Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01512/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT LEONARD WOOD, 

Petitioner,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 02-CR-0624-2-L 

 02-CR-0625-2-L 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, or CORRECT 

SENTENCE UNDER 28 U.S.C. 2255, 

and 

(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

 Petitioner, Robert Leonard Wood (“Petitioner”) filed a motion pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. Respondent filed a Response 

and Opposition to the Motion. The Court has reviewed the record, the submissions of the 

parties, and the supporting exhibits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES

Petitioner’s Motion without prejudice. 

// 

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I. BACKGROUND

 Petitioner Robert Leonard Wood was charged on March 7, 2002 in two 

indictments as follows: in case number 02-CR-0624-L Petitioner was charged with three 

counts of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), 

characterized as violent crimes in aid of racketeering (“VCAR”); and in case number 02-

CR-0625-L Petitioner was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. (Indictment, Case No. 02-

CR-0624 [ECF NO. 8]; Indictment, Case No. 02-CR-0625 [ECF NO. 1.]) 

On February 28, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to Count One of the indictment in 

Case No. 02-CR-0624-L and Count One of the indictment in Case No. 02-CR-0625-L 

and entered a plea agreement. (Plea Agreement Case No. 02-CR-0624 [ECF NO. 53]; 

Plea Agreement, Case No. 02-CR-0625 [ECF NO 144.]) On July 10, 2003, Petitioner 

was sentenced by this Court to concurrent sentences of 120 months, three years 

supervised release, a $1000 fine, and a special assessment of $100 in Case No. 02-CR0624-L (“the VCAR case”); and 300 months, five years supervised release and a special 

assessment of $100 in Case No. 02-CR-0625-L (“the drug case”). (Amended Judgment, 

Case No. 02-CR-0624 [ECF NO. 104]; Amended Judgment, Case No. 02-CR-0625 [ECF 

NO. 300.])1

 On July 29, 2003, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. [Notice, Case No. 02-CR0624 [ECF NO. 94]; Notice, Case No. 02-CR-0625 [ECF NO. 242.]) The Ninth Circuit 

dismissed Petitioner’s appeal upon the determination that he knowingly and voluntarily 

entered a plea waiver, waiving his right to appeal. United States v. Wood, 117 F.App’x 

519, 521 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner filed his first petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in this 

Court on December 2, 2005. (Mot. [ECF NO. 176.]) On July 24, 2007, this Court 

dismissed Petitioner’s petition as barred by his appellate waiver, and to the extent 

                                               

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The Judgments were amended for clerical error. 

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Petitioner’s claims were not barred by waiver, the Court denied his claims on the merits. 

(Order [ECF NO. 224.]) 

 On May 17, 2016, Petitioner filed an application in the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion in light of Johnson 

v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Wood v. United States, Application, Case No. 

16-71500, (9th Cir. May 17, 2016). On June 24, 2016, Petitioner filed the current 

petition in case numbers 02-CR-0624 and 02-CR-0625 to protect the statute of limitations 

while the application for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 petition was 

pending before the Ninth Circuit. [Motion, Case No. 02-CR-0624 [ECF NO. 297]; 

Motion, Case No. 02-CR-0625 [ECF NO. 689.] On December 22, 2016, the Ninth 

Circuit granted Petitioner’s application for leave to file a second or successive petition. 

See Wood v. United States, C.A. No. 16-71500. This Court issued a briefing schedule on 

Petitioner’s Motion and the Government filed a Response in Opposition on May 19, 

2017, followed by Petitioner’s Reply on May 22, 2017. 

II. DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner “may move the court which imposed 

the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on “the ground that the sentence 

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court 

was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of 

the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2255(a). A prisoner seeking relief pursuant to section 2255 must allege a constitutional, 

jurisdictional, or otherwise “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 

miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 

procedure.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). It is incumbent on the 

petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief. Silva v. 

Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner contends that his sentence was improperly enhanced under the residual 

clause of the career offender statute, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which he contends has since been 

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found to be unconstitutional under Johnson. (Mot. at 2). Petitioner argues by analogy 

that the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) residual clause held void-for-vagueness 

in Johnson is identical to the “residual clause” in the career offender definition of a 

“crime of violence” under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2), therefore the Court must reconsider his 

sentence without the career offender designation. (Id.) Despite the passage of a great 

deal of time since Petitioner’s sentencing, he argues that his claims are not procedurally 

barred because he could not have raised them prior to Johnson’s holding. (Id. at 16). 

The Government objects and contends the Court should dismiss or deny the 

Petition for six reasons: (1) Petitioner waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence 

through his plea; (2) Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim regarding the career 

offender guidelines calculation because he did not raise this claim on appeal; (3) 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the residual clause in USSG § 4B1.2 was relied upon 

in his sentencing; (4) Petitioner cannot raise a due process challenge to the application of 

the advisory or mandatory guidelines after Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890 

(2017); (5) even if Johnson allows due process vagueness challenges to mandatory 

guidelines, it represents a procedural and not substantive rule which does not apply 

retroactively to seek collateral relief; (6) California Penal Code § 211 remains an 

enumerated crime of violence independent of the residual clause therefore the Court had 

an independent basis upon which to find that Petitioner qualified as a career offender. 

(Oppo at 2). 

A. Waiver and Successiveness

As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner waived the right to appeal and to collaterally 

attack his judgment and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless the Court imposed a 

sentence in excess of the high end of the guideline range. (Plea Agreement at 14, Case 

No. 02-cr-0624 [ECF NO. 53]; Plea Agreement at 14, Case No. 02-cr-0625 [ECF NO. 

144]). The Court previously found that Petitioner’s waiver of his appellate and collateral 

attack rights was knowing and voluntary, and that none of the potential limitations to the 

validity of his waiver were applicable. (Order at 3 [ECF NO. 482.]) Petitioners waiver 

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would therefore appear to foreclose his right to bring this challenge, however the 9th

Circuit in United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016), held that a 

defendant’s waiver does not bar an appeal if the defendant was sentenced under a 

Guidelines provision that has since been found to be unconstitutionally vague. Although 

the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is sparse in Torres, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 

prior waiver does not prohibit him from challenging his sentence to the extent it was 

enhanced under the now unconstitutional residual clause of § 4B1.2. 

As previously noted, Petitioner has likewise overcome the hurdle to filing a second 

or successive petition pursuant to section 2255 in light of the Ninth Circuit’s 

authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (h)(2) finding that Petitioner’s motion “makes a 

prima facie showing for relief under Johnson v. United States.” (Wood v. United States, 

No. 16-71500 (Dec. 22, 2016).) The appellate Court further noted that “Johnson

announced a new substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral 

review,” citing Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1264-68 (2016). (Id.) 

B. Procedural Default

A petitioner must first raise his claim on direct appeal before challenging his 

sentence under § 2255 or he procedurally defaults the claim. United States v. Ratigan, 

351 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir.2003). A procedural default may be overcome and a 

petitioner may raise the claim in a habeas petition “‘only if the defendant can first 

demonstrate either cause and actual prejudice or that he is actually innocent.’ ” United 

States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir.2007) 

The Government argues that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim because he 

did not raise it on appeal and he does not attempt to excuse this default by demonstrating 

cause and prejudice. (Oppo 12). Nor is it possible for Petitioner to demonstrate cause for 

his default, in the Government’s view, because challenges to sentencing guidelines as 

unconstitutionally vague were not novel at the time he appealed his sentence, and his 

attorney should have known that a challenge to the residual clause on vagueness grounds 

could be raised. (Id.) Petitioner has also failed to show he suffered actual prejudice as a 

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result of the alleged sentencing error according to the Government, and instead he has 

only alleged that the Court misapplied the sentencing guidelines. (Id. 15) 

Petitioner claims that his challenge to the residual clause is novel and could not 

have previously been raised because attacks on the constitutionality of the residual clause 

had failed until Johnson, which explicitly overruled precedent and overturned widespread

practices, citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). (Reply 4). Petitioner argues he is 

serving more time in custody as a result of the enhancement because he was exposed to a 

sentence range with a low-end of 290 months as a result of the career offender 

enhancement, but without the enhancement, the low-end exposure would have been 235 

months, a difference of almost five years. (Id.) The career offender designation thus 

prejudiced him by exposing him to a higher sentencing range which resulted in a higher 

sentence. 

1. Cause 

Cause can be demonstrated by showing that the procedural default is “due to an 

objective factor that is external to the petitioner and cannot be fairly attributed to him.” 

Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)(internal quotes omitted). The 

Supreme Court has excused procedural default on collateral review where (1) the claim 

was “novel” in a court proceeding, Reed, 468 U.S. at 16, (2) the defendant received 

ineffective assistance of counsel, Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000), or (3) 

the defendant is actually innocent. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013). 

A petitioner can demonstrate cause for the failure to pursue a claim if he can show that 

“the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” at the time 

of direct appeal. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478. 

Contrary to the Government’s position, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is 

sufficiently novel to demonstrate cause for his failure to raise it on appeal. A petitioner 

may demonstrate that a claim is novel if it fits into one of three categories identified by 

the Supreme Court which represent “a clear break with the past.” Desist v. United States, 

394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969). First, a decision of this Court may explicitly overrule one of 

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the Supreme Court’s precedents. Reed, 468 U.S. at 17. Second, a decision may 

“overtur[n] a longstanding and widespread practice to which the Supreme Court has not 

spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly 

approved.” Id. Finally, “a decision may ‘disapprov[e] a practice this Court arguably has 

sanctioned in prior cases.’” Id. 

 Constitutional challenges to the residual clause had been raised prior to 

Petitioner’s sentencing, and the Ninth Circuit denied those challenges, holding that the 

residual clause was not void for vagueness. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 209 

(2007) and Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 16 (2011). However, Johnson overruled 

James and Sykes, placing Petitioner’s claim squarely within the first of Reed’s three 

categories. See Johnson, 135 S.Ct at 2563 (“Our contrary holdings in James and Sykes

are overruled.”) In addition, the Supreme Court held that Johnson was a “new substantive 

rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.” Welch, 136 S.Ct. at 1268. 

Where, as here, retroactive effect is given to a case which falls into one of the first 

two categories, an attorney will have had no reasonable basis to raise the claim where it 

would undoubtedly meet defeat, instead “the failure of a defendant’s attorney to have 

pressed such a claim before a . . . court is sufficiently excusable to satisfy the cause 

requirement.” Reed, 468 U.S. at 17. Therefore, a vagueness challenge to the residual 

clause of section 4B1.2 was foreclosed at the time of Petitioner’s sentence by Supreme 

Court precedent. United States v. Savage, 231 F.Supp. 542, 563 (9th Cir. 2017). 

In addition, at the time of petitioner’s sentencing and during the time within which 

he would have appealed, there was a longstanding and widespread practice of courts 

enhancing sentences under § 4B1.2’s residual clause which was overturned by Johnson. 

See e.g. United States v. Park, 649 F.3d 1175, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 

California residential burglary to be a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of § 

4B1.2); United States v. Spencer, 724 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)(holding Hawaii criminal 

property damage in the first degree was “crime of violence” under residual clause of § 

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4B1.2). Petitioner’s claim is novel under either of the first two categories in Reed, 

therefore, Petitioner has demonstrated cause for his failure to previously raise his claim. 

2. Prejudice

To establish “prejudice,” Petitioner must demonstrate that he suffered actual 

prejudice from the claimed violation, meaning it worked to his “actual and substantial 

disadvantage.” United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2007). “[I]n 

the ordinary case a defendant will satisfy his burden to show prejudice by pointing to the 

application of an incorrect, higher Guidelines range and the sentence he received 

thereunder.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1347 (2016). 

Petitioner was designated as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 as a result of 

his prior California robbery conviction, which changed his criminal history score from IV 

to VI, thereby increasing the applicable sentencing range from a low-end of 235 to a lowend of 292. The Court added 8 months to the low-end of the career offender range as 

requested by the Government, for a sentence of 300 months. The Court applied the 

correct Guidelines range in effect at the time of his sentencing, however, if it is 

determined that Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced under the arguably unconstitutional 

residual clause of section 4B1.2, and all other sentencing factors remained the same, he 

has demonstrated he suffered actual prejudice as required under Molina-Martinez because 

he is serving a longer term of confinement as a result of the career offender designation. 

For the above reasons, the Court finds Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated 

cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default of his claim. 

C. Merits 

The career offender guidelines increase the base offense level and criminal history 

category for a defendant whose “instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a 

crime of violence or a controlled substance offense” and who “has at least two prior 

felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. A “crime of violence” was defined at the time of Petitioner’s 

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sentencing as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a 

term exceeding one year, that” – 

(1) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another, or 

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, 

or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another. 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). 

Courts typically refer to section 4B1.2(a)(1) as the “force” or “elements” clause, 

and to the first part of section 4B1.2(a)(2) which lists four specific offenses as the 

“enumerated offenses” clause. United States v. Molinar, 881 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2017). The italicized clause is commonly called the “residual clause.” Id. 

At the time Petitioner was sentenced, the application Note of the Commentary to 

Section 4B1.1 further refined the definition of “crime of violence” to include the 

following: 

Murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, 

robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extensions of credit, and burglary of a 

dwelling. Other offenses are included as “crimes of violence” is (A) that 

offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i.e. 

expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted 

involved use of explosives (including any explosive material or destructive 

device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury 

to another. 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 Application note 1 (emphasis added). 

In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered the residual clause of the ACCA, a 

similar sentence enhancing statute which imposes a fifteen-year minimum prison 

sentence on anyone who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three prior convictions for 

either violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Id. at 2555; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 

Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2556. Under the ACCA, there are three definitions for “violent 

felony,” one of which states that a felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious 

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potential risk of physical injury to another” and is referred to as the residual clause for its 

catch-all nature. Id. 2555-56; § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court employed the categorical 

approach and struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, finding that the 

language of the residual clause “fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it 

punishes” and “invites arbitrary enforcement,” thereby violating due process. Id. at 2556. 

Petitioner argues that the residual clause found to be void-for-vagueness in 

Johnson, mirrors the residual clause in the career offender statute, rendering it 

unconstitutionally vague as well. He claims that this Court must have relied upon the 

residual clause and Note 1’s list of included offenses when finding that his prior robbery 

conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of enhancing his sentence, 

because California robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the force 

clause or enumerated offenses clause. (Mot. 7-8). 

 As a primary matter, the Court finds no support in the record for Petitioner’s 

contention that the residual clause served as the basis of his career offender designation to 

the exclusion of other portions of section 4B1.2. It is Petitioner’s burden to prove his 

claims by a preponderance of the evidence and yet Petitioner has cited to no portion of 

the record, nor any sentencing documents, to verify his assertion that the residual clause 

formed the foundation for his enhancement. Silva, 279 F.3d at 835. Additionally, the 

Court finds no merit to Petitioner’s assertion that application Note 1 applies exclusively 

to the residual clause. Recently the Ninth Circuit explained that Note 1 applies to the 

enumerated offenses clause under the career offender guidelines. United States v. Givens, 

268 F.Supp. 3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) (“It is . . . clear that the Sentencing 

Commission . . . intended robbery and the other felonies listed in application note 1 to 

constitute an expanded list of crimes of violence under the enumerated-offense clause.”) 

Further support for Note 1’s application to the enumerated offenses clause rather 

than the residual clause appears in the most recent Guidelines themselves. After the 

decision in Johnson, the Sentencing Commission made changes to the career-offender

guideline including the removal of the offending residual clause, and the inclusion of the 

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list of felonies in application Note 1 directly into the enumerated offense clause. See

U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2016). As evidenced above, it is clear that Note 1 applies to the 

enumerated offense clause and not the residual clause as Petitioner claims. 

Even if Petitioner could demonstrate that the Court relied upon the residual clause 

when determining his career offender designation, it would appear from the Supreme 

Courts holding in Beckles that Petitioner’s challenge to the residual clause on vagueness 

grounds is impermissible. Beckles, 137 S.Ct. at 888. The Beckles court held that the 

advisory Guidelines, “including § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause, are not subject to vagueness 

challenges under the Due Process Clause” because “the advisory Guidelines do not fix 

the permissible range of sentences. To the contrary, they merely guide the exercise of a 

court's discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range.” Id. at 

892. 

Petitioner contends that Beckles does not apply to him because he was sentenced 

under the mandatory Guidelines in place at the time, and the holding applies only to 

sentences under the advisory Guidelines. (Supp. Brief. 4). Where guidelines firmly set 

the sentencing range, as with the mandatory Guidelines, Petitioner claims that void for 

vagueness attacks are permissible. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Beckles

seems to indicate that vagueness challenges against mandatory Guidelines may not be 

completely foreclosed noting “the Court’s adherence to the formalistic distinction 

between mandatory and advisory rules at least leaves open the question whether 

defendants sentenced to terms of imprisonment . . . during the period in which the 

Guidelines did ‘fix the permissible range of sentences,’ ... may mount vagueness attacks 

on their sentences.” Beckles, 137 S.Ct. at 903 n.4. However, the Supreme Court did not 

carve this exception to the rule against vagueness challenges to the Guidelines, therefore, 

this Court finds Petitioner’s void-for-vagueness challenge to his sentence is 

impermissible. 

 Instead, Petitioner was properly considered a career offender because California 

Penal Code § 211 qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the enumerated offenses clause 

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giving the Court an independent basis upon which to rest its sentencing decision. To 

determine whether a state statute of conviction meets the career offender Guidelines 

definition of “crime of violence,” a court applies the categorical approach as articulated 

in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Under the categorical approach, a court 

may only “compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant's [prior] 

conviction with the elements of the generic crime.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 

254 (2013). 

Here, the Court must compare California Penal Code section 211 and the federal 

generic definition of robbery. Under section 211, robbery is defined as “the felonious 

taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate 

presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 211. Under Ninth Circuit authority, “generic robbery” is defined as “aggravated 

larceny, containing at least the elements of misappropriation of property under 

circumstances involving immediate danger to the person.” U.S. v Becerril-Lopez, 541 

F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In Molinar, the Ninth Circuit compared Arizona’s armed robbery statute with 

federal generic robbery statute under the enumerated offenses clause. United States v. 

Molinar, 881 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017). In determining that the Arizona’s statute 

qualified as a crime of violence under 4B1.2’s enumerated clause, the Court held that “for 

a state crime to be equivalent to generic robbery it must require property to be taken from 

a person or a person’s presence by means of force or putting in fear.” Id. After 

considering the definitions of “force” and “fear” the Court held that “Arizona robbery is 

coextensive with generic robbery and is thus a crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s 

enumerated felonies clause.” Id. at 1075. Similarly, California robbery requires that 

personal property must be taken from a person or a person’s immediate presence, against 

his will, accomplished by means of force or fear, which renders it coextensive with 

federal generic robbery. Cal Pen. Code § 211. 

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 02-CR-0625-2-L 

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s prior California Penal Code § 211 

robbery conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the enumerated offense 

clause of the career offender statute thereby properly enhancing his sentence. For the 

above reasons, the Court DENIES his claim. 

D. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A certificate of appealability is authorized “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To 

meet this standard, Petitioner must show that “jurists of reason could disagree with the 

district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the 

issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Petitioner does not have to show “that he should 

prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that endeavor.” Lambright v. Stewart, 220 

F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). 

Having reviewed the matter, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right and the Court is not 

persuaded that jurists could disagree with the Court’s resolution of his claims or that the 

issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, a certificate of 

appealability is DENIED . 

E. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion under section 2255 is DENIED 

without prejudice. Further, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: May 24, 2018 

 

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