Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02564/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02564-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SVK 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Timothy Olmos, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 10-2564-PHX-GMS (BSB) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Timothy Olmos filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against various officials of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC). (Doc. 21.) 

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment, and the remaining Defendants—Director 

Ryan and Allen Ortega—cross-move for summary judgment on all remaining claims.1

 

(Docs. 116, 163.) Plaintiff also submits a Motion to Strike Arguments within 

Defendants’ Reply. (Doc. 206.) 

 The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motions and grant Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment in part and deny it in part. 

I. Background

 On screening of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the Court directed 

Defendant Charles L. Ryan to answer several Counts and Defendant Allen Ortega to 

answer one Count. (Doc. 27.) The remainder of the Defendants and claims were 

 1

 The Court provided Plaintiff Notice pursuant Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 

960 (9th Cir. 1998) of Plaintiff’s obligation and requirements for responding. (Doc. 166.) 

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dismissed. (Id.) Defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 132.) The 

Court dismissed additional claims and determined that the remaining claims are: 

 Count III (violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding conditions of 

confinement, including insufficient necessities such as food, clothing, and hygiene 

products, and overcrowding); 

 Count VII (violation of due process for charging inmate accounts for photocopies, 

legal phone calls, legal supplies and legal mail postage, follow-up visits and 

prescription renewals for chronic diseases, and GED testing); 

 Count IX (violation of due process for violating state-law inmate-compensation 

statutes); and 

 Count XV (violation of the First Amendment by retaliation). 

(Doc. 152 at 25.) 

 Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment was filed before the Court issued 

its Order dismissing additional claims, and his motion addresses several dismissed 

claims.2

 (Doc. 116.) Specifically, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on Counts VII 

through XI. (Id.) Thus, the only relevant arguments in Plaintiff’s motion are those 

related to Counts VII and IX. Defendants respond and cross-move as to all remaining 

claims. 

 Plaintiff submits his motion (Doc. 116) and numerous exhibits.3

 Defendants 

submit their response and cross-motion (Doc. 163), their Statement of Facts (Doc. 164 

(DSOF)), and the declaration of Ortega, with attachments (id., Ex. A, Ortega Decl.), the 

declaration of Linda Finchum, ADC Financial Services Bureau, with attachments (id., 

Ex. B, Finchum Decl.), and the declaration of G. Denning, Correctional Officer IV, with 

attachments (id., Ex. C, Denning Decl.). In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff 

 

2

 In addition, Plaintiff’s motion, as with many of his other filings (See Docs. 12, 

47), exceeds the page limit. 

3

 Plaintiff also cites to many improperly submitted documents, including Docs. 2- 8, which the Court specifically directed not be filed (Doc. 11), a Memorandum in Support of his Amended Complaint (Doc. 47) with hundreds of pages of exhibits, and a Memorandum Establishing Conformance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (Doc. 52), which also 

has hundreds of pages of exhibits. 

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submits his Response/Reply (Doc. 195) and a statement of facts and exhibits (Doc. 200 

(PSOF),4

 and a Controverting Statement of Facts (Doc. 187 (PCSOF)). 

II. Summary Judgment

 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial 

responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the 

record, together with affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact 

in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the 

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the non-moving party. Id. at 250; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party need not establish a material 

issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be 

shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). 

 When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits or declarations, if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the 

judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine 

whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of 

 

4

 Defendants object to the Court’s consideration of PSOF, but the Court has 

already determined to admit it. (Doc. 199.) 

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the non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 

favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the non-moving party is merely colorable or is 

not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 248-49. 

Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). See

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[c]onclusory, 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine 

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment”). 

III. Count III 

Count III is against Ryan and asserts allegedly unconstitutional conditions of 

confinement. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Ryan fails to provide Plaintiff with 

“sufficient (a) nutrition that meets the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s latest Dietary 

Guidelines for Americans, (b) clothing between launderings, (c) hygiene products. . . , (d) 

cleaning/sanitation supplies, and (e) living facilities.” (Doc. 21 at 5.) Plaintiff also 

alleges that Ryan houses inmates in overcrowded dorms and does not provide sufficient 

numbers of security staff, which has led to increases in violence among inmates. (Id.) 

 The Court will grant summary judgment to Ryan on this Count because Plaintiff 

fails to create a triable issue of fact that Ryan knew of unconstitutional conditions of 

confinement and ignored them. 

A. Analysis 

As a minimum standard, the Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials 

ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, and medical care, 

and take reasonable measures to guarantee inmates’ safety. Farme v. Brennanr, 511 U.S. 

822, 832 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 

1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 To demonstrate that a prison official has deprived an inmate of humane conditions 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, two requirements must be metCone objective and 

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one subjective. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000). First, “the 

prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The subjective prong 

requires the inmate to demonstrate that the deprivation was a product of “deliberate 

indifference” by prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). Deliberate 

indifference occurs only if a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In addition, a deprivation of a constitutional right 

occurs if the person acting under color of state law “does an affirmative act, participates 

in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do 

that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 

628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (alteration in original); see also King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 

567, 568 (9th Cir. 1987) (to be liable under § 1983, government officials must play an 

affirmative role in the constitutional deprivation alleged); Monell v. New York City Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). But there is no respondeat superior liability 

in a § 1983 action so a prison official is not liable merely because he is the supervisor of 

others. 

 To the extent that Plaintiff objects to Defendant raising the exhaustion issue again, 

Plaintiff misunderstands Defendant’s arguments. (See PSOF ¶ 5; Doc. 195 at 2.) 

Defendant is not arguing that the claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Rather, Defendant is claiming that Plaintiff cannot show that 

Ryan was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement because 

Plaintiff cannot show that Ryan was aware of them. (Doc. 203 at 3.) 

 Although a written ADC policy regarding a condition of confinement, such as a 

Department Order, would likely be sufficient to show that Ryan was aware of a particular 

condition, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not point to any written policies regarding 

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laundering of clothing or nutrition or the other matters about which he complains.5 

Because there is no respondeat superior liability in a § 1983 action, even if Plaintiff did 

experience unconstitutional deprivations, Ryan cannot be liable unless he was aware of 

the condition. 

 As to the conditions complained of in Count III, although Plaintiff complained in 

an Informal Resolution about allegedly inadequate nutrition, Plaintiff did not appeal this 

to the Director’s level. (DSOF ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 132-1 at 114-15.) Therefore, Plaintiff cannot 

show that Ryan was aware of the allegedly inadequate nutrition. And even if the Court 

assumes that Ryan received the grievance about wearing dirty clothing, which alleged 

that the longest interval between launderings is four days (DSOF ¶ 5), the Court finds 

that this does not state a constitutional violation; there is no requirement that inmates 

receive freshly laundered clothing with greater frequency. The Court notes that he is 

permitted two pair of athletic shorts but also permitted three state-provided boxers and 

may purchase four. (Doc. 144 at 19.) The Eighth Amendment requires only that inmates 

be provided with minimum essentials such as adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical 

care and safety. Helling, 509 U.S. at 32. In addition, Plaintiff admitted in response to the 

Motion to Dismiss that he did not attempt to grieve any other Count III subclaim. (Doc. 

132, Pl’s. May 2, 2012, Supp. Resp. to Defs’. First Set of Non-Uniform Interrogatories, at 

2.) Therefore, there is nothing to show that Ryan was aware of the allegedly 

unconstitutional deprivation of hygiene products, or cleaning/sanitation supplies, or 

insufficient security staff. 

 Finally, even if the Court assumes that Ryan received Plaintiff’s grievance about 

overcrowding (Doc. 132, at 114-115), overcrowding by itself is not a constitutional 

 

5

 Plaintiff submits only a list of permissible clothing and a holiday laundry scheduled for a period not at issue here. (Doc. 144 at 19; Doc. 200, Ex. B (Doc 200-3 at 

18.) ) 

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violation. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1249. Therefore, a grievance alleging overcrowding 

would not have made Ryan aware of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 

 In addition, Ryan is entitled to qualified immunity. A defendant in a § 1983 action 

is entitled to qualified immunity from damages for civil liability if his or her conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

The qualified-immunity inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of 

the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer 

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202 (emphasis 

added). The burden is on the plaintiff to show a clearly established right. See Sorrels v. 

McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no clearly established right to more 

clothing than is provided and no clearly established right to more frequent laundry 

service. And Ryan acted reasonably when he did not address the additional matters about 

which Plaintiff complains because there is no evidence that he was aware of 

unconstitutional conditions. 

 The Court will grant Ryan summary judgment on Count III. 

IV. Count VII 

In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges due process violations regarding ADC policies to 

charge inmates for various services; those claims for which the Court has determined he 

exhausted his administrative remedies relate to legal photocopies, legal phone calls, legal 

supplies, legal-mail postage, follow up doctor visits, prescription renewals, and GED 

testing costs. Plaintiff also claims that he is improperly charged for chronic care visits 

and medications. 

 The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Ryan’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as Plaintiff may have been charged for allergy 

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visits and medications. The Court will grant the remainder of Ryan’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment on Count VII. 

A. Analysis 

 1. Postage, photocopies, telephone calls, and legal supplies 

 (a) No forfeiture 

 As to the claim regarding postage, photocopies, telephone calls, and legal supplies, 

Plaintiff relies first on Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-904(D), which provides that: 

The conviction of a person for any offense shall not work forfeiture of any 

property, except if a forfeiture is expressly imposed by law. All forfeitures 

to the state, unless expressly imposed by law, are abolished. 

(Doc. 116 at 7.) But charging inmates for services provided is not forfeiture. The act of 

forfeiting is defined as “the loss of property or money because of a breach of a legal 

obligation.”6

 (See e.g., Doc. 164, Ex. B, Attach. 1, DO 905.06 Forfeit of Inmate Earnings 

Upon Escape.) Plaintiff is not being charged for stamps or legal telephone calls merely 

because of his status as an inmate but, rather, because he used the services. 

 The cases on which Plaintiff relies are inapplicable and do not support his claim of 

a forfeiture. (See Doc. 195 at 3-4, 14.) In Blum v. State, 829 P.2d 1247 (Ariz. App. 

1992), inmates challenged an ADC policy regarding disposal of excess property, alleging 

that it violated a statutory provision requiring return of property upon the prisoner’s 

parole or discharge—Ariz. Re Rev. Stat. § 31-228(A). 829 P. 2d 1247, 1248. The policy 

provided that the an inmate was to be notified if any personal property in his or her 

possession or received while in prison was deemed to be unauthorized property and the 

inmate would have 90 days in which to notify the property officer of the desired 

disposition of the unauthorized property; if the inmate failed to designate a disposition of 

the property, the property would be processed as unclaimed and then disposed of. Id. at 

 

6

 Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forfeiture (last 

visited June 3, 2013.) 

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1248. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the prison regulation conflicted with the 

statute requiring return of property; it noted that the regulation, therefore, caused a 

forfeiture of the property in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-904(D) because there would 

be situations where inmates had no means of disposing of the property to safeguard it. Id.

at 1251-52. In the present case, charging for stamps and photocopying actually used does 

not violate a specific statute. 

Ill. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Hawkins, 952 N.E. 2d 624 (Ill. 2011) is also inapposite. In 

Hawkins, the Illinois Supreme Court considered an Illinois statute that provided that the 

assets of a committed person could be subject to a claim for reimbursement by the Illinois 

Department of Corrections. Id. at 632. The Illinois Court concluded that under the 

relevant Illinois statutory scheme, a portion of the wages earned in prison programs was 

exempt from collection. Id. at 634-35. Likewise, Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F. 3d 891, 896 

(9th Cir. 2001) does not apply. There, the Ninth Circuit held that funds in an inmate 

account that came from payments of Veteran’s Disability Benefits could not be used by 

the prison to reimburse itself for copying costs or dental appliances because 38 U.S.C. § 

5301(a) specifically exempted such funds from claims of creditors and provided that the 

funds were not subject to attachment, levy, or seizure. 271 F.3d at 893-94, 896. Again, 

in the present case, charging for stamps and photocopying used does not violate a specific 

statute. 

 (b) No need for express statutory authority 

 Plaintiff also relies on the absence of express authority for the ADC Director to 

charge inmates for these services. (Doc. 116 at 7.) But Arizona does not require express 

authorization from the legislature for agency action. 

 As to Ryan’s authority, the issue is not whether there is express authorization from 

the legislature to charge inmates for postage, photocopies, and the other items but 

whether the regulations, or in this case the policies, as adopted “may be reasonably 

implied from a consideration of the statutory scheme as [a] whole to carry out the 

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purposes and intent of the legislative mandate.” Longbridge Inv. Co., v. Moore, 533 P.2d 

564, 567 (Ariz. App. 1975), quoting State of Arizona v. Arizona Mines Supply Co., 107 

Ariz. 199, 484 P.2d 619 (1971). Legislative authority need not be set out in express 

terms; “it is the law of this state that an agency may promulgate regulations which may 

be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’” Id; see 

Ethridge v. Ariz. State Board of Nursing, 796 P.2d 899, 906-07 (App. Ariz. 1990). The 

court in Longbridge found that the very nature of the liquor industry and its effect upon 

the health and welfare of the public subjects it to strict regulation and reasoned that under 

the mandates of State v. Arizona Mines Supply, a delegation of rule-making power to the 

Superintendent and the Board of the Department of Liquor Licenses should be liberally 

construed. 533 P.2d at 568. Likewise, the court in Ethridge held that the term 

“unprofessional conduct” is sufficient to guide the Board in its exercise of delegated 

discretion where the purpose of the statute authorizing the Board to adopt rules and 

regulations was to protect the public health, safety and welfare. 796 P.2d at 906-07. 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on Smith v. Dep’t. of Corrs., 920 So. 2d 638 (Fl. 1 Dist. 

App. 2003), is misplaced. In Smith the Florida state court found that a regulation 

allowing the Florida Department of Corrections to charge inmates for photocopying was 

invalid because it exceeded the legislature’s grant of rulemaking authority. Id. at 643. 

But the Florida court relied on the language of a Florida statute—and Florida case law 

interpreting that statute—that required an express statutory grant of authority to validate 

any agency rule-making. Id. at 641. That is not the law in Arizona. 

 As Defendant asserts, under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1604(A), the Director possesses 

broad powers and wide discretion with respect to his responsibility “for the overall 

operations and policies of the department” and to “[m]aintain and administer all 

institutions and programs within the department.” (Doc. 163 at 3.) Ariz. Rev. Stat. §41-

1604(B) provides Ryan with authority to “[a]dopt rules to implement the purposes of the 

department and the duties and powers of the director” and “[t]ake any administrative 

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action to improve the efficiency of the department.” (Id.) In addition, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 31-230(B) states that “[t]he Director shall adopt rules and regulations for the 

disbursement of monies from prisoner spendable accounts.” In Ward v. Ryan, 623 F. 3d 

807, 811(9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit held that statutes creating a property interest in 

prison wages did not give inmates full and unfettered right to their property, the inmate 

did not have a property right in wages withheld in a dedicated discharge account, and the 

Director had authority to regulate inmate usage of funds in the prisoner spendable 

accounts, citing § 31-230(B). 

 The Court holds that as with Longbridge and the liquor industry, the nature of 

corrections and its effect on employees, inmates, and the public subject it to strict 

regulation and that delegation of rule-making power should be liberally construed. The 

Court finds that the policies in question can be reasonably implied from “a consideration 

of the statutory scheme as a whole” because they relate to the operations of ADC and 

administration of programs within ADC. 

 (c) No state-created right

 In addition, Plaintiff’s claim fails because he cannot demonstrate a state-created 

right to postage, photocopies, telephone calls and legal supplies at state expense. In Piatt 

v. MacDougall, the plaintiff inmate sued the Director of ADC alleging that the former 

version of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-254 created a property right to wages from his workshop 

job—wages that he had not received.7

 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985). The former 

version of § 31-254 provided that 

A. Each prisoner who is engaged in productive work in any state prison or institution under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections as a part of the prison industries program shall receive for his work such 

compensation as the director of the department of corrections shall determine. Such compensation shall be in accordance with a graduated schedule based on quantity and quality of work performed and skill 

 

7

 Count IX raises wage issues under the current version of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-

254. 

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required for its performance, but in no event shall such compensation exceed fifty cents per hour unless, pursuant to § 41–1624.01, the director 

enters into a contract with a private person, firm, corporation or association in which case such compensation shall be as prescribed by the person, firm, corporation or association, but shall not be below the minimum wage. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41–1624.01(A) stated that the director shall compensate prisoners for 

their services pursuant to § 31–254. In Piatt, the court held that the language of the 

statute was unambiguous and, accepting the plaintiff’s assertions as true that he engaged 

in productive work as a prisoner, he was entitled to compensation; further, if his work 

was done as part of a contract with a private entity, he was is entitled to pay at least equal 

to the minimum wage. 773 F.2d at 1032. In addition, because Arizona provided a right to 

compensation for work performed for private parties, the right could not be denied 

without due process. Id. 

 The court then determined that the failure to compensate was not random and 

because statutes mandated compensation, failure to compensate was unauthorized. The 

court concluded that the state was under a constitutional obligation not to deny the inmate 

his wages without affording him a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the time the 

wages were due; that is, a post-deprivation remedy was not sufficient. Id. at 1037. 

 Thus, in Piatt, the inmate was able to identify specific state statutory language 

creating an unambiguous property right. But here, Plaintiff points to no language 

creating a right to stamps, photocopies, etc. at state expense. In Piatt, the court reasoned 

that the inmate’s federal due process claim would “succeed or fail in part depending upon 

whether he had a property right to wages from his workshop work.” Id. at 1035. 

Because Plaintiff has no property right to stamps, photocopies, etc. at state expense, his 

due process claim fails. 

 The Court also finds that Ryan is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 

There is no clearly established right for an inmate to receive the services and items in 

question free of charge. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 

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 2. Charges for “chronic care” 

 Plaintiff’s claim that Ryan improperly charges for chronic care has more merit but 

it, too, ultimately fails, except for his claim regarding allergies. 

 Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-201.01 (I), the director is to exempt certain inmates or 

medical visits by inmates from payment of medical and health services fees and fees for 

prescriptions, medication or prosthetic devices, including “inmates who are undergoing 

follow-up medical treatment for chronic diseases.” DO 1101 provides for health care 

fees to be deducted from inmate accounts and that “no one shall waive the payment of 

health care fees, except in the following situations: . . . Inmates who undergo follow-up 

health treatment specifically for their chronic conditions per provider request.” (Doc. 

164, Ex. B, Attach. 3, DO 1101 at 21-22 (164-1 at 105-06.)) The DO also states the 

following: 

[c]hronic conditions requiring regular examinations and/or treatment: 

cancer, diabetes, hypertention, seizure disorder, heart disease, respiratory 

disease, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDs, serious mental illness (and other mental 

illnesses of inpatients at the Alhambra Special Psychiatric Hospital and the 

Flamenco mental Health Center,) or any condition requiring regular 

examinations and or treatment that are directly related to a qualifying 

disability, as defined by 42 U.S.C. [§] 12102(2) of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act. Arizona Department of Corrections health care providers 

shall determine whether regular examinations and or treatment are directly 

related to a qualifying disability. There is no health care fee for these 

conditions. 

 

(Id. at 21-22.) But the definitions state that chronic conditions include allergies and 

developmental disabilities, as well as the conditions listed in the material quoted above. 

(Id.) 

 The Court is not persuaded by Ryan’s argument that the determination as to 

whether a condition is chronic is made by the provider (DSOF ¶ 10); that language 

appears to apply only to conditions that may qualify under the ADA. In fact, the DO 

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contains a list of specific chronic conditions. But Plaintiff has the burden to show a statecreated property interest, and he cannot establish an unambiguous right to most of the 

free chronic care he seeks. The statute on which Plaintiff relies contains no definition of 

“chronic diseases”; it certainly does not specify the conditions to which Plaintiff asserts a 

right to free care. Compare Piatt, 733 F.2d at 1036 (the language of the Arizona inmate 

wage statute is unambiguous). Although Plaintiff argues that Ryan should be bound by 

the “the common and approved” use of the term, Plaintiff does not explain what that is. 

In fact, the Centers for Disease Control have recently noted the lack of consistency in the 

definition of chronic diseases and conditions.8

 The Court finds that Ryan had authority to 

promulgate DO 1101 and that it does not conflict with the language of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 

31-201.01(I). Because Plaintiff cannot establish a property right to free medical care for 

most of the conditions about which he complains, Plaintiff has no property right protected 

by due process. See Piatt, 773 F.2d at 1035. 

 However, the policy itself defines allergies as a chronic condition. (Doc. 164, Ex. 

B, Attach. 3, DO 1101 at 21 (164-1 at 105.)) Under § 31-201.01(I), treatment, 

prescriptions, and medications for chronic diseases should be exempted from fees. 

Plaintiff asserts that he has been charged for these items, although he does not submit 

proof of this claim. His charts at Doc. 47-2, 37G-38G, list only medical visits and 

medications but do not specify what these were for. Therefore, the Court will deny 

summary judgment to Plaintiff. But because it appears that Plaintiff may have been 

improperly charged for allergy treatments and visits because the policy is contradictory or 

inconsistent, the Court will deny summary judgment to Ryan. Charging fees for 

treatment of a chronic condition violates state law. In addition, the state had a 

constitutional obligation not to deny Plaintiff free care without affording him a 

 

8

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meaningful pre-deprivation opportunity to be heard, which the state apparently did not 

do. See Piatt, 773 F.2d at 1036. 

 Further, as to as to the conditions other than allergies, the Court finds that Ryan is 

entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right to have the 

conditions about which Plaintiff complains deemed chronic. As to treatment for 

allergies, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because the 

DO 1101 defines allergies as a chronic condition but excludes them from the list of 

conditions for which no fee will be charged. In view of the statutory language 

prohibiting fees for follow-up chronic care and the lack of a pre-deprivation opportunity 

to be heard, the Court cannot find that Ryan acted reasonably as to any charges for 

allergy care and medication. 

 The Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count VII 

except for the issue regarding charges for chronic care for allergies and will deny 

Plaintiff’s motion. The remaining issues for determination are whether Plaintiff has 

allergies, whether he was charged for follow-up visits and treatment, and if so, how 

much. See id. at 1037. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief. (Doc. 21 at 6.) 

V. Count IX 

Plaintiff asserts that he was undercompensated for his work performed for ADC’s 

food service contractor and for his work as an education aide. He also asserts that he was 

not paid a $.05 per hour raise to which he was entitled. 

 The Court will deny summary judgment, without prejudice, to both parties 

regarding the kitchen work. The Court will grant summary judgment to Ryan and deny 

summary judgment to Plaintiff regarding the downgrade of the education aide position. 

The Court finds that the claim for a $.05 per-hour raise based on performance is beyond 

the scope of the First Amended Complaint. 

/// 

/// 

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 1. Kitchen worker 

 Regarding Plaintiff’s claim for under-compensation as a kitchen worker, Plaintiff 

relies on two state statutes, including Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-254. (Doc. 116 at 10, 21.) As 

noted in the discussion of Count VII, the Ninth Circuit addressed a prior version of § 31-

254 in Piatt. 773 F.2d at 1034, n. 2. There, the court found that the statute 

unambiguously created a right to compensation at the minimum wage for work 

performed for private parties and that the right could not be denied without due process. 

Id. at 1036. 

 But Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-254 has been revised since Piatt. It now provides that: 

A. Each prisoner who is engaged in productive work in any state prison or 

institution under the jurisdiction of the department or a private prison under 

contract with the department as a part of the prison industries program shall 

receive for the prisoner’s work the compensation that the director 

determines. The compensation shall be in accordance with a graduated 

schedule based on quantity and quality of work performed and skill 

required for its performance but shall not exceed fifty cents per hour unless 

the prisoner is employed in an Arizona correctional industries program 

pursuant to title 41, chapter 11, article 3. If the director enters into a 

contract pursuant to § 41-1624.01 with a private person, firm, corporation 

or association the director shall prescribe prisoner compensation of at 

least two dollars per hour. Compensation shall not be paid to prisoners for 

attendance at educational training or treatment programs, but compensation 

may be paid for work training programs. 

(Emphasis added.) Section § 41-1624.01 relates to Arizona Correctional Industries 

(ACI), which is a program pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1622(B). Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 

41-1624.01 provides that: 

 

A. The director shall compensate prisoners for their services pursuant to 

§ 31-254. 

B. The director or his designee may contract with any state agency, political 

subdivision or state department or any private person, firm, corporation or 

association to provide services or labor rendered by prisoners. 

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C. All monies derived from contract services provided pursuant to 

subsection B of this section shall be deposited in the fund established 

pursuant to § 41-1624.9

 Reading the relevant provisions of § 31-254 and § 41-1624.01 together, it is 

apparent that the $2.00 per hour minimum compensation is not triggered by just any 

contract between the Director or his designee and a private person, firm, corporation or 

association. Rather such a contract must be one pursuant to § 41-1624.01 (ACI), and it 

must be to provide services or labor rendered by prisoners. 

 Plaintiff alleges that if the Director enters into a contract with an outside 

contractor that provides for the contractor’s use of labor and services by inmates the 

$2.00 per hour minimum applies. (Doc. 116 at 10, 21.) But that is not what the statute 

says. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege or provide evidence that the contract with 

Canteen is one in which ADC contracts to provide services or labor rendered by 

prisoners; it is more likely that the contract is one for Canteen to provide food services to 

ADC. Defendant appears to argue that if Plaintiff was paid at a certain amount under the 

WIPP program, the contract must not have been one requiring the higher wage (DSOF 

¶¶ 23, 32, 34); the Court cannot grant summary based on this circular argument. Neither 

party provides a copy of the contract. The Court finds that it cannot make a 

determination on this claim without reviewing the contract or contracts in question and 

other necessary documentation to determine if the director entered into a contract 

pursuant to § 41-1624.01 with a private person, firm, corporation or association to 

provide services or labor rendered by prisoners. 

 2. Education aide 

Turning to the issue of Plaintiff’s compensation as an education aide, as noted,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-254 provides that prisoners are to receive compensation as 

 

9

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determined by the Director based a graduated schedule that accounts for quantity and 

quality of work performed and skill required for its performance. To the extent that 

Plaintiff is arguing that any revisions Ryan makes to the compensation schedule must be 

applied to all jobs equally or that he cannot reduce the skill level of a particular job (Doc. 

195 at 16), the Court disagrees. Plaintiff does not like how Ryan has implemented the 

graduated scale, but the statute creates no right to have the job of education aide 

designated as the same skill level as tutor or to have pay reductions applied equally; the 

statute does not refer to particular jobs. Compare Piatt, 733 F.2d at 1036 (the language 

of the Arizona statute is unambiguous). The Court finds that Ryan has the authority to 

reduce the skill level of the education aide position to semi-skilled. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 41-1604(A) (2) and § 31-254. Because Plaintiff has no state-created right to have his 

position as education aide classified as skilled or as the equivalent to a tutor position, he 

has no property right protected by due process. See Piatt, 773 F. 3d at 1036. 

 Alternatively, the Court finds that Ryan is entitled to qualified immunity on this 

claim because there is no clearly established right to have the job of education aide 

designated to be a particular skill level. The Court will deny Plaintiff summary judgment 

on this claim and grant summary judgment to Defendant. 

 3. $.05 per-hour raise 

Plaintiff has made the issue of the raise needlessly confusing. It appears from a 

careful reading of his pleadings that Plaintiff is claiming that he is entitled (1) to a $.05 

per hour raise because his job as an education aide was improperly downgraded from 

skilled to semi-skilled (Doc. 21) and that he is entitled (2) to a second $.05 per hour raise 

as a semi-skilled education aide because he has received “overall exceeds” work 

evaluations for 6 consecutive months while receiving no unsatisfactory ratings in the past 

12 months (Doc. 116 at 13-14; PCSOF ¶ 30). That is, he claims a second $.05 per hour 

raise based on work performance. 

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shows that semi-skilled Phase III inmates earn a base pay of $.30 and maximum pay of 

$.45. The skilled Phase III inmate has a base pay of $.35 and a maximum pay of $.50. 

(Doc. 47-3 at 12.) Plaintiff asserts that he is a Phase III semi-skilled inmate, has a GED, 

which entitles him to $.35 per hour, received one merit increase of $.05 per hour, and 

now earns $.40 per hour. A second $.05 per-hour raise based on work performance 

would bring him the maximum Phase III semi-skilled wage of $.45 per hour. 

 In his First Amended Complaint, Count IX, Plaintiff complained about 

downgrading the skill level of education aides from “skilled to semi-skilled when an 

automated system (called TOSS) was rolled out without changing any of the duties of the 

position to reflect the lowered skill level, resulting in a [$.0]5 per hour decrease in 

compensation.” (Doc. 21 at 5-G.) The Court has disposed of that claim, finding that 

Ryan had the authority to reduce the skill level of the education-aide position. 

 The second issue—the pay increase based on work performance—was not raised 

in the First Amended Complaint. (Id.) There is no mention of denial of a merit raise, so 

Plaintiff=s First Amended Complaint gave no notice of the factual allegations presented 

for the first time in Plaintiff=s motion for summary judgment. Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports 

(U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 

534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)). The Court notes that Plaintiff does not state what period he is 

referring to so it is not possible to determine if any claim for a second merit pay increase 

had even accrued at the time of filing the First Amended Complaint or if such a claim 

was exhausted. The Court will not consider the claim regarding the second merit raise. 

VI. Count XV 

Count XV asserts a claim of retaliation by Ortega stemming from Plaintiff sending 

a letter to the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDC) seeking information about the 

library. The Court will grant summary judgment to Ortega as to the disciplinary charge 

and the cell search. 

/// 

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A. Analysis 

 A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of 

(3) that prisoner’s protected conduct and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal 

harm) and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-58 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 

F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (retaliation claims require an inmate to show that (1) the 

prison official acted in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally-protected right and 

(2) the action “advanced no legitimate penological interest”). Retaliation claims must be 

evaluated in light of the concerns of excessive judicial involvement in day-to-day prison 

management, and courts must therefore “afford appropriate deference and flexibility” to 

prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct 

alleged to be retaliatory. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995.) 

 The evidence shows that Department Order 914 at 914.05 § 1.1 requires outgoing 

inmate mail to include an inmate’s ADC inmate number and full return address, including 

the name of the complex, unit, and bed location. (Doc. 203 at 8; Doc. 164, Ex. A, Attach. 

2.) Plaintiff was found guilty of a misdemeanor violation and reprimanded because, 

although the information he sought from KDC was public and he was enrolled in college 

at the time as he represented, the return address he used on his envelope did not 

accurately reflect his status as an ADC inmate. (DSOF ¶¶ 49, 50.) 

Turning to the disciplinary charge, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence 

shows that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim of retaliation against Ortega. Alternatively, 

Ortega is entitled to qualified immunity. 

 First, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to send mail that does not comply with 

prison rules. Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of the rule, and courts have upheld 

prison rules requiring identifying information on mail. See Riggins v. Clark, 403 Fed. 

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Appx. 292 (9th Cir. 2010); Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2001). Second, 

the Court holds that Plaintiff has not established that Ortega’s conduct constituted a 

sufficiently “adverse action” to prevail on a claim of retaliation; the undisputed evidence 

shows that although Ortega wrote Plaintiff up, the charges were later changed by another 

officer, and Plaintiff was found guilty on the revised charges. (PSOF ¶¶ 31, 34, 36; 

DSOF ¶¶ 46-50.) Thus, Ortega’s charges were not the basis of the disciplinary action 

against Plaintiff. See Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F. 3d 910, 926 (9th Cir. 2009) (the 

harm to the plaintiff can be traced more directly to an intervening actor). While 

defendants are generally responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their 

actions, “liability may not attach if ‘an intervening decision of an informed, neutral 

decision-maker breaks the chain of causation,’ meaning that the harm to the plaintiff can 

be traced more directly to an intervening actor.” Id. (quoting Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 

278, 292 (5th Cir. 2005).) Thus, Ortega’s conduct caused no harm. Moreover, Plaintiff 

concedes that he was found guilty of the revised charges, and the Court found on 

screening the First Amended Complaint that Plaintiff failed to state a due process claim 

regarding the disciplinary charges. (Doc. 27 at 22.) Therefore, whether the finding of 

guilt was correct is not an issue before the Court. 

 The Court also finds that there was a legitimate penological justification for the 

charges. Even if the charges as written by Ortega were revised, the new charges also 

dealt with the same letter to KDC. (PSOF ¶ 34.) Those charges were sustained. Thus, it 

is beyond dispute that there was a legitimate penological justification for charges against 

Plaintiff based on the letter to KDC. 

 The Court also finds that Ortega is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim 

because it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that he was violating a 

clearly established right. Ortega charged Plaintiff with fraud for posing as a college 

student regarding the letter, which did not have the proper identifying information. 

(DSOF ¶ 46.) Although Plaintiff claims he showed Ortega a text book, Ortega asserts 

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that he did not know that Plaintiff was a college student. “A plaintiff=s belief that a 

defendant acted from an unlawful motive, without evidence supporting that belief, is no 

more than speculation or unfounded accusation about whether the defendant really did act 

from an unlawful motive.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 

1028 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court finds that it would not have been clear to Ortega that his 

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

 In addition, although Ortega did not brief the issue regarding the alleged 

retaliatory cell search, the Court will dismiss the claim. The Court has found that 

Plaintiff had no constitutional right to send mail that did not comply with prison rules; 

therefore, he cannot establish a claim for a retaliatory cell search based on sending the 

letter to KDC.

 IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The reference to the Magistrate is withdrawn as to the Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 116), Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 

163), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Arguments within Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 206). 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 116) is denied and 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Arguments within Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 206) is denied. 

 (3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 163) is granted in part 

and denied in part as follows: 

 (a) granted as to the claims in Count III; the claims in Count VII, 

except for the claim regarding charges related to care and medication for allergies; the 

claim in Count IX regarding payment for work as an education aide; and the claim in 

Count XV; and 

 (b) denied as to the remaining claims. 

(4) Within 45 days of the date of entry of this Order, Defendants may file a 

new motion for summary judgment, with appropriate documentation, on the claim in 

Count IX regarding compensation for work in the kitchen. Plaintiff may file a response 

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and cross-motion within 30 days of the date of filing of Defendants’ new motion. 

Plaintiff’s response and cross-motion, if any, must not exceed a total of 17 pages 

together, and he must not file any documents independent of his response and crossmotion, if any. The Court will strike any filings submitted by Plaintiff that do not 

comply with these directions. 

 (5) The remaining claims are the claim in Count VII regarding fees for 

treatment of allergies, including damages and injunctive relief, and, pending the 

second motion for summary judgment, the claim in Count IX for compensation as a 

kitchen worker. 

 Dated this 29th day of August, 2013. 

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