Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00213/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00213-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

G&M FARMS INC., a California 

Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

E.I. du PONT, dba CORTEVA 

AGRISCIENCE, and Does 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00213-JLT-BAM

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING MOTION FOR LEAVE OF 

COURT TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(Doc. 43)

G&M Farms Inc. (“G&M Farms”) alleges that it suffered losses caused by the application 

of Fontelis® fungicide to its blueberry plants, including the Snow Chaser variety. Currently 

before the Court is G&M Farms’ motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2).

1

 (Doc. 43.) Defendants EIDP, Inc. and Corteva 

Agriscience LLC (incorrectly named as E.I. du Pont and Corteva Agriscience) opposed the 

motion. (Doc. 48.) G&M Farms did not file a reply. The matter has been submitted on the record

pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (See Doc. 46.) 

For the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that G&M Farms’ motion for leave 

of court to file a fourth amended complaint be DENIED.

1 The motion was referred to the undersigned for appropriate action. (Doc. 45.) 

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BACKGROUND

G&M Farms initiated this action in Fresno County Superior Court on January 10, 2024, 

and asserted causes of action for strict liability in tort, negligence in manufacture, negligence n 

warning, and breach of warranty. (See Doc. 5, Complaint.) Defendants removed the matter to 

this Court on February 15, 2024. (Doc. 1.) 

On March 8, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (Doc. 8.) 

On March 26, 2024, G&M Farms filed a first amended complaint, asserting causes of 

action for strict liability in tort, negligence in failing to warn, strict liability in labeling, breach of 

warranty, and breach of implied warranty. (Doc. 12.) The filing of the first amended complaint 

rendered the pending motion to dismiss as moot. (Doc. 16.) Defendants answered the first 

amended complaint on April 9, 2024. (Doc. 17.)

On June 11, 2024, after a Scheduling Conference with the parties, the Court issued a 

Scheduling Conference Order. (Doc. 27.) The Scheduling Conference Order set the following 

deadlines:

Initial Disclosure: June 25, 2024

Amendment to Pleadings: September 6, 2024

Non-expert Discovery Cutoff: July 31, 2025

Expert Disclosure: August 22, 2025

Supplemental Expert Disclosure: October 3, 2025

Expert Discovery Cutoff: November 7, 2025

Pretrial Motion Filing Deadline: January 26, 2026

Pretrial Conference: June 29, 2026

Jury Trial: September 1, 2026

(Id.)

On August 28, 2024, G&M Farms filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 33.) 

Thereafter, on August 30, 2024, G&M Farms filed a motion for leave to file its second amended 

complaint to delete its claim for punitive damages.2 (Doc. 34.) Defendants filed a statement of 

non-opposition to the motion. (Doc. 39.) On September 30, 2024, the Court granted the motion 

and, to avoid confusion, directed G&M Farms to file its complaint as a third amended complaint. 

(Id.) . (Doc. 41.) 

2 G&M Farms had mistakenly filed its second amended complaint without first seeking leave to amend 

under Rule 15(a)(2). (See Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 6.) 

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On October 3, 2024, G&M Farms filed its third amended complaint, which asserts causes 

of action for strict liability in tort, negligence in manufacture, negligence in labeling, breach of 

written warranty, and breach of implied warranty. (Doc. 42.) G&M Farms also filed the instant 

motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 43.) G&M Farms asserts that the 

proposed amendment seeks to provide additional facts upon which the causes of action are based. 

(Id. at 1.) G&M Farms explains that on September 19, 2024, while waiting for the Court’s 

decision on the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, Defendants advised that 

they intended to file a motion to dismiss the bulk of the second amended complaint “on the basis 

that allegations of defective manufacture and design, and inadequate warning and inadequate 

testing were insufficiently plead.” (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 7; Doc. 43-7, Ex. 1 to Declaration of D. 

Mitchell Taylor (“Taylor Decl.”) at 3.) Counsel for G&M Farms indicated that he would prepare 

a detailed factual basis for the allegations and asked defense counsel to stipulate to the filing of a 

third (fourth) amended complaint. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 7; Doc. 43-7, Ex. 1 to Taylor Decl. at 3.) After 

reviewing the proposed amended complaint, Defendants reportedly offered to stipulate to its 

filing provided the allegations of defective design, inadequate warning, and inadequate testing 

were removed. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 8.) G&M Farms rejected the offer. Defendants then indicated 

that September 6, 2024 was the deadline set by the Court to file an amended complaint. Counsel 

for G&M Farms asserted, however, that the deadline was specifically for the issue of punitive 

damages. (Id.) 

Upon review, the proposed fourth amended complaint submitted by G&M Farms includes 

additional factual allegations in causes of action for strict liability in tort, negligence in 

manufacture, breach of written warranty, and breach of implied warranty. (See Doc. 43-1, 

Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint ¶¶ 9-11, 16, 41-42, 46.) The proposed fourth amended 

complaint also (1) modifies the claim for negligence in labeling into a claim for failure to warn 

with corresponding allegations, (id. ¶¶ 18-24), and (2) includes separate causes of action for 

inadequate testing and design defect, (id. ¶¶ 25-31, 32-35). 

///

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LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16

G&M Farm’s request for leave to amend comes after expiration of the relevant Scheduling 

Conference Order deadline for amendment to the pleadings. As observed by Defendants, the 

Court therefore must apply the standard for amending a scheduling order under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 16. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding 

district court correctly addressed motion for leave to amend under Rule 16 because it had issued a 

pretrial scheduling order that established a timetable for amending the pleadings and the motion 

was filed after the deadline had expired); Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. 

Cal. June 16, 1999) (“[O]nce the district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to 

Rule 16 which establishes a timetable for amending pleadings, a motion seeking to amend 

pleadings is governed first by Rule 16(b), and only secondarily by Rule 15(a).”).

District courts enter scheduling orders in actions to “limit the time to join other parties, 

amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). Once 

entered, a scheduling order “controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 16(d). Scheduling orders are intended to alleviate case management problems, Johnson v. 

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992), and are “the heart of case 

management,” Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3rd Cir. 1986). Indeed, a scheduling 

order is “not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by 

counsel without peril.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610 (quoting Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 

108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Maine 1985)). Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

16(b), a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see also Green Aire for Air Conditioning W.L.L. v. Salem, No. 1:18-cv00873-LJO-SKO, 2020 WL 58279, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020) (“Requests to modify a 

scheduling order are governed by Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 

provides that a court may modify a scheduling order ‘only for good cause.’”). 

///

///

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As the Ninth Circuit has explained,

In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and state systems

routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and 

resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the deadlines are taken 

seriously by the parties, and the best way to encourage that is to enforce the 

deadlines. Parties must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply 

strictly with the scheduling and other orders, and that failure to do so may properly 

support severe sanctions and exclusions of evidence.

Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005).

The party seeking to modify a scheduling order bears the burden of demonstrating good 

cause. Handel v. Rhoe, No. 14-cv-1930-BAS(JMA), 2015 WL 6127271, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 

2015) (citing Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002); Johnson, 975 

F.2d at 608-609). The Court may modify the scheduling order “if it cannot reasonably be met 

despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. If the party 

was not diligent, then the inquiry should end. Id. If, however, there is good cause to modify the 

scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16(b), the Court will then turn to Rule 15(a) to determine 

whether the movant’s requested amendment to the pleading should be granted. Ramos v. FCA US 

LLC, No. 1:17-CV-00973, 2019 WL 2106172, at *5 (citing Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 607).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)

Rule 15(a) provides that a court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court has stated:

[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith 

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 

by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue 

of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. —the leave sought 

should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The intent of the rule is to “facilitate decision on the 

merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Center of S. Nev., 

649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). Consequently, the “policy of favoring amendments to 

pleadings should be applied with ‘extreme liberality.’” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 

(9th Cir. 1981).

Courts consider five factors in determining whether justice requires allowing amendment 

under Rule 15(a): “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, 

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and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 

1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citing Western Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

These factors are not of equal weight as prejudice to the opposing party has long been held to be 

the most critical factor in determining whether to grant leave to amend. Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“As this circuit and others have held, it is the 

consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight”); Jackson v. 

Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Prejudice to the opposing party is the 

most important factor.”). Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining factors, a 

presumption exists under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend. Eminence Capital, 316 

F.3d at 1052.

DISCUSSION

As indicated, G&M Farms’ request for leave to amend comes after expiration of the 

relevant deadline for amendment of the pleadings as set forth in the Scheduling Conference 

Order. Although G&M Farms contends that such deadline was specific to the punitive damage 

claim, (see Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 9; Doc. 43-6, Taylor Decl. ¶ 8), that contention is incorrect. The 

Scheduling Conference Order deadline applies to all motions to amend the pleadings, and 

expressly states, “All stipulated amendments or motions to amend shall be filed by September 6, 

2024.” (Doc. 27 at 2.) G&M Farms is therefore required to demonstrate good cause to modify 

the Scheduling Conference Order. See Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1294–95; Johnson, 974 F.2d at 609.

The Court will examine G&M Farms’ diligence to determine whether amendment of the 

Scheduling Conference Order is proper. Phillips-Kerley v. City of Fresno, No. 1:18-cv-00438-

AWI-BAM, 2021 WL 1966387, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2021). In determining diligence, the 

Court can inquire into (1) whether the movant was diligent in aiding the Court in creating a 

scheduling order, (2) whether matters that were not, and could not be foreseeable at the time the 

scheduling order was entered caused the need to amend, and (3) whether the movant was diligent 

in attempting to amend the scheduling order once the need to amend became apparent. Gonzalez 

v. Jones, No. 2:15-cv-2448-TLN-KJN, 2020 WL 9144005, at *2 (E.D. Cal. April 13, 2020) 

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(citation omitted).

Here, the Court does not find the requisite diligence to support modification of the 

Scheduling Conference Order. First, G&M Farms has neither requested modification of the 

Scheduling Conference Order, nor addressed the Rule 16 standard. Second, although G&M 

Farms aided the Court in creating a scheduling order, it is not evident that the present need to 

amend was caused by matters that were not, and could not be, foreseeable at the time the 

Scheduling Conference Order was entered. For instance, G&M Farms has not indicated that the 

underlying facts and causes of action that it seeks to include in the fourth amended complaint 

were not known or knowable when it initiated this action in January 2024. Additionally, it 

appears that G&M Farms is attempting to amend its complaint to address purported pleading 

deficiencies in its claims of defective manufacture and design, inadequate warning, and 

inadequate testing, which were identified by Defendants after expiration of the amendment 

deadline. (Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 7; Doc. 43-7, Ex. 1 to Taylor Decl.) However, Defendants previously 

challenged the sufficiency of G&M Farms’ claims for defects in testing, design, manufacture, 

labeling, and warning by filing a motion to dismiss in March 2024.3 (See Doc. 8; Doc. 48 at 3.) 

This was well before the Court issued the Scheduling Conference Order in June 2024. (Doc. 27.) 

G&M Farms has had multiple opportunities to amend its complaint prior to expiration of the 

relevant amendment deadline as evidenced by filing both a first amended complaint and seeking 

leave to file a second amended complaint (now identified as the third amended complaint). There 

is no indication as to why the pleading deficiencies could not have been addressed at that time. 

Third, and finally, even if G&M Farms was unaware of any pleading deficiencies in its operative 

complaint until after expiration of the amendment deadline, (see Doc. 43-5 at ¶ 7; Doc. 43-7, Ex. 

1 to Taylor Decl.), G&M Farms has not presented any argument that it attempted to seek 

modification of the Scheduling Conference Order once any need to amend became apparent. For 

these reasons, the Court does not find the requisite diligence and concludes that there is not good 

3 Defendants also notified G&M Farms in May 2024 of pleading deficiencies in its strict liability in tort 

cause for any alleged defects in testing or manufacture. (Doc. 48-1, Declaration of William E. Padgett ¶ 3 

and Ex. 1.) 

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cause for modifying the Scheduling Conference Order. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Accordingly, 

the Court need not address whether G&M Farms satisfied Rule 15(a)(2)’s standard for amending 

the complaint, and will recommend denial of G&M Farms’ motion for leave to amend. See 

Ramos, 2019 WL 2106172, at *8. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that G&M Farms’ 

motion for leave of court to file an amended complaint (Doc. 43) be DENIED. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 

file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 

fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 

number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 

limit may not be considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 

findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 3, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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