Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03703/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03703-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 376
Nature of Suit: other
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, ex rel. J. Scott, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Center for Hematology and 

Oncology PLC; Christopher Biggs; 

Devinder Singh; Daniel Reed; and Terry 

Lee, 

Defendants. 

No. CV16-3703-PHX DGC 

ORDER 

 Qui tam relator J. Scott (“Relator”) filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim by 

Defendant Arizona Center for Hematology and Oncology PLC, d/b/a Arizona Center for 

Cancer Care (“AZCCC”). Doc. 114. AZCCC did not respond, but filed an amended 

counterclaim. Doc. 122. Relator again moves to dismiss. Doc. 123. The motion is fully 

briefed and the Court finds that oral argument is not needed. Docs. 126, 128. For the 

following reasons, the Court will deny Relator’s motion. 

I. Background. 

 The Court takes the allegations of AZCCC’s counterclaim as true for purposes of a 

motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). AZCCC is a 

“multispecialty cancer treatment center” that cares for patients throughout Phoenix. 

Doc. 122 at 49 ¶ 7. In 2008, AZCCC hired Relator to work as billing manager of the 

Radiation Oncology Department to develop and implement its billing system. Id. at 49 

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¶¶ 8-9. Relator’s responsibilities included: “analyzing billing and claims for accuracy 

and completeness; serving as the . . . expert on coding and billing processes; ensuring that 

. . . billing operations [wer]e conducted in a manner consistent with payor rules and 

guidelines; . . . and keeping up-to-date with current coding, billing, and compliance 

requirements.” Id. ¶ 10. Relator was, “essentially[,] the architect” of the billing system, 

and AZCCC relied on him to “ensure all claims were properly coded and compliant with 

applicable billing requirements prior to submission.” Id. at 49-50 ¶¶ 9, 11. 

 AZCCC’s billing policy included routine monitoring of overpayments and prompt 

refunds. Id. at 51 ¶ 17. An overpayment “is any payment that a healthcare provider 

receives in excess of amounts due and payable under the payor’s policies.” Id. ¶ 17. As 

a senior-level employee, Relator had the sole responsibility of overseeing insurance 

refunds and was authorized to “immediately approve and issue” identified overpayments. 

Id. at 51 ¶¶ 15-16, 18. AZCCC alleges Relator failed to complete required refunds, and 

that in several instances Relator reviewed an account multiple times, noted an 

overpayment, but failed to issue a necessary refund on the account. Id. at 52 ¶¶ 19-20. 

Relator’s failure to issue refunds interfered with AZCCC’s contractual relationships with 

payors and exposed it to a risk of liability. Id. at 53 ¶ 23. 

 When an account is not collectible, AZCCC will sometimes “write off” accounts 

receivable – monies owed to it. Id. at 54 ¶ 26. AZCCC’s policy required Relator to 

“confer with and obtain consent from the physician associated with the account 

receivable” before writing off an account. Id. ¶ 27. “Relator was not authorized to write 

off accounts without approval.” Id. ¶ 26. But Relator wrote off “approximately $250,000 

in accounts receivable without obtaining the requisite consent from an AZCCC 

physician.” Id. at 54-56 ¶¶ 28-32. Relator also used an incorrect code when billing a 

particular procedure, resulting in underpayments and lost revenue to AZCCC in the 

amount of approximately three million dollars between 2008 and 2017. Id. at 57-61 

¶¶ 34-42. 

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On October 26, 2016, Relator, individually and on behalf of the United States, 

sued AZCCC and several of its doctors – Dr. Christopher Biggs, Dr. Devinder Singh, Dr. 

Daniel Reed, and Dr. Terry Lee – for violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 

§§ 3729 et seq. (“FCA”). Doc. 1. The case originally was sealed, but was unsealed in 

February 2017. Doc. 9. AZCCC was served on June 6, 2017 (Docs. 117 ¶ 45; 18), 

terminated Relator (Doc. 124 at 6-7), and counterclaimed, alleging breach of fiduciary 

duty (Doc. 122 at 62, 64). 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A successful motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must show either that the 

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts sufficient to support its 

theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A 

complaint that sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss as 

long as it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when “the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). 

III. Relator’s Motion to Dismiss. 

AZCCC never responded to Relator’s first motion to dismiss (Doc. 114), and has 

since filed an amended counterclaim (Doc. 122). The Court will deny Relator’s first 

motion as moot and consider only Relator’s subsequent motion to dismiss. Doc. 124. 

Relator argues that AZCCC’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations (id. at 12), fails 

sufficiently to plead breach of fiduciary duty (id. at 8-15), and violates Arizona’s antiSLAPP statute (id. at 15). 

 

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A. Statute of Limitations. 

 “[T]he statute of limitations defense . . . may be raised by a motion to dismiss . . . 

[i]f the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean 

Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). But even if the relevant dates alleged in 

the complaint are beyond the statutory period, the “‘complaint cannot be dismissed unless 

it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the 

timeliness of the claim.’” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 

1998) (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 

1995)); see Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). Indeed, 

“[d]ismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6) ‘only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, 

would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.’” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (quoting Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682)); see Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 

F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996). “‘Because the applicability of the equitable tolling 

doctrine often depends on matters outside the pleadings, it is not generally amenable to 

resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 402 (quoting Supermail 

Cargo, 68 F.3d at 1206). 

Arizona law governs AZCCC’s state law claim. United Mine Workers of America 

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Actions for breach of fiduciary duty must commence 

within two years of the action’s accrual. A.R.S. § 12-542; CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts 

& Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 7 P.3d 979, 981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). “Under Arizona’s 

discovery rule, a claim does not accrue until ‘the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of 

reasonable diligence, should know the facts underling the cause.’” Perez v. First Am. 

Title Ins. Co., No. CV–08–1184–PHX–DGC, 2010 WL 1507012, at *3 (D. Ariz. April 

14, 2010) (quoting Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 898 P.2d 

964, 966 (1995)). AZCCC’s claim is barred if, based on the face of its counterclaim, it 

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would be unable to prove that its claim accrued after March 29, 2016. See Doc. 88 

(AZCCC’s counterclaim filed March 29, 2018). 

AZCCC alleges that it did not discover Relator’s breach until after he filed his 

complaint in this case. Doc. 122 ¶¶ 44-48. Relator responds that AZCCC “had every 

opportunity . . . to exercise reasonable diligence in reviewing Relator[’s] notes and 

overseeing Relator’s work such that it would be on notice of any perceived deficiencies.” 

Doc. 124 at 13. But the Court must accept AZCCC’s allegations as true for purposes of 

this motion. AZCCC alleges that Relator became its billing manager in 2008, Relator 

provided AZCCC with assurances that he was billing in accordance with applicable 

requirements, AZCCC paid for Relator to receive training on billing practices, and 

AZCCC reasonably relied on Relator to handle billing properly. Id. at ¶ 46. AZCCC 

alleges that it conducted an investigation after being served with Relator’s complaint in 

this case and, as a result, discovered his misconduct. Id. at ¶ 47. Accepting these 

allegations as true, the Court cannot conclude that AZCCC can prove no set of facts that 

would establish the timeliness of the claim. Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 402. The Court 

therefore cannot dismiss the claim at this stage on statute of limitations grounds. 

B. Failure to State a Claim. 

1. Rule 9(b) Standard. 

Relator argues that AZCCC must satisfy the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading 

standard because its claim “sounds in fraud,” and because “by seeking ten years[] of 

damages [AZCCC must be] accusing Relator of engaging in some kind of fraud or 

concealment.” Doc. 124 at 8-9. Rule 9(b) states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party 

must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b)’s purpose is to “ensure[] that allegations of fraud are specific 

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct that is alleged . . . so that 

they can defend against the charge.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 

1985). 

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But AZCCC alleges breach of fiduciary duty, not fraud or mistake. Docs. 122; 

126 at 6. Relator cites no Ninth Circuit authority for extending Rule 9(b)’s heightened 

standard to breach of fiduciary duty. And Relator’s unexplained case citations are 

unavailing. See Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding “that the 

same heightened [Rule 9(b)] pleading standard applies to securities claims brought under 

[securities statute] when premised on averments of fraud.”) (emphasis added); Shapiro v. 

UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 1992) (“we hold that when [securities claims] 

are grounded in fraud, rather than negligence, Rule 9(b) applies.”). The Court will apply 

Rule 8’s pleading standard to evaluate AZCCC’s claim. 

 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 

 In Arizona, it is well settled that an employee owes his employer a fiduciary duty. 

McCallister Co. v. Kastella, 825 P.2d 980, 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Mallamo v. 

Hartman, 219 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Ariz. 1950)). The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty 

claim are “the existence of a duty owed, a breach of that duty, and damages causally 

related to such breach.” Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 997, 

1004 (D. Ariz. 2011) (citing Smethers v. Campion, 108 P.3d 946, 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2005)). Relator argues that AZCCC fails sufficiently to plead all elements. Doc. 124 at 

9-15. 

 AZCCC alleges that Relator was its employee and owed it a fiduciary duty. 

Doc. 122, ¶¶ 8-15. AZCCC alleges that Relator breached his duty by violating billing 

procedures, failing to complete required insurance refunds according to policy, using 

improper billing codes, and writing off accounts receivable without authorization. Id., 

¶¶ 16-43. AZCCC alleges this breach damaged it by interfering with contractual 

relationships, exposing it to liability, and causing revenue losses for under-billed 

procedures. Id., ¶ 53. These allegations, if true, allow the Court to reasonably infer 

Relator breached his fiduciary duty to AZCCC. 

Relator contends that AZCCC’s inclusion of the “faithless servant doctrine” in its 

counterclaim is fatal. Doc. 124 at 9-11. AZCCC cites several cases in its counterclaim 

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applying the faithless servant doctrine, none from Arizona. Doc. 122 ¶ 54. “The 

faithless servant doctrine provides that an employee who violates his . . . duty of loyalty 

or fidelity in the performance of his . . . employment duties forfeits the right to 

compensation therefor.” Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Application of “Faithless Servant 

Doctrine”, 24 A.L.R. 6th 399 (2007). But AZCCC’s counterclaim cannot be read as 

limited to this doctrine, and, as discussed above, AZCCC sufficiently alleges breach of 

fiduciary duty under Arizona law. Whatever the ultimate viability of the faithless servant 

doctrine in this case, the Court cannot conclude that AZCCC has failed to state a claim 

for breach of fiduciary duty. 

Relator also argues that AZCCC has not pled breach because the counterclaim 

shows he was diligent and acted in good faith. Doc. 124 at 11. This is a factual argument 

not appropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. At this stage, AZCCC need not prove breach 

or disprove Relator’s defenses – it need only satisfy Rule 8, which it has done. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Relator’s cited cases were all resolved at 

trial. See Atkinson v. Marquart, 541 P.2d 556, 558 (Ariz. 1975); Tovrea Land & Cattle 

Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 412 P.2d 47, 66 (Ariz. 1966); Sequoia Vacuum Sys. v. Stransky, 229 

Cal. App. 2d 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Little Rock Towel & Linen Supply Co. v. Indep. 

Linen Serv. Co. of Ark., 377 S.W.2d 34, 37-38 (Ark. 1964); Golden Rod Mining Co. v. 

Bukvich, 92 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1939). 

 Relator argues that AZCCC fails to plead damages by omitting necessary facts 

about how much money was under-refunded, over what time period Relator failed to 

refund monies, how Relator’s actions exposed AZCCC to liability, whether AZCCC 

would have authorized Relator’s unapproved write-offs, whether AZCCC had a payor 

contract about billing codes, and whether Relator’s training preceded any misconduct. 

Doc. 124 at 14-15. But AZCCC need not set forth detailed factual allegations in its 

counterclaim; it must plead only enough facts to allow the Court to infer Relator’s 

liability. Id., 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The counterclaim 

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sufficiently alleges that AZCCC was damaged by Relator’s breach of fiduciary duty. 

Doc. 122, ¶ 53. 

IV. Arizona’s anti-SLAPP statute. 

Relator argues the Court should dismiss AZCCC’s claim as frivolous and in 

violation of Arizona’s anti-SLAPP statute. Doc. 124 at 15-18. See A.R.S. § 12-752 

(strategic lawsuits against public participation; motion to dismiss, (“SLAPP”)). The 

statute provides: 

In any legal action that involves a party’s exercise of the right of petition, 

the defending party may file a motion to dismiss the action under this 

section. The court shall grant the motion unless the party against whom the 

motion is made shows that the moving party’s exercise of the right of 

petition did not contain any reasonable factual support or any arguable 

basis in law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual compensable 

injury to the responding party. 

A.R.S. § 12-752(A)-(B). 

“Exercise of the right of petition” means any written or oral statement that 

falls within the constitutional protection of free speech and that is made as 

part of an initiative, referendum or recall effort or that is all of the 

following: 

(a) Made before or submitted to a legislative or executive body or any 

other governmental proceeding. 

(b) Made in connection with an issue that is under consideration or review 

by a legislative or executive body or any other governmental 

proceeding. 

(c) Made for the purpose of influencing a governmental action, decision or 

result. 

Id. § 12-751(1) (emphasis added). “Government proceeding” excludes “a judicial 

proceeding.” Id. § 12-751(2). 

“The first step in evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion is to determine whether the 

statements at issue involve an exercise of the right of petition, as defined by the statute.” 

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Tennenbaum v. Ariz. City Sanitary Dist., 799 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (D. Ariz. 2011). To 

qualify for protection under the statute, the moving defendant’s statements must be 

constitutionally protected free speech and be made as part of a recall effort, or must 

satisfy all three prongs in § 12-751(1)(a)-(c). Id.

 Relator, as the moving defendant in AZCCC’s counterclaim, argues that he 

exercised “the right of petition” under the statute with his submission of a disclosure 

statement and qui tam complaint to the Department of Justice. Doc. 124 at 17. This 

submission, Relator argues, was a “written statement to an executive body or as a part of 

[a] governmental proceeding” to satisfy the first prong in § 12-751(1)(a). Id. The Court 

does not agree. 

Section 12-751(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute excludes statements made in judicial 

proceedings, and Relator’s submission of his complaint and supporting documents to the 

Department of Justice was merely a requirement for filing this judicial proceeding. 31 

U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); cf. Varela v. Perez, No. CV–08–2356–PHX–FJM, 2009 WL 

4438738, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2009) (“The [anti-SLAPP] statute was intended to encourage 

the free participation in the process of government. The defendants have cited no case 

interpreting the right to petition the government under Arizona’s anti-SLAPP statute as 

including the filing of a criminal complaint with law enforcement. The crime victim 

defendants’ report of criminal activity to the police is not a ‘petition to the government’ 

as that term is used in A.R.S. § 12–751. Therefore, the statute has no application to the 

present case.”). 

Even if Relator could establish that he had exercised “the right of petition” under 

§ 12-751(1)(a), the issue in his qui tam suit is not “under consideration or review by a 

legislative or executive body” under § 12-751(1)(b). Relator asserts that federal agencies 

will decide the issue of “reimbursement payments to affiliated providers.” Doc. 124 at 

17. But Relator’s qui tam suit is before the Court and will be resolved in a judicial 

proceeding, not by a legislative or executive body. 

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Further, Relator asserts he brought this suit “for the purpose of influencing the 

government to intervene in his case” under § 12-751(1)(c) (Doc. 124 at 17), but again, 

Relator’s submission to the Department of Justice under § 3730(b)(2) was required. The 

United States’ decision about whether to intervene in Petitioner’s lawsuit is incidental to 

resolution of the case before the Court. 

 Finally, AZCCC’s claims are not contrary to public policy. Doc. 124 at 15. “A 

SLAPP suit is one in which the plaintiff’s alleged injury results from petitioning or free 

speech activities by a defendant that are protected by the federal or state constitution.” 

Tennenbaum, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. AZCCC’s alleged injury results from Relator’s 

breach of fiduciary duty, not from Relator’s petitioning or free speech activities. 

Moreover, qui tam defendants are permitted to bring counterclaims for damages 

independent of the underlying FCA suit. U.S. ex rel. Madden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp, 4 

F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e hold that qui tam defendants can bring 

counterclaims for independent damages. . . . [W]e are not persuaded that it is necessary to 

bar counterclaims in qui tam actions in order to provide relators with the proper incentive 

to file suit. The bounty provisions of the FCA already serve this purpose. Rather, we 

believe that some mechanism must be permitted to insure that relators do not engage in 

wrongful conduct in order to create the circumstances for qui tam suits and to discourage 

relators from bringing frivolous actions. Counterclaims for independent damages serve 

these purposes”). Even counterclaims that amount to indemnification need not 

necessarily be dismissed. Id. (“[I]t is possible to resolve the issue of a qui tam 

defendant’s liability before reaching the qui tam defendant’s counterclaims. If a qui tam 

defendant is found liable, the counterclaims can then be dismissed on the ground that 

they will have the effect of providing for indemnification or contribution. On the other 

hand, if a qui tam defendant is found not liable, the counterclaims can be addressed on 

the merits.”) (citation omitted). 

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Relator is not protected by Arizona’s anti-SLAPP statute and is therefore not 

entitled to attorneys’ fees under the statute. The Court will not dismiss AZCCC’s 

counterclaim on this basis or award Relator fees. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s first motion to dismiss (Doc. 114) is denied as moot. 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 123) is denied. 

 Dated this 11th day of October, 2018. 

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