Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00803/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00803-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1400 IDEA: Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (short title)

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3:16-cv-0803-CAB-(BLM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

A.V. By and Through His Guardians Ad 

Litem ANDREA VAZ ANTUNES and 

ANTONIO VAZ ANTUNES,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEMON GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-0803-CAB-(BLM)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

[Doc. No. 30]

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff A.V.’s (“A.V.”) Motion for 

Attorneys’ Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). [Doc. 

No. 30.] The motion has been fully briefed and the Court finds it suitable for determination 

on the papers submitted and without oral arguments in accordance with Civil Local Rule 

7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A.V. is a 12-year-old boy who resides within the Lemon Grove School District 

(“District”) and suffers from dyslexia, auditory working memory, and visual processing 

deficits. A.V. was first determined to be eligible for special education in December 2007. 

In the years that followed, District provided A.V with a free appropriate public education

Jul 11 2017

s/ joanag

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(“FAPE”) in both public and non-public schools and periodically assessed A.V. to evaluate 

his educational needs and progress and made any necessary adjustments. Beginning in 

December 2014, District and Parents began discussing where A.V should be placed moving 

forward but could not reach an agreement regarding which school A.V. should attend.

On April 24, 2015, Parents on behalf of A.V. filed a due process hearing request 

with the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). [Administrative Record (“A.R.”). 

at 1-8.] The OAH complaint was amended on May 13, 2015, to include District’s offer to

placement at Sierra Academy (“Sierra’), a non-public school. [Id. at 13-24, 36.]

On May 26, 2015, District responded to Plaintiff’s OAH complaint by making the 

required statutory settlement offer. [Doc. No. 21-2 at 119-121.] Subject to proof, District 

offered to reimburse Parents for the tuition and mileage reimbursement that they had paid 

to the non-public school Banyan Tree Foundations Academy (“Banyan”), dating back to 

January of 2015 to the end of the 2014-2015 school year. [Id.] District propounded that it 

would provide A.V. with a FAPE at Sierra and provide transportation to and from the 

school. [Id.] As an alternative to Sierra, District would authorize A.V.’s attendance at 

NewBridge, his Parents’ school of choice, but Parents would be entirely responsible for 

transporting their son at no cost to District. [Id.] On June 5, 2015, Parents declined 

District’s May 28, 2015, Statutory Settlement Offer claiming that the terms of the offer 

were overly broad and lacked specificity. [Id. at 123-24.] On August 28, 2015, District 

filed a complaint with the OAH to determine whether its offer of Sierra Academy 

constituted a FAPE. [A.R. at 67-74.]

On September 2, 2015, the OAH consolidated A.V. and District’s cases. [Id. at 88-

90.] In October and November of 2015 a six day OAH hearing was held before 

Administrative Law Judge Darrell Lepkowsky. On January 8, 2016, the ALJ issued a 

Decision.

1

[Doc. No. 1-1.] The ALJ found that A.V. was denied a FAPE between 

 

1 There were eight identified issues before the ALJ: (1) Did the District deny A.V. a FAPE by failing to 

make an appropriate, specific offer of placement on or after December 2014?; (2) Did District deny A.V. 

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December 20, 2014 and April 26, 2015, because District failed to make an appropriate, 

specific offer of placement between December 20, 2014, and April 26, 2015. [Id. at 30-

33.] Further, the ALJ concluded that the District did not predetermine its offer of 

placement at Sierra and was not required to make the offer at an individualized education 

program (“IEP”) team meeting. [Id. at 34-36.] Additionally, the ALJ held that the failure 

to have a representative from Sierra at the May 20, 2015, IEP team meeting was not a 

FAPE violation and that Parents had meaningfully participated in the meeting. [Id. at 36-

41.] Furthermore, the ALJ found that the settlement discussions did not limit A.V.’s 

remedies, and held that A.V.’s Parents were entitled to reimbursement for A.V.’s tuition at 

Banyan from January 5, 2015, to June 10, 2015, totaling $27,030, and for mileage costs for 

transporting A.V. to Banyan in the amount of $1,604.67.2 [Id. at 45-47.]

On April 4, 2016, A.V., by and through his Parents as guardians ad litem, filed a 

complaint in the Southern District of California for partial reversal of the decision of the 

OAH pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 

 

a FAPE with regard to the January 23, 2015 IEP team meeting by: (a) failing to offer a specific non-public 

school placement; and (b) failing timely to provide A.V. with a copy of the January 23, 2015 IEP document 

and meeting notes?; (3) Did the District’s April 25, 2015 offer of placement at Sierra deny A.V. a FAPE, 

because: (a) District predetermined its offer of placement at Sierra; (b) District made the offer through 

correspondence between its attorney and A.V.’s attorney instead of at an IEP meeting; and, (c) District 

failed to convene an IEP team meeting to discuss A.V.’s placement subsequent to making the offer of 

placement?; (4) Did District deny A.V. a FAPE at the May 20, 2015 IEP meeting, by: (a) Failing to have 

a non-public school representative from Sierra present; and, (b) denying A.V’s parents the opportunity to 

meaningfully participate in the meeting?; (5) Did District deny A.V. a FAPE by failing to conduct a vision 

therapy assessment at any time after the December 15, 2014 IEP meeting?; (6) Did District deny Student 

a FAPE from December 15, 2014, to the [date of the OAH hearing], by failing to make an appropriate 

and/or sufficient offer of occupational therapy, speech and language therapy, or vision therapy services?; 

(7) Did District offer A.V. a FAPE in the least restrictive environment in the triennial IEP dated December 

15, 2014, as amended in January 23, 2015, and May 20, 2015?; (8) Does the settlement agreement between 

the parties, executed on February 28, 2014, and March 3, 2014, limit or otherwise preclude any remedy 

to which A.V. might otherwise be entitled for prevailing on any issue brought in this case? [A.R. at 1061-

62.] 

2 Specifically, the ALJ found that A.V. prevailed on a portion of Issue 1; on Issue 2(a); on a portion of 

issue 7; and on Issue 8 [A.R. at 1106.]

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1400 et seq.

3

 [Doc. No. 1]. On June 22, 2016, District filed a cross-complaint seeking 

partial reversal of the decision rendered by the OAH.4 [Doc. No. 14.] 

On November 4, 2016, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. [Doc. 

Nos. 23, 24.] On February 24, 2017, this Court issues an Order affirming the ALJ’s 

decision and denying both motions for summary judgment. [Doc. No. 29.] The Court also 

found that A.V. was a prevailing party at the ALJ hearing. 

On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed his application for attorneys’ fees, requesting a 

total of $122,477.73. [Doc. No. 30-2 at 14-15.] Defendant filed its opposition [Doc. No. 

31] and Plaintiff filed his reply [Doc. No. 32].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The IDEA provides that “the court, in its discretion may award reasonable attorneys’ 

fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 

20 U.S.C. § 1451(i)(3)(B). “The prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude 

of the relief obtained.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). Rather “‘a prevailing 

party’ is one who ‘succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of 

the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.’” Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker 

 

3

 In his complaint Plaintiff alleged that the ALJ erred in holding that Defendant’s April 25, 2015, offer of 

placement at Sierra was not a predetermination (Issue 3(a)). [Doc. No 1 ¶ 21.] Further, Plaintiff alleged 

that the ALJ was incorrect in ruling that the failure to have a non-public school representative at the May 

20, 2015, IEP meeting was not a denial of FAPE (Issue 4(a)). [Id. ¶ 22.] Relatedly, Plaintiff also claimed 

that the ALJ incorrectly ruled that Parents were not denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in the 

May 20, 2015, IEP meeting (Issue 4(b)). [Id.] Plaintiff also sought reimbursement of reasonable 

attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party in the OAH proceeding, as well as attorneys’ fees incurred as a 

result of filing this action. [Id. ¶ 24.]

4 Defendant’s cross complaint included multiple challenges to the ALJ’s findings. First, Defendant 

contended that the OAH erred when it ruled that Plaintiff was denied a FAPE. (Issues 1, 2a, 7). [Doc. 

No. 14 ¶ 22.] Second, Defendant asserted that the ALJ erred in allowing Plaintiff an award of remedies 

and by deciding that Parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement for A.V.’s time at Banyan after 

December 20, 2014 (Issue 8). [Id. ¶¶ 25, 26, 28.] Relatedly, Defendant argued that the ALJ did not give 

due weight to the ongoing settlement discussions between the Parties or the offers made by the District, 

or fully consider the District’s efforts to resolve Plaintiff’s placement (Issue 8). [Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.] Fourth, 

Defendant argued that Plaintiff should be not be accorded prevailing party status. [Id. ¶ 30.]

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Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup 

Sch. Dist., No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir. 1994)).5 

The most useful starting point for determining attorney’s fees awarded under the 

IDEA is by performing the lodestar calculation – the number of hours reasonably expended 

on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424, 433 (1983). For a fee request to be adjudged reasonable it must “exclude from this 

initial fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended.’” Id. at 434. See also 

Webb v. Bd. Of Educ. of Dyer Cnty., Tenn., 471 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (Where a statute 

provides for fee shifting in connection with litigation, “[t]he time that is compensable under 

[that statute] is that ‘reasonably expended on the litigation.’”). Counsel for the prevailing 

party are therefore cautioned to “make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request 

hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 

Generally, a partially prevailing plaintiff may not recover fees for her unsuccessful 

claims because “the level of a plaintiff’s successes is relevant to the amount of fees to be 

awarded.” Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1118-1121 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(adopting the Supreme Court’s degree of success principles enumerated in Hensley to 

attorney’s fees awarded under the IDEA). In these situations, a district court has discretion 

in deciding whether to attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it 

may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

 

5 Specifically, “[t]he success must materially alter the parties’ legal relationship, cannot be de minimis and 

must be causally linked to the litigation brought.” Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker School Dist. 5J, 

502 F. 3d 811, at 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). See also Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (“The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the 

material alteration of the legal relations of the parties. . . .’). A legal relationship has been materially 

altered where “the plaintiff become entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against 

the defendant.” Fisher v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F. 3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. 

at 113 (1992)); see also Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 373 F.3d 

857, 865 (9th Cir. 2004); V.S. ex rel. A.O. v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 484 F.3d 

1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 2007)

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III. DISCUSSION

Having previously awarded Plaintiff prevailing party status,

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the Court will turn to 

the requested fee amount to determine whether it’s reasonable. 

With his motion, Plaintiff submits a declaration from his counsel along with 

supporting documentation that provide an itemized description of the time spent by his 

counsel on this matter beginning on August 21, 2014 and ending on March 1, 2017. [Doc. 

No. 30-3.] The declaration also sets forth counsel and his colleagues’ qualifications and 

hourly rates. Plaintiff requests a total fee award in the amount of a total of $122,477.73, 

demanding reimbursement of $74,105.90 for the fees associated with the due process 

hearing and $48,371.47 in fees associated with the district court claim. [Doc. No. 30-2 at 

14-15.] Defendant does not dispute the hourly rate but takes issue with Plaintiff’s inclusion 

of fees to cover attendance at IEP meetings or other general representation activities which 

occurred prior to the initiation of the administrative proceeding. [Doc. No 31 at 6-11.] 

Additionally, Defendant claims that Plaintiff may not recover fees incurred after his 

rejection of the district’s pre-hearing settlement offer. [Id. at 11-18.] Finally Defendant 

asserts that the fee award must be reduced to reflect Plaintiff’s degree of success and 

Plaintiff may not recover attorneys’ fees for his district court appeal. [Id. at 18-23.]

A. Inclusion of fees incurred after rejection of district’s pre-hearing settlement 

offer

Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not recover fees for any work performed by 

his attorney subsequent to the rejection the timely written offer it tendered on May 28, 

 

6

In its earlier order denying both cross motions for summary judgment this Court concluded: “Plaintiff 

was afforded significant relief that materially altered the relationship of the parties. A.V. was found to 

have been denied a FAPE between December 2014 and April 2015. To remedy the denial of a FAPE, the 

ALJ required District to reimburse Parents for expenses associated with Banyan through the end of the 

2015 school year. [A.R. 1105 ¶ 83.] The fact that the ALJ ruled in favor of the District on other issues 

does not change the fact that Plaintiff prevailed at the ALJ hearing.” [Doc. No, 29 at 32:22-28.]

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2015. Further, Defendant asserts that the ALJ’s award was “not more favorable to the 

parents that the offer of settlement” and that it was unreasonable for Parents to reject its

offer. In response, Plaintiff contends that he was justified in rejecting Defendant’s offer 

because it did not include a provision to pay for his attorney’s fees and maintained a 

provision that limited the District’s obligations regarding A.V.’s placement which could 

have potentially precluded him from services, future assessments, and transportation.7 

[Doc. No. 32 at 5-7.]

Under the IDEA, if a parent “protracts the litigation by rejecting a favorable offer, 

he risks suffering a financial penalty.” T.B ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. 

Dist, 806 F.3d 451, 476-76 (9th Cir. 2015). This is because IDEA prohibits an award of 

attorneys’ fees and related costs subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a 

parent if: “(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at any time more than 

10 days before the proceeding begins; (II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and (III) 

the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the 

parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement.” 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(i)(3)(D). “To deny attorneys’ fees under this provision, the court must find that the 

relief obtained from the ALJ was “not more favorable to the parents than the offer of 

settlement.” T.B. ex rel. Brenneise, 806 F.3d at 476 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(III)) (emphasis added in original) (“it should be recognized that the statute 

specifies that the comparison of the settlement offer versus the result of litigation must be 

made from the perspective of the parents, not the district’s”). An exception to this 

prohibition allows an award of fees and costs to be “made to a parent who is the prevailing 

party and who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.” 20 U.S.C § 

1415(i)(3)(E).

 

7 Parents initially rejected the settlement offer because it failed to provide the relief being sought and 

they considered the terms to be overboard and lacking in specificity. [Doc. No. 21-2 at 123-124.]

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Here, the District’s statutory settlement offer would have reimbursed Parents for 

tuition at Banyan subject to proof and documentation of attendance and mileage 

reimbursement dating back to January of 2015 through to the end of 2014-2015 school 

year. [Doc No. 21-2 at 119-121; Doc No. 31-1 at ¶ 7.] As part of the offer District would 

provide occupational therapy services at 30 minutes a week and speech therapy service at 

50 minutes per week until the end of 2014-2015 school year while Banyan was in session. 

[Doc No. 21-2 at 120; Doc No. 31-1 at ¶ 7.] If these related services were provided by 

Banyan at additional costs, District, subject to proof, would reimburse the monies. [Doc 

No. 21-2 at 120.] If these services were not provided by Banyan, District would procure 

and pay for them via a certified non-pubic agency. [Id.] District also offered A.V. two 

prospective placements: (1) he could attend Sierra with District paying the round trip 

transportation costs or (2) he could attend Newbridge with Parents being entirely 

responsible for paying the transportation costs even if a later IEP determined A.V. should 

attend NewBridge. [Id.] The statutory settlement offer provided that if Parents selected 

NewBridge “the only prospective waiver of claims shall relate to parents assuming full 

responsibility for transportation costs.” [Id.] It did not include an offer to pay attorneys’

fees and costs and specifically stated that each party would bear its own fees and costs. 

The ALJ’s decision reimbursed Parents $27,030 for A.V.’s tuition at Banyan from 

January 5, 2015, to June 10, 2015, and awarded $1,604.67 in mileage costs for transporting 

A.V. to and from Banyan. The ALJ did not require District to place A.V. at NewBridge, 

finding that Sierra could provide A.V. with a FAPE and did not place any prospective 

transportation costs on Parents. [Doc. No. 1-1.] 

Defendant focuses on what was included in the terms of the settlement itself to 

illustrate that the ALJ’s decision was not more favorable than the statutory settlement offer. 

But, Defendant fails to consider what was omitted from the Settlement and the ALJ’s 

decision. Under the terms of the proposed settlement Parents would not have been able to 

seek an award for fees and costs already incurred. Parents’ attorney had been representing 

them for approximately six months, had been racking up billable hours and had revoked 

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the earlier offer to eliminate attorneys’ fees and costs in an attempt to informally settle this 

matter. Thus, “[b]y declining the offer, the [Antunes] retained the right to seek an award 

of fees and costs. In that way, the offer was less favorable than the relief obtained.” T.B. 

ex. rel. Brenneise, 860 F.3d at 478. Similarly, Defendant’s related argument that the ALJ 

award was not more favorable to Parents because it did not provide them with the choice 

of two non-public schools overlooks the prospective waiver related to one of the offered 

schools that was included in the settlement. If Parents agreed to the offer, A.V.’s future 

attendance at NewBridge would be predicated on his Parents ability to foot the bill for the 

costs of daily roundtrip transportation. Proposing Parents prospectively agree to pay 

transportation costs for their child to attend a specific school, even if the school is later 

offered by District as that child’s FAPE, imposes a monetary cost on Parents. The ALJ did 

not impose any prospective transportation costs on Parents and therefore provides another 

way, “the offer was less favorable than the relief obtained.” Id. In light of these omissions, 

and viewing the offer from Parents perspective, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision was not 

more favorable than the statutory settlement offer.

Defendant also argues that A.V’s parents had no reasonable basis for rejecting its 

offer. The Court disagrees. The fact that the proposed settlement did not include an offer 

to pay attorneys’ fees provided Parents’ with sufficient justification for rejecting it. As the 

Court of Appeals noted, ‘[t]here is little precedent interpreting the phrase ‘substantially 

justified,’ but examples from other cases include situations where the offer failed to cover 

the parents’ attorney fees.” Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 816 F.3d 1216, 

1222 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Dicks v. D.C., 109 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2015)). 

Cases within this circuit have found that a failure to provide for attorneys’ fees can be 

interpreted as providing sufficient justification for rejecting a settlement offer. See, e.g., 

Adams v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., Case No CV 14-04753 BRO (PJWx, 2015 WL 

12748005, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2015) (“failure to provide for attorney’s fees in their 

statutory settlement offer when Plaintiffs had a reasonable basis to expect to recover fees 

substantially justified Plaintiffs in rejecting Defendants’ [] settlement offer.”); Hawkins v. 

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Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-07-4206 EMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94673 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 20, 2008) (finding that the insufficiency of the attorney’s fees offered in 

settlement offer substantially justified the plaintiff’s decision to reject the offer). Further, 

proposing Parents prospectively agree to pay transportation costs for their child to attend a 

specific school, even if the school is later offered by District as that child’s FAPE, imposes 

a monetary cost on Parents that cuts at the heart of the free public education IDEA 

promotes. The inclusion of this prospective waiver regarding future transportation costs 

also provides a reasonable justification for rejecting the statutory settlement offer. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Parents were substantially justified in rejecting 

Defendant’s offer because it did not provide any monies towards attorneys’ fees and it was 

restricting A.V.’s rights under the IDEA. 

In light of the above, the Court finds that the statutory bar to an award of attorneys’ 

fees and related costs is not applicable.

B. Inclusion of fees to cover activities that occurred prior to the initiation of 

the administrative proceedings

Next, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff improperly seeks substantial fees for work 

performed by Mr. Schwartz related to the development of his IEP and future school 

placement.

8

 In support of its position, Defendant notes that from August 21, 2014 through 

May 27, 2014, Mr. Schwartz was the sole attorney proving A.V. legal services, before the 

case transitioned to attorney Erin Minelli who directly handled the due process hearing. It 

is Defendant’s position that once Ms. Minelli became involved, Mr. Schwartz’s role was 

to “continue and complete discussions with the District’s counsel and his clients to come 

to an agreement on the IEP.” [Doc. No. 31 at 10:7-9.] In response, Plaintiff asserts that 

 

8 Defendant also asserts that some of the hours Mr. Schwartz has included are related to the IEP process 

and A.V.’s placement and are therefore not compensable. Further, Defendant argues that fees listed for 

continued communications between Mr. Schwartz and the District regarding A.V.’s placement, in which 

Ms. Minelli did not participate, were not related to the due process hearing and therefore are also not 

compensable.

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Mr. Schwartz bill does not include any time for preparation and attendance at the IEP 

meetings. Defendant posits that since Plaintiff’s due process action was not initiated until 

April 23, 2015, any requests for time that predate the commencement of the action should 

be excluded. Specifically, Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff’s inclusion of billable hours 

from August 21, 2014 through to April 23, 2015, other than for the preparation of the 

complaint. Plaintiff counters that “time spent on the litigation even if occurs before an 

initiating document is filed, are compensable.” [Doc. No. 32 at 3:8-9.]

Fees related to time spent on the litigation, prior to the commencement of a formal 

suit are compensable. As the Supreme Court has explained “some of the services 

performed before a lawsuit is formally commenced by the filing of a complaint are 

performed ‘on the litigation.’ Most obvious examples are the drafting of the initial 

pleadings and the work associated with the development of the theory of the case.” Webb 

v. Bd. Of Educ. Cnty., Tenn., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). But, the IDEA explicitly provides 

that courts may not award fees for an attorney’s attendance at an IEP meeting. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). Courts within the Ninth Circuit have found that attendance at IEP 

meetings or resolution sessions9and the work done in relation to them is not compensable. 

See LaToya A. V. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. 3:15-CV-04311-LB, 2016 WL 344558, at 

*10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (“The court excludes all fees relating to the . . . resolution 

session.”); Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., No. S-03-4568 WBS KJM, 2004 WL 

4999156, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004) (denying request for compensation at IEP meetings 

because “20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(d)(ii) prohibits any award of attorney’s fees ‘relating to 

any meeting of the IEP Team, unless such meeting is convened as a result of an 

administrative proceeding or judicial action...”). 

 

9 A “resolution session” is a meeting between parents and relevant IEP team members that the IDEA 

mandates within fifteen (15) days of the District receiving notice of a new due process filing, to discuss 

the student’s program without assistance or determination by a neutral. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i).

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The Court has reviewed the billable entries that Defendant assert are related to the 

IEP. [Doc. No. 31-2 at 2.] The majority of the challenged entries were for time spent in 

April 2016, following the filing of the complaint for partial reversal of the OAH decision. 

The Court finds nothing that substantiates Defendant’s position and is mindful of the fact 

that, based on the record before it, the last IEP meeting between the parties occurred in 

May 2015. Being unable to say with any degree of certainty that these entries related to 

the IEP or resolution sessions, the Court declines to discount them from the time billed.

However, the Court agrees with Defendant that the request includes time spent by 

Mr. Schwartz that cannot be interpreted as being related “to this litigation.” Plaintiff has 

submitted a blanket request for fees, dating back months before commencement of the due 

process hearing, without providing any explanation as to how they are related to work “on 

this litigation.” The Court finds it difficult to conceive how work performed between 

August 21, 2014 and March 2015 can be considered “work on a litigation” that was not 

even commenced until April 23, 2015, and nothing in the entries, most of which are labeled 

as correspondence/communication with client/or district, suggest that the work related to 

the drafting of the initial pleadings or development of the theory of the case. Plaintiff’s 

cursory response that “Counsel spent several months preparing for due process, then in 

January 2015, at the request of Defendant, began settlement negotiations outside of the IEP 

process” [Doc. No. 32 at 3:10-14] does not assuage the Court’s concern. Additionally, the 

fees being requested by the Plaintiff are for work performed by Mr. Schwartz, who 

Defendant asserts and Plaintiff does not contest, was not the attorney primarily responsible 

for litigating the due process case. In light of the lack of substantiation regarding the 

relatedness of this work, the Court concludes that the work billed for the month preceding 

the filing of the complaint was work reasonably performed on this litigation. 

Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff has overlooked the important caveat of the Webb 

ruling, that the compensability of pre-formal commencement fees is limited to “some of 

the services performed before the lawsuit is formally commenced.” Webb, 471 U.S. at 243. 

The Supreme Court did not hold that all fees are reimbursable. Accordingly, the Court 

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declines to reimburse Plaintiff for work done from August 21, 2014 through March 22, 

2015 and reduces the fee request by $6,047.50.10

C. Reduction of fees to reflect degree of success

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s recovery should be reduced by 50 percent to 

appropriately reflect his partial success at the OAH. Taking the opposite position, Plaintiff 

asserts that substantial relief awarded at the OAH is illustrative of the excellent results 

achieved and therefore warrants granting the full fee amount. [Doc. No. 30-2 at 5-9; Doc. 

No. 32 at 8-9.]

In determining the amount of fees to award, district courts must consider the results 

obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In situations, such as here, where a plaintiff has been 

deemed a prevailing party, even though he had only succeeded on some of his claims for 

relief, the court must ask two questions:

[first] did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the 

claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of 

success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory bases for 

making a fee award?

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney 

should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. at 435. In such circumstances reduction of 

the fee award is not required simply because plaintiff has not prevailed on every issue. Id. 

“If on the other hand, a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product 

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate 

may be an excessive amount.” Id. at 436. Where only partial or limited success has been 

achieved the absence of precise formula or rule for determining the appropriate reduction 

is based on degree of success obtained. Id. See also Aguirre, 461 F.3d at 1118, 1121 

(Although “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making [fee] determinations,” “the 

most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.”) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424, 

 

10 In determining this amount the Court has tallied up the billed amount found at pages 4– 10 in Doc. 

No. 30-3 for time entries between 08/21/14 through 03/16/2015.

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436). Using its discretion a district court “may attempt to identify specific hours that should 

be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Id.

Turning to the first question, the Court finds that plaintiff did not fail to prevail on 

claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded. Here, Plaintiff’s claims 

for relief involved a common core of facts and were based on related legal theories. All of 

his claims stemmed from Defendant’s obligation to provide Plaintiff with a FAPE under 

IDEA and whether Defendant followed the statutory requirements for developing his IEP. 

Finding much of counsel’s time to be “devoted generally to the litigation as a whole,” the 

Court “focus[es] on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation 

to the hours reasonable expended on the litigation.” Id. at 435.

In determining the level of Plaintiff’s success the Court will considers the claims 

pursued and outcome of the due process hearing. There were eight identified issues before 

the ALJ, Plaintiff originally argued that Defendant failed to provide A.V. with a FAPE 

based on six issues, excluding subparts. Defendant, in turn, presented two issues for the 

ALJ to determine, with the parties stipulating that Sierra would meet student’s placement 

needs. Defendant prevailed on a majority of the issues, with the ALJ concluding that: (1) 

Defendant did not predetermine its offer of placement at Sierra; (2) Defendant was not 

required to make the offer of placement at Sierra at the IEP team meeting; (3) Defendant 

did not violated FAPE by failing to have a representative from Sierra present at an IEP 

meeting and; (4) that Parents had meaningfully participated in the meeting. But, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff prevailed on two distinct issues and portions of two other issues,

11

 

11 The ALJ found that Plaintiff prevailed on Issues 2 (a) and 8 and on portions of Issues 1 and 7. Issue 2 

(a) related to the issue of whether District denied A.V. a FAPE with regard to the January 23, 2015 IEP 

team meeting but failing to offer a specific non-public school placement. Issue 8 asked if the settlement 

agreement between the parties, executed on February 28, 2014, and March 3, 2014, limit or otherwise 

preclude any remedy to which A.V. might otherwise be entitled for prevailing on any issues brought in 

this case. The question posed in Issue 1 was did District deny A.V. a FAPE by failing to make an 

appropriate, specific offer of placement on or after December 2014? Issue 7 asked if District offered A.V. 

a FAPE in the least restrictive environment in the triennial IEP dated December 15, 2014, as amended in 

January 23, 2015, and May 20, 2015. 

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determining that Plaintiff was denied a FAPE between December 2014 and April 2015. To 

remedy the denial of a FAPE, the ALJ required Defendant to reimburse Parents for 

expenses associated at Banyan through the end of the 2015 school year, including tuition 

and transportation costs. While most of the issues Plaintiff did not prevail on were 

regarding purported procedural violations, he also failed to secure the additional vision and 

occupational therapies and speech and language services he had requested. At best, 

Plaintiff only secured approximately one-third of the remedies sought and prevailed on half 

of the issues he presented.

12

 [Doc. No. 31-2 at 9-15.] 

In light of the ALJ’s findings and remedies awarded it “cannot be said that Plaintiff 

obtained ‘excellent results’ that would entitle h[im] to a full attorneys’ fee award.” L.R. v. 

Hollister Sch. Dist., Case No.: 5:13-MC-80085-EJD, 2014 WL 1118019, at * 6 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 19, 2014). As a consequence, the Court finds that a reduction in attorneys’ fees is 

appropriate but that there is no clear determination point of what that amount should be. 

Having familiarized itself with the issues at the summary judgment stage, and in 

consideration of Plaintiff’s degree of success and the relief afforded him at the due process 

hearing, the Court applies its discretion and finds a 33 percent reduction in the requested 

attorneys’ fees award to be reasonable and appropriate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

D. Inclusion of Appellate Costs

Defendant’s penultimate argument is that Plaintiff may not recover attorneys’ fees 

for his district court appeal since he was not the prevailing party on the appeal. Not 

surprisingly, Plaintiff takes the opposite position, asserting that he was the prevailing party 

at both the Administrative Hearing and the District Court appeal and is therefore entitled 

to an award of attorneys’ fees for both. [Doc. No. 30-2 at 5; Doc. No. 32 at 9.]

 

12 In determining how many issues Plaintiff prevailed on in this case is not as simple as reviewing the 

issues he presented in his amended complaint. After consolidation of Plaintiff and Defendant’s cases, the 

parties clarified what the issues were in a joint exhibit, with the ALJ noting that Plaintiff’s withdraw of 

two of his earlier issues. This issues in the joint exhibit was later re-numbered and re-worded by the ALJ 

for the sake of uniformity and clarity.

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A prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney’s fees is a party who 

“succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the 

parties sought in bringing the suit.” Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1498. Plaintiff is 

indeed correct that this Court previously determined that he “was the prevailing party at 

the ALJ hearing.” [Doc. No. 29 at 32.] The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that, to the 

extent that he successfully defended against Defendant’s summary judgment motion and 

maintained the ALJ’s previous reimbursement award, he prevailed on the appeal. The 

Court has reviewed the submitted invoice and has confirmed that Plaintiff is not submitting 

any requests for fees associated with his unsuccessful summary judgment motion. While 

the time spent on these activities appear as line items, the rate and total billed for this time 

is $0.00. [Doc. No. 30-3 at 34.] Accordingly, the Court declines to remove time spent 

responding to Defendant’s summary judgment motion from the fee award.

E. Additional Reductions Requested 

Finally, Defendant’s seek to remove the time spent by attorney Matthew Storey at 

the due process hearing and the travel charges for Ms. Minelli to attend the hearing from 

the attorneys’ fee award. Plaintiff counter that reimbursement for travel expenses is not 

unreasonable and that the attorneys’ fees have already been reduced to avoid duplicative 

billing.

“The touchstone in determining whether hours [spent on travel time] have been 

properly claimed is reasonableness.” Suzuki v. Yuen, 678 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1982). 

“Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the travel time that he billed for is 

compensable in the local community.” K.M. ex. rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 78 

F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1304 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2015) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has not 

introduced any evidence establishing that local attorneys customarily bill their clients for 

travel time to due process hearings. Rather, Plaintiff simply cites to a district court case in 

the Eastern District. Having not met his burden, the Court reduces Plaintiff’s attorneys’

fee award by $914.50 to reflect the time Ms. Minelli spent travelling to and from the due 

process hearing. [Doc. No. 30-3 at 24-25.] 

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As to Mr. Storey’s presence at the due process hearing, the Court finds nothing 

untoward in his presence at the due process hearing. Furthermore, Defendant has not 

provided the Court with any authority that holds that a second attorney’s presence at a due 

process hearing is not compensable. Accordingly, the Court declines to deduct the 32.2 

hours spent by Mr. Storey at the OAH from the requested fees.

IV. CONCLUSION

After making the reductions described above, the total amount of attorneys’ fees to 

which Plaintiff’s counsel are entitled is 66 percent of $115,515.37.

13

 Accordingly, the 

Court awards Plaintiff’s counsel $77,010.28 in attorneys’ fees. 

The Clerk shall close this case.

Dated: July 11, 2017

 

13 $122,477.37 - $6,047.50 (for worked not “on this litigation) – $914.50 (travel time) = $115,515.37 –

$38,505.09 (33%) = $77,010.08. 

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