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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

ex rel. THE CITIZEN BAND 

POTAWATOMI INDIAN TRIBE 

OF OKLAHOMA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

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No. 88-2311 

ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT 

CONSULTANTS, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. Civ-86-1171-A) 

Michael Minnis (David McCullough with him on the brief) of Michael 

Minnis & Associates, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Randy Dean Witzke (David w. Edmonds with him on the brief) of 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, MCWILLIAMS, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 1 
The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (Tribe) 

brought this action against Enterprise Management Consultants, 

Inc. (EMCI) seeking a declaration that two bingo management 

contracts between the parties are void. Pending resolution of the 

merits, the Tribe ejected EMC! from the bingo enterprise premises. 

The district court granted EMCI's motion for a preliminary 

injunction ordering the Tribe to return the premises and 

prohibiting it from interfering with EMCI's operation of the bingo 

enterprise. The Tribe appealed and obtained an emergency stay of 

the district court's order under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. We now vacate the injunction. 

I. 

LITIGATION BACKGROUND 

The instant litigation is but one manifestation of a long and 

acrimonious relationship between EMC! and the Tribe, which has 

generated three lawsuits and two petitions for writs. EMCI 

originally operated a bingo game on Tribal land under a management 

agreement executed in 1982. In 1984, EMC! sued the Tribe to 

enjoin it from interfering with EMCI's performance tinder the 1982 

contract. In 1985, while that action was being pursueq in 

district court, the parties entered into a second management 

agreement and EMC! dismissed its suit with prejudice. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 2 
The Tribe subsequently filed the instant action. The Tribe 

alleged that the contracts are, and always have been, null and 

void because they were not approved under 25 u.s.c. § 81 (1982), 

which governs all agreements "made by any person with any tribe of 

Indians ••• for the payment or delivery of any money or other 

thing of value, in present or in prospective, or for the granting 

or procuring any privilege to him, or any other person in 

consideration of services for said Indians relative to their 

lands." Td. Section 81 requires that ~ny agreement to which it 

perta-ins must "bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior 

and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it." Id. 

Section 81 further provides: 

"All contracts or agreements made in violation of 

this section shall be null and void, and all money or 

other thing of value paid to any person by any Indian or 

tribe, or any one else, for or on his or their behalf, 

on account of ·such services, in excess of the amount 

approved by the Commissioner and Secretary for such 

services, may be recovered by suit in the name of the 

United States in any court of the United States, 

regardless of the amount in controversy1 and one-half 

thereof shall be paid to the person suing for the same, 

and the other half shall be paid into the Treasury for 

the use of the Indian or tribe by or for whom it was so 

paid." 

Id. The Tribe sought an accounting of money obtained by virtue of 

the management agreements, as well as rent allegedly due under a 

business lease between the parties which had been approved by the 

Secretary. The Tribe also sought to have the lease declared 

terminated, and to obtain injunctive relief restraining EMC! from 

operating under the lease. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 3 
EMC! counterclaimed, seeking a judgment ordering the Tribe to 

submit the 1985 agreement to the appropriate federal officials for 

approval or to renegotiate the contract, and to indemnify it for 

any state sales tax due. In December 1986, the district court 

ordered the parties to submit the 1985 contract to the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs (BIA) for approval, ordered the BIA to act upon it 

within sixty days, and dismissed EMCI's counterclaim on the basis 

of the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit. 

In February 1987, the BIA issued a decision refusing to 

approve the contract. On April 7, the district court entered an 

order staying the court proceedings while EMC! completed an 

administrative appeal of the BIA decision. The order also 

prohibited the BIA and the Tribe from interfering with EMCI's 

operation of the bingo games under the 1985 agreement "pending 

exhaustion of administrative remedies." Rec., vol. I, doc. 185, 

at 3. The Tribe did not appeal this order. After the Assistant 

Secretary for Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior 

affirmed the initial agency decision not to approve the contract, 

the Tribe moved the district court to reopen the proceedings and 

renewed its motion for partial summary judgment under section 81. 

In response, the court issued an order in October stating, in its 

entirety, "[f]or good cause shown, plaintiff The Citizen Band 

Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma's motion to reopen proceedings 

is granted, and the stay order vacated." Id., doc. 192, at 1. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 4 
In December 1987, EMCI filed a separate action in federal 

district court seeking judicial review of the administrative 

decision not to approve the 1985 contract. On January 19, 1988, 

the court in the instant action entered an order denying the 

Tribe's summary judgment motion. In so doing, the court referred 

to the separate action £or judicial review as "part of the 

administrative remedies which must be exhausted before this court 

can render a decision." Id., doc. 204, at 2. In addition, the 

court again stayed the action pending a final district court 

decision in the separate suit. In April, the Tribe filed a motion 

requesting that the trial judge in this action recuse himself and 

that the two actions be consolidated and heard before the judge 

hearing EMCI's judicial review case. 

In May 1988, the court in EMCI's action ruled against EMCI. 1 

On August 30, the Tribe ejected EMCI from the bingo enterprise 

premises. EMCI promptly filed an application for a temporary 

injunction and an order of contempt in this action. A hearing was 

1 The court granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss on the basis 

of sovereign immunity. It thereafter concluded that it had no 

jurisdiction over the suit against the federal officials. See 

Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 685 

F.Supp. 221 (W.D. Okla. 1988). EMCI appealed to this court. 

In an opinion filed today, we affirm the dismissal of the 

Tribe on sovereign immunity grounds. We also affirm the dismissal 

of the suit against the federal defendants, holding that the Tribe 

is an indispensable party without which the action against the 

federal officials may not proceed. See Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States,.-- F.2d , Nos. 88-2151, 

88-2231 (10th Cir. filed -----=-,-1989). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 5 
held on EMCI's motions, at which EMCI argued that the Tribe had 

violated the order of April 7, 1987, prohibiting the Tribe from 

interfering with EMCI's operation of the bingo games, while the 

Tribe argued that the April 7 order expired by its own terms when 

EMC! exhausted its administrative appeal. The district court 

ruled the Tribe in contempt and ordered the Tribe to return the 

bingo operation to EMCI. A hearing was held in this court on the 

Tribe's emergency application for a stay of the district court 

order. After the Tribe's request for an emergency stay was 

granted, the district court issued an order vacating the contempt 

holding. Although the judge also denied the Tribe's motion to 

recuse, the next day he reconsidered and removed himself from the 

case. 

On appeal, the Tribe asserts that 1) the· district court had 

no jurisdiction· to enter the preliminary injunction due to the 

Tribe's immunity from suit; 2) the court entered the injunction in 

violation of the Tribe's right to due process; and 3) the court 

abused its discretion in granting EMCI injunctive relief. We 

agree with the Tribe that the injunction constitutes an abuse of 

discretion and must therefore be vacated. 2 

2 We disagree with the Tribe's argument that the district court 

was without jurisdiction to enter an injunction due to the Tribe's 

sovereign immunity. We believe that the Tribe waived its immunity 

by agreeing that the court could enter interlocutory orders 

preserving the status quo. See rec., vol. II, at 49. The Tribe's 

waiver is also reflected in its failure to appeal the court's 

April 7, 1987 order prohibiting the Tribe from interfering with 

EMCI's operation of the bingo games pending exhaustion of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 6 
II. 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the 

exception rather than the rule. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.~d 

676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984). Because it constitutes drastic relief 

to be provided with caution, a prelminary injunction should be 

granted only in cases where the necessity for it is clearly 

established. Goldammer v •. Fay, 326 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 

1964). In this circuit, a party seeking a preliminary injunction 

must satisfy four prerequisites: 

"(l) substantial likelihood that the movant will 

eventually prevail on the merits; (2) a showing that the 

movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the 

injunction issues; (3) proof that the threatened injury 

to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed 

injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) a 

showing that the injunction, if issued, would not be 

adverse to the public interest." 

Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). When the 

movant has established that he will suffer irreparable injury and 

that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in his favor, 

administrative remedies. 

The Tribe also argues that it was denied due process with 

respect to the injunction hearing because its notice of the 

hearing was insufficient, its opportunity to be heard was 

inadequate, and the bias of the trial judge denied it the right to 

a fair and impartial tribunal. This argument is rendered moot by 

our decision infra that the injunction must be vacated under 

Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1980), and its 

progeny. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 7 
however, he may satisfy the probability-of-success factor by 

' 

raising "questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, 

difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for 

litigation and thus for more deliberate inquiry." Id. at 63 

(quoting Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 

780, 781-82 (10th Cir. 1964)); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark 

Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

109 s.ct. 260 (1988); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, 

Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 358 (10th Cir. 

1986). 

Although the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is a 

matter committed to the district court's discretion, see Lundgrin, 

619 F.2d at 63, we must scrutinize the exercise of that discretion 

with care, see Tri-State, 805 F.2d at 355. The district court's 

determination of the propriety of injunctive relief must be 

reviewed in light of the four Lundgrin factors set out above. See 

National Distrib. Co. v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 845 F.2d 

307, 309 (11th Cir. 1988); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 

F.2d 1328, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1980). 

As an initial matter, we observe that the district court's 

failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

governing the form of orders granting injunctive relief raises a 

serious question as to whether the court did in fact measure the 

propriety of the injunction against the Lundgrin factors. Rule 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 8 
52(a) states that "in granting or refusing interlocutory 

injunctions the court shall ••.• set forth the findings of fact 

and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 

action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule 65(d) similarly requires 

that "[e]very order granting an injunction ••• shall set forth 

the reasons for its issuance." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). The 

district court order granting the injunction here makes a single 

bare reference to the basis for granting that relief, stating that 

EMCI "will suffer immediate, irreparable harm if the [Tribe is] 

not enjoined from interfering with the operation of bingo by 

[EMCI], and that such injury cannot be subsequently compensated." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 221, at 5. The order contains no fact findings 

or legal conclusions supporting this assertion. Moreover, the 

order does not address the balance of hardships, or EMCI's 

likelihood of .success on the merits. 

These deficiencies in the court's order may themselves 

constitute an abuse of discretion. See American Can Co. v. 

Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 326 (7th Cir. 1984); Coca-Cola Co. v. 

Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 315 (2d Cir. 1982). If the 

failure to comply with the formal requisites of an injunction 

order renders meaningful appellate review impossible, we may 

vacate the injunction and remand for findings and conclusions 

demonstrating that the moving party has met the standards for 

obtaining injunctive relief. See Educational Testing Services v. 

Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 1986). We need not remand 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 9 
here, however, because we are able to resolve this appeal on the 

basis of EMCI's inability to establish its likelihood of success 

on the merits, a purely legal issue based on undisputed facts. 

The Tribe brought this suit to vacate its management 

contracts with EMCI, asserting that the contracts are void under 

section 81 because they have not been approved by the appropriate 

federal officials. Assuming solely for the purposes of our 

analysis that EMCI has established irreparable harm and that the 

balance of hardships favors it, EMCI must nonetheless raise 

questions about the merits of the Tribe's claim that are so 

serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make the merits 

fair ground for litigation. To satisfy this standard, the 

questions must rise to a certain level of "uniqueness and 

uncert~inty or abound with untested legal arguments." Koerpel v. 

Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 867 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The questions raised by EMCI simply do not meet these 

criteria. Every case addressing the validity of an unapproved 

bingo management contract under section 81 has voided the contract 

at the request of the tribe. See Barona Group of the Capitan 

Grande Band of Mission Indians v. American Management & Amusement, 

Inc., 840 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (as amended on denial of reh'g 

and reh'g en bane) cert. dismissed, 109 s.ct. 7 (1988); A.K. 

Management Co. v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 789 F.2d 785 

(9th Cir. 1986); Wisconsin Winnebago Business Comm. v. Koberstein, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2311 Document: 01019835675 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 10 
762 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Shakopee 

Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. Pan American Management Co., 616 

F.Supp. 1200 (D. Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 789 F.2d 632 (8th 

Cir. 1986). EMCI attempts to distinguish these cases and to 

support its claim of likelihood of success on the merits by 

arguing that this case involves particularly egregious conduct by 

the Tribe that was absent in those cases. EMCI argues that this 

conduct supports its claim that the Tribe is estopped from 

asserting the protection of section 81. Contrary to EMCI's 

contention, however, similar claims of estoppel based on similar 

circumstances have been considered in the context of section 81 

and rejected. See A.K. Management, 789 F.2d at 788-89; Shakopee, 

616 F.Supp. at 1218. 

Accordingly~ we conclude that EMCI has failed to establish 

sufficient doubt as to the proper resolution of the merits to 

entitle it to injunctive relief. The injunction is therefore 

vacated. 

REVERSED. 

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