Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00518/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00518-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KELLY LUCKADOO, )

)

Petitioner, ) 2:09-cv-00518 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

BERRY LARSON, et al., ) [Re: Petition at docket 1 as

) amended at docket 2]

Respondents. )

)

I. MATTER PRESENTED

At docket 1, petitioner Luckadoo seeks a writ of habeas corpus. An amended

petition is at docket 2. Respondents oppose the petition at docket 25. At docket 26,

Magistrate Judge Duncan filed a report and recommendation in which he recommended

that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. Luckadoo objected to the

recommendation at docket 27. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate.”1

 When reviewing a magistrate judge’s

Case 2:09-cv-00518-JWS Document 29 Filed 01/27/11 Page 1 of 7
2

Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by

Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996).

3

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

4

Taberer v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 906 (3d Cir. 1992).

5

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)

6

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

7

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

8

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he period of ‘direct

review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a

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report and recommendation in a case such as this one, the district court conducts de

novo review of all conclusions of law,2 and any findings of fact to which objections have

been made.3 Uncontested findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.4

III. DISCUSSION

A. Luckadoo’s Petition is Time-Barred

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

one-year statute of limitations on applications for writs of habeas corpus from state

prisoners.5

 The limitation period generally runs from “the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review.”6

 Where applicable, the limitation period may run from “the date on which

the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence” if that date is later than the conclusion of direct

review.7

Luckadoo’s time to seek direct review expired on May 19, 1994, ninety days after

the Arizona Supreme Court denied review.8 Because Luckadoo’s conviction became

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petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.”).

9

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

1028 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

11544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005)

12Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

13Id.

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final prior to the effective date of AEDPA, Luckadoo was “entitled to a one-year grace

period, beginning on April 24, 1996, in which to file [his] petition.”9 Absent any tolling,

Luckadoo’s grace period expired on April 24, 1997. 

AEDPA tolls the limitation period for “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”10

1. Luckadoo’s State Claim for Post-Conviction Relief Was “Properly Filed” 

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

11 the Supreme Court held that a state post-conviction

petition rejected as untimely by a state court is not “properly filed” within the meaning of

§ 2244(d)(2). Luckadoo filed his notice of post-conviction relief in state court on

November 22, 2004. 

Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a), notice of post-conviction relief

must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty

days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the

later.”12 “Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e),

(f), (g) or (h).”13

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14Doc. 25-1 at 112–113.

15Ariz. R. Crim P. 32.2(b).

16Doc. 25 at 8 (citing Gaston v. Palmer, 387 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004), superseded

on other grounds by 417 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A decision on the merits necessarily

implies that an application was ‘properly filed,’ because it is axiomatic that a court will not rule

on the merits of an improperly filed application.”)).

17Cf. Pace, 544 U.S. at 413.

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Luckadoo’s post-conviction claim for relief was pursuant to Arizona Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.1(e) and (h).14 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)

provides that when a claim under paragraph (e) or (h) of Rule 31.1 

is to be raised in a[n] . . . untimely post-conviction relief proceeding, the

notice of post-conviction relief must set forth the substance of the specific

exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in . . . a timely manner. 

If the specific exception and meritorious reasons do not appear

substantiating the claim and indicating why the claim was not stated in . . .

a timely manner, the notice shall be summarily dismissed.15

Luckadoo’s state post-conviction proceeding was therefore untimely, but “properly filed”

under Arizona’s post-conviction relief framework.

Respondents state that Luckadoo’s state petition for post-conviction relief

became “‘properly filed’ once the state court entertained the [p]etition on its merits.”16

While respondents’ recitation of law is correct, it is unnecessary to rely on the state

courts’ entertainment of Luckadoo’s petition. Even though Luckadoo’s state petition

was not timely filed, it was still “properly filed” because it was authorized by the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure.17

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18Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

19Id. (emphasis added).

20Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d

1331, 1335 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001)).

21Doc. 27 at 2.

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2. The Federal Limitation Period Expired Before Luckadoo’s State Claim

was “Pending”

Even though Luckadoo’s application for state post-conviction relief was “properly

filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2), that section also requires that the application

be “pending” in order to toll the limitation period. The Ninth Circuit has concluded “that

the AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for all of the time during which a state prisoner

is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court

remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.”18 “AEDPA’s statute of

limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and

the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’

during that interval.”19 Because “a properly and timely filed petition in state court only

tolls the time remaining in the federal limitation period,” by the time Luckadoo filed his

state petition for post-conviction relief the federal limitation period had expired.20

3. The Factual Predicate of Luckadoo’s Claim Could Have Been Discovered

Earlier Through Due Diligence

Relying on § 2244(d)(1)(D), Luckadoo maintains that “the one-year period of

limitation began to run on the date which the newly discovered evidence was uncovered

. . . through the exercise of due diligence.”21 The statute provides that the limitation

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22There is no basis to assume that the affidavits of an independent medical examiner

and a crime scene reconstruction expert could not have been obtained through the exercise of

due diligence at an earlier date.

23See doc. 5-5 at 4; doc. 5-7 at 4.

24Doc. 27 at 5.

25Pace, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

26Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).

27Doc. 27 at 5.

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period begins to run on the date that newly discovered evidence could have been

discovered, not on the date that it was actually discovered. Luckadoo makes no

argument that the newly discovered evidence could not have been uncovered sooner.22

Moreover, two of the affidavits presented as newly discovered evidence were submitted

in February of 1999, more than five years before Luckadoo’s state petition was filed.23

Luckadoo offers no explanation for the delay.

B. Luckadoo Is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling

Luckadoo argues that he “is entitled to equitable tolling because this is his first

habeas petition and his claims have never before been addressed on the merits.”24

Equitable tolling is available where a petitioner demonstrates “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his

way.”25 The extraordinary circumstances must cause the untimeliness.26

Although Luckadoo maintains that he “diligently pursued his rights by hiring a

private investigator and counsel,” he has not shown that extraordinary circumstances

prevented him from filing his habeas petition sooner.27 In rare cases, egregious

Case 2:09-cv-00518-JWS Document 29 Filed 01/27/11 Page 6 of 7
28See, e.g., Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 801.

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attorney misconduct may justify equitable tolling.28 The misconduct alleged in

Luckadoo’s petition, however, relates to his trial and not to the circumstances

surrounding his post-conviction proceedings. In the absence of extraordinary

circumstances, equitable tolling is not available. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Duncan’s findings and

recommendations are adopted in part and modified in part as detailed above.

Luckadoo’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk

will please terminate this case.

DATED this 27th day of January 2011.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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