Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00600/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00600-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

REGINALD JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-600-KD-M

:

THE UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

et. al,

Defendant.

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:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action brought by a Plaintiff proceeding pro se,

was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before 

the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3), 

Plaintiff’s Responses1 (Docs. 11-15), and Defendants’ Reply 

(Doc. 16). After careful consideration of the record, it 

is recommended that this action be dismissed with prejudice

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. 

																																																							 1 Plaintiff did not actually file a pleading identified as a response. 

However, on the date in which Plaintiff’s response was due (per Court 

Order), he filed multiple motions separately entitled Motion for Jury 

Trial, Motion to Reopen Mail Route, Motion for Federal Criminal 

Investigation, and Motion for Equal Protection of the Law (Docs. 11-14) 

and supporting exhibits (Doc. 15). Given the timing of these filings 

and because Plaintiff is pro se, this Court has considered these 

filings collectively as Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 3). 

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action stems from a relocation of the mailbox at 

42 Hildreth Drive, Satsuma, Alabama, in October, 2003, by a 

land developer. (Doc. 1 at p. 2). Thereafter, Plaintiff 

allegedly reported this relocation to multiple individuals, 

including Defendant English in 2008, Defendant Chapman in 

2012, and Defendant Potter in 2013, and requested that the 

land developer be arrested for violating 18 U.S.C. 1705, 

1701, and 1707. (Id. at p. 4). Additionally, in 2015, 

Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Brennan seeking 

permission to relocate the mailbox to its previous location 

and to reopen the mail route at Plaintiff’s expense. (Id). 

No response was provided to Plaintiff by Defendants and as 

a result, Plaintiff filed his Complaint (Doc. 1) entitled 

“Conspiracy Against Plaintiff Rights Violation of Plaintiff 

Federally Protected Rights Deprivation of Plaintiff Rights 

Discrimination of Plaintiff Civil Rights and Mental 

Anguish” (hereinafter “Complaint”) on November 23, 2015, 

alleging violations of his constitutional rights. More 

specifically, Plaintiff alleges “(1) Conspiracy against 

Rights under Title 18 U.S.C. Section 241, (2) Federally 

Protected Rights under Title 18 U.S.C. Section 245, (3) 

Deprivation of Plaintiff rights under Title 18 U.S.C. 242, 

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(4) Discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, (5) the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 

Section 1981, (6) and Mental Anguish.” (Doc. 1 at p. 2). 

Plaintiff named as Defendants, the United States 

Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigations

(“F.B.I.”), the United States Postal Service, Postmaster 

General Megan Brennan, Postmaster General John E. Potter, 

Special Agent in Charge of the F.B.I. Mobile Alabama Lewis 

M. Chapman, and the City of Satsuma Postmaster Kathy 

English. For relief, Plaintiff requests Defendants “pay 

plaintiff the appropriate punitive, compensatory and all 

other applicable damages” and that the mailbox be relocated 

to its original location, the mail route reopened, and that 

Defendants be found “guilty on all counts.” (Id. at pp. 8-

9).

Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion directly challenges the 

district court's subject matter jurisdiction. Gilmore v. 

Day, 125 F.Supp.2d 468, 470 (M.D. Ala. 2000). A motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may occur 

either facially or factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 

F.3d 920, 925 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2003). A “facial attack” is 

based solely on the pleadings and requires the court to 

assess whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient basis 

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for subject matter jurisdiction. Id.; Lawrence v. Dunbar,

919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Further, for the 

purposes of the court's analysis, the allegations in the 

plaintiff's complaint are taken as true. Id. On the other 

hand, a “factual attack” challenges “subject matter 

jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.” 

Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925. The burden of proof on a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion is on the party averring jurisdiction. See 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Gilmore, 

125 F.Supp.2d. at 471 (citing Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 

442, 446, 62 S.Ct. 673, 86 L.Ed. 951 (1942)). 

“Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) ‘on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate 

only if it is “apparent from the face of the complaint” 

that the claim is time-barred.’ “ Tello v. Dean Witter 

Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005); see 

also Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir.

1993)(“[G]enerally, the existence of an affirmative defense 

will not support a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. A district court, however, may 

dismiss a complaint on a rule 12(b)(6) motion ‘when its own 

allegations indicate the existence of an affirmative 

defense, so long as the defense clearly appears on the face 

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of the complaint.’ ”). Because a claim that the statute of

limitations has run is an affirmative defense, defendants 

bear the burden of proof on the issue of when plaintiff's 

cause of action accrued. See Smith v. Duff and Phelps, 

Inc., 5 F.3d 488, 492 n. 9 (11th Cir. 1993).

Discussion

A. 18 U.S.C §§ 241, 242, and 245

Plaintiff’s asserted claims under 18 U.S.C § 241, 242, 

and 245 are not viable private actions and are due to be 

dismissed. 18 U.S.C § 241 makes it a crime for two or more 

persons to conspire to deprive another of rights secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States and § 242 

makes it a crime to deprive another of such rights, under 

color of law, on account of alienage, color or race. 

Lastly, section 245 makes it a crime for any person, 

whether acting under color of law or not, to intimidate, 

interfere with, or attempt to intimidate, interfere, or 

injure a person engaged in federally protected activities. 

18 U.S.C. § 245. These sections are criminal provisions 

and it is well settled that criminal provisions do not 

provide a private right of action. See Zinnia Chen v. 

Lester, 364 F. App’x 531, 536 (11th Cir. 2010) (unreported) 

(Criminal statutes generally do not provide a private cause

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of action). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff's claims 

are based on §§ 241, 242, or 245, they must be dismissed.

B. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants for 

discrimination and/or constitutional violations, regardless 

of whether those claims are pursuant to the Fourteenth or 

Fifth Amendments2, or under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, are due to be 

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 

jurisdiction because the Defendants have not waived 

sovereign immunity. 

Of the seven named Defendants, Plaintiff has 

identified four individuals, Defendants Brennan, Potter, 

English, and Chapman without specifying whether those 

individuals are being sued in their individual or official

capacity. Defendants have argued that because Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is silent on the subject and because of the 

nature of the proceedings in this action, that these 

individuals are being sued in their official capacity, and 

this Court agrees. Plaintiff has identified these 

individuals in the Complaint by their official title 

(either Postmaster of Special Agent of the F.B.I.) and 

requested that service be issued to these individuals at 

																																																							 2 Plaintiff has not specifically set forth a claim under the Fifth 

Amendment. However, because Plaintiff is pro se, this Court has 

liberally construed Plaintiff’s Complaint and considered this

ostensible claim. 

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their respective agency addresses. Further, the type of 

relief sought by Plaintiff, i.e., to relocate his mailbox, 

and reopen the mail route (a discontinuance of the alleged 

wrong), suggests that Plaintiff is suing these individuals 

in their official capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) citing to Brandon v. Holt, 469 

U.S. 464, 469, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1951) 

(“In many cases, the complaint will not clearly specify 

whether officials are sued personally, in their official

capacity, or both. ‘The course of proceedings’ in such 

cases typically will indicate the nature of the liability 

sought to be imposed...”).		

A suit against a federal employee in his or her 

official capacity is another way of pleading action against 

the entity of which the officer is and agent. Smith v. 

Mercer, 572 F. App’x 676, 679 (11th Cir. 2014) referring to 

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 

55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 		

Furthermore, federal agencies may not me sued eo nomine. 

See Castleberry v. Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, 530 F.2d 

672 at n.3 (5th Cir. 1976); Covington County Bank v. R.J. 

Allen & Associates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 415 (M.D. Ala.

1975). As a result, the present action against four

individual defendants in their official capacities and 

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against the remaining defendant agencies is, in reality, an 

action against the United States.

Plaintiff's claims against the United States based on 

constitutional violations are barred by sovereign immunity. 

See Boda v. United States, 698 F.2d 1174, 1176 (11th Cir. 

1983) (constitutional claims against federal employees in 

their official, as opposed to individual, capacities are 

barred by sovereign immunity). Likewise, section 1981 does 

not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity and 

thus may not be used against the United States, see United 

States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982), or 

federal employees acting in their official capacities, see 

Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1973), 

rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974). The 

doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suit against the United 

States without its consent and waiver of sovereign immunity 

cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed. 

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 

953–54, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (citations and quotations 

omitted). In the present action, the United States has not 

expressed consent, unequivocally or otherwise, and as a 

result, Plaintiff’s claims for constitutional violations 

against it are due to be dismissed. 

C. Statute of Limitations

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In addition to the above, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and for mental anguish are due to be 

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because they are time barred 

by the applicable statute of limitations. 

The statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is equal to the state statute of 

limitations for personal injury claims, which in Alabama is 

two years. See Baker v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 850 

F.2d. 1480, 1482 (11th Cir. 1988) citing Goodman v. Lukens 

Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 

(1987)); Ala.Code § 6–2–38 (1975).

According to the Complaint, at the root of this action 

is the relocation of Plaintiff’s mailbox at 42 Hildreth 

Drive, in Satsuma, Alabama in 2003, more than twelve years

years ago. In the years since this relocation, Plaintiff 

has, on numerous occasions, sought judicial relief against 

the land developer and a review of the relevant court 

documents show that Plaintiff has been involved with no 

less then six lawsuits3, not including the present action, 

pertaining to property located at 42 Hildreth Drive and/or 

																																																							 3

See Gilbert Leasing Company, Inc. v. Rose Mary Johnson, et al., Civil 

Action CV-97-3705-EBM filed in Mobile County Circuit Court; Reginald 

Johnson v. Gilbert Leasing, Inc., and Harless/Stokke, Inc., Civil 

Action 99-00574-CB-M; Shirley A. Johnson-Young and Viola Shaw v. MKH 

Properties, et al., Civil Action No. 01-04105-51; Reginald Johnson v. 

City of Satsuma, Civil Action No. 04-00445-CG-M; Reginald Johnson v. 

Marilyn E. Wood, et al., Civil Action No. 05-00391-KD-B; and Reginald 

Johnson and Shirley Johnson-Young v. Randall Champions, et al., Civil 

Action No. 12-00334-WS-M.

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the relocation of the mailbox.4 Thus, it is clear from the 

Complaint that the statute of limitations has expired and 

Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims are due to be dismissed.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim of mental anguish is due 

to be dismissed as untimely. A claim of mental anguish 

sounds in tort and “[a]bsent a waiver, of immunity the 

United States is immune from suit in tort.” Gregory v. 

Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, the 

only avenue for Plaintiff to bring his tort claim in the 

present action is to do so under the partial waiver 

provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). See 28 

U.S.C. § 1346(b). Under the FTCA, a tort claim is “forever 

barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate 

Federal agency within two years after such claim 

accrues....” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Generally, an FTCA claim 

“accrues” for purposes of the FTCA “at the time of the 

plaintiff's injury.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 

111, 120, 100 S.Ct. 352, 358, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). More 

specifically, the claim “accrues” when the plaintiff is 

“armed with the facts about the harm done to him, [and] can 

																																																							 4 Even assuming, arguendo, that the claims in the present action stem 

from Plaintiff’s notification to Defendants of the relocation of the 

mailbox, and not the relocation itself (which this Court does not find 

compelling), Plaintiff’s claims would still fail as a matter of law 

because, according to Plaintiff, those notifications and/or 

correspondences occurred in 2008, 2012, and 2013, also beyond the two 

year statute of limitations. 

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protect himself by seeking advice....” Id. at 123, 100 

S.Ct. at 360. Plaintiff failed to present his tort claims 

to any federal agency, much less the appropriate federal 

agency (See Declaration of Kimberly A. Herbst, Doc. 3-1) 

and because more than two years have passed since 

Plaintiff’s claimed accrued (in 2003), Plaintiff’s claim 

for mental anguish is now time barred and due to be 

dismissed.

CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the record, it is 

recommended that this action be dismissed with prejudice

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72. The parties should note that 

under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with 

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the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to 

challenge on appeal the district court's order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may 

review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the 

interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 22nd day of April, 2016.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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