Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_93-cv-05726/USCOURTS-caed-1_93-cv-05726-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Albert Cecil Howard, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

Steven W. Ornoski, As Acting Warden )

of San Quentin State Prison, )

)

Respondent. )

)

Case No. CV F-93-5726-REC 

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: FILING AMENDED

PETITION AND HOLDING FEDERAL

PROCEEDINGS IN ABEYANCE

DATE: FEBRUARY 13, 2006

TIME: 1:30 p.m.

COURTROOM ONE

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Petitioner

Albert Cecil Howard (“Howard”) for an order permitting him to backfile his First Amended Petition nunc pro tunc as of April 23, 1997,

and then to hold federal proceedings in abeyance. The Honorable

Robert E. Coyle, presided over the proceedings. Respondent Steven W.

Ornoski, as Acting Warden of San Quentin State Prison (the “Warden”)

opposes the motion. Howard was represented at the hearing by

Assistant Federal Defender Joseph Schlesinger; the Warden was

represented by Deputy Attorney General Brian G. Smiley. The hearing

originally was set for December 12, 2005. Following the Court’s

consideration of a request for a continuance filed by the Warden, the

hearing was continued to January 30, 2006. The Warden filed his

opposition to the motion on January 16, 2006 and Howard filed his

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 1 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The petition was denied without explanation. In addition, in

the same order, Howard’s applications for an order to preserve

testimony and for appointment of counsel to represent him on state

habeas were denied.

2 While the appellate decision affirmed Howard’s murder

conviction and death sentence, one of the special circumstances and

two other convictions were set aside.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 2

reply on January 23, 2006. The January 30, 2006 hearing was continued

to February 13, 2006.

I. Procedural History.

The pertinent procedural history for this case dates back over

15 years. During direct appeal proceedings in the California Supreme

Court, Howard filed his initial state habeas petition on June 22,

1990. That petition was denied on December 11, 1991.1 On February

27, 1992, Howard’s direct appeal proceedings were concluded when the

California Supreme Court affirmed his murder conviction and death

sentence.2

Howard initiated federal proceedings in this Court on October 25,

1993 with a request for appointment of counsel and a stay of execution

of his sentence. The Court appointed George Holt to represent Howard

on March 4, 1994. Because Mr. Holt was overwhelmed with the scope and

breadth of representing Howard in these federal proceedings, on July

11, 1995, the California Appellate Project (“CAP”), was appointed cocounsel. On November 17, 1995, Mr. Holt substituted out and CAP, by

Joseph Schlesinger, substituted in as sole counsel. Finding that all

files had been delivered to CAP as of April 15, 1996, the Court, on

May 9, 1996, ordered CAP to file Howard’s federal petition by October

24, 1996.

Four months after the Court established this due date, CAP, on

September 18, 1996 requested authorization to conduct investigation

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 2 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The amount set did not require a report to the California State

Bar.

4 In fact, the application for an extension of time requested up

to and including February 14, 1997 to file the petition. The Court

provided an extra month, to March 14, 1997.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 3

and consult with experts. Over the Warden’s objection, the Court

considered and ultimately granted (in part) the funding request under

seal. The Court found, however, that the timing of the investigative

funding application was unacceptable. Because CAP failed to keep the

Court apprised of its litigation efforts and the need for an extension

to file the petition, the Court imposed a minimal amount of sanctions,

$500.3 After the sanctions order was issued, CAP immediately applied

for and was granted and extension to file Howard’s petition, up to and

including March 14, 1997.4 Contrary to the Warden’s opposition papers

in the present motion, at no time did the Court find dilatory tactics

on the part of Howard or his counsel in the development of his federal

claims. Rather, it was the inconsiderate omission of keeping the

Court apprised that provoked the sanctions.

Howard timely filed his original federal petition on March 14,

1997, and as part of his prayer for relief, requested that the federal

proceedings be held in abeyance so he could pursue state remedies on

additional federal claims discovered during preparation of the

petition. The original federal petition was reputed to contain only

exhausted claims. On April 10, 1997, the Warden opposed Howard’s

abeyance request because the additional, unexhausted claims had not

been identified, and thus, the Warden could not evaluate whether they

were cognizable federal claims. Within two weeks, Howard responded

by filing his state exhaustion petition in the California Supreme

Court on April 23, 1997. This date is important, because it is the

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 3 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 In making this finding, the Court discounted the potential of

a procedural default based on failure to raise the claims in the first

instance on direct appeal, see In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 760

(1953), or an attempt to raise a claim on state habeas that had

previously been rejected on direct appeal, see In re Waltreus, 62

Cal.2d 218, 225 (1965).

6 Howard alleged in his state exhaustion petition that his claims

were timely because they were presented without substantial delay from

discovery and that circumstances beyond his control prevented

discovery of the claims earlier.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 4

date on which Howard now claims that he could have filed a complete

petition in federal court, which would have been comprised of his

exhausted claims, as alleged in the original March 14, 1997 petition,

and his newly discovered, unexhausted claims presented to the

California Supreme Court. 

On May 30, 1997 the Court ordered the federal proceedings held

in abeyance until the California Supreme Court completed its review

of the state exhaustion petition, a result the Warden conceded at the

time was “a fair result.” Based on the Warden’s arguments, prior to

entering that order, the Court evaluated the allegations in the state

exhaustion petition for potential procedural default infirmities to

determine whether proceeding with the state exhaustion process was

futile. The Court specifically determined that the only basis for a

state procedural default, if any, would be untimeliness.5 In

addition, the Court observed that Howard made the necessary

allegations in his state exhaustion petition to address the issue of

timeliness under applicable state rules.6 Because of these findings,

the Court concluded that abeyance of federal proceedings was supported

and that Howard’s state exhaustion petition was not futile.

Significantly, the Court also observed that under prevailing Ninth

Circuit authority, any state procedural default predicated on

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 4 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 The Clark decision was issued on July 29, 1993.

8 Under procedural default analysis jurisprudence, courts must

look at the date on which a state petition should have been filed to

determine when the default occurred. Calderon v. United States Dist.

Ct. (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 75 (9th Cir. 1996). In Howard’s case, his

state habeas petition was presumptively timely in 1990, when his

original state habeas petition was filed. Thus, his default under

California’s articulated timeliness rules was before 1993, the year

Clark was decided.

9 The Court found that Chapter 154 did not apply to any of the

cases pending in the Fresno Division of the Eastern District of

California in April 1999.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 5

untimeliness would not be adequate to bar federal review because a

timeliness default prior to the decision in In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th

750 (1993)7 is not an adequate state ground to bar federal review on

the merits. Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1996);

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th

Cir. 1996).8 The Court nonetheless abstained from concluding the

California Supreme Court actually would find an untimeliness default

since it would be improper for this Court to interfere with the state

process or usurp state jurisdiction.

On two occasions in late 1998 and early 1999, the Warden asked

that the Court vacate the May 30, 1997 abeyance order, arguing that

Howard’s case was subject to the expedited provisions of Chapter 154

of Title 28. The Court rejected these requests on the grounds that

Chapter 154 did not apply to Howard’s case.9

The next pertinent order was issued on June 15, 1999, when Court

granted Howard’s request that he be permitted to file his amended

federal petition containing previously and newly exhausted federal

claims within 30 days of completion of state exhaustion proceedings.

As of the present writing, Howard’s state exhaustion petition is

still pending before the California Supreme Court. An amendment to

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 5 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Howard’s federal habeas action was commenced on October 25,

1993 when he filed his request for appointment of counsel and a stay

of execution of his death sentence.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 6

that petition was permitted by the state high court and thereafter

filed on September 25, 2000. This Court has reviewed that amendment,

as well as the April 23, 1997 exhaustion petition in connection with

the present motion. The state exhaustion petition and amendment

remain fully briefed, and as far as this Court can see, are ready for

decision by the California Supreme Court.

II. Evolving Precedent Over the Past Nine Years.

In the nearly nine years since Howard filed his initial federal

petition on March 14, 1997, and the date of this order, there have

been some significant shifts in the controlling precedent regarding

applicability of AEDPA, holding federal proceedings in abeyance, and

statutory tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. The only

pertinent authority that has not undergone a change over the years is

the precedent governing nunc pro tunc filings. Each of these

applicable principles are discussed

A. Applicability of AEDPA.

At that time Howard filed his federal petition (March 14, 1997),

the Court held federal proceedings in abeyance (May 30, 1997), and the

Court established a due date for Howard’s amended federal petition

(June 15, 1999), caselaw dictated that because Howard’s action was

commenced prior to the effective date of the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the provisions of AEDPA,

including amendments to Chapter 153, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, et. seq., were

not applicable.10 Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163

F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). This authority was abrogated a little

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 6 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 7

over four years later when the United States Supreme Court issued

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003), and held that it is not the

mere commencement of the action, but rather, the filing of the

petition (alleging actual claims for relief) which determines whether

AEDPA does or does not apply to a pending action. Cases with

petitions on file prior to April 24, 1996, the effective date of

AEDPA, are not subject to the provisions of AEDPA. Cases with

petitions filed subsequent to that date are. See id. at 207. Since

Howard’s initial federal petition was filed on March 14, 1997, nearly

eleven months after the effective date of AEDPA, the provisions of

AEDPA do apply to his case, notwithstanding the parties’ and the

Court’s previous understanding to the contrary.

B. Holding Federal Proceedings in Abeyance.

Prior to the issuance of Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.

Ct. 1528 (2005), controlling precedent in this circuit precluded

federal courts from holding in abeyance “mixed” petitions, that is

petitions containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Calderon

v. United States District Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir.

1998). However, if the federal petition contained only fully

exhausted claims, federal courts were at liberty to exercise

discretion to hold federal proceedings in abeyance during state

exhaustion. See id., at 987-88; Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268,

1274 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, if a federal court were presented with

a mixed petition, the unexhausted claims would have to be deleted or

withdrawn by amendment before the petition could be held in abeyance.

Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986. With respect to capital cases, this Court

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 7 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 Petitioners were directed to file exhausted petitions and the

Warden was given an opportunity to contest the exhaustion status of

the petitions filed. Once the exhaustion issue was resolved, and the

petitions were amended to delete any unexhausted claims, if necessary,

abeyance of federal proceedings was ordered. In no case did this

Court ever dismiss a mixed petition filed in a capital case. To the

extent that either party references the practice of dismissing mixed

capital habeas petitions, the discussion is irrelevant.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 8

followed the procedure of holding fully exhausted petitions in

abeyance.11

Under Rhines, a district court may now hold in abeyance a mixed

petition under limited circumstances. 544 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at

1534-35. To do so, first, the district court must determine if “there

was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims

first in state court.” Id. at 1535. Second, the unexhausted claims

must not be “plainly meritless.” Id. Finally, a mixed petition

“should not be stayed indefinitely,” meaning, there should be specific

limits on the trip to state court and back to federal court. Id.

Unfortunately, the Court in Rhines did not define or give any

examples of what may constitute “good cause” for not presenting the

unexhausted claims in state court first (or earlier). Less than a

month later, however, the high Court did suggest one example of “good

cause.” That is, “reasonable confusion about whether a state filing

would be timely.” Pace v. DiGluglielmo, 544 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct.

1807, 1813 (2005). After conducting independent research this Court

has failed to uncover any published Ninth Circuit opinion elucidating

this point further. Under Pace, it appears that a petitioner

uncertain about whether his filing of a state petition will be timely

is permitted to file a “protective” mixed petition in federal court

and then request abeyance of that petition under Rhines. See Pace,

544 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 1813. At least one Ninth Circuit case,

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 8 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 9

however, in an unpublished opinion, found the requisite good cause

because his unexhausted claim otherwise would be barred by the oneyear statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) unless he were

to file the protective petition and have it held in abeyance during

state exhaustion proceedings. Barretto v. Giurbino, 150 Fed.Appx.604

(9th Cir. 2005). The rules governing citation of unpublished cases

prevents this Court from relying on Barretto, and in any event, the

rationale contradicts the holding in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,

181-82 (2001)(holding that the limitations period is not tolled during

pendency of a federal petition). Walker calls into question whether

the inclusion of an unexhausted claims in a protective mixed petition

under Pace and held in abeyance under Rhines, satisfies the federal

statute of limitations. It may be that such claims are subject to a

limitations bar where those claims are denied as untimely by the state

court on state post-conviction review, and the state review is not

completed during the limitation period. This discussion leads to a

separate discussion of changes in the manner in which statutory

tolling under § 2244(d)(2) applies to AEDPA cases.

C. Statutory Tolling of the Statute of Limitations under

AEDPA. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year statute of limitations

is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed” application for

state post-conviction relief:

The time during which a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.

Prior to 2005, when Pace was decided, courts in the Ninth Circuit

generally found that if a state post-conviction was filed within the

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 9 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 If and when the state court denial was based in whole or part

on state procedural rules, the issue of procedural default in federal

court was still an issue.

13 The procedural bar at issue in Bennett, was based on two

grounds: the petitioner’s presentation of some claims which were

previously determined on direct appeal; and the petitioner’s

presentation of other claims which could have been raised on direct

appeal, but were not. Id. at 7.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 10

federal limitations period, the statute was tolled under § 2244(d)(2),

no matter the reason for the state court denial. Ninth Circuit courts

specifically did not equate state procedural defaults with “improperly

filed” state post-conviction petitions. Thus, so long as a state

petition was filed during the federal limitations period, statutory

tolling was available.12 See Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726-

29 (9th Cir. 2001). This construction of the statutory tolling

provision was based on Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-10 (2001) which

distinguished between time limits and procedural bars.13 Then, in

Pace, the Supreme Court held that “time limits, no matter their form

are ‘filing’ conditions” (which determine whether a state postconviction petition is properly filed), and that “[w]hen a

postconviction is untimely under state law, that is the end of the

matter for purposes of § 2244(d)((2).” Pace, 544 U.S. at ___, ___,

125 S. Ct. at 1812, 1814 (internal quotation and brackets omitted).

The phrase “no matter their form” appears to embrace procedural

defaults based on untimeliness, notwithstanding the holding in

Bennett. The only rationale for distinguishing the two cases is that

the procedural default in Bennett did not involve a timeliness bar.

See note 13, supra.

The Pace decision also applies the limitations bar on a claim-byclaim basis, meaning that some claims in a federal habeas petition may

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 10 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14 This Court follows the most recent Supreme Court precedent.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 11

be time-barred, while others will be considered timely. The Court

acknowledges that Howard takes a contrary view and argues that the

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) applies to the

application as a whole and not on a claim-by-claim basis. While this

position finds support in Bennett, 531 U.S. at 10 (holding that the

tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) “refers only to ‘properly filed’

applications and does not contain the peculiar suggestion that a

single application can be both ‘properly filed’ and not ‘properly

filed’”), it contradicts Pace. In Pace, the Court specifically

rejected the argument that since § 2244(d)(2) refers to “a properly

filed application,” any condition applied on a claim-by-claim basis,

such as the state law there at issue, could not be a “condition to

filing” which determines whether a state petition is “properly filed.”

Pace. 544 U.S. at ___- ___, 125 S. Ct. at 1813-14.14 The Supreme

Court’s rejection of this argument is based on the fact that another

provision of § 2244, that is subsection (b) (pertaining to subsequent

petitions), requires inquiry into specific claims rather than to the

application as a whole. Id. The Supreme Court further noted that

even in § 2244(d)(2), the provision at issue, the statute refers to

a “properly filed application . . . with respect to the pertinent

judgment of claim.” See id. 

The Court also acknowledges that Howard disputes Pace is

applicable to his case, or any California case, at all. As he argued

at the hearing in this matter, the issue is currently before the Ninth

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 11 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 Without oral argument or the benefit of briefing on the

applicability of Pace to the case at hand, the Ninth Circuit panel

held that a California state procedural bar for untimeliness in a noncapital case was an “improperly filed” state post-conviction petition

which disqualified the petitioner from the benefits of statutory

tolling under § 2244(d)(2).

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 12

Circuit in Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2005) on a

petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.

15

D. Utilizing Nunc Pro Tunc Amendments.

The circumstances governing when a nunc pro tunc amendment should

be approved have not changed in the nine years Howard’s exhaustion

petition has been pending before the California Supreme Court. The

nunc pro tunc devise traditionally has been utilized as part of a

court’s inherent power to correct court records in order to reflect

what actually occurred. Invocation of this power is limited. 

It does not imply the ability to alter the substance of

that which actually transpired or to backdate events to

serve some other purpose. . . . [I]ts use is limited to

making the record reflect what the district court actually

intended to do at an earlier date, but which it did not

sufficiently express or did not accomplish due to some

error or inadvertence.

United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Analysis.

When the Court directed the Warden to file a responsive brief to

Howard’s present motion, it instructed him to address the

applicability of Pace in the event some claims in Howard’s state

exhaustion petition are denied as untimely. In addition, the Court

directed the Warden to address two other subjects: whether the claims

alleged in the exhaustion petition relate back to the original federal

petition as described in Mayle v. Feliz, 544 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2562

(2005); and whether Howard might be entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. In reviewing the parties respective

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 12 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 13

briefs and the lengthy procedural history in this case, the Court

determines that the relation back and equitable tolling issues are not

properly before the Court and this juncture. Accordingly, the Court

declines to address them. The Pace and Rhines cases, however, are

relevant to the parties’ respective contentions. Howard requests that

the Court back-file his amended federal petition as of April 23, 1997,

and then hold the federal proceedings in abeyance. The Warden

contends there is no jurisdictional basis to utilize the nunc pro tunc

procedure and that filing the amended petition must await completion

of state exhaustion proceedings. In the alternative, if the Court

permits filing of the amended petition during state exhaustion

proceedings, the Warden maintains that the Court should decline to

hold federal proceedings in abeyance under Rhines because Howard has

not been diligent in the development and prosecution of his claims.

A. Back-Filing the Amended Petition to April 23, 1997, Nunc

Pro Tunc.

Howard argues that but for the now abrogated precedent, he would

have filed a mixed petition in federal court and requested abeyance

of the proceedings on April 23, 1997. He maintains that Rhines now

makes this possible. He also argues that the Court has inherent power

to modify the prior abeyance order and that the Court has the

authority to permit the nunc pro tunc filing under its equity powers

to prevent an injustice. See Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 64-65

(1881).

The Warden characterizes the application for the requested nunc

pro tunc amendment as having the Court say something that is untrue.

He additionally argues that under traditional nunc pro tunc

jurisprudence, the Court is without authority to apply the procedure.

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 13 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 14

He further argues, strenuously, that Howard has not prosecuted his

federal claims diligently, and therefore does not qualify for the

benefits of the Court’s inherent equitable powers.

The Court declines to exercise its authority to permit Howard to

back-file his amended federal petition, nunc pro tunc, to April 23,

1997. There was no inadvertence which caused the Court to proceed in

the manner it did in 1997. See Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1010. Rather, the

Court purposefully required Howard to file a fully federal exhausted

petition and identify his unexhausted claims before holding federal

proceedings in abeyance during state exhaustion. The Court did

express what it intended to do in 1997. The fact that the controlling

precedent has changed since that time does not entitle Howard to the

relief he presently seeks. This is an entirely different type of

situation from that presented in Mitchell, 103 U.S. 62, on which

Howard relies. In that case the lower (state) court entered a civil

action judgment on November 10, 1872, in favor of the plaintiff, which

was made effective as of October 16, 1868. Back-dating the decree

followed from the fact that the state court held the matter under

submission for an undue length of time. Id. at 63. Unknown to the

court or the defense, the plaintiff died, intestate, on November 10,

1869, prior to entry of judgment, but after its effective date. Id.

When the plaintiff’s personal representative proceeded to enforce the

judgment in 1873, the defendant resisted because a judgment entered

on behalf of a deceased, intestate, plaintiff is void. Id. The

plaintiff’s representative urged that the decree was valid because it

was effective prior to the plaintiff’s death. The Supreme Court

agreed because the delay in entering the judgment in the first place

was not due to “any cause attributable to the laches of the parties,”

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 14 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 15

but was for the court’s “convenience, or [ ] the multiplicity or press

of business, [or] the intricacy of the questions involved.” Id. at

65. Taking an inordinate amount of time to reach a decision while a

matter is under submission is a completely different concept than

experiencing a change in precedent. In the present case, this Court

was simply following Ninth Circuit precedent, and the Ninth Circuit

was following Supreme Court precedent which wasn’t revised until the

Supreme Court decided Rhines. 

Nor does the Court see the necessity of the nunc pro tunc devise

in this case to prevent an injustice. Were the Court to grant the

relief Howard seeks and the California Supreme Court then ruled some

or all of the claims in the exhaustion petition were untimely, Pace

might still preclude a finding of statutory tolling for those claims,

because the federal limitations period is not tolled by filing a

federal petition. Walker, 533 U.S. at 181-82. Although the Court is

well-aware that the applicability of Pace is uncertain, Ninth Circuit

authority exists concerning its applicability, see Bonner, 425 F.3d

1145, even though that authority is scheduled for en banc review.

Further, the Court acknowledges that the adequacy of an untimeliness

state default would have to be litigated at some point in the process,

especially in light of the fact that the Court already observed that

since Howard’s default would be considered pre-Clark, prevailing

authority dictates the default would not bar federal review. See May

30, 1997 order (quoting Morales, 85 F.3d at 1391, Bean, 96 F.3d at

1131, and Hayes, 103 F.3d at 75). On the other hand, if the

California Supreme Court’s denial of Howard’s state exhaustion

petition demonstrates that it was timely, statutory tolling would be

available under § 2244(d)(2) for all claims. As the Supreme Court

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 15 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 16

stated in Mitchell, “[a] nunc pro tunc order should be granted or

refused, as justice may require in view of the circumstances of the

particular case.” 103 U.S. at 65. In the case of Howard, it will be

refused.

B. Filing the Amended Petition as of November 1, 2005.

At the hearing the parties clarified their respective positions

as to whether Howard’s amended petition can or should be filed during

state exhaustion, at all, even if the Court declines to enter the nunc

pro tunc relief Howard requests. Howard argues that he is absolutely

entitled to file an amended petition during state exhaustion, and in

fact he actually filed it on November 1, 2005. The Warden counters

that the filing of the amended petition must await completion of state

exhaustion proceedings because the (federal) case is on abeyance under

the regimen in practice pursuant to Greenawalt, 105 F.3d 1268 and

Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. If the Court switches to the new procedure

under Pace and Rhines, the Warden argues, Howard will not be entitled

to abeyance because he cannot meet the Rhines good cause requirement

and is not entitled to benefit from the Court’s equitable power

because he has not been diligent in pursuing his federal claims.

Although Howard is not entitled to a nunc pro tunc order backfiling his amended petition to April 23, 1997, the Court finds that

under Pace and Rhines, he is authorized to file his amended petition

prior to completion of state exhaustion proceedings. Both of these

cases permit a petitioner to file a mixed federal petition while s/he

pursues state remedies. The Court can discern no rational basis for

limiting the filing of such protective petitions to the beginning of

the state exhaustion process, especially where, as here, the option

only became available within the last several months. The Warden has

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 16 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 17

presented no authority to dissuade the Court from this course. The

Court hereby approves the November 1, 2005 filing of Howard’s amended

petition. The only remaining question is abeyance. 

C. Holding Federal Proceedings in Abeyance Pending Completion

of State Exhaustion Proceedings.

The Warden’s objection to holding Howard’s amended petition in

abeyance under Rhines is that he has not been diligent in developing

his federal claims and pursuing his state remedies. As a result, the

Warden claims Howard is disqualified outright under the third Rhines

requirement, he cannot establish the first Rhines requirement, and

finally, he is not entitled to equitable relief. To reiterate, the

Rhines requirements for holding a mixed petition abeyance are:

1. the district court must determine there was good cause

for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust claims first

(or earlier) in state court;

2. the unexhausted claims (or claims pending in the state

exhaustion petition) must not be plainly meritless;

and

3. a mixed petition should not be stayed indefinitely,

but rather, there should be specific limits on the

trip to state court and back, and, “if a petitioner

engages in abusive litigation tactics or intentional

delay, the district court should not grant him a stay

at all.”

544 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 1535. 

The Warden offers two separate but related circumstances which

he claims demonstrate Howard’s claimed lack of diligence. The first

is comprised of conduct by Howard’s counsel which led this Court to

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 17 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 The Court does not express an opinion or prediction that state

relief will or will not be denied.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 18

impose sanctions in September 1996. The second is that the federal

constitutional claims presented in the state exhaustion petition were

not pursued in a timely manner. 

Neither example is compelling. In the first place, the diligence

requirement under Rhines relates to filing delays between federal and

state court, see, 544 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 1535, a requirement

not relevant to these proceedings at all. As the procedural history

of this case demonstrates, the state exhaustion petition is currently

on file in the California Supreme Court, and the amended federal

petition is on file in these proceedings. There can and will be no

delays as contemplated by Rhines. Once the California Supreme Court

denies post-conviction relief (if the California Supreme Court denies

post-conviction relief),16 federal proceedings can move ahead without

any delay.

In the second place, on the merits, the Warden hasn’t

demonstrated lack of diligence. With respect the September 1996

sanctions, the Court did not find lack of diligence in the development

of Howard’s federal claims. Rather the statement that CAP had been

“knowingly dilatory” was based on inconsiderate behavior, for not

keeping the Court apprised of the CAP’s progress in developing federal

claims and maintaining the schedule for filing the federal petition

by October 24, 1996. Along with imposing minimal sanctions, the

Court also granted CAP investigative funding for claim development and

upon request, extended the due date for the federal petition by seven

months. 

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 18 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 The Court expresses no opinion on whether Howard’s allegations

can be or have been established.

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 19

The assertion that Howard was dilatory in presenting his claims

to the California Supreme Court is not for this Court to decide,

notwithstanding the Warden’s strenuous argument. Indeed it was this

very conclusion which compelled the Court in its May 30, 1997 order

to grant abeyance in the first place. As summarized above, based upon

this Court’s reading of the exhaustion petition, including the

allegations addressing the California timeliness standards, the Court

could not and would not conclude that the presentation of the

exhaustion petition to the California Supreme Court was futile. In

both the April 23, 1997 exhaustion petition and the September 25, 2000

amendment, Howard takes great pains to explain how he discovered

claims after they would have been presumed timely pursuant to the

applicable California timeliness standards. As alleged in these state

pleadings, part of the delay was attributable to efforts by

governmental agencies, including the Tulare City Council, the Tulare

County Counsel’s Office, the Tulare County District Attorney’s Office,

and the Attorney General’s Office, to prevent Howard’s attorneys from

gaining access to exculpatory records. Those records are said to

concern extensive internal and external investigation of police

misconduct in Tulare County, specifically with respect to the officers

who investigated Howard’s case.17 The other part of the delay is said

to be attributable to lack of investigative funds, which Howard’s

litigation team finally were able to obtain in federal court during

development of his federal claims (including claims which had not been

exhausted). A significant allegation of actual innocence is advanced

by virtue of expert opinion of a forensic pathologist who reviewed

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 19 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 20

trial evidence. Claims of juror misconduct (supported by juror

declarations) also were developed with the aid of available federal

funds. 

The Warden’s review of the claims in the exhaustion petition

produce a different conclusion. He argues that factual bases for many

claims were available long before April 23, 1997. Analogizing to a

Fifth Circuit case, In re Wilson, 433 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2005), the

Warden is critical of Howard for waiting until just two days before

the federal limitations period expired before filing his exhaustion

petition. In Wilson, the Fifth Circuit concluded the petitioner

exceeded the limitations period when he returned to federal court

after timely exhausting a newly discovered claim in state court.

However, because counsel only left one day to accomplish the federal

filing, and he failed to adhere to the rules for seeking permission

to file a second federal habeas petition in federal court, the one day

cushion was insufficient. The only avenue open to the petitioner to

defeat the statute of limitations was equitable tolling. The Fifth

Circuit held that the “actions of his counsel – particularly in

waiting until the very last day of the limitations period to file his

[state] application – appear to us to be more indicative of

brinkmanship than of careful diligence.” Id. at 453. Aside from the

fact that this Court does not discern from these facts any strategic

advantage from counsel’s waiting until one day before the expiration

of the limitations period, which would justify the accusation of

“brinkmanship,” the situation in Wilson is completely distinguishable

from Howard’s case. First and foremost, in Wilson, it must understood

that all players (counsel, the courts, the State, and the petitioner)

knew when the federal statute limitations would expire, whereas here,

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 20 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 21

all of the players (counsel, the Court, the Warden, and Howard)

believed that AEDPA did not apply, and hence there was no statute of

limitations to worry about. Second, the precise issue under

consideration in Wilson was equitable tolling, whereas here, the issue

is holding Howard’s amended federal petition in abeyance. The

Warden’s arguments are unpersuasive and thus, the third requirement

of Rhines, that is, prompt state litigation and return to federal

court, is satisfied.

Apart from finding satisfaction of the third Rhines requirement,

the Court finds good cause to hold the amended petition in abeyance.

That good cause is supplied by Pace, 544 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1807.

“A petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing

would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to

file [a mixed petition] in federal court.” Id. at ___, 125 S. Ct.

at 1813. This Court already has found there is reasonable confusion

about the timeliness standards pertinent to Howard’s state exhaustion

petition when it determined in the May 30, 1997 order that any preClark untimeliness default is not adequate to bar federal review. The

Court acknowledges and rejects the Warden’s separate argument that

because of the 1996 sanctions order, Howard wasn’t confused about

timeliness requirements for state claims. First, as already

explained, the 1996 order was not based on lack of diligence in the

development of federal claims and the exhaustion of state remedies.

Second, even if the Court had found lack of diligence, there is no

connection between failure to pursue claims and being confused about

timeliness standards under California habeas rules.

Nor are there any equitable considerations which detract from

permitting abeyance. The Warden’s citation to Pace, 544 U.S. at ___-

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 21 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

93dp5726OReAPetn.How.wpd 22

___, 125 S. Ct. at 1814-15, for elucidation about equitable principles

relates to the availability of equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. As the Court declines to enter any order about equitable

tolling, the Warden’s argument is inapposite. Abeyance under Rhines

for Howard’s amended petition is authorized.

IV. Order.

Howard’s request for an order permitting him to back-file his

amended petition nunc pro tunc to April 23, 1997 is denied. The Court

accepts the filing of the amended petition as of the date it was

provided to the Court, on November 1, 2005. The Court further holds

in abeyance federal proceedings, except for the filing of quarterly

status reports as hereinafter provided. During the pendency of state

exhaustion proceedings, Howard shall advise this Court of the progress

of state proceedings by filing status reports on a quarterly basis

beginning March 1, 2006, and continuing every three months thereafter

until the state proceedings are concluded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2006 

 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

Robert E. Coyle

 United States District Judge

Case 1:93-cv-05726-LJO Document 143 Filed 02/28/06 Page 22 of 22