sick and

then said to Christiansen, “It feels like I have AIDS. Sorry, you know what that’s

like.” J.A. at 17 ¶ 38. At that time, Christiansen kept private the fact that he was

HIV‐positive.

On October 19, 2014, Christiansen submitted a complaint to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) detailing the harassment

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described above. After receiving a “Notice of Right to Sue” from the EEOC,

Christiansen filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York on May 4, 2015. Shortly thereafter, defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint. In their motion to dismiss, defendants argued, inter alia,

that Christiansen’s claim under Title VII was a sexual orientation discrimination

claim rather than a gender stereotyping claim and was thus not cognizable under

Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), and Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble,

398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005).

The district court agreed. In its decision, the district court described at

length difficulties in distinguishing sexual orientation discrimination claims from

gender stereotyping claims, specifically noting that negative views people hold

of those with certain sexual orientations may be based on stereotypes about

appropriate romantic associations between men and women. See Christiansen, 167

F. Supp. 3d at 619–20. Having reviewed the decisions of other district courts

addressing this issue in the wake of Simonton and Dawson, the district court

concluded that “no coherent line can be drawn between these two sorts of

claims.” Id. at 620. Nevertheless, the district court recognized that “the prevailing

law in this Circuit—and, indeed, every Circuit to consider the question—is that

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such a line must be drawn.” Id. Although the district court considered several

references to effeminacy in the complaint, it concluded that, as a whole,

Christiansen’s complaint did not allege that he was discriminated against

because he did not conform to gender stereotypes, but because he was gay. Id. at

620–22. As a result, the district court held that Christiansen’s claim was a sexual

orientation discrimination claim that was not cognizable under Title VII

pursuant to Simonton and Dawson and dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Id. at 622.  

II. DISCUSSION

“We review a District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting the complaint’s factual

allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”

Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 750 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir.

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this

standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against

any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .  sex.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e‐2(a)(1). On appeal, Christiansen argues, supported by various amici, that

we should reconsider our decisions in Simonton and Dawson in light of a changed

legal landscape and hold that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because

of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

Because we are “bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they

are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court,”

United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004), “it [is] ordinarily . . .

neither appropriate nor possible for [a panel] to reverse an existing Circuit

precedent,” Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67

(2d Cir. 2009). We thus lack the power to reconsider Simonton and Dawson.  

However, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that

Christiansen failed to plausibly allege a Title VII claim based on the gender

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stereotyping theory of sex discrimination articulated in Price Waterhouse v.

Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), which is also binding on this panel. In Price

Waterhouse, the female plaintiff, a senior manager at an accounting firm, was

described as “macho” and “masculine” and informed that “to improve her

chances for partnership, . . . [she] should walk more femininely, talk more

femininely, dress more femininely, wear make‐up, have her hair styled, and

wear jewelry.” 490 U.S. at 231–32, 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). After

her office declined to nominate her for partnership, she sued under Title VII

alleging sex discrimination. Id. at 231–33. Six members of the Supreme Court

held that adverse employment action rooted in “sex stereotyping” or “gender

stereotyping” was actionable sex discrimination. Id. at 250–52 (plurality); see also

id. at 258 (White, J., concurring); id. at 272–73 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  

Here, as noted above, Christiansen’s complaint identifies multiple

instances of gender stereotyping discrimination. His complaint alleges that his

supervisor described him as “effeminate” to others in the office, J.A. at 15 ¶ 30,

and depicted him in tights and a low‐cut shirt “prancing around,” J.A. at 16

¶ 34.A; J.A. at 40. The complaint further alleges that the “Muscle Beach Party”

party poster, depicting Christiansen’s head attached to a bikini‐clad female body

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lying on the ground with her legs in the air, was seen by at least one coworker as

portraying Christiansen “as a submissive sissy.” J.A. 13 ¶ 30. The district court

acknowledged these facts but concluded that because Christiansen’s complaint

contained fewer allegations about his effeminacy than about his sexual

orientation, the allegations about his effeminacy did not “transform a claim for

discrimination that Plaintiff plainly interpreted—and the facts support—as

stemming from sexual orientation animus into one for sexual stereotyping.”

Christiansen, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 621. The district court also opined that permitting

Christiansen’s Title VII claim to proceed “would obliterate the line the Second

Circuit has drawn, rightly or wrongly, between sexual orientation and sex‐based

claims.” Id. at 622.

The district court’s decision draws attention to some confusion in our

Circuit about the relationship between gender stereotyping and sexual

orientation discrimination claims. Some district courts in this Circuit have

viewed Simonton and Dawson as making it “especially difficult for gay plaintiffs

to bring” gender stereotyping claims. Maroney v. Waterbury Hosp., No. 3:10‐CV‐

1415 (JCH), 2011 WL 1085633, at *2 n.2 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2011); see also Estate of

D.B. v. Thousand Islands Cent. Sch. Dist., 169 F. Supp. 3d 320, 332–33 (N.D.N.Y.

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2016) (“The critical fact under the circumstances is the actual sexual orientation

of the harassed person.”). Such cases misapprehend the nature of our rulings in

Simonton and Dawson. While Simonton observed that the gender stereotyping

theory articulated in Price Waterhouse “would not bootstrap protection for sexual

orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically

feminine,” 232 F.3d at 38, it acknowledged that, at a minimum, “stereotypically

feminine” gay men could pursue a gender stereotyping claim under Title VII (and

the same principle would apply to “stereotypically masculine” lesbian women).

Simonton and Dawson do not suggest that a “masculine” woman like the plaintiff

in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, has an actionable Title VII claim unless she is

a lesbian; to the contrary, the sexual orientation of the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse

was of no consequence.  In sum, gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals do not

have less protection under Price Waterhouse against traditional gender stereotype

discrimination than do heterosexual individuals. Simonton and Dawson merely

hold that being gay, lesbian, or bisexual, standing alone, does not constitute

nonconformity with a gender stereotype that can give rise to a cognizable gender

stereotyping claim.  

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The gender stereotyping allegations in Christiansen’s complaint are

cognizable under Price Waterhouse and our precedents. Christiansen alleges that

he was perceived by his supervisor as effeminate and submissive and that he

was harassed for these reasons. Furthermore, the harassment to which he was

subjected, particularly the “Muscle Beach Party” poster, is alleged to have

specifically invoked these “stereotypically feminine” traits. Simonton, 232 F.3d at

38. The district court commented that much more of the complaint was devoted

to sexual orientation discrimination allegations than gender stereotyping

discrimination allegations2 and that it thus might be difficult for Christiansen to

withstand summary judgment or prove at trial that he was harassed because of

his perceived effeminacy and flouting of gender stereotypes rather than because

of his sexual orientation. Even if that were Christiansen’s burden at summary

judgment or at trial—and we do not hold here that it is—it is not our task at the

                                              

2 This highlights an issue that may arise when a plaintiff alleges discrimination under

Title VII as well as under state and local laws that do prohibit sexual orientation

discrimination. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8‐107(1)(a).

In such a case, one would expect a plaintiff to detail alleged instances of sexual

orientation discrimination in violation of state and local law alongside alleged instances

of gender stereotyping discrimination in violation of federal law. When evaluating such

a complaint, courts should not rely on the mere fact that a complaint alleges sexual

orientation discrimination to find that a plaintiff fails to state a separate claim for

gender stereotyping discrimination, but should instead independently evaluate the

allegations of gender stereotyping.

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motion to dismiss stage to weigh the evidence and evaluate the likelihood that

Christiansen would prevail on his Title VII gender stereotyping claim. Instead,

we assess whether he has “state[d] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). We hold that he has.3  

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of

Christiansen’s Title VII claim and REMAND for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in all other

respects.  

                                              

3 Defendants argue on appeal that Christiansen’s Title VII claim is time‐barred.

Christiansen responds that the continuing violation doctrine and equitable estoppel

apply to his claims. Because the district court did not reach the time‐bar issue below, we

will not decide it here in the first instance. Instead, we leave it to the district court to

determine, on remand, whether Christiansen’s claims are time‐barred.  

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