Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02656/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02656-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDOLFO GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv2656-WQH-KSC

ORDER

vs.

JEFF MILLER

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“Motion

to Proceed IFP”) filed by Defendant Jeff Miller. (ECF No. 2). 

On September 14, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint in the

San Diego County Superior Court, case number 37-2014-00032404-CL-UD-CTL. 

(ECF No. 1-2). The Complaint alleges one cause of action for unlawful detainer. See

ECF No. 1-2). On November 7, 2014, Defendant, proceeding pro se, removed the case

to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1441 (ECF No. 1) and filed the

Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2). The Notice of Removal asserts that “[t]his action

is removable to the instant Court because it originally could have been filed in this

[C]ourt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441(a)/and or (b). The Complaint presents federal

questions.” (ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendant asserts that “the Complaint for Unlawful

Detainer was filed by the [P]laintiff for non-payment of rent. However, Defendant with

held [sic] rent due to [P]laintiff discriminating against [D]efendant by violating Fair

- 1 - 14cv2018-WQH-NLS

Case 3:14-cv-02656-WQH-KSC Document 3 Filed 11/17/14 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Housing Act and U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(A). (ECF No. 1 at 2-3).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 4.5. An action may proceed

despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177

(9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.” Smart v.

Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965).

In his affidavit, Defendant states that he is self-employed and his take-home pay

is $700.00, but did not indicate the pay period. (ECF No. 2 at 2). Defendant states that

he does any savings, IRA, money market, CD’s, or checking account. Id. Defendant

states that he owns a 2011 Jeep Patriot. Id. Defendant states that the automobile is

financed and he owes $12,000.00 on the automobile. Defendant states that he does not

receive income from any other source. Id. 2-3. Defendant does not indicate whether

he has any dependents or any other assets or items of value. Id. at 3.

The Court has reviewed the affidavit and finds that it is sufficient to show that

Defendant is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action. 

The Court grants the Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. Initial Screening of Complaint

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) is also subject to mandatory review and sua sponte dismissal to the

extent it “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). Additionally, “if the court determines at anytime that it lack subject matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Cal.

Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It has been

- 2 - 14cv2018-WQH-NLS

Case 3:14-cv-02656-WQH-KSC Document 3 Filed 11/17/14 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

long held that a judge can dismiss sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction.”); Compass Bank

v. Goble, 2012 WL 3229155 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012) (sua sponte remanding action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction after granting motion for leave to proceed IFP).

An action is removable to federal court only if it might have been brought there

originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and

as such “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not

to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). The court must presume that a case

lies outside of its limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing jurisdiction is on

the party asserting it. Id. The removal statute is strictly construed against removal

jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). “Federal

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

instance.” Id.

“[D]istrict courts ... have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The “federal

question” must be disclosed on the face of the complaint. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l

Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir.1998). “Under the

longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, this means that jurisdiction is proper ‘only

when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon

[federal law].’” Red Bluff Funding, LLC v. Gil, 2013 WL 1729662, at *2 (S.D. Cal.

Apr. 22, 2013) (citing Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (internal

quotation omitted). “It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks somewhere

inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under

federal law.” Vaden, 556 U.S. 49 at 70.

Defendant’s Notice of Removal asserts federal question jurisdiction as the basis

for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendant asserts that “the

Complaint for Unlawful Detainer was filed by the [P]laintiff for non-payment of rent. 

However, Defendant with held [sic] rent due to [P]laintiff discriminating against

- 3 - 14cv2018-WQH-NLS

Case 3:14-cv-02656-WQH-KSC Document 3 Filed 11/17/14 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

[D]efendant by violating Fair Housing Act and U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(A).” (ECF No. 1 at

2-3). Plaintiff's complaint asserts only one cause of action for unlawful detainer, which

is a state law claim. (ECF No. 1-2). The Court finds that the Notice of Removal does

not adequately state a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction because Defendant did

not show that Plaintiff’s Complaint is based on federal law. See Vaden, 556 U.S. 49 at

60 (“It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks somewhere inside the

parties' controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under federal law.”). 

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is

GRANTED and the action is REMANDED to the San Diego County Superior Court. 

DATED: November 17, 2014

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

- 4 - 14cv2018-WQH-NLS

Case 3:14-cv-02656-WQH-KSC Document 3 Filed 11/17/14 Page 4 of 4