Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00546/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00546-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dusty Michelle Woolley,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-22-00546-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

Plaintiff Dusty Michelle Woolley (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a decision 

by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) 

denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under the 

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (the “Act”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed her 

Opening Brief (Doc. 16), the Commissioner filed a Response (Doc. 18), and Plaintiff filed 

a Reply (Doc. 19). Upon review of the briefs and the Administrative Record 

(Doc. 13, “AR”), the Court reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s October 28, 2021,

decision (AR at 27–40) and remands for further proceedings.

I. Background

On April 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits under Title XVI of 

the Act, alleging a disability onset date of January 30, 2019. (Id. at 27). Plaintiff was fortythree years old at the time of her alleged onset date and has a tenth grade education. (AR 

at 38, 51). Her past relevant work includes employment as a restaurant manager. 

(Id. at 38). She has a history of a lumbar spine surgeries, which resulted in a spinal cord 

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stimulator implant due to ongoing pain and other symptoms, and subsequent revision 

surgeries. (Doc. 16 at 9). Plaintiff claims she is unable to work because she suffers from 

chronic pain in her low back, hip, and legs that causes difficulty standing and walking. 

(Id. at 9–10).

Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied on November 14, 2019, and upon 

reconsideration on April 9, 2020. (AR at 27). After holding a hearing on 

October 13, 2021, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) again issued an unfavorable 

decision on October 28, 2021 (id. at 27–40) (the “October Decision”).

II. The ALJ’s Five Step Process 

To be eligible for Social Security benefits, a claimant must show an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The ALJ follows a five-step process1to determine whether a claimant is disabled under the 

Act:

The five-step process for disability determinations begins, at the first and 

second steps, by asking whether a claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity” and considering the severity of the claimant’s impairments. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(ii). If the inquiry continues beyond the 

second step, the third step asks whether the claimant’s impairment or 

combination of impairments meets or equals a listing under 

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 and meets the duration requirement. 

See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is considered disabled and 

benefits are awarded, ending the inquiry. See id. If the process continues 

beyond the third step, the fourth and fifth steps consider the claimant’s 

“residual functional capacity”2in determining whether the claimant can still 

do past relevant work or make an adjustment to other work. 

See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv)–(v). 

1 The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

2 A claimant’s residual functional capacity is defined as their maximum ability to do 

physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from their 

impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

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Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)–

(g). If the ALJ determines no such work is available, the claimant is disabled. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 

The ALJ’s findings in the October Decision are as follows:

At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since April 29, 2019. (AR. at 29). At step two, he found Plaintiff has the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease of the spine and synovial cyst of popliteal space of 

the left knee. (Id. at 29–30 citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)). At step three, he determined 

Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 

(Id. at 33). 

At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

to perform sedentary work3 with several exceptions: Plaintiff “can never climb ladders, 

ropes or scaffolds, but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She can frequently stoop, 

kneel, and crouch, occasionally crawl and must avoid moving machinery and unprotected 

heights.” (Id. at 24–38). The ALJ determined Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant 

work given her RFC assessment. (Id. at 38). At step five, however, the ALJ found Plaintiff 

is “capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy.” (Id. at 38–39). Plaintiff was therefore deemed not 

disabled under the Act. (Id. at 40).

The SSA Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

October Decision, thus adopting the Decision as the agency’s final decision. (Id. at 1–3). 

This appeal followed. On April 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint under 

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) requesting judicial review and reversal of the 

Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 1).

3

“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting 

or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is 

defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often 

necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are 

required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a); 

416.967(a).

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III. Standard of Review

In determining whether to reverse a decision by an ALJ, the district court reviews 

only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d

503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). “An ALJ’s disability determination should be upheld unless 

it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)). “‘Substantial evidence’ means 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). To determine whether substantial 

evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole and may not 

affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts, ambiguity, and determining 

credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 

881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ must “set forth the reasoning behind its 

decisions in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 

487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). This is because district courts may only review those reasons the 

ALJ places on the record and cannot speculate what the ALJ’s reasoning might have been 

based on other evidence available. Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 554 

F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles of administrative law require 

[the court] to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered 

by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may 

have been thinking.”). Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion 

must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted). 

“Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act context.” Molina v. 

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Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if there remains 

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error does not affect the 

ultimate nondisability determination. Id. Typically, the claimant bears the burden of 

showing that an error is harmful. Id. at 1111 (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 

409 (2009)).

IV. Discussion 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred for two reasons: (1) the ALJ improperly discounted

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony; (2) the ALJ improperly rejected the assessment by 

examining physician Lise A. LaBarre, M.D. (“Dr. LaBarre”). The Court will address each 

of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn. 

A. Symptom Testimony

First, Plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to give specific, clear, and convincing reasons 

for rejecting her symptom testimony. (Doc. 16 at 11–19). The Court agrees. 

1. Legal Standard

An ALJ must perform a two-step analysis when determining whether a claimant’s 

testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 

F.3d 1028, 1035-1036 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff 

presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected 

to produce the symptoms alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. “In this analysis, the 

claimant is not required to show ‘that her impairment could reasonably be expected to 

cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.’” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)). Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ 

may reject the Plaintiff’s symptom testimony only by giving specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons. Id. at 1015; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488–89. “This is not an easy requirement 

to meet: ‘The clear and convincing standard4is the most demanding required in Social 

4 The Commissioner applies the substantial evidence standard when arguing the ALJ did 

not erroneously discredit Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 18 at 3 n.2). The Court 

will apply the clear and convincing standard according to binding Ninth Circuit case law.

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Security cases.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her 

symptoms is credible, an ALJ may consider the following: 

(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s 

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, 

and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; 

(2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to 

follow a prescribed course of treatment; and 

(3) the claimant’s daily activities.

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. An ALJ may also consider the claimant’s work record, and the 

observations of treating and examining physicians and other third parties regarding “the 

nature, onset, duration and frequency of claimant’s symptoms, and precipitating and 

aggravating factors, functional restrictions caused by the symptoms, and the claimant’s 

daily activities.” Id. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” 

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014). 

The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s symptom testimony as follows:

[Plaintiff] testified her primary medical issues deal with her back . . . . [and] 

that her lower back pain also causes problems with walking. From the knee 

down her left leg has weakness and numbness. She has had injections with 

some improvement but did have complications from a medial branch block 

injection at one point. In her Function Report-Adult, the claimant reported 

that she has to sit in a recliner most of the day due to her pain (12E:1). She 

also reported her conditions affect her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, 

walk, sit, kneel, and climb (Id. at 5). 

(AR at 33–34). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments 

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are 

not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the 

reasons explained in this decision.” (Id. at 34). In so doing, the ALJ primarily discussed 

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(1) objective diagnostic and clinical evidence in the record; (2) Plaintiff’s ability to carry 

out daily activities; and (3) Plaintiff’s statements to providers and signs of improvements.

(Id. at 34–36). As will be explained below, the Court finds these reasons insufficient.

2. The ALJ Summary of Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

At the outset, the Court notes the ALJ cited to one exhibit to summarize Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony: Plaintiff’s September 2009 “Function Report-Adult.” (See AR at 33–

34 citing id. at 285–292). This report was completed a decade before Plaintiff’s most recent 

surgical revision procedures on January 30, 2019, and January 29, 2020. (Doc. 16 at 5–6). 

The ALJ parroted a routine checklist to outline Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and did not 

identify any degrees of limitation. (AR at 290). Thus, it appears the ALJ evaluated “the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms” without identifying

what those intensity, persistence and limiting effects were in first instance. (Id. at 34). 

Upon review of the record, Plaintiff gave symptom testimony in greater detail at the 

October 13, 2021, hearing. (Id. at 52–57). She indicated inter alia that her spinal cord 

stimulator did not improve her back pain; she had to turn the device off because it caused 

more pain than relief; she was unable to work because her low back, hip, and leg pain

increased with standing and walking;she could be hit by sudden pain attacks while walking 

where her leg would drop and she would have to hold onto something so that she would 

not fall; and her left leg was numb and so she had to compensate by carrying most of her 

weight on the right side. (Doc. 16 at 9–10 citing AR 52–54, 57). She averred she could 

stand in the same place for about five minutes before having to sit down. She could sit for 

twenty–thirty minutes at a time and had to lay down for six hours within an eight-hour day 

because of pain. (AR at 56–57). Such limitations would preclude sustained work.

3. Objective Medical Evidence 

The ALJ began his discussion of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony with an overview 

of various objective medical evidence. (Id. at 34). He acknowledged Plaintiff’s magnetic 

resonance imaging (“MRI”) reflected significant lumbar conditions resulted from her back 

surgeries, including moderate to severe disc narrowing, moderate to severe degenerative 

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disc disease with disc bulges, disc collapse, vacuum disc, and moderate foraminal stenosis.

(Id.) Indeed, these conditions support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s impairments could 

reasonably be expected to affect her “ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, sit, 

kneel, and climb[.]” (Id. at 35); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. However, the ALJ went on 

to emphasize certain normal findings: an electromyogram “did not show any definite 

abnormal findings”; an MRI showed disc space narrowing without impingement; 

Plaintiff’s gait and stance were “normal”; Plaintiff had full range of motion in her 

extremities; Plaintiff had no edema, and no erythema; and Plaintiff had “unremarkable” 

musculoskeletal examinations. (AR at 34). The ALJ then found that “despite these 

findings, the undersigned finds the evidence overall, best supports a reduced sedentary 

residual functional capacity for this younger individual.” (Id.) 

The Commissioner argues the ALJ sufficiently considered the “negative findings” 

and the “positive findings,” to conclude that Plaintiff was capable of sedentary work. 

(Doc. 18 at 7). Plaintiff opposes, contending the ALJ “failed to connect anything specific 

in the medical record to a specific inconsistency with any particular portion of [Plaintiff’s]

symptom testimony.” (Doc. 16 at 12). The Court agrees with Plaintiff.

Although the ALJ provided a relatively detailed overview of Plaintiff’s medical 

history, “providing a summary of medical evidence . . . is not the same as providing clear 

and convincing reasons for finding the claimant’s symptom testimony not credible.” 

Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 

494). The ALJ neglected to “identify what testimony [was] not credible and what evidence 

undermine[d] the claimant’s complaints.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. For example, he 

neither explained (a) why the abnormal findings did not support Plaintiff’s symptom

testimony; nor (b) why the normal findings should be given more weight than the abnormal 

findings to discredit Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. See Curtis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 2018 WL 6418486, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2018) (citing Garrison, 59 F.3d at 

1009). The ALJ’s lengthy discussion of the objective medical evidence, absent any reasons 

for credibility determinations, is insufficient to reject Plaintiff’s testimony under the clear 

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and convincing standard. See Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277–78; Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 

1133, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

4. Daily Activities

The ALJ next cited to Plaintiff’s daily activities, noting Plaintiff “reported 

independence in selfcare, including meals, hygiene and light housework, denied 

confinement to a bed and reported adequate sleep.” (AR at 34 citing id. at 394).5 A 

plaintiff’s ability to carry out “daily activities may be grounds for an adverse credibility 

finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits 

involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.’” 

Orn, 495 F.3d at 639 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, the ALJ made no 

such indication. Therefore, the Court does not find these activities serve as clear and 

convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 

F.3d 1044, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain 

daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, 

does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability [; o]ne does not 

need to be utterly incapacitated in order to be disabled.”). 

5. Plaintiff’s Statements and Signs of Improvements

The ALJ also raised various statements and signs of improvement by Plaintiff.

6 He

listed findings of Plaintiff’s reduced pain levels; normal gait, movement, and muscle bulk; 

and use of a cane that was not medically necessary or prescribed. (AR 34–35). Plaintiff 

contends the ALJ improperly referenced isolated notes of improvement without looking at 

the record in broader context. (Doc. 16 at 17 citing Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 

5 The ALJ also raised Plaintiff’s trip to Tennessee for two months. (AR. at 34 citing id. at 

365). Although the ALJ reasoned Plaintiff’s trip “suggest[ed] a level of exertion consistent 

with work related tasks, such as packing clothing, prolonged sitting, either in a car or in a 

plane, arranging for transportation to and from the airport, checking luggage, and claiming 

luggage[,]’” he ultimately conceded it did not serve as “conclusive evidence of the 

[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform at an exertional level greater than she alleges.” (Id. at 35).

6 The parties dispute whether the ALJ properly relied on reports that predated Plaintiff’s 

onset disability date. (Docs. 16 at 17; 18 at 9). The Court need not address this issue. In 

any event, the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony were 

insufficient because he did not connect any of the cited improvements back to Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony. 

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(9th Cir. 2016)). The Commissioner argues signs of relieving symptoms demonstrates 

Plaintiff is not as limited as she claimed. (Doc. 18 at 10).

Again, the ALJ emphasized these instances without linking them back to Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony or articulating why they undermine Plaintiff’s credibility. He simply 

listed these findings to conclude “the examination did not reveal findings that would 

support greater limitation in the residual functional capacity than already provided for.” 

(Id. at 35). Without more, this is an insufficient basis to reject Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015. 

In sum, the ALJ has not met his burden to give specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons for his adverse credibility finding because he failed to connect his analysis back to 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1139. He did not identify which of 

Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible and what evidence undermined her complaints. 

Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. Consequently, the ALJ’s error is not harmless. See BrownHunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (holding it was legal error when the ALJ “never connected the 

medical record to Claimant’s testimony”).

B. Medical Opinion 

Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision to reject Dr. LaBarre’s 

September 2021 assessment. (Doc. 16 at 19). She maintains the ALJ did not adequately 

articulate how he considered the supportability and consistency factors when discounting

Dr. LaBarre’s opinion; he rather “cherry-pick[ed] isolated normal physical examination 

findings without reconciling the other positive objective findings on examination, on 

imaging, and supported by [Plaintiff’s] aggressive course of treatment[.]” (Id. at 24, 22). 

The Commissioner contends the ALJ properly cited numerous normal findings that 

contradicted Dr. LaBarre’s “extreme” opinion. (Doc. 18 at 12–14). The Court disagrees.

1. Legal Standard 

Because Plaintiff applied for disability benefits after March 27, 2017, she is subject 

to the new regulations for evaluating evidence from medical providers.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. The new regulations eliminate the previous hierarchy of 

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medical opinions, and the ALJ is not allowed to defer to or give specific weight to any 

medical opinions: 

We will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including 

controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 

finding(s), including those from your medical sources . . . The most important 

factors we consider when we evaluate the persuasiveness of medical opinions 

and prior administrative medical findings are supportability (paragraph (c)(1) 

of this section) and consistency (paragraph (c)(2) of this section). We will 

articulate how we considered the medical opinions and prior administrative 

medical findings in your claim according to paragraph (b) of this section.

Id. § 416.920c(a).

7

 The regulations require an ALJ to articulate how persuasive they find 

all the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings and set forth specific 

“articulation requirements” for the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence. 

Id. §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920(b).

The Ninth Circuit confirmed that the recent changes to the SSA regulations

displaced the former hierarchy of medical opinions. Woods, 32 F.4th at 787. The 

longstanding rule that assigned “presumptive weight based on the extent of the doctor’s

relationship with the claimant [] no longer applies.” Id. An ALJ no longer needs to 

articulate “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting a treating or examining doctor’s 

opinion. Id. at 792. “Now, an ALJ’s decision . . . to discredit any medical opinion, must 

simply be supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 

However, “[e]ven under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or 

treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation 

supported by substantial evidence. The agency must articulate how persuasive it finds all 

the medical opinions from each doctor or other source and explain how it considered the 

supportability and consistency factors in reaching these findings.” Id. at 792 (emphasis 

added). Supportability refers to “the extent to which a medical source supports the medical 

opinion by explaining the ‘relevant . . . objective medical evidence.” Id. at 791–92 (quoting 

7 Other factors that may, but need not, be considered by the ALJ in addition to 

supportability and consistency include the provider’s relationship with the claimant, the 

length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose and extent of the 

treatment relationship, and the specialization of the provider. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c.

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20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). Consistency refers to “the extent to which a medical opinion 

is ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in 

the claim.” Id. at 792 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)).

2. Dr. LaBarre’s September 2021 Assessment 

The issue is whether the ALJ’s explanation to reject Dr. LaBarre’s medical opinion

was supported by substantial evidence. In her September 2021 Assessment (AR at 629–

37), Dr. LaBarre performed orthopedic, thoracic, lumbar, neurological, sensory, and 

cerebellar exams on Plaintiff. (Id. at 632–33). Dr. LaBarre also reviewed Plaintiff’s 

available medical records, including MRIs from 2006 and 2020, and explained how those 

findings were consistent with her observations of Plaintiff’s symptoms. (Id. at 633–34). 

As to Plaintiff’s ability to do work related activities, Dr. LaBarre opined Plaintiff could use 

her hands for less than sixty-six percent of the workday; could carry no more than fifteen

pounds; could sit for up to two hours; could stand and walk for up to three hours; needed 

to alternate between sitting and standing every twenty-one to forty-five minutes; and would 

miss four to five days of work a month due to her medical condition. (Id. at 636–37).

The ALJ found Dr. LaBarre’s orthopedic findings unpersuasive because they were 

inconsistent with the record.8 (AR at 36–37). To support his conclusion, he summarized 

(1) certain objective medical evidence; and (2) various findings in Plaintiff’s November 

2019 examination administered by Douglas R. Denney, PA (“PA Denney”). The Court 

will examine each reason in turn.

a. Comparison to Objective Medical Evidence

The ALJ first explained that “[w]hile Dr. LaBarre’s examination had many 

significant positive orthopedic findings, the findings are belied by several other 

examinations and records in evidence.” (Id.) He did not define what he meant by 

8 The ALJ also rejected Dr. LaBarre’s finding of limited hand functions as inconsistent 

with and unsupported by the record. (AR at 36). However, Plaintiff primarily takes issue 

with Dr. LaBarre’s orthopedic findings. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d at 517 n.13 (the 

district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision). She 

only mentions in passing that “the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. LaBarre’s manipulative 

limitations . . . does nothing to discredit Dr. LaBarre’s assessed sitting, standing, or 

walking limitations, or limitations related to the effect of Woolley’s pain.” 

(Doc. 16 at 21 n.11).

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significant positive orthopedic findings. The ALJ then reproduced verbatim the same

overview of objective medical evidence that he provided when discounting Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony. (Compare id. at 34 with id. at 37). In doing so, he neglected to

articulate how he considered the supportability or consistency factors when reaching his 

findings.

First, he did not articulate the support, or lack thereof, behind Dr. LaBarre’s positive 

orthopedic findings. And it is apparent that Dr. LaBarre’s assessment was at least based 

on (1) the orthopedic, thoracic, lumbar, neurological, sensory, and cerebellar exams she 

conducted on Plaintiff; and (2) her review of Plaintiff’s available medical records, 

including MRIs from 2006 and 2020. (Id. at Ex. 25F, 4–6). 

Second, the ALJ did not explain why the evidence he cited belies Dr. LaBarre’s 

orthopedic findings. In fact, the referenced evidence appears to be consistent with Dr. 

LaBarre’s findings. (Compare id. at 37 (the ALJ explained Plaintiff’s November 2019 

imaging reflected “multi-level degenerative change throughout the lumbar spine, including 

moderate to severe degenerative disc disease at L5-S1”) with id. at 633 (Dr. LaBarre found 

“there are progressive changes at L4-5 and L5-S1, consistent with the patient’s complaints 

of progression of her symptoms.”); (compare id. at 37 (the ALJ explained Plaintiff’s July 

2020 MRI indicated moderate to advanced degenerative disc disease with disc bulges at 

L4-L5 and L5-S1, mild bilateral recess stenosis without central canal stenosis, moderate 

bilateral neural foraminal narrowing and mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing at L5-

S1) with id. at 633 (Dr. LaBarre confirmed advanced degenerative disc changes with broad 

based disc bulges at L4-5 and L5-S, mild bony bilateral neural foramina narrowing, no 

central canal stenosis or lateral recess stenosis, and the neural foramina have moderate 

narrowing)). 

Thus, the ALJ’s citations to objective medical evidence do not serve as a sufficient 

basis for rejecting Dr. LaBarre’s opinion of Plaintiff’s orthopedic condition. 

/ / /

/ / /

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b. Comparison of Plaintiff’s November 2019 Consultative 

Examination

The ALJ’s next reason for rejecting Dr. LaBarre’s orthopedic findings is because 

PA Denney’s November 2019 consultative exam did not indicate findings as “extreme” as 

Dr. LaBarre. (Id. at 37). The ALJ reproduced verbatim the same overview of PA Denney’s 

findings that he provided when discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Compare id.

at 34 –35 with id. at 37). This contrast was to show “the medical record exhibits varying 

degrees of orthopedic findings.” (Id. at 37). The ALJ then concluded that “the record 

better support[ed] finding the claimant is capable of performing work at a reduced 

sedentary level, and that this finding is supported by objective evidence.” (Id.) 

The ALJ failed to address how he considered the supportability factor in finding Dr. 

LaBarre’s medical opinion to be unpersuasive. And, “[m]erely pointing out . . . varying 

clinical findings does not explain specifically how [a] medical opinion [is] unsupported.” 

Scala v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022 WL 3754720, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2022)

(explaining that incongruities between opinions may imply the opinions are inconsistent, 

but this does not mean they are unsupported). While the ALJ’s explanation may discuss 

the consistency of Dr. LaBarre’s orthopedic findings, the revised regulations also require

discussion of the supportability factor. Id.; see also Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. 

In sum, although the ALJ sufficiently justified why Dr. LaBarre’s opinion regarding 

Plaintiff’s hand functions were unpersuasive, he did not do so for Dr. LaBarre’s orthopedic 

findings. The Court therefore finds the ALJ erred when rendering the entirety of 

Dr. LaBarre’s assessment unpersuasive.

V. Remand

Once a court has determined an ALJ’s decision contains harmful error, it maintains 

discretion to remand the case for additional proceedings or for an award of benefits. 

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 

683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989)). Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if 

enhancement of the record would be useful. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 

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(9th Cir. 2000). This is “the proper course, except in rare circumstances[.]” Treichler v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). Conversely, under the 

“credit-as-true” rule, the court has discretion to remand for an award of benefits where 

“(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would 

serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the 

improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find 

the claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff argues her case meets the credit-as-true standard because there are no 

“significant factual conflicts,” or “crucial questions as to the extent of [claimant’s] 

impairment” that require resolution before a finding of disability. (Doc. 16 at 24 quoting

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1104–1105). However, the Court finds it is not clear from the record 

that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly 

evaluated. Further analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony and evaluation of 

the medical evidence are necessary before a proper determination of Plaintiff’s disability 

can be made. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, finds that a remand for further 

proceedings is appropriate here. 

VI. Conclusion

The ALJ committed legal error when he failed to provide legally sufficient reasons 

for (1) discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony; and (2) rejecting Dr. LaBarre’s 

assessment of Plaintiff’s orthopedic condition and work-related abilities. The Court finds 

these errors warrant remand for further proceedings.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Administrative Law Judge’s October 28, 2021, decision is 

reversed and remanded for additional proceedings. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter 

judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 26th day of September, 2023.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge

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