Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-17236/USCOURTS-ca9-08-17236-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TARYN CHRISTIAN, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

No. 08-17236 CLAYTON FRANK, Director, State of

Hawaii Department of Public D.C. No.

Safety,  1:04-cv-00743-

Respondent-Appellant, DAE-LEK

and OPINION

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC SAFETY,

Respondent. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 15, 2009—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed February 19, 2010

Before: Robert R. Beezer, Susan P. Graber and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Beezer

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COUNSEL

Mark Barrett, Esq., Norman, Oklahoma, for petitionerappellee-cross-appellant.

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Richard K. Minatoya, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Wailuku,

Hawaii, for respondent-appellant-cross-appellee.

OPINION

BEEZER, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the district court erred in granting

habeas relief on behalf of petitioner Taryn Christian.1 The district court granted Christian’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Hawaii Supreme Court unreasonably

applied Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). We

have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We hold that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s application

of Chambers was reasonable, and we reverse the district

court’s grant of the petition.

I

The events that led to the instant appeal stem from Christian’s alleged involvement in a murder on July 14, 1995.

Early that morning, Vilmar Cabaccang and his girlfriend,

Serena Seidel, awoke from their slumber due to a noise outside the residence. Seidel looked out the window and saw

someone inside Cabaccang’s car. Cabaccang and Seidel

immediately bolted outside to confront the unidentified

intruder. The intruder fled on foot, and both Cabaccang and

Seidel gave chase. Seidel stopped briefly to attempt to enlist

a friend’s help by banging on the door of the friend’s residence. When no one answered the door, Seidel resumed her

pursuit of the intruder.

1

In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we decline to issue

a certificate of appealability for Christian’s cross-appeal claims. See

Christian v. Frank, No. 08-17438, 2010 WL _________ (9th Cir. Feb. 19,

2010). 

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Seidel eventually caught up to Cabaccang and the intruder

and found the two men engaged in a struggle. Cabaccang

warned Seidel that the unknown man had a knife. Undeterred,

Seidel attempted to assist Cabaccang, and their eventual combined efforts caused the man to drop the knife and flee. Seidel

then observed that there was blood all over the immediate

area and that Cabaccang had been stabbed. Shortly thereafter,

Phillip Schmidt, a local resident who heard the noise from the

struggle, rushed to the scene. Upon seeing Cabaccang’s injuries, he called 911. Cabaccang ultimately died from the knife

wounds.

The police initially suspected that Hina Burkhart was

responsible for Cabaccang’s death based on a statement by a

friend of Seidel’s. The police discarded this theory after two

people placed Burkhart in another location at the time of the

crime and neither Seidel nor Schmidt identified Burkhart as

the perpetrator during police photo lineups. 

Three days after the attack, Christian told his former girlfriend that he had killed Cabaccang. His former girlfriend

conveyed this information to the police a few days later.

Christian was arrested and charged with the murder after the

police uncovered further incriminating evidence against him,

including photos of Christian wearing a baseball cap identical

to that found at the crime scene and identifications by both

Seidel and Schmidt during police photo lineups.

At trial, Christian’s theory of defense was that he had been

misidentified as the perpetrator. In support of this defense,

Christian sought to introduce testimony that Burkhart had

confessed to the murder on two separate occasions. Burkhart

exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and so the court declared him “unavailable,” as

defined by Rule 804(a) of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence.

Unable to question Burkhart directly regarding his alleged

confessions, Christian attempted to call the two witnesses

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who allegedly heard Burkhart confess to the murder.2

 The trial

court conducted a hearing pursuant to Rule 103 of the Hawaii

Rules of Evidence to determine whether there was sufficient

corroboration of Burkhart’s alleged confessions to admit them

into evidence.3

The first witness to one of Burkhart’s alleged confessions

was William Auld. Christian’s counsel explained during the

Rule 103 hearing that Auld intended to testify that, while

sharing a prison cell with Burkhart in late 1995, Burkhart told

Auld that he had killed Cabaccang. Auld was prepared to testify that he had believed that Burkhart was telling the truth

when he made that statement.

The second witness was Patricia Mullins. According to

Christian’s counsel, Mullins would testify that, on a previous

occasion, “considerably before” the murder in July 1995, she

had seen Burkhart pull out a knife during an argument. She

was also prepared to testify that several days after the murder,

she confronted Burkhart about whether he had killed Cabaccang. Burkhart allegedly responded by stating that he had

killed Cabaccang and that he thought he would get away with

the murder. Mullins acknowledged, however, that she routinely used drugs with Burkhart and that she did not know if

he had been under the influence of drugs at the time of his

confession to her. Mullins would also testify that, at a later

date, Burkhart allegedly warned her to not talk about his prior

confession to the Cabaccang murder.

2Although some details in the record allude to a third witness, the state

trial court, the Hawaii Supreme Court, the federal district court and Christian’s appellate briefing all focus entirely upon the same two witnesses.

We do the same. 

3Under Hawaii Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), a “statement tending to

expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the

accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” 

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In an effort to fulfill Rule 804(b)(3)’s trustworthiness

requirement, at the Rule 103 hearing, Christian proffered several corroborating details that he intended to offer as evidence. First, Christian alleged that Auld’s and Mullins’

statements corroborated each other. Second, Christian

explained that he would call a witness to testify that Burkhart

owned a knife that “could have been” similar to the one used

in the murder. Third, Cabaccang’s neighbor, Tesha Santana,

would testify that she was expecting Burkhart to visit her that

night and that he never showed up. Fourth, Christian intended

to show that Cabaccang’s keys were found at the scene of the

murder and that Cabaccang’s car showed no signs of forced

entry.4 And fifth, Christian planned to demonstrate that Seidel

acted strangely on the night of the murder and called out to

Santana specifically instead of calling for help generally.5

The trial court ultimately concluded that this evidence, in

the aggregate, was insufficient to corroborate Burkhart’s

alleged confessions and thus refused to admit Auld’s and

Mullins’ testimony. Christian was convicted by a jury of

second-degree murder, attempted third-degree theft and use of

a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime.

Following his conviction, Christian moved for a new trial.

The trial court orally denied Christian’s motion. Christian

then timely appealed to the Hawaii Supreme Court, arguing

that the district court erred by, among other things, excluding

the testimony about Burkhart’s alleged confessions. The

Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of

4Christian reasoned that the car was unlocked and that the presence of

Cabaccang’s keys suggested that the murderer was someone who had

some relation to Cabaccang and thereby had access to his keys. Burkhart

allegedly had such a relation to Cabaccang via his acquaintance with Santana. Of course, Cabaccang’s car may have been unlocked and Cabaccang

may have simply had the keys on his person that night and dropped them

during the struggle. 

5Christian’s theory was that Seidel wanted to talk with someone who

knew Burkhart, such as Santana. 

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Christian’s post-verdict motion for a new trial and also

affirmed Christian’s convictions for second-degree murder

and attempted third-degree theft.6State v. Christian, 967 P.2d

239, 243 (Haw. 1998). The Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned

that the convictions were appropriate because Christian’s case

was distinguishable from Chambers, and Christian had not

suffered any violation of his due process rights. Christian,

967 P.2d at 260-63.

Christian then timely petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus

in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

A federal magistrate judge issued 82 pages of findings and

recommendations, ultimately recommending that the writ be

issued. The federal district court adopted in part and modified

in part the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations

and, in a 35-page order, granted Christian’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. The district court rested its decision on its

conclusion that the Hawaii Supreme Court decision affirming

the exclusion of the testimony about Burkhart’s confessions

was an “unreasonable application” of Chambers.

The appeal to this court timely followed.

II

We review de novo a district court’s decision to issue a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Lewis v.

Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court’s

findings of fact are reviewed for “clear error.” Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.

Ct. 941 (2009).

[1] Federal courts review habeas corpus petitions from

6The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed Christian’s conviction for use of

a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime because it

was “included” in the second degree murder conviction. See Christian,

967 P.2d at 263-65. 

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state prisoners under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison

Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006). Under AEDPA,

a federal court may not grant a habeas corpus petition unless

the “last reasoned” state court decision “was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

clearly established federal law if the state court identified the

correct governing legal rule but unreasonably applied it to the

facts at hand. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000).

“Clearly established Federal law” refers to the holdings of the

Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state-court decision.

Id. at 412.

[2] The AEDPA standard is “ ‘highly deferential’ ” and

“demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per

curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7

(1997)). A federal court may second-guess a state court decision only if it determines that “the state court was not merely

wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004).

III

In this appeal, we are compelled to revisit Chambers and

decide whether the Hawaii Supreme Court unreasonably

applied Chambers by affirming the exclusion of testimony

about the Burkhart confessions in Christian’s trial.7 The

7We reject the argument that Chambers is not clearly established federal

law for the purpose of a § 2254 habeas petition. Although there are factual

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Hawaii Supreme Court explained at great length its conclusion that the exclusion of the testimony about Burkhart’s confessions did not violate Christian’s due process rights and

why it believed that Chambers was “manifestly distinguishable” from Christian’s case. Christian, 967 P.2d at 260. In

light of the highly deferential standard afforded state court

decisions under AEDPA and the particular facts of Christian’s

case, we hold that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s application of

Chambers was reasonable.

A

In Chambers, the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that Leon Chambers had been deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Chambers

was convicted of murder by a jury in Mississippi state court.

Id. at 285. The murder itself happened in a small town in

southern Mississippi near a bar that two policemen, including

the victim, had entered to arrest a young man. Id. A crowd of

some two dozen men physically impeded the officers’ arrest.

Id. The officers radioed for assistance, additional officers

showed up and the officers again tried to make the arrest. Id.

at 286. A struggle ensued and, during the commotion, the victim policeman was shot in the back repeatedly by someone in

the crowd. Id. Before he collapsed, the officer turned around

and fired two shots into the crowd, one of which was deliberately “aimed” and hit Chambers in the back of the head. Id.

Chambers was rushed to the hospital by his friends and ultimately survived the shot. Id. at 287. The police officer died.

Id.

On the night of the shooting, Gable McDonald was in the

vicinity of the crime. Id. McDonald was one of three people

differences between Chambers and the instant appeal, “AEDPA does not

‘require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual

pattern before a legal rule must be applied.’ ” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551

U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81 (2006)

(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 

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who drove Chambers to the hospital that night. Id. Shortly

after the shooting, McDonald left his wife and moved to Louisiana. Id. Sometime later, he returned to the city where the

shooting had transpired at the request of Reverend Stokes, an

acquaintance of his. Id. After meeting with Stokes, McDonald

agreed to, and did in fact, make a confession to Chambers’

attorneys that he, McDonald, had shot the police officer. Id.

The confession was transcribed, signed and witnessed, and

McDonald affirmed to those present that it had been made

voluntarily. Id. at 287-88. Local police authorities immediately arrested McDonald. Id. at 288.

At a preliminary hearing, McDonald repudiated his prior

confession, claiming that Stokes had induced him to make the

confession.8Id. While acknowledging that he had once owned

the type of firearm used in the shooting and was in the general

vicinity of where the shooting took place, McDonald insisted

that he was not the shooter. Id. The local justice of the peace

accepted McDonald’s repudiation, he was released from custody and local authorities undertook no further investigation

about his potential involvement in the crime. Id.

Chambers was eventually charged and tried for the murder

of the policeman. Chambers presented two lines of defense at

his trial. First, he argued that he was simply not the shooter.

In this regard, conflicting testimony about the night of the

shooting was introduced into evidence. One officer testified

that he had seen Chambers shoot the victim, whereas another

witness testified that he was certain that Chambers did not fire

any shots. Id. at 289. Three officers testified that they saw the

victim shoot Chambers and that they assumed that, in doing

so, the victim was shooting his attacker. Id. No officer had

8Stokes allegedly convinced McDonald that, if he confessed to the

crime, he could share in the proceeds of a lawsuit that Chambers would

bring against the local town. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 288. Stokes allegedly

assured McDonald that he would not be convicted of the murder despite

confessing to the crime. Id. 

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examined Chambers after he was shot to determine whether

he had a firearm on his person, and there was no proof that

Chambers had ever owned a firearm of the kind used in the

shooting. Id.

Chambers’ additional defense was that McDonald had shot

the officer. Id. In furtherance of this defense, one witness, a

“lifelong friend” of McDonald, testified that he saw McDonald shoot the officer. Id. Another witness claimed that he saw

McDonald with a firearm in his hand after the shooting took

place. Id. Chambers called McDonald himself as a witness

and introduced McDonald’s signed confession into evidence.

Id. at 289, 291. McDonald disavowed the confession and

made reference to his prior repudiation. Id. at 291. Chambers

attempted to challenge McDonald’s earlier repudiation, but

state procedural rules prevented him from examining McDonald further. Id. Chambers was thereby denied any opportunity

to disprove McDonald’s repudiation.

Chambers then sought to bolster this theory of defense by

introducing testimony that McDonald had allegedly confessed

to the crime on three other separate occasions. Id. at 292. The

first alleged confession was to a friend of McDonald’s, who

claimed that McDonald had independently confessed to him

on the evening of the shooting. Id. The second witness was

another friend of McDonald’s who was prepared to testify

that McDonald admitted to shooting the officer as they were

driving Chambers to the hospital. Id. This same witness was

prepared to testify that a week later, McDonald referenced his

prior confession and warned the witness to not “mess him

up.” Id. The third witness was McDonald’s former neighbor

and friend of 25 years. Id. He stated that he was prepared to

testify that, on the day after the shooting, McDonald admitted

to him privately that he was the one who shot the officer and

that he had disposed of the murder weapon. Id. This witness

was also willing to state that several weeks after the shooting,

he went with McDonald to purchase a firearm to replace the

discarded one. Id. Through a combination of several state eviCHRISTIAN v. FRANK 2693

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dentiary rules, the testimony of all three witnesses was

excluded. Id. at 292-94.

Chambers was ultimately convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 285. The Mississippi

Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the

exclusion of the witnesses’ testimony was appropriate pursuant to the Mississippi hearsay rules. Id. at 285, 293.

[3] The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and ultimately concluded that these evidentiary exclusions were, in the aggregate, a violation of Chambers’ due

process right to a fair trial. Id. at 302. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed two primary considerations: the

amount and quality of the evidence corroborating the testimony about the confessions and the significance of the testimony to the defense. The Court spent the greatest portion of

its analysis on the fact that the corroborating evidence “provided considerable assurance of [the testimonies’] reliability.”

Id. at 300. According to the Court, this reliability stemmed

from four main sources: each confession was spontaneously

made to a different close friend shortly after the crime, each

confession was corroborated by other evidence in the case,9

the confessions were against penal interest and McDonald

himself was available in the courtroom to be cross-examined

by the state if there was any question about the reliability of

the out-of-court statements.10 Id. at 300-01. The Court also

briefly noted that the testimony about the confessions was

9

In particular, the Court noted that persuasive corroboration stemmed

from “McDonald’s sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to

the shooting, the testimony that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, . . . proof of [McDonald’s] prior ownership of [the

type of firearm used in the shooting] and subsequent purchase of a new

weapon” and the “sheer number of independent confessions.” Chambers,

410 U.S. at 300. 

10The Court stressed that McDonald’s availability “significantly distinguishe[d]” the case from earlier Mississippi cases where the alleged confessor had been declared unavailable. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301. 

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critical to Chambers’ defense and that its crucial nature

weighed in favor of admitting it. Id. at 302. The Court concluded that, “under the facts and circumstances of this case,”

Chambers had been deprived of a fair trial. Id. at 303.

B

[4] In its decision affirming the trial court’s conviction of

Christian, the Hawaii Supreme Court acknowledged that

although Chambers bore upon Christian’s case, the two cases

were ultimately distinguishable. Christian, 967 P.2d at 260.

The Hawaii Supreme Court noted that, unlike in Chambers,

no eyewitness linked Burkhart with the scene of the crime. Id.

at 262. On the contrary, the Hawaii Supreme Court noted that

the only two eyewitnesses present at the murder, Seidel and

Schmidt, had both failed to identify Burkhart in photo lineups

and instead had individually identified Christian as the culprit.11

Id. And two witnesses had actually placed Burkhart at a completely different location at the time of the stabbing. 

[5] The Hawaii Supreme Court also observed that Burkhart

made only two unsworn confessions compared to McDonald’s four confessions, one of which was sworn in the presence of Chambers’ attorneys. Id. And the court further

11During the evidentiary hearing before the district court, Schmidt

recanted his identification of Christian and instead claimed that Burkhart

was the person he saw leaving the crime scene. Schmidt’s recantation does

not change our conclusion that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision was

reasonable. Schmidt’s “later recantation of his trial testimony does not

render his earlier testimony false,” Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 994

(9th Cir. 2005). His recantation is especially unreliable given that it was

made more than a decade after his original failure to identify Burkhart as

the perpetrator and positive identification of Christian as the perpetrator.

See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 483 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Appellate courts . . . look upon recantations

with extreme suspicion.”); State v. Naeole, 617 P.2d 820, 824 (Haw. 1980)

(“[R]ecantation is to be viewed with the utmost suspicion . . . .”); 58 Am.

Jur. 2d New Trial § 345 (2009) (“[R]ecantation testimony is generally

considered exceedingly unreliable . . . .”). 

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distinguished the two cases by noting the dearth of other corroborating evidence linking Burkhart to the crime. Id. at

262-63. In the aggregate, these facts made the testimony

about the alleged confessions in Christian’s case much less

reliable than the testimony at issue in Chambers. Id. at 263.

Given the great weight that the Supreme Court had placed

upon reliability in Chambers, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that it was proper to distinguish Christian’s case. Id.

C

The federal district court held that not only was it wrong to

distinguish Chambers in such a fashion, but that it was unreasonably wrong of the Hawaii Supreme Court to do so. The

district court reasoned that the Hawaii Supreme Court had

failed to fully appreciate the inherent reliability of selfinculpatory statements. The district court further concluded

that it was inappropriate for the Hawaii Supreme Court to

consider the other evidence against Christian when it was

examining the reliability of the confession testimony. And

finally, the district court stressed that nothing in Chambers

explicitly “dictated that the same level of corroborating evidence is required.” The district court concluded that these

considerations made the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision

unreasonable and habeas relief was therefore warranted.

D

[6] Although we sympathize with Christian’s desire to

present evidence that Burkhart allegedly confessed to the

murder, we cannot agree with the district court’s conclusion

that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s application of Chambers

was unreasonable. We are guided and bound by AEDPA’s

highly deferential standard of review of state court decisions.

There are such significant factual differences between the

case before us and Chambers that the Hawaii Supreme

Court’s decision to distinguish the two cases was not unreasonable.

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[7] The Hawaii Supreme Court accurately detailed several

ways in which the excluded testimony at issue in this case

was materially less trustworthy than the excluded testimony

in Chambers. There were fewer alleged confessions, the confessions were made to less reputable individuals12 and the

confessions were contradicted, rather than supported, by the

other evidence in the case. All of these considerations seriously diminish the reliability of the testimony at issue. This

distinguishing analysis was especially appropriate given the

fact that the Supreme Court of the United States so heavily

stressed that it was the “trustworthiness” of the evidence at

issue in Chambers that compelled its admissibility.

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. 

[8] Moreover, Chambers can be further distinguished from

the case before us in that, here, Burkhart exercised his Fifth

Amendment right not to testify and was declared to be

unavailable. Christian, 967 P.2d at 244. His unavailability

contrasts sharply with the availability of McDonald in Chambers, which the Supreme Court of the United States stressed

greatly enhanced the reliability of the extrajudicial statements

in that case. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301. Burkhart could not

“have been cross-examined by the State” nor could “his

demeanor and responses [be] weighed by the jury” to gauge

the truthfulness of the alleged confessions. Id. 

[9] We further distinguish Chambers by noting that, in

Christian’s case, there is doubt not only about the truthfulness

of the alleged confessions, but also about whether those confessions were ever made in the first place, in light of the unre12Mullins, one alleged recipient of a confession from Burkhart, had been

convicted of several crimes of dishonesty. As noted previously, she had

also acknowledged that she routinely used drugs with Burkhart and that

she was uncertain as to whether he had been under the influence of drugs

at the time of his confession to her. The other alleged recipient, Auld, was

a convicted felon. The credibility of such confessions is not as great as the

credibility of the confessions at issue in Chambers, where one confession

was signed and made in the presence of reputable witnesses. 

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liability of the witnesses and the unrecorded form of the

confessions. Given the fact that the Hawaii Supreme Court

faced, in Chambers, an opinion that was explicitly tailored to

“the facts and circumstances of [that] case,” the Hawaii

Supreme Court’s distinguishing conclusion was reasonable.

Id. at 303.

Contrary to Christian’s assertions, our decision is in complete accord with Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997 (9th Cir.

2004), another case in which our circuit explored the parameters of Chambers in the context of habeas petitions. In Chia,

we ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of the petitioner because, at trial, several exonerating confessions had been excluded from evidence. Id. at 1001. These

statements clearly stated that the petitioner had not been

involved in the murder at all. Id. 

In Chia, the statements bore “strong indicia of reliability”

and the exclusion of them by the state court was therefore

unreasonable. Id. at 1004-05. The four statements bore high

marks of both accuracy—one was made in a recorded police

interview—and reliability—another statement was made “in

real danger of imminent death—a traditional indicium of reliability.” Id. at 1004-06. Moreover, the statements were

entirely consistent with the independent observations of law

officials and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s version

of the events. Id. at 1006. We concluded that, in light of such

reliability, it was unreasonable to exclude the evidence.

[10] Again, such poignant reliability as that of the evidence in Chia is simply not present in the case before us. The

alleged statements here were fewer in number, were strongly

contradicted by the physical evidence, were made in far less

reliable contexts and were perhaps never even made, given

the unreliability of the witnesses. The Hawaii court’s decision

to exclude such materially less reliable evidence did not

amount to an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law.

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IV

The Hawaii Supreme Court’s application of Chambers was

not unreasonable. We reverse the district court’s decision to

grant Christian’s § 2254 habeas petition.

REVERSED; PETITION DENIED.

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