Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01309/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01309-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVIN CHARO COLLINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE 

DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE AND 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR LACK 

OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

(ECF No. 1)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 30

DAYS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marvin Charo Collins proceeds pro se in this civil case.1(ECF No. 1). Generally, 

Plaintiff alleges that government officials, including President Joseph Biden, have violated the 

Lanham Act, federal criminal statutes, and his civil rights. 

Because the complaint is absolutely meritless, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction 

and the undersigned will recommend that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without 

leave to amend.

II. PENDING CASES

Plaintiff has two pending cases that are relevant here.

2 Plaintiff filed this case on October 

25, 2024, suing (1) President Biden; (2) Phillip Talbert, United States Attorney for the Eastern 

1 Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this case and is not proceeding in forma pauperis. 

2 For readability, minor alterations, like changing capitalization and correcting misspellings, have been 

made to some of Plaintiff’s quotations without specifying each change.

Case 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG Document 8 Filed 11/12/24 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

District of California; (3) Brittany Gunter, Assistant United States Attorney; and (4) United States 

Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. (ECF No. 1). He lists various federal statutes—Lanham 

Act provisions, criminal statutes, and a civil rights statute—as the basis for federal question 

jurisdiction. He seeks approximately $3 million in damages based on “crimes by government.”

He includes conclusory assertions against the Defendants, e.g., “conspiracies to violate 

constitutional rights,” “violation of oath,” and “treason.” 

Plaintiff offers no developed allegations to indicate how any Defendant violated the 

statutes at issue. Rather, in his statement of his claims, Plaintiff states: “Precedents of law 

establish by court case which are in violation of law, render violation of law legally unassailable. 

Such a situation violations several specifically stated intents and purposes of the Constitution set 

forth in the Preamble.”

Three days after filing the instant case, Plaintiff filed a materially similar case in this 

District, 1:24-cv-1313-JLT-EPG, suing the same Defendants.

3 While the plaintiff is listed as 

Collins Charo Capital, LLC (the LLC), Plaintiff signed the complaint with his name, i.e., Marvin 

Collins. The complaint lists the same Lanham Act provisions (albeit adding an additional 

provision) as the basis for federal question jurisdiction as in the instant case. The LLC seeks 

approximately $2 million in damages based on “infringement by government.” However, the 

LLC provides no developed allegations as to how any Defendant violated its rights. Rather, in the 

LLC’s statement of its claims, it states as follows:

Via a phone call [on October 18, 2024] it was mentioned to managing director a 

warrant for an arrest in the name of the company’s intellectual property, i.e., 

trademark(s) that identifies goods or services and distinguishes the company from 

competition. 

A message was pass via phone call, stating a warrant for an arrest for the name 

“Marvin Collins,” which is a trademark, along with “Marvin Charo Collins” from 

a government agency, person acting for the United States Department of the 

Treasury.

Collins Charo Capital, LLC could and will suffer losses that would make it 

difficult to compensate or measure, the company would sustain false designations 

of origin, false description, and dilution forbidden.

(1:24-cv-1313-JLT-EPG, ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5). 

3 The Court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 

118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

Case 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG Document 8 Filed 11/12/24 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Also, in 1:24-cv-1313-JLT-EPG, the LLC has filed a “notice to cease and desist” 

addressed to Judge McAuliffe based on her purported “unauthorized use of the trademark Marvin 

Charo Collins.” (1:24-cv-1313-JLT-EPG, ECF No. 4). 

In both cases, Plaintiff includes “UCC 1-308” in the signature section by his name. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in 

a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes 

of the Colville Rsrv., 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction. Under federal question jurisdiction, 

federal district courts “have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence 

of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides 

that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the 

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Further, “it is well established that ‘a court may raise the question of subject matter 

jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal.”’ Nevada 

v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 

F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir.2002)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time 

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Moreover, the 

Supreme Court has held that a court lacks jurisdiction over absolutely meritless claims: 

Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without 

power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so 

attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,’ Newburyport 

Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579, 24 S.Ct. 553, 557, 48 L.Ed. 795 

(1904); ‘wholly insubstantial,’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 

550-551, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962); ‘obviously frivolous,’ Hannis Distilling Co. v. 

Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288, 30 S.Ct. 326, 327, 54 L.Ed. 482 (1910); ‘plainly 

unsubstantial,’ Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105, 53 S.Ct. 

549, 550, 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933); or ‘no longer open to discussion,’ McGilvra v. 

Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31, 54 L.Ed. 95 (1909).

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974).

\\\

Case 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG Document 8 Filed 11/12/24 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

IV. ANALYSIS

While it is difficult to decipher Plaintiff’s complaint, when considered in conjunction with 

his materially similar case, he appears to allege that Defendants have violated various federal 

laws in connection with a warrant issued for his arrest. However, for the reasons discussed below, 

such claims are absolutely meritless.

While this is purportedly a civil rights case, the only civil rights provision that Plaintiff 

cites is 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which provides as follows:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the 

highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly 

or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or 

of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing 

or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or 

securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the 

laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or 

threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or 

advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully 

qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of 

Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on 

account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this 

section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in 

furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his 

person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a 

citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action 

for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any 

one or more of the conspirators.

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 

“To state a cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a 

conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a class of persons of the equal protection 

of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one 

of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, 

property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the 

United States.” 

Gilliespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 

88, 102-103 (1971). “The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal 

privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 

102.

Plaintiff fails to include any developed allegations to state a § 1985(3) claim. Rather, 

Case 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG Document 8 Filed 11/12/24 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiff appears to have filed this lawsuit because he is displeased that an arrest warrant has been 

issued against him. This is an insufficient basis to allege a civil rights violation under § 1985(3).

Plaintiff’s other cited federal statutes fair no better. Plaintiff relies on various criminal 

provisions, including 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 242, which concern conspiracy against or deprivations 

of a person’s rights. But “[t]hese criminal provisions . . . provide no basis for civil liability.” 

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (addressing §§ 241, 242). Rather, “unless 

a specific statute provides for a private right of action, courts have found that violations of Title 

18 are properly brought by the United States government through criminal proceedings and not 

by individuals in a civil action.” Banuelos v. Gabler, No. 1:18-CV-00675-LJO-SAB, 2018 WL 

2328221, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2018).

Lastly, Plaintiff relies on the Lanham Act, the key provision being 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), 

which provides as follows:

(a) Civil action

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 

container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, 

or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 

description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which--

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 

affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or 

as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 

commercial activities by another person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's 

goods, services, or commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 

likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendants violated this provision by using his name 

in connection with an arrest warrant. However, there is no legal support for such a position. 

Notably, the Lanham Act requires a person’s conduct to be in connection with “commerce,”

which is absent here.

Lastly, Plaintiff’s use of “UCC 1-308” by his name also illustrates the frivolousness of 

this action. UCC 1-308(a) provides as follows: “A party that with explicit reservation of rights 

Case 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG Document 8 Filed 11/12/24 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by 

the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as ‘without prejudice,’

‘under protest,’ or the like are sufficient.”

Plaintiff’s intent behind citing this provision is unclear. However, similar notation has 

been used by persons who consider themselves to be “sovereign citizens.” See Hill v. Rivera, No. 

ED CV 22-0060-JLS(E), 2022 WL 21663917, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2022) (noting plaintiff’s 

signing complaint with reference to UCC 1-308 and self-identification as a sovereign citizen); Joe 

Elton Mosley, LLC v. Walmart, No. 3:20-CV-00184-MMD-WGC, 2020 WL 1846553, at *2 (D. 

Nev. Mar. 26, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1821307 (D. Nev. Apr. 10, 

2020) (noting that a plaintiff’s IFP application with UCC 1-308 inserted above plaintiff's name 

indicated “an adherence to the ‘sovereign citizen’ anti-government movement”).

Generally, sovereign citizens disclaim any authority by government authorities over them 

based on the person’s own purported sovereignty. See Vazquez v. California Highway Patro, No. 

2:15-CV-756-JAM-EFB (PS), 2016 WL 232332, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2016) (explaining 

“sovereign citizen” ideology). To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert any sovereign citizen 

ideology in this case, courts have uniformly rejected such arguments as completely meritless. 

Mackey v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:15-CV-1934-LJO-BAM, 2016 WL 3254037, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 

June 14, 2016) (noting that “[c]ourts across the country” have rejected sovereign citizen 

arguments “as frivolous, irrational, or unintelligible”). Moreover, “advancement of such utterly 

meritless arguments is now the basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise 

them.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986).

In short, all of Plaintiff’s claims are absolutely meritless so as to deprive the Court of 

jurisdiction. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Because Plaintiff’s claims are absolutely meritless for the reasons given above, it is clear 

that the complaint could not be saved by amendment; thus, the Court will recommend that the 

complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. Eminence Cap., LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave 

to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be 

Case 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG Document 8 Filed 11/12/24 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

saved by amendment.”); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of 

amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”). 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. This action be dismissed, with prejudice and without leave to amend, for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. 

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to the 

case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after being 

served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 

Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no more than 15 pages, including exhibits. 

Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver 

of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 11, 2024 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:24-cv-01309-JLT-EPG Document 8 Filed 11/12/24 Page 7 of 7