Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00397/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00397-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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* This matter was deemed appropriate for adjudication

without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h).

** The caption is amended to reflect the dismissal of 

Does 1 through 10 (Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order at 2) and

Yuba Cinema Associates, Ltd. (Order July 2, 2004).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERIE WHITE, )

) No. 2:04-cv-397-GEB-CMK

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER*

v. )

) 

CINEMARK USA, INC., dba )

CINEMARK MOVIES 8,** )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her claims under the

California Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons

Act. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53, 54-55.2. Plaintiff also moves for

summary judgment on her claim under section 19955 of the California

Health & Safety Code. Plaintiff, a quadriplegic, alleges that she

encountered barriers at the Defendant’s Yuba City movie theater

(“Theater”), which she visited on January 4, 2004.

Defendant separately moves for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

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1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Rules are

to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Defendant also seeks $11,075.50 in costs incurred

preparing its motion for sanctions should sanctions be awarded.

2

§§ 12101-12213, as well as all of her state law claims. In addition,

Defendant moves for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, for

evidence preclusion sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

37(d) and the court’s inherent power.1 Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s

motion for sanctions and filed a counter-motion for sanctions under

Rule 16(f).

DISCUSSION

I. Cross-Motions for Sanctions

Defendant argues that terminating sanctions are appropriate

because Plaintiff failed to appear at her properly noticed deposition,

and Plaintiff’s counsel wrongfully prevented Plaintiff’s experts from

appearing at their properly noticed depositions. Alternatively,

Defendant seeks a sanction precluding the testimony of Plaintiff and

her two experts.2 Plaintiff responds that Defendant’s motion is an

untimely discovery motion that is barred because the Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Order (“Scheduling Order”), as amended, called for all

discovery to be completed by April 25, 2005. In addition, Plaintiff

seeks monetary sanctions from Defendant under Rule 16(f) in the amount

of $11,375.00, as well as an order that Defendant’s counsel reimburse

Defendant $11,075.50 for the costs incurred preparing its motion for

sanctions.

The first issue is whether Defendant may bring a motion for

terminating sanctions under Rule 37(d) after the April 25, 2005,

discovery “completion” date. (Feb. 18, 2005, Order at 2.) The

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3

Scheduling Order explains that “‘completed’ means that all discovery

shall have been conducted so that all depositions have been taken and

any disputes relative to discovery shall have been resolved by

appropriate orders, if necessary, and where discovery has been

ordered, the order has been complied with or, alternatively, the time

allowed for such compliance shall have expired.” (Scheduling Order at

2-3.) In addition, the Scheduling Order warns that “[a] party

conducting discovery near the discovery ‘completion’ date runs the

risk of losing the opportunity to have a jurist resolve discovery

motions pursuant to the Local Rules.” (Id. at 3 n.2.) Local Rule 72-

302(c)(1), which is cited in the Scheduling Order, states that the

magistrate judge hears motions for sanctions under Rule 37. Thus,

motions for sanctions under Rule 37 should normally be brought before

the magistrate judge within the time allotted for completion of

discovery in the Rule 16 scheduling order. Freeman v. Allstate Life

Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding the requirement

that discovery disputes be timely prosecuted before the magistrate

judge, as required by the Rule 16 scheduling order and Local Rule 72-

302(c)).

However, Plaintiff’s attempt to use the Scheduling Order as

both a sword (by preventing the deposition of Plaintiff and her

experts) and a shield (by preventing sanctions for discovery

violations that occurred immediately before the “completion” of

discovery) is improper. See Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 508

(9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that “the district court erred

by considering all of [Plaintiff’s] discovery misconduct in connection

with its decision to dismiss, because the time to challenge

[Plaintiff’s] responses to [Defendant’s] first round of discovery ‘had

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3 Likewise, Defendant’s claim that in April 2005 it

“learned that Plaintiff’s disclosures for one of the experts

included only a post office box, rendering service of the

subpoena much more costly and burdensome” is unpersuasive since

Defendant should have addressed this defect closer to the time

when the expert report was disclosed in January 2005.

4

long since passed.’”). Rule 1 requires that Rule 16 and Rule 37 “be

construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action.” Further, “[l]itigants are expected to

act in good faith in complying with their discovery obligations, and

[Plaintiff’s] reliance on [her] own delay to justify refusing to

produce [her experts or to attend her own properly noticed deposition]

was anything but good faith.” Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 280

F.3d 1125, 1132 (7th Cir. 2002). Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument that

Rule 16 insulates her from sanctions because the time for completing

discovery has lapsed is erroneous and her cross-motion for Rule 16(f)

sanctions is denied.

A. Plaintiff’s Experts

Defendant did not heed footnote 2 of the Status Order and

waited until the final two weeks of discovery to notice the deposition

of Plaintiff’s two expert witnesses. Defendant’s delayed effort to

depose Plaintiff’s expert witnesses does not justify use of the severe

sanction of either dismissal or evidence preclusion.3

B. Plaintiff

Defendant first noticed Plaintiff’s deposition on

December 9, 2004, setting the deposition for February 1, 2005. 

(Burror Decl. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Sanctions ¶ 3.) Plaintiff twice

requested to reschedule the deposition, and Defendant accommodated

Plaintiff on each occasion. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff’s counsel

unilaterally took the third-noticed deposition off-calendar, but did

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not provide an alternative date to hold the deposition. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

Upon meeting and conferring with Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff’s

deposition was rescheduled for April 11, 2005. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff

did not appear. (Id. ¶ 7.) Afterward, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to

produce Plaintiff for a deposition on April 25, 2005 - the last day

available for discovery. (Id. ¶ 8.) However, once the magistrate

judge denied Defendant’s motion to compel the appearance of

Plaintiff’s experts, Plaintiff, and a third-party witness, Plaintiff

refused to appear, claiming that she could not arrange for

transportation to the noticed location for the deposition. (Id.)

Terminating sanctions requires a showing of willful

disobedience, fault, or bad faith. In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429,

432 (9th Cir. 1996). Disobedience, fault, or bad faith exists where

“disobedient conduct [is] not shown to be outside the control of the

litigant.” Fjelstad v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th

Cir. 1990), quoted in Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948

(9th Cir. 1993). Defendant fails to identify the ground for a finding

of willful disobedience, fault, or bad faith. Indeed, Defendant does

not identify this necessary showing as an element of a caseterminating sanction. (Def.’s Br. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Sanctions at 8.) 

Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to terminating sanctions under

Rule 37 since this element will not be raised and addressed sua

sponte. Furthermore, precluding Plaintiff from testifying and

striking her declarations serves as a de facto terminating sanction,

which requires a specific finding of willful disobedience, fault, or

bad faith. United States for Use & Ben. of Wiltec Guam, Inc. v.

Kahaluu Constr. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 600, 602-03, 603 n.5 (9th Cir.

1988). Therefore, Defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions or

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4 Plaintiff also objects to Card’s analysis of the

Theater under the Americans with Disability Act Accessibility

Guidelines (“ADAAG”) because his analysis does not evaluate the

Theater under the ADA’s “readily achievable” standard. This

argument, however, is not a basis for striking Card’s declaration

as an improper expert report.

6

evidence preclusion is denied, as is Defendant’s request for the costs

it incurred in preparing its motion for sanctions.

II. Defendant’s Objection to Card’s Declaration

Defendant moves to strike the declaration of Joseph Card

(Plaintiff’s expert), which Plaintiff filed in support of her motion

for summary judgment. Defedant argues, inter alia, that Card’s

declaration violates Rule 26 because Card’s expert report analyzed the

Theater under the 2001 California Building Code (“CBC”), but his

declaration analyzed the Theater under the 1984 CBC.4 Plaintiff

characterizes Card’s declaration as a supplement to his January 21,

2005, expert report, or a surrebuttal to Kim Blackseth’s (Defendant’s

expert) rebuttal to Card’s January 21, 2005, expert report. (Pl.’s

Reply Br. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 2-3.)

Rule 26(e)(1) imposes a duty to supplement an expert’s

report if (1) the court so orders, (2) the party learns that the

earlier information is inaccurate or incomplete, or (3) answers to

discovery requests are inaccurate or incomplete. A party may not use

a “non-opinion” as a placeholder to spring a “supplemental opinion” in

the eleventh hour that squarely addresses the issues in a case. 

Keener v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 639, 641 (D. Mont. 1998). As

concerning potential violations of the CBC, Card’s initial report was

a “non-opinion” because it analyzed the Theater under an inapplicable

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5 Plaintiff argues that the 2001 CBC provisions apply

because “barrier removal under federal law . . . is an alteration

under state law, and triggers compliance with the current version

of the CBC.” (Pl.’s Br. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 16.) This

argument, however, does not justify subjecting the Theater to the

provisions of the 2001 CBC before alterations are made to an

existing facility. Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 19959.

7

standard. Cf. id.5 Indeed, Card negates the need to supplement his

expert report by declaring that the information in his January 21,

2005, report is neither inaccurate nor incomplete. (Card Decl. ¶ 7.) 

Therefore, the portion of Card’s declaration discussing alleged

violations of the 1984 CBC is not a supplement to his January 21,

2005, expert report under Rule 26(e)(1). Further, Card’s declaration

cannot be characterized as a valid rebuttal to Blackseth’s rebuttal

because it was disclosed after the time allotted for rebuttal reports

had expired. (Feb. 18, 2005, Order at 2; Blackseth Decl. ¶ 6.) In

addition, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) does not provide for a surrebuttal report.

Since the portion of Card’s declaration discussing alleged

violations of the 1984 CBC at the Theater is neither a supplement to

his January 21, 2005, expert report, nor a rebuttal under Rule

26(a)(2)(C), the declaration must be considered a separate expert

report. See Keener, 181 F.R.D. at 641-42. As such, the portions of

Card’s declaration analyzing the Theater under the 1984 CBC are

stricken because they were not submitted within the time allotted for

expert reports set forth in the Scheduling Order. Pickern v. Pier 1

Imports, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088-89 (E.D. Cal. 2004).

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6 “The standards applicable to motions for summary

judgment are well known, see, e.g., Rodgers v. County of Yolo,

889 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D. Cal. 1995), and need not be repeated

here.” Reitter v. City of Sacramento, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1042

(E.D. Cal. 2000).

8

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment6

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her claim under the

California Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons

Act, arguing that Defendant violated the ADA and the CBC. Title III

of the ADA prescribes: “No individual shall be discriminated against

on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations

of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns . . . or

operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). For

public accommodations constructed before 1993 (“existing facilities”),

discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers

. . . where such removal is readily achievable.” Id.

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The ADAAG “‘provide valuable guidance for

determining whether an existing facility contains architectural

barriers.’” Pascutti v. New York Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226

(S.D.N.Y. 1999), quoted in D’Lil v. Stardust Vacation Club, CIV-S-00-

1496, 2001 WL 1825832, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2001).

Plaintiff tersely lists aspects of the Theater that

allegedly violate the ADAAG. (Pl.’s Br. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at

6-9.) While citing to violations of the ADAAG will prevent Defendant

from obtaining summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claims, those

violations, standing alone, do not “show that there is a genuine issue

as to any material fact [such that Plaintiff] is entitled to judgment

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as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Access Now v. South

Florida Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her state law claims for

violations of the ADA is denied because she has failed to demonstrate

that the Theater “contained actual barriers that hindered her access.” 

Access Now, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1367, cited in D’Lil, 2001 WL 1825832,

at *5.

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to

relief under the Unruh Civil Rights Act because “she was ‘denied full

and equal’ enjoyment and use of the [T]heater” in violation of the

ADA’s general non-discrimination language. (Pl.’s Br. Supp. Pl.’s

Mot. Summ. J. at 11 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).) However, the

ADA’s general non-discrimination language must be considered in light

of the regulatory context of the ADA, rather than evaluated in a

vaccuum. United States v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d

251, 257 (D. Mass. 2001).

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on state law claims

for violations of the CBC is denied because, as discussed above, those

portions of Card’s declaration analyzing the Theater under the 1984

CBC are stricken. Consequently, Plaintiff is denied summary judgment

on these claims because she cannot establish a necessary element of

these theories of liability. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986).

B. Defendant’s Defenses

In the alternative, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment of

Defendant’s twenty-one affirmative defenses. To meet her initial

burden of production under Rule 56, Plaintiff relies on Defendant’s

response to an interrogatory (“Question 12") requiring Defendant to

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identify, inter alia, all facts upon which it bases each of its

affirmative defenses. (White Decl. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 43,

Exh. B.) Defendant responded to Question 12 subject to an objection,

which Magistrate Judge Kellison sustained. (March 25, 2005, Order at

5.) Pursuant to Magistrate Judge Kellison’s order, Defendant

supplemented its response to Question 12 by addressing its first,

third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth,

thirteenth, fourteenth, eighteenth, and twenty-first affirmative

defenses. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet her initial burden of

production under Rule 56 as to Defendant’s second, eleventh, twelfth,

fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, and twentieth

affirmative defenses because she has not demonstrated the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A]

party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility

of ‘. . . identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admission on file together with the

affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In

addition, as to the affirmative defenses that Defendant addressed in

its supplemental response to Question 12, Plaintiff fails to meet her

initial burden of production under Rule 56 because she has made no

effort to show why she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law. Id. (“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of

the motion.”).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

on Defendant’s affirmative defenses is denied. Defendant withdraws

the affirmative defenses of laches and statute of limitations in light

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7 Defendant argues in response to Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment that Plaintiff lacks standing to claim that the

path from the accessible parking spaces crosses a route that

vehicles travel without providing detectable warnings. (Def.’s

Br. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 14.) Defendant is granted

summary adjudication on this issue because detectable warnings

are designed to assist the visually impaired, and Plaintiff is

not visually impaired. Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp.

2d 1065, 1082 (D. Haw. 2000).

11

of Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that she is only seeking relief based on

an alleged visit to the Theater on January 4, 2004. (Def.’s Br. Opp’n

Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 18 n.10.)

IV. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standing

Although in its Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant states that Plaintiff’s claim for relief under the Title III

of the ADA fails for lack of standing, Defendant’s brief is more

narrow, since Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to

injunctive relief under the ADA because there is no real or immediate

threat of future injury. (Def.’s Br. Supp. Def.’s Mot for Summ. J. at

3-5.)7 Defendant proffers two arguments to support its conclusion

that Plaintiff lacks standing: (1) Plaintiff’s visit to the Theater

was a “fluke,” and (2) there is no threat of future harm because

within the upcoming months either Defendant will renovate the Theater,

or Yuba City will condemn the Theater for construction of a public

road. (Id.)

Plaintiff counters Defendant’s first argument by declaring

that she regularly travels from her home in Corning to Sacramento

along Highway 99, which takes her past the Theater. (White Decl.

Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff’s declaration creates a

genuine issue of material fact preventing summary judgment on the

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ground that Plaintiff’s visit to the Theater was a “fluke.”

Defendant’s second argument “‘[confuses] mootness with

standing.’” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000), quoted in Adarand Constructors,

Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 221-22 (2000) (per curiam). To prevail,

Defendant must show that it is “absolutely clear that the alleged

wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to reoccur.” 

Adarand, 528 U.S. at 222 (citation omitted). Neither Defendant’s

submission of a project application to Yuba City for a proposed

renovation of the Theater, nor the prospect that Yuba City may condemn

the Theater to construct a public road meets the lofty showing

required by Adarand. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim for lack of standing is denied.

In its reply brief, Defendant argues, for the first time,

that Plaintiff did not suffer an injury in fact because Plaintiff was

capable of actually accessing the Theater. (Def.’s Reply Br. Supp.

Def.’s Mot for Summ. J. at 10.) Defendant’s argument, however,

incorrectly assumes that Plaintiff must be incapable of entering the

Theater to sustain an injury in fact. Cf. Beomino v. Love’s Rest.,

954 F. Supp. 204, 207 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (analyzing the Unruh Civil

Rights Act and concluding, “[i]f a finding that ultimate access could

have been achieved provided a defense, the spirit of the law would be

defeated.”).

B. ADA

1. Barriers

Defendant asserts that the ADAAG do not apply to the Theater

because it was built before January 1993. (Def.’s Br. Supp. Def.’s

Mot. Summ. J. at 6.) Rather, Defendant contends, “the Theater is

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subject to the less burdensome readily achievable standard.” (Id.) 

Although ADAAG violations are not conclusive proof of a barrier in

existing facilities, they “‘provide valuable guidance for determining

whether an existing facility contains architectural barriers.’” 

Pascuiti, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), quoted in D’Lil, 2001

WL 1825832, at *4; see 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(g) (“The requirements for

barrier removal [in existing facilities] shall not be interpreted to

exceed the standards for alterations in [the ADAAG].”) (emphasis

added). Thus, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

ADA claim for want of architectural barriers is denied because

Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue

of material fact that such barriers exist. Access Now, 161 F. Supp.

2d at 1367.

2. Readily Achievable

Alternatively, Defendant argues that summary judgment is

appropriate because the proposed barrier removal is not readily

achievable. Readily achievable means “easily accomplishable and able

to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 28 C.F.R.

§ 36.304(a). “Whether a specific change is readily achievable ‘is a

fact intensive inquiry that will rarely be decided on summary

judgment.’” Colo. Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd.

P’ship I, 264 F.3d 999, 1022 (10th Cir. 201), quoted in D’Lil, 2001 WL

1825832, at *5 (listing ten “factors to be considered”). 

“[Plaintiff] bear[s] the initial burden of suggesting a method of

barrier removal and proffering evidence that [her] suggested method

meets the statutory definition of ‘readily achievable.’ If

[Plaintiff] meet[s] this burden [Defendant] then bear[s] the ultimate

burden of proving that the suggested method of removal is not readily

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achievable.” Pascuiti v. New York Yankees, 98 CIV. 8186, 1999 WL

1102748 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1999), cited in Colo. Cross, 264 F.3d at

1005-06.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to meet her initial

burden of showing that proposed changes are readily achievable because

“[she] only addresses . . . the cost of barrier removal.” (Def.’s Br.

Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 9.) Further, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff “fails to offer evidence regarding the financial resources

of the facility at issue, . . . fails to offer design plans under the

readily achievable analysis relevant here[,] . . . [and] fails to

provide any evidence that Yuba City would approve [her] proposed set

of modifications.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff submits with Card’s

declaration a “Cost Analysis letter” written to Plaintiff’s counsel

listing the projected costs of “removing architectural barriers per

1990 [ADA] and [CBC] Title 24 requirements,” and organizing those

costs in logical categories. (Card Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B.) Attached to

this letter is a set of specific construction plans for the Theater

addressing some of the alleged ADA violations at the Theater outlined

in Card’s declaration. (Id. at 2-13.) In addition, Plaintiff

proffers the report of Harold Littlejohn, which analyzes Defendant’s

financial status and concludes that Defendant “has the financial

capability of spending reasonable amounts on needed improvements to

comply with ADA.” (Burror Decl. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at ¶ 8,

Exh. F.)

Defendant rejoins that Plaintiff fails to provide financial

analysis of the Theater, as opposed to Defendant’s overall operations;

however, this failure does not negate the Plaintiff’s showing as to

the other factors. Cf. Colo. Cross, 264 F.3d at 1009 (holding that

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8 As discussed above in footnote 7, however, Plaintiff

does not have standing to argue that the lack of detectable

warnings in the route between the accessible parking spaces and

Theater constitutes a violation of the ADA.

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plaintiff’s failure to provide specific construction plans, specific

cost estimates, and the added nuance of the public accommodation being

a historic building presented a “close case” for finding that

plaintiff met his initial showing). Therefore, Defendant is denied

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claims on those barriers addressed

in the Advanced Design Consultants’ Accessibility Improvements Plan

since a genuine issue of material fact exists on the question of

whether removal of those alleged barriers is readily achievable. 

However, since Plaintiff failed to counter Defendant’s motion for

summary adjudication on all alleged ADA violations that are not

addressed in the Advanced Design Consultants’ Accessibility

Improvements Plan, Defendant is granted summary adjudication on those

issues. (Card Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B.) Therefore, the remaining alleged

ADA violations that survive Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

include:

(1) Path of travel from the public way to the Theater’s main

entrance;

(2) Improvements to the disabled parking area, including

installation of level parking and unloading area, proper striping, and

signage;8

(3) Ramps, stairs, and landings at the main entrance;

(4) Removal of barriers in the men’s restroom; and

(5) Removal of barriers in the women’s restroom.

Only those improvements illustrated in the Advanced Design

Consultants’ Accessibility Improvements Plan survive summary

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adjudication.

C. CBC

Defendant meets its initial burden of production under Rule

56 for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for violations

of the CBC because it points to an absence of evidence establishing a

violation of the applicable CBC. (Blackseth Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) For the

reasons set forth in Part II above, those portions of Card’s

declaration analyzing the Theater under the 1984 CBC are stricken. 

Consequently, Plaintiff fails to show that a genuine issue of material

fact exists on her claim under section 19955 of the California Health

and Safety Code. Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 19958.6. Similarly,

Plaintiff fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on her

claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the California Disabled

Persons Act for violations of the applicable CBC. Cal. Civ. Code

§§ 51(d), 54.1(a)(3). Therefore, Defendant is granted summary

adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim under section 19955 of the

California Health and Safety Code. Defendant is also granted summary

adjudication on Plaintiff’s claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act

and the California Disabled Persons Act for violations of the CBC.

In addition, Defendant is grated summary adjudication on

Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se because Plaintiff conceded

that she does not seek actual damages. (Tr. of Mar. 8, 2005, Hr’g at

29:24-30:2.)

CONCLUSION

The parties’ cross-motions for sanctions are denied. 

Defendant’s objection to Card’s analysis of the Theater under the 1984

CBC is sustained, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of Card’s declaration, as

well as those portions of paragraph 9 analyzing the Theater under the

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1984 CBC, are stricken. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

denied. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims

under the ADA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the California Disabled

Persons Act is denied. Defendant is granted summary adjudication on

Plaintiff’s claim under section 19955 of the California Health and

Safety Code and on Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim. Defendant is

granted summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claims under the Unruh

Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons Act as to alleged

violations of the CBC. Defendant is also granted summary adjudication

on Plaintiff’s claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the California

Disabled Persons Act, and the ADA as to alleged violations of the ADA,

except for those alleged ADAAG violations addressed in the Advanced

Design Consultants’ Improvements Plan.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 3, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge 

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