Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00702/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00702-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUSTIN THOMAS MILLER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10-CV-702-WQH

(BGS)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT DEFENDANT

RICHARD O BUTCHER’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENY DEFENDANT RICHARD

O BUTCHER’S MOTION TO

STRIKE 

vs.

JOHN LAMONTAGNE, Factory

Superintendent; RICHARD O

BUTCHER, Medical Doctor; and DAVID

G. SMITH, Medical Doctor,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Justin Thomas Miller, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

filed a Complaint on April 1, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (“Compl.,” Doc. No. 1.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint arises out of an injury he suffered while working at a prison shoe factory

and the medical treatment he received following the injury. Miller brings claims for violations

of his Eighth Amendment rights based upon freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and

right to medical care. (Id.) On July 20, 2010, Defendant Richard O Butcher filed a motion to

dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) and a motion to strike punitive

damages pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(f). (Doc. Nos. 18 & 19.) Plaintiff filed a response

in opposition to the motion to dismiss on August 2, 2010. (Doc. No. 22.) On August 16, 2010,

Case 3:10-cv-00702-WQH-BGS Document 42 Filed 01/28/11 Page 1 of 11
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1 Citations to the complaint are to page numbers, as the complaint includes paragraphs assigned the

same number. 

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Defendant Butcher filed a reply in support of his motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 26.) Plaintiff

did not file an opposition to Defendant Butcher’s motion to strike. On October 18, 2010,

Plaintiff submitted two exhibits to the Court; however, they have no bearing on Defendant

Butcher’s instant motions before the Court. ( Doc. No. 34.) 

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”). The Court determines that this matters is appropriate for resolution

without oral argument and submits the motions on the parties’ papers pursuant to Local Civil

Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant

Butcher’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND and Defendant

Butcher’s motion to strike be DENIED.

Background

Plaintiff Justin Thomas Miller is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on his Complaint filed pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Compl. at 1.)1

 The Defendants named by Plaintiff in his Complaint

include John LaMontagne, formerly employed by the California Prison Industry Authority

(“CALPIA”) as the Superintendent in charge of a prison shoe factory located at Donovan state

prison; Richard O Butcher, a medical doctor employed by Alvarado Hospital Medical Center;

Jose E. Otero, a medical doctor employed by Alvarado Hospital Medical Center; and David

G. Smith, a medical doctor who provides orthopedic services to prisoners at Donovan state

prison. (Id. at 2.) The following description of events is taken from the parties’ pleadings

relating to the medical care provided by Defendant Butcher, and is not to be construed as

findings of fact by the Court.

On July 2, 2009, Plaintiff’s finger was crushed while working as a machine operator at

the shoe factory located at Donovan state prison. (Id. at 3.) After Plaintiff’s hand was crushed,

he was transported to the emergency room at Alvarado Hospital Medical Center. (Id. at 7.)

An X-ray of Plaintiff’s left hand showed a compound fracture of his third finger. (Id. at 7.)

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Plaintiff also had multiple lacerations causing nerve and joint damage. (Id. at 7.) A preoperation history and a physical of Plaintiff was completed. (Id. at 7.) Defendant Richard O

Butcher, M.D., informed Plaintiff that he would be hospitalized for one week in order for an

operation to be performed on the third finger of his left hand. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff requested

medication to alleviate his pain, and was issued Motrin. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff complained to the

nurse that he was still in excruciating pain, but the nurse stated that Dr. Otero ordered only

Motrin to be issued for pain as a cost cutting measure. (Id. at 4.) After remaining shackled to

a hospital bed for one week, Dr. Otero informed Plaintiff that the hospital was no longer

accepting “I.O.U.’s” from the state for non-life threatening injuries. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff was

discharged with a splint taped to his finger. (Id. at 5.) Approximately two weeks later Plaintiff

removed the splint, but his finger was still causing him severe pain. (Id. at 5.) 

On August 5, 2009, Plaintiff had his finger X-rayed again at Donovan Correctional

Facility which showed that his finger was still fractured. (Id. at 5.) On August 24, 2009,

Defendant saw Dr. Smith regarding the continued pain he suffered from his finger. (Id. at 5.)

Dr. Smith sated that he had not been able to see Plaintiff earlier because of overcrowding. (Id.

at 5.) In an examination that lasted only 82 seconds, Dr. Smith said that the fracture had healed

and there was no further treatment available. (Id. at 5; Ex. J.) However, Plaintiff states his

finger never healed correctly causing him to suffer severe pain on a daily basis, continued

disfigurement, and partial range of motion loss. (Id. at 5.)

Discussion

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “ ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’ ” Johnson v.

Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). The plaintiff’s complaint must

provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Id.

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

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The Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), discerned

a two step process for evaluating a complaint under Rule 12. First, the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible

claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1950. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. The complaint must allege

enough factual content to “nudge” the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.

Id. at 1952. If there are other, more likely explanations, the complaint is not plausible. Id. at

1951.

Notwithstanding, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (reaffirming that this standard still applies to pro se pleadings post-Twombly). Thus,

where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings

liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

B. 42 U.S.C § 1983 Standard

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by

the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535

(1981) (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331

(1986)); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 

Plaintiff seeks to fulfill the first requirement by alleging a violation of his right to

adequate medical care secured by the Eighth Amendment under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97 (1976). However, the threshold issue which must be addressed is whether Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged that Defendant Butcher was acting under color of state law when he

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rendered medical services to Plaintiff.

1. Under Color of State Law

To determine whether a private actor acts under color of state law, the Court must

evaluate whether the alleged infringement of federal rights is “fairly attributable” to the

government even though committed by private actors. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092

(9th Cir. 2003); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (“To constitute state action,

the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State

or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and the party charged with the deprivation

must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” (internal punctuation omitted)).

Determining what is fairly attributable to the government “is a matter of normative judgment,

and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. . . . [N]o one fact can function as a necessary condition

across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient,

for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.”

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001). There

must be “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private

behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. at 295 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Single Moms, Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because of the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, courts have developed a variety of

approaches to assess whether a private party has acted under color of state law. Lee v. Katz,

276 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit has recognized at least four such criteria,

or tests: (1) public function, (2) joint action, (3) governmental compulsion or coercion, and (4)

governmental nexus. Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1092; Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192

F.3d 826, 835-36 (9th Cir.1999). The established criteria are helpful in determining the

significance of state involvement, and “[s]atisfaction of any one test is sufficient to find state

action, so long as no countervailing factor exists.” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1092.

Under the “public function” analysis, state action is present “in the exercise by a private

entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” Caviness v. Horizon Cmty.

Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,

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419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). For example, in West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), the Supreme

Court held that a private physician acted under color of state law when the physician

contracted with the state to provide medical services to prisoners at state-prison hospitals. Id.

at 54. A prisoner filed a civil-rights action against such a physician alleging that the physician

violated the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide necessary medical

treatment. Id. at 45. The Court held that the physician’s conduct could “fairly be attributed to

the State” because the state “bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care

to [the prisoner]; the State delegated that function to respondent [physician]; and respondent

voluntarily assumed that obligation by contract.” Id. at 55-56. The Court found significant the

prison’s policy prohibiting the prisoner from employing or electing “to see a different

physician of his own choosing.” Id. at 44. The Court held, “[c]ontracting out prison medical

care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment

to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State’s prisoners of the means to vindicate

their Eighth Amendment rights.” Id. at 56; see also, e.g., Lee, 276 F.3d at 554-55. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that plausibly support an

inference that Defendant Butcher was acting under the color of state law while providing

medical services to Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff has not specifically alleged a contractual

agreement between Defendant Butcher or his employer, Alvarado Hospital, and the State,

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that would allow the Court to reasonably draw such an

inference. Plaintiff was a prisoner at Donovan state prison. After suffering the alleged injury

he was transported to Alvarado Hospital where he was attended to by Defendant Butcher.

Given his status as a prisoner, he was not simply free to choose his own medical care but was

directed by prison authority to be treated at Alvarado hospital. That Defendant Butcher

admitted Plaintiff to the floor supports an inference that the hospital had some arrangement to

admit Donovan prisoners. 

There is nothing in this case to meaningfully distinguish it from West. Defendant argues

that this case is distinguishable because Defendant did not perform any medical services at a

prison or prison hospital. While the physicians in West did provide medical services at a state

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prison hospital, the Court did not focus on this fact as a threshold issue in determining whether

a private physician can act under the color of state law. Rather than focusing on the physical

location where the medical services were performed, the West Court emphasized the

significance of the State’s allocation of its medical obligations to the physician, and the

physician’s acceptance of this obligation. West, 487 U.S. at 45; see also George v. Sonoma

County Sheriff’s Dept., 2010 WL 3155690 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) (holding private

physicians acted under the color of state law when providing medical services to inmates at a

privately owned facility.) Thus, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, especially given the more

liberal pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants, that would support that Defendant

Butcher was acting under the color of state law while providing medical services to Plaintiff.

2. Violation of Constitutional Right: Eighth Amendment

To state a viable § 1983 claim, a Plaintiff must also sufficiently allege the violation of

a constitutional right. Plaintiff has alleged Defendant Butcher violated his Eighth Amendment

rights. Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they act with deliberate indifference

to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A plaintiff

alleging such a violation must satisfy a two-part test containing both an objective and a

subjective component. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff must prove that the defendant prison official (1) deprived him of the “minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities;” and (2) acted with deliberate indifference by denying,

delaying or intentionally interfering with medical treatment. Id. A prisoner’s civil rights will

only be abridged if “the indifference to his medical needs [is] substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v.

Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06).

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if the official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). “If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official]

has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). “Deliberate indifference is a high

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2

 A court may consider documents attached to the complaint when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss “without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” U.S. v. Ritchie,

342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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legal standard.” Id. at 1060. Where a prisoner alleges delay in receiving medical treatment, he

must show that the delay led to further harm. See Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). “Medical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

Step one of the Iqbal analysis requires identification of allegations in the complaint that

are not entitled to the assumption of truth due to their conclusory nature. In his complaint,

Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that Defendant Butcher acted with deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. (Compl. at 4, ¶1.) This statement in itself is

disentitled to the presumption of truth. However, the Court deems that said conclusion

provides a framework for the factual allegations supporting this claim.

Step two of the Iqbal analysis provides for a determination of whether the factual

allegations of “deliberate indifference” plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Butcher informed him that he would be hospitalized for one week in

order for an operation to be performed on the third finger. (Compl. at 7, ¶5.) Plaintiff cites to

Exhibit E2

 to the Complaint for support of this allegation. Exhibit E, Pre-Op History and

Physical by defendant Butcher, contradicts Plaintiff’s allegation, stating, “The patient is

admitted for acute care and further evaluation.” This Exhibit goes on to state that Defendant

Butcher “will ask Jose Otero, MD to evaluate status. The patient may need some debridement,

further care.” 

Plaintiff next alleges that defendant Otero informed him that the hospital was no longer

accepting I.O.U.’s from the state. He was discharged without the compound fracture being set.

(Compl. at 8, ¶8.) The inference Plaintiff makes is that he was kicked out of the hospital

without having been given the required medical care. He points to Exhibit F to the Complaint

for support of this allegation. 

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Exhibit F, Transfer Summary, prepared by Defendant Butcher, does not support any of

these allegations of indifference. Defendant Butcher provides that, “The patient was seen by

Dr. Otero, plastic surgeon, who reviewed x-rays and felt the patient did not need surgical

intervention. The patient is stable at this time. We will plan on discharging him back to the

facility.” Defendant Butcher then lists 7 Discharge Medications. He notes that the patient

(Plaintiff) is okay for general population. 

Plaintiff’s last factual allegation against Dr. Butcher states that his third finger did not

heal correctly causing him to suffer severe pain and continued disfigurement/motion loss.

(Compl. at 8, ¶11.) Exhibit J to the Complaint directly contradicts this allegation. Dr. Smith,

who conducted a medical examination on the finger on August 24, 2009, writes, “A recent xray shows the nondisplaced fractures in the proximal phelanx to be completely healed.”

The Court concludes the attached exhibits do not establish that Plaintiffs factual

allegations are plausible. The more likely explanation is that Plaintiff received adequate

medical care. Exhibit E is a Pre-op History and Physical of Plaintiff when he was admitted to

Alvarado Hospital and states:

History of present illness: X-ray shows a stellate fracture of the

proximal phalanx which does not involve either articular surface. The

patient is admitted for acute care and further evaluation.

Plan: The patient is admitted to the floor. Will keep on IV antibiotics:

Ancef. Will ask Jose Otero, MD, to evaluate status. The patient may

need debridement, further care. Will admit the patient on the floor.

Will continue Ancef IV. Will ask Dr. Otero to evaluate and give

medicine for pain control.

(Compl. Ex. E.)

This exhibit does not support Plaintiff’s position that Defendant Butcher in any way

denied, delayed, or intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s medical care. As the admitting

physician, Defendant Butcher recognized that Plaintiff had a fractured finger, admitted him to

the floor, provided him with antibiotics and recommended follow up care by Dr. Otero to see

if any surgery was necessary. 

In reviewing Exihibit F, the Transfer Report, it appears that Dr. Butcher was aware that

Dr. Otero consulted with Plaintiff, and noted that Dr. Otero felt that Plaintiff did not require

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surgical intervention. (Compl. Ex. F.) Based on these consultations, Defendant Butcher

discharged the Plaintiff with orders to not partake in work detail for two weeks and with

instructions for seven different medications. Plaintiff’s allegations and the exhibits offered in

support do not allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendant Butcher “knew

of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim

against Defendant Butcher for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights based on deliberate

indifference. His pleadings do not meet the standard necessary to comply with Rule 8.

3. Leave to Amend

“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is

absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Noll

v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

1130 (9th Cir. 2000). This is not a situation where it is absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot

cure the deficiencies noted above. Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss be granted with leave to amend. 

II. Motion to Strike

Defendant Butcher has moved to strike, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(f), punitive

damages from the Complaint. Rule 12(f) states that a district court “may strike from a pleading

an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”

Defendant argues the Court should strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages under Cal.

Civ. Pro. § 425.13, which prohibits any claim for punitive damages arising out of a

professional negligence claim against a health care provider. However, Defendant’s reliance

on this section is misplaced. Plaintiff filed a complaint based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is

not a claim arising out of medical negligence. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Defendant has also

failed to cite any controlling authority applying Cal. Civ. Pro. § 425.13 to strike punitive

damages in the context of a prisoner § 1983 suit.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 12(f) does not authorize a district

court to strike a claim for damages on the ground that such claims are precluded as a matter

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of law. Whittlestone Inc. V. Handicraft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather

such a motion should be made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. However, even if the Court were

to examine the merits of the Motion to Strike as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Whittlestone,

the Court would deny the motion on the substantive grounds noted above. Therefore, the Court

recommends Defendant’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages be Denied without prejudice.

Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Defendant Butcher’s Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND and Defendant Butcher’s Motion

to Strike be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This Report and Recommendation of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than February 18, 2011, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 28, 2011

 

BERNARD G. SKOMAL

United States Magistrate Judge

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