Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02470/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02470-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 22, 2015*

Decided July 28, 2015

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐2470           Appeal from the

        United States District Court

TERRY WAGNER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MARCUS HARDY, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 4477

Harry D. Leinenweber,

Judge.

O R D E R

Terry Wagner, an Illinois inmate, appeals from the dismissal of his lawsuit

alleging that he was removed from a prison educational program because of a learning

disability and in retaliation for using the prison grievance system. The district court,

agreeing with the defendants, concluded that Wagner’s suit is barred by the two‐year

statute of limitations governing his claims. We affirm the judgment.

   

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Wagner’s lawsuit was dismissed on the complaint, so we accept his factual

allegations as true for purposes of this appeal. See Vinson v. Vermilion County, Ill.,

776 F.3d 924, 925 (7th Cir. 2015); Thulin v. Shopko Stores Operating Co., 771 F.3d 994, 995

(7th Cir. 2014). Wagner is serving a 35‐year term of imprisonment. For several years at

Stateville Correctional Center, he participated in an educational program taking

pre‐GED and GED courses. On March 26, 2010, he was told that he no longer could

participate in the program. Several weeks later he submitted three grievances asserting

that he was removed from the program unlawfully. The first of these grievances, dated

April 16, claims that Gale Sessler, the education‐program principal, and Diane Coleman,

a program teacher, dropped him from the program in violation of federal statutes as well

as a prison rule purportedly guaranteeing GED classes for “all offenders who do not

have a high school diploma or G.E.D. certificate.” A second grievance, dated April 19,

accuses principal Sessler of ending his participation in the program because of previous

grievances about her dating back to 2008. The grievance adds that both Sessler and

Coleman had administered GED practice tests incorrectly. Wagner’s third grievance,

also dated April 19, repeats the allegations from the first and second grievances but this

time directed at teacher Coleman only. On May 27, 2011, the Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections issued a decision agreeing with the Administrative Review

Board’s (“ARB”) conclusion (and the warden’s earlier determination) that Coleman’s

“[a]llegations of staff misconduct are not substantiated.” Almost four months later, on

September 19, 2011, the ARB returned Wagner’s third grievance with the explanation

that “[t]his office previously addressed this issue” in the May 2011 decision.

Wagner filed this lawsuit—by placing his complaint in the prison mail

system—on May 13, 2013, nearly two years after the Director had rejected his first two

grievances and 20 months after the ARB had returned the third. Named as defendants

are Sessler and Coleman, along with the warden and two other Stateville employees. At

screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court concluded that Wagner’s complaint

states claims under the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 794,1 for denial of equal access

to educational services, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation. Later, on the

defendants’ motion, the court dismissed the action as barred by the two‐year statute of

                                                 

1 The district court concluded that Wagner’s complaint also states a claim under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. But the

Rehabilitation Act provides at least as much protection to inmates as the ADA, see

Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (characterizing Title II of the ADA

and the Rehabilitation Act as “functionally identical”), so we construe Wagner’s

statutory claims as a single claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

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limitations governing claims arising in Illinois under both the Rehabilitation Act and

§ 1983. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13‐202; Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir.

2001) (§ 1983); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1993)

(Rehabilitation Act). The court acknowledged that the statute of limitations had been

tolled while Wagner exhausted his first two grievances. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/13‐216; Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2008); Johnson, 272 F.3d at 522. Yet,

the court reasoned, Wagner had been removed from the GED program three weeks

before he submitted those grievances, and then he waited fourteen days shy of two years

after the grievances were rejected before filing suit. Thus, the court concluded, more

than two years of countable time had elapsed between Wagner’s removal from the

program and the date he filed suit. Moreover, the court added, Wagner’s third

grievance, although not resolved until September 2011, could not save his lawsuit

because that grievance was returned as “duplicative” of the first two grievances. To

conclude that the statute of limitations had been tolled all the way to September, the

court explained, would encourage inmates to “keep extending the statute of limitations

tolling period by filing duplicate grievances on the same issue.”

Before reaching the merits of Wagner’s appeal, we note that the defendants

contend that our jurisdiction is limited by Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, which requires an appellant to “designate the judgment, order, or part

thereof being appealed.” FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B). The district court had granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss on March 26, 2014, but Wagner’s notice of appeal

designates as the “judgment” a June 6, 2014 order denying a timely motion for

reconsideration. According to the defendants, we are limited to reviewing the June 6

order because Wagner did not also designate the district court’s March 26 decision. That

contention is mistaken; a notice of appeal that designates for review an order denying a

motion for reconsideration confers appellate jurisdiction over that decision and the

underlying decision. See Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2015); Borrero v. City of

Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2006).

On the merits Wagner disagrees with the district court about the dates when

tolling began and ended. Wagner contends that the statute of limitations was tolled from

March 26, 2010, when he learned about his removal from the educational program, until

September 19, 2011, when the ARB returned the last of his three grievances. Based on

those dates, Wagner continues, he filed his complaint well within the two‐year statute of

limitations.

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We cannot conclude that the district court erred in finding that that the statute of

limitations was running until Wagner submitted the first of his grievances, three weeks

after his claims accrued. See Walker, 526 F.3d at 978. Although Wagner now argues that

the statute of limitations was tolled while he pursued informal resolution of his dispute

with prison officials, which, he asserts, started immediately after he learned of his

dismissal from the program, Wagner did not make this argument in the district court,

and so he has waived it on appeal. See Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir.

2013); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).   

Wagner also argues that the statute of limitations should have been tolled until

the ARB returned his last grievance on September 19, 2011. But the entirety of Wagner’s

allegations against principal Sessler and teacher Coleman are contained in the first two

grievances, which were resolved by the Director on May 27, 2011. Thus, the limitations

period for Wagner’s claims expired no later than May 6, 2013, seven days before he

placed his complaint in the prison mail system.

Wagner’s third grievance does not change this outcome. We agree with the

district court that because that grievance is duplicative of the first two, the statute of

limitations was tolled only until the first two grievances were resolved. Wagner was

required to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

93 (2006); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011), and filing multiple grievances

accusing the same individuals of misconduct based on the same underlying facts cannot

save Wagner’s suit, see Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).

AFFIRMED.

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