Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01793/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01793-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REYES LEGRANDE, JR,

Petitioner,

 v.

JAMES A. YATES,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-01793 WHA

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS, STAYING CASE, AND 

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this habeas corpus action, respondent moves to dismiss the petition, alleging that

petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies. This order finds that petitioner has failed to

exhaust one of his claims in state court. However, this order will STAY these proceedings so that

petitioner may exhaust the claim. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in April and May 2004, petitioner Reyes LeGrande, Jr. was

convicted of assault with semiautomatic firearm; assault with a firearm; possession of a firearm

by a felon; transportation and furnishing of methamphetamine; possession of methamphetamine

for sale; possession of a false compartment with intent to store a controlled substance; possession

of a controlled substance while armed with a loaded, operable firearm; carrying a concealed

firearm in a vehicle; carrying a concealed firearm; carrying a loaded firearm; carrying a loaded

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firearm with a prior felony conviction; and personal possession of a loaded, operable firearm

while under the influence of methamphetamine (Exh. A-3 530–44). 

The trial court sentenced petitioner as follows. Petitioner received an aggregate state

prison sentence of 16 years and eight months. For assault with semiautomatic firearm, petitioner

received a middle term of six years, plus a four-year personal use enhancement. For assault with

a firearm, petitioner received a middle term of three years, plus an additional four-year personal

use enhancement. For possession of a firearm by a felon, a middle term of two years. For

transportation and furnishing of methamphetamine, a middle term of three years. For possession

of methamphetamine for sale, a middle term of two years. For possession of a false

compartment with intent to store a controlled substance, a concurrent middle term of two years. 

For possession of a controlled substance while armed with a loaded, operable firearm, a

concurrent middle term of three years. For carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle, a

concurrent middle term of two years. For carrying a concealed firearm a middle term of two

years. For carrying a loaded firearm, a middle term of two years. For carrying a loaded firearm

with a prior felony conviction, a middle term of two years. For personal possession of a loaded,

operable firearm while under the influence of methamphetamine, a concurrent middle term of

two years. Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 654, the court stayed certain sentences and

enhancements, ordered other sentences to be served consecutively, and stayed all but eight

months and one year respectively. Additionally, the court imposed a two-year on-bail

enhancement and a three-year enhancement for a prior drug conviction (Exh. A-3 at 649–53). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. Before the California Court of Appeal

and California Supreme Court, petitioner advanced the following arguments: (1) improper

joinder of offenses; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; (4)

insufficiency of evidence; and (5) improper denial of motion to suppress. The California Court

of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction on June 27, 2006. The California Supreme Court

denied review on October 18, 2006. Petitioner did not seek collateral review in the state courts.

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On March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 2254. In the federal petition, petitioner dropped the claim based on an allegedly improper

denial of a motion to suppress. The petition also included a previously unraised allegation that

the trial court violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights, pursuant to the United States

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007).

ANALYSIS

Before a federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a state

prisoner, state remedies must first be exhausted. Claims can be exhausted either on direct appeal

or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim raised in federal court. See 28 U.S.C.

2254(b), (c). This total-exhaustion requirement protects principles of comity between federal

and state courts. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515–19 (1982). As such, if available state

remedies have not been exhausted as to all claims, the district court must dismiss the petition. 

Id. at 522. 

Respondent here alleges that petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies as to the

claim based on Cunningham v. California, 12 S. Ct. 856 (2007). This order agrees. When

petitioner petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, he did not raise the

Cunningham claim. His petition for review was filed on August 3, 2006, and the California

Supreme Court denied it on October 18, 2006. Cunningham was not decided by the United

States Supreme Court until January 22, 2007. It is plain that the state courts have not had an

opportunity to pass on petitioner’s contention that the procedures utilized at his sentencing

deprived him of the federal constitutional right to a jury trial under Cunningham. The Ninth

Circuit’s holding in Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 1965), is on point:

[A] state prisoner who believes that some decision of the United

States Supreme Court subsequent to the state court decision in his

case requires that his conviction or sentence be set aside should

first pursue any state remedy which may be available to present

that contention before applying for a federal writ of habeas corpus. 

If no state remedy is available or if, pursuing it, the state prisoner

fails to obtain the relief desired, exhaustion of state remedies

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would be established and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 would not stand in the

way of federal habeas corpus.

When presented with a habeas petition with both unexhausted and exhausted claims, a

district court may stay proceedings to allow the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his

previously unexhausted claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). To obtain a stay,

petitioner must demonstrate: (1) he has good cause for his failure to exhaust, (2) his

unexhausted claim is “potentially meritorious,” and (3) there is no indication that he engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Ibid. This order finds that all three Rhines factors exist

and that this litigation should be stayed to allow petitioner to exhaust his Cunningham claim in

state court.

First, petitioner has good cause for his failure to exhaust. Cunningham had not been

decided at the time petitioner filed his appeal and petition for review. Thus, petitioner’s

arguments under Cunningham were not available to him at that time. This being the first

opportunity he has had to raise a claim under Cunningham, good cause exists for his failure to

exhaust.

Second, petitioner’s Cunningham claim is potentially meritorious. In Cunningham, the

United States Supreme Court held that California’s determinate sentencing law violates the Sixth

Amendment because it assigns to the trial judge, not the jury, authority to find facts that expose a

defendant to an elevated “upper term” sentence. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860. Concluding

that the middle term was the relevant statutory maximum, and noting that aggravating facts were

found by a judge and not the jury, the Court declared that California’s sentencing law violated

the rule set out in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-490 (2000). See Cunningham, 127

S. Ct. at 871. 

Without passing on the merits of petitioner’s claim, this order finds that there may be

potential merit to the Cunningham claim. It is true that in People v. Black, 161 P.3d 1130 (Cal.

2007), the California Supreme Court held that the application of Cunningham is limited to “any

fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence than is authorized by the jury’s

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verdict alone.” Id. at 578. Here, however, petitioner received a series of middle term sentences. 

Petitioner argues, however, that Cunningham is applicable to mitigation and consecutive

sentencing. Pursuant to Cunningham, it is possible that the California state court may find that

petitioner must now be given the opportunity to have a jury determine whether there are

sufficient mitigating or aggravating facts to justify a lower sentence or concurrent (rather than

consecutive) sentence. 

Third, respondent does not contend that petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory

litigation tactics. The California Supreme Court denied review of petitioner’s appeal on October

18, 2006. The instant petition was filed on March 29, 2007. There is no indication that

petitioner engaged in dilatory tactics.

***

Although petitioner’s Cunningham claim was not exhausted, this order finds that a stay

of this case is warranted. Petitioner will be allowed to pursue a claim based on the new Supreme

Court precedent before the California state courts. Once he has exhausted that claim, he may

return to federal court and these proceedings will recommence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this case is STAYED so petitioner may return to state court to

exhaust the claim at issue. If the California Supreme Court denies the petition, petitioner, within

thirty days, shall seek leave to lift the stay and amend his petition to add the additionally

exhausted federal claim. Please promptly notify the Court if the state court grants the petition. 

The hearing previously set for THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 2007, at 2:00 P.M. is hereby VACATED.

A joint status report shall be filed on THE FIRST BUSINESS DAY OF EACH QUARTER. If

plaintiff is not diligent in seeking state court review, then this case may be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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