Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01994/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01994-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. 

Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on 

December 2, 2011. Respondent filed an answer with supporting 

documentation on July 25, 2012, and Petitioner filed a traverse on 

January 18, 2013.

I. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

MARTIN DAREE MILLER,

 Petitioner,

v.

L. S. McEWEN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (D0C. 1) AND 

TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 53
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of Tulare (TCSC), located within the 

territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 84(b), 2254(a), 2241(a), (d). Petitioner claims that in the 

course of the proceedings resulting in his conviction, he suffered 

violations of his constitutional rights. The Court concludes it has 

subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2254(a) and 2241(c)(3), which authorize a district court to 

entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground 

that the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 

(2010) (per curiam). 

An answer was filed on behalf of Respondent Warden L. S.

McEwen. Pursuant to the judgment, Respondent had custody of 

Petitioner at Petitioner’s institution of confinement when the 

petition was filed. (Doc. 19.) Petitioner thus named as a 

respondent a person who had custody of Petitioner within the meaning 

of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases in the District Courts (Habeas Rules). See, Stanley v. 

California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the 

person of the Respondent.

///

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 2 of 53
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Procedural and Factual Summary

Petitioner was convicted in the TCSC on April 25, 2004, of 

murder, attempted murder, and assault with a firearm in violation of 

Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187(a), 664 and 187(a), 245(a)(2), and 

120222.53(c) and (d). He is serving a sentence of 82 years years to 

life. (Pet., doc. 1, 1.)

Petitioner appealed the judgment and raised claims in various 

petitions for post-judgment collateral review, which will be 

detailed as necessary in connection with Petitioner’s specific 

claims.

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant 

to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue 

made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the 

petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence 

to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). This 

presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from a state 

appellate court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

The facts of the offenses were summarized in the decision of 

the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate 

District (CCA), in People v. Martin Daree Miller, case number 

F055635, appearing at 2009 WL 5067612, *1-*4 (Dec. 28, 2009), as 

follows:

FACTUAL SUMMARY

In November 2005, a group of young people attended a party 

in Tulare. Included in the crowd were five Black males, 

Miller, Tristan Evans, Debrae Evans, Adell Evans FN2 and 

Frankie Wilson, all related by blood or marriage. Miller 

and Wilson were from Arizona and were in Tulare visiting 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 3 of 53
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Tristan. Miller, who played football in college, was a big 

stocky man, standing six feet three inches tall and 

weighing 270 pounds. Debrae was also large, at six feet 

two inches tall and weighing approximately 260 pounds. 

Wilson weighed 170 pounds and was five feet nine inches 

tall. Adell was smaller, weighing 160 pounds and standing 

about five feet nine inches tall. The five men heard about 

the party after meeting some young women at a store.

FN2. In order to distinguish between the three 

Evans men, we refer to them by their first 

names.

At the party, a fight broke out among some of the Hispanic 

partygoers. Someone, identified only as a “Mexican,” fired 

into the crowd. Several individuals were shot, including 

Debrae and a young Hispanic female. Dario Davalos was at 

the party. He and an acquaintance, Sandro Munguia, took 

the young Hispanic female victim to the hospital in his 

pickup truck. There were other victims who were also 

transported to the hospital by friends. Jesse Rios, his 

brother Miguel Rios, and his girlfriend Elise Flores had 

been at the party and also came to the hospital. There 

were several others from the party who were present.

Miller and his relatives drove Debrae to the hospital in 

Tristan's white car, but they stopped at Tristan's house 

first, allegedly to tell Tristan's girlfriend that they 

were taking Debrae to the hospital and to ask her to call 

Debrae's parents. Tristan, however, spent all his time at 

the hospital on the phone trying to call Debrae's father. 

Davalos testified that the Miller group arrived after he 

did.

In the hospital emergency room, emotions ran high. Adell 

was extremely agitated and accused the Hispanics present 

of shooting his brother. Several witnesses claimed that 

Davalos, Rios, and others tried to calm down Adell, 

telling him that they had not been the shooters, and that 

they too had friends in the hospital who had been shot. 

They were not successful.

The conflict in the emergency waiting room escalated and 

the group was told by the hospital security guard to 

leave. The group moved to the parking lot. Witnesses 

testified that Adell was arguing with Jesse Rios. All 

witnesses said that the conflict was between a mixed group 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 4 of 53
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of Hispanics and a group of Black males. Davalos said he 

was standing with Rios when a Black male came up with a 

gun and started to shoot. Rios was shot in the eye and 

died as a result of his wounds. Davalos turned and ran but 

was shot as he did so. Davalos identified the Black male 

shooter as a big man, “kinda thick,” taller and 

considerably heavier than Davalos. Davalos picked Miller 

out of a photo lineup, saying that he was “50% sure” 

Miller was the shooter. Davalos testified at trial that 

Miller looked like the shooter.

Munguia testified that at the hospital a car full of 

Hispanics and a car full of Black males wanted to fight. 

He testified that he saw Miller shoot Rios and Davalos. He 

described Miller as being between 5 feet 10 inches and 6 

feet, and as being “kinda stocky.” Munguia said that 

Miller was wearing a gray sweatshirt. He said after the 

shooting, Miller ran to the white car—the same one that 

had been used to bring Debrae into the hospital. Munguia 

said he had seen Miller at the party and identified him at 

trial as the shooter.

Flores said she was standing next to Rios and that a tall 

Black man, built like a football player, was the shooter. 

She said the shooter was wearing a gray Arizona sweatshirt 

with gray and orange writing. She said that after the 

shooting the Black men ran to a white car and drove off.

Wilson testified that he was standing next to Adell when 

he saw a “spark” in his face from behind and realized it 

was a gunshot. He turned around and saw Miller running. 

Wilson also ran back to the car, as did Adell. The three 

left in the white car, leaving Tristan and Debrae at the 

hospital. Miller was driving. Shortly after, Miller and 

Wilson switched places because, according to Wilson, he 

was the only one with a driver's license. Miller, however, 

did have a driver's license, and it is undisputed that he 

drove to the party.

The group went back to Tristan's house. Wilson and Adell 

threw their shirts and hats into a neighbor's trash can. 

Wilson said that Miller was not with them at this point 

and he did not know what happened to the gray sweatshirt 

Miller had been wearing. Wilson thought the sweatshirt had 

something on the front of it.

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 5 of 53
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Miguel was not a cooperative witness at trial, expressing 

fear about testifying. He testified that Rios was trying 

to calm people down without success when he was shot. 

Miguel said he ran when Rios was shot but saw the shooter 

jump into a white car and drive away. He said the shooter 

was big and refused to identify anyone at trial. At the 

preliminary hearing, Miguel testified emphatically that 

Miller was the shooter and was wearing a gray sweatshirt 

with orange writing at the belly.

Hospital supervisor Alan Davis testified that he saw a 

young Hispanic man and a young Black man in a heated 

discussion outside the hospital emergency room. The Black 

man was claiming that someone had shot his brother. Davis 

then saw a Black man walk off and then veer into the 

crowd. Davis heard a pistol cocking and saw the Black man 

raise his arm and shoot. Davis said the shooter had on a 

two-tone shirt that was lighter on top and darker at the 

bottom. Davis said the shooter was approximately 5 feet 11 

inches or 6 feet tall, stocky, athletically built, and 

around 280 pounds. The shooter ran to a light-colored car.

The police arrived at Tristan's house the morning after 

the shooting, shortly after Debrae had been released from 

the hospital. Miller, Adell, Tristan, and Wilson were 

arrested. When interviewed by police, Miller admitted to 

shooting Rios and Davalos. He claimed that he picked up a 

gun that had been abandoned at the scene of the party. He 

said he got the ammunition for the gun from a friend. 

Miller told police that Adell was angry because his 

brother had been shot and was arguing with the Hispanics 

from the party present at the hospital. When the group 

moved to the parking lot, Miller said that Adell was 

arguing with two Hispanic males. Miller said he saw the 

Hispanic male go to his waistband, and wanted to “back up” 

his cousin so he shot him. He said he shot Davalos because 

he thought Davalos was armed as well. Miller also told 

police that, after leaving the hospital, he disposed of 

the gun but did not know where. The murder weapon was 

never recovered.

Miller also said he changed his clothes when he got back 

to Tristan's house. The police never found a gray 

sweatshirt with orange writing. They did find a gray 

sweatshirt that Tristan's girlfriend thought Miller had 

been wearing at the time. The shirts Wilson and Adell wore 

were recovered from the neighbor's trash can. All three 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 6 of 53
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

items tested positive for gunshot residue. The expert 

reported that the amount of gunshot residue on the two 

shirts worn by Wilson and Adell indicated exposure to 

residue from the discharge of a firearm. Both these shirts 

were visibly stained with blood. The small amount of 

gunshot residue found on the sweatshirt did not provide 

substantial evidence of exposure to a firearm being 

discharged. There was no obvious blood on the sweatshirt

and there was an old bullet hole in the shirt.

Several .40–caliber shell casings were found at the scene 

of the party shooting. These casings matched the casings 

found at the scene of the hospital shooting. Tristan said 

that he had .40–caliber ammunition in his house. Police 

recovered a .40–caliber bullet and a pistol grip in a 

search of Tristan's car. They also found a pistol with 

ammunition in the house at the time it was searched.

Defense

At trial, Miller denied shooting Rios and Davalos. He 

claimed he never admitted being the shooter during the 

police interview. Miller's interview was not taped because 

the tape recorder was inadvertently paused at the start of 

the interview. Miller testified he had stayed with the car 

when the group dropped off Debrae until he saw Adell in a 

conflict with a group of Hispanics. He then left the car 

and walked over to the group. He said he had not arrived 

at the group yet when he heard shooting and turned to run 

back to the car. When Adell and Wilson arrived, the three

drove off. Miller said he saw another car leave as well. 

Miller said no one in the group had a gun, and he had not 

seen the gun at Tristan's, the ammunition, or the pistol 

grip in the car.

The police interviews of Adell and Wilson were taped and 

both individuals claimed they had not seen Miller shoot 

Rios or Davalos. Adell said Miller was not the shooter; 

Wilson said he did not know who was the shooter. The 

defense claimed this was a case of mistaken identity and 

suggested that the shooter was a rival gang member. Two of 

the witnesses picked someone other than Miller as the 

shooter in the photographic line up. Denise Garcia picked 

someone who looked like the shooter but said she was not 

certain; the individual she selected was not Miller. The 

hospital security guard also picked someone other than 

Miller as the shooter. The guard did say that Miller was 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 7 of 53
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in the group outside the emergency room. The guard also 

testified that the shooter was a Black medium-sized man 

and described “medium size” as someone weighing about 200 

pounds. He then, using a hospital surveillance photograph, 

identified a Black male, later identified as Wilson, 

wearing a distinctive black and white shirt, as the person 

he believed was the shooter. The guard reiterated a number 

of times that he could not be sure who the shooter was and 

said he believed that Wilson was the shooter because he 

had made threatening comments earlier in the emergency 

room. When interviewed by police, the guard said the 

shooter was a tall Black male in dark clothing. Davis 

picked out Tristan as the shooter when asked to identify 

the shooter in the photo line up.

In support of the defense gang theory, several witnesses 

said that gang members were present at the party. Flores 

testified that the fight at the party started when Rios 

and another man began to fight with others and that she 

remembered seeing “blue,” the color of the Surreño gang. 

She said that Rios's friends claimed “red,” the color of 

the Norteños. She also said that Rios used to hang out 

with the Norteños, but now hung out mostly with Crips. 

Flores also said that Rios tried to tell Adell that it was 

the “enemy” who shot Debrae. Defense counsel represented 

that there was one witness, Jose Yanez, who could not be 

located to testify at trial but who said he saw a person 

wearing a blue rag over his face shoot Rios.

People v. Martin Daree Miller, 2009 WL 5067612, at *1-*4.

III. Standard of Decision and Scope of Review 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

 judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 8 of 53
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of 

the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000).

A state court’s decision contravenes clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite 

to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or 

concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of 

facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. A state court 

unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it either 1) 

correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new 

set of facts in an objectively unreasonable manner, or 2) extends or 

fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new 

context in an objectively unreasonable manner. Hernandez v. Small, 

282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); see, Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 

An application of clearly established federal law is unreasonable 

only if it is objectively unreasonable; an incorrect or inaccurate 

application is not necessarily unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 

410. A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief as long as fairminded jurists could 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 9 of 53
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Even 

a strong case for relief does not render the state court’s 

conclusions unreasonable. Id. To obtain federal habeas relief, a 

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on a claim 

was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. 

The standards set by § 2254(d) are “highly deferential 

standard[s] for evaluating state-court rulings” which require that 

state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt, and the 

Petitioner bear the burden of proof. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 

S.Ct. at 1398. Habeas relief is not appropriate unless each ground 

supporting the state court decision is examined and found to be 

unreasonable under the AEDPA. Wetzel v. Lambert, -–U.S.--, 132 

S.Ct. 1195, 1199 (2012).

In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court’s 

legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

federal law, “review... is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court 

has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400. 

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas proceeding 

brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 10 of 53
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court 

shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of 

producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of 

correctness. A state court decision on the merits based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state proceedings. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 340 (2003).

Pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), a habeas petition may be granted only 

if the state court’s conclusion was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

state court proceeding. For relief to be granted, a federal habeas 

court must find that the trial court’s factual determination was 

such that a reasonable fact finder could not have made the finding; 

that reasonable minds might disagree with the determination or have 

a basis to question the finding is not sufficient. Rice v. Collins, 

546 U.S. 333, 340-42 (2006). To conclude that a state court finding 

is unsupported by substantial evidence, a federal habeas court must 

be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards 

of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding 

is supported by the record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000

(9th Cir. 2004). To determine that a state court’s fact finding 

process is defective in some material way or non-existent, a federal 

habeas court must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 11 of 53
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defect is pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the 

state court’s fact finding process was adequate. Id. 

With respect to each claim raised by a petitioner, the last 

reasoned decision must be identified to analyze the state court 

decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Barker v. Fleming, 423 

F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 

1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003).

IV. Exclusion of Evidence Resulting from an Unlawful

Arrest and Entry 

To the extent Petitioner contends his statements should be 

suppressed as the fruit of a warrantless entry and arrest in 

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Petitioner argues 

that he exited a residence only because he was threatened with 

physical harm, and thus he exited while under arrest. (Trav., doc. 

30, 5.) He contends there was no exigency, and the officers had 

time to obtain a warrant. He further contends there was no consent

to the entry or search, but rather only an acquiescence to an 

assertion of authority. (Id. at 7-8.)

Respondent contends Petitioner received a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate his claim and thus is not entitled to relief 

in this proceeding. Where the state has provided the petitioner 

with an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 

Amendment claim, the petitioner may not be granted federal habeas 

corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an 

unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at trial. Stone 

v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). The limitation of Stone v. 

Powell applies to claims regarding Fourth Amendment objections to

the admissibility of statements that result from an unlawful 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 12 of 53
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

seizure. Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571, 572-73 (1983); Reed v. 

Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994).

In Stone, the Court did not set forth a test for determining 

whether a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair 

litigation of a claim. However, in a footnote the Court cited 

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), which held that a federal 

court must grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing if 1) 

the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state 

hearing; 2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported 

by the record as a whole; 3) the state court’s fact-finding 

procedure was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 4) 

there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; 5) 

the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court 

hearing; or 6) for any reason the state trier of fact did not afford 

the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. Stone v. Powell, 

428 U.S. at 494 n.36 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 313). 

Other factors include the extent to which the claims were briefed 

before, and considered by, the state trial and appellate courts. 

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176 1178-79 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Even though a petitioner may contend the state court's factual 

findings concerning a search are not supported by the evidence, a 

petitioner has been provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

his search claim where the validity of the search was raised in a 

pre-trial motion, the trial court held a hearing at which the 

petitioner was permitted to present evidence and examine witnesses, 

the trial court made a factual finding, and there was judicial 

review of the trial court=s decision. Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 

1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005).

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 13 of 53
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Here, Petitioner fully briefed and presented his claim with the 

assistance of counsel at trial where his claim was the subject of a 

hearing at which witnesses testified. (3 RT 33-98.) The trial 

court determined the claim on the merits, finding that the 

warrantless arrest was lawful due to exigent circumstances and 

consent. (2 CT 462-66.) Petitioner appealed the judgment through 

counsel. Although he did not raise the issue in the direct appeal, 

he had the opportunity to do so. (LD 1-LD 3.)1 Petitioner raised 

the issues in petitions for collateral relief before the trial 

court, CCA, and CSC. (LD 7-LD 12.) The circumstances of 

Petitioner’s opportunity to litigate his search claims are analogous 

to those of the petitioner in Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044.

After reviewing the pertinent record of the state court 

proceedings, the Court concludes that Petitioner was afforded a full 

and fair opportunity to litigate his claims concerning the Fourth 

Amendment. Therefore, he cannot receive habeas corpus relief in 

this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2

V. Contentions concerning Petitioner’s Statements

Petitioner alleges his right to due process under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments was violated when after he was arrested at a 

third party’s home, he was questioned without being informed of his 

 

1

“LD” refers to documents lodged by Resondent.

2

In the traverse, Petitioner alleges that the entry and arrest also violated his 

rights under the California constitution. (Trav., doc. 30, 4.) It is improper to 

raise substantively new issues or claims in a traverse, and a court may decline to 

consider such matters; in order to raise new issues, a petitioner must obtain 

leave to file an amended petition or additional statement of grounds. Cacoperdo 

v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. den., 514 U.S. 1026 

(1995). Here, amendment would be futile because Petitioner’s claim is based on 

California law and thus does not warrant relief in this proceeding. See Wilson v. 

Corcoran, 131 S.Ct. at 16; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Souch v. 

Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 14 of 53
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Miranda rights; he was taken to a station where he was questioned 

after requesting counsel; and he was then coerced into making 

prejudicial statements. (Pet., doc. 1, 4.) Petitioner argues his 

rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were 

violated when the trial court admitted testimony regarding 

statements of Petitioner, who suffered post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD), because the statements were coerced by unspecified 

psychological and physical means. (Id. at 5.) 

Respondent contends that the trial court properly found that 

Petitioner did not make a clear request for counsel and waived his 

right to counsel before making admissions. (Ans., doc. 19, 20-24.)

A. Background

The last reasoned decision on this issue was the decision of 

the trial court. When Petitioner raised the issue in a habeas 

petition to the TCSC, the court noted the issues regarding the 

admissibility of his statements were fully litigated at the 

preliminary hearing and the pretrial and trial stages of the 

proceedings, and the trial court’s rulings and viewpoint had been 

correct and without error. (LD 7, LD 8 at 3.) 

At a hearing on his pretrial motion, Petitioner testified he 

was taken to the police station, placed in a cold cell, and ignored 

when he asked deputies who walked past his cell for food and a 

blanket. (3 RT 123-26.) Officer Haney confirmed Petitioner had 

been in the jail more than six hours and it was after the noon hour; 

however, he believed Petitioner had been fed. (Id. at 101, 105, 

118-19.) Petitioner was a twenty-one-year-old student who played 

football at San Diego State. (Id. at 137.) 

///

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 15 of 53
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

When taken into an interview room with two detectives who were 

putting a new tape in a tape recorder, Petitioner testified that he 

was told there were cameras at the hospital, and they had him on 

video. Petitioner told the officer, “Oh hell no, I want a lawyer.” 

(3 RT 126.) The detectives asked if he had his own lawyer, and he 

said he did not, and asked, “Aren’t you guys supposed to get me 

one?” (Id. at 127.) A detective said they did not know anything 

about getting a lawyer and that lawyers just complicate things. 

(Id.) One detective said, “You don’t want to give a statement.” 

Petitioner testified that he responded, “I want to give a statement, 

but I only want to give a statement when my—-when I have an attorney 

present.” (Id. at 128.) Petitioner was read his Miranda rights, 

but when he stated he wanted a lawyer, he was taken back to his 

cell. (Id. at 129, 131.) 

Petitioner denied he told them that he wanted to talk with them 

without a lawyer present and understood that he would procure a 

lawyer in the future. Petitioner also denied telling the detectives 

he shot someone because he thought they were reaching for a gun. (3 

RT 129-32.)

At the hearing, Officer Darren Altermatt testified he and 

Officer Haney met with Petitioner in a booking interview room; when 

Haney left the room, Petitioner made a comment about having a public 

defender; when Haney returned, Altermatt told him that Petitioner 

had asked for an attorney, and the interview essentially stopped 

before it got started. (3 RT 141-43.) Altermatt believed that part 

of the Miranda warnings had been given before Petitioner asked about 

an attorney; however, Petitioner kept stating he wanted to talk to 

them but was not sure about an attorney; he was that he would have 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 16 of 53
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to wait for a couple of days for a court-appointed attorney, and 

then Petitioner continued to insist on wanting to talk to them. He 

eventually said, “I’ll talk without an attorney.” (Id. at 143-45.) 

Petitioner then made a statement indicating that he was responsible 

for the death of Jesse Rios. (Id. at 145.)

Officer Haney’s testimony at the hearing was essentially 

consistent with that of Officer Altermatt. Petitioner had been 

arrested around 5:45 a.m. and was approached by Haney before 3:00 

p.m. after Petitioner had been housed in a single cell at the police 

department. (3 RT 100-02.) When the detectives began to walk 

Petitioner back to his cell, Petitioner was told they were done, but 

Petitioner said no, he wanted to give a statement but wanted to know 

if the attorney could sit with him. Haney informed Petitioner he 

did not know how to arrange that, but if Petitioner did not have his 

own attorney, he would be assigned one at arraignment and could call 

for an appointment to give a statement with his attorney. (Id. at 

108, 110-11.) When Petitioner was informed of his Miranda rights, 

including his right to have an attorney present before any questions 

and to have such an attorney appointed free of charge, Haney said, 

“[s]o I need a voluntary either you’re gonna talk to us or you don’t 

want to talk to us and you’re going to wait for a lawyer.” Haney 

testified Petitioner stated he wanted to speak with them, and would 

go ahead and speak with them. (Id. at 116-117.) In the context of 

communicating to Petitioner that he did not have to give a 

statement, Haney told Petitioner he would be arraigned in two days 

and after being assigned an attorney, Petitioner could give a 

statement at that time. Petitioner responded, “[N]o, no, I want to 

give a statement. I don’t want to wait.” (Id. at 117-21.) Haney 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 17 of 53
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testified he tried to end it several times and even told Petitioner 

just to wait for his attorney, but Petitioner kept wanting to give a 

statement. (Id. at 118.) 

Haney testified the officers were unaware until after the 

statement was completed that the tape recorder did not record the 

interview. After about half an hour, they asked Petitioner to 

undergo a second interview that would be recorded; however, 

Petitioner started yelling “that he didn’t do that shit,” and he 

said he wanted to get a lawyer, which resulted in his being returned 

to his cell. (3 RT 120-22.)

The trial court’s decision was as follows:

Well, the law is clear that the burden is with the People 

by a preponderance of the evidence. That’s the low 

standard in our system of justice. There are credibility 

issues here because there’s a difference in testimony 

about what factually occurred between what the defendant 

has testified and what the officers have testified.

The law is also clear that if a demand is made for counsel 

before questioning, that ends the conversation. And I 

think Mr. Alavezos, you’re correct in characterizing what 

occurred not as a demand for counsel, but an inquiry with 

respect to counsel. The officer’s statement that “I 

wouldn’t know how to go about doing that,” referred to 

obtain a lawyer for you now so a lawyer can be here while 

we question you.

The defendant clearly had the option to be represented by 

counsel which would be a delay or you can waive that right

and subject yourself to an interview.

If he asserts his right to counsel, the further 

communication with regards to a statement has to be made 

by the defendant. But we didn’t really get to that point 

even though I think clearly the further request was made 

by the defendant here.

But the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 

that there was not a definitive request for counsel. There 

was an appropriate Miranda warning and that he waived his 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 18 of 53
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Miranda rights and gave a statement. So the defendant’s 

motion is denied.

(3 RT 162-163.) 

B. Analysis

To implement the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination made binding upon the states by the Fourteenth 

Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that statements made in the 

course of custodial interrogation are not admissible in the 

prosecution’s case-in-chief in a criminal case unless the defendant 

is advised that 1) he has the right to remain silent, 2) anything he 

says can be used against him in court, 3) he has a right to counsel 

before questioning and to counsel’s presence during interrogation, 

4) if he is indigent, counsel will be appointed for him before 

interrogation, and 5) the government demonstrates that the defendant 

voluntarily and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436, 468-75 (1966); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 

(1971). 

The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant validly waived his 

Miranda rights. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). A 

waiver must be 1) voluntary, or the product of a free and deliberate 

choice and not the result of intimidation, coercion, or deception, 

and 2) knowing, or “‘made with a full awareness of both the nature 

of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 19 of 53
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

abandon it.’” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010)

(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). A waiver of 

Miranda rights may be express and formal, or implied through all the 

circumstances, including the words and conduct of the person 

interrogated. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 383 (citing North 

Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). Specifically, a 

waiver may be implied through “the defendant’s silence, coupled with 

an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating

waiver.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 (quoting North Carolina v. 

Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). “Where the prosecution shows that a 

Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, 

an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of 

the right to remain silent.” Id.

An invocation of the right to counsel must be unequivocal and 

unambiguous; however, once the right is clearly invoked, there can 

be no further questioning until either a lawyer is made available or 

the suspect himself re-initiates the conversation. Smith v. 

Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92-96, 98 (1984). The test is whether the 

statement is sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer in 

the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for 

counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). The law 

requires an objective inquiry into whether there has been a 

statement that can reasonably be construed as a request for the 

assistance of counsel that is also unambiguous and unequivocal. Id.

at 458-59.

///

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 20 of 53
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner’s testimony and his reaction when the officers 

suggested a second interview demonstrate that Petitioner invoked his 

right to counsel and did not waive it. However, it was the province 

of the trial court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses’ 

conflicting testimony on the issue of advice as to Miranda rights 

and waiver of those rights. The officers’ testimony supported a 

conclusion that initially, Petitioner made a statement about 

counsel, and the officers adjourned the interview. However, before 

transport back to his cell, Petitioner indicated a desire to give a 

statement with counsel and questioned the officers regarding the way 

appointment of counsel would occur. Petitioner was informed of his 

right to counsel, that appointment of counsel would occur at 

arraignment, and that arraignment would occur in a couple of days. 

The discussion concerning the process of appointment of counsel 

prompted Petitioner to express a desire to make a statement, which 

resulted in the officer’s effort to clarify whether Petitioner 

wanted to speak with the officers or did not wish to speak and 

wanted to wait for a lawyer. These circumstances support a 

conclusion that Petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel; 

however, he re-initiated conversation with the officers about giving 

a statement and about the appointment of counsel. Further, once he 

was fully informed of his rights and received some information on 

the process of appointment of counsel, Petitioner voluntarily chose 

to waive the presence of counsel and made the statement.

Under the circumstances, the trial court’s decision was 

consistent with the standards of Smith and Davis. 

C. Coercion

Respondent does not address Petitioner’s claim that his 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 21 of 53
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

admission or confession should be excluded as involuntary. A valid 

waiver of Miranda rights generally results in a finding of 

voluntariness of a confession following the waiver. DeWeaver v. 

Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 

183 (2009) (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004) 

and Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)). In 

determining whether a statement or confession was involuntary and 

obtained in violation of due process protected by the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments, a court examines whether a defendant's will 

was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of the 

statement or confession. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 

434 (2000). A court considers the totality of all the surrounding

circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused and the 

details of the interrogation. Id.

Here, if Petitioner’s claim that his admission was involuntary 

was preserved for this Court’s review, the Court concludes 

Petitioner has not shown he is entitled to relief in this 

proceeding. The interrogation was brief, Petitioner was advised of 

his rights and acknowledged he understood them, the government did 

not engage in coercive or improper conduct, and Petitioner was a 

mature individual who, after being informed of his rights, chose to 

speak without counsel despite having been informed he could remain 

silent and/or have a free attorney before or during questioning. 

Even if the issue is viewed de novo, Petitioner’s statement was 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 22 of 53
23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

voluntary in light of the absence of coercive police activity. 

Further, a finding that Petitioner’s statement was “voluntary” 

within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment is consistent with the standards set forth above; it is

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 

167 (1986). Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s 

Miranda claim and his claim that his confession was involuntary be 

denied.

Petitioner mounts no argument and cites no authority to support 

his generalized assertion of an Eighth Amendment violation in 

connection with the admission of his statements. Accordingly, it 

will be recommended that any Eighth Amendment claim concerning the 

statements be denied. 

VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Petitioner alleges he suffered a violation of his due process 

rights based on the insufficiency of the evidence to support his 

convictions and enhancements. He challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence as follows: 1) there was no physical evidence that 

Petitioner possessed, used, or fired a firearm; 2) a test of 

Petitioner for gunshot residue (GSR) was negative; 3) there was no 

unequivocal identification of Petitioner by witnesses, and other 

identifications were tainted by newspaper photographs of Petitioner; 

4) no murder weapon was recovered; and 5) the evidence included 

testimony as to an alleged confession, a recording of which had been 

accidentally paused or erased. (Pet., doc. 1, 4.)

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 23 of 53
24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondent contends the TCSC rejected the claim on state habeas 

corpus and found no basis for Petitioner’s failure to have raised 

his issues on appeal (LD 7, LD 8), and that decision was left 

undisturbed by the other state courts who considered the claim on 

habeas corpus. (Ans., doc. 19, 24-25.) However, Respondent 

proceeds to address the claim on the merits. (Id.) 

A. Legal Standards

To determine whether a conviction violates the constitutional 

guarantee of due process of law because of insufficient evidence, a 

federal court ruling on a petition for writ of habeas corpus must 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 20-21 (1979); Windham v. Merkle, 163 

F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 

(9th Cir. 1997). 

All evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones, 114 F.3d at 1008. 

It is the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve conflicting 

testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the 

facts; it must be assumed that the trier resolved all conflicts in a 

manner that supports the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 

319; Jones, 114 F.3d at 1008. The relevant inquiry is not whether 

the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but rather 

whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. United 

States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991). Circumstantial 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 24 of 53
25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom can be sufficient 

to prove any fact and to sustain a conviction, although mere 

suspicion or speculation does not rise to the level of sufficient 

evidence. United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 

1994); United States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508, 514 (9th Cir. 1990); 

see Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d at 563. The court must base its 

determination of the sufficiency of the evidence from a review of 

the record. Jackson at 324. 

The Jackson standard must be applied with reference to the 

substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state 

law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Windham, 163 F.3d at 1101. 

However, the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause 

requires to prove an offense is purely a matter of federal law. 

Coleman v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per 

curiam). 

Under the AEDPA, federal courts must also apply the standards 

of Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Coleman v. 

Johnson, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012); Juan H. v. Allen, 

408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). This Court thus asks whether 

the state court decision being reviewed reflected an objectively 

unreasonable application of the Jackson standard to the facts of the 

case. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2062; Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

F.3d at 1275. The state court’s determination on a question of 

sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to considerable deference 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2065.

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 25 of 53
26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Analysis

Here, even if the claim is reviewed de novo, the evidence is 

sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the challenged 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including 

that Petitioner personally used a firearm and shot both Jesse Rios 

and Dario Davalos. 

Sandro Munguia testified regarding the development of the 

conflict, the argument, and having observed Petitioner shoot Jesse 

Rios and Davalos from a distance of a few feet with a gun that 

Petitioner had by his side and had cocked behind his back. (4 RT 

315-33.) Miguel Rios testified he was about fourteen to sixteen 

feet from his brother Jesse, who was trying to calm everyone down,

when Jesse was shot; Miguel did not know who the shooter was, but he

agreed that he testified at the preliminary hearing it was 

Petitioner. (5 RT 470-478, 493, 522.) Miguel agreed he had 

testified at the preliminary hearing that Petitioner walked up with 

a gun and said, “‘Back off my cousin.’” (Id. at 493.) Petitioner 

walked towards them, cocked his gun, pushed Jesse, and told him to

leave or he would be shot. (Id. at 493.) When Jesse stepped 

towards Petitioner, Petitioner put the gun to Jesse’s head and shot 

him. (Id.) Dario Davalos testified that when he tried to calm down

Jesse Rios and a Black male with whom Jesse was arguing, another 

male approached with a gun and began shooting. (4 RT 249, 259-61.) 

Finally, Tulare Police Officer Todd Davis testified that Davalos had 

identified Petitioner in a photographic line-up. (6 RT 712-15.) 

Davis and Haney testified that when interviewed, Petitioner said 

that in response to a movement to his waistband made by one of the 

Hispanic males in the parking lot, Petitioner took out his gun to 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 26 of 53
27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

protect Adell and shot one of them, who fell to the ground. 

Petitioner then shot in the direction of the second Hispanic male 

because he thought the latter might also have had a gun. Petitioner 

admitted firing the gun four or five times. (Id. at 715-722, 790-

91.) 

In summary, multiple sources of evidence with solid value

permitted a rational trier of fact to conclude that Petitioner used 

a firearm to shoot at Rios and Davalos and thereby committed the 

offenses against Rios and Davalos. It must be assumed that the 

trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in favor of the 

judgment. The fact that some contradictory evidence was before the 

trier does not upset the judgment where the evidence is sufficient 

for a rational trier to conclude that Petitioner used a gun to shoot

at the two victims. Accordingly, it will be recommended that 

Petitioner’s claim or claims regarding the sufficiency of the 

evidence be denied.

VII. Exclusion of a Gang Expert’s Testimony

Petitioner alleges the trial court violated his rights under 

the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, abused its discretion, 

and denied Petitioner’s right to present a defense when it excluded 

unspecified testimony of unspecified defense gang experts. (Pet., 

doc. 1, 5.) Petitioner alleges the trial court failed to permit a 

police gang expert to testify on a possible retaliatory motive that 

would have supported Petitioner’s defense of mistaken 

identification. (Trav., doc. 30, 2.)

To the extent Petitioner’s claim addresses an abuse of 

discretion under state evidentiary law, Petitioner is not entitled 

to relief because the claim presents only a state law issue. 28 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 27 of 53
28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S.C. ' 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S.Ct. at 16; Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d at 623. 

A. Background

The last reasoned decision was the decision of the CCA, which 

the CSC left undisturbed when it summarily denied review. (LD 6.)

The CCA’s decision on Petitioner’s claim is as follows:

I. Exclusion of gang evidence

Miller claims the trial court abused its discretion and 

denied him a defense when it precluded him from 

introducing evidence that gang culture requires that gangs 

retaliate after being targeted by rival gang activity. The 

trial court excluded the gang expert testimony, ruling 

that, although there was some evidence that gang members 

were present at the earlier party, there was no evidence 

that the shootings at the party or later at the hospital 

were gang motivated. After explaining that it understood 

the defense claim that the shootings at the party, if gang 

motivated, would have provided someone with the motive to 

retaliate, the trial court noted:

“Here, we don't have that. We have, really, a 

claim by the defense that [the shooting] was 

gang related and someone out there in one gang 

or another, we don't even know which gang, had 

the motivation [to commit the offense] because 

this expert's going to testify retaliation is 

important to the gang member, and we have 

nothing else to indicate that. [¶] The Court's 

not going to allow it. The gang is not probative 

in this case. If it has any probative value at 

all, which I highly question, the time 

consumption and the ability to really divert the 

jury and mislead them is great....”

On appeal, we review a trial court's decision to admit or 

exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. 

Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717–718.)

The defense is entitled to present evidence of third-party 

culpability in order to exonerate a defendant if the 

evidence is capable of raising a reasonable doubt about

the defendant's own guilt. (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 28 of 53
29

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cal.4th 155, 176.) The evidence Miller sought to present 

falls within this category because it was intended to show 

that someone other than Miller had a motive for shooting 

the victims. The rule governing third-party culpability 

evidence does not, however, “ ‘require that any evidence, 

however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's 

possible culpability.... [E]vidence of mere motive or 

opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without 

more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a 

defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial 

evidence linking the third person to the actual 

perpetration of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 176.)

We conclude that Miller's showing related to third-party 

culpability is insufficient. There was evidence that there 

were gang members present at the party where the initial 

shootings occurred. There was also evidence that Rios had 

some gang affiliation. There was no evidence, however, 

other than pure speculation, that the party shooting was 

gang motivated or that the hospital shooting was a 

retaliatory act. The defense merely raised the possibility 

that others had a motive to shoot the victims at the 

hospital but provided no direct or circumstantial evidence 

linking gang activity to the shootings. Although defense 

counsel represented that there was a witness named Yanez 

who had reported seeing someone with a blue rag in the 

parking lot commit the offense, Yanez was not produced at 

trial. No one at trial suggested that anyone other than a 

large Black male, present at the hospital and standing in 

or near the crowd, was the shooter. No other witness 

mentioned a blue rag.

This case is similar to People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 

Cal.3d 983, 1017–1018, where the defense sought to 

introduce evidence concerning the victim's association 

with motorcycle gangs and drug dealers in order to prove 

that someone other than the defendant committed the 

murder. In Edelbacher, our Supreme Court held that such 

evidence was inadmissible where no possible suspect other 

than the defendant was identified, where there was no link 

of any third person to the crime, and where only a 

potential motive was alleged. (Ibid.) This is the 

situation we have before us. All the evidence establishes 

that the conflict at the hospital was between the group 

with Rios and the group with Miller. There is no evidence 

that Miller or his relatives were gang members or that the 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 29 of 53
30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dispute between the two groups was gang related. No 

evidence links the offenses to a rival gang member.

Given this record, we conclude that the gang expert 

testimony proffered here was too speculative and 

tangential to be admissible under the third-party 

culpability evidence rule. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 334, 373 [trial court properly excluded thirdparty culpability evidence as “too speculative to be 

relevant”].) The probative value of the evidence, if any, 

did not outweigh its prejudicial effect and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. 

(Ibid.; see also People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 

682 [evidence irrelevant if it produces only speculative 

inferences].)

Even if we were to conclude it was error to exclude the 

evidence, there is no prejudice. The jury heard the gang 

evidence, which the defense claimed supported the 

inference that the shooting at the hospital was done in 

retaliation for the shooting at the party. The jury heard 

that there were members of rival gangs present and that 

the victim had changed gang allegiances. It heard that, 

when the initial fight at the party erupted, one witness 

remembered there being both Surreños and Norteños present. 

We may take judicial notice that citizens of Tulare County 

and other valley communities know that relationships 

between rival gangs often erupt in violence as gang 

members seek to protect their turf and retaliate against 

one another to even the score. (Evid.Code, § 451, subd. 

(f); see Medina v. Hillshore Partners (1995) 40 

Cal.App.4th 477, 481 [court takes judicial notice as 

matter of common knowledge that street gangs protect home 

territory and gang activity spawns violence].) Had the 

jury wanted to draw the inference the defense claims it 

should have been allowed to develop, it could have done so 

without the help of an expert.

We are also not convinced that the jury's questions during 

deliberation regarding (1) Miller's admission to police 

and (2) its request for a read-back of several witnesses' 

testimony suggest the jury was having trouble reaching a 

verdict. We agree with respondent that the request for 

read-backs and the questions asked by the jury reflect a 

consciousness of the jury's responsibility and its 

diligence in carrying it out. (People v. Houston (2005) 

130 Cal.App.4th 279, 301.)

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 30 of 53
31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Further, although there was some evidence that would have 

supported a reasonable conclusion that someone other than 

Miller was the shooter, there is no evidence to support a 

reasonable conclusion that the shooter was someone other 

than one of Miller's group. All of the witnesses to the 

event who testified at trial, without exception, said the 

shooter was in or near the crowd of people in the parking 

lot surrounding Rios and Adell. All of them identified the 

shooter as a Black man. All of them said the shooting 

stemmed from a confrontation between Rios and a Black man. 

Although there was some disparity among the eyewitnesses' 

descriptions of the shooter, none of them identified the 

shooter as a gang member and all of them said the shooter 

was in close proximity to the argument.

In addition to the eyewitness testimony, there was 

additional independent evidence that Miller was the 

shooter, including evidence that Miller confessed to 

shooting Rios when interviewed by the two detectives; 

Miller's behavior after the shooting; the behavior of his 

relatives after the shooting; and the ammunition and 

pistol grip found in the car. Given the overwhelming 

evidence of guilt, we conclude that, excluding the gang 

expert testimony, even if error, would have caused Miller 

no harm.

For these same reasons, we also reject Miller's contention 

that the exclusion of the evidence violated his state and 

federal constitutional rights to present a defense. The 

absence of the expert testimony was not prejudicial under 

any standard of review.

People v. Martin Daree Miller, 2009 WL 5067612, at *4-*6.

B. Legal Standards

Although state and federal authorities have broad latitude to 

establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials, the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory 

Process and Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment guarantee a 

criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 

defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). A defendant 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 31 of 53
32

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

has a right to present a defense by compelling the attendance and 

presenting the testimony of witnesses. Washington v. Texas, 388 

U.S. 14, 18-19, 23 (1967). However, a defendant does not have an 

absolute right to present evidence without reference to its 

significance or source; the right to present a complete defense is 

implicated when the evidence the defendant seeks to admit is 

relevant, material, and vital to the defense. Id. at 16. Further, 

the exclusion of the evidence must be arbitrary or disproportionate 

to the purposes the exclusionary rule is designed to serve. Holmes 

v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324-25 (2006). If the mechanical 

application of a rule that is respected, frequently applied, and 

otherwise constitutional would defeat the ends of justice, the rule 

must yield to those ends. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 

302 (1973).

C. Analysis

The CCA properly determined there was no violation of the right 

to present a defense because exclusion of the evidence was not 

prejudicial. People v. Miller, 2009 WL 5067612 at *4-*6. There was 

an absence of evidence that the party shooting was gang- motivated, 

the hospital shooting was a retaliatory act, Petitioner or his 

relatives were gang members, the dispute between the two groups was 

gang-related, there was a link between the offenses and any rival 

gang member or any specific third person, or that there was a 

specific suspect possible other than the defendant. There was no 

concrete gang motivation scenario. The state court correctly noted 

that the evidence established that the conflict at the hospital was 

between the group with Rios and the group with Petitioner. Under 

the circumstances, the proffered evidence had very slight probative 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 32 of 53
33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

value and was not material to the issues. A fairminded jurist could 

therefore conclude that no weighty interest of Petitioner was 

infringed.

Further, excluding the evidence advanced goals related to the 

administration of justice. A fairminded jurist could conclude that 

the exclusion of the evidence avoided repetition and eliminated only 

marginally relevant evidence to avoid confusion of the issues and 

misleading the jury. As the state court observed, the jury had

already received evidence that warranted commonsense inferences 

without the aid of the expert. It was reasonable for the state 

court to conclude that the exclusion of the testimony was not 

arbitrary or disproportionate.

Even if there was error in excluding the evidence, an error is 

harmless unless it had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993). The jury heard evidence concerning the 

presence of rival gangs, Nortenos and Surenos, at the party and the 

victim’s having changed gang allegiances; the trier was already 

aware of generalized gang evidence. Because the proffered evidence

lacked probative value and in view of the strong evidence of 

Petitioner’s guilt, a fairminded jurist could conclude there was no 

prejudice.

There is also merit to Respondent’s contention that there is no 

clearly established federal law governing the state court’s 

admission of expert testimony. Respondent relies on Moses v. Payne, 

555 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2009), which upheld the exclusion of the 

defendant’s expert witness’s testimony regarding the victim’s 

depression. The state court rule in Moses v. Payne admitted expert 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 33 of 53
34

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony if it would assist the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or a fact in issue, such as when the testimony concerned 

matters beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson and was 

not misleading. Id. at 756. 

The court in Moses considered whether clearly established 

federal law governed the state court’s decision excluding the 

evidence as cumulative and not sufficiently probative to outweigh 

likely prejudice and confusion. The court noted that the Supreme 

Court’s decisions did not either squarely address whether a court’s 

exercise of discretion to exclude expert testimony violates a 

criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present relevant 

evidence, or clearly establish a controlling legal standard for 

evaluating discretionary decisions to exclude the type of evidence 

at issue. Id. at 758-79. The court concluded the state court’s 

decision upholding the trial court’s discretionary exclusion of the 

expert testimony could not have been, and thus was not, contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent. Id. at 759.

Based on Moses v. Payne, the state court’s decision upholding 

the trial court’s discretionary exclusion of expert testimony 

concerning generalized retaliation in gangs was not contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

It will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim concerning the 

exclusion of the gang expert’s testimony be denied.

VIII. Instructional Deficiency

Petitioner alleges his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the trial court’s failure 

properly to instruct the jury with CALCRIM no. 361. (Pet., doc. 1, 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 34 of 53
35

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5.) Petitioner challenges the trial court’s actual reading of the 

instruction, which omitted major portions. Petitioner equates the 

omission with a failure to instruct the jury on an element of the 

offense. (Trav., doc. 30, 12-13.) 

A. Background

The last reasoned decision on this issue was the decision of 

the CCA, which was left undisturbed by the CCA’s denial of review. 

(LD 6.) The CCA’s decision is as follows:

Next Miller contends that the trial court erred when it 

failed to include in its instructions to the jury Judicial 

Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) 

No. 361. The instruction directs the jury how to evaluate 

a defendant's testimony when a defendant fails to explain 

or deny evidence against him. Miller claims the 

instruction was “key to the jury's assessment of 

appellant's credibility” and the omission was prejudicial. 

We disagree.

It is undisputed that CALCRIM No. 361 was included in the 

instruction packet and the trial court intended to give 

it. The record reveals, however, that although the trial 

court started reading CALCRIM No. 361 (it read the phrase 

“[I]f the defendant failed in his testimony”), it 

inadvertently picked up the text of the next instruction 

without completing CALCRIM No. 361. A copy of CALCRIM No. 

361 was provided, however, in the instructional packet 

given to the jury for use during deliberations. In 

addition, the court told the jury that it would receive a 

copy of the written instructions for use in the jury room.

We conclude any error in failing to read the instruction 

was harmless under either the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 

or the reasonably probable standard of People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Cf. People v. Murillo (1996) 

47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1108 [failure to instruct on elements 

of offense is error of clear constitutional import, but 

failure to instruct jury on one of tests used in 

evaluating credibility of witness is evaluated under 

Watson].)

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 35 of 53
36

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The jury here was given written instructions, which 

included the complete CALCRIM No. 361 instruction. (People 

v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 255.) The written 

instructions govern in any conflict between the oral and 

written instructions. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 

622, 717.) We may presume that the jury was guided by the

written instructions. (People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 

97, 111, fn. 2; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 

542.) We recognize that in People v. Murillo, supra, 47 

Cal.App.4th at pages 1107–1108, another appellate court 

refused to presume the jury read the written instructions 

in the absence of evidence that it had done so. Murillo, 

however, does not cite to either McLain or Davis, nor does 

it address the presumption announced and applied in both 

these state Supreme Court cases. In Murillo, the court 

made no reference to the missing instruction in the oral 

reading and therefore there was nothing to alert the jury 

that there was conflict between the oral and written 

instructions that needed resolving. Here, the trial court 

began to give CALCRIM No. 361 and then abruptly went on to 

another instruction. This would alert the jury that 

reference to the written instructions was needed.

In addition, when considering an allegation of 

instructional error, we look to the instructions as a 

whole. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 831; 

People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1013.) In this 

case, the jury was told how to evaluate the testimony of 

any witness testifying (CALCRIM No. 226), and was told 

that neither side is required to call all witnesses or to 

produce all evidence relevant to the case (CALCRIM No. 

300). The jury was told repeatedly that the prosecution 

bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Miller had committed the offense.

The jury was also told, with specific reference to Miller, 

that any evidence it heard from Miller or statements 

attributed to Miller had to be evaluated in light of all 

other evidence, and that it was up to the jury to decide 

the importance of this evidence. This instruction was in 

reference to prior statements by Miller, any false 

statements by Miller, any evidence that Miller tried to 

hide evidence, and any evidence that Miller left the scene 

of the crime. (CALCRIM Nos. 358, 362, 371, 372.) As to 

each of these, the jury was instructed that it was to 

determine whether this evidence was significant. In most 

instances, the jury was further instructed that the 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 36 of 53
37

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence that Miller had made a false statement or tried 

to hide evidence was not sufficient by itself to prove 

guilt. In light of these instructions, we conclude the 

jury understood it was to rely only on evidence actually 

before it and that it was not to place significance on any 

failure by Miller to explain evidence adverse to him when 

testifying. It also was clear to the jury that the 

prosecution retained the burden of proof no matter what 

evidence was or was not produced by Miller. (See People v. 

Murillo, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [when viewed as 

whole, court concludes jury was adequately instructed on 

relevant legal principles, despite absence of required 

instruction].)

People v. Miller, 2009 WL 5067612 at *7-*8.

Respondent argues that the CCA’s reasoned decision on the issue 

was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law and 

did not involve an unreasonable finding of fact based on the 

evidence before the state courts; the state court concluded that the 

written form of the instruction was given to the jury, and that in 

light of the totality of the instructions, the jury understood the 

burdens of proof and the absence of any obligation of Petitioner to 

explain evidence in his testimony. (Ans., doc. 19, 28-30.)

B. Legal Standards

The only basis for federal collateral relief for instructional 

error is that the infirm instruction or the lack of instruction by 

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72 (1991); 

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (it must be established not 

merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even 

“universally condemned,” but that it violated some right guaranteed 

to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment). The instruction may 

not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 37 of 53
38

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, it must be determined 

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the 

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73 (reaffirming the standard as stated in 

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). The Court in 

Estelle emphasized that the Court had narrowly defined the category 

of infractions that violate fundamental fairness, and that beyond 

the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due 

Process Clause has limited operation. Id. at 72-73.

Moreover, even if there is instructional error, a petitioner is 

generally not entitled to habeas relief for the error unless it is 

prejudicial. The harmless error analysis applies to instructional 

errors as long as the error at issue does not categorically vitiate 

all the jury's findings. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008) 

(citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999) (quoting 

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) concerning erroneous 

reasonable doubt instructions as constituting structural error)).

In Hedgpeth v. Pulido, the Court cited its previous decisions 

that various forms of instructional error were trial errors subject 

to harmless error analysis, including errors of omitting or 

misstating an element of the offense or erroneously shifting the 

burden of proof as to an element. Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. 60-61. To 

determine whether a petitioner proceeding pursuant to § 2254 

suffered prejudice from such an instructional error, a federal court 

must determine whether the petitioner suffered actual prejudice by 

assessing whether, in light of the record as a whole, the error had 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 38 of 53
39

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict. Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 62; Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 638 (1993).

C. Analysis

Petitioner contends the jury was not orally instructed with 

CALCRIM 361, which provided:

If the defendant failed in his testimony to explain

or deny evidence against him, and if he could 

reasonably be expected to have done so based on 

what he knew, you may consider his failure to explain

or deny in evaluating that evidence. Any such failure

is not enough by itself to prove guilt. The People

must still prove each element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.

If the defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up 

to you to decide the meaning and importance of that 

failure.

(2 CT 574.) The record confirms that the written instruction was 

given to the jury. (9 RT 1248-49, 1291.) The jury was also orally 

instructed that the jury must judge the credibility or believability 

of the witnesses and neither side was required to call all witnesses 

or put on all relevant evidence. The jury was also instructed on 

the need to consider various factors in considering and evaluating 

the defendant’s statements, the need to view statements with caution 

unless recorded or written, the corpus deliciti rule and the need 

for independent evidence, and the fact that guilt may not be proved 

by a defendant’s false statement, hiding evidence, or flight alone. 

(2 CT 535-6, 547-48, 550, 557, 560-65.) The jury was also given 

detailed instructions on the burden of proof. (Id. at 533, 542, 

546.) The state court noted the totality of the instructions, 

reasonably concluded that the jury would refer to the written 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 39 of 53
40

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

instructions, and reasonably concluded that the jury understood that 

affirmative proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required for 

conviction and that any failure of Petitioner was to be evaluated in 

light of that burden.

On the record before this Court, it does not appear that the 

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict. The Court concludes that there was 

no fundamental unfairness created by the omission of the full oral 

version of the instruction. Accordingly, it will be recommended 

that Petitioner’s claim concerning the incomplete jury instruction 

be denied. 

IX. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner alleges his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 

it also violated the trial court’s discretion. (Pet., doc. 1, 5.) 

In the traverse, Petitioner contends that the sentence is in effect 

a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. (Trav., doc. 

30, 3.)

A. The State Court Decision

The reasoned decision of the CCA, which was left undisturbed by 

the CSC (LD 6), is as follows:

III. Cruel and unusual punishment

Miller next contends that his sentence of 82 years to 

life equates to life without possibility of parole. Since 

he is a young man with no prior criminal record, Miller 

claims this sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of both the state and federal 

Constitutions.

“Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 

I, section 17 of the California Constitution. Punishment 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 40 of 53
41

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

is cruel and unusual if it is so disproportionate to the 

crime committed that it shocks the conscience and offends 

fundamental notions of human dignity.” (People v. 

Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fns. omitted.)

The Legislature has deemed it appropriate to impose harsh 

punishment for those who take a life and do so by 

personally discharging a firearm. Miller acknowledges 

that all components of his sentence are mandated by 

statute and that imposition of a section 12022.53 firearm 

enhancement has been uniformly upheld in California. (See 

People v. Felix (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 994, 999–1002.) “ 

‘Defining crime and determining punishment are matters 

uniquely legislative in nature, resting within the 

Legislature's sole discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Lewis (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 243, 251.) “Our Supreme Court 

has emphasized ‘the considerable burden a defendant must 

overcome in challenging a penalty as cruel or unusual. 

The doctrine of separation of powers is firmly entrenched 

in the law of California, and a court should not lightly 

encroach on matters which are uniquely in the domain of 

the Legislature. Perhaps foremost among these are the 

definition of crime and the determination of punishment. 

While these intrinsically legislative functions are 

circumscribed by the constitutional limits of article I, 

section 17 [of the California Constitution], the validity 

of enactments will not be questioned “unless their 

unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably 

appears.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Kinsey (1995) 40 

Cal.App.4th 1621, 1630.)

A sentence that is the functional equivalent of life 

without possibility of parole is not, as a matter of law, 

unconstitutionally disproportionate. (People v. Ayon

(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 385, 399 [term of 240 years], 

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Deloza (1998) 

18 Cal.4th 585, 600, fn. 10.) As a result, we must 

determine if such a sentence is cruel or unusual based on 

Miller's current offenses and criminal history, applying 

the familiar test of disproportionality adopted under 

both the federal and state Constitutions. (People v. 

Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1136 [court has 

authority to intervene and find sentence unconstitutional 

where there is proper showing, even when sentence 

authorized by statute]; Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 

277, 289–290.) We review independently the question of 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 41 of 53
42

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

whether Miller's sentence is cruel and unusual. (People 

v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615.)

Miller focuses his challenge on the nature-of-the-offense 

and the nature-of-offender analyses identified in In re 

Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425. The factors identified in 

Lynch are: (1) the nature of the offense and/or the 

offender; (2) the nature of the punishment compared to 

other punishments imposed by the same jurisdiction for 

more serious offenses; and (3) the nature of the 

punishment compared to other punishments imposed by other 

jurisdictions for the same offense. (Id. at pp. 425–427.) 

Regarding the offense, the court must evaluate the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the offense, 

including its motive, the way it was committed, the 

defendant's involvement, and the consequences of the 

offense. Regarding the offender, the court must evaluate 

the defendant's individual culpability, including his 

age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and 

state of mind. (People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 

1502, 1510.) The federal Constitution affords no greater 

protection than the state Constitution. (People v. 

Martinez, supra, at p. 1510; People v. Haller (2009) 174 

Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092.)

Miller focuses only on the first Lynch factor—his 

individual culpability. He claims he is a youthful 

offender, without a criminal history, attending college 

and playing football, and is someone who has a chance of 

being rehabilitated. Based on these facts, he claims the 

sentence imposed was disproportionate with the crime 

committed.

We disagree. Miller's crime was senseless and unprovoked. 

It did not involve the use of drugs or alcohol. Miller 

took the life of a young man and severely injured another 

young man. It unleashed violence at a place where 

individuals come to seek medical aid, placing medical 

personnel as well as innocent and medically compromised 

individuals at risk. Miller soberly chose to pick up a 

gun that had been abandoned on the street rather than 

call law enforcement; to drive to his cousin's house to 

find appropriate ammunition despite the immediate medical 

needs of his cousin; and to deliberately shoot an unarmed 

individual at close range without provocation.FN3 He then 

fired at a fleeing Davalos, despite the crowd of 

individuals present and at risk. Miller knew Adell was 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 42 of 53
43

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the aggressor in the conflict between Adell and Rios. He 

knew or should have known that the individuals present at 

the hospital were not the individuals responsible for the 

shootings at the party. He chose to respond with violence 

without regard to the consequences of his actions on the 

lives of others.

FN3. Miller argues in his opening brief that he 

shot Rios only after believing that both Rios 

and Davalos were reaching for weapons in their 

waistbands. He claims this court must accept 

this fact as true, citing People v. Toledo

(1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 577. We disagree. First, 

Miller did not claim self-defense at trial. The 

jury heard that this was what Miller claimed 

when first interviewed by police, but the 

defense was not raised or argued at trial. The 

jury obviously rejected as true Miller's earlier 

initial claim that he acted in self-defense, 

otherwise the jury could not have found the 

murder to be of the first degree. We need only 

accept as true those facts and inferences that 

could have been deduced from the evidence to 

support the verdict. (People v. Pensinger (1991) 

52 Cal.3d 1210, 1237; People v. Reilly (1970) 3 

Cal.3d 421, 425.) Second, the Toledo doctrine is 

not applicable where there is other competent 

and substantial evidence to establish guilt as 

there is in this case. (See Matthews v. Superior 

Court (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 385, 393–394 [where 

defendant's statement tends to disprove 

criminality but other prosecution evidence tends 

to prove criminality, it is function of jury to 

determine which version is correct].)

We conclude the sentence imposed is not constitutionally 

disproportionate to the crime committed under either the 

state or federal Constitution.

People v. Miller, 2009 WL 5067612 at *8-*10. 

B. Analysis

A criminal sentence that is “grossly disproportionate” to the 

crime for which a defendant is convicted may violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); Harmelin v. 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 43 of 53
44

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). Outside of the capital 

punishment context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits only sentences 

that are extreme and grossly disproportionate to the crime. United 

States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Harmelin 

v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 

Such instances are “exceedingly rare” and occur in only “extreme”

cases. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72 73; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 

272. So long as a sentence does not exceed statutory maximums, it 

will not be considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 

Amendment. See United States v. Mejia Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 (9th 

Cir. 1998); United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Here, even if the issue is considered de novo, in light of the 

limited range of disproportionate sentences recognized as Eighth 

Amendment violations under Supreme Court authority, and considering

the nature of Petitioner’s criminal conduct and the danger to 

society it presented, Petitioner’s sentence was not disproportionate 

and did not offend the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Cf.

Plasencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 

that a sentence of fifty years to life for murder with use of a 

firearm is not grossly disproportionate); People of Territory of 

Guam v. Sablan, 584 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding a life 

sentence for first degree felony murder); United States v. LaFleur, 

971 F.2d 200, 211 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding life imprisonment for 

first degree murder); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 44 of 53
45

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1996) (upholding a mandatory sentence of life without parole for 

first degree murder committed by a young offender). Accordingly, it 

will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim of cruel and unusual 

punishment be denied.

X. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner alleges he suffered the ineffective assistance of 

counsel (IAC) in violation of his constitutional rights based on 

trial counsel’s failure to investigate Petitioner’s PTSD as an 

exculpatory and mitigating defense. (Pet., doc. 1, 5.) Petitioner 

contends counsel should have addressed the trial court’s failure to 

put the burden of proof of an unspecified essential element of 

murder on the prosecution. (Doc. 30, 3.)

Respondent relies on the TCSC’s decision on habeas review, and 

the CSC’s denial of review based on Petitioner’s failure to provide 

any facts in support of his claim. (Ans., doc. 19, 30-34.) The 

California Supreme Court cited Duvall and Swain, which Respondent 

argues amounts to a determination on the merits that the state court 

presentation was unworthy of relief, as well as a ruling that the 

claims were not presented fairly, citing Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (2012). Alternatively, Respondent argues that if the 

defect is incurable, the California Supreme Court’s ruling means 

that court has found the “claims themselves are defective.” Kim v. 

Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986).

In a habeas case, the issue of procedural bar need not be 

resolved if another issue is capable of being resolved against the 

petitioner. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997). 

Likewise, the procedural default issue, which may necessitate 

determinations concerning cause and miscarriage of justice, may be 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 45 of 53
46

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

more complex than the underlying issues in the case. In such 

circumstances, it may make more sense to proceed to the merits. See

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court 

thus proceeds to the merits of Petitioner’s claim.

A. Background

The decision of the TCSC is as follows:

Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

petitioner has failed to establish the basic requirements 

for success on that claim. The leading cases are

(Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2053 and 

In Re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal4th 977, 1018). The Strickland

court stated “The benchmark for judging any claim of 

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having

produced a just result. A convicted defendant’s claim that 

counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require 

reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two 

components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient. This requires showing that 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that 

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This

requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as 

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both 

showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death 

sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 

process that renders the result unreliable.” (id at p 

687.)

The California Supreme Court in In Re Alfredo Reyes Valdez

at 2010 DJDAR 10603 stated “To make the required showings, 

petitioner must show that his attorney’s representation 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms” (Strickland supra and Hardy 

supra). Establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel requires the defendant to demonstrate (1) 

counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e. there is a 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 46 of 53
47

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome. This second part of the Strickland test “is 

solely one of outcome determination. Instead, the question 

is “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the 

result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding 

fundamentally unfair.”

[¶] . . . [¶]

A defendant is entitled to a new trial if he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. (People v. 

Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1036.) No such showing has 

been raised in the instant writ.

The court in People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 540-

541 stated: “Our review is deferential; we make every 

effort to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight and to

evaluate counsel’s conduct from counsel’s perspective at 

the time. A court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s acts were within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.[”]

Petitioner failed to raise any issues which rise to the 

level of prima facie evidence which would warrant relief.

(LD 8.) 

B. Analysis

The law governing claims concerning ineffective assistance of 

counsel is clearly established for the purposes of the AEDPA 

deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d). Premo v. 

Moore, BU.S. B, 131 S.Ct. 733, 737-38, 178 L.Ed.2d 649 (2011); 

Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 

of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a convicted defendant must 

show that 1) counsel=s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms in 

light of all the circumstances of the particular case; and 2) unless 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 47 of 53
48

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prejudice is presumed, it is reasonably probable that, but for 

counsel=s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); 

Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). A petitioner must 

identify the acts or omissions of counsel alleged to have been 

deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. 690. This standard is the same 

standard that is applied on direct appeal and in a motion for a new 

trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. 697-98.

In determining whether counsel=s conduct was deficient, a court 

should consider the overall performance of counsel from the 

perspective of counsel at the time of the representation. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a strong presumption that 

counsel=s conduct was adequate and within the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment and the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90. 

In determining prejudice, a reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 

proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of a trial, 

the question is thus whether there is a reasonable probability that, 

absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt 

respecting guilt. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This Court must 

consider the totality of the evidence before the fact finder and 

determine whether the substandard representation rendered the 

proceeding fundamentally unfair or the results thereof unreliable. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 696.

A court need not address the deficiency and prejudice inquiries 

in any given order and need not address both components if the 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 48 of 53
49

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697.

Further, when a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s IAC 

claim, the standard of review is doubly deferential; the Court has 

cautioned that “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the question is not 

whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether 

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's 

deferential standard.” Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. at 739-40 (quoting 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011)).

Here, Petitioner contends counsel’s failure to challenge the 

admission of Petitioner’s statements based on PTSD is the omission 

that was not the result of reasonable professional judgment. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 490. Logically this claim may 

relate to the issues of the presence of a valid waiver of 

Petitioner’s Miranda rights, the voluntariness of Petitioner’s 

admissions to law enforcement, and even Petitioner’s criminal

culpability. However, Petitioner does not state any facts in 

support of his claim. 

Neither party has directed the Court to any portion of the 

record that would reflect the nature, extent, or frequency of any 

PTSD symptoms, any diagnosis or treatment for PTSD, how any PTSD 

affected any event or proceeding relevant to this case, or how 

counsel might have been obligated to undertake any specific conduct. 

The claim is unsupported by an allegation of specific facts or by 

evidence; mere speculation is insufficient to demonstrate deficient 

performance or prejudice. Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088-89

(9th Cir. 2001); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000).

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 49 of 53
50

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Further, no possible prejudice appears. Even if assuming 

Petitioner suffered PTSD, the mental illness of a person making an 

admission or confession does not render the statement involuntary 

absent coercive conduct by law enforcement. Colorado v. Connelly, 

479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Here, there was no coercive conduct on 

the part of law enforcement. 

In summary, the state court’s decision was a reasonable 

application of clearly established federal law that was supported by 

the record. Even if the claim is reviewed de novo, no ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel has been established. Accordingly, it 

will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim concerning the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel be denied.

XI. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

 Petitioner alleges he suffered the ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel in violation of his constitutional rights based on 

counsel’s failure to raise issues that were matters of record, 

including 1) failure properly to Mirandize Petitioner, 2) unlawful 

interrogation; 3) psychological coercion; 4) improper waiver of 

Miranda rights; and 5) failure to suppress evidence resulting from a 

warrantless entry of a structure made without exigent circumstances 

or consent and a warrantless arrest made pursuant to the entry. 

(Pet., doc. 1, 5.)

As the previous analysis of Petitioner’s challenges based on 

Miranda and the due process protection against admission of 

involuntary statements demonstrates, the record does not show 

counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the admission of the 

statement on those grounds. The failure to make a motion which 

would not have been successful or was otherwise futile does not 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 50 of 53
51

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. James v. Borg, 24 

F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994).

With respect to a Fourth Amendment challenge to the statement 

as the fruit of an allegedly unlawful entry and arrest, it is 

unclear what standing the Petitioner would have to challenge the

warrantless entry of a third party’s residence. This is 

particularly true where the record supports the express finding of 

the trial court that the owner of the structure consented to entry 

and search. As a person on the premises with the permission of the 

owner, Petitioner could not challenge an invasion of the owner’s 

privacy interest, let alone override the owner’s consent. See Rakas 

v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (Fourth Amendment rights 

may not be vicariously asserted). To the extent Petitioner 

otherwise lodges a Fourth Amendment challenge to the arrest and its 

fruits, Petitioner has not shown that the government lacked probable 

cause for Petitioner’s arrest in a public place or that the arrest 

was unlawful. 

The Court concludes that Petitioner has not established that 

his appellate counsel was deficient in not raising Petitioner’s 

issues or that any omission resulted in prejudice to Petitioner.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Petitioner’s claim that he 

suffered the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel be denied. 

XII. Certificate of Appealability 

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 51 of 53
52

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Habeas Rule 11(a). 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, it will be recommended that 

the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

///

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 52 of 53
53

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

XIII. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that: 

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; 

2) Judgment be ENTERED for Respondent; and

3) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:11-cv-01994-LJO-SKO Document 31 Filed 03/30/15 Page 53 of 53