Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-84-02382/USCOURTS-ca10-84-02382-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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P U B L I S H 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SHARON LEE LONG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LARAMIE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 

DISTRICT; RODNEY SOUTHWORTH; 

RICHARD WILLIAMS; ROBERT SCHLISKE; 

HARLAN HEGLAR, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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PILED 

United Starn Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APPEALS 

FEB 2 3 1988 

ROBERT L HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 84-2382 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. C 82 0494) 

Richard C. LaFond of LaFond & Evangelisti, Denver, Colorado, (Jay 

Dee Schaefer, Schaefer & Newcomer, Laramie, Wyoming, was also on 

the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant 

Craig Kirkwood (Kennard Nelson of Kirkwood, Copenhaver and Nelson, 

Laramie, Wyoming, was also on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and MCWILLIAMS and McKAY, Circuit 

Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Sharon Lee Long, a former part-time 

instructor in computer science, brought this action against 

defendants-appellees Laram~e County Community College District and 

several of its administrators and employees. Long seeks 

declaratory and injunctive relief and back pay under Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e, et~, for 

alleged disparate treatment resulting from sexual harassment and 

retaliatory treatment. She also seeks compensatory and punitive 

damages under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983, 1985 and state common law tort 

theories. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgments in favor 

of defendants-appellees. 

I 

A. The factual background 

The record reveals the following evidence relevant to this 

appeal: 

Defendant Laramie County Community College (LCCC) hired 

Sharon Lee Long in August 1977 after she had responded to a 

newspaper advertisement placed by LCCC. At the time she applied, 

Long had a high school diploma, three and one half months of 

training with International Business Machines, Inc. and a few 

accounting and computer courses through community colleges. She 

had no college degree and she took no additional courses while at 

LCCC. The chairman of the business division, defendant Richard 

Williams, interviewed Long and offered her a contract to teach an 

introductory business data processing class part-time in the fall 

semester of 1977, which Long accepted. Long was employed on a 

semester by semester basis. 

2 

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After the spring of 1979 LCCC employed defendant Rodney 

Southworth as its first full-time computer instructor. Long 

testified that Southworth was her immediate supervisor and that he 

controlled her scheduling and assignments; Southworth denied being 

her supervisor and disputed her testimony on his authority over 

her. 

Long's courseload temporarily declined in 1979 when 

Southworth started as a full-time instructor. When he began 

teaching higher level courses in the spring of 1980, Long's 

courseload again increased. The parties stipulated that from the 

fall of 1977 through the spring of 1981, Long performed her duties 

capably and competently and she received positive input about her 

job performance. XXIV R. pl. ex. 2 at t-3; VI R. 11. 

Long testified that in 1979 and 1980 Southworth and at least 

one student told her that Southworth was sexually involved with 

female students. VI R. 19-20. At trial Southworth admitted 

having affairs with one H. and one other student in the fall of 

1979 and the spring of 1980. X R. 370-372. Although Long did not 

initially report these allegations, by October 1980 she testified 

that Southworth's sexual involvements were beginning to affect her 

career and relationships with students and peers. XI R. 20. 

Long had a dispute with H., who was a member of the LCCC 

student chapter of the Data Processing Management Association, a 

group interested in data processing for which Long was faculty 

advisor. After a business portion of an October 17, 1980 meeting, 

Long testified that she called Southworth into the hall and "asked 

him to please get his girlfriends in line," as they were affecting 

3 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 3 
her professionally. Southworth became angry and protested her 

going to his wife, the Board of Trustees or defendant Williams 

with her accusations. 

There was a further incident between Long and Southworth on 

October 24, 1980. Long testified that she met Southworth in his 

office and that he leaned over and put his hands on hers and said: 

"I'm really sorry, but I've been neglecting you lately, Sharon. 

If you want to spend some special time with me, I'm sure we can 

make everything fine. The students don't mean much to me. Let's 

just find some extra time to spend together by ourselves." Long 

interpreted the remarks as a sexual advance and left Southworth's 

office. XI R. 23; IV R. 2264. About a month later, Long 

testified that Southworth made a similar statement when she met 

him at a local bar to discuss their deteriorating working 

relationship. Long said that Southworth told her that if she 

would make apologies for some untruths about him, he would see to 

it that she had the same number of classes to teach in the spring 

of 1981 as she had in the fall and that he would take her away and 

they would "spend a lot of time together." She interpreted these 

remarks again as a sexual advance and threat, and left this 

meeting in tears. IV R. 2264; VI R. 25. 

Southworth disputed Long's version of these meetings 

directly. He said that in the office meeting he had told Long he 

hoped they could communicate effectively and denied the remarks 

interpreted as a sexual advance. Southworth denied making any 

representations at the off-campus meeting about Long's teaching 

4 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 4 
load and testified he was in no position to determine her 

workload. X R. 382-89. 

Long testified that after she told Southworth she did not 

want an affair with him, he and others at the college made special 

criticisms of her job performance, which she had not had before. 

Long test~fied that she learned from class schedules that the 

college did not rehire her to teach in the summer or fall 

semesters of 1981. Southworth was not speaking to her at this 

time and defendant Williams would only speak with her when his 

secretary was taking notes. VI R. 36-38. Again, the defendants' 

versions of these events differed sharply with Long's statements. 

While Long said she had raised Southworth's sexual harassment of 

her and the students ·at November and December 1981 meetings, 

defendants Williams, Schliske and Heglar all testified that the 

meetings did not involve Southworth's alleged sexual harassment of 

her. XI R. 573, 661; XII R. 755. 

There was testimony that in February 1981 there was a meeting 

of Southworth with Heglar and Schliske. Southworth first denied 

any involvement with students, but when he was told that someone 

had reported such an involvement, Southworth admitted having a 

sexual relationship with one employee, but denied relationships 

with others. X R. 390-91. Southworth had a relationship with one 

other student, according to some testimony. X R. 370, 45. The 

college staff placed Southworth on probation and told him that if 

he had any sexual involvement with students or committed other 

improprieties, he would be discharged. Southworth testified that 

he lived up to the terms of his probation. X R. 392, 404. 

5 

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The defendants testified there were non-discriminatory 

reasons for the reduction of Long's teaching load and their 

decision later not to re-employ her at all. LCCC hired a second 

full-time instructor in the spring of 1981 for the computer 

science program. Williams testified that this employee's presence 

and a normal decline in the demand for courses in the spring of 

1981 accounted for a second reduction of Long's courseload from 

five to two courses in the spring of 1981. Defendants also 

presented evidence that LCCC did not offer a teaching contract to 

Long during the 1981 summer session because she had taught two 

courses in the spring while a better qualified instructor was 

available and requested one course. Under a new rotation policy, 

Long was not allowed to teach summer classes in order that the 

other instructor could teach two courses during that session. 

Lastly, the decision not to employ Long in the fall of 1981 was 

based on the availability of more qualified part-time instructors, 

on the improvement in the data processing program, on the lack of 

improvement in Long's qualifications, and on the fact that Long 

had started some rumors and had a poor relationship with defendant 

Williams and a lack of communication with the remainder of the 

faculty. XI R. 526-27. 

Long contacted a Cheyenne, Wyoming law firm concerning her 

problems at the college. An intern there investigated and made a 

report. With Long's approval, the LCCC Board of Trustees treated 

the report as an administrative grievance under the administrative 

grievance procedures of the college and the Wyoming Administrative 

Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 16-3-101 to 16-3-115. 

6 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 6 
A college Grievance Committee hearing was held and the 

committee made findings and recommendations. Under the school's 

procedure, findings and decisions of the Board of Trustees of the 

college followed after review of the committee findings and 

recommendations. The Board found that those named as parties 

against whom the grievance was submitted included Rodney 

Southworth, Dean Schliske, Mr. Williams, Division Chairman, and 

Dr. Heglar, President of the College, and the College itself. The 

Board found that a hearing had been held before the Committee. An 

attorney appeared for Long and another attorney entered an 

appearance of behalf of all the respondents except Southworth, who 

represented himself. Testimony was taken for approximately 18 

hours and transcribed. 

The Board found that there was a basis for the claimed 

grievance by Long. The Board recognized that sex discrimination 

is an employment practice in which an employer or his agents 

discriminate on the basis of sex; that sexual harassment is a form 

of sex discrimination; and that sexual harassment is any behavior, 

unwelcome or unsolicited, verbal or physical, which imposes a 

requirement of sexual cooperation as a condition of employment or 

advancement; and that sexual harassment may range from innuendo to 

coerced sexual relations. 

The Board considered that professional harassment is conduct 

which has the purpose of affecting or substantially interfering 

with an individual's performance and/or creating an intimidating, 

hostile or offensive working environment. The Board found that 

the administrative record supported the findings of the Grievance 

7 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 7 
Committee that Southworth sexually harassed Long and 

professionally harassed Long as well; that Long sought redress 

with various agents of the college for such harassment; and that 

she received retaliatory action from agents of the college and, as 

a result, was not re-employed by the college. 

The Board entered legal conclusions and a decision that the 

college should reinstate Long in a position, appropriate to her 

education and teaching abilities as of the fall semester of 1982, 

that the college should repay her back wages of $4,080.00, and 

$1,500.00 as a reasonable attorney's fee for the grievance 

procedure representation. The Board found that a written sexual 

harassment policy should be presented for consideration by the 

Board. It found further that should Southworth later be found 

guilty of sexual harassment of an employee or student at the 

college, or of professional harassment and/or professional 

retaliation against an employee of the college he should 

immediately be subject to notice and discharge by the Board. Pl. 

Exs. 1 and 15. 

In view of more difficulties with the college, Long filed 

further charges with the Office of Civil Rights of the Department 

of Education of Wyoming. That office investigated and made 

findings that the college did not re-employ her as a retaliation 

for her efforts on behalf of female students who were being 

sexually harassed. The college offered an agreement about her 

employment, conditioned on Long's release of further claims for 

lost compensation or other damages, but she declined to agree to 

such a waiver. Long filed discrimination charges with the EEOC in 

8 

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February 1982. The EEOC made findings and recommendations and 

issued a notice of right to sue. The college complied with the 

recommendations, increasing the back pay, inter alia. 

Bo The court proceedings 

Following her refusal to sign the waiver discussed above, 

Long brought this suit under Title VII and 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 

1985, alleging sexual and professional harassment and retaliation 

for her actions protesting sexual harassment of students and 

herself. The trial judge bifurcated the trial of the Title VII 

claim from the§ 1983 and§ 1985 and pendent claims on his own 

motion. A non-jury trial of the Title VII claims was held first, 

without objection by the plaintiff to that procedure. Long 

claimed at this trial that Southworth had harassed her and various 

students, that the defendants retaliated when she reported his 

activities by making her conditions of employment more difficult 

anq ultimately refusing to renew her contract. VIII R. 6-7. Long 

relied on the findings of the Grievance Committee and the LCCC 

Board of Trustees as ''direct evidence" of sexual harassment and 

retaliation, and argued that when she rested, defendants had the 

burden of proving that they had no discriminatory motive. 

The defendants, Southworth, Williams, Schliske, President 

Heglar and the College, defended first by challenging the 

credibility of Long and denying her charges. Individual 

defendants and women whom Southworth allegedly harassed 

contradicted Long's testimony concerning the facts. Her former 

husband, Thompson, contradicted testimony of Long in her 

deposition and at the grievance hearing. He testified he had been 

9 

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discharged from the military in April 1972 and was living in North 

Carolina, at the time when Long later claimed that she had 

received notice of his death. He had called and asked her to come 

to North Carolina to join him. According to Thompson, Long had 

been in a mental hospital, had been involved in an affair, and her 

reputation for truthfulness was bad. 

The defendants argued that Southworth had not harassed Long; 

that the college had not engaged in any retaliation against her; 

and that the college was not obligated to renew her teaching 

contract. Furthermore it did not renew it because she had not 

improved her qualifications to keep pace with the computer science 

program and it was easier to hire others than to continue a 

"battle'' the college considered resolved. 

The trial judge found that under McDonnell-McDouglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Long had failed to establish a prima 

facie case of sex discrimination because she had failed to prove 

that Southworth had sexually harassed her or that the college or 

the individual defendants had retaliated against her. In any 

event, the judge found that the defendants had articulated 

legitimate reasons for their failure to offer Long additional 

employment and that the reasons given by the defendants were not 

shown to be pretexts for discrimination. The court said that in 

the de novo proceedings it was not bound by the findings of the 

Grievance Committee or the Board of Trustees which were based on 

Long's unsubstantiated and uncorroborated version of the facts and 

that Long's credibility was highly questionable. 

10 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 10 
After the trial court entered judgment for defendants on the 

Title VII claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the 

remaining claims, arguing that collateral estoppel precluded Long 

from relitigating the facts. The court granted summary judgment 

and this appeal followed. 

Long makes three principal arguments on appeal which we 

consider in Parts II through IV, infra. 

Long argues 

Trustees in her 

discrimination. 

II 

The Title VII trial and findings 

that the findings and decisions of the Board of 

favor constituted "direct evidence" of 

In those proceedings all of the defendants in the 

federal suit had been parties and the final decision of the Board 

had not been appealed. Long argues that the burden was therefore 

on defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

discrimination did not occur, and not merely to articulate a 

reason for the discriminatory conduct complained of. Long says 

that the trial judge erred by not requiring that the defendants 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have 

decided not to grant her the teaching contract in any event. 

The McDonnell-Douglas test is "inapplicable where the 

plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." Trans 

World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Furr 

v. A. T. & T. Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1549 (10th Cir. 

1987). However if the factfinder does not credit the plaintiff's 

direct evidence of discrmination, the McDonnell-Douglas mode of 

analysis still applies. Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair 

11 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 11 
County, 825 F.2d 111, 114-15 n.l (6th Cir. 1987). If the district 

court finds that discrimination has been established by the 

plaintiff's direct evidence, the employer must do more than merely 

articulate a nondiscriminatory justification and the burden shifts 

to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the adverse employment action would have been taken even in the 

absence of the impermissible motivation. Id. at 115. 

However, here the district judge specifically found against 

the plaintiff on her proffered evidence and did not find that she 

had established her claims of discrimination and retaliation. The 

judge said that the proceedings in the Title VII trial were de 

~, that the court was not bound by the findings of the 

Grievance Committee, the Bo~rd or the EEOC; and that the findings 

of those agencies were based on plaintiff's version of the facts, 

unsubstantiated an uncorroborated by any witnesses before the 

court. Since the judge did not believe the proffered direct 

evidence, the evidentiary framework of McDonnell-Douglas was the 

proper mode of analysis. Terbowitz, 825 F.2d at 115 n.3. 

The findings of the trial judge on the Title VII case must be 

judged under the clearly erroneous standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

52(a). Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 

(1985). We are satisfied that the record contains ample evidence, 

including the testimony of Mr. Thompson, from which the judge 

could disbelieve Long and credit the defendants' testimony. The 

Title VII findings rejecting the claims of sexual harassment and 

retaliation are not clearly erroneous. Moreover the findings that 

the defendants had presented legitimate reasons for their failure 

12 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 12 
to offer Long additional employment, including a reduced need for 

part-time faculty and the availability of more qualified and 

highly trained instructors, were supported by the record. As we 

discuss below, in the Title VII proceeding the administrative 

findings were not binding on the court. 

In sum, we uphold the findings of the court against Long on 

her Title VII claim. 

III. 

The admission of Mr. Thompson's testimony 

Long contends that the trial court erred in admitting the 

testimony of Mr. Thompson, her former husband. More specifically, 

objection is made to the trial court's permitting him to testify 

at all because his name did not appear on the witness lists of the 

defendants. 

At the time of trial, then Local Rule 8(e)(3) of the District 

of Wyoming provided that "[e]xcept for impeachment or rebuttal 

purposes and absent good cause shown," no witness could testify 

unless his name and a summary of his testimony appeared on a 

witness list. This Rule has since been superseded. See Local 

Rules of the District Court for the District of Wyoming, Rule 

208(e)(l), (3) (April 12, 1985). The pretrial order further 

provided that the parties could not call witnesses whose names 

were not listed unless "at least ten (10) days prior to trial" 

they provided opposing counsel the names and addresses of the 

additional witnesses, together with a summary of their expected 

testimony. III R. 968. 

13 

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At the close of the first day of trial defendants called 

Thompson as their first witness, offering his testimony for 

impeachment purposes. VIII R. 58. The judge recessed trial until 

the next morning, and at that time Long's attorney moved that the 

court refuse to allow Thompson to testify because he was not 

listed on any witness list. Moreover, in view of a stipulation by 

the parties that Thompson was alive, his testimony would be 

irrelevant and highly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403. This 

latter stipulation was relevant because there had been 

contradictory statements made by Long in earlier proceedings in 

which she had stated that she had received notice of Thompson's 

death. 

In response to the objections, counsel for Southworth 

admitted he knew of this witness some two and a half or three 

weeks earlier but stated that in view of Long's earlier insistence 

that Thompson was dead, it was a deception that was being 

attempted on the court, rather than on the plaintiff. He further 

argued that he knew that if the witness was listed, some story 

would be brought up that they would not have time to rebut and 

felt it in the best interest of justice not to reveal the name. 

IX R. 66. 

The argument of counsel is wholly unconvincing and 

inconsistent with the purposes of discovery. The contention harks 

back to times of surprise achieved through the withholding of 

witnesses and evidence until a dramatic opportunity for 

impeachment appeared. That occurred here when Long screamed and 

fell when Mr. Thompson appeared. Nevertheless, counsel's 

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explanation, admitting a clear violation of the pretrial order 

offers no support for his position. 

There was no violation of the Local Rule itself because the 

defendants called Thompson to impeach Long's veracity. However, 

the language of the pretrial order does preclude Thompson's 

testimony and the explanation for disregard of the order is 

untenable. Nevertheless the question before us is whether the 

trial judge abused his discretion in relieving the defendants from 

the provisions of the pretrial order. 

The terms of the pretrial order prohibiting the calling of 

unlisted witnesses did, of course, have binding effect on the 

parties. Perry v. Windspur, 782 F.2d 893, 894 (10th Cir. 1986). 

However, the "trial court may modify the pretrial order during 

trial to prevent manifest injustice." Grant v. Brant, 796 F.2d 

351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Patterson v. F. w. Woolworth 

Co., 786 F.2d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 1986) ("flexible application of 

pretrial orders is within the sound discretion of the District 

Court"); Hull v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 812 F. 2d 584, 588 (10th 

Cir. 1987). 

The trial judge stated that the objection to Thompson's 

testimony was addressed to the discretion of the court. He was 

best able to assess the circumstances. He concluded that in the 

interest of justice the objection should be overruled. IX R. 73. 

We cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion. 

15 

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IV. 

The summary judgment for defendants on the 

claims under SS 1983 and 1985 and common law tort theories 

Long's remaining argument is that the trial court erred by 

granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the 

remaining claims under§§ 1983 and 1985 and common law theories. 

In his order granting summary judgment on those claims the trial 

judge recounted his written findings and conclusions for 

defendants on the Title VII claim. The court had found that the 

evidence failed to show sexual harassment of Long by Southworth. 

The court had found also that there were no acts of retaliation 

taken by the college or the other individual defendants against 

Long. The judge concluded that under collateral estoppel 

principles, the findings from the Title VII hearing applied with 

respect to the remaining claims, and that Long had failed to show 

that there were any remaining material facts to be presented at a 

second hearing. Having found the facts for the defendants and 

against Long, the judge held that the defendants were entitled to 

summary judgment on all the remaining claims. 1 

l 

In addition to the Title VII sexual harassment and 

retaliation claim, the complaint alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983 and 1985(3) for violation of plaintiff's 14th Amendment 

equal protection rights and conspiracy to violate those rights 

(counts 2 and 3); negligence against LCCC for failure adequately 

to supervise the individual defendants and for failure to provide 

written policies or guidelines for handling sexual harassment 

cases (counts 4 and 5); negligence against Heglar, Schliske and 

Williams for failing adequately to supervise Southworth and for 

participating in his harassment of plaintiff (count 6); 

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Southworth 

for harassing plaintiff (count 7); intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against Williams, Schliske and Heglar for 

retaliating or acquiesing in retaliation against plaintiff (counts 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

16 

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Long argues that the summary judgment should not have been 

grounded on the Title VII findings under principles of collateral 

estoppel. She says that she was entitled to a jury trial on fact 

issues which remained after the trial court found against her on 

her Title VII claim and that the initial Title VII trial was not a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate the remaining claims. 

For reasons given later we agree that summary judgment in 

favor of Southworth and the college must be reversed. We do not, 

however, accept the arguments that Long has made against any 

application of the findings from the Title VII proceedings with 

respect to the remaining claims. Long made a timely demand for a 

jury trial on these remaining claims, but she did not object to 

the de novo trial by the judge of the Title VII claim first. 2 

Long argues, albeit with respect to the discussion of Part II 

above, that the final decision of the Board of Trustees· presented 

"direct evidence" of discrimination. Long further makes a general 

argument that the summary judgment against her remaining claims 

was error. Considering these broad contentions and the Court's 

holding in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, U.S. 54 

(Footnote continued): 

8 and 9); defamation against Southworth for statements he 

allegedly made to harass plaintiff (counts 10 and 11); and 

interference with contractual relations against Southworth, 

Williams, Schliske, and Heglar for their actions which allegedly 

led to plaintiff's termination (count 12). IR. 8-21. 

2 

No argument is made under Woods v. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. 469, 

(1962) or Beacon Theatres~. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), that 

the order of the trial on the Title VII claim denied Long her 

right to trial by jury. 

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U.S.L.W. 5084 (1986), we agree that the summary judgment as to the 

defendants was in error. 

In Elliott the Court held that findings of fact in unreviewed 

administrative proceedings do not have preclusive effect by 

collateral estoppel in Title VII cases, but that they do have 

preclusive effect in§ 1983 and other proceedings. The scope of 

the preclusive effect of the administrative findings was defined 

in United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 

394, 422 (1966). In Elliott the Court stated: 

••• Accordingly, we hold that when a state agency 

"acting in a judicial capacity •• resolves 

disputed issues of fact properly before it which 

the parties have had an adequate opportunity to 

litigate." Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra, 

at 422, federal courts must give the agency's 

factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it 

would be entitled in the State's courts. 

54 U.S.L.W. at 5087. 

With respect to the test stated in Elliott, we are satisfied 

that the Board of Trustees and the Grievance Committee acted in a 

judicial capacity in the determinations made with respect to 

Long's claims. The hearing was conducted pursuant to regulations 

of the college which it had authority to promulgate under Wyo. 

Stat. § 21-18-304. The hearing was also conducted in accordance 

with the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act. The parties were 

all represented by counsel except Southworth; he was offered 

counsel by the college but instead chose to represent himself at 

the grievance proceedings. Witnesses were examined and crossexamined and documentary evidence was introduced. Thereafter the 

Grievance Committee made its findings and recommendations which 

18 

Appellate Case: 84-2382 Document: 010110018253 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 18 
were reviewed by the Board of Trustees and it then entered its own 

findings, conclusions and decision. We feel that the 

administrative agencies acted in a judicial capacity within the 

meaning of Elliott. See Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, 

Inc., 820 F.2d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 1987); Yancy v. McDevitt, 802 

F.2d 1025, 1029 n.2 (8th Cir. 1986). 

It is clear that the Board resolved disputed issues of fact 

which had properly been before it. Buckhalter, 820 F.2d at 896. 

We are convinced that the requirements of Elliott for the 

application of collateral estoppel in the § 1983 and§ 1985 

proceedings were met. 

Since the Elliott requirements were met, the findings of the 

Board and the Grievance Committee were entitled in the proceedings 

under§§ 1983 and 1985 to the same preclusive effect that they 

would have carried in the Wyoming courts. 3 Elliott, 54 U.S.L.W. 

at 5085. In Wyoming, collateral estoppel "involves the preclusion 

of issues which were actually decided in prior litigation of a 

different claim or cause of action between the parties." Rialto 

Theatre v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 336 (Wyo. 

1986). Wyoming employs the doctrine of collateral estoppel to 

promote finality, reliance by parties on courts to settle 

disputes, and to conserve judicial resources. Id. These 

3 

We realize that giving such preclusive effect to the Board's 

findings in the§ 1983 and§ 1985 proceedings produces results at 

odds with the denial of preclusive effect to those findings in the 

Title VII proceedings. The inconsistency was noted in the dissent 

of Justice Stevens in Elliott, 54 U.S.L.W. at 5088 n.l. 

Nevertheless the difference in treatment of the findings is 

required by Elliott. 

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int~rests would be served 

unappealed agency findings. 

by giving preclusive effect to the 

Under Wyoming law we believe the 

findings of the Board would be given preclusive effect. 

We must consider now whether giving such preclusive effect to 

the Board's findings requires reversal of the summary judgment for 

Long. The parties before the Board included Williams, Schliske 

and Heglar, college officials, and the college. The Board found 

that the record "supports the findings of the Grievance Committee 

that Sharon Long sought redress with various agents of the college 

for the aforesaid harassment and that in the process she received 

retaliatory action from agents of the college, and that, as a 

result, she was not re-employed by the college." This finding is 

most reasonably interpreted as adverse to Williams, Schliske 

Heglar and the college on the federal claims against them. 

However a theory of liability under federal law for retaliatory 

conduct by these four defendants does not give rise to a viable 

claim under§ 1985, and instead supports only a Title VII claim. 

Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 

366, 378 (1979). Nor does such a theory of liability for 

retaliatory conduct come within§ 1983. Meade v. Merchants Fast 

Motor Line, Inc., 820 F.2d 1124, 1125 n.l (10th Cir. 1987); Tafoya 

v. Adams, 816 F.2d 555, 557-58 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, U.S. 

, 108 S. Ct. 152 (1987). In sum, we hold that the summary 

judgment was proper in favor of Williams, Schliske, Heglar and the 

college on the federal claims for retaliation asserted under 

§§ 1983 and 1985. 

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However, with respect to claims against these four defendants 

(Williams, Schliske and Heglar and the college), under§§ 1983 and 

1985 for allegedly improper supervision and control of Southworth 

and for acquiescence, resulting in constitutional wrongs, and with 

respect to the pendent state law claims for infliction of 

emotional distress, negligence and the like, we are not satisfied 

that these four defendants have demonstrated that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c), particularly in light of the Board's findings which are 

evidence adverse to these defendants. Thus the summary judgment 

pertaining to these federal and pendent claims against these four 

defendants is reversed and those claims are remanded for further 

proceedings in the district court. On remand there should be a 

determination whether valid constitutional claims against these 

four defendants on such grounds exist. 

Since the administrative findings were made first and are to 

be considered in connection with the pendent state law claims and 

any constitutional claims, we feel that the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment in favor of Williams, Schliske, Heglar 

and the college. The judge's reason for doing so was that he made 

de novo findings which he relied on in the Title VII suit. He was 

entitled to do so in that trial. Nevertheless under Elliott and 

Wyoming law the administrative findings of sexual harassment by 

Southworth and of action by the agents of the college must be 

considered. They do not establish liability per se but they are 

evidence, along with the conflicts in testimony, which show that 

it was error to grant the summary judgment. We therefore reverse 

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the summary judgment in favor of the four defendants and remand 

the claims against them for further proceedings, except the§ 1983 

claim for retaliation which may not be maintained in light of the 

Tafoya opinion. 

Lastly, we turn to Long's claims against Southworth. There 

was a clear dispute in the testimony concerning his conduct toward 

Long and concerning his supervisory status over her. Moreover the 

Board's findings that he did sexually and professionally harass 

her were the first findings made and they are entitled to 

consideration in the proceedings against Southworth on Long's 

constitutional and pendent state law claims. Again, it was not 

demonstrated by Southworth that there was no genuine issue as to a 

material fact and the summary judgment on the claims is reversed 

and they are remanded for further proceedings. 

V 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, we affirm the judgment for defendants on the 

Title VII claim. We likewise affirm the summary judgment in favor 

of defendants Williams, Schliske, Heglar and the college district 

with respect to Long's claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 for 

retaliatory conduct. We reverse the summary judgment as to those 

defendants on the pendent state law claims for negligence, 

emotional distress and the like, and under§§ 1983 and 1985 on the 

sexual harassment theory. On remand, it should be determined 

whether the actions of Southworth, Williams, Schliske and Heglar 

amounted to any constitutional violations sufficient for liability 

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under §§ 1983 and 1985, by them and the college, except the claim 

for retaliatory conduct which the Tafoya ruling bars. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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