Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00527/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00527-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD GARNES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-0527 FCD EFB P

vs.

ANTHONY LAMARQUE, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 2000 judgment of

conviction entered against him in the Solano County Superior Court on charges of attempted

murder, assault with a deadly weapon, assault, and grossly negligent discharge of a firearm, with

several enhancements for use of a firearm. Petitioner seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) there is

insufficient evidence to support his attempted murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in

excluding relevant evidence; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of petitioner’s prior

conduct; (4) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (5) jury instruction error violated

his right to due process; and (6) the cumulative effect of errors at his trial violated his right to

due process. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned

will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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1

 This statement of facts is taken from the November 8, 2001 opinion by the California

Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 1-2, appended as

Exhibit F to respondent’s Answer, filed on June 26, 2003.

2

FACTS1

The charges against appellant arose out of a series of fights

between appellant and Webster Burks on March 11, 1999, that

eventually involved several other individuals who sided with

appellant or Burks, and culminated with appellant firing his gun at

Burks as Burks ran away. According to appellant, he first

confronted Burks because Burks was selling marijuana in front of

appellant’s mother’s house. Burks was angry, but left. Burks

returned a while later, claiming he was missing some property, and

appellant and Burks became involved in a physical fight, with

appellant’s sister, Sabra Garnes, joining in. A neighbor broke up

the fight, but it later was renewed when Burks returned with his

girlfriend, Kaima Davis, and other members of Davis’s family, to

demand his property. Burks and appellant resumed fighting, and

eventually appellant yelled to Sabra to get his gun. Sabra pointed

the gun in the air, and told everyone to leave, but they ignored her. 

Someone took the gun and put it under a mat on the porch. A

general melee ensued, in which Sabra and Burks began fighting,

Kaima Davis assisted Burks, and others joined in, or tried to break

it up.

Appellant ran to the porch and retrieved the gun. He testified that

he fired a shot into the air, hoping everyone would leave, but no

one reacted. Appellant testified that he then fired two shots at

some cars parked about 15 to 20 feet away from Burks, and then

Burks turned and ran, as appellant fired another shot. 

Burks testified that when appellant picked up the gun, he looked at

Burks, said, “yeah, you,” and began to fire from about 22 feet

away. Burks turned and started running, and as he ran, he heard a

bullet ring by his ear. Burks ran past several cars, and heard

several more shots as he ran. He turned to see appellant running

after him, with the gun pointed in Burk’s direction. Other

witnesses also saw appellant firing at Burks as he ran.

Police investigators found several nine millimeter shell casings in

front of the house at 175 Kemper; two live rounds in a bedroom; a

live round in front of a nearby house; a bullet hole, and two bullet

fragments in a car parked in front of a house down the street; and

two bullet holes in a car parked in front of 806 Gateway.

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3

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits

in state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

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4

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner’s first claim is that his conviction on the charge of attempted murder

must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial that he had the intent

to kill. Pet. at 7-8. Petitioner argues that the evidence demonstrated only that he intended to

frighten his attackers and not that he intended to kill Burks. Points and Authorities in Support of

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (P&A) at 12. Petitioner notes that he did not hit Burks, even

though he was shooting at close range. Id. 

This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in a written decision on

petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the California Supreme Court without comment on petition for

review. Answer, Exs. F, G, H. The California Court of Appeal explained its reasoning as

follows:

When reviewing a judgment for substantial evidence this court

must draw all inferences, and resolve all conflicts, in favor of the

judgment, and defer to the credibility determinations made by the

trier of fact. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 546;

People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Absent direct

evidence of the defendant’s state of mind at the moment he shoots,

the trier of fact may infer it from “all the circumstances of the

attempt, including the putative killer’s actions and words.” 

(People v. Lashley, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 946.) “The act of

firing toward a victim at a close, but not point black, range ‘in a

manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet

been on target is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill .

. . .’” (People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690,

quoting People v. Lashley, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 945.)

Conflicting inferences could be drawn from the circumstances of

the attempt, in this case. Viewing the evidence in the light most

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favorable to the judgment, substantial evidence supports the

finding of intent to kill: Before firing, appellant looked at Burks

and said, “Yeah, you.” He fired at Burks from a distance of

approximately 22 feet, and continued to fire after Burks turned and

ran. As he ran, Burks turned to see appellant running after him,

and pointing the gun at him. Bullets were found in cars along the

path of Burks’s retreat. All of the foregoing evidence supports the

inference that appellant aimed the gun at Burks, and intended to

kill him. That he was unsuccessful either because of poor

marksmanship, or because he abandoned his effort “out of

necessity or fear,” does not necessarily “establish a less culpable

state of mind.” (People v. Lashley, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p.

945.)

Opinion at 3. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There

is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “[T]he dispositive

question under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318). A petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding “faces a

heavy burden when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction

on federal due process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274, 1275 & n.13 (9th Cir.

2005). In order to grant the writ, the habeas court must find that the decision of the state court

reflected an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. 

Id.

The court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985),

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vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is

the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the trier

of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in its review will assign

the inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). The

relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether

the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th

Cir. 1991). “The question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” 

Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court determines the

sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as

defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983. 

Intent to kill is an element of the crime of attempted murder under California law. 

Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187, 664. See also People v. Lashley, 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945 n.4 (1991). As

described by the California Court of Appeal, Burks testified that petitioner pointed a gun at him

from a distance of approximately 22 feet and fired. Petitioner continued firing while pursuing

Burks down the street. Police investigators found bullets and bullet holes in front of homes and

in cars parked along the path of Burks’s retreat. These facts could reasonably support a finding

that petitioner intended to kill Burks. The fact that there was also evidence supporting

petitioner’s claim that he only intended to frighten Burks and his associates is not dispositive of

this claim. Notwithstanding any exculpatory evidence, there was substantial evidence from

which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was

guilty of intent to commit murder. Because there was substantial evidence presented at trial to

support petitioner’s conviction on these charges, the state court’s analysis of this claim is not

“objectively unreasonable.” See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). See also 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

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B. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence

Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial court violated his rights to due process,

to confront the witnesses against him, and to present a defense when it refused to allow him to

cross-examine Burks with evidence that at the time of trial Burks had criminal charges pending

against him for possession of cocaine and marijuana for sale arising from an altercation with a

police officer in December, 1999. Pet. at 8; P&A at 14. Petitioner contends that the jury would

have “received a significantly different impression of Burks’ credibility” if he had been allowed

to impeach Burks with his pending criminal charges. P&A at 17, 18. Petitioner also argues that

this evidence would have supported his contested assertion that Burks was attempting to sell

marijuana outside petitioner’s mother’s house when the confrontation occurred, and would have

provided evidence that Burks had a motive to lie on the witness stand in order to gain a possible

advantage in his pending criminal case. Id. at 18-19. Finally, petitioner contends that the trial

court’s exclusion of evidence of Burks’s pending drug charges was unfair because the court

allowed evidence that petitioner had a prior conviction for possession for sale of marijuana. Id.

at 20.

1. State Court Opinion

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision of the California Court of

Appeal on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court explained its reasoning as follows:

The court ruled, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, that

appellant could impeach Burks with several prior incidents in

which he gave false information to a police officer and resisted

arrests. The court also allowed the defense to present the

testimony of a Vallejo police officer that, when he attempted to

arrest Burks in the December 1999 incident, Burks resisted arrest. 

However, because of concerns that Burks would invoke the Fifth

Amendment if asked about the pending charges, and that all of

Burks’s testimony could be stricken, which would necessitate the

reading of his preliminary hearing transcript, the court did not

allow appellant to cross-examine Burks, regarding the pending

charges of possession of marijuana, or cocaine base for sale.

Appellant contends that the court abused its discretion, and that the

limitation it imposed upon cross-examination of Burks violated

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appellant’s right of confrontation, and his ability to present a

complete defense.

“A trial court’s limitation on cross-examination pertaining to the

credibility of a witness does not violate the confrontation clause

unless a reasonable jury might have received a significantly

different impression of the witness’s credibility had the excluded

cross-examination been permitted.” (People v. Quartermain

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623-624; accord, Delaware v. Van Arsdall

(1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d

744, 781.) Here, the jury was informed through cross-examination

that Burks had twice lied to police officers, and fled from another

who was running a warrant check on him, and with respect to the

December 1999 incident, they learned that he had resisted arrest by

punching the arresting officer. Sabra Garnes testified that Burks

brought marijuana to her house every day, and on the day of the

shooting had returned to the house to retrieve his lost stash. 

Appellant also testified that Burks was selling drugs in front of

appellant’s mother’s house on the day of the incident. This

evidence clearly conveyed the impression that Burks was

dishonest, engaged in assaultive behavior, and involved in criminal

activities, including selling drugs. The marginal impact of the

specific information that in the December 1999 altercation with a

police officer he was charged with possession of marijuana and

cocaine base for sale, would not have created a significantly

different impression, and the limitation the court imposed therefore

did not violate appellant’s right of confrontation.

Nor did the court abuse its discretion pursuant to Evidence Code

section 352. The additional information that the December 1999

incident involved possession of marijuana for sale, a crime of

moral turpitude, was cumulative of other permitted impeachment

evidence, and therefore only of marginal probative value. 

Weighed against this was the substantial risk of undue

consumption of time if Burks had invoked the Fifth Amendment,

and all his testimony had been stricken. (See People v. Jennings

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 372 [court did not abuse its discretion under

§ 352, or violate the defendant’s confrontation rights by restricting

impeachment to avoid consumption of time as a result of witnesses

invocation of Fifth Amendment].) The court also took into

consideration that both the prosecution, and appellant, wanted

Burks to testify as a live witness, and accomplishing that goal

required some restriction on the scope of cross-examination to

avoid invocation of the Fifth Amendment.

Appellant argues that questioning Burks regarding the pending

charges of possession of cocaine and marijuana for sale would not

have been merely cumulative of other impeachment, because

appellant could have relied upon this evidence to impeach Burks

on a specific issue, i.e., his denial that he was selling marijuana in

front of appellant’s mother’s house on the day the shooting

occurred. He suggests that evidence that Burks was arrested in

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2

 Appellant also contends that the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion because the

court did allow appellant to be impeached with a prior conviction for possession of marijuana

for sale. Appellant is comparing apples and oranges: Burks had many other convictions with

which he could be impeached, and allowing questions regarding the pending charge posed the

risk that Burks would invoke the Fifth Amendment. Appellant had only one prior conviction,

impeachment did not pose any Fifth Amendment problem, and the court ruled that it must be

sanitized.

9

December 1999 for possession of marijuana for sale was

admissible pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1103, to

show that Burks also was selling marijuana on the day of the

shooting, as appellant and Sabra Garnes testified. Yet, in the

argument prior to the court’s evidentiary ruling, appellant did not

suggest to the trial court that the evidence of pending charges was

independently admissible for this purpose. Instead, she argued

only that the conduct of possession for sale was admissible as a

crime of moral turpitude. The court did not have an opportunity to

rule on the issue, and it is therefore waived on appeal. In any

event, the court did allow the direct testimony of Sabra Garnes,

and appellant, that Burks was selling marijuana.

Appellant also contends that the court’s ruling prohibited him from

demonstrating Burks’s bias arising from the fact of pending

charges, and the hope that, if he testified favorably for the

prosecution, he might receive more lenient treatment. Again, the

contention is waived because it was not made in the trial court. 

Had appellant presented this argument below, it is possible that the

court could have modified its ruling to allow appellant either to ask

Burks whether he had any charges currently pending against him,

without inquiring into the nature of the charges, or any other

questioning which might not have provoked the invocation of the

Fifth Amendment. Again, however, it is not reasonably probable,

that evidence of this particular bias would have resulted in a more

favorable outcome, in light of the admission of other evidence

impeaching Burks’s credibility.

We conclude, based upon the arguments presented to it, the court

struck a reasonable balance between appellant’s need to crossexamine and impeach Burks, and avoidance of the risk that Burks

would invoke the Fifth Amendment if asked about the pending

charges, especially in light of the stated desire of both the defense

and the prosecution that it was important to have Burks testify

“live” to the jury. The court reasonably concluded that the risk

that time would be wasted, by striking his testimony, outweighed

the marginal probative value of presenting the jury with yet

another reason why it could discredit Burks’s testimony.2

Opinion at 4-6.

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2. Procedural Default

As set forth above, the state appellate court concluded that petitioner had waived

certain of his arguments on appeal because of his trial attorney’s failure to raise the appropriate

objections at trial. Specifically, the appellate court noted that trial counsel failed to suggest to

the trial court that the excluded evidence would have been relevant to show that Burks was

selling marijuana on the day of the shooting, as appellant and Sabra Garnes testified; or that it

was “relevant to Burks’s bias arising from the fact of pending charges, and the hope that, if he

testified favorably for the prosecution, he might receive more lenient treatment.” (Opinion at 6.) 

Respondent suggests that the state appellate court’s finding of waiver constitutes a state

procedural bar precluding this court from addressing the merits of these two arguments. 

(Answer at 9 n.4.) 

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural default. Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). As a general rule, a federal habeas court “‘will not review a question

of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Calderon v.

United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The state rule is only “adequate” if it is “firmly

established and regularly followed.” Id. (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991));

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F 3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[t]o be deemed adequate, the state law

ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied.”) The state rule must also

be “independent” in that it is not “interwoven with the federal law.” Park v. California, 202

F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). 

Even if the state rule is independent and adequate, the claims may be heard if the petitioner can

show: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal

law; or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50. 

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Respondent has met his burden of adequately pleading an independent and adequate state

procedural ground as an affirmative defense. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner does not

deny that his trial counsel did not raise a contemporaneous objection on these two grounds to the

admission of evidence of Burks’s pending criminal charges. Although the state appellate court

addressed petitioner’s due process claim on the merits, it also expressly held that these two

specific grounds were waived on appeal because of defense counsel’s failure to object. 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate

the inadequacy of California's contemporaneous-objection rule as unclear, inconsistently applied

or not well-established, either as a general rule or as applied to him. Bennett 322 F.3d at 586;

Chein, 323 F.3d at 751-52; Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner’s claims therefore appear to be procedurally barred. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747;

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th

Cir. 2004). Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that there was cause for his procedural

default or that a miscarriage of justice would result absent review of the claim by this court. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999). However,

for the reasons discussed below, even if these claims were not procedurally barred, they lack

merit and must be denied. 

3. Analysis

Absent some federal constitutional violation, a violation of state law does not

provide a basis for habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Accordingly,

a state court’s evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it

renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Drayden v.

White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999);

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment,

to present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v.

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Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687, 690 (1986);

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972). 

However, the constitutional right to present a defense is not absolute. Alcala v. Woodford, 334

F.3d 862, 877 (9th Cir. 2003). "Even relevant and reliable evidence can be excluded when the

state interest is strong." Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, 

[w]here evidence has been excluded pursuant to a state evidentiary

law, we use a balancing test: In weighing the importance of

evidence offered by a defendant against the state's interest in

exclusion, the court should consider the probative value of the

evidence on the central issue; its reliability; whether it is capable

of evaluation by the trier of fact; whether it is the sole evidence on

the issue or merely cumulative; and whether it constitutes a major

part of the attempted defense. A court must also consider the

purpose of the [evidentiary] rule; its importance; how well the rule

implements its purpose; and how well the purpose applies to the

case at hand. The court must give due weight to the substantial

state interest in preserving orderly trials, in judicial efficiency, and

in excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence.

Alcala, 334 F.3d at 877 (quoting Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985)). See also

Drayden, 232 F. 3d at 711. A state law justification for exclusion of evidence does not abridge a

criminal defendant’s right to present a defense unless it is "arbitrary or disproportionate" and

"infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,

308 (1998). See also Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-91 (discussion of the tension between the

discretion of state courts to exclude evidence at trial and the federal constitutional right to

“present a complete defense”); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 The right to confront witnesses, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments, includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses to attack their general

credibility or show their possible bias or self-interest in testifying. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S.

227, 231 (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415

U.S. 308, 316 (1973); United States v. Larson, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2466872 (9th Cir. 2006). 

A Confrontation Clause violation occurs where the defendant is prevented from investigating “a

prototypical form of bias” if “[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different

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impression of [the witness’] credibility had respondent's counsel been permitted to pursue his

proposed line of cross-examination”). Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. However, “[t]rial judges

retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned” and may impose

limitations on cross-examination that are “reasonable’ and are not “arbitrary or disproportionate

to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Id. at 679; Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151

(1991). “The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,

not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense

might wish.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20

(1985) (per curiam)). The Ninth Circuit utilizes a three-part test to determine whether a trial

court violated the Confrontation Clause by excluding evidence: “(1) whether the excluded

evidence was relevant; (2) whether there were other legitimate interests outweighing the

defendant’s interest in presenting the evidence; and (3) whether the exclusion of evidence left the

jury with sufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness.” Larson, 2006 WL

2466872 at *4. 

The improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias is

subject to a harmless-error analysis. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d

1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005). (“Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error

analysis and thus may be excused depending on the state of the evidence at trial”). Thus,

petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the trial court’s error “had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See also Forn v. Hornung 343 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir.

2003) (finding that a Confrontation Clause error did not have a “substantial and injurious” effect

on the verdict and that the error was therefore harmless).

 The conclusion of the state appellate court that petitioner’s right to confront the

witnesses against him was not violated by the exclusion of evidence that Burks had criminal

charges pending at the time of trial is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the

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federal principles discussed above and should not be set aside. Petitioner’s jury was advised of

sufficient information to enable it to effectively assess Burks’s credibility and to “appropriately

draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. As

noted by the California Court of Appeal, the jury learned that Burks had lied to police officers,

had fled from an officer who was running a warrant check, had punched a police officer who was

trying to arrest him, and had possessed and sold drugs. Under these circumstances, evidence that

Burks was facing drug charges would not have given the jury a significantly different impression

of his credibility. The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply clearly established

federal law in concluding that there was no Confrontation Clause error here.

In addition, legitimate interests outweighed the slight probative value of the

excluded evidence. See Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 421 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th

Cir. 2005). Specifically, the trial court wished to avoid the time-consuming task of reading

Burks’ preliminary hearing transcript to the jury, and both parties wanted Burks to testify in

person. It is true that evidence of Burks’s pending criminal charges could have enabled the

defense to argue that he was testifying favorably for the prosecution in order to obtain lenient

treatment in his criminal case. However, there is no information that Burks received or was even

offered favorable treatment on his pending criminal charges. Accordingly, any inference of bias

would have been based on pure speculation. Although evidence regarding Burks’ pending

charges was technically relevant to his bias or motivation in testifying, it was only marginally so

given the circumstances of this case. For this reason, even if there were any Confrontation

Clause error, it would not have had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Nor did the exclusion of this evidence render petitioner’s trial fundamentally

unfair or preclude petitioner from presenting his defense. Evidence that Burks had drug charges

pending against him was not particularly probative on the central issue of petitioner’s intent

when he fired the gun. Both petitioner and the prosecutor wanted Burks to testify as a live

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witness. Further, both petitioner and Sabra Garnes testified in support of the defense argument

that Burks was selling marijuana in front of petitioner’s mother’s home immediately prior to the

altercation. The decision of the California Court of Appeal that the trial court imposed

reasonable restrictions on cross-examination in order to strike a balance between petitioner’s

constitutional rights, the desire of both parties that Burks testify in person, and the need for

judicial efficiency, is not contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent nor is it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts of this case.

The state appellate court also concluded that it was not a violation of due process

to allow the introduction of evidence of petitioner’s prior conviction for possession of marijuana

for sale while excluding evidence of Burks’s pending charge for essentially the same offense. 

This court agrees. As explained by the California Court of Appeal, the decision to allow or not

to allow evidence of petitioner’s prior conviction and/or Burks’ pending criminal charges was

dependent on the circumstances pertaining to each individual case. Here, those circumstances

were too distinct to allow for comparison. The trial court’s decisions to exclude evidence of

Burks’s pending criminal charges and to allow evidence of petitioner’s prior conviction were not

fundamentally unfair. 

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal that petitioner’s constitutional

rights were not violated by the exclusion of evidence that Burks had criminal charges pending

against him is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

authority. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

C. Admission of Evidence of Petitioner’s Prior Conduct

In his next claim, petitioner contends that the trial court violated his right to due

process when it improperly allowed the admission of evidence of his “prior conduct selling

marijuana.” Pet. at 8; P&A at 25. Petitioner argues that the trial court’s decision to admit

evidence of petitioner’s prior bad acts while disallowing evidence of Burks’ pending criminal 

/////

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3

 On redirect Sabra stated that she falsely told the police appellant was selling marijuana

at the time, and kept a box of marijuana in his bedroom because they pressured her. The court

sustained appellant’s relevance and Evidence Code section 352 objection to admission of a bag

of marijuana seeds the police found in a box where Ms. Garnes had said appellant kept his

marijuana.

16

charges was fundamentally unfair, and contends that the state appellate court’s decision rejecting

this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts of this case. 

This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in a written decision on

petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the California Supreme Court without comment on petition for

review. The state appellate court explained the facts surrounding the claim as follows:

Appellant, through the direct testimony of Sabra Garnes,

introduced evidence that Burks brought marijuana to her mother’s

house every day, and that on the day of the incident Sabra had

been smoking with Burks. Burks left, but returned later because he

had lost his stash. Then, on cross-examination, Sabra stated that

Burks was trying to make a sale of marijuana in front of the house,

and that was why appellant told Burks to leave. The prosecutor

asked whether appellant was upset, and Sabra responded, “Not

really.” The prosecutor then stated, “Not really. Well, didn’t you

tell the police that your brother sold weed?” After Sabra admitted

that she had made this statement, appellant objected on the ground

of relevance, and moved to strike Sabra’s response. The court

overruled the objection and the prosecutor asked, “[s]o your

brother was selling weed at that time, or used to . . .?,” and Sabra,

replied that he used to.3

Opinion at 7.

The appellate court rejected petitioner’s argument that the trial court abused its

discretion in overruling petitioner’s relevance objection to Sabra Garnes’s testimony. The court

explained its reasoning as follows:

The court has wide latitude in determining the relevance of

evidence. (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 14.) Here, Ms.

Garnes testified that appellant asked Barnes to leave because he

was selling marijuana in front of appellant’s mother’s house, but

that appellant was not upset about it. Her statement to the police

that appellant also sold marijuana then became relevant because, if

he also sold marijuana and was protecting his turf, that fact would

have a tendency in reason to refute Ms. Garnes’s assertion that

appellant was not upset. Appellant’s defense portrayed Burks as

the aggressor, and appellant sought to prove that he acted only in

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defense of himself and of Sabra, and that he fired the gun only to

scare Burks away. Although the reason why the first fight started

was not essential to the prosecution’s case in light of other

circumstances surrounding the shooting that supported the

inference of intent to kill, evidence that appellant also sold

marijuana had a tendency in reason to support the inference that

appellant was defending his territory, and fired the gun at Burks

not to defend himself, or his sister, but to eliminate his

competition. It is immaterial that the prosecutor ultimately chose

not to advance this theory in closing argument, because we review

the court’s ruling based upon the material issues at the time the

objection is made.

Opinion at 7-8.

As discussed above, a state court's evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal

habeas review unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial

guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal, 926 F.2d at

919-20. A federal court cannot disturb a state court's decision to admit evidence on due process

grounds unless the admission of the evidence was “arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair.” See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley v.

Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F. 3d 939, 956

(2002) (a writ of habeas corpus will be granted for an erroneous admission of evidence “only

where the ‘testimony is almost entirely unreliable and ... the factfinder and the adversary system

will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.’"

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)). In addition, in order to obtain habeas

relief on the basis of evidentiary error, petitioner must show that the error was not harmless

under Brecht. Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, in order to grant

relief, the habeas court must find that the error had "'a substantial and injurious effect' on the

verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). 

The use of “other acts” evidence as character evidence is “not only impermissible

under the theory of evidence codified in the California rules of evidence (Cal.Evid.Code § 1101

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4

 It is an open question in The United States Supreme Court whether it violates due

process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in conformity

therewith. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5. 

5

 Petitioner argues that there was no evidence that petitioner and Burks were competing

over the opportunity to sell drugs in front of petitioner’s mother’s house. Therefore, according

to petitioner, the appellate court’s use of this rationalization for the trial court’s decision is based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in this case. P&A at 26. Petitioner notes that the

prosecutor did not argue “or in any way suggest[] that the case was about a drug turf war.” Id. 

He states that, on the contrary, all of the evidence introduced at trial indicated that petitioner had

stopped selling marijuana before the confrontation with Burks. Id. See e.g., RT at 298, 303-04,

312. The trial judge did not explain the basis for his ruling on petitioner’s objection. Id. at 297-

98.) Accordingly, it is not possible to determine whether the trial judge saw the same relevance

in Sabra Burks’s testimony that the appellate court did. However, the appellate court’s ultimate

18

(West Supp.1993) and the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)), but is contrary to

firmly established principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence.” McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d

1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1993). However, under Ninth Circuit law, the admission of “other acts”

evidence violates due process only if there were no other permissible inferences the factfinder

could have drawn from the evidence. Id. at 1381 (question is “whether any inferences relevant

to a fact of consequence may be drawn from each piece of the evidence, or whether they lead

only to impermissible inferences about the defendant's character”); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920

("[e]vidence introduced by the prosecution will often raise more than one inference, some

permissible, some not; we must rely on the jury to sort them out in light of the court's

instructions"). See also United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (evidence

of prior similar crimes “will only sometimes violate the constitutional right to a fair trial, if it is

of no relevance, or if its potential for prejudice far outweighs what little relevance it might

have”).4

As noted by the state appellate court, evidence that petitioner was selling

marijuana in the same location as Burks, if true, could have had a tendency to show petitioner’s

intent (i.e., that he intended to kill Burks in order to eliminate competition or to retaliate for

intruding into his market). For this reason, there was a rational inference the trial court could

draw from the challenged evidence that was not constitutionally impermissible.5

 In addition, the

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determination that the evidence was relevant on the theory that petitioner might have been

attempting to eliminate his competition is not objectively unreasonable, given the facts of this

case. The court notes that whether petitioner was actually engaged in selling drugs at the time of

the altercation or whether he had ceased doing so has nothing to do with the propriety of the

prosecutor’s question to Ms. Barnes. If, as she testified, petitioner was selling drugs, this

information could have provided evidence of petitioner’s state of mind when he ordered Burks

off of his mother’s property and fired a gun at his retreating figure. 

6

 Cal. Evid. Code § 352 provides as follows:

The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)

create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the

issues, or of misleading the jury.

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evidence was not unduly inflammatory or prejudicial. Although Sabra Garnes admitted that she

told the police petitioner had sold marijuana in the past, she explained during cross-examination

that she had only done so because she felt pressured by the police. Petitioner denied that he was

selling drugs at the time of the altercation with Burks. Further, as described by the state

appellate court, evidence of petitioner’s intent was obtained from the actual circumstances of the

shooting as opposed to any theory that petitioner was trying to defend his turf. Under these

circumstances, the testimony of Sabra Garnes with regard to petitioner’s past conduct, which

was recanted by her and denied by petitioner, could not have had “a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

The decision of the California Court of Appeal with respect to this claim is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court authority. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner’s next claim is that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance

when he failed to raise a Cal. Evid. Code § 352 objection to the prosecutor’s question to Sabra

Garnes, described in the claim above.6 This claim was rejected by the California Court of

Appeal in a written decision on petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the California Supreme Court

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7

 Appellant apparently decided to volunteer the nature of his prior conviction, but that

strategic choice was not compelled by the prosecution’s inquiry of Sabra, which did not ask

about the nature of any prior convictions. Both Sabra and appellant testified that, at the time of

the shooting he was no longer engaged in marijuana selling, and the court refused to allow the

prosecution to admit evidence of the marijuana seeds found in a box in appellant’s bedroom.

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without comment on petition for review. The California Court of Appeal explained its reasoning

as follows:

In order to prevail on his contention that his counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel, by failing also to object pursuant

to Evidence Code section 352, appellant must show not only that

counsel’s performance fell below the standard of competence, but

also that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-

694, 697.) We need not decide whether counsel’s performance fell

below the standard of competence, because it is not reasonably

probable that, in the absence of evidence that appellant also had

sold marijuana, the result would have been more favorable. 

Although the prosecution’s question regarding Sabra Garnes’

statement to the police that appellant also sold marijuana satisfied

the minimal standard of relevance, it ultimately did not materially

assist the prosecutor in proving intent to kill. Exclusion of this

evidence would not have produced a more favorable result because

the primary evidence of intent to kill consisted of the

circumstances surrounding the shooting itself, and the physical

evidence relating to location of bullet holes, along the path of

Burks’s retreat. Nor did the admission of this evidence

significantly affect the jury’s assessment of appellant’s credibility

as compared to Burks, who also was impeached with multiple

incidents involving lying to the police, and resisting arrest.7

 We

conclude it is not reasonably probable that the additional

information that appellant also might have sold marijuana in the

past, would have significantly affected the jury’s credibility

determination.

Opinion at 8-9 (emphasis added). Given the strong physical evidence manifesting petitioner’s

intent, the question of whether he was or was not in competition with Burks is of little

consequence.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

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counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a

petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that petitioner did not suffer

prejudice from his trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s question pursuant to Cal.

Evid. Code § 352 is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland and should not

be set aside. The admission of evidence that petitioner used to sell marijuana, but was no longer

doing so, could not have had a significant impact on these proceedings, where evidence of

petitioner’s intent was not dependent on a theory that he was a drug dealer competing with

Burks, and where Burks’s credibility was seriously undermined by evidence of his prior bad acts. 

There is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had counsel raised

an objection to the prosecutor’s question pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 352. Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

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E. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner raises two claims of jury instruction error. After setting forth the

applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate these claims in turn below. 

1. Legal Standards

In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982));

Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas

relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even

“universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth

amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail on such a claim petitioner must demonstrate

“that an erroneous instruction ‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 317 (quoting Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir.

1987)). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury instructions

“‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.’” Id.

(quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). Further, in reviewing an

allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the

Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). 

2. California Jury Instruction (CALJIC) No. 2.21.2

The trial court instructed petitioner’s jury with CALJIC No. 2.21.2, as follows:

A witness, who is willfully false in one material part of his or her

testimony, is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole

testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a

material point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the

probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.

Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 243. Petitioner claims that this jury instruction

unconstitutionally lessened the prosecution’s burden of proving all elements of the crime beyond

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a reasonable doubt, in violation of Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (constitutionally

deficient reasonable-doubt instruction required reversal of conviction) and In re Winship, 397

U.S. 358 (1970) (due process clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact

necessary to constitute the charged crime). Petitioner argues that Burks’s testimony was too

unreliable to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but that this jury instruction may have

persuaded the jurors to rely on the testimony in reaching their verdict, notwithstanding its overall

lack of truthfulness. Specifically, petitioner argues: “a reasonable juror could have found that

Burks testified falsely as to some details but that the probability of truth favored his testimony in

other areas, even if Burks testimony was not reliable enough to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” P&A at 30. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim because “[i]n People v. Riel

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1200 the court rejected this challenge, and we are bound to follow it.” 

Opinion at 9. In Riel, the California Supreme Court concluded that CALJIC No. 2.21.2 did not

reduce the prosecution's burden of proof where the jury was also correctly instructed on the

reasonable doubt standard and was told to “consider all the instructions as a whole and ... to

regard each in the light of all the others.” Id. at 1200. In that case, “[t]he instructions as a whole

correctly instructed the jury on the prosecution's burden of proof.” Id. 

Petitioner argues that the state appellate court’s decision is contrary to the holding

in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) that a constitutionally infirm jury instruction is not

cured by a correct instruction where “a reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two

irreconcilable instructions the jury applied in reaching their verdict.” Id. at 322. Petitioner also

argues that the error in giving CALJIC No. 2.21.2 is not harmless because Burks’ credibility was

crucial in this close case where there was a significant dispute regarding petitioner’s intent when

he fired the gun.

In addition to being instructed with CALJIC No. 2.21.2, petitioner’s jury was

correctly instructed on the concept of reasonable doubt and was told to consider the instructions

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as a whole and “each in light of all the others.” CT at 232, 249. The jury was further instructed

on how to evaluate inconsistent statements made by a witness and how to determine the

“believability” of a witness. Id. at 239-40. When viewed in the context of the instructions as a

whole, the giving of CALJIC No. 2.21.2 did not mislead petitioner’s jurors as to how to evaluate

Burks’s testimony or induce them to give it more weight than it deserved. Francis involved a

situation where a jury instruction used a mandatory presumption to relieve the prosecution’s

burden of proof on an element of the crime charged, and where nothing in the instructions as a

whole clarified that the correct instruction carried more weight than the improper instruction. 

Neither of those factors is present in this case. Accordingly, Francis does not dictate the result

here. 

In addition, there is no evidence in the record that the jury actually applied

CALJIC 2.21.1 to any part of the case before it. On habeas review a trial error is harmless unless

it “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637. Petitioner provides no suggestion or argument as to the testimony on which the

jury may have found Burks “willfully false” or which part of his testimony carried a “probability

of truth.” Further, the instruction applied to all witnesses, and did not single out Burks or any

other witness. As noted, the jury was given a list of factors to consider in determining the

truthfulness of the witnesses and was admonished not to disbelieve the testimony of a particular

witness simply because it contradicted the testimony of another witness. CT at 242. The

prosecutor did not rely on the instruction, or any facts that might have triggered it, at closing

argument. Moreover, the text of CALJIC No. 2.21.2 specifically instructs the jury that “you may

reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point,

unless, from all the evidence, you shall believe the probability of truth favors his testimony in

other particulars,” thereby informing the jury that it could choose to disregard the entire

testimony of a witness found to be materially false. Because petitioner’s jury “‘remained free to

exercise its collective judgment to reject what it did not find trustworthy or plausible,’ the

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instruction could not be applied in a way that challenged the Constitution.” Turner v. Calderon,

281 F.3d 851, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149 (1973))

(declining to issue a certificate of appealability on petitioner’s claim that CALJIC No. 2.21.2

violated due process).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the “instruction by itself so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting

Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147), or “‘a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim of jury instruction error.

3. CALJIC No. 1.22

Petitioner’s next claim is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with “the

wrong definition of ‘malice,’” thereby violating his rights to a jury trial and due process. Pet. at

9. The state court record reflects that petitioner’s jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No.

1.22 with the definition of “malice” contained in Cal. Pen. Code § 7, as follows: “The words

"malice" and "maliciously" import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to

do a wrongful act.” CT at 236. The jurors were also instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.66,

that in order to find petitioner guilty of attempted murder, they must find that he “harbored

express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” 

Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 355. In California, the crime of attempted murder

requires a finding of the specific intent to kill. People v. Lee, 43 Cal.3d 666, 669-70 (1987). 

This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in a written decision on

petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the California Supreme Court without comment on petition for

review. The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in giving CALJIC

No. 1.22. However, the court found that the error was harmless. The court explained its

reasoning as follows:

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8

 Appellant notes only that these cases are “older,” but fails to explain why these

decisions of our supreme court are not controlling in this case.

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Appellant finally contends that the court erred by instructing the

jury on the definition of malice in CALJIC No. 1.22 which gives

the general definition of the word “malice” as defined in Penal

Code section 7. Appellant is correct that it is error to instruct on

this definition of malice when the charge is murder. However, the

courts have also uniformly held that the error is harmless when the

court correctly instructs the jury on the more specific definition of

malice aforethought as an element of murder. (See, e.g., People v.

Price (1965) 63 Cal.2d 370, 374; People v. Chavez (1951) 37

Cal.2d 656, 666; People v. Shade (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 711, 715;

People v. Harris (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 944, 956; People v.

Powell (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 389, 393.) The court in People v.

Chavez, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 666, adopted the reasoning of a

decision of the court of appeal, that the error in giving CALJIC

No. 1.22 was harmless because the jury would follow the more

specific definition of malice aforethought as an element of murder.

The court, in this case, specifically instructed the jury, pursuant to

CALJIC No. 8.66 that : “ . . . In order to prove the attempted

murder, each of the following elements must be proved . . . . 2. 

The person committing the act harbored express malice

aforethought, namely a specific intent to kill unlawfully another

human being.” The jury therefore was not only clearly informed

that it had to find intent to kill, but also that, for the purpose of

finding appellant guilty of attempted murder, malice aforethought

is defined as “a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human

being.” Although giving CALJIC No. 1.22 was error, it was

harmless in light of this more specific instruction that the jury had

to find intent to kill, in order to convict him of attempted murder. 

(People v. Price, supra, 63 Cal.2d 370, 374; People v. Chavez,

supra, 37 Cal.2d 656, 666.)8

Appellant’s reliance upon People v. Lee, supra, 43 Cal.3d 666,

People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, and People v. Johnson

(1981) 30 Cal.3d 444, for the proposition that the definition of

malice in CALJIC No. 1.22, and definition of malice aforethought

in CALJIC No. 8.66 are conflicting instructions on an element of

the offense, requiring reversal if the evidence of intent to kill is not

conclusive, is misplaced. These cases did not involve CALJIC No.

1.22. Instead, they involved the entirely different error that occurs

when the court, in the context of a charge of attempted murder, or

assault with intent to commit murder, incorrectly defines malice

aforethought in include implied malice, which does not require the

specific intent to kill, or informs the jury in one instruction that

attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill, but then, when

defining malice aforethought, includes the definition of implied

malice informing the jury that “it is not necessary to establish that

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9

 The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of

state law when it gave CALJIC 1.22 at petitioner’s trial is not reviewable in this federal habeas

corpus proceeding. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (a federal writ is not available for alleged

error in the interpretation or application of state law); Park, 202 F.3d at 1149 (same). The issue

before this court is whether the erroneous jury instruction violated petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights. 

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the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a

human being.” (People v. Lee, supra, 43 Cal.3d 666, 670; People

v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d 675, 695-696; and People v. Johnson,

supra, 30 Cal.3d 444, 447-449.) In those circumstances there is

either a direct conflict between two instructions on the necessity of

finding intent to kill as an element of attempted murder, or an error

in the instruction on the element of intent to kill that is not cured

by reference to another more specific instruction.

Opinion at 9-11 (emphasis in original).

Where a trial court fails "to properly instruct the jury regarding an element of the

charged crime," the court commits "a constitutional error that deprives the defendant of due

process." Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hennessy v. Goldsmith,

929 F.2d 511, 514 (9th Cir. 1991)). However, harmless error analysis is ordinarily applied to

trial errors, including a jury instruction that actually omits an element of the offense. See Neder

v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 11 (1999). In determining whether the trial court’s error in

giving CALJIC No. 1.21 entitles petitioner to habeas relief, this court must ask “whether the

error had a substantial and injurious effect” on the outcome of the trial. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Under this standard of review, a habeas court may not grant habeas relief unless petitioner can

establish that, as a result of the state trial court's error, he suffered “actual prejudice;” i.e., that as

a result of the error, the outcome of the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair. Id.9

Petitioner claims, in essence, that the trial court gave conflicting jury instructions

regarding the malice required for a guilty finding on the charge of attempted murder. However,

these two jury instructions are not necessarily in direct conflict: the general jury instruction

simply defined malice as a general matter, whereas the specific jury instruction explained that

the criminal act of attempted murder requires specific intent to kill. There is no evidence that the

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jurors believed the more general definition of malice applied to their decision with respect to

whether petitioner was guilty of attempted murder; indeed, the plain language of CALJIC No.

8.66 told them otherwise. This court also notes that the correct statement of the malice

requirement appeared in the part of the instructions that set out the elements of the crime of

attempted murder, whereas CALJIC No. 1.21 was buried in the introductory background

definitions part of the jury instructions. Further, the jury was instructed that in the crime of

attempted murder there must exist a union of act and intent and that “the specific intent required

is included in the definition of the crimes set forth elsewhere in these instructions.” CT at 251.

These circumstances undercut any argument that the jury may have relied on the general

instruction as opposed to the specific instruction in finding petitioner guilty of attempted murder. 

Because petitioner’s jury was prominently instructed on the correct definition of

malice for a guilty finding on the charge of attempted murder, and because substantial evidence

supporting a finding of express malice, the error in giving CALJIC No. 1.22 could not have had

a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. See Estelle, 502 U.S. 62. The

decision of the state appellate court to the same effect is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of United States Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

F. Cumulative Error

Petitioner claims that the cumulative effect of all the errors at his trial violated his

due process right to a fair trial.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the right to a

fair trial. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). However, as the United States Supreme

Court stated in Rose v. Clark: 

The thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct

of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and

correct judgments. Where a reviewing court can find that the

record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment

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10 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that where "no single trial error

examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of

multiple errors may still prejudice a defendant." United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381

(9th Cir.1996). See also Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). 

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should be affirmed. As we have repeatedly stated, "the 

Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a

perfect one.” 

478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681.

This court has addressed each of the issues raised in the pending petition and

concludes that they did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair, either individually or in

the aggregate. Indeed, of all of the claims asserted by petitioner, the state court found only one

harmless state-law error committed by the trial court. There simply is no accumulation of errors

here. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has not articulated a claim of “cumulative

error.”10 Accordingly, any decision by the California courts with respect to this claim is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the United States

Supreme Court. See Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (state court’s

decision not contrary to federal law where no United States Supreme Court precedent exists).

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 25, 2006.

garnes527.hc

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