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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L b D 

United States ~rt <?f Appeals 

DR. PATRICIA SCHLOESSER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THE KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

ENVIRON-•iENT and STANLEY C. GRANT, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Tenth C1rcu1t 

APR 12 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-3079 

(D.C. No. g r 2029-V) 

(D . Kan . ) 

Before LOGAN and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

Judge.t 

Defendants appeal the denial of summary judgment . Our 

jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we reverse. 

Background 

Plainti ff- appellee Dr. Schloesser brought this action after a 

demoti on and ultimately the termination of her employment with 

Defendant-appellant Kansas Department of Health and Environment 

(KDHE). Dr. Schloesser clai ms that these actions were the result 

of discrimination based on age , violating the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 u.s. c. §§ 621 - 634 . Defendants moved 

* This order and judgment has no precedential va ~ and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth ~ i rcuit, 

e x c ept for purposes of establishing the doctri n es of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3 . 

t The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge 

for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-3079 Document: 010110200890 Date Filed: 04/12/1993 Page: 1 
for summary judgment, arguing that Eleventh Amendment immunity 

applied and that the claim regarding the demotion was time-barred. 

The district court denied summary judgment and, at trial, 

Plaintiff prevailed only on the claim relating to her demotion. 

Discussion 

We review the denial of summary judgment de novo, utilizing 

the same legal standard as the district court in evaluating the 

summary judgment motion. Applied Genetics Int'l. Inc. v. First 

Affiliated Sec .• Inc ., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if " there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the 

evidence and draw any inferences in a light most favorable to the 

party opposing summary judgment, but that party must identify 

sufficient evidence which would require submission of the case to 

a jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-52 

(1986). 

At a minimum, a movant must point to those portions of the 

record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1 986) . If 

a movant establishes entitlement to judgment as a matter of law 

given uncontroverted, operative facts contained in the documentary 

evidence, summary judgment will lie. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

251. 

Many of the facts of this case were not in dispute. The 

Secretary of the KDHE, Dr. Grant, appointed Dr. Schloesser, a 

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Appellate Case: 92-3079 Document: 010110200890 Date Filed: 04/12/1993 Page: 2 
sixty-three year old woman, as Director of Health. Obviously, the 

motivation behind the activity that followed is in dispute, but it 

is undisputed that in a meeting on May 2, 1988, Dr. Grant informed 

Dr. Schloesser that she would no longer serve as Director of 

Health. A new position, with a lower salary and a lower 

classification, was created for her. Also at that meeting, 

Plaintiff alleged, Dr. Grant made several comments to the effect 

that Dr. Schloesser would be replaced with a "kid." Plaintiff 

served in her new capacity until May 1989, when that position was 

eliminated. She filed a complaint with the EEOC on June 19, 1989. 

Timely filing of a discrimination charge is a prerequisite to 

an ADEA claim. 29 U. S.C. § 626(d) . An individual has 300 days 

from t h e alleged discriminatory act in which to file a charge with 

the EEOC. 29 U.S . C. § 626(d) (2 ) . Dr. Schloesser argues that the 

limitations period should be tolled because Defendants actively 

misled her at the May 2, 1988 meeting and lulled her into 

inaction. The district court agreed that the limitations period 

might be subject to equitable tolling and refused to grant 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 1 

We have recognized that a defendant may be equitably estopped 

from asserting a defense based on a limitations period if that 

1 As a technical matter, we agree with the court in Cada v. 

Baxter Healthcare Corp . , 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990), cert . 

denied, 111 S . Ct. 2916 (1991 ) , that equitable tolling should be 

distinguished from equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel is 

applied if a defendant takes active steps to prevent a plaintiff 

from suing in time , most usually by promising not to plead the 

statute o f limitations. Equitable tolling of the limitations 

period is appropriate if a plaintiff is unable to obtain important 

information surrounding the c laim despite due dil igence . Plaintiff urges the former, although both Plaintiff and the 

dis trict court used the label o f t he latter. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3079 Document: 010110200890 Date Filed: 04/12/1993 Page: 3 
defendant has "'actively misled,'" Martin ez v . Orr, 738 F.2d 110 7 , 

1110 (10th Cir. 1984 ) (quoting Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Age ncy, 

Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (1 0 th Cir. 1982 )) , o r if a plaintiff "has 

been 'lulled into inaction by her past employer state or federal 

agencies, or the courts,'" Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110 (quoting 

Carlile v. South Routt Sch. Dist. RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981, 986 (1 0th 

Cir. 1981)). 

Dr. Schloesser's ADEA claim, on the other hand, involved two 

separate acts by Defendants -- her demotion and the subsequent 

elimination of her new job. Plaintiff only prevailed on, and 

Defendants only appeal from, the demotion claim. We are convinced 

that Plaintiff had ample notice that possible discrimination based 

on age had resulted in her demotion after the May, 1988 meeting. 

She immediately suffered the consequences of lower pay, a less 

desirable office space, less administrative authority and 

diminished support staff assistance. Prior to the meeting, 

comments about Dr. Schloesser's retirement had been directed 

towards her and at the meeting Dr. Grant referred to Dr. 

Schloesser's replacement as a 11 kid. 11 At that point, "facts that 

would suppo rt a cause of action [were] or [should have been] 

apparent." Blumberg v. HCA Management Co ., 848 F . 2d 642, 645 (5th 

Cir. 1 988) , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989). Plaintiff points 

to no action taken by the Defendants to mislead her as to any o f 

the pertine nt facts or "trick" her into allowing the limitation 

period to pass. See Irwin v. Veterans Adrnin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 457 

(1990 ). 

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Appellate Case: 92-3079 Document: 010110200890 Date Filed: 04/12/1993 Page: 4 
Dr. Schloesser's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment 

discusses various disputed facts which go to the merits of her 

discrimination claim. However, the limitation issue does not turn 

on the truthfulness of Defendants' proffered legitimate reasons 

for the demotion and, in fact, forecloses the relevanc~ of the 

merits of Plaintir f's claim. See Fleury v. Harper & Row, 

Publishers. Inc., 698 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 

464 U.S. 846 (1983) . Rather, to determine when the limitati on 

period began to run, we focus on what informat ion was available to 

the Plaintiff and when it was available. The .:naterial facts to 

that inquiry were not in dispute and summary judgment should have 

been granted in favor of the Defendants with respect to the 

demotion claim. 

Dr. Schloesser cites several cases where courts have found 

equitable estoppel of the limitations period appropriate based 

upon an employer's promise of reinstatement. See Coke v. General 

Adjustment Bureau, Inc . , 640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1981) ; Bonham v. 

Dresser Indust . , 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977) , cert. denied, 439 

U.S . 821 (19 78 ) . Plaintiff overlooks a major factual difference 

from her own situation which renders these cases inapplicable . 

The "reinstatement" cases allow equitable relief to the plaintiff 

who files late because "subsequent to his discharge, demotion, or 

f o rced r etirement, his employer had promised to reinstate him in 

his former position or in a comparable alternative position. " 

Cerbone v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 

4S . 49 (2d Cir. 1985). He re, Plaintiff has not alleged that, 

a ~ _er her demotion, Defendants made promises that she would be 

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Appellate Case: 92-3079 Document: 010110200890 Date Filed: 04/12/1993 Page: 5 
reinstated in a comparable position. There was no indication that 

the Defendants or Dr. Schloesser ever attempted "settlement 

negotiations" to address the alleged improper demotion. Id. at 

50. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that, because Defendants failed to 

object to the jury instruction concerning tolling of the 

limitation period at trial, it is now the law of the case. 

Plaintiff misinterprets the nature of the Defendants' argument on 

appeal. Defendants do not argue that there is no such thing as 

equitable tolling or even that the instruction is an inaccurate 

statement of law. Rather, their contention, and the principle 

upon which our decision rests, is that when the Defendants moved 

for summary judgment, the court failed to find that as a matter of 

law, given the undisputed facts, equity would not toll the 

limitations period. 

REVERSED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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