Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05798/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05798-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Wrongful Death

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KASSAUNDRA LEE SALYARDS, by and

through her Guardian ad Litem,

JENNIFER LEE SALYARDS, and

JENNIFER LEE SALYARDS,

individually,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

METSO MINERALS TAMPERE OY; METSO

MINERALS INDUSTRIES, INC.; METSO

MINERALS MINERALS (USA), INC.;

and DOE 1 through DOE 10,

Inclusive, 

 Defendants.

1:04-CV-05798 OWW LJO

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DOC. 66)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns the death of Jason Salyards, an employee

at Vulcan Materials Company’s plant in San Emido, California. 

Mr. Salyards was killed while performing a maintenance procedure

on a piece of rock-crushing machinery, a Nordberg Jaw Crusher C140 (“Nordberg C-140"). The Nordberg C-140 is manufactured,

marketed and distributed by Defendants. Plaintiffs, Jennifer Lee

Salyards (decedent’s widow) and Kassaundra Lee Salyards

(decedent’s daughter) filed suit based on diversity jurisdiction,

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alleging (1) wrongful death based on various products liability

theories, (2) negligence, (3) and breach of warranty. Defendants

move for partial summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled

to judgment on (a) that portion of Plaintiff’s wrongful death

claim based on failure to warn (a strict liability cause of

action) and (b) the breach of warranty claim. (Doc. 1, filed

June 4, 2004.) 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Nordberg Jaw Crusher was manufactured in Finland by

Metso Minerals Tampere Oy (MMTO), a Finnish company. MMTO has a

number of subsidiaries, two of which are also named defendants in

this case: Metso Minerals Industries, Inc. (MMII) is a Delaware

corporation with its principal place of business in Wisconsin. 

MMII sells Nordberg crushers in the United States. Metso

Minerals (USA), Inc. (MMUSA) is a separate American subsidiary of

MMTO. MMTO, MMII, MMUSA and ten does are named as defendants in

the complaint. 

The complaint sets forth the following claims for relief: 

• First Cause of Action: Wrongful Death based upon

products liability theories of manufacturing

defect, design defect, and failure to warn. 

• Second Cause of Action: Negligence in the design,

manufacture, selection of component parts,

assemby, marketing, leasing, renting,

distribution, repair, installation, failure to

warn and maintain, and failure to provide proper

instruction and equipment for servicing of the

crushing plates. 

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• Third Cause of Action: Breach of Warranty.

• Damages requested: General damages, medical and

incidental expenses, funeral burial and incidental

expenses, all losses incurred “because of

plaintiffs’ inabilities to pursue their usual

occupations and activities along with loss of

financial support,” costs of suit, and prejudgment

interest. 

MMTO previously moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 28, filed Nov. 15, 2004.) The

motion was denied on the ground that MMTO had sufficient contacts

with California. (Doc. 42, filed Feb. 10, 2005.)

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Vulcan Materials Company (“Vulcan”) purchased the Nordberg

C-140 that allegedly caused Jason Salyard’s injuries from MMII's

California distributor, Cooley Equipment Corporation (“Cooley”),

in April 2000. 

The Nordberg C-140 crushes rock in a V-shaped crushing

cavity (or “jaw”). One side of the jaw is stationary or “fixed”;

the other side moves in a pinching motion to crush stone or other

material. The moving and fixed sides of the jaw make up two

opposing sides of a four-sided cavity. (The other two opposing

sides of the cavity are stationary and are referred to as

"cheeks.") When operating properly, large pieces of rock or

other material enter the jaw crusher from above through the

cavity. The jaw periodically closes, crushing the rock into

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The two "cheeks" are lined with "cheek plates" that 1

also must be periodically replaced

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smaller pieces, which then fall out the bottom of the cavity onto

a discharge conveyer belt 

Each side of the v-shaped jaw is lined with a two-piece set

of jaw plates (or jaw “dies”), each with an “upper” and a “lower”

plate. These dies must be periodically replaced, as they wear

during use. To be clear, there are four separate jaw die plates

which can wear and need to be periodically replaced -- an upper

and lower plate on each of the two sides of the v-shaped die.1

Each jaw die weighs more than 3,000 lbs. During normal

operation, a system of “wedges” holds the jaw dies in place

within the crushing cavity. On the fixed side, the jaw dies sit

flush against the frame of the crusher at six degrees from

vertical.

A. The Jaw Die Change-Out Procedure as Set Forth in the

Manual.

Nordberg’s instructions for installation of new plates

begins with the removal of the old, worn plates, commencing with

the upper jaw die on the fixed side of the jaw. (See Nordberg

Instruction Manual, attached to Forney Depo., Ex. C, at § 8.5

(Metso 00071).) The manual first instructs the reader to “clean

the jaw plate lifting points.” “Lifting hooks” provided by Metso

fit into the jaw plate lifting points. The manual then instructs

personnel to “[h]old the jaw plate up with a hoist and [the]

lifting hooks.” (Id.) Next, the manual calls for the removal of

the nuts, bolts, and tightening wedges that hold the upper plate

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in place. The manual states in bold face: “Be careful not to

drop the jaw die as it may [sic] personal injury and cause damage

to the crusher.” (Id.) This procedure is to be repeated for the

lower jaw die on the fixed side, followed by the upper then lower

dies on the moving side of the jaw. (Id.)

Once the old dies have been removed, the manual explains how

to install the new dies, again beginning on the fixed side of the

crusher. (Id. at Metso 00072.) The manual instructs the reader

simply to “replace the lower jaw.” The manual does not mention

the hoist and lifting hooks in the context of the re-assembly

instructions. Once the lower die is in place, the middle

“tightening wedge” is replaced at the top of the lower die and

secured with a bolt and spring assembly. The instructions direct

that the nut holding this bolt and spring assembly is to be

screwed in “lightly.” (Id.)

Next, the manual tells the reader to “replace the upper

jaw.” Once the upper jaw is in place (above the lower plate),

two wedges are replaced at the top of the upper plate. These

wedges are secured with a bolt and spring assembly as well. The

instructions then state: “make sure there is a clearance of 5-8

mm (3/16 - 5/16") between the upper and lower jaw plate and that

the tightening wedge (3) has not bottomed out.” It appears that

this caution against “bottoming out” is a re-iteration of the

instruction that the bolt in the middle wedge should be screwed

in “lightly.” (If this bolt is screwed in tightly, there is no

way to adjust the dies up or down to achieve the required

clearance. Once the desired clearance is achieved, the bolts are

tightened according to specifications provided in the

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 A box on the page of the manual containing these re- 2

assembly instructions states: 

Note! The tightening sequence:

First pretighten the lower bolts and adjust the

clearance between the upper and lower jaw plate 5-8 mm

(3/16" - 5/16"). Tighten the upper bolts and then

lower ones. If the tightening wedge has bottomed out

and there is no clearance, torch cut a piece from the

jaw plates. 

(Metso 00072.)

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instructions. ) The procedure for replacing the dies on the 2

moving side of the jaw is essentially the same. 

Plaintiffs assert that there is a hidden danger associated

with this tightening sequence and that Defendants did not provide

sufficient warnings of this danger. 

B. Cautionary Language in the Manual.

The jaw die change-out procedure is explained in Section 8.5

of the instruction manual. The only cautionary warnings

contained within this section of the manual are as follows: 

• During the jaw die change out procedure, “Hold the jaw

plate up with a hoist and lifting hooks.” (UMF No.

25.)

• During the jaw die change out procedure, “Be careful

not to drop the jaw die as it may [cause] personal

injury and cause damage to the crusher.” (UMF No. 26

[Bolding in original].)

Elsewhere in the manual, the following general warnings are

included:

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• “A copy of this manual must be kept at the equipment’s

location and made available to the operators as

required.” (UMF No. 15.)

• “In addition to this manual and accident prevention

regulations mandatory in the country of use and at the

equipment’s places of operation, generally recognized

rules for safe and professional operation must be

observed.” (UMF No. 16.)

• “This instruction manual must be read and used by each

person who works with the equipment,

typically...maintenance, including inspection and

repair.” (UMF No. 17 [Underlining in original].)

• The information contained in this manual is not

intended to replace safety codes, insurance

requirements, federal, state and local laws, rules and

regulations.” (UMF No. 18.)

• “Remember that on any job, YOU are the key to safety. 

Good safety practices not only protect the men around

you, they are your own best protection. Study this

manual and any manufacturer’s operator’s manual

covering your specific equipment. Read all warnings

and caution instructions. Practice safe operation

INSIST THAT YOUR FELLOW WORKERS DO, TOO. BE ALERT TO 

POSSIBLE HAZARDS BEFORE THEY CAUSE TROUBLE, AND 

REMEMBER . . .SAFETY IS UP TO YOU!!!” (UMF No. 19

[Capitalization in original].)

• “DO YOU KNOW YOUR EMPLOYER’S SAFETY PROGRAM? Company

safety records show that the greatest percentage of

accidents are caused by disregard of simple safety

rules. Know—observe!—the overall program . . . and

consult your supervisor when starting a job.” (UMF No.

20 [Capitalization in original].)

• DON’T STOP YOUR SAFETY PROGRAM WITH THESE GENERAL

RULES. BE EQUALLY CONSCIOUS THAT SPECIFIC WORKING

CONDITIONS AND YOUR PARTICULAR EQUIPMENT CAN REQUIRE

ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS.” (UMF No. 21 [Capitalization

in original].)

• “Use the proper tools; handle tools and heavy parts

sensibly.” (UMF No. 22.)

• “Since periodic inspection and maintenance must be

performed on each Crusher, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SOME

TYPE OF PLATFORM BE ERECTED AT A LEVEL CONVENIENT FOR

THE MAINTENANCE MEN WHO MUST INSPECT AND WORK ON THE

CRUSHER.” (UMF No. 23 [Capitalization in original].)

• “During replacement of parts or heavy structural

components careful handling and hoisting procedures

must be followed to eliminate any possible danger.” 

(UMF No. 24.)

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C. Vulcan’s Handling/Use of the Instruction Manual.

The instruction manual was not kept alongside the jaw

crusher, but was stored in an office behind the desk of Mr. Cliff

Warden, who served as the production foreman at the San Emidio

plant at the time of the accident. (UMF No. 27; Warden Depo. at

14.) Mr. Warden reviewed the manual himself when it arrived in

2000, but admits that he did not review the manual at any other

time before the accident. Warden also acknowledges that he was

not responsible for safety oversight. (Warden Depo. at 21-23.)

Warden does not recall whether Mr. Salyards ever reviewed the

manual. (Id. at 22-23.)

Three Vulcan employees ordinarily performed the change-out

procedure with Mr. Salyards: Jason Morris, Frank Buffuna, and

Jonathan Latham. (UMF No. 28.) Neither Morris nor Buffuna had

ever seen or read the instruction manual prior to the accident. 

(Id.) The parties dispute whether Jonathan Latham read the

manual prior to the incident.

In addition, neither Frank Parra, the San Emidio Plant

Manager, nor Biagio Ventura, the Vulcan Safety and Health

Representative in charge of the San Emidio Plant, ever saw the C140 Instruction Manual prior to the accident. (UMF No. 29.)

D. MMII’s supplemental training.

Defendants held training seminars on the Nordberg C series

of crushers. At these seminars, trainers employed by Defendants

explained the jaw die change out procedure and described how to

block jaw dies during the process. (UMF No. 30.) Metso sent

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notice of these seminars to Vulcan personnel. Although other

Vulcan plants sent employees to these seminars, no one from the

San Emido plant attended. (Id.) However, prior to Vulcan

obtaining the Nordberg C-140, Henry Gaffron, another Vulcan

employee, trained Mr. Salyards on how to change out jaw dies on a

different jaw crusher at the San Emidio Plant. (UMF No. 31.) 

Mr. Gaffron taught Mr. Salyards to block the jaw dies from moving

by welding a length of angle iron between the two sides of the

crushing cavity. (Id.) 

E. The Accident.

Mr. Salyards was killed while performing the die change out

procedure on June 14, 2003. (UMF No. 32.) At that time, the new

jaw dies were hoisted into place in the crushing cavity. (Id.) 

Mr. Salyards attempted to block the jaw die from movement by

jamming (not welding) a length of angle iron into the top of the

crushing cavity. (Id.) He then removed the hoisting assembly

(provided by Metso) and attempted to replace the top wedge

assembly. (UMF No. 32.) Mr. Salyards had used this same method

of restraining the jaw several times in the past. (Id.)

Mr. Salyards stood at the top of the crushing cavity with

his left foot on the top of the “cheek plate” and his right foot

extended onto the length of angle iron. (UMF No. 33.) At this

point, Mr. Salyards was positioned above the discharge conveyor. 

He was not wearing any fall protection. As Mr. Salyards

attempted to secure the top wedge assembly, the angle iron

slipped out from under him. He fell into the crushing cavity,

and the jaw die toppled over into the cavity, killing him. (UMF

No. 34.) 

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F. Other pertinent facts.

The contract between MMII and Cooley disclaims all

warranties, express or implied, on products sold by MMII to

Cooley under the contract. (UMF No. 36.)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). The evidence

must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. West Oregon Wood Products,

Inc., 268 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 2001 WL

1490998 (9th Cir. 2001). Facts are “material” if they “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

at 248). 

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The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263

F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th

Cir. 2000). However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party must only show “that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the

moving party has met its burden of proof, the non-moving party

must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could

find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in light of the

evidentiary burden the law places on that party. Triton Energy

Corp., 68 F.3d at 1221. The nonmoving party cannot simply rest

on its allegations without any significant probative evidence

tending to support the complaint. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

“In order to show that a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the nonmoving party must introduce some ‘significant

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probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’” Rivera v.

AMTRAK, 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249). If the moving party can meet his

burden of production, the non-moving party “must produce evidence

in response....[H]e cannot defeat summary judgment with

allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or

conclusory statements.” Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343

F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). “Conclusory allegations

unsupported by factual data cannot defeat summary judgment.” 

Rivera, 331 F.3d at 1078 (citing Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley

Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)).

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

nonmoving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

“[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.” Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on summary judgment

is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues; rather, it is to find

genuine factual issues. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d

407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996).

//

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V. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to warn claim.

To establish a claim of strict liability for failure to

warn, a plaintiff must prove that

[1] the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers

arising from a foreseeable use of the product and [2]

that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of

the plaintiff's injuries. When a manufacturer is or

should have been aware that a product is unreasonably

dangerous absent a warning and such warning is

feasible, the manufacturer will be held strictly liable

if it fails to give an appropriate and conspicuous

warning.

Maneely v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir.

1997)(applying California law). 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the failure to warn

claim arguing (1) that they had no duty to provide additional

warnings in this case and (2) that Plaintiff has failed to

present any evidence establishing causation.

1. Defendants’ Duty to Warn.

Defendants may escape liability for failure to warn if the

potential dangers posed by the Nordberg C-140 were “open and

obvious” ones: 

Strict liability for failure to warn does not attach if

the dangerous propensity is either obvious or known to

the injured person at the time the product is used.

Gonzales v. Carmenita Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 3d

1143, 1153 (1987). Here, Defendants argue that they had no duty

to warn in this case because any potential hazards associated

with the jaw die change-out were obvious and/or well known to the

maintenance staff, including Mr. Salyards. 

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First, Defendants argue that there is an obvious risk posed

by a 3000 pound slab of metal standing on end. Defendants submit

that Mr. Salyards must have been aware of this risk because of

the training he received from Mr. Gaffron, who taught Mr.

Salyards to weld (rather than simply jam) a length of angle iron

between the opposing plates during installation. (UMF No. 31) 

Defendants suggest that “the fact that [Mr. Salyards] continued

to use the angle iron at all... is powerful evidence that he was

fully aware of the need to block the jaw die from falling into

the crushing cavity.” (Doc. 66 at 9.)

Plaintiffs respond by pointing to one potential hazard that

could create a “trap for the unwary.” (Doc. 72 at 5.) After the

new upper die is set into place, the instruction manual directs

the reader to secure the middle wedge (which holds the bottom of

the upper die in place) by initially tightening the nut and bolt

assembly lightly. After the position of the upper die is finetuned and the upper wedge is bolted into place, the nuts holding

the middle wedge may need to be tightened further. 

According to Defendants’ expert, Dr. Fourney, so long as the

middle wedge nuts remain loose during the initial phase of the

procedure (a situation the parties describe as “leaving the

middle wedge in the full outboard position”), the upper jaw die

does not pose a particularly great tipping hazard. (Fourney

Depo. at 85-86.) However, Dr. Fourney opined that, if the nuts

on the middle wedge are tightened too much (moving the wedge

toward the inboard position), the dies’ center of gravity would

change, and the force required to tip the uplifted jaw die would

diminish – creating an increasingly hazardous condition. (Id. at

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87-89.) Dr. Fourney thought that the inclusion of a warning

specifically informing the reader of the nature of this hazard

would be too confusing. (Id. at 178.) However, Dr. Fourney did

admit that he would have “prefer[red]” it if the manual

contained more detailed instructions to ensure that the reader

only tighten the bolt “lightly.” For example, Dr. Fourney

suggested that it would have been better if the manual stated

“turn [the nut] three complete turns” or “hand tighten.” (Id. at

177.)

Under normal circumstances (i.e., if the bolts are left

loose), Plaintiffs maintain that the jaw die would be difficult

to tip in to the crusher. Under these circumstances, jamming a

piece of angle iron into the cavity (an ad hoc method used by the

workers to satisfy a general industrial safety requirement that

heavy objects be blocked from unintended movement) would probably

be sufficient. However, given the chance that the nuts could be

over-tightened, Plaintiffs maintain that a more substantial

blocking method is absolutely necessary (e.g., welding the angle

iron into place). Plaintiffs point out that the crusher manual

contains no warning about this particular hazard or of the

importance of welding a blocking device into place. 

Defendants rejoin that the instruction manual for the

Nordberg jaw crusher does warn of the possibility of personal

injury if the jaw is allowed to drop into the crushing cavity

during the change out. (See Metso 00071.) Defendants also place

great emphasis on the language in the section of the change-out

procedure instructions concerning disassembly, that directs the

reader to “[h]old the jaw plate up with a hoist and lifting

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hooks.” (Id.) However, no similar language is contained within

the sub-section of the manual concerned with the re-insertion of

the new jaw dies. (Metso 00072.) Dr. Fourney admitted that it

would have been better if the manual provided additional

instructions concerning when and under what circumstances to

utilize and or remove the hoisting mechanisms. (Fourney Depo. at

175-76.)

On balance, there is a genuine factual dispute over whether

Defendant should have either warned users of the dangers

associated with over-tightening the bolts during the initial the

change-out procedure or, at the very least, clarified the

instructions so as to minimize the chance of this occurring. 

Whether a particular set of warnings is adequate under the

circumstances is generally a question of fact for the jury. See

Torrez v. Xomox Corp., 49 Cal. App. 4th 1, 22 (1996). The

existence of disputed facts over the prominence and sufficiency

of any warnings precludes summary judgment on the failure to warn

claim. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it must be inferred that the warnings were

inadequate. 

2. Causation

Defendants argue in the alternative that summary judgment is

appropriate on the failure to warn claim because Plaintiffs have

failed to establish a causal link between any alleged failure to

warn and Mr. Salyard’s death. “A plaintiff asserting causes of

action based on a failure to warn must prove not only that no

warning was provided or the warning was inadequate, but also that

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the inadequacy or absence of the warning caused the plaintiff’s

injury.” Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 984, 991 (C.D.

Cal. 2001) (applying California law). To establish such

causation under California law, Plaintiffs must prove that the

“alleged failure to warn or inadequate warning was a substantial

factor” in bringing about Mr. Salyard’s death. Id. (citing

Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953, 968 (1997)). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs cannot establish causation

in this case because none of the Vulcan employees responsible for

changing out the jaw dies ever read the instruction manual. In

other words, Defendants maintain that the absence of any

particular warning could not have been a “substantial factor” in

Mr. Salyard’s death because no amount of additional warnings

would have altered Mr. Salyard’s conduct. 

It appears to be undisputed that Nordberg C-140 manual was

kept behind Mr. Warden’s desk in the Vulcan site office and that

neither the plant manager nor the safety and health

representative in charge of the San Emido Plant had ever seen the

instruction manual. It is also undisputed that neither Jason

Morris nor Frank Buffuna -- the two men working with Mr. Salyards

during the change-out procedure on the date of the accident --

had ever seen or read the instruction manual prior to the

accident. (UMF No. 28.) There is some dispute, however, over

whether a third maintenance worker, Jonathan Latham, read the

manual prior to the incident. This dispute arises from ambiguous

comments Mr. Latham made during his deposition. Mr. Latham

stated that he did review the instruction manual approximately

one year prior to the incident, for the specific purpose of

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learning "the specifications for the pinch-down measurement on

the spring" (referring to a part of one of the spring and bolt

assemblies that hold the jaw wedges in place). (Latham Depo. at

30.) However, Latham also testified that he did not review the

instruction manual prior to the incident for the purposes of

learning how to perform the change out procedure. (Id. at 30-

31.) Plaintiffs use this portion of Mr. Latham's deposition to

argue that “the Vulcan employee who needed to read the

Instruction Manual before the initial changeout did so.” (Doc.

72 at 2.) The testimony does not show that Mr. did anything

other than look up the spring specifications, which are indicated

in a detail on Figure 8.5.1 in Section 8.5 of the manual. 

Whether the manual should have included a more prominent warning

directing the reader’s attention to potential fatal risksin the

change-out procedure remains an open question.

However, it is also undisputed that Mr. Warden did read the

manual when it first arrived at the San Emido plant. Drawing

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the warnings

provided to Vulcan and read by Mr. Warden were inadequate. 

Although neither party discusses this fact or its potential legal

significance, there is some authority that indirectly suggests

summary judgment is inappropriate where inadequate warnings were

provided to and read by an injured person’s employer.

Mr. Warden’s role is potentially legally significant. In

general, a manufacturer has a duty to warn the end user if a

product poses particular non-obvious hazards. Under certain

circumstances, however, a manufacturer may discharge its duty to

directly warn end users by providing a proper warning to an

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Although it appears that no California court has 3

applied the intermediary principle to an employer, other courts

have done so. See, e.g., Washington v. Dept. of Transp., 8 F.3d

296, 301, (5th Cir. 1993)(manufacturer owed no separate duty to

warn employee where it issued adequate warning to employee’s

supervisor, who failed to relay the information); Adams v. Union

Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453, 1456-58 (6th Cir.

1984)(manufacturer reasonably relied on sophisticated employer to

warn its employees).

The Restatement Second of Torts has often been relied 4

upon by California courts in products liability cases. See e.g.,

Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 64-65 (1973);

Persons v. Salomon N. Am., Inc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 168, 175

(1990). 

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intermediary. For example, a prescription drug manufacturer may

usually discharge its duty to warn by providing warnings to the

prescribing physician, a so-called “learned intermediary.” If

the doctor fails to read or heed the warning, the manufacturer is

absolved of liability. In Motus, 358 F.3d at 661, one of the

cases relied upon by Defendants, causation was found lacking

because the prescribing doctor admitted that he failed to read a

drug’s warning label. In contrast, where there is no

intermediary at all, the end user is held responsible for his or

her failure to read warning labels. In Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.,

6 Cal. 4th 539, 556 (1993), another case cited by Defendants,

causation was disproved where Plaintiff’s mother admitted she

failed to read the warning label on an over-the-counter

medicine. See also Rest. 2d Torts § 388, comment n. 3 4

This case is distinguishable from both Motus and Ramirez. 

Unlike the warnings in those cases, here, the warning in the

instruction manual is inferred to be inadequate under summary

judgment rules. It is impossible (and improper) for the court to

speculate what steps Mr. Warden might have taken to improve

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safety if a different set of warnings had been included in the

manual. 

Defendants motion for summary judgment on the failure to

warn claim is DENIED. 

B. Breach of Warranty

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached express and

implied warranties associated with the Nordberg C-140. A

defendant can exclude express and implied warranties if the

disclaimer is conspicuous. See Cal. Com. Code § 2316. 

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims

should be dismissed because the contract between MMII (Nordberg’s

sales subsidiary) and its distributor (Cooley) expressly

disclaims any express or implied warranty. The agreement between

MMII and Cooley provides:

 Distributor agrees that it has no authority to and

shall not at any time extend any warranty, make any

representation or extend to any customer any right or

remedy not expressly provided for in the Nordberg

published warranties. Any additional representations

made or obligations assumed by Distributor in excess of

Nordberg’s published warranties shall be solely the

responsibility of the Distributor. 

DISTRIBUTOR AGREES THAT THE WARRANTIES AND REMEDIES SET

FORTH IN NORDBERG’S PUBLISHED WARRANTIES ARE EXCLUSIVE

AND IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES AND REMEDIES

WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR STATUTORY, INCLUDING,

BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OR MERCHANTABILITY

OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, WHICH NORDBERG

EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS. 

(UMF No. 40.)

Plaintiffs contend that these disclaimers do not operate

against Vulcan or Plaintiffs because the disclaimers are

contained within the contract between MMII and its distributor,

not within any contract signed by Vulcan. Plaintiffs emphasize

the requirement than any warranty disclaimer be “conspicuous.” 

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Cal. Com. Code § 2316(2). According to California Commercial

Code § 1201(10), a “term or clause is conspicuous when it is so

written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate

ought to have noticed it.” 

The purpose underlying section 2316 suggests that

disclaimers must be included in the contract for sale to the end

user. Section 2316 “seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and

unbargained language of disclaimer by...permitting the exclusion

of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other

circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.” 

Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d

1, 34-35 (1989)(requiring a plaintiff to show that the warranty

formed a “part of the basis of the bargain.”). 

Here, there is no evidence that the disclaimers were

included in any contract entered into by Vulcan. Accordingly,

Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the warranty

claims must be DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for

partial summary judgment on the failure to warn and warranty

claims is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED

Dated: November 10, 2005

_/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER______

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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