Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02083/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James A. Pierce, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Maricopa, and John and Jane Does

I-X, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-2083-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff James A. Pierce’s Motion to Remand

to the Superior Court in Pinal County (Doc. 5). The Court now rules on this motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James A. Pierce (“Pierce”) filed a civil complaint against Defendants

Maricopa County and John and Jane Does I-X (collectively “Maricopa”) in the Pinal County

Superior Court on June 27, 2012. The Complaint contains claims of “assault and/or

excessive force, violation of A.R.S. § 13-3916, deliberate indifference, negligent supervision,

intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Arizona

Constitution, including right to privacy, due process and abuse of power” arising out of

Maricopa’s lawful execution of a search warrant for Pierce’s residence (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1,

Complaint, at 6-8). Pierce seeks compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s

fees, and appropriate further relief.

Maricopa removed the action to this Court on October 1, 2012. Maricopa asserts in

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its notice of removal that the Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because

one or more of Pierce’s claims “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States,” and, therefore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)

(Doc. 1, at 2).

Pierce objects to removal and moves for remand to Pinal County Superior Court on

three grounds: (1) there is no subject matter jurisdiction because Pierce, as plaintiff, has not

asserted any federal claims; (2) Maricopa waived removal through its actions in the state

court proceedings; and (3) Maricopa did not timely file for removal.

II. REMOVAL AND REMAND STANDARDS

Pursuant to the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, any civil action brought in state

court over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction may be removed to the

federal district court for the district where the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There

is a “strong presumption” against removal and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there

is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that

the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. “If at any

time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,

the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

III. DISCUSSION

The complaint in this case does not explicitly claim a cause of action under the

Constitution or laws of the United States (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1, Complaint, at 5-9). While the

Arizona state causes of action Pierce alleges—for example his due process and equal

protection claims—may have federal law analogs, in his motion for remand, Pierce argues

that he had been “careful not to plead any federal claims” and that “[n]owhere are federal

claims made” in the complaint (Doc. 5, at 2, 4). In Pierce’s reply to Maricopa’s response to

his motion to remand, Pierce further characterizes his complaint as avoiding federal claims:

“no federal claims were pleaded, [and they] are not being asserted”; “[Pierce] does not make

the claim to any federal causes of action”; and “[t]he complaint does not reference any

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 Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel: “where a party assumes a certain position

in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter,

simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to

the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” New

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 742-43 (2001) (citing Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680,

689 (1895)).

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federal constitutional claims” (Doc. 7, at 1-3). Indeed, Maricopa, itself, appears to recognize

that the complaint does not plead federal claims; a lack of notice of federal claims within the

“four corners of the complaint” forms the backbone of Maricopa’s timeliness argument (Doc.

6, at 4-5).

Instead of pursuing potential federal claims, Pierce avows that he intends to rely solely

on the Arizona Constitution and state statutes to address his claims (Doc. 5, at 4; Doc. 7, at

3). Pierce, as plaintiff, is “master to decide what law he will rely upon,” Fair v. Kohler Die

& Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). Consequently, if Pierce “can maintain his claim

on both state and federal grounds, he may ignore the federal question and assert only a state

law claim and defeat removal.” Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc., 813 F.2d 1368,

1371-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987) (citing Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746

F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985)).

Confusion about Pierce’s intentions to pursue a federal claim appears to have arisen

from an ambiguous answer Pierce provided to one of Maricopa’s non-uniform interrogatories

which asked Pierce “to state all theories of liability for any claims asserted under the U.S.

Constitution and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983”; Pierce answered: “due process, equal protection, right

of privacy, deliberate indifference, [and] acting under color of law to violate [Pierce]’s

rights” (Doc. 6, at 2). Any confusion, however, should now be dispelled by Pierce’s repeated

assertions that he has not and will not plead any federal claims unless this Court “somehow

determine[s] that the complaint also included federal claims” (Doc. 7, at 1-2).1

In light of Pierce’s repeated disavowal of federal claims, this court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over this case. “A case ‘arises under’ federal law within the meaning of

section 1331 only if a federal question appears on the face of plaintiff’s well-pleaded

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complaint.” Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371 (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley,

211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). Because there are no federal questions in Pierce’s complaint,

there is no basis for original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Consequently, the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the

Court need not address Maricopa’s timeliness or waiver arguments, and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

requires remand.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting Pierce’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 5).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of the Court shall remand this case to Pinal

County Superior Court.

DATED this 26th day of February, 2013.

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