Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01173/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Margaret Dominguez, individually and on

behalf of Samuel Dominguez, a minor

child, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Officer Denny (Badge No. 8794) et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-1173-PHX-MHM

ORDER

The Court has before it the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims. (Doc. 9)

Having reviewed the motion, as well as the Plaintiffs' response and the Defendants' reply and

having determined that oral argument is unnecessary, the Court issues the following order.

I. Background

On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff Margaret Dominguez, individually and on behalf of her

minor son, Samuel Dominguez ("the Plaintiffs") filed a complaint against numerous police

officers as well as the City of Phoenix. In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that on May 4,

2009, 15-year old Samuel Dominguez was with his friend Joshua Odell Mackey outside

Joshua's house, waiting for Samuel's mother, Plaintiff Margaret Dominguez, to arrive and

give him a ride home. As the two were waiting outside, they noticed a City of Phoenix

police car down the street as well as police officers who appeared to be arresting a boy. As

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

they approached the police car, they realized that the boy being arrested was Joshua's brother.

The complaint alleges that around the same time, Margaret Dominguez arrived at

Joshua's house and sat in her Jeep waiting for her son. Samuel and Joshua walked back to

Joshua's house and Margaret told them to get into the vehicle. As Margaret and Samuel were

preparing to leave, Margaret's vehicle was suddenly swarmed by multiple police officers. 

According to the complaint, one of the officers, alleged to be officer Klein, opened

the driver side door and forcefully pulled Margaret out of her vehicle in a manner which

exceeded the level of reasonable force which would have been necessary to arrest her.

Officers Klein and Shaw then allegedly arrested Margaret in an aggressive, violent and

forcefully excessive manner.

According to the complaint, Samuel begged the officers to leave his mother alone, and

as he exited the vehicle to ask them to stop hurting her, two officers believed to be Officers

Denny and Conn lunged at him and violently slammed him down onto the hard ground. A

third officer, believed by the Plaintiffs to be Officer Flores, allegedly assisted Officers Denny

and Conn in physically accosting Samuel. The complaint also alleges that after Samuel had

been physically restrained that Officer Denny proceeded to knee and punch him repeatedly

in the face and head, and finished the assault by forcing Samuel's face down into the rocks

on the ground and grinding his face back and forth. Plaintiffs allege that Officers Conn and

Flores either assisted in facilitating Officer Denny's assault and physical of Samuel or at least

failed to intervene in his brutal attack. 

On April 23, 2010, Margaret Dominguez individually and on behalf of Samuel

Dominguez, filed a complaint in state court asserting claims against a number of Defendant

Officers and their spouses, including Officer Denny (Badge No. 8794) and Jane Doe Denny,

Officer Shaw (Badge No. 9206) and Jane Doe Shaw, Officer Flores (Badge No. 8659) and

Jane Doe Flores, Officer J. Conn (Bad No. 9405) and Jane Doe Conn. The Complaint also

names the City of Phoenix and John and Jane Does I-X. The Complaint asserts five counts:

1) Assault and Battery and exceeding the minimal amount of force reasonably necessary to

accomplish a lawful purpose, in violation of A.R.S. §13-3881(B); 2) False Imprisonment; 3)

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Negligence Per se, for violation of §13-3881(B); 4) Willful or Wanton Negligence which

also includes allegations pertaining to A.R.S. §13-3881(B). For each of these four counts,

Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant Officers were acting "in concert" and that they are jointly

and severally liable for all of the conduct of the other officers pursuant to A.R.S. §12-2506

and that the City is responsible on the basis of Respondeat Superior. 

Plaintiffs also assert a fifth count entitled 5) "Civil Rights". In Count 5, Plaintiffs

allege that each Defendant Officer, acting under color of state law, knowingly, willfully and

intentionally deprived Plaintiffs of the rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws

and constitutions of the United States and State of Arizona. Plaintiff alleges that this

occurred through the unreasonable use of excessive force, unlawful detention and wrongful

imprisonment and subjecting the Plaintiffs to substantive due process rights violations and

imposing summary punishment. Plaintiff also asserts that the City deprived the Plaintiffs of

the rights privileges and immunities secured by the laws and constitution of the United States

and State of Arizona by maintaining policies that contributed to the illegal actions of the

Defendant Officers, by hiring the Defendant Officers without reasonably investigating them,

for failing to train or supervise the Defendant Officers and for failing to adequately

discipline, demote or terminate the Defendant Officers. Plaintiffs seek damages, medical

expenses, punitive damages, attorneys' fees as well as costs. On June 2, 2010 the case was

removed to Federal District Court. 

II. Motion to Dismiss

On June 29, 2010, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims. The

Defendants assert that 1) the Plaintiffs fail to assert a claim for negligence "per se" and that

"willful" and "wanton" negligence should not constitute a claim separate or distingushed

from the negligence claim. Defendants also claim that 2) Plaintiff Margaret Dominguez fails

to state a claim for assault and battery and false imprisonment against Officers Denny, Conn

and Florez and that Plaintiff Samuel Dominguez fails to state a claim for battery and false

imprisonment against officers Klein and Shaw because Plaintiffs have not offered any facts

supporting their claims that the Defendant Officers were acting "in concert." The Defendants

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

also assert that 3) Plaintiffs' claims for violation of substantive due process and right to

freedom from summary punishment fail as a matter of law. In addition, the Defendants argue

that, 4) the City of Phoenix is immune from liability under A.R.S. §12-820.05(B) for

Samuel's claims of assault and battery and willful or wanton negligence as well as both

Plaintiffs' claims of false imprisonment. Finally, Defendants argue that 5) Count Five of

Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a civil rights claim against the City.

On July 13, 2010 Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 11). The

Plaintiffs concede that the Court should dismiss some though not all of the claims the

Defendants move to dismiss, and that their complaint does not provide allegations to support

certain of their claims. On July 23, 2010, Defendants filed a reply in support of the motion

to dismiss. The response and reply are addressed in greater detail as necessary below. 

III. Discussion

A. Negligence Per Se and Willful and Wanton Negligence.

The Defendants argue and the Plaintiffs agree, that Plaintiffs' Count Three for

negligence per se should be dismissed. Defendants also argue and Plaintiffs agree that the

complaint's references to "willful" and "wanton" as distinct classes of negligence are

improper. Plaintiffs ask for leave to amend the complaint to remove references to "willful"

and "wanton" negligence. Defendants do not object. The Court will grant Plaintiffs' request

for leave to amend to remove references to "willful" and "wanton" negligence as distinct

classes of negligence. Plaintiffs' claim for negligence will remain.

B. Margaret Dominguez's Claims against Officers Denny, Florez and Conn

and Samuel Dominguez's Claims against Officers Klein and Shaw

The complaint alleges in part that all of the Defendant officers acted in concert with

regard to the Plaintiffs and that they are jointly and severally liable for all of the claims

brought against them. Defendants' motion argues first that joint and several liability for

acting in concert only applies to intentional torts, so that to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to

extend joint and several liability to other claims such as negligence, the Court should dismiss

those portions of the claims. Indeed, the statute is plain that "acting in concert does not apply

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

to any person whose conduct was negligent in any of its degrees rather than intentional."

A.R.S. §12-2506. Plaintiffs have not alleged that any other exception to the comparative

fault standard would apply. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants cannot be jointly and

severally liable for the negligence claim.

 Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not provided factual allegations

sufficient to support their claims that all of the Defendant Officers acted in concert even with

regard to the intentional tort claims. Defendants argue that according to the allegations in

the complaint, Plaintiff Margaret Dominguez has alleged facts allowing her to bring claims

against officers Klein and Shaw, but not against officers Denny, Conn, or Flores. Similarly,

the Defendants argue that the complaint alleges facts allowing Plaintiff Samuel Dominguez

to assert claims against officers Denny, Conn and Flores, but not officers Klein and Shaw.

Consequently, the Defendants ask that the Court dismiss Margaret Dominguez's intentional

tort claims against officers Denny, Conn and Flores as well as Plaintiff Samuel Dominguez's

intentional tort claims against officers Klein and Shaw.

The Plaintiffs respond that it would be impossible to discern specific facts to establish

any agreement or collaboration among the Officers without he opportunity to undertake

discovery. The Plaintiff's cite the case of Mohave Electric Cooperative v. Byers, 189 Ariz.

292, 306, 942 P.2d 451, 465 (Ct. App. 1997) and argue that circumstantial evidence may

establish the existence of an agreement or common plan. 

Mohave Electric, however, as the Defendants point out in their reply, is

distinguishable, as the circumstantial evidence in that case was much more suggestive that

the defendants had acted in concert. The case involved whether an assistant manager could

be liable to the employer for wrongful acts committed by the general manager in connection

with expense advances. The circumstantial evidence included the fact that the defendants

jointly owned property, expenses for which had been paid with company advances and that

the funds has been spent for joint vacations and socializing. 189 Ariz. at 306, 942 P.2d at

465. In this case, the Plaintiffs only point to the officers' "command presence" -- i.e. the fact

that all the officers were present, in uniform and armed – and allege that this constitutes

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

active participation in the improper conduct of the other officers. 

Merely being present during the alleged assault, however, would not be sufficient to

invoke joint and several liability. A.R.S. §12-2506(F)(1) (noting that each defendant must

"actively" take part in the particular intentional tort and stating that "provd[ing] substantial

assistance to one committing an intentional tort does not constitute acting in concert if the

person has not consciously agreed with the other to commit the intentional tort."); see also

Lightner v. County of Contra Costa, 2010 WL 1267121 at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 29, 2010)

(finding that Plaintiff alleging that two officers were involved in release of police dog must

allege factual support, and alleging only that they acted in concert with officer who actually

released dog was not sufficient to survive motion to dismiss, citing Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to support their allegation that the Defendant

officers Denny, Conn and Flores acted in concert with respect to the alleged mistreatment

of Plaintiff Margaret Dominguez. Plaintiffs have also not alleged any facts to support their

allegation that Defendant Officers Klein and Shaw acted in concert with respect to alleged

mistreatment of Plaintiff Samuel Dominguez. Accordingly, Plaintiff Margaret Dominguez's

intentional tort claims against Officers Denny, Conn and Flores for assault, battery and false

imprisonment and Samuel Dominguez's intentional tort claims against Officers Klein and

Shaw for assault, battery and false imprisonment are dismissed. 

C. Violations of Substantive Due Process, Right to Freedom from Summary

Punishment

The Defendants argue and the Plaintiffs agree that the claims in Count Five are based

upon Defendants' alleged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights as well as their

derivative rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants also argue, however, that while

Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to support a Fourth Amendment claim under the United

States Constitution, Plaintiffs' allegations that the Defendants violated their substantive due

process rights and their right to freedom from summary punishment do not state cognizable

claims under federal or Arizona law. In their response, the Plaintiffs seek to amend their

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

complaint to dismiss references to substantive due process and freedom from summary

punishment. Rather than allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint, however, the Court will

simply dismiss those claims.

D. City's Immunity from Liability under A.R.S. §12-820.05(B)

The Defendants argue that the City is immune from Samuel Dominguez's claims for

assault and battery, willful or wanton negligence as well as both Plaintiffs' claims for false

imprisonment under A.R.S. §12-820(b). This immunity statute provides that a public entity

may not be held liable for any losses "that arise out of...an act or omission determined by a

court to be a criminal felony by a public employee" unless the public entity knew of the

public employee's propensity for such action. Id. The Defendants cite State v. Heinze, 196

Ariz. 126, 130, 993 P.2d 1090 (Ct. App. 1999) in support of their argument. In that case, the

court, interpreting a statute with similar language ruled that a felony conviction was not a

prerequisite for the law to apply and that "any court may make the requisite determination."

Id. 

The Plaintiffs respond that in order for this statute to apply and for the City to be

immune, a Court must previously have ruled in a criminal proceeding that a felony was

committed. They argue that State v. Heinze is not applicable because in that case, unlike in

this one, the parties stipulated that the conduct at issue was felonious. The Plaintiffs also

argue that their negligence claims would not be sufficient to constitute a felony offense so

that A.R.S. §12-820(b) would not apply.

In their reply, the Defendants argue that another court need not find that the conduct

constitutes a felony in order for the City to have immunity under A.R.S. §12-820(b) and cite

McGrath v. Scott, 250 F. Supp.2d 1218 (D. Ariz. 2003). In that case, the plaintiffs like the

Plaintiffs here argued that a conviction was necessary in order for the immunity provision

in A.R.S. §12-820(b) to apply. The McGrath court, however, applying the reasoning in

Heinz, held that a felony conviction was not necessary and this Court agrees. 

The Defendants also argue that because the Plaintiffs' negligence claim incorporates

all previous allegations in the complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged felonious conduct by the

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Defendant Officers in support of their negligence claims.

The Court finds that the allegations, particularly those supporting Samuel

Dominguez's claims for assault and battery, as well as both Plaintiffs' allegations supporting

their claims for negligence and false imprisonment suggest acts or omissions that could,

depending on the circumstances, constitute criminal felonies by public employees. Whether

the alleged acts or omissions committed, however, constitute a felony such that the City

would be immune under the statute cannot be determined at this stage in the litigation so

Defendants' request that the City be immunized from these claims is premature and the

motion to dismiss on this point is denied. 

E. Allegations Regarding the City's Policies, Training and Hiring Procedures

The Defendants assert and the Plaintiffs agree that the conclusory allegations in Count

Five regarding the City's policies, training and hiring procedures with regard to the

Defendant Officers fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiffs ask

the Court, without any authority, to reserve its ruling regarding dismissal of the civil rights

claims until Plaintiffs have had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery to be able to

assert sufficient allegations. While courts sometimes do defer dismissal of claims to allow

discovery for limited purposes, for example to establish jurisdiction, it would not be

appropriate for the Court to broadly reserve its ruling on dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims in

order to allow Plaintiffs to develop these speculative and conclusory claims, for which they

have offered no basis. See Rutman Wine Co. v. E.&J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.

1987) Therefore, these claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs will be given the

opportunity to amend their complaint should they discover evidence to provide facts

supporting this claims.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion

to Dismiss. (Doc. 9)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, dismissing Count Three of Plaintiff's complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, dismissing Count Four of Plaintiff's complaint, to the

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

extent that count attempts to state a claim for willful or wanton negligence. Count Four will

remain a claim for negligence.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, dismissing Plaintiff's claims that the Defendants are

jointly and severally liable with respect to Count Four.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff Margaret

Dominguez's intentional tort claims against officers Flores, Conn and Denny, and dismissing

without prejudice Plaintiff Samuel Dominguez's claims against officers Klein and Shaw.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, dismissing the portions of Count Five pertaining to

substantive due process and freedom from summary punishment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, dismissing without prejudice the portions of Count

Five pertaining to the the City's policies, hiring and training and supervising, disciplinary

practices. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, permitting Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to

reflect the changes above. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, directing the Clerk to reassign this case. 

DATED this 14th day of March, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-01173-FJM Document 16 Filed 03/15/11 Page 9 of 9