Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00840/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00840-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 05:5542 Federal Employees Pay Act -- overtime rates

---

1

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: OUTLAW LABORATORIES, LP 

LITIGATION,

.

Case No.: 18CV840 GPC (BGS)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

COMPEL

[ECF 116]

I. INTRODUCTION

Counter-claimant Roma Mikha and Third Party Plaintiff NMRM, Inc. and Skyline 

Market, Inc. (collectively the “Stores”) move to compel Plaintiff Outlaw Laboratory, L.P. 

(“Outlaw”) to provide full and complete responses to the Stores Document Requests 1-7, 

10, 13-16 and 19-20 and Interrogatories 1-3 and 5-8 which encompass: demand letters, 

communications between Outlaw and class members, identification of law firms that 

represented Outlaw in conjunction with these demand letters, settlement agreements, 

amounts paid in settlement, documents identifying Outlaw employees, documents 

showing Outlaws current and former partners, and documents related to the manufacture 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of

36
2

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and sale of Tri-Steel.

1

 (ECF 116, 138,2 148.) The Stores argue the discovery requests are 

relevant to class certification and the Stores’ class counterclaims against Outlaw and are 

proportionate to the needs of the case. Outlaw primarily argues the requests are

overbroad.

II. BACKGROUND

The Stores have alleged counterclaims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (“RICO”) and a recession claim on behalf of a class of similarly 

situated stores.

3

 The Stores allege that since at least December 2017, Outlaw, Outlaw’s 

former attorneys Tauler Smith, and Outlaw’s principles, Michael Wear and Shawn 

Lynch, have engaged in a scheme that includes sending demand letters via U.S. mail to 

small businesses that threaten the store could be held liable for over $100,000 based on 

false and misleading statements about potential liability for the sale of certain products by 

the stores. (SACC ¶¶ 2, 26, 82-88.) The SACC alleges Outlaw employs “investigators,” 

some hired through craiglist postings by Outlaw’s counsel Tauler Smith, who identify 

stores selling the products, take pictures of storefronts and shelves in the store with the 

products and provide that information to others participating in the scheme to target these 

stores. (SACC ¶¶ 66, 73, 86, 92.) The SACC alleges that Outlaw and its attorneys then 

send the demand letters with FDA notice attached that falsely indicate the store is 

 

1 This is only a very brief overview of the discovery topics at issue. As explained in the 

analysis below, the definitions of certain terms explicitly define and limit the scope of 

these requests significantly. Those definitions and the scope of the requests is detailed 

below in analyzing each topic.

2 The Stores have two reply briefs on file with the Court. The Stores filed a reply brief 

accurately noting that Outlaw had failed to timely file an Opposition to the Motion to 

Compel and seeking a ruling in their favor. (ECF 138.) After Outlaw requested and was 

granted an extension to file a late Opposition, the Stores filed an Amended Reply brief. 

(ECF 148) The Court has considered all the briefs. 

3 The Court only briefly summarizes the counterclaims and third-party claims asserted in 

the Stores’ Second Amended Counterclaims (“SACC”) as necessary for purposes of 

ruling on the Motion. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of

36
3

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

illegally selling products in violation of RICO and the Lanham Act. (SACC ¶¶ 2, 23-24, 

26-52, 84-86, 88.) The demand letters also allegedly include pictures taken of receipts 

for purchase of the products by investigators. (SACC ¶¶ 68, 73, 91.) Follow-up 

communications then offer to settle for increasingly lower amounts, including as low as 

$2,500. (SACC ¶¶ 3-4, 56, 72, 87, 98.) 

The Stores seek to bring these claims on behalf of a Store Class, “All business 

entities in the Unites States that received a demand letter substantially similar to the letter 

received by the class representatives” with three subclasses: (1) Sued Stores;4(2) 

Threatened Stores;5and (3) a Payment Class.

6

(SACC ¶¶ 77-81.) These subclasses

encompass three different outcomes that have resulted from Outlaw’s demand letters. 

Some stores, like defendant Roma Mikha, received the demand letter, removed the 

products from their shelves (losing out on those sales) based on their initial belief in the 

false assertions in the demand letter, but did not pay a settlement and were sued. (SACC 

¶¶ 33, 77, 89.) Others, like NMRM, received the demand letter, removed the products 

 

4 Proposed Sued Stores:

All business entities in the United States that received a demand letter 

substantially similar to the letter received by Roma Mika, Inc. and that were 

subsequently named as defendants in the state or federal litigation brought 

by Outlaw Laboratory, LP.

(SACC ¶ 77.)

5 Proposed Threatened Stores:

All business entities in the United States that received a demand letter 

substantially similar to the letter received by NMRM, Inc. and that were not 

thereafter named as defendants in state or federal litigation brought by 

Outlaw Laboratory, LP.

(SACC ¶ 78.)

6 Proposed Payment Class:

All business entities in the United States that received a demand letter 

substantially similar to the letter received by Skyline Market and that 

subsequently paid or agreed to pay money to Tauler Smith LLP, 

Outlaw Laboratory, or an agent of either. 

(SACC ¶ 79.)

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of

36
4

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

from the shelves, but did not pay the settlement and were not sued. (SACC ¶¶ 34, 78, 

89.) And, still others, like Third Party Plaintiff Skyline Market, removed the products

from the shelves and paid a settlement. (SACC ¶¶ 4, 22, 35, 69, 71, 89, 97-99.) The 

Stores also assert a claim for rescission on behalf of Skyline Market and the class to 

rescind the settlement agreements entered into with Outlaw (SACC ¶¶ 96-99.) 

The actual discovery requests at issue and related definitions are included below as 

necessary in analyzing the propriety of the discovery by each topic.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

The Stores seek to compel responses to both document requests and interrogatories 

to obtain information and documents the Stores claim is relevant primarily to class 

certification. Before analyzing the specific requests, the Court outlines the applicable 

authority.

1. Requests for Production of Documents

“A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) to 

produce any designated documents or electronically stored information.” Rule 

34(a)(1)(A). The request must describe the document sought “with reasonable 

particularity” and any “objection must state whether any responsive materials are being 

withheld on the basis of that objection.” Rule 34(b)(2). The requesting party may move 

to compel the production of responsive documents if a party fails to produce documents. 

Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). 

2. Interrogatories

“An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 

26(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected 

to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Rule 33(b)(3). “The grounds 

for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity” Rule 33(b)(4). The 

party propounding the interrogatory may move to compel an answer if the party fails to 

answer. Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iii). “If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of

36
5

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party’s business records 

. . . , and if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the 

same for either party, the responding party may answer by” producing or providing an 

opportunity for the moving party to examine records. Rule 33(d). 

3. Rule 26

As the party seeking to compel discovery, the Stores have “the burden of establishing 

that [their] request[s] satisfy the relevancy requirements of Federal Rule 26(b)(1).” 

Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Money Market 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 

2012) (citing Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). Outlaw, as 

the party opposing discovery, “has the burden of showing that discovery should not be 

allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections 

with competent evidence.” Id. (citing DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. 

Cal. 2002)). “An opposing party can meet its burden by demonstrating that the information 

is being sought to delay bringing the case to trial, to embarrass or harass, is irrelevant or 

privileged, or that the person seeking discovery fails to show need for the information.” 

Colaco v. ASIC Advantage Simplified Pension Plan, 301 F.R.D. 431, 434 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 

(citing Khalilpour v. CELLCO P’ship, No. C 09-02712 CW (MEJ), 2010 WL 1267749, at 

*3 (N.D.Cal. April 1, 2010)); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 

353 n. 17 (1978).

Rule 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 

needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount 

in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 

the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense 

of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

“District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery” and “in determining 

relevancy.” Laub v. Horbaczewski, 331 F.R.D. 516, 521 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Hallett 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of

36
6

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) and Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor 

Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Following the 2015 Amendments to Rule 26, it is clear that “[r]elevancy alone is 

no longer sufficient—discovery must also be proportional to the needs of the case.” In re 

Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liability Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016). “The 

court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to consider 

these, [undue burden or expense and importance of information sought,] and all the other 

factors in reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes. In deciding whether a request is unduly 

burdensome, a court must balance the burden to the responding party against the benefit 

to the party seeking the discovery. Thomas v. Cate, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1032 (E.D. 

Cal. 2010)(collecting cases). 

As discussed more fully below, (III.B.1), the Court’s discretion in controlling 

discovery extends to whether to allow, and the appropriate scope of, class discovery Vinole

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“District courts have 

broad discretion to control the class certification process, and ‘[w]hether or not discovery 

will be permitted . . . lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.’”) (citing Kamm v. 

Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975)).

Rule 26(b)(2) also requires the court, on motion or on its own, to limit the frequency 

or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by the rules if it determines that (1) “the discovery 

sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other 

source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;” (2) “the party seeking 

discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action;” 

or (3) “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii).

Under Rule 26(c), a party may move for, or the court may issue, a protective order 

“to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden 

or expense.” Among numerous options under Rules 26(c) are forbidding disclosure, 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of

36
7

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

specifying terms for disclosure, prescribing a different discovery method, and limiting 

disclosure to certain matters.

4. Rule 23

Most of the discovery requests discussed below concern discovery sought for 

purposes of certifying and maintaining the Stores’ SACCs as a class action. Specifically, 

the Stores argue the discovery sought is necessary to show numerosity, commonality, and

typicality under Rule 23(a) as well as predominance, ascertainability,

7

superiority, and 

manageability, and that damages are subject to common proof. Because the Stores rely 

heavily on class issues to demonstrate this discovery is relevant, the Court briefly 

summarizes Rule 23’s requirements.8 

“Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains two sets of class 

certification requirements set forth in Rule 23(a) and (b).” Moyle v. Liberty Mut. 

Retirement Ben. Plan, 823 F.3d 948, 964 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also 

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (Explaining that in addition to proving 

Rule 23(a)’s requirements are met, “[t]he party must also satisfy through evidentiary 

proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b).”). 

///

///

 

7 The Court attempts to include the standards for all the bases the Stores rely on for 

relevancy, but does not include a standard for “ascertainability,” because the Ninth 

Circuit has “refraine[d] from referring to ‘ascertainability’ . . . because courts ascribe 

widely varied meanings to that term,” and the Ninth Circuit has explained that there is no 

“ascertainability requirement” in this Circuit. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 

1121, 1124 nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 2017). Rather, the Ninth Circuit “address[es] the types of 

alleged definitional deficiencies other courts have referred to as ‘ascertainability’ issues . 

. . through Rule 23’s enumerated requirements.” Id. at 1124 n.4.

8 The Court is not setting forth all requirements or inquiries related to class certification. 

Rather, the Court is briefly summarizing the legal standards for the requirements and 

factors the Stores rely on for purposes of relevancy as necessary to determine if the 

sought discovery is relevant. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of

36
8

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a) Rule 23(a)

“Rule 23(a) requires parties seeking class certification to establish: (1) that the 

class is so large that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) that there 

are one or more questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) that the 

named parties’ claims are typical of the class (typicality); and (4) that the class 

representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of other members of the 

class (adequacy of representation).” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, (9th 

Cir. 2011). (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). 

“Rule 23(a)(1) requires the party seeking certification to show the ‘class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” In re Packaged Seafood Prods. 

Antitrust Litig., 332 F.R.D. 308, 318 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Rule 23(a)(1)). While 

there is no “fixed numerical threshold,” the Ninth Circuit has observed that 40 members 

is generally sufficient and less than 15 is too small. Rannis v. Recchia, 380 Fed. Appx 

646, 651 (9th Cir. May 27, 2010) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 

318, 330 (1980)). 

Commonality9requires a “common contention” that “must be of such a nature that 

is it capable of class wide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or 

falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 

stroke.” Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). “[A] class meets Rule 

23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement when the common questions it has raised are ‘apt to 

drive the resolution of the litigation,’ no matter their number.” Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 

 

9 “The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve 

as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of 

a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims 

are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately 

protected in their absence.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13 

(1982). 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of

36
9

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

731 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) and summarizing cases applying Dukes decision with 

regard to commonality). “Whether a question will drive the resolution of the litigation 

necessarily depends on the nature of the underlying legal claims that the class members 

have raised.” Id. 

The test of typicality is “whether other members have the same or similar injury, 

whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and 

whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Parsons 

v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 

F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992)). A plaintiff can show typicality by “showing [plaintiff’s] 

injuries . . . arose ‘from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gave rise to 

the claims of other class members and [their] claims were based on the same legal 

theory.” Ramirez v. Transunion, LLC, -- F.3d --, 2020 WL 946973 at *17 (9th Cir. Feb. 

27, 2020). 

b) Rule 23(b)

One10 of three ways a class action may be maintained is if “the court finds that the 

questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Rule 23(b)(3) (emphasis 

added). 

Among the matters a court may consider in the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis is “the likely 

difficulties in managing a class action.” Rule 23(b)(3)(D) (emphasis added); see also 

Brisenos, 844 F.3d at 1127 (describing “the manageability criterion of the superiority 

requirement” in Rule 23(b)). “Rule 23(b)(3) requires that a class action be ‘superior to 

other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,’ and it

 

10 The Court only discusses one of the three options because, based on the requirements 

they rely on in their Motion, it appears to be the only option the Stores rely on for the 

discovery sought.

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of

36
10

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

specifically mandates that courts consider the likely difficulties in managing a class 

action.’” Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1127-28 (citing Rule 23(b)(3)). Although the Ninth 

Circuit has also observed in rejecting the creation of an administrative feasibility 

requirement that “‘courts should not refuse to certify a class merely on the basis of 

manageability concerns.” Id. at 1128 (quoting Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 

654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015) (other citations omitted). “Rule 23(c) enables district courts to 

divide classes into subclasses or certify a class as to only particular issues.” Briseno, 844 

F.3d at 1128 (citing Rule 23(c)(4)-(5)). 

Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement demands that “questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

members.” Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 

2016) (“The Supreme Court has noted that, ‘if anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 

criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a).”).

5. RICO

As noted above, the Stores SACC include claims for violation of RICO. In 

considering whether discovery is relevant for purposes of class certification and 

maintenance, the underlying claims are important. Accordingly, the Court also sets out 

the elements of the Stores’ RICO claim for the analysis that follows. Because one of the 

district judge’s decisions11 in this case provides the relevant standard, the Court relies on 

it here:

RICO’s private right of action is contained in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1964(c), which provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person injured 

in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of 

this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district 

court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost 

 

11 This particular decision dismissed the Stores’ RICO claim under the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine, however, the Stores were later able to amend and add additional parties to this 

claim. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

36
11

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1964(c).

Section 1962, in turn, prohibits “any person employed by or 

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which 

affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, 

directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs 

through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful 

debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To recover under § 1962(c), a plaintiff 

must prove (1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) 

of racketeering activity (known as “predicate acts”), (5) causing injury 

to the plaintiff's “business or property” by the conduct constituting the 

violation. See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Numours & Co., 

431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005).

One type of predicate act of racketeering activity recognized by 

RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) is mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A 

mail fraud violation consists of (1) the formation of a scheme or 

artifice to defraud; (2) use of the United States mails or causing a use 

of the United States mail in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) 

specific intent to deceive or defraud. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. 

Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986); 

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647, 128 S. Ct. 

2131, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008) (“Mail fraud occurs whenever a 

person, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice 

to defraud,” uses the mail “for the purpose of executing such scheme 

or artifice or attempting so to do.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341)). The 

gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any “mailing 

that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing 

element,” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712, 109 S. Ct. 

1443, 103 L. Ed.2d 734 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted), even if the mailing itself “contain[s] no false information,” 

id. at 715, 109 S. Ct. 1443.

In re Outlaw, LP Litig., 352 F.Supp. 3d 992, 1000 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 

B. Analysis

1. Class Discovery

Before proceeding to the categories of discovery raised in the Motion and the 

appropriate scope of that discovery, the Court addresses two overarching issues related to 

class discovery: (1) Outlaw’s assertion that the Stores should be precluded from obtaining 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

36
12

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

any class discovery prior to class certification and (2) in general whether the Stores need 

the discovery requested for purposes of class certification.

12

 As explained further below, 

the Court finds the Stores are entitled to class discovery before class certification and have 

shown that most of the discovery sought is relevant for class certification.

Many of the discovery requests at issue in this Motion seek discovery for purposes 

of establishing one of Rule 23’s requirements. In moving to compel further responses to 

these discovery requests, the Stores have explained how the discovery sought is relevant 

and necessary to meet specific class certification requirements. In opposition, Outlaw has 

not disputed the Stores’ relevancy arguments as to the specific class certification 

requirements. Instead, Outlaw argues their scope should be limited and argues that the 

undersigned should refuse to allow class discovery until the Stores’ request to certify a 

class is granted. It appears Outlaw is arguing that the Stores should not be allowed any 

class discovery prior to class certification. The Court addresses these two overarching 

issues before addressing the parties’ arguments on the scope of the discovery requests by 

topic. (III.B.3.)

Precertification discovery “lies within the sound discretion” of the court. Doninger 

v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Artis v. Deere 

& Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 351 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942). “Although 

a party seeking class certification is not always entitled to discovery on the class 

certification issue, [the Ninth Circuit has] stated that the propriety of a class action cannot 

be determined in some cases without discovery and that the better and more advisable 

practice for a District Court to follow is to afford the litigants an opportunity to present 

 

12 The relevancy of the discovery sought for purposes of class certification is discussed in 

this section and further below, but primarily only to the extent disputed by Outlaw. 

Because Outlaw’s Opposition does not address many of the Stores arguments regarding 

the need for this discovery for purposes of specific class certification requirements, in the 

interest of judicial economy, the Court elects not to address those bases not disputed by 

Outlaw unless otherwise noted.

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

36
13

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence as to whether a class action was maintainable.’” Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942 (“Our 

cases stand for the unremarkable proposition that often the pleadings alone will not 

resolve the question of class certification and that some discovery will be 

warranted.”)(internal citations omitted). To deny discovery when “the propriety of a 

class action cannot be determined . . . without discovery, for example where discovery is 

necessary to determine the existence of a class or set of subclasses . . . would be an abuse 

of discretion.” Id. However, if “the plaintiffs fail to make even a prima facie showing of 

Rule 23’s prerequisites, . . . the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that discovery 

measures are likely to produce persuasive information substantiating class allegations. 

Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313.

First, the Court notes that the assigned district judge has already effectively 

concluded that class discovery is appropriate in this case. (ECF 85 at 12-14 (rejecting 

Outlaw’s request to preemptively deny class certification as premature based in part on 

the parties not having taken formal discovery).) Given the Stores’ class allegations, 

including the proposed class and subclasses, have already withstood Outlaw’s preemptive 

challenge to class certification through a challenge to the pleadings, and the district judge 

has already indicated class discovery is appropriate in this case, the Court need not revisit 

these issues. Class discovery prior to certification is appropriate in this case.

Second, the Court finds, subject to the limitations on scope discussed below, the

Stores are entitled to class discovery to, at a minimum, (1) identify class members for 

purposes of establishing numerosity – “the class is so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable” (Rule 23(a)(1)); (2) demonstrate that the Stores’ claims are 

typical of the class – “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of 

the claims or defenses of the class;” and (3) categorize the class members into the alleged

subclasses. Doninger, 564 F.3d at 1313 (explaining it “would be an abuse of discretion” 

to deny discovery when “discovery is necessary to determine the existence of a class or 

set of subclasses”). Additionally, this information is largely solely within Outlaw’s 

possession because only Outlaw has the demand letters it sent to class members and the 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

36
14

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

settlement agreements with the class members that may or may not have followed. This 

information is central to identifying how may stores received Outlaw’s demand letters 

with false statements and classifying them into the proposed subclasses of those that were 

sued (proposed sued subclass), were not sued (threatened subclass), or paid a settlement 

(proposed payment subclass) following receipt of Outlaw’s demand letters. 

The appropriate scope of the discovery as to specific topics, requests for production 

and interrogatories is discussed further below, but the Court finds the Stores are entitled to 

precertification class discovery and have established that, other than the limitations 

imposed below, the discovery sought is relevant for purposes of class certification.

2. Discovery Requests at Issue

a) Definitions

The discovery requests at issue are discussed below by topic, however, there are 

numerous defined terms (capitalized terms) within the requests that are part of numerous 

requests and accordingly numerous topics. Given their applicability across numerous 

topics the definitions are provided first and then the topics are discussed.13 

YOU is defined as:

Plaintiff Outlaw Laboratory, LP, and all of its attorneys, agents, brokers, 

employees, contractors, officers, directors and all persons or entities acting or 

purporting to act on its behalf or under its control, including independent 

contractors14

 

13 Definitions that are only at issue as to one topic are provided in the discussion of that 

topic. 

14 Although Outlaw has raised no challenge to the scope of this definition with regard to 

any of the discovery requests that include it, the Court has considered it because of its 

breadth. The Court concludes that while it is a very broad definition, the allegations of 

the SACC’s provide justification for such a broad definition. The SACC details the ways 

in which Outlaw and its counsel Tauler Smith used others who could be considered 

agents, employees, contractors, independent contractors, or other entities acting on 

Outlaw’s behalf. The breadth of the definition is intended to encompass all the possible 

entities or individuals enlisted to perpetrate the scheme alleged in the SACC.

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

36
15

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

RETAIL STORE is defined as:

Has the same meaning as it has where YOU use that term in the 

COMPLAINT, and includes any business entity that sells merchandise to the 

general public from a “brick and mortar” location.

DEMAND LETTER is defined as:

Any written communication YOU sent to anyone in the United States, 

that (a) concerns one or more ENHANCEMENT PRODUCTS, (b) 

threatened litigation by YOU against the recipient, and (c) offered any 

manner of “settlement” of YOUR asserted claims in exchange for 

money

ENHANCEMENT PRODUCTS are defined as follows:

Any sexual enhancement product which, as alleged by YOU in the 

COMPLAINT,15 contains an undisclosed and/or illicit pharmaceutical 

ingredient. The term ENHANCEMENT PRODUCTS includes all 

such products that YOU identified in any DEMAND LETTER.16

3. Discovery Topics Raised by the Parties’ Dispute

a) Demand Letters and Identities of Recipients

This topic encompasses RFP No. 1 and Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2.17 More 

specifically, the Stores’ RFP requests:

A copy of each and every DEMAND LETTER that YOU have sent to 

a RETAIL STORE in the United States.

 

15

“Complaint” is in turn defined as “the operative complaint in this action, which was 

filed in San Diego County Superior Court on July 25, 2018 and removed to this court on 

August 12, 2018.” This is the Complaint on record in the 18cv1882 docket. (ECF 1-2). 

The Complaint lists a variety of “Rhino Products” described as male enhancement pills 

that allegedly contain undisclosed pharmaceuticals. (ECF 1-2 ¶ 1.) 

16 The Court notes that it is confusing to define enhancement product by reference to 

demand letter, which is itself defined by enhancement product. However, the Court 

understands the definition of enhancement product to be defined by Outlaw’s definition 

of it within the Complaint, (see footnote 15) and the products identified in a demand 

letter. 

17 The Court relies on the requests set forth in the Stores’ briefing throughout.

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

36
16

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Interrogatories 1 and 2 ask Outlaw to:

IDENTIFY each RETAIL STORE in the United States to which YOU 

have sent a DEMAND LETTER

***

IDENTIFY each RETAIL STORE in the United States to which YOU 

have sent a DEMAND LETTER that made any reference to the 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act.

The Stores argue the demand letters and the identities of those the demand letters 

were sent to are relevant and necessary to identify all class members for purposes of 

establishing numerosity, the superiority of the class action, manageability, typicality, 

adequacy, predominance, and ascertainability. Additionally, the Stores assert that the 

demand letters are needed to classify the class members among the subclasses. The 

Court first addresses the request for production of the demand letters and then the 

interrogatories.

Outlaw does not specifically address any of these relevancy arguments. Instead, 

Outlaw argues the requests are overbroad in two specific ways. Outlaw argues it should 

only have to produce demand letters that specifically assert a store violated RICO and 

also resulted in a settlement. Outlaw argues that because the class definition only 

encompasses class members that received letters that are “substantially similar” to that 

received by the class representative, only demand letters that assert that the store is 

violating RICO should be produced. Outlaw also seeks to narrow that narrowed 

production further to only those demand letters that resulted in a settlement because it 

asserts that those are the only stores that could have suffered any harm.18 

 

18 Outlaw combines its argument regarding the proper scope of the demand letter 

production with its argument regarding the next topic, its communications with retail 

stores relating to demand letters. As explained below, the Court’s analysis of Outlaw’s 

attempt to limit the demand letters for these two reasons also applies to the 

communications topic discussed below. (III.B.3.b)

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

36
17

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court will not delve into every possible way the Stores argue these demand 

letters are relevant for class certification, particularly when Outlaw has not specifically 

challenged any of them. In short, the Court finds that the demand letters sought in the 

request are relevant, at a minimum, for purposes of identifying class members to establish 

numerosity, categorizing the class members among the defined subclasses in conjunction 

with other discovery requested, and establishing that the Stores’ claims are typical of the 

class. See Doninger, 564 F.3d at 1313 (finding the denial of discovery when “the 

propriety of a class action cannot be determined . . . without discovery, for example 

where discovery is necessary to determine the existence of a class or set of subclasses . . . 

would be an abuse of discretion.”) (emphasis added). As discussed above, the demand 

letters are essentially the foundation, or first step, of the scheme alleged in the SACC. 

(II.) And, because the requests are limited to only demand letters that concern the 

enhancement products, threaten litigation, and offer settlement, the requests are 

sufficiently narrowed to conduct that allegedly befell the class. Additionally, knowing 

who received the demand letters in combination with other information, discussed below, 

will also allow the Stores to determine which, if any, subclass they belong to. But, at a 

minimum, the Stores need the demand letters to know how many stores were targeted by 

the alleged scheme. The next step of the scheme may be different, hence different 

subclasses, but the demand letters are the common act across all the subclasses and the 

foundation of the alleged scheme. This discovery is relevant for class certification 

purposes. See Hamm v. Cal. Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (1975) (Finding denial of 

discovery “where discovery is necessary to determine the existence of a class or set of 

subclasses” would be an abuse of discretion); see also Artis, 276 F.R.D. at 352 (Finding 

disclosure of contact information for class members is “common practice in the class 

action context.”) .

Additionally, the Court has considered whether it would be a more proportional 

course to have Outlaw respond to the interrogatories instead of providing the letters 

because it could address the numerosity issue sufficiently. However, as the Stores point 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

36
18

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

out, the demand letters are also important in showing the members of the class all 

experienced this same conduct by Outlaw, i.e. as to the demand letters, that they made 

uniform assertions and threats. This is relevant to show typicality, i.e. that the Stores 

suffered “the same event or practice or course of conduct that gave rise to the claims of 

other class members and [their] claims were based on the same legal theory.” Ramirez,

2020 WL 946973 at *17; see also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(“We do not insist that the named plaintiffs’ injuries be identical with those of the other 

class members, only that the unnamed class members have injuries similar to those of the 

named plaintiffs and that the injuries result from the same, injurious course of conduct.”)

(emphasis added). 

As to Outlaw’s attempt to narrow the requests to only demand letters that assert a 

store violated RICO and demand letters that resulted in a settlement, the Court is not 

persuaded. First, limiting the production to only demand letters asserting a RICO 

violation would have the effect of the undersigned redefining or striking class allegations 

through a discovery request. Defining a “substantially similar” letter in the class 

definition to be only a letter asserting a RICO violation changes the scope of the 

definition from substantially similar to a letter asserting a RICO violation. It changes the 

class definition. The Court recognizes the SACC places more emphasis on the assertion 

of a RICO violation in the letters than a Lanham Act violation, but the Court finds for 

purposes of discovery, the Stores are entitled the scope requested. The Stores 

counterclaims do include allegations that one of Outlaw’s most fear-invoking false 

statements in their letters to stores is that the store is violating RICO and the allegations 

go to great lengths to establish this assertion is completely baseless. (SACC ¶¶ 27-28, 30-

31, 40-45, 47.) Additionally, the sample form letter attached to the SACC includes a 

claim the store has violated RICO with a form civil complaint including a RICO claim. 

(SACC, Ex. A.) However, there is nothing in the SACC that specifically limits the 

Stores’ claims to only those instances where the demand letter sent to a store asserted a 

RICO violation. On the contrary, the SACC includes a lengthy list of other false and 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

36
19

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

misleading statements in the letters, including the assertion the store has violated the 

Lanham Act and Outlaw will be entitled to punitive and triple damages under it. (SACC 

¶¶ 27-29, 38-39, 46, 48, 50-52.) Outlaw has selected one allegedly false and misleading 

statement and attempted to limit the class to that statement when the allegations of the 

SACC and the class definition are not so narrow. The discovery produced and 

certification process might ultimately result in that sort of narrowing, but it is not 

appropriate for the Court to effectively narrow a class definition via the denial of relevant 

discovery. 

The Court is also not persuaded that the demand letters should be limited to only

those that resulted in a settlement. The SACC alleges that the class representatives 

suffered injuries other than paying a settlement. (SACC ¶¶ 33-35, 89.

19) Roma Mika, 

NMRM, and Skyline all initially believing the false demand letter, removed the products 

from their shelves and lost legitimate sales. (SACC’s ¶¶ 33-34.) Given the scope of the 

allegations in the SACC and the scope of the class definitions, the Court finds the 

demand letters requested are relevant and should not be limited to only those asserting a 

RICO violation that resulted in a settlement. 

The next question is whether the request is proportional to the needs of the case.

As discussed above, the demand letters are a foundational part of the RICO claim 

because they are a common part of the pattern of conduct by Outlaw that all the class 

members allegedly experienced. Additionally, this discovery has the potential to factor 

significantly in numerosity. The subclass divisions would divide them further, but if the 

number of stores that received uniform demand letters is small, it would weigh heavily in 

determining whether class treatment is appropriate. In this respect, it is discovery that 

goes to a very important issue in the case and is likely to be very beneficial. See Rule 

26(b)(1) (listing among factors to consider for proportionality, “the importance of the 

 

19 These three categories correspond to the three subclasses, threatened, sued, and paid 

settlement. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

36
20

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

discovery in resolving the issues” and “whether the burden or expense of the proposed 

discovery outweighs its likely benefit). Outlaw asserts that the production will be 

“unduly burdensome” and “will require significant resources” but provides the Court 

with no other explanation. This is not an instance where the burden of the production is 

readily apparent. Outlaw does not explain how the documents are kept, if they are 

searchable electronically, or otherwise provide the Court with any explanation that would 

even suggest the burden is significant enough that the discovery should be limited 

because the burden of it “outweighs its likely benefit.” Rule 26(b)(1). Additionally, this 

information, like most of the information sought in this Motion is likely exclusively in 

the possession of Outlaw. See id. (listing among factors to consider for proportionality 

“the parties’ relative access to relevant information”). Here, the Stores have crafted a 

relatively narrow document request that will allow them to identify the members of the 

class and, in conjunction with responses to other discovery, categorize them into 

subclasses.

As to the interrogatories, the Court finds they are largely duplicative of the letters 

that will be produced. See Rule 26(b)(2) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit 

the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allow by the rules or by local rule if it 

determines that . . . the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, . . . or 

the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by 

discovery in the action.”) The most persuasive bases for producing the demand letters is 

identification of class members and classification of them into subclasses based on the 

demand letters in combination with other discovery responses. The identities of the retail 

stores that have been sent a demand letter (Interrogatory No. 1) and the identifies of retail 

stores that have been sent a demand letter that included a RICO violation (Interrogatory 

No. 2) will be contained in the demand letters produced. In this respect the responses to 

the interrogatories are duplicative and will already be available to the Stores from the 

demand letter production itself. As the Stores allege, they should be able to provide 

notice to class members, if the class is certified, from the addresses “set forth at the top of 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

36
21

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

each of the fraudulent demand letters.” (SACC ¶ 81.) The only additional information 

that would be disclosed by responding to the interrogatories is present and last known 

contact information for the recipients of the letters.20 The only possible benefit of 

obtaining responses to the interrogatories in addition to the document production is 

expediting notice to the class members if the case reaches that stage. However, the 

benefit of that additional information at this point is minimal. It is also not particularly 

important to resolving issues in the case. Rule 26(b)(1) (listing among factors to consider 

for proportionality “the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”). 

Outlaw must respond to RFP No. 1. Outlaw is not required to respond to 

Interrogatories 1 and 2.

b) Communications with Class Members

This topic encompasses RFP No. 10. More specifically, this RFP requests:

ALL COMMUNICATIONS YOU sent to or received 

from any RETAIL STORE or its counsel in the United 

States RELATING TO a DEMAND LETTER

 

20 IDENTIFY is defined as:

When used with reference to a person, means to state:

a. the name of such person if known, or if not known, as complete a 

description of such person as is possible

b. the present address, if known, or if not known, the last known address 

of such person;

c. the present telephone number, including area code, or if not known, 

the last known telephone number of such person; and 

d. the capacity of such person (whether individual, partnership, 

corporation, or otherwise).

When used in reference to a business entity, means to state:

e. the name of such business;

f. the address of the business’

g. the name of YOUR contact at that business, whether the proprietor or 

the business’s attorney;

h. the telephone number including area code.

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

36
22

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

RELATING TO means:

referring to, concerning, pertaining to, discussing, mentioning, 

containing, reflecting, evidencing, constituting, describing, displaying, 

showing, identifying, proving, disproving, consisting of, arising out 

of, supporting or contradicting

COMMUNICATION means

any transmission of information from one person to another, including 

without limitation by personal meeting, telephone, letter facsimile, email, instant messaging service, Skype, text message, posts and 

messages on social media platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn, 

and other similar forms of electronic correspondence

The Stores argue that this discovery is relevant to show how Outlaw operates the 

scheme and identify class members for purposes of class certification. More specifically,

they argue that these documents will show that Outlaw starts by threatening liability of 

$100,000 and then, through subsequent communications, lower settlement offers are 

made. They also contend that the communications will identify class members and 

support typicality, adequacy, commonality, manageability, and predominance as well as 

confirm Outlaw co-conspirators’ knowledge that settlements were purely nuisance rather 

than true disputed claims. The Stores additionally argue the communications will 

identify other members of Outlaw’s conspiracy. 

In Opposition, Outlaw again does not address the relevancy of this discovery for 

purposes of class certification or otherwise, as is their obligation. As the party opposing 

the discovery, Outlaw has the burden of “clarifying, explaining, and supporting its 

objections with competent evidence.” Louisiana Pac., 285 F.R.D at 485 (explaining 

obligations of party opposing discovery). As noted above, Outlaw combines its argument

regarding this topic with its argument regarding the demand letters. In this respect, 

Outlaw argues that it should only produce communications regarding demand letters that 

asserted a RICO violation and also resulted in a settlement. The Court rejects those 

arguments for the same reasons set forth above. (III.B.3.a).)

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

36
23

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, the Court has independently considered the relevancy of this discovery 

and finds it is relevant. First, the limitation that communications relate to a demand letter

is a significant limitation on the scope of the discovery requested because demand letter 

is narrowly defined. The universe of communications with the retail stores is broad, 

particularly given the vague definition the Stores provide for retail stores,

21 however, by 

requiring the communication relate to a demand letter, the scope is significantly smaller 

because a demand letter must threaten litigation, concern an enhancement product, and 

offer settlement in exchange for money. This limitation, already built into the definition,

narrows the scope. However, to be sure the scope is limited to relevant discovery, the 

Court clarifies and narrows the request to communications that relate to demand letters 

that threaten litigation based on statements about enhancement products22 and offer to 

settle in exchange for money. This would include communications that follow a demand 

letter about the demand letter or about settlement of claims originally identified in the 

demand letter. These communications will likely evidence the course of conduct 

described in the SACC. 

As narrowed, this discovery is relevant to showing the class members suffered a 

common course of conduct by Outlaw in violation of RICO. As discussed above with 

regard to the demand letters, showing the class members experienced a similar course of 

conduct by Outlaw is relevant to show typicality, i.e. that the Stores suffered “the same 

event or practice or course of conduct that gave rise to the claims of other class members 

and [their] claims were based on the same legal theory.” Ramirez, 2020 WL 946973 at 

*17; see also Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685 (“We do not insist that the named plaintiffs’ 

 

21 Like the definition of enhancement products, the Stores rely on the definition of retail 

stores in the July 25, 2018 Complaint filed in San Diego Superior Court and then 

removed to this Court on August 12, 2018. (See infra note 15.) However, in contrast to 

the definition of enhancement product based on the Complaint, how Outlaw defined 

“retail stores” in the Complaint is not so clear.

22 See footnote 16.

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

36
24

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

injuries be identical with those of the other class members, only that the unnamed class 

members have injuries similar to those of the named plaintiffs and that the injuries result 

from the same, injurious course of conduct.”) (emphasis added).23 Outlaw’s scheme 

extends beyond the initial demand letter. As set forth above, the SACCs allege Outlaw 

scared businesses with demand letters containing false and misleading statements and 

alleging liability at $100,000 and then followed them with offers to settled for 

increasingly smaller amounts. (II.) Outlaw might then obtain a settlement, sue the target 

store, or maybe take no further action. (Id.) 

Although, as discussed above, the demand letters are the first conduct the stores 

experienced, the scheme alleged involves the next steps by Outlaw that would be 

evidenced in their follow-up communications with the stores. The course of this conduct 

might show Outlaw was engaging in a uniform course with all stores or that some stores 

were treated differently for particular reasons. These consistencies from uniformity or 

unique treatment could establish (or destroy) commonality and show whether “questions 

of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 

individual members” for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. 

Vaquero, 824 F.3d at 1154; see also Rule 23(a)(2) (One or more members of a class may 

be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if . . . there are questions 

of law or fact common to the class.”) 

The Court also notes that the Stores will be required to show that their “damages 

resulted from [Outlaw’s] conduct” to establish predominance. Vaquero, 824 F.3d at 

1154. The subclasses in the SACC and the respective class representatives appear 

intended to deal with the diverging ways class members’ damages will be proven 

 

23 As with other topics at issue, the Court’s conclusion that the discovery is relevant for 

purposes of one issue, for instance typicality, does not necessarily mean it is not relevant 

for other class certification requirements, for instance the similar requirement of 

commonality or related issue of predominance. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

36
25

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(threatened, sued, paid settlement) and Outlaw’s communications with class members 

may provide the evidentiary proof the Stores will need to show which subclasses the class 

members fall into and whether there are enough members in the subclasses for 

numerosity. Even if the communications were not necessary to establish numerosity for 

the class as a whole, the communications are important in determining how many class 

members fall into each subclass and whether numerosity is met for each subclass. See 

Gomez v. Rossi Concrete, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 579, 587 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Betts. v. 

Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 659 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1982) and Rule 23(c)(5) 

(Explaining Rule 23(a)’s “requirements must be satisfied with respect to each class and 

subclass.”). 

The Court has also considered whether this discovery is proportional to the needs 

of the case. Given Outlaw addressed this topic in conjunction with its argument 

regarding the demand letters, it makes the same unexplained and unsupported assertions 

that responding “will require significant resources” and that it is “unduly burdensome.” 

The Court again rejects these assertions for the same reasons discussed above. (III.B.3.a) 

Additionally, the Court finds this discovery is important to the resolving numerous issues 

in the case, i.e. the class certification issues discussed above and Outlaw’s 

communications with the retail stores are likely to be only realistically obtainable through 

Outlaw. Rule 26(b)(1) (“importance of resolving discovery issues” and “parties’ relative 

access to the relevant information” are factors in proportionality). 

Outlaw shall respond to RFP No. 10 as clarified and narrowed by the Court. 

c) Identities of Law Firms That Have Represented Outlaw

This topic addresses Interrogatory No. 5. More specifically, the Stores’ request

Outlaw:

IDENTIFY each law firm that has represented YOU in 

conjunction with either a DEMAND LETTER or any litigation 

YOU have filed RELATED TO ENHANCEMENT 

PRODUCTS

///

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

36
26

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Stores argue Outlaw’s production of only demand letters sent by Tauler Smith 

to the defendants in this litigation and only law firms Outlaw used to pursue this litigation

are insufficient. Additionally, the Stores argue the law firms are both witnesses and 

potential members of the Outlaw scheme, i.e. co-conspirators. They contend that if 

Tauler Smith is the only firm that has represented Outlaw, then Outlaw should be 

compelled to provide that answer. 

Outlaw argues this interrogatory, like the demand letters discussed above, should 

be limited to law firms that represented Outlaw in conjunction with demand letters that 

include a threat of a RICO violation by the target store. Outlaw also seems to argue that 

this discovery should not be allowed because the Stores might use it to identify additional 

members of the scheme and attempt to add them as parties in the case. Finally, Outlaw 

argues that the identity of Outlaw’s attorneys is a matter of public record and available on 

PACER24 which the Stores’ counsel should have access to. The Court presumes this last 

argument only regards the second portion of the interrogatory seeking the identity of 

firms that have represented Outlaw in any litigation related to enhancement products 

given only law firms associated with the litigation component would be in PACER. 

The Court agrees that only responding as to defendants in this litigation is 

incomplete and insufficient because it does not fully respond to this interrogatory absent 

a declaration indicating that Tauler Smith is the only law firm that has represented 

Outlaw in conjunction with a demand letter or any litigation regarding the enhancement 

products. However, the Court must also consider Outlaw’ other challenges to this 

interrogatory. 

 

24

“Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) is an electronic public access 

service that allows users to obtain case and docket information online from federal 

appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts and the PACER Case Locator.” PACER, 

http://www.pacer.gov (last visited 3/2/2020).

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of

36
27

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court finds this interrogatory is largely properly limited in scope. The first 

portion of Interrogatory No. 5 is because it only seeks the names of law firms 

representing Outlaw in conjunction with demand letters.

25

 Demand letters are limited to 

those that threatened litigation, concern an enhancement product, and sought money in 

exchange for settlement. Limiting it to law firms that provided representation in 

conjunction with a demand letter confines the interrogatory to relevant information. 

Given the SACC allegations that attorneys for Outlaw have participated in the scheme of 

sending false and misleading demand letters with claims of $100,000 in liability followed

by lower settlement offers through counsel, the Stores have alleged that Outlaw’s 

attorneys may be participants in the scheme, making identification of them relevant. The 

Court is not persuaded that the interrogatory should be limited only to law firms that 

represented Outlaw in conjunction with demand letters that alleged a RICO violation for 

the same reasons set forth above. (III.B.3.a) The Court is also not persuaded that the 

potential for this discovery to lead to additional parties that the Stores might attempt to 

add as parties is a basis to deny discovery. Outlaw cites no authority, case or rule, for the 

proposition that identifying additional defendants to ultimately name, if approved by the 

court, is a basis to deny discovery about those parties. 

The Court further finds that the availability of some of this information in PACER 

is not a sufficient basis to deny the Stores this discovery. See Hill v. Asset Acceptance, 

LLC, No. 13-cv-1718 BEN (BLM), 2014 WL 3014945, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) 

(collecting cases rejecting the availability of public documents as a basis to deny 

discovery). There may be instances where the ease of obtaining documents from a public 

source might factor into the proportionality analysis, however, here, it is not at all clear 

that the information sought would necessarily be obtainable through PACER, depending 

on whether all Outlaw’s litigation related to the enhancement products has been filed in 

 

25The Court’s reference to the first portion is: “IDENTIFY each law firm that has 

represented YOU in conjunction with . . . a DEMAND LETTER.”

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of

36
28

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

federal court given PACER provides electronic access to federal cases. Additionally, 

there are cost associated with PACER and it is not clear why the Stores should be 

required to incur that cost when the information is available from Outlaw. 

The scope of the second portion26 of the interrogatory as drafted is overbroad. The 

answer is not necessarily limited to law firms that are involved in the scheme because it

lacks the connection to demand letters. The identity of law firms that have represented 

Outlaw in conjunction with litigation Outlaw has filed related to the enhancement 

products is not necessarily connected to the scheme. A law firm’s representation of 

Outlaw that relates to an enhancement product, but not to the scheme, would have no

relevance. However, in an effort to ensure the Stores obtain the relevant information 

sought, the Court modifies this second portion of the interrogatory from “or any litigation 

YOU have filed RELATED TO ENHANCEMENT PRODUCTS” to “or any litigation 

YOU have filed in conjunction with a DEMAND LETTER.” Although it may yield 

duplicative discovery given the other responses the Stores will receive, this should 

provide the Stores with the identities of law firms that have been involved in the scheme 

alleged whether prior to or in litigation related to the scheme. 

Outlaw shall respond to Interrogatory No. 5 as modified by the Court. 

d) Settlement Agreements and Total Sum Outlaw Has Received 

from Settlement Agreements

This topic27 encompasses RFP Nos. 2 and 7 and Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 8. More 

specifically, the Stores’ request Outlaw provide:

A copy of each and every SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

between YOU and any RETAIL STORE in the United States.

 

26 The Court’s reference to the second portion is: IDENTIFY each law firm that has 

represented YOU in . . . any litigation YOU have filed RELATED TO ENHANCEMENT 

PRODUCTS

27 The Stores addressed this single topic as two separate topics in their Motion. They are 

combined here for ease of analysis. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of

36
29

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DOCUMENTS sufficient to show the total sum of money YOU 

have received in connection with SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENTS.

The interrogatories ask Outlaw to:

IDENTIFY each RETAIL STORE in the United States with which 

YOU have entered a SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, and state the 

dollar amount of such settlement

State the total amount of money YOU have received in conjunction 

with all SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT is defined as:

any written agreement, whether or not fully executed, pursuant to 

which anyone who received a DEMAND LETTER agreed to pay 

YOU money, whether directly to YOU or indirectly to any law firm or 

other agent.

The Stores argue this discovery is relevant to identify those stores that paid Outlaw 

for purposes of establishing numerosity, superiority, and manageability for the payment 

subclass alleged in the SACC. The Stores also argue the actual terms of the settlement 

agreements are relevant to show the settlement agreement terms are uniform to establish 

predominance, and that the dollar amounts in the settlement agreements are needed to 

show damages are subject to common proof for the payment class.

28 The Stores offer, in 

the alternative to accept Outlaw’s stipulation that all of its settlement agreements with 

stores are identical or substantially identical for purposes of class certification. 

Outlaw again does not address any of the Stores’ relevancy arguments. Instead, 

Outlaw makes the same argument to limit the scope to settlements that followed after a 

 

28 The Stores also argue this information is needed to confirm jurisdiction under the Class 

Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) if the RICO claim ultimately fails. However, the Court 

declines to reach this argument given the Court finds the Stores are entitled to this 

discovery on other bases.

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 29 of

36
30

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

demand letter with an assertion of a RICO violation. Outlaw also raises confidentiality. 

However, Outlaw’s argument on confidentiality consists of the following “Next, these 

settlement agreements and the amounts of these settlements are confidential.”29 Outlaw 

does not even affirmatively state that the settlement agreements should not be disclosed 

because they are confidential, although it is sufficiently implied that is what they are 

arguing. There is no citation of any authority addressing when confidential documents, 

assuming they are actually confidential, should or should not be disclosed or indication

whether any confidentiality concerns could be addressed through a protective order. 

There is no indication if the settlement agreements at issue contain confidentiality

provisions or what they are. Finally, Outlaw dedicates most of its briefing on this topic to 

arguing merits issues like the propriety of the Stores attempts to undue or rescind 

settlement agreements and how this undermines the policy behind alternative dispute 

resolution. Again, there is no citation of any authority for the proposition that the Court 

can deny the Stores’ discovery based on Outlaw’s unfavorable view of the merits of their 

claims. 

The Court addresses this last argument first and in conjunction explains why the 

Court finds the settlement agreements are relevant. The Court is not persuaded, 

particularly in the absence of any authority in support, that the Court should deny the 

Stores relevant discovery based on Outlaw’s unfavorable view of the Stores’ allegations. 

The Stores allege that the settlements were “protection money” paid as a result of the 

RICO scheme, what one court has referred to as a “shake down” threatening huge 

liability for small businesses and then getting them to settle quickly to avoid the expense 

of hiring an attorney. (SACC ¶¶ 3, 56, 59, 62, 80.) And, as with the prior requests, this 

one is limited to settlement agreements that followed a demand letter, bringing it squarely 

 

29 The only other two sentences on this issue indicate that other stores have already 

breached confidentiality clauses and that Outlaw expects the Stores now hope to do so on 

a much larger scale. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 30 of

36
31

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

into the category of relevant discovery. The Court cannot deny relevant discovery 

because Outlaw thinks the Stores’ claims lack merit. 

The Court can limit relevant discovery based on proportionality, including under 

Rule 26(b)(1) based on the “importance of the issues at stake in the action” and the 

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” But the Court cannot deny a party 

discovery on an issue as critical to their case as damages, particularly in a class action 

with a payment subclass defined as having “received a demand letter” and subsequently 

“paid or agreed to pay money to Tauler Smith LLP, Outlaw Laboratory or an agent of 

either.” (SACC ¶ 79 (emphasis added).) Damages are an important issue in this case, not 

just for proving the counterclaims, but for class certification. See Vaquero, 824 F.3d at 

1154 (“If the plaintiffs cannot prove damages resulted from the defendant’s conduct, then 

the plaintiffs cannot establish predominance.”) Additionally, as the Stores explain, the 

uniformity or lack thereof, of the terms of the settlement agreements are relevant to show 

that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members.” Id. The Court will not deny this discovery based on 

Outlaw’s unfavorable view of the merits or proportionality because the discovery is 

relevant and important to resolving important issues in the case.

As to confidentiality, Outlaw has in no way carried its burden. As the party 

opposing discovery, Outlaw “has the burden of showing that discovery should not be 

allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections 

with competent evidence.” Louisiana Pac. Corp, 285 F.R.D. at 485. Outlaw has fallen 

far short of this burden. It provides no legal argument in favor of denying this discovery 

based on confidentiality. And, it provides no factual information from which the Court 

could attempt to analyze the issue itself. Outlaw says simply that “these settlement 

agreements are confidential.” In the alternative, Outlaw could have moved for a 

protective order under Rule 26(c), but it did not. Based on the foregoing the Court would 

order the settlement agreements disclosed without limitation. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 31 of

36
32

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, the Court cannot ignore that these settlement agreements were entered 

into with third parties. Based on the limited information provided by Outlaw, it seems 

highly likely that the settlement agreements allow production when ordered by a court

because, as the Stores explain in Reply, Skyline’s includes a provision that confidentiality 

applies “unless ordered by the court.”30 Additionally, as pointed out by the Stores,

Outlaw has failed to move for a protective order despite the opportunity to do so. This all 

weighs in favor of ordering the settlement agreements produced without restriction. 

However, out of an abundance of caution, particularly given the minimal information 

provided by Outlaw (the only party that could provide the court with information on the 

agreements), the Court finds a protective order is the most efficient way to resolve the 

issue. Rule 26(c)(“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or 

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.) 

Accordingly, the Court orders as follows. Outlaw must either stipulate that all of 

its settlement agreements are substantially identical or produce the settlement agreements 

subject to the following protective order limitations. Each page of the settlement 

agreement must include a legend or label designating it as CONFIDENTIAL. The 

settlement agreements may only be used for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to 

settle this litigation and the settlement agreements may only be disclosed to the Stores 

counsel of record in this action and counsel of record’s employees as reasonably 

necessary.31 

 

30 The Court would expect that Outlaw would have explained if the settlement agreements 

contained any more restrictive confidentiality provisions or notice requirements to third 

parties and that they have already followed those procedures if they exist. 

31 Nothing in this order precludes the parties from seeking to modify these terms or enter 

into a more comprehensive protective order. However, given the record before the Court 

it does not appear the parties have been successful in resolving discovery related matters 

and ordering the parties to meet and confer on this issue appears futile and likely to cause 

even further delays in this case. 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 32 of

36
33

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If the settlement agreements are produced, Outlaw is not required to respond to 

RFP No. 7 (requesting documents sufficient to show the total sum received in connection 

with settlement agreements), Interrogatory No. 3 (requesting the identity of each store 

with which Outlaw has entered a settlement agreement and the dollar amount of the 

settlement), or Interrogatory No. 8 (requesting the total amount received in conjunction 

with all settlement agreements). The production of the settlement agreements will 

provide all this information. See Rule 26(b)(2) (court must limit the extent of discovery 

otherwise allowed if it determines “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 

duplicative”). However, if any of the settlement agreements lack the amount of the 

settlement, or if Outlaw elects to provide a stipulation as to the uniformity of its 

settlement agreement terms, i.e. that they are substantially identical, Outlaw must respond 

to Interrogatory No. 3 and 8 to identify the stores and settlement amounts. 

e) Documents Identifying Outlaws Investigators and 

Employees

This topic encompasses RFPs Nos. 13 and 14 and Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 7. 

More specifically, the Stores’ RFPs request:

DOCUMENTS sufficient to show each and every person or 

entity that YOU hired or otherwise engaged to investigate 

whether any RETAIL STORE in the United States carried 

ENHANCEMENT PRODUCTS for sale.

DOCUMENTS sufficient to IDENTIFY all YOUR current or 

former employees

The Stores’ interrogatories request:

IDENTIFY each and every person, business, or entity that YOU 

hired or otherwise engaged to investigate whether any RETAIL 

STORE in the United States carried ENHANCEMENT 

PRODUCTS for sale

IDENTIFY each of YOUR employees

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 33 of

36
34

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Stores argues the identities of Outlaw investigators is relevant to its allegations 

that Outlaw dispatched “investigators” to purchase and take photos of the Rhino Products 

to use to shake down the stores. The Stores claim these investigators are either witnesses 

to the scheme or members of it. Similarly, the Stores argue the identities of Outlaw’s 

employees are relevant to the allegation that Outlaw uses its employees to carry out the 

scheme. Outlaw argues the requests are overbroad in that they seek the identity of every 

Outlaw employee regardless of whether they had anything to do with this case and argue 

that if the Court is inclined to compel Outlaw to disclose this information it should be 

limited to those employees or independent contractors involved in issuing demand letters.

The Court finds RFP No. 14 and Interrogatory No. 7 are overbroad because they 

seek information about anyone employed by Outlaw for any reason. These requests 

would encompass irrelevant discovery not relevant to any claim in this case. As 

discussed at length and in relation to numerous requests above, limiting the requests by 

connecting them to the demand letters and its associated limitations narrowed those 

requests to discovery that is relevant. But here, there is no similar tether. All employees 

do not necessarily have anything to do with the scheme or know anything about it. 

However, Interrogatory No. 7 can be limited to employees or independent contractors 

that were involved in issuing demand letters. Because this should provide the Stores with 

the relevant information, Outlaw need not also respond to RFP No. 13.

f) Protective Order Objections

The Stores indicate that Outlaw agreed to provide responses to RFP Nos. 3-6, 15-

16, and 19-20,32 but only once a protective order was entered. They also indicate that 

 

32 These RFPs encompass Outlaw business records regarding TriSteel and the documents 

showing the partners in Outlaw. As to the TriSteel products, the SACC alleges: that the 

TriSteel products “were created as artifices upon which to found the enterprise’s 

scheme;” that the demand letter claims of Lanham Act liability were objectively baseless 

because Outlaw had never sold these products; that the draft complaint attached to 

demand letters falsely claimed Outlaw sold TriSteel products in stores; and that Outlaw’s 

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 34 of

36
35

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

they indicated to Outlaw that the Stores would treat the documents at “Attorneys’ Eyes 

Only” in the event the Stores eventually sought a protective order. The Stores contend

this indicates the assertion of a need for a protective order was just a delay tactic and

Outlaw failed to provide responses. Outlaw has never moved for a protective order. 

And, Outlaw has not addressed any of these requests in its Opposition to the Motion to 

Compel. 

Out of an abundance of caution, before finding waiver by Outlaw based on the 

foregoing, the Court Orders Outlaw and the Stores to meet and confer by March 11, 2020 

and attempt to come to a resolution on these requests.33 If the parties are unable to 

resolve the issue, Outlaw must file a two-page response addressing these discovery 

requests. It must be filed by March 13, 2020. The Stores must file a two-page reply by 

March 17, 2020. 

C. Rule 37(a)(5)

The Stores ask the Court to order Outlaw to pay the Stores’ attorneys’ fees 

incurred in bringing the Motion to Compel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

37(a)(5). Outlaw opposes, arguing the discovery requests were overbroad in seeking 

documentation and information that was not actually relevant. 

Rule 37(a)(5) provides that if a motion to compel discovery is granted, as it was in 

part here,

the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the 

party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or 

attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable 

expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees. 

But the court must not order this payment if:

(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith 

to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;

 

claims as to when they first sold TriSteel are false. (SACC ¶¶ 46, 48, 52, 60, 66-67, 71, 

88.) 

33 The Court notes that as to each RFP at issue, Outlaw indicated it“ will produce 

documents responsive to this request once a protective order is entered.”

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 35 of

36
36

18CV840 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection 

was substantially justified; or

(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

A party’s conduct is substantially justified “if reasonable people could differ as to 

whether the party requested must comply.” Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 

F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds as stated by Molski v. 

Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Pierce v 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (Interpreting substantially justified to mean “there 

is a ‘genuine dispute’ or ‘if reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the 

contested action.”); see also Liew v. Breen, 640 F2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1981) 

(Addressing whether conduct was substantially justified under Rule 37(b) and finding “a 

good faith dispute concerning a discovery question might, in the proper case, constitute 

‘substantial justification.”)

Here, the Motion to Compel was granted in part and denied in part. Some of the 

requests for production and interrogatories must be fully responded to while others have 

been narrowed and still others need not be responded to all because they are not 

proportional to the needs of the case based on proportionality. Given this outcome, the 

Court DENIES the request for attorneys’ fees under Rule 37(a)(5). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Outlaw must respond to the discovery requests as set forth above by March 20, 

2020. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2020

Case 3:18-cv-00840-GPC-BGS Document 177 Filed 03/05/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 36 of

36