Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05028/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05028-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT HURLEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PECHINEY PLASTIC PACKAGING, INC. a

California corporation, and DOES 1 through

100, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-05028 JSW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

Now before this Court is the motion filed by defendant Pechiney Plastic Packaging, Inc.

(“Pechiney”) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and

considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court

hereby DENIES Pechiney’s motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Robert Hurley (“Hurley”) was employed by Pechiney as a press helper since

1997. (Amend. Compl., ¶ 6.) In August 2000, Hurley suffered a severe thumb injury in a nonwork related accident. (Id., ¶ 8.) On June 1, 2000, he underwent the first of two reconstructive

surgeries on his thumb and informed Pechiney that he had a medical condition requiring

treatment and surgery. (Id., ¶ 10.) On January 13, 2002, he informed Pechiney that he would 

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need to see a doctor because he was experiencing severe gastrointestinal problems. (Id., ¶ 11.) 

Hurley missed work from January 13, 2002 through January 15, 2002 and from February 25,

2002 through February 28, 2002 to receive treatment for and/or recuperate from these

gastrointestinal problems. (Id., ¶ 11.) 

In August 2002, Hurley informed Pechiney that he needed to take time off to attend a

previously scheduled treatment for his thumb. (Id., ¶ 14.) He provided Pechiney with four

forms from his doctor entitled “VISIT VERIFICATION/FAMILY LEAVE Health Care

Provider Certification.” (Id., ¶ 15.) The last of these, dated September 3, 2002, informed

Pechiney that Hurley could not use his left hand or grasp over five pounds, that he was

scheduled to undergo another surgery, and that he would return to work in four months. (Id.) 

On August 28, 2002, Pechiney sent Hurley a form entitled “Request for Family and

Medical Leave,” to be completed and returned by September 15, 2002. (Id., ¶ 18.) Hurley did

not receive the letter until September 18, 2002 because his wife at the time had arranged for

mail to be delivered to her flower shop. (Id.) On September 20, 2002, Hurley received a letter

from Aleena Lopez (“Lopez ”), Pechiney's Human Resources Representative, stating that

Hurley's FMLA paperwork was overdue. (Id., ¶ 19.) Hurley called Lopez that day and informed

her that his mother was in a medically-induced coma and his mother-in-law was dying of

cancer. (Id., ¶ 20.) Hurley explained that due to the stress of these circumstances and the time

required to accompany his mother to her medical appointments and to attend his own, he forgot

to complete the FMLA paperwork. (Id.) Pechiney terminated Hurley’s employment on

September 23, 2002. (Id., ¶ 23.) 

On June 29, 2005, after obtaining a right to sue letter from the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing, Hurley filed a complaint in Alameda County Superior Court alleging

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causes of action based on California state law, including breach of contract, age discrimination,

violation of California Government Code § 12940(a), tortious termination of employment, and

negligence. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-27.) On November 3, 2005, Hurley filed a first amended complaint

alleging causes of action based on California state law, including retaliation in violation of

California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), interference with his CFRA rights, disability

discrimination, failure to accommodate his disability, failure to engage in the interactive process

pursuant to California Fair Housing and Employment Act (“FEHA”), wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, and violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. 

(Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 1-64.) On December 6, 2005, Pechiney removed the state court action to

this Court. Pechiney now moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for an

order dismissing Hurley’s complaint for failure to state a claim.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss are

viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th

Cir. 1986). A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). “A complaint may be dismissed for

one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable

legal claim.” Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). On a

motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

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party and all material allegations in the complaint are taken to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794

F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986).

B. Pechiney’s Motion to Dismiss.

1. Hurley Sufficiently States a Claim for Retaliation in Violation of CFRA.

Hurley alleges that Pechiney violated his CFRA rights by “improperly denying him leave

and instead terminating his employment as a result of his attempt to exercise rights under

CFRA.” (Amend. Compl., ¶ 27.) CFRA provides “protections to employees needing family or

medical leave.” Gibbs v. Am. Airlines, Inc,. 74 Cal. App. 4th 1, 6 (1999). CFRA generally

provides that it is unlawful for an employer to refuse an employee’s request for up to 12 weeks

of family care and medical leave in a year. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(a). Such leave may be

taken “because of an employee’s own serious health condition that makes the employee unable

to perform the functions of the position of that employee.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(c)(3)(C). 

A “serious health condition” is defined by CFRA to mean “an illness, injury, impairment, or

physical or mental condition that involves either inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or

residential health care facility or continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health care

provider.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(c)(8).

It is also unlawful for an employer “to refuse to hire, or to discharge, fine, suspend,

expel, or discriminate against, any individual because of (1) an individual’s exercise of the right

to family care and medical leave provided by subdivision (a).” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(l)(1). 

The administrative regulations promulgated under CFRA recognize the cause of action provided

for by subdivision (l)(1) as one for “retaliation.” 2 CCR § 7297.7. To state a claim for

retaliation in violation of CFRA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant was an employer

covered by CFRA; (2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA leave; (3) the

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plaintiff exercised her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRA purpose; and (4) the plaintiff

suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of her

exercise of her right to CFRA leave. Dudley v. Dep't of Transp., 90 Cal. App. 4th 255, 261

(2001). 

Pechiney argues that Hurley failed to allege the third and fourth elements. (Mot. at 3.)

In essence, Pechiney contends that Hurley failed to provide sufficient notice of his need to take

leave and failed to timely return the required certification. (Id. at 3-4.) According to Pechiney,

Hurley was not entitled to take leave under CFRA, and thus, he cannot show he exercised his

right to take leave or that he was terminated in retaliation for taking such leave. (Id.) Under

CFRA, an employee is required to “provide the employer with reasonable advance notice of the

need for leave.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(h). An employee “shall provide at least verbal

notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs CFRA qualifying leave,

and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave.” 2 CCR § 7297.4(a)(1). The employee

 need not expressly assert rights under CFRA or even mention CFRA to meet the notice

requirement. Id. The employee must, however, state the reason the leave is needed, such as for

medical treatment. Id. 

 Although the failure to give proper, timely notice may bar a claim for retaliation under

CFRA, see McDaneld v. E. Mun. Water Dist. Bd., 109 Cal. App. 4th 702, 706 (2003) (citing

Gibbs, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 6-9), Hurley sufficiently alleges that he provided adequate notice. 

Hurley alleges that he provided notice of his need for leave to seek treatment for gastrointestinal

problems and a thumb injury. (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 10, 11, 14, 15.) Therefore, the Court denies

Pechiney’s motion to dismiss Hurley’s claim for retaliation in violation of CFRA.

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2. Hurley Sufficiently States a Claim for Interference in Violation of CFRA.

Hurley alleges that Pechiney interfered with his CFRA rights by using an attendance

policy to discourage Hurley from exercising his CFRA rights, by misrepresenting the law to

deny Hurley CFRA protections, by failing to inform him of his entitlement to invoke CFRA,

and by refusing to give Pechiney a reasonable amount of time to return the FMLA forms. 

(Amend. Compl., ¶ 32.) 

Unlike FMLA, CFRA does not contain an express regulation prohibiting “interference ”

with CFRA rights. However, California courts have held that the same standards apply to

CFRA and FMLA claims. Dudley, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 261; see also Pang v. Beverly Hospital,

Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 986, 993 (2000). In addition, the California Code of Regulations provide

that “to the extent the FMLA regulations are not inconsistent with the this subchapter, other

state law or the California Constitution, the Commission incorporates the federal regulations

interpreting FMLA which govern any FMLA leave which is also a leave under this subchapter.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 7297.10. Therefore, the Court will look to other courts’ analyses of

interference claims under FMLA and apply the same standards to Hurley’s interference claim

under CFRA. 

Under FMLA, it is unlawful for any employer “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the

exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.” 29 CFR §

825.220(a)(1). “[A]n employer interferes with an employee’s rights under FMLA by ‘refusing

to authorize FMLA leave’ and ‘discouraging an employee from using such leave.’” Xin Liu v.

Amway Corp, 347 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 CFR § 825.220(b)). To state a

claim for interference, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) he is an eligible employee; 

(2) his employer is an employer under the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to take leave; (4) he gave

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notice of his intention to take leave; and (5) the defendant denied him the benefits to which he

was entitled under the FMLA. Price v. Multnomah County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1297 (D. Or.

2001). 

Pechiney argues that Hurley fails to state a claim of interference because Pechiney

provided ample opportunity for Hurley to avail himself of CFRA leave and he failed to provide

timely certification as Pechiney requested. (Mot. at 5.) Under CFRA regulations, the employer

shall respond to a CFRA leave request as soon as practicable and in any event no later than ten

calendar days after receiving the request. 2 CCR § 7297.4(a)(6). As a condition of granting a

leave for an employee’s serious health condition, the employer may require certification of the

condition. 2 CCR § 7297.4(b)(2). He may “require that the employee provide certification

within fifteen calendar days of the employer’s request for such certification, unless it is not

practicable for the employee to do so despite the employee’s good faith efforts.” 2 CCR §

7297.4(b)(3). “This means that, in some cases, the leave may begin before the employer

receives the certification.” Id. Hurley alleges that it was not practicable for him to complete the

certification by Pechiney’s deadline despite his good faith efforts to do so because of mail

delivery and family illness problems and that Pechiney denied him the benefits to which he was

entitled. (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 18, 20, 32.) Accordingly, Hurley sufficiently alleges compliance

with this requirement. Therefore, the Court denies Pechiney’s motion to dismiss Hurley’s claim

for interference in violation of CFRA.

3. Hurley Sufficiently States a Claim for Discrimination in Violation of FEHA.

Hurley contends that Pechiney “unlawfully discriminated against [him] by terminating

his employment based on his disability, in violation of FEHA.” (Amend. Compl., ¶ 37.) 

Pechiney moves to dismiss the discrimination claim based on its contention that Hurley “has not

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alleged facts establishing that he had a disability covered by [FEHA].” (Mot. at 5.) In addition,

Pechiney contends that Hurley failed to allege that he was otherwise qualified to do his job. (Id.

at 6.)

To state a claim of discrimination under the FEHA, a plaintiff must allege (1) he

suffered from a disability, (2) he was otherwise qualified to do his job, and (3) he was subjected

to adverse employment action because of his disability. Diaz v. Fed. Express, 373 F. Supp. 2d

1034, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2005). A physical disability under FEHA is defined as an impairment

that (1) affects one or more of the following body systems: neurological, immunological,

musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory . . . cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,

genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; and (2) limits an individual’s ability to

participate in a major life activity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(k)(1); Bryan v. United Parcel

Serv., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (2004). An impairment limits a major life activity if it makes

the achievement of the major life activity difficult. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(k)(1)(B)(ii). 

Working is recognized as a major life activity, regardless of whether the actual or perceived

working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of

employments. Id. at § 12926(c)(1). In order to meet the “otherwise qualified” prong of the

discrimination case, a plaintiff must be able to perform the essential functions of the position at

issue with or without reasonable accommodation. Diaz, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1060. 

Here, Hurley alleges that he suffered from a severe thumb injury that prevented him

from attending work, that he had a “strong performance record” prior to incurring this disability,

and that he was terminated because of the disability. (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 7, 15, 23, 37.) 

Therefore, the Court finds that Hurley sufficiently alleges a claim for discrimination in violation

of FEHA and denies Pechiney's motion to dismiss on this basis.

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4. Hurley Sufficiently States a Claim for Failure to Engage in Interactive

Process in Violation of FEHA.

Hurley alleges that Pechiney “failed to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process

with [him] to determine effective reasonable accommodations for his known disability or

medical condition.” (Amend. Compl., ¶ 42.) Pechiney moves to dismiss Hurley's failure to

engage in the interactive process claim based on its contention that Hurley “failed to allege facts

which establish that [he] had a known physical disability or medical condition for which he

made a request to Pechiney for a reasonable accommodation.” (Mot. at 6.) 

It is an unlawful employment practice for “an employer to fail to engage in a timely,

good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable

accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee

or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12940(n). FEHA requires that employers and employees engage in a good-faith

interactive process to explore reasonable accommodation. Velente-Hook v. Easter Plumas

Health Care, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2005). The standard for FEHA violations

for failure to engage in the interactive process tracks the standard for the ADA violations. Id. 

“‘The interactive process is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation on the part of

employers under the ADA.’” Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 261 (2000)

(quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)). This obligation is

“‘triggered by an employee . . . giving notice of the employee’s disability and the desire for

accommodation.’” Id. (quoting Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1114). The process requires good faith

communication by both parties as a means of achieving the shared goal of identifying an

accommodation that would enable the employee to perform his job effectively. Id. “Employers,

who fail to engage in the interactive process in good faith, face liability for the remedies

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imposed by the statute if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible.” Humphrey v.

Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2001).

Hurley alleges that he gave Pechiney notice of his disability and his desire for

accommodation, such as time off from work, and that Pechiney failed to engage in a timely,

good faith interactive process. (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 10, 11, 14, 15, 42.) Therefore, the Court

finds that Hurley sufficiently alleges a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process in

violation of FEHA and denies Pechiney’s motion to dismiss on that basis.

5. Hurley Sufficiently States a Claim for Failure to Provide Reasonable

Accommodation.

Hurley alleges that he “made a request for reasonable accommodation based on his own

serious disability or health condition” and that Pechiney “did not attempt to reasonably

accommodate [him], and instead, terminated him from employment.” (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 47,

48.)

Pechiney argues that Hurley’s cause of action is time-barred by FEHA’s one year statute

of limitations. (Mot. at 7.) Under FEHA, the complainant must file an administrative charge

within one year after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960. Here,

Hurley alleges that Pechiney denied his requests for reasonable accommodation of his disability

from August 2002 through September 23, 2002. (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 14-23.) He also alleges

that he filed his complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing on July 15,

2003, within a year after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. (Id., ¶ 24.) Because Pechiney

filed his administrative complaint within one year, his complaint here is not barred by the FEHA

statute of limitations. 

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Pechiney also argues that the cause of action should be dismissed based on the

contention that Hurley “has not alleged facts which show that he had a covered disability, that

the disability was known to [him] or that a reasonable accommodation could be made.” (Mot. at

7.) Under California Government Code § 12940(m), it is “an unlawful employment practice for

an employer . . . to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental

disability of an applicant or employee.” In order to state a claim for failure to accommodate, a

plaintiff must allege that he suffers from a disability covered by the FEHA. Bagatti v. Dep't of

Rehab., 97 Cal. App. 4th 344, 361 (2002). A plaintiff need not show that he is a qualified

individual within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111. Id. In addition, a plaintiff need not

establish that an adverse employment action was taken against him. Id. Here, Hurley claims

that he suffered from a severe thumb injury that prevented him from attending work. (Amend.

Compl., ¶ 15.) Therefore, the Court finds that Hurley sufficiently alleges a claim for failure to

reasonably accommodate in violation of FEHA and denies Pechiney’s motion to dismiss on that

basis.

6. Hurley Sufficiently States a Claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of

Public Policy.

Hurley alleges that Pechiney terminated him in violation of the public policies against

terminating employees for exercising their right to take family medical leave and against

employer discrimination based on a known disability of medical condition of employees

codified in CFRA and FEHA, respectively. (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 52 -55.) Pechiney argues for

the dismissal of the wrongful termination claim based on the contention that Hurley “has failed

to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for any of his FEHA or CFRA claims.” (Mot.

at 8.)

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To state a claim for termination in violation of public policy an employee must allege (1)

an employer-employee relationship; (2) termination of employment; (3) the termination was a

violation of public policy; (4) the termination was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s damages; and

(5) damages. Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172 (1980). A tortious discharge

claim requires that the employee be discharged in violation of a policy that is “(1) delineated in

either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘insures to the

benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well

established at the time of discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.” Stevenson v.

Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880, 887-90 (1997). Discharge in violation of CFRA has been held,

as a matter of law, to constitute wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Nelson v.

United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 612 (1999). In addition, “FEHA provisions may provide

the policy basis for a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.” Trop v. Sony

Pictures Entm't Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1144 (2005). 

Here, Hurley alleges that he and Pechiney were in an employer-employee relationship,

that his employment was terminated, that the termination was a violation of CFRA and FEHA,

that the termination was the legal cause of his damages, and that he suffered damages. (Amend.

Compl., ¶¶ 6, 23, 53-56.) As discussed above, the Court finds that Hurley sufficiently alleges

his claims under CFRA and FEHA. Accordingly, the Court denies Pechiney’s motion to

dismiss Hurley’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

7. Hurley Sufficiently States a Claim for Unfair Business Practices.

Hurley contends that Pechiney’s attendance policy “on its face and as implemented”

violates CFRA and FEHA, that it causes damage to Pechiney’s employees and competitors, and

that it is an unfair business practice. (Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 60-63.) Pechiney argues that the

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claim for unfair business practices should be dismissed because it gave Hurley notice of his

rights, provided Hurley with certification documents and sufficient time to have them

completed, and reminded Hurley to turn in the documents. (Mot. at 9.)

Business and Professions Code § 17200 defines unfair competition as “any unlawful,

unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” To state a claim for unfair competition, a plaintiff

must allege that the practice is either unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. Albillo v. Intermodal

Container Servs., Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 190, 206 (2003). Section 17200 is interpreted broadly

and allows lawsuits based on the public’s right to protection from fraud, deceit and other

unlawful conduct, as well as actions aimed at anticompetitive business practices. Cmty.

Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis Sec. Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th 886, 891 (2001). Whether any

particular conduct is a business practice within the meaning of § 17200 is a question of fact

dependant on the circumstances of each case. Id. at 895. Unlawful business activity includes

“‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden

by law.’” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992) (citing Barquis v.

Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 113 (1972)). Unfair simply means any practice

whose harm to the victim outweighs any benefits. Olsen v. Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 608,

618 (1996). “The court must weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of

the harm to the alleged victim.” Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Assocs., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1425

n.15 (2002). 

Although CFRA and FEHA do not explicitly prohibit employer use of attendance

policies, Hurley alleges that Pechiney’s implementation of that policy violates CFRA and

FEHA. (Amend. Compl., ¶ 60.) In addition, Hurley alleges that the attendance policy is an

unfair business practice and that it causes damage to Pechiney’s employees and competitors. 

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(Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 62, 63.) In order to state a claim for unlawful and unfair business practices

in violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200, Hurley must allege violations of CFRA

and FEHA. As discussed above, the Court finds that Hurley sufficiently alleges his claims

under CFRA and FEHA. Therefore, the Court denies Pechiney’s motion to dismiss Hurley’s

claim for unfair business practices.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Pechiney’s motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-05028-JSW Document 28 Filed 03/16/06 Page 14 of 14