Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02340/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02340-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN E. RANSOM,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv02340-IEG [WMC]

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO COMPEL [Doc. No.

33], PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE [Doc. 33-1],

AND PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL [Doc. No. 31]

vs.

GRAY, ET AL.,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bryan E. Ransom, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed

suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 

31.]. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Compel Discovery [Doc. 33] and further responses to

already propounded discovery. Included in Plaintiff’s discovery motion is a Request for Judicial

Notice. [Doc. No. 33-1]. Defendant has filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s discovery motion. [Doc.

27].

II. GOVERNING STANDARD

Rule 26 authorizes a party to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is

relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(1). However, the right to

discovery must be limited when: 1) the information sought is unreasonably cumulative or can be

obtained from a less burdensome source; 2) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity

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to obtain it; or 3) the burden outweighs the value. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(2)(C). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel as to Plaintiff’s RFA Nos. 14 & 16 

Plaintiff argues further discovery must be compelled in response to Plaintiff’s Request for

Admissions Nos. 14 & 16. The Plaintiff’s Requests and the Defendant’s Responses are as follows:

“Request for Admission No. 14:

Please admit that the CDC 602, dated 12-9-96 and marked as Exhibit D is authentic.

Response to Request for Admission No. 14:

Unable to admit or deny. Defendant Santiago is informed and believes that Exhibit

D is not part of Plaintiff’s current prison records, and that prison officials at

Donovan purge such records after ten years.

...

Request for Admission No. 16:

Please admit that Plaintiff’s 8/12/06 CDC 602 claiming that he had been

misdiagnosed with TB exposure was submitted prior to the 4/5/07 discovery of a

negative T.B. skin test.

Response to Request for Admission No. 16:

Unable to admit or deny. Defendant Santiago is informed and believes that Exhibit

E is not part of Plaintiff’s current prison records, and that prison officials at

Donovan purge such records after ten years.”

[Doc. 33, Mot. to Compel at 13]

With regards to Request for Admission No. 14, Plaintiff argues further discovery must be

compelled since the CDC 602 form bears a stamp showing it was received by the Calipatria State

Prison Appeals Office for formal review on March 5, 1997. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 6]. 

Plaintiff asserts that when a CDC 602 is accepted for formal review, a copy of it is placed in the

inmate’s central file, which Defendant has in his possession. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 6-7]. 

Finally, Plaintiff asserts authentication of the document is necessary in order to present it as

evidence of the medical staff’s awareness of Plaintiff’s negative reaction to the INH treatment.

[Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 7].

Defendant notes the CDC 602 form in question does not bear a formal log number and,

based on conversations with Appeals Coordinators, concludes the complaint was either resolved

informally or not accepted for formal review. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 4]. Further,

Defendant argues the form was likely purged from prison records pursuant to prison policy to

purge records after ten years. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 4]. Defendant also asserts a

review of Plaintiff’s central file revealed the CDC 602 form in question was not recorded in that

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file. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 4]. Consequently, Defendant asserts the response of

“unable to admit or deny” was appropriate since Defendant is unable to conclusively verify the

authenticity of the document.

In connection with Request for Admission No. 16, Plaintiff argues there is no reason why

the particular CDC 602 form was purged. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 7-8]. Plaintiff argues since

any prison record purging policy would be inapplicable to a CDC 602 form less than ten years old,

and since authentication is necessary to present the form as evidence of the medical staff’s

awareness, further discovery must be compelled. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 8].

Defendant responds by asserting the CDC 602 was likely resolved at the informal level

since it was not assigned a log number and the request for formal review section was not filled out.

[Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 5]. Defendant asserts the particular form was not found in

Plaintiff’s central file. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 5]. Defendant also acknowledges the

section of the response concerning the record purge policy was unnecessary and irrelevant to

Defendant’s actual response of “unable to admit or deny.” [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 5,

fn.3]. However, Defendant asserts its inability to conclusively authenticate the document justifies

an answer of “unable to admit or deny,” since authentication of the document is necessary in order

to determine whether the document was actually submitted. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 5].

“A party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for the purposes of the

pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to: ... (B)

the genuineness of any described documents.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 36(a)(1). If the answering party

does not admit or deny the matter, that party must “state in detail why [he/she] cannot truthfully

admit or deny it.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 36(a)(4).

Plaintiff has failed to provide grounds for compelling further responses from Defendant on

both Requests for Admissions. Concerning the CDC 602 form referenced in Request for

Admission No. 14, Plaintiff’s contention is the form was stamped received by the appeals office

and so must be contained in Plaintiff’s central file. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 6]. Defendant’s

response of “unable to admit or deny” is appropriate since Defendant has provided specific

grounds explaining the form “is not part of Plaintiff’s current prison records, and that prison

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officials at Donovan purge such records after ten years.” [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 3]. 

Defendant notes the particular CDC 602 was not located during a personal review of Plaintiff’s

entire central file. [Doc. 27; Decl. Hagan in Support Opp. Mot. to Compel at 4]. Defendant’s

opposition papers further explain Defendant’s informed belief that the CDC 602 was either

“resolved informally or screened out and not accepted for formal review since there is no log

number assigned.” [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 4]. This belief was based on conversations

held with CDCR officials who reviewed the CDC 602 form in question. [Doc. 27; Decl. Hagan in

Support Opp. Mot. to Compel at 4]. Defendant also notes the CDC form was likely purged since it

is over twelve years old and prison policy is to purge records over tens years old. [Doc. 27; Opp.

Mot. to Compel at 4]. Consequently, Defendant has stated in detail why he cannot truthfully admit

or deny the matter and Defendant’s response was appropriate.

Defendant’s response to Request for Admission No. 16 is also appropriate. Plaintiff’s sole

contention is the CDC 602 form here would not have been purged and so must be contained in

Plaintiff’s central file. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 7-8]. However, Defendant concedes the form

would not have been purged. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 5, fn.3]. Defendant further

explains the CDC 602 form was probably informally resolved since the form “has no log number

and section ‘D’ regarding formal review is not filled out.” [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 5]. 

Consequently, Defendant also notes “neither of the appeals coordinators at Richard J. Donovan or

Corcoran could authenticate the genuineness of this particular CDC form 602 since there is no

record of the same on the Inmate Appeals Tracking system nor is this particular CDC form 602

contained within plaintiff’s [central file].” [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 5]. Consequently,

Defendant has stated in detail why he cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter and Defendant’s

response was appropriate.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel as to Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. 1-4 & No. 2 (Set 2) 

Plaintiff argues further discovery must be compelled in response to Plaintiff’s Request for

Production Nos. 1-4 & No. 2 (Set 2). Plaintiff’s Requests and Defendant’s Responses are as

follows:

“Request for Production No. 1:

Please produce the medical data on the time tables of how long it takes for chronic

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use of INH to develop stages 1, 2, and 3 Fibrosis.

Request for Production No. 2:

Please produce the medical data on the time lines of how long it takes for Hep-C to

develop stages 1, 2, and 3 Fibrosis.

Request for Production No. 3:

Please produce the medical data on all the variables involved in determining and/or

approximately how long a person has had Hep-C.

Request for Production No. 4:

Please produce the medical data on whether INH induced Fibrosis can be

distinguished from Hep-C induced Fibrosis, and if so, how.

Response to Requests for Production Nos. 1-4:

Objection. The discovery is obtainable from some other source that is more

convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; and the party seeking discovery has

had ample opportunity in the action to obtain the information sought. FED.R.CIV.P.

26(b)(2). This request for production also requests expert discovery which can only

be obtained through deposition and by paying reasonable fees to the expert.

FED.R.CIV.P. 34(a) [requests for production limited to parties]; FED.R.CIV.P.

26(b)(4)(A) [expert discovery is through deposition]; and FED.R.CIV.P.

26(b)(4)(C) [party must pay fees related to expert deposition]. To comply with this

request for production, Defendant Santiago, who is now retired, would be required

to perform medical research or produce medical data that is equally available to

plaintiff through his own medical research or expert. Moreover, to the extent that

this information seeks discovery from an expert it is improper for the reasons stated

herein. Based on the aforementioned objections, Defendant Santiago will not be

complying with this request for production.

...

Request for Production No. 2 (Set 2):

Please produce the name and last known business address of the medical staff

member who gave the reading of plaintiff’s 9/30/96 PPD test as positive.

Response to Request for Production No. 2:

Objection. This request for production is phrased as an interrogatory and thus is

improper. The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity in the action to

obtain the information sought. FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(2). The discovery is obtainable

from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive.

FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(20. This request is unduly burdensome and oppressive in that

it asks defendant to identify a medical staff member from a chart note from 1996.

[¶] Without waiving said objections, Defendant Santiago replies he does not know

the name and the last known business address of the initial medical staff member

who gave the reading of plaintiff’s 9/30/96 PPD test as positive. Defendant

Santiago replies, on information and belief, that the reading was verified by Dr.

Gray, now deceased. Dr. Gray’s last known business address was R.J. Donovan

Correctional Facility, 480 Alta 

Road, San Diego, California, 92179.”

[Doc. 27, Opp. Mot. to Compel at 6-8].

In connection with Requests for Production Nos. 1-4, Plaintiff asserts Defendant is under

an obligation to produce the requested medical data since Defendant has caused Plaintiff’s Fibrosis

by continuing the INH treatment. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 9]. Plaintiff further asserts the

production is necessary in order for Plaintiff to refute defense expert’s testimony. [Doc. 33; Mot.

to Compel at 9]. 

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Defendant asserts Requests for Production Nos. 1-4 is improper since Plaintiff is

attempting to have Defendant’s retained expert do Plaintiff’s work. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel

at 7]. Defendant relies upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 34 & 26 to argue

Plaintiff’s Requests for Production are objectionable. [Doc. 27; Opp. Mot. to Compel at 7].

In connection with Request for Production No. 2 (Set 2), Plaintiff asserts a further response

is necessary in order to properly identify and serve the individual who gave the PPD reading as

positive. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 10]. Plaintiff further notes that compelling a response is

appropriate since Defendant did not specify what attempts have been made to identify the

individual. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 9-10].

Defendant asserts Request for Production No. 2 (Set 2), is objectionable since it is actually

an interrogatory improperly categorized as a request for production. [Doc. 27; Mot. to Compel at

8]. Furthermore, Defendant objects as the request is unduly burdensome on Defendant; Plaintiff is

seeking to identify a particular medical staff member when the fact that the PPD test was read as

positive is undisputed by the parties. [Doc. 27; Mot. to Compel at 7]. 

A party may request the production of document which is in the responding parties’

possession, custody or control. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). However, the party’s right to do so is limited

by the scope of discovery set forth in Rule 26(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). Although a party is

entitled to discovery as to any non-privileged matter, discovery may be limited if the court finds

either: 1) the requested documents may be obtained from another source which is more

convenient; 2) the party has had an ample opportunity to obtain the information; or 3) the burden

outweighs the need in light of the circumstances of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). When an

expert has been retained as a testifying witness, the party’s discovery must be conducted through

deposition following the production of the expert’s report. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A). 

Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production Nos. 1-4 was proper. Plaintiff

sought production of the requested medical data for the sole purpose of attacking Defendant’s

expert witness’ conclusions. [Doc. 33; Mot. to Compel at 9]. However, Plaintiff has already been

provided with the defense expert’s report pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A), 26 (a)(2)(D), &

26(e)(2). [See Doc. 27; Req. Judicial Notice in Supp. Mot. to Compel, Exhibit A]. This report

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would include “all data or other information considered by the witness” in reaching his/her

conclusion. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). If Plaintiff sought more information from the expert

witness, Plaintiff, in accordance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A), would have to depose the witness. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff may discover the information through his own research from another

source which is more convenient and less costly. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(2)(C). Defendant’s

objection was proper as Plaintiff sought production of documents which exceeded the scope of

allowable discovery.

Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 2 (Set 2) is also

appropriate. Plaintiff sought identification of the medical staff member who read Plaintiff’s 1996

PPD test as positive for the sole purpose of including this individual in the suit and effecting

service of process. [Doc. 27; Mot. to Compel at 9-10]. However, Plaintiff fails to explain why

inclusion of this individual, who would merely affirm an undisputed fact (the PPD test was read as

positive), would be of any value. 

Ordinarily, Defendants have an obligation to identify its employee who made the subject

entry. However, it is an undisputed fact that the test was positive. Plaintiff has given no

compelling reason to identify the reader of Plaintiff’s 1996 PPD. Thus, Plaintiff’s need for the

information is outweighed by the unnecessary burden on Defendants to determine the subject

individual. The Court finds Defendant’s objection was proper. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 

D. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice “that Defendant Santiago’s expert witness’s

(sic) testimony will imply that Plaintiff’s stage 3 Fibrosis is a result of Hep-C and not INH

treatment.” [Doc. No. 33. pg.2.]

Judicial Notice is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 201 which concerns judicial

notice of adjudicative facts. “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable

dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” FRE 201. In other words, “the fact must be one that only an

unreasonable person would insist on disputing.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th

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Cir. 1994).

Documents that are part of the public record may be judicially noticed to show, for

example, that a judicial proceeding occurred or that a document was filed in another court case,

but a court may not take judicial notice of findings of facts from another case. See Wyatt v. 

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

698 (9th Cir. 2001). Nor may the court take judicial notice of any matter that is in dispute. Lee,

250 F.3d at 689-90. 

Plaintiff has submitted what appears to be a document entitled “Opinions and Data.” The

content of the document presents information exactly on point with the claims presented in

Plaintiff’s complaint and disputed by Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice

is DENIED. 

E. Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has also submitted a motion in which he requests the Court appoint counsel for

him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). [Doc. 31; Mot. Appt. Counsel].

“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution Trust

Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, federal courts

do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States

District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency,

54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request”

that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. 

See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d

819, 823 (9th Cir. 1989). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both

the ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se

in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789

F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Here, it appears Plaintiff has a sufficient grasp of his case, the legal issues involved, and is

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able to adequately articulate the basis of his claims. In fact, Plaintiff’s pro se pleading has

survived the initial screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and the Court’s

docket reflects that Plaintiff has effected service.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show the

“exceptional circumstances” required for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1) and therefore DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of

Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery,

motion for judicial notice and motion for appointment of counsel are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 21, 2009

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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