Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01561/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01561-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANGELA MARIE SNYDER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:14-cv-01561-SGC

)

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, )

COMMISSIONER, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff, Angela Marie Snyder, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Ms. Snyder timely 

pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe 

for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to 

magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 10). 

I. FACTS, FRAMEWORK, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Snyder was born in 1985 and has a high school education. (R. 20, 109). Her past 

work experience includes employment as a cashier, waitress, stock clerk, and fast food worker. 

(R. 135). Ms. Snyder alleged she became unable to work on December 13, 2010, due to severe 

back problems, bi-polar disorder, and diabetes. (R. 111, 401).

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the regulations 

prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; 

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a determination 

of whether the claimant is performing “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

FILED

 2015 Sep-15 PM 02:24

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 1 of 10
2

404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he or she is not 

disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity, the Commissioner proceeds to consider the combined effects of all the claimant's 

physical and mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These 

impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be 

found disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. 

Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments are not severe, the 

analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis 

continues to step three, at which the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s 

impairments meet the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ pt. 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairments fall within 

this category, the claimant will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If the 

impairments do not fall within the listings, the Commissioner determines the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). 

At step four the Commissioner determines whether the impairments prevent the claimant 

from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the 

claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation 

stops. Id. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth 

step, at which the Commissioner considers the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age, 

education, and past work experience to determine whether he or she can perform other work. 

Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, he or 

she is not disabled. Id. 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 2 of 10
3

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found

Ms. Snyder had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her 

disability. (R. 15). At step two, the ALJ found Ms. Snyder's degenerative disc disease 

constituted a severe impairment. (Id.). However, the ALJ found Ms. Snyder's other claimed 

ailments were not severe because: (1) her diabetes mellitus was well-controlled; and (2) her

medically determinable impairment of depression did not cause more than minimal limitation in 

her ability to work. (Id. at 15-16). 

At step three, the ALJ found Ms. Snyder did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments meeting or medically equal to any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 17). Specifically, the ALJ determined Ms. Snyder failed to satisfy 

the listing requirements for disorders of the spine. (Id.). 

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined Ms. Snyder retained the RFC to

perform sedentary work with the following restrictions: (1) only occasional stooping, kneeling, 

crouching, crawling, and climbing ramps and/or stairs; (2) no more than frequent overhead 

reaching with her left arm; (3) never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and (4) no exposure to 

unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. (R. 17). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ 

considered Ms. Snyder's symptoms, the medical record, and opinion evidence. (Id.). Regarding 

opinion evidence, the ALJ assigned no weight to the opinion of the state agency single decision 

maker, who opined that Ms. Snyder could perform limited medium work. (R. 19). The ALJ 

assigned "some weight" to the opinion of Ms. Snyder's treating physician, Dr. Leigh Copeland, 

which imposed severe limitations on Ms. Snyder's ability to perform even sedentary work. (Id.). 

The ALJ concluded that, while Ms. Snyder's medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause some of the symptoms alleged, her testimony concerning the 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 3 of 10
4

severity, persistence, and effects of these symptoms was not credible in light of the medical 

record. (Id. at 18).

At step four, the ALJ determined Ms. Snyder was unable to perform her past relevant 

work. (R. 19-20). At step five, the ALJ noted Ms. Snyder was a "younger individual" as defined 

in the regulations and had at least a high school education. (Id. at 20). The ALJ also found 

transferability of job skills was not an issue and concluded that, even though Ms. Snyder could 

not perform the full range of sedentary work, she was capable of performing jobs in the national 

economy, including ticket checker, charge account clerk, and telephone clerk. (Id. at 20-21). In 

reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert regarding the 

effect of the limitations imposed by Ms. Snyder's RFC. (Id.). The ALJ concluded by finding

Ms. Snyder “[was] not under a ‘disability,’ as defined in the Social Security Act” since the 

alleged onset date. (R. 21).

Ms. Snyder appealed to this court on August 11, 2014. (Doc. 1). Ms. Snyder filed a brief 

in support of her appeal (Doc. 9), and the Commissioner responded (Doc. 12). All deadlines for 

submitting briefs have passed, and this matter is ripe for adjudication.

II. Standard of Review

The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow 

one. The scope of review is limited to determining: (1) whether there is substantial evidence in 

the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner; and (2) whether the correct 

legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson 

v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of 

the Commissioner with deference but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. 

Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 4 of 10
5

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The substantial evidence standard 

permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of 

drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative 

agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 

1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 

U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if the court finds the evidence preponderates against the 

Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential standard 

[for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to 

determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 

(11tj Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. 

See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984). 

III. Discussion

Ms. Snyder argues the ALJ’s decision should be reversed for two reasons. First, Ms. 

Snyder contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr. Copeland’s medical opinion regarding 

the effects of her impairments. (See Doc. 9 at 7-10). Next, Ms. Snyder argues the ALJ did not 

properly apply the standard used to evaluate claims of disability based on pain. (See id. at 10-

15). Each argument is addressed in turn.

A. Dr. Copeland’s Medical Opinion

The weight to be afforded a medical opinion regarding the nature and severity of a 

claimant’s impairments depends upon the examining and treating relationship between the 

medical source and the claimant, the evidence the medical source presents to support the opinion, 

the opinion's consistency with the record as a whole, the specialty of the medical source, and 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 5 of 10
6

other factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Generally, greater weight is given to 

the opinions of treating sources than the opinions of one-time examiners. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 

1161 (11th Cir. 2004). More weight is also given to an opinion that is well supported and 

explained. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3). Additionally, more deference is 

given to an opinion that is consistent with the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). Finally, the opinion of an examining physician is subject to 

heavy skepticism when it is based primarily on the plaintiff’s subjective complaints but is

unsupported by the medical evidence. Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159-60. 

A treating physician’s testimony receives “substantial or considerable weight unless 

‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 

125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, “good cause” 

exists for an ALJ to not give a treating physician’s opinion substantial weight when the: “(1) 

treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary 

finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own 

medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 

F.3d at 1440); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 

“good cause” existed where the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the physician’s 

own record).

Underpinning all of the considerations mentioned above is the fact that opinions such as 

whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the application of 

vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to 

the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 6 of 10
7

would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). 

It is the ALJ's responsibility to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See, e.g., 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).

On June 2, 2011, Dr. Copeland completed a Physical Capacities Exam ("PCE"), opining 

Ms. Snyder could: (1) lift and/or carry five pounds occasionally; (2) sit for thirty minutes in an 

eight hour day; (3) stand for thirty minutes in an eight hour day; (4) never perform pushing or 

pulling movements; (5) never perform gross manipulation; (6) never bend, stoop, or reach; and 

(7) never be exposed to dust, allergens, fumes, or hazardous machinery. (R. 361). Dr. Copeland 

further opined: (1) Ms. Snyder's pain was intractable and virtually incapacitating; (2) increased 

physical activity would cause an increase of pain and necessitate bedrest and/or medication; and 

(3) side-effects from drugs used to treat Ms. Snyder's symptoms would be severe. (Id. at 362-

63). 

In addition to completing the PCE, Dr. Copeland also examined Ms. Snyder on June 2, 

2011. Dr. Copeland diagnosed Ms. Snyder with chronic lower back pain, degenerative disc 

disease, and depression. (R. 401). Dr. Copeland advised Ms. Snyder not to return to work due 

to her back pain. (Id.). An August 2012 MRI revealed a broad-based annular bulge with a 

central annular tear at L3-4 and postoperative findings at L4-5 with fluid collection around the

laminotomy defect. (R. 430). Dr. Copeland diagnosed Plaintiff with a bulging lumbar disc and 

back pain. (Id. at 424).

As previously noted, the ALJ afforded Dr. Copeland's opinion "some weight," rather than 

the substantial weight typically afforded the opinion of a treating physician. In doing so, the ALJ 

noted inconsistencies between Dr. Copeland's opinion and the medical record. (R. 19). 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Copeland's PCE imposed restrictions more severe than those 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 7 of 10
8

Ms. Snyder self-reported. (Id.). Additionally, while the ALJ acknowledged imaging showing a 

pathological component to Ms. Snyder's back pain, he concluded Dr. Copeland's opinion was 

overly reliant on Ms. Snyder's subjective complaints, given the "fairly mild" abnormalities 

revealed by the images. (Id.). In light of the inconsistencies noted by the ALJ and the standard 

applicable to this appeal, the undersigned concludes the ALJ had good cause to discount Dr. 

Copeland's opinion. Accordingly, the ALJ's assignation of less than controlling weight to Dr. 

Copeland's opinion does not warrant reversal.

B. Ms. Snyder’s Allegations of Pain

Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints of pain. 

Specifically, Ms. Snyder alleges that "the ALJ’s decision is contrary to Supreme Court and 

Eleventh Circuit case law [because it fails] to properly consider evidence of record establishing a 

disabling impairment." (Doc. 9 at 14). Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may 

establish the presence of a disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See 

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish disability based upon pain 

and other subjective symptoms, "[t]he pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying 

medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the 

alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition 

is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain." Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 

(11th Cir. 1991)); see also Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).

An ALJ may discredit a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms if he 

articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 

(11th Cir. 2002); see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (1996) ("[T]he adjudicator 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 8 of 10
9

must carefully consider the individual’s statements about symptoms with the rest of the relevant 

evidence in the case record in reaching a conclusion about the credibility of the individual’s 

statements."). Although the Eleventh Circuit does not require explicit findings as to credibility, 

"the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court." Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quoting 

Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). "[P]articular phrases or formulations" are not required, but the ALJ's 

credibility determination cannot be a "broad rejection which is not enough to enable the district 

court or this Court to conclude that the ALJ considered her medical condition as a whole." Id. 

(internal quotations and punctuation omitted).

Ms. Snyder’s degenerative disc disease satisfies the "underlying medical condition"

requirement of the pain standard. However, after reviewing the evidence, the ALJ determined 

Ms. Snyder’s subjective complaints of pain were not entirely credible and were unsupported by 

the objective medical record. (R. 19). In particular, the ALJ found Ms. Snyder's conservative 

course of treatment for back pain undermined her testimony that she is essentially bed-ridden. 

(Id.). Additionally, the ALJ noted Ms. Snyder's medication regimen was at least somewhat 

effective in controlling her pain. (Id.). Finally, the ALJ found that the severity of pain described 

by Ms. Snyder was not supported by objective medical evidence, which showed a relatively nonadvanced pathology. (Id.). 

“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 

at 1212. If the ALJ “articulate[s] explicit and adequate reasons” for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

testimony, he does not have to accept its accuracy. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 

(11th Cir. 1991). Here, the ALJ satisfactorily explained why Ms. Snyder's complaints of pain 

were not entirely credible. This court can reverse such credibility determinations only when

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s position or when the ALJ applied incorrect legal 

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 9 of 10
10

standards. Neither case is present here, and the ALJ's application of the pain standard does not 

warrant reversal.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Snyder’s arguments, 

the court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accord 

with the applicable law. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.

A separate order will be entered.

DONE this 15th day of September, 2015.

 ______________________________

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-01561-SGC Document 14 Filed 09/15/15 Page 10 of 10