Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02043/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02043-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stephen Don Powell, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02043-TUC-RM

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 14) issued by 

Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro. After an independent review of the record, this 

Court instructed Respondents to file a supplemental brief addressing how and whether the 

apparent lack of notice to Petitioner of the necessary state procedures should affect this 

Court’s analysis. Respondents have filed their Supplemental Brief (Doc. 16). 

I. Background

 Petitioner pled guilty in the Arizona Superior Court in Pima County on March 14, 

2013 and received a sentence of seven and one-half-years on April 29, 2013. The trial 

court informed Petitioner during his change of plea hearing that although Petitioner was 

forfeiting his right to a direct appeal by pleading guilty, he could “file a petition for post[-

]conviction relief, but that petition [would be resolved by the trial court].” (Doc. 13-1 at 

50.) The trial court further informed Petitioner that if it denied Petitioner’s request, “the 

Court of Appeals [would] not have to hear [his] case beyond that.” (Doc. 13-1 at 50-51.) 

During Petitioner’s sentencing, the trial court again informed Petitioner that he had “the 

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right to challenge [the trial court’s] decision, but [that] if [he] want[ed] to do so, [he] 

must do so within 90 days from [the date of sentencing].” (Doc. 13-2 at 1-11.) 

 On May 13, 2013, Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(“PCR”). (See Doc. 13-2 at 13-16.) On May 20, 2013, the trial court appointed 

Petitioner counsel and set a schedule for the proceeding. (See Doc. 13-2 at 21-22.) On 

August 29, 2013, Petitioner’s PCR counsel filed a Notice indicating he was unable to find 

any claims that “Petitioner wished to pursue” and counsel therefore would not file a 

petition for PCR. (Doc. 13-2 at 24-25.) Counsel also stated that he informed Petitioner 

that Petitioner could file a petition pro se and requested that the trial court allow 

Petitioner an additional forty-five days in which to do so. (See Doc. 13-2 at 25.) The 

trial court granted this request on August 29, 2013. (See Doc. 13-2 at 27.) 

 On October 23, 2013, the trial court issued an order denying and dismissing 

Petitioner’s PCR proceeding on the basis that Petitioner had not filed a pro se petition. 

(See Doc. 13-2 at 30.) 

 On April 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. In his Petition, Petitioner raised four grounds 

for relief: (1) the indictment against him was multiplicitous and thus violated the Double 

Jeopardy Clause; (2) he received unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel from 

both his trial and PCR counsel; (3) he was unlawfully induced into pleading guilty by his 

trial counsel and the state prosecutor; and (4) he was denied due process by each of the 

foregoing claims. (See Doc. 1 at 6-9.) Petitioner concedes that he did not present any of 

these claims to the necessary state courts. (Doc. 1 at 6-9.) He explains that the reason for 

this failure was that his PCR counsel informed him that he had “no colorable claims 

which would entitled [him] to post-conviction relief.” (Doc. 1 at 6-9.) 

 Respondents filed an Answer arguing Petitioner’s grounds for relief were not 

cognizable and were procedurally defaulted. (See Doc. 13.) Respondents first argued 

that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim was not cognizable because 

(1) Petitioner had no constitutional right to effective counsel during his PCR proceeding; 

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(2) Arizona does not recognize claims challenging the effectiveness of PCR counsel; and 

(3) Congress explicitly precluded such claims from habeas relief. Respondents further 

argued that the basis for Petitioner’s claim was improperly vague and conclusory. 

Respondents next argued that each of Petitioner’s four grounds for relief was 

procedurally defaulted. Lastly, Respondents contended that Petitioner could not satisfy 

the “cause and prejudice” standard that would excuse his procedural default. The 

Government based this argument on the theory that Petitioner had no constitutional right 

to effective PCR counsel and that the indictment was not in fact multiplicitous. 

Respondents did not otherwise address the substance of Petitioner’s claims. 

II. Report and Recommendation 

 Judge Ferraro found that Petitioner’s failure to present his claims to the Arizona 

courts rendered them technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted. (See Doc. 14 at 

3.) Judge Ferraro correctly acknowledged that Petitioner was in fact constitutionally 

entitled to effective assistance of counsel during his PCR proceeding because it was an 

“of right” proceeding. (See Doc. 14 at 3 n.1, 4 n.2.) See also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 

U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Osterkamp v. Browning, 250 P.3d 551, 556 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). 

Judge Ferraro next considered whether the Petition provided a basis for finding sufficient 

cause and prejudice to excuse Petitioner’s default. (See Doc. 14 at 4.) 

 The Supreme Court has long held that a petitioner may obtain federal review of his 

defaulted claims if he can show sufficient cause for the default and prejudice from the 

alleged error. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82-85, 87-88 (1977); Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); 

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000). 

 Judge Ferraro determined that a claim of constitutionally deficient assistance of 

counsel is sufficient cause to excuse a procedural default. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

However, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must itself be presented to a state 

court before serving as cause for failure to present other claims. Id. at 489. In the case of 

a pleading defendant who waives his right to a direct appeal, Arizona requires the 

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defendant to initiate two PCR proceedings. The first, to allege any grounds for relief 

stemming from the pre-conviction proceedings, and the second—unmentioned by the 

trial court when explaining Petitioner’s possible post-conviction relief options—to allege 

that the attorney appointed in the first PCR proceeding was constitutionally ineffective. 

See Osterkamp, 250 P.3d at 556-57. Judge Ferraro concluded that because Petitioner 

failed to raise the claim that his first PCR counsel was ineffective in a second PCR 

proceeding, that claim was defaulted and could not serve as cause for the default of 

Petitioner’s other claims. 

III. Discussion 

 “Arizona’s Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘the right to appeal in all 

cases.’” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ariz. Const. 

art. 2, § 24)). Defendants who plead guilty, however, waive the right to the standard 

appellate review. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(e). To comply with the Constitution’s 

requirement that appellate review be available to all criminal defendants, Arizona 

amended its rule governing PCR proceedings to provide an “of-right” proceeding for 

pleading defendants. Summers, 481 F.3d at 715 (citing Wilson v. Ellis, 859 P.2d 744, 746 

(Ariz. 1993) (en banc)); Charles R. Krull, Eliminating Appeals from Guilty Pleas, Ariz. 

Att’y, Oct. 1992, at 34-35); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). This “of-right” proceeding is 

the functional equivalent of a convicted defendant’s direct appeal, and thus, is not 

considered a collateral proceeding. Defendants are constitutionally entitled to effective 

assistance of counsel in the “of-right” proceeding. Arizona provides a second PCR 

proceeding for the specific purpose of allowing a pleading defendant to present a claim 

that his “of-right” PCR counsel was ineffective. See Osterkamp, 250 P.3d at 557-58. A 

petitioner must raise his claim of ineffective assistance of his “of-right” PCR counsel in 

this second proceeding to comply with the exhaustion and federalism requirements that 

limit federal review to those claims that have been properly presented to the relevant state 

courts. See id. at 556-57. 

This case presents an unusual situation of compounded procedural defaults. First, 

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Petitioner defaulted his claims of trial-court errors by not raising them in a pro se petition 

during his first “of-right” PCR. This default could be excused by Petitioner’s claim that 

his PCR counsel was ineffective (with a showing of prejudice). But, Petitioner defaulted 

that claim by not raising it in the required second PCR. For this Court to have authority 

to review Petitioner’s claims, he must have sufficient cause and prejudice for both 

defaults.1

A. Procedural Default of Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel 

 1. Cause for Procedural Default 

In the many cases discussing procedural default, the Supreme Court has declined 

to create a list of incidents that are sufficient to serve as “cause” for a procedural default. 

See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (“We leave open for resolution in 

future decisions the precise definition of the ‘cause’-and-‘prejudice’ standard”); Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (declining to “attempt[] an exhaustive catalog of. . . 

objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule” that would warrant a 

finding of “cause”). Rather, the Court has set forth a broad standard: “the existence of 

cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that 

some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with 

the State’s procedural rule.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. In applying this standard, the 

Court has concluded that the violation of a petitioner’s constitutional right was a 

sufficient “external factor” to serve as cause for a procedural default. See Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (the fact that the incident petitioner alleges is 

“cause” for his default “constitutes a violation of petitioner’s right to counsel,” renders it 

a sufficient “external factor”). 

This Court finds that a constitutional violation has occurred in Petitioner’s case to 

 

1

 The Supreme Court has stated that a court may excuse the procedural default of a claim that serves as cause for another procedural default. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 

U.S. 446, 452 (2000) (“To hold, as we do, that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted 

is not to say that that procedural default may not itself be excused if the prisoner can satisfy the 

cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to that claim.” (emphasis in original)).

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warrant a finding of cause for the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel claim. “The essential requirements of procedural due process are reasonable 

notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Willie G. v. Arizona Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 119 

P.3d 1034, 1038 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, “due process is offended when a 

defendant who pled guilty is kept completely ignorant of his appellate rights.” Wolfe v. 

Randle, 267 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Peguero v. United States, 526 

U.S. 23, 26-27 (1999) (finding constitutional error where trial court did not advise 

pleading defendant of his appellate rights)). 

 Here, the record demonstrates that Petitioner was only informed of the first 

component of his appellate rights. That is, he was never told that he was entitled to—and 

would be required to—initiate a second PCR proceeding after the first was dismissed. 

This omission violated Petitioner’s rights to procedural due process and is sufficient 

cause for the default of the claim that his PCR counsel was ineffective. 

 2. Prejudice Resulting from Defaulted Claim

 Next, the Court must consider whether Petitioner suffered any prejudice as a result 

of the violation he wishes the Court to consider, that is, that his PCR counsel was 

ineffective. To show prejudice, Petitioner must allege that his PCR counsel’s 

ineffectiveness “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage.” United States v. 

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 91; Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 752-57. The Petition contains such allegations. If Petitioner’s PCR counsel 

would not have advised him that he had no viable claims, Petitioner would have filed a 

petition for relief and had his claims reviewed. Instead, the state court dismissed 

Petitioner’s case without reviewing the merits. Because Petitioner cannot now return to 

seek state review of these claims, he has lost the right to his “of-right” appellate review 

and has been prejudiced. 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

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B. Procedural Default of Habeas Petition Claims

Having found that the default of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

PCR counsel can be excused, the Court now turns to whether that ineffective assistance 

of PCR counsel claim can serve to excuse the procedural default of his habeas Petition 

claims. 

 1. Cause for Procedural Default 

 The Supreme Court has set specific standards for any petitioner seeking to use a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for a procedural default. The 

petitioner must first allege that his PCR counsel was deficient according to the standards 

established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). That is, he must allege 

enough facts to indicate that his PCR “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness,” and that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for his 

counsel’s [] error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 695. 

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that the underlying claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel is substantial, or “has some merit.” Martinez v. Ryan, 132 

S.Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012). Because whether Petitioner’s PCR counsel’s representation can 

be said to fail the Strickland test depends, in part, upon whether there is a substantial 

claim that Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective, this Court addresses the claims 

against Petitioner’s trial counsel first. 

 a. Substantial Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

 Petitioner’s habeas Petition offers two grounds to support his claim that his trial 

counsel was ineffective: (1) trial counsel failed to challenge Petitioner’s indictment as 

multiplicitous; and (2) trial counsel misinformed Petitioner about the range of sentences 

Petitioner could face if convicted of the six charges brought against him, and thus 

improperly induced Petitioner to plead guilty. 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

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 i. Multiplicitous Indictment 

 Petitioner alleges the Arizona indictment was multiplicitous because it charged 

him with four counts of molestation of a child and two counts of luring a minor for sexual 

exploitation.2

 (See Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner also implies that the conduct for which he was 

charged in the six counts was the same conduct, and the state improperly “divided the 

timespan” in order to obtain a true bill for all six counts. (See Doc. 1 at 6.) 

 “An indictment is multipicitious if it charges a single offense in more than one 

count.” United States v. Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2009). Where a challenged 

indictment charges the same conduct under different statutes, courts must apply the test 

detailed in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), and determine if the 

statutes have the same elements. United States v. Zalapa, 509 F.3d 1060, 1062 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2007). If, however, the challenged indictment charges the same conduct under the 

same statute, courts are instead tasked with determining what Congress intended to be an 

“allowable unit of prosecution.” Id. at 1062. 

 The indictment brought against Petitioner charges six offenses under four different 

statutes. However, without needing to apply either of the aforementioned tests, it is clear 

that “a single offense” is not charged more than once. Each count brought against 

Petitioner was for a distinct act, committed on separate occasions, against two victims. 

(See Doc. 13-1 at 17-18; see supra p. 6 n.1.) While there are two sets of counts that 

allege violations of the same statute, the underlying offense conduct is distinct. (See Doc. 

13-1 at 17-18, 23-29.) Further, looking at the four statutes the indictment alleges 

Petitioner violated, each has separate and distinct elements. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 

13-1404, with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1405, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1410, and Ariz. Rev. 

 

2

 Petitioner’s characterization of the indictment is inaccurate. The indictment lists 

the following six counts: (1) sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen by way of digital penetration of Victim 1 at some time between February and March 2011; (2) sexual abuse 

of a minor under fifteen by way of touching Victim 1’s breast; (3) sexual conduct with a 

minor under fifteen by way of digital penetration of Victim 1 at some time between 

September 2010 and March 2011; (4) molestation of a child by way of touching Victim 1 with his penis; (5) luring a minor for sexual exploitation by way of soliciting sex from Victim 1; and (6) luring a minor for sexual exploitation by way of soliciting sex from Victim 2. (Doc. 13-1 at 17-18.) 

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Stat. § 13-3554. Accordingly, Petitioner’s indictment was not multiplicitous, and his trial 

counsel (and PCR counsel) cannot be faulted with failing to raise that challenge. This 

ground therefore cannot support a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel.3

 

 ii. Misinformation Regarding Possible Sentences 

 As to Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel misinformed him of the possible 

sentence Petitioner would face if found guilty, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed 

to demonstrate that this claim is substantial. 

 It is true that a defendant must be accurately informed of the potential sentences he 

faces. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (“because a guilty plea 

is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly 

voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 

facts.”); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution 

insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea [with] sufficient 

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” (internal citations and 

alternations omitted)). It is also true that a defense attorney’s failure to so accurately 

inform his client fails Strickland’s standard for effective assistance of counsel. Iaea v. 

Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986) (“counsel ha[s] a duty to supply criminal 

defendants with necessary and accurate information.”); see also id. (“. . . the gross 

mischaracterization of the likely outcome presented in this case, combined with the 

erroneous advice on the possible effects of going to trial, falls below the level of 

competence required of attorneys.”). But, Plaintiff’s claim is not just that his counsel 

improperly informed him of the possible sentences. Rather, Defendant links this claim to 

his previously discussed claim of a multiplicitous indictment: 

I was misinformed by the government and my defense lawyer about the threat I faced, concerning the total range of sentences that could be 

imposed concerning all six (6) counts charged in the multiplicitous indictment if I chose to go to trial, which coerced me to enter a plea of 

 

3

 Further, because Petitioner’s first ground for habeas relief is based upon the supposed multiplicitous indictment, (see Doc. 1 at 6), that ground will be dismissed. 

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guilty, that was not voluntarily nor intelligently made pursuant to the plea agreement, concerning only two (2) alleged victims, which the court used to convict me of one (1) count of molestation of a child and two (2) counts, of the same lesser included offense, of luring a minor for sexual exploitation, even though you cannot commit molestation without also committing luring, and the court imposed 15 years [of] probation in addition to two (2) 

terms of imprisonment for 3.5 and 4 years. 

(Doc. 1 at 8 (emphasis added).) Because Petitioner’s claim of receiving misinformation 

regarding the potential sentences he could face is dependent upon the indictment being 

unlawfully multiplicitous, the claim cannot succeed. Accordingly, Petitioner has not 

demonstrated that his underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is 

substantial. 

 b. Claim that PCR Counsel Was Deficient According to Strickland v. Washington. 

 Petitioner alleges that his PCR counsel was ineffective because counsel informed 

Petitioner that there were no colorable claims that he could raise during a PCR 

proceeding. However, as discussed above, Petitioner has not presented any claim to this 

Court that is colorable and should have been presented during the PCR proceeding. PCR 

counsel cannot therefore be said to be constitutionally deficient for his advice to 

Petitioner. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to excuse the default of 

his habeas Petition claims.4

 

. . . 

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4

 Because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the necessary cause to excuse his 

procedural default, this Court does not address whether there was sufficient prejudice resulting from the defaulted claims. 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 14) is 

adopted in part and rejected in part. The Report and Recommendation is rejected to 

the extent that it finds that Petitioner’s claimed ineffective assistance of PCR counsel 

cannot serve as cause for the procedural default of his claims. The Report and 

Recommendation is otherwise adopted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) is denied and 

dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment as necessary and close this 

case. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines 

to issue a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s 

ruling debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 Dated this 25th day of August, 2016. 

Honorable Rosemary Márquez

United States District Judge

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