Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03832/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03832-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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ALF

EDM

BRI

und

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Am

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with

acc

felo

 

bee

of t

FRED E. D

P

vs. 

MUND G. 

IAN DUFF

R

Petition

der 28 U.S.C

civious act o

nnection wit

mended Petit

BACKG

A. S

On Aug

h committin

used of eng

ony convict

 1 Brian 

en substitute

the Federal 

FOR TH

DIXON, 

Petitioner, 

BROWN, J

FY, Warden

Respondent

ner Alfred E

C. § 2254 to

on a child u

th this matt

tion for the

GROUND 

STATEMEN

gust 3, 2005

ng a lewd a

gaging in su

tion; having

 

Duffy, the 

ed in the pla

Rules of Ci

UNITED S

HE NORTH

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JR. and 

n,

1

ts. 

E. Dixon (“P

o challenge

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 reasons set

NT OF FACT

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Petitioner”)

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S

ra Costa Co

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DISTRICT C

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Case No:

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COURT 

 CALIFOR

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DENYING

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 instant pro

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r 14 years-o

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n

Case 4:08-cv-03832-SBA Document 60 Filed 02/08/16 Page 1 of 9
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The following evidence was presented at Petitioner’s jury trial: 

 On July 4, 2005, the 11-year-old victim was staying at 

the home of her adult cousin Anita. Many others, including 

Anita’s father, the defendant, were also spending the night 

there. Anita testified that when she went to sleep at around 3:00 

a.m. the victim, defendant and the other children were in the 

living room watching television. Sometime between 6:00 a.m. 

and 7:00 a.m. defendant woke Anita to ask for a cigarette. She 

directed him to a pack of cigarettes by her bed and as defendant 

left the room he said something like “That little girl gonna come 

in here and say I tried to do something to her.” As soon as 

defendant left, the victim came into the bedroom, reporting “I 

got to tell you something . . . . When I woke up, your daddy 

was sucking on me.” When asked where, the victim pointed to 

her vagina. Anita called the police and reported the incident. 

The victim testified that while watching television she 

had fallen asleep on the couch with the other children. She was 

wearing her swimsuit bottom, jeans and a shirt. Early in the 

morning, she was awakened to find that defendant had 

unbuttoned and unzipped her pants and partially pulled down 

her swimsuit bottom. Defendant was on his knees licking the 

exposed part of her vagina. The victim pushed defendant away. 

Police Officer David Zuniga testified that he arrived at 

Anita’s home shortly before 8:00 a.m. on July 5. He took a 

brief statement from the victim, who appeared to be upset and 

looked as if she had been crying. The victim was cooperative 

and although she began to cry when she described the incident, 

she was able to demonstrate the positions of defendant and 

herself during the incident. On cross-examination, the officer 

stated that defendant was cooperative when asked to give a 

DNA sample, knowing the purpose for which the sample would 

be used. 

Anita’s 17-year-old cousin testified regarding a separate 

incident with defendant that occurred when she was staying 

with Anita in June. She testified that she was watching 

television alone with defendant when he spontaneously asked if 

he could “suck on [her] pussy.” She was shocked and left the 

room. Although she told Anita what defendant had said to her, 

the police were not called. 

Case 4:08-cv-03832-SBA Document 60 Filed 02/08/16 Page 2 of 9
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Peo

omi

bifu

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sen

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Petition

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On July

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exhaust stat

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defendant. 

old, she was

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but she imm

she identifie

that night. 

incident she

on, 2007 W

CASE HIST

ober 18, 20

ceedings on

evidence Pe

the 1996 inc

us felony co

tioner to se

ner filed a d

e appellate c

ner then sou

e supreme c

y 21, 2008, 

rch 16, 201

tition, upon 

xhausted an

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e judicial re

ly closed pe

etitioner the

an R. testifie

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Susan also 

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WL 1068211

ORY

005, a jury f

n the prior s

etitioner had

cident abou

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eventeen ye

direct appea

court affirm

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ourt denied

Petitioner f

0, the Cour

finding tha

nd the remai

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victed of fir

usan R. had 

Id. On Jan

prison. Id.

lifornia Cou

gment. Id. a

ifornia Supr

Dkt. 43, Exs

tial habeas 

Respondents

federal clai

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stant habea

xhausted cla

ceipt of a fin

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involving 

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urt of Appe

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reme Court

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aims. Dkt. 2

nal decision

nd lift the st

years 

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missing. 

07) (footno

d. Id. at *2.

on, the jury

burglary in 1

Id. The jury

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this Court. 

o dismiss th

structional e

Dkt. 17. 

ngs to allow

20. This ca

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court 

April 11, 

ne 20, 

 Dkt. 1. 

he petition 

error 

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ase was 

highest 

e

Case 4:08-cv-03832-SBA Document 60 Filed 02/08/16 Page 3 of 9
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On March 11, 2011, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition, raising three claims with 

subclaims. Thereafter, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion to lift the stay and his 

apparent motion for leave to file his Amended Petition. Dkt. 39. The Court reopened this 

action and directed Respondents to file an answer showing cause why a writ of habeas 

corpus should not be issued. Id. at 1-2. 

In response, Respondents moved to dismiss the claims in the Amended Petition as 

untimely and for failure to exhaust state remedies. Dkt. 43. 

 On January 7, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part Respondents’ 

motion to dismiss. Dkt. 55. The Court denied the motion as to Petitioner’s instructional 

error claim, which was previously found to be exhausted. Id. at 11. The Court granted the 

motion as to all other claims in the Amended Petition upon determining that they were 

either untimely or unexhausted. Id. at 6-11. Therefore, the Court directed Respondents to 

file an answer showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted as to the 

only remaining claim in the Amended Petition—the instructional error claim. Id. at 11. 

Respondents have filed an answer. Dkt. 56. Petitioner has filed a traverse. Dkt. 59. 

Briefing is now closed and the petition is ripe for adjudication. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The instant Amended Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot 

grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state-court 

proceeding unless the proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state 

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or 

if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] 

precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks 

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omitted). Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause is appropriate “if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. Habeas 

petitioners bear the burden of showing that a state court’s decision applied some Supreme 

Court precedent in an objectively unreasonable manner. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 

19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). 

On federal habeas review, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit 

of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In applying the above standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the “last reasoned 

decision” by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The last reasoned decision in this case is the Court of Appeal’s unpublished disposition 

issued on April 11, 2007. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his due process rights when it 

incorrectly instructed the jury with the 2002 revised version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, 

Evidence of Other Sexual Offenses. That instruction explained the permissible uses of the 

evidence of Petitioner’s prior sex acts to show propensity under California Evidence Code 

§ 1108. CALJIC No. 2.50.01 stated: 

 Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of 

showing that the defendant engaged in a sexual offense other 

than that charged in the case. 

 “Sexual offense” means a crime under the laws of a state 

or of the United States that involves any of the following: 

 Any conduct made criminal by Penal Code section 

288(c)(1)-664, attempted lewd act upon child age 14 or 15. The 

elements of this crime are set forth elsewhere in these 

instructions. 

 If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual 

offense, you may, but are not required to, infer that the 

defendant had a disposition to commit sexual offenses. If you 

find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are 

not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did 

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commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused. 

 However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, that is not 

sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

committed the charged crime. If you determine an inference 

properly can be drawn from this evidence, this inference is 

simply one item for you to consider, along with all other 

evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been 

proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime. 

 Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not 

consider this evidence for any other purpose. 

CT 157-158. 

The jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 2.50.1, Evidence of Other Crimes by 

the Defendant Proved by a Preponderance of the Evidence, which stated: 

 Within the meaning of the preceding instructions, the 

prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that a defendant committed a sexual offense and/or 

an act similar to that constituting a crime, other than that for 

which he is on trial. 

 You must not consider this evidence for any other 

purpose unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the defendant committed the other sexual offense and/or an act 

similar to that constituting a crime. 

 If you find the other sexual offense and/or act similar to 

that constituting a crime were committed by a preponderance of 

the evidence, you are nevertheless cautioned and reminded that 

before a defendant can be found guilty of any crime charged or 

any included crime in this trial, the evidence as a whole must 

persuade you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 

guilty of that crime. 

CT 162. 

The jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 2.50, Evidence of Other Crimes, 

which stated: 

 Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of 

showing that the defendant committed acts similar to those 

constituting a crime, other than that for which he is on trial. 

 Except as you will otherwise be instructed, this evidence, 

if believed, may not be considered by you to prove that the 

defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a 

disposition to commit crimes. It may be considered by you 

only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show: 

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 A characteristic method, plan, or scheme in the 

commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan, or 

scheme used in the commission of the offense in this case 

which would further tend to show the existence of the intent 

which is a necessary element of the crime charged. 

 For the limited purpose for which you may consider such 

evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all 

other evidence in this case. 

CT 156. 

Prior to Susan R. taking the stand to testify about the 1996 incident, the trial court 

again instructed the jury that it could not consider her testimony to prove that Petitioner 

was a “person of bad character.” RT 212. Instead, the court instructed the jury to consider 

it for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show “a characteristic method, plan or 

scheme in the commission of a criminal act similar to the method, plan or scheme used in 

the commission of the offense in this case,” or to show an inference that Petitioner “had a 

disposition to commit sexual offenses.” RT 212. The state court of appeal relied on state 

law, specifically People v. Reliford, 29 Cal. 4th 1007 (2003), in finding that the challenged 

jury instruction met constitutional requirements. Dixon, 2007 WL 1068211, *3 n.2. 

Jury instructions on prior uncharged offenses may violate due process where they 

lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof by allowing the “jury to find that [petitioner] 

committed the uncharged [offenses] by a preponderance of the evidence and thus to infer 

that he had committed the charged acts based upon facts found not beyond a reasonable 

doubt, but by a preponderance of the evidence.” Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 822 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original) overruled in part on other grounds by Byrd v. Lewis, 566 

F.3d 855, 866 (9th Cir. 2009). A jury may, however, infer that a defendant committed the 

charged crime based on previous, uncharged crimes, as long as those previous offenses 

were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Gibson, 387 F.3d at 822. 

In Gibson, the Ninth Circuit held that an unmodified 1996 version of CALJIC No. 

2.50.01, in tandem with a modified version of an instruction regarding the preponderance of 

the evidence standard, unconstitutionally lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof for the 

charged sexual offenses to a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 822-23. Since 

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then, however, CALJIC No. 2.50.01 has been revised several times. The California 

Supreme Court has upheld the revised instruction, stating, “We do not find it reasonably 

likely a jury could interpret the instructions to authorize conviction of the charged offenses 

based on a lowered standard of proof.” Reliford, 29 Cal. 4th at 1015. 

Just as the California Supreme Court found the more recent version of the jury 

instruction to be proper in Reliford, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 

Schultz v. Tilton, 659 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2011). In Schultz, the Ninth Circuit held that “the 

California Court of Appeal did not act contrary to federal law in applying the analysis from 

Reliford to uphold the 2002 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01.” Id. at 945. Distinguishing 

the 2002 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 from the 1996 version at issue in Gibson, the 

Ninth Circuit noted that the 2002 version “in no way suggest[ed] that a jury could 

reasonably convict a defendant for charged offenses based merely on a preponderance of 

the evidence,” but rather “made clear that Schultz could be convicted only if the evidence 

as a whole “proved [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime.” Id. 

 The instruction in the instant case is the same instruction that was found proper in 

Schultz, and it contained the necessary language described above. Compare CT 157-158, 

with Schultz, 659 F.3d at 943. After reviewing this instruction, it is evident that it was 

constitutionally appropriate and did not lower the burden of proof. Thus, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief. Therefore, this claim is DENIED. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. For the reasons set out 

above, jurists of reason would not find this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s instructional error 

claim debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner 

may not appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a 

certificate from the Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. The remaining instructional error claim in the Amended Petition is DENIED, 

and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Petitioner may seek a certificate of 

appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate any pending matters and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/8/16 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.08\Dixon3832.denyHC.docx 

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