Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00224/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00224-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Isidoro Sanchez,

Petitioner,

v. 

Attorney General of the State of Arizona, et 

al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-17-00224-TUC-RM (DTF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion seeking expansion of the record and a third 

stay of this case (Motion). (Doc. 49.) The Motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 59, 61.) This 

matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro for pretrial 

proceedings and report and recommendation. (Doc. 12.) As more fully set forth below, it 

is recommended that the district court deny the Motion.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual conduct with a 

minor and attempted sexual conduct with a different minor in exchange for the dismissal 

of nine additional sexual charges against the same victims. (Doc. 51 at 3-11, 13-16, 18-24, 

and 49.) Petitioner completed appellate proceedings in his of-right petition for postconviction relief (PCR) pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

before he filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 16, 2017. Id. at 74-66. At 

that time, Petitioner’s petition for review challenging the state PCR court’s denial of his 

second PCR petition was pending in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and he asked the district 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 63 Filed 04/21/20 Page 1 of 5
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court for a stay and abeyance in order to complete the review process in the state courts. 

(Doc. 4.) Respondents did not object to Petitioner’s request for a stay. (Doc. 15.) On 

September 1, 2017, the district court granted Petitioner’s motion to stay his federal habeas 

proceedings pending completion of state appellate review of his second PCR proceeding. 

(Doc. 16.) 

On August 10, 2017, Petitioner filed a third PCR notice in the state court. (Doc. 56 

at 92-99.) On October 11, 2017, Petitioner moved for a second stay and abeyance to allow 

him to complete his third round of state PCR proceedings. (Doc. 18.) 

On January 16, 2018, Sanchez notified the district court that earlier in the month the 

Arizona Supreme Court had denied his petition for review in his second PCR proceeding 

and reminded the court that his October motion for stay and abeyance was still pending. 

(Doc. 20.) The district court lifted the first stay and denied Petitioner’s second motion for 

a second stay. (Docs. 21, 24.) 

Petitioner requested that the district court reconsider that order to the extent of the 

denial of his second stay request. (Doc. 26.) Respondents did not object to the second stay. 

(Doc. 28.) On August 21, 2018, the district court granted Petitioner’s motion for 

reconsideration and stayed the habeas proceedings for a second time. (Doc. 29.) 

On May 8, 2019, Sanchez notified the district court that earlier in the month the 

Arizona Supreme Court had denied his petition for review in his third PCR proceeding. 

(Doc. 35.) Five days later, Petitioner lodged an amended habeas petition. (Doc. 37.) 

On May 17, 2019, the district court lifted the stay and ordered a response to the 

petition. (Doc. 38.) The district court later clarified that order, specifying a response to 

Sanchez’s amended petition. (Doc. 40, 41.) 

One week before the due date for Respondents’ answer to the amended petition, 

Petitioner filed the instant Motion requesting a third stay claiming newly discovered 

evidence. (Doc. 48, 49.) Petitioner asserts that he has filed a fourth PCR notice in the state 

court based on the alleged newly discovered evidence. (Doc. 49-1 at 27-32.) That evidence 

consists of written reports of forensic medical examinations conducted on June 13, 2013, 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 63 Filed 04/21/20 Page 2 of 5
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of Petitioner’s minor victims. Id. at 2-21. The offenses occurred between June 1 and 10, 

2013. (Doc. 51 at 3-5.) Petitioner argues that the report for the victim of his conviction for 

sexual conduct with a minor showed no evidence of “penetration” which, according to 

Petitioner, is “exculpatory,” shows that conviction is “factually false,” and leads to the 

conclusion that he is actually innocent. (Doc. 49 at 2.) 

Respondents have filed their answer to Petitioner’s amended petition. (Docs. 50-

58.) Respondents object to Petitioner’s request for a third stay on the grounds that a stay 

would be futile. (Doc. 59 at 3.) Respondents argue that because Petitioner pleaded guilty 

any independent claims relating to the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights are

waived. Id. Respondents also argue that the medical reports do not exonerate him. Id. 

Lastly, Respondents object to a stay on the grounds that a freestanding claim of actual 

innocence in federal habeas actions has not been recognized by the United States Supreme 

Court. Id. at 4.

LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

“A stay and abeyance should only be granted in limited circumstances.” Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). “Because granting a stay effectively excuses a 

petitioner’s failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only 

appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s 

failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. “Moreover, even if a petitioner had 

good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant 

him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the State”).

Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen and 

attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen. (Doc. 51 at 18-24.) This 

Court agrees with Respondents that a stay would be futile as a result of Petitioner’s guilty 

plea. Petitioner’s guilty plea operates as an express waiver of any non-jurisdictional claims.

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 63 Filed 04/21/20 Page 3 of 5
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty 

of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims 

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the 

guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (habeas petitioner may only 

attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea). By pleading guilty, a 

defendant “waives the right to assert on review all non-jurisdiction defenses, including 

deprivations of constitutional rights.” State v. Chavez, 407 P.3d 85, 90, ¶ 14 (Ariz. App. 

2017) (citing Tollett). Petitioner’s “guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events 

which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett, 411 U.S at 267. 

In reply, Petition argues the newly discovered medical records somehow establish 

and that the indictment in his case was not specific enough for him to prepare a defense

and that to construe count 1 of the indictment to include the slightest penetration would 

amount to constructive amendment of the indictment. (Doc. 61 at 4-5.) These claims are 

precluded by Petitioner’s guilty plea. Tollett, supra. This Court determines that entering a

stay to allow Petitioner to exhaust his newly raised claim of “newly discovered material 

facts” in the state court would be futile. (Doc. 49-1 at 28.) 

This Court also agrees with Respondents that a stay would be futile because a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence has not been recognized in federal habeas cases. 

See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013) (“We have not resolved whether 

a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on freestanding claim of actual 

innocence.” citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S 390, 404-405 (1993)).

This Court also determines that the allegedly newly discovered medical reports do 

not support his claim of actual innocence. Petitioner contends the medical reports exonerate 

him because the medical records reflect that the examiner found the physical condition of 

the minors’ genitals within normal limits. Thus, Petitioner argues, he is actually innocent 

because “[t]he medical exams are exculpatory in that they prove that Petitioner did not 

penetrate nither (sic) victims (sic) vagina[.]” (Doc. 61 at 5.) 

As pointed out by Respondents, under Arizona law penetration does not require full 

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 63 Filed 04/21/20 Page 4 of 5
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

insertion of the penis into the vagina. Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1405(A) and (B), the 

offense of sexual conduct with a minor is defined as “intentionally or knowingly engaging 

in sexual intercourse” with a person under age 15. See A.R.S. § 13-1405(A), (B). Section 

1401(A)(4), Title 13, Arizona Revised Statutes, defines “sexual intercourse” as 

“penetration into the ...vulva...by any part of the body.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1401(A)(4). Because the medical examiner found the physical condition of the victims’ 

genitals within normal limits does not mean that the “slightest penetration” did not occur.

See State v. Scott, 460 P.2d 3, 4 (Ariz. 1969) (en banc) (... “the slightest penetration of the 

vulva is sufficient to complete the offense.” quoting State v. Pollock, 114 P.2d 249 (1941)).

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court determines that a stay of the proceedings

pending the state court consideration of Petitioner's fourth PCR notice and expansion of 

the record would be futile. It is recommended that the district court, after its independent 

review of the record, deny Petitioner’s Motion. (Doc. 49).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. 

If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

Dated this 21st day of April, 2020.

Case 4:17-cv-00224-RM Document 63 Filed 04/21/20 Page 5 of 5