Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06382/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06382-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISIDRO ROMERO,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT AYERS, Warden

Respondent.

 /

No. C-07-6382 TEH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Pro se Petitioner Isidro Romero, a state prisoner

incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, California, seeks a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the California

Board of Parole Hearings’ (“BPH”) March 7, 2007 decision to deny him

parole, which, for the reasons that follow, the Court denies.

I

Below is a brief factual summary of Petitioner’s

commitment offense, as set forth in the state appellate court

opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court. 

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During a party, Sergio Cruz, a noninvitee,

attempted to coax one of the guests, Sophia,

outside. Although Cruz and Sophia had

previously dated, Sophia refused to leave the

house.

Cruz returned hours later accompanied by

[Petitioner] and others. When Sophia still

refused to leave with Cruz, catcalls were made

until a fight erupted between those inside the

house and Cruz and his friends. During the

brawl, witnesses identified [Petitioner] as

stabbing Jose Gomez, Sophia’s cousin.

[Petitioner], Cruz and the others fled.

Gomez’s autopsy revealed he died from eight

stab wounds. [Petitioner] was arrested at a

hospital while being treated for cuts and

bruises. Blood tests showed [Petitioner’s]

blood alcohol level to be .16.

[Petitioner] admitted at trial he

accompanied Cruz to the party and was involved

in a fight, but denied stabbing anyone. In

addition he admitted drinking beer but denied

feeling its effect.

People v. Romero, 153 Cal. App.3d 757, 759 (1984).

On May 16, 1985, Petitioner was sentenced to sixteenyears-to-life in state prison following his conviction by a jury in

Orange County of second degree murder with an attached deadly weapon

enhancement. Doc. #6-1 at 23. His minimum eligible parole date was

August 25, 1991. Id. 

On March 7, 2007, Petitioner appeared before BPH for his

eleventh parole suitability hearing. Doc. #6-1 at 21 & 23; Doc. #6-

3 at 2. At the conclusion of the hearing, BPH found Petitioner was

“not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” Doc. #6-2 at 30. 

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Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged BPH’s decision in the

state superior and appellate courts. Doc. #6-3 at 2-7; Doc. #6-6 at

2. On November 28, 2007, the California Supreme Court summarily

denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review. Doc. #6-8 at 2. This

federal Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus followed. Doc. #1. 

Per order filed on July 2, 2008, the Court found

Petitioner’s claim that BPH violated his due process rights, when

liberally construed, colorable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and ordered

Respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted. Doc. #5. Respondent has filed an Answer and Petitioner

has filed a Traverse. Doc. ## 6 & 7. 

II

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive

vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody

pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v.

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

Court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a

California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s

adjudication of any claim on the merits: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard,

federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this]

[C]ourt concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). 

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in

determining whether the state court made an unreasonable application

of Supreme Court precedent, the only definitive source of clearly

established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) rests in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark

v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The state court decision to which 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applies

is the “last reasoned decision” of the state court. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). Although Ylst primarily involved the

issue of procedural default, the “look through” rule announced there

has been extended beyond the context of procedural default. Barker,

423 F.3d at 1092 n.3 (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970

n.17 (9th Cir. 2004) and Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112–13 (9th

Cir. 2003)). 

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 Where the state court cited only state law in its

decision, the federal court must ask whether state law, as explained

by the state court, is “contrary to” clearly established governing

federal law. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230

(9th Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir.

2002) (state court applied correct controlling authority when it

relied on state court case that quoted Supreme Court for proposition

squarely in accord with controlling authority). If the state court,

relying on state law, correctly identified the governing federal

legal rules, the federal court must ask whether the state court

applied them unreasonably to the facts. See Lockhart, 250 F.3d at

1232.

III

A

Under California law, prisoners like Petitioner who are

serving indeterminate life sentences become eligible for parole

after serving minimum terms of confinement required by statute. In

re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1077–78 (2005). At that point,

California’s parole scheme provides that BPH “shall set a release

date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Regardless of the length of the time

served, “a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied

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parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(a). In making this determination,

BPH must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social

history, past criminal history, and base and other commitment

offense, including behavior before, during and after the crime. See

Id. § 2402(b)–(d).

California’s parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable

liberty interest in release on parole” that cannot be denied without

adequate procedural due process protections. Sass v. California Bd.

of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion v.

Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). It matters not that a

parole release date has not been set for the inmate because “[t]he

liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date,

but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334,

F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that “some

evidence” support BPH’s decision finding him unsuitable for parole. 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125. This “some evidence” standard is

deferential, but ensures that “the record is not so devoid of

evidence that the findings of [the board] were without support or

otherwise arbitrary.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457

(1985). Determining whether this requirement is satisfied “does not

require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at

455. Rather, “the relevant question is whether there is any

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evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455–56. 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying

BPH’s decision have some indicium of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d

at 915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. Relevant to this inquiry is

whether the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to appear before,

and present evidence to, BPH. See Pedro v. Oregon Parole Bd., 825

F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987). If BPH’s determination of parole

unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some reliable

evidence to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229,

1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

B

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from BPH’s

March 7, 2007 decision finding him unsuitable for parole and denying

him a subsequent hearing for one year on the ground that the

decision does not comport with due process. Specifically,

Petitioner claims BPH’s decision was not supported by “some

evidence.” Doc. #1. 

As an initial matter, the record shows that BPH afforded

Petitioner and his counsel an opportunity to speak and present

Petitioner’s case at the hearing, gave them time to review documents

relevant to Petitioner’s case and provided them with a reasoned

decision in denying parole. Doc. #6-1 at 29–33; Doc. #6-2 at 30–38.

The record also shows BPH relied on several circumstances

tending to show unsuitability for parole and that these

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circumstances formed the basis for its conclusion that Petitioner

was “not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” Doc. #6-2 at 30; see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(a)

(stating that a prisoner determined to be an unreasonable risk to

society shall be denied parole).

In rendering its decision, BPH cited the circumstances of

the commitment offense, in that it was “carried out in a very cruel,

very cold and callous manner” that “demonstrated a very callous

disregard for human suffering.” Doc. #6-2 at 30. BPH further

observed that the motive for the crime “was extremely trivial in

relation to the offense.” Id. at 31. 

Further, BPH expressed concern that from 2000 through

2005, Petitioner’s participation in Alcoholics Anonymous was

minimal; specifically, he attended once in 2000, not at all in 2001,

twice in 2002, once in 2003, and not at all in 2004 and 2005. Doc.

#6-2 at 35. BPH noted that during the evidentiary portion of the

hearing, Petitioner “admitted that the culture that [he] grew up

with[,] . . . [his] father was a heavy drinker and may be an

alcoholic and the culture that’s surrounding [Petitioner] and the

way [he] grew up was that everybody drinks.” Doc. #6-2 at 36. 

Given Petitioner’s blood alcohol level at the time of the commitment

offense was twice the legal limit, BPH expressed trepidation that if

remaining sober “were the top priority in [Petitioner’s] life, [his

minimal, sporadic attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous from 2000

through 2005] would never happen. [Petitioner] would fully

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understand that continued support in keeping . . . sober is the

number one goal in [his] life to survive.” Id. at 35.

BPH then made the following findings: 

[Petitioner] need[s] to continue with all types

of documented self-help in order to face,

discuss, understand and cope with stress in a 

nondestructive manner. Until progress is made,

the prisoner continues to be unpredictable and a

threat to others. 

And, sir, it’s not just stress. It’s

really do whatever you need to do to get a

better understanding and to be able to

communicate with a future panel as to what

brought you to make the decisions you did that

evening. There’s a lot of questions and we

ended up leaving here with more questions than

what we have answers for. And that [is] to

understand what functional alcoholism is. And

we really question whether or not, how

inebriated you were during the life crime, okay?

So, basically, sir, we’re giving you a

another one year denial. And I highly recommend

that you use that time wisely to get additional

self-help, to get a better understanding of why

you did the things you did. We recommend that

you remain disciplinary-free, and that if

available, you continue to upgrade vocationally

and educationally, and also participate in selfhelp. And update those support letters, okay?

Doc. #6-2 at 37–38. 

In a six-page written decision, the state superior court

affirmed the decision of BPH to deny Petitioner parole, finding that

it was supported by “some evidence.” Doc. #6-3. The court noted:

It is unnecessary for this court to

determine whether petitioner’s commitment

offense alone would have supported the Board’s

decision herein, because the unsuitability

determination herein was not limited solely to

the commitment offense, but instead was based on

additional factors which are supported by the

evidence. 

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 The transcript of the 3/7/07 parole

suitability hearing indicates that the Board of

Parole Hearings addressed the factors required

by law and provided an individualized

consideration of these factors as they related

to petitioner. Therefore, his claim that the

result was pre-determined, arbitrary and

capricious is unfounded. 

A major reason for the Board’s conclusion

that petitioner still represents a threat to

public safety involved its concern that

petitioner had not shown that he would abstain

from alcohol abuse if released. Petitioner was

admittedly drunk at the time of the offense, and

an admitted alcoholic who began drinking at age

15. His alcohol abuse also contributed to his

prior criminal record. The 2005 psychological

assessment stated petitioner’s Axis I Diagnosis

as “Alcohol Abuse in full institutional

remission” and identified his foremost risk

factor as the potential for alcohol relapse. 

The report’s conclusion that petitioner posed a

minimal risk to the community if released was

expressly conditioned upon his continued

abstention from alcohol use and his continued

involvement with alcohol recovery activities. 

The factors relied on by the Board in

denying parole (i.e., petitioner’s commitment

offense, criminal history, social history,

parole plans and self-help issues) are connected

to his alcoholism. Because his threat to

society if released is directly related to his

permanent abstention from alcohol use, the

Board’s conclusion that he would still pose a

threat to society if released, based on the

aforementioned deficiencies in this area

(including but not limited to his failure to

regularly attend AA from 2000 through 2005), is

supported by the record. Consequently, the

denial of parole is supported by “some evidence”

and was not an abuse of discretion. (In re

Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 616). 

Doc. #6-3 at 6–7. 

Although the state superior court cited only state law in

its decision denying Petitioner’s due process claim, the court

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correctly identified the “some evidence” standard that applies under

federal law; therefore this Court must determine whether the state

court applied the standard unreasonably to the facts. See Lockhart,

250 F.3d at 1232. After a careful review of the record, the Court

finds that the state court’s conclusion that BPH’s decision to deny

Petitioner parole was not supported by “some evidence” was not

contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, and it was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Williams, 354 F.3d at 1106. The evidence shows Petitioner’s

commitment offense occurred when he was under the influence of

alcohol, with a blood alcohol level twice the legal limit. 

Petitioner’s social history involved a culture where alcohol often

was abused; if paroled, Petitioner planned on returning to that very

culture. Based on these considerations, especially when viewed in

conjunction with the nature of the commitment offense, this Court

cannot say that BPH’s finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for

parole was “without support or otherwise arbitrary.” See Hill, 472

U.S. at 457. 

Given the evidence before the Court, BPH reasonably

concluded that Petitioner was not yet suitable for parole. See,

e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232–33 (upholding denial of parole based

on gravity of offense and the petitioner’s psychiatric reports

documenting his failure to complete programming while in prison);

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity

of offense and the petitioner’s conduct prior to imprisonment);

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Morales v. California Dep’t. of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th

Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995) (upholding

denial of parole based on the cruel nature of offense, the

petitioner’s unstable and criminal history, and his need for further

psychiatric treatment). It is not up to this Court to “reweigh the

evidence.” Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994).

IV 

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall terminate any pending

motions as moot, enter judgment in accordance with this order and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 03/26/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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