Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01276/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 71989 

WILLARD LEE BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

TOM c. MARTIN, Warden, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1276 

(D.C. No. 87-1217-T) 

( W. D. Ok la. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BURCIAGA, District 

Judge.* 

*The Honorable 

District Court 

designation. 

Juan G. Burciaga, 

for the District 

District Judge, United States 

of New Mexico, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Willard Lee Brown, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241 which challenged a determination by the Parole Commission 

regarding when he will be reconsidered for parole. 

Appellate Case: 88-1276 Document: 01019962400 Date Filed: 01/27/1989 Page: 1 
Brown pled guilty to second degree murder and assault with 

intent to commit rape and was sentenced to life imprisonment for 

the second degree murder and fourteen years for the assault with 

intent to commit rape. At an initial parole hearing in 1984, 

Brown was continued for a reconsideration hearing in ten years in 

accordance with 28 C.F.R. S 2.12(b}. That regulation was 

subsequently amended so that Brown's statutory interim hearing in 

1986 was treated as an initial parole hearing and a fifteen-year 

interval between full reconsideration of his case was imposed. 

Brown's pleadings and appellate brief have raised two related 

objections to the fifteen-year reconsideration period: (1) it was 

the result of ''double counting," and (2) application to him of the 

amended regulation violated the ex post facto clause of the United 

States Constitution. 

Double counting exists when the same factors used to place a 

prisoner within a particular severity category are used as 

justification to continue a prisoner beyond the parole guidelines. 

Castaldo v. United States Parole Comm'n, 725 F.2d 94, 96 (10th 

Cir. 1984). We agree with the district court that placing 

petitioner on a fifteen-year reconsideration period pursuant to 

the amended regulation did not constitute double counting. As the 

district court observed, since Brown's statutory interim hearing 

was conducted as an initial hearing due to a change in the 

applicable regulation, the same facts and offenses that were 

considered at the 1984 initial parole hearing were naturally 

considered again at the statutory interim hearing. This does not 

constitute double counting. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1276 Document: 01019962400 Date Filed: 01/27/1989 Page: 2 
The ex post facto clause prohibits retroactive application of 

any criminal or penal law which imposes additional punishment to 

that then prescribed. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). 

The district court, in rejecting any suggestion that application 

of the amended regulation to Brown may implicate the ex post facto 

prohibition, relied on cases which sustained retroactive 

application of the parole guidelines under 28 C.F.R. S 2.20. This 

case concerns an entirely different regulation. Nevertheless, 

without deciding whether the change in the parole process at issue 

here is within the purview of the ex post facto · clause, we 

conclude that any request for habeas relief by Brown based on that 

change is premature until 1994. Even if the fifteen-year 

reconsideration period imposed in 1986 were to violate the ex post 

facto prohibition, the ten-year reconsideration period set in 1984 

was appropriate. Thus, Brown's custody is not unlawful at the 

present time. If Brown has a basis for habeas relief, it would 

not arise until 1994 and only if he has not received a full parole 

reconsideration by then. The Parole Commission's determination in 

1986 is subject to reassessment every twenty-four months, and it 

is conceivable that Brown's reconsideration hearing could be 

advanced. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(a)(2)(ii). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 88-1276 Document: 01019962400 Date Filed: 01/27/1989 Page: 3