Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00465/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00465-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENYA DARRICK CALDWELL,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF SELMA, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 1:13-cv-00465-SAB 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 24-29, 35, 38, 39, 40) 

 Plaintiff Kenya Darrick Caldwell, an incompetent person, by Ever Jean Kelley, his 

conservator, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 28, 2013. 

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment filed August 21, 2014. 

 The Court heard oral arguments on August 28, 2014. Counsel M. Greg Mullanax 

appeared for Plaintiff and counsel David M. Overstreet and Rachelle Taylor Golden appeared for 

Defendants. Having considered the moving, opposition and reply papers, the declarations and 

exhibits attached thereto, arguments presented at the August 28, 2014 hearing, as well as the 

Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.1

I. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury after he was attacked by his stepfather on 

January 1, 1999. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Petitioner’s mother, Ms. Kelly, filed for 

conservatorship in Fresno County Superior Court and was appointed as conservator of Plaintiff’s 

                                                            

1

 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 15, 16.) 

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person and estate on March 25, 2003. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17.) 

 Plaintiff was arrested on February 10, 2006, and filed the complaint in this action on 

March 28, 2013.2 On August 21, 2103, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against 

Defendants City of Selma (“City”), Chief Thomas H. Whiteside (“Chief Whiteside”), and Steve 

Burgamy. Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant Burgamy alleging violations of the right 

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, due process of law, excessive force, equal 

protection, and freedom from interference with Plaintiff’s zone of privacy;3 against Defendants 

City and Chief Whiteside alleging they had knowledge of a pattern and practice of these 

violations and did not act to prevent such violations. 

 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 25, 2014. Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to the motion for summary judgment on August 14, 2014. Defendants filed a reply on 

August 19, 2014. 

II. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party may move for summary judgment ... 

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary judgment must be entered “against a party 

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case...” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary 

judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita 

                                                            

2

 Although Defendants have pled the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, they have not raised the issue 

of this lapse in time in their motion for summary judgment. 

3

 Defendant Burgamy does not move for summary judgment on the equal protection or due process claims. 

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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its 

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. 

III. 

UNDISPUTED FACTS 

1. In February 2006, Plaintiff lived in Chowchilla, with his mother. Plaintiff has a 

history of mental instability and is prescribed medication to control raging fits. 

 2. After the incident, Plaintiff told investigating officers that he ran away from 

home. He had been reported as a missing person days before the February 10, 2006, incident. 

Plaintiff had not taken his medication during the time he was missing. 

 3. At about 7:59 p.m., on February 10, 2006, a citizen called to report a suspicious 

person reported as a “black gentleman” moving between cars. The citizen reported that there had 

been previous burglaries and tires stolen in the area. 

 4. At about 8:01 p.m., Defendant Burgamy was dispatched to the 3400 block of 

Jordan for a “suspicious BMA.” 

 5. Defendant Burgamy was dressed in police uniform and drove a marked patrol car 

as he pulled up to the site of the incident. 

 6. Plaintiff was compliant and did not appear to be on drugs or intoxicated when 

Defendant Burgamy initially spoke with him. 

 7. After having observed a black male adult, Defendant Burgamy arrived in a 

marked patrol car on scene at approximately 8:03 p.m. Defendant Burgamy asked Plaintiff his 

name to which Plaintiff responded with, “John” “Jake” or “Jacob” “Winston”. Plaintiff stated 

that his name was “John Brown.” Defendant Burgamy suspected the names were false. 

 8. Defendant Burgamy requested and Plaintiff gave permission to search Plaintiff for 

weapons for their mutual safety. After requesting and receiving Plaintiff’s permission to extract 

objects from Plaintiff, and laying them on the hood of the patrol car, Defendant Burgamy began 

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to go through Plaintiff’s wallet.4

 9. As Defendant Burgamy was going through Plaintiff’s items, Plaintiff attacked 

Defendant Burgamy, striking him and biting his face causing a wound. Defendant Burgamy felt 

pressure on his handgun which he perceived as an attempt by Plaintiff to obtain his handgun. 

During the scuffle, Defendant Burgamy fired one shot striking Plaintiff in the left side of his 

back.5

 10. At 8:10 p.m., Defendant Burgamy radioed that he needed backup. Almost 

immediately, Defendant Burgamy radioed that he had discharged his weapon and requested an 

ambulance. 

 11. The event happened quickly and Plaintiff does not recall the specific details of the 

incident. 

 12. Plaintiff attacked Defendant Burgamy by running and swinging at and biting him; 

intending to knock Defendant Burgamy out and escape. 

 13. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Burgamy struck him twice in the forehead with 

his hands, and Plaintiff then bit Defendant Burgamy. 

 14. Plaintiff admits that he bit Defendant Burgamy, but claims that it was not hard 

enough to leave a mark. 

 15. Plaintiff admitted causing the bite mark on Defendant Burgamy’s face. 

 16. Plaintiff claims that he was biting Defendant Burgamy when he was shot. 

 17. To Defendant Burgamy, Plaintiff appeared aggressive with his hands positioned 

                                                            

4

 Plaintiff objected to the original fact as mischaracterizing Defendant Burgamy’s testimony. The undisputed 

evidence establishes that Defendant Burgamy placed Plaintiff’s belongings on the hood of his patrol car and had 

Plaintiff sit on the front bumper of his patrol vehicle. (Depo. of Steve Burgamy 18:18-21, ECF No. 28-2.) 

Defendant Burgamy then moved to the passenger side of his patrol car and began looking through the paperwork in 

Plaintiff’s wallet. (Id. at 19:8-19, 21:18-24; Interview Transcript 10-11, ECF No. 35-9.) 

5

 See Fresno County Sheriff’s Department Technical Services Report 060003531, ECF No. 35-8 at 50. 

 According to Defendant Burgamy, he pushed Plaintiff away, called for backup and ordered Plaintiff to stay 

back. Plaintiff began to charge toward Defendant Burgamy as if preparing to tackle him. At that time, Defendant 

Burgamy pulled and fired his gun striking Plaintiff. (ECF No. 35-8 at 11.) 

 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Burgamy fired his weapon while Plaintiff was biting him in the face. 

(Depo. of Kenya Darrick Caldwell 118:7-19.) 

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as if about to make a tackle just before he charged Defendant Burgamy. Plaintiff does not have a 

recollection of the details of charging or running at Defendant Burgamy. 

 18. Just before pulling the trigger, Defendant Burgamy felt that Plaintiff was seriously 

trying to hurt, or was trying to kill him.6

 19. Defendant Burgamy believed that Plaintiff had previously tried to get his 

handgun, and if Plaintiff was successful, he would shoot Defendant Burgamy. 

 20. One round from a .40 caliber duty weapon was fired by Defendant Burgamy, and 

only one matching bullet casing was found at the scene. 

 21. After firing the shot, Defendant Burgamy notified dispatch of having done so, and 

requested ambulance. 

 22. Shortly after the gun was fired both Selma Police and Fresno County Sheriff 

officials arrived, investigating the incident. 

 23. The bullet which was just under the surface of Plaintiff’s skin was removed under 

local anesthesia as an outpatient procedure. 

 24. Lisa Gamoian, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Homicide Unit, of The Office of 

the District Attorney for Fresno County, found that there were grounds for self-defense under the 

circumstances. 

 25. Plaintiff was arrested for violation of Penal Code sections for causing injury to 

Defendant Burgamy. 

 26. Peace Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.) is recognized as the authority 

that governs the training of police officers in California. These professional standards are similar 

to other states across the nation.7

                                                            

6

 Plaintiff disputes whether Defendant Burgamy actually felt threatened by Plaintiff. 

7

 Plaintiff objects on the grounds of lack of foundation and hearsay. Myron Dyck is a Lieutenant in the Selma 

Police Department who is the custodian of record for police policies and procedures, investigations relating to 

officer involved shootings, internal affairs investigations, and officer training. As such he would have personal 

knowledge of the facts included in this declaration regarding P.O.S.T. certification and the training provided by 

Selma Police Department. Lt. Dyck’s statements in his declaration are statements made within this proceeding and 

are not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 

 Plaintiff also objects to the report of expert Joe Callanan on the same grounds. Mr. Callanan has included 

his Professional Resume and declaration which establish that has law enforcement experience and has been qualified 

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 27. The Selma Police Department is a fully certified law enforcement agency 

consistent with the minimum standards set forth by P.O.S.T. Officers with the Selma Police 

Department are required to attend a P.O.S.T. certified academy. They receive ongoing training 

through field training programs, on-the-job training, advanced officer courses, and various 

classes and seminars offered throughout the State of California. The Selma Police Department 

has had a training unit that ensures Selma police officers receive training in compliance with 

P.O.S.T. The training provided by the Selma Police Department with regard to use of force and 

use of deadly force is in compliance with P.O.S.T. standards. 

 28. Prior to February 10, 2006, Defendant Burgamy had attended a P.O.S.T. certified 

police academy and received P.O.S.T. certification. 

 29. Consistent with its policy regarding the use of force, the Selma Police Department 

trains its officers that they can use reasonable force to defend themselves or others, affect an 

arrest or detention, prevent escape and/or overcome resistance. Officers are trained to assess the 

situation and use the amount of force that is reasonable under the circumstances. 

 30. The training regarding the use of deadly force provided to Selma Police 

Department officers is P.O.S.T. compliant. 

 31. Defendant Burgamy was trained in the appropriate use of force. 

 32. Selma Police Department’s policies governing use of deadly force are consistent 

with other law enforcement agencies within the State of California. 

 33. P.O.S.T. does not exclude the use of deadly force when an officer reasonably 

believes that such force is necessary to protect him or others from an immediate threat of death 

or serious bodily injury. 

 34. Plaintiff inflicted serious bodily injury on Defendant Burgamy. 

 35. At no time has the Selma Police Department had a policy, practice, or custom of 

improperly supervising its police officers. 

 36. Administrative staff of the Selma Police Department review and examine 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

as an expert witness in the United States and abroad regarding police matters. He is qualified to testify as an expert 

in this matter. Plaintiff’s objections on the grounds of foundation and hearsay are overruled. 

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incidents in which force is used in order to determine whether the force used was reasonable in 

light of the circumstances facing the officers; and take appropriate action when necessary. 

Furthermore, it has been the policy and practice of the Selma Police Department to conduct 

thorough investigations into allegations of misconduct on the part of its police officers. 

 37. In 2006 it was the policy of the Selma Police Department, when available, to have 

the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department investigate officer involved shootings. 

 38. The City of Selma Police Department requested and the Fresno County Sheriff’s 

Department investigated the shooting involved in this case. 

VI. 

DISCUSSION 

 A. Fourth Amendment 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burgamy violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 

conducting an illegal search and seizure and using excessive force. “The Fourth Amendment 

provides that ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated * * *.’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 8 (1968). The Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures, but unreasonable 

searches and seizures. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. 

 1. Search and Seizure 

 While it is unclear from the First Amended Complaint whether Plaintiff is challenging 

the initial contact by Defendant Burgamy, the motion for summary judgment contends that the 

initial stop and search for weapons did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 25 at 9.) 

Plaintiff does not address the initial stop or the subsequent search in the opposition to the motion 

for summary judgment, nor was this issue addressed at the August 27 hearing. 

 In determining the constitutionality of a seizure, the court considers the level of suspicion 

required by law enforcement and the manner in which the seizure occurred. U.S. v. GuzmanPadilla, 573 F.3d 865, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2009). In considering the manner in which the seizure 

occurred, the Court looks at the totality of the circumstances and “must balance the nature and 

quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of 

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the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion” to determine the reasonableness of the 

seizure. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 

703 (1983)); Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d at 876-77. 

 A police officer may make a brief investigatory stop for the purpose of investigating 

possible criminal behavior when he has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. 

U.S. v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). The officer “must be able to 

articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion’ or ‘hunch’ of criminal 

activity.” Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, ___, 

120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000)). “[R]easonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific, 

articulable facts which, when considered with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis 

for particularized suspicion.” Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1129. This requires an assessment 

based on the totality of the circumstances and the circumstances must arouse reasonable 

suspicion that the particular individual being stopped has committed or is about to commit a 

crime. Id. Applying these principals to the facts of this case the Court finds that Defendant 

Burgamy did not violate the Fourth Amendment by initially contacting Plaintiff and searching 

him. 

 Defendant Burgamy was responding to a call that there was a “suspicious black male” in 

the area who was hanging around parked vehicles. The caller indicated that there had been 

burglaries and tires stolen in the area. (U.F. 3.) Dispatch informed Defendant Burgamy that a 

black male, wearing a large overcoat was walking westbound on Nelson Boulevard toward 

Highland. (ECF No. 35-8 at 8; ECF No. 35-5 at 1.) Defendant Burgamy arrived in the area 

within five minutes of receiving the call and observed Plaintiff, who matched the description of 

the suspect, walking southbound on Highland just south of Nelson Boulevard. (U.F. 7; ECF No 

35-8 at 8.) 

 Defendant Burgamy contacted Plaintiff to investigate if he was the suspicious individual 

who was reported to have been in the area. The facts available to Defendant Burgamy allowed 

him to reasonably believe that Plaintiff was the subject of the dispatch call. Defendant Burgamy 

found Plaintiff close to the area that the individual was reported to have been heading within five 

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minutes of receiving the call; and Plaintiff matched the description provided by the reporting 

party. 

 There was no show of force involved in the initial contact with Plaintiff. Defendant 

Burgamy was alone in his patrol vehicle. Defendant Burgamy stopped his vehicle behind 

Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff if he could talk to him. (ECF No. 35-8 at 9.) Defendant Burgamy 

did not draw his weapon or order Plaintiff to come to the vehicle. Plaintiff responded to the 

request by walking over to Defendant Burgamy. Law enforcement officers do not implicate the 

Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street and inquiring if he is 

willing to answer some questions. U.S. v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 2007); U.S. 

v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 Defendant Burgamy suspected that Plaintiff had provided a false name. (U.F. 7.) 

Defendant Burgamy asked Plaintiff if he could search him. (U.F. 8.) It is permissible for an 

officer to request consent to search as long as the officer does not convey the message that the 

individual is required to consent. Washington, 490 F.3d at 770. Further, the parties do not 

dispute that Plaintiff consented to the search. 

 Defendant Burgamy searched Plaintiff and extracted several items from his pockets and 

laid them on the hood of his patrol car. (U.F. 8.) Defendant Burgamy then moved to the 

passenger side of the vehicle to look at the paperwork in Plaintiff’s wallet, at which time Plaintiff 

attacked him. (U.F. 8, 9.) The entire incident, from the time that Defendant Burgamy initially 

contacted Plaintiff to the shot being fired lasted approximately seven minutes. (ECF No. 35-5 at 

1.) Based upon the totality of the circumstances giving rise to the consent, this was a consensual 

search that did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Kim, 23 F.3d at 1432. 

 Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant Burgamy’s 

initial stop and search of Plaintiff was not an unreasonable search and seizure that would violate 

the Fourth Amendment. 

 2. Zone of Privacy 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burgamy violated his “right to be free from interference 

with his zone of privacy as protected by the Fourth and Ninth Amendments to the United States 

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Constitution.” (ECF No. 8 at ¶ 34(e).) Defendant Burgamy contends that Plaintiff has provided 

no information that his privacy was invaded. (ECF No. 25 at 9.) 

 “While the Supreme Court has expressed uncertainty regarding the precise bounds of the 

constitutional “zone of privacy,” its existence is firmly established.” In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 

954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999). At least two distinct kinds of privacy interests have been identified as 

being protected by the United States Constitution: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure 

of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 

decisions. Id. Plaintiff does not submit any evidence to create a triable issue of fact that his 

privacy has been violated by any acts alleged in the complaint. 

B. Qualified Immunity

 Defendant Burgamy contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because his use of 

force was reasonable. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from 

civil liability where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects 

“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 

__ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (citations omitted). 

 To determine if an official is entitled to qualified immunity the court uses a two part 

inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. 

The court determines if the facts as alleged state a violation of a constitutional right and if the 

right is clearly established so that a reasonable official would have known that his conduct was 

unlawful. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. This does not require that the same factual situation must 

have been decided, but that existing precedent would establish the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate. Id. “The linchpin of qualified immunity is the reasonableness of the 

official’s conduct.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 654 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011). A 

district court is “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs 

of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the 

particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct. at 818. 

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 When confronted with the question of whether Defendant Burgamy is entitled to 

qualified immunity, the Court will first consider whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable to 

the party asserting the injury, do the facts show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 

right?” Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). In this instance, the Court shall first 

address whether Defendant Burgamy used excessive force in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. 

 1. Defendant Burgamy Did Not Use Excessive Force

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burgamy shot him without provocation or cause. (ECF 

No. 1 at § 30.) Defendant Burgamy contends that he used reasonable force in the circumstances 

presented here. (ECF No. 25 at 10-11.) Plaintiff counters that he was shot in the back and the 

reports fail to mention this. (ECF No. 38.) 

 Initially, while Plaintiff alleges that the use of excessive force violated his due process 

rights, where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 

protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more 

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s 

claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and 

brackets omitted) overruled on other grounds by Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. V. Swift –

Eckrick, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). 

The Supreme Court has held that the use of excessive force in making arrests is analyzed under 

the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test, not the substantive due process standard. Graham 

v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 391 (1989). Plaintiff’s excessive force claim does not implicate 

substantive due process considerations. 

 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was attacking Defendant Burgamy in an attempt 

to knock him out so that he could escape at the time that the shot was fired. The issue here is 

whether the use of deadly force was excessive under the circumstances. The reasonableness 

inquiry in excessive force cases is whether the officer’s actions were “ ‘objectively reasonable’ 

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting” him. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 

701 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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 “The ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of 

a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Wilkinson v. 

Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 

(1989)). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers 

are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 

490 U.S. at 397. In determining whether Defendant Burgamy’s actions were reasonable, the 

Court must consider the risk of bodily harm that Defendant Burgamy posed to Plaintiff in light of 

the threat that he was trying to eliminate. Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. 

 The “relevant factors in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry include “[1] the 

severity of the crime at issue,[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of 

the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 

by flight.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 701 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The Supreme Court has 

held that where an officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious 

physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not unconstitutionally unreasonable to use 

deadly force. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). 

 In this instance, Defendant Burgamy stopped Plaintiff to determine if he was the 

individual who had been reported to be leaning on cars in the neighborhood. Upon being 

questioned, Plaintiff provided a false name. While the severity of the crimes initially involved in 

this instance weighs against the use of deadly force, at the time that Plaintiff was shot he was 

engaged in committing assault and battery on a police officer. The crime being committed at the 

moment the shot was fired weighs in favor of the use of force. 

 The most important factor is whether the suspect poses a threat to the safety of the 

officers or others. Smith, 394 F.3d at 702. In this instance, Plaintiff was attempting to escape by 

attacking Defendant Burgamy. Since Plaintiff was initially compliant, Defendant Burgamy was 

taken off guard by Plaintiff’s initial attack. As Defendant Burgamy was looking through 

Plaintiff’s wallet, Plaintiff attacked Defendant Burgamy by striking him and biting him in the 

face. (U.F. 9.) Photographs of Defendant Burgamy’s injury show a large mouth shaped abrasion 

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on the left side of his neck, in close proximity to the officer’s jugular vein. Half of this abrasion 

is surrounded by teeth marks that have broken the skin. (Exhibit 35-4.) Defendant Burgamy 

testified that Plaintiff bit him on the left jaw for a few seconds and the pain was excruciating. 

(ECF No. 28-2 at 24:8-25:11.) It was at this same time that Defendant Burgamy felt Plaintiff’s 

hand on his gun and he pushed the hand away. (U.F. 9; ECF No. 28-2 at 26:21-27:10, 28:5-8, 

30:17-31:21.) Defendant Burgamy perceived this as an attempt by Plaintiff to obtain his gun. 

(U.F. 9.) 

 It is at this point that the parties’ view of the facts diverges. However, the mere existence 

of some factual disputes between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported 

motion for summary judgment. Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. Plaintiff’s position is that the fact that 

the bullet entered his back is not consistent with Defendant’s version of the facts and creates a 

disputed fact. 

 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Burgamy fired the shot while Plaintiff was biting 

Defendant Burgamy. Plaintiff would be close to, if not up against, Defendant Burgamy’s body. 

Since Defendant Burgamy is right handed (ECF No. 28-2 at 26:10-11), Defendant Burgamy 

would be firing at Plaintiff with his right hand. The bullet entering the left side of Plaintiff’s 

back is consistent with these facts. 

 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant Burgamy claims that 

he was able to push Plaintiff away and create two to three strides between them. (ECF No. 28-2 

at 31:19-32:8.) Defendant Burgamy just had a second to call for backup when Plaintiff advanced 

toward him again. (Id. at 32:12-24.) Plaintiff moved to an aggressive stance, slightly crouched 

with his knees slightly bent. (Id. at 33:5-20.) Defendant Burgamy told Plaintiff to stop, but 

Plaintiff started moving forward. (Id. at 33:23-34:4.) Defendant Burgamy pulled out his gun 

and fired at Plaintiff. 8 (Id. at 34:6.) 

 Plaintiff argues that Defendant Burgamy’s version of the facts does not mesh with the 

                                                            

8

 Plaintiff complains that Defendants did not provide a photograph of the injury to Plaintiff’s back. However, 

Plaintiff had the opportunity to submit evidence to show that a material issue of fact exists. If Plaintiff believed that 

the location of the entry wound created a triable issue of fact, he should have submitted such evidence in support of 

his opposition. The description of the entry wound contained in the record is not inconsistent with the testimony of 

the parties as to the incident alleged and Plaintiff’s argument does not create a triable issue of material fact. 

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physical evidence, and Defendant argues that the bullet entering the left side of his back is 

consistent with Plaintiff turning away from the gun when it was drawn. Based upon the evidence 

presented by the parties, the fact that the bullet entered the left side of Plaintiff’s back does not 

create a triable issue to defeat summary judgment. 

 The factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff was biting Defendant Burgamy at the time he 

was shot or whether Defendant Burgamy had pushed him away and Plaintiff was advancing for 

another attack is immaterial. Billington, 292 F.3d at 1185. In either circumstance, Plaintiff was 

actively and violently attacking Defendant Burgamy with the intent of causing serious injury so 

he could escape. Defendant Burgamy had already felt Plaintiff’s hand in the area of his gun. 

Plaintiff had exhibited that he was intent on causing injury to Defendant Burgamy in his attempt 

to escape. In fact, Plaintiff had already caused injury to Defendant Burgamy by striking and 

biting him and Defendant Burgamy believed that if Plaintiff was able to get his gun he would 

shot Defendant Burgamy. 

 Plaintiff contends that it was unreasonable for Defendant Burgamy to have felt threatened 

by Plaintiff as he had searched him and knew that Plaintiff did not have a weapon. However, in 

this instance, Plaintiff was biting or had bitten the officer in the neck. Defendant Burgamy had a 

reasonable belief that Plaintiff posed an imminent threat of injury or death to himself. Further, as 

Defendant argued during the hearing, had Plaintiff been able to overcome Defendant Burgamy 

and get the gun he posed a threat to others. 

 At the August 27 hearing, Plaintiff argued that the investigation into this incident was not 

complete. For example, Defendant Burgamy was not questioned as to where his hand was 

positioned when he fired the gun, no tests were conducted to see if there was gun powder residue 

on Plaintiff or Defendant Burgamy, and no ballistic tests were conducted to determine the 

trajectory of the bullet that was fired. While Plaintiff contends that he would be able to question 

Defendant’s expert at trial regarding these alleged discrepancies, no party has submitted any 

expert reports for consideration on this motion. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to 

create a triable issue of material fact on these issues. Additionally, the evidence before the Court 

is undisputed. Defendant Burgamy was the only officer on the scene and Plaintiff was in the act 

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of assaulting Defendant Burgamy when the shot was fired. 

 In deciding whether the use of force was reasonable, the court can also consider the 

availability of alternate methods of subduing a suspect. Smith, 394 F.3d at 703. “Officers ‘need 

not avail themselves of the least intrusive means of responding to an exigent situation; they need 

only act within that range of conduct we identify as reasonable.’ ” Glenn v. Washington, 673 

F.3d 864, 876 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). In 

his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burgamy had pepper spray or his baton available 

to subdue Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff was within two to three strides of Defendant Burgamy. 

Even if Defendant Burgamy had the time to deploy his pepper spray, he would have run the risk 

of the pepper spray rebounding back on him. This could have created a greater danger to 

Defendant Burgamy had the pepper spray not stopped Plaintiff. Further, given the totality of the 

facts and the short timeframe in which this incident occurred, this incident is one in which 

Defendant Burgamy was forced to make a “split-second judgment[]—in circumstances that 

[were] tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that [was] necessary in 

[the] particular situation.”9

 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Defendant Burgamy’s use of deadly force 

was justified by his reasonable belief that Plaintiff presented an immediate threat of serious 

physical harm or death. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2008) (“a law 

enforcement officer's use of force will be justified, or not, by what that officer reasonably 

believed about the circumstances confronting him”). 

 Considering the totality of the circumstances presented here, Defendant Burgamy’s use of 

force was reasonable given the threat posed by Plaintiff. See Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 551 

(finding deadly force justified where suspect driving minivan did not yield to commands and 

accelerated in close proximity to two officers on foot); Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1186 

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that deadly force was justified where suspect was violently resisted 

                                                            

9

 During oral argument at the August 27 hearing, Plaintiff raised for the first time an argument that there was a 

triable issue as to whether Defendant Burgamy created the situation that occurred here. Plaintiff improperly raised 

this argument by raising it for the first time during oral argument. Moreover, even if the Court were to consider this 

contention, the facts here do not support such a finding. Defendant Burgamy did not take any action which would 

have provoked the attack by Plaintiff. See Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (where an 

officer recklessly or intentionally provokes a violent response it may make it unreasonable for him to use force to 

defendant himself). 

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arrest, physically attacked officer and grabbed his gun); Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 

F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1996) (overruled on other grounds by Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 

114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that deadly force was reasonable where suspect, who had 

been acting erratically, swung a knife at officer); Garcia v. U.S., 826 F.2d 806 (1987) (findings 

use of deadly force reasonable where plaintiff attacked a border patrol officer with a rock and 

stick). 

 The Court shall next consider the second part of the analysis. The question to be 

considered is whether it was clearly established that a law enforcement office cannot use deadly 

force when he was being physically attacked by a suspect. 

 2. The Right Was Not Clearly Established 

 Qualified immunity protects an officer from suit even when he makes a decision that is 

constitutionally deficient unless that right is clearly established at the time that the officer acted. 

Brousseau, 543 U.S. at 198. The inquiry as to whether the right was clearly established is 

“solely a question of law for the judge.” . Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t., 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009)). The 

right the official is alleged to have violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity 

before the court can determine if it was clearly established. Dunn, 621 F.3d at 1200. In 

considering whether it has been clearly established that Defendant Burgamy could not use deadly 

force in this instance the Court looks to similar cases. 

 In Mitchell v. City of Pittsburg, No. C 90-00794 SI, 2011 WL 249458 (N.D. Cal. 2011), 

while officers were executing a search warrant, a suspect grabbed the wrist of the hand in which 

an officer was carrying his gun. The officer responded by shooting the suspect. Id. at *11. The 

court found that the officer reasonably believed that he risked losing control of his gun and the 

use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. Id. 

 In Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002), an off duty police officer observed 

the suspect driving recklessly and pursued the vehicle. 292 F.3d at 1180. The suspect crashed 

the vehicle and the officer approached to see if the suspect was injured and to arrest him for 

reckless driving. Id. The officer had his gun drawn and as he approached the vehicle the driver 

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appeared to be unconscious, but he was actually just very drunk. Id. The officer identified 

himself and ordered the driver to place his hands on the steering wheel several times, but the 

driver did not respond. Id. 

 The driver eventually replied by asking the officer if he was going to shoot him, and then 

put the car in gear in an attempt to drive away but the car was too damaged to drive. Id. The 

officer reached in to turn off the ignition and the driver grabbed his flashlight. Id. The officer 

was able to pull the flashlight away and the driver turned off the engine. Id. 

 Before the officer was able to handcuff him, the driver began hitting the officer and 

grabbed him by his throat. Id. The officer tried to back away, but the driver clambered out the 

car window still holding onto the officer. Id. The driver yelled for the officer to shoot him and 

started swinging at the officer. Id. The officer hit the driver repeatedly with his flashlight, but 

the driver was undeterred and started kicking him in the stomach and groin. Id. 

 As the officer attempted to ward him off, the driver placed him in a bear hug and grabbed 

his gun. Id. The driver landed a solid blow to the officer’s head, cutting him and knocking off 

his glasses. Id. As they fought for control of the gun, the officer fired, hitting and killing the 

driver. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that where an officer is fighting with a suspect and losing it is 

not objectively unreasonable to use deadly force. Id. at 1185. 

 Relying on Billington, in Jensen v. Burnsides, No. CV-06-2356-PHX-GMS, 2008 WL 

4700020 (D. Ariz. Oct. 23, 2008), the court found an officer’s use of deadly force to be justified. 

After being taken to the police station, a handcuffed arrestee attacked the police officer who 

arrested him without provocation. 2008 WL 4700020, at *1. The arrestee knocked the officer to 

the floor and while he was semi-conscious, kicked the officer in the head. Id. The officer 

attempted to get up and the arrestee continued to kick and knee him in the head and torso. Id. 

The officer was able to get up and grab the arrestee’s handcuffs and called for help. Id. The 

arrestee spun away from the officer and slammed him into a wall and the officer fired his Taser 

at him several times. Id. The arrestee continued to fight with the officer and grabbed for the 

Taser. Id. at *1-2. As they were fighting for the Taser, the officer un-holstered his pistol and 

told the arrestee to stop or he would shot. Id. at *2. The officer fired, killing the arrestee. Id. 

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The court found that the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. Id. at *6. 

 It appears clear that in the Ninth Circuit an officer is entitled to use deadly force when he 

is engaged in hand to hand combat and losing. Other courts have also recognized an officer’s 

right to use deadly force when engaged in hand to hand combat. 

 In Estate of Grigsby v. Falat, No. 90C1956, 2011 WL 2297680 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2011), a 

case based upon facts different from those here, in dicta the court recognized situations in which 

an officer is put in reasonable fear for his life, such as when someone reaches for his weapon or 

is engaging in hand to hand combat. Id. at *2. Similarly, in Estate of Jackson v. City of 

Rochester, 705 F.Supp. 779 (W.D. N.Y. 1989), the Court recognized that requiring police 

officers to use minimum of violence when attempting to stop a suspect from using deadly force 

against police officers or others would expose police officers to unnecessary risks. Id. at 784. 

 In a case that the Court finds most similar to that here, Tom v. Voida, No. IP 89 857 C 

(S.D. Ind. May 3, 1991), an officer chased and violently struggled with a suspect when she 

caught him. Id. at *1. The suspect broke free and the officer continued to chase him. Id. The 

officer was able to catch him and another violent struggle ensued. Id. The officer backed away 

and told the suspect to stop but the suspect moved toward the officer and she fired a shot which 

missed. Id. The suspect stepped back but then came toward the officer again and she fired a 

second shot killing him. Id. The court found that at the time the shot was fired the officer was 

trying to protect herself and based upon these facts, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn 

was that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the suspect posed a real and 

imminent threat of serious harm to her. Id. at *6. It was not unconstitutionally unreasonable for 

the officer to shoot him. Id. 

 In this instance, it is not clearly established that Defendant Burgamy’s use of force 

violated the Fourth Amendment. 

 3. Defendant Burgamy Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity 

 Based on a review of the case law, it would not be clearly established that Defendant 

Burgamy would be violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment in the circumstances 

presented here. Accordingly, even if Defendant Burgamy had used excessive force in this 

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instance he would be entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established 

at the time he acted. 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists as to the Fourth Amendment claims raised in the first amended 

complaint. Accordingly, Defendant Burgamy is entitled to summary judgment on the Fourth 

Amendment claims. 

B. Monell Claim 

 Cause of Action Two in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges that Defendants City 

of Selma and Chief Whiteside “approved, ratified, condoned, encouraged and/or tacitly 

authorized the continuing pattern and practice of misconduct and/or civil rights violations by 

Selma Police Department officers.” (ECF No. 7 at ¶ 38.) Cause of Action Three alleges that 

Defendant City of Selma had “a custom, policy, or repeated practice of condoning and tacitly 

encouraging the abuse of police authority, and disregard for the constitutional rights of 

citizens[;]” (id. at ¶ 42); and that Plaintiff’s “damages and injuries were caused by customs, 

policies, patterns or practices of defendants City of Selma, Chief Whiteside, DOES 11 through 

20, and each of them, of deliberate indifference in the training, supervision and/or discipline of 

defendant Burgamy and DOES 1 through 10, and/or each of them[,]” (id. at ¶ 46). 

 Defendants move for summary judgment on the second and third causes of action against 

Defendants City of Selma and Chief Whiteside. While the Court agrees with Defendants that the 

allegations in the complaint are conclusory, Defendants have not brought a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. Defendants address the claims on the merits. Plaintiff does not address 

the motion for summary judgment on these causes of action in his opposition. 

 1. Custom or Policy 

 A local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a 

respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

691 (1978). Rather, a local government unit may only be held liable if it inflicts the injury 

complained of through a policy or custom. Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 

707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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 Generally, to establish municipal liability, the plaintiff must show that a constitutional 

right was violated, the municipality had a policy, that policy was deliberately indifferent to 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights, “and the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation.” Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); 

see also Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2002). In this 

instance, Plaintiff has not shown that his constitutional rights were violated. Since Plaintiff has 

failed to establish an element of the claim, Plaintiff cannot prevail on a Monell claim against 

Defendants City of Selma or Chief Whiteside. 

 Further, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendants City of Selma and Chief Whiteside were 

aware of repeated acts of misconduct and use of excessive force by Defendant Burgamy and 

other officers, Plaintiff has presented no such evidence to support the allegation that a custom or 

policy existed. Accordingly, there is no evidence before the Court of any other incident of 

excessive force or misconduct by Defendant Burgamy or any other law enforcement officer 

employed by the City of Selma. 

 b. Failure to Train 

 “A municipality’s failure to train an employee who has caused a constitutional violation 

can be the basis for § 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference 

to the rights of persons with whom the employee comes into contact.” Long v. County of Los 

Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006); see City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

388 (1989). “The issue is whether the training program is adequate and, if it is not, whether such 

inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent municipal policy.” Long, 442 F.3d at 

1186, see Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. The failure to train must be the moving force behind the 

constitutional violation. Id. at 391.

 Plaintiff has failed to show that his constitutional rights were violated, much less that 

Defendants City of Selma and Whiteside failed to train law enforcement officers. Further, while 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants City of Selma and Whiteside failed to train Defendant Burgamy 

on the use of force, Defendant Burgamy had attended a P.O.S.T. certified police academy and 

received basic P.O.S.T. certification. (U.F. 28.) Police officers in the City of Selma receiving 

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training o

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dence presen

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foregoing, I

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motion for s

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policy and pr

21 

T. complaint

1.) Plaintiff

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ita, 475 U.S

endants is un

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summary jud

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. at 586 n.11

ndisputed, th

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City of Selm

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ORDER

RED that: 

dgment is GR

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d failure to tr

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he Courtok fi

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