Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02352/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02352-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Westley Vance Haskins, 

Petitioner,

v. 

Dora Schriro, 

Respondent. ______________________________________

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CV 05-2352 PHX-MHM (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court are Petitioner Westley Vance Haskins’ Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] and Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery on Child

Abuse [Docket No. 26]. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred

to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss

the Petition with prejudice and deny the Motion for Discovery. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2000, the State of Arizona charged Haskins by Information with nine

felony counts related to the manufacture of drugs at his residence, child abuse, and escape

from custody. (Exhibit A.) The specific charges were filed in Maricopa County Cause

Number CR 2000-001375(A) and were: Conspiracy (Count 1); Possession of Equipment and

Chemicals for the Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs (Count 2); Manufacture of Dangerous

Drugs (Count 3); Misconduct Involving Weapons (Count 4); Possession of Drug

Paraphernalia (Count 5); two charges of Theft (Counts 6 and 7); Child Abuse (Count 8) and

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Escape in the Second Degree (Count 9). (Exhibit A.) That State amended the Information

to allege that Petitioner had a prior felony conviction for Illegally Conducting an Enterprise

and alleged that he committed the offenses while on probation. (Exhibits C & D.) 

On March 10, 2000, Petitioner, through his attorney Rick Tosto, filed a number of

motions including requests for specific disclosure, a notice of change of judge, a motion for

a Rule 609 hearing, a voluntariness hearing, and for discovery. (Exhibit E.) Petitioner also

filed a notice of defenses indicating that he would raise a defense of mere presence and

insufficiency of the State’s evidence. (Exhibit F.) Petitioner also indicated that his

witnesses included himself and any and all individuals named and referred to int the State’s

disclosure. (Id.) On May 10, 2000, Petitioner filed an amended notice of defenses and added

the defense of entrapment and identifying prospective witnesses Mike Malone, Frances

Smith, Donna Little, Michelle Stockdale, Mark Bosack, Leslie Ray, and Donald Winters.

(Exhibit G.) Petitioner did not provide any contact information for the identified witnesses.

On May 22, 2000, the State moved to dismiss the case “for the reason that there is an

issue as to the validity of the search which led to the riling of these charges.” (Exhibit H.)

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. (Exhibit I.) The

State subsequently moved to reinstate the charges and the motion was granted by the trial

court and, on November 6, 2000, a warrant was issued for Petitioner’s arrest. (Exhibit L.)

 Thereafter, Petitioner and his co-defendant filed a number of motions for continuances and

the trial date was delayed several months. (Exhibit M.) The trial court ultimately set a trial

date of April 18, 2001. (Exhibit N.)

On April 13, 2001, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Notice of Witnesses. (Exhibit O.)

In the notice, Petitioner listed Emma Graham (his mother), Albert Graham (his step-father),

Westley Haskins, Jr. (his son), Allen Haskins (his son), David Smith, and Albert Harrington.

(Id.) The family members were listed as residing in the town of Prescott, Arizona, and the

other two witnesses were listed as residing in the Maricopa County Jail. (Id.) The State

moved to preclude the newly identified witness on the ground that their late disclosure was

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made in bad faith and unfairly prejudiced the State. (Exhibit P.) In response to the trial

court’s inquiry regarding the disclosure of these witnesses less than a week before trial,

defense counsel explained:

Well, I can only give you what I find out about at that particular

time. I don’t know. I think Mr. Haskins had alluded to it a little

while in court. He has to talk to his other attorney. There was

another attorney he was attempting to bring on board, which was

Mr. Larry Debus, to which that obviously never happened.

So, I don’t know, I have given those names just recently. I gave

them to Billie [Rosen, the prosecutor] and the Court as soon as

I got them. 

(Exhibit Q, at p. 4.) 

During the April 18, 2002, hearing on the States motion to preclude the witnesses,

Petitioner argued that he had a due process right to present the newly identified witnesses and

that preclusion would be too severe a sanction because the prospective witnesses were known

to the State through its criminal investigation. (Exhibit R, at pp. 6-10.) The State responded

that because of the Petitioner’s prior trial– where the late disclosure of witnesses had also

been litigated– Petitioner was aware that the timely disclosure of witnesses was required.

(Id. at p. 11.) During the hearing, after an off-record conversation with Petitioner,

Petitioner’s counsel informed the court that he had not seen Petitioner for “a few months”

and that he only saw him once in the days before the date set for trial. (Id. at p. 13.)

Petitioner’s counsel requested another continuance so that another lawyer, Larry Debus,

could substitute in as counsel. (Id. at p. 16.) The court denied the request for a continuance,

found that the witnesses had not been properly disclosed, and ordered that they be precluded

from testifying at trial. (Id. at pp. 21-22.) 

Petitioner later filed a motion for reconsideration and made an offer of proof on the

anticipated testimony of the six precluded witnesses, along with discussing the testimony of

four additional undisclosed witnesses, Donna Little, Mark Bossack, Michelle Stockdale, and

Mike Malone. (Exhibit T.) The trial court heard argument on the motion for reconsideration

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and ruled that Petitioner would be permitted to call one witness from his May 2000 notice

of witnesses. (Exhibit U, pp. 75-89.) 

The case proceeded to trial and, at the conclusion of the State’s case-in chief,

Petitioner moved for a directed verdict. (Exhibit U, p. 168.) The trial court entered judgment

of acquittal on the charges of conspiracy (Count 1) and theft of a motorcycle (Count 7). (Id.

at 179-180.)

The jury found Petitioner guilty as charged except for returning a guilty verdict on the

child abuse charge as a lesser-included class 4 felony. (Exhibit X.) Regarding the theft

charge, the jury determined that the value of the property was $3,000 or more, but less than

$25,000, indicating in parenthesis “$4,000.” (Id.)

The trial court imposed the following aggravated sentences: 13 years on Count 2

(Possession of Chemicals for the Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs); 15 years on Count 3

(manufacture of Dangerous Drugs); 6 years on Count 4 (Misconduct Involving Weapons);

2 1/4 years on Count 5 (Possession of Drug Paraphernalia); 10 years on Count 6 (Theft); 5

years on Count 8 (Child Abuse); and 3 years on Count 9 (Escape). (Exhibit Y.) The trial

court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently with the exception of the escape

conviction, which was to be served consecutively to the other sentences. (Id.) The court also

ordered restitution of $2,000. (Id.) 

Petitioner timely appealed on June 25, 2001, and filed his opening brief on January

8, 2002. (Exhibit Z.) Petitioner raised the following claims on appeal:

1. The trial court erred by precluding his witnesses.

2. The evidence presented was insufficient to support a

conviction for a Class 3 felony theft alleged in Count 6.

3. The trial court erroneously concluded that Petitioner had

a second prior felony conviction and improperly used it

to aggravated his sentences on all counts. 

(Id.) The State filed a response addressing the merits of the claims. (Exhibit AA.) On

August 8, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision affirming

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Petitioner’s convictions in part, vacating the convictions in part, and remanding for resentencing. (Exhibit BB.) 

On February 7, 2003, the trial court dismissed Count 2 (Possession of Equipment and

Chemicals for the Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs), and resentenced Petitioner to the same

terms on the remaining counts with the exception of the sentence for theft (Count 6), which

was reduced to 6 years. (Exhibit CC.) 

On November 8, 2002, during the pendency of his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a

notice of post-conviction relief. (Exhibit DD.) Petitioner filed the petition for postconviction relief on March 27, 2003, and raised the following claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel:

1. Failure to call witnesses.

2. Failure to timely give notice of defenses, witnesses, and

exhibits.

(Exhibit EE.) Petitioner submitted supporting affidavits from Albert Graham, Emma

Graham, and Buffey Marie Case. (Id.) The State filed a response addressing the merits of

the claims. (Exhibit FF.) The trial court dismissed the petition finding that Petitioner failed

to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance. (Exhibit GG.) Petitioner petitioned the

court of appeals for review raising substantially the same claims, and later moved to stay the

proceedings and requested a remand to the trial court with instructions to reconsider its ruling

in light of Wiggins v. Smith. (Exhibit HH; Exhibit II.) The Court of Appeals denied the

motion for stay and, on July 20, 2004, summarily denied review. (Exhibit JJ; Exhibit KK.)

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court which, on January 5, 2005,

summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (Exhibit MM, Exhibit LL.) 

On August 4, 2005, Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas review. Petitioner

raises the following claims:

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1. The trial court’s refusal to allow Petitioner to call the

witnesses on his third notice, in the absence of real

prejudice to the State, violated Petitioner’s constitutional

right to due process, and was in contravention to clearly

established federal precedent.

2. Trial counsel’s failure to timely disclose witnesses was

objectively unreasonable and violated Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; the

trial court’s refusal to grant relief was in contravention to

clearly established precedent.

3. Trial counsel’s failure to interview and call Petitioner’s

proposed witnesses even when given the opportunity to

do so, was objectively unreasonable and violated

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel; the trial court’s refusal to grant

relief was in contravention to clearly established federal

precedent.

4. The Court of Appeals refusal to allow a remand to the

trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of Wiggins v.

Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), deprived Petitioner of due

process protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Docket No. 1, p. 7.)

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies in relation

to Ground I of the Petition, where he alleges that the trial court’s preclusion of his witnesses

amounted to a violation of due process. A state prisoner must exhaust the available state

remedies before a federal court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been procedurally

defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his claims to the

state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these claims. See

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O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been “fairly presented” if the

petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories on which the claim is based.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.

1995). The operative facts must be presented in the appropriate context to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation requirement is not satisfied, for example,

when a claim is presented in state court in a procedural context in which its merits will not

be considered in the absence of special circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact

correlation of the claims in both state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403.

The substance of the federal claim, however, must have been fairly presented to the state

courts. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court found his

claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims in any forum, that

no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.

1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 9th

Cir. 1999).

1. Ground I Was Not Presented As A Federal Issue In State Court.

Respondent contends that Petitioner's due process claim was not presented as a federal

issue and, therefore, the state courts were not on notice that a federal claim was being

asserted. Answer, at p. 16. As a threshold matter, the record clearly establishes that

Petitioner did not frame his due process claim in federal terms. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has held that a state prisoner has not fairly presented federal claims in state court

unless he specifically indicated to that court that the claims were based on federal law. See,

e.g., Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-70 (2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.

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2001) (general reference to insufficiency of evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury and

ineffective assistance of counsel lacked the specificity and explicitness required to present

federal claim); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (broad reference to

"due process” insufficient to present federal claim); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098,

1106 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is

insufficient to establish exhaustion.”). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim

explicit by citing specific provisions of federal statutory or case law, even if the federal basis

of a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by

citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v.

Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Here, Petitioner cannot establish he satisfied these exhaustion requirements. In his

brief on direct appeal of his conviction, only a cursory mention of a federal basis appears.

(Exhibit Z, p. 13). The substance of Petitioner’s claim is based on the Arizona Constitution,

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and on five Arizona cases addressing the issues

of discovery sanctions and the preclusion of witnesses. (Id.) In response to Petitioner’s

argument, the State noted that he had not raised any argument based on Federal constitutional

guarantees and therefore only addressed Petitioner’s state law arguments. (Exhibit AA, pp.

7-9.) The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the argument only under state law grounds.

(Exhibit BB, pp. 3-7.) As there was nothing in Petitioner briefs that would alert the Arizona

courts to a federal aspect of this claim, it was not fairly presented. See Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 830-31 (petitioner did not fairly present his federal claim where he “limited his

arguments exclusively to state evidentiary law”).

2. No State Court Remedies Remain Available.

If a claim has not been fairly presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-

270 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). When determining whether state remedies are

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available, the court looks to the time of filing of the federal habeas petition. Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 125 n. 28 (1982). If, at the time the habeas petition is filed, there are no state

remedies available to a petitioner who has failed to fairly present a claim in a procedurally

appropriate manner to the state’s highest court, the petitioner has technically exhausted the

claim by procedural default. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. That is the case here. As

Respondents assert, any attempt by Petitioner to now present these unexhausted claims in

state court would be futile. Pursuant to Rule 32.2, Ariz.R.Crim.P., a petitioner may not be

granted state court relief on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32

petition for post-conviction relief. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (outlined

in sub-sections (d) through (g) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was

omitted from a prior petition will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2 be avoided. Here,

Petitioner presents no argument addressing the applicability of any exception provided in

Rule 32. As such, Petitioner's due process claim is procedurally defaulted.

3. Petitioner Cannot Establish Cause And Prejudice.

As Petitioner's due process claim is procedurally defaulted, federal court review is

barred absent a showing of legitimate cause for the default and actual prejudice attributable

to it, or a demonstration that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Sawyer v. Whitley,

505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the default and “prejudice”

is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To show cause, a petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate that

“some factor external to the defense” impeded efforts to raise the claim in state court.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception is only available “where the petitioner supplements his constitutional claim with

a colorable showing of factual innocence.” Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.

1995) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)). As Petitioner has not argued

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factual innocence or responded to the State’s argument that cause and prejudice are not

present, there is no basis for review of this claim. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Grounds 2 and 3 of the petition allege that Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to interview and timely disclose witnesses. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of

the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right to “effective assistance of

counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to determine if

Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel, the court must determine “whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the

trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. The Strickland standard for

ineffective assistance of counsel has two components. A defendant must first demonstrate

that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466

U.S. at 687. It requires the defendant to show that counsel's conduct “fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-688. Second, a defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense, i.e., that counsel’s errors were so serious as

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 466 U.S. at 687. In other words, “but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at

694. 

In reviewing counsel's performance, the court must be highly deferential to counsel's

behavior. “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 466 U.S. at 689. A reviewing court

may first consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and if it finds that the alleged

unprofessional conduct would not have changed the result of the proceeding, it need not

consider the performance prong. Id.

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Addressing the claims raised in Grounds 1 and 2, the trial court (which issued the last

reasoned decision) concluded as follows:

Defendant was well aware of the witnesses which were not

disclosed. The Court finds no sufficient evidence to call for an

evidentiary hearing since the Court is not persuaded that the

outcome would have been any different than what occurred.

Defendant claims that he was prejudiced by not being allowed

to call witnesses he identified just before trial. However,

defendant fails to respond to the fact that the Court allowed him

to call one of his requested witnesses and he chose not to call

any such witness. It is not appropriate to second-guess the

strategy of trial counsel. Further, defendant failed to provide his

counsel with the addresses of the witnesses he now claims were

precluded because of [his attorney] Mr. Tosto’s ineffective

representation; however, defendant is the party who knew or

could have provided such information and it was never turned

over.

Defendant complains that evidence could have been presented

about part of the property being rented to another person;

however, there was evidence about the lease and the lease was

admitted into evidence. What defendant fails to address is the

overwhelming evidence against him, including the presence of

surveillance cameras on the perimeter of the property to be able

to see who was approaching, the presence of drugs in his

daughter’s system, and the testimony of Mr. Smith.

(Exhibit GG, pp. 1-2.)

Going directly to Strickland’s prejudice prong, there is no basis for a finding that the

trial court was unreasonable in concluding that the alleged unprofessional conduct would not

have changed the result of the proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The appropriate

inquiry is whether the state court’s factual determinations on the issue were “objectively

unreasonable.” Miller-El v. Cockrell 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). As the quoted portion of the

court’s reasoning establishes, evidence about the lease and the lease itself were admitted at

trial, but the trial court, considering what it termed “overwhelming evidence against

[Petitioner],” including surveillance cameras installed on the property and the drugs in his

daughter’s system, concluded that more evidence about the lease would not have made a

difference in the outcome of the trial. The court’s factual determinations are presumed

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correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and the Petitioner has not satisfied his burden with evidence

that rebuts the trial court’s findings. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his

Grounds 1 and 2 ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

C. Due Process Violation from Failure to Remand

Petitioner’s final claim is that the Court of Appeals’s refusal to allow a remand to the

trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 2003) deprived

him of due process. However, as Respondent indicates, the denial of remand was based on

Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Ninth Circuit “has specifically

stated that federal habeas relief is not available to redress alleged procedural errors in state

post-conviction proceedings.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998). As

Petitioner’s claim is based on an alleged procedural error in his post-conviction relief

proceedings, relief is unavailable. 

D. Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery on Child Abuse

Petitioner seeks leave of Court to conduct discovery related to the drug test results and

medical records for his daughter, Mallory Haskins. Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254

cases allows the district court to authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. However, to expand the record in the manner proposed by

Petitioner, he must establish pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) that he was diligent in

attempting to develop the factual basis of the claim in state court. Cooper-Smith v.

Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). To meet the burden § 2254(e)(2) imposes,

a petitioner must show that he is relying on “a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The

factual predicate to Petitioner’s request for discovery was available to him immediately

following trial. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot make the required showing and is not entitled

to discovery. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, issue an Order denying Petitioner's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed August 4, 2005 [Docket No. 1];

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Conduct

Limited Discovery on Child Abuse [Docket No. 26] be denied.

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 05-2352-PHXMHM. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 24th day of June, 2008.

Case 2:05-cv-02352-MHM-JR Document 37 Filed 06/24/08 Page 13 of 13