Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07207/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 1999 Decided August 8, 2000

No. 98-7207

Sunday Daskalea,

Appellee

v.

District of Columbia and

Margaret A. Moore, Director, D.C. Department of Corrections,

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv02496)

Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation

Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for

appellants. With him on the briefs were Jo Anne Robinson,

Interim Corporation Counsel at the time appellants' main

brief was filed, Robert R. Rigsby, Interim Corporation CounUSCA Case #98-7207 Document #534701 Filed: 08/08/2000 Page 1 of 26
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sel at the time appellants' reply brief was filed, and Charles

L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel. Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Gregory L. Lattimer argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellee.

Before: Sentelle, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Uncontradicted evidence at the

trial of this case established the routine sexual abuse of

women inmates by prison guards at the District of Columbia

Jail. The plaintiff, Sunday Daskalea, suffered from a continuing course of such abuse, culminating in an evening

during which "correctional" officers forced her to dance

naked on a table before more than a hundred chanting,

jeering guards and inmates. The District asks us to relieve it

of all responsibility for this conduct, contending that the facts

fail to establish the "deliberate indifference" necessary to

sustain a municipality's liability for the acts of its employees.

But "deliberate indifference" is precisely how any reasonable

person would describe the District's attitude toward its women prisoners, and we therefore uphold in full the jury's award

of $350,000 in compensatory damages. We are unable, however, to uphold the jury's punitive damages award because

District of Columbia law bars the imposition of such awards

against the District. And because Daskalea sued codefendant Margaret Moore solely in her official capacity as

Director of the Department of Corrections, plaintiff must look

to the District alone for payment of compensation.

I

This is not the first time the federal courts have reviewed

charges of sexual abuse by D.C. correctional officers against

female inmates. In 1993, a class action was filed on behalf of

all women prisoners under the care of the District of Columbia correctional system. See Women Prisoners v. District of

Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994). In that case, the

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district court found a pattern of rape and sexual assault--

coupled with other forms of sexual harassment, inadequate or

nonexistent staff training, and retaliation against women who

filed complaints--that rose to a level of objective cruelty

sufficient to violate the Eighth Amendment. See Women

Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 639-43, 664-67; see also Women

Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 929, 931 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). The court further found that the inmates had

filed complaints and written letters to prison administrators

to no avail, and that the harassment was obvious and widely

known. It concluded that the District of Columbia had acted

"with 'deliberate indifference' to the condition of sexual

harassment which women prisoners at the [District's facilities] must endure," and that the District was therefore liable

under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 for the violation of the inmates'

constitutional rights. See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at

665-67.1

On the basis of the foregoing, the Women Prisoners court

issued a detailed order on December 13, 1994, requiring the

Department of Corrections to "take all action necessary to

remedy and prevent" sexual harassment of female inmates by

its employees. The court specifically directed the Department to issue, distribute, and post a sexual harassment policy

within sixty days, and to conduct mandatory training on

sexual harassment for both employees and female inmates.

See Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 679-81.

On May 15, 1995, the Department of Corrections issued a

policy in response to the Women Prisoners order. The policy

forbade sexual misconduct and harassment, as well as retaliation for the filing of complaints regarding such behavior, and

directed the institution of mandatory training. Although

some of the guards who testified at Daskalea's trial remem-

__________

1 The District did not appeal the district court's finding of

liability. See Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 928. Although it did

appeal aspects of the court's remedial order, the District did not

challenge the requirement, discussed below, that it promulgate a

sexual harassment policy. This court ultimately overturned portions of the remedy not relevant here and remanded for further

proceedings. See id. at 931-32.

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bered receiving the policy, others did not. No inmate testified to receiving the policy, and officers admitted that the

policy was never posted. There was no evidence that the

training requirements were implemented nor that any significant corrective intervention occurred.

Against this background, we now turn to a consideration of

the specific facts of Daskalea's case.

A

Daskalea was arrested on drug charges and sent to the

D.C. Jail on October 26, 1994--two months before the district

court issued its decision and order in the Women Prisoners

litigation. She was initially housed in South 1, the unit used

primarily for women awaiting trial and for those in either

solitary confinement or protective custody. From the beginning of her confinement, Daskalea testified that she was

called "whore," "white bitch," "cracker," and other epithets by

guards and inmates alike.2

In January 1995, Daskalea was moved to Southeast 1.

This unit housed approximately eighty women who were

serving short-term sentences. Upon arrival, she was met

with rumors that she was an undercover FBI agent. She was

threatened by other inmates, including one who--in the presence of several guards who did not intervene--told her:

"Bitch, you better sleep with one eye open." Daskalea's fears

of attack were realized when she was subsequently assaulted

by two inmates.

The civilian employee in charge of the Jail's library, Edward Gardner, was well known for providing inmates with

cigarettes in exchange for sex. It was also widely known that

__________

2 This recitation of facts is taken from the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, which stands largely unrebutted because the District did not offer any evidence of its own. Even if that were not

the case, when reviewing a jury's verdict we must adopt the version

of the facts most favorable to the party prevailing below. See

Kirkland v. District of Columbia, 70 F.3d 629, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

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the rooms adjacent to the library were routinely used for sex

between library staff and inmates. When Daskalea first

attempted to use the library's research materials, Gardner

leered at her and rubbed his genitals. She rebuffed his

advances, and thereafter had difficulty obtaining any assistance from the library staff. Some time later, a guard took

Daskalea out of her cell and brought her to the library. The

guard led her to a room where a male inmate, notorious for

engaging in sexual misconduct in the library, was waiting.

The inmate then attacked her, attempting a sexual assault.

As time went on, the campaign of fear, harassment, and

violence against Daskalea--on the part of both staff and

inmates--intensified. Guards told her they would break her.

One day, when inmates were supposed to be on lockdown, a

prisoner known as Bootsie came to Daskalea's cell and spat

and cursed at her. Later that day a guard, Sgt. Theresa

Noble, forcibly restrained Daskalea's hands while Bootsie

attacked her. Plaintiff stopped sleeping at night for fear she

would be raped or assaulted.

The testimony at trial disclosed a culture of routine acceptance of sexual encounters between staff and inmates on

Southeast 1. One cell, known as Cell 73, was kept empty and

used for sex between prisoners and guards. It was also used

by staff to sleep off drunkenness--particularly by Officer

Yvonne Walker, the officer in charge of the evening shift.

There was also testimony that one of the inmates, Jacky

Newby, was threatened by a guard jealous of Newby's sexual

relationship with evening-shift guard Quida Graham.

Daskalea repeatedly complained to the authorities about

sexual harassment. She filed more than fifteen official Internal Grievance Procedure Forms and wrote letters directly to,

among others, the Deputy Warden, Warden, and Director

Moore. She also wrote to the judge in her criminal case, who

held a hearing at which Daskalea's complaints of sexual

harassment were aired. Notwithstanding the judge's written

recommendation that "defendant be moved from D.C. Jail,"

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J.A. at 484 (commitment order), she was not. Nor did prison

authorities intervene in any other way to stop the abuse.

All of the above turned out to be a mere prelude to the

events of July 20, 1995. During the weeks preceding that

date--on at least three occasions and perhaps as often as

weekly--Officer Walker, the head guard on the evening shift,

organized a series of evenings during which female inmates

stripped and danced provocatively to loud music. Both female and male guards were present and, according to the

testimony at trial, some guards assaulted inmates who refused to dance.

On the evening of July 20, the Jail's cell doors were kept

open because the air conditioning system was malfunctioning.

Sometime that evening, while plaintiff was sitting in her cell,

loud music began and inmates started moving to the dining

area. Daskalea followed, arriving late and standing at the

back of the crowd. There, at the center of attention, was

Officer Walker, doing a handstand on one of the dining tables

and gyrating her hips provocatively. Soon, at Walker's instigation, three inmates climbed onto the table and began

dancing, completely naked, while the crowd cheered. One of

the dancing inmates performed a lewd act, and Officer Walker placed her head between the inmate's legs to get a closer

look. By that point, all of the inmates, numerous female

guards, and several male guards and maintenance workers

were in attendance.

Then, someone called out Daskalea's name. Fearing what

might be coming, plaintiff fled back to her cell, but was

unable to close the door. A few minutes later, Officer Walker

bellowed out the command: "Get Sunday down here!" The

crowd began chanting Daskalea's name, and the dancing

stopped. Two inmates pulled plaintiff out of her cell, one

taking each arm while a third followed behind preventing

escape. The inmates dragged Daskalea to the center of the

crowd. Officer Walker commanded her to dance, and when

Daskalea hesitated, Walker visibly angered. Afraid, Daskalea complied. She removed all of her clothes except for her

underwear and attempted to dance to the music. But she

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was in such a state of shock and fear that her legs trembled.

Guards began shouting and clapping; some flashed money.

Officer Walker tried to get Daskalea to remove her underwear. An inmate began rubbing baby oil all over Daskalea's

body. The inmate then began rubbing her own body against

Daskalea's. Plaintiff lost control of her legs and collapsed to

the ground. The other inmate lay on top of her. Eventually,

the guards permitted Daskalea to take her clothes and return

to her cell. Later that night, both guards and inmates

approached her, communicating sexual interest. One guard

exposed herself to Daskalea while telling her how much she

enjoyed the dance.

During the next few days, word spread about the incident.

When inmate Newby submitted a grievance complaining of

sexual harassment, assault, and threats by correctional officers, Lt. Edward Given "counseled" Newby to mind her own

business. Subsequently, Daskalea was summoned to the

office of a Mr. Lytle, who asked her about the forced striptease. Although Daskalea expressed concern that guards

would retaliate against her if she discussed it, Lytle assured

her that they would not.

Just days later, however, an officer arrived at Daskalea's

cell and demanded that she turn over all of her underwear as

"contraband." Plaintiff's request to talk to Lytle was ignored. A lieutenant appeared, told Daskalea she was going

to solitary, and when she protested threatened to mace her.

She was then placed in solitary confinement, without any of

her belongings and, at first, without a mattress. A guard

who went back to Daskalea's cell to retrieve her personal

items, including her legal papers, found another guard going

through them. The second guard told the first that Daskalea

would not be getting them back.

Daskalea's requests to call an attorney were refused. She

wrote a letter to the Warden to report the forced stripping.

When she subsequently saw the Warden, however, he

brushed her off and turned away.

The Warden appointed a committee, headed by Acting

Deputy Warden Brenda Makins, to investigate the nude

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dancing incidents. When the Makins' Committee asked to

speak with Daskalea in early August--at which time she was

being held in solitary confinement--it was informed that she

had already been discharged. The Committee concluded that

Daskalea had been forced to dance for the assemblage (including both female and male guards) against her will, and

that nude dancing had taken place on three earlier dates the

same month. The Makins Report named fourteen guards

who had "aided and abetted" the "sexual misconduct" and/or

"assault." These included the lead guard, Officer Walker,

who was also found to have attacked another prisoner while

the prisoner was hand-cuffed and in the presence of other

guards. In addition, the Committee concluded that eight

officers, ranging from corporals to lieutenants, had been

negligent, and that the "misconduct/assault was effected due

to," among other things, "poorly trained supervisors." The

Committee further found that officers had tried to cover up

the incidents by providing it with false information. At trial,

Director Moore testified that she had never read the Makins

Report.

B

Daskalea was released from prison at the end of August

1995. On October 30, 1996, she filed a lawsuit alleging

violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. s 1983. Her

second amended complaint added common law claims of

negligent supervision and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. The parties agreed to refer the case to a magistrate

judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 636(c)(1).

At trial, the named defendants were the District of Columbia and Director Moore. Daskalea testified on her own

behalf, along with other inmates and six former or present

Department of Corrections employees. Among the latter

were Brenda Makins, head of the investigatory committee,

whose report was introduced into evidence. Daskalea also

called as a witness defendant Moore, who, among other

things, testified about the district court's findings and order

in the Women Prisoners case; the order itself was entered

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into evidence. Defendants introduced no evidence. The jury

found them liable on all counts and awarded $350,000 in

compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.

Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the

alternative, for a new trial or remittitur on the ground that

the damages award was excessive. The court denied the

motion.

In this court, defendants press most of the arguments they

advanced below. In particular, they deny liability under

section 1983, deny liability under the common law of the

District, assert immunity against punitive damages, and contend that Director Moore cannot be held personally liable

because she was sued solely in her official capacity. We

consider each of these contentions below.

II

We begin with an examination of the issues raised by the

District regarding the jury's finding of liability and award of

damages under 42 U.S.C. s 1983.

A

Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified at 42

U.S.C. s 1983, provides a cause of action for monetary damages and injunctive relief against "[e]very person who, under

color of [law] ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any

person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution...." The District

does not dispute that the guards who assaulted and tormented plaintiff violated her Eighth Amendment right to be free

of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend.

VIII; see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1992)

(holding Eighth Amendment is violated, even in the absence

of serious injury, when guard uses force against prisoner

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in

good-faith effort to maintain discipline); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding guard's

attempted rape of prisoner constituted Eighth Amendment

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violation). The only question is whether the District may be

held liable for that violation.3

There is also no disagreement over the appropriate standard for determining whether the District may be held liable.

In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), the Supreme Court ruled that a municipality is a

"person" who can be held liable under section 1983, but only

when the municipality's "policy or custom ... inflicts the

injury." Id. at 694. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court

and this court have held that a city's inaction, including its

failure to train or supervise its employees adequately, constitutes a "policy or custom" under Monell when it can be said

that the failure amounts to " 'deliberate indifference' towards

the constitutional rights of persons in its domain." City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 & n.7 (1989) (recognizing municipal liability under s 1983 for failure to train

adequately); see Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44,

56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing liability for failure to train or

supervise); Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450,

1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that "inaction giving rise to or

endorsing a custom" can be basis of s 1983 liability).4

The District has no objection to the manner in which the

jury was charged on the question of municipal liability. Its

only contention is that there was insufficient evidence upon

which to base a finding of deliberate indifference, and that the

magistrate should therefore have granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). We review de novo a trial court's ruling on such a

motion. See United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ.,

153 F.3d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Because granting judgment as a matter of law "intrudes upon the rightful province

of the jury, it is highly disfavored." Id. (quoting Boodoo v.

__________

3 Although plaintiff's complaint also asserted violations of due

process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, only the

Eighth Amendment issue was submitted to the jury.

4 See also Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 419

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (failure to train); Parker v. District of Columbia,

850 F.2d 708, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).

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Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). It "is warranted

only if 'no reasonable juror could reach the verdict rendered

in th[e] case.' " Id. (quoting Anderson v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 820 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

We conclude that the jury had more than sufficient evidence upon which to base its finding of deliberate indifference. Only seven months prior to Daskalea's forced striptease, a federal district court had found the District liable

under section 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to the

repeated sexual abuse and harassment of women prisoners by

D.C. correctional officers. The court noted a failure to train

officers to prevent such misconduct, and ordered the District

to take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment of

female prisoners, including the institution of mandatory training. Given this history, the District and its policymakers

were on notice that D.C. guards lacked basic respect for the

rights of female inmates, and that absent substantial intervention, the pattern of unconstitutional behavior would persist.

Notwithstanding the court's unequivocal findings and order, the sexual abuse of women prisoners at Southeast 1

continued in an open and notorious manner. The use of the

library for sexual trysts between guards and inmates was well

known. Nude dancing incidents, accompanied by blaring

music and raucous crowds, took place on a regular basis.

There was no evidence that a training program or any other

corrective measure was implemented. Daskalea repeatedly

complained of sexual abuse, sending grievance forms and

letters to everyone from correctional officers to the Deputy

Warden, Warden, and Director of the Department. Given

the notice afforded by the Women Prisoners order and

Daskalea's own letters, and the open and notorious nature of

the continued abuse, a jury could reasonably have concluded

that the District was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of its women prisoners. See Canton, 489 U.S. at

390 n.10 (recognizing municipal liability where officers "so

often violate constitutional rights that the need for further

training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers"); Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 421 (same); see also Board of

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County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1997)

(recognizing that "the existence of a pattern of tortious

conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to show

that the lack of proper training ... is the 'moving force'

behind the plaintiff's injury"); id. at 407 (noting that "municipal decisionmakers['].... continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent

tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious

disregard for the consequences of their action--the 'deliberate indifference'--necessary to trigger municipal liability").

Finally, the jury had additional, direct evidence from which

it could have concluded that the District's policymakers were

indifferent to the plight of women in the Jail, and specifically

to the plight of Sunday Daskalea. Margaret Moore, Director

of the Department of Corrections, testified at the trial. Notwithstanding the notoriety of the incident, Moore conceded

that she had not read the Makins Report and had not

familiarized herself with the events at issue. Moreover,

notwithstanding the findings of the report, Moore pronounced

herself unaware of the multiple nude dancing incidents that

preceded Daskalea's humiliation, and she took no action to

protect Daskalea from the subsequent harassment and solitary confinement that a jury reasonably could have regarded

as retaliation for Daskalea's complaints.

The District's principal defense to section 1983 liability is

that, because the abuses in this case were committed by

female guards, while those in Women Prisoners were committed by males, Women Prisoners did not sufficiently put it on

notice of the kind of constitutional violations that Daskalea

would suffer. We reject this argument as cutting the notice

issue much too finely. Moreover, its premise is factually

inaccurate: several of the incidents in this case did involve

male-on-female harassment. To take but three examples:

the librarian who demanded sexual favors of Daskalea was a

male; the guard who brought her to the library to be

attacked by a male prisoner was a male; and the group of

guards and other employees who were "entertained" by Daskalea's forced striptease included several males.

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The District also attempts to turn the very court order that

required it to issue a harassment policy into a defense against

liability for its guards' harassment. Because the Department

of Corrections eventually did issue such a policy, the District

argues, it is clear that sexual harassment was against District

"policy" and hence may not be the subject of a section 1983

action. This argument has two flaws. First, the policy upon

which the District relies was not issued until well after many

of the events of which Daskalea complains. Second, a "paper" policy cannot insulate a municipality from liability where

there is evidence, as there was here, that the municipality was

deliberately indifferent to the policy's violation. See Ware v.

Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he

existence of written policies of a defendant are of no moment

in the face of evidence that such policies are neither followed

nor enforced."). That evidence included not only the continued blatant violation of the policy, but also the fact that the

policy was never posted, that some guards did not recall

receiving it, that inmates never received it, and that there

was no evidence of the training that was supposed to accompany it. Indeed, the Department purportedly had a "policy"

against sexual harassment even before the court order in

Women Prisoners--a policy that court found to have been "of

little value." 877 F. Supp. at 640.

The District makes one further attempt at legal jujitsu--

trying to turn Daskalea's evidence against her by arguing

that the very fact that guards sought to conceal the July 20

incident is proof that the abuse was only undertaken "by a

small group of rogue employees, acting surreptitiously." Reply Br. at 16. In Triplett v. District of Columbia, we did note

that "[c]over-up efforts at relatively low levels in the hierarchy not only reduce the likelihood that policymakers will

learn of the covert practice, but suggest a belief by the

subordinates that their behavior violates established policy."

108 F.3d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But here the misconduct can hardly be described as that of a few "rogues." The

District's own investigative committee charged fourteen

guards with "aiding and abetting" sexual misconduct and/or

assault, and charged several more--including supervisors and

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lieutenants--with negligence. Moreover, whatever the participants did to cover up the July 20 incident, the series of

bacchanalian nights that preceded it was open and notorious,

and the jury could reasonably have concluded that if such

behavior were not known to prison policymakers, it was only

because of their deliberate indifference to conditions at the

Jail. Accordingly, we affirm the jury's verdict against the

District under 42 U.S.C. s 1983. 5

B

The District urges that even if we affirm the jury's finding

of liability, we should grant a new trial with respect to the

amount of the compensatory damages award. We review

trial courts' rulings on motions for new trial only for an abuse

of discretion. See Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106

F.3d 1018, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A jury award must stand

unless it is "beyond all reason" or "so great as to shock the

conscience." Williams v. Steuart Motor Co., 494 F.2d 1074,

1085 (D.C. Cir. 1974). "Courts may not set aside a jury

verdict merely deemed generous; rather, the verdict must be

so unreasonably high as to result in a miscarriage of justice."

Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1024 (citing Barry v. Edmunds, 116

U.S. 550, 565 (1886)). And remittitur of a jury verdict is

appropriate only if the verdict "is so inordinately large as

obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range

within which the jury may properly operate." Id. at 1024

(internal quotation omitted); see Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 135 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

The District argues that there was insufficient evidence to

justify a compensatory award of $350,000 because Daskalea

__________

5 The District also contends that proof of its adherence to the

harassment policy is demonstrated by the fact that employees were

disciplined for its violation. But while there was some evidence

that discipline followed the July 20 incident, too late to be of any

comfort to Daskalea, the only person identified as having been

terminated was Brenda Makins--the author of the investigative

report that found serious wrongdoing at the Jail--allegedly because

she had lied about her home address.

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"suffered no physical injury," because her damages evidence

was limited to her own testimony, and because she did not

establish a "causal link" between the unlawful acts and the

harm she suffered. We disagree.

First, it is well established that "mental and emotional

distress" are "compensable under s 1983," even in the absence of physical injury. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264

(1978); see Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 94 (4th Cir. 1991)

(noting that "even in the absence of physical injury," plaintiff

may prove actual damages under s 1983 "based on injuries

such as 'personal humiliation' and 'mental anguish and suffering' ") (quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,

477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986)). Moreover, Daskalea plainly did

suffer "physical" injury through sexual assault. If what the

District means is that she did not suffer permanent injury

from such attacks, we emphatically disagree with the proposition that a person may not recover damages for a constitutional violation unless she suffers lasting physical harm.

Second, no expert testimony was required to bolster that of

Daskalea and her witnesses, or to show the causal link

between her treatment in prison and her injuries. See Price

v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1251 (4th Cir. 1996) ("A

survey of the case law reveals that a plaintiff's testimony,

standing alone, may support a claim of emotional distress

precipitated by a constitutional violation.") (collecting cases).

The unrebutted evidence showed that she was subjected to

continuing sexual abuse and harassment, was denied library

assistance because she refused to have sex with the librarian,

was set up by correctional officers to be assaulted, was

attacked with the assistance of correctional officers, was

forced to perform a striptease for guards and inmates, and

thereafter was confined in isolation without underwear or a

mattress. Daskalea testified that, as a result, she felt constant stress, anxiety, and dread of imminent sexual attack.

She had to sleep during the day for fear of what the guards

might do at night. After her release, she suffered from

insomnia and eating disorders, and spent months emotionally

and psychologically debilitated, withdrawn, and depressed.

These injuries are hardly surprising or unexpected in light of

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the abuse Daskalea suffered, and it does not take an expert to

confirm the jury's common sense with respect to both their

existence and cause.

Finally, we have no basis for questioning the amount of the

jury's award. The jury's valuation of Daskalea's damages

"was neither beyond all reason nor so great as to shock the

conscience." Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1024 (affirming award of

$200,000 under s 1983 for, inter alia, pain, suffering, humiliation, and emotional distress, despite only minor physical

injury arising from single incident). Indeed, a "court must be

especially hesitant to disturb a jury's determination of damages in cases involving intangible and non-economic injuries."

Id. The magistrate's denial of the District's motion for a new

trial is therefore affirmed.6

III

In addition to finding the District liable for violating section

1983, the jury found it liable on Daskalea's pendent claim for

negligent supervision under the common law. The damages

verdict did not distinguish between the grounds for liability,

and Daskalea concedes that both theories represented attempts to impose liability for the same predicate acts. The

District challenges this ground for liability as well.

Under District of Columbia law, prison authorities have "a

duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in

the protection and safekeeping of prisoners," Toy v. District

of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1988), including the duty "to

use reasonable care in supervising and controlling" their

employees, Morgan v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1102,

__________

6 The District contends that a new trial should also be granted

because the magistrate judge wrongly denied it an opportunity to

cross-examine Daskalea as to whether some of the stress she

suffered was actually caused by her alleged post-release activities

as an informant. We review such a claim only for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 919 (D.C. Cir.

1997). The magistrate found the District's proposed crossexamination to be both irrelevant and prejudicial, and we perceive

no error.

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1108 & n.3 (D.C. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 468 A.2d 1306

(1983) (en banc).7 The District may be held liable for damages caused by its negligence in carrying out that duty. See

Finkelstein v. District of Columbia, 593 A.2d 591, 594-95

(D.C. 1991) (holding District liable for negligence in death of

prisoner). That the District negligently supervised its employees in this case is an a fortiori conclusion from the

finding, discussed in Part II.A. above, that the District displayed deliberate indifference with respect to the treatment

of women prisoners by correctional officers.

The District's only real challenge to liability for negligent

supervision is its claim that proof of the standard of care

requires expert testimony, which Daskalea did not offer.

That, however, is not the law of the District of Columbia. To

the contrary, the rule is that "[p]roof of a deviation from the

applicable standard of care need not include expert testimony

where the alleged negligent act is 'within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience.' " Toy, 549 A.2d at

6 (quoting District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159, 164

(D.C. 1982)). Expert testimony is required only "where the

subject presented is 'so distinctly related to some science,

profession, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the

average layperson.' " Id. (quoting District of Columbia v.

Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1273 (D.C. 1987)).

It is true that in cases involving assaults on prisoners by

fellow prisoners, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

has held expert testimony necessary to establish the standard

of care for "secur[ing] the safety of an inmate," because a

"reasonably prudent juror cannot be expected to appreciate

the ramifications of prison security." District of Columbia v.

Carmichael, 577 A.2d 312, 314 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Hughes,

425 A.2d at 1303); cf. Toy, 549 A.2d at 9 (holding expert

testimony necessary to establish standard of care for administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation). But it does not

__________

7 See Finkelstein v. District of Columbia, 593 A.2d 591, 594

(D.C. 1991); District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629, 639

(D.C. 1987); Hughes v. District of Columbia, 425 A.2d 1299, 1302

(D.C. 1981).

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take an expert to establish that the District was negligent in

permitting the kind of persistent, open and notorious conduct

at issue here. Surely a juror could reasonably conclude that

the District had been negligent (at best) when it failed to

notice, let alone stop, a continuing series of evening stripteases, accompanied by blaring music and guard-on-inmate violence. See Morgan, 449 A.2d at 1106, 1109 (stating that

expert testimony is not required to establish "standard of

care for control and supervision of police officers" because

"[d]iscipline of police officers ... is not a matter which

laymen are incapable of intelligently evaluating without the

assistance of expert testimony") (internal quotation omitted).

Nor did Daskalea's jury have to rely only upon its common

sense. As we have noted, the Department's own investigating committee concluded that eight officers, ranging from

corporals to lieutenants, had been negligent, and that the

"misconduct/assault was effected due to," among other things,

"poorly trained supervisors." Moreover, Patricia Jackson,

Deputy Warden at the time of the events in question, testified

that she agreed with the committee that the supervision had

been inadequate, that officers were negligent, and that the

Jail was grossly negligent in protecting women from sexual

misconduct.

The District also attacks the amount of damages awarded

for negligent supervision, noting that the District of Columbia

Code bars local law claims against the District unless, within

six months after the injury, the potential claimant gives notice

in writing of the "circumstances." D.C. Code s 12-309; see

Gross v. District of Columbia, 734 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C.

1999). Because Daskalea did not send the required notice

until November 21, 1995, the District contends she cannot

recover for any injuries suffered before May 21 of that year.

We need not resolve the merits of this contention, however,

as it has no bearing on the result in this case. The six-month

notice requirement of the D.C. Code does not apply to

plaintiff's claim under section 1983, see Brown v. United

States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), and

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that cause of action therefore provides an independent basis

for the full amount of the damages award. 8

IV

In addition to compensatory damages, the jury awarded

Daskalea $5 million in punitive damages for her D.C. common

law claims. In this Part, we consider the permissibility of

that award.

Daskalea did not seek punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.

s 1983, conceding that she was not eligible for them in light

of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Newport v. Fact

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). See Daskalea Br. at 19.

In Fact Concerts, the Court considered whether punitive

damages may be awarded against municipalities under section

1983. It began by noting that municipalities had long been

held immune from punitive damages under the law of the

"vast majority" of the states. 453 U.S. at 259-60. It then

surveyed the rationales for that result, declaring that "punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a

windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff[,] are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services

for the citizens footing the bill," and punish only the "blameless or unknowing taxpayers" rather than the true wrongdoer, the offending government official. Id. at 267. Finding

the same principles applicable to suits brought under section

1983, the Supreme Court concluded that "a municipality is

immune from punitive damages" under that statute as well.

Id. at 271. In a footnote, the Court preserved a potential

exception: "It is perhaps possible to imagine an extreme

situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for

perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights."

Id. at 267 n.29

The District contends that it is immune from punitive

damages for the common law tort of negligent supervision,

__________

8 For the same reason, we need not address Daskalea's common law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which

involves the same predicate acts and produces no difference in the

damages award.

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just as it is for a violation of section 1983. As the District

points out, the D.C. Court of Appeals has never permitted

such an award. In Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d

831 (D.C. 1975), a case decided before Fact Concerts, the

Court of Appeals rejected a claim against the District for

punitive damages resulting from false arrest and assault.

The court noted that "[t]he clear weight of authority in the

states is that as a general rule there can be no recovery of

punitive damages against a municipality absent a statute

expressly authorizing it." 336 A.2d at 832. It then proceeded to quote six paragraphs from a Florida Supreme Court

opinion explaining the rationales for such immunity--rationales similar to those later surveyed by the U.S. Supreme

Court in Fact Concerts. See 336 A.2d at 832 (quoting Fisher

v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965)).9 On the

basis of the Florida court's rationales, the D.C. Court of

Appeals concluded: "Absent extraordinary circumstances not

present here, we agree with the weight of authority and

conclude the District of Columbia is not liable for punitive

damages." Id. at 832.

The District argues that notwithstanding the Court of

Appeals' caveat--"absent extraordinary circumstances not

present here"--punitive damages are never available against

the District for wrongs committed by its employees. That

argument is not without support. The Florida opinion upon

which Smith rested held municipalities wholly immune in the

absence of a legislative authorization. See Fisher, 172 So. 2d

at 457. And in a subsequent en banc opinion, the D.C. Court

of Appeals stated, this time without qualification, albeit in

dictum, that: "punitive damages may not be awarded against

the District of Columbia." Finkelstein v. District of Columbia, 593 A.2d 591, 599 (D.C. 1991) (en banc) (citing Smith, 336

A.2d at 832). The following year, the court again rejected a

claim for punitive damages against the District, citing Fact

Concerts as "reaffirming [the] common law principle that

__________

9 Fact Concerts cited both Smith and Fisher as examples of

"[j]udicial disinclination to award punitive damages against a municipality." 453 U.S. at 260 & n.21.

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municipalities [are] immune from punitive damages." Ramos

v. District of Columbia Dep't of Consumer and Regulatory

Affairs, 601 A.2d 1069, 1074 n.9 (D.C. 1992).

We need not go as far as the District urges to resolve this

case. Even if the D.C. Court of Appeals would permit

punitive damages in some not-yet-presented category of "extraordinary" cases, we are unable to conclude that this case

would fit within that category. That is not, in any way, to

minimize the offensiveness of the District's conduct here.

But this is not a case that falls within the exception noted in

Fact Concerts, where a jurisdiction's taxpayers are directly

responsible for perpetrating the policies that caused the

plaintiff's injuries. Nor is this a case where a municipality or

its policymakers have intentionally adopted the unconstitutional policy that caused the damages in question.10 Rather,

this is a case where the charge against the District is "deliberate indifference," and the D.C. Court of Appeals has given

no hint that it would permit an award of punitive damages in

such a case--if it would permit such an award at all. Because

our role in deciding a pendent District of Columbia claim is

only to ascertain what District law is, "not what it ought to

be," Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 922 (quoting Klaxon Co. v.

Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941)), we are

unable to do for Daskalea what the D.C. Court of Appeals has

never done for any plaintiff.

V

The other named defendant in this case, Margaret Moore,

served at all relevant times as the Director of the D.C.

Department of Corrections. The jury returned a general

__________

10 Cf. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2125-

26 (1999) (noting that "[t]he justification of exemplary damages lies

in the evil intent of the defendant") (internal quotation omitted);

Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 481-82 (D.C. Cir.

1977) (declining to find "extraordinary circumstances" justifying

punitive damages against District, notwithstanding parole officers'

breach of duty leading to murder of plaintiff's daughter), vacated

then reinstated in relevant part by en banc court, 580 F.2d 647

(D.C. Cir. 1978).

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verdict finding "defendants" liable on all counts. Moore and

the District contend that Moore was sued solely in her official

capacity, and hence cannot be held personally liable for the

damages award. Daskalea contends that she sued Moore in

her individual (personal) capacity, and that Moore therefore is

liable not only for the $350,000 in compensatory damages, but

also--because she is not an immune municipality--for $5

million in punitive damages. See generally Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (holding that a government

official may be held personally liable only if sued in an

individual rather than official capacity); Atchinson v. District

of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); Eskridge v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 986, 989 n.7 (D.C. 1979) (same

under D.C. law); Keith v. Washington, 401 A.2d 468, 470-71

(D.C. 1979) (same). The magistrate judge agreed with Daskalea and held Moore personally liable for the entire amount

of both awards.

Neither the complaint nor any other pleading filed by

plaintiff indicates whether Moore was charged in her official

or her individual capacity. In some circuits, that would be

the end of the matter, as they require a plaintiff who seeks

personal liability to plead specifically that the suit is brought

against the defendant in her individual capacity.11 Although

it has not definitively resolved the issue, see Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 24 n.* (1991), the Supreme Court has typically

looked instead to the "course of proceedings" to determine

the nature of an action. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14;

Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985). Following the

Supreme Court's lead, this circuit has joined those of its

sisters that employ the "course of proceedings" approach.

See Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 425.12 Like the Supreme Court,

__________

11 See Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir.

1999) ("Generally, plaintiffs must designate in which capacity they

are suing defendants; if not, by operation of law, defendants are

deemed sued in their official capacities."); see also Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 24 n.* (1991) (citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592

(6th Cir. 1989); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989)).

12 See Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995) (examining "the nature of the plaintiff's claims, the relief sought, and the

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however, we remind litigants that "it is obviously preferable

for the plaintiff to be specific in the first instance to avoid any

ambiguity." Hafer, 502 U.S. at 24 n.* (internal quotation

omitted).

We conclude that the course of proceedings in this case

neither put Moore on notice that she was being sued in her

individual capacity, nor evidenced her understanding that her

personal liability was at stake. As noted, the complaint itself

did not give her such a warning, stating only that "Defendant

Moore is the Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections

and is responsible for the overall operation of that Department and each institution of which it is comprised, including

the D.C. Jail." Nor did the complaint seek to hold the

defendants jointly and severally liable, a formulation that

might have given some indication of an intention to sue Moore

in her personal capacity. See Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 425.

Indeed, at several points the complaint refers to "defendant's

failure" in the possessive singular, suggesting that plaintiff

viewed Moore and the District as interchangeable. See

Compl. p p 21, 23, 25, 27.

Daskalea contends that the fact that Moore was named at

all indicates an intention to hold her personally liable, because

naming Moore would have added nothing to the available

damages if she had been named only in her official capacity.

Although the latter point is true, it does not prove the former.

Complaints often include surplusage. Indeed, it is not uncommon for civil rights complaints to name both the municipality and an officer charged in his or her official capacity.

On occasion this may be due to a misunderstanding of the law

of section 1983, but it also may be done in an effort to

__________

course of proceedings"); Jackson v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 16

F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1326

(2d Cir. 1993); see also Hafer, 502 U.S. at 24 n.* (citing Houston v.

Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1991); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d

628, 635-36 (3rd Cir. 1990); Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 394

n.8 (7th Cir. 1988); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 603-604

(11th Cir. 1987)).

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"personalize" the otherwise faceless municipal entity being

sued.13

Once the complaint was filed, attorneys for the District

repeatedly expressed their understanding that Moore had

been sued solely in her official capacity. District counsel

expressed that understanding in their answer to the complaint. See J.A. at 511 (stating that Moore had been "sued

solely in her official capacity"). They did so again in their

trial brief, specifically noting that because plaintiff "has sued

only the District and the Director of the Department of

Corrections in her official capacity, plaintiff's claim is governed by the standards set forth in Monell." J.A. at 43. And

they did so yet again, with great clarity, on four occasions

during the trial.14 Not once, prior to rebuttal argument, did

Daskalea's attorney dispute opposing counsel's characterization of the nature of the case. To the contrary, plaintiff's own

trial brief, which addressed only one claim, mentioned only a

single defendant--the District of Columbia. See Pl. Trial Br.

at 1 (Jan. 12, 1998).

Moreover, both Moore and her counsel plainly acted on the

understanding that she had been sued solely in an official

capacity. Moore did not hire separate counsel, but relied

__________

13 The fact that the complaint sought punitive damages did not

put Moore on notice that she was being sued in her individual

capacity. Although we hold in Part IV that such damages are

unavailable against the District (or against Moore if sued in an

official capacity), Daskalea prosecuted the case on the understanding that punitive damages would be available against the District if

she succeeded on a negligent supervision theory.

14 Those four occasions were: (1) before jury selection, see Tr.

at 8-9 (Court: "So it is only Margaret Moore?" D.C. Counsel: "In

her official capacity."); (2) when Moore testified, see J.A. at 216

("Ms. Moore is also named as a defendant in her official capacity.");

(3) when moving for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's

evidence, see J.A. at 359 ("Margaret Moore's sued solely in her

official capacity."); and (4) in closing argument, see Trial Tr. at 902

("She is sued in this case in official capacity, which means that she's

sued just because she's the head of the Department of Corrections.").

instead upon the District of Columbia Office of Corporation

Counsel, which represented the District in the case. Although joint representation would not necessarily have been

unusual even if Moore had been sued individually, it would

have raised potential conflicts that would have had to have

been addressed. See Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 427 ("[N]aming

the officials in their individual capacities ... may make

continued joint representation problematic, if not impossible.

A municipality and officials named individually may have

mutually exclusive defenses.").

Corporation Counsel certainly defended the case as if

Moore had nothing personally at risk. A government official

sued under section 1983 has available to her the defense of

qualified immunity, a defense unavailable in an officialcapacity suit. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-167; Atchinson,

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73 F.3d at 425. Corporation Counsel did not offer that

defense on Moore's behalf, notwithstanding that it surely

would have been at least colorable had she been sued individually. Nor did Corporation Counsel (or plaintiff's counsel, for

that matter) seek to introduce evidence of Moore's personal

finances, despite the fact that punitive damages awards are

supposed to be based on a defendant's "personal financial

resources." Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 269; see also Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 940 (D.C. 1995).

Other than assuming complete incompetence (as well as gross

malpractice) on the part of Moore's attorneys, the only explanation for these lapses must have been their perception that

Moore had been sued in her official capacity alone.

As against all of this, Daskalea draws our attention to a

pretrial deposition at which counsel focused on the specifics of

Moore's involvement, as well as to a pretrial conference at

which her lawyer told lawyers for the District that "we're

coming dead at your directors," and that "your Director was

negligent." These events did not, however, serve to put

Director Moore on notice that plaintiff was seeking to hold

her individually liable: Moore's personal involvement, even

her personal negligence, was equally relevant to proving the

District's own deliberate indifference and negligent supervision.

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Finally, Daskalea calls our attention to her counsel's closing

rebuttal argument, during which he told the jury: "Margaret

Moore is an actor here. Margaret Moore is responsible for

this. Margaret Moore isn't some figurehead...." Even if

this were enough to make Moore's personal stake clear, it was

simply too late to do so in a rebuttal argument--the last piece

of advocacy prior to the jury's deliberations. By that time it

was too late for Moore to hire separate counsel, to proffer a

defense of qualified immunity, or to introduce evidence that

her personal assets did not approach $5 million. Indeed, by

that time it was too late for Moore's counsel to respond in any

way at all. Such notice can hardly be characterized as fair.

See Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 427-28 (affirming denial, due to

concern for prejudice, of plaintiff's motion to amend complaint

to name official in individual capacity shortly before trial).

Accordingly, we reverse the award of damages against Moore

in her individual capacity.

VI

Sexual assault, forced naked dancing, and the other indignities borne by Sunday Daskalea at the District of Columbia

Jail are "simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation omitted); see

Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 929. To the contrary, "when

the State takes a person into its custody and holds [her] there

against [her] will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for [her] safety

and general well-being." DeShaney v. Winnebago County

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). Because

the evidence at trial established that the District of Columbia

wholly failed to live up to that responsibility, we affirm in full

the jury's award of $350,000 in compensatory damages. At

the same time, however, District law requires us to reverse

the award of punitive damages, and plaintiff's failure to sue

co-defendant Moore in her individual capacity means that the

District alone is responsible for payment.

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