Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_16-cv-00600/USCOURTS-alnd-4_16-cv-00600-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

ANNE HUIGENS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

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Civil Action Number

 4:16-cv-00600-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Anne Huigens brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social 

Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final adverse 

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). This 

court finds that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied the correct legal 

standards and that his decision — which has become the decision of the 

Commissioner — is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision denying benefits.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Huigens filed her application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and 

Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on July 14, 2010, alleging a disability 

onset date of December 2, 2009 due to arthritis, depression, restless leg syndrome, 

anxiety, and memory loss. (R. 188, 339, 353). Huigens later claimed disability 

FILED

 2017 Feb-14 AM 11:12

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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due to fibromyalgia, as well. (R. 112). After the SSA denied her application, 

Huigens requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 254). The ALJ subsequently 

denied Huigens’s claim, (R. 185, 199), and the Appeals Council vacated the 

hearing decision and remanded the case for the ALJ to clarify his residual 

functional capacity finding regarding “whether [Huigens] is limited to light work 

or sedentary work,” (R. 204–05). After holding another hearing, the ALJ again 

denied Huigens’s claim, (R. 78, 98), and the Appeals Council issued a partially 

favorable decision, awarding SSI benefits with an onset date of June 5, 2013, the 

date Huigens turned fifty-five. (R. 7). The Appeals Council denied review of the 

SSDI claim, however, (R. 13–19), rendering the ALJ’s opinion the final decision 

of the Commissioner. Huigens then filed this action pursuant to § 405(g). (Doc. 

1.).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial 

evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 

F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal 

standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 791 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) 

mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if supported by 

‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). 

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The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or 

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the 

final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable and 

supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 

F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a 

preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 

would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 

(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by 

substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings 

even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings. 

See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review 

of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield 

automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.

III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 416(i)(1)(A). A physical or mental 

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impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Determination of disability under the Act requires a five-step analysis. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)–(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine, in 

sequence:

(1)whether the claimant is currently unemployed; 

(2)whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the 

Secretary;

(4)whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national 

economy. 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative 

answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps 

three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other 

than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20 

C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)–(f)). “Once the finding is made that a claimant cannot return 

to prior work the burden of proof shifts to the Secretary to show other work the 

claimant can do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation 

omitted).

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IV. The ALJ’s Decision1

In performing the five-step analysis, the ALJ determined that Huigens met 

the criteria for Step One, because she had not engaged in any substantial gainful 

activity since her alleged onset date in December 2009. (R. 84). Next, the ALJ 

acknowledged that Huigens’s impairments of “osteoarthritis, chronic pain 

syndrome, depression, bipolar disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder” met the 

requirements of Step Two. (Id.). The ALJ then proceeded to the next step and 

found that Huigens did not satisfy Step Three, because she did “not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of one of the impairments included in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1.” (R. 86) (internal citations omitted). In this step, the ALJ 

acknowledged Huigens’s complaints of joint pain, osteoarthritis, and spine issues, 

but remarked that Huigens’s treatment notes have never reported “difficulty 

ambulating on a persistent basis,” and that several treatment notes have in fact

reported a “moderate activity level.” (R. 86–87). Moreover, while acknowledging 

Huigens’s depression, bipolar disorder, and anxiety, the ALJ concluded that,

“[b]ecause [Huigens’s] mental impairments do not cause at least two ‘marked’ 

limitations or one ‘marked’ limitation and ‘repeated’ episodes of decompensation, 

 1 This section details the ALJ’s 2014 decision, which incorporated the information the 

Appeals Council directed the ALJ to clarify on remand.

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each of extended duration, the ‘paragraph B’ criteria[2] are not satisfied.” (R. 88)

(footnote added). Rather, Huigens has only moderate limitations in her activities 

of daily living, social functioning, and concentration, persistence, or pace. (R. 87–

88, 520). Finally, the ALJ noted that “no examining or treating medical source has 

reported that [Huigens] has an impairment that medically equals the criteria of a 

listed impairment.” (R. 88).

Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the negative, consistent with the 

law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, he proceeded to Step Four, where he 

determined that, at her date last insured, Huigens had the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) 

and 416.967(b) except [Huigens] requires the option to change postures from 

seated to standing or walking, not on a mechanical basis but as frequently as thirty 

minutes.” (R. 89). The ALJ articulated further restrictions, specifically, that 

Huigens can “carry out one to two step instructions,” “maintain a regular work 

schedule by compliance with appropriate mental health treatment,” “handle 

ordinary work pressures but not excessive amounts of work pressure,” and “adapt 

to change that is infrequent.” (Id.). The ALJ also found that Huigens’s “contact 

with the public should be non-intensive.” (Id.). In light of Huigens’s RFC and the 

 2 These criteria include “marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked 

difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, 

persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.” (R. 

87). See Bellew v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 605 F. App’x 917, 924 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations 

omitted).

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testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that Huigens was 

unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (R. 96). Lastly, in Step Five, the 

ALJ considered Huigens’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, and 

determined that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that [Huigens] can perform.” (R. 97). Therefore, the ALJ found that 

Huigens “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

from December 2, 2009.” (R. 98).

V. ANALYSIS

Huigens raises four contentions of error. For the reasons below, the court 

rejects each contention and affirms the ALJ’s decision.

A. The ALJ did not err by purportedly failing to assess the intensity and 

persistence of Huigens’s symptoms pursuant to Social Security 

Ruling 16-3p

Huigens contends that the ALJ’s decision “failed to assess the intensity and 

persistence of [her] symptoms pursuant to Social Security Ruling 16-3p which 

became effective 3/28/16” and which, Huigens claims, applies retroactively. (Doc. 

11 at 1). For these reasons, Huigens has asked this court to remand to the ALJ for 

further proceedings consistent with this ruling. (See doc. 11). SSR 16-3p 

announced that the SSA would depart from “assess[ing] the ‘credibility’ of an 

applicant’s statements,” and instead “focus on the ‘intensity and persistence of [the 

applicant’s] symptoms.’” Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 

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81 Fed. Reg. 14166, 14167). Huigens fails to cite any binding authority to support 

her contention that SSR 16-3p applies retroactively and instead cites Cole, a 

Seventh Circuit case which does not endorse (or otherwise discuss) retroactive 

application, and Mendenhall v. Colvin, No. 3:14-cv-3389, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

105404 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2016), a non-binding out-of-circuit district court case 

which found that retroactive application was “appropriate,” id. at *10. The court 

declines to follow Mendenhall, especially where, as here, a retroactive application

would not help Huigens. In other words, even assuming that the SSA intended 

SSR 16-3p to apply retroactively, the ALJ’s decision shows that he evaluated 

Huigens’s symptoms, and not her overall credibility, by reviewing her allegations, 

medical records, treatment notes, and activities of daily living. (See R. 84–96). 

For these reasons, the court concludes that remand is not appropriate.

B. The ALJ did not err in giving weight to the medical opinions in the 

record

Huigens next contends that the ALJ erred by failing to afford proper weight 

to the opinions of her treating physicians, Dr. Muhammad Tariq and Dr. Larry 

Scarborough. (Doc. 12 at 42). The ALJ is required to weigh all the medical 

evidence in the record, and “to state with particularity the weight he gave to 

different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 

278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, the ALJ must “clearly articulate the reasons 

for giving less weight to the testimony of a treating physician.” Moore v. 

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Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). “The law of this circuit is clear 

that the testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or considerable 

weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 

1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “Good cause” for refusing to give 

considerable weight to a treating physician’s opinion exists where, among other 

examples, the physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, or was 

inconsistent with his own treatment records. Id. For the reasons stated below, the 

court finds that good cause existed for the ALJ to give less weight to the opinions 

of the two treating physicians.

First, as it relates to Dr. Tariq, he opined that Huigens could sit for one hour 

at a time, stand for less than thirty minutes at a time, walk for less than fifteen 

minutes at a time, would need to lie down, sleep, or sit with her legs propped above 

waist level for two hours in an eight-hour day, and would be able to perform a task 

for one hour before needing a break. (R. 647). The ALJ afforded little weight to 

Dr. Tariq’s opinion, in part because he found Dr. Tariq’s opinion “inconsistent 

with [Dr. Tariq’s] treatment notes, which do not report symptoms that would 

support the serious medical restrictions he listed in his Physical Capacities form.” 

(R. 95). The ALJ further noted that “the medical evidence of record does not 

support such severe symptoms, as [Huigens] is essentially just given medication 

for her problems,” and Dr. Tariq “has never persistently suggested surgery or any 

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other such measure for her impairments.” (R. 95–96).3 These findings are 

supported by the record. (See, e.g., R. 646 (Dr. Tariq notes Huigens’s “General 

Osteoarthritis,” “Myalgia and Mysotis,” “Generalized Anxiety,” and “Chronic Pain 

Syndrome,” and states that Huigens should “[c]ontinue present care,” which 

consisted solely of medications)).

The ALJ also afforded little weight to the opinion Dr. Scarborough

expressed in a Physical Capacities Form. According to Dr. Scarborough, Huigens 

could sit for eight hours at a time, stand and walk for fifteen minutes each at a 

time, would need to lie down, sleep, or sit with her legs propped above waist level 

for one hour in an eight-hour day, could occasionally lift up to ten pounds, and

could perform a task for thirty minutes before needing a break. (R. 677). The ALJ 

provided multiple reasons for rejecting Dr. Scarborough’s opinion. First, the ALJ 

noted that the opinion was “wholly inconsistent with [Huigens’s] treatment notes, 

which [did] not report symptoms sufficient to support such limitations.” (R. 96). 

Second, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Scarborough’s opinion was “not consistent 

with his own treatment notes which did diagnose joint pain, but are grossly less 

extensive than [would indicate] a December 2, 2009 onset, and do not contain any 

medical restriction, referral to an orthopedic or other specialist.” (Id.) (emphasis 

 3 Huigens counters that medical records dated May 29, 2013 “indicate that an MRI was 

mentioned, and [Huigens] stated that she could not afford it, which indicates that the doctors at 

Quality of Life did consider [her] joint pain serious and did suggest further diagnostic testing.” 

(Doc. 12 at 26). However, this does not rebut the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Tariq did not 

“persistently” suggest measures other than medication.

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added). In referencing Dr. Scarborough’s own treatment notes, the ALJ added 

that, “despite a statement of arthritis, [Dr. Scarborough’s notes] contain laboratory 

results of a sedimentation rate of 2, which is well within the stated allowable range 

of 30.” (Id.). Finally, the ALJ noted that the medical records reflected that 

Huigens’s conditions were managed conservatively with medication and that Dr. 

Scarborough had not recommended that Huigens undergo “more invasive or 

complex treatment.” (Id.). (See, e.g., R. 652 (Dr. Scarborough notes Huigens’s 

“Edema,” “Joint Pain,” “Abnormal Weight Gain,” and “Sinusitis,” and prescribes

medications, “labs,” and a “low sodium” diet)). The substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s findings related to Dr. Scarborough.

In addition to the specific inconsistencies between Dr. Tariq’s and Dr. 

Scarborough’s opinions and their treatment notes, the ALJ noted generally that 

Huigens’s medical records show only mildly- to moderately-reduced range of 

motion and/or mobility, (R. 91 (citing R. 542, 561, 566, 570, 584, 589, 656)), and a 

moderate activity level, (R. 91 (citing 541, 564, 568, 588, 665, 693)). 

Additionally, several of Huigens’s treatment notes documented 0/10 pain scores,

(R. 546, 550, 553, 557, 570, 584, 589), and, on other occasions, reported that her 

pain was relieved by elevation, medication, and mobility, (R. 568, 587, 599). 

Furthermore, Huigens’s x-rays showed only “slight” or “some mild” degenerative 

joint disease of the bilateral elbows. (R. 575, 582).

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Dr. Tariq’s and Dr. Scarborough’s opinions were also inconsistent with the 

consultative examinations. For example, an August 2010 consultative examination

by Dr. Ashley Thomas showed that Huigens was “independent in activities of daily 

living [and ambulation],” had a normal gait, had negative straight leg raising, and 

generally exhibited full to only-slightly-decreased range of motion of most joints. 

(R. 501, 503). An October 2013 consultative examination by Dr. Sathyan Iyer 

reported some decreased range of motion, but also reported normal gait, full range 

of motion of the elbows, wrists, and ankles, full abduction, adduction, and rotation 

of the hips, negative straight leg raising, normal grip strength and opposition 

functions, and normal muscle power of the upper and lower extremities. (R. 627–

29). Dr. Iyers further reported that Huigens had no limitation in sitting or standing. 

(R. 630).4

 

Based on the court’s review of the record, it is clear that the ALJ considered 

the full medical history and, in making his determination of Huigens’s RFC, 

properly and comprehensively analyzed the medical evidence as a whole. 

Accordingly, good cause existed for the ALJ to give less weight to the opinions of 

 4 The ALJ stated that he afforded little weight to Dr. Iyer’s opinions due to internal 

inconsistencies in Dr. Iyer’s reports. Specifically, while Dr. Iyer “opined after his examination 

of [Huigens] that, ‘[s]he does not have limitation of functions involving sitting, standing, 

handling, hearing, or speaking,’” in his Medical Source Opinion Form, Dr. Iyer opined that 

Huigens “could sit a total of 4 hours in an eight-hour day, and could stand only two hours in an 

eight-hour day.” (R. 95). The ALJ also stated that Dr. Iyer’s diagnosis of “possible” 

degenerative joint disease and “history of” fibromyalgia, anxiety, and depression were “vague 

and ill defined.” (Id.).

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these treating physicians. As such, the court concludes that the ALJ properly 

considered the medical evidence in determining Huigens’s ability to work in spite 

of her impairments, and made “clear the weight accorded to each item of evidence 

and the reasons for those decisions . . . .” Himes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. 

App’x 758, 764 (11th Cir. 2014).

C. The ALJ did not err by purportedly failing to consider Huigens’s 

fibromyalgia

Huigens next contends that the ALJ failed to follow the “slight abnormality” 

standard in finding that her fibromyalgia is non-severe, and failed to otherwise 

consider her fibromyalgia. (Doc. 12 at 28–29). The Commissioner contends that 

because the ALJ found in Huigens’s favor at Step Two, any error at that step is not 

reversible. (Doc. 16 at 19). The court agrees. See Hearn v. Comm’r, SSA, 619 F. 

App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Any error at step two was harmless because the 

ALJ found in [the claimant’s] favor as to impairment, and the ALJ properly noted 

that he considered [the claimant’s] impairments in the later steps.”) (citations 

omitted).

As to Huigens’s contention that the ALJ failed to follow the “slight 

abnormality” standard, (doc. 12 at 29–30; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c) (an 

impairment must be more than “a slight abnormality or a combination of slight 

abnormalities that causes no more than minimal functional limitation”)), the ALJ’s 

finding that Huigens’s fibromyalgia is not “severe” is supported by the absence of 

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specific documentation in Huigens’s medical records. The only evidence Huigens 

cites to support her contention that her fibromyalgia constitutes more than a “slight 

abnormality” is medical records that: list “joint pain” as one of her “chief 

complaints,” (see doc. 12 at 30–31 (citing R. 587–90, 595–98, 599, 619–22, 654–

57, 658, 659–63)); reference “fibromyalgia” without explanation, (see doc. 12 at 

30–31 (citing R. 650)); or merely recite that she was “diagnosed to have 

fibromyalgia in 2012,” (see doc. 12 at 30–31 (citing R. 627)). In light of this 

vague and underdeveloped evidence, the ALJ did not err in failing to list 

fibromyalgia as a severe impairment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 

1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming ALJ’s finding that an impairment was not severe 

where substantial medical evidence showed that the claimant “manifested few 

symptoms of the disease”).

Finally, Huigens’s reliance on the assessment of Dr. Daniel Prince, a nonpracticing and unlicensed physician, is misplaced. As an initial matter, Dr. Prince 

is not an acceptable medical source. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a) 

(acceptable medical sources include licensed physicians and psychologists) 

(emphasis added). Moreover, pursuant to SSR 12-2p, a finding that a claimant’s 

fibromyalgia constitutes a medically determinable impairment requires evidence of 

all of the following: (1) a history of widespread pain; (2) at least eleven positive 

tender points, or the repeated manifestation of at least six fibromyalgia symptoms; 

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and (3) evidence that other disorders that could cause the symptoms or signs were 

excluded. See 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012).5 Dr. Prince’s assessment did 

not comply with the foregoing requirements. (R. 85–86 (citing R. 601–03)).6

 

Aside from Dr. Prince, only Dr. Tariq indicated the presence of tender points, and 

Dr. Tariq failed to quantify the tender points. (See R. 621).

Where, as here, the ALJ discussed Huigens’s fibromyalgia, and considered 

the medical record as a whole, the ALJ did not err in concluding that Huigens’s 

fibromyalgia was not severe.

D. The Appeals Council did not err in applying the age criteria of the 

grids

Lastly, Huigens contends that the Appeals Council erred in “mechanically 

applying the age criteria of the grids so as to deprive [her] of SSDI benefits at age 

54 and a half by finding [that she] became disabled on 6/5/13, the date [she] turned 

 5 See also Hennes v. Comm’r of SSA, 130 F. App’x 343, 344 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 

STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 535) (“Diagnostic criteria [for fibromyalgia] include 

‘pain on both sides of the body, both above and below the waist, as well as in an axial 

distribution . . . [and] point tenderness in at least 11 or 18 specified sites.’”).

6 The ALJ observed that

Dr. Prince did not provide evidence that other disorders that could cause the 

symptoms or signs were excluded, and did not note any consideration of the 

claimant’s osteoarthritis. Moreover, Dr. Prince did report that he was not a 

practicing physician, but failed to report that he had allowed his license to practice 

medicine to expire by December 31, 2011, and as such, per SSR 06-03p, his 

opinions regarding the existence of fibromyalgia are not entitled to any weight, as 

they are reported by an unlicensed physician (Exhibit 9F).

R. 86 (citing R. 602).

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55[,] when [she] was last insured on 12/31/12, seven months before [she] turned 

55.” Doc. 12 at 31. This argument is unavailing. 

With respect to a claimant’s age, the Regulations provide three categories: 

“Younger person” (under age fifty), “Person closely approaching advanced age” 

(age fifty to fifty-four), and “Person of advanced age” (age fifty-five or older). 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c)–(e). The Regulations provide for the following application 

of these categories:

When we make a finding about your ability to do other work under §

404.1520(f)(1), we will use . . . each of the age categories that applies 

to you during the period for which we must determine if you are 

disabled. We will not apply the age categories mechanically in a 

borderline situation. If you are within a few days to a few months of 

reaching an older age category, and using the older age category 

would result in a determination or decision that you are disabled, we 

will consider whether to use the older age category after evaluating 

the overall impact of all the factors of your case.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(b), 416.963(b) (emphasis added). Here, Huigens was five 

months shy of her fifty-fifth birthday as of her date last insured (see R. 175, 339), 

so it is not clear that the flexibility described above would apply under any 

circumstances. Moreover, the SSA’s Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law 

Manual (“HALLEX”) states that, “[a]bsent a showing of additional adversity(ies) 

justifying the use of the higher age category, the adjudicator will use the claimant’s 

chronological age — even when the time period is only a few days.” HALLEX IICase 4:16-cv-00600-AKK Document 19 Filed 02/14/17 Page 16 of 17
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5-3-2. Here, Huigens had no additional adversities.7 To the contrary, Huigens has

a twelfth-grade education, speaks English, enjoys reading, and has past relevant 

work that is semi-skilled/skilled in nature. (R. 123–24, 352, 354, 383, 522). 

Moreover, the vocational experts at both of Huigens’s hearings testified that 

Huigens’s past relevant work involved skills that would transfer to sedentary work. 

(R. 124, 164–65). For all these reasons, the court finds that the Appeals Council 

did not err in applying Huigens’s chronological age.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination 

that Huigens is not disabled and has the RFC to perform light work is supported by 

substantial evidence, and that the ALJ applied proper legal standards in reaching 

this determination. Therefore, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. 

The court will enter a separate order in accordance with this Memorandum 

Opinion.

DONE the 14th day of February, 2017.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 7 See Program Operations Manual System: DI 25001.001(B)(2) (examples of additional 

vocational adversities include reduced hearing ability, limited education, illiteracy, inability to 

communicate in English, no past work experience, and work in an isolated industry).

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