Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03342/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03342-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GORDON D. MEADOR, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

M. HAMMER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:11-cv-03342 KJM AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and with the assistance of 

counsel in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is before the court. ECF No. 72. Plaintiff has filed a response (ECF No. 80) and 

defendants have replied (ECF No. 76). Plaintiff, acting pro se, has also filed a declaration (ECF 

No. 84) which defendants oppose (ECF No. 85). 

I. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when 

they ignored his claims that he was experiencing chest pains, resulting in an approximately threehour delay in treatment. ECF No. 1. According to the complaint, defendants Hammer and Asad 

refused plaintiff’s requests to call for medical assistance when he informed them he was 

experiencing chest pain. Id. at 4. Plaintiff then began using his cane to bang on the window in 

his cell, ultimately breaking the window. Id. Defendant Shaw was called and ordered plaintiff 

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moved to the sally port. Id. at 4-5. Shaw was aware from the beginning that there was an 

emergency medical situation, but failed to order plaintiff sent to medical. Id. at 7. It was not until 

plaintiff was at the sally port that another office sent him to medical. Id. at 5. Medical staff 

performed an EKG and had plaintiff transported by ambulance to the hospital. Id. At the hospital 

plaintiff was given morphine for the pain, and he suffered heart damage due to the delay in 

treatment. Id. It was ultimately determined that plaintiff required an ablation to correct the 

damage to his heart. Id. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory 

damages. Id. at 9-10. 

II. Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion 

 Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff cannot establish the 

essential element of deliberate indifference to his medical need. ECF No. 72-1 at 4-5. They 

argue that even assuming plaintiff’s account of events is true, he cannot show that he suffered any 

harm as a result of the alleged delay, and therefore cannot establish deliberate indifference. Id. 

They also argue that because the alleged delay was an isolated incident, there was no deliberate 

indifference. Id. at 5-6. Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for damages for mental or 

emotional injury is barred by 42 U.S.C. 1997(e) because he did not suffer a physical injury. Id. at 

6. 

III. Plaintiff’s Opposition 

 Plaintiff, through counsel, argues that because there is a material issue of fact regarding 

the events of August 13, 2011, summary judgment should not be granted. ECF No. 75 at 7-8. He 

further argues that defendants’ actions on August 13, 2011, were not an isolated event and that 

inmate calls for help were routinely ignored. Id. at 8. Plaintiff appears to concede that he is not 

entitled to damages for emotional and mental injury. Id. at 7-8. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Pro Se Declaration 

Acting pro se, plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to lodge a declaration with 

supporting medical records. ECF No. 84. The defendants oppose the motion, arguing that it is an 

attempt to file a sur-reply and is untimely and inadmissible. ECF No. 85. 

Plaintiff’s proposed declaration attempts to offer an opinion on the appropriate 

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interpretation of plaintiff’s medical records and to dispute whether he abused his asthma 

medication. ECF No. 84. However, there is no evidence to establish that plaintiff is qualified to 

offer testimony regarding the proper interpretation of his medical records, and whether he abused 

his asthma medication is immaterial to deciding this case. Furthermore, plaintiff has previously 

been warned that pro se filings will be disregarded so long as he is represented by counsel. ECF 

No. 23 at 2; ECF No. 37 at 2. For these reasons, the court will disregard plaintiff’s pro se filing. 

ECF No. 84. 

V. Undisputed Material Facts 

With the exception of the issue whether plaintiff suffered damage to his heart, for the 

purposes of summary judgment the defendants have assumed that plaintiff’s version of events is 

accurate. Accordingly, the facts are largely undisputed. See Defendants’ Statement of 

Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) (ECF No. 72-2); Plaintiff’s Response to DSUF (ECF No. 80). The 

following material facts are undisputed for purposes of this motion unless otherwise noted. 

Prior to August 13, 2011, plaintiff had been diagnosed with supraventricular tachycardia 

(“SVT”), the symptoms of which include “pounding of the heart, shortness of breath, chest pain, 

rapid breathing, and dizziness.” DSUF ¶ 2; Response to DSUF ¶ 2. He had also “received and 

rejected recommendations from physicians that he undergo an ablation procedure to address his 

SVT condition.” 1 DSUF ¶ 3; Response to DSUF ¶ 3. 

On August 13, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m., plaintiff awoke to symptoms of “chest 

pain, shortness of breath, and numbness and tingling in his left arm.” DSUF ¶ 4; Response to 

DSUF ¶ 4. He proceeded to take two nitroglycerin pills and an aspirin, which did not help to 

alleviate his symptoms. DSUF ¶ 5; Response to DSUF ¶ 5. At approximately 1:30 a.m., after the 

nitroglycerin and aspirin did not help his symptoms, plaintiff began banging on his cell doors and 

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 Plaintiff admits DSUF ¶ 3 in part and denies it in part. However, plaintiff does not actually 

deny that the procedure was recommended and rejected, but instead offers reasons why plaintiff 

chose not to go forward with the procedure. Response to DSUF ¶ 3. Why plaintiff chose not to 

have the procedure is immaterial to deciding this motion and does not dispute DSUF ¶ 3, which is 

therefore deemed admitted. 

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yelling “man down.”2 Officers did not arrive until approximately 2:30 a.m. Id. 

When defendants Hammer and Asad arrived at plaintiff’s cell, he advised them he was 

“having a heart attack, was short of breath, and that nitroglycerin medication and aspirin did not 

help.” DSUF ¶ 7; Response to DSUF ¶ 7. Defendant Hammer told plaintiff that since he was 

standing up there was nothing wrong with him and defendants Hammer and Asad then walked 

away.3 DSUF ¶ 8; Response to DSUF ¶ 8. Approximately five to ten minutes later, plaintiff 

began banging on his cell window with his cane, and after about twenty to thirty minutes, the 

window broke. DSUF ¶ 9; Response to DSUF ¶ 9. 

At approximately 3:00 a.m., Hammer returned to plaintiff’s cell and plaintiff told them he 

had broken the window to get Hammer’s attention and that he “was still experiencing chest pain, 

was short of breath, and had thrown up twice.” DSUF ¶ 10; Response to DSUF ¶ 10. Hammer 

left and briefly and returned with Asad, at which point they handcuffed plaintiff and moved him 

to a holding cell. DSUF ¶ 11; Response to DSUF ¶ 11. Plaintiff estimates that it was 

approximately three hours between when he first began trying to get the officers’ attention and 

when he was removed from his cell and placed in a holding cell.4

 Id. After plaintiff was moved 

to a holding cell, an unknown officer arrived and plaintiff advised that he was experiencing chest 

pain. DSUF ¶ 12; Response to DSUF ¶ 12. Five minutes later, plaintiff was taken to a prison 

yard emergency room and subsequently transported to Mercy Folsom Hospital by ambulance. Id. 

DSUF ¶ 13; Response to DSUF ¶ 13. 

Once at Mercy Hospital, an electrocardiogram (“EKG”) was performed that did not 

 

2

 Plaintiff admits DSUF ¶ 6 in part and denies it in part. However, plaintiff does not actually 

deny the statement in DSUF ¶ 6, but instead adds that several other inmates were yelling “man 

down.” Response to DSUF ¶ 6. Whether other inmate were trying to notify correctional officers 

of plaintiff’s condition does not create a material issue of fact, nor does it contradict DSUF ¶ 6, 

which is therefore deemed admitted. 

3

 Though plaintiff admits DSUF ¶ 8 in part and denies it in part, he does not actually deny the 

statement in DSUF ¶ 8, but instead adds that the defendants also told him and the other inmates 

“to shut the fuck up before they kick our ass.” Response to DSUF ¶ 8. Although defendants’ 

alleged threat to plaintiff may go to the egregiousness of their alleged behavior, it does not render 

DSUF ¶ 8 untrue. DSUF ¶ 8 is therefore deemed admitted. 

4

 The court notes that though plaintiff estimates approximately three hours passed, the timeline 

supports a lapse of closer to one and half to two hours. However, this difference will not affect 

the disposition of the motion. 

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indicate that plaintiff was experiencing SVT or that he had sustained a heart attack or myocardial 

infarct. DSUF ¶¶ 14-15; Response to DSUF ¶¶ 14-15. Blood tests were also administered and 

they did not show “elevated cardiac enzyme levels, elevated troponin levels, or other indications 

that a heart attack or damage to the heart had occurred.”5 DSUF ¶ 15; Response to DSUF ¶ 15. 

Plaintiff was transferred to Queen of the Valley Hospital, where an additional EKG and blood 

tests were performed. DSUF ¶¶ 16-18; Response to DSUF ¶¶ 16-18. The EKG demonstrated 

“normal sinus rhythm, with episodes of atrial fibrillation and flutter, without mention of 

supraventricular tachycardia” and did not indicate that plaintiff had sustained a heart attack or 

myocardial infarct. DSUF ¶¶ 17-18; Response to DSUF ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff’s blood tests once 

again “indicated that there were no abnormal cardiac enzyme levels, elevated troponin levels, or 

other indications that damage to the heart had occurred.” DSUF ¶ 18. Even assuming a threehour delay in plaintiff’s receipt of medical care took place, his medical records do not indicate he 

suffered any physical damage as a result of the alleged delay.6

 DSUF ¶ 28; Response to DSUF ¶ 

28. 

VI. Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence 

 Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that affidavits and 

declarations submitted for or against a summary judgment motion “must be made on personal 

knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or 

declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” In other words, only admissible evidence 

may be considered by the court. Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Services, Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 

(9th Cir. 1988). Inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered on motion for summary judgment. 

 

5

 Plaintiff admits DSUF ¶ 15 in part and denies it in part. Plaintiff appears to deny the statement 

that there was no evidence his heart was damaged because “he was told by a doctor at Mercy 

Folsom that his heart had been damaged.” Response to DSUF ¶ 15. To the extent plaintiff is 

attempting to use what the doctor allegedly told him to prove his heart was damaged, that 

statement is inadmissible hearsay and not competent evidence to create an issue of material fact. 

See infra Section VI.A. DSUF ¶ 15 is therefore deemed admitted. 

6

 Plaintiff states he cannot admit or deny DSUF ¶ 28 at this time because based on what a doctor 

told him at Mercy Folsom, he believes his heart was damaged as a result of the delay. Response 

to DSUF ¶ 28. Statements allegedly made by the doctor are inadmissible hearsay and not 

competent evidence on a motion for summary judgment. See infra, Section VI.A. DSUF ¶ 28 is 

therefore deemed admitted. 

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See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 69 F.3d 337, 345 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995); 

Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1990); 

Fong v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1980). Statements in affidavits that are 

legal conclusions, speculative assertions, or statements of hearsay evidence do not satisfy the 

standards of personal knowledge, admissibility, and competence required by 56(c)(4). Blair 

Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1980); Soremekun v. Thrifty 

Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Defendants have objected to several items of evidence submitted by plaintiff on the 

grounds that they are inadmissible. ECF No. 76-1. 

 A. Statements Regarding Damage to Plaintiff’s Heart 

 Defendants object to statements contained in plaintiff’s deposition transcript and 

declaration related to the alleged damage to his heart as inadmissible hearsay. ECF No. 76-1 at 1, 

3. They also object to the admissibility of the statements as competent expert testimony. Id. 

Specifically, they object to pages 59:23-60:7 of plaintiff’s deposition transcript (ECF No. 75-5 at 

9-10) and paragraph 2 and the first sentence of paragraph 4 of plaintiff’s declaration (ECF No. 

75-9 at 1-2). 

 Plaintiff’s deposition transcript and declaration include statements that he was told by a 

doctor that his heart was damaged after the August 13, 2011 incident (ECF No. 75-5 at 9-10; ECF 

No. 75-9 at ¶ 4) and that over the years doctors have told him that his heart is damaged every time 

he has an SVT attack (id. at ¶ 2). Defendants are correct that to the extent plaintiff is attempting 

to use the doctors’ alleged statements as proof that his heart was damaged, the statements are 

hearsay and do not fall under any of the exceptions. See Fed. R. Evid. 801-804. 

Plaintiff is unable to testify to these matters himself because he has not established that he 

is qualified to testify regarding the allegedly damaging effects of an SVT attack. He also has not 

established that he is qualified to interpret his EKG and blood test results such that he can opine 

his heart was damaged by the alleged three-hour delay in treatment on August 13, 2011. 

Defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s statements regarding damage to his heart are 

sustained and these statements cannot be used as evidence that plaintiff’s heart was damaged by 

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the alleged three-hour delay in treatment. 

 B. Evidence Regarding the Death of Inmate Visnayak 

 Defendants object to statements in plaintiff’s deposition (ECF No. 75-5 at 18-22, 80:18-

86:8) and declaration (ECF No. 75-9 at 3, ¶ 6) related to the death of inmate Visnayak, as well as 

to Visnayak’s death certificate (ECF No. 75-6). ECF No. 76-1 at 2-4. They argue that this 

evidence is not relevant and is not admissible to demonstrate that they acted improperly as to 

plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff argues that the evidence is relevant because it establishes that the events of 

August 13, 2011, were not an isolated incident and that inmate calls for help were routinely 

ignored. ECF No. 75 at 8. 

 Plaintiff’s argument that this evidence establishes the events of August 13, 2011, were not 

an isolated incident is misplaced. That argument deals with the care provided to plaintiff 

specifically, not to the defendants’ actions generally. Furthermore, since the defendants’ 

argument that there was no deliberate indifference because it was an isolated event fails for other 

reasons, the evidence of Visnayak’s death is immaterial to deciding the motion. As for the use of 

the evidence to establish defendants’ character, while that is not permissible (Fed. R. Evid. 404), 

the evidence could potentially be used to established habit or routine (Fed. R. Evid. 406). 

However, conduct is not a habit unless there is evidence that it is frequently engaged in, and a 

single incident is insufficient to establish habit or routine. Mathes v. The Clipper Fleet, 774 F.2d 

980, 984 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 Since the evidence regarding Visnayak’s death is irrelevant to deciding the motion, the 

defendants’ objections will be sustained. 

 C. Spaulding and Virgo Declarations 

 Plaintiff’s opposition also includes declarations from Scott Allen Spaulding (ECF No. 75-

7) and David Allen Virgo (ECF No. 75-8). Defendants object to portions of these declarations on 

various grounds. ECF No. 76-1 at 3. The portions of the declarations objected to by defendants 

do nothing but confirm information contained in plaintiff’s declaration (ECF No. 75-9), making 

them unnecessary to the resolution of the motion. Defendants’ objections are therefore overruled 

as moot. 

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 D. Additional Statements from Plaintiff’s Deposition 

 Defendants also object to statements from plaintiff’s deposition dealing with his prior 

request for an asthma inhaler, what Officer Haney saw on August 13, 2011, and defendant 

Hammer’s failure to respond to other inmates’ requests for help. ECF No. 76-1 at 2. 

 With respect to the statements related to plaintiff’s request for an asthma inhaler (ECF No. 

75-5 at 17, 70:1-10) and what Officer Haney saw on August 13, 2011 (id. at 41-42, 113:24-

114:7), both these matters are irrelevant to deciding the motion and defendants’ objections are 

sustained. As for the testimony regarding Hammer’s failure to respond to other inmates’ requests 

for help (id. at 23-26, 88:22-89:9, 90:7-10, 91:1-11), this testimony is not admissible as character 

evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 404) and the few examples provided are insufficient to establish habit, 

Mathes, 774 F.2d at 984. Defendants’ objections will therefore be sustained. 

VII. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). 

 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party “initially bears the burden of 

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 

627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). 

The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory 

answers, or other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears the burden 

of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the nonmoving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see 

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate 

time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 

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establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof 

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as 

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary 

judgment, . . . , is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the 

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., 

Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is 

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted). 

 “In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” the 

court draws “all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving 

party.” Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). It is 

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

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drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), 

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing 

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation 

omitted). 

VIII. Legal Standard Governing Eighth Amendment Claims 

In order to state a §1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on 

inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

To prevail, plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that 

defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 

(1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1992) (on remand). The requisite 

state of mind for a medical claim is “deliberate indifference.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 

5 (1992). 

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Indications that a 

prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment are the following: the existence of an injury 

that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the 

presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic and substantial pain. See, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-

41 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1989). 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX 

Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court established a very 

demanding standard for “deliberate indifference.” Negligence is insufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 835. Even civil recklessness (failure to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm 

which is so obvious that it should be known) is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment 

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violation. Id. at 836-37. It is not enough that a reasonable person would have known of the risk 

or that a defendant should have known of the risk. Id. at 842. Rather, deliberate indifference is 

established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 

citation omitted) (emphasis added). Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm 

caused by the indifference. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 

omitted). 

A finding that an inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s action or inaction tends 

to provide additional support for a claim of deliberate indifference; however, it does not end the 

inquiry. McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir.1992). In summary, “the more serious the 

medical needs of the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of those 

needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established deliberate indifference on the part of the 

defendant.” Id. at 1061. 

IX. Analysis 

 As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff’s response is completely devoid of any 

citation to legal authority. ECF No. 75. Moreover, though plaintiff seems to believe that there 

are additional material facts that would preclude summary judgment, he has failed to file a 

statement of disputed facts, as allowed by Local Rule 260(b), and makes only a handful of nonspecific citations to the attached exhibits, which include excerpts from five deposition transcripts 

that range from eight to forty-three pages in length (ECF Nos. 75-1 to 75-5). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1)(A) (a party seeking to establish “a fact cannot be or is disputed must support the 

assertion by citing to particular parts of the materials in the record”) (emphasis added). Rather 

than provide the court with specific citations, plaintiff appears to expect the court to comb 

through these documents to find the relevant portions of the record that support his arguments. 

However, despite these deficiencies in plaintiff’s response, defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment should be denied as to the claims that defendants Hammer, Asad, and Shaw violated 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, though the motion should be granted as to plaintiff’s claims 

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for mental and emotional injury. 

 A. Eighth Amendment Claim 

 Defendants argue that because plaintiff did not suffer any physical injury as a result of the 

alleged three-hour delay in treatment, he cannot show that he suffered any harm and therefore 

fails to establish a necessary element of deliberate indifference. ECF No. 72-1 at 5. The 

defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot establish deliberate indifference because the alleged 

delay was an isolated occurrence. Id. at 5-6. In support of their motion, defendants have 

produced the declaration of Dr. J. Bal, M.D. who is certified by the American Board of Internal 

Medicine and is licensed to practice in California. Declaration of Dr. J. Bal (“Bal Decl.”) (ECF 

No. 72-2 at 39-45) at ¶¶ 1, 7. Dr. Bal opines that based on plaintiff’s medical records, he did not 

suffer any damage to his cardiovascular system as a result of the alleged three-hour delay in 

providing treatment on August 13, 2011. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17, 22. 

Plaintiff’s response is largely focused on establishing the fact that there are differences 

between his version of events and the defendants’ version, leading to material issues of fact that 

preclude summary judgment. ECF No. 75 at 2-8. Plaintiff also argues that the existence of 

plaintiff’s serious medical condition and the failure to provide medical assistance within a 

reasonable time, without any reference to injury, are sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. 

Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff’s final argument is that because there is a history of officers ignoring “man 

down” calls, the incident on August 12, 2011, was not an isolated incident. Id. at 8. 

Plaintiff’s argument that there are issues of material fact is meritless since, for purposes of 

the summary-judgment motion, the defendants have assumed that plaintiff’s version of events is 

true. The only fact potentially in dispute is whether plaintiff’s heart was damaged. However, it is 

undisputed that prior to August 13, 2011, plaintiff suffered from SVT and it had been 

recommended he have an ablation. DSUF ¶¶ 2-3; Response to DSUF ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff has failed 

to offer any competent evidence to challenge the defendants’ expert testimony establishing that 

his heart was not damaged. As set forth above in Section VI.A., plaintiff’s statements that he has 

been told that every SVT attack damages his heart and that his heart was damaged on August 13, 

2011, are not sufficient to create a material issue of fact. 

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Plaintiff’s argument that the existence of his serious medical condition and the 

defendants’ delay in obtaining medical assistance overlooks the fact that harm is a necessary 

element of deliberate indifference. Wood, 900 F.2d at 1335 (delay in treatment does not 

constitute deliberate indifference unless it causes substantial harm); citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. 

of State Prison Com’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding denial of surgery was not 

deliberate indifference unless it was harmful). However, defendants’ argument that no harm 

occurred is inaccurate. The Eighth Amendment protects plaintiff from the “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 

Williams v. Ross, No. C 04-2409 SI, 2007 WL 108468 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2007), presents 

facts strikingly similar to those in this case. In Williams, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants 

delayed at least an hour before summoning medical help when he complained of severe chest 

pains. Id. at *1. The defendants argued that the plaintiff did not suffer any legally cognizable 

harm because he “did not suffer a heart attack or any physical injury as a result of a delay in 

receiving medical care.” Id. They argued that plaintiff’s allegations of pain were insufficient to 

establish deliberate indifference because he had self-medicated with nitroglycerine and aspirin or 

Motrin, the same medications he received from medical, and so his pain would have been the 

same even if he had been treated by medical earlier. Id. The district court determined that there 

was no triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants’ actions were the actual and proximate 

cause of the pain plaintiff and granted summary judgment. Id. at *2-3. However, on appeal, the 

Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment, finding that because the record showed that 

the plaintiff’s pain did not subside until he was administered treatment in addition to the 

nitroglycerine tablets, “a reasonable jury could conclude the prison guards’ inaction caused [the 

plaintiff] to suffer a constitutional injury.” Williams v. Sotelo, 295 Fed. Appx. 208 at 209 (9th 

Cir. 2008). 

In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not suffer any physical injury on August 13, 

2011. However, he did not obtain relief from his “unbearable continued chest pain” until he was 

sent out to the hospital and received “cardiac medications and morphine.” ECF No. 1 at 5. On 

these facts, the court finds a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants’ alleged inaction caused 

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plaintiff to suffer unnecessary and severe pain during their three-hour delay. 

Defendants’ final argument, that the events of August 13, 2011, were an isolated event is 

not applicable given the facts of this case. Taking plaintiff’s version of events as true, he advised 

the defendants that he was having a heart attack, experiencing “chest pain, pain in [his] neck, and 

numbness and tingling down [his] left arm,” and that his nitroglycerin was not working. DSUF 

¶¶ 6-7. Defendants allegedly told him to shut up, that he would be fine, and left. Id. at ¶ 8. 

Under these facts, plaintiff alerted defendants to the fact that he was having a heart attack and 

required medical assistance, and they ignored him. Given defendants’ alleged complete disregard 

to plaintiff’s claims that he was suffering a heart attack, summary judgment on the grounds that 

this was an isolated incident is inappropriate. This was not negligence or inadvertence. 

Defendants were aware of a serious risk of harm to plaintiff and knowingly failed to act, resulting 

in the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 

 B. Claim for Mental and Emotional Injury 

 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a 

prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury 

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a 

sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title 18).” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Alleged physical injury 

need not be significant, but must be more than de minimis in order for a claim for mental and 

emotional damages to proceed. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for mental and emotional injury should be barred 

because he did not suffer any physical injury as a result of the alleged three-hour delay in 

treatment. ECF No. 72-1 at 6-7. Plaintiff does not challenge this argument, and in fact appears to 

concede the issue by pointing out that he is still entitled to nominal damages, which open the door 

to punitive damages. ECF No. 75 at 7-8. Furthermore, as set forth above, there is no dispute that 

plaintiff did not suffer any physical injury as a result of the alleged three-hour delay. 

Because plaintiff did not suffer any physical injury, he cannot recover damages for claims 

of mental and emotional injury, and these claims should be dismissed. 

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X. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s pro se filing at ECF No. 84 will be disregarded, 

and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s pro se filing at ECF No. 84 shall 

be disregarded. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

(ECF No. 72) be granted in part and denied in part as follows: 

 1. Denied as to plaintiff’s claim that defendants Asad, Hammer, and Shaw violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights and the case should proceed on plaintiff’s claim that defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need when they ignored his requests for medical 

care, resulting in a three-hour delay in treatment. 

 2. Granted as to plaintiff’s claim for damages for mental and emotional injury and 

plaintiff’s claims for mental and emotional injury be dismissed. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court, which shall be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Due to exigencies in the court’s calendar, no extensions of time will 

be granted. A copy of any objections filed with the court shall also be served on all parties. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 16, 2015 

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