Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01023/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01023-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Larry Charles Snow, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-1023-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before this Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner

Larry Charles Snow. (Doc. 1). Magistrate Judge Michelle Burns has issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R & R”) in which she recommends that the Court deny the petition with

prejudice. (Doc. 16). Petitioner has objected to the R & R and filed a Motion for a Certificate

of Appealability. (Docs. 21, 22). Because objections have been filed, the Court will review

the petition de novo. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)

(en banc). For the following reasons, the Court accepts the R & R, denies the petition, and

declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

The facts regarding Petitioner’s apprehension, plea, and state court post-conviction

proceedings are ably set forth in the R & R, and will only be briefly summarized here. On

March 10, Petitioner was indicted on nineteen counts of sexual conduct with a minor, child

molestation, sexual abuse, and related offenses. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. B). The indictment stemmed

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from an investigation conducted by the Phoenix Police Department after it had been

contacted by the FBI. The FBI had received information from a person in London that

Petitioner, under the internet pseudonym “Greenhorn,” had boasted of molesting his six-year

old stepdaughter, had stated that he had married the girl’s mother to obtain ready access to

the child, and had offered access to the girl to other child predators should they travel to

Phoenix. (Doc. 13–2, Ex. N, Ex. B at 18–20). The girl was interviewed and described

substantial abuse, and Petitioner admitted to abusing the girl for over a year. (Doc. 13-1, Ex.

A).

On May 6, 2004, Petitioner pled guilty to two amended counts of attempted sexual

conduct with a minor under the age of 15, which were categorized as class 3 felonies and

dangerous crimes against children in the second degree (Count Four and Count Seven), and

one count of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 15, classified as a class 2 felony

and a dangerous crime against children in the first degree (Count Five). (Doc. 13-1, Ex. D).

On February 11, 2005, he was issued a ten-year sentence on Count Four and a twenty-year

sentence on Count Five, to run consecutively, and 99 years probation for Count Seven. (Doc.

13-1, Ex. F).

After his appointed counsel stated that he could find no colorable claim for postconviction relief (“PCR”), Petitioner filed a pro per PCR petition claiming that the state had

failed to provide the name of the London informant, that his plea was involuntary, that his

counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations and sentencing, and that his sentence had

been aggravated in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) because the

content of the internet chats that formed the basis of the investigation had not been found by

a jury. (Doc. 13, Ex. J). The petition was denied on December 20, 2005, and the Court of

Appeals denied review on November 16, 2006. (Doc. 13-2, Exs. M, O).

Eighteen months later, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Sentence Correction,” asking that

his sentence be modified in light of State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, 162 P.3d 650 (App.

2007), which held that A.R.S. § 13-604.01, the law undergirding Count Four and Count

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Seven, did not provide for a sentencing enhancement for attempted sexual conduct when the

victim was under the age of twelve. (Doc. 13, Ex. P). The court treated the petition as a

successive PCR petition, and after a response from the state and a telephonic hearing, ruled

that Petitioner was not precluded from bringing a successive claim. (Doc. 13, Ex. U). The

State moved to stay resentencing until the Arizona Supreme Court had ruled on a pending

case that would decide whether Gonzalez had created a “significant change in the law” for

the purposes of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, and therefore would resolve the

question of whether subsequent petitions based on Gonzalez were precluded. (Doc. 13, Ex.

W). The Court granted the stay, and on March 19, 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled

that the appeals court in Gonzalez did not create a significant change in the law, but was

merely “the first to interpret a statute.” State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 120, 203 P.3d 1175,

1180 (2009). The trial court thereafter ruled that Petitioner’s subsequent Gonzalez-based

PCR was precluded because he had not raised the issue in his initial PCR. (Doc. 13-3, Ex.

CCC). Both the Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. 13-3,

Exs. GG, II).

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 23, 2011, alleging that

his sentence had been issued in violation of Gonzalez, and that the error constituted a

violation of his rights to Due Process and Equal Protection. (Doc. 1).

In the R & R, Judge Burns wrote that Petitioner’s claim was not cognizable on habeas

review because “[t]he gravamen of Petitioner’s claim challenges the state court’s

interpretation and application of state sentencing statutes, and the propriety of Petitioner’s

post-conviction proceedings.” (Doc. 16 at 7–8). Further, Judge Burns noted that even were

the petition cognizable, it was not timely under AEDPA, and equitable tolling was not

available because Petitioner had been aware of the facts regarding his sentence on February

11, 2005, and “[a]ny purported lack of legal sophistication regarding the legal significance

of those facts does not justify equitable tolling on the instant record.” (Doc. 16 at 12, citing

Pham v. Ryan, CV-09-2535 (FJM), 2010 WL 4393012 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 2010) (denying

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1

 Petitioner structures these objections as two objections with multiple sub-categories. For

clarity, the Court will analyze them individually.

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equitable tolling to a petitioner claiming that he could not have brought his claim before he

learned of the Gonzalez decision)).

Petitioner lodged three objections to the R & R.1 They are: 1) his successive PCR in

state court was based not on the claim that Gonzalez was a “significant change in the law”

under ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32(1)(g), but instead on the theory that when he was told of the

decision it constituted a “[n]ewly discovered material fact[]” under ARIZ. R. CRIM. P.

32(1)(e). (Doc. 21 at 2); 2) his petition does not rest on questions of state law, because he

claims that the errors in his state sentencing were “of a constitutional magnitude.” (Doc. 21

at 3); and 3) the claim is not untimely, or alternately Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling.

(Doc. 21 at 5–8). These objections will be discussed in turn.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). The writ

may be granted by “the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit

judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Review of Petitions for

Habeas Corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244 et seq. (2006).

Under AEDPA, petitions for habeas corpus are governed by a one-year statute of

limitations. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005) (AEDPA “establishes a

1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition”) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)). The limitation period begins to run when the state conviction becomes

final—either “upon ‘the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review.’” White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

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2244(d)(1)(A)). The limitations period is subject to statutory tolling under the terms of

AEDPA or equitable tolling under extraordinary circumstances.

The one-year limitation period is statutorily tolled during any time in which a

“properly filed” state petition for post-conviction relief is “pending” before the state court,

and “must be tolled for the entire period in which a petitioner is appropriately pursuing and

exhausting his state remedies.” 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004

(9th Cir. 1999).

In certain limited circumstances, AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline may be equitably

tolled. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2590 (2010). A petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling if he can demonstrate that “(1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” to prevent his timely filing.

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Nevertheless, equitable tolling is rare: the Court must “take seriously

Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process” and may equitably toll the

AEDPA’s limitation period only when the test’s “high hurdle is surmounted.” Calderon v.

United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on

other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998).

II. Analysis

Judge Burns’s R & R properly concludes that the petition is untimely under AEDPA,

since the statute of limitations began to run on December 18, 2006, thirty days after the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of his first PCR petition. (Doc. 16 at 10). It further

concludes that if the petition were timely, it would nevertheless be denied because “the claim

turns solely on alleged state law errors.” (Doc. 16 at 7). The Court has reviewed the petition

de novo and determined that these conclusions are correct. Only Petitioner’s objections will

be discussed in this order.

A. Arizona Rule 32.1

When a prisoner files a petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Arizona State Court, he

waives any claim that he could have raised but did not, and cannot raise that claim in a

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subsequent collateral proceeding. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a)(3). This general rule admits to

number of exceptions, including subsequent petitions predicated upon discovery of new

evidence pursuant to Rule 32.1(e) or significant changes in the law pursuant to Rule 32.1(g).

ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b). Evidence is “newly-discovered” for the purposes of Rule 32.1

when the following five requirements are met:

1. the evidence must appear on its face to have existed at the

time of trial but be discovered after trial;

2. the motion must allege facts from which the court could

conclude the defendant was diligent in discovering the facts and

bringing them to the court’s attention;

3. the evidence must not simply be cumulative or impeaching;

4. the evidence must be relevant to the case;

5. the evidence must be such that it would likely have altered the

verdict, finding or sentence if known at the time of trial.

State v. Cooper, 166 Ariz. 126, 129, 800 P.2d 992, 995 (App. 1990) (quoting State v. Bilke,

162 Ariz. 51, 52–53, 781 P.2d 28, 29–30 (1989)). The Court of Appeals decided Gonzalez

in 2007, and therefore the fact that it had been decided could not have “existed at the time

of trial,” and cannot form the basis for a claim under Rule 32.1(e). Id. More generally, court

opinions are simply not newly-discovered material facts, since they are by definition

decisions of law. Petitioner may not gain relief by mischaracterizing a legal claim as a factual

one once the legal claim has been denied. Petitioner’s subsequent PCR was not rendered

timely through Rule 32.1(e).

B. Constitutional Violation

Petitioner argues that the R & R improperly misconstrues his petition as resting solely

on state law grounds when in fact he claims that he was denied due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 21 at 3). He argues that “due process demands that Snow be

sentenced properly,” and that sentencing “pursuant to the wrong statute constitutes a

structural defect” under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993). (Doc. 21 at 4). The

Arizona procedural rules that precluded Petitioner’s subsequent claim comply with Due

Process, and his sentence did not constitute a structural constitutional defect. Habeas review

is not available for state claims denied on procedural grounds when the state law ground is

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2

 Petitioner quotes Martin as holding that “[Arizona’s] time bar, either by design or

operation, discriminates against federal claims or claimants.” (Doc. 21 at 8). Martin did

not involve Arizona’s time bar; in it, the Court upheld California’s procedural time bar

even though the bar did not set a particular time limit on filing claims but stated only that

they should be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” 131 S.Ct. at 1126.

Moreover, Petitioner selectively quotes the passage to distort its meaning; the full quote

reads: “Martin has not alleged that California’s time bar, either by design or operation,

discriminates against federal claims or claimants.” Id. at 1125..

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“independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Walker v.

Martin,131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).2

 The Supreme Court has

held that Arizona’s rule barring subsequent PCR petitions does not violate federal law and

such claims are not subject to federal review. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 861 (2002)

(“Because the state court’s determination that respondent waived his . . . claim under Ariz.

Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3) did not require an examination of the merits of that claim, it was

independent of federal law.”). The Court in Brecht described “structural defects” as

constitutional failings—such as the failure to provide a defendant with counsel—that “make

a trial fundamentally unfair even if they do not affect the outcome of the proceeding.” Brecht,

507 U.S. at 640. Having a PCR petition denied on a valid state procedural ground does not

create such a defect. Petitioner has not raised a federal claim, and habeas review would not

be available even were his claim timely.

C. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner claims that his petition is not untimely under AEDPA because his

subsequent state PCR was improperly denied. (Doc. 21 at 5). As discussed above, AEDPA’s

statute of limitations began to run thirty days after the expiration of Petitioner’s first PCR;

filing a subsequent state PCR did not reset or toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner argues that his case should be equitably tolled because “Snow did not know

about the facts of DCAC in connection with his charge.” (Doc. 21 at 7) (emphasis added).

The “fact” that Petitioner claims he did not know was the decision of the Gonzalez court

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3 Ross was in fact a case in which the Court defined “cause” for failing to abide by a state

procedural rule sufficient to overcome procedural default. Ross, 468 U.S. at 15. Petitioner

cites it for the proposition that it will equitably toll his deadlines under AEDPA. Under

neither circumstance does it offer Petitioner relief.

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issued in 2007. The Gonzalez court noted that its interpretation of the statute was not

novel—in fact, the statute offered no textual support for punishing those who attempted

sexual assaults against children under twelve, because of what “appears to have been

legislative oversight.” Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. at 14. Failing to note the plain text of a statute

does not provide the basis for equitable tolling when a petitioner knows the underlying facts

of the acts for which he was convicted. See Pham v. Ryan, CV-09-2535 (FJM), 2010 WL

4393012 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 2010) (denying equitable tolling for a habeas claim filed based

on the denial of a second state PCR alleging that petitioner was sentenced in violation of

Gonzalez). After the Gonzalez decision was rendered, the Arizona legislature revised the

sentencing statute to correct the error that the court had noted. See A.R.S. § 13-705(B). 

Nor do Petitioner’s other arguments merit equitable tolling. A claim based on the plain

language of a state sentencing statute is not one in which “there was no reasonable basis in

existing law.” Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).3

 Petitioner was not prevented from

including a Gonzalez-style claim in his first state PCR, and this case simply does not present

the “extraordinary circumstances sufficient to merit equitable relief.” Holland v. Florida, 130

S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010). The petition was untimely filed, and Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling.

D. Certificate of Appealability

A Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) will issue when counts are dismissed on

procedural grounds so long as “reasonable jurists could debate” whether the decision is

correct. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When a decision issues on the merits,

a COA will issue when “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. No reasonable jurist could debate that the

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petition is untimely, and no reasonable jurist would find the Court’s conclusion that

Petitioner was raising a state law claim not cognizable on habeas review to be debatable or

wrong. No COA will issue.

CONCLUSION

The conclusions of the R & R are correct—Petitioner raises state law claims that are

not cognizable on habeas review, and his petition is untimely. Petitioner’s objections are

meritless.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Burns’ R&R (Doc. 16) is accepted.

2. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

3. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

4. Motion for Certificate of Appealability (Doc. 22) is denied. Pursuant to Rule

11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the

Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find

the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 5th day of April, 2012.

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