Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00266/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00266-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 345
Nature of Suit: Marine Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Marine-Exoneration from/or Limitation of Liability

---

1Although the state complaint was not appended to the federal complaint, it may be considered

without converting Quality’s motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, because it is central to

P.G.’s claim (since without it, P.G. has no need of exoneration or limitation) and its authenticity is not

questioned. E.g., Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT )

OF P.G. CHARTER BOATS, INC., etc., )

 ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0266-WS-M

Petitioner. )

ORDER

This action is one for exoneration or limitation. Before the Court is the motion of claimant

Quality Inspection Services, Inc. (“Quality”) to dismiss the action as untimely, a motion joined by

claimant John Soles. (Docs. 11, 17). Petitioner P.G. Charter Boats, Inc. (“P.G.”) has filed a response,

(Doc. 20), and Quality a reply, (Doc. 22), and the motion is ripe for resolution. 

In March 2002, Soles was injured while aboard a spud barge named NAV 1 (“the Vessel”). 

(Doc. 1 at 1-2). In March 2004, Soles filed suit in state court, naming as defendants Quality, P.G.,

Gazzier Shipyard, Inc., Richard W. “Pud” Gazzier, and several fictitious defendants. (Doc. 11, Exhibit

A). The complaint did not specify the role of each defendant in causing Soles’ injuries but described

the defendants generally as “either the owner or owner pro hac vice and/or [having] operated or

controlled the activities of various vessels and/or conducted construction upon certain vessels, barges

and appurtenances located and operated upon navigable waters in the Gulf of Mexico.” (Id., ¶ 8).1

According to the petitioner, Richard Gazzier acquired the Vessel in 2001 and transferred

ownership to P.G. in August 2001. Thus, at the time of Soles’ injury and thereafter, P.G. was the

owner of the Vessel. During discovery in the state action, including Gazzier’s deposition, it was

revealed that P.G. was the owner of the Vessel. (Doc. 20 at 2-3). Within six months of receiving

Soles’ proposed amended complaint naming P.G. in December 2004, the instant action was filed. 

“The vessel owner, within six months after a claimant shall have given to or filed with such

owner written notice of claim, may petition a district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction

Case 1:05-cv-00266-WS-M Document 24 Filed 09/07/05 Page 1 of 4
2See Diamond v. Beutel, 247 F.2d 604, 607 (5th Cir. 1957)(although Section 185 specifies

that the vessel owner is to receive notice, “[t]here is, however, nothing, either in the letter of the statute

or in the purpose for which it was enacted, to prevent the owner from appointing an agent to receive

the notice ....”). P.G. does not dispute that notice to its sole shareholder constitutes notice to it. 

-2-

for limitation of liability ....” 46 U.S.C. § 185; accord Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp. Adm. Rule

F(1)(complaint for limitation to be filed “[n]ot later than six months after receipt of a claim in writing”). 

The claimants argue that P.G.’s complaint is untimely as having been filed more than six months after

Soles’ March 2004 complaint. P.G. responds that the six-month period did not begin to run until Soles

proposed amending his complaint in December 2004.

Most of the published cases concerning the timeliness of limitation complaints address the

information that must be provided in a “written notice.” See, e.g., Paradise Divers, Inc. v. Upmal,

402 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 2005)(discussing the competing tests formulated by the Second and

Seventh Circuits). P.G. does not dispute that Soles’ March 2004 complaint provided all the

information required by either of these tests. Instead, P.G. argues that the complaint fatally failed to

provide written notice that Soles was contemplating suit against P.G., because he “sued the wrong

parties.” (Doc. 20 at 6). 

The difficulty, as the claimants note, is that Soles’ complaint named fictitious parties as

defendants and identified them as including the owner of the Vessel. This complaint was received by

Richard Gazzier and Gazzier Shipyard, one of whom was the sole shareholder of P.G. (Doc. 20 at 7). 

By suing fictitious parties as the owner of the Vessel, Soles in fact sued the right party, and by delivering

the complaint to the owner’s sole shareholder, he provided the owner with the written notice required

by statute.2

The adequacy of this notice is amply illustrated by a hypothetical. Had Soles written Gazzier

that he had been injured aboard the Vessel due to the owner’s fault, that his injuries included

hospitalization, permanent disability and loss of earning capacity, and that he intended to sue the owner

for his losses, there is no question but that such a notice would have satisfied the requirements of the

statute. This, however, is precisely the information contained in Soles’ complaint. 

P.G. argues that its position is supported by Billiot v. Dolphin Services, Inc., 225 F.3d 515

Case 1:05-cv-00266-WS-M Document 24 Filed 09/07/05 Page 2 of 4
3Although it appears that Soles’ usage of fictitious defendants satisfied state procedural rules,

see Ala. R. Civ. P. 9(h), the result would not change if it did not, because the question is the adequacy

of notice to P.G. under federal law, not the adequacy of pleading under Alabama law. 

4The Court’s order restraining, staying and enjoining prosecution of the state action, (Doc. 6, ¶

3), is vacated. The Court’s order appointing T.M. Jemison Construction Co. as trustee of the Vessel,

(id., ¶ 5), is likewise vacated. 

-3-

(5th Cir. 2000), and by In re: Lady Jane, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1470 (M.D. Fla. 1992). In Billiot, the

only written notice the owner received misidentified the vessel, and the Court allowed the owner to rely

on the misidentification until the claimant substituted the correct vessel in its notice. 225 F.3d at 517-

18. Here, Soles did not name an incorrect defendant and later substitute a correct one but named a

correct defendant and later merely provided a more specific name for that defendant.3 In re: Lady

Jane is inapposite on similar grounds: the complaint of the owner was deemed timely because the only

claim that had been received was directed exclusively against the owner’s sole shareholder. 818 F.

Supp. at 1472, 1474. Here, the written notice was not directed only to the shareholder but to any

entity that might constitute the owner. 

P.G.’s position is defensible only if Section 185 requires, not only that the owner receive

written notice of an actual or contemplated suit against it but also that the notice identify the owner by

name and do so precisely. That suggestion, however, has already been rejected. See In re: Beesley’s

Point Sea-Doo, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 538, 541 (D.N.J. 1997)(finding it of “little significance” that the

written notice was directed to “Sea Isle Wave Runner/Jet Ski Rentals” because the petitioner did not

dispute that it “received and reviewed” the notice).

“The time limit imposed by [Section 185] is strictly enforced,” Paradise Divers v. Upmal, 402

F.3d at 1090, and the remedy for noncompliance with its statute of limitations is dismissal of the action. 

Id. at 1089, 1091. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, Quality’s motion to dismiss is

granted. This action is dismissed.

4

Case 1:05-cv-00266-WS-M Document 24 Filed 09/07/05 Page 3 of 4
-4-

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of September, 2005.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00266-WS-M Document 24 Filed 09/07/05 Page 4 of 4