Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00810/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00810-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM R. BONNER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0810 MCE GGH P

vs.

JAMES E. TILTON, et al., 

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, who seeks

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was severed from another action, Pogue v.

Tilton,Case No. CIV S-05-1873 MCE GGH P. See, Order filed 4/30/07. Plaintiff’s first

amended complaint was dismissed, and plaintiff was granted leave to file a second amended

complaint. Plaintiff in this case has filed a second amended complaint.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

In the action from which this case was severed, the motion for that action to be

certified as a class action was found deficient and was denied, and plaintiff Pogue therein was

directed to proceed in that case solely as an individual plaintiff; thereafter, as noted above,

Pogue’s claims were severed from those of the seven other plaintiffs, including plaintiff herein,

and each was granted leave to amend to proceed on their separate claims. See Orders, filed on

10/17/06, Case No. CIV S-05-1873 MCE GGH P; see also, Order, filed on 4/30/07. 

Notwithstanding, plaintiff herein in the second amended complaint appears simply to have refiled the defective first amended complaint, wherein the parties named as defendants remain the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); Jeanne Woodford, Roderick

Hickman; James Tilton; and “all unknown wardens of CDCR prisons, et al.” 

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26 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. 1

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As to defendant CDCR, the Eleventh Amendment serves as a jurisdictional bar to

suits brought by private parties against a state or state agency unless the state or the agency

consents to such suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781

(1978)( per curiam); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982). In the

instant case, the State of California has not consented to suit and the court finds that this

defendant should be dismissed.

As to naming all unnamed wardens of CDCR prisons (and firecamps) as

defendants, plaintiff has no standing to names these parties as defendants. To the extent, plaintiff

seeks to sue any warden who is not the warden of the facility wherein he is incarcerated, he

appears to be attempting to circumvent the court’s prior ruling that he may only proceed in this

action on his own behalf. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (party

must assert [his] own rights not those of third parties), citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina

Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 (1974). Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed only as

to claims of violations of his own constitutional rights or of his rights under RLUIPA in the 1

practice of his Muslim religion at the facility wherein he is incarcerated.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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26 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). 2

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). To sue defendants Woodford, Hickman and Tilton in their individual capacities for

money damages, plaintiff must allege a link between their actions and the constitutional

deprivation which he has suffered.

However, just as it is not necessary to allege Monell policy grounds when suing a 2

state or municipal official in his or her official capacity for injunctive relief related to a procedure

of a state entity, Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1989), it follows that it is not

necessary to allege the personal involvement of a state official when plaintiffs are attacking a

state procedure on federal grounds that relates in some way to the job duties of the named

defendant. All that is required is that the complaint name an official who could appropriately

respond to a court order on injunctive relief should one ever be issued. Harrington v. Grayson,

764 F. Supp. 464, 475-477 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Malik v. Tanner, 697 F. Supp. 1294, 1304

(S.D.N.Y. 1988). (“Furthermore, a claim for injunctive relief, as opposed to monetary relief,

may be made on a theory of respondeat superior in a § 1983 action.”); Fox Valley Reproductive

Health Care v. Arft, 454 F. Supp. 784, 786 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See also, Hoptowit v. Spellman,

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 The court takes judicial notice that in Mayweathers v. Terhune, CIV S-96-1582 LKK 3

JFM P, restrictions on Muslim inmate religious practices at CSP-Solano were challenged in a

class action seeking injunctive relief, whose members included all Muslim inmates at CSPSolano. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction was granted on June

25, 2004. Judgment in Mayweathers was entered on August 18, 2004, in accordance with the

orders in that case, filed on June 25, 2004, and August 18, 2004. An amended joint order re:

expungement of disciplinary records of the plaintiff class was filed on September 17, 2004. 

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753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985), permitting an injunctive relief suit to continue against an official’s

successors despite objection that the successors had not personally engaged in the same practice

that had led to the suit. However, because a suit against an official in his or her official capacity

is a suit against the state, a practice, policy or procedure of the state must be at issue in a claim

for official capacity injunctive relief. Haber v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S. Ct. 358, 361-62

(1991). To the extent that plaintiff seeks to allege that the state policy or procedure regarding

plaintiff’s ability to practice the Muslim religion in the facility wherein he is incarcerated is

unconstitutional, plaintiff need only name in an official capacity, defendant Tilton, the present

Secretary of CDCR, and/or the warden of the facility wherein plaintiff is incarcerated. 

The court observes that plaintiff is incarcerated at California State Prison (CSP)-

Solano. In his putative second amended complaint (as in the previously dismissed first amended

complaint), plaintiff avers that only at that facility, CSP-Solano, were Muslim inmates granted

the rights to which they were entitled under RLUIPA, pursuant to Mayweathers v. Newland, 314

F.3d 1062, 1070 (9 Cir. 2002). Second Amended Complaint, pp. 7-8. It is therefore confusing th 3

that plaintiff now seeks to proceed on his claims for violations of his First Amendment Free

Exercise and RLUIPA rights against defendants based on conditions at that same facility, CSPSolano. Plaintiff’s duplicative second amended complaint will be dismissed with leave to file a

third amended complaint, within thirty days of this order. In doing so, plaintiff must specifically

allege how his right to practice his religion is being violated within the institution where he is

incarcerated and not speak broadly and generically to alleged policies or practices at all other

CDCR facilities.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the second amended complaint is

dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file a third amended complaint within

thirty days from the date of service of this order. Failure to file a third amended complaint will

result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

DATED: 10/1/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

bonn0810.b

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