Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04964/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04964-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The remaining defendants in this action are Glenda (Supervisor TOCS), Small Business Administration, Barbara

Zepeda, Tanya N. Garfield (Deputy Area Director), Veterans Administration, Bank of America, Visa Card, Homeland

Security, and Inspector Lott. 

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 Docket No. 35.

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Docket No. 43. Plaintiff’s opposition was untimely, however because he is proceeding pro se, the Court will

nevertheless consider his brief. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 TREASURY DEPARTMENT ET AL,

Defendant. /

No. C05-04964 MJJ

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR FAILURE TO STATE CLAIM

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Treasury Department1 et al.’s (“Defendant”) Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State Claim pursuant to Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).2 Pro Se Plaintiff Robert Curtis (“Plaintiff”) opposes

Defendant’s motion.3 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim.

Case 3:05-cv-04964-MMC Document 46 Filed 02/07/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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See 31 CFR § 285.7 establishing the Department of Treasury Fiscal Management Services’ procedure for

centralized offset of Federal salary payments to collect delinquent nontax debts. 31 CFR § 285.7(a). Plaintiff argues that

(1) travel advances are not salary and (2) even if travel vouchers constituted salary, according to 31 C.F.R. § 287.5(g) the

offset amount can only be 15% of the debtors disposable pay or the amount of the debt, whichever is lesser. Further Plaintiff

argues the under 5 U.S.C § 5707, only the unused portion of a sum advanced to an employee (travel advance, etc.) is

recoverable to satisfy a debt owed to the government. See also 5 CFR 550.1102(b)(2).

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The instant action presents a tort claim alleging fraud. On December 5, 2005, Plaintiff filed a

complaint which contained allegations against Defendant for fraud relating to Defendant’s

procedures used to satisfy a debt owed by the Plaintiff to the Portland Veterans Hospital. Plaintiff’s

Complaint states that on November 22, 2004, he received notice from the Department of Treasury

(“DOT”) that he owed the Portland Veterans Hospital $600.44 for pharmacy charges after his

quadruple bypass surgery. Accordingly, the DOT intended on collecting the debt by intercepting

any federal payments made to him in accordance with the Treasury Offset Program (“TOP”). 

Plaintiff states that from October 15, 2004 until December 12, 2004, he was employed by the Small

Business Administration as a Loss Verifier. During this time, he received travel advances in the

form of travel vouchers deposited directly into a government issued Visa account in Plaintiff’s name. 

Plaintiff alleges that the DOT intercepted the total amount owed to the Portland Veterans Hospital

($600.44) from travel vouchers that were deposited into his Visa account. Plaintiff alleges that this

action resulted in a violation of the TOP.4

 According to the Complaint, because Plaintiff’s travel

advance was used to offset his debt to the Portland Veterans Hospital, he was held responsible for

travel costs accrued during his employment with the Small Business Administration. Plaintiff

alleges that he was unable to pay such amount and was not subsequently rehired. Plaintiff’s

Complaint states that in June, 2005, he contacted the Small Business Administration via telephone in

attempt to resolve the issue. 

Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint states that on November 22, 2005, he was notified that the

DOT had intercepted his year 2003 Federal Tax Return for eighty-one dollars. Plaintiff alleges this

interception was also a violation of the TOP.

In the instant action, Plaintiff seeks relief for $10,000,730.23 alleging that the government’s

conduct was fraudulent in satisfying Plaintiff’s debt to the Portland Veterans Hospital. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On December 20, 2006, Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction and for Failure to State Claim, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6). 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; thus, the Court presumes lack of

jurisdiction, and the party seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that

subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994). A party challenging the court's jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do so by raising either

a facial attack or a factual attack. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A facial attack is one where “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack to jurisdiction, the Court

must accept the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d

1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). For a factual attack, in contrast, the Court may consider extrinsic

evidence. See Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, the court does

not have to assume the truthfulness of the allegations, and may resolve any factual disputes. See

White, 227 F.3d at 1242. Thus, “[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a

factual motion by presenting affidavits or evidence properly before the court, the party opposing the

motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir.

2003). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, “[j]urisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question

jurisdiction are exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specific in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678

[] (1946).” Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1983); see Safe Air for

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The Bell standard provides that jurisdictional dismissals are warranted

“where the alleged claim under the [C]onstitution or federal statute clearly appears to be immaterial

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United States District Court

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and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly

insubstantial and frivolous.” 327 U.S. at 682-83. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has admonished

that a “[j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when ‘the jurisdictional

issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the

resolution of factual issues going to the merits’ of an action.” Sun Valley, 711 F.2d at 139. The

jurisdictional issue and the substantive issues are intertwined where “a statute provides the basis for

both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for

relief.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Sun Valley, 711 F.2d at 139).

II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State Claim

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal

sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the Court ordinarily limits its review to the

face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.

2002). Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal

theory or failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental

Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d

530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389,

391 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s material

allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

ANALYSIS

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not meet the subject matter jurisdictional prerequisite

under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for bringing this action because he failed to file the

required administrative claim. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (stating that the

FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their

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28 U.S.C.A section 2675 states in relevant part:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money

damages for injury or loss of property...unless claimant shall have first presented their

claim to the appropriate Federal Agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by

the agency. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2675(a).

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In Allen, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that

United States, not Veterans Administration was the proper defendant. See also Daniel A. Morris, Esq., Fed. Tort Claims §

20:2 (2006).

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administrative remedies); Warren v. United States Dep’t of Interior Bureau of Land Management,

724 F.2d 776,778 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (noting that section 2675(a) requires a claimant to file “a

written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own

investigation, and . . . a sum certain damages claim.”)5

 Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not

filed an administrative claim with the agency. Plaintiff alleges in his opposition that he contacted

the agency via telephone to complain and attempted to resolve the issue. Defendant has not

provided any evidence supporting its bare assertion that Plaintiff has failed to file an administrative

claim. Further, it is unclear from the Plaintiff’s Complaint or his opposition brief whether he filed

an administrative claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. Pleading Requirements Under the FTCA

A. United States as the Only Proper Party

Plaintiff frames his Complaint as a tort action against the Treasury Department, Small

Business Administration, Veterans Administration, the Department of Homeland Security and four

individuals employed by these agencies. Defendant contends that under the FTCA, the only proper

defendant is the United States, not the other agencies listed in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Allen v.

Veteran’s Administration, 749 F.2d 1386,1388 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that under the FTCA

“individual agencies of the United States may not be sued.”)6 Defendant also argues that the FTCA

does not support claims against individuals, unless the individuals acted outside their employment. 

See Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the purpose of the FTCA

was to remove the personal liability of Federal employees for common law torts committed within

the scope of their employment and instead provide that the exclusive remedy for such torts is

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See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d)(1).

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through actions against the United States under the FTCA.)7 

In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint reflects suit against individual agencies, not the United

States. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to comply with this requirement under the FTCA. Further,

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not indicate that the individual defendants listed in his Complaint were

acting outside the course of their employment. Therefore, Plaintiff also fails to meet this

requirement under the FTCA. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to satisfy the

requirements under the FTCA. 

B. Plaintiff Must Affirmatively Allege Compliance with FTCA 

 Although Defendant does not set forth arguments based on the other deficiencies in

Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court takes note that to file a claim under the FTCA, a plaintiff must

affirmatively allege in his complaint “the timely filing of an administrative claim [as] a jurisdictional

prerequisite to the bringing of suit under the FTCA.” Gillespie v. Civileti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th

Cir. 1980) (citing Canton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974)) (stating that “[although the]

district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to allege this jurisdictional prerequisite . . . the

pleader should be given an opportunity to file an amended complaint to attempt to cure such

pleading defects.”) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails for multiple reasons. First, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not

affirmatively allege that he filed an administrative claim. Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to

identify the United States as the sole party defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently

allege any claims under the FTCA or any other viable claims, constitutional or otherwise. However,

the Court finds that Plaintiff should have the opportunity to amend his Complaint. Accordingly,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the entry of this

Order to file an amended Complaint.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

for Failure to State Claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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