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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 12, 2016*

Decided December 12, 2016

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐1068

GEORGE REED,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

PAUL S. KEMPER and  

MICHELLE BONES,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 15‐CV‐208‐JPS

J. P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

The warden at the Racine Correctional Institution denied George Reed, an

inmate, the right to marry his fiancée. Reed sued the warden, Paul Kemper, and the

institution’s complaint examiner, Michelle Bones.  The district court ordered the

defendants to allow him to marry but denied damages on the basis of qualified

immunity. We conclude that the complaint examiner is entitled to qualified immunity

                                                 

* We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral

argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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but that the warden must pay nominal damages. Thus we affirm in part and vacate in

part.

Reed is serving a life sentence for murder and sought to marry his fiancée,

Jerusha Bohannon, who is not incarcerated. Bohannon is his high‐school sweetheart and

the mother of his child. Under a Wisconsin state regulation, inmates may apply for a

marriage ceremony if they meet certain criteria, including counseling and financial

requirements. Once an inmate has submitted the required information, a marriage

coordinator reviews the application and makes a recommendation to the warden. The

decision to grant or deny the marriage request rests with the warden.  

Reed met all the required criteria, and the marriage coordinator recommended

that he be allowed to marry. But Kemper denied Reed’s marriage request in a brief

written statement to Reed: “Taking into consideration your criminal history, sentence

structure, and your unmet program needs, I have determined that there is no justifiable

reason for this marriage to take place while at Racine Correctional Institution.” Reed

contested this decision administratively, and after reviewing his complaint, Bones

concluded that Kemper did not violate any rules.  

In an affidavit supplied to the district court, Kemper elaborated that he denied

the marriage request because he thought that the marriage would not succeed. He gave

three reasons for his prediction. The first was based on Reed’s criminal history and

Reed’s attitude about it:

Criminal history is reviewed and considered because it illustrates the

background of this individual. . . . I consider whether this history will

have an impact on the relationship with the proposed wife and family. . . .

For Reed, . . . his criminal history . . . entails possession with intent to

deliver, controlled substance manufacturing/delivery, first‐degree

homicide and possession of a firearm. These are all very serious felony

convictions. . . . Reed made a statement that he believed he was innocent

of the [homicide]. . . . therefore still minimalizing his involvement in the

crime. Even more concerning to me was the impact his crime had on

others.

The second reason for predicting marital difficulty was Reed’s life sentence. He

explained:

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Sentence structure is considered to determine what kind of support the

inmate may be able to provide to the spouse. . . . Reed is serving a life

sentence. I considered what role Reed could/will play in the life of his

proposed spouse if he is incarcerated for the remainder of his life. I

questioned whether he could provide for her and support her in times of

crisis. I also questioned whether a marriage under these circumstances

could be successful. I believed it was irresponsible to approve this

marriage for fear it would only create another divorce in the future, which

adds additional burden to the spouse, children, society as a whole and

Reed himself.

Finally Kemper wrote that “Reed has a history surrounding drugs and at the

time of his marriage request, had yet to complete an Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse

program.” The program was not available at the prison.

Reed moved for summary judgment and won partial relief on his claim that the

defendants had violated his constitutional right to marry under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78 (1987). Turner declared that inmates retain the fundamental right to marry

established in cases such as Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia,

388 U.S. 1 (1967). Turner, 482 U.S. at 94–99. While Turner recognizes that wardens can

restrict this right, the limits must be “reasonably related to legitimate penological

objectives.” Id. at 97. The district court granted Reed an injunction allowing him to

marry. It reasoned that, if the defendants were trying to promote public safety, denying

the marriage request was not reasonably related to that goal because the marriage

would not endanger anyone.  

On the question of damages, the defendants argued that they were entitled to

qualified immunity, and the district court agreed. It reasoned that their conduct “d[id]

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). According to

the court, no precedent has rejected Kemper’s rationale for preventing the marriage.  

In this court Reed contends that Kemper is not entitled to qualified immunity. He

argues that Turner clearly establishes that the rationale articulated in Kemper’s affidavit

is not related to penological objectives. Penological interests include prison security,

crime deterrence, rehabilitation, and resource allocation. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta,

539 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2003) (recognizing interests in security, protecting visitors, crime

prevention, and deterring substance use); Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 785

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(7th Cir. 2011) (“[L]egitimate penological interests might include crime deterrence,

prisoner rehabilitation, and protecting the safety of prison guards and inmates.”);

Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 921 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding brief delay on right to

marry to resolve a security concern); Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1995)

(upholding rule preventing jail employees from marrying inmates out of security

concerns).

Kemper’s rationale—that he stopped Reed’s marriage to a civilian because it may

fail—is clearly insufficient under Turner because marital success is not a penological

interest. Ordinarily, “where the inmate wishes to marry a civilian, the decision to marry

(apart from the logistics of the wedding ceremony) is a completely private one.”

See Turner, 482 U.S. at 98.  Kemper may be right that, because Reed is a convicted

murderer, past drug abuser, and sentenced to life in prison, Reed’s marriage to a

civilian faces enormous challenges. But the uncertain success of a marriage is not itself a

valid reason for a state official to prevent it. And Bohannon understood Reed’s

background as part of the requirements leading up to Reed’s marriage request, so her

consent is fully informed.  

Rehabilitation and deterrence are valid penological goals, but Kemper never

mentions them as reasons for prohibiting the marriage. We recognize that in his

affidavit Kemper asserted that Reed has “yet to complete an Alcohol and Other Drug

Abuse program” and that Reed is still “minimalizing” his crime. But these assertions do

not imply that stopping the marriage will promote rehabilitation or deterrence. First,

Kemper provided no evidence that Reed is refusing to participate in a drug‐abuse

program. To the contrary the program is simply not available to Reed. Second, Kemper

never opines that until Reed receives drug treatment or openly declares his role in his

crime he will misuse the marriage to exploit or abuse others. Kemper has therefore not

connected the denial of Reed’s marriage to these valid prison goals. See Shimer

v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996).

Although Kemper has not established a basis for qualified immunity from

damages, his exposure to damages is limited for another reason. Kemper correctly

observes that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), prisoners

asserting only emotional and not physical injury cannot recover compensatory

damages; only nominal damages and, if willful and wanton conduct is shown, punitive

damages are possible. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Calhoun

v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003)). In moving for summary judgment, and in

responding to the defendants’ opposition to damages, Reed presented no evidence of

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physical injury or willful misconduct. Therefore he can recover only nominal damages

on remand.

Michelle Bones, however, is entitled to qualified immunity because she did not

violate clearly established law. Complaint examiners follow the law so long as they do

their job in examining complaints in good faith. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592,  

595–96 (7th Cir. 2009). Bones declared that she has no authority to grant or deny

marriage requests and that she reviewed Kemper’s decision only for compliance with

the marriage regulation. Bones completed her duties as a complaint examiner in good

faith and therefore did not violate the law. See id.

A final note. The district court denied Reed’s requests for counsel because he did

not timely show that he had attempted to secure counsel on his own, see Pruitt v. Mote,

503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). He submitted that evidence only after the

court had decided summary judgment. Because his submission came too late, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request. See id.

Reed’s motion for recruitment of counsel on appeal is DENIED as moot, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED for an award of nominal damages of one dollar payable by defendant

Kemper.

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