Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02154/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02154-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FRANK ROQUE, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 08-02154 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) 

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On or about November 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed an amended petition on February

5, 2009. See Docket No. 14. Respondents filed an Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 20) on April

13, 2009. Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his

petition on August 5, 2009. See Docket No. 44.

I Procedural History

On September 25, 2001, a Maricopa County grand jury

indicted Petitioner on one count of first-degree murder in the

death of Mr. Balbir Singh Sodhi on September 15, 2001 (Count 1).

See Answer, Exh. I. Petitioner was also charged with three

counts of drive-by shooting, involving a Mobil gas station

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1

 The amended indictment on which Petitioner was tried was

comprised of Count 1, the first-degree murder of Mr. Sodhi; Count 2,

the drive by shooting at the Chevron station; Count 3, the attempted

first degree murder of Mr. Khalil; Count 4, the drive by shooting at

the Mobil; Count 5, the drive by shooting at the private residence;

Count 6, the reckless endangerment of Mr. Ledesma. See Answer, Exh.

L at 100-02 & Exh. F at 4.

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(Count 6), the shooting of Mr. Sodhi in front of a Chevron gas

station (Count 2), and a shooting at a private residence in Mesa

previously owned by Petitioner (Count 7). See id., Exh. I. The

grand jury further indicted Petitioner on three counts of

attempted first-degree murder, naming as victims Anwar Khalil

(Count 3), Leali Chamseddine (Count 4), and Ali Khein (Count 5).

The indictment also charged Petitioner with three counts of

reckless endangerment, naming as victims Louis Ledesma (Count

8), Jesus Ledesma (Count 9), and Jose Valencia (Count 10). Id.,

Exh. I. 

The state subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek

the death penalty if Petitioner was convicted of first-degree

murder in the death of Mr. Sodhi. Id., Exh. K. Two of the

attempted murder counts and two of the reckless endangerment

counts were later dismissed. Id., Exh. F & Exh. L.1

Prior to trial, on March 22, 2002, Petitioner’s counsel

filed a motion pursuant to Rule 11, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, requesting a hearing to evaluate Petitioner’s mental

competence to stand trial. See id., Exh. KK. The prosecution

and the defense subsequently stipulated that the trial court

could determine Petitioner’s competency to stand trial based

upon the reports of two appointed experts, Dr. Jack Potts and

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Dr. Michael Colfield. Id., Exh. LL. At the time Petitioner

requested a competency determination, he had been prescribed and

was being medicated with Zyprexa, an anti-psychotic medication.

Id., Exh. KK. 

Both experts found Petitioner competent to stand trial.

Id., Exh. MM. After reviewing the experts’ reports, on May 28,

2002, the state trial court concluded that Petitioner understood

the proceedings and was able to assist counsel with his defense.

Accordingly, the state trial court determined Petitioner was

mentally competent to stand trial, citing Arizona Revised

Statutes § 13–4510(B). Id., Exh. MM.

The presentation of evidence to the jury in

Petitioner’s trial began on or about September 2, 2003. Id.,

Exh. F. Mr. Ledesma, a witness to the shooting of Mr. Sodhi,

testified that he was in front of the Chevron station showing

Mr. Sodhi a problem with a landscaping water line when he heard

tires squealing. Id., Exh. F at 64-65 & 67. Mr. Ledesma

testified he then heard Mr. Sodhi say “Don’t shoot me”, and then

he heard gunshots. Id., Exh. F. Mr. Ledesma testified that he

was more or less kneeling on the ground about one and a half

feet from Mr. Sodhi at the time the shots were fired. Id., Exh.

F at 68. Mr. Ledesma testified that, after the first shot was

fired, he saw that Mr. Sodhi had been shot in the stomach. Id.,

Exh. F at 68. Mr. Ledesma testified that he then flung himself

prone onto the ground. Id., Exh. F at 68. Mr. Ledesma

testified that Mr. Sodhi fell to the ground after the second or

third gunshot. Id., Exh. F at 69. Mr. Ledesma testified that

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when he looked up he saw a black truck speeding away. Id., Exh.

F at 69. Mr. Ledesma testified that he did not see the

individual who fired the gunshots which struck Mr. Sodhi. Id.,

Exh. F at 69. 

A witness to the shooting of Mr. Sodhi at the Chevron

station testified that between one and three in the afternoon he

was in his vehicle on a street adjacent to the Chevron station

when he heard three gunshots and saw Mr. Sodhi fall to the

ground. Id., Exh. F at 83. The witness testified that the

shots appeared to come from a black Chevrolet S10 truck at a

distance from Mr. Sodhi of twenty or thirty feet, and that the

truck sped off after Mr. Sodhi was shot. Id., Exh. F at 83-84.

Mr. Ahmed Sahak, who had purchased a house in Mesa from

Petitioner in late 1998, testified that around 3 p.m. on

September 15, 2001, he and his wife were about to leave their

house when they heard gunshots. Id., Exh. G at 17 & 19. Mr.

Sahak testified he looked outside through a window and saw a man

in a dark pick-up truck putting down a weapon in the truck.

Id., Exh. G at 20. Mr. Sahak testified that he did not

recognize the man in the truck as Petitioner and that Petitioner

had a beard on September 15, 2001, but did not have a beard in

1998 when Mr. Sahak had purchased the house. Id., Exh. G at 20-

21.

Several witnesses, including Mr. Anwar Khalil,

testified that at approximately 2:45 p.m. on Saturday, September

15, 2001, a man in a black truck fired from the truck into a

combination Mobil gas station and sandwich shop on University

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Drive at Val Vista in Mesa, Arizona. Id., Exh. A at 50-52

(testimony of Ms. Andrews) & 70-72 (testimony of Ms. Benchley),

Exh. B at 45-47 (testimony of Mr. Khalil). Mr. Khalil testified

that he was injured by glass fragmented from a light fixture by

the shooting. Id., Exh. B at 46-47 & 55. 

The state offered evidence from police detectives,

crime scene investigators, and a ballistics expert, that the

bullets which struck Mr. Sodhi and the bullets that were fired

into the Mobil station and at the house in Mesa were fired from

weapons found in Petitioner’s house and that shell-casings from

the guns found in the house were found in Petitioner’s black

Chevrolet S10 truck, which Petitioner was seen driving on

September 15, 2001. Id., Exh. A at 181-93, Exh. G at 26-43,

Exh. B at 103-06 & 115-30.

The government’s case in chief focused on establishing

that the murder of Mr. Sodhi was premeditated. The government

presented testimony that Petitioner was very upset by the events

of September 11, 2001. Several witnesses testified Petitioner

had expressed animus towards the ethnic group he believed

responsible for the events of September 11, 2001. Id., Exh. A

at 86-87 & 105-07. Several of Petitioner’s co-workers testified

regarding Petitioner’s emotional response to the events of

September 11, 2001. See id., Exh. A at 25-27, 86-87 & Exh. B

at 23, 38-39, 42. The state also offered testimony from two of

Petitioner’s co-workers that Petitioner had told them he had “a

hard time” with a man who worked at a gas station on Broadway

who was “probably Indian”. See id., Exh. B at 12-13 & 27. The

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government also presented a witness who worked at an Applebee’s

restaurant visited by Petitioner on September 11, 2001, who

testified that on that date Petitioner, who was extremely upset,

had used the derogatory term “towelhead” to refer to people of

Middle Eastern heritage. Id., Exh. C at 18-22 (testimony of Mr.

Sewell). The government also presented witnesses who

encountered Petitioner at three different bars on the date of

the crime, i.e., the Wild Hare, Famous Sam’s, and the Papillon

Too. Id., Exh. A at 124-46 & 146-61; Exh. C at 17-26; Exh. D at

61-85; Exh. E at 6-32. 

Defense counsel was successful in discrediting some of

the prosecution’s evidence of premeditation. A police

detective, Steve Casillas, testified that when he had

interviewed Ms. Baldenegro she told him she did not see

Petitioner get in his truck and leave the Wild Hare on September

15, 2001, contradicting her testimony on the stand at the trial.

Id., Exh. E at 102-04. Upon questioning by defense counsel,

Detective Casillas testified that he had garnered Petitioner’s

Mobil, Chevron, and Discover credit card records and that,

within the six months prior to the date of the crimes, there was

no evidence Petitioner had purchased gasoline at either the

Mobil station or the Chevron station where the crimes occurred

on September 15, 2001. Id., Exh. E at 82 & 104-08. This

evidence contradicted the coworker’s statement that Petitioner

had told him he had trouble with a person who wore a turban that

worked in a gas station Petitioner patronized. The detective

testified that, although there was no evidence Petitioner had

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purchased gasoline at either of the stations involved in the

crimes within that six month time period, Petitioner had used

his Mobil and Chevron credit cards at other Chevron and Mobil

stations in that area during that time period. Id., Exh. E at

83-84 & 107-08. Additionally, the detective testified he first

contacted Petitioner at about 9 p.m. on September 15, 2001, and

that he was with Petitioner until about 11:30 p.m., and that

during that time period he saw no sign of intoxication. Id.,

Exh. E at 109-10. 

At the close of the state’s case Petitioner’s counsel

moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of reckless

endangerment with regard to Mr. Ledesma (Count 6 of the amended

indictment), asserting the state had failed to present

sufficient evidence to sustain the charge against Petitioner.

Id., Exh. C at 33. The motion was denied. Id. 

In addition to challenging the legal sufficiency of the

state’s evidence with regard to Count 6, Petitioner presented a

defense of guilty-except-insane. E.g., id., Exh. L at 68. In

support of this defense Petitioner introduced evidence from his

sister and his brother that their mother suffered from and had

been hospitalized for schizophrenia. Id., Exh. C at 37-95 &

106-89. Petitioner’s sister and his brother both testified they

had observed behavior indicating Petitioner also suffered from

mental illness from the time he was an adolescent. Id., Exh. C

at 37-95 & 106-89. Petitioner’s brother testified that he spoke

with Petitioner by telephone on September 15, 2001, and that on

that day his brother was incoherent and so emotionally unstable

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that Petitioner’s brother contacted police because he feared

Petitioner would harm himself. Id., Exh. C at 123-29.

Petitioner’s daughter also testified as to her father’s state of

mind the week of September 11, 2001, and his uncharacteristic

extreme agitation on September 15, 2001. Id., Exh. C at 190-21

& Exh. M at 152-71 & Exh. N at 4-24.

The defense presented the testimony of two

psychological experts, Dr. Philip Barry and Dr. Richard

Rosengard, regarding Petitioner’s mental condition at the time

of the crimes. Id., Exh. M at 9-151 & Exh. N at 5-103. Dr.

Barry, a psychologist, testified that prior to examining

Petitioner in May of 2003 he had reviewed the reports of Dr.

Scialli and Dr. Rosengard. Id., Exh. M at 14. Dr. Barry

testified he had administered, inter alia, the MMPI (Minnesota

Multi-phasic Personality Inventory) to Petitioner, by reading

the questions to Petitioner and recording his answers, which was

not the standard methodology for performing that test. Id.,

Exh. M at 26-30. Dr. Barry testified he had administered an IQ

test and that Petitioner’s IQ was below average. Id., Exh. M at

34.

Dr. Barry testified his testing indicated Petitioner

had a “schizotypal” personality disorder. Id., Exh. M at 40-42

& 43. Dr. Barry testified that Petitioner had experienced a

“psychotic episode” on the day of the crimes, which episode was

precipitated by the events occurring on September 11, 2001.

Id., Exh. M at 42–44, 49–52. 

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Dr. Rosengard testified he had examined Petitioner in

February and March of 2002. Id., Exh. N at 38. Dr. Rosengard,

a forensic psychiatrist, disagreed with Dr. Barry’s diagnosis,

and testified Petitioner suffered from major affective disorder

with psychotic features. Id., Exh. N at 73 & 76-77. Dr.

Rosengard agreed with Dr. Barry that Petitioner was not legally

responsible for his crimes at the time of the crimes. Id., Exh.

N at 41, 50, 69–77, 82–85. 

An independent forensic psychological expert, Dr.

Potts, called by the prosecution in rebuttal, testified that in

his opinion Petitioner was legally sane at the time of the

crimes. Id., Exh. D at 134, 138, 142–43, 146–47. Dr. Potts

examined Petitioner in 2003 on two separate occasions for two

hours each time. Id., Exh. D at 102-03 & 116. Dr. Potts

averred Petitioner told him that, on September 13, 2001,

Petitioner had heard a voice telling him to “kill the devils”.

Id., Exh. D at 123. Dr. Potts testified this statement was

consistent with what Petitioner had told Dr. Scialli and Dr.

Rosengard, i.e., Petitioner told these individuals he heard a

voice telling him to “kill the devils” on September 13. Id.,

Exh. D at 123.

Dr. Toma, a psychologist, testified he had performed a

second MMPI-2 test on Petitioner in August of 2003. Id., Exh.

O. Dr. Toma testified he had been asked to administer the test

to Petitioner because of the arguable validity of the first MMPI

test administered by Dr. Barry. Dr. Toma testified some mental

health experts believed the test should not be administered by

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the expert reading the test to the subject and recording their

answers. Id., Exh. O. 

Dr. John Scialli, a medical expert called by the state,

testified at Petitioner’s trial that he had examined Petitioner

twice in 2002. Id., Exh. O at 96 at Exh. H at 76. Dr. Scialli

testified that shortly after Petitioner was incarcerated in the

Madison Avenue Jail pending his trial, Petitioner was prescribed

Zyprexa by a different doctor, i.e., the physician attending the

inmates at the jail. Id., Exh. H. Dr. Scialli testified that,

when he examined Petitioner in 2002, Petitioner did not appear

to be psychotic at that time. Id., Exh. O at 76. This expert

witness opined Petitioner did not fit the medical diagnosis to

warrant prescribing Zyprexa, i.e., that Petitioner did not

suffer from schizophrenia or manic episodes with grandiose

behavior as those terms are represented in the DSM IV. Id.,

Exh. O at 75. 

Dr. Scialli testified that, in his opinion Petitioner

did not suffer from bipolar disorder with psychosis. Id., Exh.

O at 72. Dr. Scialli testified Petitioner did not need to be on

Zyprexa. Dr. Scialli did allow that Petitioner had said he

heard voices. Id., Exh. O at 76. 

Dr. Scialli further testified that, at the time of the

crimes, the only disorder Petitioner suffered from was alcohol

dependence, with possibly an adjustment disorder with depressed

mood. Id., Exh. O at 78-79. Dr. Scialli opined Petitioner had

committed the crimes while suffering a strong reaction to a

situational “stressor”, i.e., the events of September 11, 2001.

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Id., Exh. O at 79. Dr. Scialli opined that, at the time of the

crimes, Petitioner was not having hallucinations. Id., Exh. O

at 80-82. 

Dr. Scialli also testified that Petitioner knew that

what he was doing was wrong, as evidenced by his subsequent

evasiveness, i.e., speeding away in his car after committing

crimes. Id., Exh. O at 82. The doctor stated: “Someone who’s

delusional doesn’t have a particular reason to get away.” Id.,

Exh. O at 82. Additionally, Dr. Scialli noted in his testimony

that Petitioner did not start talking about having “command”

hallucinations until conversations with investigators at the end

of September. Id., Exh. O at 83-84.

Dr. Scialli disagreed with Dr. Barry that Petitioner

suffered from schizotypal personality disorder. Id., Exh. O at

86. Dr. Scialli also disagreed with Dr. Rosengard’s diagnosis

of recurring major depressive disorder. Id., Exh. O at 86. Dr.

Scialli gave detailed testimony as to why he had concluded

Petitioner was not suffering from a definable mental disorder

and these disorders specifically. Dr. Scialli testified that,

at the time of the crimes, Petitioner did not fall within the

legal definition for insanity. Additionally, Dr. Scialli

testified he thought it was possible Petitioner was faking or

exaggerating any mental disease. Id., Exh. O at 95-96 & Exh. H

at 20.

Ms. Amy Woods, a counselor at the jail where Petitioner

was incarcerated pending his trial, testified she interviewed

Petitioner on September 17, 2001. Id., Exh. O at 72-86. She

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2 As stated supra, Mr. Ledesma was next to Mr. Sodhi but

closer to the ground, i.e., kneeling on the ground while Mr. Sodhi

stood, when Mr. Sodhi was shot. Mr. Ledesma testified at Petitioner’s

trial that he was not injured during the shooting.

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stated Petitioner did not complain of hearing voices at that

time. Ms. Woods testified Petitioner denied he had said he

heard voices coming from a television set. Exh. O at 80.

The jury was instructed, inter alia, that it was

Petitioner’s burden to establish his insanity at the time of the

crimes by clear and convincing evidence, stating Petitioner bore

the burden of providing evidence it was “highly probable that

the defendant was insane. This is a lesser standard of proof

than beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., Exh. L at 99. The jury

was dismissed to begin deliberations on the afternoon of

September 29, 2003. Id., Exh. I. The jury returned with a

verdict at approximately 11:45 a.m. on September 30, 2003,

having deliberated that morning since 9 a.m. Id., Exh. P. 

The jury found Petitioner guilty of the murder of Mr.

Sodhi, guilty on one count of attempted murder, and guilty on

one count of reckless endangerment. Id., Exh. P. The jury also

found Petitioner guilty on three counts of drive-by shooting.

Id., Exh. P. Additionally, the jury found that the government

had established that the murder, attempted murder, and drive-by

shootings were all dangerous offenses. Id., Exh. P & Exh. Q.

The jury also found the existence of another aggravating factor,

i.e., a grave risk of death to Mr. Ledesma. Id., Exh. P & Exh.

Q.2 

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A hearing regarding Petitioner’s sentences for his

capital crime was conducted on October 7 and October 8, 2003.

Id., Exh. R, Exh. S, Exh. GG, Exh. PP, Exh. QQ. The jury

determined that the evidence offered in mitigation was

insufficient to call for leniency with regard to the sentence to

be imposed for the murder conviction. Id., Exh. R & Exh. S.

Accordingly, on October 9, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to

death pursuant to his conviction for the murder of Mr. Sodhi.

Id., Exh. S at 9–11. The trial court subsequently imposed

aggravated sentences as to each of the other counts of

conviction. Id., Exh. T. At the hearing regarding the

remaining sentences to be imposed, the state asked the trial

court to aggravate the sentences because the victims were

targeted based on their race or religion. Exh. T. The state

also asked for aggravation on Count 2 because that drive-by

shooting resulted in the death of Mr. Sodhi. The state asked

for aggravation on Petitioner’s conviction on the charge of

endangerment because the commission of that crime involved the

use of a weapon. Id., Exh. T at 5. 

The state trial court concluded the sentences on Counts

2 and 6 could be aggravated by the fact of conviction on Counts

3, 4, and 5. Id., Exh. T at 6. The court determined that

Counts 3 and 4 could be aggravated based on the fact of

Petitioner’s convictions on Counts 1, 2, 5, and 6. Id., Exh. T

at 6.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences to the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. U. In his

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direct appeal Petitioner alleged that the state wrongfully

discriminated in choosing a jury by using a peremptory strike on

a prospective African American jury venireman. Petitioner also

argued the trial court should have precluded Dr. Ben Porath’s

testimony regarding the ultimate issue of Petitioner’s insanity,

based on the state’s failure to disclose the scope of the

expert’s testimony. 

Additionally, Petitioner asserted that the admission of

certain videotaped statements violated the Confrontation Clause.

Petitioner further maintained that there was insufficient

evidence to support the jury’s finding of the “grave risk of

death” aggravating factor with regard to the charge of reckless

endangerment of Mr. Ledesma. Petitioner also alleged the trial

court abused its discretion by allowing a juror to remain on the

panel after contact with a media outlet. Id., Exh. U.

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed all of Petitioner’s

convictions and the non-capital sentences in a lengthy decision

issued August 14, 2006. See Answer, Exh. V. See also Arizona

v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 141 P.3d 368 (2006) (en banc).

Reviewing Petitioner’s capital sentence pursuant to his

conviction for murder, the Arizona Supreme Court exercised its

discretion to independently review the aggravating circumstances

and the mitigation evidence. See Answer, Exh. V. Upon

conclusion of this review, the Arizona Supreme Court reduced

Petitioner’s sentence on the murder conviction from death to

life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Id., Exh.

V. 

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3 This subsection provides:

Summary Disposition. The court shall review the

petition within twenty days after the defendant's

reply was due. On reviewing the petition,

response, reply, files and records, and

disregarding defects of form, the court shall

identify all claims that are procedurally

precluded under this rule. If the court, after

identifying all precluded claims, determines that

no remaining claim presents a material issue of

fact or law which would entitle the defendant to

relief under this rule and that no purpose would

be served by any further proceedings, the court

shall order the petition dismissed. If the court

does not dismiss the petition, the court shall

set a hearing within thirty days on those claims

that present a material issue of fact or law. If

a hearing is ordered, the state shall notify the

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On September 6, 2006, Petitioner initiated an action

for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. W. In his Rule 32

action Petitioner raised fifty claims for relief including,

inter alia, that his rights were violated by the use of a stun

belt during his trial. Petitioner also asserted there was

prosecutorial and juror misconduct during his trial. Petitioner

further argued he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, and also

alleged his convictions should be vacated because he was forced

to take anti-psychotic medication during his trial. Id. Exh. W.

Petitioner did not seek appointment of counsel in his Rule 32

action but averred to the state court that he wished to proceed

pro se in that matter.

On May 18, 2007, the state trial court summarily

dismissed Petitioner’s post-conviction action pursuant to Rule

32.6(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. Y.3 The

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victims, upon the victims' request pursuant to

statute or court rule relating to victims'

rights, of the time and place of the hearing.

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Superior Court concluded Petitioner had failed to raise a

colorable issue of fact or law entitling him to relief or

warranting further proceedings. Id., Exh. Y. Petitioner

appealed this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

denied relief on March 14, 2008. Id., Exh. AA. Petitioner

sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review

on June 13, 2008. Id., Exh. CC.

In his amended petition for habeas relief before the

District Court, filed February 5, 2009, Petitioner asserts:

1. The state violated his right to due process of law

by withholding exculpatory evidence regarding his blood alcohol

level at the time of the offenses;

2. His right to due process of law and his right to a

fair trial were violated when the state failed to fully disclose

the content of an expert witness’ rebuttal testimony;

3. He was denied a fair trial as a result of juror

misconduct;

4. He was incompetent to stand trial inter alia because

he was on anti-psychotic medication at the time of trial;

5. His constitutional right to confront the witnesses

against him was violated;

6. He was denied the ability to assist and confer with

his defense counsel because he was required to wear a stun belt

during his trial;

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7. His constitutional right to due process of law was

violated by the introduction of autopsy photographs as evidence;

8. His right to due process of law was violated by the

introduction of evidence regarding a prior conviction;

9. He was subjected to 22 specific instances of

prosecutorial misconduct, the cumulative effect of which was to

violate his right to a fair trial;

10. He was denied a fair trial as a result of testimony

by Dr. Jack Potts;

11. His trial and appellate counsel were both

unconstitutionally ineffective, in violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights;

12. The indictment was defective because it failed to

allege aggravating factors and because the prosecution was

granted a sixty-day continuance to consult the government of

India regarding its opinion on imposition of the death penalty;

13. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial

to support Petitioner’s convictions for drive-by shooting and

the finding of premeditation on the charge of attempted firstdegree murder;

14. His rights were violated because the state failed

to prove the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Docket No. 14.

Respondents allow that the section 2254 habeas petition

is timely filed. Respondents assert that Petitioner did not

properly exhaust all of his federal habeas claims in the state

courts. See Docket No. 20. Respondents argue that because

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Petitioner did not present nine of his habeas claims to the

Arizona Supreme Court in his action for post-conviction relief,

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted those claims. Respondents

maintain that, to fully exhaust these claims, Petitioner was

required to raise the claims to the state Supreme Court in

addition to the state Court of Appeals because Petitioner was

originally sentenced to death, rather than life imprisonment.

Respondents allow that, at the time Petitioner’s post-conviction

action was heard by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner

stood sentenced to life imprisonment.

In reply to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts that there was no proper evidence that he was

intoxicated at the time of the crimes and that, at the time of

the crimes, he heard “voices from God telling him to kill

devils.” Docket No. 44 at 3. Petitioner asserts that, at the

time of the crimes, he was “suffering severe decompesation (sic)

due to 9-11 events”. Id. Petitioner re-argues and

characterizes the evidence and testimony presented at his trial.

Petitioner notes evidence presented at trial indicated his

mother was a schizophrenic and that Petitioner suffered from

mental illness prior to reaching adulthood. Petitioner states:

“Both defense experts concluded Petitioner was legally insane at

the time of the offenses.” Id. at 6.

Petitioner further argues that his fourteenth claim for

relief includes the allegation that his sentence violates the

holding of Blakely v. Washington. Petitioner contends he has

“suffered ‘cause and prejudice’”, citing Dretke v. Haley and

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4

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3)

precludes post-conviction relief based on any

ground “waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding.” Claims

predicated on “a significant change in the law

that if determined to apply to defendant’s case

would probably overturn the defendant’s

conviction or sentence,” Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.1(g), are excluded from the general rule of

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Teague v. Lane. Petitioner alleges that he was improperly

sentenced to aggravated terms of imprisonment on Counts 1

through 6 pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence standard,

rather than having the aggravating factors found by a jury.

Accordingly, Petitioner argues, the holding of Blakely dictates

a finding of prejudice. Petitioner also alleges that he has

exhausted his tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth grounds for habeas

relief by raising these claims to the Arizona Supreme Court in

a supplemental brief filed February 13, 2006. Petitioner also

asserts he exhausted grounds 2, 5, 7, 9, and 10 through 14 of

his federal habeas petition by raising them in his direct

appeal.

With regard to the exhaustion of claims raised in his

state action for post-conviction relief, Petitioner contends the

state trial court’s “denial to review the 50 claims raised on

P.C.R. does not specifically state a procedural default for

failure to fairly present the claim.” Id. at 14. Petitioner

asserts that Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure is not an adequate and independent basis for denying

federal habeas relief and that this rule is not regularly

enforced.4

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preclusion under certain circumstances, Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.2(b).

Arizona v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 116, 203 P.3d 1175, 1176 (2009).

5

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2009).

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II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).5 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in cases arising in Arizona in which the sentence imposed is not

a capital sentence, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner presented his

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal

or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Paige v.

Schriro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168-69 (D. Ariz. 2009)

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(providing a thorough discussion of what constitutes the

“highest court” in Arizona for purposes of exhausting a habeas

claim in the context of a conviction resulting in a non-capital

sentence and a sentence of life imprisonment); Crowell v.

Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

At the time of his direct appeal Petitioner faced a

capital sentence and at the time of his Rule 32 action

Petitioner faced a life sentence. Accordingly, any claim not

presented to the Arizona Supreme Court in Petitioner’s direct

appeal or to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Rule 32 action

was not completely exhausted. See Paige, 648 F. Supp. 2d at

1168-69. Therefore, to the extent Respondents contend that

Petitioner did not exhaust all of his habeas claims because some

of his claims were not presented to the Arizona Supreme Court in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, the Magistrate Judge rejects this

argument, finding the thorough reasoning of Paige persuasive.

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements,

a petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial

equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009).

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to

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have presented the substance of his federal habeas claim to the

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional

guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner

to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1014 (2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d

1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner need

not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution” to

fairly present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more than present the

facts necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2009). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is clearly procedurally barred from

pursuing their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489

U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law,

the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural

default” of the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93,

126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

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his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

With regard to claims that were expressly barred by

the state courts:

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). See also Stewart v. Smith,

536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (2002); Johnson v.

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1987 (1988).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted and

procedurally defaulted any claim not previously fairly presented

to the Arizona Supreme Court in his direct appeal or to the

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6

 In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state

courts by means of a direct appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief are generally barred from federal review because an

attempt to return to state court to present them is futile, unless the

claims fit in a narrow category of claims for which a successive

petition is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h) & 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for

post-conviction relief, except for narrow exceptions). See also Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.4 (providing a time-bar to claims for post-conviction

relief). Because Rule 32.2(a), Arizona’s preclusion rule, has been

found both “independent” and “adequate,” either its specific

application to a claim by an Arizona court, or its operation to

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally

bar review of the merits of that claim by a federal habeas court. See

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (2002)

(determinations made under Arizona’s procedural default rule are

“independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1195

n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default

rule is regularly followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) (citations

omitted); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (rejecting argument

that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly followed” Rule 32

of Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure).

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Arizona Court of Appeals in his state action for post-conviction

relief. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir.

2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See

also Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860, 122 S. Ct. at 2581 (holding

Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and procedural

default of claims raised in attacks on criminal convictions are

adequate and independent state grounds for affirming a

conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the grounds of

a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th

Cir. 1998).6

However, with regard to claims which may have been

procedurally barred by the state courts, “procedural default

does not bar consideration of a federal claim on habeas corpus

review unless the last state court rendering a reasoned opinion

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on the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests

on a state procedural bar.” Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138

(6th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). See also Harris

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043 (1989).

B. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

C. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

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contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2009); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325

(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1041 (2003); Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008). The “presumption of

correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court,

as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.”

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05

(1982). See also Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1

(9th Cir. 2009).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133,

141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). For

example, a state court’s decision is considered “contrary to

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federal law” if the state court erroneously applied the wrong

standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008).

See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008);

Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035-38; Cook

v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,

129 S. Ct. 1033 (2009). However, the state court’s decision is

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. Carey,

549 U.S. at 74-75, 127 S. Ct. at 653; Williams, 529 U.S. at 409,

120 S. Ct. at 1521. An unreasonable application of law is

different from an incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002); Cooks v. Newland, 395

F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Furthermore, only United States Supreme Court holdings,

and not dicta or concurring opinions, at the time of the state

court’s decision are the source of “clearly established federal

law” for the purpose of the “unreasonable application” prong of

federal habeas review. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S. Ct. at

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7

The federal appellate courts have split on

whether Faretta, which establishes a Sixth

Amendment right to self-representation, implies

a right of the pro se defendant to have access to

a law library.[]. That question cannot be

resolved here, however, as it is clear that

Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid

that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant.

The ... court below therefore erred in holding,

based on Faretta, that a violation of a law

library access right is a basis for federal

habeas relief.

Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10-11, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408-09

(2005).

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1523; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S. Ct. at 653; Ponce v. Felker,

606 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2010); Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d

1204, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2885

(2009).

If the Supreme Court has not addressed a specific issue

in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the issue

cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881, citing Kane v.

Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006).7

Stated another way, if the issue raised by the petitioner “is an

open question in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court

may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the

state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law

by rejecting the precise claim presented by the petitioner.

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1016; Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123

(9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008). The

United States Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that

it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established

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8

Our cases provide no categorical answer to this

question, and for that matter the several

proceedings in this case hardly point toward one.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held counsel’s

performance by speaker phone to be

constitutionally effective; neither the

Magistrate Judge, the District Court, nor the

Seventh Circuit disputed this conclusion; and the

Seventh Circuit itself stated that “[u]nder

Strickland, it seems clear Van Patten would have

no viable claim.” Deppisch, 434 F.3d, at 1042.

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008).

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Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific

legal rule that has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1419, citing Wright, 552 U.S. at

124-25, 128 S. Ct. at 746-47.8 See also Vasquez, 572 F.3d at

1038.

The holdings of the Circuit Courts of Appeal are

relevant to resolution of a petitioner’s habeas claims only to

the extent they are useful in deciding whether the law has been

clearly established or that the state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court

precedent, and not with regard to what constitutes a violation

of constitutional rights. See Maxwell, 606 F.3d at 567; Bible

v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2009); Ortiz-Sandoval v.

Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Because [the]

AEDPA limits habeas relief to state decisions that offend

‘clearly established’ federal law as set by the Supreme Court,

a state court decision may not be overturned simply because of

a conflict with circuit law.”). Compare Smith v. Dinwiddie, 510

F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007).

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9

If the Court’s decisions do provide a

“controlling legal standard,” Panetti, 127 S. Ct.

at 2858, that is applicable to the claims raised

by a habeas petitioner without “tailoring or

modification” of the standard, the question is

then whether the application of that standard was

objectively unreasonable, even if the facts of

the case at issue are not identical to the

Supreme Court precedent.

Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009).

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 Accordingly, a state court decision may be contrary to

a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding without being an

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent. See Kessee v. Mendoza Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 679 (9th

Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit recently held that when a Supreme

Court decision does not “squarely address” the issue presented

by the habeas petitioner, or if the Supreme Court principle does

not “clearly extend” to the context of the situation presented

by the petitioner, “it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is

‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the

issue.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009).9 

The Court must review the last reasoned state court

opinion on the claims raised in the habeas action. See, e.g.,

Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035. When there is no “reasoned” state

court decision explaining the state’s denial of a claim

presented in a federal habeas petition, the District Court must

perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether

the state court’s decision summarily denying the claim was

objectively reasonable. See Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857,

863 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1878 (2008);

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Stenson, 504 F.3d at 890; Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742

(9th Cir. 2005). If the Court determines that the state court’s

decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise

requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127

S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 641

(9th Cir. 2008). See also Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 640 (9th

Cir. 2009).

D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts the state violated his right to

due process of law by withholding exculpatory evidence regarding

his blood alcohol level during the offenses.

Petitioner argues his constitutional rights were

violated by the state’s failure to disclose evidence regarding

his blood alcohol level during the offenses. Petitioner

contends the prosecutor did not disclose that a police detective

had determined that Petitioner’s blood alcohol content would

have been below the legal limit for driving while intoxicated

after the consumption of two Fosters beers three and one half

hours prior to the crime. Petitioner contends the failure to

disclose this evidence prior to trial violated his rights

pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. Regardless of any failure to

fully or properly exhaust this claim, it may be denied on the

merits.

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In Brady v. Maryland the United States Supreme Court

held that a defendant’s right to due process of law is violated

when the government fails to disclose evidence that is material

to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, including impeachment

evidence. See 373 U.S. 83, 86-87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97

(1963); Schad v. Ryan, 595 F.3d 907, 915 (9th Cir. 2010). The

state violates this obligation and denies a criminal defendant

due process of law if “(1) the evidence in question was

favorable to the defendant, meaning that it had either

exculpatory or impeachment value; (2) the state ‘willfully or

inadvertently’ suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant

was prejudiced by the suppression.” Schad, 595 F.3d at 915,

quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct.

1936, 1948 (1999). See also Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 578

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding the government’s failure to disclose a

leniency deal with a witness was reversible error).

Petitioner’s state of intoxication, or not, at the time

of the crimes, and whether Petitioner had a preexisting alcohol

consumption issue, were disputed during testimony. The

inferences that Petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the

crimes was countered by testimony that signs of intoxication

could have resulted from allergies or extreme mental agitation.

Petitioner’s counsel elicited testimony from the employees of

the restaurant and sports bar who had contact with Petitioner on

the day of the crimes that they regularly called taxis for

people who were obviously intoxicated and that they did not

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10 Inter alia, Petitioner’s brother testified he believed

Petitioner had a problem with alcohol prior to the events of September

11, 2001. See Answer, Exh. C. Petitioner’s brother testified that

Petitioner was so incoherent when he spoke with him by telephone on

September 15, 2001, that the brother initially surmised Petitioner was

intoxicated. Id., Exh. C. The record indicated that Petitioner had

purchased two beers and consumed at least one of them at the Wild Hare

bar at approximately 11:30 on the morning of September 15, 2001. See, e.g., Answer, Exh. E.

11 “The legislature amended the statute in 1994 to eliminate

intoxication as a defense ‘for any criminal act or requisite state of

mind.’ A.R.S. § 13-503 (2001); 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 256, §§ 2,

3 (1st Reg. Sess.).”

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think it necessary to call a taxi for Petitioner.10 

Any undisclosed evidence regarding Petitioner’s blood

alcohol level at the time of the crimes could not have been

exculpatory because evidence that Petitioner’s blood alcohol

level was below the legal limit for driving while intoxicated

would not necessarily prove or disprove Petitioner’s affirmative

defense of insanity. No prejudice resulted from the alleged

“failure” to disclose this evidence because in Arizona a

defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge

of murder, assault with a deadly weapon, or drive-by shooting.

Arizona v. Kiles, 222 Ariz. 25, 33 & n.10, 213 P.3d 174, 182 &

n.1011 (2009) (“The statute unambiguously provides that

intoxication is a defense only against the culpable mental state

of intentionally.”); Arizona v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 389, 814

P.2d 333, 346 (1991) (concluding that voluntary intoxication is

not defense to knowing first degree murder). Accordingly, this

claim for federal habeas relief may be denied on the merits of

the claim.

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2. Petitioner contends his right to due process of law

and his right to a fair trial were violated when the state

failed to fully disclose the content of an expert witness’

rebuttal testimony and when that expert witness made

inconsistent statements.

Petitioner raised this federal habeas claim in his

direct appeal. The en banc Arizona Supreme Court denied relief

on this claim:

At trial, the defense called Drs. Rosengard

and Barry to testify regarding Roque’s mental

condition at the time of the crimes. Before

the defense rested, the State called Dr.

Ben-Porath out of order in rebuttal. The

State had disclosed to the defense only that

Dr. Ben-Porath would testify regarding the

validity of the administrations of the

MMPI-2. However, on the stand, Dr. Ben-Porath

began to interpret the results of Roque’s

MMPI-2 tests. The defense immediately

objected that the doctor’s testimony fell

outside the scope of disclosure, pointing out

that the State had neither disclosed any

written report from Dr. Ben-Porath nor

outlined his opinion. Citing Arizona Rule of

Criminal Procedure 15.1(a)(3), the defense

asserted that the State was obligated to

disclose “an overview” of the expert’s

testimony, including an “outline” of his

opinion or a “written report.”

 The judge concluded that the State would

have had to disclose any written report

generated by Dr. Ben-Porath, but did not have

to create an overview of his testimony. The

judge therefore found no disclosure

violation, but nonetheless proposed giving

the defense the remainder of the afternoon,

commencing at approximately 3:15 p.m., to

interview Dr. Ben-Porath. The defense

attorney declined, saying that he could not

effectively challenge Dr. Ben-Porath’s

expanded testimony on such short notice. The

judge ruled that Dr. Ben-Porath could

continue to testify, and the doctor proceeded

to analyze Roque’s MMPI-2 results in detail.

 Dr. Ben-Porath then began to analyze the

results of the M-FAST that Dr. Barry had

administered to Roque. The defense again

objected, this time because Dr. Ben-Porath

was testifying regarding a diagnostic tool

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other than the MMPI-2. The judge overruled

the objection. Dr. Ben-Porath proceeded to

opine on the critical questions of whether

the MMPI-2 results indicated that Roque had

mental disorders and whether the M-FAST

results indicated malingering.

 The prosecutors conceded below that they

had not revealed to the defense that Dr.

Ben-Porath would testify to anything other

than the proper administration of the MMPI-2.

Recognizing that their failure to disclose

the scope of Dr. Ben-Porath’s testimony might

create an appellate issue, the lead

prosecutor said, “I don’t suppose an

appellate court cares whether I’m sorry about

something but I think we had ... a

miscommunication.” The prosecutor then said

he would not object if the defense had to

hire another expert to rebut Dr. Ben-Porath’s

testimony because of the “miscommunication.”

213 Ariz. 193, 206, 141 P.3d 368, 381. The state court

continued: “We therefore conclude, under these facts, that the

trial court erred in ruling that Rule 15.1(a)(3) requires that

only a ‘written report or statement’ need be disclosed.” Id.,

213 Ariz. at 209, 141 P.3d at 384.

The Arizona Supreme Court further found:

 Dr. Ben-Porath’s testimony far exceeded

a discussion of the validity of an oral

administration of the MMPI-2 followed three

months later by a paper administration of the

test. Dr. Ben-Porath analyzed several of

Roque’s scores from both test

administrations, such as those indicating

bizarre mentation. Indeed, Dr. Ben-Porath

testified to the ultimate question in

dispute, opining that Roque’s MMPI-2 scores

did not indicate that Roque had any of

several mental conditions about which the

prosecutor questioned him. On this critical

issue, Dr. Ben-Porath was the only expert to

find no evidence of mental illness. Dr.

Ben-Porath also testified that Roque’s M-FAST

score indicated malingering, and he offered

a general psychological opinion in response

to a juror’s question.

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Id., 213 Ariz. at 209, 141 P.3d at 384 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the court held: “The State’s failure to

fully and fairly disclose to the defense the results of Dr.

Ben-Porath’s assessment of Roque’s mental health, the critical

issue in this capital case, violated Rule 15.1(a)(3).” Id.,

213 Ariz. at 210, 141 P.3d at 385. Citing state law, the

Arizona Supreme Court found the state trial court had fashioned

an appropriate sanction for the prosecution’s improper conduct,

notwithstanding defense counsel’s refusal to accept the trial

court’s proffered sanction. Therefore, the Arizona Supreme

Court held, the failure to preclude the testimony was not

reversible error. Id., 213 Ariz. at 211, 141 P.3d at 386,

citing Arizona v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 441, 759 P.2d 579, 587

(1988) (observing that, without reversal, counsel may consider

admonition only a “verbal spanking”). 

A federal court is limited in conducting habeas review

to deciding whether a conviction violates the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480

(1991). A state court’s evidentiary ruling does not provide a

basis for habeas relief unless the ruling infringed upon a

specific federal constitutional right or deprived the petitioner

of a fundamentally fair trial as guaranteed by the right to due

process of law. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42, 104

S. Ct. 871, 874-75 (1984); Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069,

1076-77 (9th Cir. 2009). The violation of a state rule of

criminal procedure does not, by itself, constitute a violation

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of a defendant’s federal constitutional rights, including their

right to procedural due process.

To be entitled to habeas relief on this type of claim,

the petitioner must establish that the admission of the evidence

was so arbitrary or prejudicial that it rendered their trial

fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357

(9th Cir. 1995) (stating this in the context of a claim that the

improper admission of the fact of a prior conviction violated the

petitioner’s federal constitutional right to due process of law).

“In essence, the inquiry comes down to the question, whether

absent the constitutionally-forbidden evidence, honest and

fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty

verdicts.” Burns v. Clusen, 798 F.2d 931, 943 (7th Cir. 1986).

Typically, the federal courts require other evidence of guilt to

be overwhelming before concluding a constitutional error was

harmless. See Mauricio v. Duckworth, 840 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir.

1988).

The state court’s conclusion that any violation of

Petitioner’s rights in admitting the testimony of Dr. Ben Porath

was harmless is not clearly contrary to federal law as

established by the United States Supreme Court. 

With regard to expert testimony, we recently

noted that we have found no cases

“support[ing] the general proposition that the

Constitution is violated by the admission of

expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue

to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Moses v.

Payne, 543 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008).

“Although ‘[a] witness is not permitted to

give a direct opinion about the defendant’s

guilt or innocence .... an expert may

otherwise testify regarding even an ultimate

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issue to be resolved by the trier of fact.’”

Id. at 1106 (quoting United States v. Lockett, 919 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 1990) (alteration

in original)). We found this “not

surprising,” id., in light of the

well-established rule permitting opinion

testimony on ultimate issues, see Hangarter v.

Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d

998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004).

Briceno, 555 F.3d at 1077-78. 

Because the state court’s decision regarding this claim

was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

federal law, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the

merits of this claim.

3. Petitioner alleges he was denied a fair trial as a

result of juror misconduct.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Supreme Court concluded Petitioner was not entitled to

relief on this claim. 

 Roque claims that the trial judge abused his

discretion in not replacing a juror with an

alternate after a movie producer handed the

juror a business card. We review for abuse of

discretion, [], deferring to the trial judge’s

superior opportunity to assess the juror’s

demeanor and credibility, []

 “In a criminal case, any private

communication, contact or tampering[,]

directly or indirectly, with a juror during a

trial about the matter pending before the jury

is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively

prejudicial.” State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555,

558-59, 875 P.2d 788, 791-92 (1994) (quoting

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74

S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954)). But the

“presumption is rebuttable, and the burden

rests with the government to show that the

third party communication did not taint the

verdict.” Id. at 559, 875 P.2d at 792.

 In this case, while the movie producer’s

contact with the juror was presumptively

prejudicial, the judge properly heard

testimony from the producer and the juror to

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12 Petitioner contends the juror lied to the state trial

judge by saying first that they did not know the profession of the

person who had proffered the business card and then by saying they

thought the individual was part of a news crew covering the trial.

After the trial court’s questioning of Juror 13, Petitioner’s defense

counsel moved to have the juror replaced or for the declaration of a

mistrial. However, immediately thereafter the jury reported reaching

a verdict. The bailiff indicated to the trial court that the jury had

reached a verdict before the trial court’s questioning of Juror 13

regarding their interaction with the film maker. See Answer, Exh. JJ.

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determine whether the juror could still render

a fair and impartial decision. The hearing

revealed that, when the producer handed the

business card to the juror, the juror simply

put it in his pocket. He said nothing to the

producer and was unsure of the producer’s

profession. The juror stated unequivocally

that the producer’s contact would not affect

his ability to fairly and impartially decide

the case. The judge concluded that the State

had met its burden of overcoming the

presumption of prejudice. On this record, we

cannot conclude that the judge abused his

discretion in allowing the juror to remain on

the panel.

213 Ariz. at 209, 141 P.3d at 384.12

The state court’s decision was not clearly contrary to

nor an incorrect application of established federal law. To be

entitled to relief on this claim, Petitioner must rebut the state

courts’ presumptively correct finding that the challenged juror

could serve fairly and impartially. See Greene v. Georgia, 519

U.S. 145, 146, 117 S. Ct. 578, 579 (1996) (holding the federal

habeas courts must accord a presumption of correctness to state

court’s findings of juror bias).

In a criminal case any private communication, contact,

or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial

about the matter is presumptively prejudicial. See Caliendo v.

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Warden of Calif. Men’s Colony, 365 F.3d 691, 694–96 (9th Cir.

2004). However, the presumption is rebuttable if the state

establishes that the communication did not taint the verdict.

Id., 365 F.3d at 696.

In Petitioner’s case, the trial judge heard testimony

from the producer and the juror to determine whether the juror

could still render a fair and impartial decision. The juror

stated unequivocally that the producer’s contact would not affect

his ability to fairly and impartially decide the case. The judge

concluded that the state had met its burden of overcoming the

presumption of prejudice. Because the contact revealed by the

record indicates that the impartiality of the jury’s verdict was

not affected by the contact, the trial court’s denial of

Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law. See Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755,

779-80 (9th Cir. 2007); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 577 (9th

Cir. 2005). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

this habeas claim. 

4. Petitioner contends he was incompetent to stand trial

because he was on anti-psychotic medication at the time of trial.

Petitioner asserts his right to due process of law was

violated because he was not mentally competent to stand trial.

Petitioner raised this issue in his state Rule 32 action, which

was summarily denied. The state court’s decision did not

expressly proclaim that Petitioner’s claims were denied based on

the procedural basis of claim preclusion. Nonetheless, the claim

may be denied on the merits notwithstanding any failure to

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properly exhaust the claim.

Prior to trial, Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion

requesting an evaluation to determine Petitioner’s mental

competency. Answer, Exh. KK. All parties, including Petitioner,

subsequently stipulated that the trial court could determine

Petitioner’s competency to stand trial based upon the reports of

Dr. Jack Potts and Dr. Michael Colfield. Id., Exh. LL. Both

experts found Petitioner competent to stand trial. Id., Exh. MM.

After reviewing their reports, the state trial court concluded

that Petitioner understood the proceedings and was able to assist

counsel with his defense. Id., Exh. MM.

To be entitled to habeas relief on a claim that they

were mentally incompetent to stand trial notwithstanding a

pretrial hearing to determine their competence, a petitioner must

present clear and convincing evidence that he was incompetent at

the time of his trial. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,

111, 116 S. Ct. 457, 464-65 (1995); Miller-El v. Johnson, 261

F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2001); Mackey v. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399,

412–14 (6th Cir. 2000). The issue is not whether the petitioner

suffered from a mental illness per se, but whether the petitioner

had the ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding and whether he had a rational

as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.

Edmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996), quoting

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789

(1960); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000).

See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 & 448, 112 S.

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Ct. 2572, 2574 & 2579 (1992). Criminal defendants who have

been diagnosed as psychotic or who were taking anti-psychotic

medications before pleading guilty or during trial are not per

se incompetent to stand trial or enter a plea. See Beck v.

Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 388 (4th Cir. 2001); Miles v. Dorsey, 61

F.3d 1459, 1474 (10th Cir. 1995); Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d

1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995); Balfour v. Hawes, 892 F.2d 556,

561–63 (7th Cir. 1989). A mentally-ill petitioner claiming

incompetence must also point to some irrational conduct calling

into question their ability to assist defense counsel and

understand the proceedings against him at the time of his trial.

See, e.g., Contreras v. Rice, 5 F. Supp. 2d 854, 864–65 (C.D.

Cal. 1998).

The trial transcript in this matter and Petitioner’s

pleadings having been thoroughly reviewed, the Magistrate Judge

concludes that there is no evidence before the Court of

irrational conduct by Petitioner at the time of his trial that

would call into question his ability to assist counsel or

understand the proceedings. Accordingly, the state court’s

decision denying this claim in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, to

the extent it was not based on the preclusion of the claim, was

not clearly contrary to federal law nor an unreasonable

application of federal law to Petitioner’s case. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim.

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5. Petitioner maintains his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation was violated by the introduction of statements made

by his wife to a police investigator.

In his amended habeas petition Petitioner asserts that

a videotape of his wife being interviewed by police was

introduced as evidence at Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner argues

that, because his wife did not testify at trial and because she

made statements on the videotape regarding Petitioner’s mental

health, the introduction of the tape violated his Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause rights, i.e., his right to confront

witnesses against him. Petitioner also alleges that his rights

were violated by the introduction at trial of testimony by a

police detective as to statements made to the detective by

Petitioner’s wife. 

Petitioner’s wife could not be located by the

prosecution and, accordingly, was not subpoenaed to testify at

Petitioner’s trial. The primary issue at trial was Petitioner’s

sanity at the time the crimes were committed. Conflicting

testimony was presented regarding whether or not Petitioner

exhibited signs of mental illness, such as hallucinations, prior

to the date of the crimes and on the date of the crimes. The

trial court admitted a videotape of police detectives telling

Petitioner about statements made by his wife in the course of

their investigation of the crimes committed on September 15,

2001, at which time Petitioner was a suspect in those crimes.

The admission of out-of-court statements by Petitioner’s wife,

who was not available to testify, to a police detective

investigating the crimes regarding Petitioner’s mental condition,

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would arguably violate the holding in Crawford.

Respondents assert Petitioner is factually mistaken in

claiming that the jury viewed a videotape of the police

interviewing his wife. The record indicates that, during

Petitioner’s trial, portions of a videotape of two police

investigators interviewing Petitioner were played for the jury.

Defense counsel objected to the introduction of this evidence.

The videotape was recorded shortly after Petitioner was taken

into custody. In the videotape the investigators tell Petitioner

that his wife has told them certain facts about Petitioner. 

Additionally, the jury was shown a portion of a

videotape in which Petitioner and his wife are talking at the

police station after Petitioner was interviewed by the

investigators. Petitioner’s counsel objected to the introduction

of the videotape, asserting it was hearsay and also arguing that

it violated marital privilege. The trial judge overruled defense

counsel’s objection to the admission of the videotape, concluding

that the statements in the tape were not being offered for the

truth of the asserted facts.

The videotape of Petitioner speaking with his wife was

introduced during Dr. Scialli’s testimony, and was offered as the

best evidence regarding Petitioner’s mental state at a time close

to the time of the crimes, as compared to the examinations of

mental health experts weeks, months, or years after the crimes.

Dr. Scialli had reviewed the tapes and believed it supported his

conclusion that Petitioner was not unable to understand his

circumstance or what had occurred at the time of the crimes. 

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The trial judge instructed the jury that the videotapes

were offered only to establish the context of Petitioner’s

statements as relied upon by Dr. Scialli when he rendered his

expert opinion regarding Petitioner’s mental state and that the

jury was not to accept the truth of what the detectives said on

the videotape or the truth of what Petitioner’s wife had said on

the videotape. See Answer, Exh. H at 58.

Petitioner raised the first portion of his fifth federal

habeas claim in his direct appeal, asserting that the trial court

improperly admitted as evidence a videotape of Petitioner’s wife

being interviewed by police. Petitioner argued that the police

interviewers testified at his trial as to his wife’s statements

about Petitioner’s mental state at the time of the crimes. 

In denying this claims, the Arizona Supreme Court

concluded:

 During the videotaped interrogation of Roque

after the shootings, the police detectives

told Roque that his wife, Dawn, had made

statements to them incriminating Roque. Dawn

refused to testify at trial. Roque asserts

that the admission of the videos at trial

violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation

Clause as interpreted in Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, []

(2004), because the detectives used Dawn’s

statements in questioning Roque and Roque had

no opportunity to cross-examine Dawn.

 The trial court’s admission of the videos

did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

Crawford establishes that the Sixth Amendment

right to confront witnesses attaches to

testimonial witness statements made to a

government officer to establish some fact.

See 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354. In this

case, however, there was no evidence presented

that Dawn actually made the statements that

the detectives used in questioning Roque. The

detectives’ report of what Dawn said was not

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being offered at trial for the truth of the

matters allegedly asserted by Dawn and

therefore did not constitute hearsay. Instead,

the detectives were using an interrogation

technique to elicit a confession from Roque.

The judge instructed the jury, in watching the

interrogation videos, not to consider the

detectives’ statements for their truth.

Because the statements allegedly made by Dawn

were never introduced for their truth, they

were not testimonial hearsay statements barred

by the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 59

n.9, 124 S. Ct. 1354. The admission of the

videotaped statements therefore did not

violate Roque’s rights under the Confrontation

Clause.

213 Ariz. at 213-14, 141 P.3d at 388-89 (emphasis added).

In addition to the videotape, the prosecution introduced

testimony relating to a police interview between Petitioner’s

wife and police detective Donald Vogel. Petitioner’s defense

counsel objected to this testimony, arguing that it was hearsay.

See Answer, Exh. NN at 81. The prosecutor responded that it was

not hearsay because it was not being offered for the truth of the

matter asserted, but rather to impeach previous testimony

regarding claims that Petitioner had heard voices prior to the

offense. Id., Exh. NN at 82. The trial court overruled the

objection, and instructed the jury that the testimony was not

being offered to prove or disprove the matter asserted or the

truth of any matter not asserted by a person who was speaking

outside of the courtroom, i.e., Petitioner’s wife. Id., Exh. NN

at 82. On cross-examination, Detective Vogel admitted that he

did not ask Petitioner’s wife specific questions about

Petitioner’s mental health, and that he did not ask her whether

Petitioner had heard voices the week prior to the offense. Id.,

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Exh. NN at 92. 

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354

(2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment right to confront witnesses attaches to testimonial

witness statements made to a government officer to establish some

fact. However, non-testimonial statements do not implicate the

Sixth Amendment’s core concerns. Id., 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S. Ct.

at 1364. See also United States v. Earl, 488 F.3d 537, 543 (1st

Cir. 2007) (describing categories of statements which have been

held to be testimonial). 

Detective Vogel’s testimony was not offered for the

truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Petitioner had told his

wife he heard voices or that he did not, but rather to impeach

prior testimony regarding the assertion that Petitioner had heard

voices prior to the date of the crimes. Because this testimony

was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted but

instead was impeaching, it did not involve testimonial hearsay

statements barred by the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541

U.S. at 59, 124 S. Ct. at 1369. Because the state court’s

decision in this regard was not clearly contrary to federal law,

i.e., the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

In Crawford, issued in 2004 while Petitioner’s case was

on appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the

admission at trial of a wife’s out-of-court statements to police

officers investigating her husband’s complicity in felony crimes

violated the husband’s Confrontation Clause rights. Accordingly,

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to the extent Petitioner asserted in his direct appeal that or

his post-convictions proceedings that the trial court improperly

admitted evidence of his wife’s statements to police officers,

a state court decision denying this claim on the merits of the

claims would be contrary to established federal law. 

Assuming that such a claim was properly exhausted and

wrongly decided by the state courts, however, Petitioner is still

not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

Under AEDPA, even where the state court has

committed constitutional error under §

2254(d), habeas relief may still be denied

absent a showing of prejudice. ... To

determine prejudice, we apply the

harmless-error standard from Brecht. Under

this standard, we grant relief where we

believe the error “had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623,

113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239[]

(1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As

the Supreme Court has explained, under the

Brecht standard, we ask, “Do I, the judge,

think that the error substantially influenced

the jury’s decision.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513

U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, [] (1995). In a

case where the record is so evenly balanced

that a “conscientious judge is in grave doubt

as to the harmlessness of an error,” the

petitioner must prevail. Id. at 438, 115 S.

Ct. 992. Thus, in the course of a Brecht

inquiry, the state bears the “risk of doubt.”

See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 762

(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) (some internal

citations and quotations omitted).

To be entitled to federal habeas relief, the Court must

independently conclude that Petitioner’s constitutional rights

were violated and that the violation was not harmless error. 

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Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless

error analysis. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140,

119 S. Ct. 1887, 1901-02 (1999); Winzer v. Hall, 494 F.3d 1192,

1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Violation of the Confrontation Clause is

trial error subject to harmless-error analysis ... because its

effect can be ‘quantitatively assessed in the context of other

evidence presented’ to the jury.” (citation omitted)). 

The entire record submitted by the parties in this

matter having been thoroughly reviewed, the Magistrate Judge

concludes that any error in admitting the videotape of the

interview of Petitioner’s wife by the police detective at

Petitioner’s trial was harmless error. In light of all of the

evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial, including the testimony

of psychiatric experts, police detectives, Petitioner’s daughter

and brother, and the people who observed Petitioner on the date

of the crimes, the admission of any testimonial statements by

Petitioner’s wife could not have influenced the jury’s decision.

Accordingly, habeas relief may be denied on this claim.

6. Petitioner was denied the ability to assist and

confer with defense counsel because he was required to wear a

stun belt during trial. Petitioner contends wearing the belt

inhibited his ability to confer with his defense attorney.

Petitioner contends that the shock belt hampered his

ability to assist his defense counsel because he was afraid any

quick movement would result in a shock and because prongs in the

shock belt kept him in constant pain and he could not lean back.

Petitioner alleges the trial judge found the use of the device

was at the sole discretion of the detention officers and that the

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trial judge did not make a record regarding any necessity for the

belt. Petitioner raised this claim in his state action for postconviction relief, in which relief was summarily denied by the

state courts.

All of the federal cases which discuss habeas relief

based on a shackling claim state that, to succeed on this type

of claim, the petitioner must show that the physical restraints

‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict...” Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th

Cir. 1999). See also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69,

106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1986). To be entitled to habeas relief

on this claim the District Court must conclude that the jury saw

or was aware of the restraint and that the restraint was not

justified by state interests. See Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d

1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, for unjustified

restraint to rise to the level of a constitutional trial error,

Petitioner must establish that he suffered prejudice as a result

of the restraint. See id.; Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567,

592-93 (9th Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903

(9th Cir. 2003). See also Dyas v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934, 936-37

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner has not established that the jury saw the

stun belt. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 592-93; Packer v. Hill, 291

F.3d 569, 583 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding no prejudice resulted

from the defendant’s leg brace when no juror interviewed after

trial remembered seeing a leg brace on the defendant); Rich v.

Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner’s

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13 In an unpublished opinion which is, therefore, not

precedential but is indicative of the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, that court stated:

Despite this violation of his constitutional

rights, we cannot grant habeas relief. In the

habeas context, [harmless error analysis] means

that the petitioner must show that the physical

restraints had substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.

Gonzalez, 341 F.3d at 903 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). There is no

evidence that the belt was visible to the jury.

Berg’s speculative claims that the jury’s

perception of him was distorted by the React belt

and the fear and anxiety that it provoked in both

him and his trial counsel do not show substantial

and injurious effect or influence where the jury

was also presented with significant and strong

evidence of Berg’s guilt. In the light of this

evidence, it is unlikely that the React belt and

its effects on Berg’s comportment and demeanor

had a substantial influence on the jury’s

determination of his guilt. Further, the evidence

tendered in this case was insufficient to

establish that Berg could not communicate with

his counsel because of the use of the React belt.

Berg v. Runnels, 198 Fed. App. 672, 673 (2006).

-51-

defense counsel has conceded that the jury was never aware of any

such device. See Answer, Exh. OO. Moreover, although Petitioner

claims that the stun belt inhibited his ability to participate

in his defense, unlike the defendant in Gonzalez, there is

nothing in the record to support this assertion. The record is

devoid of any complaints, comments, or objections on the part of

Petitioner regarding the device.13

7. Petitioner contends his right to due process of law

was violated by the introduction of autopsy photographs as

evidence.

During Petitioner’s trial the state moved to admit

autopsy photographs of Mr. Sodhi. Answer, Exh. B at 74–78. The

prosecutor argued that the photographs demonstrated the entrance

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wounds of the bullets and were thus relevant to establish

premeditation, i.e., that Petitioner intended to kill the victim.

Id., Exh. B at 77. 

Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of

state law which is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.

See, e.g., Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68, 112 S. Ct. at 479-80;

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Standing

alone, the failure to comply with state rules of evidence is not

a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief, i.e., such

a failure is not equivalent to a deprivation of the federal

constitutional right to due process of law. See, e.g., Jammal

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919–20 (9th Cir. 1991). A due

process violation occurs only if there was no permissible

inferences that the jury could draw from the evidence. Id., 926

F.3d at 920. 

To rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the

introduced evidence must be of such quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial. Id., quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda,

800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The essence of our inquiry under the Fifth,

Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, as applied to

the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, is

whether the admission of the photographs

rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair.

See Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1322

(10th Cir.) (“[D]ue process arguments relating

to the admissibility of the victims’ ...

autopsy photos ... will not support habeas

relief ‘absent fundamental unfairness so as to

constitute a denial of due process of law.’”

(quoting Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d 931, 934

(10th Cir. 1990)))... “[W]e approach the

fundamental fairness analysis with

‘considerable self-restraint.’ Jackson, 143

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F.3d at 1322 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1477 (10th Cir. 1990) (en

banc)). .... Given the probative nature of the

photographs, the gruesome character of the

crime itself, and the wealth of additional

evidence supporting defendant’s convictions,

the admission of the photographs was not so

unduly prejudicial as to render the

proceedings against petitioner fundamentally

unfair. See Jackson, 143 F.3d at 1322.

Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this ground.

Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).

Although Petitioner asserts the photographs were

admitted solely to inflame the jury, there was at least one

permissible inference the jury could draw from the photographs,

i.e., premeditation. Accordingly, the admission of the autopsy

photographs did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process of

law and Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

the merits of this claim. See Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp.

1388, 1409–10 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding the autopsy photographs

at issue were not so inflammatory or prejudicial as to render the

trial fundamentally unfair).

8. Petitioner asserts his right to due process of law

was violated by the introduction of evidence regarding a prior

conviction.

In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted the trial court

erred by allowed the fact of a prior conviction to be introduced

to the jury. In denying this claim, the Arizona Supreme Court

concluded:

Here, however, the judge permitted an expert

to testify regarding his reliance on the

conviction in assessing Roque’s mental health.

Roque does not contest that evidence of his

previous conviction is the type of evidence

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reasonably relied upon by experts in making

mental health assessments. Under the Rules of

Evidence, therefore, the evidence may be

disclosed as forming the basis of an opinion

without regard to its independent

admissibility. See Ariz. R. Evid. 703. Roque

claims, however, that the mention of the

conviction was so unduly prejudicial that it

outweighed the probative value of the

evidence.

 We agree that Roque’s 1983 attempted robbery

conviction had only minimal probative value in

showing a lack of mental illness because the

State did not produce evidence that the

attempted robbery was alcohol-induced or that

it was motivated by racism, which were its

theories at trial. Nor did Dr. Scialli’s

testimony demonstrate the relevance of the

1983 conviction to his assessment of Roque’s

mental health. See Ex parte Vaughn, 869 So.2d

1090, 1097, 1099 (Ala. 2002) (finding

probative value of prior bad acts

substantially outweighed by prejudice where

state ‘presented nothing to indicate that the

prior acts committed by [defendant] were

relevant to his mental state during the

shooting that occurred ... many years later’).

 But if the probative value of the conviction

was minimal, so was any prejudicial effect.

The jury heard of the conviction from at least

two other experts, Dr. Potts and Dr.

Rosengard, who testified that because of the

age of the conviction and lack of violence

involved, it did not affect their assessments

of Roque’s mental health. Moreover, Roque

admitted doing the acts that constituted the

crimes for which he was charged in this trial,

so the jury did not rely on the prior

conviction to conclude that Roque may have

acted in conformity with it in committing the

present crimes. Finally, we note that the

trial judge offered to give a limiting

instruction advising the jurors to consider

the conviction only as information relied upon

by the expert, but Roque declined the offer.

213 Ariz. at 209, 211-12, 141 P.3d at 386-87.

This conclusion was not contrary to clearly established

federal law because the Court of Appeals correctly identified the

governing rule and its application of the rule to the facts of

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the case was not unreasonable. See Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420

F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Supreme Court has established a general principle

that the admission of evidence which is extremely unfair to the

defendant, including the fact of a prior conviction, may violate

the defendant’s right to due process. See Dowling v. United

States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S. Ct. 668, 674 (1990); Alberni

v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006). However, a state

court’s evidentiary rulings can form the basis for federal habeas

relief under the due process clause only when they were so

conspicuously prejudicial or of such magnitude as to fatally

infect the trial and deprive the defendant of due process. See

Parker v. Bowersox, 94 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1996). The

improper admission of unduly prejudicial evidence violates a

defendant’s right to due process only when there were no

permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the

evidence. See Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir.

1998).

Even assuming that the evidence was unduly prejudicial,

the jury could draw permissible inferences from the fact of

Petitioner’s prior conviction, i.e., that the fact of the

conviction did or did not weigh in favor of a particular expert’s

opinion regarding Petitioner’s mental state at the time of the

crimes. Accordingly, the state court’s decision denying relief

on the merits of the claim was not clearly contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law and Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on the merits of the claim.

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9. Petitioner alleges that he was subjected to

prosecutorial misconduct.

Petitioner raised twenty-eight specific claims of

prosecutorial misconduct in his direct appeal. The state Supreme

Court thoroughly addressed these claims, stating:

 Roque asserts that twenty-eight incidents of

prosecutorial misconduct occurring throughout

the guilt and sentencing proceedings denied

him a fair trial. We have addressed fifteen of

the alleged incidents elsewhere in this

opinion, and, of those, only the State’s

failure to disclose the scope of Dr.

Ben-Porath’s testimony warrants inclusion

here. Roque also alleges thirteen additional

incidents, which we now address.

213 Ariz. at 228, 141 P.3d at 403. “After reviewing each

incident for error,” the state court assessed “whether the

incident should count toward [Petitioner’s] prosecutorial

misconduct claim.” After the specific incidents contributing to

a finding of misconduct were identified, the court went on to

“evaluate their cumulative effect on the trial.” 213 Ariz. at

230, 141 P.3d at 405.

The state Supreme Court then concluded: 

Under the Hughes test, we cannot say that the

cumulative effect of the misconduct here so

permeated the entire atmosphere of the trial

with unfairness that it denied Roque due

process. [] We recognize in particular that

the prosecutors’ failure to disclose the scope

of Dr. Ben-Porath’s testimony was improper and

potentially prejudicial, but the defense did

not make a good faith effort to resolve that

discovery dispute. As a result, we cannot now

assess the prejudice the defendant may

ultimately have suffered. The cumulative

effect of the incidents of misconduct in this

case thus does not warrant reversal.

213 Ariz. at 230, 141 P.3d at 405.

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14 Petitioner contends the prosecutor committed misconduct

by introducing the testimony of Dr. Ben Porath; by telling the jury

Petitioner had said he had a preexisting conflict with Mr. Sodhi; by

calling Petitioner a terrorist and comparing Petitioner to Osama Bin

Laden; by discrediting the defense experts with harassment and

innuendo; by being insolent and dismissive about Dr. Toma’s

qualifications; by calling the defense experts “so called medical

experts presented by the defense” and calling Dr. Potts a “so called”

psychiatrist; by saying he was using the term “doctor” “loosely” with

regard to the defense experts; by telling the jury they could not

consider Petitioner’s IQ or any mental impairment because it did not

excuse his conduct. Petitioner further asserts prosecutorial

misconduct because, he asserts, the prosecution’s statement that he

was urging them not to accept the “distorted” story told via the

expert witnesses testifying as to what Petitioner had said to them

constituted a comment on Petitioner exercising his right to remain

silent. Petitioner additionally argues the prosecutor committed

misconduct by eliciting testimony from Dr. Scialli that he had

previously worked with Petitioner’s defense counsel and by repeatedly

telling the jury that Petitioner was a drunk, an alcoholic, and a

racist. Petitioner notes his defense counsel moved for a mistrial

based on the prosecutor’s misconduct, which motion was denied.

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Only those specific acts of the prosecutor alleged to

be instances of prosecutorial misconduct that were exhausted in

state court would be properly considered in this habeas action.14

The undersigned concludes the state court’s determination that

the asserted instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not

deprive Petitioner of his right to procedural due process of law

was not clearly contrary to federal law.

A habeas petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief based on a prosecutor’s improper statements unless the

statements infected the entire proceeding and rendered it

fundamentally unfair in violation of defendant’s right to due

process of law. See Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106

S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (1986), quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416

U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974); Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2004).

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On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the

standard of review for a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct is the narrow one of

due process, and not the broad exercise of

supervisory power. Darden v. Wainwright, 477

U.S. 168, 181, 106 S. Ct. 2464, [] (1986)

(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.

637, 642, 94 S. Ct. 1868, [] (1974)). Thus, to

succeed, [the petitioner] must demonstrate

that it so infected the trial with unfairness

as to make the resulting conviction a denial

of due process. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94

S. Ct. 1868.

Renderos v. Ryan, 469 F.3d 788, 799 (9th Cir. 2006).

Thus, we must examine the entire proceedings

to determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks

so infected the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process. Before granting relief, we must also

determine that any constitutional error was

not harmless. Specifically, we must find that

the error had substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. Only if the record demonstrates that

the jury’s decision was substantially

influenced by the error or there is grave

doubt about whether an error affected a jury

will [the petitioner] be entitled to relief.

Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 807-08 (9th Cir. 2008)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

To be entitled to relief on this claim, Petitioner must

demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments “had [a] substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S. Ct.

1710, 1714 (1993), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253. In making this determination,

the Court must look at the nature of the prosecutor’s comments,

the nature and quantum of the evidence before the jury, the

arguments of opposing counsel, the judge’s charge, and whether

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the alleged errors were isolated or repeated. See Billings v.

Polk, 441 F.3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2006).

The United States Supreme Court has concluded that

habeas relief on this type of claim is not appropriate unless the

prosecutor manipulated or misstated the evidence or implicated

other specific rights of the defendant, such as his right to

counsel or his right to remain silent. See Darden, 477 U.S. at

181-82, 106 S. Ct. at 2471-72. A prosecutor’s statements might

satisfy the standard if they are racially motivated or if they

attempt to establish guilt by association. See United States v.

Wolfswinkel, 44 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The complained of statements were not racially motivated

insofar as they did not disparage Petitioner because of his race

or his associations. The prosecutor did not manipulate the

evidence or wrongfully implicate Petitioner’s invocation of his

right to counsel. The statement alleged by Petitioner to have

implicated his right to remain silent did not explicitly do so,

instead it encouraged the jury not to accept the version of

events proffered by the defense expert witnesses, based on what

Petitioner had told them. Neither did the prosecutor explicitly

implicate Petitioner had exercised his right to remain silent

after his arrest. Additionally, Petitioner’s counsel

successfully argued to limit the effect of the improper

statements by the prosecutor and to challenge the prosecutor’s

characterization of factual evidence. 

The contested statements made by Petitioner’s prosecutor

reflected emotional reactions and attempts to elicit emotional

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responses to the evidence from the jury, which, even if

classified as improper, undesirable, or even universally

condemned, did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process.

See Darden, 477 U.S. at 180-81, 106 S. Ct. at 2470-71; Hovey v.

Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 923 (9th Cir. 2006); Allen v. Woodford, 395

F.3d 979, 997 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Magistrate Judge concludes the statement of the

prosecutor did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to make

the resulting conviction a violation of due process. See

Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 1998); Thompson v.

Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying habeas

relief based on a due process claim regarding a prosecutor’s

comments in closing argument because, in part, the jury returned

a verdict of second degree murder rather than first degree

murder). Accordingly, the state courts’ decision that Petitioner

was not deprived of a constitutional right by the prosecutor’s

challenged comments was not clearly contrary to federal law and

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the merits

of this claim. 

10. Petitioner contends he was denied a fair trial as

a result of testimony by Dr. Jack Potts.

In his amended habeas petition Petitioner contends Dr.

Potts committed perjury by testifying Petitioner had told him

Petitioner had been to one of the gas stations the day or week

before the events of September 15, 2001. See Docket No. 14.

Petitioner has arguably not exhausted this claim for relief. In

his state action for post-conviction relief Petitioner argued Dr.

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Potts committed perjury by stating Petitioner was intoxicated at

the time of the crimes. This is a different factual premise for

the asserted perjury claimed in the habeas petition. However,

regardless of any failure to fully exhaust this claim, the claim

may denied on the merits. Petitioner is not entitled to relief

based on a single alleged instance of perjury unless it rendered

his trial fundamentally unfair. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68,

112 S. Ct. at 479-80. Although Dr. Potts did testify that

Petitioner had told Dr. Potts he had been to one of the gas

stations involved in the crimes prior to September 15, 2001, this

testimony did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair.

Defense counsel did an admirable job of eliciting testimony

contradicting the prosecution’s assertion that Petitioner had

been to one or both of the gas stations prior to the date of the

shootings and that Petitioner had previously had negative

interactions with Mr. Sodhi. Accordingly, habeas relief on this

claim may properly be denied.

11. Petitioner contends his trial and appellate counsel

were both unconstitutionally ineffective.

Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of counsel

claims in his state action for post-conviction relief pursuant

to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The state court

determined that Petitioner was not entitled to relief from his

convictions and sentences based on these claims.

In his action for state post-conviction relief pursuant

to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner

alleged he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

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trial counsel because his counsel failed to submit or request

adequate jury instructions regarding the insanity defense.

Petitioner also asserted his counsel was ineffective because he

did not object to Petitioner being forced to wear a stun belt

during the trial. Petitioner further alleged his rights were

violated because his counsel did not object to Petitioner’s being

forced to take anti-psychotic medications during his trial.

Petitioner further alleged his trial counsel’s performance was

deficient because counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the

state’s key expert witness. Petitioner argued his trial counsel

was incompetent because he failed to object to Dr. Ben Porath’s

inconsistent statements. Additionally, Petitioner asserted his

trial counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally deficient

because he failed to secure a change of venue. 

Petitioner also maintains his counsel was ineffective

because he failed to move for a competency hearing close to the

date of the trial and because he did not move for a Willits jury

instruction. Petitioner alleges his trial counsel was

ineffective because he failed to challenge the admission of a

prior conviction from 1983 as not authenticated. Petitioner also

asserts his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not

object to the admission of the autopsy photographs and because

he did not object to prosecutorial misconduct.

With regard to his appellate counsel, Petitioner

asserted counsel failed to argue there was insufficient evidence

to convict Petitioner of first degree murder and insufficient

evidence to convict Petitioner of drive-by shooting at the gas

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stations, and insufficient evidence to convict Petitioner of

drive-by shooting at the Mesa residence. Petitioner also alleged

his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue a

violation of Petitioner’s right to be free of double jeopardy

caused by the charge of attempted murder and drive by shooting

at the Mobil gas station. Additionally, Petitioner asserted his

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to contend that

being forced to wear a stun belt at his trial and being forcibly

medicated during his trial violated Petitioner’s constitutional

rights, warranting reversal of his convictions.

The state trial court summarily denied the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims raised in Petitioner’s Rule 32

action. The Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme

Court declined to review or reverse this decision. The entire

record in this matter having been thoroughly reviewed, including

the recording of oral argument in Petitioner’s direct appeal

proceedings, the Magistrate Judge concludes the state courts’

resolution of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims was not contrary to federal law.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

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To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish that there

is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Martin v. Grosshans, 424 F.3d 588, 592

(7th Cir. 2005). Additionally, prejudice from counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance is less likely when the case

against the defendant is strong. See, e.g., Avila v. Galaza, 297

F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting the cases so holding).

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. “An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25,

123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted). Vague or

conclusory claims do not establish evidence sufficient to

conclude the state court’s decision was clearly contrary to

federal law. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir.

1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The Strickland prejudice requirement applies to claims

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel:

The Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel includes the right to

effective appellate counsel. However,

appellate counsel need not advance every

possible argument, even those that are

non-frivolous, and should instead concentrate

his advocacy on winnowing out weaker arguments

on appeal and focusing on one central issue if

possible, or at most on a few key issues. The

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two-part Strickland test, which the Court has

used in evaluating claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, supra, also

guides an analysis of claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel.

Davis v. Singletary, 853 F. Supp. 1492, 1549 (M.D. Fl. 1994)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was

deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular argument,

either in his trial proceedings or in his appeals, the petitioner

must establish the argument was likely to be successful, thereby

establishing that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s omission.

See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007);

Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). The

appropriate inquiry is not whether raising a particular issue on

appeal would have been frivolous, but whether there is a

reasonable probability raising the issue would have led to the

reversal of Petitioner’s conviction. See Miller v. Keeney, 882

F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). If Petitioner had only a remote

chance of obtaining reversal based upon’ a specific issue,

neither element of the Strickland test is satisfied. Id.

A defendant’s counsel’s decisions regarding jury

instructions are fairly construed as a strategic decision. See

Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2002). “[S]trategic

choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and

strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are

reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland,

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466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. 

Under AEDPA, we apply Strickland to each

individual case, irrespective of whether the

precise fact pattern at issue has been

considered previously by the Supreme Court.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S. Ct. 1495

(That the Strickland test “of necessity

requires a case-by-case examination of the

evidence ... obviates neither the clarity of

the rule nor the extent to which the rule must

be seen as ‘established’ by this Court.”).

“[B]ecause the Strickland standard is a

general standard, a state court has even more

latitude to reasonably determine that a

defendant has not satisfied that standard .”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ----, 129

S.Ct. 1411, 1420, [] (2009) []. We do not,

however, afford the state courts a blank check

to determine, at their whim, whether an

attorney’s conduct was reasonable or

unreasonable... 

Where counsel’s failure to investigate was

both objectively unreasonable and prejudicial,

and where the state court acted unreasonably

in finding to the contrary, we will grant a

petition for habeas corpus.

Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Arizona state court’s decision in Petitioner’s Rule

32 proceedings, that Petitioner was not denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel, was not clearly contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of federal law and Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that he was

deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Compare Jones

v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 640 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding counsel was

ineffective for (1) failing to secure the appointment of a mental

health expert; (2) failure to timely move for neurological and

neuropsychological testing; and (3) failure to present additional

mitigation witnesses and evidence).

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12. Petitioner alleges the indictment was defective

because it failed to allege aggravating factors and because the

state was granted a sixty-day continuance to consult the

government of India regarding their opinion on seeking the death

penalty.

Respondents assert Petitioner did not raise a claim for

relief based on the indictment or the continuance in the state

courts in his direct appeal or his Rule 32 action. Accordingly,

Respondents argue, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the

claims asserted in his twelfth ground for habeas relief. 

Petitioner did not raise these claims in his direct

appeal or in his state action pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure.

A federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state

prisoner unless the prisoner has first exhausted his state court

remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement by fully and fairly presenting

each claim to the highest state court. A

petitioner fully and fairly presents a claim

to the state courts if he presents the claim

(1) to the correct forum, see § 2254(c); (2)

through the proper vehicle,; and (3) by

providing the factual and legal basis for the

claim. Full and fair presentation additionally

requires a petitioner to present the substance

of his claim to the state courts, including a

reference to a federal constitutional

guarantee and a statement of facts that

entitle the petitioner to relief. 

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

citations omitted). 

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims by

failing to raise them in his direct appeal or in his pro se first

state action for post-conviction relief. Arizona’s Rules of

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Criminal Procedure bar Petitioner from returning to the state

courts with the claim. Accordingly, the claims are exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. Relief may not be granted on the merits

of the claims unless Petitioner establishes cause and prejudice

for his procedural default.

Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural

default of his habeas claims in the state courts. Under the

“cause and prejudice” test, Petitioner bears the burden of

establishing that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded his compliance with Arizona’s rules regarding the timely

assertion of these claims. See, e.g., Moorman v. Schriro, 426

F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005). To establish prejudice,

Petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982).

See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir.

1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not

cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho State

Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986) Additionally,

allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not

establish cause for the failure to properly exhaust a habeas

claim in the state courts unless the specific Sixth Amendment

claim providing the basis for cause was itself properly

exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.

Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at

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2567 (“We reiterate that counsel’s ineffectiveness will

constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional

violation”); Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“[a]ttorney error does not constitute cause to excuse a

procedural default unless counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.”).

Petitioner has not established that either alleged

constitutional error asserted in this claim for relief so

infected his criminal proceedings as to violate his right to due

process. Petitioner has not established that any delay in his

trial for sixty days affected his ability to adequately prepare

his defense. Petitioner has not established that any failure to

allege aggravating factors in the indictment prejudiced his

defense at trial. Therefore, because Petitioner has not shown

cause and prejudice regarding these procedurally defaulted

claims, the Court may not grant relief on the merits of the

claims.

13. Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence

presented at trial to support his convictions for drive-by

shooting and a finding of premeditation on the charge of

attempted first-degree murder.

In his amended habeas petition Petitioner asserts that

the state failed to prove each and every element of the charged

offenses with regard to his conviction for first-degree murder

and his convictions for the three drive-by shootings. Petitioner

contends that the state did not prove he premeditated the murder

of Mr. Sodhi. Petitioner contends that there was insufficient

evidence to sustain his conviction for drive-by shooting with

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regard to the shooting at the Chevron station, noting Mr. Ledesma

testified “he saw nothing at all.” Amended Petition at 32.

Petitioner also notes Mr. Khalil testified his back was to the

window when the shots were fired at the Mobil station. Id.

Petitioner also alleges “Sahak stated he saw Petitioners (sic)

truck pull up and stop while he was in his house with the door

closed. He then stated he hid behind a wall and heard a

gunshot...” Id. Petitioner correctly notes that “[n]ot one

witness testify stated they saw Petitioner shoot from his

vehicle.” Id., citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1209.

In his Rule 32 Petitioner argued there was insufficient

evidence to convict him of each of the three drive-by shootings

and accompanying 12-year sentences. The state court denied these

claims without comment. The state court’s decision was not

clearly contrary to federal law.

In his amended petition Petitioner claims a violation

of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, i.e., he

contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

convictions for drive-by shooting. “[T]he Due Process Clause

protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond

a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). To determine whether

sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to support a habeas

petitioner’s conviction, the Court must decide if, “viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

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of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). See also

McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2010); McMillan v. Gomez,

19 F.3d 465, 468-469 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Under this standard, a federal habeas court faced with

a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences

must presume--even if it does not appear affirmatively in the

record--that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793. See also McDaniel,

130 S. Ct. at 673.

[I]t is the province of the jury to resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.[] As the

Ninth Circuit has explained, The question is

not whether we are personally convinced beyond

a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational

jurors could reach the conclusion that these

jurors reached.[] While mere suspicion or

speculation cannot be the basis for creation

of logical inferences... [c]ircumstantial

evidence and inferences drawn from it may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Atwood v. Schriro, 489 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1002-03 (D. Ariz. 2007)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge, we ask whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the state

habeas court did not address the merits of

this claim, we review de novo whether

sufficient evidence exists to support Schad’s

murder conviction.

Circumstantial evidence and reasonable

inferences drawn from it may properly form the

basis of a conviction.

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Schad, 595 F.3d at 917 (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

The Court may presume the state court’s conclusion,

although implied in this matter, that the conviction was

supported by the evidence is correct. See Crow v. Eyman, 459

F.2d 24, 25 (9th Cir. 1972). Petitioner bears the burden of

proving that the record is so totally devoid of evidentiary

support for the challenged conviction as to violate due process.

Id. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a

petitioner’s guilty verdict. Jackson, 442 U.S. at 324-25, 99 S.

Ct. at 2792; Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 2000)

(finding sufficient evidence to support a murder conviction when

the evidence was almost entirely circumstantial and relatively

weak); Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d 538, 547 (8th Cir. 2005). In

reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a federal habeas

court must defer to the trier of fact with respect to issues of

conflicting testimony, weight of the evidence, and the

credibility of the witnesses. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.

Ct. at 2789.

The record in this matter having been thoroughly

reviewed, including all of the testimony of all of the witnesses

and each of Petitioner’s pleadings in state court and in this

habeas action, the Magistrate Judge concludes there was

sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find Petitioner

guilty of the crimes charged, specifically first-degree murder

and the drive-by shootings. Although no eyewitness testified they

saw Petitioner actually shooting a weapon, eyewitnesses testified

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they saw Petitioner alone in his truck setting down a weapon

immediately after the shots were fired apparently from his truck

into the residence in Mesa and at the Mobil station. Ballistics

experts testified that tests had determined the shots fired at

each of the three locations, including the five shots fired at

Mr. Sodhi, were fired from weapons found in Petitioner’s home.

Petitioner told each psychiatrist or psychologist who examined

him that he had committed the crimes. Accordingly, the state

court’s decision denying these claims was not clearly contrary

to federal law nor an unreasonable application thereof and

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

14. Petitioner asserts his Sixth Amendment right to a

jury trial was violated because the state failed to prove the

aggravating factors to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Petitioner asserts that a judge, rather than a jury,

found the aggravating factors used to enhance his non-capital

sentences under state sentencing statutes. Petitioner asserts

the aggravating factors were not presented to a jury, in

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, including

an impartial jury.

Petitioner exhausted this claim in the state courts.

In his Rule 32 action Petitioner asserted that the imposition of

aggravated sentences on Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, violated his

rights pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, i.e., that aggravating

factors must be determined by a jury rather than a judge. The

state courts summarily denied the claim.

In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S.

Ct. 2531, 2537-38 (2004), the United States Supreme Court

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determined that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to

have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that

increases his sentence beyond the “statutory maximum,” unless the

fact was admitted by the defendant or was based on a prior

conviction. The United States Supreme Court clarified that the

term “statutory maximum” was to be interpreted as the presumptive

sentence, or the presumptive sentence given the facts as found

by the jury or admitted by the defendant, rather than the maximum

statutory sentence allowed. See Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 772

(10th Cir. 2005) (“In other words, the relevant ‘statutory

maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after

finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without

any additional findings.”).

Many constitutional errors are not such as to

“necessarily render[ ] a criminal trial

fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle

for determining guilt or innocence.”

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-19,

126 S.Ct. 2546, [] (2006) (quoting Neder v.

United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827,

[] (1999)). So long as the “defendant had

counsel and was tried by an impartial

adjudicator, there is a strong presumption

that any other [constitutional] errors that

may have occurred are subject to

harmless-error analysis.” Id. at 218, 126

S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119

S.Ct. 1827) (alteration in original).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that

a state court’s failure to submit a sentencing

factor to the jury, a Sixth Amendment

violation under Blakely, is not structural

error and is subject to harmless error

analysis. Id. at 221-22, 126 S.Ct. 2546.

Besser v. Walsh, 601 F.3d 163, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2010).

Having found that [the petitioner’s] sentence

violates Blakely and Apprendi, we must next

consider whether the constitutional error was

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harmless. Habeas relief is only appropriate if

the constitutional error harmed the

petitioner. See Jensen v. Romanowski, 590 F.3d

373, 378 (6th Cir. 2009). “Failure to submit

a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure

to submit an element to the jury, is not

structural error,” and accordingly, such error

is subject to harmless error analysis.

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221, 126

S.Ct. 2546, [] (2006). 

Villagarcia v. Warden, Noble Corr. Inst., 599 F.3d 529, 536 (6th

Cir. 2010).

Prior to the imposition of Petitioner’s sentences, the

jury heard testimony regarding the existence of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances to evaluate whether Petitioner should

be sentenced to death pursuant to his conviction for first-degree

murder. The jury found that, in the commission of the murder of

Mr. Sodhi, Petitioner knowingly caused a grave risk of death to

another person, i.e., Mr. Ledesma. 

 The Arizona courts have interpreted Blakely to allow for

the imposition of an aggravated sentence founded partially on

facts not found by a jury if at least one aggravating factor is

compliant with Blakely, i.e., found by a jury or admitted by the

defendant. See Arizona v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618

(2005); Arizona v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601 (2005).

Because an Arizona defendant may receive an aggravated

sentence based on a single aggravating factor, see Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated § 13-702(B), the federal courts have

concluded that if a single Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt

aggravating factor establishes the facts “legally essential” to

punishment, a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial

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is not violated by the fact that other factors were found by a

judge in the context of sentencing the defendant. See, e.g.,

Stokes v. Schriro, 465 F.3d 397, 402-03 (9th Cir. 2006).

Arizona’s sentencing scheme, as iterated in Martinez,

was upheld upon review by the United States Supreme Court. See

Martinez v. Arizona, 546 U.S. 1044, 126 S. Ct. 762 (2005).

Arizona’s response to Blakely as explained in Martinez has been

found to be not clearly contrary to federal law. See Stokes, 465

F.3d at 402-03 (holding “the Arizona state courts’ interpretation

of these [sentencing] provisions does not contradict clearly

established federal law”).

Moreover, even if a Blakely-compliant aggravating factor

was not present, any resulting error was harmless. See

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 222-23, 126 S. Ct. 2546,

2553 (2006) (holding that Blakely error is subject to harmless

error review). Having reviewed the record in this matter, the

Magistrate Judge concludes that a reasonable juror could find

beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factors which the trial

court considered in imposing aggravated sentences. The jury

found Petitioner guilty of each crime charged in the amended

indictment, including first-degree murder, which crimes were used

to aggravate Petitioner’s sentence, and also found Petitioner had

caused a grave risk of death to Mr. Ledesma. 

III Conclusion

All but one of Petitioner’s claims for habeas relief was

raised in and denied by the state courts. Petitioner has not

shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural

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default of the claims which were not exhausted. With regard to

the claims which were presented to and denied by the state

courts, the state courts’ decisions denying the claims raised by

Mr. Roque in his amended habeas petition were not clearly

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

Accordingly, the petition may be denied and dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Roque’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2). 

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

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