Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00693/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00693-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES EDWARD SPENCER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 7:14-cv-00693-LSC-SGC

 )

ROBERT BENTLEY, et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On or about April 15, 2014, James Edward Spencer filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging rights, privileges, or immunities afforded him under the Constitution 

or laws of the United States were abridged by his arrest and incarceration at the Tuscaloosa 

County Jail in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Plaintiff names the following individuals as defendants in 

their official and individual capacities: Alabama Governor Robert Bentley, Alabama Attorney 

General Luther Strange, Alabama Director of Public Safety Hugh McCall, Tuscaloosa County 

Sheriff William Sharp, and Deputy Charles Ray Jacobs (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1 at 

3-4). In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment hearing to determine whether the 

Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act is unconstitutional as 

applied to him, a preliminary and permanent injunction that enjoins enforcement of the Act, 

restoration of his driver’s license back to the “status quo[],” and compensatory and punitive 

damages. (Id. at 8). On or about July 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting a preliminary 

injunction enjoining enforcement of the Act. (Doc. 8). In accordance with the usual practices of 

this court and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate 

FILED

 2015 Jan-13 PM 01:05

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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judge for a preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 

(1991). The purpose of this report and recommendation is to address the request for preliminary 

injunctive relief Plaintiff makes in his complaint (Doc. 1) and by motion (Doc. 8). 

I. Standard of Review

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted until 

the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to the four prerequisites.” Northeastern 

Fla. Chapter v. Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990). To obtain a 

preliminary injunction a movant must demonstrate “(1) a substantial likelihood that he will 

ultimately prevail on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction 

issues; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed 

injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be 

adverse to the public interest.” Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 

1985); Gold Coast Publ=ns, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1343 (11th Cir. 1994). 

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff admits he was convicted of first degree sexual abuse in 1988, for which he was 

released from prison in 1991. (Doc. 1 at 3). Although he claims Alabama’s sex offender 

registration and notification law has continually violated his constitutional rights from November

15, 1997 to the present, Plaintiff’s current troubles and the impetus for the present lawsuit began 

on March 14, 2014. (Id.). 

On that date Deputy Sheriff Charles Ray Jacobs arrested Plaintiff in the carport of his 

sister’s home in Tuscaloosa, Alabama for ASORCNA violations. (Id. at 5). The warrants 

accused Plaintiff of establishing a residence at his sister’s home between December 25, 2013 and 

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March 14, 2014 without registering that address, which was within “2000 feet of a school or 

childcare facility . . . or with a minor.” (Id. at 18-22) (citing Ala. Code §§ 15-20A-10 & 11).

After his arrest Plaintiff signed a Miranda waiver and gave a written statement. (Id. at 9-

10). He wrote:

I was put out of Jesus Way Shelter on December 25, 2013. Since that time I have 

been registering as homeless with Inv. Dean at a location of the Old Credit Union 

Building at the area of Kicker Rd and 25th Ave E. Since December of 2013, on 

cold nights, I have been staying at my sister[’]s house (2200 3rd St. E.) three or 

four nights a week. I have a great niece, Jemera Anthony, age 6 and a great 

nephew, Jonathon Anthony, age 3, who also live at the residence. I told Inv. Dean 

that I have a sister who lives close by and I would stay there when it was cold, 

and out of the weather.

I asked Deputy Jacobs if he understood the U.S. Constitution and he said that he 

did. I told him that this law has Supreme Court cases that make it invalid and he 

still arrested me. 

(Id. at 10-11).

The State moved to dismiss the original case brought against Spencer in connection with 

his March 14th arrest because “the acts outlined in the deposition [did] not reflect the charge 

listed on the warrant.” (Id. at 14); see also State v. Spencer, DC-2014-20636. However, in its 

motion to dismiss, the State indicated the Tuscaloosa County Sheriff’s Office intended to “obtain 

a warrant with the correct deposition.” (Id.). State court records confirm three pending 

ASORCNA violation charges stemming from the factual circumstances described by Plaintiff.

See State v. Spencer, DC-2014-20637, DC-2014-20638 and DC-2014-20763.

1

Plaintiff waived 

preliminary hearings in each case on May 14, 2014, and the cases are currently awaiting

 

1 The undersigned takes judicial notice of the state court criminal charges currently pending against Plaintiff. See 

Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1976)); 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . 

. can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Keith 

v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.18 (11th Cir. 2014) (judicial notice taken of an online judicial 

system similar to AlaCourt). 

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examination by a grand jury. (Id.) 

In his complaint, Plaintiff claims the Act as applied to him violates numerous 

constitutional rights and other federal laws. (Doc. 1 at 3-8).2 He demands a preliminary 

injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Act but does not specifically assert the law he relies upon 

for that relief. (Id. at 8). 

In a separate motion for preliminary injunctive relief, however, Plaintiff claims 

ASORCNA is being unconstitutionally applied to him in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause

and procedural and substantive due process. (Doc. 8 at 2-4, 6). He declares because of the Act, 

“he can’t live with [his] sister, family or friends” and demands his “immediate release from 

custody” because he is “factual[ly] and actual[ly] innocent of being incarcerated” pursuant to 

Carr v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). (Id.). 

III. Analysis

 To the extent Plaintiff requests the State of Alabama be enjoined from enforcing the Act 

(Doc. 1 at 8), it is well established a federal court will not interfere with ongoing state criminal 

proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances. 

 In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that abstention is 

appropriate where federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of 

restraining state criminal proceedings; the Court recognized exceptions for bad 

faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute. 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 

27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971). In Samuels v. Mackell, the Court extended Younger to 

cases in which federal jurisdiction was invoked for the purposes of obtaining 

declaratory relief when the federal plaintiff is a defendant in a pending state 

criminal prosecution, if Younger would have barred an injunction in the 

circumstances. 401 U.S. 66, 91 S. Ct. 764, 27 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1971). . . . . A 

state’s trial and appeals process is considered “a unitary system,” and Younger

 

2

Spencer claims violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, equal protection, the Fair Housing Act and Equal 

Employment Opportunity Act, procedural due process, and substantive due process, and that he has been deprived of 

liberty and property interests under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has suffered a “loss of society,” and has 

been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. 

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prevents a federal court from disrupting the process while a case is on appeal. See 

New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, ––––, 

109 S. Ct. 2506, 2518, 105 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1989). Thus, as long as a federal 

challenge to a state statute or local ordinance “relate[s] to pending state 

proceedings, proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal 

questions presented in state court litigation mandates that the federal court stay its 

hand.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1527, 95 L. 

Ed. 2d 1 (1987).

Redner v. Citrus County, Florida, 919 F.2d 646, 649 (11th Cir. 1990) (redaction supplied). 

 According to the Younger abstention doctrine, this court must abstain from deciding 

Plaintiff’s federal challenges to the Alabama statute in question. To the extent Plaintiff’s 

reliance on Carr v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010), can be construed as an 

argument encouraging this court to find extraordinary circumstances justify an exception to 

Younger abstention, the argument is without merit. Carr involved questions concerning the Sex 

Offender Registration Notification Act (SORNA), a federal law. 130 S. Ct. at 442. In that case, 

the petitioner pled guilty to first degree sex abuse in May of 2004. Id. In 2007 the petitioner was 

charged with violating SORNA because, in either 2004 or 2005, he travelled to another state and 

failed to register when SORNA became law in 2006. Id. The petitioner argued his prosecution 

would violate the Ex Post Facto clause because his travel occurred at least one year before

SORNA’s 2006 enactment. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner on statutory 

construction grounds but did not reach the constitutional question. Id. at 458. The Court found 

the present tense language of the 2006 federal statute and the Congressional intent expressed in 

committee comments showed the statute did not read nor did Congress intend prosecution under 

the statute for “preenactment travel.” 

 Plaintiff has been charged with violating ASORCNA, a completely different statute from 

the one at issue in Carr. Plaintiff admits he has been subject to Alabama registration and 

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notification requirements since 1997 and that ASORCNA, in its current form, was enacted in 

2011. Plaintiff allegedly violated the Act between December of 2013 and March of 2014, long 

after its enactment. Thus, neither the concerns present in Carr nor the Supreme Court’s holding 

in that case have any bearing on Plaintiff’s case. Moreover, the undersigned finds persuasive an 

Eleventh Circuit decision rejecting a constitutional attack on ASORCNA based on the Ex Post 

Facto Clause. See Windwalker v. Governor of Alabama, 2014 WL 4290604, at *1-3 (11th Cir. 

Sept. 2, 2014). 

 Plaintiff also seems to rely on Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), 

for the proposition he has the “right to choose to live” wherever he desires. (Doc. 1 at 6). Again, 

that case does not address Plaintiff’s circumstances. The petitioner in Moore attacked a city 

ordinance that “limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family[,] . . . . but 

the ordinance contain[ed] an unusual and complicated definitional section that recognize[d] as a 

‘family’ only a few categories of related individuals.” Moore, 431 U.S. at 495-96. Because 

Moore’s family did fit any of the categories, she was convicted of violating the ordinance. Id. at 

496. 

 The Supreme Court held the ordinance was an “intrusive regulation of the family” for 

which “the usual judicial deference to the legislature [was] inappropriate.” Id. at 499. The Court 

stated it had “long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family 

life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court found the legitimate government interests advanced by

the ordinance—“preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and 

avoiding undue financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system”—were, at best, only 

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marginally served by the ordinace Id. at 499-500. Moreover, Cleveland also had another 

ordinance in place to address overcrowding, and that ordinance limited occupancy based on 

population density. Id. at 500 n.7. The Court held the suspect ordinance violated substantive 

due process because “the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children 

and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.” Id. at 506. 

 Plaintiff does not explain how the constitutional ordinance problems in Moore bear any 

relation to his circumstances or ASORCNA, and the undersigned finds the two matters to be 

incomparable. In fact, “the Supreme Court has not addressed whether substantive due process 

invalidates sex offender registration statutes[,]” and this circuit has found “no history or tradition 

that would elevate the issue to a fundamental right.” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, (11th Cir.

(Fla.) 2005) (citing Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003).

 The circuit courts that have considered this substantive due process 

argument regarding sex offender registries have upheld such registration and 

publication requirements finding no constitutional infirmities. See, e.g., Doe v. 

Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“Persons who have 

been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free 

from ... registration and notification requirements ....”); Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 

F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir.2003) (sex offender registration statute did not infringe the 

fundamental right to a presumption of innocence); Paul P. [v. Verniero], 170 F.3d 

[396] at 404, 405 [(1999)] (holding that sex offender registration did not infringe 

fundamental right of family relationships, and although the registration of 

offenders[’] home address invaded the fundamental right to privacy, the state had 

a compelling interest to prevent future sex offenses).FN5 In Paul P., the court held 

that the indirect effects of members of the public on the offender’s relationship 

with his family did not rise to the infringement of a fundamental right by the state. 

170 F.3d at 405. As the court conceded, even if the effect of registration places a 

constitutionally recognizable claim on the offender’s family relationships, it did 

not fall under a fundamental right classification because the sex offender statute 

did “not restrict plaintiffs’ freedom of action with respect to their families and 

therefore does not intrude upon the aspect of the right to privacy that protects an 

individual’s independence in making certain types of important decisions.” Id.

FN5. The Eighth Circuit has further held constitutional an Iowa 

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statute banning sex offenders from living within 2000 feet of a 

school or child care facility, which was argued on similar 

substantive due process and right to travel grounds. See generally 

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).

Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1344-1345 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Windwalker, 2014 WL 

4290604, at * 2-4 (rejecting constitutional attacks on ASORCNA based on substantive due 

process and equal protection grounds and finding statute was rationally related to a legitimate 

government interest—regulating sex offenders for the sake of public safety.)

 Additionally, Plaintiff cannot show his procedural due process rights have been violated 

by ASORCNA because he has been convicted of a sex offense. See Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 

1337, (11th Cir. (Fla.) 2005) (quoting Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 

(2003) (upholding a Connecticut sex offender registration statute against claims of procedural 

due process violation on grounds “no liberty interest was implicated because the . . . statute 

turned ‘on an offender’s conviction alone.’”). In short, Plaintiff received all the process he was 

due when he was charged and convicted of the sex crime. 

 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to show any exigent constitutional 

circumstances exist that would justify refusal to implement the Younger abstention doctrine. 

This court must abstain from addressing the federal challenges to the state statute under which 

Plaintiff is currently being prosecuted. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown a substantial 

likelihood of success on the constitutional claims for which he demands preliminary injunctive 

relief. He has not shown he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues, that any 

threatened injury to him outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction might cause the 

opposing party, or that an injunction would not be adverse to the public.

 Finally, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate entitlement to a preliminary injunction releasing him 

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from custody because such relief is “not cognizable under § 1983.” See Grider v. Cook, 522 

Fed. Appx. 544, 547 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F. 3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 

2002) (“[H]abeas corpus [rather than § 1983] is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner [or pretrial detainee] who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or 

speedier release.”)) (additional citation omitted, all but final alteration in original). 

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the magistrate judge RECOMMENDS that 

Plaintiff’s requests for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 8) be DENIED. 

V. Notice Of Right To Object

Any party who objects to this report and recommendation must, within fourteen (14) days 

of the date on which it is entered, file specific written objections with the clerk of this court. 

Any objections to the failure of the magistrate judge to address any contention raised in the 

petition also must be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the 

factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 

1111, 106 S.Ct. 899, 88 L.Ed.2d 933 (1986); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982) 

(en banc). In order to challenge the findings of the magistrate judge, a party must file with the 

clerk of the court written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed 

findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. A 

copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.

Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United 

States District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed 

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findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The district 

judge, however, need conduct a hearing only in his discretion or if required by law, and may 

consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his own determination on the 

basis of that record. The district judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or 

recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered 

by a district judge.

A party may not appeal a magistrate judge’s recommendation directly to the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final 

judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge."

DONE this 13

th day of January, 2015.

 ______________________________

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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