Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01016/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01016-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN C. APPLEGATE,

Plaintiff,

v.

WINFRED KOKOR, et al,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01016-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) No other parties have appeared in this action. Plaintiff’s 

complaint is before the court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally frivolous, malicious, or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

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such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is not a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2). The Complaint is 252 pages long. It contains appeal records, 

correspondence, large sections of the CDCR operations manual, and alleges various 

religious claims against eight Defendants.

The Complaint does not satisfy federal pleading standards, and given the 

demands imposed on the Court by the sheer volume of other prisoner cases, it is neither 

time-efficient nor fair to other litigants for the Court to hunt through Plaintiff’s Complaint 

for camouflaged cognizable claims.

In the following sections of this order, the Court will provide general pleading 

requirements and the legal standards for the causes of action Plaintiff may be intending 

to allege. Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to re-plead in a “short and plain 

statement” a claim that meets those standards. The amended complaint must only 

assert claims against Defendants who may be credibly found responsible for the alleged 

unlawful conduct, and must not contain unrelated facts or claims. Plaintiff should not

attach the record of his administrative appeals or any other documentary evidence to his 

complaint: he must instead summarize in his own words what Defendants did or did not 

do, and why he believes these acts or omissions violated his rights. This Court can 

envision few complaints that ought reasonably to exceed twenty pages. Thus, any 

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amended filing that is longer than twenty pages will be viewed with extreme skepticism 

and may be rejected on that basis alone. 

A. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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B. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons, 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21(9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th 

Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff may not 

attribute liability to a group of defendants, but must “set forth specific facts as to each 

individual defendant’s” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th 

Cir. 1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Liability may 

not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, as 

each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; 

Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable if they “participated in or 

directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 

(9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. 

Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 

F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Joinder of Multiple Claims and Defendants under Rules 18 and 20

Plaintiff attempts to bring multiple constitutional claims against multiple 

defendants. While Plaintiff may bring multiple claims against one defendant under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 18(a), Rule 20(a)(2) circumscribes his ability to join multiple defendants to the 

same action. Under Rule 20(a)(2), a plaintiff may only sue multiple defendants in the 

same action if at least one claim against each defendant arises out of the same 

“transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and there is a 

“question of law or fact common to all defendants.” If defendants were involved in 

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separate transactions that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights, Plaintiff must vindicate 

these distinct violations in separate lawsuits.

Just because claims are premised on the same type of constitutional violation(s) 

does not make them factually related. Claims are only related when they are based on 

the same precipitating event or on a series of events caused by the same precipitating 

event. Thus, in order to bring claims against all defendants in the same action, Plaintiff 

must plead facts demonstrating that his claims against each defendant are factually 

related. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint that does not comply with Rules 18(a) and 

20(a)(2), unrelated claims and defendants will be subject to dismissal.

D. Legal Standard – Free Exercise Clause

Under the Constitution, “reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all 

prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972). However, as with other 

First Amendment rights in the inmate context, prisoners' rights may be limited or 

retracted if required to “maintain [ ] institutional security and preserv[e] internal order and 

discipline.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549 (1979). 

Restrictions on access to “religious opportunities,” whether group services, chapel 

visits, or meetings with religious advisers, must be found reasonable in light of four 

factors: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation and a 

legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) “whether there are alternative 

means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) whether 

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have a significant impact on 

guards and other inmates; and (4) whether ready alternatives are absent (bearing on the 

reasonableness of the regulation). Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987); see also

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Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006); Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 

1999) (en banc).

Thus, Prisons may lawfully restrict religious activities for security purposes and 

other legitimate penological reasons. See Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 

1209 (9th Cir. 2008). However, denial of all access to religious worship opportunities 

can violate the First Amendment. Id.

E. Legal Standard – Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause, applicable to state action by incorporation through the 

Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947),

states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. 

Const. Amend. I. The clause, at a minimum, prohibits state and federal governments 

from passing laws that “aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 

another.” Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013)(citing Everson, 330 

U.S. at 15). However, to violate the Establishment Clause, “a government policy need 

not be formal, written, or approved by an official body to qualify as state sponsorship of 

religion.” Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir.1998); Am. Humanist Ass'n v. 

United States, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1282-83 (D. Or. 2014). Although prison officials are 

entitled to discretion in the “difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration,” 

officials “must do so without unduly preferring one religion over another.” Hartmann, 707 

F.3d at 1126. Whether a prison policy is unconstitutionally preferential is a totality of the 

circumstances inquiry. Id.; Blanks v. Cate, No. 2:11-cv-0171, 2013 WL 1129280, at *15 

(E.D. Cal. March 18, 2013).

F. Legal Standard - Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that persons 

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who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 

Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An incarcerated adherent of a minority religion has an 

equal protection right to “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to 

the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.”

Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (9th Cir 2008)(citing Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322). However, “[i]n 

the prison context, even fundamental rights such as the right to equal protection are 

judged by a standard of reasonableness, specifically whether the actions of prison 

officials are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Walker v. Gomez, 

370 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir.2004), citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Thus, there is no 

requirement that “every sect or group within a prison” have “identical facilities or 

personnel.” Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568 (citing Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n. 2.); 

accord Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1123-1124 (9th Cir. 2013)(finding Wiccan 

inmates did not have Equal Protection right to paid chaplain when they had access to a 

volunteer chaplain).

To make an Equal Protection Claim, an inmate plaintiff must show either that 

Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his faith, see

Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th 

Cir. 2005); or that he received disparate treatment compared to adherents of other 

religions. See Rouser v White, 630 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2009). If 

proceeding under the disparate treatment theory, plaintiff must show the following: (1) he 

is a member of an identifiable class; (2) he was intentionally treated differently from 

others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); accord Rouser, 630 

F.Supp.2d at 1199.

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G. Legal Standard – Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 

Act

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) provides that 

“no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person 

residing in or confined to an institution... even if the burden results from a rule of general 

applicability,” unless the government demonstrates that the burden furthers “a 

compelling governmental interest,” and does so by the “least restrictive means.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 860 (2015); Greene v. Solano 

Cty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008). 

An inmate’s “religious exercise” refers not to his practice of religion as a whole, 

but his engagement in particular practices or rituals within his religion. Greene, 513 F.3d 

at 987. The practice need not be “compelled by, or central to, a system of religious 

belief” in order to qualify as a “religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Holt, 135 

S.Ct. at 862; Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.33d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that Defendants substantially

burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d at 994-

95 (9th Cir. 2005). A “substantial burden” is a restriction that is “oppressive to a 

significantly great extent,” Id. at 995, and is presumed when a policy forces an inmate to 

choose between “serious disciplinary action” and “engag[ing] in conduct that seriously 

violates his beliefs.” Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 862; accord Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 996. An 

“outright ban on a particular religious exercise” also generally constitutes a substantial 

burden on that religious exercise. Greene, 513 F.3d at 988.

If a plaintiff establishes a substantial burden on his religious exercise, the 

defendants must demonstrate that such burden “is both in furtherance of

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a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.” Id. “RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of

protecting an inmate's right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. Although prison security 

is a compelling interest, prison officials may not “justify restrictions on religious exercise 

simply by citing to the need to maintain order and security.” Greene, 513 F.3d at 989-

990. Instead, they must show that they “actually considered and rejected the efficacy of 

less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.” Greene, 513 F. 3d at 

989 (quoting Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999). 

RLUIPA only authorizes official capacity suits against government employees for

prospective, injunctive relief. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1660 (2011); Wood 

v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 902-04 (9th Cir. 2014). An inmate’s transfer from the prison 

where his claims arose will generally moot a claim for prospective relief, so unless he 

can show a reasonable likelihood of being transferred back, his RLUIPA claims will be 

dismissed. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-05 (1983); Preiser v. 

Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 

(9th Cir. 2007).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim for relief under Section 1983 because 

it violates the pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

The Court grants Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 

1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by 

adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaint). 

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An amended complaint would supersede the prior complaint. Forsyth v. Humana, 

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 f.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 

1987). Thus, it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded 

pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form and a 

copy of his Complaint, filed July 6, 2015;

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the service of this order, Plaintiff must file an 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order;

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will order that this action be 

dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute and 

failure to obey a court order, subject to the three strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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