Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_15-cv-00539/USCOURTS-almd-1_15-cv-00539-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRAWICK REDDING, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:15-cv-539-MHT-PWG

)

DALE COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

AMENDED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Dale County Jail when he alleges he was

exposed to a Burmese python by two jailer deputies, and he brings this lawsuit

seeking redress for injuries he alleges were caused by that event and subsequent

inadequate medical care caused by Defendants. This matter is before the court on the

following motions: (1) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted filed by Defendant Dale County, Alabama (“the County”) (Doc.

12); and (2) a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Ron Nelson and Wally Olson

(Doc. 13). The motions are fully briefed and are taken under submission on the

record and without oral argument. 

I. JURISDICTION

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to Plaintiff’s

federal causes of action, and the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 1 of 18
Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The parties do not contest

personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both. See

28 U.S.C. § 1391. On August 17, 2015, this matter was referred to the undersigned

by U.S. DistrictJudge Myron H. Thompson for disposition or recommendation on all

pretrial matters. (Doc. 9). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Rule 72, Fed. R. Civ. P.;

United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Jeffrey S. v. State Board of Education

of State of Georgia, 896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990).

II. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS1

Plaintiff was an inmate at the Dale County Jail and worked in the jail’s kitchen

as a trustee. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 10-11). The jail facilities are maintained by Defendant

Dale County. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 4). Dale County Sheriff Wally Olson is responsible for

staffing, supervision, and medical care provided at the jail. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 4, 8). Jailer

Ron Nelson was employed by Olson as the jailer and was the immediate supervisor

of jailer deputies Zeneth Glenn and Ryan Mittelbach (sometimes collectively “the

deputies”) at all times relevant to this action. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 9). On or about August

11, 2013, Plaintiff observed the deputies in possession of a yellow Burmese python,

These are the facts for purposes of recommending a ruling on the pending

1

motions to dismiss; they may not be the actual facts and are not based upon evidence

in the court’s record. They are gleaned exclusively from the allegations in the

Complaint. 

2

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 2 of 18
approximately six to seven feet in length. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 12-13). Plaintiff told the

deputies that he was afraid of snakes and did not wish to be near the snake. (Doc. 36-

1 at ¶ 14). When Plaintiff finished his duties in the kitchen, he returned to his dorm

and fell asleep in his bunk. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 16). Several hours later, the deputies

entered the Plaintiff’s dorm with the python while Plaintiff wassleeping. (Doc. 36-1

at ¶ 17). Glenn placed the python close to Plaintiff’s face, and then screamed, waking

Plaintiff from his sleep. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 18). Realizing the snake was in his bunk,

Plaintiff was startled, screamed, and hit his head on the rail of his bunk. (Doc. 36-1

at ¶ 19). Glenn and Mittlebach were terminated from their employment as a result of

this incident. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 20, 55). Plaintiff alleges that the County has video of

the incident. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 21). Plaintiff further alleges that employees working in

the jail are observed by a shiftsupervisor upon entering and leaving the jail. (Doc. 36-

1 at ¶ 30). Plaintiff further alleges that “Mittlebach and Glenn were therefore

observed by a jail supervisor, possibly Nelson, bring the python into the jail several

hours before the incident as described occurred.” (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 31). 

After the incident, Plaintiff “was sent to a medical facility and saw a therapist

at an outside facility where he was prescribed psychiatric medication.” (Doc. 36-1

at ¶ 38). Plaintiff remained incarcerated at the jail for over a year after the incident. 

(Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 39). Plaintiff alleges that he was “paid off or bribed with a job at a

3

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 3 of 18
car wash in return for not reporting this case to other law enforcement agencies or

filing a notice of claim or a lawsuit” and that “Olson was complicit” in this alleged

bribery. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 40). As a result of the incident, Plaintiff “lived in constant

fear, and suffered from depression and post-traumatic stress” and “had trouble

sleeping, suffered general anxiety ... and had nightmares and night terrors on a daily

basis.” (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 39, 41). “The Plaintiff has been treated for injuriesincluding

being prescribed sleeping medications, anti-depression medication and anxiety

medicines and being under the care of mental health professionals and a licensed

psychiatrist.” (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 44). However, Plaintiff claims that he “did not receive

proper psychiatric care in the Dale County Jail after this incident and as a result

suffered emotionally and physically. It is alleged that the Dale County Jail was

motivated by saving money and not insisting that [Plaintiff] receive[] more

psychiatric care despite the obvious signs of his anxiety, fear, sleeplessness and

fatigue.” (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 45). Plaintiff alleges that in August of 2012, Joshua Glenn

McVickers, while an employee working in the Dale County Jail, received sexual

favors in exchange for providing contraband and “would manipulate jail cameras in

an attempt to keep any wrongdoing from being filmed.” (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 60). 

Therefore, Plaintiff alleges, “Olson was put on notice that the security precautions at

4

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 4 of 18
the jail failed to prevent constitutional violations and he failed to take corrective

action.” (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 61). 

On July 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging seven counts

against the Defendants:

I - Violations of Eighth Amendment rights alleging cruel and unusual

punishment against Defendants Glenn and Mittelbach. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶

61-66).

II - Violations of Eighth Amendment rights alleging “Monell Liability”

Indifference to Cruel and Unusual Punishment against Olson, Nelson,

and the County. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 67-82).

III - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Mittelbach and

Glenn under Alabama tort law. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 83-89).

IV - Assault and Battery against Mittelbach and Glenn under Alabama

tort law. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 90-95).

V - Wantonness against Mittelbach and Glenn under Alabama tort law. 

(Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 96-99).

VI - Outrage against Mittelbach and Glenn under Alabama tort law. 

(Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 100-103).

VII - Violations of Eighth Amendment rights alleging deliberate

indifference to psychiatric care against all Defendants. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶

104-111).

5

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 5 of 18
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the Complaint

against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must

take “the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th

Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted astrue, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 

6

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 6 of 18
“[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard also “calls for enough

facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the

claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While the complaint need not set out “detailed

factual allegations,” it must provide sufficient factual amplification “to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.

“So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim

of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of

minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Twombly,

550 U.S. 558 (quoting 5 Wight & Miller § 1216, at 233-34 (quoting in turn Daves v.

Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953)) (alteration original). 

“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to

dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss

can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

7

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 7 of 18
IV. DISCUSSION - THE COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The County argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts

of Alabama sheriffs. “Alabama counties are not liable under a theory of respondeat

superiorfor a sheriff's official acts that are tortious.” McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala.,

520 U.S. 781, 789 (1997); Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So. 2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ala.

2006)(“Furthermore, counties cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions or

omissions of the sheriff or his deputiesin operating a county jail. See King v. Colbert

County, 620 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1993), and Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442

(Ala.1987).”). The Plaintiff argues in response that “[t]he Counts against Dale

County are for deliberate indifference to medical care. It is simply alleged that by

failing to provide medical resources via staffing and services that [Palintiff] suffered

once he sustained the injuries from the python incident.” (Doc. 26 at 4). However,

“any liability of a county resulting from an incident at a county jail must be based on

a failure of county officialsto provide an adequate facility.” Ex parte Sumter County,

953 So. 2d at 1239. Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no factual allegation regarding the

adequacy of the jail facility nor does he allege that any official policy or custom of

the County caused his injuries. “[Plaintiff] has not shown that a county policy or

customwasthe ‘moving force’ that caused the alleged constitutional violationsin this

case as [he] must to establish the county's § 1983 liability. See Young v. City of

8

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 8 of 18
Augusta, Ga., 59 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 1995).” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d

1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Count Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks relief directly against Mittelbach,

Glenn, and the County based on the holding in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc.

Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiff alleges that the

Defendants maintained an “unwritten ‘custom’ or ‘policy’” allowing deputy sheriff’s

to torture inmates. However, Plaintiff’s claim for “Monell Liability” is inapposite to

the nature of Alabama’s county jails: 

“Alabama counties have no duties with respect to the daily operation of

the county jails and no authority to dictate how the jails are run. Monell,

which firmly established that local governments could be sued under §

1983, is ‘a case about responsibility.’ Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 478, 106

S.Ct. at 1297 (discussing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv.,

436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). The County

cannot be liable for the harms that befall jail inmates due to improper

operation of the jail or negligent supervision of its inmates because the

County has no responsibility in that area.”

Turquitt v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998). See also Tittle

v. Jefferson Cty. Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994)(“Counties may be

liable for violations of constitutional rights only when such violations occur as a

result of an official county policy.”). The County had no authority to dictate how the

jail wasrun, and neither the County, Glenn, or Mittelbach created an “official policy”

that resulted in Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

9

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 9 of 18
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims under

Monell liability are due to be granted on the merits in the Defendants’ favor.

V. DISCUSSION - OLSON AND NELSON’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Failure to state a claim for deliberate indifference

Olson and Nelson argue that “the Complaint is absent any averment that Sheriff

Olson or Administrator Nelson personally participated or even knew of the Plaintiff’s

presence in the jail. Thus, because Sheriff Olson and Administrator Nelson were not

personally involved in the events giving rise to this lawsuit, the claims against them

must be based on supervisory liability.” (Doc. 15 at 6). “In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens

action—where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the term

‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government

official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Further, “[i]t is well established in [the Eleventh] Circuit that

supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their

subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v.

Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff fails to

allege any personal participation by Olson or Nelson in the August 11, 2013, “snake

10

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 10 of 18
incident.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims brought via § 1983 arising 2

from the original “snake incident” against Olson and Nelson based on supervisory

liability are due to be dismissed.3

B - Qualified Immunity

As to Plaintiff’s remaining constitutional claimalleging deliberate indifference

to psychiatric medical treatment against Olson and Nelson, they argue that qualified

immunity as government officials bars Plaintiff’s claims brought against themin their

individual capacities. (Doc. 15 at 9). Qualified immunity limits suit against state

officials in their individual capacities. A plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation

under § 1983 can only overcome qualified immunity if “(1) the defendant violated

a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the

Plaintiff’s additional factual allegations in his amended complaint fail to offer 2

any further evidence plausibly demonstrating that Olson or Nelson participating in

the “snake incident.” Even assuming, as Plaintiff pleads, that Nelson “possibly”

observed Mittelbach and Glenn bringing the python into the jail (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 31) 

and that Olson was put on notice that the security precautions at the jail failed to

prevent constitutional violations because of a single prior incident with an employee 

(Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 61), Plaintiff fails to allege any facts which would make Olson or

Nelson vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of Mittelbach and Glenn.

Plaintiff cites a single case, Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298 (11 Cir. 2008), 3 th

for the proposition that Olson and Nelson could, under certain circumstances, be

subject to supervisory liability. However, the holding in Danley on which Plaintiff

would reply was overruled by Iqbal.

11

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 11 of 18
alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th

Cir. 2004). 

“[T]his court has acknowledged that the deliberate indifference standard

also applies to inmates' psychiatric or mental health needs. Greason v.

Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir.1990); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d

1030, 1033 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052,

1058 (11th Cir. 1986)). It is thus clear that prisoners are guaranteed the

right under the eighth amendment to be free fromdeliberate indifference

by correctional institutions to their serious physical or psychological

needs...

“Medical treatment violates the eighth amendment only when it is ‘so

grosslyincompetent, inadequate, or excessive asto shock the conscience

or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058

(citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence or malpractice do not

rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Estelle [v. Gamble], 429

U.S. [97,] 106, 97 S.Ct. [285,] 292 [1976)](‘Medical malpractice does

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.’); Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787–88 (mere negligence or medical

malpractice ‘not sufficient’ to constitute deliberate indifference);

Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (mere medical malpractice does not

constitute deliberate indifference). Nor does a simple difference in

medical opinion between the prison's medical staff and the inmate as to

the latter's diagnosis or course of treatment support a claim of cruel and

unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (citing Bowring v.

Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir.1977)).

“In institutional level challengesto prison health care such asthis

one, systemic deficiencies can provide the basis for a finding of

deliberate indifference. Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058. Deliberate

indifference to inmates' health needs may be shown, for example, by

proving that there are ‘such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing,

facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is

effectively denied access to adequate medical care.’ Ramos v. Lamm,

639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101

12

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 12 of 18
S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). Moreover, although incidents of

malpractice standing alone will not support a claimof eighth amendment

violation, ‘[a] series of incidents closely related in time may disclose a

pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference.’ Rogers, 792

F.2d at 1058–59 (citing Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir.

1974)). ‘Repeated examples of delayed or denied medical care may

indicate a deliberate indifference by prison authorities to the suffering

that results.’ Id. at 1059 (citing Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.

1977)); see also Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (‘In class actions challenging

the entire system of health care, deliberate indifference to inmates'

health needs may be shown by proving repeated examples of negligent

acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff.’).”

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504-06 (11th Cir. 1991)(footnotes omitted).

“Although ‘courts hesitate to find an Eighth Amendment violation’

when an inmate ‘has received medical care,’ this Court has cautioned

that such hesitation ‘does not mean ... that the course of ... treatment of

a prison inmate's medical ... problems can never manifest’ deliberate

indifference. Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th Cir.1989).

Carswell v. Bay Cnty., 854 F.2d 454, 457 (11th Cir. 1988); see also

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that

medical treatment rises to the level of a constitutional violation only

when it is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock

the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness’ (quotation

omitted)).”

Kruse v. Williams, 592 F. App'x 848, 858 (11th Cir. 2014).

In the instant case, Plaintiff alleged deliberate indifference to his psychological

and medical needs, but fails to provide sufficient factual allegations to support his

claim. “Plaintiff concedes that the facts as currently pled may not be sufficient to

properly support each and every claim currently made” and suggests that he “should

13

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 13 of 18
be given the opportunity to engage in some discovery and remedy any shortcomings

in the complaint by amending the pleadings which would be consistent with the

heightened pleadingsstandard required by Twombly.” (Doc. 27 at 2-3). Plaintiff was

granted leave to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 44). However, the only additional

factual allegation presented by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint in support of his

claim of deliberate indifference to his psychiatric care is that Plaintiff was “bribed or

paid off” by some unnamed party to not disclose the incident “to anyone including

medical staff...” (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 106) and that “Olson was complicit” in this alleged

bribery. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 40). Nevertheless, Plaintiff states that he is “arguing that

Defendants Olson and Nelson be held liable for their supervisory roles in

constitutional violations as well as negligent training, hiring and supervision that

allowed these violations to occur and but for would have prevented the injuries from

being sustained. Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Olson is directly

responsible for deliberate indifference to medical care as he makes all decisions as

to how care is apportioned to the inmates.” (Id.). Plaintiff acknowledges that he “saw

a therapist at an outside facility” and received treatment, therapy, and medication, but

fails to offer any factual allegations to support his conclusory claim that the care he

was provided was not “proper.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 38, 44). Plaintiff does not allege

malpractice, systemic and gross deficiencies in the provision of care, a series of

14

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 14 of 18
related incidents or deficiencies, or that his care was delayed or denied. Rather,

Plaintiff acknowledges that he received treatment, therapy, and medication. His bare

factual allegation isthat he did not receive “proper” psychiatric treatment and that the

Dale County jail failed to “insist[] that [Plaintiff] receieve[] more psychiatric care...”

in an effort to save money. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 45). Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate

indifference is conclusory and lacks sufficient factual allegations to support a

plausible claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Olson or Nelson.

See Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)(“[A] simple difference

in medical opinion” does not constitute deliberate indifference.). Because Plaintiff

fails to demonstrate a plausible claim of deliberate indifference, Olson and Nelson’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference is due to be granted in

their favor.

C - Immunity as to state law claims

Olson and Nelson next argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity to

Plaintiff’s state law claims. Olson is the Dale County Sheriff.

“[A] sheriff is an employee of the state, rather than a county, based on

the following constitutional provision: ‘The executive department shall

consist of a governor ... and a sheriff for each county.’ Article V, § 112,

Alabama Constitution of 1901. As executive officers, sheriffs have

sovereign immunity under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution,

which reads: ‘[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant

15

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 15 of 18
in any court of law or equity.’ The only exceptions to such immunity are

for actions brought against a sheriff:

“‘(1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to compel

him to perform ministerial acts, (3) to enjoin him from

enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from

acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or

under mistaken interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek

construction of a statute under the Declaratory Judgment

Act if he is a necessary party for the construction of the

Statute.’

“519 So. 2d at 443. None of those exceptions applies here.”

Hereford v. Jefferson Cty., 586 So. 2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991). As in Hereford, none

of the exceptions apply in this case, and Olson is entitled to sovereign immunity from

Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Plaintiff’s Complaint names Nelson in his capacity as a “jailer” employed by

the Dale County Sheriff. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 9). In 2009, the Alabama Supreme Court

ruled that jailers employed by a sheriff were not entitled to the same § 14 sovereign

immunity afforded to deputy sheriffs. See Ex parte Shelley, 53 So. 3d 887, 897 (Ala.

2009)(“The doctrine of State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution,

insofar asit operatesto provide absolute immunity to certain State actors with respect

to suits against themin their individual capacity for money damages, is a doctrine that

is applicable to constitutional officers. ... [A] position as a jailer simply does not meet

16

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 16 of 18
this requirement.”). Following that ruling, the Alabama legislature amended § 14-6-

1, Ala. Code 1975, to provide as follows:

“The sheriff has the legal custody and charge of the jail in his or

her county and all prisoners committed thereto, except in cases

otherwise provided by law. The sheriff may employ persons to carry out

his or her duty to operate the jail and supervise the inmates housed

therein for whose acts he or she is civilly responsible. Persons so

employed by the sheriff shall be acting for and under the direction and

supervision of the sheriff and shall be entitled to the same immunities

and legal protections granted to the sheriff under the general laws and

the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as long as such persons are acting

within the line and scope of their duties and are acting in compliance

with the law.”

In this case, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Nelson was acting as a jailer under

Olson's supervision and was also acting in the line and scope of his employment at

all times relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Based upon a straightforward application of

§ 14–6–1, Nelson is absolutely immune from Plaintiff's state law claims.

For the foregoing reasons, Olson and Nelson’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

state law claims against them is due to be granted in their favor.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the reasons asstated, it isthe RECOMMENDATION of the

Magistrate Judge that Defendant Dale County’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) is due

to be granted in Dale County’s favor. It isthe further RECOMMENDATION of the

17

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 17 of 18
Magistrate Judge that Defendants Olson and Nelson’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 13)

is due to be GRANTED in their favor.

It is ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before March 28, 2016. Any objections filed must

specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which

the party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered

by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final

order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations

in the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District

Court except upon grounds of plain error ormanifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright,

677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33

(11th Cir. 1982).

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of March, 2016.

/s/ Paul W. Greene

United States Magistrate Judge 

18

Case 1:15-cv-00539-MHT-PWG Document 44 Filed 03/14/16 Page 18 of 18