Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00991/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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06cv991-WQH (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER A. ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ABERCROMBIE AND FITCH STORES,

INC.; ABERCROMBIE AND FITCH

MERCHANDISING & DESIGN COMPANY;

ABERCROMBIE AND FITCH TRADING

CO.; JEN (DOE), individually,

and DOES 1 through 20,

inclusive,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 06cv991-WQH (BLM)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR COURT ORDER

AUTHORIZING PRODUCTION OF

DOCUMENTS BY SUBPOENAS TO

BALBOA NAVAL HOSPITAL AND

CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD,

AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND

TO LIMIT DISCOVERY; TO QUASH

SUBPOENAS

[DOC. NOS. 38 and 43]

Plaintiff, an African-American male, alleges that he suffered

racial discrimination and retaliation at the hands of Defendants, his

former employer. Plaintiff contends that as a result of Defendants’

alleged conduct, he has suffered emotional and mental distress, lost

wages, and lost employee benefits. See Compl., Doc. No. 1. In addition

to these compensatory damages, Plaintiff seeks exemplary and punitive

damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Id.

On May 31, 2007, counsel for both parties contacted Chambers to

discuss an ongoing dispute regarding subpoenas Defendants intend to

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 Plaintiff did not file a reply in connection with his motion.

2 06cv991-WQH (BLM)

issue to the Naval Medical Center San Diego (“Balboa Naval Hospital”)

and the California Franchise Tax Board (“Board”). Counsel for both

parties requested hearing dates for parallel discovery motions, namely,

a motion for a court order authorizing production by subpoena

(Defendants) and a motion to quash and for a protective order

(Plaintiff). That same day, the Court issued an order setting a hearing

date and expedited briefing schedule on the parties’ dueling motions.

Doc. No. 37. The parties filed their motions on June 6, 2007, see Doc.

Nos. 38, 43, and subsequently filed further briefing pursuant to the

special schedule.1 The Court took the briefing under submission pursuant

to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

Having considered the arguments presented and all supporting

documents submitted, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

Motion for Court Order Authorizing Production of Documents by Subpoenas

to Balboa Naval Hospital and California Franchise Tax Board [Doc. No.

38] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Protective Order and to Limit Discovery; to Quash Subpoenas [Doc. No.

43] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

LEGAL STANDARD

The threshold requirement for discoverability under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure is whether the information sought is “relevant

to the subject matter involved in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(1). To be discoverable, the information need not be admissible at

trial if it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence.” Id. The relevance standard is thus commonly

recognized as one that is necessarily broad in scope in order “to

encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to

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3 06cv991-WQH (BLM)

other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the

case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)

(citation omitted). However broadly defined, relevancy is not without

“ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,

507 (1947). Accordingly, district courts have broad discretion to

determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296

F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

District courts also have broad discretion to limit discovery. For

example, a court may limit the scope of any discovery method if it

determines that the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or

duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more

convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(2)(C). Similarly, district courts are directed to limit discovery

where “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its

likely benefit.” Id.

Under Rule 45, any party may serve a subpoena commanding a nonparty “to attend and give testimony or to produce and permit inspection

[and] copying” of documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). Any such

subpoena is subject to the relevance requirements set forth in Rule

26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The non-party may make objections to

the subpoena within fourteen days after service, or before the time for

compliance if less than fourteen days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B).

Upon a timely motion, the court may quash or modify the subpoena for any

one of the reasons set forth in Rule 45(c)(3)(A), such as the subpoena

“requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no

exception or waiver applies,” or it “subjects a person to undue burden.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A). A party cannot simply object to a subpoena

served on a non-party, but rather must move to quash or seek a

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protective order. See Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D.

Cal. 2005); see also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 708 F.2d

492, 494 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[o]nce the person subpoenaed objects to

the subpoena . . . the provisions of Rule 45(d) come into play”). The

party who moves to quash a subpoena has the burden of persuasion under

Rule 45(c)(3). See Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 637.

Courts have broad discretion to determine whether a subpoena is

unduly burdensome. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34

F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994). For example, a subpoena is unduly

burdensome where it seeks to compel production of documents regarding

topics unrelated to or beyond the scope of the litigation. See Mattel,

Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 813-14 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding subpoenas properly quashed where their overbreadth led the

court to conclude that subpoenas were “served for the purpose of

annoying and harassment and not really for the purpose of getting

information”). Again, the moving party bears the burden of establishing

that a subpoena is unduly burdensome. See F.D.I.C. v. Garner, 126 F.3d

1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997).

Finally, although irrelevance is not among the enumerated reasons

for quashing a subpoena under Rule 45(c)(3), federal courts have

incorporated relevance as a factor to be considered when ruling on

motions to quash. See Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 637. Under Rule 45(c)(3)(A),

“[a]n evaluation of undue burden requires the court to weigh the burden

to the subpoenaed party against the value of the information to the

serving party[,]” and mandates the court’s consideration of such factors

as relevance, the serving party’s need for the requested documents, the

breadth of the discovery request, the particularity with which the

documents are described, and the burden imposed. Id. (internal

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2

 To address any privacy concerns Plaintiff may have, Defendants offer to enter

into a protective order authorizing production to Defendants but prohibiting disclosure

outside the instant litigation. Defs.’ Mem. at 4. Plaintiff does not address this

offer in his briefing.

3

 In the alternative, Defendants request that the Court issue an order for (1)

the subpoena of records reflecting that Plaintiff was treated by Balboa Naval Hospital

or was the victim of identity theft and/or a mistaken garnishment order, or (2)

certification from either entity that no such records exist. Defs.’ Mem. at 5-7.

5 06cv991-WQH (BLM)

citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek an order authorizing the production of medical and

tax board records maintained by Balboa Naval Hospital and the Board.2

Defs.’ Mem. at 2. Defendants allege that neither entity will produce

the records without a release from Plaintiff—which Plaintiff refuses to

provide—or a court order. Id.; Nagle Decl. at ¶ 3. Defendants argue

that the records sought are relevant and discoverable, and that the

proposed subpoenas are narrowly tailored and prompted by Plaintiff’s own

deposition testimony. Defs.’ Mem. at 4-7; Defs.’ Reply at 1; Defs.’

Opp’n at 1. As such, Defendants request that the Court authorize the

issuance of their proposed subpoenas.3 Defs.’ Mem. at 7; Defs.’ Reply

at 4.

Plaintiff simultaneously seeks a protective order limiting

Defendants’ discovery of the requested medical, wage garnishment,

identity theft, and educational records, and moves to quash subpoenas

Defendants have issued (the Remington College subpoena) or seek to have

issued (the Balboa Naval Hospital and Board proposed subpoenas). Pl.’s

Mem. at 2-4. Plaintiff argues that the three subpoenas are

impermissibly overbroad, request irrelevant information, and unduly

invade his privacy rights. Id. Plaintiff therefore urges the Court to

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6 06cv991-WQH (BLM)

limit this discovery, to quash the subpoenas in question, and to deny

Defendants’ motion. Id. at 9; Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.

As an initial matter, it is clear from the briefing that the

subpoenas to Balboa Naval Hospital and the Board have yet to be issued.

Thus, at least with respect to these two subpoenas, the parties’ motions

are premature in that there are no objections to or violations of any

discovery device to examine and no pending subpoenas to quash. However,

the briefing also makes clear that the arguments presented in support of

the instant motions would be repeated were Defendants to serve their

proposed subpoenas. As a result, the Court will reach the merits of the

parties’ motions notwithstanding this procedural defect.

A. The Balboa Naval Hospital Subpoena

The proposed subpoena to Balboa Naval Hospital seeks

[a]ny and all medical psychiatric and/or psychological records

pertaining to any examinations, treatments, and consultations

of [Plaintiff] in November 2004, including, but not limited

to, all inpatient and outpatient records, medical histories,

referrals, prescriptions, chart notes, billing records, x-rays

and reports, histories, laboratory reports, tests, admissions

and discharge reports, treatment records, diagnosis and

prognosis records, nurses’ and doctors’ notes, and all

medical, psychiatric and psychological evaluations and/or

reports.

See Defs.’ Mem. Ex. A.

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s medical records are directly relevant

to his wrongful termination and emotional distress claims. Defs.’ Mem.

at 5. Defendants allege that Plaintiff was terminated due to

absenteeism. Id. As such, Defendants claim that the requested records

are the only way to verify Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he was

treated at Balboa Naval Hospital on one of the days he was disciplined

for absenteeism, and that he suffered emotional distress as a result of

Defendants’ alleged conduct. Id. (citing Britt v. Superior Court, 20

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4

 Because this is a diversity case, California’s law of privilege applies. See

Fed. R. Evid. 501; Star Editorial, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 7 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1993)

(analyzing qualified reporter’s privilege under California law).

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Cal. 3d 844, 859-62 (Cal. 1978) for the proposition that medical records

are relevant and discoverable where plaintiff places his emotional wellbeing at issue); Defs.’ Reply at 3 (citing In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d

415, 436-39 (Cal. 1970) (ordering production of plaintiff’s

psychotherapy records where plaintiff sought damages for emotional

distress)); see also Nagle Decl. Ex. 1 (excerpts from Plaintiff’s

deposition testimony).

Plaintiff argues that as drafted, the subpoena is without

reasonable limitation and amounts to a fishing expedition into his

entire medical history. Pl.’s Mem. at 6. Plaintiff emphasizes that he

possesses a constitutional right to privacy in his medical history, and

that Defendants’ subpoena encompasses irrelevant records unrelated to

the claims and injuries at issue in this case such that their disclosure

would violate that right. Id. (citing Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal. App. 4th

402, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Palay v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 4th

919, 933-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)). Plaintiff also insists that

Defendants’ desire to test the veracity of his deposition testimony or

to assess his general credibility are not legally permissible reasons to

violate his privacy rights, and the fact that the complaint alleges

emotional distress and seeks compensatory damages does not justify the

invasion of such rights. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.

California law recognizes a constitutional right to privacy in an

individual’s medical history.4

 See Pettus, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 440 (“the

‘zones of privacy’ created by article I, section 1 [of the California

Constitution], extend to the details of one’s medical history”); Palay,

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18 Cal. App. 4th at 932 (“[F]undamental to the privacy of medical

information ‘is the ability to control [its] circulation . . . .’”).

This constitutional right to privacy is not absolute, but is subject to

invasion where a compelling public interest is involved. See Ragge v.

MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Where one

party claims that his opponent has waived this protection by filing

suit, “the court must construe the concept of ‘waiver’ narrowly and a

compelling public interest is demonstrated only where the material

sought is directly relevant to the litigation.” Tylo v. Superior Court,

55 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Britt, 20 Cal.

3d at 858-59)) (emphasis in original). The party seeking the

constitutionally protected information bears the burden of establishing

that the information is directly relevant to the claims at issue. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges claims of wrongful termination,

discrimination, retaliation, and emotional distress. See Compl. at ¶¶

21-39; id. at 12. Plaintiff testified during deposition that while

employed by Defendants, he received an Unsatisfactory Performance Notice

in November 2004 due to absenteeism. See Nagle Decl. Ex. 1 at 142-46.

Plaintiff also testified that he was unable to work on the date he was

disciplined because he was heavily medicated and tired from a doctor’s

appointment he attended at Balboa Naval Hospital. Id. Plaintiff

offered this information and identified the EKG procedure he underwent

without objection from his counsel or claim of privacy rights. Id. In

light of these representations by Plaintiff, the Court finds that some

of the requested medical records are relevant to Plaintiff’s wrongful

termination claims in that they either may bolster or undermine

Defendants’ absenteeism allegation.

However, the Court declines to find the requested records are

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relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations of emotional distress. In his

opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff expressly states that (1) he

has not alleged “any extraordinary emotional distress beyond that

normally accompanying a wrongful termination,” (2) he has not testified

that his emotional distress is ongoing, and (3) his emotional state is

not at issue in this case. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Plaintiff has therefore

limited his claim for emotional distress to the standard mental injuries

associated with an allegedly wrongful termination, and in turn has

tacitly agreed not to present at trial physical evidence of emotional

distress, such as any medical treatment or supporting records, or

evidence of any emotional distress beyond that normally accompanying

wrongful termination. Accepting Plaintiff’s representations, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has tendered his mental condition in this case only

as it relates to the alleged wrongful termination, and as such, any

discovery related to Plaintiff’s allegations of emotional distress must

be limited to those injuries resulting from that allegedly wrongful

termination. See Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 841 (Cal.

1987) (underlining that plaintiff’s mere initiation of a sexual

harassment suit, even where plaintiff claims to have suffered “rather

extreme mental and emotional damage,” does not waive all privacy

interests or expose plaintiff to “unfettered mental probing”); Britt, 20

Cal. 3d at 864 (“plaintiffs are ‘not obligated to sacrifice all privacy

to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury”;

while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or

mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing [] suit, they

are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or

psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past”)

(citation omitted); Tylo, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1388 (in employment

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discrimination and wrongful termination case where plaintiff asserted

her psychological condition only as it related to termination of

employment contract, discovery was limited to those injuries resulting

from contract’s termination, and thus plaintiff could be questioned

regarding her marital relationship only as it related to those asserted

claims); Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 557, 573 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1988) (in sexual harassment case, “the bare fact that plaintiff

alleges that the improper behavior produced emotional distress will not

justify a defendant’s requested invasion of plaintiff’s sexual privacy”;

to warrant such an inquiry, “either plaintiff must claim some special

damage . . . or defendant must demonstrate some extraordinary

circumstance attendant to plaintiff’s claim”). Moreover, the Court

notes that Defendants’ proposed subpoena seeks a variety of medical and

psychological records for November 2004, a time period when Plaintiff

was still in Defendants’ employ. See Defs.’ Mem. Ex. A. Given the

scope of the proposed subpoena, the Court fails to comprehend how

records documenting medical treatment Plaintiff received while still

employed by Defendants in November 2004 would be relevant to emotional

distress Plaintiff may have experienced following his termination by

Defendants in 2005. Accordingly, the Court finds that the requested

medical records are not relevant to Plaintiff’s emotional distress

claims.

In conclusion, based on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and in

light of Plaintiff’s representations regarding emotional distress, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s medical records are relevant to Defendants’

absenteeism theory, but not to Plaintiff’s emotional distress claims.

Accordingly, while Defendants are entitled to obtain medical records

relating to Plaintiff’s November 2004 EKG examination, they are not

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entitled to the panoply of medical, psychological, and psychiatric

reports and notes requested by Defendants. Defendants, therefore, may

issue a subpoena to Balboa Naval Hospital requesting the dates and times

of any and all medical appointments made and medical appointments

attended during the month of November 2004, and any and all records

relating to the EKG examination conducted in November 2004. As a

result, Defendants’ motion for an order authorizing production of Balboa

Naval Hospital documents by subpoena is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. Plaintiff’s concurrent motion for a protective order, to limit

discovery, and to quash this subpoena is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

B. The Board Subpoena

The proposed subpoena to the Board seeks

[a]ny and all documents pertaining to [Plaintiff’s] wage

garnishment and/or claim of identity theft in 2005-2007,

including, but not limited to: (1) [a]ll investigator notes,

forms and reports regarding [Plaintiff]; (2) [a]ll notes,

memos, reports, and summaries of interviews with other persons

concerning [Plaintiff]; (3) [a]ll notes of interviews with

[Plaintiff] or his agent; (4) [a]ll correspondence between the

Franchise Tax Board and [Plaintiff] or his agent; (5) [a]ll

correspondence between the Franchise Tax Board and any other

person(s) or agency regarding [Plaintiff]; (6) [a]ll

interoffice communications regarding [Plaintiff]; (7) [a]ll

documents relating to the status and/or closure of

[Plaintiff’s] case files by the Franchise Tax Board or any

other agency; and (8) [a]ll other documents that refer to or

relate to any and all issues or claims regarding [Plaintiff].

See Defs.’ Mem. Ex. B.

Defendants argue these records are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s

future wage loss and emotional distress claims because they will provide

further insight into (1) why Plaintiff voluntarily left a higher paying

position after being terminated by Defendants, and (2) the nature and

extent of stress Plaintiff may have experienced as a result of wage

garnishment and alleged identity theft. Defs.’ Mem. at 6; Defs.’ Reply

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at 2. Having searched area court files for records pertaining to

Plaintiff’s garnishment and identity theft allegations to no avail,

Defendants claim they have no other recourse than to request an order

authorizing production by subpoena. Defs.’ Mem. at 6. Moreover,

Defendants contend the Board subpoena seeks no financial or tax

information implicating Plaintiff’s privacy rights, rather, it requests

records confirming Plaintiff’s testimony that he was the victim of

identity theft and mistakenly subject to wage garnishment. Defs.’ Mem.

at 4-7; Defs.’ Reply at 2-3; see also Nagle Decl. Ex. 1. Defendants

further argue that even assuming these records do implicate a right to

privacy, Plaintiff waived that right by providing deposition

testimony—without objection or claim of a right to privacy—about the

wage garnishment and identity theft issues. Defs.’ Mem. at 6 (citing

Schnabel v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 704, 721 (Cal. 1993)); Defs.’

Reply at 2-3.

Plaintiff maintains this subpoena is overbroad, seeks records with

no connection to either Defendants or the claims at issue, and unduly

invades his privacy rights. Pl.’s Mem. at 6-8. In support, Plaintiff

contends that the personnel policies of his other former employers have

no bearing on the discrimination claims at issue, and as such,

Defendants cannot meet the standard for general discovery, let alone the

heightened standard for discovery where, as here, privacy rights are

implicated. Id. at 4-8 (citing Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 858-89, 864); San

Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1097 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2001)). Plaintiff also denies that he waived his right to

privacy in these records by initiating suit or providing deposition

testimony on these subjects. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Plaintiff represents

that he provided such testimony “only because the mitigation of economic

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damages was an issue,” and that in any event, his testimony did not

“constitute a carte blanche waiver of privacy rights.” Id.

As with medical records, California’s privacy protection similarly

embraces personal financial and tax information. See Davis v. Leal, 43

F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109-10 (E.D. Cal. 1999); Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 712-

13. However, the constitutional right to privacy in financial

information is not absolute and may be abridged to accommodate a

compelling public interest. See Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.

App. 3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). “One such interest, evidenced

by California’s broad discovery statutes, is the ‘historically important

state interest of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection

with legal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 857). Thus,

where an individual’s right of privacy in his financial affairs

conflicts with this public interest, the court must carefully balance

the competing interests. Id.; Hofmann Corp. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.

App. 3d 357, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (underlining limited protection

given to sensitive financial information and describing balancing test).

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for lost wages, lost employee

benefits, and emotional distress, as well as exemplary and punitive

damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. See Compl. at 12. Plaintiff has

provided deposition testimony that he voluntarily left a higher paying

job at Jack-in-the-Box, a job he held after his termination by

Defendants. See Nagle Decl. Ex. 1 at 239-40. Plaintiff has provided

testimony that he was a victim of identity theft while employed at Jackin-the-Box, which in turn prompted an improper order of the Board to

garnish his wages. Id. at 241-44. Moreover, Plaintiff has testified

that after explaining the matter to an unidentified official, his record

was expunged and his wages were not garnished. Id. Plaintiff has

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provided this testimony without objection from counsel or an assertion

of his privacy rights. Id.

To the extent that the records sought by Defendants’ proposed

subpoena seek financial or tax information, the Court underlines that

they are subject to a constitutional right to privacy under California

law. Davis, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1109; Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th 712-13.

Nevertheless, the Court finds that the requested records are relevant to

damages, in particular, Plaintiff’s claims for lost wages and lost

benefits, as well as mitigation of damages. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 723

(in a marital dissolution proceeding, finding that husband’s corporate

and payroll tax returns were discoverable to assist in the assessment of

husband’s assets, but information in the payroll tax returns identifying

persons other than husband were privileged). As such, the records are

sufficiently relevant to justify their disclosure. See Harding Lawson

Assocs. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 4th 7, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)

(“A showing of relevancy may be enough to cause the court to balance the

compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of

privacy.”).

Notwithstanding this relevance finding, Plaintiff’s arguments

regarding the subpoena’s overbreadth are well taken. As noted above,

Defendants seek records spanning from 2005 through 2007. Defs.’ Mem.

Ex. B. Both Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and exhibits reviewed by

Plaintiff during his deposition confirm that he was hired by Jack-inthe-Box in October 2005 and that he voluntarily resigned his position

sometime in 2006. See Nagle Decl. Ex. 1 at 239-41 (Plaintiff testifying

that he was hired by Jack-in-the-Box in October 2005 and voluntarily

left the company “in the middle of 2006"); id. (attaching exhibits

noting Plaintiff’s dates of employment at Jack-in-the-Box). In

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addition, the record before the Court includes an exhibit marked during

Plaintiff’s deposition—a letter from Jack-in-the-Box payroll services to

Plaintiff dated January 19, 2006—informing Plaintiff of an impending

wage garnishment. Id. (attaching January 19, 2006 letter and notice of

earnings withholding from the Board). Based on the evidence presented,

the Court fails to see how Board records dated well before and long

after Plaintiff’s employment at Jack-in-the-Box are relevant to confirm

a January 2006 wage garnishment/identity theft, to determine the

resolution of the wage garnishment/identity theft issue, to assess the

nature and extent of Plaintiff’s emotional distress with respect to that

January 2006 wage garnishment/identity theft, and to evaluate

Plaintiff’s future wage loss claim. Thus, while the Court finds the

Board records are relevant, it also finds the subpoena is overbroad to

the extent that it seeks production of records far exceeding Plaintiff’s

dates of employment at Jack-in-the-Box. The Court therefore finds it

appropriate to limit the proposed subpoena’s scope to Board records

dated from October 2005 through December 2006, and to authorize

production of such records by subpoena as so limited.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for an order authorizing production

of Board documents by subpoena is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants are entitled to those Board documents described in their

proposed subpoena dated from October 2005 through December 2006. As

such, Plaintiff’s concurrent motion for a protective order, to limit

discovery, and to quash this subpoena is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART consistent with the above limitation.

C. The Remington College Subpoena

In addition to the aforementioned proposed subpoenas, Plaintiff’s

briefing addresses Defendants’ subpoena to Remington College, which was

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issued by Defendants and received by Plaintiff’s counsel on May 10,

2007. Pl.’s Att’y Decl. at ¶ 2. This subpoena seeks

[a]ny and all documents pertaining to [Plaintiff], for all

dates of enrollment at Remington College (“school”), including

but not limited to, any of the following: (1) transcripts, (2)

application for enrollment, (3) records of courses taken, (4)

records of degrees earned, (4) [sic] any notes or

correspondence regarding [Plaintiff], (5) any disciplinary

documentation, (6) billing records, and (7) dates of

attendance.

Pl.’s Notice of Lodgment Ex. 1. Plaintiff’s arguments in support of his

motion to quash this subpoena mirror those presented in connection with

the Balboa Naval Hospital and Board subpoenas. Pl.’s Mem. at 6-9; Pl.’s

Opp’n at 2-4.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s motion is untimely and was not

identified to the Court as a proper subject for the present briefing.

Defs.’ Opp’n at 2, 4-6. In particular, Defendants claim that Plaintiff

has waived any right to oppose this subpoena, noting that Plaintiff

failed to file a motion prior to the identified production date and that

Remington College has never served written objections. Id. Defendants

also maintain the records sought are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s

credibility and a potential defense of after-acquired evidence based on

the fact that Plaintiff may have falsified information on his employment

application. Id. at 2; see also Nagle Decl. Ex. A (excerpts from

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony). Finally, Defendants assert that

Plaintiff has provided no authority to support his claim that his

educational records are protected by a right to privacy, and that in any

event, Plaintiff waived that right by failing to object to an identical

subpoena issued to Mesa College. Defs.’ Opp’n at 5; see also Nagle

Decl. Ex. C (subpoena to Remington College and attaching letter

producing responsive documents).

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The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s motion to quash

the Remington College subpoena is untimely. To excuse compliance, a

motion to quash must be made before the production or deposition date

identified in the subpoena. See King v. Fidelity Nat’l Bank of Baton

Rouge, 712 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasizing that “a motion to

quash must be not only made but granted before the scheduled deposition

to excuse compliance”) (emphasis in original); Pioche Mines Consol.,

Inc. v. Doman, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964) (under earlier version

of rules, motion to quash notice of deposition must be filed and acted

on before scheduled time of deposition to avoid sanctions); Innomed

Labs, LLC v. Alza Corp., 211 F.R.D. 237, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting

that motion to quash was untimely because it was filed after the

deposition at issue was to have taken place). Defendants’ subpoena

called for production from Remington College on May 30, 2007. Pl.’s

Notice of Lodgment Ex. 1. Plaintiff filed the instant motion on June 6,

2007. Doc. No. 43. Because the May 30, 2007 production date came and

went without a timely motion from Plaintiff, he cannot now attack the

subpoena’s validity through a motion to quash. See King, 712 F.2d at

191; Pioche Mines Consol., Inc., 333 F.2d at 269; Innomed Labs, LLC, 211

F.R.D. at 240. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to quash the Remington

College subpoena is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the Court’s review of the briefing submitted, and for the

foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Court Order Authorizing

Production of Documents by Subpoenas to Balboa Naval Hospital and

California Franchise Tax Board [Doc. No. 38] is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Defendants are entitled to issue a subpoena to Balboa

Naval Hospital requesting the dates and times of any and all medical

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appointments Plaintiff made and medical appointments Plaintiff attended

during the month of November 2004, as well as any and all records

relating to the EKG examination to which Plaintiff submitted in November

2004. Defendants are also entitled to issue a subpoena to the Board

requesting those documents described in their proposed subpoena for the

period between October 2005 through December 2006.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and to Limit Discovery; to

Quash Subpoenas is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART consistent with

the foregoing. Doc. No. 43. Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order

and to Limited Discovery; to Quash Defendants’ subpoena directed to

Remington College is DENIED. Doc. No. 43.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 2, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE WILLIAM Q. HAYES

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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