Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00370/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAYNOR CARLOCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

COLLINS MOTOR COMPANY, 

RICHARD H. COLLINS, SR.,

RICHARD H. COLLINS, JR., RITA A.

COLLINS, & KRISTEN COLLINS,

and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive,

Defendants. 

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Civil Case No. 04cv0370 J (RBB) 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS/

CLARIFICATION OF ORDER FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

(Fed R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2))

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Enforcement of Order for Attorney’s Fees

and Costs/Clarification of Order for Attorney’s Fees Costs (“Motion”). [Doc. No. 107.] For the

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion, and CLARIFIES and

ENFORCES its order imposing sanctions upon Plaintiff’s Counsel.

Background

 On February 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations of the Americans

With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and related state law claims. [Doc. No. 1.] 

Case 3:04-cv-00370-J-RBB Document 114 Filed 04/07/08 Page 1 of 5
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On May 2, 2005, the Court ordered that Plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant and

issued a pre-filing injunction against Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 70.] The Court found that Plaintiff

was filing an inordinate number of ADA and related state law claims with the bad faith motive

of harassing businesses in order to extract quick cash settlements. (Id. at 10.) On May 4, 2005,

the Court issued an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s ADA claim for lack of standing and mootness

and dismissing Plaintiff’s state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 71.] 

On May 23, 2005, Defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees against Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 75.] 

On September 7, 2005, Plaintiff filed a notice of his own motion for award of attorney’s fees. 

[Doc. No. 90.]

On September 19, 2005, the Court issued an Order granting Defendant’s motion for

attorney’s fees and denying Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (“Order”). [Doc. No. 93.] 

On November 6, 2007, Defendant filed the present Motion. [Doc. No. 107.] On

November 13, 2007, Plaintiff filed its Opposition and Objection to Defendant’s Motion (“Opposition”). [Doc. No. 108.] On November 26, 2007, Defendant filed its Reply Brief to Plaintiff’s

Opposition (“Reply Brief”). [Doc. No. 110.]

Legal Standards

I. Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1927 (“section 1927") provides that “[a]ny attorney

... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required

by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably

incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927 does not permit sanctions

for the initial filing of the complaint; rather, the sanctions only apply to subsequent filings and

tactics which multiply the proceedings. Moore v. Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir.

1996). 

To award sanctions under section 1927, the court must make a finding of recklessness or

bad faith. See Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2001); see also West Coast Theater

Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 1528 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Defendant also sought fees associated with bringing the Motion for Attorney’s Fees; the Court

included such fees in its calculation.

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II. Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Court’s Inherent Power

In addition, a federal court has the inherent power “to levy sanctions, including attorneys’

fees, for willful disobedience of a court order ... or when the losing party has acted in bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 (citing Roadway

Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)); see also Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32,

44-45 (1991) (stating that as an “appropriate sanction for conduct that abuses the judicial

process,” “an assessment of attorney’s fees is undoubtedly within the court’s inherent power.”). 

Sanctions under the court’s inherent power are only warranted when an attorney has acted

in bad faith. Id. at 993; see also Keegan, 78 F.3d at 436. Bad faith is found where an attorney

“knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the

purpose of harassing an opponent.” Primus Auto Fin. Servs. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th

Cir. 1997); see also Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 (bad faith includes a broad range of improper conduct,

including actions that are not frivolous, yet are “substantially motivated by vindictiveness,

obduracy, or mala fides.”). 

Discussion

Defendant moves the Court for an Order enforcing and/or clarifying the Court’s prior

Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (Motion at 1.) The parties now dispute

as to whether the Court ordered sanctions merely against Plaintiff or also against Plaintiff’s

counsel. Defendant sought attorney’s fees, both as the prevailing party under the ADA and as

sanctions under Section 1927. (Id. at 2.) The Court ruled in its Order, “Based upon the

particular circumstances of the present case, the Court finds it appropriate under both the Court’s

inherent power and Section 1927 to impose sanctions against Plaintiff in the form of reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs.” (Order at 5.) The Court granted attorney fees in the amount of

$14,275.50, fees for legal assistant and paralegal services in the amount of $4,983.00, and costs

in the amount of $1,605.20, for a total of $20,863.70.1

 (Id. at 6-7.) The Court further stated that,

“[s]ince the Court finds sufficient authority under both Section 1927 and the Court’s inherent

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power to award Defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs, the Court declines to address whether

such expenses are warranted in the present case under the ADA.” (Id. at 5.) Because the Court

relied solely on its inherent power and on section 1927, which apply only to the award of

sanctions against the attorney, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff’s counsel, Roy L. Landers, is

specifically liable for Defendant’s costs and fees. 

 Defendant argues that the Court’s Order specifically awards the recovery of attorney fees

and costs as against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, Roy L. Landers. (Motion at 1.) In support

of his argument that the fees are also the responsibility of Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant notes

that the Court’s Order “specifically grants Defendant’s motion based, in part, on Title 28, United

States Code section 1927,” which applies to attorneys only and not the party. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends that the Court’s Order “clearly and specifically does not contain any

language to the effect that Roy L. Landers, as plaintiff’s counsel ... is jointly or severally liable

for any of the findings that the court made with regard to its order and judgment for sanctions

against plaintiff Gaynor Carlock.” (Opposition at 2.) Plaintiff concedes that the Court made

several references in its Order that the ruling was based upon both its inherent power and that

under section 1927. (Id.) Plaintiff argues, however, that “the Court is not bound ... to find a

violation of 28 U.S.C. [sic]. It can and did find under its inherent authority the means whereby it

determined sanctions.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further asserts that the Court did not make the

necessary finding that Plaintiff’s counsel acted in bad faith for sanctions under section 1927. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff misconstrues the Court’s Order when he argues that the Court is not bound to

find a violation of section 1927. (Id.) The Court expressly found it appropriate, pursuant to both

the Court’s inherent power and section 1927, to impose sanctions against Plaintiff. (Order at 6.) 

Furthermore, the Court did make explicit findings of bad faith, improper purpose, and improper

motive on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel. (Id. at 5.) The Court reasoned that it “specifically

found that ‘Plaintiff’s complaints when viewed in the aggregate are contrived and incredible,

manifesting bad faith and the improper motive of extracting quick cash settlements’ and that

‘Plaintiff’s contrived claims were made in bad faith and for the improper purpose of harassing

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defendants and extracting cash settlements.’” (Id.) Plaintiff has filed 85 suits in the Southern

District of California, in all of which he was represented by Roy L. Landers. [Doc. No. 70 at 3-

4.] The Court concluded in its Vexatious Litigant Order that, “Plaintiff Gaynor Carlock, and his

attorney, Roy Landers, have actively engaged in the lucrative ‘cottage industry’ of filing ADA

claims with related state law claims for damages to harass businesses into quickly entering into

cash settlements.” (Id. at 14.) This is a sufficient finding of bad faith for purposes of attorney

sanctions under section 1927. 

Conclusion

The Court specifically made a finding of bad faith and found it appropriate to impose

sanctions against Plaintiff under both its inherent authority and section 1927. As section 1927

only applies to the award of sanctions against the attorney, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s

Motion and CLARIFIES and ENFORCES its order imposing sanctions upon Plaintiff’s

Counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 7, 2008

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks

 All Counsel of Record

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