Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00674/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00674-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KRISHNA UJAGAR,

NO. CIV. S-05-674 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

CAMPBELL'S SOUP COMPANY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff Krishna Ujagar has brought suit against her former

employer, defendant Campbell’s Soup Company, alleging disability

discrimination. Plaintiff brings claims under California law for

(1) disability discrimination, (2) wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, (3) failure to take reasonable steps

to prevent discrimination, (4) failure to engage in the interactive

process, and (5) failure to make reasonable accommodations.

Pending before the court is the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. The court resolves the matter based on the parties’

papers and after oral argument. For the reasons set forth below,

the motion is denied.

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26 Undisputed unless otherwise noted. 1

2

I. Facts1

A. Plaintiff’s Employment

Krishna Ujagar (“plaintiff”) began her employment with

Campbell’s Soup Company (“defendant”) in 1988. Dep. of Krishna

Ujagar (“Ujagar Dep.”) at 21:10-12. She was originally hired for

the position of “Sorter.” Id. at 21:13-14, 25:12-19. At the time

of her termination, and for a number of years beforehand, plaintiff

held the positions of Statistical Quality Control (“SQC”) and

Filler Operator. Id. at 27:1-13. Plaintiff’s employment was

terminated by letter dated October 28, 2003. Dep. of Lillian Dyste

(“Dyste Dep.”) at 33:10-17.

The SQC position requires an employee to “randomly select five

cans of soup off the line and test[] the cans’ contents for weight,

steam integrity, and taste.” Decl. of Brent Littlejohn

(“Littlejohn Decl.”) ¶ 3. The Filler Operator position requires

an employee to “manually feed[] sleeves of can lids into an

automated can closer.” Id. ¶ 4. Physical demands associated with

this position include walking, climbing, and lifting of 10-15

pounds. Id. Plaintiff’s work shift was during nighttime hours,

and during that particular shift, employees were also required to

perform cleaning duties. Littlejohn Decl. ¶ 5. Physical demands

associated with these cleaning duties include bending, stooping,

and lifting of 15-20 pounds. Id.

Plaintiff was represented by the Food Process Workers Union,

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Teamsters Local 228 (“Teamsters”). Def.’s SUF ¶ 1. The terms of

her employment with defendant were governed by the contractual

terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between

Teamsters and defendant. Id. The CBA provides that an employee

with more than one year of acquired seniority may take up to a one

year medical leave of absence. Def.’s SUF ¶ 2. The CBA also

provides that this leave of absence “will not be granted for a

period longer than one year.” Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Leave of Absence

On October 14, 2002, plaintiff complained of leg pain and went

on medical leave for non-work related medical reasons. Plaintiff

submitted a series of subsequent doctor’s notes indicating that she

was unable to work between October 14, 2002 and March 21, 2003.

Decl. of Lisa Ryan (“Ryan Decl.”), Ex. 11. On March 24, 2003,

defendant’s Occupational Health Department released plaintiff to

work with the restriction that she was “unable to walk on [her]

right leg for prolonged periods.” Id. Plaintiff was unable to

return to work at that time, because there were no positions that

could accommodate this restriction. Id. Plaintiff remained on

medical leave at this time. In July 2003, plaintiff underwent

corrective surgery for a herniated disc. Id. 

Following her surgery, plaintiff submitted a doctor’s note to

defendant on September 22, 2003 stating that she would be able to

return to work in eight weeks. Def.’s SUF ¶ 4. Plaintiff then

submitted a second doctor’s note, dated October 8, 2003, indicating

that plaintiff would be able to return to work on October 13, 2003.

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Def.’s SUF ¶ 5. The October 8, 2003 note also indicated that

plaintiff would be subject to “modified duty,” with no repetitive

bending or stooping and restricted lifting. Id. 

The lifting restriction stated “No Lifting 0-25 lbs.” Id.

The parties differ in their interpretations of this lifting

restriction. Plaintiff believes that this restriction meant that

she could lift any amount up to 25 pounds. Pl.’s Reply at 2:27-28.

Defendant, however, interpreted this restriction as essentially

prohibiting any lifting. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5:4-6. This

issue arose earlier with respect to a different employee who had

seen the same doctor. Decl. of Sal Hernandez ¶ 3. After

clarification, it was determined that the doctor had intended

plaintiff’s interpretation of the restriction. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.

On October 9, 2003, plaintiff and a nurse with defendant’s

Occupational Health Department each signed a “work status form”

indicating the work restrictions, as defendant construed them, that

were detailed in the October 8, 2003 doctor’s note. Def.’s SUF ¶

6. At this time, defendant maintains that there were no positions

available that, based upon these restrictions, plaintiff would have

been able to perform. Def.’s SUF ¶ 16. Based upon plaintiff’s

reading of the lifting restriction, there were five positions that

plaintiff could have performed. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF ¶ 22-A.

There is no evidence these five positions were either vacant or

filled at this time. Def.’s SUF ¶ 19.

On October 13, 2003, plaintiff spoke with Christine Dinnie,

from defendant’s Occupational Health Department, about returning

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to work. Def.’s SUF ¶ 13. Plaintiff was informed that the matter

was still being evaluated. Id. On October 14, 2003, plaintiff

spoke again with Dinnie and was informed that her paperwork had

been given to the Human Resources Department. Ujagar Dep. 163:13-

22. 

Subsequently, plaintiff submitted another note from her doctor

to defendant on October 22, 2003. Def.’s SUF ¶ 8. This note again

indicated that plaintiff was prohibited from repetitive bending or

stooping, but her lifting restriction was now “may lift 5-10 lbs.”

Id. Finally, plaintiff submitted another doctor’s note on November

3, 2003 stating that she was able to return to work with no

restrictions. Ujagar Dep. at 180:11-181:17.

C. Termination Grievance Proceedings

On October 24, 2003, plaintiff spoke with Lillian Dyste from

defendant’s Human Resources Department, where her paperwork had

been transferred, and was informed that she would be terminated

because her leave of absence had exceeded a year. Def.’s SUF ¶ 26.

Dyste did not send notice of termination at that time in order “to

allow plaintiff an opportunity to discuss the matter with Human

Resources Director Timothy Samuel.” Id.

A meeting was scheduled by her Teamsters representative

between the representative, plaintiff, and Samuel. Def.’s SUF ¶

27. At the meeting, Samuel and the Teamsters representative were

present, but plaintiff was not. Def.’s SUF ¶ 28. Plaintiff claims

she was unaware of this meeting. Ujagar Decl. ¶ 9. A letter

confirming her termination was sent to plaintiff the next day.

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Dyste Dep. at 32:19-33:9.

Plaintiff then filed a grievance, asking to be reinstated, on

October 30, 2003. Decl. of Jack Vetter (“Vetter Decl.”), Ex. B-12.

This grievance was denied on the ground that plaintiff had violated

the CBA by taking a leave of absence in excess of one year. Id.

Teamsters did not proceed further or seek arbitration of the

matter. Def.’s SUF ¶ 11.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

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to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

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Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093

(9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

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must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County

of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff claims that the termination of her employment was

a result of disability discrimination in violation of the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and in

violation of public policy. Plaintiff additionally claims that

defendant violated FEHA by failing to take reasonable steps to

prevent disability discrimination, failing to engage in the

interactive process, and failing to make reasonable accommodations

for her disability. Defendant moves for summary judgment as to all

claims. For the reasons explained below, defendant’s motion is

denied.

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 California law is unclear as to whether the plaintiff 2

must also initially show that she was able to perform the essential

duties of her position, with or without reasonable accommodations,

or whether the defendant must prove as an affirmative defense that

plaintiff was unable to perform these duties. Compare Brundage v.

Hahn, 57 Cal. App. 4th 228, 236 (2d Dist. 1997) (plaintiff must

show, as part of their prima facie case, that she was a “qualified

individual”) with Bagatti v. Dept. of Rehabilitation, 97 Cal. App.

4th 344, 360 (3d Dist. 2002) (plaintiff alleging failure to make

reasonable accommodations was not required to show that she was a

“qualified individual”). The question of whether FEHA differs from

the ADA, in making the plaintiff’s qualification an affirmative

defense rather than part of the prima facie case, is currently

pending before the California Supreme Court. Green v. State of

California, review granted, November 16, 2005, S137770.

10

A. Disability Discrimination

Plaintiff first claims that termination of her employment

constituted disability discrimination in violation of FEHA, Cal.

Gov. Code § 12940(a). In analyzing discrimination claims brought

under FEHA, California courts utilize the three-stage burden

shifting test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Guz v.

Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000); Diaz v. Federal

Express Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Under

this test, the plaintiff must initially state a prima facie case

of discrimination. Id. Here, plaintiff must show that she: (1)

suffered from a disability or was regarded as disabled; (2) was

otherwise qualified to do the job; and (3) suffered an adverse 2

employment action because of her disability. Diaz, 373 F. Supp.

2d at 1063. Upon establishing a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Guz,

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24 Cal. 4th at 355-56. Plaintiff then bears the final burden of

proving that defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse

employment decision was pretextual. Id.

Defendant argues that (1) plaintiff was not actually disabled

and that (2) the reason for her termination was the violation of

the CBA provision limiting the duration of leaves of absence. The

court first considers whether plaintiff was actually disabled at

the time of her termination. Physical disability includes any

physiological condition that “(A) Affects one or more of the

following body systems: neurological . . . musculoskeletal . . .

and (B) Limits a major life activity.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12926(k).

At the time of her termination, plaintiff had back problems

sufficiently severe that her doctor gave her instructions

prohibiting her from repetitive bending and stooping and imposing

a lifting restriction of 5-10 pounds. Def.’s SUF ¶ 8. Plaintiff

also made representations of her disability upon inquiry by the

California Employment Development Department. Ujagar Dep. at

271:20-272:7, Ryan Decl., Ex. 1. 

Defendant cites Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App.

4th 34 (2d Dist. 2006) in support of the argument that plaintiff

was not disabled at the time of her termination. Def.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. at 11:5-12:14. In Gelfo, the plaintiff, who had suffered

a back injury and then been denied employment by defendant, alleged

disability discrimination under FEHA. At the time the alleged

disability discrimination occurred, the plaintiff in Gelfo was not

only performing job duties identical to those he sought, without

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accommodations, but was engaging in strenuous physical activities

inconsistent with his claims of disability. Gelfo, 140 Cal. App.

4th at 47. Additionally, at the time his employment was still

uncertain, plaintiff made statements to his worker’s compensation

claims handler and to his orthopedic surgeon indicating he did not

have any physical limitations. Id. Based upon plaintiff’s own

“clear, unequivocal, uncontroverted testimony,” the court

determined that he was not actually disabled. Id. at 48. 

The Gelfo court’s determination is not persuasive in the case

at bar with respect to plaintiff’s disability. Defendant cites

plaintiff’s deposition testimony stating that she believed she

could have performed her job duties, as evidence that plaintiff was

not, in fact, disabled. Def.’s SUF ¶ 12. Unlike Gelfo, here,

there is no evidence that plaintiff was engaging in any conduct

inconsistent with the medical restrictions set forth by her doctor.

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony simply does not approach the

extreme nature of the plaintiff’s statements and actions in Gelfo.

Furthermore, if “an employer cannot slavishly defer to a

physician’s opinion without first pausing to assess the objective

reasonableness of the physician’s conclusions,” Gelfo, 140 Cal.

App. 4th at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted), then, a

fortiori, an employer also cannot unthinkingly defer to an

employee’s opinion either, even as to her own condition. After

all, plaintiff is not a physician. Moreover, her comments were

made retrospectively (increasing the risk of error), whereas the

plaintiff in Gelfo made contemporaneous representations as to his

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 A plaintiff alleging disability discrimination under FEHA, 3

who is not actually disabled, can also proceed under the 

theory that he or she was “regarded as” disabled. Cal. Gov. 

Code § 12926(k). Given the court’s determination that there 

is a genuine dispute as to whether plaintiff was actually 

disabled, the court need not reach this issue.

13

condition. At the very least, there is a genuine dispute as to

whether plaintiff was actually disabled.3

The court next turns to the issue of the one-year leave of

absence provision in the CBA. Defendant claims that plaintiff

violated the CBA when she remained on medical leave in excess of

one year, and that plaintiff’s termination was solely due to this

violation of the labor contract. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at

10:18-20. Plaintiff responds that defendant prevented her from

returning to work within the required time frame by misconstruing

her work restrictions and then failing to timely accommodate them.

Pl.’s Reply at 12-16. Because there is a genuine dispute as to

whether defendant’s reliance on the CBA as the reason for

plaintiff’s termination was merely pretextual, summary judgment is

inappropriate.

The critical fact is that plaintiff submitted a doctor’s note

releasing her to return to work before her one-year medical leave

had run. Def.’s SUF ¶ 5. Although the parties dispute which day,

October 8 or October 9, 2003, this notice was received by

defendant, they agree that it was in advance of her last day of

leave allowed under the CBA. Def.’s SUF ¶ 5. Whether or not the

delay between plaintiff’s notice and defendant’s subsequent conduct

was intentional or simply reflected defendant’s standard operating

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 The court wishes to be clear. It is certainly not ruling 4

that the defendant's reasons were improper. The court is 

merely holding that there is another reasonable inference.

14

procedure is a question of fact upon which reasonable minds could

disagree.

Defendant argues that if it had intentionally delayed

processing plaintiff’s notice in order to push plaintiff outside

the one year time limitation, it would not have taken the steps

that it did after October 13, 2003. For instance, defendant points

out that it took into account the doctor’s note from October 21,

2003. Likewise, defendant also agreed to a meeting with

plaintiff’s union representative in late October. However, the

court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and one could reasonably infer that these actions

were simply undertaken to shore up the employment decision that

defendant had already made. Accordingly, summary judgment is 4

denied as to the disability claim.

B. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff additionally claims that her termination was

wrongful and in violation of public policy. Under California law,

an employer may be held liable for wrongful termination if it

discharges an employee in contravention of fundamental public

policy. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 177

(1980); Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66 (1998). To

state a prima facie wrongful discharge claim, a plaintiff must

establish: (1) an employer-employee relationship; (2) that

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plaintiff’s termination was a violation of public policy; (3)

causation; and (4) damages. See Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp.,

17 Cal. App. 4th 1418, 1426 n.8 (4th Dist. 1993). FEHA establishes

fundamental public policy upon which a common law tort claim for

disability discrimination in violation of public policy may be

based. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143,

1158-59 (1998). 

Defendant’s motion with respect to this claim is premised

solely upon the argument that plaintiff’s failure to establish

discrimination under FEHA leaves her prima facie wrongful

termination claim incomplete. As discussed above, summary judgment

is inappropriate as to the discrimination claim. Similarly,

summary judgment as to the wrongful termination claim is also

inappropriate. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment as to the wrongful termination in violation of public

policy claim is denied.

C. Failure to Take Reasonable Steps to Prevent Discrimination

Next, defendant seeks summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

failure to prevent discrimination claim, brought under Cal. Gov.

Code § 12940(k). This section provides that it is unlawful for an

employer to “fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent

discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal. Gov. Code §

12940(k). Plaintiff must establish a claim for discrimination

before a failure to prevent discrimination claim can be stated.

See Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.

2004); Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th

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280, 289 (1998) (“[T]here's no logic that says an employee who has

not been discriminated against can sue an employer for not

preventing discrimination that didn't happen”) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Defendant argues that because plaintiff’s discrimination claim

under FEHA fails, her claim of failure to prevent discrimination

must fail as well. For the reasons previously discussed,

plaintiff’s FEHA claim of disability discrimination survives

summary judgment. Moreover, there is at least a genuine dispute

as to whether defendant engaged in sufficient training regarding

disability accommodation. Accordingly, defendant’s summary

judgment motion as to the failure to prevent discrimination claim

is denied.

D. Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Plaintiff claims that defendant’s failure to engage in the

interactive process constitutes a violation of Cal. Gov. Code §

12940(n), which makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail to

engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the

employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable

accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable

accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known physical or

mental disability or known medical condition.” Defendant argues

that (1) plaintiff cannot establish that there was a vacant

position, (2) plaintiff never explicitly requested accommodation,

and (3) defendant did, in fact, engage in the interactive process.

First, defendant contends that a plaintiff must establish that

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there was a vacant position as a prerequisite to bringing an

interactive process claim. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 17-18. In

support of this argument, defendant cites authority from the

Seventh Circuit interpreting the ADA. Id. California’s FEHA,

however, does not impose such a requirement. See Claudio v.

Regents of the University of California, 134 Cal. App. 4th 224, 248

(3d Dist. 2005) (“[S]ince we conclude a triable issue exists

concerning failure by the [defendant] to participate in the

interactive process, the judgment cannot be affirmed on the ground

that no alternate jobs were available.”).

Second, defendant also argues that plaintiff never requested

an accommodation. By the plain wording of the FEHA statute, an

employer must engage in a good faith, interactive process “in

response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee.”

Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(n). However, this request need not include

any particular “magic words” to trigger an employer’s duty to

engage in the interactive process. Prilliman v. United Air Lines,

Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4th 935, 954 (2d Dist. 1997). Given plaintiff’s

October 8, 2003 doctor’s note, which set forth various work

restrictions (e.g., no repetitive bending and stooping), it may

reasonably be inferred that plaintiff was requesting accommodation.

Moreover, it appears that defendant interpreted the note as a

request for accommodation, given that it thereafter completed

plaintiff’s “work status form” and communicated internally as to

whether there were positions which could accommodate plaintiff’s

work restrictions. Def.’s SUF ¶ 6; Miller Dep. at 96:1-97:23.

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Third, defendant argues that it did, in fact, engage in the

interactive process. Most of the interactions cited by defendant

as examples of the interactive process were short and insubstantial

conversations with plaintiff regarding her employment status. The

most significant interaction was the meeting, scheduled by the

Teamsters representative, that was supposed to take place between

the Teamsters representative, plaintiff, and defendant’s Human

Resources Director Timothy Samuel. Samuel was present at the

meeting, Def.'s SUF ¶ 28, as was the Teamsters representative,

Samuel Dep. at 24:7-15, but plaintiff was not, Def.’s SUF ¶ 28. 

Defendant argues that it was plaintiff who therefore caused

a breakdown in the interactive process. Plaintiff states, however,

that she was unaware of the meeting, and did not intend to end

communications with defendant. Ujagar Decl. ¶ 9. Indeed, after

the scheduled meeting, plaintiff also initiated additional contact

with defendant when she filed a grievance and when she submitted

another doctor’s note dated November 2, 2003. Pl.’s Reply, Ex.s

B-12-13. Whether or not plaintiff caused a breakdown in the

interactive process, and whether defendant engaged in the

interactive process in good faith, are both triable issues of fact.

Accordingly, summary judgment as to the interactive process claim

is denied.

E. Failure to Make Reasonable Accommodations

Finally, plaintiff claims that defendant failed to make

reasonable accommodations for her physical disability in violation

of FEHA. The statute provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful

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employment practice . . . for an employer . . . to fail to make

reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental

disability of an applicant or employee”. Cal. Gov. Code §

12940(m). However, employers are not required to provide

accommodations that would “impose an undue hardship.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 2 § 7293.9.

For a defendant employer to prevail on summary judgment for

a reasonable accommodation claim, it may establish, inter alia,

that (1) “there simply was no vacant position within the employer’s

organization for which the disabled employee was qualified and

which the disabled employee was capable of performing with or

without accommodation,” or (2) “the employer did everything in its

power to find a reasonable accommodation, but the informal

interactive process broke down because the employee failed to

engage in discussions in good faith.” Jensen, 85 Cal. App. 4th at

263.

Neither path is availing in this case. First, because there

is a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant engaged in the

interactive process, there is a similar question of fact regarding

whether an alternate position could have been found for plaintiff.

See Claudio, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 245. Defendant’s reliance on

case law indicating that an employer need not violate its seniority

system in order to accommodate an employee, e.g., U.S. Airways v.

Barnett, 525 U.S. 391 (2002), does not change this conclusion.

There is no indication that plaintiff’s restrictions could not have

been managed within the seniority system, or that plaintiff lacked

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the requisite seniority to obtain appropriate accommodation within

the CBA.

Second, a defendant can prevail on summary judgment for a

reasonable accommodation claim by establishing that the employee

failed, in good faith, to engage in discussions. Jensen, 85 Cal.

App. 4th at 263. As discussed above with respect to the

interactive process claim, however, a question of fact remains as

to whether plaintiff failed to engage in discussions in good faith.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the

reasonable accommodations claim is denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 20, 2006.

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