Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02198/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02198-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Declaratory Judgement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RACHAEL A. EARL, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Wachovia Motgage FSB, f/k/a WORLD

SAVINGS BANK; MTC FINANCIAL

INC. dba TRUSTEE CORPS; GOLDEN

WEST SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, JOHN

DOE AND JANE DOE, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-2198-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court are Defendant Wachovia Mortgage, FSB’s (“Wachovia”)

Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be

Granted or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. #10), Defendant MTC

Financial, Inc, dba Trustee Corps (“Trustee Corps”) Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. #9), and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend. (Dkt. #18). After reviewing the pleadings, and

determining that oral argument is unnecessary, the Court issues the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Rachael A. Earl filed this action in Maricopa County Superior Court

asserting numerous grounds for equitable and injunctive relief related to a power-of-sale

clause contained in a deed-of-trust to which she was a signatory. (Dkt. #1). Defendant

Trustee Corps removed this case to federal court on October 20, 2009. On December 1,

Case 2:09-cv-02198-MHM Document 19 Filed 06/10/10 Page 1 of 11
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2009, Trustee corps filed its Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. #9), and on December 18, 2009,

Defendant Wachovia filed its Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Dkt. #10). Due to an issue regarding service of the aforementioned motions to

dismiss, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Effectuate Service on February 26,

2010, asking for an additional thirty days to answer Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Dkt.

#14). The Court granted this request. (Dkt. #16). On April 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed two

identical documents, both entitled Opposition to Defendants’ Respective Motions to Dismiss

for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted or, in the Alternative for

Summary Judgment, and Motion to Strike or Alternatively for leave to Amend the

Complaint. (Dkt. #17–18).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must liberally construe pleadings submitted by a pro se claimant, affording

the claimant the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623

(9th Cir. 1988). However, the Court “may not supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),

the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007); see also Morley

v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A dismissal for failure to state a claim is

appropriate only where it appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

that would entitle it to relief.”). In evaluating such a motion to dismiss, a district court need

not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint; courts may take into account “facts that are

[ ] alleged on the face of the complaint [and] contained in documents attached to the

complaint.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, “all wellpleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d

658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). However, “the court [is not] required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

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Spreewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

1. Trustee Corps’ Motion to Dismiss

Trustee Corps argues that as the foreclosure trustee, it is not a proper party to this

lawsuit and must be dismissed from the case. Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-807(E)

provides: “The trustee need only be joined as a party in legal actions pertaining to a breach

of the trustee's obligations under this chapter or under the deed of trust.” Plaintiff’s

complaint does not allege that Trustee Corps breached any obligation under Arizona’s trustdeed statutes. See A.R.S. § 33-801 et seq.. On the contrary, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges

violations that occurred in the creation of the deed-of-trust on or around May 10, 2005, long

before Trust Corps involvement in this case, which began when it was appointed successor

trustee on July 2, 2009. Therefore, this Court finds that Trustee Corps is not a proper party

to this action and should be dismissed.

2. Wachovia’s Motion to Dismiss

A. Show-me-the-note Theory

It is difficult to discern from Plaintiff’s Complaint exactly the grounds upon which

her lawsuit is predicated. After reading her response, however, it is apparent to this Court

that Plaintiff alleges a so-called “show me the note” theory of liability against Defendant

Wachovia (and possibly Trust Corps). In other words, Plaintiff contends there was no holder

in due course that possessed the original “wet ink signature note,” therefore the trustee sale

was unlawful. 

Under Arizona law, “[u]nlike their judicial foreclosure cousins that involve the court,

deed of trust sales are conducted on a contract theory under the power of sale authority of the

trustee.” In re Krohn, 52 P.3d 774, 777 (Ariz. 2002). “[A] power of sale is conferred upon

the trustee of a trust deed under which the trust property may be sold . . . after a breach or

default in performance of the contract or contracts, for which the trust property is conveyed

as security . . ..” A.R.S. § 33-807(A). The Arizona statutes governing the sale of foreclosed

property through a trustee’s sale do not specifically require that the foreclosing party

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produce a physical copy of the original promissary note. Like most states, Arizona has

adopted the U.C.C.. The U.C.C., among other things, governs the enforcement of negotiable

instruments, providing that “‘[p]erson[s] entitled to enforce’ an instrument include the holder

of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder

or a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument

pursuant to § 47-3309 [because the note is lost or destroyed].” A.R.S. § 47-3301. There is

very little case law on the issue of whether the U.C.C. has any applicability in the context of

non-judicial trustee sales or foreclosures in Arizona. The only courts that have addressed this

issue are federal courts within the District of Arizona; neither the Arizona Court of Appeals,

nor the Arizona Supreme Court have weighed in on the issue. When addressing the

applicability of the UCC to foreclosure sales, courts within the District of Arizona “have

routinely held that [a plaintiff’s] ‘show me the note’ argument lacks merit.” Diessner v.

Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187-88 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting

Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009)).

 As such, the any counts relating to the production of the original note are hereby dismissed

with prejudice. “Dismissal is appropriate where the complaint lacks . . . a cognizable legal

theory . . ..” Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D.

Ariz. 2006) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

B. Due Process Violations and Cognovit Note

Plaintiff’s Complaint makes numerous references to violations of due process.

Plaintiff’s claims must arise, then, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under § 1983, however,

only exists when the alleged deprivation was committed “under color of state law.” Am.

Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). This case concerns a non-judicial

foreclosure predicated on a contract signed by private parties. A private remedy such as

non-judicial foreclosure does not involve state action. Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d

1091, 1095 (9th Cir.2003). In short, “Plaintiff[] do[es] not explain how a private contract

between nongovernmental parties is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies

only to governmental entities.” Phillips v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 2009 WL 4898259, *2 (D.

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Ariz. Dec. 11, 2009); See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (stating that “[n]o state shall ... deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... [or] deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). Because Plaintiff has sued only

private actors, including Defendant Wachovia, she has not alleged an government-entity

action which might support a due process claim under § 1983.

Relatedly, Plaintiff’s alleges that her deed-of-trust is unenforceable as a cognovit note.

“The cognovit is the ancient legal device by which the debtor consents in advance to the

holder's obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing, and possibly even with the

appearance, on the debtor's behalf, of an attorney designated by the holder.” D. H. Overmyer

Co. Inc., of Oh. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 177 (1972). This claim, the Court assumes is also

a constitutional claim, as the Supreme Court has held that cognovit notes, under certain

circumstances can violate due process rights. See id. at 187 (“ Our holding necessarily

means that a cognovit clause is not, per se, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due

process.”). Plaintiff appears to argue that the power-of-sale clause authorizing a non-judicial

foreclosure in the deed-of-trust is cognovit because non-judicial foreclosure does not allow

for a hearing in a court of law. A non-judicial foreclosure, is, by definition, not a judicial

proceeding, and a power-of-sale clauses does not allow a creditor to seek judgment against

a debtor, but merely allow the creditor to obtain title to the collateral as a result of default.

Accordingly, no judicial proceeding was contemplated or took place at which Plaintiff was

denied notice or not permitted to appear. There was, then, no state action which might

support a constitutional claim. Additionally, the facts asserted do not demonstrate in any

way whatsoever that the deed-of-trust was a cognovit note. In short, Plaintiff cannot proceed

under a cognovit note theory and this Court must dismiss her claim with prejudice. 

D. Truth in Lending Act

Plaintiff’s complaint makes brief and passing reference to the Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”). TILA, “requires a ‘creditor’ to disclose credit terms—for example, the annual

interest rate—to a borrowing consumer.” Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 647 (9th Cir.

1974) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1638). “Congress through TILA sought to protect consumers'

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choice through full disclosure and to guard against the divergent and at times fraudulent

practices stemming from uninformed use of credit.” King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915

(9th Cir. 1986) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s TILA claim must be dismissed because it does not

comply with the applicable statute of limitations. TILA requires that debtors bring their

claims for damages “within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation . . . . ”

15 U.S.C. § 1640(e); see Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003)

(noting TILA’s one year statute of limitations). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that the

statute of limitations runs from the “date of consummation of the transaction,” which is

generally understood as the date on which the creditor lends the debtor the money. King, 784

F.2d at 913. Any loan of funds that occurred in this case appears to have taken place on or

around the date of the closing, May 10, 2005. Accordingly, barring the application of

equitable tolling, Plaintiff’s claim is prohibited by TILA’s statute of limitations. 

Equitable tolling is only available in cases where the plaintiff alleges the creditor

fraudulently concealed the alleged TILA violation. Hubbard v. Fidelity Fed. Bank, 824 F.

Supp. 909, 920 (C.D. Cal.1993). This doctrine “suspends the limits period until the borrower

discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud that forms the basis of the

TILA action.” Id. at 915. In this case, Plaintiff has made a general accusation that the Deed

of Trust “contained, inter alia, a small and somewhat hidden and/or disguised provision,

knows as a Power of Sale Clause, that plaintiff now finds wanton to, individually and

severally invoke, in order to literally confiscate plaintiff’s property without due process.”

(Dkt. #1,p.11). This accusation, however, falls well short of alleging facts which

demonstrate fraud, asserting only a generalized accusation that the provision in question

(presumably the power-of-sale-clause) was fraudulently concealed or kept from Plaintiff

without detailing or explaining how Defendant’s conduct constituted fraud. Accordingly,

dismissal of Plaintiff’s TILA claim is warranted as the claim is barred by the statute of

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In her response brief, Plaintiff argues that TILA has a three-year statute of

limitations. This is an accurate statement of the law, but only as to rescission. Under 15

U.S.C. § 1640, a creditor may be liable for damages if it fails to respond to the debtor's notice

of rescission as required under 15 U.S.C. § 1635. “While a debtor normally has three days

to rescind the transaction after it has been consummated, the debtor has up to three years to

rescind the transaction if the required notice or material disclosures are not delivered.”

Rowland v. Novus Fin. Corp., 949 F. Supp.1447, 1455 (D. Haw. 1996) (citing 12 C.F.R. §

226.23(a)(3) and 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)). Recision, however, does not appear to be an issue

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limitations.1

 

E. Violation of Fiduciary Relationship

Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated its fiduciary relationship to Plaintiff. The

Court must dismiss with prejudice any claim predicated on this theory, as absent

extraordinary circumstances, there is no fiduciary relationship between a debtor and a

creditor. See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 51, 64 P.2d 101, 108 (1937) (“The

facts alleged do not show any fiduciary relation between plaintiff and defendant bank but a

relation of creditor and debtor.”); see also Valley Nat. Bank of Phoenix v. Electrical Dist. No.

Four, 90 Ariz. 306, 316, 367 P.2d 655, 662 (1961) (“It is the law that the relationship

between a Bank and an ordinary depositor, absent any special agreement, is that of debtor

and creditor.”). Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which this Court might ignore the weight

of Arizona law and allow his case to proceed based on a theory of breach of fiduciary duty.

F. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was enacted “to eliminate abusive

debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain

from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to

promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15

U.S.C. § 1692(e). “To effectuate this purpose, the Act prohibits a “debt collector” from

making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair

practices. Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2008).”To

be held liable for violation of the FDCPA, a defendant must-as a threshold requirement-fall

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within the Act's definition of “debt collector.” Id. (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291,

294 (1995)). The courts of this district have held that a foreclosure trustee is not a debt

collector and a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding is not an attempt to collect a debt.

Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182 (D. Ariz. 2009);

see Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp.2d 1188, 1204 (D. Or. 2002) (“the activity

of foreclosing on the property pursuant to a deed of trust is not the collection of a debt within

the meaning of the FDCPA.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a cause of

action under the FDCPA and must be dismissed with prejudice.

G. Unconscionability

Finally, Plaintiff Complaint alleges generally that the deed-of-trust was an

unconscionable adhesion contract. Unconscionability has two dimensions: procedural and

substantive. “Substantive unconscionability concerns the actual terms of the contract and

examines the relative fairness of the obligations assumed.” Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs.,

Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 89, 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz.,1995). Indicative of substantive

unconscionability are contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an

innocent party, an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain,

and significant cost-price disparity.” Id. Procedural unconscionability, on the other hand,

concerns the process that led to the formation of the contract, or what the Arizona Supreme

Court has referred to as “bargaining naughtiness.” Id.. When examining procedural

unconscionability courts look to “the real and voluntary meeting of the minds of the

contracting party: age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative

bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker

party, whether alterations in the printed terms were possible, whether there were alternative

sources of supply for the goods in question.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,415

F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich.1976)).

Besides the power-of-sale clause, Plaintiff has not alleged facts directed towards a

claim for substantive unconscionability. And with regards to the power-of-sale clause,

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not explain how a provision allowing for a non-judicial

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foreclosure is substantively unfair. Indeed, such provisions are common and clearly

contemplated by Arizona law. See A.R.S. § 33-801 et seq.. As for procedural

unconscionability, Plaintiff alleges or insinuates that she did not knowingly make her home

subject to a power of sale clause, that Defendant somehow hid that clause from her, there was

no meeting of the minds, and that she was forced to sign the deed-of-trust. These allegations,

however, are unsubstantiated by facts and, instead, are mere conclusory statements supported

only by generalized citations to case law. Additionally, Plaintiff suggests that there was

unequal bargaining power amongst the parties, but has not marshaled facts to support this

proposition. The mere fact that Plaintiff entered into a contract with a financially

sophisticated bank is not, in and of itself, enough to find procedural unconscionability. See

Phillips at *2. Plaintiff needs to bring forth specific facts “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level,” identifying specific aspects of the contract negotiation that might render

the contract unconscionable. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1965 (2007). This, she has not done. 

3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

Having determined that dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint is warranted, the Court now

turns to Plaintiff’s request that she be given leave to amend in the event that her Complaint

is deficient. (Dkt. #18). Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party

may amend its pleading once as a matter of course, either twenty-one days after serving it or

within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or a motion under 12(b), (e),

or (f), whichever is earlier. FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, a party may only amend its

complaint with the opposing party’s permission or with leave from the court. FED.R.CIV.P.

15(a)(2). In determining whether amendment is appropriate, the Rules counsel that courts

“should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. And, “[t]his policy in favor of leave

to amend must not only be heeded by the Court, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83

S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), it must also be applied with extreme liberality, see Owens

v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 880 (9th Cir.2001).” Salazar v.

Lehman Brothers Bank, 2010 WL 1996374, *1 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2010).

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The Court, in this Order, has dismissed the following claims with prejudice: due

process violation, cognovit note, show-me-the-note, FDCPA, and fiduciary-duty theory.

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In light of the policy favoring amendment and in the interests of justice, this Court

will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Permission to Amend as to the claims which this Court has

not stated it will dismiss with prejudice. Plaintiff may, therefore, file an amended complaint

as to her allegations of unconscionability and violation of TILA.2

 In so doing, the Court

reminds Plaintiff that Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,

counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds

of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different

types may be demanded.

FED.R.CIV.P. 8. As the Court has already explained, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a

claim for relief. Additionally the complaint is somewhat disjointed and difficult to follow,

relying on conclusory statements and abstract statements of law without reference to facts

applicable to this case. Any amended complaint should focus on facts from which this Court

can determine the harm Defendants caused to Plaintiff and why Plaintiff is entitled to seek

relief for these alleged harms in this Court. The Court will only give Plaintiff this one

opportunity to amend the complaint before it dismisses her lawsuit in its entirety. To avoid

dismissal, Plaintiff must:

make clear h[er] allegations in short, plain statements with each claim for

relief identified in separate sections. In the amended complaint, [Plaintiff]

must write out the rights [s]he believes were violated, the name of the person

who violated the right, exactly what that individual did or failed to do, how

the action or inaction of that person is connected to the violation of

[Plaintiff's] rights, and what specific injury [Plaintiff] suffered because of the

other person's conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377

(1976). Each claim of an alleged violation must be set forth in a separate

count. Any amended complaint filed by [Plaintiff] must conform to the

requirements of Rules 8(a) and (e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, *3 (D. Ariz. 2005).

Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant Trustee Corps (“Trustee Corps”)

Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. (Dkt. #9). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant Wachovia’s Motion to Dismiss

without prejudice. (Dkt. #10).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend.

Plaintiff shall have fifteen (15) days to filer her First Amended Complaint in accordance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1. (Dkt. #18).

DATED this 8th day of June, 2010.

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