Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01515/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01515-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donna Marie Biscoe,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Patricia Davis, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 19-01515 PHX ROS (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

Plaintiff, is pro se and has paid the full filing fee in this prisoner civil rights matter. 

(ECF No. 9). Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to docket her proposed 

Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 27; ECF No. 28). 

I. Background

Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights complaint on March 4, 2019, which was 

dismissed with leave to amend. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 10). In her First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 11), naming as defendants Corizon Health Service, Arizona 

Department of Corrections Director Charles Ryan, and Nurse Practitioner Patricia Davis, 

Plaintiff asserts:

. . . she has been confined in prison since October 2014 and was 

unaware she had a sexually transmitted disease, Trichomoniasis. Plaintiff 

asserts she submitted several health needs request forms to Defendant 

Corizon’s medical staff explaining her symptoms and she explained her 

symptoms to the nurses when they saw her. Plaintiff contends she thought 

she had a yeast infection and Defendant Davis “kept on prescribing 

[Plaintiff] a v[a]ginal cream to use for seven days.” She claims Defendant 

Davis provided the “least amount of medical treatment” and, although 

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Defendant Davis knew Plaintiff continued to have the same infection from 

visit to visit, Defendant Davis did not examine Plaintiff, order a blood test, 

or refer Plaintiff to a gynecologist.

Plaintiff asserts that in June 2018, after she submitted another health 

needs request form, she described her symptoms to a nurse who scheduled 

Plaintiff to see the gynecologist the following day. The gynecologist 

conducted a pap smear and discovered Plaintiff had an infection. Plaintiff 

alleges that when her test results came back, the gynecologist told Plaintiff 

that she had tested positive for Trichomoniasis and that “parasites have 

spread [] throughout your body.” The gynecologist prescribed an antibiotic 

to treat the Trichomoniasis.

Plaintiff contends no follow-up was done to make sure the 

Trichomoniasis and parasites were gone, so Plaintiff requested that various 

tests be performed. She alleges the tests were performed. Plaintiff claims 

she submitted a health needs request regarding bites on her body and 

Defendant Davis saw her regarding the bites and performed a biopsy. 

Plaintiff allegedly told Defendant Davis to take the biopsy from a specific 

spot where Plaintiff had a new bite. Plaintiff claims Defendant Davis told

Plaintiff, “I can tell you now that you don’t have parasites or anything. You 

are one of th[ose] people [who] learn something is out there and think you 

are going to catch it.” In her original Complaint, Plaintiff stated that the 

biopsy came back negative.

Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to its policies, decisions, and contract 

restrictions and limitations, Defendant Corizon did not test inmates for 

Trichomoniasis during certain years. She contends Defendant Ryan was 

aware of the medical services Defendant Corizon provided and Defendant 

Corizon’s deprivation of medical treatment, but failed to intervene.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions and inactions caused her 

sexually transmitted disease to go untreated for three-and-a-half years, 

which caused Plaintiff to “suffer[] . . . from being bitten by parasites all 

over [her] body, because they had long spread[] throughout [her] body.”

Plaintiff claims she had a burning feeling, pain, and discomfort in her 

vaginal area; “sickness in [her] stomach”; and was searched by female 

officers numerous times because of the “yellowish, greenish, odor stuff 

discharge in [her] underwear.”

(ECF No. 12 at 3-4). 

The Court concluded in its Screening Order at ECF No. 12:

Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to its policies, decisions, and contract 

restrictions and limitations, Defendant Corizon did not test inmates for 

Trichomoniasis during certain years.

***

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Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Corizon. The Court will 

require Defendant Corizon to answer the First Amended Complaint. 

***

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Davis may, at best, support 

a claim that Defendant Davis was negligent or committed medical 

malpractice in failing to diagnose Plaintiff’s sexually transmitted disease, 

examine Plaintiff, order a blood test, or refer her to a gynecologist. But 

neither negligence nor medical malpractice is sufficient to state an Eighth 

Amendment claim. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice 

Defendant Davis.

***

. . . Plaintiff cannot maintain a lawsuit for damages against ADC 

employees in their official capacities. . . . Thus, the Court will dismiss 

Defendant Ryan in his official capacity.

***

Plaintiff has not alleged facts that show Defendant Ryan personally 

participated in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Nor does 

her conclusory allegation that Defendant Ryan was generally aware of 

Corizon’s provision or denial of healthcare suffice. Plaintiff does not allege 

that Defendant Ryan was aware of a specific deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights, how he was made aware, what response, if any, he 

gave, and how that response rose to the level of deliberate indifference. 

Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Ryan in his 

individual capacity.

(ECF No. 12 at 6-7). Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendants Davis and Ryan 

without prejudice, and ordered Defendant Corizon to answer the sole count of Plaintiff’s 

First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 12). 

Defendant Corizon answered the complaint. (ECF No. 15). A case management 

order was issued September 9, 2019, requiring any motion to amend the complaint be 

filed no later than December 6, 2019, all discovery be completed no later than February 

6, 2020, and that dispositive motions be filed by May 6, 2020. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff 

filed a motion to amend her complaint on December 2, 2019. (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff 

stated she “wish[ed] to add Patricia Davis as a defendant in her Complaint, in count two, 

for her actions (inactions) in the treatment of plaintiff’s serious medical needs.” (ECF 

No. 23 at 2-3). Lodged with Plaintiff’s motion to amend was a proposed Second 

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Amended Complaint, naming as Defendants Corizon Health Service, Patricia Davis, and 

Charles Ryan. (ECF No. 24 at 1-2). Plaintiff’s lodged Second Amended Complaint also 

asserted a claim pursuant to the “Federal Tort Claims Act-Eighth Amendment,” asserting 

Defendants were liable based on their “Negligence/Malpractice.” (ECF No. 24 at 10-16). 

Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion to amend because the lodged proposed 

Second Amended Complaint “did not indicate how it differs from the First Amended 

Complaint,” citing Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1. (ECF No. 25 at 1). In an order 

entered December 6, 2019, the Court allowed Plaintiff until December 27, 2019, to re-file 

her motion to amend accompanied by a proposed Second Amended Complaint in 

compliance with Local Rule 15.1. (ECF No. 26). Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, 

Plaintiff filed the pending motion to amend and lodged the proposed Second Amended 

Complaint on December 26, 2019. (ECF No. 27 at 6).

In her proposed Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff seeks to add an additional 

defendants, including Ms. Davis, in “Count Two and/or in Count One, for their actions 

(inactions) of negligence and acts of malpractice in the treatment of her serious medical 

needs.” (ECF No. 27 at 3; ECF No. 28 at 1-3). Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended 

Complaint also:

1. . . .[P]rovides actual dates the treatment(s) of plaintiff’s serious medical 

need(s) took place. []

2. Provides details of plaintiff’s and the defendant(s) actions (inactions) that 

is the cause of the action. []

3. Provides the defendants negligence and acts of malpractice of the 

defendants that participated in the providance [sic] of inadequate medical 

treatment to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. []

4. Provides the inadequate medical treatment plaintiff was provided, by the 

defendants, for her serious medical needs. []

5. Provides the pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc. the plaintiff 

experienced, endured as a result of the defendants negligence. []

6. Includes a Count Two, stating plaintiff’s right under the Eighth 

Amendment - Federal Tort Claims Act - was violated. []

7. Provides the names of the defendants that should be parties in this cause 

of action(s).

(ECF No. 27 at 4-5).

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In her lodged Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges she was “bitten all 

over [her] body by parasites,” and she endured “a burning feeling, pain and suffering, 

discomfort in her vagina area and enduring illness in [her] stomach [sic],” and on 

“countless” occasions she was “searched by female officers,” “enduring humiliation and 

embarrassment because of the yellowish, greenish odor stuff discharge in [her] 

underwear.” (ECF No. 28-1 at 3). Plaintiff contends she was “denied and deprived” of 

“adequate medical treatment causing [her] unnecessary pain and suffering, etc., violating 

[her] U.S. Constitutional rights.” (Id.). Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of ten 

million dollars for her pain and suffering. (ECF No. 28-1 at 11).

Defendant Corizon opposes Plaintiff’s motion to amend, arguing:

. . . Plaintiff’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint is materially 

different than the Proposed Second Amended Complaint upon which the 

Court originally granted her Motion to Amend. Plaintiff did not make 

allegations against an additional six Defendants until after the Court 

ordered deadline. Plaintiff should not be allowed to circumvent the Court’s

Order. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend should be denied.

(ECF No. 29 at 2). 

II. Standard for granting or denying a motion to amend

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff should 

be given leave to amend her complaint when justice so requires. Granting or denying 

leave to amend is a matter committed to the Court’s discretion. Hartmann v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court’s discretion to 

deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the plaintiff was previously given leave 

to amend her complaint and repeatedly failed to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court. 

See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Turner v. County of Los Angeles, 18 F. App’x 592, 597 (9th Cir. 2001); Navajo Nation v. 

United States Dep’t of the Interior, 2019 WL 3997370, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2019); 

Skinner v. Ryan, 2013 WL 3967619, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2013). 

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), requires the screening 

of prisoner complaints and the dismissal of allegations that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted prior to ordering service of a complaint on the defendants. 

See, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Futility of amendment is 

sufficient to justify denial of a motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 

627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amended complaint is futile if, 

accepting all of the facts alleged as true, it would be immediately “subject to dismissal” 

for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 

1298 (9th Cir. 1998); Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mutual of Ohio, 601 F.3d 

505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), and the Court is 

obliged to liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, although Rule 8 does not demand 

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id., quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). A claim is plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

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III. Analysis

Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must 

show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;

and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. 

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison 

official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a

prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the

way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104-05 (1976); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference is a higher standard 

than negligence or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” 

Clement v. California Dep’t of Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see 

also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of 

“indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not support a claim under 

§ 1983). Furthermore, the indifference must be substantial. The purported defendant’s 

action or inaction must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

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Although Plaintiff seeks to add Charles Ryan as a defendant in this matter, in her 

lodged Second Amended Complaint she deletes her allegation that Ryan “personally 

participated in the deprivation” of her constitutional rights. (ECF No. 28-1 at 2). 

Additionally, as Plaintiff herself avows, she seeks to assert claims that Ms. Davis and the 

newly-named individual defendants were negligent and committed malpractice with 

regard to Plaintiff’s medical treatment. As noted in the Screening Order at ECF No. 12, 

claims of negligence and medical malpractice are insufficient to state a claim for 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, a Federal Tort Claims Act is an 

appropriate cause of action only against the United States when a federal employee 

would be liable under state law. None of the purported defendants named in Plaintiff’s 

proposed Second Amended Complaint are or were federal employees. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion at ECF No. 27, seeking leave to 

docket and proceed on her proposed Second Amended Complaint, be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

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Dated this 20th day of February, 2020.

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