Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00674/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00674-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID SMITH,

Petitioner,

v.

A. P. KANE, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-674 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

David Smith, an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this pro

se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before

the court for consideration of the merits of the habeas petition. For the reasons discussed

below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Smith was convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court of second degree murder

and was found to have used a firearm in the offense. On February 22, 1988, he was

sentenced to a total of 17 years to life in prison. His habeas petition does not challenge his

conviction but instead challenges an June 14, 2005 decision of the Board of Parole Hearings

("BPH"), that found him not suitable for parole. The hearing was Smith's third subsequent

parole hearing and was held at a time when he was 18 years into his 17-to-life sentence. 

The BPH identified the circumstances of the commitment offense, Smith's history of

violent and assaultive conduct, his failure to sufficiently participate in beneficial self-help

programs such as an anger management program despite a previous recommendation that he

do so, and his inadequate parole plans as the reasons for its decision that his release would

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pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or threat to public safety. The BPH also noted

the opposition to parole by the district attorney's office. 

Smith sought relief in the California courts. The Los Angeles County Superior Court

denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in a reasoned decision. The California Court of

Appeal summarily denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The California Supreme

Court summarily denied his petition for review. 

Smith then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found

cognizable his claim that his right to due process was violated because the evidence was

insufficient to support the BPH's decision that he was unsuitable for parole. Respondent

filed an answer and Smith filed a traverse. Although it was not identified in the order to

show cause, the parties also briefed an Apprendi claim concerning the parole denial. 

The court had intended to wait for guidance from the anticipated en banc decision in

Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir.

2008). Although much time has passed, Hayward remains pending in the appellate court and

it is unknown to this court when the decision will be released. The court will proceed to

decide the merits of the petition without the benefit of the Hayward decision.

 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action concerns the execution of the sentence of a prisoner housed at a prison in Monterey

County, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claim asserted in the petition.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process

in the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442

U.S. 1 (1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the

entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached'" by the BPH. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and

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assures that 'the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law

in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. As a matter of state

law, the parole authority’s decision must also satisfy the "some evidence" standard of review. 

See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1191 (Cal. 2008) (state court "standard of review

properly is characterized as whether 'some evidence' supports the conclusion that the inmate

is unsuitable for parole because he or she currently is dangerous"). 

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets

the criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to

answer the question, "'some evidence' of what?"

B. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A

first degree murder conviction yields a minimum term of 25 years to life and a second degree

murder conviction yields a minimum term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal. 2005); Cal. Penal Code § 190. The upshot of

California's parole scheme described below is that a release date normally must be set unless

various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in

respect to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the

Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole

release dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the

panel "shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

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is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration

for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b).

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The

regulation also provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(a). The panel may consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of

crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix

of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years,

depending on some of the facts of the crime. The statutory scheme places individual

suitability for parole above a prisoner's expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to

ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is

not reached unless and until the prisoner is found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2403(a).

The "Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the fundamental

consideration in parole decisions is public safety . . . [T]he core determination of 'public

safety' under the statute and corresponding regulations involves an assessment of an inmate's

current dangerousness." Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205 (emphasis in source).2

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the parole authority's use of evidence

about the murder that led to the conviction. Three Ninth Circuit cases provide the guideposts

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for applying the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, and Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d

846 (9th Cir. 2007).3

 Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over time

as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and

requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued

reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct

prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system

and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the

initial denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the

prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . ., should Biggs

continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a

parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise

serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which

criticized the Biggs statements as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the

court: "Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future parole hearings

could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Sass determined that the parole board is not

precluded from relying on unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment

offense or the petitioner's pre-offense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id.

(commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support

denial of parole at subsequent parole consideration hearing). Sass also put to rest any idea

from Biggs that the commitment crime and pre-offense behavior only support the initial

denial of parole. Irons determined that due process was not violated by the use of the

commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny parole for a prisoner 16 years into

his 17-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that all three cases (Irons, Sass and Biggs) in

which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process, the decision

was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of years required by his

sentence." Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. Interpreting this statement from Irons to suggest that the

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offense can only be relied on until the minimum number of years has been reached would

suffer the same problem that Sass identified in Biggs: it is not the holding of the case. The

dicta in Biggs and Irons are speculative and do not determine when a denial of parole based

solely upon the commitment offense or pre-offense behavior violates due process. Neither

logic nor Irons compel a decision that such reliance must cease when the prisoner reaches the

minimum number of years in his sentence, such as the fifteenth year of a 15-to-life sentence.

The upshot of these three cases is that the BPH can look at immutable events, such as

the nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the

prisoner is not currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight

to be attributed to those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future

dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs and

Irons). Sass did not dispute the principle that, other things being equal, a murder committed

50 years ago is less probative of a prisoner's current dangerousness than one committed 10

years ago. Not only does the passage of time in prison count for something, exemplary

behavior and rehabilitation in prison count for something according to Biggs and Irons. 

Superintendent v. Hill's standard might be quite low, but it does require that the decision not

be arbitrary, and reliance on only the facts of the crime might eventually make for an

arbitrary decision.4

 C. Some Evidence Supports The BPH's Decision In Smith’s Case

1. BPH Decision

The BPH identified the circumstances of the commitment offense, Smith's history of

violent and assaultive conduct, his failure to sufficiently participate in beneficial self-help

programs such as an anger management program, and his inadequate parole plans as the

reasons for its decision that his release would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society

or threat to public safety. The BPH also noted the opposition to parole by the district

attorney's office. In its decision, the BPH noted that there were positive factors in favor of

Smith, most notably, that he had never received any CDC-115 rule violation reports and had

received only three CDC-128 counseling chronos (the last of which was in 1998 for a

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grooming issue). The BPH also noted that he had a generally supportive psychological

report, had no alcohol or substance abuse problem, had finished two vocational programs,

and had positive work evaluations. Nonetheless, the positive aspects of his behavior did not

outweigh the factors of unsuitability, in the BPH's view. The parole hearing was unusual in

that Smith opted not to attend because he did not want to be in the minimal restraints one of

the commissioners generally required for prisoners at parole hearings.

a. Commitment Offense

In finding Smith unsuitable, the BPH stated that the commitment offense “was carried

out in an especially callous manner," "demonstrates an exceptional callous disregard for

human suffering," and was done for an inexplicable and very trivial motive. Resp. Exh. 3,

6/14/05 BPH hearing reporter's transcript ("RT"), p. 42. The circumstances of the

commitment offense could be considered as tending to indicate unsuitability. See 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1).

The BPH read from the probation officer's report, which had described the crime. 

"On April 7, 1987 at 11:00 a.m., the defendant shot and killed the victim, his wife, at their

home. . . . While engaged in a verbal altercation with her, the defendant became angry and

pointed a loaded .44 caliber handgun at the victim. He pulled the trigger, fired one shot and

struck her in the neck." Resp. Exh. 2 at 2; RT 12-13. That probation officer's report also

stated that the victim's mother told the probation officer that her daughter had called her a

few months before the shooting and told her that "the defendant had been drinking a lot and

probably using drugs. Subsequently, he had beaten her several times." Resp. Exh. 2 at 3. 

The victim's mother also told the probation officer that when she came to Los Angeles

several months after the murder, "she was told by at least three people that the defendant had

pulled guns on them." Id. at 3-4. The autopsy report showed powder residue in the wound

that would indicate that the weapon was placed against the victim's body when fired. Id. at

13. When questioned by police, Smith initially told one story and then changed it, although

he apparently claimed consistently that he did not intend to shoot his wife, but only to

frighten her. Id.

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b. History Of Violent And Assaultive Conduct

The BPH also relied on Smith's record of violence and assaultive conduct in reaching

its decision that he was not suitable for parole. RT 43; see also RT 45 (noting Smith's history

of unstable relationships with others) There was evidentiary support for the BPH's concern

about Smith's conduct, even if it had not resulted in felony convictions. First, Smith had

been arrested in 1974 for assault with a deadly weapon and inflicting injury on his wife or

child. The district attorney rejected the charges, so there was no conviction. Resp. Exh. 2 at

5. Although the police department record had been destroyed, Smith told the probation

officer that he threatened his first wife with a stick and that his wife told police that he had

beaten her with a stick. Id Second, he had been arrested in 1983 for battery, hit and run with

property damage, and obstructing or resisting a peace officer. He resolved that case by

entering a no contest plea to misdemeanor hit and run. Id. According to the probation

officers' report, police officers went to Smith's home to investigate a report of a stolen

vehicle and, during the course of the investigation, advised Smith that he was a suspect and

would be cited. Smith reportedly "became agitated and told officers, 'get out of my house.'

[Smith] then pushed the officer and was restrained. Once under arrest for battery, [Smith]

was taken to the hit and run scene and identified by the victim." Id. Smith stated that he had

merely brushed by the officer as he moved away from his chair. Id. at 5-6. Third, as noted

earlier, the probation officer wrote that the victim's mother had told him that Smith

reportedly had beaten the victim several times in the months before the killing and that Smith

had pulled a gun on three different people. Id. at 3-4. 

Interestingly, this information provided evidence of a history of violent and assaultive

conduct as the BPH noted, even though Smith suffered no felony convictions. The probation

officer recognized the inconsistency as he stated that Smith had a "relatively minor known

criminal history" but both of his prior contacts with law enforcement "had elements of overly

aggressive and assaultive behavior." Id. at 13-14. The BPH reasonably could consider on

the underlying assaultive conduct as to which there was reliable evidence, even if it had not

resulted in a conviction for an assault. It is the violent or criminal activity more than the

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getting caught or punished that would be predictive of one's future dangerousness. 

c. Need For Further Self-Help Programming

In finding Smith unsuitable for parole, the BPH also relied on the fact that Smith "has

not sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help therapy programs such as anger

management." RT 43. The BPH noted that Smith had not taken anger management course

as recommended in the last BPH decision two years earlier. RT 44; see RT 25. In fact,

Smith had not done any self-help programming since 2000, even though he had done some in

the earlier years of his incarceration. RT 27, 29. The BPH's decision indicates that the selfhelp therapy, especially anger management programming, was related to this particular

inmate's history of violence and assaultive conduct. See RT 44-45, see also RT 30 and

Resp. Exh. 4 at 3 (Smith admitted to psychologist that "poor anger control, poor judgment,

and impulsivity contributed significantly to the instant offense"). 

d. Inadequate Parole Plans

The BPH also relied on Smith's inadequate parole plans in finding him unsuitable. RT

44. The specific concern was that Smith did not have a place to live or any job offer in

California. He had offers to live with family members in Maryland, but those would not help

him if he was paroled to a location in California. See RT 14, 17-18. He had a letter that

showed parole services of some sort existed in Los Angeles, but the nature of those services

was not stated at the hearing. RT 17. 

 2. State Court Decision

The Los Angeles County Superior Court rejected Smith's habeas petition in a reasoned

decision. Resp. Exh. 7. The court issued its ruling based on Smith's petition (with the

transcript attached) before respondent was ordered to file an answer. Consequently, the court

did not have the documentation that the BPH had considered. See Resp. Exh. 6. 

Understanding that the superior court had a limited record helps one understand some of the

statements in that court's decision, e.g., the statement that the record lacked sufficient

information for the court to determine whether the BPH mischaracterized the offense. 

The superior court noted the various factors that the BPH had relied on to find Smith

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unsuitable for parole, and then considered the suitability decision. The court noted that the

BPH had cited to confidential information, which is permissible under the regulations but

which could not be considered by the court in evaluating the some evidence claim because

the confidential information had not been discussed by the BPH "with sufficient detail for the

court to consider how it supported their decision." Resp. Exh. 7 at 2. The state court also

determined that the record regarding the circumstances of the murder was not sufficient for

the court to determine whether the BPH had some evidence to determine that Smith "acted in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.'" Id. at 2. The superior court apparently

relied on the statements in the parole hearing itself to find that there was some evidence of

earlier violence, unrealistic parole plans, insufficient self-help programming, and an unstable

social history. Based on a review of the record it had and giving deference to the broad

discretion of the parole board, the superior court concluded that "the record contains 'some

evidence' to support the Board's finding that Petitioner is unsuitable for parole." Id. at 1. 

3. Analysis Of Federal Claim

This court applies § 2254(d) to the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s decision

because it is the last reasoned decision from a state court on Smith's claim. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th

Cir. 2005). The superior court correctly identified the “some evidence” standard as the

applicable standard for judicial review, as evidenced by its citation to In re Rosenkrantz, 29

Cal. 4th 616 (Cal. 2002), which had cited and adopted the Superintendent v. Hill some

evidence standard as the proper standard for judicial review of evidentiary sufficiency for

administrative cases. See Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 665-67. 

The state court determined that the record regarding the circumstances of the murder

was not sufficient for the court to determine whether the Board had some evidence to

determine that Smith "acted in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.'" Id. at 2. 

Contrary to Smith's assertion, this was not a determination that there was insufficient

evidence that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner,

but instead was merely an acknowledgment that the record Smith had submitted to the

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superior court did not have enough information for the court to make the determination. The

record Smith submitted to the state court did not include the probation officer's report that

had additional details (such as that the victim was shot at very close range) beyond those in

the short description of the killing that the BPH commissioner read into the record. 

The superior court did find that there was some evidence a previous record of

violence, unrealistic parole plans, insufficient self-help programming, and an unstable social

history. Resp. Exh. 7 at 2. Unfortunately, the state court got one of the details wrong when

it stated that Smith's prior battery conviction provided some evidence that he had inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim; this was incorrect because there had been an

arrest for battery and other crimes but the case was resolved with a no-contest plea only to

misdemeanor hit-and-run. See RT 13; Resp. Exh. 2 at 5. Although the superior court

mistakenly stated there was a battery conviction, it correctly noted that there was evidence

about domestic violence problems Smith had with both his first and second wives, and

"towards three other individuals," which were the incidents the BPH commissioners

mentioned at the hearing as coming from the probation officer's report. See Resp. Exh. 7 at

3; RT 30, 32-33, 36. The superior court used this information as evidence of an unstable

social history, but this same evidence provides support for BPH's determination that he had a

record of assaultive or violent conduct. Whether considered in the category of an unstable

social history or in the category of assaultive/violent conduct, the evidence did exist and was

detrimental to Smith's parole chances. Further, the superior court's other determinations had

support in the record. Smith did not have "solidified parole plans in California," Resp. Exh.

7 at 3, because he planned to live with his brother but his brother had not sent a letter

extending any offer to house his brother even though other relatives on the East Coast said

Smith could live there. RT 18-20, 37. Smith had not attended anger management classes or

any self-help classes since the year 2000. See Resp. Exh. 7 at 3; RT 27, 29. 

 The superior court did not unreasonably apply Superintendent v. Hill in determining

that there was some evidence to support the BPH's decision. Notwithstanding some positive

factors for Smith, the BPH had determined that, 18 years into his 17-to-life sentence, Smith

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posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison because of the murder

plus his history of violent and assaultive conduct, his failure to sufficiently participate in

beneficial self-help programs, and his inadequate parole plans. There is a rational connection

between the evidence relied on and the decision that he is a current threat. Shooting one's

wife at point-blank range would qualify as an offense carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. The BPH was not

obliged to accept Smith's story that he had shot his wife by accident. Although the murder

was obviously a very large factor in its decision, the BPH did not rely solely on the murder

and instead properly relied on the murder plus a combination of several other factors. The

panel is authorized by regulation to consider all relevant and reliable information available to

it. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). Also, "[c]ircumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding

of unsuitability." Id. Bearing in mind that the court's chore is to consider not whether some

evidence supports the reasons, but whether some evidence supports the conclusion that

Smith's release unreasonably endangers public safety, this court concludes that the Los

Angeles County Superior Court's rejection of his insufficient evidence claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence

standard.

Smith argues that the state court wrongly denied him an evidentiary hearing to

develop the facts about his prior criminal activity. The place for Smith to present

information about the nature of the prior criminal episode was at the parole hearing, which he

chose not to attend. An evidentiary hearing would not have helped him because of the nature

of a "some evidence" claim: it requires the state court, like this court, to review whether there

was some evidence in the record available to the BPH to support the BPH's decision. For

example, on the question of whether he had engaged in a battery and had a battery

conviction, the issue for the state court was not whether Smith had committed a battery or

had a battery conviction but instead was whether there was evidence in the record before the

BPH that he had committed a battery or had a battery conviction. Smith also could not

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develop that kind of evidence here because this court's some evidence review has the same

limit as the state court's review. In any event, this court agrees that there is not evidence in

the record of a battery conviction: (a) the probation officer's report states that there was an

arrest for a battery but not a conviction for battery, (b) the BPH did not specifically state that

Smith had a battery conviction, and (c) the state superior court mistakenly said that the BPH

cited Smith's battery conviction as evidence that he had inflicted or attempted to inflict

serious injury on a victim. 

D. Apprendi Argument

Smith contends that the BPH's decision finding him unsuitable for parole increased his

punishment in violation of the rule in Apprendi in that the BPH used circumstances for which

there were not findings of fact by a jury. See Petition attachment, p. 4. This argument fails

because the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was not implicated, let alone violated, by

anything the BPH did in considering Smith's case. 

The rule from a line of cases that started with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), is that, "under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater

potential sentence [than the statutory maximum] must be found by a jury, not a judge, and

established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence." 

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281 (2007). The relevant statutory maximum "'is

not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional fact, but the

maximum he may impose without any additional findings." Id. at 274 (quoting Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 303-04 (2004)). 

Smith's Apprendi argument runs into the insurmountable hurdle that the statutory

maximum for his crime is life imprisonment. The maximum sentence allowed under

California law following a fact-finder's guilty verdict on the second degree murder charge is

life imprisonment. See Cal. Penal Code § 190. No additional facts need to be found beyond

those which were found by the trier of fact in his 1987 trial in order for Smith to be kept in

prison for the rest of his life. Nothing the BPH did has caused Smith's sentence to extend

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beyond the life maximum to which he was sentenced and for which he may be imprisoned

based on the second degree murder conviction. He has no right to jury trial in connection

with any decision whether to release him before the expiration of his life maximum term. 

That the Apprendi line of cases does not apply is evidenced by the fact that an indeterminate

sentencing scheme is one of the proposed solutions to the jury trial problems caused by

determinate sentencing schemes the Court has invalidated. See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at

305 (citing with approval Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1986) (judge's consideration

of facts outside the trial record to decide whether to sentence defendant to death did not

violate the jury trial right because the indeterminate sentencing scheme allowed the judge to

sentence the defendant to death or imprisonment)); see also id. at 332 (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(noting that one of the alternatives to Guidelines-type sentencing scheme is indeterminate

sentencing, such as California's former system). In Blakely, the Court explained that

indeterminate sentencing that gives a judge greater judicial power to set a sentence does not

infringe on the province of the jury: "It increases judicial discretion, to be sure, but not at the

expense of the jury's traditional function of finding the facts essential to the lawful

imposition of the penalty. Of course, indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in

that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the

exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant

has a legal right to a lesser sentence–and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial

impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308-09. 

The Apprendi claim is rejected. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The clerk shall close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 26, 2010 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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1. The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the

prisoner has an unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual

offense, the prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;

and negative institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances

tending to show suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social

history, signs of remorse, a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered

from battered woman's syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age reduces the

probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or developed

marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

2. The California Supreme Court's determination in Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, that state

law requires the parole authority to determine whether the inmate is unsuitable for parole

because he currently is dangerous is binding in this federal habeas action. See Hicks v.

Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). However, Lawrence does not govern this court's

analysis in every respect. This court is not bound by the discussion in Lawrence

(see footnote 4, infra) as to the evaluation of the commitment offense in determining whether

the parole applicant currently is dangerous. As to that point, Lawrence is persuasive

authority, while the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Sass, Biggs, and Irons are binding authority. 

Also, Lawrence's determination that "some evidence" is the proper standard of judicial

review, 44 Cal. 4th at 1211-12, does not bind this court because it is a state court decision

and, in any event, was not determining the standard required by the federal constitution. 

3. En banc review is now pending in a fourth case regarding the some evidence standard,

Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir.

2008). The order granting en banc review states that the panel opinion is of no precedential

value. 

4. The California Supreme Court discussed the use of the commitment crime

to deny parole in the companion cases of Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, and In re Shaputis, 44

Cal. 4th 1241 (Cal. 2008). The court explained that where "evidence of the inmate's

rehabilitation and suitability for parole under the governing statutes and regulations is

overwhelming, the only evidence related to unsuitability is the gravity of the commitment

offense, and that offense is both temporally remote and mitigated by circumstances

indicating the conduct is unlikely to recur, the immutable circumstance that the commitment

offense involved aggravated conduct does not provide 'some evidence' inevitably supporting

the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety." Lawrence, 44 Cal.

4th at 1191 (emphasis in source). Applying that rule, the court determined that there was not

some evidence to deny parole in Lawrence but that there was some evidence to deny parole

in Shaputis. 

NOTES

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