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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-20363

Summary Calendar

JOHN W. HAMILTON-PROVOST, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CAROLYN COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CV-2585

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

John Hamilton-Provost was denied benefits under Title II and Title XVI 

of the Social Security Act. On appeal, Hamilton-Provost raises several 

challenges to the Commissioner’s finding that he was not disabled.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4. * “R.” refers to the Bates-stamped page numbers of the paper administrative record. 

“ROA.” refers to the electronic record on appeal.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 5, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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I.

In 2004, Hamilton-Provost applied for supplemental security income 

benefits (SSI) under Title XVI and disability insurance benefits under Title II. 

He alleged that he had been disabled since December 14, 2002 as a result of 

visual and mental health impairments. After Hamilton-Provost’s application 

was denied initially and on reconsideration, an Administrative Law Judge 

(ALJ) held a hearing in July 2008.1 The ALJ concluded that Hamilton-Provost 

was not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied review. Hamilton-Provost 

sought judicial review in federal district court, which resulted in the court

remanding the case to the Commissioner with instructions to consider medical

records which were not reviewed at the 2008 hearing. On remand in 2011, a 

different ALJ also concluded that Hamilton-Provost was not disabled. In 2012, 

the Appeals Council denied review of the Title II claim, but granted review of 

the Title XVI claim and affirmed the ALJ’s decision with modifications. 

Hamilton-Provost again filed suit in federal district court. After considering

the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded

that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s finding of no 

disability. This appeal followed. 

The factual record in this case is detailed and lengthy. We summarize 

the relevant facts. Hamilton-Provost testified at the administrative hearings

that he was 51 years old at the time of his alleged disability onset, had earned 

a general equivalency diploma, and could perform various physical tasks 

(including lifting up to fifty pounds). He also testified that he wore a prosthetic 

in his right eye, could only see shadows out of his left eye, used Braille to read, 

did not wear glasses because they did not help him, and used a cane and escort

1 An administrative hearing had been held in July 2006, but Hamilton-Provost failed 

to appear. Upon request by Hamilton-Provost, the Appeals Council remanded the case for 

another hearing, which resulted in the 2008 hearing. 

2

 

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to get around. At both hearings, Hamilton-Provost appeared pro se and 

telephonically because he was, and continues to be, incarcerated on a life

sentence for robbery. He began serving his sentence in 2008, and the case is 

currently on appeal. As the district court noted, Hamilton-Provost’s

incarceration potentially complicates his eligibility for benefits.

A Vocational Expert testified in 2008 that Hamilton-Provost had last 

worked in 1993 and had past relevant work experience as a general laborer, 

detailer, tank cleaner, and delivery driver. The expert also testified that a 

person with Hamilton-Provost’s age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity could work as a detailer, laundry worker, industrial 

cleaner, and dining room attendant, and that these jobs existed in significant 

numbers in the national economy. A different Vocational Expert testified in

2011 that a person with Hamilton-Provost’s residual functional capacity could 

continue to work as a general laborer. 

The record also documents the medical history surrounding

Hamilton-Provost’s alleged impairments. Between 2003 and 2008, various 

physicians examined Hamilton-Provost or reviewed his ophthalmological 

records. An August 2003 examination diagnosed Hamilton-Provost with 

“profound visual loss” with “no apparent cause” and concluded that he was 

“most likely malingering.” R.350–51. Later that month, a review of

Hamilton-Provost’s records concluded that “[n]o objective clinical findings 

[supported] the apparent impairment of . . . vision suggested by subjective test 

responses.” R.359. The doctor further concluded that “[a] severe visual 

impairment was not established on the basis of medical evidence.” R.359. An 

April 2004 examination recorded Hamilton-Provost’s left-eye vision as 20/200 

without correction. An August 2004 examination concluded that if 

Hamilton-Provost “has loss of vision due to organic disease, it is masked by 

functional overlay,” and opined that the prognosis was “[g]ood for retention of 

3

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vision.” R.360–61. A September 2004 review of the medical records concluded

that there was “no severe pathology of [the] left eye,” and that the “subjective 

blindness of [the] left eye is not supported.” R.364. Finally, a November 2008

examination diagnosed a left-eye vision of 20/200 with correction.2 

Hamilton-Provost’s records also reflect a history of mental health 

assessments. In August 2004, a physician conducted a mental status report 

and noted that Hamilton-Provost had a history of depression and anxiety and 

that his mood and affect were depressed; the report also concluded, however,

that his memory, attention, concentration, insight, judgment, and ability to 

relate to others and sustain work were all fair. At a September 2004

examination, Hamilton-Provost complained of feeling depressed and of 

difficulty interacting with people. The examining doctor noted that 

Hamilton-Provost’s “mood was sad” and that his “thought processes were 

logical, goal-directed, relevant, and coherent.” R.367. The doctor assessed a 

moderate impairment in functioning,3 and concluded that “[p]rognosis is fair 

with continuation of treatment, psychosocial support, and rehabilitation.” 

R.368. In October 2004, a state agency Ph.D. reviewed the psychiatric records 

and concluded that Hamilton-Provost’s condition did not meet the criteria for 

Listing 12.04 (Affective Disorders) or Listing 12.06 (Anxiety-Related 

Disorders), both of which would automatically establish disability under the 

Act. At a July 2008 examination, Hamilton-Provost reported that he had been 

experiencing auditory hallucinations and that he was experiencing distressing 

2 This is one of the three examinations which the district court ordered the 

Commissioner to consider on remand. 

3 The examiner assessed a Global Assessment Functioning score of 55, which entails: 

“Moderate Symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) 

OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, 

conflicts with peers or co-workers).” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual 

of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). 

4

 

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symptoms. The examining doctor observed that Hamilton-Provost was: calm,

cooperative, goal-directed and rational, exhibited clear and concise speech,

exhibited no psychotic or anxious symptoms, and was mildly depressed. Later 

that month, another examination concluded that all objective indicators were 

normal except for a “slightly depressed and anxious” mood.4 R.428.

II.

Federal courts have jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Social 

Security Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review “of the 

Commissioner’s decision is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and (2) whether 

the Commissioner applied the proper legal standard.” Perez v. Barnhart, 415 

F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere 

scintilla and less than a preponderance,” Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 

272 (5th Cir. 2002), and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 401 (1971) (internal citation omitted). “In determining whether 

substantial evidence of disability exists, this court weighs four factors: 

(1) objective medical evidence; (2) diagnoses and opinions; (3) the claimant’s 

subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, 

and work history.” Perez, 415 F.3d at 462 (internal citation omitted). In 

applying this standard of review, we may not reweigh the evidence or 

“substitute our judgment for the Commissioner's, even if we believe the 

evidence weighs against the Commissioner’s decision.” Masterson, 309 F.3d at 

272. Conflicting evidence is for the Commissioner, not the courts, to resolve.

Id. 

4 The July 2008 examinations constitute the other two of a total of three examinations

that the district court ordered the Commissioner to consider on remand. 

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Although Social Security disability insurance and SSI are separate and 

distinct programs, Hamilton-Provost’s entitlement to benefits under either 

program requires him to establish a “disability” under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(a)(1) (eligibility requirements for disability insurance); 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1381a (eligibility requirements for SSI). Disability is defined as the inability 

“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to . . . last 

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) 

(disability insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A) (SSI). To determine whether the 

claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry: (1) whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the 

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment 

meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the 

claimant is capable of returning to his previous work; and (5) whether the 

claimant is capable of performing any other work. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 

(internal citations omitted). Before proceeding to step four, the Commissioner 

must evaluate the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC)—“a 

determination of the most the claimant can still do despite his physical and 

mental limitations.” Id. at 461–62. The RFC is used at step four to determine 

if the claimant can continue to perform his past relevant work; at step five, the 

RFC is used to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing any 

other work. Id. at 462. The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four 

steps, and then the burden shifts to the Commissioner on the fifth step. Id. at 

461. 

III.

Hamilton-Provost first argues that the Commissioner’s decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he challenges the 

Commissioner’s findings at steps three, four, and five of the disability inquiry. 

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After the remand from the district court, the ALJ found at step three 

that Hamilton-Provost’s impairments did not meet or equal impairments listed 

in the regulations. The ALJ then assessed Hamilton-Provost’s RFC, finding:

[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: 

no climbing ropes, ladders or scaffolds, no working at unprotected 

heights or around dangerous moving machinery, simple routine 

work environment, no highly detailed work and none requiring 

sustained concentration or attention for prolonged periods, only 

occasional interaction with the general public, no driving, and no 

work that requires good depth perception. 

R.547. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found that Hamilton-Provost was capable 

of performing his past relevant work as a general laborer and thus made a 

no-disability finding at step four of the inquiry. The Appeals Council in 2012 

denied review of the Title II disability insurance claim, rendering the ALJ’s 

decision the final decision of the Commissioner, but granted review of the SSI

claim, which was based on a different time frame.5 The Appeals Council agreed 

with the RFC determination, but concluded that stage four denial was 

inappropriate for the Title II claim. The Appeals Council proceeded to step 

five, at which point it adopted the testimony of the Vocational Expert from

2008 that Hamilton-Provost was capable of performing other work. The 

Appeals Council thus affirmed the ALJ’s no-disability finding for the Title II 

claim on this modified basis. 

5 For the Title II disability insurance claim, the relevant time period is December 14, 

2002 (the alleged disability onset date) through December 31, 2006 (the last date on which 

Hamilton-Provost met the Act’s insured requirement). The relevant time period for the SSI

claim is December 14, 2002 through July 25, 2011 (the date of the ALJ’s decision). The 

Appeals Council modified the SSI decision because Hamilton-Provost’s work as a general 

laborer in 1993 was more than 15 years prior to the 2011 decision (the end-date of the 

relevant time period for the SSI claim), and was therefore too remote in time to qualify as 

“past relevant work.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1). This was not an issue with respect to 

the Title II disability insurance claim because Hamilton-Provost’s past relevant work was 

within 15 years of his last insured date of December 31, 2006. 

7

 

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We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s 

decision. In making his determination, the ALJ first considered

Hamilton-Provost’s testimony regarding his symptoms and conditions; the ALJ

found the testimony not credible, noting Hamilton-Provost’s multiple felony 

convictions.6 The ALJ also reviewed the objective medical evidence, as well as

opinions and diagnoses, including the 2008 eye and psychiatric examinations

that the district court instructed the Commissioner to consider on remand. As 

to the visual impairment, Hamilton-Provost contends that the November 2008 

eye examination satisfies the requirements of Listing 2.02, requiring a 

disability finding in his favor at step three.7 But the ALJ considered that 

examination and accorded it little weight on the grounds that it did not provide 

a reason why Hamilton-Provost was legally blind and was inconsistent with 

the reports of malingering. The ALJ instead found that the allegations of 

statutory blindness were not credible, a determination squarely within his 

province.8 See Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272. The RFC nevertheless accounts for 

visual problems by restricting work requiring driving, climbing, unprotected 

heights, or good depth perception. Substantial evidence in the record supports 

the ALJ’s conclusion, including the examinations from August 2003, April 

2004, and August 2004; and the medical record review from September 2004. 

6 Prior to the life sentence he is currently serving for robbery, Hamilton-Provost was 

incarcerated for felony theft from approximately 1970–1972, for attempted murder from 

1978–1990, and for a parole violation from 1999–2001. 7 Listing 2.02 pertains to loss of visual acuity and is satisfied when the remaining 

vision in the claimant’s better eye, after best correction, is 20/200 or less. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 

404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 2.02 (defining loss of central visual acuity as “[r]emaining vision in 

the better eye after best correction is 20/200 or less”). 

8 Hamilton-Provost also argues that his impairment meets Listing 2.03, which 

pertains to contraction of the visual field in the better eye, but he merely recites the 

diagnostic criteria of the listing and points to no objective medical evidence supporting his

assertion. The claimant bears the burden of proving presumptive disability under the 

regulations at step three of the five-step inquiry. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461. The ALJ determined 

that Hamilton-Provost did not carry his burden, specifically finding that Hamilton-Provost’s 

subjective allegations of visual impairment were not credible. .

8

 

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On appeal to this court, Hamilton-Provost offers for the first time an

examination dated February 2014, which diagnoses a left-eye vision of 20/200 

with correction. The examination was performed by Dr. George Steed, the 

same physician who diagnosed a left-eye vision of 20/200 with correction in 

November 2008. A district court may remand the case to the Commissioner if 

“there is new evidence which is material and . . . there is good cause for the 

failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The statute does not expressly allow for, and we could find 

no case permitting, new evidentiary submissions in the court of appeals. We 

need not reach this question, however, because remand based on new evidence

would not be appropriate even if it were generally allowed at this late stage. 

Evidence is material if there is “a reasonable possibility that it would 

have changed the outcome of the [ALJ’s] determination.” Latham v. Shalala, 

36 F.3d 482, 483 (5th Cir. 1994). The examination at issue was not performed 

until approximately nineteen months after the Appeals Council reviewed the 

ALJ’s decision, and so it is not probative of whether Hamilton-Provost was 

disabled at the time the Commissioner issued her decision.9 Cf. Perkins v. 

Shalala, 36 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that district court erred in 

finding medical records offered for the first time before it were not new and

material evidence, and remanding to Commissioner on grounds that the 

claimant “made a strong showing that the ‘new’ evidence presented confirms 

that he suffered from a [disability] at the time that the ALJ denied the benefits”) 

9 This situation is quite different from that surrounding the November 2008 records. 

There, the eye examination was conducted two weeks before the ALJ issued his decision in 

2008. It is not clear if those records were available to the ALJ, but it is undisputed that they 

were available to the Appeals Council. The district court thus remanded the case because 

the Commissioner failed to consider this evidence. Cf. Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 

332, 337 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that evidence presented for the first time to the Appeals 

Council is part of the administrative record because the Commissioner’s decision is not final 

until the Appeals Council issues its decision). 

9

 

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(emphasis added). Further, remand is not appropriate “solely for the 

consideration of evidence of a subsequent deterioration of what was correctly 

held to be a non-disabling condition.” Johnson v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 180, 183 

(5th Cir. 1985) (noting that “subsequent deterioration, however, may form the 

basis for a new claim”). The ALJ found that the claims of statutory blindness 

were not credible, and substantial evidence supported his finding. The 

February 2014 examination is thus relevant, if at all, only as evidence of

subsequent deterioration of a non-disabling condition. Remand to the agency 

on these grounds is not appropriate. 

As to the mental health impairment, Hamilton-Provost contends that his 

condition satisfies the requirements of Listing 12.04, requiring a disability 

finding in his favor at step three.10 But the ALJ considered all of the 

psychiatric evidence (as well as Hamilton-Provost’s subjective claims) and 

concluded that the record did not establish that Listing 12.04 was met. At step 

four, the ALJ concluded that no objective medical evidence showed the

impairment to be so severe that Hamilton-Provost could not work within the

10 Listing 12.04 pertains to affective disorders and is “[c]haracterized by a disturbance 

of mood, accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 

404, subpt. P, app.1, § 12.04. To meet Listing 12.04, the claimant must satisfy the 

requirements listed in both paragraphs A and B of the regulation, or paragraph C. See id. 

As relevant to this case, paragraph B requires a medically documented persistent syndrome

to result in at least two of the following: (1) marked restrictions of daily living; (2) marked 

difficulties in social functioning; (3) marked difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace; 

or (4) repeated episodes of extended decompensation. See id. As relevant to this case, 

paragraph C requires a medically documented “chronic affective disorder of at least two 

years’ duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do basic work,”

and either: (1) repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration; (2) such 

marginal adjustment that a minimal increase in mental demands or change in environment 

would cause decompensation; or (3) a history of at least one years’ inability to function outside 

a highly supportive living arrangement. See id. The ALJ found that the evidence did not 

satisfy paragraph B or paragraph C. Specifically, the ALJ found that Hamilton-Provost did 

not have marked restrictions or difficulties with daily life, social functioning, or ability to 

sustain focused attention and concentration for prolonged periods of time, and that there was 

no evidence that he was unable to function outside of his home or that slight changes in his 

mental demands or environment would result in “decompensation.” 

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RFC’s limitations, which restrict work requiring a high level of detail, 

sustained concentration for prolonged periods, or more than occasional 

interaction with the general public. Substantial evidence in the record 

supports the ALJ’s decision, including the August 2004 report (noting that 

Hamilton-Provost’s memory, attention, concentration, insight, judgment, and 

ability to relate to others and sustain work were all fair) and the September 

2004 examination (assessing his functioning as moderately impaired but 

giving a fair prognosis).11 

Hamilton-Provost also argues that the Commissioner erred at step five 

by adopting the testimony of the Vocational Expert from the 2008 hearing. The 

Appeals Council has broad authority to modify the ALJ’s decision. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.979, 416.1479 (“The Appeals Council may affirm, modify or 

reverse the administrative law judge hearing decision or it may adopt, modify 

or reject a recommended decision.”). The RFC that the Vocational Expert 

considered in 2008 was, in all relevant respects, substantially similar to the

RFC assessed in 2011.12 Further, Hamilton-Provost was present by telephone 

at the 2008 hearing; when asked if he had any questions for the Vocational 

Expert following her testimony, he responded: “No, sir.” R.486. The 

Commissioner satisfied her step five burden of showing that Hamilton-Provost 

is capable of performing other work that exists in the local or national economy, 

and Hamilton-Provost failed to rebut this showing. 

11 Hamilton-Provost also argues that his impairment meets Listing 12.06 

(Anxiety-Related Disorders). For the same reasons we discussed in connection with his 

Listing 2.03 claim, this argument fails. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 

12 The 2008 RFC contained restrictions accommodating the mental health impairment 

(no highly detailed work, occasional interaction with the general public, no work requiring 

sustained concentration or attention for prolonged periods) and the visual impairment (no 

work requiring good depth perception). The 2011 RFC incorporated all of these restrictions 

and added more; the additional limitations, however, do not meaningfully change the nature, 

scope, and purpose of the restrictions in the 2008 RFC.

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Hamilton-Provost next argues, for the first time in the long history of his 

case, that the Commissioner did not apply the correct legal standard in 

declining to give weight to Dr. Steed’s November 2008 opinion and diagnosis. 

“Arguments not raised in the district court cannot be asserted for the first time 

on appeal.” Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir.

2004). Nonetheless, we note that his argument fails on the merits. 

Hamilton-Provost contends that the ALJ was required under Newton v. Apfel,

209 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2000) to address the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) before rejecting Dr. Steed’s opinion. But Newton

stated that the ALJ is required to do so “absent reliable medical evidence from 

a treating or examining physician controverting the claimant’s treating 

specialist.” 209 F.3d at 453. Here, Dr. Steed’s opinion was controverted by 

evidence from other examining and treating physicians. 

In sum, we agree with the thorough reasoning of the district court and 

conclude that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record and that the Commissioner did not apply the incorrect 

legal standard in arriving at her decision.13

IV.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

13 In light of our holding, we need not address the impact of Hamilton-Provost’s 

incarceration on his eligibility for benefits. 

12

 

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