Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02177/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02177-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983vp Violation of Due Process and Equal Protection

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RUTH HENRICKS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES 

COMMISSION, a California state agency; and MICHAEL PICKER, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv2177-MMA (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 

OF JURISDICTION; AND 

[Doc. No. 5] 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SANCTIONS 

[Doc. No. 6]

 Plaintiff Ruth Henricks (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants 

California Public Utilities Commission and Michael Picker (collectively, “Defendants”) 

alleging claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of Plaintiff’s equal 

protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. See Doc. No. 1 (hereinafter “Complaint”). Defendants now move to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1). See Doc. No. 5. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, 

to which Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 7, 9. Defendants also filed a motion for 

sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Doc. No. 6. Plaintiff filed 

an opposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions, to which Defendants replied. See 

Doc. Nos. 10, 14. The Court found both matters suitable for determination on the papers 

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and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. Nos. 13, 15. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and 

DENIES Defendants’ motion for sanctions. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff is an individual residing in the County of San Diego. Complaint ¶ 13. 

Plaintiff is a San Diego Gas & Electric (“SDG&E”) customer and ratepayer. Id. 

Defendant California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission” or “CPUC”) is an 

agency of the State of California. Id. ¶ 14. The Commission has authority over public 

utility practices, facilities, and retail rates under the California Constitution and 

California’s Public Utilities Code. See Cal. Const., art. XII; Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 451, 

701. SDG&E is a public utility subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. See Cal. Pub. 

Util. Code § 216(a) (defining public utility). Defendant Michael Picker (“Picker”) is the 

President of the Commission. Complaint ¶ 18. 

 Beginning on October 21, 2007, SDG&E equipment ignited the destructive Witch, 

Guejito, and Rice fires in San Diego County. Id. ¶ 28. In September 2015, SDG&E 

“initiated a reasonableness review of its uninsured 2007 fire losses in proceeding A.15-

09-010.”1

 Id. ¶ 5. In this proceeding, the Commission is tasked with “determin[ing] 

whether SDG&E imprudently operated its electricity equipment when that equipment 

started the San Diego fires of 2007. SDG&E claimed it acted prudently and therefore 

was entitled to recover, from its ratepayers and fire victim[s], losses of $379,000,000 

claimed to have been incurred beyond that covered by SDG&E’s insurance.” Id. ¶ 3. 

Plaintiff filed a motion for party status in October 2015, which the Commission granted 

in February 2016. Id. ¶ 5. 

 In April 2016, the assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) “issued a Scoping 

                                               

1

 SDG&E initiated a similar proceeding several years prior seeking recovery related to the 2007 

fires. See id. ¶ 4. The Commission “denied SDG&E any recovery in the first proceeding (A.09-080-20) 

on 28 December 2012.” Id. Moreover, the Commission ruled that “any future SDG&E fire cost 

recovery proceedings would be subject to a ‘reasonableness review.’” Id. 

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Ruling that implemented a two-phase approach” for proceeding A.15-09-010. Id. ¶ 6. In 

the first phase, the ALJ tasked the parties with addressing “[w]hether SDG&E’s 

operation, engineering and management of the facilities alleged to have been involved in 

the ignition of the fires was reasonable.” Id. Proceeding A.15-09-010 was reassigned to 

ALJ Pat Tsen and ALJ Pro Tem Sasha Goldberg in October 2016. Id. ¶ 8. In January 

2017, evidentiary hearings related to this proceeding were held in San Francisco. Id. 

“The record for Phase 1 of this proceeding was submitted for . . . consideration on 6 July 

2017.” Id. 

 On August 22, 2017, ALJs Tsen and Goldberg issued a decision finding that 

SDG&E did not reasonably manage and operate its facilities prior to the 2007 San Diego 

fires, thereby denying SDG&E’s request to recover costs. See id. ¶ 9. The Commission 

was “scheduled to approve the ALJs’ proposed decision denying SDG&E any further 

2007 fire cost recovery” on September 28, 2017, at the Commission’s meeting in Chula 

Vista. Id. ¶ 10. The Commission, however, did not issue its decision at the September 

28, 2017 meeting. Rather, the Commission allegedly deliberately delayed voting on the 

decision “so as to provide an opportunity for SDG&E and its utilities monopoly kin . . . to 

meet privately with the Commissioners and lobby against the ALJs’ proposed 

decision[.]” Id. ¶ 11. 

 Plaintiff alleges that the Commission “engaged in a series of actions in violation of 

the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, all of which were aimed at denying SDG&E utility customers the benefit of 

the 22 August 2017 decision.” Id. ¶ 36. Specifically, on September 5 and 6, 2017, 

SDG&E representatives “had five individual Ex Parte communications in meetings with 

CPUC Commissioner advisers.” Id. ¶ 37. In these meetings, SDG&E representatives 

requested that the proposed decision by the ALJs “not be adopted by the Commission 

because it commits legal error by failing to address the critical legal issue of the 

relationship between inverse condemnation and cost recovery, does not correctly apply 

the reasonableness standard, and contains factual errors in its review of and conclusions 

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regarding the record evidence[.]” Id. ¶ 39. Thus, the SDG&E representatives requested 

that the Commission “permit SDG&E to spread the San Diego 2007 fire losses through 

rates.” Id. ¶ 41. 

 Additionally, on September 11, 2017, Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) and 

Southern California Edison (“SCE”) “filed for party status” in the A.15-09-010 

proceeding and sought leave to submit comments. Id. ¶ 45. On September 26, 2017, the 

Commission, under Picker’s discretion, granted party status to PG&E and SCE “for the 

limited purpose of filing comments on the legal issue of inverse condemnation from the 

existing record.” Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff claims that the issue of inverse condemnation is 

outside the scope of the evidentiary hearing; thus, Plaintiff “objected in writing to 

SDG&E’s insertion of the inverse condemnation in the proceedings post trial.” Id. ¶¶ 49, 

51. The Commission granted PG&E and SCE permission to file comments on the 

inverse condemnation issue by October 4, 2017. See id. ¶ 54. On October 4, 2017, 

PG&E “filed for itself and for SCE a pleading in A.15-09-010 that improperly inserted 

the inverse condemnation issue into the case.” Id. ¶ 55. 

 As a result, Plaintiff commenced the instant action on October 24, 2017, alleging 

that in violation of her rights, the Commission has “decided to relieve SDG&E from the 

proposed decision that makes SDG&E, and not the ratepayers, bear the costs of the fires 

for which they were found to have acted unreasonably and imprudently.” Id. ¶ 59. In her 

prayer for relief, Plaintiff requests the Court issue an order declaring that Defendants 

“violated fundamental principles of the Due Process and Equal Protection2

 Clauses of the 

United States Constitution” and declaring that Defendants “violated the statutory, 

contractual, and Constitutional rights of Plaintiff.” Complaint at 21. Moreover, Plaintiff 

requests the Court enjoin Defendants from seeking to enforce “a decision to charge 

                                               

2

 Notably, Plaintiff does not elaborate in her Complaint or opposition to Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the basis for the alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 

Constitution. 

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ratepayers with any part of the $379 million for the SDG&E 2007 fires[.]” Id. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are now moot in light of the Commission’s 

November 30, 2017 decision denying SDG&E rate recovery for the costs of the 2007 

Witch, Guejito, and Rice fires. See Doc. No. 5-1. Defendants have also filed a motion 

for sanctions against Plaintiff’s attorneys, arguing that “[n]o reasonable attorney would 

continue to prosecute a lawsuit that was so obviously non-justiciable.” Doc. No. 6-1. 

The Court addresses Defendants’ motions in turn. 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard 

1. Judicial Notice 

 Generally, a court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and supplies the 

court with the requisite information. Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). “A judicially noticed fact 

must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known 

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67, 70 

(9th Cir. 1956)). While a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, it 

may not take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). 

2. Rule 12(b)(1) 

 “Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and 

‘controversies.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016). 

“Thus, ‘[t]o qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must 

be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” 

Hamamoto v. Ige, 881 F.3d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election 

Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 732-33 (2008)). 

 “Lack of standing is a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction and may be properly 

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challenged under [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1).” Wright v. Incline Village 

Gen. Imp. Dist., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1199 (D. Nev. 2009) (citing Bender v. 

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a 

party may seek dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “either on the 

face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family 

Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 

1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the party asserts a facial challenge, the court limits its 

inquiry to the allegations set forth in the complaint. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack . . . the 

plaintiff is entitled to safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

is made.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 905 F. 

Supp. 2d 1158, 1167 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (internal citation and quotation omitted). “Lack of 

standing is a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction and may be properly challenged under 

Rule 12(b)(1).” Wright v. Incline Village Gen. Imp. Dist., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1199 

(D. Nev. 2009) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 

(1986)). 

B. Analysis 

1. Requests for Judicial Notice 

 As an initial matter, Defendants and Plaintiff have filed separate requests for 

judicial notice. See Doc. Nos. 5-2, 7-4. Specifically, Defendants request the Court take 

judicial notice of the Commission’s November 30, 2017 order denying SDG&E rate 

recovery for the costs of the 2007 Witch, Guejito, and Rice fires (Exhibit A). See Doc. 

No. 5-2 (hereinafter “DRJN”). Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants’ request 

for judicial notice. In fact, Plaintiff also requests that the Court take judicial notice of 

excerpts from the Commission’s order. See Doc. No. 7-4 at 3. Because the 

Commission’s decision is a publicly available document, and not subject to reasonable 

dispute, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Exhibit A. See 

W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 530 F.3d 1186, 1192 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We take 

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judicial notice of the [C]PUC’s order because its existence is ‘capable of accurate and 

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.’” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas & 

Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 435 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

 Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of fourteen (14) documents 

(Exhibits 1-14) in support of her opposition to the motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 7-4. 

Specifically, Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of excerpts of the 

Commission’s order, various emails, CPUC documents, state court records, an order from 

the 9th Circuit relating to the San Onofre nuclear plant proceedings, pleadings, 

newspaper articles, and SCE and PG&E’s application for rehearing in Proceeding A.15-

09-010. Aside from the Commission’s November 2017 order which the Court has 

already taken judicial notice of, the Court does not rely on these exhibits in reaching its 

conclusion below. As such, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s request for 

judicial notice. 

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 

as moot. See Doc. No. 5-1. Specifically, Defendants indicate that “[o]n November 30, 

2017, by a 5-0 vote, the Commission confirmed the draft decision and denied SDG&E’s 

application.” Id. at 4; see also DRJN. The Commission found that SDG&E “did not 

reasonably manage and operate its facilities prior to the 2007 Southern California 

Wildfires” and that rate recovery was therefore inappropriate. DRJN at 2. The 

Commission further noted that “[t]his proceeding is closed.” Id. Thus, Defendant 

contends that “[b]ecause the Commission has already concluded its administrative 

proceeding in a manner entirely favorable to [Plaintiff], [her] claims [for injunctive and 

declaratory relief] are moot.” Doc. No. 5-1 at 4. 

 Plaintiff alleges that the Commission has permitted SCE and PG&E to file a joint 

application for rehearing on January 2, 2018. See Doc. No. 7 at 5. As such, Plaintiff 

maintains that her claims are not moot as the Commission “must now determine whether 

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to grant or deny the rehearing and in so doing, provide the legal and factual grounds for 

its decision.” Id.; see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 16.1. 

a. Plaintiff’s Claim for Injunctive Relief is Moot 

 Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive is moot because the 

Commission has already denied rate recovery. As such, Plaintiff “has received all of the 

relief she could get through her proposed injunction[.]” Doc. No. 5-1 at 5. In opposition, 

Plaintiff asserts “[t]he case is not over; it has entered the ‘rehearing’ stage.” Doc. No. 7 

at 1. 

 “Mootness can be characterized as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The 

requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation 

(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes 

v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[F]ederal courts have no jurisdiction to hear a case that is moot, that is, where no actual 

or live controversy exists.” Id. “If there is no longer a possibility that an appellant can 

obtain relief for his claim, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.” Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A., 167 F.3d 514, 521 (9th Cir. 1999). When the 

issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a cognizable interest in the 

outcome, the action fails to contain a “case or controversy” under Article III of the United 

States Constitution. See In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation 

omitted); U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2. “The mootness doctrine ‘requires that an actual, 

ongoing controversy exist at all stages of federal court proceedings.’” Leigh v. Salazar, 

677 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2012). “As long as the parties have a concrete interest, 

however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Chafin v. Chafin, 

568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Here, Plaintiff initially requested that the Court enjoin Defendants from seeking to 

enforce “a decision to charge ratepayers with any part of the $379 million for the 

SDG&E 2007 fires, or to act as described in Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.” 

Complaint at 21. Defendants claim Plaintiff’s claim is moot because on November 30, 

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2017, the Commission “denie[d] [SDG&E’s] request to recover costs recorded in its 

Wildfire Expense Memorandum Account.” DRJN at 2. Plaintiff concedes as much in 

requesting that the Court “look beyond the mere fact of the CPUC’s issuance of a final 

decision.” Doc. No. 7 at 6 (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff has already obtained the 

original relief requested. 

 Plaintiff now requests that the Court enjoin the Commission “from adopting a 

decision other than the one [already] reached by the CPUC . . . .” Id. at 2. Specifically, 

in her opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff expands her request for relief, suggesting 

that the Court “could . . . provide declaratory and injunctive relief preventing injury to 

plaintiffs’ due process rights on a going forward basis by requiring” the Commission to: 

(1) remove SCE and PG&E as parties to the proceeding, (2) no longer consider any 

arguments raised by these parties, including inverse condemnation, and (3) deny SCE and 

PG&E’s request for rehearing. Id. at 5. Plaintiff, however, fails to show she is under the 

threat of suffering a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is not speculative or 

hypothetical for several reasons. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 

(2009). 

 First, in its decision denying SDG&E’s application for relief, the Commission 

expressly stated, “[t]his proceeding is closed.” DRJN at 2. CPUC decisions are final 

when they are issued. See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1735 (indicating that an application for

rehearing does “not excuse any corporation or person from complying with and obeying 

any order or decision” of the commission). Second, the Commission explained that 

“Inverse Condemnation was not a material issue in Phase 1 and did not merit a dedicated 

discussion. Notably, even SDG&E withdrew its testimony concerning Inverse 

Condemnation for purposes of Phase 1.” DRJN at 65 (emphasis added). Third, whether 

the Commission at some point in the future grants the request for a rehearing, and then

reverses its November 2017 decision is entirely speculative. Pursuant to Section 

1731(b)(1) of the California Public Utility Code, “[a]fter an order or decision has been 

made by the commission, a party . . . may apply for a rehearing in respect to matters 

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determined in the action or proceeding and specified in the application for rehearing.” 

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1731(b)(1). “The commission may grant and hold a rehearing on 

those matters, if in its judgment sufficient reason is made to appear.” Cal. Pub. Util. 

Code § 1731(b)(1) (emphasis added). As such, Plaintiff fails to point to any “actual and 

imminent” threat that is not “conjectural or hypothetical.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 493. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in 

itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied 

by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 

(1974). 

 Accordingly, in light of the Commission’s 5-0 decision denying SDG&E’s 

application, and Plaintiff’s failure to point to continuing, present adverse effects, 

Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is moot. See Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 

1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[w]hen a plaintiff has received ‘all the relief [he] 

could win on the merits,’ an adjudication would have ‘no consequences on remaining 

related disputes between the parties’ and ‘nothing further would be ordered by the court, 

there is no point in proceeding to decide the merits.’”) (quoting 13B Charles Alan Wright 

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.2 (3d ed. 2015)). 

b. Plaintiff’s Claim for Declaratory Relief is Moot 

 Defendants further claim that Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief is moot 

because “[e]ven assuming the Commission violated Henricks’ procedural rights, there are 

no future adverse effects flowing from that violation that this Court could remedy.” Doc. 

No. 5-1 at 7. Plaintiff, in opposition, contends “the original requested relief of injunctive 

and declaratory relief to prevent any of the $379 million at stake in the administrative 

proceeding at issue being assessed against ratepayers remains available.” Doc. No. 7 at 

8. 

 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that “where, as here, both injunctive and 

declaratory relief are sought but the request for injunctive relief is rendered moot, the 

case is not moot if declaratory relief would nevertheless provide meaningful relief.” Ctr. 

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For Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2007). The test for 

mootness when a plaintiff seeks declaratory relief is “whether the facts alleged, under all 

the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 

adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 

declaratory judgment.” Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). 

“Stated another way, the ‘central question’ before [the court] is ‘whether changes in the 

circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled any occasion 

for meaningful relief.’” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting West v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 925 n. 

4 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

 Here, Plaintiff requests that the Court declare that: (1) Defendants violated 

fundamental principles of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United 

States Constitution; and (2) Defendants violated the statutory, contractual, and 

Constitutional rights of Plaintiff. See Complaint at 21. Plaintiff summarily concludes 

that “[b]ecause of the availability of relief as to future conduct in the administrative 

proceeding at issue, the case is not moot.” Doc. No. 7 at 6 (emphasis added). The Court 

is not persuaded. 

As Defendants note, even assuming Defendants violated Plaintiff’s procedural due 

process rights, there are no concrete future adverse effects flowing from such a violation 

that the Court could remedy. The Commission issued its decision, and the proceeding is 

closed. See DRJN at 2. Whether the Commission will grant SCE and PG&E’s joint 

application for rehearing is unclear. Even assuming that the Commission grants the 

application for a rehearing, Plaintiff does not contest that she has the right to participate 

in the rehearing through written briefing and oral argument. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 20, 

§§ 16.1(d), 16.3(b), 16.4(f). Plaintiff’s argument that the alleged due process violations 

will taint the administrative proceeding going forward is “speculative at best;” thus, the 

Court “lack[s] the power to grant any effective relief.” Feldman v. Bomar, 518 F.3d 637, 

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643 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 511 F.3d at 964 (“That the 

DPS Policy might adversely affect the Southern Resident’s endangered species status or 

the Service’s listing determination of certain other killer whale populations at some 

indeterminate time in the future is too remote and too speculative a consideration to save 

this case from mootness.”) (emphasis in original). 

 Accordingly, because there is no present controversy as to which effective relief 

can be granted, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is moot. See 

Feldman, 518 F.3d at 643 (indicating that a claim for declaratory relief is moot when the 

alleged future harm is “so remote and speculative that there is no tangible prejudice to the 

existing interests of the parties”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) 

(emphasis in original). 

3. Conclusion 

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 

are moot. The Commission issued its final decision on November 30, 2017, and the case 

is closed. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the application for rehearing are speculative 

and hypothetical.3

 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

                                               

3

 Plaintiff argues for the first time in her opposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions that 

two exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that her “Complaint validly 

alleges the existence of collateral injuries and voluntary cessation, both established exceptions to the 

doctrine of mootness.” Doc. No. 10 at 1. Despite the fact that Plaintiff could have raised these 

arguments in her opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff failed to do so. Even if the 

Court were to consider such arguments, neither exception is applicable here. The collateral injury 

exception to the mootness doctrine applies when a plaintiff continues to suffer collateral legal 

consequences after the plaintiff’s primary injury has been resolved. See In re Burrell, 415 F.3d at 998. 

Because Plaintiff’s argument regarding the rehearing and other future proceedings is speculative, this 

exception does not apply. See id. (noting that a plaintiff “may not invoke” this exception “when such 

harm is merely hypothetical and speculative.”). Moreover, the voluntary cessation exception to the 

mootness doctrine applies if a defendant voluntarily halts an offending practice, but is free to resume it 

at any time. See U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). Here, it is not Defendants’ 

voluntary conduct that moots Plaintiff’s claims, nor do Defendants contend that they engaged in any 

voluntary conduct that moots such claims. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) 

(“[O]ur cases have explained that a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears 

the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not 

reasonably be expected to recur.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). Rather, the 

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Defendants request that the Court sanction Plaintiff’s attorneys, Mr. Michael 

Aguirre and Ms. Maria Severson, in the amount of $1,000 each. See Doc. No. 6-1. 

Defendants contend that “[n]o reasonable attorney would continue to prosecute a lawsuit 

that was so obviously non-justiciable.” Id. at 1. In opposition, Plaintiff’s counsel claims 

that the Complaint is neither frivolous nor filed for an improper purpose. See Doc. No. 

10. 

A. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states in pertinent part that when an attorney 

presents a signed paper to a court, that attorney is certifying to the best of his or her 

“knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 

circumstances” that: 

(1)it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, 

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 

(2)the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 

reversing law or for establishing new law; 

(3)the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 

identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 

opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 

(4)the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 

specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 

information. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(4). 

Sanctions under Rule 11 are warranted when a party files a lawsuit or motion that 

is frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation, or is otherwise brought for 

                                               

Commission issued a decision, as required by CPUC regulations, on the ALJ’s proposed decision in 

favor of Plaintiff. Therefore, both exceptions relied on by Plaintiff are inapplicable. 

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an improper purpose. Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 

Conn v. Borjorquez, 967 F.3d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992); Operating Eng’rs Trust v. A-C 

Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988)). A filing is “frivolous” when it is “both 

baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman 

Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1992). Either improper purpose or 

frivolousness is sufficient to sustain a sanction. Id.

 When one party seeks sanctions against another, the Court must first determine 

whether any provision of Rule 11(b) has been violated. Warren, 29 F.3d at 1389. A 

finding of subjective bad faith is not required under Rule 11. See Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 

1478, 1488 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 452 (9th 

Cir. 1987)) (“Counsel can no longer avoid the sting of Rule 11 sanctions by operating 

under the guise of a pure heart and empty head.”). “Instead, the question is whether, at 

the time the paper was presented to the Court (or later defended) it lacked evidentiary 

support or contained ‘frivolous’ legal arguments.” Odish v. CACH, LLC, No. 12-CV1710-AJB (DHB), 2012 WL 5382260, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012). Where such a 

violation is found, Rule 11 provides that “the court may impose an appropriate sanction 

on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the 

violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added). 

B. Analysis 

1. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice 

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of twenty-one (21) documents in 

support of her opposition to the instant motion (Exhibits 1-21). See Doc. No. 10-5. 

Specifically, Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of various transcripts, emails, 

newspaper articles, press releases, the proposed decision in CPUC proceeding 15-09-010, 

a Ninth Circuit opinion related to the San Onofre nuclear plant proceedings, and a denial 

of party status in the San Onofre proceedings. See id. The Court need not rely on these 

documents in reaching its conclusion below. Accordingly, the Court DENIES AS 

MOOT Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits 1-21. 

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Plaintiff further requests the Court take judicial notice of the Commission’s motion 

to dismiss in this case, Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s 

Complaint. See id. The Court need not take judicial notice of pleadings filed on the 

docket in this case. Cf. Asdar Grp. V. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 99 F.3d 289, 290 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1996) (noting that a court may take judicial notice of pleadings and court orders 

in related proceedings) (emphasis added). As such, the Court DENIES AS MOOT

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice as to the documents filed on the docket in this case. 

2. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions 

Defendants contend that sanctions under Rule 11 are warranted because: (1) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous; and (2) the Complaint was brought for an improper 

purpose. The Court addressed Defendants’ arguments in turn. 

Here, upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that sanctions are not 

warranted. First, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is not frivolous. At the time 

Plaintiff filed her Complaint, the Commission had not yet issued its decision. Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff’s counsel should have dismissed the Complaint once the Commission 

issued its decision. However, Plaintiff maintains that the Court can still provide 

injunctive and declaratory relief because exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. See 

Doc. No. 10 at 16-17. While the Court disagrees with Plaintiff and concludes that her 

claims are moot, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s claims are baseless. This is 

not a case in which Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Complaint that they should have known 

was frivolous “in the face of previous dismissals involving the exact same parties under 

the same legal theories.” Warren, 29 F.3d at 1390 (quoting Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 

F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1987)). Therefore, because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is not baseless, the Court need not address whether counsel conducted a 

reasonable inquiry. See Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362 (noting that a filing is frivolous only 

when it is “both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.”) 

(emphasis added). 

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Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed for an improper 

purpose. Defendants present no evidence, aside from arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are 

moot, that Plaintiff filed her Complaint to “harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 

needless increase in the cost of litigation.” G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 

1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003). To the contrary, at the time Plaintiff commenced the instant 

action, the Commission had not yet issued its decision. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that 

the Court can still provide injunctive and declaratory relief. See Doc. No. 10 at 16-17. 

While the Court ultimately disagrees with Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed for an improper purpose. 

3. Conclusion 

Accordingly, because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is not frivolous, 

and that Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed for an improper purpose, the Court DENIES 

Defendants’ motion for sanctions. 

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without 

prejudice4

 and without leave to amend. See Hamamoto v. Ige, No. 14-CV-491 DKW, 

2015 WL 770346, at *9 n.6 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015) (denying the plaintiff’s request for 

leave to amend where the plaintiff’s claims are moot because it would be futile to allow 

an amended complaint that lacks subject matter jurisdiction), aff’d, 881 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 

2018). Additionally, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for sanctions. The Clerk of 

Court is instructed to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 17, 2018

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

                                               

4

 “Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction ‘should be . . . without prejudice so that a plaintiff may 

reassert his claims in a competent court.’” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

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