Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02065/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02065-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

04cr1016/05cv1701

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STEVEN TROY HICKS,

Defendant-Petitioner. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 05-CV-2065-L

Criminal No. 02-CR-0625-L

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255

TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR

CORRECT SENTENCE

Defendant, a prisoner in federal custody proceeding pro se, filed a motion pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence (“Motion”) following his guilty plea and

sentencing in Criminal Case No. 02cr625-L and direct appeal from the judgment and sentence. 

The court issued an order requiring response to the Motion. The government filed a response,

and Defendant replied. The Motion is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE because by the express terms of the Plea Agreement Defendant waived his right

to bring the Motion. 

Defendant was represented by counsel throughout his criminal case. He was indicted on

one charge of conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He was involved in a conspiracy with at least

/ / / / /

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 While eleven of the conspirators were Defendant’s co-Defendants, four of them

were prosecuted and tried in the companion case for violent crimes in aid of racketeering. (Tr.

of Proceedings before the Hon. M. James Lorenz Without a Jury, 9/4/03 (“Sentencing”) at 12;

see also Indictment at 4.)

04cr1016/05cv1701

2

fifteen other individuals1 to distribute cocaine base and crack cocaine among members of the

West Coast Crips street gang and other individuals. (Indictment filed 3/7/02.) The conspiracy

charge carries a maximum penalty of 10 years to life in custody, a maximum fine of $ 4 million,

a $100 mandatory assessment, and five years of supervised release. (Plea Agreement ¶ III; Tr.

of Proceedings before the Hon. M. James Lorenz Without a Jury, 4/21/06 (“Dispo.”) at 6-7.) 

On April 21, 2003, Defendant entered into a Plea Agreement. He admitted to a number of

drug transactions, and that he personally delivered approximately two kilograms of crack

cocaine. (Plea Agreement ¶ II.B.; Dispo at 11-13.) He agreed to plead guilty, waive his right to

trial, appeal and collateral attack, and provide information to the government regarding the

offense and the West Coast Crips Gang in exchange for the government’s promise not to file a

Notice of Enhanced Sentence for a Prior Conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, and its agreement to

a three level sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and one level departure for a

package deal disposition. (See Plea Agreement ¶¶ I, IV, V, X, XI & XII.) Defendant was

sentenced to 235 months in custody, five years of supervised release and a $100 mandatory

assessment. (Judgment filed 2/10/06; Tr. of Proceedings before the Hon. M. James Lorenz

Without a Jury, 9/4/03 (“Sentencing”) at 22-24.)

Defendant makes two contentions in support of his Motion: (1) ineffective assistance of

counsel who allegedly promised Defendant a ten-year sentence; and (2) that for this reason

Defendant inadvertently waived his right to appeal. In addition, Defendant requests an

evidentiary hearing. The court rejects both contentions based on the record regarding the

voluntariness of Defendant’s guilty plea. An evidentiary hearing is not required because

Defendant’s claim is conclusory and inherently not credible.

The Plea Agreement informed Defendant that by pleading guilty he would waive certain

constitutional and statutory rights, including his right to appeal or collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence: 

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Although not mentioned by the government at the sentencing, Defendant also

received a substantial benefit from the government’s agreement not to file a Notice of Enhanced

Sentence for a Prior Conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851. (Plea Agreement ¶ XI.) Had the

government filed the notice, the resulting enhancement would have doubled the minimum

mandatory sentence from ten to twenty years. (Opp’n at 4, 7-8.)

04cr1016/05cv1701

3

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement, defendant

waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally

attack the conviction and sentence, . . ..

(Plea Agreement ¶ XIII (emphasis added).) The Plea Agreement contains one exception to

Defendant’s waiver:

. . . unless the court imposes a custodial sentence greater than the high end of the

offense level recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement. If the

custodial sentence is greater than the high end of the range, the defendant may

appeal, . . ..

(Id.) Since the court sentenced Defendant to a shorter custodial sentence than the high end of the

offense level recommended by the government, the exception does not apply in this case.

The Plea Agreement expressly set forth the agreed upon sentencing recommendations. 

The parties agreed to a base offense level of 38 and an adjustment of -3 for acceptance of

responsibility. The government agreed to recommend a one level departure for a package deal

disposition, and Defendant reserved the right to request a departure for a medical/psychological

condition and for a combination of factors, which the government could oppose. No agreement

was reached as to Defendant’s criminal history category. (Id. ¶ X.)

At the sentencing, the court considered the arguments of both counsel. The defense

vigorously argued for the statutory minimum 120-month sentence based on Defendant’s mental

disability. (Sentencing at 2-10.) This included arguments that Defendant’s criminal history

resulted from his diminished mental capacity and was overstated. That Defendant suffered from

some level of diminished mental capacity was not disputed. (Id. at 3, 16 & 20.) Based on the

Plea Agreement, the government argued for a sentence of 262 months. (Id. at 19.) According to

the government, Defendant reaped a significant benefit from the Plea Agreement because the

one level departure for a package deal translated to a 30-months reduction in the custodial

sentence.2

 (Id.) The government argued against any additional grounds to shorten the custodial

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

04cr1016/05cv1701

4

sentence. It argued against departing from criminal history category VI because of Defendant’s

long and serious criminal history, including a prior federal drug felony and a state robbery

conviction. (Id. at 12-15, 16-17.) The government further argued against a departure for

diminished mental capacity in part because Defendant’s mental capacity was reduced at least to

some extent due to voluntary drug use, his involvement in the conspiracy indicated the need to

protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or serious threat of violence, and

because his extensive criminal history indicated the need to protect the public. (Id. at 15-18.) 

On October 17, 2001, during the investigation, Defendant was arrested for being a felon in

possession of a firearm during time of gang violence. (Id. at 13-15.) The government

maintained that the surveillance of the situation indicated Defendant agreed to participate in a

shooting of a Blood gang member to retaliate for the suicide death of his brother. (Id.) 

In imposing the 235-month sentence, the court followed the Plea Agreement. The court

found the base offense level to be 38, and granted an adjustment of -3 for acceptance of

responsibility. (Id. at 22.) The court also accepted the government’s recommendation for a one

level departure for group disposition. (Id.) The court declined to depart from criminal history

category of VI because it was not overrepresented given the history of the case, the violence

involved, and the extent of the drug sales involved. (Id.) The court granted, however, a one

level departure for diminished capacity. It found Defendant’s diminished capacity was not

caused by drug use, although it was accentuated by it. (Id. at 23.) No greater departure was

granted due to the need to protect the public, given the serious threat of violence involved in the

offense, and Defendant’s inability to resist participating in criminal activities. (Id. at 23-24.) 

This resulted in a Guidelines range of 235 to 295 months, and the court imposed the sentence of

235 months, at the low end of the range, due to Defendant’s age. (Id. at 24.) The custodial

sentence imposed was lower than the 252-month sentence requested by the government in

accordance with the Plea Agreement, lower than the Guideline range of 292 to 365 months

recommended by the Probation Department in the Presentence Report, and lower than the

mandatory statutory minimum of 240 months, had the government not entered into the Plea

Agreement and filed for a section 851 sentencing enhancement (Notice of Enhanced Sentence

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

04cr1016/05cv1701

5

for a Prior Conviction). Without the plea bargain, with the base offense level of 38 and criminal

history category of VI, and assuming one level departure for diminished capacity. Defendant

faced a potential custodial sentence in the range of 360 months to life. 

After the sentence was pronounced, Defendant expressed his dissatisfaction:

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I would like to say one thing for the record. I

would like to [sic] know that I want to appeal this because I want to go to trial. 

My lawyer had told me ten years. You know what I am saying? The only reason I

took this – I was going to trial. What is the difference, at my age, then taking 20 or

then life? Twenty is life to me. So I would like to put a notice of appeal on record

today.

(Id. at 25-26.) This is the first time Defendant indicated he was promised a shorter sentence.

Defendant appealed, claiming his waiver of appeal was not voluntary, he was legally

incompetent to understand and aid in his defense, and that he should have been told at the

disposition hearing that the government would have had the burden to prove the amount of drug

sales attributable to him beyond reasonable doubt. (Mem., 9th Cir., filed 12/1/04.) The Court of

Appeal rejected all of these claims, found the appeal waiver to have been voluntary and free of

plain error, and dismissed the appeal. (Id.)

Defendant then filed the instant Motion, wherein he claims his guilty plea was neither

knowing nor voluntary because his counsel had promised him that if he pled guilty, he would

receive a 120-month custodial sentence, but instead he received a 235-month sentence. He

further argues that an evidentiary hearing is necessary because neither the Plea Agreement nor

the disposition hearing “shed any light on the advice or promises that Petitioner’s attorney made

to him.” (Reply at 2.) The court disagrees. 

At the disposition hearing, the Court reviewed the charge and the Plea Agreement with

Defendant. (Dispo. at 4-10.) The court then extensively questioned Defendant about any

promises extraneous to the Plea Agreement, which he unequivocally denied, and the

voluntariness of his plea and understanding of the agreement, including the uncertainty of the

sentence, which he unequivocally affirmed:

THE COURT: . . . Mr. Hicks, have you read the Plea Agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

04cr1016/05cv1701

6

THE COURT: Has your attorney gone over the agreement with you paragraph by

paragraph?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And has he explained the agreement to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . Do you understand the agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . Do you have any questions about it at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . Now, you have initialed each page of the agreement; you have

signed at the end of this agreement. This indicates to the court that you have gone

over each and every page of the agreement with your attorney, and that you

understand the terms and conditions of the agreement. Further, based on your

initials on each of the pages and signing at the end and indicating that you

understand the agreement, I find that the statement of facts is a true and correct

summation of the facts in this case.

Now, you understand that the court is not bound by this agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: However, if I do follow the agreement and pronounce sentence in

accordance with the terms of the agreement, you have waived your right to appeal

the sentence or at a later date to collaterally attack the sentence. Is that clear?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And finally, if I don’t follow the terms of the agreement, you have

no right to withdraw your plea of guilty. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . [U]nder the Sentencing Reform Act, the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines apply in this case and after it’s been determined which guideline

applies, then the court has the authority in some circumstances to impose a

sentence that is more severe or less severe than the sentence called for by the

Guidelines. Is that clear?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . [T]he court will not be able to determine the Guideline

sentence for your case until after the Probation Department prepares a Presentence

Report, and both you and the government have had an opportunity to challenge the

facts and recommendations contained in that report. Is that clear?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

04cr1016/05cv1701

7

THE COURT: . . . [H]ave you reviewed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with

your counsel?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about those Guidelines at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . Are you satisfied with the services of your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . Are you entering this plea of guilty of your own free will?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

. . . 

THE COURT: . . . Has anyone made any promises or offered you any

rewards in return for this guilty plea, other than the promises in the Plea

Agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: . . . So you are pleading guilty to count one because in truth and in

fact you are guilty as charged?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, your Honor.

(Dispo. at 7-10 (emphasis added).) Consistent with his representations in court, Defendant

signed the Plea Agreement and initialed its every page. He acknowledged and agreed that “[n]o

one has made any promises or offered any rewards in return for this guilty plea, other than

those contained in this plea agreement or otherwise disclosed to the court.” (Plea

Agreement ¶ VI.B (emphasis added).) Further, he acknowledged and agreed that his counsel

could not make any promises about the sentence:

Defendant understands that the sentence is within the sole discretion of the

sentencing judge. The Government has not made and will not make any

representations as what sentence defendant will receive. Defendant understands

that the sentencing judge may impose the maximum sentence provided by the

statute, and is also aware that any estimate of the probable sentence by defense

counsel is a prediction, not a promise, and is not binding on the court. Likewise, the recommendation made by the Government is not binding on the

court, and it is uncertain at this time what defendant’s sentence will be.

/ / / / /

/ / / / /

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The affidavit of Defendant’s mother lacks any suggestion of foundation or

personal knowledge regarding this assertion.

04cr1016/05cv1701

8

(Plea Agreement ¶ IX (bolded emphasis added).) The Plea Agreement and Defendant’s

representations in court under oath contradict Defendant’s subsequent claim that he was

promised a shorter sentence. 

“A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if (1) the language of the

waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly

and voluntarily made.” United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, a plea agreement that waives the right to appeal or collaterally attack the

conviction and sentence is unenforceable with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims

to the extent they challenge the voluntariness of the waiver. Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d

864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendant maintains that because his Motion challenges the

voluntariness of his plea, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The court disagrees.

An evidentiary hearing is required when the defendant alleges “specific facts which, if

true, would entitle him to relief,” and the motion, files and records of the case “cannot

conclusively show that he is entitled to relief.” Howard v. United States, 381 F.3d 873, 877 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defendant does not allege any specific facts. Without providing any specifics and

without attempting to explain his testimony that he had not received any promises, he makes a

bald assertion that his counsel had promised him a ten-year sentence. This assertion, without

any elaboration, is repeated in Defendant’s affidavit and in the affidavit of his mother.3

 

Defendant relies on Marchibroda v. United States for his argument that an evidentiary

hearing is required. 368 U.S. 487 (1962). Marchibroda is distinguishable, because the

defendant’s motion and affidavit set out detailed factual allegations regarding the times, places

and circumstances when he allegedly received assurances from the prosecutor about the length

of the sentence. Id. at 489 &n.1; see also id. at 495. By contrast, Defendant’s allegations and

affidavit in this case are conclusory and lacking any particulars.

/ / / / /

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

04cr1016/05cv1701

9

When claims in a section 2255 motion are “conclusory or inherently incredible, a district

court has the discretion to dismiss the petition without a hearing.” Howard, 381 F.3d at 879. 

“Specific, credible evidence” is needed to move a claim beyond a bald assertion. Id. Since

Defendant has failed to do so, an evidentiary hearing is not required.

The record establishes Defendant received a sentence in accordance with the Plea

Agreement and that his plea was knowing and voluntary. His waiver of the right to collaterally

attack the conviction and sentence is therefore valid, and his Motion is DENIED. The case is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 4, 2006

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

Case 3:05-cv-02065-L Document 2 Filed 12/04/06 Page 9 of 9