Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01536/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONNIE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 

Defendant.

 /

No C 04-1536 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff Connie Brown (Brown) brings suit against the

City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 USC § 2000e (Title VII), 42 USC § 1981 (§ 1981), 42 USC §

1983 (§ 1983) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(FEHA), Cal Govn’t Code § 12900, et seq. Doc #1 (Compl). CCSF

moves the court partially to dismiss Brown’s complaint pursuant to

FRCP 12(b)(6) and to strike specific allegations pertaining to

punitive damages pursuant to FRCP 12(f). Doc #11. For the reasons

below, the court GRANTS IN PART CCSF’s motion.

Case 3:04-cv-01536-VRW Document 29 Filed 06/01/05 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I

Brown is an African American female employed by CCSF’s

Department of Public Works (DPW). Compl at ¶ 4. On July 9, 2001,

Brown, along with seventeen other CCSF employees, filed a complaint

against CCSF alleging racial discrimination. Armstrong v City and

County of San Francisco, C-01-2611-VRW (ND Cal 2001) (hereinafter

Armstrong); Id at ¶ 7. On July 17, 2003, Brown filed a charge with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging

additional discrimination and retaliation subsequent to the filing

of Armstrong. Doc #13 (Jud Not), Ex A. She received a right to

sue letter from the EEOC on January 21, 2004. Compl at 2. On

April 20, 2004, Brown filed the present suit alleging that she has

been subjected to (1) additional racial discrimination since the

filing of the complaint in Armstrong and (2) retaliation based upon

her participation in Armstrong, all in violation of FEHA, Title

VII, § 1983 and § 1981. 

Specifically, Brown claims that she was denied sick leave

on different days during September 2002. Compl at ¶ 8. Brown

asserts that Jim Horan (Horan), head of personnel at DPW, refused

to grant her sick leave without proof of medical necessity. Id. 

Brown states that, to the best of her knowledge, no non-African

American employee has ever been required to produce evidence of

medical necessity before taking sick leave. Id. 

Also, Brown alleges she received a false performance

appraisal report (PAR) from Chris Montgomery (Montgomery). Compl

at ¶ 9. Brown alleges that the false PAR was another instance of

retaliation. On September 20, 2002, Brown challenged the PAR

through CCSF’s administrative procedures. Id. The challenge

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resulted in some degree of modification to the PAR but not in

conformity with Brown’s true job performance. Id. 

Finally, Brown alleges that there have been “numerous

[other] instances of race discrimination, disparate treatment and

retaliation [which are] consistent with CCSF’s pattern and practice

of [racial] discrimination,” but she does not cite any additional

specific incidents. Id at ¶ 10.

CCSF moves to dismiss Brown’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Doc #11 at 2-4. 

Additionally, CCSF moves to dismiss Brown’s Title VII claims based

upon the statute of limitations insofar as these claims stem from

events occurring prior to September 21, 2002. Id at 4-5. Finally,

CCSF moves to strike Brown’s allegations requesting or relating to

punitive damages. Id at 5-6. In her opposition, Brown agrees to

(1) dismiss all claims premised on § 1981 and (2) strike any

paragraph in her prayer for relief that relates to punitive

damages. Doc #14 at 1. She does, however, defend her Title VII

and § 1983 claims. Id. 

II

A

FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially “test

whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint.” 

Scheid v Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc, 859 F2d 434, 436 (6th Cir

1988). Although a plaintiff is not held to a “heightened pleading

standard,” the plaintiff must provide more than mere “conclusory

allegations.” Swierkiewicz v Sorema NA, 534 US 506, 515 (2002)

(rejecting heightened pleading standards); Schmier v United States

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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F3d 817, 820 (9th Cir

2002) (rejecting conclusory allegations). 

All material allegations in the complaint must be taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 

See In re Silicon Graphics Inc Sec Lit, 183 F3d 970, 980 n10 (9th

Cir 1999). But “the court [is not] required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v Golden State

Warriors, 266 F3d 979, 988 (9th Cir 2001) (citing Clegg v Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir 1994)). Review of a

FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is generally limited to the

contents of the complaint, and the court may not consider other

documents outside the pleadings. Arpin v Santa Clara Valley Transp

Agency, 261 F3d 912, 925 (9th Cir 2001). 

Brown alleges CCSF is liable under § 1983 for race

discrimination and retaliation. Brown’s complaint states simply

that CCSF has “violated federal law” in discriminating and

retaliating against her; she does not specify which federal law she

is referring to (e g, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Title

VII). Compl at 8-9. 

Municipalities and local government units may be held

liable under § 1983. Monell v Department of Social Services, 436

US 658, 690-91 (1978). Municipal liability is limited to

situations in which the injury is inflicted pursuant to government

“policy or custom” and may not be based on a respondeat superior

theory. Id at 694. A § 1983 plaintiff may establish municipal

liability in one of three ways: First, she may prove that a

constitutional violation was committed pursuant to a “longstanding

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practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating

procedure of the local government entity.” Gillette v Delmore, 979

F2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir 1992) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Next, she may prove that the constitutional

tort was committed by someone with “final policy-making authority”

for the entity. Id (citations omitted). Finally, she may prove

that an official with policy-making authority ratified a

subordinate’s unconstitutional decision. Id at 1346-47 (citations

omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, “a claim of municipal liability

under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss

‘even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation

that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy,

custom, or practice.’” Karim-Panahi v Los Angeles Police Dept, 839

F2d 621, 624 (9th Cir 1988) (quoting Shah v County of Los Angeles,

797 F2d 743, 747 (9th Cir 1986)).

Brown specifies two events, the denial of sick leave and

the PAR report, as examples of the discrimination and retaliation

she has suffered. CCSF asserts that Brown fails to state a claim

because she has not alleged that Horan or Montgomery have “final

policy making authority.” Doc #15 at 2 (emphasis in original). 

While the court agrees that Brown has not alleged that either

individual has such authority, that is not the only way Brown can

state a cause of action under § 1983. In her complaint, Brown

explicitly states that she has been subjected to “numerous

instances of race discrimination[,] disparate treatment and

retaliation consistent with CCSF’s pattern and practice of

discrimination against African-Americans.” Compl at 3, ¶ 10. 

Under the Ninth Circuit’s liberal pleading standard for stating a

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cause of action for municipal liability, Karim-Panahi, 839 F2d at

624, the court concludes that Brown has alleged that she was

discriminated and retaliated against in accordance with a

“longstanding practice or custom” which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of DPW. That is all that is required to

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Of course, this says nothing about

whether Brown can marshal sufficient evidence of a long standing

practice or custom to survive a motion for summary judgment.

B

Brown claims that she was subjected to disparate

treatment, retaliation and a hostile work environment in violation

of Title VII. Compl at 4-5, 8. CCSF moves to dismiss the claims

for disparate treatment and retaliation insofar as these claims are

premised on conduct occurring prior to September 20, 2002. Doc #11

at 5-6. 

Title VII requires a plaintiff to file EEOC charges

within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practices. 42 USC 2000e5(e)(1). CCSF, however, concedes that Brown’s deadline was

extended to 300 days because California has a local agency with

similar investigatory authority over state law claims. Id at 4

(citing Laquaglia v Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc, 186 F3d 1172, 1174-75

(9th Cir 1999)). As mentioned above, Brown filed her EEOC charge

on July 19, 2003. Counting back 300 days from this date, any claim

premised on conduct occurring prior to September 20, 2002, is timebarred. 

 CCSF is wise not to challenge Brown’s hostile work

environment claim, as this claim represents a “continuing

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violation” which is presently occurring and thus is not time-barred

under Supreme Court precedent. See Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp v

Morgan, 536 US 101, 112-15 (2002). Brown’s Title VII claims for

retaliation and disparate treatment, however, are not continuing

violations under Morgan; they are based “discrete acts” which

“occurred on they day that [they] happened.” Id at 110. 

Specifically, Brown asserts that she was retaliated and

discriminated against when Montgomery gave her a false PAR and each

time Horan denied her sick leave. These unlawful employment

practices represent discrete acts that have a precise moment of

occurrence. Accordingly, to the extent that Brown’s Title VII

claims for retaliation and disparate treatment are premised on the

conduct of Horan, Montgomery or any CCSF employee occurring prior

to September 20, 2002, those claims are time-barred and thus are

dismissed with prejudice.

III

In sum, the court GRANTS IN PART CCSF’s motion to dismiss

and strike (Doc #11). Pursuant to Brown’s concession, all § 1981

claims are dismissed and ¶¶ 3, 16, 20, 24, 28, 37 and 41 insofar as

they reference Brown’s prayer for punitive damages are stricken. 

CCSF’s motion to dismiss Brown’s § 1983 claims is DENIED. The

motion to dismiss Brown’s Title VII claims for retaliation and

disparate treatment is GRANTED insofar as these claims are premised

on discrete acts occurring prior to September 20, 2002.

To be clear, Brown may proceed on all of her FEHA claims,

all of her § 1983 claims, her Title VII claim for hostile work 

//

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environment and her Title VII claims for retaliation and disparate

treatment to the extent they are premised on conduct occurring on

or subsequent to September 20, 2002.

The parties should note that the dates set in the

stipulation and order entered on March 17, 2005 (Doc #27), remain

in effect. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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