Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05742/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05742-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE MARTINEZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

G. E. LEWIS, 

Respondent.1

Case No. 13-cv-05742-CW (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner Jose Martinez, a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state criminal conviction, 

asserting that his constitutional rights were violated when the 

trial court instructed the jury with an invalid theory of felonymurder. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the 

petition and a certificate of appealability. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural History 

In 2010, a Contra Costa County jury found Petitioner guilty 

of: count one, the second degree murder of Jose Mendoza-Lopez, 

finding true the allegations that Petitioner committed the crime 

for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that the principal 

in the offense used and intentionally discharged a firearm; count 

two, conspiracy to commit aggravated assault,2

 finding true the 

 

1

In accordance with Habeas Rule 2(a) and Rule 25(d)(1) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clerk of the Court is 

directed to substitute Warden Clark E. Ducart as Respondent 

because he is Petitioner's current custodian. 

2

The jury failed to make a finding on whether the purpose of the 

conspiracy was to commit an aggravated assault or to commit 

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allegation that the conspiracy was committed to benefit a street 

gang; and count three, conspiracy to participate in a criminal 

street gang. 7 Clerk’s Transcript (CT) 1864-84. The trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to sixty years in state prison. 7 CT 1956-

61. 

 On January 11, 2013, the California Court of Appeal affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction and, on February 11, 2013, it modified 

its opinion upon denial of rehearing. Ex. 9; People v. Martinez, 

2013 WL 136183 (Cal. Ct. App.)(unpublished). On April 17, 2013, 

the California Supreme Court denied review. Exs. 10, 11. 

Petitioner timely filed this federal petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. Respondent has filed an answer; Petitioner has 

not filed a traverse. 

II. Statement of Facts 

 Petitioner and two others were charged with seven counts, 

comprising five counts of murder, conspiracy to commit murder and 

aggravated assault, and engaging in a criminal street gang 

conspiracy. Martinez, 2013 WL 13182, at *1. One co-defendant 

plead guilty in return for testifying against Petitioner and the 

other fled and remained at large. Id. The jury acquitted 

Petitioner of the four murders alleged in counts four through 

seven and made no findings on the gang allegations related to 

those counts. Id. at n.2. 

 The California Court of Appeal summarized the evidence 

relevant to the murder of Mendoza-Lopez, as follows: 

 

murder. The trial court subsequently found that the purpose of 

the conspiracy in counts two and three was to commit the lesser 

crime of aggravated assault. 7 CT 1956. 

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 Diana Salazar, who knew Mendoza-Lopez, testified to the 

following. On January 26, 2008, a group of friends and 

acquaintances, including Salazar and Mendoza-Lopez, celebrated 

the birthday of Juan Ayala at his house. Id. at *2. Nobody in 

this group, including Mendoza-Lopez, was involved in a street 

gang. Mendoza-Lopez wore shoes and a hat that were red or 

partially red. Id. 

 Later, eight of these people drove to a friends’ party at a 

San Pablo apartment. Id. A few of them went inside and Salazar, 

Mayra Lainez, Noel Castro, Luis Anaya and Mendoza-Lopez stayed 

outside. Id. Several men inside looked like gang members and 

were dressed in blue and wore hoodies and baggie jeans. Id. 

 Lainez testified that, after being outside about three to 

five minutes, a man walked toward them with a gun. Id. The man 

was wearing a hoodie and a beanie. Id. The man pulled a gun 

from the front center pocket of his hoodie and shot Mendoza-Lopez 

four to five times, and then said, “RST on me,” in good English. 

Lainez was standing next to the victim and was within eleven feet 

of the gunman. Id. 

 Anaya testified to the following: He saw six people come 

out of the apartment toward them. Id. They said, “Southside 

RSTs,” and then one pulled a gun from his black hooded sweatshirt 

and started shooting. Id. The shooter was short, about five 

feet, four inches or five feet, five inches in height. Id. 

Petitioner stood next to Fernando Garcia (aka Danger), both wore 

sweatshirts, and they generally resembled each other. Id. Both 

were approximately five feet, six inches tall. Id.; Id. at *4 

n.3. Anaya was not sure who fired the gun. Id. Anaya saw 

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Mendoza-Lopez get shot and fall down. Id. He ran inside the 

apartment after the third shot. Id. When he went back outside, 

the shooter’s friends started hitting him. Id. 

 Salazar’s testimony continued as follows: She had just 

taken half a step into the apartment when she heard three or four 

gunshots. Id. She turned and saw Mendoza-Lopez falling. Id. 

She saw Maria Vargas run out of the apartment and argue with the 

shooter. Id. Salazar did not see the shooting, but she thought 

Garcia was the shooter because of his gestures and because he 

said, in English, “RST on mine” and Mendoza-Lopez was wearing the 

wrong color. Id. Salazar heard Vargas ask Garcia why he “did 

what he did,” and Garcia responded that “he was wearing the wrong 

color on the wrong block and that it was RST on his.” Id. She 

saw Garcia make a gesture, like he was covering the gun, then saw 

him put the hoody on, turn around and run off. Id. 

 Salazar understood the man clearly. He was speaking in 

English, and she speaks English and Spanish. Id. She did not 

recall Spanish being spoken. Id. Salazar did not see a gun in 

the man’s hand, just a gesture to indicate that he had hidden it 

in his pants. Id. He was five feet, nine inches tall, lightskinned, had short hair, and was in his early twenties. Id. 

 Petitioner’s friend, Ingrid Martinez, testified to the 

following: She used to hang out with Sureno gang members 

including Petitioner, who was called Cobra, Fernando Garcia, who 

was called Danger, and Victor Cervantes, who was called Creeper. 

Id. at *3. Petitioner was a member of the gang called “SSL,” the 

Southside Locos. Id. Petitioner spoke Spanish and only a few 

words in English. Id. On January 26, 2008, Martinez was 

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upstairs at the San Pablo party. Id. Petitioner came upstairs 

and told the other men that someone was wearing red downstairs. 

Id. Everyone went downstairs where Petitioner, Garcia and 

Cervantes “claimed their Sureno gangs.” Id. Mendoza-Lopez, who 

was downstairs with Ayala and Castro, told Garcia, “I need to 

talk to you.” Id. Martinez tried to tell Petitioner and Garcia 

that the people downstairs were not Nortenos, that they were 

nothing. Id. Garcia said, “Okay.” Id. And then “they shot.” 

Id. Just before the shooting, Martinez heard, “RST on me,” or, 

“RST on Mine,” in English. Id. She saw Petitioner shoot 

Mendoza-Lopez and heard three gunshots. Id. She did not see 

Garcia with a gun. Id. 

 After the shooting, everyone ran. Id. Martinez spent the 

night at Garcia’s house. Id. In the morning, she learned that 

the police were at her house. Id. Martinez called Petitioner, 

told him the police were at her house and asked, “why did he do 

that in front of all that people and putting me into this.” Id. 

Petitioner said he was sorry but told her not to say anything. 

Id. Martinez gave a statement to the police, but was scared and 

tried not to “snitch.” Id. She went to Mexico for a year, came 

back, and then moved out of state. Id. She was certain that 

Petitioner shot Mendoza-Lopez. Id. 

 Frank R. testified to the following. He had known 

Petitioner since 2006. Id. After the shooting, he went to 

Garcia’s house, where he saw Petitioner. Id. Petitioner had a 

gun in his waistband. Id. Petitioner said that he killed the 

victim because he was disrespecting him and because he was 

wearing red. Id. When Frank R. asked Petitioner what happened, 

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Petitioner said he “fired some shots to this guy.” Id. The next 

day, Petitioner called Frank R. and asked for a ride. Id. 

Petitioner told him the police had picked up Martinez and that he 

had told her that if she said anything, she would pay for it. 

Id. at *4. 

 Frank R. was arrested and charged with Petitioner for five 

homicides and two counts of conspiracy. Id. In return for 

testifying, Frank R. was allowed to plead guilty in juvenile 

court for being an accessory after the fact. Id. He entered 

witness protection and testified under a grant of immunity. Id. 

 Victor Cervantes testified to the following. On January 26, 

2008, he was at the party with Petitioner and others. Id. The 

party was “weird” because three gangs were hanging out together. 

Id. Petitioner came running upstairs as if there were something 

exciting happening and said in Spanish that “there were some 

busters downstairs.” Id. Petitioner, Garcia and two other 

people ran downstairs. Id. Cervantes walked downstairs and 

heard Garcia arguing with Mendoza-Lopez, saying he had told him 

not to wear red in Richmond. Id. He heard Garcia say in 

English, “I already told you about wearing all the red in 

Richmond.” Id. Cervantes saw Garcia and Petitioner facing 

Mendoza-Lopez and arguing with him. Id. Both Garcia and 

Petitioner were wearing black hoodies and blue jeans. Id. 

Garcia was on the right-hand side; Petitioner was on the left. 

Id. Cervantes heard three gunshots. Id. Cervantes could not 

see who had the gun when he heard the gunshots. Id. He 

testified that the person on the left had the gun; that person 

was Petitioner. Id. He admitted that he might have told police 

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the positions were reversed, that is, that Garcia was on the left 

and Petitioner on the right. Id. 

 On January 27, 2008, Mayra Lainez was interviewed by police 

and shown a photographic lineup. Id. She identified Petitioner 

as the shooter, but could not remember the faces of the others 

who were with him. Id. Lainez told police that she had known 

Mendoza-Lopez for two years and did not know him to be a gang 

member or to have friends who were gang members. Id. She 

initially described the shooter to police as being five feet, ten 

inches. At trial she stated that she was sure Petitioner was the 

shooter. Id. at *5. But, on cross-examination, after seeing 

that Petitioner was shorter than her estimate, she was no longer 

positive he was the shooter. Id. 

 On January 28, 2008, officers conducted more photographic 

lineups. Id. Vargas did not identify anyone. Id. Salazar 

identified Petitioner as the shooter. Id. Anaya at first 

testified that he could not see the shooter’s face, but then he 

identified Petitioner as the shooter. Id. Anaya explained that 

Petitioner and Garcia both wore sweaters and stated that he did 

not know which of the two men was the shooter. Id. 

 Petitioner was arrested on January 31, 2008. Id. From his 

bedroom, police recovered a baggie containing six live .357 

magnum handgun rounds, three pairs of baggy blue jeans, a blue 

and white striped shirt, two large black hooded sweatshirts, and 

a jersey with the number 13. Id. From Petitioner’s vehicle, 

police recovered several photographs of Petitioner wearing blue, 

holding various firearms, and making or “throwing a three” with 

his hand. Id. 

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 Forensics evidence showed that Mendoza-Lopez died from two 

bullet wounds from shots fired from a distance of no more than 

two feet. Id. 

 Lucila Navarro testified about Petitioner’s prior uncharged 

conduct. Id. at *6. On May 6, 2007, Navarro was with a group of 

friends at Keller Beach. Id. A group of six to eight men, 

mostly wearing blue, jumped her brother Francisco, screaming “Sur 

Trece.” Id. One of them hit Francisco in the head with a 

bottle, and Francisco fell to the ground, unconscious. Id. 

Navarro identified Petitioner as one of the assailants. Id. 

Petitioner was wearing blue and had “SS” and X3” tattoos on his 

shoulders. Id. Petitioner punched and kicked her brother and 

threw a beer bottle at him. Id. When Francisco was on the 

ground unconscious, Petitioner repeatedly kicked him. Id. 

After the Keller Beach incident, when Petitioner was 

arrested, he identified himself as a Mexican Locos and Southside 

Locos gang member. Id. 

The defense case consisted of the testimony of Dr. Scott 

Fraser, an expert in eyewitness identification. Id. Fraser 

testified as follows: People who are certain in their 

identification are just as likely to be correct or incorrect as 

those who say they are fifty or seventy-five percent certain. 

Id. Thus, confidence is not a good predictor of accuracy. Id. 

When a person experiences a stressful event, such as seeing a 

weapon, blood flow to the brain decreases and less information is 

processed. Id. Seeing a gun increases stress and distracts a 

person’s attention, reducing the accuracy of correct recognition. 

Id. Errors in identification also can occur through a process 

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known as conscious transference, whereby a person misidentifies 

an individual as someone he or she has seen before. Id. 

As noted above, the jury convicted Petitioner of count one, 

second degree murder of Mendoza-Lopez, and found true that the 

crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and 

that a principal in the offense used and intentionally discharged 

a firearm causing the victim’s death. Id. The jury found not 

true that Petitioner personally and intentionally discharged the 

firearm. Id. The jury also convicted Petitioner of count two, 

conspiracy to commit murder and to commit aggravated assault; the 

verdict form did not require the jury to specify either crime as 

the object of the conspiracy and, therefore, the trial court 

found that the object of the conspiracy was the lesser crime of 

aggravated assault. Id. The jury found true two of the eighteen 

overt acts alleged, both of which related to the killing of 

Mendoza-Lopez, and found true that the conspiracy was to benefit 

a criminal street gang. Id. The jury also convicted Petitioner 

of count three, conspiracy to participate in a criminal street 

gang. Id. The court found the allegation of Petitioner’s prior 

conviction true and deemed it a serious felony and a strike 

prior. Id. at *7. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 

prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation 

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant 

habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

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“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

 A federal court on habeas review may not issue a writ 

“simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. 

Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to 

support granting the writ. Id. at 409. The factual 

determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless there 

is "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

 If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted 

only if the error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 638 (1993)). 

 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state 

court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the 

last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). In the present 

case, the California Court of Appeal is the highest court that 

addressed Petitioner’s claims in a reasoned opinion. 

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DISCUSSION 

 In support of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 

Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when 

the trial court instructed the jury on an invalid theory of 

second-degree felony murder in which the underlying felonies were 

assault and conspiracy to commit assault. Respondent concedes 

here, as he did in the Court of Appeal, that the trial court 

erred by instructing the jury on felony murder based on assault. 

Respondent argues, however, that the state courts’ rejection of 

this claim, by finding that the erroneous jury instruction was 

not prejudicial, was objectively reasonable and, alternatively, 

that the error was not prejudicial under the federal standard set 

forth in Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

I. State Court Opinion 

 The state court explained that, based on two California 

Supreme Court cases, People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522 (1969), 

and People v. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009), the felony murder 

instruction was erroneous, as follows: 

In Ireland, supra, 70 Cal. 2d 522, our 

Supreme Court concluded that assault with a 

deadly weapon cannot serve as the predicate 

felony for purposes of the felony murder 

rule. The court adopted a merger rule that 

limited the application of second degree 

felony murder where the underlying felony was 

“an integral part of the homicide.” (Id. at 

539.) The court explained: “To allow ... use 

of the felony-murder rule would effectively 

preclude the jury from considering the issue 

of malice aforethought in all cases wherein 

homicide has been committed as a result of a 

felonious assault—a category which includes 

the great majority of all homicides. This 

kind of bootstrapping finds support neither 

in logic nor in law.” (Ibid.) 

 

In Chun, supra, 45 Cal. 4th at 1189, 1200, 

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the court acknowledged that inconsistencies 

had emerged in its prior holdings based on 

Ireland. The court reconsidered those cases 

and adopted a simplified test for application 

of the merger doctrine in a second degree 

felony murder situation: “When the underlying 

felony is assaultive in nature, such as a 

violation of section 246 or 246.3, we now 

conclude that the felony merges with the 

homicide and cannot be the basis of a felonymurder instruction. An ‘assaultive’ felony 

is one that involves a threat of immediate 

violent injury. In determining whether a 

crime merges, the court looks to its elements 

and not the facts of the case. Accordingly, 

if the elements of the crime have an 

assaultive aspect, the crime merges with the 

underlying homicide even if the elements also 

include conduct that is not assaultive.” 

(Chun at 1200.) 

 

Here, based on Ireland and Chun, appellant 

contends the trial court gave three erroneous 

instructions to the jury. First, he 

challenges the court’s instruction on second 

degree felony murder based on aiding and 

abetting: “If a human being is killed by any 

one of several persons engaged in the 

commission of the crime of assault with force 

likely to produce great bodily injury and/or 

assault with a deadly weapon, felonies 

inherently dangerous to human life, all 

persons who either directly and actively 

commit the act constituting one of those 

crimes or who with knowledge of the unlawful 

purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and 

with the intent or purpose of committing, 

encouraging or facilitating the commission of 

the offense, aid, promote, encourage or 

instigate by act or advice its commission are 

guilty of murder of the second degree, 

whether the killing is intentional, 

unintentional or accidental.” (CALJIC No. 

8.34, emphasis added.) 

 

Second, he challenges the court’s instruction 

defining murder, which included assault with 

force likely to produce great bodily injury 

and assault with a deadly weapon as 

inherently dangerous felonies: “The defendant 

is accused in Counts 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of 

having committed the crime of murder, a 

violation of Penal Code Section 187. Every 

person who unlawfully kills a human being 

with malice aforethought or during the 

commission or attempted commission of a 

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felony inherently dangerous to human life is 

guilty of the crime of murder in violation of 

Penal Code Section 187. In order to prove 

this crime, each of the following elements 

must be proved: One, a human being was 

killed; two, the killing was unlawful; three, 

the killing was done with malice aforethought 

or occurred during the commission of a felony 

inherently dangerous to human life which was 

perpetrated by someone other than the 

defendant. Assault with force likely to 

produce great bodily injury and assault with 

a deadly weapon are felonies inherently 

dangerous to human life.” (CALJIC No. 8.10, 

emphasis added.) 

 

Third, he challenges the court’s instruction 

regarding second degree felony murder based 

on conspiracy: “If two or more persons 

conspired together to commit a felony 

inherently dangerous to human life, namely, 

assault with force likely to produce great 

bodily injury and assault with a deadly 

weapon, and if the life of another person is 

taken by one or more of them in furtherance 

of the common design and if that killing is 

done to further that common purpose or is the 

natural and probable consequence of the 

pursuit of that purpose, all of the coconspirators are equally guilty of murder of 

the second degree, whether the killing is 

intentional, unintentional or accidental.” 

FN4 (CALJIC No. 8.33, emphasis added.) 

 FN4 This instruction erroneously stated 

that the killing had to be in 

furtherance of the conspiracy to assault 

or a natural and probable consequence of 

the common plan or design of the 

conspiracy, i.e., phrased in the 

disjunctive. However, both findings are 

required. 

Respondent concedes, based on Ireland and 

Chun, that the trial court erred in 

instructing the jury on felony murder based 

on assault by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury or assault with a 

deadly weapon under section 245. However, 

respondent contends the error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt based on the facts 

of this case. 

Martinez, 2013 WL 136183, at *7-8 (footnote in original). 

The Court of Appeal then explained the prejudice analysis 

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set forth in Chun, and compared it to Petitioner’s case, as 

follows: 

“Instructional error regarding the elements 

of the offense requires reversal of the 

judgment unless the reviewing court concludes 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 

not contribute to the verdict.” (Chun, 45 

Cal. 4th at 1201.) Chun explained that, 

where the jury has been instructed with both 

a legally adequate and a legally inadequate 

theory, e.g., a valid malice murder theory 

and an invalid second degree felony murder 

theory, “to find the error harmless, a 

reviewing court must conclude, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the jury based its 

verdict on a legally valid theory, i.e., 

either express or conscious-disregard-forlife malice.” (Id. at 1203.) Finally, Chun 

stated that the reviewing court can find the 

instructional error harmless only if “other 

aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave 

no reasonable doubt that the jury made the 

findings necessary for conscious-disregardfor-life malice. . . .” (Id. at 1205.) 

 

The prejudice analysis in Chun is 

instructive. There, the evidence showed that 

shots were fired from one car, a Honda, into 

another, a Mitsubishi, when both were stopped 

at a stoplight. At least six bullets were 

fired from three different guns. All three 

occupants in the Mitsubishi were struck by 

bullets; one person was killed. The 

defendant admitted to being in the backseat 

of the Honda; he identified the driver and 

said there were two others in the car. In a 

second statement, the defendant admitted to 

firing a gun during the incident but claimed 

he did not point the gun at anyone and just 

wanted to scare the victims. The jury found 

that the defendant was an active participant 

in a criminal street gang and that the 

shooting was committed for the benefit of the 

gang. (Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1179–1180.) The 

erroneous felony murder instruction given to 

the jury in Chun “required the jury to find 

that defendant had the specific intent to 

commit the underlying felony of shooting at 

an occupied vehicle. Later, it instructed 

that to find defendant committed that crime, 

the jury had to find these elements: ‘1. A 

person discharged a firearm at an occupied 

motor vehicle; and 2. The discharge of the 

firearm was willful and malicious.’” (Id. at 

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1205.) 

 

Based on the facts and the jury instructions, 

the court found that the invalid felony 

murder instruction was harmless. It 

explained: “[A]ny juror who relied on the 

felony-murder rule necessarily found that 

defendant willfully shot at an occupied 

vehicle. The undisputed evidence showed that 

the vehicle shot at was occupied by not one 

but three persons. The three were hit by 

multiple gunshots fired at close range from 

three different firearms. No juror could 

have found that defendant participated in 

this shooting, either as a shooter or as an 

aider and abettor, without also finding that 

defendant committed an act that is dangerous 

to life and did so knowing of the danger and 

with conscious disregard for life—which is a 

valid theory of malice. In other words, on 

this evidence, no juror could find felony 

murder without also finding consciousdisregard-for-life malice. The error in 

instructing the jury on felony murder was, by 

itself, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

(Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1205.) 

 

Here, the jury found “not true” the 

allegation that appellant personally and 

intentionally discharged the firearm, and 

rejected the seventh overt act alleged in the 

conspiracy count, i.e., that appellant was 

the shooter. The evidence showed that there 

was one gun used by one shooter. Thus, 

appellant’s second degree murder conviction 

was based on aiding and abetting or being a 

co-conspirator, and not on his being the 

perpetrator of the fatal shooting. The only 

overt acts found by the jury were that 

appellant was at the upstairs party with 

other Sureños and that he told the others 

that someone downstairs was wearing red. 

There was no evidence that appellant or 

anyone else knew that Garcia had a gun that 

night or that he habitually carried a 

firearm, and no evidence that anyone at the 

upstairs party said anything about shooting 

or killing the individual who was downstairs 

wearing red. Ingrid Martinez testified that 

the most she was expecting was a fist fight. 

 

As in Chun, the court here instructed on both 

implied malice murder and felony murder. 

(Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1202–1203.) However, 

unlike the felony murder instruction in Chun, 

here the court’s instruction did not require 

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proof that appellant had the specific intent 

to commit or aid in committing the crime of 

shooting into an occupied vehicle. Rather, 

all it required was proof that appellant 

committed or aided in committing the crime of 

assault by means of force likely to produce 

great bodily injury and/or assault with a 

deadly weapon. The court’s instruction on 

the elements of those crimes required proof 

that (1) “a person was assaulted;” and (2) 

“the assault was by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury or with a 

firearm.” There was no requirement, as in 

Chun, that to find appellant guilty of second 

degree felony murder, the jury had to find 

that he acted with the knowledge and intent 

that a willful and malicious shooting at 

close range would take place, a finding that 

necessarily included a conscious disregard 

for life. (Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1205.) By 

contrast, here the jury could have applied 

the invalid felony murder instruction to 

convict appellant of second degree murder 

based on finding that he intended to aid in 

an aggravated assault, with no subjective 

belief that it would endanger someone’s life. 

Martinez, 2013 WL 136183, at *8-9. 

 The Court of Appeal then found that Petitioner did not 

suffer prejudice from the erroneous jury instruction because the 

jury also received instructions that it could find Petitioner 

guilty of murder as an aider and abettor of the assault under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine and, based on the 

evidence presented, the jury found him guilty under this doctrine 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned as follows: 

“The natural and probable consequences 

doctrine FN5 provides that: ‘[An aider and 

abettor] is guilty not only of the offense he 

intended to facilitate or encourage, but also 

of any reasonably foreseeable offense 

committed by the person he aids and 

abets....It follows that a defendant whose 

liability is predicated on his status as an 

aider and abettor need not have intended to 

encourage or facilitate the particular 

offense ultimately committed by the 

perpetrator. His knowledge that an act which 

is criminal was intended, and his action 

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taken with the intent that the act be 

encouraged or facilitated, are sufficient to 

impose liability on him for any reasonably 

foreseeable offense committed as a 

consequence by the perpetrator. It is the 

intent to encourage and bring about conduct 

that is criminal, not the specific intent 

that is an element of the target offense, 

which . . . must be found by the jury.’ 

Thus,. . . a defendant may be held criminally 

responsible as an accomplice not only for the 

crime he or she intended to aid and abet (the 

target crime), but also for any other crime 

that is the “natural and probable 

consequence” of the target crime.” (People 

v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th at 261.) 

 FN5 The natural and probable 

consequences doctrine is applied in 

cases involving the liability of 

conspirators for substantive crimes 

committed in the course of a conspiracy 

and the liability of aiders and 

abettors. (See People v. Prettyman 

(1996) 14 Cal. 4th 248, 260-261, and 

cases cited therein.) 

“Aider and abettor culpability under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine 

for a nontarget, or unintended, offense 

committed in the course of committing a 

target offense has a different theoretical 

underpinning than aiding and abetting a 

target crime. Aider and abettor culpability 

for the target offense is based upon the 

intent of the aider and abettor to assist the 

direct perpetrator to commit the target 

offense. By its very nature, aider and 

abettor culpability under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine is not 

premised upon the intention of the aider and 

abettor to commit the nontarget offense 

because the nontarget offense was not 

intended at all. It imposes vicarious 

liability for any offense committed by the 

direct perpetrator that is a natural and 

probable consequence of the target offense. 

(People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal. 3d 746, 

778 [accomplice liability is vicarious].) 

Because the nontarget offense is unintended, 

the mens rea of the aider and abettor with 

respect to that offense is irrelevant and 

culpability is imposed simply because a 

reasonable person could have foreseen the 

commission of the nontarget crime. It 

follows that the aider and abettor will 

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always be ‘equally guilty’ with the direct 

perpetrator of an unintended crime that is 

the natural and probable consequence of the 

intended crime.” (People v. Canizalez (2011) 

197 Cal. App. 4th 832, 851–852.) 

 

Moreover, “the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine operates independently 

of the second degree felony-murder rule. 

(People v. Culuko (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 

307, 322.) The natural and probable 

consequences doctrine does not merge all 

assaults into the felony-murder rule. 

Rather, it is a theory of liability for 

murder that applies when the assault has the 

foreseeable result of death. For aider and 

abettor liability, it is the intention to 

further the acts of another that creates 

criminal liability and not the felony-murder 

rule. (People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal. 

App. 3d 1039, 1052-1054.)” (People v. 

Karapetyan (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1172, 

1178.) 

 

According to respondent, because the intended 

crime was not simple assault, but rather was 

aggravated assault—assault with force likely 

to produce great bodily injury or assault 

with a deadly weapon—the jury necessarily 

would have found that Mendoza–Lopez’s murder 

was a natural and probable consequence of the 

assault. Based on the evidence and the 

jury’s verdicts, a principal, i.e., Garcia, 

intentionally discharged a firearm, killing 

Mendoza–Lopez, with no mitigating 

circumstances. Although appellant was not 

the shooter, he was found guilty of second 

degree murder and conspiracy to commit 

aggravated assault. The target offense was 

aggravated assault, and the jury necessarily 

found that appellant intended to commit the 

target offense. 

 

Our Supreme Court has addressed the 

dangerousness of gang-related conflicts. 

(People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 913. An 

act is dangerous to life for the purposes of 

malice where there is a high probability that 

it will result in death. (See People v. 

Patterson (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 615, 626–627.) 

Medina involved a gang fist fight, after 

which one of the co-defendants shot and 

killed the rival gang member. (Medina, 46 

Cal. 4th at 917.) The gunman and his codefendants were convicted of murder. The 

court stated that “a natural and probable 

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consequence is a foreseeable consequence. 

. . .” (Id. at 920.) Liability under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine 

attaches if “a reasonable person in the 

defendant’s position would have or should 

have known that the charged offense was a 

reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act 

aided and abetted.” (Ibid.) 

In Medina, the court also discussed the 

foreseeability of firearm use by gang 

members: “Prior knowledge that a fellow gang 

member is armed is not necessary to support a 

defendant’s murder conviction as an aider and 

abettor.” People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal. 

App. 4th 1050, 1056 (given the great 

potential for escalating violence during gang 

confrontations, it is immaterial whether 

[defendant] specifically knew [fellow gang 

member] had a gun);. . . People v. Godinez 

(1992) 2 Cal. App. 4th 492, 501, fn.5 

(“although evidence indicating whether the 

defendant did or did not know a weapon was 

present provides grist for argument to the 

jury on the issue of foreseeability of a 

homicide, it is not a necessary 

prerequisite)” (Medina, 46 Cal. 4th at 921.) 

 

Here, where the jury found appellant guilty 

under an aiding and abetting theory, he was 

properly found guilty of murder under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine 

because of the heightened potential for gun 

violence with gangs and because of the 

foreseeability of someone being killed. (See 

Medina, 46 Cal. 4th at 921.) The trial court 

instructed the jury on the prosecutor’s 

burden to prove every element of every 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt and natural 

and probable consequences, and the prosecutor 

argued natural and probable consequences to 

the jury. The evidence showed that appellant 

and Garcia approached the victim followed by 

several others, rushed downstairs and 

confronted him about wearing red clothing. 

The shooter fired several times at close 

range with two of the bullets striking the 

victim and killing him. There was no 

evidence of any mitigating circumstance such 

as any form of self-defense or heat of 

passion. At a minimum, the shooter evinced 

implied malice, and appellant was held 

vicariously liable for the foreseeable 

consequence of the violent assault. (See 

Medina, 46 Cal. 4th at 920; People v. 

Canizalez, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 851–852.) 

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Martinez, 2013 WL 136183, at *11-12 (footnote in original). 

II. Federal Authority 

 A determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that 

the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that 

violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has 

occurred. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an 

error is found, the court also must determine that the error had 

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury's verdict, see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, before granting 

relief in habeas proceedings. Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47. 

Under AEDPA, a federal habeas court need not determine whether 

the state court’s harmlessness determination on direct review, 

which is governed by the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 

test set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), 

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-20 

(2007); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (on collateral review, the 

Chapman beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice must give 

way to the less onorous standard of whether the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict).3

 However, no case forbids a federal habeas court 

from applying AEDPA to the state court’s harmlessness conclusion 

to determine whether it was contrary to or an unreasonable 

 

3

Previously, in Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003), the 

Supreme Court held that, when a state court determined a 

constitutional violation was harmless, a federal court could not 

award habeas relief unless the harmlessness determination itself 

was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); thus, the state 

Chapman harmlessness determination was to be analyzed within the 

statutory provisions of AEDPA. 

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application of clearly established law, and a number of Ninth 

Circuit cases have used this method. See, e.g., Ponce v. Felker, 

606 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2010)(finding no prejudice under 

Brecht and because state court’s determination of no prejudice 

was not contrary to or unreasonable application of established 

federal authority); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (in applying the “unreasonable application” clause of 

§ 2254(d)(1), habeas court may determine whether state court’s 

harmless error analysis under Chapman was objectively 

unreasonable under AEDPA). 

III. Analysis 

 Taking into consideration the evidence, instructions and 

jury findings of this case, the Court of Appeal found that the 

instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, under 

the Chapman standard. Martinez, 2013 WL 136183, at *12. The 

Court of Appeal’s finding of no error was not objectively 

unreasonable. Furthermore, upon an independent review of the 

record, the Court finds that the error was harmless under Brecht. 

 Although the jury was given the erroneous felony murder 

instruction, it also was given an instruction that Petitioner 

could be an aider and abettor of the target crime of aggravated 

assault, that is, assault with force likely to produce great 

bodily injury or assault with a deadly weapon, and could be found 

guilty, not only of the target crime, but of any crime committed 

by the principal which was a natural and probable consequence of 

the target crime. 13 Reporter’s Transcript (RT) 2411-12. The 

relevant jury instructions were as follows: 

A person aids and abets the commission of a 

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crime when he or she, with knowledge of the 

unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with 

the intent or purpose of committing or 

encouraging or facilitating the commission of 

the crime and by act or advice, aids, 

promotes, encourages or instigates the 

commission of the crime. Mere presence at 

the scene of the crime which does not itself 

assist in the commission of the crime does 

not amount to aiding and abetting. Mere 

knowledge that a crime is being committed and 

the failure to prevent it do not amount to 

aiding and abetting. 

One who aids and abets in the commission of a 

crime is not only guilty of that crime, but 

is also guilty of any other crime committed 

by a principal which is a natural and 

probable consequence of the crime originally 

aided and abetted. 

In order to find the defendant guilty of the 

crime of murder as charged in Count 1 under 

an aiding and abetting theory, you must be 

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: 

The crime of assault with force likely to 

produce great bodily injury or the crime of 

assault with a deadly weapon was committed; 

that the defendant aided and abetted one of 

those crimes; that a co-principal in a crime 

committed the crime of murder; and the crime 

of murder was a natural and probable 

consequence of the commission of the crime of 

assault with force likely to produce great 

bodily injury or assault with a deadly 

weapon. 

In determining whether a consequence is 

natural and probable, you must apply an 

objective test based not on what the 

defendant actually intended but on whether a 

person of reasonable and ordinary prudence 

would have expected likely to occur. 

The issue is to be decided in light of all of 

the circumstances surrounding the incident. 

A natural consequence is one which is within 

the normal range of outcomes that may be 

reasonably expected to occur if nothing 

unusual has intervened. 

“Probable” means likely to happen. 

13 RT 2412-13. 

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were three theories under which the jury could find Petitioner 

guilty of the murder of Mendoza-Lopez. One of these was finding 

that the murder was a natural and logical consequence of 

Petitioner’s aiding and abetting the principal in the crime of 

assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury or the 

crime of assault with a deadly weapon. 13 RT 2452-56; 2462. 

 The Court of Appeal summarized the jury’s findings: 

(1) Petitioner was not the shooter; (2) he was found guilty of 

second degree murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault; 

and (3) the jury necessarily found that Petitioner intended to 

commit the target offense of aggravated assault.4 Martinez, 2013 

WL 136183, at *11. Because the jury was instructed that it could 

find Petitioner guilty of murder through the natural and logical 

consequence doctrine and the prosecutor argued it to the jury, 

the question is, whether the evidence supports a finding by the 

jury that Petitioner was guilty of murder through this doctrine, 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 The evidence shows that, on January 26, 2008, Petitioner was 

at a party with many people who were both upstairs and 

downstairs. Petitioner, who was a member of a street gang, ran 

upstairs to inform his companions that Mendoza-Lopez, who was 

downstairs, was wearing red, the color of a rival gang. The 

Petitioner went back downstairs with Garcia and other companions 

to confront Mendoza-Lopez about wearing red clothing in Richmond. 

 

4

As discussed previously, although the jury was instructed to 

return a finding on whether it found Petitioner guilty of 

conspiracy to commit murder or conspiracy to commit aggravated 

assault, it did not do so. The trial court declared the target 

offense to be the lesser offense of aggravated assault. 13 RT 

2563-66; 2577-78. 

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Then, Garcia, who was standing next to Petitioner and directly in 

front of Mendoza-Lopez, intentionally discharged a firearm, three 

times, at Mendoza-Lopez, killing him. No evidence suggests the 

existence of mitigating circumstances such as Garcia acting in 

self-defense, imperfect self-defense or in the heat of passion. 

This evidence supports the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that Petitioner aided and abetted Garcia, at the very 

least, in the target offense of aggravated assault. Petitioner 

does not dispute this finding. The evidence also shows that 

Garcia demonstrated the implied malice necessary for a finding 

that he committed murder. The key issue is whether the evidence 

supports the finding that the murder was the natural and logical 

consequence of the aggravated assault. 

 Although no evidence showed that Petitioner or anyone else 

knew that Garcia was in possession of a firearm at the party, 

ample evidence about the possession of firearms by Petitioner and 

his gang members and about gang murders of rival gang members 

supported a finding that Mendoza-Lopez’s murder was the natural 

and logical consequence of an aggravated assault on a suspected 

rival gang member. See Medina, 46 Cal. 4th at 921 (prior 

knowledge that fellow gang member is armed not necessary to 

support murder conviction as aider and abettor) 

 This evidence consists of the following: From Petitioner’s 

vehicle, the police recovered numerous photographs of Petitioner 

holding a semiautomatic firearm and pistols and making a gang 

sign. 5 RT 948-52. From Petitioner’s bedroom, police recovered 

numerous live .357 magnum handgun rounds. 6 RT 1079, 1084, 1086. 

Gang member Cervantes testified that in 2007 and 2008, Sureno 

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gang members were killing Nortenos to increase recruitment. 7 RT 

1337-38; 1340. Gang member Frank Rubalcava testified that 

murders were part of the Sureno gang culture. 8 RT 1425; 1427-

28. Gang member Jorge Sanchez testified that guns were used to 

protect the Surenos’ drug territory and were used to attack 

Nortenos. 9 RT 1454. He described the shooting and killing of 

three Nortenos by Surenos in December 2007. 9 RT 1475; 1500-14. 

 This evidence of firearm possession by Petitioner and other 

Sureno gang members and gun violence by Sureno gang members 

supports the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 

murder of Mendoza-Lopez was the natural and probable consequence 

of the aggravated assault on Mendoza-Lopez, a suspected rival 

gang member. Because Petitioner aided and abetted the aggravated 

assault of Mendoza-Lopez, he was guilty also of his murder. See 

People v. Mendoza, 18 Cal. 4th 1114, 1133 (1998) (the question is 

not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional 

crime, but whether, looked at objectively, it was reasonably 

foreseeable). Therefore, based upon the evidence, all of the 

jury instructions and the jury’s findings, any error in the 

felony-murder instruction did not have a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. 

 Petitioner argues that finding him guilty of murder through 

the natural and logical consequences doctrine does not comply 

with the California Supreme Court’s specific prejudice standard 

set out in Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1203. He argues that, under 

Chun, when the jury receives erroneous second degree felonymurder instructions, the instructions can only be deemed harmless 

if the reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

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the jury based its finding of second degree murder on either 

express or implied malice, an element of the crime of murder. 

Petition at 38. This argument fails for two reasons. First, on 

habeas review, this Court is not bound by the state standard for 

finding prejudice. See Fry, 551 U.S. at 119-20. Second, the 

Court of Appeal acknowledged that Petitioner could not be found 

guilty of second degree murder under the reasoning in Chun; that 

is why it continued its analysis under the alternate theory of 

the natural and logical consequences doctrine, under which 

Petitioner could be found guilty of murder without a finding of 

express or implied malice. 

 Petitioner next argues that the Court of Appeal unreasonably 

relied on Medina, 46 Cal. 4th at 916, which was a sufficiency of 

evidence case, to conclude Mendoza-Lopez’s murder was the 

inevitable foreseeable outcome of the assault. Petition at 39-

42. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, Medina 

is particularly applicable to this case. It addressed whether 

sufficient evidence supported the jury’s murder convictions of 

two aiders and abettors of an assault involving rival gang 

members on the theory that the murder was a reasonably 

foreseeable consequence of the assault. Id. Although Medina was 

a sufficiency of the evidence case and not a case determining 

whether an erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial, its 

findings and reasoning are useful in this case which also poses 

the question of whether a murder was a reasonably foreseeable 

consequence of an assault. 

 Second, the Court of Appeal opinion did not conclude that 

Medina stands for the “proposition that the convictions of the 

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aiders and abettors automatically or inevitably followed from 

their complicity in the assault,” as Petitioner argues. Petition 

at 39. The Court of Appeal cited Medina to show the California 

Supreme Court had addressed the dangerousness of gang-related 

conflicts and had found that, in certain circumstances, firearm 

use by gang members is a foreseeable consequence of gang 

conflicts. Martinez, 2013 WL 136183, at *11-12. The Court of 

Appeal then applied Medina to the evidence presented at 

Petitioner’s trial to conclude that the jury reasonably held 

Petitioner vicariously liable for the foreseeable consequence of 

the violent assault on Mendoza-Lopez. Id. at *12. 

Third, as discussed above, sufficient evidence about gang 

members using firearms and murdering rival gang members was 

presented in this case to support the finding that MendozaLopez’s murder was the natural and logical consequence of the 

aggravated assault. 

Petitioner next argues that a finding that murder is the 

natural and probable consequence of assault when gangs are 

involved would create the same problem Chun rejected, that a 

murder conviction would always result from a conviction for 

aiding and abetting an assault where the victim died. The Court 

of Appeal rejected this argument explaining that “the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine does not merge all assaults into 

the felony-murder rule. Rather, it is a theory of liability for 

murder that applies when the assault has the foreseeable result 

of death. For aider and abettor liability, it is the intention 

to further the acts of another that creates criminal liability 

and not the felony-murder rule.” Martinez, 2013 WL 136183, at 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

*11. This Court must defer to the state’s interpretation of its 

own laws. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) 

(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting 

habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a 

conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States.”); see also Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 

(9th Cir. 1993) (federal habeas courts must defer to state 

courts’ interpretations of their own state laws). 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. 

See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 (requiring district court to rule on certificate of 

appealability in same order that denies petition). Petitioner 

has failed to make a substantial showing that his claim amounted 

to a denial of his constitutional rights or demonstrate that a 

reasonable jurist would find this Court’s denial of his claim 

debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000). 

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 06/04/2015 

__________________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

Case 4:13-cv-05742-CW Document 22 Filed 06/04/15 Page 28 of 28