Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03825/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03825-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK DEMARC SAMPSON,

Petitioner,

 vs.

MIKES KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-3825 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS; RULINGS

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Respondent has moved to

dismiss the petition on grounds that it is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner has

resisted the motion and the time for respondent to reply has passed, so it is now ready for

ruling. Also before the court for ruling are several motions by petitioner. 

DISCUSSION

1. Petitioner's motions for appointment of counsel

The right to counsel provided in the Sixth Amendment does not apply in habeas

corpus actions. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). However, 18

U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) authorizes appointment of counsel to represent a habeas

petitioner whenever "the court determines that the interests of justice so require and such

person is financially unable to obtain representation." The decision to appoint counsel is

committed to the discretion of the district court. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Petitioner has presented his claims adequately in the petition, and has done a good

job opposing the motion to dismiss, given the facts he has to work with. The interests of

justice do not require appointment of counsel. The motions for appointment of counsel will

Case 4:05-cv-03825-PJH Document 25 Filed 03/13/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

be denied. 

2. Petitioner's other motions

Petitioner moves for leave to amend his petition to add a claim. Because no

responsive pleading had been filed when he filed his amendment, it is an amendment as of

right. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a). The motion will be denied as unnecessary.

Petitioner's "Motion for Relief from Default" refers to his "default" of not filing the

petition on time, that is, it is his opposition to the motion to dismiss. As a motion, it will be

denied. 

As to petitioner's motion for entry of default against respondent, respondent' s

motion for an extension of time was granted and the motion to dismiss filed within the time

as extended, so the motion for default will be denied. 

3. Motion to dismiss

a. Basic calculation

The statute of limitations is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one

year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion

of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an

application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner's conviction became final on September 10, 2002. His federal petition

therefore was due by September 10, 2003, absent tolling or a different starting date for the

limitations period. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying

“anniversary method” to habeas limitations period; absent any tolling, the expiration date of

Case 4:05-cv-03825-PJH Document 25 Filed 03/13/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the limitation period will be the same date as the triggering event but in the following year). 

His first state habeas petition was filed on May 25, 2003, about eight months after the

limitations period began running. This stopped the clock until the last petition was denied

by the California Supreme Court on September 29, 2004. This federal petition was not filed

until August 3, 2005, about ten months after tolling ended. These dates are not disputed by

petitioner. 

With eight months of the period having been used before petitioner started state

collateral proceedings, and ten months having passed after completion of them before the

petition was filed, this petition is clearly untimely, absent other considerations. 

Petitioner contends in his opposition that he was so caught up in investigations he

was undertaking to support the claims he raised in the petition that he "must have lost

time," and that he was not abusing the legal system by his delay. This may be an attempt

to claim equitable tolling. 

b. Equitable tolling

The one-year limitation period can be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute

of limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler),

128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v.

United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Equitable

tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of time should be granted

only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a

petition on time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The petitioner bears the burden of showing that this "extraordinary exclusion" should

apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). He must establish

two elements in order to be granted equitable tolling: “(1) that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Rasberry

v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

419 (2005)). The prisoner also must show that “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the

cause of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 4:05-cv-03825-PJH Document 25 Filed 03/13/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Petitioner's contention that he was so absorbed in his investigation that he just lost

track of time is far from meeting these stringent requirements. Equitable tolling does not

apply. See Beeler, 128 F.3d 1283 at 1288-89 (stating that equitable tolling “will not be

available in most cases” and expressing confidence that district courts will “take seriously

Congress's desire to accelerate the federal habeas process, and will only authorize

extensions when this high hurdle ["extraordinary circumstances"] is surmounted.”). 

c. Actual innocence

Petitioner also contends that he is "actually innocent." The Ninth Circuit has stated

in dictum that the actual innocence gateway established in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298

(1995), may be available to a petitioner whose petition is otherwise barred by AEDPA’s

limitations period. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2002) (implying that

unavailability of actual innocence gateway would raise serious constitutional concerns and

remanding to district court for a determination of whether actual innocence claim was

established before deciding whether gateway is available under AEDPA). 

The “actual innocence” or “miscarriage of justice” exception arose in the context of

procedural bars: If a state prisoner cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard to

escape a procedural bar, a federal court may still hear the merits of the successive,

abusive or procedurally defaulted claims if failure to hear the claims would constitute a

"miscarriage of justice." Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-340 (1992) (citations

omitted); see also Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776-77. In the traditional understanding of habeas

corpus, a "miscarriage of justice" occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is secured in

violation of a constitutional right. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 543-44. However, the

Supreme Court limits the "miscarriage of justice" exception to habeas petitioners who can

show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. at 496); see, e.g., Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001)

(petitioner must establish factual innocence in order to show that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice would result from application of procedural default). Under this

Case 4:05-cv-03825-PJH Document 25 Filed 03/13/07 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

exception, a petitioner may establish a procedural "gateway" permitting review of defaulted

claims if he or she demonstrates "actual innocence." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 & n.32. 

Thus,

[i]f a petitioner . . . presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court

cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also

satisfied that the trial was free of non-harmless constitutional error, the

petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the

merits of his underlying claim. 

Id. at 316. 

"To be credible, such an actual innocence claim requires petitioner to support his

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was

not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The "new" evidence need not be newly

available, just newly presented -- that is, evidence that was not presented at trial. Griffin v.

Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003). 

It is not enough that the new evidence show the existence of reasonable doubt;

rather, petitioner must show "that it is more likely than not that no ‘reasonable juror’ would

have convicted him." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "the test is

whether, with the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have found [p]etitioner guilty." Van Buskirk v. Baldwin, 265 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir.

2001). Thus, "actual innocence" means factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency. 

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998) (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339). 

 A petitioner need not always affirmatively show physical evidence that he or she did

not commit the crime. Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). A

petitioner may pass through the Schlup gateway by producing evidence "that significantly

undermines or impeaches the credibility of witnesses presented at trial, if all the evidence,

including new evidence, makes it 'more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Petitioner contends that he has always asserted his innocence and presents a

conclusory claim that the facts alleged in the petition show that he is indeed actually

Case 4:05-cv-03825-PJH Document 25 Filed 03/13/07 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

innocent. The allegations of the petition are, of course, not proof of anything. This is far

from meeting the demanding standard set out above. The actual innocence exception,

assuming it exists, does not apply. 

d. Starting date for limitations period

Petitioner also refers to newly discovered evidence uncovered in the investigation

which led to his supplemental petition filed on May 25, 2006. This might be an attempt to

claim that as to the issue in the supplemental petition the limitations period should not have

begun running until the evidence was discovered. One of the possible starting dates for the

limitations period provided in the statute is "the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence." See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

The claim petitioner raises in the supplemental petition is that defense counsel was

ineffective in waiving his right to be present at an in camera review of possibly impeaching

materials from the arresting officer's personnel file. Petitioner has completely failed to

establish that he exercised due diligence to discover this fact; indeed, he provides no

information except that he did not discover it until May 12, 2006. Obviously, this does not

go to whether he was diligent in attempting to discover it. 

The supplemental petition also contains a reference to "new evidence." In a section

headed "Exhibits B" on the last page of the supplemental petition, petitioner refers to an

attached copy of a newspaper story which appeared in the San Jose Mercury News

contending that many persons had been convicted in cases where the prosecutor

misstated the law or the evidence. The exhibit includes a page of the story listing

defendants in whose cases the paper says there was "questionable conduct," and the list

includes petitioner.

Even if he intended to add this as a separate claim in this proceeding, which is by no

means clear, petitioner has not established due diligence – he presumably was present at

the trial, and therefore knows what the prosecutor did or did not do before the jury. This

court also notes that several claims of prosecutorial misconduct were raised in petitioner's

Case 4:05-cv-03825-PJH Document 25 Filed 03/13/07 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

direct appeal, and that the California Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecutor

committed misconduct but that it was not prejudicial. See People v. Sampson, 2002 WL

462279 at *12-16 (Cal. App. 2002). This may well be the misconduct to which the

newspaper article refers; it simply is not possible to tell, because the copies provided by

petitioner do not contain any discussion of his case. If the newspaper story is a reference

to the same misconduct, petitioner obviously was aware of it long before May 12, 2006. 

Petitioner has failed to show that a starting date for the limitations period other than

completion of direct review should apply.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner's motion for leave to amend was filed before a responsive pleading, so is

an amendment as of right. His motion (document number 7 on the docket) is DENIED as

unnecessary. His motions for appointment of counsel (documents 8 and 10) and for entry

of default (document 13) are DENIED for the reasons set out above. His motion for relief

from default (document 21) is actually his opposition to the motion to dismiss; considered

as a motion, it is DENIED.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (document 18) is GRANTED. The petition is

DISMISSED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.05\SAMPSON825.DSM

Case 4:05-cv-03825-PJH Document 25 Filed 03/13/07 Page 7 of 7