Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01244/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEWAYNE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONSANTO COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01244-MMC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND; VACATING HEARING

Re: Dkt. Nos. 31, 44

Before the Court is plaintiff Dewayne Johnson's Motion to Remand, filed March 30, 

2016, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendant Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") has 

filed opposition, to which plaintiff has replied. Having read and considered the papers 

filed in support of and in opposition to the motion,1the Court deems the matter suitable 

for decision on the parties' respective written submissions, VACATES the hearing 

scheduled for May 6, 2016, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

In his complaint, filed in state court on January 28, 2016, plaintiff alleges that 

defendant Monsanto markets the herbicide glyphosate under the brand name Roundup. 

(See Compl. ¶ 1.) According to plaintiff, Roundup is "manufactured, designed, and 

labeled in an unsafe, defective, and inherently dangerous manner" (see Compl. ¶ 79), as 

it "pose[s] a grave risk of cancer and other serious illnesses when used in a reasonably 

 

1On April 19, 2016, Monsanto filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply. Although 

the Court questions whether the citation to new case authority in a reply, as opposed to 

the proffer of a new theory or evidence, constitutes good cause for the filing of such 

additional opposition, the Court hereby GRANTS Monsanto's motion, and has considered

its sur-reply.

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anticipated manner" (see Compl. ¶ 84.b). Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Steven 

Gould, an employee of Monsanto, is "responsible for sales and marketing to distributors 

and users of Roundup and other glyphosate-containing products in California" (see

Compl. ¶ 73), and that defendants Wilbur-Ellis Company ("Wilbur-Ellis Co.") and WilburEllis Feed LLC ("Wilbur-Ellis Feed") sell and distribute Roundup in California (see Compl.

¶¶ 16, 17).

Plaintiff alleges that, during his employment with the Benicia Unified School 

District, "his responsibilities included direct application of Roundup and RangerPro, 

another Monsanto glyphosate product, to school properties" (see Compl. ¶ 74), and that, 

in 2014 when he was 42 years of age, he was "diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma" 

(see Compl. ¶ 75). Plaintiff further alleges that his illness is the "direct and proximate 

result of [d]efendants placing defective Roundup products into the stream of commerce." 

(See Compl. ¶ 94.) Based on the above-cited allegations, plaintiff asserts against 

Monsanto, Gould, Wilbur-Ellis Co. and Wilbur-Ellis Feed the following five claims for 

relief, each arising under state law: "Strict Liability (Design Defect)"; "Strict Liability 

(Failure to Warn)"; "Negligence"; "Breach of Implied Warranties"; and "Punitive 

Damages."

On March 14, 2016, Monsanto removed the above-titled action to the district court 

on grounds of diversity jurisdiction, alleging in its Notice of Removal that (1) plaintiff 

seeks damages in excess of $75,000 (see Notice of Removal ¶ 5), (2) plaintiff, a citizen 

of California, and Monsanto, a citizen of Delaware and Missouri, are citizens of differing 

states (see id. ¶¶ 6-8), and (3) although defendants Gould, Wilbur-Ellis Co. and WilburEllis Feed are citizens of California (see id. ¶¶ 12-14), said three defendants are 

"fraudulently joined" (see id. ¶ 11).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks remand on the ground that diversity of citizenship does not exist. 

Specifically, plaintiff argues that Monsanto has failed to show Gould, Wilbur-Ellis Co. and 

Wilbur-Ellis Feed are fraudulently joined as defendants.

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A district court has diversity jurisdiction where an action is between citizens of 

different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(a). As noted above, Monsanto acknowledges that each defendant other 

than itself is a citizen of California, as is plaintiff, but contends the citizenship of each 

defendant other than itself should be disregarded. As discussed below, the Court finds 

Monsanto has failed to show Wilbur-Ellis Co. has been fraudulently joined.

"Fraudulent joinder is a term of art." See McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F. 

2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). "If the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a 

resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, 

the joinder of the resident defendant is fraudulent." See id. In seeking to establish a 

non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined, the removing defendant "is entitled 

to present the facts showing the joinder to be fraudulent." See id. Thus, in determining 

whether a defendant has been fraudulently joined, the district court may look beyond the 

pleadings and consider evidence submitted by the parties. See Morris v. Princess 

Cruises, Inc., 236 F. 3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding "fraudulent joinder claims 

may be resolved by piercing the pleadings and considering summary judgment-type 

evidence such as affidavits") (internal quotation and citation omitted). The burden is on 

the removing defendant to prove "by clear and convincing evidence" that the plaintiff 

cannot prevail against the non-diverse defendant. See Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow 

Chemical Corp., 494 F. 3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding removing defendant’s 

burden is to show it is “not possible” for plaintiff to prevail against non-diverse defendant).

In its Notice of Removal, Monsanto initially argues that Wilbur-Ellis Co. has been 

fraudulently joined, for the asserted reason that the complaint lacks "specific factual 

allegations of liability" on the part of Wilbur-Ellis Co. (See Notice of Removal ¶ 16.)2 The 

Court is not persuaded. As noted, plaintiff alleges Roundup is a defective product due to 

 

2

In its opposition to the motion to remand, Monsanto does not, in any detail, 

address this argument.

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the presence therein of glyphosate (see Compl. ¶¶ 22, 56-62, 64, 81-82); plaintiff further 

alleges Wilbur-Ellis was "one of the distributors providing Roundup and other glyphosatecontaining products actually used by [p]laintiff" (see Compl. ¶ 71). Under California law, 

an entity that places a "defective product into the stream of commerce" can be held 

strictly liable for injuries caused by that product. See Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 

Cal. 3d 268, 271 n.1, 279 (1981). To the extent Monsanto is contending plaintiff's 

allegations as to the nature of the defect or Wilbur-Ellis Co.'s role as a distributor are not 

sufficiently detailed, such argument is unavailing, as Monsanto has not shown the state 

court would preclude amendment. See Albi v. Street & Smith Publications, Inc., 140 F.2d 

310, 312 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding "[a] merely defective statement of the plaintiff's 

action does not warrant removal"; explaining, "[t]he plaintiff's right to retain the action in 

state court should not be defeated by a mere failure, through inadvertence or want of 

skill, perfectly to state the facts constituting the cause of action"); see also, e.g., Padilla v. 

AT&T Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding, where removing 

defendant bases fraudulent joinder argument on pleading deficiency, “[r]emand must be 

granted unless the defendant shows that the plaintiff would not be afforded leave to 

amend his complaint to cure the purported deficiency”) (internal quotation, citation, and 

alteration omitted).

Monsanto also relies on a declaration by Scott M. Hushbeck ("Hushbeck"), a VicePresident of Wilbur-Ellis Co., which declaration, Monsanto argues, "contradicts the 

[c]omplaint." (See Monsanto's Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Remand at 1:11.) In his declaration, 

Hushbeck states that Wilbur-Ellis Co. "has not sold Roundup, RangerPro, or any other 

glyphosate-containing products to the Benicia Unified School District (CA) or the City of 

Benicia (CA)" (see Hushbeck Decl. ¶ 5),3and that, "[p]rior to 2015, Wilbur-Ellis [Co.] did 

not have any knowledge of any potential risk of cancer, including non-Hodgkin 

lymphoma, from Roundup, RangerPro, or any other glyphosate-containing products" (see

 

3

The Hushbeck Declaration is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Notice of Removal.

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id. ¶ 7). Assuming the truth of the statements made therein, Hushbeck's declaration

nonetheless is insufficient to support a finding of fraudulent joinder. In particular, 

Monsanto has not thereby shown plaintiff's inability to establish, as against Wilbur-Ellis 

Co., a claim for strict products liability. See, e.g., Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206 

(requiring defendant to show, "by clear and convincing evidence," it is "not possible" for 

plaintiff to prevail against non-diverse defendant). First, nothing in the declaration 

forecloses plaintiff from establishing his employer purchased Roundup from a retailer or 

other provider which, in turn, had obtained Roundup from Wilbur-Ellis Co. Second, 

Wilbur-Ellis Co.'s asserted lack of knowledge of the defect at the time plaintiff used 

Roundup does not foreclose a claim of strict liability based on a theory of design defect, 

as knowledge of the alleged defect is not an element of such claim. See Brown v. 

Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1056-57 (1988) (explaining that strict liability "focuses 

not on the conduct of the [defendant] but on the product itself, and holds the [defendant] 

liable if the product was defective" and the product "proximately caused injury").

4

Accordingly, as Monsanto has not shown Wilbur-Ellis Co. is fraudulently joined as 

a defendant,

5

the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the above-titled action, and the

motion to remand will be granted.6

 

4Monsanto's assertion that "[f]ailure to warn is plaintiff's sole theory against WilburEllis [Co.]" (see Def.s' Opp. at 14:21) is not supported by the record. Rather, the 

complaint also alleges a strict liability claim based on a theory of design defect and 

asserts such claim against all defendants. (See Compl. ¶ 77.) In any event, even if the 

claims against Wilbur-Ellis Co. were wholly based on a theory of failure to warn, WilburEllis Co.'s asserted lack of knowledge of the defect would not foreclose the claims, as a 

defendant can be held strictly liable for failing to warn of risks "scientifically knowable at 

the time of distribution," see Carlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 1104, 1111 (1996) 

(internal quotation and citation omitted), and there is no showing that plaintiff would be 

foreclosed from establishing the risk posed by glyphosate was scientifically knowable at 

such time.

5Given this finding, the Court does not consider herein Monsanto's assertion that 

Gould and Wilbur-Ellis Feed are fraudulently joined, as, even assuming they are so 

joined, the presence of Wilbur-Ellis Co. nonetheless destroys diversity.

6

In light thereof, defendants' motions to dismiss, filed March 21, 2016, and 

Monsanto's motion to transfer, filed March 31, 2016, are hereby DENIED without 

prejudice to refiling in state court.

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Lastly, in his motion, plaintiff requests that, if the action is remanded, he be 

awarded his fees and costs incurred in seeking remand. A district court has "wide 

discretion" in deciding whether to award attorney fees and costs under § 1447(c). See

Moore v. Permanente Medical Group, 981 F. 2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, although 

the Court has found Monsanto failed to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 

complaint, the Court is not persuaded that an award of fees and costs is warranted. 

Indeed, plaintiff has not set forth, either in his motion or his reply, any reason why an 

award of fees and costs is appropriate in this instance.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for an award of fees and costs will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion to remand is hereby GRANTED, 

and the above-titled action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of 

California, in and for the County of San Francisco.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 2, 2016

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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