Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_90-cv-00363/USCOURTS-caed-1_90-cv-00363-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ALLEN HAMILTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Acting Warden )

of San Quentin State Prison,* )

)

Respondent. )

)

Case No. CIV. F-90-363-OWW-P

Death Penalty Case

Final Memorandum Decision

and Order Denying Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus

and Granting in Part

Certificate of Appealability

Petitioner Michael Allen Hamilton (“Hamilton”) first

appeared in federal court June 12, 1990, requesting a stay of

execution and appointment of counsel. Hamilton filed his

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

December 3, 1991, and amended his petition January 11, 1993. 

Hamilton was ordered to exhaust state remedies March 18, 1993,

and his second state habeas petition was filed in July, 1994. 

After informal briefing, the California Supreme Court issued an

order to show cause (“OSC”) on July 17, 1996, addressing issues

__________________

* Robert Ayers is substituted for his predecessor as Acting

Warden of San Quentin State Prison, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 25(d).

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of juror bias and misconduct. The matter was referred to the

trial court, a referee was appointed, and an evidentiary hearing

was held November 4 and 5, 1997. The California Supreme Court

discharged the OSC and denied the petition May 6, 1999, holding

the evidence did not show the juror’s failure to fully disclose

her pretrial knowledge and opinions about the case resulted in

the seating of a biased juror since her omissions were

inadvertent, and her contemplation of her deceased uncle did not

bear on her ability to be fair and was not a pretrial event which

she was required to disclose in voir dire. In re Hamilton, 20

Cal. 4th 273 (1999). The remainder of Hamilton’s claims in his

second state habeas petition were summarily denied.

Hamilton filed his fully exhausted petition with supporting

points and authorities April 14, 2000. Respondent Robert Ayers

(“the State”) filed an answer with supporting points and

authorities July 19, 2000, and Hamilton’s traverse was filed

November 20, 2000. Hamilton filed his motion for evidentiary

hearing December 5, 2000, and the State’s opposition to an

evidentiary hearing was filed January 2, 2001. The State was

granted leave to file a supplemental opposition to Hamilton’s

motion for evidentiary hearing January 15, 2002, and Hamilton’s

response to the supplemental opposition was filed March 1, 2002.

Hamilton’s motion for evidentiary hearing was granted in

part on Claim 2b, addressing the issue of whether trial counsel’s

performance was deficient for failing to present mitigating

evidence. Claims 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 21, and subclaims a, g, h,

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 The analysis of the claims denied evidentiary hearing is 1

repeated here for continuity. The language of the original order

inadvertently referred to the standard of review under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 

The merits of those claims have been reconsidered under the

standard in effect prior to the enactment of the AEDPA and the

result is not altered.

ORePetnHam 3

i, o, u, w, aj, ak, ao, and as, of Claim 2, were denied an

evidentiary hearing and denied on the merits. See Memorandum 1

and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for

Evidentiary Hearing, dated November 12, 2002.

An evidentiary hearing was held December 3 and 4, 2003, at

which testimony was received from Strickland expert Phillip

Cherney, trial counsel David M. Liebowitz, defense investigator

Danny Wells, and Hamilton. Following the hearing, Hamilton was

allowed to supplement the record, and did so with documents filed

January 26, 2004. Hamilton filed his post-hearing brief March

16, 2004, and the State filed their post-hearing brief on March

29, 2004.

The State objected to a copy of a letter by Hamilton about

his background dated September 20, 1982, first submitted with the

supplemental records filed January 26, 2004. See Ex. 133D. The

State argued the late submission, fourteen years after the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was raised and after the

completion of habeas discovery and the evidentiary hearing,

raises serious questions about its authenticity and reliability. 

The State submitted a declaration from trial counsel stating he

was certain he never saw this document. The State contended

these issues must be resolved before any weight could be given to

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this document. The State’s motion to reopen the evidentiary

hearing was granted and a hearing addressing the limited issue of

the credibility of Exhibit 133D was held September 9, 2004. 

Hamilton filed his supplemental brief October 26, 2004, and the

State filed its supplemental brief November 2, 2004.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hamilton was convicted of the November 2, 1981 shooting of

his wife and their unborn child. The jury found Hamilton

personally used a firearm in the murders. Two special

circumstances, financial gain and multiple murder, were found

true as to Hamilton’s wife, and the special circumstance of

multiple murder was found true as to the fetus. Hamilton was

sentenced to death on December 16, 1982. On direct appeal the

California Supreme Court set aside one of the multiple murder

special circumstances and otherwise affirmed the judgment in

full. People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142 (1989). Hamilton’s

first state habeas corpus petition, filed March 14, 1989, was

summarily denied August 31, 1989, and certiorari was denied March

19, 1990.

II. FACTS

In 1981, Hamilton, his wife Gwendolyn (Gwen) who was

pregnant, and their four children, ages six, four, three and one,

lived in Bakersfield. RT 7:1725, 1740; RT 9:2039-40. In March

of that year, the Hamiltons purchased life insurance policies,

$175,000 on Hamilton and $100,000 on Gwen, paying the initial

premium for coverage until June. RT 7:1715-17. When they did

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not pay the second quarterly payment on time, the agent

personally collected the payment from Hamilton, extending the

policy into September. Id. at 1717, 1722. When the third

premium was not received, the agent again visited the Hamiltons

on October 17, collecting payment for two months from Gwen,

extending the policies into November. Id.

In September, Hamilton began an extramarital relationship

with Brenda Burns. RT 8:1798-99. In October, he called his

sister Carolyn Hamilton to ask if she knew anyone who would do

something illegal for money. Id. at 1852-53. Later he told

Carolyn he wanted someone to kill Gwen and offered her $20,000

from the insurance on Gwen's life if she would help find someone

to do the killing. Id. at 1855, 1857-60. Hamilton told both

Carolyn and his brother-in-law Lyle Palmer that he had a

girlfriend, but if he left or divorced Gwen he wouldn’t have his

kids. Id. at 1857; RT 7:1744-45. Brenda’s sister Sharon Burns

also testified that Hamilton told her he didn’t like the way Gwen

was in bed, sexually, and he wanted to divorce her so he could

live with Brenda. RT 8:1842.

Carolyn first asked another sister, Victoria (Vicki)

Hamilton, who agreed to kill Gwen for $10,000 of the insurance

money. RT 8:1861; RT 9:2045. However, Vicki moved to Texas a

few days later. RT 8:1959-68. Carolyn then approached Gilbert

Garay, a prior acquaintance she met when both worked as security

guards for Porterville Private Patrol. Id. at 1856, 1865-67,

1972-77. Gilbert agreed to kill Gwen for $10,000. Id. at 1867,

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1974-75.

On October 31, Hamilton and Brenda Burns went to K-Mart in

Bakersfield and purchased a single-shot 12-gauge shotgun. RT

8:1776, 1801. Hamilton said he left his identification in the

car, so Brenda purchased the gun and shells with money furnished

by Hamilton. Id. at 1776; 1802-03, 1805-06.

That evening Hamilton, Gwen, and their children drove to

Porterville to take their kids trick-or-treating with Carolyn’s

son. RT 8:1868. While accompanying the children trick-ortreating, Hamilton, Carolyn and Gilbert discussed plans for the

murder. Id. at 1869-70. Hamilton told Carolyn he would start to

drive his family home, but then stop on Highway 65 claiming one

tire was flat, so that Carolyn and Gilbert could drive by and

shoot Gwen. Id. at 1869-70, 1982. Carolyn and Gilbert left in

Carolyn’s truck a few minutes after Hamilton. Id. at 1981. As

planned, Carolyn and Gilbert found Hamilton crouched down by the

tire with Gwen standing beside him holding a flashlight. Id. at

1872-73. Although Carolyn drove by three to four times, Gilbert

never pulled the trigger, so they eventually returned to

Porterville. Id. at 1874, 1984-85.

Hamilton phoned Carolyn about an hour later to ask what

happened. RT 8:1875. Carolyn made excuses and Hamilton said

they would come back to Porterville the next day. Id. at 1875-

76. The next day Hamilton phoned Carolyn to say he would pretend

to have lost his wallet while changing the tire. Id. at 1876-77,

1987. Hamilton and Gwen would stop at the same place on the

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pretext of looking for his wallet. Id. at 1877, 1987. Carolyn

and Gilbert would follow them and shoot Gwen as previously

planned. Id.

That evening, Hamilton and his family again visited Carolyn,

his mother and stepfather, Jacqueline (Jackie) and Sam Piper, in

Porterville. RT 8:1877, 1988. Carolyn and Gilbert followed

Hamilton about a half-hour after he left, and found him and Gwen

at the same place, looking for the “lost” wallet. Id. at 1878-

79, 1989. Carolyn and Gilbert drove by several times, but again

Gilbert did not shoot. Id. at 1879-80, 1990-91. Hamilton was

mad when he called Carolyn about an hour later, and she made more

excuses. Id. at 1881.

The following day Hamilton called Carolyn with a new plan. 

RT 8:1882. As part of this plan, Carolyn called Gwen and told

her that Hamilton’s wallet had been found. Id. at 1993. 

Hamilton and Gwen for the first time left their children with

Gwen’s sister, who also lived in Bakersfield, and drove a white

pickup truck to Porterville. RT 7:1726-28. When they arrived,

Hamilton surreptitiously gave Carolyn his wallet, so she could

return it to him in front of the family. RT 8:1884. Hamilton

and Carolyn went to pick up Gilbert, and Carolyn and Gilbert told

Hamilton they weren’t going to shoot Gwen. Id. at 1886-87,

1993. Hamilton said he would do it. Id. at 1888. Hamilton said

he would be hitchhiking, and instructed Carolyn and Gilbert to

pick him up and take him back to his pickup. Id. at 1995.

This time everything went according to the new plan. 

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Carolyn gave Hamilton an icepick, which he used to jab a hole in

one of his pickup’s tires. Id. at 1888-89. Hamilton stopped the

pickup along the highway because one tire was going flat. RT

7:1696. He left Gwen in the truck and walked along the highway,

ostensibly to find a place where he could phone for help. Id.

Carolyn and Gilbert picked him up in Carolyn's truck and drove

him to a phone booth, where Hamilton called his mother and asked

her to come help him. RT 8:1892, 1998; RT 7:1613. Mrs. Piper

said she could not come until Carolyn returned with the truck. 

Id. at 1614. Carolyn and Gilbert then drove Hamilton back to

where Gwen was waiting in the pickup. RT 8:1892, 1998. Hamilton

took the shotgun, walked over to the pickup, and shot Gwen. Id.

1894, 2001. He returned to the truck and demanded another shell. 

Id. at 1894, 2003. After reloading, he went back and shot Gwen

again. Id. at 1896, 2003-04.

Gilbert drove back to the phone booth where they left

Hamilton. RT 8:1897-98, 2006. Carolyn returned home with the

truck after she dropped Gilbert off at a friend’s house. Id. at

1899-1900. Carolyn called Hamilton back at the phone booth and

said their mother and stepfather were on the way. Id. at 1900;

RT 7:1615. The Pipers drove Carolyn’s truck to pick up Hamilton

at the phone booth, and then to where Hamilton “discovered” that

Gwen had been killed. Id. at 1615-16.

An autopsy revealed the cause of Gwen’s death was shotgun

wounds to the throat and chest, fired at close range. RT 7:1677-

81. The fetus was viable and died from anoxia caused by Gwen’s

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death. Id. at 1682-84; RT 8:1929-30.

Hamilton first told the police that Gwen had been killed

while he was hitch-hiking to the phone booth. RT 7:1695-98. The

next day, however, he said that she was killed by a Canadian whom

he refused to identify. Id. at 1699. Eventually Vicki told the

police of the plan to kill Gwen. RT 9:2052-53. With Vicki’s

consent, the police taped two phone calls between her and

Carolyn. Id. at 2054. Carolyn and Gilbert each confessed when

they were arrested, and were each charged with two counts of

first degree murder with special circumstances. RT 8:1904, 2011-

12. Both Carolyn and Gilbert agreed to plead guilty to second

degree murder with a dangerous-weapon enhancement, and be

sentenced to 16 years to life, in return for their testimony

against Hamilton at trial. Id. at 1904, 2013. Carolyn and

Gilbert both testified at trial, identifying Hamilton as Gwen’s

killer. Id. at 1894-96, 2000-04.

At trial, the defense attempted to show that Gilbert might

have been the actual killer. Lilly Bardsley, the clerk from KMart who testified for the prosecution that she sold the shotgun

to Brenda and Hamilton, was recalled by the defense and testified

instead that she sold the gun to Brenda’s sister Sharon, who was

accompanied by both Hamilton and Gilbert. RT 9:2145-51, 2157-68. 

Sharon, also recalled by the prosecution in rebuttal, denied

purchasing the shotgun. Id. at 2177-80. The ATF form filled out

at the time the gun was purchased was signed with Brenda’s name,

and the prosecutor presented expert testimony that the signature

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was in Brenda’s, not Sharon’s, handwriting. Id. at 2211-24. 

Vicki testified that when she first talked to Carolyn after the

murder, she assumed Gilbert was the shooter. Id. at 2050. 

Another defense witness testified that prior to Gwen’s murder,

Hamilton told her he suspected Vicki and her boyfriend, Stephen

Fitzherbert (who was Canadian), were planning to kill him. 

Hamilton stated, “Well, you know my family, if they want anything

bad enough, they'll kill for it.” RT 9:2138-41. Hamilton did

not testify.

The jury found Hamilton guilty as charged, and found true

the charged special circumstances of intentional murder for

financial gain, and two counts of multiple murder. RT 10:2347-

58. The penalty trial was brief. The prosecutor presented

documentary evidence that ten years previously Hamilton was

convicted of grand theft. Id. at 2373-74. Defense counsel

called Hamilton’s mother, who testified that as a child Hamilton

had been removed from the family home because of abusive conduct

by his father, and placed in a series of foster homes. Id. at

2382-84. Hamilton requested permission to read a statement

telling the penalty jury he was not guilty, but for unspecified

reasons beyond his control he was not permitted to testify or

present exonerating evidence, and asking the jury to “return with

the penalty described by law for the crime that you have me

guilty of.” Id. at 2374-81. Defense counsel objected, and the

court refused to permit Hamilton to read the statement. Id.

After approximately four hours, the jury returned a verdict

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imposing the death penalty. Id. at 2419-20.

III. APPLICABILITY OF THE AEDPA; STANDARD OF REVIEW

On April 24, 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), amending Chapter

153 (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255), which governs federal habeas corpus

proceedings. The United States Supreme Court held the provisions

of the AEDPA apply only to cases filed after its effective date. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under previous Ninth

Circuit authority, a capital habeas corpus case was pending or

filed when an application for appointment of counsel and a

request for a stay of execution was filed. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Court (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

banc). However, Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003),

overturned Kelly V, holding that only an application for habeas

relief which seeks adjudication on the merits of a petitioner’s

claims qualifies a case as “pending” under amended § 2254(d). 

Id. at 207.

The holding of Garceau does not affect the previous rulings

that Hamilton is not subject to the limitations of the AEDPA. 

Hamilton’s initial federal habeas petition, which sought

adjudication on the merits of his claims, was filed on December

3, 1991. Hamilton’s case was pending at the time the AEDPA was

enacted and is not subject to the amendments to Chapter 153.

Constitutional violations are categorized as either trial

error or structural error. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,

306-10 (1991). Trial errors “occur during the presentation of

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the case to the jury," and are amenable to harmless-error

analysis because they can “be quantitatively assessed in the

context of other evidence presented” to determine the effect on

the trial. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-308. Structural errors

are “defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which

defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,” id. at 309, and

require “automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect

the entire trial process.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

629-30 (1993).

The limited scope of federal habeas review does not warrant

relief unless trial errors had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” and

deprived Hamilton of a fair trial in violation of his right to

due process. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. In the rare case where a

court is in “grave doubt” or “virtual equipoise” about the

harmlessness of the error, the error should not be treated as

harmless. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995). Mixed

questions of fact and law require de novo review. Dickson v.

Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1988). State court

findings of historical fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (effective until April 23,

1996), and are reviewed for clear error. Jeffries v. Blodgett,

5 F. 3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1993).

IV. PRE-TRIAL CLAIMS

1. CLAIM 21: COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL

Hamilton contends he was incompetent to stand trial and that

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no inquiry was made by the court, the prosecutor, or defense

counsel, into his mental state even though they were on notice of

his possibly disordered or impaired mentality. Competence to

stand trial is a fundamental right which implicates due process. 

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). The test for

competency to stand trial is whether the defendant “has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has

a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per

curiam); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993).

Cases finding sufficient evidence of incompetency have

entailed either extremely erratic and irrational behavior during

trial or a lengthy history of acute psychosis and psychiatric

treatment. Compare Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir.

1985) (no real and substantial doubt of competency because five

attempted suicides were too distant from the crime, no mental

impairment from repeated head injuries and alcoholism, and

diagnosis as a sociopath does not affect competency); and De

Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 983-85 (9th Cir. 1976) (no bona

fide doubt of competency despite two emotional and inappropriate

outbursts at trial, expert testimony of severe disturbance and

paranoid schizophrenia, and a bizarre and gruesome crime); with

Tillery v. Eyeman, 492 F.2d 1056, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1974)

(incompetence found where the defendant displayed erratic and

irrational behavior during trial, such as screaming throughout

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the night, laughing at the jury, gesturing to the bailiff,

disrobing in the courtroom and butting his head through a glass

window); Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir.

1972) (incompetence shown by the defendant’s lengthy history of

acute psychosis, repeat hospitalization for acute mental illness

and hallucinations, and evidence of psychiatric treatment); and

Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (competency

hearing required where section of Odle’s brain was removed and

had history of psychotic episodes, despite calm appearance in

court).

On collateral review, the determination of competence is

reviewed as of the time of trial. De Kaplany, 540 F.2d at 979-80

(evidence before the state trial judge reviewed to determine if

there should have been a bona fide doubt as to competence). A

claim of trial court error requires a showing that a reasonable

judge would have had a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s

competence to stand trial. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486,

489 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1109

(9th Cir. 2000) (trial court’s finding of no bona fide doubt was

not supported by the record). A bona fide doubt arises if there

is substantial evidence of incompetence, which includes

irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, and any prior medical

opinion on competence. Amaya-Ruiz, id.; Drope v. Missouri, 420

U.S. 162, 180 (1975).

Hamilton contends he had a previous psychiatric history

including an admission to a psychiatric ward, was psychiatrically

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and neuropsychologically impaired during the commission of the

crime and pre-trial detention, and suffered from major mental

illnesses, all of which required professional intervention and

medications while awaiting trial, including treatment for: (1)

major depression; (2) suicidal tendencies with at least one

attempted suicide while awaiting trial; (3) post-traumatic stress

disorder; and (4) psychosis. Hamilton contends he was

administered medications for depression, agitation, anxiety and

emotional instability which were not supported by reliable

medical or judicial determinations and were contra-indicated for

a patient with hyperthyroidism and emotional instability.

Hamilton presents in support of this claim the opinion of

George Woods, M.D., who asserts that Hamilton’s mental state

deteriorated during his incarceration before trial. Dr. Woods

relates that Hamilton was observed by medical staff to be

anxious, depressed, experienced sleep disturbances and

nightmares, and was suicidal, that a psychologist noted his

difficulty in concentration, blunted affect (feeling, emotion),

exhaustion, sadness and tearfulness, that he was medicated with

Etrafon (an antipsychotic drug), Tofranil (an antidepressant) and

Benadryl, medications which could have been contra-indicated

given his medical history, that he was observed by court staff

and jurors to be emotionally constricted, remarkably

expressionless, lacking emotion and seemingly detached, while at

other times emotionally labile (unstable), weepy and suddenly

uncontrollable, and that his emotional responses intensified and

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he began shouting and crying during a conversation with counsel

after his dosage of Etrafon was increased. Dr. Woods concludes

these reports point to a pharmaceutically-induced or aggravated

state of confusion, agitation and inattention that likely

affected Hamilton’s ability to make decisions, testify

relevantly, and respond appropriately to courtroom proceedings

and developments, and made it extremely unlikely he would have

been able to weigh and consider such issues as the advantages and

disadvantages about testifying and to reach a rational decision

about testifying. Dr. Woods also concludes that Hamilton’s

family history of genetic disorders, childhood physical and

psychological abuse and atmosphere of sexual abuse, burdened him

with extreme mental and emotional impairments, including serious

psychiatric disorders, that compromised his ability to fully

appreciate the nature and consequences of his acts or to conform

his conduct to the requirements of the law. See Ex. 48.

No medical records are presented in support of this claim. 

Hamilton instead offers the opinion of Dr. Woods, concluding that

contemporaneous observations of Hamilton’s emotional state during

his trial indicate Hamilton’s preexisting mental condition was

exacerbated by the drugs he was given, rendering it extremely

unlikely Hamilton was able to make rational decisions. No

declaration regarding Hamilton’s competency is submitted from

trial counsel.

Further, Hamilton has not cited, and the record does not

show, one instance of Hamilton acting irrationally during the

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pretrial, trial or sentencing proceedings. To the contrary, on

the three occasions when the trial court conversed with Hamilton

regarding his request to be moved to an alternate cell, his

Marsden motion, and his request to read a statement to the jury, 2

Hamilton responded appropriately and intelligently, indicating an

understanding of the court’s explanations. See RT May 17, 1982;

RT June 22, 1982; RT 10:2374-81. Even Hamilton’s proclamation of

his innocence prior to sentencing indicates his ability to

control his emotions and communicate, despite facing an extremely

stressful event. See RT December 16, 1982.

Finally and very importantly, Hamilton has not shown that he

was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against

him or to assist counsel. To the contrary, Hamilton’s discourses

with the trial court indicate he was fully aware of what was

occurring and was able to communicate his thoughts and opinions

to counsel.

Hamilton filed supplemental records on January 26, 2004,

which included Tulare County Jail Medical Records from December

1981 through March 1982, as well as medical records from Kings

View Clinic of a mental health evaluation on April 8, 1982, and

medication orders for May through October, 1982. The jail

records show that Hamilton was receiving medication for

depression in March, 1982, and that it had been discontinued for

an unknown reason. See Ex. 140. The Kings View diagnosis

attributed Hamilton’s blunted affect (feelings, emotions) and

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depressed mood to being incarcerated and charged with murder. 

See Ex. 134. The supplemental evidence does not support

Hamilton’s claim that he was incompetent.

When the record is viewed as a whole, the evidence presented

by Dr. Woods does not raise a “bona fide doubt” as to Hamilton’s

competence to stand trial. Based on the evidence presented,

defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the

issue of Hamilton’s competence. The record fairly supports the

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim

21 is denied on the merits.

2. CLAIMS 1 & 2ab: CHANGE OF VENUE; INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL

Hamilton contends the trial court erred by twice denying his

request to change venue. Hamilton also argues trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue the

interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of his change of

venue motion. Hamilton asserts the publicity before and during

his trial in Tulare County was so pervasive it was not possible

to impanel an impartial jury. Hamilton alleges the media

coverage included grave inaccuracies, extra-judicial proof of

guilt, references to inadmissable evidence, and opinions by court

officers and state agents about his guilt and the appropriateness

of the death penalty.

The California Supreme Court reviewed this claim on direct

appeal, examining (1) the nature and extent of pretrial

publicity, (2) the county’s population, (3) the nature and

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gravity of the offense, (4) the status of the victim and of the

accused in the community, (5) the existence of political

overtones in the case, and the actual jury voir dire. The Court

denied this claim, finding the trial court’s denial of Hamilton’s

change of venue motion did not result in a reasonable likelihood

of an unfair trial. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1156-57.

Hamilton claims approximately 83% of the potential jurors

(126 of 147) and of the impaneled jurors (10 of 12) had been

exposed to the extensive media coverage of the murder. Hamilton

maintains the selection of the jury and the conduct of the trial

resulted in the prejudicial exposure to inaccurate, exaggerated,

inflammatory publicity and extrajudicial information about his

guilt or innocence. Hamilton alleges several jurors read a great

deal about the case before being called for jury duty, several

had extrajudicial information about fetal viability which they

shared with other jurors, and one juror thought she saw

Hamilton’s sister near her house during trial.

A criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury. 

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). Where prejudicial

publicity makes seating an impartial jury impossible, a motion

for change of venue must be granted. Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d

1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988); Gallegos v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065,

1070 (9th Cir. 1997). Prejudice of the venire may be presumed or

actual. On habeas review, the district court must make an

independent review of the record to determine if prejudice

existed which denied the petitioner a fair trial. Jeffries v.

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Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1993).

Presumed Prejudice

 “Prejudice is presumed when the record demonstrates that

the community where the trial was held was saturated with

prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime.” 

United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 410 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Prejudice is rarely presumed “because ‘saturation’ defines

conditions found only in extreme situations.” Jeffries, 5 F.3d

at 1189. Prejudice is not established where the nature of the

news coverage was factual and not inflammatory, and the bulk of

the publicity occurred months before jury selection began. Id.

The evidence presented does not undermine the California

Supreme Court’s finding that the publicity in this case was not

inflammatory nor very extensive for a crime of this magnitude. 

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1157; Ex. 60. The submitted evidence

includes news articles from three area newspapers. Six of the

articles were published in first five days following the murder

(through November 7, 1981) and another nine articles in the next

twenty-five days (through December 3, 1981). Until the start of

jury selection on October 6, 1982, ten articles were published:

three in February, two in March, one in April, two each in June

and September. The submitted evidence supports the state court’s

finding that the majority of news articles appeared immediately

following the crime and almost a year before the trial, that the

publicity was not persistent and pervasive, and that it did not

create a reasonable likelihood Hamilton would be deprived of a

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fair trial. Id. at 1157-58. Prejudice cannot be presumed in

this case.

Actual Prejudice

To establish actual prejudice, the defendant must

demonstrate that the jurors exhibited “actual partiality or

hostility that could not be laid aside.” Harris, 885 F.2d at

1363. A defendant is entitled to an impartial jury, but that

does not mean a jury completely ignorant of the facts. United

States v. Flores-Elias, 650 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1981). “The

relevant question is . . . whether the jurors . . . had such

fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of

the defendant.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984). A

key factor in evaluating the reliability of jurors’ assurances of

impartiality is the percentage of veniremen who “will admit to

disqualifying prejudice.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803

(1975). Prejudice was not been established where 25 per cent of

the venire were excused because they indicated an opinion about

the defendant’s guilt. Id.; contra, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

727 (1961) (90 per cent of venire held some opinion as to guilt,

over 60 per cent were excused for cause as having a fixed opinion

of defendant’s guilt).

Here about 20 per cent, 30 of the 152 persons in the venire,

were excused because they had formed a bias from the publicity

about the case. Many of the potential jurors who had heard about

the case but were not excused for cause had only heard Hamilton’s

version of the events (he had car trouble, he left to get help

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which he provides no supporting evidence, factual explanation, or

argument: subclaim b. that the manner of voir dire was inherently

unfair; subclaim c. that jurors were from outside the geographic

area of the crime; and subclaim d. that the jury was subjected to

unfair and discriminatory remarks by court officers and the

prosecution. These subclaims are denied on the merits as they fail

to state a prima facie claim for relief and are unsupported by any

facts.

ORePetnHam 22

and returned to find his wife murdered). Actual prejudice is not

established in this case. Counsel was not deficient in failing

to pursue a meritless appeal of venue. The record fairly

supports the California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. 

Claim 1 and Claim 2ab are denied on the merits.

3. CLAIM 5: IMPAIRED RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY3

a. WITHERSPOON ERROR

Hamilton contends that jurors were excused who did not meet

the Witherspoon standard, as they were excused without being

informed of their duty to subordinate their views and follow the

law. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Wainwright v.

Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420 (1985).

Hamilton does not indicate which excusals of potential

jurors he objects to, and no argument is presented in support of

this claim. The excusal of Mr. Skidmore was raised and rejected

in Hamilton’s direct appeal. The California Supreme Court found

Mr. Skidmore’s excusal complied with Witherspoon and Witt,

because he made it unmistakably clear that, regardless of the

evidence, he would not vote for the death penalty unless he was

an eyewitness to the murder. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1165-66.

Hamilton further asserts that the trial court erred in not

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 Wendell Webb stated “I am personally in favor of the death 4

sentence.” On further questioning, he said his main concern was

that he didn’t “believe that if someone takes a life they should

ever walk the streets again. . . . But as I said, my personal

belief is now that eventually someone would walk the streets

again.” Voir Dire RT 2:392-93. After questioning by the

prosecutor, Webb indicated that he could follow the law and weigh

the evidence presented during the penalty phase. Id. at 394.

Geneva Gholston stated that her personal beliefs were not so

opposed to the death penalty that she could never vote for death,

and that she would weigh both alternatives of life without parole

as well as death during the penalty phase. Voir Dire RT 4:1094-95.

The claim as to Gholston appears to be based on information raised

in Hamilton’s state exhaustion petition. See Claim 6d.

ORePetnHam 23

excusing two “pro-death” jurors, Wendell Webb and Geneva

Gholston. Although Hamilton raises this claim in his petition,

the claim is not included in his supporting argument.4

A prospective juror is required to be excused under

Witherspoon and Witt if his or her views on capital punishment

would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the

juror’s duties. The inquiry on review is whether the finding is

fairly supported by the record. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d

1099 (9th Cir. 1992). A trial judge’s factual finding about

juror bias is entitled to a presumption of correctness under

(former) 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Witt, 469 U.S. at 429; Hendricks,

at 1103. Even assuming for the sake of argument the trial judge

incorrectly denied an excusal for cause, the question is whether

the jury which actually was impaneled was impartial. Ross v.

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988).

Hamilton has presented no evidence to overturn the

presumption of correctness given the trial court’s findings

regarding juror bias. Further, review of the pertinent portions

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of the trial transcript, including the voir dire of jurors Webb

and Gholston, fails to indicate the impaneled jury was not

impartial. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to

object to the jury’s composition. The record fairly supports the

California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. Claim 5a is

denied on the merits.

e. FAIR CROSS-SECTION CLAIM

Hamilton alleges that Hispanics and other minorities were

systematically excluded from his jury. Hamilton contends 30% of

Tulare County was Hispanic in 1980-81. (The 1980 census

indicates 73,290 Hispanics and 245,738 total population.) 

Hamilton asserts that the Tulare County jury book for 1981

contained 14% Hispanic surnames (Appendix B: 1,461 of 10,495),

that his jury pool was 11% Hispanic (Appendix C: 20 of 160), and

that no Hispanics were seated on his jury. Hamilton contends the

county erred by using voter registration and DMV records when

there was access to lists reflecting a more accurate crosssection of the population. Hamilton further asserts the county

was able to control the racial/ethnic composition of panels

through computerized data processing.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant an

impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. 

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1985). “In order to

establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section

requirement, the defendant must show: (1) that the group alleged

to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2)

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that the representation of this group in venires from which

juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the

number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of the group in

the jury selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,

364 (1979).

Proof of unconstitutional discrimination has not been

established by statistics showing a 10% or less absolute

disparity between the group representation on the jury venire and

in the community. “We cannot say that purposeful discrimination

based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by showing that an

identifiable group in a community is under-represented by as much

as 10%.” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965),

overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

90-96 (1986).

The 1980 census showed that the adult population of

Hispanics in Tulare County was 24.85%. People v. Howard, 1 Cal.

4th 1132 (1992); Appendix A (Total adult population - 165,565;

Hispanic adult population - 41,142 = 24.85% ). The number of

people with Hispanic surnames in Hamilton’s jury pool was 22. 

(Appendix D omitted Jerry Rocha and Mary Rodarte.) The

percentage of Hispanics on Hamilton’s venire was 13.75% (22 of

160). These figures represent a 11.1% absolute disparity between

the Hispanic representation on Hamilton’s jury venire and in the

county’s adult Hispanic population.

 Although this percentage of under-representation is

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slightly greater than the amount held inadequate to alone show

purposeful discrimination in Swain, Hamilton fails to address

other issues which would narrow the gap between adult population

and the jury pool, such as citizenship, prior felony conviction,

or the ability to speak and understand English. See California

Code of Civil Procedure section 230 and United States v. TorresHernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding a

determination of under-representation must rely on evidence that

most accurately reflects the jury-eligible population). 

 Hamilton provides no evidence to support his allegation

that the disparity is due to the systematic exclusion of

Hispanics in the jury selection process. In fact, Hamilton’s

allegation of computerized manipulation is undermined by the

declaration of Steve Konishi, court administrator for Tulare

County, stating that no procedures to monitor racial composition

exist, nor has the county ever been required to study racial

representation on jury panels. See Appendix F.

Even assuming that Hamilton has presented sufficient

evidence to meet the second prong of Duren, there is no evidence

that the under-representation was caused by a systematic

exclusion of Hispanics from the jury selection process. Based on

this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to

object to the composition of the jury. The record fairly

supports the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this

claim. Claim 5e is denied on the merits.

/////

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f. BATSON CLAIM

Hamilton contends the prosecutor exercised peremptory

challenges to remove Hispanics or other minorities, as well as

persons with scruples against the death penalty, from the jury. 

However, Hamilton has provided no evidence, factual explanation

or argument in support of this claim, instead he only lists page

citations for the voir dire of Hispanics on his jury venire. See

Appendix D. This claim was not raised at trial.

The improper exercise by a prosecutor of a peremptory

challenge can deny a defendant the Equal Protection of the laws

under Batson v. Kentucky. Although Hamilton was tried before the

Supreme Court decided Batson, both state and federal law grounds

existed under which he could have challenged the jury selection

process. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 272 (1978)

(prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective

jurors on basis of race violates state constitution); Ford v.

Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 420 (1991) (defendant who was tried before

Batson and raised a contemporaneous objection to jury selection

based on Swain v. Alabama preserved a Batson claim for direct

appeal). Under California law, a challenge to the composition of

the jury based on a prosecutor’s improper exercise of peremptory

challenges must be made prior to the completion of jury

selection, that is, before the jury is sworn or alternates are

impaneled. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-282; People v. Ortega, 156

Cal. App. 3d 63, 69-70 (1984).

To excuse procedural default, Hamilton must establish both

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cause and actual prejudice. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 169 (1982). An attorney’s ignorance or inadvertent error

does not establish cause for procedural default unless the

attorney’s performance is constitutionally defective. Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). Thus, “the mere fact that

counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a

claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does

not constitute cause for procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S.

at 486-87. Further, the establishment of a new federal claim

does not provide cause for a default if the alleged error also

violated established state law and no objection was made on state

law grounds. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989). 

Actual prejudice requires that Hamilton show “the errors at his

trial . . . worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional

dimension.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170.

Hamilton’s failure to raise this claim during trial, when it

could have been timely addressed, renders adequate review

difficult, since the opportunity for the prosecutor to provide a

basis for his peremptory challenges was lost. For five of the

seven potential jurors with Hispanic surnames the prosecutor

excused, a non-racial basis for each excusal is apparent on the

face of the record. Since this claim was not raised during

trial, when the prosecutor could have articulated non-racial

reasons for the challenges which are not apparent from the cold

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record, and because Hamilton has shown no error resulting from

the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges which worked

to his actual or substantial disadvantage, it cannot be assumed

that the other two challenges were improper. Review of the

record establishes that, overall, an “inference of

discrimination” is not raised. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S.

162, 168 (2005). This evidence from the record that no

discriminatory exercise of challenges occurred means defense

counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the jury

selection process. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary merits denial of this claim. Claim 5f is

denied on the merits.

4. CLAIM 6: JUROR MISCONDUCT

d. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE BIAS

Hamilton alleges Geneva Gholston failed to disclose that

prior to being summoned for jury duty she formed the opinion

Hamilton was guilty, that she was motived to serve to avenge

certain crimes, that she was guided by a dead uncle to impose

death, and that she had extrajudicial contact with and fear of

Hamilton’s sister Vicki and her boyfriend Stephen Fitzherbert

(who she saw parked in the alley behind her house) which prompted

her to request police protection. Hamilton asserts Ms.

Gholston’s failure to disclose her bias violated his right to an

impartial jury and prevented trial counsel from examining her to

determine prejudice.

On state exhaustion, the California Supreme Court ordered an

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evidentiary hearing on this claim. The state trial court held,

based on factual findings by the referee, that even if Ms.

Gholston’s voir dire answers understated her pretrial awareness

and impressions about the case, particularly with respect to

Hamilton’s claim of a Canadian killer, her omissions did not lead

to the seating of a biased juror. In re Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th at

298. The state court found that Ms. Gholston stated on voir dire

she was impartial, and regardless of any pretrial impressions,

she could and would judge the case solely on the evidence; that

she has since insisted at all stages her exposure to pretrial

information did not affect her fairness at trial; that the

referee, after watching Ms. Gholston testify, explicitly credited

her claim of impartiality. The state supreme court found the

circumstantial evidence did not rebut the findings and there was

no basis to conclude Ms. Gholston’s failure to disclose fully her

pretrial knowledge and opinions about Hamilton’s case resulted in

the seating of a biased juror. Id., 20 Cal. 4th at 301.

The state court further held “the evidence provides no

convincing reason to credit [Ms.] Gholston’s 1994 declaration

[which was prepared by a defense investigator], so lurid as to

raise doubts on its face, over her subsequent [contrary] and more

reasonable disclaimers both in writing and on the witness stand.” 

Id. at 304. Like the referee, the state court accepted Ms.

Gholston’s assurance that “the 1994 declaration does not

accurately set forth the ‘Uncle Frank’ episode, and that the true

experience is one which could have no bearing on her fairness as

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a juror.” Id. at 304. The Court also found no substantial

likelihood that the alleged alley incident with Vicki Hamilton

and Stephen Fitzherbert, as described by Ms. Gholston, caused her

to develop actual bias against Hamilton. Id. at 306.

Hamilton does not seek to present any additional facts on

this claim, but disputes the conclusions reached by the state

referee, which were adopted by the California Supreme Court. 

Hamilton contends the referee’s findings were contrary to the

facts and that he has stated a claim for relief under federal

law. Hamilton asserts Ms. Gholston’s bias was entrenched; that

the opinion she formed about Hamilton’s guilt during the

conversation with her neighbor was not superficial; that her fear

of Hamilton’s sister affected her decision; that the “presence”

of her uncle contributed to her prejudgment of the case; that she

is not a competent witness of her own mental state; and that her

statements at the hearing and to investigators were demonstrative

of bias. Hamilton contends Ms. Gholston was profoundly

influenced by both pretrial bias and bias which developed during

the trial such that he did not receive a fair trial.

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to a

verdict rendered by impartial, indifferent jurors. To justify a

new trial based on a claim of juror bias, a petitioner must show

a dishonest answer was given on voir dire to a material question

and that the correct response would have provided a valid basis

for a challenge for cause. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (plurality opinion); Tinsley

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v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1990). A voir dire question

is material when the honest response would reflect bias,

prejudice or partiality against a party. Coughlin v. Tailhook

Ass’n., 112 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a juror’s

dishonest answers on voir dire were unrelated to material

questions as they did not result in any bias to the defendant);

Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (an

intentionally dishonest answer to a voir dire question is not

fatal unless it indicates a bias). “Few voir dires are

impeccable, and most irregularities can be shrugged off as

immaterial to the fairness of the trial.” Dyer, 151 F.3d at 984.

State-court determinations of factual issues are presumed

correct unless an exception is present. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The exceptions to § 2254(d)’s presumption of correctness

essentially codified the standards requiring an evidentiary

hearing from Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Thompson v.

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1995). If a habeas petitioner has

had a full and fair hearing resulting in reliable findings, the

federal court ordinarily should accept the facts as found by the

state tribunal. Id. at 109. The determination of basic,

primary, or historical facts are subject to the presumption of

correctness, while the application of a legal standard, the

ultimate question, generally is not subject to § 2254(d).

Here, the credibility determination by the referee accepting

Ms. Gholston’s testimony given at the evidentiary hearing is

exclusively a factual finding, subject to the presumption of

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correctness. The state court’s conclusions that any failure to

fully disclose pretrial impressions was inadvertent, In re

Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th at 301; that the “Uncle Frank” episode was

not accurately set forth in the 1994 declaration; that Ms.

Gholston experienced no direct encounter with her Uncle Frank’s

spirit, id. at 302; and that although it was doubtful she saw

Hamilton’s sister Vicki and her boyfriend Stephen near her house,

any failure to disclose this brief, ambiguous incident was

inadvertent, id. at 306; are all entitled to a presumption of

correctness. Hamilton has presented no evidence nor persuasive

argument these presumptions of correctness should be set aside.

Whether the facts as found by the referee and state court

resulted in the seating of a biased juror is the ultimate legal

question, subject to de novo review. In each instance, the state

court concluded after an evidentiary hearing that the undisclosed

incidents experienced by Ms. Gholston did not result in the

seating of a bias juror. In re Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th at 301-02,

306. Hamilton has not shown, nor does review of the record

reveal, that Ms. Gholston was biased against him. Any omissions

about her pretrial impressions did not impact her ability, or

stated intention, to be a fair and impartial juror. There is no

evidence that any “feeling of the ‘presence’” of her Uncle

Frank’s spirit, nor any alleged contact with Vicki Hamilton and

Stephen Fitzherbert resulted in a bias against Hamilton. Nothing

in the facts found by the state court indicates prejudice or

partiality against Hamilton.

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 Detective Byrd testified Hamilton stated “a guy who was a 5

Canadian citizen and a female subject were enroute back to Canada

and that this person had done the shooting and he [Hamilton] knew

that he [the Canadian] had used a shotgun to do it.” RT 7:1699.

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Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective

for failing to discover and impeach Ms. Gholston’s alleged bias. 

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s denial

of this claim. Claim 6d is denied on the merits.

5. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

a. CLAIM 13: ILLEGAL ARREST/PRE-TRIAL DETENTION

Hamilton contends that his arrest was without warrant or

probable cause, and made solely because he discovered the crime. 

Hamilton asserts that law enforcement exploited his unlawful

detention, preying upon his lack of sleep and food to obtain a

statement in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights which was

used against him at trial. Hamilton argues this statement was 5

prejudicial, in part because the fact that Gwen had been shot had

not been made public, and that it was a product of his unlawful

detention. Hamilton also contends his arrest was merely a

pretext for a warrantless search incident to arrest, allowing the

seizure of his clothing and Brenda Burns’ address and phone

number from his wallet. Hamilton also contends he is entitled to

habeas relief on this claim because trial counsel was ineffective

in failing to object to the admission of the above evidence,

resulting in his denial of a full and fair hearing on the claim

in state court.

The issue of probable cause to support Hamilton’s arrest was

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properly litigated prior to trial during a hearing on a defense

motion to suppress. RT 1538.5 Motion, Sept. 20 - 21, 1982. 

Hamilton there argued that Brenda Burns’ name and address were

improperly obtained from his wallet following his unlawful

arrest, and thus evidence of the shotgun and its purchase should

be excluded. Id. at 25. To make a determination whether the

seizure of Hamilton’s wallet was proper, evidence was received

about the basis for Hamilton’s arrest. Id. at 47. The trial

court found that there was probable cause to arrest Hamilton. 

Id. at 76-77. Further, the trial court determined that, even

assuming Hamilton’s arrest was without probable cause, an

independent source for Ms. Burn’s address existed. Id. at 75-76.

The question of probable cause to support Hamilton’s arrest

received a full and fair California Penal Code section 1538.5

hearing prior to trial. The only evidence supporting the

contention that Ms. Burn’s name and address were obtained from

Hamilton’s wallet comes from her testimony of what the officers

told her. This evidence was before the trial court and fully

considered in denying the motion to suppress. A claim based on

the alleged violation of a Fourth Amendment right is not

cognizable on federal habeas corpus unless the petitioner shows

the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair

litigation of the claim. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494

(1976); Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1993). Since

Hamilton was provided the full opportunity to fairly litigate

this claim in state court, it is not cognizable on federal habeas

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corpus review.

Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

based on incompetent representation with respect to Fourth

Amendment issues are not barred from habeas review. Kimmelman v.

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986). However, the record establishes

defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the

introduction of Hamilton’s statement, since the issue of probable

cause to arrest had already been resolved by the 1538.5

suppression hearing and order. Claim 13 is denied on the merits.

b. CLAIMS 14 & 15: MIRANDA VIOLATIONS AND COERCED

STATEMENT BY HAMILTON

Hamilton alleges in Claim 14 that he was denied sleep, food,

drink and cigarettes on the night of the murder; that when he was

finally allowed into a cell, he was forced to attempt sleep with

a radio and the intercom playing at high volume; that he was

badgered and berated by the police; that he was told Gilbert was

an officer’s brother and would not take the fall for the crime;

that gory pictures of Gwen’s and the baby’s autopsies were shoved

in his face; and that he was denied basic hygiene prior to making

statements. Hamilton further asserts that on the third day he

was in custody (not the afternoon following the murder as

Detective Byrd testified), in response to a question about who

might have committed the crime, he suggested a Canadian (meaning

his sister Vicki’s boyfriend Stephen Fitzherbert) might have had

a motive. Hamilton also contends he was not given Miranda6

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warnings again prior to this questioning. Hamilton argues he

would not have made the statements he did in the absence of this

coercion.

Hamilton asserts in Claim 15 that he was interrogated and

made statements without a proper warning or waiver; that

interrogation and a request for a waiver occurred after he

requested counsel; and that he was interrogated, from which the

police obtained statements, after he was represented by counsel.

Some of the allegations in Claims 14 and 15 are contradicted

by Hamilton’s own declaration of November 28, 2000. Ex. A to

Motion for Evidentiary Hearing. The petition alleges that

Hamilton was given no drink or cigarettes, which along with other

deprivations coerced him into making the statement that a

Canadian killed his wife. However, Hamilton’s declaration states

that after he called his Uncle Marvin to arrange for clothing for

his children, he was given coffee and cigarettes. Ex. A, ¶ 21. 

The petition alleges Hamilton made the statement about a Canadian

on November 5 or 6, just prior to his release. However,

Hamilton’s declaration states he made the statement about a

Canadian early on the morning of November 3. Id. ¶¶ 22, 23. The

petition alleges Hamilton was interrogated and made the statement

about a Canadian after he requested and was represented by

counsel. However, Hamilton’s declaration states he made the

statement about a Canadian on November 3, before and after the

polygraph examination, id. ¶¶ 22-24, and that he first asked to

speak to a lawyer when put in a holding cell after the polygraph

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People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970) (defendant has 7

constitutional right to state specific examples of allegedly

inadequate representation in support of a motion to substitute new

counsel).

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examination and subsequent interview. Id. ¶ 30.

The allegations in the petition also are contradicted by

Lt. Byrd’s testimony at trial, where he related Hamilton’s

statement about a Canadian was made on November 3rd. RT 7:1698-

99. Further, there is no evidence the police had any suspicion

that Gilbert was involved in the murder before Vicki contacted

the detectives around November 19th, so Hamilton could not have

been coerced to make the statement about a Canadian by threats

about Gilbert’s police connections. Hamilton was only held for a

few days after the murder: he was taken from the scene late on

the second of November and first questioned about 2:30 a.m. on

the third of November. RT 7:1670-76. He was released on the

fifth of November. Ex. 38A to Hamilton’s Pro Se Motion filed

Jan. 13, 2006. Hamilton’s sister Vicki informed law enforcement

of the plan to kill Gwen about a week before Thanksgiving. RT

9:2074. Based on November 2nd being a Monday, RT 8:1882,

Thanksgiving was on November 26. Gilbert was arrested on

November 30th. Id. at 2011.

In addition, Hamilton made more than one statement on the

record which shows his ability to communicate with the trial

judge. See RT May 17, 1982:7 et seq. (request move to another

cell due to inmate harassment); RT June 22, 1982:8 et seq.

(Marsden motion); RT 10:2374-81 (November 18, 1982 request to 7

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read statement to jury as part of closing argument at penalty);

RT December 16, 1982:1 (statement of innocence at sentencing). 

No evidence has been presented showing Hamilton was prevented

during trial from asserting that his statement had been coerced.

There is no evidence beyond Hamilton’s self-serving

statements to support these claims. Based on the total lack of

evidence supporting these claims, Hamilton cannot establish

defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek exclusion of

Hamilton’s pre- and post-arrest statements. The contradictions

between the allegations in the petition and Hamilton’s own

declaration, prepared just seven months following the filing of

the amended petition, cast doubt on the credibility of both

Hamilton’s declaration and the allegations in his petition. 

Claims 14 and 15 are denied on the merits.

6. CLAIM 9: DENIAL OF MOTION TO RECUSE DA’s OFFICE

Hamilton contends the trial court improperly denied his

motion to recuse the District Attorney’s Office. Hamilton

asserts that prior to his preliminary hearing, with the

assistance of a jail employee, he informed Mr. Richmond (the

district attorney who originally prosecuted his case) that he

wanted to speak with him. Mr. Richmond instructed his chief

investigator Mr. Tucker to speak with Hamilton. Mr. Tucker

obtained a statement from Hamilton, and Mr. Richmond notified

defense counsel of the contact the following day. Deputy

district attorney Patrick O’Hara prosecuted the case against

Hamilton. Defense counsel instituted disciplinary proceedings

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offered into evidence. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1155.

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against Mr. Richmond with the State Bar of California, which

Hamilton alleges created a direct conflict of interest between

defense counsel and the District Attorney’s Office.8

At trial Hamilton’s counsel sought the prosecutor’s recusal

on two bases: the prosecutor’s misconduct in communicating with

Hamilton without his counsel’s consent, and the bias arising from

defense counsel’s complaint against the prosecutor filed with the

State Bar. The trial court denied recusal, relying on the fact

that Hamilton himself initiated the contact with the prosecutor,

questioning whether California Rule of Professional Conduct 7-

103, prohibiting contact with a party known to be represented by

counsel, applied to a public prosecutor, and questioning whether

prosecutorial bias or “ill will” against a defendant constitutes

a conflict of interest. RT March 2, 1982:5-18. Hamilton’s

counsel appealed this denial, but the claim was rejected by the

Fifth District Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court.

The California Supreme Court, on direct review, found that

Hamilton -- 

presented no evidence of actual antagonism on the part

of the district attorney or any attorney from the

prosecutor’s office. He points to nothing in the

conduct of the case which suggests bias against him. 

Under these circumstances the possibility of hidden

bias engendered by defense counsel’s complaint to the

State Bar is insufficient to overturn the trial court’s

ruling.

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1155-56.

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Hamilton asserts that California law does not exclude from

the requirements of Rule 7-103 claims by a represented party who

contacted the opposing attorney or claims where the opposing

counsel was a public official. Hamilton also contends that the

potential for bias was grounds for recusal, and the context of

this error in a capital prosecution warrants reversal of his

conviction. Hamilton cites People v. Superior Court (Greer), 19

Cal. 3d 255 (1977) in support of his contention that the

prosecutor’s potential for bias justifies recusal. Greer states

that a conflict disqualifies a District Attorney if the conflict

either affects or appears to affect his ability to faithfully

perform the discretionary functions of his office. However,

Greer was superceded by statue in 1980. See People v. Conner, 34

Cal. 3d 141, 147-48 (1983). The standard applicable at the time

of Hamilton’s trial, from California Penal Code section 1424,

stated that a motion to recuse may not be granted unless evidence

shows a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely

the defendant would receive a fair trial.

Hamilton has presented no evidence showing the district

attorney had a conflict that affected Hamilton’s ability to

receive a fair trial. Hamilton contacted the prosecutor. His

counsel made a complaint for misconduct against the prosecutor. 

There is a total absence of evidence that Mr. O’Hara, Mr.

Richmond, or any other prosecutor bore Hamilton any animus,

arising out of what are expected and often strategically asserted

defense requests for sanctions against prosecutors in criminal

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cases. The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

denial of this claim. Claim 9 is denied on the merits.

7. CLAIM 12: STATE INTERFERENCE WITH TRIAL PREPARATION

Hamilton asserts agents of the State of California,

including Tulare County Sheriff’s Officers, incited jail inmates

against him and housed him with “problem” inmates resulting in

threats and assaults. Hamilton states his complaints and legal

actions were ineffectual, and he could not sleep, eat,

concentrate or communicate effectively with counsel. Hamilton

further contends his mental state and competence were adversely

affected by the improper administration of drugs.

The record reveals that on May 17, 1982, Hamilton requested

that he be moved to another cell because of harassment by other

inmates. RT May 17, 1982:8-9. Judge Conn stated he would make

an informal inquiry into the matter. Id. at 10. The record does

not contain the result of the judge’s inquiry, however on June

22, defense counsel stated, in response to Hamilton’s Marsden

motion, that he didn’t have time to get involved in “certain

aspects of the jail,” that Hamilton would have to “take a certain

amount of . . . c___ that they dish out in the way of words,” and

that Judge Conn had investigated and did not perceive Hamilton’s

treatment as different from other inmates. RT June 22, 1982:16.

As noted above in Claim 21, neither medical records nor

declaration from trial counsel were presented to support

Hamilton’s claim of incompetence. Hamilton instead relied on the

opinion of Dr. Woods, which concludes that Hamilton’s preexisting

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medicated, but makes no comment that it was an improper type or

dose, or that there was a resulting negative effect on Hamilton’s

mental state. Ex. 61.

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mental condition was exacerbated by the drugs he was given,

rendering it extremely “unlikely” he was able to make rational

decisions. Ex. 48:18. The record does not show any irrational 9

actions by Hamilton during trial, but reveals several occasions

where Hamilton responded appropriately and intelligently while

conversing with the trial court. See RT May 17, 1982; RT June

22, 1982; RT 10:2374-81; RT December 16, 1982.

Finally and most importantly, Hamilton has not shown that he

was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against

him or to assist counsel. To the contrary, Hamilton’s discourses

with the trial court demonstrate he was aware of what was

occurring and was able to communicate his thoughts and opinions

to counsel.

The record as a whole fails to support Hamilton’s

allegations of state interference and of improper medication. 

Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective for

failing to further raise Hamilton’s assertions of state

interference or issues of improper medication affecting

Hamilton’s competence. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 12 is denied

on the merits.

/////

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conviction and special circumstance finding. See RT 10:2322 (jury

instructions).

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V. TRIAL CLAIMS - GUILT PHASE

1. CLAIMS INVOLVING CO-CONSPIRATORS

a. CLAIM 10: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE/FACTUAL INNOCENCE

Hamilton asserts that instructions, court comments and

argument led the jury to believe the beyond a reasonable doubt

standard was not required to determine the viability of the

fetus, but instead implied that viability only needed to be

proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Hamilton contends 10

there was insufficient evidence of the fetus’s viability, to

support the financial gain special circumstance, to support a

finding of first degree murder of either Gwen or the fetus, to

support a finding that he personally used a firearm, or to

establish the alleged aggravating factors.

Hamilton contends, in support of his claim that he did not

kill his wife and did not know of the plan to kill her, that

prior to the murder he agreed with his sister Carolyn and her

friend Gilbert to assist them in the robbery of an unnamed drug

dealer. Ex. 62:1, Declaration of Michael Allen Hamilton, dated

November 28, 2000. Hamilton asserts his role in the robbery was

to buy a shotgun and then after the robbery to fence the stolen

goods. Id. at 1-2. Hamilton contends that after he heard the

police had discovered the paperwork for the shotgun purchase, he

asked Carolyn to return the gun so he could turn it in. Id. at

9-10. Hamilton states that eventually Carolyn revealed she could

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not return the gun because Gilbert had disposed of it. Id. at

10. When Hamilton replied he had to tell the police about the

gun to stay out of trouble, he asserts Carolyn begged him not to,

admitting Gilbert had shot Gwen and she had been with him,

driving the truck. Id.

Hamilton asserts defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate the timing discrepancy (a minimum of 15 minutes)

in Carolyn’s and Gilbert’s accounts between the total time (from

when Hamilton and Gwen left and Carolyn returned) and the time

required for all the activities they recounted, and for failing

to pursue testing to establish the lack of gunpowder residue,

blow-back and/or other physical evidence on Hamilton’s clothes or

person from firing a shotgun. Hamilton contends prosecutorial

misconduct occurred by failing to disclose secret benefits or

agreements conferred on witnesses and by the knowing use of

perjured testimony when his sister Vicki testified she received

no promises regarding the bad check charges. Hamilton points 11

to the following discrepancies in the evidence: the conclusion

that Gwen was relaxed and unalarmed despite a vehicle, occupied

by people she knew, repeatedly driving by on a lonely road three

nights in a row; that Vicki originally said Gilbert was the one

who shot Gwen; and differing testimony about the color of the

shotgun shells. Hamilton also claims that investigation of the

driver of the Mustang who drove him to the telephone that night

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was insufficient in light of his detailed description of the car,

that Gilbert had an opportunity to shower after the murder to get

rid of any evidence, and that extreme acrimony existed between

Hamilton and both his sisters, such that concerted action between

them was unlikely and which provided a motive for his sisters to

transfer blame for the murder to Hamilton.

In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1992), the United

States Supreme Court assumed for the sake of argument that a

“truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ . . . would

render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional . . . .” 

Id. at 417. However, the Court held that, due to the disruptive

effect entertaining a substantive claim of actual innocence would

have on the finality of capital cases, “the threshold showing for

such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.” 

Id. Alternatively, a claim of actual innocence may be a

procedural gateway to allow consideration of a constitutional

claim otherwise procedurally barred from federal review. Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Either claim of actual

innocence requires the presentation of new, reliable evidence,

such as exculpatory scientific evidence, trust-worthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence. Id. at 324.

The standard for a substantive actual innocence claim

requires the petitioner to show by clear and convincing evidence

that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty and/or

eligible for the death penalty. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,

339, 350 (1992). The standard for a procedural actual innocence

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claim requires a finding that in light of the new evidence, it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted the petitioner. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

Evaluating a request for evidentiary hearing on a claim of

actual innocence requires a court to assess the probative force

of the new evidence in light of the evidence of guilt presented

at trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 331-32. This test may consider

the timing of the submission and the affiants’ likely credibility

when determining the probable reliability of the new evidence. 

Id. at 332.

The California Supreme Court addressed the underlying basis

for Hamilton’s insufficient evidence allegations on direct

appeal, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the

jury’s finding that the fetus was viable, that although the

evidence supporting the financial gain special circumstance was

relatively weak it was properly admitted and sufficient to

support the jury’s true finding, and that although “other

aggravating evidence was not overwhelming, the capital crimes

themselves were exceptionally brutal.” Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at

1185; see also id. at 1172-73 (fetal viability), 1173-79

(financial gain special circumstance), 1185 (aggravating factor

evidence) and 1187 (evidence of first degree murder). Hamilton

has not pointed to any evidence which, when considered in light

of the entire record, undermines the findings of the California

Supreme Court. Further, the allegation the jury was mislead to

believe that fetal viability could be proved by only a

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Carolyn testified that after picking up Hamilton on November 12

2 and driving to Teapot Dome Road, they drove to Hamilton’s pickup

and stopped. RT 8:1890-93.

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preponderance of the evidence is refuted by the record. The jury

instructions expressly state “you must find beyond a reasonable

doubt that the fetus was viable.” RT 10:2322 (emphasis added).

Defense counsel argued the fact that no evidence of blood or

gunpowder was found on Hamilton. The implication that the lack

of blood cleared Hamilton was undercut by the testimony of

criminalist Steve O’Clair stating the lack of blood or blood

stains on Hamilton’s clothes or hands was not unusual as it is

possible to shoot someone without getting blood on the shooter. 

RT 9:2033-35. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to

further test for blood or gunpowder.

The allegation that Carolyn’s and Gilbert’s accounts of the

night of the murder lack credibility because of insufficient time

to accomplish all they testified to does not establish a claim of

actual innocence. The time discrepancies are insignificant. 

Contrary to Hamilton’s allegations, Carolyn did testify she

looked at a clock when Hamilton and Gwen left at 8:45 p.m., RT

8:1912, neither Carolyn nor Gilbert testified Hamilton left at

the two-minute warning of the Monday Night Football game, no

source was provided to place the time of the two-minute warning

at 9:00 to 9:05 p.m., and Gilbert testified he drove past

Hamilton’s truck twice, stopping the third time, but only one

time drove “a ways” down Terra Bella Road. RT 8:1999-2000. 12

The minimal time discrepancy of fifteen minutes is not sufficient

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to support even a colorable claim in light of the conflict

between the record and the allegations in the petition. Defense

counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate the timing

issue.

The argument that Carolyn planned the murder and Gilbert was

the actual killer was presented as a defense at trial, RT

10:2273-83, but was rejected by the jury. The allegation that

extreme acrimony between Hamilton and his sisters would have made

any conspiracy between them unlikely is contradicted by

Hamilton’s own declaration, where he contends the purchase of the

shotgun and his repeated trips to Porterville were prompted by an

agreement with Carolyn to rob a drug dealer. Ex. 62:1-2.

Beyond Hamilton’s current assertions, no evidence shows his

innocence. Even the proposed opinion of Mr. Morton, if rendered

as Hamilton contends, would not render it more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have convicted Hamilton. See

Claim 2a below. The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly

supports Hamilton’s conviction. The record fairly supports the

California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. Claim 10 is

denied on the merits. 

b. CLAIM 8: LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFLICT REGARDING GILBERT

Hamilton contends that Detective Salazar’s close friendship

with Gilbert and his family resulted in a conflict of interest

which affected the investigation and prosecution of this crime. 

Hamilton asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct set forth in

Claim 3 (failure to disclose benefits to Vicki on bad check

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Bardsley’s identification of him was presented during the defense

case, RT 9:2157-70, and Gilbert had already testified as part of

the prosecution’s case. RT 8:1970-2023.

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charges, failure to disclose instructions to Gilbert not to

deviate from prior statement) was part of a plan to reduce

Gilbert’s culpability for a capital offense and afford him

special, lenient treatment. Hamilton argues this plan left

reasonable and obvious lines of investigation unexplored, coerced

witnesses to reduce Gilbert’s involvement and to give false and

misleading testimony against Hamilton.

Hamilton presents a declaration from Gilbert, stating that

his plea agreement included a requirement that he testify

truthfully, and that the prosecutor reviewed the statement he

made to law enforcement to ensure there was nothing to add. 

Gilbert declares that when Lilly Bardsley identified him as being

at K-Mart when the shotgun was purchased, the prosecutor

threatened to withdraw his deal and reinstate the death penalty

charges because that evidence made him more involved in the

planning of the crime than his confession had admitted. Gilbert

states the prosecutor allowed his brother to obtain rebuttal

witnesses asserting he was with his child on Halloween afternoon,

and then he was allowed to testify. See Ex. 23. 13

A recent Ninth Circuit case found prosecutorial misconduct

justified the presumption of truthfulness of a declaration

recanting a co-conspirator’s testimony, and establishing Smith’s

actual innocence claim sufficient to excuse his procedural

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default. Smith v. Baldwin, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3007751 (9th

Cir. Oct. 24, 2006). Smith’s co-conspirator signed two

declarations, one seven years after the crime and one tweleve

years after the crime, recanting his testimony and declaring that

Smith was not the killer. The government informed the coconspirator that if he persisted with a recantation of his trial

testimony on federal habeas, the plea agreement would be set

aside and he could be subject to capital murder charges for the

killing, but that if he reaffirmed his trial testimony

identifying Smith as the murderer, the state would not persue

perjury charges against him. After conferring with counsel, the

co-conspirator invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to

testify in the federal proceedings. 

Although the holding of Smith appears to apply to this

claim, there are significant facts which distinguish Smith from

Hamilton’s claim. First, Gilbert’s declaration does not in any

way clear Hamilton of responsibility for Gwen’s death. There is

sufficient evidence that Hamilton was the one who wanted Gwen

killed, and that he solicited Carolyn, and through her Gilbert,

to assist him. Even assuming Gilbert was the actual shooter,

which is not supported by any statement in Gilbert’s declaration,

Hamilton and Carolyn are still equally guilty of the murder. 

Second, the State has made no current threat of further

prosecution, and has not in any way attempted to supress the

facts presented in Gilbert’s declaration. No evidence presented

by Hamilton shows misconduct by the prosecution, or any

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constitutional error.

Gilbert’s plea agreement required he testify truthfully. 

The prosecutor’s warning to Gilbert not to deviate from his prior

statement was no more than an attempt to ascertain that Gilbert

had given the full truth in his statement, and to communicate the

expectation that Gilbert must also tell the full truth at trial. 

The assertion the prosecutor was angry Lilly Bardsley identified 

Gilbert does not establish that the subsequent rebuttal witnesses

presented false, manufactured testimony. The rebuttal witnesses’

testimony was in fact consistent with Gilbert’s testimony on

direct examination, given long before Lilly Bardsley identified

him, that he had taken his child trick-or-treating prior to going

to Carolyn’s house on Halloween. RT 8:1978. 

Similarly, Vicki’s testimony, consistent with her

declaration, that Detective Salazar talked to the District

Attorney to get a misdemeanor disposition on her felony check

charges, does not establish sufficient basis under Brady for

failing to disclose benefits regarding her bad check charges. 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Vicki’s declaration

does not say that those benefits were received prior to her

testimony at trial. See Ex. 22. Even assuming the benefits were

given before trial, in light of the benefits which Vicki did

disclose to the jury, that she and Stephen received money to fly

from Texas to California and for seven months of living expenses,

it is unlikely the non-disclosure of any benefit regarding the

bad check charges was material to the jury’s evaluation of her

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 The jury was instructed, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 14

§ 1111, that "a defendant cannot be found guilty based on the

testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by

other evidence which tends to connect such defendant with the

commission of the offense;" that accomplice testimony was to be

viewed with distrust; and that "an accomplice is one who is subject

to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the

defendant on trial." The court instructed that Carolyn Hamilton

and Gilbert Garay were to be considered accomplices as a matter of

law, and the jury should determine whether Victoria Hamilton and

Brenda Burns were accomplices. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1168-69.

ORePetnHam 53

credibility. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 8 is denied on the

merits.

c. CLAIM 11: ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY

Hamilton asserts (1) the trial court erred by refusing to

instruct the jury that Vicki was an accomplice as a matter of

law, (2) that in light of Lilly Bardsley’s identification of

Sharon Burns, the jury should have been instructed to determine

whether Sharon also was an accomplice, and (3) that without these

errors, the case against him would lack corroboration.14

The California Supreme Court addressed this claim on direct

review, holding the uncontradicted evidence did not show Vicki

was an accomplice to murder as a matter of law. Vicki’s

participation was limited to two conversations with Carolyn. An

aider and abettor as a matter of law must "act with knowledge of

the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or

purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating

commission of, the offense." People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547,

560 (1984). The state court found the evidence regarding Vicki's

intent ambiguous since she stated she would participate in the

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murder, suggested the appropriate weapon, but shortly after her

statements moved to Texas and did not participate in the murder. 

Because her actions are subject to a variety of interpretations

her accomplice status was properly left for the jury to

determine. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1169-70.

The California court did find that whether Sharon Burns was

an accomplice should have been submitted to the jury, but found

the error was harmless. There was no evidence Sharon intended

the killing. The jury could not find Sharon was an accomplice

without rejecting her testimony and finding that she did buy the

gun. Since an accomplice finding could not be made without

rejecting Sharon’s credibility, a subsequent instruction to view

her testimony with caution would have little effect. Lastly,

even if all Sharon's testimony was viewed with caution, the

prosecution’s case would not have been affected. Sharon

testified that Hamilton told her he was unhappy with his sex life

with Gwen and wanted a divorce, but considerable other evidence

supports that testimony. Sharon’s discovery of the shotgun

shells in Brenda's apartment was not significant in the case. 

And even if the jury concluded that Sharon purchased the gun

instead of Brenda, that conclusion would do little to detract

from the evidence that Hamilton used the gun to kill his wife. 

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1170-71.

Hamilton contends that the evidence shows Vicki agreed to

join the plan to kill Gwen, suggested the weapon to use, and was

to have been the person to do the actual shooting, and that even

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after her move to Texas she still stated her intent to

participate in the murder. Hamilton asserts this evidence makes

Vicki equally liable as a co-conspirator, so her testimony was

required to be viewed with distrust. Hamilton argues the

numerous benefits Vicki received in exchange for her testimony

suggest she was an accomplice. Hamilton concludes that had the

court instructed Vicki was an accomplice as a matter of law the

case against him would have lacked corroboration.

Hamilton further alleges the failure to include Sharon Burns

in the accomplice instructions implied that Lilly Bardsley’s

identification of her as the purchaser of the gun was not to be

believed. Hamilton contends he was prejudiced by this error

since the rebuttal identification of Sharon as the gun purchaser

cast doubt on the entire version of events given by the

prosecution’s witnesses. This notion was rejected because Brenda

testified she purchased the gun for Hamilton, Sharon denied

purchasing the gun, Brenda’s name was on the gun purchase form,

and a handwriting expert confirmed Brenda signed the gun purchase

form.

The State asserts the trial court was correct to instruct

the jury to determine whether Vicki was an accomplice, since the

uncontradicted evidence reveals she was not an accomplice as a

matter of law, and that no accomplice instruction regarding

Sharon was proper since there was no evidence she knew of

Hamilton’s criminal purpose. The State urges that even if the

instructions were erroneous, the error was unquestionably

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harmless since Brenda Burns testified as to Hamilton’s motive,

purchase of the gun, and later consciousness of guilt; and the

prosecution’s case remained almost unaffected without Sharon’s

testimony.

It is undisputed law in California that whether a person is

an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury, unless there is

no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn

regarding accomplice status. People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d

953, 960 (1976). Generally, federal habeas relief is not

available for errors of state law, unless the error amounts to a

deprivation of constitutional rights. Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-69 (1991). The denial or misapplication of state

procedures implicates a federally recognized liberty interest

only if it results in the deprivation of a substantive right. 

Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983).

Hamilton’s contention, that if Vicki had been included in

the accomplice as a matter of law instruction and Sharon included

in the accomplice instructions, the result of his trial would

have been different, lacks support. The evidence presented at

trial of Hamilton’s affair with Brenda; his financial troubles;

the life insurance on Gwen; Brenda’s testimony of her purchase of

the shotgun for Hamilton and his later attempt to conceal that

fact; Jackie Piper’s testimony about his unusual visits to

Porterville three days in a row; the inconsistencies in his

statements to police and his prevarication about a Canadian

suspect were independent evidence and sufficient to corroborate

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the testimony of Carolyn, Gilbert, and Vicki. Nothing in this

claim shows that Hamilton was deprived of a constitutional right.

Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective

for failing to further object to the failure to instruct that

Vicki was an accomplice as a matter of law or to seek Sharon’s

inclusion in the accomplice instructions. The record fairly

supports the California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. 

Claim 11 is denied on the merits.

d. CLAIMS 2a & u: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Hamilton first asserts that defense counsel was ineffective

because he failed to investigate and present evidence that others

planned and committed the murder. Hamilton contends there was a

conspiracy between Carolyn, Vicki, Jackie and Sam Piper to kill

Gwen and then coerce Hamilton into sharing with or loaning them a

portion of the insurance proceeds. Hamilton alleges that Jackie,

believing she would be repaid by the insurance, funded Vicki’s

travel to Texas so Vicki could talk Stephen into shooting Gwen. 

Hamilton asserts that Carolyn convinced Hamilton to buy the

shotgun for another purpose, that when Vicki and Stephen did not

return from Texas, Carolyn convinced Gilbert to act as the

shooter, and that Vicki contacted the police because Carolyn

attempted to exclude her and Stephen from sharing in the

insurance. Hamilton states that Patti Ketchum saw Gilbert

“anxiously brush past her” upon returning after the murder,

shower and carry away his soiled clothes, Ex. 27, ¶ 17; Ex. 16,

¶ 5 (declaration of Ron Stafford), and that Vicki confirmed

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Gilbert was the one who shot Gwen. RT 9:2050, 2079. Hamilton

asserts counsel failed to subpoena phone records of Jackie,

Brenda, Hamilton’s residence, and the phone booth to impeach the

witnesses’ claims, failed to hire a ballistics expert to show the

absence of gun powder residue and blood on his clothes and hands

pointed to someone else as the shooter, and failed to locate

witnesses to show Hamilton was looking forward to the birth of

his fifth child with Gwen and was not in terrible financial

straits.

As stated below in Claim 2, in order to establish an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show: 

that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency

prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984).

Gilbert’s actions as related by Patti Ketchum (brushing past

her and showering) also can be consistent with just witnessing

(instead of performing) a murder. Gilbert taking his clothes

away does not conclusively imply that gunpowder/blood was on

them, but could be seen as reasonable since he was not living

with Patti at that time. Vicki’s statement that Carolyn said

Gilbert did the shooting was introduced at trial and fully argued

by the defense in closing. RT 9:2279-81, 2292. Expert testimony

presented the opinion that the lack of gun powder residue and/or

blood on Hamilton did not exclude him as the one who shot Gwen. 

Id. at 2034-35. The absence of gun powder residue or blood tying

Hamilton to the shooting also was argued by the defense in

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closing. RT 10:2286. Testimony regarding Hamilton’s history of

paying his debts even when money was tight was presented at trial

and also argued in closing. Id. at 2284, 2287, 2296-97.

Hamilton has presented no evidence supporting the allegation

that his mother and step-father, Jackie and Sam Piper, were

involved in any way in the conspiracy. As observed by the State,

Hamilton has failed to come forward with phone records or

witnesses to his happiness about Gwen’s latest pregnancy to show

prejudice from counsel’s failure to investigate and present this

evidence. Even if expert testimony was now presented stating the

lack of blood and/or gunpowder residue exculpates Hamilton, this

would only cumulate the expert testimony and argument presented

to the jury at trial. In light of the damaging testimony by

Vicki, Carolyn and Gilbert, the blood spatter and gunpowder

residue evidence were not so consequential as to change the

outcome. That Carolyn planned the murder and carried it out with

Gilbert’s assistance was the main defense Hamilton presented at

trial. It was defense counsel’s main argument in closing and was

rejected by the jury. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2a is denied

on the merits.

Second, Hamilton alleges that defense counsel was

ineffective because he failed to make motions in limine regarding

damaging, inadmissible evidence, the tape of the phone call

between Vicki and Carolyn, photos and testimony about the crime

scene and victims, and Hamilton’s statements. See Claims 4a and

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4b below and Claims 14 and 15 above. As discussed separately,

all this evidence was properly admitted. Counsel cannot be

ineffective for failing to seek exclusion of this admissible

evidence. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2u is denied on the

merits.

e. CLAIMS 3a(6), (11) & (14): IMPROPER ARGUMENT BY

PROSECUTOR

Hamilton alleges the prosecutor misstated the law during

argument to the jury by expressing his opinion that as a matter

of law Vicki could not be prosecuted as an accomplice. Hamilton

also alleges the prosecutor improperly argued that Carolyn’s

hearsay statement was admitted as a prior consistent statement

and could be considered to prove the truth of the matter, when it

was admitted only for limited purposes. Lastly, Hamilton alleges

the prosecutor misstated witness testimony, e.g., that Carolyn

testified Hamilton committed the murder for financial gain, when

she gave no such testimony. See Claim 2g below.

A prosecutor’s improper argument does not justify federal

habeas relief unless it so infects the trial with unfairness as

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. 

“Improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s

constitutional rights.” Thompson, 74 F.3d at 1576 (citing Darden

v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). Moreover,

prosecutorial comments to which a defendant fails to object are

reviewed for plain error. Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1191.

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First, the prosecutor’s statement that Vicki was not an

accomplice as a matter of law was not misconduct as the trial

judge made that specific legal ruling in submitting the issue of

Vicki’s accomplice status to the jury for decision. The record

fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s denial of this

claim. Claim 3a(6) is denied on the merits.

Second, defense counsel, during cross-examination of

Carolyn, asked whether she told Vicki that Gilbert did the

shooting. RT 8:1910. Carolyn denied making such a statement. 

Id. Gilbert also denied being the actual killer. Id. at 2022. 

Later Vicki testified she had “assumed” Gilbert was the killer

because she was to have been the shooter and Gilbert took her

place in the plot. RT 9:2050. The prosecution then introduced

over objection a tape recording of a November 27, 1981 telephone

conversation between Vicki and Carolyn, where Carolyn said that

Hamilton, not Gilbert, shot Gwen. Id. at 2061-63. The

conversation was admitted as a prior consistent statement under

an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 2062, 2101-02.

Defense counsel’s objection impliedly asserted that

Carolyn’s testimony, stating Hamilton and not Gilbert did the

shooting, was a recent fabrication made to minimize her and

Gilbert's role in the murder. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1168. The

issue is whether the admitted conversation took place “before the

bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged

to have arisen.” Id. The California Supreme Court, addressing

this claim on direct appeal, found that at the time Carolyn made

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the taped statement she had consistently denied all involvement

in the crime, but Hamilton was under arrest so she might have

already anticipated arrest and reasoned that her involvement in

the murder would appear less if Hamilton instead of Gilbert were

the triggerman (although this was unlikely). Id. The state

supreme court observed the testimony did not explore Carolyn’s

state of mind at the time of the conversation, so arguably, the

prosecution failed to show that the statement was made before the

motive for fabrication arose, however, any error was found

harmless. Id.

Hamilton contends the prosecutor improperly urged the taped

conversation could be considered to establish the truth of

Carolyn’s assertion that Hamilton shot Gwen when in fact it was

admitted on a limited basis. The record, however, does not

reflect that any limiting instruction was given as to the taped

telephone conversation, but in fact the court’s instructions told

the jury that prior consistent statements could be considered for

the truth of the facts as stated. RT 10:2313. Even assuming,

arguendo, this instruction and therefore the argument by the

prosecutor were erroneous, Hamilton cannot show prejudice since

the taped conversation duplicates testimony given by Carolyn and

Gilbert at trial. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. Claim 3a(11) is denied on

the merits.

Third, the California Supreme Court concluded the

prosecutor's misstatement, attributing the statement to live

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testimony instead of the tape which was played for the jury, did

not prejudicially affect the outcome of the trial because it was

clear that Carolyn said Hamilton wanted to kill Gwen for money. 

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1178. The record fairly supports the

California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. Claim 3a(14) is

denied on the merits.

f. CLAIMS 3b(1), (2) & (4): KNOWING USE OF PERJURED

TESTIMONY

Hamilton asserts the prosecution presented perjured

testimony by failing to disclose consideration given to Vicki and

Carolyn, and by insisting that Gilbert not deviate from his prior

statement.

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused [Brady evidence] violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment.” There are two

general types of Brady evidence: knowing use of perjured

testimony, and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. United

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473

U.S. 667, 678 (1985).

Presentation of false evidence violates due process and

requires a new trial. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112

(1935). This is so even where the prosecution does not solicit

the false information but only allows it to go uncorrected, Napue

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), irrespective of the good

or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. “The

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principal [underlying Brady] is not punishment of society for

misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the

accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted,

but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the

administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated

unfairly.” Id.

The knowing use of perjured testimony is material “if there

is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have

affected the judgment of the jury.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103. This is equivalent to the Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) harmless error standard. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80 n.9. See also Napue, 360 U.S. at 267

n.2 and 271-72 (finding the primary witness testified falsely,

the prosecutor knew he did so, and in light of the record showing

insufficient evidence without the witness’s testimony, a new

trial was required).

Hamilton alleges the prosecution failed to disclose

consideration given to Vicki in exchange for her testimony,

specifically that she would not be prosecuted for conspiracy to

commit capital murder; that she received a favorable disposition

of insufficient fund check charges pending against her (i.e., her

warrants were cleared, and a misdemeanor disposition was secured

on felony charges); that Stephen was not deported; and that she

was protected from loss and/or prosecution for an accident while

driving a police vehicle. Ex. 22. As discussed in Claim 8

above, it is unclear that the favorable disposition of the bad

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check charges occurred before her testimony, and even if it did,

in light of the benefits of airfare from Texas to California and

seven months of living expenses she received which were

disclosed, it is unlikely the additional disclosure would have

been material. Similarly, Vicki’s statement in her declaration

that the prosecutor agreed not to deport Stephen is cumulative of

impeachment evidence which was disclosed, and not material to her

credibility. Lastly, that Vicki was not held responsible for the

alleged accident in Detective Salazar’s vehicle is not material

to her credibility. It is not reasonably likely that any of the

alleged undisclosed benefits, individually or collectively, even

if they had been disclosed to the jury, would have affected the

judgment. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial on state habeas of this claim. Claim

3b(1) is denied on the merits.

Hamilton asserts consideration was given to Carolyn in the

form of favorable treatment while she was in custody and special

treatment for her and her son J.R. which was not disclosed. 

Ex. 25. Hamilton contends the undisclosed benefits were that

Carolyn’s son was allowed to visit her in jail and a picture of

them together was taken; that Carolyn was allowed to wait in a

jury room prior to a hearing where Gilbert’s family brought them

food; and that Carolyn was allowed out of her cell more than

other people charged with murder before the trial.

Even assuming these alleged benefits were bestowed to

Carolyn, in light of the damaging disclosures she made about her

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involvement in the murder, it is unlikely the disclosure of these

minor benefits were material to her credibility or would have

affected the judgment of the jury. The record fairly supports

the California Supreme Court’s summary denial on state habeas of

this claim. Claim 3b(2) is denied on the merits.

Hamilton contends the prosecution made it a condition of

Gilbert’s plea bargain that he not deviate in his testimony from

the prior statement given to the police, which allegedly

precluded the defense from discovering Gilbert’s ability to

describe the shooting in vivid detail, to impeach his trial

testimony. Ex. 23. As discussed in Claim 8 above, the

prosecutor’s requirement that Gilbert not deviate from his prior

statement was not misconduct. For a prosecutor to condition

immunity on the witness testifying truthfully and not committing

perjury is not prohibited. No limit was placed by the court on

the type of cross-examination of Gilbert at trial. The record

fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s summary denial on

state habeas of this claim. Claim 3b(4) is denied on the merits.

g. CLAIMS 3c(8) & (9): BRADY VIOLATION

Hamilton asserts the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the

requirement that Gilbert adhere to his prior statement, as well

as the additional benefits granted to Vicki violated Brady. As

discussed in Claims 3b(2), 3b(4) and 8 above, even assuming the

prosecutor should have disclosed the disputed evidence, it was

not material and its lack of disclosure did not violate due

process in light of the extent of the benefits which were

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disclosed to the jury. Defense counsel was free to inquire

whether any limits had been placed on Gilbert’s testimony. The

record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s summary

denial on state habeas of this claim. Claims 3c(8) and (9) are

denied on the merits.

h. CLAIM 3e: PATTERN OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Hamilton contends the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of

misconduct, in order to shift the blame for Gwen’s murder from

Gilbert to Hamilton, by requiring that Gilbert not deviate from

his prior statement, see Claim 8 above, and by coercing Brenda

Burns to make a statement consistent with the prosecution theory

and to testify in accordance with that statement although it did

not reflect her recollection. See Claim 3b(3) below. As

discussed above, a requirement that Gilbert not deviate from his

statement does not provide the basis for constitutional error. 

As discussed below, the record does not support the allegation

that Brenda’s testimony was coerced. The record fairly supports

the California Supreme Court’s summary denial on state habeas of

this claim. Claim 3e is denied on the merits.

i. CLAIM 4a: ADMISSION OF HEARSAY

Hamilton argues the taped conversation between Vicki and

Carolyn was admitted in violation of California law. Hamilton

asserts admission of a hearsay statement under the prior

consistent statement exception requires either that there was an

intervening inconsistent statement admitted to attack

credibility, or that a charge of recent fabrication or bias has

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been made and the statement was made before any motive to

fabricate arose. Hamilton contends the phone call between Vicki

and Carolyn that was played for the jury failed to meet either of

these requirements.

Federal courts have no authority to review claims that a

state’s evidentiary rules were violated, but can only determine

if the admission of evidence rendered the trial so fundamentally

unfair as to violate due process. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72;

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). Even if

evidence was admitted in violation of a state rule of evidence,

due process is not violated unless the evidence is “of such

quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Id. at 1103

(citing Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir.

1986)). However, a state court finding that an evidentiary

admission was harmless error is a question of law or a mixed

question of law and fact, not a factual finding entitled to a

presumption of correctness. Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403,

405 (9th Cir. 1988).

The California Supreme Court addressed this claim on direct

appeal, finding that although the evidence showed defense counsel

implied Carolyn’s statement from the taped phone call, that

Hamilton not Gilbert did the shooting, was a recent fabrication

the prosecution arguably failed to show the statement was made

before the motive for fabrication arose by not exploring

Carolyn’s state of mind. The state high court found that any

error, however, was harmless. The California Supreme Court found

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although Carolyn’s statement rebutted Hamilton’s theory that

Gilbert fired the fatal shots, the admission of the taped

conversation was not significant due to the absence of any

evidence to support Hamilton’s theory. Even if the taped

conversation had been excluded, the jury would still have heard

the testimony of Carolyn and Gilbert that Hamilton was the actual

killer, their unequivocal denial that Gilbert was the killer, and

no contrary testimony or evidence whatever. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d

at 1166-68.

The State contends the taped conversation was properly

admitted to counter the defense’s charge of recent fabrication,

since any motive to fabricate did not arise until Carolyn was

confronted with her involvement in the murder when she was

arrested. The State asserts even if the taped conversation was

admitted in error, it was harmless since there was no evidence

that Gilbert shot Gwen and the evidence against Hamilton was

strong.

From a temporal and logical perspective, Carolyn had no

incentive to falsely accuse Hamilton shortly after the murder. 

The exact time of Carolyn’s prior statement, and whether it was

made before any motive to fabricate arose, was not precisely

established. Even if the statement was not made before a motive

to fabricate arose, the admission of the taped conversation did

not render Hamilton’s trial fundamentally unfair. Both Carolyn

and Gilbert testified at trial to the same matters discussed in

the taped conversation, that Hamilton was the one who actually

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shot Gwen. Even assuming the taped conversation was erroneously

admitted, it does not justify habeas relief. The record fairly

supports the California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. 

Claim 4a is denied on the merits.

2. CLAIM 2: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT GUILT PHASE

A petitioner must satisfy two components to establish an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim: that counsel's

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 521 (2003). The deficient performance prong requires a

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious that he was “not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The question is

whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. There is a “strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v.

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689). Every effort must be made to “eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689;

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995).

In order for counsel's inadequate performance to constitute

a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must show counsel's

failures prejudiced his defense. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534

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(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692). The prejudice prong

requires a showing of reasonable probability that without

counsel’s unprofessional errors the “result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Hamilton presents the following instances which he claims

resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel:

a. failure to investigate and present evidence that others

planned and committed the murder,

b. failure to investigate and present mitigation

(psychological disorders, physical/sexual abuse,

addiction),

c. failure to investigate and present issues from Claims

5-7, 10-15, 20-21 (impartial jury, juror misconduct,

unreliable penalty, factual innocence, accomplice 15

testimony, state interference with trial, illegal

arrest, coerced statements, Miranda violations,

improper aggravation, incompetence),

d. failure to object to admission of hearsay evidence

regarding financial gain special circumstance,

e. failure to object to instruction on financial gain

special circumstance and accomplice corroboration,

f. failure to object to instruction regarding motive,

g. failure to object to prosecutor’s misstatement of

evidence regarding financial gain,

h. failure to object to prosecutor’s misleading argument

that no mitigation equals aggravation,

i. failure to object to prosecutor’s argument in favor of

the death penalty based on mathematical weighing,

j. submission of erroneous instructions regarding

financial gain special circumstance and accomplice

corroboration,

k. failure to investigate and present guilt/penalty

issues,

l. failure to research and demonstrate the death penalty

is excessive based on inter-proportionality,

m. failure to research and demonstrate the death penalty

is excessive based on intra-proportionality,

n. failure to prepare defense to aggravation,

o. failure to investigate and present evidence of deal

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This subclaim refers to conduct presented in Claim 11, and 16

duplicates subclaim c.

 This subclaim duplicates issues presented subclaim a. 17

 It is not clear what conduct is referred to here, as the 18

petition does not contain a “section XIII.” If the reference is to

Claim 13, this subclaim duplicates subclaim c.

 This subclaim duplicates subclaim c, as the issue of 19

Hamilton’s incompetence is contained in Claim 21.

 This subclaim duplicates subclaim b. 20

This subclaim raises issues presented in Claim 10, and 21

duplicates subclaim c.

 Subclaims ae, af, ag and ah duplicate subclaims d, g, h, and 22

w respectively.

ORePetnHam 72

with prosecution witness,

p. failure to adequately cross-examine accomplice

witnesses,16

q. failure to investigate and present forensic evidence of

Hamilton’s innocence in the shooting,17

r. failure to investigate and present evidence of unequal

treatment of accomplices,

s. failure to impeach and exclude witness testimony,

t. failure to object to jury composition,

u. failure to make motions in limine regarding damaging,

inadmissible evidence (tape of phone calls, crime scene

and victim photos and testimony, Hamilton’s statements,

evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment),

v. failure to obtain discovery,

w. failure to object to prosecutor’s and judge’s

misstatements during voir dire,

x. failure to investigate constitutionality of means to

prepare jury roll,

y. failure to prevent continuation of conduct in section

XIII,18

z. failure to raise incompetence,19

aa. failure to procure psychological/neurological exam,

research and present evidence of sanity, incompetence

or diminished capacity,20

ab. failure to prosecute writs regarding denial of change

of venue,

ac. failure to cross-examine regarding gun powder residue

tests,21

ad. failure to adequately prepare for closing argument,

ai. failure to object to admission of damaging, 22

inadmissible evidence (knife, disc removed from body,

shotgun and shells),

aj. failure to object to admission of excluded news reports

and their use in closing argument,

ak. failure to object to prosecutor’s argument in closing

of facts not in evidence and of excluded evidence, in

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aq are addressed in Hamilton’s points and authorities.

ORePetnHam 73

effect “testifying” as a criminal law expert,

al. unreasonable stipulation to use of Carolyn’s taped

statement, the only statement that Hamilton wanted his

wife killed for the insurance money,

am. unreasonable stipulation to use of prior testimony at

penalty instead of recalling witnesses to point out

inconsistencies in testimony,

an. failure to object at penalty to evidence regarding

Hamilton’s prior crime,

ao. lack of competence -- no assistance, conflicting

caseload, and first capital trial,

ap. appellate counsel’s failure to raise federal grounds,

instead relying on state grounds,

aq. failure to interview known witnesses,

ar. inadequate knowledge of relevant law,

as. failure to object to prosecutor’s inaccurate and out of

context statements,

at. failure to investigate to support tactical decision for

any alleged error.

The State urges that all but seven subclaims should be

dismissed because they are conclusory and fail to state a prima

facie case. Hamilton’s points and authorities address the 23

failure of counsel to properly investigate his background and

mental state (subclaim b: failure to investigate and present

mitigation, i.e., psychological disorders, physical/sexual abuse,

addiction and subclaim aq: failure to interview known family and

other mitigation witnesses), his incompetence (subclaim c: Claim

21- failure to raise incompetence), and his mental state at the

time of the murder (subclaim b: failure to investigate and

present mitigation). Subclaims a, b, o and aq are argued in the

petition. See pages 7-12, 12-15, and 16-17. Sufficient

reference is made in the petition and/or the state record to

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determine the bases for subclaims c, g, h, i, l, m, p, u, y, ab,

ac, ad, ai, aj, al, and ao.

Subclaims d, e, f, j, k, n, r, s, t, v, w, x, ak, am, an,

ap, ar, as, and at, to the extent that they present allegations

not discussed in other claims, are denied on the merits as they

fail to state a prima facie claim upon which relief may be

granted. Subclaims a and u are discussed above with the claims

involving Hamilton’s co-conspirators. Subclaim c is discussed in

Claims 5-7, 10-15, 20 and 21. Subclaim ab is discussed above in

the analysis of Claim 1. Subclaims p, q, y, z, aa, ac, ae, af,

ag, and ah are denied on the merits as they present claims which

are included in other subclaims of Claim 2. 

g. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’s MISSTATEMENT OF

EVIDENCE REGARDING FINANCIAL GAIN

In his closing argument during the guilt phase, the

prosecutor stated Carolyn Hamilton “testified on the stand” that

the killing was for money and that she “told Vicki that

[Hamilton] was going to kill Gwendolyn for the insurance money.” 

RT 10:2256. Hamilton alleges defense counsel’s failure to object

to this misstatement constitutes ineffective assistance of

counsel.

The California Supreme Court addressed this claim on direct

appeal, finding that defense counsel’s failure to object to the

prosecutor’s misstatement of financial gain evidence during

closing argument did not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel since it did not result in the withdrawal of a

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potentially meritorious defense. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1177. 

The state court found, in spite of the fact that Carolyn made

this statement to a police detective instead of to her sister and

that it came before the jury through a taped confession instead

of direct testimony, that it was clear she stated that Hamilton

stated he wanted to kill his wife for the money, so the

credibility of the statement was not significantly affected. Id.

at 1178. The state court concluded that the prosecutor's

misstatement, and defense counsel's failure to object to it, did

not prejudicially affect the outcome of the trial. Id.

Hamilton does not present any offer of proof or other

showing which indicates defense counsel’s failure to object

resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel, nor that in any

other way refutes the state court’s analysis of the record. The

record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s summary

denial of this claim. Claim 2g is denied on the merits.

o. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT BENEFITS GIVEN TO

PROSECUTION WITNESS 

Hamilton alleges defense counsel’s failure to uncover

evidence of the prosecution’s undisclosed consideration to Vicki

in exchange for her testimony resulted in ineffective assistance

of counsel. See Claims 3b(1) and (8) above. As discussed above,

there was no prosecutorial misconduct, so defense counsel cannot

have provided ineffective assistance by failing to uncover the

alleged additional benefits.

Hamilton does not present any offer of proof or showing

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which indicates defense counsel’s actions resulted in ineffective

assistance of counsel. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2o is denied

on the merits.

ad. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR CLOSING ARGUMENT

Hamilton argues that defense counsel’s failure to prepare

for closing argument resulted in a rambling, nearly incoherent

presentation which left major inconsistencies and arguments

unaddressed. Review of defense counsel’s closing argument

reveals not a “rambling, nearly incoherent presentation,” but

repeated attacks on inconsistencies in the testimony of Carolyn,

Gilbert and Vicki, bolstering the theory that they planned and

carried out Gwen’s murder and then framed Hamilton.

Hamilton does not present any offer of proof or showing

which indicates defense counsel’s actions resulted in ineffective

assistance of counsel. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2ad is

denied on the merits.

ai. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ADMISSION OF DAMAGING,

INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE

Hamilton contends defense counsel’s failure to object to the

admission of damaging, inadmissible evidence, including a knife,

shot cups removed from Gwen’s body, the shotgun pieces, and

shotgun shells, was unreasonable and resulted in ineffective

assistance of counsel. Hamilton asserts testimony established

the knife had no connection to the case, the shot cups were not

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identified and had no foundational chain of custody, and the

shotgun and shells were not shown to have been used in the

murder.

 The knife, People’s Exhibit No. 29, was taken from

Hamilton at the crime scene, tested by criminologist Steven

O’Clair and determined not to have made the hole in the tire of

Hamilton’s pickup truck. RT 8:1769; RT 9:2029-30. The shot cups

(which are the part of shotgun shells that hold the pellets

together until they leave the barrel of the gun, RT 8:1771) were

removed from Gwen’s neck and chest during the autopsy, tested by

O’Clair and determined they could have come from a 12-gauge

shotgun with number 8 shot. RT 8:1770-71, RT 9:2031-33. The

shotgun parts were found where Gilbert said he disposed of them,

RT 7:1966, RT 8:2008-09. The serial number on the recovered

shotgun part matched the serial number on the ATF form of the

sale to Brenda Burns on October 31, 1981. RT 8:1777-78; 1788.

Hamilton does not present any offer of proof or showing

which indicates any undue prejudice from admission of this

evidence, or that defense counsel’s failure to object resulted in

ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, Hamilton does not

present any basis for the allegation that any of this evidence

was inadmissible. See Claim 4e and f below. The record fairly

supports the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this

claim. Claim 2ai is denied on the merits.

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aj. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ADMISSION OF EXCLUDED NEWS

REPORTS, USE IN CLOSING ARGUMENT24

Hamilton contends defense counsel failed to object when a

properly excluded news release was put into evidence, and again

failed to object when the prosecutor referred to that evidence in

closing argument.

Review of the record reveals defense counsel did object to

the admission of the news release into evidence, and the trial

court ruled it was not admitted. RT 9:2100. Review of the

prosecutor’s arguments to the jury reveals that although

reference was made to the news release, the argument was based on

the testimony of Lt. Byrd, who related Hamilton’s statement that

he knew Gwen was shot with a shotgun because he saw a news

release, and indicating the news release stated Gwen was shot,

but did not reveal the type or caliber of weapon. RT 10:2263,

RT 7:1700-01. These references to a news release were invited by

Hamilton’s post-arrest statement to Lt. Byrd which made reference

to the news release as bearing on whether such a news release

existed as related to the credibility of Hamilton’s post-arrest

statement. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2aj is denied on the

merits.

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al. UNREASONABLE STIPULATION TO USE CAROLYN’S TAPED

STATEMENT

Hamilton contends that the tape of Carolyn’s November 27,

1981 confession to Detective Salazar included the only statement

that Hamilton wanted to kill his wife for the insurance money,

and that defense counsel’s stipulation to playing the tape for

the jury resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. RT

8:1960.

The California Supreme Court addressed the underlying

admission claim on direct appeal and held that since Carolyn's

statement was admissible, it was not necessary to consider

whether counsel's failure to object to its admission denied

Hamilton constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. 

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1175, n.21.

Carolyn testified at trial that Hamilton said he wanted his

wife killed because he had a girlfriend and he wanted his kids. 

Similarly, in her taped confession Carolyn stated that Hamilton

wanted to kill Gwen for the insurance money and because he had a

girlfriend. Even assuming the taped confession was improperly

admitted, and that defense counsel erred in not objecting to its

admission, there was no prejudice because the implication that

Hamilton wanted the life insurance money was presented by

Carolyn’s in-court testimony that Hamilton offered her $20,000

from the insurance proceeds if she assisted him with the murder. 

Hamilton cannot show that defense counsel’s failure to object

resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. The record fairly

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supports the California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim. 

Claim 2al is denied on the merits.

ao. LACK OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE IN CAPITAL CASE TRIALS

Hamilton contends that defense counsel provided him

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel since this was

his first capital trial, he had no assistance, and he was

attempting to defend other capital murder trials and major felony

cases during Hamilton’s trial.

Hamilton does not present any offer of proof or other

showing which indicates defense counsel was not competent to

represent a capital defendant. The record fairly supports the

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. See

also analysis below of Claim 2b. Claim 2ao is denied on the

merits.

aq. FAILURE TO INTERVIEW KNOWN WITNESSES

Hamilton asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to interview known witnesses. However, Hamilton does not

specify in the petition or supportive briefing which witnesses

counsel knew of and did not interview, or what their testimony

would establish, nor does he present any offer of proof or other

showing how defense counsel’s actions resulted in ineffective

assistance of counsel. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2aq is

denied on the merits.

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3. CLAIM 3: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

a. IMPROPER ARGUMENT

Hamilton asserts the prosecutor made improper statements

during argument which undermined the basic fairness of his trial. 

This claim asserts the prosecutor: (1) made graphic, prejudicial,

inflammatory remarks; (2) misstated the law on fetus viability;

(3) misstated evidence regarding the behavior of alleged

accomplices; (4) argued fetal murder by a preponderance of the

evidence; (5) inaccurately argued Hamilton made admissions;

(7) gave improper opinion that Sharon’s boyfriend Don Van Eck’s

testimony connected Hamilton to the crime; (8) improperly stated

that Hamilton had a motive for murder; (9) improperly stated the

elements of murder; (10) argued Hamilton originally intended to

carry out the murder in front of his children; (12) inaccurately

argued the defense presented no evidence on key points; (13)

misstated the nature of the financial gain special circumstance,

its necessary proof, and argued irrelevant facts; and

(15) improperly usurped the jury’s role and “testified” as a

criminal law expert.25

“Improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s

constitutional rights.” Thompson, 74 F.3d at 1576. A

prosecutor’s argument, even though improper and universally

condemned, does not justify federal habeas relief unless it so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

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conviction a denial of due process. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. 

Moreover, prosecutorial comments to which a defendant fails to

object are reviewed for plain error. Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1191.

Subsections (1) and (12), that the prosecutor made graphic,

prejudicial, inflammatory remarks, and inaccurately argued no

evidence was presented on key defense points, are not supported

by specific allegations or citations to the record. Review of

the record does not reveal that the prosecutor’s argument was

improper, or inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. 

These claims are denied on the merits as they fail to state a

prima facie claim upon which relief may be granted and are

unsupported by record references. 

Subsections (2), (5) and (9), that the prosecutor misstated

the law on fetus viability, inaccurately argued Hamilton made

admissions, and improperly stated the elements of murder, lack

specific allegations or citations to the record. Review of the

state record reveals that the language used by the prosecutor

mirrors the language of California’s jury instructions. 

RT 10:2245 and 2322; id. at 2243 and 2322, 2324. Subsections

(2), (5) and (9) are denied on the merits.

Subsections (3), (4), (8) and (13), that the prosecutor

misstated evidence regarding the behavior of the alleged

accomplices, argued fetal murder by a preponderance of the

evidence, stated Hamilton had a motive for murder, and misstated

the necessary proof for the financial gain special circumstance

and argued irrelevant facts, are not supported by specific

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October 1982; Gwen was 26 at the time of her death and the mother

of 4 children ages 6 and younger. RT 7:1752; 1737, 1725.

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citations to the record. Review of the state record reveals that

the argument by the prosecutor regarding the accomplices,

Hamilton’s motive, and the financial gain special circumstance

was consistent with the evidence presented at trial. RT 10:2265-

71 and 2254-56. The prosecutor’s argument about fetal viability

told the jury they “must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

fetus was viable.” Id. at 2241 (emphasis added). There is no

error. Subsections (3), (4), (8) and (13) are denied on the

merits.

Subsections (7) and (10), that the prosecutor stated his

opinion that Van Eck’s testimony connected Hamilton to the crime,

and argued Hamilton originally intended to carry out the murder

in front of his kids, are both confirmed by the record. RT

10:2265 and 2050-51. Hamilton alleges these statements by the

prosecutor were improper, intended only to inflame the jury, and

infected the trial with unfairness. Defense counsel’s objection

to Van Eck’s testimony, that on November 3, 1981, he saw Hamilton

with an “older” woman in a white pickup, id. at 1751-52, was 26

overruled. RT 7:1756. Although the testimony by Van Eck may not

have “overwhelmingly” connected Hamilton to the crime, it did

provide a connection and as such the prosecutor’s argument did

not render the entire trial unfair. The argument of intent to

carry out the murder in front of the children was consistent with

and did not misrepresent the evidence presented at trial. The

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trial judge twice warned the jury, once prior to counsels’

closing arguments and once during the instructions, that

statements of counsel were not evidence. RT 10:2238-39, 2308. 

Subsections (7) and (10) are denied on the merits.

Subsection (15), that the prosecutor argued at both guilt

and penalty that it was hard to conceive of a more cold-blooded,

calculated murder, is confirmed by the record and the

circumstances of the killing. RT 10:2304 and 2388. Defense

counsel did not object to this argument during the guilt phase,

but did object at the penalty phase. The trial court sustained

the objection, but indicated the prosecutor’s comment was proper

if submitted as argument instead of personal belief. Id. at

2388. The prosecutor indicated that he was submitting the

statement as argument only. Id. Hamilton alleges the argument

effectively allowed the prosecutor to give his personal opinion

about the evidence, which allowed him to “testify” as a criminal

law expert on the ultimate issue of guilt, thus improperly

usurping the jury’s role and infecting the trial with unfairness.

The prosecutor’s argument is premised on a reasonable

inference that the murder was carried out for Hamilton’s selfish

pecuniary gain after two aborted attempts. Even assuming this

statement was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence

against Hamilton, any error was later cured by the instructions

to the jury that they alone were to determine the facts based on

the evidence presented at trial, RT 10:2306, and that the

statements and argument of counsel were not evidence. Id. at

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2238-39, 2308. The trial court’s instructions were sufficient to

focus the jury’s attention on the proper issues. United States

v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986). Subsection (15)

is denied on the merits.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 3a is denied on the merits.

b. KNOWING USE OF PERJURED TESTIMONY

(3) BRENDA BURNS’ COERCED/REHEARSED TESTIMONY AND

CONSIDERATION

Hamilton asserts Brenda Burns was permitted to give

testimony which the prosecutor knew to be false, misleading and

unreliable because it had been coerced and repeatedly rehearsed

without regard for whether it reflected her independent memory of

events. Hamilton also alleges Brenda’s testimony misleadingly

failed to disclose that she was testifying in exchange for

explicit and implicit promises that she would not be charged for

capital murder and that county authorities would not take custody

of her children.

Hamilton presents a supporting declaration by Brenda Burns,

asserting she was questioned by detectives for hours until she

gave the answers she thought they wanted, that she was given a

lie detector test which she was told she failed, that she was

instructed to memorize her statement before she testified, and

that when she testified to something not in her statement she was

shown her statement so she could change her answer. Ex. 28.

To justify a new trial under Brady v. Maryland for knowing

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use of perjured testimony, the false evidence must be material,

i.e., reasonably likely to affect the judgment of the jury. 373

U.S. at 87.

Hamilton’s allegation of coercion is not supported by the

record. Contrary to her declaration, Brenda Burns’ testimony at

trial contains three instances where she was asked to examine the

statement she gave to the police in order to refresh her

recollection, however only one instance resulted in her

correction of an incorrect answer. RT 8:1821-27 (correcting

response that she did not call Carolyn at Hamilton’s request). 

The other two instances where she was asked to review her

statement to police, was to refresh her recollection following

her answers that she “did not recall.” Id. at 1818-19 and 1833-

36. 

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 3b is denied on the merits.

c. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

Hamilton alleges the prosecutor failed to: 1) disclose names

and addresses of all witnesses who might have been called to

testify or who gave statements to the police, including consulted

experts; 2) provide access to all physical evidence obtained and

information, including felony conviction records, regarding

prosecution witnesses (i.e., whether they were on probation/

parole, had any pending charges, were given money, immunity or

other promises, had prior false charges or statements); 3)

disclose the existence of taped conversations made for the Tulare

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County Sheriff between Patti and Vicki; and 4) disclose Brenda’s

failed polygraph exam with evidence of extensive coaching and

threats.

The failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence

favorable to the defense is material if there is a “reasonable

probability” that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense

“the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. A “reasonable probability” is “a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. Bagley materiality is not a sufficiency

of the evidence test. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435

(1995). “The question is not whether the defendant would more

likely than not have received a different verdict with the

evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,

understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of

confidence.” Id. at 434.

Hamilton fails to show any witness information which is

material, that had it been disclosed the result of the trial

would have been different. Further, there is no indication that

the reports, records, or other physical evidence Hamilton

challenges ever existed. Assuming such information existed,

there is no evidence any of it was exculpatory evidence mandating

disclosure to the defense. Hamilton has failed to make any

showing that any physical evidence to which he refers existed

which should have been disclosed. More importantly, Hamilton has

not shown that any undisclosed evidence was material or that the

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result was an unfair trial.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 3c is denied on the merits.

d. WITHHOLDING, MISREPRESENTING, AND FAILING TO PRESERVE

EVIDENCE 

Hamilton contends the prosecution withheld, misrepresented,

and failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence,

including blood and gun powder residue, test results of Hamilton

and his clothing, the tires of Hamilton’s station wagon and

truck, and the polygraph tests administered to Hamilton and other

witnesses. None of this alleged evidence, however, has been

identified as having been in the possession of law enforcement or

located during this proceeding, or in any other case which has

reviewed Hamilton’s conviction. Repeated requests of habeas

counsel and continual investigation have not revealed such

evidence.

Due process is not violated by the mere failure to preserve

evidence which could have been subjected to tests which might

have exonerated the defendant. United States v. Hernandez, 109

F.3d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1997); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.

51, 56 (1988). The failure to preserve evidence which is only

potentially exculpatory violates due process only if the

evidence’s exculpatory value was apparent before it was

destroyed, the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable

evidence by other reasonably available means, and the police

acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the potentially useful

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evidence. Hernandez, 109 F.3d at 1455; California v. Trombetta,

467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.

Hamilton has shown no facts which would support an

allegation that the prosecution, or law enforcement, acted in bad

faith by failing to preserve evidence or that evidence he seeks

existed or is in existence. Further, Hamilton has not shown that

any of the evidence or tests he describes possessed any

exculpatory value. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 3d is denied

on the merits.

4. CLAIMS 4b, c, d, e, & f: ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ERRORS

Hamilton claims inadmissible, prejudicial evidence was

admitted which infected the trial with fundamental unfairness. 

Hamilton challenges the admission of graphic photographs of Gwen

and the fetus, as well as their autopsies; the unduly graphic

testimony of officers which related the discovery of Gwen’s body

and detailed the scene; and the knife taken from him at the

scene, the shotgun and the shells, since evidence showed the

knife could not have been used in the commission of the crime and

the shotgun and shells were never connected with the crime. 

Hamilton contends all this evidence was irrelevant and more

prejudicial than probative.

Hamilton also raises a challenge to evidence for which he

provides no factual identification, explanation, specification,

or argument: that “unreliable, false or irrelevant evidence of

prior bad acts or crimes” was admitted. Claim 4c is denied on

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the merits as it fails to state a prima facie claim for relief.

As noted above in Claim 4a, an evidentiary admission only

justifies federal habeas relief if the admission renders the

proceedings fundamentally unfair. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72;

Windham, 163 F.3d at 1103. Evidence which is probative of an

element of the crime may be introduced whether or not that

element is specifically contested by the defense. McGuire, 502

U.S. at 69-70. The trial court has broad discretion to admit

photos of the murder victim. People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324,

441 (1991). The prosecution is not obligated to rely solely on

testimony or accept an antiseptic stipulation. Kealohapauole,

800 F.2d at 1466 (finding no denial of due process from admission

of a videotape of autopsy procedure). Photographs which disclose

the manner in which a victim was wounded or killed are properly

admitted on the issue of malice. United States v. Goseyun, 789

F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986).

Hamilton has presented no evidence showing that the trial

judge abused his discretion in allowing admission of the

challenged evidence, or that the admissions made his trial

unfair. Claims 4b, d, e, and f are denied on the merits.

5. CLAIM 6: JUROR MISCONDUCT AT GUILT PHASE

a. EXTRANEOUS INFORMATION RE: FETAL VIABILITY

Hamilton contends that the jury, in determining the multiple

murder special circumstance, relied on extraneous information

which was irrelevant and unreliable to resolve the issue of fetal

viability. Hamilton asserts consideration of this information

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failed to provide him the opportunity to refute it and created an

impermissible risk of conviction based on materially false and

misleading evidence.

Hamilton presents the declarations of two jurors, Allen

Peoples and Mabel Heguigaray, saying that they personally knew of

babies born at seven months who survived and that some

unidentified women on the jury related knowledge of similar

experiences. Ex. 31, ¶ 5 and Ex. 32, ¶ 3.

Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs

about general matters of law and fact that find their source in

everyday life and experience. United States v. Navarro-Garcia,

926 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1991); People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d

907, 950 (1990). When jurors receive information from extraneous

sources, the effect of such receipt is judged by a review of the

entire record, and may be found not prejudicial. In re

Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th 634, 647 (1995). A petitioner is entitled

to habeas relief only if the extrinsic evidence had a substantial

and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. Lawson v.

Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1995).

The extraneous information Hamilton complains of was based

upon past, pre-trial, personal experiences of the jurors, and was

not the subject of outside, independent research or from an

authoritative extrinsic source. Further, it duplicated

information which was testified to at trial, and did not have a

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict.

Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective

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for failing to investigate and present evidence of juror

misconduct. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 6a is denied on the

merits.

c. FAILURE TO INFORM COURT OF JUROR CONVERSATION WITH

DETECTIVE SALAZAR

Hamilton asserts that Juror Peoples violated the trial

court’s admonition not to discuss the case with anyone or to

speak to witnesses when he initiated a conversation with

Detective Salazar outside the courtroom. Hamilton presents the

declaration of Juror Peoples in support of this claim, where

Peoples admits being acquainted with Detective Salazar, that on

the day the jury was sworn Peoples called out to Salazar saying

he recently found an old newspaper photo of him, to which Salazar

laughed and they went their separate ways. Ex. 31, ¶ 3. Juror

Peoples also declares he assumed that the trial judge lectured

the jury not to talk to witnesses the next day because of this

incident. Id.

The state record reveals that the “lecture” by the trial

judge was the standard admonition given on the same day the jury

was sworn in. RT 7:1595-99. If Juror Peoples is mistaken about

when the incident occurred and he talked to Detective Salazar the

day before the “lecture,” that was prior to any admonition given

by the judge. Even if the incident occurred after the jury was

admonished, the conversation related by Juror Peoples is

innocuous, did not concern the trial or any issue in it, and

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could not have had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the verdict.

Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective

for failing to investigate and present evidence of juror

misconduct. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claims 6c is denied on the

merits.

VI. TRIAL CLAIMS - PENALTY PHASE

1. CLAIM 2: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT PENALTY PHASE

b. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT MITIGATION

Hamilton asserts defense counsel failed to investigate and

present evidence from his background, including evidence of

multi-generational sexual abuse and symptoms of psychiatric

disorders, suicide and alcohol/drug addiction, his father’s

physical and psychological abuse of the entire family, his early

and continuing symptoms of psychic trauma, dissociative behavior,

extreme anxiety and depression which went untreated, his parents’

arrests for sexual exploitation of Carolyn and his subsequent

foster care placement, his attempted suicide prior to trial, and

the probability he suffers from organic trauma. Specifically,

Hamilton contends defense counsel was ineffective since he did

not consult any mental health specialists or present any expert

testimony of his psychiatric history, and failed to locate his

childhood evaluations of psychological trauma and schizophrenic

paranoid disturbances. Exs. 50 and 40.

Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to

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make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. In assessing

whether counsel's investigation was reasonable, an objective

review must be conducted of their performance “under prevailing

professional norms." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523. “The

reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or

substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or

actions. . . . [W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to

believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless

or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations

may not later be challenged as unreasonable.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 691.

Deficient Performance

Hamilton presents in support of this claim eighteen

declarations by family members and friends detailing the chaotic

and abusive environment in which he grew up, as well as records

documenting his early mental health evaluations. Exs. 2-5, 7-10,

12-14, 17-20, 22, 24-25. He also presents a social history

prepared by Shirley A. Reece, M.S.W., who interviewed Hamilton

and members of his family in 1993 and 1994, and reviewed numerous

documents. Ms. Reece states that Hamilton was raised in an

environment of inter-generational alcoholism, child abuse and

domestic violence, that much of the adult behavior he was exposed

to was and is proscribed by law, and that there was seemingly a

total lack of familial or social supports. Ms. Reece observes

there is abundant evidence that all the children were severely

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deprived in every sense and lacked the normal affectional bonds

and guidance which foster healthy development and prosocial

behavior, that the ongoing stress far exceeded Hamilton’s coping

capabilities and he literally had nowhere to turn for help. Ms.

Reece states that Hamilton was repeatedly subjected to gross

maltreatment and incredible psychological abuse, and that his

parents’ behavior was by all reasonable standards both deviant

and depraved. Ms. Reece concludes that without a doubt Hamilton

is the product of an extraordinarily dysfunctional and

pathological family, which contributed substantially to his

behavior and to his functioning as an adult. Ex. 47.

Hamilton also presents the opinion of Dr. Woods, who

interviewed Hamilton and reviewed numerous documents. Dr. Woods

states that Hamilton has had serious psychiatric disorders which

substantially altered his ability to understand and function,

that both sides of Hamilton’s family have histories of

genetically transmitted disorders which expressed themselves

early in Hamilton’s life, and that any ability Hamilton had to

function normally was destroyed by a constant barrage of lifethreatening and degrading treatment at the hands of his parents. 

Dr. Woods states Hamilton’s mental health was severely damaged by

repeated physical and psychological abuse directed at Hamilton

and others, and his sense of hopelessness, learned helplessness,

and chronic anxiety have their roots in times he was forced to

witness sadistic attacks against family members and was unable to

help them. Dr. Woods opines that Hamilton is incapable of

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meaningfully engaging others and must either retreat into

isolation or surrender to the influence of people around him. 

Dr. Woods concludes that as a result of environmental,

developmental and traumagenic factors beyond his control,

Hamilton has been burdened throughout his life with extreme

mental and emotional impairments which compromised his ability to

fully appreciate the nature and consequences of his acts or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Ex. 48.

Hamilton asserts trial counsel failed to interview family,

friends, and others with whom he had contact, about his

background or family history of psychiatric disorders and alcohol

and drug dependency, failed to obtain evidence about his

childhood and any psychologically traumatic events, and failed to

obtain a psychiatric or psychological exam or any psychiatric

records. Hamilton maintains trial counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and violated the

duty to obtain mental health exams and to investigate his

background.

Hamilton argues the standards for effective capital counsel

were no different in 1982 than they are now. Hamilton asserts

that both the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court

have rejected the notion that a different standard applied to

capital counsel in the early 1980s, both acknowledging the

importance of developing the defendant’s background and character

in order to make an individualized assessment of the appropriate

penalty. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); Ainsworth

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v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2001); Bean v.

Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998); Karis v. Calderon, 283

F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362 (2000) applying the 1980 American Bar Association

(“ABA”) Standards in evaluating counsel’s duty to investigate

mitigation). Hamilton asserts the mitigation evidence in his

case is similar to that in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 534

(severe privation and abuse by alcoholic, absentee mother,

physical torment, molestation and rape in foster care, diminished

mental capacities, homelessness), which the Supreme Court found

to be relevant to assessing moral culpability.

The State agrees that counsel must thoroughly investigate a

defendant’s background to prepare for the penalty phase, but

contends the performance inquiry must determine whether counsel’s

actions were reasonable in light of all the circumstances. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The State argues the circumstances

include the defendant’s cooperation as well as the prevailing

norms of practice. The State observes the standards of the ABA

should only be viewed as guides, id., and that the prevailing

norms may be determined from the standard practices at the

particular time and place of trial, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522, but

that no set of rules can account for the variety of circumstances

counsel faces and should not restrict counsel’s constitutional

independence and wide latitude to make tactical decisions. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. Further, the State notes that

the purpose of the ABA Standards is to improve the quality of

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legal representation, while the purpose of the Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that

criminal defendants receive a fair trial. Id. at 689.

The State argues the evidence establishes that despite trial

counsel’s urging to the contrary and warnings about the

consequences, Hamilton insisted no mitigating evidence of his

background or character be presented; Hamilton refused to

entertain a mental defense or to undergo mental health testing

and evaluation; insisted on an “all or nothing” defense of

innocence at the guilt phase; and adamantly contended that if

convicted he wanted to receive the death penalty. This was

confirmed by the testimony of his trial counsel at the

evidentiary hearing held in these federal habeas proceedings.

The State contends trial counsel persevered in his duty to

investigate penalty phase mitigation despite the lack of

cooperation by Hamilton and his friends and family, but the

investigation produced little positive information. Trial

counsel’s investigation was not only hampered by Hamilton’s

refusal to discuss mitigation, but also by difficulty in

obtaining information from other witnesses, whom trial counsel

either could not speak to; did not provide any useful

information; or provided negative information. The State argues

that nothing in counsel’s dealings with Hamilton suggested the

need to consult a mental health professional. The State observes

that records and reports provided after the evidentiary hearing

show that defense counsel obtained Hamilton’s juvenile record,

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his prior convictions, and his school records, and that inquiry

was made about his foster care but no records were produced from

providers.

The State asserts trial counsel made a tactical decision not

to present evidence which had been gathered, including “character

disorder” type evidence, in light of the circumstances;

particularly Hamilton’s strong objections to “mental” evidence;

the absence of a history of serious mental pathology; and an

offense which involved aggravated, pre-meditated, and purposeful

activity. The State asserts that in light of the results of

trial counsel’s investigation, it was reasonable to seek to

present evidence of Hamilton’s childhood through his mother.

The State argues that Hamilton’s categorical denial of

complicity in the murders during the guilt and penalty phases

made his refusal to seek mitigation an understandable and

consistent trial strategy. The State concludes that under the

norms of practice in Tulare County in 1981 and 1982, trial

counsel was not so deficient that he was not functioning as

counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, especially where

the psycho-social history evidence which has ultimately been

discovered is weak and not particularly helpful to Hamilton.

The State observes that at the federal evidentiary hearing

Hamilton conceded his consistent focus has been on the guilt

phase of his trial and absence of complicity for the crime as he

denied being the peretrator. Both trial counsel and defense

investigator Wells confirmed Hamilton’s attitude was if he was

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 However, Hamilton was equivocal when asked at the 27

evidentiary hearing if that was his strategy, replying “Not

entirely,” but conceding, “I can’t deny that the [my] words are

there.” EH at 249-50, 252.

ORePetnHam 100

found guilty he would rather receive the death penalty than spend

the rest of his life in prison, which prompted Hamilton to refuse

their repeated requests to provide background information. The

State asserts Hamilton’s motivation to forego a penalty phase

defense was based on his assertion that if he was convicted,

trial counsel had failed to do his job, and a sentence of death

would entitle him to an automatic appeal to the California

Supreme Court. See the State’s Exhibit 5; December 2003

Evidentiary Hearing transcript (“EH”) at 249-50.27

The State contends the record corroborates trial counsel’s

recollection over Hamilton’s current assertion that he did supply

all the requested information for the penalty phase and never

said he did not want to present a penalty phase case. See the

State’s Exhibits 5 and 7; EH at 2379.

Hamilton contends there was ample evidence available to

trial counsel which called for additional investigation which

would have led to mitigating information, and that a rudimentary

investigation would have alerted counsel to records revealing his

mental health problems, the myriad of medications he was

prescribed, and his bizarre behavior. Hamilton maintains the

available evidence of his alleged suicide attempt, his problems

at the jail, and his questions about his medication, should have

prompted counsel to hire a mental health expert.

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Hamilton argues a capital counsel’s failure to investigate

and present mitigating evidence is not justified by a lack of

cooperation from his client. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825,

847 (9th Cir. 2002) (if a client forecloses certain avenues of

investigation, it is an obligation, especially on capital

counsel, to seek alternative sources); Douglas v. Woodford, 316

F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (counsel’s obligation to obtain

mitigating evidence is not excused by a client’s lack of

cooperation). Hamilton refers to Exhibits 133, 134 and 140,

which include Kern County court records obtained in October of

1982, and a letter he wrote to trial counsel in September of

1982, that were discovered in counsel’s files and submitted after

the December, 2003 evidentiary hearing. Hamilton asserts these

documents reveal mitigating evidence from his childhood which

could have been used at trial and contradict trial counsel’s

assertion that Hamilton refused to provide useable information

about his background.

The evidentiary hearing was re-opened at the State’s request

in order to allow testimony by Hamilton, trial counsel,

investigator Wells, and federal habeas counsel about the recently

produced letter in Hamilton’s handwriting, dated September 20,

1982, which provided details about his background. See Ex. 133D. 

Hamilton testified he provided this letter to trial counsel, but

does not recall if it was mailed or given to counsel in person. 

September 2004 Reopened Evidentiary Hearing transcript (“REH”) at

53.

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Hamilton argues that even if trial counsel did not review,

or even receive, Exhibit 133D, investigator Wells obtained

records which would have led to the same mitigating evidence, had

counsel only investigated the information they contained. 

Hamilton observes that the records included references to his

parents’ arrests for sexual abuse of his sister, his placement in

various foster homes, the name of his social worker, and a report

by the probation officer who interviewed him following his

father’s arrest. Hamilton asserts that in light of the

information in these records, trial counsel had sufficient

information to investigate mitigation even if Hamilton was

uncooperative.

Hamilton asserts that even assuming trial counsel never

received Exhibit 133D and that he had been as uncooperative as

trial counsel characterized him, trial counsel still failed in

his duty to investigate all avenues of mitigating evidence. 

Hamilton contends a defendant’s insistence that penalty phase

witnesses not be called does not eliminate trial counsel‘s duty

to investigate mitigation, or to advise about the potential

consequences of failing to present mitigating evidence. Hamilton

argues that trial counsel’s decision to call only Hamilton’s

mother was not a strategic decision made after full investigation

of mitigation, but was a decision made because trial counsel had

abdicated his responsibility to conduct a full investigation and

failed to interview probation officers, foster parents, and

mental health experts.

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The State contends the September, 1982 letter (Ex. 133D) is

completely contrary to an October, 1982 letter Hamilton wrote to

his defense counsel in which Hamilton eschewed a penalty phase

defense, and is also contradicted by statements Hamilton made at

the time of trial in 1982. See Respondent’s Ex. 4 (Hamilton’s

statement to the jury), Ex. 7 (Hamilton’s statement at

sentencing), and Ex. 8 (Hamilton’s statement to probation

officer). The State observes Hamilton did not mention preparing

a written history during the December, 2003 evidentiary hearing,

but testified instead that trial counsel took notes when Hamilton

told him about his background. See EH at 205-06. Trial counsel

testified he has no recollection of having ever seen the letter

or having received it from Hamilton. REH at 26. The State urges

that Exhibit 133D is unreliable, inferring it is a fabrication

and should not be entitled to any weight.

Grave doubts about whether trial counsel ever received

Exhibit 133D, and about Hamilton’s credibility in 2003 as to the

1982 letters, do not have to be resolved because there is

sufficient evidence to show that investigator Wells obtained

records in October 1982 which contained sufficient information

about Hamilton’s background that would have led to similar

mitigating evidence. See Exs. 133, 134 and 140.

The State asserts that reports of Hamilton’s mental health

problems in 1965 were only contained in his father’s military

records, and nothing alerted trial counsel of the need to obtain

Hamilton’s father’s employment records. The State observes even

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Hamilton’s Strickland expert Phillip Cherney hesitated to say a

capital defense counsel must obtain a defendant’s parents’

employment records without any basis to do so. EH at 176-77. 

The State disputes that trial counsel should have been put on

notice of the need for a mental health evaluation by Hamilton’s

pre-trial alleged suicide attempt and use of antidepressant

medication. The State asserts defense counsel was entitled to

believe Hamilton’s denial of an actual suicide attempt, and that

Hamilton’s understanding and interaction with trial counsel in

the preparation for trial contradicted any suggestion that he was

mentally impaired. EH at 278-80.

Hamilton concludes there was no strategic reason for trial

counsel’s failure to investigate and present substantial

mitigating evidence of his father’s depraved and sadistic

behavior, his mother’s complicity in the incest of his sister,

his succession of stays in foster homes, his childhood behavioral

and thought disturbances, and his attempted suicide while in

jail. Hamilton contends the presentation of mitigation at his

penalty trial was constitutionally deficient and he should be

granted a new penalty trial.

The State observes trial counsel still believes Hamilton’s

mother was the best, and indeed only, way to present evidence of

the family abuse and incest to the jury. EH, Thomas Transcript,

at 20; State’s Exhibit 2 at 25. When Mrs. Piper refused to

discuss the abuse on the stand, trial counsel had no alternative

way to present the evidence. State’s Exhibit 1 at 2. The State

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asserts, however, that defense counsel had other strategies for

the penalty phase, such as observing that the disposition of

Carolyn’s and Gilbert’s cases could let them out of prison in as

little as ten years when they were just as guilty of the murder,

and arguing that Hamilton’s life had value by reminding the jury

of guilt phase testimony mentioning positive impressions about

Hamilton, including that he was a good father.

Mr. Cherney testified at the evidentiary hearing that trial

counsel should have developed a “theme,” obtained a mental health

evaluation, prepared a social history, and possibly obtained

Hamilton’s father’s military records. EH at 72, 81, 104, 90. 

The State contends there is no established practice requiring

capital counsel to develop a “theme,” but asserts trial counsel

did focus on a theme throughout the trial: that Carolyn Hamilton

instigated the murder conspiracy and that Gilbert Garay shot

Gwen. Trial counsel returned to this theme in his penalty phase

argument when he contrasted the sentences of Carolyn and Gilbert

with the sentence Hamilton was facing. The State observes trial

counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that preparing a

social history and hiring a mental health expert was not done as

a matter of course in 1981, and Mr. Cherney, Hamilton’s

Strickland expert, did not disagree.

That appellate cases decided twenty years later, when social

history and mental health mitigation preparation is the standard

of practice in death penalty trials, does not change the reality

of capital defense practice in 1981 and 1982. Nor does it

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resolve defense counsel’s testimony that he partially undertook

social history and mental health analysis but Hamilton refused to

permit him to present a mitigation defense.

The State admits the duty to make a reasonable investigation

into potential mitigating evidence has never changed, but

contends that the norms of practice which define “reasonableness”

and the extent of mitigation evidence have evolved with

experience and study. Trial counsel testified he would prepare

for Hamilton’s penalty phase differently today, but at the time

he did the best he could in light of Hamilton’s strong opposition

and lack of cooperation. The State questions the validity of Mr.

Cherney’s opinion that trial counsel’s investigation into

mitigation was inadequate, because Mr. Cherney does not know

about the communications between trial counsel and Hamilton and

because Mr. Cherney has no first-hand knowledge of the prevailing

norms in Tulare County in 1981 and 1982. The State asserts both

are critical to any assessment of trial counsel’s performance,

arguing conversations between counsel and defendant are

particularly important when an uncooperative defendant later

alleges ineffective representation at the penalty phase.

The State asserts Mr. Cherney is not an authority in the

prevailing norms of practice in Tulare County in 1981 and 1982. 

Mr. Cherney was in private practice until 1987, and did not try a

capital case to a jury until 1989 and 1990. Conversely,

Hamilton’s trial counsel began work for the Tulare County Public

Defender’s Office in 1979, has been appointed to twelve capital

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 The State also cited Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1067 28

(9th Cir. 2002) for this argument, however that opinion was

substituted after the State’s brief was filed by Hayes v. Brown,

ORePetnHam 107

cases, tried six of those to a jury (of which Hamilton was the

only one to receive the death penalty), and has been promoted to

supervising attorney in the Public Defender’s Office.

Trial counsel testified that the norms of practice in

capital litigation have evolved since 1981. EH, Thomas

transcript at 10-11, 24-25. He did not think there was a death

penalty seminar before his appointment to Hamilton’s case, but if

there was it only lasted about two hours, where now the seminars

occur annually and last three to four days. EH at 291. Trial

counsel testified that attorneys in his office now assigned to

capital cases hire an investigator and an outside consultant or

mitigation specialist to investigate every aspect of a

defendant’s life. EH at 303, Thomas transcript at 11, 25, 28-29,

40-41. In 1981 this was not done, and trial counsel did not

believe that a mitigation specialist even existed then. EH,

Thomas transcript at 29. At the time of Hamilton’s trial, trial

counsel’s office did not hire a psychologist or psychiatrist as a

matter of course in every capital case and did not prepare a

psychosocial history, as they do today. EH at 133, 142, 282-83,

303, Thomas transcript at 10, 24-25, 40. In short, trial counsel

testified that the techniques and practices of capital defense in

Tulare County today are very different from 1981.

The State argues this case is like Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5

F.3d 1180, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1993) , which recognized the 28

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26 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting habeas relief for

presentation of false evidence).

ORePetnHam 108

principle from Strickland that the reasonableness of counsel’s

actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the

defendant’s own statements and desires about how the trial be

conducted. 466 U.S. at 691. The State contends Hamilton’s

letter to trial counsel, and the statement he wished to read to

the jury, unequivocally expressed his wish not to present

mitigation evidence, entitling his trial counsel’s decisions to

additional deference. The State observes that a law review

article relied on by Mr. Cherney discusses the effect of an

uncooperative defendant, stating it may be impossible to

construct a substantial mitigation case without the defendant’s

active assistance. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life:

Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.

L.Review 299, 321-22 (1983).

The State concludes that trial counsel properly sought

Hamilton’s assistance to prepare for the penalty phase early in

his representation, but Hamilton refused to cooperate, insisted

he did not want mitigation evidence presented, and made it clear

he did not want counsel to investigate or present evidence of his

family background, including the incest, by refusing to provide

information or names of relatives. The State contends Hamilton’s

lack of cooperation prevented trial counsel from obtaining all

the details of the abuse and problems in Hamilton’s family, but

that nevertheless trial counsel did investigate, interviewed

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witnesses and searched for records, trying to persuade Hamilton

to cooperate, and making sure Hamilton understood the

consequences of his failure to do so. The State argues trial

counsel made a tactical decision to call Hamilton’s mother to

testify about his childhood because she had firsthand knowledge

of the abuse. Counsel expected her to generate sympathy, and she

had additional credibility due to her testimony for the

prosecution at the guilt phase. Trial defense counsel reminded

the jury of positive comments about Hamilton made by guilt phase

witnesses and emphasized the relatively lenient sentences

received by Hamilton’s co-defendants as a result of their

agreements with the prosecution. The State concludes Hamilton

received reasonably effective assistance of counsel under the

circumstances and the prevailing professional norms, and that

Hamilton’s failure to cooperate in his defense, which sabotaged

counsel’s efforts, cannot be used to obtain a reversal of his

sentence.

Analysis

Standard practice in death penalty defense in Tulare County

in 1982, the time of Hamilton’s trial, was different from today. 

The law review article by Goodpaster, which Hamilton’s Strickland

expert relied on, was published in 1983. Strickland was not

decided until 1984. Although the ABA Standards published in 1980

stated capital counsel was required to thoroughly investigate a

defendant's background, it is unclear what constituted a

“thorough background investigation” at the time of Hamilton’s

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The fourth case Hamilton cites, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 29

302, 319 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia,

536 U.S. 304 (2002), was tried in 1980, but the issue addressed by

the Supreme Court involved jury instructions. The fifth case,

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (finding

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and

present evidence of abusive and neglectful childhood, history of

foster care, borderline retardation, and positive conduct in

prison), was tried in 1986.

ORePetnHam 110

trial. Trial counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing,

that using a mitigation expert and obtaining a social history

were not standard practices in 1982, was not contradicted by

Hamilton’s Strickland expert nor any other evidence. The Supreme

Court in Strickland noted that prevailing norms of practice, as

reflected in the ABA Standards, were only guidelines for

determining reasonableness and could not take account of the

variety of circumstances defense counsel faces or the range of

legitimate decisions about representation. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688-89.

Three of the cases Hamilton cites, in support of his

assertion that the standards regarding investigation in capital

cases have not changed from the early 1980s to the present,

confirm that in the early 1980s capital counsel had an obligation

to conduct an investigation of a capital defendant’s

background. In Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (9th 29

Cir. 1998), counsel was found ineffective in a 1981 trial for

failing to obtain testing of an accused which had been

recommended by mental health experts and for not furnishing

necessary information to testifying experts, which would have

resulted in the presentation of evidence of mental retardation,

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post-traumatic stress disorder, brain damage, and the inability

to form intent. In Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.

2001), counsel was found ineffective in a 1980 trial because he

could not provide a tactical reason for failing to investigate

mitigation, failing to interview one witness until ten minutes

before she was scheduled to testify, obtaining records but not

examining them, failing to obtain evidence of a troubled

childhood, drug use in the military and a 20 year addiction to

drugs and alcohol which were documented in the probation report,

and failing to present evidence of positive adjustment to prison. 

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002), held that

counsel in a 1982 trial had a duty to investigate a capital

defendant’s background for possible mitigation, citing Penry v.

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 319, that the sentencer must be able to

consider relevant evidence from the defendant’s background and

character. However, Karis also held that in 1982 capital counsel

was not constitutionally compelled to perform the extent of

family history research which is now often presented on appeal. 

See 283 F.3d at 1133-34.

In addressing what constituted a reasonable background

investigation at the time of Hamilton’s trial, in light of the

circumstances of his case, trial counsel knew about Hamilton’s

troubled childhood and did investigate, but could not find

witnesses who were available or willing to present that evidence. 

Trial counsel did obtain and reviewed the records which were

available, and investigated Hamilton’s background to the extent

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possible. No recommendation for further examination or testing

was made by mental health experts. Trial counsel testified at

the evidentiary hearing that Hamilton appeared to fully

understand the proceedings, was active in preparing for the guilt

phase, and that his refusal to assist with the penalty phase was

not due to a lack of understanding or competence. EH at 280,

Thomas transcript at 16, 43.

Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that the

standard capital practice in the Tulare County Public Defender’s

Office at the time of Hamilton’s trial did not include preparing

a social history. EH, Thomas transcript at 28. This testimony

distinguishes Hamilton’s case from the facts in Wiggins. In

Wiggins, trial counsel acknowledged that standard practice in

capital cases at the time of trial in 1988 included the

preparation of a social history report, but that he chose not to

commission such a report despite the fact that funds were

available. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.

Considering the available evidence and the evidence

presented at the evidentiary hearings, in light of the

circumstances of the crime, trial counsel’s investigation and

presentation of mitigation was not deficient. Regardless of

whether the allegations of Hamilton’s lack of cooperation are

true or not, either trial counsel or investigator Wells did

interview the available witnesses, and no better, available

witness about Hamilton’s background and social history other than

his mother was uncovered. Trial counsel could not talk to

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Carolyn and Gilbert because they were adverse parties represented

by counsel. Counsel did obtain background information from Vicki

and Uncle Marvin, the brother of Hamilton’s father, but their

testimony would have included information detrimental to

Hamilton, and Gwen’s family and other friends were either

unwilling to talk to defense counsel or their testimony would

have been more detrimental than helpful to Hamilton. The mental

condition evidence known to defense counsel and his interactions

with Hamilton, who did not want a “mental” defense, support

counsel’s lack of further pursuit of such evidence.

Prejudice

Even assuming arguendo, that trial counsel did render

deficient performance by failing to sufficiently investigate and

present Hamilton’s background and mental history in mitigation,

Hamilton must also establish prejudice in order to prevail. In

assessing prejudice, the evidence in aggravation is reweighed

against the totality of available mitigating evidence. Wiggins,

539 U.S. at 534. Persons who commit crimes attributable to

mental or emotional problems or a disadvantaged background may be

less culpable than those with no excuse. Boyde v. California,

494 U.S. 370, 382 (1990).

The mitigation presented in these proceedings which is most

favorable to Hamilton is: childhood physical abuse by his father

against him, his sisters, and mother; his father’s sexual abuse,

with his mother’s assistance, of his sister Carolyn; the breakup

of the family, twice; the first time when the extended family

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discovered evidence that he experienced mental health difficulties,

as discussed in Claim 21, supra, there is no credible evidence

supporting these claims. Hamilton’s conduct and demeanor at the

federal evidentiary hearings, and his communications with, and

motions to the Court, totally contradict these claims that he

suffered from any mental impairments.

ORePetnHam 114

discovered the sexual abuse perpetrated against Carolyn and

brought the children from Washington State to stay with relatives

in California, followed by the family’s reunion and a resumption

of the sexual abuse (the time at which Hamilton learned about

it), and the second time when both parents were arrested on

sexual abuse charges; his transient foster care for three years

during high school; and that he was prescribed medication for

depression prior to trial.30

In aggravation, Hamilton’s crime was premeditated and

extremely cold-blooded. Hamilton attempted three days in a row

to murder Gwen by shooting her with a shotgun. The first two

attempts were to have her murdered by another in the presence of

their children. He finally shot her himself. Jury deliberation

was short at both guilt and penalty phases. RT 10:2334-46 (two

hours for guilt); 2417-18 (about four hours for penalty,

including lunch). The California Supreme Court commented on the

characteristics of the crime in relation to the background

evidence which Hamilton presented at trial: 

In addition, though other aggravating evidence was not

overwhelming, the capital crimes themselves were

exceptionally brutal. [Hamilton] planned the shotgun

murder of his pregnant wife for reasons of personal

convenience and financial gain. With cold-blooded

determination, he personally executed his homicidal

scheme, at point-blank range, after confederates failed

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to make good on earlier attempts to assassinate the

victim. [Hamilton] knew his wife’s death would also

kill their unborn fetus and would render their four

young children motherless. Though mitigating evidence

that [Hamilton] suffered a difficult childhood was

cause for sympathy, it was unlikely to carry persuasive

weight against such a callous and calculated murder.

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1185.

The cases cited by Hamilton, Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825

(9th Cir. 2002) and Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.

2002), are distinguishable. The murders in Silva and Karis were

crimes of opportunity, by contrast the murder here was

“exceptionally brutal” and deliberately calculated. The

circumstances of Hamilton’s crime are not the type mitigated by a

possible lack of control or an inability to foresee the

consequences of actions. Cases where counsel’s failure to

investigate and present mitigation have been found prejudicial

involve either less aggravating evidence, including the

circumstances of the crime, or more significant mitigating

evidence, or both. 

The facts of the murder in Wiggins were less aggravating

than the facts here: Wiggins was observed talking to the victim

the last time she was seen alive and later that evening was in

possession of the victim’s car and credit cards. However, no

other evidence tied him to the murder, and the victim’s time of

death could not be definitely established. Wiggins v. State, 352

Md. 580, 724 A.2d 1 (1999). There, the mitigating evidence was

more compelling: Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse

in the first six years of his life while in the custody of his

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of a photo shoot, then raped and brutally murdered them. 316 F.3d

at 1091.

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alcoholic, absentee mother, suffered physical torment, sexual

molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent years in

foster care, spent time homeless, and had diminished mental

capacities. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535.

In Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003), the

jury heard about Douglas’s aversion to the sight of blood and to

his non-violent nature, and were given a very generalized

sociological history, but did not hear about his abandonment as a

child, having an abusive alcoholic foster father who locked him

in the closet for hours at a time, having to scavenge for food,

being beaten and gang-raped as a young man in a Florida jail, and

did not hear expert testimony of possible significant mental

illness and dysfunction. The Douglas expert could also have

explained how the effects of inhaling solvents and an automobile

accident may have exacerbated Douglas's pre-existing neurological

deficit. In spite of the gruesome nature of the killing for 31

which Douglas was convicted, the jury did not hear a substantial

amount of Douglas's social history and heard none of the evidence

regarding his mental problems, which undermined confidence in the

outcome of the penalty phase verdict.

Similarly, in Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.

2002), where the defendant was convicted of abduction, robbery,

and murder, trial counsel's failure to present significant

evidence regarding the defendant's abusive childhood, mental

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illnesses, organic brain disorders, and substance abuse "was

profoundly prejudicial." Id. at 847. Trial counsel's "failure

to investigate Silva's background and to prepare evidence

relating to his family history, mental health, and substance

abuse problems resulted in an egregious failure to uncover and

present a raft of potentially compelling mitigating evidence." 

Id. at 850.

In Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en

banc), humanizing mitigation evidence was determined to have

unique significance. Mayfield killed a woman and her son who had

filed an auto theft complaint against him, and then killed

another man who witnessed the murders. Id. at 918-19. Although

"[t]he aggravating evidence against Mayfield was strong," and

counsel had already solicited testimony from a psychiatrist about

Mayfield's childhood diabetes, drug use, and psychological and

social problems, counsel’s failure to present the additional

available mitigation evidence was prejudicial. Id. at 929-32. 

Counsel's failure to present experts in endocrinology and

toxicology to explain the chemical impact of Mayfield's illness

and drug abuse contributed to the finding of ineffective

assistance. Id. at 932. Much of the potential mitigating

testimony would have emphasized that Mayfield was a good,

protective brother and generous nephew; not a violent person;

that friends and family loved Mayfield and wished the jury to

spare his life; and that friends and siblings understood

Mayfield's years of drug and alcohol abuse and his poorly

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controlled diabetes had changed him. Id. at 931-32.

In Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006)

(en banc), cert. granted ___ S. Ct. ___, 2006 WL 1591780 (Sept.

26, 2006), a colorable claim was presented that counsel was

ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence, although

Landrigan told his counsel that he did not want family members to

testify who had been subpoenaed to testify. Landrigan actively

sought to defeat counsel’s efforts to present mitigation evidence

by making statements that made matters even worse every time

counsel attempted to place mitigating factors before the court. 

There, it was reasonably probable that, had counsel developed

other mitigating evidence from different sources, the result

might have differed. The murder in Landrigan involved stabbing

and strangulation of an acquaintance in Arizona after escaping

from prison in Oklahoma where he was incarcerated for murder. 

The state court pointed out, Landrigan himself was exceptional

(unscrupulous, lacking in regard for others, and lacking in

morals), see State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 859 P.2d 111, 117

(1993), but the available mitigating evidence of an alcoholic

mother, an alcoholic adoptive mother, and a predisposition to

violence, could have provided an explanation of his actions.

Conversely, in Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25-26

(2002), the aggravating evidence of the circumstances of the

crime (a cold-blooded execution-style killing of one victim and

attempted execution-style killing of another, both during the

course of a preplanned armed robbery) and the prior offenses (the

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knifing of one man, and the stabbing of a pregnant woman as she

lay in bed trying to protect her unborn baby) were so severe that

counsel’s failure to present evidence of Visciotti’s troubled

family background and possible seizure disorder was not

prejudicial. Id. at 26. 

In Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied sub nom., Allen v. Brown, ___ U. S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 134

(2005), counsel’s failure to present potential humanizing, nonexculpatory mitigating evidence that Allen could be pleasant at

times did not prejudice him because, even if counsel had

presented the evidence, there was no reasonable probability that

the jury would have weighed the evidence in favor of life rather

than death, when Allen was convicted of murdering three people

and conspiring to murder four others while already serving a life

sentence for yet another murder, and he had a long history of

orchestrating and committing violent robberies and burglaries. 

Id. at 1002-10. “None of the testimony portrays a person whose

moral sense was warped by abuse, drugs, mental incapacity, or

disease or who acted out of passion, anger or other motive

unlikely to reoccur.” Id. at 1007.

In the over fourteen years between Hamilton’s removal from

his parents’ house in March of 1967 until Gwen’s murder in

November of 1981, Hamilton was frequently in trouble with the

law, but generally for non-violent crimes such as theft. See

Exs. 133C, E, F, G & I. While Hamilton’s record does show

instability (such as his failure to stay employed for any

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significant length of time), there is no evidence that the

experiences of his childhood caused him to be violent or unable

to control his impulses. Instead, the evidence shows that

Hamilton cold-bloodedly planned to murder his wife, intending to

share the life insurance proceeds with a killer Hamilton

solicited, and that Hamilton eventually carried out the murder

himself, and did this at the expense of his unborn child’s life

to obtain the life insurance money and to clear the way for him

to be with his mistress.

Like Allen, none of the evidence here portrays Hamilton as

“a person whose moral sense was warped by abuse, drugs, mental

incapacity, or disease or who acted out of passion, anger or

other motive unlikely to reoccur.” 395 F.3d at 1007. The murder

took three days in execution under circumstances arguably

analogous to lying in wait. Even if evidence of Hamilton’s

complete background had been presented to the jury, the

circumstances of the crime are such that confidence in the

outcome is not undermined. “Evidence about the defendant’s

background and character is relevant because of the belief, long

held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts

that are attributable to a disadvantaged background or to

emotional or mental problems, may be less culpable than

defendants who have no such excuse.” Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. at 382 (emphasis added). Hamilton’s deliberately

premeditated criminal act is not the type attributable to a

disadvantaged background or to emotional or mental problems. It

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is not reasonably probable that had all the available mitigating

evidence been presented that the result of the proceeding would

have been different in light of the very extensive evidence of

ruthless premeditation. Trial counsel’s performance was not

prejudicial. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2b is denied on the

merits.

h. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S MISLEADING ARGUMENT

THAT NO MITIGATION EQUALS AGGRAVATION 

Hamilton asserts that defense counsel unreasonably failed to

object to the prosecutor’s argument that the absence of a

mitigating factor was aggravating.

The California Supreme Court addressed the underlying claim

on direct appeal, finding that the jury was adequately informed

of its sentencing responsibility and the pertinent sentencing

factors, was given the standard admonition to consider only

“applicable” factors, and that defense counsel vigorously

disputed the prosecutor’s version of the aggravation-mitigation

balance, urged the factors on which no evidence had been

presented should be “ignored” or were “not an issue,” reminded

the jurors they alone decided the weight of each factor, and that

any one mitigating factor could justify a life sentence “no

matter how many other factors point the other way.” Hamilton, 48

Cal. 3d at 1185. The California Supreme Court held there was

only a minimal chance the jury was misled by the prosecutor’s

argument and found there was no reasonable possibility the

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prosecutor’s improper argument affected the life-death

determination since the mitigating evidence of a difficult

childhood was unlikely to carry persuasive weight against such a

callous and calculated murder. Id.

As found in Claim 7a below, the prosecutor’s erroneous

argument, that the lack of mitigating evidence was aggravating,

was not prejudicial as the jury was adequately informed of its

discretion and admonished to consider only applicable factors. 

Further, defense counsel vigorously disputed the prosecutor’s

version of the aggravation-mitigation balance and reminded jurors

they had the sole power to decide the weight of each factor and

that any single factor could justify a life sentence.

Hamilton does not present any offer of proof or other

allegation which indicates defense counsel’s failure to object to

the prosecutor’s argument resulted in ineffective assistance of

counsel. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s denial of this claim. Claim 2h is denied on the merits.

i. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF

THE DEATH PENALTY BASED ON MATHEMATICAL WEIGHING 

Hamilton asserts that defense counsel unreasonably failed to

object to the prosecutor’s argument that the death penalty should

be imposed on the basis of a mathematical balance of mitigating

and aggravating factors.

The California Supreme Court addressed the underlying claim

on direct appeal, holding that although the prosecutor stressed

during argument the existence of at least “nine” factors in

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aggravation and a maximum of “two” in mitigation, there was no

reasonable possibility his comment would have led jurors to

refrain from weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence to

decide which penalty was appropriate. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at

1181-82.

As found in Claim 7a below, the prosecutor’s argument

referring to a numerical count of aggravating and mitigating

factors was not prejudicial as the jurors were not mislead

regarding their discretion and responsibility. Defense counsel

reminded the jurors they needed to weigh the sentencing factors

and that any single factor could justify a life sentence.

Hamilton does not make any offer of proof or other showing

that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s

argument resulted in prejudicial ineffective assistance of

counsel. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2i is denied on the

merits.

l. & m. INTER-CASE AND INTRA-CASE PROPORTIONALITY 

Hamilton asserts defense counsel’s failure to research and

demonstrate that the death penalty was excessive based on intercase and intra-case proportionality, compared to sentences in

similar cases and compared to his alleged accomplices, resulted

in ineffective assistance of counsel. Hamilton does not make any

offer of proof or showing which indicates defense counsel’s

failure to research this issue resulted in ineffective assistance

of counsel. This claim is foreclosed by Pulley v. Harris, 465

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U.S. 37, 53 (1983) (holding the jury’s finding of a special

circumstance with automatic review by the trial judge and the

California Supreme Court, sufficiently limits the risk of

arbitrariness and capriciousness without comparative

proportionality review). The record fairly supports the

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claims

2l and m are denied on the merits.

ao. LACK OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE IN CAPITAL CASE TRIALS

Hamilton contends that defense counsel provided him

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel since this was

his first capital trial, he had no assistance, and he was

attempting to defend other capital murder trials and major felony

cases during Hamilton’s trial. See same claim (2ao) in guilt

phase above. As above, Hamilton does not make any offer of proof

or other showing that defense counsel was not competent to defend

a capital defendant. At the time of his appointment to represent

Hamilton, defense counsel had been a lawyer for six years, had

been employed by the Tulare County Public Defender’s Office for

over two years, had specialized in criminal defense, and had

tried a murder case before a jury. EH at 280-81, Thomas

transcript at 8. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 2ao is

denied on the merits.

aq. FAILURE TO INTERVIEW KNOWN WITNESSES

Hamilton asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to interview known witnesses. See same claim (2aq) in

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guilt phase above. Hamilton does not specify in the petition or

identify in briefing which witnesses counsel knew of and did not

interview, or what testimony they would provide. Nor does he

present any offer of proof or evidence which demonstrates defense

counsel’s actions resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s summary

denial of this claim. Claim 2aq is denied on the merits.

2. CLAIM 5: IMPAIRED RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

g. IMPROPER PENALTY DETERMINATION

Hamilton asserts that from 1967 until the time of his trial

in 1982 there had been only five executions nationwide, and none

in California, so the jurors at his trial did not reasonably

believe a death sentence would be carried out.

California’s death penalty statute requires juries to find a

special circumstance based on the facts of the crime and/or on

the defendant’s history, distinguishing those defendants

convicted of first degree murder who are selected for death from

those who are not. Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct.

884, 892, 894 (2006); Tuileapa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972

(1994); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The federal

constitution requires that sentence selection be made after “a

broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an

individualized determination.” Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S.

269, 276 (1998); Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-73; Zant v. Stephens,

462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983). The consideration of aggravating

and mitigating factors at the penalty phase, including the

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defendant’s character and background and the circumstances of the

crime, allows for an individualized determination of sentence,

thereby directing and limiting the sentencer’s discretion to

avoid arbitrary and capricious action. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.

586, 604-05 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-

04 (1976). The jury “need not be instructed how to weigh any

particular fact in the capital sentencing decision,” but is

permitted unbridled discretion in determining the appropriate

sentence. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979; Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276;

Stephens, 462 U.S. at 875. Finally, California’s statute

requires that the defendant either killed, intended to kill, or

acted with reckless indifference to human life, so the death

penalty is proportionate to the crime committed. Edmund v.

Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.

137, 157-58 (1987).

Hamilton presents no evidence in support of this claim. The

history of a state’s application of its laws is not relevant to a

reliable determination of penalty. In arriving at a verdict for

the penalty phase, Hamilton’s jury properly considered the

circumstances of the crime, all evidence presented in mitigation

including Hamilton’s character and background, and whether

Hamilton killed, intended to kill or acted with reckless

indifference to human life. Based on this evidence, defense

counsel was not ineffective. The record fairly supports the

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim

5g is denied on the merits.

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3. CLAIM 6: JUROR MISCONDUCT AT PENALTY

As reflected in the guilt phase analysis of this claim,

jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about

general matters of law and the facts that find their source in

everyday life and experience. The effect of information received

from extraneous sources is judged by a review of the entire

record, and the determination of whether the extraneous

information is nonprejudicial or is sufficient to justify habeas

relief turns on whether there was a substantial and injurious

effect or influence on the verdict. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d at

821; In re Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th at 647; Lawson, 60 F.3d at 612.

b. & f. EXTRANEOUS INFORMATION REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF

RELEASE AND PRISON CONDITIONS

Hamilton asserts that the jurors discussed, considered and

relied on extraneous information that if they chose a sentence of

life without possibility of parole, Hamilton would still be

paroled within seven to twenty years. Hamilton presents the

declarations of Irene Perkins, Allen Peoples, Mabel Heguigaray,

Wendell Webb, and Geneva Gholston in support of this claim. Ex.

30 ¶ 5, Ex. 31 ¶ 6, Ex. 32 ¶ 5, Ex. 33 ¶ 7, and Ex. 34 ¶ 13.

 Hamilton also asserts an unnamed juror, who had a brother

in prison, observed that if Hamilton were sentenced to life he

would probably be killed by other inmates because of the nature

of the crimes, so they would probably be extending his life by

sentencing him to death. Ex. 33 ¶ 7. Hamilton contends this

extraneous information was prejudicial and improperly aggravated

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Rules of Evidence apply to habeas corpus cases brought under 28

U.S.C. § 2254.

ORePetnHam 128

the offense by implying that the crime was reprehensible even by

prison standards.

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) governs the admissibility of

a statement by a juror to impeach the verdict. Under Rule 32

606(b), a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement

occurring during deliberations, or the effect of anything upon

any juror’s mind, emotions, or mental processes as influencing

the verdict. An exception under Rule 606(b) allows juror

testimony about whether extraneous prejudicial information was

brought to the jury’s attention or whether any improper outside

influence was brought to bear.

The starting point is the rule that jurors’ statements

cannot be considered unless they concern the receipt of

extraneous prejudicial information or the presence of outside

influence. The declarations submitted in support of this claim

deal with personal opinions of certain jurors expressed during

deliberations. This is not a case involving extrinsic

information imparted by a third party or obtained through an

outside reference. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363-65

(1966) (misconduct for bailiff to tell the deliberating jury that

defendant was a “wicked fellow” who was guilty and to tell

another juror the Supreme Court would correct any improper guilty

verdict); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 502-03, 505 (9th Cir.

1987) (misconduct for juror to consult a dictionary for the

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definition of “malice”); Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880,

882-84, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1986) (misconduct for juror to call a

law librarian to inquire about the differences, including

penalties, between first and second degree murder); Gibson v.

Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 852-55 (9th Cir. 1980) (misconduct occurred

when one juror consulted an encyclopedia and another juror looked

at a medical dictionary and both jurors shared the information

during deliberations).

A careful review of the submitted juror declarations reveals

no evidence of any extraneous information provided to the jury or

any outside influence exerted on the jury. None of the

allegations or declarations raise anything other than intra-jury

matters. Rule 606(b) and related case law prohibit the court

from considering the type of information upon which Hamilton

bases his claims. Based on this evidence, defense counsel was

not ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence

of juror misconduct. The record fairly supports the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claims 6b and f

are denied on the merits.

e. CONSULTATION OF THE BIBLE AT PENALTY PHASE

Hamilton contends that Juror Lahoma Kuehl consulted the

Bible to guide her decision to impose death, denying him the

opportunity to refute or correct her interpretation of the

scriptures and impermissibly interjecting religion as a guiding

influence into the deliberations.

Hamilton submits the declaration of Juror Kuehl which states

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that when the trial became too stressful she handed her worries

to God and she repeatedly read the Bible’s teachings that the

death penalty is an appropriate punishment which gave her

guidance. Ex. 29 ¶ 4. Juror Kuehl also testified at the state

evidentiary hearing, where she contended she was not a religious

fanatic as the declaration made her appear, and that she did not

specifically consult the Bible regarding the death penalty. In

re Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th at 291. Juror Kuehl admitted at the

evidentiary hearing that she did study the Bible daily during the

trial. Id. at 292.

No clearly established federal rule governs the consultation

of the Bible during a capital sentencing jury deliberation. 

Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2006) (Wilkinson, J.,

concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). Juror Kuehl made no

mention, either in her declaration or at the state evidentiary

hearing, that she discussed biblical passages and/or beliefs with

other jurors. Hamilton has made no allegation that a Bible was

present in the jury room during deliberations, or that Juror

Kuehl’s actions had any impact on the jury’s decision. There is

no suggestion the jury disregarded the law or the court’s

instructions, and instead referred to or applied biblical law.

Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective

for failing to investigate and present evidence of juror

misconduct. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 6e is denied on the

merits.

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4. CLAIM 7: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT - IMPROPER ARGUMENT AT

PENALTY; LACK OF MITIGATION IS AGGRAVATING

a. MATHEMATICAL COMPARISON OF MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION

ENCOURAGED

Hamilton asserts the jury was led to believe by

instructions, voir dire questioning and prosecutorial argument

that they were to determine the applicability of the death

penalty based on a mathematical comparison of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances. The California Supreme Court rejected

this claim on direct appeal, holding that prosecutorial argument

which simply restates the statutory language that death shall be

imposed if aggravation outweighs mitigation is insufficient to

mislead the jury or to misstate the law. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at

1181. The state court found the prosecutor did not suggest the

jury merely count factors, but told them to “weigh” the factors

and to “balance them.” Id. at 1182. Although observing that it

might have been better for the prosecutor not to have emphasized

the numerical count, the state supreme court saw no reasonable

possibility his comment led jurors to refrain from weighing the

aggravating and mitigating evidence to decide which penalty was

appropriate. Id.

Hamilton further alleges, as he did on his state direct

appeal, that the prosecutor’s argument was erroneous as he argued

the absence of evidence as to mitigating factors constituted

aggravation. See Claim 19e below. The California Supreme Court

rejected this claim despite finding error in the prosecutor’s

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argument (that the absence of evidence on factors (d), (e), (f),

(g), (h), and (j) of California Penal Code section 190.3

(“§ 190.3") was aggravating), because the jury was adequately

informed of its responsibility and the pertinent factors, the

jury was admonished to consider only “applicable” factors, and

defense counsel vigorously disputed the prosecutor’s version of

the aggravation-mitigation balance and reminded the jurors they

had the sole power to decide the weight of each factor and any

one mitigating factor could justify a life sentence. Hamilton,

48 Cal. 3d at 1184-85. The California Supreme Court concluded

that any chance the jury was misled by the prosecutor’s argument

was minimal, especially in light of the exceptionally brutal

character of the crimes. Id. at 1185.

A prosecutor may properly argue that the jury can consider

the lack of evidence as to mitigating factors. Tuilaepa, 512

U.S. at 975-81. Under California law it is error for a

prosecutor to argue that such a lack of evidence of mitigating

factors constitutes an aggravating factor. People v. Davenport,

41 Cal. 3d 247, 289-90 (1985).

Here, the prosecutor stated in closing argument there were

two factors in mitigation and nine factors in aggravation, but

then immediately told the jury, “Your duty as judges at this time

I would submit to you is to weigh the factors in aggravation with

the factors in mitigation,” RT 10:2395, implying that more than

mechanical counting was required. Defense counsel also told the

jury that they alone would decide the weight and importance of

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each factor, and that any single factor could justify a life

sentence. Id. at 2403.

Review of the state record reveals that the California

Supreme Court was correct in finding no prejudice from the

prosecutor’s erroneous argument. The jurors were not misled

about their discretion and responsibility to determine the

appropriate penalty under all the evidence. Since both the

prosecutor and defense counsel reminded the jurors they needed to

find that aggravation outweighed mitigation, the prosecutor’s

statement did not render the proceedings so unfair “as to make

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477

U.S. at 181.

Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective

for failing to object to the instruction, voir dire questioning,

or argument. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s denial of this claim. Claim 7a is denied on the merits.

b. DEATH MANDATORY IF AGGRAVATION OUTWEIGHED MITIGATION

Hamilton contends the court instructed, and the prosecutor

argued, that if the jury found aggravating factors outweighed

mitigating factors it was mandatory they impose a death sentence. 

Although Hamilton concedes this claim is foreclosed by Boyde v.

California, 494 U.S. at 374-77, he asserts in this case the

mandatory instruction was unconstitutional because the argument

of the prosecutor reinforced the notion that the jury had no

discretion once a mathematical counting had taken place and they

were not told they had the ultimate sentencing discretion. 

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Hamilton contends the “shall impose” instruction is only

permissible if the jury is informed of the requirement of an

individualized sentencing determination.

As found above, the prosecutor’s statement about the

numerical count of the § 190.3 factors did not mislead the jury

as to its duty to weigh the evidence. The purported “mandatory”

instruction was not rendered unconstitutional. Based on this

evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to

object to the instruction or argument. The record fairly

supports the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this

claim. Claim 7b is denied on the merits.

c. IMPLICATION JURY WASN’T RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPOSING DEATH

PENALTY

Hamilton contends jury instructions and argument led the

jurors to believe their role was limited strictly to finding the

facts as to aggravation and mitigation, and that the law required

the death penalty if more aggravation existed than mitigation.

Hamilton points to nothing other than the prosecutor’s

statement, reviewed in Claim 7a above, to support his argument

that the jury’s duty was lessened. The instructions as a whole

and the arguments of counsel adequately informed the jury of its

responsibility.

Based on the record, defense counsel was not ineffective for

failing to object to the instruction or argument. The record

fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of

this claim. Claim 7c is denied on the merits.

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d. INDICATION HUNG JURY WAS IMPROPER

Hamilton asserts that voir dire questioning and statements

of the court led the jurors to believe it would be improper to

have a hung jury, and that repeated instructions that the jurors

work together exacerbated this misunderstanding.

Hamilton does not identify what questions, statements and/or

instructions allegedly misled the jury about the failure to reach

unanimity. A review of the record does not reveal any statement

by either counsel or the judge which impaired the jury’s

understanding of their responsibility.

Based on this evidence, defense counsel was not ineffective

for failing to object to the voir dire questioning or court

statements. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 7d is denied on the

merits.

5. DEATH PENALTY ISSUES

a. CLAIM 16: CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS

ADMINISTERED

(1) SUBCLAIM a: UNBRIDLED PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

Hamilton asserts California’s death penalty statute is

unconstitutional because prosecutors’ unbridled discretion

whether to seek the death penalty renders the result arbitrary

and capricious. He further contends that discretion is

improperly influenced by a prosecutor’s professional and

political aspirations which benefit by compiling a record of

capital convictions, especially as here in cases occurring during

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an election year.

This argument has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme

Court. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality of

Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The Court stated the

presence of discretionary stages does not render a death sentence

unconstitutional and in fact indicated the opposite, that the

absence of discretion would be unconstitutional. Id. at n.50. 

“Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that

prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions by

factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood

that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts.” Id.

at 225 (White, J. concurring).

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 16a is denied on the merits.

(2) SUBCLAIM b: CONFINEMENT ON DEATH ROW IS CRUEL AND

UNUSUAL

Hamilton asserts California’s death penalty statute is

unconstitutional as the severe conditions of and psychological

strain from confinement on death row inflicts unnecessary

physical and psychological pain, resulting in cruel and unusual

punishment.

If Hamilton’s claim is that the conditions of his

confinement on death row make his sentence cruel and unusual, he

has not alleged sufficient facts to state a prima facie case. 

Generally a challenge to conditions of confinement is not

cognizable on habeas corpus. Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d

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1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573,

574 (9th Cir. 1991)) (habeas corpus proceedings are proper

mechanism to challenge legality or duration of confinement and

civil rights action the proper method to challenge conditions of

confinement). However, an Eighth Amendment claim may be stated

if the conditions of confinement result in a denial of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), through the “deliberate

indifference” by prison personnel or officers. Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991). The evaluation of claims of cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment has both

objective and subjective components, so reviewing courts must ask

both if “the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state

of mind” and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively “harmful

enough” to establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 298,

303; Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Hamilton has not alleged any facts showing a denial of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” or that

“deliberate indifference” by prison personnel or officers caused

such deprivation.

If Hamilton is alleging psychological strain results from

extended confinement on death row, that claim is foreclosed by

Ninth Circuit precedent. Lengthy incarceration on death row

during the pendency of capital appeals does not violate the

Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 

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ORePetnHam 138

Although this claim is raised in Hamilton’s first federal

petition, unlike McKenzie’s claim which was raised in a

subsequent petition along with a request for a stay of execution,

the reasons for rejecting the claim remain the same. “A

defendant must not be penalized for pursuing his constitutional

rights, but he also should not be able to benefit from the

ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of those rights.” McKenzie v.

Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995) (panel opinion).

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 16b is denied on the merits.

(3) SUBCLAIM c: DISCRIMINATORILY IMPOSED DEATH PENALTY

Hamilton asserts California’s death penalty statute is

unconstitutional since it has been discriminatorily imposed

against poor males with white victims. The same argument, 33

proffered by Justice Blackmun, was rejected by the Supreme Court

during review of the constitutionality of § 190.3(a), the

circumstances of the crime sentencing factor. Tuilaepa v.

California, 512 U.S. at 978-79, 991-93. Hamilton’s claim is

foreclosed.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 16c is denied on the merits.

b. CLAIM 17: DISPROPORTIONATE AND EXCESSIVE PENALTY

Hamilton asserts that his death sentence is unconstitutional

because, as applied, it is disproportionate and excessive as

compared to his co-defendants and alleged co-conspirators and

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procedures which the United States Supreme Court found sufficient

to protect against arbitrariness are all present in the 1978

statute as well.

ORePetnHam 139

also as compared to others who commit similar crimes.

The California Supreme Court reviewed this claim on direct

appeal, finding that the federal Constitution did not require

either intra-case nor inter-case proportionality review. 

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1187. Although the California

Constitution prohibits punishment which is disproportionate to

culpability, the state court determined that in view of the

circumstances of the crime Hamilton’s sentence was not

disproportionate. Id.

The Eighth Amendment does not require comparative

proportionality review. Harris, 465 U.S. at 50-51. California’s

statute provides sufficient protection against arbitrariness

through procedures which require a special circumstance finding,

the consideration of relevant aggravating and mitigating factors,

an automatic motion for new trial, and an automatic appeal. Id.

at 51-53. Further, the jury here found that Hamilton was the 34

one who actually shot Gwen and did so in order to obtain the

insurance proceeds on her life.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 17 is denied on the merits.

c. CLAIM 18: VAGUE AND OVERBROAD AGGRAVATING FACTORS

The Eighth Amendment requires that a jury’s capital

sentencing decision involve an individualized determination, that

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is, consideration of relevant mitigating evidence including the

character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of

the crime, but does not require instruction on how to weigh any

particular fact. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972, 979; Buchanan, 522

U.S. at 276. “Once the jury finds that the defendant falls

within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for

the death penalty,” the jury’s consideration of a myriad of

factors and exercise of “unbridled discretion” in determining

whether death is the appropriate punishment, is not arbitrary and

capricious. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008-09 (1983).

(1) SUBCLAIM a: FACTOR (a)

Hamilton asserts that § 190.3(a) incorporates several vague

and overbroad special circumstances from the list of special

circumstances in California Penal Code section 190.2 (“§ 190.2")

as aggravating factors: i.e., the uncertainty that the multiple

murder special circumstance applies to one act which results in

the murders of a mother and a fetus; the vagueness and overbroad

nature of the financial gain special circumstance.

This claim is foreclosed by Tuilaepa v. California, which

upheld the constitutionality of § 190.3(a), the actual

circumstances of the murder as an aggravating factor; and Brown

v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. at 894, holding the impact

of the inclusion of any true special circumstance applying factor

(a) was inconsequential and could not fairly be regarded as a

constitutional defect in the sentencing process. The Court in

Tuilaepa found factor (a) to be a “constitutionally indispensable

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part of the process” in capital cases, 512 U.S. at 976, and its

open-ended subject matter an appropriate part of the jury’s broad

discretion in determining the sentence. Id. at 978-79.

The application of factor (a) here does not give rise to

federal constitutional error since the totality of the

instructions and both counsels’ arguments made clear the jury’s

duty. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (finding no

constitutional error in capital sentencing scheme which permits

the jury to consider in sentence selection an element of the

underlying crime); People v. Holt, 15 Cal. 4th 619, 699-700

(1997). Although the prosecutor here gave a numerical count of

the § 190.3 factors, he in substance also told the jury more than

mechanical counting was required, and defense counsel told the

jury they alone could decide the weight and importance of each

factor and any single factor could justify a life sentence. See

Claim 7a above.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 18a is denied on the merits.

(2) SUBCLAIM b: FACTOR (b)

Hamilton contends § 190.3(b), prior criminal activity which

used or threatened violence, is vague and overbroad since it can

be interpreted either to only apply to prior acts or to include

the subject murder. This argument, that the jury should have

been instructed the violent criminal activity referred to in (b)

excludes the circumstance of the subject crime, thus preventing

double counting of the guilt phase offense in both (a) and (b),

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is foreclosed by Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 976-77 (holding factor (b)

is not unconstitutionally vague). See Bonin, 59 F.3d at 848.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 18b is denied on the merits.

(3) SUBCLAIM c: FACTOR (j)

Hamilton asserts that § 190.3(j), whether the defendant was

an accomplice or minor participant in the murder, is vague and

overbroad since it can be interpreted, as he alleges it was in

his case, to constitute an aggravating factor which would

automatically apply to every murder. The California Supreme

Court has indicated in numerous cases that factor (j) is only

mitigating and inapplicable unless the defendant was an

accomplice whose participation was relatively minor. People v.

Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 553 (1992). That the state court has

approved the treatment of factor (j) as an aggravating factor

where a defendant was the sole participant, id., does not

transform it into an automatic aggravating factor for every

murder. The jury properly determined Hamilton’s role in the

offense.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 18c is denied on the merits.

(4) SUBCLAIM d: FACTOR (k)

Hamilton alleges § 190.3(k), any other circumstance, even

though not a legal excuse, that extenuates the gravity of the

crime, is vague as it does not clearly instruct jurors they can

consider anything offered in mitigation, including a defendant’s

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background and character.

The California Supreme Court rejected this claim on direct

appeal. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1182. Because this case was

tried before People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 878, n.10 (1983),

Hamilton’s jury was not instructed that factor (k) includes not

only circumstances which extenuate the gravity of the crime, but

also any other aspect of the defendant’s character or background

that he offers as a basis for a life sentence. Hamilton, 48 Cal.

3d at 1182. The state court’s review of Hamilton’s sentence

considered whether, because such an instruction was not given,

the jury may have been led to fail to consider Hamilton’s

mitigating character and background evidence. Id. The state

court found, based on the arguments of the prosecutor and defense

counsel, that the jury was not misled into believing it could not

consider Hamilton’s mitigating background and character evidence. 

Id. at 1182-83.

The United States Supreme Court has held that an instruction

based on the “unadorned” version of factor (k) is not erroneous. 

Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. The Court found it was not reasonably

likely a jury would think the instruction was limited to evidence

related to the crime or that it prevented the consideration of

background and character. Id. at 381-82.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

denial of this claim. Claim 18d is denied on the merits.

/////

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(5) SUBCLAIM e: FACTORS NOT IDENTIFIED AS AGGRAVATING

OR MITIGATING

Hamilton asserts that § 190.3 is unconstitutionally vague

because it fails to identify which factors are to be considered

aggravating and which are to be considered mitigating.

This claim is foreclosed by Tuilaepa v. California. “A

capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any

particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. . . . [but]

is free to consider a myriad of factors . . . [and] given

unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty

should be imposed.” 512 U.S. at 979-80.

The record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s

summary denial of this claim. Claim 18e is denied on the merits.

d. CLAIM 19: INFLATED AGGRAVATION/UNCONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTE

(1) SUBCLAIM a: DOUBLE/TRIPLE COUNTING

Hamilton asserts certain acts were counted more than once,

as elements of the crime, and/or special circumstances, and in

aggravation, violating double jeopardy. See Claim 18b above. 

Hamilton contends this double-counting resulted in “automatic

aggravating circumstances,” making California’s death penalty

statute in effect mandatory, especially when combined with:

(i) the mandatory language of the statute, see Claim 7b above;

(ii) the erroneous double counting of multiple murder special

circumstance; (iii) the erroneous instruction and argument that

the absence of mitigation was aggravating, see Claim 7a above;

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and (iv) the invitation by statute, the court, prosecutor and

defense counsel to determine the sentence based on mathematical

comparison of aggravation and mitigation. See Claim 7a above.

Hamilton’s claim that the charging of two separate multiplemurder special circumstances requires reversal, was rejected by

the California Supreme Court on direct appeal. The Court found

the duplicate charging erroneous, but found no basis to reverse

the penalty as there appeared no reasonable possibility the jury

gave significant independent aggravating weight to the fact that

two multiple-murder special circumstances, rather than one, had

been charged and found. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1180-81. 

Hamilton asserts the error of charging two multiple-murder

special circumstances requires reversal because California’s

statute calls for weighing and the California Supreme Court did

not re-weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, as required

by Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1992). 

The United States Supreme Court recently held California is

a non-weighing state. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. at 893. 

However, the Supreme Court found the weighing/non-weighing scheme

needlessly complex and incapable of providing for the full range

of variations, and so imposed the following rule: “An invalidated

sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will

render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an

improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process

unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer

to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances.” 

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Id. 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. at 891-892.

California’s eligibility factors, the special circumstances

of § 190.2, are designed to satisfy the narrowing requirement of

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See

Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. at 892. If the jury finds one

charged special circumstances true, a penalty trial follows at

which the jury must "take into account" the separate list of

sentencing factors from § 190.3 which include the "circumstances

of the crime." Id. 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct at 892-93. Even if

the direction in § 190.3(a) to consider "the existence of any

special circumstances found to be true" placed special emphasis

upon the facts and circumstances relevant to an invalid factor,

that impact "cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect

in the sentencing process." See Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126

S. Ct. at 894; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 889 (1983).

Applying Sanders’ analysis to the special circumstances

Hamilton’s jury found true, the California Supreme Court

invalidated one of the multiple murder special circumstances; 

but each of the remaining two special circumstances, one of

multiple murder and one of murder for financial gain, is

independently sufficient to uphold Hamilton’s death sentence. 

The facts and circumstances considered by the jury in support of

the valid special circumstances, properly admitted under the

"circumstances of the crime" sentencing factor, were the same

facts and circumstances supporting the invalid special

circumstance. See Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. at 893-94.

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Hamilton raised three other challenges to the death penalty 35

statute for which he provides no factual basis or argument:

subclaim (b) that no instruction identifying the mitigating factors

which were supported by some evidence was given; subclaim (c) that

improper classifications differentiate between acts and mental

state which may be considered in aggravation or mitigation from

those that may not bear a significant relationship to the

retributive and deterrent justifications of the death penalty; and

subclaim (d) that a death sentence may be imposed on the basis of

a “personal characteristic” which is not a rational or legitimate

basis and lacks sufficient justification for imposing death. No

explanation is given which defines the challenged classifications

under subclaim (c) or the challenged personal characteristic under

subclaim (d). Subclaims (b), (c) and (d) are denied on the merits

as they fail to state a prima facie claim for relief.

ORePetnHam 147

The remaining allegations underlying this claim have been

rejected above in Claims 7 and 18. The federal constitution

requires that sentence selection be made after “a broad inquiry

into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an individualized

determination.” Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276; Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at

971-73; Stephens, 462 U.S. at 878-79. The sentencer may not be

prevented from considering, nor refuse to consider, any such

mitigating evidence. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276; Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982). The jury “need not be

instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital

sentencing decision,” but is permitted unbridled discretion in

determining the appropriate sentence. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979;

Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276; Stephens, 462 U.S. at 875. Hamilton

provides no evidence, nor does review of the record indicate,

that the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence was

impacted. The record fairly supports the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim. Claim 19a is denied on the

merits.35

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(2) SUBCLAIM e: ARGUING THAT ABSENCE OF MITIGATION WAS

AGGRAVATING

Hamilton contends his death sentence is unreliable since the

prosecutor was allowed to argue that the absence of evidence on a

mitigating factor constitutes aggravation. See Claim 7a above. 

Hamilton asserts this error created an unconstitutional

presumption of the appropriateness of death and the existence of

aggravation, falsely inflated the number of aggravating

circumstances, confused the jurors, thwarted the requirement of

carefully channeling their sentencing discretion, and created

aggravating circumstances which bore no rational relationship to

the question of whether a man should live or die.

As discussed in Claim 7a above, the Davenport error in the

prosecutor’s argument was harmless. The record reveals the

jurors were not misled about either their discretion or their

responsibility to determine the appropriate penalty under all the

evidence. In light of the entire record, the prosecutor’s

erroneous argument did not render the proceedings unfair. The

record fairly supports the California Supreme Court’s summary

denial of this claim. Claim 19e is denied on the merits.

e. CLAIM 20: IMPROPER AGGRAVATION

Hamilton asserts his death sentence was improperly imposed

because unconstitutional prior convictions were relied on to

prove aggravating factors, and evidence of aggravation not

enumerated in § 190.3 was considered.

The prosecutor admitted into evidence during the penalty

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phase one of Hamilton’s prior conviction for grand theft. RT

10:2373. California Penal Code section 190.3(c) lists prior

convictions as a valid sentencing factor. Hamilton does not

specify in the petition or his briefing how his prior grand theft

conviction was unconstitutional, or what aggravating evidence not

enumerated in § 190.3 was considered. Based on these

allegations, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to

object to evidence submitted in aggravation. The record fairly

supports the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this

claim. Claim 20 is denied on the merits.

6. CLAIM 22: CUMULATIVE ERROR

Hamilton argues that the cumulative effect of the errors in

the guilt and penalty phases of his trial resulted in an

unconstitutional death sentence.

Where no claim establishes a violation of constitutional

law, there is no reason to grant habeas relief based on

cumulative error. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.

1996). See also Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir.

1997) (“Cumulative-error analysis applies where there are two or

more actual errors”). Two errors at the penalty phase exist

here, as also found by the California Supreme Court, see

Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d at 1186, both of which were individually

found to be harmless: the prosecutor’s argument that lack of

mitigation was aggravating (Claim 7a), and the two special

circumstances for multiple murder (Claim 19a). Considering these

errors cumulatively, even assuming arguendo, the additional

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possible error that trial counsel’s performance at the penalty

phase was deficient for failing to investigate and present more

mitigating evidence (Claim 2b), prejudice is not established. 

The record provides substantial support for both of the jury’s

conclusions: that Hamilton with cold-blooded premeditation

planned and endeavored three thime over three days to murder his

wife and unborn child. When co-conspirators were twice unable to

perpetrate the shotgun killing, Hamilton himself carried out the

execution by shooting his wife, killing her and their unborn

child. A jury was justified on the facts finding that death was

the appropriate sentence. Claim 22 is denied on the merits.

VII. CONCLUSION

Hamilton, who has never accepted responsibility for the

murder, continues to maintain that someone else, namely his

sister Carolyn and her friend Gilbert Garay killed Gwen without

his knowledge or participation. This defense was fully presented

at trial, and it was rejected by the jury. Hamilton’s own

statements and other evidence, such as the testimony of his

girlfriend, Brenda Burns; the inconsistencies in Hamilton’s

statements to police and his prevarication about a Canadian

suspect; all indicate that Hamilton was involved in the shooting. 

The testimony of Hamilton’s mother and his sister Vicki

corroborate Carolyn’s and Gilbert’s accounts of Hamilton’s plan:

that for two days in a row Hamilton drove his wife and children

on a country road to create the opportunity for Carolyn and

Gilbert to shoot Gwen. When they dod not act, Hamilton, on the

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next night took over and himself shot and killed Gwen and his

unborn child. No evidence has been presented of any error which

shows a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict” or the deprivation of a fair

trial in violation of Hamilton’s right to due process. Brecht,

507 U.S. at 623.

Hamilton cold-bloodedly planned to murder his wife; intended

to share the life insurance proceeds with the actual killer;

eventually carried out the murder himself; and did this at the

expense of his unborn child’s life to obtain the life insurance

money and to clear the way for him to be with his mistress. In

light of the very extensive evidence of ruthless premeditation,

it is not reasonably probable, under any scenario, that there was

a substantial or injurious effect or injury to the jury’s

verdict, or a deprivation of a fair trial in violation of the

right to due process. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.

VIII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Appeal from an order denying habeas relief lies only if

leave to appeal is obtained. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2253

to require a "certificate of appealability" (“COA”), which may be

granted only upon a "substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right," and must issue on a claim specific basis. 

A substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right

includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or

for that matter agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented

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deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000), (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 462 U.S.

880, 893 and n.4 (1983)).

Slack held the § 2253 certificate of appealability

requirement has retroactive effect to petitions filed before the

AEDPA's effective date when the appeal commences after the

effective date. Id. at 481. Hamilton is subject to certificate

of appealability requirements of the AEDPA.

Although there is no showing of the denial of a

constitutional right for any claim advanced, there are two issues

where jurists of reason may differ. A certificate of

appealability shall issue on Claim 2b, ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to investigate and present mitigation at

penalty; and, since the law on this issue is currently unclear in

the Ninth Circuit, on Claim 3b(4) and related Claim 8,

prosecutorial misconduct as to Gilbert’s plea agreement,

testimony and subsequent declaration.

/////

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IX. ORDER

For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Hamilton’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED

on the merits on every ground advanced. All declarations and

evidentiary submissions, including testimony and exhibits

received at the evidentiary hearing, have been fully considered,

including the offers of proof.

2. A certificate of appealability shall issue on Claim 2b

and Claim 3b(4) and related Claim 8.

3. Judgment shall be entered for RESPONDENT, the State, and

against PETITIONER, Michael Allen Hamilton.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b64h1h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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