Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02204/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02204-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFFORD L. SASSELLI, No. CIV S-06-2204-GEB-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JIM PENA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action alleging various

due process violations by employees of the United States Forest Service. 

This action proceeds on the first amended complaint filed on April 26, 2007. 

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Pena, Caston, Smolden, Heydon, and

Christofferson. All defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities. On May

17, 2007, the court determined that the amended complaint stated a cognizable claim for relief

against defendant Christofferson and directed plaintiff to submit documents to the United States

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On June 1, 2007, a notice of submission of documents was filed. It is not clear, 1

however, whether plaintiff submitted service documents to the court or directly to the United

States Marshal as directed in the May 17, 2007, order. If plaintiff has not submitted documents

directly to the United States Marshal, he should do so immediately. 

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Marshal for service of process on this defendant. The court now addresses the remaining 1

defendants in more detail. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court is also required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under these screening

provisions, the court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B) and

1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h), this court must

dismiss an action “[w]henever it appears . . . that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 

matter . . . .” Because plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court

will screen the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). 

Plaintiff’s first claim is directed against defendant Pena, who is a supervisor with

the National Forest Service. Plaintiff alleges:

Defendant J. Pena was or should have been aware of or informed

of the coercive and unreasonable acts and omissions of defendants J.

Caston, Rodney Smolden, Karen Heydon, and Tricia Christofferson,

proper supervision of the named Defendants would or should have

prevented the stated violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights. 

Supervisory personnel, such as defendant Pena, are generally not liable for the

actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that

there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the

constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or had actual knowledge of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See id. 

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When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Here, the amended complaint alleges that defendant Pena “was or should have

been aware” of the alleged conduct of other defendants he supervised. As outlined above, this is

insufficient because supervisory liability requires actual participation or actual knowledge. In

this case, plaintiff has not alleged either. Because there is nothing in the amended complaint

beyond the conclusory allegation that defendant Pena should be liable solely by virtue of his role

as a supervisor, it does not appear that this pleading defect can be cured by amendment. 

Specifically, there are no facts alleged elsewhere in the complaint to suggest actual knowledge or

participation by defendant Pena. Defendant Pena should be dismissed. 

Plaintiff’s second claim is directed against defendant Smolden. The allegations

are as follows:

At all times relative to this complaint defendant R. Smolden

arbitrarily and capriciously defied not just the law, but common sense and

fundamental fairness.

On February 5, 2004, Plaintiff was notified by certified mail

acting District Ranger R .Smolden that listed key items of Plaintiff’s

Mineral Processing Equipment was impounded in place. Plaintiff was

offered 90 days or no later than midnight May 9, 2004, to remove said

equipment from U.S. Forest Service lands or said equipment would be

confiscated and sold at auction.

Defendant R. Smolden was surely aware of the fact that any

significant snow pack would close the 14 mile road to the mine from

January to Late May.

Defendant R. Smolden violated Plaintiff’s Civil Rights under the

Due Process clause. 

Due process requires that certain procedures be followed to ensure that

government action is fair. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged that required procedures were not

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In his third claim, plaintiff alleges that he sent a letter requesting an extension due 2

to heavy snow to defendant Caston. He does not, however, allege that he sent the same letter to

defendant Smolden. 

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followed or that the procedures themselves are unfair. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that specific

procedures were followed – he was sent a letter by certified mail and he was given 90 days to

respond. Plaintiff does not allege that other procedures were required but not followed. 

Moreover, plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Smolden “was surely aware” does not equate to

an allegation that he was actually aware. As such, the key component of plaintiff’s claim against

defendant Smolden is purely speculative and conclusory. Defendant Smolden should be 2

dismissed. 

Plaintiff third claim is directed against defendant Caston. Plaintiff alleges:

On April 26, 2004, Plaintiff sends certified mail to Defendant J.

Caston requesting an amendment to Plaintiff’s 1998 Plan of Operation,

said amendment reflects further downsizing of operations, said letter to J.

Cason also contains a request to restart the impoundment and redemption

period due to snow preventing access to Plaintiff’s Helms Deep Mining

Claim.

On April 27, 2004 (1 day later), Plaintiff received Defendant J.

Caston’s response to Plaintiff’s April 26 letter with total denial of the

amendment of 1998 Plan and the request to restart impoundment time. 

By Defendant J. Caston’s arbitrary and capricious action of not

restarting the time to redeem said equipment he is in fact withholding it

from Plaintiff “the entitled party,” thereby denying the Plaintiff’s Due

Process Rights (emphasis in original). 

Initially, the court observes that plaintiff’s claim against defendant Cason relates to his denial of

plaintiff’s request to extend the 90-day cure period. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant

Caston violated his due process rights with respect to amendment of the 1998 plan. In addition,

the court notes that plaintiff’s due process claim goes to property interests given that plaintiff

alleges that defendant Caston improperly withheld his property. 

The key allegation against defendant Caston is that he was “arbitrary and

capricious” in not extending the 90-day cure period. Again, as with defendant Smolden, plaintiff

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While plaintiff alleges that the sign was placed without notice, suggesting a 3

potential procedural due process violation, plaintiff does not allege that the lack of notice caused

him harm. Rather, it is the notice itself which plaintiff alleges resulted in the theft of his

property.

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has not stated a claim based on deprivation of procedural due process guarantees – he has not

alleged that procedures were not followed. Rather, he takes issue with the result of the

procedures that were followed – the denial of his requested extension. In addition, the allegation

that defendant Caston was “arbitrary and capricious” is conclusory in that plaintiff does not state

the reason defendant Caston denied the request, which would have been recited in the April 27,

2004, letter. Defendant Caston should be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s fourth claim is directed against defendant Christofferson. The court

has determined that service is appropriate for this defendant. Plaintiff claims that this defendant

violated his due process rights by authorizing a private contractor to remove equipment parts and

steel from plaintiff’s claim, which were authorized to remain on the claim until November 30,

2005. 

Plaintiff’s fifth claim is directed against defendant Heydon. Plaintiff alleges:

Defendant K. Heydon in her official capacity as acting District

Ranger arbitrarily and capriciously without notice or due process to

Plaintiff posted a large “abandoned Mine Hazards” sign on a tree next to

Plaintiff’s 4' diameter steel lined and capped mine shaft. The sign listed

five hazards – none of which existed, and furthermore, the mine was and

is not abandoned. This reckless act effectively opened the Plaintiff’s mine

to thievery, resulting in the loss of a great deal of equipment and tools.

The gravamen of plaintiff’s claim against defendant Heydon is that placement of the sign

resulted in plaintiff’s equipment being stolen. This does not state a due process claim against 3

defendant Heydon because she cannot be held responsible for the intervening and unexpected

acts of third parties who stole plaintiff’s property. Moreover, plaintiff does not explain how

simply posting the sign made plaintiff’s property more vulnerable to theft. Defendant Heydon

should be dismissed.

/ / /

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Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that defendants Pena,

Smolden, Caston, and Heydon be dismissed and that this action proceed against defendant

Christofferson only.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 8, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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