Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_15-cv-00117/USCOURTS-almd-1_15-cv-00117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MARY L.R. DOZIER, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 1:15-cv-117-WKW-WC 

 ) 

LAWTON ARMSTRONG, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Before the court is Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) and Amended Complaint (Doc. 

5). On February 19, 2015, the District Judge entered an Order referring this matter to the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge “for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or 

recommendations as may be appropriate.” Order (Doc. 3). 

Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Mot. (Doc. 2). Thus, 

the court is obligated to undertake review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 

2002) (applying § 1915(e) in non-prisoner action). That statute instructs the court to 

dismiss any action wherein it is determined that an in forma pauperis applicant’s suit is 

“frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

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After an initial review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

entered an Order (Doc. 4) describing numerous fatal deficiencies with the complaint, and 

instructing Plaintiff to amend her complaint. Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 5) on March 9, 2015. For the following reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

finds that Plaintiff’s complaint, as amended, is due to be dismissed pursuant to the 

provisions of § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

As the undersigned explained in the Order directing Plaintiff to amend her 

complaint, a review of the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s complaint for purposes of § 

1915(e)(2)(B) begins with analysis of whether Plaintiff’s complaint complies with the 

pleading standard applicable to all civil complaints in federal courts. Rule 8 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff file a “short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he 

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it 

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007)). In general, then, a pleading is insufficient if it offers only mere “labels 

and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 557) (a complaint does not suffice under Rule 8(a) “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”). Thus, in order to satisfy Rule 8(a), Plaintiff’s 

complaint “‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for 

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relief which is plausible on its face.’” Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 

1051 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A claim is factually plausible 

where the facts alleged permit the court to reasonably infer that the defendant’s alleged 

misconduct was unlawful. Factual allegations that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability,’ however, are not facially plausible.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678). 

As a general matter, “[i]n the case of a pro se action . . . the court should construe 

the complaint more liberally than it would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell 

v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). However, although district courts must 

apply a “less stringent standard” to the pleadings submitted by a pro se plaintiff, such 

“‘leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to 

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air 

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. 

of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 

complaint, even if liberally construed, must minimally satisfy the dictates of Rule 8(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to survive review under § 1915(e). As set 

out below, the undersigned concludes that the complaint, as amended, fails to withstand 

such scrutiny. 

As the court stated in its Order instructing Plaintiff to amend her complaint, 

Plaintiff’s original complaint was confusing, conclusory, encumbered by pleading 

defects, and, even interpreting Plaintiff’s allegations liberally, was subject to dismissal 

under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for a number of reasons. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not 

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merit a different outlook on the ultimate viability of her case. Plaintiff appears to allege a 

violation of her constitutional rights stemming from an apparent conviction, or revocation 

of probation, on state drug charges in 1988 or 1989. Am. Compl. (Doc. 5) at 1. The 

defendants appear to be a number of persons involved in events related to the conviction 

or in other positions of state and local government, including, inter alia, the current 

Governor and Attorney General of Alabama, state court judges, law enforcement officers, 

a prosecutor, her defense attorney, and a state court clerk. Plaintiff appears to allege that 

that the charges for which she was convicted in 1988 or 1989 were fabricated. She 

alleges that Defendants, including the current Governor and Attorney General, “Forged 

document and Tampered with evidence” by falsifying an indictment filed in 1988 and, 

further, that Defendants committed “Forgery and Tampering” in regard to an “Alabama 

Judicial Information System – Case Action Summary” report which was produced in 

2008. Am. Compl. (Doc. 5) at 1-2. She claims that Defendants “knew that Dozier had 

no 1989 charges and forged documents and tampered with government records that 

caused Dozier to be arrested and detained in violation of her 4th 5th 14th Amendment and 

due process rights.” Id. at 2. She further alleges that Defendant Crespi “errored and 

violated due process in trying Dozier and Bullard fail to defend Dozier of 

unconstitutional actions which is ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of her 6th

amendment right[,]” which, she asserts, “led to guilty verdict and sentence to false 

imprisonment[.]” Id. In addition, Plaintiff appears to be challenging a recent decision of 

the state courts to decline to purge her record of any notation of the subject conviction, 

despite what she describes as an executive pardon which she received. See id. (alleging 

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that Defendants Binford and Mendheim “should have granted Dozier’s ‘request to purge’ 

and make all 1989 charges void and of no effect”). Id. at 3. 

As a preliminary matter, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff largely failed to abide 

by the court’s order that she file an amended complaint which would “clearly and 

succinctly allege the facts with which she is aggrieved, and, as to each defendant she 

names in the complaint, [would] clearly and succinctly allege the specific actions taken 

by such defendant which she alleges has violated her constitutional rights.” Order (Doc. 

4) at 4. In response to the court’s directive, Plaintiff has only alleged that essentially all 

defendants committed or participated in the discrete acts of forgery or tampering which 

she appears to assert as the core of her complaint. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state 

specific, viable claims for relief against the individual defendants she names in her suit. 

Putting aside this fatal defect, however, it is apparent that the allegations of Plaintiff’s 

original and amended complaint are precisely the sort of “unadorned,” “naked assertions” 

of fact which are insufficient to satisfy the pleading standard of Rule 8(a). Plaintiff 

simply presents the conclusory allegation that all defendants forged or tampered with 

court documents. The Amended Complaint is therefore completely devoid of the sort of 

“factual enhancement” necessary to sustain a viable claim for relief under Rule 8. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations are utterly implausible on their face. Plaintiff offers no 

factual allegations establishing that her claims of a wide-ranging conspiracy to convict 

and imprison her on bogus criminal charges could be plausible. Most glaring in this 

regard is Plaintiff’s allegation that the current Governor and Attorney General of 

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Alabama were somehow involved in falsification and tampering with records which were 

produced long before those persons held their current offices. 

Apart from the insufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s 

action is untimely. Plaintiff purports to bring her claims for constitutional violations 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Am. Compl. (Doc. 5) at 2. “Constitutional claims brought 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are tort actions subject to the personal injury statute of limitations 

of the state where the action has been brought. The statute of limitations in Alabama is 

two years.” Lindley v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 515 F. App’x 813, 814 n.1 (11th Cir. 

2013) (citing McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008), and Ala. Code § 6-

2-38). “A cause of action accrues for purposes of determining when the statute of 

limitations began to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury and 

its cause.” Eubank v. Leslie, 210 F. App’x 837, 841 (11th Cir. 2006). The complaint 

makes clear that Plaintiff knew or should have known of her alleged injuries in 1988 or 

1989, when she was convicted on purportedly nonexistent charges, or in 2008, when, she 

alleges, Defendants falsified a Case Action Summary report concerning that conviction. 

None of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her conviction in 1988 or 1989 state a claim for 

a constitutional injury occurring within two years of the date that she filed the instant 

complaint. 

In addition to the insufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations and the bar imposed by 

Alabama’s statute of limitations, other defects warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Plaintiff is attempting to sue several defendants, including a state court prosecutor and 

state court judges, for alleged actions they committed in their functions as a prosecutor 

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and judges. Such defendants are plainly immune from suit under § 1983 under the 

principles of judicial and prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiff is also attempting to sue her 

former defense attorney, who cannot be liable to her in a suit under § 1983 because 

defense attorneys in criminal prosecutions, even those appointed and compensated by the 

court, are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. See Holt v. Crist, 233 F. App’x 900, 

902-03 (11th Cir. 2007). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is indeed alleging a claim 

based upon the failure of a state court to grant her “request to purge,” she is plainly a 

losing state court litigant seeking a federal court reversal of the state court’s decision. 

The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. See, e.g., Casale v. 

Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2009) (describing and applying RookerFeldman1

 doctrine). Finally, it appears Plaintiff is likely precluded by Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), from seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the 

basis of her state court conviction.2

 

 

1

 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 

U.S. 413 (1923). 

2

 In short, Heck held as follows: 

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would 

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, 

or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus []. 

A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has 

not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 

512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff alleges that she has received a pardon, and attached documents in 

support of this contention to her complaint. However, the Certificate of Pardon appended to 

Plaintiff’s complaint makes clear that the basis for the pardon is that Plaintiff “so conducted 

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For all of the reasons stated above, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the 

Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s complaint, as amended, be DISMISSED prior to service 

of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) because the amended complaint 

is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary 

relief from defendants who are immune to such relief. The undersigned Magistrate Judge 

further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion to Lift Stay to Serve Defendants (Doc. 6) 

be DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) 

is GRANTED. Further, it is 

 ORDERED that Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before November 24, 2015. A party must specifically identify 

the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is 

made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file 

written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance 

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the 

Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by 

 

himself [sic] as to demonstrate his [sic] reformation and to merit pardon with restoration of civil 

rights.” The Certificate clarifies that it does not have the effect of restoring Plaintiff’s right to 

possess a firearm or relieve her from the effects of Alabama’s Habitual Offender Act. Thus, it 

appears the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles merely exercised its discretion to relieve 

Plaintiff of some of the collateral consequences of her conviction based upon her ostensibly good 

conduct in the intervening years. And, as Plaintiff’s own allegations make clear, the state court 

has rejected her request to “purge” her record of the subject conviction. It therefore appears that 

Plaintiff’s conviction has not been invalidated, set aside, expunged, or called into question for 

purposes of applying Heck. 

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the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning 

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 

F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised that this Recommendation is 

not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Done this 10th day of November, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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