Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05051/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05051-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

Clarence Ray ALLEN,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

Roderick HICKMAN, Secretary, California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et

al., 

 Defendants.

Case Number C 05 5051 JSW

DEATH-PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

[Docket Nos. 6 & 17]

Plaintiff Clarence Ray Allen, a condemned inmate at California’s San Quentin State

Prison, is scheduled to be executed on January 17, 2006. He applies for a temporary restraining

order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue to stay his

execution for alleged violations of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Plaintiff’s Application is opposed by Defendants Roderick Hickman, Secretary of

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; S.W. Ornoski, Acting Warden of

San Quentin State Prison; and Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California. The Court has

read the moving and responding papers. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(2005) and finds that it is appropriate to resolve Plaintiff’s Application without oral argument
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s

Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause and dismisses

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1982. He is now 75 years

old. Plaintiff suffers from coronary artery disease and diabetes. In addition, he is legally blind.

Over the course of his incarceration, Plaintiff alleges that he has received inadequate

medical care. Prior to 2005, he alleges, this has included having his Vitamin E supplement

arbitrarily not renewed in 1993 and his medication for diabetes arbitrarily halved in 1997. Also

prior to 2005, Plaintiff was independently evaluated twice by psychologists: Dr. Eric S.

Morgenthaler issued his report on January 10, 1991, and Dr. Gretchen E. White issued hers on

July 25, 1996.

On January 24, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed

the denial of Plaintiff’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, denied his petition for

rehearing and rejected his suggestion for rehearing en banc. Plaintiff was aware that, unless the

Supreme Court of the United States granted him a writ of certiorari, his execution soon would be

scheduled. Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael Satris, Esq., visited Plaintiff on February 7.

Dr. Jahangir Sadeghi, an ophthalmologist, examined Plaintiff on June 30 and concluded

that Plaintiff suffers from diabetic retinopathy and recommended that Plaintiff undergo laser

surgery to correct his vision. On July 18, Sadeghi submitted a request to schedule the

recommended laser surgery; to date, laser surgery has not been scheduled.

On September 2, Plaintiff experienced a heart attack (allegedly possibly due to the

arbitrary withholding of critical medication from June 15 to August 4). Plaintiff was taken first

to the prison hospital and then to Marin General Hospital, where doctors performed angioplasty

and Plaintiff successfully underwent cardiac catheterization. After Plaintiff regained

consciousness around September 9, Dr. Henry L. Zhu recommended to Plaintiff that he undergo

coronary artery bypass grafting surgery; however, Plaintiff developed a staphylococcal infection

that required treatment with intravenous antibiotics. On September 18, having been weaned off
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Klingman’s consultation report at the time of Plaintiff’s discharge from Queen of the Valley

Hospital states:

I have discussed with the patient that I think that he should undergo a

repeat cardiac catheterization to assess his anatomy for consideration of

coronary artery bypass grafting. The patient has told me, however, that

he is on death row. He says that his time is just about up and he will be

the next one to be executed and, for this reason, he is not interested in

proceeding with any further interventions. He states that at this time he

does not have pain, and he thinks it would be silly for him to undergo

bypass surgery prior to being executed. He says that he would rather

have the opportunity to spend time with his family. I have offered him

intervention, and at this time he is refusing and he would prefer to go

back to San Quentin.

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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

the IV, Plaintiff was transferred to Queen of the Valley Hospital for, among other things,

revascularization and consideration of surgery. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff underwent another

cardiac catheterization to determine whether surgery would be appropriate; Dr. Robert R.

Klingman determined that it would be. However, Plaintiff refused treatment and was returned to

San Quentin.1

At San Quentin, on September 20, Plaintiff’s counsel’s capital-case consultant, Denise E.

Ferry, visited Plaintiff, and a prison physician named Dr. Aydar explained the need for surgery

to Plaintiff, who then consented to surgery. The following day, on September 21, Ferry visited

Plaintiff again, and Plaintiff had a session with Dr. Dale G. Watson, a forensic psychologist

retained by Plaintiff’s counsel to assess Plaintiff’s brain functioning to help prepare Plaintiff’s

clemency petition; Watson abbreviated the session due to Plaintiff’s poor health. Later that day,

Plaintiff was transferred to Corcoran State Prison due to the severity of his medical condition. 

Watson was scheduled to see Plaintiff again on September 22 but was advised at San Quentin’s

gate that Plaintiff was at Corcoran. Satris attempted to contact Plaintiff during the week that

Plaintiff was at Corcoran, but Plaintiff was never advised of this.

On September 28, Plaintiff was returned to Queen of the Valley Hospital for further

cardiology evaluation. Following repeat angiographic imaging, Klingman determined that

surgery no longer was indicated and that Plaintiff’s condition easily could be treated medically. 

Plaintiff was returned to San Quentin’s hospital on September 30; on October 4, Plaintiff was
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

released from the prison hospital and returned to his cell.

Meanwhile, on October 3, the Supreme Court of the United States denied Plaintiff’s

certiorari petition, thereby drawing Plaintiff’s federal habeas proceedings to a close. Ferry

visited Plaintiff on October 6. On October 11, the Glenn County Superior Court scheduled a

public session for November 18 to set Plaintiff’s execution date.

Dr. Peter Pompei independently examined Plaintiff on October 17. Pompei

recommended that Plaintiff’s primary-care physician consider the possibility of administering a

stress test to Plaintiff to characterize his risk of myocardial ischemia. Plaintiff has requested a

stress test but has not been given one to date.

Ferry visited Plaintiff again on October 20. Watson had a second session with Plaintiff

on October 25. On October 27, Satris visited Plaintiff. Watson examined Plaintiff a third and

final time on November 1. Ferry returned to San Quentin to see Plaintiff on November 8 and

Plaintiff’s counsel’s investigator, David Hinckley, visited Plaintiff on November 10.

On November 16, the Supreme Court of California expanded its appointment of Satris to

include Plaintiff’s clemency proceedings, and Ferry visited Plaintiff one more time. On

November 17, Defendant Schwarzenegger directed Plaintiff to file any clemency petition not

later than 35 days prior to his scheduled execution date. Then, on November 18, the Glenn

County Superior Court set January 17, 2006, for Plaintiff’s execution; the due date for Plaintiff’s

clemency petition thereby became December 13, 2005. Also on November 18, Satris requested

that San Quentin arrange for Plaintiff to undergo a SPECT test and an MRI scan pursuant to

Watson’s recommendation as part of Watson’s investigation into whether Plaintiff suffers from

brain damage; to date, however, Plaintiff has not been permitted to undergo these procedures.

On November 22, Ferry visited Plaintiff. Subsequently, in preparation of Plaintiff’s

clemency petition, Dr. Paul Good, a psychologist, examined Plaintiff on November 30 and

December 5 and Dr. Pablo Stewart, a psychiatrist, examined Plaintiff on December 2 and

December 6.

Plaintiff filed the present action on December 7. With the Application currently before

the Court, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring a postponement of the due date for his
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

clemency petition and staying his execution until he has a stress test and, if subsequently

recommended, open-heart surgery, and has undergone laser surgery on his eyes, MRI procedures

and a SPECT test to assist him in preparing his clemency petition.

The Court issued an expedited scheduling order for briefing Plaintiff’s Application on

December 8. Pursuant to that order, Defendants filed their Opposition to the Application on

December 12 and Plaintiff filed his Reply to Defendants’ Opposition on December 13. Also on

December 13, Plaintiff petitioned Defendant Schwarzenegger for clemency: Plaintiff is asking

Defendant Schwarzenegger to commute his sentence to life in prison or, alternatively, to grant

him a reprieve, in part to enable him to receive care for his heart disease and to undergo laser

surgery and tests to develop further evidence supporting his request for commutation. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has explained that a condemned

inmate seeking a stay of execution is 

required to demonstrate (1) a strong likelihood of success on the

merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if

preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships

favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest

(in certain cases). Alternatively, injunctive relief could be granted

if he demonstrated either a combination of probable success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his

favor. These two alternatives represent extremes of a single

continuum, rather than two separate tests. Thus, the greater the

relative hardship to the party seeking the preliminary injunction,

the less probability of success must be established by the party. In

cases where the public interest is involved, the district court must

also examine whether the public interest favors the plaintiff. [¶] 

In capital cases, the Supreme Court has instructed that equity must

take into consideration the State’s strong interest in proceeding

with its judgment.

Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks,

citations, brackets and emphasis omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

It is undisputed that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies

for his claims. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
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That the administrative procedure cannot result in the particular form of relief requested by the

prisoner does not excuse exhaustion because some sort of relief or responsive action may result from the

grievance. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 737; see also Porter, 534 U.S. at 525 (purposes of exhaustion

requirement include allowing prison to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases and creating

administrative records). 

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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

(1996) (“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as

are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An action must be dismissed unless the

prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies before he or she filed suit, even if the

prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,

whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion

of all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor

must they be “plain, speedy and effective.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance

proceedings exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 741.2

 The obligation to exhaust persists as

long as some remedy is available; when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need not further

pursue the grievance. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also

provides its inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by correctional

officers. See id. § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this

system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2)

formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second-level appeal to the institution

head or designee, and (4) third-level appeal to the Director of the California Department of
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

Corrections. Id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This

satisfies the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38. 

A prisoner need not proceed further and also exhaust state judicial remedies. Jenkins v. Morton,

148 F.3d 257, 259-60 (3d Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff attempts to argue in his Reply that because he is seeking a stay of his execution, a

remedy not available under the administrative appeals process, he is not required to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Plaintiff is wrong. His Complaint plainly seeks relief from what he

alleges is Defendants’ inadequate medical care, and such relief is available through the

administrative procedure. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has stated, the available remedies

need not be “plain, speedy and effective” in order for the exhaustion requirement to apply, 

Porter, 534 U.S. at 524, and exhaustion is a prerequisite even when the specific relief sought by a

prisoner is not available in administrative proceedings, Booth, 532 U.S. at 739; Brown, 422 F.3d

at 935 (recognizing that so long as “the possibility of some relief for the action complained of” is

available through the relevant administrative procedures, the plaintiff is required to exhaust).

In addition, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks relief for allegedly inadequate medical care as far

back as 1993. He has had ample time to pursue his administrative remedies for many of the

violations alleged in the Complaint, and yet he has, by his own admission, failed to do so. 

Because he has not exhausted his administrative remedies with regards to the allegedly

inadequate medical care he describes in his Complaint, this Court is required to dismiss his

Complaint without prejudice. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court now turns to the merits

of Plaintiff’s Application.

B. Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

In his second and third causes of action in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants’ interference with the preparation of his clemency petition violates the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as his right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. He asserts that Defendants’ disregard for his medical needs has hindered his ability

to prepare a petition, that his repeated transportation from one facility to another has prevented

medical experts from examining him and has interfered with his attorneys’ efforts to meet with
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

him, and that Defendants’ failure to perform laser eye surgery to correct his eyesight has impaired

his ability to undergo certain mental examinations. He alleges that such exams, along with the

MRI and SPECT procedures that Defendants have not authorized, would enable a determination

of whether he suffers from organic brain damage resulting from a severe beating in 1946 and an

episode of pediatric encephalitis that same year.

Under Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), only minimal dueprocess protections apply to clemency proceedings. Clemency proceedings satisfy the Due

Process Clause as long as the State follows the procedures set out in State law, the State does not

arbitrarily deny the prisoner all access to the clemency process, and the clemency decision is not

wholly arbitrary or capricious. See id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (controlling opinion)

(“Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state

official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State

arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.”) Courts have found that even a

governor’s adoption of a policy uniformly to refuse to grant clemency in all capital cases does not

violate the minimal due-process protections applicable to clemency proceedings. See Anderson v.

Davis, 279 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff has demonstrated neither a likelihood of success on the merits, nor serious

questions going to the merits, of his due-process claim. Plaintiff cites incidents of alleged

disregard for his medical needs, but presents no specific allegations regarding the effect the

State’s actions have actually had on his ability to prepare a clemency petition. He states, for

example, that on June 15, Defendants arbitrarily cut off vital medications used to treat his heart

disease, blood pressure and diabetes. The medications were not restored until August 4, which

apparently was too late to prevent the heart attack he suffered one month later on September 2. 

He also states that Defendants have failed to provide him with recommended heart surgery.

Although these alleged incidents may have led to the deterioration of Plaintiff’s health, it is not

clear how they actually impaired his ability to prepare a clemency petition. While Plaintiff

alleges that he suffers from exhaustion as a result of Defendants’ indifference to his medical

needs, he does not allege that he is unable to communicate, comprehend or otherwise assist in the
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

preparation of his clemency petition. Furthermore, Plaintiff cites incidents of alleged medical

neglect dating as far back as 1993 and 1997. These alleged incidents took place too long ago to

be relevant to the preparation of his clemency petition, for which the due date was established just

this past November 18 when the Glenn County Superior Court set January 17, 2006, as Plaintiff’s

execution date.

Plaintiff’s allegation that his repeated movement from one facility to another has

prevented him from being examined by retained medical experts as well as meeting with his

attorneys, is defeated by the fact that since his return to his cell on October 6, 2005, he has, in

fact, been examined eight separate times by four different examiners, and since his heart attack in

September 2005, has had at least nine separate visits from his legal team. He was examined by

Pompei on October 17 and was evaluated by Watson on September 21, October 25 and November

1. He was visited by Good on November 30 and December 5. He was also visited by Stewart on

December 2 and December 6. Satris visited Plaintiff on October 27. Ferry visited Plaintiff on

September 20 and 21, October 6 and 20, and November 8, 16 and 22. Additionally, Hinckley

visited Plaintiff on November 10. These numerous visits demonstrate that Plaintiff has had

significant access to his legal team and medical experts. 

Plaintiff contends that his legal team and medical experts were nonetheless denied access

to him at “critical moments.” He cites no authority requiring attorneys and medical experts to

have unfettered access to a prisoner during such times. Here, the provision of medical care to

Plaintiff imposed logistical demands that required his transfer to different facilities with different

visitation requirements—for example, at one point Plaintiff was transferred to Corcoran State

Prison because, according to his medical records, it was determined that Plaintiff could not be

medically managed at San Quentin due to the severity of his medical condition at that time, and

Plaintiff’s legal team was denied access to Plaintiff following his heart attack on September 2

until September 20 because prison policy forbids such access when an inmate is confined in a

community hospital. Plaintiff further contends that Watson’s examination of Plaintiff on

September 21 was impeded by Plaintiff’s exhaustion and shackling, and that a visit planned for

the following day was cancelled because Plaintiff was moved to Corcoran. But by Plaintiff’s own
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

account, this visit was in fact successfully rescheduled to October 25. Plaintiff has not

demonstrated that the logistical difficulties his legal and medical team may have encountered in

visiting him amounted to a violation of the minimal guarantees of due process applicable to

clemency proceedings.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have denied him laser eye surgery which would

improve his vision and permit him to participate in tests to determine whether he suffers from

organic brain damage. He asserts that evidence of brain damage would serve as a mitigating

factor relevant to his clemency petition. To investigate the matter further, Plaintiff has requested

to undergo MRI and SPECT procedures, which would provide a structural and functional picture

of his brain and its activity. He alleges that Defendants have refused to provide such procedures,

even though he maintains they are necessary for the completion of his clemency petition.

Defendants’ denial of the eye surgery, MRI and SPECT procedures requested by Plaintiff

does not violate due process. There is no case law or statutory authority suggesting that due

process requires Defendants to help Plaintiff investigate and develop claims relevant to the

preparation of his clemency petition. Although Defendants may have a duty to provide Plaintiff

with medical care such as laser surgery for purposes of preserving his health, they do not have a

duty to provide Plaintiff the same services for the purpose of preparing a clemency petition. 

Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff with MRI and SPECT procedures likewise does not

violate due process. Cf. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289-90 (prisoner’s allegations that three days’

notice of interview with parole board members and ten days’ notice of clemency hearing before

Ohio Adult Parole Authority were inadequate; that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to

prepare his clemency application because postconviction proceedings were pending; that his

counsel was improperly excluded from the interview; and that he was precluded from testifying or

submitting documentary evidence at the hearing did not amount to a due process violation).

Furthermore, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s allegations of organic brain damage must

be viewed against the backdrop of almost two decades of collateral litigation challenging his

conviction and sentence. Plaintiff has access to the investigative materials generated by this

litigation, including the results of two psychological exams performed at Plaintiff’s counsel’s
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

behest. In 1991, Morgenthaler prepared a report describing his evaluation of Plaintiff. He noted

that when Plaintiff was ten years old, he suffered head trauma during a fall, and that when he was

sixteen, he contracted encephalitis. The report includes the conclusions that “there were no signs

of neurobehavioral impairment and no basis to conclude that Mr. Allen suffers from organic brain

dysfunction.” The report prepared in 1996 by White included findings that Plaintiff is dysthymic,

anxious and prone to hypochondria. Furthermore, on collateral review, Magistrate Judge John F.

Moulds found that Plaintiff’s trial counsel was not obligated to have Plaintiff examined by

mental-health experts because there was no indication that he suffered from mental illness. 

Altogether, Plaintiff has ample psychological evidence, and has long been familiar with the

encephalitis and head trauma which he cites as reasons for securing new mental exams.

In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege State action resulting in a

violation of due process or a denial of the right to counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff has

demonstrated neither a likelihood of success on the merits nor serious questions going to the

merits of his second and third causes of action.

C. Eighth Amendment

In Plaintiff’s first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ alleged failure to

provide adequate medical care has resulted in a violation of his Eighth Amendment protection

against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff argues that a TRO is required because

Defendants’ failure to provide him with medical care has resulted in his inability to prepare his

clemency petition. 

Plaintiff’s request for a TRO based on his first cause of action must be denied. Plaintiff

has demonstrated neither a likelihood of success on the merits, nor serious questions going to the

merits, of his first cause of action. Plaintiff argues in his reply brief that, even though much of the

harm alleged in the first cause of action has already occurred, some of it more than a decade ago,

the extraordinary remedy of a TRO to stop the execution and clemency process is required

because “Defendants’ failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be separated from

Defendants’ interference with Mr. Allen’s clemency petition.” 

Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. Plaintiff presents no specific allegations regarding
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While Plaintiff must be mentally competent for the state to execute him, Ford v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 399 (1986), there is no requirement that he be in a particular state of physical health in order for

the execution and clemency proceedings to move forward. Plaintiff does not allege that he is

incompetent.

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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

the effect the state’s actions have actually had on his ability to prepare a clemency petition. As

already discussed, while Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants’ actions have contributed to his ill

health,3

 he has not shown that Defendants’ alleged indifference to his health needs have

negatively impacted his due-process rights to prepare a clemency petition such that an order

staying the scheduled execution is required. The record demonstrates that, since September 2005, 

Plaintiff has met with retained medical experts at least four times and with his legal team at least

nine times. Furthermore, on December 13, Plaintiff filed a lengthy and thorough clemency

petition, a fact which tends to belie his assertion that Defendants’ behavior has interfered with his

clemency rights. In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations of inadequate medical care do not support his

request for a stay of execution.

D. Possibility of Injury and Balance of Hardships

Plaintiff alleges that, absent a TRO, he is likely to face the irreparable injury of execution,

and thus that the balance of hardships tips strongly in his favor. Defendants counter that it is not

enough for Plaintiff to assert that he will be executed, as there is no authority for the proposition

that irreparable injury warranting a stay of execution is present in every case brought by a person

on death row.

Defendants are correct. While this Court is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff is facing the

ultimate punishment, that alone does not entitle to him to a stay. As detailed above, Plaintiff has

not demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on the merits nor has he demonstrated serious

questions going to the merits of his claims that Defendants have violated his rights regarding the

filing of his clemency petition. Given this, even the fact that Plaintiff is facing execution cannot

entitle him to the injunctive relief of a stay.

In his clemency petition (as well as with the present litigation), Plaintiff has made

Defendant Schwarzenegger aware of his allegations of his need for medical treatment as well as
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Case No. C 05 5051 JSW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(DPSAJBDVGGOK)

further testing to explore the possibility that Plaintiff may suffer from organic brain damage. As a

result, Defendant Schwarzenegger may do one of three things. First, he may commute Plaintiff’s

sentence based on the information already before him, in which case a stay from this Court would

serve no legitimate purpose. Second, Defendant Schwarzenegger may conclude that he is not

moved to grant clemency even if Plaintiff’s allegations of organic brain damage were to be

demonstrated, also in which case a stay from this Court would serve no legitimate purpose. 

Finally, Defendant Schwarzenegger may decide that he requires the evidence proffered by

Plaintiff before making a determination about commutation, in which case he will grant Plaintiff a

reprieve that would make a stay issued by this Court duplicative. Accordingly, and in light of

“the State’s strong interest in proceeding with its judgment,” Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for

N.D. Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992), the balance of hardships tips sharply against granting

Plaintiff’s Application for a stay of execution.

IV. DISPOSITION

There is no question that Plaintiff is old and infirm. These may be factors to be

considered in a bid for clemency. But it is not for this Federal Court to intrude on the

prerogatives of the State Executive to determine what information he requires in deciding whether

to have mercy on a condemned prisoner.

Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause is denied and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice.

 It is so ordered.

DATED: December 15, 2005 __________________________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge