Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03507/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03507-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

---

ORDER — No. 16-cv-03507-LB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

CHERYL CAMPERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

VISTA HEALTH CLINIC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03507-LB 

ORDER GRANTING THE 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 6

Cheryl Campers filed suit in California state court on September 4, 2015.1In her complaint, a 

Judicial Council of California form, Ms. Campers marked four boxes to indicate the substance of 

her claims: “Property Damage,” “Personal Injury,” “ADA & Malpractice Violatio[n],” and 

“Human Rights V[iolation].”2 Other than indicating that the case is “unlimited” (i.e. the case value 

exceeds $25,000), Ms. Campers did not provide any additional information about her claims.3

Two defendants, Santa Rosa Community Health Center (d/b/a Vista Family Health Center) 

and Dr. Daniel Creggan,4removed the action and now move to substitute the United States as the 

 

1 Complaint — ECF No. 1-1.

2

Id. at 3. 

3

Id.

4 Ms. Campers sued “Vista Health Clinic” and Dr. Daniel Creggin, but the defendants indicate that 

these are incorrect names for these two defendants.

Case 3:16-cv-03507-LB Document 17 Filed 09/20/16 Page 1 of 7
ORDER — No.16-cv-03507-LB 2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

proper defendant and to dismiss the complaint for two reasons: (1) the court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction because Ms. Campers has not exhausted her administrative remedies under the Federal 

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), and (2) Ms. Campers fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).5 Ms. 

Campers did not respond to the motion.6 After the opposition deadline, however, Ms. Campers 

contacted Courtroom Deputy Lashanda Scott to explain that she needed additional time to respond 

to the motion. The court gave Ms. Campers until September 8 to file a response, but she never 

did.

7

The court can decide this matter without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The 

court grants the motion and dismisses Ms. Campers’s claims without prejudice to pursuing 

administrative relief.

GOVERNING LAW

1. Rule 12(b)(1) Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the ground for the court’s jurisdiction 

(unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La 

Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). A defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) 

jurisdictional attack can be either facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 

2000). “A ‘facial’ attack asserts that a complaint’s allegations are themselves insufficient to 

invoke jurisdiction, while a ‘factual’ attack asserts that the complaint’s allegations, though 

adequate on their face to invoke jurisdiction, are untrue.” Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 

F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). Under a facial attack, the court “accept[s] all allegations of fact 

in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Warren 

 

5 Motion to Dismiss — ECF No. 6.

6

See generally Docket; Notice of Non-Opposition — ECF No. 10.

7 Order — ECF No. 13.

Case 3:16-cv-03507-LB Document 17 Filed 09/20/16 Page 2 of 7
ORDER — No.16-cv-03507-LB 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). In a factual attack, the court 

“need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations” and “may review evidence 

beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern 

California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).

2. Sovereign Immunity

“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the 

existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 

903 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). This is the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit has explained: “Before we may exercise 

jurisdiction over any suit against the government, we must have ‘a clear statement from the United 

States waiving sovereign immunity, together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver.’” 

Id. (quoting in part United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003)).

“[L]imitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly 

observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” Mollison v. United States, 568 F.3d 1073, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)) (internal 

quotations omitted; alteration in original).

Absent a waiver, “a court does not have authority to award relief against the United States or a 

federal agency . . . .” Isaacs v. United States, No. 13-cv-01394-WHO, 2013 WL 4067597, at *1

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013). “As the party asserting a claim against the United States, [the plaintiff] 

has the burden of ‘demonstrating unequivocal waiver of immunity.’” United States v. Park Place 

Associates, Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 924 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cunningham v. United States, 786 

F.2d 1445, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Case 3:16-cv-03507-LB Document 17 Filed 09/20/16 Page 3 of 7
ORDER — No.16-cv-03507-LB 4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

ANALYSIS

1. The United States Is the Proper Defendant

The first issue is whether the United States should be substituted as the defendant for the 

Health Center and Dr. Creggan. Because these two defendants are deemed federal employees and 

the government certifies they were acting within the scope of that employment, the United States 

is substituted as the proper defendant.

Federally funded health centers and their employees may be deemed employees of the federal 

Public Health Service. 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A), (g)(4). When a federal employee is sued, “[u]pon 

certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of” 

his or her employment during the subject incident, the suit is considered an action against the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The United States will then be substituted as the proper 

defendant for the named employee. Id.

Here, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, through the Chief of 

the Civil Division, certifies that Santa Rosa Community Health Center and its employees have 

been covered by the FTCA since January 1, 2012.

8

The Civil Chief further certifies that Dr. 

Creggan “was an employee of the health center and was acting within the scope of his 

employment at all times material to” the case.9Such a certification is “prima facie evidence that a 

federal employee was acting in the scope of her employment at the time of the incident and is 

conclusive unless challenged.” Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995). Ms. 

Campers has the burden of disproving the certification by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

Ms. Campers has not met her burden. She in fact has not challenged the defendants’ 

classification, their FTCA-coverage, or their substitution with the United States. The court 

therefore grants the motion and substitutes the United States for the defendants Santa Rosa 

Community Health Center and Dr. Creggan.

 

8 Certification — ECF No. 2, ¶ 2. 

9

Id.

Case 3:16-cv-03507-LB Document 17 Filed 09/20/16 Page 4 of 7
ORDER — No.16-cv-03507-LB 5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The other two defendants — doctors Eleaser and Richardson — will, however, remain as 

individually named defendants. The Civil Chief does not certify that these two defendants were 

employees of the Health Center or acting within the scope of such employment.10 To the contrary, 

a Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) senior attorney declares that these two 

defendants were not employees of the health center and thus not eligible for FTCA coverage.11

2. Sovereign Immunity Bars Ms. Campers’s Claims Against the United States

The second issue is whether, because the United States is now a defendant, sovereign 

immunity bars Ms. Campers’s claims. It does and so the court dismisses her claims to the extent 

asserted against the United States.

“[T]he FTCA remedy against the United States [is] ‘exclusive of any other civil action or 

proceeding’ for any personal injury caused by a [Public Health Service] officer or employee 

performing a medical or related function ‘while acting within the scope of his office or 

employment.’” Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 802 (2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 233(a)). This 

rule applies equally where, as here, the named defendants were publically funded health centers 

and their employees. 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A).

The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity to certain tort claims and is “the 

exclusive remedy for torts committed by Government employees in the scope of their 

employment.” United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160 163 (1991); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 

111, 117-18 (1979); Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2011); 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1346(b)(1), 2679(b)(1). An FTCA-plaintiff must first exhaust available administrative 

remedies: 

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money 

damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the 

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while 

acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall 

 

10 Id.

11 Torres Decl. — ECF No. 6-1, ¶¶ 7–8.

Case 3:16-cv-03507-LB Document 17 Filed 09/20/16 Page 5 of 7
ORDER — No.16-cv-03507-LB 6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim 

shall have been finally denied by the agency . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The § 2765(a) presentment requirement is satisfied by “(1) a written 

statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable to agency to begin its own investigation, and 

(2) a sum certain damages claim.” Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff may then bring a civil case only once the agency 

“finally denie[s]” the claim or fails to arrive at a “final disposition of [the] claim within six months 

after it is filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The claim-exhaustion requirement “is jurisdictional in nature 

and may not be waived.” Spawr v. United States, 796 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Burns, 

764 F.2d at 724).

Here, Ms. Campers does not allege that she ever filed an administrative claim with the 

DHHS.

12 The record supports just the opposite: the United States submits a declaration that the 

DHHS’s database contains no record of a claim by Ms. Campers against the Health Center or Dr. 

Creggan.13 Ms. Campers, having not responded to the motion, has presented no basis to believe 

otherwise. The court therefore dismisses Ms. Campers’s claims without prejudice to refiling after 

she has exhausted her administrative remedies. See Pinzon v. Mendocino Coast Clinics, Inc., No. 

14-cv-05504-JST, 2015 WL 4967257, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2015) (dismissing claims without 

prejudice where the DHHS database had no record of the plaintiff’s administrative claims and the 

plaintiff provided no evidence to the contrary).

The dismissal relates to each of Ms. Campers’s claims, including what appears to be a claim 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). As the Supreme Court explained, § 233(a) 

“grants absolute immunity to PHS officers and employees for actions arising out of the 

performance of medical or related functions within the scope of their employment” and “limits 

recovery for such conduct to suits against the United States.” Hui, 559 U.S. at 806, 812–13 

(concluding that § 233(a) precludes a Bivens action). Based on this record, it appears that any 

injury Ms. Campers suffered arises out of the defendants’ “performance of medical or related 

 

12 See generally Compl.

13 Torres Decl. ¶¶ 2–4.

Case 3:16-cv-03507-LB Document 17 Filed 09/20/16 Page 6 of 7
ORDER — No.16-cv-03507-LB 7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

functions,” and therefore all of her apparent claims fall within § 233(a) and are subject to the 

FTCA’s immunity-waiver requirements. See Pinzon, 2015 WL 4967257 at *3 (dismissing ADA 

and Civil Rights Act claims against federally funded health clinic).

CONCLUSION

The court grants the defendants’ motion, substitutes the United States as defendant for Santa 

Rosa Community Health Center and Dr. Creggan, and dismisses Ms. Campers’s claims to the 

extent raised against the United States. Dismissal is without prejudice to Ms. Campers refiling her 

claims after exhausting her administrative remedies. This order does not affect the other two 

defendants, doctors Eleaser and Richardson.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2016

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:16-cv-03507-LB Document 17 Filed 09/20/16 Page 7 of 7