Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00956/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00956-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JDDL-K

WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David S. Martinez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Unit Manager Meier, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-956-PHX-MHM (ECV)

ORDER

On May 4, 2009, Plaintiff David S. Martinez, who is confined in the Corrections

Corporation of America’s La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, Arizona, filed a pro se civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis. In a June 18, 2009 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and

dismissed with Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that cured

the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

On July 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Application for Enlargement of Time to Amend

Complaint, seeking an extension of time to file his amended complaint. In an August 11,

2009 Order, the Court granted Plaintiff's Application, giving him until August 18th to file his

first amended complaint.

On August 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. #8). The

Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend.

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I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

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In his original Complaint, Plaintiff named Corrections Corporation of America as a

defendant. However, Plaintiff does not list Corrections Corporation of America as a

Defendant in the caption of his First Amended Complaint or in the list of Defendants on the

second page of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Thus, Corrections Corporation of

America is no longer a defendant in this action, and the Court will disregard any references

to “Defendant CCA” in the body of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. See Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (a first amended complaint supersedes the

original complaint; after amendment, the Court will treat an original complaint as

nonexistent). Moreover, there is only one Plaintiff in this action—Plaintiff David S.

Martinez—and, therefore, the Court will disregard any references to “Plaintiff Torrez” in the

First Amended Complaint.

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required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend because the First Amended

Complaint may possibly be saved by amendment.

II. First Amended Complaint

In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants Unit Manager Meier,

Lieutenant Johnson, “Unknown Officer(s),” and "Unknown Medical Staff."1

Plaintiff claims that he arrived at the La Palma Correctional Center and submitted

under duress to tuberculosis testing after Defendants Meier, Johnson, and an unknown officer

verbally threatened to physically restrain inmates and place inmates in segregation if they

refused to submit to testing. 

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy

because he was forced to participate in the tuberculosis testing. He claims Defendants Meier

and Johnson “intruded . . . into a clinic area designed for private medical screening for

inmates . . . with the intent to forcefully coerce [P]laintiff Martinez, and other inmates . . .

to accept unwarranted and/or excessive medical treatment.” He asserts that Plaintiff Meier

used excessive and unjustifiable verbal threats and that Defendant Johnson’s presence was

“not standard procedure and was maintained contrary to [P]laintiff Martinez’[s] objection.”

He also alleges that Defendant Unknown Medical Staff, who is a nurse practitioner,

“improperly and negligently and with intent to deny [P]laintiff Martinez of his right to

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privacy” injected Plaintiff with the tuberculosis test without Plaintiff’s express or implied

consent.

In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment,because

Defendants Meier, Johnson, and Unknown Male Staff exposed Plaintiff to “substantial risk

of harm with indifference to the risk by instigating a riot using unwarranted combative

language” towards the inmates in the clinic waiting room. Plaintiff contends that when the

inmates became agitated as a result of Defendants Meier, Johnson, and Unknown Male

Staff’s statements, Defendants threatened to call the Special Operation Response Team to

control the inmates with pepper spray and physical restraint.

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate medical care, in violation

of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, because Defendant Unknown Medical Staff

(the nurse practitioner) “improperly and negligently and with intentional misconduct” denied

Plaintiff the right to decline medical treatment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Unknown

Medical Staff ordered Plaintiff to extend his arm, after Plaintiff verbally objected to the test

because he had tested positive for tuberculosis for 14 years, and then injected Plaintiff after

Plaintiff’s “express objection.”

In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, monetary damages, and his

costs of suit.

III. Failure to State a Claim

A. Count One—Right to Privacy

“The applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns on ‘whether the person invoking

its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’

that has been invaded by government action.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984)

(quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). “A right of privacy in traditional

Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual

surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal

order.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28. 

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Any restriction on an inmate’s privacy interests is justified to the extent that it is

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89

(1987). Prisons can restrict privacy rights“to the extent necessary to further the correctional

system’s legitimate goals and policies.” Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir.

1985). The plaintiff “‘bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate

correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains.’” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283,

1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff fails to describe any facts to support that he had an expectation of privacy in

not being subjected to a tuberculosis test or that receiving the test was not reasonably related

to legitimate penological interests. Tuberculosis is a highly contagious disease in prison

populations and screening is necessary to prevent outbreaks. See DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d

525, 527 (8th Cir. 1990). Diagnosing and preventing disease and protecting the health of

inmates are legitimate penological goals. See Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d

1439, 1447 (9th Cir.1989) (“County’s interest of diagnosing severe medical problems to

prevent transmission of serious disease among the general jail population is sufficiently

compelling to preclude a finding that [forced blood tests and x-rays] are unreasonable within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to

support that Defendants Meier and Johnson’s presence in the clinic or Defendant Johnson’s

presence during the test was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 

Finally, “[v]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional

deprivation[.]’” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Collins

v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)). Therefore, the Court will dismiss without

prejudice Count One.

B. Count Two—Threat to Safety

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of inmates, and officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence

at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); Hearns v.

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The inmate must show that the deprivation

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is “objectively, sufficiently serious,” and that the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable

state of mind,” acting with deliberate indifference. Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040 (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that

the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety; the official must both

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and the official must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

 Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that Defendants Meier, Johnson, or Unknown

Male Staff knew of, but disregarded, a substantial threat to Plaintiff’s safety. To the

contrary, Plaintiff alleges that, when Defendants saw that the inmates were becoming

agitated, Defendants took steps to control the inmates by informing them that Defendants

would call the Special Operation Response Team to control the inmates with pepper spray

and physical restraints. No riot occurred. Plaintiff therefore has failed to state a claim for

a threat to his safety. The Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Two.

C. Count Three—Inadequate Medical Care

Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states

a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating

that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent.

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know

of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and

he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference in the

medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain

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or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies,

delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the

prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does

not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). The indifference must be substantial. The action

must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-

06.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Unknown Medical Staff forced Plaintiff to submit

to the tuberculosis test without Plaintiff’s consent because Defendant Unknown Medical

Staff ordered Plaintiff to extend his arm after Plaintiff objected to the test on the ground that

he had tested positive for tuberculosis for 14 years. Plaintiff has failed to suggest that he was

subjected to a wanton infliction of pain or that Defendant Unknown Medical Staff knew of

and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff’s allegations in Count Three

do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Therefore, the Court will dismiss without

prejudice Count Three.

IV. Leave to Amend

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may

submit a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of

Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a second amended complaint.

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If Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the second amended

complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff.

A second amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint and First Amended

Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will

treat the original Complaint and First Amended Complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d

at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original Complaint or First Amended

Complaint is waived if it is not raised in a second amended complaint. King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

V. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice

to Plaintiff.

D. Possible “Strike”

Because the First Amended Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim,

if Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in

this Order, the dismissal will count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(g). Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal

a civil judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

E. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the

Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. #8) is dismissed for failure to state

a claim. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a second amended

complaint in compliance with this Order.

(2) If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk

of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with

prejudice that states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(3) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a civil

rights complaint by a prisoner.

DATED this 21st day of September, 2009.

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