Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02161/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02161-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERMAINE ROBERT BLAIR, No. 2:14-CV-2161-GEB-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MONTGOMERY,

Respondent.

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 14) grounds two, three, and four of the instant petition as untimely. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted on July 3, 2007, and sentenced to a determinate prison

term of 87 years. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence on

September 12, 2008. The California Supreme Court denied direct review on December 17, 2008. 

Petitioner then filed a series of post-conviction actions in state court as follows: 

First Action Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed November 26, 2009

Denied March 11, 2010

Second Action Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed June 10, 2013

Denied August 13, 2013

Third Action California Court of Appeal

Filed November 7, 2013

Denied November 21, 2013

Fourth Action California Supreme Court

Filed May 19, 2014

Denied September 10, 2014

Petitioner also filed a prior federal habeas petition, Blair v. Small, 2:09-CV-1879-GEB-CMK, on

July 9, 2009. That matter was dismissed on February 12, 2010. Petitioner commenced the

instant federal petition on September 14, 2014.1

II. DISCUSSION

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of: (1)

the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

This is the date petitioner signed the proof of service indicating he mailed the 1

petition to the court for filing. The petition was filed on the court’s docket on September 17,

2014.

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U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek direct

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Where a petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed and no

petition for certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year limitations period

begins running the day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the

United States Supreme Court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Where a petition for writ of certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year

limitations period begins to run the day after certiorari is denied or the Court issued a merits

decision. See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). Where no petition for

review by the California Supreme Court is filed, the conviction becomes final 40 days following

the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the limitations period begins running the following day. See

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). If no appeal is filed in the Court of Appeal, the

conviction becomes final 60 days after conclusion of proceedings in the state trial court, and the

limitations period begins running the following day. If the conviction became final before April

24, 1996 – the effective date of the statute of limitations – the one-year period begins to run the

day after the effective date, or April 25, 1996. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th

Cir. 1999).

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); see also Allen v. Siebert, 128 S.Ct. 2 (2007); Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (holding that, regardless of whether there are exceptions to a

state’s timeliness bar, time limits for filing a state post-conviction petition are filing conditions

and the failure to comply with those time limits precludes a finding that the state petition is

properly filed). A state court application for post-conviction relief is “pending”during all the

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time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to present his

claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). It is not, however, considered

“pending” after the state post-conviction process is concluded. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549

U.S. 327 (2007) (holding that federal habeas petition not tolled for time during which certiorari

petition to the Supreme Court was pending). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between

state court applications, however, there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as

untimely, the federal court must independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id.

at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

The current federal petition raises four grounds for relief. Respondent concedes

that the first ground for relief, which is based on a March 2, 2013, report by the Sacramento

County District Attorney’s Crime Lab constituting the factual predicate of the claim, is timely. 

Respondent’s motion is directed to the remaining claims (two, three, and four). 

As to these claims, the one-year limitations period began on March 18, 2009 – the

day after the time to seek certiorari from the United States Supreme Court expired. Thus, as

respondent notes, the limitations period expired on March 17, 2010, plus any time for tolling. 

Respondent concedes that petitioner’s first post-conviction action was properly filed and tolled

the limitations period for 106 days. Thus, with 106 days of tolling, the one-year limitations

period expired on July 1, 2010. Citing Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003),

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respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled to tolling for any of the remaining postconviction actions because they were all filed after July 1, 2010. 

In his opposition, petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling as to

grounds two, three, and four due to “extenuating circumstances.” According to petitioner, “[a]t

no time did any state court . . . reject petitions for untimeliness or cite lack of due diligence.”

Petitioner adds that he acted diligently in filing the instant petition only a few days following the

California Supreme Court’s denial of his fourth post-conviction action in September 2014. 

Petitioner also states that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was in administrative

segregation from the beginning of 2009 through October 2014, during which time he suffered

“disposal of all legal work (transcripts, briefs, legal mail, etc.).” He also states that he did not

have access to the prison law library during this period. Petitioner states:

Petitioner contacted trial attorney (Robert Peters), of record, and

investigator (Larry Fuller), of record, and informed them of situation and

that he was in need of another copy of his transcripts and other pertinent

legal work. They informed him they would assist as much as they could. 

Shortly thereafter both succumbed; Robert Peters to a mountain bike

accident and Larry Fuller to throat cancer.

Respondent argues that nothing cited by petitioner constitutes an extraordinary circumstance

justifying equitable tolling. 

Because the statute of limitations under AEDPA is not jurisdictional, it is subject

to traditional equitable tolling principles. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128

F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). To be entitled to equitable tolling, 

the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) he has been diligent in pursuing his rights; and 

(2) extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing on time. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408 (2005). 

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In Pace, the Supreme Court held that equitable tolling was not applicable because

“petitioner’s lack of diligence precludes equity’s operation.” 544 U.S. at 419. In Beeler, the

district court granted equitable tolling and the respondent sought a writ of mandamus to reverse

the district court’s order. See 128 F.3d at 1288. In denying the respondent’s mandamus petition,

the Ninth Circuit addressed the district court’s decision to grant equitable tolling as follows:

Having decided that [the statute of limitations] can be tolled, we

have no basis for upsetting the district court’s decision to allow Beeler

more time to file his petition. The district court found that Beeler’s lead

counsel, Scott Braden, had diligently pursued the preparation of Beeler’s

petition. Braden, however, withdrew after accepting employment in

another state, and much of the work product he left behind was not usable

by replacement counsel – a turn of events over which Beeler had no

control. There were thus “extraordinary circumstances” which justified

tolling [the] statute of limitations. 

Id. at 1289. 

In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit again denied mandamus relief and held that equitable tolling was

appropriate because:

. . . [A]s part of its order that Kelly be mentally evaluated, the

district court ordered “that all other aspects of this case be, and hereby are,

stayed pending final determination by this Court of the Petitioner’s mental

capacity to proceed.” The only reasonable reading of this order was that it

prohibited Kelly’s attorney’s from filing a habeas petition, which is how

the district court itself construed it. . . . This stay of the proceedings

prevented Kelly’s counsel from filing a habeas petition and, in itself,

justifies equitable tolling. 

163 F.3d at 541. 

In addition, the egregious misconduct of counsel may warrant equitable tolling. See Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003). Mental incompetence may also warrant equitable tolling

for the period the prisoner was incompetent if he can show that the incompetency in fact caused

the delay. See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has

concluded, however, that equitable tolling is not appropriate based on the ordinary negligence of

counsel. See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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In this case, the court agrees with respondent that equitable tolling is not available

because petitioner has not demonstrated diligence or extraordinary circumstances. The one-year

limitations period expired on July 1, 2010. Nowhere in his opposition does petitioner state what

efforts he made before that date to file his federal petition. Additionally, while petitioner states

that he was in administrative segregation from the beginning of 2009 through October 2014,

during which time he did not have access to his legal materials or the law library, he does not

state that these problems existed between early 2009 and July 1, 2010. Nor does petitioner

provide any evidence that he was in fact separated from his legal materials or denied access to the

law library during this time period. In any event, limited access to legal materials and the law

library are ordinary prison limitations and do not constitute extraordinary circumstances

justifying equitable tolling. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009); Frye v.

Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, as respondent notes, despite petitioner’s

claim that his placement in administrative segregation from the beginning of 2009 prevented him

from filing his federal petition on time, petitioner was able to file his first state post-conviction

action in November 2009 and was able to file his prior federal petition in July 2009. 

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III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 14) be granted and that claims two, three, and four be dismissed as untimely.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 18, 2015

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CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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