Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04388/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04388-26/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J. AUGUSTO BASTIDAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL LP, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04388-SI 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 176

This dispute arises out of a medical peer review following defendant Good Samaritan 

Hospital‟s suspension of plaintiff‟s surgical privileges. Plaintiff initially filed this suit alleging 

discrimination and disparate treatment based on race. After substantial motion practice and four

amended complaints, plaintiff now alleges two claims of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

Plaintiff claims that defendants retaliated against him for filing and prosecuting this lawsuit by: (1) 

unreasonably and intentionally delaying with finalizing and implementing plaintiff‟s surgical 

proctoring program; and (2) unreasonably and intentionally delaying an update to the National 

Practitioner Data Bank with details of plaintiff‟s limited suspension.

On November 4, 2016, the Court held a hearing on defendants‟ motion for summary 

judgment. After careful consideration of the papers submitted, for the reasons articulated in open 

court, the Court finds that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to plaintiff‟s retaliation 

claims against the hospital defendants. The Court further finds that the record contains no 

evidence of retaliatory acts by the individual defendants, Dr. Wilbur and Dr. Schwartz. The Court 

hereby DENIES defendants‟ motion as to the hospital entities and GRANTS the motion as to the 

individual defendants.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a Colombian-born general surgeon sub-specializing in oncology surgery and 

advanced cancer treatments at Good Samaritan Hospital (“GSH”). Plaintiff began working at 

GSH in 2004. In 2009, plaintiff lost a patient shortly after performing a complicated surgical 

procedure, known as a “Whipple.” GSH immediately suspended plaintiff‟s surgical privileges, 

which prompted GSH‟s filing of an “Adverse Action Report” with the National Practitioner Data 

Bank (“NPDB”) explaining plaintiff‟s “indefinite,” “summary or emergency” suspension. Decl. 

Bastidas, Ex. C, NPDB report (Dkt. No. 185-6). Plaintiff‟s suspension began a years-long peer 

review and administrative appeal process, finally completed in early 2013 when the GSH Board of 

Trustees issued its final decision. See Decl. Wong, Ex. 7, Board final action (Dkt. No. 174-4).

Pursuant to the Board‟s final decision, the GSH Medical Executive Committee (“MEC”) 

presented plaintiff with a Focused Professional Practice Evaluation (“FPPE”), a surgical 

proctoring program through which plaintiff could eventually regain his full surgical privileges at 

GSH. Roughly two months later, on August 1, 2013, plaintiff responded by letter, stating his 

belief that the FPPE was more restrictive than required by the final Board decision. Id., Ex. 12, 

letter from plaintiff to Tilles (Dkt. No. 174-8). Plaintiff asked the GSH Chief of Staff to “review 

this issue and clarify” and stated that he was “happy to meet . . . to finalize a FPPE.” Id. At this 

point, neither party progressed the issue for well over a year.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on September 20, 2013. Dkt. No. 1. On December 16, 2014, for 

the first time since filing the lawsuit, plaintiff renewed his requests for a revised FPPE and update 

to the NPDB. Decl. Bastidas ¶ 91, Ex. L, plaintiff email to GSH staff (Dkt. No. 186-8). Plaintiff 

stated that the GSH Medical Staff had “yet to respond to [his] request to initiate [his] FPPE.” Id. 

Plaintiff requested a status update on the FPPE process and asked GSH to “submit an appropriate 

amendment ASAP” to the NPDB since he “remain[ed] listed as an „incompetent‟ physician . . . 

and that item continue[d] to prevent [him] from obtaining privileges at any new institutions.” Id. 

Having heard nothing, plaintiff followed up again on April 28, 2015 by certified letter to Dr. 

Blumenfeld, now acting as GSH Chief of Staff, and reiterated the same concerns about the FPPE 

and NPDB. Decl. Wong, Ex. 17, plaintiff letter to Blumenfeld (Dkt. No. 175-1). Again, plaintiff 

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received no response.

Plaintiff noticed the depositions of the GSH Medical Staff on June 2, 2015, including as 

topics, “actions taken by the [MEC] with regard to the proctoring of Plaintiff,” actions taken in 

response to plaintiff‟s August 1, 2013 letter objecting to the FPPE and his follow-up 

communications on December 16, 2014 and April 28, 2015, and actions related to updating the 

NPDB. Decl. Bastidas ¶ 94. One week later, Dr. Blumenfeld, GSH Chief of Staff, called plaintiff 

to let him know that the MEC was working on a proposed FPPE and that the two should meet to 

discuss NPDB reporting. See Decl. Bastidas ¶ 95 & Ex. N, email from plaintiff to Blumenfeld 

memorializing conversation (Dkt. No. 186-12). Over several weeks following the phone 

conversation, plaintiff and defendants exchanged letters and emails, eventually leading to an 

agreed FPPE. Decl. Bastidas ¶ 97; see also Decl. Wong, Exs. 19-21. Plaintiff signed the FPPE on 

August 26, 2015, which appointed Dr. Harris from UCSF as his proctor and included optional 

intra-operative observation at the election of the Chief of Staff. Decl. Wong, Ex. 28 (Dkt. No. 

175-10).

Around the time that the parties executed plaintiff‟s FPPE, discussions also progressed 

regarding the NPDB update. On August 24, 2015, Dr. Blumenfeld sent plaintiff a letter about 

plaintiff‟s requested NPDB updates. Decl. Bastidas ¶ 99 & Ex. O, letter from Blumenfeld to 

plaintiff (Dkt. No. 186-14). The letter set forth agreed-upon language for an NPDB revision,

describing plaintiff‟s suspension and proctoring program, and stated that the NPDB update would 

be filed the same week. Id. By the end of August 2015, the parties had signed plaintiff‟s 

proctoring program and agreed to the content of the NPDB revision. Despite the apparent 

agreement, the parties did not finalize either for several more months.

Mary Ann Rodriguez, now GSH‟s Director of Medical Staff Services, states that between 

late August and mid-December of 2015, she did not realize that filing the NPDB update was her 

responsibility. Decl. Rodriguez (Dkt. No. 173-6) ¶¶ 7-8.1 Rodriguez states that she could not find 

 

1

Plaintiff objects to certain portions of the Rodriguez Declaration, claiming the 

information is either inadmissible hearsay or that the declarant lacks personal knowledge with 

respect to certain statements. See Dkt. No. 193. This order need not address these objections 

because, even taking this evidence into account, defendants‟ motion will be denied. Accordingly, 

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log-in credentials for the data bank, so she called the NPDB and waited “a couple of weeks” for 

her log-in information. Id. ¶ 10. She then tried to submit the report, but the submission required a 

payment and she did not have access to a hospital credit card. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Rodriguez filed 

plaintiff‟s “Revision to Action Report” with the NPDB on January 28, 2016, approximately five 

months after Dr. Blumenfeld told plaintiff it would be filed. Id. ¶ 12; Wong Decl., Ex. 35, 

Revision to Action Report (Dkt. No. 177-6).

After reaching an agreed FPPE in August 2015, the parties continued to experience delays 

with the implementation of plaintiff‟s proctoring. Over the next several months, plaintiff followed 

up with GSH administration regularly about submitting cases to his proctor. Plaintiff wrote 

directly to the Board on December 14, 2015 requesting a status update, stating that he had been 

waiting to have Dr. Harris review certain patients that plaintiff wanted to schedule for surgery. 

Decl. Bastidas, Ex. P, letter to Board (Dkt. No. 186-16). 

While plaintiff sought to have his proctoring program fully implemented, plaintiff ran for 

election as Chair of GSH‟s Department of Surgery. On October 27, 2015, the MEC wrote plaintiff 

and informed him that because of the practice restrictions in place under plaintiff‟s suspension, 

plaintiff was not in “good standing” and therefore ineligible to run for Chair of Surgery under the 

Medical Staff Bylaws. Decl. Bastidas ¶ 122 & Ex. S, letter from Chief of Staff to plaintiff (Dkt. 

No. 187-4) at 1. The MEC removed plaintiff from the ballot. Plaintiff disputed the MEC‟s 

interpretation of the Bylaws. Decl. Bastidas ¶ 123; id., Ex. S, email from plaintiff to MEC 

members (Dkt. No. 187-4) at 2. On November 16, 2015, the MEC responded to plaintiff by letter. 

Decl. Bastidas ¶ 124 & Ex. T, letter from MEC to plaintiff (Dkt. No. 187-6). The MEC stated that 

after meeting on the issue, it had determined that the Bylaws were not clear about plaintiff‟s 

eligibility to run and that because of the ambiguity, it would send out new ballots including

plaintiff‟s name. Id. The MEC noted, however, that in the course of reviewing the Bylaws, it had 

determined that members of medical staff committees must be in good standing, and that 

accordingly, plaintiff could no longer serve on the hospital‟s Cancer Care Committee. Id. After 

 

plaintiff‟s objections to this declaration are OVERRULED.

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the MEC added plaintiff‟s name to the new Chair of Surgery ballot, plaintiff‟s voting peers elected 

him as Chair. Decl. Bastidas ¶¶ 125-26, id. Exs. U, V, memo and new ballot for election, letter 

from MEC to plaintiff (Dkt. Nos. 187-8, 187-10). On December 21, 2015, the MEC wrote 

plaintiff again to explain that under the Bylaws, election results are subject to ratification by the 

MEC. Decl. Bastidas ¶ 127 & Ex. V, letter from MEC to plaintiff (Dkt. No. 187-10). The MEC 

stated that ratification required a majority vote and, after discussing the election in a closed 

session, plaintiff‟s election had narrowly fallen short of ratification; plaintiff “therefore [could not] 

serve in that position.” Id. 

Before, during, and after the election proceedings, GSH claims to have experienced 

significant delays in getting Dr. Harris, a UCSF doctor, the necessary temporary privileges to act 

as plaintiff‟s proctor at GSH. See Decl. Abrams (Dkt. No. 173-5) ¶¶ 7-12.2 GSH, UCSF, and Dr. 

Harris needed to negotiate and agree to a professional services contract for Dr. Harris‟s proctoring 

arrangement. See id. ¶¶ 8-9. Gregory Abrams, who oversaw this process, describes that it 

dragged out over many months from late 2015 to mid-2016, and involved extensive coordination 

between GSH, UCSF, GSH‟s parent company, the hospital‟s credentialing arm, and others. See 

id. ¶¶ 7-25; see also Supp. Decl. Wong, Ex. 60, excerpts from Hinsdale deposition (Dkt. 196-10) 

at 26. Plaintiff states that he has only been able to submit cases to Dr. Harris for review since late 

July 2016. Decl. Bastidas (Dkt. No. 184-6) ¶ 115.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, 

 

2

Plaintiff objects to the admissibility of the Abrams Declaration in whole and in part. Dkt. 

No. 184-8. This order need not address these objections because, even taking this evidence into 

account, defendants‟ motion will be denied. Accordingly, plaintiff‟s objections to this declaration 

are OVERRULED.

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has no burden to disprove matters on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at 

trial. Id. at 325. The moving party need only demonstrate to the Court that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the non-moving party‟s case. Id.

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set 

forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, „specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.‟” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). To carry this burden, the non-moving party must 

“do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the 

jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 252 (1986).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. 

However, conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise 

genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court has interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to encompass retaliation claims, even 

though section 1981 does not include an express retaliation provision. CBOCS W., Inc. v. 

Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008). A plaintiff alleging retaliation under section 1981 may 

either proceed by producing direct or circumstantial evidence showing that a discriminatory reason 

more likely than not motivated the employer, or may apply the burden-shifting framework set 

forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, both parties apply the 

McDonnell Douglas framework. See Mot. (Dkt. No. 176) at 9; Opp‟n (Dkt. No. 184) at 17.

The McDonnell Douglas framework utilizes a three-step analysis. The first step requires 

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the plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. 

Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). If the 

plaintiff succeeds, he has established a rebuttable presumption of retaliation. See Texas Dep’t of 

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). “The burden of production, but not 

persuasion,” then shifts to the defendant to articulate “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” 

for its adverse action against the plaintiff. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ray v. Henderson, 217 

F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If the defendant puts forth a legitimate reason, 

the presumption of unlawful discrimination “simply drops out of the picture.” St. Mary’s Honor 

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). The final burden then rests with the plaintiff to prove that 

the defendant‟s proffered explanation is merely a pretext for retaliation. Bergene, 272 F.3d at 

1140-41 (citation omitted); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240 (citation omitted). 

As a general matter, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action “need produce 

very little evidence in order to overcome an employer's motion for summary judgment. This is 

because „the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry—one 

that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.‟” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. 

Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., 

Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996)).

For the reasons set forth below, and for the reasons stated in open court, the Court 

GRANTS defendants‟ motion as to Dr. Schwartz and Dr. Wilbur, and DENIES defendants‟ 

motion as to the remaining defendants.

I. Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case on summary judgment, “[t]he plaintiff need only 

offer evidence which gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot 

Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 

1987)); see id. (noting that the degree of proof necessary on summary judgment is “minimal”). To 

make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee 

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must show: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that his employer subjected him to an 

adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the 

adverse action. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240.3 The parties do not dispute that plaintiff meets the first 

requirement of his prima facie case: plaintiff engaged in a protected activity by filing and 

prosecuting this discrimination lawsuit. Dkt. 1; Dkt. 39; Dkt. 60; Dkt. 83; Dkt. 140; Dkt. No. 176 

at 9; Dkt. 190 at 18. The parties‟ arguments center on the second and third elements of plaintiff‟s 

prima facie case: whether defendants subjected plaintiff to an adverse employment action, and 

whether there is a causal link between plaintiff‟s prosecution of this lawsuit and the alleged 

adverse employment actions. 

A. Adverse Employment Action

Plaintiff alleges that defendants subjected him to two adverse employment actions in this 

case, by: (1) failing to timely implement a surgical proctoring program for the plaintiff; and 

(2) failing to timely file an update to the National Practitioner Data Bank regarding plaintiff‟s 

suspension of privileges. The Ninth Circuit defines “adverse employment action” broadly. 

Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Any action “reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity” can be 

considered an adverse employment action. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. An adverse action may include 

a reduction in compensation, a warning letter or negative review or a limitation of the terms or 

privileges of employment. Fonseca, 374 F.3d at 847; Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1125-26. 

A jury could reasonably find that the two adverse employment actions alleged here, failure 

to timely implement plaintiff‟s proctoring program and failure to timely update the NPDB with 

plaintiff‟s disciplinary status, would be reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in 

protected activity. At minimum, the record demonstrates that successful implementation of an 

approved proctoring program directly affected plaintiff‟s privileges to perform certain types of 

 

3 While Ray addressed retaliation claims under Title VII, courts analyze section 1981 

retaliation claims under the same framework. See Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 375 F.3d 909, 912 

(9th Cir. 2004).

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surgeries at GSH, surgeries that previously had formed a significant part of plaintiff‟s medical 

practice at the hospital. Any delay in implementation served to prevent plaintiff from regaining 

full surgical privileges. Moreover, the record contains sufficient evidence demonstrating a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants‟ failure to update the NPDB report 

materially affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiff‟s employment, or otherwise 

would be reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity. The report 

on file, without revision until January 2016, stated that plaintiff had been suspended for 

incompetence. The report was visible to other hospitals at which plaintiff may have sought 

surgical privileges.

B. Causal Connection

To establish causation in this Circuit, a plaintiff may offer direct evidence of causation, or 

circumstantial evidence from which causation can be inferred, such as an employer‟s “pattern of 

antagonism following the protected conduct,” Porter v. Cal. Dep’t Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th 

Cir. 2005), or temporal proximity between the protected activity and the occurrence of the adverse 

action. Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 389 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004); Bell v. Clackamas Cnty., 

341 F.3d 858, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2003); Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376. In cases that rely solely on the 

existence of temporal proximity, however, our Circuit has cautioned that a “specified time period 

cannot be a mechanically applied criterion. A rule that any period over a certain time is per se too 

long (or, conversely, a rule that any period under a certain time is per se short enough) would be 

unrealistically simplistic.” Porter, 419 F.3d at 895 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants separately urge the Court to apply the heightened “but-for” causation standard 

employed in Title VII cases to this action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 

2517 (2013). Defendants admit that the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly extended Nassar to 

section 1981 claims, but argue that the Ninth Circuit is “headed in that direction.”4 Mot. (Dkt. No. 

 

4

The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that “[r]etaliation claims under Title VII and § 

1981 share identical legal standards.” Williams v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 316 F. App‟x 563, 

564 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(recognizing that “those legal principles guiding a court in a Title VII dispute apply with equal 

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176) at 14 n.6 (citing Bagley v. Bel-Aire Mech. Inc., 647 F. App‟x 797, 800 (2016) (unpublished 

memorandum opinion)). Under this standard, a plaintiff must prove that “his or her protected 

activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” 133 S.Ct. at 2534.

Although Nassar‟s applicability to section 1981 cases is questionable,

5

the Court finds that 

plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence of causation under either standard to meet his “minimal” 

burden of establishing a prima facie case at summary judgment. The record contains sufficient 

circumstantial evidence of causation to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on both retaliation 

claims. The following items, at minimum, demonstrate a genuine dispute as to causation: 

protracted delays continuing even after plaintiff reopened communications in December 2014; Dr. 

Beaupre, GSH‟s CEO, allegedly ending an unrelated sit-down meeting with plaintiff in June 2015

after plaintiff refused to talk about the litigation; GSH‟s continuing struggles with implementation 

of plaintiff‟s proctoring program in 2015 and 2016; delays with filing the agreed NPDB revision 

in late 2015; plaintiff‟s removal from the Cancer Care Committee in 2015; and the MEC‟s 

nullification of plaintiff‟s election as Chief of Surgery in 2015. 

Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record 

demonstrates a genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of causation. As such, the Court holds 

that plaintiff has met his minimal burden to demonstrate a prima facie case at the summary 

 

force in a § 1981 action”)). The Ninth Circuit recently extended Nassar‟s heightened “but-for” 

causation standard to ADA retaliation claims. T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. 

Dist., 795 F.3d 1067, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015). While the Ninth Circuit has not directly held that the 

Nassar standard applies in section 1981 cases, see Peterson v. Nat’l Sec. Technologies, 650 F. 

App‟x 476, 478 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished memorandum opinion), the Court observes that 

other circuits have applied Nassar‟s “but-for” causation standard to section 1981 retaliation 

claims. See, e.g., Zastrow v. Houston Auto Imports Greenway Ltd., 789 F.3d 553, 564 (5th Cir. 

2015); Wright v St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737-38, n.5 (8th Cir. 2013).

.

5

The Supreme Court reached its holding in Nassar based, in part, on “Title VII‟s detailed 

structure[,]” as compared to other, more “broadly worded antidiscrimination statutes[.]” See 133 

S. Ct. at 2532-33; see also id. at 2530 (dictum) (“Unlike Title IX, § 1981, § 1982, and the federalsector provisions of the ADEA, Title VII is a detailed statutory scheme.”); id. at 2532-33 

(“[W]hile the Court has inferred a congressional intent to prohibit retaliation when confronted 

with broadly worded antidiscrimination statutes, Title VII‟s detailed structure makes that inference 

inappropriate here.”). The Court‟s decision appears to be limited to detailed statutory schemes 

like Title VII and the ADA. See id. at 2531.

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judgment stage.

II. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

Under McDonnell Douglas, the burden now shifts to defendants. The Court must 

determine whether defendants have shown legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse 

actions. To meet their burden at this stage, defendants must clearly set forth, through the 

introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for the adverse actions “which, if believed by the trier 

of fact, would support a finding that the employment action was not a result of unlawful 

discrimination.” Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Burdine, 450 

U.S. at 255). Defendants offer several nondiscriminatory reasons for the delays with finalizing 

and implementing plaintiff‟s proctoring program, and for delays with updating the NPDB. For 

purposes of this order, the Court will assume that defendants‟ reasons are sufficient.

III. Pretext

Because defendants have come forward with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to 

explain the alleged adverse actions, the final burden rests with plaintiff to establish that 

defendants‟ proffered motives are merely a pretext for retaliation. At summary judgment, plaintiff 

must demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the legitimacy of 

defendants‟ reasons for the delays. See Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1169.

Pretext may be demonstrated by direct evidence showing the employer‟s discriminatory 

motive, or by circumstantial evidence that undermines the credibility of the employer‟s articulated 

reasons. Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1170-71; Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 

2003). Circumstantial evidence must be “specific” and “substantial” in order to create a triable 

issue with respect to whether the employer intended to discriminate. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, 

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998); Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 

2003); see also Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted) (“To avoid summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must do more 

than establish a prima facie case and deny the credibility of the defendant‟s witnesses. She must 

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produce specific, substantial evidence of pretext.”). “All of the evidence as to pretext—whether 

direct or indirect—is to be considered cumulatively.” Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1170 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court finds that plaintiff has met his burden to show genuine disputes of material fact 

concerning pretext at the summary judgment stage. Plaintiff offers sufficient indirect evidence to 

undermine the credibility of defendants‟ reasons. One such item is defendants‟ handling of the

2015 election for GSH‟s Chair of the Department of Surgery. Initially, plaintiff was listed on the 

ballot, but the MEC decided to remove him because he was not in “good standing.” Plaintiff 

objected, and the MEC eventually put his name back on the ballot. At the same time, however, 

the MEC removed plaintiff from the Cancer Care Committee. The Chair of Surgery ballot 

proceeded and plaintiff‟s peers elected him. Afterwards, the MEC voted and declined to ratify 

plaintiff‟s election, nullifying the election results. Defendants argue that the MEC‟s decision to 

reject the election results could have been based on other issues with the plaintiff, such as 

behavioral complaints or surgical misconduct. Reply (Dkt. No. 196-3) at 10. 

At this stage of the proceedings, there are genuine issues of material fact that must be 

resolved at trial. Based on the record, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that defendants‟ 

reasons for the extensive and protracted delays are unworthy of credence. The Court hereby 

DENIES the hospital defendants‟ motion for summary judgment as to liability. However, because

plaintiff has pointed to no evidence demonstrating personal responsibility on behalf of Dr. 

Schwartz and Dr. Wilbur, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to these individual 

defendants.

IV. Damages

Defendants also move for summary judgment on plaintiff‟s damages, arguing that plaintiff 

cannot prove that he actually suffered any harm from the retaliation claims in the fourth amended 

complaint. Mot. (Dkt. No. 173-3) at 21-25; Reply (Dkt. No. 196-3) at 14-15. The Court finds that 

genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding plaintiff‟s alleged damages. These issues are best 

reserved for decision by a jury on a full record. The Court hereby DENIES defendants‟ motion for 

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summary judgment as to damages.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES defendants‟ motion for summary 

judgment as to the hospital defendants and GRANTS defendants‟ motion as to the individual 

defendants, Dr. Schwartz and Dr. Wilbur. The trial in this matter will be a clean slate. This order 

does not establish anything for purposes of trial.

This order resolves Dkt. No. 176.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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