Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00802/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00802-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eric Jordan,

Plaintiff,

v.

Ryan Thornell, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-23-0802-PHX-GMS (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge Deborah 

M. Fine pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all 

pretrial proceedings as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Doc. 8 at 10). 

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss (Doc. 43) be granted as set forth herein and that this matter be dismissed without 

prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and failure to comply with orders of this Court.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Throughout these proceedings, Plaintiff Eric Jordan (“Plaintiff”) has been and 

remains confined in an Arizona State Prison Complex. Upon screening of Plaintiff’s May 

2023 Complaint (Doc. 1), the Court ordered that Defendant Vance must answer the 

excessive force claim in Count One in his individual capacity only, and the Court dismissed 

the remaining claims and defendants (Doc. 8). The excessive force claim in Count One of 

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the Complaint against Defendant Vance in his individual capacity arose from alleged 

events in November 2022 (Doc. 1 at 3-7). As the Court observed:

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to excessive force. He 

claims he is diabetic and, on November 11, 2022, had low blood sugar, 

“slipped into a diabetic coma with seizure,” was unconscious and 

unresponsive, was “mentally [and] physically out of it,” could not “focus [or] 

understand[] the condition,” and was “not all there.” Plaintiff asserts that 

while he was unconscious and needing medical assistance, Defendant Vance 

“assaulted” Plaintiff by either punishing him or hitting him with an object, 

hard, in the face. He contends he suffered injuries including headaches, eye 

damage and a loss of vision for two-and-a-half months, nose bleeds when he 

blows his nose, breathing problems, and a chipped and lose tooth.

(Doc. 8 at 3) (footnote 1 omitted) (emphasis and alterations in original).

After Defendant Vance filed an answer, on December 14, 2023, the Court issued a 

Scheduling and Discovery Order (Docs. 12, 14). In the following few months, the parties 

filed notices of service indicating that written discovery requests and responses were 

proceeding (by Plaintiff: Docs. 16, 17, 22; by Defendant Vance: Docs. 15, 18, 19, 20, 24, 

26, 27). 

By June 2024, Defendant reported in a motion to extend certain Scheduling Order 

deadlines that discovery was not moving forward smoothly (Doc. 28). Some of the reasons 

Defendant reported were claimed delays by Plaintiff in returning complete releases and 

Plaintiff’s refusal of a discovery requests envelope sent to Plaintiff by Defendant (Id. at 2-

3). Defendant reported continued efforts to work with Plaintiff to resolve disputes and to 

move discovery forward (Id.). On June 6, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to 

extend certain Scheduling Order deadlines (Doc. 29). Also on June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed 

motions to extend time to respond to Defendant’s discovery requests (Docs. 30, 31). On 

June 7, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motions to extend time and extended the 

deadline for Plaintiff to respond to the referenced discovery requests to June 28, 2024 

(Docs. 32). In doing so, the Court noted that “Plaintiff’s motions lack any statement as to 

good cause for the extensions of time requested, and the record raises concerns about 

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Plaintiff’s good faith participation in discovery[,]” but the Court decided to “nevertheless 

grant the extensions requested in Plaintiff’s motions” (Id.).

On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for production of documents and tangible 

things which set forth Plaintiff’s discovery requests verbatim (Doc. 33). Plaintiff also filed 

a Notice of Request for Production of Documents and Tangible Things regarding the 

requests for production (Doc. 34). On June 28, 2024, the Court struck Plaintiff’s request 

for production of documents and tangible things (Doc. 36). The Order doing so included 

the text of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5(d)(1)(A):

Any paper after the complaint that is required to be served — together with 

a certificate of service — must be filed within a reasonable time after service. 

But disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or (2) and the following discovery 

requests and responses must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding 

or the court orders filing: depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents 

or tangible things or to permit entry onto land, and requests for admission.

(Doc. 36 at 1-2). On July 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed with the Court his responses to 

Defendant’s discovery requests in violation of the applicable rules and the Court’s previous 

Order (Doc. 37). In a July 15, 2024, Order which struck Plaintiff’s improperly filed 

discovery responses, the Court again cited and quoted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

5(d)(1)(A) (Doc. 38). The Court also ordered that Plaintiff promptly file a proper notice 

of service regarding any discovery responses he has served (Doc. 38 at 2). 

On July 15, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion for Sanctions seeking an order for 

sanctions against Plaintiff for failure to comply with this Court’s June 7, 2024, Order to 

provide responses to Defendant’s discovery by June 28, 2024 (Doc. 39). In the motion, 

defense counsel “certifie[d] that undersigned counsel has conferred in good faith with 

Plaintiff prior to seeking this relief from the Court” (Id. at 1). In the motion, Defendant 

stated that:

On July 2, 2024, undersigned counsel sent Plaintiff a letter reminding him of 

the Court’s Order and asking for responses by July 12, 2024. (See Ltr. dated 

7/2/2024 to Plaintiff, attached as Exhibit 4.) On July 12, 2024, undersigned 

counsel also had a telephone call with Plaintiff to meet and confer regarding 

Plaintiff’s delinquent discovery responses. Plaintiff stated that he thinks he 

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filed a response to some of the requests but has not responded to the 

remainder because he is looking for someone to assist him and he was 

delayed due to his recent address change. He thinks he can serve responses 

in the next “week or two”. Plaintiff’s excuse is curious as he was able to 

prepare and serve Requests for Production to Defendant prior to the Court’s 

June 28 deadline expired, yet he did not comply with the Court’s Order to 

respond to Defendant’s discovery. Shortly after the parties’ call, on July 12, 

2024, Plaintiff inappropriately filed responses to Defendant’s First Set of 

Requests for Admissions on the docket, which the Court has stricken. (Dkts. 

37-38.) Defendant has not received proper service of these responses through 

the mail. Nor has Defendant received responses to Defendant’s Second Set 

of Interrogatories and Third Set of Requests for Production served on April 

22, 2022. 

(Id. at 2-3). In the motion, Defendant further stated that: 

[a]s a sanction for his continued and unjustified failure to comply with the 

Court’s June 7, 2024 Order, Defendant requests the Court stay further 

proceedings until the Order is obeyed. More specifically, pursuant to the 

extended deadline, discovery cutoff is August 16, 2024, the deadline to bring 

discovery disputes is October 16, 2024, and the deadline to file dispositive 

motions is November 18, 2024. (See Dkt. 29 at 3.) Defendant needs 

Plaintiff’s discovery responses to determine whether additional written 

discovery is necessary and in preparation for taking Plaintiff’s deposition 

prior to this cutoff. Defendant cannot prepare his defense without this 

discovery and has been prejudiced by Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the 

Court’s Order. 

(Id. at 3-4). Defendant also requested reasonable attorney’s fees expended in litigating 

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s June 7, 2024, Order pursuant to Rule 37(d)(3) 

(Id. at 4). 

The time for response by Plaintiff to Defendant’s motion expired without Plaintiff 

filing a response.

On August 8, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion in part, observing that 

“Defendant has scheduled Plaintiff’s deposition for August 9, 2024 (Doc. 40)” (Doc. 42 at 

3). In ruling, the Court stated that:

[a]t the time of the Court’s Screening and Service Order on September 12, 

2023 (Doc. 8 at 7), Plaintiff was put on notice that if Plaintiff fails to timely 

comply with every provision of the Court’s Orders, the Court may dismiss 

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this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to 

comply with any order of the Court). Plaintiff is hereby (again) warned that 

if Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of the Court’s Orders, 

the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may 

dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 37.

Upon review of the record, applicable law, and careful consideration, the 

Court will grant, at least in part, Defendant’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 39) 

at this time. Defendant has noticed Plaintiff’s deposition for tomorrow 

morning (Doc. 40). Defendant may proceed or not with the deposition as 

scheduled or may reset such at Defendant’s discretion given the orders 

below. If Defendant has not received the discovery responses at issue in the 

motion for sanctions (Doc. 39) already with sufficient time to review such 

before the set deposition tomorrow (the Court leaves judgment as to time for 

review to defense counsel) and if there is any court reporter or other 

fees/expenses for resetting the deposition, such fees and expenses shall be 

included in the application for reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses 

expended in litigating Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s June 7, 

2024, Order. Also, Plaintiff is specifically warned that failure to fully and 

properly participate in his deposition may result in sanctions against Plaintiff, 

including payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses and including 

possible dismissal of this action.

(Id. at 3-4). The Court ordered (1) that no later than August 22, 2024, “Plaintiff shall mail 

to defense counsel his discovery responses . . . and shall at the same time file notices of 

service with the Court” or “show cause in writing filed with the Court why additional 

sanctions, including up to dismissal of this action, should not be imposed”; (2) “that 

pursuant to Rule 37(d)(3) Plaintiff shall pay Defendant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and 

expenses expended in litigating Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s June 7, 2024, 

Order”; (3) “sua sponte extending the deadline to complete discovery to October 16, 2024, 

including the deadline to take Plaintiff’s deposition”; (4) “extending the deadline to file 

motions to compel to December 17, 2024, and extending the deadline to file dispositive 

motions to February 21, 2025”; and (5) “warning Plaintiff that failure to fully and properly 

participate in his deposition may result in sanctions against Plaintiff, including payment of 

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reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses and including possible dismissal of this action” 

(Id. at 4-5).

As recounted by Defendant, although Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s Order was 

due August 22, 2024, “Plaintiff did not file a notice of service, nor did he serve responses 

to Defendant’s Requests for Production, Requests for Admissions, or Interrogatories” 

(Doc. 43 at 2). Additionally, Defendant noted that “Plaintiff failed to show cause why 

additional sanctions should not be imposed pursuant to the Court’s Order. (Dkt. 42)” (Id.).

On August 30, 2024, Defendant moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim and this 

action pursuant “to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(v) and 41(b)” (Doc. 43

at 1). The motion was served on Plaintiff by mail (Id. at 6). In the motion, Defendant 

argues:

Plaintiff has the general duty to prosecute his case. See Fidelity Philadelphia 

Trust Co. v. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc., 587 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs that the rules governing 

procedure in all civil actions “should be construed, administered, and 

employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and 

inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Rule 41(b) 

permits involuntary dismissal of an action “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute 

or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to 

dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also 

Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (district court’s 

authority to dismiss for lack of prosecution is necessary to prevent undue 

delays in the disposition of pending cases and avoid congestion in district 

court calendars). “The courts have read this rule to require prosecution with 

‘reasonable diligence’ if a plaintiff is to avoid dismissal.” Anderson v. Air 

West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). “[T]he 

failure to prosecute diligently is sufficient by itself to justify a dismissal, even 

in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant from the 

failure.” Id. (citations omitted). “The law presumes injury from 

unreasonable delay.” Id. In Link, the Supreme Court recognized that a 

federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for 

failure to prosecute, even though the language of Rule 41(b) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure appears to require a motion from a party. 370 U.S. 

at 633; see also Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 

683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (district court may dismiss under Rule 41(b) for 

failure to prosecute or comply with rules of civil procedure or the court's 

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orders). A dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is committed to the sound 

discretion of the district court. See Link, 370 U.S. at 633. 

In determining whether a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute warrants dismissal 

pursuant to Rule 41(b), the Court must weigh the following five factors: “(1) 

the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s 

need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the 

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 

availability of less drastic sanctions.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 

(1988) (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

As detailed below, the weight of these factors favors dismissal. 

Given Plaintiff’s refusal to respond to Defendant’s discovery requests, 

despite a Court order to do so, the first two factors—the public’s interest in 

expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s need to manage its 

docket—favor dismissal of this action. See Cisneros v. Corizon Health Care, 

No. CV1904490[-]PHX[-]JAT[-]CDB, 2020 WL 5095305, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Aug. 28, 2020) (dismissing case for failure to prosecute where plaintiff failed 

to participate meaningfully in discovery and failed to comply with court 

orders); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a 

district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of 

the Court). These failures hamper Defendant’s ability to prepare his defense 

and prevents this action from proceeding. See Jones v. Arpaio, No. CV05-

3975-PHX-JAT[-]MHB, 2008 WL 138082, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2008) 

(finding plaintiff’s failure to cooperate with discovery prejudiced 

defendants’ preparation of their defense and granting defendants’ motion to 

dismiss for lack of prosecution). Neither the public’s interest in expeditious 

resolution of litigation nor the Court’s need to manage its docket are served 

by allowing this action to continue. Indeed, pursuant to the Court’s original 

Scheduling Order, dispositive motions should have been filed by June 12, 

2024. Due to Plaintiff’s refusal to provide discovery responses despite court 

orders, Defendant has been unable to address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims 

and has had to seek relief from the Court’s Scheduling Order. 

As to the third factor, the failure to dismiss this action will continue to 

prejudice Defendant as he has been deprived of the ability to prepare his 

defense against Plaintiff’s claims. While public policy favors disposition of 

cases on their merits (the fourth factor), Plaintiff’s repeated failure to 

prosecute this case makes resolution on the merits unlikely, even if this action 

were to proceed. 

The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether a less drastic 

alternative than dismissal is available. But the Court need not exhaust every 

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sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case. Henderson, 779 

F.2d at 1424. Plaintiff’s refusal to respond to Defendant’s discovery 

requests, despite the Court’s warning of additional sanctions and potential 

dismissal has not motivated him to comply. (Dkt. 42). 

Plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him having to comply with the Rules 

or the Court’s orders. The Court and Defendant have provided pro se 

Plaintiff several extensions and opportunities to comply with the Rules and 

the Court’s orders. While complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to “less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[,]” Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), pro se litigants must comply with all procedural 

and local rules. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“we 

have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should 

be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without 

counsel.”); Carter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 

1008 (9th Cir. 1986); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 56, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) ( “Pro 

se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other 

litigants.”). A pro se litigant’s status does not entitle pro se litigants to special 

treatment not given to represented parties, nor does it exempt them from 

compliance with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Local Rules, or the 

orders of this Court. 

Plaintiff has been provided ample opportunity to comply with his obligations 

but refuses to do so. To date, he has failed to show cause why the sanction 

of dismissal should not be imposed pursuant to the Court’s Order. (Dkt. 42.)

(Doc. 43 at 2-5).

The Court issued an order notifying Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the 

motion to dismiss, and the Court set a briefing scheduling (Doc. 44). Plaintiff has not filed 

any response to the pending motion to dismiss (Doc. 43), and the time to do so has expired 

(Doc. 44). Plaintiff has not made any filings after the Court’s August 8, 2024, Order 

granting in part Defendant’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 42). Indeed, Plaintiff’s most recent 

filing was the filing of discovery responses which were struck by the Court in July 2024 

(Docs. 37, 38). 

II. DISCUSSION

This Court’s Local Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) describe that as a part of a 

United States Magistrate Judge’s duties:

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A Magistrate Judge may hear and determine a procedural or discovery 

motion or other pretrial matter in a civil case other than the motions that are 

specified in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A). As to such specified motions so 

assigned, a Magistrate Judge shall, upon designation by a District Judge, 

submit to that District Judge a report containing proposed findings of fact 

and recommendations for disposition by the District Judge. In any motion in 

which the parties are seeking sanctions, if the Magistrate Judge is inclined to 

grant such requests regarding dispositive sanctions, the Magistrate Judge 

shall be limited to filing a report and recommendation with the District Court; 

a Magistrate Judge may enter an order granting requests for nondispositive 

sanctions (including monetary sanctions) or denying any sanctions request.

LRCiv 72.2(a)(1). Given the dispositive nature of dismissal sought, undersigned proceeds 

by report and recommendation. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and applicable law, Defendant’s arguments 

in his motion to dismiss (Doc. 43) are sound and persuasive in these circumstances, even 

upon consideration that the statute of limitations may bar Plaintiff from refiling this action.

1

 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is based on “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

37(b)(2)(A)(v) and 41(b)” (Doc. 43 at 1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)

regards sanctions for not obeying a discovery order and states that if a party “fails to obey 

an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), 

the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders” including “dismissing 

the action or proceeding in whole or in part[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). While 

Defendant’s arguments appear to focus on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) regarding

failure to prosecute (Doc. 43 at 2-5), the five factors for consideration of discovery 

sanctions coincide with the factors to be considered regarding failure to prosecute. See In 

re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Further, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Court’s orders regarding discovery

responses constitute the extreme circumstances contemplated for dismissal, particularly 

given the stage of the case and Plaintiff’s apparently purposeful lack of participation in the 

1 Because “Section 1983 does not include its own statute of limitations[,] . . . federal courts 

apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury claims in the forum state.” Finkle 

v. Ryan, 174 F.Supp.3d 1174, 1186 (D. Ariz. 2016). In Arizona, where Plaintiff alleges 

the events in his Complaint took place in part, the statute of limitations “for personal injury 

claims is two years.” Id.

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matter after the adverse ruling regarding discovery (Doc. 42). Conduct constituting 

“willfulness, bad faith, or fault” warrants dismissal and is defined as “‘disobedient conduct 

not shown to be outside the control of the litigant.’” Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 

943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Fjelstad v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1341 

(9th Cir. 1985)). Dismissal is usually reserved for repeated violations of court orders, 

although a single violation may suffice if it is sufficiently severe. See, e.g., Valley 

Engineers Inc. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that 

dishonest concealment of critical evidence justified dismissal). Here, Plaintiff’s failure to 

properly respond to discovery requests interfered with the taking of Plaintiff’s deposition. 

The Court attempted to impose less drastic sanctions, but those were met with silence and 

non-participation in discovery by Plaintiff.

Further, dismissal is appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal . . . 

or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 

138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the first, second, third, and fifth factors strongly 

support dismissal. Still, “[i]n an abundance—perhaps overabundance—of caution,” the 

Court finds dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 

706 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013) (remanding to the district court to consider whether 

dismissal should have been without prejudice).

III. CONCLUSION

On this record and for reasons set forth above, it is recommended that the pending 

motion to dismiss (Doc. 43) be granted as set forth herein and that this action be dismissed

without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with orders of this Court, including 

orders pertaining to discovery.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the pending motion to dismiss (Doc. 43) be granted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without 

prejudice and that the Clerk of Court be directed to terminate this matter.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

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Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

In addition, LRCiv 7.2(e)(3) provides that “[u]nless otherwise permitted by the 

Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation issued by a Magistrate Judge shall 

not exceed ten (10) pages.”

Dated this 21st day of October, 2024.

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