Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01299/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01299-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH R. BARBER, JR.,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 14-cv-1299-H-(PCL)

DENYING PETITIONER’S

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. No. 1]

ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; AND

[Doc. No. 15]

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

JEFFERY BEARD, Secretary,

Respondent.

On May 23, 2014, Kenneth R. Barber Jr. (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) On June 13, 2014, Jeffery Beard

(“Respondent”) was sua sponte substituted as respondent. (Doc. No. 7.) On July 18,

2014, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacked federal

habeas jurisdiction because Petitioner’s due process claim did not affect the fact or

duration of his confinement. (Doc. No. 8.) On November 6, 2014, the magistrate judge

issued a report and recommendation that the Court grant Respondent’s motion to

dismiss. (Doc. No. 13.) On December 17, 2014, Petitioner filed an objection to the

report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 14.) For the following reasons, the Court 

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adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denies Petitioner’s

petition for habeas corpus.

Background

On September 12, 2013, the Superior Court of the State of California for the

County of Imperial denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No.

1-2 at 37.) The court considered the petition on the merits and held that the petition was

without merit. (Id. at 38.) The court held that the fact that the “officers who witnessed

the altercation are uniform in describing arm movements by petitioner which are

consistent with slashing” provided some evidence that the inmate manufactured

slashing-type weapon was attributable to Petitioner. (Id. at 39.) The court also noted

that Petitioner had “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to appeal

the third level determination made on June 21, 2013 that his appeal was not timely.”

(Id.)

On June 8, 2014, the California Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 40.) In the last reasoned state opinion on this petition,

the Court of Appeals described the underlying facts as follows:

On November 9, 2009, a Calipatria correctional officer saw inmate

Kenneth Barber overpowering inmate Dennis. The officer hit Barber with

a baton and, although both inmates fell to the ground, Barber stayed on

top of Dennis swinging with both arms. Staff sprayed both inmates with

OC spray but had to use physical force to pry Barber off Dennis. An

inmate manufactured slashing-type weapon, i.e., a 3-inch piece of plastic

with a razor blade attached to one end, was found near Barber. Dennis

was actively bleeding from a 6-inch laceration on his neck and a 6-inch

laceration on his back, which required medical attention.

Authorities issued a rules violation report charging Barber with

battery on an inmate with a deadly weapon. Although he admitted fighting

with Dennis, Barber pleaded not guilty to battery with a deadly weapon

and requested that Dennis be present at the hearing. The hearing officer

denied the request because Dennis was unavailable (he had been paroled),

found Barber guilty, but did not assess any loss of behavioral credits.

Asserting the officerssaw him hit Dennis in the face and chest with

a closed fist, Dennis had no lacerations on his face and chest, and no

officer saw Barber use a weapon, Barber takes the position that the

evidence showed he engaged in mutual conduct with Dennis—not that he

committed a battery with a deadly weapon. He adds that Dennis stated in

an interview with an investigator that Barber did not stab him, and

complains the hearing officer’s refusal to allow him to submit the

investigator’s notes or provide a mechanism for him to obtain a statement

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from Dennis violated his due process rights.

Although there was no direct evidence identifying Barber as the

stabber, the evidence before the hearing officer included (1) statements by

officers who witnessed the fight identifying Barber as the aggressor,

reporting that staff was unable to subdue Barber without the use of force,

and describing Barber’s arm movements in a manner consistent with the

slashing, (2) discovery of an inmate manufactured slashing weapon near

Barber, and (3) the fact that Dennis’ injuries were consistent with slashing

injuries. This constitutes “some evidence” to support the disciplinary

determination.

(Id. at 40-41, citations omitted.)

On March 12, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for

review without opinion. (Id. at 42.)

On May 23, 2014, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challengesthe sufficiency of the evidence

to support the disciplinary hearing’s finding that he was guilty of committing battery

on an inmate with a deadly weapon and that the supervisory hearing officer’s refusal

to admit a statement by Dennis, either directly orthrough testimony by the investigator,

violated his due process rights. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 11-12.) On July 18, 2014, Respondent

filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks federal habeas

jurisdiction because Petitioner’s due process claim did not affect the fact or duration

of his confinement. (Doc. No. 8.) On November 6, 2014, the magistrate judge issued

a report and recommendation that the Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

(Doc. No. 18.) On December 17, 2014, Petitioner filed his objection to the report and

recommendation. (Doc. No. 14.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Because Petitioner filed

this petition after April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

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of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327

(1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Federal habeas

relief is available only if the result reached by the state court on the merits is “contrary

to” or “an unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent, orif the adjudication

is “an unreasonable determination” based on the facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. §§

2254(d)(1)-(d)(2).

A federal court may grant habeas relief only if a state court either “applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or

“confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the]

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (distinguishing

the “contrary to” and the “unreasonable application” standards). “[R]eview under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398

(2011). “Although the Supreme Court has declined to decide whether a district court

‘may ever choose to hold an evidentiary hearing before it determines that § 2254(d)

has been satisfied,’ an evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has

determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief.” Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057,

1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1411 n. 20).

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule

from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A federal court may also

grant habeasrelief “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from

[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where itshould not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. The state

court’s “unreasonable application” of binding precedent must be objectively

unreasonable to the extent that the state court decision is more than merely incorrect

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or erroneous. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citation omitted); see

also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).

Additionally, even if a state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court

precedent or rests on an “unreasonable determination” of facts in light of the evidence,

the petitioner must show thatsuch error caused substantial orinjurious prejudice. Penry

v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38); see also

Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th

Cir. 2000). AEDPA creates a highly deferential standard toward state court rulings.

Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002); see Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998,

1001 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Woodford, 537 U.S. 19 (2002)). In determining whether

a state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, the court looks to

the state’s last reasoned decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).

Where there is an unexplained decision from the state’s highest court, the court “looks

through” to the lastreasoned state judgment and presumesthat the unexplained opinion

rests upon the same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 891-06 (1991).

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects

to any portion of the report, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id.

B. Standard of Review for Due Process Claims

Under the Fourteenth Amendment “a prisoner is entitled to certain due process

protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation.” Serrano v. Francis, 345

F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Wolff v. Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71

(1974). These protectionsinclude “the rights to call witnesses, to present documentary

evidence and to have a written statement by the fact finders as evidence relied upon and

the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1077; see also

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. Due process protections adhere only when the “disciplinary

action implicates a protected [liberty] interest in some unexpected matter or imposes

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an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078 (citing Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995)). A liberty interest “may arise from the Constitution itself” or from “an

expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 546 U.S.

209, 221 (2005). Good-time credits are a protected liberty interest when the “State

[has] created the right to good time and itself recogniz[es] that its deprivation is a

sanction authorized for major misconduct.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557;see also McFarland

v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a liberty interest in good-time

credits when a statute uses mandatory language).

A district court will uphold a prison disciplinary board’s judgment that affects

a protected liberty interest so long as “the findings of the prison disciplinary board are

supported by some evidence in the record.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); see also Bruce v. Ylst, 351, F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.

2003). The “some evidence” standard prevents “arbitrary deprivations [of liberty]

without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue administrative burdens.”

Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455. This standard does not require “examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of the witness, or weighing of the

evidence.” Id. at 455; see also Bruce, 351 F.3d 1287. Instead, the central question is

“whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached

by the disciplinary board.” Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (citing Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455-

56).

II. Analysis

A. Lack of Evidence Claim

Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the disciplinary

hearing’s finding that he committed battery on an inmate with weapon. (Doc. No. 1-1

at 11-12.) A district court will uphold a prison disciplinary board’s judgment that

affects a protected liberty interest so long as it is “supported by some evidence in the

record,” Walpole, 472 U.S. at 454; see also Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287, and does not

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violate procedural due process requirements. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. In this

case, the evidence brought before the disciplinary hearing satisfies the “some evidence”

standard. The hearing officer reviewed statements from correctional officers who

witnessed the fight involving the Petitioner and Dennis. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 41.) These

statements identified Petitioner as the aggressor, stated that the use of force was

required to subdue Petitioner and described Petitioner’s arm movements in a manner

that was consistent with the slashing. (Id.) The hearing officer received information

regarding the discovery of an inmate manufactured slashing-type weapon that was

found near Petitioner after the fight. (Id.) Additionally, the hearing officer reviewed

information that showed Dennis’ injuries were consistent with slashing injuries. (Id.)

Accordingly, there is “some evidence” to support the disciplinary hearing’s guilty

finding of battery on an inmate with a weapon. This is consistent with both state court

determinations and the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. (Id. at 39, 41;

Doc. No. 12 at 6-7.)

B. Violation of Due Process Claim

Petitioner also contends that the supervisory hearing officer’s refusal to admit

a statement from Dennis, either directly or through testimony by Petitioner’s

investigator, violated Petitioner’s due process rights. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 12.) To allege

a due process violation under Wolff, Petitioner must show that the “disciplinary action

implicate[d] a protected [liberty] interest in some unexpected matter or impose[d] an

atypical and significant hardship on [Petitioner] in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078 (citing Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995)). The Supreme Court has held that if Wolff applies, due process requires that

a prisoner have “the rights to call witnesses, to present documentary evidence and to

have a written statement by the fact finders as evidence relied upon and the reasons for

the disciplinary action taken.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1077; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at

564-71. Here, Petitioner’s protected interest in good-time credits was not affected as

the supervisory hearing officer ultimately did not assess forfeiture of any good-time

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credits. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 11; Doc. No. 1-2 at 40.) Petitioner also fails to show that any

of the other consequences he faced implicated a protected interest or imposed an

atypical and significant hardship. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078 (“Typically, 1

administrative segregation in and of itself doesimplicate a protected liberty interest.”). 

Accordingly, the Court declines to reach Petitioner’s due process argument because it

is speculative and Petitioner fails to show that he suffered any prejudice.

C. Continuing Collateral Consequences

The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Petitioner’s claim also fails to

establish federal habeas jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 13 at 3-6.) A writ of habeas corpus is

the appropriate federal remedy when the duration or fact of confinement is at issue.

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Within the Ninth Circuit, habeas

jurisdiction may exist, where a “petitioner seeks expungement of a disciplinary finding

from his record” and “expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for

parole.” Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989). A prisoner seeking to

challenge prison disciplinary proceedings in a habeas petition must demonstrate that

continuing collateral consequences exist. Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner does not argue that the disciplinary hearing has any

bearing on his release or provide facts that support such a conclusion. (Doc. No. 1-1

at 11-17). Even if Petitioner had argued that the disciplinary hearing had a bearing on

his release, the Court would not have needed to reach the argument because Petitioner’s

claim fails on the merits. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982)

(noting that where deciding the merits of a claim provesto be less complicated and less

time consuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural default, a court may exercise

The disciplinary hearing also assessed ten days loss of yard time, placed 1

Petitioner in the security housing unit for fourteen months and added thirty points to

Petitioner’s classification score. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 11.) These consequences alone do not

establish that Petitioner suffered an atypical or significant hardship. See Serrano, 345

F.3d at 1078 (“Rather than invoking a single standard for determinating whether a

prison hardship is atypical and significant, we rely on a ‘condition or combination of

conditions or factors [that] requires a case by case, fact by fact consideration.’” 

Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078 (citing Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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discretion in its management of the case to reject the claims on their merits).

D. Writ of Mandate

In his objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, Petitioner

asks this Court to consider his habeas petition as a petition for a writ of mandate. (Doc.

No. 14 at 1.) But under the plain language of the governing statute, federal district

courts do not have mandamus jurisdiction over state officials. 28 U.S.C. § 1361; see,

e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 1988);

Rivers v. King, 23 F. App’x 905, 908 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001); Wise v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.,

CIVA 607-596-HFF-WMC, 2007 WL 1302703 (D.S.C. May 2, 2007).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation and denies Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus. Additionally, the

Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability as Petitioner has failed to make a

substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2015 

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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