Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02486/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02486-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVIN D. GILLIAM,

Booking #19751724,

Plaintiff,

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; WILLIAM 

D. GORE; CAPTAIN BUCHANAN,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02486-CAB-BLM

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 3]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Marvin D. Gilliam (“Plaintiff”), while incarcerated at the San Diego County 

Sheriff Department’s George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, 

California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff did not pay the fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his 

Complaint; instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 3).

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his San Diego 

County Sheriff’s Department Inmate Trust Account Activity statement. See ECF No. 3 at 

4; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This 

statement shows that Plaintiff had only a $0.02 available balance to his credit at the time 

of filing. See ECF No. 3 at 4.

Based on this accounting, the Court assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (b)(1), as Plaintiff has insufficient funds with which to pay an 

initial fee at the time this Order issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n 

no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil 

action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means 

by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d 

at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal 

of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds 

available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3), 

declines to exact an initial filing fee because his trust account statements suggest he may 

have “no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and instead directs the Watch 

Commander at GBDF, or his designee, to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fee

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and to forward all payments to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A 

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must review and sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint, and any 

complaint filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity, or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or 

seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

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1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 

purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need 

not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 

2012)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

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allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”). However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro 

se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Finally, the “[c]ourt[] must consider the complaint in its entirety,” including 

“documents incorporated into the complaint by reference” to be part of the pleading when 

determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading for all purposes.”); 

Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Individual Causation

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to contain any specific factual 

allegations against Defendants Gore or Buchanan whom he claims violated his 

constitutional rights and contains no “further factual enhancement” which describes how, 

or to what extent, these individuals became aware of, or were actually aware of, any 

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alleged constitutional violation. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . §1983 

suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; 

see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 

646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of 

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). 

“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks 

v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must 

be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional 

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). There are no factual allegations linking Defendants Gore 

or Buchanan to any of his claims regarding alleged constitutional violations. 

Thus, for these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Gore and 

Buchanan must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.

D. Property claim

While not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff is claiming that when he was 

transferred to GBDF on September 12, 2019 he lost his personal property. (See Compl. 

at 1.) Plaintiff claims that is “right to protect property was violated” by the County of 

San Diego. (Id.) “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons 

against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its 

procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. 

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).

Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of 

hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. Sinaloa Lake Owners 

Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989). Neither the negligent 

nor intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim under section 1983 if 

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the deprivation was random and unauthorized, however. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 

535-44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). The availability of 

an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, e.g. a state tort action, precludes relief 

because it provides sufficient procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 

113, 128 (1990) (where state cannot foresee, and therefore provide meaningful hearing 

prior to the deprivation, a statutory provision for post-deprivation hearing or a state 

common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process); King v. 

Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). The Ninth Circuit has long 

recognized that California law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 810-

895). 

Deprivations of property resulting from negligence, or “mere lack of due care” do 

not deny due process at all, and must be redressed through a state court damages action. 

See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a 

negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or 

property.”); id. at 330 (“‘To hold that this kind of loss is a deprivation of property within 

the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only to trivialize, but grossly to 

distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution.’” (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545 

(Stewart, J., concurring)). In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly warned against 

turning the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 into a “font of tort law to be 

superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.” See 

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 

Thus, because Plaintiff claims Defendants deprived him of personal property, any 

remedy he may have lies in state court and his federal action must be dismissed for 

failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27.

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E. County of San Diego

To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against the County of San Diego 

itself, his allegations are insufficient. A municipal entity is liable under section 1983 only 

if Plaintiff alleges his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to 

the municipality’s policy or custom. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 

U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 

541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). The County of San Diego may not be held vicariously 

liable under section 1983 simply based on allegedly unconstitutional acts of its 

employees. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 

U.S. at 691 (“[A] a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 

tortfeasor.”); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2014). Instead, the 

municipality may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... 

inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 

U.S. 29, 36 (2010). 

Plaintiff’s vague allegations that unidentified policies were “adopted” is 

insufficient to state a claim of municipal liability. Plausibility requires pleading facts, as 

opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, which rise above the mere conceivability or 

possibility of unlawful conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims 

against the County of San Diego are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.

F. Leave to Amend

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint, considered together with 

the exhibits he has attached, fails to state a plausible claim against any named Defendant, 

and that therefore, it is subject to sua sponte dismissal in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d 

at 1004.

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Because he is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided him 

with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant Plaintiff an opportunity 

to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 3).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of GBDF, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s inmate trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s 

income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 

the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST 

BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Watch 

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, San Diego, California, 

92158.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and 

GRANTS him thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 

pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint 

will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

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amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights 

complaint form for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2020

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