Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07198/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07198-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OPENGOV, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

GTY TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS INC., et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-07198-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Re: Dkt. No. 40

Plaintiff OpenGov, Inc. (“OpenGov”) sued Defendants GTY Technology Holdings Inc., 

GTY Govtech, Inc., GTY Technology Merger Sub, Inc. (“Merger Sub”), GTY Investors, LLC 

(“GTY Investors”), Harry L. You, and Stephen J. Rohleder (collectively, “Defendants”) in

Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Mateo, alleging four causes 

of action related to alleged misuse of Plaintiff’s proprietary information. (Dkt. No. 11-1, Ex. 1.)1

Defendants timely removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1332.2 (Dkt. Nos. 1 & 11.) On February 28, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion 

to remand, (Dkt. No. 22), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 35.) Now before the 

Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. No. 40.) After careful consideration of the 

parties’ briefing, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 

7-1(b), and GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion. 

DISCUSSION

District courts have discretion following issuance of an order remanding a removed case to 

state court to “require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, 

incurred as a result of removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 

 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

2 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 20 & 21.) 

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546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (“[A]n award of fees under § 1447(c) is left to the district court’s 

discretion”). “The appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c) should recognize the desire 

to deter removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the 

opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a right to 

remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria are satisfied.” Martin, 546 U.S. at 140. 

Thus, “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only 

where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. 

Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Id. at 141. 

Plaintiff seeks “an award of $148,663.78 in attorneys’ fees, plus any additional fees 

incurred in connection with [the instant] motion.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 4.) Defendants argue that they 

“reasonably removed this case on the basis of analogous fraudulent joinder case law and the 

relevant factual record,” and in any event, Plaintiff “has not shown that it is entitled to an 

extraordinary award of nearly $150,000 in fees.” (Dkt. No. 43 at 5, 13.) The Court addresses each 

argument in turn. 

I. Reasonableness of Removal

“Removal is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments 

lack merit, or else attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever remand is granted.” 

Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, “the degree of clarity in the relevant law at the 

time of removal is a relevant factor in determining whether a defendant’s decision to remove was 

reasonable.” Id.; see also Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citing with approval and applying the Seventh Circuit’s reasonableness test of whether the 

relevant case law clearly foreclosed the arguments in support of removal). The relevant law at 

issue here is the fraudulent joinder standard, which Grancare clarified before Defendants’ 

removal; specifically:

There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: “(1) actual fraud 

in the pleading of jurisdiction facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to 

establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state 

court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 

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573 (5th Cir. 2004)). Fraudulent joinder is established the second way 

if a defendant shows that an “individual[ ] joined in the action cannot 

be liable on any theory.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 

1318 (9th Cir. 1998). But “if there is a possibility that a state court 

would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of 

the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder 

was proper and remand the case to the state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d 

at 1046 (quoting Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 340 F.3d 1277, 

1279 (11 Cir. 2003) (per curiam)) (emphasis added). A defendant 

invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent 

joinder bears a “heavy burden” since there is a “general presumption 

against [finding] fraudulent joinder.” Id. (citations omitted). 

889 F.3d at 548 (alterations in original). In clarifying the fraudulent joinder standard, the 

Grancare court directly addressed and rejected the argument “that the correct standard [in 

analyzing fraudulent joinder] is close to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id. at 549 

(noting that “[a] claim against a defendant may fail under Rule 12(b)(6), but that defendant has not 

necessarily been fraudulently joined.”). The court found that the defendant’s arguments regarding 

“deficiencies in the complaint” (i.e., “‘lumping’” one defendant “with other defendants by alleging 

misconduct against all defendants collectively,” and failure to sufficiently plead claims) went “to 

the sufficiency of the complaint, rather than to the possible viability of [the plaintiffs’] claims,” 

and thus did “not establish fraudulent joinder.” Id. at 552. 

The Court accordingly noted in its February 28, 2019 order granting Plaintiff’s motion to 

remand that “[t]he standard for determining fraudulent joinder is not equivalent to a Rule 12(b)(6) 

standard.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 9 (citing Grancare, 889 F.3d at 549 (“A standard that equates 

fraudulent joinder with Rule 12(b)(6) conflates a jurisdictional inquiry with an adjudication on the 

merits.”)).) Instead, as stated in Grancare, “a federal court must find that a defendant was 

properly joined and remand the case to state court if there is a possibility that a state court would 

find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the [non-diverse] defendants.” (Id.

(quoting Grancare, 889 F.3d at 549 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)).) Further: 

The “no possibility” standard is “similar to the ‘wholly insubstantial 

and frivolous’ standard for dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for 

lack of federal question jurisdiction[,]” and “[t]he relative stringency 

of the standard accords with the presumption against removal 

jurisdiction, under which we ‘strictly construe the removal statute,’ 

and reject federal jurisdiction ‘if there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal in the first instance.’” [Grancare, 889 F.3d at 549-50]

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(quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566). If a federal court determines that a 

deficiency in the complaint regarding allegations against a nondiverse defendant could “possibly be cured by granting the plaintiff 

leave to amend,” it must remand the case to state court. See id. at 550 

(emphasis added).

(Dkt. No. 35 at 9-10.) 

The Grancare court issued its decision on April 26, 2018—over seven months before 

Defendants removed the action to this Court asserting that GTY Investors and Merger Sub were 

fraudulently joined and thus complete diversity of citizenship existed “between Plaintiff and the 

properly joined Defendants.” (See Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Thus, at the time of removal, the case law on 

the fraudulent joinder standard was settled in the Ninth Circuit. 

Defendants’ retort that the case upon which it relied in its original and amended notice of 

removal—Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001)—“was valid law” 

at the time of removal, “and remains valid law today” (Dkt. No. 43 at 7), is correct but unhelpful 

to its cause. Morris also applied a “no possibility of prevailing” test: the court held that the nondiverse defendant was not fraudulently joined because it was “abundantly obvious” that the 

plaintiff “could not possibly prevail on her negligent misrepresentation claim.” 236 F.3d at 1068; 

see also Grancare, 889 F.3d at 549 (noting that in Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 

1046 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit “emphasized . . . that a federal court must find that a 

defendant was properly joined and remand the case to state court if there is a ‘possibility that a 

state court would find that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action 

against any of the [non-diverse] defendants’”). Morris did not hold that a defendant is 

fraudulently joined merely because the plaintiff fails to state a claim.

Although Defendants’ opposition recognized the “no possibility” standard in a footnote, 

(see Dkt. No. 26 at 12 n.6), and asserted that “[t]o establish that joinder is fraudulent, a defendant 

need only show “that there is no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of 

action . . . against [it],” (see id. at 10-11 (quoting Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. Supp. 2d 

804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1998))), Defendants’ substantive arguments did not apply that standard.

Instead, their original and amended notice of removal was expressly based on the Rule 12(b)(6) 

failure to state a claim standard. (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 1 & 11 at ¶ 27 (“[b]ecause Plaintiff 

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OpenGov has failed to plead facts supporting any plausible claims against Merger Sub and GTY 

Investors, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court should find that the fraudulent 

joinder doctrine applies”). Defendants’ opposition characterized the allegations against GTY 

Investors and Merger Sub as “conclusory,” argued that the complaint contains “pleading gaps,” 

and asserted that “OpenGov has failed to explain the factual basis for any claims against GTY 

Investors, including the heightened factual details necessary to state a fraud claim.” (Dkt. No. 26 

at 9, 14.) Defendants repeated the same arguments at oral argument, asserting that the complaint 

“is conclusory and only conclusory and its lumps together a list of defendants and treats them all 

alike.” (Dkt. No. 40-7 at 12:2-4.) As the Court noted at the February 28, 2019 hearing, given that 

Defendants’ removal applied an improper standard for fraudulent joinder, the lack of removal 

jurisdiction was “not even a close question.” (See Dkt. No. 38 at 23:11-12.) 

The district court cases Defendants cite do not persuade this Court otherwise. (See Dkt. 

No. 43 at 9-12 (citing Tuttle v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 18-CV-01544-JCS, 2018 WL 

2412289, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2018); Lopez v. Allied Packing & Supply Inc., No. 16-cv00371-JSC, 2016 WL 3068392 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2016); Bercraft v. Ethicon, Inc., No. C00-

1474CRB, 2000 WL 1721056 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2000)).) 

The Tuttle court denied the request for attorneys’ fees, noting that the reasonableness of the 

defendant’s removal was a “close question[ ],” because of the defendant’s reliance on a case 

finding “fraudulent joinder under analogous circumstances” (i.e., finding a foreclosure trustee 

fraudulently joined), and the complaint’s “boilerplate allegations” suggesting “a real possibility” 

that the defendant in question was “in fact no more than a nominal party.” Id. Here, Defendants 

can point to no case finding fraudulent joinder under analogous circumstances and the Court made 

no assertions—in the February 2019 Order or at the hearing—regarding “a real possibility” that 

GTY Investors is a mere nominal party.

3

 

 

3 Defendants assert that the reasonableness of their removal is supported by this Court’s statement 

at oral argument that the GTY Defendants “may be ‘correct that [GTY Investors is] not a proper 

defendant.’” (Dkt. No. 43 at 11 (quoting Dkt. No. 40-7 at 24).) However, the Court neither said 

nor implied that Defendants “may be correct” that GTY Investors is not a proper defendant. The 

Court instead stated: “So you may be back because, of course, you have a year from the filing of 

the Complaint if you are correct that they are not a proper defendant. You get them knocked out . 

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Lopez does not help Defendants either. There this Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for 

attorneys’ fees after granting their motion to remand, concluding that the defendant’s removal 

position was not unreasonable for two reasons. First, the defendant’s “removal argument, while 

ultimately unpersuasive, was novel,” and “no case within the Ninth Circuit” had addressed “the 

precise issue raised.” 2016 WL 3068392, at *1 (noting that the defendant’s arguments against 

application of the case the Court ultimately deemed controlling “were not frivolous” because that 

case’s controlling nature was not “obvious”). Not so here. Grancare clearly sets forth the 

fraudulent joinder standard and in that case “the Ninth Circuit had considered and rejected the 

very arguments [Defendants] advanced.” Id. Second, the amount of fees sought in Lopez

undercut the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s removal position was without merit. Id. at 

*2 (concluding that the fee amount and hours expended “suggest[ed] that the issues presented 

were not objectively unreasonable, otherwise there would be no need for Plaintiffs to incur so 

much attorney time in briefing the issues.”). Defendants argue that the same logic applies based 

on the fee request and hours expended here. While Plaintiff’s extraordinary fee request suggests 

that the issue was complicated, as will be discussed below the fee request is unreasonable. In any 

event, the amount of fees sought does not persuade the Court in this case that Defendants’ removal 

was reasonable.

Bercraft—another pre-Grancare case—is similarly unpersuasive. There the court denied 

the plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees because the defendants’ argument regarding the 

fraudulent joinder of non-diverse defendants was “not wholly without merit.” 2000 WL 1721056, 

at *6. This Court cannot draw the same conclusion here.

In sum, the Court concludes that Defendants’ removal was objectively unreasonable 

because they did not apply the governing law on fraudulent joinder, and instead, based their 

removal on arguments directly foreclosed by Grancare. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ 

fees under section 1447(c). See Martin, 546 U.S. at 141. The Court must next address whether 

Plaintiff’s requested fee award is reasonable. It is not. 

 

. . on demurrer. But I don’t think it comes close to meeting the Grancare standard.” (Dkt. No. 

40-7 at 24:18-22 (emphasis added).) 

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II. Amount Requested

To calculate an award of attorneys’ fees, district courts apply “the lodestar method, 

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ryan v. 

Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424, 433 (1983)). “A reasonable hourly rate is ordinarily the prevailing market rate in the relevant 

community.” Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in 

addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing 

in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and 

reputation.” Camancho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The party requesting fees also bears “the burden of 

submitting billing records to establish that the number of hours” requested are reasonable. 

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). The number of hours should 

not exceed the number of hours reasonable competent counsel would bill for similar services. 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Courts may reduce the hours expended “where documentation of the 

hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are 

deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 

1210 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34). 

The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors courts should consider in determining the 

reasonableness of the number of hours expended and the hourly rate charged, including: (1) the 

“experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney”; (2) “the outcome of the results of the 

proceedings”; (3) “the customary fees”; and (4) “the novelty or the difficulty of the question 

presented.” Id. (citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975),

abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)). 

As previously discussed, Plaintiff requests “an award of $148,663.78 in attorneys’ fees, 

plus any additional fees incurred in connection with [the instant] motion.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 4.) In 

support of the requested amount, Plaintiff’s counsel submits a declaration attesting to the 

following fees “incurred as a result of [Defendants’] removal of this action”:

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Motion to Remand: $93,772.51 (127.375 hours)

Opposition to Motion to Transfer: $26,302.50 (39.625 hours)

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss: $15,059.38 (24.5 hours)

Instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees: $13,529.39 (22.25 hours)

(Dkt. No. 40-1 at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s counsel further provides the billing rates of the attorneys and 

paralegals who worked on this case, as follows:

John Keker (partner): $1,500 per hour

Jeff Chanin (partner): $1,075 per hour

Dan Jackson (partner): $775 per hour

Nicholas Goldberg (partner): $700 per hour

Ellison Wada (paralegal): $290 per hour

Sarah Herbert (paralegal): $250 per hour

(Id. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s counsel submits a “billing summary spreadsheet” detailing the work 

performed by each of the above-named individuals, with the majority performed by Dan Jackson 

and Nicholas Goldberg. (Id. at ¶ 10; see also Dkt. No. 40-2, Ex. A at 2-5.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s fee request is unreasonable, citing 10 cases from this 

District dating from 2008 to 2019 in which the plaintiffs requested attorneys’ fees ranging from 

$2,100 to $13,080. (See Dkt. Nos. 43-2 – 43-11, Exs. 1-10.) Defendants further argue that 

Plaintiff “include[s] two categories of fees that it simply cannot recover”—those incurred in 

opposing both GTY Defendants’ motion to transfer and Merger Sub and GTY Investors’ motion 

to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 43 at 16 (arguing that “courts in this Circuit have held that fees related to 

opposing motions to dismiss are not recoverable under . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), because they are 

only tangentially related to removal and would have been incurred if the litigation had remained in 

state court.”).) The Court agrees that the total amount requested is unreasonable in light of the 

relatively minor complexity of the motion to remand. Further, awarding fees for the instant 

motion and Merger Sub and GTY Investors’ motion to dismiss is unwarranted.

A. Reasonableness of Hours Expended

First, it is unclear why Plaintiff’s motion to remand required over 127 billable hours from

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four highly experienced litigation partners.

4

 The motion itself consists of 14 substantive pages 

setting forth the same overarching argument—the claims against GTY Investors and Merger Sub 

were not “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” and thus, Defendants failed to meet the Grancare

standard of demonstrating fraudulent joinder. (See Dkt. No. 22.) According to Plaintiff’s billing 

summary, counsel billed over 59 hours of work in researching, drafting, and editing the initial

motion.5 (Dkt. No. 40-2, Ex. A at 2-3.) Counsel then billed over 41 hours on the reply, (see Dkt. 

No. 40-2, Ex. A at 3-4), which consists of 8 pages, (see Dkt. No. 32). The remainder of time was 

spent preparing for, traveling to, and participating in the February 2019 hearing on all motions. 

Generally, district courts should defer to the “lawyer’s professional judgment as to how 

much [time] he or she was required to spend on the case.” Ryan, 786 F.3d at 763 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, however, Plaintiff provides no analogous caselaw 

where a similar number of hours were billed by similarly experienced attorneys and their staff in 

litigating a motion to remand, and the Court’s own research reveals none. On this record, the 

Court cannot conclude that 127 hours on the motion to remand constitutes time “reasonably 

expended,” see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, given the minor complexity of the arguments set forth 

and the hours billed for the other motions at issue, (see Dkt. No. 40-1 at ¶ 8). 

Mr. Jackson performed the majority of work conducting legal research, drafting, and 

editing the motion to remand and reply; his time entries for work on the motion and reply alone 

total 76.125 hours. (Dkt. No. 40-2, Ex. A at 2-4.) That amount of time is more than sufficient 

given the nature of the arguments presented and Mr. Jackson’s extensive litigation experience, 

(see Dkt. No. 40-5, Ex. D). The remaining hours expended in researching, drafting, and editing 

the motion and reply by Mr. Jackson and others were “excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” See

 

4 Mr. Keker has nearly four decades of litigation experience, and is a name partner of Keker, Van 

Nest & Peters LLP. (See Dkt. No. 40-3, Ex. B.) Mr. Chanin is a litigator with nearly three 

decades of experience. (See Dkt. No. 40-4, Ex. C.) Mr. Jackson has nearly two decades of 

litigation experience. (See Dkt. No. 40-5, Ex. D.) Mr. Goldberg is a litigator with nearly a decade 

of experience. (See Dkt. No. 40-6, Ex. E.) 

5 Plaintiff’s billing summary includes “block-billed” entries—single time entries for multiple 

motions (i.e., “Attention to editing and finalizing opposition to motion to transfer, motion to 

remand, and related pleadings.”), (see Dkt. No. 40-2, Ex. A). Plaintiff appears to have included 

the full time for such entries into its 127.375 hour total for hours expended on the motion to 

remand. 

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Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210. 

As for preparation for the February 2019 hearing on all motions, the billing summary 

includes block-billed entries for Mr. Jackson and Mr. Goldberg. (See Dkt. No. 40-2 at 4 (“Prepare 

for hearings on motion to remand, motion to dismiss, motion to transfer.”).) Those block-billed 

entries constitute 23.125 hours. The Court reduces by two-thirds the hours expended for such 

entries to reflect only preparation for the motion to remand (7.70 hours). The summary also 

includes one entry specifically for the motion to remand. (Id. (“Confer with Goldberg in 

preparation for remand hearing.”).) The Court includes that time (0.5 hours) in total. Similarly, 

the Court includes in total the hours expended for travel and oral argument (3.375 hours), because 

the parties argued only the motion to remand. In sum, 11.575 hours is reasonable for preparation, 

travel time, and oral argument. 

The Court concludes that 87.70 hours were reasonably expended on the motion to remand. 

Because the Court is including only the hours billed by Mr. Goldberg (8.9 hours) and Mr. Jackson

(78.8 hours), it addresses the reasonableness of only their rates, below. 

B. Reasonableness of Rates

Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the instant motion asserts that this is a “complex 

commercial case,” and “the rates of Keker, Van Nest & Peters are in line with those prevailing in 

the legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and expertise.” 

(Dkt. No. 40-1 at ¶ 10.) The Court agrees that the rates charged by Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Jackson 

are reasonable, given their extensive litigation experience and the status and reputation of their 

firm. See Superior Consulting Servs., Inc. v. Steeves-Kiss, No. 17-cv-06059-EMC, 2018 WL 

2183295, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) (noting that “district courts in Northern California have 

found that rates of $475-$975 per hour for partners and $300-$490 per hour for associates are 

reasonable.”). 

Mr. Goldberg is a partner at Keker, Van Nest & Peters practicing in the firm’s Contract & 

Commercial, Intellectual Property, Professional Liability, Securities, and White Collar Criminal 

litigation groups. (Dkt. No. 40-6, Ex. E.) His billing rate in this case was $700 per hour. (Dkt. 

No. 40-1 at ¶ 9.) Mr. Goldberg holds a bachelor’s degree from Brown University, and a J.D. from

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U.C. Berkeley School of Law. (Dkt. No. 40-6, Ex. E.) He has nearly a decade of experience as a 

litigator. (See id.) Mr. Goldberg’s rate is reasonable based on his experience and the average rates 

of law firm partners in the Bay Area. 

Mr. Jackson is a partner at Keker, Van Nest & Peters practicing in the firm’s Appellate, 

Consumer & Class Actions, Contract & Commercial, Intellectual Property, and Professional 

Liability litigation groups. (Dkt. No. 40-5, Ex. D.) His billing rate in this case was $775 per hour. 

(Dkt. No. 40-1 at ¶ 9.) Mr. Jackson holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the University of 

Southern California, as well as a Candidate of Philosophy degree from the University of 

California, San Diego. (Dkt. No. 40-5, Ex. D.) He received his J.D. from Yale Law School and 

has nearly two decades of litigation experience. (See id.) Mr. Jackson’s rate is reasonable based 

on his experience and the rates of comparably skilled and experienced lawyers in the Bay Area. 

In sum, the Court reduces the fees requested for the motion to remand by $26,472.51 and 

awards Plaintiff’s $67,300 in fees on the motion. Although this amount is still high, it is 

reasonable given the nature of the legal representation chosen by Plaintiff and Defendants alike. 

C. Fees for Work on Other Motions

As previously discussed, the total amount of fees requested includes fees for work 

performed on other motions; specifically, Plaintiff’s opposition to Merger Sub and GTY Investors’ 

motion to dismiss and opposition to Defendants’ motion to transfer, and Plaintiff’s instant motion 

for attorneys’ fees. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for such fees is improper under 

section 1447(c). The Court agrees that awarding Plaintiff attorneys’ fees for work opposing the

motion to dismiss is not warranted. Nor should Plaintiff receive fees for work on the instant 

motion for attorneys’ fees. The Court disagrees, however, as to fees related to the motion to 

transfer. 

The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue indirectly in Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., stating, 

in pertinent part:

The language of section 1447(c) refers to the payment of expenses 

“incurred as a result of the removal.” When defendants remove a case 

improperly, for example, they cause the plaintiffs to incur the expense 

of seeking a remand. That expense is a direct result of the removal, 

and section 1447(c) permits the plaintiffs to recoup that expense. In 

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contrast, other fees and costs incurred in federal court after a removal 

may be related only tenuously to the removal, as when they replace 

similar fees and costs that would have been incurred in state court if 

the litigation had proceeded there. Such fees and costs cannot be 

considered “incurred as a result of the removal.” 

64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 

Here, Plaintiff’s fees in opposing Merger Sub and GTY Investors’ motion to dismiss 

constitute “fees and costs that would have been incurred in state court if the litigation had 

proceeded there.” See id. Indeed, Defendants’ opposition to the instant motion asserts that “[t]he 

GTY Defendants intend to file a demurrer in California state court as to all claims against GTY 

Investors and Merger Sub.” (Dkt. No. 43 at 8 n.4.) Plaintiff’s argument that the “demurrer will be 

based on state law principles,” and thus, the fees incurred will not be similar to those incurred in 

opposition to the motion to dismiss, is unpersuasive. (See Dkt. No. 44 at 8 (citing Husko v. Geary 

Elec., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2004)).) 

As Baddie noted, the fees and costs sought need not be identical, but only similar to those 

“that would have been incurred in state court if the litigation had proceeded there.” 64 F.3d at 

490. Defendants’ anticipated demurrer in state court will likely set forth similar arguments in 

seeking to dismiss all claims against Merger Sub and GTY Investors as those set forth here. The 

state court will obviously apply the California state law pleading standard as opposed to the 

federal standard, but the gravamen of Defendants’ argument will be the same: the complaint 

against Merger Sub and GTY Investors is deficient as a matter of law because it fails to state 

claims against those defendants. Further the legal standard on demurrer is similar to the standard 

for motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Compare Blank v. Kirwan, 

39 Cal. 3d 311, 318 (1985) (“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general 

demurrer, . . . [w]e treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not 

contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted), with Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that on motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) courts must accept all factual allegations as true but mere “labels and 

conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient). 

Thus, the fees incurred by Plaintiff in opposing the motion to dismiss here merely “replace[d]

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similar fees and costs that would have been incurred in state court if the litigation had proceeded 

there.” See Baddie, 64 F.3d at 490 (emphasis added). As such they were not “incurred as a result 

of the removal.” See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)). 

The $13,529.39 Plaintiff incurred for the instant motion for attorneys’ fees is also 

unwarranted. Instead of “reserv[ing] the right to [separately] move for its attorneys’ fees after the 

Court decide[d] th[e] motion” to remand, (see Dkt. No. 22 at 6 n.1), Plaintiff could have added a 

request for attorneys’ fees to its motion to remand. Indeed, Plaintiff had ample room in its motion 

to make such a request because the motion to remand contained only 14 pages of argument and the 

instant motion contains 9 pages of argument. See Civ. L.R. 7-2 (providing that motions cannot 

exceed 25 pages in length). Further, the 87.80 hours expended on the motion to remand could 

have accounted for the time spent on the instant motion. 

The Court is satisfied, however, that the fees arising out of Defendants’ motion to transfer

were incurred as a result of the removal. Defendants moved to transfer to the Southern District of 

New York, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings, based on the first-filed action in that district 

brought by GTY Holdings, New GTY, Mr. Rohleder, and Mr. You against OpenGov. (See Dkt. 

No. 8.) Defendants’ motion argued that transfer was warranted under the federal first-to-file rule, 

or alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Id.) The first-to-file rule and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 

apply only to transfers between federal district courts. Thus, based on the purely federal basis for 

transfer, Plaintiff’s fees in opposing the motion to transfer were not tenuously related to the 

removal, but were instead incurred as a result of removal because the motion could not have been 

brought in state court.

6

 See Baddie, 64 F.3d at 490 (noting that fees are unavailable under section 

1447(c) “when they replace similar fees and costs that would have been incurred in state court if 

the litigation had proceeded there.”). 

The hours expended (39.625)7and rates charged in opposition to the motion to transfer are 

 

6

It bears noting that the parties stipulated to a briefing schedule for Defendants’ motion to 

transfer, Plaintiff’s motion to remand, and Merger Sub and GTY Investors’ motion to dismiss 

providing that briefing on all motions would proceed concurrently and with overlapping deadlines, 

and all motions would be heard on the same date—February 28, 2019. (See Dkt. No. 18.) 

7 Plaintiff’s billing summary includes entries specific to Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to 

transfer, in the amount of 36.625 hours. (See Dkt. No. 40-2, Ex. A at 2-3.) Mr. Goldberg billed 

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reasonable. Plaintiff’s declaration does not specify how it determined the amount requested 

($26,302.50), but that figure is below the amount of fees corresponding to the actual hours 

expended on the opposition. The billing summary indicates that Mr. Goldberg performed the 

majority of the work on the opposition (33.125 hours on the opposition only, with an additional 

6.75 block-billed hours that included work on the motion to remand). (See Dkt. No. 40-2, Ex. A at 

2-3.) After reducing the block-billed entries by one-half, Mr. Goldberg is responsible for 36.5 of 

the hours expended on the opposition and $25,550 of the requested fees at his billing rate of $700 

per hour. The billing summary contains block-billed entries for work on the opposition completed 

by Mr. Jackson, in the amount of eight hours. After reducing those block-billed entries by onehalf, Mr. Jackson is responsible for 4 hours expended on the opposition and $3,100 in fees at his 

billing rate of $775 per hour. The combined fees of Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Jackson ($28,600) total 

more than the amount requested. Further, the fees requested also apparently do not reflect work 

performed by Mr. Keker, Mr. Chanin, or the firm’s paralegal, Mr. Wanda, or any work done in 

preparation for the February 2019 hearing. (Id. at 2-4.) 

Defendants argue that in requesting fees incurred in opposition to the motion to transfer, 

Plaintiff is impermissibly and “indirectly seeking fees related to its litigation of the first-filed 

action” in the Southern District of New York because “[m]any of the arguments OpenGov 

advanced in [its] opposition to the motion to transfer in this case also were used in OpenGov’s 

papers moving to dismiss” the action in that case. (Dkt. No. 43 at 17.) Defendants assert that 

Plaintiff is thus “prohibited from recovering fees related to the New York federal action under 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c), which permits recovery of only costs related to remanding an action that was 

originally filed in state court and then removed.” (Id.) Defendants cite no authority for this

argument, and the Court fails to see how a party’s use of similar arguments against the same 

opposing party in two separately filed cases based on the same underlying facts runs afoul of 

section 1447(c). 

 

33.125 of those hours, with the remainder billed by Mr. Wanda. (Id.) The billing summary also 

includes block-billed entries from Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Jackson that reference work done on the 

motion to transfer, in the amount of 14.75 hours, not including preparation for oral argument or 

review of Defendants’ removal papers by Mr. Keker and Mr. Chanin. (See id. at 2-4.) 

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***

In sum, the Court concludes that an award of $93,602.50 in fees is appropriate. This 

amount reflects a reasonable amount of time on a motion to remand that set forth one substantive 

argument of relatively minor complexity, and reflects a reasonable rate for work performed by law 

firm partners Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Jackson. (See Dkt. No. 40 at ¶¶ 9-10.) This amount also 

includes the reasonable hours expended and rates charged in connection with Plaintiff’s opposition 

to Defendants’ motion to transfer, which was “incurred as a result of the removal.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(c).8 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion for 

attorneys’ fees. Defendants are ordered to pay Plaintiff fees and costs in the total amount of 

$93,602.50.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 40. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

 

8 Defendants also argue in a footnote that Plaintiff’s “moving papers are carefully drafted to avoid 

stating that OpenGov actually was billed for and paid the fees sought in this motion.” (Dkt. No. 

43 at 17 n.11.) Defendants, however, do not cite any authority that would make such facts 

material to resolution of the fees issue. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 

(9th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing 

party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”) (emphasis added); 

Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The fee applicant bears the 

burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit 

evidence in support of those hours worked.”) (emphasis added); see also In re Washington Pub. 

Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The party petitioning for attorney’

fees bears the burden of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have 

been expended.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

May 7, 2019

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