Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02111/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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Case No. C 06-2111 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ETC.

(RSEX)

**E-Filed 3/29/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARY ANN SALMON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 06-2111 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 1

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Re: Doc. Nos. 9, 10 ]

Plaintiff Mary Ann Salmon (“Salmon”) filed this action on March 21, 2006, seeking 

reversal or remand of Defendant’s decision to deny her request for disability income benefits.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on July 16, 2006. Defendant filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment on August 11, 2006. Plaintiff filed a reply on August 17, 2006. The

matter was submitted without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs motion

will be denied, and Defendant’s motion will be granted.

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Case No. C 06-2111 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ETC.

(RSEX)

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

dated October 4, 2005, and the accompanying administrative record. Salmon is sixty-one years

old with more than a high school education. A. R. at 17. Her work experience includes

employment as an office manager, a leasing agent, and a marketing coordinator. Id. Salmon

alleges that she became disabled on May 5, 2003, as a result of status post cervical fusion,

lumbar degenerative disc disease, major depression, and post traumatic stress disorder. Id. On

September 8, 2003, she applied for disability insurance benefits. Id. at 16. Her application was

initially denied on November 25, 2003, Id. at 25, and denied again after reconsideration on June

7, 2004. Id. at 30. Pursuant to Salmon’s request, the ALJ held an administrative hearing on

December 7, 2004. Id. at 47. Salmon, who was represented by counsel, testified at the hearing, as

did vocational expert Scott Simon. Id. at 250-85. 

After reviewing all of the evidence, the ALJ found that Salmon is not disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled to disability or disability insurance

benefits. Id. at 16. Specifically, the ALJ found that Salmon had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged onset of her disability. Id. at 20. Further, although the ALJ found that

Salmon’s chronic back pain is “severe” based upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 

her medical impairment, does not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in

Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. Id. The ALJ also found that Salmon’s allegations

regarding her limitations were not totally credible. Id. Salmon had excellent results from the

cervical fusion in 2003, and has not seen a doctor since September, 2003. Id. at 19. Although

Salmon was disabled for several months after a car accident in May 2003, the medical evidence

indicates that she recovered fully . Id. Although Salmon complained of back pain, she received

no treatment for it. Id. The ALJ found that Salmon’s medically determinable chronic back pain

does not deprive her of the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary

work. Id.

The ALJ also found that there is little medical evidence to support Salmon’s allegation

that she has a severe mental impairment or that her impairments are so severe as to meet or equal

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Case No. C 06-2111 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ETC.

(RSEX)

an impairment in the Listing. Id. at 18. Salmon has not taken psychotropic medication, and has

never sought therapy from a mental health professional. Id. Although Salmon was depressed and

tearful during a psychiatric evaluation, the ALJ found that she could perform work activities on a

regular basis. Id.

The ALJ stated that Salmon’s claimed symptoms exceeded what reasonably could be 

expected based on the medical evidence of record. Accordingly, Salmon was found to have the

residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. Id. at 19. Moreover, Salmon’s past

relevant work as an office manager, leasing agent, and marketing coordinator do not require

performance of work-related activities precluded by her residual functional capacity pursuant to

20 CFR § 404.1565. Id. at 21. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Salmon was not under a

“disability” as defined in the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled to disability or

disability insurance benefits. Id.

In October 2005, Salmon requested an administrative review of the ALJ’s decision by the

Appeals Council. Her request was denied, and the ALJ’s decision thus became final. Salmon

then commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only

if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper

legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966

F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the term “substantial evidence” means “more

than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance - it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; see also

Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering

adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation,

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A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he or she can still do despite 2

existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152,

1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Case No. C 06-2111 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ETC.

(RSEX)

the Court must defer to the decision of the Commissioner. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin,

966 F.2d at 1258.

B. Standard for Determining Disability

A person is “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if he or she is 

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment which 

is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of

at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. The Commissioner

follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). In the first

step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant currently is engaged in substantial

gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant is

not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner

to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments

which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities; if not, a finding of

“not disabled” is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or

combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the

impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing; if so,

disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment or

combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step

requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional

capacity” to perform his or her past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is

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denied. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she is unable to perform past

relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets this burden, a prima facie case

of disability is established. The Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the

claimant can perform other substantial gainful work; the determination of this issue comprises

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the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester, 81

F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

III. DISCUSSION

Salmon asserts several challenges to the ALJ’s decision. First, she argues that the ALJ

improperly assessed her residual functional capacity in concluding that she could perform her

past relevant work. Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to consider the diagnosis of Dr.

Ronald S. Greenwald, her treating orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Lara A. Salamacha, her

consultative examining orthopedist. Third, Salmon argues that the ALJ erred in not finding her

mental impairment - depression - to be severe.

A. ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

Salmon contends that the ALJ failed accurately to assess her residual functional capacity

and thereby found incorrectly that she could perform her past relevant work as an office manager. 

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing disability by showing that a physical or

mental impairment prevents her from engaging in any of her previous occupations. Sanchez v.

812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1989), Allen v. Sec’y of HHS., 726 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984).

In assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ must assess all evidence, including

the claimant’s medical reports, to determine what capacity the claimant has for work despite her

impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The ALJ may resolve disputes in contradicted medical

evidence. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989);Vincent ex rel. Vincent v.

Keckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).

Here, the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence in the record before determining

that Salmon has the residual functional capacity to work in her past relevant work as an office

manager. In assessing Salmon’s alleged mental impairment, the ALJ considered the November

11, 2004, psychological evaluation by David H. Silverman, Ph.D, characterizing Salmon as

“profoundly depressed.” A.R. 220-23. The ALJ also considered the contradicting report of the

Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) consultative examiner, who concluded that Salmon

did not have a psychiatric disorder. Id. at163-66. The latter report indicated that Salmon has

never taken psychotropic medication and had never sought therapy with a mental health

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professional. Id. at 164. 

In assessing Salmon’s physical impairment, the ALJ considered Dr. Greenwald’s note 

dated August 21, 2003, which stated that Salmon returned for her second “postop” visit, that 

she was “doing extremely well status post C5 to C7 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion,” and

that “she feels great regarding her neck and arm. No complaints at all. No numbness or tingling

and no neck pain. Her only complaint is chronic low back pain without radiation.” Id. at 132.

The ALJ also considered the December 16, 2004, diagnosis by Dr. Greenwald that Salmon had a

low back pain with bilateral lumbar radiculopathy, the May 4, 2004, x-ray evaluation by Jack

Henry, D.C., and Dr. Salamacha’s consultative examination of Salmon’s back pain. Dr.

Salamacha opined that Salmon could stand or walk in fifteen to twenty minute intervals as

tolerated with ten minutes of rest between intervals and use of a cane; could lift ten pounds

frequently and twenty pounds occasionally; could perform no bending, stooping or crouching;

could perform overhead reaching bilaterally; and could perform frequent table top handling,

feeling, fingering and grasping up to ten pounds. In addition to these medical reports, the ALJ

also considered Salmon’s testimony from the hearing that she is in pain at all times and that she

has emotional problems. 

Salmon contends that the ALJ’s discussion of the medical and non medical evidence

noted above did not comport with Social Security Ruling 96-8p (“SSR 96-8p”), which requires

the adjudicator to provide a narrative description of how the evidence supports the residual

functional capacity. Specifically, Salmon contends that the ALJ failed to provide a rationale for

his findings and failed to consider whether Salmon had the ability to sustain work activity on a

regular and continuous basis despite her back pain problems. These contentions are not supported

by the record. It is clear from his decision that the ALJ reviewed all of the probative medical and

non-medical evidence in the record. The ALJ complied with SSR 96-9p, and his determination is

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ made several specific findings as to Salmon’s

functional capacity. First, the ALJ listed and contrasted the opinion of Dr. Silverman against the

evidence of the DDS consultative examiner. Based on this analysis, the ALJ concluded that

Salmon did not have a severe psychiatric impairment. Second, after summarizing the medical

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evidence with respect to Salmon’s physical condition, the ALJ explained why he believed

Salmon’s testimony was not entirely credible. A.R. at 19. In particular, the ALJ found that

Salmon’s claimed symptoms exceed what reasonably could be expected based on the objective

medical evidence. Id. The ALJ found no objective medical support in the record for Dr.

Greenwald’s opinion that Salmon is limited to less than a full range of sedentary work. Id. The

ALJ considered the x-ray evaluation and determined that it was specific for chiropractic

treatment and otherwise only revealed mild findings which are little more than mild spondylosis.

Id. Then, giving weight to Salmon’s low back pain symptoms, and acknowledging the vocational

expert’s testimony that Salmon’s past relevant work as an office manager was light skilled as

Salmon performed it, the ALJ concluded that Salmon retains the residual functional capacity to

perform the full range of sedentary work. Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s

determination that Salmon retained the residual functional capacity to perform her “past relevant

work as office manager as generally performed in the national economy.” 

B. ALJ’s Consideration of Examining and Treating Sources

Salmon’s second argument is that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of her

treating and examining physicians. 

1. ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Greenwald’s Opinion

Greater weight usually is given to the opinion of a treating physician. Batson v.

Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Matney v.

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, a treating physician’s opinion is not

always binding, and in the case of a conflict, the “ALJ must give specific, legitimate reasons” for

disregarding a treating physician’s opinion. Id. 

Here, Dr. Greenwald is Salmon’s primary treating physician. As noted above, The ALJ

expressly considered Dr. Greenwald’s findings and conclusions. The ALJ observed that on July

3, 2003, Dr. Greenwald noted that Salmon is “doing extremely well status post CS to C7 anterior

cervical discectomy and fusion” and that “she has absolutely no numbness or tingling and no

pain and no weakness whatsoever. The only pain is in the left low back.” A.R. at 18. The ALJ

also cited Dr. Greenwald’s opinion dated December 16, 2004, that Salmon could perform “less

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than sedentary work,” and that Dr. Greenwald had diagnosed Salmon with chronic low back

pain. Id. The ALJ concluded expressly that Dr. Greenwald’s diagnosis was “not supported by

examination findings of longitudinal treatment records.” Id. at 19. The ALJ also found that the xray evaluation was for specific chiropractic treatment and that it revealed only mild findings.

Accordingly, the ALJ adequately explained his basis for giving little weight to the treating

physician’s opinion.

2. ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Salamacha’s Opinion

The opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a

nonexamining physician. See Lester v. Charter, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended

April 9, 1996, Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the opinion of

an examining physician is not contradicted, it may be rejected for “clear and convincing”

reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041-42. Where the opinion of an

examining physician is contradicted by another opinion, it may be rejected for “specific and

legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31;

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1042-43. The opinion of a nonexamining physician, standing alone, will not

constitute substantial evidence justifying rejection of the opinion of either a treating or examining

physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1042-43. Nevertheless, a nonexamining

physician’s opinion may constitute substantial evidence if it is supported by other evidence in the

record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1042-43.

Here, Dr. Salamacha performed a consultative examination on March 18, 2005. Based on

her examination, Dr. Salamacha concluded that Salmon could occasionally lift twenty pounds

and frequently lift ten pounds, and determined that sitting was not affected by any impairment.

Dr. Salamacha also opined that Salmon could only stand and/or walk between two to six hours in

an eight hour workday. This inability to stand and/or walk for a full workday places Salmon in

the sedentary occupation category. See 20 CFR § 404.1567 and Social Security Ruling 83-10. 

The ALJ contrasted Dr. Salamacha’s opinion with the opinion of the DDS nonexamining

medical expert that Salmon could perform light work. That nonexamining report was not

supported by any other evidence in the record and thus did not justify rejection of Dr.

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Salamacha’s examining opinion. Therefore, giving weight to Salmon’s back pain symptoms and

consistent with Dr. Salamacha’s diagnosis, the ALJ properly concluded that Salmon retains the

residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work, not light work. 

C. ALJ’s Finding of a “non-severe” Depression Impairment

Salmon’s final argument is that the ALJ erred in concluding that her depression was a

non-severe impairment. The ALJ noted that Dr. Silverman’s psychological evaluation referred to

Salmon as “profoundly depressed.” The ALJ found that Dr. Silverman’s report was not supported

by any other evidence. Moreover, the report was directly contradicted by the DDS consultative

examiner’s report. The ALJ also found it noteworthy that Salmon had not taken any psychotropic

medication, had never sought therapy with a mental health professional, and had never been

hospitalized for psychiatric reasons. The consultative examiner stated that Salmon was

depressed, but that she could perform work activities on a regular basis. In light of the deference

to which the ALJ’s factual findings are entitled, the record here provides adequate support for the

ALJ’s determination that Salmon’s psychiatric impairments have no more than a minimal effect

on her ability to function. Corrao v. Shalala, 20 F.3d. 943, 949 (9th Cir. 1994). 

IV. ORDER

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; 

(2) Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and 

(3) The Clerk of the Court shall close the file.

DATED: 3/29/07

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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This Order was served on the following persons:

Jaime Luna Preciado jaime.preciado@ssa.gov

Kevin Charles Thurber thurberlaw@sbcglobal.net

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov; claire.muller@usdoj.gov

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