Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02407/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02407-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERGIO SANCHEZ,

CDCR #J-07661,

Civil No. 14cv2407 LAB (MDD)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS

(Doc. No. 2) 

(2) DENYING MOTION TO

APPOINT COUNSEL 

(Doc. No. 3)

AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S.

MARSHAL TO EFFECT

SERVICE OF SUMMONS 

AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT

TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

AMY MILLER, Warden; R. MADDEN,

Chief Deputy Warden; M. GREENWOOD,

Captain; N. TELLES, Correctional

Lieutenant; O. MARTIN, Correctional

Officer; DOES 1-5, Correctional Officers,

Defendants.

Sergio Sanchez (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Centinela

State Prison (“CEN”) in Imperial, California, has filed a civil rights Complaint

(“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1). 

Plaintiff claims several CEN officials violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by filing disciplinary charges against himbecause he refused medical

treatment on September 27, 2013. See Compl. at 3-5, ¶¶ 9-26. Plaintiff seeks

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declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and he alleges to have

exhausted “all available administrative remedies” before filing suit. Id. at 5-7, ¶¶ 27, 32-

34.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 3).

I.

Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the

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entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted

leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments,” see

Williams v. Paramo, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 74144 at *1 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of

whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v.

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy

of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the six-month

period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly

deposits in the account for the pastsix months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the

account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after 1

May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a),

(b); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May

1, 2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of

the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding

month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forward them to

the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statement

and has determined that Plaintiff has had no deposits to his account, and no available

funds from which to pay any filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action

or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal

of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2) and

assesses no initial partialfiling fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees due must be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff also requests appointment of counsel on grounds that he is indigent,

incarcerated, has limited accessto the law library and knowledge of the law, and because

a “trial in the case will likely involve conflicting testimony and counsel would better

enable [him] to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.” See Doc. No. 3 at 1.

Nonetheless, “[t]here is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983

action.” Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v.

Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust

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Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right

to counsel in civil proceedings.”) (citation omitted). Federal courts do not have the

authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States District

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S.

Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts have discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request”

that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional

circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103

(9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, a finding of exceptional

circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the

merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn

v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9thCir. 1986));see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court notes that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance

of counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). However, so

long as a person proceeding in pro se, like Plaintiff in this case, is able to “articulate his

claims against the relative complexity of the matter,” the “exceptional circumstances”

which might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. Id. (finding no abuse of

discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel

despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have fared better–particularly in the realms

of discovery and the securing of expert testimony.”). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates his ability to articulate

the essential facts supporting his claim. Thus, at least at this initial pleading stage, the

Court finds he appears to have an adequate grasp of the relevant facts as well as the

relatively straightforward legal issues involved. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. In fact,

as discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to survive the

initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because Plaintiff has

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not satisfied the stringent standards required for an appointment of counsel under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), however, his Motion for Appointment ofCounsel (Doc. No. 3)must

be DENIED without prejudice at this time.

III.

Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the PLRA

also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damagesfrom

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000);see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while

a plaintiff’s allegations are taken astrue, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where

the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 

/ / /

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1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey

v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges constitutional claims sufficient

to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 

See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (“It cannot be

disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in

refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.”); Thor v. SuperiorCourt, 5 Cal. 4th 725, 732

(Cal. 1993) (holding that “under California law a competent, informed adult has a

fundamental right of self-determination to refuse or demand the withdrawal of medical

treatment of any form irrespective of the personal consequences,” and that “in the

absence of evidence demonstrating a threat to institutional security or public safety,

prison officials, including medical personnel, have no affirmative duty to administer such

treatment and may not deny a person incarcerated in state prison this freedom of

choice.”); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting out

elements of retaliation claim and finding plaintiff who alleged prison officials had “filed

a false disciplinary complaint against him,” and “made false statements to the parole

board” because he had exercised his constitutional right to petition for redress had

“sufficiently pleaded First Amendment retaliation claims.”).

Based on these legal precedents and on the facts as currently alleged in Plaintiff’s

Complaint, the Court will authorize U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1126-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve

all process, and performall dutiesin [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (providing that

“service be effected by a United States marshal, deputy United States marshal, or other

officer specially appointed by the court . . . when the plaintiff is authorized to proceed

in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV.

Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED without

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No.

2) is GRANTED.

3. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, is DIRECTED to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust

account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the

account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income

and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account

exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS

ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Order on

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. TheClerk will issue a summons upon Defendants, and forward it to Plaintiff

along with a blank U.S. Marshal (USM) Form 285 for each named Defendant. In 2

Plaintiff must, of course, identify the persons he currently lists only as Does 1-5

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whom he currently identifies only as “correctional officers” at CEN, by their true names

and substitute those individual persons by amending his Complaint to identify each of

these parties before the United States Marshal will be able to execute service upon any

of them. See Compl. at 4; Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (1995)

(Doe defendants must be identified and served within 120 days of the commencement

of the action against them); FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(1)(C) & 4(m). Generally, Doe pleading

is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). And when the

plaintiff proceeds IFP, it is in most instances impossible for the United States Marshal

to serve a summons and complaint upon a party identified only as a Doe. See Walker v.

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly effect service under

Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the information necessary to

identify the defendant.”). However, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

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addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order, and a copy of his

Complaint and summons for purposes of serving each named Defendant. Upon receipt

of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 285s as completely and

accurately as possible, and return them to the United States Marshal according to the

instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. 

Thereafter, the U.S. Marshal is ORDERED to serve a copy of the Complaint and

summons upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of

service will be advanced by the United States. 

6. Plaintiff must thereafter serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been

entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other

document he submits for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff must include with the

original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in

which a true and correct copy of that document wasserved on Defendants, or counsel for

Defendants, and the date of thatservice. Any paper received by the Court which has not

been properly filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service may

be disregarded.

DATED: January 16, 2015

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

the Doe Defendants at this time because where the identity of an alleged party is not

known prior to filing of an action, Ninth Circuit authority permits plaintiff the

opportunity to pursue appropriate discovery to identify the unknown Does, unless it is

clear that discovery would not uncover their identities, or that his Complaint should be

dismissed for other reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir.

1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642).

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