Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02943/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02943-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD JAMES WELK,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary

Respondent.

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Civil No. 12-2943-IEG(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Richard James Welk (hereafter “Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereafter “Petition”)

challenging his conviction for one count of first-degree murder of

David Fortner (hereafter “Fortner”). (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 4

at 1554.) Petitioner contends that habeas relief is proper based on

one ground. (Petition at 9-19.) He asserts that his due process

rights were violated based on insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 187 (a). (Petition at

9.) Respondent Matthew Cate (“Respondent”) has filed an Answer to

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the Petition. Petitioner has filed a Traverse to Respondent’s

Answer. 

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, the

Traverse, and all supporting documents submitted by the parties. 

Based on the documents and evidence presented, and for the reasons

set forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to

the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see

also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30-36 (1992) (findings of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such

facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). This

statement of facts is substantially taken from the unpublished

opinion of the California Court of Appeal and filed as Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 9.

Early in the evening on April 28, 2007, [Petitioner] and

his friend, Wayne Brown, went to Mission Beach in San

Diego where they met up with friends. While at the beach,

[Petitioner] had an altercation with Fortner, who appeared

to be homeless. During the altercation, [Petitioner]

stabbed Fortner in the neck with a knife and killed him.

Multiple witnesses, including Brown, testified to describe

events relevant to the stabbing incident.

On the evening of the incident, Ruben Frausto was at the

beach and noticed Fortner, who was wearing headphones and

singing, sitting on the seawall. Frausto saw [Petitioner]

approach Fortner and taunt him. Fortner told [Petitioner]

to stop, but when [Petitioner] continued the taunting,

Fortner swung at him to get him to move away. Fortner was

unsteady on his feet, appeared to be intoxicated, and

never actually struck [Petitioner]. At some point, Frausto

saw [Petitioner] holding a knife behind his leg and heard

him say to Fortner, "I'm going to get you in self-defense." [Petitioner] swung the knife in an upward "roundhouse" motion and hit Fortner in the left side of his

neck. When [Petitioner] pulled his hand away, Fortner fell

to the ground and did not move again. [Petitioner] walked

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away and said "I told ya I'd get you. Self-defense. Selfdefense. Everybody saw that. Self-defense."

Oscar Kebriti was at the beach with his wife when he saw

[Petitioner] approach Fortner. Kebriti observed Fortner

trying to punch [Petitioner] and saw the two men fighting,

but thought they were playing. At one point, Kebriti saw

[Petitioner] pull a knife out of his pocket, flip it open

and stab Fortner in the neck. As Fortner fell to the

ground, [Petitioner] folded the knife and returned it to

his pocket. [Petitioner] then said something to a group of

people and left on his bike.

Elsie Machuca also witnessed the stabbing incident.

Machuca never saw Fortner strike or advance toward

[Petitioner]. Rather, Fortner was moving away from

[Petitioner] and had his hands up to block [Petitioner]'s

blows. Machuca saw [Petitioner] strike Fortner and then

pull back with a knife in his hand. [Petitioner] folded

the knife, put it in his shorts, and walked over to a

group of people sitting along the seawall. [Petitioner]

then gave someone a "high five" and left on his bike.

Anthony Atwood was at the beach with his friend, Omar

Cantu, when he noticed [Petitioner] and Fortner yelling at

each other. Fortner was trying to disengage by putting his

hands up and backing away. [Petitioner] punched Fortner in

the face, causing him to fall into the sand. As Fortner

tried to get up, [Petitioner] pulled out a knife, flipped

it open, and held it by his side. Before Fortner could

fully stand up, [Petitioner] cupped Fortner's head in his

left hand and, with a quick forceful blow, stabbed him in

the neck with the other hand. Fortner fell to the ground

as [Petitioner] folded the knife and put it away. With a

smile on his face, [Petitioner] then walked up to a group

of people and enthusiastically said, "Oh, yeah. That's right."

On the night of the incident, Misti Ann Ramsay was at a

friend's house when [Petitioner] arrived. A news story

regarding the stabbing incident was on the television.

[Petitioner] responded to the story by stating, "I did it.

I got in it with that guy and that was me." [Petitioner]

also said that he was attacked by a homeless person and

acted in self-defense. When Ramsay returned home that

evening, she called the police and stated that [Petitioner] bragged to her about the incident when it came on

the news. Additionally, that evening, [Petitioner] called

Brown and said, "I guess I got him pretty good" or "I got

him." 

(Respondent’s Lodgment 9 at 2-4.) 

//

//

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In San Diego Superior Court case number SCD206206, a jury 

found Petitioner guilty of one count of first-degree murder [Cal.

Pen. Code § 187 (a)]. The jury found true the allegation that

Petitioner committed the offense with a deadly weapon [Cal. Pen.

Code § 12022 (b) (1)]. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 26

years to life imprisonment. (Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 1554.) 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment 6.) On May 31, 2011, the Court of

Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, in an unpublished opinion. (See generally Respondent’s Lodgment 9.) On June

15, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California

Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment 10.) On September 14, 2011,

the California Supreme Court summarily denied the Petition for

Review. (Respondent’s Lodgment 11.) 

On December 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 27, 2012,

this Court ordered a Response to the Petition. (Doc. No. 5.) On

February 14, 2013, Respondent answered the Petition. (Doc. No. 7.)

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by Title 28, United States Code, §

2254, as amended by the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Section 2254(a) sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or

a district court shall entertain an application for a writ

of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

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As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §

2245(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

“AEDPA establishes a ‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa,

497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) [quoting Woodford v. Viscotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)]. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court has

ruled that the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) permits a grant

of habeas relief “if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-13. The

Supreme Court has also interpreted the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1) to allow a grant of “the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The Supreme Court has

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clarified that under § 2254(d)(2), even an erroneous or incorrect

application of clearly established federal law does not support a

habeas grant, unless the state court’s application was “objectively

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-

76). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). Even absent citations to Supreme Court precedent, habeas

relief is not merited if the state court decision neither contradicts the reasoning nor the result of Supreme Court rulings. Id.

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that habeas relief is proper based on one

ground. Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were

violated based on insufficient evidence to support his conviction

for first-degree murder under California Penal Code § 187(a). 

(Petition at 9.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that there was no

evidence of premeditation or deliberation to suggest “the crime was

anything other than an unconsidered or rash impulse arising from a

sudden argument and unplanned physical confrontation.” (Petition at

19.)

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 In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. (Respondent’s

Lodgment 8.) The appellate court denied Petitioner’s appeal. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment 9.) He then filed a Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court which denied his Petition without

comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment 11.) The last reasoned state

decision which addressed the merits of the claim is the California

Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming Petitioner’s conviction for

first-degree murder. (Respondent’s Lodgment 9.) It is to that

decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at

805-06. 

The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of

the evidence claims in the criminal context is set forth in Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Jackson, the Court held

that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and

an applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief, “if it is found

that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier

of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. In making this determination, habeas

courts must respect the province of the jury to determine the

credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw

reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming the jury

resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict. Id.

at 319. Once a state court fact finder has found a defendant

guilty, federal habeas courts must consider the evidence “in the

light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. Federal habeas

courts must also analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to

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the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state

law.” Id. at 324 n. 16. 

The Ninth Circuit has stated, “(a)fter AEDPA, we apply the

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference.” Juan

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005). In Allen, the

Ninth Circuit first reviewed the standard of review applied by the

state appellate court to a sufficiency of the evidence claim, and

found that, although the state court did not cite to the relevant

federal case law, “such a citation is not required ‘so long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts’ Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1274 n. 12, quoting

Early, 537 U.S. at 8. Viewing the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the prosecution,” as this Court must, it is clear that

sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support Petitioner’s

conviction for committing first-degree murder under California law. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

The appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim that there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction, stating:

Here, there is sufficient evidence that [Petitioner]

murdered Fortner in a premeditated and deliberate

fashion. In fact, there is ample evidence from which

the jury could have reasonably inferred that [Petitioner] wanted to kill Fortner. The evidence shows

that [Petitioner] taunted Fortner, who was intoxicated

and unsteady on his feet. During the altercation,

Fortner tried to fight back, but never actually struck

[Petitioner]. Fortner was trying to disengage himself

by putting his hands up and backing away, but despite

these attempts, [Petitioner] said to Fortner, “I’m

going to get you in self-defense.”

Further, the jury could have reasonably inferred that

Fortner was an unresisting victim. When Fortner tried

to stand up after being punched by [Petitioner],

[Petitioner] pulled out a knife, flipped it open, and

held it by his side. Before Fortner could fully stand

up, [Petitioner] cupped Fortner’s head in his hand and,

with a single quick blow, stabbed him in the neck with

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such force that it completely severed his spinal cord

and vertebral artery and cut into his cervical vertebrae. (Citations omitted.) [Petitioner] walked away

and said “I told ya I’d get you. Self-defense. Selfdefense. Everybody saw that. Self-defense.” 

Based on the evidence, a rational trier of fact could

have concluded that [Petitioner] rapidly and coldly

formed the idea to kill Fortner during the course of

events at the beach that evening, and that he therefore

acted after a period of reflection, rather than on an

unconsidered or rash impulse.

(Respondent’s Lodgment 9 at 5-7.) 

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal’s findings. Under

California law, “[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being 

... with malice aforethought.” Cal. Penal Code § 187(a). Further,

“[a]ll murder which is perpetrated by means of ... willful,

deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first

degree.” Cal. Penal Code § 189. “Premeditated” means “considered

beforehand,” and “deliberate” means “formed or arrived at as a

result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and

against the proposed course of action.” People v. Mayfield, 14

Cal.4th 668, 767 (1997). “The true test is not the duration of time

as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow

each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be

arrived at quickly ...” Id. Here, sufficient evidence was adduced

at trial to prove to a rational jury that Petitioner was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt for committing the offense. Jackson, 443

U.S. at 324.

Petitioner argues that there was no evidence of planning or

motive for his attack. (Petition at 17.) In addition, Petitioner

argues that Fortner started the altercation by throwing the first

punch. (Petition at 16.) The evidence does not support either of

his contentions. Multiple witnesses observed the altercation

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between Petitioner and Fortner. (Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 230-40,

256-70, 285-316, 337-79, and 400-33.) Petitioner was observed

approaching Fortner and taunting him as he sat on the seawall with

headphones on. (Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 290-97.) Many of the

witnesses testified that Petitioner was the aggressor and had the

upper-hand throughout the altercation. (Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at

234-35, 290-97, 342, 344, and 406-07.) Fortner was observed backing

away with his hands up in self-defense and told Petitioner to stop. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 235-36, 297, 307, 360, and 405-06.)

Instead of retreating, Petitioner removed a knife from his pocket,

opened it, and held it at his side for a few seconds. (Respondent’s

Lodgment 4 at 307-10, 365, 407 and 409-10.) Petitioner did not show

Fortner the knife before issuing the lethal blow to his neck. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 365 and 419.) Rather, Petitioner told

Fortner that he was acting in self-defense, then struck Fortner with

enough force to sever Fortner’s spinal cord and vertebral artery. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 310.) The evidence presented by the

prosecution could lead a rational trier of fact to find that the

Petitioner quickly developed a plan to kill Fortner at the beach

that day and then deliberately acted on that plan. 

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could

have found sufficient evidence that Petitioner committed firstdegree murder in violation of California Penal Code § 187(a). Thus,

the Court concludes that the appellate court’s denial of this claim

was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable determination

of the facts. Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

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claim for habeas relief in this regard is DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petitioner for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 7, 2013, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than June

21, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Ylst, 951 F.2d at 1156.

DATED: May 3, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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