Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01909/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01909-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Housing Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LaRELL FRANKLIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ALLSTATE CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-06-1909 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

TO ENTER DEFAULT OF ROY

GRANLUND; VACATING HEARING

(Docket No. 118)

Before the Court is the motion filed July 27, 2007 by plaintiffs LaRell Franklin, et al.,

(collectively “Franklin”) to enter default against defendant Roy Granlund (“Granlund”). To

date, Granlund has not filed opposition to the motion. Having considered the papers filed in

support of the motion, the Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral

argument, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), hereby VACATES the August 31, 2007 hearing, and rules

as follows.

BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2006, Franklin filed the instant action, alleging claims of federal and

state civil rights violations and state law insurance bad faith against Allstate Insurance

Company and other defendants, including Granlund. On April 6, 2006, Franklin filed an

amended complaint. On July 11, 2006, Franklin filed a second amended complaint.

On August 11, 2006, Franklin filed an application for entry of clerk’s default against

Case 3:06-cv-01909-MMC Document 121 Filed 08/31/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Granlund pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On November

15, 2006, the Clerk declined entry of default against Granlund. 

On July 27, 2007, Franklin filed the instant motion to enter default against Granlund. 

DISCUSSION

Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for entry of default

against a party who “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

To date, Granlund has not appeared in the instant action. 

To obtain entry of default, the plaintiff must show the defendant was properly served

as provided in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mason v. Genisco

Tech. Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding where service is not properly

effected, any default entered “is void”); Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized

Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A federal court does not have jurisdiction

over a defendant unless the defendant has been properly served under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.”). 

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for several methods of service,

including any method authorized “pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court

is located.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). 

Here, Franklin contends Granlund was served pursuant to California Code of Civil

Procedure § 415.20. Section 415.20 provides that “[i]f a copy of the summons and

complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered,” substitute service may

be effected “by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling

house, usual place of abode . . . or usual mailing address . . . in the presence of a

competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his . . . usual

mailing address . . . , at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents

thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class

mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the

summons and complaint were left.” See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b). 

According to the proof of service, the original summons, first amended complaint,

and related documents were personally delivered on June 17, 2006 to Granlund’s ex-wife,

Case 3:06-cv-01909-MMC Document 121 Filed 08/31/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 On July 11, 2006, Franklin mailed the second amended complaint to 6311

Shorewood Court. If the above-referenced delivery of the first amended complaint sufficed

to effectuate service in the first instance, then mailed service of the second amended

complaint would be sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a).

2

 Counsel also asserts the mailed copies “were not returned to sender,” (see

Canatella Decl. ¶ 6), but cites no authority suggesting that any relevant inference can be

drawn therefrom. 

3

 For the same reason, Franklin has not demonstrated “reasonable diligence.” As

noted, § 415.20(b) provides for substitute service only after service by personal delivery

cannot with “reasonable diligence” be accomplished. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§ 415.20(b). Two or three attempts at personal service may satisfy the requirement of

reasonable diligence, if the method of service is “reasonably calculated to provide . . .

3

Terri Granlund, at 6311 Shorewood Court in Pleasanton, California, and thereafter copies

of the same documents were mailed to Granlund at the same address. (See Proof of

Service, filed July 13, 2006.)1

 The proof of service also provides, however, that during an

earlier attempt at serving Granlund, on May 24, 2006, the process server spoke to

Granlund’s minor daughter at the above-referenced address, who informed him that

Granlund no longer lived at that address. (See id.) The daughter did not provide the

process server with Granlund’s forwarding address. (See id.) Nonetheless, on seven

subsequent occasions, the process server returned to 6311 Shorewood Court to attempt to

serve Granlund, (see id.), and, on June 17, 2006, the process server, as noted, delivered

the documents to Terri Granlund, Granlund’s ex-wife, at that address. (See id.) There is

no indication in the proof of service that Terri Granlund told the process server that

Granlund lived or received mail at that address.

Franklin’s counsel states that “[t]here is no dispute that Roy Granlund did reside at

6311 Shorewood Court, since counsel was assured that the address was cross-referenced

by the process server to Granlund’s advertised post office box.” (See Canatella Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Such “assurance,” whatever its meaning may be, fails to demonstrate that the abovereferenced Pleasanton address is Granlund’s “dwelling place, usual place of abode . . . or

usual mailing address,” see Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b), and, in any event, constitutes

inadmissible hearsay.2 Accordingly, Franklin has not demonstrated service upon Granlund

pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.20(b).3

 

Case 3:06-cv-01909-MMC Document 121 Filed 08/31/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

actual notice of the action.” See Espindola v. Nunez, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1389, 1392 (1988). 

Here, however, Franklin has not established reasonable diligence because he has not

demonstrated that Granlund lived at 6311 Shorewood Court or used that address as his

usual mailing address and, consequently, has not demonstrated that his attempts to serve

Granlund at that address were reasonably calculated to provide Granlund with actual notice

of the instant action.

4

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Franklin’s motion to enter

default against defendant Granlund. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01909-MMC Document 121 Filed 08/31/07 Page 4 of 4