Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-01028/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-01028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

SANDRA LAWRENCE, )

PLAINTIFF, )

VS. ) 4:15-cv-1028-JHH

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING )

COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY, )

DEFENDANT. )

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Plaintiff Sandra Lawrence brings this action pursuant to Sections 205(g) and

1631(c) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), seeking review

of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for

Disability Insurance Benefits(SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under

Riel II and Title XVI fo the Social Security Act. For the reasons set forth below, the

decision is due to be affirmed.

I. Proceedings Below

Plaintiff filed her application for SSDI and SSI benefits on January 9, 2012,

alleging a disability onset date of October 4, 2011. (R. 147-59.) After the 

application was denied initially on April 4, 2012, Plaintiff requested and received a

FILED

 2016 Feb-26 AM 10:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:15-cv-01028-JHH Document 12 Filed 02/26/16 Page 1 of 14
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (R. 82-88, 96-98). The video

hearing was held on August 21, 2013, with Plaintiff appearing in Anniston, Alabama

and the ALJ presiding over the hearing from Montgomery, Alabama. (R. 12). Both

Plaintiff and Vocational Expert William F. Green testified at the hearing. (R. 37-60).

In his November 22, 2013 decision, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and thus ineligible for

benefits. (R. 29-24, 29-60). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ

decision by the Appeals Council. (R. 1-3). After the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review (R. 1-6), that decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner, and therefore a proper subject of this court’s review. 

At the time of Plaintiff’s alleged onset of disability, she was fifty-six years of

age and had a high school education. (R. 9, 147, 153). Plaintiff’s past relevant work

experience was as a marketing sales manager and graphic designed. (R. 184, 194-97). 

According to Plaintiff, she has been unable to engage in substantial gainful activity

since October 4, 2011, due to chronic obtrusive pulmonary disease with ongoing

tobacco use, questionable fibromyalgia, arthritis, possible diffuse, particularly left

shoulder; and questionable Hepatitis C. 

At the August 21, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff testified thatshe began having issues

with her back, neck and knees around 2005. (R. 18). She began working at Walmart

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in April 2011, where she worked in the jewelry, shoe and lingerie department, butshe

left the job in September 2011 because the job was physically demanding and she was

unable to do the job. (R. 18). Her attorney stated that Plaintiff was diagnosed with

depression and anxiety, but she has not sought treatment for those impairments. (R.

18). 

Plaintiff testified that she used drugs (cocaine) recreationally in the 1979s,

1980s and 1990s, but stopped using in 1993 after she got a divorce. (R. 18). 

Although her physicians have repeatedly instructed her to stop smoking, Plaintiff

testified that she smokes a pack of cigarettes a day. Plaintiff has trouble breathing

and she uses two inhalers each morning. (R. 19). As far as her daily activities,

Plaintiff stated that she is able to dress, have and eat, but she has trouble washing her

own hair. (R. 18). She stated that she can dust, mop, sweep and do laundry at a slow

pace. (R. 18). She is able to drive, but only for short distances because it hurts her

hands. (R. 18). She watches television and gets on the internet in her spare time. (R.

18). Plaintiff also reads, but she does less of this because it hurts her hands to hold

a book and sitting for long periods of time hurts her back, legs and hips. (R. 18). 

She stated that she has difficulty grasping and turning doorknobs, writing with a pen

or a pencil and typing on a keyboard because it hurts her hands. (R. 18). She is no

longer able to keep her grandchild, entertain, shop or work in her yard. (R. 18). She

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is able to walk her dog for short distances, but stated that she has developed a limp

on her left leg from the pain in her left leg, hip and back. (R. 18). She is unable to

sleep and constantly stays tired. (R. 18). 

As far as her pain, Plaintiff stated that it began about five years ago and has

gotten progressively worse, with the pain in her legs, hands and back being constant

and the pain in her arms, neck, shoulders, hips and feet being intermittent. (R. 18). 

She stated thatsitting for too long, bending,squatting, walking too much, driving and

lying down makes her pain worse, and that the pain last for hours to sometimes days

at a time. (R. 18). To manage her pain, she takes Norco and Meloxicam, which

relieve the pain for two to three hours, but have side effects of drowsiness and

constipation. (R. 18). She also uses Bio Freeze, takes hot showers or bath, gets

massages or changes positions to relieve her pain. (R. 18). Plaintiff stated that

sometimes she gets chills and feels faint from the pain. (R. 18). 

II. ALJ Decision

Determination of disability under the Social Security Act requires a five-step

analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 et. seq. First, the Commissioner determines whether

the claimant is working (“Step One”). Second,theCommissioner determines whether

the claimant has an impairment which prevents the performance of basic work

activities (“Step Two”). Third, the Commissioner determines whether claimant’s

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impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of Part 404 of the

Regulations (“Step Three”). Fourth, the Commissioner determines whether the

claimant’s residual functional capacity can meet the physical and mental demands of

past work (“Step Four”). The claimant’sresidualfunctional capacity consists of what

the claimant can do despite his impairment. Finally, the Commissioner determines

whether the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience prevent the

performance of any other work (“Step Five”). In making a final determination, the

Commissioner will use the Medical-Vocational Guidelinesin Appendix 2 of Part 404

of the Regulations when all of the claimant’s vocational factors and the residual

functional capacity are the same as the criteria listed in the Appendix. If the

Commissioner finds that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any step in this

procedure, the Commissioner will provide no further review of the claim. 

The court recognizes that “the ultimate burden of proving disability is on the

claimant” and that the “claimant must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating

that he can no longer perform his former employment.” Freeman v. Schweiker, 681

F.2d 727, 729 (11th Cir. 1982) (other citations omitted). Once a claimant shows that

he can no longer perform his past employment, “the burden then shifts to the

[Commissioner] to establish that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful

employment.” Id.

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act

through December 31, 2013. (R. 14, No.1), and that she has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset of disability on October 4, 2011. 

(R. 14, No. 2). The ALJ found that, during the relevant time period, Plaintiff has the

following severe combination of impairments:” chronic obstructive pulmonary

disease with ongoing tobacco abuse; questionable fibromyalgia; arthritis, possibly

diffuse, particularly left shoulder; and questionable hepatitis C.” (R. 14, No. 3).

Nevertheless, he determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that meet or medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed at 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. (R. 16, No. 4). According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her

symptoms were not entirely credible. (R. 23.)

Based upon his review of the record, the ALJ concluded that that Plaintiff

retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined in

20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) that entailed the following:

• Sitting for at least three hours without interruption and a total of six

hours during an eight-hour workday;

• Standing and /or walking up to one hour each without interruption and

a total of six hours during an eight-hour workday;

• Frequently using her left, non-dominant upper extremity for reaching in

all directions;

• Frequently using her lower extremities for pushing, pulling and in the

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operation of foot controls;

• No climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

• Rarely climbing stairs (up to one hour total over the course of an

eight-hour workday)

• Occasionally climbing ramps;

• Frequently balancing and stooping;

• Occasionally crouching and kneeling;

• No crawling;

• Occasionally working in extreme temperatures;

• Frequently working in wetness and humidity;

• Frequently working while subject to vibration;

• Frequently working while exposed to fumes, odors, dusts, and gases;

• No working in poorly ventilated areas;

• No operating hazardous machinery;

• No working at unprotected heights; and

• Frequently operating motorized vehicles.

(R. 17). Based on the testimony of the vocational expert and her RFC, the ALJ

determined that the plaintiff was unable to return to any of her past relevant work as

a marketing sales manager and graphic designer. (Tr. 23). However, considering

Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational

expert, the ALJ found that there are jobs in the national economy that exist in

significant numbersthat the plaintiff can perform. (R. 23). Therefore, the ALJfound

that the plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined by the Act, from the alleged

onset date of October 4, 2011 through the dat of his decision. (R. 24). 

III. Plaintiff’s Argument for Remand or Reversal

Plaintiff seeks to have the ALJ’s decision, which became the final decision of

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the Commissioner following the denial of review by the Appeals Council, reversed,

or in the alternative, remanded for further consideration. Specifically, Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ committed reversible error by not properly evaluating her subjective

complaints of disability. (Doc. # 10 at 3-9.) 

IV. Standard of Review

The only issues before this court are whether the record reveals substantial

evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Walden v.

Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the correct legal

standards were applied, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner’s findings are conclusive if supported by

“substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). 

The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute

its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the final decision

as a whole and determine if the decision is reasonable and supported by substantial

evidence. See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.

1983)).

Substantial evidence fallssomewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance

of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

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adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth,

703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the

Commissioner’sfactualfindingsmust be affirmed even if the evidence preponderates

against the Commissioner’s findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court

acknowledgesthat judicial review of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, the court

also notesthat review “does not yield automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.

V. Discussion

Plaintiff contends that when determining her ability to work, the ALJ failed to

appropriately evaluate her alleged pain and subjective symptoms in light of the “pain

standard.” (Doc. # 10 at 3-9). It is axiomatic that the Act and its related regulations

provide that a claimant’s statements about pain or other symptoms will not alone

establish disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. Rather, medical

signs and laboratory findings must be present to show a medical impairment that

could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. Holt v. Sullivan, 921

F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). 

When, as here, a claimant alleges disability through subjective complaints of

pain or other symptoms, the Eleventh Circuit’s “pain standard” for evaluating these

symptoms requires: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition, and either (2)

objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain arising from

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that condition, or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such

severity that it can reasonably be expected to cause the alleged pain. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); Holt, 921 F.2d at

1223; Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986). If the ALJ fails to

credit a claimant’s pain testimony, she must articulate reasons for that decision. 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). 

After the application of the three-pronged pain standard, Eleventh Circuit

jurisprudence requires a secondary inquiry, which evaluates the severity, intensity,

and persistence of the pain and the symptoms a claimant actually possesses. Indeed,

there is a difference between meeting the judicially created pain standard and having

disabling pain; meeting the pain standard is merely a threshold test to determine

whether a claimant’s subjective testimony should even be considered at all to

determine the severity of that pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b) (2006); Marbury v.

Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The Secretary must consider a

claimant’s subjective testimony of pain if [the pain standard is met].”). After

considering a claimant’s complaints of pain, an ALJ may then “reject them as not

creditable.” Marbury, 957 F.2d at 839. 

Although a reversal is warranted if the ALJ’s decision contains no indication

that the three-part pain standard was properly applied, Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223, no

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“magic language” is required and no case citations are mandatory, Wilson v.

Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that an ALJ’s mere

reference to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, along with a discussion of the relevant evidence,

demonstrates the ALJ properly applied the pain standard). 

The court disagrees with the argument presented by Plaintiff. It is entirely

evident from the ALJ’s opinion that Plaintiff’s pain complaints were properly

evaluated under Eleventh Circuit law. In accordance with both the initial and

secondary inquiries required for the assessment of subjective complaints, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could be expected to

produce the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the

intensity, duration, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible.

(R. 23). In so concluding, the ALJ not only thoroughly recited the medical evidence

of record (as outlined in detail above and incorporated by reference here), but he

specifically analyzed why Plaintiff’s complaints of pain are simply not consistent

with that evidence. (R. 19-23, 277, 285, 301-02, 307, 315, 317). 

Plaintiff arguesthat the ALJimproperly relied upon evidence that pre-dated her

alleged onset date of disability to explain his credibility findings. Specifically,

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “ignored” the longitudinal medical record, which

documents her consistent complaints of treatment and her debilitation pain. (Doc. #

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10 at 5-6.) The court disagrees. Although the ALJ discussed the medical

documentation that pre-dated her alleged onset date and noted that the evidence did

not support her inability to work, he also thoroughly discussed and considered the

medical evidence after Plaintiff’s alleged onset date and specifically found that the

evidence did not support her subjective complaints of pain or her allegations of

disability. (R. 21). Additionally, the ALJ used some of the evidence that pre-dated

her alleged onset date to compare it with the evidence after her alleged onset to show

that Plaintiff’s condition had not become disabling after her alleged onset date.1

(R.

21).

Plaintiff also contends that there is no evidence that her physicians questioned

her subjective complaints of sever pain and that her physicians prescribed her strong

narcotic medication to relieve her pain. (Doc. #10 at 5, 8). While this may be true,

subjective complaints of pain alone are not enough to establish disability. Rather,

medical signs or laboratory findings must show that there is a medical impairment

that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a) & 416.929(a). The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff

 

1

 Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary (Doc. #10 at 5-6) is not supported by the record.

There is no evidence that supports escalation of Plaintiff’s pain, and, although she did receive

severe diagnoses, a diagnosis in and of itself, says very little about the severity of an impairment. 

See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir 2005). 

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complained of pain all over her body, but noted that the clinical findings upon

examination did not support her complaints. (R. 21-22, 285, 300-02, 315, 317). 

Additionally, Plaintiff did not cite any authority to establish that merely being

prescribed pain medication supports complaints of disability. Cf. Laurey v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 7729455, *10 (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2015) (finding ALJ’s

credibility finding wassupported by substantial evidence based on part on claimant’s

conservative treatment which consisted of pain medication and muscle relaxers).

Plaintiff’sreliance on the application for Disability Access Parking Privileges,

completed by Dr. Huang, where he noted that Plaintiff was severely limited in her

ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological or orthopedic condition (R. 334) is

also unpersuasive. (Doc. #10 at 8). The ALJ considered this evidence and concluded

that the application was entitled to little probative value given Dr. Huang’s

examination findings and the record as a whole. (R. 23). Indeed, Dr. Huang’s

examination consistently showed no significant abnormalities, (R. 205, 307, 315,

317), and Dr. Jariwala’s examination revealed normal gait, no motor or sensory

deficits, normal reflexes, no neurological defects, full strength of the muscle groups,

and the ability to walk on her heels and toes, and squat and arise without difficulty. 

(R. 303). Thus, the application was properly given little weight in the face of the

other medical evidence. 

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For all of these reasons, the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints is supported by substantial evidence. 

VI. Conclusion

In summary, the court concludesthat the determination of the ALJthat Plaintiff

is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and proper legal standards were

applied in reaching this determination. The final decision of the Commissioner,

therefore, is due to be affirmed. A separate order will be entered.

DONE this the 26th day of February, 2016.

 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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