Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00757/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00757-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARK HUDDLESTON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 07-0757-C

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of Social Security, 

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying his claims for disability insurance benefits

supplemental security income. The parties have consented to the exercise of

jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all

proceedings in this Court. (Docs. 20 & 21 (“In accordance with the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to

have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this

case, . . . order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment

proceedings.”)) Upon consideration of the administrative record, plaintiff's

Case 1:07-cv-00757-C Document 22 Filed 05/29/08 Page 1 of 12
1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (Docs. 20 & 21 (“An appeal from a judgment

entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for

this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this district

court.”))

2

proposed report and recommendation, the Commissioner's proposed report and

recommendation, and the parties’ arguments at the May 15, 2008 hearing

before the Court, it is determined that the Commissioner's decision denying

benefits should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this decision.1

Plaintiff alleges disability due to diabetes mellitus and depression. The

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the following relevant findings:

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments:

diabetes mellitus and depression (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and

416.920(c)).

...

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals

one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

...

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the

undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual

functional capacity to perform [work activity] at least at the

sedentary strength or exertional level, in function-byCase 1:07-cv-00757-C Document 22 Filed 05/29/08 Page 2 of 12
3

function terms (SSRs 83-10 and 96-8p). The claimant’s

mental residual functional capacity would limit him to

unskilled work.

Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a

time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket

files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is

defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of

walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job

duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required

occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met (20 CFR

404.1567(a) and 416.967(a)).

...

On June 8, 2005 Dr. Dannelley completed [a] Physical

Capacities Evaluation form for the claimant. On the Physical

Capacities Evaluation form Dr. Dannelley noted the claimant’s

diagnosis was diabetic polyneuropathy and opined that the

claimant could sit, stand and/or walk no more than 2 hours each

during an entire 8-hour work day, she indicated that the claimant

occasionally [could] lift 20 pounds and frequently [could] carry

20 pounds. Dr. Dannelley indicated that the claimant could not

use his feet for repetitive movements as in pushing and of leg

controls; however, he had no limitation to repetitive use of his

hands such as simple grasping, pushing and pulling (arm

controls) and fine manipulation. Dr. Dannelley opined that the

claimant could occasionally bend, squat, crawl and reach, but

never climb. She indicated that the claimant had moderate

restriction of activities involving unprotected heights, being

around moving machinery, exposure to marked changes in

temperature, humidity, dust, fumes and gases and mild

restriction of driving automobile equipment.

In finding that the claimant has the aforementioned residual

functional capacity, the undersigned Administrative Law

Judge has assigned significant evidentiary weight herein, as

required by Social Security Rulings 96-2p and 96-5p, to the

Case 1:07-cv-00757-C Document 22 Filed 05/29/08 Page 3 of 12
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reports and examinations of the treating physician, Dr.

Dannelley, who treated the claimant on an intermittent basis

from November 2004 through July 2006. It is noted that Dr.

Dannelley’s assessments of the claimant’s physical capacities

and limitations are not deemed inconsistent with her own

examination findings or with those of other examining or

treating physicians as set out in the record evidence.

...

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant

work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965). 

...

7. The claimant was born on May 19, 1967 and was

thirty-six (36) years old on the alleged disability onset date,

which the Regulations define as a “younger individual.” (20

CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the

determination of disability because using the MedicalVocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the

claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has

transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1560(c),

404.1566, 416.960(c), and 416.966).

...

Case 1:07-cv-00757-C Document 22 Filed 05/29/08 Page 4 of 12
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If the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform

the full range of sedentary work, a finding of “not disabled”

would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rules 201.24, 201.25

and 201.26; however, the claimant’s ability to perform all or

substantially all of the requirements of this level of work has

been impeded by additional limitations. To determine the extent

to which these limitations erode the unskilled sedentary

occupational base, the Administrative Law Judge asked the

vocational expert whether jobs exist in the national economy for

an individual with the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity. In response to the

residual functional capacity, the impartial vocational expert Mr.

Barry Murphy identified 3 unskilled sedentary representative

occupations, identified in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

(DOT), and existing in certain numbers in the state and national

economies: bench assembler sedentary unskilled with 2500

statewide and 260,000 nationally; order clerk with 2400

statewide and 185,000 nationally and Vehicle Escort Driver with

2,600 statewide and 145,000 nationally.

...

Based on the reliable testimony of the vocational expert, and

based on the entire record evidence, the undersigned concludes

that, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience,

and residual functional capacity, the claimant has been capable

of making a successful adjustment to representative occupations

that have existed in significant numbers in the national

economy. A finding of “not disabled” is therefore appropriate

under the framework of the above-cited rule.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as

defined in the Social Security Act, from April 15, 2004

through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and

416.920(g)).

(Tr. 25, 26, 31, 36 & 37 (some emphasis supplied)) The Appeals Council

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affirmed the ALJ's decision (Tr. 5-7) and thus, the hearing decision became the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

DISCUSSION

In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving

that he is unable to perform his previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001

(11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the

examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical facts

and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of

pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education and work history. Id. at 1005.

Once the claimant meets this burden, as here, it becomes the Commissioner's

burden to prove that the claimant is capable, given his age, education and work

history, of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which

exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th

Cir. 1985).

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that he can

perform a limited range of sedentary work activity, is supported by substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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2 This finding reaches the ALJ’s evaluation of plaintiff’s mental impairment as

well. In this case, the ALJ failed to evaluate Huddleston’s mental impairment (depression) in the

manner prescribed by the Commissioner’s own regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a and

416.920a (2007), as well as controlling case law in the Eleventh Circuit, see Moore v. Barnhart,

405 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005). In Moore, the Eleventh Circuit joined her “sister circuits in

holding that where a claimant has presented a colorable claim of mental impairment, the social

security regulations require the ALJ to complete a PRTF and append it to the decision, or

incorporate its mode of analysis into his findings and conclusions.” 405 F.2d at 1214. In this

case, the ALJ neither completed a PRTF nor did he incorporate its mode of analysis in his

decision. (Tr. 23-38) “Failure to do so requires remand.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1214 (citations

omitted).

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support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28

L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we

must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as

well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792

F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

In this case, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding he

retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work and erred

in posing an incomplete hypothetical question to the vocational expert.

Because the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is not supported

by substantial evidence,2

 this Court need not reach the other issue raised by

plaintiff. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985)

(“Because the ‘misuse of the expert’s testimony alone warrants a reversal,’ we

do not consider the appellant’s other claims.”).

It is clear in this circuit that the Commissioner of Social Security must

Case 1:07-cv-00757-C Document 22 Filed 05/29/08 Page 7 of 12
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develop "a full and fair record regarding the vocational opportunities available

to a claimant." Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989)

(citation omitted). The Commissioner must articulate specific jobs that the

claimant can perform given his age, education and work history, if any, "and

this finding must be supported by substantial evidence, not mere intuition or

conjecture." See id. (citation omitted). The means by which the

Commissioner meets this burden include use of the grids and reliance on

vocational expert testimony. See id. at 1201-1202. 

In this case, the ALJ made the following finding: “[T]he claimant has

the residual functional capacity to perform [work activity] at least at the

sedentary strength or exertional level, in function-by-function terms

(SSRs 83-10 and 96-8p). The claimant’s mental residual functional

capacity would limit him to unskilled work.” (Tr. 26, Finding No. 5) The

ALJ then proceeded to find that the framework of Rules 201.24, 201.25 and

201.26 of the grids, along with the vocational expert’s testimony, directed a

finding that plaintiff was not disabled since there exist a significant number of

sedentary jobs in the national economy that plaintiff can perform. (Tr. 36 &

37, Findings 10 & 11) The ALJ’s reliance upon the framework of the grids and

the vocational expert’s testimony to satisfy the Commissioner’s fifth-step

Case 1:07-cv-00757-C Document 22 Filed 05/29/08 Page 8 of 12
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burden necessarily stands and falls upon his determination that Huddleston

retains the residual functional capacity to perform the exertional and nonexertional requirements of sedentary work.

Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a

time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket

files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is

defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of

walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job

duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required

occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) & 416.967(a) (2007). Social Security Ruling 83-10

provides that “‘[o]ccasionally’ means occurring from very little up to one-third

of the time. Since being on one’s feet is required ‘occasionally’ at the

sedentary level of exertion, periods of standing or walking should generally

total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday, and sitting should

generally total approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” Id. 

As is clear from the foregoing discussion, in this circuit the burden is

upon the Commissioner at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process

to establish capacity to perform other work and thereby to establish the

claimant’s residual functional capacity. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553,

1559 (11th Cir. 1995). This Court has held on numerous occasions that the

Commissioner’s fifth-step burden cannot be met by a lack of evidence or

Case 1:07-cv-00757-C Document 22 Filed 05/29/08 Page 9 of 12
3 The opinion of a non-examining, reviewing physician “is entitled to little weight

and taken alone does not constitute substantial evidence to support an administrative decision.”

Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). 

10

otherwise, where available, by the residual functional capacity assessment of

a non-examining, reviewing physician,3 see, e.g., Sharp v. Barnhart, CA 01-

0325-BH-C, but instead must be supported by the residual functional capacity

assessment of a treating or examining physician. 

In this case, the ALJ purports to rely on the residual functional capacity

assessment of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Julia Dannelley, in finding that

plaintiff can perform exertional work activity at the sedentary level. (Compare

Tr. 26 with Tr. 31) In fact, the ALJ makes it a point to state that in making his

residual functional capacity determination he was assigning significant

evidentiary weight to the reports and examinations of Dr. Dannelley and, more

specifically, that “Dr. Dannelley’s assessments of the claimant’s physical

capacities and limitations are not deemed inconsistent with her own

examination findings or with those of other examining or treating

physicians as set out in the record evidence.” (Tr. 31 (emphasis supplied))

The ALJ’s clear acceptance of Dannelley’s assessments of plaintiff’s physical

capacities and limitations, however, is at odds with his determination that

Huddleston retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work.

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This is because sedentary work assumes the ability to sit, stand and walk for

8 hours in an 8-hour workday, SSR 83-10, yet Dr. Dannelley’s PCE (Tr. 277)

clearly limits plaintiff to sitting a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour workday and

standing and/or walking a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour workday (i.e., the

ability to sit, stand, and walk a total of 4 hours in an 8-hour workday). Because

the ALJ clearly gave significant weight to Dannelley’s PCE and same

contraindicates the capacity to perform sedentary work for an entire 8-hour

workday, see Rye v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 2008

WL 786663, *1 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Social Security Ruling 96-8p defines an

individual’s residual functional capacity as the person’s maximum remaining

ability ‘to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular

and continuing basis.’ [] A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means eight hours

a day, five days a week, or the equivalent work schedule.”), there is simply no

basis upon which this Court can find that the ALJ’s sedentary work

determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner has not

satisfied his fifth-step burden of proving that Huddleston is capable of

performing other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy

and, therefore, the Commissioner’s decision denying claimant benefits is

reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

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decision. 

CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying plaintiff benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to

sentence four of § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct.

2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes the plaintiff

a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239

(1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over this matter.

DONE and ORDERED this the 28th day of May, 2008.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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