Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02119/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125la Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

T-C FORUM AT CARLSBAD, LLC, 

a Delaware limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-2119 DMS (BGS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

v.

THOMAS ENTERPRISES, INC., a 

Georgia corporation; and DOES 1-10, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff T-C Forum at Carlsbad, LLC’s motion 

for default judgment. Defendant Thomas Enterprises, Inc. did not file an opposition 

to the motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff owns a shopping center known as “Forum at Carlsbad,” “Forum 

Carlsbad,” and “The Forum – Carlsbad.” Plaintiff discovered Defendant using the 

“Hillside Forum” designation to identify a planned shopping center located across 

the street from Plaintiff’s shopping center. On June 22, 2016, Plaintiff sent a cease 

and desist letter to Defendant. (Compl. ¶ 21, Ex. A.) The letter advised Defendant 

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that it must cease using the “Hillside Forum” designation on its shopping center and 

related business services because it was confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s “Forum at 

Carlsbad” mark, and any continued use of such designation would give rise to 

several causes of action against Defendant. (Id.) On July 27, 2016, Defendant 

responded, disagreeing with Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 23, Ex. B.) 

Thereafter, on August 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant, 

alleging eleven causes of action: (1) service mark infringement of unregistered 

service mark, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (2) false designation of origin/false 

advertising, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (3) false endorsement, in violation 

of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (4) trade name infringement, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(a), (5) unfair competition, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (6) state 

statutory trade name infringement, in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 14400 

& 14411, (7) common law unfair competition, (8) common law trade name 

infringement, (9) common law misappropriation, (10) violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 17500, and (11) statutory unfair competition, in violation of Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17200. (Comp. ¶¶ 29–106.) On October 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a 

proof of service, showing that it properly served Defendant’s registered agent by 

substituted service. When Defendant failed to respond to the Complaint, Plaintiff 

filed a request for entry of default, which the Clerk of Court granted on November 

29, 2016. Subsequently, on December 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for default 

judgment.

On January 20, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to set aside the entry of default. 

The Court granted Defendant’s motion and ordered Defendant to respond to the 

Complaint by April 25, 2017. Moreover, the Court conditioned the setting aside of 

the default by requiring Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff for costs it had incurred as 

a result of Defendant’s conduct. Defendant, however, has not responded to the 

Complaint nor did it pay Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs as ordered by the Court.

On April 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second request for entry of default, which 

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was granted on the same day. Subsequently on May 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed the 

present motion.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Default Judgment

A court may grant a default judgment upon application of a party. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Granting or denying a default judgment under Rule 55(b) is within 

the court’s discretion. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). In 

making this determination, a court considers the following factors, commonly 

referred to as the Eitel factors: “(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) 

the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 

material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the 

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on 

the merits.” Id. at 1471–72. When weighing these factors, the well-pleaded factual 

allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to 

damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987); 

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6).

Based on the factors announced in Eitel, the Court concludes that default 

judgment is appropriate. First, one of the factors is whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect. It is highly unlikely that Defendant’s default is due to excusable 

neglect as this is its second default. When Defendant moved to vacate the first entry 

of default, the Court granted its request and ordered it to respond to the Complaint 

by April 25, 2017. Moreover, the Court conditioned the setting aside of the default 

by requiring the Defendant to pay Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs it 

had incurred because of Defendant’s conduct. Nevertheless, Defendant has failed to 

comply with the Court’s orders. To date, Defendant has not responded to the 

Complaint nor has it paid Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as ordered 

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by the Court. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.

Next, because Defendant has refused to participate in this lawsuit, no 

possibility of dispute concerning material facts has been presented. In any event, 

the Court takes all factual allegations in the Complaint as true in light of the entry of 

default. See Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Upon 

review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated claims 

under the Lanham Act and related state law and common law claims. Therefore, 

these factors also weigh in favor of granting default judgment.

Finally, while “public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits 

weighs against default judgment, that single factor is not enough to preclude it.” Rio 

Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). Proceeding 

with the instant litigation would be futile given Defendant’s failure to participate in 

this action. Moreover, the denial of this motion would likely result in prejudice to 

Plaintiff because it would be left without resources in the matter. These factors favor 

default judgment for Plaintiff.

After weighing the Eitel factors, the Court finds that default judgment is 

appropriate.1

 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is granted.

B. Permanent Injunction

Under the Lanham Act, “the district court [has] the ‘power to grant injunctions 

according to principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem 

reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right’ of the trademark owner.” Reno Air 

Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 

1116(a)). In order for the Court to grant a permanent injunction, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate the following: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 

remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate 

 1 The fourth factor, the sum of money at stake in the action, is inapplicable to 

the present case because Plaintiff does not request monetary damages as it only seeks 

a permanent injunction and sanctions. 

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for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 

and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would 

not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 

547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).

Here, Plaintiff requests a permanent injunction against Defendant as follows:

1. That Defendant, its officers, directors, principals, owners, agents, 

servants, employees, representatives, affiliates, associates, partially or whollyowned subsidiaries, assignees, successor entities or individuals, and all persons 

and/or entities in concert or participation with Defendant, directly or indirectly, be 

preliminarily and permanently enjoined and restrained perpetually from:

A. infringing the “Forum at Carlsbad,” “Forum Carlsbad,” and “The 

Forum – Carlsbad” unregistered Service Marks (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s 

Service Marks”) which have become distinctive in the public’s mind 

and caused the public to associate Plaintiff’s Property located at 1923 

Calle Barcelona, Carlsbad, California 92009 (hereainafter “Plaintiff’s 

Property”) with Plaintiff’s Service Marks;

B. infringing the “Forum at Carlsbad,” “Forum Carlsbad,” and “The 

Forum – Carlsbad” Trade Names (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Trade 

Names”) which have become distinctive in the public’s mind and 

caused the public to associate Plaintiff’s Property with Plaintiff’s Trade 

Names;

C. using the term “Hillside Forum,” any phonetic equivalent or 

abbreviation therefor, or any mark using the designation “Forum” alone 

or in combination with any other word or design in its business affairs, 

including but not limited to as a trademark or trade name, or any other 

designation confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s Service Marks and/or 

Plaintiff’s Trade Names, in connection with Defendant’s services, 

including the sale, offering for sale, leasing, offering to lease 

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commercial or retail real estate, and/or to identify a shopping center and 

services related thereto;

D. promoting or marketing services in any way that tends to deceive, 

mislead, or confuse the public into believing that Defendant’s services 

and/or shopping center is in any way sanctioned by Plaintiff or affiliated 

with Plaintiff’s Property or Plaintiff’s “Forum at Carlsbad,” “Forum 

Carlsbad,” and “The Forum – Carlsbad” shopping center;

E. otherwise competing unfairly with Plaintiff in any manner;

F. passing off, inducing, or enabling others to sell or pass off any sale, 

offering for sale, leasing, offering to lease commercial or retail real 

estate, and/or to identify a shopping center or any other properties under 

or in connection with the term “Forum”, or any designation confusingly 

similar thereto; and

G. committing any acts calculated to cause purchasers to believe any 

goods or services provided by Defendant are sponsored by, approved 

by, connected with, guaranteed by or offered, sold, or leased by 

Plaintiff, or under the control or supervision of Plaintiff.

After reviewing the record, the Court concludes a permanent injunction is 

appropriate in this case. Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that it will suffer 

irreparable harm absent an injunction and that monetary damages are inadequate to 

compensate for that harm. Plaintiff alleges “[it] will suffer great and irreparable 

injuries, for which damages would not afford adequate relief, in that said damages 

would not adequately compensate for injury to Plaintiff’s service marks and trade 

names, business reputation, goodwill, and customer base, and Defendant’s conduct, 

if allowed to continue, would inevitably result in damage to Plaintiff’s retail real 

estate holdings.” (Compl. ¶ 35.) As to the balance of hardships, Plaintiff’s interest 

in maintaining the integrity of its service and trade marks and protecting its goodwill 

outweighs any interest that Defendant may have in continued infringement. Finally, 

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the public interest in maintaining vigorous protection for intellectual property rights 

also favors an injunction. These factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff’s request 

for a permanent injunction. 

Generally, “an injunction must be narrowly tailored ... to remedy only the 

specific harms shown by [a plaintiff], rather than ‘to enjoin all possible breaches of 

the law.’” Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983)). After reviewing Plaintiff’s 

proposed language for the permanent injunction, the Court finds that the language 

in paragraphs D, E, and G is vague as it is not directed specifically at Defendant’s 

infringing conduct, but rather, it is a general proscription against Defendant 

engaging in any conduct that negatively affects Plaintiff’s business. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction against Defendant as requested, with 

the exception of paragraphs D, E, and G. 

C. Attorneys’ Fees 

Plaintiff seeks imposition of sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees pursuant 

to the Court’s inherent powers and Civil Local Rule 83.1. Specifically, Plaintiff 

requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $31,453.46, consisting of $18,453.46 

awarded pursuant to the Court’s order issued on April 11, 2017, and $13,435.72 

incurred in connection with preparing supplemental briefs regarding attorneys’ fees 

and costs, second request for entry of default, and the instant motion. 

“All federal courts are vested with inherent powers enabling them to manage 

their cases and courtrooms effectively and to ensure obedience to their orders.... As 

a function of this power, courts can dismiss cases in their entirety, bar witnesses, 

award attorney’s fees and assess fines.” F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River 

Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Sanctions are an 

appropriate response to “willful disobedience of a court order ... or when the losing 

party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Fink 

v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations 

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omitted). Further, Rule 83.1(a) permits the Court to order sanctions for “[f]ailure of 

counsel or of any party to comply with these rules, with the Federal Rules of Civil 

or Criminal Procedure, or with any order of the court[.]” Civ. L. R. 83.1(a). 

As explained above, this is Defendant’s second default. When the Defendant 

moved to vacate the first entry of default, the Court granted its request and ordered 

it to respond to the Complaint by April 25, 2017. Moreover, the Court has ordered 

Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs it had incurred 

due to Defendant’s conduct. Nevertheless, Defendant has failed to comply with the 

Court’s orders. To date, Defendant has not responded to the Complaint nor has it 

paid Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs. Defendant’s refusals to participate in this 

lawsuit and to comply with the Court’s orders have resulted in substantial delay in 

this case and forced Plaintiff to file a second entry of default and motion for default 

judgment, thereby incurring additional attorneys’ fees and costs. Accordingly, 

pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to administer justice and Rule 83.1, a sanction 

against Defendant in the form of attorneys’ fees is clearly warranted.

The amount of fees awarded is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. 

Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). “The most useful starting 

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff seeks fees based on an hourly rate of $430 for Partner Matthew A. 

Newboles and $325 for Of Counsel Stephen Z. Vegh. For the reasons explained in 

the April 11, 2017 order, the Court finds the hourly rates reasonable.

Next, Plaintiff seeks to recover fees for 19.2 hours of work performed in

connection with preparing supplemental briefs regarding attorneys’ fees and costs. 

It is notable the billing entries from March 2 and 3, 2017 are not related to work on 

the supplemental briefs. Therefore, a deduction of 0.5 hours is warranted. Next, 

Plaintiff requests fees for 12.3 hours for preparing a second request for entry of 

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default. The hours billed on April 11, 2017 through April 21, 2017, and April 26 

and 27, 2017 appear unreasonable because the billing entries pertain to unrelated 

activities. Therefore, the Court deducts 5.3 hours. Lastly, Plaintiff seeks to recover 

fees for 8.5 hours expended in connection with the second motion for default 

judgment. The requested number of hours appears to be reasonable. Accordingly, 

the Court allows recovery of 34.2 hours.

III.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is granted. A 

permanent injunction is entered in favor of Plaintiff as follows:

1. That Defendant, its officers, directors, principals, owners, agents, servants, 

employees, representatives, affiliates, associates, partially or wholly-owned 

subsidiaries, assignees, successor entities or individuals, and all persons 

and/or entities in concert or participation with Defendant, directly or 

indirectly, be preliminarily and permanently enjoined and restrained 

perpetually from:

A. infringing the “Forum at Carlsbad,” “Forum Carlsbad,” and “The 

Forum – Carlsbad” unregistered Service Marks (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s 

Service Marks”) which have become distinctive in the public’s mind 

and caused the public to associate Plaintiff’s Property located at 1923 

Calle Barcelona, Carlsbad, California 92009 (hereainafter “Plaintiff’s 

Property”) with Plaintiff’s Service Marks;

B. infringing the “Forum at Carlsbad,” “Forum Carlsbad,” and “The 

Forum – Carlsbad” Trade Names (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Trade 

Names”) which have become distinctive in the public’s mind and 

caused the public to associate Plaintiff’s Property with Plaintiff’s Trade 

Names;

C. using the term “Hillside Forum,” any phonetic equivalent or 

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abbreviation therefor, or any mark using the designation “Forum” alone 

or in combination with any other word or design in its business affairs, 

including but not limited to as a trademark or trade name, or any other 

designation confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s Service Marks and/or 

Plaintiff’s Trade Names, in connection with Defendant’s services, 

including the sale, offering for sale, leasing, offering to lease 

commercial or retail real estate, and/or to identify a shopping center and 

services related thereto; and

D. passing off, inducing, or enabling others to sell or pass off any sale, 

offering for sale, leasing, offering to lease commercial or retail real 

estate, and/or to identify a shopping center or any other properties under 

or in connection with the term “Forum”, or any designation confusingly 

similar thereto.

Moreover, Defendant shall make payment to Plaintiff in the amount of 

$29,967.46 within thirty (30) days of this Order for reasonable attorneys’ fees, 

consisting of $18,453.46 awarded under the Court’s April 11, 2017 Order, and 

$11,514 for fees related to preparing supplemental briefs regarding attorneys’ fees 

and costs, second request for entry of default, and the instant motion. The Clerk of 

Court is instructed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2017

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