Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55574/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55574-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE LANDMARK FENCE COMPANY,

INC.,

Debtor,

JAMES SAHAGUN and GERARDO

GARCIA,

Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

v.

LANDMARK FENCE COMPANY, INC.,

a California corporation,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 13-55509

13-55574

D.C. No.

5:12-cv-01582-

AHM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Alvin Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 7, 2015*

Submission Deferred April 7, 2015

Resubmitted September 4, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed September 11, 2015

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 IN RE LANDMARK FENCE

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

SUMMARY**

Bankruptcy

The panel dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an appeal and

a cross-appeal from the district court’s order in a bankruptcy

case.

The bankruptcy court ruled, after a trial, that the

bankruptcy debtor had committed violations of California

wage and hour laws, and it awarded damages to a plaintiff

class. The district court affirmed in part but held that the

bankruptcy court had applied an incorrect legal standard for

assessing whether the debtor was required to pay prevailing

wages for the time class members spent traveling to and from

public worksites. The district court remanded for additional

fact finding on the terms of the debtor’s public works

contracts and the practical conditions of the jobsite to

determine what damages might be justified.

The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction because the

district court’s order vacating the bankruptcy court’s

judgment and remanding for further factfinding was not a

final order. The panel concluded that the risk of piecemeal

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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IN RE LANDMARK FENCE 3

litigation was significant; judicial efficiency would not be

enhanced by exercising jurisdiction; preserving the

bankruptcy court’s role as the finder of fact tipped in favor

of declining jurisdiction; and neither party would suffer

irreparable harm if the panel declined jurisdiction.

COUNSEL

Rudy Ginez, Jr., Ginez, Steinmetz & Associates, Santa Ana,

California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Marc J. Winthrop and Peter W. Liandes, Winthrop Couchot

P.C., Newport Beach, California; John E. Lattin and Spencer

W. Waldron, Fisher & Phillips LLP, Irvine, California, for

Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

As Chief Justice Roberts recently observed in the context

of determining whether a bankruptcy court order is final,

parties considering the filing of an appeal would do well to

remember the maxim: “It ain’t over till it’s over.” Bullard v.

Blue Hills Bank (In re Bullard), 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1693 (2015). 

While we have well-established and quite rigid standards of

finality in civil and criminal actions governed by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291—our most frequently invoked jurisdictional statute—

we have taken a more nuanced and “flexible” approach to

assessing the finality of appeals in bankruptcy cases. 

However, even this flexible approach is stretched beyond its

breaking point by this appeal from a district court order that

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4 IN RE LANDMARK FENCE

includes a remand to the bankruptcy court with explicit

instructions to engage in “further fact-finding.” We dismiss

the appeal because this order is not final for purposes of

appeal.

BACKGROUND

In 2003, James Sahagun and Gerardo Garcia (collectively

“Sahagun”) filed a class action in state court against their

former employer, Landmark Fence Company (“Landmark”). 

The suit was a typical wage-and-hour class action, alleging

that Landmark had failed to pay a variety of wages required

by California law. Four years later, in 2007, the state court

certified a class of current and former Landmark employees. 

Before the class claims could proceed to trial, however,

Landmark filed for bankruptcy in the Central District of

California.

Sahagun entered the bankruptcy fray, filing a claim

against the Landmark estate. The bankruptcy court held a

six-day trial on the merits of Sahagun’s wage claims. The

bankruptcycourt found that Landmark had committed several

violations of California wage laws and awarded the plaintiff

class approximately $15 million in unpaid wages, interest,

and penalties. A significant portion of the damages were

based on the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that California

law required Landmark to pay class members a prevailing

wage for the time they spent 1) traveling to and from public

worksites; and 2) fabricating parts for use on public

worksites.

Landmark appealed the decision to the district court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The district court affirmed

the bankruptcy court’s ruling that Sahagun was entitled to the

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IN RE LANDMARK FENCE 5

prevailing wage for time spent fabricating components for

public works contracts. The district court held, however, that

the bankruptcy court applied an incorrect legal standard for

assessing whether Landmark was required to pay prevailing

wages for the time class members spent traveling to and from

public worksites. The district court thus remanded for

“additional fact finding” on “[t]he terms of Landmark’s

public works contracts and the practical conditions of the

jobsite” to determine what damages might be justified.

Sahagun appealed, alleging that the district court’s ruling

on travel time was erroneous and asking us to reinstate the

bankruptcy court’s damages award. Landmark crossappealed the district court’s determination regarding

entitlement to prevailing wages for parts fabrication.

ANALYSIS

Although both parties urge us to decide this appeal on its

merits, “[i]t needs no citation of authorities to show that the

mere consent of parties cannot confer upon a court of the

United States the jurisdiction to hear and decide a case.” 

People’s Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1880). We

undertake this jurisdictional analysis sua sponte. Gupta v.

Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 487 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 2007).

The district court exercised appellate jurisdiction over the

bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have

jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal only if the

district court’s order vacating the bankruptcy court’s

judgment and remanding for further factfinding was a “final

decision[], judgment[], order[], [or] decree[].” 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d)(1). We hold that it was not, and dismiss the appeal

for lack of jurisdiction.

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6 IN RE LANDMARK FENCE

Typically, a district court order is considered final when

it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the

court to do but execute the judgment.” Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373–74 (1981) (quoting

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)). 

The district court’s order does not meet this standard. Rather,

the order directed the bankruptcy court to reassess the

evidence and determine anew the size of Sahagun’s claim

against the Landmark estate.

We have held, however, that the fluid and sometimes

chaotic nature of bankruptcy proceedings necessitates a

degree of jurisdictional flexibility. See, e.g., Cannon v.

Hawaii Corp. (In re Hawaii Corp.), 796 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th

Cir. 1986). In assessing jurisdiction over an appeal from a

non-final order in the bankruptcy context, we weigh four

factors: “(1) the need to avoid piecemeal litigation;

(2) judicial efficiency; (3) the systemic interest in preserving

the bankruptcy court’s role as the finder of fact; and

(4) whether delaying review would cause either party

irreparable harm.” Stanley v. Crossland, Crossland,

Chambers, MacArthur & Lastreto (In re Lakeshore Vill.

Resort, Ltd.), 81 F.3d 103, 106 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Vylene

Enters., Inc. v. Naugles, Inc. (In Re Vylene Enters., Inc.),

968 F.2d 887, 895–96 (9th Cir. 1992)).1 These factors cut

1 This flexible test is arguably in conflict with the Supreme Court’s

decision in Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253

(1992). See In re Bender, 586 F.3d 1159, 1163–64 (9thCir. 2009) (noting

that Germain “cast doubt on our application of a flexible standard” but

that no subsequent Ninth Circuit case has determined “that our earlier

precedent must be overturned”). Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent

opinion in In re Bullard acknowledged that the rules of finality “are

different in bankruptcy,” but nonetheless cautioned against exercising

jurisdiction over appeals in which the “parties’ rights and obligations

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IN RE LANDMARK FENCE 7

sharply against finding that we have jurisdiction over this

appeal.

To begin, the risk of piecemeal litigation is significant. 

“[W]hen an intermediate appellate court remands a case to

the bankruptcy court, the appellate process likely will be

much shorter if we decline jurisdiction and await ultimate

review of all the combined issues.” In re Lakeshore Vill.

Resort, 81 F.3d at 106 (quoting In re Stanton, 766 F.2d 1283,

1287–88 (9th Cir. 1985)). We have departed from this rule

where the district court’s remand order is limited to “purely

mechanical or computational task[s] such that the

proceedings on remand are highly unlikely to generate a new

appeal.” Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re

Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re

Fox, 762 F.2d 54, 55 (7th Cir. 1985)). Far from remanding

for a “mechanical or computational task,” the district court

directed the bankruptcy court to engage in “further factfinding” before reassessing its damages award.

In a quixotic effort to convince us to assume jurisdiction,

Sahagun argues that the litigation is effectively over because

the plaintiff class cannot present any evidence that will

support an award of damages under the legal standard

articulated by the district court. We do not necessarily share

Sahagun’s pessimism. Upon remand from the district court,

the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to prove that wages

were owed for travel “required” or “necessary” to “carry out

remain unsettled.” 135 S. Ct. at 1692–93. Nonetheless, we need not

resolve whether Germain can be reconciled with a flexible approach to

jurisdiction “because we conclude that the [lower court’s] decision was

not final even under our circuit’s flexible finality standard.” In re Bender,

586 F.3d at 1164.

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8 IN RE LANDMARK FENCE

. . . accomplish or fulfill” a public works contract—a standard

that, after all, isn’t that different from the one originally

employed by the bankruptcy court.

Nor would judicial efficiency be enhanced by exercising

jurisdiction. Although Sahagun points out that the litigation

would end if we held that the bankruptcy court got it right on

all counts, we eschew a “jurisdictional inquiry that requires

us to decide the merits of the appeal.” In re Vylene Enters.,

968 F.2d at 891.

The third factor, preserving the bankruptcy court’s role as

the finder of fact, also tips in favor of declining jurisdiction. 

Although the parties characterize the issues in the appeal as

purely matters of law, viewing the appeal through this lens

ignores the language of the order on appeal. The district

court remanded the case with explicit directions for the

bankruptcy court to engage in “further fact-finding.” 

Assuming jurisdiction now would deprive the bankruptcy

court of the opportunity to assess whether and to what extent

the district court’s order alters its assessment of wages owed

to the class members.

Finally, neither party will suffer irreparable harm if we

decline jurisdiction. That the plaintiff class has endured a

significant delay in recovering unpaid wages is regrettable,

but not irreparable. The desire for a resolution—even a

partial one—is understandable, but this consideration does

not override the finality consideration.

A final wrinkle in our jurisdictional analysis bears

mention. In a motion for judicial notice filed just six days

before oral argument, counsel for Landmark indicated that the

underlying bankruptcy petition had been dismissed over

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IN RE LANDMARK FENCE 9

seven months prior, in August 2014. Landmark thus urges us

to dismiss the appeal as moot and vacate the orders of the

district court and the bankruptcy court. We deny the motion

for judicial notice and Landmark’s other entreaties to

terminate the litigation.

We recognize that developments during the pendency of

an appeal may render a case moot at any time. Counsel has

an obligation to inform the court promptly of any such events. 

But wholly apart from the inexplicable and irresponsible

delay in notifying us that the bankruptcy petition had been

dismissed, we decline to address mootness now. Doing so

would require us to violate the Supreme Court’s direction

that, “[o]n every writ of error or appeal, the first and

fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this

court, and then of the court from which the record comes.” 

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 547

(1986) (quoting Mansfield C. &L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S.

379, 382 (1884)); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

716 F.3d 653, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that because

appellate jurisdiction was lacking, the court “can express no

position on . . . [whether] the Sierra Club’s case was moot

when filed”); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers

Union v. S.E.C., 15 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Since we

conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review

the Commission’s May 6, 1993 letter of affirmance in this

case because it is not a final order . . . we do not [decide] . . .

whether this issue is moot.”); cf. Sierra Club v. U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Comm’n, 825 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987),

(dismissing appeal of a non-final order and declining to

address the argument that the “petition may very well be

moot” due to events occurring during the pendency of the

appeal).

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10 IN RE LANDMARK FENCE

Although the mootness issue may seem a superficially

quick fix, Sahagun’s response to the motion points to why the

argument over mootness is more appropriately raised in the

trial court.2 More importantly, because we do not have

appellate jurisdiction, we lack the authority to grant

Landmark’s request to vacate the district court’s orders. See

Defenders of Wildlife v. Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317, 1328

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (“If we lack jurisdiction, we cannot vacate

the district court’s order for lack of jurisdiction because we

lack the power to do so.”). We thus deny the motion for

judicial notice of the bankruptcy dismissal.

DISMISSED.3

2 Sahagun contends that the dismissal did not render the appeal moot and

that vacatur would be unjust, pointing out that at least $5 million of the

$15 million in damages awarded by the bankruptcy court constituted a

final judgment that should be afforded preclusive effect because it was not

contested on appeal.

3

In light of our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction, we deny Sahagun’s

motion to certify to the California Supreme Court the two issues of

California wage and hour law relating to the merits of the appeal. We also

deny as moot the pending motions to file amicus briefs.

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