Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02910/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02910-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERNARDO TAPIA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Respondent, _________________________________ 

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No. C 04-2910 MMC (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On July 25, 2004, in the Eastern District of California, petitioner, a California prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney

advised him to reject a plea bargain offered prior to the preliminary hearing in the underlying

criminal case. The petition subsequently was transferred to the Northern District. On

December 14, 2004, this Court found the claim, liberally construed, to be cognizable and

ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent has

filed an answer along with a memorandum and exhibits in support thereof, and petitioner has

filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND

By a complaint filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court on January 2, 2001,

petitioner was charged with committing, between October 5, 2000 and December 5, 2000, a

lewd and lascivious act on a child under fourteen years of age in violation of California Penal

Code § 288(a). (Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) (Resp.’s Ex. A) at 32.) The complaint further

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See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996).

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alleged that petitioner had a prior felony “strike” conviction for attempted lewd and

lascivious acts with a minor. (CT at 33.) Finally, the complaint alleged that at the time of

the charged offense, petitioner was out of custody on bail for another offense of attempted

lewd and lascivious act with a minor. (Id.)

A preliminary hearing was held on April 20, 2001. (Id. at 1-30.) At the outset

of the hearing, the prosecutor first noted that the case had proceeded to “Felony Advanced

Resolution,” and that petitioner had been offered a plea bargain of six years with the

understanding that the “out-on-bail enhancement” would be stricken, or, in the alternative,

petitioner would plead to the charges and then “bring a Romero,” i.e., a motion to strike the

prior-conviction allegation.1

 (Id. at 6.) The prosecutor next stated his understanding that the

offer had been rejected, after which the trial court inquired of defense counsel, “And is that

correct, Counsel, that defendant has been made aware and you’ve discussed with him those

alternatives and at this stage he is rejecting those and requesting that we proceed with the

preliminary examination?” (Id.) Defense counsel then asked petitioner, “Do you understand

what’s being said?” and petitioner responded, “Yes.” (Id.) 

The court then proceeded with the preliminary hearing, at which the victim testified 

as follows: On October 5, 2000, when she was twelve years old, she met petitioner while she

was visiting a mall with her friend. (Id. at 5, 10.) Sometime later that month, petitioner

became the victim’s “boyfriend,” and they kissed each other using their tongues. (Id. at 11-

13.) At some point in November 2000, while they were at her house, petitioner asked the

victim to orally copulate him. (Id. at 19-20.) She refused, but did agree to masturbate him. 

(Id. at 20-21.) Also in November 2000, she was at petitioner’s house and he touched her

breasts, on the outside of her clothing, while they were kissing. (Id. at 21-22.) Finally, on a

Friday morning in November or December 2000, she went to petitioner’s house, where they

went to the bedroom and engaged in sexual intercourse. (Id. at 15-18.)

Based on the victim’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor filed an

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In sentencing a defendant for a violation of Penal Code § 288(a), the court may

impose one of three terms: the lower term of three years, the middle term of six years, or the

upper term of eight years. At the time petitioner entered his plea, the prosecutor calculated

petitioner’s maximum exposure, with the enhancements, to be 30 years. (RT at 6.) 

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information charging petitioner with four counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a

child under the age of fourteen years, in violation of Penal Code § 288(a). (Id. at 35-37.) 

The information also included the out-on-bail and prior-strike allegations from the complaint. 

(Id. at 37-38.) 

On May 30, 2001, the day set for trial, the trial court ruled on various in limine

motions. (Id. at 51-52.) The following day, petitioner pled guilty to all four counts and

admitted the out-on-bail and prior-strike allegations. (Id. at 53.) Petitioner’s subsequent

motion to strike the latter allegation was denied. (Id. at 55; Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”)

(Resp.’s Ex. B) at 18-19.) On November 9, 2001, petitioner was sentenced to a term of 18

years in state prison. (CT at 95; RT at 19.) The sentence consisted of the lower term on

Count 1, doubled by reason of the strike conviction, and one-third of the middle term on

Counts 2, 3, and 4, each of which likewise was doubled based on the prior conviction.2

 (CT

at 95; RT at 19.) Petitioner also received a suspended sentence of two years on the out-onbail enhancement. (Id.)

Petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause was granted, and appellate

counsel filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal pursuant to People v. Wende,

25 Cal.3d 436 (1979), stating the record raised no meritorious issues for appeal. Appellate

counsel simultaneously filed in the California Court of Appeal a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, raising the claim raised herein. On January 15, 2003, the California Court of Appeal

reviewed the entire record and concluded there were no arguable issues on appeal. By

separate opinion filed concurrently therewith, the California Court of Appeal summarily

denied the habeas petition. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

the California Supreme Court, also raising the claim raised herein; that petition was denied

summarily on October 1, 2003.

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A federal court 

must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority only if “the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority if it correctly 

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decision but “unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. On habeas review, a

federal court may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

 in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, to support the writ,

the application must have been “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

B. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he advised

petitioner to reject the plea bargain offered by the prosecutor prior to the preliminary hearing. 

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According to petitioner, prior to the “Felony Advanced Resolution,” which occurred prior the

preliminary hearing, counsel advised him that the prosecutor had offered to recommend a

sentence of six years in exchange for petitioner’s guilty plea to the sole charge in the

complaint. According to petitioner, counsel advised him to reject the offer, without

informing him of (1) the minimum and maximum sentences that could be imposed in the

event petitioner were to be convicted, (2) the fact that his kissing the victim could be a

violation of § 288(a), and (3) the fact that the prosecutor could add new charges based on the

evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing, which new charges could expose petitioner to

a potentially greater sentence.

Petitioner’s claim is foreclosed by his guilty plea. A defendant who pleads guilty

cannot later raise in federal habeas proceedings independent claims relating to the

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before entry of such plea. See Haring v.

Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-320 (1983); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). 

The only challenges left open in federal habeas proceedings after a plea of guilty are to the

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea and to the nature of the advice of counsel to so

plead. Id. at 267. A defendant who enters a guilty plea on the advice of counsel, as did

petitioner herein, may attack the voluntary and intelligent character of that plea only by

showing the advice he received to plead guilty was not within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. 

Claims of pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel are among the constitutional

claims precluded by a subsequent guilty plea. See Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th

Cir. 1994) (holding petitioner’s claim that attorneys were ineffective in failing to prevent use

of his confession at trial constituted claim of pre-plea constitutional violation precluded by

petitioner’s plea); United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9th Circ 1992) (per curiam)

(holding guilty plea precluded claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance at in camera

hearing occurring prior to plea). By pleading guilty, a defendant “waive[s] any such alleged

constitutional claim.” See id.; see also United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir.

1991) (noting, with exception of “jurisdictional” claims, “guilty plea generally waives all

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In his traverse, petitioner states he wishes to add a “new” claim, namely, “that his

guilty plea was neither voluntary nor intelligent based on ineffective assistance of counsel,”

(Traverse at 3), and requests that the petition be stayed while he exhausts his “new” claim,

(id.). A petitioner may not raise new claims for habeas relief in a traverse. See Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). In any event, the purportedly “new” claim 

merely repeats petitioner’s claim that counsel’s advice to reject the prosecutor’s initial offer

was deficient. (See “Motion and Request to File ‘Statement of Additional Claims or

Grounds’ for Relief,” attached to Traverse.) 

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claims of a constitutional violation occurring before the plea.”). Here, as noted, petitioner

claims his counsel was ineffective at the outset of the case, prior to the April 2001

preliminary hearing. Petitioner pled guilty over a month later, on May 31, 2001, at the start

of the trial. Petitioner does not claim his plea was either uninformed or involuntary.3

Consequently, petitioner’s guilty plea precludes him from obtaining habeas relief based on

his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at an earlier stage of the

proceedings. Accordingly, the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s claim was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby

DENIED.

Any pending motions are hereby terminated.

The Clerk shall close the file

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 22, 2006

 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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