Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01726/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01726-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Garland Scott Holden, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV11-1726-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Garland Scott Holden applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental social security income on April 15, 2008, claiming to be disabled since 

December 26, 2006. Tr. 127, 135. His claim was denied on July 17, 2008 (Tr. 52-53), 

and upon reconsideration on January 12, 2009 (Tr. 54-55). A hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was held on April 19, 2010. Tr. 27-50. In a 

prehearing letter dated April 2, 2010, Plaintiff moved to amend his alleged onset date to 

June 3, 2008. Tr. 31, 212. The ALJ issued a written decision on July 21, 2010, finding 

that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 12-22. 

The Appeals Council denied review (Tr. 1-5), making the ALJ’s decision the final 

decision of Defendant for purposes of judicial review. Plaintiff commenced this action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1. The parties have not requested oral argument. 

I. Background.

 Plaintiff alleges disability since June 3, 2008, for chronic knee pain and a seizure 

disorder. Tr. 31, 14. Plaintiff’s appeal is limited to the ALJ’s finding of no disability 

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with respect to Plaintiff’s seizure disorder. Doc. 20 at 4-8. 

 A. Medical Evidence.

 On June 29, 2007, prior to Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, he presented to the 

Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) with complaints of an alleged seizure disorder. 

Tr. 18, 351. Plaintiff reported seizures occurring about one week apart. Tr. 351. 

Plaintiff admitted that he drank a 12-pack of alcohol a day. Tr. 18, 351. Plaintiff was 

advised not to drive or operate machinery and to seek further testing. Tr. 18, 353-54. 

 On August 3, 2007, Plaintiff was admitted to Payson Regional Hospital after 

another seizure. Tr. 18, 257. He was treated by Dr. Michael Paulk who noted that 

Plaintiff was intoxicated upon admission. Id. Dr. Paulk released Plaintiff with the 

instructions to stop drinking alcohol and to follow-up with his primary care physician as 

needed. Tr. 18, 264. 

 On October 24, 2007, Plaintiff returned to Payson Regional after experiencing 

another seizure. Tr. 18, 224. Plaintiff was again treated by Dr. Paulk who noted that 

Plaintiff had stopped taking his medication and had been drinking. Id. Dr. Paulk 

released Plaintiff with the instructions to take his medications as prescribed and to stop 

drinking alcohol. Tr. 18, 225. 

 On November 6, 2007, Plaintiff was treated by Dr. John Sorteberg at the VA. 

Tr. 19, 343. Plaintiff reported having a seizure the day before and experiencing seizures 

about every three weeks. Tr. 343. Plaintiff reported not taking any anti-seizure 

medications and that he was waiting to see a neurologist about an abnormal MRI. Id. Dr. 

Sorteberg reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and determined that his seizures were 

likely the result of brain injury to frontal lobes and drinking alcohol. Id. Dr. Sorteberg 

also noted that Plaintiff took medicine to minimize his withdrawal effects of alcohol. 

Tr. 19, 343. Dr. Sorteberg advised Plaintiff not to drink anymore. Id. 

 A VA note from November 13, 2007, indicates that Plaintiff presented with 

generalized epilepsy, and that Plaintiff reported he had been drinking a 12-pack of beer, 

but that he was no longer drinking. Tr. 19, 341. 

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 On June 3, 2008, the amended alleged onset date, Dr. Lawrence opined that 

Plaintiff’s seizures were not well enough controlled to permit him to work, despite 

medication. Tr. 19, 429-29. 

 On October 1, 2008, Plaintiff suffered a seizure in the backseat of a police car and 

was taken to the emergency room. Tr. 19. Plaintiff was again treated by Dr. Paulk, who 

noted that Plaintiff was intoxicated. Id. Dr. Paulk released Plaintiff with the instruction 

to avoid alcohol and to take his prescription medications regularly. Id. 

 On October 29, 2008, Plaintiff called Dr. Lawrence, requesting to be released back 

to work because his seizures were under control. Based on Plaintiff’s report, Dr. 

Lawrence opined that Plaintiff could go back to work part-time. Tr. 19, 422. 

 On November 5, 2008, Plaintiff called the VA and reported that he was still 

experiencing seizures. Tr. 19, 421. Plaintiff said he was taking his medication, but that 

he did not take the full dosage because it caused him to get dizzy. Tr. 421. 

 On November 18, 2008, Dr. Lawrence noted that Plaintiff’s last seizure had been a 

week earlier. Tr. 421, 468. Plaintiff reported not feeling well taking Carbamazepine and 

forgetting to take that day’s dosage. Tr. 468. Dr. Lawrence indicated that he planned to 

adjust Plaintiff’s medications and specifically increase his Dilantin dosage and taper him 

off Carbamazepine. Id. Plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Lawrence on December 3, 

2008, to further adjust his medication. Id. On January 14, 2009, Plaintiff reported that 

he was still having partial seizures. Tr. 468. 

 On January 26, 2009, Plaintiff was admitted to Payson Regional and complained 

of a seizure disorder and alcohol withdrawal. Tr. 19, 612. At the time he was at 

Community Bridges for alcohol therapy, but had difficulty obtaining his increased 

Dilantin dosage and had a grand mal seizure the night before his admission. Tr. 612. 

 On March 15, 2009, Plaintiff was admitted to Payson Regional after having 

consumed eight ounces of isopropyl alcohol in 45 minutes. Tr. 607. Plaintiff reported 

that he was an alcoholic, had been in an alcohol withdrawal program, but had fallen off 

the wagon. Id. At that time, Plaintiff reported taking both Dilantin and Carbamazepine. 

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Id. Plaintiff was determined to have a seizure disorder secondary to alcohol abuse 

presently stable. Tr. 608. 

 On September 29, 2009, Plaintiff reported drinking a six-pack of beer one day a 

week. Tr. 19, 714. 

 At the request of the Disability Determination Service Administration (“DDSA”), 

Plaintiff attended a physical examination with Dr. Ketan Vora on June 27, 2008. Tr. 20, 

403-408. Dr. Vora diagnosed Plaintiff with a seizure disorder, currently not under 

control (Tr. 407), and opined that Plaintiff should not operate any heavy machinery until 

his seizure disorder stabilized “to prevent endangerment of his life or the life of others” 

(Tr. 19, 408). Plaintiff was described as “an adequate historian” who provided a history 

“consistent throughout” the examination, and who “was not noted to have exaggerated 

any of his symptoms.” Tr. 406. Plaintiff reported seizures occurring at a rate of twice 

per month for a year. Tr. 404. At the time, Plaintiff was taking Carbamazepine for his 

seizures, and Plaintiff informed Dr. Vora that the dosage had recently been increased. Id. 

Plaintiff admitted to drinking a six-pack of beer per day. Tr. 19, 405. 

 In July 2008, state agency physician Dr. Charles Fina reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 

records and completed an RFC assessment. Tr. 20, 408-416. The assessment indicated 

that Plaintiff’s primary diagnosis was chronic alcoholism and a seizure disorder. Tr. 408. 

The assessment indicated that functional capacity limits relative to Plaintiff’s seizures 

would “be addressed in the body of the text” (Tr. 410), but Dr. Fina does not appear to 

have addressed such limits in the assessment. 

 In January 2009, state agency physician Dr. Vivienne Kattapong reviewed 

Plaintiff’s record and affirmed the previous RFC determinations. Tr. 20, 464. Dr. 

Kattapong noted that Plaintiff’s “functional allegations are not credible,” that his seizures 

appear related to alcohol abuse, and that he has a history of non-compliance. Id. 

 On November 20, 2009, Dr. L. Friedman, Plaintiff’s most recent treating 

physician, assessed Plaintiff’s functional capacity. Tr. 20, 735-36. Dr. Friedman opined 

that Plaintiff has intermittent and unpredictable grand mal and complex partial seizures at 

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a rate of approximately “1/month.” Tr. 736. Dr. Friedman’s specific limitation for 

Plaintiff was that he was not allowed to drive. Id.

B. Hearing Testimony. 

At the April 19, 2010 hearing, Plaintiff testified that his seizures “happen about 

still once a month or so.” Tr. 35. Plaintiff stated that he cannot describe the seizures 

because he loses consciousness. Id. Plaintiff testified he sometimes loses consciousness 

for about a half hour during a grand mal seizure (Tr. 35-36, 37), and then suffers from 

severe fatigue for two to three days thereafter (Tr. 36, 37). Plaintiff testified he can 

remember certain things about his petit mal seizures (Tr. 36), and that he suffers from 

severe fatigue for the remainder of the day and sometimes the day after as well (Tr. 37-

38). Plaintiff testified he takes Dilantin to control his seizures. Id. Plaintiff stated that he 

has been taking Dilantin for about three years, but the dosage has been changed over time 

because he gets sick if the dosage is too large and still has seizures if the dosage is too 

small. Id. Plaintiff testified that he stopped consuming alcohol six months before the 

hearing, and that he continued to experience seizures during this time. Tr. 36-37. 

 The ALJ then noted that his problem with the case was that the record showed that 

Plaintiff continued to drink significantly and stated that “I don’t pay people who . . . are 

alcoholics.” Tr. 44. Plaintiff’s attorney responded by pointing to medical records from 

after the amended alleged onset date and noting that they do not discuss whether 

Plaintiff’s seizures are alcohol related. Id. The ALJ then asked Plaintiff if he had 

undergone alcohol rehabilitation, and Plaintiff responded that he had a year earlier for 30 

days, but he did not recall the exact date. Tr. 45. The ALJ responded by announcing that 

“you know, when people stop drinking alcohol, you know, alcohol has been such a 

significant thing in their life, they know when they stopped.” Id. The ALJ asked 

Plaintiff about the 2009 medical records from Southwest Behavior and the Casa Regional 

Medical Center regarding his alcohol consumption, and Plaintiff testified that those 

records were wrong. Tr. 44-46. The ALJ concluded by noting “he’s not owning up to 

the alcohol problem.” Tr. 46. 

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 The ALJ asked vocational expert, Mr. Bluth, about a hypothetical person of 

Plaintiff’s age and education who is able to do unskilled sedentary work, with the further 

limitations of no crawling, crouching, climbing, squatting, or kneeling; no exposure to 

unprotected heights or moving machinery; and no use of extremities for pushing or 

pulling, lifting and carrying ten pounds occasionally lifting, and carrying five pounds 

frequently. Tr. 47. Mr. Bluth responded that there are jobs that exist in the national 

economy for such a hypothetical person, and gave examples of cashiers and quality 

control inspectors. Tr. 48. The ALJ asked if a person would be terminated if they missed 

three or more days per month and Mr. Bluth responded affirmatively. Id. Claimant’s 

attorney asked whether a person who missed two days a month on a regular basis would 

have difficulty sustaining work and again Mr. Bluth responded that they would. Id. 

 II. Standard of Review.

 Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court cannot affirm the 

decision “simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); see Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. 

III. Analysis. 

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step sequential 

evaluation process. The claimant bears the burden in steps one through four. To 

establish disability, the claimant must show (1) he is not currently working, (2) he has a 

severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment, and (3) the impairment 

meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

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precludes him from performing his past work.1 At step five, the Commissioner bears the 

burden of showing that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in 

substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(iv); see 20 

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (Listing of Impairments). “The Commissioner can meet 

this burden through the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines[.]” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

 Plaintiff has not worked since the alleged onset date of disability. Tr. 14, ¶ 2. The 

ALJ found that although Plaintiff’s chronic knee pain and seizure disorder were severe 

impairments when considered in combination (Tr. 14, ¶ 3), Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments severe enough to meet or equal one of the 

listed impairments (Tr. 16-17, ¶ 4). The ALJ concluded that while Plaintiff is not able to 

perform his past work (Tr. 20, ¶ 6), he is not disabled because he has the RFC to perform 

unskilled sedentary work (Tr. 17, ¶ 5), including the jobs of assembler, cashier, and 

quality control inspector (Tr. 21). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find that his impairments meet or 

equal listing 11.02 (Doc. 20 at 6), failing properly to consider the effects of all of 

Plaintiff’s impairments in determining RFC (id. at 4-5), rejecting the opinion of a treating 

source (id. at 5), and failing properly to evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility (id. at 7). 

Defendant contends that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free 

from legal error. Doc. 21 at 8. 

 A. Listing 11.02 – Epilepsy — Convulsive Epilepsy.

 “The Commissioner has promulgated a ‘Listing of Impairments’ that are ‘so 

severe that they are irrebuttably presumed disabling, without any specific finding as to 

the claimant’s ability to perform [her] past relevant work or any other jobs.’” Frazier v. 

 

1

 RFC is the most a claimant can do given the limitations caused by his impairments. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.927(a); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). 

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Astrue, No. CV-09-3063-CI, 2010 WL 3910331, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2010) 

(quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1995)). Listing 11.02 requires 

“convulsive epilepsy (grand mal or psychomotor), documented by detailed description of 

a typical seizure pattern, including all associated phenomena; occurring more frequently 

than once a month in spite of at least 3 months of prescribed treatment” with either 

(1) daytime episodes or (2) nocturnal episodes manifesting residuals which interfere 

significantly with activity during the day. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.02. 

Section 11.00 of Appendix 1 provides further information about evaluation of listing 

11.02: “Under 11.02 [], the criteria can be applied only if the impairment persists despite 

the fact that the individual is following prescribed antiepileptic treatment.” 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.00(A). “Where documentation shows that use 

of alcohol or drugs affects adherence to prescribed therapy or may play a part in the 

precipitation of seizures, this must also be considered in the overall assessment of 

impairment level.” Id.

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet listing 11.02. Tr. 17. Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ erred because the record demonstrates that he has been experiencing 

seizures at a frequency of more than once per month since June 2008. Doc. 20 at 6. 

 Under listing 11.02, Plaintiff must prove that his grand mal seizures occurred more 

than once a month. There is no indication from his medical records that the seizures 

occurred this frequently, and Plaintiff stated in his own hearing testimony that he was 

having seizures “about . . . once a month.” Tr. 35. Questionnaires submitted by Plaintiff 

and his wife advising that Plaintiff was having two seizures a month in June of 2008 are 

the only evidence of record which supports a finding of such frequency. Tr. 170, 173; 

Doc. 20 at 6. These questionnaires do not specify whether the June 2008 seizures were 

grand mal or petit mal and thus are too vague to indicate that Plaintiff met the frequency 

and severity of seizures required under listing 11.02. Additionally, Dr. Friedman’s 

opinion that Plaintiff experienced seizures at a rate of approximately “1/month” (Tr. 736) 

fails to satisfy the listing’s requirement of “more frequently than once a month.” 20 

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C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.02. In sum, the record does not show that Plaintiff 

experienced grand mal seizures at the frequency required to meet or equal listing 11.02. 

B. The RFC Determination.

 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff can perform unskilled sedentary work with the 

following additional limitations: no crawling, crouching, climbing, squatting, or kneeling; 

no exposure to unprotected heights or moving machinery; no use of extremities for 

pushing or pulling; and lifting and carrying limited to ten pounds occasionally and five 

pounds frequently. Tr. 17, 18. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in improperly rejecting 

a medical opinion, misinterpreting medical evidence, and failing to consider all of his 

seizure symptoms. Doc. 20 at 4. 

 The law is clear. In determining RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined 

effects of all impairments. 42 U.S.C. ' 423(d)(2)(B); see also Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 

540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The ALJ found the combination of Plaintiff’s 

seizure and knee conditions to be severe (Tr. 14, ¶ 3), but imposed no limitation with 

respect to Plaintiff’s testimony that he had no functional capacity for one to three days 

after a seizure. 

 1. Medical Opinion Evidence. 

 a. Dr. William H. Lawrence. 

 The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Lawrence’s June 3, 2008, opinion on the 

grounds that his opinion simply stated that Plaintiff could not work and did not detail any 

specific limitations, and that the opinion of disability is an issue reserved for the 

Commissioner. Tr. 19. The ALJ did not specify what weight he gave to Dr. Lawrence’s 

October 29, 2008, opinion, and Plaintiff argues that affording this opinion any weight 

would constitute a misinterpretation of the evidence because the record shows Plaintiff 

had experienced seizures earlier in October 2008 (Tr. 506), and again a few weeks after 

Dr. Lawrence’s release (Tr. 421). Defendant submits that the ALJ presumably adopted 

Dr. Lawrence’s October 29, 2008 opinion because it comports with the ALJ’s ultimate 

determination that Plaintiff could perform work, and argues that the ALJ’s failure to state 

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what weight he gave the opinion is harmless error. Doc. 21 at 12 (citing Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the court will not reverse an ALJ’s 

decision for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s 

error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” (quotation marks 

and citations omitted)). Since Dr. Lawrence’s October opinion does not support 

Plaintiff’s disability claim, the Court finds that the ALJ committed harmless error when 

he failed to specify the weight he gave to it. 

 b. Dr. L. Friedman. 

Dr. Friedman completed a medical assessment form on November 20, 2009, 

opining that due to “intermittent and unpredictable seizures” occurring approximately 

“1/month” (Tr. 736), Plaintiff should not drive (id.). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred 

in rejecting Dr. Friedman’s opinion regarding his seizure frequency. Doc. 20 at 5. To the 

contrary, the ALJ stated that he gave “significant weight” to Dr. Freidman’s opinion, and 

adopted Dr. Friedman’s opinion in finding that Plaintiff’s RFC prohibits work near 

moving machinery. Tr. 20. Consistent with Dr. Friedman’s assessment, the ALJ also 

concluded that Plaintiff experiences seizures. Id. This does not constitute legal error. 

 c. Medical Opinion Summary.

 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “seizures are alcohol-induced and can be 

controlled through a combination of sobriety and compliance with prescription 

medications.” Tr. 20. Plaintiff submits that the record lacks any evidence indicating a 

diagnosis of alcohol-induced seizures, and argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the 

evidence in making a diagnosis unsupported by the record. Doc. 20 at 5. 

 The ALJ based his conclusion on a finding that the times Plaintiff suffered 

seizures “were generally coupled with severe alcohol intoxication and/or noncompliance 

with prescription medications.” Tr. 20. The ALJ’s opinion cites to medical notes 

indicating Plaintiff experienced seizures when he consumed alcohol and did not take his 

prescription medications. Tr. 18-20. For example, on November 6, 2007, Dr. Sorteberg 

concluded that Plaintiff’s seizures were likely due “brain injury to frontal lobes and 

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drinking alcohol.” Tr. 343. His plan for Plaintiff was: “Don’t drink alcohol anymore” 

and see a neurologist. Id. On October 1, 2008, Plaintiff had a seizure while in custody in 

the back of a police car and was taken to the hospital. Tr. 506-508. He was intoxicated 

upon arrival. Special instructions given to Plaintiff on discharge were to take his 

medication and “don’t drink alcohol.” Tr. 507. These facts were noted by the ALJ. 

Tr. 19. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff attended alcohol therapy in January of 2009, but 

was admitted to the hospital in March of that year after drinking isopropyl alcohol 

because there was no beer in the house. Id. 

 In addition to these and similar facts he recited, the ALJ gave significant weight to 

state agency examiner Dr. Kattapong’s opinion that Plaintiff’s seizures are related to 

alcohol abuse. Tr. 20, 464. No medical source opinion contradicts the assessment of Dr. 

Kattapong, and much of Plaintiff’s history supports it. Because an examining physician’s 

opinion that comports with other record evidence may constitute substantial evidence, the 

ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s seizures are alcohol-related and controllable is 

supported by substantial evidence. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; see also Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining physician=s opinion may 

constitute substantial evidence supporting ALJ=s decision).2

 

 2. Plaintiff’s Testimony. 

 Plaintiff testified that seizures leave him too weak to work for one to three days 

(Tr. 35-36, 37-38), but the ALJ found that his testimony concerning the limiting effects 

of his symptoms were not credible (Tr. 20). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ was 

required to evaluate Plaintiff’s testimony using the two-step analysis established by the 

Ninth Circuit. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Applying the 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s opening brief (he did not file a reply brief) takes a scatter-shot approach to its arguments, failing to identify defects in the ALJ’s decision with precision. Plaintiff does not specifically assert that the ALJ erred in rejecting his testimony that he had not been drinking for several months and yet continues to have seizures. Doc. 20 at 

7. If Plaintiff were to make this argument, the Court would conclude that the ALJ’s 

discounting of this testimony is supported by the substantial evidence recited in his opinion, as described above, including Dr. Kattapong’s opinion. See Tr. 17-20. 

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test of Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), the ALJ first determined that 

Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably produce some of the symptoms alleged. Tr. 20. 

Given this conclusion, and because the ALJ found no evidence of malingering, the ALJ 

was required to present “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff not 

entirely credible. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. This clear and convincing standard “is the 

most demanding required in Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of SSA, 278 F.3d 

920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Unfortunately, in explaining his reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, the 

ALJ said only this: “Claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with 

the above residual functional capacity assessment.” Tr. 20. No further explanation was 

provided. The ALJ did not identify or discuss the evidence on which he was relying, did 

not give specific, clear, and convincing reasons for his determination, and made no 

specific findings. This constitutes legal error. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 

(9th Cir. 2007) (general assertions that the claimant’s testimony is not credible are 

insufficient because the ALJ must identify “what testimony is not credible and what 

evidence undermines the claimant's complaints.”). 

 III. Remedy.

 Defendant’s decision denying benefits must be reversed because it is based on 

legal error. See Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2008). This Circuit 

has held that evidence should be credited as true, and an action remanded for an award of 

benefits, where (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

evidence, (2) no outstanding issues remain that must be resolved before a determination 

of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence credited as true. See, 

e.g., Varney v. Sec’y of HHS, 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1292; Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007). The second and third steps of this test are not satisfied here. 

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Plaintiff testified that his seizures leave him unable to work for one to three days. The 

vocational expert testified that an absenteeism rate of two days per month would make 

sustained employment difficult, and that termination would result from missing three 

days in any given month. Tr. 48. The Court has found, however, that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s seizures are alcohol-related 

and controllable. The record therefore does not show that Plaintiff would miss two or 

three days per month as a result of his seizure condition if he took his medications and 

stopped drinking. As a result, it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find Plaintiff disabled if Plaintiff’s testimony about the effects of a seizure is 

credited as true. Remand to the ALJ is appropriate to determine whether Plaintiff’s 

condition, in a controllable state, would require a finding of disability. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s decision denying insurance benefits is reversed. 

 2. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 4. The Clerk shall terminate this matter. 

 Dated this 25th day of January, 2013. 

Case 2:11-cv-01726-DGC Document 22 Filed 01/28/13 Page 13 of 13