Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05048/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 3, 2004 Decided July 8, 2005

No. 04-5048

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02155)

Robert D. Thornton argued the cause for the appellants. John

J. Flynn, III, Duane J. Desiderio, Thomas J. Ward and Felicia

K. Watson were on brief. 

Seth M. Barsky, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Andrew J. Doyle and

Ellen J. Durkee, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice

were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

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1 Home Builders’ lawsuit originally named Bruce Babbitt and James

Clark as defendants in their official capacities as Secretary of the

Interior and Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, respectively.

Pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 43©)(2), Gale Norton, current Secretary

of the Interior, and Steven A. Williams, current FWS Director, have

been automatically substituted as parties.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The National

Association of Home Builders (Home Builders) appeals the

district court’s summary judgment order dismissing its suit

against the United States Department of the Interior (Interior)

and its Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).1 Nat’l Ass’n of Home

Builders v. Norton, 298 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2003) (NAHB).

The lawsuit revolves around the FWS’s promulgation of a

survey protocol, first in 1999 and again in revised form in 2000

(together, Protocols), that provides a methodology for the

detection of an endangered subspecies of butterfly in certain

areas of southern California. Before the district court, Home

Builders asserted violations of the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., and the Endangered Species Act

(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq., arguing that the FWS failed

to comply with those statutes’ notice and comment provisions.

The district court dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction.

NAHB, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 80. We now affirm.

I.

The ESA provides “a means whereby the ecosystems upon

which endangered species and threatened species depend may

be conserved.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). Under section four of the

ESA, the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) must promulgate

regulations that list species deemed “endangered” or

“threatened” due to, inter alia, the “present or threatened

destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range.”

Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A), ©)(1); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

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2 The ESA also authorizes the Secretary to designate a certain

geographical area as “critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).

Critical habitat is defined as land “essential for the conservation of the

species.” Id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). A critical habitat designation under

section four affects the obligations of federal agencies under section

seven of the ESA, id. § 1536, but does not alter the scope of an

individual’s potential liability under section nine, id. § 1538, which

extends beyond land specifically designated as critical habitat.

Compare id. § 1536(a)(2) (“Each Federal agency shall ... insure that

any [agency action] is not likely to result in the destruction or adverse

modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the

Secretary ... to be critical....”) with 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (establishing

liability under section nine if an individual’s action causes “significant

habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures

wildlife”). “The designation of critical habitat has no effect on nonFederal actions taken on private land, even if the private land is within

the mapped boundary of designated critical habitat.” Endangered and

Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for

the Cactus Ferruginous Pygmy-owl (Glaucidium brasilianum

cactorum) 64 Fed. Reg. 37,419, 37,428 (1999). That there is some

overlap between section nine and section seven of the ESA “is

unexceptional and simply reflects the broad purpose of the Act.”

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,

515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (internal citation omitted).

154, 157–58 (1997).2 The Secretary is further charged with

developing and implementing a “recovery plan” for the

“conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened

species.” Id. § 1533(f).

Once a species is designated “endangered” or “threatened,”

the ESA provides a variety of protections, including a

prohibition on “take” of the species. Id. § 1538(a)(1). “Take”

is a term uniquely defined by the ESA to mean: “to harass,

harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect”

the listed species. Id. § 1532(19). Following the statutory

labyrinth one step deeper, regulations passed pursuant to the

ESA define “harm” as used in the definition of “take” to include

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“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually

kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential

behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”

50 C.F.R. § 17.3; see also, generally, Endangered and

Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of “Harm,”

46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981). Thus, a landowner can effect a take

of an endangered species, subjecting himself to liability under

the ESA, if he alters the habitat of an endangered species in a

manner that causes death or injury to a member of the species.

The ESA establishes civil and criminal penalties for any person

who unlawfully takes an endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1540.

In addition to more traditional enforcement mechanisms using

federal and state personnel, id. § 1540(e), the ESA contains a

“citizen suit” provision that permits a private party to seek

injunctive relief against any landowner “alleged to be in

violation” of the ESA, id. § 1540(g)(1)(A).

Section 10 of the ESA does permit landowners and other nonfederal entities to obtain a permit to “take” a listed species “if

such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying

out of an otherwise lawful activity.” Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). To

obtain such a permit, the landowner must demonstrate to the

Secretary through a documented conservation plan that the

owner will, inter alia, minimize the impact of the taking and that

the “likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species” will

not be diminished by the taking. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). In

addition, the ESA authorizes the grant of a “recovery” permit,

which enables a researcher to engage in actions “for scientific

purposes” that could result in a taking. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A).

II.

The quino checkerspot butterfly (Quino) is a small butterfly

native to southwestern California and northwestern Mexico.

The Quino was listed as an endangered species on January 16,

1997. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;

Determination of Endangered Status forthe Laguna Mountains

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Skipper and the Quino Checkerspot Butterfly (Euphydryas

editha quino), 62 Fed. Reg. 2313 (1997) (Listing Rule). Once

abundant, only seven or eight known colonies of Quino remain

in the United States, all in Riverside and San Diego counties in

California. Id. at 2315. The primary suspected cause of the loss

of the species is the destruction of Quino habitat through

development, grazing and fragmentation. Id. at 2317–2319. See

also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;

Designation of Critical Habitat for the Quino Checkerspot

Butterfly (Euphydryas editha quino), 67 Fed. Reg. 18,356,

18,359 (2002) (Critical Habitat Designation). Quino require a

very particular habitat to survive, owing in part to their reliance

on specific host plants during the larval life stage. Listing Rule,

62 Fed. Reg. at 2314. The Quino live as adult butterflies only

for a period of roughly four to eight weeks. Id. The wingspan

of an adult Quino measures a mere one inch. Id. Their flight

season lasts from mid-January until late April, but peaks in

March and April. Id. Quino do not fly in adverse weather

conditions such as rain or wind, however, which, combined with

their short lifespan and small size, can make detection difficult.

The FWS issued its first guidance for detecting the Quino

several months after listing the butterfly as fully protected by the

ESA. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Interim General

Survey Protocols and Mitigation Guidelines for the Endangered

Quino Checkerspot Butterfly (November 4, 1997) (Interim

Protocol).

Based on information gathered during the 1998 field season,

as well as consultation with scientists and species experts, the

FWS revised the Interim Protocol and promulgated the “Survey

Protocol for the Endangered Quino Checkerspot Butterfly

(Euphydryas editha quino) for the 1999 Field Season” (1999

Protocol), reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 87–111, on

January 25, 1999. The FWS did not, however, engage in formal

notice and comment proceedings in drafting the 1999 Protocol.

On February 1, 1999, a notice of availability for the 1999

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3

 The protocol itself was not published in the Federal Register; it

could be obtained by visiting either the FWS’s Region 1 web page or

the Carlsbad, California Fish and Wildlife Office. Notice of

Availability of a Recommended Survey Protocol for the Endangered

Quino Checkerspot Butterfly (Euphydryas editha quino) for the 1999

Field Season, 64 Fed. Reg. 4890 (1999). 

Protocol was published in the Federal Register.3 Notice of

Availability of a Recommended Survey Protocol for the

Endangered Quino Checkerspot Butterfly (Euphydryas editha

quino) for the 1999 Field Season, 64 Fed. Reg. 4890 (1999)

(1999 Notice of Availability). The notice of availability referred

to the 1999 Protocol in both its title and text as “recommended.”

Id. It also provided an address where “comments,” “data” and

“materials concerning the survey protocol” could be sent for the

FWS’s consideration during the development of a revised

protocol for the 2000 field season. Id. The text of the 1999

Protocol identified on a map attached to the 1999 Protocol as

Appendix B “areas with no potential for Quino, with potential

habitat where adult surveys may be necessary of [sic] suitable

habitat occurs on a site, and with Quino habitat where adult

surveys should be conducted.” 1999 Protocol at 1 & App. B,

reprinted in J.A. at 90, 98. It recommended, but did not

mandate, habitat assessment in areas designated by the FWS as

Potential Habitat Areas and adult surveys in the Adult Focused

Survey Areas or if a habitat assessment indicated suitable Quino

habitat. Id. The 1999 Protocol stipulated that in order to avoid

take of the species, adult surveys “must be conducted by a

biologist possessing a recovery permit pursuant to section

10(a)(1)(A) of the [ESA].” Id. at 1, reprinted in J.A. at 90; see

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).

The FWS published a revised protocol in the year 2000. U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service, Quino Checkerspot Butterfly

(Euphydryas editha quino) Year 2000 Survey Protocol (2000

Protocol), reprinted in J.A. at 112–21. Again, a notice of

availability regarding the “recommended survey protocol for the

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2000 field season” was published in the Federal Register.

Notice of Availability of a Recommended Year 2000 Survey

Protocol for the Endangered Quino Checkerspot Butterfly

(Euphydryas editha quino), 65 Fed. Reg. 8188 (2000) (2000

Notice of Availability). The revisions were based on

information derived from public workshops, the input of a new

“recovery team,” the development of the recovery plan, the 1999

survey reports and public comments. 2000 Protocol at 1,

reprinted in J.A. at 113. The 2000 Protocol provides

substantially more detail regarding survey methodology than the

1999 Protocol did. Compare 1999 Protocol at 1–4, reprinted in

J.A. at 90–93, with 2000 Protocol at 2–6, reprinted in J.A. at

114–118. As with the 1999 Protocol, however, the FWS

describes the 2000 Protocol as merely “recommended” except

for “requirements for biologists conducting quino butterfly

surveys under recovery permits.” 2000 Protocol at 1, reprinted

in J.A. at 113. Both Protocols also warn that “surveys may not

be considered valid if ... the specific survey methods described

above are not followed.” 2000 Protocol at 6, reprinted in J.A.

at 118; see also 1999 Protocol at 4, reprinted in J.A. at 93.

Home Builders, a non-profit advocacy group that represents

individuals and companies in the residential construction

industry, filed suit in federal district court, alleging, inter alia,

that the 1999 and 2000 Protocols constituted a “rule” subject to

the notice and comment provisions of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553.

Thus, according to Home Builders, in promulgating the

Protocols the FWS exceeded its authority under the ESA by

failing to comply with section 553 of the APA and section

4(b)(4) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(4) (incorporating

APA’s notice and comment requirements with respect to “any

regulation promulgated to carry out the purposes” of the ESA).

Compl. 13–25. In NAHB, the district court dismissed the suit at

the summary judgment stage, holding that the Protocols did not

constitute “final agency action” and thus the court lacked

jurisdiction under sections 702 and 704 of the APA. 298 F.

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4 The district court also noted that the claim was not yet ripe for

review and that Home Builders lacked standing because there was

insufficient evidence of injury in fact. Home Builders, 298 F. Supp.

2d at 79–81. Because we affirm the district court’s finding that the

Protocols do not constitute final agency action necessary to confer

jurisdiction under the APA and the ESA, we express no opinion on the

standing and ripeness issues discussed by the district court and raised

in the parties’ briefs. See N.J. Television Corp. v. FCC, 393 F.3d 219,

221 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

5

 “Agency action” is defined by the APA as “the whole or part of an

agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial

thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). The FWS and Interior

argue that “ ‘the term [agency action] is not so all-encompassing as to

authorize ... judicial review over everything done by an administrative

agency,’ ” and that the Protocols at issue in this case do not meet the

statutory definition of “agency action.” Appellee’s Br. at 21 (quoting

Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (omission in brief)). Home Builders counters that the Protocols

are “rules” within the APA’s definition of “agency action.”

Appellant’s Br. at 16–17. A “rule” is defined as “the whole or part of

an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future

Supp. 2d at 79. Specifically, the court found that the Protocols

did not satisfy the finality test established by the United States

Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997),

because “the Protocols do not determine rights or obligations of

landowners and legal consequences do not flow from them.”

NAHB, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 76.4 Home Builders timely filed this

appeal.

III.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Saint Luke’s Hosp. v.Thompson,355F.3d 690, 693 (D.C.

Cir. 2004). The APA authorizes judicial review of “[a]gency

action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”5 5 U.S.C.

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effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 5

U.S.C. § 551(4). Courts have struggled to classify documents such as

the Protocols here. See, e.g., Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d

90, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing cases discussing difficulty in

distinguishing between “guidance” documents and rules). Because we

find the issue of finality dispositive on the question of jurisdiction, we

need not decide whether each Protocol constitutes a “rule” as defined

by the APA. Moreover, we express no opinion on whether the

Protocols might constitute a procedural or substantive rule for

purposes of the APA’s notice and comment provisions. Compare 5

U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3), ©), (d) (requiring notice and comment

proceedings to promulgate rule) with id. § 553(b)(A) (exempting

“interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency

organization, procedure, or practice” from notice and comment

requirement).

§ 704 (emphasis added). There exists no statutory review

provision in the ESA that authorizes judicial review of agency

action beyond that provided for in the APA. See Cabinet

Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman’s Peak Grizzly Bears v.

Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, an agency

action must be final in order to be judicially reviewable. See,

e.g., Ctr. for Law and Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152,

1165 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“APA ... bars review prior to final

agency action.”); Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 235

F.3d 588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“ ‘[T]he requirement of a final

agency action has been considered jurisdictional. If the agency

action is not final, the court ... cannot reach the merits of the

dispute.’ ” (quoting DRG Funding Corp. v. Sec’y of Housing &

Urban Dev., 76 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996))).

The Supreme Court has established a two-part test to

determine when an agency action is reviewable as “final.” First,

the action under review “must mark the ‘consummation’ of the

agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely

tentative or interlocutory nature.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

154, 177–78 (1997) (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.

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Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 431, 437 (1948). Second, the

action must “be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been

determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’ ”

Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (quoting Port of Boston Marine

Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S.

62, 71 (1970)). The Protocols at issue in this case clearly

marked the consummation of the decisionmaking process. The

Protocols were published after the FWS solicited input from

specialists and reviewed data from past field seasons. 1999

Protocol at 1, reprinted in J.A. at 90; 2000 Protocol at 2,

reprinted in J.A. at 114. A notice of availability was published

each year in the Federal Register. 1999 Notice of Availability,

64 Fed. Reg. at 4890; 2000 Notice of Availability, 65 Fed. Reg.

at 8180. Ongoing revisions to the Protocols based on new data

and feedback from interested parties do not negate finality. See

United States Air Tour Ass’n. v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1013 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). Thus, the pivotal issue is whether the 1999 and 2000

Protocols published by the FWS are documents “by which rights

or obligations have been determined, or from which legal

consequences will flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Home Builders asserts three arguments to support its view that

the Protocols impose legal obligations. It first claims that the

Protocols are binding on their face. This argument fails to pass

muster. The Protocols are consistently referred to in agency

documents as “recommended,” rather than mandatory. See, e.g.,

1999 Notice of Availability, 64 Fed. Reg. at 4890 (referring to

1999 Protocol as “recommended” in both title and text); 2000

Notice of Availability, 65 Fed. Reg. at 8188 (same); 1999

Protocol at I, reprinted in J.A. at 88 (protocol “recommended”);

2000 Protocol at 3, reprinted in J.A. at 114 (protocol surveys

“recommended”). Morever, in a letter from the FWS Director

to several members of the Congress, the agency stated that the

“survey protocol does not contain any prohibitions or

restrictions on land development, nor should the protocol be

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interpreted as such.” Letter from Clark to Calvert at 1 (Apr. 16,

1999). An agency’s past characterization of its own action,

while not decisive, is entitled to respect in a finality analysis.

See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (agency

opinion constitutes “body of experience and informed judgment

to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”);

see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.576, 587 (2000)

(opinion letters entitled to respect under Skidmore “to the extent

those interpretations have the power to persuade” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). But cf. Appalachian Power Co. v.

Envt’l Prot. Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(disregarding “boilerplate” non-final action language in

guidance document). Despite some mandatory language in the

Protocols regarding how the survey should be conducted in

order to maximize accuracy and minimize incidental take of the

species (“Butterfly surveys may only be conducted by a

biologist possessing a current recovery permit,” 2000 Protocol

at 2, reprinted in J.A. at 113), neither the 1999 nor the 2000

Protocol contains any language compelling a landowner to

conduct a survey at all. “Protocol surveys,” according to the

FWS, merely “are recommended for all sites partially or

completely within ... survey areas.” 2000 Protocol at 2,

reprinted in J.A. at 113 (emphasis added). 

Given the voluntary nature of the language contained in the

Protocols, it is futile for Home Builders to argue that the

Protocols are binding on their face. Home Builders goes on to

argue, however, that the Protocols constitute final agency action

because in practice they have a coercive effect on both

landowners and local governments, in effect compelling

compliance with the Protocols in order to avoid prosecution for

unlawful take of the species. Appellant’s Br. at 24–35. Finality

resulting from the practical effect of an ostensibly non-binding

agency proclamation is a concept we have recognized in the

past. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377,

383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“if the language of the document is such

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that private parties can rely on it as a norm or safe harbor by

which to shape their actions, it can be binding as a practical

matter”); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v.Thomas,838F.2d 1317,

1321 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (agency action, though facially nonbinding, “created a norm with present day binding effect”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, if the practical

effect of the agency action is not a certain change in the legal

obligations of a party, the action is non-final for the purpose of

judicial review. See DRG Funding Corp. v. Sec’y of Housing

and Urban Dev., 76 F.3d 1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (agency

order non-final that “does not itself adversely affect complainant

but only affects his rights adversely on the contingency of future

administrative action”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, we have held that “[p]ractical consequences, such as the

threat of having to defend itself in an administrative hearing

should the agency actually decide to pursue enforcement, are

insufficient to bring an agency’s conduct under our purview.”

Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 372 F.3d

420 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

There is nothing in the record to support Home Builders’

claim that the Protocols could affect the outcome of an

enforcement proceeding. Just as compliance with the Protocols

does not provide a “safe harbor” from prosecution, Gen. Elec.,

290 F.3d at 383, failure to comply does not change the legal

burden placed on the government (or on a private party in a

citizen suit) in a suit for injunctive relief: the enforcing party

must convince the court that “the alleged activity has actually

harmed the species or ... will actually, as opposed to potentially,

cause harm to the species.” Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d

163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993). The results of the survey, the decision

to conduct a site assessment but not a survey, the failure to

perform either, or any other course of action by the landowner

would constitute just one piece of the evidence necessary to

obtain an injunction. At the time of any enforcement

proceeding, the landowner can challenge the soundness of the

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6 The Ninth Circuit confronted an analogous situation with respect

to the Incidental Take Permit (ITP), a statutorily-authorized permit

issued by the FWS under certain circumstances to applicants whose

actions may result in take incident to other lawful activity. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1539(a)(1)(B). In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920

(9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that “pursuing an ITP is not

mandatory and a party can choose whether to proceed with the

permitting process. However, if a party chooses not to secure a

permit and the proposed activity, in fact, takes a listed species, the

ESA authorizes civil and criminal penalties.” Id. at 927 (internal

citations omitted). The Protocols differ from an ITP in that

compliance with the Protocols is not a bar to liability if take occurs,

but in both situations the landowner must decide how confident he is

of his own ability—without agency guidance—to act without causing

take of the species.

Protocols’ methodology, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power

Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (methodology

“subject to complete attack”), and to demonstrate that no take is

likely to result from his actions. AT&T v. Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm’n, 270 F.3d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(Agency guidance “has force only to the extent the agency can

persuade a court to the same conclusion.”).6 Moreover, the ESA

has not brought any enforcement action against a landowner for

failing to comply with the Protocols. Thus, in the absence of

any record evidence to the contrary, it appears that the scope of

a landowner’s liability under section nine of the ESA remains

exactly as it was before the Protocols’ publication: a complete

prohibition on “take” of any endangered species. 16 U.S.C. §

1538(a)(1)(B); see Indep. Equip. Dealers, 372 F.3d at 428

(agency action “left the world just as it found it, and thus cannot

be fairly described as implementing, interpreting, or prescribing

law or policy”); Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer

Prod. Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(Agency action not reviewable if action does not “impos[e] any

obligation..., deny[] any right..., or fix[] any legal

relationship.”). 

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Home Builders’ argument that the Protocols exert a coercive

effect on local governments is likewise unavailing. Home

Builders asserts that local permitting agencies have adopted the

Protocols to guard against their own potential liability under

section nine of the ESA. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d

155, 164 (1st Cir. 1997) (state regulatory scheme constituted

“continuing violation” of section nine of ESA); United States v.

Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81, 91 (D. Mass. 1998)

(inadequate shoreline management “harmed” protected species).

Drawing on Appalachian Power, Home Builders characterizes

this case as one in which the agency action “leads private parties

or State permitting authorities to believe that it will declare

permits invalid unless they comply with the terms of the

document.” 208 F.3d at 1021. Yet in Appalachian Power we

were addressing a very different statutory scheme from the one

at issue here. Appalachian Power involved the Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq., which establishes an intricate

permitting process that involves federal review of state operating

permits. See Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1017. The FWS

does not have comparable authority under the ESA to “declare

permits invalid,” id. at 1021. Furthermore, while the record

demonstrates that Riverside and San Diego counties have

adopted the 1999 Protocol as part of their building permit

process, there is no evidence that helps to reveal the local

officials’ reason for doing so, much less evidence that local

officials were coerced by the FWS. While the FWS did issue a

letter to the City of Thousand Oaks, California in response to a

draft environmental impact report for a proposed golf course in

which it noted that the location of the golf course was within a

potential habitat area for Quino, Letter from Noda to Smith

(Feb. 22, 1999), such warning is within the authority of the FWS

under section nine of the ESA. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83

F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the record is inadequate

to support a finding that the Protocols have the practical effect

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7 The “false negative” designation is one used by the FWS if it has

reason to believe that a survey in close proximity to a known Quino

population may have incorrectly found no Quino present. See, e.g.,

Letter from Barrett to Lacy (Sept. 9, 1999) (“[T]he ... flight season

was poor and ... false negative surveys were highly probable in the

vicinity (within 2 km) of known Quino colonies.”).

of binding interested parties to their terms. Gen. Elec. Co., 290

F.3d at 383; McLouth Steel, 838 F.2d at 1321.

Home Builders’ third argument is that the Protocols constitute

final agency action because they cabin the agency’s discretion.

Appellant’s Br. at 36. In Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818

F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987), this court concluded that an FDA

action level for alfatoxins in corn was a substantive rule because

the language of the action level resulted in a “cabining of [the]

agency’s prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at 948. The language of

the Protocols at issue here is not nearly as severe as that in

Community Nutrition. The regulation in Community Nutrition

stated that “an action level ... may be established to define the

level of contamination at which food will be deemed to be

adulterated.” Id. at 947 (emphasis in original). The FDA had

also made statements that any shipment exceeding the stated

toxin level would “be considered adulterated and subject to

condemnation.” Id. at 948 (emphasis in original). No such

binding language appears in either of the Protocols. Nonconforming surveys may be accepted. 2000 Protocol at 6.

Conforming surveys may also be rejected through the “false

negative” designation.7 There have been no enforcement actions

that indicate whether the FWS considers itself bound by survey

results. Thus, there is insufficient evidence in the record to

conclude that either of the Protocols binds the agency

sufficiently to make it a substantive rule under the reasoning of

Community Nutrition.

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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

So ordered.

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