Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00915/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00915-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dell Rainbow Vanderschuit,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00915-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The 

Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation 

(R&R) recommending that the Petition be denied. (Doc. 44). Petitioner filed objections 

to the R&R. (Doc. 53). 

I. Review of R&R 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 

F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes 

that de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not 

otherwise.’”); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 

1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the 

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[Magistrate Judge=s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). District courts are 

not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”). 

II. Petition 

The Petition in this case raises 7 claims of relief. Claim 4 has 5 sub-parts. The 

R&R finds that only subparts (a), (b), and (c) of claim 4 were exhausted in state court. 

The R&R finds that claims 1, 5, and 6 are state law claims that are not cognizable on 

habeas. The R&R also finds that claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 are subject to a procedural 

bar. The R&R also finds that claims 4(d) and 4(e) are subject to a procedural bar. 

 The R&R recounts the factual and procedural background of this case at pages 1 - 

5. Neither party has objected to this recounting. Accordingly, the Court accepts and 

adopts it. 

A. Claims 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) 

Claim 4 presents 5 theories of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: 

specifically, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal: a) that 

attempting to commit a crime of words is not a crime under Arizona law; b) Petitioner 

was convicted of conduct not prohibited by statute because the court gave the jury an 

instruction that included an incorrect definition of prostitution; c) the state did not present 

sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for attempted child prostitution; d) 

that Petitioner’s conviction was improperly determined to be a dangerous crime against 

children;1

 and e) that the trial court gave an incorrect definition of attempt.2 (R&R at 27, 

14). As indicated above, the R&R concludes that claims 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) were 

 

1

 Claim 5 is Petitioner’s claim that his conviction was improperly determined to be a dangerous crime against children. 

2

 Claim 7 is Petitioner’s claim that the trial court gave an incorrect definition of 

attempt. 

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exhausted in state court. 

 As to any claims that were exhausted in state court, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) 

and (2) this Court must deny the Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”3

or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 71 (2003). Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s 

factual findings regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 

149 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas 

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

 On post-conviction relief in state court, Petitioner argued that appellate counsel 

was ineffective for not raising claims a, b, and c on direct appeal. This Court agrees with 

the R&R that the state court’s finding that appellate counsel was not ineffective for not 

raising claims a, b, and c on direct appeal was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of federal law, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts. (See

Doc. 44 at 27-32). 

 In his objections, (see e.g. Doc. 53 at 37), Petitioner argues that appellate counsel 

was ineffective for not raising all of these issues. However, Petitioner has failed to show 

that the state court’s decision on ground 4(a), 4(b), or 4(c) was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s objections as to these 3 sub-parts are overruled. 

B. Claims 1, 5, and 6 

The R&R concludes that claims 1, 5, and 6 are all state law claims that are not 

cognizable in a federal habeas petition. This Court agrees. 3

 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in 

accordance with Supreme Court case law. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 

(2006). 

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 Specifically, in claim 1 Petitioner argues that he cannot be guilty of attempt under 

A.R.S. § 13-3212(A)(8) because his conduct does not meet the definitions under A.R.S. § 

13-3211 and A.R.S. § 13-1001. (Doc. 44 at 6). Petitioner’s global objection that his 

conviction implicates a “larger constitutional issue” does not change the fact that claim 1 

presents solely a state law issue that is not cognizable on federal habeas. (See Doc. 53 at 

11-16). Accordingly, the objection is overruled and the R&R’s recommendation to reject 

this claim as not cognizable on habeas is accepted. 

 As to claim 5, Petitioner raises a claim as to what constitutes a dangerous crime 

against children under Arizona law. (Doc. 44 at 8-9). The R&R concludes that, even if 

Petitioner were correct, an error in the application of the state law sentencing scheme is 

not cognizable as a federal habeas claim. (Id. at 9). This Court agrees. Petitioner’s 

global objection that his conviction implicates a “larger constitutional issue” does not 

change the fact that claim 5 presents solely a state law issue that is not cognizable on 

federal habeas. (See Doc. 53 at 11-16). Accordingly, the objection is overruled and the 

R&R’s recommendation to reject this claim as not cognizable on habeas is accepted. 

 As to claim 6, Petitioner raises a claim based on the state court’s rejection on postconviction relief on procedural grounds of certain claims he attempted to raise in his postconviction relief petition. (Doc. 44 at 9). In other words, Petitioner claims that the state 

court committed a procedural error in how they reviewed his post-conviction relief 

petition. (Id.). The R&R concludes that procedural errors that may have been committed 

by the state court during a post-conviction relief proceeding are not cognizable as a 

federal habeas claim. (Id. at 9-10). This Court agrees. 

 Petitioner objects to the entire state court system whereby he must raise his claims 

of error on direct appeal, and not save them to raise for the first time in a post-conviction 

relief proceeding. (Doc. 53 at 25-36). This objection does not change the fact that claim 

6 raises only a state law procedural issue that is not a cognizable federal habeas claim. 

Accordingly, the objection is overruled and the R&R’s recommendation to reject this 

claim as not cognizable on habeas is accepted. 

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C. Claims 1, 2, 3, 4(d), 4(e), 5, 6 and 7 

The R&R concludes that claims 1, 2, 3, 4(d), 4(e), 5, 6, and 7 are all procedurally 

barred (Doc. 44 at 11) because Petitioner did not exhaust them in state court. This Court 

agrees.

4

 Thus, this Court can only consider the merits of these claims if Petitioner can 

overcome this procedural bar. 

 1. Claims 1, 2, and 3 

Petitioner raised claims 1, 2 and 3 in his first post-conviction relief proceeding in 

state court. (Doc. 44 at 13). Relief on these claims was denied on procedural grounds 

because Petitioner was required to raise these claims in his direct appeal. (Id.). The 

R&R concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or fundamental 

miscarriage of justice to overcome this procedural default. (Id. at 15-17). The Court 

accepts the R&R’s findings and conclusions that Petitioner has defaulted his claims. 

 The R&R next addresses whether Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel (for not raising these claims) can serve as “cause” to overcome this 

default. (Id. at 17-19). In deciding the first post-conviction relief petition, the state court 

analyzed whether Petitioner’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

claims 1, 2 and 3 on direct appeal. (Id. at 18). As the R&R notes, the state appellate 

court in considering the post-conviction relief petition found that appellate counsel was 

not ineffective because appellate counsel was not required to raise every possible claim 

on appeal and appellate counsel did not perform deficiently by narrowing the issues on 

appeal. (Id. at 18). Moreover the state court of appeals found that claims 1, 2 and 3 

lacked merit; thus, appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising meritless claims. 

(Id.). 

 Petitioner makes a global objection to the concept of procedural default premised 

on Petitioner’s objection to the state court’s Rule 32 post-conviction-relief process as a 

whole. (Doc. 20 at 20-29). The Court overrules this objection for the reasons stated in 

the discussion of claim 6 below. (Claim 6 is a challenge to the state court’s Rule 32 post-

 4

 As to claims 1, 5 and 6 this is an alternative basis for this Court’s decision. 

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conviction relief system). 

 The Court agrees with the state court of appeals’ analysis and finds that appellate 

counsel was not ineffective and therefore appellate counsel’s performance cannot be 

cause to overcome Petitioner’s failure to exhaust claims 1, 2, and 3. Accordingly, the 

Court will not reach the merits of these claims because they are subject to a procedural 

bar. 

 2. Claims 5 and 7 

The R&R notes that Petitioner argues that his failure to exhaust claims 5 and 7 in 

state court was also due to the ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel. (Doc. 44 at 19). 

The R&R then concludes that because Petitioner did not exhaust this theory of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel in state court, this Count cannot consider such alleged 

ineffectiveness as cause to overcome the failure to exhaust the merits of claims 5 and 7. 

(Doc. 44); see Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453-54 (2000) (holding that claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel must be exhausted to serve as cause to overcome a 

failure to exhaust the substance of the claim). 

 Petitioner makes a global objection to the concept of procedural default premised 

on Petitioner’s objection to the state court’s Rule 32 requirements. (Doc. 20 at 20-29). 

The Court overrules this objection for the reasons stated in the discussion of claim 6 

below. Accordingly, claims 5 and 7 are subject to a procedural bar and this Court will 

not consider them on the merits. 

 3. Claims 4(d) and 4(e) 

Claims 4(d) and 4(e) are Petitioner’s claims that appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise claims 5 and 7 on direct appeal. (Doc. 44 at 19). The R&R concludes 

that these claims were not exhausted in the state courts, and therefore, cannot be 

considered on the merits by this Court. (Doc. 44 at 19-20). In his objections at pages 23-

28, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was in fact ineffective and that the state 

system of requiring appellate counsel to raise claims of error on direct appeal or such 

claims will be waived is unfair. (Doc. 53 at 23-28). Neither of these arguments 

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addresses that theories 4(d) and 4(e) of ineffective assistance of counsel were not 

presented to the state courts and are now procedurally barred. Accordingly, the Court 

accepts the R&R and will not reach the merits of these claims.5

 4. Claim 6 

Finally, in claim 6 Petitioner challenges the state court’s post-conviction relief 

rules that preclude certain claims from consideration on post-conviction relief if they 

were not presented on direct appeal. (Doc. 44 at 20). Generally, Petitioner complains 

that the state’s requirement that certain claims be raised on direct appeal or be barred is 

unfair because appellate counsel determined what to raise on direct appeal and he should 

not be limited by appellate counsel’s decisions. (Doc. 44 at 21). The R&R concludes 

that neither the state’s procedural rules nor the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel are cause to overcome Petitioner’s failure to exhaust a challenge to the state rule 

32 (post-conviction-relief proceedings) in state court. (Doc. 44 at 21-22). 

 Petitioner objects6

 to this conclusion and argues that the state courts do not 

routinely apply state Rule 32; therefore, it is not adequate and independent. (Doc. 53 at 

26-27). However, none of the cases cited by Petitioner show that Arizona does not 

routinely apply Rule 32. Accordingly, this objection is overruled. 

 Next, Petitioner objects and argues that state rule 32 is unfair because, Petitioner 

claims, his waiver of his right to bring claims via a post-conviction relief petition because 

his appellate counsel did not raise them on direct appeal was not a knowing, voluntary 

 

5

 The Court notes that in certain circumstances a petitioner’s failure to exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, or failure to exhaust a claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel, can be excused if the failure was based on the ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction relief counsel (and certain other requirements are met). See 

Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 2013). In this case, Petitioner has 

made no argument that post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective and the Court has 

not considered this basis to excuse default. 

6

 In his objections, Petitioner is not clear whether he is asserting this claim solely as a basis for cause to overcome his procedural default of other claims; or whether it is a 

free standing constitutional challenge to the state court’s Rule 32 proceedings. The Court 

has treated this claim as both. The Court does not see that this theory was presented as a constitutional challenge to the state courts. 

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and intelligent waiver. (Doc. 53 at 27-28). However, unlike a plea, Petitioner does not 

have to consent to every argument counsel makes or does not make on Petitioner’s 

behalf. See Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that tactical 

decisions with which the defendant disagrees cannot be the basis for an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim). Accordingly, this objection is also overruled. 

 Finally, Petitioner disagrees with both the state court and the R&R’s conclusions 

that Petitioner’s state appellate counsel’s decision to raise some claims, but not other 

claims, on direct appeal was a reasonable strategic decision and was not ineffective 

assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). (Doc. 53 at 36-38). 

This Court has reviewed the claims raised and not raised and finds that counsel’s 

decisions were reasonable strategic decisions and those decisions were not ineffective 

under Strickland; and as to the three theories of ineffective assistance presented to the 

state appellate court, the state court’s decision that counsel’s strategy was not ineffective 

was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, nor an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Thus, this objection is also overruled and relief as to claim 6 

is denied because it is procedurally barred, or alternatively, fails on the merits. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the 

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in 

the courts of the State.”). 

III. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to supplement (Doc. 54) is granted to the 

limited extent that the Court considered the attentional documents filed on November 23, 

2016. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 44) is 

accepted. The objections (Doc. 53) are overruled. The Clerk of the Court shall enter 

judgment denying and dismissing the Petition, with prejudice. 

 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

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Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a 

certificate of appealability because dismissal of portions of the petition is based on a plain 

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find this Court=s procedural ruling 

debatable, see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), and Petitioner has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). 

 Dated this 21st day of December, 2016. 

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