Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01960/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01960-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICHOLAS ASSEF, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DOES 1-10,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01960-MEJ 

ORDER VACATING HEARING AND 

ORDERING FURTHER BRIEFING

Re: Dkt. No. 37

This matter is currently scheduled for a hearing on August 11, 2016 regarding the motion 

for default judgment filed by Nicholas Assef and Lincoln Crowne & Co. (“Plaintiffs”). Pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter 

suitable for disposition without oral argument and hereby VACATES the August 11, 2016

hearing; however, the Court orders Plaintiffs to provide further briefing on the five issues listed 

below:

(1) Defendant agreed to a forum selection clause when he accepted Google’s Terms of 

Service in 2007. Plaintiffs are not parties to that contract but nonetheless attempt to use the forum 

selection clause to support the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this 

action. Plaintiffs cite Scott USA Inc. v. Patregnani, 2015 WL 1736496 (D. Id. Apr. 16, 2015) for 

the proposition that courts can use a forum selection clause to establish a defendant’s consent to 

their jurisdiction even though the plaintiff was not a party to the agreement. See Mot. at 6-7. In 

that case, however, the Idaho court found the non-party was bound because it was “‘closely 

related’ to the dispute such that it becomes ‘foreseeable’ that it will be bound.” 2015 WL 

1736496, at *3 (quoting Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 

1988)). Specifically, the Idaho court found there could “be little doubt that [the third party] is 

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‘closely related’ to the dispute between [plaintiff] and [defendant]. This dispute . . . arises out of 

[third party’s] alleged breach of its credit agreement with [plaintiff,] which [defendant] 

guaranteed. Thus, it is eminently foreseeable that [third party] would be bound by a forum 

selection clause that references [third party] specifically—even if [third party] was not a signatory 

to the Personal Guarantee signed by [defendant.]” Id. Plaintiffs should provide further legal

support for their contention that personal jurisdiction based on Defendant’s consent exists under 

the circumstances here, i.e., where an unrelated third party uses a forum selection clause as the 

means to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant who agreed to that clause in a contract 

with an entity that is not a party to the present dispute.

(2) To establish personal jurisdiction exists under a minimum contact analysis, Plaintiffs

must show Defendant purposefully directed his activities toward California. See Schwarzenegger 

v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (tort claims—such as defamation—

are generally analyzed under the “purposeful direction” test). To determine whether a defendant 

“purposefully directs his activities at a forum state,” courts apply the “effects” test articulated in 

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). See Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2002). The “effects” test requires that the defendant allegedly must have “(1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows 

is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. In Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123-24 

(2014), the Supreme Court revisited personal jurisdiction and the Calder test, and clarified that the 

relevant inquiry was the defendant’s contact with the forum, not with plaintiff: “mere injury to a 

forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum” to establish minimum contact exists. 

Courts must look to defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not with the persons who 

reside there. Plaintiffs should clarify why they believe Defendant purposefully directed his 

activities at California, particularly as Plaintiffs are Australian residents and the blog at issue here 

does not appear connected to California in any manner besides being hosted by Google.

(3) Ninth Circuit courts apply state law to determine whether the speech at issue is 

defamatory. Lee Myles Assocs. Corp., v. Paul Rubke Enters., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (S.D. 

Cal. 2008). Under California law, the elements of defamation are: “(a) a publication that is (b) 

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false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that 

causes special damage.” Kechara House Buddhist Ass’n Malaysia v. Does, 2015 WL 5538999, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2015). To make a prima facie defamation case, Plaintiffs bear the burden 

of establishing each element, but Plaintiffs have not addressed whether the blog statements are 

unprivileged. “One potential issue is the First Amendment. . . . In the context of default judgment 

for alleged defamation on gripe sites, the situation is not just about notice pleading and service on 

a defaulting defendant. It necessarily implicates whether the allegations establish a claim at all 

because some speech is protected by the First Amendment. The analysis turns on what the speech 

is.” Wilens v. Doe Defendant No. 1, 2015 WL 4606238, at *15 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2015). Why is 

the speech at issue here unprivileged?

(4) A court may deny a motion for default judgment where a statute of limitations defense 

is apparent on the face of the complaint. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Tu Minh Nguyen, 2011 WL 

1642306, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011) (citations omitted). The Complaint alleges Defendants 

posted the Blog in 2007 and Plaintiffs discovered it the same year. Compl. ¶ 14. For purposes of 

the statute of limitations, the Ninth Circuit has held that the publication date of a webpage is the 

date the allegedly defamatory statements were first posted. See Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 

1156, 1167 (9th Cir. 2011). Under California law, the statute of limitations for defamation is one 

year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340. Plaintiffs filed this action in 2015. Is a statute of limitations 

defense to the defamation claim not apparent on the face of the complaint?

(5) If Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is granted, how could a court order Google, 

Inc.—a non-party to this action—to remove the offending blog or transfer ownership of the blog 

to Plaintiffs? 

//

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//

//

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The supplemental brief shall be no longer than eight pages and shall be filed no later than 

August 22, 2016. Upon receipt of Plaintiffs’ additional briefing, the matter will be deemed under 

submission. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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