Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01199/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELAINE ROLAND-WARREN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09 CV 1199 JM (WMc)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REMAND

Doc. No. 8

v.

SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING, INC.;

SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING

MANAGEMENT, INC.; TERRY BROWN;

CHER HORST; RAJ D’SOUZA; and DOES

1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff Delaine Roland-Warren (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in the

Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego, raising claims for racial

discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge under the state’s Fair Employment and Housing

Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq., and for defamation, all stemming from her employment

relationship with Defendant Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (Doc. No. 1, Exh. 1, “Compl.”) Defendants

filed an Answer to the Complaint on June 1, 2009. (Doc. No. 1, Exh. 4.) On June 2, 2009, Defendants

timely removed the action to federal court. (Doc. No. 1.)

In their Notice of Removal, Defendants claim federal subject matter jurisdiction based on

diversity. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(b). Defendants allege the amount in controversy exceeds

Case 3:09-cv-01199-JM-WMC Document 13 Filed 08/04/09 Page 1 of 12
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 Plaintiff does not dispute the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 threshold required

for diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b).

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$75,000,1 the Sunrise corporate defendants are not California citizens as suggested by Plaintiff, and

the California citizenship of the individual defendants should be disregarded because they were

fraudulently joined. (Doc. No. 1 at 2-8.) At the court’s request (Doc. No. 4), Plaintiff submitted an

opposition to the Notice, styled as a Motion for Remand and considered by the court as such. (Doc.

No. 8, “Mot.”) Defendants filed an opposition to the Motion on July 7, 2009. (Doc. No. 10,

“Opp’n.”)

For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand and

DISMISSES the defamation claims against Defendants Terry Brown, Cher Horst, and Raj D’Souza

without prejudice.

I. Background

The Sunrise organization provides senior living services across the United States, Canada, the

United Kingdom, and Germany. (Opp’n at 6.) The independent living and assisted living services

are offered through senior facilities called “communities.” (Id.) Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.

(“Sunrise”) develops facilities for itself, for joint ventures, or for third parties. (Id.) Sunrise Senior

Living Management, Inc. (“SSLM”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sunrise which “enters into

operating contracts with the owners of the senior living physical facilities.” (Id.) 

According to the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff, an African-American woman, was

employed with Sunrise through a temporary agency from February 13, 2006 to late March 2007.

(Compl. ¶¶ 6, 12, 14.) Plaintiff was initially hired as a Charge Nurse, but was promoted in May 2006

to Director of Staff Development at a higher pay rating. (Compl. ¶ 9.) After her promotion, Plaintiff

covered additional nursing shifts at her elevated hourly rate. (Id.) However, in September 2006,

Plaintiff noticed her pay had been reduced to the original Charge Nurse level and that other nonAfrican-American nurses received higher pay. (Id.) Plaintiff complained about the alleged

discriminatory treatment to several Sunrise managers and directors, including the named individual

defendants, without success. (Id.) On September 24, 2006, Plaintiff was demoted from her

management position to that of a Licensed Vocational Nurse. (Id.)

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According to Plaintiff, in January 2007, she received unjustified reprimands for being late to

work and for failing to transcribe lab orders, while other Licensed Vocational Nurses who were not

African-American received no reprimands for more serious transgressions. (Id.) To avoid being

subjected further to the alleged discriminatory treatment, Plaintiff changed her status to part-time oncall. (Id.) Throughout February 2007, Plaintiff was not assigned any shifts despite informing Sunrise

regularly of her availability. (Compl. ¶ 12.) When Plaintiff called Defendant D’Souza, Executive

Director of the facility, for an explanation, she was informed that she had been terminated because she

had not worked any shifts. (Id.) Plaintiff’s temporary agency told her “D’Souza had requested that

plaintiff not be sent to the Sunrise facility.” (Id.) Another Sunrise employee asked “Luz,” the

Director of Nurses, why Plaintiff had not been assigned nursing shifts and was told, in essence, “We

don’t need that kind of help here.” (Id.)

Plaintiff contends the defendants neither investigated her complaints about racial

discrimination and retaliation nor took any corrective action. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The intolerable working

conditions allegedly forced Plaintiff’s constructive termination on March 28, 2007. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges the defendants made defamatory statements about her, communicating

“in substance, the innuendos that plaintiff is incompetent, untrustworthy, and unfit for a management

position.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff believes Defendants published the statements to, among others,

“Rhona Jones, Carol Treadway, Terry Brown, Peggy Tyson, Cher Horst, Ruth Sills, Raj D’Souza,

Jennifer Delise, Luz (LNU), Nancy Bright, Rick (LNU), Norelle Johnson, Cheryl Martinez, [and]

Gayle Thomas....” (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff offers that the publications occurred between August 2006

and the date of her complaint. (Compl. ¶ 22.)

II. Citizenship of Corporate Defendants

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Sunrise and SSLM are both incorporated under

California law with their principal places of business in California. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Defendants counter

that neither Sunrise corporation is a California citizen for diversity purposes. (Not. ¶ 8.) As the

parties’ arguments focus on parent company Sunrise, the court assumes for purposes of this motion

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2

 Plaintiff mentions she was unable to find specific information regarding SSLM’s facility

locations. (Mot. at 4, fn. 1.) As mentioned above, SSLM is headquartered in Virginia and manages

contractual obligations for the assisted living organization.

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that SSLM is not a California citizen.2

 A. Legal Standards

For diversity purposes, “a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has

been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business....” 28 U.S.C. §

1332(c)(1). Defendants offer Sunrise is a Delaware corporation. (Not. ¶ 8.) In her Motion, Plaintiff

has apparently conceded this point. However, Plaintiff pursues the theory that Sunrise’s principal

place of business is indeed California rather than Virginia, where Sunrise’s corporate headquarters

are located.

To determine a corporation’s principal place of business, the parties agree Ninth Circuit courts

first apply the “place of operations test.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 557 F.3d 1026, 1028

(9th Cir. 2009); Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001)(per

curiam). Under this test, the court determines whether one state “contains a substantial predominance

of corporate operations.” Davis, 557 F.3d at 1028. If so, that state is the deemed the principal place

of business. Otherwise, the court moves to the “nerve center test,” under which the state housing the

majority of the corporation’s executive and administrative functions is the principal place of business.

Id.; Indus. Techtonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990).

Factors relevant to the “place of operations” inquiry include the “location of employees,

tangible property, production activities, sources of income, and where sales take place[,]” as well as

the location of the corporation’s executive and administrative offices. Davis, 557 F.3d at 1028; Tosco,

236 F.3d at 500, 502 (citing Indus. Techtonics, 912 F.2d at 1094). Although courts have not precisely

defined “substantial predominance” in this context, the determination “plainly requires a comparison

of that corporation’s business activity in the state at issue to its business activity in other individual

states.” Tosco, 236 F.3d at 500. To satisfy the test, “the corporation’s activity in one state must be

‘substantially larger’ than the corporation’s activity in any other state.” Davis, 557 F.3d at 1029

(quoting Tosco, 236 F.3d at 500). Notably, “when a corporation has operations spread across many

states, the nerve center test is usually the correct approach.” Davis, 557 F.3d at 1029.

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3

 Plaintiff requests the court take judicial notice of statistics provided in motion exhibits 1-6,

documented on pages from Sunrise’s 2008 10-K filing. (Mot., Decl. of Walter H. Root, ¶ 8.)

Jurisdiction is assessed as of the date of removal which was June 2, 2009. Ghaderi, 136 F.Supp.2d

at 1045 fn. 3. Defendants provide statistics as of June 26, 2009, a date more relevant to the present

motion than the December 31, 2008 fiscal year-end date reflected in the 10-K filing. The court

therefore declines to take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s data because it is less relevant to the issue at

hand. Furthermore, the statistics provided by each party reflect roughly the same distribution of

activity among individual states and thus, reliance on Defendants’ figures would not significantly alter

Plaintiff’s statistical arguments. For these reasons, Defendants’ figures are recited in the present

analysis.

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The court also notes the burden of persuasion on this issue falls on “the party seeking to invoke

the court’s diversity jurisdiction.” Ghaderi v. United Airlines, Inc., 136 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1045

(N.D.Cal. 2001) (citing Indus. Techtonics, 912 F.2d at 1092. Thus, employing the Tosco test, the

defendants bear the burden of showing Sunrise is not a California citizen.

 B. Analysis

In evaluating whether California hosts a “substantial predominance” of Sunrise’s corporate

activities, the court reviews the distribution of activities through the comprehensive data provided by

Defendants.3 The Sunrise evidence on its U.S. operations is as follows:

1) Communities (374): California, 56 (14.97%); New Jersey, 28 (7.49%); Illinois, 25 (6.68%);

Virginia, 24 (6.42%); Pennsylvania, 23 (6.15%); Ohio, 20 (5.35%); and Georgia, 18 (4.81%).

2) Residents (35,423): California (14.33%); New Jersey (7.90%); Virginia (7.89%); Illinois

(6.58%); Florida (6.50%); Pennsylvania (5.77%); and Maryland (4.91%).

3) Employees (35,336): California (14.28%); Virginia (8.13%); New Jersey (7.46%); Illinois

(7.27%); Pennsylvania (5.73%); New York (5.47%); and Maryland (4.93%).

4) Property Owned or Operated (32 million sq. ft.): California (14.17%); Virginia (9.29%);

Florida (8.31%); Maryland (6.86%); New Jersey (6.53%); Illinois (6.02%); and Pennsylvania

(5.90%).

5) Sales Revenue ($2.1 billion): California (15.88%); New Jersey (8.31%); Illinois (7.60%);

Virginia (7.44%); Pennsylvania (5.77%); New York (5.59%); and Maryland (4.99%).

(Opp’n, Decl. of Maryann R. Owen.)

Plaintiff argues California meets the “place of operations test” because twice as many Sunrise

communities are in California than in New Jersey, the second highest domestic representation. (Mot.

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at 4.) In addition, Plaintiff points out there are approximately 78% more residents in Sunrise’s

California facilities than in second-place Virginia. (Id.) While Plaintiff suggests these numbers

represent Sunrise’s significantly greater exposure to litigation in California, her analysis does not take

the figures into the context advocated by the Ninth Circuit. 

Plaintiff relies primarily on Ghaderi, where the court compared United Airlines’ business

activity in California and Illinois, two states which together accounted for more than 50% of the

company’s employees, passengers, assets, and revenues. Ghaderi, 136 F.Supp.2d at 1045-46. The

Ghaderi court noted that where a corporation has a high concentration of its activity in two states, the

gap between the two need not be substantial for one to pass the Tosco test. Id. at 1047. Although

United was headquartered in Illinois, the court ultimately concluded California was its place of

operations. Id. at 1046-47. Here, as Sunrise’s operations are not concentrated in one or two states,

Ghaderi’s facts are distinguishable.

“The substantial predominance test does not require that a majority of corporate operations

occur in a single state, . . . [b]ut the test requires a ‘substantial’ predominance, not mere

predominance.” Davis, 557 F.3d at 1029. In Davis, cited by Sunrise, Defendant Best Buy had the

largest percentage of activity in California in terms of stores (11%), sales (13%), and employees

(13%). Davis, 557 F.3d at 1032. Texas had the next largest proportion in each category, at 9 to 10%.

Id. at 1032-33. The court found the company’s predominance in California to “roughly reflect

California’s larger population[,]” observing the company’s per capita exposure to consumers was

actually less in California than elsewhere. Id. at 1029, 1030 fn. 4. Considering the rationale for the

diversity statute, the Davis court observed that if raw numbers alone could confer California

citizenship on a corporation, “nearly every national retailer–no matter how far flung its

operations–will be deemed a citizen of California....” Id. at 1029-30. The court reversed the district

court’s ruling that California had satisfied the Tosco “place of operations” test. Id. at 1030.

Similarly, in Ho v. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 143 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1167 (N.D.Cal. 2001),

the court found no state satisfied the place of operations test for Defendant Ikon because none held

a “substantial percentage of Ikon’s business activity.” Further, there were “a good many states in

which the level of Ikon’s activity, measured as a percentage of all the corporation’s business, [was]

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only a few percentage points less than in California.” Id. at 1167.

Finally, in Arellano v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.Supp.2d 1102 (S.D.Cal. 2003), a case

out of this district, the court considered Home Depot’s place of operations. Home Depot maintained

stores in 49 states, with 15.1% of its employees in California, 9.3% in Georgia, 6.9% in New York,

and 6.9% in Texas. Arellano, 245 F.Supp.2d at 1106. The court found Home Depot had no

substantial predominance in any state. Id. at 1108. Where a national corporation’s contacts are

“spread relatively evenly among many states,” a small margin of difference among several states is

insufficient to show a substantial predominance of activity in any one state. Id. at 1107. Furthermore,

“[b]ecause California is the state with the largest population, business activity on a national scale can

be expected to be greater in California.” Id. (citing Ho, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1167-68). The court held

Ikon’s place of operations was not California.

Upon review of the statistics in the present case, the court finds the distribution of Sunrise’s

business activities closely parallels that observed in Davis, Ho, and Arellano. No one state

substantially predominates over the others in terms of property, employees, customers, or sales

revenue. Once the population differentials among the most heavily represented states are considered,

other states actually contend for the top spot. For example, Sunrise maintains one senior living

community for every 656,369 residents of California, yet one for every 323,712 Virginia residents.

(Opp’n at 12.) 

Muddying the waters further, the court must also take into account the location of Sunrise’s

executive and administrative functions. Tosco, 236 F.3d at 502. Here, it is undisputed that Sunrise

maintains all of its executive and administrative functions at its corporate headquarters in northern

Virginia, including its executive offices and its “finance, development, accounting, purchasing,

marketing, training, human resources, information systems, and legal departments.” (Opp’n at 14-15,

Decl. of Maryann R. Owen, ¶ 15.) Sunrise does not maintain any regional offices. (Opp’n, Owen

Decl., ¶ 17.) The company has strong historical ties to and significant brand recognition in the Fairfax

County area. (Opp’n ¶¶ 4-6, 9.)

Based on the preceding analysis, the court finds no state contains a substantial predominance

of Sunrise’s business activities. Thus, the court defers to the “nerve center” test for determining

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4

 As many courts have noted, “fraudulent” or “sham” joinder is a term of art and is not

intended to reflect the Plaintiff’s mental state in joining the particular defendants. McCabe v. Gen.

Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Sunrise’s principal place of business. Indus. Techtonics, 912 F.2d at 1092. As discussed above, the

evidence demonstrates the bulk of Sunrise’s executive and administrative functions take place in

Virginia. Thus, the court concludes Sunrise is a citizen of Delaware and Virginia, and that diversity

of citizenship exists between it and Plaintiff, a California citizen.

III. Fraudulent Joinder of Individual Defendants

In the Complaint, individual defendants Raj D’Souza, Cher Horst, and Terry Brown are

charged only with defamation. Both Plaintiff and Defendants recognize these defendants are

California citizens for diversity purposes. Sunrise argues these defendants were fraudulently joined4

in the action and their citizenship should be disregarded in evaluating whether complete diversity

exists. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).

 A. Legal Standards

“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party seeking removal...and the

removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Emrich v. Touch Ross & Co., 846

F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921)

and Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass’n, 731 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1984)). However, a

plaintiff may not avoid the reach of the diversity statute by joining a non-diverse defendant without

stating a viable claim against that defendant. Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th

Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963 (1998). Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the key question for the

court is whether the Complaint “fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the

failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.” Morris, 236 F.3d at 1067. The standard

parallels that used in deciding motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 1067-68; Ritchey, 139

F.3d at 1319-20; McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339. Thus, the complaint’s “factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 556 (2007) (allegations must provide “plausible grounds to infer” that plaintiff is entitled to

relief). Furthermore, the claim fails if it lacks facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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Sunrise argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for defamation against the individual

defendants because she has not sufficiently identified any statements which would survive the

applicable statute of limitations. “Under California law, although a plaintiff need not plead the

allegedly defamatory statement verbatim, the allegedly defamatory statement must be specifically

identified, and the plaintiff must plead the substance of the statement.” Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger,

357 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1216 (C.D.Cal. 2004) (citing Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.3d 442, 458 (1981),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981)). “Even under liberal federal pleading standards, ‘general

allegations of the defamatory statements’ which do not identify the substance of what was said are

insufficient.” Id. (citing Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1303, 1314

(N.D.Cal. 1997)). The applicable statute of limitations for a defamation claim under California law

is one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c).

 B. Analysis

As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleges that while she was employed at Sunrise, her temporary

agency told her “D’Souza had requested that plaintiff not be sent to the Sunrise facility,” and that

Sunrise Director of Nurses “Luz,” told another Sunrise employee, “We don’t need that kind of help

here.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) As these statements were made prior to Plaintiff’s departure in March 2007,

they fall outside the limitations period and thus, do not provide an adequate basis for Plaintiff’s

defamation claim.

Plaintiff offers the defendants communicated statements to a number of possible recipients

which suggested, “in substance, the innuendos that plaintiff is incompetent, untrustworthy, and unfit

for a management position.” (Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25.) Plaintiff alleges these statements were published

sometime between August 2006 and the date of her Complaint. (Compl. ¶ 22.)

Sunrise argues these contentions lack a sufficient factual predicate to survive dismissal.

(Opp’n at 21-23.) Plaintiff contends she should not be required to provide the particulars at this stage

because the “exact details of each defamatory statement are better known to the defendants who made

them.” (Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff relies on Okun, supra, and Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827

(1954), for this proposition, but fails to note the factual distinctions between those cases and her own.

In Okun, the court specifically noted the complaint did provide sufficient details regarding the time,

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place, and recipients of the statements. Okun, 29 Cal.3d at 458. Such allegations, along with a

detailed substantive description of the allegedly defamatory statements, put the defendants on

sufficient notice of the charges against them. Id. Similarly, in Schessler, although the court allowed

the plaintiff to support part of her claim with contentions that statements were made at “various times

and places to numerous persons,” the complaint was packed with specific details of related statements.

Schessler, 125 Cal.App.2d at 830.

In contrast, Defendants direct the court to three cases which stand on comparable factual

footing with the present case. In Silicon Knights, the plaintiff company alleged the defendants had

made “false and defamatory statements” to the company’s customers about the “quality and

reliability” of its products, the “competence and ability” of its employees, and its “cooperation and

ability to work with customers, suppliers,” or others in the industry. Silicon Knights, 983 F.Supp. at

1313-14. Although the plaintiff identified the speaker, time, place, and recipients of the statements,

the court dismissed the claim, finding the complaint set forth only “general allegations of the

defamatory statements and [did] not identify the substance” of what was said. Id. at 1314. In addition,

the statements appeared “to be expressions of opinion rather than factual assertions.” Id.

Although the two other cases cited by Defendants are unpublished, the court finds their

analyses informative. In Williams v. County of Los Angeles, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96769, at *14-15

(C.D.Cal. Jun. 19, 2006), the plaintiff claimed the defendant made “defamatory” statements about her

“work performance, ethics, veracity, alleged criminal conduct and competency.” Even though the

statements clearly related to the plaintiff’s work performance, the assertions were too vague to put the

defendant on fair notice of the basis for the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at *15-17. Without more specific

factual allegations regarding the statements’ substance or the context in which they were made, the

court was unable to assess whether the statements were privileged or whether they were intended as

opinion or factual assertion. Id. at *16. Finally, in Jones v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 13978, at *15 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 14, 2006), the plaintiff claimed the defendant made false

comments which “expressly and impliedly stated that Plaintiff was dishonest, lazy, incompetent and

a poor performer.” The plaintiff noted that while “the precise dates of these publications are not

known...[she] believes that the publication may have started in December 2003” and were continuing.

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Id. at *15, 19. The Jones court dismissed the claim because “[n]owhere in the FAC does Ms. Jones

provide any reference to the speakers of the defamatory communications, the recipients, the timing,

or the context in which they were made, sufficient to provide [the defendant] sufficient notice of the

issues to enable preparation of a defense.” Id. at *17. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s general belief that

republication of the statements was ongoing did not parry the one-year statute of limitations. Id. at

*19.

In the present case, Plaintiff merely alleges the defendants made statements suggesting she was

“incompetent, untrustworthy, and unfit for a management position” and that the statements were made

sometime between August 2006 and March 17, 2009, the date she filed her Complaint. (Compl. ¶¶

22-23, 25.) Plaintiff does not identify the time, place, particular speakers, or recipients of these

statements, nor does she mention their substance or context. The court cannot determine whether the

statements were intended as opinion or fact or whether they were privileged. The assertions fail to

put Defendants on notice of the factual underpinnings of Plaintiff’s claim.

Plaintiff mentions she will seek leave of court to amend her complaint when discovery reveals

certain details of the alleged defamation. (Compl. ¶ 25.) However, fraudulent joinder is assessed

based on the assertions in the complaint, not on the potential yield of future discovery. TPS Utilicom

Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 223 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1103 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (“[T]he propriety of removal

is determined at the time of removal – not according to the factual allegations stated at a later date.”).

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for defamation against California citizen

defendants Raj D’Souza, Cher Horst, and Terry Brown, the court concludes these defendants have

been fraudulently joined in the action. As complete diversity exists among the remaining defendants,

this court enjoys federal subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and removal was proper. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(b).

IV. Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions

Plaintiff requests the court order for Defendants to pay costs and attorney fees incurred by

Plaintiff as a result of the removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Mot. at 8.) Because removal was

proper, the court declines to make such an award.

//

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V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for remand is DENIED. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claim for defamation against Raj D’Souza, Cher Horst, and Terry Brown is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

DATED: August 4, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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