Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_20-cv-00155/USCOURTS-cand-3_20-cv-00155-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J.C.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-00155-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 25, 43, 44, 45, 72

In this suit, plaintiff J.C. sues defendants Choice Hotels International, Inc. (“Choice”), 

Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (“Hilton”) and Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) for 

claims arising from trafficking her at several hotels in California and Virginia. She brings claims 

under both the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595,

and the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“CTVPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 52.5. See 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [Dkt. No. 67].

It appears that the SAC would state a claim under the TVPRA against the local hotels

where she was trafficked. But J.C. has sued the hotel chains associated with the local hotels, not 

the local hotels themselves. She contends that the hotel chains are both directly and indirectly 

liable, but her theories seem confused. As I understand it, she alleges that the hotel chains directly 

“participated” in a sex trafficking venture by providing room rentals to traffickers, and in turn 

“knowingly benefited” financially from it.

1

 But she relies on an agency theory to prove the third 

 

1

I agree with the statutory construction analysis in M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 

F. Supp. 3d 959, 969 (S.D. Ohio 2019), where the court concluded that applying the “participation 

in a venture” definition from the criminal liability section of the TVPRA, section 1591(e)(4), to 

the civil liability section of the TVPRA, section 1595, would void the “should have known” 

language in the civil remedy. This violates the “cardinal principle of statutory construction that a 

statute ought, upon the whole, to be construed so that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

element of her TVPRA claim, that the local hotel staff “knew or should have known” J.C. was 

being trafficked given the allegedly obvious signs, and that this actual or constructive knowledge 

is imputed to the hotel chains. An amended complaint that parses out her direct and indirect 

liability theories and articulates factual allegations that support those theories would clarify J.C.’s 

claims.

At the hearing, parties disputed whether indirect liability of the hotel chains is a question 

of state law or federal common law. Other courts with similar complaints seem to have assumed it 

is a question of state law. See A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. CV 19-5770, 2020 WL 1939678, at 

*18 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2020) (applying Pennsylvania agency law); M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & 

Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (applying Ohio agency law). But the 

TVPRA is silent on the issue of indirect liability, which suggests that the federal common law of 

agency should apply. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-91 (2003). J.C. has leave to amend 

her complaint so that she may more clearly allege the necessary factual allegations under the 

federal common law of agency. (It is not obvious to me whether those allegations are somewhere

in the SAC; J.C. should organize her allegations to address the concerns in this Order.) I

recognize that some relevant information may not be known without the benefit of discovery, but 

that does not excuse J.C. from plausibly stating her claim.

Assuming that she is able to do so, the allegations in the SAC would establish personal 

jurisdiction over Hilton for claims arising out of local hotels located in both California and 

Virginia. See Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004)

(under the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction, “[w]hen a defendant must appear in a forum 

to defend against one claim, it is often reasonable to compel that defendant to answer other claims 

in the same suit arising out of a common nucleus of operative facts”). Hilton’s argument that it is 

simply a holding company is unpersuasive. See Team, Inc v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 

No. CV155057WHWCLW, 2017 WL 2539395, at *4 (D.N.J. Jun. 12, 2017) (denying Hilton’s 

 

or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). J.C. is not required to allege an overt act in furtherance of a sex trafficking venture in 

order to sufficiently plead her section 1595 civil liability claim. Id. at 968-69.

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motion for summary judgment based on argument that it is not liable for acts of its franchisee 

hotel in New Jersey; finding allegations demonstrate that Hilton “retained a great deal of control 

over the day-to-day operations of the [franchisee hotel],” including control over personnel 

decisions, employee training and policies or procedures that gave rise to the incident at issue).

In addition, J.C. does not sufficiently allege the intent element under the CTVPA. The 

CTVPA allows victims to seek damages for violations of California Penal Code section 236.1, 

which in turn provides: “Any person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with 

the intent to . . . obtain forced labor or services, is guilty of human trafficking.” Cal. Penal Code § 

236.1(a). The CTVPA does not include negligent “should have known” language as in the 

TVPRA; cases interpreting the CTVPA have required plaintiffs to plausibly allege intent at the 

pleading stage.

For these reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED [Dkt. Nos. 43, 44, 45].2 

J.C. may amend her SAC within 28 days of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2020

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

 

2 Defendants’ unopposed motions for leave to file untimely oppositions to J.C.’s motion for 

protective order are GRANTED. [Dkt. Nos. 21, 25, 72]. At the Case Management Conference 

following the hearing, the parties indicated that they have not finished their meet and confer 

sessions concerning a stipulated protective order that addresses both J.C.’s legitimate request for 

anonymity and defendants’ necessary discovery needs. I will not make a ruling on the motion for 

protective order until the parties either reach agreement, file a joint dispute letter, or set a briefing 

schedule and hearing date for the motion.

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