Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01380/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01380-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHINEAS C. BOLDEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

 

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Case No. 14-CV-1380-BEN (JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

[ECF No. 11]

On June 5, 2014, Plaintiff Phineas C. Bolden (“Plaintiff”) filed a

Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking

judicial review of the denial of disability and supplemental security income

(“SSI”) benefits under the Social Security Act. (Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1.) 

On August 25, 2014, Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of

Social Security,1

 filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as untimely. (Mot.

Dismiss, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion. 

The motion was referred to the undersigned on a report and

recommendation basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local

1

Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this suit.

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Rule 72.1 c. The Court finds Defendant’s Motion suitable for decision

without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1 d.1. For the reasons

set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint be GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND2

In applications for SSI and disability insurance benefits filed on March

29, 2011, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of May 1, 2008, due to

degenerative disc disease, a meniscal tear, hypertension, fibroid tumors,

depression, and anxiety. (Weigel Decl. in Supp. of Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1 at 4,

7.) Plaintiff’s applications for benefits were denied initially on July 19, 2011. 

(Id. at 4.) 

On July 26, 2011, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (Id.) 

A hearing was conducted in Moreno Valley, California on May 13, 2013 by

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mark B. Greenberg, who determined on

May 16, 2013 that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id., Ex. 1.) Plaintiff requested

a review of the ALJ’s decision; the Appeals Council for the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 27,

2014. (Weigel Decl., Ex. 2.) The Appeals Council notice informed Plaintiff

that she had 60 days to file a civil action and that this time period would

commence 5 days after the date of its letter. (Id. at 3.) The notice also

informed Plaintiff that if she required additional time to file a civil action, she

could send the Appeals Council a written request for an extension of the 60-

day deadline. (Id.) There is no evidence that Plaintiff requested additional

time. Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on

2

The following facts are taken from exhibits attached to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. As the Defendant has not yet submitted an answer to Plaintiff’s

Complaint, a certified copy of the administrative record has not been filed in this

case. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring Commissioner to file certified copy of administrative record as part of its answer to complaint). Plaintiff has not

disputed the accuracy of any of these facts. Accordingly, the Court assumes

these facts as true for purposes of resolving the instant motion.

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June 5, 2014. (Compl. at 1.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may

move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it fails “to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” To state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts

may consider not only the allegations of a complaint, but also the exhibits

attached thereto and any concessions made by the plaintiff. Vasquez v.

Colvin, 2014 WL 5761133 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) (citing Parks Sch. of

Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Generally, the affirmative defense of statute of limitations is properly

raised in a responsive pleading. Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278

(9th Cir. 1987). However, a statute of limitations defense may be raised in a

motion to dismiss and a claim may be dismissed as untimely “when the

running of the statute is apparent from the face of the complaint.” Id. (citing

Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1980));

U.S. ex rel. Air Control Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174,

1178 (9th Cir. 2013). “[S]uch a motion to dismiss should be granted only if

the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Vernon, 811 F.2d at

1278 (quoting Conerly, 623 F.2d at 119) (internal quotations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because it

was untimely filed. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Dismiss at 2-6.) Defendant

further contends there are no extraordinary circumstances in this case that

would justify equitable tolling of the sixty-day statute of limitations period. 

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(Id. at 6-7.) 

A. The Sixty-Day Statute of Limitations 

“[T]he United States, as sovereign, ‘is immune from suit save as it

consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court

define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” Hercules Inc. v. United

States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.

392, 399 (1976)). Plaintiff’s complaint seeks review of a decision by the

Commissioner of Social Security denying disability benefits. This Court’s

jurisdiction for judicial review of claims arising under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act, is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h), which

provide in relevant part:

(g) Any individual, after any final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to

which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in

controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil

action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him

of such decision or within such further time as the

Commissioner of Social Security may allow. Such action

shall be brought in the district court of the United States for

the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his

principal place of business . . . . The court shall have power

to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without

remanding the cause for a rehearing.

(h) The findings and decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals

who were parties to such a hearing. No findings of facts or

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be

reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency

except as herein provided.

 Id. Together, sections 405(g) and (h) operate to constitute a 60-day statute

of limitations in which the claimant may appeal a final decision from the

Commissioner. Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1277. Because the 60-day statute of

limitations set forth in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) is a condition of the waiver of

sovereign immunity, it must be strictly construed. Bowen v. City of New

York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986). “Accordingly, courts have dismissed

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actions filed only days after the expiration of this statute of limitations.” 

Edmond v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4964309, at *3 (C.D. Cal Aug. 29, 2014) (citing

Tate v. United States, 437 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1971) (filed two days after

expiration of statute of limitations); Atherton v. Colvin, 2014 WL 580167

(C.D.Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (four days after); Davila v. Barnhart, 225

F.Supp.2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (one day after); O’Neill v. Heckler, 579

F.Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (one day after); see also Oliver v. Astrue, 2011

WL 2669275 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 28, 2011) (one day after). 

Mailing is complete and a claimant is presumed to have received

notice of the final administrative decision five days after the date on the

notice, unless he can make a reasonable showing to the contrary. 20

C.F.R. § 422.210(c). Therefore, a claimant has 65 days following the date

of the Appeals Council’s notice of denial to institute a civil action. “A civil

action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3;

see also Rodgers v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 1550, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986) (“an

action is commenced within the meaning of § 405(g) when a complaint is

filed with the court”).

Here, it is uncontested that the Appeals Council’s determination,

which represented the final decision of the Commissioner, was dated March

27, 2014. The deadline for Plaintiff to seek review of the Commissioner’s

decision by filing a civil action was 65 days later, or June 2, 2014.3

 Plaintiff

filed her Complaint on June 5, 2014, three days after the statute of

limitations had expired. (Compl. at 1.) A complaint brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) may be dismissed on a 12(b)(6) motion if it appears beyond

doubt from the face of the complaint “that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Lazerson v. Colvin,

3

Because the 65th day, May 31, 2014, was a Saturday, Plaintiff’s complaint was not due until Monday, June 2, 2014. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). 

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2014 WL 967048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014) (citing Supermail Cargo,

Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995)). As it is apparent

from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint that she did not properly file within the

prescribed statutory period, the Court RECOMMENDS the motion to

dismiss be GRANTED.

Moreover, a district court may properly grant an unopposed motion to

dismiss pursuant to a local rule where the local rule permits, but does not

require, the granting of a motion for failure to respond. See Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Civil Local Rule 7.1 provides, “If an

opposing party fails to file the papers in the manner required by Civil Local

Rule 7.1 e.2, that failure may constitute a consent to the granting of a

motion or other request for ruling by the court.” Civ. L.R. 7.1 f.3.c. The

Court thus RECOMMENDS the motion to dismiss be GRANTED on this

alternative basis. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bank of America, N.A., 2012 WL

4953104 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing action pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1

for plaintiff’s failure to respond to motion to dismiss). 

B. Equitable Tolling

Defendant argues that there are no circumstances in this case that

justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. (Mem. in Supp. of

Mot. Dismiss at 6-7.) Only in rare cases will the doctrine of equitable tolling

allow a plaintiff to avoid the statute of limitations. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at

480-81. Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. 

Lazerson, 2014 WL 967048, at *4 (citing Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v.

Simmonds, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1414, 1419 (2012)). Given that the

imitations period must be strictly construed, “[t]he task of showing a basis

for equitably tolling the statute of limitations may . . . prove to be daunting.” 

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Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1278. 

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and thus

has provided no argument or authority that the statute of limitations should

be equitably tolled, and there is no support for equitable tolling on the face

of the Complaint itself. Thus, dismissal is proper as there is no showing that

Plaintiff could prevail on the equitable tolling issue. See, e.g., Lazerson,

2014 WL 967048, at *4 (granting motion to dismiss where allegations in

complaint failed to establish potential applicability of equitable tolling

doctrine); Middleton v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2219662, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

(same).

In sum, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is time barred by

section 405(g) and RECOMMENDS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint should be GRANTED.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the Honorable

Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before

December 30, 2014. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be served

and filed on or before January 12, 2015. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

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right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 11, 2014

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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