Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03336/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03336-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

CHICAGO REGIONAL COUNCIL OF 

CARPENTERS PENSION FUND, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants,

v.

SCHAL BOVIS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11-cv-00992

Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge, and Manish S. Shah, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 10, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. This action was brought by four 

carpenter union fringe benefit funds (“the Funds”) under 

§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 185, and § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income 

Case: 14-3336 Document: 35 Filed: 06/10/2016 Pages: 18
2 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). The Funds allege 

that Schal Bovis, Inc., a general contractor that builds large 

and small buildings in the Chicago metropolitan area, failed 

to make fringe benefit payments for work performed by nonunion labor, as was required under collective bargaining 

agreements. The Funds started with 36 claims of unpaid 

fringe benefits, but proceeded to trial on only four claims. The 

district court granted summary judgment to the Funds on all 

four claims on the issue of liability. From summary judgment, 

the parties proceeded to a bench trial on damages, and from 

there both parties appeal. Schal Bovis appeals the granting of 

summary judgment for two of the four claims, the calculation 

of damages for those two claims, and the amount of attorneys’ 

fees awarded. The Funds cross-appeal the calculation of damages for one of the claims and the admission of certain evidence for that calculation.

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on the two claims Schal Bovis appeals and remand for further 

proceedings. In the first claim, we hold that the non-union 

subcontractor should be considered a single employer with 

the union signatory who ultimately performed the work. 

Consequently, the Funds are prevented from claiming fringe 

benefits for the work performed in that claim because Schal 

Bovis subcontracted the work to a union signatory as required 

by the collective bargaining agreement. In the second claim, 

we hold that the collective bargaining agreement prevented 

the carpenters’ union from claiming work which was the existing practice of other trade unions. Since Schal Bovis presented undisputed evidence that the work performed in the 

second claim was the existing practice of another trade union—the union to which Schal Bovis subcontracted the 

work—the Funds cannot claim fringe benefit contributions 

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Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 3

for the work. The remaining issues are rendered moot by 

these holdings, so we limit our discussion accordingly.

I. Background

Schal Bovis has been a party to collective bargaining 

agreements with the Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters 

(“the Union”) since it first signed an agreement in 1983 (“the 

Memorandum”). The Memorandum and a Commercial Area 

Agreement effective 2005 to 2008 (“the Agreement”), bound

Schal Bovis to several trust agreements which provided for 

the creation of the Funds. The Agreement also limited Schal 

Bovis’s ability to subcontract work “coming within the jurisdictional claims of the Union,” that is, carpenter’s work. According to Article III, Section 3.2 of the Agreement, Schal Bovis could not subcontract carpenter’s work, which the parties 

refer to as “jurisdictional work,” to any subcontractor who 

had not signed the Agreement (usually a non-union shop). If 

Schal Bovis did, then Section 3.5 obliged Schal Bovis either to 

require the non-union subcontractor to sign the Agreement

itself, or to keep track of the hours worked by the subcontractor and pay fringe benefit contributions to the Funds for those 

hours. Article I, Section 1.1 of the Agreement described in 

broad, expansive terms what the Union considered to be jurisdictional work, but concluded by stating: “However, the 

Union agrees that it will not interfere with existing practices 

of other unions affiliated with the Building Trades.” Doc. 13-

12 at 33.

A. The Litigation

In February 2009, the Funds conducted an audit of Schal 

Bovis’s books covering the years 2006 and 2007. Based on the 

audit, the Funds claimed and demanded $8 million in unpaid 

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4 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

fringe benefit contributions, liquidated damages, and interest

for 36 claims of work that Schal Bovis allegedly subcontracted 

to non-union shops. Over the next two years, through correspondence between the parties, the Funds reduced their 

claims from 36 to eight for a total of $1.25 million in unpaid 

contributions, exclusive of interest and liquidated damages.

In February 2011, the Funds filed suit seeking payment for 

the eight remaining claims. Early on, however, they withdrew 

four of the eight claims, leaving a total of $203,000 in allegedly 

unpaid contributions. In a brief two-page order, the district 

court granted summary judgment to the Funds on the four 

remaining claims on the issue of liability only. It left the determination of damages for later, allowing Schal Bovis to present appropriate evidence on that issue. Since only two of the 

four claims are at issue in this appeal, we limit our discussion 

to those two. They concern work by Canac Kitchens and Edward Don & Company.

B. The Canac Claim

The Canac claim involved the installation of cabinetry, undisputedly within the Union’s jurisdiction. Schal Bovis admitted that Canac did not have an agreement with the Union, but 

presented evidence that it had required Canac to use union 

labor and that Canac had used its sister company, Qualifit 

Kitchens, which had used union labor. Schal Bovis argued 

that, under the single-employer doctrine, the district court 

should consider Schal Bovis to have contracted with a union 

shop because Canac and Qualifit were essentially the same 

company. Schal Bovis presented evidence that the companies 

were owned by the same parent company, did business out 

of the same office, considered themselves and held themCase: 14-3336 Document: 35 Filed: 06/10/2016 Pages: 18
Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 5

selves out to be the same company, and had a merged management chain. It also pointed out that Canac completed 

Qualifit’s fringe benefit report forms and Canac paid the contributions to the Funds from its own account. Alternatively, 

Schal Bovis argued that, by refusing to withdraw the Canac 

claim, the Funds were administering their ERISA plans arbitrarily because the Funds had withdrawn other claims under 

identical circumstances, with no explanation for why they 

were treating the Canac claim differently.

The district court acknowledged Schal Bovis’s single-employer argument, but dismissed it simply by stating that Schal 

Bovis contracted with Canac, not Qualifit. It then held that 

Schal Bovis presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate 

that it had fulfilled its obligations under the agreement when 

hiring non-union labor, specifically, its obligations to keep 

track of the hours worked by the subcontractor and pay fringe 

benefit contributions to the Funds for the hours worked. The 

district court did not address Schal Bovis’s alternative argument that the Funds were arbitrarily enforcing their plans.

C. The Edward Don Claim

The work for the Edward Don claim involved the installation of fire protection systems and stainless steel kitchen 

equipment. The stainless steel kitchen equipment was comprised of cooking equipment, hoods and ventilation systems, 

counters and tops, and freezers. Edward Don subcontracted 

the work to Reid’s Fire and Safety Equipment. Reid’s installed 

the fire protection systems, which the Funds conceded was 

not jurisdictional work. The stainless steel kitchen equipment 

was installed by Reid’s sister company, RB Hoods, which was 

a union signatory with the Sheet Metal Workers. RB Hoods 

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6 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

used union labor from the Sheet Metal Workers and paid 

fringe benefit contributions to the Sheet Metal Workers. 

Schal Bovis argued that it was not liable for fringe benefit 

contributions because the work subcontracted to Edward Don 

was not jurisdictional work. The definition of jurisdictional 

work in the Union’s collective bargaining agreement was

broad enough to encompass the installation of stainless steel 

kitchen equipment. However, Schal Bovis argued that the Union was prevented from claiming the installation of stainless 

steel kitchen equipment as jurisdictional work because the 

work was an existing practice of the Sheet Metal Workers. Significantly, Section 1.1 of the Agreement prevented the Union 

from interfering with the existing practices of other unions. 

As with the previous claim, Schal Bovis argued in the alternative that by insisting on contributions for the Edward Don 

work, the Funds were administering their ERISA plans arbitrarily. After all, they had already withdrawn several claims 

that would have interfered with other unions but gave no reason why they refused to withdraw the Edward Don claim. 

The district court found that work in the Edward Don 

claim fit the Union’s broad definition of jurisdictional work.

The district court acknowledged that Schal Bovis had raised 

the possibility that the Funds had exempted other similar 

claims so as not to interfere with other unions. Nevertheless, 

the district court found that Schal Bovis’s evidence of the circumstances of those exemptions was insufficient to demonstrate that the Funds were required by Section 1.1 to exempt 

the Edward Don claim. Instead, the district court reasoned 

that the Union could have been granting individualized accommodations.

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Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 7

After the issue of liability was decided at summary judgment, the parties agreed to determine damages by a bench 

trial on written submissions alone. The district court entered 

its judgment for damages in the total amount of $312,621.13. 

Both parties appeal.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The parties dispute the applicable standard of review. 

Schal Bovis argues that the usual standard of review applies, 

that is, that we review a grant of summary judgment de novo, 

with factual inferences construed in favor of the non-moving 

party. Mazzei v. Rock-N-Around Trucking, Inc., 246 F.3d 956, 

959 (7th Cir. 2001). Conversely, the Funds argue that the 

proper standard of review for this case is clear error. The 

Funds rely on Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Nagy, 714 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2013), in which 

we stated:

However, where, as here, there is no right to a jury trial 

and the only issue before the district court is the characterization of undisputed subsidiary facts, we have 

held that the clear-error standard of review applies.

Put differently, in these sorts of ERISA cases, we review mixed questions of law and fact under a clearly 

erroneous standard.

Id. at 549 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

This application of the clear error standard originated 

with Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund 

v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1992), and is unique to 

our circuit. See French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 722 F.3d 1079, 

1084–85 (7th Cir. 2013); Nagy, 714 F.3d at 549 n.1. The “sorts 

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8 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

of ERISA cases” in which we used this standard primarily 

concerned efforts by pension funds to recover from employers who withdrew from the funds, thereby triggering “withdrawal liability” under the Multiemployer Pension Plan 

Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. § 1381. In those cases, the 

facts were not in dispute, and the only question was whether 

the defendant should be held liable because it was a “trade or 

business” that was “under common control” with the withdrawing employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1). See, e.g., Nagy, 714 

F.3d at 546–47; Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. 

Messina Prods., LLC, 706 F.3d 874, 884 (7th Cir. 2013); Cent. 

States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. SCOFBP, LLC, 668 F.3d 

873, 877 (7th Cir. 2011); McDougall v. Pioneer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 

494 F.3d 571, 575–77 (7th Cir. 2007); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., 974 F.2d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 1992).

This case is not one of those “sorts of ERISA cases.” Nagy, 714 

F.3d at 549.1

Moreover, as explained below, the Canac claim involves 

the issue of whether the district court committed legal error 

 

1 We have been asked to extend Slotky’s standard to other circumstances, but have declined the invitations so far. In French v. Wachovia Bank, 

N.A., 722 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2013), we were asked to extend it to a case

involving Wisconsin trust law, but declined “to wade into the debate 

[t]here because [w]e would affirm under either [the clear error or de novo] 

standard.” Id. at 1085 (quotation marks omitted). In Jurcev v. Cent. Comm. 

Hosp., 7 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1993), we were asked to use the standard to 

review a grant of summary judgment on a claim involving the Worker 

Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 210l, et seq. We 

similarly declined the invitation stating: “While this new standard causes 

us some concern, we need not resolve any conflict between the competing 

standards in this case because the class cannot prevail under either de novo

or clearly erroneous review.” Jurcev, 7 F.3d at 623.

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Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 9

in its interpretation of the single-employer doctrine, so our review of the single-employer question is necessarily de novo. 

Messina Prods., 706 F.3d at 879 (declining to apply Slotky’s

standard because the issue involved a legal conclusion, which 

is reviewed de novo); Frey v. E.P.A., 403 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 

2005) (same); See also Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund 

v. White, 258 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); Cent. States, 

Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Fulkerson, 238 F.3d 891, 894 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (same). And, on the Edward Don claim, the question is whether the district court misinterpreted the Agreement; our review of its interpretation is therefore de novo as 

well. Dugan v. R.J. Corman R. Co., 344 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 

2003) (holding that we review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement that is clear as 

written); Mazzei, 246 F.3d at 960; see also Church v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 74 F.3d 795, 798–99 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to apply 

Slotky’s standard because the determinative issues in the case 

were matters of contract interpretation requiring de novo review).

The Funds contend that Slotky nevertheless applies because Schal Bovis has not pointed to any specific facts in dispute, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,

and neither requested a jury trial. But these details do not alter 

our duty to review the district court’s decision on those crossmotions for summary judgment de novo and to construe all 

inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration was made. Tsareff v. ManWeb Servs., Inc., 794 

F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 2015) (conducting de novo review where 

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and neither demanded a jury trial). Consequently, we review de novo

whether it was error for the district court to grant summary 

judgment to the Funds on the issue of liability for the Canac 

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10 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

and Edward Don claims, and we construe all inferences in favor of Schal Bovis.

B. The Canac Claim

Schal Bovis argues that the district court erred by granting 

summary judgment to the Funds on the Canac claim because 

Canac and Qualifit should have been considered the same 

employer under the single-employer doctrine. The single-employer doctrine provides that “when two entities are sufficiently integrated, they will be treated as a single entity for 

certain purposes.” Moriarty v. Svec, 164 F.3d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 

1998) (“Moriarty I”). If the two companies were a single entity, 

then Schal Bovis would not have violated Section 3.2 of the 

Agreement, because Canac utilized Qualifit for the work, and 

Qualifit was a signatory to the Agreement. To determine if the 

doctrine applies, we examine four factors: “(1) interrelation of 

operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control 

of labor relations, and (4) common ownership.” Trs. of Pension, 

Welfare & Vacation Fringe Ben. Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia 

Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1993). No single factor controls; we must consider the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. 

According to undisputed testimony of Canac’s general 

manager, Nate Syens, Qualifit was the union arm of Canac 

and performed all of Canac’s installation and service work.2

Both Canac and Qualifit were owned by Kohler Company. 

The president of Kohler Company, K. David Kohler, was also 

the president of Qualifit. Both companies did business out of 

the same office, which was also a warehouse and showroom. 

 2 Syens testified that Canac at one time employed non-union service 

technicians who were not employees of Qualifit, but that was several years 

before the events giving rise to this case.

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Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 11

As Canac’s general manager, Syens supervised three department heads: an operations manager, an office manager, and a 

sales manager. Canac’s operations manager, Ray Jacobson,

was responsible for the day-to-day operations of Qualifit. Jacobson consulted with Syens on hiring, firing, and disciplinary decisions for Qualifit installers as needed. Canac accounts payable personnel were responsible for completing 

the monthly fringe benefit reports filed with the Funds on behalf of Qualifit installers. The checks used to pay the fringe 

benefit contributions to the Funds were drawn on Canac’s accounts. When Qualifit performed the installation work for 

Canac at issue here,3 Qualifit received no subcontract or purchase order from Canac, nor did Canac ever pay Qualifit for 

the work performed. When asked why this was so, Syens responded that it was because they were the same company. Finally, when Kohler Company eventually closed Canac and 

Qualifit, it was Syens who officially terminated Qualifit’s 

agreement with the Union. This is a clear case of the singleemployer doctrine. See, e.g., Lippert Tile Co. v. Int’l Union of 

Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Dist. Council of Wis. & Its Local 

5, 724 F.3d 939, 947–49 (7th Cir. 2013).

Nonetheless, the Funds argue that the single-employer 

doctrine can only be used by plaintiffs as a sword to establish 

liability, not by defendants as a shield against liability. There 

 3 The Funds dispute that Syens’s testimony established that Qualifit 

installers performed the work at issue. They point to Syens’s admission on 

cross-examination that he could not, without referencing time records, say 

which specific installers performed the work, what hours they worked, or 

whether their hours were reported accurately to the Funds. Syens’s inability to recall, without referencing time records, such specific details for

work performed well over five years ago, does not controvert his general 

testimony that Canac used Qualifit installers to perform the work.

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12 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

is nothing in the doctrine that mandates this limitation, and 

such a limitation would be fundamentally unfair. Besides, we 

have already held that a defendant can use the doctrine defensively. In Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Moriarty II”), we allowed the defendant to use the doctrine to argue that he did not owe contributions as an employee of one 

company, because he was the principal owner of another 

company which was found to be a single employer with the 

first company.4 We stated:

Moriarty successfully argued [in Moriarty I, 164 F.3d at 

332–35,] that Home and WSL are a single organization 

such that the employees of WSL would be considered 

the employees of Home for purposes of contributions 

to the funds under the CBA. Thus, [the defendant] is 

correct that Moriarty is now estopped from arguing 

that the single employer doctrine cannot be applied in 

determining whether [the defendant] is an employee 

of Home.

Id. at 962. The fact that it was the plaintiff who first used the 

doctrine in Moriarty I does not diminish the fact that we allowed the defendant to use it as a shield against liability in 

Moriarty II.

The Funds further argue that we cannot hold that Canac 

and Qualifit were a single employer because to do so would 

be to render an impermissible advisory opinion. Neither

Canac nor Qualifit is a party to the lawsuit, and there was no 

 4 We were unable to resolve the defendant’s argument ourselves because it relied on a factual determination not in the record. We directed 

the district court to make the determination on remand. Moriarty II, 233 

F.3d 955 at 963.

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Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 13

dispute before the district court between Schal Bovis and 

Canac or between the Funds and Canac. See Deveraux v. City 

of Chicago, 14 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1994). “The term ‘advisory 

opinion’ is often just a conclusion; it is what you call a decision that does not resolve an actual case or controversy.” People of State of Ill. ex rel. Barra v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 

F.2d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 1983). The actual controversy here is 

whether Schal Bovis can rely on Canac’s status as a single employer with Qualifit, a union signatory, so that Schal Bovis is 

not liable to the Funds for subcontracting carpenter work to a 

non-signatory. We can resolve this question and grant relief. 

And, while our answer is not binding on Canac and Qualifit 

should they choose to contest it in the future—were they ever 

to come back into existence—our answer is binding on the 

parties to this case.

The district court ruled that Schal Bovis could not rely on 

the single-employer doctrine solely because Schal Bovis’s 

subcontract was with Canac, not Qualifit. This was an error of 

law. The single-employer doctrine can be used defensively to 

determine that a company has subcontracted with a union 

signatory despite having signed an agreement with a non-signatory, just as it can be used offensively to determine that a 

non-signatory is liable for the obligations of a union signatory, despite the lack of a union agreement. Because Canac and 

Qualifit were a single employer, and because Qualifit was 

covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the Union, 

Schal Bovis did not violate Section 3.2 of the Agreement by 

assigning the work at issue to Canac. Therefore, Schal Bovis 

was not required under Section 3.5 to keep track of the hours 

worked by the installers and pay fringe benefit contributions 

to the Funds for those hours.

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14 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

C. The Edward Don Claim

Schal Bovis argues that the district court erred by granting 

summary judgment to the Funds on the Edward Don claim 

because the work did not fall within the jurisdiction of the 

Union. Specifically, Schal Bovis argues that the installation of 

the stainless steel kitchen equipment by RB Hoods was the 

work of the Sheet Metal Workers, not the Union.5 Schal Bovis 

acknowledges that the work fits into the Union’s broad definition of its jurisdiction found in Section 1.1 of the Agreement, 

which

include[s], but [is] not limited to, the milling, fashioning, joining, assembling, erection, fastening or dismantling of all material of wood, plastic, metal, fiber, cork, 

and composition, and all other substitute materials; the 

handling, erecting, installing and dismantling of machinery and equipment, hydraulic jacking and raising, 

and the manufacturing of all material where the skill, 

knowledge and training of the Employee are required 

either through the operation of machine or hand tools.

Doc. 13-12 at 32. But, Schal Bovis argues that the definition is 

limited by the provision at the end of Section 1.1 which prevents the Union from claiming work within the established 

jurisdiction of other unions. Again, that provision states: 

“However, the Union agrees that it will not interfere with existing practices of other unions affiliated with the Building 

Trades.” Id. at 33.

 5 The Funds concede that the installation of fire protection systems by 

Reid’s Fire and Safety Equipment was outside the Union’s jurisdiction.

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Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 15

Schal Bovis presented undisputed evidence that the installation of stainless steel kitchen equipment was the existing 

practice of the Sheet Metal Workers. The evidence included a 

prior jurisdictional agreement with the Plumbers Union and, 

most notably, an arbitration award from a 2010 jurisdictional 

dispute between Sheet Metal Workers Local 73 and Carpenters Local 58 of the Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters. 

The arbitrator found that the prevailing trade practice was 

that the installation of stainless steel kitchen equipment belonged to the Sheet Metal Workers. Schal Bovis bolstered its 

argument by pointing out that, in this case, the Funds withdrew another claim when Schal Bovis presented them with 

evidence during the audit that the work in that claim, which 

was also the installation of stainless steel kitchen equipment, 

was done by the Sheet Metal Workers.

Without expressly referencing the limiting provision of 

Section 1.1, the district court treated the provision as if it was 

ambiguous by looking only to the extrinsic evidence of the 

Funds’ previously withdrawn claims. The district court 

acknowledged that the Funds had withdrawn other claims as 

a result of concessions to the jurisdiction of other unions. 

However, the court found that the evidence of those withdrawals showed nothing more than individualized accommodations. According to the district court, the evidence did 

not demonstrate that the previous withdrawals were a result 

of any binding contract provision. This was error.

Where an agreement is clearly written, a court should not 

look to outside evidence to interpret the agreement. Dugan, 

344 F.3d at 665. If an agreement lends itself to one reasonable 

interpretation only, it is not ambiguous and can be construed 

as a matter of law. Mazzei, 246 F.3d at 960; Ill. Conference of 

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16 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

Teamsters & Emp’rs Welfare Fund v. Mrowicki, 44 F.3d 451, 459 

(7th Cir. 1994). The limiting provision of Section 1.1 is unambiguous when viewed in the context in which it is found, that 

is, union jurisdiction. The Union’s definition of its jurisdiction

is so expansive that it encompasses what is traditionally the 

work of other unions. This can lead to jurisdictional disputes 

with other unions over which union will perform the work in 

question. This, in turn, can cause serious problems for an employer who signs multiple collective bargaining agreements,

each of which requires the employer to assign work based on 

union jurisdiction. An innocent employer, needing to choose 

between two different unions with overlapping jurisdictions, 

will find itself “caught between the devil and the deep blue.” 

N.L.R.B. v. Radio & Television Broad. Eng. Union, 364 U.S. 573, 

575 (1961) (quotation marks omitted). By assigning work to 

one union, it will necessarily violate its collective bargaining 

agreement with another. For this reason, it is not in an employer’s interest to agree to a collective bargaining agreement 

with an overly broad jurisdiction definition. Section 1.1’s limiting provision works to alleviate this concern. It confirms for 

the employer that the Union does not intend for its jurisdiction to swallow that of other unions because the Union agrees 

it will not claim work that other unions have established as 

their own.

Thus, the limiting provision at the end of Section 1.1 of the 

Agreement prevents the Funds from claiming contributions 

for work performed by another union if it is the existing practice of the other union to do that work, i.e., if the work is considered within the established jurisdiction of the other union.

As mentioned above, Schal Bovis presented evidence demonstrating that the installation of stainless steel kitchen equipment was within the jurisdiction of the Sheet Metal Workers. 

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Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336 17

Furthermore, the company that ultimately completed the 

work, RB Hoods, was a union signatory with Sheet Metal 

Workers Local 20.6

The Funds attempted to counter this evidence by presenting thirteen letters of assignment from three contractors 

which purportedly assigned the work of installing stainless 

steel kitchen equipment to the Union. The Funds’ submission 

is insufficient to counter Schal Bovis’s evidence for a number 

of reasons. First, it is debatable whether the affiant through 

whom the letters were introduced based his statements on 

personal knowledge as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 

Second, none of the thirteen letters assigned the work of installing stainless steel kitchen equipment. One of the letters, 

from 1994, assigned the work of installing “counter tops/shelving/kitchen equipment,” but it does not state 

whether the work involved stainless steel equipment. Dist. 

Doc. 29 at 60. The remaining letters, which were dated 2010 

or undated, either assigned only the loading and unloading 

of stainless steel kitchen equipment or the installation of 

“owner supplied equipment and fixtures.” Id. at 48–61. Finally, it does not matter whether the Union has been assigned 

the installation of stainless steel kitchen equipment in the past 

or is assigned such work presently. It does not even matter 

whether the work is exclusively the work of the Sheet Metal 

Workers, which the Union disputes. What matters is whether 

it is the existing practice of the Sheet Metal Workers to install 

stainless steel kitchen equipment. It is undisputed that the 

 6 Schal Bovis subcontracted the work to Edward Don, who subcontracted the work to Reid’s Fire and Safety Equipment. Reid’s had its sister 

company, RB Hoods, complete the work. The president and sole owner of 

Reid’s is also the president and sole owner of RB Hoods.

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18 Nos. 14-3413 & 14-3336

work is the existing practice of the Sheet Metal Workers. Consequently, the limiting provision of Section 1.1 of the Agreement prevents the Funds from demanding contributions for 

the work in the Edward Don claim.

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, Schal Bovis is not liable for contributions for 

the work performed in the Canac claim because Canac was a 

single employer with Qualifit; hence, Schal Bovis did not subcontract jurisdictional work to a non-signatory. Schal Bovis is 

also not liable for contributions for the work performed in the 

Edward Don claim because the Funds are prevented from 

claiming contributions for such work by the limiting provision of Section 1.1 of the Agreement. Accordingly, we 

REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the Funds on the Canac and Edward Don claims, and 

REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

Case: 14-3336 Document: 35 Filed: 06/10/2016 Pages: 18