Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05790/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05790-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP FLORES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

VELOCITY EXPRESS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 12-cv-05790-JST 

AMENDED1 ORDER 

CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING 

COLLECTIVE ACTION, APPROVING 

PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE, AND 

APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS

COUNSEL

Re: ECF No. 26

Plaintiffs Phillip Flores and Darah Doung move to conditionally certify a collective action 

of Defendant Velocity Express, Inc.’s delivery drivers pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act 

(FLSA). After considering the moving papers, the arguments of the parties at the hearing held on 

May 16, 2013, and good cause appearing, the Court will grant the motion, approve the proposed 

class notice, and designate interim class counsel.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this FLSA collective action on November 9, 2012, on behalf of a proposed 

class of delivery drivers employed by Velocity who Plaintiffs allege were misclassified as 

independent contractors. ECF No. 1. The operative First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 15

(“FAC”), asserts five causes of action: violation of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (failure to pay 

minimum wage); violation of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (failure to pay overtime wages); 

violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194 (failure to pay minimum wage and overtime); 

violation of California Labor Code § 226.8 (willful misclassification of individuals as independent 

 

1

This Order corrects an inconsistency in the class definition set forth on page 15 of the Order 

dated June 2, 2013, ECF No. 57.

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 1 of 16
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

contractors); and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§ 17200, et seq. The present motion requests conditional certification of the proposed FLSA 

collective action and not class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 of 

based on the state law claims. As of the filing of the instant motion, the parties had not yet begun 

taking discovery. ECF Nos. 25, 26. 

A. The Independent Contractor Agreement

According to the First Amended Complaint, Velocity employs delivery drivers, including 

Plaintiffs, who deliver packages on routes assigned to them by Velocity. FAC ¶ 23, 29. Velocity 

requires delivery drivers to sign an “Independent Contractor Agreement for Transportation 

Services” (“IC Agreement”), which states that Velocity’s delivery drivers are independent 

contractors. Id. ¶ 24; Ex. A. The IC Agreement submitted with the First Amended Complaint, 

signed by Plaintiff Doung and dated October 1, 2011, appears to be a form contract; the bottom of 

each page of the IC Agreement contains the footer “IC Agreement 2009 Master.” The Agreement 

recites that the independent contractor “shall in no way and for no purpose hereunder be 

considered an agent, servant, employee, partner or co-venturer of” Velocity. Id. Ex. A ¶ 1 (“IC 

Agreement”). Velocity in turn “agrees and acknowledges that it shall have no right to direct or 

control the details or methods by which the Contractor performs its services hereunder, and that 

[Velocity] shall be concerned only with the results accomplished by the services performed by the 

Contractor and not with the means with which those results are accomplished.” Id. 

In a paragraph titled “Contractor’s Control of Services Provided,” the IC Agreement states 

that Velocity “may, from time to time in its sole discretion, based on customer requirements, 

request the Contractor perform courier or delivery services by advising it of the place and time of 

the customer requested pick-up, the destination of the delivery, and any completion schedules and 

specifications being requested by the customer. The Contractor shall have the right to decline or 

accept any such request.” IC Agreement ¶ 3. That paragraph permits drivers to “select the route 

or routes to be taken” and leaves all other matters relating to the delivery in the discretion of the 

driver, provided the package is delivered within the time frame specified by Velocity and the work 

conforms and meets the “general contractual standards and approval of [Velocity’s] customers.” 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 2 of 16
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Id.

The IC Agreement further provides that drivers will supply their own vehicles, and shall be 

responsible for all costs and expenses, including the cost of liability insurance, cargo insurance, 

worker’s compensation premiums, signage with Velocity’s logo on it, Velocity uniforms, and 

equipment necessary to handle and deliver the packages. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9, 11–13. Each of those items 

may be purchased through Velocity or an existing contract Velocity has with an insurance carrier 

by deducting the cost of the items from the driver’s pay. Id. For example, Addendum D to the IC 

Agreement attached to the complaint shows that Plaintiff Doung was provided with a scanner, 

stylus, holster, repair unit, gate card, ID Badge, vehicle signs, and a car charger, and Velocity 

deducted an amount not specified in the addendum from his “weekly settlement” “for the 

associated rental, airtime, repair and replacement costs.” Drivers must also procure the necessary 

licenses and permits at their own expense. Id. ¶ 14.

The IC Agreement contains few standards relating to the handling and delivery of 

packages. It provides, for example, standards relating to substance abuse and driver qualification.

Id. ¶ 16. It also requires the driver to “wear the appropriate uniform at all times while performing 

services under” the Agreement. Id. ¶ 12. 

The IC Agreement advises drivers that, as independent contractors, they are responsible for 

paying their own income and payroll taxes; paragraph 7 of the Agreement states, in part, that the 

driver agrees “to maintain sufficient records to enable [Velocity] to determine that the Contractor 

has satisfied its obligation to pay such taxes and other payments . . . . Upon written request 

Contractor shall provide [Velocity] a copy, which evidences that such taxes have been promptly 

paid, including but not limited to, cancelled checks, receipts or government forms such as 

Employment Development Department Form DE-8.” Id. ¶ 7. 

Finally, the IC Agreement provides that it can be terminated by either party upon fourteen 

days prior written notice, or alternatively, upon five calendar days’ notice by Velocity “in the 

event [Velocity] determines in its sole discretion that any route or routes being serviced by the 

Contractor hereunder do not meet the financial or budget objectives of [Velocity].” Id. ¶ 18(b). 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 3 of 16
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

B. First Amended Complaint

The First Amended Complaint alleges that Velocity signed thousands of independent 

contractor agreements with its delivery drivers when, in reality, they were employees. Plaintiffs 

allege that “[t]here are no material deviations in job duties or descriptions for [Velocity’s] drivers 

from location to location.” FAC ¶ 25. Velocity employs “uniform pay practices” with respect to 

each driver. Id. ¶ 26. In contrast to the requirements of the IC Agreement, Plaintiffs also allege 

that Velocity “deducts a percentage of each driver’s income from each paycheck in order to pay 

the drivers’ respective ‘quarterly estimated Federal Income and Self-Employment Taxes.’” Id. ¶ 

27.

The First Amended Complaint also alleges that Velocity exercises control over its delivery 

drivers in the following ways: requiring drivers to arrive one to two hours early to the package 

warehouse to sort the packages to be delivered that day; assigning routes to drivers based on 

geography or specific customers; providing drivers with “route sheets” with suggested “stop 

times;” requiring drivers to call a company dispatcher at certain times to verbally verify package 

deliveries; requiring drivers to submit written verifications of deliveries; and requiring drivers to 

wear uniforms and display Velocity signage on delivery vehicles. Id. ¶¶ 28–32. Plaintiffs allege 

that drivers “do not have a meaningful opportunity to bid for their routes or to negotiate the rates 

they will be paid for their routes.” Id. ¶ 29. The route assignments create long, twelve to fourteen 

hour workdays while also preventing drivers from taking breaks as well as from working for other 

companies, even though the IC Agreement permits drivers to do so. Id. ¶ 33. 

Plaintiffs allege these practices prompted the U.S. Department of Labor to initiate an 

enforcement action against Velocity’s predecessor, which filed for bankruptcy in 2009, contending 

the company misclassified its delivery drivers as independent contractors. Id. ¶ 39 (citing Solis v. 

Velocity Express, Inc., No. 09-cv-0864-MO (D. Ore. 2009)).

C. Declarations

With their motion, Plaintiffs each submitted sworn declarations, both of which state that 

they regularly worked more than forty hours a week and more than eight hours a day; that they 

were required to be on call twenty-four hours a day to take additional routes; that they had no 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 4 of 16
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

control over the routes they were assigned, that they were required to wear uniforms; that Velocity 

deducted from their weekly paychecks quarterly estimated Federal Income and Self-Employment 

taxes; that they were not paid overtime wages; and that they are aware of other employees subject 

to the same policies and practices complained-of in suit. See ECF No. 26, Exs. C (Doung Decl.), 

D (Flores Decl.).2 

Also attached to Plaintiffs’ motion is a “VEXP [Velocity] Income Tax Deduction 

Authorization Form” signed by Plaintiff Doung on October 1, 2011, the day the IC Agreement 

was signed. The form contains an acknowledgment that independent contractors are responsible

for paying all income and payroll taxes, and provides: “To assist in payment of my Federal 

Income and Self-Employment taxes, I authorize VEXP to deduct 3% from my gross commissions 

at each settlement period and to set this amount aside to my credit for the payment of my quarterly 

estimated Federal Income and Self-Employment taxes.” The percentage is handwritten; the form 

recommends 8–10% deductions of “gross commissions” for courier drivers and provides that a 

blank form will result in a default 8% deduction. The form also states that the funds will be held 

in escrow and paid to the Internal Revenue Service; the driver is not permitted to withdraw funds 

from the account.

Defendant submitted the declaration of Angie Wheeler, Velocity’s National Driver 

Services Manager. ECF No. 44-1. The Wheeler declaration states that Velocity has contracted 

with more than five thousand “Owner-Operators” to provide delivery services in the last three 

years. Wheeler Decl., ¶ 7. Wheeler’s declaration states that prior to September 2012, when it was 

discontinued, Velocity “offered a service whereby it would set aside, at an Owner-Operator’s 

request, a specified percentage of the Owner-Operator’s settlement payments from Velocity which 

could be used later by the Owner-Operators to pay their federal income and self-employment 

taxes.” Id. ¶ 13. The declaration states that approximately ninety-four drivers took advantage of 

 

2 After the Defendants’ opposition was filed, Plaintiffs also filed the declarations of Marquites 

Jolly and Tommy Rice. ECF Nos. 54, 55. Because these declarations were filed after the 

Defendants’ opposition to the motion, the Defendants did not have an opportunity to respond to 

them, and the Court has not considered them in ruling on this motion. 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 5 of 16
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the program. Id.

The Wheeler declaration itself attaches four of its delivery agreements: Plaintiff Flores’ IC 

Agreement, dated and signed May 2, 2011, which is substantially identical to Plaintiff Doung’s; 

Plaintiff Doung’s IC Agreement; a “Fleet Contractor Agreement” executed by Conner Logistics

on August 8, 2012; and a one-page undated “Rate Agreement: On-Demand or Distribution Rates”

executed by Yellow Cab of Sacramento. 

Velocity also submitted twenty declarations from its independent contractors, including the 

proprietors of Conner Logistics and Yellow Cab of Sacramento. Seven of those declarations were 

submitted by independent contractors who run businesses like Conner Logistics and Yellow Cab. 

The remaining thirteen were submitted by delivery drivers who were hired directly by Velocity. 

The declarations describe some of the differences among Velocity’s deliver drivers. Some of the 

declarants work more than eight hours a day, and others less. Each of them state that they 

understood they were being hired as independent contractors, and that they had to pay their own 

income and payroll taxes. Some of them were able to negotiate higher rates for the routes they 

were assigned. Some of them were offered routes and turned them down. Some of them worked 

for other delivery companies while working for Velocity. Some wore uniforms for every delivery; 

others, just for certain customers.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that actions against employers for violation of its 

overtime and minimum wage requirements may be brought “in any Federal or State court of 

competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves 

and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). A suit brought on behalf of other 

employees is known as a “collective action,” a type of suit that is “fundamentally different” from 

class actions. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013) (citing

Hoffmann–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1989)). For example, unlike in class 

actions, members of a collective action must file a “consent to sue” letter with the court in which 

the action is brought — creating an opt-in class. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Also different is that 

“‘conditional certification’ does not produce a class with an independent legal status, or join 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 6 of 16
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

additional parties to the action. The sole consequence of conditional certification is the sending of 

court-approved written notice to employees.” Id. (citing Hoffmann-LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 171–72.

Collective actions allow aggrieved employees “the advantage of lower individual costs to 

vindicate rights by the pooling of resources.” Hoffman-LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 170 (discussing 

collective action provision, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in context of ADEA claims). The judicial system 

also benefits through the “efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact 

arising from the same” unlawful activity. Id. Those benefits may only be realized through 

“accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that [employees] 

can make informed decisions about whether to participate.” Id.; see also McElmurry v. U.S. 

Bank N.A., 495 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts have significant discretion in managing 

the notice process to ensure that employees receive notice in an “orderly, sensible” manner. 

Ultimately, notice “serve the legitimate goal of avoiding a multiplicity of duplicative suits and 

setting cutoff dates to expedite disposition of the action.” Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Conditional Certification

The majority of courts, including this district, apply a two-step approach to certification of 

collective actions. See, e.g., Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 

2009) (citing Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001)

(comparing approaches and adopting two-step approach)); Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 

F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying two-step approach); Wong v. HSBC Mortgage Corp. 

(USA), No. 07-cv-2446-MMC, 2008 WL 753889, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2008) (same).

In the first step, alternatively called the “notice stage” and “conditional certification,”

courts determine whether the plaintiff employees are sufficiently “similarly situated” to justify 

sending notice of the action to potential class members. In making that determination, “the court 

requires little more than substantial allegations, supported by declarations or discovery, that the 

putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Lewis, 

669 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (quotation omitted). “Because the court generally has a limited amount of 

evidence before it, the initial determination is usually made under a fairly lenient standard and 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 7 of 16
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

typically results in conditional class certification.” Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 

462, 467 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See also Adams v. Inter–Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530, 536 

(N.D. Cal. Apr.11, 2007) (recognizing “lenient” standard “based on the pleadings and affidavits 

submitted by the parties”). 

Only after notice is sent and discovery has closed do district courts move on to the second 

step, which requires a determination, usually prompted by a motion for decertification by the 

employer, whether the employees are “similarly situated” as measured by a “stricter standard.” Id.

(quoting Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102). That determination involves several factors, including the 

disparate factual and employment settings of the individual employees; the defenses available to 

the employer that apply to different employees differently; and fairness and procedural 

considerations. See Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467; Wong, 2008 WL 753889, at *2. Even then, the 

standard courts apply is different, and easier to satisfy, than the requirements for a class action 

certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (quoting

Wertheim v. Arizona, No. 92-cv-453-PHX, 1993 WL 603552, *1 (D. Ariz. 1993) (requiring only 

“that some identifiable factual or legal nexus binds together the various claims of the class 

members in a way that hearing the claims together promotes judicial efficiency and comports with 

the broad remedial policies underlying the FLSA.”).

Here, Plaintiffs ask this Court to take only the first step in the two-step process of 

certifying a FLSA collective action. Plaintiffs originally proposed the following class definition:

All current and former delivery drivers of Velocity Express, LLC 

and DOES 1–10 who are or were employed to deliver goods to its 

clients at any time in the last three years, who worked over eight 

hours per workday or 40 hours per workweek, and were not paid a 

minimum wage or overtime for hours worked over 40 in a 

workweek or hours worked over 8 in a workday.

Plaintiffs have alleged, and Defendants do not dispute, that each individual delivery driver 

signed an independent contractor agreement, subjecting them to a uniform company policy of 

treating them as exempt workers under FLSA. Plaintiffs have also alleged, and averred in sworn 

declarations, that the delivery drivers were all required to wear Velocity uniforms, display the 

company logo, keep regular routes and hours, pay Velocity for equipment, permit Velocity to 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 8 of 16
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

deduct from their paychecks income and payroll taxes, and arrive at certain times in advance of 

their shifts. In other words, Plaintiffs have alleged that each member of the proposed class was 

“similarly situated” with respect to the material allegations of the complaint.

Defendant Velocity opposes conditional certification on three principal grounds. First, 

Velocity argues that conditional certification should be subject to the requirements of Rule 23 

class actions. Second, Velocity argues that Plaintiffs’ theory depends on the alleged 

misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and that this by itself is insufficient to 

state a claim for violation of FLSA. Third, Velocity argues that the proposed class is too diverse 

to be certified. 

Turning to Velocity’s first argument, Velocity states in its brief that “many California 

federal courts rule that it is proper to incorporate the stringent standards of Rule 23” to FLSA 

collective actions. Opp., ECF No. 43, p. 9. Notwithstanding its use of the word “many,” Velocity 

cites just two cases, Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 482 (E.D. Cal. 

2006), and Buckland v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., 11-cv-8414-JST, 2012 WL 3705263, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012). Neither supports its position. The Romero court endorsed the two-step 

approach described above to conditionally certify a FLSA class. 235 F.R.D. at 482 (“The Court 

therefore will use the two-tiered approach taken by the majority of district courts to address the 

issue and taken previously by this Court.”). The Buckland court merely looked to Rule 23’s 

commonality requirement (but not its other requirements) in deciphering the meaning of “similarly 

situated,” as other courts have done. However, the Buckland court also adopted the two-step 

approach described above and denied conditional certification because “the evidence Counsel 

submitted in support of this Motion is so lacking, and the proffered theories so inconsistent, that 

the Court cannot determine that those Nurses within the scope of the FLSA Nurse Collective 

Action were subject to a single illegal policy, plan or decision, or that there are others similarly 

situated to Nurse Plaintiffs.” Buckland, 2012 WL 3705263, at *3 (“The majority of courts, 

including three circuit courts, have adopted the two-tiered approach. Likewise, this Court will use 

the two-tiered approach.”) (citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102). In other words, Buckland denied 

conditional certification using the same standards urged by Plaintiffs, not the “hybrid Rule 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 9 of 16
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

23/FLSA collective action” approach claimed by Velocity. 

In fact, courts have repeatedly rejected attempts like Velocity’s to equate FLSA class 

actions and Rule 23 class actions because “Congress chose not to apply the Rule 23 standards to 

collective actions under the ADEA and FLSA, and instead adopted the ‘similarly situated’

standard. To now interpret this ‘similarly situated’ standard by simply incorporating the 

requirements of Rule 23 would effectively ignore Congress’ directive.” Gerlach v. Wells Fargo 

& Co., 05-cv-0585-CW, 2006 WL 824652, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2006) (quotation omitted). 

See also Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102 (rejecting comparison to Rule 23); Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219 

(same); Beauperthuy v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 06-cv-0715-SC, 2007 WL 707475, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) (“Given that a motion for conditional certification usually comes before much, 

if any, discovery, and is made in anticipation of a later more searching review, a movant bears a 

very light burden in substantiating its allegations at this stage.”); Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1127

(“[T]he court requires little more than substantial allegations, supported by declarations or 

discovery, that the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, 

or plan.”) (quotation omitted). Simply put, “Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different from 

collective actions under the FLSA.” Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 1529 (2013) (citing

Hoffmann–La Roche, 493 U.S. at 177–178 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

Velocity’s second argument, that the misclassification of workers as independent 

contractors “involves a fact-intensive inquiry that does not lend itself to collective treatment,”

Opp., p. 12, also fails. The need for such an inquiry has not prevented courts, such as those cited 

above, from routinely certifying FLSA cases based on allegations and affidavits similar to those 

presented here. See, e.g., Wong, 2008 WL 753889, at *3 (conditionally certifying FLSA 

collective action based on allegations “suggesting there exists a uniformly-applicable basis for 

defendants’ classification decision”); In re Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litig., 527 

F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (conditionally certifying FLSA collective action where 

plaintiffs alleged and averred “that Wells Fargo’s policy and practice related to HMC 

compensation is uniform for all putative class members”); Gerlach, 2006 WL 824652, at *3 

(conditionally certifying FLSA collective action where all employees “share a job description, 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 10 of 16
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

were uniformly classified as exempt from overtime pay by Defendants and perform similar job 

duties”). 

Velocity’s third argument is that the alleged class is too diverse to be certified. In support 

of this argument, Velocity submits twenty declarations from owner-operators describing the 

differences in their relationships with Velocity, vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis the plaintiffs. 

Velocity misapprehends the question before the Court; the question at this stage is not whose 

evidence regarding commonality is more believable, but simply whether plaintiffs have made an 

adequate threshold showing. The Court will consider “the disparate factual and employment 

settings of the individual plaintiffs” if and when Defendant makes a motion to decertify. Leuthold 

v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 467 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Escobar v. Whiteside 

Const. Corp., 08-cv-01120-WHA, 2008 WL 3915715, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2008) (“It may be 

true that the evidence will later negate plaintiffs’ claims, but this order will not deny conditional 

certification at this stage in the proceedings”); Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (rejecting 

defendant’s 54 declarations raising factual issues because “[t]o apply the second-tier heightened 

review at this stage would be contrary to the broad remedial policies underlying the FLSA. After 

discovery is complete, Defendant can move for decertification, and the Court will then apply the 

heightened second-tier review.”). 

In addition to the foregoing concerns, Velocity, Plaintiffs, and the Court identified some 

problems with Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition. First, at the hearing, based on Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint, the papers submitted in support of their motion, and Defendant’s arguments in 

opposition, Plaintiffs proposed limiting the class definition to the specific contract at issue: the 

2009 Independent Contractor Master Agreement. Second, in response to Defendants’ opposition, 

Plaintiffs also agreed to delete the reference to Defendants “DOES 1–10.” Third, Defendants 

argued — and Plaintiffs conceded — that the reference to delivery drivers “employed” by 

Velocity is inappropriate. Finally, the Court notes that the Defendant in this case is incorrectly 

named in Plaintiffs’ original proposed definition as Velocity Express, LLC and not Inc. The 

amended proposed class definition thus reads:

All current and former delivery drivers of Velocity Express, Inc.

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 11 of 16
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

who signed the 2009 Master “Independent Contractor Agreement,” 

and who have delivered goods to its clients at any time in the last 

three years, worked over eight hours per workday or 40 hours per 

workweek, and were not paid a minimum wage or overtime for 

hours worked over 40 in a workweek or hours worked over 8 in a 

workday.

With those modifications, and for the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’

motion and hereby conditionally certifies a FLSA collective action class as defined above.

B. Production of Class Members’ Identifying Information

Plaintiffs move to compel Velocity to provide a list of all potential class members with 

each person’s full name, last known address, telephone number, and dates and locations of 

employment in order to facilitate Plaintiffs’ notice efforts.3 Velocity opposes the request on the 

grounds that “(1) Plaintiffs have no need for the information; (2) the production of such 

information violates the privacy rights of such individuals; and (3) the scope of the request is 

exceedingly broad and unduly burdensome.”

The first of these arguments — that Plaintiffs do not need the information — stems from 

Velocity’s argument that no class should be conditionally certified. As set forth above, the Court 

will grant conditional certification, and so this argument does not require further discussion.

Velocity’s second argument is that the production of that information would violate the 

drivers/owner-operators’ rights under First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the 

Constitution. This argument flies in the face of decades of settled authority on the production of 

class member identifying information. See, e.g., Hoffmann-LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 170 (district 

courts have the authority to compel the production of names and addresses of employees for 

purposes of facilitating notice in collective actions against employers); Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 

1128 (“The Court finds that providing notice by first class mail and email will sufficiently assure 

that potential collective action members receive actual notice of this case. Defendant’s objection 

to the production of email addresses is baseless.”); Wong, 2008 WL 753889, at *4 (ordering 

production of names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates and locations of employment, employee 

 

3 Velocity argues in its opposition that it should not be required to produce email addresses, but 

Plaintiffs do not appear to have requested email addresses. Compare, Opp., p. 19 with Mot., ECF 

No. 26, p. 11.

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 12 of 16
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

numbers, and last four digits of employee social security numbers). 

The only case Velocity cites in support of its privacy arguments, Pioneer Electronics 

(USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 4th 246, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 17, 21 (2005), is not 

helpful. The Court of Appeal’s opinion in Pioneer was vacated by the California Supreme Court 

and its privacy holdings were substantially undermined. See Pioneer Electronics v. S.C. 

(Olmstead), 40 Cal. 4th 360 (2007). Moreover, the issue in Pioneer was potential class members’

rights with regard to pre-certification notices, not post-certification notices such as the ones at 

issue here. 

Velocity then argues that the court must “balance” the rights of class members with 

Plaintiffs’ need for the information, citing several decisions from outside the Ninth Circuit. All of 

the decisions relate to the production of identifying information prior to certification. See Brooks 

v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 561, 571 (N.D. Ala. 1995) aff’d sub nom. 114 

F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying request for discovery of employee information because 

conditional certification was denied); Mackenzie v. Kindred Hospitals E., L.L.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 

1211, 1221 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (same); Tracy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 303, 313 

(D. Colo. 1998) (denying discovery generally, not employee identifying information, before 

motion for conditional certification was decided, based on grounds other than privacy interests). 

These cases also are not helpful. 

The Court will order Velocity to produce a list of potential class members, including the 

full name, last known address, and telephone number of each, along with their dates and locations 

of employment. 

C. Notice

Velocity objects to Plaintiff’s proposed form of notice on four grounds: (1) the opt-in form 

should require the individual to include his or her actual dates of service; (2) the notice should 

require opt-in within 45 days instead of 90; (3) the notice should not include the case caption; and 

(4) the notice’s description of the lawsuit should include a statement that Velocity denies any and 

all liability. 

As to the first bullet point, the Court sees no reason why Velocity’s former and current 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 13 of 16
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

delivery drivers should identify their dates of service on their opt-in forms. As set forth above, 

Velocity will be producing this information to Plaintiffs. 

Nor does Velocity provide any reason for limiting the opt-in period to 45 days. Lengthier 

opt-in periods are not uncommon. See, e.g., Lewis, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (seventy-five day 

deadline). 

The Court also approves the inclusion of the case caption at the top of the notice form. 

“[N]otices typically contain a court caption.” Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530, 

540 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

With regard to Velocity’s request that the notice include a statement that Velocity denies 

any and all liability, the Court notes that the notice contains such a statement, but not until page 

two. The Court will order (1) that this sentence appear on the first page of the notice; and (2) that 

the notice also contain a new, second paragraph, in boldface, stating as follows: “Please note that 

the Court has not ruled on the merits of the lawsuit. The Court has only ruled that it is important 

that you be notified of the existence of the lawsuit so that you can determine whether you wish to 

join it.”

The Plaintiffs are also ordered to amend the sentence that currently reads: 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys will be compensated by the greater of either a forty (40%) 

percent contingent fee of all sums recovered by settlement, award, court-ordered 

attorney’s fees, or judgment, or whatever attorneys fee is awarded by the Court or 

obtained/negotiated through a settlement. The Court must approve any fees 

received by the Plaintiffs’ lawyers.

to read instead: 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys will request to be compensated by as much as forty (40%) 

percent contingent fee of all sums recovered by settlement, award, court-ordered 

attorney’s fees, or judgment. The Court must approve any fees received by the 

Plaintiffs’ lawyers. 

The Court has independently reviewed the proposed notice and opt-in forms and finds that 

they comport with the applicable legal standards in all other respects. Assuming Plaintiffs revise 

the proposed notice form to reflect the amended class definition, the foregoing comments, and the 

reassignment of this action to this Court, Plaintiffs’ proposed form of notice is hereby 

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 14 of 16
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

APPROVED. Plaintiffs’ requested opt-in period of ninety days is also APPROVED. 

D. Interim Class Counsel

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3) authorizes district courts to designate interim 

counsel to act on behalf of a putative class before the final certification decision is made. Rule 

23(g)(1)(A), which applies to the appointment of class counsel, is also instructive in evaluating 

interim class counsel. See In re CRT Antitrust Litig., No. 07-cv-5944-SC, 2008 WL 2024957, at 

*1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2008). In making the determination, courts must consider: “(i) the work 

counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel’s 

experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in 

the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will 

commit to representing the class.” 

Here, the Court finds that each element is satisfied. Plaintiffs’ counsel represent clients in 

multiple states, have expended resources investigating the case, drafting the complaint, and 

briefing this motion, and have identified the claims at issue. Counsel’s submissions evidence 

sufficient experience in handling complex litigation to adequately represent the class, and the 

briefing before the Court establish the requisite knowledge of applicable law. Finally, counsel 

have already committed resources to representing the class, and there is no suggestion that this 

will not continue to be the case.

Consequently, the Court DESIGNATES Johnson Becker, PLLC and Sommers Schwartz, 

P.C. as Interim Class Counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. The class defined as: “All current and former delivery drivers of Velocity Express, Inc. 

who signed the 2009 Master “Independent Contractor Agreement,” and who have 

delivered goods to its clients at any time in the last three years, worked over eight hours 

per workday or 40 hours per workweek, and were not paid a minimum wage or overtime 

for hours worked over 40 in a workweek or hours worked over 8 in a workday.” is hereby 

conditionally certified.

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 15 of 16
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2. Plaintiffs’ proposed form of notice is hereby APPROVED, provided the final form 

of notice reflects the amended class definition, the reassignment of this action to this Court, and 

the alterations discussed above. 

3. Johnson Becker, PLLC and Sommers Schwartz, P.C. are hereby DESIGNATED

Interim Class Counsel. Interim Class Counsel shall keep records of their time and costs consistent 

with the professional standards expected of class counsel, and shall ensure the efficient and 

productive expenditure of time and costs in prosecuting the action.

4. Defendant shall provide Interim Class Counsel, within thirty days of the date of this 

Order, with a list of potential class members, in Microsoft Excel or similar digital format, 

identifying each person by full name and last known address, telephone number, and dates and 

locations of employment.

5. Interim Class Counsel shall mail class notice to each person on the class list no 

later than thirty days from the date of receipt of the class list from Defendant.

6. Interim Class Counsel shall attempt to locate current addresses for any individual 

for whom a notice mailing is returned as undeliverable and shall promptly mail the notice 

documents to the current address. Interim Class Counsel shall keep a record of the addresses that 

it updates and the dates on which those notices were sent to those addresses. Interim Class 

Counsel shall not be required to mail notice to any particular individual more than three times.

7. The members of the conditionally certified class shall have ninety days from the 

initial mailing of the Notice and Consent to Join forms to postmark their Consent to Join forms 

and mail or otherwise send such Consents to Interim Class Counsel for filing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2013

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:12-cv-05790-JST Document 58 Filed 06/07/13 Page 16 of 16