Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05561/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05561-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH LOUIE PAEZ, III,

Plaintiff,

vs.

STEVEN CAMBRA, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:02-cv-05561-AWI-LJO-P

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 48)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND MOTION TO DROP

DEFENDANT ANDREWS (Doc. 43)

ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANTS TO 

RESPOND WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Plaintiff, Joseph Louis Paz, III (“plaintiff”), is a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was

referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

On May 27, 2005, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and

Recommendations herein which were served on the parties and which

contained notice to the parties that any objections to the

Findings and Recommendations were to be filed within thirty (30)

days. On June 29, 2005, defendants filed a motion to extend

time, to and including July 14, 2005. On July 12, 2005, the court

Case 1:02-cv-05561-LJO -LJO Document 56 Filed 08/23/05 Page 1 of 5
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granted defendants until July 14, 2005 to respond. On July 14,

2005, defendants filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 73-305, this Court has conducted a

de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the

entire file, the Court finds the Findings and Recommendations to

be supported by the record and by proper analysis.

In the objections, Defendants contend that the Magistrate

Judge erred in finding exhaustion because there is no evidence

Plaintiff filed administrative appeals to the third level. In

the Findings and Recommendations, the Magistrate Judge did not

make a finding that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative

remedies. Rather, the Magistrate Judge found that by only citing 

to evidence showing that Plaintiff had not appealed to the third

level, Defendants had not met their burden of proof on

Defendants’ motion. The court agrees with this finding.

In the objections, Defendants contend that Plaintiff could

not have been given the relief he sought at lower levels because

Plaintiff complains the violations continued to occur long after

this action was filed. Because Defendants’ motion regarding

exhaustion will be denied without prejudice, Defendants are free

to raise additional evidence and arguments concerning exhaustion

to the Magistrate Judge. The court declines to consider any new

evidence or arguments concerning exhaustion at this time. A new

theory cannot properly be raised in objections to Findings and

Recommendations. Greenhow v. Secretary of HHS, 863 F.2d 633,

638-39 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by United

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States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.1992). Factual

assertions which could have been but were not presented to the

Magistrate Judge should be given no consideration when the court

is deciding whether to adopt Findings and Recommendations 

Sundaram v. County of Santa Barbara, 2001 WL 540515, *1 (C.D.Cal.

2001); Beam System, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, Inc., 1997 WL

423113, *9 n.9 (C.D.Cal. 1997). "[A]llowing parties to litigate

fully their case before the magistrate and, if unsuccessful, to

change their strategy and present a different theory to the

district court would frustrate the purpose of the Magistrates

Act." Greenhow, 863 F.2d at 638. Thus, nothing in the objections

persuades the court that the Magistrate Judge erred in

recommending Defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied on the

ground that Defendants failed to meet their burden.

Defendants also contend the Magistrate Judge erred in

failing to recommend the court grant Defendants’ motion to “drop”

Defendant Andrews. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure provides:

Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an

action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the

court on motion of any party or of its own initiative

at any stage of the action and on such terms as are

just. Any claim against a party may be severed and

proceeded with separately.

Rule 21 itself sets forth no substantive standards for joinder.

Pan Am. Airways v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1073, 1080

(9th Cir.1975). The cases imply that parties are misjoined when

they fail to satisfy either of the preconditions for permissive

joinder of parties set forth in Rule 20(a). 5 C. Wright and A.

Miller § 1683; see also e.g., Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust

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Co., 848 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1988); Pan Am. Airways, 523 F.2d at

1080. Thus, Rule 21 applies when the claims asserted by or

against the joined parties do not arise out of the same

transaction or occurrence or do not present some common question

of law or fact. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20(a); Pan Am. Airways,

523 F.2d at 1080.

A motion under Rule 21 to add, drop, or sever parties is

addressed to the discretion of the court. Coughlin v.

Rogers,130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Intercon Research

Assocs., Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 53, 56 (7th

Cir.1982); 2 Motions in Federal Court § 6:25 (3d ed.). The

Court of Appeals will affirm the dismissal of a party for

misjoinder unless this court is left with a definite and firm

conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of

judgment. Letherer v. Alger Group, L.L.C., 328 F.3d 262, 266

(6th Cir. 2003).

Analysis of the provisions of Rules 20 and 21 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the principles underlying those

Rules, persuades the court that the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that the court not drop Defendant Andrews as a

Defendant is correct. Andrews appears to be a party who could be

joined under Rule 20 with the permission of the court. The

claims against Andrews are based on his failure to provide

certain necessities while Plaintiff was housed in the Security

Housing Unit (“SHU”). The claims against the other defendants

concern their finding that Plaintiff was a validated gang member,

requiring his confinement in the SHU. These claims are

sufficiently related as to avoid Defendant Andrews being dropped

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 To the extent Defendants believe litigating the claims against Defendant Andrews with the remaining

claims will result in the jury hearing unnecessary evidence, the court would find the remedy for this potential

problem would be to sever Defendant Andrews, not drop him from this action. At this time, there is no motion to

sever before the court. If Defendants believe litigating the claims in this action in separate proceedings would be

beneficial, Defendants are free to file a motion to sever. Defendants may wish to forgo filing such a motion until the

issue of exhaustion concerning Defendant Andrews is resolved.

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from this action. As explained by the Magistrate Judge, it is

plaintiff’s validation as a gang member that caused his placement

in the SHU, which in turn caused Defendant Andrews to allegedly

not give Plaintiff hygiene materials. In addition, the court

has examined other relevant factors and determined that dropping

Defendant Andrews is not necessary to comport with the principles

of fundamental fairness. See Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of

North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1980). Defendants

have not shown how litigating Plaintiffs’ claims in one action

results in any prejudice.1

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations, filed May 27, 2005,

are ADOPTED IN FULL;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of

exhaustion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

3. Defendants’ motion to “drop” Defendant Andrews and the

claim against him from this action is DENIED without prejudice to

refiling a motion to sever the claim against Defendant Andrews,

3. Defendants SHALL respond to the complaint within thirty

(30) days from the date of service of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2005 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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