Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01080/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 1/ Plaintiff’s Complaint spells Smelosky’s name as “Smeloski.”

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss spells Smelosky’s name as “Smelosky.”

In this Report and Recommendation, the Court will refer to Smelosky

09cv1080 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. GARIBAY, M.A. SMELOSKY, 

N. GRANNIS,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 09-1080-W(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Docs. ## 13, 14)

On May 15, 2009, Peter Gonzalez, (hereafter “Plaintiff”), an

inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (hereafter “Complaint”), claiming that

his civil rights were violated when he was housed at Centinela State

Prison. He sues Defendants in their official and individual

capacities, and seeks “special damages according to proof,” punitive

damages, an injunction, costs incurred in pursuing this litigation,

and reasonable attorneys fees. Defendants J. Garibay, (hereafter

“Garibay”), and M.A. Smelosky, (hereafter “Smelosky”)1/

, have filed

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as “Smelosky.”

2/ The Court notes that Defendants’ Motion is not brought on behalf of

Grannis because he has not been served in this action.

3/ The Complaint is not entirely clear.

09cv1080 2

a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (hereafter “Motion”).

Plaintiff did not file an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion. The

Court, having reviewed the Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, HEREBY RECOMMENDS THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS BE GRANTED.

 I

 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Correctional Officer

Garibay, Acting Warden of Centinela State Prison Smelosky and Chief

of the Inmate Appeals Branch N. Grannis (hereafter “Grannis”).2/ 

Plaintiff alleges3/ that on June 12, 2008, Garibay removed him

from his job as a barber “in which a discrepancy took place of a

missing barber tool.” (Complaint at 3).

On June 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed a grievance about the

removal from his job. On July 25, 2008, the grievance was partially

granted and Plaintiff was allowed to keep his job as a barber.

(Complaint at 3).

Sometime between June 17, 2008 and August 1, 2008, Garibay

took a leave of absence. When Garibay returned from his leave of

absence, he discovered that Plaintiff had returned to his job as a

barber and retaliated against Plaintiff by recommending that

Plaintiff be removed from his job as a barber. Prison officials

followed Garibay’s recommendation. Plaintiff alleges that Garibay’s

action was motivated by Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment

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09cv1080 3

rights of redressing grievances without fear of reprisals, which did

not serve any legitimate penalogical interests or goals. (Complaint

at 3).

On August 4, 2008 and September 23, 2008, Plaintiff filed

grievances and appeals that addressed Garibay’s retaliation against

him. (Complaint at 4).

On August 18, 2008 and October 23, 2008, subordinates of

Smelosky denied Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals. Plaintiff

appears to allege that in denying the grievances and appeals,

Smelosky deliberately condoned Garibay’s misconduct. Plaintiff

alleges, “Defendant’s wrongful act of ommission (sic) through tacit

authorization as chain of command acted in collusion as not pursuant

to the evidence presented to correct the misconduct of his subordinates,” and “... allowed... (retaliation) inflicted upon Plaintiff,”

for the exercise of his First Amendment rights to file grievances

without fear of reprisals. (Complaint at 4).

On November 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Director’s Level

Appeal with Grannis regarding the retaliation for exercising his

First Amendment rights to file grievances and appeals. On January

21, 2009, the appeal was denied. Plaintiff alleges that Grannis, in

turn, deliberately condoned Garibay’s and Smelosky’s misconduct.

(Complaint at 5).

Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing “agents, employees,

successors in interest and all other persons in active concept,

collusion or participation with them from deprivation or reprisals -

(retaliation) - in any form against Plaintiff for exercising his

First Amendment right, a protected liberty interest.” (Complaint at

7).

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09cv1080 4

 II

 PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff claims the following:

(1) Garibay removed Plaintiff from his job due to a “discrepancy (that) took place of a missing barber tool.”

(2) Garibay retaliated against Plaintiff for filing a

grievance about Garibay’s recommendation to remove Plaintiff from

his job;

(3) After Plaintiff was allowed to return to his job, Garibay

recommended that Plaintiff be removed from his job a second time.

(4) Smelosky’s subordinates denied Plaintiff’s appeals

thereby retaliating against Plaintiff for filing appeals of

grievances about Garibay’s conduct;

(5) Plaintiff’s right to due process was violated when

Grannis denied Plaintiff’s Director’s Level Appeal, thereby

retaliating against Plaintiff for filing appeals of grievances about

Garibay’s conduct.

Defendants’ Motion asserts:

(1) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim against

Smelosky;

(2) Smelosky is entitled to qualified immunity;

(3) Defendants are immune from suit in their official

capacities; and 

(4) Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief.

 III

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

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09cv1080 5

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in

the complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ...

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200

(2007). Dismissal of a claim is appropriate only where the

complaint lacks a cognizable theory. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at

553-565. The court must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from

them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898

(9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The court does not look at whether

the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94

S.Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974). 

“If a complaint is accompanied by attached documents, the

court is not limited by the allegations contained in the complaint.

These documents are part of the complaint and may be considered in

determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in

support of the claim.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1

(1991) [quoting Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267

(9th Cir.1987)]. "[W]hen the allegations of the complaint are

refuted by an attached document, the Court need not accept the

allegations as being true." Roth, 942 F.2d 625 n.1 [citing Ott v.

Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 265 F.2d 643, 646 n.1 (9th Cir.1958)].

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09cv1080 6

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d

1194, 1197, n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, when resolving a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may not generally

consider materials outside the pleadings. Id. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d

232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.34[2]

(Matthew Bender 3d ed.) [“The court may not . . . take into account

additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to

dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under

Rule 7(a).”)].

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and, (2)that the conduct deprived

the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d

1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Vicarious liability does not exist

under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Jones

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To hold a person “liable under section 1983 there must be a showing

of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.” Id.

A supervisory official may be liable only if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. See Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). Causation may be

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09cv1080 7

established only by showing that the supervisor set in motion a

series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably

should have known would cause others to inflict the injury. Watkins

v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Finally, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a

civil rights case, the Court must also be careful to construe the

pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt.

See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th

Cir. 1988); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027, n.1 (9th Cir.

1985) (en banc). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448

(9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se

litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the

person who benefits from the representation of counsel.”). In

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint,

however, a court may not “supply essential elements of the claim

that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”

Id.; see also Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977)

(“Conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected

as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.”).

Thus, at a minimum, even the pro se plaintiff “must allege with at

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants

engaged in that support [his] claim.” Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

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09cv1080 8

 IV

 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST SMELOSKY

Plaintiff alleges that Smelosky’s subordinates denied his

grievances and appeals, thereby excusing Garibay’s alleged retaliatory conduct. Respondent argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to

state a claim against Smelosky because he can not be held liable for

the vicarious liability of the other persons involved in denying

Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals.

As previously noted, vicarious liability does not exist under

§1983. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Therefore, Smelosky, as a

supervisor, can not be held liable for any of the acts of other

employees of the prison unless Plaintiff can show a causal connection between Smelosky’s conduct and the alleged constitutional

violation. Plaintiff must plead that each official, through his own

actions, violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. Watkins, 145 F.3d at

1093. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is insufficient because it fails

to describe how Smelosky participated in, or directed, any alleged

violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights, or knew of any of the alleged

violations and failed to act to prevent them. Since Plaintiff’s

Complaint fails to allege anything other than that Smelosky’s

subordinates denied his grievances and appeals, thereby condoning

Garibay’s misconduct, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED without prejudice.

 V

 SMELOSKI AND GARIBAY ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN

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09cv1080 9

 THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES

Smelosky and Garibay contend that they are immune from suit

in their official capacities.

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits damages actions against

state officials acting in their official capacities. See Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989).

However, it does not “bar actions against state officers in their

official capacities if the plaintiffs seek only a declaratory

judgment or injunctive relief.” Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247,

252 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). Nor does it bar

damage actions against state officials in their personal capacities.

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). The Eleventh Amendment

prohibits only damage actions against the “official’s office;”

actions that are in reality suits against the state itself-rather

than against its individual officials. Id. at 26-27. 

Here, Plaintiff clearly indicates his intent to sue Smelosky

and Garibay for damages in both their individual and official

capacities. (Complaint at 1-2). For this reason it is RECOMMENDED

that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED with prejudice with

respect to Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Smelosky and

Garibay in their official capacities.

 VI

 SMELOSKY IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Smelosky also asserts that he is protected from suits for

civil damages due to the doctrine of qualified immunity because his

conduct did not violate any clearly-established right under the

circumstances in which he allegedly acted. Smelosky further claims

that he is entitled to dismissal pursuant to F ED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

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4/

 The affirmative defense of qualified immunity does not extend to

claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. Keenan v. Hall, 83

F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing American Fire, Theft &

Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir.

1991). The Court takes notice that Plaintiff is also seeking

injunctive and declaratory relief. 

09cv1080 10

based on his qualified immunity. 

The entitlement to qualified immunity “is an immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The defense of “qualified immunity”

protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). This standard “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by

protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per

curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986));

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909-910 (9th Cir. 2001).4/

The Supreme Court recently held that the test for qualified

immunity in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), is no longer a

rigid two step analysis. Pearson v. Callahan, 192 S.Ct. 808 (2009).

However, the Saucier analysis is still pertinent for qualified

immunity purposes. Pearson, 192 S.Ct. at 818. Pursuant to Saucier,

the first step in a qualified immunity analysis is, “taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Jackson v. City of Bremerton , 268 F.3d

646, 650 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d

787, 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that because qualified immunity is

“‘an entitlement not to stand trial’ ... courts, not juries, [must]

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09cv1080 11

settle the ultimate questions of qualified immunity”) (quoting

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). “If no constitutional right would have

been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d

1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). The second step of the qualified

immunity analysis is whether “it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that (Plaintiff’s) conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Saucier 533 U.S. at 202, Wilkins v. City of Oakland

350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth sufficient

allegations to support a claim of violation of a constitutional

right against Smelosky. (See Section IV of this Report and Recommendation). As a result, Plaintiff does not satisfy the first prong of

Saucier because the facts alleged in his Complaint do not show that

Smelosky’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier 533 U.S.

at 201. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED without prejudice. 

 VII

 PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to an injunction

preventing Defendants’ “agents, employees, successors in interest,

and all other persons in active concept, collusion or participation

with them from deprivation or reprisals - (retaliation) - in any

form against Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment right a

protected liberty interest.” Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not

entitled to injunctive relief.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction the movant must

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09cv1080 12

demonstrate “(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2)

the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the

plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain

cases).” Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005)

[citing Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430

(9th Cir. 1995)] (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Alternatively, injunctive relief could be granted if the movant

“demonstrates ‘either a combination of probable success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in

his favor.’” Id. (citation omitted). “These two alternatives

represent ‘extremes of a single continuum,’ rather than two separate

tests.” Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d

810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the only

Defendants who have been named in, and served with, Plaintiff’s

Complaint are Garibay and Smeloski.

A federal district court may issue injunctive relief only if

it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter

jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti

Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one

“becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that

capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting

measure stating the time within which the party served must appear

to defend.”). The court may not attempt to determine the rights of

persons not before the court. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co.

v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d

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719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983); Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked &

Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953, 961 (M.D. Fl. 1993); Kandlbinder

v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Suster v.

Marshall, 952 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano

v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (injunctive relief must be

“narrowly tailored to give only the relief to which plaintiffs are

entitled”); 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (“In any civil action with

respect to prison conditions, ... [p]reliminary injunctive relief

must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct

the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the

least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.”). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), an injunction

binds only “the parties to the action, their officers, agents,

servants, employees, and attorneys, and ... those persons in active

concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the

order.” The district court must, therefore, tailor the injunction

to affect only those persons over which it has power. See Gardner

v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 481 (1978).

As noted above, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction

over only Garibay and Smeloski who have been named as Defendants and

served with Plaintiff’s Complaint. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350;

Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104

(1987) (“Before a ... court may exercise personal jurisdiction over

a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must

be satisfied.”). However, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against

nonparties, “agents, employees, successor in interest and all other

persons in active concept or participation with them...,” (hereafter

“agents”). Plaintiff does not identify the agents. As a result,

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09cv1080 14

the agents have not been named as a parties and Plaintiff has not

sought leave to amend his Complaint to add any of the agents.

Therefore, this Court simply lacks the power to grant the injunctive

relief Plaintiff seeks. See Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727-28. For this

reason alone, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief be DENIED. 

Moreover, even if this Court had personal jurisdiction over

the agents Plaintiff seeks to enjoin (which it does not), he has

failed to establish either an imminent irreparable injury, or the

likelihood of success on the merits. See Beardslee, 395 F.3d at

1067. First, while Plaintiff claims to have suffered retaliation

for exercise of his First Amendment rights, the threat of injury

required to justify injunctive relief must be imminent and not

merely speculative. Caribbean Marine Services Co. v. Baldridge, 844

F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, where injunctive

relief is sought against actions by a governmental actor or agency

which has allegedly violated the law in the past, as is the case

here, Plaintiff must establish that the threat of future or repeated

injury is both “real and immediate,” not just “conjectural” or

“hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102

(1983). This he has not done. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to show he is likely to succeed

on the merits of any claim for retaliation for exercise of his First

Amendment rights. To state a claim for retaliation, a prisoner must

allege facts that demonstrate that (1) a state actor took adverse

action against the inmate; (2) because of; (3) the inmate’s

protected conduct, and that such action; (4) chilled the exercise of

the inmate’s First Amendment rights, and; (5) the action did not

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reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-568 (9th Cir. 2004).

In this case, Plaintiff simply alleges that Garibay removed

him from his job as a barber because “a discrepancy took place of a

missing barber tool.” After Petitioner appealed the removal from

his job, he was allowed to keep his job. Thereafter, when Garibay

discovered that Plaintiff had returned to his job, he recommended

that Plaintiff be again removed from his job and prison officials

followed Garibay’s recommendation. Plaintiff alleges that Garibay’s

actions were motivated by Plaintiff’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights of redressing grievances without fear of reprisals.

Further, Plaintiff alleges that Smelosky and Grannis, in denying

Plaintiff’s appeals regarding Garibay’s conduct, supported Garibay’s

alleged retaliation against Plaintiff. These allegations are

insufficient to grant injunctive relief.

First, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’

retaliation are lacking in that he fails to allege any facts to show

that his First Amendment rights were chilled by Defendants’ actions,

and that Defendants’ actions did not advance a legitimate correctional goal. Therefore, Plaintiff has not even stated a complete

cause of action for retaliation. Second, Plaintiff does not

identify the agents that he seeks to have enjoined. The Court can

not fashion injunctive relief against unidentified individuals.

Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350. Third, Plaintiff does not even

address the likelihood of the success of his claims on the merits.

Accordingly, Plaintiff also has failed to show the likelihood of

success on the merits required to justify injunctive relief. 

Beardslee, 395 F.3d at 1067. 

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09cv1080 16

 VIII

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS as

follows:

(1) The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Smelosky for failure to state a claim be GRANTED without prejudice.

(2) The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with

regard to Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Defendants in their

official capacities be GRANTED with prejudice.

(3) The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with

regard to Smelosky’s Qualified Immunity be GRANTED without prejudice.

(4) the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief be DENIED without prejudice.

(5) The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff be given a reasonable

amount of time to amend his Complaint. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 1, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

June 14, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

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951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

DATED: May 4, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01080-W-MDD Document 16 Filed 05/04/10 Page 17 of 17