Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05671/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05671-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAOUL FLAVIANO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

STATE HOSPITALS, NAPA, DENISE

DALY, JASON GOODING, and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 14-05671 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the terms of a settlement agreement and move for summary judgment on that basis. 

For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Raoul Flaviano was a hospital police sergeant employed by defendant, the

California Department of State Hospitals, at Napa State Hospital. Throughout 2011 and 2012,

Flaviano’s wife was also employed as a hospital police officer. 

In July 2012, Flaviano requested accommodations to take care of certain childcare

needs, specifically for a work schedule that included a break of a few minutes in each shift so

that he and his wife could transfer care of their child between shifts. Flaviano alleges that his

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supervisors, defendants Chief Denise Daly and Lieutenant Jason Gooding, made several

inappropriate comments about Flaviano, his wife, and their need for childcare accommodations,

which led to a “campaign of harassment and unequal treatment.” Flaviano claims his request

for accommodations was denied “under the guise of ‘nepotism.’” Flaviano submitted a formal

complaint of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of DSH. That

complaint alleged that Chief Daly and Lieutenant Gooding had discriminated against Flaviano

and harassed him by making inappropriate comments and denying his request for

accommodations (Flaviano Decl. 5–7; Rashkis Decl., Exh. 6). 

Flaviano claims that Chief Daly and Lieutenant Gooding took adverse employment

actions against him in the work place in retaliation for filing that complaint, for example by

moving him to a less-desirable shift. In September 2012, Flaviano filed a new internal EEO

complaint alleging retaliation (Flaviano Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Rashkis Decl., Exh. C). 

In October 2012, Flaviano requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act in order

to assist with a family emergency, and elected to use his available vacation pay concurrently

with that leave. Flaviano claims that Chief Daly and Lieutenant Gooding interfered with his

leave request and made inappropriate comments about his request for leave. Flaviano later

informed Lieutenant Gooding that he would need to extend his leave by three days, but got no

response. He received a formal disciplinary notice from Chief Daly and Lieutenant Gooding for

being “AWOL” for those three days, resulting in docked pay (Flaviano Decl. 10–13; Rashkis

Decl., Exh. D).

On October 30, 2012, Flaviano brought his daughter to work while he was on duty in

violation of DSH policy. He explained to his supervisor that he did this because his wife could

not supervise her that day and he allegedly could not afford childcare. Flaviano received a

disciplinary action in the form of a “Counseling Record” due to that conduct, at which he was

advised that his “unwillingness or inability to resolve [his] childcare issues [were] detrimental to

the department and severely impaire[d] [his] effectiveness as a supervisor” (Rashkis Decl.,

Exh. B). 

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On November 8, 2012, Flaviano filed a formal complaint for retaliation with the state

EEO office, claiming that Chief Daly and Lieutenant Gooding were retaliating against him for

filing his prior complaints. He also made a wage claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act and

the California Labor Code for the docked pay. The state EEO office conducted an investigation

and in November 2013 concluded that there was insufficient evidence of a violation of EEO

policies, though Flaviano retained the right to file a complaint with the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Flaviano Decl.

¶¶ 14–15, Exh. A; Rashkis Decl., Exh. D).

On November 21, 2012, Officer James Nohel observed Flaviano conducting what

appeared to be a traffic stop. Flaviano’s personal vehicle was parked on the side of the road

behind another person’s vehicle. He had activated a system of flashing red and blue lights on the

front grill of his vehicle, in violation of California law. Officer Nohel observed Flaviano

speaking to the driver of the other vehicle and saw he had exposed his off-duty firearm in

violation of DSH policy. Officer Nohel informed defendant Lieutenant Jason Gooding of what

he observed (SPB Record at 8).

On December 5, 2012, Chief Daly reviewed her file on Flaviano because of the concerns

raised by Officer Nohel and discovered Flaviano had failed to submit his quarterly firearms

documentation and failed to identify, in writing, the off-duty firearm he intended to carry

(id. at 9).

DSH decided to investigate Flaviano’s conduct regarding the traffic stop Nohel had

observed. The investigators interviewed Flaviano and concluded that he had deliberately

attempted to mislead them throughout the process (id. at 10). 

In May 2013, Flaviano was served with a “Notice of Adverse Action” terminating his

employment (id. at 6–12). The NOAA specifically identified the following conduct as the basis

for Flaviano’s termination and provided detailed descriptions of the events discussed above

(id. at 10):

You illegally installed emergency lights on your personal vehicle

and used them to make a traffic stop. You neglected to qualify

your off-duty firearm and submit documentation to your Chief. 

You failed to appropriately stow your off-duty weapon during duty

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hours, and you failed to keep your off-duty firearm concealed to

the casual observer. You knowingly violated California Vehicle

Code and Department of State Hospital Policy and gave false

information in attempt to mislead investigators. Your dishonesty

makes you unreliable as a potential witness. Your actions as

described above are unbecoming of a Hospital Police Officer and

bring discredit to you and to the Napa State Hospital Police

Department. Your conduct was unacceptable and will not be

tolerated.

A section entitled “Notice of Progressive Discipline” in the NOAA also referred to the prior

disciplinary action taken against Flaviano because he brought his daughter to work.

***

Flaviano appealed his dismissal to the California State Personnel Board. Flaviano’s

complaint in the appeal stated the reason for his appeal (id. at 14):

I deny these allegations, and I have witnesses, documents, and

evidence which can confirm that (1) I did turn in the weapons’

qualification form, (2) I did not lie about anything during my

investigation interview, and (3) there was nothing improper about

me using “red and blue” lights. I believe that I did my job [by

conducting the traffic stop] by helping an elderly member of the

public, who was obviously lost, and there was [sic] never any

problems with my ‘red and blue’ lights until after I filed an EEO

charge against Chief Daly and her leadership staff. I was never

given a Skelly hearing, and my rights under the Public Safety

Procedural Bill of Rights were violated. I am asking that I be

reinstated, with full backpay and any other relief that can be

provided.

Flaviano did not pursue any claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, denial of

reasonable accommodations, or wage claims in his SPB appeal (id. at 13; Poore Decl. ¶ 6,

Exh. D). 

Flaviano, who was represented by counsel, negotiated and signed a settlement agreement

with DSH resolving his SPB appeal in February 2014. Counsel for both Flaviano and DSH

approved the agreement as to form, and the agreement was approved and adopted by SPB as its

decision in March 2014. 

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Flaviano agreed to withdraw his appeal and

to resign from employment with DSH “for retirement purposes.” DSH agreed to accept that

resignation and to remove the NOAA and all supporting documents, the settlement agreement,

and the SPB decision from Flaviano’s official personnel file (SPB Record at 102).

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Flaviano additionally agreed to release all claims against DSH and its employees

according to the following terms (id. at 102–03):

[T]his Stipulation, releases, acquits, and forever discharges [DSH]

and it agents, representatives, and employees, successors and

assigns, from any actions, or claims, known or unknown, or any

claim under federal or state law including, but not limited to,

claims under the [FEHA] and [Title VII], which may exist relating

to the events giving rise to this Notice of Adverse Action and

subsequent appeal by [Flaviano].

Flaviano also expressly waived the application of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code,

which, absent such waiver, would have preserved claims he may not have known about or

suspected to exist at the time of the release. 

The agreement contained a merger clause which read (id. at 103):

This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the

parties on the matters settled herein. Moreover, the terms of this

Agreement cannot be amended except in writing, signed by all the

parties thereto. [Flaviano] acknowledges that no promises or

representations other than those set forth in this Agreement were

made to him by or on behalf of [DSH] for purposes of inducing

him to enter into this Agreement.

***

Flaviano commenced this action in December 2014. His complaint alleges seven claims

for relief, including violations of Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, the Fair

Employment and Housing Act, the California Family Rights Act, the Family Medical Leave Act,

and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the basis

that all of plaintiff’s claims are barred by the terms of the settlement agreement. This order

follows full briefing and oral argument.

ANALYSIS

The immediate dispute pertains to the scope of the release of claims in the settlement

agreement. In particular, by the terms of the settlement agreement, Flaviano released all claims

“which may exist arising out of the facts giving rise to [the] Notice of Adverse Action and

subsequent appeal by [Flaviano],” including claims that Flaviano may not have known about at

the time. Defendants argue that the release bars all of Flaviano’s claims herein. Flaviano argues

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that defendants misconstrue the terms of the release and that his claims herein were not within

the scope of that release. 

1. CLAIMS BASED ON TERMINATION.

Flaviano’s SPB appeal was limited to alleged procedural defects surrounding his

termination. He did not pursue, on that appeal, discrimination or retaliation claims, even those

relating to his termination. Flaviano argues that the release in the settlement of his SPB appeal

pertained only to those due process claims, and that he retained all other claims against DSH and

its employees. This argument ignores that the fact of his termination was the central fact giving

rise to Flaviano’s SPB appeal, even if his challenges focused on due process issues surrounding

that termination. Moreover, in Flaviano’s own description of his reason for the appeal, he denied

allegations surrounding his weapons qualification form, the traffic stop, and the subsequent

internal investigation. Accordingly, claims arising out of his termination and any claims

pertaining to the allegations he denied in that appeal, including claims that Flaviano did not

know about at the time, were released.

Flaviano avers that he interpreted the release to be limited only to those procedural

challenges at the time he signed it (Flaviano Decl. ¶¶ 25, 27). That would, however, be extrinsic

evidence submitted to contradict the terms of the settlement agreement, which was completely

integrated. Accordingly, that portion of Flaviano’s declaration is barred by the parol evidence

rule. Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal. 4th 336, 343 (2004).

At oral argument, Flaviano argued that the settlement agreement was not completely

integrated because it referred to the NOAA and the SPB appeal, but did not attach documents

pertaining to those events, however, the parol evidence rule does not bar the introduction of

extrinsic evidence “to explain the meaning of a written contract . . . [if] the meaning urged is one

to which the written contract terms are reasonably susceptible.” Ibid. Neither party disputes that

the references to the NOAA or SPB appeal in the settlement agreement refer to the documents

submitted in the instant motion. Accordingly, that extrinsic evidence can be considered without

opening the door to extrinsic evidence that contradicts the plain language of the settlement

agreement.

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Accordingly, the plain language of the settlement agreement bars Flaviano’s claims based

on his termination and defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on those

claims, namely, Flaviano’s Section 1983 claim and claims for retaliation and discrimination for

which the requisite adverse employment action is his termination. Flaviano’s complaint also

alleges violations based on discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and adverse employment

actions other than his termination and the events that led to it. Those claims must be considered

separately.

2. CLAIMS BASED ON OTHER CONDUCT.

Flaviano argues that the claims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation detailed in

his EEO complaints, all of which were filed before his termination, arose out of a different

corpus of facts and thus were not “relat[ed] to the events giving rise to” his termination. 

The only events cited in the NOAA were (I) Flaviano’s failure to qualify his off-duty

weapon, (ii) Flaviano’s decision to bring his daughter to work in October 2012, (iii) the traffic

stop, and (iv) Flaviano’s conduct during the internal investigation of the traffic stop. Those are

the events that gave rise to the NOAA. The events which Flaviano denied in his appeal, the

NOAA itself, and the procedure surrounding the NOAA, are the only events that gave rise to

Flaviano’s SPB appeal. The fact that Flaviano referred to his EEO complaints in the text of his

SPB appeal (specifically by noting “there was never any problem with [his] ‘red and blue’ lights

until after [he] filed an EEO charge against Chief Daly and her leadership staff”) did not

automatically bring the substance of those complaints within the scope of the appeal or the terms

of the release.

Flaviano’s claims under FEHA pertain to allegedly inappropriate comments made by

Chief Daly and Lieutenant Gooding relating to his childcare needs, as well as the denial of

accommodations for those needs. Flaviano’s FMLA and CFRA claims are based on the denial

of his request for medical leave and the subsequent docking of his pay. His FLSA claim also

refers to “other adverse actions.” None of those events gave rise to Flaviano’s NOAA nor his

appeal. Accordingly, claims arising out of those events are not subject to the terms of the

release or at least would not be read into the release on summary judgment.

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Defendants argue that because Flaviano knew about his claims in his EEO complaints at

the time he entered the agreement, such complaints are barred. They refer to Wright v.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 1991), as support, but that

decision involved a release waiving “any and all claims [the plaintiff had] or might have [had].” 

Although the language there was held to bar claims based on the plaintiff’s previously-filed EEO

complaints, that decision does not apply here, as the language of the release includes the

limitation that the released claims were only those that “relate[d] to the events giving rise to”

Flaviano’s termination and SPB appeal. 

Finally, defendants argue that because one of the events referenced in the NOAA,

namely, Flaviano’s decision to bring his daughter to work and the subsequent counseling record,

relate to his childcare needs, any claim based on his childcare needs must be barred. Not so. 

Flaviano’s FEHA claims pertain to remarks about his childcare needs and the denial of

accommodations in his work schedule. Neither of those issues was mentioned in the NOAA or

the SPB appeal. To bring those claims under the terms of the release simply because they

involve the subject matter of “childcare” would be to ignore the plain language of the release,

which is not a general “any and all claims” release, but rather, a release expressly limited to the

events that gave rise to Flaviano’s NOAA and subsequent SPB appeal. Moreover, the

allegations in the counseling record were not among those that Flaviano denied in his appeal, nor

did Flaviano make any allegations of discrimination or retaliation on that basis. It is also unclear

whether the counseling record actually gave rise to the NOAA in the first place, as it was

mentioned only in the separate “Notice of Progressive Discipline” section, and not in the

“Statement of Acts or Omissions” in the NOAA. Accordingly, on summary judgment, it cannot

be held that Flaviano released any claims for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation based on

comments or adverse actions relating to his childcare needs, apart from any claims based on his

termination itself.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and to the extent stated above, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED as to Flaviano’s Section 1983 claims and his claims of

discrimination and retaliation based on his termination. Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to

Flaviano’s FEHA, CFRA, FMLA, and FLSA claims based on other allegations of

discrimination, harassment, retaliation, wage claims, and adverse employment actions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2015. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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