Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03930/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03930-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Motor Vehicle (P.I.)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Plaintiff,

v

WESTERN TRANSPORT, INC, ET AL

Defendants. /

No C-06-3930 - VRW

ORDER

This suit brought by the City and County of San Francisco

arises out of a car accident allegedly caused by the negligent

driving of Norman Smith, an employee of Western Transport, Inc. 

Notice Remov (Doc #1). The accident injured Ms Curry, an employee

of plaintiff to whom plaintiff paid benefits, and damaged one of

plaintiff’s vehicles. 

Defendants removed the case from the superior court of

San Francisco to this court on June 23, 2006, on the basis of

diversity of citizenship. Notice Remov (Doc #1). Although there

is no question as to diversity of citizenship, the parties contest

Case 3:06-cv-03930-VRW Document 24 Filed 11/09/06 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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whether the $75,000 minimum amount-in-controversy requirement of 28

USC § 1332 is met.

Plaintiff contends that the amount-in-controversy

threshold of § 1332 is not met and thus remand is required pursuant

to 8 USC § 1447(c). Mot Remand (Doc #15). Defendants oppose,

attempting to demonstrate that, if plaintiff is successful, its

damages will each exceed $75,000. Def Opp (Doc #19). The court

finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument,

and, accordingly, the hearing scheduled for November 16, 2006, is

VACATED. See Civ L R 7-1(b). For the reasons that follow, the

court GRANTS the motion to remand. 

I

Any civil action may be removed to federal district court

so long as original jurisdiction would lie in the court to which

the case is removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Jurisdiction founded on

28 USC § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete diversity

and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. Where it is not

facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in

controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the

jurisdictional threshold. Sanchez v Monumental Life Ins Co, 102

F3d 398, 403 (9th Cir 1996) (citing Gaus v Miles, Inc, 980 F2d 564,

566-67 (9th Cir 1992). See also William W Schwarzer, et al,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶2:1093 (Rutter Group, 2005)

(“Plaintiff’s motion for remand effectively forces defendant -- the

party who invoked the federal court’s removal jurisdiction -- to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence whatever is necessary to

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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support the petition”). 

To satisfy the preponderance of the evidence test for

jurisdiction, defendants may rely upon facts presented in the

removal petition as well as any “summary-judgment-type evidence

relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” 

Singer v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 116 F3d 373, 377 (9th Cir

1997) (quoting Allen v R & H Oil & Gas Co, 63 F3d 1326, 1335-36

(5th Cir 1995)). Conclusory allegations as to the amount in

controversy are insufficient. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567

II

To support removal, defendants rely on two sources of

damages: (1) workers compensation benefits already paid to Ms

Curry and (2) potential additional claims by Ms Curry. Doc #16. 

The workers compensation benefits to Ms Curry — under

which she has received $67,692.97 — do not independently satisfy

the amount-in-controversy requirement. As a result, defendants

attempt to portray this amount as increasing, citing two pieces of

evidence: that the plaintiff recently transferred additional funds

to Ms Curry and that Ms Curry’s medical treatment included

“shoulder surgery performed at a hospital under general

anesthesia.” Doc #19 at 6. Yet neither of these facts show that

the sum will increase. The June 26, 2006, transfer to Ms Curry

constitutes the final payment pursuant to her stipulated partial

disability benefits. Metilzky decl, Ex E. And the surgery

defendants reference occurred almost two years ago. Although past

surgery raises the possibility of future medical treatment, it does

not render such treatment more likely than not to occur — the

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standard defendants must satisfy. 

Because the workers compensation payments fall short of

satisfying the amount-in-controversy, defendants resort to

speculation, contending that potential additional claims by Ms

Curry should supplement the damage amount. In support of this

assertion, defendants correctly note that California Labor Code

provides Ms Curry with a statutory right to intervene at any time

before “trial on the facts.” See Cal Labor Code § 3853. Moreover,

defendants assert that prior to removal one of the plaintiff’s

attorneys indicated that Ms Curry intended to intervene. Vorobyov

decl, Ex 2-4. But the fly in this ointment is that Ms Curry never

actually intervened. Hence, defendants removed on the mere

prospect of intervention, speculation that cannot carry the burden

of establishing jurisdiction.

As a last resort, defendants complain that remand would

be “manifestly unfair” because Ms Curry would retain a right to

intervene but defendants would be unable to remove due to the oneyear limit for removal based on diversity jurisdiction. Doc #19 at

10 (citing 28 USC § 1446(b)). The court first notes that some

courts recognize “equitable exceptions” to the one-year deadline to

prevent such a result. See Tedford v Warner-Lambert Co, 327 F3d

423, 426 (5th Cir 2003). But even if remand is unfair to

defendants, such an argument is not suitable for this court. 

Congress adopted a one-year limit both to provide fair opportunity

to pursue removal and minimize uncertainty as to when a defendant

“ascertains” the cases is removable (and to avoid “eve of trial”

removals). See William W Schwarzer, et al, Federal Civil Procedure

Before Trial ¶2:960 (Rutter Group, 2005). Whether Congress

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correctly balanced these competing interests is a policy decision

that the court should not second guess. 

III

In sum, defendants’ speculation as to the damage amount

does not satisfy the removal statutes, which are to be construed

restrictively, so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Gaus v Miles,

Inc, 980 F2d 564, 566 (9th Cir 1992). Accordingly, the court 

GRANTS plaintiff’s motion and REMANDS the case to San Francisco

superior court. The clerk is DIRECTED to close the file and

TERMINATE all motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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