Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00693/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00693-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s motion to 1

dismiss. (Court Docs. 1, 13.)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL TREGLIA,

Petitioner,

v.

WALKER, Warden

Respondent.

 /

CV F 07-00693 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 13]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in state prison following a plea of guilty to possession of a weapon

while confined in a state prison and admitted allegations that he had previously been convicted of

a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law. Petitioner was sentenced

to a determinate state prison term of 6 years. (Lodge Docs. 1-2.) 

On March 30, 2004, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the

judgment. (Lodged Doc. 2.) Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court. 

Petitioner subsequently filed five pro se state post-conviction collateral challenges. The

first petition was filed on April 7, 2006, in the Tuolumne County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc.

Case 1:07-cv-00693-AWI -SMS Document 18 Filed 11/20/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

3.) It was denied on May 1, 2006. (Lodged Doc. 4.)

The second petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on May 19, 2006, in the

Tuolumne County Superior Court, and denied on May 23, 2006. (Lodged Docs. 5, 6.)

The third petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on June 23, 2006, in the Fifth

District Court of Appeal, and denied on June 29, 2006. (Lodged Docs. 7, 8.)

The fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on July 25, 2006, in the California

Supreme Court, and denied on February 7, 2007. (Lodged Docs. 9, 10.)

The fifth and final petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on July 3, 2007, in the

California Supreme Court, and is currently pending. (Lodged Doc. 11.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas on May 7, 2007. (Court

Doc. 1.)

On August 13, 2007, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss the petition as timebarred. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner did not file an opposition.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review th

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

Case 1:07-cv-00693-AWI -SMS Document 18 Filed 11/20/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Therefore, the Court will review Respondent’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on March 30,

2004. (Lodged Doc. 2.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review. According to the Rules of

Court, a decision becomes final thirty (30) days after filing, and an appeal must be taken to the

Case 1:07-cv-00693-AWI -SMS Document 18 Filed 11/20/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 2

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

4

California Supreme Court within ten (10) days of finality. Cal.R.Ct. 8.500(e)(1); Smith v. 

Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir. 2002). Therefore, direct review ended upon expiration of the 40- th

day period following issuance of the opinion, May 9, 2004. The one-year limitations period

commenced running the following day–May 10, 2004. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9 Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Thus, the last day to file a federal petition was th

on May 9, 2005, plus any time for tolling. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). 

Here, Petitioner did not file his first collateral petition until April 7, 2006, well after the

statute of limitations expired on May 9, 2005. Because the limitations period had already

expired, the collateral challenge had no tolling consequence. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

Case 1:07-cv-00693-AWI -SMS Document 18 Filed 11/20/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

(9 Cir. 2001); Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to th

tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256

(11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Consequently, the first

through fifth state petitions do not toll the limitations period. (Lodged Docs. 3-11.) 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert th th

denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to

tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. th

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

Petitioner did not file an opposition and has not presented any grounds for equitable

tolling. Thus, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is barred by the statute of limitations

and must be dismissed, with prejudice. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as time-barred be GRANTED;

and

2. The instant petition be DISMISSED, with PREJUDICE.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

Case 1:07-cv-00693-AWI -SMS Document 18 Filed 11/20/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00693-AWI -SMS Document 18 Filed 11/20/07 Page 6 of 6