Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00542/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00542-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOE S. McCLENTON, #240601, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11-cv-542-TMH

) [WO] 

)

KIM THOMAS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Joe S. McClenton

(“McClenton”), an indigent state inmate, challenging the response of medical personnel to an

issue with his defibrillator and the adequacy of treatment provided to him for a bilateral hernia

during his incarceration at the Bullock Correctional Facility (“Bullock”). McClenton also

1

brings an Eighth Amendment claim asserting that all areas of Bullock are not accessible to him

as a wheelchair-bound inmate. McClenton names Kim Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama

Department of Corrections, Kenneth Jones, the warden of Bullock, Sylvester Nettles, a

correctional officer at Bullock, Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (“CMS”), Dr. Tahir Siddiq

and Nurse Emma Nalls, as defendants in this cause of action. McClenton seeks declaratory

relief, monetary damages, and injunctive relief for the alleged violations of his constitutional

rights.

A bilateral hernia occurs when a hernia develops on each side of the groin. 1

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The defendants filed special reports and relevant supporting evidentiary materials,

including affidavits and certified medical records, addressing McClenton’s claims for relief.

Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to construe the

aforementioned reports as motions for summary judgment. Order of September 1, 2011 - Doc.

No. 21. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

Upon consideration of these motions, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the

plaintiff’s responses, the court concludes that the defendants’ motions for summary judgment

are due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for summary

2

judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discoverymaterials

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 2

summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent

stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally

applicable to the current rule. 

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and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -]

of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet

this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing

that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case

on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists.

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits,

relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion

and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant

is entitled to it.”). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg,

498 F.3d at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities [and medical personnel]. Unless a

prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to

allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment

stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to survive

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the defendants’ properly supported motions for summary judgment, McClenton is required to

produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting his

claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable

. . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50. “A

mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must

be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v.

Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242). Conclusory

allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of

material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield

v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . . , in the

absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”);

Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate

where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of

the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“mere verification

of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment”); Evers

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations

without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails

to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial,

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322

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(“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th

Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to

require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74 Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d

th

1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable

to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and Family

Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are material under the

substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere

existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute

is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine

dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

[dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which

can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is

proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

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evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite

material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.

2001) (to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, nonmoving party must produce evidence

such that reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant

does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material

fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the

plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles

of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, McClenton fails to demonstrate a requisite

genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

3

A. Absolute Immunity - Correctional Defendants

To the extent McClenton sues defendants Thomas, Jones, and Nettles in their official

capacities, they are immune from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all

respects other than name, ... treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has

Although in response to the defendants’ special reports McClenton presented more specific claims and 3

supporting facts with respect to his initial grounds for relief, this court limits its review to the allegations set forth in the

complaint. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald &Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff may not amend [his]

complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”); Ganstine v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 502 F.

App’x 905, 909-10 (11th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff may not amend complaint at the summary judgment stage by raising a new

claim or presenting a new basis for a pending claim); Chavis v. Clayton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 300 F.3d 1288, 1291 n.4 (11th

Cir. 2002) (court refused to address a newtheory raised during summary judgment because the plaintiff had not properly

amended the complaint). 

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waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984), or Congress has

abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S. Ct.

1114, 1125, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity,see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted),

and Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are

immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe

Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997).

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that defendants Thomas, Jones, and Nettles are state

actors entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking

monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson

v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471

(11th Cir. 1989).

B. Individual Capacity Claims Against the Correctional Defendants

1. Wheelchair Accessability. McClenton alleges that defendants Thomas, Jones, and

Nettles subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment

because Bullock “is not in compliance with handicap standards.” Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 3.

The correctional defendants deny that the conditions at Bullock violated McClenton’s

constitutionalrights protected by the Eighth Amendment. In response to the allegation presented

by McClenton regarding wheelchair access, defendant Jones avers that

Bullock Correctional Facility is handicap accessible. All areasthat accommodate

inmate traffic (Dormitories, Dining Hall, Hallways, Gymnasium, Chapel, etc.[)],

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are located inside a building with a solid concrete floor and doorways wide

enough to allow wheelchair passage. Five (5) dormitories atBullock Correctional

Facility have not only handicap accessibility, but have bathroom/shower areas

with wheelchair accessibility and handrails for the showers and toilets. One (1)

dormitory has a fold-down seat in the shower area to accommodate the physically

impaired.

Attachment 1 to the Supplemental Special Report of the Correctional Defendants (Exhibit 5) -

Doc. No. 35-1 at 1.

Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards

of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Eighth Amendment,

therefore, proscribesthose conditions of confinement which involve the wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain. Id. at 346. Only actions which deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities” are grave enough to establish constitutional violations. Id. at 347. The

Eighth Amendment is concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or

sanitation” or “other conditionsintolerable for prison confinement.” Id. at 348 (citation omitted).

Conditions which may be “restrictive and even harsh, [ ] are part of the penalty that criminal

offenders pay for their offenses against society” and, therefore, do not necessarily constitute

cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Id. “‘[T]he

Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.’ If prison conditions are merely ‘restrictive

and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society.’ Generally speaking, prison conditions rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation only when they ‘involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.’” Chandler v.

Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Although the

Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . neither does it permit inhumane ones.”

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). Thus, it is

well-settled that the conditions under which a prisoner is confined are subject to constitutional

scrutiny. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).

A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to “provide humane conditions

of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmatesreceive adequate food, clothing,shelter,

and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)); Helling,

509 U.S. at 31-32. The challenged prison condition must be “extreme” and must pose “an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,

1289-90 (11th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions

of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834. In Farmer, the Court identified both objective and subjective elements necessary

to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. With respect to the requisite objective elements,

an inmate must first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. Second,

once it is established that the official is aware of this substantial risk, the official must react to

this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh, 268 F.3d 1028-29. As to the

subjective elements, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The

Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual

‘punishments.’ . . . [A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be

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condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 (emphasis added);

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838)

(“Proof that the defendant should have perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient.”); Cottrell

v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue “must involve

more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and

wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited

by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with

establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control

over a tumultuous cellblock.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (emphasis added).

To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been “subjectively

aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a ‘“sufficiently

culpable state of mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1977-80;

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271

(1991). . . . Even assuming the existence of a serious risk of harm and legal

causation, the prison official must be aware of specific facts from which an

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists - and the

prison official must also “draw that inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.

Ct. at 1979.

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). “The known risk of injury must be

a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [the responsible official’s] failure to act

can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)

(citations and internal quotations omitted). As the foregoing makes clear, “[m]erely negligent

failure to protect an inmate . . . does not justify liability under section 1983.” Id.

McClenton challenges wheel chair accessibility at Bullock. He fails to establish,

however, that the challenged conditions have caused him serious harm and it is clear from his

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pleadings that he is able to access all areas of Bullock necessary to maintain his health and well

being without suffering the requisite harm. McClenton has also failed to produce evidence

which shows that the correctional defendants ignored an obvious risk of serious harm to him of

which they were aware and nevertheless disregarded, Farmer 511 U.S. at 837, or that the actions

of the correctional defendants resulted in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

In addition, McClenton’s allegation of wheelchair inaccessibility at Bullock and his

purely conclusory contention that this purported lack of access is inadequate, standing alone, do

not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. Instead, McClenton

must show that the conditions complained of deprived him of essential food, medical care,

sanitation or other necessities. Id. His general allegation fails to make this showing and there

is no indication or evidence that McClenton was deprived of access to facilities when needed or

that the challenged conditions otherwise deprived him of basic needs, posed a risk to his health

or subjected him to a substantial risk of serious harm, nor that correctional officials exhibited

deliberate indifference to any known risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The mere fact that

some areas of Bullock may not accommodate a wheelchair is insufficient to demonstrate a

constitutional violation and, without more, do not do so in this case. Consequently, summary

judgment on this claim is due to be granted in favor of defendants Thomas, Jones and Nettles.

2. Medical Treatment. The claim made against defendants Thomas, Jones and Nettles

challenging the constitutionality of treatment provided by medical professionalslikewise entitles

McClenton to no relief as

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[t]he law does not impose upon correctional officials a duty to

directly supervise health care personnel, to set treatment policy for

the medical staff or to intervene in treatment decisions where they

have no actual knowledge that intervention is necessary to prevent

a constitutional wrong. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th

Cir. 1977) (a medical treatment claim cannot be brought against

managing officers of a prison absent allegations that they were

personally connected with the alleged denial of treatment).

Moreover, “supervisory [correctional] officials are entitled to rely

on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible

for prisoner care. See, e.g., Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69

(3d Cir. 1993); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir.

1988).” Williams v. Limestone County, Ala., 198 F[. App’x] 893,

897 (11th Cir. 2006).

Cameron v. Allen, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

To the extent McClenton seeks relief from defendants Thomas, Jones and Nettles due to

their positions as correctional officials for the treatment furnished to him by medical personnel,

assuming arguendo the aforementioned defendants exerted some authority over the manner in

which those personsresponsible for the provision of medical treatment rendered such treatment,

the law is well settled “that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or vicarious liability].”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (citing Robertson v. Sichel,

127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances

or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the

subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of

his official duties”)). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676; Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d

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1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.”); Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001) (A supervisory official

“can have no respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim.”); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325

F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir.

1999) (citing Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994)) (42 U.S.C. § 1983

does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates

under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability). “Absent vicarious liability,

each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Thus, liability for medical treatment provided to

McClenton could attach to defendants Forniss and Thomas only if they “personally participate[d]

in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between [their] actions

. . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.

McClenton, however, has presented no evidence, nor can the court countenance the

existence of any evidence, which would create a genuine issue of disputed fact with respect to

the claim of deliberate indifference by defendants Thomas, Jones, and Nettles. The record is

devoid of evidence indicating that these defendants personally participated in or had any

involvement, direct or otherwise, with the medical treatment provided to McClenton; rather, it

is undisputed that Thomas, Jones, and Nettles did not participate in the provision of treatment

to McClenton. The evidentiary materials before the court demonstrate that medical personnel

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made all decisions relative to the course of treatment provided to McClenton and that they

provided treatment to McClenton in accordance with their professional judgment upon

assessment of his condition.

In light of the foregoing, defendants Thomas, Jones, and Nettles can be held liable for

decisions of medical personnel only if their actions bear a causal relationship to the purported

violation of McClenton’s constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and

therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Thomas, Jones, and Nettles,

McClenton must present sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either “a

history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [the defendant] on notice of the need to correct the

alleged deprivation, and [he] fail[ed] to do so” or “a . . . custom or policy [that] result[ed] in

deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or . . . facts [that] support an inference that

[Forniss] directed the [facility’s health care staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff]

would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360

(internal punctuation and citations omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and evidentiary

materials submitted in this case demonstrates that McClenton has failed to meet this burden.

The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference that

Thomas, Jones, or Nettles directed medical personnel to act unlawfully or knew that they would

act/acted unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, McClenton has presented no

evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the face of which the

defendants failed to take corrective action; instead, the undisputed medical records indicate that

McClenton had continuous accessto medical personnel and received treatment for his condition.

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Finally, the undisputed medical records demonstrate that the challenged course of medical

treatment did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by the correctional defendants. Thus, the

requisite causal connection does not exist in this case and liability under the custom or policy

standard is not warranted. Cf. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Turner v. Safely,

482 U.S. 78 (1987). Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of defendants

Thomas, Jones, and Nettles. Furthermore, even had McClenton presented a proper basis for the

claims lodged against these defendants, the medical records before the court indicate that health

care personnel did not act with deliberate indifference to McClenton’s medical needs.

C. Deliberate Indifference by Medical Personnel

McClenton asserts that beginning in February of 2011 and continuing until the time he

filed this complaint in July of 2011 medical personnel at Bullock ignored his complaints

regarding a defibrillator malfunction and failed to provide him adequate treatment for his hernia

condition. Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 2-3. The medical defendants adamantly deny they acted with

deliberate indifference to McClenton’s medical needs. In support of this assertion, the

defendants maintain they provided medical treatment to McClenton in accordance with their

professional judgment, including issuance of medical profiles to permit limited activity and

provide access to both a walking cane and wheelchair, issuance of prescriptions for medication

to alleviate his pain, scheduling McClenton appointments with a free-world cardiologist for

evaluation of complications associated with the defibrillator and referral to a free-world surgeon

for surgical repair of his bilateral hernia.

To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of adequate medical treatment, an

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inmate must, at a minimum, show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254

(11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871

F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).

Specifically, medical personnel may not subject an inmate to “acts or omissions sufficiently

harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;

Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotations omitted)

(As directed by Estelle, a plaintiff must establish “not merely the knowledge of a condition, but

the knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the

acknowledged necessary] treatment.”

That medical malpractice-negligence by a physician-is insufficient to form the

basis of a claim for deliberate indifference is well settled. See Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 105-07, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976); Adams v. Poag,

61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995). Instead, something more must be shown.

Evidence must support a conclusion that a prison physician’s harmful acts were

intentional or reckless. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-38, 114 S. Ct.

1970, 1977-79, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,

1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that deliberate indifference is equivalent of

recklessly disregarding substantial risk of serious harm to inmate); Adams, 61

F.3d at 1543 (stating that plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to assert

an Eighth Amendment violation); Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr.,

40 F.3d 1176, 1191 n.28 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Supreme Court has

defined “deliberate indifference” asrequiring more than mere negligence and has

adopted a “subjective recklessness” standard from criminal law); Qian v. Kautz,

168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating “deliberate indifference” is synonym

for intentional or reckless conduct, and that “reckless” conduct describes conduct

so dangerous that deliberate nature can be inferred).

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).

In order to properly establish “deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . . ,

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Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to

that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser

Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking relief based on deliberate

indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively serious need, an objectively

insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual

inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d

at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to

the prisoner). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164,

168 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just

knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of

deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he

should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be

condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate

indifference, . . . the Supreme Court has . . . emphasized that not ‘every claim by

a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation

of the Eighth Amendment.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S. Ct. at 291; Mandel,

888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth amendment only when it

is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or

to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation

omitted). Mere incidents of negligence or malpractice do not rise to the level of

constitutional violations. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292 (‘Medical

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malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim

is a prisoner.’); Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical

malpractice ‘not sufficient’ to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871

F.2d at 1033 (mere medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate

indifference). Nor does a simple difference in medical opinion between the

prison’s medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of

treatment support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871

F.2d at 1033 (citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)).

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation and

internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that [the] defendants’ response to the need was more than “merely

accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice

actionable under state law.”). Moreover, “as Estelle teaches, whether government actorsshould

have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of

a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability

under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896,

898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not

give rise to a constitutional violation.”); Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.

1985) (mere fact inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to

deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9th Cir. 1981) (prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because

their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient). Selfserving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory,

contemporaneously created medical records. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.

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1990).

The affidavits filed by the medical defendants address the claims made by McClenton

alleging a lack of adequate medical treatment. A thorough review of the evidentiary materials

filed in this case demonstrates that these affidavits are corroborated by the objective medical

records compiled contemporaneously with treatment provided to McClenton relative to the

instant claims of deliberate indifference. Dr. Siddiq addresses McClenton’s allegations, in

pertinent part, as follows:

As evident from Mr. McClenton’s medical records, Mr. McClenton has

been diagnosed with a long list of chronic medical conditions, including diabetes,

hyperlipidemia, chronic constructive pulmonary disease and hypertension. Mr.

McClenton has relied upon a defibrillator implanted in his chest since

approximately May of 2005. It should be noted that a defibrillator is not a

pacemaker. In layman’s terms, a defibrillator is intended to shock the heart in the

event that the heart ceases to function, while a pacemaker ensures that the heart

continues to function in a particular manner. Mr. McClenton also has a history

of colon cancer and colon polyps with a possible previous colon restriction.

Because of his medical condition, Mr. McClenton has been on medical hold since

as early as October 14, 2010.

Mr. McClenton began relying upon a walking cane as early as September

of 2009. Thus, Mr. McClenton’s limited mobility and his use of a walking cane

existed long before any of the medical conditions listed in his Complaint in this

case, as evident from the fact that he received a “profile” for a walking cane as

early as March of 2010. A profile is simply a physician’s order which permits an

inmate to utilize approved medical devices and otherwise deviate from the

standard operating procedures and protocols [for inmate activity] established by

the Alabama Department of Corrections.

Prior to his incarceration at Bullock, Mr. McClenton initially developed

an inguinal hernia in approximately 2005 [while not confined in the prison

system]. I understand from communications from Mr. McClenton that his

inguinal hernia was evaluated by a physician at Huntsville Hospital in Huntsville,

Alabama during this time frame. According to Mr. McClenton, he refused to

undergo a procedure for the surgical repair of his hernia at that time. Therefore,

Mr. McClenton did exhibit a small inguinal hernia at the time of his arrival at

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Bullock.

Throughout the Fall of 2010, the Bullock medical staff routinely saw Mr.

McClenton regarding all of his complaints and concerns related to his medical

condition. Mr. McClenton complained of some discomfort in his chest as a result

of his defibrillator and [submitted] a sick-call request form dated October 17,

2010. Mr. McClenton was evaluated during sick call on October 19, 2010, at

which time he complained of pain in his shoulder. However, the exact nature of

his concerns were unclear at that time as his complaints were possibly related to

some muscular strain as opposed to some issue with his defibrillator.

Mr. McClenton complained of constipation in a November 1, 2010 sickcall request form. But, Mr. McClenton failed to appear for sick call [regarding

this complaint] on November 3, 2010.

Mr. McClenton complained of pain in his right side in a sick-call request

form dated November 13, 2010, and was evaluated later that day by the medical

staff who noted that the discomfort appeared to be associated with the inguinal

hernia. As indicated in the records from [McClenton’s examination by medical

personnel], Mr. McClenton’s hernia was small at the time and was reducible not

indicating any need for further evaluation or intervention. Mr. McClenton failed

[to] appear for another evaluation on November 15, 2010.

Mr. McClenton underwent an evaluation of his defibrillator by an off-site

cardiology specialist on November 17, 2010, at which time the outside specialist

indicated that there were no changes necessary to his device at that time.

Following the November 17, 2010 evaluation of McClenton’s defibrillator, he

wasinstructed to return to the off-site specialist in approximately three monthsfor

further evaluation.

Mr. McClenton submitted a sick-call request form dated December 11,

2010, requesting a support [harness] for his hernia. Mr. McClenton was evaluated

by the medical staff during sick call on December 12, 2010 at which time it was

evident that his hernia was increasing in size and he was instructed to utilize his

hernia support or “truss” to maintain the position of the hernia in hopes that the

hernia might resolve itself without surgical intervention.

Mr. McClenton was evaluated again during sick call on January 13, 2011,

relative to complaints regarding his hernia. At that time, McClenton complained

of pain in his side. The medical staff moved Mr. McClenton to the infirmary at

Bullock where he remained until he was evaluated by me later that afternoon.

Upon an evaluation of Mr. McClenton on January 13, 2011, I noted the

small inguinal hernia on his right side which was easily reducible and Mr.

McClenton only reported slight pain. Following the January 13, 2011, evaluation,

I indicated to Mr. McClenton that we would evaluate him for possible surgical

repair of his hernia. I subsequently ordered Mr. McClenton to continue the use

of a hernia support or “truss” to support [his hernia] and otherwise avoid any

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complications with his hernia.

I then completed the necessary paperwork to refer Mr. McClenton to an

offsite specialist for surgical evaluation of his hernia. Mr. McClenton attended

an appointment with an off-site surgeon on January 18, 2011 for evaluation of his

inguinal hernia. As indicated in the notes from the surgical specialist that

evaluated Mr. McClenton’s hernia, the surgeon expressed concern that the hernia

repair should not be completed until “after [] defibrillator addressed.”

When Mr. McClenton was evaluated by me on January 29, 2011, he did

not mention any complaints related to his defibrillator [but only referenced]

complaints of chest congestion and cold symptoms.

When I evaluated Mr. McClenton the very next day, Mr. McClenton

complained that his defibrillator had fired approximately three times over the past

24 hours. Following my evaluation of Mr. McClenton, I ordered certain lab work

and testing, including an EKG and informed Mr. McClenton that we would refer

him to a cardiologist if his defibrillator fired again. On January 31, 2011, Mr.

McClenton refused to undergo a chest x-ray as ordered by me.

[Upon referral by the medical staff at Bullock], Mr. McClenton attended

an appointment with a cardiologist at River Regional Cardiology Associates in

Montgomery, Alabama on February 3, 2011. As indicated in the notes from . . .

Dr. Mohammad L. Ahmed, a cardiologist with River Regional Cardiology

Associates, I was in regular consultation with [Dr. Ahmed] assoon as we realized

the complaints from Mr. McClenton related to his defibrillator. As indicated in

these notes, Mr. McClenton had demonstrated normal lab results and normal heart

rhythm. During the course of the evaluation [by Dr. Ahmed], there was a

discussion with Mr. McClenton relative to his wishes as to the device and Mr.

McClenton voiced his request that the current defibrillator be removed and

replaced. Dr. Ahmed confirmed [that] during the course of the evaluation on

February 3, 2011, that Mr. McClenton’s defibrillator was dysfunctional in certain

respects and required turning off, which was accomplished during the

appointment.

Upon hisreturn [to Bullock], I conducted an evaluation of Mr. McClenton

and [despite deactivation of the defibrillator during his appointment with the

cardiologist] he reported to me that his defibrillator had fired again. He also

reported tenderness at the site of his defibrillator. Therefore, following this

February 3, 2011, evaluation, I immediately completed the necessary paperwork

to continue to pursue Mr. McClenton’s continued care with the off-site

cardiologist, including the possible removal of his defibrillator. The following

day, February 4, 2011, Mr. McClenton [again] reported the firing of his

defibrillator. . . .

On February 10, 2011, CMS’s associate regional medical director

approved the replacement of the defibrillator consistent with Mr. McClenton’s

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wishes. On February 8, 2011, I received a letter from Dr. John Vermillion from

the Montgomery Surgical Specialists who had previously evaluated Mr.

McClenton [regarding possible surgical repair of his hernia]. In this letter, Dr.

Vermillion confirmed his recommendation that we “address [Mr. McClenton’s]

cardiac situation first and take care of the defibrillator before we proceed with

surgery on his inguinal hernia.”

On February 15, 2011, I completed the necessary documentation to

proceed with the evaluation of Mr. McClenton’s medical condition to evaluate the

current status of Mr. McClenton’s cardiac function. This . . . evaluation was

subsequently scheduled for March 2, 2011 at 11:00 a.m. at Dr. Ahmed’s office in

Montgomery, Alabama.

Mr. McClenton was evaluated by the medical staff [at Bullock] on

February 24, 2011, at which time they evaluated his condition and his request for

a new truss as well as additional profiles, though his current truss was performing

appropriately.

Mr. McClenton was evaluated by the medical staff during sick call on

March 2,2011, at which time he was provided a profile for a tub bath and referred

to me for further evaluation. Between March 2, 2011 and the present date

[August 29, 2011], the medical staff continued to evaluate Mr. McClenton’s

complaints on each occasion that he submitted a sick-call request form. However,

Mr. McClenton continued to fail to appear for sick call on many occasions when

he submitted a sick call request form. Throughout February and March of 2011,

I also evaluated Mr. McClenton on two occasions during which we discussed his

continuing issues with his defibrillator and his consultation with a cardiologist.

On February 24, 2011, Mr. McClenton complained of pain in his hernia and his

groin and requested pain medication and received medication for these

complaints.

For reasons unknown to the medical staff, Mr. McClenton was unable to

keep his March 2, 2011, appointment for pre-surgical evaluation at Dr. Ahmed’s

office. After being notified of this scheduling issue, Mr. McClenton was

subsequently scheduled for another appointment with Dr. Ahmed for March 23,

2011. Mr. McClenton underwent a stress test on March 23, 2011. As indicated

through this testing, the stress test undertaken by Mr. McClenton did indicate the

stability of his current cardiac function without assistance of a defibrillator.

According to the notes from the March 2[3], 2011 evaluation by Dr. Ahmed, Dr.

Ahmed indicated that he recommended extended discussions with medical

personnel at the University of Alabama [Hospital] in Birmingham relative to the

explantation of the device and also instructed the medical staff to have Mr.

McClenton return for a follow-up at approximately one month to “determine the

need for new [defibrillator].”

Upon his return from this appointment [with Dr. Ahmed], I entered orders

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to arrange defibrillator replacement. I also entered orders for Mr. McClenton to

return for another evaluation at Dr. Ahmed’s office on April 12, 2011 at 10:00

a.m.

As of April 5, 2011, Mr. McClenton did not voice any complaints to me

during his appointment regarding his hernia or his defibrillator.

Mr. McClenton returned for another appointment with the off-site

cardiologist on April 12, 2011. During the April 12, 2011, appointment with Dr.

Ahmed, Mr. McClenton and Dr. Ahmed discussed the processfor explantation of

his defibrillator device which would require one procedure to remove the device,

an interim evaluation to determine the necessity of implantation of a new device,

and if appropriate, another surgical procedure to implant a new device. As soon

as we received the recommendation from Dr. Ahmed in April of 2011, we

immediately began attempting to schedule the explantation procedure for Mr.

McClenton at UAB. However, we were unable to obtain an appointment for this

procedure prior to July 5, 2011. The request for explantation of the defibrillator

was approved by the associate regional medical director on June 13, 2011.

In an order dated June 27, 2011, I ordered Mr. McClenton to attend an

interim consultation with the medical staff at the University of Alabama in

Birmingham (“UAB”) while he awaited the procedure for explantation of his

defibrillator. On July 5, 2011, Mr. McClenton attended an appointment with a

cardiologist at UAB. As indicated in the documentation completed both by the

UAB cardiac surgeon and medical personnel [at Bullock] upon Mr. McClenton’s

return to the facility, Mr. McClenton wasinformed of the processfor explantation

of his device and he “chose to leave it in.” In particular, Mr. McClenton was

informed by the UAB cardiologist of the significant risks and concerns related to

the removal of the device, including uncontrollable bleeding. Mr. McClenton was

also made aware at that time that his defibrillator could remain implanted in his

chest without any meaningful harm to him. As indicated in my review of the offsite consultant report and the “return from offsite” form, I noted that there would

be “no need for any other procedure” after this appointment and that we would

follow-up with Mr. McClenton [at Bullock] as of July 5, 2011. On July 14, 2011,

I received approval to continue to refer Mr. McClenton to Dr. Ahmed for

continuing evaluations of his cardiac function.

I evaluated Mr. McClenton on July 7, 2011, at which time he indicated that

his hernia was creating additional problems in his mobility and therefore, I

ordered that he receive a wheelchair. I next evaluated Mr. McClenton on July 15,

2011, relative to his complaints regarding his inguinal hernia. During my course

of interaction with Mr. McClenton on July 15, 2011, I also attempted to discuss

his defibrillator situation with him, but Mr. McClenton refused to engage in any

discussion with me. As indicated in my notes from the July 15, 2011, evaluation,

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I informed Mr. McClenton that we would be pursuing surgical options for his

hernia given the recent resolution of hisissues with his defibrillator. In summary,

the final decision relative to Mr. McClenton’s defibrillator was the result of his

consultation with an off-site cardiologist and I was not involved in any way with

the decision to forego explantation of the defibrillator device.

On August 11, 2011, Mr. McClenton attended the follow-up appointment

with Dr. Ahmed who cleared him for surgical repair of his hernia and instructed

Mr. McClenton to follow-up with him 3 months after his hernia repair. Having

now obtained approval for this procedure, we are in the process of scheduling the

surgical repair procedure. However, due to security protocols, I cannot disclose

the timing or date and time of such surgical procedure.

Dr. Ahmed instructed [McClenton] to follow-up three months after his

pending surgery for his hernia repair. Throughout the course of Mr. McClenton’s

incarceration, we have entered certain profiles which allowed him to utilize a

hernia support and other medical devices to control any discomfort associated

with his medical conditions.

Throughout hisincarceration atBullock, Mr. McClenton has also attended

the chronic care clinics during which all of his current medical conditions were

[consistently] evaluated. Mr. McClenton also underwent regular lab testing to

evaluate his diabetic and other chronic medical conditions.

During the time when Mr. McClenton has been under my care, I have not

at any time ignored any request by Mr. McClenton for medical treatment. I have

not deliberately ignored any medical complaints made by Mr. McClenton or

interfered in any way with the provision of medical care to Mr. McClenton at any

time. . . . At all times during his incarceration at Bullock, I listened to Mr.

McClenton’s complaints, undertook thorough physical examinations of him and

provided medication when appropriate to control the symptoms which he

communicated to me. I can state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that

Mr. McClenton has received an extensive amount of medical attention for his

medical complaints.

Exhibit 1 to the Special Report of the Medical Defendants - Doc. No. 15-1 at 3-11 (internal

citations to medical records omitted) (emphasis in original). The medical records demonstrate

that McClenton underwent surgical repair of his bilateral hernia at Baptist Hospital South in

Montgomery, Alabama on September 12, 2011. Exhibit 1 to the October 10, 2011 Response of

the Medical Defendants - Doc. No. 28 at 6-7. During this procedure, Dr. Vermillion repaired

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both the left and right inguinal hernias. Id.

Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the course of treatment

undertaken by the medical defendants in addressing McClenton’s complaints regarding his

defibrillator and hernia did not violate his constitutional rights. The medical care McClenton

received was certainly not “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. The

allegations presented by McClenton simply fail to establish deliberate indifference by the

defendants. Garvin, 236 F.3d at 898 (difference of opinion regarding manner in which condition

should be treated fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545-46

(Whether medical personnel “should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms

of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an

appropriate basis” on which to ground constitutional liability. In addition, an inmate’s allegation

that prison physicians did not diligently pursue alternative means of treating condition “did not

‘rise beyond negligence’. . . to the level of deliberate indifference.”); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505

(inmate’s desire for some other form of medical treatment does not constitute deliberate

indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (simple divergence of

opinions between medical personnel and inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment).

It is undisputed that McClenton received treatment with respect to the deficient

performance of his defibrillator and for his bilateral hernia. It is likewise evident that the

defendantsrendered treatment to McClenton in accordance with their professional judgment and

pursuant to the recommendations of free-world specialists to whom McClenton was referred for

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evaluation of both his cardiac function and hernia condition. Moreover, McClenton has failed

to present any evidence which indicates the medical defendants knew that the manner in which

they provided treatment created a substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge

consciously disregarded such risk. The record is therefore devoid of evidence, significantly

probative or otherwise, showing that the medical defendants acted with deliberate indifference

to McClenton’s medical needs. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor

of CMS, Dr. Siddiq, and Nurse Nalls. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. No costs be taxed herein.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before September 3, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and,

therefore, it is not appealable.

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Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 1982); see Stein v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,

1981. 

Done this 20th day of August, 2014.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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