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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 19, 2020*

Decided March 23, 2020

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2751

MILTON J. LEBLANC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MR. BULT’S, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 6019

Ronald A. Guzmán,

Judge.

O R D E R

After a semitruck rear-ended the car in which Milton LeBlanc was riding, he

sued Mr. Bult’s, Inc. (the owner of the truck) and Antonio Wright (the driver) in state 

court. The defendants removed the case to federal district court, and after protracted 

litigation the court entered summary judgment against LeBlanc. Because LeBlanc’s

argument that the district court should have entered a default judgment in his favor is 

baseless, we affirm.

* We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is 

frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 19-2751 Page 2

In mid-2013 LeBlanc was involved in two automobile collisions; only the second

one concerned the defendants. While driving a truck owned by Mr. Bult’s, Antonio 

Wright rear-ended the car in which LeBlanc was a passenger. Nearly two years later, he

sued Mr. Bult’s and Wright in the Circuit Court of Cook County to recover for his 

alleged back and neck injuries. The defendants removed the case to federal court 

asserting diversity jurisdiction. Mr. Bult’s is an Illinois citizen that was defending in 

Illinois state court, so LeBlanc could have objected to removal on that ground. See

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019). But 

that defect was procedural, not jurisdictional, and LeBlanc did not raise it—let alone 

within 30 days, as required. See Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP, 796 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 

2015).

After three years the suit ended in stages. First, LeBlanc said that he planned to 

drop his lawsuit against Wright (the driver) and pursue his case only against Mr. Bult’s. 

This led Wright to withdraw his answer to LeBlanc’s complaint. The judge then ordered 

LeBlanc to confirm that he no longer intended to sue Wright, and LeBlanc obeyed by 

successfully moving to dismiss Wright. Later, LeBlanc moved for a default judgment, 

asserting that Mr. Bult’s had withdrawn its answer. The judge denied the motion, 

explaining that only Wright (now dismissed) had withdrawn an answer; Mr. Bult’s had 

not. Both parties then moved for summary judgment, and the judge entered summary 

judgment for Mr. Bult’s. The judge concluded that LeBlanc had not offered any 

evidence that the second collision had injured him.

On appeal LeBlanc’s only developed argument is frivolous. He argues that

Mr. Bult’s defaulted by withdrawing its answer to his complaint, the judge wrongly 

ruled otherwise, and the judge should not have permitted the case to proceed to 

summary judgment. But Mr. Bult’s never withdrew its answer and never defaulted;

only Wright withdrew his answer. Mr. Bult’s continued to defend itself in the district 

court on the merits, and the judge ruled in its favor. “What is more, it would make little 

sense to enter a default after a case has been decided on the merits” where, as here, the

timing of the answer “did not cause injury” to the plaintiff. Mommaerts v. Hartfort Life &

Accident Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 967, 968 (7th Cir. 2007). 

We have considered other possible issues on appeal. First, we have asked 

whether LeBlanc challenges the entry of summary judgment on the merits, but we 

conclude that he does not. He focuses solely on a failed argument that he deserved a 

default judgment. He does not otherwise challenge the district court’s judgment, so any 

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No. 19-2751 Page 3

such argument is waived. Snyder v. King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014). Finally, we 

note that LeBlanc lists three dozen other “issues” in his brief. But he develops none of 

them, so we need not discuss them. See McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 

783, 791 (7th Cir. 2019).

AFFIRMED

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