Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00345/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00345-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 In a supplemental state law negligence claim, Pratt also 1

sued Applied Measurement Professionals, Inc. (“AMP”), a firm that

consulted on the content and grading of the test. The court

granted AMP’s motion for summary judgment on February 1, 2006. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS PRATT, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF

PHARMACY, et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 05-0345 DFL PAN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Thomas Pratt (“Pratt”) failed the pharmacist

licensing examination three times. In this action, he claimed

that the grading of the examination discriminated against him

because of his race. Defendants Patricia Harris (“Harris”), the

Executive Officer of the California State Board of Pharmacy

(“CSBP”) and Virginia Herold (“Herold”), Assistant Executive

Officer of the CSBP, succeeded on a motion for summary judgment.1

They now move for attorney’s fees in the amount of $98,093. For

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the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion for

a reduced amount of $67,616.90. 

I.

Pratt is an African-American male who has taken and failed

the CSBP license exam three times. (First Am. Verified Compl.

(“FAC”) ¶¶ 1, 4.) Each of the exams that Pratt took contained

two parts: (1) a multiple choice section (“Part 1”); and (2) a

short-answer essay section (“Part 2”). (Id. ¶ 4.) Pratt passed

Part 1 of each test, but failed Part 2. (Id.) 

Pratt alleged that the CSBP grading methodology had a

disparate impact on African Americans because the pass rate of

Caucasians was significantly greater than the rate for “people of

color.” (Id. ¶ 7.) However, Pratt had no statistics of his own,

and the CSBP does not compile statistics of pass rates based on

race. (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 3-6.) 

Pratt testified at his deposition that the statistics upon which

he relied in making the accusation of racial bias concerned the

pass rates of “foreigners” and did not show the race of any

examinee. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) Pratt further admitted that he did

not know how many African Americans passed or failed any of the

exams. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Pratt also alleged in his complaint that Harris and Herold

knew of the discrimination and “conspired with one another to

facilitate it.” (FAC ¶ 13.) Specifically, he claimed that

Harris and Herold knew that the subjective nature of Part 2 of

the exam allowed graders to grade Caucasians differently from

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others. (Id. ¶ 8.) However, Pratt admitted in his deposition

that this claim was based solely on his unsupported suspicion

that the graders had access to photos of the examinees. (SUF ¶

16.) In fact, graders do not have access to such photos, and

would have no idea of the race of the particular examinee. (Id.

¶ 18.) 

In short, all of plaintiff’s claims of disparate treatment

and disparate impact, based on race, were entirely unsupported. 

In opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion, Pratt

did not dispute any of these facts. Instead, he alleged for the

first time that defendants discriminated against African

Americans because they failed to compile or keep statistics of

pass rates based on race. (Opp’n to MSJ at 2.) To support this

claim, Pratt relied upon the expert declaration of Dr. John

Poggio. (Id.) 

The court rejected Pratt’s argument because: (1) Pratt

failed to disclose Poggio as an expert witness before the October

7, 2005 deadline set by the pre-trial scheduling order; (2) Pratt

did not plead in the complaint or assert in response to the

motion to dismiss that defendants had an affirmative duty to

compile statistics on the race of test takers and their pass

rates; (3) Pratt failed to cite or provide a copy of the sections

of the EEOC guidelines that defendants allegedly violated; and

(4) Pratt made no showing that a failure to keep statistics on

the race of test takers was tantamount to racial bias or

disparate impact in the design or administration of part 2 of the

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test. (4/7/2006 Order at 3-4.) 

Pratt also claimed that defendants intentionally

discriminated against him because several questions that he

answered correctly were marked as incorrect. (Opp’n to MSJ at 2-

4.) However, the court found that Pratt did not show how

defendants’ alleged grading errors demonstrated an intent to

discriminate because of his race when there was no evidence that

the graders had any knowledge of Pratt’s race. (4/7/2006 Order

at 4, n.2.) 

II.

Attorneys fees are only awarded to prevailing defendants in

section 1983 actions where “the plaintiff’s action is frivolous,

unreasonable, or without foundation.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.

5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173 (1980). “This test applies not only to the

time the suit is filed, but throughout the litigation.” Maag v.

Wessler, 944 F.2d 654, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, fees may be

assessed if a plaintiff continued to litigate the claim after it

clearly becomes “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct.

694 (1978).

A. The Merits of Pratt’s Action

Defendants argue that Pratt’s action was groundless because

he had no evidence at all to support his allegation that

defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of his

race. (Mot. at 8-9.) The complaint alleged that: (1) “Part Two

of the examinations was based on no reliable methodology” (Compl.

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¶ 6); (2) the grading scheme adversely impacted African Americans

such as Pratt as evidenced by a comparison between “the failure

rate of Caucasians/whites to the failure rate of people of color”

(Id. ¶ 7); (3) the subjective nature of the exam “allows the

graders to discriminate based on their perception that a person

is not American, or based on their perception that an individual

is of a different race, creed, or color than Caucasians/white”

(Id. ¶ 8); and (4) Harris and Herold knew of the discrimination,

intended it to occur, and conspired with each other to facilitate

it. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

At the time he filed the complaint, Pratt had no evidence to

provide even a tenuous basis for his allegations. While Pratt

claimed that the CSBP maintained statistics demonstrating the

disparity between the failure rate of Caucasians and people of

color, the CSBP did not keep such statistics and Pratt had no

reason to think that it did. (SUF ¶¶ 3-6.) As the court

discussed in its April 7, 2006 Order, Pratt admitted in his

deposition that he did not know how many African Americans passed

or failed any of the exams. (Id. ¶ 13.) Pratt also admitted

that he had no support for his assertion that Harris and Herold

knew of the discrimination. (Id. ¶ 16.) He based the claim

solely on his suspicion that the graders had access to examinees’

photos, which they did not. (Id. ¶ 16, 18.) The other facts

listed by Pratt also did not support a claim of intentional

discrimination. It is fair to conclude that Pratt had no

evidence of racial discrimination when he filed the action and

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26 The court also addressed these contentions on AMP’s motion 2

for summary judgment. The court found that none of them had

merit. (2/1/2006 Order at 6-10.) 

6

that he was unable to develop such evidence in the course of

discovery.

Nevertheless, Pratt still asserts that his complaint had

merit because his expert, Poggio, found that the CSBP should have

maintained statistics on minorities. (Opp’n at 2.) However, as

the court also noted in its April 7, 2006 Order, Pratt failed to

provide any evidence that failure to keep statistics is evidence

of intentional discrimination. (4/7/2006 Order at 4.) Moreover,

Poggio’s opinion was entirely different than the theory on which

this action was instituted and was not admissible evidence in any

event due to Pratt’s disregard of the scheduling order. (Id. at

3.) 

Pratt also points out in his opposition that his complaint

had merit because he introduced evidence that: (1) the CSBP

incorrectly scored his exams; (2) defendants decided to change

the passing point score of the exam from 63 to 67; and (3) the

exam did not have test specifications. None of these contentions

remotely suggests racial discrimination even were they supported

by evidence. 

2

For these reasons, the court finds that Pratt’s action was

frivolous, thereby justifying an award of attorney’s fees. 

B. The Amount of the Award

Defendants request a total of $98,093.00 in fees. The

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 This amount excludes the time spent on this motion and the 3

plaintiff’s state court action, as well as the amount already

charged to the California Office of Administrative Law. (Mot. at

10.) 

7

proper place to start for determining a reasonable fee is with

the lodestar amount. Hensley v. Eckert, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103

S.Ct. 1933 (1983). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the

total number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly

rate. Id. However, the court will “exclude from this initial

fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended.’” Id.

(citing S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976)). 

Defendants’ attorney, D.L. Helfat, provides a declaration

and a copy of his time sheets with this motion to support his

calculation of attorney’s fees. His declaration states that the

Attorney General’s Office’s billable rate was $139.00 per hour

for fiscal year 2004-05 and $146.00 per hour for fiscal year

2005-06. (Helfat Decl. ¶ 4.) This is a reasonable rate. See

Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., No. Civ-S-03-1843 DFL CMK,

2005 WL 3287233 at *4 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 28, 2005) (finding that

rates of $250.00 per hour for an experienced attorney and $150.00

per hour for an associate are reasonable for the Sacramento

area). 

According to Helfat’s declaration and time sheets, the AG’s

office spent 541.25 hours in 2004-05 and 95 hours in 2005-06 on

this case, totaling 636 hours. (Id. ¶ 5, Exs. A, B.) This leads 3

to a fee of $92,193.00. Helfat’s time sheets demonstrate that he

spent this time: (1) responding to many discovery requests; (2)

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researching the issues surrounding licensing examinations; (3)

reviewing and redacting numerous documents; (4) preparing

motions; (5) preparing for and attending hearings; and (6)

traveling to Sacramento for meetings, depositions, document

review, and expert consultation. (Mot. at 10-11; Helfat Decl. ¶

9.) Helfat also seeks $5,840.00, the estimated cost of bringing

this motion. 

Pratt raises several arguments against awarding these fees. 

First, Pratt argues that “[d]efendants are not entitled to claim

attorneys’ fees for [m]otions that were denied, or even partially

denied, or oppositions filed to [m]otions that were granted, or

even partially granted.” (Opp’n at 8 (citing Galen v. County of

Los Angeles, 322 F.Supp.2d 1045 (C.D.Cal. 2004).) Pratt asserts

that defendants should not recover fees for filing their motion

to dismiss and for opposing his motion to compel because

defendants did not succeed in either instance. (Opp’n at 6, 8.)

Pratt is half right. For the reasons stated below, the

court finds that time spent on the motion to dismiss should not

be awarded but that defendants are entitled to time spent

opposing the motion to compel. Therefore, the court will

subtract only the cost of pursuing the motion to dismiss from the

total fees requested. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them on two

grounds: (1) plaintiff’s claims were non-justiciable because the

court would have to usurp the State’s power to determine who

could be a licensed pharmacist; and (2) the complaint failed to

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state a claim. (6/27/2005 Order at 1.) Although the court

granted the motion in part, the bulk of the motion was without

merit. First, Pratt’s claims were clearly justiciable. If the

court had found that Part 2 was intentionally discriminatory and

did not further the State’s legitimate licensing function, it

would have the authority to grant some kind of relief to Pratt,

including licensure. (Id. at 3.) The complaint also stated an

intentional discrimination claim given the allegations. (Id. at

6.) 

Because the motion to dismiss did not further defendants’

legal position, the court will subtract the time spent on the

motion from the total hours billed by Helfat. According to

Helfat’s timesheets, Helfat spent 48.5 hours on the motion from

February to June in the 2004-05 fiscal year. Thus, the time

spent for 2004-05 will be reduced from 541.25 hours to 492.75

hours.

As to the motion to compel, Pratt sought discovery of: (1)

the names and addresses of the judges that contributed to setting

the passing score for the 2002 and 2003 exams; (2) the correct

and incorrect item responses for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 exams;

and (3) diskettes of each candidate’s individual response to

every essay item for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 exams. (Pl.’s Mot.

to Compel at 3-7.) The magistrate judge ordered defendants to

provide Pratt only with “the essay/short answer questions and his

answers thereto that were graded as incorrect on the June 2002

[CSBP] Examination as well as the portions of the answer keys as

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to only those questions graded as incorrect on plaintiff’s June

2002 examination.” (1/6/2006 Order at 2.) For the rest of the

exam question information, the magistrate judge issued a

protective order as requested by defendants. (Id.) Pratt’s

motion was otherwise denied. (Id. at 3.) Because defendants

were largely successful in their opposition to the motion to

compel, the court grants defendants the attorney’s fees

associated with the opposition. 

Second, Pratt takes issue with the hourly rate. He argues

that Helfat’s salary should be the starting point, not the

reimbursement rate assessed by the AG. This argument fails. The

AG charges the various boards and board employees that it

represents in much the same way that any law firm charges its

clients. And just as an associate’s rate is not reduced to

reflect what the associate is actually paid by the firm, so it

would be improper to reduce Helfat’s rate to reflect his salary. 

The object of the entire exercise is to reimburse the prevailing

party for what that party actually paid, not to calculate the

take home pay of the assigned attorney.

Third, Pratt contends that the number of hours spent by

Helfat on the litigation were excessive. Pratt asserts that his

attorney expended nothing like the amount of time Helfat

dedicated to the case. However, this point is entirely without

force given plaintiff’s lack of success in litigating this

action. Nonetheless the court does consider that some reduction

in the number of hours is appropriate in the exercise of billing

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 The court calculated the fee reduction as follows: 4

Helfat billed 541.25 hours for 2004-05. 541.25 total hours

minus 48.5 hours spent on the motion to dismiss = 492.75. 492.75

x 0.75 = 369.6 hours. 369.6 x $139/hr. = $51,374.40 for 2004-05. 

Helfat also billed 95 hours for 2005-06. 95 x 0.75 = 71.25

hours. 71.25 x $146/hr. = $10,402.50 for 2005-06. 

$51,374.40 + $10,402.50 = $61,776.90.

$61,776.90 + $5,840.00 = $67,616.90. 

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judgment. A 25% reduction in Helfat’s hours recognizes both that

the case was not particularly complex and that many of the most

intricate issues concerning the examination were resolved because

of AMP’s summary judgment motion. With this reduction and the

reduction for the motion to dismiss, the number of hours is 369.6

for the 2004-05 fiscal year and 71.25 for the 2005-06 fiscal

year, totaling 440.85 hours. Thus, the total fee award is

$61,776.90. With the addition of the estimated cost of the fees

motion, $5,840.00, the total award comes to $67,616.90.4

Finally, Pratt argues that, even were a substantial fee

award appropriate, the court should not make the award because he

is unemployed and only receives income from military disability

payments. (Opp’n at 8.) However, Pratt has not provided a

declaration or any other information regarding his financial

condition. (Reply at 9-10.) Therefore, the court does not know

how much income he receives through the military disability

benefits or whether he is currently looking for employment. 

According to defendants, Pratt has a pharmacist’s license in

Nevada and could arguably find a well-paying job there. (Reply

at 10.) The court will permit Pratt to seek a reduction in fees

because of his financial condition by a motion for reduction,

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 While Pratt’s financial situation may justify reducing the 5

amount of fees awarded, it will not justify eliminating the award

entirely. In awarding attorney’s fees, courts consider the nonprevailing plaintiff’s financial resources because “the award

should not subject the plaintiff to financial ruin.” Miller v.

Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir.

1987). “However, a district court should not refuse to award

attorney’s fees . . . solely on the ground of the plaintiff’s

financial situation.” Id. at 621 n.5 (citing Durrett v. Jenkins

Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir. 1982)). “A fee

must be assessed which will serve the deterrent purpose of the

statute, and no fee will provide no deterrence.” Durrett, 678

F.2d at 917. 

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with supporting declarations, within ten days of the date of this

order. The supplemental briefing and declarations should be 5

limited to this issue.

III.

For the reasons stated above, the court awards attorney’s

fees in the amount of $67,616.90.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2006

 /s/ David F. Levi 

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge 

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