Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01833/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01833-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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04cv1833

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERTO VERA JIMENEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. SAMBRANO, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 04cv1833-L(PCL)

ORDER 

(1) OVERRULING DEFENDANTS’

OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; AND 

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A

MATTER OF LAW

Plaintiff Alberto Vera Jimenez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was referred to United States Magistrate

Judge Peter C. Lewis for a report and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.3. After Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in

part, the only remaining claims in the case are a First Amendment claim for retaliation and an

Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against correctional officers Alfonso Alvarado and

Richard Sambrano. (See Order: (1) Adopting in Part and Rejecting in Part Report and

Recommendation; (2) Granting in Part and Denying Part Motion to Dismiss, filed Mar. 30,

2006.)

/ / / / /

Case 3:04-cv-01833-L-PCL Document 154 Filed 02/26/08 Page 1 of 7
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Plaintiff alleges Defendants ordered him out of his cell for a cell search. Plaintiff refused

because he believed Officer Sambrano was retaliating against him for having reported his taking

of Plaintiff’s personal property from his cell during prior searches. Instead of leaving his cell,

Plaintiff requested to speak to a ranking officer. Defendants then “charged” into Plaintiff’s cell

and attacked him “with excessive violent force,” causing him serious bodily injury, including a

11⁄2 inch laceration above his left eyebrow, fractured nose, and bruises all over his body. In

addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sambrano knew Plaintiff had recently undergone a

cornea transplant, but nevertheless sprayed pepper spray in his eyes five to six times, causing

damage to Plaintiff’s eyesight. (See First Am. Compl. at 2-6.)

Defendants Alvarado and Sambrano filed a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff

cross-moved for a judgment as a matter of law. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation, recommending Defendants’ summary judgment motion be granted with

respect to the retaliation claim and denied with respect to the excessive force claim. He also

recommended Plaintiff’s motion be denied. Defendants objected to the Report and

Recommendation to the extent it recommends denying summary adjudication of the excessive

force claim. Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ objections. For the reasons which follow,

Defendants’ objections are overruled.

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, “the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc)

(emphasis in original); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26 & n.5 (D. Ariz.

2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia to habeas review). 

Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that evidence in the record raises a

genuine issue of material fact whether Defendants used excessive force on Plaintiff. (See R&R

at 7-8.) They maintain that Plaintiff did not provide any admissible evidence to counter the

Case 3:04-cv-01833-L-PCL Document 154 Filed 02/26/08 Page 2 of 7
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1 In his response to Defendants’ objections, Plaintiff also appears to request this

court to reject the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as

a matter of law and grant Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the retaliation claim. 

To the extent Plaintiff intended his response to Defendants’ objections to serve as his own

objections in these regards, they are denied as untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

3 04cv1833

evidence they had presented. Plaintiff responded by pointing to the pertinent portions of his

exhibits, including his deposition transcript.1

 Accordingly, the only issue before this court is

whether Plaintiff met his burden on the excessive force issue for purposes of establishing his

Eighth Amendment claim.

As this case is before the court on a summary judgment motion, Rule 56 governs the

parties’ burdens. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to enter summary

judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and

inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327

(1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001). “By its

very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 

When a defendant moves for summary adjudication of plaintiff’s claims, the moving

party can meet its burden by pointing out the absence of evidence from the nonmoving party. 

See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.

1998). If the movant meets his burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show summary

adjudication is not appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317, 324. The nonmoving party cannot

oppose a properly supported summary adjudication motion by "rest[ing] on mere allegations or

denials in his pleadings." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmovant must go beyond the

pleadings to designate specific facts showing there are genuine factual issues which "can be

Case 3:04-cv-01833-L-PCL Document 154 Filed 02/26/08 Page 3 of 7
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resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either

party." Id. at 250. In considering the motion, the nonmovant's evidence is to be believed and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Id. at 255. 

The Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine

issue of material fact to overcome Defendants’ motion with respect to the Eighth Amendment

claim. A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Under the governing law, “[a]fter incarceration,

only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (internal

quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted). “[T]he question whether the measure taken

inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was

applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for

the very purpose of causing harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992); see also id. at 7. 

“[S]uch factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the

amount of the force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted are relevant to that ultimate

determination.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (internal quotation marks, brackets and citation

omitted). 

According to Defendants’ declarations, Plaintiff was drunk at the time of the incident,

failed to obey repeated orders to cuff up and exit his cell, spat at the officers, adopted a fighting

stance, and threw an electric kettle at Officer Sambrano. (R&R at 6.) Defendants attempted to

restrain Plaintiff with pepper spray, however, Plaintiff continued to defy them. (Id. at 7.) 

Defendants then used physical force to restrain Plaintiff and remove him from his cell. (Id.) 

Defendants also filed a declaration from their expert opining that it was reasonable for them to

gain compliance with a lawful order. (Id. at 4.)

/ / / / /

/ / / / /

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2 Defendants attached a deposition excerpt to their memorandum of points and

authorities in support of their summary judgment motion. Plaintiff attached an excerpt to his

cross-motion styled as Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Rules 50(1)(2) and

56 Fed. Rules of Civil Proc. The Magistrate Judge construed the cross-motion as a summary

judgment motion. The parties’ cross-motions addressed the same claims. When cross-motions

for summary judgment are filed on the same claims, the court must consider evidence submitted

in support of and in opposition to both motions before ruling on either. Fair Housing Council of

Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).

3 Plaintiff wanted to speak to a sergeant because this was the third time Officer

Sambrano conducted a random search of Plaintiff’s cell that week. (Id. at 31.) Each time he

searched, he removed Plaintiff’s items but did not include them on the cell search receipt. 

Plaintiff therefore could not retrieve them later. (Id.) Plaintiff had previously filed grievances

complaining of this conduct. (Id. at 31, 49-50.) Three days before the incident, Officer

Sambrano told Plaintiff that at the next search, he will take away Plaintiff’s TV set. (Id. at 49.) 

5 04cv1833

In their summary judgment briefing, both sides relied on Plaintiff’s deposition transcript,

and each attached an excerpt to his respective motion papers.2

 Plaintiff filed additional pages

from the deposition transcript in response to Defendants’ objections. The court may consider

these additional deposition pages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), which states in pertinent

part that the district court judge may receive further evidence on review of a report and

recommendation. 

According to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, Defendants entered Plaintiff’s cell to

conduct a random search. (Pl.’s Dep. at 22, 31.) When Officer Sambrano instructed Plaintiff

and his cell mate, Edward Valencio, to exit the cell, Mr. Valencio requested to speak to a

sergeant. (Id.) Officer Sambrano again instructed Plaintiff and Mr. Valencio to exit. (Id. at 23.) 

Eventually, Mr. Valencio exited the cell, and Officer Sambrano again instructed Plaintiff to

leave. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff requested to speak to a sergeant,3

 but Officer Sambrano expressly

denied this request. (Id.) 

Officers Sambrano and Alvarado then sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray approximately

five or six times. (Id. at 39.) Plaintiff denied the defense counsel’s suggestion that he tried to

strike Officer Sambrano after he was sprayed. (Id. at 39-40.) After the pepper spray, Officer

Sambrano hit Plaintiff with a baton several times on his chest, face, right eye, and forehead. (Id.

at 42.) When Plaintiff raised his hands to shield his face, he was also hit on his forearms. (Id. at

42-43.) At the same time, Officer Alvarado hit Plaintiff several times with a baton on his left

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leg, hip, ribs, left shoulder and back. (Id. at 43.) As they were hitting him, Officer Sambrano

stood in front of Plaintiff, and Officer Alvarado stood on Plaintiff’s side. (Id.) Plaintiff

eventually fell onto his bed and the officers handcuffed him. (Id.) After Plaintiff was

handcuffed, Officer Sambrano started hitting him on the back. (Id. at 43-44.) At that time,

Plaintiff heard Mr. Valencio asking the officers to leave Plaintiff alone. (Id. at 44.) Officer

Sambrano then pushed Plaintiff to the floor and dragged him out of the cell. (Id.) 

After the incident, there was blood all over Plaintiff’s cell. (Id. at 64.) Among other

injuries, Plaintiff received a 11⁄2 inch laceration above his left eye (id. at 40, 46) and lost vision in

his right eye (id. at 42, 60).

Plaintiff denied the defense counsel’s suggestions that Officer Sambrano ordered him to

cuff up at any time during the incident (id. at 24, 40), that Plaintiff was drunk at the time of the

incident (id. at 24-28), brandished or threw an electric kettle toward Officer Sambrano (id. at

39), or spat at Officer Sambrano (id. at 37). 

Plaintiff’s account of the incidents differs materially from Defendants’ account in that it

does not appear that the extent of the force used was necessary. On the other hand, Defendants

assert the use of force was justified by Plaintiff’s aggressive and threatening conduct toward

them. Based on the differences between Defendants’ declarations and Plaintiff’s deposition

testimony, issues such as the need for the application of force, the amount of the force applied,

and the relationship between the need and the amount of the force that was used, see Whitley,

475 U.S. at 321, are disputed. These are material issues of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. If there is a genuine dispute about a material fact,

summary judgment can not be granted. Id. at 250. 

Defendants liken this case to Scott v. Harris, which noted that “[w]hen opposing parties

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of

ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). This case is not like

Harris. In Harris, the plaintiff’s account of the incident was contradicted by an undisputed

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videotape of the incident. By contrast, this is the usual case where each side describes the

incident differently. Whether a jury will believe Defendants over Plaintiff is a question of

witness credibility. Determinations regarding credibility, the weighing of evidence, and the

drawing of legitimate inferences are jury functions and are not appropriate for resolution by the

court on a summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court concurs with Magistrate Judge Lewis’ finding that

Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the excessive force claim. 

Defendants’ objections are OVERRULED, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED as

amplified herein. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and GRANTED with respect to his First Amendment

claim. Plaintiff’s motion styled as a motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 26, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. PETER C. LEWIS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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