Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01330/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01330-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAULINE HARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv1330 JM(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

ALTER PRIOR JUDGMENT OR

ORDER 

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), moves

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend this court’s September 29, 2008

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (“Order”).

Specifically, the court found that the ALJ’s failure to ask the vocational expert (“VE”) if her testimony

conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) constituted reversible error under

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). The Commissioner argues that remand to the ALJ

for further consideration is not warranted under the circumstances because such an error is harmless

in light of the evidentiary record. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

DISCUSSION

 A motion to alter or amend a judgment or order under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60 is appropriate

where “(1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court

committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an

Case 3:07-cv-01330-JM-RBB Document 28 Filed 01/14/09 Page 1 of 3
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intervening change in controlling law.” Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2008); School

Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 2742 (1994). The Government argues that any error in the underlying administrative proceeding

is harmless because “substantial evidence [] supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the VE’s testimony

was consistent with the DOT (Dictionary of Occupational Titles).” (Motion at p. 2:15-16). For the

reasons set forth below, the court finds this argument persuasive and therefore reconsiders its prior

Order.

The court incorporates the analysis set forth in its earlier Order and addresses the issues raised

by the Commissioner. “The procedural requirements of SSR 00-4 ensure that the record is clear as

to why an ALJ relied on a vocational expert’s testimony, particularly in cases where the expert’s

testimony conflicts with the” DOT. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1152. Where there is an apparent conflict

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, “at a minimum” the ALJ “must inquire through a

vocational expert into the possible inconsistency.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (3rd Cir.

2002) (finding that Social Security Ruling 00-4p requires the ALJ to ask the vocational expert whether

any possible conflicts exist between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT). 

As the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT, the Commissioner concludes that there

was no need for testimony explaining the inconsistencies as no material inconsistency exists.

Consequently, the Commissioner concludes that the court committed clear error. As set forth in the

Order, two of the positions identified by the VE (counter clerk and office helper) require a level two

reasoning level. (Order at 18-21). A level two GED reasoning means the worker must apply

“commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions and deal

with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” 1 U.S. Dept of

Labor, DOT Titles Nos. 239.567-010, 249.366-010, at 210, 217 (4th ed. Rev. 1991). Reasoning at

GED level one means the worker must apply “commonsense understanding to carry out simple one-or

two-step instructions and deal with standardized situations with occasional or no variables in or from

these situations encountered on the job.” Id., No. 230.687-101, at 205. 

In addressing Plaintiff’s reasoning level (and as set forth in the Order), the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff was able to perform “simple, repetitive work [and] to understand detailed but

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uncomplicated instructions, and simple one/two instructions.” (Admin. R. 19; Order at p.19). While

the ALJ’s findings do not precisely parrot the definition of GED level two in the DOT, the degree or

level of reasoning identified by the ALJ is consistent with the definition of GED level two in the DOT.

In this sense, there is no apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT which would

trigger the further consistency review contemplated in Massachi. As the scope of this court’s review

of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence

and is free of legal error, Hermes v. Secretary, 926 F.2d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1991), the court finds that

it would be clear error to remand this matter for further determinations where the evidentiary record

supports the Commissioner’s decision. 

In sum, the court grants the motion to reconsider the prior Order. The Clerk of Court is

instructed to enter judgment on the cross motions for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 18, 19), in

favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on all claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 13, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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