Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05030/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05030-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:185 Employee Pension Plan

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY TOTTEN et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

BLAIR EXCAVATORS, INC et al,

Defendants. /

No C-03-5030 VRW

ORDER

On November 12, 2003, plaintiffs sued for damages and

injunctive relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA), 29 USC §§ 1001 et seq, for an alleged breach of a

collective bargaining agreement. Doc #1. On April 13, 2005,

plaintiffs moved pursuant to FRCP 25(a)(1) to substitute Deborah

Jean Blair (“Deborah Blair”) for defendant Victor A Blair, who

apparently died shortly after being served in August 2004. Doc

##24, 36-1. Plaintiffs stated that the decedent “was survived by

his wife, Deborah Jean Blair” and that the motion sought “an order

substituting Deborah Jean Blair as a defendant in place of the

deceased as successor in interest to the income and debts at issue

in this case.” Doc #36-2. Deborah Blair did not respond to the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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motion to substitute, and the court ordered her to show cause in

writing by June 13, 2005, why the motion should not be treated as

unopposed. Doc #38. The court received no response to the order

to show cause.

On June 14, 2005, the court denied without prejudice

plaintiffs’ motion to substitute because plaintiffs did not

properly serve the motion on Deborah Blair pursuant to FRCP 4. Doc

#40. See FRCP 25(a)(1) (a motion under this provision must “be

served * * * in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a

summons.”). The court admonished plaintiffs “that it will not

extend the time for service under Rule 4(m), and a failure to

effect service within 120 days of the April 13, 2005, filing of

plaintiffs’ motion to substitute will result in dismissal of the

claims against Victor Blair pursuant to the third sentence of FRCP

25(a)(1).” Doc #40 at 3-4.

On August 11, 2005, plaintiffs’ counsel, Andrea J

Kirkpatrick, filed a declaration detailing the various attempts at

service on Deborah Blair before and after the court’s June 14, 2005

order. Doc #41. On November 15, 2005, plaintiffs again moved for

“an order substituting the surviving spouse, Deborah Jean Blair, in

place of the deceased defendant, Victor A Blair[,] in the action

filed herein.” Doc #42.

Before the court can revisit whether plaintiffs have

satisfied FRCP 4’s service requirements, the court must determine

whether plaintiffs’ claims against Victor Blair survived his death. 

See FRCP 25(a)(1) (“If a party dies and the claim is not thereby

extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper

parties.” (emphasis added)). Although plaintiffs assume that

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California law governs this issue (Doc ##36-2, 42), “[w]hether or

not such a claim, based upon federal law survives the death of a

claimant, is a question of federal law exclusively.” Heikkila v

Barber, 308 F2d 558, 561 (9th Cir 1962). See also Smith v No 2

Galesburg Crown Fin Corp, 615 F2d 407, 413 (7th Cir 1980); County

of Oakland by Kuhn v City of Detroit, 784 F Supp 1275 (ED Mich

1992); Continental Assur Co v American Bankshares Corp, 483 F Supp

175 (ED Wis 1980); Khan v Grotnes Metalforming Systems, Inc, 679 F

Supp 751, 756 (ND Ill 1988). And under federal common law,

although actions that are penal in nature die when a party does,

Schreiber v Sharpless, 110 US 76 (1884), actions that are remedial

can survive that party’s death. See Riggs v Govt Employee

Financial Corp, 623 F2d 68, 70-72 (9th Cir 1980); United States v

Land, Winston County, 221 F3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir 2000). The

Ninth Circuit has on numerous occasions noted ERISA’s remedial

nature. See, e g, Cleghorn v Blue Shield of California, 408 F3d

1222, 1225 (9th Cir 2005) (finding the “intended exclusivity of the

ERISA remedial scheme” to preempt state causes of action). 

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims against Victor Blair would survive

against a properly substituted party.

Next, the court must determine whether Deborah Blair is a

proper party for substitution. In the Ninth Circuit, a proper

party is a “legal representative[]” of the decedent —— the executor

or administrator of the decedent’s estate. Mallonee v Fahey, 200

F2d 918, 919 (9th Cir 1952). Additionally, other courts have held

“that the distributee of [the] distributed estate is a ‘proper

party’ for substitution * * *.” McSurely v McClennan, 753 F2d 88,

99 (DC Cir 1985).

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Plaintiffs did not provide any proof in their motion or

supporting papers that Deborah Blair was the executor,

administrator or distributee of Victor Blair’s estate. In fact,

one of the service papers in plaintiffs’ August 11, 2005, filing

suggests that Deborah Blair “has been divorced from [Victor Blair]

for 7 years [and] has no idea as to his whereabouts.” Doc #41, Ex

D at 1. That Deborah Blair might have been divorced from Victor

Blair at the time of his death could explain why plaintiffs have

been unsuccessful in serving her, if she reverted to her maiden

name or remarried. And even if Deborah Blair were married to

Victor Blair when he died, that fact alone does not warrant

substitution. See Graham v Henderson, 224 FRD 59, 64-65 (ND NY

2004) (finding substitution improper where plaintiff established

nothing more than a marital relationship between decedent and

person to be substituted). Hence, the court harbors serious

reservations whether Deborah Blair is a proper party to be

substituted for Victor Blair.

Accordingly, the court ORDERS plaintiffs to show cause on

or before August 28, 2006, why plaintiffs’ claims against Victor

Blair should not be dismissed because Deborah Blair is not an

executor, administrator or distributee of Victor Blair’s estate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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