Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00302/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00302-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY CASTILLO,

Petitioner,

v.

F.B. HAWS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00302-LJO-BAM HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT THE COURT DENY 

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §2254

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contends that (1) his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution were violated when police officers questioned him despite his lack of understanding 

that he could refuse to answer questions; and (2) by failing to ask Petitioner about his arrest or 

whether he understood his rights, trial counsel's assistance was ineffective, violating Petitioner's 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

I. Factual Background

Theodore Betts and Gabriel Martin lived together in a remote area 

of Raymond, Madera County [, California]. Martin and Betts had a 

large amount of marijuana at their home. On March 21, 2005, an 

SUV pulled into Martin and Betts's driveway. A young woman, 

Marissa Rubianes, was driving.

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Rubianes asked Martin if he knew of an apartment or house for rent 

in the area. Martin said he did not and asked her to turn the car 

around and leave. As Rubianes started to back up, two men, 

Anthony Burciaga and Anthony Mendez, jumped out of the back of 

the SUV holding guns. Burciaga ordered Martin to keep his dog 

away and told Martin to walk back toward the house. Burciaga was 

pointing a shotgun at Martin.

When Martin, Burciaga, and Mendez got close to the house, Betts 

came out with a shotgun. Burciaga shoved Martin and ran toward 

the back of the house. Betts told Martin to go get another gun and 

Martin ran inside the house.

Martin was inside the house reaching for a rifle when he heard a 

shotgun blast coming from the back of the house. Betts came 

inside, stating he had been shot. Martin went outside, did not see 

anyone, and fired a round into the air. Martin then went inside to 

call 911. Betts bled to death at the scene. Burciaga and Mendez 

were arrested a short distance from the shooting.

On the day of the shooting, [Petitioner] provided a statement to law 

enforcement. [Petitioner] told officers that around March 2004, a 

friend of his had told him that he knew a man who had a lot of 

marijuana and that [Petitioner] should go and get it. The friend, 

Bob, told [Petitioner] that it would be easy to take the marijuana 

because the man who had it was in a wheelchair, could be tied up, 

and no one would have to be hurt. Bob said the man had 200 to 

300 pounds of marijuana on the side of his house.

About two months later in May 2004, Bob drove [Petitioner] to the 

man's house to show [Petitioner] where it was located. Later, 

[Petitioner] went to the man's house by himself to be sure he 

remembered the location. On March 20, 2005, [Petitioner] and Bob 

discussed the marijuana with Burciaga. Bob asked [Petitioner] and 

Burciaga to steal the marijuana; they agreed. [Petitioner] claimed 

Burciaga "took care of it from there."

On March 21, 2005, [Petitioner], Burciaga, and Mendez were in the 

SUV with Rubianes. [Petitioner] acknowledged seeing the shotgun 

and pistol in the car. When they got to the Martin and Betts 

property, Burciaga and Mendez got out of the car. [Petitioner] was 

lying down on the back seat.

[Petitioner] heard a commotion and sat up. He saw Burciaga and 

Mendez walking Martin toward the house. [Petitioner] stepped out 

of the car. At this point, Betts came out of the house pointing a 

gun. [Petitioner] heard Martin saying, "no, no" to Betts.

[Petitioner,] Rubianes, Burciaga, and Mendez were charged with 

murder. The special circumstance that the murder was committed 

in the course of a robbery was alleged. It was also alleged the 

Burciaga personally and intentionally discharged a firearm; Mendez 

personally used a firearm; and as to [Petitioner] and Rubianes, a 

principal was armed with a firearm.

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The trial court severed the trials so that Burciaga and Rubianes 

were tried together and [Petitioner] and Mendez were tried together.

On April 8, 2008, the jury found [Petitioner] guilty of first degree 

murder and found true the special circumstance that he was a major 

participant and acted with reckless disregard for human life while 

committing a robbery. The jury also found true the special 

allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm.

A jury also convicted Mendez and Burciaga of murder and the

special circumstance and firearm allegation were found true as to 

both [sic]. Rubianes was acquitted.

[Petitioner] was sentenced to a term of life without possibility of 

parole.

People v. Castillo (F055493) (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2009), 

Lodged Doc. 8 at 1-4.

II. Procedural Background

A criminal complaint filed March 23, 2005, and amended March 24, 2005, charged 

Petitioner and three co-defendants with (1) murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)) and (2) robbery 

(Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)). On June 19, 2007, Petitioner moved to suppress the March 24, 

2005, statement he made to police after his arraignment but before the appointment of counsel to 

represent him (Petitioner's second statement). The district attorney conceded that Petitioner's 

second statement was inadmissible in the People's case in chief, and the trial court granted the 

motion on July 16, 2007.

Petitioner and co-defendant Mendez were tried before a jury on March 26 and 27, and 

April 1, 2, 3, and 8, 2008. On April 8, 2008, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the first degree 

murder of Theodore Betts (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)). The jury found true the special 

circumstances that (1) Petitioner was a major participant in the crime and acted with reckless 

indifference in the commission of robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)), and (2) Petitioner 

was armed with a firearm (shotgun (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(a)(1)). On June 3, 2008, the trial 

judge sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on June 10, 2008, contending that (1) the felony murder 

special circumstance should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to determine that 

Petitioner was a major participant in the attempted robbery and that he acted with reckless 

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indifference to life, and (2) defense counsel's concession that Petitioner was a major participant in 

the attempted robbery constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals denied

the appeal on June 29, 2009.

On August 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court, contending that (1) the felony murder special circumstance should be reversed because the 

evidence was insufficient to determine that Petitioner was a major participant in the attempted 

robbery and that he acted with reckless indifference to life, and (2) defense counsel's concession 

that Petitioner was a major participant in the attempted robbery constituted ineffective assistance 

of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on October 19, 2009.

On November 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Madera 

County Superior Court, contending that (1) Petitioner's confession was obtained without a valid 

waiver of his right to counsel and (2) the assistance of trial counsel was ineffective because (a) 

counsel conceded in his closing that Petitioner was a major participant in the attempted robbery 

and (b) counsel failed to seek exclusion of Petitioner's confession, which was obtained without 

Petitioner's waiver of his right to counsel. On July 23, 2010, the Superior Court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing at which Petitioner and his trial counsel, Randall Shrout, testified. The 

Superior Court denied the petition on September 17, 2010.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal on 

December 2, 2010. The Court of Appeals summarily denied the petition on December 14, 2010.

On June 30, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on January 25, 2012.

II. Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review 

of the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 

n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme 

malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a petitioner can prevail only if he can show that the 

state court's adjudication of his claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

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an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 413 (2000). "By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the 

merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the 

Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must 

then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state court contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court 

must apply the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the 

state court is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme 

Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

"A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that 

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' 

on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, the AEDPA standard is difficult to 

satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not demonstrate that the state court's 

determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

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III. No Waiver of Right to Counsel

Petitioner contends that he did not understand his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384

U.S. 436 (1966)) and never waived those rights before the questioning that led to his first 

statement to police. Respondent counters that the Superior Court reasonably determined that 

Petitioner nonverbally waived his right to counsel before he answered the questions of sheriff's 

officers.

A. Defendant's First Statement

The transcript of Petitioner's statement begins with Detective John Grayson reading 

Petitioner his Miranda rights and asking him whether he understood them. The transcript does 

not indicate that Petitioner replied. Grayson then stated, "Okay," and proceeded to question 

Petitioner, who responded.

Before the prosecutor played the recording of Petitioner's statement during trial, 

Grayson testified that before speaking with Petitioner following his arrest, he read Petitioner 

"his rights from a department-issued Miranda card," and asked Petitioner if he understood. 

Reporter's Transcript (April 1, 2008) at 2847. According to Grayson, Petitioner confirmed that 

he understood his rights. Reporter's Transcript (April 1, 2008) at 2847-48. 

In a declaration, Petitioner's appellate counsel, Sharon Wrubel, stated that she did not 

raise a Miranda issue on appeal because she was unable to establish that Petitioner did not 

nonverbally indicate his understanding of his rights.

At the evidentiary hearing before the Superior Court, Petitioner's counsel, Randall 

Shrout, testified that although he brought a successful motion to suppress Petitioner's second 

statement to sheriff's deputies, he did not move to suppress the first statement, explaining:

I don't think I did because in discussing with [Petitioner] all the 

statements and stuff, I believe we discussed the parameters of the 

statements and whether he said "yes" or "no" and why the verbal 

"yes" wasn't on the recording. I believe he told me that he nodded 

his head.

Reporter's transcript (July 23, 2010) at 9.

Shrout admitted that he lacked clear recollection of the interview, testifying that he had 

reviewed his records and did not have "specific notes of [Petitioner] saying that in the first 

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statement I did cooperate or said 'yes' to law enforcement." Reporter's Transcript (July 23, 2010) 

at 10. He added, however, that it would not have made sense to have brought a motion to 

suppress the second statement, but not to seek to suppress the first statement, unless he had 

information indicating that Petitioner had waived his right to counsel and proceeded voluntarily.

In his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner denied that he shook his head to 

indicate his understanding after Grayson read the Miranda warnings to Petitioner and asked 

whether he understood. Petitioner also testified that he never discussed his first statement with 

Shrout. He denied ever telling Shrout that he shook his head to indicate his understanding after 

Grayson read his Miranda rights. 

B. Superior Court's Denial of Habeas Petition

In its denial of the habeas petition, the Superior Court concluded that Petitioner's Miranda

rights were not violated in the course of his first statement:1

[Petitioner's] conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Fifth District 

Court of Appeal. (F055493) Sharon Wrubel, petitioner's attorney 

on appeal, did not raise the Miranda issue because she could not 

establish that petitioner did not give a non-verbal indication he 

understood his Miranda rights. (Declaration of Wrubel attached to 

petition). Detective Grayson testified at trial that petitioner 

understood his rights. (RT 326:15-327:4) Petitioner's statement 

was audio recorded, however, the transcript does not reflect that 

petitioner said he understood his rights. Mr. Shrout testified at the 

evidentiary hearing that he asked petitioner if he told Grayson he 

understood his rights. Shrout then testified that petitioner told him 

that he nodded yes to Grayson indicating that he understood his 

rights. At the hearing, petitioner denied nodding yes and denied 

that he told Shrout he had nodded yes. This court finds that Mr. 

Shrout was credible and that the petitioner was not credible. Mr. 

Shrout testified that had petitioner told him he had not nodded yes 

then he would have brought a motion to suppress the statement. But 

since petitioner told him he did nod yes then such a motion would 

not be proper. Mr. Shrout knew the two statements were 

detrimental to his client and since he was successful in excluding 

one of them then he would have sought to suppress the other 

statement if it was proper. Additionally, the interview between 

petitioner and Grayson suggested that petitioner nodded to Grayson 

indicating he understood his rights. Right after Grayson asked 

petitioner is he understood "all that[,"] Grayson said "okay" 

indicating that Grayson was acknowledging petitioner's nod that he 

understood his rights, Lastly, there was no indication from reading 

 

1 Because the California Court of Appeals and Supreme Court both summarily denied review of the state habeas 

petition, the Court must "look through" the summary denial to the last reasoned decision, which is, in this case, the 

opinion of the Madera County Superior Court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991).

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the transcript of the interview in its entirety that petitioner did not 

understand his rights or anything else covered by Grayson with 

petitioner in the interview.

Lodged Document 16: Order at 2 (September 17, 2010).

C. The State Court's Credibility Determination

The first question requires a factual determination: Did Petitioner indicate his 

understanding of Miranda rights by nodding his head or another nonverbal response. The state 

court resolved the factual dispute against Petitioner, finding "that Mr. Shrout was credible and 

that the petitioner was not credible." Lodged Document 16: Order at 2 (September 17, 2010). 

Although reasonable minds could disagree on the parties' relative credibility, on habeas review 

this Court may not substitute its own credibility assessment for that of the state court. See Rice 

v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 335 (2006). The Superior Court's decision was a reasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the trial record and the testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing. 

D. Waiver of Miranda Rights

Even if Petitioner did not nonverbally indicate his understanding of his Miranda rights, 

established federal law supports the conclusion that Petitioner waived his rights.

Pursuant to Miranda, a person in custody must be informed before interrogation that he 

has a right to remain silent and to have a lawyer present. 384 U.S. 436. The decision

formulated a warning to be given to all suspects before custodial interrogation. Berghuis v. 

Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380 (2010). The transcript of Petitioner's first statement reflects that 

Grayson read the Miranda warnings to Petitioner before speaking with him. Thus, as in 

Berghuis, the issue here is not whether Grayson provided a Miranda warning, but whether 

Petitioner's response (or lack of response) constituted a waiver of those rights.

"An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or the right 

to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either 

necessary or sufficient to establish waiver." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 

(1979). Miranda holds that "full comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an 

attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process." 

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Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986). Observing Miranda's requirements is not a matter 

of form, but of whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Id. 

This question is resolved based on "'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, 

including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" Id. at 374 (quoting 

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). "A defendant's silence, coupled with a 

understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," is sufficient basis to 

conclude that a defendant has waived his rights. Moran, 475 U.S. at 373. 

If a suspect intends to invoke his Miranda right to counsel, he must do so 

"unambiguously." Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 

459 (1994)). "If an accused makes a statement concerning the right to counsel "that is 

ambiguous or equivocal" or makes no statement, the police are not required to end the 

interrogation . . . or to ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or her 

Miranda rights. Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62). "[T]here is no principled reason to 

adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to 

remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel." Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 

concluded that "a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not 

invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement 

to the police." Id. at 388-89.

Considered as a whole, Petitioner's first statement includes nothing to suggest that 

Petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily participate in the colloquy. Petitioner willingly 

recounted the participants' plan to rob Betts and Martin of their sizable marijuana stash, his 

anticipation that violence would not be required because the "old men" were disabled and 

unlikely to resist the theft, his surprise when Betts and Martin confronted the co-defendants 

with armed force, and his running from the scene when the shooting began.

E. Conclusion

The Superior Court reasonably resolved this claim factually by finding that Petitioner 

nonverbally confirmed his understanding of his Miranda rights. Even if Petitioner did not 

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nonverbally indicate his understanding, the Superior Court’s conclusion that Petitioner waived 

his Miranda rights was reasonable under established federal law.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by Shrout's 

ineffective assistance, specifically his failure to ask Petitioner about his arrest and whether he 

ever indicated to deputies that he did not understand his rights. Although Respondent restates

his position that this claim is unexhausted, in light of the Court's prior determination that the 

claim was presented to the state courts (see Doc. 26), he contends that Strout's assistance was 

appropriate in light of his knowledge that Petitioner had nonverbally indicated his 

understanding of his Miranda rights.

A. Standard of Review

The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to ensure that the defendant 

receives a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). "[T]he right to 

counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 

771 n. 14 (1970). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate 

that his trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" at the 

time of trial and "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 688, 694. The Strickland

test requires Petitioner to establish two elements: (1) his attorney's representation was deficient 

and (2) prejudice. Both elements are mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 698.

These elements need not be considered in order. Id. at 697. "The object of an 

ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance." Id. If a court can resolve an 

ineffectiveness claim by finding a lack of prejudice, it need not consider whether counsel's 

performance was deficient. Id.

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B. State Opinion

In his direct appeal and in the habeas petition before the California Superior Court, 

Petitioner contended that Shrout’s ineffective assistance arose when he conceded in his closing 

argument that Petitioner was a major participant in the robbery. Petitioner does not raise the 

major participant issue, that his attorney conceded the issue, in his petition to this Court.

As previously discussed, the Madera County Superior Court rejected the factual basis 

for Petitioner’s argument, concluding that Strout’s testimony was the more credible. The 

California Supreme Court denied the petition for habeas corpus, citing People v. Duvall, 9 

Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995) (holding that the petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving 

adequate grounds for habeas relief). “If no prima facie case for relief is cited, the court will 

summarily deny the petition.” Id. at 475. As a result, the California Supreme Court left 

undisturbed the Superior Court’s determination that Strout’s testimony that he had to have 

discussed the first statement was more credible than Petitioner’s contrary testimony.

C. No Deficient Performance

The state courts reasonably concluded that the ineffective assistance claim could not 

prevail in light of the Superior Court’s finding that Shrout’s testimony was more credible than 

Petitioner’s testimony. Although Shrout conceded that his notes neither supported nor 

disproved his recollection that Petitioner told him that he had nodded affirmatively to his 

understanding of his rights, Shrout reasoned that his memory must have been accurate since he 

brought a successful motion to suppress Petitioner’s second statement to deputies but did not 

move to suppress Petitioner’s first statement. A state court could reasonably have concluded 

that Strout’s declining to bring a motion to suppress the first statement under these circumstance 

would have been consistent with California Rules of Professional Conduct §§ 5-200, 5-200A, & 

5-200B, requiring counsel to employ only such means as are consistent with the truth and 

precluding counsel from misleading the court through artifice or false statements.

D. No Proof of Prejudice

In any event, because the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is intended to ensure 

the reliability of the trial's outcome, "an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, 

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does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect 

on the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. Merely showing that counsel's error had 

some conceivable effect on the outcome is insufficient: A petitioner must establish a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

differed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Even if Petitioner’s confession to participation in the planned robbery had been 

suppressed, the evidence against Petitioner and the two other gunmen in the robbery that led to 

Betts’ murder was overwhelming. Despite defense attempts to use the drug charges against 

Martin to impeach his credibility, Martin, an eyewitness, testified to the facts of the defendants’ 

attempt to rob him and Betts that led to Betts’ death. Sheriff’s deputies testified that they

apprehended Petitioner and two other participants on roads in the vicinity of the murder, and 

recovered the abandoned weapons on a path leading from Betts’ and Martin’s ranch. The three 

male participants offered similar accounts of the planned robbery with the exception of which 

of them shot Betts.

2

 Because the conviction was for felony murder, the participant’s differing 

accounts of who actually fired the fatal shotgun blast were immaterial to Petitioner’s guilt as a 

major participant in the robbery.

E. Conclusion

The California Supreme Court reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.

V. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue 

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 

2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to 

review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which 

the proceeding is held.

 

2 Rubianes, the get-away driver, was a juvenile on the date of the crime. The nature of her statement, if any, was not 

readily apparent from the record.

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(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a 

proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another 

district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a 

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of 

such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals 

from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which 

 (A) the detention complained of arises out of process 

issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph 

(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required 

by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims 

or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate 

"something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . 

part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's 

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or 

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

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VI. Recommendation

The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the Petition for writ of habeas corpus 

with prejudice and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C ' 636(b)(1). Within thirty 

(30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, either party may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate 

Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections, if any, shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may constitute waiver of the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 ((9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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