Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00801/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00801-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRETT PETERSON, D.D.S.; 

B.O.L.T., an unincorporated 

association of motorcycle 

riders and enthusiasts; JOHN 

DALKE, an individual; MARK 

TEMPLE, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH A. FARROW, 

Commissioner California 

Highway Patrol; MICHAEL 

GOOLD, in his official 

capacity as Chief of Police 

of the City of Rancho 

Cordova; SCOTT R. JONES, in 

his official capacity as the 

Sheriff of County of 

Sacramento; ROBERT DIMICELI 

a.k.a. ROBERT DI MICELI, 

Officer of the California 

Highway Patrol; STEPHEN 

CARROZZO, Rancho Cordova 

police officer and Deputy 

Sheriff; KAMALA HARRIS, in 

her official capacity as 

California Attorney General,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

ATTORNEY GENERAL HARRIS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs Brett Peterson, B.O.L.T. (short for, “Bikers of 

Lesser Tolerance”), John Dalke (“Dalke”), and Mark Temple

(“Temple”) sued the following Defendants—Sheriff of the County of 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Sacramento Scott R. Jones in his official capacity, Chief of 

Police of the City of Rancho Cordova Michael Goold in his 

official capacity, and Rancho Cordova Police Officer Stephen 

Carrozzo in his individual capacity (collectively, “Municipal 

Defendants”); California Highway Patrol Officer Robert Dimiceli 

in his individual capacity, and California Highway Patrol 

Commissioner Joseph A. Farrow in his official capacity

(collectively, “State Defendants”), and California Attorney 

General Kamala Harris in her official capacity (“Defendant 

Harris”)—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the 

First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution.

Defendant Harris moves to dismiss the two claims brought by 

Temple against her in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC) 

(Doc. #44) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 8 and 

12(b)(6), or in the alternative to sever these claims under Rules 

20(a) and 21 (Doc. #55). For the reasons stated below, the Court 

grants Defendant Harris motion to dismiss the claims brought 

against her.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

“Plaintiffs Peterson, Dalke, and Temple . . . are 

individuals with a class M1 motorcycle license who, at all times 

relevant herein, resided in the State of California.” SAC ¶ 10. 

“Plaintiff B.O.L.T. is an unincorporated association of 

 

1 These motions were determined to be suitable for decision 

without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 17, 2016.

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

motorcycle riders and enthusiasts[,]” “focusing on the 

unconstitutional enforcement [and constitutionality] of helmet 

laws . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ policies governing the 

issuance of helmet non-compliance citations are unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs also allege that because Temple received a 

motorcycle helmet citation, Jones revoked Temple’s concealed 

carry weapons (CCW) permit. Id. ¶ 191. As a result, Temple

asserts “a constitutional challenge to the complex statutory 

scheme set forth in Cal[ifornia] Penal Code [sections] 25450-

25475, 26150-26225, 26300-26325, 32000-32030 as honorably retired 

California peace officers are granted mandatory rights, 

privileges and immunities which are not bestowed to Temple.” Id. 

¶ 6.

On April 10, 2015, Plaintiffs brought this action against 

Defendants (Doc. #1) and on July 1, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” Doc. #5). In response, 

Defendants filed motions to dismiss (Doc. ##13, 18) and the Court 

granted the motions under Rule 8, giving Plaintiffs leave to 

amend (Doc. #42). On March 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their SAC 

(Doc. #44). The SAC states nine causes of action brought under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, including two claims specifically brought by 

Temple against Defendant Harris: the eighth cause of action for 

injunctive and declaratory relief for Fourteenth Amendment Equal 

Protection violations and the ninth cause of action for

injunctive and declaratory relief for Fourteenth Amendment 

Privileges or Immunities clause violations. The Court now 

addresses the merits of Defendant Harris’ motion to dismiss these 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

two claims (Doc. #55).

II. OPINION

A. Failure to Comply with Rule 8

Defendant Harris contends that Plaintiffs’ SAC should be 

dismissed for failure to abide by Rule 8(d)(1)’s requirement that 

“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(d)(1). The SAC sets forth which claims are being 

brought against which defendants in accordance with Rule 8 and 

while the eighth and ninth causes of action are, in part, 

somewhat of a mash of claims, the Court finds that they minimally 

satisfy the Rule 8 requirements. Defendant Harris’ motion to 

dismiss these two claims under Rule 8 is therefore denied. 

B. Equal Protection Claims

1. As Applied Challenge

Temple brings “as-applied” and “on-the-face challenge[s]” to 

various California statutes regulating the sale and possession of 

firearms. SAC ¶ 221. Defendant Harris contends that Temple has 

not properly alleged as applied challenges. Mot. 5:22-23. 

“Temple alleges that the challenged Penal Code provisions include 

exemptions ‘for retired peace offers’ and effectively ‘create 

[two] classes of citizens’—‘honorably retired peace officers’ and 

‘all others.’” Id. at 6:4-6 (alteration in original) (quoting 

SAC ¶¶ 215, 227, 229). Temple “does not allege that any of the 

laws are neutral, but applied in an unequal manner.” Id. at 6:8-

9. Defendant Harris concludes, “the Court should treat his 

claims against [her] simply as a facial challenge.” Id. at 6:9-

10.

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

“The Equal Protection Clause provides a basis for 

challenging legislative classifications that treat one group of 

persons as inferior or superior to others, and for contending 

that general rules are being applied in an arbitrary or 

discriminatory way.” United States v. Pitts, 908 F.2d 458, 459 

(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 423-24 

(1981)). A facial challenge attacks a statute that “‘on its 

face’ classif[ies] persons for different treatment,” while an asapplied challenge relates to a law that “may be ‘applied’ in a 

manner that creates a classification, although it appears neutral 

‘on its face.’” Id. (citing Rotunda, Nowak & Young, Treatise on 

Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 18.4 (3d ed. 

2000)).

Despite Temple’s contention that they have brought an as 

applied challenge, Temple’s claims against Defendant Harris are 

plead strictly as facial challenges to the statutory schemes and 

the Court addresses Temple’s claims accordingly.

2. CCW Permitting Scheme

Defendant Harris contends that the SAC “does not dispute 

that [the state has legitimate reasons for distinguishing between 

honorably retired peace officers and others in the CCW permitting 

scheme], nor does it alleges that the State has no other 

legitimate reason to justify the law.” Mot. 7:28-8:1. “Rather, 

[the SAC] simply asserts that Temple ‘is a master marksmen’ [sic] 

with extensive training ([SAC] ¶ 213) and that ‘[a]ctive and 

retired peace officers are no better trained in the safe use of 

firearms’ than him (id. ¶ 214).” Mot. 8:1-4. Defendant Harris

asserts that “[t]hese allegations about Temple’s personal skills 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

are simply irrelevant[,]” such allegations do not meet Temple’s 

burden to show “‘that there is not ‘any reasonable conceivable 

state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 

classification.’’” Id. at 8:4-9.

Temple contends that “[t]he right to keep and bear arms is a 

fundamental, individual right, requiring the application of 

strict scrutiny to the challenged statutes.” Opp’n 4:18-21 

(citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)).

The Ninth Circuit recently held that “there is no Second 

Amendment right for members of the general public to carry 

concealed firearms in public.” Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, ---

F.3d ----, 2016 WL 3194315, at *5 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

Plaintiffs urge this Court to decline to follow Peruta, arguing 

that the facts and issues are distinguishable, and that Peruta

“ignores the facts, legal reasoning and historical analysis as 

set forth in” various Supreme Court cases. Pls.’ Supplemental 

Brief Re: Municipal Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 2:2-13, ECF No. 69. 

The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that the facts and 

issues are meaningfully distinguishable, and this Court is 

obligated to follow binding Ninth Circuit precedent. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot base their Equal Protection claim 

on alleged impingement of their Second Amendment rights. 2016 WL 

3194315, at *17. Further, there is no constitutionally 

recognized suspect classification for people who are not 

“honorably retired peace officers.” Accordingly, the rational 

basis standard applies.

A statute challenged under the rational basis standard is 

“generally presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to 

legitimate state interest.” Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 

F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2005)(citations omitted). “A legislative 

classification subject to rational basis scrutiny ‘must be wholly 

irrational to violate equal protection.’” Id. (quoting De 

Martinez v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 2004)). In 

“applying rational basis review . . ., any hypothetical rationale 

for the law [will] do.” Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 

806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008). Additionally legislative action can 

pass rational basis review “even when there is an imperfect fit 

between means and ends.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321

(1993).

Here, California has a legitimate reason for distinguishing 

between honorably retired peace officers and others in the CCW 

permitting scheme. Specifically California’s “important 

interest[s] in reducing the number of concealed weapons in public 

in order to reduce the risks to other members of the public who 

use the streets” and “because of their disproportionate 

involvement in life-threatening crimes of violence.” Peruta v. 

Cty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 2010) 

rev’d and remanded, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir 2014), vacated by 781 

F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (granting en banc hearing). It would 

be reasonable for the legislature to conclude that the above 

security concerns are implicated much less when experienced 

former police officers carry concealed weapons and it would be 

reasonable for the legislature to conclude that former police 

officers face heightened personal security risks. “It is 

entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

conceived reason[s] for the challenged distinction actually 

motivated the legislature.” See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 

U.S. 307, 315 (1993). Accordingly, the CCW permitting scheme 

passes rational basis review and because any further amendment 

would be futile, Defendant Harris’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ 

eighth claim regarding the CCW permitting scheme is granted with 

prejudice. See Peruta, 2016 WL 3194315, at *17 (holding that the 

Ninth Circuit’s finding that the Second Amendment “does not 

protect, in any degree, the carrying of concealed firearms by 

members of the general public . . . necessarily resolves, 

adversely to [p]laintiffs, their derivative claim[] of . . . 

equal protection . . . .”).

3. Unsafe Handgun Act Claim

Defendant Harris contends that Temple fails to state a valid 

Equal Protection clause challenge to the Unsafe Handgun Act, 

because the relevant provisions of California’s Penal Code do not 

“treat retired peace officer differently than ‘all others’ and 

[do] not grant them special privileges to purchase of handguns 

not on the approved-handgun roster.” Mot. 8:21-9:1. “The only 

exemption and differential treatment Temple alleges is for active 

peace officers, see Cal. Penal Code § 32000(b)(4), an exemption 

Temple does not object to.” Id. at 9:1-3. Temple counters that 

“[p]ossession of hanguns of one’s own choosing is protected by 

the Second Amendment.” Opp’n 7:21.

Temple asserts the following relevant factual allegations in 

the SAC: “Dealers may not sell any new handgun unless it is 

listed in the state Department of Justice roster of handguns 

certified for sale[,]” SAC ¶ 216; “[u]nder California’s Unsafe 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Handgun Act, all semi-automatic handguns that were not on the 

state’s approved handgun roster before 2010 are now barred from 

the roster unless they are equipped with the technology, which 

‘microstamps’ the weapon’s make, model and serial number on the 

cartridge when a bullet is discharged[,]” id. ¶ 223; and “peace 

officers can purchase unlimited handguns of an unlimited variety 

for sale in the United States, regardless as to the gun’s quality 

and safety, but Temple cannot buy a handgun which is newer and 

safer than most duty weapons of the police,” id. ¶ 226.

California’s Unsafe Handgun Act, codified as California 

Penal Code section 32000, includes an exemption allowing sales of 

non-rostered handguns to certain peace officers “for use in the 

discharge of their official duties.” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 32000(b)(4). While the SAC alleges that this exemption actually 

confers rights to retired police officers because it is “the 

common practice of retiring officers to stockpile handguns they 

won’t be able to purchase after retirement” id. ¶227, this 

allegation is unsupported by the language of the statute. 

Whether active peace officers may retire and keep their nonrostered weapons is not an issue addressed by the law which 

regulates only the purchase of handguns. And nowhere in the 

Penal Code are honorably retired peace officers allowed to 

purchase non-rostered handguns.

Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a valid equal 

protection claim because the Penal Code does not in fact treat 

retired police officers differently than all others and does not 

grant them special privileges. Defendant Harris’ motion to 

dismiss Temple’s challenge to California’s Unsafe Handgun Act is

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

granted with prejudice since further amendment would be futile.

4. Ten-Day Waiting Period and Large-Capacity 

Magazine Claims

Defendant Harris next contends that “the SAC does not 

include a single factual allegation about the law [requiring a 

ten-day waiting period for handgun purchases in California, see

Cal. Penal Code §§ 26950, 27650,] and its requirements.” Mot. 

9:28-10:1. “There is no assertion that this waiting period 

applied to Temple but not to other gun purchasers, or that 

describes how it operates or violates equal protection.” Id. at 

10:1-2. “Similarly, the SAC implies without stating that 

[California] law prohibiting the sale of large-capacity magazines 

has an exemption for active peace officers (see SAC ¶¶ 215, 224), 

but includes no factual allegations about this law either.” Id.

at 10:6-8. “Again there is no assertion that the large-capacity 

magazine prohibition applies to Temple but not to other 

ammunition purchasers, and no factual allegations that describe 

how it operates or violates equal protection.” Id. at 10:8-10.

A careful examination of the SAC reveals that relevant Penal 

Code provisions governing the mandated ten-day waiting period and 

large-capacity magazines are simply included in string citations,

in the captions of the eighth and ninth causes of action, and in 

two general allegations listing the laws challenged by Temple. 

See SAC ¶¶ 215, 221. As noted by Defendant Harris, the SAC is 

devoid of any factually specific allegations challenging the tenday waiting period or limitations on large-capacity magazines 

under the Equal Protection clause. 

Temple’s opposition to these arguments fails to specifically 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

address these shortcomings nor does it present any legal 

authority upon which this Court can rely to allow the claims 

regarding California’s ten day waiting period and large capacity 

magazine prohibition to go forward. The Court finds that any 

further amendment would be futile and dismisses these claims with 

prejudice.

C. Privileges and Immunities Claims

1. Claim Under Article IV

Defendant Harris moves to dismiss the ninth cause of action 

on the grounds that “[t]here are absolutely no allegations in the 

SAC to support Plaintiffs’ Privileges and Immunities Clause 

claim[; t]his is because the challenged provisions of the Penal 

Code do not distinguish between residents and non-residents of 

the State but rather between peace officers or honorably retired 

peace officers and all others.” Mot. 11:8-11. “In addition, 

Temple does not have standing to bring the claim, as he alleges 

California residency.” Id. at 11:11 n.4 (citing SAC ¶ 10).

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits 

states from discriminating against out-of-state residents when it 

comes to certain “fundamental” rights. McBurney v. Young, 133 S. 

Ct. 1709, 1714 (2013). The clause’s protections do not apply to 

laws that do not discriminate against non-residents. Id. at 1716.

Because Temple alleges California residency he does not have 

standing to bring this claim. See, e.g., Council of Ins. Agents 

& Brokers v. Molasky-Arman, 522 F.3d 925, 930-32 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(holding plaintiff had standing as a nonresident to assert 

challenge under the Privileges and Immunities clause). Further, 

Temple’s allegations fail to allege any discrimination against 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

non-California residents. Accordingly, Defendant Harris’ motion 

as to this claim is granted with prejudice as the Court once 

again finds that any further amendment would be futile. 

2. Claim Under the Privileges or Immunities Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment

Defendant Harris contends that Temple’s challenge to various 

firearms provisions in California’s Penal Code does not implicate

any of the limited rights the Privileges or Immunities clause has 

been held to protect, and Temple has failed to allege otherwise.

Temple counters that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or

Immunities Clause guarantees the right to possess a firearm for 

purposes of travel. Opp’n 10:16-17.

The Supreme Court has narrowly applied the Privileges or 

Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to “protect[] only 

those rights ‘which owe their existence to the Federal 

government, its National character, its Constitution, or its 

laws.’” McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 754 

(2010) (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79 (1873)). 

The clause protects “very few rights,” namely “the right to 

petition Congress, the right to vote in federal elections, the 

right to interstate travel or commerce, the right to enter 

federal lands, or the rights of a citizen while in the custody of 

federal officers.” 2 John E. Nowak, et al., Treatise on Const. 

L. §14.3(b) (2d ed. 1987) (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 

at 79-81). The Supreme Court has consistently held that the 

Privileges or Immunities Clause does not protect a right to bear 

arms, and has declined to overrule this holding. McDonald, 561 

U.S. at 758. Temple fails to allege any facts in the SAC which 

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

demonstrate how the challenged statutes have any effect on his

right to travel. Accordingly, Temple has failed to allege a 

plausible claim under the Privileges or Immunities clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment and Defendant Harris’ motion on this claim 

is granted with prejudice as the Court finds that further 

amendment would be futile. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant 

Harris’ motion to dismiss under Rule 8, but GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE 

Defendant Harris’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection 

and Privileges and Immunities challenges asserted by Plaintiff 

Temple in the eighth and ninth causes of action of Plaintiffs’ 

Second Amended Complaint. There being no other claims brought by 

Plaintiffs against Defendant Harris, she is dismissed as a 

defendant in this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 24, 2016

Case 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 70 Filed 06/27/16 Page 13 of 13