Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02037/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02037-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Medical Malpractice

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carla M. Lacombe, individually)

and as Administrator for the )

Estate of David Nichols, ) No. CIV 06-2037-PHX-RCB

deceased; Donald A. Nichols, )

father of David Nichols; )

Nancy Nichols, mother of ) O R D E R

David Nichols, )

Plaintiffs )

vs. )

)

Bullhead City Hospital Corp., )

a Tennessee corporation doing )

business in Arizona as Western)

Arizona Regional Medical )

Center, )

)

Defendant. )

David Nichols died on September 3, 2004, eleven days after he

was seen at defendant’s facility, Bullhead City Hospital

Corporation, a Tennessee corporation doing business in Arizona as

Western Arizona Regional Medical Center (“WARMC”). Nearly three

years ago, on August 21, 2006, plaintiffs filed this medical

malpractice action arising out of Mr. Nichols’ death. Prior to the 

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1 A.R.S. § 12-542 provides that the statute of limitations for personal

injury, including medical malpractice and wrongful death, is two years. See A.R.S.

§ 12-542(1) and (2) (West 2003). 

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filing of this action, plaintiffs had filed an action in Nevada

state court against WARMC, among others. Claiming that plaintiffs

have allowed this action to “languish[][,]” WARMC, the only

remaining defendant, is moving to dismiss for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Mot. (doc. 62) at 3:20. 

Plaintiffs oppose dismissal and “countermove for a Stay . . .

pending the outcome of the Nevada . . . action.” Resp. (doc. 64)

at 1:20-21. 

Background

 Roughly six weeks after the filing of their Nevada state

court action, plaintiffs filed the present action. Plaintiffs

filed this action shortly before the September 3, 2006, expiration

of the two-year statute of limitations.1 Plaintiffs candidly admit

that they filed this action because WARMC challenged jurisdiction

in Nevada. Resp. (doc. 64) at 2. The Nevada action has proceeded

apace; it is still pending and continues to be prosecuted. During

the Nevada litigation, the court found that it has jurisdiction

over WARMC - a ruling which WARMC intends to appeal. Id. In the

meantime, although defendants made various motions herein,

plaintiffs have done nothing affirmative to prosecute this action. 

Basically, WARMC argues that dismissal for failure to

prosecute is warranted because witnesses are unavailable; memories

have gone stale; and it is incurring unspecified “needless

expenses.” Mot. (doc. 62) at 6:2. Plaintiffs oppose dismissal,

primarily because of WARMC’s “refusal to submit to Nevada

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2 WARMC requests oral argument, mot. (doc. 62) at 1, but plaintiffs do

not. Given the court’s familiarity with the rather convoluted history of this

action, the straightforward issues presented herein, and the fact that those issues

have been fully briefed, oral argument will not aid the court’s decisional process.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Dev. Malibu

Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir.1991); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th

Cir. 1998). Therefore, the court denies WARMC’s request for oral argument.

 

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jurisdiction[.]” Resp. (doc. 64) at 2. Plaintiffs posit that if

WARMC ultimately prevails on the jurisdiction issue in Nevada, and

that action is dismissed, they will be left without a remedy unless

they can proceed against WARMC in this federal action. Hence, they

are seeking a stay “pending the outcome of the Nevada . . .

action.” Id. at 1:20-21. 

“Alternatively,” if the court declines to grant a stay,

plaintiffs “are ready to proceed and will confer with [WARMC] for a

schedule of discovery deadlines and pretrial proceedings.” Id. at

2. Asserting that a stay is “the most drastic alternative to the

defense[,]” WARMC opposes that request for alternative relief, and

insists that dismissal will “provide[] the least risk of prejudice

to all the parties[.]” Reply (doc. 65) at 4:17-18. 

Discussion2

I. Rule 41(b) Dismissal

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes

a court to dismiss an action when, among other reasons, “the

plaintiff fails to prosecute[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). A district

court’s authority to dismiss under that rule is well-settled. 

See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 

8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized

that “[t]he power to invoke this sanction is necessary in order to

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prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to

avoid congestion in the calendar of the District Courts.” Id. at

629-630. 

At the same time, however, “[d]ismissal for failure to

prosecute is a ‘harsh penalty’ and ‘should be imposed only in

extreme circumstances.[’]” Fidelity National Financial, Inc. v.

Friedman, 2009 WL 1160234, at *4 (C.D.Cal. April 27, 2009 (quoting

Johnson v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 825 (9th

Cir. 1991)). Thus, in resolving a motion to dismiss on that basis,

a court must weigh the following somewhat conflicting factors: 

“(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation;

(2) the court’s need to manage the docket; (3) the risk of

prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of

less drastic sanctions.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod.

Liability Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “This multi-factor test 

. . . is not ‘a mechanical means of determining what [] sanction is

just.’” Wade v. Ratella, 407 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1207 (S.D.Cal. 2005)

(quoting Valley Engineers Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998)). Rather, these factors are “a

disjunctive balancing test, so not all five factors must support

dismissal.” Grubb v. Hernandez, 2009 WL 1357411, at *3 (C.D.Cal.

May 1, 2009) (citing Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 1057). 

Consistent with the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit has instructed

that “[t]hese factors are not a series of conditions precedent

before the judge can do anything, but a way for a district judge to

think about what to do.” PPA Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1226

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the

Ninth Circuit has indicated that it “may affirm a dismissal where

at least four factors support dismissal . . . . or where at least

three facts strongly support dismissal.” Yourish v. California

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 9893, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

Not surprisingly, WARMC contends that the five factors

enumerated above all favor dismissal here. Plaintiffs recognize

that these factors frame the court’s inquiry, but they urge a

different outcome. Without citing any authority, plaintiffs seek a

stay of this action because in their view a stay will serve the

five factors previously identified. Plaintiffs posit that a stay

pending the outcome of the Nevada action may render this action

moot. They further posit that no additional costs will be incurred

in that “[t]he discovery now being conducted in Nevada can be used

in this action as well[.]” Resp. (doc. 64) at 2. 

WARMC strenuously opposes a stay, describing it as “the most

drastic alternative to the defense.” Reply (doc. 65) at 4:17-18. 

Although WARMC contends that it would be prejudiced by having to

begin discovery in this case now, it further contends that such

prejudice “is nothing compared to [what] it would endure if this

case were stayed until years from now [-] after resolution of the

Nevada case at the trial court . . . and [WARMC’s] appeal of the

jurisdiction[] issue.” Id. at 4:19-20 - 5:1-2.

WARMC also takes the opposite view from plaintiffs in terms of

the use to which the Nevada discovery can be put. WARMC maintains

that “[t]he three . . . years of discovery” in Nevada “will have to

begin in Arizona from scratch.” Id. at 2:23-24. This perceived

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necessity of starting “from scratch” arises from the fact that

WARMC’s Arizona counsel has not participated in the Nevada action. 

Furthermore, WARMC notes that any discovery here will have to be

done in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as

opposed to Nevada state law. For these reasons, WARMC replies

that “[t]he only reasonable course of action . . . is to dismiss

this federal case.” Id. at 2:8-10 (emphasis omitted). 

“[A] district court is not required to make specific findings

on each of the essential factors[]” pertaining to dismissal for

failure to prosecute. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th

Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, because such findings

are “beneficial to the reviewing court[,]” and because the court

believes that the parties should have the benefit of the court’s

reasoning, it will evaluate each of the enumerated factors in turn. 

See id. 

A. Expeditious Resolution

“[T]he public has an overriding interest in securing ‘the

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” PPA

Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). 

“Orderly and expeditious resolution of disputes is of great

importance to the rule of law.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]he public’s

interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors

dismissal.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (emphasis added). Given

plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute this action, despite its pendency

for almost three years, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal,

although not strongly. 

B. Docket Management

“District courts have an inherent power to control their

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dockets.” PPA Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.2d at 1227 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Acknowledging that inherent

power, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[t]he trial judge is

in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular

case interferes with docket management and the public interest.” 

Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted); see also Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991 (district courts occupy

a “superior position to evaluate the effects of delay” on their own

dockets). “This factor is usually reviewed in conjunction with the

public’s interest in expeditious resolution and, as with th[at]

first factor, [the Ninth Circuit] give[s] deference to the district

court since it knows when its docket may become unmanageable.” PPA

Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.2d at 1227 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

The court is well aware that this action has been pending for

more than two and a half years with no discovery having been

conducted. This is not a situation, however, where plaintiffs have

sat idly by and done absolutely nothing during the pendency of this

action. They have complied with this court’s Rule 16 scheduling

conference order and have actively participated in a scheduling

conference and two status conferences. At one of those status

conferences, due in part to plaintiffs’ cooperation, the number of

defendants were significantly reduced. See Doc. 21. Further,

plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate in April, 2007. Moreover,

nothing precluded WARMC from proceeding with discovery, even though

plaintiffs did not. 

This action has “consumed some of the court’s time that could

have been devoted to other cases on [its] docket.” See Pagtalunan,

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291 F.3d at 642. Nonetheless, because plaintiffs have complied

with the court’s orders, including timely filing an amended

complaint, plaintiffs’ conduct is not tantamount to an

impermissible delay tactic. Nor has the court’s docket been

rendered unmanageable by plaintiffs’ failure to actively pursue

this action. Thus, the court finds that this second factor weighs

against dismissal. 

C. Risk of Prejudice to Defendant

Typically, the Ninth Circuit’s “cases have tended to focus on

the factors of prejudice and delay.” Nealey v. Transportation

Maritima Mexicana, SA,, 662 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1980)

(footnote omitted). These factors are “often integrally related[]”

and hence cannot be “viewed in isolation.” Id. at 1280. Given

this interplay, “[t]he law . . . presumes prejudice from

unreasonable delay.” PPA Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.2d at 1227

(citations omitted). However, due to the “competing concern” of

“disposing of cases on their merits[,]” the Nealey Court

instructed: “The pertinent question for the district court, . . .,

is not simply whether there has been any, but rather whether there

has been sufficient delay or prejudice to justify dismissal of

plaintiff’s case.” Nealey, 662 F.2d at 1280 (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a burden shifting approach to

prejudice. Under that approach, first it is “incumbent upon the”

party moving for dismissal under Rule 41(b) “to come forth with

some facts indicating delay on the part of the plaintiff.” Id.

(citation omitted). After that, the court must consider the

proffered reasons for the delay because “[e]ven where a plaintiff

has failed to do what he might have done earlier, he may have an

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explanation that excuses or justifies his failure.” Id. 

 “[W]here a plaintiff has come forth with an excuse for his

delay that is anything but frivolous, the burden of production

shifts to the defendant to show at least some actual prejudice.” 

Id. at 1281 (emphasis added). Once the defendant does that, “the

plaintiff must then persuade the court that such claims of

prejudice are either illusory or relatively insignificant when

compared to the force of his excuse.” Id. “In this circumstance

prejudice, delay and excuse all inform the district court’s

discretion.” PPA Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.2d at 1228. Given that

“the district court is in the best position to assess prejudice[,]”

the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the district court’s “finding

of prejudice deserves substantial deference[.] Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“Prejudice normally consists of loss of evidence and

memory[.]” Id. (citations omitted). “[A] district court in the

exercise of its discretion should consider whether such losses have

occurred and if so, whether they are significant [since] [n]ot

every loss, and particularly not every loss of memory, will

prejudice the defense of a case.” Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1453 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Whether the prejudice is

significant will depend on whether the plaintiff’s actions impair

the defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere

with the rightful decision of the case.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

Additionally, prejudice may “consist of costs or burdens of

litigation, although it may not consist of the mere pendency of the

lawsuit itself[.]” PPA Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.2d at 1228

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(citations omitted). That is so because “[l]imited delays and the

prejudice to a defendant from the pendency of a lawsuit are

realities of the system that have to be accepted, provided the

prejudice is not compounded by unreasonable delays.” Pagtalunan,

291 F.3d at 642 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Especially given that the movant’s initial burden “will rarely

be difficult[,]” the court finds that WARMC has met its burden of

showing delay in that plaintiffs have done almost nothing

affirmative to advance this litigation. See Nealey, 662 F.2d at

1280. For example, as already noted, plaintiffs have conducted no

discovery, despite the pendency of this action for over two and a

half years. 

Because WARMC has met its initial burden of showing delay, the

court must determine whether plaintiffs have “come forth with an

excuse for [their] delay that is anything but frivolous[.]” See id.

at 1281 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not frame their opposition

in terms of an excuse for delay. Despite that, their response

easily can be read as asserting that the reason for the delay is

that plaintiffs are pursuing the Nevada action first. From

plaintiffs’ standpoint, what transpires in the Nevada action will

directly impact the course this action takes. In that regard,

plaintiffs stress that a settlement of that Nevada action will

render this federal action moot. Resp. (doc. 64) 2:11. 

Plaintiffs add that they initially filed this case because

WARMC would not consent to jurisdiction in Nevada. Further,

plaintiffs contend that the dismissal is not appropriate because if

the Nevada court ultimately finds jurisdiction lacking, they will

be without any recourse, unless they are allowed to proceed here. 

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Given the relatively low threshold showing required of plaintiffs

at this juncture, i.e., an excuse which is “anything but

frivolous,” the court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden

of proof in that regard. 

Therefore, the court must proceed to the next level of

inquiry. WARMC misconceives the nature of its burden, arguing that

it “will be greatly prejudiced if this case is not dismissed.” 

Reply (doc. 62) at 6:4-5 (emphasis omitted). However, because

plaintiffs’ excuse for delay is not frivolous, WARMC has the burden

of production which requires a showing of “at least actual

prejudice[]” arising from that delay, not prejudice from denying

dismissal. See Nealey, 662 F.2d at 1281. WARMC has not met that

burden. 

Attempting to show actual prejudice, WARMC declares that its

Arizona counsel has had “no access to discovery in the Nevada case

and has had no opportunity to protect [WARMC’s] interests under

Arizona law.” Reply (doc. 62) at 6:10-12. While that may be so,

the fact remains that WARMC somehow was able to obtain the

deposition of Dr. Arthur Delrosario, who performed the autopsy on

Mr. Nichols, as well as a copy of his autopsy report. Primarily

based upon those items, WARMC previously moved for summary judgment

in this action, which the court denied, finding issues of fact as

to proximate cause. See Lacombe v. Bullhead City Hosp. Corp., 2008

WL 518822 (D.Ariz. Dec. 9, 2008). The foregoing significantly

undermines WARMC’s assertion that it has been prejudiced in this

action by its inability to obtain discovery in the Nevada action. 

Moreover, nothing precluded WARMC from proceeding with its own

discovery in this action. 

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WARMC’s argument that it has been prejudiced due to witness

unavailability and memories fading is equally misplaced. The

fundamental flaw with this argument is that WARMC only generically

asserts loss of memory and loss of evidence. It has not met its

burden of production by showing that such losses actually occurred. 

Cf. Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1454 (actual prejudice shown where, inter

alia, “one of the beneficiaries of the properties, who would have

served as a witness, . . . passed away[]”). Thus, the court

cannot, as it must, determine whether these claimed losses “are

significant[.]” See id. at 1453 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Likewise, the court also is unable to determine

“whether plaintiff[s’] actions [have] impair[ed] [WARMC’s] ability

to go to trial or threaten[ed] to interfere with the rightful

decision of the case[]” based simply upon WARMC’s incantation of

the phrases “witness memory loss” and “loss of evidence” without

more. See Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1454 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

Nor is WARMC’s reliance upon the costs of litigation a

sufficient basis for finding actual prejudice. Given WARMC’s

characterization of this case as “stagnant,” Mot. (doc. 62) at 4:3,

the court fails to see how the unspecified costs WARMC purportedly

is incurring can be anything other than those associated with “the

mere pendency of the lawsuit itself[.]” See PPA Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d at 1228 (citations omitted). Such costs are simply the

“realities of the system,” especially where, as here, there has

been no showing of actual prejudice. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at

642 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

As the foregoing demonstrates, WARMC has not met its burden of

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showing actual prejudice in any form. Consequently, there is no

need to proceed to the third level of inquiry under Nealey, i.e.

whether the prejudice is illusory or relatively insignificant. 

Thus, as to the third factor - risk of prejudice - while there has

been some delay here, at the end of the day, the court is not yet

convinced that that delay has been sufficient enough to justify the

harsh penalty of dismissal. That is all the more so given WARMC’s

failure to show actual prejudice as a result of this delay. 

Therefore, as with docket management, this factor too militates

against dismissal.

D. Public Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits

Turning to the fourth fact, the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits, this “weighs against

dismissal, as it always does.” Grubb, 2009 WL 1357411, at *3

(citing, inter alia, Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643); see also PPA

Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1228 (citation omitted) (Ninth

Circuit has often said that the public policy favoring disposition

of cases on their merits strongly counsels against dismissal[]”). 

E. Availability of Less Drastic Sanctions

The fifth factor also weighs against dismissal, “particularly

since the court has not considered or tried less drastic

alternatives to dismissal.” See United Van Lines, LLC v. Edwards,

2008 WL 686840, at *3 (E.D.Cal. March 11, 2008) (citation omitted). 

Indeed, “[t]he district court abuses its discretion if it imposes a

sanction of dismissal without first considering the impact of the

sanction and the adequacy of less drastic sanctions.” PPA Prods.

Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1228 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

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In sum, because four of the five Nealey factors weigh against

dismissal, the court finds that this case does not presently

present the type of “extreme circumstances” which warrant the

“harsh penalty” of dismissal. See Johnson, 939 F.2d at 825). 

Consequently, the court denies WARMC’s motion to dismiss for

failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 41(b).

By the same token, however, the court will not turn a blind

eye to the fact that this case has been pending for nearly three

years without diligent prosecution by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’

strategy in keeping this action alive, while simultaneously

pursuing the Nevada state action also against WARMC, obviously is

one of “hedging their bets.” Plaintiffs cannot proceed in this way 

though to the point where it becomes prejudicial to WARMC. That

point is fast approaching. Accordingly, as plaintiffs have

indicated they are ready to do, the court directs them to confer

with WARMC and submit a proposed scheduling order in conformity

with Fed.R.Civ.P. 16. Such order shall be submitted within ten

(10) days of the entry of this order. In determining the scope of

any discovery, plaintiffs are advised that they will not be allowed

to repeat any discovery which has already been conducted in the

Nevada action. Nothing herein should be construed, however, as

limiting the discovery in which WARMC decides to engage. 

II. “Countermotion for Stay”

As should be abundantly clear by now, the court finds no basis

for staying this action pending the outcome of the Nevada action. 

Therefore, it denies plaintiffs’ “countermotion” for such relief.

For the reasons set forth above, the court hereby ORDERS that:

(1) defendant WARMC’s “Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 

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 Prosecute” (doc. 62) is DENIED without prejudice; 

(2) plaintiffs’ “Countermotion for Stay” (doc. 64) is DENIED;

(3) the parties shall confer and within ten (10) days of 

 entry of this order, they shall submit a proposed

scheduling order in conformity with Fed.R.Civ.P. 16. 

 A scheduling conference pursuant to Rule 16 is set on

June 29, 2009, at 10:00 a.m.; and

(4) the parties are GRANTED leave to conduct limited 

 discovery as specified herein. 

DATED this 9th day of June, 2009.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:06-cv-02037-RCB Document 66 Filed 06/09/09 Page 15 of 15