Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06017/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06017-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

ALAN S. HAMBY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-6017

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Alan S. Hamby, appealed to this Court from the denial of his application for

social security disability benefits by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(hereinafter "Commissioner") (Doc. #1). On March 31, 2006, the undersigned remanded this

matter to the Commissioner for further consideration (Doc. #9 & 10). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Terry P. Diggs, filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to the

EAJA (the Equal Access to Justice Act, hereinafter the "EAJA"), on April 19, 2006 (Doc. #11-

13). The Commissioner filed her response to the EAJA motion on October 6, 2006 (Doc. #14). 

This matter is now ready for consideration. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits

was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner expressly states that

she does not oppose the award of a reasonable attorney’s fee under the EAJA, the hourly rate

sought or the number of hours for which compensation is requested (Doc. #14). The Court

Case 6:05-cv-06017-BES Document 15 Filed 10/10/06 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-2-

construes the Commissioner’s response as an admission that the government's decision to deny

benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing

Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the

benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the

contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen

v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

Case 6:05-cv-06017-BES Document 15 Filed 10/10/06 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-3-

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe

firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v.

Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359,

361 (8th Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request,

even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d

456, 459 (8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties

requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The statutory ceiling for attorney fees is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2

412(d)(2)(A). The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award

accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at the average rate of $150.00 per

hour, for the 11.70 hours which he asserts she devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this

Court. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $150.00 per hour based upon an increase in the cost of living

(Doc. #11-13). 

The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are

reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Case 6:05-cv-06017-BES Document 15 Filed 10/10/06 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-4-

28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) provides:

“fees and other expenses” includes....reasonable attorney fees (The amount of

fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates

for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that....(ii) attorney fees

shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that

an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited

availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher

fee.)

Plaintiff’s counsel presented a copy of the Consumer Price Index as evidence of an

increase in the cost of living (Doc. #11-13), and thus, has presented sufficient evidence of an

increase in the cost of living. Therefore, his argument for increased attorney fees, based on a

cost of living increase, has merit. 

We further conclude that in light of the evidence of an increased cost of living, awarding

an enhanced fee in the amount of $148.00 per hour, rather than $150.00, would promote

consistency in the EAJA awards in the judicial districts of Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan,

919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, upon consideration of the above consideration, we

find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $148.00 per

hour. 

Further, as has been noted, the defendant failed to file an objection to the number of

hours for which counsel seeks a fee award. Yet, as always, we have carefully reviewed the time

records submitted in plaintiff’s counsel’s itemization (Doc. #12). 

Counsel seeks compensation for a total of 19.60 hours under the EAJA. After a careful

review of counsel itemization, the number of hours is found to be both fair and reasonable.

Thus, we find that plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to compensation for 11.70 hours spent

in the representation of this plaintiff before the district court. at the rate of $148.00 per hour, as

Case 6:05-cv-06017-BES Document 15 Filed 10/10/06 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-5-

well as reimbursement for costs and expenses in the amount of $24.45, for a total attorney's fee

award of $1,756.05 under the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to

prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of October, 2006.

/s/Bobby E. Shepherd 

Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 6:05-cv-06017-BES Document 15 Filed 10/10/06 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>