Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03477/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03477-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alexander Paul Celaya,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-03477-PHX-ROS (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Alexander Paul Celaya’s (“Petitioner”) “Petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents 

have filed their Answer (Doc. 8), and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 16). For the 

reasons explained herein, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Grounds One, 2(d)-

(h), and Four as procedurally defaulted and deny Grounds 2(a), (b), (c), (i), (j), and Three

on the merits. 

I. BACKGROUND

On April 17, 2013, a Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on (i) five 

counts of child molestation, a class 2 felony and dangerous crime against children; (ii)

one count of public sexual indecency to a minor, a class 5 felony; and (iii) seven counts 

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of kidnapping, a class 2 felony. (Bates Nos. 2-7).1 The charges pertained to two victims, 

Petitioner’s daughter, K.C., and Petitioner’s cousin, J.H. Following trial, a jury found 

Petitioner guilty on four counts of child molestation as to victim K.C. and one count of 

child molestation as to victim J.H. (Bates Nos. 88-99). The trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to a total of fifty-one years in prison. (Bates No. 103).

As summarized by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the facts underlying Petitioner’s 

convictions are as follows:

In July 2012, K.C., Defendant’s daughter, spent 

several weeks with him in Arizona before returning to her 

mother in New Mexico. Defendant and the mother had been 

divorced since 2010 and shared time with K.C. In November 

2012, K.C.’s mother found her in her play tent without her 

pants or undergarments with a stuffed animal between her 

legs. Her mother asked what she was doing, and K.C. began 

to cry and said that it was what her “Daddy” does. Her 

mother contacted the police in New Mexico. An investigator 

in New Mexico interviewed K.C., and a specially trained 

nurse conducted a physical exam. K.C. stated that Defendant 

had taken her to his room and touched his hand and penis to 

her vaginal area. The physical exam revealed nothing 

abnormal.

When Defendant’s uncle and aunt who lived in 

Arizona learned about K.C. statements, they asked their 

daughter, J.H., if Defendant had ever touched her 

inappropriately. She told her mother that Defendant had done 

so when she was around six years old, on more than one 

occasion. J.H.’s father called the police. An investigator

interviewed J.H. but did not request a physical examination 

because of the length of time since the incidents. J.H. stated 

that Defendant took her upstairs into another room, removed 

their pants, and made her touch her vaginal area and his penis.

(Bates No. 178).2 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

1 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 8) 

refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page of the

record.

2 A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not rebutted this presumption by clear and convincing 

evidence.

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sentences on direct appeal. (Bates Nos. 179-81). Petitioner did not seek further review 

by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

On April 19, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Bates Nos. 183-85). Petitioner’s PCR counsel filed a PCR Petition raising a number of 

issues. (Bates Nos. 189-220). After briefing, the trial court denied relief. (Bates Nos.

434-39). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (Bates Nos.

540-41).

In May 2019, Petitioner timely initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 1 ). 

As detailed in the Court’s May 31, 2019 Screening Order, the Petition alleges that

he was subjected to prosecutorial misconduct (Ground One), 

he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 

counsel (Grounds Two and Three), and his Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated because he was confined in 

jail during the trial and the sheriff’s transportation practices 

interfered with his ability to participate in his trial and confer 

with his counsel (Ground Four).

(Doc. 4 at 1-2). Respondents have identified and separately addressed a number of subclaims contained in Ground Two, which Respondents have labeled as Grounds 2(a)-(j). 

(Doc. 8 at 4-5). This Report and Recommendation addresses all of those sub-claims. 

Section II of this Report and Recommendation pertains to Grounds One, 2(d)-(h),

and Four. In Section II(B), the undersigned finds that Ground One and Four are 

procedurally defaulted as the state courts denied relief on those claims by invoking an 

adequate and independent state rule. Section II(C) concludes that Grounds 2(d)-(h) are

unexhausted because Petitioner did not fairly present them to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in his PCR proceeding. The undersigned further finds in Section II(C) that 

Grounds 2(d)-(h) are procedurally defaulted because Petitioner would be precluded by 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure from returning to state court in an attempt to 

exhaust them. Section II(D) explains that the procedural defaults should not be excused 

under the cause and prejudice and miscarriage of justice exceptions. 

In Section III, the undersigned reviews the ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

presented in Grounds 2(a), (b), (c), (i), (j), and Three. The undersigned explains why the

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claims are without merit. 

II. GROUNDS ONE, 2(d)-(h), AND FOUR ARE PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED

A. Legal Standards Regarding Procedurally Defaulted Habeas Claims 

1. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

It is well-settled that a “state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal courts.” 

Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 

275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 

L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial 

remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). The 

rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 U.S. at 

275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to review 

and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

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claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

2. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

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the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

B. Grounds One and Four Are Procedurally Defaulted as the State Courts 

Denied Relief on Those Claims Based on an Adequate and Independent 

State Rule

As mentioned, Ground One alleges that Petitioner was subjected to prosecutorial 

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misconduct. (Doc. 1 at 6). In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated “as a result of jail detention and conditions.” (Id. at 13). 

Respondents concede that Petitioner raised these claims in his PCR proceeding. (Doc. 8 

at 12, 14).

In denying the PCR Petition, the trial court found that the claims in Grounds One 

and Four could have been raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Bates No. 435). As such, 

the trial court concluded that the claims were precluded under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2(a)(3).3(Id.). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. (Bates 

No. 541). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) constitutes an “adequate and

independent” state ground for denying review. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002) (per curiam) (preclusion of issues for failure to present them at an earlier

proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) “are independent of

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the

merits”); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law and has been regularly and 

consistently applied, so it is adequate to bar federal review of a claim.”); Murray v. 

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim that has been ‘waived’ under 

[Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3)] is procedurally defaulted and therefore barred from federal 

court consideration, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage 

of justice.”) (quoting Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Accordingly, because the Arizona state courts denied the claims contained in Grounds 

One and Four by invoking an adequate and independent state rule, the undersigned finds 

that they are procedurally defaulted.

3 Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3), a defendant is precluded 

from raising claims that could have been raised and adjudicated on direct appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceeding. See also State v. Curtis, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds 

that were adjudicated, or could have been raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or 

prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State v. Berryman, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1994) (defendant’s claim that his sentence had been improperly enhanced by 

prior conviction was precluded by defendant’s failure to raise issue on appeal).

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C. Grounds 2(d)-(h) are Unexhausted 

In Ground Two, Petitioner presents ten ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 

which Respondents have enumerated 2(a)-(j) as follows:

a. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to marshal evidence 

impeaching victims/support of alibi. 

b. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to conduct other discovery. 

c. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to renew the motion for 

severance. 

d. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the 

opening statement. 

e. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the 

rebuttal testimony of Haughn. 

f. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the 

rebuttal testimony of Andrew Celaya. 

g. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the 

testimony of Wendy Dutton.

h. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the

prosecutor’s closing arguments. 

i. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to specifically 

object to the introduction or recorded recollection. 

j. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present known 

impeachment evidence.

(Doc. 8 at 4-5). To the extent Petitioner raises other ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims in the Petition that are not identified above, the undersigned finds that the claims 

should be summarily dismissed as the claims are vague and conclusory. See Shah v. 

United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (vague or conclusory claims without 

supporting factual allegations warrant summary dismissal of § 2255 motion); see also 

Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is well-settled that ‘[c]onclusory 

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas 

relief.’”) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner exhausted the ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims contained in Grounds 2(a), (b), (c), (i), and (j). (Doc. 8 at 20-25). 

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Respondents also do not dispute that Petitioner exhausted the ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim in Ground Three. (Id. at 25). The undersigned finds that these claims have 

been exhausted, and they are reviewed on the merits in Section III. 

Petitioner raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented in Grounds

2(d)-(h) in his PCR Petition submitted to the trial court. (Bates No. 211). However, 

Respondents correctly observe that Petitioner did not fairly present Grounds 2(d)-(h) in 

his Petition for Review filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals regarding the trial court’s 

denial of PCR relief. (Doc. 8 at 12-14; Bates No. 475-506). Accordingly, the 

undersigned finds that Grounds 2(d)-(h) have not been exhausted. Castillo v. McFadden, 

399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (in noncapital cases, “claims of Arizona state 

prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals 

has ruled on them”) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) ); 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“To provide the State with the necessary 

‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court .

. . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.”). 

Because adequate and independent state rules would preclude Petitioner from 

returning to state court to exhaust Grounds 2(d)-(h), the undersigned finds that those 

claims are procedurally defaulted.4 See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); Beaty, 303 F.3d at 

987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies 

and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to 

meet the requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”) (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)).

D. Petitioner’s Procedural Defaults are Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims are to be 

reviewed if the petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

4

 This type of procedural default is often referred to as “technical” exhaustion 

because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, Petitioner no longer 

has an available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has 

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for 

exhaustion; there are no remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

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of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013). 

i. Petitioner has Not Established “Cause” for the Procedural Defaults

In order to establish cause for a procedurally defaulted claim, “a petitioner must

demonstrate that the default is due to an external objective factor that cannot fairly be

attributed to him.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner’s status as an inmate with limited legal 

resources cannot constitute cause to excuse his procedural defaults. See Hughes v. Idaho 

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner's lack 

of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. 

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s arguments concerning his 

mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). 

In his Reply, Petitioner references Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) with 

respect to Grounds 2(d)-(h). (Doc. 16 at 5, 12-13). Grounds 2(d)-(h) were presented to 

the trial court, but not the Arizona Court of Appeals. Any argument that the procedural 

defaults concerning Grounds 2(d)-(h) should be excused for cause under Martinez is 

without merit. Martinez holds that “inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review 

collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim 

of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1315. Martinez expressly states that its holding 

“does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, including appeals from 

initial-review collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and 

petitions for discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts.” Id. at 1320 (emphasis 

added). In other words, the Martinez exception “does not extend to attorney error at postconviction appellate proceedings because those proceedings are not the ‘first occasion’ at 

which an inmate could meaningfully raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim.” West v. Carpenter, 790 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original).

Petitioner has failed to show cause for his procedural defaults. Where a petitioner 

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fails to establish cause, the Court need not consider whether the petitioner has 

shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner 

has not satisfied the “cause and prejudice” exception to excuse his procedural defaults.

ii. The Miscarriage of Justice Exception Does Not Apply

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 

340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual

innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (citing Calderon v. 

Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)). In addition, “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new 

evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite

showing [of actual innocence].” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935.

To the extent Petitioner asserts the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, Petitioner

has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is factually innocent of 

his convictions. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In order to present 

otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, a petitioner must 

produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the ‘narrow class of 

cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”) (citations omitted); 

Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable 

evidence not presented at trial.”); Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of 

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innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome 

otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden 

of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse his procedural defaults. See Smith v. Hall, 466 F. 

App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through the Schlup gateway, a

petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming forward with ‘new 

reliable evidence’”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To meet [the 

Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new reliable evidence . . . that 

was not presented at trial.’”) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). For the above reasons, 

the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Grounds One, 2(d)-(h), and Four 

with prejudice.

III. MERITS REVIEW OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

CLAIMS IN GROUNDS 2(a), (b), (c), (i), (j) and THREE

A. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last 

reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. [R]esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

2. [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to the first entitlement to habeas relief as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 

above, “clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme 

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Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state 

court decision is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law if the state court (i) 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] 

cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision 

of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. 

Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

As to the second entitlement to habeas relief as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 

above, factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner 

can show by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see 

also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 

628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as “fair-minded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of 

the state court’s decision. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004). 

B. Analyzing the Merits of Habeas Claims Alleging the Ineffective Assistance 

of Counsel 

The “clearly established federal law” for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

is the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under 

Strickland, a petitioner arguing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must establish 

that his or her counsel’s performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the 

petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and 

“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 

711, 725 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). 

In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, judicial review 

“must be highly deferential” and the court must try not “to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, counsel’s representation must fall 

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below an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was outside the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A reviewing court considers 

“whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was effective. Rogovich v. 

Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a petitioner has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other). 

Finally, on federal habeas review, the “pivotal question is whether the state court’s 

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785. And 

“it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the 

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 

19, 25 (2002) (per curium). “Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could 

disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

C. Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j)

In Ground 2(a), Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel “failed to marshal 

irrefutable evidence in support of [an alibi] defense through third-party discovery practice 

. . . .” (Doc. 1 at 8). In Ground 2(b), Petitioner contends that his attorney failed to 

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conduct “other discovery” regarding the “delayed-report of his cousin [victim J.H.]; such 

as, school curricula, Facebook entries and to interview friends of the cousin.” (Doc. 1 at 

8). Ground 2(j) asserts that Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to present certain evidence

impeaching the victims’ testimony. Id. Attached to the Petition (Doc. 1-2 at 35-38) and

Petitioner’s Rely (Doc. 16-1) is a Declaration of Attorney Robert Campos, which 

Petitioner states he offers “as a Strickland expert opining that [Petitioner] suffered from 

deficient performance.” (Doc. 1 at 9; Doc. 16 at 16). The Declaration is dated November

3, 2016 and is identical to the Declaration attached to Petitioner’s PCR Petition submitted 

to the trial court. (Bates Nos. 293-97).

In rejecting the claims in Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j), the trial court noted that

Petitioner failed to submit affidavits or a record supporting his allegations as required by 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.5. (Bates No. 437). The trial court’s decision

also cites an Arizona Supreme Court case holding that an attorney’s failure to conduct a 

particular investigation was not ineffective assistance of counsel as the defendant offered 

no proof that it would have yielded anything of value to the defense. (Id.) (citing State v. 

Atwood, 832 P.2d 593, 617 (Ariz. 1992)). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the

trial court’s ruling that the claims in Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j) lack merit and that

Petitioner failed to satisfy the first performance prong of the Strickland test. (Bates No.

540-41).

A defense attorney has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); see also Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 

883, 893 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Counsel’s investigation must, at a minimum, permit informed 

decisions about how best to represent the client.”). This includes a duty to investigate the 

prosecution’s case and to follow up on any exculpatory evidence. Duncan v. Ornoski, 

528 F.3d 1222, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “‘the duty to investigate and prepare 

a defense is not limitless,’ and . . . ‘it does not necessarily require that every conceivable 

witness be interviewed or that counsel must pursue every path until it bears fruit or until 

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all conceivable hope withers.’” Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citation omitted). The duty to investigate does not require “defense lawyers to scour the 

globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a 

line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.” 

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (citation omitted). Petitioner’s claims in 

Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j) are speculative, and Petitioner has failed to establish that there 

was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different had

his trial counsel obtained the discovery that Petitioner asserts should have been obtained. 

See Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir. 2009) (speculation insufficient to satisfy 

prejudice prong of Strickland test); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir.

1991) (habeas petitioner cannot satisfy Strickland standard by “vague and conclusory 

allegations that some unspecified and speculative testimony might have established his 

defense”). The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the state courts’ 

rejection of Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j) is contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

Strickland or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. It is therefore 

recommended that the Court deny Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j).

D. Ground 2(c)

Petitioner’s trial counsel moved to sever the counts pertaining to victim K.C. from 

the counts pertaining to victim J.H. (Bates Nos. 9-12). The trial court denied the motion, 

and the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the ruling on direct appeal. (Bates Nos. 22-23, 

177-181). In Ground 2(c), Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to renew a motion to sever the counts, asserting that he “lost the opportunity to ask 

the court to revisit the earlier denial in light of J.H.’s inability not to remember much of 

her accusations and resulted in a waiver of the issue.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Although Petitioner 

disagrees with trial counsel’s defense strategy, that disagreement does not constitute 

deficient performance on the part of Petitioner’s trial counsel. See Murray v. Schriro, 

882 F.3d 778, 817 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A defendant’s disagreement with trial counsel’s 

strategy does not constitute deficient performance on the part of trial counsel.”). A court 

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reviewing the performance of counsel must make “every effort . . . to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Bell v. 

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); Edwards v.

Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (court cannot apply “fabled twenty 

twenty vision of hindsight” (internal quotation omitted)). As the trial court explained in 

its decision denying PCR relief, 

had trial counsel renewed the motion to sever the counts, and

the court had granted it, that would have provided the state 

additional time to shore up any of its evidence thereby 

making its case against the defendant potentially stronger. 

Furthermore, as counsel for the State argues, trial counsel’s 

closing argument “centered on the idea that the lack of 

evidence corroborating both allegations made each allegation 

less likely.” [ ] The strong presumption that trial counsel’s 

conduct falls within reasonable performance standards applies 

here and the first prong of Strickland has not been met.”

(Bates Nos. 437-38). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s reasoning. 

(Bates Nos. 540-41).

The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the state courts’ 

rejection of Ground 2(c) is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland or is 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The undersigned finds that 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of establishing entitlement to habeas relief. 

Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25; Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99. It is therefore recommended that the 

Court deny Ground 2(c).

E. Ground 2(i)

Victim J.H. testified at trial. After J.H. stated that her memory concerning her 

contact with Petitioner was better when she was interviewed several years ago by police, 

the State sought to introduce J.H.’s police interview. Petitioner’s trial counsel objected.

The trial court overruled the objection and allowed “an edited version for only that

portion dealing with the incident that [J.H.] does not remember.” (Bates No. 37). In 

Ground 2(i), Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 

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making “only a general objection to the introduction of J.H.’s recorded recollection. No 

specific objection was made to the statement’s lack of freshness. The matter was of 

moment because J.H.’s recorded statement was made nearly six years following the

alleged conduct and did not satisfy the foundational freshness requirements under Rule 

803(5).” (Doc. 1 at 9). 

In rejecting the claim in Ground 2(i), the trial court noted that Petitioner’s trial

counsel did object to the admission of J.H.’s police interview. (Bates No. 438). The trial 

court also recounted that Arizona Court of Appeals’ precedent “does not specify a time

limit for admissibility between the abuse and the interview.” (Id.). The trial court

concluded that because the interview was properly admitted, trial counsel’s performance 

was not deficient. (Id.). As Respondents correctly assert (Doc. 8 at 24), Petitioner has 

not shown that any specific “freshness” objection would have succeeded. The 

undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the state courts’ rejection of 

Ground 2(i) is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland or is based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. The undersigned recommends that the Court 

deny Ground 2(i).

F. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel “failed to present 

as fundamental error claims of prosecutorial misconduct and the admission of J.H.’s 

recorded recollection.” (Doc. 1 at 11). In denying PCR relief as to Ground Three, the

trial court correctly noted that as “a general rule, [a]ppellate counsel is not ineffective for 

selecting some issues and rejecting others.” (Bates No. 438) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted) (alteration in original). “A lawyer who throws in every arguable 

point—‘just in case’—is likely to serve her client less effectively than one who 

concentrates solely on the strong arguments.” Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 

(9th Cir. 1989). “Appellate counsel will therefore frequently remain above an objective 

standard of competence (prong one) and have caused her client no prejudice (prong two) 

for the same reason—because she declined to raise a weak issue.” Id.; see also Smith v. 

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Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (the “process of ‘winnowing out weaker arguments on 

appeal and focusing on’ those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of 

incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy”) (quoting Barnes, 463 

U.S. at 751–52); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The failure 

to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”). 

Petitioner has not shown that his appellate counsel omitted claims on direct appeal 

that are stronger than the claims Petitioner’s appellate counsel presented on appeal. The 

undersigned does not find that the state courts’ rejection of Ground Three is contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of Strickland or is based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts. The undersigned recommends that the Court deny Ground Three.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

Grounds One, 2(d)-(h), and Four of the Petition (Doc. 1) and DENY Grounds 2(a), (b), 

(c), (i), (j), and Three on the merits.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of a number of 

grounds in the Petition (Doc. 1) is justified by a plain procedural bar and Petitioner has 

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his remaining 

claims for relief.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

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Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. Failure to file 

timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey,

481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 28th day of February, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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