Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02139/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02139-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alexis Rodriguez, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Louis Winn, Jr., 

 Respondent. 

 CV 14-2139-TUC-JAS (JR) 

 

 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Alexis Rodriguez’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Rodriguez is currently 

confined in the United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona (“USP-Tucson”), and 

alleges that his rights were violated during a disciplinary hearing and requests that his 

Good Conduct Time credits and other privileges be restored. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

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recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On June 15, 2011, Rodriquez was convicted in the Eastern District of New 

York of robbery and weapons related charges1

 and was sentenced to serve a 131-

month sentence. Doc. 9-1, p. 3. He has been incarcerated at USP Tucson since 

August 11, 2011, and his Good Conduct Time (“GCT”) release date is November 15, 

2019. Id. 

 On October 30, 2015, Rodriguez returned to USP Tucson after “being on Writ 

for two years and Rikers Island, New York fighting a state case.” Doc. 1-1, pp. 1-2.2

Two days later, on November 1, 2013, Rodriguez provided a urine sample pursuant 

to the prison’s Urine Surveillance Program. The specimen was assigned specimen 

number BOP0002095528, and the number was affixed to the specimen bottle and 

entered into a urine surveillance log. Doc. 9-1, p. 4. On November 6, 2013, the test 

results were returned to USP-Tucson and showed that specimen number 

BOP0002095528 had tested positive for opiates and marijuana. Doc. 9-2, p. 43. 

 

1

 Rodriguez pled guilty to Conspiracy to Obstruct Commerce by Robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Doc. 9 (Answer), p. 2. 

2

 Presumably, Rodriguez was at Rikers Island in New York pursuant to a writ of 

habeas corpus ad prosequendum. However, neither Rodriguez nor Respondent 

submitted any documentation related to the writ or the terms under which Rodriguez 

was moved and held at Rikers Island. 

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 On November 14, 2013, Special Investigative Supervisor E. Boston prepared 

an Incident Report indicating that Rodriguez tested positive for opiates and marijuana 

and charging him for the violation of Prohibition Act Code 112 for the use of 

narcotics, marijuana, drugs or related paraphernalia not prescribed by medical staff. 

Doc. 9-2, p. 41, 42. The Incident Report was a rewrite of a misplaced report and was 

delivered to Rodriguez by Lieutenant R. Reed on November 15, 2013. Id., p. 41. 

Rodriguez was advised of his rights and offered the opportunity to comment on the 

charges and stated, “I came from a State prison in New York and I was using when I 

was there, when I transferred here I told them this on intake and told them that if I 

was UA’d I was going to be dirty from before I was transferred here.” Id., p. 42. 

Based on the information recorded in the Incident Report, Lieutenant Reed concluded 

that the charge of violating section 112 was supported and accurate. Id. Based on 

those findings, the Incident Report was forwarded to the Unit Disciplinary 

Committee (“UDC”) for further review. Id. 

 On November 18, 2013, Correctional Counselor Y. Flores convened a hearing 

before the UDC. Rodriguez was advised of his rights and offered the opportunity to 

comment on the charges. Id., pp. 3-4, 41. The hearing officer reported his comments 

as follows: “When inmate arrived to USP-Tucson from writ he stated that he advised 

the R&D officer that he used drugs. Inmate states he noted this on paperwork given 

to him to fill out.” Id., p. 41. The UDC’s decision, based on the severity of the 

alleged violation, referred the matter to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”), 

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along with the recommendation that Rodriguez be subjected to disciplinary 

segregation or the loss of GCT credits. Id. 

 On December 10, 2013, DHO Phillips convened a Discipline Hearing on the 

charge against Rodriguez and subsequently prepared a Discipline Hearing Report. 

Id., pp. 38-40. DHO Phillips noted that Rodriguez had waived staff representation 

and gave him the option of postponing the Discipline Hearing until his requested 

staff representative was available, but Rodriguez elected to proceed. Id., p. 38. The 

DHO also noted that Rodriguez had waived his right to call witnesses at the hearing. 

Id. 

 In her report, the DHO noted that she reviewed the toxicology report, a chain 

of command form, and the medical staff memorandum. Id. The DHO noted that 

Rodriguez admitted the charges and reported the following as his statements: 

I came from the State Prison in New York and I was using when I was 

there. When I transferred here I told them this on intake and told them 

that if I was UA’d, I was going to be dirty from before I was transferred 

here. 

I advised the R&D office that I used drugs and noted this on paperwork 

given to me to fill out. 

I came from the state, no [sic] the feds. I used marijuana in the state 

prison, not the BOP. 

Id., pp. 38-39. Based on the cited evidence and Rodriguez’s statements, the DHO 

determined that he “did commit the prohibited act of code 112, Use of Marijuana.” 

Id., p. 39. The DHO also noted that: 

during the time you were at the New York State Prison, you were on a 

writ and you were still under the rule/guidelines . . . outlined by the 

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Federal Bureau of Prisons. It should also be noted, that you have been 

sentenced to the Bureau of Prisons for a lengthy period of time and are 

aware that the Use of any Narcotics, Marijuana, Drugs, Alcohol, 

Intoxicants are against the rules. 

 

Id. Having found that Rodriguez had violated code 112, the DHO sanctioned him 

with 30 days of disciplinary segregation; the loss of 41 days of GCT; the loss of one 

year of telephone privileges; and the loss of one year of visit and visitor privileges. 

Id., p. 40. She then advised Rodriguez of her findings, the evidence, the sanctions, 

and her reasoning. On January 6, 2014, the DHO gave Rodriguez a copy of the 

decision, which advised him of his right to appeal the decision “to the Regional 

Director within 20 calendar days under the Administrative Remedy Procedures.” Id. 

 On January 15, 2014, Rodriguez appealed the outcome of the Discipline 

Hearing under the Administrative Remedy Program to the Regional Director at the 

Western Regional Office. Doc. 9-1, p. 46. Rodriguez claimed that the DHO’s 

decision violated his due process rights and that the BOP did not have jurisdiction 

over him while he was in state custody. Id. On February 7, 2014, the Regional 

Director denied the appeal, finding that Rodriguez had been afforded due process as 

required by the BOP policy and finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

DHO. Id., p. 45. 

 On March 12, 2014, Rodriguez appealed the decisions of the DHO and 

Regional Director to the Central Office, contending that the evidence and law in 

support of his position had not been properly considered. Id., p. 44. On May 21, 

2014, Rodriguez was advised by FCC Tucson Executive Assistant John Stahley that 

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due to a backlog, Rodriguez could “consider the absence of a response to be a denial 

on the appeal/s exhausted at this level.” Doc. 1-1, p. 15. 

 Rodriguez filed the instant petition on May 30, 2014. Doc. 1, p. 9. 

Subsequently, on November 6, 2014, the Acting Administrator for National Inmate 

Appeals denied Rodriguez’s appeal, holding that: 

the required disciplinary procedures were substantially followed and 

each of your Due Process rights were upheld during the discipline 

process. The greater weight of the evidence supports the DHO’s 

decision, and the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the severity 

level of the offense and in compliance with policy. 

 

Doc. 9-1, pp. 39-40.

II. DISCUSSION 

A. BOP Disciplinary Jurisdiction

 Rodriguez’s threshold contention is that the prison did not have jurisdiction to 

sanction him because his marijuana use occurred while he was in New York state 

custody. A similar argument was raised in Capozzi v. Warden USP-Lewisburg, 610 

Fed.Appx. 105 (3rd Cir. 2015). There, Capozzi was serving a federal sentence for 

firearms and extortion offenses when he was released to the custody of the United 

States Marshals Service pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to 

testify in a state court matter. Id. at 105. The Marshals delivered him to a county 

detention center and, while being transported by county authorities to the airport for 

his return flight to the federal facility, Capozzi escaped. Id. After his capture, 

Capozzi was disciplined for his escape under the BOP Inmate Discipline Program 

(“IDP”) and sanctioned 68 days of good conduct time. Id. He challenged the 

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sanctions by filing a petition under section 2241 alleging that the BOP lacked 

jurisdiction to discipline him because he was not in BOP custody at the time of the 

escape. Id. 

 Capozzi’s argument was evaluated under the since repealed 28 C.F.R. § 

541.10(a) (2010), which described the inmates to which the BOP’s IDP applied, and 

the court concluded that even though he was in a state facility on a writ at the time of 

his escape, the provisions of the IDP continued to apply to him. Id. at 108. Under 

that version of the regulation, the court found that Capozzi was, “at the very least, 

under the constructive control of the BOP at the time of his escape.” Id. Although 

the regulation has since changed, the Court agrees with the Respondent that the IDP 

applies to Rodriguez just as it did to Capozzi. 

 The current federal regulation governing the applicability of the IDP provides 

that: 

This program applies to sentenced and unsentenced inmates in Bureau 

custody. It also applies to sentenced and unsentenced inmates 

designated to any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are 

held in custody by direction of, or under an agreement with, the Bureau 

of Prisons. 

28 C.F.R. § 541.2. As Respondent contends, and Rodriguez does not contradict, 

Rodriguez’s time at the New York state facility was due to a specific writ of limited 

scope and duration.3

 Rodriguez has presented no evidence that the BOP ever 

 

3

 The BOP’s Program Statement with regard to § 541.2 states that the “policy applies 

to all persons in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons or Bureau contract 

facilities . . . [but does] not apply to Federal inmates designated to a non-Federal 

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relinquished the exercise of direction his custody. As such, he remained subject to 

the IDP program’s requirements while designated to the New York facility. 

 B. Due Process

 Federal prisoners have a statutory right to good time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3624. “It is well-settled ‘that an inmate’s liberty interest in his earned good time 

credits cannot be denied without minimal safeguards afforded by the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1444 

(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir. 1991)). 

“Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives 

written notice of the charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison 

officials and the reasons for disciplinary action.” Zimmerlee v. Keeny, 831 F.2d 183, 

186 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Rodriguez’s contends is that his procedural due process rights were violated 

because “[t]here was a 14 day delay in the handling of his incident report.” Doc. 1, 

p. 4. However, even if there was a violation of the BOP’s regulations, delay by itself 

does not violate due process. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 

1989); see also Brown v. McGrew, 2013 WL 6512948, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2013) 

(“Thus, even if Petitioner did not receive the report within 15 workdays of the 

 

facility (e.g., inmates serving Federal sentences in state or county facilities).” BOP 

Program Statement 5270.09 (eff. Aug. 1, 2011). There is no evidence that Rodriguez 

was designated to the New York facility to serve his federal sentence; rather, it is 

undisputed that he was designated to the state facility pursuant to a writ of limited 

duration. 

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DHO’s decision, his constitutional rights were not violated by the alleged delay.”); 

Armstrong v. Warden of USP Atwater, 2011 WL 2553266, 8 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A] 

violation of a BOP regulation, without more, does not rise to the level of a due 

process violation.”). To justify relief, the delay must be accompanied by prejudice. 

See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (requiring a showing of 

prejudice to establish a due process violation in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254); Smith v. United States Parole Commission, 875 F.2d 1361, 1368-69 (9th Cri. 

1989) (showing of prejudice required to establish due process violation in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 

 Here, Rodriguez has not alleged prejudice and the Court can discern none. 

The DHO’s decision was based entirely on the urine analysis and other documentary 

evidence the reliability of which was not affected by any alleged delay in handling 

the matter. Similarly, Rodriguez’s explanation of the positive results remained the 

same throughout the administrative process and remains intact in the pending habeas 

petition. His claim is that the positive result for opioids resulted from a prescription 

medication and that he should not have been penalized for using marijuana while he 

was in a New York state prison. The Court cannot see how any delay impacted 

Rodriguez’s ability to present these facts in his disciplinary proceedings. 

 Rodriguez’s remaining due process arguments are substantive. Because 

good time credits are a protected liberty interest, the decision to revoke credits must 

be supported by some evidence in the record. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 

454 (1985). In Hill, the Supreme Court stated: 

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 We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if 

some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to 

revoke good time credits. This standard is met if “there was some 

evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal 

could be deduced. . . .” United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner 

of Immigration, 273 U.S. [103], at 106, 47 S.Ct., [302] at 304. 

Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require 

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the 

relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that 

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See 

ibid.; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133–134, 44 S.Ct. 

260, 260–261, 68 L.Ed. 590 (1924); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 

1018 (C.A.8 1974). 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56. The Constitution does not require that 

the evidence logically preclude any conclusion other than the conclusion reached by 

the disciplinary board; there need only be some evidence to ensure there was some 

basis in fact for the decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. 

 Except for his jurisdictional challenge addressed above, Rodriguez does not 

challenge the finding that he tested positive for marijuana. It is not disputed that the 

report from Phamatec Laboratories constitutes more than “some evidence” of the 

Code 112 violation charged. As such, that is enough to support the DHO’s 

conclusion. 

 It should be noted, however, that Rodriguez’s claim that the DHO’s reliance 

on the positive test for opiates was not justified does have merit. A Code 112 

violation is described as the use of drugs “not prescribed for the individual by the 

medical staff.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1. Rodriguez argues that he was prescribed 

Acetaminophen with Codeine at the time and that the drug would have caused a 

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positive result for opiates. In support of his claim, he has attached Medication 

Administration Records that reflect the prescription. Doc. 1-1, pp. 11-12. Despite 

what the records obviously show, Respondent dismisses Rodriguez’s argument as 

“unsubstantiated,” but offers nothing to undermine the claim. Ultimately, however, 

even if the positive test for opiates is disregarded, the positive test for marijuana 

supports the DHO’s findings under the legal standard applicable to prison discipline 

challenges. 

C. Eighth Amendment 

In Ground Two, Rodriguez contends that the disciplinary process and 

associated penalties amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight 

Amendment. Rodriguez does not appear to be raising a claim of excessive force. 

See, e.g., Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, the claim 

appears to allege that his punishment for the Code 112 violation violates the 

proportionality principle imposed by the Eighth Amendment. See Ewing v. 

California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (Eighth Amendment “forbids only extreme 

sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime”). However, depriving a 

prisoner of phone calls and visits for a year does not violate the Eighth Amendment. 

See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136–37 (2003) (two-year ban on visits to 

inmates who had committed two or more substance-abuse violations does not violate 

the Eighth Amendment); Toussant v. McCarthy, 597 F.Supp. 1388, 1413 

(N.D.Cal.1984) (“Plaintiffs cite to no authority for the assertion that the complete 

denial to inmate of access to telephone violates contemporary standards of decency 

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inherent in the Eighth Amendment”), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 801 

F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986); Williams v. ICC Committee, 812 F.Supp. 1029, 1034 (N.D. 

Cal. 1992) (same). Nor is the loss of 41 days of good time credit so grossly 

disproportionate to Rodriguez’s misconduct as to violate the Eighth Amendment. 

See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980); Tellez v. Ives, 518 Fed.Appx. 

566, 567 (9th Cir. 2013). 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny and dismiss Rodriguez’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 14-2139-TUC-JAS. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 27th day of January, 2016. 

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