Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01402/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01402-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACOB THOMAS DEMASTERS,

Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-1402 DLB HC

ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 12]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Court Docs. 4, 14, 16.) 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Petitioner is confined at the California Correctional Institution, Tehachapi, California

pursuant to a judgement of conviction of the Superior Court of the State of California, County of

Tulare. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of kidnaping for carjacking with

personal use of a firearm, vehicle theft and resisting an officer. (Lodged Doc. 1.) Petitioner was

sentenced to state prison for concurrent life terms on the kidnaping counts, plus ten years for the

firearm use, and two years for the vehicle theft. A one-year sentence for resisting an officer was

ordered to run concurrently. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. (Id.) The conviction was affirmed in its entirety on July 1, 2005. (Lodged

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Doc. 4.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc.

5.) The petition was denied on September 21, 2005. (Lodged Doc. 6.)

Petitioner did not seek state habeas corpus review.

The instant petition was filed on November 8, 2005. Petitioner filed an amended petition

of which this action is proceeding on April 5, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

 A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

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with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

th

violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.”

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

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Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the amended petition, Petitioner raises the following three claims: 1) “public defender

failed to call witnesses on behalf of my defense Marsden hearing conducted”; 2) “scent of

alcohol amongst jurors”; and 3) “the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to exclude the

identification testimony as tainted by an inherently unfair and unnecessary suggestive field line

up.” (Amd. Pet., at 5-6.) 

In reviewing the petition for review submitted to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner

raised the single claim: “[Petitioner’s] Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was

violated by the admission of the identification testimony because it was tainted by an inherently

unfair and unnecessarily suggestive field showup.” (Lodged Doc. 4.) Therefore, only the first

claim was raised and exhausted. Claims Two and Three are unexhausted, resulting in the instant

petition being “mixed.” 

The Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an

opportunity to exhaust the claims if he can do so. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 521-22;

Gordon, 107 F.3d at 760. However, Petitioner must be provided with an opportunity to withdraw

the unexhausted claims and go forward with the exhausted claims. Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d

1013 (9 Cir.2005); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) ("district courts

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must provide habeas litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking

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unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering dismissal"). 

ORDER

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition shall be GRANTED. 

However, Petitioner may, at his option, move to withdraw the unexhausted claims within thirty

(30) days of the date of service of this Order and proceed with only the exhausted claim. Guizar

v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1988). If petitioner fails to withdraw the unexhausted

claims within the thirty (30) day time frame, the entire petition will be dismissed, without

prejudice, so Petitioner can return to state court to exhaust the remainder of his claims before

filing a new federal petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520; Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d at 372. 

This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after exhausting available

state remedies. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9 Cir.1995). However, th

this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject to the one year statute of limitations

imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed

request for collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for

the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S.

991 (2001). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 9, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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