Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08189/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08189-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Charles Henry Todd, who is no longer confined in an Arizona State 

Prison, has filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 5.)1

 

1

 Petitioner filed this Petition while he was confined in an Arizona State Prison. 

Petitioner’s subsequent release from custody after filing the Petition does not deprive the District Court of habeas jurisdiction. See Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (holding that “if a petitioner is in custody at the time he files his federal habeas petition, his subsequent release from custody does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction”). In addition, Petitioner’s release does not render his Petition moot because 

“‘the adverse consequences of [his] criminal conviction remain.’” Goldyn v. Hayes, 444 

F.3d 1062, 1063 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Spawr Optical Research, 

Inc., 864 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Charles Henry Todd, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-8189-PCT -PGR (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 

 In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the facts and procedural history in the first ten pages of a 21-page 

memorandum decision. The court included the following facts in its opinion: 

 In March 2011, an undercover Yavapai County deputy sheriff investigating the online solicitation of minors for sex 

created a fictitious profile on a social networking website. She listed her age as “19,” but named the profile “Allyee13” 

and described herself as a thirteen-year old girl looking for an older boyfriend . . . . 

 Todd sent Allyee13 a friend request through the 

website . . . . 

 Between May 1 and May 15, 2009, Todd chatted 

online with Allyee13, believing that she was the thirteenyear-old girl described in her profile . . . . 

 On May 2, Todd began chatting overtly about sex . . . . 

 On May 12, Todd told Allyee13 that he read an internet story “about a guy having an affair with a 13 yr old girl and he was in his 50’s.” Todd said that the story made him think of Allyee13 and made him “really hard.” Todd told 

Allyee that he liked her “a lot” and hoped to “hook up some day.” He also said that Allyee13 “d[id] strange things to [his] body” because she was good looking, sexy [and] smart.” When she asked what he wanted her “to do about it,” Todd 

responded that they “should find some time together and 

figure it out together . . . .” 

 On May 13, Todd again chatted with Allyee13 about his sexual history . . . . After Allyee13 answered his questions about what sexual acts she enjoyed, Todd responded, “You will learn and love to do more because u r a sensual person.” Todd described in detail sexual acts that she could perform to arouse a man . . . . He said, “I get hard just thinking about it.” 

Todd told Allyee13, “[F]or a guy that likes younger women you are like a gift from Santa early.” 

 Todd suggested that they go some place where they could be together. Allyee13 asked if Todd meant that they 

should go somewhere “to do stuff.” When he replied yes, she 

suggested that they bring blankets to the forest or that they go to a hotel, his house, or even his car if it was big enough to lie down in. Todd replied that his “car is big enough.” After 

further discussion, Allyee13 arranged to meet Todd at a park around noon the next day. 

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 Todd was arrested the next day when he drove to the park for their rendezvous. Todd denied that he went there to 

have sex. The State charged Todd with two counts of luring a 

minor for sexual exploitation based on his online solicitations 

of Allyee13 for digital penetration (count 1) and oral sex 

(count 2). 

(Doc. 10, Exh. EE.)2

 A jury convicted Petitioner on both counts. (Id.) Petitioner appealed. (Id.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL 

 In a timely, direct appeal, Petitioner raised four issues: (1) the trial court 

improperly permitted introduction of Defendant’s statements that referred to a 

relationship with a different 12-year-old girl; (2) the trial court improperly precluded 

Defendant’s hearsay statements; (3) insufficiency of the evidence; and, (4) indictment 

duplicity. (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences on November 6, 2012. (Id.) On February 12, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review. (Id.) 

C. PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 On March 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Doc. 10, Exh. GG.) On May 16, 2013, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a notice with 

the trial court stating that counsel could not find a colorable claim for review. (Doc. 10, 

Exh. KK.) The trial court then gave Petitioner an additional 45 days to file a pro se PCR 

petition. (Doc. 10, Exh. LL.) Petitioner did not file a pro se PCR petition and the trial 

court dismissed the PCR proceeding on September 4, 2013. (Doc. 10, Exh. MM.) 

D. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 On December 3, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus. Petitioner asserts nine grounds for relief, which allege the following: 

(1) entrapment and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to attack the case detective’s credibility in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights; 

(2) counsel rendered ineffective assistance by portraying Petitioner as 

 

2

 Ten pages of detailed facts that are contained in the appellate decision are not recounted here. 

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having a life-long interest in children; 

(3) indictment duplicity and non-unanimous verdict; 

(4) defense counsel filed to request a synopsis of the scope of Detective Edgerton’s investigation or operation and rendered ineffective assistance in 

violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; 

(5) Petitioner’s exposure in jail to something that was contagious and caused and caused him to itch and squirm in court caused him to appear to be evading issues at trial and violated his Eighth Amendment rights; 

(6) counsel rendered ineffective assistance by introducing a “fairy tale” and damaging information about Petitioner’s involvement in a high school “coming out” party and a meeting with a teacher, in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment rights; 

(7) (a) the trial court improperly admitted bad act evidence, and (b) did not 

allow non-hearsay testimony, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights; 

(8) counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by suggesting that Petitioner accept a proffered plea bargain; and, 

(9) counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment rights by failing to follow-through on a co-operation agreement with the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Department. 

(Doc. 5.) 

 Respondent filed an Answer on March 21, 2014. (Doc. 8.) Respondent asserted 

that all but one of the allegations in the timely petition were procedurally barred. (Id.) 

Respondent further asserted that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective, and that 

Petitioner’s claims nonetheless fail on their merits. Respondent asserted that the 

remaining claim was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. (Id.) 

 Petitioner did not file a reply. 

II. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 A. THE PETITION IS TIMELY. 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

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latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner’s PCR proceedings were dismissed on September 4, 2013, and 

Petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition on December 3, 2013. The Petition is 

timely. 

B. THE PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED. 

 1. Law 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court... thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 31–

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum ... 

(2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis 

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

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(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet 

the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to those 

represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

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procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-

89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need 

not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2008). Lastly, “[t]o qualify 

for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the procedural default rule” a 

petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the 

conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 

(quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) 

(petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the 

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have 

voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be credible, such a claim 

requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, 

or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

 2. Application 

 Grounds One (entrapment, ineffective assistance for failing to attack detective’s 

credibility), Two (ineffective assistance for discussing Petitioner’s history with children), 

Four (ineffective assistance for failing to attack scope of investigation), Five (exposure to 

jail contagion), Six (ineffective assistance for discussing Petitioner’s childhood), Eight 

(ineffective assistance related to plea bargain), and Nine (ineffective assistance for failing 

to complete cooperation agreement) are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because 

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Petitioner raises them for the first time.3 Claims raised for the first time on habeas review 

are not exhausted because they were not fully and fairly presented to state courts. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts when a petitioner 

has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact [he] was asserting a claim under the United 

States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations 

omitted). Here, these claims were never presented. The failure to fairly present these 

grounds has resulted in procedural default because Petitioner is now barred from 

returning to state courts. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a). See also Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 735 n. 1 (1991) (“[I]f the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court 

to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred . . . there is a 

procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.”). 

 Ground Three (duplicity) was not raised as a federal claim in state court. In his 

appeal, Petitioner argued that “Article 2, Section 23 of the Arizona Constitution 

guarantees a defendant the right to a unanimous jury verdict in a criminal case.” (Doc. 10, 

Exh. BB at 28.) Petitioner’s argument in his state appeal rested exclusively on state law 

grounds and is unexhausted. See Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If 

a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional 

claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in 

state court.”). 

 Ground Seven contains two arguments. Ground Seven (a)—other act evidence was 

improperly admitted—was not raised as a federal claim in state court. Petitioner’s 

appellate argument focused solely on violations of Rules 404 and 403 of the Arizona 

Rules of Evidence. (Doc. 10, Exh. BB at 7-17.) Petitioner did cite two federal, appellate 

 

3

 Grounds Two and Six assert similar claims (ineffective assistance of counsel for 

portraying defendant as someone interested in children). Ineffective of assistance was not 

raised on appeal, and no PCR was filed. The substantive claim regarding the introduction of this same evidence as impermissible “other act” evidence is raised by Petitioner in Ground Seven (a). 

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cases in his Reply brief (United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233 (3rd Cir. 2010) and United 

States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1989)), but he did not raise a federal claim in his 

argument. (Doc. 5-1 at 6.) These citations were unalloyed with argument that presented a 

federal constitutional claim, and are insufficient exhaustion. See Castillo v. McFadden, 

399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2005) (“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, 

detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory.”).4

 

 Ground Seven (b)—the trial court improperly precluded the introduction of his 

prior, exculpatory statements—is reviewed below. 

 Petitioner has not established grounds to excuse the procedural default by a 

showing of cause and prejudice, and he has not argued a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some 

external cause that prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state court 

and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the 

prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [the 

prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external 

impediment such as government interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim’s 

factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). 

 Petitioner offers conclusory assertions regarding the cause for the failure to 

present these arguments previously. Petitioner alleges that PCR counsel would not 

“pursue,” “address,” “discuss,” or “consider” several of the arguments he now presents. 

 

4

 Petitioner also notes, for the first time, that he was sentenced under another 

name. If this is an argument, it is also unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Moreover, 

the trial court consistently referred to Petitioner by his name. This Court assumes Petitioner references a clerical error on the second and third pages of the sentencing minute entry. (Doc. 10, Exh. Z.) The court corrected the clerical error with a subsequent minute entry. (Doc. 10, Exh. AA.). 

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(Doc. 5 at 9-17.)5 These brief statements are insufficient to establish cause to cure 

Petitioner’s procedural default. See United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 

1993) (stating that a mere “conclusory statement” demonstrates neither cause nor 

prejudice). 

 Petitioner, however, also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel throughout his 

Petition.6

 Although cursory, Petitioner’s claims are liberally construed. “Prisoner pro se 

pleadings are given the benefit of liberal construction.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 

958 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Ineffective 

assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly exhaust claims in state 

courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). 

 Ordinarily, to satisfy the “cause” requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel 

must amount to an independent constitutional violation. Ortiz, at 932. Thus, where no 

constitutional right to an attorney exists (e.g. in a PCR proceeding), ineffective assistance 

will not amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. “There is no 

constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a 

petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such 

proceedings.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (citations omitted). In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 

S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), however, the Court recognized a narrow exception to the 

Coleman rule. Under Martinez a petitioner may establish cause for the procedural default 

of an ineffective assistance claim by demonstrating two things: (1) ‘counsel in the initial 

review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective 

 

5

 Petitioner’s only other cited cause (Ground Nine) was that he “didn’t realize the 

problem until recently.” (Doc. 5 at 15.) Petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the law do not satisfy the cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 

905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

6

 Petitioner does not assert ineffective assistance of counsel in Ground Three 

(duplicity and non-unanimous verdict) and Ground Five (exposure to jail contagion) and there is no cause or prejudice argued by Petitioner. These claims remain unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. 

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under the standards of Strickland7 . . . ’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate 

that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318). 

 3. Martinez

 The Court finds that even if Martinez did apply to Petitioner's case, it does not 

provide cause to excuse the procedural default of these claims. Petitioner’s trial counsel 

was not deficient and Petitioner suffered no prejudice.8

 In Ground One, Petitioner claims trial counsel should have argued entrapment 

because the police officer “initiated an on-line discussion relating to various sexual acts 

and behavior.” (Doc. 5 at 9.) Entrapment was not Petitioner’s defense. “In his opening 

statement, Todd’s counsel informed the jury that Todd believed he was chatting with a 

law enforcement officer.” (Doc. 10, Exh. EE at 14.). In Ground One, Petitioner confirms 

this defense by stating that “any savvy teen would see the website as a phony.” (Doc. 5 at 

9.) Petitioner testified at trial that “I didn’t believe was talking to a minor.” (Doc. 10, 

Exh. K at 112.) Counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue an inconsistent defense 

that was contrary to Petitioner’s testimony. See Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1266–67 

(9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that once counsel reasonably selects a defense, failing to 

present an alternative and inconsistent defense is not ineffective assistance of counsel); 

Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that “[m]ere criticism 

of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate 

representation.”) (internal citation omitted). This claim also has little merit in light of the 

 

7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

8

 Petitioner does not allege ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. Petitioner’s 

claims, if any, regarding PCR counsel are so vague that they would not qualify as having “some merit.” “A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must 

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Without identifying the specific claims that Petitioner contends should have been raised after appeal, Petitioner cannot prevail. 

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overwhelming evidence presented to the jury. (Doc. 10, Exh. EE at 1-10.) 

 In Grounds Two, Six, and Seven9

, Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective 

for introducing inaccurate and prejudicial other-act evidence. All three of these claims 

derive from the introduction of a trial transcript (Doc. 10, Exh. P.; Trial Exhibit 21) that 

documents the online conversations between Petitioner and the detective. This exhibit 

was introduced by the State over defense counsel’s objection. (Doc. 10, Exh. J at 5-61.) 

In a conference with the trial attorneys, the court stated that “. . . I spoke with counsel, at 

the bench, concerning the admission of Exhibit Number 21, which has already been 

admitted over the defense’s objection.” (Doc. 10, Exh. J at 87.) Petitioner’s counsel 

objected to the introduction of the “coming out” party and the “liaison” evidence. 

Petitioner’s claim is unfounded. 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges trial counsel filed to request discovery 

regarding of the scope of Detective Edgerton’s investigation to consider impeachment 

and determine how subjects were selected for investigation. Defense counsel has a “duty 

to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. This includes a duty to 

investigate a defendant’s “most important defense” and to “investigate and introduce into 

evidence records that demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that 

question to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 

(9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh’g 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations 

omitted). 

 Petitioner’s claim that “a synopsis of the scope and restrictions placed” on the 

detective would have allowed for proper impeachment is conclusory and speculative. 

 

9

 In Ground Two, Petitioner claims counsel rendered ineffective assistance by portraying Petitioner as having a life-long interest in children. In Ground Six, Petitioner 

asserts counsel was ineffective by introducing evidence of a high school “coming out” party and “liaison” with high school teacher. In Ground Seven, Petitioner claims (a) the 

court improperly admitted “bad act” evidence and (b) the preclusion of non-hearsay exculpatory evidence denied him of a fair trial. The court reviews argument of Ground Seven (b) below. 

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(Doc. 5 at 16.) “[I]neffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate must be 

considered in light of the strength of the government’s case.” Eggleston v. United States, 

798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986). First, the primary evidence in the case consisted of 

the conversations between Petitioner and the detective. In light of Petitioner’s trial claim 

that he knew he was conversing with a police officer, the question before the jury was 

whether Petitioner “offer[ed] or solicit[ed] sexual contact” with a minor, and not whether 

the detective acted improperly. Thus, the impeachment of the detective would not have 

changed the question before the jury. Second, Petitioner fails to explain how a synopsis 

of the investigation would have assisted him. See Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 

632 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting petitioner's ineffective assistance claim where he presented 

no evidence concerning what counsel would have found had he investigated further, or 

what lengthier preparation would have accomplished). Third, as documented by the court 

of appeals, the evidence implicating Petitioner was also substantial. (Doc. 10 at EE.) 

Even if the failure to impeach the detective was unreasonable, Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate prejudice. The test for prejudice with respect to defective investigations is 

“whether the noninvestigated evidence was powerful enough to establish a probability 

that a reasonable attorney would decide to present it and a probability that such 

presentation might undermine the jury verdict.” Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236–37 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003)). Even if there was 

potential impeachment, such information was of minor value in a case where the actions 

of the Petitioner were recorded and presented to the jury. Any potential impeachment 

does not establish a probability sufficient to undermine the jury verdict. 

 In Ground Eight, Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective by recommending 

Petitioner accept a plea offer, which Petitioner ultimately refused. Petitioner alleges that 

the plea offer he refused required a ten-year sentence and subsequent lifetime probation. 

(Doc. 5 at 14.) Petitioner received a sentence after trial of 42 months imprisonment 

without probation. (Doc. 10, Exh. Z.) A two-step analysis governs Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim for relief. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, Petitioner must 

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prove that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 690. To establish deficient performance, 

Petitioner must show his counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 

687. Second, Petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by demonstrating a reasonable 

probability that, but for his counsel's errors, the result would have been different. Id. at 

694. 

 Petitioner cannot satisfy he was prejudiced. Assuming arguendo that counsel 

deficiently advised Petitioner to accept a ten-year imprisonment plea, Petitioner is 

required to prove the plea result would have been more favorable. See Lafler v. Cooper, 

132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) (stating that “. . . a defendant must show . . . the conviction 

or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the 

judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.”). Petitioner’s trial sentence was 

significantly lower than the plea offer he rejected. Petitioner cannot establish that but for 

counsel’s advice, his result would have been different (in his favor). Petitioner’s claim is 

meritless. 

 In Ground Nine, Petitioner alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow 

through on agreement made with Yavapai [County] Sheriff’s Deputies.” (Doc. 5 at 15.) 

Petitioner does not argue that a cooperation plea offer was extended by the State. 

Petitioner alleges that he “agreed to provide the means of delivery, times, [&] those 

taking delivery” in return for benefits. (Doc. 5 at 15.) Petitioner does not contend, or 

establish, that the State accepted his offer. The State was not required to accept his 

invitation or extend him a different plea offer. “[T]here is no constitutional right to plea 

bargain.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). Trial counsel cannot be 

ineffective when no offer was extended. 

 Petitioner fails to satisfy the ineffective assistance of counsel standard under 

Martinez. Accordingly, his claims are procedurally barred from review. 

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 C. THE STATE COURT DETERMINATION OF GROUND SEVEN(b) 

WAS NOT CONTRARY TO FEDERAL LAW. 

 1. Law 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, 132 

S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 

2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in 

light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2); Harrington v. Richter, 

131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 

786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which 

demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. 

Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.’” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

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application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1052 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

 Violations of the Arizona Rules of Evidence do not generally provide grounds for 

habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). However, a state 

court’s evidentiary ruling becomes subject to federal habeas review when the ruling 

violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory 

provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due 

process. (Id. at 68.) 

 2. Analysis 

 Petitioner contends that the preclusion of his prior statements violated his rights 

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner asserts “that the trial court erred 

by excluding hearsay testimony from D.L. and her son-in-law that he told them before his 

arrest that he believe he had been chatting with an undercover police officer.” (Doc. 10, 

Exh. EE at 14.) The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that their preclusion did 

not deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. “We need not resolve whether the trial court correctly 

excluded this testimony because Todd’s counsel nevertheless skillfully placed this 

information before the jury.” Id. The court concluded that because the “jury thus 

considered the evidence, we find no reversible error on this ground.” Id. At 15-16. This 

Court must determine if that ruling involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. 

 This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that Petitioner was not harmed by the 

preclusion of these statements from the two witnesses, even though only part of this 

evidence was admitted. A review of the trial establishes that the court of appeals was only 

partially correct that this information had been placed before the jury. The jury heard 

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evidence that Petitioner spoke with police after his arrest and told them he knew he was 

talking to a police officer during the online conversations. (Doc. 10, Exh. K at 24-25.) 

Petitioner told the detective he told two witnesses (D.L and W.W.) his belief days before 

his arrest. (Id. at 102.) The detective testified that she later interviewed D.L. to determine 

if Petitioner had made those statements to her prior to his arrest. (Id. at 27.) The detective 

testified in trial that she confirmed part of Petitioner’s statements. (Id. at 27.) Both D.L. 

and W.W. testified that they spoke with Petitioner several days prior to his arrest. (Id. at 

87-89, 95-96.) Petitioner’s counsel argued this exculpatory evidence to the jury during 

closing arguments. (Doc. 10, Exh. M at 59.)10 There was no testimony by the detective 

confirming that Petitioner’s statements to W.W. were made before Petitioner’s arrest. 

Thus, the court of appeals was partially correct that this exculpatory information was 

presented to the jury. Nonetheless, the court of appeals was correct that any error was 

harmless. Along with the strength of the transcript evidence, the detectives also arrested 

Petitioner at the park at the time and place he agreed to meet Alyee13. Petitioner had a 

blanket in his car as discussed with Alyee13. (Doc. 10, Exh. J at 150.) Even if W.W. and 

D.L. had testified, Petitioner’s conduct and his conversations render any preclusion 

harmless and not an unreasonable application of federal law. See United States v. Kahre, 

737 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that precluding self-serving statements of defendant 

was not plain error, and determining any preclusion was harmless in light of a strong 

government case); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18 (stating that habeas relief is appropriate only 

if state court’s application of harmless-error review was objectively unreasonable). 

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground 

Seven (b) of his habeas petition be denied. 

 

10 Petitioner also testified that he made these statements to the two witnesses. 

Petitioner testified that, prior to his arrest, he told witness W.W. that “... I was talking to someone on line that says she is thirteen but I have reason to believe she is way over that age, and a police officer – he or she is a police officer.” (Doc. 10, Exh. K at 102.) Petitioner testified he had a similar conversation with D.L. prior to the conversation with 

W.W. (Id.) 

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CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Grounds One, Two, Four, Five, 

Six, Eight, and Nine are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because Petitioner raises 

them for the first time. Grounds Three and Seven (a) are procedurally defaulted because 

they were not raised as a federal claim in state court. Petitioner has not satisfied the 

burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as to any ground. Under Ground 

Seven (b) Petitioner has not established that he was prejudiced by any finding that was 

“contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law. The 

Court will therefore recommend that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 5) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 5) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

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 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 19th day of March, 2015. 

 Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

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