Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00274/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00274-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CURTIS BASS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv0274 JM(PCL)

ORDER DENYING OBJECTIONS

TO REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION 

vs.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

On May 12, 2009, Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis entered a Report and

Recommendation Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“R & R”). Petitioner

has filed Objections and Supplemental Briefing to the R & R. (Docket Nos. 42, 43).

Respondent did not file a response to the Objections. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1),

this matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth

below, the court denies the Objections.

In large part, the arguments raised in the Objections were specifically addressed

in the R & R and Petitioner fails to distinguish the reasoning or the authorities cited in

the R & R. One argument, however, warrants further discussion. The issue discussed

herein is whether the denial of a continuance to thoroughly review previously produced

discovery, employ a runner, or to conduct telephonic discovery constituted harmless

error. The Supreme Court in Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) discussed trial

continuances in conjunction with due process:

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The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial

judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed.

377. Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face

of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1,

99 L.Ed. 4. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 77 S.Ct. 431, 1 L.Ed.2d 415; Torres v.

United States, 270 F.2d 252 (C.A.9th Cir. 1959).

Id. at 589-90. For purposes of the following discussion, the court assumes that the trial

judge committed constitutional error in not granting a continuance.

The harmless error standard announced in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 776 (1946), applies in determining whether habeas relief must be granted because

of constitutional error of the trial type. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993). The test under Kotteakos is whether the error had “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

at 637; Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1574-75 (9th Cir. 1996).

In evaluating the harmlessness of a constitutional error, the Court does not merely

determine “whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase

affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial

influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.”

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 642 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The habeas court cannot ask only

whether it thinks the petitioner would have been convicted even if the constitutional

error had not taken place. Kotteakos is full of warnings to avoid that result.”); Wade

v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378,

1385-86 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Here, the court concludes that even if a constitutional error occurred, such error

would not likely have substantially influenced the trial judge’s decision. See O’Neal

v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (whether an error has a substantial and

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injurious effect is not analyzed under who has the burden of proof but whether “the

error substantially influenced the jury’s decision”). Here, the case proceeded by bench

trial, and not by jury. The record reveals that Petitioner referred to the discovery during

opening statements and cross-examination of witnesses and Petitioner demonstrated a

familiarity with the discovery including, for example, the Costa Mesa Police

Department report. (RT 419-20, 461, 464, 465, 486-87, 495, 498, 499, 500, 539, 768,

774, 776, 787-88, 895, 900, 776). Petitioner also represented that he had “the past 100

days to review [his case] and to look at some case law and criminal codes.”

(Lodgement 9, People v. Bass, slip op. at 10).

With respect to the defense witnesses sought by Petitioner, and ultimately not

produced at the time of trial, he provided the trial judge with the identities of six

witnesses. One witness, a foreign national (Michael Bellow), was beyond the subpoena

powers of the court. With respect to the subpoena for Detective Niderost, Petitioner

represented that the detective “may have” made annotations on a few documents in

evidence and that Detective Niderost would provide testimony that he assisted the bank

to recover wire transfers out of Rancho Santa Fe National Bank. The trial judge noted

that this argument did not negate his intent to defraud the bank. (RT 1085-86). With

respect to Detective Fant, Petitioner represented that this witness would testify about

the investigative report he prepared and his interviews with bank personnel. Petitioner

also represented that Detective Fant “may” testify that he found exonerating evidence,

but did not include it in the report. (RT 1088). Petitioner did not identify any

exculpatory evidence. With respect to Deputy Ngyugen, Petitioner represented that this

witness would testify to the statements in his report and the dates of the report. In

response, the Government stated that it would stipulate that Detective Ngyugen went

to the bank on January 5 as a result of a call from the bank to the sheriff’s department.

(RT 1091). With respect to Detective Mikhalek, Petitioner represented that he would

testify about a disposition report on the stolen vehicle counts. With respect to the

subpoena for the prosecutor, Petitioner represented that she would testify about the date

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and time she received the case and assigned Investigator Cargel to the case. (RT 1096).

The trial court denied the subpoena for the prosecutor but noted his tentative decision

to permit Petitioner to issue subpoenas to the other five potential witnesses even though

“they are not likely to produce relevant testimony.” (RT 1097). The trial judge noted

that he would appoint an investigator and a runner and delayed the trial on the forgery

counts for several days, until the following Wednesday (from April 6 until April 12),

to permit Petitioner the opportunity to subpoena the witnesses. Ultimately, however,

Petitioner was not permitted to call the identified five witnesses or to conduct additional

discovery.

A review of the record reveals that Petitioner possessed a familiarity with the

discovery provided to him and that the witnesses he intended to call to testify would

provide evidence of dubious relevancy. In light of the record, the court concludes that

any error that may have occurred was harmless. 

In his Supplemental Objections, Petitioner argues that the failure to grant a

continuance violated state law as articulated in People v, Shulz, 5 Cal.App.4th 563

(1992). One difficulty with this argument is that to present a cognizable federal habeas

corpus claim, a state prisoner must allege that the conviction was obtained in "violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and

not state law. Accordingly, the court rejects this argument.

In sum, for the above stated reasons, the court denies the Objections and adopts

the R & R in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 9, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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