Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00804/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00804-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDERICK RAY BROWN,

Petitioner,

v.

A.P. KANE, WARDEN

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-00804 SMS HC

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS, DISMISSING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

AS TIME-BARRED, DIRECTING CLERK OF

COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR

OF RESPONDENT, AND DECLINING TO

ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

[Doc. 27]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is presently confined at Soledad State Prison following a conviction entered in

the Superior Court of Kern County, on October 13, 1999, for one count of violation of California

Penal Code section 261(a)(2), forcible rape, and one count of violation of California Penal Code

section 285, incest. With enhancements for prior convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to a term

of 38 years-to-life. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. On August 14, 2001, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction

and sentence. (Exhibit B.)

On September 19, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

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California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Exhibit C.) The petition was denied on

January 22, 2002. (Exhibit D.)

On September 21, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Superior Court of Kern County. (Exhibit E.) The petition was denied on October 17, 2000. 

(Exhibit F.)

On June 19, 2001, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Superior Court of Kern County. (Exhibit G.) The superior Court denied Petitioner’s petition on

July 10, 2001. (Exhibit H.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court on September 21,

2001. (Exhibit I.) The petition for review was denied on November 14, 2001. (Exhibit J.)

On June 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Superior Court of Kern County. (Exhibit K.) The petition was denied on July 23, 2002. 

(Exhibit L.)

On July 18, 2003, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Exhibit M.) The petition was denied on

November 14, 2003. (Exhibit N.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court on

December 4, 2003. (Exhibit O.) The petition was denied on November 10, 2004. (Exhibit P.)

Petitioner then filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District on June 17, 2005. (Exhibit Q.) The petition was denied on June

23, 2005. (Exhibit R.)

Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme

Court on July 7, 2005. (Exhibit S.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition on May

17, 2006. (Exhibit T.)

Petitioner filed a fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District on September 12, 2005. (Exhibit U.) The Court of Appeal

denied the petition on September 22, 2005. (Exhibit V.)

Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme

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Court on October 3, 2005. (Exhibit W.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition on

August 30, 2006. (Exhibit X.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 23, 2006. 

(Court Doc. 1.) Petitioner filed an amended petition on May 4, 2007. (Court Doc. 17.) 

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss arguing that the petition is time-barred on

January 8, 2008. (Court Doc. 27.) Petitioner filed an opposition on February 8, 2008. (Court

Doc. 30.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on June 23, 2006, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

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 Cal. R. Ct. 24(a) providing that an order of the Supreme Court denying a petition for review of a decision 1

of a Court of Appeal becomes final when it is filed. 

 See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) 2

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The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on October 13, 1999. The California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on November 14, 2001. Thus, direct

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review became final on February 12, 2002, when the ninety (90) day period for seeking review in

the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen 2

v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999) (concluding period of "direct review" includes the

th

period within which one can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year

th

from February 13, 2002, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. See, Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule th

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 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 3

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the calculation of statutory tolling

applicable to the one year limitations period.) Therefore, the statute was set to expire on March

19, 2003. Petitioner did not file the instant petition until October 14, 2004.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 3

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

As Petitioner’s conviction became final on February 12, 2002, at the time he filed the first

state habeas corpus petition on June 26, 2002, 131 days of the one year limitations period had

lapsed. The Superior Court denied the petition on July 23, 2002. (Exhibit L.) Although the

limitations period was tolled while this first petition was pending (June 26, 2002 through July 23,

2002), the limitations period began to run again on July 24, 2002, and Petitioner did not file his

next petition with the California Court of Appeal until July 18, 2003. (Exhibit M.) However, at

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that time, the 234 days that remained of the limitations period had already expired on March 19,

2003. The collateral petitions raised after the expiration of the limitations period do not revive

the limitations period. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not

entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199

F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). 

In his opposition, Petitioner contends that he is actually innocent of the offense and the

limitations bar does not prevent review. Petitioner argues that his daughter, the victim in this

case, committed perjury during trial. Petitioner attaches a declaration, dated August 21, 2000, in

which Rochelle Brown declares that she was “misled by the prosecutor to testify against my

father for the crime of rape. [¶] The prosecutor knowingly had me give false testimony

concerning Deon using a condom when we had sex. [¶] They use false evidence to convict my

father.” (Declaration of Rochelle Brown, attached to Opposition.) 

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have resolved the question whether the

Constitution requires creating an actual innocence exception to the statute of limitations. Majoy

v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770 (9 Cir. 2002) (expressing no opinion on the issue). th

Petitioner’s claim is unfounded, as it could not have factually prevented Petitioner from

filing a timely petition. Despite the fact that the declaration, is dated August 21, 2000, it was not

initially presented to state court in support of his claim, and was submitted only after the defect

was pointed by state court. (See Exhibit L, Order of Superior Court of Kern County, dated July

23, 2002.) The declaration does not excuse Petitioner’s untimeliness as he was obviously aware

of the claim in August, 2000, when it was executed by his daughter, and was not ultimately

submitted to the state court until July 18, 2003, when it was attached to his state habeas corpus

petition filed in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Exhibit M.) The

evidence is certainly not new, reliable evidence that could not have been presented earlier. Only

Petitioner’s lack of diligence can be blamed for his failure to acquire this evidence and bring a

timely challenge. Consequently, Petitioner does not fall within the narrow classes of cases

implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See e.g. Whitley v. Senkowski, 317 F.3d 223,

225 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Gildon v. Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir. 2004) (“a petitioner

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would have to show action or inaction on the part of the respondent that prevent him from

discovering the relevant facts in a timely fashion, or, at the very least, that a reasonably diligent

petitioner could not have discovered these facts in time to file a petition within the period of

limitations.”); Baker v. Norris, 321 F.3d 769, 772 (8 Cir. 2003) (actual innocence exception th

unavailable where issue was not raised until fifteen years after conviction and four years after the

limitations period expired).

Even assuming the exception is applicable and Petitioner raised the claim with reasonable

diligence, it is without merit. “To be credible,” a Schlup actual innocence claim “requires

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it

be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence-that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. This Court must utilize the

rules of admissibility and it must consider the probative value of relevant evidence that was

wrongfully excluded, illegally admitted, or unavailable. Id. at 327-328. The new evidence may

“call into question the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial . . . . [and] the habeas corpus

may have to make some credibility assessments.” Id. at 330. 

The declaration by the victim, Petitioner’s daughter, states she was “misled by the

prosecutor to testify against my father for the crime of rape. [¶] The prosecutor knowingly had

me give false testimony concerning Deon using a condom when we had sex. [¶] They use false

evidence to convict my father.” (Declaration of Rochelle Brown, attached to Opposition.) This

ambiguous declaration does not satisfy the Schlup actual innocence requirement, especially when

viewed in light of the evidence presented at trial. The evidence at trial consisted of strong DNA

evidence, Petitioner’s admission to having sexual intercourse with his daughter claiming she was

the aggressor, and police officer’s testimony recounting the victim’s statements regarding the

rape. (See Exhibits A & B.) In addition to being highly suspect, the Court finds the declaration

by the victim to be rather low in terms of reliability, both because of its tardy presentation and

vague and ambiguous statements. The victim merely states, in conclusory terms, that she was

misled by the prosecutor and some third party did not use a condom. These vague allegations

have no connection to the factual circumstances of the underlying case and are simply

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insufficient to demonstrate actual innocence exception under Schlup. Thus, the Court does not

find it more not that had the jury been presented with the victim’s declaration, no reasonable

juror would have convicted him. Accordingly, this Court concludes Petitioner’s claim of actual

innocence does not implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice and it does not fall within the

narrow exception of the Schlup actual innocence gateway. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert th th

denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to

tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. th

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

Petitioner has raised no argument as to how or why the limitations period should be

equitably tolling. 

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as time-barred is GRANTED;

2. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED, with prejudice; 

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent; and,

4. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. When a district court

denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying

constitutional claims, the petitioner must show, in order to obtain a certificate of

appealability: (1) that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

stated a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right; and (2) that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While both

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showings must be made to obtain a certificate of appealability, “a court may find

that it can dispose of the application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds

first to resolve the issue whose answer is more apparent from the record and

arguments.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 485. The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to

make an adequate showing. The Court does not find that jurists of reason would

not find it debatable whether the petition was properly dismissed, with prejudice,

as time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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