Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02887/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02887-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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Case No. 5:14-cv-02887-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 

DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ABRAHAM PORTNOV,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

CARNIVAL CORPORATION, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 5:14-cv-02887-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS AND DENYING 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(Re: Docket Nos. 33, 34, 40)

After dismissing his claims for improper venue,1 the court granted Plaintiff Abraham 

Portnov leave to amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies. Seeing no new allegations in 

Portnov’s amended complaint that avoid the mandatory arbitration clause that the court considered 

before, Defendant Carnival Corporation moves to dismiss once more. In response, Portnov moves

for sanctions as well as for summary judgment. 

As explained below, the court again GRANTS the motion to dismiss for improper venue, 

this time without leave to amend, DENIES the motion for sanctions as procedurally improper and 

DENIES the motion for summary judgment as moot. 

I.

 Portnov purchased a cruise ticket from Carnival just over a month before his cruise was set 

to embark. Based on a dispute over whether Portnov needed a visa in order to board the cruise in 

 

1 See Docket No. 30. 

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Case No. 5:14-cv-02887-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 

DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Argentina, Portnov claims that Carnival discriminated against him by intentionally giving him the 

run-around.2 In his amended complaint, Portnov alleges that this series of events caused him 

significant stress and lasting physical harm.3 Carnival seeks to dismiss the amended complaint on 

the grounds that the venue is improper and that Portnov has not pleaded any new allegations that 

might render the mandatory arbitration contract unenforceable. 

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

The parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 

28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, “[e]very defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be 

asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following 

defenses by motion: . . . (3) improper venue.”4 “[I]n the context of a Rule 12(b)(3) motion based 

upon a forum selection clause, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

non-moving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party.5

III.

First, Carnival moves to dismiss under the law of the case doctrine. The doctrine holds that 

if a court makes a decision at an earlier stage of a case, it should adhere to that decision in later 

stages unless “(1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest 

injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or 

(3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.”6 Here, the court previously 

“determined that both the contract and the arbitration clause are valid and enforceable” and “the 

 

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 Portnov ultimately was allowed to board the cruise ship. See Docket No. 32. 

3 See id.

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 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). 

5 Murphy v. Schneider National, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003). 

6 Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997); see Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 

(9th Cir. 1993) (“[A] court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been 

decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.”).

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Case No. 5:14-cv-02887-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 

DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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terms of the forum selection clause [thus] must be honored.”7 Absent any indication that the 

court’s decision was “clearly erroneous” the ruling must therefore stand. 

Had Portnov’s amended complaint addressed the ticket contract and the terms therein 

differently or presented the court with a new reason to believe that venue in this court is proper, 

there might be a reason to revisit the determination of enforceability. Instead, in his amended 

complaint Portnov takes issue with the court’s previous ruling and argues against it by simply 

reiterating his primary argument—that he was not aboard the ship when the discrimination 

occurred and thus was not a guest, rendering the allegations at issue here outside the scope of the 

ticket contract’s arbitration provision. But as this court has made clear, “the contract itself defines 

‘guest’ as ‘all persons or entities booking or purchasing passage and/or traveling under [the] 

[c]ontract.’”8 In order to be bound by the ticket contract, Portnov did not need to board the ship at 

all. He merely had to purchase the ticket, which he did readily and willingly. And he has 

presented no evidence that he did anything to the contrary. 

Portnov also claims that the fact that this court granted his application to proceed in forma 

pauperis indicates the court essentially approved his complaint and his case.9 But Portnov 

misapprehends the purpose and the effect of an order granting IFP status. The IFP statute specifies 

that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal—(i) is 

frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”10 In other words, the court’s 

ruling that Portnov qualified for IFP status was not a determination of the merits of his claim but 

rather a procedural determination that he could not afford to pay the initial filing fee. The court is 

 

7 Docket No. 30 at 6. 

8 Id. at 4 (citing Docket No. 19-5).

9 See Docket No. 32 at 2. 

10 28 U.S. § 1915(e). 

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Case No. 5:14-cv-02887-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND 

DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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perfectly within its purview to dismiss such a case at this stage.11 Because the court has already 

given Portnov the opportunity to amend his claims to remedy their deficiencies and his amendment 

failed to do so, the court finds that any further amendment would be futile.12 The motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED without leave to amend.

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Second, Portnov moves for sanctions against Carnival under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 on the 

grounds that Carnival misrepresented facts in the course of its pleadings. Before it can address the 

merits of the motion, the court must note that a Rule 37 motion is procedurally improper at this 

time because it only applies to a party who disobeys a court order to provide or permit discovery.14 

This case has not yet even entered the discovery phase. 

Even had Portnov styled his motion for sanctions as one under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,15 it 

 

11 See, e.g., McSweeney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 10-cv-02119, 2010 WL 4065779, at *1 

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010) (“Although the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed IFP, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court is under a continuing duty to 

dismiss an IFP case whenever the Court determines that the action “fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted.”); Stickler v. Cal. State Police, Case No. 12-cv-00385, 2012 WL 1409677, at 

*2 (“Notwithstanding IFP status, the Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds 

. . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 

(9th Cir. 2000) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua 

sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim.). 

12 See Pedigo v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 24 F. App’x 779, 785 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] district court 

does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where the proposed amendment would be 

futile or where the amended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss.”) (citing 

Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998)); Low v. LinkedIn Corp, 900 

F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Defendant’s first motion to dismiss placed Plaintiffs on 

notice regarding the deficiencies of these claims in the complaint, and Plaintiffs failed to cure the 

defects in the Amended Complaint.”). 

13 The court therefore does not reach Portnov’s motion for summary judgment. See Docket No. 40. 

The motion is DENIED as moot. 

14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (“If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery 

. . . the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders” including sanctions.). 

15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)-(c):

(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or 

other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’ 

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 

circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as tot harass, cause 

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increased the cost of litigation; 

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