Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00771/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00771-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The court granted Sanders leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this cause of action. Court Doc. No. 3. A 1

prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis will have his complaint screened under the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) which requires this court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GEORGE J. SANDERS, JR., )

AIS #263280, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-CV-771-ID

) [WO]

)

M. P. MYRICK, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which George J. Sanders, Jr. [“Sanders”], an

indigent state inmate, challenges the constitutionality of actions undertaken with respect

to his arrest on November 5, 2008 for robbery and capital murder. Sanders also complains

Judge Sharon Yates, a judge for the District Court of Montgomery County, Alabama,

violated his constitutional rights when she referred his cases to the grand jury for possible

indictment and conspired with the other defendants to undertake such action.

Upon thorough review of the amended complaint, the court concludes that Sanders’

claims against Judge Yates are due to be dismissed prior to service of process pursuant to

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). 

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monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

 Although Neitzke interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to § 1915(e)(2), the 2

analysis contained therein remains applicable to the directives contained in the present statute.

2

I. DISCUSSION

A. The Request for Monetary Damages

Sanders complains Judge Yates deemed the evidence presented at the preliminary

hearing sufficient to refer his cases to the Grand Jury of Montgomery County, Alabama.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint - Court Doc. No. 41 at 3. It is clear the allegations made

by Sanders against Judge Yates emanate from actions taken by this defendant in her

judicial capacity during state court proceedings over which she had jurisdiction. These

actions are neither ministerial nor administrative. The law is well established that a state

judge is “entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while

... acting” pursuant to her judicial authority. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11 Cir. th

2000); Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 227-229 (1988); Paisey v. Vitale in and for

Broward County, 807 F.2d 889 (11 Cir. 1986); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). th

“This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in

excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239. Accordingly, Sanders’ claims

for monetary damages against Judge Yates are “based on an indisputably meritless legal

theory” and are therefore due to be dismissed in accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).2

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 In a document filed by on January 21, 2010 (Court Doc. No. 52-2), the law enforcement defendants advise 3

that an indictment has been issued against Sanders. 

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 B. Declaratory Relief 

Sanders alleges there is no viable evidence to support the criminal charges pending

against him. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint - Court Doc. No. 41 at 3 (During the

preliminaryhearing, “neither one of the robbery victims took the witness stand and testified

before the defendant (Yates) that plaintiff’s co-defendants or plaintiff invaded their home

and robbed them....”). To the extent disposition of the plaintiff’s claims would require

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issuance of declaratory relief regarding the decision entered by Judge Yates referring his

cases to the grand jury, such relief is not warranted in this cause of action. 

Under the decision issued by the United States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), a federal court must refrain from interfering with pending state

criminal proceedings “when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not

suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” The Younger abstention doctrine is

premised upon a fundamental “public policy against federal interference with state criminal

prosecutions.” Id. at 43. In this case, Sanders has an adequate remedy at law because he

may pursue his federal constitutional issues challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

through the state court system. See generally Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405 (11 Cir. th

1985). Specifically, Sanders may attack the sufficiency of the evidence throughout the onCase 2:09-cv-00771-MEF-TFM Document 60 Filed 02/01/10 Page 3 of 7
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going state criminal proceedings, including pre-trial motions and post-conviction

proceedings. Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of any special

circumstance which creates a threat of irreparable harm. The mere fact that Sanders will

endure state criminal proceedings fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. Younger, 401 U.S.

at 45. This court must therefore abstain from considering the merits of Sanders’ claims

which challenge the constitutionality of the criminal charges pending before the Grand Jury

of Montgomery County, Alabama as such claims are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action at this time. Id. at 43-44. Consequently, summary dismissal of those claims which

would necessarily involve imposition of declaratory relief regarding the pending criminal

charges is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. The Conspiracy Claim

Sanders alleges Judge Yates conspired with the other named defendants “to have

him binded over to the Grand Jury of Montgomery County for an indictment on his (7x)

First Degree Robbery charges and (1) Felony Murder charge ... since neither one of the

robbery victims or the defendant (Myrick) testified at plaintiff’s preliminary hearing ... that

he had committed either one of the offenses.” Plaintiff’s Amendment to the Complaint -

Court Doc. No. 54 at 3. A conspiracy claim justifiably may be dismissed because of the

conclusory, vague and general nature of the allegations. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d

553, 556-557 (11 Cir. 1984). The court has carefully reviewed the instant complaint and th

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amendments thereto. At best, the assertions made by Sanders relative to a purported

conspiracy are self-serving, purely conclusory allegations that fail to assert those material

facts necessary to establish the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants. Strength

v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11 Cir. 1988) (to properly state a claim for relief based on th

a conspiracy, a plaintiff must plead that the offending parties “reached an understanding”

to deny the plaintiff his constitutional rights); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11th

Cir. 1992) (merely “string[ing] together” relevant actions, “without showing contacts

between the parties” which demonstrate the parties “reached an understanding” to violate

plaintiff’s rights, is insufficient to adequate plead existence of a conspiracy). Other than

his specious allegations, Sanders presents nothing, nor can this court countenance the

existence of any evidence, which would indicate Judge Yates entered into a conspiracy to

deprive Sanders of his constitutional rights during the proceedings related to his

preliminary hearing. 

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Sanders’ bare allegation of a

conspiracy between the defendants during the state court proceedings is insufficient to

support a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1133; Fullman, 739

F.2d at 556-557. This claim against Judge Yates istherefore subject to summary dismissal

under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

 II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

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1. The plaintiff’s claims presented against Judge Sharon Yates be DISMISSED with

prejudice in accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). 

2. The plaintiff’s challenges to the constitutionality of the criminal charges pending

against him before the Grand Jury of Montgomery County, Alabama be dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as such claims are not

properly before the court at this time. 

3. This case, with respect to the plaintiff’s claims challenging the constitutionality

of his arrest and the actions taken against him during the arrest, be referred back to

undersigned for additional proceedings. 

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before February 16, 2010 the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in

the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination

by the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

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Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 1 day of February, 2010 st

/s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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