Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02185/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DWIGHT TAYLOR, Civil No. 12cv2185 GPC (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

vs.

JOEL A. JOHNSON; CANDACE BEEN;

DR. AUHL; MR. MOYA; MR. C. YODER;

DHS/ICE EL CENTRO DETENTION

CENTER DEP’T,

Defendants.

On September 5, 2012, Dwight Boyd Taylor (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at the San

Diego Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1) Plaintiff did not prepay $350

filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). On October 16, 2012, District

Judge Irma E. Gonzalez granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously dismissed

his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 3.)

Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of

pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 6-7.) On October 22, 2012, this matter was

transferred to the docket of United States District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel. (ECF No. 4.) 

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\12cv2185-Dismiss FAC.wpd -1- 12cv2185 GPC (PCL)

Case 3:12-cv-02185-GPC-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/12/13 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Currently pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No.

5.)

I.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte dismissal by the

Court to the extent it contains claims which are “frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief froma defendant immune fromsuch relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)

(holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”). “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true

all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

A. Bivens Action

The Court notes that while Plaintiff again purportedly brings this action under § 1983, the

Court will liberally construe his claims to arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed.

Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) because Plaintiff claims violations of his civil rights by

a federal actors. Bivens established that “compensable injury to a constitutionally protected

interest [byfederal officials alleged to have acted under color offederal law] could be vindicated

by a suit for damages invoking the general federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts

[pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978). “Actions under

§ 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement of a state actor under

§ 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991).

To state a private cause of action under Bivens, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\12cv2185-Dismiss FAC.wpd -2- 12cv2185 GPC (PCL)

Case 3:12-cv-02185-GPC-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/12/13 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

committed by a federal actor. Id.; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624

(9th Cir. 1988). Bivens provides that “federal courts have the inherent authority to award

damages against federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional

rights.” Western Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, a Bivens action may only be brought against the responsible federal official in his or

her individual capacity. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988). Bivens

does not authorize a suit against the government or its agencies for monetary relief. FDIC v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988);

Daly- Murphy, 837 F.2d at 355. Here, Plaintiff seeks to sue the “El Centro Processing Center”

which is not permitted in a Bivens matter for the reasons set forth above. In addition, Plaintiff

seeks to hold all the Defendants liable in their official capacity only, which once again, is not

authorized in a Bivens action. Id. Thus, the entire action must be dismissed on these grounds

as Plaintiff does not name any of the Defendants in their individual capacities. 

B. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate medical care while he was housed at the El

Centro Detention Center. (See FAC at 6.) To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money

damages for alleged inadequate health care against federal employees, the Court finds that he

has failed to state a claim. It appears as though Plaintiff is a detainee at the time the claims

found in his First Amended Complaint arose. Thus, the Eighth Amendment may not apply to

him. Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate

only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with

criminal prosecutions. . . . [and] the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the

Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in

accordance with due process of law.”); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“Because [petitioner] had not been convicted of a crime, but had only been arrested,

his rights derive from the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection

against cruel and unusual punishment.”). 

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\12cv2185-Dismiss FAC.wpd -3- 12cv2185 GPC (PCL)

Case 3:12-cv-02185-GPC-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/12/13 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rather, if Plaintiff was a detainee at the time his claims arose, his conditions of

confinement claims must be analyzed under “the more protective” substantive due process

standard. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-33 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Wolfish, 441 U.S. at

538-39 (“Absent a showing of an express intent to punish on the part of detention facility

officials, . . . if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to

a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’”);

Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The concept of ‘substantive

due process,’ semantically awkward as it may be, forbids the government from depriving a

person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that ‘shocks the conscience’ or ‘interferes with

rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.

739, 746 (1987)). However, “the due process clause imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the

Eighth Amendment imposes: ‘persons in custody ha(ve) the established right not to have

officials remain deliberately indifferent’” to their needs. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 (quoting

Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996)); Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410,

418-19 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will therefore look to Eighth Amendment standards to

determine the minimum level of protection afforded Plaintiff.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits any punishment which violates civilized standards of

decency or involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)). Where an

inmate’s claim is one of inadequate medical care, the inmate must allege “acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Such a claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc.

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat

the prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications

of a serious medical need include “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\12cv2185-Dismiss FAC.wpd -4- 12cv2185 GPC (PCL)

Case 3:12-cv-02185-GPC-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/12/13 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

an individual’s daily activities.” Id. at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious

medical need, an inmate satisfies the objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment

violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Even if Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to establish the existence of a serious medical

need, he must also allege that each Defendant’s response to his need was deliberatelyindifferent. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials

deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with a prescribed course of medical treatment, or it may

be shown by the way in which prison medical officials provide necessary care. Hutchinson v.

United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). Before it can be said that an inmate’s civil

rights have been abridged with regard to medical care, however, “the indifference to his medical

needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.

1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is far fromclear but it appears that he is alleging that

Defendants failed to provide him with a “shower chair” which he claims he needed for his

disabilities. (See FAC at 4.) As a result, on June 24, 2012, Plaintiff fell in the shower and hurt

his knee. (Id.) It is not clear which Defendant that Plaintiff is claiming refused to provide him

with a shower chair nor is it clear that Plaintiff ever sought to use a shower chair prior to his fall. 

The facts as Plaintiff alleges shows that he received medical treatment, was sent to an outside

hospital for an MRI and was treated in the Detention Center’s infirmary. (Id.) There are

insufficient facts from which the Court could find that any of the named Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. 

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a failure to protect claim, again he must

allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants were “deliberately indifferent,” that they were

aware of, but nevertheless consciously disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Here, the First Amended Complaint is devoid of facts that would

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\12cv2185-Dismiss FAC.wpd -5- 12cv2185 GPC (PCL)

Case 3:12-cv-02185-GPC-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/12/13 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

demonstrate that any of the named Defendants knew of any excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health

or safety.

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, he fails to allege facts sufficient to show that

many of the Defendants were personally aware of his medical claims or needs. “The inquiry

into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). Here, there are no facts fromwhich this Court could find any personal

liability claim as to any of the named Defendants. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from

the date this Order is filed in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures the

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself

without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not

named and any claim not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended

Complaint within 45 days, this case shall remain dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

2. The Clerk of Court shall mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights form

complaint.

DATED: March 12, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\12cv2185-Dismiss FAC.wpd -6- 12cv2185 GPC (PCL)

Case 3:12-cv-02185-GPC-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/12/13 Page 6 of 6