Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07204/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07204-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRIYA SANGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AHE AHN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-07204-JCS 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RELIEF FROM SCHEDULING 

ORDER, MOTION TO AMEND, AND 

MOTION TO STRIKE JURY DEMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 54

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Priya Sanger and Michael Sanger move for leave to file an amended complaint 

after the deadline set by a scheduling order. The Sangers’ sole existing claim is under California’s 

codification of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. The Sangers seek to add allegations on 

information and belief that Defendant Ahe Ahn (rather than her daughter, non-party Leah Ahn) 

owns the real property in dispute and add a quiet title claim on based on those allegations, and to 

remove all allegations and claims against Defendant Lance Ahn, as well as the Sangers’ claim for 

money damages. Based on the proposed removal of their claim for damages, the Sangers seek to 

strike the Ahns’ jury demand. The Ahns contend that the Sangers’ proposed amendment is 

untimely, not brought diligently, prejudicial, and brought in bad faith.

The Court held a hearing on September 13, 2019. Because the Sangers did not act 

diligently, the motion for relief from the scheduling order is DENIED. Without such relief, the 

proposed amendment is untimely, and is also DENIED, although the Sangers may voluntarily 

dismiss their claim against Lance Ahn and their prayer for damages if they so choose. At this 

time, however, the request for damages remains in the complaint, and the motion to strike the 

Ahns’ jury demand is therefore DENIED, without prejudice to the Sangers renewing that motion 

Case 3:18-cv-07204-JCS Document 69 Filed 09/26/19 Page 1 of 7
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after the Court resolves the Ahns’ pending motion for summary judgment.1

II. BACKGROUND

The proposed amendment is based on Ahe Ahn’s testimony at her deposition, which took 

place on July 10, 2019. The Sangers contend that until this testimony, they lacked a sufficient 

basis to allege that Ahe Ahn owned the property: 

Q: Did Leah Ahn pay any part of the down payment for the Lombard 

property?

A: No. It’s all my money.

Q: Has she paid any of the mortgage payments with her own money?

A: No.

Q: You made all the mortgage payments for her?

A: Yes.

Q: From 2004 to present?

A: Yes.

Q: So all the money she spent on the Lombard property has been your 

money?

A: Yes, it’s mine.

Q: She hasn’t paid anything as far as you know?

A: No.

Utrecht Decl. Ex. D (Ahe Ahn Dep.) at 47:3–19.

Q: Were you intending to become an owner of the Lombard property 

yourself when you sent the money?

A: Owner? Yeah, maybe.

Id. at 53:3–6.

Q: Did you and Leah ever have an agreement that you would get all 

of the profits on her unit if it was sold?

A: Not in that specific terms, but the unit itself is mine. So it’s 

supposed to -- I'm the -- supposed to get everything.

 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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Id. at 198:12–17. According to the Sangers, this testimony supports a new argument that Ahe 

Ahn’s purported lien on the property was extinguished by merger as a result of her also holding 

title to the property, regardless of whether any transfer was voidable under the UVTA.

The scheduling order in this case provided that the last day to seek leave to amend 

pleadings would be May 15, 2019—two weeks later than the May 1, 2019 date initially proposed 

by the parties. Case Mgmt. & Pretrial Order (dkt. 40) at 1; Joint Initial Case Mgmt. Statement 

(dkt. 35) § 5. The deadline to complete non-expert discovery is October 31, 2019. Id. § II.B. The 

deadline to hear dispositive motions and motions to exclude expert testimony is January 24, 2020, 

with rules for briefing schedules that would likely require those motions to be filed no later than 

December 6, 2019, and each party . See id. § III. A jury trial of no more than five days is set to 

begin on May 4, 2020. Id. § I. The Ahns elected to file their summary judgment motion early, on 

July 29, 2019, noticed for a hearing on October 11, 2019. See Mot. for Summary J. (dkt. 53).

That motion has not yet been heard or decided.

The initial case management conference occurred on March 15, 2019. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

initiated efforts to take Ahe Ahn’s deposition by asking defense counsel on March 28, 2019 for 

available dates. Hurwitz Decl. ¶ 5. In response to that initial request and subsequent requests over 

the following months, defense counsel repeatedly either stated his intent to respond soon but did 

not do so, or failed to respond at all. Id. ¶¶ 5–8. The deposition did not occur until July 10, 2019. 

See Utrecht Decl. Ex. D. The Ahns’ opposition brief and supporting declarations do not dispute 

that the Ahns and their counsel were responsible for the delay in Ahe Ahn’s deposition taking 

place.2 The Sangers brought their present motion on August 2, 2019, soon after receiving the 

transcript of Ahe Ahn’s deposition, and the Ahns do not argue that the delay between the 

deposition and filing the motion was unreasonable. See Opp’n at 14.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Deviations from scheduling orders are governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

 

2 There also appears to have been a delay in the Ahns’ production of potentially relevant 

documents, through no fault of the Sangers. 

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Procedure, which provides that such orders “may be modified only for good cause and with the 

judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Ninth Circuit has established a standard for such 

modification that focuses on the diligence of the party seeking relief from a deadline:

Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy . . . , Rule 16(b)’s 

“good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence of the party 

seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial 

schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the 

party seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s 

notes (1983 amendment). Moreover, carelessness is not compatible 

with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. 

Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing 

the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, 

the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 

modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

Courts look to a party’s diligence not only in complying with the scheduling order after it has been 

issued, but also “in creating a workable Rule 16 scheduling order,” as well as “in seeking 

amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that [the party] could not comply with 

the order.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999).

B. The Sangers Did Not Act Diligently

If the Sangers had no reason to think that Ahe Ahn’s testimony might provide a basis for 

amendment, they could perhaps be forgiven for failing to take more assertive action either to 

ensure that the deposition occurred before the May 15, 2019 deadline to amend pleadings, or to 

extend that deadline long enough to allow the deposition to occur before it expired. There is 

ample evidence, however, that the Sangers had reason to believe that such testimony was at least a 

possibility.

In a March 27, 2017 brief seeking Ahe Ahn’s deposition in an arbitration proceeding, the 

Sangers—represented by the same counsel as in this case—argued that Ahe Ahn’s testimony 

would be relevant to determine whether she owned the property at issue, and thus whether the 

same theory of merger they now propose to assert in their amended complaint would be viable:

. . . Leah Ahn has also said that she and her mother purchased the 

Property together. Leah Ahn has been inconsistent in stating who 

owns the Property – whether she owns it jointly with Ahe Ahn or 

whether she owns it alone. Getting Ahe Ahn’s testimony will be 

helpful to the Sangers to understand what the ownership structure of 

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Leah Ahn’s interest in the Property is, because if Ahe Ahn is a [sic] 

undisclosed principal with Leah Ahn as her agent, then Ahe Ahn’s 

Deed of Trust merged with her ownership interest.

Leah Ahn Decl. Ex. A at 6. The Sangers ultimately were not able to take Ahe Ahn’s deposition in 

the course of the arbitration. The Sangers also alleged in their operative first amended complaint, 

filed March 29, 2019, that Ahe Ahn may have provided funds to Leah Ahn with the intent of 

taking an unrecorded ownership interest in the property:

Based on testimony given by Leah Ahn in a deposition and at 

arbitration, the Sangers are informed and believe, and on that basis 

allege, that at the time of Leah Ahn’s purchase of her interest in the 

Property, Defendant Ahe intended the $124,000 was either for an 

unrecorded ownership interest of Ahe, or it was a gift or an unsecured 

loan to Leah Ahn.

1st Am. Comp. ¶ 28.

The Sangers contend that they had good reason to question Leah Ahn’s credibility and not 

to rely on her inconsistent statements regarding ownership of the property, and thus lacked a good 

faith basis to allege that Ahe Ahn owned the property until they took Ahe Ahn’s deposition. The 

Court need not reach that question. It is enough that the Sangers understood that Ahe Ahn’s 

deposition might result in such evidence.

The 2017 arbitration brief makes clear that the Sangers believed Ahe Ahn’s deposition 

testimony might disclose an ownership interest sufficient to support a theory of merger. The 

Sangers argued in that brief that such a possibility was one reason why the deposition was 

necessary. The Sangers’ first amended complaint makes clear that they still believed at the time 

that they were pursuing Ahe Ahn’s deposition in this case that she might have sought to obtain an 

ownership interest. Under these circumstances, there is reason to question the Sangers’ assertions 

that they neither “believe[d] they would find any evidence to support” their ownership and merger 

theory nor “expect[ed] that Defendant Ahe [Ahn] would admit to being an owner in her 

deposition.” Cf. Reply at 3, 11. At the very least, the Sangers recognized a distinct possibility that 

the deposition would result in evidence supporting their theory.

If, as the Court concludes, the Sangers recognized that Ahe Ahn’s deposition testimony 

might give them reason to amend their complaint to add a new theory of recovery, the Sangers did 

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not act diligently. At least three options were available to them that could have prevented them 

from missing the deadline. First, the Sangers could have proposed a deadline for amendments 

more than two months after the initial case management conference, and explained that they 

needed sufficient time to investigate a theory they suspected but did not yet feel justified in 

alleging. Second, the Sangers could have unilaterally noticed Ahe Ahn’s deposition before the 

deadline to amend, rather than two weeks after its expiration. See Hurwitz Decl. ¶ 9 (indicating 

that counsel first served a deposition notice “[o]n May 31, 2019, more than two months after 

[counsel’s] initial request for deposition dates”). Third, the Sangers could have made clear to 

defense counsel that they believed Ahe Ahn’s testimony might support a potential amendment and 

requested a stipulation to extend the amendment deadline if defense counsel could not ensure that 

the deposition occurred before the existing deadline. 

Instead, the only action that counsel for the Sangers took before the deadline for 

amendment was to request on three occasions that defense counsel provide potential dates for Ahe 

Ahn’s deposition. See id. ¶¶ 5–7 & Exs. A–C. In an email dated May 3, 2019 that appears to be 

the last relevant communication before the deadline, counsel for the Sangers indicated that they 

could not take the deposition on May 21, 2019, but that they would “have much more flexibility 

with dates if the deposition will be held here [in San Francisco].” Id. Ex. C. Nothing in that email 

or any of counsel’s other communications indicated that the Sangers wished to take Ahe Ahn’s 

deposition before the amendment deadline, or that they considered the deadline relevant in any 

way.

A party that had no reason to believe it might uncover grounds for amendment might not 

reasonably be expected to take the amendment deadline into account in scheduling a deposition, 

but given the Sangers’ apparently understanding of such a possibility—particularly their own 

argument to that effect two years earlier—the lack of any serious effort to ensure that the 

deposition occurred before the amendment deadline does not reflect diligence. Because the “party 

[seeking relief] was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

3

 

 

3 Although Ninth Circuit precedent requires this Court to decide the motion based on the Sangers’ 

lack of diligence, nothing in this order should be construed as excusing defense counsel’s repeated 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Sangers’ motion is DENIED. The Court does not 

reach the parties’ remaining arguments.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

 

failure to provide meaningful responses to requests to schedule his client’s deposition.

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