Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_16-cv-00042/USCOURTS-ared-4_16-cv-00042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405 Review of HHS Decision

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

LITTLE ROCK DIVISION 

KIMBERLY L. REED PLAINTIFF 

v. No. 4:16-CV-00042-JM-JTK 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

INSTRUCTIONS 

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to 

United States District Judge James Moody. You may file written objections to all or part 

of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the 

factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court 

within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the 

right to appeal questions of fact. 

REASONING FOR RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

Kimberly Reed applied for social security disability benefits with an alleged onset 

date of July 1, 2004. (R. at 81). After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied 

her application. (R. at 35). The Appeals Council denied Reed’s request for review. (R. at 

3A). The ALJ’s decision now stands as the Commissioner’s final decision, and Reed has 

requested judicial review. 

For the reasons stated below, the magistrate judge recommends affirming the 

Commissioner’s decision. 

I. The Commissioner’s Decision 

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The ALJ found that Reed had the severe impairment of bipolar disorder. (R. at 23). 

Due to this impairment, the ALJ found that Reed had the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) to perform work at all exertional levels with the nonexertional limitations that the 

work must be unskilled, defined as able to understand, retains, and carry out simple job 

instructions, make simple work-related decisions, respond appropriately to co-workers 

and supervisors but limited to only occasional incidental contact that is not necessary to 

perform the work; that she would be able to respond to minor changes in the usual work 

routine; and that she would be prohibited from dealing with the general public. (R. at 26). 

Reed had no past relevant work. (R. at 33). The ALJ took testimony from a vocational 

expert (VE) and determined that Reed could perform jobs such as cook’s helper or 

dishwasher. (R. at 34). The ALJ therefore held that Reed was not disabled. (R. at 34–35). 

II. Discussion 

Reed argues that the ALJ improperly determined her RFC, improperly discounted 

her treating physician’s opinion, failed to include all of her limitations in the hypothetical 

to the VE, failed to include an exhibit list, and erred in determining Reed’s credibility. 

The Court is to affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by “substantial evidence 

in the record as a whole,” which is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 

Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009). Even if it is possible to draw two 

inconsistent positions from the evidence, the Court must affirm if one of those positions 

represents the ALJ’s findings. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015). The 

Court considers evidence supporting and evidence detracting from the Commissioner’s 

decision, but it will not reverse simply because substantial evidence could support a 

different outcome. Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000). 

a. The RFC Determination 

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Reed maintains that the ALJ provided an insufficient definition of unskilled work 

and that remand is required to clarify the definition of unskilled work. She argues that 

unskilled work is generally considered work that can be learned within thirty days, which 

the RFC does not specifically state. 

This argument is unavailing. The RFC contains specific limitations and sufficient 

detail to provide a guideline for work that can be performed with those limitations. 

Furthermore, to the extent that it might be error for the RFC not to include an explicit 

requirement that the work be capable of being learned within thirty days, that error is 

harmless. The two jobs identified by the ALJ are both SVP 2 jobs, which are capable of 

being learned within thirty days. Adding an additional restriction to the RFC would not 

have changed the ALJ’s decision. 

Reed also argues that the RFC does not include limitations identified by one of her 

treating physicians, specifically “limitations functioning independently, dealing with 

work stress, maintaining attention and concentration, behaving in an emotionally stable 

manner and demonstrating reliability.” The undersigned cannot agree. The physician who 

asserted those limitations noted that Reed had “fair” ability in all those areas. (R. at 384–

85). The RFC fully accounts for these limitations by limiting Reed to unskilled work and 

limiting her interactions with others. It is not necessary for the RFC to contain specific 

terminology, but it must capture the concrete consequences of the impairments. Lacroix 

v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2006). The RFC in this case does so. 

Reed also takes issue with the ALJ finding her mental impairment to be nonsevere, but this argument is clearly at odds with the actual decision. The ALJ held that 

Reed’s lone severe impairment was bipolar disorder. (R. at 23). The ALJ acknowledged 

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Reed’s former diagnosis of schizophrenia, but that diagnosis has since been dropped. (R. 

at 375–80). The undersigned can find no error in the RFC determination. 

b. The Treating Physician Opinions 

Reed contends that the ALJ did not consider the opinion of one of her treating 

physicians, wrongly considered a 2004 mental evaluation, and erred in not giving 

controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion. 

In the first instance, Reed notes that the ALJ did not acknowledge the medical 

assessment of Dr. Derek Lewis. She argues that this alleged failure to consider evidence 

requires remand. However, Reed’s argument is mistaken. The ALJ discussed opinions by 

Dr. Kaczenski, one of her treating physicians. However, the ALJ discussed one of those 

opinions as having been provided in December 2013, and the ALJ identified that opinion 

as exhibit 19F. (R. at 31). Exhibit 19F is the opinion of Dr. Lewis. (R. at 386–87). The ALJ 

clearly made a mistake in the attribution of the assessment, but the ALJ also discussed 

the assessment in detail. While it would have been better for the ALJ to make no mistake, 

the undersigned cannot see how this misattribution prejudiced Reed in any way. 

Reed argues that the ALJ improperly referenced a 2004 mental evaluation. Reed 

contends that the ALJ should have instead ordered a new psychological examination. The 

ALJ committed no error. The ALJ simply considered all of the evidence in the record. The 

ALJ also gave little weight to the 2004 evaluation and gave more weight to more recent 

evidence. (R. at 30). 

Reed’s complaint that the ALJ did not give controlling weight to Dr. Kaczenski’s 

opinion is also unavailing. Reed argues that Dr. Kaczenski’s opinion supports listing 

12.04, which the ALJ found she did not meet. (R. at 24–26). However, Dr. Kaczenski did 

not identify any “marked” limitations that would be necessary to meet listing 12.04 under 

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the paragraph B criteria or limitations that would satisfy the paragraph C criteria. 20 

C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. As noted above, the RFC fully accounts for all the 

limitations Dr. Kaczenski identified. The undersigned cannot agree that the ALJ 

improperly weighed his opinion. 

c. The Hypothetical to the VE 

Reed next argues that the ALJ failed to include limitations in the hypothetical 

question to the VE. The limitations she speaks of are limitations that Reed mentioned 

during testimony. 

A hypothetical is sufficient if it sets forth the impairments the ALJ accepts as true 

that are supported by substantial evidence. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 

2005). Reed testified that she could not stand for a long time, gets lost and forgets what 

is going on, has problems concentrating, and has problems with her back. (R. at 43, 55, 

56, 59). The record does not contain objective evidence supporting these limitations, and 

the ALJ included all of the limitations he found to be substantiated by the evidence. The 

undersigned can find no error in the hypothetical question. 

d. The Exhibit List 

The Hearing, Appeals, and Litigation Law (“HALLEX”) is a manual guideline 

which provides procedural guidance for processing and adjudicating claims at the ALJ 

hearing and Appeals Council levels. HALLEX I-2-1-20 requires that the ALJ include an 

exhibit list be included with any unfavorable or partially favorable decision. In this case, 

the ALJ did not include an exhibit list along with the decision. Reed contends that this is 

reversible error. 

 The Eighth Circuit has not addressed the legal impact of a HALLEX violation. 

However, other district courts within the Eighth Circuit have concluded that such 

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violations are not reversible error, noting that there is a split in the circuits, where some 

circuits hold that HALLEX is not legally binding on the Commissioner or the courts. 

Crabtree v. Colvin, No. 1:14 CV 29 DDN, 2014 WL 6977779, at *8–9 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 

2014). The undersigned agrees with this assessment. HALLEX is an internal manual not 

meant to have the force of law. 

Nevertheless, even if such a violation were error, it would be harmless in this case. 

Reed complains that a claimant has a right to know on what basis a decision was made 

and that the record in this case is incomplete. An exhibit list would surely make the 

decision easier to navigate, but the record contains all of the evidence upon which the ALJ 

based his decision, and the ALJ’s decision itself contains references to all of the evidence. 

Reed cannot show that she has been in any way harmed by the lack of an exhibit list. 

e. The Credibility Determination 

Finally, Reed contends that the ALJ erred in finding her testimony to not be 

entirely credible. She argues that the ALJ made a single conclusory statement concerning 

credibility and failed to fully consider the credibility factors. 

The Court is to defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination if supported by good 

reason and substantial evidence. Turpin v. Colvin, 750 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 2014). An 

ALJ is to consider multiple factors in determining a claimant’s credibility, including daily 

activities and whether the claimant’s subjective complaints are consistent with the 

evidence as a whole. Id.

Here, the ALJ considered that Reed cares for four minor children without 

assistance, needs no reminders to take medication, prepares meals daily, and performs 

household chores without help or encouragement, and can go out alone. (R. at 30). The 

ALJ also considered Reed’s use of medication to manage her impairments. (R. at 31). The 

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ALJ noted that Reed’s symptoms seemed controlled as long as she took her medication 

and that her only hospitalizations occurred when she was not compliant with medication 

or was abusing illegal drugs. (R. at 29). Overall, the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for 

discrediting Reed. 

III. Recommended Disposition 

The ALJ properly determined Reed’s RFC, properly weighed the treating physician 

opinion evidence, posed a sufficient hypothetical question to the VE, and performed a 

proper credibility determination. The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

on the record as a whole and is not based on legal error. For these reasons, the 

undersigned magistrate judge recommends AFFIRMING the decision of the 

Commissioner. 

It is so ordered this 15th day of March, 2017. 

 ________________________________ 

 JEROME T. KEARNEY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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