Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01770/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01770-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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ORDER – No. 19-cv-01770-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

WILLIAM H. CLAPP,

Plaintiff,

v.

FLORENCE KORKAMES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01770-LB

ORDER SCREENING [FIFTH]

1

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

Re: ECF No. 47

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff William H. Clapp alleges that on November 29, 2016, at approximately 11:20 

p.m., he was leaving a restaurant in San Francisco’s Mission District, when he was confronted by 

a group of five to seven individuals who began advancing on him, yelling “You are not allowed to 

 

1 While Mr. Clapp has not been numbering his successive complaints, by the court’s court, he has filed 

six complaints altogether: ECF No. 1 (his original complaint), ECF No. 39 (what would be his first 

amended complaint), ECF No. 40 (what would be his second amended complaint), ECF No. 41 (what 

would be his third amended complaint), ECF No. 42 (what would be his fourth amended complaint),

and his operative complaint ECF No. 47 (what would be his fifth amended complaint) (“5AC”). 

Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECFgenerated page numbers at the top of documents.

Case 3:19-cv-01770-SI Document 48 Filed 04/24/19 Page 1 of 6
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01770-LB 2

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leave!”2In response, Mr. Clapp yelled for someone to call the police and took out both pepper 

spray and a stun gun from his pockets and “sparked” the stun gun, after which the incident ended.

3

Mr. Clapp brings this action against five individuals (the “Individual Defendants”) — alleging 

claims of (1) false arrest and false imprisonment, (2) malicious prosecution, (3) assault, 

(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) conspiracy. Mr. Clapp does not allege who 

the Individual Defendants are or what they did. Notably, he does not actually allege that the 

Individual Defendants were among the individuals who advanced on him in November 2016.

As the court previously explained to Mr. Clapp, his claims against the Individual Defendants 

do not appear to belong in federal court.4 There is no basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction 

over Mr. Clapp’s claims as he has pleaded them.5 Additionally, as the court previously explained 

to Mr. Clapp, he has not actually alleged that the Individual Defendants did anything at all.6 He 

thus has not pleaded a claim against any of the Individual Defendants.7

The court dismisses Mr. Clapp’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to 

state a claim. The dismissal is without prejudice, and the court will grant Mr. Clapp one final 

opportunity to plead a cognizable claim over which the court has federal subject-matter 

jurisdiction. If he fails to do so, the court may dismiss Mr. Clapp’s claims with prejudice and 

without further notice and close this case.8

 

2

5AC – ECF No. 47 at 3–4 (¶¶ 4.1–4.3). 

3

Id. at 5 (¶ 4.5).

4 Order – ECF No. 43 at 8.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 9.

7

Id. at 10.

8 Mr. Clapp also brought claims against the City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) relating to the 

San Francisco Police Department’s interactions with him after officers arrived on the scene. Clapp v. 

City and Cty. of San Francisco, No. 3:19-cv-01770-LB (N.D. Cal.). The court severed Mr. Clapp’s 

claims against CCSF from his claims against the Individual Defendants. Order – ECF No. 43 at 5–7. 

Mr. Clapp agrees that his claims against CCSF and his claims against the Individual Defendants 

should proceed separately. 3/29/2019 Letter – ECF No. 45. Mr. Clapp’s claims against CCSF are not 

at issue here.

Case 3:19-cv-01770-SI Document 48 Filed 04/24/19 Page 2 of 6
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01770-LB 3

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ANALYSIS

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

1.1 Governing Law

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 

437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case 

unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 

Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that 

his case is within federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. / Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 264 

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 

(1936)).

1.2 Application

As the party that filed this action in federal court, Mr. Clapp bears the burden of establishing 

federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims against the Individual Defendants. He has 

not done so.

First, Mr. Clapp’s claims against the Individual Defendants do not present a question of 

federal law. The claims Mr. Clapp purportedly brings against the Individual Defendants — false 

arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and conspiracy — are all state-law claims and do not give rise to federal-question 

jurisdiction.9

Second, Mr. Clapp’s complaint does not appear to present any other basis for federal 

jurisdiction, such as diversity jurisdiction. For there to be diversity jurisdiction, Mr. Clapp would 

have to be a citizen of a different state than all of the defendants and the amount in controversy 

would have to exceed $75,000. Mr. Clapp is a citizen of California,10 and he does not allege that 

any of the Individual Defendants are not citizens of California, much less that all of them are not. 

 

9 Contrary to Mr. Clapp’s claims, these state-law torts are not constitutional claims. Contra 5AC –

ECF No. 47 at 3 (¶ 3.2).

10 Id. at 2 (¶ 2.1).

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ORDER – No. 19-cv-01770-LB 4

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Additionally, he does not allege that his claims against the Individual Defendants exceed $75,000. 

Mr. Clapp therefore has not met his burden to establish diversity jurisdiction.

As there is no basis for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Clapp’s claims against 

the Individual Defendants, these claims must be dismissed. Cf. Hernandez v. City of San Jose, No. 

16-CV-03957-LHK, 2017 WL 2081236, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017).

2. Failure to State a Claim

2.1 Governing Law

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 

subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent that it is 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. 

Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc). Section 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an in forma pauperis complaint 

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the United States Marshal to serve the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. The Ninth 

Circuit has noted that “[t]he language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). As the 

Supreme Court has explained, “[the in forma pauperis statute] is designed largely to discourage 

the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying 

litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court 

must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include a “short and plain statement” showing 

the plaintiff is entitled to relief. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bell Atl. Corp. 

Case 3:19-cv-01770-SI Document 48 Filed 04/24/19 Page 4 of 6
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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The complaint need not contain “detailed factual 

allegations,” but the plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief,” which 

“requires more than labels and conclusions”; a mere “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action” is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In determining whether to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is ordinarily 

limited to the face of the complaint. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 

(9th Cir. 2002). Factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and reasonable 

inferences drawn from them must be construed in favor of the plaintiff. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court cannot assume, however, that “the [plaintiff] 

can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). “Nor is the court required to accept as true 

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

2.2 Application

“[A] plaintiff’s allegations must ‘provide sufficient notice to all of the Defendants as to the 

nature of the claims being asserted against them,’ including ‘what conduct is at issue.’” Adobe 

Sys., Inc. v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting 

Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., No. 12-cv-04137 JCS, 2014 WL 1338297, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 

28, 2014)). “As a general rule, when a pleading fails ‘to allege what role each Defendant played in 

the alleged harm,’ this ‘makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for individual Defendants 

to respond to Plaintiffs’ allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)).

As the court previously explained in connection with Mr. Clapp’s [Fourth] Amended 

Complaint, Mr. Clapp does not actually plead that the five individuals that he names as Individual 

Defendants actually did anything.11 Mr. Clapp has not corrected this deficiency in his operative 

[Fifth] Amended Complaint, which still does not plead that any of these specific five individuals 

 

11 Order – ECF No. 43 at 9.

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actually did anything. Mr. Clapp makes allegations about “a group of some 5–7 people,” but he 

does not actually allege that the Individual Defendants were members of that group, much less 

what — if anything — each Individual Defendant did. This does not provide fair notice to the 

Individual Defendants and does not plead a claim against them. Mr. Clapp’s complaint thus is 

subject to dismissal. Cf., e.g., Karkanen v. California, No. 17-cv-06967-YGR, 2018 WL 3820916 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2018) (dismissing complaint where “plaintiff repeatedly lumps ‘defendants’ 

together in her allegations,” because “a complaint which lumps together multiple defendants in 

one broad allegation fails to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)”) (citing cases) (internal 

brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

The court dismisses Mr. Clapp’s claims against the Individual Defendants for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.

The court has repeatedly explained to Mr. Clapp the deficiencies in his claims as he as pleaded 

them and has extended him repeated opportunities to amend his complaint.12 The court will extend 

Mr. Clapp one final chance. Mr. Clapp may file an amended complaint against the Individual 

Defendants if he can cure the deficiencies in his [Fifth] Amended complaint, i.e., if he can plead a 

cognizable claim against the Individual Defendants over which the court has federal subject-matter 

jurisdiction. The court extends Mr. Clapp 14 days from the date of this order (i.e., until May 8, 

2019) to do so. If Mr. Clapp does not timely file an amended complaint that pleads a cognizable 

claim over which the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may dismiss Mr. Clapp’s 

claims with prejudice and without further notice and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 24, 2019 ______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

 

12 See, e.g., 3/7/2019 Hr’g; Notice and Order – ECF No. 38 at 1–2; Order – ECF No. 43 at 8–10.

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