Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00883/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00883-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory Keith Jones,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-0883-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson,

Arizona, serving nine concurrent life sentences, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 18, 2015 (Doc. 1). On September 2, 2015 

Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 10). Petitioner filed a Reply on November 23, 

2015 (Doc. 14).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background (in the light most favorable to sustain the 

convictions), as follows:

On January 10, 2008, Scottsdale Police Officer Timothy 

Edwards contacted Defendant at his home in south Scottsdale ("the 

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Residence") during a "patrol response." Though the home was 

located in a working or middle class area Edwards observed a 

Bentley -- which he had never seen in his 15 years working that 

neighborhood in the garage and "at least a hundred shoe boxes" 

some of which he confirmed were filled with Nike shoes. When 

Edwards asked Defendant what he did for a living, he initially 

replied that he owned Tipps Barbecue, but then stated that his sister 

owned it and that he was "helping her out." Edwards told Defendant 

that he had never heard of Tipps Barbecue and when he asked for 

"some reference," Defendant told him he also did consulting for a 

Phoenix real estate firm. 

After speaking with Defendant, Edwards relayed his 

observations to his supervisor and eventually to Scottsdale Police 

Detective Scott Dersa of the narcotics investigations unit. In January 

2008, Dersa, along with other officers, began a three-month 

surveillance of Defendant. During the surveillance, Dersa personally 

observed Defendant using multiple vehicles to make multiple trips 

between Tipps Barbecue, the Residence, a condominium at the 

Cofco Center Court complex ("the Condo"), and a U-Haul storage 

unit ("the Unit") on east McDowell Road. Based on his 

observations, Dersa had a motion-activated video camera installed 

in the public hallway of the U-Haul facility on March 20, 2008. The 

camera captured Defendant entering the Unit on March 20, 22, 27 

and 31, and April 1, 3 and 7. Still photos generated from the video 

showed Defendant handling a box containing several white plastic 

bottles located on a shelf in the Unit and retrieving what appeared to 

be "blister packs" from another box. On March 27 and 31, Dersa 

observed Defendant leaving the facility with some shoe boxes from 

the Unit. 

Based on the surveillance information, Dersa drafted and 

obtained eight search warrants, including warrants for the Unit, 

Tipps Barbecue, the Residence and the Condo. During the search of 

the Unit on April 7, 2008, officers found many boxes containing 

numerous bottles and containers of prescription narcotic drugs, 

including: 3,000 tablets containing hydrocodone; 100 tablets 

containing morphine; 100 pills containing oxycodone; 3,300 pills 

containing hydrocodone; 289 capsules containing morphine; 3500 

tablets containing methadone; 2,400 tablets containing alprazolam; 

471 tablets containing morphine; 828 milliliters of liquid containing 

promethazine with codeine and 1 bottle of codeine; 3,300 tablets 

containing hydromorphine; 500 tablets containing diazepam; 200 

tablets containing oxycodone; 100 tablets containing meperidine; 

200 tablets containing methylphenidate; 500 tablets containing 

hydrocodone; 100 tablets containing hydromorphone; 1,200 tablets 

containing alprazolam; and 13, 964 tablets of alprazolam (contained 

in jars). All of the various drugs were in usable amounts, including 

those in liquid form. In all, the quantity of drugs found at the storage 

unit amounted to "over 34,600 dosage units" or the equivalent of 

what would be stocked by a mid-range Fry's Pharmacy. Police also 

located a briefcase containing "rubber-banded" bills in stacks 

labeled "1- or 2000" that added up to a total of $40,500; a roll of 

"large industrial shrink wrap"; and a number of empty shoeboxes. 

On April 8, 2008, Scottsdale Police executed a search 

warrant on the Condo at the Cofco Center Court complex. During 

surveillance, police had observed Defendant leaving the Condo and 

locking the front door with a key. The police found a newer model 

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silver Mercedes-Benz and a newer model white Dodge Magnum 

that they had seen Defendant use. Inside the Dodge, police found 

two driver licenses in the name of "Henry Griffin," but bearing 

Defendant's photograph. Police also found a "money counter" under 

a bed in one bedroom, "U.S. currency . . . stacked in rubber bands" 

in a dresser drawer, and the keys to the Mercedes. 

When executing the warrant for the Residence, officers found 

in the garage the Bentley, which was registered to an "LLC in the 

State of California." And beneath a large box in the garage, they 

found a large metal plate that concealed a safe in the concrete floor. 

Inside the safe, there were several shoe boxes containing stacks of 

U.S. currency totaling approximately $231,000. A wallet containing 

bank cards bearing Defendant's name, a checkbook bearing 

Defendant's name on the checks, and the key to the Bentley were 

also inside the safe. In an attic space above the garage, police 

located "financial paperwork." 

After completing the search of the Residence, Dersa 

interviewed Defendant, who was already under arrest. Dersa offered 

to read Defendant his Miranda rights a second time, but Defendant 

waived them and agreed to speak with him. Defendant initially 

denied that he sold narcotic drugs, but after being shown the 

surveillance photographs of him at the storage unit, Defendant told 

Dersa "to think of him [as] somewhat of a mule" -- that he "move [ 

d] things." Defendant also told Dersa that "guys [came] from all 

over the country for [the drugs]." When Dersa asked him about the 

prescription drugs, Defendant said he was "compensated for his 

role." 

Defendant admitted that the contents of the Unit were his and 

that he rented it under the name "Michael Griffin." Defendant also 

admitted using the name "Michael Griffin" when co-signing on the 

lease for the Condo and that he paid cash for the Unit. Defendant 

claimed ownership of one of the cash-filled shoeboxes found in the 

safe and identified the box containing $40,000 as one that was 

"owed to somebody for a quantity ... of drugs that he had received 

and that quantity was kind of fronted," and that "people would be 

after that money." 

Defendant continued to maintain that he worked at Tipps 

Barbecue, where he was paid in cash. Defendant told Dersa that he 

helped his son, a college student in San Diego, "get" the Residence 

"as a business investment," to help his son improve his credit rating. 

Defendant denied owning the Bentley parked in the garage at the 

house, and claimed that it came from California and belonged to a 

friend who kept it at the Residence. Defendant maintained that the 

Mercedes he was seen riding in "belonged to somebody locally who 

could no longer afford to make the payments," therefore he had 

taken over the payments to help out the registered owner. The 

Dodge Magnum, which Defendant stated he obtained "from a local 

car lot," had a temporary registration under the name "Michael 

Griffin."

(Exhibit XX, Mem. Dec. 12/15/11 at 2-8.0 (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 10, are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) (See Exhibit NNN, Affid. For Search Warrant.) 

/ /

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B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Allegations - On April 18, 2008, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County 

Superior Court on: Count 1, possession of narcotic drugs for sale (hydrocodone), a class 

2 felony; Count 2, possession of narcotic drugs for sale (codeine), a class 2 felony; Count 

3, possession of narcotic drugs for sale (oxycodone), a class 2 felony; Count 4, 

possession of narcotic drugs for sale (morphine), a class 2 felony; Count 5, possession of 

dangerous drugs for sale ( diazepam), a class 2 felony; Count 6, possession of dangerous 

drugs for sale (methylphenidate), a class 2 felony; Count 7, possession of dangerous 

drugs for sale (alprazolam), a class 2 felony; Count 8, possession of drug paraphernalia, 

a class 6 felony; Count 9, money laundering in the second degree, a class 3 felony; and 

Count 10, illegal control of an enterprise, a class 3 felony. The original Count 1 charged 

sale or transportation of marijuana over two pounds, a class 2 felony. However, the state 

dismissed this charge, with Defendant's agreement, before trial and the remaining counts 

were renumbered accordingly. (Exhibit AA, M.E. 11/16/09 at 2.) 

The state also filed allegations that Petitioner was on release at the time of the 

offenses (Exhibit E), that the offenses were for pecuniary gain (an aggravating factor) 

(Exhibit F), and the Petitioner had a historical prior (Exhibit G). 

On August 27, 2009, the state also filed a notice alleging that Petitioner was a 

“Serious Drug Offender” pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3410 (Exhibit S), thereby 

raising Petitioner’s sentencing exposure to life in prison.

Settlement Conferences – Petitioner appeared on November 18, 2008 for a 

settlement conference. The state offered a plea to one Class 2 felony, with a minimum 

term (“slightly aggravated”) of 7 years, in exchange for dismissal of remaining counts, 

and allegations, including the prior convictions and probation status. (Exhibit I, R.T. 

11/18/08 at 11.) The defense responded that the offer had not moved from a prior offer, 

even after Petitioner had been of assistance to the prosecution. (Id. at 13-14.) The 

defense argued for a sentencing cap of 7 years, rather than a minimum. (Id. at 18.) 

Based in part on suggestions from the court that a presumptive sentence was likely, the 

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state proposed to remove any stipulation on sentencing, coupled with a consecutive term 

of probation on another Class 2 offense, but declined to make a formal offer. (Id. at 19, 

25.) The conference was concluded without resolution. (Id. at 25-26.) 

At the outset of trial, after voir dire, trial counsel requested a hearing with the trial 

court to review Petitioner’s potential sentencing at trial. The trial court indicated the 

purpose would be limited to reviewing potential sentencing, and would not include 

discussion of the facts of the case. The trial court indicated both sides would need to 

waive any potential conflict. The state indicated it was unprepared to negotiate a plea 

agreement, but agreed to waive the conflict. Defense counsel also agreed, but Petitioner 

refused. The hearing was terminated. (Exhibit DD, R.T. 11/12/09 at 108-112.)

Motions to Suppress - On August 6, 2008, trial counsel moved to suppress 

portions of the custodial interview on the basis that Petitioner invoked his right to 

counsel. (Exhibit D.) 

Trial counsel also moved to suppress the evidence obtained under the search 

warrant on the basis that the surveillance video was a violation of Petitioner’s right to 

privacy, and because the search warrant application contained misrepresentations about 

the police observing drugs in boxes exchanged by Petitioner with a Mississippi buyer, 

Mario Jones (no relation). (Exhibit J.) Trial counsel indicated an intent to supplement 

the motion with additional information (Exhibit N, R.T. 5/4/9 at 5), and filed a Discovery 

Request (Exhibit M) seeking inter alia FBI and DEA reports on the alleged exchange, 

which the court granted. Petitioner did not supplement his motion, and on June 8, 2009, 

the court denied the motion to suppress and vacated the scheduled suppression hearing. 

(Exhibit XX, Mem. Dec. 12/15/11 at 11.)

Motions to Withdraw – Retained trial counsel (Mr. Simpson) filed on August 7, 

2009 a Motion to Withdraw (Exhibit MMM), citing potential violations of the ethical 

rules and discharge by Petitioner. The prosecution opposed the motion because the 

matter was on the eve of trial. Petitioner spoke in favor of the motion, arguing that 

Petitioner believed the court had wrongly rejected his motion in limine, and that he 

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wished to represent himself. The Court advised Petitioner that he would not be 

permitted to re-litigate the case, and gave Petitioner time to discuss the matter with 

counsel. Petitioner persisted in his request, and retained counsel’s motion to withdraw 

was granted, and substitute counsel was appointed. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 8/10/9; Exhibit Z, 

M.E. 8/10/09.) 

On September 30, 2009, appointed counsel (Mr. Acosta) filed a Motion to 

Withdraw (Exhibit T), citing as cause disputes with Petitioner over the handling of the 

case resulting in a breakdown in communication. The court denied the motion. (Exhibit 

Z, M.E. 10/1/9; Exhibit V, R.T. 11/2/9 at 5; Exhibit XX, Mem. Dec. 12/15/11 at 12.) 

Counsel also filed a Motion to Continue (Exhibit U) citing as cause the time required to 

complete preparations for trial, which was denied. (Exhibit Z, M.E. 11/2/9; Exhibit V, 

R.T. 11/2/9 at 8.) 

 Trial – Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial on November 12, 2009. (Exhibit AA, 

M.E. 11/12/9.) Petitioner was found guilty on all charges, although with regard to 

Counts 2 (codeine) and 6 (methylphenidate) the jury found that the state had not proven

that the amount equaled or exceeded the statutory amounts. (Exhibit XX, Mem.Dec. 

12/15/11 at 14; Exhibit LL, Verdicts.) 

Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment (Exhibit RR), which the trial court 

treated as a motion for new trial and denied. (Exhibit XX, Mem. Dec. 12/15/11 at 14.) 

On January 8, 2010, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 

life in prison on each of Counts 1 through 7, 9 and 10, and to a concurrent, presumptive

term of one year in prison on Count 8. (Id. at 14; Exhibit UU, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed through appointed counsel (Mr. Lucero), a direct appeal, arguing: 

(1) error in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress based on 

the misrepresentations in obtaining the search warrant; (2) error in denying the motion to 

continue after the state filed the allegation of Serious Drug Offender (“SDO”); and (3) 

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there was insufficient evidence to support the SDO allegation. (Exhibit VV, Opening 

Brief.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed his 

convictions and sentences. (Exhibit XX, Mem. Dec. 12/15/11.) 

Petitioner did not seek further direct review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit YY.) Counsel 

was appointed. (Exhibit ZZ, M.E. 4/9/12.) On June 4, 2012, before counsel filed a 

petition or notice of completion of review, Petitioner filed a Pro Per Petition for PostConviction Relief (Exhibit AAA).

On July 18, 2012, counsel filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit BBB) evidencing 

an inability to find a tenable issue to raise in a supplemental petition, and sought leave 

for Petitioner to file one pro per. On August 15, 2012, Petitioner filed his amended Pro 

Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit CCC), raising the following four 

claims:

1. violation of Petitioner’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment 

by the use of the surveillance video;

2. violation of state rules and due process when the prosecution failed to 

disclose prosecution witness Officer Edwards;

3. error in failing to rule on Petitioner’s motion in limine regarding the 

investigation regarding the dismissed Count 1, resulting in the admission of 

unfairly prejudicial evidence; and 

4. ineffective assistance of appointed trial counsel (Mr. Acosta) and 

appellate counsel (Mr. Lucero), in a variety of ways.

The PCR court denied the first three claims because Petitioner “raised, or could have 

raised, the exact issues on appeal.” (Exhibit FFF, M.E. 12/19/12 at 2.) The PCR court 

denied the ineffective assistance claims as without merit. (Id. at 3-4.)

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Although the PCR court’s Minute Entry was not filed until January 14, 2013 (See 

Exhibit JJJ, Docket at Item 206; Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at n. 1), on December 

31, 2012, Petitioner filed with the Arizona Supreme Court a Petition for Review (Exhibit 

GGG), arguing that: (1) the PCR court erred in denying his PCR Petition: (2) his rights 

to privacy were violated by admission of the surveillance video; (3) violations of state 

law and Brady from failure to disclose prosecution witness Edwards; and (4) the PCR 

court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

On April 1, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over the 

petition and transferred the matter to the Arizona Court of Appeals, who in light of the 

convoluted procedural history elected “to treat Jones's ‘Petition for Review and Ruling 

as a petition for review of the trial court's denial of his PCR.” (Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 

9/4/14 at n. 1.) 

On September 3, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum 

Decision (Exhibit HHH), granting review but denying relief. The court denied the right 

to privacy and disclosure claims “because Jones could have raised them on direct 

appeal.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) The court rejected the ineffective assistance claims on the merits. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 4-11.) 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

24, et seq., Petition for Review). That court summarily denied review. (Exhibit III, 

Order 3/2/15.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 18, 2015 (Doc. 1). As determined 

in the Court’s service order, Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for 

relief:

(1) Petitioner was convicted with evidence obtained in 

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violation of the Fourth Amendment; the Arizona Court of Appeals 

erred in applying the plain view doctrine; and the Court of Appeals 

erred in failing to address the need for an evidentiary hearing; 

(2) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated when the state failed to disclose witnesses, and 

Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object; 

(3) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective, in violation of 

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, when counsel failed to object to a 

witness’s testimony regarding a portion of the investigation that the 

trial court excluded at the beginning of the trial; and 

(4) The Arizona Court of Appeals erred in denying 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

(Order 6/10/15, Doc. 3 at 1-2.) Broken down by subpart, Petitioner’s Petition presents, 

or Respondents perceive, the following claims and subclaims:

1. Fourth Amendment Claims: 

(a) Privacy claim: Placement of the surveillance cameras was a violation of 

his privacy rights;

(b) Franks Claim: the search warrant affidavit contained a false statement.

2. Disclosure Claims:

(a) Brady claim: the prosecution failed to disclose Officer Edwards as a 

trial witness;

(b) Ineffectiveness Claim: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 

to Officer Edwards’ testimony. 

3. Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence: 

(a) Prejudice claim: the court erred by not excluding testimony regarding 

evidence related to the dismissed Count 1;

(b) Ineffectiveness Claim: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 

to the prejudicial evidence.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: trial or appellate counsel were ineffective:

(a) Advice regarding Plea: trial counsel advised Petitioner he was 

negotiating a plea agreement;1

(b) Failure to Present Defense: trial counsel failed to prepare for trial or 

 

1 Respondents label the seven subparts of Ground 4 as “IAC claim” 1 through 7. For 

consistency, the undersigned designates them as subparts (a) through (g) of Ground 4.)

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present a defense;

(c) Discovery: trial counsel failed to pursue available discovery;

(d) Testimonial Objections: trial counsel failed to object to critical 

testimony; 

(e) Serious Drug Offender Allegation: trial counsel failed for over two 

months to alert Petitioner to the filing of a serious drug offender allegation;

(f) Privacy Claim: appellate counsel failed to challenge the privacy interest 

violation; 

(g) Appeal on Motion in Limine: appellate counsel failed to adequately 

argue the improper denial of the motion in limine. 

Response - On September 2, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 10). Respondents argue: (1) Ground 1 is a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 

claim not cognizable on habeas review under the Stone doctrine (Answer, Doc. 10 at 40, 

et seq.); (2) the privacy claim in Ground 1 was procedurally barred on an independent 

and adequate state ground (id. at 41, et seq.); (3) the Franks claim in Ground 1 is without 

merit (id. at 44, et seq.); (4) both the Brady claim and the ineffective assistance claim in 

Ground 2 were procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds (id. at 51, 

et seq.); (5) ineffectiveness of appellate or PCR counsel is not cause to excuse the 

procedural bar of the ineffectiveness claim in Ground 2 (id. at 52 et seq.); (6) Ground 3 

was either procedurally defaulted because not fairly presented as a federal claim, or 

procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground (id. at 58, et seq.); (7) 

ineffectiveness of appellate or PCR counsel is not cause to excuse the procedural bar of 

the ineffectiveness claim in Ground 3 (id. at 59 et seq.); (8) the ineffective assistance 

claims in Grounds 4(a) (advice regarding plea), 4(d) (testimonial objections), and 4(g) 

(appeal on motion in limine) are procedurally defaulted, and are not “substantial” under 

Martinez (id. at 68 et seq.); (9) the ineffective assistance claim in Ground 4(b) (failure to 

present a defense) is without merit (id. at 69, et seq.); (10) the ineffective assistance 

claim in Ground 4(c) (discovery) is without merit (id. at 71, et seq.); (11) the ineffective 

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assistance claim in Ground 4(e) (serious drug offender allegation) is without merit (id. at 

72, et seq.); and (12) the ineffective assistance claim in Ground 4(f) (privacy claim) is 

without merit (id. at 74, et seq.).

Reply - On November 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14). Petitioner 

argues: (1) he fairly presented his claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel (id. at 

2, et seq.); (2) and he had a constitutional right to effective PCR counsel (id. at 5, et 

seq.); (3) the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel excuses his procedural defaults (id. at 11, et 

seq.); (4) 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) does not prevent relying on ineffectiveness of PCR counsel 

to excuse the procedural default of Petitioner’s claims (id. at 14 et seq.); (5) Petitioner’s 

failure to raise his ineffective assistance claims by failing to raise them on PCR did not 

result in procedural default (id. at 17, et seq.); (6) Arizona’s waiver bar is an inadequate 

bar because it frustrates the exercise of a federal right (id. at 25, et seq.); (7) Petitioner is 

entitled to a stay to exhaust state remedies (id. at 26, et seq.); (8) PCR counsel’s 

ineffectiveness resulted in Petitioner’s procedural defaults (id. at 35, et seq.); and (9) 

Petitioner’s claims regarding plea negotiations are meritorious (id. at 40, et seq.).

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that most of Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally 

defaulted or were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and 

thus are barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

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650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Here, Petitioner received numerous life sentences. It is true that the Swoopes

decision refers to there being no right of appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court "except in 

capital cases or when a life sentence is imposed." Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009. The 

decision concludes that "except in habeas petitions in life-sentence or capital cases, 

claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them. Id. at 1010. 

In reaching that decision, however, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a habeas 

petitioner whose appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals was denied in 1988, prior to the 

1989 amendments eliminating life-sentences from the exceptions to Arizona Court of 

Appeals jurisdiction. See State v. Swoopes, 155 Ariz. 432, 747 P.2d 593 (App. 1988). 

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit was required to draw on decisions applying the pre-1989 

amendments law. In State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), the Arizona 

Supreme Court considered the review rights of a defendant whose appeal was denied in 

1986. Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 157, 777 P.2d at 220. Although the Sandon court noted the 

adoption of the 1989 amendments in a footnote, they were not applying that law. Id. at 

158 n. 1, 777 P.2d at 221 n.1. 

Similarly, the decision in State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), 

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also relied on in Swoopes, predated the 1989 amendments. Indeed, the only Arizona 

decision relied upon in Swoopes and made after the 1989 amendments was Moreno v. 

Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Moreno did not, however rely upon 

Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 12-120.21 or 13-4031, or specifically discuss the death/life sentence 

limitation. Rather, Moreno focused on the "nature and scope of discretionary review by 

petition for review," Moreno, 192 Ariz. at 134, 962 P.2d at 133, and was concerned with 

whether such discretionary review was an "appeal" within the meaning of the exceptions 

to Arizona's timeliness bar for claims not presented on "appeal" for good cause. 

Moreover, the import of Sandon was the Arizona Supreme Court's apparent desire 

to stop the flood of "large numbers of prisoner petitions seeking to exhaust state 

remedies." Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 157, 777 P.2d at 220. The Sandon court concluded 

that "‘[o]nce the defendant has been given the appeal to which he has a right, state 

remedies have been exhausted." Id. at 158, 777 P.2d at 221, quoting Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 

at 585, 684 P.2d at 157. Thus, their recitation of the death/life sentence limitation is not 

properly read as the limit of their holding, but as a reiteration of the pre-1989 holding of 

Shattuck. Thus Sandon may only be reasonably read as an attempt by the Arizona 

Supreme Court to remove their discretionary review from the cycle of review required 

for exhaustion of state remedies. While a given respondent may desire to require its 

Arizona prisoner to file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, it is not 

the respondents' desire, however, but that of the Arizona court that is controlling. 

Finally, Swoopes itself did not hinge on any reading of Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 12-

120.21 or 13-4031 themselves, but upon the question "whether Arizona has identified 

discretionary Supreme Court review ‘as outside the standard review process and has 

plainly said that it need not be sought for purpose of exhaustion.' " Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 

1010, quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 849 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1735 (1999). 

The only basis for identifying that discretionary review as being tied to death/life 

sentences was the language of Shattuck and Sandon, and their reliance upon the then 

applicable pre-1989 versions of Ariz.Rev.Stat. § § 12-120.21 and 13-4031. 

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Thus, until this issue is resolved by the Ninth Circuit, the Arizona District Courts 

are faced with either applying the exact language of Swoopes, or applying the principle 

of Swoopes to the facts as they exist in this case. The latter holds truer to the function of 

a trial court in attempting to apply appellate court precedent. 

Using the techniques developed at common law, a court confronted 

with apparently controlling authority must parse the precedent in 

light of the facts presented and the rule announced. Insofar as there 

may be factual differences between the current case and the earlier 

one, the court must determine whether those differences are material 

to the application of the rule or allow the precedent to be 

distinguished on a principled basis. 

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In O'Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that " ‘the creation of a discretionary 

review system does not, without more, make review' in a state supreme court 

‘unavailable.'" Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009, quoting O'Sullivan, 119 S.Ct. at 1734. The 

reasoning of Swoopes is based upon the determination that the Arizona Supreme Court 

has instructed that discretionary review by that court is not part of the standard review 

process in Arizona and that it need not be sought for the purposes of exhaustion, and the 

Ninth Circuit's conclusion that this instruction is the something "more" referred to in 

O'Sullivan. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. 

Under the version of Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-120.21 applicable to Petitioner, review 

by the Arizona Supreme Court is discretionary. Thus, that review is "unavailable" 

within the meaning of Swoopes and O'Sullivan, and utilization of that review is not 

necessary for Petitioner to exhaust his state remedies, despite his life sentence. See 

Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925 (D. Ariz. 2007) (reaching same conclusion). 

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

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Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

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involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Mode of Presentation - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a 

claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar 

document) that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find 

material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 32 (2004). The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, 

constitutional issue before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his 

appellate briefing." Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in 

appendix attached to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

10 at 19, n. 17.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

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available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

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Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

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evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

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petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Inadequacy of State Waiver Bar Applied to Ineffective Assistance Claims

Here, Petitioner argues that Arizona’s waiver rules are inadequate to bar federal 

habeas review, citing Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F .3d 523, 531, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 

(2001), because they frustrate the exercise of the federal rights to effective assistance of 

PCR counsel with regard to the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

(Reply, Doc. 14 at 25-26.) 

In Hoffman, the Ninth Circuit observed: “The unique difficulties involved in 

arguing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have led federal habeas courts to find 

‘inadequate’ a state procedural bar that denies a petitioner ‘any meaningful review of his 

ineffective assistance claim.’” Id. at 531 (quoting Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 

1364 (10th Cir.1994)). Those concerns arise in situations such as where the claim was 

required to be raised on direct appeal, and there was no provision for independent 

appellate counsel and appellate claims were limited to the existing record. See e.g. 

Brecheen, supra. The concerns have also arisen where a state rule required challenges to 

the grand jury composition be raised before an indictment was returned, and the 

defendant had no notice of the proceedings or right to counsel. See Reece v. Georgia, 

350 U.S. 85, 89 (1955).

In Hoffman, the frustrating state rule was one which required all claims in death 

penalty cases to be raised within 42 days of entry of judgment in a single petition for 

review, and extended to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, even if trial 

counsel continued to represent the defendant on review. 236 F.3d at 532, et seq.

Petitioner’s complaint is based upon his reference to Respondents arguments that 

any claims of ineffective assistance not previously raised are now waived under Arizona 

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law, and thus procedurally defaulted. Petitioner argues that if the ineffectiveness of PCR 

counsel is not a basis to avoid the procedural default, then the waiver bar frustrates the 

presentation of his ineffective assistance claims and thus is inadequate to bar habeas 

review.

However, Petitioner mistakenly focuses on his reading that Respondents argue

that his claims of ineffective assistance were waived by failure to present them on direct 

appeal, referencing the Answer at 51:26-27 and 52:5-8. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 25.) The 

referenced portions do not identify the specific proceeding in which Respondents 

contend that the ineffective assistance claim in Ground 2 being discussed was 

procedurally defaulted. But the plain import of the remainder of the Answer is that the 

procedural default occurred in the PCR proceeding, not on direct appeal. Requiring 

Petitioner to present his ineffective assistance claims in his PCR proceeding did not 

frustrate his ability to seek review. Petitioner had substantial time to develop a record on 

any such claims, and had appointed counsel available to him to research and argue those 

claims. Thus, the concerns it addressed in Hoffman are not present.

Petitioner does go on to argue that his PCR counsel was ineffective, and that 

would constitute cause to excuse his procedural default. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 25.) But that 

confuses the cause and prejudice exception to the procedural default rule with the 

adequacy of the state rule. Perhaps, if Arizona denied Petitioner PCR counsel to raise 

his claims of ineffective assistance, then its waiver rule would frustrate review of his 

federal rights and thus not bar habeas review. But Petitioner was provided PCR counsel. 

Thus, his dispute is not with the adequacy of Arizona’s procedural rules, but with the 

adequacy of his PCR counsel. That issue relates to cause and prejudice, not to the 

adequacy of the state procedural bar. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Respondents argue that: (1) Grounds 1(a), 2(a), and 2(b) were procedurally barred 

on independent and adequate state grounds; (2) that Grounds 4(a), 4(d) and 4(g) were not 

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fairly presented and are now procedurally defaulted; and (3) that Grounds 3(a) and 3(b) 

were either procedurally barred or were not fairly presented and are now procedurally 

defaulted. (Respondents address Grounds 1(b) 4(b), 4(c), 4(e), and 4(f) only on the 

merits.)

a) Ground 1(a) (Privacy)

In Ground 1(a) of his Petition, Petitioner argues that the placement of the 

surveillance cameras at the storage facility was a violation of his privacy rights. 

Petitioner argues this claim was raised on direct appeal and in his first PCR petition. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Respondents agree the privacy claim in Ground 1 was presented 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals on PCR review, but argue it was procedurally barred on 

an independent and adequate state ground. (Answer, Doc. 10, at 41, et seq.)

This claim was not presented on direct appeal. Although Petitioner raised his 

claim in Ground 1(b) (regarding the Franks issue) in his first issue on direct appeal 

(Exhibit VV, Opening Brief at 20, et seq.), he did not raise the privacy issue.

The claim was raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals in section 3(B) of 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review in his PCR proceeding. (Exhibit GGG, PFR at 6.) 

However, the Arizona Court of Appeals disposed of this claim by finding it waived 

under Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) “because Jones could have raised them on direct 

appeal.” (Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 3.) 

Other than his argument regarding the frustration of review of federal rights 

disposed of hereinabove, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that Rule 32.2(a) 

is not an independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal habeas review 

of claims a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. The federal courts 

have routinely held that it is. “Arizona's waiver rules are independent and adequate bases 

for denying relief.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

710 (2014). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 861 (2002) (Arizona’s waiver rule 

is independent of federal law); and Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)

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(adequate because consistently and regularly applied). Accordingly, the undersigned 

concludes that Ground 1(a) was procedurally barred on an independent and adequate 

state ground.

b) Ground 2(a) (Brady Claim)

In Ground 2(a), Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to disclose Officer 

Edwards as a trial witness, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), 

and alleges that, although appellate counsel failed to present the claim on direct appeal, 

he presented this issue in his PCR proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) Respondents 

concede that the claim was raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner’s PCR 

proceeding, but assert that (like Ground 1(a)), it was procedurally barred on independent 

and adequate state grounds (Answer, Doc. 10 at 51, et seq.).

Indeed, this claim was presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in Claim 3(C) in 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review (Exhibit GGG at 7, et seq.). As with Ground 1(a), 

however, the Arizona Court of Appeals disposed of this claim by finding it waived under 

Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) “because Jones could have raised them on direct appeal.” 

(Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 3.) ). Accordingly, the undersigned concludes 

that Ground 2(a) was procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground.

c) Ground 2(b) (Ineffectiveness re Brady Claim)

In Ground 2(b), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to Officer Edwards’ testimony. Again, he asserts this claim was raised in his PCR 

proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) Respondents argue that although Petitioner asserted 

ineffective assistance claims regarding counsel’s cross-examination of Edwards, he 

presented no claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Brady objection, and 

that Petitioner has now procedurally defaulted on this claim. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 51, et 

seq.)

As discussed above, Petitioner did raise the underlying Brady claim in his PCR 

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petition for review (although it was procedurally barred). “While [the ineffective 

assistance and underlying constitutional claim are] admittedly related, they are distinct 

claims with separate elements of proof, and each claim should have been separately and 

specifically presented to the state courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

In Claim IV of his PCR petition, Petitioner asserted a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Exhibit CCC at 16, et seq.) However, the only reference to 

Officer Edwards was Petitioner’s allegation that counsel “was not adequately prepared to 

cross-examine” him. (Id. at 20.) In his Petition for Review, he again argued ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, but he did not assert any facts in 

support of the claim. (Exhibit GGG, Pet. Rev. at 9-10.) He did, however, append his 

PCR petition. (Id. at Exhibit D, PCR Pet.) The Arizona Court of Appeals apparently 

looked through to the appended PCR petition to identify a series of claims. However, 

the Court made no reference to Officer Edwards, and did not actually consider a claim 

that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Edwards’ testimony under Brady. 

(Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14.) Ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but 

must each be specifically argued. See Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th 

Cir. 1982) (presentation of “additional facts of attorney incompetence” transformed 

claim into one not presented to state court); and Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 

(9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that presentation of any claim of ineffectiveness 

results in fair presentation of all claims of ineffective assistance). Cf. Hemmerle v. 

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing in the course of determining 

whether to apply “gap tolling” to successive state petitions purported on the same claims 

that “ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent”). 

Thus, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not fairly present to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals his claim in Ground 2(b), and the claim was not actually considered by 

that court. Therefore, this claim was not properly exhausted.

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For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the undersigned also concludes that 

Petitioner has now procedurally defaulted on this claim 

d) Ground 3(a) (Prejudicial Evidence on Dismissed Count)

In Ground 3(a), Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated when 

unfairly prejudicial other act evidence regarding the dismissed Count 1 (relating to the 

alleged sale of marijuana on January 14, 2008) was admitted. Petitioner alleges this 

claim was presented in his PCR proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) Respondents argue 

that this claim was either procedurally defaulted because not fairly presented as a federal 

claim, or procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground (id. at 58, et 

seq.).

In Claim III of his pro per PCR petition, Petitioner argued that trial counsel had 

filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence on the January 14, 2008 conduct, and 

despite dismissing the count, the trial court failed to rule on the motion. (Exhibit CCC at 

13, et seq.) While Petitioner raised the claim primarily under Arizona Rule of Evidence 

403, and related state authorities, he also argued that allowing the admission to pass 

without correction was a “violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Id. at 15.) He also 

cited U.S. v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) and U.S. v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 

247 (4th Cir. 2007). However, these two cases only relate to applying standards from 

finding prejudice in procedural challenges in federal prosecutions. Nonetheless, the 

undersigned finds that Petitioner’s description of the unfairly prejudicial nature of the 

evidence coupled with his reference to the Fourteenth Amendment was sufficient to 

fairly present a constitutional claim of unfair prejudice from other acts evidence.

The PCR court disposed of this claim, along with his other non-ineffectiveness 

claims, by concluding that they were precluded because “the Defendant raised, or could 

have raised, the exact issues on appeal.” (Exhibit FFF, M.E. 12/19/12 at 2.) 

Petitioner did not repeat this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Respondents 

contend that the Arizona Court of Appeals nonetheless disposed of the claim as waived 

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by failure to raise it on direct appeal. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 59.) However, the cited 

paragraph 3 in the appellate court’s decision did not identify the claim in Ground 3(a) 

(and it was not raised to them by Petitioner). In a footnote, the appellate court did 

reference the related argument, and concluded that it too was waived by failure to raise it 

on direct appeal. (Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 3 n. 3.) However, in so doing 

the appellate court did not reference the due process claim, but instead defined the claim 

as asserting “the trial court erred by failing to rule on his motion(s) in limine.” (Id.) 

Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not rule on the due process argument raised in 

Ground 3(a), but only the state law argument regarding the trial court’s obligation to rule 

on the motion in limine.

Looking only to Petitioner’s obligation to fairly present his claims to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, the undersigned would find the claim was not fairly presented and thus 

is now unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

However, Respondents suggest that this Court should ignore the failure to present 

the claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals and instead rely upon the PCR court’s 

pronouncement that the claim was precluded.2 However, the PCR court’s 

pronouncement was ambiguous on the nature of the bar invoked, concluding without 

designation that the claims were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal. Of 

course, if the claim was raised on direct appeal then Petitioner exhausted his state 

remedies.

A finding of preclusion, i.e. that the claims have been raised before, “does not 

provide a basis for federal courts to apply a procedural bar.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 

1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996). Where an Arizona Court asserts both conditions apply to a 

group of claims without delineating which applied to which, it “did not clearly base its 

 

2

The Arizona courts often reference both its waiver bar (e.g. that the claims were not 

raised earlier, when they could have been) and its preclusion bar (i.e. that the claims 

actually were raised earlier and adjudicated on the merits) as resulting in the claims 

being “precluded”. This likely results from the pronouncement in Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) that with both types, the “defendant shall be precluded from 

relief under this rule.”

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decision on independent and adequate state law grounds.” Id. See also Calderon v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of California (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 

1996); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774-75 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2002) (“By failing to 

specify which claims were barred for which reasons, the Nevada Supreme Court ‘did not 

clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.’”); and Koerner 

v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2003). To avoid habeas review, a state 

court decision must “clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state 

ground.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991).

It might be argued that this Court should look beyond the pronouncement of the 

PCR court, to the procedural history, and conclude that the true decision was one that the 

claim had not been raised, was thereby waived, and thus procedurally barred on that 

ground. However, in Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009), the Court was faced with a state 

appellate decision which disposed of a federal claim on the mistaken basis that it had 

been previously presented. The record reflected that the claim had clearly not been 

presented or passed on in any prior proceeding. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held: 

“When a state court declines to review the merits of a petitioner's claim on the ground 

that it has done so already, it creates no bar to federal habeas review...When a state court 

refuses to re-adjudicate a claim on the ground that it has been previously determined, the 

court's decision does not indicate that the claim has been procedurally defaulted.” 556 

U.S. at 466-67. The Cone Court further rejected the state’s request to treat the rejection 

as a procedural bar based upon the state’s waiver rule. “Although we have an 

independent duty to scrutinize the application of state rules that bar our review of federal 

claims, we have no concomitant duty to apply state procedural bars where state courts 

have themselves declined to do so. The Tennessee courts did not hold that Cone waived 

his Brady claim, and we will not second-guess their judgment.” 556 U.S. at 468-69.

It might be argued that this Court should nonetheless rely upon the dissent in 

Koerner, wherein Judge Beezer argued that the reference to an ”ambiguous” order 

“should be understood in light of the state court opinion and the record in that case, 

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rather than looking solely to the face of the state court’s opinion.” 328 F.3d 1039, 1056 

(Beezer, J. dissenting). However, Judge Beezer’s dissent plainly acknowledged the 

import of the majority decision in Koerner:

Today's opinion holds that a federal court may only look to the state 

court opinion at issue in determining whether a state court opinion 

relies on a procedural default. If a state court opinion is ambiguous 

on its face, today's opinion makes it impossible to find a procedural 

default because any such state court opinion does not “clearly and 

expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.” 

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir.2002) (citation 

omitted).

Koerner, 328 F.3d at 1056 (Beezer, J. dissenting). Thus the portion of Judge Beezer’s 

dissent on which such an argument would rely was not a statement of what the law in 

the Ninth Circuit is, but Judge Beezer’s assertion of what it ought to be. But see McElyea 

v. Schriro, 2009 WL 222375, CV-06-0884-PHX-SMM(HCE) (D. Ariz. 2009) (looking 

beyond state court opinion, based on pre-Koerner 9th Circuit cases doing so, citing 

Koerner, but without noting Beezer’s dissent). Respondents point to no authority 

permitting this Court to reject Judge Beezer’s analysis of the majority’s holding in 

Koerner, nor the effect of that holding.

Here, the decision of the PCR court is ambiguous on its face, proposing two 

mutually exclusive reasons for disposing of the claim. According to Koerner, this Court 

is not free to look beyond that ambiguity and attempt to ascertain the true basis for 

disposing of the claim.

Accordingly, having found that the claim was fairly presented only to the PCR 

court (and acted upon only by the PCR court), and that the PCR court ambiguously ruled 

that it was previously presented on direct appeal, this Court must treat it as having been 

presented, and thus conclude that Petitioner exhausted his state remedies on this claim.

e) Ground 3(b) (Ineffectiveness re Evidence on Dismissed Count)

In his Ground 3(b), Petitioner argues that both trial and appellate counsel were

ineffective for failing to object to the evidence on the dismissed count as being unfairly 

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prejudicial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) The Court’s service order identified only a claim 

that related to the effectiveness of trial counsel. (See Service Order 6/10/15, Doc. 3 at 3.) 

However, the plain language of the Petition is that “counsel was ineffective ....[for] 

failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) He further references 

the purported decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals on PCR review that “Petitioner 

fail to raise this claim in his direct appeal.” (Id.) Because it does not affect the outcome, 

the undersigned will treat this claim as relating to both the ineffectiveness of trial counsel 

and the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel.

Respondents do not separately address this claim as part of Ground 3. Instead, 

they consider Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in 

failing to raise the claim only as a basis for cause to excuse the purported procedural 

default or procedural bar of Ground 3(a). (Answer, Doc. 10 at 59.) 

Petitioner asserts he raised Ground 3 in his PCR proceeding. As noted with 

regard to Ground 2(b) (ineffectiveness re Bradyclaim), Petitioner’s Petition for Review 

did not provide any facts to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit GGG, Pet. Rev. at 

9-10.) He did, however, append his PCR petition. (Id. at Exhibit D, PCR Pet.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals apparently looked through to the appended PCR petition to 

identify a series of claims. However, the Court made no reference to a failure by trial or 

appellate counsel with regard to the evidence on the dismissed count. (Exhibit HHH, 

Mem. Dec. 9/4/14.) 

Moreover, Petitioner’s PCR petition did not assert that trial counsel was 

ineffective with regard to evidence on the dismissed count. (Exhibit CCC, PCR Pet. at 

16, et seq.) 

Petitioner did argue that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to “seek 

review of the controlling authority of law to the prejudicial evidence to alleged trials’ 

error.” (Id. at 23.) The only prejudicial evidence argued in the PCR petition related to 

the evidence on the dismissed count. Thus, liberally construed, this claim was fairly 

presented to the PCR court in Petitioner’s PCR petition. In Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 

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403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit concluded that arguments set 

out in an appendix attached to a petition and incorporated by reference were fairly 

presented. Here, Petitioner generally asserted his claims of ineffectiveness of trial and

PCR counsel, asserted “in [his] Rule 32 P.C.R. Petition Appendix Exhibit ‘D’, the 

appellant presented several documents and facts,” and argued that he was improperly 

denied a hearing on these colorable claims by the PCR court. (Exhibit GGG, Pet. Rev. at 

9-10.) The fact that the Arizona Court of Appeals ultimately looked through to this 

attachment to identify the nature of Petitioner’s claims indicates that Petitioner’s 

attachment of his PCR Petition was a fair manner of presenting his claims of ineffective 

assistance. Therefore, Petitioner fairly presented this claim regarding appellate counsel.

Thus, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not fairly present to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals his claim in Ground 3(b) regarding trial counsel, but did fairly present 

a claim regarding appellate counsel. 

For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the undersigned also concludes that 

Petitioner has now procedurally defaulted on the unexhausted portion of this claim

related to trial counsel.

f) Ground 4(a) (Ineffectiveness re Plea Agreement)

In Ground 4(a), Petitioner argues that in August through November, 2009, trial 

counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner that he was negotiating a plea agreement, 

and that the case would not go to trial. Petitioner asserts that this claim was raised in his 

PCR proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) Respondents argue this claim was not fairly 

presented to either the PCR court or the Arizona Court of Appeals, and is now 

procedurally defaulted, and is not “substantial” under Martinez. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 68 

et seq.)

Because Petitioner did not allege any facts in support of his ineffective assistance 

claim in his PCR Petition for Review, any fair presentation would have to come from the 

attachment of his pro per PCR petition to that Petition for Review. Petitioner did raise 

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Ground 4(a) in his PCR petition. At best, Petitioner argued that there was a breakdown 

in communications with trial counsel, and trial counsel failed to inform Petitioner of the 

SDO allegations resulting in the rejection of the plea agreement. (Exhibit CCC, PCR 

Pet. at 21-22.) That claim was addressed by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit 

HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 9.) But Petitioner did not argue to the state courts that he

was misinformed about whether a plea agreement was being negotiated. 

Accordingly, Petitioner failed to fairly present his claim in Ground 4(a), the claim 

was not properly exhausted, and is now procedurally defaulted.

g) Ground 4(d) (Ineffectiveness re Testimonial Objections)

In Ground 4(d), Petitioner argues that trial counsel “failed to object to critical 

testimony that prejudice[d] the entire trial.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) Respondents argue 

that the claim is devoid of particulars, and that even if liberally construed to relate to the 

detective’s testimony on the dismissed count, the claim is barred because not fairly 

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Respondents further argue the claim is not 

“substantial” under Martinez. (Answer, Doc. 10 at at 68 et seq.) 

The undersigned agrees. Even assuming that the claim (which appears conclusory 

and devoid of any specific allegations, e.g. the witness referred to, the basis for any 

objections) is sufficiently developed to warrant habeas review, Petitioner presented no 

similar expansive claim in his PCR petition. Moreover, if the claim is to be liberally 

construed as referring to the dispute over testimony regarding the dismissed count, it is a 

duplicate of the portion of Ground 3(b) relating to trial counsel, and the undersigned has 

concluded hereinabove that that claim was procedurally defaulted.

Accordingly, whether read as a generic claim or read as referring to the dismissed 

count testimony, this claim was not fairly presented to the state courts, was not properly 

exhausted, and is now procedurally defaulted.

/ /

/ /

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h) Ground 4(g) (Ineffectiveness re Appeal on Motion in Limine)

In Ground 4(d), Petitioner argues that appellate counsel failed to adequately argue 

the improper failure to rule on the motion in limine, especially after the trial court stated

that the evidence was irrelevant and dismissed the count. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that while the underlying claim was presented to the state courts, this 

claim of ineffectiveness was not raised, and the claim is now procedurally defaulted, and 

is not “substantial” under Martinez. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 69 et seq.)

Again, looking through Petitioner’s PCR Petition for Review to his pro per PCR 

petition, Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim. Petitioner’s claims raised with 

regard to appellate counsel were limited to counsel’s failure to adequately pursue the 

privacy argument, and failure to object to the introduction of the evidence on the 

dismissed count. (Exhibit CCC, PCR Pet. at 22-23.) The latter is the subject of the 

appellate counsel portion of Ground 3(b) (which the undersigned finds properly 

exhausted), and thus any portion of Ground 4(g) read to assert the same claim would be 

duplicative. Petitioner did not, however, argue that appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise a claimed based simply on the trial court’s failure to rule on the motion in 

limine.

According, this claim was not fairly presented, thus not properly exhausted, and is 

now procedurally defaulted.

i) Summary Re Exhaustion

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner properly 

exhausted his remedies as to: (1) Ground 3(a) (prejudicial evidence re dismissed count); 

and (2) the portion of Ground 3(b) (ineffectiveness re prejudicial evidence on dismissed 

count) which relates to appellate counsel. Moreover, Respondents have asserted no 

exhaustion defense as to Grounds 1(b), 4(b) (ineffectiveness re failure to present a 

defense), 4(c) (ineffectiveness re discovery), 4(e) (ineffectiveness re SDO allegation), 

and 4(f) (ineffectiveness re privacy). Accordingly, these claims must be addressed on 

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their merits.

Also based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted on: (1) Ground 2(b) (ineffectiveness re Brady claim); (2) the 

portion of Ground 3(b) (ineffectiveness re prejudicial evidence on dismissed count) 

which relates to trial counsel; (3) Ground 4(a) (ineffectiveness re plea agreement); (4) 

Ground 4(d) (ineffectiveness re testimonial objections); and (5) Ground 4(g) 

(ineffectiveness re appeal on motion in limine). 

Finally, based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner was 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds from asserting: (1) 

Ground 1(a) (privacy); and (2) Ground 2(a) (Brady claim). 

5. Stay to Exhaust

Petitioner argues that he has presented a “mixed” petition and is entitled to a stay 

to exhaust state remedies under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). (Reply, Doc. 14.

at 27, et seq.) In Rhines, the Court addressed the availability of a stay to a Petitioner 

with a petition asserting both exhausted and unexhausted claims, to permit the Petitioner 

to return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted remedies. Rhines has no application 

here, however, because Petitioner has not presented a “mixed” petition with unexhausted 

state remedies, but one in which all of his state remedies are exhausted, albeit some of 

them “technically exhausted” by procedural default.

In habeas, state-court remedies are described as having been 

“exhausted” when they are no longer available, regardless of the 

reason for their unavailability. Thus, if state-court remedies are no 

longer available because the prisoner failed to comply with the 

deadline for seeking state-court review or for taking an appeal, those 

remedies are technically exhausted, but exhaustion in this sense 

does not automatically entitle the habeas petitioner to litigate his or 

her claims in federal court. Instead, if the petitioner procedurally 

defaulted those claims, the prisoner generally is barred from 

asserting those claims in a federal habeas proceeding.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006) (citations omitted). 

Because all of Petitioner’s claims which were not properly exhausted (or 

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procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds) are now plainly 

procedurally defaulted under Arizona state law, there is no purpose to be served by 

staying consideration of the petition.

6. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural 

defaults based on the ineffective assistance of appellate and PCR counsel.

(a) Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel Can Establish Cause

Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, to meet the “cause” requirement, the ineffective 

assistance of counsel must amount to an independent constitutional violation. Id. 

Moreover, “[t]o constitute cause for procedural default of a federal habeas claim, the 

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constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must first have been presented to 

the state courts as an independent claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 

2003). Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel as cause, a failure to exhaust state remedies on that claim of 

ineffectiveness will preclude relying upon it as cause.

(b) Ineffectiveness of PCR Counsel Ordinarily Not Cause

Ordinarily, to meet the “cause” requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel 

must amount to an independent constitutional violation. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 

932, (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists, 

ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. 

"Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default 

only if the petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in the proceeding in which the 

default occurred....The fact that counsel is appointed by the state court does not change 

the result, because counsel is not constitutionally required." Smith v. State of Idaho, 392 

F.3d 350, 357 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original, citations omitted). If there is no 

federal constitutional right to counsel, a petitioner "cannot establish cause because of the 

state trial court’s failure to appoint him counsel, even if such failure was erroneous as a 

matter of state law." Smith, 392 F.3d at 357 . In Patrick Poland v. Stewart, 169 F. 3d 

573 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause there is no right to an attorney 

in state post-conviction proceedings, there cannot be constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Id. at 588 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)). 

Petitioner nonetheless contends that he had a federal constitutional right to 

effective assistance of PCR counsel, citing Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005). 

(Reply, Doc. 14 at 5, et seq.) However, Halbert provides for no such right. 

In Halbert, the Court observed that Michigan had required that defendants 

convicted by plea agreement were required to obtain leave from the court of appeals to 

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file an appeal, and the Michigan Supreme Court had concluded that because the appeal 

was thus discretionary, there was no federal right to counsel in seeking leave to appeal. 

The Supreme Court reversed, applying the decision in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 

353 (1963) that in first appeals as of right, States must appoint counsel to represent 

indigent defendants. Here, Petitioner had appointed counsel on direct appeal. It is true 

that Petitioner was required to bring his claims of ineffective assistance on PCR review. 

But the Supreme Court has since Halbert expressly declined to extend a constitutional 

right to counsel to such PCR counsel. 

Instead, in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), discussed hereinafter, the 

Supreme Court noted the longstanding observation in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722 (1991) that there might be a Constitutional right to counsel in initial-review 

collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise claims of ineffective 

assistance. The Martinez Court concluded “[t]his is not the case, however, to resolve 

whether that exception exists as a constitutional matter.” 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Thus, at 

least as of Martinez, the Court still was declining to find a constitutional right to PCR 

counsel, even when the PCR proceeding amounted to the only opportunity for review of 

claims of ineffective assistance. In essence, then, Martinez simply applied the logic of 

Halbert to the unique context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which are 

only assertable in many states on collateral review. But neither Halbert nor Martinez

extended the right to counsel beyond such initial review proceedings, and Martinez

expressly declined to extend a constitutional right to counsel in PCR proceedings, even 

in the context of them being the first opportunity to present ineffective assistance claims. 

Instead, the Court adopted an exception to its jurisprudence on cause and prejudice.

Petitioner points to no other authority to support his contention that a 

constitutional right to PCR counsel exists, and the Ninth Circuit has plainly held it does 

not. Thus, any showing of cause of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel must be 

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limited to the exceptions under Maples and Martinez discussed hereinafter.3

Finally, Petitioner correctly argues that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) poses no bar to him 

relying on the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to excuse his procedural defaults. 

(Reply, Doc. 14 at 14 et seq.) The Supreme Court specifically held so in Martinez. “In 

short, while § 2254(i) precludes Martinez from relying on the ineffectiveness of his 

postconviction attorney as a ‘ground for relief,’ it does not stop Martinez from using it to 

establish ‘cause.’” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. 

(c) Exception for Abandonment without Notice

The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the general rule that 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel is not cause.

The first exception was recognized in Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), 

where the Supreme Court held that cause could be shown when PCR counsel was not 

merely negligent (and under the law of agency that negligence being chargeable to the 

petitioner) but had abandoned the representation without notice to the petitioner, 

resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

Here, however, Petitioner does not suggest that counsel abandoned the 

representation without notice, merely that counsel was deficient in not bringing claims 

Petitioner asserts are meritorious. Indeed, counsel filed the appropriate notice to the 

Court when he was unable to find an issue of review. Thus, any such deficiency was not 

external to the defense, and is chargeable to Petitioner. 

(d) Exception for Claims re Ineffectiveness of Trial & Appellate Counsel

The second exception to the general rule that ineffectiveness of PCR counsel 

 

3

There is some inherent logic to extending Martinez beyond claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel to find a right to PCR counsel for pleading defendants for whom 

post-conviction review is their only form of review, e.g. in states like Arizona that deny 

direct appeal to pleading defendants. However, Petitioner was not a pleading defendant, 

and had the benefit of direct appeal. 

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does not establish cause concerns the failure of PCR counsel to bring claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.4

In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Court recognized that because 

courts increasingly reserve review of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to 

post-conviction relief proceedings, the ineffectiveness of counsel in such PCR 

proceedings could effectively defeat any review of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Accordingly, the Court recognized a narrow exception to the Court’s ruling in Coleman, 

supra, that the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel cannot provide cause. Arizona, the state 

at issue in Martinez, is just such a state, and accordingly ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel can establish cause to excuse a procedural default of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel.

However, the Martinez court made clear that the limited exception it was creating 

for ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as “cause” did not extend outside the initial PCR 

proceeding.

The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other 

kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review 

collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, 

and petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts. It 

does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first 

occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral 

proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320. 

Further, Martinez only applies to the important “right to the effective assistance of 

trial counsel.” 132 S.Ct. at 1320. In Ha Van Nguyen, 736 F.3d 1287, 1295 (9th Cir. 

2013), the Ninth Circuit extended Martinez to PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing 

to bring claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Thus, any failure of PCR 

 

4

 The Ninth Circuit has concluded that an ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim 

used to establish cause for a procedural default of a claim for ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel need not be exhausted itself. Dickens v. Ryan, Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

1302, 1322 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2014) (“where Martinez applies, there seems to be no 

requirement that the claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as cause for an 

ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claim be presented to the state courts”).

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counsel to assert any other type of claim is not sufficient to establish cause.

For Petitioner to rely upon Martinez, Petitioner must “demonstrat[e] two things: 

(1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been 

raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318).

In many instances the two Martinez prongs are so intertwined that they will be 

subsumed into one analysis focused on one or the other prongs, i.e. trial counsel’s 

performance or PCR counsel’s performance. There remains, however, a clear distinction 

between the prongs. For example, there are gradations of the potential for success, and 

ultimate effect, of the foregone tactic. Some underlying claims will be so attractive that 

trial counsel was clearly ineffective, and thus (barring inability to discover, or other 

impediments), PCR counsel was clearly ineffective in not raising it. Others may be so 

clearly meritless that both trial and PCR counsel were obviously not ineffective in 

avoiding the claim. And there may be still others, in the middle ground, that are 

substantial enough that (while perhaps not guaranteed of success) they require a 

determination whether PCR counsel had other tactical reasons to raise or not raise the 

claim, i.e. the availability or absence of other, more attractive, claims, or was otherwise 

acting reasonably in foregoing the claim.

Finally, in evaluating the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel (and as part thereof, the 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel), this habeas Court is not constrained by the limits on 

grants of habeas relief in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, i.e. unreasonable factual determinations, 

state court decisions contrary to or unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, etc. 

Cf. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320 (finding limits on habeas relief for ineffectiveness of 

PCR counsel not applicable to cause and prejudice determination).

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(e) Standard for Ineffectiveness 

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

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omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 

679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

(f) Application of Martinez to Petitioner

As discussed hereinabove, the undersigned has concluded that Petitioner 

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on: (1) Ground 2(b) (ineffectiveness re Brady

claim); (2) the portion of Ground 3(b) (ineffectiveness re prejudicial evidence on 

dismissed count) which relates to trial counsel; (3) Ground 4(a) (ineffectiveness re plea 

agreement); (4) Ground 4(d) (ineffectiveness re testimonial objections); and (5) Ground 

4(g) (ineffectiveness re appeal on motion in limine). The undersigned has also 

concluded that Petitioner was procedurally barred on independent and adequate state 

grounds from asserting: (1) Ground 1(a) (privacy); and (2) Ground 2(a) (Brady claim). 

The assertions of cause will be addressed with regard to each of these claims.

(1) Ground 1(a) (privacy)

In Ground 1(a) of his Petition, Petitioner argues that the placement of the 

surveillance cameras at the storage facility was a violation of his privacy rights. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Because this Ground does not assert a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial or appellate counsel, Martinez has no application. See Martinez, 132 

S.Ct. at 1320; Ha Van Nguyen, 736 F.3d at 1295.

Petitioner argues that his failure to exhaust the claim should be excused because 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim. Petitioner fairly presented 

his claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel with regard to this claim by 

incorporating in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals his pro per 

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PCR petition in which he complained that appellate counsel had failed to seek review 

“regarding his privacy interest argument.” (Exhibit CCC, PCR Pet. at 23.) The Arizona 

Court of Appeals addressed the claim on its merits, concluding that Petitioner failed to 

show that this claim was stronger than others raised on appeal. (Exhibit HHH, Mem. 

Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 11.) 

Respondents now argue that Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy 

in the hallway of the storage facility. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 41-44.) Respondents 

arguments are persuasive. 

The Fourth Amendment protects people from warrantless searches in places 

where they have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. 

Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J. 

concurring)). “[C]apacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not 

upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the 

protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 

place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). “One has a reasonable expectation 

of privacy if one has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and if the expectation is 

one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” United States v. Nohara, 3 

F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show that he had a legitimate or reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the public hallway of the storage facility. 

In Jones, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy over a friend’s 

apartment, when the defendant “not only had permission to use the apartment of his 

friend, but also had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of 

the search and kept possessions in the apartment.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149. “Except with 

respect to his friend, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and 

could exclude others from it.” Id. In contrast, here Petitioner proffers nothing to show 

that he had exclusive use of the hallway, or a right to exclude others from it, nor even 

that he kept possessions in the hallway. Rather, it appears that such hallway was freely 

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available to any customer or employee of the facility, and Petitioner’s use of it was 

limited to accessing his own storage locker. 

These circumstance are akin to that in Nohara, where the defendant asserted an 

expectation of privacy in the hallway of a high security, high rise apartment building. 

The Ninth Circuit observed the long list of cases finding no reasonable expectation of 

privacy in common hallways and concluded that “any expectation of privacy Nohara 

might have had is not one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Nohara, 3 F.3d at 

1241.

5

 Similarly, here it is unreasonable for Petitioner to expect privacy in the common 

hallway of a commercial storage facility.

Therefore, the undersigned would conclude that Petitioner had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy impacted by the video surveillance, and thus any claim that 

appellate counsel might have made would have been without merit.

Nonetheless, even if some merit could be found to the argument, appellate 

counsel could have made the reasonable tactical determination that the claim was of such 

limited merit that foregoing it was in Petitioner’s best interests. “The law does not 

require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. Counsel also is not 

required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable appraisal of a claim's 

dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim be dropped 

altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations omitted). "In 

many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she foresees little or 

no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely 

recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy." Miller v. Keeney, 

 

5 Respondents rely upon United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977), which 

involved the hallway of a storage facility. There, however, the 10th Circuit relied at least 

in part upon the information that “[w]hen the defendant initially rented the locker he was 

advised by the manager ...that from time to time she allowed the police on the premises 

and permitted them to use their dogs for the purpose of detecting marijuana, and that 

should he store marijuana in his locker, he did so at his own risk.” Id. at 1006. Nothing 

suggests that such a warning was given to Petitioner. Nonetheless, given the nature of a 

common hallway in a storage facility, the undersigned finds such warning unnecessary to 

the conclusion that any subjective expectation of privacy Petitioner might assert was not 

justified.

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882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). In light of the limited merits to this claim, 

appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to raise it.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise his claim in Ground 1(a), and thus fails to establish cause to avoid the 

effect of the procedural bar applied to this claim. 

(2) Ground 2(a) (Brady claim)

In Ground 2(a), Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to disclose Officer 

Edwards as a trial witness, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), 

and alleges that appellate counsel failed to present the claim on direct appeal, but he 

presented this issue in his PCR proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) The undersigned has 

concluded that this claim was procedurally barred on PCR review. 

As with Ground 1(a), because this claim is not one for ineffective assistance of 

trial or appellate counsel, Martinez has no application. 

Petitioner asserts appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present the claim 

on direct appeal, and that such ineffectiveness provides cause to excuse the procedural 

bar. Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot show cause because the underlying claim 

is without merit because: (1) there was no prejudice from the limited testimony of 

Officer Edwards; (2) counsel was otherwise aware of Edwards’ expected testimony; (3) 

the claim is essentially one founded upon state procedural rule; (4) Brady does not 

require disclosures of who will testify; (5) the testimony was not exculpatory; and (6) the 

testimony was not material. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 52-54.) Respondents further argue that 

appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to bring the claim. (Id at 55.) 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a 

defendant’s due process rights are violated when the state fails to disclose to the 

defendant prior to trial “evidence favorable to an accused...where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The prosecution’s duty to disclose favorable evidence is 

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not dependent upon a request from the accused, and even an inadvertent failure to 

disclose may constitute a violation. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 110 

(1976). As the Supreme Court has observed, Brady and its progeny “illustrate the special 

role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.” 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).

The obligation imposed under Brady and related cases “extends not only to 

exculpatory information about the defendant but also to information about witnesses 

which would undermine the government's case..[but] does not give the defendant the 

right to know about information which would help solidify the government's case.” 

United States v. Barker, 988 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Here, Petitioner fails to show that either the fact that Officer Edwards was to 

testify, or the substance of his testimony, were exculpatory. Rather, Petitioner describes 

Edwards’ testimony as “prejudicial to the defense,” “important to establish the case in 

chief,” and “essential to the state.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner’s real complaint is 

that the defense was surprised by the incriminating testimony, and thus unprepared to 

meet it. Brady does not protect against such surprise. “It does not follow from the 

prohibition against concealing evidence favorable to the accused that the prosecution 

must reveal before trial the names of all witnesses who will testify unfavorably.” 

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). 

This claim is without merit, and raising it would have been futile, and counsel was 

not ineffective for filing to do so. See Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445.

Petitioner thus fails to establish cause to avoid the effect of the procedural bar 

applied to this claim. 

(3) Ground 2(b) (ineffectiveness re Brady claim)

In his Ground 2(b), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to Officer Edwards’ testimony based on the state’s failure to list him in their 

discovery. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

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Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot establish ineffectiveness of PCR counsel 

under Martinez with respect to this claim because Petitioner cannot show the objection 

would have been sustained because trial counsel may have been aware of Edwards, that 

exclusion was an unlikely remedy, the absence of any deliberateness on the part of the 

prosecution, and exclusion would not have likely resulted in a different verdict. 

(Answer, Doc. 10 at 55-56.) 

At trial, Edwards testified on direct examination to: his employment with the 

Scottsdale Police Department (Exhibit FF, R.T. 11/16/09 PM at 45-47); that on January 

10, 2008 he responded to a call to Petitioner’s residence, and observed hundreds of shoe 

boxes and a Bentley in the garage (id. at 47-49); the inside of the house was 

unremarkable, and the neighborhood was older, with the one street being redeveloped 

(id. at 49-51); Petitioner reported that he owned or his sister owned Tipps Barbecue, a 

place unknown to the officer (id. at 51-52); and upon leaving, his trainee completed a 

field information card, and Edwards communicated with Detective Dersa about his 

experiences at the house (id. at 52-53). On cross-examination, Edwards denied recalling 

the specifics of the communication with Dersa, confirmed Petitioner’s description of his 

employment at his sister’s barbeque, denied checking all the shoe boxes for shoes, 

reported that Petitioner said the shoes were his, that the Bentley was recorded as 

belonging to someone else in California, Petitioner said the house was his, confirmed he 

did not inquire about Petitioner’s income, but Petitioner did report being involved in real 

estate. (Id at 53-58.) On re-direct, he confirmed his testimony about Petitioner’s 

reporting owning the barbeque and then saying his sister did, testified that he had never 

seen a Bentley at a residence in that part of town, confirmed that Petitioner claimed to 

own the shoes, that the house was built in the early to mid 1990s, and Petitioner reported 

he owned the house. (Id. at 58-60.) 

Edwards had not been disclosed in the prosecutions’ list of trial witnesses. 

(Exhibit B, State’s Disclosure.) 

For the reasons discussed hereinabove with respect to Ground 2(a), trial counsel 

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could not have objected to Edwards’ testimony under Brady. 

But, trial counsel was not limited to arguing Brady. Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 15(b)(1) mandates that the prosecution disclose the “names and addresses of 

all persons whom the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses in the case-in-chief.” 

However, such disclosures need not be reduced to a single list of witnesses, nor even be 

formally made. See e.g. State v. Linden, 136 Ariz. 129, 140, 664 P.2d 673, 684 (App. 

1983) (letter filed with court listing witness adequate disclosure); and State v. Roseberry, 

210 Ariz. 360, 366, ¶ 25, 111 P.3d 402, 408 (2005) (no error where defendant had actual 

notice of the aggravating circumstance before trial, despite lack of written notice under 

Rule 15.1). Petitioner proffers nothing to show that the state had not disclosed Edwards 

in some manner other than their initial disclosure. 

Moreover, Petitioner presumes that an objection would have resulted in the trial 

court precluding Edwards from testifying. To the contrary, preclusion was unlikely. 

Rule 15.7(a) provides for compelling the required disclosures and sanctions for failure to 

make disclosures, which include but are not limited to:

(1) Precluding or limiting the calling of a witness, use of evidence 

or argument in support of or in opposition to a charge or defense, or

(2) Dismissing the case with or without prejudice, or

(3) Granting a continuance or declaring a mistrial when necessary in 

the interests of justice, or

(4) Holding a witness, party, person acting under the direction or 

control of a party, or counsel in contempt, or

(5) Imposing costs of continuing the proceedings, or

(6) Any other appropriate sanction.

Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 15.7(a). While the Rule appears to make sanctions mandatory, it 

provides an exception where “the court finds that the failure to comply was harmless or 

that the information could not have been disclosed earlier even with due diligence and 

the information was disclosed immediately upon its discovery.” Id. Moreover, it directs 

that the sanctions reflect “the significance of the information not timely disclosed, the 

impact of the sanction on the party and the victim and the stage of the proceedings at 

which the disclosure is ultimately made.” Id. Arizona applies a multi-factor analysis to 

determining whether preclusion is an appropriate remedy: “(1) how vital the witness is 

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to the case, (2) whether the opposing party will be surprised, (3) whether the discovery 

violation was motivated by bad faith, and (4) any other relevant circumstances.” State v. 

(Joe. U.) Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 359, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378 (1984) (Ariz. Sup. Ct. en 

banc). The Arizona Supreme Court has counseled that preclusion should be a last resort:

The trial court, however, should seek to apply sanctions that affect 

the evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as possible, 

since the Rules of Criminal Procedure are designed to implement, 

and not to impede, the fair and speedy determination of cases. 

Prohibiting the calling of a witness should be invoked only in those 

cases where other less stringent sanctions are not applicable to 

effect the ends of justice. 

State v. (Joseph Clarence) Smith (Jr.), 123 Ariz. 243, 252, 599 P.2d 199, 208 (1979)

(Ariz. Sup. Ct. en banc). 

Here, there is no indication that Edwards’ testimony was vital to the prosecution. 

That would lean towards exclusion. See State v. Birdsall, 23 Ariz. App. 454, 456, 533 

P.2d 1191, 1193 (1975) (exclusion of witnesses vital to state’s case was too severe). 

However, neither is there any evidence that counsel was surprised. As pointed out 

by Respondents, trial counsel had filed a motion in limine arguing:

the investigation of Mr. Jones was initiated on a Domestic Violence 

call that called into question Mr. Jones' finances. Officers observed 

that Mr. Jones had many expensive items and felt that he may be 

involved in illegal activities and therefore began an investigation on 

him. 

(Exhibit X, 1st MIL (regarding DV evidence) at 2.) The matter was discussed at the 

hearing on the motion, and the prosecution made clear that it intended to present 

testimony containing the evidence presented by Edwards, albeit without naming 

Edwards. (Exhibit EE, R.T. 11/16/9 at 8-10.) Thus trial counsel was fully aware of the 

events testified to by Officer Edwards, as well as the existence of Officer Edwards, if 

perhaps not by name.

Nor is there any suggestion that the prosecution acted in bad faith. Maybe, if 

Edwards had volunteered some surprisingly new and inculpating evidence, a suggestion 

of bad faith might appear. But Edwards’ testimony reflected what trial counsel had 

already anticipated. 

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Moreover, assuming trial counsel was surprised, other less onerous sanctions 

would appear effective, given the limited nature of Edwards’ testimony, including a 

recess to permit an interview of Edwards. “In any event, it is almost universally held that 

the violation of a notice-of-witness rule does not automatically disqualify the witness. If 

the defense is given an opportunity to meet and question the undisclosed witness prior to 

the proffered testimony, as was done here, it is generally held not to be an abuse of 

discretion.” State v. LaBarre, 115 Ariz. 444, 448, n. 2, 565 P.2d 1305, 1309, n. 2 (App. 

1977). 

Based upon the foregoing, even assuming trial counsel was unaware Edwards 

would be called (thus establishing a violation of the state’s disclosure rule), he could 

have reasonably concluded that the testimony of Edwards would not have been excluded, 

and that an objection would not have provided any benefit to Petitioner. 

Further, excluding Edwards had little benefit for Petitioner. Without him, the jury 

was left with testimony of Detective Dersa that his investigation of Petitioner was started 

because of “communication from an officer.” (Exhibit GG, R.T. 11/17/2009 at 13.) 

Moreover, Detective Dersa had already testified that upon service of the search warrant 

at the residence, the same Bentley and shoeboxes later testified to by Edwards were 

present. (Exhibit HH R.T. 11/7/9 PM at 88-91.) 

Counsel could have reasonably concluded that allowing the sanitized explanation 

of the genesis of the investigation from Officer Edwards was less damaging than the 

ominous description that it was triggered by some unspecified communication from an 

officer, and thus counsel could have reasonable made the tactical decision to forego the 

objection.

In sum, Petitioner fails to make allegations sufficient to show that trial counsel 

performed deficiently by failing to object to the testimony of Edwards. Accordingly, this 

claim is not substantial, and PCR counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it.

Petitioner thus fails to establish cause to excuse his procedural default of his state 

remedies on this claim. 

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(4) Ground 3(b) (ineffectiveness re prejudicial evidence on 

dismissed count re trial counsel)

In Ground 3(b), Petitioner argues that both trial and appellate counsel were 

ineffective for failing to object to the evidence on the dismissed count as being unfairly 

prejudicial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) The undersigned has concluded hereinabove that the 

portion of this claim relating to trial counsel was procedurally defaulted.

Although not addressing this claim as a separate claim for relief, Respondents 

argue with respect to cause and prejudice that Petitioner cannot show appellate counsel 

was ineffective with regard to this evidence because the evidence was relevant to the undismissed counts, and was not unfairly prejudicial, nor was it a violation of due process. 

Respondents further argue that Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice because of the 

limited impact of this evidence, and the other evidence of Petitioner’s guilt on the undismissed counts. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 58-61.)

On November 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion in limine that sought “to preclude 

the State from introducing evidence of drug sale on January 14, 2008, without the 

testimony of FBI agents and lab reports confirming results of the drug analysis.” (Exhibit 

X, #3.) At argument, the prosecution responded on the motion by stating: “I have no 

objection to that, Judge. That refers [to] Count 1, and we don’t intend to proceed on that 

count anymore.” (Exhibit EE, at 13.) After discussing the potential to leave Count 1 

pending for trial (to allow admission of the evidence relevant to that claim), the 

likelihood of an involuntary dismissal at trial on directed verdict, and whether limited 

evidence of Petitioner’s movements on January 14, 2008 would remain relevant to the 

remaining counts, the prosecution agreed to dismiss Count 1, the defense agreed, and the 

court dismissed it with prejudice. (Id. at 13-19.) With regard to the relevance of the 

evidence to the remaining counts, the parties hinted at raising the objection at the time of 

the evidence, but the trial court made no ruling on the motion in limine at that time. (Id.

at 18.) At best, the trial court opined: “But it seems to me that it is relevant in a sense 

that it establishes the locations, it establishes Mr. Jones' whereabouts, [w]hat his 

familiarity [is].” (Id. at 19.) 

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At trial, Detective Dersa testified that they began surveilling Petitioner on January 

14, 2008. (Exhibit GG, R.T. 11/17/9 at 14.) He described observing Petitioner leave his 

home in Scottsdale, travel in a Range Rover to an office building where he met another 

person who got in the vehicle with petitioner, and then they separated. Petitioner then 

went to a condo, where he got into a Mercedes S550 driven by someone else, who drove 

to Tipps Barbeque. Petitioner went into the restaurant for a short time, returned back to 

the Mercedes, and went back to the condo. Afterward, he left in the Range Rover, and 

drove back to Tipps Barbeque, where he got into a white Chevy panel van and drove to 

the U-Haul storage facility, where Petitioner went in and emerged with a brown 

cardboard box, returned inside and came out again with a larger box, and then drove 

back to Tipps Barbeque. Petitioner then drove the Range Rover back to the condo. (Id.

at 14-25.) 

Trial counsel did not oppose this testimony as irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. 

Petitioner fails to explain why, even with Count 1 dismissed, this information was 

irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. The evidence plainly tied Petitioner to the storage 

facility, and demonstrates his transportation of boxes from the location. This was plainly 

relevant to the charges based upon the drugs found in the storage facility.

Petitioner argued to the state courts that the evidence was a violation of Arizona 

Rule of Evidence 403. That rule, like its federal counterpart, provides: “The court may 

exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 

of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 

jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 

Petitioner argues that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and misleading to the jury 

because it related to the FBI investigation of the dismissed count. (See Exhibit CCC, 

Pro Per PCR Pet. at 14-15.) 

Petitioner fails to explain how that was unfairly prejudicial. “Unfair prejudice 

results if the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 

such as emotion, sympathy, or horror. Not all harmful evidence, however, is unfairly 

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prejudicial.” State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 545-46, 931 P.2d 1046, 1055-56 (1997). 

Nothing about the testimony concerning January 14 would evoke such a response. 

The essence of Petitioner’s argument seems to be that the evidence was 

suggestive of the criminal conduct in the dismissed Count 1. But Petitioner’s view is 

skewed by information not presented to the jury. No mention was made on direct 

examination of the FBI investigation of the purported drug sale occurring during those 

events. No reference was made to the dismissed charge, nor even to any drugs being 

involved in Petitioner’s actions that day. 

Petitioner makes much of the jury’s questions about the events of the day (e.g. 

what happened to the boxes). Petitioner argues this demonstrates that the evidence was 

misleading. But those questions were prompted by the fact that no explanation was 

given on the results of the surveillance (e.g. the results of the FBI investigation), because 

that evidence had been opposed by trial counsel based on the lack of disclosure of the 

drug tests. The jury was not misled, but rightly recognized that there was nothing to 

connect Petitioner’s conduct that day directly to any drug transaction occurring on that 

day. 

Petitioner’s argument seems to be that, alternatively, this was improper “other 

act” evidence. Like Federal Rule of Evidence 404, Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) 

generally prohibits the introduction of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” to the extent used 

to prove the character of the person “to show action in conformity therewith.” But, here, 

the testimony of Petitioner’s conduct on January 14, 2008 was not related to Petitioner’s 

character. (It did not even depict any overtly criminal or wrongful conduct.) Rather, it 

was for other purposes permissible under that rule, “such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 

accident.” 

Here, the evidence of events on January 14, 2008 was limited to describing the 

progression of the investigation from the initial police encounter with Officer Edwards 

through the arrest. The Arizona Courts have long permitted the prosecution to explain 

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the background for a police investigation as part of its “completing the story doctrine.” 

Even “[e]vidence of other criminal acts is admissible when so blended or connected with 

the crime of which defendant is accused that proof of one incidentally involves the other 

or explains the circumstances of the crime.” State v. Villavicencio, 95 Ariz. 199, 201, 

388 P.2d 245, 246 (1964). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit allows “other act” evidence “to 

be admitted when it was necessary to do so in order to permit the prosecutor to offer a 

coherent and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime; it is 

obviously necessary in certain cases for the government to explain either the 

circumstances under which particular evidence was obtained or the events surrounding 

the commission of the crime.” United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1012-

13 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In sum, Petitioner fails to show that there was a valid objection to be raised by 

trial counsel. “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th 

Cir. 1982). 

Because the undersigned finds no valid objection, and thus there was clearly no 

deficient performance, Respondents arguments regarding a lack of prejudice are not 

addressed.

Based on the foregoing, the underlying claim of ineffective assistance is not 

substantial, and PCR counsel’s failure to raise the claim cannot provide cause to excuse 

Petitioner’s procedural default on this portion of Ground 3(b).

(5) Ground 4(a) (ineffectiveness re plea agreement)

In Ground 4(a), Petitioner argues that in August through November, 2009, 

appointed trial counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner that he was negotiating a 

plea agreement, and that the case would not go to trial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) The 

undersigned has concluded hereinabove that this claim is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner argues:

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The trial attorney was appointed August 21, 2009 and requested to 

withdrawal from representing the Petitioner on September for 

1.C1.Claim. The courts denied trial counsel on or in October. On 

November 5, 2009 the case was set for trial in which as an last ditch 

effort trial counsel requested an continuance in which was denied. 

Through this whole process he informed Petitioner that this case 

was not going to trial and he was negotiating an plea agreement, and 

had a murder trial that he was focus on.

(Id.)

Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot overcome the procedural bar under 

Martinez “because: (i) he clearly anticipated that the case would go to trial, as 

demonstrated by his refusals to accept the State’s plea offers, or even to participate in a 

Donald advisement, and his vocal criticisms of trial counsel for not “believing” in “his 

case”; and (ii) the fact that the case did not settle does not suggest that trial counsel were 

ineffective, and Petitioner fails to demonstrate how that was the case.” (Answer, Doc. 10 

at 68.) 

Petitioner addresses the plea bargaining at length in his Reply. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 

40, et seq.) Most of his argument is directed at arguing that retained counsel, Mr. 

Simpson, was ineffective during his tenure in advising Petitioner about the proffered 

pleas. (Id. at 40-49.) Petitioner then relates that by the time they had proceeded to trial, 

Petitioner remained interested in a plea, but because the prosecution would not offer a 

plea agreement, his only option was to plead to the charges. (Id. at 49-55.) Petitioner 

complains that Mr. Acosta erroneously requested a settlement conference with the trial 

court after the jury was empaneled, failed to adequately advise him about the 

consequences of pleading guilty as charged, and to challenge the addition of the Serious 

Drug Offender allegation and to raise arguments that the indictment sought double 

punishment. (Id. at 55-58.) Petitioner also argues that the trial court committed various 

errors.

Most of the argument by Petitioner in his Reply with regard to plea bargaining 

(Doc. 14 at 40-63), is an attempt to raise new claims. Petitioner has not sought leave to 

amend his Petition to raise new claims. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15 (requiring motion to 

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amend for amendments more than 21 days after answer). None of his argument 

addresses his claim regarding misrepresentations regarding the potential for a negotiated 

plea agreement.

In the unique context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea 

offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel's deficient performance, a defendant 

can establish ineffective assistance of counsel upon showing the requisite prejudice, “a 

reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been 

afforded effective assistance of counsel.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). 

But central to such a claim is the loss of a proffered plea. Here, Petitioner does not 

suggest, and the record does not reflect, that a plea offer was available in August through 

November 2009. 

Rather, Petitioner’s argument is that counsel misrepresented that plea negotiations 

were ongoing and would be successful.

Assuming arguendo that Mr. Acosta made those representations, and assuming 

arguendo that doing so was deficient performance (e.g. because there were no plea 

negotiations and/or no reasonable attorney could have believed they would be 

successful), Petitioner fails to suggest any prejudice. 

Petitioner does go on to argue in Ground 4(b) that counsel failed to present a 

defense at trial. But as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner fails to support that claim.

Petitioner also argues with regard to Ground 4(e) that the serious drug offender 

allegation was filed on August 24, 2009, and that trial counsel was apparently unaware 

of and did not communicate the allegation until November 5, 2009. As discussed 

hereinafter with regard to Ground 4(e), Petitioner fails to show prejudice from delayed 

notification of the SDO allegation. And, Petitioner fails to suggest how, even coupled 

with a misrepresentation that trial would be avoided, this would have prejudiced 

Petitioner. 

At best, Petitioner contends simply that trial counsel painted too rosy of a picture 

about the potential for a negotiated plea. The Sixth Amendment is not a guarantee of 

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perfect performance by counsel or a satisfaction guarantee. It is a protection to insure 

that the outcome of the proceeding is not worsened for a defendant because his counsel 

was performing in unreasonable ways. Petitioner offers nothing to show how the 

outcome at trial was worse than what it would have been had counsel advised Petitioner 

that the matter was headed to trial. 

Having failed to proffer any prejudice, Petitioner has failed to show that his claim 

in Ground 4(a) is substantial. Accordingly, Martinez does not apply, and Petitioner 

cannot avoid the effect of his procedural default of this claim. 

(6) Ground 4(d) (ineffectiveness re testimonial objections)

In Ground 4(d), Petitioner argues that trial counsel “failed to object to critical 

testimony that prejudice[d] the entire trial.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) The undersigned has 

concluded hereinabove that this claim is procedurally defaulted.

Respondents argue this claim is conclusory, and that even assuming this refers to 

Detective Dersa’s testimony regarding surveillance on January 14, 2008, the claim is not 

substantial because “Petitioner’s activities on January 14, 2008, were clearly relevant 

with respect to the undismissed counts, and there is no reasonable prospect that the jury 

would have reached a different result if the January 14 evidence had not been included.” 

(Answer, Doc. 10 at 68-69.) 

Petitioner does not address the merits of this claim in his Reply, nor does he 

clarify it.

To the extent that Petitioner simply attacks the failure to object to Dersa’s 

testimony, this claim is duplicative of the portion of Ground 3(b) regarding trial counsel, 

which the undersigned has concluded hereinabove is not substantial.

Beyond the Dersa testimony, Petitioner’s claim is conclusory. 

Conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts do not merit habeas 

relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. nom James v. White, 

513 U.S.935 (1994). Cursory allegations that are purely speculative cannot support a 

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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989). Thus, a defendant cannot satisfy the 

Strickland standard by "vague and conclusory allegations that some unspecified and 

speculative testimony might have established his defense." Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 

923 F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991).

Accordingly, Ground 4(d) is not substantive within the meaning of Martinez, and 

Petitioner’s procedural default of the claim is not excused by PCR counsel’s failure to 

raise it.

(7) Ground 4(g) (ineffectiveness re appeal on motion in limine) 

In Ground 4(g), Petitioner argues that appellate counsel failed to adequately argue 

the improper failure to rule on the motion in limine, after stating that the evidence was 

irrelevant and dismissing the count. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) The undersigned has 

concluded hereinabove that this claim is procedurally defaulted.

Respondents argue this claim is not substantive, and thus not subject to Martinez, 

because the underlying motion in limine was without merit. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 69.) 

Indeed, as discussed hereinabove with regard to Ground 3(b), the undersigned has 

concluded that the testimony was admissible. Thus, any insistence by counsel on a 

ruling on the motion in limine should have resulted in denial of the motion, and thus 

would have been futile. Failure to take futile action is not ineffective assistance. See 

Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445. 

Accordingly, this claim is not substantial under Martinez, and Petitioner may not 

avoid his procedural default of this claim on that basis.

(g) Summary re Cause and Prejudice

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to 

establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

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although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

7. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner makes no assertion or showing that no reasonable juror would 

have found him guilty in light of new evidence. Accordingly his procedurally defaulted 

and procedurally barred claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

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B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON HABEAS

The remainder of Petitioner’s claims must be addressed on the merits. 

Standard Applicable on Habeas - While the purpose of a federal habeas 

proceeding is to search for violations of federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in 

custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every 

error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

C. MERITS OF GROUND 1(B) (FRANKS & SEARCH WARRANT)

As discerned by Respondents, in Ground 1(b), Petitioner argues that the trial court 

failed to grant an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claim that the affidavits presented to 

obtain the search warrants contained false information. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 33.) 

Petitioner references the failure to grant an evidentiary hearing, but does not make 

explicit any assertion that it was wrongful, or why. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents argue the claim is barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 

(Answer, Doc. 10 at 40.) Respondents further argue that the claim is without merit 

because the Arizona Court of Appeals properly rejected it on the merits on the basis that 

Petitioner failed to show that the search warrant affidavit contained a false statement, or 

that outstanding discovery would have entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. (Answer, 

Doc. 10 at 44 (citing Exhibit XX, Mem. Dec. 12/15/11 at ¶¶ 27-32.) For the same 

reasons, Respondents argue that the denial of an evidentiary hearing did not preclude 

Petitioner’s opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim, as required for 

application of the Stone doctrine. 

Franks Hearings – In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), despite the 

presumption of validity attaching to affidavits in support of search warrants, the Supreme 

Court extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to search warrants shown to 

have been issued based on “deliberate misstatements, and those of reckless disregard” of 

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the truth. Id. at 170. After evaluating the need to preserve the solemnity of the warrant 

issuing process and judicial determinations, and other policy considerations, the Court 

concluded that evidentiary hearings to challenge search warrant affidavits should not 

lightly be granted.

To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be 

more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere 

desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations of deliberate 

falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations 

must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out 

specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be 

false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting 

reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of 

witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily 

explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are 

insufficient. The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose 

impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of 

any nongovernmental informant. Finally, if these requirements are 

met, and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or 

reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content 

in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no 

hearing is required.

Id. at 171-72.

In applying Franks, the court engages in a two step process.

First, the district court determines whether the affiant officer 

intentionally or recklessly made false or misleading statements or 

omissions in support of the warrant. If it finds by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the officer so acted, the district court then 

inquires into whether “with the affidavit's false material set to one 

side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish 

probable cause.” 

United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1205, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Stone Doctrine – Notwithstanding Franks, such Fourth Amendment exclusionary 

rule claims are generally not cognizable on habeas review.

“Exclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress 

the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search. The rule's sole purpose, we have 

repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Davis v. U.S., 564 

U.S. 229, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). Thus, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), 

the Supreme Court recognized that habeas proceedings are so far removed from the 

offending conduct that any deterrent effect is outweighed by the societal cost of ignoring 

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reliable, trustworthy evidence and the judicial burden of litigating collateral 

issues. Thus, the Court held that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full 

and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted 

habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 

search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 494. See Balistreri v. Ryan, 2009 

WL 4673931, at *14 (D. Ariz. Dec. 3, 2009) (Cambell, D.J. accepting report and 

recommendation of Anderson, M.J.) (applying Stone to Franks claim). 

It is irrelevant whether the petitioner actually successfully availed himself of the 

opportunity for a state court hearing, so long as he had the opportunity to do so. Gordon 

v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990). Nor is it relevant whether the decision 

rendered was correct. “Moreover, Siripongs' argument goes not to the fullness and 

fairness of his opportunity to litigate the claim, but to the correctness of the state court 

resolution, an issue which Stone v. Powell makes irrelevant.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 

F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Oct. 

13, 1994). 

Factual Background – Petitioner’s Petition and Reply fail to identify the nature 

of false or misleading statements in the warrant application. In his Motion to Suppress 

based on Franks, Petitioner argued that the falsehood made in obtaining the warrant to 

search his home and storage locker was that the FBI and Scottsdale Police Department 

had observed drugs in the two boxes handled by Petitioner on January 14, 2008. 

(Exhibit J, Mot Supp. at 4.) Petitioner provided no evidence in support of the assertion 

that the information was false, but simply added a footnote: “Jones will seek to 

supplement the factual the [sic] support for this contention following examination of 

additional discovery that he has requested from the state.” (Id. at n. 2.) In his Reply in 

support of the Motion to Suppress, Petitioner reported:

In his motion, Jones noted that he would supplement the factual 

basis for this assertion after and [sic] examination of additional 

discovery. That discovery has been requested and is the subject of a 

separate motion to produce. However, the available reports do not 

support the avowal in the warrant application.

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(Id. at 2-3.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the resolution of the motion as 

follows:

At a trial management conference on May 4, 2009, the 

parties discussed the motion, and defense counsel informed the 

court that he had made a discovery request for "DEA 6' s and 302's" 

so that he could file a supplemental brief on the suppression issue if 

necessary. The prosecutor could not confirm that the requested 

discovery existed, but qualified that it possibly could, and vowed to 

get and disclose it if it existed. Defense counsel never filed a 

supplement to his motion to suppress.

On June 8, 2009, the trial court vacated the June 12, 2009 

suppression hearing and denied the motion to suppress. Defendant 

never attempted to supplement his original motion to suppress nor 

asked the trial court to reconsider its decision.

(Exhibit XX, Mem. Dec. 12/15/11 at 11.) 

State Court Decision - The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s appeal 

based on the motion to suppress, quoting Franks and concluding:

Defendant failed to make anything other than an unsubstantiated 

and conclusory attack on the validity of the affidavit for the search 

warrant. Defendant never alleged, let alone made any showing, 

substantial or otherwise, that the "suspect" false assertion that he 

questioned in the affidavit was the result of any deliberate falsehood 

or of reckless disregard for the truth. Defendant failed to satisfy the 

threshold prerequisite of an allegation and therefore was not entitled 

to a determination on the issue of probable cause.

(Id. at 16-17.) The court also rejected Petitioner’s arguments that discovery was still 

ongoing when the trial court ruled by noting that Petitioner did not seek reconsideration 

based on later obtained discovery, and Petitioner still failed to proffer any support for the 

allegations of falsehood. (Id. at 17-18.) 

Application of Law to Facts – Petitioner’s claim in Ground 1(b) is barred by 

Stone. Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he was denied an opportunity for a full 

and fair hearing on this claim in the state courts.

Petitioner points to the denial of an evidentiary hearing, but Petitioner fails to 

show that he had adequately supported his request for such a hearing under Franks. 

Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that he lacked the opportunity for a full and fair 

hearing, merely that he failed to properly take advantage of the opportunity.

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Even if not barred by Stone, Petitioner still fails to proffer anything other than 

naked suspicions that the search warrant contained falsehoods, that the falsehood was 

intentional or reckless, or that the remaining allegation of the affidavit would not be 

sufficient to support the search warrant. That is not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary 

hearing under Franks, nor to establish that the fruit of the warrant was excludable. 

Even if this Court could somehow find some validity to Petitioner’s Franks claim, 

Petitioner fails to point to any unreasonable determination of the facts in the decision of 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, or to show that the decision was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Accordingly, this claim is without merit, and must be denied. 

D. MERITS OF GROUND 3(A) (EVIDENCE ON DISMISSED COUNT)

In Ground 3(a), Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated when 

unfairly prejudicial other act evidence regarding the dismissed Count 1 (relating to the 

alleged sale of marijuana on January 14, 2008) was admitted. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) 

The undersigned has concluded that this claim is exhausted, but has not been addressed 

by the state court on the merits. 

For the reasons addressed hereinabove in disposing of the Petitioner’s Martinez

argument on the related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the undersigned 

concludes that the evidence admitted regarding the January 14, 2008 dismissed count 

was not irrelevant to the remaining counts or unfairly prejudicial. (See supra Section 

III(A)(6)(f)(4).) 

Accordingly, this ground must be denied on the merits.

E. MERITS OF GROUND 3(B) (IAC RE DISMISSED COUNT EVIDENCE)

In Ground 3(b), Petitioner argues that both trial and appellate counsel were 

ineffective for failing to object to the evidence on the dismissed count as being unfairly 

prejudicial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) The undersigned has concluded hereinabove that the 

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portion of this claim relating to trial counsel was procedurally defaulted, but the portion 

related to appellate counsel was properly exhausted.

Although not addressing this claim as a separate claim for relief, Respondents 

argue with respect to cause and prejudice that Petitioner cannot show appellate counsel 

was ineffective with regard to this evidence because the evidence was relevant to the undismissed counts, and not unfairly prejudicial, nor was it a violation of due process. 

Respondents further argue that Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice because of the 

limited impact of this evidence, and the other evidence of Petitioner’s guilt on the undismissed counts. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 58-61.)

In addressing Petitioner’s allegations of cause and prejudice under Martinez 

arising from the portion of Ground 3(b) related to trial counsel, the undersigned has 

concluded that Petitioner has failed to show a valid objection to the limited evidence 

presented regarding the dismissed count. (See supra Section III(A)(6)(f)(4).)

Similarly, Petitioner fails to show that there was a valid objection to be raised on 

direct appeal by appellate counsel. “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 

565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Accordingly, this claim is without merit, and must be denied.

F. MERITS OF GROUND 4(B) (IAC RE DEFENSE) AND GROUND 4(c) 

(IAC RE DISCOVERY)

Parties Arguments - In his Ground 4(b), Petitioner argues that trial counsel 

failed to prepare for trial or present a defense. In his Ground 4(c) he argues trial counsel 

failed to pursue available discovery. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.)

Respondents argue that ground 4(b) is conclusory because Petitioner “does not

state what defense counsel should have presented, what witnesses might have been

called, and how they would have saved the day.” (Answer, Doc. 10 at 70.) Respondents 

further argue that the mere fact that no defense witnesses were presented creates no 

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presumption of ineffectiveness, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence 

against and admissions by Petitioner. (Id. at 70-71.) 

Respondents similarly argue that Ground 4(c) is conclusory because Petitioner 

does not identify the omitted discovery or suggest how it would have made a difference 

in the case. (Id. at 71-72.)

Petitioner does not address the merits of these claims in his Reply. 

New Allegations - Petitioner does raise a number of new allegations in his Reply 

of defenses trial counsel should have raised, e.g. a claim of double jeopardy, the legal 

insufficiency of the Serious Drug Offender Allegation, and to oppose a non-unanimity 

verdict. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 37, et seq.) However, Petitioner points to no place where he 

raised these potential defenses to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate somewhat the claims made 

in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on 

other grounds by Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal 

claim must have been “fairly presented” in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 

6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Tamapua, 796 F.2d 

at 262. Thus, a petitioner may not broaden the scope of a constitutional claim in the 

federal courts by asserting additional operative facts that have not yet been fairly 

presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not presented in the highest state court 

are not considered in a federal habeas petition. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 

1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 

459 U.S. 1219 (1983). Thus, while new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a 

claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not "fundamentally alter the legal claim already 

considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also 

Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th Cir.1994). 

By now asserting a laundry list of potential defenses never before presented in 

connection with Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance, Petitioner is attempting to 

fundamentally alter the claims in Ground 4(b) and 4(c) from what was presented to the 

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state courts. Indeed, as discussed hereinafter, the state court rejected these claims largely 

because Petitioner had provided no such potential defenses or claims. 

Nor did Petitioner identify these potential defenses in his Petition, nor seek leave 

to amend his Petition to include them. “The district court need not consider arguments 

raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 

2007).

Accordingly, the undersigned does not consider these allegations a part of 

Petitioner’s grounds for relief, and does not address them herein. 

State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals did not address the 

summary claim now asserted by Petitioner, but rejected Petitioner’s claims as to specific 

defenses. 

With regard to the failure to call character witnesses, the court rejected the claim 

because “Jones does not specify who should have been called as a character witness in 

his defense or what those witnesses would have testified to.” The court also concluded 

that Petitioner failed to show that the decision not to present such witnesses was not a 

tactical one. (Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 5.) 

With regard to uninvestigated financial records, the court found Petitioner failed 

to specify the records or how they were beneficial. (Id. at ¶ 6.) 

With regard to the failure to conduct discovery, be informed, and prepare for 

cross-examination, , the court found that Petitioner offered no specifics, and cited the 

trial court’s finding that “defense counsel was prepared for trial, filed pre-trial motions, 

cross-examined the State's witnesses, and advocated strongly on behalf of the 

Defendant.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

Application of Law - Indeed, a defendant may not leave a court to speculate at 

what additional preparation, investigation or discovery may have yielded.

A failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 

448 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). However, a habeas petitioner 

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may not leave a court to speculate what evidence the deficient investigation would have 

discovered. In order to prevail on an allegation that defense counsel conducted an 

insufficient investigation resulting in ineffective assistance, the petitioner must show 

specifically what that investigation would have produced. For example, a petitioner may 

not simply speculate about what a witness’ testimony, but must adduce evidence to show 

what it would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness must generally be presented in the 

form of actual testimony by the witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state 

that the testimony would have been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain 

an ineffective assistance claim.” U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991).

Moreover, while complete failure to defend a criminal case is ineffective 

assistance, the constitution does not require counsel to manufacture a defense where 

none exists. See U.S. v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1986). “The sixth amendment 

does not require counsel to invent a defense.” Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 764 (5th

Cir. 2001), rehr’g granted on other grounds, 284 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2002).

In many cases, the law and facts will be so overwhelmingly in favor 

of the government that defense counsel can do little more than try to 

poke holes in the government's case in cross-examination. The 

hopelessness of some cases may even relegate the most competent 

defense counsel to the role of official hand-holder. The Sixth 

Amendment does not hold an attorney responsible for the difficulty 

of the case he inherits. The choice to pursue a bad strategy makes no 

comment on an attorney's judgment where no better choice exists.

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9

th Cir. 1995). 

Here, the state courts found that trial counsel was prepared for trial, filed pre-trial 

motions, cross-examined the State's witnesses, and advocated strongly on behalf of 

Petitioner. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that this was an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. The undersigned finds that it fairly summarizes the efforts by 

trial counsel. 

Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 4(b) and 4(c) are 

without merit and must be denied.

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G. MERITS OF GROUND 4(E) (IAC RE SDO ALLEGATION)

Parties Arguments - In Ground 4(e), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was 

ineffective because he failed for over two months to alert Petitioner to the filing of the 

serious drug offender allegation. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner fails to offer evidence of when he was advised 

of the allegation, fails to establish prejudice to an available plea offer, and fails to show a 

likelihood he would have accepted such offer, in light of his prior refusal offers when 

even without the SDO allegations an effective life sentence was possible. (Answer, Doc. 

10 at 72-73.) 

Petitioner does not address the merits of this claim in his Reply.

Factual Background – The state filed its Notice of Serious Drug Offender on 

August 27, 2009 (Exhibit S). At trial, Petitioner complained to the trial court that 

counsel had not alerted him to the SDO allegation until November 3. (Exhibit FF, R.T. 

11/16/9 PM at 7.) 

State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim, 

finding:

He does not, however, support the allegation with reasonable 

evidence demonstrating that, but for this error, the outcome would 

have been different. Jones does not say whether a plea agreement 

was offered to him following the State's filing of the allegation, the 

terms of any offered plea agreement, if one existed, or that, in light 

of the serious drug offender allegation, he would have agreed to a 

plea agreement if one was offered.

(Exhibit HHH, Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 9 (citations omitted).) 

Application of Law to Facts – Assuming arguendo that Petitioner was not 

advised by counsel of the SDO allegation for over two months, and assuming arguendo

that it was deficient performance for trial counsel to fail to alert him, Petitioner still fails 

to identify any prejudice. The only speculative prejudice might have been to the 

rejection of a plea offer. But the last plea offer had expired long before the SDO was 

filed.

Thus Petitioner fails to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

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purported unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a 

court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable 

or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

Even if this Court could somehow find some validity to Petitioner’s claim, 

Petitioner fails to point to any unreasonable determination of the facts in the decision of 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, or to show that the decision was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Accordingly, this claim is without merit and must be denied.

H. MERITS OF GROUND 4(F) (IAC RE PRIVACY CLAIM) 

Parties Arguments - In Ground 4(f), Petitioner argues appellate counsel failed to 

challenge the privacy interest violation. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents point to their arguments on Ground 1(a), and argue that the 

underlying privacy claim is without merit, and that given the deference due to appellate 

counsel in selecting claims, this claim of ineffective assistance is without merit. 

(Answer, Doc. 10 at 74.) 

State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed this claim on 

the merits in Petitioner’s PCR proceeding. The court rejected the argument based on 

Petitioner’s failure to show prejudice from failure to raise the claim, and because 

appellate counsel is not ineffective for choosing among issues for appeal. (Exhibit HHH, 

Mem. Dec. 9/4/14 at ¶ 11.) 

Application of Law – The substance of the underlying claim and the merits of the 

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are addressed hereinabove in 

disposing of Petitioner’s attempts to rely upon the ineffectiveness raised in this claim, to 

avoid his procedural default on the underlying claim. (See supra Section III(A)(6)(f)(1).) 

For the reasons expressed hereinabove, the undersigned concludes that this claim is 

without merit.

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Even if this Court could somehow find some validity to Petitioner’s claim, 

Petitioner fails to point to any unreasonable determination of the facts in the decision of 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, or to show that the decision was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Accordingly, Ground 4(f) must be denied.

I. SUMMARY

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on: (1) Ground 2(b) (ineffectiveness re 

Brady claim); (2) the portion of Ground 3(b) (ineffectiveness re prejudicial evidence on 

dismissed count) which relates to trial counsel; (3) Ground 4(a) (ineffectiveness re plea 

agreement); (4) Ground 4(d) (ineffectiveness re testimonial objections); and (5) Ground 

4(g) (ineffectiveness re appeal on motion in limine). Petitioner was procedurally barred

on independent and adequate state grounds from asserting: (1) Ground 1(a) (privacy); 

and (2) Ground 2(a) (Brady claim). Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice or 

actual innocence to avoid the effects of his procedural defaults and procedural bars. 

Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

Petitioner has failed to establish the merits of: (1) Grounds 1(b) (Franks claim); 

(2) Ground 3(a) (prejudicial evidence re dismissed count); (3) the portion of Ground 3(b) 

(ineffectiveness re prejudicial evidence on dismissed count) which relates to appellate 

counsel; (4) Ground 4(b) (ineffectiveness re failure to present a defense); (5) Ground 

4(c) (ineffectiveness re discovery); (6) Ground 4(e) (ineffectiveness re SDO allegation); 

and (7) Ground 4(f) (ineffectiveness re privacy). Accordingly, these claims must be 

denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

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cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the following portions of 

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed May 18, 2015 (Doc. 1) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE: (1) Ground 1(a) (privacy); (2) Ground 2(a) (Brady

claim); (3) Ground 2(b) (ineffectiveness re Brady claim); (4) the portion of Ground 3(b) 

(ineffectiveness re evidence on dismissed count) which relates to trial counsel; (5) 

Ground 4(a) (ineffectiveness re plea agreement); (6) Ground 4(d) (ineffectiveness re 

testimonial objections); and (7) Ground 4(g) (ineffectiveness re appeal on motion in 

limine).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that remainder of Petitioner's Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed May 18, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DENIED, including: (1) 

Grounds 1(b) (Franks claim); (2) Ground 3(a) (prejudicial evidence re dismissed count); 

(3) the portion of Ground 3(b) (ineffectiveness re prejudicial evidence on dismissed 

count) which relates to appellate counsel; (4) Ground 4(b) (ineffectiveness re failure to 

present a defense); (5) Ground 4(c) (ineffectiveness re discovery); (6) Ground 4(e) 

(ineffectiveness re SDO allegation); and (7) Ground 4(f) (ineffectiveness re privacy). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

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within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated: March 17, 2016

15-0883r RR 16 02 29 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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