Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00534/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00534-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

VERNESIA LEE WOMACK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:08-CV-534-WKW[WO]

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________________

GANESIA LEE WOMACK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:08-CV-664-WKW[WO]

)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, )

DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge

(“Recommendation”). (Doc. # 32. ) Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se, filed objections

1

to the Recommendation. (Doc. # 33.) For the reasons to follow, the Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation is due to be adopted in part and rejected in part.

 The filings are referred to by their assigned docket number, with the exception of exhibits. 1

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Those Portions of the Recommendation to Which No Objection Is Made

Plaintiffs raise no objection to the Recommendation that the United States’s Motion

to Dismiss Ganesia L. Womack’s Complaint (Doc. # 25) be granted. The Recommendation

found that Constitutional tort claims are not cognizable under the jurisdictional grant of the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. (Doc. # 32, at 9-10 (citing

F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994)).) There also is no challenge to the Recommendation

that Vernesia Womack’s claim alleging a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) be dismissed. The Recommendation noted that

“HIPAA does not create a private cause of action.” (Doc. # 32, at 11.) The Magistrate Judge

is correct on both grounds, and no objection having been lodged as to these

recommendations, the Recommendation is due to be adopted. This ends Ganesia L.

Womack’s lawsuit, but not Vernesia Womack’s.

B. Those Portions of the Recommendation to Which Objection Is Made

1. Vernesia Womack’s FTCA Claim

In addition to her HIPAA claim, Vernesia Womack brings a claim under the FTCA

against the United States for receiving inadequate and delayed medical care on November

18, 2005, when she sought treatment for abdominal pain at the Central Alabama Veterans

Health Care System (“CAVHCS”) in Montgomery, Alabama. In her Complaint (Doc. # 1),

Vernesia Womack avers that the emergency room physician, Dr. Stuart Smalheiser

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(“Smalheiser”), provided inadequate “medical treatment” by failing to “determine the

severity of [her] symptoms” (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5). According to the Complaint, that delay began

when Dr. Smalheiser sent Vernesia Womack home on the night of November 18, with

directions to return to the CAVHCS for an ultrasound the following Monday (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5),

and the delay further was exacerbated by a chain of events that had the effect of prolonging

her surgery until November 27, 2005. The delay allegedly caused Vernesia Womack’s

2

“[gall]stones [to] extract[] from [her] gall bladder and lodge in [her] liver and common bile

duct,” thus resulting in an “intense” five-hour surgery and “eleven day stay in SICU/CCU.”

(Doc. # 1 ¶ 5.)

 As to the delay, the Complaint contains the following allegations. After the ultrasound on that 2

Monday, Vernesia Womack “was dismissed home again with no answers or follow up from any medical

staff” at the CAVHCS, but the “intolerable” and “unbearable” pain caused her to seek treatment at a local

hospital’s emergency room (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5). It was only after events that occurred at the local hospital that

she was admitted to the CAVHCS on November 25, 2005, for emergency surgery. On November 25,

Lakshmipathi Namineni, M.D. (“Namineni”), a surgeon employed by the Veteran’s Administration,

examined her. (Namineni Decl. ¶¶ 6-7 (Ex. 2 to Doc. # 24 ).) Based upon his diagnosis of “cholelithiasis

(gallstones) and cholecystitis (inflammation of the gallbladder),” Dr. Namineni requested a surgical

consultation from Dr. John Tinglin, who “performs all laporoscopic cholecystectomies” at the CAVHCS. 

(Namineni Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Tinglin Decl. ¶ 5 (Ex. 3 to Doc. # 24).) After that consultation, Vernesia

Womack was scheduled for surgery. (Namineni Decl. ¶ 9.) The surgery initially was scheduled for

November 25 (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5), but was rescheduled for Saturday, November 26, because “the

[a]nesthesiologist had a prior obligation” (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5). The surgery was postponed again because the

“anesthesiologist had made plans with his family for the weekend.” (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5.) Dr. Tinglin

performed the gallbladder surgery on November 27. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5; Namineni Decl. ¶ 10.) He “first

attempted laporoscopic cholecystectomy, but due to the severely diseased condition of the gallbladder,

[he] converted the procedure to an open cholecystectomy.” (Tinglin Decl. ¶ 6.)

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2. The United States’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction and Vernesia Womack’s Response

The United States moved for dismissal of Vernesia Womack’s FTCA claim for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (Doc. # 23, at 1; Doc. # 24, at 6, 8-10.) As grounds for its Rule 12(b)(1) motion,

3

the United States argued that Vernesia Womack cannot hold it responsible for Dr.

Smalheiser’s alleged negligent acts because, at all material times to this litigation, he was an

independent contractor excepted from the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. (Doc.

# 24, at 5-6.) The United States pointed out that under the FTCA, which embodies a limited

waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity, suits against the United States are

permitted only for acts committed by “an employee of the Government while acting within

the scope of his office or employment,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). (Doc. # 24, at 9.) Sovereign

immunity, the United States argued has not been waived “for the actions of ‘any contractor

with the United States.’” (Doc. # 24, at 9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671).)

In support of its motion to dismiss, the United States submitted a declaration from Dr.

Smalheiser. In that declaration, Dr. Smalheiser, who is board certified in internal medicine,

attests that, “[f]rom July, 2005 until June, 2006, [he] worked as a contract doctor in the

 As to Vernesia Womack’s FTCA claim, the United States’s singular motion (Doc. # 23) is 3

twofold. First, it moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

(Doc. # 24, at 6, 8-10.) Second, and alternatively, the United States moved for summary judgment on the

ground that Dr. Smalheiser did not breach the appropriate standard of care in providing medical

treatment to Vernesia Womack. (Doc. # 24, at 7, 10-14.) Both grounds are addressed infra, in Section

III of this opinion.

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emergency room, Life Support Unit (LSU), at [CAVHCS] Hospital in Montgomery,

Alabama.” (Smalheiser Decl. ¶ 3 (Ex. 1 to Doc. # 24).) He further attests, “I was not a

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employee. I was paid on an hourly basis for my

services in the LSU. The VA did not supervise my day-to-day care and treatment of patients.

Rather, I exercised independent clinical judgment at all times when treating patients in the

LSU.” (Smalheiser Decl. ¶ 4.)

The Magistrate Judge opined that the United States wasraising a Rule 12(b)(1) factual

attack (as opposed to a facial attack) to subject matter jurisdiction and entered an Order

giving Vernesia Womack a deadline by which to file a response to the motion and any

evidentiary materials in support of her position that Dr. Smalheiser was a federal government

employee. (Doc. # 27, at 2.) The Magistrate Judge noted that “any evidentiary materials

submitted should be restricted to the establishment of jurisdiction.” (Doc. # 27, at 1 n.1.)

In response, Vernesia Womack argued that Dr. Smalheiser was a participant in a

fellowship program funded by the VA. (Doc. # 29.) She also submitted several exhibits.

(See, e.g., Exs. 3, 4 & 5 (Doc. # 29).) As described by the Magistrate Judge, one exhibit

“appear[ed] to be a physician’s profile printout from the Florida Department of Health” (Doc.

# 32, at 14); the other two exhibits “appear[ed] to be excerpts from a [VA] Health

Administration Handbook” (Doc. # 32, at 14). In rebuttal, the United States submitted a

second declaration from Dr. Smalheiser, who said that he “was not a VA resident or fellow

at CAVHCS and ha[d] never been enrolled in a VA training program.” (Smalheiser 2d Decl.

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Case 2:08-cv-00534-WKW-TFM Document 36 Filed 08/12/09 Page 5 of 17
¶ 3 (Ex. 6 to Doc. # 30).) Nor was he “supervised by the VA as a resident or fellow.”

(Smalheiser 2d Decl. ¶ 3.) He reiterated that he “was working as a contract physician using

[his] independent clinical judgment as a licensed, board certified internist.” (Smalheiser 2d

Decl. ¶ 3.)

3. The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

After considering the evidence, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Vernesia

Womack’s exhibits constituted hearsay (Doc. # 32, at 15), that Dr. Smalheiser provided

“specific factual declarations” within his personal knowledge, and that Vernesia Womack

failed to rebut those declarations. (Doc. # 32, at 15-16.) Because Vernesia Womack

“proffered no competent evidence to establish jurisdiction in opposition to the denials of the

jurisdictional allegations contained in Dr. Smalheiser’s affidavit,” the Magistrate Judge

reasoned that “she ha[d] not met her burden of establishing jurisdiction[.]” (Doc. # 32,

at 16.) Consequently, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Vernesia Womack’s

FTCA claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 32,

at 16.)

4. Vernesia Womack’s Objections to the Recommendation

Vernesia Womack objects to the Recommendation on what appears to be two main

grounds. First, she asserts that Dr. Smalheiser’s facts are “unclear” as to whether he is an

employee or an independent contractor. (Doc. # 33, at 3.) Second, she contends that she was

“clearly misled by the United States about the employment status of Dr. Stuart Smalheiser

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Case 2:08-cv-00534-WKW-TFM Document 36 Filed 08/12/09 Page 6 of 17
for approximately 2 1⁄2 years after the incident; therefore, stripping [her] of [her] legal right

to file suit in State Courts.” (Doc. # 33, at 3.) Vernesia Womack, thus, argues that the

United States should not be permitted to “bring evidence that Dr. Smalheiser was not an

employee of the United States.” (Doc. # 33, at 3.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews “de novo . . . those portions of the [Recommendation] or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The United States’s Rule 12(b)(1) Challenge

There are two principal Rule 12(b)(1) issues, one substantive and one procedural. The

substantive issue is whether Dr. Smalheiser is an employee of the federal government or an

independent contractor. The FTCA only waives sovereign immunity for injuries caused by

an “employee of the Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Means v. United States, 176

F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The alleged tortfeasor’s status as an ‘employee of the

government’ is the sine qua non of liability under the FTCA.” (citation omitted)). Injuries

caused by “‘any contractor with the United States’” are excluded from that waiver. United

States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671).

The procedural issue is whether the appropriate standard of review was applied when

assessing whether Dr. Smalheiser was an independent contractor or a federal government

employee. The Magistrate Judge stated, on one hand, that he would apply a “summary

7

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judgment standard” but, on the other hand, that he was “free to weigh the evidence.” (Doc.

# 32, at 14; see also Doc. # 32, at 7.) As will be explained, the Magistrate Judge’s former

statement is correct, but the latter is not.

In Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990), the Eleventh Circuit

explained that, on a Rule 12(b)(1) factual attack, the district court “‘may proceed as it never

could under’” Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1529

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1)

motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction – its very power to hear the case – there is substantial

authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence

of its power to hear the case.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord

Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008).

The court, however, is not at liberty to weigh the evidence when the factual attack

“also implicates an element of the cause of action.” Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529. The

Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] cautioned . . . that the district court should only rely on Rule 12(b)(1)

‘[i]f the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of plaintiff’s cause

of action.’” Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation

omitted); accord Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 105 F.3d 599, 603

4

 In Morrison, brought under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654,

4

the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss attacked only subject matter jurisdiction, and that “it [the district court] could properly act as a

‘fact finder,’ and ‘weigh the evidence submitted by the parties.’” 323 F.3d at 924. The Morrison court

held that “[t]he district court’s decision to treat [the defendants’] attack as purely jurisdictional and

resolve disputed issues of fact . . . erroneously invaded the province of the jury.” Id. at 930. “The proper

course in this case was to resolve the attack under Rule 56[.]” Id.

8

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(11th Cir. 1997); (“[T]he jurisdictional question [was] intertwined with the merits of the

[plaintiff’s] claims”; hence, “the district court should [have] appl[ied] a summary judgment

standard when ruling on the motion to dismiss as a factual attack on subject matter

jurisdiction[.]”).

In Lawrence, relied upon in Morrison, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated “the standard

by which a district court should decide factual attacks on subject matter jurisdiction when the

defendant’s attack also implicates an element of the cause of action.” Lawrence, 919 F.2d

at 1529. It explained:

[T]he proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that

jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits

of the plaintiff’s case. . . . Judicial economy is best promoted when the

existence of a federal right is directly reached and, where no claim is found to

exist, the case is dismissed on the merits. This refusal to treat indirect attacks

on the merits as Rule 12(b)(1) motions provides, moreover, a greater level of

protection to the plaintiff who in truth is facing a challenge to the validity of

his claim: the defendant is forced to proceed under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . or Rule

56 . . . both of which place great restrictions on the district court’s

discretion . . . . [A]s a general rule a claim cannot be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction because of the absence of a federal cause of action.

The exceptions to this rule are narrowly drawn, and are intended to allow

jurisdictional dismissals only in those cases where the federal claim is clearly

immaterial or insubstantial.

Id. (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415-16 (5th Cir. May 1981) ); see also

5

Morrison, 323 F.3d at 922 (The Rule 12(b)(1)standard “is far less deferential to the plaintiff”

than the Rule 56 standard.).

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh 5

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions handed down by the former Fifth Circuit prior to

October 1, 1981. Id. at 1209. 

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Simpson v. Holder, 184 F. App’x 904 (11th Cir. 2006), although unpublished, is

instructive. In Simpson, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Rule 12(b)(1) attack on subject

matter jurisdiction is “intertwined with the merits” of an FTCA claim when the assertion is

that the allegedly negligent actor is not an employee of the United States. Id. at 909. Hence,

in Simpson, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[w]hether the . . . medical staff [were]

government employees or independent contractors affect[ed] both subject matter jurisdiction

under the FTCA and the merits of the FTCA claim,” id. (citing Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529),

and that, therefore, Rule 56’s standard of review was implicated because matters outside the

pleadings were considered, id.

Here, the United States filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),

challenging subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that “Dr. Smalheiser [was] an

independent contractor, not a VA employee.” (Doc. # 24, at 7.) It further asserted that its

motion was “a factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction” (Doc. # 24, at 7), and that the

Magistrate Judge could “resolve any disputed issues of fact . . . material to the jurisdictional

issue” (Doc. # 24, at 6).

The United States’s reliance upon Rule 12(b)(1)’s standard for analyzing factual

attacks on subject matter jurisdiction is misplaced. Applying Simpson and the other

authorities cited above, the issue of whether Dr. Smalheiser is an “employee” of the United

States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), or an “independent contractor,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2671,

implicates both subject matter jurisdiction and the merits of Vernesia Womack’s FTCA

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claim. The Magistrate Judge, therefore, was required to “‘find that jurisdiction exists and

deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the . . . case.’” Lawrence, 919 F.2d

at 1529 (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415-16). Because the United States’s motion

indirectly challenged the merits of the FTCA claim, the motion should have been analyzed

under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, not Rule 12(b)(1).

On this record, the Magistrate Judge’s statement that, under Rule 12(b)(1), he was

“free to weigh the evidence” (Doc. # 32, at 14), although understandable in light of the

United States’s urging, was in error. Moreover, because evidence outside the pleadings was

submitted and relied upon by the Magistrate Judge, review under Rule 12(b)(6) would have

been inappropriate. See Morrison, 323 F.3d at 924 (“[T]he district court could not have

considered [the plaintiff’s] motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because in rendering its decision the

court relied on extrinsic evidence outside the pleadings.” (citations omitted)). Rule 56, thus,

provides the correct standard of review. See Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1530 (“When the

6

jurisdictional basis of a claim is intertwined with the merits, the district court should apply

a Rule 56 summary judgment standard when ruling on a motion to dismiss which asserts a

factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction.”).

Having clarified the governing standard of review, the court finds that the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation that the United States’s motion be granted is due to be rejected.

 It does not appear that the Magistrate Judge actually weighed the evidence, as there essentially 6

was no evidence to weigh. This is because, as the Magistrate Judge correctly found, Vernesia Womack’s

evidence was largely hearsay and, thus, not admissible. (Doc. # 32, at 14-16.) Nonetheless, elaboration

on the correct standard of review is necessary to the ultimate disposition of the FTCA claim.

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This court’s ruling is based upon the procedural posture of the case, not the merits of whether

Dr. Smalheiser was an independent contractor.

In Eaton v. Dorchester Development, Inc., 692 F.2d 727 (11th Cir. 1982), which was

brought under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720, the

Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of the complaint based

on a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 734. The court explained that,

because the question “of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction will hinge on

whether the defendant owe[d] a duty to plaintiffs under the Act, that determination will, at

the same time, effectively decide the merits of plaintiffs’ claim.” Id. And, “[w]here the

jurisdictional issues are intertwined with the substantive merits, ‘the jurisdictional issues

should be referred to the merits, for it is impossible to decide one without the other.’” Id.

at 733 (quoting Chatham Condo. Ass’ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1011 (5th

Cir. 1979)). The court “remand[ed] for further discovery of jurisdictional facts.” Id. It

observed, “[T]he argument against premature dismissal on 12(b)(1) grounds is particularly

strong when the basis of jurisdiction is also an element of plaintiffs’ cause of action on the

merits.” Id.

Similarly, in Chatham Condominium Ass’ns, the former Fifth Circuit cautioned that

“dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . prior to giving the plaintiff ample

opportunity for discovery, should be granted sparingly.” 597 F.2d at 1012. In that case, the

“discovery had barely begun” when the district court entered its dismissal order based upon

12

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the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. “With the facts not fully developed, a fair and

conclusive resolution of the jurisdictional issue [could] not be made[.]” Id.

And so it is here also. An overview of the substantive law explains why a Rule 56

ruling would be premature. In Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2008), the

Eleventh Circuit reiterated that in this circuit “the ‘control test’ [governs] whether an

individual is a government employee or an independent contractor.” Id. at 1159. “‘[A]

person is an employee of the Government if the Government controls and supervises the

day-to-day activities of the alleged tortfeasor during the relevant time.” Id. (quoting

Patterson & Wilder Constr. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000)). The

control test “does not require that the government exercise actual control over an individual.

It is enough that the government has reserved the power or authority to control him.” Id.; see

also Simpson, 184 F. App’x at 909 (“The distinction between an employee and an

independent contractor turns on the power of the United States ‘to control the detailed

physical performance of the contractor.’” (quoting Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521,

527-28 (1973))).

Bravo also held that the focus for resolving whether a tortfeasor is a federal

government employee is on the United States’s authority to control the contractor’s

performance, and not on whether the United States actually exercised that authority. See 532

F.3d at 1159-60. “‘[I]t is not necessary that the Government continually control all aspects

of the individual’s activities, so long as it has the authority to do so given the nature of the

13

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task.’” Id. at 1159-60 (quoting Patterson, 226 F.3d at 1274); see also Linkous v. United

States, 142 F.3d 271, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[I]f control were the only factor, then no

professional who exercises professional judgment could be considered a federal employee

under the FTCA.”).

7

In Bravo, the contractual provisions were paramount in the determination of whether

the negligent physician, who worked at a naval hospital, was a federal government employee,

and were relied upon almost exclusively by the court. See 532 F.3d at 1160 (“The question

of whether the Naval Hospital reserved the right to control [the physician’s] activities is one

whose answer depends on the various contractual provisions.”). In Broussard v. United

States, 989 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit also relied principally on an

examination of the governing contract to determine whether the emergency room physician

 In Linkous, the Fifth Circuit also cited the non-exhaustive factors listed in § 220 of the 7

Restatement (Second) of Agency on the definition of a servant. See 142 F.3d at 276. Those factors are: 

“(a) [T]he extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the

details of the work; 

(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;

(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually

done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; 

(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;

(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the

place of work for the person doing the work;

(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;

(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;

(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant;

and

(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.”

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220).

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was an independent contractor. See id. at 176 (holding that the contractual arrangement

governing the physician’s relationship with the army hospital placed the physician “‘outside

of the parameters of an employer-employee relationship with the Government.’” (citation

omitted)).

The foregoing principles of substantive law reveal the shortcomingsin the evidentiary

record. Vernesia Womack’s evidence, as the Magistrate Judge correctly found, is based

largely upon hearsay and, thus, not admissible under the summary judgmentstandard. (Doc.

8

# 32, at 14-16.) At the same time, however, the United States’s evidence also is lacking. The

United States did not support its motion with a copy of the contract governing Dr.

Smalheiser’s working relationship with the CAVHCS. If there was not such a contract, that

fact has not been argued or established. Here, the United States’s only evidence consists of

9

two declarations from Dr. Smalheiser. The statements in those declarations are, for the

10

most part, conclusory. They do not permit a meaningful analysis of the control test. On this

record, the court believes that the best course is to reject the Magistrate Judge’s

 On a motion for summary judgment, a court can consider evidence that is admissible on its

8

face, or that can be reduced to admissible form and complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Macuba v. DeBoer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-24 (11th

Cir. 1999).

 Whether a contract exists is one question that needs to be answered before a ruling can be

9

issued. Obviously, if there is a contract, it needs to be submitted.

 In those declarations, Dr. Smalheiser says that during the pertinent time, (1) he was “a contract 10

doctor in the emergency room” (Smalheiser Decl. ¶ 3), (2) he was not a VA employee (Smalheiser Decl.

¶ 4), (3) he “was paid on an hourly basis” (Smalheiser Decl. ¶ 4), (4) he was not supervised by the VA

(Smalheiser 2d Decl. ¶ 3), (5) he “exercised independent clinical judgment at all times when treating

patients” (Smalheiser Decl. ¶ 4), and (6) he “was not a VA resident or fellow at CAVHCS and ha[d]

never been enrolled in a VA training program” (Smalheiser 2d Decl. ¶ 3).

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recommendation that Vernesia Womack’s FTCA claim be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1), and to refer that claim back for further discovery, and for later disposition, if

appropriate, on a properly-filed motion to be reviewed under Rule 56’s strictures.

B. The United States’s Rule 56 Challenge

The United States also has argued that it is entitled to summary judgment on the

ground that “the care and treatment [Vernesia Womack] received at the VA Hospital

complied with the applicable standard of care.” (Doc. # 24; see also Doc. # 23).) The

Magistrate Judge has recommended that the Rule 56 motion be denied as moot. (Doc. # 32,

at 18.) Given that Dr. Smalheiser’s status as either a federal government employee or an

independent contractor cannot be resolved on the present record, the United States’s

summary judgment motion (Doc. # 23), challenging Vernesia Womack’s claim that she

received inadequate medical care, will be denied as premature. The United States may

renew, if necessary, its Rule 56 summary judgment motion at the appropriate time.

11

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that:

(1) The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (Doc. # 32) that this court grant the

United States’s Motion to Dismiss Ganesia L. Womack’s Complaint (Doc. # 25) is

ADOPTED. The motion to dismiss (Doc. # 25), therefore, is GRANTED, and Ganesia L.

 In light of the court’s findings herein, it is unnecessary to address Vernesia Womack’s 11

objection suggesting that the United States should be equitably estopped from asserting that Dr.

Smalheiser is not a federal government employee. Should Ms. Womack desire to rely upon that

argument in the future, it must be raised again.

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Womack’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED

to close Ganesia L. Womack’s case, Civil Action No. 2:08-CV-664-WKW.

(2) The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (Doc. # 32) that this court grant the

United States’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 23) Vernesia Womack’s claim alleging a HIPAA

violation is ADOPTED. The motion to dismiss the HIPAA claim (Doc. # 23), therefore, is

GRANTED, and Vernesia Womack’s HIPAA claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.

(3) The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (Doc. # 32) that this court grant the

United States’s motion to dismiss Vernesia Womack’s FTCA claim (Doc. # 23), pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), is REJECTED, and the motion to dismiss (Doc. # 23) the FTCA claim is

DENIED.

(4) The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (Doc. # 32) to deny as moot the

United States’s summary judgment motion (Doc. # 23) is REJECTED, and the motion (Doc.

# 23) instead is DENIED as premature, with leave to renew if and when appropriate.

(5) Vernesia Womack’s FTCA claim is REFERRED BACK to the Magistrate

Judge for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

DONE this 12th day of August, 2009.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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