Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03891/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03891-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

WARDEN TOM L. CAREY, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-3891 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After moving to the stay the petition in order to exhaust state

remedies, petitioner returned to federal court with a first amended petition. The court ordered

respondent to show cause why the amended petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed

an answer addressing the merits of the amended petition. Petitioner filed a traverse. Having

reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled

to relief based on the claims presented and DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

On January 28, 2001, at around 3:00 a.m., petitioner and five passengers pulled into a gas

station. (Resp. Ex. 9, (People v. Williams, California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District,

Case No. A099284, July 30, 2003) at 1.) Petitioner’s blood alcohol level was estimated to be at

*E-FILED - 1/5/10*

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.25 percent. (Id.) As petitioner was pulling out of the gas station, he hit Louis Roberson

(“victim”), who had walked in front of the car. (Id.) Jennifer Jones, a passenger, saw the victim

go under the car. (Id.) Jones testified that she screamed for petitioner to stop and others were

screaming to be let out of the car. (Id.) 

Tamika Armstrong, another passenger, testified that no one said anything about someone

getting hit. (Id. at 2.) However, the prosecution impeached her by introducing her preliminary

hearing testimony, in which Armstrong testified that Jones yelled, “You hit that man,” as

petitioner drove away. (Id.) 

As petitioner’s car hit the victim, the victim got caught under one of the wheels. (Id.) 

After driving several blocks, petitioner stopped the car and everyone got out. (Id.) Jones saw

that the victim was alive albeit still underneath the car and she said so. (Id.) Another unnamed

passenger told Jones not to say anything to anyone. (Id.) That passenger got behind the wheel,

petitioner got back in the car, and they drove off. (Id.) At some point, the victim’s body

separated from the car and eventually, the victim died of head and chest injuries as well as

asphyxia. (Id.) 

Police found petitioner at 4:30 a.m. and discovered blood and scrape marks on his car. 

(Id.) Although petitioner was glassy-eyed and smelled of alcohol, he denied driving his car after

10:00 p.m. or drinking more than one single beer. (Id.) 

After arrest, petitioner was charged with murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while

intoxicated, felony leaving the scene of an accident, misdemeanor driving under the influence,

misdemeanor driving with a blood-alcohol level above .08 percent, and various enhancements. 

(Id.) A jury convicted petitioner on all counts and enhancements, and the trial court sentenced

him to 15 years to life for second degree murder. (Id.) On July 30, 2003, the state appellate

court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence and denied petitioner’s habeas corpus

petition. (Resp. Exs. 9, 10.) On October 29, 2003, the state supreme court denied both petitions

for review. (Resp. Exs. 12, 14.) After exhausting state post-conviction remedies, the instant

amended petition was filed on October 4, 2006.

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a district court

may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that

was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies

both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 384-86 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations,

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an

“unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of

§ 2254(d)(1), if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

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evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. The court must

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner

rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1).

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision

of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. 

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard of review under the

AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its

decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the

claim. When confronted with such a decision, a federal court should conduct “an independent

review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Richter v. Hickman, 521 F.3d 1222,

1229 (9th Cir. 2008).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Jury instruction error

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction that referenced the

felony murder rule. Specifically, the instruction stated:

If a person causes another’s death while committing another felony which is

dangerous to human life, the crime is murder. If a person causes another’s

death while committing a misdemeanor, which is dangerous to human life

under the circumstances of its commission, the crime is involuntary

manslaughter.

There are many acts which are lawful but nevertheless endanger human life. 

If a person causes another’s death by doing an act or engaging in conduct in a

criminally negligent manner without realizing the risk involved, he is guilt of

involuntary manslaughter. If, on the other hand, the person realized the risk

and acted in total disregard of the danger to life involved, malice is implied

and the crime is murder.

(CALJIC No. 8.51, RT 483-84, CT 378.) (Italics added.)

Petitioner argues that the reference to felony murder in the instruction violated his due process

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right. The jury was instructed on three other felonies in addition to murder: leaving the scene of

an accident resulting in death or serious permanent injury; gross vehicular manslaughter; and

involuntary manslaughter. None of these felonies could be properly considered for purposes of

the felony murder rule: the first felony was not an inherently dangerous felony, so it could not

support application of the felony murder rule; and the remaining two felonies were

impermissible under the merger doctrine, see People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 538 (1969). 

Therefore, suggests petitioner, the court improperly inserted a second degree felony murder

theory into the case even though such a theory was legally insufficient. As a result, the jury

could have convicted petitioner of second degree felony murder without having to find the

required element of implied malice.

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim. The Court of Appeal agreed that

giving the instruction was erroneous, but determined that there was no “reasonable likelihood”

that the instruction misled the jury. In reaching that conclusion, the court considered all the jury

instructions as a whole as well as counsels’ closing arguments. The court determined that the

instructions made no other mention of felony murder and explicitly defined malice, and that

closing arguments on both sides focused on whether the evidence demonstrated implied malice. 

The court concluded that both the instructions and counsels’ statements made it “unmistakably

clear” that the jury had to find malice in order to convict petitioner of murder.

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that

the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The instruction may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the

trial record. See id.; see, e.g., Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam)

(applying the “reasonable likelihood” language of Estelle). A conviction based on a general

verdict is subject to challenge if the jury was instructed on alternative theories of guilt and may

have relied on an invalid one. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 129 S. Ct. 530, 530 (2008) (per curiam). 

Such instructional error is not structural; rather, a reviewing court must apply the harmless-error

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analysis set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), and determine whether the

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Pulido, 129 S. Ct. at 531; see id. at 532-33 (reversing Ninth Circuit’s application of structural

error analysis and remanding for application of Brecht). 

Petitioner argues that the California Court of Appeal used the wrong standard of review

to resolve his claim. Specifically, he asserts that Estelle is not the appropriate standard to review

instructions on a legally erroneous theory of liability. He states that the proper standard is that

announced in People v. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th 1116, 1129 (1993), which concluded that unless there

is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground, reversal is required. 

Notwithstanding the fact that this claim appears to be challenging a state court’s improper

decision under state law, which does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus

proceedings, see Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72, this court disagrees that the standard in this case is

that announced in Guiton rather than Estelle. 

The court’s decision to apply Estelle is bolstered by Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d

1200, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 2009). In that case, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the same due process

issue as that asserted by this petitioner and used the standards promulgated by Estelle. 

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit considered the claim of whether the trial court’s instruction on

felony murder improperly permitted the jury to convict a defendant of second degree murder

without having to also find the element of implied malice. The court stated, “[N]ot every

ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process

violation. . . . the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.” Id. at 1209 (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Accordingly, in analyzing petitioner’s due process claim, this court will

also apply the standards announced in Estelle. 

Here, the trial court did not read the other standard jury instructions explicitly explaining

the felony murder rule. See CALJIC 8.21, 8.32. Throughout the jury instructions, the trial judge

emphasized that a murder conviction requires malice. (RT 480-81, 484.) Immediately after

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 As in Townsend, petitioner supports his argument with a citation to Suniga v. Bunnell,

998 F.2d 664, 666-668 (9th Cir. 1993). However, as in Townsend, this court concludes that

Suniga, a pre-AEDPA case, is distinguishable for similar reasons: the reference to felony murder

in Suniga was not fleeting and the trial court in Suniga instructed on the separate theory of

felony murder and also instructed the jury that the other mentioned felony qualified as an

inherently dangerous felony. None of those incidents occurred here.

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reading the erroneous instruction at issue here (RT 483-84), the trial judge emphasized that

murder and manslaughter are separated by a finding of malice. (RT 484.)

In addition, the prosecution’s closing argument further clarified the jury instructions. 

(RT 504-06, 507, 518, 525.) In its argument, the prosecution focused the jury on whether the

evidence showed implied malice and informed the jury that although the case was charged as

murder, the government was proceeding under an implied malice theory. (RT 525.) The defense

counsel made similar points, also focusing the jury on the issue of implied malice. (RT 531-32,

543.) At no point in the argument did the prosecution or defense raise the reference to “felony

murder.” 

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Townsend is particularly instructive here. There,

Townsend was charged with one count of murder and an allegation that he personally used a

dangerous weapon. Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1209. After a jury trial, Townsend was acquitted of

first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder and the jury found true the use of a

knife during the murder. Id. at 1203. The Ninth Circuit rejected Townsend’s argument that the

challenged instruction, CALJIC No. 8.51, violated due process, noting that the jury instruction

that included “felony” and “murder” in the same sentence, intending to describe the difference

between murder and manslaughter, was too tangential as to have violated due process. Id. at

1210-1211. Further, the court stated that Townsend had not been charged with nor was his jury

instructed on felony murder, and the jury was not instructed that assault with a deadly weapon

was an inherently dangerous felony. Id. at 1210.1

Similarly here, as the California Court of Appeal observed, the jury was not instructed on

the felony murder theory; the jury was not instructed on whether any other felonies would

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qualify as an inherently dangerous felony; and the court properly instructed on second degree

murder as well as express and implied malice. The challenged instruction was a solitary and

inapplicable statement of law among a large number of correct and applicable jury instructions. 

The jury was instructed not to place any emphasis on any particular sentence or instruction to the

point of ignoring the others, but to consider the instructions as a whole and in light of all the

others. (RT 467.) Even if a juror decided to rely on the challenged instruction, it was not

articulated in a way that negated the requirement that a finding of malice was required to convict

petitioner of murder. In other words, the instruction was irrelevant and unhelpful, but it did not

so mislead the jury as to cast doubt on the its ability to render a fair verdict. 

Viewing the instructions as a whole, and mindful of the court’s duty to give appropriate

deference to the state court’s decision, this court concludes that the California Court of Appeal

did not “unreasonably apply federal law when it found that there was no reasonable likelihood

the jury was misled.” Middleton, 541 U.S. at 438 (finding no constitutional error in giving

single erroneous instruction defining “imminent peril” for imperfect self-defense when three

other instructions correctly stated the law and parties clarified jury charge in closing argument).

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court authority, nor was it based upon an unreasonable

application of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), (2). 

2. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner next claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

second degree murder. Respondent counters that this issue is procedurally barred.

On December 2, 2003, petitioner raised the claim of insufficiency of the evidence in an

original state habeas petition to the California Supreme Court. On September 29, 2004, the

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th

750 (1993); In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947), and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953). 

A federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the

decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate

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to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). In the context of

direct review by the United States Supreme Court, the “adequate and independent state ground”

doctrine goes to jurisdiction; in federal habeas cases, in whatever court, it is a matter of comity

and federalism. Id. The procedural default rule is a specific instance of the more general

“adequate and independent state grounds” doctrine. Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

While it is still unclear whether Clark or Dixon are independent and adequate state

procedural bars, cf. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003), it is of no

consequence here because the California Supreme Court’s postcard denial also cited Lindley. 

Lindley is an established independent and adequate state ground barring federal review. Since

1947, California state courts have consistently applied the Lindley procedural rule that

sufficiency of the evidence claims cannot be raised in a state habeas petition. Carter v. Giurbino,

385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the Lindley rule is an independent and

adequate state bar). As a result, “unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural

default and actual prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice,” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 580, petitioner’s claim of insufficiency

of the evidence is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner does not dispute that this claim is procedurally barred, nor does he attempt to

demonstrate cause or prejudice. Accordingly, the court is barred from reviewing this claim. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to

CALJIC No. 8.51, the instruction referencing felony murder, and failing to investigate and

present a defense that the victim was intoxicated. 

The California Supreme Court denied both claims without comment or citation.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any

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claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a

just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner

must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e.,

that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

Id. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

The court rejects petitioner’s argument that counsel’s failure to object to CALJIC No.

8.51 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the court concluded above in Section

B.1, supra, that there was no reasonable likelihood that the challenged instruction misled the

jury, petitioner cannot demonstrate that any failure to object was prejudicial. See Townsend,

562 F.3d at 1211-1212. Petitioner does not show that had his trial counsel objected and had the

instruction been modified, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings

would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

The court also rejects petitioner’s argument that counsel’s failure to investigate and

present a defense that the victim’s intoxication contributed to petitioner’s crimes rendered

counsel’s assistance ineffective. Petitioner asserts that counsel should have presented evidence

that the victim’s toxicology report demonstrated that the victim had a high level of cocaine in his

body at the time petitioner hit him with the car. Petitioner further claims that had the jury heard

evidence of the victim’s intoxication, it would have found that the victim’s intoxication rather

than petitioner’s actions was the contributing factor in his death.

In California, a victim’s contributory negligence is not a defense. People v. Marlin, 124

Cal. App. 4th 559, 569 (2004). Here, petitioner could only be found guilty if “there is a causal

connection between his conduct and the harm suffered by the victim. To establish this causal

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connection and for criminal liability to attach, the evidence must show that the [petitioner’s]

conduct was both the actual and the legal, or proximate, cause of the death or injuries. Once that

has been shown, the actions or failings of the victims or third parties are of no consequence.” Id.

at 569.

Here, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 3.41, which instructs that there may be

more than one cause of death. (CT 388.) The instruction goes on to say that if the actions of

more than one person can contribute to the death, the conduct of each is the cause of death if his

conduct was a “substantial factor” contributing to the death. (Id.) In other words, even if the

victim’s conduct contributed to his own death, petitioner can still be found guilty if petitioner’s

conduct was a substantial factor in causing the death.

At trial, a forensic pathologist testified that the victim died of blunt force head and

thoracic injuries and traumatic asphyxia. (RT 314.) The pathologist further opined that while

there were injuries from the initial impact of the car to the victim, those injuries multiplied as the

victim was dragged for several blocks before stopping, creating extensive injuries where whole

skin was torn away. (RT 319-20.) The pathologist noted that a combination of those abrasions,

plus being crushed underneath a car for several blocks, caused the victim’s death. Moreover, the

jury found that petitioner acted unlawfully and knew that he had hit the victim, as demonstrated

by the fact that it found him guilty of felony hit and run. And the jury also concluded that

petitioner was grossly negligent, as demonstrated by the fact that it found him guilty of gross

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. All these factors taken together clearly establish that

petitioner’s conduct was a substantial factor that contributed to victim’s death. As a result, even

if the victim’s intoxication contributed to his death, introduction of it into evidence would have

made no difference. See Marlin, 124 Cal. App. at 570. 

Accordingly, counsel’s failure to investigate or present a defense regarding the victim’s

intoxication could not have been deficient performance nor prejudicial to petitioner. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The court concludes that the state court’s decision denying this

claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Richter

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v. Hickman, 521 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2008).

C. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently been

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). For the reasons set out in the discussion above,

petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states

a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right [or] that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and COA are DENIED. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment for respondent and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

1/5/10

Case 5:05-cv-03891-RMW Document 39 Filed 01/05/10 Page 12 of 12