Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01754/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01754-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1754

___________

Ricky Rodgers, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Maco Management Co., Inc.; Janet *

Milam, in her individual and official *

capacity, Property Manager; Jason * [UNPUBLISHED]

Maddox, in his individual and official *

capacity, Manager; Shelia Cobb, in her *

individual and official capacity, *

Assistant Property Manager, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 22, 2007

Filed: February 27, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Ricky Rodgers appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in his suit against his former employer, Maco Management Co., Inc. (Maco), and

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several Maco employees (collectively, defendants), alleging race and sex

discrimination under Title VII and violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rodgers. See Kratzer v. Rockwell

Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review). 

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Rodgers’s race

discrimination claim because he failed to raise such a claim in his administrative

charge. See Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684-86 (8th Cir. 1996)

(although pro se charges of discrimination are construed liberally, court may not

create claim not made administratively; rejecting discrimination claim as

administratively unexhausted where claim was not related to administrative charge).

We also agree with the district court that Rodgers did not present a triable sex

discrimination claim, despite his disparate treatment theory, because Maco proffered

a non-discriminatory reason for dismissing Rodgers (his refusal to perform work) and

Rodgers failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether that proffered reason was

a pretext for sex discrimination: the female employee with whom he compared

himself was not similarly situated in all relevant respects. See Pope v. ESA Servs.,

Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1009 (8th Cir. 2005) (pretext may be demonstrated with evidence

that similarly situated employees outside of protected class received more favorable

treatment). To the extent Rodgers maintains that it was unfair for Maco to terminate

him for refusing to perform independent contract work beyond his regular

employment duties, we note that unfair treatment per se does not give rise to a Title

VII cause of action. See Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 812

(8th Cir. 2005) (while plaintiff may present “a sympathetic situation in which the

employer’s judgment in imposing discipline may appear poor or erroneous to

outsiders,” court’s role in Title VII case is to consider whether adverse employment

action was based upon protected factor, not whether action was unduly harsh).

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Finally, because Maco is undisputedly a private, non-governmental employer,

we hold that the district court correctly dismissed Rodgers’s Fourteenth Amendment

due process claim. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974)

(private action not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections);

United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 680 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he governmental

employer is subject to certain constitutional due process restrictions in terminating

employees having a property interest in their positions, restrictions that are not

constitutionally imposed on the private employer.”). 

 Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

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