Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00571/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00571-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dana Quednau, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

State of Arizona dba Arizona Department 

of Economic Security; Nina Ferrer in her 

capacity as Professional Standards 

Management and in her personal capacity; 

Sally Reyes in her capacity as Regional 

Program Manager and in her personal 

capacity, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-571-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant State of Arizona’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment on Plaintiff Dana Quednau’s claims. (Doc. 31.) For the reasons discussed 

below, the Court grants the Motion. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Dana Quednau claims that her former employer, Defendant State of 

Arizona, retaliated against her after she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 

In November 2010, Quednau was hired by the Arizona Department of Economic Security 

(the “DES”) in the Coolidge office of the Agency’s Division of Benefit and Medical 

Eligibility (the “DBME”) as a Program Services Evaluator I. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 1; Doc. 

36, PSOF ¶ 1.) As a new employee, Quednau began her tenure on probation and spent 

much of her first five months on the job in training. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶¶ 2–3; Doc. 36, 

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PSOF ¶¶ 2–3.) 

 In April 2011, Quednau learned that co-worker Antoinette Mercado had made 

comments regarding Quednau’s drinking and had implied that Quednau was an alcoholic. 

(Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 5; Doc. 36, PSOF ¶ 5.) Quednau submitted a report accusing Mercado 

of slander, hazing, harassment, and workplace bullying. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 6; Doc. 36, 

PSOF ¶ 6.) Quednau’s report further alleged that Mercado drove recklessly and used 

sexual slurs in the workplace. (Doc. 37, Ex. 3.) 

 On April 25, 2011, Nina Ferrer, Professional Standards Manager for the Central 

Region, went to the Coolidge office to investigate Quednau’s report. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 7; 

Doc. 36, PSOF ¶ 7.) Ferrer asked Quednau to meet with Mercado to try to resolve the 

situation, but the Parties dispute whether Quednau refused to do so or stated that she did 

not want to do so. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 9; Doc. 36, PSOF ¶ 9.) On April 26, 2011, Ferrer 

and Sally Reyes, Regional Program Manager, met with Quednau and Mercado. (Doc. 31, 

DSOF ¶¶ 10–12; Doc. 36, PSOF ¶¶ 10–12.) 

 In response to Quednau’s alleged unprofessional behavior during the April 26 

meeting, Ferrer prepared and submitted a recommendation to DES-DBME Human 

Resources (“HR”) for Quednau’s dismissal. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 13; Doc. 36, PSOF ¶ 13.) 

HR received this recommendation and supporting documents on April 27, 2011. (Doc. 

31, DSOF ¶ 14; Doc. 36, PSOF ¶ 14.) On May 11, 2011, HR forwarded Ferrer’s 

recommendation to Assistant Director Leona Hodges, the employee responsible for 

making determinations regarding the termination, promotion, and suspension of DESDBME employees. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶¶ 15-16; Doc. 36, PSOF ¶¶ 15-16.) 

 Quednau contacted her EEO liaison after the April 26 meeting and contacted EEO 

Administrator Morris Greenridge on May 4. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ PSOF 23, 24, 26, 27.) 

Greenridge informed Human Resources Manager Kathy Montaño of Quednau’s 

complaints and Montaño told Greenridge that she would direct Mercado to cease using 

sexual slurs and review the DES sexual harassment policy. (Doc. 36, ¶¶ PSOF 29–30.) 

 Quednau received a noticeable workload increase during the time that she was 

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writing her April 2011 report and soliciting witness statements for that report. (Doc. 36, 

PSOF ¶¶ 5–6, 11, 32, 38.) In response to the increased workload, Quednau filed a charge 

with the EEOC on May 12, 2011, alleging a sexually hostile work environment and 

retaliation for reporting that conduct. (Doc. 36, PSOF ¶ 39.) 

 After receiving Ferrer’s recommendation for Quednau’s termination on May 11, 

Assistant Director Hodges reviewed the documentation and discussed the matter with 

Human Resources Manager Kathy Montaño and Regional Manager Sally Reyes. (Doc. 

31, DSOF ¶¶ 15, 18, 19; Doc. 36, PSOF ¶¶ 15, 18, 19.) 

 The State asserts that Hodges decided to terminate Quednau because her behavior 

was unprofessional and undermined efforts to improve relations in the Coolidge office. 

(Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 19.) Quednau was terminated on May 25, 2011. (Doc. 31, DSOF ¶ 22; 

Doc. 36, PSOF ¶ 22.) 

 Quednau filed the present suit against the State, Ferrer in her official capacity, and 

Reyes in her official capacity. (Doc. 1.) Quednau claimed that Ferrer and Reyes had 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 36–40.) The Parties stipulated to the dismissal of 

Quednau’s claims against Ferrer and Reyes. (Doc. 19.) 

 Remaining are Quednau’s retaliation claims against the State under both Section 

704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and 

analogous provisions of the Arizona Civil Rights Act (the “ACRA”), A.R.S. § 41-

1464(A) . (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 31–35, 41–45.) Quednau alleges that the State retaliated against 

her by increasing her workload and terminating her because she filed an EEOC charge. 

(Doc 1, ¶¶ 35, 45.) The State moves for Summary Judgment on these remaining claims. 

(Doc. 31.) 

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARD

 Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

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P. 56(a). Substantive law determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over 

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the nonmoving 

party must show that the genuine factual issues “‘can be resolved only by a finder of fact 

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” Cal. Architectural 

Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). 

 Because “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the 

drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . 

. [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 

drawn in his favor” at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 

1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of credibility, including questions of intent, should be 

left to the jury.”) (citations omitted). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Quednau must prove her claim of retaliation by showing facts that demonstrate 

that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) her employer subjected her 

to a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the 

protected activity and the adverse action. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 

634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 As to Quednau’s ACRA retaliation claim, the Act is “generally identical to Title 

VII, and therefore federal Title VII case law is persuasive in the interpretation of the 

[ACRA].” Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Higdon v. 

Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 138 Ariz. 163, 165, 673 P.2d 907, 909–10 n.3 (1983)) 

(internal quotations omitted); see Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 350, 354, 830 

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P.2d 871, 875 (Ct. App. 1991). The ACRA’s prohibition against retaliation, A.R.S. § 41–

1464(A), is “essentially identical” to the prohibition under Title VII. Storey v. Chase 

Bankcard Services, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 722, 731 (D. Ariz. 1997). Thus, the Court will 

analyze both of Quednau's retaliation claims under federal law. 

A. Protected Activity 

Under the first prong of Title VII’s retaliation provision, Quednau must prove that 

she was retaliated against for opposing an employment practice made unlawful by Title 

VII, or because she “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner 

in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” related to Title VII enforcement. 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-3(a); see also Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 1996). The 

opposition clause protects “only those employees who oppose what they reasonably 

perceive as discrimination under the Act.” Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 

(9th Cir. 1988). While an employee may fail to prove the alleged unlawful employment 

practice but still prevail on a retaliation claim, “the opposed conduct must fairly fall 

within the protection of Title VII to sustain a claim of unlawful retaliation.” Id. (citing 

Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 132 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

 Quednau alleges that she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII by filing her 

May 12, 2011, EEOC charge. The State acknowledges that filing an EEOC charge is 

generally protected conduct, but argues that Quednau’s charge does not qualify because it 

was not in opposition to any “practice made unlawful” by Title VII. 

 Quednau asserts that she opposed Mercado’s comments that created a hostile work 

environment based on sex. Title VII is violated “when the workplace is permeated with 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 

alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working 

environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, Quednau would 

need to show that her work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile; 

that is, she would need to demonstrate that she perceived her work environment to be 

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hostile, and that a reasonable person in her position would perceive it to be so. 

Dominguez–Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). She would also need to show evidence sufficient to establish 

that any harassment that took place was because of sex. Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

In analyzing whether the alleged conduct that Quednau opposed created an 

objectively hostile work environment, this Court must assess all the circumstances, 

“including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 

unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id. (quoting Clark Cty. 

Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001)) (internal citation omitted). “Simple 

teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 

amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher 

v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal citation omitted). 

 Quednau does not produce evidence that the conduct she opposed constituted 

sufficiently severe or pervasive discrimination because of sex to establish a retaliation 

claim. Much of the behavior Quednau alleged does not relate to gender in any manner. 

Quednau provides no evidence that Mercado’s comments on Quednau’s drinking or work 

were due to the fact that Quednau is a woman. 

 Quednau further alleged that Mercado used sexual slurs in the workplace. In her 

April 21, 2011, complaint to her supervisors, Quednau asserted that Mercado “would 

curse to extremes (using sexual slurs) making for a very hostile work environment.” 

(Doc. 37, Ex. 4.) Quednau did not elaborate as to the contents or frequency of these 

sexual slurs. The remainder of Quednau’s report focused on Mercado’s driving and other 

behavior unrelated to gender. Id. Similarly, in her complaint sent to HR on April 26, 

2011, Quednau asserted that Mercado made “comments to [Quednau] that were 

inappropriate and unprofessional (using sexual slurs),” but otherwise focused on 

unrelated behavior. In her May 4, 2011, e-mail to EEO Administrator Morris Greenridge, 

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Quednau wrote that “[w]e should have the opportunity to report misconduct and sexual 

harassment,” but did not elaborate further regarding the alleged sexual harassment. (Doc. 

37, Ex. 8.) In a May 4, 2011, e-mail from Human Resources Manager Kathy Montaño to 

Greenridge, Montaño reported that when asked on April 25 about the type of sexual slurs 

used by Mercado, Quednau responded that “‘she used the ‘f-word’ or ‘f-off.’” (Doc. 37, 

Ex. 10.) Quednau subsequently testified that Mercado told her to “get f—ed” and that 

Mercado used the F word on a “continuous basis every day...[i]t was raunchy F words. It 

always came with a joke of some sort.” (Doc. 3, Ex. 1 at 74, 84.) 

 Quednau largely provides only conclusory statements in asserting that she was 

sexually harassed. She provides no facts by which a reasonable jury could conclude that 

she was subjected to harassment because of her sex, or that Mercado’s use of the term 

constituted an objectively hostile work environment. 

 As previously noted, to state a claim for sexual harassment, the Plaintiff must 

prove that “any harassment took place ‘because of sex.’” Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d 

1027 at 1034 (quoting Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 871-72 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, (1998))). 

Among other complaints that have no apparent reference to gender or sex, Quednau 

complained that Mercado, a fellow female employee, used the “F” word every day and 

that “[i]t always came with a joke of some sort.” Quednau further states without 

additional detail that Mercado “‘used the ‘f-word’ or ‘f-off.’” (Doc. 37, Ex. 10) or told 

her to “get f—ed.” It is certain that the use of this vulgar term can be and most likely was 

offensive to Quednau. It is also true that a primary definition of the general term is a 

crude reference to the act of sexual intercourse and thus could plausibly have some 

connection to gender. 

 But, the term has also acquired a connotation of being a vacuous vulgarity used 

only for emphasis by those who wish to express crude or harsh emotions. Although the 

term generally refers to a sex act, Quednau has put forth no facts from which a reasonable 

jury could conclude that Mercado used that term in her relations with Quednau precisely 

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because of Quednau’s sex. In the absence of such a showing, no reasonable jury could 

conclude that the use of the “F” term, in this case, was sexually discriminatory. 

 Further, Quednau has not set forth facts from which a reasonable jury could 

determine that Mercado’s use of the F-word subjected Quednau to an objectively hostile 

work environment. In determining whether the alleged conduct created an objectively 

hostile work environment, a court “must assess all the circumstances, ‘including the 

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening 

or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with 

an employee’s work performance.’” Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034 (quoting 

Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270-71). 

 Quednau did testify at her deposition that Mercado used the F-word on a daily 

basis, but she raises no facts which suggest that the use of the term was physically 

threatening or humiliating to her as opposed to being merely an offensive utterance. 

Dominguez–Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034. Further, she sets forth no facts from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that Mercado’s use of the term interfered with Quednau’s 

work performance. Mercado was a co-worker; she was not Quednau’s supervisor. 

Quednau offers no explanation as to how her work environment was so substantially 

impacted by Mercado’s daily use of the vulgarity. Finally, for the reasons set forth 

above, Quednau does not set forth facts from which a jury could conclude that Mercado 

used the F-word because of Quednau’s sex. 

 “Not every insult or harassing comment” constitutes sexual harassment. Rather, to 

constitute a hostile work environment such comments must be “[r]epeated derogatory or 

humiliating statements.” See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other 

grounds, Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding “severe or 

pervasive” harassment when one supervisor “repeatedly engaged in vulgarities, made 

sexual remarks, and requested sexual favors” while another supervisor “frequently 

witnessed, laughed at, or herself made these types of comments.”). 

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 At most, the alleged sexual slurs as alleged by Quednau amount to offensive 

comments insufficient to give rise to a claim of sexually-based harassment. Although 

Quednau may have subjectively felt that Mercado’s language created a hostile work 

environment, she offers insufficient facts to conclude that a reasonable person would 

have perceived it to be so. See Dominguez–Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034. Quednau’s 

allegations do not reasonably fall under Title VII and thus fail to establish that she 

engaged in protected activity under the Act when she filed her EEOC charge. 

CONCLUSION 

Quednau fails to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation because she 

fails to raise issues of fact on which a reasonable jury could conclude that she engaged in 

protected activity under the Act. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State of Arizona’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate 

this action and enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 20th day of September, 2013. 

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