Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01590/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01590-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Injunction

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JOHN M. LOWERY,

Plaintiff,

v.

Hon. Christopher A. Hart, 

Chairman, NATIONAL 

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; 

and Loretta E. Lynch, 

Attorney General, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:15-1590 WBS CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff John M. Lowery brought this action against 

the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”)

and the Attorney General of the United States Department of 

Justice (collectively, “defendants”) asserting violations of the

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Plaintiff 

additionally seeks to set aside the judgment in a related case 

that plaintiff brought against NTSB in 1997 on the basis that 

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NTSB committed fraud on the court. Defendants now move to 

dismiss plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action for fraud on the 

court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

(Docket No. 17.)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Piper Tomahawk (“Tomahawk”) is a two-seat, singleengine aircraft used as a primary trainer for student pilots 

attempting to earn their basic private pilot’s certification from 

the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”). (Anderson Decl. ¶ 4 

(Docket No. 4).) Plaintiff is an author of aviation safety 

articles who had published articles discussing the Tomahawk’s 

purported tendency to spin and crash. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) 

¶ 4 (Docket No. 16); Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Ex. 

1 (“1998 Order”) at 2 (Docket No. 10-2).)

During the course of research in the 1990s for an 

upcoming article, plaintiff made a number of FOIA requests to the 

FAA and NTSB regarding the government’s investigation into 

Tomahawk stall-spin accidents. (1998 Order at 2.) Plaintiff 

made four FOIA requests to NTSB seeking (1) documents regarding a 

1994 Tomahawk crash in Kansas; (2) information regarding an 

August 1995 meeting between NTSB personnel and the Tomahawk’s 

manufacturer in Vero Beach, Florida; (3) photographs of a 

Tomahawk experimental prototype and a videotape of Tomahawk 

stall-spin tests; and (4) documents regarding a 1995 Tomahawk 

crash in Indiana. (Id.)

In 1997, plaintiff filed a civil action in this court 

against the FAA and NTSB claiming that they violated the FOIA by 

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failing to conduct an adequate search for and furnish the 

requested documents. (Id. at 2-3; FAC ¶ 5); see Lowery v. 

F.A.A., Civ. No. 2:97-15 WBS DAD (E.D. Cal. filed Jan. 3, 1997)

(“1997 Action”). NTSB’s air safety investigator Frank Gattolin 

had conducted NTSB’s investigation into whether the Tomahawk had 

been properly spin-tested by its manufacturer during the 

certification process with the FAA. (Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) 

According to plaintiff, Gattolin testified at his deposition on 

September 30, 1997 that he did not possess the Tomahawk prototype 

photographs that plaintiff sought in the third FOIA request 

(“Third Request”). (FAC ¶ 95.)

Gattolin also submitted a declaration stating that, in 

early 1997, he gave all photographs that were related to Tomahawk 

stall-spin issues to NTSB attorney Jane Mackall, who worked at 

NTSB’s Office of the General Counsel but was not counsel of 

record in the 1997 Action. (See id. ¶¶ 30, 97.)1 In Mackall’s

own declaration, however, she stated that neither she nor 

Gattolin had such photographs. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 96.) Plaintiff 

alleges that as a result of these inconsistencies, the Magistrate 

Judge permitted plaintiff to depose Mackall and other NTSB 

personnel in Washington, D.C. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges

that he traveled to Washington, D.C. but was unable to depose 

Mackall because she had suddenly left town due to a family 

illness. (Id.) He states that he could not depose Mackall on a 

later date because “the Magistrate Judge’s order placed a very 

 

1 Plaintiff alleges that five years later, in 2003, 

Gattolin contacted plaintiff and confirmed that he gave the 

prototype photographs to Mackall months before his September 30, 

1997 deposition. (Id. ¶¶ 98-99.)

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strict time limit to finish the depositions in Washington, D.C.”

and the court later denied his requests to extend the time for 

discovery. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 101.)

Plaintiff asserts that based upon Gattolin and 

Mackall’s sworn testimony regarding the Tomahawk prototype 

photographs, he withdrew his FOIA claim concerning the Third 

Request. (Id. ¶¶ 101-103.) Plaintiff and NTSB subsequently 

filed cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims

regarding the first and fourth FOIA requests concerning the 

Tomahawk crashes in Kansas and Indiana. (Id.; 1998 Order at 2-3 

& n.3.)2 In March 1998, the court granted summary judgment in 

favor of NTSB, entered final judgment, and approved the parties’ 

settlement agreement to waive their rights to appeal and bear 

their own costs and attorney’s fees. (1998 Order at 11; RJN Exs. 

2-3.)

Plaintiff alleges he later learned in 2008 that, three 

months before Gattolin’s 1997 deposition, Gattolin had sent at 

least seven Tomahawk prototype photographs to former NTSB 

investigator George Anderson. (FAC ¶ 28; Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 2-9, 

Ex. 2.) Anderson states in a declaration that Gattolin then

contacted him shortly after September 1997 and asked him to

return the prototype photographs to Gattolin’s home address. 

(Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Anderson represents that he was not 

aware at the time of any pending FOIA requests concerning the 

photographs and states that Gattolin did not inform him of any 

such requests. (Id. ¶ 10.)

 

2 The court had separately granted the FAA’s motion for 

summary judgment as to all claims against it. (1998 Order at 2.)

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Plaintiff asserts that “Gattolin deliberately hid the 

requested photos and used Anderson as his unwitting repository, 

until immediately after the September 30, 1997 Deposition of 

Gattolin, when he called Mr. Anderson and asked that the photos 

be returned to Frank Gattolin’s home address.” (FAC ¶ 92.) 

Plaintiff claims that “NTSB, acting by and through its official 

Frank Gattolin, committed fraud on the court in order to win the 

case and obtain the favorable [1998 MSJ] order dismissing the 

case, the judgment for Defendant NTSB, and the settlement 

agreement wherein Plaintiff was forced to waive his right to 

appeal in exchange for the government waiving its costs bill.” 

(Id. (citations omitted).)

On that basis, plaintiff has brought an independent 

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) seeking to 

set aside the 1998 Order, the resulting judgment, and the 

settlement agreement regarding the parties’ rights to appeal and 

attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. ¶ 104.) Plaintiff also requests 

that the court enter a new judgment for plaintiff in the 1997 

Action and award him reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in 

pursuing that action and the present action. (Id.) Defendants 

now move to dismiss plaintiff’s claim to set aside the judgment 

in the 1997 Action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. Legal Standards

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60

To preserve the finality of judgments, the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure limit a party’s ability to seek relief 

from a final judgment. Rule 60(b) enumerates six grounds under 

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which a court may relieve a party from a final judgment:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to 

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 

opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or 

discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has 

been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively 

is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion seeking relief from a final 

judgment under Rule 60(b) must be made “within a reasonable time” 

and any motion under one of the first three grounds for relief 

must be made “no more than a year after the entry of the 

judgment.” Id. R. 60(c)(1). 

Despite the limitations in Rule 60(b), courts have 

discretion pursuant to their “inherent equity power to vacate 

judgments obtained by fraud.” United States v. Estate of 

Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Chambers v. 

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)). Rule 60(d)(3) preserves 

this inherent power and recognizes that Rule 60 does not limit a 

court’s power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” 

See also Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 

780 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [60(d)(3)]

preserves the district court’s right to hear an independent 

action to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”); Estate 

of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 443 (“Rule [60(d)(3)], which governs 

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relief from a judgment or order, provides no time limit on 

courts’ power to set aside judgments based on a finding of fraud 

on the court.”).3

B. Fraud on the Court

A court “must exercise the power to vacate judgments 

for fraud on the court with restraint and discretion, and only 

when the fraud is established by clear and convincing evidence.”

Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 443-44 (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). Relief for fraud on the court must be 

“reserved for those cases of ‘injustice[] which, in certain 

instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure’ 

from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.” United 

States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998) (citation omitted). 

“A fraud on the court is an unconscionable plan or 

scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its 

decision.” Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 

682 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The relevant inquiry is not whether 

fraudulent conduct “prejudiced the opposing party,” but whether 

it “harmed the integrity of the judicial process.” Estate of 

Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444 (citation and alterations omitted). 

 

3 Prior to the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure in 2007, the savings clause for fraud on the court was 

contained in Rule 60(b) and courts referred to Rule 60(b) as 

preserving a court’s inherent power to set aside a final judgment 

for fraud on the court. As part of the stylistic amendments in 

2007, the savings clause language was moved from subsection (b) 

to subsection (d). Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2006) (“This 

rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 

independent action . . . to set aside a judgment for fraud on the 

court.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) (amended 2007) (“This 

rule does not limit a court’s power to: . . . (3) set aside a 

judgment for fraud on the court.”).

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The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that exceptions that

“would allow final decisions to be reconsidered must be construed 

narrowly in order to preserve the finality of judgments.” Abatti 

v. Comm’r of the I.R.S., 859 F.2d 115, 119 (9th Cir. 1988); see 

also Appling, 340 F.3d at 780; Dixon v. C.I.R., 316 F.3d 1041, 

1046 (9th Cir. 2003).

A party “bears a high burden in seeking to prove fraud 

on the court.” Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 

2015). A finding of fraud on the court involves “far more than 

an injury to a single litigant.” Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 

at 444 (citation omitted). “Fraud on the court requires a ‘grave 

miscarriage of justice,’ and a fraud that is aimed at the court.” 

Appling, 340 F.3d at 780 (quoting Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47). 

Perjury or non-disclosure by a party or witness “does 

not, by itself, amount to fraud on the court.” Id. Nondisclosure or perjury by an officer of the court may amount to 

fraud on the court only if it was “so fundamental that it 

undermined the workings of the adversary process itself.” Estate 

of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 445; see also 11 Charles Alan Wright et 

al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2870 (3d ed. 2014) 

(“[T]here is a powerful distinction between perjury to which an 

attorney is a party and that with which no attorney is 

involved . . . . [W]hether perjury constitutes a fraud on the 

court should depend on whether an attorney or other officer of 

the court was a party to it.”). Non-disclosure or perjury by an 

officer of the court, however, does not rise to this level if it 

had a “limited effect on the district court’s decision” and the 

withheld information would not have “significantly changed the 

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information available to the district court.” Estate of 

Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 446.

III. Analysis

A. Alleged Fraud on the Court

As a threshold matter, plaintiff discovered the facts 

giving rise to his allegations of fraud on the court by at least 

2008.

4 (FAC ¶ 28.) Despite alleging that the conduct at issue 

amounts to a “‘grave miscarriage of justice,’ and a fraud that is 

aimed at the court,” Appling, 340 F.3d at 780 (quoting Beggerly, 

524 U.S. at 47), plaintiff fails to explain why he simply waited 

at least seven years before even notifying the court that this 

alleged fraud was committed against it. There is no excuse – no 

excuse whatsoever - for such delay, and plaintiff’s delay alone 

should preclude him from seeking the extraordinary relief of 

setting aside a settlement and judgment. 

Even assuming plaintiff’s inexcusable lack of diligence 

does not bar relief, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “in 

nearly all fraud-on-the-court cases, the misrepresentations went 

to the central issue in the case.” Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 

at 452. Here, however, plaintiff’s allegations of fraud on the 

 

4 Plaintiff also alleges in his verified FAC that, in 

February 2004, he sent a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft 

reporting that a certain NTSB employee had committed perjury: the 

same allegation that forms the basis of his fraud on the court 

claim here. (FAC ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff’s remaining causes of 

action here arise out of FOIA requests he made to the Department 

of Justice (“DOJ”) and NTSB concerning his 2004 letter to 

Attorney General Ashcroft. (Id. ¶¶ 8-27, 34-90.) That plaintiff 

sent such a letter in 2004 confirms that he was aware at that 

time of the alleged facts upon which his claim of fraud on the 

court is predicated, and that he in fact waited eleven years to 

notify the court.

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court are limited to alleged misconduct surrounding only the 

Third Request, which plaintiff had voluntarily withdrawn before 

the court rendered a decision in the prior case. The 1998 Order 

mentioned plaintiff’s Third Request only in its background 

discussion referencing plaintiff’s four original FOIA requests. 

(1998 Order at 2.) Immediately thereafter, the Order explicitly 

stated that “[o]nly requests One and Four are the subject of this 

action.” (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff also admits that his crossmotion for summary judgment in that case “lacked any reference to 

FOIA # 3.” (FAC ¶ 103.) 

Because the Third Request and the prototype photographs 

were not at issue in the 1998 Order, it is not possible that the 

allegations surrounding the Third Request could have influenced

or misled the court in its decision. See Appling, 340 F.3d at 

780 (“Fraud on the court requires . . . a fraud that is aimed at 

the court.”); Phoceene Sous-Marine, S. A., 682 at 805 

(emphasizing that the “deception was clearly not an attempt to 

influence the court’s ultimate decision on the merits”); accord

Broyhill Furn. Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster Furn. Corp., 12 F.3d 

1080, 1086-87 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (although a party knowingly 

withheld material and thereafter sought enforcement of a 

fraudulently obtained patent, there was no fraud on the court

because the fraudulent evidence used to obtain the patent from 

the patent office was not submitted to the court, so the court 

itself was not the victim of fraud).

Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations that Gattolin’s sworn 

deposition testimony in the 1997 Action constituted perjury do 

not “show more than perjury or nondisclosure of evidence.” 

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Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 445. The Ninth Circuit has 

repeatedly held that perjury by a witness alone cannot amount to 

fraud on the court. See id.; In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119 

(9th Cir. 1999) (“[P]erjury by a party or witness, by itself, is 

not normally fraud on the court.”).

Plaintiff also admits that he, and not the court,

determined that the Third Request would no longer be part of the 

litigation. (FAC ¶ 102.) Plaintiff made the strategic decision 

to enter into a settlement waiving his right to appeal in 

exchange for defendants’ waiver of their costs bill. (Id. ¶ 60.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “Rule 60(b) is not intended to 

remedy the effects of a deliberate and independent litigation 

decision that a party later comes to regret through second 

thoughts.” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 

1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Gattolin’s perjury

therefore fail to meet the high threshold required to state a 

plausible claim of fraud on the court. Even if Gattolin’s 

alleged perjury, had it occurred, worked an injustice, it did not 

work a “grave miscarriage of justice.” Appling, 340 F.3d at 780.

There is also no allegation that counsel of record for 

the government in the 1997 Action had any reason to suspect that 

Gattolin possessed or knew the whereabouts of the pictures. 

Plaintiff in fact emphasizes that he is not alleging “that the 

Assistant United States Attorney who handled the defense had any 

information there was a problem with the veracity of the verified 

evidence from NTSB personnel that was filed with this Court.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 (Docket No. 19).)

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While Mackall was employed by NTSB’s Office of the 

General Counsel, she served only as a witness and did not handle 

the defense of the 1997 Action. The Ninth Circuit has 

recognized, however, that “fraud upon the court includes both 

attempts to subvert the integrity of the court and fraud by an 

officer of the court.” Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 

F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995). It could be argued that 

Mackall’s participation in the 1997 Action “was sufficient to 

render [her] an officer of the court.” See id. (holding that the 

participation of a party’s general counsel who did not enter an 

appearance in the action was nonetheless “sufficient to render 

him an officer of the court”).

Plaintiff does not, however, allege that Mackall 

committed perjury in the 1997 Action. He states only that 

Mackall’s declaration was inconsistent with Gattolin’s sworn 

testimony and that she had failed to appear for her deposition 

due to a family illness. (FAC ¶¶ 29-31.) Even assuming Mackall 

knew that Gattolin or another NTSB employee had the photographs, 

non-disclosure by an officer of the court or perjury by or 

suborned by an officer of the court may amount to fraud on the 

court only if it was “so fundamental that it undermined the 

workings of the adversary process itself.” Estate of Stonehill, 

660 F.3d at 445. Non-disclosure by an officer of the court does 

not rise to this level if it had a “limited effect on the 

district court’s decision” and the withheld information would not 

have “significantly changed the information available to the 

district court.” Id. at 446.

Even if Mackall were considered an officer of the 

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court for purposes of the 1997 Action, any alleged perjury 

regarding plaintiff’s Third Request would have had at most only a 

limited effect on the court’s 1998 Order because, as discussed 

above, the Third Request was neither before nor considered by the

court. Any alleged non-disclosure or perjury by Mackall thus

cannot amount to a “‘grave miscarriage of justice,’ and a fraud 

that [was] aimed at the court.” Appling, 340 F.3d at 780 

(quoting Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47).

Nor can plaintiff allege fraud on the court based on 

his inability to take Mackall’s deposition. Plaintiff alleges he 

“did not press the matter of taking Attorney Mackall’s deposition 

on a later date” because the Magistrate Judge had imposed strict 

discovery limitations on the Washington, D.C. depositions. (FAC 

¶ 31.) In the court’s December 3, 1997 Order denying plaintiff’s 

request for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s denial of 

plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery responses, the court noted

that “the discovery limitations imposed by the Magistrate Judge 

were primarily due to the fact that plaintiffs noticed several 

depositions on the last day for discovery.” (1997 Action, Docket

No. 83.)

Plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge on appeal

the court’s denial of his request for reconsideration and any

denials for an extension of time to conduct Mackall’s deposition. 

Plaintiff instead elected to forgo the normal procedures of 

litigating the issue on appeal by stipulating to a waiver of his 

right to appeal. Allowing plaintiff to knowingly relinquish his 

right to appeal and seek relief now would erroneously allow 

“fraud on the court” to “become an open sesame to collateral 

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attacks.” Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc. v. Expeditors Int’l of Wash., 

Inc., 127 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1997).

As this court has observed in the past, if the court 

were to simply ignore the language of a settlement agreement, 

parties to such an agreement could never obtain a reasonable 

assurance that a settlement was indeed final. See United States 

v. Sierra Pac. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 3d 948, 964 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 

A grave miscarriage of justice cannot result from enforcing the 

clear and deliberate terms of a settlement agreement like the one 

here. 

Accordingly, because plaintiff’s allegations fail to 

state a facially plausible claim of fraud on the court, the court 

must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim to set 

aside the judgment for fraud on the court.

B. Leave to Amend

“Although a district court should grant the plaintiff 

leave to amend if the complaint can possibly be cured by 

additional factual allegations, ‘dismissal without leave to amend 

is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by 

amendment.’” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citations omitted). Defendants here have previously filed 

a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eleventh claim that raised the 

same arguments as their present motion. (Docket No. 10.)

Plaintiff was granted leave to file his lengthy First 

Amended Complaint after stating that the amendment “should 

address [the] issues raised” in defendants’ original motion to 

dismiss. (Docket No. 13 at 2.) Plaintiff thus had a full 

opportunity to present his best case against defendants

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concerning relief under Rule 60(b)(3). The court cannot imagine 

any further allegations plaintiff could make regarding his Third 

Request that could remedy the fatal deficiencies noted above. 

Accordingly, any proposed amendment would be futile, 

and the court will not grant plaintiff leave to amend. Cf.

Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

plaintiff’s second request for leave to amend where amendment 

would be futile); Sapse v. Ferm, 457 F. App’x 654, 655 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying leave to amend the complaint to plead fraud on the court 

because amendment would have been futile.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s eleventh claim seeking to set aside the 

judgment for fraud on the court (Docket No. 17) be, and the same 

hereby is, GRANTED, without leave to amend.

Dated: March 9, 2016

Case 2:15-cv-01590-WBS-DB Document 25 Filed 03/09/16 Page 15 of 15