Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05436/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05436-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEBBIE SEBER DALOIAN, CASE NO. CV-F-04-5436 LJO

 

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

vs.

ANNE VENEMAN,

Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,

Defendant.

 /

Pursuant to a notice filed on July 18, 2005, Defendant Anne Veneman, the Secretary of the

United States Department of Agriculture, moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims and moves for summary

judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion on September 2, 2005. The Court vacated the

hearing and took the motions under submission. Having considered the moving and opposition papers,

as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Background

Plaintiff resigned from her position with the Forest Service in August 1994. In April 2001,

plaintiff contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor regarding her claim that she had been

subjected to sexually hostile work environment. She contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) six years after her employment ended pursuant to the terms of a settlement

agreement in a class action in which the Forest Service agreed that past female employees could contact

the EEOC to raise sexual harassment complaints that would otherwise be time-barred.

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The EEOC accepted for investigation and adjudication, pursuant to the terms of the settlement

agreement, plaintiff’s complaint. The EEOC stated the following issues to be adjudicated:

Whether the agency subjected the complainant to discrimination based on sex (female),

when she was subjected to an allegedly hostile work environment and constructive

discharge, while a temporary employee at the Sequoia National Forest between June 13,

1994 and August 8, 1994, when: 

After the complainant refused to have drinks after work with her

supervisor, all requests for training and instructions were allegedly

refused;

The complainant was not informed that trail signs had been removed and

to watch for cattle trails crossing the main trails; The complainant was

sent out, untrained and unfamiliar with the territory, with an untrained

student; and 

The complainant was told to resign or be terminated. 

The EEOC processed plaintiff’s complaint and found that plaintiff could not make a showing

of sexual harassment sufficient to justify a hearing. The EEOC ALJ issued a decision without a hearing.

The EEOC ALJ determined that the conduct plaintiff complained of was not sufficiently severe and

pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her employments. Plaintiff appealed the matter to the

EEOC. The appeal was denied and plaintiff filed this judicial action.

On March 16, 2004, plaintiff filed her judicial complaint entitled “Complainant’s Request for

Reconsideration or to Vacate a Decision.” The complaint is stated in terms of an “appeal,” of the

administrative decision and plaintiff sets out numerous procedural errors in the EEOC’s handling of her

case. From the complaint, the Court infers she alleges discrimination, based on gender and disability,

and procedural deficiencies in the EEOC’s administrative handling of her claim.

Defendant’s contentions

Plaintiff was hired for a temporary employee position as an Animal Packer Wilderness Ranger

on June 13, 1994. In her first 2 weeks of employment, plaintiff repaired tack in the tack room among

other things. During her first two weeks of employer, she accompanied a second level supervisor to the

general store and during that trip, he asked her out for a drink. She declined.

She was then accompanied by another employee to become familiar with the trail system.

Plaintiff got lost on at least three pack trips, including one in which she had to be airlifted from a canyon

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by helicopter, at significant cost to the agency. 

On August 8, 1994, District Ranger Del Pengilly gave plaintiff a choice of resigning or being

terminated. Plaintiff decided to resign to avoid a derogatory mark on her employment record.

Plaintiff’s allegation in support of hostile work environment is that a male supervisors asked her

to join him for a drink. This conduct was not sufficiently severe that pervasive as to comprise a sexually

hostile work environment. At the administrative level, plaintiff did not press her hostile work

environment claim but suggested that her problems arose from lack of training and her lack of training

was attributable to her having declined the drink invitation.

In this action, plaintiff shifts to her claim to having a learning disability. She alleges that instead

of forcing her to resign, she should have been accommodated by providing training as to the trail system.

Plaintiff, however, failed to exhaust her claim for disability discrimination. 

Plaintiff’s complaint also suggest that she was dissatisfied with the way the EEOC ALJ handled

the proceeding. The remedy for a person aggrieved by the agency action is to file an action in district

court. A complainant who believes that the investigation is not being conducted appropriately has the

opportunity to shift the forum to district court, conduct their own investigation through the tools of

discovery and present the case to court.

Plaintiff’s opposition

Pro Se Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion consists of a statement of disputed facts. She repeats

the facts as defendant describes them, then inserts where she feels she disputes the fact. She attaches as

Exhibits to the statement of undisputed facts much of the administrative record from the EEOC

administrative file, such as the complaint, EEOC investigative report, her evidence submitted to the

EEOC, etc. The relevant disputed facts are as follows:

1. Plaintiff disputes that she was shown the trails or explained the trails, i.e., given any form

of training. Trail signs were poorly marked or few and far between. She refers to a letter

from another packer, Mike Cobb, who says he was not given training as to the trails. 

2. Plaintiff states that she informed defendant of her learning disability from the beginning.

Plaintiff refers to Exhibit G attached to her opposition and Exhibit L, a letter discussing

her disability. Exhibit G is a multi-page document containing unrelated documents with

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wide ranging dates. The first page is a 1994 “Notification of Personal Action” form

which appears to be the form filed out by the forestry service as to the date, terms and

employment salary for plaintiff’s position. The second document in Exhibit G is a

Diagnostic Assessment Report dated May 7, 1990 which reports tests given to plaintiff

and that states, in part, she has a “difficult time executing a task that is purely visual in

nature.” The remaining two documents in Exhibit G are letters plaintiff wrote to the

Chief of the Forestry Service, dated January 2, 2003 and August 19, 2004, wherein she

says she has a learning disability. Exhibit L is plaintiff’s September 10, 2004 and

September 28, 2004 letters on topics related to obtaining documents for her

administrative claim.

3. Plaintiff disputes that a formal forestry procedures for separating her from employment

were properly followed. (Additional Fact no. 2 “the Separation for Performance or

Conduct was not followed through”.)

4. Plaintiff cites to Exhibit J, which is her journal she was required to keep as part of her

school grading purposes. In the journal, she says she asked for help during her

employment and recites that she was just dropped off by another packer on the trails and

just left there.

5. Plaintiff attaches an information packet form from OSHA Health and Safety Protection

in the workplace and argues that she was put in danger by the lack of training. 

6. Discovery was not provided to her in the administrative proceeding. She refers to letters

she sent to people, which she attaches as Exhibits, to ask for documents for her

administrative claim.

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

A. Standards for Motion to Dismiss and for Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant has moved for both a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on the claims

which are not dismissed.

1. Motion To Dismiss Standard

Fundamentally, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

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Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). Limits on federal jurisdiction must neither be disregarded

nor evaded. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). A

plaintiff bears the burden to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at

377, 98 S.Ct. 2396. This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient allegations

to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over an action. McNutt v.

General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936); F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1). 

A party may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint as a whole, it appears

to lack jurisdiction either “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec.

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction may be made on the basis that the complaint fails to allege grounds for federal subject matter

jurisdiction. It may consider extrinsic evidence; and if the evidence is disputed, it may weigh the

evidence and determine the facts in order to satisfy itself as to its power to hear the case: 'The existence

of disputed material facts will not prevent the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.' Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Defendant attempts

to "factually attack" jurisdiction. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.

2000). The court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the jurisdictional question. Roberts v.

Coorrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987).

2. Summary Judgment Standard

Initially, it is the moving party's burden to establish that there is "no genuine issue of material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); British

Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978). Rule 56(e) requires the party against

whom the motion is made to “set for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Absent

such a showing, a properly supported motion for summary judgment may be granted if the court finds

it appropriate.” Nilsson, Robbins, et al v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material

issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First National Bank

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of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968). The opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue

for trial.’”Matasushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations

omitted). The opposing party’s evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). The court must not weigh the

evidence and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Freeman v.

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1997); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504

U.S. 451, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992) (“Because this case comes to us on petitioner Kodak's motion

for summary judgment, the evidence of respondents is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are

to be drawn in their favor."). 

The court, however, has no duty to search the record, sua sponte, for some genuine issue of

material fact; the court may rely entirely on the evidence of the moving party. Guarino v. Brookfield

Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992). If the motion is based on deposition testimony,

the court may rely exclusively on portions highlighted by the moving party and need not comb the

deposition to discover conflicting testimony. Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, supra, 980 F.2d

at 403. The court is not obligated to consider matters not specifically brought to its attention. Thus, it

is immaterial that helpful evidence may be located somewhere in the record. The opposition must

designate and reference specific triable facts. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby (DC Cir. 1988) 863 F.2d

1029, 1034. Inferences drawn from the evidence, however, must be viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456, 112

S.Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992).

B. Plaintiff’s Sex Discrimination Claims

The underlying claim before the EEOC was for a sexually hostile work environment.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer .

. . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 

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 A plaintiff may establish violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex

created a hostile or abusive work environment. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106

S.Ct. 2399 (1986). “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive

‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”

Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th

Cir. 1982)).

The elements for a prima facie case of environmental sexual harassment are:

1. Plaintiff belongs to a protected group;

2. Plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;

3. The harassment complained of was based on sex;

4. The harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of

employment and create an abusive working environment; and

5. Respondeat superior.

See Kotan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); Pavon v. Swift Trans. Co.,

Inc., 192 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1999).

Of the above elements, the Court’s attention is directed to the extent and degree of the alleged

harassment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has described actionable conduct:

“‘Conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of

employment.’ To be actionable under Title VII, ‘a sexually objectionable environment

must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would

find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim did in fact perceive to be so.’”

Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,

524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998)); Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1110. 

The Ninth Circuit uses “a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a plaintiff’s

allegations make out a colorable claim of hostile work environment.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229

F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). Factors considered include frequency, severity and level of interference

with work performance and whether discriminatory conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or

a mere offensive utterance. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-788, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924

(citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993)).

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In determining what constitutes “sufficiently pervasive” harassment, courts have held that

harassing acts cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial, rather the plaintiff must show a

concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature. Downes v. F.A.A., 775

F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Fisher, 214 Cal.App.3d at 610, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842. “[S]imple teasing,

offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory

changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275. As

to alleged harassment of women, a court must consider “what is offensive and hostile to a reasonable

woman.” Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original;

while a harasser’s abuse of men was not related to their gender, “his abuse of female employees,

especially [plaintiff], centered on the fact that they were females”); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878

(9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, the conduct complained of which created a hostile work environment consisted of a single,

isolated incident of being asked out for a drink. A single incident of this nature is not extreme or

objectively and subjectively offensive. There is no evidence which would escalate this isolated incident

to one which created a “hostile” work environment as that term is defined by the Ninth Circuit. Thus,

as a matter of law, the incident does not amount to a hostile work environment.

C. Retaliation

What plaintiff really complains about is the lack of training on the trails such that she could

perform her job. The Court, inferring this argument most favorably to the plaintiff, views this argument

as a claim for retaliation for her refusal to have a drink with a supervisor.

To succeed on a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by

showing he/she “engaged in a protected activity, that [he/she] thereafter subjected her employer to

adverse employment action, and that a causal link exists between the two.” Cohen v. Fred Myer, Inc.,

686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982). The causal link may be established by an inference derived from

circumstantial evidence, “such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected

activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory

employment decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).

There is no causal link between plaintiff’s refusal to go out for a drink and her termination, lack

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of training or other treatment. Plaintiff offers no evidence that even relates to training or her termination.

The evidence establishes that plaintiff’s first line supervisor was Susan Nickey and her second line

supervisor was James Diesman, the individual who asked her out for a drink There is not any evidence

that Diesman had authority to authorize or prohibit training to plaintiff. Indeed, there is not any evidence

of the training procedures for plaintiff’s position or that Diesman had anything to do with training. In

fact, plaintiff introduces the statement of Mike Cobb who states that he was a wilderness ranger and was

not given any trail training either. Thus, the lack of any evidence that plaintiff was denied training for

refusing the supervisor’s offer fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

D. Conduct not described in the administrative complaint 

Plaintiff alleges that her disability should have been accommodated.

The civil action is limited to acts of discrimination reasonably related to the allegations of the

administrative charge or new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge before the administrative

body. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973).

The parties, including the Secretary of Agriculture, entered into a settlement agreement in the

class action case of Donnelly, et al v. Secretary of Agriculture, Civ. No. 95-4389 DLJ (N.D. Cal.). The

members of the class were defined as “all past and current non-supervisory female employees of Region

5 who have been, or are being subject to a sexually hostile work environment at any time since February

1, 1994 through the date of Final Approval and who are seeking equitable relief only.” (Defendant’s

Moving papers, Exhibit A at 397 ¶2.3.) The agreement also provided that class members who had not

previously initiated complaints “relating to sexual harassment or retaliation for EEO activity related to

sexual harassment that arose on or after February 1, 1994... may initiate a complaint with respect to such

matter...." by filing a “complaint form” with the agency. (Defendant’s Moving papers, Exhibit A at 422,

¶21.1.) Thus, the settlement agreement permitted claims arising from sexual harassment, even though

those claims would otherwise be untimely.

The administrative complaint filed by plaintiff with the EEOC did not include claims of disability

discrimination. (Defendant’s Moving papers, Exhibit A p. 369.) Thus, disability discrimination was

not exhausted at the administrative level. Moreover, the settlement agreement, which permitted the

filing of late sexual harassment claims, did not encompass or permit any other form of discrimination.

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 Moreover, the Court questions whether the disability claim, arising from plaintiff’s 1994 employment, is timely

made. However, since the Court can resolve the disability claim on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the

Court does not reach this issue.

In addition, plaintiff raises for the first time possible violations of OSHA standards. She has not plead this claim.

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Since plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on the disability discrimination, she is

precluded from pursuing a civil action on that claim.1

E. EEOC’s alleged negligence

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges numerous procedural errors in the EEOC proceeding.

It is well established that Congress has not authorized-either expressly or impliedly, either in

Title VII or elsewhere-"a cause of action directly against the EEOC for misprocessing of claims asserted

against third-party employers." Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 312-14 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466

U.S. 953 (1984). Instead, Congress has provided the ability to pursue de novo judicial proceedings with

the EEOC's handling of their charge. Hall v. EEOC, 456 F. Supp. 695, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (quoted

in Ward, 719 F.2d at 314). 

Plaintiff has named her former employer as defendant in this action. Presumably, she wishes to

hold defendant liable for the alleged misprocessing of her administrative claim.

The Supreme Court has noted that it must accommodate the agency principles of vicarious

liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority. The Supreme Court adopted the holding

that: “An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile

environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the

employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative

defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Burlington

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (U.S.Ill.,1998). Thus, vicarious

liability may be found for persons with supervisory authority over plaintiff.

Here, plaintiff seeks to hold her former employer liable for the alleged negligent acts by the

EEOC in processing her EEOC complaint. No vicarious liability exists on behalf of the employer for

the acts of the EEOC. In short, plaintiff cannot hold her employer liable.

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court issues the following order:

1. GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the discrimination based on

hostile work environment.

2. GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the claim for disability

discrimination.

3. GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the claim for errors in

processing plaintiff’s EEOC administrative claim. 

The clerk of this Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant Anne Veneman, Secretary

United States Department of Agriculture and against plaintiff Debbie Seber Daloian. The October 27,

2005 pretrial conference and the December 5, 2005 trial are VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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