Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03757/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03757-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAN A. MAYEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA N.A., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03757-JST 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

Re: ECF Nos. 6, 12

Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Shoreline Assets Group and 

WCAL 3, LLC, and the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and Green Tree 

Mortgage. ECF Nos. 6, 12. Plaintiff has not opposed the motions. See ECF No. 10. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court will grant both motions.

I. BACKGROUND1

In November 2000, Plaintiff acquired an interest in a residential property located at 230 

Pacific Avenue, Redwood City, CA 94043 (“the Property”).2 ECF No. 12 at 2. To purchase the 

 

1 Because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege specific facts underlying his claims, this section is 

constructed from Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

2 Defendants have filed requests for judicial notice of several documents: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint 

for unlawful detainer in the San Mateo County Superior Court, (2) grant deeds recorded in the San 

Mateo County Recorder’s Office, (3) a copy of recorded deeds of trust for Plaintiff’s loans on the 

Property, (4) a copy of the January 20, 2014 Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of 

Trust and the accompanying Notice of Default Declaration, which were both recorded in the San 

Mateo County Recorder’s Office, (5) copies of Notices of Trustees’ Sales relating to the Property 

and recorded in the San Mateo County Recorder’s Office, and (6) a copy of the Trustee’s Deed 

Upon Sale, which was recorded in the San Mateo County Recorder’s Office. ECF Nos. 8, 13. 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of matters that are “not 

subject to reasonable dispute” and “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 

accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.” The Court will take judicial notice of these 

documents, as they are all matters of public record, which are generally subject to notice. Lee v. 

City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

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Property, Plaintiff obtained a $252,700 loan from Downey Savings & Loan Association, which 

was secured by a deed of trust. Id. Plaintiff subsequently refinanced the home five times, 

receiving loans from First Nationwide Mortgage Corporation, Chevy Chase Savings, and Bank of 

America. Id. After receiving the fifth refinancing loan from Defendant Bank of America, Plaintiff 

failed to make required payments on the loan. Id. In January 2014, a notice of Plaintiff’s default 

was issued and recorded, in the amount of $63,871.10. Id. Plaintiff failed to cure the default, and 

the Property was foreclosed on. Id. at 2-3.

The Property was then sold to Shoreline Assets Group, with the Deed Upon Sale recorded 

August 18, 2014. Id. at 3; ECF No. 6 at 7. Shoreline then conveyed a 50% interest in the Property 

to WCAL 3, LLC. ECF No. 6 at 7. On August 21, 2014, Shoreline filed an unlawful detainer 

action against Plaintiff to recover possession of the Property. Id.; ECF No. 8, Ex. A. 

Plaintiff filed his complaint pro se, alleging nine causes of action. ECF No. 1 at 1. His

claims are: (1) lack of standing to foreclose; (2) fraud in the concealment; (3) fraud in the 

inducement; (4) slander of title; (5) quiet title; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”); (7) declaratory relief; (8) violation of California Civil Code § 2932.5 (“§ 2932.5”); and 

(9) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. (“§ 17200”). Id. 

Plaintiff names as Defendants Bank of America, Fannie Mae, Green Tree Mortgage, Shoreline 

Assets Group, and “all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or 

interest in the property.” 3 Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court must grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if a complaint fails to provide 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Facial plausibility exists when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. The Court must accept as true both the material facts alleged in the complaint and 

 

3

The complaint also refers to “Defendant MERS,” which is not a named defendant. The 

complaint also refers to New York law in several places. See, e.g., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 52-54. The 

Court advises Plaintiff to select more carefully the content of any amended complaint he files. 

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all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 

Cir. 2001). But “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements” and “mere conclusory 

statements” are insufficient to provide the requisite factual basis for a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient 

facts to support a legal theory can provide a basis for dismissal. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990).

A court must construe the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs liberally, but it may not provide 

essential factual elements that have not been alleged. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982). The court “must provide the pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies of his 

or his complaint and an opportunity to amend the complaint prior to dismissal.” McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, a court should grant such leave to amend 

unless amendment would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. JURISDICTION

This Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action as a result of Defendant Fannie 

Mae’s presence in the action. Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 769 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2014).

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss all nine of Plaintiff’s causes of action. 

A. Lack of Standing

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants lacked standing to foreclose on the Property because they 

“failed to perfect any security interest in the property,” and thus that “the purported power of sale 

by” Defendants “no longer applies.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 49. Further, Plaintiff alleges that “the only 

individual who has standing to foreclose is the holder of the note because they have a beneficial 

interest.” Id. ¶ 50.

Shoreline and WCAL argue they have standing and a beneficial interest in the Property 

because, as bona fide purchasers, they are entitled to a conclusive presumption under California 

law that their title to the Property is valid. ECF No. 6 at 9-10 (citing Shiavon v. Arnaudo Bros., 84 

Cal. App. 4th 374 (2001)). Fannie Mae and Green Tree contend that Plaintiff’s theory regarding 

lack of standing fails because, under California law, foreclosure proceedings can be initiated 

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without the production of the original note. ECF No. 12 at 6 (citing Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. 

Funding, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and Dubose v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 

No. 5:11-CV-03264 EJD, 2012 WL 1376983 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012). And further, California 

does not recognize a cause of action for “lack of standing.” ECF No. 12 at 7-8. Defendants are 

correct. 

As to Shoreline and WCAL’s purported failure to perfect their interest in the Property, the 

Court finds that Shiavon precludes Plaintiff’s claims. Bona fide purchasers who take property as a 

result of a reconveyance are entitled to a presumption of valid title, so long as the reconveyance 

was voidable and not void. Schiavon, 84 Cal. App. 4th at 378. 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts or law that, if proven, would render Shoreline and 

WCAL’s title void; rather, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the deed of trust was “void or voidable,” 

that “any documents that purport to transfer any interest in the Note . . . are void as a matter of 

law, pursuant to New York trust law and the relevant portions of the PSA,” and that “[a]ny attempt 

to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without actual ownership of the underlying note, is 

void under law.” ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 13(e), 34, 62. All of these bases for asserting that the deed of 

trust is void fail. 

The first statement does not establish that the deed of trust is void, only that it might be. 

The second statement is irrelevant, because New York law is inapplicable and the alleged “PSA” 

is an agreement to which Plaintiff has not alleged she was a party or beneficiary. See Subramani 

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 13-1605 SC, 2013 WL 5913789, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 

2013) (“To the extent Plaintiff relies on violations of the PSA or any other agreements among the 

parties, Plaintiff’s claim fails. As this Court has often explained, plaintiffs who are not parties to 

PSAs lack standing to challenge that aspect of the securitization process’s validity.”); Jenkins v. 

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 216 Cal. App. 4th 497, 515 (2013) (same). Finally, as discussed 

more fully below, the lack of physical possession of a note does not void a sale. Thus, the Court 

presumes the validity of Shoreline and WCAL’s title to the Property.

With respect to Defendants’ alleged lack of a physical note, California law does not require 

a trustee to have possession of the physical note before initiating foreclosure proceedings. Hafiz, 

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652 F. Supp. 2d at 1043; Dubose, 2012 WL 1376983, at *3 (citing cases); Avila v. Countrywide 

Home Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-05485 LHK, 2011 WL 1192999, *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011) 

(citing cases). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff intends to challenge the foreclosure based on the 

trustee’s failure to produce a physical note, his claim does not state a cause of action upon which 

relief can be granted. Id.

More fundamentally, Plaintiff’s cause of action for “lack of standing” is not cognizable. 

Plaintiff attempted to allege Defendants’ lack of standing based on the theories discussed 

immediately above—i.e., no physical possession of a note, and violation of a PSA—but because 

neither of those claims are viable, his attempt to allege a standalone claim for “lack of standing” 

also fails. And because “lack of standing” is not a viable claim, and therefore any attempt by 

Plaintiff to amend his complaint to fix the deficiencies in his allegations in support of the claim 

would be futile, the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128.

B. Fraud in the Concealment and in the Inducement

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s fraud claims on the ground that they do not meet the 

heightened pleading standard for fraud imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF 

Nos. 6 at 10-11, 12 at 8-10.

Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a Plaintiff alleging fraud must 

“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake including the who, what, 

when, where, and how of the misconduct charged. In addition, the plaintiff must set forth what is 

false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Avila, 2011 WL 1192999, at *3 (citing 

Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff’s fraud allegations either rest on theories the Court has already rejected or do not 

meet the heightened fraud pleading standard provided in Rule 9(b). Plaintiff claims that 

Defendants were not owners of “the Note” and the beneficiaries of the deed of trust, and that he 

detrimentally relied on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations about the terms of “Securitization 

Agreements.” ECF No. 1 at 19-20. These allegations repeat those challenging Defendants’ lack 

of a physical note and appear to rely on the PSA mentioned earlier in the complaint. As to the 

former, the Court has already rejected any legal challenge based on Defendants’ alleged lack of a 

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physical note; the lack of physical possession of the note does not constitute fraudulent behavior. 

And as to the latter, Plaintiff has mentioned a PSA, but has not provided any specifics as to the 

PSA or that he was a party to or beneficiary of the PSA. Nor has Plaintiff made clear whether the 

purported “Securitization Agreements” are the same as the PSA he challenges throughout his

complaint. Plaintiff’s general and conclusory statements regarding “Securitization Agreements” 

fail, at the very least, to demonstrate the “who,” “what,” and “how” of his fraud claims. Plaintiff 

has failed to meet the pleading standard for his fraud claims, which must therefore be dismissed.

C. IIED

Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions were “outrageous and extreme” and those actions 

caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 75-85. Defendants argue this cause of 

action must fail because Plaintiff has failed to identify any extreme or outrageous conduct on 

Defendants’ part (because the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the Property were legally valid). 

ECF Nos. 6 at 12, 12 at 10-11.

An IIED claim requires the following elements under California law: (1) extreme and 

outrageous conduct by defendants with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by defendants’ 

outrageous conduct. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1989). Outrageous 

conduct must be ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized 

community.’” Avila, 2011 WL 1192999, at *6 (citing Davidson). As was the case in Avila, 

“[n]one of Defendant[s’] acts, as alleged by Plaintiff, qualify as outrageous.” Id. Plaintiff has not 

alleged facts sufficient to survive the motions to dismiss his IIED claim. 

D. Slander of Title

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “disparaged Plaintiff’s exclusive valid title by and through 

the preparing, posting, publishing, and recording of the documents previously described herein, 

including, but not limited to, the Notice of Default, Notice of Trustee’s Sale, and Trustee’s Deed.” 

ECF No. 1, ¶ 87. Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants knew or should have known that such 

documents were improper in that at the time of the execution and delivery of said documents, 

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Defendants had no right, title, or interest in the Property” and that “as a direct and proximate result 

of Defendants’ conduct,” Plaintiff’s title to the Property was disparaged and slandered and he has 

suffered, and continues to suffer, damages and emotional and physical distress, and to incur 

expenses as a result. Id. ¶¶ 88-91. Finally, Plaintiff contends that, at the time Defendants engaged 

in the slanderous course of action, “Defendants knew the documents were false and created and 

published them with the malicious intent to injure Plaintiff and deprive them [sic] of their 

exclusive right, title, and interest in the Property . . . .” Id. ¶ 92. 

Fannie Mae and Green Tree counter that this claim must fail for two reasons: (1) a slander 

of title claim requires falsity, but there is “nothing false about the title documents recorded”; and 

(2) “recorded documents pursuant to nonjudicial foreclosure are absolutely privileged acts on 

which no tort claims of any sort, other than malicious prosecution, may be based.” ECF No. 12 at 

11-12. Shoreline and WCAL argue that Plaintiff made no specific allegation as to Shoreline and 

WCAL and that “Defendants had justification to record the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, as they 

acquired the property at public auction on August 5, 2014.” ECF No. 6 at 13.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for slander of title, as alleged, fails as a matter of law. 

Slander of title includes the following elements: (1) a publication, (2) that is false, and (3) without 

privilege or justification, and (4) that causes direct or pecuniary loss. Dubose, 2012 WL 1376983, 

at *3 (citing Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 1040, 1051 

(2009)). Plaintiff only alleges the falsity of documents premised on the faulty theories discussed 

in Section IV.A., supra. Because those theories are not viable, Plaintiff’s allegations of falsity fail, 

and so too does his claim for slander of title founded on those alleged falsities.

Further, the Court finds that the documents on which the slander of title claim is premised 

are privileged communications and for that reason are not actionable. See Dubose, 2012 WL 

1376983, at *3 (citing cases and Cal. Civ. Code §§ 47, 2924(d)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s slander of 

title claim is dismissed.

E. Quiet Title

Plaintiff asks the Court to grant him “equitable relief in the form of a judicial decree and 

order declaring Plaintiff to be the title owner of record of the Property as to the effective date of 

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said cancellation, and quieting Plaintiff’s title therein and thereto . . . .” ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 95. Under 

California law, however, “a borrower may not assert quiet title . . . without first paying the 

outstanding debt on the property.” Avila, 2011 WL 1192999, at *6 (citing Miller v. Provost, 26 

Cal. App. 4th 1703, 1707 (1994)); see also Lopez v. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, No. 10cv978 BTM (BGS), 

2010 WL 3463622, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (“[I]f the plaintiff has mortgaged the property, 

he must discharge the debt before a court will quiet title.”) (citing Miller). As was the case in 

Avila, “Plaintiff has not alleged that he has paid the outstanding debt on the Property, or can do 

so.” 2011 WL 1192999, at *6. Plaintiff’s quiet title claims against Defendants must therefore be 

dismissed.

F. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff alleges a claim for “declaratory relief.” ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 97-104. Defendants argue 

that declaratory relief is not a cause of action, but instead a form of equitable relief that must be 

premised on a separate, standalone cause of action. ECF Nos. 6 at 14-15, 12 at 13. Because 

Plaintiff’s other claims are not viable, Defendants argue, his request for declaratory relief must 

also fail. Id. 

The Court agrees that declaratory relief is not a standalone claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 

2202; Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The Declaratory Judgment Act does not 

provide an independent jurisdictional basis for suits in federal court. . . . It only permits the 

district court to adopt a specific remedy when jurisdiction exists.”) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. 

Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-74 (1950)). The Court also agrees that, because 

Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed in its entirety, no viable causes of action remain to support 

Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief. Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim must be dismissed.

G. Violation of § 2932.5

Plaintiff alleges that § 2932.5 “requires the recordation of an assignment of the beneficial 

interest in a deed of trust prior to foreclosure,” and that Defendants “cannot show valid and 

recorded assignments.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 107. Defendants respond that § 2932.5 is inapplicable 

because that section “applies only to mortgages under which a power of sale is given to the 

creditor, not to a deed of trust [that] grants the trustee, not the creditor, the power of sale.” ECF 

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Nos. 6 at 15-16, 12 at 13-14. 

Defendants are correct. Section 2932.5 applies only to mortgages, not foreclosures 

wherein a deed of trust grants a trustee the power of sale. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2932.5 (“Where a 

power to sell real property is given to a mortgagee . . . .”); Roque v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. C09-00040 RMW, 2010 WL 546896, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Section 2932.5 applies to mortgages, 

not deeds of trust. It applies only to mortgages that give a power of sale to the creditor, not to 

deeds of trust which grant a power of sale to the trustee.”). Because the non-judicial foreclosure 

Plaintiff challenges here involved a sale by a trustee under a deed of trust, and not to a mortgage 

that gave a power of sale to a creditor, Plaintiff’s § 2932.5 claim fails as a matter of law and 

cannot be remedied. It will be dismissed with prejudice.

H. Violation of § 17200 et seq.

Plaintiff alleges no substantive allegations under § 17200 et seq., California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”). Instead, the totality of Plaintiff’s UCL allegations is: “Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.” 

ECF No. 1, ¶ 110. Plaintiff provides no facts in support of this allegation. This is something less 

than even the “conclusory” and “threadbare” pleadings that are subject to dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Moreover, UCL claims must rest on an 

underlying violation of law. Rosal v. First Fed. Bank of Cal., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. 

Cal. 2009) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Avila, 2011 WL 1192999, at *6. Because none of 

Plaintiff’s other causes of action are viable, Plaintiff has not pled an adequate UCL claim. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s lack of standing, declaratory relief, and § 2932.5 causes of action are dismissed 

with prejudice. Plaintiff may not amend his complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies of those 

claims because doing so would be futile. Plaintiff may request declaratory relief based on 

standalone causes of action alleged in any amended complaint he files.

Plaintiff’s fraud, IIED, quiet title, UCL, and slander of title causes of action are dismissed 

without prejudice. Plaintiff may amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies of those claims 

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identified in this order. To the extent Plaintiff re-alleges any of these causes of action, he may not 

premise the claims on the theory that Defendants lacked physical possession of the note, nor may 

he premise his claims on a PSA, unless he alleges the existence of the PSA, the parties to the PSA, 

and that he is a party to and/or beneficiary under the PSA. 

Plaintiff may not amend his complaint to add further causes of action. If Plaintiff chooses 

to amend his complaint, he must do so within thirty days of the date of this order. If Plaintiff does 

not amend his complaint, it will be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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