Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01761/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01761-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Prison Legal News, a project of the Human 

Rights Defense Center, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

Paul Babeu, individual and in his official 

capacity as Sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona; 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

NO. CV 11-01761-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

The Court has before it the supplemental briefing (Docs. 144, 148) it requested on 

the publisher-only rule in a previous Order. (Doc. 143 at 10–13.) Defendants have moved 

to strike most of the Response filed by Plaintiff Prison Legal News (“PLN”). (Doc. 149.) 

After reviewing the Parties’ submissions, the Court grants in part and denies in part 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike and denies PLN’s outstanding Motion for Permanent 

Injunction (Doc. 85). PLN has also filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. 145.) 

Defendants responded in accordance with this Court’s Order, and the Court now denies 

the Motion for Reconsideration. 

I. PUBLISHER-ONLY RULE AND NECESSITY FOR A PERMANENT 

INJUNCTION 

On March 19, 2013, this Court issued an Order in response to the Cross-Motions 

for Summary Judgment that the Parties filed. (Doc. 143.) In that Order, the Court resolved 

several of the claims, but ordered supplemental briefing on one issue and the effect of that 

issue on PLN’s request for injunctive relief. Specifically, PLN requested a permanent 

injunction that would prevent Defendants from rejecting PLN materials under the 

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mailroom policy in effect at Pinal County Jail. (Doc. 86 at 13–17.) One of PLN’s 

arguments for the necessity of injunctive relief was that the policy’s current provisions 

governing admission of publications were “vague and contradictory.” Before resolving 

PLN’s Motion for Permanent Injunction, the Court sought clarification on the “basis the 

jail has determined to presently accept all the materials that PLN sends into it.” (Doc. 143 

at 13.) That information, in turn, would illuminate the inquiry into whether injunctive 

relief is necessary. 

A. Background and Current Application of the Publisher-only Rule

The official mailroom policy in effect when PLN’s materials were rejected allowed 

“publications” as long as they “c[a]me directly from a recognized publisher, distributor, or 

authorized retailer.” (Doc. 88-5, Ex. Q at PCSO 000052; id. at PCSO 000066.) Nowhere 

did the policy define the term “publication” or describe how jail staff determined a given 

publisher, distributor, or retailer became “recognized” or “authorized.” The Parties 

referred to this rule as the “publisher-only” rule. At the time PLN was sending materials, 

mailroom staff applied the publisher-only rule for books in a very limited fashion. Only 

four vendors, who were in fact not generally publishers, were considered “recognized”: 

Amazon, Borders, Barnes & Noble, and Waldenbooks. (Doc. 87 ¶ 25; Doc. 99 ¶ 25.) And 

so only books coming from these book sellers were allowed. (Id.) 

Defendants conceded the unconstitutionality of the way mailroom staff applied the 

publisher-only rule. (Doc. 98 at 7.) The Court then determined the liability of various 

Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for those unconstitutional actions and the availability 

of certain categories of damages to PLN at trial that stemmed from the First Amendment 

violations, among others. (Doc. 143 at 18–25; 28–32.) 

PLN also requested injunctive relief and cited the fact that the publisher-only rule 

under the new policy was substantially similar to the previous policy, which mailroom 

staff had implemented in an unconstitutional manner. The Court made the following 

observations: 

PLN asks the Court to enter a permanent injunction that it may send 

materials into the jail and have them received by the addressees. 

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Nevertheless, in light of the deference to which prison officials are entitled, 

the Court is disinclined to enter such a broad and undefined injunction on a 

permanent basis, when it is not sure on what basis the jail has determined to 

presently accept all the materials that PLN sends into it. PLN might change 

the nature of materials it seeks to send into the jail that could conceivably 

cause security or management concerns. Nor, in light of the jail’s 

undisputed representation that all of PLN’s materials are now being 

received, is it necessarily clear that such an injunction is necessary. 

On the other hand, when Defendants have not explained what 

determinations were made under the current policies to allow the receipt of 

PLN’s materials, nor the criteria on which such determinations were made, 

if any, it is possible that the jail’s current decision to allow such materials 

may be ephemeral. This is underlined by the jail’s refusal to permit mailing 

privileges to other organizations that PLN asserts are similar to it. Further, 

to the extent there are no such criteria there is the possibility if not 

likelihood that the jail is resolving such matters “on an ad hoc and 

subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 

application.” 

(Id. at 12–13 (quoting Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 

1996)).) 

Deputy Chief James Kimble, who has final policymaking authority for the prisons 

in Pinal County, (Doc. 87 ¶ 35; Doc. 99 ¶ 35), filed a Declaration in response to the 

Court’s Order for supplemental briefing. (Doc. 144-1, Ex. 1.) Deputy Chief Kimble 

clarified how the jail is currently implementing the “publisher-only” rule. 

 The current policy permits “publications” so long as they come from a “recognized 

publisher, distributor, or authorized retailer.” (Doc. 88-6, Ex. S at PCSO 000082.) 

“Publications” are defined as “books, magazines, periodicals, and catalogs.” (Id. at PCSO 

000075.) Upon arrival, all publications are screened for contraband. (Doc. 144-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 

3.)1

 The policy, however, does not specify what criteria the jail employs to classify an 

entity as a “recognized publisher, distributor, or authorized retailer.” 

 Nevertheless, Deputy Chief Kimble has “interpreted the terms ‘recognized 

publisher,’ ‘recognized distributor,’ and ‘authorized retailer’ to mean that the identity and 

address of the purported publisher, distributor, and/or retailer have been verified through 

 1

 At no point has PLN ever challenged this procedure. 

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internet searches, thus eliminating any danger that it is an individual attempting to contact 

inmates by simply using a name that sounds like a book publisher or distributor.” (Id. ¶ 4.) 

The reason the jail allows publications only from entities—not individuals—is “[t]o 

eliminate contraband.” (Id. ¶ 3.) 

 PLN mails (1) its own newsletter, (2) its own brochures and pamphlets, (3) books 

that it has published, and (4) books that are published by other entities. (Doc. 89 ¶¶ 4–6, 

12.) According to Deputy Chief Kimble, “PLN is a recognized publisher and distributor 

because its identity is able to be independently verified.” (Doc. 144-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 5.) 

Consequently, PLN’s own newsletter, brochures, and pamphlets and self-published books 

are allowed because “they come directly from PLN, a recognized publisher, and not from 

an individual.” (Id. ¶ 6.) For books that PLN does not publish but still distributes, PLN is 

considered a “recognized distributor.” (Id.) 

B. Analysis

 PLN seeks a permanent injunction against Defendants. PLN, however, has not had 

any materials rejected by the jail since this lawsuit was filed. (Doc. 99 ¶ 94; Doc. 119 ¶ 

94.) Injunctive relief is for unusual cases, where a plaintiff “(1) has suffered an irreparable 

injury; (2) [where] remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate 

to compensate for that injury; (3) [where], considering the balance of the hardships 

between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) [where] the 

public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay, Inc. v. 

MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). In case like this, where the injury to the 

plaintiff has ceased, the plaintiff carries a weighty burden to show that future injury is 

likely. See Nelsen v. King Co., 895 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990). Notably, “[p]ast 

exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding 

injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea 

v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). 

As discussed in the prior Order, several Defendants violated PLN’s constitutional 

rights, and PLN can proceed to trial to determine what damages should be awarded. But 

any injury due to application of the publisher-only rule appears to be over, and injunctive 

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relief is appropriate only when injuries are ongoing or imminent. See Demery v. Arpaio, 

278 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] suit for injunctive relief is normally moot 

upon the termination of the conduct at issue” unless there is evidence that the conduct is 

likely to recur). 

 PLN’s primary argument for why the jail is likely to deny its materials in the future 

pursuant to the publisher-only rule is that the jail currently allows PLN materials only on 

the whim of Deputy Chief Kimble. PLN is a “recognized publisher and distributor” 

because Deputy Chief Kimble interpreted the terms “approved” and “recognized” to mean 

“verifiable by internet search.” An internet search confirmed the existence of PLN. Yet 

the policy itself does not prescribe that procedure. Its opacity leaves open the possibility 

that a subsequent Deputy might ascribe a different meaning to those terms that would 

move PLN back to the blacklist. The written policy’s failure to specify the procedure for 

approval may leave open the possibility that, despite the efforts of Deputy Chief Kimble, 

jail officers might resolve questions of approval “on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with 

the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972. 

This is the vagueness that the First Amendment condemns. Id. 

 To support its theory that the policy—even with Deputy Chief Kimble’s 

interpretation—will result in arbitrary application and that an injunction is necessary, PLN 

cites the jail’s refusal to permit mailing privileges to other similarly-situated non-profit 

entities, such as Prison Library Project and Read Between the Bars. (Doc. 88-8, Ex. AA at 

PCSO 000224-26; id., Ex. CC at PCSO 005292, 005241-44, 005424.) While those entities 

are not parties to this case and PLN cannot assert their rights, the jail’s treatment of those 

materials serves as a yardstick for measuring how jail staff are implementing the 

publisher-only rule and whether the danger is real that they might refuse PLN materials in 

the future. At one point, PLN materials were getting through, but materials from other 

non-profits were not, raising the possibility that the only reason PLN materials were 

allowed was because PLN had filed suit. 

 Defendants counter by asserting that Deputy Chief Kimble has personally 

institutionalized his interpretation of the policy by conducting training for all jail staff. 

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(Doc. 144-1, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 8–9.) Under Deputy Chief Kimble’s interpretation of the policy, 

books from non-profits like Read Between the Bars and Prison Library Project are 

allowed—those entities qualify as “recognized distributors because their identity can be 

independently verified.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Consequently, jail staff should allow materials from 

those organizations. (Id.) 

 Deputy Chief Kimble acknowledged, however, that “[u]nfortunately, during and 

shortly after the implementation and training phase of the jail policy on incoming mail, 

several publications were [incorrectly] rejected. . . . Apparently front line mail staff did 

not independently verify the identity of these organizations.” (Id. ¶ 8.) This lapse would 

explain why the jail was rejecting materials from other non-profit organizations while 

allowing PLN material in. Jail staff were unaware of Deputy Chief Kimble’s 

interpretation of the policy, and, as discussed in the prior order, appeared to adhere to the 

idea that the only approved suppliers were Amazon, Borders, Barnes & Noble, and 

Waldenbooks. (Doc. 143 at 5, 10–13.) 

 Deputy Chief Kimble contends that he has disabused the jail staff of that notion. 

“Since that time [January and February, 2012), I have reinforced the implementation of 

the jail mail policy by personally instructing lower and upper supervisory staff on the 

proper implementation of the policy. I have also implemented periodic jail mail policy 

training for front line mail staff to reinforce the policy.” (Doc. 144-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 8.) 

Accordingly, “[f]ront line mail staff now know that . . . ‘recognized publishers and 

distributors’ and ‘authorized retailers’ are those that can be independently verified to 

ensure that contraband is not hidden in publications that reach the jail. Publications 

coming to the jail go through a review process.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Deputy Chief Kimble described 

the now-operational review process: “Front line mail staff (1) inspect each publication for 

contraband, sexually explicit materials, and unauthorized materials . . . and (2) must verify 

the identity of an unknown purported publisher, distributor and/or retailer through internet 

searches. If the internet search confirms the identity of the organization, then the 

publication should be allowed in subject to the [contraband] review process.” (Id. ¶ 9.) 

 The training and review process that Deputy Chief Kimble outlined and that he 

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asserts is now operative appears to alleviate the concern from PLN’s perspective that 

acceptance or rejection of its materials depends on which mailroom staffer reviews the 

package. Deputy Chief Kimble has testified that the review process is regularized and 

uniform. 

 In its Response, PLN attempts to raise issues as to the accuracy of Deputy Chief 

Kimble’s affidavit. Defendants have moved to strike significant portions of PLN’s 

Response. (Doc. 149.)2

 PLN filed copies of emails between jail staff that show confusion 

relating to the policy. Those emails, however, are all dated before PLN sought to send 

material to the jail, and are irrelevant to the very limited question the Court left for this 

supplemental briefing. Consequently, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike the 

emails and accompanying affidavit. (Doc. 148-1; id., Exs. 1–4.) 

PLN also submitted an Expert Report, prepared by John L. Clark, who is a former 

corrections professional. (Doc. 148-1, Ex. 5.) The report and accompanying affidavit 

(Doc. 148-2), contain his review and opinion on the adequacy of all of the jail’s mailroom 

policies. Only a small portion of Clark’s report and affidavit is relevant to the question 

here, namely his opinion that “verbal instructions to staff in correctional institutions often 

do not lead to consistent implementation of written policies over time, as memories fade 

or personalities change.” (Id. ¶ 10.) The Court has considered that observation for what it 

is worth in arriving at its final decision. The remainder of the report and affidavit is 

irrelevant, and the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike that material. (Doc. 148-1, 

Ex. 5; Doc. 148-2.) 

Finally, PLN submitted an affidavit from a Jody Holmes. (Doc. 148-3 (Holmes 

Decl.).) Holmes claims to be “a core member of Read Between the Bars (‘RBtB”), a nonprofit book distributor.” (Id. ¶ 2.) She claims that “[p]rior to reading Deputy Chief 

Kimble’s March 29, 2013 affidavit it was my understanding that books sent by RBtB to 

 2

 Defendants believe that the standards normally applicable to a Motion for 

Reconsideration apply to any argument or evidence submitted by PLN in response to the 

Court’s Order for supplemental briefing. While the Court is mindful of the respective 

burdens attendant to summary judgment, its Order did not necessarily foreclose the 

possibility of new evidence, provided that it was responsive to the issue. 

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prisoners at the Pinal County Jail would be rejected by mailroom staff and would not be 

delivered.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Holmes states that Read Between the Bars ceased sending materials 

to Pinal County Jail after April 2010, but that a few volunteers were unaware of this 

change and sent books to prisoners as recently as April 2012, after the jail instituted the 

new policy. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7.) Those books were rejected and no notice was given as to the 

reasons for rejection. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

PLN cannot use Holmes’s affidavit to show that, despite Deputy Chief Kimble’s 

training, the message has not gotten through and frontline mailroom staff are still rejecting 

publications on an ad-hoc basis. Holmes’s statements lack foundation. The Federal Rules 

of Evidence state that “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced 

sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. 

R. Evid. 602. PLN apparently relies on Holmes’s status as “a core member” of Read 

Between the Bars to supply the foundation for her later claims about the packages sent to 

the Pinal County Jail. Nowhere does Holmes establish what “a core member” means. Nor 

does she claim that she sent the packages to the jail; indeed, it is clear that other 

volunteers sent those packages and received them back again. (Doc. 148-3 ¶¶ 6–7.) Her 

affidavit lacks foundation as to her claims about what happened with those packages—it 

is not clear what channels of communication she employed to ascertain what happened. 

Absent that foundation, she lacks sufficient personal knowledge to testify as to what the 

jail did with certain packages. 

And in any event, her testimony does not establish that Pinal County has not fixed 

its former unconstitutional denial of access. It is not clear when Deputy Chief Kimble 

conducted the training he references in his affidavit. He cites incidents from December 

2011, January 2012, and February 2012 where jail staff rejected materials from nonprofits like PLN, and then states that “[s]ince that time, I have . . . personally instruct[ed] 

lower and upper supervisory staff on the proper implementation of the policy.” (Doc. 144-

1 ¶ 8.) According to Holmes, Read Between the Bars volunteers sent books in April 2012 

and “[a]fter April 2012.” (Doc. 148-3 ¶¶ 6–7.) On this incomplete record, the Court 

cannot determine that the jail rejected books from Read Between the Bars after Deputy 

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Chief Kimble conducted the training. Deputy Chief Kimble admitted that mailroom staff 

did not understand the new policy for a period of time after implementation and 

improperly rejected books from some “recognized” entities. PLN has not shown the jail is 

still administering the policy on an ad-hoc basis. 

PLN has thus failed to show a likelihood that its materials will be denied in the 

future under the policy. Deputy Chief Kimble has standardized the approval process and 

ensured that frontline mailroom staff are aware of and are acting according to that policy. 

PLN has produced no evidence to the contrary. Consequently, PLN has not shown that it 

is likely to suffer future injury on the facts before the Court. Its Motion for a Permanent 

Injunction is denied. 

II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

 PLN filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 145) of the Court’s decision that the 

jail’s prior policy limiting correspondence to one-page letters or postcards was not 

unconstitutional. (Doc. 143 at 13–15.) PLN contends that Court’s ruling was manifest 

error because Defendants had previously conceded that the policy was unconstitutional. 

A. Legal Standard

 A motion for reconsideration can be granted only on one of four grounds: “1) the 

motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is 

based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 

3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice or 4) there is an intervening 

change in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 

1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). In addition, L.R. Civ. 

7.2(g)(1) provides that “No motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or 

written argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that 

resulted in the Order.” 

B. Analysis

PLN fails to show why the Court should grant the Motion under the strict standards 

that govern these requests. When PLN tried to send its materials into the jail, at least some 

materials were rejected under the jail’s policy limiting correspondence to one-page letters 

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or postcards. (Doc. 88-5, Ex. Q at PCSO 000048; id. at PSCO 000062.) The Court upheld 

that policy under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). The arguments PLN makes, 

and the evidence it cites to show that the decision was manifestly erroneous, were either 

previously made or could have been made at the summary judgment stage. At no point 

does PLN attempt to fit its argument to one of the limited bases that can support a Motion 

for Reconsideration. 

 It is true that PLN described the postcard and one-page letter policy and how 

certain PLN materials were denied under that policy in its Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment. (Doc. 86 at 4.) But when PLN laid out its legal challenge to the mail policies, it 

chose not to make any specific arguments about the unconstitutionality of the one-page 

policy. Instead, PLN argued broadly that “[t]he Jail’s policies and practices violate 

established law on the First Amendment rights of publishers and prisoners.” (Id. at 5.) At 

no point in its Motion did PLN differentiate between the policy banning newspapers and 

magazines, the publisher-only rule, or the postcard/one-page letter policy. PLN lumped 

all of the policies together into a generalized argument that all of Defendants’ policies 

were patently unconstitutional. 

With regard to the one-page/postcard policy, PLN made only one specific point: 

“Defendants’ person-most-knowledgeable testified that there was no legitimate 

penological interest for the postcard only policy, and that in his professional experience 

there were penological benefits to allowing inmate correspondence.” (Id. at 7.) PLN 

supported that statement with a citation to Deputy Chief Kimble’s deposition. (Id.) At his 

deposition, Deputy Chief Kimble was asked why he changed the policy from allowing 

only postcards to allowing both postcards and one-page letters. (Doc. 88-1, Ex. I at 60:19–

61:13.) Deputy Chief Kimble responded by stating that “we don’t have anything to show a 

legitimate penological interest” to justify allowing only postcards but not letters. (Id. at 

61:14–25.) He also added that allowing prisoners to write letters is helpful in maintaining 

order. (Id. at 62:1–7.) Nowhere did he state that the jail lacked a legitimate penological 

interest in limiting correspondence to postcards and one-page letters. 

Defendants likewise did not directly address the constitutionality of the 

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postcard/one-page letter policy in their Response/Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 

but, unlike the other policies, neither did Defendants concede that the postcard/one-page 

letter policy was unconstitutional. (Doc. 101 at 7.) Finally, in its Reply/Response to 

Defendant’s Cross-Motion, PLN made its first specific argument for why the 

postcard/one-page letter policy was unconstitutional. First, it claimed, citing supporting 

facts, that “PLN has demonstrated that Jail policy allowed inmates to receive 

correspondence only in the form or postcards and one-page letters, and that delivery of 

PLN’s materials, including its information packs, was refused as a result.” (Doc. 117 at 6; 

Doc. 87 ¶¶ 2, 5, 24.) The Court accepted these facts in its Order. PLN then claimed that 

“Defendants have offered no evidence that this policy served a legitimate penological 

objective. [citation]. It follows that summary judgment should be granted.” (Doc. 117 at 

6.) Those statements constituted the extent of PLN’s case against the postcard/one-page 

letter policy. Defendants argued in their Reply that “PLN errs in suggesting that the jail’s 

one-page letter policy was unconstitutional . . . . Prison officials are free to limit the 

number of pages of material an inmate may receive or send in the mail in order to reduce 

the volume of materials they must screen for contraband.” (Doc. 132 at 3.) 

In light of the portions of the record that the Parties cited and the arguments they 

made, the Court concluded that 

[t]here appears to be a common-sense connection between a jail goal of 

reducing contraband and limiting the number of pages a particular piece of 

correspondence contains. . . . PLN has not provided any evidence that 

would refute the obvious connection between a page limit and volume 

control. The remaining Turner factors do not counsel against the 

constitutionality of the jail’s policy. Sufficient alternative avenues of 

communication remain open for publishers like PLN who wish to 

communicate with inmates at the Pinal County Jail: newspapers, 

magazines, books, brochures and other publications. The jail’s policy 

limiting correspondence to one-page and postcards did not violate the First 

Amendment. 

(Doc. 143 at 14–15.) 

 For the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration, PLN claims that Defendants 

disclaimed any legitimate penological interest in their discovery responses and waited 

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until their Reply to raise the issue. PLN’s argument fails for two reasons. First, it is not a 

proper basis for a Motion for Reconsideration. PLN’s citations to other evidence in the 

record are unavailing. Most of that evidence was already considered by the Court in its 

Order. As to the statements PLN cites for the first time, PLN could have cited those 

statements in its original Motion and did not. None of the evidence qualifies as newlydiscovered. The remainder of PLN’s Motion for Reconsideration rehashes why certain 

cases that the Court relied on are inapplicable. None of those are proper bases for a 

Motion for Reconsideration. 

The second reason PLN’s argument is unconvincing is because it is incorrect. PLN 

bore the burden on its Motion for Summary Judgment to show that the postcard/one-page 

policy was not “rationally related to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective.” 

Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. 

at 89–90); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“In our view, the 

plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate 

time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”) PLN attempts to avoid its failure 

to meet that obligation by contending that it thought Defendants had already conceded the 

point. PLN then references Defendants’ Responses to two Interrogatories as evidence of 

the concession. The Court has reviewed those discovery responses (Doc. 145-1, Ex. B) 

and nowhere did Defendants concede that there was no legitimate penological interest in 

the decision to restrict incoming mail to postcards/one-page letters. They conceded that 

the materials were not denied “based on content” or because the materials themselves 

“implicated a health or safety concern” or would have “an adverse impact on other guards 

and prisoners”. (Id.) But they did not concede that the specific policy that allows only 

postcards and one-page letters was unconstitutional. PLN still had to carry its burden on 

summary judgment and it did not. 

 Accordingly, PLN has failed to show clear error. There is no basis for 

reconsideration. 

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CONCLUSION 

 PLN has failed to show that its materials are likely to be rejected under the 

publisher-only rule, and is therefore not entitled to a permanent injunction. PLN has 

likewise failed to show manifest error in the Court’s decision upholding the postcard/onepage letter policy. 

IT IS THERFORE ORDERED that PLN’s Motion for Permanent Injunction 

(Doc. 85) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 149) is 

granted in part and denied in part as described herein. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that PLN’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 145) 

is DENIED. 

Dated this 1st day of May, 2013. 

Case 2:11-cv-01761-DJH Document 150 Filed 05/01/13 Page 13 of 13