Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-03561/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-03561-378/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 GOOGLE INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 10-03561 WHA

ORDER RE GOOGLE MOTION

IN LIMINE RE EXPERT VOUCHING

FOR PREFERRED VERSION OF

DISPUTED FACT (ECF NO. 1697)

Google is correct that an expert should never purport to tell the jury which side’s fact

witnesses are credible or vouch for whose fact scenario is correct — that is entirely for the jury. 

Nor should an expert ever attempt to tell the jury what someone intended or was thinking. 

The mental state of the characters in our story on trial is for the jury to decide, never for experts

to speculate about. No after-the-fact expert could possibly have firsthand knowledge anyway. 

No expert is a mind reader. These are clear-cut prohibitions.

That said, subject to the other rules of evidence, it will be permissible for experts to quote

from fact testimony or emails, memos, letters or other documents which are part of the res gestae

of the case and then to explicitly assume that they accurately reflect the relevant circumstances

and then, based thereon, apply their specialized expertise to render opinions beyond the ken of

our lay jury. This will be allowed even if a document (or testimony) reveals a mental state (like

an intent to “make enemies”). Under such a procedure, there will be no vouching because the

expert will make clear that he or she is simply assuming the document or testimony to have been

Case 3:10-cv-03561-WHA Document 1803 Filed 05/03/16 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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accurate. The expert, however, cannot embellish on the content of the evidentiary material in

violation of the strict prohibitions set forth above. On cross-examination, the other side may

clobber the expert’s assumption with documents or testimony going the other way. Within the

limits of Rule 403, the Court will allow this for both sides unless and until it gets out of hand.

As a matter of respect for the ability and role of juries, the Court would have preferred

that experts truncate the “fact advocacy” part of their testimony down to their core factual

assumptions and then, based thereon, explain their opinions to the jury. Both sides in this case,

however, seemed primed to argue their fact cases through experts, so it is hopeless to try to

regulate the problem further than to say the judge will vigilantly enforce the two principles stated

above, even to the extent of interrupting and striking testimony sua sponte. 

Furthermore, to protect the integrity of the process and to help the jury evaluate “expert

testimony,” the Court will give the jury the instruction appended hereto, subject to hearing

counsel’s objections (due by NOON ON MAY 7). 

Google’s motion is DENIED.

Please note that other orders in limine will address Witnesses Kemerer, Jaffe and

Malackowski and the denial in this order is without prejudice to restrictions elsewhere. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2016. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:10-cv-03561-WHA Document 1803 Filed 05/03/16 Page 2 of 2