Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05044/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05044-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 12, 2015 Decided June 16, 2015

No. 14-5044

JAMES E. MURPHY,

APPELLANT

v.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00573)

Ishan K. Bhabha, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

for the appellant. David W. DeBruin and Paul M. Smith, 

appointed by the court, were with him on brief.

James E. Murphy, pro se, filed the brief for the appellant. 

Peter R. Maier, Assistant United States Attorney, argued 

the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., United 

States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, were with him on 

brief. Dionne S. Shy, Assistant United States Attorney, 

entered an appearance.

USCA Case #14-5044 Document #1557659 Filed: 06/16/2015 Page 1 of 16
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Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and MILLETT, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: James 

Murphy is a federal prisoner. He submitted a request under 

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to the 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA), a part 

of the United States Department of Justice. See Harris v. 

Gonzales, 488 F.3d 442, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2007). FOIA requires 

federal agencies to produce “records” upon request unless one 

of nine statutory exemptions applies. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(3)(A). Murphy sought grand jury information for 

two criminal cases. The EOUSA gave Murphy most of the 

information that he requested but it declined to disclose the 

dates and times of day that the grand jury met to hear testimony 

and consider evidence in the two cases. The EOUSA invoked 

exemption 3 to justify its non-disclosure. Murphy 

contends—unsurprisingly—that exemption 3 is inapplicable 

and filed suit to compel the EOUSA to disclose the withheld 

material. The district court ultimately held that exemption 3 

was properly invoked and granted summary judgment to the 

EOUSA. We affirm.

I

FOIA implements “a general philosophy of full agency 

disclosure.” DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 

Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 (1989). The statute requires federal 

agencies to make “records promptly available” when an 

individual submits a “request for records which (i) reasonably 

describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with 

published rules.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). An agency, 

however, can reject the request if it “fall[s] within one of nine 

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exemptions.” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 

(2011); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). The United States

Supreme Court has stated that the exemptions must be 

“narrowly construed” because “the mandate of the FOIA calls 

for broad disclosure of Government records.” DOJ v. Julian, 

486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (alteration omitted). The Court has also 

cautioned, however, that each exemption must be given 

“meaningful reach and application.” John Doe Agency v. 

John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989).

The exemption relevant here is exemption 3, which 

permits an agency to withhold records that are “specifically 

exempted from disclosure by statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 

We have recognized that “requests for documents related to 

grand jury investigations implicate FOIA’s third exemption.” 

Lopez v. DOJ, 393 F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Rule 

6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits 

certain persons designated therein (including government 

attorneys) from “disclos[ing] a matter occurring before the 

grand jury,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B), and, although a rule is 

not generally considered to be a statute, it qualifies as one 

under FOIA because the Congress has enacted it into positive 

law. See Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives and 

Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 867–68 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing 

Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2(a), 91 Stat. 319 (1977)). Hence, 

information related to a grand jury matter may be withheld 

under exemption 3 “if the disclosed material would tend to 

reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury’s investigation, 

including the identities of witnesses.” Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 

575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

In 2008, Murphy was charged with distribution,

possession and conspiracy to distribute and possess heroin and

crack cocaine. See United States v. Murphy, 460 F. App’x 

122, 123 (3d Cir. 2012). He was convicted of both counts 

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after a two-day jury trial and sentenced to 360 months’ 

imprisonment. Id. In 2013, Murphy submitted two FOIA 

requests to the EOUSA for “information and documents.”

Joint Appendix (JA) 25, 31. His first FOIA request asked for:

disclosure of the dates that the grand jury 

convened in reference to case # 1:08-CR-00433 

and case # 1:08-CR-314 filed in U.S. District 

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

including the names [sic] of the Judge who 

summoned the grand jury, the date the 

indictments were returned, the date they were 

discharged, the starting and ending date of the 

grand jury’s term, and a certified copy of the 

courts [sic] minute entries.

Id. at 39. Case number 08-CR-00433 is Murphy’s criminal 

case and case number 08-CR-00314 is a criminal case 

involving Richard Byrd.

Approximately two months later, Murphy submitted a 

second FOIA request that sought:

disclosure of the dates the grand jury issued the 

indictments pertaining to criminal No. 

1:08-CR-314 and 1:08-CR-0433 . . . including 

the dates and times of sessions the grand jury 

convened, whether it was summoned pursuant 

to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(a), or 18 U.S.C. 1331, and 

the certified letter requesting the special grand 

jury . . . the caption of the indictment . . . [and] 

an unredacted copy of the indictment of Case 

No. 1:08-CR-314 pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

49.1(b)(9).

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Id. at 42. Before the EOUSA responded to his requests, 

Murphy filed suit in federal district court.1

 He challenged the 

EOUSA’s invocation of exemption 3 and alleged that the grand 

jury indictments were inaccurate and that the EOUSA’s search 

for records was inadequate. He asked the court to order the 

EOUSA to produce the “agency records previously requested 

by [him].” Am. Compl. ¶ 1. 

After Murphy filed his complaint, the EOUSA responded 

to both of his FOIA requests. It first told Murphy that it 

intended to disclose “all records required to be released, or 

considered appropriate for release as a matter of discretion.” 

JA 45. These included “the date the grand jury was impaneled 

and expired; the name of the judge who supervised the grand 

jury; [and] the date on which the grand jury was convened and 

returned an indictment for each particular criminal case.” Id. 

at 37. It also disclosed that both of the “grand juries . . . were 

summoned pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(a).” Id. at 47. 

Other than its disclosure of the date on which the grand jury 

issued indictments, the EOUSA declined to provide the 

specific dates and “times the grand juries convened” between 

the date of empanelment and the date each grand jury was 

discharged “in order to protect the identity of witnesses and the 

 1

 Murphy properly filed suit before the EOUSA responded to his 

requests because he had constructively exhausted his administrative 

remedies. “As a general matter, a FOIA requester must exhaust

administrative appeal remedies before seeking judicial redress.” 

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 711 F.3d 

180, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But a requester “shall be deemed to have 

exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to [his] request” 

if the agency does not respond to the FOIA request within 20 

business days. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i), (C)(i). The EOUSA 

did not timely respond to Murphy’s FOIA requests and Murphy then 

began this litigation. 

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secrecy of the grand jury proceedings.” Id. It invoked 

exemptions 3 and 7(C) to support its decision.2 Id.

Less than one month after responding to Murphy’s second 

FOIA request, the EOUSA moved for summary judgment. 

The district court granted the motion in part. See Murphy v. 

EOUSA, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013). It held that 

Murphy’s claims regarding the accuracy of the records and the 

adequacy of the government’s search were premised on a 

“misunderstanding.” Id. at 5. According to the court, 

Murphy’s claim that some of the records were inaccurate and 

that others did not disclose what he “expected to find” did not 

amount to a FOIA violation. Id. It then found the EOUSA’s 

declaration, executed by EOUSA attorney advisor Kathleen 

Brandon, insufficient because it contained only one “obscure 

statement” related to exemption 3. Id. at 6. The court

therefore ordered the EOUSA to disclose each date and the 

times of day on each date that the grand jury convened to 

consider Murphy’s and Byrd’s cases.

3

 Id. at 7.

 2

 Exemption 7(C) permits an agency to withhold records “compiled 

for law enforcement purposes” if disclosure of such records “could 

reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Because we hold that the 

EOUSA properly invoked exemption 3, we do not address whether it 

also properly invoked exemption 7(C). See Larson v. Dep’t of 

State, 565 F.3d 857, 862–63 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“agencies may invoke 

the exemptions independently and courts may uphold agency action 

under one exemption without considering the applicability” of 

others).

3

 So that the record is clear, we describe exactly the information 

that was disclosed to Murphy. Murphy requested and received the 

date the grand jury was empaneled, the date the grand jury returned 

indictments and the date the grand jury was discharged. In his 

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second FOIA request, Murphy explicitly requested “the dates and 

times of sessions the grand jury convened” whenever the grand jury 

met to consider his case and Byrd’s case during the approximately 

six-month period between empanelment and discharge. JA 42; see 

also supra pp. 4–6 (describing Murphy’s FOIA requests and 

EOUSA’s response thereto). The EOUSA did not disclose that 

information to Murphy but did disclose it to the district court in 

camera. See Murphy v. EOUSA, 11 F. Supp. 3d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2014) 

(district court reviewed in camera “the documents which contain . . . 

the requested times that the grand jury convened”). The EOUSA 

also disclosed the same material to this Court in camera. The 

EOUSA counsel confirmed in a post-argument letter to this Court 

that the dates and times of day the grand jury met to consider 

Murphy’s and Byrd’s cases have not been disclosed to Murphy. 

Therefore, the only information in dispute—and the only 

information Murphy has not yet received—covers the dates and 

times of day the grand jury met to consider Murphy’s and Byrd’s 

cases as distinct from the dates the grand jury issued its indictments 

in the two cases.

What confusion may have existed is likely due to Murphy’s use 

of “convene.” “Convene” usually refers to the empanelment of the 

grand jury. See Convene, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 

2014) (“To call together, esp. for a formal meeting; to cause to 

assemble.”); see also, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 523 

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (independent counsel “convened a grand jury to 

consider evidence”). The EOUSA disclosed that information to 

Murphy. JA 45 (releasing the date the grand jury was empaneled to 

Murphy). But he also asked for the “dates and times of sessions the 

grand jury convened” to consider both his case and Byrd’s case. Id. 

at 42 (emphasis added). We take him to mean the dates and times 

the grand jury met to consider evidence or to deliberate in his and 

Byrd’s cases separate from the dates the grand jury indictments 

issued. Amicus agrees with our interpretation of Murphy’s FOIA 

request. See Amicus Br. 16 (Murphy has “the dates the grand juries 

began their sessions” but not the dates and times of day “the grand 

juries were in session” after empanelment).

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Both parties moved for reconsideration. See Murphy, 11 

F. Supp. 3d at 8. The EOUSA also filed a supplemental 

declaration, again executed by Brandon, in support of its 

motion. The district court noted that Murphy’s motion for 

reconsideration contained the same arguments he had 

previously made regarding the adequacy of the search and the 

accuracy of the records. See id. at 8–9. Because he did not 

identify “an intervening change in the law,” “new evidence not 

previously available” or “a clear error in the first order,” the 

district court denied his motion. Id.

The district court, however, granted the EOUSA’s motion 

for reconsideration after reviewing the withheld material in 

camera and concluding that it “contain[ed] information that 

would reveal secret aspects of a grand jury investigation.” Id.

at 9. Additionally, the court held that the withheld material 

was “inextricably intertwined” with non-exempt information, 

making it infeasible to segregate and produce any unprotected 

information. Id. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment 

to the EOUSA. Id. Murphy timely appealed. We appointed 

amicus curiae to present arguments in support of Murphy’s 

position. 

II

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve 

Sys., 647 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Our task on appeal 

is to “ascertain whether the agency has sustained its burden of 

demonstrating that the documents requested are exempt from 

disclosure under the FOIA.” Newport Aeronautical Sales v. 

Dep’t of Air Force, 684 F.3d 160, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(alteration omitted). An agency can meet this burden by 

submitting “affidavits [that] describe the justifications for 

nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail” and 

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“demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls 

within the claimed exemption.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 862. 

We have emphasized that an agency’s task is not herculean. 

The justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if 

it “appears logical or plausible.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted). We believe the EOUSA’s basis for invoking 

exemption 3 is both logical and plausible.

The EOUSA’s supplemental Brandon Declaration 

explains why releasing the dates and times of day the grand 

jury convened to consider Murphy’s and Byrd’s cases could 

reveal grand jury witness identities. Assume that a suspect 

knows his girlfriend witnessed the crime he is suspected of 

committing. Also assume (plausibly) that he can discover 

from friends or family members whether his girlfriend was 

absent from work or school on a particular day and time. 

Once convicted, the suspect wants to know whether his 

girlfriend in fact provided testimony to the grand jury. If the 

government discloses the dates and times of day that the grand 

jury convened, he can compare those dates and times with his 

girlfriend’s corresponding absences. If the grand jury met on 

a day and time that his girlfriend missed school or work, he 

could infer that she could have testified before the grand jury. 

See JA 56–57 (providing similar example).

4

 4

 This is not the only scenario that could involve a risk of disclosing 

the identity of a grand jury witness. The same risk could occur if 

the criminal defendant and the suspected grand jury witness are 

cellmates. Knowing when the grand jury met could provide an easy 

way for him to determine whether his cellmate was likely providing 

testimony. If the grand jury met on a day and at a time that the 

cellmate was absent, the inference is plain: His cellmate could have 

testified. Moreover, cellmates’ close proximity to one another 

enhances the opportunity for (and success of) retaliation, which 

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The EOUSA’s position is all the more reasonable because 

it is based on extensive experience. The EOUSA declarant 

was an assistant United States Attorney with more than twenty

years’ experience handling criminal cases in federal court. Id. 

at 56. She averred that she “went to great lengths” to keep 

grand jury proceedings secret in order to “protect the identity 

of the witnesses.” Id. Secrecy is essential because, in her 

experience, “defendants often went to great lengths to discover 

the identity of witnesses in their cases, both before and after 

trial.” Id. at 57. We cannot lightly brush aside both the logic 

and experience underlying the EOUSA’s decision to withhold 

the requested information. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Dep’t of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 

(suggesting government can justify disclosure under FOIA 

with “special knowledge based upon its experience”); Taylor v. 

Dep’t of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 

(government affidavits explaining why material was classified 

were entitled to deference because of affiants’ “experience”).

Granted, simply because an individual misses work or is 

otherwise unaccountably absent does not mean we can be 

certain that he provided testimony to a grand jury. But 

exemption 3 is not limited to circumstances that are certain to 

reveal a witness’s identity. Instead, the exemption is properly 

invoked if “the disclosed material would tend to reveal some 

secret aspect of the grand jury’s investigation, including the 

identities of witnesses.” Hodge, 703 F.3d at 580 (emphasis 

added; quotation marks omitted). A tendency need only make 

a result more likely. See Tendency, OXFORD ENGLISH 

DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“leaning,” “inclination” or “bent 

toward some . . . result”). The EOUSA has demonstrated how 

 

raises an even more compelling security concern than with someone

who is not confined with the defendant. See JA 56–57.

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disclosing the specific dates and times of day a grand jury met

to consider a particular “matter” makes it more likely that a 

witness’s identity can be discovered. See supra pp. 9–10; see 

also Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1350 (“[R]evealing the dates of 

preliminary interviews conducted for the purposes of 

‘screening’ potential [grand jury] witnesses may in fact tend to 

reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury.” (emphasis added; 

some quotation marks omitted)).

The EOUSA’s position also draws from the plausibility of 

its explanation for invoking exemption 3. It reasonably 

believes that a criminal suspect or defendant not only wants to 

discover a grand jury witness’s identity but that he may also 

want to retaliate against that witness. See JA 57 (if 

“defendants . . . discover the identity of witnesses,” “that 

person’s safety was in jeopardy”). Federal prosecutors are not 

the only ones who believe that grand jury witnesses confront a 

risk of retaliation; the Congress falls squarely in that camp as 

well. That is why federal law prohibits tampering with or 

retaliating against witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (witness 

tampering unlawful); id. § 1513 (retaliation against witnesses 

unlawful). These laws are not a solution in search of a 

problem; there are countless cases dealing with successful 

criminal prosecutions for both witness tampering and witness 

retaliation. See, e.g., United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 

1283 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction of “conspiring to 

retaliate against a witness” and “retaliating against a witness”); 

United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(affirming convictions of “conspiracy to kill a witness, killing a

witness with intent to prevent him from testifying, [and] 

retaliating against a witness” (citations omitted)); United 

States v. Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995) 

(affirming convictions of “retaliating against a federal 

witness”). And grand jury witnesses in particular—despite 

the government’s best efforts to keep their identities 

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secret—have not been immune from similar threats. See, e.g., 

United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2007) 

(affirming defendant’s sentence after he “pled guilty to 

retaliating against a grand jury witness”); United States v. 

Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming 

conviction of tampering with and retaliating against witness 

because jury could have found defendant’s “threat was 

intended in retaliation against [the witness] for his earlier 

testimony before the grand jury”).

The reported cases highlight that the risk of witness 

retaliation is real or, at least, “plausible.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 

862. The risk of retaliation against grand jury witnesses is one 

reason for maintaining grand jury secrecy. See United States 

v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681–82 (1958) 

(“long-established policy” of grand jury secrecy rests in part on 

“encourag[ing] all witnesses to step forward and testify freely 

without fear of retaliation”). The government plainly has a 

strong interest in witness safety.

While the consequence of disclosing information that 

tends to reveal the identity of grand jury witnesses is, by itself, 

substantial, that risk alone is not the only reason for protecting 

the times and dates a grand jury considered evidence or 

deliberated in a particular case. Disclosing the days and times 

a grand jury met to consider evidence and hear testimony 

would also reveal the content of grand jury deliberations by 

disclosing how long a particular “matter occurr[ed] before the 

grand jury,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), how much or how little 

evidence was weighed and which witnesses most occupied the 

grand jury’s time. That information could shed light on the 

nature of the grand jury’s investigative and deliberative 

processes. Because disclosing the day-and-time information 

Murphy sought would tend to reveal the complexity and 

“scope, focus and direction of the grand jury investigations,” 

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that information is protected from disclosure by Rule 6(e) even 

if no disclosure of witness identity or risk of retaliation exists. 

See Fund for Constitutional Gov’t, 656 F.2d at 869.

Amicus offers several rejoinders. We find none of them 

persuasive. First, amicus argues that the supplemental 

Brandon Declaration is insufficient because it does not point to 

an actual case in which a witness’s identity was revealed after 

disclosing the dates and times of day a grand jury met. But the 

basis for invoking exemption 3 need only be “logical or 

plausible.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 862. A risk of harm is 

plausible even if the anticipated harm has not yet materialized. 

See ACLU v. DOD, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A] 

reviewing court must take into account that any affidavit or 

other agency statement of threatened harm . . . will always be 

speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a 

potential future harm.” (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 

Likewise, an explanation is no less plausible because it posits 

persuasive hypotheticals rather than real-world examples. Cf.

Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v. ITC, 846 F.2d 

1527, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suggesting agency could have 

cured insufficient FOIA affidavit by providing “hypothetical 

examples”).

Second, amicus contends there is little risk that Murphy 

could use the requested information to identify grand jury 

witnesses because the grand juries convened five to seven 

years ago. But there is no time limit on the secrecy of grand 

jury proceedings. See Fund for Constitutional Gov’t, 656 

F.2d at 869 n.32 (“the chronological remoteness of grand jury 

proceedings bears no relevance to [a] FOIA inquiry” and “[t]he 

general rule [of grand jury secrecy] admits to no exception for 

old grand jury proceedings”). Moreover, we have previously 

decided FOIA cases seeking years-old grand jury information 

and not once intimated that the passage of time made Rule 6 

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inapplicable. See Hodge, 703 F.3d at 579 (2002 FOIA request 

seeking grand jury information related to 1985 conviction);

Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1347 (1997 FOIA requests seeking grand 

jury information leading to 1990 indictment).

Amicus further claims that the information which we have 

previously held to be covered by exemption 3 is different from 

the date-and-time information that Murphy wants. Amicus

states that, notwithstanding that documents that include the 

name of a grand jury witness necessarily disclose his identity, 

the same cannot be said for the dates and times of day a grand 

jury meets. This argument misunderstands what is needed to 

successfully invoke exemption 3. The test is whether “the 

disclosed material would tend to reveal some secret aspect of 

the grand jury’s investigation, including the identities of 

witnesses.” Hodge, 703 F.3d at 580 (emphasis added).

Finally, amicus identifies three cases in which the Justice 

Department allegedly disclosed the dates and times of day a 

grand jury convened to hear testimony. We find all three 

inapposite. In one, the Justice Department was ordered to 

disclose “the date the grand jury convened, the date the 

indictment was returned or issued, and the date the grand jury 

was discharged.” Hill v. DOJ, No. 11-cv-00273, ECF No. 29, 

at 8 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2011) (magistrate report and 

recommendation). This information revealed nothing more 

than when “the grand jury’s work began and ended.” Id. 

Murphy has this information for the two criminal cases 

identified in his FOIA requests. 

In the second case, the Justice Department declined to 

disclose “the dates the grand jury convened.” Peay v. DOJ, 

No. 04-cv-1859, 2007 WL 788871, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 

2007). The district court denied the government’s summary 

judgment motion because its declaration did not explain “how 

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the disclosure of the dates the grand jury convened would tend 

to reveal a ‘secret aspect’ of the grand jury investigation.” Id. 

In contrast, we have here the second Brandon Declaration. 

Amicus also points to North v. DOJ, 774 F. Supp. 2d 217 

(D.D.C. 2011), a district court case in which the Justice 

Department released “cover sheets and final pages of 

transcripts of grand jury testimony . . . that indicated the date 

that the testimony was given.” Id. at 220. The Justice 

Department had initially withheld the information; it was 

released only after the district court found its FOIA 

declarations wanting. Compare North v. DOJ, No. 

08-cv-01439, ECF No. 17-1, at 6, ¶ 19 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) 

(categorically denying “entire [FOIA] request” because “all of 

the materials requested were specifically identified as grand 

jury materials”), with id. ECF No. 71-1, at 5, ¶ 14 (D.D.C. Apr. 

15, 2010) (releasing documents that “allow plaintiff to see 

when the proceedings took place since the redactions do not 

include the dates”). The Justice Department’s initial response 

in North is consistent with the EOUSA’s position here, 

namely, that the dates and times of day the grand jury meets to 

consider a specific case are protected by exemption 3. In any 

event, North does not bind this court.5

 5 Amicus also contends that the district court’s segregability analysis 

was insufficient. We disagree. An agency can withhold records 

that are exempt from disclosure under FOIA but it must produce 

“[a]ny reasonably segregable” portion thereof that does not fit one of 

the statutory exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Here, however, there 

is no segregability problem. Murphy requested specific 

“information”—i.e., the dates and times of day the grand jury met to 

consider his case and Byrd’s case. JA 25, 31. Once the EOUSA 

declined to disclose the requested information, there was nothing left 

to segregate. Cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 366, 370 

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Finally, we address one remaining minor issue. In his 

informal brief to this Court, Murphy requested an unredacted 

copy of the indictment in Byrd’s case. Murphy admitted in 

district court that the only redacted information in the Byrd 

indictment was the grand jury foreperson’s name and 

signature. This information is plainly protected under 

exemption 3. See Hodge, 703 F.3d at 580 (exemption 3 

protects information that would “tend to reveal some secret 

aspect of the grand jury’s investigation, including the identities

of . . . jurors” (quotation marks omitted)). Although the 

EOUSA has not invoked exemption 3 to protect the identity of 

the grand jury foreperson, we can uphold ex mero motu

non-disclosure of information when ordering disclosure would 

“endanger the safety and privacy of third parties.” August v. 

FBI, 328 F.3d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also id. (“The law 

does not require that third parties pay for the Government’s 

mistakes.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is 

affirmed.

So ordered.

 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (segregability does not apply if “there simply are no 

‘reasonably segregable’ portions to release after deletion of the 

portions which are exempt.” (ellipsis and some quotation marks 

omitted)).

In addition, Murphy’s inadequate-search challenge fails 

because the adequacy of the search becomes a moot point if the 

requested information is in fact found but not disclosed. See 

Blanton v. DOJ, 64 F. App’x 787, 788–89 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam) (plaintiff’s challenge to adequacy of search was “moot” 

when agency “found th[e] [requested] documents”).

USCA Case #14-5044 Document #1557659 Filed: 06/16/2015 Page 16 of 16