Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07015/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 18, 1995 Decided June 23, 1995

Nos. 94-7014, 94-7015, 94-7022, and 94-7107

DARRYL COVINGTON; TRACY DEW-BEY; DAVID EDWARDS;

LEE ROY FERGUSON; RAYMOND GANT; CHARLES HARRIS;

DONALD HUNT; LARRY LEE; LEO WRIGHT; AND CHARLES BARBER,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; R. BARNES; JAMES BRYANT;

P.D. BULLOCK; L.C. CHILDS; D.P. DALTON; H. KING;

ROBERT NEWKIRK; M.L. RANDLE; G.M. CUTLER; R. JACKSON;

R. NICKENS; F. SCHULER; L.D. JOHNSON; D.E. MARSHALL;

L. SESSE-KHALID; RITA GOODALL;

OTHER CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS;

OTHER UNKNOWN PRESENT OR FORMER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LORTON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY OFFICERS,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Civ. No. 87cv02658)

-

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause

for appellants. With her on the briefs were Vanessa Ruiz,

Corporation Counsel at the time of filing of appellant's brief,

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Erias A.

Hyman, Acting Corporation Counsel. John A. Payton entered an

appearance.

Roger E. Warin argued the cause for appellees. With him on the

joint brief were Mindy A. Kaiden, Michael J. Gaffney, Daniel M.

Schember, Vicki Golden, and David Cashdan.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and HENDERSON, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: This appeal involves consolidated

challenges to attorneys' fee awards granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

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(1988 & Supp. V 1993) in favor of prevailing parties (collectively

"plaintiffs") in three civil rights cases against the District of

Columbia ("District"). In support of the fee claims, the

plaintiffs' attorneys submitted to the District Court declarations

describing their billing practicesexplaining that when they do

bill clients, they charge reduced rates for non-economic,

public-spirited reasonsas well as information indicative of their

skill, experience, and reputation. They also submitted evidence of

the prevailing market rates for complex federal litigation in the

District of Columbia. The District opposed plaintiffs' fee

applications, claiming that plaintiffs' requested rates were

substantially higher than rates charged by similarly experienced

attorneys who litigate civil rights and employment discrimination

cases in the District of Columbia. In support of its position, the

District submitted an affidavit of the Assistant Deputy Corporation

Counsel, who recounted rates charged by nine plaintiff attorneys

and contended that those rates more accurately reflected prevailing

market rates. The District Court disagreed.

The District Court found that plaintiffs' attorneys

intentionally charged their poorer clients reduced rates for

non-economic, public-spirited reasons. The record indicates

plaintiff counsels' years of legal experience as well as their

ability to handle complicated federal cases. The court found that

the relevant market was complex federal litigation and that

plaintiffs' requested rates were in line with those prevailing in

the District of Columbia for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Thus,

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relying on established law, the District Court granted plaintiffs'

motion for reasonable attorneys' fees. Finding no abuse of

discretion, we affirm the judgments of the District Court.

In section 1988 attorneys' fee cases, attorneys who

customarily charge reduced fees reflecting non-economic,

public-spirited goals may seek fees based on the prevailing market

rates if the prevailing party demonstrates the reasonableness of

the requested hourly rates. That burden entails the following:

first, if the attorney customarily charges clients lower rates than

plaintiff has requested under section 1988, the attorney must

demonstrate that the customarily reduced rates are charged for

non-economic reasons; second, the attorney must offer information

documenting his or her skill, experience, and reputation; and

third, the attorney must produce evidence of the prevailing market

rates in the relevant community for attorneys of comparable skill,

experience, and reputation. In the instant cases, plaintiffs met

this burden, and the District offered little by way of rebuttal.

Accordingly, the District Court did not err in finding plaintiffs'

requested rates reasonable and granting the motions for attorneys'

fee awards. Nor did the District Court err in determining that

complex federal litigation was the relevant market for purposes of

establishing the prevailing market rates in the District of

Columbia. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's attorneys'

fee awards in all three cases.

I. BACKGROUND

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs supported their

motions for attorneys' fees by submitting evidence of their

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1For the sake of simplicity, our references to the parties

and to the District Court will focus on the Covington litigation. 

We emphasize, however, that there are no material differences in

the three cases on the principal points here in issue, and

neither side suggests otherwise. 

attorneys' billing practices, their attorneys' legal experience,

skill, and reputation, and the prevailing market rates for complex

federal litigation in the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs'

motions were granted in all three cases. Although each case

involved a different claimCovington v. District of Columbia, 839

F. Supp. 894 (D.D.C. 1993), was a prisoners' rights case; Sexcius

v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1993), was a

First Amendment case; and Galloway v. Superior Court, Civ. Action

No. 91-0644 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 1994), was a handicap discrimination

caseand each was brought by different attorneys, the plaintiffs in

each case submitted substantially similar evidence. A detailed

review of the evidence presented in Covington will suffice to

provide the necessary foundation for our analysis.1

Attorneys for the plaintiffs in Covington brought a section

1983 action on behalf of ten prison inmates who were beaten while

shackled and handcuffed and nine inmates who were sent to a maximum

security facility without proper hearings. Covington, 839 F. Supp.

at 895. The jury found for the plaintiffs, the District appealed,

and then the parties settled while the appeal was pending. Id.

The settlement provided that plaintiffs were entitled to an

attorneys' fee award; but when the parties could not agree on the

appropriate hourly rate, the plaintiffs filed a motion for

attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs' fee application included information pertaining to

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2From 1986 to 1990, Gaffney's and Schember's highest hourly

rate was $125, and from 1990 to the present, their highest hourly

rate was $150. They also accept clients on an attorneys' fee

award or contingency fee basis. Declaration of Gaffney at 2, 12-

13, J.A. at I-160, I-170-71. 

3Schember and Gaffney were lead or sole counsel in several

cases brought in federal district court, federal court of

appeals, and the Supreme Court. Declaration of Schember at 2-5,

J.A. at I-151-54; Declaration of Gaffney at 2-4, J.A. at I-160-

62. 

counsels' billing practices; their experience, skill, and

reputation; and the prevailing market rates for complex federal

litigation in the District of Columbia. Specifically, the lead

attorneys in the case, Michael Gaffney and Daniel Schember,

submitted declarations, explaining that they compose a two-attorney

firm which handles federal court litigation concerning civil rights

and civil liberties, military and veterans law, employment and

labor law, and administrative proceedings. According to their

declarations, Gaffney and Schember choose clients and cases based

on "commitments to the clients and to the constitutional and

statutory rights at issue," Declaration of Michael J. Gaffney at 5,

Joint Appendix (J.A.) at I-163, and they offer needy clients

reduced or below-market rates for these non-economic reasons.2 The

ten inmate plaintiffs in Covington were indigent. As Schember's

declaration explains, the lead attorneys took the case "to seek to

enforce the constitutional prohibition against punitive beating of

prisoners." Declaration of Daniel M. Schember at 6, J.A. at I-155.

Gaffney's and Schember's declarations each recount their

significant experience since 1975, at the Lawyers Committee for

Civil Rights Under Law, and since 1977, at their own firm,

practicing federal court litigation on a variety of issues.3 Their

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4Schember taught administrative law, constitutional law, and

advanced legal research and writing at Antioch School of Law as

an adjunct professor during the 1980s. Declaration of Schember

at 5, J.A. at I-154. 

5Gaffney received an education law fellowship from the Legal

Services Corporation's Research Institute for Legal Assistance to

co-author a paper on organizing the private bar to address the

problems of urban education. Declaration of Gaffney at 8, J.A.

at I-166. 

6In 1982, the ACLU Fund of the National Capital Area awarded

their firm the Alan Barth Service Award for their effort in

Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470

U.S. 1084 (1985). Declaration of Gaffney at 7, J.A. at I-165. 

7Schember and Gaffney have participated in several federally

funded inter-disciplinary policy research studies concerning

implementation of federal education programs. Declaration of

Gaffney at 8, J.A. at I-166. 

8Gaffney also served on the board of directors of the

National Veterans Legal Services Project, a non-profit

organization funded by the Legal Services Corporation, Vietnam

Veterans of America, and the Agent Orange Class Assistance

Program. Declaration of Gaffney at 9, J.A. at I-167. 

9In 1988, Delaney set her hourly rate at $125 and has not

changed it. She asserted that she "essentially permit[s][her]

clients to pay what they could afford when they could afford it." 

Declaration of Delaney at 5, J.A. at I-189. 

declarations also provide indications of their reputations, listing

teaching positions4 and fellowships,5 awards received,6

participation in congressionally mandated studies,7 and chairing

the D.C. Bar's Committee on Military and Veterans Rights.8

Two other attorneys in the Covington case, Linda Delaney and

Mark Hager, also submitted declarations regarding their billing

practices and experience. Delaney's declaration revealed that when

she bills clients, she charges below-market prices for non-economic

reasons.9 Declaration of Linda A. Delaney at 5-6, J.A. at I-189-

90. Delaney, who has practiced law since 1984, submitted

descriptions of eight federal civil rights or employment cases in

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10The original Laffey matrix rates for 1983 were as follows:

$175 an hour for very experienced federal court litigators, 

i.e., lawyers in their 20th year or more after

graduation from law school;

$150 an hour for experienced federal court litigators in

their 11th through 19th years after law school

graduation;

$125 an hour for experienced federal court litigators in

their 8th through 10th years after graduation from law

school;

which she was involved as well as actions brought in District of

Columbia courts. Declaration of Delaney at 2-3, J.A. at I-186-87.

Hager, who holds a J.D. and a Ph.D. from Harvard and currently

teaches law at American University, stated that he does not have a

standard hourly rate for litigation. Declaration of Mark M. Hager

at 1, 3, J.A. at I-191, I-193. He practiced law full time for one

year at a Boston law firm, doing commercial and criminal defense

litigation, and since 1987, when he began teaching full time, he

has represented clients in political asylum cases, employment

cases, prisoners' rights cases, and has acted as a commercial

arbitrator. Declaration of Hager at 1-3, J.A. at I-191-93. In

addition, plaintiffs used the services of two law graduates and two

law students. Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 900-01.

The Covington plaintiffs submitted a good deal of evidence

establishing the prevailing market rates for comparably experienced

attorneys handling complex federal litigation. They submitted the

original Laffey matrix, a schedule of charges based on years of

experience developed in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.

Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985).10 Plaintiffs also

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$100 an hour for senior associates, i.e., 4 to 7 years after

graduation from law school; and

$75 an hour for junior associates, i.e., 1 to 3 years after

law school graduation.

Laffey, 572 F. Supp. at 371. The Laffey court noted that

plaintiffs' fee matrix was supported "with a barrage of data." 

Id.

11Covington attorneys also submitted 1988, 1989, and 1990

hourly rate information for lawyers in more than a dozen local

law firms used by plaintiffs in Lewis v. Brady, Civ. Action No.

82-0918 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1991), J.A. at I-113-17, as well as

affidavits from four attorneys in Robles attesting to the

reasonableness of annual increases of $10 per hour for the

updated Laffey matrix. See J.A. at I-141-49. 

12Plaintiffs requested current market rates rather than the

rates that prevailed in the market when counsel actually worked

on Covington to compensate for the delay in payment of their

attorneys' fees. See Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 902. 

submitted affidavits attesting to increases in the market rates

since the original Laffey matrix was established; the U.S.

Attorney's Office version of the updated Laffey matrix; the

memorandum opinions in Robles v. United States, Civ. Action No. 84-

3635, (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1992), J.A. at I-119, and Fischbach v.

District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 87-0646 (D.D.C. Jan. 3,

1993), J.A. at I-254, in which district courts awarded fees based,

in part, on the Laffey matrix; and an EEOC decision, Hatfield v.

Garrett, Appeal No. 01892909 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 26, 1990), J.A. at I90, in which the EEOC awarded attorneys' fees using the updated

Laffey matrix.11

Based on this evidence, plaintiffs requested fees for Schember

and Gaffney at a rate of $260 per hour, which represented the 1993

prevailing market rate12 for experienced federal court litigators

with eleven to nineteen years of experience in an updated version

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13Although the Laffey matrix charts fees only up to 1988-89,

the Robles district court updated the Laffey matrix by adding $10

per hour to the 1988-89 hourly rate of $220 and to the hourly

rates of each succeeding year. See Covington, 839 F. Supp. at

900 (citing Robles, Civ. Action No. 84-3635, slip op. at 16 &

n.7). 

14The U.S. Attorney's Office developed its fee matrix by

adding the Consumer Price Index increase for the Washington,

D.C., metropolitan area to the prior year's rate and rounding

upwards if the sum is within $3 of the next $5 multiple. See

Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 900. 

of the Laffey matrix13 and the U.S. Attorney's Office matrix.14

Plaintiffs requested attorneys' fee awards at an hourly rate of

$160 for Delaney and Hager, which represents a rate just under that

suggested by the U.S. Attorney's Office matrix for attorneys with

four to seven years experience. Finally, plaintiffs requested that

the two law graduates be awarded $85 per hour (less than the

prevailing market rate of $125 under the U.S. Attorney's Office

matrix), and that the two law students be awarded $70 per hour (the

prevailing market rate for paralegals and law clerks under the U.S.

Attorney's Office matrix). See Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 900-03.

The District opposed plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees,

arguing that a submarket of plaintiff attorneys who handle civil

rights and employment discrimination cases existed, and that the

prevailing market rate for this submarket of attorneys with between

ten and twenty years of experience was well below that requested by

plaintiffs in this case. In support, the District submitted the

declaration of Michael Zielinski, Assistant Deputy Corporation

Counsel in the Civil Division of the Office of Corporation Counsel,

who recounted plaintiffs' requests for attorneys' fees in nine

cases brought by solo practitioners or small firms against the

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District of Columbia. Zielinski Declaration at 2-7, J.A. at I-218-

23. Zielinski suggested that there were "a large number of

attorneys in the District's legal marketplace who ... litigate

complex cases like employment discrimination and civil rights

actions and who have established hourly billing rates at or near

$150." Zielinski Declaration at 8, J.A. at I-224. A majority of

the nine plaintiff attorneys identified by Zielinski had requested

attorneys' fees at their usual billing rates; and two of the

attorneys had sought market rates akin to those in the Laffey

matrix.

The District Court found for plaintiffs and awarded them the

requested attorneys' fees. The trial judge noted that, because the

Covington "plaintiffs' assertions that their counsel have taken

public interest cases for below-market rates are reasonably

well-documented" and that these assertions were "virtually

unchallenged," the court would "take plaintiffs at their word."

Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 897. The District Court Judge also

noted that "[p]laintiffs' counsel handled very well this

complicated federal case, which involved the constitutional claims

of ten plaintiffs against sixteen defendants, lengthy discovery,

many motions and a jury trial." Id. at 895. The District Court

found that plaintiffs presented "sufficiently persuasive evidence

charting the prevailing market rates of litigators of complex

federal matters." Id. at 898. In reviewing the evidence

plaintiffs submitted on the prevailing market rates, the District

Court noted that the Laffey matrix had been "relied upon, at least

in part, by six District of Columbia district judges and that [it

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had] received a degree of approval" from this court in Save Our

Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (en banc). Id. (citations omitted). The court also reviewed

the fee matrix "developed by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the

District of Columbia that the U.S. Attorney relies upon in

settlements." Id. In short, the trial court found that plaintiffs

met their evidentiary burden, and that defendants' factual rebuttal

of plaintiffs' evidence was ineffectual. Id. at 899-900.

The District Court found the District's evidence unpersuasive:

"Defendants' sole affidavit ... cites only seven instances in which

lawyers with 10-20 years of experience charged about $150 per hour

in representing plaintiffs in civil rights, employment, or

discrimination matters. Standing alone, these seven instances are

insufficient to demonstrate that $150 per hour is the prevailing

rate across the District of Columbia in this sub-market." Id. at

898. Finally, the District Court rejected the District's submarket

theory, noting that the District had failed to convince the court

"that lawyers handling civil rights, employment, or discrimination

cases for plaintiffs constitute a sub-market of their own," and

that "the prevailing rate in the sub-market ... isas defendants

claimlower than the rate prevailing in the broader legal market"

of complex federal litigation. Id. at 898 & n.8.

The District Court awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees for

Gaffney and Schember at an hourly rate of $260; for Delaney and

Hager at an hourly rate of $160; for the law graduates at an

hourly rate of $85; and for the law students at an hourly rate of

$70. Id. at 900-02. Defendants conceded to the reasonableness of

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15Plaintiffs do not request any enhancements above the

"lodestar" to compensate their attorneys for the risk of

accepting contingency fee arrangements. 

the hours claimed in plaintiffs' original motion. Id. at 903.

II. ANALYSIS

The fee shifting provision embraced by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b),

covering federal civil rights actions, provides that

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the United States, a reasonable

attorney's fee as part of the costs.

In Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), the Supreme Court

determined that Congress intended

"reasonable fees" under § 1988 are to be calculated

according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant

community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented

by private or non-profit counsel.

Four years later, this court, sitting en banc, held that

the prevailing market rate method heretofore used in

awarding fees to traditional for-profit firms and public

interest legal services organizations shall apply as well

to those attorneys who practice privately and for profit

but at reduced rates reflecting non-economic goals.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d at 1524 ("SOCM").

This case involves a relatively straightforward application of

these principles. The attorneys in the instant cases, who either

practice privately and for-profit but at reduced rates reflecting

non-economic goals or who have no established billing practice,

request the prevailing market rates.15 Under the Supreme Court's

decision in Blum and this court's decision in SOCM, we think it is

quite clear that plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to an award

based on the prevailing market rates, and we can find nothing in

the records of these cases to indicate that the trial judges abused

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their discretion under the statute in awarding fees.

A. The Attorneys' Fee Case

As the Supreme Court has stated, "[a] request for attorney's

fees should not result in a second major litigation." Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). "Parties to civil rights

litigation in particular should make a conscientious effort, where

a fee award is to be made, to resolve any differences." Blum, 465

U.S. at 902 n.19. Where settlement is not possible, case law

establishes a clear structure for the determination of reasonable

fees.

Under the statute, the district court is expressly empowered

to exercise its discretion in determining the amount of a fee

award, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); however, a fee applicant bears the

burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the

appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates,

see Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11 ("[C]ourts properly have required

prevailing attorneys to justify the reasonableness of the requested

rate or rates."); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 ("[T]he fee applicant

bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and

documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.").

As a general matter, this court has characterized the Blum

formulation as constituting a three-part analysis: "(1)

determination of the number of hours reasonably expended in

litigation; (2) determination of a reasonable hourly rate or

"lodestar'; and (3) the use of multipliers as merited." SOCM, 857

F.2d at 1517; see also In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir.

1989); In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In this

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case, however, only the second prongthe determination of a

reasonable hourly rateis at issue. As noted above, a fee

applicant's burden in establishing a reasonable hourly rate entails

a showing of at least three elements: the attorneys' billing

practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and

the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. See Blum,

465 U.S. at 896 n.11; SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524.

First, in cases in which prevailing attorneys request rates

which are greater than those they normally charge, the attorneys

must offer some evidence that they charge reduced rates for

public-spirited or non-economic reasons. In SOCM, the court

addressed the claims of attorneys engaged in private, for-profit

practice, who "adjusted fee schedules downward from pro bono or

quasi public interest motives to reflect the reduced ability of the

client to pay or what the attorney saw as the importance and

justice of the client's cause." 857 F.2d at 1519. Building on the

Supreme Court's decision in Blumwhich allowed market-rate fees for

attorneys in nonprofit legal services organizationsthe SOCM court

concluded:

Congress did not intend the private but public-spirited

rate-cutting attorney to be penalized for his public

spiritedness by being paid on a lower scale than either

his higher priced fellow barrister from a more

established firm or his salaried neighbor at a legal

services clinic.

857 F.2d at 1524.

As was true in SOCM, the burden is on the fee applicant to

show that the attorney's billing practices are of the sort covered

by the SOCM test. That is, the attorney must show that his or her

custom of charging reduced rates is in fact attributable to "public

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16The Supreme Court noted that the Senate Report

accompanying the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act of 1976

explicitly approved of the "appropriate standards" for awarding

attorneys' fees set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,

Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See Blum, 465 U.S. at 893

(quoting S. REP. NO. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976)). One of

the several factors the court used to determine reasonable

attorneys' fees in Johnson was the "experience, reputation, and

ability of the attorneys." 488 F.2d at 718. And in Blum, the

spiritedness." Implicit in this line of inquiry is the assumption

that the law was not written to subsidize attorneys who charge

below-market rates because they cannot command anything more. And

a defendant is free to rebut a fee claim on these terms in cases in

which the issue is posed. We recognize that, in some cases, this

may be a difficult line of inquiry, for an attorney who cannot

command market rates invariably will have a "custom" of charging

rates below the market. This problem is diminished with respect to

attorneys who charge variable rates (both at and below the market,

with the latter attributable to public-spirited goals). In any

event, it is within the sound discretion of the district court to

weigh the evidence to determine whether an attorney customarily

charges reduced rates for non-economic reasons.

Second, prevailing parties must offer evidence to demonstrate

their attorneys' experience, skill, reputation, and the complexity

of the case they handled. In articulating the plaintiffs' burden

in these cases, the Supreme Court required that fee applicants

"produce satisfactory evidencein addition to the attorney's own

affidavitsthat the requested rates are in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum,

465 U.S. at 896 n.11.16 To some extent, this second element of the

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Supreme Court appeared to focus primarily on this factor. See

465 U.S. at 890 n.4 (noting years in which attorneys graduated

from law school, years and general type of legal experience, and

whether attorneys served as judicial law clerks); id. at 895

n.11 (noting lawyers' experience, skill, and reputation varies

extensively). 

17In SOCM, the court approved of the district court's use of

the Laffey matrix, a schedule of hourly rates based largely on

years of experience. See SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1525. Attorneys

would have to state their federal court experience in order to

get Laffey rates. 

reasonable-rate analysis informs the first element of the inquiry,

for as the SOCM court noted: "We do not propose ... that all

attorneys be remunerated at the same rate, regardless of their

competence, experience, and marketability. We only aim to provide

that their experience, competence, and marketability will be

reflected in the rate at which they are in fact remunerated."17 857

F.2d at 1521 n.4.

Third, plaintiffs must produce data concerning the prevailing

market rates in the relevant community for attorneys of reasonably

comparable skill, experience, and reputation. This is undoubtedly

a difficult assessment, and the Supreme Court has so acknowledged:

We recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate

"market rate" for the services of a lawyer is inherently

difficult. Market prices of commodities and most

services are determined by supply and demand. In this

traditional sense there is no such thing as a prevailing

market rate for the service of lawyers in a particular

community. The type of services rendered by lawyers, as

well as their experience, skill, and reputation, varies

extensivelyeven within a law firm. Accordingly, the

hourly rates of lawyers in private practice also vary

widely.

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. However, as this court stated in

National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675

F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982), "[t]he complexity of the market

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for legal services does not ... reduce the importance of fixing the

prevailing hourly rate in each particular case with a fair degree

of accuracy."

The Supreme Court's decision in Blum establishes the framework

for analysis:

To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its

discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce

satisfactory evidencein addition to the attorney's own

affidavitsthat the requested rates are in line with

those prevailing in the community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

reputation. A rate determined in this way is normally

deemed to be reasonable, and is referred tofor

convenienceas the prevailing market rate.

Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11. The Court also noted that "rates

charged in private representations may afford relevant

comparisons." Id.; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274,

286 (1989) ("A reasonable attorney's fee under § 1988 is one

calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the

relevant market ... and one that grants the successful civil rights

plaintiff a "fully compensatory fee,' ... comparable to what "is

traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client.' ")

(citations omitted).

In order to demonstrate this third element, plaintiffs may

point to such evidence as an updated version of the Laffey matrix

or the U.S. Attorney's Office matrix, or their own survey of

prevailing market rates in the community. In SOCM, we approved of

the district court's reliance, at least in part, on the schedule of

prevailing rates compiled in Laffey. Although the SOCM court

remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of

making new findings as to reasonable hourly rates at the time the

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18In fact, the District Court in Galloway v. Superior Court

noted its dissatisfaction with the Laffey matrix in this regard: 

"The Court accepts as credible evidence the Matrix, but

nonetheless would hope that a more complete breakdown and study

of rates could be compiled for future use in attorneys' fee

awards." Civ. Action No. 91-0644, slip op. at 4 n.1. 

services were performed, it stated:

We do not intend, by this remand, to diminish the

value of the fee schedule compiled by the District Court

in Laffey. Indeed, we commend its use for the year to

which it applies. Perhaps the most desirable result of

the present litigation would be the compiling of a

similar schedule of prevailing community rates for other

relevant years.

SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1525. Although fee matrices are somewhat

crudethe Laffey matrix, for example, lumps attorneys with four to

seven years of experience in the same category; attorneys with

eleven to nineteen also share the same hourly rate18the matrices

do provide a useful starting point. To supplement any matrix that

has been offered, plaintiffs may also provide surveys to update the

matrix; affidavits reciting the precise fees that attorneys with

similar qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in

comparable cases; and evidence of recent fees awarded by the

courts or through settlement to attorneys with comparable

qualifications handling similar cases.

"When ... the applicant for a fee has carried his burden of

showing that the claimed rate and number of hours are reasonable,

the resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable fee

contemplated by § 1988." Blum, 465 U.S. at 897. At this point,

the defendant may challenge the plaintiffs' application for

attorneys' fees, but the Government's burden in rebuttal is not

without demands:

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Once the fee applicant has provided support for the

requested rate, the burden falls on the Government to go

forward with evidence that the rate is erroneous. And

when the Government attempts to rebut the case for a

requested rate, it must do so by equally specific

countervailing evidence. Although there may be occasions

in which the applicant's showing is so weak that the

Government may without more simply challenge the rate as

unsubstantiated, in the normal case the Government must

either accede to the applicant's requested rate or

provide specific contrary evidence tending to show that

a lower rate would be appropriate.

Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1326.

Defendants may challenge any part of the prevailing parties'

case for attorneys' fees. For example, defendants may challenge

the plaintiff attorneys' claims that they charge reduced rates for

non-economic reasons, and this might include a claim that under no

circumstances would that particular plaintiff's attorney ever

command the rates he or she requests. Defendants also may

challenge the plaintiff attorneys' claims as to their competence,

experience, reputation, or performance in the instant case.

Finally, defendants may challenge plaintiff attorneys' market data,

in an effort to show that the submitted market rates are

inaccurate.

B. The Claims in this Case

Our review function in this case is limited, for district

courts act with a real measure of discretion in granting a fee

award under section 1988. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 902 n.19 ("A

district court is expressly empowered to exercise discretion in

determining whether an award is to be made and if so its

reasonableness."); Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995

F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("A district court's discretion as

to the proper hourly rate to award counsel should not be upset

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19The dissenting opinion appears to challenge the District

Court's findings that counsel in Sexcius and Galloway reduced

their rates for non-economic reasons. However, the record

clearly supports the District Court on this point.

Counsel in Galloway submitted an affidavit explaining that

"[b]ecause my clients are unable to pay the rates prevailing in

the community for complex federal litigation and are frequently

unemployed, my rates vary from pure contingent fee to $200 per

hour, and I rely to a great extent on court-awarded fees for my

compensation." Second Affidavit of Vicki G. Golden, J.A. at III50-51. The District Court determined that "[b]ecause this case

involves both attorneys who practice privately and for profit but

who give reduced rates to many clients, and attorneys who

practice in public interest legal services organizations, SOCM is

particularly relevant." Galloway, slip op. at 3, J.A. at III-14. 

The District Court found that "[plaintiffs' counsel] is exactly

the type of private attorney who charges reduced rates to clients

due to non-economic goals discussed in SOCM." Id. Counsel in

Sexcius submitted an affidavit with similar explanations, stating

that their "clients are unable to pay the rates prevailing in the

community for complex federal litigation," and that they "charged

plaintiffs a low hourly rate because their case was important and

absent clear misapplication of legal principles, arbitrary fact

finding, or unprincipled disregard for the record evidence.");

Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)

("It is common learning that an attorney's fee award by the

District Court will be upset on appeal only if it represents an

abuse of discretion."). This limited standard of review is

"appropriate in view of the district court's superior understanding

of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent

appellate review of what essentially are factual matters."

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

In this case, plaintiffs clearly met their burden and their

requested rates were properly accorded a presumption of

reasonableness. Plaintiffs submitted their counsels' declarations

attesting that they charged below-market rates for non-economic,

public-spirited reasons.19 Plaintiffs submitted data demonstrating

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as teachers they could not afford the prevailing market rates." 

Declaration of Francine K. Weiss, J.A. at II-71. The District

Court in Sexcius found that "[b]ecause plaintiffs' counsel

charged plaintiffs this low $100 rate out of public interest

motives, plaintiffs are entitled to collect the prevailing market

rate, not merely the rate they actually charged plaintiffs." 

Sexcius, 839 F. Supp. at 921. This court does not disturb the

factual findings of the district court when they are supported by

the record. 

their attorneys' experience in the legal profession and in

litigating complex federal court cases, as well as information

probative of their attorneys' skill and reputation. Finally,

plaintiffs submitted a great deal of evidence regarding prevailing

market rates for complex federal litigation. This included the

Laffey matrix, the U.S. Attorney's Office matrix, affidavits

attesting to increases in the market rates since the original

Laffey matrix, and memorandum opinions in district court cases

which relied on these matrices.

The District, on the other hand, submitted little in rebuttal.

First, the District attempted to challenge plaintiffs' requested

hourly rates by suggesting that these rates were higher than the

established billing rates of attorneys who litigate complex federal

cases. In support, the District submitted a single declaration

from an Assistant Deputy in its office recounting cases which, for

the most part, were inapposite to the case at bar: attorneys in a

majority of those cases never requested fees at prevailing market

rates; nor did they suggest that they charged below-market rates

for non-economic reasons; rather they simply sought the rates at

which they typically billed clients. See Zielinski Declaration at

3-8, J.A. at I-219-24. One of the attorneys mentioned in

Zielinski's declaration requested and received prevailing market

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20In reviewing a case approved of in the Senate Report that

accompanied the Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Award Act, the SOCM

court noted that "Congress did not intend to use historical

billing rates as a cap on fee awards." SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1523

(quotations omitted). 

rates in line with the Laffey matrix. See id. at 8, J.A. at I-224;

Fischbach v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 87-0646 (D.D.C.

Jan 3, 1993), J.A. at I-254. Simply put, although the District

does not bear the ultimate burden in this case, its evidence did

not come close to rebutting the presumption of reasonableness

plaintiffs established. The District Court therefore correctly

"rel[ied] solely upon plaintiffs' unrebutted evidence." Covington,

839 F. Supp. at 900.

Second, the District attempted to argue that plaintiffs are

only entitled to the rates they regularly charge, i.e., that these

rates are in fact the prevailing market rates. This argument was

considered and rejected by this court in SOCM, and, therefore,

merits little attention here. As the SOCM court stated, "[t]he

result sought by plaintiffs, that is a fee award based on

prevailing market rates rather than the actual rates of

[plaintiffs' attorneys], is not only not inconsistent with the

express intent of Congress, but rather accomplishes Congress'

express goals."20 857 F.2d at 1521. Thus, the en banc court

concluded: "Henceforth, the prevailing market rate method

heretofore used in awarding fees to traditional for-profit firms

and public interest legal services organizations shall apply as

well to those attorneys who practice privately and for profit but

at reduced rates reflecting non-economic goals." Id. at 1524. The

District Court properly dismissed the District's argument that

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21The District mentions in its brief that the market

consists of those attorneys who litigate "employment

discrimination and civil rights actions in the District of

Columbia." Brief for the District of Columbia at 43. However,

the point was not pressed in its briefs; nor did counsel attempt

to argue the point when asked at oral argument about whether the

District challenged the scope of the relevant market. In fact,

counsel for the District suggested that this court need not reach

that issue. 

plaintiffs are only entitled to an award based on the fees their

attorneys routinely charge clients.

Finally, the District argues that the court should define the

relevant market, for purposes of determining the prevailing market

rates, narrowly, as including only plaintiff attorneys in civil

rights, employment, or discrimination actions. Covington, 893 F.

Supp. at 897. The District Court rejected this narrow definition,

noting that the District failed to show that a civil rights and

employment discrimination market actually exists independent of

attorneys who handle other types of complex federal litigation.

Id. at 898 n.8. And even assuming, arguendo, the existence of such

a submarket, the trial court found no evidence that submarket rates

are lower than the prevailing rates in the broader legal market.

Id. at 898. The District only weakly challenges this determination

on appeal,21 so we are hard-pressed to find even a compelling

argument to address.

The Senate Report accompanying the enactment of section 1988

suggests that Congress envisioned rates to be set according to

standards in other types of complex federal litigation: "It is

intended that the amount of fees awarded under [§ 1988] be governed

by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally

complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases[,] and not be

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22Indeed, as noted by the Third Circuit, it makes little

sense to narrow the market in the fashion suggested by the

District in this case:

Courts that try to establish public interest market

rates by looking to the going rate for public interest

work ... do not examine an independently operating

market governed by supply and demand, but rather recast

fee awards made by previous courts into "market" rates. 

Courts adopting this micro-market approach, therefore,

engage in a tautological, self-referential enterprise.

Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories,

842 F.2d 1436, 1446 (3d Cir. 1988). 

reduced because the rights may be nonpecuniary in nature." Blum,

465 U.S. at 893 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6

(1976)).22 The point is that "Congress after all did not simply

express its intent that the fees would attract counsel, but rather

that they would be "adequate to attract competent counsel.' "

SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1521 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1011 at 6).

In short, we can find no basis to overturn the District

Court's determination that the relevant market is that of complex

federal litigation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court did

not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiffs reasonable

attorneys' fees in these consolidated cases.

So ordered.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Supreme Court has made clear that federal fee shifting

statutes "were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve

the financial lot of lawyers." Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley

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1I assume arguendo that the applicants meet the skill and

experience requirements. I part from the majority insofar as it,

unlike the district court, relies on special interest recognition

within the applicants' limited area of practice to evaluate their

experience. Maj. Op. at 5-6 & nn.4-8. I would suggest that

broader assessment such as that reflected in law directory

listings like, for example, the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory

provides more probative "pieces of evidence that will enable the

District Court to make a reasonable determination of the

appropriate hourly rate." National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans

v. Secretary of Defense (NACV ), 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C. Cir.

1982). The Martindale-Hubbell ratings are derived from

confidential surveys of members of the bar and, significantly,

the judiciary and "take[ ] into consideration experience, nature

of practice and qualifications relevant to the profession." 4

Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory XI (1994). 

Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). The

majority nonetheless affirms fee awards totalling nearly $664,000

in public funds calculated on the basis of premium hourly rates.

I respectfully dissent because none of the plaintiffs has

demonstrated as required by our previous opinions that the rates

awarded prevail for the type of work performed or that the rates

their lawyers have historically been able to secure from paying

clients are not determinative of a "reasonable hourly rate." Blum

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984).

The majority recognizes that a fee applicant bears the burden

of justifying the reasonableness of his requested hourly rate by

showing "at least three elements: the attorneys' billing

practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and

the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Maj. Op.

at 12. In my view, however, it does not follow our precedent

prescribing the evidence necessary to meet that burden with respect

to at least two of the elements.1 First, "[a]n applicant is

required to provide specific evidence of the prevailing community

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2Unless otherwise specified, the term "district court"

refers to both district judges who decided the three fee awards

consolidated on appeal. 

3NACV, 675 F.2d at 1324. 

rate for the type of work for which he seeks an award." National

Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense (NACV ), 675

F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added); see also Blum,

465 U.S. at 896 n.11; Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("The reasonable hourly rate is that

prevailing in the community for similar work."). The applicants

have not met this burden because they rest their applications

entirely on evidence of rates in the broad market of "complex

federal litigation" that provides no basis for the district court2

to determine the rate prevailing for the specific type of work

performed by them.

The applicants chiefly rely on adjusted versions of the fee

matrix developed more than ten years ago in Laffey v. Northwest

Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other

grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984); cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021

(1985). We have not considered whether the broad Laffey matrix

constitutes "specific evidence" of rates charged for "similar"3

work performed irrespective of the nature of the litigation. In my

view the Laffey matrix cannot do so where, as here, the litigation

is of a discrete type that appears to generate its own range of

rates. For example, as demonstrated by the evidence submitted by

the District of Columbia (District), "the hourly rates ... in the

Laffey matrix are substantially higher than the hourly rates

charged by similarly experienced attorneys who litigate employment

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4The data submitted with the District's affidavit indicate

that the Laffey rates significantly overstate the non-reduced

market rates charged to fee-paying clients for employment

discrimination and other civil rights cases in the District of

Columbia, sometimes by more than $100 an hour. See, e.g., JA I220-21, 243-44 (hourly rate of $150 compared to Laffey rates of

$250 and $260); JA I-221-22, 247-48 (hourly rate of $150

compared to Laffey rates of $290 and $300). If the $150 figure

accurately estimates the prevailing community rate for this

litigation specialty, the bulk of the awards here is based on

hourly rates overstated by more than $100 per hour. The

difference amounts to more than $109,000 in additional fees for

Schember and Gaffney, see Covington v. District of Columbia, 839

F. Supp. 894, 903 (D.D.C. 1993) (996 hours at $260 per hour) and

more than $100,000 in additional fees for Weiss and Barnett, see

Sexcius v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 919, 929 (D.D.C.

1993) (912 hours at $260 per hour). 

discrimination, civil rights and other types of damages actions in

the courts of the District of Columbia." Joint Appendix (JA) I218.4

In my view, the district court in Covington correctly outlined

the type of specific evidence required to fulfill the burden

prescribed by NACV:

A statistically reliable, well-documented, and extensive

survey of the rates clients pay for a certain sub-market

of legal services would be powerfully persuasive. Such

a survey would collect the rates of a statistically

significant number of lawyers or firms within a legal

sub-market, convincing the court that the survey's scope

is broad enough to reflect the market faithfully. Such

a survey would be sufficiently documented with supporting

affidavits, assuring the court of the accuracy of the

survey's data. Lastly, such a survey would encompass

both the high rates that large, prestigious law firms in

the area command for their work in the sub-market and the

lower rates commanded by others for their work in the

sub-market. (Ideally, the survey would also indicate

what fraction of clients pay which rates within the

sub-market's rate spectrum. That is, the survey would

state what fraction of the sub-market's clients take

their cases to high-priced firms, what fraction to

low-priced firms, and what fraction to firms priced in

the middle. This would help the court determine whether

any given rate is typical or aberrant.)

Covington v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 894, 899 (D.D.C.

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5Nothing in Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel

(SOCM ), 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc), altered either

the burden of proof imposed by the court's earlier opinions or

who bears it. Indeed, the court expressly noted that

"[h]enceforth, the prevailing market rate method heretofore used

in awarding fees to traditional for-profit firms and public

interest legal services organizations shall apply as well to

those attorneys who practice privately and for profit but at

reduced rates reflecting non-economic goals." Id. at 1524

(emphasis added). Although the court "commend[ed]" the use of

the Laffey matrix in that case without evaluating it in any

detail, id. at 1525, it bears note that SOCM involved a fee award

under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Id. at

1517. Fee awards under that statute are undoubtedly so few in

number, at least compared with the type of litigation involved

here, that use of the broad Laffey matrix may be by default the

most accurate evidence of a reasonable hourly rate. 

6See Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 897; Sexcius v. District of

Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D.D.C. 1993); Galloway v.

Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 91-

0644, Mem. Op. at 5 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 1994) (reprinted in JA III12, III-16). 

1993) (emphasis in original).

Where the district court committed error, however, was in

placing the burden of proof on the District, not the applicants.5

Because the applicants have failed to submit evidence that carries

their burden under NACV, the fee awards are in my view based on a

"clear misapplication of legal principles" requiring reversal.

Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C.

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1398 (1994). Although the

majority affirms the district court's reasoning that the applicants

are nonetheless entitled to the matrix-based rates they claim

simply because "[t]he District ... submitted little in rebuttal,"

Maj. Op. at 19,6 the sufficiency of the District's rebuttal is

relevant only if the applicants first meet their burden.

Second, in Sexcius and Galloway, the district court did not

give full effect to our precedent requiring it to consider the

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7I do not question the evidence indicating that some of the

lawyers in these cases have reduced their rates for non-economic

reasons both in the past and here. I do dispute, however, that a

lawyer's billing history can be disregarded in favor of a rate

that he has never commanded. For example, a lawyer who normally

charges $120 per hour to paying clients but agrees to reduce that

rate to $100 per hour for non-economic reasons would not, in my

view, be entitled under NACV or SOCM to recover a market rate of

$150 per hour. 

rates customarily charged by counsel to their paying clients for

whom they have not reduced their rates in the public interest. The

court in NACV explained

counsel for applicants may be required to submit specific

evidence of his or her actual billing practice during the

relevant time period, if in fact applicant has a billing

practice to report. This information, when available,

will provide important substantiating evidence of the

prevailing community rate.... Accordingly, the actual

rate that applicant's counsel can command in the market

is itself highly relevant proof of the prevailing

community rate.

675 F.2d at 1326 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). In Sexcius,

counsel attested to a maximum quoted rate of $187.50 per hour. JA

II-71. In Galloway, counsel indicated that the maximum rate she

had been able to command was $200 per hour. JA III-51. Neither

indicated that those rates had been reduced for non-economic

reasons. Although the court in SOCM held that a lawyer in private

practice who reduces his customary rate is not normally limited to

that reduced hourly rate in fee awards, the SOCM court did not

alter the significance under NACV of the full, non-reduced, rate

charged by counsel to other clients.7

Together, NACV and SOCM instruct that a lawyer's usual hourly

rate remains the most probative evidence of a reasonable rate to

award him under a fee-shifting statute unless that rate does not

fairly reflect the value of his services because it is a "reduced

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8Although the district court in Covington concluded that the

District had produced insufficient evidence that counsel's

ordinary billing rate of $150 per hour was below market value,

839 F. Supp. at 897, that conclusion was premised on the

incorrect market of "complex federal matters," id. at 898. 

rate[ ] reflecting non-economic goals." SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1524;

see also NACV, 675 F.2d at 1326; Goos v. National Ass'n of

Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Kattan, 995 F.2d

at 278 (noting "an attorney's usual billing rate is presumptively

the reasonable rate"). Resort to a matrix to determine a

reasonable rate is thus appropriate only if a lawyer's ordinary

rate is so reduced; and, if so used, the matrix must be based on

"specific evidence" of "the type of work" for which the lawyer

seeks an award. NACV, 675 F.2d at 1325.

I would reverse the district court's conclusion that

leapfrogged over the applicants' burden and declared instead that

the District had failed to meet its burden, thereby leaving it, in

its view, no alternative but to grant the applicants' requests.

See, e.g., Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 898. Fee applicants are

required to do more than simply ask for an award authorized by

statute; they must meet a factually demanding burden. The record

contains no evidence that the maximum rates previously charged by

the Sexcius counsel and by Golden in Galloway had been so reduced,

making their customary rates the presumptive bases for fee awards

to them. Goos, 997 F.2d at 1568-69; Kattan, 995 F.2d at 278.

There is, however, insufficient evidence to evaluate the claims of

the other lawyers and law students who participated in the

consolidated cases.8 Accordingly, I would remand to the district

court to determine whether each counsel has established a

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customary, non-reduced rate; if so, that rate should provide the

basis of a fee award. I would further instruct the district court

to determine a reasonable hourly rate for those lawyers who have

not established such a rate. Its determination should be made on

the basis of detailed evidence of the type it has already described

so well. Covington, 839 F. Supp. at 899.

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