Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01412/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01412-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LELAND COMBS,

Inmate Booking No. 11109312,

Civil No. 11cv1412 MMA (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b)

vs.

JAMES PASTO; STAN JONES;

SAN DIEGO PUBLIC DEFENDER’S

OFFICE; CITY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On June 22, 2011, John Leland Combs (“Plaintiff”), an inmate currently incarcerated at

the San Diego Central Jail located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, submitted

a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2]. On July 15,

2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed his

Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). See

July 15, 2011 Order at 7. Plaintiff was granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint in order

Case 3:11-cv-01412-MMA-WVG Document 5 Filed 08/15/11 Page 1 of 7
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to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff

filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or

portion thereof, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires courts to review complaints

filed by prisoners against officers or employees of governmental entities and dismiss those or

any portion of those found frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Prior to the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only

frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing a prisoner’s suit make and rule

on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The district court should grant leave to

amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

1995)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while liberal

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not

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initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). 

As currently pled, it is once again clear that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to

state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the

conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

As Plaintiff did in his original Complaint, he seeks to sue his private retained counsel and

the counsel appointed to represent him in his criminal proceedings for “legal malpractice” and

“criminal negligence.” (Compl. at 3.) However, a person “acts under color of state law [for

purposes of § 1983] only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County

v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326

(1941)). Attorneys appointed to represent a criminal defendant during trial, do not generally act

under color of state law because representing a client “is essentially a private function ... for

which state office and authority are not needed.” Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States

v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when publicly appointed counsel

are performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with clients, investigating possible defenses,

presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not act under color of state law for

section 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Polk County, 454

U.S. at 320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding

that public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 because, so long as he

performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “his function,” no matter how ineffective,

is “to represent his client, not the interests of the state or county.”). Neither James Pasto, the

attorney retained by Plaintiff, nor Stan Jones, the attorney appointed to represent Plaintiff are

“state actors” for § 1983 purposes. 

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Pasto and Jones must be dismissed for failing to

state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

& 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. 

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the

alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, his claim amounts to an attack on the validity

of his underlying criminal proceedings, and as such, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unless and until he can show that conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent

such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause

of action under § 1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2388

(2004). 

Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction

or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by

a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim challenging the

legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under §

1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the

plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds

in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

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Here, Plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Pasto and Jones

“necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and continuing incarceration.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Were Plaintiff to succeed in showing that Pasto and Jones rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel, an award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity”

of his conviction. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed

on ineffective assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below

objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial would

have been different); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1992) (remedy for

ineffective assistance of counsel is a conditional writ granting petitioner’s release unless state

retries him or allows him to pursue an appeal with the assistance of counsel within a reasonable

time). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks damages for allegedly unconstitutional criminal proceedings

in a criminal case, and because he has not alleged that his conviction has already been

invalidated, a section 1983 claim for damages has not yet accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-

90. 

Plaintiff also names the San Diego Public Defender’s Office as a Defendant in this matter.

An agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper defendant under § 1983. Vance

v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Rather, the county or city

itself is the proper defendant. See Id. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it

employs a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on

a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive

relief where the constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference

to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the

constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); see

Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Trevino v.

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state a § 1983 claim against the City

of San Diego, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that his injury was caused by individual

officers whose conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or practice. See KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 624. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim

against the City of San Diego because he has failed to allege that any individual officer’s

conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or practice. 

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be

dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 4] is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A(b). Moreover, the Court finds further amendment would be futile.

See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend

is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since plaintiff has

not, and cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed

without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d

904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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2) IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that an IFP appeal from this final order of

dismissal would not appear to be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th

Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be

frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 15, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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