Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01994/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01994-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAGELLAN GROUP INVESTMENT, LLC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

FIRST INDIGENOUS DEPOSITORY

COMPANY, LLC,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-01994 JSW

ORDER DENYING

APPLICATION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER AND REQUEST FOR

EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Magellan Group Investment, LLC (“Magellan”) filed

an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order against Defendant First Indigenous

Depository Company, LLC (“FIDC”) and for an order allowing for expedited discovery. To

date, FIDC has not filed any opposition. Nevertheless, having carefully considered Magellan’s

application, and finding this application suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant

to Civil Local Rule 7-6, the Court Denies Magellan’s application because it failed to make an

adequate showing, supported by admissible evidence, of immediate irreparable harm

necessitating the issuance of a TRO and further has failed to demonstrate the need to preserve

the status quo pending final resolution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

“To prevail on a motion for temporary restraining order, as with a preliminary

injunction, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating either 1) a combination of

probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or 2) the existence of

serious questions as to success on the merits and irreparable injury along with a sharp tipping of 

Case 3:05-cv-01994-JSW Document 17 Filed 07/08/05 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the balance of hardships in the moving party's favor.” Bespaq Corp. v. Haoshen Trading Co.,

2004 WL 2043522, *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 13, 2004) (citing Sammartano v. First Judicial District

Court, 303 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir.2003)). “Because injunctive relief prior to trial is a harsh and

extraordinary remedy, it is to be granted sparingly and only in cases where the issues are clear

and well defined and the plaintiff has established a reasonable certainty of prevailing at trial.” 

Watermark, Inc. v. United Stations, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 31, 32-33 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (citing Dymo

Industries, Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1964)).

Here, Magellan contends that FIDC has defaulted on a loan, which was secured by

collateral pursuant to a security agreement between the parties. Magellan presents evidence

regarding the merits of its action, including that it sent FIDC a notice of default on this loan on

February 16, 2005, and that FIDC does not dispute that it is in default. (Declaration of Robert

Fessler, ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. F.) Magellan further represents that on May 11, 2005, FIDC promised to

provide Magellan with a plan to resolve the default, but never actually provided such a plan. 

(Id., ¶¶ 8-9.) As of that date, the amount outstanding on the loan, including interest, was

$525,053.10, with interest continuing to accrue daily. (Id., ¶ 10.)

Magellan argues it would suffer irreparable injury if FIDC sells, transfers, or otherwise

disposes of the collateral, yet does not provide any evidence that there is an imminent threat that

FIDC is going to dispose of the collateral. Nor does Magellan make any showing that it could

not be compensated with monetary damages even if FIDC does dispose of the collateral. 

Finally, Magellan does not provide any explanation as to why it suddenly needs immediate relief

now, when it knew as of mid-February that FIDC had defaulted. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Magellan’s request for a temporary restraining order. This order is without prejudice

to Magellan filing a noticed motion for preliminary injunction.

Magellan also seeks to conduct an expedited deposition of FIDC’s corporate

representative pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) to determine the extent,

condition and location of the collateral covered by the security agreement. Magellan relies on

Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D.Cal. 2002) as support

for its request to conduct such expedited discovery. The Court in Semitool held that expedited

Case 3:05-cv-01994-JSW Document 17 Filed 07/08/05 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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discovery may be allowed upon a showing of good cause, and that “[g]ood cause may be found

where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice,

outweighs the prejudice to the responding party. Id. The key issue for the court was not

whether the requested discovery was relevant, but instead, whether there was “good cause to

provide immediate access to the requested discovery rather than postponing its ultimate

production during the normal course of discovery.” Id. Magellan has not made any showing as

to why it cannot wait to conduct the requested deposition through the normal course of

discovery. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Magellan’s request to conduct expedited discovery

without prejudice to Magellan resubmitting its request upon a showing of good cause.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2005 /s/ Jeffrey S. White 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-01994-JSW Document 17 Filed 07/08/05 Page 3 of 3