Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08020/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jace F. Eden,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-8020-PCT-DGC (JFM)

Order and

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on February 29, 2015 (Doc. 1). On August 6, 2015 Respondents filed their Answer 

(Docs. 26, 27). Petitioner filed a Reply on September 9, 2015 (Doc. 29).

In addition, Petitioner has filed a Motion for Disclosure (Doc. 30) and Motion for 

Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 31), the resolution of which is intertwined with the 

disposition of the Petition, and accordingly is addressed herein.

The Petitioner's Petition and motions are now ripe for consideration. 

Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following orders and proposed findings of fact, 

report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 

Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner seeks review of a sentence imposed on April 5, 2012 by Navajo County 

Superior Court based upon revocations of probation in case numbers CR2009-0017 

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(consolidated with CR2007-1075), and CR2009-0700, and new convictions in CR2009-

00960, and CR2011-00340.1 

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2007 DUI - In case CR2007-1075, Petitioner was indicted for aggravated driving 

under the influence (“DUI”), while his license was suspended, revoked, etc. based on 

events on June 7, 2007. (Exhibit B, Indictment.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Docs. 26, 27, 

are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

In case CR2009-0017, Petitioner was again indicted for events on June 7, 2007, 

for aggravated DUI, and aggravated driving with blood alcohol content over .08%, both 

denominated as third DUI convictions within 84 months. (Exhibit D, Indictment.) 

In addressing Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals described 

the factual background of this offense as follows:

Shortly after midnight on June 7, 2007, Officer Powell 

observed a vehicle driven by Eden speeding and failing to properly 

stop behind the curb line at a red light. When the traffic light 

changed, Officer Powell began following Eden and activated his 

patrol car's emergency lights. Eden did not immediately stop but 

instead turned down a side street and traveled some distance before 

stopping in a motel parking lot. 

When Officer Powell approached Eden and asked for his 

license, registration, and insurance documentation, the officer 

smelled the odor of alcohol coming from the cab of Eden's vehicle 

and noticed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Eden appeared 

to have difficulty understanding the officer's request, resulting in the 

officer having to ask several times for his license and registration. 

Eden initially denied consuming any alcohol, but later admitted 

having one glass of wine after the officer asked him to exit the 

vehicle for field sobriety tests. The officer observed all six cues of 

impairment when examining Eden for horizontal gaze nystagmus. In 

addition, Eden performed poorly on both the one-leg stand and heelto-toe field sobriety tests. Testing of two breath samples obtained 

from Eden following his arrest evidenced blood alcohol content 

levels of .118 and .119 within one hour of driving.

 

1

In his Petition, Petitioner cites a sentence date of September 1, 2011. (Doc. 1 at 1.) 

That is the date of the related Plea Agreement (Exhibit DDDD). Petitioner references 

pages 27 to 32 of his attached exhibits, which include the Plea Agreement from 

September 1, 2011, and the related Sentence from April 5, 2012, making clear the 

sentence to which he intends to refer.

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(Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/24/11 at 2-3.)

Stalking Charge – In case CR2009-0700, Petitioner was indicated for stalking 

and influencing a witness, based on events between February 2007 and July, 2009. 

(Exhibit T, Indictment.) The Pre-sentence Report summarized the police report as 

follows:

Jace Eden has engaged in a course of conduct starting in February 

of 2007 in which he verbally abused, sexually solicited and harassed 

the victim [HL]. Jace Eden is alleged to have stalked [HL] by 

watching her residence, trying to break into her residence and send 

harassing text messages. This behavior resulted in [HL] getting an 

alarm installed in her residence as she is afraid for her safety.

(Exhibit Y, at 2.)

2009 DUI – In case CR2009-0960, Petitioner was again indicted for aggravated 

DUI, and aggravated driving the blood alcohol content over .08%, both denominated as 

third DUI convictions within 84 months, based on events on August 16, 2009. (Exhibit 

BB, Indictment.) The Pre-Sentence Report summarized the factual background as 

follows:

On or about August 16, 2009, Officer Mellor was in his patrol car 

and observed a vehicle traveling southbound at a high rate of speed. 

The Officer initiated a traffic stop. Upon making contact with the 

driver, Jace Eden, was identified by his Colorado Driver's License. 

The Officer could smell the odor of an intoxicating liquor. Jace was 

asked how much he had to drink and he stated he had not been 

drinking. Jace was asked to step out of his vehicle to perform field 

sobriety tests, to which he refused. He was also asked to blow into a 

portable breath test but also refused this test as well. Jace was 

arrested for DUI and transported to the Show Low Police 

Department. A search warrant was obtained to draw blood from 

Jace. He was then booked into the Navajo County Jail. The blood 

drawn was sent Department of Public Safety. On September 14, 

2009, specimen showed it to contain .115% w/v ethyl alcohol. 

(Exhibit YYY at 2.)

2011 Sexual Abuse – In case CR2011-0340, Petitioner was charged with 

engaging in non-consensual sex, based on events on May 13, 2011. (Exhibit VVV, 

Indictment.) The Pre-Sentence Report summarized the factual background:

On or about May 13, 2011, Officer Williams was dispatched 

to the Branding Iron Steak House in reference to a sexual assault. 

Upon arrival, the Officer met with the victim, K. W., who advised 

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she had been drinking at the bar and knows Jace Eden from the bar. 

She mentioned she was done drinking for the night and was going 

home. K. W. indicates she paid for her bill but Jace advised her she 

needed to come back into the lounge to do something else with the 

bill. K. W. states Jace almost immediately grabbed her while they 

were alone in the lounge and pulled her pants down and pulled her 

shirt down. He then pulled his penis out and attempted to insert his 

penis into her vagina. She told him to please stop, and he said no, 

and he told her that "you know she wants it.” She pushed him away 

and she screamed, but felt that nobody heard her at first. K.W. was 

asked if she had a romantic relationship with Jace, to which she 

stated no. Officers interviewed other witnesses, [LS}, [JB] and [JL], 

who stated they heard a scream and then saw K. W. running from 

the lounge with her breasts hanging out. They indicated K. W. was 

very upset and telling them Jace had raped her. Jace was located 

inside the lounge area and appeared to be very intoxicated as he had 

blood shot watery eyes, a strong odor of an intoxicating beverage 

coming from his mouth, and a lack of balance. Jace was arrested 

and read his Miranda Rights. He asked to contact his attorney, Kate 

Roberts. Kate later contacted officers and advised she could no 

longer practice law. Jace was advised of this and he requested to 

contact Ben Brewer. Jace was not interviewed about the incident 

after he had invoked his right to an attorney. Officer Fechtelkotter 

was asked to finger print Jace, and obtain a DPS swab for 

Department of Public Safety.

(Exhibit YYY at 1-2.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON 2007 DUI

The two cases on the 2007 DUI, CR2007-1075 and CR2009-0017, were 

consolidated, and Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial on July 8, 2009. Petitioner was 

found guilty of a lesser included offense of driving while impaired to the slightest 

degree, and aggravated DUI, a third DUI offense. He was acquitted of the charge of 

DUI on a suspended license. (Exhibit L, Verdict.) On August 27, 2009, sentence was 

suspended, and Petitioner was placed on four years probation, with 4 months 

imprisonment as a condition of probation on each offense. (Exhibit M, Sentence.) 

Petitioner moved for correction of several errors in the sentence (Exhibit 

PPPPPP), and on January 15, 2010, the trial court corrected the sentence to clarify that 

the two prison terms of fourth months were concurrent. 

Direct Appeal - In the interim, Petitioner filed a direct appeal (Exhibit 

NNNNNN), arguing he had been denied due process and his rights of confrontation 

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when the prosecution failed to disclose the existence of a video and audio recording of 

Petitioner’s arrest and booking, and that the trial court’s denial of the motion for 

sanctions based on the non-disclosure was an abuse of discretion. Petitioner further 

argued that his prison term should have been stayed. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part. (Exhibit P, 

Mem. Dec. 3/24/11.) The court concluded that the prosecution had violated the state’s 

disclosure rule by disclosing the arrest video on the first day of trial, but that the sanction 

requested (exclusion of testimony regarding the events at the time of arrest) was overly 

harsh given the opportunity for counsel to review the video prior to the officer’s 

testimony. The court found no evidence that a recording of the booking existed, and 

arguments that the prosecution had the burden of explaining its nonexistence was 

waived. The court rejected the due process argument based upon the absence of a 

constitutional right to pretrial discovery. The court rejected any argument under Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the material was disclosed in time to be used 

at trial, even though the delay may have impacted his trial preparations. The court 

rejected the confrontation argument because of the opportunity given to counsel to 

review the tape before cross-examining the officer. The court found no error in requiring 

admission of the recording to cross-examine the officer on it. The court rejected the stay 

issue as moot, and without merit. The court concluded that the misdemeanor DUI was a 

lesser included offense of the aggravated, felony DUI, and thus conviction on both was a 

violation of double jeopardy. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction on the 

misdemeanor DUI, and otherwise affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit Q), challenging 

the trial court’s failure to grant an extended continuance based on the belated disclosure 

of the arrest video. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on August 1, 

2011. (Exhibit R, Mandate; Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits at 205, Order 8/1/11.) 

/ /

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON STALKING CHARGE

Petitioner proceeded to a trial to the court on May 19, 2010 in case CR2009-0700. 

(Exhibit V, M.E. 5/19/10.) Petitioner was found guilty of the stalking charge, but not 

guilty on a charge of influencing a witness. (Exhibit X, M.E. 6/4/10.) 

On July 9, 2010, the trial court suspended sentence and placed Petitioner on 3 

years probation, concurrent with his probation in the 2007 DUI case. (Exhibit Z, 

Sentence 7/9/10.) 

Petitioner did not seek any contemporaneous review of the conviction or sentence.

D. PROCEEDINGS ON 2009 DUI AND 2011 SEXUAL ASSAULT AND 

PROBATION VIOLATIONS, 2012 SENTENCE

On November 24, 2009, Petitioner was indicted on the 2009 DUI. (Exhibit BB, 

Indictment.) The case languished.

On May 17, 2011, Petitioner was indicted on the 2011 sexual assault. (Exhibit 

VVV, Indictment.) Thereafter, on June 1, 2011, the prosecution moved (Exhibit DD) to 

amend the indictment on the 2009 DUI to allege prior felonies, and Petitioner’s 

probation status at the time of commission.

Eventually, Petitioner entered into a consolidated written Plea Agreement dated 

September 1, 2011 (Exhibit DDDD), wherein Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one 

count of aggravated DUI on the 2009 DUI, an amended count of sexual abuse in the 

2011 sexual assault case, and the violation of his probation in the 2007 DUI and the 

stalking case. The parties stipulated to presumptive terms on each of the new 

convictions, prison terms on the probation violations, but not to exceed five years each, 

and for all prison terms to run concurrently. Petitioner agreed to withdraw or not file 

appeals or claims of ineffective assistance in the 2007 DUI.2 The parties further agreed 

that in the event of Petitioner’s failure to appear at sentencing the agreements on 

 

2 Although arguing the general waiver resulting from a guilty plea, Respondents do not 

rely upon this explicit waiver in opposing the instant habeas Petition. Accordingly, the 

undersigned does not address it.

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sentencing would be waived.

The matter was set for sentencing on December 13, 2011, but Petitioner failed to 

appear. (Exhibit EEEE, M.E. 12/13/11.) Counsel then moved to withdraw based upon 

Petitioner’s failure to maintain contact. (Exhibit FFFF.) Petitioner was apprehended, 

new counsel was appointed, and the matter reset for sentencing. (Exhibit GGGG, M.E. 

12/28/11.) On April 5, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences of: (a) 5 

years prison on the 2011 sexual abuse charge; (b) 4.5 years on the 2009 DUI; and (c) 2.5 

years on each of the 2007 DUI charges. In addition, Petitioner was sentenced to a 

consecutive sentence of .75 years on the stalking charge. (Exhibit IIII, Sentence 4/5/12.) 

Consequently, Petitioner is serving an effective term of 5.75 years, less time served.

E. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM 2012 SENTENCE

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal from the 2012 sentence. Moreover, as a 

pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

F. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ON 2012 SENTENCE

In the PCR Court - On May 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit JJJJ), challenging his 2012 sentence with respect to each of 

the various cases. Counsel appeared (Exhibit KKKK), who eventually filed a Notice of 

No Colorable Issues (Exhibit LLLL), finding no viable issue for review, and seeking to 

withdraw. Petitioner moved to appoint new counsel. The motion was denied, and 

Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per petition.3 (Exhibit MMMM, M.E. 4/5/13.) 

On June 3, 2013, Petitioner filed his pro per Petition for Post Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit NNNN), raising a laundry list of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

 

3

In this ruling the Court referenced a pro per PCR petition filed May 23, 2012, and 

permitted Petitioner to either amend that petition or provide notice that he intended to 

rely upon it. (Exhibit MMMM, M.E. 4/5/13.) No copy of such petition has been 

provided by Respondents. Because Petitioner eventually filed a new petition (Exhibit 

NNNN), the contents of that earlier petition, if any, are irrelevant.

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against his attorneys in his various prosecutions for which he was sentenced in 2012. 

Petitioner engaged in extended and vigorous litigation in the PCR proceeding, 

including moving for: (a) DNA testing (Exhibit UUUU); (b) reconsideration of the 

denial thereof and discovery of interviews of Petitioner’s counsel, etc. (Exhibit XXXX; 

Exhibit LLLLLL); and (c) default judgment based on lack of a timely response (Exhibits 

AAAAA, DDDDD). The motions were denied. (Exhibit WWWW, Order 9/10/13; 

Exhibit MMMMMM, Order 10/9/13; Exhibit BBBBB, Order 1/22/14; Exhibit ZZZZ, 

Order 2/14/14; Exhibit KKKKKK, Order 2/14/14; and Exhibit EEEEE, Order 3/18/14.)

On February 11, 2014, the state filed its PCR Response (Exhibit OOOO). 

On March 5, 2014, the PCR court found the claims of ineffective assistance to be 

without merit, and dismissed the petition. (Exhibit FFFFF, Order 3/5/14.)

On March 10, 2014, after the order dismissing his petition, Petitioner filed his 

PCR Reply (Exhibit GGGGG). On March 17, 2014, he moved to vacate the order of 

dismissal, and for leave to amend his PCR petition. (Exhibit HHHHH.) On May 30, 

2014, the PCR court summarily denied the motion. (Exhibit JJJJJ, M.E. 5/30/14.) 

Attempted Appeal/Special Action - On April 10, 2014, Petitioner filed with the 

Superior Court a notice of appeal, purportedly combined with a petition for special 

action, seeking review of the dismissal of his PCR petition without reviewing his reply. 

The notice was dated April 8, 2014. (Exhibit KKKKK.) (See also Petition, Doc. 1, 

Exhibits at 159, Notice of Filing.) Respondents do not address the disposition of this 

petition for special action. (See Answer, Doc. 26 at 48.) 

In the Arizona Court of Appeals - Meanwhile, on July 24, 2014, Petitioner filed 

in the same case with the Arizona Court of Appeals, a Petition for Review (Exhibit 

OOOOO), seeking review of the denial of his PCR petition. 

On July 25, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals construed the original filing as an 

appeal seeking review of orders on the motions for default and reconsideration, and 

dismissed the notice of appeal as appealing a non-appealable order. (Exhibit PPPPP, 

Order 7/25/14.) 

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Petitioner sought “clarification,” arguing that the appellate court had misconstrued 

the order being appealed. (Exhibit QQQQQ.) He also moved to amend his cover page 

to reference the March 5, 2014 order disposing of the PCR petition. (Exhibit RRRRR.) 

The appellate court denied, the motions finding that if the order being appealed was the 

March 5, 2014 order of dismissal, the appeal was untimely, and the court did not have 

jurisdiction to consider such an appeal. (Exhibit TTTTT, Order 8/8/14.) 

Petitioner then sought reconsideration, arguing that his notice of appeal had been 

filed within the 35 day time limit after the March 5, 2014 order.4 (Exhibit UUUUU.) On 

August 29, 2014, the appellate court summarily denied the motion for reconsideration. 

(Exhibit VVVVV.) 

On September 11, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona 

Supreme Court (Exhibit WWWWW). On February 17, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court 

directed a response to the petition for review. (Exhibit XXXXX, PFR Response at 5.) 

On April 14, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Exhibit 

YYYYY.) 

G. PETITION FOR SPECIAL ACTION

On May 13, 2014, Petitioner filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals a Petition 

for Special Action (Exhibit LLLLL), challenging a laundry list of orders in his PCR 

proceeding on the 2012 sentence. The Arizona Court of Appeals initially set a briefing 

schedule, but subsequently vacated that order and declined to accept jurisdiction over the 

petition. (Exhibit MMMMM, Order 5/15/14.) 

On or about June 17, 2014, Petitioner filed with the Arizona Supreme Court a 

Petition for Review in the special action proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits at 124.) 

 

4

Petitioner argued that he had 35 days from the mailed order (Exhibit FFFFF) 

dismissing his PCR petition, relying on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3(a) 

providing for an additional five days after a notice by mailing. However, 35 days from 

March 5, 2014 would have expired on April 9, 2014. Petitioner’s Notice of Appeal was 

not filed until April 10, 2014.

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On October 20, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Id. at 

144.) Petitioner then sought reconsideration (id. at 145), which was denied (id. at 149). 

H. FIRST MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE

On or about June 17, 2014, during the pendency of Petitioner’s first PCR 

proceeding on the 2012 Sentence, Petitioner filed a “Request for Correction of Clerical 

Errors,” challenging the consecutive nature of the .75 years sentence on the stalking 

charge, the lack of good time credits, and the imposition of two sentences of 2.5 years in 

the 2007 DUI. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits at 151.) On July 22, 2014, the trial court 

amended the sentence by striking the portion of the 2012 sentence sentencing Petitioner 

to 2.5 years on the DUI charge based on his blood alcohol content. (Exhibit BBBBBB, 

Order 7/22/14.) Petitioner sought reconsideration of the partial denial (Exhibit 

CCCCCC), which was denied (Exhibit DDDDDD, Order 9/23/14). 

I. SECOND PCR / MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE

On January 5, 2015, during the pendency of his petition for review with the 

Arizona Supreme Court on the appeal of his PCR petition on the 2012 Sentence, 

Petitioner filed a “Notice of Errors in the Record Arising from Oversight and Motion to 

Correct Errors in the Record” (Exhibit EEEEEE), arguing that the 2007 DUI had been 

improperly used to enhance multiple sentences. The motion was construed as a PCR 

petition under Rule 32, and was denied as untimely. (Exhibit FFFFFF, Order 1/28/15.) 

On February 18, 2015, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Exhibit GGGGGG) 

seeking to appeal the denial of the second PCR petition. 

Respondents allege that “Petitioner subsequently voluntarily dismissed this appeal 

to avoid staying the instant habeas proceeding.” (Answer, Doc. 26 at 59.) 28 U.S.C. § 

2248 provides: 

The allegations of . . . an answer to an order to show cause in a 

habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true, 

except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they 

are not true.

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Petitioner proffers nothing to counter this allegation, and the undersigned finds no reason 

to conclude that Respondents’ allegation is untrue. 

J. PETITIONER’S STATE COURT COUNSEL

Petitioner asserts a laundry list of claims of ineffective assistance, many of which 

are recursive claims of failures by PCR counsel to raise claims of ineffectiveness of trial 

and appellate counsel. To assist in evaluating such claims, the undersigned provides the 

following recap of Petitioner’s various counsel.

Attorney Kate Roberts represented Petitioner in the initial proceedings on the 

2007 DUI, including cases CR2007-1075, CR 2009-0017, through the suspended 

sentence in that case, the January 14, 2010 sentence correction, and the Opening Brief on 

direct appeal. (See Exhibit C, Notice of Appearance; Exhibit O, Correction of 

Sentencing; and Exhibit NNNNNN, Opening Brief.) Roberts also represented Petitioner 

throughout the trial court proceedings on the 2009 Stalking case. (See Exhibit V, M.E. 

5/19/10; Exhibit Z, Sentence.) Roberts also initially represented Petitioner in the earlier 

proceedings on the 2009 DUI case, CR2009-0960. (See Exhibit EE, Notice of 

Substitution.) 

Attorney Benjamin Brewer represented Petitioner in filing a Reply Brief on direct 

appeal in the initial 2007 DUI proceedings, including the Petition for Review to the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (See Exhibit OOOOOO, Reply Brief; Exhibit Q, Pet. Rev.) 

Brewer also succeeded attorney Roberts in representing Petitioner in the 2009 DUI case. 

(See Exhibit EE, Notice of Substitution.) 

Attorney Ronald Wood and Attorney Dirk LeGate of the Wood Law Office 

succeeded Attorney Brewer as counsel for Petitioner in the 2009 DUI case, the 2011 

Sexual Assault case, CR2011-0340, and the related probation violations. (See Exhibit 

FFF, Notice of Appearance; Exhibit AAAA, M.E. 8/30/11; Exhibit TTT, M.E. 9/1/11.) 

Following Petitioner’s failure to appear for sentencing, the firm withdrew. (See Exhibit 

FFFF, Mot. Withdraw.) The Court then appointed the Public Defender’s Office, which 

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reported a conflict, and so the Legal Defender’s Office was appointed, who also reported 

a possible conflict. (See Exhibit GGGG, M.E. 12/12/11.) 

Attorney Sam Roser was then appointed and represented Petitioner at sentencing 

on April 5, 2012. (See Exhibit IIII, Sentence 4/5/12.)

Attorney Brett Rigg was appointed to represent Petitioner in his post-conviction 

relief proceedings following the April 5, 2012 sentence. (See Exhibit KKKK, Not. 

Appear.) He continued to do so through the Notice of No Colorable Issues (Exhibit 

LLLL). 

K. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 29, 2015 (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following grounds for relief:

(1). the following 39 instances of ineffective assistance of counsel:

(a). by attorney Roberts’ failure to:

1. raise the double jeopardy violation in the 2007 DUI regarding 

the lesser included offense (Roberts IAC#1)

(b). by attorney Brewer’s failure to:

1. raise in the 2009 DUI the double jeopardy violation in the 

2007 DUI regarding the lesser included offense (Brewer 

IAC#1)

2. call attorney Roberts to testify in the 2009 DUI case at the 

hearing regarding a violation of the right to confer with 

counsel (Brewer IAC#2)

3. object in the 2009 DUI to introduction of the incomplete 

booking video (Brewer IAC#3)

4. appeal or file post-hearing motions in the 2009 DUI from the 

denial of the motion to dismiss based on the failure to 

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disclose the booking video (Brewer IAC#4)

5. file charges of false imprisonment based on the double 

jeopardy violation in the 2007 DUI (Brewer IAC#5)

6. pursue in the 2009 DUI the misrepresentation of the time of 

the blood draw (Brewer IAC#6)

(c). by attorney Wood’s failure to:

1. move to dismiss the 2011 sexual assault for lack of evidence 

or witnesses (Wood IAC#1)

2. move to suppress all evidence in the 2011 sexual assault

(Wood IAC#2)

3. move to suppress evidence in the 2011 sexual assault based 

on an illegal search (Wood IAC#3)

4. move to dismiss the 2011 sexual assault based on the lack of 

a victim (Wood IAC#4)

5. move to dismiss the 2011 sexual assault based on the lack of 

witnesses (Wood IAC#5)

6. move to dismiss the 2011 sexual assault based on other 

grounds unknown to Plaintiff (Wood IAC#6)

7. move to dismiss the 2011 sexual assault based on the lack of 

DNA evidence (Wood IAC#7)

8. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on the use of the 

booking video in violation of a court order (Wood IAC#8)

9. move to suppress the booking video in the 2009 DUI (Wood 

IAC#9)

10. move to admit in the 2009 DUI the “new video” (Wood 

IAC#10)

11. move to vacate orders in the 2009 DUI based on the 

complete booking video (Wood IAC#11)

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12. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on the violation of the 

right to counsel (Wood IAC#12)

13. move to suppress in the 2009 DUI the blood evidence based 

on the timing of the draw of blood (Wood IAC#13)

14. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on police tampering 

with evidence (Wood IAC#14)

15. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on forging of the time 

of the blood draw (Wood IAC#15)

16. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on denial of a right to 

an independent blood test (Wood IAC#16)

17. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based upon the presentation 

of the booking video (Wood IAC#17)

18. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on commission of a 

criminal simulation (Wood IAC#18)

19. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on perjury by the 

police (Wood IAC#19)

20. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on the police’s 

commission of criminal damage (Wood IAC#20)

21. move to dismiss the 2009 DUI based on failure to disclose 

DNA evidence (Wood IAC#21)

22. refrain from coercing Petitioner into a guilty plea by 

showing him email from the prosecution (Wood IAC#22)

23. obtain DNA test results in the 2011 sexual assault before 

allowing Petitioner to plead guilty (Wood IAC#23)

(d). attorney Roser’s failure to:

1. raise of a claim of double jeopardy as to the 2007 DUI and 

the 2009 DUI (Roser IAC#1)

2. call character witnesses at sentencing in the 2009 DUI/2011 

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sexual assault sentencing (Roser IAC#2)

3. read the presentence report and verify its contents before 

sentencing in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault (Roser 

IAC#3)

4. compare the presentence report with the plea agreement in 

the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault and object to the use of the 

additional charges in Case 2009-0017 in the 2007 DUI as a 

sentence enhancement (Roser IAC#4)

5. correct sentencing errors in the plea agreement in the 2009 

DUI/2011 sexual assault admitting the probation violations 

(Roser IAC#5)

6. ensure the sentencing minute entry in the 2009 DUI/2011 

sexual assault reflected the vacation of his misdemeanor 

conviction in the 2007 DUI (Roser IAC#6)

7. object in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault to the imposition 

of a consecutive prison term for the 2009 DUI, in violation of 

the plea agreement (Roser IAC#7)

8. object in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault to incorrect 

sentencing ranges (Roser IAC#8)

9. raise claims in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault regarding 

the two prison terms on the 2007 DUI (Roser IAC#9)

(2). 9 instances of violation of Petitioner’s double jeopardy protections, 

including5:

(a). imposition in the 2007 DUI of consecutive 4 month prison 

 

5 Respondents discern (Answer, Doc. 26 at 68) a tenth double jeopardy claim, they 

denominate as Ground 2J and construed as replicating the double jeopardy claim raised 

in his appeal from his PCR proceeding (Exhibit SSSSS at 3). The undersigned does not 

discern a claim separate from those asserted in Ground 2A through 2I, and finds the 

referenced language from the Petition as simply a summary of his double jeopardy 

claims. 

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terms as a condition of probation

(b). Petitioner’s service of an additional month in prison as a result 

of the consecutive 4 month sentences in the 2007 DUI

(c). sentencing in the 2007 DUI on the lesser included offense 

misdemeanor

(d). multiplicitous charges in the 2009 DUI

(e). imposition in the 2012 sentence of two consecutive 2.4 year 

sentences (later vacated)

(f). denial of his motion to reconsider and request to withdraw from 

the plea agreement in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault

(g). the determination that his 2014 notice of appeal was untimely

(h). use in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault of a violation of 

probation in the 2007 DUI based on case CR2009-0017, when 

that case number was not listed in the petition to revoke 

probation

(i). sentencing in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault as a repeat 

offender based on the vacated misdemeanor conviction

(3). 3 instances of denial of due process in Petitioner’s PCR proceeding in 

the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault, including

(a). the PCR court ruling on his PCR petition when the time for 

filing a petition had not elapsed because the transcripts had not 

all been received

(b). the PCR court ruling on his PCR petition before the time for a 

reply elapsed

(c). the PCR court allowing the state to interview prior counsel 

based on an implicit waiver of his attorney-client privilege;

(4). denial of due process in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault by a 

conviction based on a forged and tampered with booking video;

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(5). denial of Petitioner’s First Amendment rights from refusal to hear 

Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his PCR petition in the 2009 

DUI/2011 sexual assault;

(6). denial of due process in the 2009 DUI from use of falsified evidence 

of the time of Petitioner’s blood draw; 

(7). denial of due process in the 2011 sexual assault from refusal to permit 

DNA testing;

(8). denial of due process in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault from 

failure of counsel to acquire recordings, and the trial court’s refusal

of an opportunity to depose attorney Roberts as to the denial of a 

right to counsel by recording conversations with Roberts regarding 

the 2007 DUI and the 2009 DUI;

6

(9). denial of due process in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault by use of a 

stale prior to enhance Petitioner’s sentence; and 

(10). cumulative error7

Response - On August 6, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 26, 27). Respondents argue that the claims they have denominated as “Rigg IAC 

#1,” and Grounds 2G, 3A, 3B, 3C, 5, 7, 8A, and 10 are not cognizable because based 

upon violations in Petitioner’s PCR proceeding. (Doc. 26 at 69-74.) Respondents argue 

that Grounds 2B, 2H, 2G, 3A, 3B, 3C, 5, 7, 8A, 9 and 10 are not cognizable because they 

allege only state law violations. (Id. at 74-81.) Respondents argue that all of Petitioner’s 

 

6 Respondents discern two separate claims in Ground 8. The first is the claim identified 

in the service Order, and referenced herein, based on the recording of conversations with 

attorney Roberts in the 2009 DUI (denominated as “Ground 8A”) and a separate claim 

(denominated as “Ground 8B”) founded upon conversations regarding the 2007 DUI. 

Respondents argue that the claim based on the 2007 DUI was not previously asserted by 

Petitioner in his motion to dismiss the 2009 DUI. (Answer, Doc. 26 at 69.) Like Judge 

Campbell, the undersigned discerns a single claim, albeit founded upon both sets of 

events, but directed at the action of counsel and the court in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual 

assault case. 

7 Ground 10 is found at page 19 of the Petition (Doc. 1) between Grounds 5 and 6.

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grounds are procedurally defaulted or were procedurally barred on an independent and 

adequate state ground. (Id. at 81-157.) 

Reply - On September 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 29). Petitioner 

argues his pro se status as cause to excuse his procedural defaults (id. at 6-7); the 

summary ruling of the Arizona Supreme Court indicates a rejection of the untimeliness 

determination (id. at 8); his petition for review was not untimely because he was entitled 

to application of the state’s prison mailbox rule (id.); the bias against Petitioner in the 

state proceedings constitutes cause (id. at 9); double jeopardy claims are jurisdictional 

(id. at 10); the requested DNA testing will establish Petitioner’s actual innocence (id. at 

11); PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the sentencing errors on which relief 

was granted to Petitioner (id. at 12); counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the double 

jeopardy claims (id. at 12-13); trial counsel were ineffective (id. at 13-15); the 

requirement that he file his PCR petition without transcripts constitutes cause (id. at 16); 

that he can raise his claims of ineffectiveness of PCR counsel in a second PCR petition 

(id. at 38); that Respondents have waived any response on the merits by presenting a 

limited answer (id. at 39); that incorporation of earlier arguments by reference is 

adequate argument (id. at 43); and that his guilty plea did not render any errors moot (id.

at 44). Petitioner argues throughout that he fairly presented his claims to the state courts, 

and that his claims are meritorious. 

Motions – On September 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Disclosure of 

Evidence (Doc. 30) and a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 31). Respondents have 

not responded to either motion.

Because the resolution of the motions is dependent upon various determinations 

on the viability of Petitioner’s claims, the motions are addressed herein.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that all of Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted 

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or were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and thus are 

barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982). 

No exception has been recognized for purportedly “jurisdictional” claims.

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

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Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

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claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Fair Presentation - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim 

to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) 

that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

26 at 90.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. Moreover, as a pleading 

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defendant, Petitioner has no right to a direct appeal, at least on those convictions founded 

upon a guilty plea. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery, 181 Ariz. at 258, 889 

P.2d at 616.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

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assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” That 

time has long since passed.

Petitioner argues in his Reply that he could still seek a second PCR proceeding to 

assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his first PCR proceeding. (Reply, 

Doc. 29 at 38.) While that might be true, such claims must be brought within the time 

limits of Rule 32.4, and that time has run. See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 

1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition of 

pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule).

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

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(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

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state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Here, Petitioner has made four forays to the Arizona Court of Appeals: (1) his 

direct appeal from his original sentence in the 2007 DUI (Exhibit NNNNNN); (2) his 

appeal from his PCR regarding his 2012 sentence (Exhibits KKKKK and OOOOO); (3) 

his petition for special action (Exhibit LLLLL); and (4) his notice of appeal in his second 

PCR from the 2012 sentence (Exhibit GGGGGG).

Petitioner also points to a variety of motions for reconsideration and the like, 

briefs to the trial/PCR court, briefs to the Arizona Supreme Court, etc. as sources of his 

fair presentation of claims. As noted above, it is not sufficient that somewhere in the 

proceedings a Petitioner has raised his arguments. Rather, such arguments must be 

properly raised in the context of the original proceeding. Claims raised for the first time 

in such motions are not fairly presented. Ferrell v. Ryan, 2014 WL 3610955, at *12 (D. 

Ariz. 2014) report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 1755403 (2015) (citing 

Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38). 

/ /

/ /

/ /

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a) Insufficient Presentation

(1) Incorporation by Reference

Petitioner asserts that various claims were fairly presented by incorporating by 

reference portions of briefs in the trial/PCR courts, etc. Such references are not fair 

presentation of a claim, see Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32 and Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000, 

unless the other brief has been provided to the appellate court with the appellate brief, 

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 668-669. See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (“The petition 

shall not incorporate any document by reference, except the appendices.”).

(2) Motions, Etc.

Petitioner argues that he has raised his claims in various motions for 

reconsideration, motions to vacate, ungranted motions to amend, etc. None of these are 

fair presentation of an issue. See Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 

2002) (raising for first time in discretionary motion for reconsideration not fair 

presentment unless actually considered); and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (“Failure to raise 

any issue that could be raised in the petition or the cross-petition for review shall 

constitute waiver of appellate review of that issue.”). 

(3) PCR/Trial Court

Petitioner also points to his presentation of various claims in the trial and PCR 

courts. It is true that most claims must be preserved by raising in the trial and/or PCR 

court. But such presentation is not enough. Rather, the Petitioner must have also 

presented them to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998. 

(4) Notice of Appeal/Special Action from PCR 

proceeding

Following the denial of his PCR petition in the 2012 proceeding, Petitioner filed 

with the superior court a “Notice of Appeal from Superior Court and an Application for 

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an Extraordinary Writ of Special Action.” (Exhibit KKKKK.) The Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure do not permit an appeal from a PCR proceeding, but instead provide 

for a discretionary petition for review to the appellate court. See State v. Smith, 184 

Ariz. 456, 459, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996); and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9. Further, to the extent 

that this filing constituted a petition for special action, it was presented only to the 

Superior Court, and not to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and thus would not have 

qualified as presentation to the state’s highest court. Moreover, as discussed hereinafter, 

a petition for special action is seldom fair presentation of a claim.

(5) Arizona Supreme Court

Finally, Petitioner argues that he raised various claims to the Arizona Supreme 

Court. However, presentation for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court is not fair 

presentation. 

In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to 

properly exhaust a claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct 

review." Id. at 916.

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas 

corpus states, “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion 

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire 

direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire 

judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 

Id. (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b 

(4th ed. 1998) (emphasis added)).

The presentation of a claim for the first time in a petitioner’s petition for review to 

the Arizona Supreme Court is not sufficient to fairly present the claim to the Arizona 

courts. The Arizona Supreme Court generally will not consider issues raised for the first 

time before it, although it has the discretion to do so. See Town of South Tucson v. Board 

of Supv’rs of Pima County, 52 Ariz. 575, 84 P.2d 581 (1938). Raising “federal 

constitutional claims for the first and only time to the state’s highest court on 

discretionary review” is not fair presentation. Casey, 386 F.3d at 918. 

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(Neither is such presentation necessary, except in death penalty (or, perhaps, life 

sentence) cases. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005).)

(6) Actual Consideration

Nonetheless, even if a Petitioner has not fairly presented a claim, actual 

consideration of the claim by the Arizona Court of Appeals or Arizona Supreme Court 

satisfies the exhaustion requirement. 

A state court's actual consideration of a claim satisfies exhaustion. See Sandstrom 

v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir.1984) ("[t]here is no better evidence of 

exhaustion than a state court's actual consideration of the relevant constitutional issue"); 

see also Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir.1990) (state court's sua 

sponte consideration of an issue satisfies exhaustion). 

b) Claims Exhausted in Direct Appeal

Petitioner’s direct appeal from the original sentence in the 2007 DUI presented 

none of the claims he now raises. 

Petitioner did raise various claims related to the failure of the prosecution to 

disclose various videos. (Exhibit NNNNNN, Opening Brief at 8-16.) Although 

Petitioner now raises related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Ground One, 

the presentation of an underlying claim is not fair presentation of a related claim of 

ineffective assistance. “While [the ineffective assistance and underlying constitutional 

claim are] admittedly related, they are distinct claims with separate elements of proof, 

and each claim should have been separately and specifically presented to the state 

courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner also raised a claim based on the failure to stay the prison term imposed 

as a condition of probation. (Exhibit NNNNNN, Opening Brief at 16-18.) However, 

Petitioner does not raise the same claim herein. 

It is true that the Arizona Court of Appeals sua sponte concluded that his double 

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jeopardy rights had been violated by conviction on a greater and lesser included offense, 

and vacated his conviction on the misdemeanor DUI in Case CR 2007-1075, pertaining 

to the 2007 DUI. (Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/24/11 at 15-17.) In Ground Two, Petitioner 

alleges violations of his double jeopardy rights, but focuses upon the imposition of two 

four month prison terms as a condition of probation on the two felony charges in Case 

2009-0017, pertaining to the 2007 DUI. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11 (“7”).) He also argues 

that the 2012 sentence resulted in various double jeopardy violations. (Id. at 11-13.) But 

those violations could not have been considered by the Arizona Court of Appeals in its 

2011 Memorandum Decision (Exhibit NNNNNN). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s direct appeal from the 2007 DUI cases did not result in 

the exhaustion of any of his current claims.

c) Claims Exhausted in Attempted Appeal of PCR Rulings

Petitioner’s next foray to the Arizona Court of Appeals was his “Notice of Appeal 

from Superior Court and an Application for an Extraordinary Writ of Special Action”

from his first PCR proceeding following the 2012 sentence.8 (Exhibit KKKKK.) 

Petitioner eventually filed in that proceeding an “Appellant’s Brief” alternatively 

labelled as a “Petition for Review” (Exhibit OOOOO). However, those filings were not 

a fair presentation of Petitioner’s claims. 

The culmination of the rulings of the Arizona Court of Appeals was: (1) to the 

extent Petitioner sought review of the rulings on his motion for default and motion for 

reconsideration, it improperly sought review of non-appealable orders; and (2) to the 

extent that Petitioner sought review of the March 5, 2014 order dismissing the PCR

petition, it was an untimely appeal. (See Exhibit PPPPP, Order 7/25/14; Exhibit TTTTT, 

Order 8/8/14.) 

Petitioner proffers nothing to counter the effect of the ruling with regard to the 

 

8

To the extent that this filing constituted a petition for special action, as discussed 

hereinafter, a petition for special action is not fair presentation of a claim.

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non-appealable orders.

With regard to the untimeliness, Petitioner argues that the filing was timely, 

because he was entitled to the application of Arizona’s prison mailbox rule. Indeed, 

Arizona generally treats prisoner filings delivered to prison officials for mailing as being 

filed “‘at the time it is delivered, properly addressed, to the proper prison authorities to 

be forwarded to the clerk of the superior court.’” State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 22, 106 

P.3d 1035, 1037 (App. 2005) (quoting Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245, 908 P.2d 56, 

59 (App.1995)). Petitioner presents various documents to show that he mailed 

documents to the Navajo County Superior Court on March 27, 2014 and April 4, 2014, 

(Reply, Doc. 29 at Exhibits, Cook Unit Legal Log), even though his filing was dated 

April 8, 2014 and not received by the court until April 10, 2014. (See Exhibit KKKKK.)

Petitioner invites this Court to conclude that the decision of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals was in error. In almost every situation, a state court determination of state law 

is not subject to review in a federal habeas court. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 

(9th Cir. 2000) ("federal court is bound by the state court's interpretations of state law"). 

Petitioner proffers no authority for this Court to undertake to review of a state court 

ruling on the application of a state time limit.

Moreover, even assuming this Court could substitute its judgment for that of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals on the timeliness of Petitioner’s appeal, Petitioner fails to 

convince this Court that he timely mailed his “Notice of Appeal.” 

Petitioner’s argument is unavailing for two reasons: (1) his April, 2014 filing was 

a delinquent notice of appeal; and (2) his July, 2014 “Petition for Review” was a 

delinquent petition for review.

April 2014 Filing was Delinquent Notice of Appeal - The Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure do not permit an appeal from a PCR proceeding, but instead provide 

for a discretionary petition for review to the appellate court. See State v. Smith, 184 

Ariz. 456, 459, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996); and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9. Rule 32.9 does not 

provide for filing a notice of appeal, but requires the filing of a complete petition for 

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review, and provides that claims not included in the petition are waived. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.9(c)(1). 

A notice of appeal is only provided for under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

31.2, relating to an appeal from a judgment and sentence. See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

4033. 

Nonetheless, Petitioner purported to file a “Notice of Appeal.” (Exhibit 

KKKKK.) Moreover, Petitioner filed his “Notice of Appeal” with the trial court. 

Arizona law requires that “[t]he petition for review...shall be filed in the appellate court.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). 

It is apparent that the Arizona Court of Appeals honored that election. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ Order of Dismissal (Exhibit PPPPP) references the parties as 

“Appellee” and “Appellant,” described Petitioner’s filing as “purport[ing] to appeal,” 

and finding the orders referenced (the motion for default and motion for reconsideration) 

“not appealable,” citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033, which defines the types of orders 

which are appealable, and denying a right of appeal to pleading defendants. 

Similarly, the court’s order on Petitioner’s Motion for Clarification (Exhibit 

QQQQQ), even after Petitioner filed his “Appellant’s Brief”/“Petition for Review” 

(Exhibit OOOOO), continued to refer to the parties as “Appellee” and “Appellant,” and 

the April 10, 2014 filing as a “notice of appeal.” (See Exhibit TTTTT, Order 8/8/14.) 

Likewise, the court’s order (Exhibit VVVVV) on Petitioner’s Motion for 

Reconsideration (Exhibit UUUUU). 

The deadline for a notice of appeal was 60 days after entry of judgment and 

sentence.9 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.3. Of course, that time had long since passed, Petitioner 

having been sentenced on April 5, 2012. (See Exhibit IIII, Sentence.) Thus, whether

treated as filed on April 8, 2014, April 4, 2014, or March 27, 2014, this notice of appeal 

was almost two years delinquent. 

 

9 Rule 31.3 was amended effective January 1, 2015 to reduce the time for a notice of 

appeal from 60 days to 20 days. 

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July, 2014 Filing was Delinquent Petition for Review – Petitioner eventually 

filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on July 24, 2014. (Exhibit 

OOOOO.) 

Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c), Petitioner had 30 days from 

the final decision on the PCR Petition or a motion for rehearing, to file his petition for 

review. Arizona has broadly applied its rule expanding time limits by five days after 

service by mail, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3(a), to include time limits 

running from the issuance of court orders. See e.g State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 261, 782 

P.2d 737 (1989) (applying Rule 1.3(a) to Rule 31.3 deadline for notices of appeal); State 

v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535, 573 P.2d 1388 (1978) (applying Rule 1.3(a) to Rule 32.9(c) 

deadline for petition for review from denial of motion for rehearing in PCR proceeding); 

and State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 786 P.3d 956 (1990) (citing applying Rule 1.3 to time 

for notice of appeal delivered to attorneys' courthouse internal mailbox). Here, the PCR 

court’s ruling was issued from chambers by mail. (See Exhibit FFFFF, Order 3/5/14.) 

Accordingly, Petitioner had 35 days, or until Wednesday, April 9, 2014 to file a petition 

for review. 

Alternatively, the deadline runs from the order on a motion for rehearing. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). Here, Petitioner did not file anything denominated as a “motion for 

rehearing.” He did, however, file a “Motion to Vacate Ruling Upon Reconsideration and 

Motion for Leave to Amend Rule-32-Petition.” (Exhibit HHHHH.) That filing argued 

that the order of dismissal should be vacated because the PCR court had improperly 

refused transcripts, required a PCR petition before transcripts were available, and ruled 

without awaiting a reply. That motion was filed on March 17, 2014, within the 15 day 

time limit of Rule 32.9(a) for motions for rehearing. Assuming this motion qualified as a 

motion for rehearing, Petitioner’s deadline to file a petition for review did not expire 

until 30 days after the Court ruled on that filing on May 30, 2014, or until Monday, June 

30, 2014. (See Exhibit JJJJJ, Order 5/30/14.) 

Thus, at best, Petitioner had until June 30, 2014 to file a petition for review. But, 

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Petitioner did not file anything even denominated as a petition for review until July 24, 

2014. (See Exhibit OOOOO.) That filing was untimely.

Conclusion of Procedural Bar - Accordingly, any claims that Petitioner did raise 

in his 2014 proceeding before the Arizona Court of Appeals were properly barred from 

review on state grounds of non-appealability and/or untimeliness.10 Petitioner proffers 

nothing to show that that either of these grounds were not independent and adequate state 

grounds. Consequently, any of Petitioner’s federal claims raised in that proceeding were 

procedurally barred, and thus precluded from habeas review. 

d) Claims Exhausted in Special Action

Petitioner purported to combine his “Notice of Appeal” with a petition for special 

action (Exhibit KKKKK). But Petitioner filed that purported petition with the trial court 

not the Arizona Court of Appeals.

He did ultimately file with the Arizona Court of Appeals a separate Petition for 

Special Action (Exhibit LLLLL). That filing was not fair presentation.

"Submitting a new claim to the state's highest court in a procedural context in 

which its merits will not be considered absent special circumstances does not constitute 

fair presentation." Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille 

v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). The Arizona special action proceeding is just 

such a discretionary proceeding. 

It is true that a petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle to obtain 

Arizona judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim. See State v. 

Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 437, 94 P.3d 1119, 1133 (Ariz. 2004) (citing Nalbandian v. 

Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981 

 

10 Because the Arizona Supreme Court issued a summary denial of review on 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review to that court (see Exhibit YYYYY, Order 4/14/15), this 

Court would look through that rejection to the last reasoned opinion, that by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). Petitioner argues 

in his Reply, but fails to explain why, this rule would not apply to the summary dismissal 

by the Arizona Supreme Court. The undersigned concludes that it does.

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(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)). “The reasons underlying the preference for special action review 

of denials of motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy are obvious: Because the 

Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees the right to be free from subsequent prosecution, the 

clause is violated by the mere commencement of retrial.” Id. Although Petitioner has 

raised a variety of double jeopardy claims, Petitioner has not asserted an interlocutory 

double jeopardy challenge. Rather, his special action filings were all made after his 

prosecutions had been completed. 

Consequently, Petitioner’s special action petition(s) were not fair presentation of 

any claims. Moreover, in neither proceeding did the state courts address his special 

action claims. (See Exhibits PPPPP, TTTTT, and VVVVV (orders on Notice of 

Appeal), and MMMMM (Order 5/15/14 on Special Action). Consequently, the claims 

cannot found to have been exhausted despite the lack of fair presentation.

e) Claims Exhausted in Second PCR Petition for Review

Petitioner initiated a second PCR proceeding when he filed a “Notice of Errors” 

on January 5, 2015 (Exhibit EEEEEE). That proceeding was dismissed as untimely.

Petitioner then filed a “Notice of Appeal” (Exhibit GGGGGG), which he then 

dismissed. Petitioner proffers no reason to conclude that this aborted proceeding 

resulted in the fair presentation or actual review of any of his claims.

f) Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted on, or has been procedurally barred on independent and adequate 

state grounds, on all of his claims. 

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

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federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural 

defaults based on: (1) his indigent, untrained, pro se status and his resulting entitlement 

to the liberal construction of his filings (Reply, Doc. 29 at 6); (2) his claims are 

meritorious (id. at 7); (3) there was bias against Petitioner in the state court proceedings; 

(4) he was required to file his PCR petition without transcripts; and (4) his trial, appellate 

and PCR counsel were ineffective. 

Pro Se Status - The “cause and prejudice” standard is equally applicable to pro se 

litigants, Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Idaho 

State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986), whether literate and 

assisted by “jailhouse lawyers”, Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 

800 F.2d at 909, or non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058 

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989). Thus, the fact that Petitioner was 

unaided at various points in his proceedings does not establish cause to excuse his 

procedural defaults and procedural bars. 

Merits of Claims – Petitioner argues his claims are meritorious and thus must not 

be disposed of on technicalities. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 

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procedural default rules must not be applied so as to result in a “fundamental miscarriage 

of justice.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986). Although not explicitly 

limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a 

"miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual innocence. See Hertz 

& Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 

Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to claims of actual 

innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the 

potential that Petitioner’s claims might be meritorious is not sufficient to avoid the 

procedural default rules.

Bias in State Proceedings – In his Reply, Petitioner argues there was bias in 

favor of the lawyers because the state courts permitted the prosecution and PCR counsel 

to file papers after the deadlines, but then dismissed his PCR appeal as untimely. (Reply, 

Doc. 30 at 9.) But Petitioner fails to show how any purported prejudice resulted in his 

failure to fairly present his claims and exhaust his state remedies. Even assuming that 

the PCR court had wrongly extended deadlines for the state and Petitioner’s counsel, 

improperly permitting a seriously delinquent appeal by Petitioner would not have been 

authorized, nor would such exception have rectified the earlier bias. See State v. Littleton, 

146 Ariz. 531, 533, 707 P.2d 329, 331 (App. 1985) (“The filing of a timely notice of appeal is 

essential to the exercise of jurisdiction by this court.”). (See Exhibit TTTTT, Order 8/8/14, 

citing Littleton.) 

Lack of Transcripts – Petitioner also argues in his Reply that he was required to 

file his PCR petition by June 1, 2013, even though Petitioner did not have any 

transcripts. However, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show that a lack of 

transcripts cause Petitioner’s procedural defaults. Indeed, as discussed hereinafter in 

addressing the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel under Martinez, Petitioner presented all 

but five of his claims in his PCR petition. He makes no suggestion that those five claims 

could not be presented due to a lack of transcripts, and none appear dependent upon the 

availability of transcripts. 

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Moreover, Petitioner eventually filed a request for transcripts from the PCR court 

(Exhibit PPPP), along with his other discovery requests. The court granted the request, 

directing the provision of transcripts from the change of plea and sentencing. (Exhibit 

QQQQ, M.E. 7/10/13.) Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that he did not receive 

those transcripts, and did not subsequently seek to amend his petition to allege new 

claims. Thus, it appears that the lack of transcripts was not the cause of Petitioner’s 

failure to assert those additional claims.

Ineffective Assistance – Petitioner asserts that trial, appellate, and PCR counsel 

have been ineffective in failing to pursue various claims and issues.

The undersigned addresses separately hereinafter the claim of ineffective 

assistance of PCR counsel Rigg. 

Ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel may constitute cause for 

failing to properly exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. 

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, “[t]o constitute cause for 

procedural default of a federal habeas claim, the constitutional claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must first have been presented to the state courts as an independent 

claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). As with his other claims, 

Petitioner has not properly exhausted his state remedies on any claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial or appellate counsel. Consequently, he cannot rely upon any 

ineffectiveness of trial or appellate counsel as cause to excuse his procedural defaults. 

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing (but without 

consideration of the purported ineffectiveness of PCR counsel under Martinez), the 

undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish cause to excuse his 

procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

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procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

6. Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel as Cause

a) Ineffectiveness of PCR Counsel Ordinarily Not Cause 

Ordinarily, to meet the “cause” requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel 

must amount to an independent constitutional violation. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 

932, (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists, 

ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. 

"Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default 

only if the petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in the proceeding in which the 

default occurred...The fact that counsel is appointed by the state court does not change 

the result, because counsel is not constitutionally required." Smith v. State of Idaho, 392 

F.3d 350, 357 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original, citations omitted). If there is no 

federal constitutional right to counsel, a petitioner "cannot establish cause because of the 

state trial court’s failure to appoint him counsel, even if such failure was erroneous as a 

matter of state law." Smith, 392 F.3d at 357. In Patrick Poland v. Stewart, 169 F. 3d 

573 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause there is no right to an attorney 

in state post-conviction proceedings, there cannot be constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Id. at 588 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)). 

The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the general rule that 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel is not cause.

b) Exception for Abandonment without Notice

The first exception was recognized in Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), 

where the Supreme Court held that cause could be shown when PCR counsel was not 

merely negligent (and under the law of agency that negligence being chargeable to the 

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petitioner) but had abandoned the representation without notice to the petitioner, 

resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

Here, however, Petitioner does not suggest that counsel abandoned the 

representation without notice, merely that counsel was deficient in not bringing claims 

Petitioner asserts are meritorious. Indeed, counsel filed the appropriate notice to the 

PCR court when he was unable to find an issue of review. Thus, any such deficiency was 

not external to the defense, and is chargeable to Petitioner. 

c) Exception for Claims re Ineffectiveness of Trial & Appellate Counsel 

The second exception to the general rule that ineffectiveness of PCR counsel does 

not establish cause concerns the failure of PCR counsel to bring claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Court recognized that because 

courts increasingly reserve review of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to 

post-conviction relief proceedings, the ineffectiveness of counsel in such PCR 

proceedings could effectively defeat any review of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

Accordingly, the Court recognized a narrow exception to the Court’s ruling in Coleman, 

supra, that the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel cannot provide cause. Arizona, the state 

at issue in Martinez, is just such a state, and accordingly ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel can establish cause to excuse a procedural default of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. In Ha Van Nguyen, 736 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth 

Circuit extended Martinez to PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to bring claims of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

However, the Martinez court made clear that the limited exception it was creating 

for ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as “cause” did not extend outside the initial PCR 

proceeding.

The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other 

kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review 

collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, 

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and petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts. It 

does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first 

occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral 

proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320. 

Further, Martinez only applies to the important “right to the effective assistance of 

trial counsel,” 132 S.Ct. at 1320, and appellate counsel, Nguyen, 736 F.3d 1287. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s complaint that PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to assert 

other types of claims cannot establish cause.

d) Exhaustion of Martinez Claims Not Required

Respondents argue that Martinez did not disturb the requirement to exhaust 

claims of ineffective assistance used as cause to excuse a procedural default. (Answer, 

Doc. 26 at 97.) However, the Ninth Circuit has observed that “there seems to be no 

requirement that the claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as cause for an 

ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claim be presented to the state courts.” 

Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1322, n.17 (9th Cir. 2014).

e) Application of Martinez to Petitioner 

For Petitioner to rely upon Martinez, Petitioner must “demonstrate[e] two things: 

(1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been 

raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318).

Thus, this Court must resolve whether, under Martinez, Petitioner’s PCR counsel 

was ineffective so as to provide cause for Petitioner’s failure to properly exhaust his 

claims concerning the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 

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Applicable Counsel – Petitioner asserts in this habeas proceeding the ineffective 

assistance of counsel not only in the proceedings culminating in his 2012 sentence, but 

ineffectiveness in the 2007 DUI case. Respondents do not contend that these claims 

were not subject to litigation in Petitioner’s 2012 PCR proceeding. Accordingly, the 

undersigned presumes, for purposes of this Report & Recommendation that such claims 

were open to litigation by Petitioner’s PCR counsel. 

However, Petitioner’s claims regarding the ineffectiveness of trial and appellate 

counsel in the 2007 DUI and the stalking case could have been raised in PCR attacks in 

those cases. The fact that Petitioner failed to bring such PCR attacks does not prevent a 

finding that the 2012 PCR was not “the first occasion” the State allowed those claims. 

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320. Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner’s claims assert 

ineffectiveness of trial or appellate counsel in those proceedings, the ineffectiveness of 

his PCR counsel cannot form cause to excuse his procedural defaults under Martinez. 

Claims Procedurally Defaulted in Petition for Review – Respondents properly 

argue that the majority of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel were raised by Petitioner to the PCR court, and thus the procedural 

default occurred not because of PCR counsel’s failure to raise the claims to the PCR 

court, but because Petitioner failed to properly seek review from the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. See e.g. Heinz v. Mills, 2014 WL 4059767, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2014) 

(Martinez did not apply because default “not caused by counsel on PCR initial review, 

but rather by counsel on the PCR appellate review”). 

In Petitioner’s pro per PCR petition he argued that counsel Brewer, Wood, and 

Roser were ineffective under Strickland. (Exhibit NNNN, PCR Pet. at 2.) In particular, 

Petitioner asserted in his PCR Petition his claims in the following Grounds:

(1) Ground 1B(1) regarding Brewer’s failure to assert the double jeopardy 

violation in the 2007 DUI (Brewer IAC#1) (id. at 3, ¶ 3);

(2) Ground 1B(2) regarding Brewer’s failure to interview and call attorney 

Roberts regarding violations of his right to counsel (Brewer IAC#2) (id. at 

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3 ¶ 2);

(3) Ground 1B(3) regarding Brewer’s failure to object to the incomplete 

booking video (Brewer IAC#3) (id. at 4 ¶ 4);

(4) Ground 1B(4) regarding Brewer’s failure to file post-hearing motions 

based on failure to disclose the booking video (Brewer IAC#4) (id. at 

Attachment A-1 at 3-4);11

(5) Ground 1B(6) regarding Brewer’s failure to pursue the forging of the time 

of the blood draw (Brewer IAC#6) (id. at 11 ¶ 27);

(6) Ground 1C(1) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismissed based on the 

lack of evidence (Wood IAC#1) (id. at 5 ¶ 8, 6 ¶ 9);

(7) Ground 1C(2) regarding Wood’s failure to move to suppress all evidence 

in the 2011 sexual assault (Wood IAC#2) (id. at 5 ¶ 8);

(8) Ground 1C(3) regarding Wood’s failure to move to suppress evidence in 

the 2011 sexual assault based on an illegal search (Wood IAC#3) (id., 

Attachment A-1 at 9);

(9) Ground 1C(4) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss based on the 

lack of a victim (Wood IAC#4) (id. at 6 ¶ 9);

(10) Ground 1C(5) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2011 sexual assault based on the lack of witnesses (Wood IAC#5) (id 

Attachment C at 2, ¶ 2);

(11) Ground 1C(6) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2011 sexual assault based on other grounds unknown to Plaintiff (Wood 

IAC#6) (id. at Attachment A-1 at 9, ¶ 6);

(12) Ground 1C(7) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2011 sexual assault based on the lack of DNA evidence (Wood IAC#7)

 

11 Respondents contend this claim was raised in a different location. (Answer, Doc. 26 at 

116 (referencing Exhibit NNNN, PCR Pet., Attachmetn C at 1, ¶¶ 10-11).) The 

undersigned does not find the referenced location to reflect a claim based on a failure of 

disclosure, but upon the making of recording.

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(id. at 7);

(13) Ground 1C(8) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss based 

on the prosecutor’s use of the precluded video (Wood IAC#8) (id. at 6 ¶ 

10);

(14) Ground 1C(9) regarding Wood’s failure to object to the incomplete 

booking video (Wood IAC#9) (id. at 5 ¶ 7 (referring to ¶ 4));

(15) Ground 1C(10) regarding Wood’s failure to admit the video of 

denial of counsel (Wood IAC#10) (id. at 5 ¶ 7 (referring to ¶ 5));

(16) Ground 1C(11) regarding Wood’s failure to move to vacate orders 

in the 2009 DUI based on the complete booking video (Wood IAC#11) 

(id., Attachment A-1 at 6-7);

(17) Ground 1C(12) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based on the violation of the right to counsel (Wood IAC#12) 

(id., Attachment C at 1, ¶ 1; id., Attachment A-1 at 6-7);

(18) Ground 1C(13) regarding Wood’s failure to move to suppress in the 

2009 DUI the blood evidence based on the timing of the draw of blood 

(Wood IAC#13) (id. Attachment C at 1 ¶ 7); 

(19) Ground 1C(14) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based on police tampering with evidence (Wood IAC#14) (id., 

Attachment C at 1 ¶12);

(20) Ground 1C(15) regarding Wood’s failure to pursue the forging of 

the time of the blood draw (Wood IAC#15) (id. at 11 ¶ 27);

(21) Ground 1C(16) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based on denial of right to independent blood test (Wood 

IAC#16) (id., Attachment C at 1 ¶ 8);

(22) Ground 1C(17) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based upon the presentation of the booking video (Wood 

IAC#17) (id. at 6);

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(23) Ground 1C(18) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based on commission of a criminal simulation (Wood IAC#18) 

(id., Attachment C at 2 ¶ 18);

(24) Ground 1C(19) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based on perjury by the police (Wood IAC#19) (id., 

Attachment C at 2 ¶ 19);

(25) Ground 1C(20) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based on the police’s commission of criminal damage (Wood 

IAC#20) (id., Attachment C at 2 ¶ 20);

(26) Ground 1C(21) regarding Wood’s failure to move to dismiss the 

2009 DUI based on failure to disclose DNA evidence (Wood IAC#21) (id.

Attachment C at 1 ¶ 13);

(27) Ground 1C(22) regarding Wood’s coercing Petitioner to plead 

guilty with the prosecution’s email (Wood IAC#22) (id. at 6 ¶ 11);

(28) Ground 1C(23) regarding Wood’s failure to obtain DNA test results 

in the 2011 sexual assault before allowing Petitioner to plead guilty (Wood 

IAC#23) (id. at 7);

(29) Ground 1D(1) regarding Roser’s failure to raise the double jeopardy 

claim (Roser IAC#1) (id. at 8 ¶12);

(30) Ground 1D(2) regarding Roser’s failure to call character witnesses 

at sentencing (Roser IAC#2) (id. at 8 ¶ 13);

(31) Ground 1D(3) regarding Roser’s failure to review the presentence 

report (Roser IAC#3) (id. at 8 ¶ 15);

(32) Ground 1D(7) regarding Roser’s failure to object to a consecutive 

prison term (Roser IAC#7) (id. at 8 ¶ 14);

(33) Ground 1D(8) regarding Roser’s failure to object to incorrect 

sentencing ranges (Roser IAC#8) (id. at 8 ¶ 14);

(34) Ground 1D(9) regarding Roser’s failure to raise claims in the 2009 

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DUI/2011 sexual assault regarding the two prison terms on the 2007 DUI 

(Roser IAC#9) (id. at 8 ¶ 12).

Respondents concede, and the undersigned finds, that Petitioner (and PCR counsel) did 

not raise the following claims to the PCR court:

(1) Ground 1A regarding Roberts’ failure to raise the double jeopardy 

violation in the 2007 DUI regarding the lesser included offense (Roberts 

IAC#1);

(2) Ground 1B(5) regarding Brewer’s failure to file charges of false 

imprisonment based on the double jeopardy violation in the 2007 DUI 

(Brewer IAC#5)12

(3) Ground 1D(4) regarding Roser’s failure to compare the presentence report 

with the plea agreement in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault and object to 

the use of the additional charges in Case 2009-0017 in the 2007 DUI as a 

sentence enhancement (Roser IAC#4)

(4) Ground 1D(5) regarding Roser’s failure to correct sentencing errors in the 

plea agreement in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault admitting the 

probation violations (Roser IAC#5)

(5) Ground 1D(6) regarding Roser’s failure to ensure the sentencing minute 

entry in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault reflected the vacation of his 

misdemeanor conviction in the 2007 DUI (Roser IAC#6)

With regard to these claims, any effort by Petitioner to present them to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals in his petition for review would not have resulted in exhaustion, Petitioner 

having defaulted on them by failing to raise them below. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) 

(limiting petition for review to review of actions of the trial court on the PCR petition); 

State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571, 574, 334 P.3d 754, 757 (App. 2014) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 

 

12 Petitioner did assert in his PCR petition claims regarding Brewer’s failure to file 

charges, but only based on grounds other than false imprisonment based on the double 

jeopardy violation. (See Exhibit NNNN, PCR Pet at Exhibt A-1 at 5.)

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121 (2015). Accordingly, any ineffectiveness of PCR counsel in failing to raise these 

claims could constitute cause under Martinez. 

Standard for Ineffectiveness - Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In 

order to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance -

counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) 

prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the 

petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that 

counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. 

at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

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appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 

679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Applicable Proceeding – In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner attacks his 

detention under his 2012 sentence. Arguably, under Martinez Petitioner can only seek to 

excuse claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raisable by PCR counsel in his 

2012 proceeding. Any claims of ineffective assistance in Petitioner’s earlier proceedings 

would have been subject to review in those proceedings, and any attempt by PCR 

counsel to assert such claims in seeking review of the 2012 sentence would have been 

procedurally defaulted under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2

Failures of Trial Counsel – As discussed above, the instances of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel which were procedurally defaulted because of PCR counsel’s 

failure to raise them include Grounds 1A, 1B(5), 1D(4), 1D(5), and 1D(6).

Merits of Ground 1A – Roberts IAC#1 – In Ground 1A Petitioner argues that 

attorney Roberts’ was ineffective for failing to raise the double jeopardy violation in the 

2007 DUI regarding the lesser included offense (Roberts IAC#1). (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents argue, inter alia, that Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice 

from such failure because the Arizona Court of Appeals sua sponte vacated this 

conviction, and there is no authority which would have mandated vacating the greater 

conviction as well. (Answer, Doc. 26 at 149-150.) 

In reply, Petitioner simply argues that the ineffectiveness is apparent from the 

ruling of the Arizona Court of Appeals, and that as a result he spent an additional 30 

days in prison. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 12, ¶ 8.) 

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This claim could have been raised by Petitioner in a PCR attack on the 2007 DUI. 

Accordingly, the PCR in the 2012 proceeding was not Petitioner’s first opportunity to 

present the claim to the state courts. Consequently, Martinez is not applicable to this 

claim.

Moreover, because, at the time Petitioner’s PCR proceeding he had already fully 

served the sentence on the lesser included offense, any challenge by PCR counsel would 

have been futile. Clearly, there was no longer any prejudice from the conviction itself: 

the Arizona Court of Appeals had already vacated the conviction. Moreover, the 

additional sentence was already served, and thus any attack based on such sentence was 

moot. See State v. Biere, 2013 WL 1460560, at *1 (App. 2013) (“In light of the fact that 

Biere has been released from custody during the pendency of this review, his challenges 

to the length of his prison term and related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

moot.”). 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds no basis to conclude that PCR counsel was 

deficient in failing to raise the claim in Ground 1A. 

Merits of Ground 1B(5) – Brewer IAC#5 – In Ground 1B(5), Petitioner argues 

that attorney Brewer was ineffective for failing to file charges of false imprisonment 

based on the double jeopardy violation in the 2007 DUI (Brewer IAC#5). (Petition Doc. 

1 at 7.) Brewer represented Petitioner in his appeal from the 2007 DUI and initially in 

the 2009 DUI.

Respondents argue that Brewer was not defective because Brewer had no 

authority to file charges.13 (Answer, Doc. 26 at 151.) 

Petitioner does not address the merits of this claim in his Reply. 

As with Ground 1A, this claim could have been raised by Petitioner in a PCR 

 

13 Respondents also argue that neither the Navajo County Attorney’s Office nor the 

police were responsible for the double jeopardy violation. (Answer, Doc. 26 at 151.) 

However, the Petition does not specify who Petitioner believes charges should have been 

filed against. Assuming it was the trial court (who was ultimately responsible for the 

error), it seems likely that judicial immunity would have precluded any prosecution. See 

Criminal Responsibility, 48A C.J.S. Judges § 223. 

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attack on the 2007 DUI. Accordingly, the PCR in the 2012 proceeding was not 

Petitioner’s first opportunity to present the claim to the state courts. Consequently, 

Martinez is not applicable to this claim.

Moreover, this claim is without merit. In disposing of similar claims regarding 

filing charges for other perceived violations, the PCR court opined: “...the filing of 

criminal charges is a decision for a prosecuting agency. Mr. Brewer's did not have the 

authority to file charges against the latter named parties. State v. Tsosie, 171 Ariz. 683,

685,832 P.2d 700, 702 (App.1992).” (Exhibit FFFFF, Findings 3/5/14 at 12.) The cited 

decision holds that decisions to prosecute are committed to the sound discretion of the 

prosecutor. 

More importantly, Petitioner is not entitled to the effective assistance of counsel 

in filing charges, nor even in making complaints to a prosecuting entity in the hopes of 

having charges filed. To the contrary, under the Sixth Amendment, Petitioner is entitled 

to the effective assistance of counsel only in his role as the accused, not as accuser. The 

Sixth Amendment provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 

right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, Petitioner fails to show prejudice from the failure to pursue such 

charges. Petitioner seems to be under the impression that any relationship between his 

criminal case and the disadvantages he complains of (e.g. the already served 30 days 

extra prison time) is sufficient to meet the prejudice requirement. (See Reply, Doc. 29 

at 12(a).) To the contrary, Strickland only finds prejudice where “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Even if it could be assumed that had trial counsel raised the issue that a prosecutor 

would have pursued a prosecution, or have even obtained a conviction, that doing so 

would have altered the outcome in the instant proceeding. There is simply no basis to 

find that the outcome of Petitioner’s direct appeal in the 2007 DUI, his conviction and 

sentence in the 2009 DUI, as well as the other charges and sentences encompassed in his 

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2012 sentence, would have been different had Brewer done so.

Accordingly, Ground 1B(5) has no merit, and is not a substantial claim of 

ineffective assistance within the meaning of Martinez.

Ground 1D(4) – Roser IAC#4 – In his Ground 1D(4) Petitioner argues that 

attorney Roser was ineffective for failing to compare the presentence report with the plea 

agreement in the 2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault and object to the use of the additional 

charges in Case CR2009-0017 in the 2007 DUI as a sentence enhancement. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that Roser was not deficient because the plea agreement 

explicitly provided for consideration of the 2007 DUI convictions in CR2009-0017. 

(Answer, Doc. 26 at 151-152.) 

Indeed, in regard to the conviction on the 2009 DUI, the Plea Agreement 

provided: “The historical prior felony conviction which the defendant admits in relation 

to this offense is Aggravated DUI, a class 4 felony, committed on or about 06-07-2007, 

and for which the defendant was sentenced in Navajo County Superior Court Case # CR 

20090017.” (Exhibit DDDD, Plea Agreement at 1.) 

With regard to the conviction on the 2011 Sexual Abuse charge, the Plea 

Agreement provided: “The historical prior felony convicitons [sic] which the defendant 

admits in relation to this offense are: (1) Aggravated DUI, a class 4 felony, committed on 

or about 06-07-2007, and for which the defendant was sentenced in Navajo County 

Superior Court Case # CR 20090017.” (Id.) 

Moreover, the Presentence Report made no explicit reference to any conviction in 

case CR2009-0017. (See generally Exhibit YYY, Presentence Report 12/7/11.) At 

most, the Report referenced that Petitioner guilty plea included “one historical prior” for 

the 2009 DUI and “two historical priors” for the 2011 Sexual Abuse. (Id. at 5.) 

Accordingly, Ground 1D(4) has no merit, and is not a substantial claim of 

ineffective assistance within the meaning of Martinez.

Ground 1D(5) – Roser IAC#5 – In Ground 1D(5) Petitioner argues that counsel 

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Roser was ineffective for failing to correct sentencing errors in the plea agreement in the 

2009 DUI/2011 sexual assault admitting the probation violations because the Plea 

Agreement did not include an admission of violating Petitioner’s probation in Case 

CR2009-0017, and yet Petitioner was sentenced for a violation of that probation. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents concede that the Plea Agreement did not explicitly reference

probation in CR2009-0017. But, Respondents argue that Petitioner fails to show 

ineffective assistance of Roser in this regard because it was a “clerical error” which was 

not prejudicial because: (1) the new convictions automatically constituted violations of 

the CR2009-0017 probation, and thus no admission was necessary;14 (2) Petitioner was 

aware that he would receive a 2.5 year sentence for violating his probation in the 2007 

DUI (albeit under the other related case numbers); and (3) the limited 5 year prison 

sentence under the plea agreement was far less than his exposure at trial. (Answer, Doc. 

26 at 152-153.)

It is true that the Plea Agreement did not explicitly reference a violation of 

probation in Case CR2009-0017. Instead, it provided that Petitioner was pleading to:

3) Violation of term one of his probation which required him to 

obey all laws in both CR20071075 and CR 20090700 which 

required him to obey all laws by committing the new felony offense 

in CR 201100340 as set out above.

(Exhibit DDDD, Plea Agreement at 2.) The Plea Agreement further provided that 

Petitioner would be “sentenced to presumptive prison sentences in the two cases for 

which he was on probation.” (Id.) 

At the change of plea, Petitioner’s plea was directed to CR2007-1075 and 

CR2009-0700:

THE COURT: You also are admitting to violating term one 

of your probation in CR2007-1075 and CR2009-700. Is that also 

your understanding?

 

14 Because Respondents’ first argument ignores the apparent purpose of the plea 

agreement to resolve all of Petitioner’s pending cases under the terms of the agreement, 

the undersigned does not rely upon it as a basis for disposing of Petitioner’s claim.

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: These are going to be nondangerous, 

repetitive offenses under the criminal code. Is that your 

understanding? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Paragraph 1 tells you that you will be 

sentenced to the presumptive prison sentence in the two cases for 

which you are on probation. Do you understand that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

(Exhibit CCCC, RT 9/1/11 at 7-8.) 

In contrast, the written Sentence reflected that Petitioner was being sentenced to 

2.5 years on the probation violation on each of the two felony charges in CR2009-0017. 

(Exhibit IIII, Sentence 4/5/12 at 4-5.) However, the trial court’s oral pronouncement 

reflected substantial confusion over the charges from the 2007 DUI:

THE COURT: For the class 5, CR2009-700, I'm giving him a 

slightly mitigated term of one year. That's mitigated because of his 

community activities, his substance abuse, his family support. For 

CR2007-1075, he's getting the presumptive term of two and a half 

years in the department of corrections. 

MR. ROSER: Excuse me, which one, Your Honor? 

THE COURT: 2007-1075. 

MR. ROSER: That's the one that they recommended six 

months on. 

THE COURT: Yes, he's going to get the two and a half on 

that, because that was on the aggravated DUI. The misdemeanor -- I 

looked at the sentencing document, all right. Let me get this again. 

On 07-1075, it was a misdemeanor so I'm going to give him credit 

for time served on that one. For CR2009-700, the class 5, I'm still 

giving him the one year I mean, let's see, did I say one year? Sorry, 

make that .75 years, mitigated sentence.

* * * 

MR. APIRION: But the 2.5 for the first aggravated DUI

would run concurrent? 

THE COURT: We didn't have a 2.5. 

MR. APIRION: The aggravated DUI he was on probation 

for. 

THE COURT: 09-117 [sic], that's not in the presentence 

report, page six does not have that. Was that in the plea agreement? 

Because they didn't talk about it. 

MR. APIRION: It was addressed on the second page, 

violation of his probation. 

THE COURT: Yeah, he'll get the presumptive two and a 

half years on that one, running concurrent as well. So he'll end up 

getting five, that was before he absconded, and now he's getting .75 

years exact because of the absconding. Credit on 2009-360 of 121 

days. CRll-340 he gets credit for 0 days. On CR2009-700 he gets 

credit for 102 days, and they didn't figure the credit on the CR2000 

-- which is the one that you were just talking about, Mr. Apirion. 

He has more than four cases? 

MR. APIRION: Only because of that misdemeanor. 

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MR. ROSER: So you are saying five cases? 

MR. APIRION: Yes, but I haven't tracked the fifth case. 

THE COURT: The misdemeanor is on page six, which is the 

other one. 2009-17, so it's 2009-17. Do we know how much credit 

he has on that one?

MR. ROSER: 2009-

THE COURT: 17. 

MR. ROSER: I don't see that in the plea agreement. 

THE COURT: I don't either. Well, I guess in the plea 

agreement there are only four cases listed. 

MR. APIRION: And the plea agreement, you know, 

substantively addresses the four felonies, if there's a confusion with 

a CR number -- 

THE COURT: Does CR2007-1075 have a felony in it? 

THE CLERK: No, the sentencing covers that case and 09-17 

-- 09-17 was a jury trial.

THE COURT: 09-17 was the one that was a jury trial and is 

that the one you are talking about, Mr. Apirion? 

MR. APIRION: Yes, the aggravated DUI earlier. 

THE COURT: So for that one he gets the presumptive of two 

and a half but the credit, do you know? 

MR. APIRION: He did do the four months in prison on that, 

plus whatever holding time. 

THE DEFENDANT: I did five months because of a clerical 

error. 

THE COURT: Okay. So five months credit on that one plus 

the hundred days. 

MR. ROSER: Right. 

(Exhibit HHHH RT 4/5/12 at 17-21.) 

In sum, it is clear that the parties utilized interchangeably the case numbers from 

the consolidated cases (CR2007-1075 and CR2009-0017) on the 2007 DUI. It is also 

clear that Petitioner was admitting a violation of probation in the 2007 DUI, and 

agreeing to be sentenced to a presumptive prison term for that violation. 

Petitioner was aware that a year before the misdemeanor conviction in CR2007-

1075 had been vacated by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (See Mem. Dec. 3/24/11 at 17.) 

That left only the two felony charges in CR2009-0017. Moreover, a prison term was not 

possible for the violation of probation on the vacated misdemeanor charge. It is also 

clear that Petitioner ultimately received what he bargained for: a presumptive prison term 

on the aggravated DUI probation violation. 

Had counsel Roser objected, the trial court could have disposed of the objection 

on the basis that the cases had been consolidated under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3, and thus 

reference to one was the equivalent of reference to the other. (See Exhibit F, M.E. 4/6/09 

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(“The Court granted the State's motion to consolidate under Rule 13.3(a) as the crimes 

arose out of the same conduct on June 7, 2007.”) Cf. 17C Ariz. Rev. Stat., Super. Ct. 

Local Prac.Rules, Maricopa Co., Rule 2.1 (“Unless the court shall otherwise order, when 

two (2) or more cases are consolidated, the Clerk of the Superior Court shall regard the 

number of the case filed first as the controlling number of the consolidated cases and all 

further pleadings and papers shall be filed and docketed under that number only.”) 

Even if the trial court had found merit to the objection, the most likely result 

would have been the trial court’s rejection of the plea. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.4(d) 

(permitting rejection of plea agreement “after accepting the agreement and reviewing a 

presentence report”); State v. Chavez, 130 Ariz. 438, 439, 636 P.3d 1220, 1221 (1981) 

(mutual mistake of essential fact underlying plea agreement justifies rescission). 

Under those circumstances, and particularly because the net prison term was the 

same as what Petitioner had agree to, counsel could have made the reasonable tactical 

determination that objecting would not have been to Petitioner’s benefit. The most likely 

result would have simply been the correction of the case number errors, and the same 

sentence subsequently being imposed. Alternatively, the state could have responded by 

seeking to rescind the agreement altogether and insisted on going to trial. In that 

instance, Petitioner would have potentially been subject to substantially harsher 

sentences on the original charges, including the loss of the agreement to concurrent 

sentencing.

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Ground 1D(5) has no 

merit, and is not a substantial claim of ineffective assistance within the meaning of 

Martinez.

Ground 1D(6) – Roser IAC#6 – In Ground 1D(6), Petitioner argues that Roser 

was ineffective for failing to ensure the sentencing minute entry in the 2009 DUI/2011 

sexual assault reflected the vacation of his misdemeanor conviction in the 2007 DUI 

(Roser IAC#6). (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to show deficient performance 

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because the sentencing minute entry does not reference the 2007 misdemeanor DUI. 

They argue that Petitioner has failed to show prejudice because: (1) the conviction was 

vacated and thus a nullity; (2) it did not affect Petitioner’s 2012 sentence; and (3) 

Petitioner is no longer detained on the 2007 misdemeanor DUI. (Answer, Doc. 26 at 

154.) 

Petitioner does not address this claim in his Reply.

Petitioner fails to show deficient performance because he proffers no reason why 

counsel should have taken the extraordinary step of including a reference to a vacated 

conviction which was not being relied upon in the relevant sentence. The misdemeanor 

conviction occurred in case CR2007-1075. (See Exhibit M, Sentence 8/27/09.) The only 

cases referenced in the sentence issued on April 5, 2012 were CR2009-0017, CR2009-

0700, CR2009-0960, and CR2011-0340. (Exhibit IIII, Sentence 4/5/12.) 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to show any resulting prejudice. The misdemeanor had 

been indisputably vacated, and was not part of the calculation of the 2012 sentence. It is 

true that the conviction was listed in the Presentence Report as a basis for an existing 

probation term. (See Exhibit YYY at 1.) However, that report omitted reference to the 

convictions in the 2007 DUI which were the true source of the probation. (Id. at 5.) 

Further, as discussed hereinabove in connection with Ground 1D(5) regarding the 

references in the plea agreement (and at sentencing) to the misdemeanor case number, 

the record was ultimately clear that Petitioner had been convicting and placed on 

probation on felony offenses in the 2007 DUI case(s), resulting in him being placed on 

probation, which was violated by his new convictions. Making reference to the vacating 

of the misdemeanor would not have altered his 2012 sentence. Accordingly, the 

undersigned finds no prejudice.

Accordingly, Ground 1D(5) has no merit, and is not a substantial claim of 

ineffective assistance within the meaning of Martinez.

Conclusion regarding Martinez – Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds 

that Petitioner fails to show a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

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procedurally defaulted by PCR counsel’s failure to raise them, and thus fails to show a 

basis to excuse his procedural defaults as a result of PCR counsel’s failure to raise such 

claims.

7. Actual Innocence

The Schlup Gateway - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of 

discretion intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

It is unclear whether the actual innocence gateway applies to defendants who 

were not convicted on trial, but pled not guilty or no contest. See Smith v. Baldwin, 510

F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). But see Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998)

(remanding for development of actual innocence to excuse procedural default of

pleading federal defendant). The undersigned presumes, for purposes of this Report and 

Recommendation, that the gateway does apply.

Here, Petitioner asserts that DNA testing would reveal his innocence of the sexual 

abuse charge, and complains that such testing has not been allowed. 

More Serious Charges - What is clear is that “[i]n cases where the Government 

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has forgone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing 

of actual innocence must also extend to those charges." Bousley, 23 U.S. at 624.

Here, Petitioner asserts that DNA testing would reveal his innocence of the sexual 

abuse charge, a class 5 felony. (See Exhibit DDDD, Plea Agreement at 1.) However, 

Petitioner was originally charged in Case CR2011-0340 with the more serious charge of 

sexual assault, a class 2 felony. (Exhibit VVV Indictment.) Accordingly, Petitioner 

must also show his actual innocence of the sexual assault charge.

Moreover, as part of the same plea agreement, the state also forwent charges in 

Case CR2009-0960, wherein Petitioner was charged with both aggravated DUI, a class 4 

felony and aggravated driving with a BAC of .08% or more, a class 4 felony. (Exhibit 

BB, Indictment.) Instead, Petitioner was permitted to plead guilty to only the aggravated 

DUI charge. (Exhibit DDDD, Plea Agreement.) Accordingly, to be entitled to any relief 

for his actual innocence, Petitioner must also show his actual innocence of the dismissed 

charge in CR2009-0960. 

Petitioner proffers no new reliable evidence of his actual innocence of the charge 

of aggravated driving with a BAC of 0.08% or more. At most, Petitioner argues that 

the timing of the blood test was misrepresented. While that might produce some 

question whether reliable evidence of his guilt on that charge would have been available 

at trial, it does not of itself constitute affirmative evidence of his innocence. For 

example, Petitioner proffers nothing to show that the actual time of collection mandates a 

determination that his BAC was less than 0.8% at the relevant times. See United States 

v. DuBois, 645 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing retrograde analysis of blood 

alcohol level, and collecting cases). See also 28 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1381(A)(2) (“.08 

or more within two hours of driving”). 

Accordingly, even if Petitioner could show his actual innocence of the sexual 

assault charge, he is not entitled to pass through the Schlup gateway. 

Pertinent Claims – Even if Petitioner could pass through the Schlup gateway on 

just his claims of actual innocence of the sexual assault charge, the resulting relief would 

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be limited to his claims related to the sexual abuse charge. Although deciding the issue 

as “a question of first impression,” the Ninth Circuit has concluded “both as a matter of 

law and of common sense, that a demonstration of actual innocence under Schlup cannot 

excuse a petitioner's procedural default for more than the counts as to which he has 

shown actual innocence.” Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014). See 

Alvarez v. Gipson, 2014 WL 1017607, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) (applying 

Vosgien to actual innocence gateway to statute of limitations). 

Here, the claims asserted in Ground 1A (ineffective assistance of Roberts), 

Ground 1B (ineffective assistance of Brewer), Grounds 1C(8) through 1C(21) 

(ineffective assistance of Wood regarding 2009 DUI), Grounds 1D(1), (4) through (7), 

and (9) (ineffective assistance of Rosser regarding 2007 DUI and 2009 DUI), Grounds 

2A through 2E (double jeopardy violations regarding 2007 DUI and 2009 DUI), are 

unrelated to Petitioner’s sexual abuse conviction and the sexual assault charge, and thus 

a showing of actual innocence on those charges would not avoid Petitioner’s procedural 

default on those charges.

New Reliable Evidence - A claim of actual innocence is not supported by 

speculation about what unpresented evidence might show. See Botts v. Biter, 2014 WL 

5661554, at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2014) report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 

5602751 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014) (“petitioner's mere speculation that the DNA test 

results would enable him to meet his burden under Schlup falls far short of meeting the 

Schlup standard”). Here, Petitioner proffers nothing more than speculation that: (1)

testable samples were recovered; (2) remain available for testing; and (3) that testing 

would exonerate Petitioner. Speculation is not evidence.

Rule 6(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, does permit a party to conduct 

discovery “for good cause.” That requires that the petitioner must demonstrate that 

“specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if 

the facts are fully developed” be able to support his claim. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 

286, 300 (1969). However, Petitioner fails to offer such specific allegations. 

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In applying the Innocence Protection Act to a request for DNA testing, the Ninth 

Circuit has observed:

Neither innocence nor guilt can be proved with scientific certainty, 

regardless of whether the proof is scientific, and the significance of 

evidence necessarily varies from case to case. Where the presence 

or absence of the movant's DNA would not show actual innocence, 

there is no reason to test for it.

United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015). “DNA testing alone does 

not always resolve a case. Where there is enough other incriminating evidence and an 

explanation for the DNA result, science alone cannot prove a prisoner innocent.” Dist. 

Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009). See id. at 

81 et seq. (Alito, J. dissenting) (discussing potential for contaminated and mixed 

samples).

This case is not an ordinary case of mistaken identification of a stranger as a 

rapist. The victim told police officers that she knew Petitioner from his bar. (Exhibit 

YYY, Presentence Report at 1.) Immediately after she ran from the back lounge into the 

bar, she identified Petitioner to employees/patrons as her assailant. (Id. at 2.) The 

responding officers then found Petitioner in the back lounge, appearing “very 

intoxicated.” (Id.) (See also Exhibit VVVV, Reply on Mot. for DNA, attachment “CR”, 

Police Reports.) 

If no testable DNA were recovered, nor even if DNA of a third party were found, 

would that necessary exculpate Petitioner. Samples were taken from both Petitioner and 

the victim. However, the victim described touching by her assailant, with fingers, a 

penis, and his mouth – but there is nothing to suggest that ejaculate or another clearly 

identifiable and inculpatory source of DNA was left. (See Exhibit VVVV, attachments 

(police reports).) See Elizabeth A. Laughton, Mckithen v. Brown: Due Process and 

Post-Conviction DNA Testing, Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 7, 24 (2008) (“One does not 

necessarily leave enough DNA for testing wherever one touches.”). See also U.S. v. 

Pitera, 675 F.3d 122 (2nd Cir. 2012) (third party’s DNA on murder weapon would not 

establish actual innocence); U.S. v. Jordan, 594 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2010) (admission 

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that defendant handled murder weapon meant DNA evidence would not establish 

innocence); 

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to make a showing that no reasonable juror would 

have found him guilty of the sexual assault, and fails to proffer anything to support a

request for discovery to support his assertions of actual innocence. 

Accordingly his procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred claims must be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents argue that various claims were either waived as a result of 

Petitioner’s guilty plea, or are non-cognizable state law claims. Because the undersigned 

finds all of Petitioner claims plainly procedurally defaulted, these other defenses are not 

reached.

C. MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING

On September 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Disclosure of Evidence (Doc. 

30) and a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 31). Respondents have not responded to 

either motion.

Motion for Discovery - In his Motion for Disclosure of Evidence (Doc. 30), 

Petitioner requests discovery of four categories of information: (1) transcripts of 

interviews of counsel Wood and Brewer; (2) DNA testing; (3) the booking video; and (4) 

a deposition of counsel Roberts regarding violation of the right to counsel. 

“A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to 

discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Rule 

6(a), provides: “A party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of discovery available under 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his 

discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise.” Availability of 

any discovery during habeas proceedings is committed to sound discretion of the district 

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court. Campbell v. Blodgett, 982 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1993). “‘[W]here specific 

allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully 

developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to 

provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry.’” Bracy, 520 U.S. at 

908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). However, habeas petitioners 

may not “use federal discovery for fishing expeditions to investigate mere speculation.” 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir.1996) (citation omitted).

Here, because the undersigned has concluded that all of Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally defaulted, discovery is only appropriate as necessary to establish cause and 

prejudice or Petitioner’s actual innocence. And Petitioner fails to show how (1) the 

Wood and Brewer interviews or (4) the Roberts deposition would show cause and 

prejudice or Petitioner’s actual innocence. This evidence relates, instead, to the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims. Thus, at least given the procedural posture of this case, this 

discovery could not entitle Petitioner to relief.

With regard to the DNA testing, as discussed hereinabove, Petitioner does argue 

that the DNA testing would establish his actual innocence, but fails to proffer specific 

allegations to raise this assertion beyond mere speculation, and thus fails to establish 

good cause to proceed with such discovery under Rule 6, Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases.

Petitioner also fails to show how the booking video would establish his actual 

innocence. At most, Petitioner suggests that it would reflect a falsification of the timing 

of the blood draw. But, as discussed hereinabove, Petitioner fails to show that such 

falsification would establish his actual innocence. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show 

good cause to conduct such discovery.

Therefore, this motion will be denied.

Motion for Evidentiary Hearing – In his Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 

31), Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing to support the merits of his claims. 

Petitioner fails to support his motion with any reference to specific evidence to be 

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submitted at such a hearing. “We begin with the rule that no such hearing is required 

‘[i]f the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas 

relief.’” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, a bald 

request for an evidentiary hearing need not be granted. “In deciding whether to grant an 

evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable 

an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the 

applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). 

Where a petitioner does not proffer any evidence to be adduced at an evidentiary hearing 

which would prove the allegations of the petition, the habeas court need not grant a 

hearing. Chandler v. McDonough, 471 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The failure 

to proffer any additional evidence defeats [petitioner's] argument that he was entitled to 

an additional evidentiary hearing in federal court.”); Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 

977 (6th Cir.2004) (“district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams's 

request, given his failure to specify ... what could be discovered through an evidentiary 

hearing”); Lincecum v. Collins, 958 F.2d 1271, 1279–80 (5th Cir.1992) (denying 

evidentiary hearing “[a]bsent any concrete indication of the substance of the mitigating 

evidence” the hearing supposedly would provide).

Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner simply would intend to present the 

evidence referenced in his Motion to Disclose Evidence (Doc. 30), such evidence would 

not be sufficient to overcome Petitioner’s procedural defaults.

Finally, any evidentiary hearing on the merits of Petitioner’s claims would only 

be relevant to the extent that such merits would show cause to excuse Petitioner’s 

procedural defaults. Petitioner does not show how such is the case.

Accordingly, this motion will be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

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when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

/ /

/ /

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V. ORDERS

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Disclosure of 

Evidence, filed September 9, 2015 (Doc. 30) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, 

filed September 9, 2015 (Doc. 31) is DENIED. 

VI. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed February 19, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VII. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: January 12, 2016

15-8020r RR 15 11 24 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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