Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04056/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04056-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GTE MOBILNET OF CALIFORNIA LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 05-04056 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On July 7, 2006, the Court heard argument on plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment

and defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Having considered the arguments presented and

the papers submitted, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART defendant’s

motion and DENIES plaintiff’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff GTE Mobilnet of California Limited Partnership dba Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) is

a company licensed by the Federal Communications Commission to build and operate wireless cellular

transmission stations to serve Northern California. In an effort to improve its coverage in the city of San

Francisco, Verizon sought a permit from the city of San Francisco to install wireless equipment on

public rights-of-way throughout the city. This equipment, antennas measuring approximately two feet

by two feet and small utility boxes, would be installed on existing telephone and utility poles.

Both state and local law regulates the ability of telephone corporations to utilize public rights-ofway for their equipment. To promote the provision of telecommunications services, state law grants

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telephone corporations a broad right of access to public rights-of-way. California Public Utilities Code

§ 7901 provides this right:

Telegraph or telephone corporations may construct lines of telegraph or telephone lines

along and upon any public road or highway, along or across any of the waters or lands

within this State, and may erect poles, posts, piers, or abutments for supporting the

insulators, wires, and other necessary fixtures of their lines, in such manner and at such

points as not to incommode the public use of the road or highway or interrupt the

navigation of the waters.

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 7901. Consistent with this broad state-created right, San Francisco exempts

telephone corporations from the usual requirement that a company obtain a “franchise” before it may

operate utility facilities in the public rights-of-way. See San Francisco Admin. Code § 11.4(c). Instead,

San Francisco only requires telephone corporations to obtain utility conditions permits (“UCPs”) before

they may use the public rights-of-way. The sole prerequisite for obtaining a UCP is proof that the

company has authorization from the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) to occupy and

use the public rights-of-way. See San Francisco Admin. Code § 11.9. Generally, this proof takes the

form of a certificate of public convenience and necessity (“CPCN”) issued by the CPUC, although the

regulation also envisions that other forms of proof may be provided. Id. (“Persons intending to

construct, install, or maintain Telephone Lines to provide Telecommunications Services shall prove their

legal right to occupy and use the Public Rights-of-Way by providing the Department of Public Works

a current copy of their [CPCN] issued by the CPUC, or otherwise demonstrate that they have been

authorized to occupy the Public Rights-of-Way by the CPUC.”).

On April 14, 2005, Verizon Wireless submitted an application for a UCP to San Francisco

through its agent, NextG Networks. In the application, however, Verizon did not include a copy of its

CPCN, nor did it represent that it had a CPCN. Instead, the application stated that Verizon had

“registered” with the CPUC. Verizon took this position because the CPUC no longer issues CPCNs to

wireless carries. The CPUC stopped doing so because federal law preempted its authority to regulate

the entry of wireless carriers.

Based on Verizon’s failure to provide a CPCN, San Francisco denied its UCP request. Instead,

the City informed Verizon that it needed to obtain an encroachment permit for every wireless box that

it wanted to install in San Francisco. Verizon appealed this decision to the San Francisco Board of

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San Francisco does not dispute that Verizon was issued a CPCN in 1984, but argues that it is

no longer valid because the CPUC no longer issues CPCNs to wireless carriers.

2

In addition to the administrative record that the City has provided, both parties have submitted

unopposed requests for judicial notice. The Court GRANTS these requests (Docket Nos. 38, 41).

3

Appeals. There, for the first time Verizon argued that a CPCN it received in 1984 was still valid.1 It

admitted, however, that its UCP application was not based on this CPCN. AR at 173 (“The application

does not reference the CPCN.”). Based on its determination that Verizon’s CPCN was no longer valid,

the Board denied Verizon’s appeal and later denied its request for rehearing. AR 02 (“[The Department

of Public Works] correctly determined that appellant did not have a valid and existing [CPCN] . . . and

therefore did not meet the requirements for a [UCP] under § 11.9 of the San Francisco Administrative

Code.”).

On October 7, 2005, Verizon filed this action, claiming that San Francisco’s decision violated

the federal Telecommunications Act, the California Public Utilities Code, and San Francisco’s own

administrative regulations. Now before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment on Verizon’s

first and seventh causes of action. The Court agrees with San Francisco that Verizon did not meet the

requirements of § 11.9 of the San Francisco Administrative Code. It finds that an issue of fact remains,

however, regarding whether San Francisco’s actions interfere with Verizon’s rights under § 7901.2

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The moving

party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have

the burden of proof at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court that there is an absence

of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there

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is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct.

1348 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255.

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from

the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Both Verizon and San Francisco seek summary judgment on Verizon’s first and seventh claims

for relief. Verizon’s first claim alleges that San Francisco’s decision to deny Verizon’s application for

a UCP violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Verizon’s seventh claim seeks a writ of

mandamus on the ground that San Francisco has not complied with California Public Utilities Code

§ 7901 or San Francisco Administrate Code § 11.9.

I. Telecommunications Act of 1996

Plaintiff’s first claim alleges that San Francisco’s action violates section 332(c)(7) of the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). That section, entitled “Preservation of local

zoning authority,” provides:

(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal

wireless service facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality

thereof--

(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally

equivalent services; and

(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of

personal wireless services.

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Verizon argues that the Ninth Circuit decided this issue in Sprint PCS Assets L.L.C. v. City of

La Cañada-Flintridge, 448 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). While that decision applied § 332(c)(7) in a

challenge to a city’s denial of a permit to place wireless facilities on a public right of way, it did not

purport to reach the issue presented here. Further, the permits applied for were site-specific permits,

and not general permits such as a UCP. See id. at 1069-70.

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. . .

(iii) Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a

request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in

writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i), (iii). Verizon argues that the Board’s denial of its permit application was

not supported by “substantial evidence.” San Francisco contests this assertion, and also argues that

§ 332(c)(7) is not applicable to Verizon’s application for a UCP.

A. Applicability of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)

As an initial matter, San Francisco argues that § 332(c)(7) does not apply to the Board’s decision

in this case. According to San Francisco, § 332(c)(7) applies only to “zoning” decisions, not to

administrative matters such as the decision to issue a UCP. San Francisco argues that the title of

§ 332(c)(7), “preservation of local zoning authority,” supports its position. It also argues that the section

does not fit comfortably over the decision to deny a UCP application, because the section anticipates

site-specific decisions. UCPs, in contrast, provide wireless companies with a broad right to install

telecommunications equipment on the public rights of way throughout the city. See San Francisco

Administrative Code § 11.9.

San Francisco previously raised an identical argument in its motion to dismiss, which the Court

rejected. The Court continues to believe its ruling was correct. While the title refers to “zoning,” the

text of § 332(c)(7) applies to “regulation of the placement . . . of personal wireless service facilities.”

See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A), (B)(i), (B)(iii). The term “placement” is broad enough to cover

permits, such as the UCP at issue here, that would allow a carrier to place antennas at a variety of

locations.3

 Thus, the Court finds that the statute’s use of the word “zoning” in the title of the section

is not sufficient to restrict its reach. See Perez-Martin v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“[I]t is a well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that specific provisions prevail over general

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provisions.”).

While San Francisco is correct that the scheme envisioned by § 332(c)(7) anticipates a greater

amount of process than the city employed in deciding whether to award the UCP, that observation is also

not sufficient to limit the reach of the statute. Indeed, if the requirements to place wireless facilities are

relatively simple, such as in this case, it follows that the written decision based upon substantial

evidence can be relatively simple as well.

Accordingly, the Court declines to revisit its determination that § 332(c)(7) applies to San

Francisco’s decision to deny Verizon a UCP.

B. Substantial Evidence

Verizon bases its argument that San Francisco’s decision was not based on substantial evidence

on two grounds. First, it claims that it possesses the right to use the public rights-of-way under state

law, and that San Francisco’s administrative regulations may not interfere with that right. Second, it

argues that the city incorrectly found that Verizon failed to meet the requirements of § 11.9.

1. Preemption of San Francisco Administrative Code by State Law

Verizon’s first argument is that California Public Utilities Code § 7901 preempts San Francisco

Administrative Code § 11.9. According to Verizon, § 7901 grants it a broad right to install

telecommunications equipment on all public rights-of-way throughout the state. It argues that the

restrictions in San Francisco’s administrative code are inconsistent with that right and are therefore

preempted. As set out above, § 7901 provides:

Telegraph or telephone corporations may construct lines of telegraph or telephone lines

along and upon any public road or highway, along or across any of the waters or lands

within this State, and may erect poles, posts, piers, or abutments for supporting the

insulators, wires, and other necessary fixtures of their lines, in such manner and at such

points as not to incommode the public use of the road or highway or interrupt the

navigation of the waters.

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 7901.

(a) Applicability of § 7901 to Wireless Carriers

As an initial matter, San Francisco argues that § 7901 is inapplicable to this case because

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Verizon is not a “telephone corporation” and is not seeking to install “telephone lines” as those terms

are used in § 7901. This argument is based on a complicated recitation of the history of § 7901. In

brief, § 7901 was passed in 1905 and was originally codified as section 536 of the California Civil Code.

Later, in 1915, the California legislature passed the Public Utilities Act, which included a definition of

“telephone line” that encompassed equipment used “to facilitate communication by telephone, whether

such communication is had with or without the use of transmission wires.” California Public Utilities

Act, ch. 91, § 2(u), 1915 Cal. Stat. 115, 117. In 1951, however, the legislature repealed the Public

Utilities Act and passed the Public Utilities Code. In the process it moved Civil Code § 536 to Public

Utilities Code § 7901, and imported the definition of “telephone line” from the Public Utilities Act into

Public Utilities Code § 233. The Public Utility Code § 234 also included a definition of “telephone

corporation” that relied on the definition of “telephone line” in § 233 and therefore encompassed

wireless carriers. The definitions in § 233 and § 234, however, only apply to the construction of Part

1 of Division 1 of the Public Utilities Code, see Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 203, while § 7901 is found in

Division 4 of the Public Utilities Code. Thus, San Francisco argues that there has been no change to

the meaning “telephone line” or “telephone corporation” as used in § 7901 since that statute was first

adopted in 1905, and that neither should therefore apply to wireless carriers or their facilities. See

Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 277 (1911) (finding that statute’s use of term

“telegraph corporation” and “lines of telegraph” did not encompass telephone corporations or telephone

lines).

The California Court of Appeal recently considered a similar argument in Sprint Telephony v.

City of San Diego, -- Cal. Rptr. 3d --, 2006 WL 1680053 (Cal. App. June 20, 2006), and rejected it. The

Court found that “when ‘the same term or phrase is used in a similar manner in two related statutes

concerning the same subject, the same meaning should be attributed to the term in both statutes.’” Id.

at *6 (quoting Diekmann v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 345, 356 (Cal. App. 1985)). The court

also found that recent legislative enactments by the California legislature indicate that the legislature

understood § 7901 to encompass wireless providers. See id. (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 14666.8, which

related only to wireless carriers yet declares that “nothing in this section alters any existing rights

of . . . telephone corporations pursuant to Section 7901 of the Public Utilities Code.”).

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The Court finds this analysis convincing. Accordingly, it finds that wireless carriers are included

in the definition of “telephone corporation” in § 7901, and that the definition of “telephone line” in

§ 7901 is broad enough to reach wireless equipment.

(b) Preemption

The California Constitution provides that “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its

limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”

California Const., art XI, § 7. A local regulation conflicts with state law if it “duplicates, contradicts,

or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.” SherwinWilliams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 4th 893, 897 (1993). Here, no one contends that San

Francisco’s regulation duplicates § 7901. Thus, the Court must determine if the regulation contradicts

§ 7901 or if the legislature has “manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area.” Id. at 898.

(i) Field Preemption

Verizon focuses its arguments on field preemption, arguing that § 7901 fully occupies the

regulation of the construction of wireless facilities in public rights of way. Verizon bases this argument

on the fact that the only limitation contained in § 7901 is that the facilities may not “incommode the

public use of the road or highway.” Thus, Verizon argues that § 7901 bars all local regulation of

telephone companies, allowing local municipalities only to ensure that the telephone equipment will not

interfere with the use of the public rights-of-way.

Two courts have previously considered this question. The Ninth Circuit reached this issue in

Sprint PCS, concluding that § 7901 preempted local ordinances. See Sprint PCS Assets L.L.C. v. City

of La Cañada-Flintridge, 435 F.3d 993, 997-98, amended, 448 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). Verizon’s

argument largely follows the Ninth Circuit opinion, which concluded that § 7901 preempted local

ordinances except to the extent that they protected against telecommunications equipment interfering

with use of a roadway. After Verizon submitted its opening brief, however, the Ninth Circuit

dramatically amended the opinion, removing the preemption discussion from the published opinion and

placing it in an unpublished memorandum disposition. See Sprint PCS, 448 F.3d at 1069.

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This Court is not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion because the Ninth Circuit’s discussion

of preemption was placed in an unpublished memorandum disposition. See Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3

(“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not binding precedent . . . .”).

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Recently, the California Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion, expressly disagreeing

with the Ninth Circuit. Sprint Telephony v. County of San Diego, -- Cal. App. --, 2006 WL 1680053,

at *10 n.13 (Cal. App. June 20, 2006) (“[W]e believe the federal ipse dixit is wrong and should not be

followed.”). The California court found that § 7901 did not preempt local regulation of the placement

of telecommunications equipment on public rights of way, but rather found that local governments

continued to possess a limited ability to regulate the placement and appearance of wireless facilities.

Id. at *11 (“[T]here is no general state law regulating the siting or appearance of [telephone

equipment].”).

The Court finds the California Court of Appeal’s analysis convincing.4

 There are three tests for

field preemption: 

(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to

clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; 2) the subject

matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate

clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action;

or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of

such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the

state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.

Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Cal. 3d 277, 292-93 (1985). Section 7901 does not satisfy any of

these tests.

First, there can be little argument that § 7901 “fully and completely” covers the area of law. As

the Sprint Telephony court stated, “there is no general state law regulating the siting or appearance of

the equipment so authorized.” Sprint Telephony, 2006 WL 1680053 at *11. Second, § 7901 is not

“couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or

additional local action.” As the Sprint Telephony court noted, state laws actually contemplate and

endorse further local action. For example, § 7901.1 reserves to localities the ability to “exercise

reasonable control as to the time, place, and manner in which roads, highways, and waterways are

accessed.” Finally, the third test is inapplicable to this case. See Sprint Telephony, 2006 WL 1680053

at *11.

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Verizon’s argument that requiring wireless providers, but not wireline providers, to obtain major

encroachment permits violates the “equivalent treatment” requirement of § 7901.1 of the California

Public Utilities Code must be rejected. That section provides:

(a) It is the intent of the Legislature, consistent with Section 7901, that municipalities

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Thus, the Court concludes that § 7901 does not preclude municipalities from regulating in the

field.

(ii) Conflict Preemption

A local ordinance may also be preempted by state law when it contradicts state law. See Cal.

Const. art. XI, § 7 (“A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary,

and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”). On its face, San Francisco’s

requirement that a wireless carrier hold a CPCN does not necessarily conflict with § 7901. Verizon,

however, argues that San Francisco’s interpretation of its municipal ordinance effectively bars all

wireless carriers from obtaining UCPs.

Verizon appears to be correct in this assertion. San Francisco readily admits that the only

requirement for a UCP is proof that the applicant holds a CPCN. San Francisco also admits that the

CPUC no longer grants CPCNs to wireless carriers. Thus, it appears to be impossible for a wireless

carrier to obtain a UCP in San Francisco.

Were a UCP the sole method of placing wireless facilities in San Francisco’s rights-of-way, the

San Francisco ordinance would clearly conflict with § 7901 because Verizon would be denied all access

to the public rights-of-way. Here, however, there is an alternative that Verizon may pursue: an

encroachment permit. Thus, the Court must decide whether San Francisco’s encroachment permit

process conflicts with § 7901. See Sprint Telephony, 2006 WL 1680053, at *11 (considering argument

that regulation was invalid because “it far exceed[ed] the permissible scope of regulation”).

The Court finds that a question of fact remains on this issue. Neither party has provided the

Court with any description of the process for obtaining an encroachment permit, nor is the Court aware

of the considerations that San Francisco takes into account when reviewing an application for such a

permit.5

 While there is certainly some support for Verizon’s argument that the encroachment permit

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shall have the right to exercise reasonable control as to the time, place, and manner in

which roads, highways, and waterways are accessed.

(b) The control, to be reasonable, shall, at a minimum, be applied to all entities in an

equivalent manner.

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 7901.1. The Court finds that given the differences between wireless and wireline

carriers, equivalence must take into account the type of entity being regulated. Indeed, Verizon’s

argument, if accepted, would have made the statutory scheme in Sprint Telephony easily in violation

of § 7901.1(b). Yet the California Court of Appeal, which discussed § 7901.1 in its Sprint Telephony

opinion, did not find any problems arising from § 7901.1.

6

For example, Verizon asserts that “an encroachment permit would be needed for each and every

installation, . . . and would involve a negotiated agreement on economic terms, CEQA review, General

Plan review, public hearings, and the ultimate issuance of the permit at the complete discretion of the

Board of Supervisors.” Pl. Mot. at 6 n.6. Verizon has also directed the Court to a recent decision from

this district, which found that the burden of San Francisco’s encroachment permit process violated § 253

of the Telecommunications Act.

11

process is burdensome,6 it is equally true that the Sprint Telephony court upheld regulation of the

placement of wireless facilities with far more demanding requirements than the UCP Verizon seeks.

See, e.g., Sprint Telephony, 2006 WL 1680053 at *2-3 (describing four-tiered structure for processing

applications for the installation of wireless facilities).

Accordingly, the Court finds that an issue of material fact remains regarding the burden that an

encroachment permit will place on Verizon’s ability to access the public rights-of-way. The Court

therefore cannot grant either party’s motion for summary judgment on Verizon’s claim that San

Francisco’s action violated California Public Utilities Code § 7901. 

2. Violation of San Francisco Administrative Code § 11.9

Verizon also argues that the City violated its own administrative regulation by refusing to grant

its UCP application. That regulation provides:

The Department of Public Works may require a Person, including a Grantee of an

existing Franchise, to obtain a Utility Conditions Permit prior to their construction,

installation, or maintenance of Telephones Lines (as defined in the California Public

Utilities Code) in the Public Rights of Way. UCPs shall be issued by the Department of

Public Works in a manner consistent with Applicable Law to Persons who have authority

as a Telephone Corporation (as defined in the California Public Utilities Code) to occupy

the Public Rights-of-Way pursuant to California Public Utilities Code Section 7901 and

who are willing to comply with the City’s requirements regarding the physical use and

occupation of the Public Rights-of-Way. Persons intending to construct, install, or

maintain Telephone Lines to provide Telecommunications Services shall prove their

legal right to occupy and use the Public Rights-of-Way by providing the Department of

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Verizon’s “Alice in Wonderland” accusations seem premised on the assumption that there must

be a way it can obtain a UCP from San Francisco. This is not necessarily correct. Given the differences

between wireless and wireline providers and the equipment they install – and specifically in light of the

community battles that unsightly wireless installations have provoked in cities across the country – the

San Francisco Administrative Code provision may be intended to differentiate between the two types

of telephone companies. San Francisco may have made the legitimate choice to subject wireless

equipment to more extensive regulation than wireline equipment via the encroachment permit process.

While possession of a CPCN is a somewhat awkward way of distinguishing between the wireless and

wireline carriers, it is nonetheless a fairly accurate distinction under current state law.

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Public Works a current copy of their certificate of public convenience and necessity

issued by the CPUC, or otherwise demonstrate that they have been authorized to occupy

the Public Rights-of-Way by the CPUC.

San Francisco Admin. Code § 11.9. Verizon argues, first, that it is a “Person[] who ha[s] authority as

a Telephone Corporation . . . to occupy the Public Rights-of-Way pursuant to California Public Utilities

Code Section 7901,” and second, that it actually possesses a valid CPCN.

As to Verizon’s first argument, this Court’s order has already determined that Verizon is a

telephone corporation within the meaning of § 7901. That fact, however, is somewhat beside the point

because the San Francisco regulation clearly requires that an applicant prove that it possess authority

from the CPUC to occupy the public rights-of-way. Aside from a CPCN issued in 1984, discussed

below, Verizon provided no such proof here. Indeed, given that the CPUC no longer regulates wireless

providers, it is possible that no such proof exists. This is not the “Alice in Wonderland” result that

plaintiff contends it to be. Rather, this Court believes it to be a legitimate means of distinguishing

between wireless and wireline providers and the issues raised by the equipment both types of companies

would install on the public rights-of-way.7

The Court also disagrees with Verizon’s argument that the CPCN it was issued in 1984 remains

valid. In 1993, Congress amended the Federal Communications Act to preempt state regulation over

the “entry of and rates charged by” wireless carriers. See Pub. L. 103-66, § 6002(c)(3)(A), 107 Stat.

312, 394 (1993) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)). In light of that statute, the CPUC ruled that it

no longer had authority to issue CPCNs to wireless carriers because it no longer possessed the ability

to authorize wireless carriers to operate in California. See In re Mobile Telephone Service and Wireless

Communications, 81 C.P.U.C.2d 152 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 2, 1998). Thus, contrary to

Verizon’s argument, it is irrelevant that its CPCN “has not been revoked, cancelled, or otherwise called

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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into question by the CPUC.” Pl. Mot. at 15. Rather, the grant of authority that the CPCN represented

has been completely extinguished; the CPCN now has no legal effect whatsoever.

Verizon failed to comply with the single requirement to obtain a UCP: proof that it was

authorized by the CPUC to occupy the public rights-of-way. The Court acknowledges that this result

means that no wireless provider has a right to a UCP under § 11.9, but does not consider such a result

as offensive as Verizon makes it out to be. As discussed above, the City has the authority to regulate

the placement and appearance of telecommunications equipment installed on its public rights-of-way.

Thus, San Francisco need not grant wireless providers blanket permission to install their equipment

throughout the city, but may require them to go through a site-specific permitting process provided it

is not so burdensome that it runs afoul of § 7901.

II. State and Local Laws

Verizon’s seventh cause of action seeks to have the Board’s decision overturned on the ground

that the City’s decision violates both California Public Utilities Code § 7901 and San Francisco

Administrative Code § 11.9. These arguments are identical to the ones discussed above; Verizon argues

that § 7901 grants it a broad right to install telecommunications equipment on all public rights-of-way

throughout the state, and also argues that it satisfied the requirements of the San Francisco

Administrative Code. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that an issue of fact remains on

whether the encroachment permit process is so burdensome that it conflicts with § 7901, and rejects

Verizon’s argument that San Francisco’s actions violated § 11.9 of its administrative code.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART San

Francisco’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Verizon’s motion for summary judgment

(Docket Nos. 37, 43).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-04056-SI Document 50 Filed 07/19/06 Page 13 of 13