Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-07139/USCOURTS-ca10-95-07139-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM T. WINFREY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

lJoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG .. 7 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-7139 

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner 

of Social Security,· 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CV-94-582) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Davis Duty, Fort Smith, Arkansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

John W. Raley, Jr., United States Attorney, Joseph B. Liken, Acting Chief 

Counsel, Tina M. Waddeii, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, Anthony D. Randall, 

• Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of 

Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. 

Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action. 

Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, 

in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate 

party at the time of the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-7139 Document: 01019278977 Date Filed: 08/07/1996 Page: 1 
Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security 

Administration, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, BARRETT, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff appeals the district court's affirmance of the Secretary's decision 

denying him disability insurance benefits. 1 Plaintiff claims to have been disabled 

since April 1991 as a result of pain in his neck, shoulder, upper and lower back, 

and right leg, headaches, a catch in the middle finger of his left hand, tingling in 

his right hand, asthma, liver problems, hypoglycemia, hiatal hernia, depression, 

general anxiety disorder, and somatoform disorder. After conducting two 

hearings and a de novo review of the record, the administrative law judge (ALJ) 

determined that plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a truck driver, 

as that work is generally performed in the national economy. When the Appeals 

Council denied review, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the 

Secretary. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 1Oth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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"We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it is supported 

by substantial evidence and whether the Secretary applied the correct legal 

standards." Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (lOth Cir. 1994). We 

must examine the record closely to determine whether substantial evidence 

supports the Secretary's determination. Id. Substantial evidence is "such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401 (1971)(quotation omitted). 

In addition to a lack of substantial evidence, the Secretary's failure to apply the 

correct legal standards, or to show us that she has done so, are also grounds for 

reversal. Washington, 37 F.3d at 1439. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff, who was sixty years old at the time the ALJ issued the present 

decision, worked as a truck driver for Roadway Express for twenty-one years. 

Plaintiff's job required him not only to drive a truck, but to load and unload 

cargo. His testimony reflected that he performed the job at an exertional level 

between medium and heavy. In 1988, plaintiff suffered a work-related injury to 

his neck and shoulder, for which he received worker's compensation. As a result 

of alleged increasing difficulty in performing his job, plaintiff quit in April 1991. 

In a decision issued August 1992, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could perform 

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a full range of medium work, but that, in light of his treating physician's opinion 

that "the claimant's loading of trucks and pulling down and latching doors may 

represent a difficulty for the claimant given his limitations," Tr. at 241, plaintiff 

could not perform his past relevant work. The ALJ, therefore, proceeded to step 

five of the sequential analysis, see 20 C.F .R. § 404.1520 (setting forth the five 

steps), where he concluded that plaintiff was not disabled based on the grids. 

The Appeals Council reversed the ALJ's decision and remanded the action 

to obtain further evidence concerning plaintiff's physical and mental limitations 

and to reevaluate the evidence under proper legal principles. On remand, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff had the physical ability to perform a full range of medium 

work, but that he had nonexertional limitations resulting from his mental 

impairments. The ALJ concluded that, despite these limitations, plaintiff could 

return to his past work as a truck driver--as distinguished from his past work as a 

loader and unloader--as that work is generally performed in the national economy. 

See Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82-61, Soc. Sec. Rep. Scrv., Rulings 1975-

1982, 836, 838 (West 1983); Andrade v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 

985 F.2d 1045, 1050-51 (lOth Cir. 1993)(holding that "past relevant work" 

includes not only claimant's particular former job, but also claimant's former 

occupation as it is generally performed in the national economy). 

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Plaintiff alleges five categories of error in the Secretary's decision: 

improper evaluation of plaintiff's subjective complaints; improper evaluation of 

plaintiff's mental impairments; improper evaluation of plaintiff's residual 

functional capacity; improper evaluation of plaintiff's ability to return to his past 

relevant work; and improper application of the vocational expert's testimony. We 

will address each in turn. 

II. Evaluation of Subjective Complaints 

"A claimant's subjective allegation of pain is not sufficient in itself to 

establish disability. Before the ALJ need even consider any subjective evidence 

of pain, the claimant must first prove by objective medical evidence the existence 

of a pain-producing impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the 

alleged disabling pain." Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (lOth Cir. 

1993 )(citations omitted). Plaintiff met this initial burden here. X-rays of 

plaintiff's cervical spine taken in 1991 showed marked degenerative changes, and 

x-rays of his left shoulder showed degenerative changes and a narrowing of the 

AC joint. A CAT scan of plaintiff's cervical spine in the fall of 1991 revealed 

"extensive osteoarthritis changes of the facet joints without evidence of [a] 

ruptured disk," Tr. at 206, and x-rays of plaintiff's lumbosacral spine showed 

"moderate lipping of osteoarthritis," but "no degenerative changes," id. at 213. 

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The ALJ was then required to consider all the relevant objective and subjective 

evidence and "decide whether he believe[ d) the claimant's assertions of severe 

pain," Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163 (lOth Cir. 1987). The ALJ found that 

plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were not credible to the extent they 

suggested he could not perform a full range of medium work. 

"Findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to 

substantial evidence .... " Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (lOth Cir. 

1988). "Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of 

fact, [however,] and we will not upset such determinations when supported by 

substantial evidence." Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 

774, 777 (I Oth Cir. 1990). 

Here, some of the reasons advanced by the ALJ for finding plaintiff's 

subjective complaints of pain incredible were not supported by substantial 

evidence. The most notable of these was the ALJ's determination that plaintiff 

had an incentive not to work. This finding was based entirely on the ALJ's 

speculation that the terms of plaintiffs pension might prohibit plaintiff from 

working. Conversely, the ALJ also failed to consider relevant factors that were 

supported by the record. The most notable of these was "the possibility that 

psychological disorders combine with physical problems," Luna, 834 F.2d at 166. 

Dr. Spray, a clinical psychologist, diagnosed plaintiff with somatoform disorder, 

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not otherwise specified. He found that plaintiff manifested an "[ u ]nrealistic 

interpretation of physical signs or sensations associated with the preoccupation or 

belief that one has a serious disease or injury." Tr. at 266. Dr. Spray also noted 

that plaintiff was "extremely somatically preoccupied," id. at 308, and that, even 

if plaintiff were given only simple job instructions, he would be "likely to 

complain about somatic concerns," id. at 310. The ALJ, however, did not treat 

plaintiff's somatic preoccupation as a manifestation of his mental impairment or 

consider how that impairment, along with plaintiff's depression and anxiety 

disorder, affected his perception of pain. Instead, the ALJ discounted plaintiff's 

credibility based on his determination that "claimant is bored and whiny and has 

[an] incentive not to work and to complain about problems." I d. at 37. Thus, the 

ALI's evaluation of plaintiff's subjective complaints was flawed by his reliance 

on factors that were not supported by the record and by his failure to consider 

other factors that were supported by the record. 

III. Evaluation of Mental Impairments 

Dr. Spray first examined plaintiff in October 1992, at which time he 

performed a mental status exam and administered several tests, including the 

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2). Dr. Spray detailed his 

findings in a report and completed a Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT) form. 

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Dr. Spray diagnosed plaintiff with the following conditions: (1) somatoform 

disorder, not otherwise specified, (2) dysthymia, (3) history of alcohol abuse, and 

( 4) personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with dependent and antisocial 

features. 

In May 1993, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Dean, a psychiatrist, at the 

Secretary's request. Dr. Dean concluded that plaintiff suffered from a generalized 

anxiety disorder and major depression. In response to an inquiry from plaintiff's 

attorney as to the presence of a somatoform disorder, Dr. Dean wrote that he "was 

unable to adequately assess the presence or absence of objective findings which 

would either corroborate or eliminate the presence of a somatoform disorder," 

because he was not given complete data on plaintiff's medical care and he neither 

obtained a complete medical history from plaintiff nor conducted his own 

physical examination of plaintiff. Tr. at 314. 

In connection with his examination of plaintiff, Dr. Dean completed a 

Medical Assessment of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities form, on which he 

indicated that plaintiff's abilities in seven areas were only "fair"2 and his abilities 

in eight areas were"good". 3 Dr. Dean noted that "chronic anxiety and depression 

2 "Fair" is defined on the form as "[a]bility to function in this area is 

seriously limited, but not precluded." Tr. at 283. 

3 "Good" is defined on the form as "[a]bility to function in this area is 

(continued ... ) 

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limits patient to more solitary vocations and limits his ability to relate to other 

people." I d. at 283. 

Dr. Spray examined plaintiff again in September 1993. He found plaintiff 

"extremely somatically preoccupied," with "occult ideas about not only the causes 

of his perceived pain, but also treatment." I d. at 308. He also noted that plaintiff 

"easily got off on somatic tangents that were not related to the question asked of 

him," id. at 309, and found that plaintiff "has difficulty concentrating due to his 

somatic preoccupation," id. at 310. With one exception, Dr. Spray's diagnoses in 

1993 were the same as those he made in 1992. The only change concerned 

plaintiff's alcohol abuse. In the 1992 report, Dr. Spray noted that plaintiff's 

statements about his alcohol use were inconsistent and, therefore, he was unclear 

when plaintiff had stopped using alcohol or if plaintiff had stopped completely. 

At the time of the exam in 1993, however, plaintiff "admit[ ted] to continued use 

of alcoholic beverages, the last time approximately two days ago when he drank 

eight to ten beers," id. at 309. Therefore, Dr. Spray changed his diagnosis from a 

"history of alcohol abuse" to "alcohol abuse." In connection with his 

examination in 1993, Dr. Spray also completed a Medical Assessment of Ability 

to Do Work-Related Activities form, on which he concluded that plaintiff's 

3

( ... continued) 

limited, but satisfactory." Tr. at 283. 

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abilities were "poor or none" in eight areas, "fair" in six areas, and "good" in 

only one area: maintaining personal appearance. 

Dr. Goodman, a psychiatrist, acted as a medical adviser at the supplemental 

hearing. Because he had not examined plaintiff, his comments were based solely 

on his review of the record and plaintiffs testimony at the supplemental hearing. 

Dr. Goodman questioned Dr. Spray's diagnosis of somatoform disorder, because 

he thought there appeared to be physical reasons for plaintiff's somatic 

complaints. Otherwise, Dr. Goodman testified that the evidence revealed an 

individual who abuses alcohol and has somatic complaints, as well as dysthymia, 

a generalized anxiety disorder, and personality disorders that may meet the A 

criteria under the listings, see 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.08. Dr. 

Goodman noted that plaintiff had not been treated for his dysthymia, which he 

described as mild chronic depression, but that the condition is "very treatable 

with medication," id. at 128. Dr. Goodman did not say, however, whether 

treatment could be expected to eliminate all effects of the condition on plaintiffs 

ability to do work-related activities. 

Despite Dr. Spray's diagnosis, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have a 

somatoform disorder. The ALJ gave three reasons for this finding: (1) Dr. 

Goodman's opinion that there were physical reasons for plaintiff's somatic 

complaints; (2) his own interpretation of "Dr. Dean's initial failure to consider 

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this diagnosis [as] a reflection of his belief at the time that such diagnosis was not 

warranted," id. at 28; and (3) his own opinion that Dr. Spray improperly used the 

MMPI-2 as a basis for the diagnosis. None of these grounds justifies rejecting 

Dr. Spray's diagnosis. 

First, because Dr. Goodman did not examine plaintiff, his opinion was not 

entitled to as much weight as that of Dr. Spray. 20 C.F .R. § 404.1527( d)(l ); 

Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1463 (lOth Cir. 1987). Dr. Spray's diagnosis 

was not inconsistent with the opinion of Dr. Dean, the only other mental health 

professional who examined plaintiff. Second, the ALJ's attempt to infer from Dr. 

Dean's failure to diagnose a soma to form disorder a determination by Dr. Dean 

that the diagnosis was not warranted is belied by Dr. Dean's own explanation for 

the absence of a diagnosis. Finally, the ALJ clearly overstepped his bounds when 

he substituted his medical judgment for that of Dr. Spray, by determining that the 

results of the MMPI-2 test were not an adequate basis on which to make a 

diagnosis. See Kemp v. Bowen, 816 F .2d 1469, 14 76 (1Oth Cir. 1987)(holding 

that an ALJ "can not interpose his own 'medical expertise' over that of a 

physician"). We note that Dr. Goodman never suggested that Dr. Spray's reliance 

on the results of the MMPI-2 test as a diagnostic tool was improper. 

The ALJ rejected not only Dr. Spray's diagnosis of a somatoform disorder, 

but also Dr. Spray's conclusions about the effect ofplaintiff's various mental 

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impairments on his ability to work. Other than those discussed above, the only 

additional reason the ALJ advanced for rejecting Dr. Spray's opinion was that he 

did not think the evidence supported Dr. Spray's change of diagnosis from a 

history of alcohol abuse to alcohol abuse. The ALJ found that "Dr. Spray's kneejerk diagnosis of alcohol abuse based on [plaintiff's report of having drunk eight 

to ten beers two days before the exam] appears to be somewhat flimsy in light of 

the remainder of the record." Tr. at 31. The ALJ found that the rate of 

consumption to which plaintiff testified at the hearing ("a few beers a week or 

two prior to the supplemental hearing") was not "excessive or abusive." I d. 

Once again, the ALJ appears to have second-guessed a medical expert's 

judgment, by determining what rate of alcohol consumption should be considered 

excessive or abusive for plaintiff. Further, although plaintiff testified at the 

supplemental hearing that he had quit drinking four years ago and had drunk only 

a few beers in recent weeks, he had previously told Dr. Spray otherwise. In 

making his diagnosis, Dr. Spray was entitled to rely on the information plaintiff 

provided him, including that plaintiff continued to drink and had recently drunk 

as many as ten beers in one day. Moreover, rejecting Dr. Spray's diagnosis of 

current alcohol abuse would not justify rejecting the remainder of his opinion. 

Not only did Dr. Dean and Dr. Goodman corroborate other diagnoses by Dr. 

Spray, but all the explanations Dr. Spray provided for his answers on the Medical 

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Assessment of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities form were based on 

plaintiff's other mental impairments, not his alcohol abuse. 

In sum, the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Spray's opinions without adequate 

justification and in substituting his own medical judgment for that of mental 

health professionals. This, in turn, led the ALJ to make conclusions about the 

effects of plaintiffs mental impairments on his ability to work that did not fairly 

take into account all the evidence. If, on remand, the ALJ determines that the 

evidence about plaintiffs mental impairments is not sufficient to support a 

decision on plaintiff's claim, the ALJ can order another consultative exam, see 20 

C.F .R. § 404.1519a(b ), and, this time, provide the examining physician with all 

the medical records necessary to make an informed diagnosis. 

IV. The Three Phases of Step Four 

Step four of the sequential analysis, at which the ALJ found plaintiff not 

disabled, is comprised of three phases. In the first phase, the ALJ must evaluate a 

claimant's physical and mental residual functional capacity (RFC), see SSR 86-8, 

Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv., Rulings 1983-1991, 423, 427 (West 1992), and in the second 

phase, he must determine the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past 

relevant work. 20 C.P.R.§ 404.1520(e). In the final phase, the ALJ determines 

whether the claimant has the ability to meet the job demands found in phase two 

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despite the mental and/or physical limitations found in phase one. See SSR 82-

62, Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv., Rulings 1975-1982, 809; Henrie v. United States Dep 't 

of Health & Human Servs., 13 F.3d 359, 361 (lOth Cir. 1993). At each of these 

phases, the ALJ must make specific findings. See Henrie, 13 F .3d at 361. 

A. Phase One: Plaintiffs Residual Functional Capacity 

In determining a claimant's physical abilities, the ALJ should "first assess 

the nature and extent of [the claimant's] physical limitations and then determine 

[the claimant's] residual functional capacity for work activity on a regular and 

continuing basis." 20 C.P.R.§ 404.1545(b). Here, the ALJ concluded that 

plaintiff had the physical ability to do a full range of medium work. SSR 83-10 

defines "full range of work" as "[a ]II or substantially all occupations existing at 

an exertional level," and provides that "[t]he considerable lifting required for the 

full range of medium work usually requires frequent bending-stooping ... 

[f]lexibility of the knees as well as the torso is important for this activity." Soc. 

Sec. Rep. Serv., Rulings 1983-1991, at 30.4 Dr. Dandridge, an orthopedic 

surgeon who examined plaintiff in 1993 at the request of the Secretary, concluded 

that plaintiff could climb, stoop, kneel, balance, crouch, and crawl only 

4 Although SSR 83-10 specifically relates to step five of the sequential 

analysis, because a claimant's RFC is relevant at both steps four and five, we may 

be guided at step four by the ruling's definitions of terms that are integral to the 

RFC determination. 

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occasionally, commenting that, "[a]t this patient's age, flexibility and elasticity of 

tissues prevent frequency of activities." Tr. at 294. The ALJ credited Dr. 

Dandridge's opinion, but determined that it did not conflict with a determination 

that plaintiff could do a full range of medium work. The ALJ reasoned that, 

because kneeling and crouching are forms of bending, plaintiff's ability to stoop, 

kneel, and crawl occasionally meant that he could frequently bend-stoop. In her 

brief on appeal, the Secretary does not even attempt to justify this fallacious 

reasoning. 

The ALJ's RFC determination also failed to take into account the physical 

limitations found by Dr. Combs, plaintiff's treating physician. Although the ALJ 

stated that he found entirely credible Dr. Combs' opinion that plaintiff would 

have difficulty loading cargo, pulling down doors and latching them, the ALJ did 

not include any of these limitations in his determination of plaintiff's RFC. Thus, 

the RFC finding the ALJ made at the first phase of the step four analysis did not 

accurately reflect plaintiff's exertional limitations. 5 

5 Although the ALJ partially rectified his error by considering the limitations 

identified by Dr. Combs at the final phase of the step four analysis, this case 

illustrates one of the hazards associated with an incomplete RFC assessment: the 

established limitations that are omitted from the RFC determination itself, may 

also be omitted from the hypothetical questions the ALJ propounds to a 

vocational expert at a later stage of the disability analysis. "[T]estimony elicited 

by hypothetical questions that do not relate with precision all of a claimant's 

impairments cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the Secretary's 

(continued ... ) 

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The ALJ also erred in evaluating plaintiffs mental RFC. "When there is 

evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant from working, 

the Secretary must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments set 

forth in 20 C.F .R. § 404.1520a and the Listing of Impairments and document the 

procedure accordingly." Cruse v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 

49 F.3d 614, 617 (lOth Cir. 1995). Documentation is made by completing a PRT 

form, which the ALJ must attach to his written decision. "[T]he record must 

contain substantial competent evidence to support the conclusions reached on the 

PRT form[, and] if the ALJ prepares the form himself, he must 'discuss in his 

opinion the evidence he considered in reaching the conclusions expressed on the 

form."' Id. at 617-18 (quoting Washington, 37 F.3d at 1442). Here, the ALJ 

repeated in the body of his written opinion the conclusions he reached on the 

PRT, but he did not relate these conclusions to the evidence. The ALJ also 

recited his conclusions as to those abilities that are the subject of the Medical 

Assessment of Ability to Perform Work-Related Activities (Mental) form. Again, 

however, the ALJ did not relate his conclusions to the evidence, other than to 

state that they were based on "a reasonable understanding of the medical 

records," Tr. at 31. We note that the ALJ's conclusions as to plaintiffs abilities 

5 ( ••• continued) 

decision." Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F .2d 1482, 1492 (1Oth Cir. 1991 )(quotation 

omitted). 

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differed dramatically from Dr. Spray's conclusions; a difference which the ALJ 

did not explain. 

B. Phase Two: Demands of Plaintiffs Past Relevant Work 

At the second phase of the step four analysis, the ALJ must make findings 

regarding the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work. 

See Henrie, 13 F .3d at 361. To make the necessary findings, the ALJ must obtain 

adequate "factual information about those work demands which have a bearing on 

the medically established limitations." SSR 82-62, Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv., Rulings 

1975-1982, at 812. When the claimant has a mental impairment, 

care must be taken to obtain a precise description of the particular 

job duties which are likely to produce tension and anxiety, e.g., 

speed, precision, complexity of tasks, independent judgments, 

working with other people, etc., in order to determine if the 

claimant's mental impairment is compatible with the performance of 

such work. 

Id. Here, the ALJ made no inquiry into, or any findings specifying, the mental 

demands of plaintiffs past relevant work, either as plaintiff actually performed 

the work or as it is customarily performed in the national economy. 

On appeal, the Secretary argues, relying on cases from outside this circuit, 

that plaintiff bore the responsibility for developing the record as to the demands 

of his past relevant work. Tenth Circuit law concerning the ALJ's duty of inquiry 

and factual development is, however, to the contrary. See. e.g., Washington, 37 

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F.3d at 1442; Henrie, 13 F.3d at 361. Further, the Secretary's own rule dictates 

that the ALJ make the necessary findings at phases two and three of the step four 

inquiry. See SSR 82-62, Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv., Rulings 1975-1982, at 813. 

C. Phase Three: Plaintiff's Ability to Perform His Past Relevant Work 

Having failed to complete phase two appropriately, the ALJ was unable to 

make the necessary findings at phase three about plaintiff's ability to meet the 

mental demands of his past relevant work despite his mental impairments. The 

Secretary glosses over the absence of the required ALJ findings, by relying on the 

testimony of the VE that plaintiff could meet the mental demands of his past 

relevant work, given the mental limitations found by the ALJ. This practice of 

delegating to aVE many of the ALJ's fact finding responsibilities at step four 

appears to be of increasing prevalence and is to be discouraged. 

At step five of the sequential analysis, an ALJ may relate the claimant's 

impairments to aVE and then ask the VE whether, in his opinion, there are any 

jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. This approach, which 

requires the VE to make his own evaluation of the mental and physical demands 

of various jobs and of the claimant's ability to meet those demands despite the 

enumerated limitations, is acceptable at step five because the scope of potential 

jobs is so broad. 

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At step four, however, the scope of jobs is limited to those that qualify as 

the claimant's past relevant work. Therefore, it is feasible at this step for the ALJ 

to make specific findings about the mental and physical demands of the jobs at 

issue and to evaluate the claimant's ability to meet those demands. Requiring the 

ALJ to make specific findings on the record at each phase of the step four 

analysis provides for meaningful judicial review. When, as here, the ALJ makes 

findings only about the claimant's limitations, and the remainder of the step four 

assessment takes place in the VE's head, we are left with nothing to review. 

We are not suggesting, as has the Fourth Circuit, see Smith v. Bowen, 837 

F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1987), that the ALJ may not rely on VE testimony in 

making the necessary findings at step four. As SSR 82-62, and SSR 82-61, Soc. 

Sec. Rep. Serv., Rulings 1975-1982, 836, indicate, aVE may supply information 

to the ALJ at step four about the demands of the claimant's past relevant work. 

ld. at 811-12, 838. For example, if the ALJ determines that the claimant's mental 

impairment affects his ability to concentrate, the ALJ may ask the VE for 

information about the level of concentration necessary to perform the claimant's 

past relevant work. The VE's role in supplying vocational information at step 

four is much more limited than his role at step five, where he is called upon to 

give his expert opinion about the claimant's ability to perform work in the 

national economy. Therefore, while the ALJ may rely on information supplied by 

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the VE at step four, the ALJ himself must make the required findings on the 

record, including his own evaluation of the claimant's ability to perform his past 

relevant work. 

Here, the ALJ's error in relying on the VE to give an opinion about 

plaintiffs ability to do his past relevant work was compounded by the fact that 

the VE's testimony did not establish that plaintiff could perform his past relevant 

work as it is generally performed in the national economy. Although the VE 

initially testified that plaintiff could do his past relevant work, even given the 

mental limitations found by the ALJ, he later qualified this opinion when 

questioned by plaintiffs counsel. 

Specifically, the VE concluded that, in light of plaintiffs successful 

employment with Roadway Express for twenty-one years, plaintiffs mental 

impairments would not negatively affect his ability to return to work at Roadway 

Express, because he would be "working with people that he's used to being with 

as well as supervisors, co-workers, and things like this, [and] it would not be like 

he's going into a new situation to where he would have new work adjustments to 

make." Id. at 135. If, however, plaintiff had to change work locations, the VE 

was of the opinion that his mental impairments would have a negative effect, such 

that plaintiff "would probably be discharged from the job if he could not maintain 

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a certain production level. . . . It wouldn't mean he couldn't work, it would mean 

-- [h]e wouldn't be able to keep the job." Id. at 137. 

"'A finding that a claimant is able to engage in substantial gainful activity 

requires more than a simple determination that the claimant can find employment 

and that he can physically perform certain jobs; it also requires a determination 

that the claimant can hold whatever job he finds for a significant period of time."' 

Washington, 37 F.3d at 1442 (quoting Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818, 822 

(5th Cir. 1986)). Thus, the VE's opinion that plaintiff's mental impairments 

would negatively impact his ability to hold a job somewhere other than at 

Roadway Express is significant, because the ALJ specifically found that plaintiff 

could return to his past relevant work only as it is generally performed in the 

national economy, not as plaintiff performed it at Roadway Express. The ALJ, 

however, did not ask the VE whether the customary demands of the occupation of 

truck driver include meeting a production level. In the absence of evidence that 

truck drivers are not customarily expected to meet a production level, the VE' s 

testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion 

that plaintiff can return to his past relevant work as it is generally performed in 

the national economy. 

In sum, the ALJ's analysis at step four was flawed in several respects. In 

the first phase of the analysis, the ALJ failed to include all plaintiff's exertional 

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limitations in his RFC finding and failed to relate the conclusions he recorded on 

the PRT about plaintiffs mental RFC to the evidence. In the second phase, the 

ALJ failed to develop the record on, and to make the required findings about, the 

mental demands of plaintiffs past relevant work. This failure infected the third 

phase, where the ALJ abdicated his fact finding and evaluation responsibilities to 

the VE. This error, in turn, was compounded by the ALJ's failure to elicit 

sufficient information from the VEto support the ALJ's ultimate conclusion that 

plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as it is generally performed in the 

national economy. 

V. Conclusion 

Because the ALJ committed numerous legal errors and his ultimate 

conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence, we must reverse the 

decision and remand for further proceedings. Both the tone of the ALJ's opinion 

and the manner in which the ALJ evaluated the evidence, including substituting 

his medical judgment for that of experts, suggest that the ALJ may not be able to 

provide plaintiff with a fair hearing on remand. Therefore, we recommend that 

the Secretary assign this case to a different ALJ for all further proceedings. 

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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with directions to remand 

the action to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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