Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00703/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00703-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Heidi Abrahamson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00703-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Heidi Abrahamson, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 12.) For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that decision. 

BACKGROUND 

 Abrahamson applied for disability insurance benefits over sixteen years ago on 

November 12, 1997. (R. at 98.) She returns to this Court for a third time following three 

rounds of denial at the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and two reversals and 

remands from this Court. (R. at 709–10.) The bases for the SSA’s denials and this Court’s 

reversals in the previous two iterations of this case provide essential background 

information. In those first two iterations, Abrahamson alleged an ongoing claim of 

disability with an onset date of September 1, 1995. (Doc. 15 1:24–2:2.) 

 The SSA approved Abrahamson’s claim for supplemental security income but 

denied her claim for disability insurance benefits upon initial and reconsideration review. 

(R. at 632.) An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and heard testimony 

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from: Abrahamson; Ryan Abrahamson, her husband; Edward Jasiniski, Ph.D., a medical 

expert; and Louise Chastain, her neighbor. (R. at 27–68.) In evaluating whether 

Abrahamson was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step sequential evaluation for 

determining disability.1

 (R. at 20–26.) The ALJ denied the claim at the first step, finding 

that Abrahamson continued to participate in substantial gainful activity through the time 

that her insured status expired. (Id.) Abrahamson’s insured status ended on June 30, 

1997.2

 (Id.) 

 The ALJ found that Abrahamson worked as an apartment manager and received 

free rent, valued at $700, along with bonuses of $100 per apartment rented. (Id.) This 

amount exceeded the $500 per month earnings threshold in place at the time at which 

employment was presumed to be substantial gainful activity. (Id.) The ALJ considered 

but rejected Abrahamson’s argument that her employment was performed under special 

 1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. 

' 404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 The ALJs and this court have previously considered and rejected Abrahamson’s 

challenge to that date and she does not raise it as an issue in this appeal. 

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conditions. (Id.) The appeals counsel denied review, and Abrahamson appealed to this 

Court. (R. at 8–10.) 

 This Court reversed and remanded. Abrahamson v. Barnhart, No. CV 03-2199-

PHX-EHC, Doc. 58 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2006). It held that the ALJ erred by accepting the 

presumption of substantial gainful activity based on the income level without determining 

whether that presumption was rebutted by the special conditions under which 

Abrahamson performed her work. Id. at 4–5. Specifically, the Court held that “[t]he 

record reflects that Plaintiff worked under special conditions. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1573(c). The ALJ failed to address this proposition. The Court will remand this 

matter to the Commissioner to consider the testimony of Graff, Chastain and others with 

respect to special circumstances under which Plaintiff worked.” Id. at 5. 

 Upon remand, a new ALJ held another hearing on March 13, 2007 at which 

Abrahamson and vocational expert George Bluth, Ph.D., testified. (R. at 666–96.) That 

ALJ again denied the claim at the first step because he found that Abrahamson continued 

to participate in substantial gainful activity until after her insured status expired. (R. at 

632–37.) That ALJ again determined that the work Abrahamson performed was not done 

under special conditions. (Id.) The appeals counsel affirmed and Abrahamson returned to 

this Court. 

 This Court again reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ violated the “law of 

the case” by conducting a “renewed ‘special conditions’ analysis.” Abrahamson v. 

Astrue, CV-07-1650-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL 806622, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2009). This 

Court held that because it had already determined that Abrahamson worked under special 

conditions, the ALJ could not reach the opposite conclusion. Id. The Court noted that it 

had remanded on the previous occasion and was doing so again because “there are 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 

made.” Id. Quoting from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c), this Court noted that “work done 

under special conditions may show that you have the necessary skills and ability to work 

at the substantial gainful activity level.” Id. The Court concluded that the ALJ “failed to 

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consider the effect of the special conditions on whether Plaintiff has the necessary skills 

and ability to work at the substantial gainful activity level.” Id. at *3. 

 The case returned again to the SSA where a third ALJ held a hearing in September 

2011. (R. at 853–93.) Abrahamson and vocational expert John J. Komar, Ph.D. testified 

at the hearing. (Id.) During this hearing, Abrahamson changed her alleged onset date of 

disability from September 1, 1995 to April 23, 1997. (Id.) The new later onset date is just 

over two months before her insured status expired on June 30, 1997. Abrahamson also 

changed her claim to a closed period ending on December 31, 2006. (Id.) During the 

hearing there were disagreements between Abrahamson’s attorney and the ALJ. (Id.) The 

ALJ elicited testimony from Abrahamson and the vocational expert, but Abrahamson’s 

attorney challenged the ALJ on several grounds. (Id.) At one point the attorney suggested 

that the ALJ should recuse himself because the attorney felt that the ALJ was not 

following this Court’s orders. (Id. at 886–87.) 

 The third ALJ again found that Abrahamson’s job as an apartment manager 

constituted substantial gainful activity under the regulations. (R. at 706–24.) The ALJ 

emphasized that the presumptive threshold of $500 per month had been exceeded but also 

considered the testimony and evidence that this Court previously held should be 

considered “special conditions” under the regulations. (Id.) The ALJ’s made a 

determination at the first step as the other two ALJ’s decisions had.3

 

 In the alternative, the ALJ went on to hold that even if the work were not 

substantial gainful activity, a denial of benefits was still appropriate. (Id.) The ALJ found 

that Abrahamson had several severe impairments under step two. (R. at 715.) Under step 

three, the ALJ held that none of those impairments individually or in combination 

equaled a listed impairment. (R. at 715–16.) The ALJ then determined that Abrahamson 

 

3

 The ALJ had indicated at the hearing that he would be deciding under the fourth 

step. (R. at 887.) This was perhaps influenced by the attorney’s insistence that this 

Court’s previous rulings had resolved step one in Abrahamson’s favor. Nevertheless, it is 

clear from the ALJ’s Decision that he made a determination at step one before making a 

determination on alternative grounds at step four. 

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had a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)4 that allowed for light work with some 

restrictions. (R. at 716–22.) Finally, the ALJ determined that with the RFC, Abrahamson 

was capable of performing her past relevant work as an apartment manager and display 

manager. (R. at 722–23.) 

 Abrahamson now appeals the latest ALJ’s determination before this Court. 

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support 

either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

 The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through 

four of the analysis. See Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 4

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

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II. ANALYSIS

 A. Previous Rulings 

 It is first necessary to clearly understand this Court’s prior directives before it can 

be determined whether the third ALJ followed them. In the first iteration, this Court held 

that Abrahamson did perform her apartment manager duties under special conditions. It 

did not hold that those special conditions precluded a finding that the work still qualified 

as substantial gainful activity, it only held that the ALJ should consider the special 

conditions and not solely the amount of money earned. As this Court restated in the 

second case, the reversible error was the ALJ’s “failure to discuss whether those special 

conditions precluded a finding that Plaintiff engaged in SGA.” Abrahamson, CV-07-

1650-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL 806622, at *1. 

 This Court’s second reversal also did not determine whether Abrahamson was 

engaged in substantial gainful activity, only that the ALJ erred when it determined that 

Abrahamson did not work under special conditions despite this Court’s earlier ruling to 

the contrary. This Court noted that under the C.F.R. rules, even “work done under special 

conditions may show that you have the necessary skills and ability to work at the 

substantial gainful activity level.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c). It remanded so that the ALJ 

could “consider the effect of the special conditions on whether Plaintiff has the necessary 

skills and ability to work at the substantial gainful activity level.” 

 This Court did comment that “[t]he mere fact that she engaged in SGA under 

special conditions is not dispositive of whether Plaintiff is in fact disabled.” Id. This is 

best read as dicta supporting the need to remand because there were still outstanding 

issues. If this Court had in fact held that Abrahamson engaged in substantial gainful 

activity that would have been dispositive even if it were under special conditions. That 

would mean that the special conditions, though existent, were not sufficient to prevent 

her employment from being a substantial gainful activity. That is also precisely what the 

ALJ found upon remand: that despite the existence of special conditions, Abrahamson 

was still engaged in substantial gainful activity when her insured status ended. 

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 Abrahamson’s attorney mistakenly believed and asserted at the hearing that this 

Court had held that Abrahamson had not engaged in substantial gainful activity (R. at 

856, 868–69) when it in fact only held that she had performed her work under some 

special conditions. 

A. Substantial Gainful Activity 

 For purposes of Social Security benefits, disability is the “inability to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 

of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The first step in evaluating a 

disability claim requires an ALJ to determine whether a claimant was engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the relevant period. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If 

so, the claimant is not disabled regardless of other factors including the existence of a 

medical condition. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

 “Substantial gainful activity means work that— (a) Involves doing significant and 

productive physical or mental duties; and (b) Is done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1510. Statutory guidelines establish a presumption of substantial gainful 

activity if the claimant earns over the amount specified in the guidelines. Keyes v. 

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 1990). However, earnings exceeding the 

presumptive level are not dispositive. Id. The claimant may rebut a presumption based on 

earnings with evidence that the claimant was unable “to perform the job well, without 

special assistance, or for only brief periods of time.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Heckler, 726 

F.2d 455, 456 (8th Cir.1984)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573. 

 The Code of Federal Regulations provides that such special conditions include, but 

are not limited to, situations in which a claimant was: (1) required and received special 

assistance from other employees in performing her work; (2) allowed to work irregular 

hours or take frequent rest periods; (3) provided with special equipment or was assigned 

work especially suited to her impairment; (4) able to work only because of specially 

arranged circumstances, for example, other persons helped her prepare for or get to and 

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from work; (5) permitted to work at a lower standard of productivity or efficiency than 

other employees; or (6) given the opportunity to work despite the impairment because of 

family relationship, past association with an employer, or her employer’s concern for her 

welfare. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c). 

 As in the previous iterations of this case, the ALJ held that Abrahamson was 

engaged in substantial gainful activity when her insured status expired. The issue before 

this Court is again whether that determination was unsupported by substantial evidence or 

based on legal error. The ALJ’s alternative basis for denial, that Abrahamson does not 

qualify for disability even if her work could be considered substantial gainful activity, 

only needs to be addressed if the ALJ was in error in finding substantial gainful activity 

despite special conditions. It is not disputed that Abrahamson’s job managing the 

apartments is presumptively substantial gainful activity because there is no doubt that she 

made enough money to create that presumption. The only issue is whether the ALJ made 

an error in holding that Abrahamson failed to rebut that presumption by establishing 

sufficient special conditions. Abrahamson bears the burden of proving disability at step 

one, which means that she had to establish the sufficiency of the special conditions 

during the relevant time period. 

 In the first iteration of this case, this Court reviewed the evidence Abrahamson 

presented and held that the ALJ’s determination that there were no special conditions was 

not supported by substantial evidence. This Court further found that it was legal error to 

accept the presumption of substantial gainful activity based on earnings without 

considering whether that presumption was rebutted by those special conditions of 

employment. In the second case, this Court found that its previous order had been ignored 

when the ALJ again found no special conditions. This Court again remanded for the ALJ 

to accept this Court’s determination that there were at least some special conditions that 

needed to be considered as part of the proper legal test to see if the presumption of 

substantial gainful activity was rebutted. 

 Here, the ALJ acknowledged and considered the special conditions even if he was 

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not particularly impressed with their extent or significance. The existence of special 

conditions may, but does not necessarily, rebut the presumption of substantial gainful 

activity based on earnings. The ALJ accepted this Court’s finding that there were special 

conditions but determined that in this case they did not rebut the presumption that 

Abrahamson’s work was substantial gainful activity. Accordingly, this Court will not set 

aside the ALJ’s decision based on legal error because the ALJ followed the law and this 

Court’s previous orders by considering whether the special conditions rebutted the 

presumption of substantial gainful activity. 

 The other possible avenue for setting aside and ALJ’s decision is if it is 

unsupported by substantial evidence. Here, the Court finds that the ALJ’s determination 

was based on far more than a scintilla of evidence and that a reasonable person could 

accept the evidence as supporting the conclusion that Abrahamson was engaged in 

substantial gainful activity despite the special conditions. 

 There is certainly conflicting testimony and documentary evidence in this case 

regarding Abrahamson’s responsibilities and special conditions as an apartment manager. 

That evidence is subject to more than one rational interpretation, and this Court defers to 

the ALJ’s conclusion because it is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine credibility and 

resolve ambiguities. This Court cannot substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s where the 

evidence can support either outcome. Although Abrahamson emphasizes the parts of the 

record that support her allegations, there is no indication that ALJ failed to consider the 

record as a whole in reaching his conclusion. 

 The ALJ discussed how the evidence shows special conditions in terms of 

allowing Abrahamson to work flexible hours and answer phone calls from home or even 

from bed. It is not clear how much this was based on the part-time, unscheduled, nature 

of the job and how much it was provided especially for Abrahamson based on her 

impairments. Abrahamson had no set hours and most of her work involved talking on the 

phone. There is evidence that the owner of the complex had hoped Abrahamson would 

also be able to do some maintenance but that she could not do this and so others were 

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used. However, the ALJ was free to determine that the apartment manager position 

involved substantial gainful activity even if it did not involve physical labor. The ALJ 

noted that part-time work can be considered substantial gainful activity. Even if 

Abrahamson was not able to do everything her employer initially planned, that does not 

mean that what she did do was not substantial. Abrahamson did not meet her burden to 

show how any of these special conditions took the job out of the realm of substantial 

gainful activity. 

 Assuming that these accommodations were as extensive as Abrahamson argued, it 

is unclear when these special conditions began. Abrahamson alleges that she got worse 

over time and was not under a severe impairment until two months before her insured 

status ended. She did not establish at what point in time the special conditions should 

have been considered sufficient to rebut the presumption of substantial gainful activity 

based on the level of income. The ALJ noted that Abrahamson’s position continued for 

three years from August 1995 to July 1998. The ALJ emphasized that it did not end until 

one year after her insured status expired. The ALJ noted that Abrahamson was never 

fired or let go. In fact the evidence is that she quit when she moved from the apartment 

complex into a home. 

 Her supervisor indicated that he was not paying her anything different than what 

he would have paid anyone else. There was no familial relationship to indicate that she 

was not earning the income she received. The ALJ reviewed how the number of 

apartment complexes and apartments she was managing actually increased over the years. 

By Abrahamson’s own account, it was only in October 1997, after her insured status had 

expired, that another employee was hired to help with her duties. (R. at 155.) 

 It was also in that same period after her insured status had ended that she had to 

stop working for a month or two, but the ALJ notes that she returned to work after that 

and continued to work at the apartment until she moved. Even assuming that this return to 

work was in a different or diminished capacity, that only shows that her responsibilities 

diminished then, and not at some earlier point before her insured status ended. The ALJ 

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also noted that Abrahamson was working three days a week in a family store during this 

same time period in addition to her apartment manager position. (R. at 721) 

 The employer filled out a form in June 1998, was interviewed the next month in 

July 1998, and provided a written statement in May 2000. (R. 178–79, 181, 204–05.) 

These reports describe varying levels of accommodation but were all written well after 

Abrahamson’s insured status expired. (Id.) They do not clearly establish when the special 

conditions began. (Id.) The last employer statement, submitted by Abrahamson on the 

day of her first hearing, describes the special conditions more severely than the previous 

reports. (R. at 204–05.) That statement goes so far as to allege that in the summer of 1996 

another employee was hired and Abrahamson “was not able to assist me anymore.” (Id.) 

Although Abrahamson argues that the ALJ should have given such statements more 

credit, these statements are contradicted by the employer’s earlier statements that 

Abrahamson work was worth the money paid and that she performed as expected and 

satisfactorily. (R. 178–79, 181.) The ALJ noted that Abrahamson herself was inconsistent 

and changed the dates on which she claimed she was no longer able to work. (R. at 720.) 

 The only date of some significance that occurred before the end of the insured 

status was April 23, 1997. At Abrahamson’s first hearing before an ALJ, a non-treating 

state doctor offered opinion testimony that as of April 23, 1997, Abrahamson met or 

equaled the severity of a listed impairment for purposes of step three. It was based on this 

testimony that Abrahamson chose to amend her alleged onset date of her disability. 

However, even assuming that this was the day at which her physical and mental 

impairment became sufficiently severe to qualify under the later steps of the analysis, it 

does not establish that she stopped or significantly curtailed her work activities at that 

point. If she continued to perform the same work after this date that she performed 

before, the substantial or gainful nature of that activity would not change. In fact she 

complained to the doctor that day about the stress of taking care of three apartment 

complexes. (R. at 405.) That implies both that she was continuing to perform substantial 

work and that any special conditions she was working under did not remove those 

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responsibilities or stress from her. As discussed above, the only specific dates on which 

Abrahamson showed that her duties may have been reduced or stopped were all later in 

1997 or 1998 after her insured status ended. Other than that, Abrahamson offered only 

general testimony from herself and others that things became gradually more difficult 

over the years and specifically during the course of 1997. 

 Given all of this conflicting testimony and evidence, the ALJ’s determination is 

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ followed this Court’s orders by considering 

this evidence of special conditions and their significance. 

 The ALJ also did not err in giving important weight to the level of income. Income 

above the threshold amount creates a presumption that there is substantial gainful 

activity. This Court did not and cannot change the important role that the level of income 

plays in creating a presumptive outcome for this case. Special conditions may, but do not 

necessarily, defeat that presumption. This Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to deny 

benefits at step one was supported by substantial evidence and was not based on a legal 

error.

Although the parties have also presented arguments about the remaining steps of 

the determination process, the Court does not address those arguments here. The ALJ did 

not err in finding that Abrahamson failed to establish a disability at step one. The ALJ’s 

alternate findings at the later steps need not be addressed because Abrahamson cannot be 

considered disabled for purposes of the statute as she was still performing substantial 

gainful activity when her insured status ended. This remains true even if she had severe 

medical impairments that made it very difficult for her to perform that work. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / /

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to 

TERMINATE this action. 

 Dated this 11th day of August, 2014. 

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