Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00659/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00659-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Interim director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, Charles L. Ryan, is substituted for

the respondent, Dora B. Schriro, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Israel A. Rivera, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 08-659-TUC-FRZ (GEE)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On December 15, 2008, Israel A. Rivera, an inmate confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28,

United States Code, Section 2254. [doc. #1] Before the court are the petition and the

respondents’ answer.1

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, enter an order denying the petition on the merits. Rivera’s seventy-year sentence for

five sexual assaults does not violate his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual

punishment.

Case 4:08-cv-00659-FRZ Document 13 Filed 06/02/09 Page 1 of 6
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Summary of the Case

Rivera pleaded guilty in Pima County Superior Court to five counts of sexual assault.

(Respondents’ answer, p. 3; Exhibit C.) His plea agreement specified that he could be

sentenced to up to 14 years on each count and the sentences would run consecutively.

(Respondents’ answer, p. 3.) On February 3, 2006, the trial court imposed consecutive

aggravated sentences of 14 years for each count totaling 70 years. (Respondents’ answer, p. 3;

Exhibit C.) The trial court acknowledged that the defendant had a low IQ, mental health issues,

and was young. (Respondents’ answer, p. 3.) Nevertheless, the trial court found these

mitigating factors outweighed by the aggravating factors. (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit F, p.

27.)

Rivera filed a notice of post-conviction relief on March 29, 2006. (Respondents’ answer,

p. 4.) He filed his petition on January 19, 2007. (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit G.) He argued

his 70-year sentence violates his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual

punishment. Id. The trial court dismissed the petition on April 3, 2007. (Respondents’

answer, Exhibit B.)

Rivera filed a petition for review with the court of appeals on May 2, 2007.

(Respondents’ answer, Exhibit H.) The court of appeals granted review but denied relief on

October 16, 2007. (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit I.) Rivera filed a petition for review with the

Arizona Supreme Court, but the court denied review on January 28, 2008. (Respondents’

answer, Exhibit K.) 

On December 15, 2008, Rivera filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. [doc. #1] He argues his seventy-year

sentence violates his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment because

he committed the offenses when he was 20 years old, he has an IQ of 84, he grew up on the

streets, and he has a “short criminal history.” Id.

The respondents filed an answer on April 10, 2009. (Respondents’ answer.) They

conceded the petition is timely and Rivera’s issue was exhausted. Id. They argue the petition

should be denied on the merits. Id. Rivera did not file a reply.

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Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to prisoners in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. If the petitioner is in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, the writ shall not be granted unless prior

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if the “state court confronted a set

of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and

nevertheless arrived at a result different from Supreme Court precedent.” Vlasak v. Superior

Court of California ex rel. County of Los Angeles, 329 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2003). A

decision is an “unreasonable application” if “the state court identified the correct legal

principles, but applied those principles to the facts of [the] case in a way that was not only

incorrect or clearly erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Id. “It is not enough that our

independent review of the legal question leaves us with a firm conviction that the state court

decision was erroneous.” Id.

If the highest state court fails to explain its decision, this court looks to the last reasoned

state court decision. See Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). In this case, the

Arizona Supreme Court did not explain its decision to deny review, so this court must analyze

the decision of the state appellate court. 

The state appellate court held that Rivera’s sentence does not violate his Eighth

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. This decision was not “contrary to”

or “an unreasonable application of [] clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “[e]xcessive bail shall

not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The

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phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” includes sentences of incarceration that are grossly

disproportionate to the underlying offense. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A

sentence of incarceration will be found grossly disproportionate only in the “exceedingly rare”

and “extreme” case. Id. at 72-73.

As a first step in analyzing an Eighth Amendment claim, the court should conduct “a

threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed.” Gonzalez v. Duncan,

551 F.3d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). The court must “weigh the criminal offense and the resulting

penalty in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or to society and the culpability

of the offender.” Id. (internal punctuation removed). If this inquiry “leads to an inference of

gross disproportionality,” the court will widen the scope of its analysis and conduct an

intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparative analysis of the sentence. Id. at 887.

In this case, the court’s threshold analysis does not reveal an inference of gross

disproportionality. Rivera’s 70-year sentence is considerable, but its length arises primarily

from the fact that Rivera committed five separate offenses. See U.S. v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257,

265 (2nd Cir. 1988) (“Eighth amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each

specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence.”); see also U.S. v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084

(9th Cir. 1998); Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). For each sexual assault,

Rivera received a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. While this is by no means an

inconsequential sentence, it is not rare or extreme when compared to the sentences imposed on

other felony defendants.

The criminal offense at issue, sexual assault, is extremely serious. It is perhaps second

only to murder in its potential for harm to the victim and society. See Coker v. Georgia, 433

U.S. 584, 597 (1977). Comparing the criminal offense with the sentence imposed does not lead

to an inference of gross disproportionality. The Supreme Court has allowed far longer

sentences for far less egregious crimes. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961,

994-95 (1991) (A sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for possession of

672 grams of cocaine imposed on a defendant without a prior felony conviction did not violate

the Eighth Amendment.). 

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2

 In his Rule 32 petition, Rivera conceded he had “one adult conviction for burglary and

juvenile offenses dealing mostly with liquor violations.” (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit G, p. 11.) 

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Rivera further argues his sentence is unconstitutional in light of his personal mitigating

circumstances: he committed the offenses when he was 20 years old, he has an IQ of 84, he

grew up on the streets, and he has a “short criminal history.”2

 The court will assume, without

deciding, that the equities of the case are relevant to the Eighth Amendment disproportionality

analysis. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (“Our cases exhibit a lack of clarity

regarding what factors may indicate gross disproportionality.”); U.S. v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082,

1084 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing the circumstances of the particular offenses); but see Arizona

v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 384 (2003) (The court must consider “the facts of the case and

circumstances of the offender” only “if the sentence imposed is so severe that it appears grossly

disproportionate to the offense.”), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1037 (2004). Nevertheless, after

considering the totality of the circumstances it still appears that Rivera’s sentence is not grossly

disproportionate to the offenses.

Taking Rivera’s personal mitigating circumstances at face value, the court cannot say

they outweigh the aggravating circumstances of the crimes themselves. Rivera “invaded the

homes of five different victims and sexually assaulted them.” (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit

I, pp. 2-3.) “He threatened to kill at least two of his victims if they did not submit to being

raped.” Id. “He used a gun in two of the assaults and a knife in another.” Id. “While assaulting

one victim, he threatened to kill or rape her children if she screamed.” Id. This court’s Eighth

Amendment analysis is not changed by considering the totality of the circumstances concerning

Rivera and his offenses.

The court concludes Rivera’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his offenses and

therefore does not violate his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.

Accordingly, the decision of the state court was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable

application of [] clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see, e.g., U.S. v. Harris,

154 F.3d 1082, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998) (A 95-year sentence for five counts of bank robbery and

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five counts of use of a firearm when committing a crime of violence does not violate the Eighth

Amendment.); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999) (A 100-year sentence for

burglary, forcible sodomy, rape, and robbery with a dangerous weapon committed by a thirteenyear old does not violate the Eighth Amendment.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 (2000); Edwards

v. Butler, 882 F.2d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1989) (A sentence of life without parole for aggravated

rape does not violate the Eighth Amendment.).

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [doc. #1] 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondents.

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2009.

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