Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05949/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05949-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WENDELL RICE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MCKESSON CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 12-05949 WHA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

TO REMAND AND VACATING

HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this pharmaceutical product liability action, plaintiffs move to remand the action back

to state court. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED. 

STATEMENT

This action is one of many currently pending in California state and federal courts

regarding alleged harms to consumers from pharmaceutical products containing propoxyphene. 

The instant action was originally filed in California state court on November 15, 2011. 

Defendants removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, arguing that the non-diverse plaintiffs

and defendants were fraudulently joined. Subsequently, the case was transferred by the

 Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to MDL No. 2226 pending in the Eastern District of

Kentucky. Judge Danny Reeves then remanded this action (among others) back to California

Superior Court. 

Case 3:12-cv-05949-WHA Document 70 Filed 01/07/13 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On October 23, 2012, plaintiffs filed a motion with the California Judicial Counsel to

coordinate this action with numerous related actions co-pending in California state court. 

Plaintiffs’ coordination petition memorandum stated that “[o]ne judge hearing all of the actions

for all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of justice,” and that “[f]ailure to

coordinate these actions will result in the disadvantages of duplicate and inconsistent rulings,

orders or judgments” (Dkt. No. 66-1 at 8, 10 (emphasis added)). 

Defendants subsequently removed the action a second time. Plaintiffs now move to

remand. Defendants oppose, arguing that the petition to coordinate “for all purposes” rendered

removal proper under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Defendants also contend (again)

in a footnote that removal was proper on the basis of diversity jurisdiction because certain

plaintiffs and/or defendants were fraudulently joined. 

ANALYSIS

A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court if original

jurisdiction would have existed at the time the complaint was filed. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). If the

case stated by the initial pleading was not removable, a defendant may remove within 30 days of

receipt of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper that renders the action removable. 

28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(2). 

Under CAFA, removal is proper in “mass action” suits so long as the following

requirements are met: (1) the amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars; (2) there is

minimal diversity, where at least one plaintiff is diverse from one defendant; (3) the monetary

relief claims of 100 or more plaintiffs are proposed to be tried jointly on the grounds that the

plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact; and, (4) at least one plaintiff’s claim

exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. 1332(d); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir.

2006). 

“[R]emoval statutes are strictly construed against removal.” Luther v. Countrywide

Homes Loans Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). “Federal jurisdiction must be

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance,” such that courts

must resolve all doubts as to removability in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,

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566 (9th Cir. 1992). The burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists is on the party

seeking removal. Id. at 566–67. 

District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions “where the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between

. . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). When federal subject-matter jurisdiction is

predicated on diversity of citizenship, complete diversity must exist between the opposing

parties. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978). A non-diverse

party named in a complaint can be disregarded for purposes of determining whether diversity

jurisdiction exists if a district court determines that the party’s inclusion in the action is a “sham”

or “fraudulent.” McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987).

1. REMOVAL UNDER CAFA WAS IMPROPER.

Defendants contend that the instant action is a “mass action” under CAFA because the

monetary claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly. This order disagrees. 

To begin with, the number of plaintiffs in this action falls far short of 100 persons. Plaintiffs’

petition for coordination before the California Judicial Counsel identifies seven actions including

141 individual plaintiffs and, according to defendants, plaintiffs’ counsel have represented in an

email that they wish to include more than a 1000 plaintiffs’ claims in their request for

coordination. Plaintiffs’ petition for coordination, however, is bereft of any explicit proposal that

the claims of these plaintiffs be tried jointly. 

Defendants attach great weight to the word “proposed” in the statute. They contend that

plaintiffs have implicitly proposed a removable mass action in their coordination petition by

using the ambiguous language “for all purposes” and by raising the possibility of “inconsistent

judgments.” This contention is unpersuasive. Our court of appeals has explained that the “mass

action” provisions of CAFA are narrowly drawn and Congress did not intend to “allow courts to

override the considered legislative limitations in the ‘mass action’ concept.” Tanoh v. Dow

Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 953–954 (9th Cir. 2009). CAFA also expressly exempts claims

“consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings” from the definition of “mass

actions.” Id. at 954 (citing 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV)). For their part, plaintiffs insist that

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they filed the motion for coordination solely for pretrial purposes. Construing plaintiffs’ petition

for coordination as the functional equivalent of an express request for a joint trial would conflict

with both the guidance proved by our court of appeals in Tanoh, as well as with the general

canon of strict construction of removal statues. 

Defendants’ reliance on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in In re Abbot Labs., Inc., 698

F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2012), is misplaced. Courts in this district are bound by the authority of our

own court of appeals. Abbot Labs is also distinguishable on its facts. In Abbot Labs, the

plaintiffs’ memorandum requesting consolidation specifically stated they were requesting

consolidation “through trial” and “not solely for pretrial proceedings.” Id. at 571. In this action,

the plaintiffs’ petition for coordination contains no such language. 

In short, defendants’ removal petition was, at best, premature. Plaintiffs will be held to

their representation that they do not and will not seek a joint trial and the action shall be

REMANDED to state court. “Plaintiffs’ separate state court actions may, of course, become

removable at [some] later point if plaintiffs seek to join the claims for trial.” Tanoh, 561 F.3d at

956. If, following remand, the coordinating judge and/or plaintiffs propose a joint trial and the

action meets CAFA’s other statutory requirements, then defendants may remove the action once

again to this district court. 

2. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH MISJOINDER.

In a footnote in their opposition, defendants assert that diversity jurisdiction is proper

because certain plaintiffs and defendants are fraudulently joined. Defendants do not brief their

contention that diversity jurisdiction is proper. Instead, they attempt to incorporate by reference

arguments from prior submissions. Defendants admit that their misjoinder contentions were

rejected by Judge Reeves in the Eastern District of Kentucky the first time they removed this

action. See In re Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene Prod. Liab. Lit., No. 2:12-cv-00135-

DCR, Dkt. No. 33 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 7, 2012); Freitas v. McKesson Corp., No. 2:12-50-DCR, Dkt.

No. 86 (E.D. Ky. July 17, 2012). Defendants also admit that they raise these points by footnote

solely to avoid waiver. 

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Defendants do not challenge Judge Reeves’ holdings or reasoning. Nor do they explain

why they should not be estopped from asserting diversity jurisdiction a second time. Given that

defendants have failed to brief their contentions, the undersigned sees no reason to question

Judge Reeves’ holdings and attempt to manufacture a basis for federal jurisdiction that that

defendants themselves fail to articulate. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons mentioned above, the motion to remand is GRANTED. The Clerk shall

FORWARD THE FILE to the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco. The January

10 hearing is VACATED. Plaintiffs’ request for costs and attorney’s fees associated with seeking

remand is DENIED. All other pending motions are DENIED as MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2013. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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