Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02037/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02037-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Medical Malpractice

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carla M. LaCombe, Individually

and as Administrator for the

Estate of David Nichols,

deceased; Donald A. Nichols,

father of David Nichols; Nancy

Nichols, mother of David

Nichols,, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Bullhead City Hospital Corp., a

Tennessee corporation doing

business in Arizona as Western

Arizona Regional Medical

Center, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-2037-PHX-RCB

O R D E R

The following motions are currently pending before the

court: (1) plaintiff’s “Amended Motion to Consolidate[]” (doc.

24); (2) a “Motion to Enforce Agreement to Dismiss” (doc. 25) by

defendant Bullhead City Hospital, a Tennessee corporation doing

business in Arizona as Western Arizona Regional Medical Center

(“WARMC”); and (3) defendant WARMC’s “Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint” (doc. 41). If defendant

prevails on its motion to dismiss, obviously the other two

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motions would be rendered moot. Therefore, although filed

subsequent to the motions to consolidate and to enforce, the

court will first address the motion to dismiss. Then, if need

be, the court will go on to consider the motions to enforce and

to consolidate.

Background

The court assumes familiarity with the rather convoluted

procedural history of this action and its related state and

federal court actions. A few aspects of that history bear

repeating though as they place the pending motions in context. 

“This medical malpractice action is one of three which plaintiffs

filed arising out of the death of David Nichols.” Lacombe v.

Bullhead City Hospital Corp., 2007 WL 2702005, at *1 (D.Ariz.

Sept. 12, 2007) (footnote omitted) (“Lacombe I”). Allegedly “Mr.

Nichols' death was due to the administration of a broad spectrum

antibiotic which is in the same general class as penicillin.” 

Id. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Nichols

purportedly “had a known allergy to penicillin.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs filed their first action in Nevada state court on

July 11, 2006, naming as defendants a host of health care

providers and entities. “Plaintiffs' filed this second action,

on August 21, 2006, against substantially all of the defendants

whom they named in the original state court action.” Id. at *1

n. 1. On September 1, 2006, plaintiffs filed a second federal

court action naming as a defendant, among others, Mark E. Luce,

M.D. That second federal court action was necessitated by

plaintiffs’ “inadvertent[]” failure to originally name Dr. Luce

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1 Evidently yet a third federal court action was filed against Dr. Luce

in Nevada. Mot. (doc. 41) at 5, n.4; see also Def. Luce Resp. Mot. to

Consolidate (doc. 28) at 3-4, n.1.

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as a defendant in this action.1 WARMC’s Reply (doc. 32), exh. A

(doc. 32-2) thereto at 3. 

As a result of either motion practice or voluntary

dismissal, WARMC is the only remaining defendant in this action,

as the second amended complaint (“the complaint”) reflects. 

WARMC promptly moved for dismissal of that complaint on several

grounds - failure to properly plead diversity jurisdiction;

failure to join indispensable parties; and impermissibly stating

a “sum certain ($2,000,000) as damages in violation of Arizona

rules.” Mot. (doc. 41) at 2. In its Reply, WARMC explicitly

withdrew its objections pertaining to alleged lack of diversity. 

Reply (doc. 43) at 1-2. The court will, accordingly, limit its

analysis to the indispensable party issue and the pleading of a

sum certain. 

 Discussion

I. Dismissal

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), WARMC is moving to

dismiss the complaint for “failure to join a party under Rule

19.” Rule 19, in turn, governs “joinder of persons needed for

just adjudication.” “A [R]ule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss for

failure to join a party will be granted only if the court

determines: (1) joinder of the party is not possible, and (2) the

party is ‘indispensable.’” Brosnahan v. Pozgay, 2007 WL 173969,

at *2 (S.D.Cal. Jan. 17, 2007) (citing Shermoen v. United States,

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982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). The

moving party “bear[s] the burden [of] producing evidence in

support of the motion.” Mintel Learning Technology v. Beijing

Kaidi Education, 2007 WL 2288329, at *13 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 9, 2007)

(citation omitted); see also Brosnahan, 2007 WL 173969, at *2

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“The moving

party [on a Rule 12(b)(7) motion] has the burden of persuasion in

arguing for dismissal.”) As more fully discussed below, WARMC has

not met this burden. 

Rule 19 provides “[t]he framework for determining whether a

party is necessary and indispensable[.]” American Greyhound

Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). “Rule

19(b), . . . , distinguishes between necessary and indispensable

parties.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. ENC Corp.,

464 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 2007 WL 682016

(U.S. Dec. 3, 2007). Thus, “[t]he proper approach” under Rule 19

“is first to decide whether the [absent parties] are, in the

traditional terminology, ‘necessary’ parties who should normally

be joined under the standards of Rule 19(a).” American Greyhound

Racing, 305 F.3d at 1022. If the absent party is not deemed

“necessary” for Rule 19 purposes, that ends the inquiry. See

Hendricks v. Bank of America, N.A., 408 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir.

2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Having

rejected Mutual’s challenge to the district court’s necessary

party analysis, we need not decide whether in equity and good

conscience Mutual qualifies as an indispensable party under Rule

19(b).”) 

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On the other hand, if the absent parties “are necessary

parties, the . . . court must then determine whether [they] are

‘indispensable’‘ that is, ‘whether in equity and good conscience

the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should

be dismissed.” American Greyhound Racing, 305 F.3d at 1022

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This equitable

determination is based upon a “variety of factors[.]” Hendricks,

408 F.3d at 1136. Those factors include: prejudice to existing

parties; the extent to which such prejudice can be “lessened or

avoided;” the adequacy of the judgment in the person’s absence;

and “whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the

action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 19(b)). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “Rule 19's

necessary and indispensable party ‘inquiry is a practical, factspecific one, designed to avoid the harsh results of rigid

application.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

1. Necessary Party

A party is “necessary” within the meaning of Rule 19 if “(1)

in [its] absence complete relief cannot be afforded among those

already parties, or (2) [it] claims an interest relating to the

subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of

the action in [its] absence may (i) as a practical matter impair

or impede [its] ability to protect that interest, or (ii) leave

any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk

of incurring . . . inconsistent obligations.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a) (emphasis added). If the absent parties fall into either

of these “alternative” categories, they are “necessary to the

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2 WARMC specifically incorporated this argument from its prior motion

to dismiss. See Mot. (doc. 41) at 5. 

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instant litigation[,]” and the analysis shifts to

indispensability. See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project

Agricultural Improvement and Power District, 276 F.3d 1150, 1155

(9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

a. Complete Relief

WARMC focuses exclusively on the first factor under Rule

19(a), arguing that complete relief cannot be afforded without

“the other healthcare providers[,]” i.e. the defendants in the

Nevada state court action. Mot. (doc. 41) at 5. WARMC posits

that if those providers are not parties to this action, there is

a “substantial risk” that it will “incur[] more than its share of

damages because the case would proceed against WARMC only in this

Court and in Nevada state court against all of the health

providers.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 19). WARMC further

posits that because under “Arizona’s comparative negligence law,

each tortfeasor is only liable for that defendant’s relative

degree of fault[,] . . . complete relief is not possible” without

the presence of the Nevada defendants. Reply (doc. 16) at 6.2

As will be discussed more fully below, in making this argument,

WARMC fails to take into account Arizona’s entire comparative

negligence statutory scheme. 

Plaintiffs counter that “WARMC is free to allege that” the

Nevada defendants “are non-parties at fault[,]” which will

“ensure[] that WARMC only incurs its share of damages.” Resp.

(doc. 42) at 4. Although unstated, evidently it is plaintiff’s

position that in light of the foregoing, the Nevada defendants

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are not necessary parties to this litigation. Hence, the court

should deny WARMC’s motion to dismiss for failure to join those

defendants in the present action.

In its Reply, WARMC did not respond to plaintiffs’ non-party

at fault argument. Instead, analyzing the indispensability

element of Rule 19(b), WARMC addressed the equitable factors

enumerated therein. Of course, as noted earlier, unless WARMC

can show that the Nevada defendants are “necessary” parties, the

indispensability element falls by the wayside. 

WARMC’s argument that “complete, fair and equitable [relief]

cannot be fashioned[]”3 in the absence of the Nevada tortfeasors

ignores the fact that “‘[it] has long been the rule that it is

not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants

in a single lawsuit.’” Mintel Learning, 2007 WL 2288329, at *13

(quoting Temple v. Synthes Corp. Ltd., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990)). 

Indeed, “‘[t]he Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 19(a) explicitly

state that ‘a tortfeasor with the usual ‘joint-and-several’

liability is merely a permissive party to an action against

another with like liability.’” Id. (quoting Temple, 498 U.S. at

7). Accordingly, “[b]ecause the liability of joint tortfeasors

is both joint and several, a plaintiff can sue one without suing

the others, and the court can afford a plaintiff complete relief

in the absence of all the joint tortfeasors in the same lawsuit.” 

Id. The foregoing completely erodes WARMC’s theory that complete

relief cannot be afforded here in the absence of the Nevada

tortfeasors.

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4 In this diversity jurisdiction case, the court applies “state

substantive law, but . . . federal procedural law.” See Nitco Holding Corp. v.

Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).

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Arizona’s “Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act

(“UCATA”), A.R.S. § 12-2501 et seq.,4 further undermines WARMC’s

theory that the Nevada tortfeasors are necessary parties to this

action. As WARMC correctly notes, under the UCATA, “the

liability of tortfeasors is several and each defendant is liable

only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in

direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault.” 

Pooley v. National Hole-In-One Association, 89 F.Supp.2d 1108,

1114 (D.Ariz. 2000) (citing A.R.S. § 12-2506(A) (West 2000)). By

the same token though, the UCATA unequivocally states that “[i]n

assessing percentages of fault the trier of fact shall consider

the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury,

[or] death . . . , regardless of whether the person was, or could

have been named as a party to the suit.” A.R.S. § 12-2506(B)

(West 2003) (emphasis added). It is this aspect of the UCATA

which WARMC does not address. 

In accordance with the UCATA, a jury in the present case

must necessarily consider the “fault” of the other healthcare

providers involved in Mr. Nichols’ medical care during the

relevant time frame. Therefore, although WARMC contends

otherwise, complete relief can be “accorded among those already

parties[]”5

 to this action. See Bremenkamp v. Beverly

Enterprises-Kansas, Inc., 1989 WL 103643, at *2 (D.Kan. 1989)

(citation omitted) (finding Rule 19(a)(1) “inapplicable” because

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“complete relief could be accorded among those already parties”

in that “under . . . Kansas[’] comparative negligence statute, in

determining [defendant’s] negligence the court may take into

account the negligence of non-parties such as the three

physicians and [the] Medical Center[]”). In reaching this

conclusion, the court also finds significant the fact that even

though plaintiffs have elected to proceed solely against WARMC in

this action, that does not preclude WARMC from pursuing its

statutory rights of contribution, if ultimately applicable. See

A.R.S. §§ 12-501 - 12-503 (West 2003).

As mentioned at the outset, WARMC’s Rule 19(a)(1) analysis

is limited to the issue of whether complete relief can “be

afforded among those already parties[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a)(1). The court has similarly limited its analysis. 

However, WARMC has also raised the specter of prejudice if a

“judgment [is] rendered [herein] in the absence of the[] [Nevada]

tortfeasors[.]” Reply (doc. 43) at 3. The court thus is

compelled to observe that in part because of the mechanisms

available to WARMC under the UCATC, there is not “a substantial

risk of [WARMC] incurring . . . inconsistent obligations” if the

Nevada defendants are not joined in this action. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 19(a)(1). In sum, WARMC has not met its burden of

showing that the Nevada tortfeasors are necessary parties within

the meaning of Rule 19(a)(1). 

2. Indispensable Party

Because the court has found that WARMC is not a necessary

party for Rule 19 purposes, that ends the analysis. The court

therefore must deny WARMC’s motion to dismiss for failure to join

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a party under Rule 19. See Mintel Learning, 2007 WL 2288329, at

*13 - *14 (denying motion to dismiss for failure to join an

indispensable party where defendants did not establish that the

absent person was “necessary” under Rule 19(a)(1)). 

B. Pleading a “Sum Certain”

WARMC accurately notes that Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure

8(g) prohibits pleading “dollar amount[s] or figure[s] for

damages[,]” except where a party is seeking a “sum certain[.]”

ARCP 8(g). WARMC contends that because plaintiffs expressly

allege in their complaint that “the amount in controversy is

$2,000,000.00[,]” they have violated that state court rule. See

Co. (doc. 40) at 1, ¶ 1. WARMC further contends that it has been

prejudiced by the fact that plaintiffs have alleged damages in a

specific dollar amount. The court is construing this as an

additional bases for dismissal, even though WARMC did not

explicitly move for dismissal on this basis. 

Perhaps WARMC is not specifically moving for dismissal on

this basis because it realizes the futility of proceeding on that

theory. “‘Under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.

64, . . . (1938), a federal court sitting in diversity must apply

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’” Harris Technical Sales,

Inc. v. Eagle Test Systems, Inc., 2007 WL 1888865, at *1 (D.Ariz.

June 29, 2007) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th

Cir. 2005)). What is more, “for the purposes of Erie, pleading

standards are considered procedural.” Id. at *3 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “where

state law directly conflicts with applicable rules of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts must apply the Federal

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Rules- not state law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (emphasis added). As should be abundantly

clear by now, Arizona’s pleading requirements simply have no

place in this federal court litigation. So, to the extent

WARMC’s motion can be read as arguing that dismissal is mandated

due to a violation of an Arizona state court pleading

requirement, this argument is without merit. Thus, the court

denies in its entirety WARMC’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

complaint.

II. Motion to Enforce Agreement to Dismiss

Having denied WARMC’s motion to dismiss, the court must next

consider WARMC’s motion to enforce a claimed agreement between it

and plaintiffs. WARMC vigorously contends that on February 20,

2007, it agreed with plaintiffs that they would dismiss this

action as against WARMC in exchange for WARMC submitting to

jurisdiction in the Nevada state court action. See WARMC’s Mot.

to Enforce Agreement to Dismiss (doc. 25), exh. A thereto (Aff.

of Mary C. Brooksby (April 19, 2007)) at 8-9, ¶¶ 3-6. WARMC’s

Arizona counsel, Ms. Brooksby, recalls that “[o]ther than

submission to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, there were no

contingencies[]” to the purported agreement. Id. at 9, ¶ 5. 

Contingencies were added after that initial conversation,

however, according to Ms. Brooksby. In particular, during the

February 26, 2007, scheduling conference, WARMC claims that

plaintiffs’ Arizona counsel, Mr. Wright, added the contingency of

“approval of Plaintiff’s [sic] Nevada counsel and his client.” 

Id. at 9, ¶ 7. A few days later, WARMC claims that Mr. Wright

added another contingency, “hing[ing] his offer on Dr. Luce’s

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6 Based upon the supposed February 20, 2007, agreement, WARMC’s Nevada

counsel entered a general appearance in the Nevada state court action. Mot.

(doc. 25), exh. B thereto (Declaration of Michael A. Hagemeyer (April 28, 2007)

at 1, ¶ 2. Prior to that “agreement,” WARMC’s Nevada counsel had only entered

a special appearance in that action. Id. 

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agreement to submit to Nevada jurisdiction.” Id. at 2, ¶ 8. 

Plaintiffs allegedly added this contingency even though “Dr. Luce

is not a WARMC employee and WARMC has no control over [him].” 

WARMC’s Mot. to Enforce (doc. 25) at 2, ¶ 9. 

Despite the purported agreement of February 20, 2007, and

even though WARMC did submit to personal jurisdiction in the

Nevada state court action,6 plaintiffs have not dismissed this

action as against WARMC. Consequently, WARMC is seeking a court

“order enforcing Plaintiffs’ counsel’s agreement to dismiss this

case as against [it].” Id. at 2.

Plaintiffs’ counsel depicts the circumstances surrounding

this purported agreement quite differently. He responds:

“[T]here simply was no agreement to dismiss WARMC[;]” and WARMC’s

Arizona counsel “misunderstood” their conversation regarding the

possibility of dismissing this action if WARMC would consent to

jurisdiction in Nevada. Resp. (doc. 29) at 1. Contrary to how

attorney Brooksby recalls their conversation, attorney Wright

recalls that there was an additional “contingency” to dismissal. 

Not only would WARMC have to agree to submit to jurisdiction in

Nevada, but Dr. Luce would have to agree to jurisdiction there as

well. Id. at 1-2. When Dr. Luce would not so agree, attorney

Wright advised WARMC that he “would not be able to work out the

proposal to dismiss this action as to WARMC.” Aff. of H. Micheal

Wright (May 3, 2007) (doc. 29-2) at 2. 

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7 Assuming for the sake of argument that WARMC is seeking summary

judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, obviously the court would have to deny

this motion because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the existence

of an agreement in the first place, much less the terms of such agreement. See,

e.g. Newtown, Inc. v. Top Heavy Clothing Co., Inc., 2006 WL 681039, at *3

(W.D.Wash. 2006) (denying motion for partial summary judgment where “a material

issue of fact exist[ed] regarding whether the parties had a binding

agreement[]”); Frontier Ford v. Technical Chemical Co., 1997 WL 266778, at *3

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In its reply, WARMC is adamant that attorney Wright’s

“representations” to it regarding dismissal in exchange for

submitting to jurisdiction in Nevada were “unequivocal and

without contingency[.]” Reply (doc. 32) at 3. According to Ms.

Brooksby, this issue was not the subject of ongoing

negotiations; nor was it presented, as plaintiffs now suggest, as

a “propos[al][.]” Id. To support its view of events, WARMC notes

that at the February 26, 2007, scheduling conference plaintiffs’

counsel, Mr. Wright, indicated that he and Ms. Brooksby had “been

communicating about the issue of whether [WARMC] would agree to

waive any contest of jurisdiction in Nevada, . . . , so that the

matter against [WARMC] here need not proceed.” Id., exh. A (doc.

32-2) thereto at 3-4. WARMC is quick to point out that at that

time attorney Wright did not indicate to the court that the

potential agreement was somehow contingent upon whether Dr. Luce

also would agree to jurisdiction in Nevada. 

At least in terms of judicial economy, at first glance

WARMC’s position that this action should proceed in one forum

rather than two has some appeal. On the other hand, WARMC cites

to no case law to support its motion to enforce the purported

unwritten “agreement” between it and plaintiffs. Indeed WARMC

does not even indicate which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

forms the basis for this motion.7

 Accordingly, because WARMC has

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(N.D.Cal. 1997) (denying summary judgment on breach of contract claims because

of factual disputes as to “[t]he existence and terms of an oral agreement[]”).

 

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not, as LRCiv 7.2(b) requires, “set[] forth the points and

authorities relied upon in support of [its] motion[,]” the court

denies this motion to enforce the alleged agreement to dismiss.

III. Consolidation

Because WARMC has not prevailed on either of its motions to

dismiss, the court, must, necessarily, consider plaintiffs’

motion to consolidate the present action with the second filed

federal court action, Lacombe v. Luce, 3:06-CV-02127-SMM

(“Lacombe II”). 

There is no indication in their motion, but presumably

plaintiffs are relying upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and LRCiv 42.1

as the bases for consolidation. The former Rule states in

relevant part: “When actions involving a common question of law

or fact are pending before the court, . . . ; it may order all

the actions consolidated[.]” Fed. R. Civ. 42(a). In a similar

vein, LRCiv 42.1(a)(1) provides in relevant part as follows:

Whenever two or more cases are pending before 

different Judges and any party believes that 

such cases (A) arise from substantially the same 

transaction or event; (B) involve substantially 

the same parties or property; . . . ; (D) 

calls for determination of substantially the

same question of law; or (E) for any other reason 

would entail substantial duplication of labor if 

heard by different Judges, any party may file a 

motion to transfer the case or cases involved to a 

single Judge. 

LRCiv 42.1(a)(1). “[C]onsolidation is within the broad

discretion of the district court.” Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d

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1158, 1169 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

Not only did plaintiffs fail to cite to the relevant Rules,

they also failed to “set[ ]forth the points and authorities”

which would support their motion. See LRCiv 7.2(b). Likewise,

plaintiffs assert that Lacombe I and Lacombe II “involve related

parties and arose under the same circumstances, and [so]

consolidation would promote judicial economy and avoid

confusion.” Pl. Mot. (doc. 24) at 2. Without explication,

however, and in the absence of any supporting case law, the

court is unable to exercise its discretion in any meaningful way

at this juncture. This inability is exacerbated by the fact

that, understandably,8 both WARMC and Dr. Luce requested that the

court defer resolving the consolidation issue until a ruling on

the motions to dismiss. WARMC Resp. (doc. 27) at 3; Luce Resp.

(doc. 28) at 1. Consequently, the court does not have the

benefit of knowing their respective views regarding

consolidation. In light of the foregoing, the court cannot, as

it must, “evaluate[]” Lacombe I and Lacombe II on their “own

facts with close attention to whether the anticipated benefits of

a consolidated complaint outweigh potential prejudice to the

parties.” See Burnett v. Rowzee, 2007 WL 4191991, at *2

(C.D.Cal. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Consideration of potential prejudice is especially important

here given that at one point Dr. Luce was a defendant in this

action, but then plaintiffs entered a notice of voluntary

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dismissal as against him. See Notice of Vol. Dismissal (doc. 6). 

Finally, the court observes that because it does not have the

benefit of full briefing, it is uncertain as to which of the

three forms of “consolidation” plaintiffs are contemplating: “(1)

when several actions are stayed while one is tried, and the

judgment in the case tried will be conclusive as to the others;

(2) when several actions are combined and lose their separate

identities, becoming a single action with a single judgment

entered; and (3) when several actions are tried together, but

each suit retains its separate character, with separate judgments

entered.’” See Kemper Sports Management, Inc. V. Westport

Investment, LLC, 2007 WL 4219355, at *3 (W.D.Wash. 2007)

(quoting, inter alia, Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th

Cir. 2002)). For all of these reasons, the court denies

plaintiffs’ amended motion to consolidate (doc. 24) without

prejudice to renew.

Conclussion

As fully discussed herein, IT IS ORDERED that defendant

WARMC’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint

(doc. 41) is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant WARMC’s motion to

enforce “agreement” to dismiss (doc. 25) is DENIED; and 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate

is DENIED without prejudice to renew.

DATED this 22nd day of January, 2008

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copies to all counsel of record

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