Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00373/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00373-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JACK GORDON GREENE

Petitioner

VS. 

LARRY NORRIS

Respondent

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NO: 5:0400373 SWW

ORDER

This is a capital habeas proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Petitioner Jack

Gordon Greene (“Greene”). By order entered February 26, 2010, the Court committed Greene

to the custody of the Attorney General for transportation to a federal medical center for

psychological evaluation. On March 1, 2010, counsel for Greene filed a notice of appeal and a

motion to stay the commitment order pending appeal (docket entry #102), and Respondent has

filed a response in opposition (docket entry #111). After careful consideration, and for reasons

that follow, Greene’s motion, which the Court construes as a motion for a stay pending appeal

and for certification of an interlocutory appeal, is denied.

The order committing Greene to the custody of the Attorney General for evaluation

followed a hearing held February 24, 2010, during which Greene testified that he does not want

to pursue a claim set forth in his petition that he is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for

the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). Greene

testified that he disapproves of efforts to “make him out to be” mentally retarded, that the

assertion that he is mentally retarded is “far from the case,” and the claim that he is incompetent

is “an outright lie.” Because Greene’s attorneys maintain that he is incompetent to withdraw his

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Atkins claim, it is the responsibility of this Court to determine his competence to waive or

withdraw the claim, and it is appropriate for the Court to “subject [Greene] to psychiatric and

other appropriate medical examinations and, so far as necessary, to temporary federal

hospitalization for this purpose.” Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S. Ct. 1505, 1507 (1966). 

 In support of the motion to stay pending appeal, counsel argues that (1) the commitment

order violates Greene’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the

commitment order violates Greene’s right to the effective advice and presence of counsel prior to

and during any examination; (3) intelligence testing would be invalid and impair counsel’s

ability to have Greene evaluated by an expert retained on his behalf; and (4) an evaluation

regarding Greene’s competency pursuant to Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) is

unjustified. 

The Court finds that counsel’s arguments are without merit. First, the Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination has no application here. The privilege is a corollary to the

government’s burden in a criminal action to establish the elements of a crime beyond a

reasonable doubt, and it prohibits the government from forcing a defendant to talk and then using

the defendant’s own statements against him. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 101 S. Ct.

1866 (1981). Entitlement to the privilege depends upon the existence of a reasonable basis for

apprehension of self-incrimination, and the danger of self-incrimination must be “real and

appreciable, not remote and speculative.” Ueckert v. Comm’r, 721 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir.

1983)(citations omitted). The Court finds that the evaluations ordered in this case present no

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Counsel cites Nooner v. Norris, No 5:08CV00003 (E.D. Ark., Interim Order entered 

Sept. 17, 2009) to support the argument that the commitment order entered in this case violates

Greene’s Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. In Nooner, the petitioner sought

habeas relief, claiming that he was actually innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced to

death. The Court denied the respondent’s motion to depose the petitioner, reasoning that the

only issue on which the petitioner could be deposed was his actual innocence, the petitioner

would be entitled to assert his privilege against self incrimination, and the deposition would not

result in information that could be considered by the Court. The present situation has nothing in

common with the issues before the Court in Nooner.

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danger of self-incrimination.1

 

Second, the Court finds no authority to support counsel’s argument that Greene has a

right to effective assistance of counsel in this habeas action, which includes a “right to the

effective advice of, and presence of, counsel prior to and during any examination.” 

Third, in light of counsel’s steadfast position that Greene refuses or is unable to be tested

by retained experts or to communicate with counsel, the argument that testing at a federal

medical center will “impair counsel’s ability to have Greene evaluated by neuropsychologist

retained on his behalf” is unpersuasive.

Fourth, counsel apparently believes that the Court’s inquiry into whether Greene 

understands that he is to be executed is connected to a competency inquiry pursuant to Ford v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10, 106 S.Ct. 2595(1986). Such is not the case. Whether Greene

understands that he is to be executed is relevant to whether his claim withdrawal is knowing. 

See Nooner v. Norris, 402 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2005). 

A party seeking a stay pending appeal must show (1) that he is likely to succeed on the

merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the stay is granted; (3) that no substantial

harm will come to other interested parties; and (4) the stay will do no harm to the public interest.

See Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control, 992 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 

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1993); James River Flood Control Ass'n v. Watt, 680 F.2d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1982). The Court

finds none of the foregoing factors present and will deny the motion to stay.

Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) permits a district court to certify an order for determination on

interlocutory appeal if it finds that the order from which an appeal is sought involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion,

and an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. “A

motion for certification must be granted sparingly, and the movant bears the heavy burden of

demonstrating that the case is an exceptional one in which immediate appeal is warranted.” 

White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1994).

In aid of the proper exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court has ordered that Greene

be evaluated at a federal medical center. The Court finds no grounds for an immediate appeal

from that order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for a stay and for certification

of an interlocutory appeal (docket entry #102) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 18TH DAY OF MARCH, 2010.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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