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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 2010 Decided January 21, 2011 

No. 09-5227 

CALVIN KI SUN KIM AND CHUN CHA KIM, 

APPELLANTS

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:08-cv-01660) 

Joseph Peter Drennan argued the cause for appellants. 

Calvin K. Kim and Chun C. Kim, appearing pro se, filed 

briefs. 

Gretchen M. Wolfinger, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief 

were Jonathan S. Cohen. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, entered an appearance. 

USCA Case #09-5227 Document #1289155 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page 1 of 13
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Before: BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: For the Kims, like many 

income-producing U.S. residents, the tax man cometh, but the 

Kims, by taking the offensive and suing the Internal Revenue 

Service (IRS), have been unusually unwelcoming. Calvin Ki 

Sun Kim and Chun Cha Kim are tax protesters who, in an 

action for unspecified damages, allege the IRS violated the 

Taxpayer Bill of Rights, failed to comply with various statutes, 

and perpetrated an “ongoing campaign of harassment by 

correspondence.” Compl. at 6. The Kims’ lawsuit is one of 

many similar actions brought by tax protestors accusing the 

IRS of a miscellany of misconduct. 

I 

 From 1998 through 2003, the Kims did not regularly file 

tax returns. When they did file, their tax returns did not 

include required information. Unsurprisingly, in 2002 the 

IRS contacted the Kims about their frivolous or missing 

returns. The resulting correspondence between the Kims and 

the IRS is the gravamen of this suit. 

The Kims insist they are not required to file individual 

income tax returns because the IRS did not maintain proper 

records or perform all duties required by law. See Compl. at 

6–8. Based on these alleged failures, the Kims filed suit in the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 

September 2008. Their complaint asserted twenty-one 

separate counts of wrongdoing against the United States; the 

Commissioner of the IRS; IRS employees Dennis Parizek, 

Scott Prentky, and A. Chow; and four unknown IRS agents 

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(collectively “Defendants”). Specifically, the Kims’ 

complaint alleged “denial of the right to due process of the tax 

law, administrative law, and record-keeping law of the United 

States,” Compl. at 1, and “disregard of provisions of the tax 

law of the United States and regulations promulgated 

thereunder,” Compl. at 2. For redress of these claimed 

violations, the Kims sought damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 

388 (1971), and what is commonly known as the Taxpayer Bill 

of Rights, 26 U.S.C. § 7433.1

 

 The district court dismissed Counts 1 through 18—the 

Bivens claims—under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1), holding it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Kims’ 

claims against the Defendants in their official capacities, and 

under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim because no 

Bivens remedy exists for claims against the Defendants in their 

individual capacities. Kim v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 2d 

31, 37–40 (D.D.C. 2009). The district court also dismissed 

Counts 19 and 20 under Rule 12(b)(1), holding the two counts 

did not pertain to “collection activities” within the meaning of 

the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. Id. at 41. Alternatively, the 

district court dismissed Counts 19 and 20, along with Count 

21, under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Kims failed to plead 

exhaustion in their complaint and failed to rebut the 

government’s exhaustion defense. Id. at 42–43. 

 We affirm the judgment of the district court with regard to 

Counts 1 through 18 because no Bivens claim is available 

 

1 The proper name of the Act is the Internal Revenue Service 

Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 

§§ 3000–3804, 112 Stat. 685, 726–83 (codified in scattered titles of 

the U.S.C.); however, we refer to it by its popular name throughout 

this opinion. See Preslar v. Comm’r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1327 n.2 (10th 

Cir. 1999). 

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against the Defendants in their official capacities and no 

Bivens remedy is available against the Defendants in their 

individual capacities. But we find, contrary to the holding of 

the district court, that Counts 19 (relating to liens and levies) 

and 20 (failure to provide notice of tax assessment) relate to 

“collection activities” under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights and 

are therefore within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 

federal courts. That said, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of Count 19 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, 

albeit for a different reason. Moreover, the Kims were not 

required to plead exhaustion pursuant to the Taxpayer Bill of 

Rights in order to survive the Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Counts 20 and 21. We therefore affirm the district court with 

respect to Counts 1 through 19, and reverse with respect to 

Counts 20 and 21. 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(1), Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 446 v. 

Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and for failure 

to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Atherton v. D.C. Office of 

Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Because 

jurisdiction is a threshold question, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for 

a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998), we turn first to the 

district court’s dismissals under Rule 12(b)(1). 

II 

A 

To the extent the Kims asserted Bivens claims against the 

Defendants in their official capacities, the district court 

dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(1). Kim, 618 F. Supp. 

2d at 37–38. It is well established that Bivens remedies do not 

exist against officials sued in their official capacities. See 

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Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

We therefore affirm the district court with respect to its 

jurisdictional dismissal of Counts 1 through 18 as against the 

Defendants in their official capacities. 

B 

The district court concluded Counts 19 and 20 were 

subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction because the challenged conduct was 

unrelated to “collection activity” as required by the Taxpayer 

Bill of Rights. 

The Taxpayer Bill of Rights provides: 

If, in connection with any collection of Federal 

tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or 

employee of the Internal Revenue Service 

recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of 

negligence, disregards any provision of this 

title, or any regulation promulgated under this 

title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for 

damages against the United States in a district 

court of the United States. 

26 U.S.C. § 7433(a) (emphasis added). Section 7433 applies 

only to collection-related activities. See Miller v. United 

States, 66 F.3d 220, 222–23 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he assessment 

or tax determination part of the [Internal Revenue Code 

enforcement] process is not an act of ‘collection’ and therefore, 

not actionable under § 7433.”); Shaw v. United States, 20 F.3d 

182, 184 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Section 7433—by its specific 

words—allows a taxpayer to sue the government only . . . ‘in 

connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a 

taxpayer’” (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a))); Gonsalves v. IRS, 

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975 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that a 

plaintiff’s claim based on “the government’s refusal to give 

him a tax refund runs afoul of the clause in Section 7433 which 

says that a taxpayer may sue only if an IRS agent disregards a 

statute or regulation ‘in connection with any collection of 

Federal tax.’”); see also Rossotti, 317 F.3d at 411 (stating in 

dicta, “[t]o be sure, § 7433 provides for a ‘civil action’ only for 

damages arising from the ‘collection’ of taxes”). 

Count 20 alleges violations of Internal Revenue Code 

§ 6303. Section 6303 requires the Secretary to provide a 

taxpayer notice of assessment within sixty days of making the 

assessment. That notice must “stat[e] the amount [of an 

unpaid tax] and demand[] payment . . . .” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6303(a). Section 6303 appears in Chapter 64 of the Internal 

Revenue Code, which is aptly entitled “Collection.” This 

placement is persuasive. Moreover, we think a demand for 

payment is certainly “in connection with any collection of 

Federal tax.” That the demand is also a notice of assessment 

does not change this conclusion. A tax assessment is 

“essentially a bookkeeping notation,” recording a taxpayer’s 

liability. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100 (2004) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). As such, the assessment serves as a 

“trigger” for administrative enforcement efforts such as tax 

liens or levies to collect outstanding taxes. Id. at 102. In 

contrast, a taxpayer receives a notice of assessment after his 

liability is set. The notice of assessment signifies the 

beginning of the Commission’s enforcement efforts. Thus, 

the notice of assessment, unlike the assessment itself, is a 

precursor to the filing of a lien and the execution of a levy. 

In addition, § 6303 requires notice of assessment “after the 

making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section 6203.” 

26 U.S.C. § 6303. Unlike § 6303, however, § 6203 appears in 

the statutory chapter entitled “Assessment” and does not 

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require prior notice to the taxpayer. See 26 U.S.C. § 6203 

(“Upon request of the taxpayer, the Secretary shall furnish the 

taxpayer a copy of the record of the assessment.”) Placement 

of the provision requiring notice of assessment in the chapter 

pertaining to “collection” is not happenstance. It strongly 

suggests the notice of assessment referred to in § 6303 pertains 

to collections, while those actions authorized under § 6203 do 

not. See Miller, 66 F.3d at 222 (“Because the statutory 

requirements of ‘notice and demand’ are under § 6303, chapter 

64, Collection, ‘notice and demand’ is a collection 

procedure.”). Thus, the provision of notice of assessment is a 

collection activity. Because Count 20 involves conduct in 

connection with collection, the district court improperly 

dismissed it for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Count 19 alleges violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6301 and the 

IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, which together 

require the Commissioner to develop and implement review 

and disciplinary procedures for an IRS employee’s decision to 

file a notice of lien, levy, or seizure. Pub. L. 105-206, § 3421, 

112 Stat. 685, 758. Like § 6303—the statutory section 

underlying Count 20—§ 6301 is also located in the IRC 

chapter on “Collection.” The text of § 6301 provides, “[t]he 

Secretary shall collect the taxes imposed by the internal 

revenue laws.” (emphasis added). And the 1998 amendment 

to § 6301 added provisions detailing procedures for executing 

liens, levies, and seizures on a taxpayer’s property. Pub. L. 

105-206, § 3421, 112 Stat. 685, 758. The process of 

executing liens, levies, or seizures on property inherently 

involves collection activity; the purpose of a lien, levy, or 

seizure is to collect assets in exchange for a debt owed. 

Accordingly, the procedures described in § 6301 also entail 

some collection activities. 

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But Count 19 suffers from another jurisdictional infirmity. 

As counsel conceded at oral argument, the Kims never alleged 

they experienced the effects of an improper lien, levy, or 

seizure. Or. Arg. Recording at 6:19–52. Thus, they lack the 

critical prerequisite of standing. Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see Sierra Club v. EPA, 

292 F.3d 895, 898–99 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Although counsel 

contends the Kims’ failure to allege an injury should be 

excused because they proceeded pro se in the district court, Or. 

Arg. Recording at 6:52–7:42, we cannot construe their 

complaint so liberally. Because there was no indication in the 

Kims’ complaint of an injury in the form of an improperly 

assessed lien, levy, or seizure—let alone an injury resulting 

from the Commissioner’s failure to develop and implement 

review and disciplinary procedures for employee decisions to 

file a lien, levy, or seizure—the district court was correct in 

dismissing Count 19 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

under Rule 12(b)(1). 

III 

Having resolved the jurisdictional issues presented, we 

now turn to the dismissals for failure to state a claim. 

A 

To the extent Counts 1 through 18 were based on the 

Kims’ assertion of Bivens claims against the Defendants in 

their individual capacities, the district court dismissed these 

counts under Rule 12(b)(6), holding no Bivens remedy was 

available in light of the comprehensive remedial scheme set 

forth by the Internal Revenue Code. Kim, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 

38–40. We agree with the district court’s reasoning, see 

Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 705–10 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(discussing Bivens remedy after resolving jurisdictional 

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questions); Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 591–93 

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (same), which is consistent with that of our 

sister circuits, see Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1185–86 

(9th Cir. 2004); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401, 

408–13 (4th Cir. 2003); Shreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 

148, 152–53 (3d Cir. 2000); Fishburn v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979, 

982–83 (6th Cir. 1997); Vennes v. An Unknown No. of 

Unidentified Agents of the U.S., 26 F.3d 1448, 1453–54 (8th 

Cir. 1994); McMillen v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 960 F.2d 187, 

190–91 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Nat’l Commodity & 

Barter Ass’n, Nat’l Commodity Exch. v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 

1247–48 (10th Cir. 1989); Baddour, Inc. v. United States, 802 

F.2d 801, 807–09 (5th Cir. 1986); Cameron v. IRS, 773 F.2d 

126, 129 (7th Cir. 1985). We therefore affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of Counts 1 through 18 for failure to state a 

claim. 

 

B 

We now turn to the district court’s dismissal of Counts 20 

and 21 under Rule 12(b)(6). The Kims contend the district 

court erred because under Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), 

exhaustion of statutory remedies is not a pleading requirement 

of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. We agree. 

In Jones v. Bock, prisoner Lorenzo Jones filed suit under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming prison officials displayed deliberate 

indifference to his medical needs. 549 U.S. at 207–08. 

Because Jones was a prisoner at the time of his suit, he was 

required to exhaust prison grievance procedures under the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) before filing suit. Id. 

at 202 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). The 

district court dismissed Jones’s suit and the Sixth Circuit 

affirmed, each concluding Jones failed to exhaust under the 

PLRA. Id. at 208–09. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 

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the lower courts’ contrary conclusion “lack[ed] a textual basis 

in the PLRA,” because nothing in the PLRA required Jones to 

plead exhaustion. Id. at 217 (“Given that the PLRA does not 

itself require plaintiffs to plead exhaustion, such a result ‘must 

be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and 

not by judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Leatherman v. 

Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 

507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993))). 

In pertinent part, the PLRA “provides that ‘[n]o action 

shall be brought’ unless administrative procedures are 

exhausted.” Id. at 220 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) 

(alteration in original). The Court read “no action shall be 

brought” as boilerplate, often used as prefatory phrasing 

without “lead[ing] to the dismissal of an entire action.” Id. 

In a similar vein, the Court described the PLRA’s language 

authorizing dismissal of an action for “fail[ure] to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted” as a “red herring,” id. at 215 

(citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(c)(1) (alteration in original)), because “[d]etermining 

that Congress meant to include failure to exhaust under the 

rubric of ‘failure to state a claim’ in the screening provisions of 

the PLRA would . . . not support treating exhaustion as a 

pleading requirement rather than an affirmative defense,” id.

Jones’s focus on the text of the PLRA is instructive here. 

Section 7433 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights provides that “[a] 

judgment for damages shall not be awarded . . . unless . . . the 

plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies 

available . . . .” 26 U.S.C § 7433(d)(1). As the Court in 

Jones read the phrase “no action shall be brought,” we read the 

phrase “a judgment for damages shall not be awarded” as 

boilerplate. Nothing in the text of § 7433 “support[s] treating 

exhaustion as a pleading requirement rather than an affirmative 

defense.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 215. If anything, the language 

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in the PLRA would have been a better candidate for a statutory 

pleading requirement as it mandated “no action” shall be 

brought, while § 7433 mandates “no judgment” shall be 

awarded. 

 

In dismissing Claims 20 and 21, the district court held the 

Kims’ failure to exhaust appeared on the face of the complaint 

and therefore, under Jones, the complaint was subject to 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In support, the district court 

pointed to the Supreme Court’s quotation in Jones of a Third 

Circuit case stating that “‘a complaint may be subject to 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative 

defense . . . appears on its face.’” Id. (quoting Leveto v. 

Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in 

original)). Thus, the parties’ briefing and oral argument 

focused on whether the Kims’ alleged failure to exhaust 

appeared on the face of their complaint. 

It is evident to us that the Kims’ alleged failure to exhaust 

did not appear on the face of the complaint. As the Jones Court 

explains, “[w]hether a particular ground for opposing a claim 

may be the basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim 

depends on whether the allegations in the complaint suffice to 

establish that ground, not on the nature of the ground in the 

abstract.” Id.; cf. Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 438 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007) (“Further, even when failure to exhaust is treated as 

an affirmative defense, it may be invoked in a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion if the complaint somehow reveals the exhaustion 

defense on its face.”). Thus, when a statute does not explicitly 

require a plaintiff to plead exhaustion, Jones rejects a 

categorical rule in favor of an analysis of the complaint. “If 

the allegations, for example, show that relief is barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to 

dismissal for failure to state a claim . . . .” Id. Exhaustion in 

this case is not comparable to a statute of limitations defense in 

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which the allegations demonstrate both the time an action 

accrues and the time in which the suit was filed. Rather, to 

discern whether the Kims exhausted, the district court 

inevitably had to go beyond the face of the complaint and 

conduct further inquiry. See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN 

WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 1277 (3d ed. 2004). 

District courts may refer to materials outside the pleadings 

in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion. But when they do, they must 

also convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Wiley v. Glassman, 

511 F.3d 151, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007); WRIGHT & MILLER

§ 1277. In converting the motion, district courts must provide 

the parties with notice and an opportunity to present evidence 

in support of their respective positions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 

56; see also Glassman, 511 F.3d at 160–61; WRIGHT &

MILLER § 1277. Failure to present evidence of exhaustion at 

that junction would be fatal to the claim. 

Because exhaustion is not a pleading requirement under 

the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, the Kims were free to omit 

exhaustion from their pleadings. And since the Kims did omit 

it from their pleadings, the district court necessarily was 

required to consider matters outside the pleadings to determine 

the validity of the Defendants’ affirmative defense. It is true 

that the Kims’ response to the motion to dismiss could have 

resolved the question. It is equally true that recalcitrance has 

been the Kims’ primary litigation strategy. But a motion to 

dismiss may not compel full disclosure concerning efforts to 

exhaust; a summary judgment motion would. 

In sum, we remand to the district court with instructions to 

provide the Kims the procedural safeguards mandated by Rule 

12(d) and Rule 56 prior to converting a motion to dismiss to a 

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motion for summary judgment. At that point, the Kims will 

have been provided sufficient notice and opportunity, and any 

continued recalcitrance will find no comparable procedural 

safe haven. We note that because the district court’s dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6) was in error, we need not reach the Kims’ 

contention that 26 C.F.R. § 301.7433-1 is an interpretive 

regulation. 

 

IV 

 We affirm the district court’s order insofar as it dismissed 

Counts 1 through 18 for want of subject-matter jurisdiction 

under Rule 12(b)(1) because no Bivens claim exists against the 

Defendants in their official capacities, and under Rule 12(b)(6) 

because no Bivens remedy exists against the Defendants in 

their individual capacities. We also affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of Claim 19 under Rule 12(b)(1) because the Kims 

lack standing. We reverse the district court, however, to the 

extent it dismissed Count 20 as unrelated to “collection 

activity” under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, and Counts 20 and 

21 for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the 

Kims were not required to plead exhaustion under the 

Taxpayer Bill of Rights. We therefore remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 

So ordered. 

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