Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-05468/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-05468-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed Question: Fed Communications Act of 1934

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HECTOR ANTONIO ORELLANA and OSCAR A.

ORELLANA, individually and d/b/a

ROCCAPULCO; and 1 PRODUCTION SF, LLC,

an unknown business entity d/b/a

ROCCAPULCO,

Defendants. /

No. 08-05468 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS TO STRIKE

(Docket Nos. 25

and 26)

Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, Inc. moves to strike the

Answer and affirmative defenses of Defendants Hector Antonio

Orellana, Oscar A. Orellana and 1 Production SF, LLC. In a

separate motion, Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ demand for a

jury trial. Defendants oppose the motions. The motions were taken

under submission on the papers. Having considered all of the

papers submitted by the parties, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

motions to strike. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed its Complaint on December 5, 2008, alleging

that Defendants unlawfully showed a sporting event at their

establishment in San Francisco, California. They bring three

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

claims: (1) violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553, (2) violation of 47

U.S.C. § 605 and (3) conversion. For its claims under §§ 553 and

605, Plaintiff seeks statutory, not actual, damages. Defendants

answered on March 3, 2009, asserting twenty-nine affirmative

defenses and demanding a jury trial. 

The Court entered a Case Management Order on April 22, 2009. 

(Docket No. 16.) Under that Order, fact discovery was scheduled to

end on April 1, 2010 and any case-dispositive motions were to be

heard on or before April 22, 2010. A case management conference is

scheduled for April 22.

On January 4, 2010, Plaintiff filed its two motions to strike. 

Defendants have filed briefs in opposition to the motions. 

Plaintiff did not reply. 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Strike Answer and Affirmative Defenses

Although Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ Answer and the

affirmative defenses contained therein, it directs its argument at

Defendants’ affirmative defenses. Accordingly, the Court assumes

Plaintiff requests the striking of the affirmative defenses, not

Defendants’ Answer in its entirety.

Plaintiff’s motion is untimely. As Defendants correctly note,

a party’s motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12 must be filed

“within 21 days after being served with the pleading.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(f)(2). Plaintiff filed its motion over ten months after

it was served with Defendants’ Answer. 

Even if Plaintiff’s motion were timely, the Court would not

have stricken Defendants’ affirmative defenses. A defendant need

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

only “state in short and plain terms” its defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(b); see also Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th

Cir. 1979). A court should strike defenses only if they are

clearly insufficient. See William Z. Salcer, Panfeld, Edelman v.

Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984); accord

Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir. 1977)

(court should deny motion to dismiss a defense as insufficient as a

matter of law if complete development of the factual record might

avoid the need to decide an unresolved question of law); Augustus

v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia County, Fla., 306 F.2d 862,

868 (5th Cir. 1962) (court should grant motion to strike only if

the pleading has no possible relation to the controversy); Moore’s

Federal Practice 3d, § 12.37[1], [4] (Rule 12(f) motions are

general disfavored and motions to strike defenses should be denied

if sufficiency of defense depends on disputed issues of fact or

questions of law). 

Defendants have adequately stated their defenses, which are

apparently plead as boilerplate in an abundance of caution. The

Court trusts that Defendants will not pursue them at trial if they

do not discover evidence to support them. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’

affirmative defenses is denied. 

II. Motion to Strike Jury Demand 

Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ jury demand, asserting that

there is no right to jury trial on Plaintiff’s claims for statutory

damages under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 39(a)(2) requires the Court to determine whether there

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Defendants assert, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that they

have a right to jury trial on Plaintiff’s claim for conversion. 

Conversion is a common law tort, the legal remedy for which is

monetary damages. Thus, Defendants have a right to a jury trial on

issues related to Plaintiff’s conversion claim. However, although

one claim provides such an entitlement, it does not follow that the

right extends to all of Plaintiff’s claims.

4

are issues for which there is no federal right to trial by jury.1

The Seventh Amendment provides, “In Suits at common law, where

the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of

trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VII. 

The preservation of the right to jury trial “is not limited to

actions that actually existed at common law, but extends to actions

analogous thereto.” Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 855 (9th

Cir. 1993) (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417

(1987)). 

To determine whether a right to jury trial on a cause of

action exists, a court looks to: (1) “the nature of the right” and

(2) whether the remedies provided “are legal or equitable in

nature.” Spinelli, 12 F.3d at 855-56. The second prong of this

test is the more important of the two. Id. at 855. 

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether there is a right

to a jury trial for claims seeking statutory damages under 47

U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) and 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). District

courts are divided on this issue. Compare Nat’l Satellite Sports,

Inc. v. Cotter’s Lounge, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (E.D. Mo. 2000)

(requiring jury trial) with Storer Cable Commun’s v. Joe’s Place

Bar & Rest., 819 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (concluding that no

jury right inhered). 

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Section 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides: 

the party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory

damages for all violations involved in the action, in a

sum of not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the

court considers just. 

Section 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) provides:

the party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory

damages for each violation of subsection (a) of this

section involved in the action in a sum of not less than

$1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just,

and for each violation of paragraph (4) of this

subsection involved in the action an aggrieved party may

recover statutory damages in a sum not less than $10,000,

or more than $100,000, as the court considers just. 

5

Before determining whether the Seventh Amendment accords a

right to a jury, the Court must first attempt to construe the

statutes in a manner that avoids the constitutional question. 

Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 n.3. Although these provisions make no

explicit mention of juries, this omission does not preclude an

implicit statutory right to a jury trial. Standard Oil of Cal. v.

Arizona, 738 F.2d 1021, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1984). These sections

state that statutory damages may be awarded within a given range

“as the court considers just.” 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) and

605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II).2 The Supreme Court has concluded that

identical language, contained in the statutory damages provision of

the Copyright Act, does not afford a right to jury trial. Feltner

v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1998)

(stating that the “word ‘court’ in this context appears to mean

judge, not jury”). Further, other district courts have concluded

that these sections do not convey a jury right. See, e.g.,

Cotter’s Lounge, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1025; Storer Cable, 819 F. Supp.

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

at 596. Because the provisions accord courts discretion in

awarding statutory damages and given persuasive authority on the

matter, the Court holds that Congress did not imply a right to jury

trial for statutory damages under §§ 553 and 605. The Court must

therefore reach the constitutional question. 

The first inquiry concerns the nature of the rights protected

by these statutes. Congress intended § 553 to combat piracy of

cable television and § 605 to proscribe an unauthorized

interception of wireless transmissions. TKR Cable Co. v. Cable

City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 200-07 (3d Cir. 2001). Quite clearly,

causes of action for cable piracy and the interception of wireless

transmissions did not exist in the late 18th century. 

Nevertheless, a jury right may inhere to these statutory claims if

they are analogous to common law claims. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 348. 

Other district courts addressing claims similar to Plaintiff’s

analogize them to torts involving interference with property

rights, such as conversion, which existed at common law. See,

e.g., Cotter’s Lounge, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1025-26; Nat’l Satellite

Sports, Inc. v. No Frills Rest., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1362-63

(S.D. Fla. 1998); see also Storer, 819 F. Supp. at 596 (opining

that conversion is a fair comparison). This is a suitable analogy. 

Plaintiff brings claims under §§ 553 and 605 to recover for alleged

unauthorized reception and display of a sporting event. Plaintiff

maintains that it had “exclusive nationwide television distribution

rights” to the event and that it granted sub-licenses to other

entities for the event’s public exhibition. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12. 

Plaintiff suggests that Defendants’ unauthorized showing of the

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

event derogated its licensing rights. Although §§ 553 and 605 do

not wholly align with the elements of conversion, they protect a

party’s right to control the transmission of programming, either

through cable or wireless means. The nature of the rights

protected by these statutes appear sufficiently analogous to those

covered by the property torts. 

The more important inquiry, however, is whether the relief

afforded is equitable or legal in nature. Generally, monetary

relief is a legal remedy and “an award of statutory damages may

serve purposes traditionally associated with legal relief, such as

compensation and punishment.” Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352; see also

Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, “an award of monetary damages may constitute equitable

relief if it is incidental to or intertwined with injunctive

relief.” Traxler, 596 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Chauffeurs Local No.

391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571 (1990)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In this respect, the award of front pay in employment

cases is considered equitable in nature because it is intertwined

with a determination on the viability of reinstatement, which

itself is an equitable remedy. Traxler, 596 F.3d at 1012. 

Here, the Court finds no reason to depart from the general

rule that monetary damages are legal in nature. Congress added the

statutory damages provisions while it was concerned with deterring

parties from stealing cable television services. See generally

H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 83-85 (1984), reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4720-22. Thus, a reasonable assumption is that

Congress intended these provisions to discourage theft. Because

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

remedies intended to punish were generally issued by courts of law,

this legislative context supports the conclusion that these damages

are legal in nature. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422 (citing Curtis v.

Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974)). While these statutes authorize

a court to provide injunctive relief, 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2)(A) and

605(e)(3)(B), the statutory damages are not incidental or

intertwined to these remedies. Each form of relief could be

ordered independent of the other. 

Plaintiff cites Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Nekos, 18 F.

Supp. 2d 214 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) to argue that statutory damages serve

a restitutionary purpose and therefore should be considered

equitable. In Joe Hand, the court, relying on Storer Cable,

offered two reasons to support its conclusion that statutory

damages under §§ 553 and 605 constitute restitution. First, it

stated that “restitution is appropriate when the plaintiff’s loss

is more than the defendant’s gain.” Id. at 217 (citing Storer

Cable, 819 F. Supp. at 596). This is because, according to the

court, restitution “refers more to the defendant’s tortious conduct

and thwarting it in the future than compensating plaintiff’s actual

loss.” Joe Hand Promotions, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (citing Storer

Cable, 819 F. Supp. at 597). Second, the court believed that its

discretion in awarding such damages rendered them equitable. Joe

Hand Promotions, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 217. This Court finds neither

basis persuasive. Without passing on whether Joe Hand correctly

defines when restitution is proper, the deterrent purpose that

court identifies favors, as noted above, the conclusion that the

statutory damages are legal. Furthermore, discretion in providing

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

a remedy does not necessarily render it equitable and, thus,

outside the purview of juries. In Feltner, the Supreme Court

concluded that the statutory damages provision of the Copyright

Act, which likewise provides that statutory damages may be awarded

“as the court considers just,” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), accords a

right to jury trial, even on the amount itself. 523 U.S. at 355. 

The Court found support in “historical evidence that cases

involving discretionary monetary relief were tried before juries.” 

Id. at 353. Notably, the decision in Storer Cable predated

Feltner. And, although the court in Joe Hand cited Feltner for

general legal concepts, it based its analysis on Storer Cable. See

Joe Hand Promotions, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 217. 

Plaintiff has not provided persuasive authority or argument to

show that statutory damages under §§ 553 and 605 are equitable in

nature. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Seventh Amendment

preserves the right to jury trial on issues related to Plaintiff’s

request for statutory damages under §§ 553 and 605. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

motions to strike. (Docket Nos. 25 and 26.) A further case

management conference is scheduled for April 22, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:08-cv-05468-CW Document 33 Filed 04/19/10 Page 9 of 9