Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01204/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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06cv1204

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SABABU BADILI ROUNTREE,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES E. TILTON, etc., et al.,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 06-CV-1204-IEG (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

Sababu Badili Rountree (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San

Diego Superior Court conviction in case number SCD 156327 for

first degree murder and personal use of a firearm. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”), at 189-190.) Petitioner contends

that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that the

trial court abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence. (See Petition, Grounds One and Two.) 

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the supporting documents submitted

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by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented

in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

[¶] In the early morning hours of December 25, 1999,

Travis Huffman, a documented “West Coast Crips” gang

member, was shot and killed in the area of 47th and

Market Streets, which is within the “Neighborhood

Crips” gang territory.

[¶] On the previous afternoon, Rountree, a documented

member of the “Lincoln Park Bloods” gang, was socializing with his girlfriend’s mother and stepfather, Kenneth McElroy, and his girlfriend’s sister’s boyfriend

Alvin Phillips. That evening, Rountree, McElroy and

Phillips left in Rountree’s black Chevrolet to purchase

Heineken beer from a liquor store on the corner of

Euclid and Logan streets. On their way back, they

passed an American Legion Club located just south of

Market Street in San Diego. McElroy, who was a member

of the legion, asked Rountree to stop so he could say

hello to friends there. McElroy entered the club and

Rountree, who was wearing brown pants and a green

shirt, remained outside talking to some people. At

some point, Phillips heard someone say “cuz” to Rountree and Rountree respond, “You guys will not disrespect me.” He watched as a confrontation quickly

started to develop with three or four guys pushing

Rountree and Rountree trying to defend himself. At

about 11:55 p.m., Phillips called the police on his

cell phone, telling the 911 operator in part that the

people jumping Rountree were “all in blue.” According

to Phillips, blue is the color for the Neighborhood

Crips gang. After the confrontation ended, Rountree

became upset with Phillips because he did not come to

his assistance. Phillips left the area on foot.

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[¶] Rountree and McElroy returned to McElroy’s house,

where Rountree’s girlfriend observed a tear in the neck

of Rountree’s sweatshirt and a bump on his head. 

Rountree indicated to her that he felt victimized. 

Rountree left the house, telling his girlfriend he was

going to his aunt’s house.

[¶] Close to 1:00 a.m. the next morning, Tasha Devasher

was at the intersection of 47th and Market Street

drinking with a friend, Mozell Sherrell, in his car. 

Devasher, approximately 30 years old at the time, had

been a 47th Street Crip gang member since she was a

teenager. She was intoxicated as she had been drinking

the entire holiday week and weekend, and she had not

slept the night before. She had also been using marijuana and cocaine. While Devasher and Sherrell talked,

Devasher saw a brown or beige colored car drive by. 

Devasher exited Sherrell’s car and was walking down

Market toward 47th Street holding an open beer bottle

when she saw a man pacing back and forth past her. 

Thinking the man looked paranoid or that he might harm

her, Devasher stopped and stared. The man said “Hi”

and Devasher replied in the same manner.

[¶] At about that time Devasher noticed another man

appear across the street getting out of a car. He

said, “What’s up, Cousin Tasha?” Although she was

nearsighted and not wearing her glasses that night,

Devasher squinted and recognized the man as Rountree,

also known by his nickname “Blackout,” whom she had

known since they were both young and living in the same

apartment complex. She responded, “What’s up, Blackout.”

[¶] According to Devasher, Rountree ran across the

street at an angle away from her towards the other man. 

She heard Rountree say, “What’s up, Cuz?” and then a

second later she heard five shots. Devasher started to

scream and did not wait to see what happened; she hid

and then jumped a fence into some bushes. She then saw

the same beige or brown car that she had seen earlier

speed by. While Devasher screamed, two of her friends,

Dedmon Washington and Ray Purvis, arrived “out the

middle of nowhere” and approached the victim.

[¶] At 2:28 a.m., Sherrell called 911 to report the

shooting. Minutes later the police arrived at the

scene. When police stopped Devasher and asked about

the shooting, she denied knowing anything about it

because she did not want to become involved. Later

Devasher told others, including her mother, that she

did not see anything that night.

[¶] The victim, Huffman, was shot twice and died as a

result of the shot to his torso. San Diego Police

Officer Jose Laguda was one of the police officers who

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responded to a radio call about the incident at about

2:30 that morning. While investigating the area, he

found a black American-made car, its doors unlocked and

hood warm, parked in the lot behind a store across the

street from the crime scene. Inside the car were two

Heineken beer bottles. According to Officer Laguda,

the temperature that morning was very cold, in the high

thirties or low forties, but when he touched the car’s

hood it was warm to his bare hand. The car was later

found to be registered to Rountree’s aunt, who told

investigating police on the morning of the incident

that she had given it to Rountree four days earlier.

[¶] At about 3:45 p.m., San Diego Police Department

Detective Stephen McDonald arrived to process the crime

scene. He observed Huffman had numerous gang-related

tattoos on his body. Next to the black vehicle, Detective McDonald found a white athletic sock tied in a

knot. Criminalists later found two particles of gunshot residue on the sock’s interior surface. They

could not say how or when the particles were deposited

on the sock.

[¶] At some point after the incident, Devasher checked

herself into a psychiatric hospital in part for alcoholism and in part for psychiatric care because she was

experiencing depression and hallucinations. On January

12, 2000, Detective McDonald interviewed her about the

incident. According to Detective McDonald, Devasher

did not seem to be drugged and appeared to understand

his questions, although she was reluctant to speak with

him. That day, Devasher described a beige car to

Detective McDonald and reluctantly gave him Rountree’s

nickname, “Blackout.” Devasher explained she was

reluctant to identify him because they had been close

and grew up together. She also told the detective the

shooter wore green. The next day, Detective McDonald

returned to the hospital and showed Devasher a photographic lineup. As he began to read the instructions,

Devasher interrupted him and pointed to Rountree’s

photograph as the shooter.

[¶] Detective McDonald later spoke with Phillips about

the December 24, 1999 American Legion Club incident. 

Phillips told the detective that three or four Crips

jumped Rountree that evening; he could tell they were

Crips because they used the word “cuz.” The detective

also interviewed Rountree’s girlfriend, who told the

detective that when Rountree returned in the early

morning hours of December 25, 1999, he told her he had

just been jumped by some Crips.

(Lodgment No. 8 at 3-7.)

//

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On January 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a Request for Stay/and to

Amend Federal Writ, etc. (“Request for Stay”). [Doc. No. 14.] On

January 25, 2007, it appearing that Petitioner may have misunderstood

the Court’s routine “Notice Regarding Possible Failure to Exhaust

[etc.]” [Doc. No. 2] and/or a statement made in Respondent’s Answer,

the Court ordered Petitioner either to file a Traverse or file an

“Amended Request for Stay and to Amend Federal Petition” not later

than March 8, 2007. [Doc. No. 15.] Petitioner filed a Traverse on

March 5, 2007, and the Court denied as moot Petitioner’s Request for

Stay on May 1, 2007. [Doc. No. 17.]

5 06cv1204

III. Procedural Background

The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a

Felony Complaint charging Petitioner with one count of murder and

personal use of a handgun in violation of California Penal Code

sections 187(a) and 12022.53(d). (CT at 1-2.) A jury found

Petitioner guilty, and he was sentenced to 50 years to life in

prison. (CT at 189-190.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging his conviction

and sentence in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 3-5.) While his appeal

was pending, he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7.) In an unpublished opinion addressing both Petitioner’s direct appeal and

collateral petition, the California Court of Appeal affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence . (Lodgment No. 8.) 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the California

Supreme Court, which was denied without comment. (Lodgment Nos.

9-10.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 in this Court on June 7, 2006. [Doc. No. 1.] Respondent

filed an Answer on November 8, 2006, and Petitioner filed a

Traverse on March 5, 2007. [Doc. Nos. 10 and 16.]1

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IV. Discussion

A. Standard of review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

& (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

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conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-806

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by

Lockyer v. Andrade, supra, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving claims

presented on direct or collateral review. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends his trial counsel’s representation was

constitutionally ineffective in three respects: (1) counsel

failed to obtain a gunshot residue test that “could have raised a

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reasonable doubt that Mr. Rountree was the perpetrator;” (2)

counsel failed to obtain an expert in eyewitness identification

to testify regarding Ms. Devasher’s mental state and the effects

of taking/not taking Thorazine; and (3) counsel failed to obtain

a weather expert to testify regarding the relationship between

the weather conditions and warmth of the hood of the car. 

(Petition, Ground One.)

Under clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show: (1)

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness”; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688,

690, 692, 694 (1984). The Court must review counsel’s performance deferentially. Additionally, a wide measure of deference

must be given to counsel’s tactical decisions. Indeed, Strickland notes that “counsel’s tactical decisions are virtually

unchallengeable.” Strickland at 690; see also, Furman v. Wood,

190 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner “must overcome

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland

at 689 (citations omitted).

On these claims, the Supreme Court of California denied

Petitioner’s Petition for Review without opinion. (Lodgment No.

10.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the California

Court of Appeal’s decision underlying that denial as the basis

for its analysis. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). With regard to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

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counsel claims, generally, the Court of Appeal stated:

[¶] Here, Rountree’s ineffective assistance claim stems

from his trial counsel’s decision to limit the scope of

his investigation into what is assertedly potentially

mitigating evidence. “[A] defendant can reasonably

expect that before counsel undertakes to act, or not to

act, counsel will make a rational and informed decision

on strategy and tactics founded on adequate investigation and preparation.” (CA citation omitted.) This is

the same type of claim presented by the defendants in

[Strickland] and Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510. 

In those cases, the United States Supreme Court explained the deference owed such strategic judgments in

terms of the adequacy of the investigations supporting

those judgments: “‘[S]trategic choices made after

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and

strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that

reasonable professional judgments support the limitations or investigation. In other words, counsel has a

duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any effectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,

applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.’” (Wiggins v. Smith, supra, 539 U.S. at pp.

521-522, quoting [Strickland] at pp. 690-691 ... .)

[¶] With these principles in mind, we turn to each of

Rountree’s contentions.

(Lodgment No. 8 at 19-20.)

1. Failure to obtain gunshot residue testing

Petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to obtain gunshot residue (“GSR”) testing of the victim’s

clothing to determine the distance from which he was shot

“[b]ecause that evidence could have raised a reasonable doubt

that [Petitioner] was the perpetrator.” (Petition, Ground One.) 

Petitioner’s claim relies on the premise that the People’s case

against him hinged on a theory that Petitioner shot the victim at

point-blank range. (Traverse at 8.) Petitioner contends that

because GSR testing would have revealed no gunshot residue

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[Footnote 6 in original:] Devasher testified: “He [Rountree]

went across [the street]. He didn’t stop in front of the victim. He

went across. Like when I said he went across, I didn’t pay the rest

of that no attention. All I heard was gunshots after that. I don’t

know if he got shot or the victim got shot until the defendant ran

back across the street. And I heard gunshots. That’s when I started

hollering and jumped. I don’t know who did what. All I know is the

guy was on the ground when I started yelling. That’s why I didn’t

know if the dude fell immediately or not.”

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present on the victim’s jacket, in turn leading to the inference

that the victim was shot from some considerable distance,

counsel’s failure to request such GSR testing was objectively

unreasonable and resulted in his conviction. 

In denying Petitioner’s direct appeal and habeas claims, the

California Court of Appeal stated:

[¶] Rountree contends his trial counsel’s failure to

seek a gunshot residue (GSR) examination of Huffman’s

clothing constitutes ineffective assistance because

later forensic tests excluded the possibility of a

point blank gunshot, contradicting the People’s theory

of how Rountree shot Huffman. In particular, Rountree

points out the forensics tests established that a

contact shot in similar fabric showed substantial

ripping that was not present in Huffman’s jacket; that

a test gunshot made at a distance of one centimeter

showed fragments of unburnt powder, which were not

present on Huffman’s jacket; and a test gunshot made at

distances from two inches to 27 and one-half inches

showed molten debris from particles of GSR, which were

not present on Huffman’s jacket.

[¶] Rountree has not demonstrated deficient performance. First, the People’s case did not turn on the

theory that Huffman was shot at point blank range. In

closing arguments, the prosecutor pointed out that

“somebody walked up to [Huffman], said, ‘What’s up,

cuz’? and shot him through the heart.” In explaining

malice aforethought to the jury, the prosecutor also

stated, “Quite obviously when you raise a gun up to

somebody’s chest and pull the trigger, you’re intending

to kill them.” These comments do not limit the People’s theory to a point blank shooting. Indeed, eyewitness Devasher testified initially that the shooter

“went to” the victim, said, “What’s up, Cuz?” and then

she heard shots a second later. She did not see either

the gun or the flash from the gun. From her testimony,

it is clear Devasher did not watch the events closely

after Rountree crossed the street.2

 It was on cross

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The California Court of Appeal noted in the preliminary portion

of its denial of Petitioner’s direct appeal and habeas petition:

“Rountree originally filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with

this appeal. (In re Rountree, D042277.) We issued an order to show

cause returnable to the superior court on the habeas petition, and

stayed the appeal. The superior court granted Rountree’s request for

expert fees for a gunshot residue expert, held an evidentiary hearing

on the matter and denied Rountree’s petition. (See Rountree v.

Superior Court (Apr. 20, 2004, D043973) [nonpub. opn.] This court

thereafter vacated the stay on the instant appeal. We have

consolidated Rountree’s second habeas petition and request for expert

fees with this appeal. We take judicial notice of the records from

Rountree’s first petition for writ of habeas corpus.” (Evid. Code, §§

452, subd. (d), 459.) (Lodgment No. 8 p. 2, n.1.)

11 06cv1204

examination that Devasher indicated Rountree walked up

to Huffman, touched Huffman’s shoulder with his left

hand and then shot him. Even that scenario, however,

does not conclusively show that Rountree placed his gun

directly against Huffman’s chest and fired.

[¶] Second, Rountree downplays that, in fact, GSR was

found on Huffman’s jacket.3 The expert testified that

the finding of GSR on the jacket indicated that the

muzzle of Rountree’s weapon was between two and five

feet from Huffman when it was fired. Under the evidence presented by the prosecution, the jury could have

concluded the shooting occurred at a distance of two

feet. But the People’s case did not turn solely on the

presence or absence of gunshot residue on Huffman’s

jacket. There was abundant circumstantial evidence

connecting Rountree to the crime, including the presence of his car, the warmth of the car’s hood when

police arrived, and the existence of a sock found next

to his car containing gunshot residue particles indicating a gun had been stored in it in the same manner

as Rountree had done in the past.

[¶] Further, Rountree’s papers demonstrate a reasonable

tactical basis for his trial counsel’s decision to

forego GSR testing. In a declaration submitted in

connection with Rountree’s habeas petition, Rountree’s

appellate counsel related a conversation he had with

Brahms, who “explained that he had considered obtaining

a GSR test for Mr. Huffman’s clothing, but decided

against it [because] [i]f GSR were found on the clothing, that would not have helped Mr. Rountree’s defense.” We cannot, on this record, including the

evidence of the GSR found on Huffman’s jacket, view

this as anything other than a reasoned tactical decision within the judgment of trial counsel. The presence of GSR in fact did not help Rountree’s defense

because it was plausible that the residue was deposited

at fairly close range (two feet) in a manner consistent

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with Devasher’s testimony. On this issue, Rountree has

not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s

decision was reasonable.

(Lodgment No. 8 at 20-22.)

No GSR testing of the victim’s clothing was produced at

Petitioner’s trial. (Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Transcript,

“RT,” 820-845.) The medical examiner testified that he was able

to “rul[e] out a tight contact wound,” but that was the extent of

the analysis introduced on the subject. (RT at 434.) In other

words, the shooter could have been inches, or feet, away from the

victim when he fired the shots. In a declaration submitted in

support of his habeas petition to the California Court of Appeal,

Petitioner’s appellate counsel stated that Petitioner’s trial

counsel Ronald Brahms “explained that he had considered obtaining

a GSR test for [the victim’s] clothing, but decided against it. 

If GSR were found on the clothing, that would not have helped Mr.

Rountree’s defense.” (Lodgment 6 at 29.)

Trial counsel did not seek GSR testing of the victim’s

clothing because of the risk that the results might hurt Petitioner’s defense. Based on all the circumstances, including that

the prosecution’s case did not specifically rely on a theory that

the victim was shot at point-blank range and that ample circumstantial evidence connected Petitioner to the shooting, counsel’s

conscious choice not to obtain a GSR test for the victim’s

clothing should be given a heavy measure of deference. “There

are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given

case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend

a particular client in the same way.” Strickland, supra, 466

U.S. at 689. Counsel’s decision constituted sound trial strategy

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and, as such, the Court should not find it objectively unreasonable. Id. at 688.

2. Expert on eyewitness identification

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective by failing to introduce testimony of an expert on

witness identification to comment on eyewitness Tasha Devasher’s

“disabilities.” (Petition, Ground One; Traverse at 9-11.) He

contends “had the jury been informed of this the witness’ testimony would have been viewed differently.” (Traverse at 11.) In

denying Petitioner’s direct appeal and habeas claims, the California Court of Appeal stated:

[¶] Rountree faults his trial counsel for failing to

obtain an expert to explain to the jury the impact of

Devahser’s disabilities, including the fact she had not

taken her Thorazine, on her memory and the accuracy of

her perception on the morning of Huffman’s murder.

[¶] On its face, Rountree’s habeas petition reveals a

reasonable tactical basis for counsel’s decision, which

we will not second-guess. In it, Rountree’s appellate

counsel avers that Brahms informed him “he had contacted a Los Angeles expert on identification and

provided him all the information he had about Ms.

Devasher. Because Ms. Devasher knew Mr. Rountree, the

expert opined that his testimony would be of no value

to the defense. During our telephone conversation, Mr.

Brahms did not remember the name of the expert.” Whether to call certain witnesses is a matter of trial

tactics unless the decision results from an unreasonable failure to investigate. [Citations omitted.] No

such unreasonable failure appears here. Brahms did not

fail to investigate the possibility of presenting a

defense on this issue; he consulted an identification

expert, presented the evidence relating to Devasher to

that expert, and concluded such an expert would not

assist Rountree in his defense.

[¶] Rountree maintains Brahms “should have consulted

additional experts to see if past acquaintance rendered

moot all Ms. Devasher’s [sic] disabilities.” We believe competent counsel would reasonably believe it

pointless to search further in the hope of finding an

expert who would offer a different conclusion. (Citation omitted.) “‘Competent representation does not

demand that counsel seek repetitive examinations of the

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defendant until an expert is found who will offer a

supportive opinion.’” (Citation omitted.) While

Brahm’s investigation may not have been as extensive as

might have been done, we cannot say his procedures to

further investigate a potential defense did not fall

below minimum standards.

[¶] In any event, Rountree has not met his burden to

show prejudice. “To prove prejudice petitioner ‘must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.’ [Citation.] To determine

whether prejudice has been established, we compare the

actual trial with the hypothetical trial that would

have taken place had counsel competently investigated

and presented the alibi defense. [Citation.] This

requires knowledge of all of the evidence that was

presented at trial, not just the evidence that was

presented at the habeas corpus hearing.” [Citation

omitted.]

[¶] Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we

are convinced there is no reasonable probability the

jury would have reached a different result had it heard

testimony from Rountree’s proposed identification

expert about the possibility that Devasher was hallucinating or suffering other debilitating consequences of

either intoxication or mental illness on the morning of

Huffman’s murder. On Devasher’s cross examination,

counsel had Devasher admit she had taken Thorazine in

the past, but had not taken any that night, or at all

during the month of the shooting. Nor had she taken

her pills for depression. Devahser’s state of intoxication that night, both by alcohol and drugs, as well

as her need for eyeglasses and her history of mental

illness was presented at length to the jury, both on

cross-examination and in closing arguments. Further,

as we have stated, there was other circumstantial

evidence pointing to Rountree as the shooter, namely

the nearby presence of his vehicle and the sock evidence.

(Lodgment No. 8 at 23-25.)

The Court of Appeal correctly found that counsel’s decision

not to offer the expert testimony was a sound strategic one and

should not be second-guessed. In addition, Petitioner has not

shown, nor is there any reasonable likelihood that he could show,

that, had such an expert testified, Ms. Devasher’s credibility

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would have been undermined to the point that the jury would have

found him not guilty.

References to Ms. Devasher’s alcohol and drug abuse, in

addition to her mental health issues, recurred throughout Petitioner’s trial – on direct examination, cross-examination, and

argument by both counsel. The prosecutor’s first question to Ms.

Devasher on direct examination confirmed that she had been

convicted of a felony drug offense. (RT 305.) Defense counsel

Mr. Brahms established with his first question on cross-examination that Ms. Devasher was incarcerated at the time she was

testifying after having been convicted of cocaine offenses. 

(RT 330, 555.) She testified that she had consumed three to four

six-packs of beer on the day of the shooting. She testified

several times that she was intoxicated at the time of the shooting, that she was an alcoholic, and that she had also been

“smoking drugs” (marijuana and cocaine) during the day and

evening of the shooting. (RT 307, 309, 338, 340-341, 348, 375,

392, 595.)

Ms. Devasher testified that, shortly after the shooting, she

checked herself into a psychiatric hospital due to drinking,

depression, and the fact that she was hearing voices. (RT 325,

337-338, 485-486, 593.) She testified that she had been a Crips

gang member since she was 13 years old (RT 335), that she was not

wearing her prescription glasses at the time of the shooting

(RT 359), and that at the time of the shooting she was taking

high blood pressure medication, Thorazine (which she had neglected to take on the evening of the shooting), and medication

for depression. (RT 549-551.)

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When Officer McDonald came to question Ms. Devasher at the

psychiatric hospital, she was taking some “real heavy” medication

to combat hallucinations. (RT 583.) She was on four types of

medication when the officer was interviewing her. (RT 584.) 

When Officer McDonald visited Ms. Devasher a second time and

showed her a photographic lineup, from which she identified

Petitioner, she was on all four of these medications. (RT 603.) 

During closing argument, defense counsel Mr. Brahms thoroughly

attacked Ms. Devasher’s credibility in terms of her ability to

perceive events and recount them accurately. (RT 1192-1200.) It

is virtually inconceivable that an expert’s analysis of Ms.

Devasher’s “disabilities” would have further assisted the defense, much less changed the outcome of the trial.

After a thorough and independent review of the record, the

magistrate judge finds that there is no reasonable probability

the jury would have reached a different result had it heard

testimony from Petitioner’s proposed identification expert. It

is clear both that Petitioner has made no showing that trial

counsel was objectively unreasonable for not attempting to

introduce such testimony and that he has made no showing that he

was prejudiced by any alleged error. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s

denial of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Strickland, and the claim should be denied.

3. Expert on weather conditions

Officer Jose Laguda testified at trial that he and his

partner were the first police responders to the scene of the

shooting. (RT 621-623.) While searching the area surrounding

the scene, Officer Laguda came upon an older-model black

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American-made car parked behind a 98 Cent Store across the street

from the scene, and the front hood was warm to the touch. By

searching DMV records for the car’s license plate number, it was

confirmed that the car belonged to Petitioner’s aunt and that she

had loaned the car to Petitioner four days prior to the shooting. 

(RT 629-634, 721-722.) Petitioner contends that trial counsel

was constitutionally ineffective by failing to seek an expert to

testify as to the prevailing weather conditions on the night of

the shooting and, specifically, to testify as to “how long a car

hood would remain warmer than the car door.” (Petition, Ground

One.) He contends that, “but for counsel’s performance, the

outcome of Petitioner’s trial would have been different.” (Id.)

In denying Petitioner’s direct appeal and habeas claims, the

California Court of Appeal stated:

[¶] With regard to Rountree’s claim of ineffective

assistance for failing to retain a forensic engineering

expert, we reach the same conclusion. The declaration

from Rountree’s appellate counsel reveals that Brahms

had an objectively reasonable basis for decision: 

“[Brahms] had considered a test to measure how long the

car hood would have stayed warm. However, he did not

believe that the conditions of Mr. Rountree’s car on

that night could be duplicated. The nature of the

operating problem was not known, but he believed the

car had been fixed long before [Brahms] received Mr.

Rountree’s case. The inability to duplicate exactly

the conditions of that night made him conclude the

results of any car test would not be admissible.”

[¶] As Rountree acknowledges, in order to lay a proper

foundation for such experimental evidence the proponent

must show in part that the experiment was “conducted

under at least substantially similar, although not

necessarily absolutely identical, conditions as those

of the actual occurrence.” [Citation omitted.] Although Brahms apparently believed conditions had to be

duplicated exactly to render any test admissible, his

erroneous belief by itself does not render his ultimate

decision incompetent. Given that the mechanical problem with Rountree’s car was unknown and the car had

been repaired in the interim, competent counsel could

have reasonably concluded it was not possible to repliCase 3:06-cv-01204-IEG-JMA Document 18 Filed 08/23/07 Page 17 of 23
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cate conditions for such an experiment even to a point

of substantial similarity. Rountree has not overcome

the strong presumption that Brahm’s representation on

this matter fell within an objective standard of reasonableness.

(Lodgment No. 8 at 25-26.)

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that it, the defendant

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered

sound trial strategy.” [Citation omitted.]

Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689. “[S]trategic choices made

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable ... . In other words,

counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. at 690-691.

The Court of Appeal was correct in finding that competent

counsel could reasonably have concluded it was not possible to

replicate conditions of the weather or the vehicle to a point of

substantial similarity, in order to make any testing admissible

at trial. Appellate counsel’s declaration, attached to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the Court of

Appeal, indicates that trial counsel Mr. Brahms considered a test

to measure how long the car hood would have stayed warm. (Lodgment No. 6 at 29-30.) Because “he did not believe that the

conditions of Mr. Rountree’s car on that night could be duplicated,” and because an unknown repair had been made to the car

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between the time of the shooting and the time Mr. Brahms received

Petitioner’s case, counsel concluded that “the results of any car

test would not be admissible.” (Id. at 30.) Evaluating counsel’s conduct from his perspective at the time, as required by

Strickland, it is clear that counsel’s decision was reasonable

and constituted sound trial strategy in light of all the circumstances.

After an independent review of the record, the magistrate

judge finds that Petitioner has made no showing that trial

counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to “conduct an

experiment on the cooling of a car hood.” (Traverse at 2.) On

all counts, the record supports a finding that Mr. Brahms was

fully engaged in defending Petitioner and that he employed sound

trial strategy in doing so. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s denial

of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application

of Strickland, and the claim should be denied.

C. Admission of Evidence at Trial

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of: (1) a knotted sock containing

gunshot residue found next to the driver’s side door of his car

and (2) a prior conviction for possession of a handgun, which was

found two years earlier in a sock beneath the driver’s seat of

his car. (Petition at Ground Two.) Petitioner contends that

“nothing could connect the sock [found at the shooting scene] to

the Petitioner but his arrest two years prior,” and that link was

wholly insufficient to support admission of either piece of

evidence. (Id.)

In denying Petitioner’s direct appeal and habeas claims, the

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[Footnote 2 in original:] The court reasoned; “And there was

something else in the gun – in the sock, and that was gunshot residue,

which would indicate that if the sock didn’t contain a foot, that it

did at some point contain a gun. The car was parked in a shopping

center where there was a Laundromat, but it wasn’t parked adjacent to

the Laundromat. It wasn’t at a time when people would ordinarily be

using the Laundromat, that being Christmas Eve or the early morning

hours of Christmas day. [¶] It’s right next to the driver’s door. 

And the one thing we know from two years ago was that the last time

the defendant was contacted, he had under his seat a gun in a sock. 

It’s an extremely unusual way to carry a gun. I have to agree with

counsel I haven’t seen anybody else carrying a gun in an athletic

sock. And if you think about it, it’s relevant because the sock is on

the ground. Things don’t come out from under a seat unless somebody

takes them out. Something has to happen. They just don’t fall out by

gravity. It’s not fast; it’s on the seat and then falls out. That

sock, if it was taken out from under the seat, probably contained the

gun when it was – the gun was taken out of the sock. The sock then

falls by the wayside. [¶] It’s at the time of the murder, not far

from the location of the murder. The murder was by a firearm. It’s

extremely probative. And at this point, weighing this evidence and

the nature in which – the way in which it would come in, that is,

evidence that the defendant was contacted two year earlier, how did he

carry his gun? In a sock. Where was the sock? Under the car seat. 

That is not unduly prejudicial to the defense. So that’s where we

are. It’s admissible.” [RT 508-509.]

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California Court of Appeal stated:

[¶] At trial, the court allowed the People to introduce

evidence that at approximately 4:00 a.m. on July 17,

1997, a San Diego police officer stopped Rountree for a

routine traffic violation and found a handgun beneath

the driver’s seat of Rountree’s car partially hidden in

a white sock. It also allowed the People to present

evidence of the sock containing particles of gunshot

residue found on the ground next to the driver’s side

door of Rountree’s vehicle near the crime scene. The

trial court found the presence of the white athletic

sock a block and a half away from the crime scene, on

the morning of Huffman’s murder next to the driver’s

door of Rountree’s car, relevant to the issue of “whether or not there was a gun present in that parking

lot.”4

[¶] Rountree contends the trial court prejudicially

erred in admitting these items of evidence. He maintains the prior crime — Rountree’s 1997 possession of a

handgun – was not sufficiently similar to the charged

offense of murder as to prove identity. He also challenges admission of the parking lot sock found next to

Rountree’s vehicle as “contrary to the evidence before

the court and contrary to common sense.” Specifically,

he argues the court’s ruling was not supported by

evidence that use of a sock is an extremely unusual

method of carrying or concealing a weapon, and was

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contradicted by evidence that the sock found was tied

in a knot at one end, negating the court’s hypothesis

that the perpetrator withdrew the gun from the sock

before committing the crime.

[¶] We need not decide whether the trial court abused

its discretion in these evidentiary rulings, for even

if we assume the court erred, Rountree has not carried

his burden to show resulting prejudice. In particular,

we agree there is substantial direct and circumstantial

evidence from which the jury could conclude Rountree

was the perpetrator of Huffman’s murder apart from

evidence of the parking lot sock and Rountree’s 1997

handgun possession. Devasher, who was an eyewitness to

Huffman’s murder, identified Rountree as the shooter in

both a pretrial photographic lineup and at trial. Her

testimony alone is substantial evidence to uphold

Rountree’s conviction. [Citation omitted.] While

Rountree questions Devasher’s credibility given her

drug and alcohol use as well as her changing stories to

police, the jury obviously believed her testimony

regarding the events and whom she saw on the night of

Huffman’s murder. It is not our province to reassess

witness credibility on appeal. [Citation omitted.] 

Minutes after Huffman’s murder, Rountree’s vehicle was

found a block and a half away from the crime scene with

its car hood still warm on a cold night. A gang expert

explained why Rountree, a documented Lincoln Pak Blood

gang member, would have been motivated to retaliate

with lethal force against a perceived Crip gang member

in the same location where he had been involved in a

fight with other Crip gang members approximately two

and a half hours earlier.[] Finally the People presented evidence of Rountree’s videotaped interview with

detectives two days after the shooting, in which Rountree failed to tell detectives about the incident at

the American Legion club, denied knowing Devasher, and

claimed his car broke down sometime before midnight.

[¶] The direct and circumstantial evidence summarized

above is amply sufficient for the jury to question

Rountree’s credibility and find Rountree was the perpetrator. [Citation omitted.] We therefore conclude

there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the

trial would have been different if the trial court had

excluded the challenged evidence. [Citation omitted.]

(Lodgment No. 8 at 7-10.)

Generally, matters relating to a state court’s interpretation of state law do not implicate federal constitutional issues. 

In fact, this Court defers to and is bound by a state court’s

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interpretation of its own laws. Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S.

78, 84 (1983); Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Petitioner has provided no authority to indicate that this case

does not fall within that general rule. Moreover, “[a] federal

court may not issue the writ [of habeas corpus] on the basis of a

perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41

(1984).

The admissibility of the sock found next to Petitioner’s car

at the scene of the shooting and his prior conviction for possession of a sock-wrapped gun was hotly contested at Petitioner’s

trial. The prosecution submitted to the trial court a ten-page

brief “Regarding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts Pursuant to

[California] Evidence Code Section 1101(B).” (CT 1-11.) The

trial court heard extensive argument from counsel on the subject

and rendered its ruling that the evidence was admissible under

California law only after extensive reflection. (See RT 44-52,

93-110, 167-179, 413-424, 506-509.) This Court will not secondguess the trial court’s reasoned decision under state law.

Petitioner’s claim deals solely with the interpretation and

application of California law, a matter which does not implicate

federal constitutional concerns. Moreover, even if Petitioner

had raised a claim for which federal habeas relief was available,

Petitioner’s claim is meritless. The California Court of Appeal’s decision amply indicates that, irrespective of whether the

trial court erred in admitting the evidence, no prejudice resulted to Petitioner since there was substantial direct and

circumstantial evidence (other than the parking lot sock and the

handgun possession) that Petitioner committed the shooting. 

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Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the Court of Appeal’s

decision was contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court

law or the result of an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence, and the claim should be denied.

V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and

that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Irma E. Gonzalez, United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that not later than September 28, 2007, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed not later than October 15, 2007. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 23, 2007

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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