Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05715/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05715-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 ALLEN DAVIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

GAIL LEWIS, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:02-cv-05715-AWI-TAG HC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

(Doc. 1)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections serving a sentence of

fifteen years to life, entered on March 25, 1999 pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of

California, County of Kern, in case number 75408A, following his conviction by jury of forcible

rape (Cal. Pen. Code § 261(a)(2)); forcible penetration with a foreign object (Cal. Pen. Code

§ 289(a)); assault with intent to commit oral copulation (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 220, 228a); possession of

a sawed-off shotgun (Cal. Pen. Code § 12020(a)); and false imprisonment (Cal. Pen. Code § 236). 

(Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal ( “CT”) 364-380; 461-462). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate

District (“5th DCA”), in case number F032999. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in

excluding evidence of two prior incidents of allegedly false reports of rape by the victim; that the

trial court erred in excluding evidence of specific instances when Petitioner had honored his

partner’s wishes not to engage in or to continue with sexual activity; and that the trial court erred in

failing to give CALJIC No. 2.01, a circumstantial evidence instruction, as to all counts. (Doc. 9,

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 1 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 2

Exh. B). The 5th DCA affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion filed on March 8, 2001. 

(Doc. 9, Exh. A). A petition for review was filed in the California Supreme Court on April 16, 2001. 

(Doc. 9, Exh. C). The petition raised the same grounds for relief as those raised in the Court of

Appeal. (Id.). The petition was summarily denied by the California Supreme Court on May 23,

2001. (Doc. 9, Exh. D). 

The instant petition was filed on May 29, 2002. (Doc. 1). Respondent’s answer was filed on

November 11, 2002. (Doc. 9). Petitioner’s traverse was filed on February 21, 2003. (Doc. 15).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the facts as summarized by the 5th DCA, in relevant part, as follows:

The victim, Charlene E., moved to Bakersfield in February or March of 1997. 

Newly divorced, she accepted the invitation of a childhood friend to come live in

her garage apartment. While in Bakersfield, Charlene met the appellant, with whom

she developed a “casual relationship” that included sexual relations on some four or

five occasions. Charlene returned to Oregon in February 1998, maintaining phone

contact with appellant. When Charlene needed to return to Bakersfield in July of

1998 to attend to a child custody matter, appellant offered to let her stay at his

townhouse. After three or four weeks, appellant and Charlene argued, and Charlene

went to stay with a former boyfriend, John Collier. Before leaving, however,

Charlene stole a check from appellant. Arrested when she attempted to cash to

forged check the next day, Charlene pled guilty and spent three weeks in jail.

On her release, Charlene returned to Collier’s apartment, awaiting arrival of a check

that would allow her to return to Oregon. After about a week, Collier told Charlene

she would have to leave. Charlene went to a park to await another former boyfriend

who lived nearby, hoping he would let her stay with him. Appellant learned of

Charlene’s whereabouts, went to the park, and told her he wanted to talk. Although

embarrassed about what had happened, Charlene agreed to return with appellant to

his townhouse.

At the townhouse, appellant proceeded upstairs to the bedroom. Charlene followed

him, turned to sit on the bed, and saw that appellant was holding a gun on her. 

Telling Charlene this was to be her confession, appellant turned on a video camera. 

For approximately the next 40 minutes, appellant confronted and berated Charlene

for stealing the checks, restraining her and pushing her back on the bed on several

occasions. He finally forcibly unclothed and sexually assaulted Charlene, at one

point holding the gun to her head in response to her continued pleading and

resistance. Appellant then instructed Charlene to take a shower, after which he

drove her back to the park...After telling her “[Y]ou took something from me and

now I took something from you,” appellant dropped her off at the park.

Charlene called Collier, who had difficulty understanding her because of her

emotional state. Collier drove to the park, took Charlene to a phone, and convinced

her to call 911. In the tape of the 911 call, the operator has difficulty even obtaining

Charlene’s name, although she is able to make clear Charlene was “raped at

gunpoint.”

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 2 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 3

Charlene told responding officers she thought a videotape had been made of the

incident. Officers executing a search warrant for the apartment the next morning

recovered the videotape from a kitchen cupboard. They also found a semiautomatic

handgun under a pillow on the bed, loaded, with the safety off and a bullet

chambered. The shotgun was found in a dresser drawer upstairs. Appropriate

charges followed.

At trial, Charlene testified that she did not consent to sex with appellant on the night

of September 11; she did not offer to have sex with him to atone for the theft, nor

were her actions on the tape the result of role-playing in a sexual fantasy. Rather,

she testified to being frightened by the gun during the incident. Charlene also

testified that when staying with appellant in the weeks prior to the September 11

incident, they were not having sex, nor had they previously ever engaged in “rough”

sex involving bondage or weapons. Questioned about her arrest, Charlene admitted

lying to the police initially about having forged the check. She also admitted to

having had problems with drugs. When the prosecution played an initial segment of

the September 11 tape, Charlene confirmed that it depicted her and appellant on that

night.

The September 11 Videotape

The videotape is approximately one hour long. Although the picture quality is poor

in the first few minutes, the remainder is clear. Much of the audio, however, is

unintelligible, since appellant often spoke softly and also turned on the television

several times. The videotape depicts a graphic and brutal rape.

The Defense

Appellant acknowledged he and the victim had been friends, sharing a relationship

that included sexual activity, sometimes involving bondage, sex toys, and roleplaying. He had videotaped their encounters. On some occasions, Charlene would

say no but the sex would continue, depending “[o]n whether she was serious or

not.” He also noted that Charlene would cry to get her way, sometimes during sex,

which he first thought strange but became “numb to” over time. Appellant played a

tape of a sexual encounter with Charlene that occurred during her first visit to

Bakersfield, in which she said “No,” but the sex continued “[b]ecause I know she

wanted it.” He said Charlene agreed to be taped on that occasion and had sex with

him subsequently, including during the weeks she stayed at his apartment before the

theft.

On the night of September 11, he testified, Charlene willingly left the park and went

to his apartment with him, after asking “[H]ow can I make it up to you?” At the

apartment, they sat downstairs and talked, and then Charlene began kissing him. 

Asked what sort of sex she wanted to have, Charlene said she wanted to “play

hard.” Appellant retrieved his handgun from upstairs, taking the bullet out of the

chamber in front of Charlene: “I made sure she saw it because just so she knew it

was empty.” They then went upstairs to the bedroom, he turned on the video

camera, and the encounter recorded on the videotape ensued. He ensured that the

gun’s safety was “on the whole time” and never put his finger on the trigger. 

Charlene’s crying and saying “No” during the encounter was acting on her part:

“Well, we already knew what we were going to do when we got up there so it was

just part of it.” On the drive back to the park, appellant told Charlene he did not

trust her and did not want to see her again, receiving a “cruel ...wicked eyeball” look

for his trouble.

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 3 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 4

Appellant acknowledged that the videotape was an accurate depiction of events the

night of September 11 and that he had turned on the television set because he did

not want neighbors to hear them. Regarding Charlene’s sexual preferences,

appellant observed “[S]he likes to have it taken from her. She wants you to force

yourself upon her.” 

Lynn Turner, the friend who had offered her garage apartment to Charlene in 1997,

testified that Charlene paid little, if any, rent, had a drug problem, and brought

unsavory companions onto the property. Turner said that when she confronted

Charlene about the latter, Charlene said one of the men, Damon, had forced sexual

relations on her. Charlene also had confided that a man named AD had raped her. 

In Turner’s opinion, Charlene was a “pathological liar” with a reputation for crying

to gain sympathy.

Appellant’s friends Stephanie Stuart and Monica Rodriguez testified appellant was

honest and not violent. Christine Becker, another friend, believed appellant to be

honest. Courtney Holland and Chavonne Benjamin, former girlfriends of appellant,

testified he was nonviolent in sexual situations. 

Rebuttal

Charlene testified that during the earlier “consensual” tape-recorded sexual

encounter, she was drunk and unaware she was being taped.

(Doc. 9, Exh. A, pp. 2-6).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn. 7, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as

guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Stanislaus 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d

751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

grounds by Lindh, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 4 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 5

after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is

therefore governed by the AEDPA.

II. Legal Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA, a petition for writ of habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of a state prisoner’s claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 413, 120

S.Ct. 1495; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court explains that

[A] state court decision is “contrary to” our clearly established [Supreme Court]

precedent if the state court it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in [Supreme Court] cases, or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court decision] and nevertheless arrives

at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.

. . . 

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court

precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

[Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.

. . .

The “unreasonable application” clause requires the state court decision to be more than

incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application of clearly established law must be

objectively unreasonable.

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73, 75 (citations omitted). 

Habeas Review of State Court Questions of Law

Challenges to purely legal questions resolved by the state court are reviewed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). “The question on review is (a) whether the state court’s decision contradicts a holding

of the United States Supreme Court; or (b) whether the state court, after identifying the correct

governing Supreme Court holding, then unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. “ Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The AEDPA denies habeas relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless

the state court proceeding resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 5 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 6

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court.

§ 2254(d)(1)’s reference to “clearly established Federal law” means the holdings (not dicta) of the

Supreme Court’s decisions, at the time of the state court’s decision. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 412. “A

state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if the state court

confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the Supreme

Court and, nevertheless, arrives at a result different from its precedent.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974

(citations omitted). “The ‘unreasonable application’ standard captures those cases in which ‘the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Id., quoting Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). The Supreme Court instructs that in applying the

“unreasonable application” standard, a federal habeas court should ask whether the state court’s

application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. Thus, a habeas writ cannot issue if the federal habeas court in its own judgment concludes that

the state court decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly; the application must also

have been objectively unreasonable. Id.

To determine whether a state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of

federal law, the federal habeas court looks to the “last reasoned decision of [a] state court as the basis

of the state court’s judgment.” Powell v. Galaza, 328 F. 3d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, when the state court

provides no reasoning for its decision, the federal court independently reviews the record to

determine whether under the AEDPA, the state court properly denied habeas relief, focusing on

whether the state court’s resolution of petitioner’s claim was an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Greene v. Lambert, 288 F. 3d 1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2002). “Only by that examination may [the federal court]

determine whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 982. 

///

///

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 6 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 §§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) address whether, and to what extent, a federal district court is

bound by state court findings on any of the dispositive factual questions presented in a federal habeas

petition. These statutes provide as follows: 

(D) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

. . .

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgement of a State court, a 

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption

by clear and convincing evidence. 

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 7

Review of State Court Questions of Fact 

Federal habeas challenges to purely factual questions determined by the state courts are

reviewed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2); “[t]he question on review is whether an appellate panel, 

applying the normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is

supported by the record. [F]act-based challenges founded on evidence raised for the first time in

federal court are reviewed under § 2254(e)(1); the question on review is whether the new evidence

amounts to clear and convincing proof sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness given

the state court’s factual findings.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003); Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, under

the AEDPA, state court factual determinations are presumed correct in the absence of clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary. In addition, state court decisions which are adjudicated on the

merits and based on factual determinations will not be overturned on habeas review under AEDPA

unless the decisions were objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceedings. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently interpreted §§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1)1, and

held both provisions apply to challenges supported by separate categories of evidence. Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); Lambert, 393 F.3d at 971-973. In Taylor, the Ninth

Circuit held that the “unreasonable determination” clause of § 2254(d)(2) applies to intrinsic review

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 7 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 8

of a state court’s process, i.e., circumstances in which a petitioner challenges the state court’s

findings based entirely on the state court record. Id. at 999-1000. In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit also

held that § 2254(e)(1) applies to challenges based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for

the first time in federal court. Id. As explained in Taylor: “[I]t is not enough that we would reverse

in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision; rather, we must be

convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not

reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Likewise,

mere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court’s findings of fact is insufficient; “we must be

satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is

pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was

adequate. Id.; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972. 

In the event a habeas petition presents no intrinsic challenge to a state court’s factual

determinations, or if it does, the factual determinations survive an intrinsic review, the factual

determinations are then “dressed in a presumption of correctness, which [ ] helps steel them against

any challenge based on extrinsic evidence.” Id., citing Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 999-1000.

State court factual findings “may be over-turned based on new evidence presented for the first time

in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the state-court

finding is in error.” Id. 

Review of State Court Mixed Questions of Law and Fact

A mixed question of law and fact is one that requires the application of legal principles to

historical and other facts. § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness is restricted to pure questions of

historical fact. Lambert, 393 F.3d at 976. However, “[s]tate decisions applying law to facts are

governed by § 2254(d)(1); however, factual findings underlying the state court’s conclusions on the

mixed issue are accorded a presumption of correctness.” Id., citing Jeffries v. Wood. 114 F.3d 1484,

1498 (9th Cir. 1997) (AEDPA “further restricts the scope of federal review of mixed questions of law

and fact. De novo review is no longer appropriate; deference to the state court factual findings is.”),

further citing Rupe v. Wood,93 F.3d 1434, 1444 (9th Cir. 1997) (voluntariness of confession is a

legal question not entitled to presumption of correctness but the state court’s finding that no threats

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 8 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 9

or promises were made was “essentially a factual conclusion, which is entitled to a presumption of

correctness”). 

A federal court reviewing a state court decision based on a mixed question of law and fact

must “first separate the legal conclusions from the factual determinations that underlies it. Factfinding underlying the state court’s decision is accorded the full deference of §§ 2254(d)(2) and

(e)(1), while the state court’s conclusion as to the ultimate legal issue–or the application of federal

law to the factual findings–is reviewed per § 2254 (d)(1) in order to ascertain whether the decision is

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established’ Supreme Court

precedent.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d at 977-978. 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

The instant petition alleges the following grounds for relief:

Ground 1. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

by excluding two of the victim’s prior rape accusations.

Ground 2. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

by excluding important character evidence.

Ground 3. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

by failing to give CALJIC No. 2.01.

Ground 1. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by excluding two of the victim’s prior rape accusations.

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by excluding evidence

of two incidents in which the victim had purportedly told others that someone had raped or sexually

assaulted her. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

A. Defense Evidence Regarding Prior Sexual Assault Allegations.

Prior to trial, and pursuant to California Evidence Code § 782, the defense sought leave to

introduce at trial evidence of several prior incidents when the victim, Charlene Eastlick, had

purportedly told friends and acquaintances that she had been sexually assaulted. (CT 70). At the

commencement of a lengthy pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the defense indicated that it would present

evidence of six separate prior allegations of sexual assault by the victim. (RT 4). Defense counsel

summarized the incidents as follows: (1) several members of a co-ed softball team would testify that

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 9 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The defense withdrew its request to present evidence regarding this incident after being unable to verify that it was

anything more than a mere “rumor.” (RT 43-44). 

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 10

the victim had been raped by “most if not all of the men on the softball team”2; (2) an incident in

April 1997 when the victim charged that Adolphus Williams, whom she met at another bar, had

taken her home and raped her (the “Williams incident”); (3) an incident at the home of Robert and

Lynn Turner, from whom the victim rented a garage-apartment, in which the victim told the Turners

that she had just been raped by two men in the garage (the “garage incident”); (4) a November 1997

claim to the victim’s then-boyfriend, John Collier, while at a local bar, that she had been raped by a

bar patron named “Damon” six months earlier (the “Damon incident”); (5) an attack on Eastlick by

Damon later that night after Collier left her (the “second Damon incident”); and (6) an incident in

Oregon in 1997 when, after disappearing from work for several days, the victim returned and

indicated that her boyfriend, Tyrone Carr, had held her hostage and raped her (the “Oregon

incident”). (RT 4-8). 

The defense did not indicate it would prove the prior allegations were false; instead, it

intended to rely on the fact that the sheer number of prior sexual assault allegations, all made within

the span of two years, made the victim inherently incredible and established a pattern of her making

false allegations of sexual assault. (RT 17). The Court will summarize the evidence proffered as to

each incident and then analyze whether the exclusion of any of these incidents violated Petitioner’s

right to Due Process.

1. The Williams Incident.

At the pre-trial hearing, Lynn Turner, who, along with her husband Robert, had leased a

garage-apartment to the victim during 1997, testified that shortly after the victim moved into the

garage-apartment, she told Turner she had been raped by one Adulfus Williams, whom she had met

at a bar called Rocking Rodeo. (RT 92). The victim had been hysterical afterward and Turner had

contacted the Alliance Against Family Violence to assist her. (RT 92). The next night, the victim

returned to the same bar. (RT 95). Eastlick testified that she had told Collier, a former boyfriend,

about the incident on several occasions. (RT 194). 

///

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 10 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 11

After the hearing, the prosecution withdrew its objection to this evidence because it intended

to establish that Collier had confused the Williams incident with the “Damon” incident and that

Collier’s testimony about the victim’s prior rape allegation regarding Damon was merely the result

of a misunderstanding and not evidence of a separate rape allegation. (RT 246). 

During trial, the victim, on cross-examination, was asked about the Williams incident. She

testified that when her girlfriend left the Rocking Rodeo early, the victim needed a ride home and

Williams offered her one, but then raped her. (RT 347). Although the victim later filed a complaint

with police and submitted to a medical examination, the prosecutor declined to prosecute. (RT 348). 

When the defense sought to elicit more specific information about the Williams incident, the

prosecutor objected and a hearing was held in camera, at the conclusion of which the court refused to

permit defense counsel to inquire further into the details surrounding the Williams assault. (RT

384). The court based its decision on Evidence Code § 352 and the fact that placing more

information before the jury regarding Williams would result in “a second rape trial here involving

Mr. Williams and I don’t want to get involved in it.” (Id.). 

2. The Garage Incident.

During the pre-trial hearing, Robert Turner testified that the victim lived in the couple’s

garage-apartment for eight months. (RT 74). At some point, Turner told his wife that he wanted the

victim to leave because she had men coming to her apartment frequently. (RT 77). Lynn Turner had

relayed to her husband various conversations she had with the victim in which the victim discussed

her sex life. (RT 82). Once, while Turner was outside doing chores, he heard two male voices

coming from the victim’s apartment. (RT 75). Turner assumed the men were having sex with the

victim because of the nature of the sounds he heard, which included angry statements such as, “Take

that, you fucking bitch.” (RT 76). Subsequently, Turner saw two African-American males leaving

the apartment. (RT 79). Turner had seen the two before and after this incident. (RT 77). Later,

Lynn Turner told her husband that the victim had indicated she had been raped by the two men. (RT

83). 

Lynn Turner was a childhood friend of the victim. (RT 85). After her husband complained

to her about the victim’s male visitors, Lynn Turner told the victim, who began to cry and got upset

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 11 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 12

and apologetic. (RT 86). The victim “alluded” to the fact that she had been raped by these men, that

she was afraid of them, and that if she did not let them in her apartment they might have hurt her. 

(RT 87). Lynn Turner admitted that she could not remember the victim’s exact words, but that she

had gotten the “impression” that the victim had been raped. (RT 90). The victim had told Lynn

Turner that one of the men was named Damon and that he had physically abused her. (RT 91). 

During her trial testimony, the victim testified that she lived in the Turner’s garage-apartment

for three or four months but that Robert Turner did not like the fact that the victim dated AfricanAmerican men. (RT 188). During the summer of 1997 while she was living at the Turner’s

apartment, Damon, an acquaintance, slapped her around. (RT 190). 

In Lynn Turner’s trial testimony, she conceded that the victim had never used the words

“rape” or “sexual assault” with respect to Damon. (RT 531). She recalled that Eastlick had told her

Damon had been physically rough with her but “maybe not raped her.” (Id.). Indeed, Turner finally

acknowledged that, on further reflection, the purported sexual assault by Damon “may have been

consensual.” (Id.). 

3 & 4. The Two “Damon” Incidents.

John Collier, a correctional officer at Wasco State Prison, dated the victim for a short time in

November 1997. (RT 149). Once, Collier and Eastlick went to Sharkey’s Bar, where the victim

pointed out an individual named Damon. (RT 150). Eastlick was tense and shaking and indicated

that Damon had done something to her on a prior occasion. (Id.). On their second visit to the same

bar, Collier testified that Damon was once again there. (Id.). At some point, Eastlick told Collier

that, as they had walked through the crowd in the bar, Damon had struck her in the back. (RT 150). 

When the couple went outside, Collier confronted Damon, who denied punching the victim. 

(RT 151). When Collier tried to console the victim, she told him that he had done something to her

on a prior occasion, and when Collier inquired further, the victim said Damon had raped her. (RT

152). 

Collier took Eastlick home and then returned to his own residence; however, when he

arrived, Eastlick had already left a telephone message asking him to come back to her residence

immediately. (RT 153). When Collier arrived at the victim’s residence, the front door was open, the

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 12 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 13

screen was open, and the victim was lying on the floor with her ripped undergarments nearby. (RT

154). She told Collier that Damon had come to the back door, had entered, and physically assaulted

and threatened her if she told anyone else about what had happened previously. (RT 154). Collier

called the police, but when they interviewed the victim, she was “really dazed” and could only

mumble answers to officers. (RT 155). 

Eastlick testified that the incident at Sharkey’s and the subsequent attack by Damon

happened essentially as Collier had described. (RT 190-198). However, Eastlick denied ever telling

Collier that Damon had raped her; in fact, he had physically assaulted her and that was why she was

afraid of him. (RT 194). She testified she had told Collier about a previous rape by Adulfus

Williams, implying that Collier may have confused the two incidents. (RT 194). 

At trial, the victim again denied ever telling Collier or the Turners that Damon had sexually

assaulted her, insisting that the assaults by Damon had been physical only. (RT 345-346). In his

trial testimony, Collier never testified that the victim told him she had been sexually assaulted by

Damon on the night they went to Sharkey’s Bar; moreover, although he recalled the victim telling

him that Damon had raped her on a prior occasion, he admitted that it was possible she had been

referring to the Williams incident. (RT 480; 482). 

5. The Oregon Incident.

Tammy Buttner lives in Portland, Oregon and works at an Albertson’s grocery store where

the victim had worked. (RT 112, 114). At some point in the summer of 1998, the victim did not

come to work for three or four days. (RT 114). When the victim finally came to work, she told

Buttner that her boyfriend had held her against her will. (RT 116). The victim did not tell Buttner

that she had been sexually assaulted by the boyfriend. (RT 117). Later, Buttner helped the victim

obtain a restraining order against the boyfriend and also helped her remove her belongings from his

residence. (RT 117). 

A defense private investigator, Harlin Hunter, testified that he had gone to Oregon to

interview Buttner, who had related the Oregon incident to him. (RT 126-127). At that meeting,

Buttner told Hunter that the victim had told her she had been sexually assaulted by the boyfriend

while she was held against her will. (RT 128). Hunter kept no notes of his interview, he obtained no

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 13 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 14

police reports or court documents from Oregon, and he prepared no written report of the

investigation. (RT 129-130). Instead, he testified entirely from memory. (RT 129). 

The victim testified that she and Buttner had met at work and were best friends. (RT 183). 

In the summer of 1998, the victim had a boyfriend, Tyrone Carr, that Buttner did not like. (RT 183). 

Carr, for his part, did not like Buttner or the victim’s other friends and wanted her to get another job. 

(RT 184). During that summer, Carr kept the victim at home for three or four days, refusing to let

her go to work; although Carr abused her physically during this episode, he did not sexually assault

her. (RT 184-186). 

B. The State Court’s Rulings On The Proffered Evidence.

As mentioned, the prosecution withdrew any objection to the admission of the fact of the

Williams allegation of sexual assault, and the defense withdrew its request to admit evidence of the

softball team incident. The trial court found that the allegations purportedly made to the Turners and

to Collier regarding Damon all referred to the same incident and that the “garage incident” was not a

separate rape allegation from the first “Damon” incident. (RT 228). Although the court never

expressly ruled on the admissibility of the “garage incident,” testimony was presented at trial by the

Turners and Collier regarding the “garage incident” and the first “Damon” incident, both of which

apparently involved but a single allegation of assault by Damon, the victim claiming it was physical

assault and two witnesses recalling it as sexual assault. Implicitly, therefore, the state court admitted

this evidence. Testimony was also presented as to the Williams incident, as indicated above. 

Hence, the defense having withdrawn the softball team incident, the only remaining incident

related to the purported sexual assault by Damon after Collier had taken the victim home from

Sharkey’s Bar, i.e., the “second Damon incident.” However, the defense presented no evidence that

the victim ever told Collier, the police, or anyone else that Damon had sexually assaulted her on that

occasion. Accordingly, and contrary to both the Petitioner’s and Respondent’s assertions, of the

original six incidents offered by the defense, the only incident of purported sexual assault that was

actually excluded by the trial court was the Oregon incident. 

///

///

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 14 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 15

C. The Exclusion Of The Oregon Incident Did Not Violate Due Process.

As mentioned previously, under the AEDPA, habeas relief will not be granted unless the

adjudication of a state prisoner’s claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The strongest source of clearly established law implicating

Petitioner’s claim is Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142 (1986). Although addressing

the exclusion of the circumstances of a defendant’s confession, the Supreme Court in Crane

nevertheless reaffirmed the general principle that criminal defendants have a “fundamental

constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.” Id. at 687 (citing California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984)). As Justice O’Connor observed:

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

...or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the sixth Amendment,

...the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.” 

Id. at 690 (citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485). (Citations omitted). 

“A state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal habeas corpus relief only if it renders

the state proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.” Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d

86, 87 (9th Cir. 1993)(per curiam); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991)

(reemphasizing that federal habeas court may not reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions.). The Supreme Court has defined the category of infractions that violate fundamental

fairness very narrowly. See McGuire, 112 S.Ct. at 482. “To evaluate whether exclusion of evidence

reaches constitutional proportions, we should consider five factors: (1) the probative value of the

excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by

the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5)

whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530

(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091(1991). The Court must then balance the importance of

the evidence against the state interest in exclusion. Id.; Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir.

1985) In so doing, a court must consider the purpose of the rule; its importance; how well the rule

implements its purpose; and how well the purpose applies to the case at hand. Stagner, 757 F.2d at

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 15 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 16

994-995. The court must give due weight to the substantial state interest in preserving orderly trials,

in judicial efficiency, and in excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence. Id. 

Applying these factors to the state court’s exclusion of the Oregon incident, the Court

concludes that Petitioner’s Due Process rights were not violated by the state court’s decision. The

probative value of the Oregon incident on the central issue of consent was de minimis. Whether

Eastlick had endured a sexual assault by her boyfriend Carr in Oregon when he held her against her

will for several days to keep her from going to work had negligible relevance on whether the victim

suffered a sexual assault at the hands of Petitioner or, conversely, was engaging in “kinky” sex with

him. Moreover, the evidence of the Oregon incident as a prior allegation of sexual assault rested

entirely on the hearsay testimony of Buttner as related by the defense investigator Hunter, the only

individual to characterize the victim’s allegation as one of sexual assault rather than physical assault. 

 Hunter testified entirely from memory and could provide no corroborating notes or reports.

Given the foregoing, the evidence would have been difficult for the jurors to evaluate. 

Additionally, the evidence was merely cumulative of several other episodes of prior allegations of

abuse–some sexual, some physical–with which the victim was confronted on cross-examination and

which she acknowledged. In light of all of these circumstances, and especially in light of the highly

prejudicial and damaging videotape shown to the jury, it is impossible to conclude that the excluded

evidence constituted a major part of the defense. The mere existence of the one prior accusation that

possibly involved sexual assault would not, by itself, have persuaded the jury that the victim was

incredible or that the version of events to which she testified at trial was a lie. 

Moreover, the state had a significant interest in excluding this evidence. which, as mentioned,

was cumulative and whose probative value was clearly outweighed by its potential for misleading or

prejudicing the jurors. See Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 531. Thus, given the unreliability, the minimal

relevance, and the cumulative nature of the proposed testimony, as well as the “wide latitude” given

to determinations of state court judges excluding “marginally relevant” evidence, Crane, 476 U.S. at

689-690, the state court’s decision to exclude the Oregon incident cannot be said to have rendered

the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate Petitioner’s due process rights. See

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 16 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The defense originally sought admission of the Oregon incident pursuant to California Evidence Code § 782, which

limits the types of information that can be admitted against a sexual assault victim at trial. It is possible that the state court

would have erred in considering the evidence under that section. See People v. Franklin, 25 Cal.App. 4th 328, (1994)(holding

that evidence relating to sexual conduct is admissible if the sexual conduct itself is not the fact from which the jury is asked

to draw a credibility reference, but instead from the fact that the witness stated as true something that was false). The state

court ultimately excluded the Oregon incident pursuant to California Evidence Code § 352, which provides in part that a

court, in its discretion, “may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing

the issues, or of misleading the jury.” And, regardless of whether the state court excluded the evidence under § 782 or § 352,

this Court’s analysis of any potential due process violation stemming from the excluded evidence would be the same and

would reach the same conclusion. 

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 17

Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530; Bueno, 988 F.2d at 87.3

The Court additionally concludes that even if the state court erred in excluding the evidence,

and even assuming, arguendo, that such an error rose to the level of a constitutional violation, the

error was harmless constitutional error under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (“A federal court

may grant habeas relief based on trial error only when that error had substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”); Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 119 S.Ct. 500

(1998). The United States Supreme Court has held that the appropriate standard on collateral

review for trial errors such as that asserted in Ground One is whether the error resulted in “actual

prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622- 623, 638. 

Petitioner has failed to show actual prejudice resulting from the trial court’s exclusion of the

prior incident. The prosecution’s primary evidence was the videotape of the sexual assault. The 5th

DCA described the videotape as depicting as “graphic and brutal rape.” (Doc. 9, Exh. A, p. 4.) 

Indeed, even the transcript of the videotape, though lacking the visual impact of the videotape itself,

was nevertheless chilling. (CT 152-182). Unquestionably, any reasonable juror would have formed

an opinion, based on the provocative nature of the events portrayed in the videotape, as to whether

the sexual encounter therein depicted was consensual or not. The testimony of the victim and

Petitioner would only serve the tangential purpose of corroborating the jurors’ already-formed

impressions regarding guilt or innocence. 

From this perspective, any excluded evidence tending to impeach the victim in a marginal

way could not “actual[ly] prejudice” Petitioner’s defense. Moreover, the state court effectively

permitted the jury to hear about all instances of prior sexual or physical abuse allegations by the

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 17 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 18

victim with the sole exception of the Oregon incident. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked

the victim specifically if she had made three such allegations within a seventeen month period and

the victim acknowledged that she had. (RT 347). In his closing argument, defense counsel

maintained that the frequency of such allegations made the victim inherently incredible:

“A total of three rapes in the course of 17 months. Now, was Ms. Eastlick being

willfully false when it came to that? I think we all know the answer to that. It was

willful, she was being wilfully false. Was that material, was that relevant? It has a

lot to do with her credibility.”

(RT 778). 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was given an ample and reasonable opportunity to present

this issue to the jury and the addition of the Oregon incident would not have appreciably altered the

jury’s consideration of the issue as it relates to the victim’s credibility. Under such circumstances,

the Court concludes that the trial court’s error, if any, in excluding the Oregon incident did not have

a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict. Hence, it is harmless. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision regarding this

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

Accordingly, Ground One must be denied.

Ground 2. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by excluding important character evidence.

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by excluding evidence

of specific instances in which Petitioner, during sexual activity with a female, had respected the

female’s request either not to have sex or not to continue with sex. Petitioner’s contention focuses

the Court’s inquiry on the state trial court’s decision permitting testimony that Petitioner was not

violent during sex but prohibiting testimony as to specific instances in which Petitioner had

respected his partner’s decision not to proceed with sexual activity. Ground Two is without merit.

The defense presented four witnesses who testified to Petitioner’s character for non-violence

and truthfulness. Stephanie Lynell Stuart, Courtney Dawn Holland, Monica Rodriguez, and

Chavonne Benjamin each testified that they were friends of Petitioner and that he was non-violent

and truthful by nature. (RT 536; 540; 556; 571). Additionally, Holland and Benjamin, both former

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 18 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 19

sexual partners of Petitioner, testified that, in their opinions, Petitioner was non-violent in a sexual

setting. (RT 540; 571).

While admitting the above testimony, the trial court excluded further testimony by Holland

regarding specific occasions when Petitioner complied with her request to discontinue a particular

activity, e.g., if Petitioner asked to videotape the couple during sex, or asked Holland to submit to

using bondage restraints, or made some other request which Holland declined. (RT 541-550). The

defense represented to the court that Benjamin, who had been involved in a six year sexual

relationship with Petitioner, would testify to similar episodes if counsel were permitted to question

her about them. (RT 549). 

The trial court ruled that Petitioner’s compliance when the women refused bondage or

videotaping was irrelevant to the issue of consent. (RT 551). Testimony from Petitioner’s former

sex partners would be permitted insofar as it related to Petitioner’s character for non-violence, even

his non-violence in a sexual setting. (RT 549). However, the court ruled, such testimony was not

relevant insofar as it merely indicated that the women had a sexual relationship with Petitioner and

that he had never raped them. (RT 549). 

As with Ground One, the clearly established federal law relating to a state court’s exclusion

of evidence can be traced back to Crane, 476 U.S. at 687, and analyzed under the factors set forth in

Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530-531. Applying the Tinsley factors in this context, the Court cannot

conclude that the state court’s exclusion of such evidence violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to

due process.

First, viewed in light of all of the evidence presented at trial, the probative value of the

excluded evidence was minimal. As Respondent correctly points out, both Holland and Benjamin

testified that Petitioner was non-violent in a sexual setting. The excluded testimony, regarding

specific instances when Petitioner wished to engage in an activity that Holland or Benjamin

refused–including videotaping, bondage, and other activities not directly related to sexual contact

itself—along with their testimony that Petitioner had respected their wishes, did not have direct

relevance to the issue of consent in the charged offenses. Moreover, as the trial court observed,

testimony by former girlfriends that Petitioner did not rape them was not relevant or probative of

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 19 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 20

whether the actions depicted on the videotape admitted at trial constituted “rough” sex or a brutal

rape. 

Also, given the testimony by Holland and Benjamin as to Petitioner’s character for nonviolence in a sexual setting, as well as Rodriguez’s and Stuart’s testimony that, in their opinions,

Petitioner was both non-violent and truthful, the excluded evidence would have added little if

anything of value to the quantum of evidence already presented to the jurors regarding Petitioner’s

positive qualities.

Thus, as was true with Ground One, the evidence excluded can hardly be characterized as

comprising a “major part of the attempted defense.” The key evidence was the videotape. The

testimony of the victim and Petitioner conflicted as to how to interpret that videotape, but both sides

presented substantial evidence impeaching the other’s credibility and, to an extent, supporting their

own credibility. As mentioned, four female witnesses testified to Petitioner’s non-violence and

truthfulness. If, in sifting through this abundance of character and credibility evidence, the jurors

had not already accepted Petitioner’s version of events as true and rejected the victim’s version, then

it is not reasonably likely that the excluded testimony about specific instances in which Holland or

Benjamin made a sexual request that Petitioner honored would not have changed jurors’ minds. 

Although it may be argued that the excluded evidence was reliable and capable of evaluation

by the jurors, the other two factors in Tinsley, the clear balance weighs here in favor of the state

court’s exclusion of this evidence. Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530-531.

As Respondent correctly notes, this outcome is entirely consistent with the federal standard

for excluding specific instances of conduct when eliciting character evidence. In Michelson v.

United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), the United States Supreme Court explained the vagaries

involved in the admission of character evidence as follows:

What commonly is called ‘character evidence’ is only such when ‘character’ is

employed as a synonym for “reputation.’ The witness may not testify about

defendant’s specific acts or courses of conduct or his possession of a particular

disposition or of benign mental and moral traits; nor can he testify that his own

acquaintance, observation, and knowledge of defendant leads to his own

independent opinion that defendant possess a good general or specific character,

inconsistent with the commission of acts charged.” 

Id. at 477.

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 20 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 21

Of course, in California, Evidence Code §§ 1101 and 1102, under which the state court

proceeded in this case, permit a wider latitude for admission of specific instances of conduct to

support character evidence testimony. However, the critical point is that, regardless of California’s

more permissive evidence rules, the exclusion of evidence here did not violate federal standards for

admission of evidence and thus does not constitute a violation of Petitioner’s federal constitutional

rights.

Moreover, even if, arguendo, the state court erred in excluding evidence of specific instances

when Petitioner respected the wishes of his partner, any error was harmless because Petitioner has

not shown actual prejudice resulting from the trial court’s ruling. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. The

combination of prosecution evidence—the videotape, the testimony of the victim, corroborating

testimony from independent witnesses about her demeanor immediately after the assault, and the

forensic evidence, including the loaded handgun retrieved from Petitioner’s bed—all paint a highly

convincing picture of Petitioner’s guilt. It is unnecessary for this Court to assess whether the

prosecution’s case was, as the 5th DCA and Respondent maintain, “overwhelming.” Certainly, it was

legally solid and highly persuasive on many levels. On the other hand, Petitioner’s sole line of

defense was that the scene depicted in the videotape was, contrary to appearances, actually a form of

play-acting about which the victim lied when she testified at trial. Given the foregoing, it is

improbable and highly unlikely that admission of the excluded testimony would have had any

significant effect on the outcome of the case. Thus, the state court’s decision to exclude this

evidence did not actually prejudice Petitioner and is, therefore, harmless. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622-

623, 638

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the state court rulings approving the exclusion of

this evidence were not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, Ground Two should be denied.

///

///

///

///

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 21 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4Although defense counsel did not expressly object to the court’s decision not to instruct, he did request that, if the

court were not going to instruct the jury on No. 2.01 as to all charges, he should be allowed to argue to the jury that the

instruction applied to the rape charge. (RT 727). Thus, the issue was properly preserved by a timely objection. 

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 22

Ground 3. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by failing to give CALJIC No. 2.01.

Finally, Petitioner contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury by giving

CALJIC No. 2.01 regarding circumstantial evidence. As with the other two grounds, this contention

is without merit.

A. Procedural History.

At trial, the state court indicated that it intended to give CALJIC No. 2.01 as to count four,

possession of an illegal weapon, but not as to the other four counts. (RT 726). The court’s rationale

was they “all agreed that this was not a case...where the People were relying upon circumstantial

evidence....” (RT 726). This was true because the primary evidence for the State was the videotape,

which the state court accurately characterized as an “eye witness account of the incident,” and the

testimony of the victim herself, a percipient witness. (RT 728). Since instruction No. 2.01 “only

applies to cases where the jury is being presented with circumstantial evidence from which they’re

asked to infer facts and those facts which are inferred [the] prosecutor would be relying upon for

binding [sic] of guilt,” the instruction was improper as to all counts except that of possessing an

illegal weapon, a charge that requires circumstantial proof that the weapon has been illegally

modified. (RT 728). 4 

The Fifth DCA did not expressly address the merits of Petitioner’s contention on direct

appeal. (Doc. 9, Exh. A, p. 9). Rather, the appellate court took the position that, because defense

counsel was able to “fully and forcefully” raise and discuss the circumstantial evidence in closing

argument, any error in failing to instruct the jury as to the rape charge was harmless. (Id.). 

B. CALJIC No. 2.01.

CALJIC No. 2.01, provides as follows:

However, a finding of guilt as to any crime may not be based on circumstantial

evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory

that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other

rational conclusion.

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 22 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 23

Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to

establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other

words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the inference

necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Also, if the circumstantial evidence [as to any particular count] permits two

reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other

to [his][her] innocence, you must adopt that interpretation that points to the

defendant’s innocence, and reject that interpretation that points to [his][her] guilt. 

If, on the other hand, one interpretation of this evidence appears to you to be

reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the

reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.

CALJIC No. 2.01. 

The Use Note to CALJIC 2.01, citing various California cases, indicates that the instruction

must be given, sua sponte, by the court when the prosecution rests “substantially or entirely on

circumstantial evidence.” CALJIC 2.01, Use Note. However, the Use Note cites cases that advise

that “[t]his instruction is unnecessary where the prosecution does not substantially rely on

circumstantial evidence.” Id. Moreover, the comment indicates that “[t]he instruction should not be

given when the problem of inferring guilt from a pattern of incriminating circumstances is not

present.” CALJIC No. 2.01, Comment.

Here, of course, the prosecution’s case did not rest “substantially on circumstantial

evidence.” To the contrary, this Court agrees with the state trial court’s assessment that the

prosecution’s case was primarily comprised of direct evidence, i.e., the videotape of the incident and

the victim’s testimony. While some circumstantial evidence was admitted on the rape charge, the

case did not “substantially rely” on it and, under those circumstances, it would torture logic to

construe the prosecution’s case as requiring the jury to “infer guilt from a pattern of incriminating

circumstances.” Accordingly, the state court correctly applied California law in refusing to instruct

the jury on CALJIC No. 2.01 as it related to the charge of sexual assault.

C. No Federal Law Violation Occurred.

Petitioner’s burden, however, is to establish that the state court’s failure to instruct on

circumstantial evidence rose to the level of a federal constitutional error. Generally, the issue of

whether a jury instruction is a violation of state law is neither a federal question nor a proper subject

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 23 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 24

for habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). ("We have stated many times

that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)

(“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be

corrected on federal habeas”). Thus, normally, a claim that challenges the propriety of a jury

instruction under state law cannot reasonably be construed to allege a deprivation of federal rights. 

Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986). Indeed, federal courts are bound by state

court rulings on questions of state law. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989).

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not normally state a

claim cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72

(1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, the petitioner must show that

the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process. See id. at 72. The constitutional significance of the omission of an instruction will depend

upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett v. Godinez,

67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

Additionally, the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered

in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. The Court must evaluate jury

instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.

See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982), citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154. 

Furthermore, even if it is determined that the instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due

process, the petitioner can only obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial

influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637 (whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.). See Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will

support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater

than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 24 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 25

154. Moreover, an individual such as Petitioner in this case whose claim involves the omission of an

instruction “bears an especially heavy burden,” because an omission is less likely to be prejudicial

than a misstatement of the law. Id. at 155. 

Here, the instruction was correctly refused under state law as to the rape charge because, as

discussed above, the prosecution’s case on the sexual assault charge did not “substantially” rely on

circumstantial evidence. Nor does federal law require such an instruction. In Holland v. United

States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-140 (1954), the Supreme Court considered the practice of instructing the

jury in a manner similar to that reflected in CALJIC No. 2.01 and disapproved of the practice. In

Holland, the defendants, husband and wife, were convicted of income tax evasion in a prosecution

based upon a “net worth” method of proof. Id. at 125. On appeal, the defendants argued that the

trial court had erroneously refused to instruct the jury that where the Government’s evidence is

circumstantial, it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. Id.

at 139. While recognizing that some authority existed for such an instruction, the Supreme Court

nevertheless went on to conclude that “the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on

the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is

confusing and incorrect....” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit, discussing Holland, noted the import of the Supreme Court’s ruling as

follows:

“The Supreme Court did more than reject the particular instruction before it; it

clearly stated that no instruction is to be given distinguishing the manner in which

direct and circumstantial evidence are to be weighed. Since circumstantial and

testimonial evidence are indistinguishable so far as the jury’s fact-finding function

is concerned, all that is to be required of the jury is that it weigh all of the evidence,

direct or circumstantial, against the standard of reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969). 

Here, the jury was instructed that “both direct and circumstantial evidence are acceptable as a

means of proof”; that “[n]either is entitled to any greater weight than the other”; that the jury was the

sole judge of the believability of witnesses; that the character of the witnesses for honesty or

truthfulness could be considered in determining their credibility; that character evidence could be

considered in making credibility determinations; and that evidence of Petitioner’s good character

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 25 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 26

could be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. (CT 258; 262-263; 275; 279). The jury

was also fully instructed regarding reasonable doubt and the applicable burden of proof. (CT 287). 

Given the comprehensive instructions regarding the different types of evidence, the credibility of

witnesses, and the burden of proof, due process and federal law require no more. Holland, 348 U.S.

at 139.

Consequently, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his trial was rendered fundamentally

unfair by the state court’s failure to instruct on CALJIC No. 2.01. See McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72; see

also Van Pilon, 799 F.2d at 1342. 

Moreover, even if the failure to give the instruction were error, it was harmless under Brecht. 

Petitioner was given a full and fair opportunity to impugn the victim’s credibility, which Petitioner 

did on numerous occasions throughout the trial and in closing argument. As the 5th DCA observed, 

“[W]e fail to see how making these arguments louder, as it were, would have

changed the outcome in this case. The jury was entitled to view that tape and

conclude that, whatever else may have transpired between [Petitioner] and the

victim on other occasions, or between the victim and other people, [the victim]

did not consent to [Petitioner’s] actions on the night of September 11.”

(Doc. 9, Exh. A, p. 10). Hence, the failure to instruct on CALJIC No. 2.01 did not “actually

prejudice” Petitioner, and thus any error is harmless. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622- 623, 638.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1), be DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Replies to the

Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail)

 ///

///

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 26 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 27

after service of the Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2006 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:02-cv-05715-AWI -TAG Document 23 Filed 03/21/06 Page 27 of 27