Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00253/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00253-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEAN MARTIN SEALEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

DUSTIN FAGUNDES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-00253-KES-EPG (PC)

ORDER (1) DIRECTING CLERK OF 

COURT TO FILE DEPOSITION 

TRANSCRIPT UNDER SEAL; AND (2) 

REQUIRING SETTLEMENT 

CONFERENCE REPORT FOURTEEN

DAYS AFTER RULING ON MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DISTRICT 

JUDGE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE 

GRANTED, IN PART, AND DENIED IN 

PART; FURTHER RECOMMENDING 

THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE DENIED

(ECF Nos. 47, 48)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY DAYS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dean Martin Sealey is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 

action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was severely injured 

during the course of his prison employment after being directed to clean machinery, even 

though he had no training, experience, or supervision. 

Both parties now move for summary judgment. Defendants Dustin Fagundes and Steve 

Souza argue that (1) they are not liable because Plaintiff was injured because he defied his 

training, (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) Souza was not responsible for 

1 Plaintiff has paid the filing fee and is not proceeding in forma pauperis. 

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Plaintiff’s training or supervision. (ECF No. 48-1, pp. 1-2). Plaintiff argues that the undisputed 

facts show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety needs by directing 

him to clean machinery without showing him how to properly do so. (ECF No. 47). 

For the reasons given below, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion be granted to 

the extent that Defendant Souza be granted summary judgment and denied to the extent that it 

requests that Defendant Fagundes be granted summary judgment. It is also recommended that 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The complaint

This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to his safety needs under the Eighth Amendment. (ECF Nos. 5, 7). The underlying 

incident occurred at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (SATF) 

In April 2022, Plaintiff was assigned to the California Prison Industry Authority (PIA).

His job title was package handler. In August 2022, Plaintiff’s supervisor, Defendant Fagundes, 

ordered Plaintiff to work in the peanut butter and jelly section. 

On this day, Defendants Fagundes and Souza had decided to experiment with 

processing hummus through the jelly processing system. However, this led to the entire system 

being clogged. Plaintiff and another inmate were given a direct order to clean inside the pipes 

and pump. However, Defendants never trained Plaintiff on how to clean the machinery.

While trying to remove a gasket from the pump, Plaintiff’s left index finger came into 

contact with a spinning propeller, causing Plaintiff’s finger to be shredded and amputated.

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B. Motions for Summary Judgment 

Plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment on August 28, 2024. (ECF No. 47). 

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on September 16, 2024. (ECF No. 48). 

Each party has opposed the other party’s motion. (ECF Nos. 48, 50, 51). Accordingly, the 

parties’ motions for summary judgment are ripe for decision.

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2 Both parties acknowledge elsewhere in the record that Plaintiff’s finger only needed to be partially 

amputated. (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 62; ECF No. 48-2, p. 4). 

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

A party may move for summary judgment on a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Summary judgment in favor of a party is appropriate when there “is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); Albino v. Baca (“Albino II”), 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“If there is 

a genuine dispute about material facts, summary judgment will not be granted.”). A party 

asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts 

of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), 

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, or showing that the materials cited do not 

establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

As for Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, because he “will have the burden of 

proof on an issue at trial, [he] must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact 

could find other than for [him].” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 

2007). As for Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the following standards apply:

A moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial—usually, but 

not always, a defendant—has both the initial burden of production and the 

ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment. See 10A 

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 2727 (3d ed.1998). In order to carry its burden of production, 

the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of 

the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does 

not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of 

persuasion at trial. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 

895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.1990). In order to carry its ultimate burden of 

persuasion on the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there is 

no genuine issue of material fact. See id.

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If a party moving for summary judgment “carries its burden of production, the 

nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense.” Id. at 1103. And “if 

the nonmoving party produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the 

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nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Id. 

In reviewing the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court “must draw all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Comite de 

Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). It 

need only draw inferences, however, where there is “evidence in the record . . . from which a 

reasonable inference . . . may be drawn”; the court need not entertain inferences that are 

unsupported by fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n. 2 (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he 

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

255, (1986). Further, the Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the 

parties but is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified 

School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001).

In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, a court is required to consider each 

motion on its own merits. Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 

1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). “In fulfilling its duty to review each cross-motion separately, the 

court must review the evidence submitted in support of each cross-motion.” Id.

B. Deliberate Indifference

“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions

under which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” 

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 

(1994). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and 

harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Prison officials must, however, 

provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other 

grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

Two requirements must be met to show an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “a prison official must have a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which for conditions of confinement claims “is one of 

deliberate indifference.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Prison officials act 

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with deliberate indifference when they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health 

or safety. Id. at 837. The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in 

determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a 

viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006).

“More specifically, the Eighth Amendment is implicated in the prison work context 

only when a prisoner employee alleges that a prison official compelled him to ‘perform 

physical labor which [was] beyond [his] strength, endanger[ed his life] or health, or cause[d] 

undue pain.”’ Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Berry v. 

Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam)). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Undisputed Facts 

The parties do not dispute the following facts. Plaintiff was an inmate at SATF during 

the time of the incident. (ECF No. 48-2, p. 1; ECF No. 47, p. 5). In April 2022, Plaintiff started 

a job with the PIA working as a package handler. (ECF No. 48-2, p. 2; ECF No. 47, p. 5).

Defendant Fagundes was Plaintiff’s supervisor. (ECF No. 48-2, p. 1; ECF No. 47, p. 5). On 

August 31, 2022, Defendants tried to process hummus through machinery, leading to a clog in 

the system. (ECF No. 48-2, p.21; ECF No. 47, p. 7).

Fagundes, in at least some manner, instructed Plaintiff and other workers to unclog the 

system. (ECF No. 48-2, p. 3; ECF No. 47, p. 7). In the process of trying to remove a gasket 

from a pump, Plaintiff’s left index finger was injured, requiring a partial amputation. (ECF No. 

48-2, p. 4; ECF No. 47, pp. 13-14; Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 62).

B. Summary of the Parties’ Positions

The crux of the dispute comes down to whether Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety needs because they failed to properly train and supervise him in 

cleaning the machinery. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion argues 

as follows:

Sealey’s training materials prove that Sealey knew not to put his hand into a 

running machine, and Defendants were not aware of a serious risk of harm 

because they could not have known that Sealey would defy his training 

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especially where, as here, Sealey was instructed to perform a task that did not 

require him to place his hand inside a machine. Moreover, Sealey’s claims fail 

for lack of causation because he was trained not to put his hand in moving 

machinery and it was unforeseeable that he would defy that training. Defendants 

are also entitled to qualified immunity.

(ECF No. 48-1, pp. 1-2). 

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants provide their own 

declarations, safety instructions that Plaintiff was purportedly provided, Plaintiff’s medical 

records, and excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition.3

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and opposition to Defendants’ motion 

contends that he was never properly trained on how to clean the machinery. (ECF Nos. 47, 50). 

Rather, he states that he was left with another inmate to train and supervise him, which the 

inmate failed to do. 

In support of his arguments, Plaintiff offers his own declaration, statements from other 

inmates, discovery responses, purported photographs of the machinery at issue, and documents 

he received in connection with his job (including safety instructions).

C. Analysis

The Court considers the arguments as to each Defendant separately, starting with 

Fagundes, whom the parties agree was Plaintiff’s supervisor in his PIA job. 4

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3 Defendants have also provided the Court with the entire transcript of Plaintiff’s deposition as required 

by Local Rule 133(j). (ECF No. 49). An entire deposition transcript “will [not] become part of the 

official record of the action absent order of the Court.” Local Rule 133(j). Because the Court has quoted 

from multiple pages of the deposition transcript that are not yet part of the record, the Court will direct 

the Clerk of Court of file the entire deposition transcript for the record, but under seal.

4 As an initial matter, Defendants argue that “Sealey’s motion for summary judgment should be denied 

as procedurally deficient . . . [because it] does not include a statement of undisputed facts properly 

supported by evidence as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Civil Local Rule 

260(a).” (ECF No. 48-1, p. 6). The Court rejects this argument. First, although Plaintiff has failed to set 

forth a statement of undisputed facts under Local Rule 260(a), he otherwise provides evidence with his 

filings and sufficiently explains why he believes that the evidence supports his factual positions. The 

Court also takes into consideration that Plaintiff is pro se and incarcerated. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988) (“This court recognizes that it has a duty to ensure that pro se 

litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of their claim due to ignorance of technical 

procedural requirements. Thus, for example, pro se pleadings are liberally construed, particularly where 

civil rights claims are involved.”) (internal citations omitted). 

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1. Fagundes

a. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

The Court begins with Fagundes’ motion for summary judgment, which argues that the 

undisputed facts establish that he was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety needs and 

that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 48-1). Generally, Fagundes argues that he is 

not liable because Plaintiff was provided with training and instructions that made clear that 

Plaintiff was not supposed to put his hands in moving machinery.

i. Fagundes’ argument

Fagundes provides a declaration stating that Plaintiff received the following training 

and instructions:

• Sealey received the California Prison Industry Authority Food and Beverage 

Packaging Safety Instructions, which provide that factory workers should 

“[k]eep hands and fingers away from belts, pulleys, and moving parts,” and 

that “[r]epair and maintenance work shall only be performed by the 

designated persons.”

• Sealey received the Lockout/Tagout Preventing Machine Suprises training, 

which instructs factory workers to turn machines off before maintaining or 

repairing them and that failure to do so could result in injury.

• Sealey took the California Prison Industry Authority – Staff/Inmate 

Orientation SATF General Safety Quiz. Sealey marked true the following 

statement: “You should never oil, adjust, or clean machinery while it is in 

motion.”

• [Regarding the incident at issue, Fagundes] instructed Sealey and two other 

senior factory workers to begin the [Clean-in-Place] CIP process and 

returned to his office.

• The process is called “Clean-in-Place” because the machine is cleaned with 

all the pipes and pieces of the machine left in place. The CIP process runs hot 

water through the machine on a cycle to clean out the pipes. The steps of 

running a CIP are: (1) fill the kettle with water using a hose; (2) open the 

kettle valve; (3) flip a switch to begin the flow of hot water through the 

system; and (4) observe the draining water to confirm that it runs clear. The 

machine is powered on during the CIP process.

• Because the CIP process does not include dismantling the machine or placing 

your hands in the machine, direct supervision is not required. Factory 

workers run the CIP process daily to ensure the machines in the factory are 

cleaned and sanitized to process food. Workers performing the CIP process 

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are trained to do so “on-the-job” by more senior workers.

(ECF No. 48-2, p. 2) (internal citation to exhibit numbers omitted). 

Based on these facts, Fagundes argues as follows:

Fagundes [was] not deliberately indifferent because [he] did not know Sealey

would stray from the CIP process, defy his training, and put his hand in moving 

machinery without authorization.

As stated above, the CIP process does not require anyone to put their hands 

inside the machine or to dismantle the machine in any way. Sealey was also 

specifically trained not to put his hands inside a machine while it was on 

because it could cause injury. Because of Sealey’s training and instruction to 

perform the CIP process, Fagundes [] did not know of or consciously disregard a 

risk of injury to Sealey when performing the CIP process. And even if [he] had 

known that Sealey was going to put his hand in the machine, [he] would not 

have known or disregarded a risk that he would place his hands in moving 

machinery because of Sealey’s training. 

Accordingly, Fagundes [was] not deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of 

harm to Sealey.

(ECF No. 48-1, p. 11) (internal citations omitted).

ii. Plaintiff’s argument

Plaintiff’s account of events differs markedly from Fagundes’. (ECF No. 50). In his 

declaration, he states that when he was hired to work for PIA—roughly four months before the 

incident—he was hired as a package handler (also referred to as a food packer). (Id. at 2). At

his deposition, Plaintiff described this job as follows:

They got a -- food -- a jelly packing machine that packaged the little small jelly 

packs. When that machine kicks all the jelly packs into a box -- small box, fill it 

up. I would take the box, put it on the conveyor belt, push it through the taper 

and stack it on a pallet. Fifty boxes to a pallet. Once that 50 boxes is done, I take 

the Reno wrap – plastic wrap and wrap it around there to secure it. And then I 

will get a pallet jack, lift it up and take it to a designated area that they want me 

to take it to. That was my job. That was sitting next to the jelly packing 

machine, and, you know, stacking boxes on the pallet, and that’s what I was 

doing all day.

(Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 17). This job description is supported by a document that Plaintiff 

provides called “Inmate Job Description.” (ECF No. 47) (stating, among other things that, 

“Workers may stack, separate, count, pack, wrap, and weigh products. Workers will be 

responsible for removing sealed bread packages from the out-feed conveyor.”). 

With these duties in mind, Plaintiff states that he was not required to perform the CIP 

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process as part of his package handling position. (ECF No. 50, p. 6). Moreover, while he 

acknowledges receiving some of the safety documents that Fagundes discusses in his 

declaration, Plaintiff states that the lockout/tagout document—which concerns turning off a

machine—was never presented to him. (Id. at 3). In support of this argument, Plaintiff correctly 

notes that the employee and supervisor signature lines are blank on this form.5(Id.; ECF No. 

48-3, p. 6). 

Relatedly, Plaintiff states that when Fagundes instructed him to perform the CIP process, 

he understood it to mean “clean inside the pipe and pumps.” (ECF No. 50, p. 4). Plaintiff 

claims that he was never trained on the CIP process and, after Fagundes ordered him to perform 

the CIP process, he explained to Fagundes that he was not familiar with it. (Id.; see Plaintiff’s 

deposition, p. 35 – Plaintiff stating that he told Fagundes he was “not familiar with all that stuff 

[in reference to the CIP process] and Fagundes responded that it was “a good time for 

[Plaintiff] to train with [a fellow inmate]”). However, rather than training him, Fagundes 

directed him to work with two inmate workers. (ECF No. 50, p. 4).

Plaintiff’s recollection of never being trained by Fagundes on the CIP process is 

supported by Fagundes’ own declaration and discovery responses. While Fagundes states that 

he directed Plaintiff to perform the CIP process—and his declaration explains the steps of the

process and that it does not involve working inside the machinery—Fagundes never states that 

he explained to Plaintiff what the steps of the CIP process are, nor how Plaintiff was not 

supposed to put his hands inside the machinery during the process. (ECF No. 48-3, p. 3). And 

although Fagundes states that “[w]orkers performing the CIP process are trained to do so ‘onthe-job’ by more senior workers,” he never states that Plaintiff was trained on the CIP process 

by a senior worker. Plaintiff stated at his deposition that inmate workers cannot be trusted to 

train “because they are not dedicated to training nobody.” (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 45). 

Further, Fagundes admitted in his discovery responses that “no [CIP training] written document 

existed at the time of the incidents at issue in this lawsuit.” (ECF No. 47, p. 34). 

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Fagundes instructed him, via communication with

one of the inmates that Plaintiff was training with, “to process the last two pipes and check the 

5 The Court notes that the other safety documents are signed by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 48-3, pp. 5, 7). 

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gasket.” (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 38). He states that he follows such instruction because not 

complying could lead to him getting fired or a disciplinary action. (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 

46). This assertion is supported by the “Inmate Job Description” document that Plaintiff 

provides, which states that refusal to meet expected job standards “could result in disciplinary 

action and unassignment.” (ECF No. 47, p. 47). 

Moreover, Plaintiff states that, when he went to check the gasket on the machine, he was 

expecting a gasket that contained a screen. (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 43). However, Fagundes 

changed the gasket to one without a screen—an “open gasket”—to allow for a better flow for 

processing hummus in the machinery. (Id. at 49). However, “[Fagundes] did not tell the 

workers.” (Id.). 

Plaintiff did not know the pump was on when he was working on it “because the pump is 

completely qu[ie]t.” (ECF No. 50, p. 6). Further, because of the position of the machinery, 

Plaintiff could not clearly see the gasket when he went to remove it. (Plaintiff’s deposition, pp. 

54-55). He reached in to pull out the stuck gasket in the pipe, which is when his finger slipped 

into the pump of the machinery, causing his finger to be injured. (Id. at 55-57). 

Lastly, although Plaintiff acknowledges that maintenance workers are supposed to clean 

machinery, he states that, because they take too long to do so, staff “recklessly use[] inmates to 

do that” in order to make sure production continued. (Id. at 75). 

Based on these facts, Plaintiff argues that Fagundes misrepresents the evidence. 

Generally, he argues that he was never trained on the proper cleanup procedure and it was not 

clear how to perform it without training, especially given his role as a package handler. Thus, 

Fagundes was deliberately indifferent to his safety needs by failing to train and supervise him. 

iii. Analysis

With the parties’ competing arguments in mind, the Court concludes that Fagundes has 

failed to meet his initial burden of showing that he is entitled to summary judgment. Nissan 

Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102. Notably, the evidence discussed above reveals multiple genuine issues 

of material fact.

Most importantly, the parties dispute the key issue here—whether Plaintiff was ever 

properly trained to work on the machinery. Among other things, the parties dispute whether 

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Plaintiff knew the CIP process and was ever instructed on the lockout/tagout procedure. 

Fagundes’ reply argues that, whether Plaintiff received certain training is ultimately 

immaterial, because there is no dispute he received at least some other training, e.g., like to 

keep his hands away from moving parts. (ECF No. 51, p. 2). The Court does not find this 

argument convincing. 

Notably, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must, 

Fagundes directed Plaintiff and fellow inmates to work on the internal portions of the 

machinery, i.e., to check the gasket from the pump that ultimately caused Plaintiff’s injury. See 

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“Therefore, at summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party: if direct evidence produced by the moving party conflicts 

with direct evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the 

evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact.”). As Fagundes repeatedly 

argues that such an action would be contrary to safety training, he would have known that 

ordering Plaintiff to do this would pose an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. And according to 

Plaintiff, ignoring workplace instructions could lead to disciplinary action against him. 

Moreover, Fagundes’ further enhanced the danger present in the task by using an open gasket 

(i.e., one without a screen) and without telling the inmates whom he instructed to work on the 

machinery. This all occurred despite Plaintiff telling Fagundes that he did not know the proper 

cleaning process; Fagundes being responsible for Plaintiff’s training; Fagundes admitting that 

he did not directly train Plaintiff on the CIP process; and Fagundes leaving Plaintiff’s training 

and supervision to another inmate, whom Plaintiff contends was not up for the task.

In light of such facts, construed in favor of Plaintiff, a jury could reasonably find that 

Fagundes was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety needs despite Plaintiff receiving 

some contrary instruction, e.g., not to put his hands near moving parts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248 (“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, 

if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”). 

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be 

denied to the extent that Fagundes requests summary judgment based on the arguments 

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discussed above. 

b. Qualified immunity

Fagundes also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has 

failed “to point to case law showing that the right was clearly defined at the time of the alleged 

violation.” (ECF No. 51, p. 5). 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must 

decide (1) whether the facts shown by plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; 

and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the officer’s alleged 

misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently 

clear “that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates 

that right.’” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2090 (2012) (quoting Al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 

741) (alteration in original). This immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

Binding caselaw “need not catalogue every way in which” prison conditions can 

be constitutionally inadequate “for us to conclude that a reasonable official 

would understand that his actions violated” an inmate’s rights. Castro v. County 

of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Rather, “a right 

is clearly established when the ‘contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that 

a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” 

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th 

Cir. 2003)).

Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754, 769 (9th Cir. 2023).

With these standards in mind, and for the reasons discussed above, the facts could 

establish a constitutional violation. 

Further, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, establishes the 

following: Fagundes directed Plaintiff to clean dangerous machinery that was the responsibility 

of maintenance workers—including checking the gasket on a pump—despite not telling 

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Plaintiff that he had installed a more dangerous “open gasket,” and Fagundes did not train or 

supervise Plaintiff, who explained that he did not know how to properly clean the machinery. 

These facts, if true, violate the following clearly established law: 

[P]rison officials supervising [an inmate worker] have a constitutional obligation 

to take reasonable measures to guarantee his safety. See Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 937.

Not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in prison represents a constitutional 

violation. A prisoner claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must show (1) that 

the deprivation he suffered was “objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) that 

prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety in allowing the 

deprivation to take place. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. More 

specifically, the Eighth Amendment is implicated in the prison work context only 

when a prisoner employee alleges that a prison official compelled him to 

“perform physical labor which [was] beyond [his] strength, endanger[ed his life] 

or health, or cause[d] undue pain.” Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th

Cir.1994) (per curiam); see also Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.1995)

(analyzing under the Eighth Amendment a prisoner's claim that his health was 

endangered when he was forced to remove asbestos without protective gear).

Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045, (9th Cir. 2006) opinion amended on reh'g (9th 

Cir., Nov. 30, 2006, No. 04-35608) 2006 WL 3437344 (prison supervisor's alleged actions of 

compelling prisoner to perform work that endangered his health and caused undue pain violated 

prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights). See also Hoa v. Cate, No. C-12-2078 EMC, 2014 WL 

2186626, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (“From Morgan, a reasonable officer would have 

understood that compelling an inmate to continue working under hazardous conditions, after 

the inmates raise serious concerns whether it was safe to do so, violated his Eighth Amendment 

right ‘not to be compelled to perform work that endangered his health and caused undue 

pain.”’) (internal citation to Morgan omitted). 

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

be denied to the extent that Fagundes requests summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

c. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

Having addressed Fagundes’ motion for summary judgment, the Court turns to 

Plaintiff’s motion, with Plaintiff now bearing the burden of showing that he is entitled to 

summary judgment. In arguing that he is entitled to summary judgment, Plaintiff relies on the 

same arguments and evidence discussed above in opposing Fagundes’ motion for summary 

judgment. Likewise, Fagundes relies on the same arguments and evidence in support of his 

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motion for summary judgment in arguing that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment; 

primarily, that Plaintiff was properly trained and defied his safety training in working on the 

internal parts of the machinery that led to his injury. 

For the reasons described above in connection with Fagundes’ motion, the Court will 

deny Plaintiff’s motion. Importantly, there are genuine disputes of material fact precluding 

summary judgment, e.g., whether Plaintiff was in fact properly trained to work on the 

machinery and whether he followed the safety instructions he received or diverted from them. 

Because Plaintiff cannot “affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find 

other than for [him],” the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

be denied as to Fagundes. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984.

2. Souza

Separately, defendant Souza asserts in his motion for summary judgment, with the 

support of his declaration, that he was a superintendent overseeing the entire food packaging 

operation at SATF. (ECF No. 48-4, p. 2). In this role, he oversees other supervisors, among 

other tasks, but does “not supervise or train inmate workers.” (Id.). Rather, “industrial 

supervisors supervise and train inmate workers.” (Id.). And he specifically asserts that he “did 

not train or supervise Sealey on August 31, 2022, or at any time.” (Id.). Further, while Souza 

concedes that both he and Fagundes were responsible for directing workers to run hummus 

through the machinery on August 31, 2022, he states that he “left work after the workers began 

processing hummus through the machine,” and “was not present when Sealey was instructed to 

perform [t]he CIP process.” (Id.). Accordingly, he claims that, because he had no involvement 

with the underlying incident, he cannot be held liable. 

Plaintiff does not meaningful dispute Souza’s factual assertions and largely confirms 

them. For example, in his deposition, Plaintiff states that “We didn’t have any interaction with 

[Souza]. He’s the superintendent. He’s, like, high up. Everything, we -- we interact with 

[Fagundes].” (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 25). Further, Plaintiff states that he saw Souza in the 

morning of August 31 but did not see him again later that day. (Id.). And he states that 

Fagundes was the only person, beside workers not implicated here, that could swap out the 

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gasket. (Id. at 58-59). 

Plaintiff tries to argue that Souza is liable because he instructed him to run hummus 

through the machinery. (ECF No. 50, p. 12). However, this fact is ultimately immaterial 

because Plaintiff’s running hummus through the machinery is not what led to his injury; rather, 

it was his subsequent cleaning of the machinery in a way that was dangerous. And all the 

available evidence indicates that Souza was not responsible for directing Plaintiff to do so, or 

administering any training or supervision to Plaintiff for his work. 

As Defendants correctly note (ECF No. 48-1, pp. 6-7), supervisory personnel are not 

liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. 

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Rather, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, 

a plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendant 

either: was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, Hansen v. 

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); “knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent 

them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); or promulgated or “implement[ed] a 

policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the 

moving force of the constitutional violation,” Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, there are no such allegations and thus the Court will recommend that Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment be granted to the extent that Souza be granted summary 

judgment. Likewise, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

be denied as to Souza.

V. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to file a copy of Plaintiff’s entire 

deposition transcript under seal.

2. Within fourteen days of the District Judge’s ruling on the parties’ motions for 

summary judgment, to the extent that any claims remain, Defendants shall file an 

updated report regarding whether Defendants want the Court to set a settlement 

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conference. (ECF No. 43)

Additionally, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 48) be granted, in part, and 

denied, in part. Specifically, the Court recommends that Defendant Souza be 

granted summary judgment and be dismissed from this action and terminated 

from the dockedt, and that Defendant Fagundes be denied summary judgment.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied in its entirety. (ECF No. 47)

3. This action proceed only on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Fagundes was 

deliberately indifferent to his safety needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty

(30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 

written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be 

served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. Any objections shall 

be limited to no more than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 

1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 13, 2024 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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