Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-04599/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-04599-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELPHINE ALLEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

MASTER CASE FILE

NO. C00-4599 TEH 

ORDER EXTENDING

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This case is nearing an important cross-roads. The Negotiated Settlement Agreement

(“NSA”), filed on January 22, 2003, provides that, “[w]ithout further action, the Agreement

shall terminate five (5) years from the effective date, unless the Monitor reports to the Court

that an extension of time, not to exceed two (2) years, is reasonably necessary to serve the

purposes of the Agreement.” NSA § XV.B.3. Thus, without further action from the Court,

the NSA is currently scheduled to expire on January 21, 2008.

Although this date remains several months away, it is the Court’s understanding that

the parties, with input from the Independent Monitoring Team (“IMT”), have been

discussing the potential extension of the NSA for several months. Indeed, on October 11,

2006, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer on this issue, and the Court repeated

that order at the January 25, 2007 status conference. The Court made these orders because it

has become clear that, despite Defendants’ good-faith efforts and hard work over the past

two years, Defendants’ late start at tackling any meaningful attempt at reform has made an

extension of the agreement inevitable. Defendants themselves appear to recognize this and

dispute only the terms and length of the extension.

At the January status conference, the Court also ordered the parties to submit a joint

statement on three issues: the extension of the NSA, the criteria used for monitoring, and the

discipline matrix. The parties timely filed their joint statement on February 26, 2007,

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providing helpful information to the Court regarding the parties’ positions on these issues. In

addition, the Court has continued its regular consultation with the IMT and has, with the

consent of all parties, recently met separately with attorneys for Plaintiffs and attorneys for

Defendants.

Upon full consideration of the views expressed by the parties during these ex parte

meetings and in the February 26 joint status statement, as well as a careful reading of the

provisions of the NSA itself, the Court now issues this order to resolve several of the parties’

disputes. The Court acknowledges that, in a letter dated March 12, 2007, Defendants

requested that the Court schedule a settlement conference prior to “issuing any formal Order

that addresses the extension of the NSA.” However, for the reasons discussed below, the

Court does not find a settlement conference to be necessary or appropriate at this time.

Extension of the NSA

While the parties may and should continue to meet and confer on certain issues, the

primary issue in dispute – the extension of the NSA – is simply not a matter on which the

parties must reach consensus. Although the Court has given the parties over six months to

attempt to reach agreement on how to proceed with the extension of the NSA, meeting and

conferring on that issue was not required by either the NSA or due process. Nor does the

extension require the approval of the Oakland City Council.

It has become increasingly clear to the Court that meeting and conferring on the

extension and related issues is serving only to divert time, energy, and resources away from

Defendants’ compliance efforts. Moreover, pursuant to the terms of the NSA, the decision to

extend the agreement lies soundly within this Court’s authority, based on the

recommendations of the IMT. As noted at the outset of this order, the NSA provides that,

“[w]ithout further action, the Agreement shall terminate five (5) years from the effective

date, unless the Monitor reports to the Court that an extension of time, not to exceed two (2)

years, is reasonably necessary to serve the purposes of the Agreement.” NSA § XV.B.3

(emphasis added). Similarly, a different section of the NSA provides that, “[t]he extension of

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Of course, if Defendants feel that they have achieved such compliance, they remain

free to file a motion to set aside the NSA’s extension pursuant to section XV.B.3 of the

agreement.

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the Monitor beyond five years shall be allowed only if the Court determines that it is

reasonably necessary in order for the Monitor to fulfill his/her duties pursuant to this

Agreement.” Id. § XIII.B (emphasis added). Notably, nowhere does the agreement provide

that the parties must agree to an extension before the NSA can be extended.

Defendants may challenge the extension by motion practice but, in doing so, would

have “the burden to establish substantial compliance with the Agreement during the five-year

period. ‘Substantial compliance’ is defined, for the purposes of this Agreement, as meaning

that OPD [the Oakland Police Department] has complied with the material provisions of the

Agreement.” Id. § XV.B.3. Thus, a showing of “substantial compliance” is the only basis by

which Defendants may object to the NSA’s extension, provided that the IMT has reported to

the Court – as it has on numerous occasions – that an extension is reasonably necessary to

serve the purposes of the NSA. As the Court has explained at past status conferences, and as

Defendants do not appear to dispute, there can be no question that Defendants have failed to

achieve “substantial compliance” with the material provisions of the NSA.1

This does not mean that Defendants have made no progress; to the contrary, the Court

has repeatedly recognized that Defendants have, in fact, made a tremendous amount of

progress over the past two to three years. The problem, as Defendants have acknowledged,

is that virtually no progress was made during the majority of the first two years of the

agreement. Indeed, had Defendants contributed the same level of commitment to reform

throughout the scope of the agreement that they have shown in the past two years, this case

may have been at a very different stage than it is today, and the IMT may well have informed

the Court that no extension was necessary. However, the reality is that Defendants do not yet

find themselves at that point.

Consequently, based on the Court’s independent review of Defendants’ progress to

date, the Court agrees with the IMT that a full extension of the NSA for the full two-year

period contemplated by the agreement is warranted because it is reasonably necessary to

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achieve the purposes of the agreement. Accordingly, the NSA, in its entirety, shall not expire

until January 21, 2010. The Court remains optimistic that Defendants will be in substantial

compliance by the end of this extension period. Because Defendants delayed implementation

of the reforms for approximately two years, achieving compliance during the two-year

extension period would fulfill the parties’ original expectation that the reforms set forth in

the NSA would be achieved within five years.

Monitoring Criteria and Related Issues

The parties have also been discussing other issues in the context of the NSA extension

– for example, the criteria used to monitor compliance and whether the Office of the

Inspector General (“OIG”) should play an expanded role during any extension period. 

However, these are properly treated as separate and secondary issues that are not tied to the

length and scope of the extension. Who should do the monitoring and how such monitoring

should be done have no bearing on the question the Court has already answered – namely,

whether monitoring must be continued to achieve the purposes of the NSA.

Significantly, the NSA does not provide that the parties may now select a new monitor

to replace the IMT. Nothing in the agreement contemplates such a change, and it would

appear unwise to change monitors at this stage of the case, given the need for continuity, the

limited time remaining before the NSA expires, and the IMT’s thorough knowledge of the

facts, background, community, and relevant players. The Court recognizes that the NSA

provides for removal of the Monitor with good cause: “Should any of the parties to this

Agreement determine that the Monitor, and/or his/her agents, employees, [and/or]

independent contractors, has exceeded his/her authority or failed to satisfactorily perform or

fulfill his/her duties under this Agreement, the party may petition the Court for such relief as

the Court deems appropriate, including replacement of the Monitor and/or his/her agents,

employees and/or independent contractors.” NSA § XIII.D. However, as this Court has

stated, it is unaware of anything the IMT has or has not done that would constitute good

cause for replacing the IMT as the Monitor for this case.

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Defendants have expressed some concern over whether the IMT has complied with

section XIII.G of the NSA, which provides that, “[t]he Monitor shall offer the City and OPD

technical assistance regarding compliance with and implementing the Agreement.” 

However, while some ambiguity over the meaning of “technical assistance” remains, this

provision clearly does not require the IMT to become a liaison between Defendants and the

Court, or for the IMT to act as Defendants’ consultant, in the sense that the IMT’s

suggestions may be accepted or rejected at Defendants’ will. The IMT, or Independent

Monitoring Team, is just that: independent. As this Court has explained on numerous

occasions, the IMT is an extension of the Court whose primary role, as the NSA spells out, is

“to assess and evaluate compliance with the provisions of the Agreement.” NSA § XIII.G. 

That said, as the Court has also explained, it expects the IMT to provide “technical

assistance” by working with Defendants to help them achieve compliance with the NSA. 

The Court’s review of the IMT’s activities to date reveals that the IMT has done so, and that

they have not limited their conduct simply to assessing and reporting compliance. Indeed,

Defendants have pointed to no specific “technical assistance” that they have requested from

the IMT and that the IMT has failed to provide.

Although Defendants remain free to make the petition contemplated by section XIII.D

if they believe that the IMT has failed to provide “technical assistance” as required by the

NSA, or that the IMT has otherwise exceeded its authority or failed to comply with its duties

under the NSA, Defendants bear the burden of making such a showing to the Court. Before

Defendants bring any such petition, the Court urges Defendants to discuss their concerns

with the IMT in hopes of reaching an informal resolution. Unless any such petition is

brought before this Court and the Court finds good cause to replace the Monitor, the IMT

shall continue to be the Monitor for the full length of the NSA’s extension.

The Court acknowledges the NSA’s provision that, “[s]hould monitoring be extended

for an additional period of time, the compensation will be renegotiated subject to the

approval of the City Council.” NSA § XIII.A.2. In addition, the Court shares the parties’

recognition of “the importance of ensuring that the fees and costs borne by the City are

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Defendants have similarly proposed that OIG take on an increased auditing role

during the extension period, but it is unclear to what extent Defendants have proposed that

the IMT retain oversight authority over any audits performed by OIG.

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reasonable.” Id. § XIII.A.1. However, the Court fully expects Defendants to enter into new

compensation negotiations with the IMT in good faith; Defendants shall not view the need

for renegotiation as an opportunity to make the contract terms so unpalatable that the IMT

chooses not to continue as the Monitor. Defendants and the IMT shall attempt to reach

prompt agreement on compensation for the two-year extension of the NSA so that this issue

does not become a prolonged diversion from the substantive compliance issues that form the

core of this case. To that end, on or before April 30, 2007, Defendants shall file a statement

with the Court verifying that they have reached agreement on the IMT’s compensation for

the two-year extension period. If no agreement has been reached by that date, then

Defendants and the IMT shall inform the Court in writing of their respective positions, and

the Court will then evaluate whether Defendants have engaged in bad-faith negotiations or,

by contrast, whether the IMT’s expectations are unreasonable.

During the full length of the extension, the Monitor – presumably the IMT, unless

Defendants demonstrate good cause why the IMT should be removed – shall retain the same

duties and scope of authority provided for by the NSA. The Court understands that the IMT

has proposed delegating some of its authority to OIG so that OIG will be given the

opportunity to audit certain NSA tasks, subject to the oversight of the IMT. The Court

approves of the IMT’s proposal.2

 Delegating certain audits to OIG will allow Defendants to

continue to build their capacity, with the hope that OIG will be able to competently review

Defendants’ efforts after the IMT is no longer in place. Such delegation would thus satisfy

the City’s goals of “provid[ing] for the critical work of both the OIG and the independent

monitors in such a way that their work is complimentary, facilitat[ing] the transition of the

oversight work to the OIG, and enhanc[ing] the achievement of the reforms and their

sustainability.” Feb. 26, 2007 Joint Statement at 14.

Critically, however, the ultimate monitoring authority shall continue to rest with the

IMT, who shall review any audits delegated to OIG before such audits may be used as a basis

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The parties have requested a settlement conference conducted by this Court rather

than a magistrate judge. However, as counsel should all be well aware, during a settlement

conference, parties may express concerns about the weaknesses of their positions or share

other confidential information that they do not want revealed to the decision-maker charged

with resolving all issues on which the parties cannot reach agreement. It is therefore this

Court’s practice – and the practice of most, if not all, other judges – not to conduct settlement

conferences in cases in which the Court is also the presiding judge.

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for demonstrating compliance. While it is the Court’s hope that the IMT will need to make

minimal changes, if any, to any audits performed by OIG, the Court also recognizes the

importance of having an independent check on OIG to ensure that compliance is objectively

monitored during the scope of the NSA. As Plaintiffs observed in the parties’ most recent

status statement, “[t]he establishment of an independent monitor was a cornerstone of the

Negotiated Settlement Agreement,” and “[t]o have Oakland City Employees measure NSA

compliance would constitute a wholesale abandonment of the NSA.” Id. at 5.

The parties shall continue to meet and confer regarding the criteria to be used to

monitor compliance, and the Court is hopeful that the parties’ optimism that they will be able

to reach agreement on these criteria is not misplaced. The parties’ discussions with the IMT

regarding appropriate monitoring criteria shall not continue indefinitely, however, since it

would be inefficient for the IMT to conduct audits based on a moving target of monitoring

criteria, and the limited time frame of the NSA mandates that audits continue to occur

without further delay. If all parties and the IMT are unable to reach agreement on the

monitoring criteria by March 30, 2007, then they shall promptly inform the Court and

request a referral to a magistrate judge for a settlement conference to resolve any remaining

disputes regarding monitoring criteria.3

 Unless the parties agree on a different magistrate

judge, this matter will be referred back to Magistrate Judge James Larson.

Discipline Matrix

The parties shall follow the same procedure with respect to the discipline matrix. As

with the monitoring criteria, the Court remains hopeful that the parties will be able to agree

on revisions to the discipline matrix that meet the approval of the IMT, especially since the

parties all initially and agreed to the current matrix. In addition, Defendants shall, if they

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have not done so already, include Intervenor Oakland Police Officers’ Association

(“OPOA”) in the meet-and-confer process regarding Defendants’ proposed changes to the

discipline matrix. If the parties are unable to reach agreement by March 30, 2007, then they

shall promptly inform the Court and request a referral to a magistrate judge for a settlement

conference on any outstanding disputes regarding the discipline matrix. As with the

monitoring criteria, this matter will be referred back to Magistrate Judge Larson unless the

parties agree on a different magistrate judge.

Concluding Remarks

As the Court noted at the conclusion of the last status conference in this case,

Defendants are now succeeding and not failing in their attempts to comply with the NSA and

improve the quality of policing in the City of Oakland. Under the leadership of Chief Wayne

Tucker and City Administrator Deborah Edgerly, Defendants have made significant progress

during the past two years and continue to work in good faith to achieve full compliance with

the NSA. Based on reports the Court has received from the IMT, it also appears that the

administration of Mayor Ronald Dellums is fully committed to the NSA and its reforms. 

However, despite Defendants’ solid efforts, they have not been able to achieve in two years

what they were expected to achieve in four, nor would it have been realistic to expect them to

have been able to do so. It is primarily because of Defendants’ late start to the reform

process that the Court has concluded that a full two-year extension of the NSA is necessary.

Now that this order has resolved several of the major disputes between the parties, the

Court hopes that the parties and the IMT can re-focus their efforts on the primary task at

hand: achieving and sustaining meaningful reform in the Oakland Police Department. Such

institutional change is rarely, if ever, an easy process, but it is the Court’s hope that

Defendants’ and Intervenor OPOA’s representations to the Court have been genuine, and that

all parties are truly committed to ensuring that reforms occur. The NSA will only have a

lasting impact if the reforms become so much a part of the Oakland Police Department that

Defendants are able – and willing – to maintain them even after the NSA expires and

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independent monitoring is no longer required. There have been indications that Defendants

are building their capacity in such a way that this goal is on its way to becoming a reality. It

is the Court’s hope that Defendants’ continued good-faith and hard-working efforts to build

their own capacity and achieve meaningful institutional reform – not for reform’s sake or for

the sake of the NSA but, instead, for the benefit of the citizens of Oakland and helping the

Oakland Police Department become an example of good practices to be followed around the

nation – will become a hallmark of the next three years. Only then will the true value of the

NSA have been realized.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 03/19/07 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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