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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID LITMON, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney

General,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-15261

D.C. No.

3:10-cv-03894-

EMC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 12, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed October 14, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Barry G. Silverman

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Chief Judge Kozinski

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2 LITMON V. HARRIS

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging

California Penal Code § 290.012(b), which requires that

“every person who has ever been adjudicated a sexually

violent predator” to appear before local law enforcement

every 90 days for the rest of their lives to verify certain

identifying information.

Citing United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th

Cir. 2012), the panel held that the district court properly

dismissed plaintiff’s claim that the registration requirement

violates the fundamental right to be free from physical

restraint by requiring sexually violent predators to appear in

person every 90 days to register. Absent a fundamental right,

the panel held that strict scrutiny was inapplicable. Applying

rational basis review, the panel concluded that the in-person

registration requirement survived. The panel held that it was

not irrational for the California legislature to conclude that

requiring those who have been convicted of sexually violent

offenses to register in person every 90 days may deter

recidivism and promote public safety.

Citing Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003), the panel

held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s ex

post facto claim that “the cumulative burden of the

[registration] requirement . . . makes it an unconstitutionally

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LITMON V. HARRIS 3

retroactive punishment.” The panel further held that

plaintiff’s equal protection claim was also properly dismissed

because neither mentally disordered offenders nor mentally

disordered sex offenders are similarly situated to sexually

violent predators.

The panel held that plaintiff’s void-for-vagueness

challenge was waived because he failed to present it to the

district. The panel further held that plaintiff’s argument that

the California Department of Justice’s failure to issue formal

regulations governing the manner of registration under

section 290.012(b) violated the California Administrative

Procedure Act was also waived.

COUNSEL

Skye D.Y. Langs (argued), Craig E. Stewart, pro bono

appointment, Jones Day, Palo Alto, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Douglas

J. Woods, Senior Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Tamar Pachter,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Nelson R. Richards

(argued), Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco,

California, for Defendant-Appellee.

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4 LITMON V. HARRIS

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

California law requires “every person who has ever been

adjudicated a sexuallyviolent predator” to appear before local

law enforcement every 90 days for the rest of their lives to

verify certain identifying information. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 290.012(b). We consider various constitutional challenges

to this registration requirement.

I. Background

David Litmon, Jr., admitted to raping four women and

severely beating another in the 1970s. Upon his release from

prison, he sexually assaulted two underage girls. After

serving his second sentence, he was adjudicated a “sexually

violent predator” pursuant to California Welfare and

Institutions Code § 6600(a)(1), and committed for treatment

in 2000. Since his release in 2008, Litmon has been reporting

to his local police station every 90 days to fill out a

registration form pursuant to California Penal Code

§ 290.012(b). The section provides in relevant part:

[E]very person who has ever been adjudicated

a sexually violent predator, as defined in

Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions

Code, shall, after his or her release from

custody, verify his or her address no less than

once every 90 days and place of employment,

including the name and address of the

employer, in a manner established by the

Department of Justice.

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LITMON V. HARRIS 5

A sexually violent predator is “a person who has been

convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more

victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes

the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that

it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent

criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). 

The California Department of Justice requires all sex

offenders to fill out a form entitled “Sex Registration /

Change of Address / Annual or Other Update.” The form

lists as a “registration requirement” that registration be

completed in person and provides blanks for information such

as physical characteristics, vehicle identification and work

and home addresses. Those adjudicated as sexually violent

predators must fill out this form in person every 90 days.

In 2010, Litmon, pro se, sought injunctive relief from the

registration requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His original

complaint against the Attorney General of California alleged

that the registration requirement violated the Double Jeopardy

Clause and due process. The district court initially dismissed

this complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, but

then reconsidered its judgment and granted Litmon leave to

amend “only to the extent [he]seeks leave to assert a cause of

action for violation of the Fourteen[th] Amendment Equal

Protection clause.” Litmon’s first amended complaint realleged his due process claim and added an equal protection

claim. The district court struck the due process claim because

it had already been dismissed, and granted Litmon leave to

replead only the equal protection claim in order to “explain

the basis on which other persons received preferential

treatment.” Litmon’s second amended complaint, which

alleges a single equal protection claim on the basis that two

other classes of offenders received more favorable treatment,

was dismissed with prejudice. Litmon appeals.

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6 LITMON V. HARRIS

II. Discussion

We review the dismissal of Litmon’s section 1983 claims

de novo. See Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson,

640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011). We construe pro se

complaints liberally, especially in civil rights cases. See

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“However, a liberal interpretation of a pro se civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled. Vague and conclusory allegations of

official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted).

A. Substantive Due Process Claims

The district court properly dismissed Litmon’s claim that

the registration requirement violates the fundamental right to

be free from physical restraint by requiring sexually violent

predators to appear in person every 90 days to register. In

United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012),

we held that a similar in-person, 90-day registration

requirement for certain juvenile sex offenders didn’t

implicate any fundamental rights protected bysubstantive due

process. See id. at 1012 (“None of the[] [fundamental] rights

[identified by the Supreme Court] are, or could be, asserted

by defendants in this case. Nor do any of defendants’ rights

that are potentially at stake appear to be so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). And

in Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (per

curiam), we held that “persons who have been convicted of

serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be

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LITMON V. HARRIS 7

free from the registration and notification requirements set

forth in” an Alaska statute requiring those convicted of

multiple aggravated sex offenses to register every 90 days,

though not in person.

That the registration period in Juvenile Male may be

reduced from life to 25 years in limited circumstances, see

670 F.3d at 1005, is not a material distinction. Litmon cannot

cite any authorities suggesting that the registration

requirement implicates the fundamental right to be free from

restraint and relies on inapposite cases in the habeas context. 

Even if we could analogize to habeas cases, we held in Henry

v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999), that

“[r]egistration, even if it must be done in person at the police

station, does not constitute the type of severe, immediate

restraint on physical liberty necessary to render a petitioner

‘in custody’ for the purposes of federal habeas corpus relief.” 

Id. at 1242.

Absent a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is inapplicable. 

We therefore apply rational basis review and conclude that

the in-person registration requirement survives. The

California legislature found that “[s]ex offenders pose a

potentially high risk of committing further sex offenses after

release from incarceration or commitment,” see Cal. Penal

Code § 290.03(a)(1), and determined that the statutory

scheme for “risk assessment, supervision, monitoring and

containment for registered sex offenders residing in

California communities is necessary to enhance public safety

and reduce the risk of recidivism posed by these offenders,”

see id. § 290.03(a). It is not irrational for the California

legislature to conclude that requiring those who have been

convicted of sexually violent offenses to register in person

every 90 days may deter recidivism and promote public

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8 LITMON V. HARRIS

safety. See Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009 (“We have held

that protecting our communities is a legitimate legislative

purpose.”).

Litmon further alleges in his original complaint that his

“liberty and freedom of movement have been so restricted

and infringed upon that [he] has been unable to obtain

employment as a truck driver, since such employment could

likely cause him to miss the 90-day appearance at the police

station.” He argues that this violates his “fundamental right

to work.” But “[t]he [Supreme] Court has never held that the

‘right’ to pursue a profession is a fundamental right, such that

any state-sponsored barriers to entrywould be subject to strict

scrutiny.” See Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031

n.5 (9th Cir. 1999). “[A] restriction on the conduct of a

profession will run afoul of substantive due process rights

only if it is irrational.” In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 961

(9th Cir. 1999). We’ve already concluded that the

registration requirement is rational. See p. 7–8, supra.

At oral argument before the panel, Litmon mentioned that

local police have been harassing sex offenders during the

registration process, causing him to spend upwards of six

hours at the police station. Nothing in the district court’s

order dismissing Litmon’s due process claims against the

Attorney General precludes Litmon from raising an asapplied substantive due process claim against local law

enforcement based on allegations of police misconduct.

B. Ex Post Facto Claim

The district court properly dismissed Litmon’s claim that

“the cumulative burden of the [registration] requirement . . .

makes it an unconstitutionally retroactive punishment.” In

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LITMON V. HARRIS 9

his original complaint, Litmon alleged a violation of the

Double Jeopardy Clause, and only on appeal did he recharacterize the claim as alleging a violation of the Ex Post

Facto Clause. The Attorney General does not object to this

change, and nor do we, as the inquiry into whether a law

constitutes retroactive punishment in violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause is identical to that with respect to the Ex

Post Facto Clause. See Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 97

(2003).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe I, supra,

is instructive. There, the Court held that an Alaska statute

requiring those convicted of aggravated sex offenses to

register every 90 days for life did not violate the Ex Post

Facto Clause. See id. at 99–105. Smith reversed our holding

in Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), and corrected

our “misapprehension” that the Alaska statute at issue

contained an in-person registration requirement. Smith,

538 U.S. at 101.

 Litmon argues that Smith is not controlling due to the

Alaska law’s lack of an in-person registration requirement. 

But there is no reason to believe that the addition of such a

requirement would have changed the outcome. In fact, we

held in ACLU of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.

2012), that an in-person, 90-day, lifetime registration

requirement for the highest level sex offenders does not

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, noting that the Nevada

statute at issue was “indistinguishable from [the statute] in

Smith,” and that Smith’s “resolution of our factual error

[regarding the in-person registration requirement] did not

amount to a holding that in-person registration necessarily

constitutes an affirmative disability” for purposes of the

inquiry. See id. at 1056; see also Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d

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10 LITMON V. HARRIS

955, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (California’s in-person, annual,

lifetime registration requirement for those who committed

certain sex offenses did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).

C. Equal Protection Claim

Litmon’s equal protection claim was also properly

dismissed. Litmon alleges in his second amended complaint

that the registration requirementfor sexuallyviolent predators

violates the Equal Protection Clause because “other similarly

situated civil committees such as . . . a) Mentally Disordered

Offender[s] . . . , [and] b) Mentally Disordered Sex

Offender[s] . . . whom [sic] also have been convicted of the

same kinds of sex offenses, civilly committed to the same

mental institution, [and] receiv[ed] the same mental health

treatment, [are] not required to appear in person at the local

police station every 90 days to update their address and

employment information”; instead, they are required to

register annually.

The equal protection challenge fails because neither

mentally disordered offenders nor mentally disordered sex

offenders are similarly situated to sexually violent predators. 

See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th

Cir. 2005). Recall that a sexually violent predator is “a

person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense

against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental

disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and

safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in

sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 6600(a)(1). A mentally disordered offender, by contrast, is

a person who has been convicted of a listed crime, including

voluntary manslaughter, arson, kidnapping or rape, see Cal.

Penal Code § 2962(e)(2), who “by reason of his or her severe

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LITMON V. HARRIS 11

mental disorder . . . represents a substantial danger of

physical harm to others” and who has been diagnosed with a

severe mental disorder that was “one of the causes or was an

aggravating factor in the prisoner’s criminal behavior,” see

id. § 2962(d)(1).

The inquiry into whether an individual poses a

“substantial danger of physical harm to others” is far broader

than the inquiry into whether one is “likely [to] . . . engage in

sexually violent criminal behavior.” Moreover, unlike

sexually violent predators, mentally disordered offenders

need not have been convicted of a “sexually violent offense

against one or more victims,” and may instead have

committed non-sexually violent offenses such as voluntary

manslaughter or arson.

Litmon argues that “because of the significant overlap

between the two commitment statutes, any sex offender

committed as a sexually violent predator could have instead

been committed as a mentally disordered offender.” This is

not the case, however, because individuals cannot be

committed as mentally disordered offenders unless they are

eligible for parole, see Cal. Penal Code § 2962, whereas those

committed as sexually violent predators must have been “in

custody pursuant to [their] determinate prison term[s] [or]

parole revocation term[s],” see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 6601(a)(2).

Nor are sexually violent predators similarly situated to

mentallydisordered sex offenders. A mentally disordered sex

offender is “any person who by reason of mental defect,

disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of

sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the

health and safety of others.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6300,

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12 LITMON V. HARRIS

repealed by Cal. Stats. 1981, ch. 928, p. 3485, § 2. Even

though the statute providing for the commitment of mentally

disordered sex offenders was repealed in 1981, it’s relevant

for our purposes because California Penal Code § 290.004

provides that “[a]ny person who, since July 1, 1944, has been

or hereafter is determined to be a mentally disordered sex

offender under Article 1 (commencing with Section 6300) of

Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 6 of the Welfare and

Institutions Code . . . shall register in accordance with the

[Sex Offender Registration] Act.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 290.004.

The two groups are distinguishable because sexually

violent predators must have been convicted of a sexually

violent offense and have been found likely to “engage in

sexually violent criminal behavior” upon their release from

prison, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1) (emphasis

added), while mentally disordered sex offenders need only

have been found to be “predisposed to the commission of

sexual offenses,” and not sexually violent offenses, see Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6300 (emphasis added).

In any event, the California legislature has a rational basis

for imposing more frequent reporting requirements on

sexually violent predators given their criminal history of

sexual violence and their higher risk of recidivism. See Cal.

Penal Code § 290.03(a)(1). Contrary to Litmon’s assertion,

strict scrutiny isn’t applicable because he has failed to allege

that a fundamental right has been implicated, and because sex

offenders do not comprise a suspect class. See Kahawaiolaa

v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009; United States v. LeMay,

260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

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LITMON V. HARRIS 13

Litmon argues in his opening brief that the equal

protection claim in his second amended complaint should “be

read to encompass the allegation that those adjudicated as

sexually violent predators within the State of California are

treated less favorably than those similarly adjudicated outside

of the state.” But Litmon’s second amended complaint

identified only mentally disordered offenders and mentally

disordered sex offenders as similarly situated individuals, and

cannot reasonably be construed as alleging an equal

protection claim on the basis of differential treatment

between those adjudicated as sexually violent predators

within California and those adjudicated as such under other

states’ statutes. Regardless, this argument is waived because

Litmon failed to raise it before the district court. See In re

Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 780

(9th Cir. 2014). The district court gave Litmon two

opportunities to allege this equal protection claim in a

subsequent complaint, both of which he passed up.

D. Remaining Claims

Litmon contends that California Penal Code § 290.012(b)

is unconstitutionally vague because it contains “no standards

describing the manner of registration required by the law”;

“it fails to establish standards that are sufficient to guard

against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests”; and it

“obstruct[s] meaningful judicial review.” He attempts to

construe this claim from the following sentence in his

original complaint: “Section 290.012(b) does not contain a

requirement that one appear physically at the local police

station, but this requirement has been created and

implemented by Defendant [then Attorney General] Brown.” 

But this language cannot reasonably be read as raising a voidfor-vagueness challenge and Litmon’s argument is therefore

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14 LITMON V. HARRIS

waived because he failed to present it to the district court. 

See In re Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d at

780.

Litmon also argues that the California Department of

Justice’s failure to issue formal regulations governing the

manner of registration under section 290.012(b) violates the

California Administrative Procedure Act, see Cal. Gov’t

Code § 11340 et seq. Litmon again attempts to construe this

claim from the allegation in his original complaint that

“Section 290.012(b) does not contain a requirement that one

appear physically at the local police station, but this

requirement has been created and implemented by Defendant

Brown.” This language fails to raise an APA claim and this

challenge wasn’t otherwise raised before the district court. It

is therefore waived. See In re Mortgage Elec. Registration

Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d at 780. Given that Litmon failed to state

an APA claim, we need not consider his argument that the

district court abused its discretion by failing to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.

* * *

California’s registration requirement for sexually violent

predators accordingly survives Litmon’s constitutional

challenges.

AFFIRMED.

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