Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00522/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00522-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY DELEAL,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 19-cv-00522-MMA-NLS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Rudy Deleal (“Petitioner” or “Deleal”), a state prisoner, has filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his San 

Diego Superior Court conviction for driving under the influence of a drug causing injury

in case number SCD265087. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Respondent filed an answer, arguing that 

Petitioner’s petition fails on the merits, and lodged the court records. (ECF No. 6; ECF 

No. 7 (“Lodgment”).) Petitioner was provided with the opportunity to file a traverse by 

July 10, 2019, (ECF No. 4 at 2,) but has failed to do so to date. After reviewing the 

parties’ submissions and the lodgments, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

///

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:1

Megan, a stay-at-home mother and part-time model, lived with her 

two children and their father in an apartment in San Diego, California. On an 

evening in December 2015, Megan went for a walk on University Avenue to 

a nearby store.

Around the same time, Jesus Contreras was driving westbound on 

University Avenue. Contreras observed a sport utility vehicle (SUV) driving 

two cars in front of him. The SUV was zigzagging and swerving between 

lanes. Contreras reached for his phone to call 911 because he believed the 

driver of the SUV was under the influence. Contreras saw the SUV slow 

down and move to the right as if it was going to park. The SUV then 

accelerated onto the sidewalk and crashed near a recycling center. 

Shawn Johnson was at a car wash on University Avenue when he 

heard tires screeching and a thumping sound of a vehicle hitting something. 

Johnson turned and saw Megan fly into the air, land on the ground, and roll 

over. The vehicle then crashed and stopped. Johnson took a picture of the 

vehicle and called 911.

San Diego Police Officer Wilton Garbutt responded to the scene of 

the accident. When he arrived, Officer Garbutt saw that a SUV had collided 

with a traffic sign and Megan was lying in the parking lot of the car wash. 

Megan was unconscious and bleeding from her head. Deleal was slouched in 

the driver’s seat of the SUV. He was unconscious. 

Officer Garbutt knocked on the window of the SUV several times, but 

Deleal did not respond. Officer Garbutt broke the passenger window of the 

SUV to unlock the doors. The keys to the SUV were still in the ignition. 

Officer Garbutt placed the car in park and took the keys out. Deleal was still 

unconscious when paramedics arrived approximately five minutes later.

 

1 This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct; Petitioner 

may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 

(1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from those facts, are 

entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). Here, Petitioner does not raise a challenge to any of 

these facts.

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Officer Michael Gottfried obtained surveillance video from the car 

wash. The video showed the SUV committing a traffic violation by moving 

unsafely to the right, leaving the paved portion of the roadway, and striking 

Megan who was walking on the sidewalk. The SUV came to a stop when it 

crashed into a street sign.

Paramedics transported Megan and Deleal to the hospital. Megan did 

not remember being struck by a vehicle. When she woke up in the hospital, 

she was in extreme pain and was having difficulty breathing. She had a large 

hematoma and contusion near he left eyebrow. She was missing two teeth 

and a third was partially broken. Megan had a swollen lip, abrasions on her 

hands, and blood in her mouth. A scan revealed that Megan had bleeding in 

her brain and had fractured her pelvis. After she left the hospital, Megan had 

to learn to walk again and undergo speech therapy. At the time of trial, 

Megan still had memory loss, pain throughout her body, and migraines. 

Dr. Mark Cannis treated Deleal. When he first came into the hospital, 

Deleal was “poorly responsive,” his eyes were closed, and he did not 

respond to questions. He was snoring and breathing slowly. Dr. Cannis 

performed numerous blood tests on Deleal. The tests were negative for 

alcohol. A urine test showed positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, 

marijuana, and a tricyclic antidepressant medication. Subsequent laboratory 

tests on Deleal’s blood samples confirmed methamphetamine at 254 

nanograms per milliliter and amphetamine at 22 nanograms per milliliter. 

Dr. Cannis testified that initial symptoms of methamphetamine 

intoxication include agitation, hyperactivity, delirium, and delusional 

behavior. The person may also have hallucinations or a fast heart rate. As the 

methamphetamine wears out of a person’s system, the person typically has a 

“profound degree of somnolence and fatigue and tiredness. It’s as if they 

haven’t – well, in some cases it is because they haven’t slept for days.” Dr. 

Cannis had seen many patients who had experienced seizures from 

marijuana use. In Dr. Cannis’s opinion, a combination of methamphetamine 

and marijuana could increase the possibility of seizures. 

Based on his training and experience, Dr. Cannis concluded that 

Deleal had a provoked seizure from methamphetamine and 

sympathomimetic abuse. Dr. Cannis explained that sympathomimetic refers 

to a substance or drug that causes a person to act in an agitated, delirious, or 

adrenaline provoked state. According to Dr. Cannis, it was possible that 

Deleal’s seizure was only coincidentally associated with his positive 

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toxicology results. However, it was much more likely that Deleal had a 

provoked seizure from methamphetamine and sympathomimetic drugs. In 

reaching this conclusion, Dr. Cannis considered that Deleal did not have 

epilepsy or other factors that could cause seizures. 

Ola Bawardi, a forensic toxicologist, testified that a person with a 

blood result of methamphetamine at a level of 254 nanograms per milliliter 

can be impaired for purposes of driving. For example, the person may drive 

too fast, drive erratically, have difficulty maintaining his lane of travel, and 

may not pay attention to things on the roadway. If a driver swerves in and 

out of traffic, makes an altered movement to the right, accelerates up a curb, 

strikes an individual, and then rolls to a rest, the driving pattern can be 

consistent with somebody who is under the influence of methamphetamine. 

Bawardi testified that methamphetamine can cause a person’s body to 

“crash,” when his body becomes so fatigued that it can no longer produce 

the stimulating effect typically associated with the drug. During the crash 

phase, the person can appear almost drunk and is extremely fatigued, 

drowsy, and difficult to wake up. However, the person could still have

internal signs of stimulation such as elevated blood pressure and heart rate. 

According to Bawardi, although a person crashing from methamphetamine 

may be difficult to wake up, he or she would not experience a prolonged 

period of unconsciousness. Unconsciousness for a period of several hours 

would be inconsistent with a person crashing from methamphetamine use. 

Defense

Dr. Charles O’Connell, an emergency room physician and medical 

toxicologist, testified that methamphetamine rarely causes seizures. In 

general, it only happens in cases of massive overdose. According to Dr. 

O’Connell, Deleal’s methamphetamine concentration of 254 nanongrams 

per milliliter is at the very low end of recreational abuse. In order for a 

seizure to occur, a person would need a significantly higher drug 

concentration. 

Dr. O’Connell reviewed Deleal’s medical records and investigative 

reports regarding the accident. Dr. O’Connell testified that Deleal’s level of 

deep sedation was not consistent with a methamphetamine “crash” because a 

person coming down from a methamphetamine high would wake up from 

prodding and stimulation. Additionally, it is not consistent with 

methamphetamine intoxication for a person to be unconscious at the wheel 

of a car after the use of the drug. In Dr. O’Connell’s opinion, Deleal was not 

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significantly intoxicated by methamphetamine at the time of the accident.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2-6.) After an independent review of the trial record, the Court 

concludes that the California Court of Appeal’s opinion represents an accurate 

summary of the record. (See Lodgment No. 1). 

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner appears to have been initially charged on April 6, 2016.

2

 (See Lodgment 

No. 2 at 7.) Petitioner was charged with driving under the influence of drugs causing 

injury. (Id. at 8); see Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(e) (2015). The prosecution also alleged 

“that in the commission and attempted commission of the offenses, [Petitioner]

personally inflicted great bodily injury upon . . . ANDERSON,” within the meaning of 

Cal. Penal Code §§ 1192.7(c)(8) and 12022.7(a). (Lodgment No. 2 at 8.) 

On June 6, 2016, a jury convicted Petitioner of driving under the influence of drugs 

causing injury and found true the accompanying allegations. (Id. at 118-119, 121.) On 

September 19, 2016, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total of 5 years in state 

prison. (Lodgment No. 1-7 at 633, 635; Lodgment No. 2 at 91.) Petitioner’s sentence was 

comprised of a middle term of two years for causing injury while driving under the 

influence of a drug and a consecutive sentence of three years for personally inflicting 

great bodily injury under Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a). 3(See Lodgment No. 1-7 at 

635:19-26; Lodgment No. 2 at 48, 91.) 

///

///

 

2 The “Complaint-Felony” in Lodgment No. 2 includes several dates on it. The date “APR 0 6 2016” 

appears in large, bolded font on the first page of the complaint. (Lodgment No. 2 at 7.) Another date, 

“2016 Jan 14” also appears on the same page. (Id.) Additionally, the “Declaration in Support of Arrest 

Warrant” was stamped on “2016 Jan 21,” but was signed “on this 7th day of January 2016.” (Id. at 10, 

13.)

3

It is not clear from the record what happened to the additional enhancement under Cal. Penal Code § 

1192.7(c)(8). The jury found the allegation associated with § 1192.7(c)(8) true, but it does not appear in 

Petitioner’s sentencing form. (Lodgment No. 2 at 119. See id. at 91.)

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B. Direct Appeal

On October 25, 2016, Petitioner filed for appeal. (Lodgment No. 2 at 92.) In his 

direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that his conviction should be reversed on the ground that 

there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of driving under the influence of a drug 

and that the trial court erred by denying him probation. (Lodgment No. 3 at 31, 38.)

Petitioner argued that aside from an eyewitness’s testimony of his erratic driving pattern, 

“there was no other credible showing that appellant was under the influence of a drug 

while he was driving.” (Lodgment No. 3 at 34.) Petitioner further argued that the failure 

of the prosecution’s expert witnesses to “opine that appellant was under the influence of 

methamphetamine” along with other inconsistencies in the expert testimony meant that 

“there [wa]s insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support the conviction.” 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 34, 36–37.) On September 22, 2017, the California Court of Appeals 

rejected petitioner’s argument stating that “[b]ased on the record before us, the jury’s 

finding that Deleal was driving while under the influence was not based on speculation or 

conjecture. While there was some testimony that may have contradicted the jury’s 

finding, there was ample evidence to support the finding.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 9–10.) 

On November 1, 2017, Petitioner sought review from the California Supreme 

Court. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) On review, Petitioner presented the same issues that he had 

raised with the California Court of Appeals. (See Lodgment No. 7.) On December 13, 

2017, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review without 

further comment. (Lodgment No. 8.)

C. Federal Habeas Proceedings

On March 19, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in this Court. (ECF No.1 at 1.) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: “(1) 

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resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “or (2) resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented at the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Early v. Packer, 537 

U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); § 2254(d)(2)).

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies a very deferential review, inquiring only whether 

the state court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable.” See Yarborough v. Gentry, 

540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). “A federal 

habeas court may issue the writ under the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state court applied a 

rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decide[d]

a case differently than [the Supreme Court] ha[s] done on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). A state court is not required to cite Supreme Court 

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. For purposes 

of § 2254(d), clearly established federal law, means “the governing principle or principles 

set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer 

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 413).

“The court may grant relief under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state 

court correctly identifie[d] the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions 

but unreasonably applie[d] it to the facts of the particular case.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 694

(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08). 

To meet the “unreasonable application” standard, a “state court’s decision [must] 

be more than incorrect or erroneous.” Lockyer 538 U.S. at 75 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 410, 412). Further, a federal court reviewing a habeas petition “must determine what 

arguments or theories supported, or . . . could have supported, the state-court decision;

and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

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arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the 

Supreme Court].” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). This is an extremely 

deferential review and imposes a heavy burden on the Petitioner to prove that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Id. at 103. 

To determine if “a decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented,” the state court’s factual findings “are presumed 

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1)). A state court’s decision “will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless” its factual determinations were “objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state court.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also 

Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds reviewing 

the record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively unreasonable). In order 

to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate 

panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude 

that the finding is supported by the record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75) overruled on other grounds by 

Murray v. Schirro, 745 F.3d 984, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2014), as recognized in Kirkpatrick 

v. Chappell, 926 F.3d 1157, 1170 n.3 (9th Cir. 2019).

When state’s highest court does not provide a reasoned decision, the Court “look[s] 

through” it to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes that the higher court’s 

“unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 

1192 (2018). See also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1996). Although not 

entitled to perform a de novo review, if the dispositive state court does not “furnish a 

basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct “an independent review of 

the record . . . to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of 

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controlling federal law.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000)), overruled on other grounds by

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76; accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982). 

V. DISCUSSION

In this federal habeas petition, the only issue raised by Petitioner is a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. (See ECF No. 1-2.)4

As a threshold matter, there is some confusion in Petitioner’s memoranda as to which 

section of AEDPA Petitioner is moving under. In his petition, Petitioner states that the issue 

raised is “[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to support conviction, under Jackson v. Virginia

(1979) 443 U.S. 307.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The heading for Petitioner’s argument reads 

“Petitioner’s conviction should be reversed because under Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 433 

U.S. 307, the evidence was insufficient to support the element requiring proof that he was 

under the influence of a drug.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 18.) Petitioner then asserts that he should 

be issued a writ of habeas corpus because he can meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). (Id. at 19, 18.) However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “§2254(d)(2) is not 

readily applicable to Jackson cases” because it “does not describe the task of a court in 

performing a Jackson analysis.” Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677, 678 (9th Cir. 2007) 

reversed on other grounds Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009), as recognized 

in Martinez v. Gonzalez, Case No.: 17-cv-1760-WQH-AGS, 2019 WL 1590471, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-55440 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2019); accord

Flores v. Beard, 533 F. Appx. 730, 731 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013). “We therefore evaluate a state 

court’s resolution of a Jackson sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in all cases under § 

2254(d)(1) rather than §2254(d)(2).” Sarausad, 471 F.3d at 678. Following this Ninth 

 

4 Petitioner failed to file a timely traverse in this case. However, the claims made by Petitioner in his 

memoranda supporting his Petition do not provide any authority to support a claim that the California 

Court of Appeal’s decision was “contrary to” clearly established Federal law. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 19-

20); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As a result, the Court will not perform any analysis under the “contrary to” 

prong of § 2254(d)(1). 

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Circuit precedent, this Court will analyze Petitioner’s claims under § 2254(d)(1). 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

The Supreme Court’s primary precedent on sufficiency of the evidence is Jackson 

v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 317–324 (1979), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 1-4-132, 110 Stat. 1214, as recognized 

in Starr v. Mitchell, No. 98-4541, 2000 WL 1529807, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2000);5

accord Foley v. Kernan, Case No.: 16-CV-408 JLS (BGS), 2018 WL 3426209, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. July 16, 2018).

6 The Supreme Court has held that “the Due Process Clause . . . 

protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction ‘except upon proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.’” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 

In Jackson, the Supreme Court established that “the critical inquiry on review of the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be . . . to determine 

whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 318. However, a court reviewing such evidence should not 

“ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318–19 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966))

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a reviewing court is 

called upon to evaluate “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

 

5 Although Jackson has been superseded by AEDPA, the Jackson standards for sufficiency of evidence 

have continued to be applied by courts in the Ninth Circuit. See e.g., United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 

1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010); Maquiz v. Hedgpeth, 907 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018); Foley v. 

Kernan, Case No.: 16-CV-408 JLS (BGS), 2018 WL 3426209, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2018); 

Granados v. Montgomery, Case No.: 19cv0517 GPC (NLS), 2019 WL 3288953, at *11 (S.D. Cal. July

22, 2019). The Supreme Court has also reaffirmed the Jackson standard. See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 

U.S. 120, 132-33 (2010). Therefore, the Court has applied the Jackson standard to this case. 

6

In its discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence in Petitioner’s case, the California Court of Appeal 

drew its definition of “‘[s]ubstantial evidence’” from People v. Gallardo, 22 Cal. App. 4th 489, 492 

(1994). (Lodgment No. 6 at 7.) Gallardo in turn quoted from People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 578 

(1980), which relied heavily on Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). As a result, the general 

standard for sufficiency of the evidence is ultimately drawn from Jackson. See e.g., Foley v. Kernan, 

2018 WL 3426209, at *3 (finding that by citing state precedents that “directly rely on Jackson v. 

Virginia . . . the California Court of Appeal correctly identified the governing legal rule.”).

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to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 

362 (1972)) (alteration in original). The Jackson Court further specified “that upon 

judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution.” Id. (alteration in original). 

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Jackson as creating “a two-step inquiry.” U.S. v. 

Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010). Using the language of Jackson, the Ninth 

Circuit held that a court evaluating the sufficiency of evidence must first consider that 

evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and in doing so, presume that 

any factual conflicts in the record were resolved “‘in favor of the prosecution.’”

7

Id.

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). Second, “the reviewing court must determine 

whether this evidence . . . is adequate to allow ‘any rational trier of fact [to find] the 

essential elements . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319) (alterations in original). This inquiry should be applied “with reference to the 

elements of the criminal offense as set forth by state law.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 

1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16); accord Gonzales v. 

Gipson, 701 Fed. Appx. 558, 560 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275). 

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient by itself. Granados v. Montgomery, Case No.: 

19cv0517 GPC (NLS), 2019 WL 3288953, at *11 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2019) (quoting 

Maquiz v. Hedgpeth, 907 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2018)). However, the Ninth Circuit 

has noted that “[s]peculation and conjecture cannot take the place of reasonable 

inferences and evidence -- whether direct or circumstantial.” Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. 

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has specified that “[a]fter AEDPA, we apply the 

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference.” Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 

 

7 The full quote from Jackson reads as follows: “a federal habeas court faced with a record of historical 

facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume––even if it does not affirmatively appear in the 

record––that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and must defer to 

that resolution.” 443 U.S. at 326. 

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(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).8 Finally, decisions of circuit courts may be considered “to 

the extent that they illuminate the meaning and application of Supreme Court 

precedents,” id. (citing Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004)), but “only 

‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States’ can be the basis for relief under AEDPA.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

B. Analysis

Petitioner was convicted of violating Section 23153(e) of the California Vehicle 

Code.9(Lodgment No. 2 at 118.) This Section states:

It is unlawful for a person, while under the influence of any drug, to drive a 

vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law, or neglect any duty 

imposed by law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately 

causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver.

Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(e) (2015). The California Court of Appeal has specified that the 

elements of this offense are:

(1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or 

drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is 

a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result 

of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was 

injured.

People v. Minor, 28 Cal. App. 4th 431, 438 (1994) (citing People v. Capetillo, 220 Cal. 

App. 3d 211, 216 (1990)). Further, the California Court of Appeal has stated that “[t]o be 

‘under the influence’ within the meaning of the Vehicle Code, the liquor or liquor and 

 

8 The Ninth Circuit stated in Gonzales v. Gipson that when “the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (‘AEDPA’) applies . . . ‘we owe a “double dose of deference”’ to the state court’s 

judgment.” 701 Fed. Appx. 558, 559 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th 

Cir. 2013)). However, the Ninth Circuit has not clearly distinguished this standard from the AEDPA 

standard itself. For example, in Juan H., the Ninth Circuit stated “that we must ask whether the decision 

of the California Court of Appeal reflected on an ‘unreasonable application’ of Jackson and Winship to 

the facts of this case.” 408 F.3d at 1275 (citing 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)). 

9

In the current version of the California Vehicle Code this is Section 23153(f). See Cal. Veh. Code § 

23153(f). 

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drug(s) must have so far affected the nervous system, the brain, or muscles as to impair to 

an appreciable degree the ability to operate a vehicle in a manner like that of an 

ordinarily prudent and cautious person in full possession of his faculties.” Byrd v. 

Municipal Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 1058 (1981) (citing People v. Haeussler, 41 

Cal. 2d 252, 261 (1953)) (alteration in original); accord People v. McNeal, 46 Cal. 4th 

1192-93 (2009) (quoting Byrd, 125 Cal. App. 3d at 1058). 

Petitioner appears to argue that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding 

that he was under the influence of a drug at the time of the accident, thereby invalidating 

his conviction for driving under the influence causing injury. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 19–

20.) Petitioner presents two primary arguments in support of this contention: First, 

relying on the testimony of his expert witness, Petitioner essentially argues that aside 

from his driving pattern, the circumstances under which he was found at the scene of the 

accident and the symptoms he presented following the accident were “not consistent with 

meth intoxication.” (Id. at 19 (citations omitted).) Second, Petitioner argues that “neither 

of the prosecution’s experts could say with any degree of certainty that a person 

presenting with petitioner’s symptoms right after the collision was under the influence of 

methamphetamine for purposes of driving.” (Id. at 20.) 

Respondent rejects these arguments, contending that there was sufficient evidence 

to find Petitioner guilty. (See ECF No. 6-1 at 6-12.) Respondent argues that 

“[Petitioner’s] erratic and unlawful driving, his blood test results, and the testimony of 

both his treating physician and the forensic toxicologist, constituted substantial evidence 

that [Petitioner] was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time he struck the 

victim.” (Id. at 12.) 

In line with the precedents established by the Supreme Court, this court “‘look[s] 

through,’” the California Supreme Court’s unexplained opinion to examine the reasoning 

of the California Court of Appeal. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192; (Lodgment No. 8; 

Lodgment No. 6). 

In its opinion, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument that 

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the only evidence in the record supporting the first element of the charge, driving under 

the influence of a drug, was the manner of his driving, which was insufficient to sustain 

his conviction by itself. (See Lodgment No. 6 at 8-9.) In so doing, the Court of Appeal 

highlighted additional evidence in the trial record that, in the court’s estimation, tended to 

support Petitioner’s conviction. This evidence included testimony from an eyewitness, 

Jesus Contreras, who observed Petitioner’s erratic driving pattern, the accident itself, and 

believed Petitioner was under the influence. (Id. at 8.) In addition, the Court of Appeal 

noted that the prosecution had presented evidence showing that Petitioner “had 

methamphetamine in his blood at a level of 254 nanograms per milliliter.” (Id.) The Court 

of Appeal further pointed to evidence from Ola Bawardi, a forensic toxicologist and 

expert witness. (See id. at 9, 5.) Bawardi testified that Petitioner’s “driving pattern was 

consistent with somebody under the influence of methamphetamine,” and that it was 

possible for a person with the same level of methamphetamine in their blood as Petitioner 

presented to “be impaired for the purpose of driving.” (Id. at 9.) Finally, the Court of 

Appeal noted that Petitioner’s elevated heart rate was a symptom that was consistent with 

methamphetamine intoxication. (Id.)

Additionally, the Court of Appeal also rejected Petitioner’s second line of

argument that the conflicting testimony of expert witnesses at trial reduces the finding 

that he was under the influence of methamphetamine to “speculation and conjecture.” (Id.

at 9.) In rejecting Petitioner’s argument that his unconsciousness was not consistent with 

methamphetamine intoxication, the appellate court noted Bawardi’s testimony that 

responses to methamphetamine are very individualized and can depend on a range of 

factors such as the “individual’s health.” (See id.) Bawardi also testified “that seizures 

can occur at any level of methamphetamine intoxication.” (Id.) Finally, the Court of 

Appeal highlighted the fact that although Dr. Cannis, the physician who treated 

Petitioner, had conceded it was possible for Petitioner’s seizure to only have been 

coincidental to his methamphetamine levels, he testified that “it was much more likely 

that [Petitioner] had a provoked seizure from methamphetamine and sympathomimetic 

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drugs.” (Id. at 9.) The court also emphasized that Dr. Cannis based his conclusions on his 

experience with thousands of methamphetamine patients, the extensive testing he had 

conducted on Petitioner, and that Petitioner had no history of seizures caused by other 

reasons. (Id.)

Despite the presence of contrasting evidence in the trial record, the Court of 

Appeal concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding and 

sustain Petitioner’s conviction. Analyzing this conclusion within the context of AEDPA, 

this Court cannot say that the Court of Appeal’s decision represented an “unreasonable 

application of” the standard for sufficiency of evidence established by the Supreme Court 

in Jackson. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315, 318-19, 326. In order 

for a state court’s decision to violate the AEDPA standard, that court’s “application must 

be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75 (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 409). Further, the Supreme Court has clearly established that “[s]ection 2254(d) . 

. . [is] designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting 

constitutional challenges to state convictions,” and that Petitioner has the substantial 

burden of “show[ing] that the state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. Given these 

standards and the foregoing evidence considered by the Court of Appeal in reaching its 

decision, this Court concludes that Petitioner has not made the necessary showing to 

establish that the Court of Appeal’s decision represented an “unreasonable application 

of” the Jackson standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315, 318-19, 

326. 

Moreover, based on an independent review of the record, this Court finds 

additional evidence not specifically cited by the Court of Appeal that could have 

supported the jury’s verdict. (See Lodgment No. 1.) For example, the jury had the 

opportunity to view footage of the accident from a nearby security camera, which at least 

showed Petitioner’s SUV making unsafe movements before the accident. (See Lodgment 

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No. 1-2 at 95-100.) Additionally, the jury heard testimony from Dr. Cannis that while he 

was treating Petitioner, he “obtained a urine toxicologic panel, which showed positive 

methamphetamines, positive amphetamines, positive tetrahydrocannabinol, which is 

marijuana. Positive for tricyclic antidepression medication.” (Lodgment No. 1-3 at 

199:19-23.) Dr. Cannis also testified that marijuana can cause seizures and that 

combining it with methamphetamine can increase the likelihood of a person suffering 

from a seizure. (Id. at 226, 227.) 

The record also indicated that the jury may have had reasons for discounting the 

testimony of Dr. O’Connell, the defense’s expert witness. For instance, the Court notes 

that even Dr. O’Connell could not opine with certainty that Petitioner had suffered from a 

seizure. When asked “it’s your opinion here today . . . that we don’t even know if the 

defendant had a seizure, correct” Dr. O’Connell replied “It’s possible. I mean, I don’t 

have another explanation.” (Lodgment No. 1-4 at 433:6-9.) Further, Dr. O’Connell 

testified that his final report stated that it was “unclear” what caused Petitioner’s “altered 

mental status.”10 (Id. at 435.) Such testimony does not reflect certainty. Dr. O’Connell 

also conceded that his evaluation of Petitioner’s records in the absence of the opportunity 

to personally examine him effectively amounted to “Monday morning quarterbacking.” 

(Id. at 441.) Finally, when asked whether he “recommend someone driving with 254-

nanograms per milliliter [of methamphetamine] in their system,” Dr. O’Connell testified 

“[t]hat’s a difficult question to answer. There are some tests that show under 200 actually 

enhances driving behavior. 254 is a little above that range.” (Id. at 444:6-7,8-10; see also 

id. at 425-27.) 

Petitioner’s primary argument for why his writ of habeas corpus should be granted 

is based on perceived inconsistencies in the record, primarily in the testimony of the 

witnesses. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 19-20.) However, the Writ of Habeas Corpus is “an 

 

10 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. O’Connell: “isn’t it true that your final conclusion in 

this case was that the cause of [Petitioner’s] altered mental status at the time of the incident is unclear?” 

Dr. O’Connell answered “[y]es, I believe I said that.” (Lodgment No. 1-4 at 435:2-6.) 

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extraordinary remedy,” and this Court is required to view all of the evidence presented at 

trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see e.g., 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus has 

historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy. . . .”). Evaluation of evidence and 

resolution of factual disputes is the purview of the trier of fact. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

It is not the place of this Court to disturb the evaluations or resolutions made by the 

finder of fact, and any attempt to do so would be a clear violation of the standards 

governing review of the sufficiency of the evidence, as this Court must consider all 

factual disagreements to have been resolved in the prosecution’s favor. See id. at 326 (“a 

federal habeas court . . . must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts 

in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.”) As the foregoing 

discussion shows, the evidence presented by Petitioner does not rise above the level of 

factual inconsistency or disagreement amongst the testimony presented at trial. Since the 

Court must presume such disagreements resolved in the prosecution’s favor, the Court 

cannot recommend that a Writ be issued on the grounds of insufficient evidence. See 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

Finally, although not required, the Court will briefly consider the argument from 

Petitioner’s brief that his conviction “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented.” See (ECF No. 1-2 at 19-20); 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). Even under this provision, the petition fails. In order for a petition to be 

granted under Section 2254(d)(2), the state court’s decision has to be “objectively 

unreasonable.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. “It is objectively unreasonable, for example, to 

fail to make an obvious factual finding, to misapprehend or misstate the record with 

respect to material facts, or to ignore evidence in support of a petitioner’s claim.” Lopez 

v. Jenkins, No. 08cv0457–LAB (AJB), 2009 WL 4895274, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 

2009) (citing Taylor, 366 F.3d at 992). Petitioner appears to argue that the state court 

“fail[ed] to make an obvious factual finding” by not finding that Petitioner was not under 

the influence at the time of accident. See Lopez, 2009 WL 4895274, at *2; (ECF No. 1-2 

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at 19-20.) However, given the evidence presented at trial supporting the conclusion that 

Petitioner was under the influence that was addressed in the foregoing discussion, 

Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that either the jury’s verdict or the Court of 

Appeal’s opinion reflected an “unreasonable determination of the facts.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that 

Petitioner’s habeas petition be DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Michael M. Anello under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. In addition, IT IS 

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting 

this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING

the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than November 6, 2019. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than November 20, 2019. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: October 15, 2019

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