Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04223/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04223-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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Case No.: 14-cv-04223 NC

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAN WISKIND,

Plaintiff,

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-04223 NC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 43

Before the Court is defendant JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Dan 

Wiskind’s Second Amended Complaint. In this Court’s prior order dismissing Wiskind’s 

First Amended Complaint, it stated, “To the extent Wiskind premises his allegations on 

purported fraud or misrepresentations, Wiskind must provide context, and clearly allege 

what statements were made to him by whom and when.” Dkt. No. 39 at 1. In this Second 

Amended Complaint, because Wiskind still fails to allege facts with particularity as to his 

fraud-based claims, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice his claims for “Deceit – Promise 

Made Without Intent to Perform”; “Deceit – Intentional Misrepresentation”; “Fraud and 

Deceit – Suppression of Material Facts”; and “Fraud and Deceit – Negligent 

Misrepresentation.” Additionally, because Wiskind’s claim under California Business and 

Professions Code § 17200 is also based on JPMorgan’s alleged fraudulent practices, the 

Court DISMISSES that claim as well with prejudice. 

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Wiskind also brings claims against JPMorgan based on negligence, promissory 

estoppel, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. The Court DISMISSES these claims because Wiskind fails to allege sufficient 

facts. Yet because the deficiencies as to these remaining four claims can be cured, the 

Court gives Wiskind leave to amend. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dan Wiskind alleges that he purchased a property located in Kelseyville, 

California, and obtained a mortgage for $357,565 from JPMorgan’s predecessor in interest, 

Washington Mutual Bank. Dkt. No. 40 at ¶ 6. In May 2013, Wiskind sought a loan 

modification from JP Morgan. Id. at ¶ 7. Wiskind alleges he was told he would be 

approved for a loan modification. Id. In June 2013, Wiskind alleges JPMorgan offered 

him a “trial modification” and that under that “trial,” Wiskind made three consecutive 

mortgage payments to JPMorgan. Id. 

In September 2013, Wiskind states he was offered a “‘permanent’ HAMP 

modification,” which he alleges was a contract that he accepted, signed and notarized. Id. 

at ¶ 8. Despite this “HAMP modification contract,” Wiskind alleges he was “subjected to 

frequent and onerous requests to provide voluminous and duplicative information and 

supporting documentation,” including “new loan modification application packages 

containing the exact same information he had previously submitted.” Id. According to 

Wiskind, this process of resubmitting the same documents and answering the same 

questions took place over a six-month period. Id. at ¶ 9. Wiskind alleges he was told this 

process would eventually lead to a loan modification. Id. 

Wiskind alleges that in December 2013, JPMorgan “Customer Assistance 

Specialist” James Cohen sent Wiskind correspondence informing him that he was 

ineligible for modification under HAMP. Id. According to Wiskind, the “HAMP 

contract” he entered into with JPMorgan had been “inexplicably cancelled”—JPMorgan 

had reneged its own final, permanent loan modification offer. Id. 

Wiskind alleges that in July 2014, he received written notification that JPMorgan 

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had initiated the foreclosure process. Id. According to Wiskind, while JPMorgan 

continued to make him submit documentation, JPMorgan secretly worked to seize 

Wiskind’s home through a “surprise foreclosure” accomplished through a “dual-tracking 

scheme.” Id. at ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). In August 2014, Wiskind alleges 

that JPMorgan recorded a Notice of Trustee Sale on his property and threatened 

foreclosure unless Wiskind paid JPMorgan $357,479.58, the alleged amount owed. Id. at ¶ 

14. 

Wiskind subsequently sued JPMorgan and secured a temporary restraining order in 

state court, which prohibited the foreclosure of his home. Id; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 76-77. 

Shortly thereafter, JPMorgan removed the case to this Court. Dkt. No. 1. Once in federal 

court, Wiskind amended his complaint. Dkt. No. 23. The Court dismissed Wiskind’s First 

Amended Complaint with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 39. This Court found Wiskind’s 

complaint failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; instead of 

providing “simple, concise, and direct” allegations, the complaint was “unreasonably 

lengthy and infused with extraneous statements.” Id. at 3. The Court also found that the 

First Amended Complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b): Wiskind’s claims failed to identify 

the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the false or misleading statements that Wiskind 

alleged JPMorgan made. Id. at 4. 

Wiskind subsequently filed a Seconded Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 40. 

JPMorgan moves to dismiss this complaint with prejudice. 

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), as all parties have consented 

to proceeding before a magistrate judge. Dkt. Nos. 15, 33.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

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merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend should be granted unless the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

Wiskind alleges nine causes of action. The first four involve fraud-based claims: 

(1) “Deceit – Promise Made Without Intent to Perform”; (2) “Deceit – Intentional 

Misrepresentation”; (3) “Fraud and Deceit – Suppression of Material Facts”; and (4) 

“Fraud and Deceit – Negligent Misrepresentation.” Wiskind also brings claims for (5) 

negligence, (6) violation of the California Business and Professions Code § 17200, and (7) 

promissory estoppel. Finally, Wiskind alleges two contract-based claims: (8) breach of 

contract; and (9) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

A. Wiskind’s Fraud-Based Claims (Claims 1-4)

To plead fraud or mistake under Rule 9(b), “a party must state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “The plaintiff must set 

forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Vess v. CibaGeigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re GlenFed, Inc. Secs. 

Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994)); see Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 

885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[m]ere conclusory allegations of fraud are 

insufficient.”). “The complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places, benefits 

received, and other details of the alleged fraudulent activity.” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 

F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 

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Put another way, “a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and how of 

the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about [the purportedly 

fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 

Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted, 

brackets in original).

Here, all four of Wiskind’s fraud-based claims fail to identify the “who, what, 

when, where, and how” of the false or misleading statements he alleges JPMorgan made. 

For instance, in describing the second cause of action for “Deceit – Intentional 

Misrepresentation,” Wiskind states that that he relied on the statement of Chase 

representatives “that no foreclosure proceedings would be initiated during the loan 

modification process and that there would be foreclosure recordation costs and attorney’s 

fees included in the arrearages.” Id. at ¶ 64. Wiskind alleges that these statements were 

made by Chase representatives “including but not limited to Chase representative James 

Cohen via both written correspondence during the period of June 2013 through December 

2013, as well as telephone communications during that same time period with Mr. Cohen 

and other agents.” Id. Wiskind fails to allege which agent he spoke to on what day 

concerning what particular misrepresentation. 

To be sure, Wiskind uses the catch-all phrase “including but not limited to Chase 

representative James Cohen” repeatedly in the complaint and frequently references the sixmonth period of time when various agents allegedly made misrepresentations to him. See, 

e.g., id. at ¶ 11 (describing “Chase loan modification agents, including but not limited to 

various self-identified ‘Customer Assistance Specialists,’ including the aforementioned 

Chase representative James Cohen”), ¶ 67 (identifying “James Cohen, among other Chase 

managers and representatives”), ¶ 76 (same). But other than JPMorgan agent James Cohen 

and the letter Cohen sent on December 11, 2013, Wiskind fails to identify the names of the 

JPMorgan representatives he spoke with during “countless telephone conservations” 

during May 2013 through December 2013, id. at ¶ 44, the dates of the conservation, and 

what that representative said. But see Ward v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 14-cvCase 3:14-cv-04223-NC Document 53 Filed 04/17/15 Page 5 of 14
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00565 NC, at 17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015) (finding plaintiff in mortgage foreclosure case 

satisfied Rule 9(b) when she identified the particular agents she spoke with, the dates, and 

the alleged misrepresentations the agents made). 

Accordingly, because Wiskind’s four fraud-based claims in his Second Amended 

Complaint fail to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard, the Court GRANTS JPMorgan’s 

motion to dismiss as to these claims with prejudice. 

B. Negligence (Claim 5) 

Under California law, “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a 

legal duty to use reasonable care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate [or legal] cause 

between the breach and (4) the plaintiff’ s injury.” Saldate v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 686

F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1062 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 

Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339 (1998)). “The threshold element of a cause of action for 

negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care.” Paz v. State of Cal., 22 Cal.4th 550, 

559 (2000) (internal citation omitted).

As a general rule, under California law, “a financial institution owes no duty of care 

to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed 

the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. 

Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095-96 (1991) (citation omitted). The test 

for determining whether a financial institution exceeded its role as money lender and thus 

owes a duty of care to a borrower-client involves “the balancing of various factors, among 

which are (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the 

foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,

(4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury 

suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, and (6) the policy of 

preventing future harm.” Id. at 1098.

Wiskind contends that JPMorgan owed him a fiduciary duty of care and a duty to 

disclose information to him regarding the loan modification process. California courts are 

squarely divided on this issue of “when lenders owe a duty of care to borrowers in the 

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context of the submission of and negotiations related to loan modification applications and 

foreclosure proceedings.” See Rijhwani v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 13-cv05881 LB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27516, 2014 WL 890016, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 

2014) (gathering cases). But several cases in our District have recently found that a lender 

may have a special duty of care when engaging in the loan modification process. See id. 

(“While a lender may not have a duty to modify the loan of any borrower who applies for a 

loan modification, a lender surely has a duty to submit a borrower’s loan modification 

application once the lender has told the borrower that it will submit it[.]”); Faulks v. Wells 

Fargo & Co., No. 13-cv-02871 MEJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65808, 2014 WL 1922185, at 

*8 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“the Court is inclined to find that Wells Fargo owed Plaintiff 

a duty of care in processing his loan modification application”); Rowland v. JP Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-0036 LB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32284, 2014 WL 992005, 

at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) (same).

Here, the Court need not reach the duty-of-care issue because Wiskind’s negligence 

claim is inadequately pled. Wiskind alleges that JPMorgan offered him a loan 

modification and represented to Wiskind that it would help him “save his home” through 

this loan modification. Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 81. Wiskind alleges that despite his accepting 

JPMorgan’s offer, JPMorgan breached its duty of care to Wiskind by “attempt[ing] to 

renege on the ‘permanent’ loan modification contract.” Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 79. Wiskind also 

alleges that JPMorgan breached its duty by “mishandl[ing] plaintiff’s loan modification 

application numerous times.” Id. at ¶ 85. Additionally, because the loan was 

“securitized,” Wiskind allege “he may have been paying the mortgage to the wrong 

entity.” Id. at ¶¶ 84-85. As a result, Wiskind contends he “suffered general and specific 

damages”; this includes losing the benefit of the loan modification and having his home 

exposed to foreclosure. Id. at ¶ 79, 83. Wiskind also alleges he experienced severe 

emotional distress. Id. at ¶ 83. It is unclear from this what damages Wiskind specifically 

seeks; no trustee’s sale took place and he continues to possess the property. Id. at ¶ 9. 

And while Wiskind does allege that he made three payments under a “trial 

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modification” from June through August 2013, he does not allege facts concerning the 

mortgage payments he made from September through December 2013 under the loan 

modification agreement. Specifically, Wiskind fails to describe whether those mortgage 

payments under the alleged permanent loan modification agreement exceeded the 

payments owed to JPMorgan under the original 2005 loan. Wiskind also fails to allege 

sufficient facts describing how JPMorgan “mishandled plaintiff’s loan modification 

application numerous times” and how Wiskind’s mortgage payments went to the wrong 

entity. 

Accordingly, Wiskind’s negligence claim is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 

with leave to amend. 

C. California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (Claim 6)

Section 17200 of California’s Business and Professions Code prohibits “unfair 

competition,” which is defined as any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or 

practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 

A claim based on the “unlawful” prong of § 17200 incorporates other laws and 

treats violations of those laws as unlawful business practices independently actionable 

under state law. Chabner v. United Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 

2000). Thus, the operative pleading must allege the way in which the practices violated 

the “borrowed” law by “stat[ing] with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the 

statutory elements of the violation.” Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 

618-19 (1993). 

Section 17200 also creates a cause of action for a business practice that is “unfair”

even if not specifically proscribed by some other law. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed 

Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1143 (2003). To state a claim based on an “unfair” 

practice under § 17200, the plaintiff must allege facts that the practice “offends an 

established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 

unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 719 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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As to the third prong of § 17200, a business practice is “fraudulent” if “members of 

the public are likely to be deceived.” Comm. on Children’s Television v. Gen. Foods 

Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 211 (1983). Allegations of fraud under § 17200 must satisfy the 

heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Kearns v. Ford 

Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). And in instances “[w]here a claim under 

the unfair prong is based upon alleged fraudulent conduct, that claim likewise must satisfy 

the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).” Kenery v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 13-

cv-02411 BLF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015) (citing

Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1125; In re Apple In-App Purchase Litig., 855 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1039 

(N.D. Cal. 2012)).

Here, Wiskind makes conclusory allegations that fail not only to satisfy the 

heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b), but also the standard to survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion—that the claim contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Notably, 

Wiskind never unambiguously asserts under what prong of § 17200 his claims are based. 

But to the extent that Wiskind brings this § 17200 claim under the “fraudulent” and 

“unfair” prongs, Wiskind fails to state the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the 

misconduct charged. For instance, Wiskind alleges that “Defendants” committed “fraud, 

deceit, and other unconscionable misconduct to ‘steal’ Plaintiff’s home” and “engaged in 

criminal and tortious fraud in a manner that was, at the very least, incredibly unfair.” Dkt. 

No. 40 at ¶ 90. Wiskind alleges that “Defendants” made “willful and inaccurate credit 

disclosures regarding Defendants’ borrowers, including Plaintiff, to third parties.” Id. at ¶ 

99. Wiskind argues that such disclosures to third parties “constituted false credit reports in 

violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act . . . permitt[ing] the Defendants to continue their 

scheme and victimize the Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶ 100. These conclusory assertions suffer from 

the same Rule 9(b) deficiencies as Wiskind’s earlier fraud-based claims—Wiskind fails to 

identify the defendant who made the fraudulent concealment or material misstatement. 

Indeed, with this particular allegation, Wiskind also does not identity the third parties, 

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what the credit disclosures consist of and how they constitute false credit reports in 

violation of federal law. 

To the extent Wiskind brings a claim under the “unlawful” prong of § 17200, it also 

fails. The only “borrowed law” Wiskind refers to is the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Yet

Wiskind fails to “state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory 

elements of the violation.” Khoury, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 618-19. 

Wiskind also alleges that JPMorgan committed the unfair business practice of dual 

tracking. Dkt. No. 40 at ¶¶ 104-05. Section 2923.6(c) of the Homeowner Bill of Rights 

forbids a mortgage servicer from engaging in “dual tracking” or “record[ing] a notice of 

default . . . while the [borrower’s] complete first loan modification is pending.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2923.6(c). Here, Wiskind does not make any allegation that JPMorgan recorded a 

notice of default while his first loan modification was pending. In fact, Wiskind contends 

that JPMorgan already approved his loan modification in September 2013 and entered into 

a loan modification contract with him before reneging on that contract and attempting to 

foreclose on his home in July 2014. Accordingly, to the extent Wiskind asserts a cause of 

action under § 17200 based on JPMorgan’s alleged § 2923.6(c) violation, the claim is 

dismissed. 

For the reasons above, JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss Wiskind’s § 17200 claim is 

GRANTED with prejudice. 

D. Promissory Estoppel (Claim 7) 

In California, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, “A promise which the 

promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the 

promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if 

injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Kajima/Ray Wilson v. L.A. 

County Metro. Transp. Auth., 23 Cal. 4th 305, 310 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) 

of Contracts § 90(1)).

A claim for promissory estoppel requires establishing the following elements: (1) a 

promise that is clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the 

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promise is made; (3) the reliance must be reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party 

asserting the estoppel must be injured by his or her reliance. Boon Rawd Trading Int’l Co. 

v. Paleewong Trading Co., 688 F. Supp. 2d 940, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

Here, as in prior claims, Wiskind fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. 

Wiskind alleges that “Defendants” promised to “work on modifying his loan,” provide 

“hardship assistance,” and help him “stay in his home.” Dkt. No. 40 at ¶ 113. These 

promises do not meet the standard for an enforceable promise under California’s 

promissory estoppel doctrine, where a promise must be “definite enough that a court can 

determine the scope of the duty, and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined 

to provide a rational basis for the assessment of damages.” Garcia v. World Sav., FSB, 

183 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1045 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Wiskind also fails to sufficiently allege detrimental reliance and damages. 

According to Wiskind, JPMorgan promised to process his loan modification application 

properly and diligently, and not foreclose on his home “while the modification 

application(s) were pending.” Dkt. No. 40 at ¶114. As a result of these promises, Wiskind 

alleges he “did not take other action to prevent his home loan from going into default, to 

his detriment, when Defendants failed to and refused to honor those promises . . . .” Id. at 

¶ 116. This conclusory allegation of reliance does not “show that [Wiskind] changed his 

position in any way because of what he was allegedly promised by [JPMorgan].” Zierolf 

v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 12-cv-3461 EMC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175527, at *25 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (finding plaintiff’s decision to pursue unspecified “measures to 

prevent foreclosure” in reliance on Wells Fargo’s promise to “properly process” loan 

modification insufficient to maintain promissory estoppel claim). Similarly, Wiskind’s 

conclusory allegation that “he has been damaged in an amount to be proven” is not 

sufficient to allege damages that resulted from his reliance. 

As such, the court GRANTS JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss Wiskind’s promissory 

estoppel claim with leave to amend. 

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E. Breach of Contract (Claims 8) 

The elements to state a claim for breach of contract are: (1) existence of the 

contract, (2) performance by the plaintiff or excuse for nonperformance, (3) breach by the 

defendant, and (4) damages. First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Reece, 89 Cal. App. 4th 

731, 745 (2001). To allege the existence of a contract, a plaintiff must plead mutual 

assent, sufficiently definite contractual terms, and consideration. Rockridge Trust v. Wells 

Fargo NA, 13-cv-01457 JCS, 2014 WL 688124, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2014) (citations 

omitted).

Here Wiskind fails to sufficiently allege in the complaint the definite contractual 

terms of the loan modification agreement that JPMorgan breached; instead, he simply 

alleges that “the existence of a contract is undeniable (See Exhibit A),” Dkt. No. 40 at ¶ 

124 (referring to attachment entitled “Home Affordable Modification Agreement”). See

Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc., 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 209, 45 (2006) (party bringing breach of 

contract claim must allege terms that are “sufficiently definite (and this is a question of 

law) for the court to ascertain the parties’ obligations and to determine whether those 

obligations have been performed or breached.”). 

Wiskind also fails to allege consideration—doing or promising to do what one is 

already legally bound to do cannot be consideration for a promise. See Patera v. CitiBank, 

N.A., 14-cv-04533 JSC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14065, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015)

(citing Witkin, Summary of California Law 10th (2005) Contracts § 218). Wiskind has not 

alleged that he was required to do more than the submit payments already owed under the 

terms of the original loan agreement. See id. While Wiskind alleges he made “modified 

monthly mortgage payments,” Dkt. No. 40 at ¶ 124, he does not state how those payments 

differed from—if at all—the terms of the original 2005 loan agreement. 

Finally, Wiskind has failed to adequately plead damages; simply alleging that “he 

lost the benefit of his bargain” and that his house was exposed to foreclosure is not 

enough. See Patera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14065, at *27 (“Plaintiff’s damages are 

inadequately pled—to the extent they are predicated on the submission of the reduced 

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payments, this is insufficient.”). 

Accordingly, Wiskind’s breach of contract claim is DISMISSED with leave to 

amend. To the extent Wiskind alleges the existence of an implied contract, as he does in 

his opposition brief, Dkt. No. 48 at 8, Wiskind must demonstrate how the elements for an 

implied contract have been satisfied. 

F. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Claim 9)

The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied by law into every contract, 

functioning “as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting 

party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express 

covenants) frustrates the other party’s rights to the benefits of the contract.” Gonzalez v. 

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-2558 EMC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152674, *19-

20 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (quoting Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, LLC, 

218 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1244 (2013)).

Put differently, the implied covenant protects only the “express terms of the 

agreement,” and “cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties 

beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.” Id. (citing McClain v.

Octagon Plaza, LLC, 159 Cal. App. 4th 784, 806 (2008)).

In the foreclosure context, violations of this duty involve specific contract terms. 

These terms can relate to a loan servicer’s decision to foreclose despite a borrower’s 

compliance with specific provisions of a trial modification plan, Erickson v. PNC 

Mortgage, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157907, 2011 WL 1743875, at *2 (D. Nev. May 6, 

2011) (denying motion to dismiss breach of good faith and fair dealing claim), or a 

servicer’s decision to foreclose despite the existence of a servicer participation agreement 

prohibiting foreclosure while a loan modification application was pending, Blackwood v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43663, 2011 WL 1561024, at *5 (D. 

Mass. Apr. 22, 2011) (same).

Here, Wiskind fails to identify the express terms of the agreement that the implied 

convent protects. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss 

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Wiskind’s good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim with leave to amend. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court DISMISSES all claims in the Second Amended Complaint. The Court 

gives Wiskind leave to amend only the claims for negligence, promissory estoppel, breach 

of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Wiskind’s 

four fraud-based claims and his § 17200 claim are dismissed with prejudice. Wiskind 

must file a Third Amended Complaint or a notice of his intention not to amend the current 

complaint within 14 days of this order. 

The Court DENIES as moot JPMorgan’s request for judicial notice, as the Court 

does not rely on any of the requested documents in reaching its conclusion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2015 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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