Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00214/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00214-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Oscar Antonio Gonzales-Garcia, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 12-214-PHX-GMS (DKD)

No. CR 11-1302-PHX-GMS

ORDER

On January 31, 2012, Movant Oscar Antonio Gonzales-Garcia, who is confined in the

Reeves County Detention Center in Pecos, Texas, filed a pro se “Motion for Time Reduction

by an Inmate in Federal Custody.” In a January 31, 2012 Order, the Court advised Movant

that the Court could not construe his Motion for Time Reduction as a motion pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c), notified Movant that the Court intended to construe his Motion for Time

Reduction as a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, warned Movant of the consequences

of such a recharacterization, and gave Movant 30 days to file either (a) a notice withdrawing

his Motion for Time Reduction, or (b) an amended “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

a Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).” 

On February 28, 2012, Movant filed an Amended § 2255 Motion. In a March 2, 2012

Order, the Court denied the Amended Motion because it did not comply with Local Rule of

Civil Procedure 7.1(b)(1). The Court gave Movant 30 days to file a second amended motion

that cured the deficiency identified in the Order. In April 3 and May 2, 2012 Orders, the

Court granted Movant two extensions of time to file a second amended motion. 

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On June 1, 2012, Movant filed a Second Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 15). The

Court will summarily dismiss the Second Amended Motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Re-Entry of Removed Alien, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with sentencing enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(1). The plea agreement provided for a sentencing range of 3 to 63 months. On

January 17, 2012, the Court sentenced Movant to a 33-month term of imprisonment followed

by 3 years on supervised release.

In his Second Amended § 2255 Motion, Movant seeks a six-month reduction of his

sentence. He states that he is challenging his sentence because it “is not the plea [he]

sign[ed].” He claims that he signed a different plea agreement and that he “entered a guilty

plea [for] 10 to 37 month[s].” Movant contends that his lawyer changed the plea to an “open

plea” even though Movant had signed a “fast-track” plea agreement. Movant also states that

his attorney told him that he would file a sealed report with the Court explaining that Movant

had worked for 24 months as a confidential informant for the City of Phoenix Police

Department, but his attorney failed to do so and failed to mention anything to the Court at

sentencing regarding this issue. 

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

. . . .

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III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

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Among other things, the plea agreement stated that the parties stipulated and agreed

that Movant would receive 

(3) A one-level reduction in offense level and a sentence within the

adjusted guideline range, if the crime is classified as a level 16 offense. . . .

The guideline range at offense level 16 is 21-57 months, depending on

criminal history. After the three-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility and one-level reduction for early disposition, the guideline range

at offense level 12 is 10-37 months, depending on criminal history.

(Emphasis added.)

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F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Providing the defendant’s sentence is consistent with this

agreement, the defendant waives . . . (2) any right to file an

appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion that

challenges the conviction, . . . the entry of judgment against the

defendant, or any aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including

the manner in which the sentence is determined, including but

not limited to any . . . motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and

2255. The defendant acknowledges that if the Court has

sentenced the defendant according to the terms of this

agreement, this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any

appeal, collateral attack, or other motion the defendant

might file challenging the conviction, order of restitution or

forfeiture, or sentence in this case.

(Doc. 24) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had discussed

the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into the plea

voluntarily. (Doc. 24).

Movant is mistaken about his plea agreement. He signed a “fast-track” plea

agreement, not an “open” plea. The Court sentenced Movant pursuant to that plea

agreement, which included a provision for a sentence between 10 and 37 months.1

 The

remainder of Movant’s assertions in his Second Amended § 2255 Motion pertain to

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sentencing and do not pertain to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived

issues regarding the imposition of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255

motion. The Court accepted his plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that

Movant waived the sentencing issues raised in his Second Amended § 2255 Motion. Thus,

the Court will summarily dismiss the Second Amended § 2255 Motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Clerk of Court must terminate Doc. 25 in CR 11-1302-PHX-GMS.

(2) The Second Amended Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or

Correct Sentence (Doc. 15 in CV 12-214-PHX-GMS (DKD)) is denied and the civil action

opened in connection with this Motion (CV 12-214-PHX-GMS (DKD)) is dismissed with

prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(3) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 29th day of June, 2012.

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