Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00401/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00401-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRIAN K. WILSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SUNSWEET GROWERS, INC., 

 Defendant. /

No. Cv. S-06-0401 RRB KJM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiff Brian Wilson alleges that defendant Sunsweet 

Growers violated state and federal law when it terminated his 

employment in May 2004. Sunsweet now moves for summary judgment 

on all claims. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS in 

part and DENIES in part the motion.1

 

 

1

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

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I. 

 Sunsweet hired Wilson in August 2006 as a forklift 

operator. Wilson was a member of a local union during his 

employment. On January 2, 2004, Wilson informed Sunsweet that 

he had recently suffered a lower back injury and could no longer 

continue his regular work duties. He provided a note from his 

treating physician and requested medical leave through 

January 24. Sunsweet granted the leave, although Wilson 

disputes whether it was designated as Family Medical Leave Act/ 

California Family Rights Act leave. On January 20, Wilson’s 

doctor requested that the leave be extended from January 24, 

through March 23, 2004. Sunsweet granted the request. On 

March 19, Wilson’s doctor sent another note requesting that the 

leave be extended from March 23 through April 30, 2004. Wilson 

alleges that the April 30, 2004 date was a mistake by the 

doctor, who intended the leave to be extended through May 30, 

2004. Sunsweet granted the leave request as stated in the 

doctor’s note. 

 Because the March 19 note did not specify any work 

restrictions for Wilson following his leave, Sunsweet scheduled 

him to return to his same position and shift, starting on May 3, 

2004. Wilson, however, did not report to work as scheduled from 

May 3 to May 7. He also failed to notify Sunsweet that he would 

be unavailable to work for those periods. On May 7, Sunsweet 

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terminated Wilson’s employment for violation of company policy 

regarding unexcused absences. On May 13, Wilson’s doctor faxed 

Sunsweet a note stating that the doctor had placed the wrong 

date on the March 19 note and that Wilson could not return to 

work until May 30. 

 On June 3, 2004, Wilson filed a grievance against Sunsweet 

regarding the termination of his employment. Under the 

applicable collective bargaining agreement (CBA), “[t]he Company 

and the Union each agree that it will not discriminate against 

any individual by reason of . . . physical or mental disability, 

[and] medical condition.” CBA § 3. Section 30(a) of the CBA 

states that “all disputes and grievances shall be settled” by 

the procedures specified in the CBA. Section 34(b) states that 

“[i]f the grievant or the Union fails to meet a time limit, the 

grievance will be deemed denied and no further action on the 

subject matter or the grievance may be taken by the grievant or 

the Union.” On June 28, 2005, an arbiter ruled that Wilson’s 

grievance was untimely and barred his claims. On February 28, 

2006, Wilson filed the present action. 

 Wilson alleges that Sunsweet’s discharge violated: (1) the 

Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; (2) 

the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), Cal. Gov. Code 

§ 12945.2; (3) California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) 

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§ 12940(m); (4) FEHA § 12940(a); and (5) public policy. 

Sunsweet now seeks summary judgment on all claims. 

II. 

 Before considering Sunsweet’s arguments against Wilson’s 

claims, the court must resolve whether Wilson may bring suit 

against Sunsweet under the terms of the applicable collective 

bargaining agreement. 

Sunsweet argues that, under the express terms of the CBA, 

Wilson waived his right to pursue further claims against it when 

he failed to file a timely grievance. Wilson filed his 

grievance on June 3, 2004 regarding the May 7, 2004 termination 

of his employment. The arbitrator considering Wilson’s case 

ruled that the grievance was untimely under the CBA’s five-day 

claim deadline. CBA § 29(e). Sunsweet argues that under CBA 

§ 34(b), the failure to file a timely grievance barred Wilson 

from any further action regarding the termination of his 

employment, including the present action. This argument lacks 

merit. 

 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 

(1974), the Supreme Court held that “the federal policy favoring 

arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against 

discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by 

permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the 

grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining 

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agreement and his cause of action under Title VII.” The Court 

has since stated that “Gardner-Denver at least stands for the 

proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of 

sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit 

union waiver in a CBA.” Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. 

Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998); see Calmat Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Labor, 364 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2004); Camargo v. 

California Portland Cement Co., 86 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1018-19 

(2001).2

 Here, the court finds the CBA waiver to be less than 

explicit, thereby allowing Wilson, as an individual employee, to 

pursue the present action based upon federal and state statutory 

rights despite the previous grievance filed by his union. The 

CBA’s anti-discrimination clause mentions no statutory right by 

name, CBA § 3, and is identical in its specificity to the clause 

found not to be binding in Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39. 

Similarly, the CBA’s general statement that “[t]he Company shall 

grant leaves from employment as required by federal and state 

laws,” CBA § 23(a), fails to incorporate specifically into the 

CBA the statutory rights invoked here. Therefore, the court 

 

2

 Sunsweet relies upon Torrez v. Consolidated Freightways 

Corp. of Delaware, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1251 n.3 (1997), in 

arguing that Wilson’s claim is barred by the CBA’s terms. The 

Torrez court, however, held that the CBA did not bar individual 

employees from litigating statutory claims, id., and that the 

employer could not use the CBA to compel arbitration of a FEHA 

claims, id. at 1260. 

 

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finds that the applicable CBA does not bar Wilson from pursuing 

statutory claims against Sunsweet regarding the termination of 

his employment.3

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issues as to any material facts and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c). Wilson’s claims are discussed individually below. 

A. Claim One: FMLA 

 Wilson argues that he was still eligible for medical leave 

under FMLA when Sunsweet terminated his employment. Wilson 

started his medical leave on January 2, 2004. Sunsweet argues 

that the week of March 26, 2004 marked the completion of his 

twelve-week FMLA-leave period and that it acted within its 

discretion to provide him five more weeks of leave before 

terminating his employment on May 7, 2004. Wilson responds that 

he had not exhausted his leave due to Sunsweet’s failure to 

 

3

 Sunsweet also argues that Wilson should be estopped by the 

grievance proceeding from arguing that his statutory rights were 

violated. Collateral estoppel does not apply here, however, 

because Wilson’s claims were not “actually litigated” or 

“necessarily decided” and the decision was not “on the merits” 

due to the arbitrators’ procedural dismissal based upon the 

CBA’s filing requirements. Gikas v. Zolin, 6 Cal. 4th 841, 849 

(1993). 

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comply with FMLA’s leave-designation requirements.4 Wilson Decl. 

¶ 4. His allegations, however, are directly contradicted by the 

“Request for Leave of Absence – CFRA/FMLA” form he signed on 

January 2, 2004. The form states “Note: Any leave of absence 

beyond three working days that is CFRA/FMLA qualifying will 

automatically be designated as such.” Stacy Decl. Exh. 3. This 

statement satisfied Sunsweet’s notification responsibility under 

FMLA. See Miller v. Personal-Touch of Virginia, Inc., 342 F. 

Supp. 2d 499, 506-08 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“This notice may be 

accomplished in any written form”). Therefore, Wilson’s twelve 

weeks of FMLA leave began on January 2, 2004 and expired well 

before Sunsweet terminated his employment on May 7, 2004. 

Therefore, the court finds that Wilson was not using FMLAprotected leave when fired. 

This finding, however, does not conclude the court’s FMLA 

analysis. Wilson argues that his leave, regardless of when it 

ended, was a factor in both his firing and Sunsweet’s refusal to 

rehire him after it was notified of the alleged error in the 

March 19 doctor’s note. Under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c), employers 

 

4

 When considering alleged FMLA violations, the court 

considers the objective status of disputed leave, not Wilson’s 

or Sunsweet’s subjective interpretations of it. See Bachelder 

v. America West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2001). Therefore, Wilson’s beliefs regarding whether Sunsweet 

properly classified his leave do not excuse his later absences, 

beyond the twelve-week period of FMLA leave. 

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are prohibited from using prior use of FMLA-leave as a negative 

factor in employment decisions regarding employees or 

prospective employees. To demonstrate that an employer violated 

§ 825.220(c), Wilson “need only prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that [his] taking FMLA-protected leave constituted a 

negative factor in the decision.” Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125. 

Wilson may support his claim with either direct or 

circumstantial evidence. Id. 

Although Wilson lacks direct evidence that Sunsweet fired 

or refused to rehire him based upon his prior use of FMLA leave, 

he alleges sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a 

material dispute of fact. Under the CBA, Sunsweet could have 

chosen less severe punishments for the unexcused absences, CBA ¶ 

27(b), and excused an employee from discipline if the employer 

later found the employee’s reason for the unexcused absence to 

be acceptable, id. ¶ 36(e). Moreover, when Wilson allegedly 

inquired about being rehired during a period of traditionally 

heavy turnover, Sunsweet was unresponsive despite several open 

positions. Pl.’s SDF ¶¶ 56-59. Finally, the close temporal 

proximity between Wilson’s FMLA-protected leave and his firing 

may give rise to an inference of causal connection. Xin Liu v. 

Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 168 (1st Cir. 

1998)). Based upon these allegations, a reasonable jury could 

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find that Sunsweet violated the FMLA in firing and/or refusing 

to rehire him. Therefore, the court DENIES the motion as to 

Claim One. 

B. Claim Two: CFRA 

 Wilson argues that Sunsweet, for the reasons stated in 

Claim One, also violated CFRA. CFRA does not contain an express 

“negative factor” prohibition analogous to FMLA § 825.200(c). 

California law, however, “incorporates by reference the federal 

regulations interpreting FMLA” so long as “they are not 

inconsistent with . . . state law or the California 

Constitution.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 2 § 7297.10. California 

courts have held that CFRA prohibits the use of leave as a 

negative factor in employment decisions in the same manner as 

FMLA. See Dudley v. Dep’t of Transp., 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 261 

(2001) (recognizing a retaliation claim under CFRA analogous to 

the FMLA “negative factor” claim). The court finds that 

Wilson’s allegations regarding the FMLA claim also create a 

material dispute of fact as to the CFRA claim. Therefore, the 

court DENIES the motion as to Claim Two. 

C. Claim Three: FEHA § 12940(m) 

 Wilson argues that Sunsweet failed to provide reasonable 

accommodation, as required by FEHA, when it fired him and 

refused to rehire him. Sunsweet responds that Wilson has not 

established a prima facie case because (1) it was unaware that 

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he suffered from a disability and (2) he was unable to perform 

the essential duties of the job even with reasonable 

accommodations. See Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 

4th 245, 256 (2000). 

Wilson has failed to create a material dispute of fact 

regarding whether Sunsweet knew he was still injured, let alone 

disabled for FEHA purposes, when it fired him. See Cal. Gov. 

Code § 12940(m) (requiring a reasonable accommodation for all 

“known” disabilities). Wilson alleges that, when he initially 

sought leave, he provided Sunsweet with a note describing his 

injury, Pl.’s SDF ¶ 33, and discussed his back problems with 

Sunsweet human resources employee Darlene Stacy, Stacy Decl. 

75:15-25. The final doctor’s note received by Sunsweet prior to 

terminating Wilson’s employment, however, stated that his leave 

would end on April 30, 2004 and made no mention of continuing 

symptoms or work limitations. Def.’s SUF ¶¶ 8, 10. Wilson 

presents no evidence that there was information before Sunsweet 

on May 7, 2004, when it terminated his employment, that would 

have led it to believe he still was injured.5

 Therefore, from 

 

5

 Wilson argues that Sunsweet lacked such information because 

it failed to engage in an “interactive process” discussing 

reasonable accommodations before terminating him. See Barnett 

v. U.S. Air, Inc. 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled 

on other grounds). This argument cannot be raised for the first 

time on summary judgment because it is a claim under Cal. Gov. 

Code § 12940(n), not § 12940(m) as alleged in the complaint. 

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the record before it when it decided to fire Wilson, Sunsweet 

did not know that he continued to suffer from the injury on 

which he bases his disability claim. See Winarto v. Toshiba 

America Electronic Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1291 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (“Given the temporary nature of [employee’s] injuries 

and work restrictions, the fact that [employer] had been given 

two notes from doctors was not enough to prove that [employer] 

perceived [employee] to be disabled.”). 

Moreover, even if the court finds that Sunsweet should have 

acted under the presumption that Wilson was still injured when 

he failed to return to work, Wilson does not demonstrate that he 

was disabled for FEHA purposes. Under FEHA, a “physical 

disability . . . [l]imits a major life activity.” Cal. Gov. 

Code § 12926(k)(1)(B). “A physiological disease, disorder, 

condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss limits a 

major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major 

life activity difficult.” Id. § 12926(k)(1)(B)(ii). An injured 

employee need allege “only minor limitations” to a major life 

activity to demonstrate a disability. EEOC v. United Parcel 

 

Wilson has not complied with applicable amendment procedures. 

See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16(b). Moreover, even if the court 

reaches the argument, it fails. The obligation to engage in 

such an interaction process “is triggered by an employee or an 

employee's representative giving notice of the employee's 

disability and the desire for accommodation.” Id. As explained 

below, at the time of his firing, Wilson had failed to 

demonstrate that he was disabled for FEHA purposes. 

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Serv., Inc., 424 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005). Working is a 

major life activity and under FEHA “encompasses a limitation in 

a particular employment, which must be something less than a 

class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.” Id. at 1072-73 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, Wilson has presented insufficient evidence for the 

court to conclude that he suffered from a disability for FEHA 

purposes when he was terminated. Wilson alleges that he was 

diagnosed with a permanent disability, but provided no documents 

to Sunsweet detailing the physical limitations imposed by the 

injury. Wilson Depo. 78:14-19. Instead, he allegedly provided 

Sunsweet with a “Post-It” on which he had written 

“neuroforaminal stenosis.” Id. at 78:20-79:5. Stacy recalls 

only discussing Wilson’s “back problem.” Stacy Depo. 76:6-8. 

The final doctor’s note prior to Wilson’s termination, dated 

March 19, 2004, states only “off work until 4/30/04.” Stacy 

Decl. Exh. 6. It did not describe any continuing limitations 

upon his ability to work or any necessary accommodations for his 

injury. The record before Sunsweet when it fired Wilson did not 

demonstrate that he was disabled for FEHA purposes. Therefore, 

he cannot state a prima facie case for failure to provide 

reasonable accommodation under § 12940(m) at the time of his 

termination. The court need not decide whether Wilson would 

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have been able to perform at the time of his firing the 

essential duties of his prior job. 

Wilson also alleges that Sunsweet failed to provide 

reasonable accommodation when he allegedly asked to be rehired. 

Wilson does not specify when he requested that Sunsweet rehire 

him. Wilson Decl. ¶ 11. Assuming it was after May 13, 2004, 

when Wilson’s doctor faxed a note to Sunsweet regarding the 

mistaken leave date, Sunsweet was on notice that Wilson was “not 

in the condition to do his former work.” Stacy Decl. Exh. 9. 

This diagnosis is relevant at least through the recommended May 

30, 2004 leave date listed on the note. Id. Based upon this 

record, Wilson has provided sufficient evidence to create a 

material dispute of fact as whether Sunsweet knew he was 

disabled for FEHA purposes. As for the performance of essential 

duties, the second prima facie case requirement, Wilson creates 

a material dispute of fact by alleging that Sunsweet could have 

made several minor accommodations that would have allowed him to 

return to work. Wilson Decl. ¶ 7. The doctor’s notes were 

silent as to whether Sunsweet could have made such 

accommodations given the nature of Wilson’s injury. Therefore, 

a reasonable jury could conclude that Wilson has presented a 

prima facie case as to Sunsweet’s failure to rehire him. 

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case under 

FEHA for failure to provide reasonable accommodation, a 

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defendant must establish “through undisputed facts that (1) 

reasonable accommodation was offered and refused; (2) there 

simply was no vacant position within the employer’s organization 

for which the disabled employee was qualified and which the 

disabled employee was capable of performing with or without 

accommodation; or (3) the employer did everything in its power 

to find a reasonable accommodation, but the informal interactive 

process broke down because the employee failed to engage in 

discussions in good faith.” Jensen, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 263. 

Here, Wilson disputes whether (1) a reasonable accommodation was 

offered for his rehiring, Wilson Decl. ¶ 11; (2) positions were 

available in which he could work with reasonable accommodations, 

Pl.’s SDF ¶¶ 50-60; and (3) the interactive process broke down 

due to his failure to engage the employer, Wilson Decl. ¶ 11. 

Therefore, for Claim Three, the court GRANTS summary 

judgment as to the failure to provide reasonable accommodation 

at the time of Wilson’s firing but DENIES summary judgment as to 

the failure to provide reasonable accommodation at the time of 

Wilson’s alleged request to be rehired. 

D. Claim Four: FEHA § 12940(a) 

 Wilson alleges that he suffered adverse employment actions 

due to disability, in violation of FEHA. To establish a prima 

facie case of discrimination based upon disability, Wilson must 

demonstrate that he (1) suffers from a disability; (2) is an 

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employee or an applicant within the meaning of FEHA, and (3) was 

subject to an adverse employment action because of the 

disability. Begatti v. Dep’t of Rehab., 97 Cal. App. 4th 344, 

360 (2002). 

As discussed above, Wilson fails to establish that he was 

disabled for FEHA purposes at the time Sunsweet fired him. 

Therefore, he cannot state a discrimination claim under 

§ 12940(a) for his dismissal. 

For Sunsweet’s alleged failure to rehire him, however, 

Wilson has created material disputes of fact as to his 

disability status and desire to be considered for employment. 

See Stacy Decl. Exh. 9; Wilson Decl. ¶ 11. Wilson also must 

demonstrate that he “was treated less favorably than nondisabled employees.” Jensen, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 254. Wilson 

creates a material dispute of fact on this issue by alleging 

that Sunsweet, during a period of traditionally high turnover, 

filled numerous vacancies that he was allegedly qualified and 

physically capable of filling. Pl.’s SDF ¶¶ 49-60. The court 

considers FEHA discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas

burden shifting standard. See Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1143-44 

(requiring defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for adverse employment action). Sunsweet’s only 

explanation for not hiring Wilson is that he did not apply for a 

position. Reply at 7. Since Wilson disputes this fact, Wilson 

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Decl. ¶ 11, the court cannot grant summary judgment regarding 

whether Sunsweet violated FEHA when it failed to rehire him. 

Therefore, for Claim Four, the court GRANTS summary 

judgment as to discrimination at the time of Wilson’s firing but 

DENIES summary judgment as to discrimination at the time of 

Wilson’s alleged request to be rehired. 

E. Claim Five: Public Policy 

 Because the court denies summary judgment, at least in 

part, on all of Wilson’s statutory claims, numerous grounds 

remain on which he may base his public policy claim. See

Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4th 880, 909 (1997). 

Therefore, the court DENIES summary judgment as to Claim Five. 

III. 

 For these reasons, the court GRANTS summary judgment as to 

Claims Three and Four regarding Sunsweet’s termination of 

Wilson’s employment but DENIES summary judgment as to the 

remaining claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 24th day of August, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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