Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06408/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06408-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHRYN HOGAN, et al., CASE NO. CV-F-03-6408 LJO WMW

 

Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

vs. RECONSIDERATION

FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPUTY MICHAEL ROBINSON,

et al.,

Defendants.

 

Preface

The Court has reviewed the Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s comments in footnote 1. They are inaccurate,

degrading to the Court and insulting to the court system. Counsel is cautioned that there is a significant

difference between strong advocacy and unprofessional conduct. The Court will give Plaintiffs’

Counsel the benefit of the doubt this time, and presume that it was the former goal that was intended.

Future counsel caution would be prudent. 

I. Introduction

Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration of its January 12, 2007 Order on Motion to

Compel Further Deposition Testimony of Defendant Robinson (“Jan. 12 Order”). Plaintiffs Kathryn

Hogan and Charlotte-Marie Hogan (“Plaintiffs”) seek reconsideration of each of the four rulings in the

Jan. 12 Order, which cover: (1) further testimony from Defendant Michael Robinson (“Robinson”) about

information contained in an internal affairs and investigations report; (2) further testimony by Robinson

about a check fraud investigation; (3) further testimony by Robinson about an unrelated elder abuse

investigation; and (4) further deposition of Kathryn Hogan. For the following reasons, this Court

DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration on all counts. 

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. Background

A. Facts

This case involves civil rights violations and related state law claims for an investigation of elder

abuse. Plaintiffs allege that beginning in June 2000 and continuing through at least February 2003, the

plaintiffs were the subject of an elder abuse investigation initiated by, jointly, defendants Patricia Towne

(an accountant) and Deputy Michael Robinson, a now-retired detective with the County Sheriff’s

Department. Plaintiffs allege that in approximately September 2000, Towne falsely alleged that

Plaintiffs were abusing their elderly parents, Plaintiff Thomas Slade Hogan and Frances Hogan (now

deceased). Plaintiffs allege that during the course of Robinson’s investigation, he conducted activities

which made it impossible for Plaintiffsto continue conducting their citrusranch business in a profitable

manner and made it possible for Towne to continue misappropriating the estate. Plaintiffs assert claims

for: (1) 42 U.S.C. 1983 against all defendants, including Monell claim against the County, (2)

declaratory relief against all defendants; (3) state law claims against the Country and Robinson,

including intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages of

diminution in the value of the ranch of over $1.5 million, emotional distress damages, punitive damages,

and injunctive and declaratory relief.

B. Pertinent Procedural History

In January and March 2006, Plaintiffs moved to compel production of personnel and internal

affairs investigation records relating to Robinson. The Court then ordered an in camera review of these

records. Following the in camera review, the Court ordered the following:

1. Robinson’s Personnel file: The Court finds that these

documents are not relevant to the issues in the case and also that the

documents are subject to the right of privacy.

2. Internal Affairs re the Kathryn Hogan’s complaint: The

Court finds that documents Bates stamped 000001 to 000015, in this

category, are confidential information protected by the official

information privilege. The remaining documents in this category are

ordered to be produced.

3. Internal Affairs re another elder abuse claim: The Court

finds that documents Bates stamped 000001 to 000027, in this category,

are confidential information protected by the official information

privilege. The remaining documents in this category are ordered

produced due to a similarity in the “favoritism” allegation.

Hogan v. Robinson, et al, CV-F-0306408 AWI LJO, “Order After In Camera Inspection” (May 3, 2006).

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Some documents were ordered produced, while others were found to be privileged information. That

order also stated: “The parties have seven days from the date of service of this Order to object, seek

reconsideration or seek review.” Id. No party filed an objection, sought reconsideration or review of that

order. On June 6, 2006, the Court issued a Protective Order regarding Privileged Documents Ordered

Produced Pursuant to Court’s In Camera Review. 

On August 30, 2006, almost four months after the in camera inspection order,, Plaintiffs filed

a Motion to Compel Further Production of Internal Investigation Documents. That motion was vacated

for failure to submit timely papers pursuant to Local Rule 37-251. 

Robinson was deposed on December 27, 2006. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, and

the Court order of January 4, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the further deposition of Michael

Robinson. The issues as framed byPlaintiffs were: (1) Robinson’s refusal to provide detailed testimony

or other information pertaining to the outcome of the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department’s

investigation of the internal affairs complaint initiated by plaintiff Kathryn Hogan; (2) Robinson’s

refusal to provide detailed testimony or other information pertaining to the specific allegations of

financial impropriety that led to defendant Patricia Towne’s performing an audit of the Fresno Deputy

Sherriff’s Association in 1999; (3) Robinson’s refusal to provide detailed testimony or other information

pertaining to the results of the aforementioned audit; and (4) Robinson’s refusal to provide details

regarding an elder abuse case he worked on in approximately 1999-2000 involving the mother of the

District Judge assigned to this case, the Hon. Anthony W. Ishii.” (Pl. Brief, 1:24-2:5). 

After the parties submitted their moving and opposition papers, the Court took the matter under

submission, without oral argument. On January 12, 2007, the Court issued its Order which made the

following rulings: (1) denied Plaintiffs’ motion to compel more testimony from Robinson regarding

information contained in the international affairs investigation and basis for Robinson’s reprimand; (2)

denied Plaintiffs’ motion to compel testimony from Robinson regarding the audit of the Fresno Deputy

Sheriff’s Association in 1999; (3) denied Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further testimony on the

investigation of an unrelated matter in which the district court judge’s mother reported a fraud type

scheme; and (4) further deposition of Hogan of no more than 6 hours was granted. Plaintiffs seek

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the instant matter, we have a peculiar procedural case. The Magistrate Judge who issued the Jan. 12 order, due 1

to elevation, is now the District Judge assigned to the case. The result is that the District Judge is reviewing his own order.

 On February 27, 2007, the Court brought this to the attention of the parties and counsel were given the opportunity to respond

with any appropriate requests. No requests were made within the time period prescribed by the Court. 

4

reconsideration of each issue covered in the Jan. 12 Order.1

III. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration

Robinson and Towne both argue that the current Motion for Reconsideration is untimely. Both

Local Rule 72-303(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) require a motion for reconsideration

to be made within 10 days of the order to be reconsidered. The order was issued on January 12, 2007

and the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on January 30, 2007–that is, eleven court days after the

issuance of the order. Defendants’ argument of untimeliness ignores Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

6(e). This rule states that “whether a party must act within a prescribed period of time after service and

service is made under Rule 5 (b)(2)...(D), 3 days are added after the prescribed period would otherwise

expire under subdivision a.” In this case, although 11 days had expired under Rule 6(a), Rule 72(a) time

computation begins after the order has been served, thus putting it within the realm of Rule 6(e). Service

was effectuated electronically. Electronic service is covered under Rule 5(b)(2)(D). Thus, three days

should be added to the computation of time. Therefore, this motion is timely.

C. Timeliness of Objections to Information found in Internal Affairs report

Plaintiffs request a reconsideration and ask the Court to compel further testimony regarding an

internal affairs investigation and the basis for Robinson’s reprimand. Plaintiff argues that the Court

erred in finding that part of the information found in the internal affairs report is privileged. The bulk

of Plaintiffs’ argument relates to a line of cases regarding the discovery of administrative files, including

internal affairs reports. These arguments are untimely in the current Motion for Reconsideration. 

In the Jan. 12 order, this Court noted:

The Court reached the substantive issue raised in the motion–the official information

privilege–but a procedural defect has also been raised by defendant. The procedural

defect is that plaintiffs are seeking reconsideration of the Court’s May 3, 2006 order after

the in camera inspection. Defendant’s argument has merit. Plaintiff’s request for

discovery of the information within the boundaries of the Court’s order regarding the IA

investigation is an untimely request for reconsideration of the Court’s order. (Jan. 12

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The argument Plaintiff makes regarding the privilege has been considered by this Court previously in the original 2

Motion to Compel, a second Motion to Compel after a meet and confer, after the in camera review and finally, in the latest

motion to compel. Thus, while the Court declines to once again consider this argument, it has done so on numerous

occasions. 

5

order, 5:5-10).

 Any objection to the finding of privilege should have been made within the allotted time after the May

3, 2006 order. Plaintiffs chose not to file an objection at the appropriate time. Plaintiffs can not use a

Motion for Reconsideration as a tool for objections which should have been brought through a different

procedure. See 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656 (9 Cir. 1999). Therefore, this th

Court rejects this argument as untimely brought. 

2

C. Reconsideration

1. Standards of Review

Reconsideration is appropriate when the district court is presented with newly discovered

evidence, committed clear error, or there is an intervening change in controlling law. School District

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. A C and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9 Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

th

512 U.S. 1236 (1994). “Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors

of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Publisher’s Resource, Inc. v. Walker Davis

Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7 Cir. 1985) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 th

F.Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 736 F.2d 388 (7 Cir. 1984); see Novato Fire Protection th

Dist. v. United States, 181 F.3d 1135, 1142, n.6 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000). th

Reconsideration should not be used to “argue new facts or issues that inexcusably were not presented

to the court in the matter previously decided.” Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1240

(D. Del. 1990). Under this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(k), a party seeking reconsideration must

demonstrate “what new facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exists or were not

shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion and why the facts or

circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.”

2. No Manifest Error in the Law

Plaintiffs object to this Court’s use of City of San Diego v. Superior Court, 136 Ca. App.3d 236

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs do not assert a change in controlling law for any of the four items in this Motion for Reconsideration.

3

While they do mention “manifest injustice,” there is no argument or support in the memorandum regarding that preliminary

claim. Accordingly, the Court has no need to consider these arguments in the instant order. 

6

(1981) in the Jan 12 order. Plaintiffs argument has missed the point of the citation. In the Jan. 12 Order,

this Court cited City of San Diego to illustrate a case with procedural similarities. The Court did not rely

on this case for its ruling regarding privileges. The Court outlined its legal reasoning and foundations

for privileges in its Order for In Camera Review of April 20, 2006. 

In the Order for In Camera Review, this Court relied upon the federal cases of Sanchez v. City

of Santa Ana, F.2d 1027 (9 Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 957 (1991), Miller v. Pancucci, 141 th

F.R.D. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1992), Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987), Soto v. City

of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. Cal. 1995), and Chism v. County of San Bernadino, 159 F.R.D. 531

(C.D. Cal. 1994) in its discussion of the official information privilege. See, generally, Hogan v.

Robinson, et al, CV-F-03-6408, “Order for In Camera Review,” (April 20, 2006). These are the same

cases relied upon by Plaintiffs in the current Motion for Reconsideration and are still good law.

Furthermore, as noted in that order, the instant matter involves both federal questions as well as pendant

state claims. The California statutory scheme for confidential law enforcement personnel files and

records is “not inconsistent with federal discovery law and privileges” and provides “the appropriate

balancing of interests for the determination to be made.” Martinez v. Stockton, 132 F.R.D. 677, 681

(E.D. Cal. 1990); Order for In Camera Review, 6:7-10. Having balanced the privacy rights of the parties

against the need for information, consistent with applicable federal law, this Court concluded after the

in camera review that the majority of the material should be provided under a protective order, while

a small amount should be kept confidential pursuant to the privilege. Thus, there is no showing of clear

error of law. 

3

3. No New Facts

As outlined above, a Motion for Reconsideration requires a showing of new or different facts or

circumstances. Plaintiff does claim that “none of the above-cited facts were known or ascertainable

from any documents that had been produced. Robinson, Klose, Stuart and Caldera had not been

deposed, and none of the factual information upon which the plaintiffs’ recent motion was based was

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs are again reminded that a Motion to Compel Testimony and a Motion for Reconsideration are not to be 4

used as tools to circumvent the Court’s order of May 2006, which found certain information found in the internal affairs file

to be privileged.

7

available.” Pl. Mot. Reconsideration 9:21-24. 

The“new facts” which Plaintiff claims are presented in the following way by Plaintiff:

Robinson testified that the IA investigation done in response to the complaint lodged by

plaintiff Kathryn Hogan resulted in a finding that he ‘didn’t have a report on file due to

a computer glitch’ and that he therefore received a letter of reprimand. However,

subsequent depositions, particularly the depositions of Robinson’s former supervisors,

now Sanger Police Chief Tom Klose and Fresno Sheriff’s Sergeant jay Stuart, confirm,

contrary to Robinson’s representation, that this alleged computer error pertains to

the 2002 supplemental report he wrote memorialized his investigation, not any

report that was written in 2000 or 2001, when he was actually purporting to be

investigating Kathryn Hogan Pl. Mot. Reconsideration, 3:9-17 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff is asserting that the subsequent depositions of Klose and Stuart brought to light new evidence

that the “computer glitch” only relates to a 2002 supplemental report and not a report which should have

been written in 2000 or 2001, contrary to what was known to Plaintiffs at the time Robinson’s deposition

was taken. 

 Counsel for Plaintiff s was aware of the computer glitch situation at the time of the deposition

of Robinson. Robinson first discusses this computer glitch on page 9 of his deposition transcript, when

he was speaking about the results of the international affairs investigation. Later, counsel asks the 4

following question to Robinson: “[C]an you explain to me how your unplugging the computer and the

network crashing in ‘02 would lead to a reassignment of a case number issued in ‘01? Because we are

talking about ‘01 case numbers here, right?” Robinson Deposition, 34:14-17. Counsel then follows up

with questions relating to how a computer glitch in 2002 could have affected a case number in 2000 or

2001. Plaintiffs had knowledge about when the computer glitch happened and what it may have affected

prior to the depositions. Further, Plaintiffs had an opportunity to ask questions relating to the concerns

they now raise. Disturbingly, the evidence shows that counsel for Plaintiffs asked questions and

received answers about the questions they say arose only after the depositions of Klose and Stuart. For

example, later in the deposition testimony, it is counsel for Plaintiffs himself who relates the computer

glitch to the entire report of 2000 or 2001, while Robinson disagrees with that assertion, saying “they

are someplace, but I have no idea.” Robinson Deposition, 173:3.

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Robinson’s Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration also argues that seven other statements made by Plaintiffs

5

are misleading. Memo. Opp. Mot. Reconsideration, 5-8. The Court finds that it is unnecessary to go through all of the

statements individually. 

Whatever law is cited in this brief relates to Plaintiffs objections to the finding of the privileged information found 6

in the May 3, 2006 order. The latest case in that series was decided in 2002, five years before the present motion. 

This ruling does not reach the substantive issues raised by Plaintiffs. 

7

8

 No new evidence or change of controlling law has been asserted in this Motion for

Reconsideration. Instead, Plaintiffs present misleading statements and mischaracterizations of the 5

evidence in a misguided attempt to circumvent the Court’s prior ruling. Failing to show any new

evidence or change in controlling law , Plaintiffs motion is denied. 6

4. FDSA Audit

Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in denying the Plaintiffs information regarding the FDSA

audit, because they “should not have to accept the mendacious Robinson’s description of this audit as

true, particularly when his explanation does not hold water.” Pl. Mot. Reconsideration, 10:4-5. Plaintiffs

claim that “the Court is preventing the plaintiffs from obtaining highly valuable impeachment

information,” but is unable to articulate or present to the Court what further information is needed. In

the Jan. 12 Order, this Court ruled, “Plaintiffs have failed to explain what further testimony Robinson

could give on the subject which would be relevant to the case and not subject to third party privacy.”

5:19-20. In the Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs offer no change in controlling law or new facts

or circumstances. Further, Plaintiffs still offer no explanation as to what further testimony is needed.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration on this point is denied.

5. Unrelated elder abuse investigation

Plaintiffs also assert that the Court erred in refusing to permit more information regarding the

investigation Robinson performed regarding elder abuse allegations pertaining to Judge Ishii’s mother.

Due to the elevation of the undersigned to United States District Court Judge, this case was re-assigned.

Judge Ishii is no longer the district court judge assigned to this matter. Therefore, this issue is rendered

moot.7

6. Hogan’s Further Deposition

In the Jan. 12 Order, the Court reviewed the issue of the continued deposition of Hogan and

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

ordered that the defendants would have no more than 6 hours of additional testimony. This issue was

presented, not by Plaintiffs in their Motion to Compel Further Testimony, but by Robinson in his

Opposition to that motion. See Def. Opp. Mot. Compel Further Testimony. Because of the complexity

of the case, Defendants sought guidance of the parameters for a further deposition. Previously, the

parties waived the seven hour deposition time limit proscribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)

by way of stipulation. 

Plaintiffs argue that they were not “afforded any opportunity to state their position before the

Court rendered its decision.” Pl. Mot. Reconsideration, 11:7-8. This Court did address the issue without

the need for a reply from Plaintiffs. In this Motion for Reconsideration, however, Plaintiffs had an

opportunity to present substantive opposition to the ruling. They presented none. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED in whole. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06408-LJO-GSA Document 146 Filed 03/19/07 Page 9 of 9