Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02992/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02992-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

---

U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

UNIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS H. RUDWALL

Plaintiff,

v.

BLACKROCK, INC.

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-2992 MHP

ORDER

Re: Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings

Plaintiff Thomas H. Rudwall (“plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant BlackRock, Inc.

(“defendant”) seeking damages for libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Now before the court is defendant’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings. Having considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth

below, the court enters the following memorandum and order. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an employee in defendant’s liquidity investment funds (“money funds”) division,

selling investment products. Complt. ¶ 6. Plaintiff became an employee of defendant in 1997 when

defendant acquired plaintiff’s previous employer. Id. In December 2002, defendant terminated the

written employment agreements of all Money Fund sales staff, re-classified them as employees-atwill, and altered the sales staff’s compensation and commission structure. Id. ¶ 8. In June 2003,

defendant requested that its employees sign a “Covenant Not to Solicit” containing a prohibition

against employees soliciting business from defendant’s clients for a period of one year following

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 1 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

termination of their employment. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff refused to sign the agreement, asserting that the

non-compete provision violated California law. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of his refusal to sign the agreement, he was subject to

intimidation and reprisal by defendant, including false and defamatory statements in plaintiff’s most

recent performance review. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff asserts that, from 1997 to 2002, he consistently

received favorable and laudatory performance evaluations. Id. ¶ 7.

Plaintiff claims that four specific statements in his July 2005 performance review are

libelous. The first concerns plaintiff’s conduct in soliciting business from Boeing:

Additionally, we are aware that in June, Tom traveled to Chicago,

outside his territory, without clearance, to call on an account for which

he is no longer responsible. (Boeing) There is no evidence that he

coordinated or communicated with the lead Boeing relationship

manager before or after his visit and as of the writing of this review,

there are no notes or Avenue entries.

Id. ¶ 10 (“the Boeing statement”). Plaintiff claims that this statement is false and defamatory in that

it accuses plaintiff of deceit and dishonesty and of violating defendant’s rules and regulations. Id. ¶

11. Plaintiff also claims that he notified defendant of his intent to travel to Chicago and meet with

Boeing, that he was and currently is defendant’s designated representative to Boeing, and that he was

never required to coordinate this trip with any “relationship manager.” Id. ¶ 12.

The second allegedly defamatory statement involves a March 11, 2005 conference call:

On our March 11, 2005 conference call with Tom, he proudly

mentioned that he “procured” two RFPs for BlackRock. When we

asked him who the underlying clients were, he didn’t know. His

posture as having had any role in RFPs sent to BlackRock was thus a

bit puzzling.

Id. ¶ 13 (“the conference call statement”). Plaintiff asserts that this statement is false and defamatory

in that it states that plaintiff falsely claimed credit for procuring the RFPs. Plaintiff further claims

that his inability to identify the underlying clients was due to the fact that he obtained the RFPs on a

“blind-anonymous basis” which he explained during the conference call. Id. ¶ 14–15.

Plaintiff asserts that a third statement also accuses him of taking credit for work he had not

done:

Tom also highlighted his active participation in conversations with

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 2 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Paccar, while in reality, Paccar contacted a colleague directly to begin

discussions in which Tom was later included.

Id. ¶ 16 (“the Paccar statement”). Plaintiff asserts that Paccar attempted to contact him directly but

was unable to do so because of problems with defendant’s voicemail system, and that Paccar

contacted another employee only because of their inability to contact plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18.

Finally, plaintiff cites a passage in his performance review related to his assets:

The key measure of Tom’s contribution is assets in his territory which

have declined dramatically over the last 18 months from $5.7 B at

12/31/03 to $4.3 B at 3/30/05 to $3.9 B at 6/30/05. This decrease in

assets is by far the largest in the group by both dollar and percent. 

Other metrics such as new business totals and activity levels have

picked up this year, placing him in the middle of the pack.

Id. ¶ 19 (“the asset statement”). Plaintiff claims that this statement wrongfully implies that the

decrease in assets was due to a failure on plaintiff’s part. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff claims that, in presenting

this information, defendant deliberately omitted approximately $640 million in sales by plaintiff, and

failed to mention the overall economic conditions that were fostering a decline in Money Fund

investments. Id. 21.

Plaintiff filed this action on May 3, 2006 asserting claims for libel, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant now moves for

judgment on the pleadings.

LEGAL STANDARD

Similar to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a motion for judgment on the

pleadings addresses the sufficiency of a pleading. A motion to dismiss will be denied unless it

appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief. Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957); Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San

Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987). All material

allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Although

the court is generally confined to consideration of the allegations in the pleadings, when the

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 3 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

complaint is accompanied by attached documents, such documents are deemed part of the complaint

and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir.) (citations

omitted), cert. denied sub. nom. Wyoming Cmty. Dev. Auth. v. Durning, 484 U.S. 944 (1987). 

Where the facts and dates alleged in a complaint demonstrate that the complaint is barred by the

statute of limitations, the court should grant a motion to dismiss. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,

614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980); see also United West Med. Ctr. v. Sup. Ct. 42 Cal. App. 4th 500,

505 (1996) (citation omitted). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), judgment on the pleadings is proper when the

moving party clearly establishes that on the face of the pleadings no material issue of fact remains to

be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). When testing the

sufficiency of pleadings on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court views the facts

presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drafting all reasonable inferences in

that party’s favor. See Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist

Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

1079 (1990). 

DISCUSSION

I. Libel

Under California law, “[l]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . which

exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or

avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 45. Defendant

raises two defenses to plaintiff’s libel claim. First, defendant claims that the job evaluation was a

privileged communication. Second, defendant claims that each of the statements are opinions and

therefore cannot form the basis for a defamation claim.

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 4 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

A. Privilege

Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s performance evaluation is privileged under California Civil

Code section 47(c). Section 47(c) states that a privileged communication is one made “[i]n a

communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested . . .” 

CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c). The statute explicitly applies to non-malicious communications concerning

the job performance or qualifications of an applicant for employment made by a former employer to

a prospective employer. Id. Plaintiff does not dispute that Section 47(c) also applies to

communications within a company concerning the job performance of a current employer. 

Accordingly, the statements in plaintiff’s July 2005 performance review are privileged unless

plaintiff can demonstrate malice. Lundquist v. Ruesser, 7 Cal. 4th 1193, 1209–10 (1994) (“where

the complaint discloses a qualified privilege, no malice is presumed and in order to state a cause of

action the pleading must contain affirmative allegations of malice in fact”).

The requisite malice to defeat a privilege under Section 47(c) is “established by a showing

that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the

defendant lacked reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the publication . . .” Noel v. River

Hills Wilsons, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1370 (2003) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff must plead

specific facts beyond conclusory allegations of malice. Kacludis v. GTE Sprint Commc’ns Corp.,

806 F. Supp. 866, 872 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (Conti, J.); Robomatic, Inc. v. Vetco Offshore, 225 Cal.

App. 3d 270, 276 (1990) (“A general allegation of malice will not suffice; plaintiff must allege

detailed facts showing defendant’s ill will towards him.”). Malice cannot be inferred from the

communication itself. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains two separate paragraphs setting forth conclusory allegations

that defendant acted with malice. Complt. ¶¶ 22, 26. Because these paragraphs contain no specific

factual allegations, however, they cannot overcome the qualified privilege of Section 47(c). 

Kacludis, 806 F. Supp. at 872. 

In addition to these bare allegations, however, plaintiff identifies examples of verbal hostility

on the part of his supervisor as evidence of ill will. According to a letter from plaintiff to

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 5 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

defendant’s managing directors attached to the complaint, plaintiff’s supervisor used “harsh tones

and sharp language” during a conference call following the dissemination of plaintiff’s performance

review. Id., Exh. 2 at 1. Even assuming, as the court must for the purposes of this motion, that

plaintiff’s characterization of his supervisor’s tone of voice is accurate, the mere fact that an

employee’s supervisor uses harsh language toward the employee hardly supports a finding of malice

sufficient to defeat the qualified privilege. Plaintiff has therefore failed to plead facts sufficient to

overcome the Section 47(c) privilege.

B. Non-Actionable Opinions

Under California law, a defamatory publication must contain a false statement of fact to be

actionable. Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 958, 970 (1993) (quoting Gregory v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 598, 600 (1976)). A statement of opinion cannot form the

basis for a libel action. Id. In determining whether particular statements can give rise to a libel

action, the dispositive question is “whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the published

statements imply a provably false factual assertion.” Id. Furthermore, “an employer’s evaluation of

[its] employee’s performance contains an inherent degree of subjectivity, and courts should be

extremely cautious before allowing such comments to become the basis of a libel action.” 

Campanelli v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 44 Cal. App. 4th 572, 581 (1996). Defendant asserts that

the July 2005 performance evaluation consisted entirely of opinions, and is therefore immune from

defamation liability.

Plaintiff claims that the four passages cited in the complaint contain disprovable factual

assertions that may properly form the basis for libel. With the exception of the asset statement, the

allegedly defamatory passages are principally subjective statements that are best characterized as

opinions. The statements simply convey the company’s impression that plaintiff exaggerated his

roles with respect to certain accounts and did not strictly comply with the company’s policies

regarding travel. In addition, while the asset statement contains specific dollar amounts subject to

dispute, plaintiff’s complaint does not clearly set forth a disagreement with the numbers presented,

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 6 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

but rather asserts that the inclusion of additional information in the performance review would have

re-characterized the asset statement to favor plaintiff. 

Even if the performance review statements contain factual assertions, however, the court

finds that the assertions do not rise to the level of defamation given California’s special treatment of

employee evaluations. As the Court of Appeal has stated,

unless an employer’s performance evaluation falsely accuses an

employee of criminal conduct, lack of integrity, dishonesty,

incompetence or reprehensible personal characteristics or behavior

[citation], it cannot support a cause of action for libel. This is true even

when the employer’s perceptions about an employee’s efforts, attitude,

performance, potential or worth to the enterprise are objectively wrong

and cannot be supported by reference to concrete, provable facts.

Jensen, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 965. California law makes it clear that, except in egregious

circumstances not present here, the courts are not the proper venue for an employee to challenge his

employment evaluation. See id. at 963 (expressing “strong judicial disfavor for libel suits based on

communications in employment performance reviews”). “The law of employment contracts would .

. . be turned on its head if management had to justify to the employee’s satisfaction each evaluative

comment deemed unfair by the employee.” Id. at 974 n.17. Following the receipt of his

performance review, plaintiff submitted to BlackRock’s managing directors a lengthy, detailed letter

expressing his numerous disagreements with the company’s evaluation of him. Complt., Exh. 2. 

The courts can offer no further recourse.

Because plaintiff has both failed to overcome the Section 47(c) privilege and failed to

identify statements actionable as libelous, defendant is entitled to judgment on plaintiff’s libel claim.

II. Emotional Distress

In addition to libel, plaintiff has brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress

and negligent infliction of emotional distress. California does not recognize negligent infliction of

emotional distress as an independent tort, but rather as the tort of negligence itself. Burgess v.

Super. Ct., 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1072 (1992). As plaintiff’s complaint does not allege the elements of a

negligence cause of action, defendant is entitled to judgment on plaintiff’s claim for negligent

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 7 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

infliction of emotional distress.

Regarding plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendant argues

that this claim should be dismissed for two reasons. First, under California law, emotional distress

claims which merely incorporate the allegations of a defamation claim without adding new

allegations are superfluous. Couch v. San Juan Unified Sch. Dist., 33 Cal. App. 4th 1491, 1504

(2005). Second, emotional distress claims arising within the course of a normal employment

relationship are governed exclusively by California’s workers’ compensation laws. Livitsanos v.

Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 747 (1992).

A. Superfluity

Under California law, “[w]hen claims for . . . emotional distress are based on the same

factual allegations as those of a simultaneous libel claim, they are superfluous and must be

dismissed.” Couch, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1504. In Couch, the Court of Appeal sustained the trial

court’s demurrer to plaintiff’s emotional distress cause of action where plaintiff’s emotional distress

claim “incorporated all the factual allegations of his libel claim and added no further allegations.” 

Id. Defendant therefore asserts that plaintiff’s emotional distress claim is duplicative of his

defamation claim.

In response, plaintiff asserts that his complaint adds sufficient allegations to make out an

additional cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A review of the relevant

portion of plaintiff’s complaint, however, reveals that plaintiff has done nothing more than recite the

elements of this cause of action without adding any new factual allegations differentiating it from his

libel claim. Complt. ¶ 28 (“The actions and statements of defendants and each of them described

above were and are outrageous, intentional and malicious and done with reckless disregard of the

fact that defendants would cause plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.”). Accordingly, the

factual basis for the libel claim is the same as that for the emotional distress claim, and defendant is

entitled to judgment on the latter claim.

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 8 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

B. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity

In addition to the improper pleading of plaintiff’s emotional distress claim, defendant asserts

that this cause of action must be dismissed because emotional injuries in the workplace are governed

exclusively by California’s workers’ compensation laws. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 747. Plaintiff

acknowledges that this rule applies, but claims that the court cannot decide the issue at this stage

because defendant has not established that the alleged infliction of emotional distress occurred as a

normal part of the employment relationship. See id. at 756. In advancing this argument and

attempting to place the burden on defendant, plaintiff ignores the fact that nothing in his complaint

suggests that the alleged misconduct occurred outside the scope of the normal employment

relationship. Accordingly, plaintiff has made no showing to overcome the exclusivity of California’s

workers’ compensation regime over his claims for emotional distress, and these claims are subject to

judgment for defendant independently on this basis.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is

GRANTED.

Dated: 

_______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 9 of 10
U

NIT

E

D

ST

A

T

ES

DIST

RIC

T

CO

U

R

T

For the Northern

District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

ENDNOTES

Case 3:06-cv-02992-MHP Document 22 Filed 11/30/06 Page 10 of 10