Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01221/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ricardo Garza,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-1221-PHX-JAT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Red Rock Correctional Center at Eloy, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 

30, 2015 (Doc. 1). On September 4, 2015 Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11). 

Petitioner filed a Reply on November 19, 2015 (Doc. 22). Respondents supplemented 

the record on February 9, 2016 (Doc. 24). 

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals described 

the factual background as follows:

K.P. was walking to his car on May 4, 2007, at 

approximately 5:00 p.m., when he noticed a Hispanic man and 

Hispanic woman parked in a black "[m]id-90's" Mercedes outside of 

the building where he worked. He retrieved his white 2000 Nissan 

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Altima, and as he waited for his co-worker to close and lock the 

parking area gate, he was approached by the Hispanic man, later 

identified as Defendant. The man held "a big knife with a long blade 

that ha[d] jagged edges," and said, "I want your car." K.P. got out of 

his car, and Defendant got in, backed up to the Mercedes, and yelled 

at the Hispanic female to "get out" of the Mercedes. Once the 

female got into the Altima, Defendant drove off. Phoenix Police 

later searched the Mercedes and found a wallet with check stubs in

Defendant's name, a photograph of Defendant, a manila envelope 

containing several letters addressed to Defendant, broken glass, and 

blood.

Later that evening, some two and one-half miles from where 

K.P.'s Altima had been taken, J.S. was in his 2004 Mercedes in a 

Dairy Queen parking lot. A man, later identified as Defendant, 

approached J.S. from behind while holding a "[v]ery large" knife, 

and told him, "Move. Move." J.S. attempted to get his wallet off of 

the passenger seat, but Defendant pushed his hand off of the wallet 

and again said, "Move. Move." A witness testified that she saw the 

incident and noticed a white Nissan Altima about two feet behind 

the Mercedes. A Hispanic female with blood on her face was in the 

passenger seat of the Altima. After J.S. got out of his car, Defendant 

got in and drove off. The female in the Altima moved to the driver's 

seat and also drove off. 

Phoenix Police broadcasted a description of J.S.'s 2004 

Mercedes shortly after the incident. At approximately 3:00 a.m. the 

next morning, an officer on patrol spotted a car fitting the 

description. After he confirmed that the vehicle had been stolen, the 

officer requested an air unit and back-up. Defendant led the 

pursuing officers on a high-speed chase from Phoenix to Casa 

Grande, but eventually stopped at a gas station and was taken into 

custody. 

Defendant was transported back to Phoenix. After Defendant 

was released to a police detective, the transporting officer searched 

the back of the patrol car and found a small bag of what was later 

identified as 540 milligrams of methamphetamine. During an 

interrogation, Defendant admitted that he dropped the bag of 

methamphetamine in the patrol car.

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 1/22/10 at 1-2.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 11, are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit ___.” Exhibits to the Petition, Doc. 1, are referenced herein as 

“Exhibit P-___.” Exhibits to the Supplement, Doc. 24, are referenced herein as “Exhibit 

R.T. ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was charged with two counts of armed robbery, class two dangerous 

felonies; two counts of theft of means of transportation, class three felonies; and one 

count of possession or use of dangerous drugs, a class four felony. 

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On April 25, 2008, Petitioner appeared with counsel for a settlement conference. 

The court reviewed the allegations, potential sentencing (including prior convictions), 

and potential additional charges, with the combined potential of 47.75 years in prison. 

(Exhibit D, R.T. 4/25/08 at 1-8.) The court also reviewed a plea offer to plead to the two 

Class 2 felonies (armed robbery) and possession of drugs, with a stipulated minimum 

sentence of 11 years. (Id. at 8-9.) The prosecutor advised that though there was no 

stipulation as to concurrent sentencing, a verbal offer to concurrent sentencing with a 

stipulated term of 15.75 years had been made. (Id. at 9.) The prosecution also noted that 

it was agreeing to not pursue charges of felony flight and witness tampering. (Id. at 10.) 

Petitioner did not proceed with the plea agreement, and eventually proceeded to 

trial, where he testified in his own defense, asserting that he was asked by a mutual 

friend to “switch cars” with K.P.. The prosecution sought to impeach Petitioner based 

on the failure to reveal these facts to police, and questioned Petitioner whether anyone 

had reviewed the police report with him. Counsel requested a sidebar and complained 

that the questioning was improper comment on communication with counsel, and moved 

for a mistrial. The court limited the questioning but denied the motion for mistrial. 

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 2-3.) (See also Exhibit E, R.T. 11/24/08 at 84-87; 105-111.) 

Petitioner was convicted as charged, and was sentenced to consecutive twentyyear prison terms for the two counts of armed robbery, fifteen-year terms for each count 

of theft of means, and a ten-year term for possession or use of dangerous drugs, each to 

run concurrently with the armed-robbery terms, an effective sentence of 40 years in 

prison. (Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 1/22/10 at 3.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, raising a single issue:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion and violate 

Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to counsel by refusing to grant 

Defendant's mistrial motion when the prosecutor cross-examined 

Defendant about attorney client communications, and by refusing to 

instruct the jury to disregard the improper question, especially when 

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credibility was crucial to the State's case and the State referred to 

the improper statement in closing argument?

(Exhibit P-A, Opening Brief at 31.) 

Petitioner attempted to file a Pro Se Supplemental Opening Brief (Exhibit P-C), 

arguing: (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) tainted photo lineup; (3) Miranda rights 

violation; (4) erroneous denial of motion for directed verdict; (5) consecutive sentences 

were not appropriate because of the limited time between the offenses; (6) his sentences 

were disproportionate. The supplemental brief was stricken as an unauthorized pro se 

filing by a represented party. (Exhibit P-D, Order 2/23/10.) 

In a Memorandum Decision issued July 22, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, concluding that the trial court had properly weighed 

the effect of the prosecutor’s questions and found that no mistrial was necessary. 

(Exhibit A at 5.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit P-D, Doc. 1-2 at 26) by the Arizona 

Supreme Court, which summarily denied review on January 18, 2011 (Exhibit P-D, 

Order, Doc. 1-2 at 35).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On March 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit 

F). Counsel was appointed, who eventually filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit G), 

evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Petitioner was granted leave to file a 

pro per petition. (Exhibit H, M.E. 8/10/11.) 

Petition filed his pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J, Appendix

(Doc. 11-1 at 154, et seq.)), raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

(1) trial counsel’s deficient impeachment of K.P.; (2) trial counsel’ deficient 

impeachment of victims J.S. and M.W.; (3) appellate counsel’s failure to raise claims of 

ineffective assistance, due process violations, and Miranda violations. He subsequently 

filed an Amended Petition (Exhibit J, Appendix (Doc. 11-1 at 174, et seq.)), arguing: (1) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel by failure to conduct pretrial investigations and to 

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interview witnesses; (2) ineffective assistance regarding failure to pursue a hearing 

challenging the identifications; (3) ineffective assistance regarding failure to pursue 

J.S.’s presence in the courtroom; (4) ineffective assistance regarding plea agreement; (5) 

ineffective assistance for failing to read the police reports and pretrial documents to 

Petitioner; (6) ineffective assistance for representing that Petitioner would receive a 

sentence of probation to 3 years; (7) ineffective assistance for failing to seek a mistrial 

based on communications between the prosecutor and an identifying witness when 

Petitioner was introduced at trial; (8) ineffective assistance for failing to seek a mistrial 

based on the prosecutor obtaining information on the defense’s trial strategy; (9) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the prosecution’s 

misrepresentation of the law; (10) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for instructing 

Petitioner to deny being on drugs or medications, when he was known to be on court 

ordered psychotropic drugs; and (11) prosecutorial misconduct regarding claims 7 

through 10).

The PCR court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner had failed 

to show deficient performance and prejudice. (Exhibit P-E, Order 9/6/12 (Doc. 1-4 at 

43, et seq.).) 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, and in his PCR proceeding. (Exhibit 

P-E, Pet. Rev. (Doc. 1-2 at 38, et seq.).) 

On February 10, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review, concluding:

On review, Garza summarizes his claims and the trial court's 

ruling but he does not identify facts material to the consideration of 

the issues he raises or develop any argument in support of them. 

Instead, he attempts to incorporate by reference the argument made 

in his filings below; that procedure, however, is not permitted. Ariz. 

R.Crim. P. 32.9(c)(l) (iv). Garza's failure to comply with Rule 32.9 

and his failure to develop any meaningful argument in support of his 

claims compels our summary refusal to grant review. See Ariz. 

R.Crim. P. 32.9(c)(l) (petition for review must contain "reasons why 

the petition should be granted" and either appendix or "specific 

references to the record"), 32.9(f) (appellate review under Rule 32.9 

discretionary); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 

838 ( 1995) (insufficient argument waives claim on review); State v. 

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French, 198 Ariz. 119, ~ 9, 7 P.3d 128, 131 (App.2000) (summarily 

rejecting claims not complying with rules governing form and 

content of petitions for review), disapproved on other grounds by 

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, ii 10, 46 P.3d 1067, 1071 (2002).

(Exhibit I, Mem. Dec. 2/10/14 at 1-2.) 

Petitioner then filed a Motion to Extend Time to Petition for Review and Motion 

for Reconsideration (Exhibit P-E, Motion (Doc. 1-2 at 45 et seq.)). The Arizona Court 

of Appeals summarily denied reconsideration. (Exhibit P-E, Order 3/11/14 (Doc. 1-3 at 

1).) 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review and Motion for Reconsideration with 

the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit P-E (Doc. 1-3 at 8, et seq.)). The Arizona Supreme 

Court summarily denied both on August 28, 2014. (Exhibit P-E, Order 8/28/14 (Doc. 1-

2 at 37, et seq.).) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 30, 2015 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following six grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying Petitioner’s motion 

for a mistrial and by failing to instruct the jury to disregard 

improper questioning. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges a 

violation of his Miranda rights in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments. In Ground Three, he alleges that his 

Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated by an improper 

line-up and admission of identification testimony. In Ground Four, 

he alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In Ground Five, he 

alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In Ground Six,

Petitioner alleges that his sentence violated his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights and his Sixth Amendment right to a 

jury trial.

(Order 7/23/15, Doc. 7 at 2 (emphasis added).) 

Response - On September 4, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 11). Respondents argue that the Petition is timely, Grounds 2, 3, and 6 are 

procedurally defaulted, and Grounds 1, 4 and 5 are without merit.

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Respondents provide only limited exhibits with their Answer, leaving the Court to 

wade through Petitioner’s largely unlabeled exhibits for much of the record. (See

Answer, Doc. 11 at 2, n. 1 (referencing proffer of unsubmitted transcripts, and referring 

the Court to Petitioner’s exhibits).) While Rule 5, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 

does not mandate that Respondents reproduce anything beyond appellate briefs and 

rulings, the undersigned finds that reliance upon a pro se petitioner’s unlabeled exhibits 

frustrates the review and citation of the record. The practice is discouraged.

Reply - On November 19, 2015 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 22). Petitioner 

argues no specific claims in his Reply, but does provide expansive recitations of law 

which are related to his claims. 

Supplement to Record – On February 8, 2016, the Court observed that 

Respondents have responded on the merits to Grounds One, Four and Five, but had not 

provided the trial transcript to permit evaluation of the merits. Accordingly, 

Respondents were directed to provide transcripts form opening statements through 

closing arguments. 

On February 9, 2016, Respondents complied (Doc. 24), supplementing the record.

Respondents have provided a series of unlabeled transcripts. The undersigned references 

those transcripts herein as “Exhibit R.T. _______.”

Although Petitioner filed an objection (Doc. 25) asserting he had not received one 

of the filed transcripts, copies were subsequently served on Petitioner, and he has not 

asserted any further objections to the supplemented record. (Order 3/1/16, Doc. 26; 

Notice of Service 3/1/16, Doc. 27.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that Grounds 2, 3, and 6 are either procedurally defaulted or 

were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and thus are 

barred from federal habeas review.

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1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

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facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Fair Presentation - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim 

to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) 

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that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a). (Answer, Doc. 11 at 15.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver bar, Petitioner 

can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

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32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Exceptions - Rule 32.2 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category 

of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) 

(exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to timeliness 

bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his 

claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

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imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

/ /

/ /

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3. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

a) Ground Two

In Ground Two of his Petition, Petitioner argues a violation of his Miranda rights 

in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7-7C.)

Petitioner argues he raised this issue on direct appeal. (Id. at 7.) 

Petitioner attempted to raise this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in Ground 

2 of his Pro Se Supplemental Opening Brief on direct appeal. (Exhibit P-C at 6.) 

However, this supplemental brief was stricken as an unauthorized pro se filing by a 

represented party. (Exhibit P-D, Order 2/23/10.) Accordingly, it was not fairly 

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in that proceeding.

He raised related claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in Claim 3 

of his pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J, Appendix (Doc. 11-1 at 

154, et seq.)). However, he failed to fairly present any claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in his PCR proceeding, because he failed to comply with the requirements for 

including his facts and arguments within his petition for review. (Exhibit I, Mem. Dec. 

2/10/14 at 1-2.) 

To the extent that Petitioner may have included this claim in his petitions for 

review to the Arizona Supreme Court (either on direct appeal or in his PCR proceeding), 

such presentation would not have resulted in exhaustion. The Arizona Supreme Court 

does not grant review of claims not properly raised below, absent special considerations. 

See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565, 20 P.3d 631, 632, n.2 (2001). "Submitting a new 

claim to the state's highest court in a procedural context in which its merits will not be 

considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." Roettgen 

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 

351 (1989)). In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to 

properly exhaust a claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct 

review." 

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas 

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corpus states, “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire 

direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire 

judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 

Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and 

Procedure, § 23.3b (4th ed. 1998). Thus, fair presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court 

for the first time is not sufficient to exhaust an Arizona state prisoner’s remedies. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to fairly present his claim in Ground Two to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, and for the reasons discussed hereinabove in Section 

III(A)(2), this claim is now procedurally defaulted.

b) Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth Amendment due process rights 

were violated by an improper line-up and admission of identification testimony. 

Petitioner argues he raised this issue on direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) 

As with Ground Two, Petitioner attempted to raise this claim to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals in Ground 2 of his Pro Se Supplemental Opening Brief on direct appeal. 

(Exhibit P-C at 6.) However, this supplemental brief was stricken as an unauthorized 

pro se filing, and thus was not fair presentation. 

Petitioner asserted various challenges to the line-up and identification testimony 

to the PCR court, but as discussed with Ground Two he failed to fairly present any 

claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Petition for Review, and similarly failed to 

fairly present any claims to the Arizona Supreme Court in that proceeding.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to fairly present his claim in Ground Three to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, and for the reasons discussed hereinabove in Section 

III(A)(2), this claim is now procedurally defaulted.

c) Ground Six

In Ground Six, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due 

process rights and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial were violated by the 

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imposition of consecutive sentences for a single act. Petitioner argues he raised this 

issue on direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.)

As with Grounds Two and Three, Petitioner attempted to raise this claim to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in Ground 5 of his Pro Se Supplemental Opening Brief on 

direct appeal. (Exhibit P-C at 16, et seq..) However, this supplemental brief was 

stricken as an unauthorized pro se filing, and thus was not fair presentation.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to fairly present his claim in Ground Six to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, and for the reasons discussed hereinabove in Section 

III(A)(2), this claim is now procedurally defaulted.

a) Summary Re Exhaustion

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted on his claims in Grounds Two, Three, and Six. 

2. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

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Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner makes no explicit argument of cause and prejudice.

In his Reply, Petitioner does assert arguments of ineffective assistance of trial, 

and appellate counsel, although devoid of any factual support. Ineffective assistance of 

counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly exhaust claims in state courts and 

excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). 

However, “[t]o constitute cause for procedural default of a federal habeas claim, the 

constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must first have been presented to 

the state courts as an independent claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 

2003). Here, Petitioner did not fairly present any claims of ineffective assistance to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in either his direct appeal (where the only fairly presented 

claims was the misconduct claim raised by appellate counsel) or in his PCR proceeding

(where he failed to fairly present any claims). Accordingly, Petitioner may not now rely 

upon such ineffectiveness to avoid his procedural defaults.

Petitioner has also asserted to the state courts (Exhibit P-E, Pet. Rev. (Doc. 1-2 at 

38, et seq.) that PCR counsel was ineffective. Ordinarily, to meet the “cause” 

requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent 

constitutional violation. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists, ineffective assistance 

will not amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. "Ineffective 

assistance of counsel can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default only if the 

petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in the proceeding in which the default 

occurred. . . . The fact that counsel is appointed by the state court does not change the 

result, because counsel is not constitutionally required." Smith v. State of Idaho, 392 

F.3d 350, 357 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original, citations omitted). If there is no 

federal constitutional right to counsel, a petitioner "cannot establish cause because of the 

state trial court’s failure to appoint him counsel, even if such failure was erroneous as a 

matter of state law." Smith, 392 F.3d at 357 . In Patrick Poland v. Stewart, 169 F. 3d 

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573 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause there is no right to an attorney 

in state post-conviction proceedings, there cannot be constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Id. at 588 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)). 

The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the general rule that 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel is not cause. The first exception was recognized in 

Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), where the Supreme Court held that cause could 

be shown when PCR counsel was not merely negligent (and under the law of agency that 

negligence being chargeable to the petitioner) but had abandoned the representation 

without notice to the petitioner, resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

Here, however, Petitioner does not suggest that counsel abandoned the 

representation without notice, merely that counsel was deficient in not bringing claims 

Petitioner asserts are meritorious. Indeed, counsel filed the appropriate notice to the 

Court when he was unable to find an issue of review. Thus, any such deficiency was not 

external to the defense, and is chargeable to Petitioner. 

The second exception to the general rule that ineffectiveness of PCR counsel does 

not establish cause concerns the failure of PCR counsel to bring claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel.1 In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Court 

recognized that because courts increasingly reserve review of claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel to post-conviction relief proceedings, the ineffectiveness of 

counsel in such PCR proceedings could effectively defeat any review of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the Court recognized a narrow exception to the Court’s 

ruling in Coleman, supra, that the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel cannot provide cause. 

Arizona, the state at issue in Martinez, is just such a state, and accordingly ineffective 

 

1

 The Ninth Circuit has concluded that an ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim 

used to establish cause for a procedural default of a claim for ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel need not be exhausted itself. Dickens v. Ryan, Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

1302, 1322 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2014) (“where Martinez applies, there seems to be no 

requirement that the claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as cause for an 

ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claim be presented to the state courts”).

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assistance of PCR counsel can establish cause to excuse a procedural default of a claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In Ha Van Nguyen, 736 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 

2013), the Ninth Circuit extended Martinez to PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing 

to bring claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

However, the Martinez court made clear that the limited exception it was creating 

only applies to the important “right to the effective assistance of trial counsel.” 132 S.Ct. 

at 1320. Accordingly, Petitioner’s complaint that PCR counsel was ineffective could not 

establish cause to excuse his procedural default of his claims in Grounds Two, Three, 

and Six, which are not based on ineffective assistance of trial (or appellate) counsel. 

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

3. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

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1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner makes no assertions of actual innocence, and proffers no new 

evidence to show that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. Accordingly his 

procedurally defaulted claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. GROUND ONE: INVASION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel by denying Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial, by failing to 

instruct the jury to disregard improper questioning, and that prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct by conducting the questioning and then commenting on the issue. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 6, et seq.)

Respondents argue that this claims was disposed of on the merits in Petitioner’s 

direct appeal, and that Petitioner fails to show that the decision of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, and 

indeed fails to show that the Supreme Court has established any relevant law. (Answer, 

Doc. 11 at 19-21.) 

Petitioner replies, citing U.S. v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1992), U.S. v. 

Walker, 839 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), and Schillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 

1143 (10th Cir. 1995). 

Standard Applicable on Habeas - While the purpose of a federal habeas 

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proceeding is to search for violations of federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in 

custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every 

error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the last reasoned decision on 

Petitioner’s claim was that of the Arizona Court of Appeals on Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Invasion of Right to Counsel – “When the government deliberately interferes 

with the confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and defense counsel, that 

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interference violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if it substantially prejudices 

the criminal defendant.” Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584–85 (9th Cir.2004). In 

U. S. v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), the Supreme Court elucidated its holdings that 

invasion of the right to counsel does not automatically require a mistrial. 

Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject 

to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury 

suffered from the constitutional violation and should not 

unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. . . In addition, certain 

violations of the right to counsel may be disregarded as harmless 

error. 

Our approach has thus been to identify and then neutralize 

the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to 

assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair 

trial. The premise of our prior cases is that the constitutional 

infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect 

upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or has produced 

some other prejudice to the defense. Absent such impact on the 

criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a 

remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full 

recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial.

More particularly, absent demonstrable prejudice, or 

substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly 

inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate. 

Id. at 364-65 (citations omitted).

Factual Determinations – In disposing of this claim, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals summarized the facts as follows:

The prosecutor sought to impeach Defendant's story by 

demonstrating that Defendant had not told his story to the police.

During cross-examination, Defendant testified that he had not read 

the police report, and the following exchange occurred:

Prosecutor: You have had somebody read [the police report] 

to you; haven't you?

Defendant: No.

Prosecutor: So no one told you what the police report says?

Defendant: No.

Prosecutor: In a year and a half no one discussed with you 

what's in the police report?

Before Defendant answered the question, defense counsel requested 

a sidebar, and after the jury was excused, moved for mistrial. 

Counsel argued that the prosecutor had implicitly "comment[ed] on 

defendant's and defense counsel's communication and

conversation." The prosecutor disagreed and argued that he was 

only trying to determine whether Defendant had general knowledge 

of what the police report stated.

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 1/22/10 at 2-3.) The Arizona Court of Appeals found: “The court 

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denied the request for a mistrial, but instructed the prosecutor not to question Defendant 

further about the subject.” (Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 1/22/10 at 3.) 

Petitioner offers no argument that the court was unreasonable or even wrong 

about the facts. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6, et seq.) The undersigned finds the state court’s 

determination of these facts to be correct. (See R.T. 11/24/08 at 105-111.) 

Petitioner does further argue that the prosecutor violated the court’s orders when 

he proceeded to ask Petitioner whether had had used the courtroom for trial preparation, 

and argued in closing that Petitioner had testified to not preparing for trial and about his 

not providing investigators his side of the story. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6B.) Petitioner 

asserted the same facts to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit P-A, Opening Brief at 

34-35.) 

Petitioner does not explain how the trial court’s instruction precluded inquiry 

about the usage of the courtroom to rehearse his testimony. The trial court simply 

instructed:

I think your [sic] entitled to question about whether he's aware of 

certain things within the police department reports. But I'm not 

going to allow any further questions along this line...So I will deny 

the defendant's motion for mistrial, with instructions that no further 

into this area of inquiry.

(Exhibit E, R.T. 11/24/08 at 108.) 

Moreover, earlier in the day, the trial court specifically authorized questions about 

the rehearsal. Defense counsel had requested permission to ask Petitioner questions 

without an interpreter to demonstrate his diction when communicating in English (as he 

had done with investigators). (Id. at 58-60.) Over the prosecution’s objection, the trial 

court agreed to permit the demonstration. The prosecution then requested permission to 

cross-examine Petitioner about rehearsing his testimony in the courtroom the day before. 

(Id. at 60.) The trial court ruled:

THE COURT: I think the defense is certainly entitled 

to ask victims that question when they get on the stand, I really see 

no difference . 

MR. INSERRA: Of course they can't ask what was 

said and asked? 

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THE COURT: Absolutely. Content is privileged 

because I understand counsel was present.

(Id. at 60-61.) 

Later, during argument on the motion for mistrial, defense counsel complained 

that the line of questioning on the police report suggested to the jury that defense counsel 

had not properly handled the case. To demonstrate no intent to impugn defense 

counsel’s professionalism, the prosecution pointed out the intent to instead show that 

defense counsel had rehearsed testimony with Petitioner:

MR. CHURCH: This is impeachment, Your Honor. 

It's frankly exactly what it is. 

Per our conversation earlier in the afternoon, I asked 

the court if counsel is allowed to do some things, if I was able to go 

into the general topic of the defendant requesting to use the 

courtroom to prepare for trial, to prepare his testimony. The court 

indicated I had. 

He's now testifying he's never looked at the police report, 

never talked about it, yet, he prepared his testimony. I'm not 

claiming anything that Mr. Inserra said to his client or making any 

kind of assertion that Mr. Inserra didn't do his job. It's not on Mr. 

Inserra. It's on the defendant with his answers. If he doesn't want to 

-- if he wants to answer question that way, it's his prerogative.

(Id. at 109-110.) 

After the discussions on the motion for mistrial regarding the police reports, the 

prosecution questioned:

Q. BY MR. CHURCH: Sir, you used the courtroom to 

prepare your testimony on Thursday afternoon; isn't that correct? 

A. No. 

Q. You never you used the courtroom on Thursday 

afternoon? 

A. I just talked to my attorney for about five minutes.

Q. And then you left?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 111-112.) 

In closing arguments, the prosecutor asserted:

But did he act like a person who was being straightforward back 

when he spoke with the police? No, he didn't. He came forward with 

some things. He made a statement about throwing the weapon out 

the window. Then he completely changes what he says here. He has 

an explanation for everything. Every single point that's brought up 

he had an explanation for. But he's never prepared. He had no idea 

about preparation in this case. And he only recalled certain little 

bits when the police officers were talking throughout the duration of 

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trial. Does that make a lick of sense?

(Exhibit RT 11/25/08 at 46.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized these facts as follows:

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Defendant had 

changed his story for trial. He stated, "Then [Defendant] completely 

changes what he says here. He has an explanation for everything. 

Every single point that's brought up he had an explanation for. But 

he's never prepared. He had no idea about preparation in this case." 

Defendant argues that the prosecutor's statements about trial 

preparation were in reference to the improper questions asked by the 

prosecutor, and served to increase the prejudice to him. We 

disagree. During cross-examination, Defendant also testified that he 

had not prepared for his testimony. Based on Defendant's testimony, 

the prosecutor's comments were not improper, nor do they amount 

to fundamental error.

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 1/22/10 at 5, n. 4.) Petitioner points to no portion of these 

findings which was unreasonable, or even wrong.

Legal Determinations – The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument 

with regard to the police report questions. The court agreed “with the trial court that the

broad questioning employed by the prosecutor had the potential of infringing on 

Defendant's attorney-client privilege.” (Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 1/22/10 at 4, ¶ 17.) But 

the court agreed with the trial court that there was insufficient prejudice to merit a 

mistrial.

Here...the trial court weighed the effect of the prosecutor's 

questions on the entire proceedings and could very well have felt, as 

we do, that there was little, if any, prejudicial effect. Defense 

counsel timely intervened and the court prudently addressed the 

situation outside of the presence of the jury. The jury, as a result, 

was never alerted to the nature of the objection or the ramifications 

of the question. The trial court was in the best position to assess the 

impact of the questions and it was not error to find that their 

influence was minimal.

(Id. at 5, ¶ 21.) 

Petitioner proffers no explanation how this determination was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of federal law. As discussed hereinabove, remedies for 

incursions into the attorney-client privilege are tailored to fit the perceived harm, and 

when there is no prejudice, no mistrial is required. U. S. v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361

(1981). Certainly there may have been the potential for harm from expanding the 

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questioning on the review of the police reports, but that harm was unrealized because the 

trial court terminated the line of questioning.

Similarly, with regard to the rehearsal, Petitioner has failed to show prejudice. 

The prosecution complied with the trial court’s instruction and did not inquire about the 

content of rehearsal. Even the reference to the participation of counsel was volunteered 

by Petitioner. And no inquiry was made into the contents of their communications. 

With regard to the closing arguments, the prosecutions’ comments were limited to 

observing Petitioner’s denial of having prepared his testimony. Again, there was no 

assertion of the contents of any communication between Petitioner and counsel. And, 

Petitioner fails to suggest any prejudice from this limited argument. 

In sum, Petitioner has failed to show any significant incursion into the attorney 

client privilege, and had failed to show any prejudice. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground One is without merit and must be denied.

C. GROUND FOUR: INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL

1. Background

a. Parties’ Arguments

In his Ground Four, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because: 

(1) he was disciplined and later disbarred; (2) he failed to investigate, interview, 

subpoena, and prepare witnesses; (3) failed to cross-examine a victim with his criminal 

record; and (4) failed to impeach witnesses’ in-court identifications with their responses 

to photographic lineups. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9, physical page 15, et seq.)

Respondents argue these claims are without merit. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 24, et 

seq.)

Petitioner replies only with general arguments regarding legal standards for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Reply, Doc. 22.) 

/ / 

/ / 

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b. State Court Rulings

Petitioner raised a variety of claims of ineffective assistance in his PCR 

proceeding. However, none of his claims were addressed on the merits by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, which disposed of them as unargued.2Thus, the only merits rulings 

are those by the PCR court. That court, however, addressed a limited set of claims of 

ineffective assistance, which did not include many of the claims raised now by 

Petitioner. 

Accordingly, any merits ruling by the PCR court will be addressed hereinafter 

with regard to each subclaim.

2. Applicable Standard on Ineffective Assistance Claims 

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

 

2 Respondents neither argue the procedural default of this claim, nor concede exhaustion. 

Perhaps Respondents do so in anticipation of Petitioner’s reliance upon Martinez v. 

Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), to excuse a default, which in turn would mandate 

consideration (at least preliminarily) of the merits of Petitioner’s claims of 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 

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reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 

679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

3. Application to Claims

a) Professional Discipline

Petitioner complains that his attorney, Mr. Inserra, was placed on professional 

disciplinary probation on March 19, 2007, and sometime after trial, was “disbarred.” 

Petitioner was represented by Mr. Inserra from March 6, 2008 (Exhibit C, M.E. 

3/6/8) through the completion of trial on November 26, 2008 (Exhibit R.T. 11/26/08). 

However, at the hearing on aggravators on April 10, 2009, Petitioner was represented by 

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Mr. Tucker. (Exhibit R.T. 4/10/09.) Apparently Mr. Inserra terminated his 

representation between November 26, 2008 and April 10, 2009, and presumably upon 

being suspended on or about January 7, 2009.

The records provided by Petitioner reflect that trial counsel was placed on 

disciplinary probation on March 19, 2007, was suspended from practice for one year in 

an order dated January 7, 2009, and on June 16, 2010 the Arizona Supreme Court 

suspended him from practice of law, retroactive to February 7, 2009. Petitioner presents 

no evidence that Mr. Inserra was ever disbarred, rather than merely suspended. 

Thus, during the bulk of his representation of Petitioner, Mr. Inserra was on 

disciplinary probation. Assuming his representation of Petitioner terminated upon his 

suspension, which was between trial and sentencing, Mr. Inserra did not represent 

Petitioner while suspended.

Nonetheless, as pointed out by Respondents, the Sixth Amendment does not 

guarantee counsel free of professional discipline. The Ninth Circuit has stated it 

succinctly in similar circumstances:

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists “not for its own sake, 

but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to 

receive a fair trial.” It follows that “defects in assistance that have 

no probable effect upon the trial's outcome do not establish a 

constitutional violation.” If counsel, who once passed the bar but 

was suspended before trial, still performed adequately, the process 

is not made fairer by awarding defendant a windfall even if he can't 

identify a single thing a licensed attorney would have done 

differently.

United States v. Ross, 338 F.3d 1054, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, complaints that counsel has undergone professional discipline “are 

appropriately addressed under the same rubric generally applicable to claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel: the test set forth in [Strickland], actual deficient 

performance plus prejudice.” Id. at 1056. 

In United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1986), the court distinguished 

between “a person posing as a lawyer who had not been admitted to any bar” and an 

admitted lawyer subjected to discipline. Id. at 697. In the former situation, “one never 

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admitted to practice law and therefore who never acquired the threshold qualification to 

represent a client in court cannot be allowed to do so, and no matter how spectacular a 

performance may ensue, it will not constitute ‘effective representation of counsel’ for 

purposes of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. “Conversely, the infliction of discipline upon an 

attorney previously qualified and in good standing will not and should not transform his 

services into ineffective assistance.” Id. 

Accordingly, trial counsel’s being on probation or suspended, or even disbarred, 

while representing Petitioner does not satisfy Strickland’s requirement for a showing of 

deficient performance and prejudice. 

Petitioner fails to show deficient performance or prejudice in this portion of 

Ground 4.

b) Witnesses

Petitioner argues that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate 

the existence of, to interview, to prepare for trial, and to subpoena witnesses. 

A habeas petitioner may not leave a court to speculate what evidence the deficient 

investigation would have discovered. In order to prevail on an allegation that defense 

counsel conducted an insufficient investigation resulting in ineffective assistance, the 

petitioner must show specifically what that investigation would have produced. A 

petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness’ testimony might be, but must 

adduce evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 

373 (9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness must 

generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness or on affidavit. A 

defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have been favorable; self-serving 

speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 

643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991).

Petitioner argues that counsel should have issued a subpoena for the witness D.P.

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who had asserted that the photo in the photo lineup did not appear familiar.

3

 However, 

Petitioner points to no evidence of such identification. Moreover, even accepting 

Petitioner’s assertions, D.P. could have proffered nothing more than a failed 

identification. Without evidence that the witness the had the ability to perceive the 

culprit, and opportunity and reason to observe, a failed identification is irrelevant. 

Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest evidence was available to support those facts.

Petitioner also argues that when shown a photo lineup during the investigation, 

the witness M.W. identified a subject and stated she was 85% sure it was the perpetrator. 

This witness did not testify at trial, but did testify at the voluntariness hearing. (Exhibit J, 

Appendix C, PCR Response at 7.) Petitioner fails to explain what beneficial testimony 

counsel could have elicited from this witness. In its PCR Response, the state seemed to 

concede that M.W. had been unable to identify Petitioner from a photo lineup during the 

investigation, but did identify Petitioner at the voluntariness hearing. (Id.) At best, 

therefore, it appears that counsel was faced with a witness who would identify Petitioner 

at trial, but could be impeached on the basis that she was not certain in the identification. 

Counsel could have made a reasonable strategic determination that defendant was better 

off with no testimony from M.W., and thus no identification, rather than trying to 

persuade a jury that her identification should be rejected because of a prior inconsistent 

identification. Even then, the best that would have resulted was the jury faced with a 

different failed identification. Moreover, even if it is assumed that M.W. had identified 

someone other than Petitioner, Petitioner fails to present any evidence to show that M.W. 

would have testified the same way at trial.

Petitioner next seems to argue that counsel should have prepared the victim J.S.

whose testimony at trial described the perpetrator as Hispanic, while J.S. had described 

the perpetrator to police officers as a black man. Petitioner proffers anything to suggest 

 

3

Petitioner’s PCR Petition complained only about the failure to attack the identifications 

of M.W. and J.S., and did not assert a claim with respect to D.P. (See Exhoibit P-E, PCR 

Pet. at A-1 to A-2.)

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that “preparation” of J.S. would have been possible or productive. As pointed out by 

Respondents (Answer, Doc. 11 at 28), trial counsel had no right, under Arizona law, to 

interview a victim, let alone “prepare” them. See Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5) 

(giving a victim the right “to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request 

by the defendant”). Moreover, on cross examination, J.S. denied having earlier 

described the perpetrator as black. (Exhibit R.T. 11/19/08 at 79-80.) Petitioner does not 

explain why an interview or attempted preparation by trial counsel could have resulted in 

different testimony by J.S.

Apart from these three witnesses (K.P., M.W., and J.S.), Petitioner does not 

proffer the identity of any overlooked or unprepared witnesses, let alone what beneficial 

testimony they might have provided, even if properly prepared. Nor does he proffer 

anything to suggest that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had 

such persons testified.

Petitioner fails to show deficient performance in this portion of Ground 4.

c) Impeachment re Criminal Record

Petitioner next argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to impeach the 

victim, K.P., with a purportedly extensive criminal record. 

As argued by Respondents, the only evidence of such a criminal record provided 

by Petitioner is a police report in his Exhibit P-G. That reports list K.P. as a victim, not a 

suspect, and appears to relate to his status as victim in the instant crime. 

Petitioner fails to show deficient performance or prejudice in this portion of 

Ground 4.

d) Impeachment re Identifications

Finally, Petitioner argues that counsel failed to impeach witnesses’ in-court 

identifications with their responses to photographic lineups. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9, 

physical page 15, et seq.) In particular, he argues that when shown a photo lineup during 

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the investigation, the witness M.W. identified a subject (apparently not Petitioner) and 

stated she was 85% sure it was the perpetrator. And, he argues that the evidence showed 

the victim J.S. described the perpetrator to the police as “a light complexioned black 

male,” and then testified at trial that the perpetrator was Hispanic.

Respondents argue that Petitioner incorrectly concludes that these discrepancies 

were the purpose for his original counsel, Mr. Trucker, requesting a pre-trial 

identification hearing. Respondents contend that the hearing was requested to argue 

issues related to the identification by the victim K.P., not the identifications by M.W. or 

J.S. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 26-27.) 

Regardless, M.W. did not testify at trial, and thus counsel had no cause or 

opportunity to try to impeach M.W.. Assuming Petitioner contends counsel was 

deficient in cross examining M.W. at the voluntariness hearing where she did testify, 

Petitioner fails to show how more effective impeachment there would have resulted in a 

different outcome at trial.

With regard to J.S., Respondents argue that trial counsel did cross examine him 

about the discrepancy in the earlier identification, and was limited by Arizona law from 

interviewing the victim. (Id. at 27-28.) 

BY MR. INSERRA: 

Q. Hello, Mr. Santos. When you described the person who 

took your car to the police back in May of 2007, did you describe 

him as a black male?

A. No.

Q. So if an officer testifies that you described as a him a 

black male, that officer would be mistaken? 

A. No. I didn't say that. 

Q. Did you describe the person who took your car to the 

officers? 

A. I don't recall. But I told the officer when they show me the 

photo, I say it's difficult. Because all these photos, and the guy took 

my car, they look exactly the same, which is Mexicans. They're all 

alike, that's what I said.

(Exhibit R.T. 11/19/08 at 79-80.) Petitioner fails to suggest what additional crossexamination should have been conducted.

Petitioner fails to show deficient performance in this portion of Ground 4.

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e) Prejudice

In light of the other substantial evidence against Petitioner (including the other 

identifications, his connections to the abandoned vehicle by the articles left inside, the 

connection in vehicle descriptions between the first stolen vehicle and the vehicle used in 

the second theft, and his arrest in the second stolen vehicle, etc.) the undersigned cannot 

find a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s purported failures, the outcome 

would have been different.

Accordingly, Ground Four is without merit and must be denied.

D. GROUND FIVE: INEFFECTIVENESS OF APPELLATE COUNSEL 

In his Ground 5, Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, based on counsel’s failure 

to raise claims based on Miranda, a tainted photo lineup, insufficient evidence, and an 

illegal sentence. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 10.) 

Respondents argue that mere failure to raise claims proffered by a defendant does 

not amount to ineffective assistance. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 29.) Respondents further 

argue that any Miranda claim would have been without merit (id. at 30-31), as would the 

tainted lineup claim (id. at 31), insufficient evidence claim (id. at 31-32), and the illegal 

sentence claims (id. at 32-33.) 

Although in his Reply Petitioner makes various general legal arguments about the 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he again fails to address the specifics of his 

claims. (Reply, Doc. 22 at 13-14.) 

The general rule is that tactical decisions with which a defendant disagrees cannot 

form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v. California, 966 

F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). "Mere criticism of a 

tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate 

representation." Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Further, 

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the reviewing court need not determine the actual reason for an attorney's actions, as 

long as the act falls within the range of reasonable representation. Morris, 966 F.2d at 

456-457. 

One flavor of tactical decision required of counsel is selection of which issues to 

pursue. "In many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she 

foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of 

weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate 

advocacy." Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). “The law does not 

require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. Counsel also is not 

required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable appraisal of a claim's 

dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim be dropped 

altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations omitted). 

In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Supreme Court rejected the ruling of 

the Second Circuit that a defendant had a “constitutional right to compel appointed 

counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of 

professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Id. at 751. The Court 

reasoned that the right to counsel on appeal was a right to an advocate who would apply 

his professional judgment as an advocate, including winnowing out arguments counsel 

believes to be lesser. Id. at 752-753.

Here, Petitioner offers a litany of claims he demanded appellate counsel raise. 

Appellate counsel was not deficient simply by refusing to concede.

Moreover, Petitioner fails to support any of his claims with facts or arguments to 

show that the claims he asserts should have been raised were even viable. Accordingly, 

there is no basis for this Court to find either deficient performance or prejudice. 

This Court need not shadow box with Petitioner’s conclusory claims to determine 

that Petitioner fails to support his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

Indeed, conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts do not merit 

habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. nom James v. 

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White, 513 U.S.935 (1994). 

With regard to the Miranda issue, appellate counsel advised Petitioner:

First, there was the interview. I went to the court and watched the 

interview CD. I then thoroughly researched this issue, but at every 

turn I came up short. The case law says that the judge's decision on 

the facts will be given great deference. The cases say that being on 

drugs does not affect the voluntariness of an interview, as long as 

the other tests for voluntariness are met. The case law says that 

Miranda warnings, once given, carry over to subsequent interview 

that are fairly close in time. Nothing I found would support an 

argument that Miranda was violated, or that your interview was 

involuntary. So, I did not raise the issue. Believe me, I wanted to - I 

did all that I needed to raise it. But if there is no law to support an 

issue, it cannot be raised.

(Exhibit P-C, Supp. Brief, Emer. Mot, Attachment A, LF Peterson 1/26/10 at 1.)

Petitioner fails to suggest any factual or legal error in this analysis, let alone showing that 

it was unreasonable. 

With regard to the photo lineup, appellate counsel explained:

Second, there is the identification, or Dessureault issue. You will 

see from reading the brief that your trial attorney filed a motion for 

a hearing on this point, but that motion was later essentially 

"abandoned" when it was not pursued. That would mean the issue 

could only be raised as "fundamental error" on appeal - a very 

difficult standard to meet. I considered raising this issue, and have 

done so in other situations. However, I have never successfully 

raised a Dessureault issue as fundamental error. As a practical 

matter, it is I nearly impossible to do so when (as here) the trial 

attorney fails to follow through on the issue and as a result the trial 

court does not hold a hearing. And, in your case, the only witness 

the issue applied to was [K.P.]. I could not make a good faith 

argument that [K.P.] could only identify you because he saw your 

driver's license - that he did not have a good chance to see you at the 

time of the offense and that the driver's license influenced him to 

such a degree that his later identification could not be valid. He 

testified at trial that he looked right at you for quite some time. This 

was not a questionable identification. In my opinion, it would be 

impossible to prove the prejudice necessary to succeed on this issue.

(Id. at 1-2.) Again, Petitioner fails to suggest any factual or legal error in this analysis, 

let alone showing that it was unreasonable.

With regard to insufficient evidence, Petitioner simply proffers no element of the 

offense not supported by evidence. 

With regard to an illegal sentence, appellate counsel explained:

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Third, you raise the sentencing "same set of events" issue. I will 

concede that this is an issue I did not consider raising or research 

before filing your brief. However, as you can see from the attached 

case, the test is not the same that you describe (from Phillips). The 

test is much narrower. Essentially, each offense must involve the 

same "act" before concurrent sentences are required. Obviously, 

what happened to [K.P.] and what happened to [J.S.] were 

completely different acts. It would not be possible to successfully 

argue that the law or constitution required concurrent sentences.

(Id. at 2.) Again, Petitioner fails to suggest any factual or legal error in this analysis, let 

alone showing that it was unreasonable.

Even if Petitioner could now produce some facts and arguments to suggest the 

issues were viable on appeal, Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest they were so much 

stronger than the issues raised on direct appeal that counsel was deficient in selecting the 

ones he proceeded on. Rather, the record reflects that appellate counsel diligently 

evaluated the case, considered the claims with some apparent viability, and determined 

that the prosecutorial misconduct claim had the best chance of success.

Fourth, you mention the prosecutorial misconduct issue, which I did 

raise. I am very hopeful that this will be successful. We should be 

getting the State's response soon and it will be interesting to see if 

they found something to counter our arguments.

(Id.) 

Under these circumstances, the undersigned can find neither deficient 

performance nor prejudice in the actions of appellate counsel. Accordingly, Ground 5 is 

without merit and must be denied.

E. SUMMARY

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claims in Grounds Two, Three, and 

Six. He has failed to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to avoid the effect of 

that procedural default, and these claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s claims in Grounds One, Four, and Five are without merit, and must be 

denied.

/ /

/ /

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

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debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds Two, Three, and Six of 

the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 30, 2015 (Doc. 1) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 30, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: April 21, 2016

15-1221r RR 16 01 28 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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