Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00951/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00951-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioners Kevin Laquan Trice and Tommy Nichols are state 

prisoners proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matters

have been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. 

KEVIN LAQUAN TRICE,

 Petitioner,

v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden,

Respondent.

-------------------------------

TOMMY NICHOLS, 

 Petitioner,

 v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Warden,

 Respondent.

Case No. 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO-HC

ORDER SUBSTITUTING WARDEN MARTIN 

BITER AS RESPONDENT TO PETITIONER 

TRICE’S PETITION AND WARDEN SCOTT 

FRAUENHEIM AS RESPONDENT TO 

PETITIONER NICHOLS’S PETITION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY PETITIONER TRICE’S REQUEST FOR 

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, DENY THE 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(DOC. 1), ENTER JUDGMENT FOR 

RESPONDENT, AND DECLINE TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY PETITIONER NICHOLS’S PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1), 

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT, AND 

DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE: 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 1 of 157
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Pending before the Court are two consolidated petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus brought by Petitioners who were tried 

together.

 Petitioner Trice’s petition was filed in case number 1:11-

00951-LJO-SKO-HC on May 25, 2011, and transferred to this Court on 

June 10, 2011. Respondent filed an answer on July 24, 2012, and 

Petitioner filed a traverse on September 21, 2012.

Petitioner Nichols’s petition was filed in case number 1:13-cv01561-AWI-BAM-HC on September 12, 2013. An answer was filed on 

December 16, 2013; no traverse has been filed.

I. Jurisdiction and Order Substituting Respondents

Because the petitions were filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of Stanislaus (SCSC), which is 

located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 28 

U.S.C. §§ 84(b), 2254(a), 2241(a), (d). Further, Petitioners claim 

that in the course of the proceedings resulting in their

convictions, they suffered violations of their constitutional 

rights. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the subject 

matter of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and 

2241(c)(3), which authorize a district court to entertain a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court only on the ground that the custody is in 

violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 2 of 157
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. 

Corcoran, 562 U.S. - , -, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam). 

As to Petitioner Trice, an answer was filed on behalf of 

Respondent Ron Barnes, who at the time the answer was filed was the 

warden of the High Desert State Prison (HDSP), where Petitioner

Trice was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition and 

the answer. Respondent sought to substitute Warden Barnes as the 

Respondent in place of Warden McDonald. (Doc. 42.) 

Petitioner initially named as a respondent a person who had 

custody of Petitioner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and 

Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the District 

Courts (Habeas Rules). See, Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 

F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). The fact that Petitioner was 

transferred to the Kern Valley State Prison (see doc. 51, filed 

April 17, 2013) after the petition was filed does not affect this 

Court’s jurisdiction; jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing 

for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of 

the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change. Francis v. 

Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Smith v. Campbell, 

450 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1971)). Accordingly, the Court has 

jurisdiction over the person of the Respondent.

However, in view of the fact that the official website of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) shows 

that the warden at KVSP is Martin Biter,

1 it is HEREBY ORDERED that

 

1

The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate and 

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned, including undisputed information posted on official websites. Fed. R. 

Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); 

Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The address of the official website for the CDCR is http://www.cdcr.ca.gov. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 3 of 157
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Martin Biter, Warden of the Kern Valley State Prison, be SUBSTITUTED 

as Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25.

As to Petitioner Nichols, an answer was filed on behalf of P.D. 

Brazelton, who was Petitioner Nichols’s custodian at the Pleasant 

Valley State Prison (PVSP) when the answer was filed, and who sought 

to be substituted as Respondent. Thus, Petitioner Nichols named a 

person with custody sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction over 

the person of the Respondent custodian.

However, in view of the fact that the official website of the 

CDCR shows that the warden at PVSP is now Scott Frauenheim, it is 

HEREBY ORDERED that Scott Frauenheim, Warden of the Pleasant Valley 

State Prison, be SUBSTITUTED as Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 25. 

II. Procedural Summary

Petitioners Trice and Nichols were tried together with Jermaine 

Michael Dean in the SCSC from November 14, 2006 through March 16, 

2007; Bobbie Blueblood was also charged but was tried separately. 

(3 CT 867, 5 CT 1230-39; LD 1-2.) 2

Petitioners were convicted of the first degree murder of Jose 

Ruiz perpetrated on March 3, 2002, during the commission of a 

robbery with the personal use and discharge of a firearm;

residential robbery of Tatum and Jose Ruiz with gang enhancements

and with the personal use and discharge of a firearm; and false

imprisonment of Roshyla and Ezra Ruiz involving the personal use of 

a firearm and with gang enhancements. (LD 3, 1-2.) Each crime was 

alleged to have been committed for the benefit of, at the direction 

 

2 “LD” refers to documents lodged by Respondent in Petitioner Trice’s case.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 4 of 157
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of, or in association with the Pasadena Denver Lane Bloods (PDL), a 

criminal street gang, but the gang allegation was dismissed during 

trial as to the murder count. Following an evidentiary hearing on a 

motion for new trial, all gang enhancements were stricken, but the 

new trial motion was otherwise denied. (Id. at 2-3.)

Petitioner Trice was sentenced to life in prison without the 

possibility of parole plus determinate and indeterminate terms as 

well as restitution and fines. (Id. at 2-3.) On June 29, 2010, in

People v. Nichols et al., case number F055572, the Court of Appeal 

of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District (CCA) modified 

the judgment with respect to a fine but otherwise affirmed the 

judgment as to Petitioner Trice. (LD 3.) Petitioner filed a 

petition for review in the California Supreme Court (CSC). On 

October 13, 2010, in case number S184678, the CSC denied review 

without any statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (LD 4, 

LD 5.)

Petitioner Nichols was found to have suffered two prior serious 

felony convictions that were also strikes (§ 667, subds.(a) & (d)) 

and to have served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

Petitioner Nichols was sentenced to life without the possibility of 

parole on the murder, plus determinate and indeterminate terms. On 

appeal, the CCA affirmed the convictions, but reversed the firearms 

enhancements pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 12022.53(c) and (d) for 

insufficiency of the evidence and ordered that sentence be imposed 

on the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancements. (LD 3, 118-

19, 122.) A petition for review filed in the California Supreme 

Court (CSC) was denied summarily on October 13, 2010, in case number 

S184678. (LD 4, LD 5.)

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 5 of 157
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Petitioner Nichols was resentenced, and he appealed from the 

resentencing; on March 13, 2012, in People v. Nichols, case number 

F061963, 2012 WL 832612 (March 13, 2012), the CCA affirmed the 

judgment but ordered the abstract be modified to delete fines and 

correctly reflect the term and custody credits. 

The docket of the CCA and CSC3 show that Petitioner Nichols 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the CCA on September 

2, 2011, which was denied on September 15, 2011. In re Tommy J. 

Nichols, case no. F063212. On June 25, 2012, Petitioner Nichols 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the CSC, which 

summarily denied it on November 14, 2012. In re Tommy J. Nichols, 

case no. S203621.

III. Factual Summary

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant 

to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue 

made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the 

petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence 

to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). This 

presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from a state 

appellate court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2009). Here, Petitioner Trice expressly adopts the 

 

3

The Court takes judicial notice of the docket as posted on the official website 

pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 

333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 

999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket 

sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010), 

cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official website of the 

California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 6 of 157
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

statement of the case and statement of the facts set forth on pages 

1 through 31 of the CCA’s decision. (Trav., doc. 47, 16.)

Accordingly, the following statement of the facts of the offenses 

consists of a summary of the facts as recorded in the CCA’s decision 

in People v. Nichols et al., case number F055572, filed on June 29, 

2010.

A. Background

In March 2002, Tatum and Jose “JoJo” Ruiz, the homicide victim, 

lived with their two children, eight-year-old Roshyla and five-yearold Ezra, in a house on Montilla Lane, a small cul-de-sac in 

Modesto. Ruiz was known to law enforcement as a member of a Norteno 

gang called the West Side Boyz, and as a major distributor of base 

cocaine in west Modesto based on information from, and controlled 

buys conducted by, confidential informant Phillip Collins, who was 

Ruiz’s friend and fellow drug dealer. In the previous year or so, 

Ruiz regularly bought cocaine by the kilo, cooked the cocaine and 

turned it into rock form, and then sold the product mostly by the 

ounce. According to Tatum, Ruiz did not sell drugs from their 

residence or keep more than small amounts of cocaine there; however, 

he sometimes prepared, cooked, or packaged the drugs at the house; 

customarily hid large sums of cash in different parts of the house; 

and kept a Taurus nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol in a safe 

with an electronic lock in the master bedroom closet.

After having twice sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer 

and informant, in July 2000 Collins sought to avoid eight to ten

years in prison by signing a contract with the Modesto Police 

Department that was approved by the district attorney's office. 

Pursuant to the agreement, Collins was required to 1) buy drugs from 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 7 of 157
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ruiz, Ruiz's brother Javier Ruiz, and another individual in 

controlled settings; 2) testify as needed; 3) obey all laws and make 

all court appearances; and 4) keep Modesto Police Sergeant Helton 

advised of his residence and whereabouts. In return, Collins would 

plead guilty to one count of selling drugs, and he would be 

sentenced to local time and three years' probation. Helton would 

contact Collins when a purchase was to be made and tell him from 

whom to make the buy. Collins would then arrange the deal, buy the 

drugs, and give the drugs to the police. He was wired for sound 

during the transactions, and the police gave him money to make the 

purchases. Under the supervision of Helton and FBI Agent Tim 

Hammond, Collins made approximately twenty controlled buys from Ruiz 

or his associates in quantities ranging from an ounce to a quarter 

kilo. 

As a result, federal authorities had planned to serve a search 

warrant on Ruiz’s residence within a matter of days of the murder. 

Federal grand jury indictments were obtained in February 2002 and 

served in March, with the prosecution of Ruiz's associates 

concluding in late spring 2003, when they all pled guilty in federal 

court. According to Helton, Collins would not have been privy to 

the status of the investigation and would not have been told when 

arrests and indictments were imminent; he was not to receive any 

consideration for his participation in the case concerning the Ruiz 

homicide.

Ultimately, Collins never pled guilty to anything or served 

time in jail, and he was told he would not be prosecuted on his 

case. Collins likewise faced no federal charges, but instead was 

paid money by the federal agents, who when contacted by Helton in 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 8 of 157
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the fall of 2000 were interested in pursuing Ruiz.

In 2002, Collins also knew Nichols (known as Bam or Bam Bam), 

and he came into contact with Dean (known as J Dogg). Collins was 

acquainted with Trice (known to him as Roach) and Bobby Blueford,

whom he got to know around 1995 when Collins served thirteen months 

in the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) for felony offenses 

involving controlled substances. At CRC Collins associated daily 

with Trice, who was from the PDL, had “Pasadena” and “DL” tattoos,

mostly associated with those wearing red (Bloods) as distinct from 

blue (Crips), and was seen to have “thrownn a Blood sign with his 

hands. Collins bragged to Trice and Blueford about his good drug 

connection in Modesto, whom he described as a Mexican partner. 

After release from CRC, Collins and Trice met up when Trice would 

come to Merced to visit family. (See LD 3, 3-6.)

B. The Robbery and Homicide

On March 1, 2002, the Friday of the weekend of the murder, 

Trice, who had called Collins the previous week, arrived at 

Collins’s home in Atwater with Dean, Nichols, and Blueford in a 

rented silver Lincoln Town Car, seeking a quarter kilo of rock 

cocaine. Trice asked several times for Collins to hook them up with 

Collins’s “Mexican homeboy” and repeatedly sought to know the 

details of the transaction. Collins knew that setting up the deal 

would violate the terms of his contract with the police department,

so he put Trice off by telling him to call in the next day or so; 

nevertheless, Collins, who was drinking at the time, told Trice and 

his co-defendants the make and color of his connection’s car and 

that his connection had a lot of drugs and money stashed. According 

to Collins, he was not familiar with the address at which Ruiz lived 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 9 of 157
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at the time. Collins denied telling an investigator from the 

Department of Justice that appellants had come to do a “lick,” i.e.,

a robbery. Trice and Blueford stayed at Collins’s house all day, 

while Dean and Nichols were there off and on. 

Officer Helton had contact with Collins late Friday morning; 

Collins said nothing about knowing of people who were trying to make 

buys from Ruiz, even though he was under an obligation to notify 

Helton anytime there was a possible sale of drugs involving Ruiz. 

Likewise, Collins did not contact Hammond, his federal handler, 

although he knew Hammond would be very interested.

On Saturday, Collins was at a wedding, but caller 

identification records on his phone showed that Trice called several 

times during the day. Collins called him back at least once and 

said he was busy that day and would call back. Collins did not know 

whether Trice called on Sunday; it was Collins's daughter's 

birthday, and Collins was away from home all day.

On that Sunday evening, Jose Ruiz was away from home after 

having received a lot of calls on his cell phone, including a call 

from Tatum made around 8:00 p.m. At the residence about fifteen 

minutes later, while the children were in the bathroom and Tatum was 

working in the kitchen, Tatum heard the front door open and close

and then heard Ruiz call to her in an urgent tone to get down. She 

observed Ruiz on the ground between the entryway and kitchen being 

held by the back of his shirt by two men who were pointing guns at 

him. One was Dean. A third person, Trice, came around the corner 

with a black revolver pointed at Tatum and told her to get down. 

Tatum then saw Nichols, who was holding a black gun that was the 

biggest of the guns she saw. Nichols pointed it at Ruiz. Trice 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 10 of 157
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

continued to direct Tatum to keep her head down. One or more of the 

intruders said something to the effect that they just wanted the 

stash. 

At Dean’s direction, Trice walked Tatum out of the kitchen and 

through the dining room, where she saw two other persons, causing 

her to believe there were four intruders. Nichols pointed the gun 

at Ruiz, and Trice went toward Ruiz, but Tatum did not see what 

Trice did.

Roshyla testified that upon being told by Ezra that her 

father’s friends were there, she left the bathroom where the 

children were going to bathe and went to see who they were. She saw 

around three African–American men coming through the door. The 

intruders were wearing black clothing and some were wearing beanies. 

One of the men, whom she subsequently identified as Dean at a 

photographic lineup and at trial, had black hair done in shoulderlength braids, a skinny or bony face, a long and pointy nose, and 

teeth protruding from his mouth. After Roshyla returned to the 

bathroom, Dean entered and then returned with Tatum, holding a gun 

to the back of her head and holding both of her arms behind her 

back. 

At Dean’s direction, Tatum and Dean left the room and returned 

with clothing for the children that had been in the laundry room, 

and Tatum hurriedly dressed the children. Dean looked around the 

bedroom and walked towards jewelry on the dresser; a watch was 

subsequently found to be missing, as was Tatum’s cell phone, which 

was in her purse on the bed in the bedroom.

Tatum saw Trice and Nichols, who were both armed, force Ruiz at 

gunpoint to walk through the bedroom to the walk-in closet. The 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 11 of 157
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

safe was behind the half-open door of the closet, through which 

Tatum could see the back of Nichols’s light blue shirt. She heard 

gunshots, probably at least three initially, and then saw Dean go to 

the closet door and start shooting inside the closet at a downward 

angle, firing a few shots. Tatum saw at least four shots go into 

the closet door while other shots were heard still going off behind 

the door. Tatum screamed and cried, ran to the bathroom, opened a 

window, broke off the screen, and boosted Roshyla up so she could 

climb out, instructing her to run to the neighbor’s house and tell 

them to call 911. Tatum testified that she tried to pick Ezra up 

and put him through the window, but he was screaming and so scared 

that he would not let her push him out. She told him to stay where 

he was, and by this time, the gunshots had stopped. Tatum believed 

she heard between five and ten shots.

As she ran off, Roshyla saw two of the intruders trying to 

leave by going over the chain-link fence next to the Ruiz house. 

One said that they had to get out of there, and he called the man 

with long braids a name that started with either R–A or R–O.

Another intruder ran out of the garage, and Ruiz crawled out of the 

house as if he were chasing the man. Roshyla kept running to the 

neighbor's house across the street, telling the woman who answered 

the door that she thought her dad got shot. The neighbors then 

called the police. 

After the gunshots stopped, Tatum saw no one in the bedroom or 

closet, but she saw Ruiz’s gun on the closet floor and blood 

everywhere. Although the gun appeared to have malfunctioned, she 

grabbed it anyway and followed the blood trail through the bedroom, 

down the hallway, and into the garage, where she found Ruiz on his 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 12 of 157
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

hands and knees, spitting out blood and gasping for air. Tatum ran 

inside to get Ezra and a telephone, and she was talking to the 911 

operator when she returned to Ruiz, who was lying still. Tatum 

screamed to an arriving neighbor that Ruiz had been shot, and she 

began performing CPR. (See LD 3, 6-11.)

C. Physical Evidence at and near the Scene

Dispatched to the Ruiz residence at approximately 8:14 p.m., 

Modesto police arrived within minutes to find Tatum performing CPR 

on Ruiz, who had been shot, was down in the driveway, and was 

bleeding profusely. Blood was trailing from him down the driveway, 

and it appeared that someone had made tracks through it. Next to 

Ruiz lay a Taurus nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun, which had 

a fifteen-round magazine in it and appeared to have malfunctioned, 

as the slide was partially back and a round was sticking out of the 

ejection port. It was subsequently determined that the unfired 

cartridge that was wedged in the chamber was a .40–caliber round, 

which, although capable of being loaded into the magazine, was too 

large for the gun barrel. The remaining thirteen unexpended 

cartridges in the magazine were the correct size. There was an odor 

of freshly burnt gunpowder in the house.

Police searched the area in and around the Ruiz home shortly 

after the shooting. Entry to the house did not appear to have been 

forced; the front door was partially open and a set of keys was in 

the lock. In the hallway that led from the garage into the house 

and ultimately to the master bedroom, officers found two aluminumcolored CCI brand .380–caliber shell casings, bloodstains, and 

bloody handprints on the carpet. Inside the master bedroom itself 

were three more of the expended .380 shell casings. There were also 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 13 of 157
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

bullet holes in various places in the room, and several expended 

copper-jacketed bullets were recovered. From the four bullet holes 

in the door of the master bedroom closet and associated gunshot 

residue, it was possible to ascertain that those shots were fired 

from the outside of the closet door inward. All four were fired in 

a downward, almost forty-five–degree angle. In the closet was an 

expended nine-millimeter shell casing that was believed to have been 

associated with the gun found by Ruiz's body. Also in the closet 

was a small safe with an electronic lock. The door was open and 

some of the contents were spilled out onto the floor. The 

trajectory of the bullets shot through the closet door was toward 

the general area of the safe.

There were bloodstains in various places in the room, and there 

was also blood in the closet, although not a lot. Bloodstain 

samples taken from the master bedroom were Ruiz's blood. The blood 

evidence essentially traveled a path from the master bedroom closet, 

through the area of the foot of the bed, down the hallway, to the 

garage, and to where Ruiz's body was located. Two dressers in the 

room contained cash in the amounts of $8,083 and $8,400. A box of 

.40–caliber ammunition was found in the master bedroom. It was the 

only box of ammunition found in the house. The box, which should 

have contained fifty .40–caliber rounds, contained forty-nine .40–

caliber cartridges and one 9–millimeter round.

On the living room floor was a red and black knit cap, and on

the floor of the dining room were a Nokia cell phone in its holder 

and four plastic zip ties that also seemed out of place.

The screen on the window of the master bedroom's bathroom was 

partially torn, and a trail of items that appeared to have been 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 14 of 157
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

taken from the house led to a hole that had recently been cut in the 

chain-link fence on the property line. Additional items and 

footprints led in a northerly direction. In a field directly north 

of the Ruiz residence, close to Woodland Avenue, officers located a 

black High Standard .22–caliber nine-shot rimfire revolver, which at 

trial Tatum testified looked similar to the one Trice pointed at 

her. Ruiz's blood was on the gun's cylinder. Footprint impressions 

in the grass and weeds indicated someone had recently run across the 

corner of the property. The direction of the footprints was 

northwest, toward Bennett Lane. A black-colored Sturm Ruger .357 

Magnum revolver containing six expended shell casings was found 

underneath a bush in the front yard of a house on Bennett; the lack 

of condensation, cobwebs, and dust on the gun indicated it had not 

been there long. At trial, Tatum testified that this gun looked 

like the one that the fourth intruder (who was not present at trial) 

had carried. The trail of evidence was consistent with a getaway 

car’s being parked about a block from the Ruiz house.

On November 24, 2002, Herbert Brownlee, who lived on Walker 

Avenue approximately half a mile north of Woodland, reported finding 

a Lorcin .380 semiautomatic handgun underneath the empty engine 

compartment of a Mustang that he was preparing to take to the 

junkyard. The Mustang had been in a field next to Brownlee's house 

for months. The gun, which was rusted, had an empty clip in it and a 

live round in the chamber. At trial, Tatum testified that this gun 

was similar to the one Dean had carried. (See LD 3, 11-14.)

D. Ballistics and Forensic Evidence

Ruiz was shot at least nine times and sustained five fatal 

wounds. Stippling indicated that at least two of the shots were 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 15 of 157
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fired from close range. Death resulted from shock and hemorrhage 

due to multiple gunshot wounds. Four .22–caliber bullets from 

rimfire cartridges were recovered from his body during the autopsy. 

Although there was insufficient individual detail to identify them 

as having been fired from the same gun, test firing showed that they 

could have been fired from the High Standard revolver recovered in 

the field near the scene. 

The nine-millimeter cartridge case found in the closet was 

fired by the Taurus nine-millimeter pistol. That pistol would not 

shoot a .40–caliber bullet; as the bullet would be too big for the 

chamber, the gun would not load itself and would jam. A ninemillimeter and .40–caliber cartridge are readily distinguishable 

because of their different diameters and weights. The condition of 

the Lorcin .380–caliber semi-automatic pistol was consistent with 

its being outside in a field for six to eight months or more, and 

the chamber and barrel were very corroded. The pistol was rusted 

shut, and a CCI-brand live round had to be forcibly removed from the 

chamber. This unfired round was the same caliber, and from the same 

manufacturer, as an expended cartridge from the homicide scene that 

was submitted for comparison, but results were inconclusive as to 

whether the expended cartridge had been fired from the Lorcin. (LD 

3, 20-21.)

E. Other Evidence Revealed in Investigation

At the scene on the night of the shooting, Detective Brocchini 

was told by Andre Ruiz that a third party, who was a neighbor, had 

told Ruiz that he had heard the shooting and then saw an older Black 

male adult with a short Afro haircut, in an orange, primered 

minivan, begin to honk his horn. The neighbor said he then saw two

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 16 of 157
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Black subjects run from the area around the Ruiz residence to the 

minivan, and then the minivan drove off. The neighbor also 

mentioned something about a black or new Lexus. Brocchini's 

attempts to track down the person who actually made the statements 

were unsuccessful.

Collins testified that after he returned to his home in Atwater

sometime after dark on that Sunday, he was visited for ten to twenty 

minutes by Nichols and Dean, who said that Trice had been shot 

crossing the street across from the gas station near Collins's 

house. They said they had dropped him off down the street at some 

girl's house. Dean said they could not leave their homeboy and 

asked how to get to the freeway. Collins gave him directions.

Nichols, the more aggressive of the two, told Collins that they knew 

where he lived, and that if anyone came by asking questions, Collins 

was to say Trice got shot crossing the street. Collins could see 

the handle of a pistol tucked in the front of Nichols's pants.

Nichols and Dean then left, and Collins could not tell whether 

anyone else was in their car. While they were there, Helton 

telephoned with the news that Ruiz had been shot.

Helton telephoned Collins at about 9:00 p.m. He told Collins 

to call him if Collins heard anything. According to Helton, Collins 

called him back about 11:00 that night and said he had received 

several calls from people, advising him of Ruiz's death. Collins 

said nothing about anyone named Roach, Bam, or J Dogg. Collins 

denied having a second conversation with Helton that night. Collins 

did not tell Helton anything about his visitors or Trice’s being 

shot because he was not sure what was going on that night.

Brocchini telephoned Collins the morning after the shooting and 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 17 of 157
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

asked Collins, whom he knew to be acquainted with Ruiz and to be 

working for Helton and the FBI, if he knew Trice, who had been found 

in Atwater, the city where Collins lived. Collins said no.

However, Collins contacted Helton later that morning and told him 

that he thought something was going on. As a result, Helton and 

Hammond interviewed him that afternoon. Collins provided 

descriptions of Bam, Roach, and J Dogg and told the officer that the 

men had come by. He said they had told him they had $5,000 and 

wanted to buy a quarter kilo, and that they would give him $500 to 

set up the buy. Collins later identified pictures of the three codefendants and Blueford from photographic lineups.

Brocchini attempted to develop a list of Trice’s associates and 

ultimately came up with Nichols as a possible suspect. Pursuant to 

Brocchini’s directions, on March 5, Nichols was arrested in 

Pasadena. A black beanie was seized in a search of his house.

The next day, Brocchini sought help in identifying J Dogg and B 

Dogg from an officer of the Pasadena Police Department who was known 

to him as an expert in the Black criminal street gangs of Pasadena. 

The officer’s efforts and an anonymous telephone source resulted in 

enough information to identify J Dogg as Dean and obtain a 

photograph of him, which was incorporated in a photographic lineup; 

the lineup was e-mailed to Modesto, where Tatum and Roshyla 

identified Dean, who was then arrested at his home.

On March 14, Brocchini listened to a telephone call at the 

Stanislaus County Jail in which Dean told his mother and sister to 

telephone at a stated number a lady Dean identified as JP's sister, 

and to make sure the lady said that Dean was dropped off at her 

house on Friday and was not picked up until after the weekend. As a 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 18 of 157
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

result of information contained in the call, Brocchini contacted 

Lisa Young, who declined to say whether Dean had been with her. 

Dean's sister telephoned Young and said there was a message from 

Dean that he wanted Young to say he was with her that weekend. 

Young subsequently testified that although Dean had telephoned her 

on the Friday of the weekend of the homicide, she had declined his 

request to visit her. Young did not see Dean on the weekend of the 

homicide. 

In an interview on the night of the homicide, a neighbor who 

lived across the street from the Ruiz home told law enforcement that 

one or two days before, a black, lowered Chevrolet pickup truck 

drove by slowly and stopped briefly, its occupants looking at the 

Ruiz house. Later, a newer light-colored, grayish, or white Lincoln 

with tinted windows did the same thing and stopped around the corner 

instead of just driving on around the cul-de-sac. Following a tip 

received after the homicide, Brocchini learned that a car rented to 

Tricia Lee was at a rental yard at the airport in Burbank. 

Examination of the car revealed what looked like blood in the car's 

back seat, which forensic testing showed was Trice’s blood. 

Nichols's palm print was found on the driver's side hood. At trial,

the neighbor testified that a photograph of the Lincoln located by 

Brocchini looked similar to the car she saw before the shooting.

Tricia Lee rented the Lincoln on a Friday in February 2002 for 

the weekend only. Trice, who was with her when she rented the car, 

asked to use the car on Friday. Lee reported that the car was at 

Trice’s mother’s home in Altadena on Friday after work, and Trice 

had permission to use it on Saturday, when Lee expected to see 

Trice. Unsuccessful in paging Trice over the weekend, she received 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 19 of 157
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on Monday a call from Blueford, who said he had the car so that she 

could return it. Lee asked where Trice was, but Blueford said he 

did not know. (See LD 3, 14-20.)

F. Petitioner Trice’s Injury and Medical Treatment 

In response to a report of shooting, Atwater Police Officer 

Ridenour responded to an address in Atwater on March 3 just after 

9:00 p.m. The officer encountered Trice, who identified himself as 

Keith (not Kevin) Trice, and who had gunshot wounds to his back and 

lower abdomen that Trice said he sustained while he had been walking 

to a store. Trice expressed a strong desire not to go to the 

indicated trauma center, which was in Modesto; however, on the way, 

Trice told the officer that he did not know who shot him, but it was 

a person or persons in a vehicle that could have been a car or a 

truck; Trice did not answer some of the officer’s questions. The 

name “Kevin Trout” was received by a paramedic, who observed 

symptoms consistent with shock, and assessed the patient's physical 

condition as being borderline critical. Shock would be a possible 

explanation for a lack of information being obtained from a patient.

However, the paramedic's assessment was that the patient had the 

ability to answer questions, but was reluctant to do so. Trice was 

similarly vague when questioned by a doctor at the hospital, adding 

little more than that he was from Los Angeles and had been down for 

three days, visiting a Sonjia in Atwater or Merced. Atwater police 

were unable to find any witnesses to a shooting or any physical 

evidence that a shooting had occurred in the area.

At about 1:40 p.m. on March 4, Modesto Police Detectives Grogan 

and Blake interviewed Trice, who stated that he had been in Atwater 

visiting a friend named Sonjia Girtman, and he was walking from her 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 20 of 157
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

house to a store to purchase some alcohol when he was the victim of 

a drive-by shooting. He said the car was dark and that he believed 

he was shot by someone sitting in the front passenger seat. Trice 

said he was bleeding profusely, and it took him some time to gather 

the strength to walk back to the apartment. Grogan subsequently 

obtained items of evidence from the Atwater Police Department and 

Sonjia Girtman's house, including an expired driver's license for 

Keith Lamont Trice (Petitioner Trice’s twin brother) and a pair of 

brown pants that had Petitioner’s blood on them. He measured the 

distance and travel time between the crime scene in Modesto and 

Girtman's residence in Atwater, and Grogan determined it was 

possible for Trice to have left the scene in Modesto and gone to the 

address in Atwater between the homicide and when he placed the call 

for assistance.

After the interview ended, Blake granted Trice’s request and

allowed Trice to use his cell phone to call his mother. Once 

connected, Trice said, “Mom, I got shot yesterday in Modesto.” This 

was said as one complete sentence, without any gaps, although Grogan 

could not hear what, if anything, Trice’s mother said or asked. 

According to Barbara Trice, Petitioner Trice’s mother, Petitioner

never said he was shot the previous day in Modesto. She did not ask 

if he had been shot; she had already heard that he had been shot and 

that it had occurred in Atwater. Because she had heard a number of 

things about his health and that he had been taken to an infirmary 

in the jail, she asked his location. He said he was in Modesto. 

(See LD 3, 15-17.)

G. Gang Evidence

A red baseball cap with a “P” on it in three different places

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 21 of 157
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was seized at Nichols's house at the time of his arrest. A letter 

addressed to J Dogg from a PDL Blood in prison was found in Dean’s 

bedroom when he was arrested. On April 1, 2002, several items 

bearing symbols and a writing referring to Denver Lane were found in 

the jail cell of Dean and Nichols.

Nichols had several tattoos. One was “Lanes” with an X through 

the A, which was a sign of disrespect to the Altadena Block Crips. 

Another of Nichols's tattoos was “God Forgive, Lanes Don't.” Trice 

had “Pasadena” tattooed across his back, with “D” on the back of his 

left arm and “L” on the back of his right arm. He also had “BIP” 

(“Blood in Peace”) on an arm. Dean had no tattoos. However, 

Brocchini reviewed records for the cell phone attributed to Dean and 

found calls made between February 25 and March 4, 2002, to the phone 

of Trice’s girlfriend, Trice’s pager, and Blueford's phone. 

Pasadena Police Officer Okamoto testified as an expert on 

gangs, specifically the PDL, which he described as a large and very 

violent gang that “pretty much controls all of Pasadena,” although 

he had received calls about PDL involvement in criminal activity in 

areas outside Pasadena. Okamoto testified the PDL’s primary 

activities were theft, robbery, drug sales, carjacking, assaults, 

and murder; in March 2002, PDL had at least 50 members. In 

Okamoto’s opinion, PDL was a criminal street gang as defined by the 

Penal Code. 

Okamoto explained that there are two sets of African–American 

gangs, the Crips and the Bloods, which are rivals. Although there 

are numerous different gangs within those two, all are either a Crip 

set or a Blood set. Bloods' predominant favorite color is red; 

Crips' is blue. PDL is a Blood set. Their main rivals are the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 22 of 157
23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Altadena Block Crips and the Raymond Avenue Crips. PDL members 

often wear a Philadelphia Phillies hat, which is red with a white P 

on the front. The hat seized in the search of Nichols's residence 

would signify someone was wearing gang attire, and “obviously” would 

be the hat of someone who was representing Pasadena.

In addition to colors, gang members use hand signals to 

identify each other. PDL members will make a P, an L, and a D with 

their hands, or, if they happen to see a rival as they drive by, 

they may throw up a quick L to signify they are from PDL.

Tattoos show fellow gang members that a person is really 

involved with gang activity; common tattoos are PDL, WSB for West 

Side Blood, DLB for Denver Lane Blood, or DL. A Blood may also have 

a CK tattoo, which stands for Crip Killer. In their graffiti, they 

will sometimes cross out the letter A so as to disrespect Altadena 

Block Crips. If someone passes away, they will not use the R in rest 

in peace, because that would be representing Raymond Avenue Crips. 

Instead, they will put BIP for Blood in Peace. 

Blood members also often call each other “Blood,” both orally 

or in writing, or will call each other by a moniker or “homey.”

In Okamoto's experience, when gang members commit crimes with 

other people, they normally commit those crimes with fellow gang 

members they can trust. A lot of PDL's activity is based on some 

type of monetary gain, as well as respect and intimidation.

Based on his review of a variety of materials, Okamoto 

concluded that Trice, Nichols, Dean, and Blueford were PDL members.

He further opined that they were active PDL criminal street gang 

members on March 3, 2002. In Okamoto's opinion, the co-defendants 

and Blueford willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted felonious 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 23 of 157
24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

criminal conduct by members of the gang by the actions alleged to 

have occurred in this case. The bragging rights they would bring 

back to Pasadena would garner them a large amount of respect from 

their fellow gang members, and would also bring a lot of respect to 

the gang. It was Okamoto's further opinion that each of the four 

actively participated in a criminal street gang with knowledge that 

its members engaged in a pattern of gang activity. His opinion was 

based on the intimidation factor they would bring back into the 

neighborhood. Whatever they would recover, such as narcotics, they 

would bring back into Pasadena and sell for some type of monetary 

gain, and then they could purchase more weapons, which would help 

them in more criminal activity. Furthermore, the crimes alleged 

were committed at the direction of or in association with a criminal 

street gang. All four individuals were active PDL gang members who

would not want to take an associate or someone they could not trust, 

so when recruiting in a case like this, they would definitely 

recruit fellow gang members.

Brocchini also testified as an expert in criminal street gangs, 

and expressed opinions, and bases therefor, that were consistent 

with those expressed by Okamoto. In addition, Brocchini explained 

that Crips call each other “Cuz,” while Bloods call each other 

“Dogg.” Brocchini opined that gang members would rob other gang 

members because if someone breaks into a gang member's house, that 

person will find drugs, guns, or money. In addition, gang members 

usually do not report robberies, but instead try to get their 

belongings back on their own. (See LD 3, 21-23.)

H. Defense Evidence

A neighbor living across the street from the Ruiz family at the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 24 of 157
25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

time of the shooting testified regarding traffic and behavior 

consistent with drug sales at the Ruiz residence, repeated 

observations of a black Lexus in the area, and evidence of gang 

attire. A detective confirmed that he did not even check or follow 

up on a list of license plate numbers of vehicles the neighbor 

associated with the Ruiz residence that was given to the detective 

shortly after the homicide. 

A person who had been located in a park several blocks south of 

Woodland Avenue and Montilla Lane at approximately 8:15 or 8:20 p.m. 

on March 3, 2002, saw a male in a black hooded sweatshirt, running

very fast to the south along the park and repeatedly turning around 

and looking back, as if maybe someone were after him. This person 

met up with two other individuals at the south end of the park.

They talked for 30 seconds to a minute, then ran father south. The 

person had reported what he had seen.

When Modesto Police Officer Wilcoxson interviewed Roshyla 

shortly after the homicide, she said she saw four or five Black 

males come through the garage door and force their way into the 

house; one was approximately 20 to 30 years old, about five feet 10 

inches, tall and thin, and wearing a black beanie on his head, as 

well as a long-sleeved black shirt and black baggy jeans. She was 

unable to give any other descriptions.

In securing the homicide scene, Modesto Police Officer Sanchez 

found in the exterior lock of the front door a set of keys that 

appeared to have blood on them.

The jury received evidence concerning two photographic lineups 

shown to Tatum on March 4 by Detective Owen. As to one that 

included Nichols’s picture, Tatum remarked that the skin tones of 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 25 of 157
26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the suspect were lighter than those in the pictures. After Owen 

asked whether any of the photographs looked similar aside from the 

skin tones, Tatum focused on the photograph of Nichols, said that 

the facial features were very similar, eliminated all the other 

photographs, and said she wanted to see the individual in person

because she believed she could identify parts of his body, such as a 

fat gut, fat sides, and jiggling stomach. After looking at the 

second photographic lineup, Tatum said none of the people looked 

familiar. Owen noted, however, that she looked at Trice's picture 

several times, and when he asked why, Tatum said the complexion, 

forehead, and hairline were the same, but she was not sure and 

wanted to see the man in person; she could eliminate two of the 

photographs, but not the others. 

On March 12, Detective Blake showed two photographic lineups to 

Tatum, one of which contained Blueford's picture. Tatum did not see 

anyone she recognized, although she pointed to the photo of someone 

other than Blueford as resembling one of the suspects. 

Dr. Mitchell Eisen, a psychologist who testified concerning 

eyewitness memory and suggestibility, explained that research shows 

people are better in general at making identifications within their 

own race than they are cross-race, which tend to result in higher 

rates of false identifications than same-race identifications. 

Research also shows that the younger the child, the more 

suggestible, because the child tends to rely more on adults for cues 

as to what the adult is after and what really happened. Children 

are not as skillful as adults in organizing information so that it 

can be recalled on demand. Children are particularly influenced by 

their parents.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 26 of 157
27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

W. Jerry Chisum, a crime scene reconstructionist, examined 

photographs, crime scene videos, and other materials in connection 

with this case, and based on his review of the evidence, he 

concluded Ruiz was shot in the bedroom itself, not in the closet

because of the absence of blood documented in the closet and the 

presence of blood spatter in the bedroom itself. Further, if 

someone other than Ruiz—-for example, Trice—-was shot inside the 

house and sustained a through-and-through wound, there would have 

been a bullet and some blood, which would have contained DNA. Chisum 

conceded that he could not exclude blood being in the closet; it 

could have been too small a spot to observe, or there could have 

been blood evidence that was not documented. He also conceded it 

was possible for someone to get shot and not have blood recovered 

from the location at which he or she was shot because someone could 

be shot and have internal, as opposed to external, bleeding; 

moreover, it was possible that clothing could catch external 

bleeding and prevent the blood from landing on the ground.

Chisum opined based on the jamming of the nine-millimeter 

pistol that someone had removed a nine-millimeter cartridge from the 

magazine and inserted a .40–caliber cartridge in its place. When 

the gun was fired once, the larger-caliber cartridge moved up, would 

not chamber properly, and jammed the weapon. In the photographs 

Chisum reviewed, the box of .40–caliber cartridges appeared to be 

closed. Chisum would have asked to have the weapon's magazine and 

the cartridges fingerprinted, particularly the .40–caliber cartridge 

causing the jam, the nine-millimeter shell that was in the box, and 

the box itself. No physical evidence Chisum saw showed Ruiz had the 

nine-millimeter pistol in his hand or fired it. As for the shots 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 27 of 157
28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fired through the closet door, the powder was still present. None 

of the physical evidence indicated when the shots were fired, 

however. They could have been fired an hour or even two days before 

the police arrived.

From a review of photographs of the bathroom window area, 

Chisum opined that they were inconsistent with someone’s going 

through that window because of the way the window's screen was 

dislodged, the lack of damage to the bush, and an absence of 

footprints in the soil below the window. The lawn appeared to be 

about two feet from the window, however, so it was possible that if 

someone landed on the grass and a photograph was taken several hours 

later, there might be no evidence of the landing.

Trice testified in his own defense. He drove the Lincoln 

rented by his girlfriend, Tricia Lee, to Altadena where he lived 

with his parents on what he believed to be Thursday, February 28. 

He visited old friends Blueford, Dean, and Nichols, and proposed 

driving to Madera, where Trice had lady friends and family, 

including his Uncle Bernard, from whom Trice wanted to buy a quarter 

kilo of cocaine for $5,000. Trice arranged to return to pick up his 

friends later. They began the journey around 8:00 p.m. on Thursday, 

stopping on several errands, including a visit to a gas station to 

allow Trice to clean himself up after his nose started to bleed 

while going over the Grapevine. They spent the night in Madera.

On Friday, March 1, the four visited Collins, socialized, and 

set up a purchase of a quarter kilo for $4,500 with a connection 

that Collins would hook up. They went to Merced, returned to 

Madera, attended a party discovered by Trice while Trice was 

unsuccessfully searching for Bernard, and spent the night in Madera.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 28 of 157
29

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Trice ended up spending Saturday night with Sonjia Girtman in 

Atwater, less than a mile from Collins’s house. Trice had entrusted 

the Lincoln to Blueford, who was accompanied by Nichols, so that 

Blueford could drive the car back to Lee. Trice had arranged with 

Bernard to have Bernard drive Trice to Merced, but Bernard left 

without Trice, so Trice took a bus to Merced. Girtman picked him up 

and drove him to her house in Atwater, where Trice spent Saturday 

night and Sunday.

On Sunday night, Trice told Girtman that he was going to the 

store, smoked a cigarette outside the residence, and then walked 

towards the store with his head down. A car pulled up with two 

people in it who might have been Hispanic. The passenger said 

something to him that Trice did not catch; he asked what was up, 

then saw the passenger pull out a gun and fire, hitting Trice. 

Trice fell, crawled off, lost his strength, but eventually made it 

back, bleeding and in pain, to Girtman’s house, where paramedics 

were called. He did not hear the car drive off and had no idea how 

long he had been hurt or what had happened to his money. He denied 

giving his name as Kevin Trout or Keith Trice; Keith’s license was 

found in Petitioner’s pants because Keith, who was Petitioner’s 

twin, had left it there when he had borrowed the pants from 

Petitioner. 

With respect to gang evidence, the defense presented the 

testimony of Timothy Rhambo, a youth counselor for a group home for 

foster children in Pasadena and also a boxing coach for children in 

the community. Rhambo was involved with PDL in the late 1980's. In 

the 1990's and early 2000's, he got to know Nichols quite well. He 

testified to Nichols’ help in organizing events in aid of stopping 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 29 of 157
30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violence between older and younger PDL gang members in 2000 or 2001. 

Nichols's involvement brought credibility to Rhambo and what he was 

trying to do, as Nichols was more known as a gang member. Rhambo 

also testified that it was easy to get out of the PDL gang; a person 

simply stops being “with that” and associating with the people he 

was associating with before and starts doing his own thing, whatever 

it is. Rhambo was seeing this from Nichols during the summer of 

2001, although Nichols had been in and out of jail a lot and had had 

a reputation as being a hardcore gang member.

Rhambo was also acquainted with Trice, with whom he had gone to 

school. In the late 1990's, Trice no longer dressed like he had in 

the early 1980's, when he was a PDL member.

Rhambo had also seen Dean before, and thought he was “probably” 

an active gang member “back in the day,” although he did not know. 

He could not remember where or in what context he had seen Dean.

(See LD 3, 24-31.)

IV. Brady Violation4

Petitioner5 argues that he suffered a violation of his right to 

due process of law and specifically to disclosure of material 

information protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when, 

as the trial court found, Detective Brocchini testified falsely at 

and after trial, withheld information, and attempted to mislead the 

Court and jurors. (Doc. 1, 4.) Petitioner alleges that Brocchini 

concealed evidence that Philip Collins was a gang member, and both 

Brocchini and Collins falsely denied that Collins’s tattoo was a 

 

4

 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

5

 To reduce the length of this order, because Petitioner Trice raises many more 

issues than Petitioner Nichols, the discussion portion of this order will refer to 

Petitioner Trice as “Petitioner.”

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 30 of 157
31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

gang tattoo. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner contends that he suffered a 

prejudicial denial of the opportunity to impeach both Collins and 

Brocchini; if the jury had known that Collins was a gang member and 

that Brocchini had lied to back him up, it would have made a 

significant difference and could have persuaded the jury to 

disbelieve the remainder of Collins’s and Brocchini’s testimony, and

it was sufficient to make it reasonably probable that at least one 

juror would conclude differently as to Petitioner’s guilt. 

Petitioner also notes that the withheld material establishes that 

Brocchini testified incorrectly on other factual matters pertinent 

to Petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner immediately seeks an evidentiary 

hearing on this issue and ultimately seeks the granting of his 

petition. (Doc. 47, 21-34.)

Petitioner Nichols also raises the Brady violation and argues 

that it rendered Collins’s statements and testimony unreliable. He 

contends that because Collins’s information was the initial link 

between the crimes and Petitioner Nichols, Collins’s participation 

in the identification process tainted the subsequent identifications 

made in the course of photographic lineups, live lineups, and incourt identifications. (Doc. 1, 27-32.) 

A. Standard of Decision and Scope of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

 

 judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 31 of 157
32

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of 

the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000).

A state court’s decision contravenes clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite 

to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or 

concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of 

facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. The state court 

need not have cited Supreme Court precedent or have been aware of 

it, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [it]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 

(2002). 

A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal 

law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but 

applies it to a new set of facts in an objectively unreasonable

manner, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal 

principle to a new context in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); see, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 32 of 157
33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) cannot be premised on an 

unreasonable failure to extend a governing legal principle to a new 

context where it should control. White v. Woodall, - U.S. -, 134 

S.Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014). Therefore, “‘if a habeas court must extend 

a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,’ then by 

definition the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the time of 

the state-court decision.’” Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 

541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004)). The Court in White v. Woodall reiterated 

the difference between extending a legal principle and applying 

rules that are squarely established by the Court’s holdings to the

facts of each case, which is required only if it is so obvious that 

a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that 

there could be no fairminded disagreement on the question. White v. 

Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1706.

An application of clearly established federal law is 

unreasonable only if it is objectively unreasonable; an incorrect or 

inaccurate application is not necessarily unreasonable. Williams, 

529 U.S. at 410. A state court’s determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief as long as fairminded jurists 

could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Even 

a strong case for relief does not render the state court’s 

conclusions unreasonable. Id. To obtain federal habeas relief, a 

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on a claim 

was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 33 of 157
34

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. The standards set by 

§ 2254(d) are “highly deferential standard[s] for evaluating statecourt rulings” which require that state court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt, and the Petitioner bear the burden of proof. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Habeas relief is not 

appropriate unless each ground supporting the state court decision 

is examined and found to be unreasonable under the AEDPA. Wetzel v. 

Lambert, -–U.S.--, 132 S.Ct. 1195, 1199 (2012).

In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court’s 

legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

federal law, “review... is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court 

has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400. 

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas proceeding 

brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state 

court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court 

shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of 

producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of 

correctness. A state court decision on the merits based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state proceedings. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 34 of 157
35

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

322, 340 (2003).

 With respect to each claim, the last reasoned decision must be 

identified to analyze the state court decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 

2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, the last reasoned decision on all Petitioner’s claims was the 

decision of the CCA.

B. The Decision of the State Court on the Brady Claims

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s opinion (LD 3, 32-41) is as 

follows:

DISCLOSURE ISSUES

A. Collins's Gang Status

Appellants contend the judgments must be reversed because 

the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 

83 (Brady) and its progeny by withholding evidence that 

Phillip Collins was a gang member, that he perjured 

himself on that point, and that Detective Brocchini and 

Sergeant Helton corroborated the perjury. We find no cause 

for reversal of the judgments.

1. Background

Collins's involvement in the case is summarized in the 

statement of facts, ante. During examination by the 

prosecutor, he testified that he “hung out” with Bloods 

while growing up on the west side of Modesto and bought 

drugs from them. He further testified that gang members 

use tattoos to signify what gang they are from, and that 

he had seen them use geographical tattoos such as the name 

of their town or “‘West Side,’” “‘North Side,’” or “‘East 

Side.’” On cross-examination, Collins testified that he 

was never a gang member. He admitted having a “Westside 

Blood” tattoo, but, when asked whether that term had a 

gang connotation, he said he got it in CRC to fit in, and 

that there were no Westside Bloods in Modesto. When asked, 

“So you were just a Westside Blood in CRC?” Collins 

replied, “Yes.”

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 35 of 157
36

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Helton testified on cross-examination that, to his 

knowledge, Collins was never a member of a criminal street 

gang, and that Helton probably would have known had he 

been.FN25 When Brocchini was asked, “Is Phil Collins a 

gang member?” he replied, “No.” Asked how he knew, 

Brocchini testified: “Because I worked in the gang unit 

for a long time and I knew Phil Collins, too. He was a 

drug dealer.” FN26

FN25. Helton was in the gang unit for the second time 

from 1996 through 2000.

FN26. Brocchini was a gang detective from 1997 to 

2000, and specialized in Black gangs, among others.

Appellants each filed a motion for new trial.FN27 Nichols 

asserted in part that Brocchini had prepared a report, 

dated February 10, 1998, in which Collins was included as 

a member of the Oak Street Posse (OSP), a known criminal 

street gang, and that this information was material to 

Collins's credibility, known by Brocchini, and not 

disclosed to the defense. A copy of the report, which 

identified “Collins, Phillip” as the person listed as 

“Philthy Phill” in the “105” column of the OSP roster, was 

attached as an exhibit.

FN27. Early on in trial, all were deemed to be 

joining in each other's motions. It is clear from

the record that the trial court also regarded them

as joining in each other's objections. Accordingly, 

throughout the appeal we will treat an objection or 

motion made by one as having been made by all.

An evidentiary hearing was held. Brocchini testified that 

about a year after his trial testimony, he was reviewing 

the particular MPD case report number referenced on a 

subpoena he received from the defense when he found a 

report he had written as a gang deputy in 1998. The report 

concerned a handwritten list found by a deputy in the jail 

cell of Norval Williams. It was a then-current list of OSP 

gang members. In 1998, OSP, a Black criminal street gang 

operating in Stanislaus County, had both Crips and Bloods 

in it. The list was split into two halves, the 105 section 

and the 213 section, with those numbers being addresses on 

Oak Street. The 105 section was Blood gang members who 

claimed OSP, while the 213 section was Crip gang members 

who claimed OSP. After the list was found under a bunk in 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 36 of 157
37

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the jail, Brocchini deciphered the identity of some of the 

people. He was able to do so from working in the gang unit 

for a long time and talking to them and hearing what they 

called each other. One of the names on the list was 

“Philthy Phill,” whom Brocchini identified as the same 

Phillip Collins who testified at trial.FN28 In writing the 

report, Brocchini never said Collins was a Blood; Collins 

was listed by an OSP member as being in that gang as a 

Blood. When Brocchini heard Collins deny at trial that he 

was a gang member, Brocchini believed him because 

Brocchini had not come across any field identification 

cards with Collins's name on them.

FN28. Brocchini did not recall how he linked the 

moniker “Philthy Phill” with Collins.

Brocchini further testified that at trial, because he was 

asked to render an opinion concerning whether appellants 

were criminal street gang members, he did a gang workup on 

them. He did not do anything similar with regard to 

Collins during the pendency of this matter. Moreover, he 

would not identify anyone as a gang member simply because 

the person's name was on the roster, because that alone 

would not meet a sufficient number of MPD's criteria. 

Collins had a gang tattoo, and Brocchini knew he 

associated with gang members and that he had been named by 

other people as a gang member at the time Collins 

testified. That fit three of the criteria used by MPD to 

establish who was a gang member. Even assuming Collins was 

a gang member in 1998, however, this would not necessarily 

mean he was still a gang member when he testified, as it 

is possible to get out of the gang. Brocchini did not know 

about Collins's tattoo until Collins testified about it, 

and he opined that Collins was not a gang member at the 

time Collins testified that he was not a gang member.

Brocchini did not tell anyone about the OSP roster or give 

a copy to the defense prior to trial because he did not 

remember it. The list was in a file regarding Norval 

Williams. Given the way MPD's database was set up, the 

only name entered in it would have been the one indexed on 

the front, i.e., Williams. The MPD gang unit did not keep 

an individual file for each suspected gang member; there 

was no file for Collins.

In its written ruling on the new trial motions, the trial 

court stated: “The Court finds Detective Brocchini's 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 37 of 157
38

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony to be disingenuous. In 1998, Collins was 

associating with gang members, had a gang monicker [sic], 

a gang tattoo, and was listed on a gang roster. MPD's own 

criteria provide that a person isn't considered a ‘dropout’ until there has been at least 5 years of no activity. 

In stating his opinion at trial, Brocchini did not state 

the many gang indicators that he was disregarding in 

reaching his fairly incredible opinion. Moreover, his 

opinion appears to have been made for the purpose of 

bolstering Collins['s] credibility in the eyes of the 

jury. The Court believes that Detective Brocchini withheld 

material information in testifying to this opinion.” In 

examining this and other defense claims concerning the 

gang evidence, the court found “plentiful evidence of gang 

membership, but scant evidence of gang benefit,” and that 

“[t]he only evidence which the jury could have relied on 

in reaching their decision was the opinions of the 2 

experts [Brocchini and Okamoto].” The court concluded: 

“[T]aken individually, each of [the enumerated] problems 

with the gang testimony were [sic] not sufficient to raise 

a concern for the integrity of the process. However, when 

viewed in the aggregate, the Court does have a serious 

concern whether the proceedings leading to the jury's true 

finding[s] on the PC § 186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement were 

fundamentally fair. Accordingly, the Court orders the 

jury's finding on this enhancement stricken on each of the 

counts.... [¶] In all other respects, the motion is denied 

and the verdicts affirmed.”

2. Analysis

“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence 

favorable to an accused ... violates due process where the 

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87.) FN29 The 

duty to disclose such evidence is wholly independent of 

the prosecutor's obligation under section 1054 et seq FN30 

(People v. Hayes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244), exists 

even where there has been no request by the accused 

(United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107), 

encompasses both impeachment and exculpatory evidence 

(United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676), and 

extends to evidence known only to law enforcement 

investigators and not to the prosecutor (Youngblood v. 

West Virginia (2006) 547 U.S. 867, 869–870; Kyles v. 

Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 438; In re Brown (1998) 17 

Cal.4th 873, 879). “In order to comply with Brady, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 38 of 157
39

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

therefore, ‘the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn 

of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the 

government's behalf in the case, including the police.’ 

[Citations.]” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 

1042, quoting Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 437; 

In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 879.) Disclosure must 

be made at a time when it would be of value to the 

accused. (People v. Superior Court (Meraz) (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 28, 51.)

FN29. Although the good or bad faith of the 

prosecutor is not determinative (Brady, supra, 

373 U.S. at p. 87; In re Ferguson (1971) 5 

Cal.3d 525, 532), and suppression of materially 

favorable evidence violates due process 

regardless of whether it was intentional, 

negligent, or inadvertent (In re Sodersten

(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1225), we 

nevertheless note that appellants do not accuse 

the prosecutor himself o[f] knowingly permitting 

perjured testimony (see People v. Musselwhite

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1252–1253).

FN30. Section 1054.1 provides in part: “The 

prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the 

defendant or his or her attorney all of the 

following materials and information, if it is in 

the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if 

the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the 

possession of the investigating agencies: [¶] 

... [¶] (e) Any exculpatory evidence.”

Although “the term ‘Brady violation’ is sometimes used to 

refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose 

exculpatory evidence—that is, to any suppression of socalled ‘Brady material’—... there is never a real ‘Brady 

violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that 

there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed 

evidence would have produced a different verdict.” 

(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281, fn. 

omitted.) Thus, to merit relief on due process grounds, 

“the evidence a prosecutor failed to disclose must have 

been both favorable to the defendant and material on 

either guilt or punishment. Evidence would have been 

favorable if it would have helped the defendant or hurt 

the prosecution, as by impeaching one of its witnesses. 

Evidence would have been material only if there is a 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 39 of 157
40

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the 

defense, the result would have been different. The 

requisite reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome on the 

part of the reviewing court. It is a probability assessed 

by considering the evidence in question under the totality 

of the relevant circumstances and not in isolation or in 

the abstract. [Citation.]” (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal 

.4th 884, 907–908; Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at 

pp. 434–435, 436; In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 

886–887.) “A showing by the [defendant] of the 

favorableness and materiality of any evidence not 

disclosed by the prosecution necessarily establishes at 

one stroke what in other contexts are separately 

considered under the rubrics of ‘error’ and ‘prejudice.’ 

For, here, there is no ‘error’ unless there is also 

‘prejudice.’ [Citations.] It follows that harmless-error 

analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 

24 [(Chapman)], with its standard of ‘harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt,’ is not implicated.” (In re Sassounian

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 547, fn. 7; Kyles v. Whitley, supra,

14 U.S. at pp. 435–436; In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 

p. 887.) “In sum, once there has been... error..., it 

cannot subsequently be found harmless....” (Kyles v. 

Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 436, fn. omitted.) 

Conclusions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, 

such as the elements of a Brady claim, are subject to 

independent review. (People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th 

at p. 1042.)

We turn first to whether the undisclosed evidence would 

have been favorable to appellants. This was not the 

typical situation in which gang involvement provided a 

readily apparent bias or interest or motive to testify, as 

when a member of one gang testifies in favor of a member 

of the same or an allied gang, or when a witness is 

reluctant to testify for fear of retaliation. (See, e.g., 

People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 276–277; People v. 

Sanchez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449–1450.) 

Nevertheless, we assume Collins's gang status was relevant 

to his credibility. (See People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 

Cal.App.4th 1148, 1168.) This being the case, Brocchini's

1998 report should have been disclosed to the defense, if 

not before trial, then certainly once Collins testified 

that he was not a gang member. Instead of disclosing 

information he possessed to the contrary, however, 

Brocchini confirmed that Collins indeed was not a gang 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 40 of 157
41

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

member. Even if this was his honest opinion, the defense 

had the right—and should have had the opportunity—to 

challenge both him and Collins, especially in light of the 

fact Collins met several of MPD's gang criteria.FN31

FN31. We need not address, at any length, 

Helton's testimony on the subject. Instead of 

testifying definitively on Collins's gang 

status, Helton testified only that Collins was 

not a gang member to his knowledge, and that he 

probably would have known if Collins was. 

Although Helton was in the gang unit at the time 

Brocchini wrote the report, nothing in the 

record before us suggests Helton knew of its 

existence, and Helton was not called to testify 

at the hearing on the new trial motions. On this 

record, it would be speculative for us to 

conclude that Helton withheld information or 

condoned or corroborated erroneous testimony. 

(See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 

952.)

We turn now to the question of materiality. In making our 

assessment, we have undertaken the cumulative evaluation 

required (Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 441), 

and taken into consideration the effect of the 

nondisclosure on defense investigations and trial 

strategies (United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 

pp. 682–683; People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 

1132–1133, disapproved on other grounds in People v. 

Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22). We conclude 

the suppressed evidence was not material under all the 

circumstances, as there is no reasonable probability its 

disclosure would have altered the trial result. (People v. 

Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) FN32

FN32. Such a probability must be, “‘as it were, 

“objective,” based on an “assumption that the 

decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, 

and impartially applying the standards that 

govern the decision,” and not dependent on the 

“idiosyncrasies of the particular 

decisionmaker,” including the “possibility of 

arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’ 

and the like.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re 

Sodersten, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1226–

1227.)

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 41 of 157
42

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

With respect to Collins, “‘[i]n general, impeachment 

evidence has been found to be material where the witness 

at issue “supplied the only evidence linking the 

defendant(s) to the crime,” [citations], or where the 

likely impact on the witness's credibility would have 

undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case, 

[citation]. In contrast, a new trial is generally not 

required when the testimony of the witness is 

“corroborated by other testimony,” [citations].’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 

1050.) Here, the most important portions of Collins's 

testimony—especially his identification of appellants as 

the perpetrators—was corroborated by the testimony of 

Tatum and, to a certain extent, Roshyla, as well as by 

circumstantial evidence. Brocchini's undisclosed report 

did not absolutely establish Collins was a gang member; 

moreover, jurors were aware that Collins associated with 

gang members and that he had a tattoo that Officer 

Okamoto, one of the prosecution's gang experts, testified 

was a common gang tattoo. Jurors knew from Brocchini's own 

testimony that the existence of gang tattoos and 

association with gang members were two matters that gang 

experts found indicative of gang membership.

Most importantly, even assuming jurors would have 

concluded Collins lied about his gang status, such a 

conclusion would not have significantly altered the 

picture jurors already had of Collins or the myriad 

reasons to question his credibility on less collateral 

matters. The evidence showed that Collins entered into a 

deal with law enforcement authorities whereby he would set 

up his best friend, a man he had known since childhood. 

Under this deal, Collins was supposed to plead guilty to 

selling drugs and serve a sentence in the local jail, but, 

despite the fact he supposedly was not receiving any 

consideration for his testimony in the homicide case, he 

ended up not even being prosecuted in his case. When the 

operation against Ruiz went federal, Collins was no longer 

working off a case, but instead was working for monetary 

compensation. Significantly, despite the fact the 

agreement specifically targeted Ruiz and his drug 

operation, Collins never alerted Helton or Hammond to 

appellants' presence or desire to purchase a quarter kilo 

of cocaine from Ruiz, nor did he ever truly explain why he 

did not alert either of them. According to Helton, this 

was a significant enough amount of drugs that he would 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 42 of 157
43

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“[c]ertainly” have wanted to know about it. When Helton 

first contacted Collins to notify him of Ruiz's death, 

Collins said nothing about his knowledge or suspicions. 

Similarly, he said nothing to Brocchini when Brocchini 

contacted him the day after the shooting.

In light of the foregoing, the undisclosed evidence, while 

favorable to appellants insofar as it tended to impeach 

Collins's credibility, was not material “because it would 

have added little to the cumulative impact of the other 

impeachment evidence.” (People v. Dickey, supra, 35 

Cal.4th at p. 908.) Given the substantial impeachment to 

which Collins's testimony was subjected at trial, we 

conclude it is not reasonably probable “that whatever 

confidence the jury placed in [his] testimony would have 

been fatally undermined” (ibid.) by learning that a 

moniker identified as referring to him was listed on a 

years-old roster for a Modesto criminal street gang, or 

even that Collins lied in denying he was a gang member. 

While we do not take potential perjury lightly, this is 

simply not a case in which the withheld information 

painted a significantly different picture of Collins and 

his credibility from the one placed before the jury. 

(Contrast In re Sodersten, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

1233–1235; People v. Johnson (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 776, 

783–786.)

Appellants point to the effect the withheld evidence would 

have had on Brocchini's credibility. The bulk of 

Brocchini's testimony concerned the gang enhancement 

allegations, however, and those were stricken by the trial 

court. Moreover, defense counsel attacked Brocchini's 

credibility, ably and at length, and expressly suggested 

none of his testimony could be trusted. Given the fact the 

undisclosed report was written approximately eight years 

before Brocchini testified at trial, it is not at all 

certain jurors would have concluded Brocchini was lying, 

as opposed to having a memory lapse, when he testified 

that Collins was not a gang member.

There is no reasonable probability that, had the 1998 

report been disclosed to the defense, appellants would 

have been acquitted. Accordingly, because the undisclosed 

evidence was not material, reversal is not warranted.

(LD 3, 32-41.)

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 43 of 157
44

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Analysis

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon 

the prosecution a duty to disclose evidence in its possession that 

is favorable to an accused if it is material either to guilt of 

punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963). The 

prosecution violates its constitutional duty to disclose to the 

defense material exculpatory evidence where, regardless of whether 

the defense requested the evidence, 1) the evidence was favorable to 

the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; 2) the 

evidence was suppressed by the government either willfully or 

inadvertently; and 3) prejudice results from the failure to 

disclose. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).

Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, 

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 

419, 433-34 (1995). However, a court may find a Areasonable 

probability@ where the remaining evidence would have been sufficient 

to convict the defendant, Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, and even 

without finding that the outcome would more likely than not have 

been different, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).

Instead, A[a] >reasonable probability= of a different result [exists] 

when the government's evidentiary suppression >undermines confidence 

in the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting 

Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. at 678). Although each item of 

undisclosed evidence must be evaluated, the cumulative effect of all 

suppressed evidence is evaluated for purposes of materiality. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 44 of 157
45

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-37.

Here, the state court articulated the correct legal standards 

concerning the due process duty of disclosure of material evidence. 

As to Collins, the state court reviewed the evidence and reasonably 

determined that the defense should have had access to the gang 

roster listing Collins as an OSP member in 1998. Further, the state 

court also reasonably applied clearly established federal law in its 

analysis of the materiality of the undisclosed information 

concerning Collins’s tattoo and his having been listed in another 

inmate’s gang roster. The jury had before it similarly weighty 

evidence of Collins’s gang ties and identity, including his having a 

tattoo of a type identified by expert opinion as a gang tattoo, his 

associating with gang members in the course of dealing drugs, his 

possible aiding and abetting the perpetrators by divulging to them 

information that effectively identified and/or located Ruiz, and his 

having been identified by others as a gang member. Although the 

probative tendency of the undisclosed impeachment evidence was to 

contradict Collins’s denial of gang membership, other evidence that 

provided essentially duplicate grounds for impeachment was also 

presented to the jury. Thus, the undisclosed evidence tended to 

lack materiality. See, Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1096-97 

(9th Cir. 2005) (citing Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 

2005)). The state court could reasonably have concluded that with 

respect to its value in contradicting Collins’s denial of gang 

membership, the roster and tattoo would not have affected the 

trier’s determination. Further, considering how remote in time the 

discovery of the roster was from Collins’s more recent conduct and 

his continuing to display a gang tattoo, it cannot be said that no 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 45 of 157
46

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fairminded jurist could reasonably agree with the state court’s 

analysis of the materiality of the gang information.

With respect to the state court’s consideration of the larger 

body of evidence in evaluating the materiality of the information in 

relation to impeaching Collins, the state court reasonably concluded 

that the undisclosed evidence would not have put the case in a 

different light or have precluded confidence in the proceedings. 

Although Collins was an important witness who tied Petitioner to the 

offenses, other evidence, including a detailed narrative of the 

facts of the offenses and repeated identifications by Tatum based on 

a substantial opportunity to perceive the intruders, identifications 

by Roshyla, physical and forensic evidence, and multiple sources of 

circumstantial evidence tied Petitioner and his co-defendants to the 

crime. Further, the state court reasonably concluded that Collins’s

credibility was more directly challenged by the strong evidence of 

bias presented by his arrangement with law enforcement and his 

receipt of substantial benefits by way of compensation and avoidance 

of prosecution, and by Collins’s lack of integrity and honesty with 

Helton and Hammond concerning Petitioner’s offer to buy drugs or 

Collins’s knowledge of the perpetrators, their whereabouts, and 

their conduct. Likewise, Collins’s willingness to work to the 

detriment of his old friend Ruiz provided the jury with a basis for 

inferring that Collins was motivated by a strong desire for personal 

gain. 

In Smith v. Cain, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 627 (2012), statements 

made by a witness on the evening of the offense and five days later 

were held to be material where the witness's testimony was the only 

evidence linking defendant to the crime, and his undisclosed 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 46 of 157
47

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

statements directly contradicted his trial testimony, in which he 

had told the jury that he had “[n]o doubt” that defendant was the 

gunman that he stood “face to face” with on the night of the crime, 

but the officer's notes showed that witness said he “could not ID 

anyone because [he] couldn't see faces” and “would not know them if 

[he] saw them.” Id. at 630. Here, Collins was not the only 

evidence linking Petitioner to the crime. Further, the undisclosed 

information did not bear directly on Collins’s capacity to perceive 

the perpetrators, but rather principally affected his credibility, 

which had already suffered significant impeachment.

This case is also distinguishable from Banks v. Dretke, 540 

U.S. 668 (2004), in which the prosecution failed to disclose that an 

admittedly key prosecution witness in the penalty phase of a capital 

trial was a paid government informant. There, the Court concluded 

that the undisclosed, favorable evidence could reasonably be taken 

to put the whole case in such different light as to undermine 

confidence in the verdict because the witness provided the sole 

basis for an inference that the defendant would continue to commit 

acts of violence, and there was no persuasive evidence in the record 

that would serve to impeach the witness. Id. at 701-03.

With respect to the materiality of the undisclosed evidence for

impeachment of Brocchini, Brocchini’s evidence related primarily to 

the gang enhancements, which were stricken. Brocchini’s testimony 

concerning Collins’s gang membership conflicted with the 

prosecution’s chief gang expert’s testimony concerning gang tattoos 

and association as indicia of gang membership. Independent evidence 

provided a basis for questioning Brocchini’s reliability, including 

Brocchini’s failure to track down the informative neighbor, his 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 47 of 157
48

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

inability to remember how he obtained some information, and his 

inability to provide documentation of some of his claims concerning 

the evidence. Further, the temporal remoteness of the discovery of 

the gang roster vastly diluted any inference of dishonesty on the 

part of Brocchini. The state court reasonably concluded that the 

undisclosed evidence concerning the gang roster was not material. 

Petitioner cites to the record and points to other evidence he 

alleges was withheld. Some of his challenge centers on Brocchini’s 

testimony that there was information that Dupree Hull and Thomas 

White were Blood gang members, and their telephone numbers were 

linked to the victim’s telephone number, whereas there was no basis 

for such a connection between the victim and Hull or White. 

The Court will defer a more complete factual and legal 

discussion of the materiality of this evidence until a related 

prosecutorial misconduct claim is analyzed because these claims are 

set forth with more factual detail and are more fully analyzed in 

the state court’s decision concerning alleged prosecutorial 

misconduct in withholding the information. Nevertheless, with that 

discussion in mind, the Court concludes that considering all the 

information and its nature and position in the present case, it 

cannot be said to be beyond fairminded disagreement that the state 

court reasonably concluded that in light of the entire record, the 

evidence was not material and thus the nondisclosure did not 

constitute a violation of due process. The state court reasonably 

concluded that the evidence did not put the whole case in a 

different light with respect to Brocchini’s credibility or the 

Petitioners’ guilt.

Further, the state court decision was not based on an 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 48 of 157
49

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unreasonable determination of fact. Pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), a 

habeas petition may be granted only if the state court’s conclusion 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Section 

2254(d)(2) applies where the challenge is based entirely on the 

state court record or where the process of the state court is 

claimed to have been defective. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 

999-1001 (9th Cir. 2004). Such challenges include claims that a 

finding is unsupported by sufficient evidence, the state court’s 

process was defective, or the state court failed to make any finding 

at all. Id. at 999.

With respect to Petitioner’s contention that the state court 

adjudications was based on an unreasonable determination of fact 

within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2), it is established that the state 

court’s determination must be not merely incorrect or erroneous, but 

rather objectively unreasonable. Id. For relief to be granted, a 

federal habeas court must find that the trial court’s factual 

determination was such that a reasonable fact finder could not have 

made the finding; that reasonable minds might disagree with the 

determination or have a basis to question the finding is not 

sufficient. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 340-42 (2006). To 

conclude that a state court finding is unsupported by substantial 

evidence, a federal habeas court must be convinced that an appellate 

panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not 

reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record. 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 1000. To determine that a state 

court’s fact finding process is defective in some material way or 

non-existent, a federal habeas court must be satisfied that any 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 49 of 157
50

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be 

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact finding process 

was adequate. Id.

Here, as set forth above, the state court did not make any 

objectively unreasonable findings of facts; rather the state court’s 

findings are supported by the record. Further, Petitioner received 

an evidentiary hearing in the trial court, and he has not shown or 

even suggested any material defect in the state court’s fact finding 

process.

Petitioner Nichols argues that the withheld information would 

have rendered all Collins’s information unreliable. However, the 

state court evaluated the withheld evidence in light of the totality 

of the evidence and came to the objectively reasonable conclusion 

that in view of the numerous and compelling bases for discrediting 

Collins that were already in evidence, the withheld evidence would 

not have put the whole case a different light. Although Collins 

gave information that was used in the identification process, the

ensuing identifications were based on personal knowledge derived 

from sources other than Collins. Further, the Court’s more detailed 

discussion of the identifications in connection with Petitioners’ 

due process claims will show that the state court reasonably 

concluded that there had been no impermissibly suggestive 

identifications.

 Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioners’ Brady

claims be denied.

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct involving Display of a Photograph 

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s displaying during trial 

a photograph of co-defendant Nichols wearing a brightly colored, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 50 of 157
51

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

striped jumpsuit and shackles constituted prosecutorial misconduct 

and violated Petitioner’s right to substantive and procedural due 

process, equal protection, and a fundamentally fair trial guaranteed 

by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1, 4.) Petitioner 

notes that the trial court found that the prosecutor’s conduct was a 

deliberate attempt to portray the defendants in an unfavorable 

light. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner asserts that the photograph was 

within view of the jury for longer than five minutes and that 

showing the evidence to the jury violated the court’s order that 

Petitioner and the co-defendants be allowed to wear civilian 

clothing and proceed through trial without being shackled. (Doc. 

47, 36-37.)

A. The State Court Decision

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s decision is as follows (LD 

3, 85-90):

C. Prosecutorial Error

Appellants contend their convictions cannot stand due to 

what they perceive as numerous instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct or other error. We conclude that while some 

error occurred, reversal is not warranted.

1. Display of Jail Photograph

 a. Background

Appellants appeared before the jury unshackled and in 

street clothing. During Okamoto's gang testimony, the 

prosecutor elicited that Okamoto had seen photographs of 

Nichols's tattoos. People's exhibit 70–6 was then shown to 

the witness and also displayed on a screen for the jury. 

Counsel for Nichols objected to the display of the 

photograph, and also asserted it had been sitting at 

counsel table by the prosecutor, in view of the jury. The 

photograph (which we have viewed) shows Nichols in a redCase 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 51 of 157
52

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and-white-striped jumpsuit, with his hands cuffed to the 

front. This ensued:

“THE COURT: Mr. Maner [prosecutor], is this a 

picture of a tattoo you're showing?

“MR. MANER: No. [¶] ... [¶] It shows who the 

tattoos belong to. The first picture is going to 

be a picture—

“THE COURT: Is this something you cleared with 

everybody before you showed to the jury?

“MR. CHASE [counsel for Nichols]: No.

“MR. MILLER [counsel for Dean]: No.

“MR. TRIMBLE [counsel for Trice]: No.

“MR. MANER: This is—I mean, we've discovered 

this and we've gone over this in advance, Judge.

“THE COURT: We have not—

“MR. MILLER: Not an answer to the Court's 

question.

“(Counsel speaking simultaneously.)

“THE COURT: Hang on just a second.

“MR. MANER: Okay, I'll minimize the screen, but 

here's my point, Judge—

“THE COURT: Just a second please.... [¶] ... [¶] 

But it is, I think, ... inappropriate, ... and I 

think you're aware it's inappropriate to show 

pictures to the jury that haven't been cleared 

by the Court, and none of those have been.

“MR. MANER: They—I'm sorry Judge.

“THE COURT: So I'm going to sustain the 

objection.

“MR. MANER: I'll show it to defense counsel now. 

We've marked it as exhibits previously, defense 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 52 of 157
53

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

counsel knew they were coming, and in my mind 

it's—shouldn't be a surprise. But if they need a 

minute to—

“THE COURT: If something's not in evidence, Mr. 

Maner, it shouldn't be shown to the jury.

“MR. MANER: Okay.

“THE COURT: So consider yourself chastised. 

Ladies and gentlemen, please disregard any 

pictures you saw on the screen there that 

weren't—

“MR. CHASE: And also on his counsel table where 

he had it sitting there waving at the jury.

“MR. MANER: I didn't wave a thing at the jury.

“THE COURT: There was nothing being waved, but 

you do need to be aware of that and be careful 

with that as well too.”

Nichols's attorney stated he was not contesting that the 

photographs were of Nichols, and there was no objection to 

the photographs of the tattoos themselves. He did, 

however, move for a mistrial based on what had happened. 

The court deferred that matter and allowed the prosecutor 

to proceed with photographs of the tattoos.

Later, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor 

apologized, explaining that he had assumed there would be 

no objection, because he had had the photographs marked as 

exhibits and defense counsel had seen them. The court 

observed that “we're kind of going back to trial procedure 

101 here. And I think it's just a matter of common 

courtesy and trial procedure that you don't show things to 

the jury that haven't either been cleared by counsel ... 

or we need to talk about this first, or whatever.” The 

court noted that the photograph was displayed on the 

screen for five minutes or less, and concluded that any 

actual prejudice was de minimis, since “the fact that the 

defendants are in custody is usually the worst kept secret 

during pretty much any trial,” and custodial status 

generally did not bother jurors one way or the other. The 

court warned, however, that it sent a subliminal message 

when jurors saw defendants in chains or in custody, and 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 53 of 157
54

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that “it just is simple trial procedure 101 that you have 

to be careful about what they can see and what they can't 

see.”

Prior to the conclusion of trial, Nichols filed a written 

motion for dismissal or other sanctions due to 

prosecutorial misconduct. One of the grounds listed was 

the display of the photograph. In opposition, the 

prosecutor asserted that the defense's claim that the 

photograph had been displayed to the jury before it was 

admitted into evidence or shown to defense counsel was 

untrue, as the photographs were submitted and marked as 

exhibits and shown to defense counsel. FN59 The court 

denied the motion based on that issue alone, and also 

after considering the potential for cumulative prejudice.

FN59. The record does not explain the 

prosecutor's apparent inability to appreciate 

the difference between having an exhibit marked 

for identification, and actually having the 

exhibit admitted into evidence.

The showing of the photograph was one of the grounds 

raised in the motions for new trial. In its ruling denying 

the motions, the court noted: “As stated by the Court at 

the time, the Court felt that the violation was de minimus 

[sic]. However, the Court believes that a prosecutor of 

Mr. Manor's [sic] skill level should have known better, 

and does believe that the incident was a deliberate 

attempt to portray the defendants in an unfavorable light. 

As such, the Court did chastise the DA in the presence of 

the jury. The Court believes that any taint from the 

incident was cured by the sanction and did not result in 

undue prejudice.”

Nichols and Trice now contend the prosecutor's wrongful 

display of the photograph irreparably tainted the trial. 

We agree that the prosecutor erred, but find the incident 

not prejudicial in and of itself. (With respect to this 

and other claims of error, we will address cumulative 

prejudice later in this opinion.)

b. Analysis

The United States and California Supreme Courts have long 

held that an accused may not be compelled, over objection, 

to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 54 of 157
55

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prison/jail clothing. (Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 

501, 512–513; People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 494, 

495; cf. People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–291 

[defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints in 

courtroom, while in jury's presence, absent showing of 

manifest need].) Such a practice violates due process by 

creating an intolerable risk of undermining the 

presumption of innocence, and also impinges upon tenets of 

equal protection. (People v. Taylor, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 

pp. 494, 495; see Estelle v. Williams, supra, 425 U.S. at 

pp. 504–506.) Accordingly, when such error occurs, its 

effect must be assessed against the “harmless-beyond-areasonable-doubt” standard of Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 

page 24 (People v. Taylor, supra, at pp. 499–500), and the 

error is not automatically cured by the giving of an 

instruction that the jury is not to be influenced by the 

fact of the defendant's arrest (id. at p. 501; cf. People 

v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 746–747).

The foregoing cases, however, all deal with situations in 

which the defendant appeared in jail clothing (or 

shackles) before the jury throughout the trial. This fact 

is significant. As the United States Supreme Court stated: 

“[T]he constant reminder of the accused's condition 

implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may 

affect a juror's judgment. The defendant's clothing is so 

likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial 

that ... an unacceptable risk is presented of 

impermissible factors coming into play. [Citation.]” 

(Estelle v. Williams, supra, 425 U.S. at pp. 504–505, 

italics added.) In the present case, by contrast, while 

there can be no doubt that the prosecutor erred by 

displaying the photograph (see People v. Bradford (1997) 

15 Cal.4th 1229, 1336–1337), the jury saw it for at most a 

few minutes. While we have not found (or been cited to) 

any California cases dealing with a jury's brief viewing 

of a defendant in jail garb, the California Supreme Court 

has held on a number of occasions that prejudicial error 

does not occur merely because jurors briefly see a 

defendant in shackles. (E.g., People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 

Cal.4th at p. 417; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th

569, 584, affd. sub nom. Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 

U.S. 967; People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 

2.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly so 

held. (E.g., Ghent v. Woodford (9th Cir.2002) 279 F.3d 

1121, 1133.) Other states have found no prejudice arising 

from the brief sight of a defendant in jail garb. (E.g., 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 55 of 157
56

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

State v. Taylor (Tenn.2007) 240 S.W.3d 789, 794–796; State 

v. Schaller (Wis.App.1995) 544 N.W.2d 247, 256–257; but 

see Ex parte Clark (Tex.Cr.App.1977) 545 S.W.2d 175, 176–

177.)

We are at a loss to understand why a prosecutor would run 

the risk of showing such a photograph to the jury when it 

had not been admitted into evidence. Nevertheless, we have 

no trouble concluding the incident was not prejudicial in 

and of itself. Jurors saw the picture for a matter of 

minutes in a trial that lasted months. Jurors were 

instructed, both at the outset of trial and at the 

conclusion of evidence, on the presumption of innocence 

and that they were not to be biased against defendants 

because they had been arrested. Jurors are presumed to 

follow instructions (Weeks v. Angelone (2000) 528 U.S. 

225, 234), and in light of the brevity of the incident 

here, we have no reason to conclude they did not (compare 

People v. Taylor, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 501; People v. 

McDaniel, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 746–747). This is 

especially true since the trial court chastised the 

prosecutor in front of them. (See People v. Kennedy, 

supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 625.) Significantly, by the time 

the photograph was shown, Nichols's and Trice's attorneys 

had already questioned Detective Blake about whether 

appellants were wearing red jumpsuits and shackles at the 

preliminary hearing. Even assuming, to the extent they 

gave it any thought at all, jurors would not have simply 

presumed appellants were in custody, given the severity of 

the charges against them—which seems unlikely—they would 

already have learned appellants were in custody at some 

point. Under the circumstances, a brief visual 

confirmation of that knowledge cannot have abridged 

appellants' constitutional rights or prejudiced them. (See 

State v. Taylor, supra, 240 S.W.3d at p. 796; State v. 

Schaller, supra, 544 N.W.2d at pp. 256–257.)

(LD 3, 85-90.)

B. Legal Sandards

It is clearly established federal law within the meaning of 

§ 2254(d)(1) that a prosecutor’s improper conduct violates the 

Constitution only if it so infects the trial with unfairness as to 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 56 of 157
57

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Parker v. 

Matthews, – U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012) (per curiam); see, 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Comer v. Schriro, 

480 F.3d 960, 988 (9th Cir. 2007). Prosecutorial misconduct 

deprives the defendant of a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due 

Process Clause if it prejudicially affects the substantial rights 

of a defendant. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1539 

(9th Cir. 1988) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 

(1982)). The standard of review of claims concerning prosecutorial 

misconduct in proceedings pursuant to § 2254 is the narrow standard 

of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power; 

improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s 

constitutional rights. Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 

1996)). This Court must thus determine whether the alleged 

misconduct has rendered a trial fundamentally unfair. Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 183. It must be determined whether the 

prosecutor’s actions constituted misconduct, and whether the 

conduct violated Petitioner’s right to due process of law. Drayden 

v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir. 2000).

To grant habeas relief, this Court must conclude that the state 

court’s rejection of the prosecutorial misconduct claim “was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 57 of 157
58

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disagreement.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (quoting 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 767-87). In addition, the 

standard of Darden v. Wainwright is a very general one that leaves 

courts with more leeway in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 

determinations. Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

In determining whether remarks in argument rendered a trial 

fundamentally unfair, a court must judge the remarks in the context 

of the entire proceeding in order to determine whether the argument 

influenced the jury’s decision. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 

385 (1990); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 179-82. In Darden, 

the Court considered whether the prosecutor manipulated or misstated 

evidence, whether specific rights of the accused were implicated, 

the context of the remarks in light of both parties’ arguments, the 

instructions given by the trial court, and the weight of the 

evidence. Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-82.

C. Analysis

Here, the state court articulated legal standards that were 

consistent with clearly established federal law, and the state court 

reasonably concluded that it had been improper to display the 

photographs to the jury before the photographs were in evidence. 

However, the jury had already heard questioning by Petitioners’ 

counsel concerning whether at the preliminary hearing the defendants 

had been wearing red jumpsuits and shackles. It was thus likely 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 58 of 157
59

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that the jury had already learned that at some point in the criminal 

proceedings, Petitioners had been in custody. Additionally, the 

jury’s exposure to the photographic evidence was brief, and the jury 

was clearly admonished. Under these circumstances, the state

court’s rejection of the due process prosecutorial misconduct claim 

was not so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement. Further, there was no unreasonable 

determination of fact based on the record before the state court.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct based on display of photographic evidence 

be denied.

D. Related Due Process and Equal Protection Claims

It is unclear whether Petitioner exhausted his state court 

remedies as to claims that the display of the photographs violated 

his rights to substantive due process of law and equal protection of 

the laws. Generally a habeas petitioner will not be afforded relief 

in the courts unless he has exhausted available state judicial and 

administrative remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-95 

(1973). However, a court may reach the merits of a claim in the 

absence of exhaustion where it is clear that the claim is not 

colorable. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b)(2) (an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the 

courts of the State); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 

(1987); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005).

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 59 of 157
60

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, Petitioner’s claims are without merit and should be 

denied. The substantive component of due process protects against 

governmental interference with those rights “implicit in the 

concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 

324-25 (1937). It forbids the government to infringe fundamental 

liberty interests, such as the right to liberty, no matter what 

process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to 

serve a compelling state interest. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 

301-02 (1993).

Here, the state court’s ruling on the misconduct claim was 

based on a weighing of the various relevant components of the case 

that was within the state court’s traditional and inherent powers to 

control trial proceedings. Further, the state court proceeded 

pursuant to regular, adversary procedures whereby the parties could 

advocate their interests and receive review. Petitioner has not 

shown that the procedures infringed a federally protected and 

fundamental right or operated too broadly beyond the ambit of the 

state’s compelling interests. 

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should 

be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Petitioner can establish an equal 

protection claim by showing that he was intentionally discriminated 

against based on his membership in a protected class. See, Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner 

can also establish an equal protection claim by showing that

similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 

differently without a rational basis for the difference in

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 60 of 157
61

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treatment. See, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 

(2000) (per curiam); Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 

553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008). 

Here, Petitioner has not shown or even suggested how he 

suffered a violation of equal protection. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

substantive due process and equal protection claims should be 

denied.

VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct concerning Presentation of 

 Evidence that the Trial Court Had Ruled Would Be Excluded

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial 

misconduct and violated Petitioner’s right to due process of law and 

a fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments when the prosecutor intentionally introduced a predicate 

acts chart and asked Petitioner on cross-examination if he had been 

convicted of attempted home invasion robbery in violation of the 

trial court’s ruling that such a characterization of the prior 

offense would be excluded. (Doc. 1 at 5, 11-12.)

A. The State Court’s Decision

The CCA addressed Petitioner’s claim as follows:

2. Violation of Court Order

 a. Background

In connection with the gang allegations, the prosecutor 

elicited testimony from Okamoto regarding appellants' 

criminal records. While showing Okamoto court records 

regarding one of Trice's convictions, the prosecutor 

asked, without objection: “And does it also show that he 

pled guilty to a violation of Penal Code Section 664 slash 

213(a)(1), attempted home invasion robbery, and that he 

pled guilty on February 26th, 1996, for a crime that 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 61 of 157
62

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

occurred exactly one year earlier, on February 26th, 

1995?” (Italics added.) Okamoto responded affirmatively.

Later, the prosecutor brought up the admissibility of a 

chart in which he had summarized Okamoto's opinion as it 

related to predicate acts. Counsel for Trice objected to 

use of the term “attempted home invasion robbery” and 

argued that there was no such thing. Counsel for Nichols 

asserted that the actual crime was called attempted first 

degree robbery. The prosecutor agreed to reword the 

reference and print out another chart. The court agreed, 

and directed him to “stick with” what the code section 

said, i.e., attempted first degree robbery. FN60 The court 

subsequently confirmed, during a discussion of whether the 

chart would be admitted into evidence so it could be used 

in examination of the expert, that the conviction was to 

be listed as attempted first degree robbery. The 

prosecutor again agreed to submit a chart incorporating 

the change.

FN60. The court was concerned with the 

similarity of the prior conviction to the 

charged offenses. During the course of trial, at 

least two witnesses used the term “home 

invasion” in referring to the present incident.

As set out in the statement of facts, ante, Trice 

testified on his own behalf. During cross-examination, the 

prosecutor asked about his felony convictions. This 

ensued:

“Q. Were you convicted of attempted home 

invasion robbery or—

“MR. TRIMBLE: Judge, I'm going to object to 

that. Mr. Maner knows better than that.

“THE COURT: It's sustained. [¶] ... [¶]

“MR. MANER: Q. Where you attempted to—

“MR. TRIMBLE: Judge, I’m going to 352 this. He

knows what he’s entitled to ask and what he’s

not, and he's asking stuff he shouldn't go into.

“MR. MANER: That's not true, Judge. I think I 

slipped on the home invasion but—

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 62 of 157
63

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“MR. CHASE: He did it again, Your Honor.

“MR. TRIMBLE: Gee, that's too bad, he did it 

again, Judge.

“THE COURT: The offense was 664/211, correct?

“MR. MANER: Yes, Judge—I think it's 213, 

actually.

“THE COURT: Let's go ahead and stick to that 

offense, then. And the jury's instructed to 

disregard the question.”

The prosecutor then elicited from Trice his conviction for 

attempted first degree robbery. In his argument to the 

jury, the prosecutor referred to the current incident as 

“a home invasion robbery, a murder, a murder during the 

course of a robbery....”

Trice raised the prosecutor's asserted violation of the 

court's order in his new trial motion. Nichols joined. In 

its ruling denying the motions, the court concluded: “The 

matter was addressed at trial when it arose, and the 

Prosecutor claimed that these [references] were 

inadvertent, and the Court accepts this representation at 

face value. Viewing the trial process as a whole, the 

Court does not believe that the term was repeated so much 

that it rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair or 

caused any confusion in the jury's mind between the prior 

and the charged offense.”

Nichols and Trice now contend the prosecutor committed 

prejudicial misconduct by violating the court's order. We 

again agree that error occurred, but again conclude the 

incident was not prejudicial in and of itself.

b. Analysis

Whether intentional or not, the prosecutor committed 

misconduct by violating the trial court's ruling that 

Trice's prior offense should be referred to as attempted 

first degree robbery. (See People v. Friend (2009) 47 

Cal.4th 1, 33; accord, People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 

822, 839; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 430.) 

However, jurors had already heard unobjected-to testimony 

that Trice pled guilty to attempted home invasion robbery; 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 63 of 157
64

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the prosecutor's references were brief in a lengthy trial; 

the exchange between the court and counsel, which occurred 

in the jury's presence, made it clear the prosecutor's 

question was improper; and the jury was instructed to 

disregard the question. (See People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 

Cal.4th 147, 180; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 

931; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1250–

1251.) Under the circumstances, no prejudice appears.

(LD 3, 90-93.)

B. Analysis

The state court reasonably applied the due process standards 

and properly concluded that the prosecutor’s characterization and 

references did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The 

trial court did not find that the violations were intentional. 

Further, it is undisputed that evidence of Petitioner’s guilty plea 

to an offense expressly characterized as an attempted home invasion 

robbery was admitted without objection and was already before the 

jury. Petitioner had testified, and his criminal history had been 

presented both as impeachment and as background concerning his 

connection with the co-defendants and Collins. Given the state of 

the record, the limited mischaracterization of the prior offense was 

not so inflammatory as to infect the proceedings with unfairness. 

The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application 

of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination 

of fact in light of the evidence before the state court. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim of a due 

process violation from mischaracterization of Petitioner’s prior 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 64 of 157
65

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conviction be denied.

VII. Violation of the Right to Present a Defense by Limiting

 Argument

Petitioner Trice argues that the trial court’s prohibiting

Petitioner Nichols’s counsel from arguing that innocent people are 

sometimes convicted and from discussing literature and feelings 

regarding such convictions violated Petitioner Trice’s rights to 

present a defense, to substantive and procedural due process of law, 

and to a fundamentally fair trial protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 5, 12.) 

A. The State Court’s Decision

The CCA addressed Petitioner’s claim as follows:

D. Restriction on Nichols's Argument to the Jury

Nichols and Trice contend the trial court committed 

federal constitutional error by excluding a portion of 

Nichols's argument to the jury. We conclude that any error 

was harmless.

1. Background

During his examination of Dr. Eisen, the defense expert on 

eyewitness memory and suggestibility, counsel for Nichols 

elicited that Eisen was aware of case studies involving 

situations in which people were convicted of crimes based 

on eyewitness identification, then were subsequently 

exonerated following DNA testing. Eisen described two 

bodies of data on the subject.

Counsel for Nichols subsequently argued to the jury that 

justice must be colorblind, and that jurors could not fill 

in the blanks for the prosecutor simply because Nichols 

might be a Black gang-banger from Pasadena. This ensued:

“[MR. CHASE:] People are convicted falsely. John 

Gresham [ sic ] wrote a book—

“MR. MANER: Objection, this is improper 

argument, judge.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 65 of 157
66

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“THE COURT: Sounds like it, Mr. Chase.

“MR. CHASE: No, it isn't, Your Honor. I can give 

you case authority, we're allowed to argue 

things that are relevant and before the people. 

And this is something that is common knowledge 

that the book is out—

“MR. MANER: Oh, Judge, some, some fictional book 

that's—

“MR. CHASE: It's not fictional, sir.

“MR. MANER: Or that is not in evidence in this 

case, Judge, is inappropriate.

“THE COURT: Mr. Chase, I'm going to sustain the 

objection. I don't think that novels are 

relevant.

“MR. CHASE: It's not a novel, Your Honor.

“THE COURT: Well, the objection is sustained.

“MR. CHASE: This is not a novel.

“THE COURT: It's sustained.

“MR. CHASE: Innocent people are convicted. 

Oftentimes those convictions are caused when

officers have arrived at a conclusion and do the 

investigation based on the conclusion and not 

the evidence. They oftentimes do this, but with 

people that aren't particularly likeable. Gangbangers. People who have mental problems. These 

are the easy targets.

People can come within—you know, you can have 

literally execution dates have been set—

“MR. MANER: Again, Your Honor, this is another 

inappropriate argument.

“THE COURT: That's sustained.

“MR. CHASE: Innocent people are convicted. If 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 66 of 157
67

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

you have these toxic elements present a little 

falsehood. Conclusion-based investigation. I 

believe in this system. I really do. It is the 

essence of what this country is all about. I was 

raised that way. My father fought in two wars—

“MR. MANER: Objection, Judge, Counsel's personal 

experiences, his family experiences, his 

personal opinion, is all irrelevant in a closing 

argument.

“THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that.

“MR. CHASE: This, ladies and gentlemen, is what 

makes our country great and worth fighting for. 

The quality [sic] under the law and the 

opportunity to have each one of you decide this 

case based on the law without prejudices.”

Counsel for Nichols filed a written objection to the 

restriction on his argument, citing case authority 

supporting his claim that he should have been allowed to 

discuss John Grisham's book The Innocent Man (2006). The 

trial court declined to change its ruling.

 2. Analysis

“[C]losing argument for the defense is a basic element of 

the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial” and 

the complete denial of an opportunity to make a closing 

argument is a violation of the constitutional right to 

counsel. (Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 858–

859, 863.) Similarly, a defendant's right to counsel is 

denied where the court seriously limits defense closing 

argument, as by precluding reference to an entire theory 

of defense (Conde v. Henry (9th Cir.1999) 198 F.3d 734, 

739) or not allowing counsel to argue the significance of 

evidence critical to a theory of defense (United States v. 

Kellington (9th Cir.2000) 217 F.3d 1084, 1099–1100). “This 

is not to say that closing arguments in a criminal case 

must be uncontrolled or even unrestrained. The presiding 

judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling 

the duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. 

He may limit counsel to a reasonable time and may 

terminate argument when continuation would be repetitive 

or redundant. He may ensure that argument does not stray 

unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 67 of 157
68

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he 

must have broad discretion. [Citations.]” (Herring v. New 

York, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 862; see People v. Holloway

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 137.)

It has been stated that “[c]ounsel's summation to the jury 

‘must be based solely upon those matters of fact of which 

evidence has already been introduced or of which no 

evidence need ever be introduced because of their 

notoriety as judicially noticed facts.’ [Citations.] He 

may state matters not in evidence that are common 

knowledge, or are illustrations drawn from common 

experience, history, or literature. [Citations.]” (People 

v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 730, disapproved on other 

grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 637, fn. 

2.) Appellants point to a number of cases that have found 

particular magazine and newspaper articles to be 

appropriate subjects for closing argument. (See, e.g ., 

People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 610–611; People 

v. Guzman (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 380, 392, disapproved on 

other grounds in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 

362, fn. 8; People v. Woodson (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 10, 

15–16; People v. Travis (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 29, 37–39.) 

While reflecting particularized exercises of judicial 

discretion under specific circumstances, these decisions 

do not stand for the proposition that attorneys may always 

refer to such items in closing argument. The trial court 

still retains discretion pursuant to section 1044 to limit 

counsel's argument under the circumstances of each 

case.FN66 (See People v. London (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 896, 

909.) “Counsel's summation to the jury must be based upon 

facts shown by the evidence or known judicially. 

[Citation.] Counsel may refer the jury to nonevidentiary 

matters of common knowledge, or to illustrations drawn 

from common experience, history, or literature [citation], 

but he may not dwell on the particular facts of unrelated, 

unsubstantiated cases.” (People v. Mendoza (1974) 37 

Cal.App.3d 717, 725 [trial court properly precluded 

defense counsel from reading newspaper clipping about 

unrelated crimes, hearsay material that could only confuse 

jury with irrelevant facts]; see also People v. Sanders, 

supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 554–555 [trial court properly 

precluded references to “notorious but unrelated” Manson 

case, but allowed defense counsel to argue in general 

terms that there were “‘worse cases'” than defendant's in 

terms of number of victims and nature of crime]; People v. 

Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115, 122 [trial court 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 68 of 157
69

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

properly restricted defense counsel's closing argument by 

prohibiting references to newspaper articles about 

individual who was acquitted of sex crimes against 

children when it was discovered children had fabricated 

their stories].)

FN66. Section 1044 provides: “It shall be the 

duty of the judge to control all proceedings 

during the trial, and to limit the introduction 

of evidence and the argument of counsel to 

relevant and material matters, with a view to 

the expeditious and effective ascertainment of 

the truth regarding the matters involved.”

Here, the trial court precluded defense counsel from 

citing to a particular book about an unrelated case and to 

his father's personal experiences, but did not limit 

counsel's argument on the crux of the defense theory: that 

people are wrongly convicted, and that appellants were 

equal under the law and had the right to a jury decision 

based on the law and not on prejudices. Counsel was thus 

allowed to fully address the relevant defense theory “in 

his own words without reference to supporting 

authorities.” (People v. Guzman, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 392.) We find no abuse of discretion or denial of the 

right to counsel or to present a defense (see People v. 

Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 137; People v.. London, 

supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 909); moreover, were we to 

find error, it necessarily would be harmless (People v. 

Guzman, supra, at p. 392).

(LD 3, 107-11.)

B. Analysis

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 

Compulsory Process and Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment 

guarantee a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a 

complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). The 

opportunity to make a summation of the evidence before the rendition 

of judgment is an essential component of the right to the effective 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 69 of 157
70

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862-63 (1975) (state 

statute permitting a judge in a non-jury criminal trial to prohibit 

counsel from making a summation of the evidence before the rendition 

of judgment violated the right to the effective assistance of 

counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). 

In Herring, the Court recognized that the right to the 

assistance of counsel means that “there can be no restrictions upon 

the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in 

accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that 

has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 

Id. at 857. The Court stated the following:

The right to the assistance of counsel has thus been given 

a meaning that ensures to the defense in a criminal trial 

the opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the 

adversary factfinding process.

There can be no doubt that closing argument for the 

defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding 

process in a criminal trial. Accordingly, it has 

universally been held that counsel for the defense has a 

right to make a closing summation to the jury, no matter 

how strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the 

presiding judge. (Footnote omitted.) The issue has been 

considered less often in the context of a so-called bench 

trial. But the overwhelming weight of authority, in both 

federal and state courts, holds that a total denial of the 

opportunity for final argument in a nonjury criminal trial 

is a denial of the basic right of the accused to make his 

defense. (Footnote omitted.)

Id. at 858-59. The Court added the following qualification:

This is not to say that closing arguments in a criminal 

case must be uncontrolled or even unrestrained. The 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 70 of 157
71

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in 

controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing 

summations. He may limit counsel to a reasonable time and 

may terminate argument when continuation would be 

repetitive or redundant. He may ensure that argument does 

not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the 

fair and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these 

respects he must have broad discretion. See generally 5 R. 

Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure s 2077 

(1957). Cf. American Bar Association, Project on Standards 

for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function s 5.8, pp. 

126—129, and the Defense Function s 7.8, pp. 277—282 

(App.Draft 1971).

(Id. at 862.)

Here, counsel for Petitioner Nichols had argued that Tatum had 

perjured herself and that Brocchini had given perjured testimony as 

to the source of some evidence; counsel then argued that perjury was 

offensive in all circumstances. (LD 39, 19 RT 4741-42.) He then 

reinforced that point by arguing that all defendants, regardless of 

race, place of residence, or gang affiliation, were entitled to 

justice and equal protection under the law. He was permitted to 

argue that innocent people are convicted often because of 

investigations based not on evidence but rather on conclusions and 

bias, particularly where the accused are gang-bangers, people with 

mental problems, or other “easy targets.” (Id. at 4742-43.) He 

extolled the value of equality under the law and the opportunity to 

have each juror decide the case based on “the law without 

prejudices.” (Id. at 4744.) It was only when counsel appeared to 

refer to specific cases of innocently convicted persons, or to 

counsel’s belief and to his father’s wartime service-—matters that 

were not in evidence or directly relevant--that the trial court 

foreclosed the argument. 

///

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 71 of 157
72

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Reference to the entirety of the parties’ closing arguments 

shows that defense counsel argued that the process of determining 

the facts should be guided by the evidence and the applicable law 

and should not be driven or affected by bias, racism, or antipathy 

toward gang culture. Petitioner’s counsel’s argument included the 

possibility of being falsely accused and the protection afforded by 

the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to 

guilt of the crimes and reliance on circumstantial evidence. (Id.

at 4792-96.) Petitioner’s counsel emphasized the duty to judge 

Petitioner fairly, to “recognize biases and avoid making snap 

judgments,” especially as to persons not in the jurors’ immediate 

circles, and particularly with respect to Petitioner, who was a 

Black person with a history of selling drugs and having done some 

bad things in his life. (Id. at 4796-97.) Petitioner’s counsel 

also referred to a seminar he had recently attended concerning race 

in the community, and he reminded the jury that there continued “to 

be an association, believe it or not, between black males and 

criminal behavior.” (Id. at 4798.) The trial court ruled that this 

argument was proper and that counsel was entitled to some leeway. 

(Id.) Petitioner’s counsel emphasized that the association 

continued to be pervasive in the community, stating: “And whether 

conscious or unconscious, I wish you to put aside the color of Mr. 

Trice’s skin and view him simply as another human being during your 

deliberations,” and counsel quoted Frederick Douglas with respect to 

equality under the law. (Id.) Dean’s counsel also argued 

extensively on the burden of proof (e.g., id. at 4817-18), referred 

to specific, notorious crimes where white perpetrators had falsely 

accused Black persons of having committed the crimes in question, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 72 of 157
73

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and noted how racism affected the investigation and trial of 

offenses (id. at 4915-18).

In sum, the state court articulated correct legal standards and 

reasonably concluded that the trial court’s ruling was within the 

Court’s considerable discretion to limit argument to the evidence 

and to avoid confusion. Counsel were permitted to engage fully as 

advocates during argument. The record shows that defense counsel 

challenged the sufficiency and accuracy of the investigation of the 

crimes and the credibility of prosecution witnesses, including law 

enforcement witnesses. Defense counsel were permitted to engage in 

substantial argument regarding false accusation and biased 

investigation; counsel were not foreclosed from arguing any defense 

or defensive theory. There was extensive and essentially unlimited 

defense argument regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the 

presumption of innocence. 

In light of the record, it cannot be said that the state 

court’s conclusion was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement. Likewise, it cannot be 

concluded the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact. Accordingly, it will be recommended that 

Petitioner’s claim concerning limitation of defense argument be 

denied. 

VIII. The Trial Court’s Failure to Grant the Defense Motion to 

 Bifurcate the Gang Enhancements

Petitioner Trice argues that the trial court’s denial of the 

defense motion to bifurcate the gang enhancements violated 

Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 73 of 157
74

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner points to the trial court’s later findings that it was 

questionable whether the prosecution had proved that the offenses 

were gang-related, the absence of evidence of gang signs or clothing 

and the location of the crimes outside of the gang’s territory, and 

the prosecution’s introduction of multiple items of inflammatory 

evidence, such as tattoos, crimes of which Petitioner Nichols had 

been acquitted, past convictions of various people, and parole 

proceedings, which were otherwise irrelevant and inadmissible. 

(Doc. 1 at 6, 12-13.)

A. The State Court’s Decision

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s decision is as follows:

A. Bifurcation of Gang Allegations

Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion 

by refusing to bifurcate the gang allegations. We conclude 

reversal is not warranted.

1. Background

Brocchini was the prosecution's gang expert at the 

preliminary hearing, although he conceded that he had no 

expertise specifically in Southern California gangs. Ruiz 

was known to Brocchini to be a member of the West Side 

Boyz, a criminal street gang whose primary activity was 

selling drugs. In Brocchini's opinion, Ruiz was a shotcaller for the gang.

Brocchini related that, upon receiving anonymous 

information giving the names Bam and Nichols and that the 

person was from Pasadena, he contacted Roger Roldan, a 

gang expert for the Pasadena Police Department. Roldan 

identified Nichols as Bam. Brocchini also gave Roldan the 

name J Dogg, which he got from Phil Collins, and asked 

Roldan to help put together a photographic lineup. 

Brocchini contacted Agent Mandenlian, a parole agent on 

the fugitive task force, and informed him of the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 74 of 157
75

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

situation. Mandenlian said he would arrest Nichols for 

Brocchini. Brocchini then went to Pasadena and, Roldan 

having figured out J Dogg's identity, a photographic 

lineup containing Dean's picture was put together. This 

was transmitted to Detective Blake, who obtained a 

positive identification of Dean as one of the 

perpetrators.

After getting anonymous information that the perpetrators 

were Pasadena Denver Lane Blood members, Brocchini spoke 

to Roldan and Mandenlian about that gang, and also 

researched it through the Cal Gang Network, a system that 

allows agencies throughout California to input information 

about gangs. He spoke to Nichols's parole officer and 

learned that Nichols had identified himself as a PDL 

member. He also spoke to Carla Galbreath when he was 

looking for Dean; she said she associated with PDL 

members, and identified Dean and Trice as PDL members. 

Brocchini also spoke with Trisha Lee, Trice's girlfriend. 

She stated that Trice had been a PDL member for as long as 

she had known him, and that she gave him money each month 

so that he did not have to commit crimes with other gang 

members.

Based on information he obtained, Brocchini opined that 

PDL was a criminal street gang as of the date of the Ruiz 

homicide, and that appellants were PDL members. He further 

opined that the primary activities of PDL were selling 

narcotics, assault with firearms, robbery, and murder. 

With respect to the present case, Brocchini opined that 

the crimes were committed for the benefit of PDL. He based 

his opinion on experience talking with gang members; the 

only way they can gain weapons is by stealing them, and 

any other stolen property, such as cocaine, they could 

sell in their own territory to make money, which would 

benefit the gang. The fact the perpetrators came into town 

unmasked and armed, then committed a violent act in 

another town, would benefit PDL's reputation. Brocchini 

conceded that, in order to create the perception in 

people's minds that a gang is expanding its sphere of 

influence and is to be feared, the gang members would have 

to identify themselves as belonging to that particular 

gang so people will know who committed the crime. He was 

unaware of anything in the facts of the present case in 

which any of the participants identified themselves as 

gang members to the victims.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 75 of 157
76

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the 

magistrate found “strong evidence” to sustain the gang 

enhancement allegations. Appellants were held to answer 

accordingly.

Prior to trial, appellants moved to have the gang 

enhancement allegations bifurcated, on the ground the gang 

evidence would have a prejudicial effect and would deprive 

them of due process and a fair trial. The People opposed 

the motion, arguing bifurcation was unwarranted because 

the gang enhancements were inextricably intertwined with 

the charged offenses and evidence of appellants' gang 

activities and membership was important to demonstrate 

their motive for the robbery. The trial court denied the 

motion.

In ruling on appellants' motions for new trial, the trial 

court found various problems with respect to the gang 

testimony. In light of these problems, which included the 

fact that “there was plentiful evidence of gang 

membership, but scant evidence of gang benefit,” the court 

ordered the jury's true findings on the section 186.22, 

subdivision (b) enhancements stricken as to each count.

2. Analysis

In People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, the 

California Supreme Court held that a trial court has 

discretion to bifurcate trial on a gang enhancement. (Id.

at p. 1049.) The court cautioned that bifurcation will 

sometimes be appropriate: “The predicate offenses offered 

to establish a ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ (§ 

186.22, subd. (e)) need not be related to the crime, or 

even the defendant, and evidence of such offenses may be 

unduly prejudicial, thus warranting bifurcation. Moreover, 

some of the other gang evidence, even as it relates to the 

defendant, may be so extraordinarily prejudicial, and of 

so little relevance to guilt, that it threatens to sway 

the jury to convict regardless of the defendant's actual 

guilt.” (Hernandez, at p. 1049.)

In cases where a gang enhancement has not been alleged, 

the state high court has “held that evidence of gang 

membership is potentially prejudicial and should not be 

admitted if its probative value is minimal. [Citation.] 

But evidence of gang membership is often relevant to, and 

admissible regarding, the charged offense. Evidence of the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 76 of 157
77

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendant's gang affiliation—including evidence of the 

gang's territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and 

practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—

can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific 

intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues 

pertinent to guilt of the charged crime. [Citations.] To 

the extent the evidence supporting the gang enhancement 

would be admissible at a trial of guilt, any inference of 

prejudice would be dispelled, and bifurcation would not be 

necessary. [Citation.] [¶] Even if some of the evidence 

offered to prove the gang enhancement would be 

inadmissible at a trial of the substantive crime itself—

for example, if some of it might be excluded under 

Evidence Code section 352 as unduly prejudicial when no 

gang enhancement is charged—a court may still deny 

bifurcation.” (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 

pp. 1049–1050.) In sum, “the trial court's discretion to 

deny bifurcation of a charged gang enhancement is ... 

broader than its discretion to admit gang evidence when 

the gang enhancement is not charged. [Citation.]” (Id. at 

p. 1050.)

Gang evidence has an inherent potential for prejudice; it 

“creates a risk that the jury will infer that the 

defendant has a criminal disposition and is therefore 

guilty of the charged offense....” (People v. Samaniego, 

supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167.) Yet, an allegation 

under section 186.22, subdivision (b) is a separate 

enhancement allegation, not a substantive crime. The 

extent to which a crime is committed to benefit a gang

does not bear, in and of itself, on the issue of guilt or 

innocence of the underlying offense. Similarly, whether a 

defendant belongs to a gang does not prove guilt. 

“Nonetheless, evidence related to gang membership is not 

insulated from the general rule that all relevant evidence 

is admissible if it is relevant to a material issue in the 

case other than character, is not more prejudicial than 

probative, and is not cumulative. [Citations.]” (People v. 

Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167.)

In our view, because of the potential for prejudice 

inherent in gang evidence, absent some showing the gang 

evidence is probative as it pertains to the issue of guilt 

of the underlying crime, failure to bifurcate is 

necessarily error. If the gang evidence (whether it be the 

defendant's association with a gang or some other aspect) 

is not at least minimally probative with respect to a 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 77 of 157
78

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

charged offense, bifurcation should be granted. There must 

be something more than guilt by association or propensity.

The basic issues thus are relevance and prejudice, and 

they are inextricably intertwined. Questions the trial 

court should consider in determining the need for 

bifurcation include: Does anything about the crime 

reasonably suggest gang involvement or motive, even 

without a gang expert's interpretation? If the gang 

enhancement allegations were to be bifurcated, would at 

least some gang-related evidence likely be admitted in the 

trial of the substantive offense(s) anyway? If bifurcation 

is not ordered, what kind of evidence is likely to be 

admitted in support of the gang enhancements that is not 

probative of the charged crimes themselves, and how 

potentially inflammatory will that evidence likely be? For 

example, will evidence of the predicate acts or pattern of 

criminal gang activity involve crimes of violence much 

greater than any involved in the charged offenses, such 

that the jury will be likely to use it as bad character 

evidence against the defendant(s)?

Turning to the case before us, “[w]e review the 

correctness of the trial court's ruling at the time it was 

made,... and not by reference to evidence produced at a 

later date. [Citations.]” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 701, 739; see People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 

302, 312 [addressing ruling on severance motion], 

overruled on other grounds in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 

Cal.3d 1104, 1149.) Here, it was apparent from the 

evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing that, although 

there were no overt signs of gang involvement such as the 

flashing of signs or saying of a gang's name during 

commission of the charged offenses, some gang-related 

evidence would be admissible even in the event of 

bifurcation—for example, to explain how appellants were 

developed as suspects. There would also be evidence of 

more than one perpetrator acting in concert. The trial 

court reasonably could also have concluded the evidence 

related only to the gang enhancement allegations would not 

likely be more inflammatory than the facts of the charged 

offenses themselves. Under the circumstances, we cannot 

say the trial court's refusal to bifurcate “exceed[ed] the 

bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being 

considered. [Citations.]” (People v. Giminez (1975) 14 

Cal.3d 68, 72.) Accordingly, the trial court acted within

its discretion in denying the motions for bifurcation. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 78 of 157
79

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) FN36

FN36. Two points warrant addressing. First, Dean 

cites People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 

437 for the proposition that “[i]t is a 

violation of constitutional due process to 

erroneously introduce evidence of gang 

affiliation.” Partida says no such thing. At 

issue in that case was “when, if ever, a trial 

objection on Evidence Code section 352 grounds 

preserves the appellate argument that admitting 

the evidence violated a defendant's federal due 

process rights and, if the argument is 

preserved, under what circumstances error of 

this nature does violate due process.” (Partida, 

at p. 431.) At the page cited by Dean, the 

opinion discusses when an objection under 

Evidence Code section 352 is sufficient to

preserve a due process argument for appeal. 

(Partida, at p. 437.) In fact, the California 

Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Court of 

Appeal's finding of no due process violation 

resulting from the erroneous admission of some 

of the challenged gang evidence. (Id. at p. 

439.)

Second, Nichols appears to suggest that if the trial court 

abused its discretion, then its ruling necessarily 

violated the federal Constitution's guarantee of 

substantive due process. Even if we were to find an abuse 

of discretion, it would not necessarily follow that the 

error was of federal constitutional magnitude, and the 

authorities cited by Nichols do not hold otherwise.

This does not end our inquiry, however, since, by analogy 

to the law concerning severance (see People v. Hernandez, 

supra, 33 Cal .4th at p. 1050), even if the ruling denying 

bifurcation was correct when made, “[a]fter trial,... the 

reviewing court may nevertheless reverse a conviction 

where, because of the consolidation, a gross unfairness 

has occurred such as to deprive the defendant of a fair 

trial or due process of law. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 313.) Appellants argue that 

admission of the gang evidence resulted in such a level of 

unfairness here, thus violating due process.FN37

FN37. Appellants raised a due process objection 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 79 of 157
80

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to the evidence during trial.

The record before us leaves no doubt that evidence came 

before the jury that was unnecessary and had a high 

potential for being inflammatory and prejudicing 

appellants. For instance, evidence of numerous criminal 

acts, committed or allegedly committed by appellants and 

other PDL members, was admitted to establish that PDL was 

a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 

186.22, and that appellants were associated with the 

gang.FN38 While we recognize that the prosecutor had to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that PDL was a criminal 

street gang since appellants apparently would not 

stipulate to that fact, PDL's status as such was never 

seriously contested. Thus, there was no need for the 

prosecutor to introduce evidence of numerous predicate 

acts simply because subdivision (e) of section 186.22 

refers to two or more offenses. Prosecutors have no right 

to overprove their case or put on every bit of evidence 

they have (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 

610), and the prosecutor's tactics here verged on 

overkill. While we cannot fault the introduction of 

evidence supporting the testimony of Officer Okamoto 

concerning what constitute PDL's primary activities, there 

is a fine line between evidence that constitutes 

legitimate proof of statutory elements or that 

demonstrates the basis for an expert's testimony, and 

evidence that constitutes illegitimate proof of guilt by 

association and bad character. It bears emphasizing that 

trial courts must be careful to use their powers under 

Evidence Code section 352 to limit the evidence to its 

proper purpose—establishing the existence of a criminal 

street gang—and not to permit a prosecutor, through the 

guise of establishing that fact, to seek to imply 

improperly to the jury that the gang is violent, therefore 

the defendant is violent, therefore the defendant likely 

committed the charged crime(s).FN39

FN38. The trial court instructed the jury on 10 

specific instances of criminal conduct 

(including the charged robbery and murder) with 

respect to what constitutes a pattern of 

criminal gang activity.

FN39. That the prosecutor here paid scant, if 

any, attention to the line between legitimate 

and illegitimate proof is demonstrated by his 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 80 of 157
81

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

repeated attempts to present evidence of 

Nichols's and Trice's alleged involvement in the 

robbery and murder of a drug dealer in Madera. 

When the trial court denied his request to 

present the evidence on the issue of guilt 

pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, 

subdivision (b), the prosecutor attempted to 

bring it in as a predicate act—despite the fact 

numerous predicate acts had already been 

introduced—and to show appellants were active 

gang members, associated with each other, and 

committed a crime for the benefit of a gang. In 

light of the obviously high potential for 

prejudice, the trial court again excluded 

evidence of the facts of the offenses, this time 

pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, and only 

allowed evidence of the resulting attempted 

robbery and assault convictions. This did not 

stop the prosecutor from trying to place before 

the jury evidence that Nichols was suspected of 

involvement in another homicide, again 

ostensibly to show that Nichols was associating 

with other criminal gang members committing 

crimes. After commenting, “This isn't just to 

show—to try and make him out to be a bad 

character, I take it,” the court sustained the 

defense objections.

Although we will discuss the prosecutor's conduct 

elsewhere in this opinion, perhaps the single most 

egregious example of his behavior occurred in connection 

with the gang evidence. Counsel for Nichols was crossexamining Okamoto concerning his reliance on an offense of 

which Nichols was acquitted. When Okamoto stated that the 

type of activity was very consistent with gang activity, 

counsel responded, “I see. Even if he didn't do it and was 

found not guilty because he wasn't the one.” The 

prosecutor then stated: “Objection, that misstates the 

evidence. Just because he's found not guilty doesn't mean 

he didn't do it.” (Italics added.) Regardless of the 

accuracy of the statement, to have made such a statement 

in front of the jury is unconscionable.

Despite the foregoing, we conclude that the erroneously 

admitted evidence was not, in light of all the 

circumstances and the record as a whole, so inflammatory 

and so lacking in probative value as to violate 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 81 of 157
82

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

appellants' right to due process, even given the trial 

court's comments about the sufficiency of the evidence in 

its ruling on the motions for new trial.FN40 The trial 

court was clearly aware of, and exercised, its authority 

to exclude cumulative and inflammatory evidence. (See 

People v. Williams, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 610–

611.) The court also required the prosecutor to have 

Brocchini testify regarding different areas than Okamoto 

and not simply go over the same ground. Brocchini 

acknowledged that gang members can commit crimes that are 

not for the benefit of the gang, and he gave an example 

from personal experience of a gang member who had been 

selling drugs for his own benefit, an offense that (unlike 

the domestic violence example Brocchini also gave) would 

often be perceived as benefitting the gang. He also 

testified that it is not a crime simply to be a gang 

member.

FN40. It necessarily follows that there was no 

prejudice under the state law standard of People 

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

Significantly, Ruiz was himself shown to be a senior 

member of a gang and a large-scale drug dealer who cooked 

his product in, and apparently conducted at least some of 

his business from, the house in which his children lived. 

This served to neutralize at least some of the 

inflammatory effect of the gang evidence. (See People v. 

Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 173, affd. sub nom. Victor 

v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1.) Also neutralizing were the 

circumstances of the charged offenses themselves—a 

callous, violent, home-invasion robbery and murder in the 

presence of young children who were lucky not to have been 

injured or killed themselves. Although some of the 

predicate acts were violent, so were the charged offenses. 

Additionally, in light of the total absence of physical 

evidence of a shooting in Atwater, admission of the gang 

evidence had little or no effect on Trice's account of 

events. (Contrast People v. Avitia (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 

185, 194–195.) Appellants' arguments to the contrary 

notwithstanding, evidence of their guilt was very strong, 

and the gang-violence evidence was not pervasive.

(Contrast People v. Maestas (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1482, 

1498.) Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that 

it could consider the evidence of gang activity only for 

the limited purpose of deciding whether a defendant acted 

with the intent, purpose, and knowledge required to prove 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 82 of 157
83

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the gang-related crime and enhancement and special 

circumstance allegations that were charged, and it 

cautioned jurors that they could not conclude from the 

evidence that a defendant was a person of bad character or

had a disposition to commit crimes. (See People v. 

Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 820.) “Jurors are 

routinely instructed to make... fine distinctions 

concerning the purposes for which evidence may be 

considered.... [Citation.]” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 93, 139.) Even where gang evidence is concerned, 

“[i]t is, of course, presumed the jury understood and 

followed the court's instruction in the absence of any 

showing to the contrary. [Citation.]” (People v. Williams, 

supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 613.) The record contains no 

such showing here.

Appellants cite People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 

214 (Albarran), in which the appellate court found that 

the admission of gang evidence violated due process and 

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. (Id. at p. 232.) 

The court summarized the law applicable to a due process 

claim as follows: “To prove a deprivation of federal due 

process rights, [a defendant] must satisfy a high 

constitutional standard to show that the erroneous 

admission of evidence resulted in an unfair trial. ‘Only 

if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw 

from the evidence can its admission violate due process. 

Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as 

necessarily prevents a fair trial.” [Citation.] Only under 

such circumstances can it be inferred that the jury must 

have used the evidence for an improper purpose.’ 

[Citation.] ‘The dispositive issue is... whether the trial 

court committed an error which rendered the trial “so 

‘arbitrary and fundamentally unfair’ that it violated 

federal due process.” [Citations.]' [Citation.]” (Id. at 

pp. 229–230, fn. omitted.)

With respect to the case before it, the court explained: 

“Certain gang evidence, namely the facts concerning the 

threat to police officers, the Mexican Mafia evidence and 

evidence identifying other gang members and their 

unrelated crimes, had no legitimate purpose in this trial. 

The trial court's ruling on the new trial motion in which 

it broadly concluded the gang evidence was admissible to 

prove motive and intent for the underlying charges was 

arbitrary and fundamentally unfair. As we have concluded 

elsewhere, the prosecution did not prove that this gang 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 83 of 157
84

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence had a bearing on the issues of intent and motive. 

We thus discern ‘no permissible inferences' that could be 

drawn by the jury from this evidence. [Citation.] From 

this evidence there was a real danger that the jury would 

improperly infer that whether or not Albarran was involved 

in these shootings, he had committed other crimes, would 

commit crimes in the future, and posed a danger to the 

police and society in general and thus he should be 

punished. Furthermore, this gang evidence was extremely 

and uniquely inflammatory, such that the prejudice arising 

from the jury's exposure to it could only have served to 

cloud their resolution of the issues. In our view, looking 

at the effect of this evidence on the trial as a whole, we 

believe that this prejudicial gang evidence was ‘“of such 

quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.”’

[Citation.]” (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 230–

231, fns. omitted.)

As we have explained, some gang evidence would have been 

properly admitted even if bifurcation of the gang 

enhancement allegations had been ordered. We cannot say 

evidence of gang benefit was wholly lacking; expanding a

gang's territory or demonstrating it can reach far beyond 

its home turf seems beneficial to us. Nor can we say the 

nature and quantity of the evidence was such that it must 

have affected jurors' resolution of the substantive 

issues. In sum, and in contrast to Albarran, this case 

does not “present[ ] one of those rare and unusual 

occasions where the admission of evidence has violated 

federal due process and rendered [appellants'] trial 

fundamentally unfair.” (Albarran, supra, 149 California at 

p. 232.)

(LD 3, 45-55.)

B. Analysis

A state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling may be subject 

to federal habeas review if it violates federal law, either by 

infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory 

provision or by admitting evidence so arbitrary or prejudicial that 

its admission rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and violated 

fundamental conceptions of justice. Perry v. New Hampshire,

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 84 of 157
85

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 716, 723 (2012); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 

1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 

919-20. (1991). 

To the extent Petitioner’s claim is considered a challenge to 

improper joinder of charging allegations, improper joinder does not, 

in itself, violate the Constitution; rather, misjoinder rises to the 

level of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice 

so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair 

trial. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 (1986). Insofar as 

Petitioner raises a due process claim to the introduction of gang 

evidence, Petitioner is entitled to relief only if the evidence was 

so arbitrary or prejudicial that its admission rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair and violated fundamental conceptions of 

justice. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. at 723; Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-69; Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 

1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Admission of evidence violates due process 

only if there are no permissible inferences that a jury may draw 

from it, and the evidence is of such quality as necessarily prevents 

a fair trial. Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 

2005) (quoting Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d at 920).

Further, even the clearly erroneous admission of evidence that 

renders a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of 

habeas relief unless forbidden by clearly established federal law as 

established by the Supreme Court. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d at 

1101. It is one matter to apply rules that are squarely established 

by the Court’s holdings to the facts of each case, but it is another 

to extend it to new facts, which is required only if it is so 

obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 85 of 157
86

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

facts that there could be no fairminded disagreement on the 

question. White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1706.

The Supreme Court has not yet made a clear ruling that 

admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes 

a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ, 

and absent such clearly established federal law, it cannot be 

concluded that the state court’s ruling was an unreasonable 

application. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d at 1101 (citing Carey 

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)). The Court will proceed to 

consider more generally, in view of the unique totality of the 

circumstances of this case, whether the state court reasonably 

determined that Petitioner’ due process right to a fair trial was

not violated by the failure to bifurcate the proceedings and by the

admission of the gang evidence. 

Here, the gang evidence included information concerning the 

criminal history of not only Petitioners, but also third persons 

affiliated with Petitioners or with the gang. Gang expert Okamoto’s 

opinion as to the primary activities of the PDL was based in part on 

the criminal convictions of a handful of PDL gang members that 

ranged from possession and sale of marijuana and cocaine, shooting 

at an inhabited dwelling, and assault with a firearm to robbery, 

armed robbery, kidnapping, and attempted murder, with some gang 

enhancements. (LD 31, 11 RT 2665-72, 2717-21.) Guilt by 

association was a possible inference. 

Here, evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was strong. As to 

Petitioner’s criminal past, evidence of Petitioner’s guilty plea to 

attempted home invasion robbery and other offenses was before the 

jury. Because Petitioner himself had committed the same offenses or 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 86 of 157
87

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

similarly serious offenses, there was little risk that the trier 

would inappropriately ascribe a third person’s level of criminality 

to Petitioner based on association alone. Thus, to a significant 

extent, the additional information about the criminal activity of 

those affiliated with the gang was not unduly prejudicial. The 

attempt to tie Petitioner Nichols to another murder of a drug dealer 

was inflammatory in nature and potentially prejudicial, but any 

injurious effect was reduced by limiting instructions. Further, the 

facts of the charged offenses and the strong evidence of the 

perpetrators’ association for the purpose of committing violent 

crimes presented the trier with a much more direct and compelling 

basis for an inference of wrongful intent and guilty concerted 

action than the gang evidence. 

Aside from its probative value with respect to the gang 

allegations, relatively extensive evidence of gang affiliation, 

association, and activity was relevant and material in various 

respects, including to the course of the investigation and 

development of the evidence, the perpetrators’ identity, motive/s 

for the offenses, the interactions and communications among the 

perpetrators, modus operandi, the source and nature of the 

perpetrators’ information concerning the victim, the history and 

origin of firearms involved in the charged offenses, and the 

credibility of Petitioner and Collins. Cf. Windham v. Merkle, 163 

F.3d 1092, 1103-04. It was objectively reasonable for the state 

court to conclude that aside from the gang allegations, the gang 

evidence was relevant. 

The state court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficiently 

probative and was not sufficiently prejudicial to render the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 87 of 157
88

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proceedings unfair was also objectively reasonable. The 

circumstances of the offense support an inference that the offenses 

were undertaken at least in part to obtain resources for the gang,

invoke fear in the gang and drug community, and demonstrate the 

reach of the gang beyond its turf. In light of the evidence in the 

record, the state court reasonably determined that the callousness 

and violence of the circumstances of the charged offenses, the 

victim’s status as a senior gang member and large-scale drug dealer, 

the Petitioner’s admitted criminal past, and the absence of any 

evidence of a shooting in Atwater all combined to reduce any 

prejudicial effect that Petitioner might suffer from the otherwise 

inadmissible gang evidence.

Finally, the jury was instructed to consider the evidence of 

gang activity only for the limited purpose of deciding whether a 

defendant acted with the intent, purpose, and knowledge required to 

prove the gang-related crime, enhancement, and special circumstances 

allegations that were charged. The jury was also cautioned that it 

could not conclude from the evidence that a defendant was a person 

of bad character or had a disposition to commit crimes. (LD 3, 54.) 

As a general proposition, jurors are presumed to follow the 

instructions given. See, Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234

(2000). It is generally presumed that a jury will follow an 

instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently 

presented to it unless there is an overwhelming probability that the 

jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions and a strong 

likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to 

the defendant. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (1987) 

(quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987) and Bruton v. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 88 of 157
89

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968)). Here, the state court 

reasonably relied on the presumption.

Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that there could be 

no fairminded disagreement on the weighing of the probative value 

and prejudicial effect of the gang evidence. The state court’s 

decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law. Further, in light of the evidence in the 

record, and considering the state court’s comprehensive review of 

the circumstances, the Court concludes that the state court’s 

decision did not involve an unreasonable determination of fact based 

on the evidence before the court.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to 

show he is entitled to relief pursuant to § 2254(d) on his claim or 

claims concerning a violation of due process from the denial of his 

motion for bifurcation and the admission of gang evidence. It will 

be recommended that Petitioner’s due process 

claims of fundamental unfairness regarding the failure to bifurcate 

be denied.

C. Related Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection

 Claims

 

It is unclear whether these issues have been preserved, but if 

so, Petitioner’s substantive due process and equal protection claims

concerning the bifurcation issue should be denied. The legal 

standards governing these claims have been previously set forth.

Here, the state court’s bifurcation decision was based on the 

court’s analysis of the pertinent legal factors, a process that was 

part and parcel of the state court’s reserved and inherent powers to 

control the administration of justice and review trial court

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 89 of 157
90

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proceedings for fairness in the cases before it. Further, the state 

courts proceeded regularly by trial and motion proceedings in which 

the parties had an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner has not 

shown that the procedures infringed a federally protected and 

fundamental right or operated too broadly beyond the ambit of the 

state’s compelling interests. 

With respect to an equal protection claim, Petitioner has not 

shown any difference in treatment or intentional discrimination. 

Petitioner has not shown how he suffered a violation of equal 

protection.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s 

substantive due process and equal protection claims be denied.

IX. Trial Court Error in Admitting Evidence of Suggestive

 Identifications

Petitioner Trice argues that the trial court’s admission of 

unconstitutionally suggestive identifications of Petitioner and his 

co-defendants Dean and Nichols made by Tatum and Roshyla Ruiz 

violated Petitioner’s right to a fundamentally fair trial and due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Doc. 1, 6.)

Petitioner Nichols alleges that tainted identification 

procedures violated his right to due process. (Doc. 1, 6.) 

A. The State Court’s Decision

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s decision is as follows:

B. Identification Procedures

Appellants contend that impermissibly suggestive 

procedures violated due process and tainted various 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 90 of 157
91

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

identifications of them as the perpetrators. We conclude 

the identifications were properly admitted and that no due 

process violation has been shown.

1. General Legal Principles

“ ‘[A] violation of due process occurs if a pretrial 

identification procedure is “so impermissibly suggestive 

as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification.” [Citations.]’” (People v. 

Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 508; Simmons v. United 

States, (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384.) A “defendant's 

protection against suggestive identification procedures 

encompasses not only the right to avoid methods that 

suggest the initial identification, but as well the right 

to avoid having suggestive methods transform a selection 

that was only tentative into one that is positively 

certain. [Citation.] While a witness is entitled to become 

surer of an identification, due process precludes the 

generation of that increased certainty through a 

suggestive [identification procedure]. [Citations.]” 

(Raheem v. Kelly (2d Cir.2001) 257 F.3d 122, 135.)

“ ‘ “In deciding whether an extrajudicial identification 

is so unreliable as to violate a defendant's right to due 

process, the court must ascertain (1) ‘whether the 

identification procedure was unduly suggestive and 

unnecessary,’ and, if so, (2) whether the identification 

was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the 

circumstances.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 

38 Cal.4th 932, 942; see Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 

293, 302, overruled on other grounds in Griffith v. 

Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 320–328.) “The cases hold 

that despite an unduly suggestive identification 

procedure, we may deem the identification reliable under 

the totality of the circumstances, after we consider such 

factors as the witness's opportunity to view the suspect 

at the time of the offense, the witness's degree of 

attention at that time, the accuracy of the witness's 

prior description, the level of certainty the witness 

expressed when making the identification, and the lapse of 

time between the offense and the identification. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1354; 

Neil v. Biggers (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 199–200.)

The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating “ ‘that 

the identification procedure resulted in such unfairness 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 91 of 157
92

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that it abridged his rights to due process. [Citation.]’ 

[Citations.]” (People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 

508.) The defendant must show that the procedure was both 

unduly suggestive and unfair “ ‘as a demonstrable reality, 

not just speculation.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cook, 

supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1355.) Contrary to Nichols's 

statement that the standard of review is unsettled, “[w]e 

review deferentially the trial court's findings of 

historical fact, especially those that turn on credibility 

determinations, but we independently review the trial 

court's ruling regarding whether, under those facts, a 

pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive.” 

(People v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 943; 

People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 608–609.)

2. Tatum's Identification of Dean FN41

FN41. We assume appellants are not limited to 

challenging identifications of themselves, 

since, in light of other evidence linking them 

in commission of the crimes, the identification 

of one bolstered the prosecution's case against 

the others. (See People v. Sanders, supra, 51 

Cal.3d at pp. 507–508.)

a. Background

While Detective Blake was interviewing Tatum shortly after 

the homicide, other officers were attempting to develop 

possible suspects. Brocchini put together a photographic 

array based both on physical descriptions given by Tatum

and on persons who had been suspected of committing 

robberies in Modesto in the recent past. It did not 

contain appellants. Blake showed it to Tatum about 1:40 

a.m. She was unable to pick out anyone. Brocchini 

subsequently gave Blake four more photographic lineups, 

which Blake showed to Tatum that afternoon. One of the 

lineups contained five photographs, while the others 

contained six each. None were of appellants. Tatum did not 

select anyone.

As the investigation focused on appellants, Blake obtained 

photographic lineups that included them. On the morning of 

March 7, 2002, he took People's exhibit 30–2, in which 

Dean's photograph appeared in the bottom right-hand 

corner, to Tatum's house to show her.FN42 Before showing 

her the photographs, Blake read her the standard so-called 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 92 of 157
93

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

SimmonsFN43 advisement that admonished her that the fact 

the photographs were shown to her should not influence her 

judgment, and that it was as important to free innocent 

persons from suspicion as to identify guilty parties.FN44 

Tatum studied the photographs, then pointed to Dean's 

picture and said, “ ‘He's one of them. He was in my 

house.’” Tatum said he was the person who took her to the 

master bath to be with her children, and who watched over 

her during the incident. She also said he shot from the 

outside into the closet door in the master bedroom. Tatum

looked at the photographs for about two seconds; there was 

no hesitation in her identification. At trial, Tatum

confirmed that she recognized Dean when viewing the 

photographs.

FN42. Brocchini and Roldan put together this 

photographic lineup. Brocchini could not recall 

whether there were other pictures of Dean that 

could have been used, but believed he and Roldan 

used the most recent one Roldan had.

FN43. Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. 

377.

FN44. Blake read the admonishment to Tatum

directly from his card. At trial, he did not 

have the card with him and had to paraphrase.

Appellants objected to People's exhibit 30–2, arguing that 

the photographic lineup was suggestive because Dean's 

photograph stood out from the others due to the degree of 

brightness in the picture.FN45 Counsel for Dean described 

Dean's photograph as looking “like the only one for which 

a flash unit was used.” The prosecutor responded that, 

although the flash “lit [Dean] up,” the array was not 

unduly suggestive because all of the photographs were of 

similar-looking individuals. The trial court examined the 

exhibit and found that the faces and hairstyles were all 

fairly similar, and that all of the individuals had facial 

hair; with respect to differences, Dean's picture was 

brighter than the others, and he was the only person 

wearing a white shirt. The trial court concluded that, 

looking at the lineup overall, it was not “unfair or 

necessarily something that would lead to an improper 

identification or that would make [Dean] quicker to be 

chosen because of those differences”; hence, there was no 

due process violation.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 93 of 157
94

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FN45. Appellants first raised the objection 

during the course of Roshyla's testimony, which 

preceded that of Tatum. Our analysis applies 

equally to Tatum’s and Roshyla's identifications 

and, to the extent appellants complain that 

Collins identified Dean from an identical 

photographic lineup (People's exhibit 30–1), 

also to his identification. We have no trouble 

resolving the question of reliability in favor 

of admission of Collins's identification of 

Dean, inasmuch as the record shows Dean was at 

his house off and on throughout the day on March 

1, and also showed up at his house after Trice 

was shot. Under these circumstances, the record 

establishes that Collins's in-court 

identification was based on an independent 

recollection of Dean. (See People v. Contreras

(1993) 17 Cal.App .4th 813, 821; People v. Phan

(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1462.)

As set out in the statement of facts, ante, Tatum

identified all three appellants at trial. She testified 

that she estimated she was at the doorway of the bathroom 

for around five minutes, and that about 10 minutes elapsed 

between when the intruders entered the house until Ruiz 

was shot.

b. Analysis

Appellants complain that the photograph of Dean contained 

in People's exhibit 30–2 stands out because it is brighter 

than the other photographs, and Dean is the only 

individual wearing a white shirt. They also contend that 

the fact a detective took the array to Tatum’s house in 

the middle of the day, four days after the homicide, 

implicitly telegraphed to her that there was a likely 

suspect in the lineup.

“To determine whether a procedure is unduly suggestive, we 

ask ‘whether anything caused defendant to “stand out” from 

the others in a way that would suggest the witness should 

select him.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 

Cal.4th at p. 124.) We have examined the exhibit in 

question; all the photographs are of African–American 

males, generally of the same age, complexion, and build, 

and all with some sort of facial hair. Minor differences 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 94 of 157
95

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in facial hair, hair style, background color, and image 

size do not make a lineup suggestive. (People v. Johnson

(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1217; see People v. Holt (1972) 28 

Cal.App.3d 343, 350, disapproved on other grounds in Evans 

v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6.) 

Similarly, a lineup is not made suggestive by the fact the 

defendant is the only participant wearing a certain type 

of clothing, at least where, as here, the clothing is 

neither distinctive nor does it match important elements 

of the description provided by the witness. (See Foster v. 

California (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 442–443; People v. 

Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 943–944; People v. 

Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 1162–1163; People v. 

Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1217; Raheem v. Kelley, 

supra, 257 F.3d at pp. 134–135.) As for appellants' claim 

the circumstances under which the photographs were shown 

implicitly telegraphed to T. that there was a suspect in 

the lineup, “ ‘[a]nyone asked to view a lineup would 

naturally assume the police had a suspect.’ [Citation.] 

This circumstance does not render the lineup unduly 

suggestive. [Citation.]” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 

Cal.4th 680, 699.)

This leaves us to consider the undeniable fact that Dean's 

photograph is brighter than the rest. Differences in 

images, such as discoloration, the size of the border 

around the photograph, and whether some images are glossy 

while others are not, are generally held to be “trivial 

distinctions [that] are immaterial. [Citation.]” (People 

v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1163; see, e.g., People 

v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 943; People v. 

Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1217.) Here, Dean's 

photograph is only somewhat brighter than the photograph 

in the upper left-hand corner, and differences in 

photographic quality and lighting are apparent in all six 

photographs.

Even were we to find the photographic array somewhat 

suggestive, under the totality of the circumstances, and 

considering the factors set out in Neil v. Biggers, supra, 

409 U.S. at pages 199–200, we find “no substantial 

likelihood” that Tatum (or Roshyla, for that matter) 

misidentified Dean when viewing the six photographs. 

(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 990; People 

v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 508–509; see People v. 

Phan, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1462.) FN46 Accordingly, 

no due process violation [h]as been shown.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 95 of 157
96

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FN46. Appellants cite People v. Carlos (2006) 

138 Cal.App.4th 907 as a case in which the 

conviction was reversed because the photographic 

lineup procedure was impermissibly suggestive, 

and analogize the lighting in Dean's photograph 

to the placement, in Carlos, of the defendant's 

name under his photograph. (Id. at p. 912.) 

Differences in lighting and photographic quality 

are much more likely to occur, and much harder 

to guard against, than the placement of a name 

under a photograph. In any event, the court in 

Carlos found a due process violation not only 

because the defendant's photograph was made to 

stand out from the others, but also because the 

method of labeling was unnecessary, the 

photographic array was not disclosed to the 

defense until the first day of trial, defense 

counsel's request for a brief continuance was 

denied, and none of the witnesses identified the 

defendant at trial. (Ibid.) Carlos is clearly 

distinguishable from the case at bench.

3. Roshyla’s Identification of Dean

a. Background

At the time Blake read the admonishment to Tatum and 

showed her People's exhibit 30–2, he and she were at the 

dining room table. Roshyla and her brother were watching a 

videotape in the living room, just off of the dining area. 

The rooms are separated by a half wall and a step, so that 

the living room is about eight or nine inches lower than 

the dining room. The children were seated on a couch, 

facing the television, and appeared to be paying attention 

to it. The table where Blake and Tatum sat was about 20 

feet away and behind the children. Blake was seated facing 

the living room, and he kept his eye on the children and 

paid attention to where they were while Tatum was looking 

at the photographs. When having different witnesses look 

at a lineup, Blake seeks to separate them so that they do 

not influence each other. He believed he was able to 

accomplish that in this instance. Generally speaking, the 

children were in a position in which they could not see 

what Blake and Tatum were doing. Blake did not believe the 

children could hear the exact words he and Tatum were 

using.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 96 of 157
97

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

After Tatum finished looking at People's exhibit 30–2, she 

gave Blake a piece of evidence she had found. He and she 

were concentrating on that when Roshyla came up to the 

table and looked at the lineup, which was lying by Tatum’s

hand. Roshyla pointed to Dean's picture and said, “‘he was 

in my house.’” Roshyla told Blake that after she had 

crawled out of the bathroom window, she saw two groups of 

men run past her. Dean was in the first group. It did not 

strike Blake as odd that Roshyla used almost the same 

terminology as Tatum; in his experience, children mimic 

the type of language and grammar that their parents use or 

that they are around.

Appellants objected that Roshyla saw Tatum make the 

identification and made the same identification for that 

reason; accordingly, Roshyla’s identification was tainted. 

The prosecutor responded that the identifications were 

made separately. The trial court ruled that the jury 

should determine, as part of the case, whether Roshyla was 

sufficiently isolated from Tastum’s identification.

At trial, Roshyla testified that the man whose photograph 

she identified was the one who came into the room, went 

back out, and brought her mother in. She was “[r]eally 

sure” the man in the photograph was one of the robbers who 

was in the house that night. She also saw him again when 

she was on her way to the neighbor's house. He was one of 

the men by the fence. She saw him there for about 10 

seconds. When shown People's exhibit 30–2 by the 

prosecutor, she identified the picture of Dean as being 

the person with the messed-up teeth who brought her mother 

into the room. She then identified Dean in court.

On cross-examination, Roshyla testified that at the time 

she was shown the photographs, she was told to pick out a 

person who looked like he had been in the house. The 

investigator and Tatum were present when Roshyla was shown 

the photographs, and Tatum was sitting next to Roshyla.

Roshyla thought the investigator had already shown 

photographs to Tatum; she did not know whether Tatum had 

picked any out because Roshyla was not sitting next to 

Tatum the whole time. Instead, Roshyla was walking around 

the house and watching television. Roshyla was in the 

living room and Tatum’s bedroom. A bar or divider 

separated the living room from the dining room, although 

Roshyla was tall enough to see over it. Roshyla testified 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 97 of 157
98

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that she and Tatum talked about what happened on the night 

Ruiz was shot; however, Tatum only asked what Roshyla had 

seen, and did not tell Roshyla what she (Tatum) saw.

b. Analysis

Appellants contend Roshyla's identification of Dean was 

tainted by her having seen her mother make an 

identification of Dean. The record does not support a 

conclusion that Roshyla had any idea that Tatum had made 

an identification, let alone which photograph she chose. 

Under the circumstances, appellant has failed to show that 

the identification procedure was unduly suggestive or that 

Roshyla’s identification of Dean was tainted. (See People 

v. Cook, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1354–1355; People v. 

Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 136, fn. 17.) The jury was free 

to take the circumstances under which the identification 

was made, and Eisen's testimony, into account in 

determining the weight to give to Roshyla’s identification 

of Dean.FN47

FN47. Significantly, the trial court instructed 

the jury that factors to be considered in 

assessing eyewitness identification testimony 

included “the testimony of any expert regarding 

acquisition, retention, or retrieval of 

information presented to the senses,” “[w]ere 

the photographic and physical lineups fair and 

were they conducted in a fair manner[,]” and 

“[w]as the witness's identification the product 

of his or her own recollection[.]” (See People 

v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413, fn. 4.)

4. Tatum's Identification of Nichols

a. Background

On March 4, 2002, Detective Owen showed Tatum People's 

exhibit 32–2, a photographic lineup in which Nichols's 

picture appears in the number 3 position. He first gave 

her the Simmons admonishment, which in part explained that 

she was not obliged to pick out anyone, then asked her to 

think about the incident and focus on the suspect who was 

heavier set and older. Tatum said she could actually 

picture that person. She then looked at the photographs 

for 10 to 15 seconds and said that the skin tones of the 

suspect were lighter than those in the pictures. Owen then 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 98 of 157
99

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

asked if, other than the skin tones, any of the 

photographs looked similar. According to Tatum, she was 

able to eliminate all but photo 3 as not looking like 

anyone who was in her house. The complexion, cheeks, 

hairline, and “[e]verything” in that photograph was 

similar to one of the men who was in her house. She also 

specifically remembered the nose. She expressed a desire 

to be able to see a lineup in person. She wanted to see 

the full body of the man in photo 3, as she remembered him 

being heavy and having a potbelly or beer belly. She told 

Owen she recalled that his stomach jiggled when he moved, 

and he had a fat gut and fat sides.

A live lineup involving Nichols was conducted on May 2, 

2002. Prior to the lineup, Tatum was admonished that she 

was not to assume that the person who committed the crime 

was among the group of individuals she would be shown, and 

that she was not obligated to identify anyone. At the 

lineup, she was shown six people. She identified Nichols. 

She also identified him (and the other appellants) at the 

preliminary hearing and at trial. There was no doubt in 

her mind once she saw Nichols in the live lineup that he 

was one of the people in her house. The individuals in the 

lineup were five feet 11 inches or six feet tall, except 

for one who was six feet four inches tall. Thus, none 

matched the description, height-wise, that Tatum gave in 

the first interview Blake conducted with her, in which she 

had described the person as having a light complexion and 

a beer belly, and being about five feet eight inches tall 

and 230 pounds. FN48

FN48. In Blake's opinion, Nichols had a medium 

complexion.

At trial, Tatum admitted having dated one of the 

participants in the lineup. She did not tell the officer 

that she recognized him. She did not think it was 

relevant, as she was looking for the person she saw in her 

home the night Ruiz died.

Appellants objected to the lineup as being inherently 

suggestive. The trial court overruled the objection.

b. Analysis

Relying in large part on the testimony of Dr. Eisen, an 

expert in eyewitness identification, appellants claim 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 99 of 157
100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Tatum’s identification of Nichols was tainted. They point, 

inter alia, to the fact that Owen asked her whether any 

photographs looked similar to the suspect apart from skin 

tone, Nichols was the only person in the live lineup who 

had previously been displayed to Tatum in a photographic 

array, and one of the participants in the live lineup was 

several inches taller than the rest.

Contrary to appellants' apparent argument, Eisen's 

testimony permitted, but did not compel, a conclusion the 

identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive. 

“[F]or a witness identification procedure to violate the 

due process clauses, the state must, at the threshold, 

improperly suggest something to the witness—i.e., it must, 

wittingly or unwittingly, initiate an unduly suggestive 

procedure.” (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 

413.) In light of the fact differences in lighting and 

photographic quality can alter skin tones, we see nothing 

suggestive in what Owen said. Similarly, we find nothing 

suggestive in the state's apparent acquiescence to Tatum’s

request to see Nichols in a live lineup. “Due process does 

not forbid the state to provide useful further information 

in response to a witness's request, for the state is not 

suggesting anything.” (Ibid.) That Nichols was the only 

participant common to both the photographic array and the 

live lineup does not render the identification procedures 

impermissibly suggestive or per se violate due process. 

(People v.. Cook, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1355; People v. 

Wimberly (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 773, 789.)

Appellants have failed to establish a violation of due 

process. The value of Eisen's testimony was properly left 

to the jury to determine.

5. Tatum's Identification of Trice

a. Background

When Brocchini created a photographic lineup for Trice, 

the only photograph of Trice he could find was from 1995. 

After Owen showed Tatum the photographic lineup that 

included Nichols's picture, he showed her People's exhibit 

32–1, a photographic lineup in which Trice's picture 

appears in the number 5 position. Tatum looked at the 

lineup for 25 to 30 seconds and said that none of the 

people looked familiar. Owen observed, however, that she 

looked at picture 5 several times.FN49 Not wanting to 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 100 of 157
101

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

taint her identification by specifying the picture, he 

said that he noticed she kept looking at a particular 

photograph. She responded, “‘Oh, you mean No. 5?’” He then 

asked why she looked back at that picture. She said the 

complexion, forehead, and hairline were the same, but she 

was not sure. She said she wanted to see the individual in 

person. Tatum told Owen that she could eliminate numbers 4 

and 6 as not being the suspect, but none of the others.

FN49. Owen knew, when he displayed the 

photographs, that Trice was in the number 5 

position.

At trial, Tatum recalled being able to eliminate all but 

number 5 as not having been in the house. She told the 

detective that number 5 looked like the person and that 

his features were very similar to what she had seen on one 

of the perpetrators. The main things were the forehead and 

hairline and the shape of the face. The complexion was 

similar, in that it was dark. Tatum told the detective 

that she wished she could do an in-person lineup, because 

she felt confident that she could pick out each individual 

in person. In person, she would be able to consider body 

type, height, and the way each stood.

b. Analysis

Despite the lack of objection in the trial court, 

appellants now contend, again based on Eisen's testimony, 

that Tatum’s identification of Trice was tainted because 

Owen made comments that steered her to focus on Trice's 

photograph. Assuming the issue is properly before us on 

appeal, through a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel or otherwise (see, e.g., People v. Williams (1988) 

44 Cal.3d 883, 906–907; People v. Barber (2002) 102 

Cal.App.4th 145, 149–150), we find no impermissibly 

suggestive procedure. Owen did not steer Tatum to focus on 

Trice's photograph; she had already demonstrated an 

interest in it beyond that which she showed concerning the 

other pictures, and he simply asked why. He did not 

improperly suggest anything. (See People v. Ochoa, supra, 

19 Cal.4th at p. 413.) Once again, Eisen's testimony was 

properly left to the jury to assess.

To summarize, in no instance have appellants persuaded us 

that their rights to due process were violated. The trial 

court did not err in admitting the challenged 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 101 of 157
102

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

identification evidence.

(LD 3, 56-67.)

B. Analysis

Due process of law requires suppression of eyewitness 

identification evidence “when law enforcement officers use an 

identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary.” 

Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. at 718, 724; Manson v. Brathwaite, 

432 U.S. 98, 107–09 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–98

(1972). An identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive 

when it emphasizes the focus upon a single individual, such as 

repeated presentation of a subject or gross disparities in 

appearance or other circumstances or behavior that direct attention 

to a particular subject, and thereby increases the likelihood of 

misidentification. United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492-93 

(9th Cir. 1985) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382–

83 (1968)).

It is not only the presence of improper state conduct in 

arranging and conducting the unnecessarily suggestive pretrial 

identification procedures, but also the reliability of the

identifications that figures in the determination of whether 

evidence of the identification must be excluded. Manson v. 

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 100–14. Identification testimony is 

inadmissible as a violation of due process only if 1) a pretrial 

encounter is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 102 of 157
103

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and 2) the 

identification is not sufficiently reliable to outweigh the 

corrupting effects of the suggestive procedure. Perry v. New 

Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. at 720. 

In determining whether in-court identification testimony is 

sufficiently reliable, courts consider five factors: 1) the witness' 

opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the incident; 2) 

the witness' degree of attention; 3) the accuracy of the witness' 

prior description; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the 

witness at the time of the identification procedure; and 5) the 

length of time between the incident and the identification. Perry, 

132 S.Ct. at 725 n. 5; Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; Neil, 409 U.S. at 

199–200.

Here, the state court articulated standards consistent with 

clearly established federal law. The state court analyzed each 

identification and reasonably applied federal law. 

No circumstances of suggestion or undue focus attended Tatum’s 

identification of Dean at the March 7 photographic lineup. Instead, 

Tatum was given the Simmons advisement, her identification was made 

in a couple of seconds and without hesitation, and it proceeded from 

her observations of Dean during a period of at least five minutes 

when he took her to the bathroom and watched over her. It was 

objectively reasonably for the state court to conclude that the 

brightness of Dean’s picture and his wearing a white shirt were not 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 103 of 157
104

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sufficient to make the procedure suggestive in view of the fact that 

the individuals shown were African-American males of generally the 

same age, complexion, and build, all with facial hair and with 

fairly similar faces and hairstyles; further, a white shirt was not 

distinctive or part of a description of the perpetrators’ clothing. 

Tatum subsequently identified Dean at trial. The state court 

reasonably concluded that there had not been any impermissible 

suggestion. Further, the identification had been made with 

certainty and relatively soon after the crime by one who had a 

strong motive to attend to the robbers and who further had a 

substantial opportunity to view Dean at the murder scene. The state 

court reasonably concluded that there was no substantial likelihood 

that Tatum misidentified Dean during the photographic lineup. 

Likewise, the state court’s decision regarding Roshyla’s 

identification of Dean did not involve an objectively unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. In light of the testimony of Brocchini, 

Tatum, and Roshyla, the state court reasonably concluded that 

Roshyla had not been influenced by Tatum’s identification of Dean. 

Further, Roshyla had a substantial opportunity to observe Dean in 

the house as the man who brought her mother into the bathroom and 

again had ten seconds to observe Dean as the man by the fence 

outside the residence. Roshyla’s identification appears to have 

been spontaneous, and she was certain that Dean was the person with 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 104 of 157
105

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

bad teeth who brought her mother into the bathroom. Roshyla also 

identified Dean in court. The state court reasonably concluded that 

Petitioner had not shown any undue suggestion or taint.

Petitioners have not shown entitlement to relief with respect 

to the state court’s decision concerning Tatum’s identifications of 

Petitioner Nichols at the live lineup on May 2, 2002, the 

preliminary hearing, and the trial. During the previous March 4 

photographic lineup, Detective Owen’s direction to Tatum to focus on 

the heavier and older suspect did not address any particular subject 

in the photographs, but rather an aspect of the charged offense; it 

was accompanied by the Simmons advisement. The query concerning 

similarity aside from skin-tone was not necessarily suggestive of a 

particular subject, and it was a logical question given the 

variability of tones and shades in photographic representations. A 

fairminded jurist could reasonably conclude that the photographic 

lineup was not suggestive. Tatum found that “everything” in the 

photograph of Petitioner Nichols, including complexion, cheeks, 

nose, and hairline, was similar to the perpetrator’s, and she 

requested a live lineup. 

Because Tatum requested the procedure, the live lineup was not

necessarily suggestive. At the live lineup, she identified

Petitioner Nichols without any doubt once she saw him, and the 

discrepancy in height given in Tatum’s first description was not 

necessarily sufficient to question the reliability of her 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 105 of 157
106

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

identification in light of her sure and specific recognition of the 

other physical features, such as the nose and belly. The state 

court reasonably concluded that Petitioners had not established 

impermissibly suggestive identifications.

Tatum’s identification of Trice was not impermissibly tainted 

by Owen’s remark about his observation that she repeatedly looked at 

an unspecified photograph. Owen merely remarked about Tatum’s own 

focus as distinct from communicating something that focused 

previously undirected attention. Tatum himself specified the 

photograph; noted similarity of complexion, forehead, and hairline;

and expressed a desire to see the individual in person in order to 

eliminate uncertainty. Her identification at trial likewise was 

based on similarity of the forehead, hairline, face shape, and 

complexion. The state court reasonably concluded that there was no 

impermissibly suggestive procedure or substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification. Further, because of the extensive 

opportunities for Tatum, Roshyla, and Collins to perceive the 

persons identified by them, it was objectively reasonable to 

conclude that under all the circumstances, the identifications were 

reliable. 

In sum, Petitioners have not shown that the state court 

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or that the state court’s findings of fact 

were unreasonable in light of the evidence before it. Accordingly, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 106 of 157
107

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

it will be recommended that Petitioners’ due process claims of 

impermissibly suggestive identifications be denied.

X. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right 

to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by trial 

counsel’s failure to object to a suggestive identification by Tatum 

Ruiz and to the evidence of the officer’s behavior that focused 

Ruiz’s attention on Petitioner. (Doc. 1 at 6, 12-14, 6.)

The state court assumed that the due process claim concerning 

Tatum’s identification of Petitioner was before it despite the 

absence of an objection, referring to an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. (LD 3, 67.)

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 

of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a convicted defendant must 

show that 1) counsel=s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms in 

light of all the circumstances of the particular case; and 2) unless 

prejudice is presumed, it is reasonably probable that, but for 

counsel=s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); 

Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994).

As previously set forth, Petitioner has not shown that he is 

entitled to relief on his due process claims concerning the 

identifications. Because Petitioner’s claims concerning the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 107 of 157
108

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

suggestive identifications were not meritorious, counsel was not 

required to object. Cf. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 

1994) (failure to raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence is 

not prejudicial where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt; 

failure to make a motion which would not have been successful is not 

ineffective assistance of counsel). Further, because the state

appellate court reached the merits of the identification claim/s 

without reliance on the absence of an objection, any failure of 

counsel to object to the identifications lacked any prejudicial 

effect. 

In sum, Petitioner has shown neither substandard conduct nor 

prejudice. Petitioner has not established that he suffered a 

violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel be denied.

XI. Rights to Confrontation and Cross-Examination

Petitioner argues that he suffered a violation of his Sixth 

Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses when Dr. 

Lawrence was permitted to testify to the cause of death determined 

in an autopsy report authored by Dr. Rulon, who was unavailable due 

to absence from the county. Petitioner argues that the autopsy 

report was testimonial and that the testifying pathologist was not a 

percipient witness to the autopsy examination. (Doc. 1 at 6, 12-

13.) Petitioner relies on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 108 of 157
109

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(2004), holding that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from 

trial may be admitted only where the declarant is unavailable and 

the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 

witness; and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), 

holding that notarized, sworn certificates of analysis prepared by 

laboratory analysts that under state law constitute prima facie 

evidence come within the core class of testimonial documents 

protected by the Sixth Amendment.

A. The State Court’s Decision

In its decision, the CCA set forth the factual background as 

follows:

Dr. Rulon performed the autopsy on Ruiz. Detective Buehler 

testified that he attended the autopsy. Also present were 

a forensic photographer to document the autopsy procedure 

so that photographs were available if the case ended up 

going to court, and someone from the district attorney's 

office.

During the autopsy, Buehler observed three bullets being 

taken out of the body. One was taken from Ruiz's left 

pelvis, one from his left neck, and the third from his 

left armpit. Later that afternoon, Buehler was called back 

by Dr. Rulon and received a fourth bullet from her. 

Buehler, who the parties stipulated was an expert in 

identifying bullets, opined that the first three bullets 

came from a .22–caliber rimfire cartridge and would have 

been fired from the same type of firearm. The item he 

received from Rulon was a similar .22–caliber slug.

During trial, the prosecutor informed the court and 

defense counsel that Rulon had left the county and was 

unavailable to testify. As a result, the prosecutor 

intended to call Dr. Lawrence, her supervisor, to testify 

regarding her autopsy report, her observations, and 

various items of physical evidence. Appellants objected, 

citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 109 of 157
110

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Crawford). Following argument, and after reviewing People 

v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953 (Beeler), the trial court 

concluded that, as long as an appropriate foundation was 

laid, the autopsy report was admissible as a business 

record under Evidence Code section 1271. The court further 

determined that, assuming the proposed witness was 

trustworthy, testimony could be admitted from a doctor who 

did not perform the autopsy. Appellants argued that Beeler

was no longer valid following Crawford, and that to permit 

a doctor to testify, without making an independent 

evaluation based on evidence other than the report, 

violated appellants' confrontation and due process rights. 

The prosecutor responded that the autopsy report was not 

testimonial and, hence, not subject to Crawford, and that 

in any event, I would be satisfied because the defense 

would be able to cross-examine Lawrence. The court 

declined to change its ruling.

Lawrence subsequently testified that he was a forensic 

pathologist, i.e., a doctor who performed autopsies for 

the purpose of determining cause and circumstances of 

death. Forensic pathologists look at deaths that are of 

interest in the legal system.

In 2002, Rulon was an employee of Delta Pathology, which 

Lawrence founded and owned. Technically, he was her boss. 

Rulon was a Board-certified pathologist and forensic 

pathologist like Lawrence, and she was fully experienced 

and performed throughout her employment in an exemplary 

fashion. Her reports followed Delta Pathology's protocol 

or procedure with regard to how autopsy reports should be 

prepared.

Rulon conducted an autopsy on Ruiz, and Lawrence reviewed 

her report. FN50 Such reports are made in the regular 

course of Delta Pathology's business. Lawrence also looked 

at the autopsy photographs and reviewed the investigative 

information about the general circumstances of the case. 

Based on those items, he formed the opinion that the cause 

of Ruiz's death was multiple gunshot wounds.

FN50. The trial court granted appellants a 

continuing objection on confrontation grounds.

Ruiz had a total of 11 entrance gunshot wounds on the 

body. Two were connected to one another, meaning he was 

struck nine, and possibly 10, times. Ruiz suffered 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 110 of 157
111

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fractures of the facial skeleton, perforation of the lung, 

and abdominal organ injuries. There were five fatal 

wounds, meaning they hit vital organs and caused extensive 

hemorrhage or organ destruction that caused death. Any one 

of the five could have killed Ruiz, although with good 

medical treatment, it was within the range of possibility 

that any given wound would not have been fatal. If Ruiz 

had received all of the wounds within a relatively short 

period of time, such as a minute, it was doubtful, but 

possible, that prompt medical attention could have saved 

his life. Several of the wounds had a downward trajectory. 

A couple had stippling, indicating they were fired 

probably from a distance of a foot or less.FN51 If a 

bullet was not found within a wound, Lawrence could not 

tell the caliber of the gun. Generally speaking, Lawrence 

could not tell Ruiz's or the shooter's position just by 

looking at the wound, although it might be possible to say 

a certain position was consistent or inconsistent with a 

particular wound.

FN51. If someone were shot through a wall, there 

would normally not be stippling on the victim.

The mechanism of death was shock and hemorrhage. It was 

due directly and primarily to the gunshot wounds. There 

was no significant natural disease that could have caused 

death. Lawrence could say with medical certainty that 

Rulon's opinion was the correct one.

Appellants reiterated their confrontation objections to 

Lawrence's testimony in conjunction with the trial court's 

determination that the death certificate for Ruiz would be 

admitted into evidence. They raised them again when the 

subject of admission of the autopsy report arose. When the 

trial court wondered why the report was needed when 

Lawrence's testimony had been admitted, the prosecutor 

observed that in Beeler, both the report and the testimony 

were admitted. The prosecutor expressed concern with 

laying the foundation for admissibility of Lawrence's 

testimony. Upon learning that enlargements of the diagrams 

attached to the report had been admitted into evidence, 

the trial court declined to admit the autopsy report. 

Appellants then withdrew their objections to the report. 

After defense counsel conferred, and apparently speaking 

for all of them, Nichols's attorney said: “We are going to 

go ahead, Your Honor, on this one we would, without 

waiving our issues with respect to the right of 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 111 of 157
112

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

confrontation, we are—and in light of the testimony that 

was brought in by Dr. Lawrence, we withdraw our objection 

to receiving [the autopsy report].” Counsel explained: 

“The objection to the report was based on the denial of 

right of confrontation, and Dr. Lawrence was relying upon 

this report, Your Honor. We objected to any of his 

testimony and also objected to the admission of the report 

as a denial of confrontation. This Court has already, in 

essence, ruled against us on the issue of denial of 

confrontation. And since that ruling has, in essence, in 

my mind, already occurred, we are withdrawing our 

objection to the admissibility on all other grounds....” 

The prosecutor promptly withdrew the autopsy report, 

saying the defense could move it in on their own if they 

wanted. Counsel for Trice moved it into evidence without 

objection. When counsel for Nichols stated, “With the 

previous notation about the right of confrontation,” the 

prosecutor responded, “Which is now waived.” The court 

cautioned that if there was no objection to the report, it 

would come in without preserving anything for the appeal, 

then admitted the autopsy report into evidence.

(LD 3, 68-71.)

In its decision, the CCA next traced the holdings of Crawford

and its progeny as well as state court decisions interpreting the 

Supreme Court’s cases. (LD 3, 72-79.) The CCA discussed MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), which held 

that notarized certificates of analysis showing the results of 

forensic testing were testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation 

Clause. The CCA also reviewed at length the state court cases 

interpreting Crawford. The CCA concluded that even if testimony by 

Lawrence, who did not perform the autopsy but merely reviewed notes 

of Dr. Rulon, would ordinarily violate the Confrontation Clause, 

there was no prejudicial error in Petitioner’s case. The court 

stated the following: 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 112 of 157
113

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the present case, with respect to the autopsy evidence, 

Lawrence did not simply testify as a proxy for Rulon. 

Instead, he reviewed the autopsy photographs in addition 

to her report, and was able to offer his own opinion 

concerning the severity of Ruiz's wounds and the cause of 

death, and as to whether Rulon's conclusions were correct. 

We need not decide whether these circumstances are 

significant, nor do we need to take sides in the debate 

over Geier or, for that matter, offer our opinion 

concerning the continued vitality of cases such as Beeler 

and People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, at pages 158–

159, which, like Beeler, deals with one physician 

testifying about the report of the physician who actually 

conducted the autopsy, and admission of that report as a 

public or business record: Assuming error, it did not 

prejudice appellants.

A violation of the confrontation clause is subject to 

harmless-error analysis under the Chapman standard. 

(Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 608; People v. Mitchell

(2005) 131 Cal .App.4th 1210, 1225 & fn. 42; see People v. 

Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal .4th 641, 709.) The question is 

whether we can find, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the 

jury verdict would have been the same absent any error. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 

239.)

The answer here is yes. With respect to the autopsy 

evidence, appellants not only withdrew their objections to 

admission of Rulon's report itself, but Trice actually 

moved it into evidence without objection from any other 

party. Once received without objection, the report was in 

evidence for all purposes. (See Wicktor v. Los Angeles

County (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 390, 406; People v. O'Brien 

(1932) 122 Cal.App. 147, 155; People v. Hickok (1921) 56 

Cal.App. 13, 17.) Appellants could not affirmatively seek 

admission of the report while still preserving their Sixth 

Amendment objections thereto.

Once the autopsy report was in evidence, any error in 

admitting Lawrence's testimony cannot possibly have 

impacted the verdict, since the pertinent evidence was 

already before the jury in the form of Rulon's report. 

Moreover, appellants did not seriously dispute that Ruiz 

was shot to death or that he was shot multiple times.FN55 

(See People v. Williams (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 364, 391.) 

Berenice Sanchez, the Ruizes' neighbor, described seeing 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 113 of 157
114

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ruiz bleeding from the chest. The first officers on the 

scene testified that Ruiz had been shot and was bleeding 

profusely. Detective Buehler witnessed three .22–caliber 

slugs being recovered from Ruiz's body during the autopsy, 

including one from the neck. Neither the autopsy report 

nor Lawrence's testimony shed any light on whether Ruiz 

was shot by multiple firearms; Lawrence explained that 

unless a bullet was found in a wound, he could not 

determine the caliber of the gun.FN56 Testimony concerning 

the trajectory of the shots and stippling (or absence 

thereof) added little or nothing. Lawrence's testimony 

(based on the report) that Ruiz was six feet tall and 

approximately 240 pounds was elicited by Nichols and can 

only have been beneficial to him, as it enabled him to 

attack Tatum's identification of him as one of the 

perpetrators by suggesting he was about Ruiz's size and 

not around the five feet eight inches that was contained 

in Tatum's original description to police.

FN55. Indeed, Dean's attorney told jurors, in 

his opening statement, that Ruiz “ended up with 

a bunch of gunshot wounds to him that killed 

him,” but that there was no physical evidence 

appellants were responsible.

FN56. In his argument to the jury, the 

prosecutor conceded that he could not say any 

particular defendant was the actual killer, or 

that, for example, Nichols had the .22, fired 

nine rounds, and those killed Ruiz.

(LD 3, 79-81.)6

B. Analysis

Here, the state court reasonably concluded that the law 

concerning a Confrontation Clause violation was unclear and 

uncertain. See Flournoy v. Small, 681 F.3d 100, 1005 (9th Cir. 

 

6

The portion of the CCA’s decision regarding ballistic or firearms evidence is 

omitted because the petition addresses only the admission of the evidence 

concerning the autopsy. (Pet., doc. 1 at 6, 12-13, 16-17.) The Court declines to 

decline to consider any new matter raised in the traverse. See, Cacoperdo v. 

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. den., 514 U.S. 1026 (1995). 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 114 of 157
115

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2012). The CCA also properly determined that because Petitioner 

moved the autopsy report into evidence, the jury already had before 

it the totality of the absent pathologist’s autopsy report and 

opinion. Petitioner thus suffered no prejudice from the testimony 

and opinion of Lawrence, who had formed his opinion and testimony in 

part on the autopsy report and was available for cross-examination. 

Further, as the CCA noted, Lawrence’s testimony was not seriously 

disputed and was based on the report or opinion of the absent 

pathologist and also on the physical evidence and investigation as 

well as his observation of autopsy photographs and diagrams. To the 

extent Lawrence relied on the procedures documented by the absent 

pathologist in the report, Lawrence had independent knowledge of the 

procedures used in the laboratory and of the history and reliability 

of the absent pathologist.

Even if there is a violation of the right to confrontation 

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the constitutional 

violation will not merit habeas relief unless the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2007); Jackson 

v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Here, Petitioner has not 

shown that any Confrontation Clause error had a substantial or 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury=s verdict 

(Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)), or that the state 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 115 of 157
116

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law.

Further, the facts in the instant case involve not one witness 

parroting the statements of another, but rather an expert opinion 

based not only on a third party’s examination and report, but also 

on independent observation of documentation of the procedure by a 

forensic photographer, and on the evidence discovered in the 

investigation. Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision was based 

on an unreasonable finding of fact.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim of

a violation of his rights to confrontation and cross-examination be 

denied. 

XII. Multiple Grounds of Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner argues that he was denied his right to due process 

of law and a fundamentally fair trial in violation of the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments when the prosecutor engaged in fourteen 

separate instances of misconduct by representations made in the 

opening statement and final argument and by failures to correct 

inaccurate and misleading testimony by prosecution witnesses. (Doc. 

1, 7.)

Petitioner Nichols mounts a similar but more limited challenge 

based on the prosecutor’s opening statement, presentation of 

evidence, and argument that telephone records linked Petitioner 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 116 of 157
117

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Nichols and co-defendant Dean during the time of the homicide. 

(Doc. 1, 40-42.)

A. The State Court’s Decision

The decision of the CCA on these claims is as follows:

3. Presentation of Incorrect and Misleading Testimony

 and Argument

Appellants contend they are entitled to reversal because 

the prosecutor presented false and misleading information 

in his opening statement, presented and failed to correct 

inaccurate and misleading testimony, and then exploited 

the errors in his argument to the jury. We disagree.

a. Background

The errors claimed were all raised in appellants' motions 

for new trial and were rejected by the trial court, except 

to the extent they contributed to its decision to strike 

the gang enhancements. The errors claimed, and what the 

record shows, are:

(1) Appellants complain that in his opening statement, the 

prosecutor represented, over objection, that numerous 

telephone calls linked the telephones of Nichols and Dean 

during the time of the homicide.FN61 The prosecutor relied 

on the December 3, 2006, report of Detective Blake. In 

Blake's January 15, 2007, report, however, Blake related 

that the number originally attributed to Nichols was in 

fact that of Jennisha Johnson, a friend of Dean. As a 

result, appellants claim, it was unreasonable for the 

prosecutor to rely on the erroneous report. However, the 

prosecutor gave his opening statement on December 12, 

2006, before Blake's second report. Moreover, Brocchini 

testified that the number in question was Jennisha 

Johnson's cell phone number, that he had called her on 

that phone, and that it was not Nichols's number, contrary 

to what was stated in Blake's report.

FN61. In his opening brief, Dean says it was 

claimed that Nichols's telephone number appeared 

on Collins's phone record. While he does not 

provide us with record citations to any 

testimony or pertinent remarks by the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 117 of 157
118

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prosecutor, he does quote the portion of the 

trial court's ruling on the new trial motions 

that dealt with the prosecutor's assertion, in 

opening statement, that Dean and Nichols made 

numerous telephone calls to other suspects in 

the case. Accordingly, we assume Dean's 

challenge is to the prosecutor's assertion 

concerning Nichols and Dean, not Collins.

(2) Appellants complain that Brocchini testified that 

Thomas White and Dupree Hull were associated with phone 

numbers found in Ruiz's cell phone records, and that the 

last call to Ruiz's cell phone was associated with White. 

Brocchini claimed that he relied on MPD records to link 

the telephone numbers, but subsequently admitted there 

were no such records and that documentation was limited to 

his handwritten notes. Those notes were not disclosed to 

the defense prior to trial. Appellants now say the failure 

of the prosecutor to give defense counsel the updated copy 

of Brocchini's report was a discovery violation, and 

Brocchini's conjecture that White and Hull were linked to 

the telephone numbers was without foundation. The record 

shows that, on cross-examination, counsel for Nichols 

asked what efforts Brocchini had made to link the 

telephone numbers obtained from Ruiz's cell phone. 

Brocchini responded that he ran them through a database in 

MPD. Brocchini conceded that, despite his 21 years of 

experience as a peace officer and his awareness of the 

reasons for writing reports, he did not provide one to the 

defense prior to trial, and in fact did not prepare a 

report until counsel requested one. Brocchini also 

admitted that when asked to back up the linkage between 

Hull and White and the numbers obtained from Ruiz's cell 

phone, he could not do so.FN62

FN62. At the hearing on the new trial motions, 

Brocchini testified that when he was preparing 

for his trial testimony, specifically crossexamination concerning telephone numbers found 

in the call log of Ruiz's cell phone, he saw 

some handwritten entries on one of his reports. 

Between his various testimony sessions, he was 

asked to do some research of MPD's database 

regarding the source of those notations. He 

discovered that the records, which were old, 

were gone. As a result, he gave what information 

he could remember from his investigation of the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 118 of 157
119

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

case, which had occurred approximately five 

years before his actual testimony.

(3) Appellants complain that Brocchini testified that 

White and Hull were Blood gang members, and he suggested 

appellants could have obtained Ruiz's home address from 

one of them. After trial, field identification cards and 

Brocchini's 1998 report were disclosed, identifying Hull 

as a member of the Crip faction of the Oak Street Posse. 

Appellants say this was a discovery violation, and 

Brocchini's testimony that White and Hull were Bloods was 

without foundation. They also say the prosecutor, having 

stated in court that he previously prosecuted Hull for 

murder, knew or should have known Hull was a Crip and not 

a Blood.FN63

FN63. At the hearing on the new trial motions, 

Brocchini conceded that he testified at trial 

that Hull was a Blood, but in his 1998 report, 

Hull's name was on the Crip side of the OSP 

list. Brocchini explained that he had spoken to 

a lot of OSP gang members over the years, and 

that the older gangsters who had been around a 

long time were on the Blood side, while the 

younger ones who started coming up in around 

1998 were on the Crip side. He knew that White 

was on the Blood side, and, because he thought 

about Hull as being one of the older members, 

was just going from memory and made a mistake.

(4) Appellants complain that in his closing argument, the 

prosecutor asserted that Dana Orent, the defense's gang 

expert, “defied police procedure” by stashing evidence in 

his garage. Appellants say the prosecutor misstated the 

evidence, because Orent did not “stash” evidence, but 

merely kept copies at his home for his own records. 

Appellants also note there was no evidence of police 

procedures, and they say the trial court erred by 

overruling their objection. In this regard, Orent 

testified that when he was asked by someone from MPD to 

review materials in connection with this case, he was no 

longer at the Pasadena Police Department. Orent termed 

himself “a pack rat” with respect to gang stuff, and 

explained that he had collected thousands of materials 

over the last 15 or 20 years. Whatever he would collect, 

including, for instance, photographs on the street, he 

would make copies of for his personal files. During the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 119 of 157
120

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

course of the prosecutor's closing argument, the following 

took place:

“MR. MANER: ... The evidence that came into the 

courtroom in this case was that Mr. Orent did 

not send an index of where the evidence came 

from.... If he had said that, it would be easy 

for the detective to know, okay, this picture 

comes from this report. Orent never did that. In 

fact, Orent defied police procedure—

“MR. CHASE: Objection, Your Honor. Again. [¶] 

... [¶] [H]e is again testifying, Your Honor. 

There's no evidence Mr. Orent in any way, shape 

or form did not follow police procedure. None. 

[¶] ... [¶]

“THE COURT: The objection's overruled at this 

point[.] It's within the evidence presented at 

the trial. Go ahead, please.

“MR. MANER: Okay. Police Procedure. Is it proper 

police procedure when you go on a search warrant 

and you find evidence, to take it home and stash 

it in your garage? Okay? Do you need a course in 

police procedure to understand that? [¶] But 

that's what Mr. Orent did. He testified [—]

“MR. MILLER: Objection, that misstates the 

testimony.

“THE COURT: It's overruled.

“MR. MANER: He testified that he and his partner 

found a roll of film and they developed it and 

they took it and he has all—he kept it in his 

garage at home, or maybe it was in his living 

room, I forget, he kept it at home. And he had 

other evidence from other crime scene searches 

of gang members at home, he had his own personal 

gang file. The appropriate thing for police 

officer to do when you get evidence of a crime.

“MR. MILLER: Objection.

“MR. MANER: You book it into evidence.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 120 of 157
121

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“MR. MILLER: Now counsel's testifying.

“THE COURT: I think this is within the common 

experience and common sense. [¶] ... [¶]

“MR. CHASE: He is misstating the evidence. Mr. 

Orent testified he made copies and put it in his 

file.

“MR. MANNER: Well, I guess we disagree about 

that, Judge. They'll decide ultimately.

“THE COURT: The objection is overruled. [¶] ... 

[¶]

“[MR. MANER:] Lost track of where I was. But the 

gist of it is Orent didn't follow traditional 

police procedures in cataloguing and keeping 

evidence. So why is it a surprise to anybody 

that he would know something no one else would 

know about where this evidence of J Dogg and 

these pictures came from? ... And he had his own 

personal stash of stuff.”

(5) Appellants complain that during his closing argument, 

the prosecutor discussed why he decided not to use Orent 

as a prosecution witness at trial. Appellants say that, 

because no evidence was presented on this subject, the 

prosecutor offered his own unsworn testimony. They concede 

that the trial court sustained their objection, but claim 

this was not an adequate remedy. In this regard, Nichols's 

attorney argued to the jury that Orent furnished materials 

to the district attorney's office in connection with this 

case, but the district attorney's office decided for some 

reason not to use him as an expert witness and instead 

chose to use someone with considerably less experience. 

When Orent complained, the prosecutor sent him a letter 

during trial and told him, inter alia, that Orent did not 

have permission to discuss the matter with anyone outside 

the district attorney's office.FN64 In his closing 

argument, the prosecutor stated: “We heard a lot about our 

internal district attorney decision making process, which 

isn't in evidence, as far as whether we use Mr. Orent as a 

witness. And I'm not going to explain to you what 

decisions I make in terms of what experts I bring to court 

and what experts I don't, ‘cause that's not something for 

you to focus on or consider about, and it's not evidence 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 121 of 157
122

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in this case. [¶] But use your common sense. If you have 

police agencies that are involved in a case and you call 

up a sister agency ... and they say, Hey, we got a gang 

from your town that did a murder up here. Can you give us 

a cop to be a gang expert? Do you have someone who's an 

expert on this Pasadena gang? [¶] They go, Yeah, here's 

this guy, he works for us, he's our expert. At one point 

that was Dana Orent. The evidence shows he retired. He 

went out and now he's working for the defense attorneys, 

okay? In situations other than this one. So he's not free 

anymore. Police agencies will lend experts to other police 

agencies for free. We'll pay their hotel, we'll pay their 

travel and so forth, but we don't have to pay them 

thousands of bucks a day like Mr. Eisen here. [¶] So was 

there a shift in experts for accounting reasons, or to 

save money? That sounds like a logical reason as any.” 

There was no objection from the defense until the 

prosecutor sought to counter the perceived argument that 

the prosecution did not use Orent as a witness because 

Orent said Dean was not a gang member, by arguing that 

there was a duty to turn over exculpatory evidence, and 

that the defense would have asked Orent about that. The 

court told the prosecutor that it did not want to get into 

arguing the law outside the case, whereupon the prosecutor 

asked jurors what they thought the defense's first 

question to Orent would have been if Orent had had the

opinion that Dean was not a gang member. Defense 

objections were sustained.

FN64. In light of the letter, jurors were 

instructed: “If you find that the prosecutor 

told a witness not to speak with defense 

counsel, or attempted to dissuade any witness 

from talking with defense counsel, you can 

consider that fact in determining if the case 

has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(6) Appellants complain that Brocchini erroneously 

testified that appellants repeatedly asked Collins where 

Ruiz lived. Appellants give no record citation to support 

this claim other than Trice's written new trial motion, 

which does not refer to the same pagination as the record 

on appeal. It is not this court's duty to comb the record 

for support for the parties' claims. We note, however, 

that on cross-examination, Dean's attorney asked Brocchini 

on what he based his testimony that Dean showed up with 

the others at Collins's house and asked where Ruiz lived. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 122 of 157
123

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Counsel commented, “I missed that in [Collins's] 

testimony.” Brocchini replied that he based it on 

Collins's testimony. Brocchini clarified: “I said they all 

four showed up and it was mainly Trice that was asking for 

the hookup to [Ruiz]. ‘I want to buy dope from [Ruiz], 

where does [Ruiz] live.’ [¶] But they were all there 

together, and they were all trying to make contact with 

[Ruiz].” Appellants are correct that Collins did not 

testify exactly as recalled by Brocchini. Collins did 

testify, however, that when appellants were at his house, 

hanging out and drinking, he and Trice talked about 

“basically, you know, how to get some dope, where to get 

it, what kind, when can I hook them up, when can I go get 

it.” Collins testified that Trice asked him a few times to 

hook him up with someone who had a quarter kilo of drugs. 

Trice was “basically” asking Collins if Collins could hook 

them up with Collins's connection. Trice wanted to know 

“[w]hen and where, what time.”

(7) Appellants complain that Brocchini testified that Lisa 

Young testified concerning Trice's status as a gang 

member.FN65 Appellants contend Young did not so testify. 

They are correct; the question asked by the prosecutor and 

answered by Young was whether Dean ever told her he was a 

gang-banger.

FN65. Again, appellants provide no citation to 

the record supporting this assertion other than 

Trice's written new trial motion.

(8) Appellants complain that Brocchini testified that Dean 

admitted he was a gang member when he was booked into the 

jail following his arrest in this case. Appellants say 

there was no documentation of any such admission. In 

reality, counsel for Dean asked Brocchini whether he 

recalled testifying at the preliminary hearing that it was 

his opinion Dean was a gang member based on an admission 

made by Dean to jail staff. When Brocchini said he 

recalled the testimony, counsel asked him the basis for 

that opinion. Brocchini responded that he believed the 

arresting officer told him that Dean made the statement. 

When counsel asked the name of the officer, Brocchini 

responded, “I don't know. And that's why I never used it 

in my basis for opinion that he's a gang member in this 

jury trial.” (Italics added.) When defense counsel 

asserted Brocchini did so at the preliminary hearing so 

that Brocchini got Dean to trial on gang allegations, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 123 of 157
124

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Brocchin responded, “Well, I stand by it. I was told by 

jail staff, or by an officer that booked him, that he said 

he was a gang member. And I—and I believe that happened. 

[¶] But you're asking who it was, I'm going to tell you I 

can't remember. And the person never wrote a report.” 

Counsel then showed Brocchini a jail classification form 

signed by Dean, that Brocchini said he had never seen 

before. According to the form, Dean was asked by “S. 

Garcia,” a clerk at the jail, whether he was affiliated 

with any gang. The checked box was “no.” According to 

Brocchini, if Dean admitted to Garcia that he was a gang 

member, it would be on the form. Garcia was not the person 

who told Brocchini that Dean admitted being a gang member. 

Brocchini insisted that he was told by someone and 

believed it, but he could not find any documentation for 

it and so did not rely on it at trial.

(9) Appellants complain that Brocchini testified that a 

certain telephone number (626–212–9466) was associated 

with Trice. Appellants say there was no documentation to 

support the claim. Brocchini testified, however, that he 

reviewed certain cell phone records. Voluminous telephone 

records were disclosed to the defense. On crossexamination, it was brought out that on one of his 

reports, Brocchini listed a pager number as 626–212–9566. 

Brocchini testified that the correct number was 626–212–

9466. He based this on Collins calling it from his house. 

Brocchini explained that when he interviewed Tricia Lee on 

March 8, 2002, she gave the number as 626–212–9566. 

Collins, however, called 9466. Brocchini was then shown 

Collins's telephone bill and admitted he had made a 

mistake, as the number was not there. Nevertheless, he 

said he believed the correct number for Trice's pager to 

be 626–212–9466. He subsequently explained that he got 

that number from Dean's telephone bill. Tricia Lee gave 

him the pager number as 9566; he did not know whether she 

did so intentionally or accidentally, as she gave it to 

him from her memory. Then, on Dean's telephone bill, 

Brocchini found 12 calls to 9466, the same number except 

for one digit.

(10) Appellants complain that Brocchini testified that a 

certain photograph of Trice was taken following a 1995 

Merced arrest. Appellants say that in reality, Trice's 

last arrest in Merced was in 1992. Again, we have not been 

cited to any testimony in this regard, nor are we told 

why, considering what the jury learned about Trice's 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 124 of 157
125

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

criminal record, any such error was of any import.

(11) Appellants complain that Okamoto testified that Dean 

was arrested with Trice during a probation search. 

Appellants say Trice was not arrested at that time. 

Appellants have misread the record. In reality, Okamoto 

testified that Dean was seen entering a vehicle that then 

left a location law enforcement had under surveillance. 

The vehicle was stopped and Dean, who was a passenger, was 

arrested. Trice was also a passenger in the vehicle. The 

subjects in the vehicle were detained while a search 

warrant was executed at Dean's residence. There was no 

testimony that Trice was arrested.

(12) Appellants complain that Okamoto testified that a 

getaway vehicle was parked several blocks from the Ruiz 

residence. Appellants argue there was no evidence to 

support this assertion. They overlook the fact that 

Brocchini testified, earlier in the trial, that the trail 

of evidence was consistent with a getaway car being parked 

about a block from the Ruiz home. Moreover, the trial 

court admonished the jury that Okamoto's testimony 

concerned the predicate acts and not the charged offenses, 

and that Okamoto was not there to make the jury's decision 

as to whether or not certain things happened. The court 

also told jurors that if there was a question about 

whether the opinion was based on matters that actually did 

come into evidence, they could check the court reporter's 

record during deliberations.

(13) Appellants complain that Okamoto incorrectly 

testified that Trice had been convicted in 1995 for sale 

of cocaine base. Appellants note that the conviction was 

removed from the predicate acts chart, but complain that

jurors were never admonished. Appellants do not cite us to 

where Okamoto actually testified about the conviction, 

although it is apparent from a discussion among counsel 

that took place outside the jury's presence, that the 

predicate acts chart had on it a drug conviction out of 

Los Angeles County to which Trice objected. As best we can 

determine, the prosecutor asked whether Okamoto was aware 

of a prior conviction of Trice that happened in Merced 

County in 1995, but the trial court ruled that the 

document being relied on was not necessarily one that an 

expert would rely on in forming an opinion. On crossexamination, Trice himself admitted to having suffered a 

conviction in 1995 for possession for sale of cocaine 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 125 of 157
126

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

base. In any event, although Trice's attorney said he 

thought somebody testified in front of the jury concerning 

the erroneous conviction, he also said he would take care 

of it in his own way.

(14) Appellants complain that the prosecution failed to 

disclose, until after trial, Brocchini's 1998 report, 

listing Collins as a member of the Blood faction of the 

Oak Street Posse criminal street gang.

b. Analysis

With respect to alleged prosecutorial misconduct in 

general, “ ‘[a] prosecutor's conduct violates the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it 

infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 

conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a 

prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial 

fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under 

state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or 

reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the 

trial court or the jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hoyos, 

supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 923.) A showing of bad faith is 

not required. (Id. at p. 924, fn. 36.) “As a general rule 

a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial 

misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same 

ground—the defendant [requested] an assignment of 

misconduct and [also] requested that the jury be 

admonished to disregard the impropriety. [Citation.] 

Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by 

the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether 

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed 

or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an 

objectionable fashion.' [Citation.]” (People v. Ochoa, 

supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 427.)

With regard specifically to the presentation of, or 

failure to correct, false or misleading testimony, “ 

‘[u]nder well-established principles of due process, the 

prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and 

must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the 

evidence it presents, even if the false evidence was not 

intentionally submitted.’ [Citations.] Put another way, 

the prosecution has the duty to correct the testimony of 

its own witnesses that it knows, or should know, is false 

or misleading. [Citations.] This obligation applies to 

testimony whose false or misleading character would be 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 126 of 157
127

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evident in light of information known to the police 

involved in the criminal prosecution [citation], and 

applies even if the false or misleading testimony goes 

only to witness credibility [citations]. Due process also 

bars a prosecutor's knowing presentation of false or 

misleading argument. [Citations.] As [the California 

Supreme Court has] summarized, ‘a prosecutor's knowing use 

of false evidence or argument to obtain a criminal 

conviction or sentence deprives the defendant of due 

process.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 698, 716–717; accord, Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 

U.S. 264, 269 .) “When the prosecution fails to correct 

testimony of a prosecution witness which it knows or 

should know is false and misleading, reversal is required 

if there is any reasonable likelihood the false testimony 

could have affected the judgment of the jury. This 

standard is functionally equivalent to the ‘harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard of Chapman [, supra,] 

386 U.S. 18. [Citation.]” (People v. Dickey, supra, 35 

Cal.4th at p. 909, italics omitted.)

We have already discussed the testimony concerning 

Collins's gang status, ante, and decline to revisit it 

here. Assuming false testimony was presented, we see no 

reasonable likelihood it could have affected the judgment 

of the jury, for the reasons stated in connection with 

appellants' claim of Brady error. This is so even assuming 

the claim here is one of intentional misconduct. (See 

People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 924, fn. 36.)

We have examined the record and conclude appellants have 

greatly overstated the effect of the remaining alleged 

errors. With the exception of Brocchini's testimony that 

Hull was a Blood and the prosecutor's argument concerning 

Orent, which we discuss post, either there was no actual 

error or the errors were of little import, whether 

considered individually or cumulatively. Prosecutorial 

misconduct in an opening statement is rarely grounds for 

reversal (see People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1108; 

People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1080, disapproved 

on other grounds in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 

284, 299, fn. 10); here, the prosecutor's misstatement 

with respect to the telephone calls was cured by the 

actual testimony on the point. Moreover, the trial court's 

instructions (which were given both before opening 

statements and again before closing arguments and which 

referred expressly and specifically to those statements 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 127 of 157
128

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and arguments), that jurors could use only the evidence 

presented in the courtroom in deciding the facts and that 

nothing the attorneys said was evidence, were sufficient 

to dispel any prejudice. (See People v. Hinton, supra, 37 

Cal.4th at p. 863.) The alleged errors that occurred 

during testimony were, almost without exception, corrected 

in front of the jury, or, when the claim was lack of 

foundation or documentary support for the testimony, that 

lack was brought to jurors' attention. While the 

prosecutor's duty to correct false or misleading testimony 

may not be discharged merely because defense counsel knows 

of, and the jury may discern, the error (U.S. v. LaPage

(9th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 488, 491–492; but see People v. 

Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 91–92), it would be illogical 

to conclude an error prejudiced a defendant merely because 

defense counsel, and not the prosecutor, was responsible 

for the error being corrected. What matters, in terms of 

potential harm, is whether the error was in fact corrected 

for the jury. The errors were corrected in the present 

case; moreover, a number of appellants' claims concern 

evidence presented in support of the gang allegations. The 

gang enhancements were stricken by the trial court in its 

ruling on appellants' new trial motions, and appellants 

fail to persuade us that this remedy was inadequate.

As for the erroneous testimony that Hull was a Blood, 

which was not corrected in front of the jury, appellants 

assert that Brocchini suggested appellants could have 

obtained Ruiz's home address from White or Hull, and not 

from Collins. The actual testimony was not nearly as clear 

on this point as appellants would have us believe. The 

prosecutor elicited from Brocchini that it was obvious to 

police Ruiz was a fairly prolific drug dealer and gang 

member. When the prosecutor asked whether that was common 

knowledge among people who were gang members, drug 

dealers, or customers, the trial court sustained a defense 

objection and directed the prosecutor to lay additional 

foundation. The prosecutor then asked whether, based on 

Brocchini's experience in narcotics cases and what he knew 

about Ruiz, Brocchini had an opinion as to whether Blood 

gang members or Nortenos out on the street would likely 

know that Ruiz would be a good source of rock cocaine. The 

trial court sustained a defense objection. The prosecutor 

then asked whether Brocchini was familiar with Ruiz's 

character as a drug dealer from 1995 to 2002. Brocchini 

said he was, and testified that Ruiz was not an 

“undercover drug dealer,” but instead flaunted the fact, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 128 of 157
129

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

driving a red Northstar Cadillac all over town and 

dressing in nice clothes. The prosecutor then asked 

whether Blood gang members would know that. The defense's 

objection, that the question called for speculation, was 

sustained. The prosecutor elicited that a lot of people in 

town who were involved in drugs or gangs were aware that 

Ruiz was a drug dealer. When he asked about Blood gang 

members coming from out of town and asking around for a 

good source, however, the trial court again sustained an 

objection that the question called for speculation. The 

prosecutor was permitted to elicit that Pasadena Bloods 

would associate with Modesto Bloods, as gang members from 

different towns often get to know each other in custodial 

settings, but another objection based on the question 

calling for speculation was sustained when the prosecutor 

sought to ask whether, if out-of-town gang members were in 

town looking for a narcotics source, Ruiz's name would 

come up. The prosecutor then left the subject.

It is apparent that the prosecutor was attempting to 

suggest appellants could have obtained Ruiz's home address 

from a source other than Collins, but it is equally 

apparent he was unsuccessful. The implication was 

contained in his questions, not Brocchini's answers, and 

jurors were instructed that questions were not evidence 

and not to assume something was true just because an 

attorney asked a question suggesting it was true. “Jurors

are presumed to understand and follow the court's 

instructions. [Citation.]” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 

Cal.4th 619, 662.) In light of the actual testimony and 

the evidence a number of people in town who were involved 

in drugs or gangs were aware Ruiz was a drug dealer, there 

is no reasonable likelihood any false impression created 

by Brocchini's testimony that Hull was a Blood could have 

affected the judgment of the jury, especially in light of 

Brocchini's admission that he could not back up the 

linkage between names and the numbers found in Ruiz's cell 

phone. (See People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 

910.) Appellants' claim the prosecutor knew or should have 

known Hull was a Crip does not help them; the record shows 

the prosecutor stated, without contradiction, that the 

case in which he prosecuted Hull for murder was not a 

gang-related case, and so he did not know whether Hull was 

a Crip or a Blood. We will not assume the prosecutor was 

lying.

We turn now to the prosecutor's argument concerning Dana 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 129 of 157
130

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Orent. “Although prosecutors have wide latitude to draw 

inferences from the evidence presented at trial, 

mischaracterizing the evidence is misconduct. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823.) 

A prosecutor “ ‘may “vigorously argue his case”’” (People 

v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 752), but “[a] 

prosecutor's ‘vigorous' presentation of facts favorable to 

his or her side ‘does not excuse either deliberate or 

mistaken misstatements of fact.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Hill, supra, at p. 823.)

We think there can be little doubt the prosecutor crossed 

the line from proper to improper argument when he asserted 

that Orent took evidence home and stashed it in his 

garage. Even assuming some aspects of traditional police 

procedure might fall within the realm of common 

experience, the prosecutor here completely misrepresented 

Orent's testimony by asserting that Orent took, kept, and 

withheld evidence. In reality, as defense counsel pointed 

out, Orent clearly testified that he made and kept copies 

in his files, and nothing in the record suggested 

otherwise. The prosecutor erred by making the argument, 

and the trial court erred by overruling the defense 

objections to it. We fail to see how appellants were 

prejudiced, however, since the prosecutor's misstatements 

concerned a witness and testimony that were relevant only 

to the stricken gang allegations.

With respect to the prosecutor's statements concerning why 

he did not use Orent as a witness, the record shows 

appellants did not initially object to the argument, nor, 

when they did object, was it on the ground the prosecutor 

was offering unsworn testimony. Accordingly, the issue has 

not been preserved for appeal. (See People v. Ochoa, 

supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 427.) In any event, the prosecutor 

himself pointed out that why he used certain witnesses was 

not in evidence and was not something for jurors to 

consider, and, again, the argument concerning Orent only 

affected the gang allegations. There was no prejudice.

(LD 3, 93-107.)

B. Analysis

The pertinent legal standards concerning prosecutorial 

misconduct have been previously set forth in connection with the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 130 of 157
131

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim concerning introduction of photographic evidence. 

This Court must decide whether Petitioner suffered prejudice by 

determining whether the state court made an objectively reasonable 

decision when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability 

that the jury would have reached a different result without the 

offending comments. The Court must place the improper remarks in 

the context of the entire trial and should consider the weight of 

the evidence submitted against the Petitioners, the prominence of 

the erroneous comments in the entire trial, whether the prosecution 

misstated the evidence, any instructions to the jury to disregard 

the comments, whether the comment was invited by defense counsel in 

summation, and whether defense counsel had an adequate opportunity 

to rebut the comments. Trillo v. Biter, 754 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 2014).

This Court is further guided by the established principle that 

due process is violated by a prosecutor’s knowing use of false 

testimony, or failure to correct testimony known to be false, in 

order to secure a conviction. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 

(1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215–216 (1942). 

Here, the state court articulated legal standards that were 

consistent with clearly established federal law. The prosecutor’s 

representation in opening statement concerning telephone calls 

connecting Nichols and Dean at the time of the homicide was 

corrected by Brocchini’s own testimony, and defense counsel had an 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 131 of 157
132

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

adequate opportunity to respond to the matter. With respect to the 

attorneys’ representations about evidence in argument, the jurors 

were instructed that they could use only the evidence presented to 

them in the courtroom, and that nothing the attorneys said was 

evidence. (LD 3, 104.) Isolated passages of a prosecutor’s 

argument may not have a significant impact on the jury’s 

deliberations where the jury is informed that they are matters of 

opinion and not evidence. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 

646. Instructing the jury that lawyers’ comments and argument are 

not evidence can cure the harmful effect of isolated instances of 

improper argument. Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 

2000). Arguments of counsel carry less weight with a jury than do 

instructions from the court. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 

384-85 (1990). 

Further, the calls were not of major importance given the other 

strong evidence of the participation of Petitioner Nichols and Dean 

in the offenses. It was not reasonably probable that the jury would 

have reached a different result in the absence of the comment made 

in opening statement. The state court reasonably applied clearly 

established federal law, and its decision was not based on an 

unreasonable determination of fact.

Brocchini’s linkage of Ruiz’s telephone to those of Thomas 

White and Dupree Hull was shown by cross-examination at trial to 

lack any current documentation or back-up. It is thus not 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 132 of 157
133

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reasonably probable that Brocchini’s testimony had any significant 

effect on the result reached by the jury.

 The state court decision that there was no prejudice from any

testimony by Brocchini regarding Petitioners’ having repeatedly 

asked Collins where Ruiz lived, was not based on an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or unreasonable 

determination of fact. Any mischaracterization of Collins’s 

testimony was neutralized by Dean’s counsel’s cross-examination of 

Brocchini in which he testified that it was Collins’s testimony that 

was the basis for Brocchini’s testimony regarding Dean’s having 

arrived with the others at Collins’s house and having made the 

inquiries. The jury had before it Collins’s testimony regarding 

Trice’s having repeatedly asked Collins for a drug connection and 

for details concerning the anticipated transaction, including when 

and where. The cross-examination provided the jury an opportunity 

to evaluate not only Brocchini’s credibility, but also the nature 

and extent of Collins’s testimony about the conduct of the 

defendants before the homicide. In light of the totality of the 

evidence, it is not reasonably probable that the jury’s decision 

would have been different absent Brocchini’s characterization of 

Collins’s testimony, a matter already in evidence before the jury.

Likewise, the state court reasonably concluded that Petitioner 

had not shown any prejudice from Brocchini’s testimony that Lisa 

Young had identified Petitioner as a gang member during her own 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 133 of 157
134

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony. Petitioner does not dispute that, as the CCA stated, the 

record of Young’s testimony shows she was asked whether Dean had 

ever told her that he was, and she answered only that he had. In 

view of the strength of Dean’s admission as related by Young, it is 

unlikely the jury would have confused Young’s own testimony with its

characterization by Brocchini, who had repeatedly been shown to have 

lacked conscientiousness in the collection and recollection of the 

facts and the evidence. Further, the record was replete with 

independent indicia of Petitioner’s allegiance to the gang. 

Similarly, with respect to Brocchini’s testimony that Dean had 

admitted gang membership when booked into the jail after the arrest 

in this case, the state court’s conclusion regarding the absence of 

prejudice was objectively reasonable. During cross-examination, 

defense counsel explored the existence of an inconsistent jail 

record, the absence of any documentation of Brocchini’s assertion, 

and Brocchini’s inability to recall the identity of the officer who 

Brocchini maintained had told Brocchini of Dean’s alleged admission. 

Similarly, Brocchini’s testimony that a telephone number was 

associated with Petitioner included Brocchini’s responses on crossexamination indicating Brocchini had made a mistake. 

The state court also properly concluded that even if Brocchini 

incorrectly testified that a photograph of Petitioner was taken 

following a 1995 arrest instead of a 1992 arrest, such an error 

would not have been “of any import” because of what the jury had 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 134 of 157
135

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

already learned regarding Petitioner’s criminal record. (LD 3, 

101.) Similarly, it was objectively reasonable for the state court 

to find that any asserted error in Okamoto’s testimony regarding 

Petitioner’s having been convicted in 1995 for sale of cocaine base 

was harmless because on cross-examination, Petitioner himself had 

admitted to having suffered a conviction in 1995 for possession of 

cocaine base for sale. 

Likewise, Petitioner does not dispute that the record reflects 

that Okamoto testified Dean was arrested when Dean and Petitioner 

were detained while a search warrant was executed at Dean’s 

residence, and not that Petitioner was arrested; the record thus 

refutes Petitioner’s assertion that there was erroneous testimony 

that required correction. As to Okamoto’s statement that a getaway 

vehicle was parked several blocks from the victim’s residence, the 

record reflects that the jury was admonished that that Okamoto’s 

testimony concerned the predicate acts pertained to the gang 

allegations, and not to whether or not certain things happened. 

Further, if there was any question regarding whether opinion 

evidence was based on matters that were in evidence, the jury during 

deliberations could ask the court reporter to check the record.

With respect to the failure to disclose Brocchini’s 1998 report 

and field identification cards identifying Hull as a member of a 

Crip faction of the Oak Street Posse, the state court had fully 

examined the problem in light of the totality of the evidence and 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 135 of 157
136

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concluded in an objectively reasonable manner that even if false 

testimony was presented, there was no reasonable likelihood that it 

could have affected the judgment.

As to Petitioner’s argument that the record contained 

uncorrected testimony that Hull was a Blood gang member, the record 

contained testimony from Brocchini that a lot of people in town who 

were involved in drugs or gangs were aware that Ruiz was a drug 

dealer and that Blood gang members from Modesto would associate with 

Pasadena Bloods in custodial settings. The jury was instructed that 

the attorneys’ questions were not evidence and that they were not to 

assume something was true just because an attorney asked a question 

suggesting that it was true. In view of the actual state of the 

evidence as set forth by the CCA and adopted by Petitioner, a 

fairminded jurist could conclude that the state court reasonably 

applied clearly established federal law when it determined that 

there was no reasonable likelihood that any false impression created 

by Brocchini’s testimony that Hull was a Blood could have affected 

the jury’s judgment.

As to the assertion that the prosecutor knew or should have 

known that Hull was a Crip and not a Blood because of his previous 

prosecution of Hull, Petitioner does not dispute that the record 

shows that the prosecutor stated without contradiction that he did 

not know Hull’s gang membership because the earlier murder 

prosecution of Hull had not been a gang-related case. Thus, the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 136 of 157
137

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

record essentially forecloses Petitioner’s contention, and the state 

court’s conclusion was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established law, or based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact. 

With respect to the prosecutor’s argument regarding defense 

gang expert Dana Orent, the prosecutor’s improper argument that 

Orent took evidence home and stashed it in his garage did not compel 

a conclusion that habeas relief was warranted. The state court 

reasonably concluded that because the misstatements concerned a 

witness and testimony that were relevant only to the stricken gang 

allegations, the Petitioner had not shown any prejudice. 

Regarding the assertion that the prosecutor improperly argued 

and effectively testified why he did not use Orent as a witness, it 

is established that attorneys are generally prohibited from taking 

the witness stand to testify in a case they are litigating because 

it raises a risk that jurors will be unduly influenced by the 

prestige and prominence of the prosecutor’s office and will base 

their credibility determinations on improper factors. United States 

v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998). Related concerns for 

maintaining the appearance of justice and public confidence in the 

administration of justice are especially significant where the 

testifying attorney represents the prosecuting arm and is an

advocate of the government. Id. The rule against an attorney’s 

testifying functions to maintain a boundary between the advocate and 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 137 of 157
138

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the witness by preventing an attorney from appearing as both a 

witness and an advocate in the same litigation. United States v. 

Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1985). When, in context, a 

prosecutor is portrayed as being personally involved with an 

investigation or transaction that is in evidence, it can be a 

violation of the rules against vouching or advocates acting as 

witnesses. See, United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1089-99 

(2002). 

Here, the state court reasonably concluded that assuming that 

the prosecutor’s offering unsworn testimony had been preserved as an 

issue, Petitioner had shown no prejudice because the prosecutor 

himself noted that his reasoning for not using certain witnesses was 

not in evidence and was thus not to be considered by the jury, and 

because argument concerning Orent affected the gang allegations, 

which had been stricken. 

Viewing the totality of Petitioner’s allegations of 

prosecutorial misconduct, the state court reasonably determined that 

there was no fundamental unfairness considering the nature of the 

misconduct, the nature and position of the pertinent evidence and 

issues, the fact that the gang enhancement allegations had been 

stricken, and the admonitions given to the jury. The issue before

the Court in this § 2254 proceeding in which the state court found

prosecutorial misconduct is not whether the prosecutor was a model 

of propriety, but rather whether the state court reasonably applied 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 138 of 157
139

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

clearly established federal law and reasonably determined the facts

in light of the evidence before it when it concluded that the 

prosecutor’s misconduct did not so infect the trial with unfairness 

as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Parker 

v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. at 2153; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 

181; Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d at 988. Here, it cannot be said 

that the state court’s decision was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. 

Petitioner Nichols includes in the petition a supplemental 

report indicating that on October 7, 2005, criminalist Donna 

Mambretti reported that a latent palm print on the rental car did 

not match Petitioner’s print. (Pet., doc. 1, 24.) The test result, 

as set forth without context in Petitioner’s petition, does not 

foreclose the possibility that another latent print was being tested 

or that the result was erroneous for a variety of reasons. The 

trial record contains the testimony of Donna Mambretti, a latent 

print analyst with the California Department of Justice, that of 

fourteen different impressions lifted from the rental car, one on 

the driver’s side hood of the car was Petitioner Nichols’s left palm 

print. (9 RT 2135, 2196-97, 2204-05 [trial testimony given January 

18, 2007].) 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 139 of 157
140

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner has not shown that any false testimony was presented 

or was the basis of argument. Accordingly, it will be recommended 

that Petitioners’ claims of prosecutorial misconduct be denied.

XIII. Sentencing Error

Petitioner argues that because there were insufficient jury 

findings or evidence of Petitioner’s discharging a firearm and 

causing Jose Ruiz’s death within the meaning of Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 12022.53(d), Petitioner suffered a violation of his rights to due 

process of law under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments 

when the trial court imposed a life term enhancement. (Doc. 1, 7.)

A. The State Court’s Decision

The decision of the CCA on Petitioner’s claim is as follows:

A. Firearm Discharge Enhancements

Appellants contend the firearm discharge enhancements must 

be stricken for failure of proof. We agree with respect to 

Nichols, but disagree with respect to Dean and Trice.

1. Background

As previously described, firearm discharge enhancement 

allegations, pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions 

(b), (c), (d) and (e)(1), FN67 were charged and found true 

with respect to counts I, III, and IV. At sentencing, the 

prosecutor observed that subdivision (e)(1) was rendered 

inapplicable by the trial court's having struck the gang 

enhancements, but that subdivision (d) still resulted in 

an enhancement of 25 years to life. As a result, the trial 

court struck the enhancements alleged pursuant to 

subdivision (e)(1), but imposed sentence pursuant to 

subdivision (d).

FN67. When we hereafter refer to subdivisions 

(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e)(1), we are referring 

to those subdivisions of section 12022.53.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 140 of 157
141

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

No one objected to imposition of sentence under 

subdivision (d). Appellants now contend, however, that 

with the gang findings stricken, imposition of 

enhancements pursuant to subdivision (d) was unauthorized, 

as the evidence is insufficient to establish personal 

firearm discharge causing death or great bodily injury by 

each, or any, appellant.FN68

FN68. Failure to object to an unauthorized 

sentence does not result in forfeiture of the 

issue for purposes of appeal. (People v. Scott

(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.)

2. Analysis

“ ‘The legislative intent behind section 12022.53 is 

clear: “The Legislature finds and declares that 

substantially longer prison sentences must be imposed on 

felons who use firearms in the commission of their crimes, 

in order to protect our citizens and to deter violent 

crime.”’[Citations.]” (People v. Palacios (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 720, 725.) To this end, and in recognition of 

different degrees of culpability, section 12022.53 imposes 

three gradations of punishment based on the seriousness of 

the type and consequences of the firearm use. (People v. 

Grandy (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 33, 42.) The portions of 

section 12022.53 pertinent to the issue raised by 

appellants provide:

“(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 

any person who, in the commission of [murder 

(subd. (a)(1)) or robbery (subd. (a)(4)) ] ..., 

personally and intentionally discharges a 

firearm and proximately causes great bodily 

injury..., or death, to any person other than an 

accomplice, shall be punished by an additional 

and consecutive term of imprisonment in the 

state prison for 25 years to life.

“(e)(1) The enhancements provided in this 

section shall apply to any person who is a 

principal in the commission of an offense if 

both of the following are pled and proved:

“(A) The person violated subdivision (b) of 

Section 186.22.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 141 of 157
142

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“(B) Any principal in the offense committed any 

act specified in subdivision ... (d).”

Under the statute, a nonshooter cannot be subjected to 

enhanced punishment under subdivision (d) absent a gang 

finding under section 186.22, subdivision (b). This does 

not mean, however, that a shooter must personally inflict 

great bodily injury or death in order to be liable in the

absence of a gang finding. While a subdivision (d) 

enhancement may most commonly be imposed where a bullet 

fired by the defendant strikes the victim (see People v. 

Zarazua (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1361), the plain 

language of subdivision (d) does not compel such a result, 

but instead requires that the shot fired by the defendant 

be a proximate cause of great bodily injury or death. In 

other words, the shooter need not personally cause great 

bodily injury or death, but instead need only proximately 

cause such a result.

It has been held that “a defendant can proximately cause 

injury by discharging a firearm within the meaning of 

section 12022.53, subdivision (d) even if his or her 

bullet does not actually strike the victim.” (People v. 

Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1150.) We agree.

People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313 (Bland) is 

instructive. In that case, the defendant and a companion 

shot at a car containing three individuals, killing one 

and injuring the other two. Despite the fact the evidence 

was not clear who fired the shots that struck the two 

survivors, the defendant was convicted of murder and two 

counts of attempted murder, and jurors found true a 

subdivision (d) allegation with respect to all counts. 

(Bland, supra, at p. 318.)

The California Supreme Court held that the trial court had 

a sua sponte duty to define proximate causation, as the 

term has a technical meaning peculiar to the law. (Bland, 

supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 334.) It approved jury 

instructions stating that (1) “‘[a] proximate cause of 

great bodily injury or death is an act or omission that 

sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a 

direct, natural and probable consequence of the act or 

omission the great bodily injury or death and without 

which the great bodily injury or death would not have 

occurred’” (CALJIC No. 17.19.5), and (2) when the conduct 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 142 of 157
143

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of two or more persons contributes concurrently as a cause 

of the great bodily injury or death, the conduct of each 

is a cause of the great bodily injury or death if that 

conduct was a substantial factor contributing to the 

result, and a cause is concurrent if it was operative at 

the moment of the great bodily injury or death and acted 

with another cause to produce that result (CALJIC No. 

3.41). (Bland, supra, at pp. 335, 336.)

In concluding that CALJIC No. 17.19.5 correctly defines 

proximate causation, the court rejected the determination 

by the Court of Appeal majority that the instruction was 

not a proper definition because it “‘would permit a true 

finding on the enhancement based [on] the cohort's 

inflicting the death and injuries and defendant's aiding 

and abetting him simply by also firing a gun. The 

enhancement cannot be found true unless defendant 

personally fired the bullets which struck the victim.’”

(Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 335.) The Supreme Court 

stated: “Section 12022.53(d) requires that the defendant 

‘intentionally and personally discharged a firearm’ ..., 

but only that he ‘proximately caused’ the great bodily 

injury or death. The jury, properly instructed, reasonably 

found that defendant did personally discharge a firearm. 

The statute states nothing else that defendant must 

personally do. Proximately causing and personally 

inflicting harm are two different things.” (Bland, supra, 

at p. 336.) The court concluded: “A person can proximately 

cause a gunshot injury without personally firing the 

weapon that discharged the harm-inflicting bullet.... 

[¶] ... [S]ection 12022.53(d) does not require that the 

defendant fire a bullet that directly inflicts the harm. 

The enhancement applies so long as defendant's personal 

discharge of a firearm was a proximate, i.e., a 

substantial, factor contributing to the result.” (Bland, 

supra, at pp. 337, 338; see, e.g., People v. Carrillo

(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1036–1038 [although trial 

court erred by instructing that subd. (d) allegation was 

true if conduct of defendant or coperpetrator harmed 

victim but then failing to instruct that concurrent causes 

could operate together to determine proximate cause, 

allegation could be found true under circumstances where 

defendant was one of several persons who shot at victim, 

victim was struck by rounds fired from more than one gun, 

and there was no evidence defendant fired one of those 

guns]; People v. Zarazua, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

1351, 1361–1362 [subd. (d) allegation properly found true 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 143 of 157
144

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

where victim was killed in traffic collision that occurred 

when car in which he was riding was hit by car carrying 

two members of one gang, who were fleeing because of 

gunfire from car carrying members of rival gang, including 

defendants]; People v. Palmer, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1145, 1149–1150 [subd. (d) allegation properly found 

true where police officer sustained broken ankle while 

diving for cover from shots fired by defendant, who, with 

his companion, was attempting to flee the scene after 

committed an armed robbery].)

In light of the foregoing, we have no trouble concluding 

that, when multiple gunmen shoot at a victim who is 

effectively trapped inside a small enclosed area such as a 

closet, and the victim is significantly injured or killed, 

all of the gunmen have proximately caused great bodily 

injury or death within the meaning of subdivision (d), 

regardless of whether it can be determined that any 

particular shooter or shooters personally fired the 

injurious or fatal shot or shots, and regardless of 

whether bullets fired by any particular shooter actually 

struck the victim. The question in the present case, then, 

is whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that 

any particular appellant or appellants personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm at Ruiz.

Whether a defendant personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm in the commission of an enumerated 

offense is a question for the trier of fact to decide. 

(People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1007.) The 

standard of appellate review applicable to such a question 

is settled. The test of sufficiency of the evidence is 

whether, reviewing the whole record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment below, substantial evidence is 

disclosed such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; 

accord, Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) 

Substantial evidence is that evidence which is 

“reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. 

Johnson, supra, at p. 578.) An appellate court must 

“presume in support of the judgment the existence of every 

fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” 

(People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425.) An appellate 

court must not reweigh the evidence (People v. Culver

(1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548), reappraise the credibility of 

the witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 144 of 157
145

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

functions reserved for the trier of fact (In re Frederick 

G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 367). This standard of review 

is applicable regardless of whether the prosecution relies 

primarily on direct or on circumstantial evidence (People 

v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1125), and applies to 

enhancements as well as convictions (People v. Wilson

(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806).

Viewed in accordance with the foregoing principles, the 

evidence showed that appellants were three of the four 

intruders Tatum saw in her home on the evening of March 3, 

2002. All were armed. Although Tatum could not positively 

identify any of the guns, given where guns were found 

after the shooting and Tatum's testimony that they looked 

similar to the weapons she saw that night, a reasonable 

inference can be drawn that Trice had the .22–caliber 

rimfire revolver, Dean had the Lorcin .380 semiautomatic, 

and Nichols had a big black gun that was never found 

because he took it with him after the shooting.

Tatum's testimony established that appellants all had 

their guns in their hands prior to the shooting. There was 

no evidence their guns ever left their hands until after 

Ruiz was shot. Trice and Nichols forced Ruiz to the walkin closet in the bedroom. Tatum saw Trice at the entrance 

of the closet door. She lost sight of Ruiz at the closet 

door. Trice and Nichols took Ruiz into the closet. Through 

the half-open door, Tatum could see the back of Nichols's 

shirt inside. Although she could not see whether there was 

anyone in the closet besides Ruiz and Nichols, since Tatum

did not see Trice anywhere, it can reasonably be inferred 

he was inside the closet when the shooting started.

When the gunfire erupted, Tatum saw Dean go to the closet 

door and start shooting into the closet at a downward 

angle, using a gun that appeared similar to the Lorcin 

.380 that was subsequently found. She witnessed, she 

estimated, at least four shots going into the closet door. 

When Dean paused after firing a few shots, Tatum could 

hear other shots going off behind the door. It can 

reasonably be inferred that Trice was inside the closet, 

shooting, as four .22–caliber bullets from rimfire 

cartridges were recovered from Ruiz's body, and Ruiz's 

blood was on the cylinder of the .22–caliber revolver. 

Ruiz was shot many more times than the number of bullets 

recovered, however.

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 145 of 157
146

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In light of the foregoing, there is ample evidence to 

support the subdivision (d) enhancements as to Dean and 

Trice, even without the gang findings. Although appellants 

attack Tatum's and Collins's testimony, their credibility 

was for the jury to determine. There being substantial 

evidence to support a conclusion Dean and Trice, in the 

commission of robbery and murder, personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing 

great bodily injury or death to a person who was not an

accomplice, it necessarily follows the trial court did not 

err in sentencing accordingly, notwithstanding the fact 

the subdivision (e)(1) allegations and gang enhancements 

were stricken. As to Dean and Trice, then, the subdivision 

(d) enhancements stand.

(LD 3, 112-18.) The CCA concluded that substantial evidence 

did not support the enhancement as to Petitioner Nichols 

because nothing in the record demonstrated that he had actually 

fired his gun. (Id. at 118-19.)

B. Analysis

To determine whether a conviction violates the constitutional 

guarantee of due process of law because of insufficient evidence, a 

federal court ruling on a petition for writ of habeas corpus must 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 20-21 (1979); Windham v. Merkle, 163 

F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 

(9th Cir. 1997). 

All evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones, 114 F.3d at 1008. 

It is the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve conflicting 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 146 of 157
147

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the 

facts; thus, it must be assumed that the trier resolved all 

conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones, 114 F.3d at 1008. The relevant 

inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except 

guilt, but rather whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its 

verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Circumstantial evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn 

therefrom can be sufficient to prove any fact and to sustain a 

conviction, although mere suspicion or speculation does not rise to 

the level of sufficient evidence. United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 

814, 820 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508, 

514 (9th Cir. 1990); see Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d at 563. The court 

must base its determination of the sufficiency of the evidence from 

a review of the record. Jackson at 324. 

The Jackson standard must be applied with reference to the 

substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state

law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Windham, 163 F.3d at 1101. 

However, the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause 

requires to prove an offense is purely a matter of federal law. 

Coleman v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per 

curiam). For example, under Jackson, juries have broad discretion 

to decide what inferences to draw and are required only to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 147 of 157
148

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Further, under the AEDPA, federal courts must apply the 

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Coleman 

v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012); Juan H. v. Allen, 

408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). This Court thus asks whether 

the state court decision being reviewed reflected an objectively 

unreasonable application of the Jackson standard to the facts of the 

case. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2062; Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

F.3d at 1275. The determination of the state court of last review 

on a question of the sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to 

considerable deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Coleman v. 

Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2065.

This Court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of

§ 12022.53(d). Alleged errors in the application of state law are 

not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 

616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court accepts a state court's 

interpretation of state law. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1180, 1389

(9th Cir. 1996). In a habeas corpus proceeding, this Court is bound 

by the California Supreme Court=s interpretation of California law 

unless the interpretation is deemed untenable or a veiled attempt to 

avoid review of federal questions. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 

926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, there is no indication that the 

state court’s interpretation of state law was associated with an 

attempt to avoid review of federal questions. Thus, this Court is 

bound by the state court’s interpretation and application of 

§ 12022.53(d). 

/// 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 148 of 157
149

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The state court articulated legal standards consistent with the 

Jackson standard. Further, the state court’s decision was not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, that standard. The 

state court reasoned that it was sufficient under state law that 

Petitioner’s discharge of his weapon was a proximate, i.e., a 

substantial, factor contributing to the great bodily injury or 

death. The evidence supported a finding that Petitioner had shot 

his weapon. Further, the evidence also warranted an inference that 

Petitioner was one of multiple persons who at essentially the same 

time and place shot at the victim, and the evidence showed that the 

victim was struck by ammunition fired from more than one gun and 

that more than one wound was potentially fatal. The state court’s 

decision that there was sufficient evidence that Petitioner’s 

discharge of his weapon was a proximate cause of injury or death to 

the victim was an objectively reasonable application of the Jackson

standard. Further, in light of the evidence before the state court, 

the state court’s decision did not involve an unreasonable 

determination of fact.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim concerning the sentencing 

enhancement be denied.

XIV. Cumulative Error

Petitioner argues that his rights to present a defense and to 

due process and a fundamentally fair trial protected by the Fifth, 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 149 of 157
150

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the cumulative 

errors made at trial (excluding errors relating to the confidential 

informant and sentencing error). (Doc. 1 at 7, 14-15.)

Petitioner Nichols also argues that the failure to disclose 

documentation of Collins’s gang status, in light of all the trial 

errors, resulted in a denial of the right to due process, to present 

a defense, and to a fundamentally fair trial. (Doc. 1, 39.)

A. The State Court’s Decision

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s decision is as follows:

 CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE

With respect to every issue not concerning disclosure of 

the confidential informant or alleged sentencing error, 

appellants contend that, even if not prejudicial by 

itself, the error was prejudicial in the context of all 

the trial errors. They say the trial errors cumulatively 

denied them their rights to due process, to present an 

effective defense, and to a fundamentally fair trial.FN71

FN71. The briefing on this issue violates 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), 

which requires that each brief state each point 

under a separate heading or subheading, by 

simply adding a paragraph asserting cumulative 

prejudice where applicable. In two instances, 

Nichols's opening brief asserts the errors 

cumulatively denied appellant Lopez (sic) his 

constitutional rights. We will address the issue 

on the merits to forestall a claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

“Lengthy criminal trials are rarely perfect, and this 

court will not reverse a judgment absent a clear showing 

[of prejudice]. [Citations.] Nevertheless, a series of 

trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some 

circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible 

and prejudicial error. [Citations.]” (People v. Hill, 

supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 844–845.) We have examined the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 150 of 157
151

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

entire record and are persuaded that what errors we have 

identified were not prejudicial by themselves. We are also 

persuaded that their combined effect was harmless, and 

that appellants received a fair trial. (See People v. 

Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 467–468.) In so holding, 

and given the nature and number of the charges and 

enhancement allegations and the fact there were three

defendants, we expressly reject Nichols's oft-repeated 

suggestion that juror deliberations of approximately seven 

hours somehow indicates a close case such that any error 

was prejudicial. (See, e.g., People v. Taylor (1990) 52 

Cal.3d 719, 732 [rejecting notion, in light of number of 

charges and allegations, that deliberations of 10 hours 

showed case was close]; People v. Walker (1995) 31 

Cal.App.4th 432, 437 [same re: deliberations of six and 

one-half hours].)

We reach this conclusion despite the fact jurors were 

exposed to behavior, from both the prosecutor and defense 

counsel, that cannot have given them a good picture of the 

legal profession or the criminal justice system. The 

prosecutor often seemed incapable of restraining himself 

from including gratuitous remarks with virtually every 

objection he made or to which he responded. Defense 

counsel—some more than others—were frequently rude and 

sarcastic toward the prosecutor and, worse, toward 

witnesses. “[I]t is the right of counsel for every 

litigant to press his claim, even if it appears farfetched 

and untenable, to obtain the court's considered ruling. 

Full enjoyment of that right, with due allowance for the 

heat of controversy, will be protected by appellate 

courts.... But if the ruling is adverse, it is not 

counsel's right to resist it or to insult the judge—his 

right is only respectfully to preserve his point for 

appeal. During a trial, lawyers must speak, each in his 

own time and within his allowed time, and with relevance 

and moderation. These are such obvious matters that we 

should not remind the bar of them were it not for the 

misconceptions manifest in this case.” (Sacher v. United

States (1952) 343 U.S. 1, 9.) Despite counsel's behavior, 

however, we remain convinced appellants were not denied a 

fair trial or any other constitutional rights.

(LD 3, 120-22.)

///

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 151 of 157
152

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Analysis

The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined 

effect of multiple trial court errors violates due process where it 

renders the resulting criminal trial fundamentally unfair, even 

though no single error rises to the level of a constitutional 

violation or would independently warrant reversal. Parle v. 

Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chambers v. 

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 302-03 (1973)). Traditional 

principles of due process provide that cumulative errors warrant 

habeas relief only where the errors have so infected the trial with 

unfairness that the resulting conviction denies due process, such as 

where the combined effect of the errors had a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict, id. (citing 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) and Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)), and where the combined effect 

of individually harmless errors renders a criminal defense far less 

persuasive than it might otherwise have been, id. (citing Chambers,

410 U.S. at 294, 302-03).

In evaluating a due process challenge based on the cumulative 

effect of multiple trial errors, a reviewing court must determine 

the relative harm caused by the errors considering the overall 

strength of the prosecution’s case; if the evidence of guilt is 

otherwise overwhelming, the errors are considered harmless, and the 

conviction will generally be affirmed. Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 152 of 157
153

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 927-28. 

Here, after reviewing all Petitioners’ claims separately, the 

state court expressly addressed the claim of fundamental unfairness 

based on cumulative error and set forth legal standards consistent 

with the governing federal standards. The state court reviewed the 

entire record and reasonably concluded that although there were 

errors, whether those errors were examined singly or in combination, 

they were not prejudicial to the extent that they rendered the trial 

unfair. This conclusion was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, and it was not 

based on unreasonable factual findings. 

The weight of the evidence against Petitioners was great; the 

errors in testimony and various representations concerning the 

evidence were challenged on cross-examination and in argument; 

improprieties were the subject of curative processes, including 

instructions; and the prejudicial effect of the gang evidence was 

limited or mitigated by various factors, including instructions, the 

inflammatory and extreme facts of the charged offenses, the victim’s 

status as a notorious gang member and drug dealer, Petitioner’s own 

history of criminal conduct and association with others in the gang 

culture, and the ever-present context of the drug trade and the 

culture of violence that inhered in the identity of the participants 

and the conduct and events involved not only in preparing and 

committing the offenses, but also in undertaking to subvert the 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 153 of 157
154

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

administration of justice by engaging in an attempt to conceal guilt 

after the fact by means of deceit and threats. Any limitation on 

confrontation was harmless in view of the lack of any material 

dispute about the physical evidence or the autopsy. Defense counsel 

engaged in extensive impeachment and argument with respect to 

Brocchini and Collins, and defense counsel overall participated 

actively in the examination and cross-examination of the witnesses 

as well as in lengthy and complex closing arguments. 

Considering all the circumstances, it cannot be said that the 

state court’s decision was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Accordingly, it will 

be recommended that Petitioner’s cumulative error claim be denied.

XV. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. 

The decision to grant an evidentiary hearing is generally a 

matter left to the sound discretion of the district courts. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2254; Habeas Rule 8(a); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473 (2007). To obtain an evidentiary hearing in federal court under 

the AEDPA, a petitioner must allege a colorable claim by alleging 

disputed facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief. 

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474. 

The determination of entitlement to relief, in turn, is limited 

by 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1) and (2), which require that to obtain 

relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 154 of 157
155

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court, the adjudication must result in a decision that was either 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of facts 

based on the evidence before the state court. Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. at 474; Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 

2005). Further, in analyzing a claim pursuant to ' 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court is limited to the record that was before the state 

court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. 

Here, Petitioner has not shown entitlement to relief under

§ 2254(d). Thus, the Court is not required to hold an evidentiary 

hearing. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1399 (citing Schriro v. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)). Accordingly, it will be 

recommended that Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be 

denied.

XVI. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 155 of 157
156

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petitions should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioners have not made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Thus, it will be recommended that

the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

XVII. Recommendations

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Petitioner Trice’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

DENIED; 

2) Petitioner Trice’s ’s request for an evidentiary hearing be 

DENIED; 

3) Petitioner Nichols’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

DENIED; 

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 156 of 157
157

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4) Judgment be ENTERED for Respondent against Petitioner Trice 

and Petitioner Nichols; and

5) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court=s 

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 10, 2014 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:11-cv-00951-LJO-SKO Document 53 Filed 09/11/14 Page 157 of 157