Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00296/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00296-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The pleading at docket number 20 is titled “Appellant’s

Opening Brief” and is the format of an appellate brief.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL DAVIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 09-00296 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On or about February 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an answer (“Answer”) (Docket

No. 18) to the petition on May 12, 2009. Petitioner filed a

reply to the response on May 22, 2009. See Docket No. 20.1

I Procedural History

On July 26, 2006, pursuant to a written plea agreement,

the Maricopa County Superior Court accepted Petitioner’s plea of

guilty to one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices.

Answer, Exh. A. As a result of this guilty plea, on December

15, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of three years

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

probation. Id., Exh. B. 

On or about April 24, 2007, Petitioner’s probation

officer alleged that he had violated several of the conditions

of his probation, including failing to make any payments on

ordered restitution, court costs, and fees, the failure to meet

with his probation officer, and his arrest resulting from the

failure to appear in court as ordered regarding an alleged

probation violation in another criminal matter. Id., Exh. C. 

At a disposition hearing conducted April 27, 2007, at

which hearing Petitioner was represented by counsel, the court

informed Petitioner regarding the constitutional rights he would

be forfeiting if he admitted he had violated a term of his

probation. Id., Exh. E. The state court told Petitioner he had

a right to deny the allegation that he had violated his

probation and to have an evidentiary hearing on the charges.

Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was told that if he admitted a

probation violation at that time and was found to be in

violation of his probation he could not take a direct appeal of

that decision but that he could file a state action for postconviction relief. Id., Exh. E. 

At that stage in the hearing Petitioner indicated he

understood the rights he was waiving by admitting that he had

violated a term of his probation, i.e., the failure to meet with

his probation officer. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner stated he was

satisfied with his counsel. Id., Exh. E.

The state trial court accepted Petitioner’s admission

that he had violated one of the conditions of his probation.

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 James Harris represented Petitioner during his probation

violation proceedings. Kerrie Droban represented Petitioner in his

Rule 32 action.

-3-

Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. The state trial court revoked

Petitioner’s probation and imposed the presumptive term of five

years imprisonment pursuant to Petitioner’s 2006 conviction on

one count of fraudulent schemes or artifices. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner’s sentence was to date from April 27, 2007, with

credit for 403 days of presentence incarceration. Id., Exh. D.

At that time the state trial court granted a motion to dismiss

the allegation that Petitioner had violated other terms of his

probation. Id., Exh. D. 

A few days later, on May 2, 2007, Petitioner initiated

an action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner

was represented by counsel in his Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. F.2

In his Rule 32 action Petitioner asserted that he was never

informed of his right to a separate post-violation hearing at

which he could present mitigation evidence before being

sentenced. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner also alleged his counsel

was ineffective because counsel failed to inform him that he had

the right to a separate hearing and because counsel did not

present evidence at the April 27, 2007 hearing. Id., Exh. G.

The state trial court summarily dismissed the Rule 32

action on January 28, 2008. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

denied review on December 29, 2008. Id., Exh. I & Exh. J.

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court.

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because he was not informed that he had a

right to a mitigation hearing separate from the hearing to

determine if he had violated a term of his probation.

Petitioner asserts he never waived his “fundamentally protected

due process right to postpone the imposition of sentencing...”

until after a mitigation hearing was conducted. 

Petitioner also contends he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not

inform him of the right to a separate mitigation hearing,

because counsel did not “exercise” this right, and because

counsel failed to present adequate mitigation evidence.

Respondents assert Petitioner’s first claim for relief

was not properly exhausted in the state courts as a federal due

process claim. Respondents also maintain Petitioner’s right to

due process of law was not violated. Respondents further argue

Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not deficient because it

is “clear” from the record that counsel had discussed proceeding

from the disposition hearing to the sentencing with Petitioner.

Respondents also contend any alleged deficiency was not

prejudicial because both counsel and Petitioner made the

sentencing court aware of the mitigating issues, i.e.,

Petitioner’s mental illness, his childhood in foster care, and

his concerns regarding his infant son. 

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -5-

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state constitutional right or state law, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Lopez v. Schriro,

491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a petitioner may provide

further facts to support a claim in federal district court, so

long as those facts do not fundamentally alter the legal claim

already considered by the state courts”), cert. denied, 128 S.

Ct. 1227 (2008). 

For a habeas claim to be considered fairly presented to

the state courts as a federal claim, the petitioner must have

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory

on which the claim is based to the state courts. See Lounsbury

v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2004); Kelly, 315 F.3d

at 1066. Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to

the state courts, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78, 92 S.

Ct. 509, 512-13 (1971), they must do more than present the facts

necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -7-

B. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74-75, 127 S. Ct. 649,

653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir.

2009). 

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.

Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340,

123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003) (the court must presume that state

court’s factual findings are correct and may not reverse a state

court’s factual finding “absent clear and convincing evidence”

that the finding is “objectively unreasonable.”); Stenson v.

Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S.

Ct. 247 (2008); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th

Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“The state court’s factual findings are entitled to a

presumption of correctness unless the petitioner rebuts the

presumption with clear and convincing evidence.”). The

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -8-

“presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state

appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the

finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct.

1303, 1304-05 (1982). 

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions or if it reaches a different result than a Supreme

Court case on the presentation of materially indistinguishable

facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1519 (2000). If the state court erroneously applied only

harmless error review to the Petitioner’s claims of

constitutional error, the state court’s decision is considered

contrary to federal law. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

The state court’s decision is an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law only if it can be

considered objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409,

120 S. Ct. at 1521. United States Supreme Court holdings at the

time of the state court’s decision are the source of “clearly

established federal law” for the purpose of the “unreasonable

application” prong of federal habeas review. Id., 529 U.S. at

412, 120 S. Ct. at 1523; Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093

(2005).

C. Petitioner’s claims for relief

Procedural due process

Petitioner asserts that his federal constitutional

right to due process of law was violated because he was not

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2008). 

-9-

informed of his right to a separate hearing at which he could

present evidence establishing that mitigation of his sentence

was appropriate. Respondents contend Petitioner did not

properly exhaust this claim in the state courts by fairly

presenting it as a claim that Petitioner’s federal

constitutional right to due process was violated.

It is arguable whether the claim was “fairly presented”

to the state courts. The section of Petitioner’s state Rule 32

brief discussing this claim, drafted by counsel, briefly

mentions the United States Supreme Court’s proclamation of the

right to due process in probation revocation proceedings and the

Arizona rules enacted to ensure this right to due process.

However, the claim may be denied on the merits regardless of any

failure to fairly present or exhaust the claim.3

The United States Supreme Court established minimum due

process requirements for parole violation hearings in Morrissey

v. Brewer. See 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972). The

Supreme Court extended these minimal due process protections to

probation revocation hearings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.

778, 786, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973), and Black v. Romano,

471 U.S. 606, 612, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 2258 (1985). Because the

revocation of probation is not part of a criminal prosecution,

the “full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

does not apply...” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S. Ct. at

2600. In the context of the revocation of probation, the

“minimum requirements” of due process consist of written notice

of the claimed violations, disclosure of the evidence against

the accused, an opportunity to be heard in person and to present

witnesses and documentary evidence, the right to confront and

cross-examine adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached hearing

body, and a written statement by the fact-finders as to the

evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. See

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782–87, 93 S. Ct. at 1760.

Petitioner received written notice and had the

opportunity to be heard. The “right” to a separate disposition

hearing at which he could present evidence establishing that

mitigation of his sentence was appropriate is not one stated in

Morrissey or Gagnon. Accordingly, the state court’s decision

denying Petitioner’s due process claim in his state Rule 32

action was not clearly contrary to federal law. Furthermore,

Petitioner and his counsel both presented mitigating factors to

the sentencing judge prior to sentencing and, accordingly, any

failure to hold a separate mitigation hearing was harmless. See

United States v. Havier, 155 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998).

Additionally, to the extent this habeas claim is

predicated on the assertion that Petitioner’s right to due

process was violated because the state court violated any state

rules of criminal procedure, the claim is not a cognizable basis

for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991) (holding federal habeas relief

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or

application of state law); Floyd v. Alexander, 148 F.3d 615, 619

(6th Cir. 1998). 

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Petitioner also asserts that his counsel for his

probation revocation proceedings was ineffective because counsel

failed to advise him of his “right” to separate disposition and

sentencing hearings. Petitioner further alleges his counsel

failed to present any mitigation evidence. 

To be entitled to relief on a habeas claim based on the

alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must

show that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the

deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s defense. See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The petitioner must

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was

within the range of reasonable professional assistance required

of attorneys in that circumstance. See id.

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002) (internal quotations

omitted). “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -12-

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added).

Petitioner presents no evidence that counsel’s advice

to continue from a disposition hearing to a sentencing hearing

was incompetent representation or anything but a strategic

choice to which he acquiesced. Petitioner has failed to show

that his counsel’s performance at the hearing fell below

objective standards of reasonableness. Furthermore, because

both Petitioner and counsel presented the sentencing court with

lengthy statements regarding the mitigating circumstances of

Petitioner’s violation, there is no evidence that any alleged

deficiency was prejudicial. Accordingly, the state court’s

decision denying this claim in Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings

is not clearly contrary to federal law. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s claims that his probation revocation

proceedings and ensuing sentence of incarceration must be

reversed based on violations of his federal constitutional

rights may be denied on the merits of those claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Davis’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 18th day of June, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-00296-DGC Document 28 Filed 06/19/09 Page 13 of 13