Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04147/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4147

___________

Billeigh H. Riser, Jr., *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United

* States District Court for

v. * the District of Minnesota.

*

Target Corporation, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: May 19, 2006

Filed: August 17, 2006 

___________

Before MURPHY, BEAM, BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Billeigh Riser, Jr., a black male, brought suit against his former employer,

Target Corporation, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Minnesota

Human Rights Act (MHRA). The district court1

 granted Target's motion for summary

judgment, determining that Riser was unable to demonstrate that he met Target's

legitimate expectations of employment or that he was terminated in circumstances that

give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. He was thus unable to establish

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a prima facie case under the relevant statutes. The court further held that even if Riser

could set forth a prima facie case, he could not show that Target's legitimate and

nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating him were pretext. Riser appeals. We

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2001, Target hired Riser as an Executive Team Lead In Training (ETL–IT).

Riser worked the overnight shift at Target's Apple Valley location. He completed one

week of business training at a different Target location along with three other newhires before he began his on-the-job training in Apple Valley. His duties as an

overnight ETL at Target included unloading merchandise trucks and shelving the

items in the warehouse, facilitating the stocking of store shelves by hourly employees,

reorganizing the stock room, and stocking store shelves himself. 

Three other ETLs worked the overnight shift with Riser in Apple Valley. All

three of the other ETLs were white. Indeed, Riser was the only black ETL working

any shift at the Apple Valley store. These three co-workers, along with Craig

Rothfolk, the director of Riser's business training program, and Chris Simon, the store

manager (STL) at the Apple Valley location, all monitored Riser's progress during

Riser's initial ninety-day probationary period. At the end of Riser's probationary

period, Target fired Riser because he was doing a poor job. Riser had a low number

of "pulls" (a number that reflects pieces of merchandise pulled from the stockroom to

replenish store shelves), failed to conduct "huddles" (the nightly staff meeting), and

did not answer overhead phone calls. Through deposition testimony, Target claims

that Riser had the lowest "pulls" of any ETL-IT they recalled. 

Riser, on the other hand, claims that he was actually fired because he was black

and that Target never gave him any supervisory feedback to alert him to the fact that

he was failing to meet certain expectations. He claims that because they failed to tell

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him exactly what to do, he cannot be held responsible for failing to perform at a

certain level. 

On appeal, Riser argues that the district court blindly accepted Target's

assertions that Riser was failing to meet its standards without producing any objective

evidence of the alleged standards that Riser failed to meet. He claims the district court

failed to apply the appropriate summary judgment standard when it viewed the

evidence. 

II. DISCUSSION

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts

most favorably to the nonmoving party. Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 440 F.3d

1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 2006). "[S]ummary judgment is proper only where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law." Id. "We must affirm the grant of summary judgment on a claim if any

essential element of [Riser's] prima facie case is not supported by specific facts

sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial." Turner v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 688, 694

(8th Cir. 2005).

Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee with respect to

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of race, color,

religion, sex or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Because Riser does

not present direct evidence of discrimination, this court analyzes the case under the

burden-shifting standard in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973). 

Under McDonnell Douglas, Riser has the initial burden of establishing a prima

facie case of discrimination by showing that: 1) he is a member of a protected group;

2) he was meeting Target's legitimate expectations; 3) he was discharged; and 4) the

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We apply the same standard for both Title VII and MHRA claims. Pope v.

ESA Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir. 2005).

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discharge occurred in circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination.2

 Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 361 F.3d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 2004).

If Riser establishes a prima facie case, Target must articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for Riser's discharge. Id. Riser must then demonstrate that

the nondiscriminatory reason offered by Target was really a pretext for racial

discrimination. Id. 

Riser claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because

it did not have any performance standards on which to base its decision and it took

Target's version of the facts as true, contrary to the standard required at this stage of

the litigation. Riser fails on appeal, however, because even if we presume he

established a prima facie case, he has shown nothing to establish that Target was

likely motivated by a discriminatory reason or that Target's explanation was unworthy

of credence. Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 1998).

Stated simply, Riser argues that the reasons Target gives for his failings as an

employee were not expectations clearly or specifically articulated to him during his

employment and the real reason he was fired was because he was black. But generally

it is not this court's disposition to pass judgment on the particular training programs

and management styles of employers. Even if more direction would have been

preferable, Target's failure to inform Riser of what was expected of him is not

evidence of discriminatory animus. Id. 

The parties have spent a great deal of time in briefing and at oral argument,

disagreeing about whether Riser established a prima facie case under the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework, especially whether it is Riser's burden at the

second step to prove that he was merely "qualified for the job" or whether he met the

more (seemingly) onerous burden of proving that he "met Target's legitimate

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expectations." See, e.g., Box v. Principi, 442 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2006)

(articulating plaintiff's burden at step two as "she was meeting the legitimate

expectations of her employer"); Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 850 (8th

Cir. 2005) (articulating plaintiff's burden at step two as "she was qualified for her

position"). However, even assuming that there is a distinction with a difference

between the two articulations, and the "qualified for the job"–articulation at the second

step is indeed a less onerous standard, as Riser contends, we need not devote extensive

analysis to the subject here. Rather, we must see the forest through the trees. Id. at

856 (Colloton, J. concurring). 

"The prima facie case method established in McDonnell Douglas was never

intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic," and "[w]here the defendant has done

everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a

prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant." U.S. Postal

Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (internal quotation

omitted). Thus, we need not indulge the parties' disputes about which material facts

are in dispute or whether Riser met his burden in establishing a prima facie case under

McDonnell Douglas regardless of the "threshold" we have set for such proof.

Rodgers, 417 F.3d at 851-53. Even assuming all of the disputed facts are material,

and that Riser has established a prima facie case, Riser falls short. Riser has not

generated a genuine issue for trial on the "ultimate question of discrimination vel

non," U.S. Postal, 460 U.S. at 714, and that is enough to resolve this appeal. 

 Target asserts that it discharged Riser because of his inadequate performance

at the Apple Valley store. Specifically, its legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for

Riser's discharge were that he failed to conduct a sufficient number of huddles, failed

to answer the phone, and was deficient in the number of pulls he completed. Riser

challenges each of the reasons given by Target, pointing out that even if the

productivity measures of his performance provided by Target are accurate and equally

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As to his low number of pulls, Riser asserts that he worked a majority of his

time in the shipping area unloading cargo from delivery trucks and when he did

ultimately pull items, they were large items such as bags of dog food or furniture that

would result in a lower pull number. Riser produced evidence that he had in fact

performed "at least" four huddles during his ninety-day learning period and claims

that Target never stated its expectations to Riser regarding the number of huddles it

expected him to perform.

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applied to all employees, which he does not concede,3

 these deficiencies were not

communicated to him on any evaluation form nor did Target convey these specific

standards of performance to him by any other means during his employment.

Basically, he claims that Target did not articulate its expectations specifically enough

to him. He rotely performed the work he was directed to do and he claims that was

sufficient to show that he should have been retained. 

However, the fact that Target might not have specifically set forth each task it

was using to measure the competency demonstrated by Riser as an ETL-IT, does not

carry the day for Riser in creating a reasonable inference that race was a determinative

factor in his termination. See Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1334

(8th Cir. 1996). Again, managers are expected to demonstrate a high level of

independence and initiative and although Riser may have felt that Target's approach

was inappropriate, and that more specificity would have been preferable, an

employer's "failure to inform an employee of what is expected of [him] is not evidence

of discriminatory animus." Rose-Maston, 133 F.3d at 1108. While Riser may have

some concerns about Target's management style, he does not have a Title VII claim.

See Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he

employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the authority

to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business

judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve

intentional discrimination.")

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A second avenue Riser traverses in an attempt to prove pretext is to demonstrate

that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside of his

protected group. He claims that similarly situated employees were not held to the

same standard. Here, though, Riser also falls short because he has failed to show that

he was similarly situated to any of these white employees. He must show that he and

the employees outside of his protected group were similarly situated in all relevant

respects. Rodgers, 417 F.3d at 853. "We have equated the phrase 'similarly situated

in all relevant respects' with the statement that '[e]mployees are similarly situated

when they are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in

different ways.'" Id. at 856 (Colloton, J., concurring) (quoting Wheeler v. Aventis

Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original). 

Riser fails to demonstrate that the comparators were similarly situated in all

relevant respects. In fact, the others are quite dissimilar. Regardless of Target's

failure to produce particular productivity reports on him for certain periods during

Riser's employment as well as those on the employees discussed by Riser, including

his fellow ETLs at Apple Valley and the ETL-ITs from his business college class

working in other locations, the duties of those individuals varied from his. As to the

other ETL-ITs, each was working at other Target locations, working different shifts,

with different management and job duties. And it suffices to say that the other ETLs

at Apple Valley were not similarly situated because they were not trainees, were not

cited for the same shortcomings as Riser and would have been held to different

standards. Additionally, Elizabeth Brown, an ETL-IT discussed by Riser, worked in

an entirely different store in a different position on a different shift. 

At any rate, Target did produce evidence showing that Riser's productivity was

lacking in particular, measurable areas. Riser has not "eliminate[d] the most common

nondiscriminatory reasons" for Target's action, and the evidence does not justify the

legal presumption that Target's decision to terminate Riser was "more likely than not

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based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

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