Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01984/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01984-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FORTUNATO LOPEZ JUAREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITIBANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-01984-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND TO STRIKE

Dkt. No. 13

INTRODUCTION

During twelve days in March, 2016, plaintiff Fortunato Juarez alleges that defendant 

Citibank N.A. telephoned him at least 42 times on his cellular phone, at least three times a day, 

using an autodialer and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice in an attempt to collect a consumer 

debt. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 1. (Dkt. No. 1). He repeatedly requested that Citibank stop calling, 

informing it that he was not the individual it was attempting to contact, but to no avail. Id. ¶ 16. I 

DENY Citibank’s motion to dismiss Juarez’s class action complaint alleging violations of the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (“TCPA”) and California’s 

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Civil Code 1788 et seq. (“Rosenthal Act”), because 

he has adequately pleaded a “concrete injury” to establish Article III standing on his TCPA claim, 

is a “debtor” under the Rosenthal Act because Citibank treated him as one, and plausibly alleged 

that Citibank’s calls were harassing.1 

BACKGROUND

Juarez alleges that in March, 2016 Citibank called him at least 42 times on his cellular 

phone using an autodialer and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice in an attempt to collect a 

 

1

I also DENY Citibank’s motion to strike Juarez’s class definitions as being premature.

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consumer debt. Compl. ¶ 1. He did not give Citibank prior written consent to make these calls 

and repeatedly requested that Citibank stop calling, informing Citibank that he was not the 

individual it was attempting to contact. Id. ¶ 16. He presents a chart showing that in March, 2016 

he received 42 calls over the course of 12 days and received at least three calls a day from the 

same number. Id. ¶ 2. Prior to receiving these calls, he never had any contact with Citibank and 

did not provide them with his phone number. Id. ¶ 19.

Based on these facts, Juarez brings claims under the TCPA and Rosenthal Act on behalf of 

a putative class. Citibank moved to dismiss and to strike the complaint arguing that Juarez failed 

to allege standing, failed to state a claim, and used improper fail safe class definitions. I heard oral 

argument on August 17, 2016.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. MOTION TO DISMISS RULE 12(B)(1)

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Article III restricts federal court jurisdiction 

to hearing “cases and controvers[ies]” and “[s]tanding to sue or defend is an aspect of the case or 

controversy requirement.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997); U.S. 

Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 

The party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court bears the burden of alleging facts to 

satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing: a (1) legal injury, (2) caused by the defendant, 

and (3) capable of legal redress. Schmier v. U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 821 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS RULE 12(B)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 

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when the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citation omitted). There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff 

must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555, 570. 

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court 

is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008).

III. MOTION TO STRIKE RULE 12(F)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f). The function of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is to avoid the expenditure of 

time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing of those issues before 

trial. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 

510 U.S. 517 (1994) (citation omitted). Motions to strike “are generally disfavored because they 

are often used as delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal 

practice.” Rosales v. Citibank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In most cases, a 

motion to strike should not be granted unless “the matter to be stricken clearly could have no 

possible bearing on the subject of the litigation.” Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F.

Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

DISCUSSION

I. TCPA STANDING

Citibank argues that Juarez’s TCPA claims must be dismissed on the ground that he lacks 

Article III standing under Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) because he has not 

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alleged facts demonstrating any concrete injury relating to the phone calls. To establish standing 

under Spokeo, a plaintiff bringing a claim based on a statutory violation must still allege a concrete 

and particularized injury as a “plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact 

requirement whenever a statute grants a right and purports to authorize a suit to vindicate it.” Id.

at 1549. Citibank argues that Juarez has failed to show any “concrete harm” or injury as a result 

of its phone calls and has simply alleged a bare procedural violation. Mot. 1. Juarez rebuts that he 

has alleged that he and the putative class members were “harmed by the acts of Defendant in the 

form of multiple involuntary telephone and electrical charges, the aggravation, nuisance, and 

invasion of privacy that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unsolicited and harassing telephone 

calls, and violations of their statutory right.” Opposition (“Oppo.”) 5. 

Several courts have addressed whether a plaintiff’s allegations that she received annoying 

and unwanted phone calls in violation of the TCPA is sufficient to establish Article III standing

since Spokeo was decided. See, e.g., Booth v. Appstack, Inc., No. c-13-1533, 2016 WL 3030256, 

*3 (W.D. Wash. May 24, 2016); Rogers v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 15-cv-4016, 2016 

WL 3162592, *2 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 03, 2016); Romero v. Dep’t Stores Nat’l Bank, No. 15-cv-193,

2016 WL 4184099, (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016). These courts have not reached a consensus on

whether such calls constitute a “concrete injury” necessary to establish Article III standing.

For example, in Booth, the court found standing where defendant Appstack used an 

autodialing system to call thousands of phone numbers to promote its products. 2016 WL 

3030256 at *3. The court concluded plaintiffs had adequately alleged a concrete injury as “the 

TCPA and WADAD2violations alleged here, if proven, required Plaintiffs to waste time 

answering or otherwise addressing widespread robocalls.” Id. at *6. Similarly, in Rogers, the 

court found there was standing where plaintiffs received unwanted phone calls from Capital One, 

ranging from two to forty calls per plaintiff, which continued even though each plaintiff instructed 

Capital One to stop calling. 2016 WL 3162592 at *1. The court concluded that because plaintiffs’ 

phones were “unavailable for legitimate use during the unwanted calls” they had “alleged 

 

2

“WADAD” refers to the Washington Dialing and Announcing Device Act which prohibits the 

use of robocalls and automatic dialing for commercial solicitation. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.36.400

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sufficient facts to support standing.” Id. at *2.

In contrast, in Romero, the court found that a plaintiff, who had received 272 phone calls 

from a debt collector, could not establish standing under the TCPA because she could not show 

that any individual phone call had caused sufficient lost time, aggravation, and distress to 

constitute a concrete injury. Romero, 2016 WL 4184099 at *4. 

I am persuaded by Booth and Rogers. Although I agree with Citibank that Juarez cannot 

establish standing based on a bare violation of the TCPA, Juarez has pleaded sufficient facts to 

show that the unwanted calls he received were an annoyance that caused him to waste time. This 

does not mean any violation of the TCPA will necessarily give rise to Article III standing–for 

example calls made to a neglected phone that go unnoticed or calls that are dropped before they 

connect may violate the TCPA but not cause any concrete injury. But here, Juarez has alleged that 

he received at least 42 unwanted and unsolicited phone calls from Citibank, getting multiple calls 

a day. Compl. ¶ 1. He has further alleged that he “repeatedly requested that Defendant stop 

calling, informing Defendant that he was not the individual they were attempting to contact” but 

that Citibank continued calling. Id. ¶ 16. Based on these allegations, it appears that Juarez wasted 

his own time and energy dealing with the unwanted phone calls. Even a single phone call can 

cause lost time, annoyance, and frustration. This is especially plausible where the recipient 

receives repeated, regular phone calls from the same number and asks the caller to stop, but due to 

the call pattern, nevertheless worries about and anticipates additional calls. Juarez’s allegation 

that he received repeated unwanted calls that caused him aggravation, nuisance, and an invasion of 

privacy, is sufficient to allege a “concrete” and “particularized” injury that establishes standing 

under Spokeo.

II. ROSENTHAL ACT STANDING

Citibank argues that Juarez lacks standing to sue under the Rosenthal Act because recovery 

is limited to a “debtor” and Juarez does not meet the Act’s definition of the term. Mot. 7. The 

Rosenthal Act defines “debtor” as “a natural person from whom a debt collector seeks to collect a 

consumer debt that is due or owing or alleged to be due and owing from such person.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1788.2. In his complaint, Juarez alleges that Citibank “called Mr. Juarez at least 42 times 

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on his cellular telephone . . . in an attempt to collect a consumer debt” and that it “engaged in a 

campaign of harassment in an attempt to coerce payment of a consumer debt.” Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4. 

He also alleges that he “repeatedly requested that Defendant stop calling, informing Defendant 

that he was not the individual they were attempting to contact.” Id. ¶ 16. Based on these 

allegations it appears that Citibank contacted Juarez “seek[ing] to collect a consumer debt . . . 

alleged to be due and owing from [Juarez].” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2.

Citibank points to Sanchez v. Client Services, Inc. and People v. Persolve, LLC, as cases 

demonstrating that only the person “who actually or allegedly owes the debt at issue” can bring a 

claim under the Rosenthal Act. Sanchez v. ClientServs., Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 n.3 

(N.D. Cal. 2007); Persolve, LLC., 218 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1272 n.1 (2013). Neither of these 

cases resolves the dispute here, where Juarez claims that Citibank contacted him and alleged he

owed a debt; in Sanchez it was clear that only the plaintiff’s mother was alleged to owe a debt, and 

in Persolve LLC the State of California brought claims on behalf of California debtors and did not 

face individual standing issues. 

In Masuda v. Citibank, N.A., the Hon. Phyllis Hamilton assessed whether a plaintiff had 

standing under the Rosenthal Act in nearly identical circumstances. 38 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1133 

(N.D. Cal. 2014). There, a plaintiff alleged that “he received over 300 calls from Citibank seeking 

to collect on a Citibank Mastercard consumer credit card” that did not belong to him. Id. at 1132. 

The court found that the plaintiff “ha[d] standing to bring an action under the Rosenthal Act 

because he fits perfectly well into the second classification of debtor—those who are alleged to 

have a consumer debt due and owing.” Id. at 1133. Judge Hamilton’s analysis from Masuda is 

persuasive. I conclude, on the facts alleged, that Juarez is a “debtor” under the Rosenthal Act’s 

definition and has standing to bring his Rosenthal Act claim.

III. ROSENTHAL ACT SUFFICIENCY OF CLAIM

Juarez bring his Rosenthal Act claim under sections 1788.11 (d) and (e) which prohibit a 

debt collector from causing a telephone to “ring repeatedly or continuously to annoy” and from 

communicating with a debtor with “such frequency as to be unreasonable and to constitute an 

harassment to the debtor under the circumstances.” Cal. Code §§ 1788.11 (d) and (e). 

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Citibank argues that Juarez fails to state a claim under the act because he alleges only that 

he received a large number of calls and makes no allegations “regarding the content of any call” or 

that any calls “were accompanied by abusive or threatening messages.” Mot. 7. Citibank points 

to a number of cases in support of its claim that “the number of calls alone is not sufficient and 

cannot itself constitute harassment.” See, e.g., Snyder v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 15-cv03049-JSC, 2015 WL 7075622, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (“A plaintiff must allege more 

than a defendant’s ‘communications’ or a ‘high volume of phone calls’ to state a claim under the 

RFDCPA.”) (internal citation omitted). 

But Juarez has done far more than allege he received a certain number of phone calls. In 

addition to alleging that he received 42 calls, Juarez has included a chart detailing the precise date 

and time he received these calls over the course of 12 days. Compl. ¶ 2. This chart demonstrates 

a pattern of calls in that Juarez received multiple calls a day, every day, for a 12 day period. Id.

Juarez also alleges that he “repeatedly requested that Defendant stop calling, informing 

Defendant that he was not the individual they were attempting to contact. Defendant’s calls 

continued despite Plaintiff’s requests.” Id. at 16. While there is no bright-line rule as to what 

conduct is sufficient to establish harassment under the Rosenthal Act, courts have found that 

calling an individual after learning or being informed that they do not owe the debt at issue 

“plausibly constitutes behavior whose natural consequence was to harass, oppress, or abuse.” 

Crockett v. Rash Curtis & Assoc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding 

harassment plausible where debt collector “very likely received notice from the contents of 

plaintiff’s outgoing answering-machine message . . . that it was calling the wrong number.”); see 

also Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (where 

the debt collector knew the debt “was invalid, the natural consequence of repeatedly calling 

[plaintiff] to demand payment of that debt was to ‘harass, oppress, or abuse.’ ”). 

Because Juarez alleges that Citibank called him multiple times a day, every day for close to 

two weeks and did not stop calling despite Juarez informing Citibank that he was not the 

individual they were attempting to contact, he has plausibly alleged that Citibank engaged in 

harassing behavior under sections 1788.11 (d) and (e). Citibank’s motion to dismiss Juarez’s 

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Rosenthal Act claim is DENIED.

IV.CLASS DEFINITIONS

Citibank moves to strike Juarez’s class definitions on the basis that they create improper 

“fail-safe” classes. This motion is premature. See Yastrab v. Apple Inc., 2015 WL 1307163, at * 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) (“[I]n general, class allegations are not tested at the pleading stage.”); 

Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 2013 WL 1892337, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (“[C]lass allegations 

are better addressed through a class certification motion, after the parties have had an opportunity 

to conduct some discovery.”): Morris v. SolarCity Corp., No. 15-cv-05107-RS, 2016 WL 

1359378, *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2016) (“While class allegations may be stricken at the pleading 

stage in the appropriate case, doing so is not warranted here. . . . [as defendant] has not presented 

any argument that would completely preclude class certification.”). Citibank’s motion to strike 

Juarez’s class definitions is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outline above, Citibank’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Juarez (1) 

adequately pleaded a “concrete injury” to establish Article III standing on his TCPA claim, (2) is a 

“debtor” under the Rosenthal Act, and (3) has pleaded sufficient facts to allege that Citibank’s 

phone calls were intended to harass. Citibank’s motion to strike Juarez’s class definitions is 

DENIED as it is not ripe at this stage of the litigation. Citibank shall answer within fourteen days 

of the date below.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2016

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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