Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02339/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 05:0552fi Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOUSTON BYRD, aka Kebra Nagast,

CDCR #AX-5330, 

Civil No. 15cv2339 GPC (KSC)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

FOR FAILING TO PAY FILING

FEE REQUIRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) AND FOR

LACK OF PROPER VENUE

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)

AND

2) DENYING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

AND MOTION TO AMEND

WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS

MOOT [ECF Doc. Nos. 5, 7]

vs.

DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS, et al.

Defendants.

Houston Byrd, aka Kebra Nagast (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner formerly incarcerated at

the California Institution for Men in Chino, California (“CIM”), first filed a Complaint

entitled “FreedomofInformation Act” (“FOIA”) on October 14, 2015. SeeECF Doc. No.

1. In his original Complaint, Plaintiff invoked FOIA as the “powerful administrative

tool” which required the “administration” at CIM to provide him with a “legal status

summary sheet & classification score sheet” so that he might “challenge the new 33.3%

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credit earning system” in state court. See Compl. at 1-2. Plaintiff did not prepay the $400

civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), nor did he file a Motion to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

On November 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address indicating

he wastransferred to California Men’s Colony (“CMC”) in San Luis Obispo, California,

on November 9, 2015. (ECF Doc. No. 2).

On December 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”),

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followed by a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on December 22, 2015. See ECF Doc.

Nos. 3, 5. 

In his FAC, Plaintiff claims prison officials at both CIM and CMC committed

various acts of “racial discrimination against [him as] a disabled person” in violation of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, denied him meaningful accessto courts, and deprived him of equal

protection and accessto Islamic religiousservicesin violation of the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). See FAC at 4-11. 

In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff asks the Court to “appoint a

federal ombudsman to investigate [and] insure” that “all CDCR libraries [are] up to the

legal standard,” that he be granted the “opportunity to visit the library at least twice per

month,” provided Islamic services once a week, and given a physical, mental and “total

assessment” exam by a “neutral party.” See Pl.’s Mot. (ECF Doc. No. 5) at 1-2. 

Finally, on January 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend both his FAC and

his Motion for Preliminary Injunction because the “CDCR is a lawless institution” and

“important information ha[s] been realized & needs to be incorporated in []his suit.” See

ECF Doc. No. 7 at 1. 

 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) provides that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a 1

matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to

which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading

or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.”

Because Plaintiff’s original Complaint had yet to be served on any party, amendment

under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) was proper, and permission to amend was not required.

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I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, other than a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party

is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

As noted above, Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 in filing and administrative fees

required to commence this action, nor has he yet to submit a Motion to Proceed IFP.

Therefore, for thisreason alone, his case issubject to immediate dismissal. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a). And while the Court would ordinarily grant Plaintiff leave to file an IFP

motion pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), it finds, for the reasons set out below, that doing

so would be futile since Plaintiff is no longer entitled to that privilege, and his case was

filed in the improper venue. 

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)’s “Three-Strikes” Bar

A. Standards

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011).“Prisoners,” however, “face an

additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a

filing fee” in installments as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP

in cases where the prisoner:

. . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court

of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent

danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter

“Andrews”). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed

IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter

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“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The

objective ofthe PLRA isto further “the congressional goal ofreducing frivolous prisoner

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997).

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner,

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, orfailed to state

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153

(9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by

section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show

he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which

“make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious

physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Case

As an initial matter, the Court has reviewed both Plaintiff’s original and First

Amended Complaints, and has ascertained that neither of them contain “plausible

allegations” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at

the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead,

in both pleadings, as well as in his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff seeks

injunctive relief against prison officials at both his current (CMC) and former institutions

(CIM) based on claims that they have, on unspecified occasions, denied his access to

court and discriminated against him due to his race and religion. See Compl. at 2; FAC

at 3-11.

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at

issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v.

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Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel.

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Thus, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff, Houston Byrd, aka Kebra

Nagast, currently identified as CDCR Inmate #AX-5330, has had at least three prior

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civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They are: 

(1) Nagast v. Lee, et al., Southern Dist. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:01-cv-02362-LNLS (April 2, 2002 Order Granting IFP and Dismissing Complaint for

Failing to State a Claim per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1))

(ECF Doc. No. 6) (strike one);

(2) Nagast v. Director of Corrections, et al., Central Dist. Cal., Eastern Div.,

Civil Case No. 5:09-cv-01044-CJC-PJW (Feb. 28, 2012 Report &

Recommendation to grant Defendants’Motion to DismissSecond Amended

Complaint for Failure to State a Claim) (ECF Doc. No. 94), and (April 26,

2012 Order Accepting Report & Recommendation) (ECF Doc. No. 96)

(strike two); and

(3) Nagast v. House of Metamorphosis, Southern Dist. Cal. Civil Case No.

3:10-cv-1036-JAH-POR (Nov. 29, 2010OrderSua Sponte Dismissing First

Amended Complaint for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1) (ECF Doc. No. 10) (strike three).

Accordingly, becausePlaintiff has,while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes”

as defined by § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed either his original or

amended complaints, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this case. See

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999)

(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the

According to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s ID 2

Warrants Unit, Plaintiff is also known as Kebra Nagast, and as Kebra Nagasi, and has

been previously identified as CDCR Inmate #AF-9119, #N-79217 and #T-76987. 

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courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from

continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”);see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d

1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of

privilege and not right.”).

III. Improper Venue

Finally, even if Plaintiff did prepay the civil filing fee, or was entitled to proceed

IFP, a further review of both his original Complaint and his FAC, as well as his Motion

for Preliminary Injunction, reveal that he initiated this action in the wrong court. Venue

may be raised by a court sua sponte where the defendant has not yet filed a responsive

pleading and the time for doing so has not run. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488

(9th Cir. 1986). 

Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides, in pertinent part, that a

“civil action may be brought in – (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides,

if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; [or] (2) a

judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is

situated[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488; Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986). “The district court of a

district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall

dismiss, or if it be in the interests of justice, transfer such case to any district or division

in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at CMC, is seeking injunctive relief related to

the conditions of his confinement at both CMC and CIM, and has sued only CMC and

CIM officials. See FAC (ECF Doc. No. 3) at 1-3; Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF Doc. No.

5) at 1-2. Thus, to the extent the substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise

to Plaintiff’s claims occurred at CMC, in San Luis Obispo County, and/or at CIM, in

Chino, California, which is located in San Bernardino County, venue would be proper

in either the Eastern or Western Divisions of the Central District of California, pursuant

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to 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(1) and (2), but not in the Southern District of California, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 84(d) (“The Southern District [of California] comprises the counties of

Imperial and San Diego.”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby: 

(1) DISMISSES this action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to prepay

the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), and for lack of proper venue

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and § 1406(a);

(2) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction (ECF Doc. No. 5)

and Motion to Amend (ECF Doc. No. 7) without prejudice as moot; and

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and

therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v.

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir.

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not

be frivolous). 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 29, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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