Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00275/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00275-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANSE SULLIVAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORM KRAMER, et al.,

Defendants.

1:13-cv-00275-GSA-PC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ALLENBY’S 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS

(ECF No. 46.)

ORDER DISMISSING CASE, WITH 

PREJUDICE, BASED ON DEFENDANT’S 

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

ORDER FOR CLERK TO CLOSE CASE

I. BACKGROUND

Manse Sullivan (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

commencing this action on February 22, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) On September 20, 2013, the 

Court screened the Complaint and issued an order dismissing the Complaint for failure to state 

a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 8.) On December 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed the First 

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 12.) The Court screened the First Amended Complaint and 

issued an order on April 23, 2014, dismissing the case for failure to state a claim, without leave 

to amend, and judgment was entered. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.)

Case 1:13-cv-00275-GSA Document 55 Filed 10/04/16 Page 1 of 11
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On May 1, 2014, Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the case to the Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeals. (ECF No. 16.) On July 1, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an order remanding the 

case to the district court, to proceed on Plaintiff’s safe conditions claim against defendant 

Allenby. (ECF No. 21.) The Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant 

Allenby – “that Allenby knew of the life-threatening dangers of valley fever at the state 

hospital but failed to take any preventative measures to protect Sullivan, and that the risk 

prevention techniques substantially departed from generally accepted standards” – “liberally 

construed, were sufficient to warrant ordering Allenby to file an answer.” (ECF No. 21 at 2-3.) 

Therefore, the case now proceeds with Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on December 

13, 2013, against defendant Cliff Allenby (“Defendant”), on Plaintiff’s safe conditions claim 

arising out of his placement in a state mental hospital where he is allegedly at risk of 

contracting the disease known as Valley Fever. (ECF No. 12.)

The parties to this action have consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos 6, 35.) Therefore, the undersigned shall conduct 

any and all further proceedings in this action, including trial and final judgment. 

On July 6, 2016, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 46.) On September 12, 2016 and 

September 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed oppositions to the motion. (ECF Nos. 52, 53.) On 

September 22, 2016, Defendant filed a reply to the opposition. (ECF No. 54.)

Defendant Allenby’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is now before the Court.

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff is a 63-year-old African-American male, presently civilly committed at 

Coalinga State Hospital (CSH) in Coalinga, California, under the Sexually Violent Predator 

Act, where he has been detained since September 2006. The sole defendant in this case is 

defendant Cliff Allenby, Executive Director of the Department of Mental Health (DMH).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant disregarded the risks of exposure to Valley Fever and 

placed him in an institution that is unfit for human habitation. Although Plaintiff has not 

contracted any form of Valley Fever, he contends that he was not informed of the severe nature 

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of the disease until it became apparent that staff and patients at CSH were infected. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant knew of the life-threatening dangers of Valley Fever as early as 2002, 

prior to the construction of CSH, based on information from Pleasant Valley State Prison, 

which is located a mere two hundred yards from CSH and has numerous cases of infections of 

Valley Fever. Plaintiff alleges that his African-American heritage causes him to be more 

subject to contracting Valley Fever than others. Plaintiff alleges that despite his knowledge of 

the dangers, Defendant Allenby became the director of DMH, and although there is scientific 

fact that individuals’ lives are at risk, Defendant Allenby has not taken any precautions to 

protect patients at the institution from the formidable dangers at the location.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges a cause of action against defendant Allenby 

for subjecting him to unsafe conditions in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.1 Plaintiff requests monetary damages and a declaratory judgment.

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A. Legal Standards

1. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter the pleadings 

are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the 

pleadings.” Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all material facts in the 

pleading under attack are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010) quoting Fajardo v. County of 

L.A., 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). The court must assume the truthfulness of the material 

facts alleged in the complaint, Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 

 

1

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brought claims against defendants Allenby, Kramer, 

Ahlin, Mayberg, Schwarzenegger, and the Fresno County Board of Supervisors. (ECF No. 12.) On April 23, 

2014, the Court dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend. (ECF No. 14.) The 

Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal the claims against defendants Kramer, Ahlin, Mayberg, Schwarzenegger, and 

the Fresno County Board of Supervisors in its memorandum filed on July 1, 2015, finding that “[t]he district court 

properly dismissed Sullivan’s claims against defendants Kramer, Ahlin, Mayberg, Schwarzenegger, and the 

Fresno County Board of Supervisors because Sullivan failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for 

relief under any viable legal theory against these defendants.” (ECF No. 21 at 2.) Therefore, this case now 

proceeds only against defendant Allenby on Plaintiff’s safe conditions claim.

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F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011), and “treat as false the allegations in the answer that 

contradict” the complaint, Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir.

2004). All inferences reasonably drawn from these facts must be construed in favor of the 

responding party. General Conference Corp. of Seventh–Day Adventists v. Seventh Day 

Adventist Congregation Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The legal standard that governs a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as that which governs a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable 

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela 

Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a 

plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint 

as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Nonetheless, Courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 

1055 (9th Cir. 2008)

If matters outside the pleadings are considered, the motion shall be treated as one for 

summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A district court may, however, “consider certain 

materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the 

complaint, or matters of judicial notice— without converting the motion to dismiss [or motion 

for judgment on the pleadings] into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 

342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 530 

F.Supp.2d 1084, 1096 (C.D.Cal. 2008). Further, the court may consider the full text of 

documents referred to in the complaint without converting the motion to a motion for summary 

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judgment, provided that the document is central to plaintiff’s claim and no party questions the 

authenticity of the document. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). Also, 

extrinsic evidence that is subject to judicial notice may be properly considered in a Rule 12(c)

motion. Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1999).

2. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless 

the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of 

the challenged conduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. 

Howards, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2092 (2012)). Qualified immunity analysis requires two prongs of 

inquiry: “(1) whether ‘the facts alleged show the official’s conduct violated a constitutional 

right; and (2) if so, whether the right was clearly established’ as of the date of the involved 

events ‘in light of the specific context of the case.’” Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2009)). These 

prongs need not be addressed in any particular order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 

S.Ct. 808 (2009). 

To determine whether a government official should be granted qualified immunity, 

under the first prong, the facts are to be viewed “in the light most favorable to the injured 

party.” Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) quoting Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001), receded from on other grounds by Pearson, 355 U.S. 

at 817-21; see also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the 

existence of a material factual dispute does not necessarily preclude a finding of qualified 

immunity. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under the second prong, clearly established law is not to be defined “at a high level of 

generality.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 

U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011). “The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative 

nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. “This inquiry ‘must be undertaken in 

light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. (quoting 

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier, 

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533 U.S. at 201) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The relevant inquiry is whether existing 

precedent placed the conclusion that [the defendant] acted unreasonably in the [specific 

circumstances confronted] ‘beyond debate.’” Id. at 309 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).

“To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable 

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichel v. Howards, 

132 S.Ct. 2088, 2092 (2012); see also Castro v. County of Los Angeles, --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 

4268955, *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016). “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects 

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 

743 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We do not require a case directly on point, but 

existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 

Id. at 741. “[A] ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ [in the Courts of Appeals]

could itself clearly establish the federal right [in question].” City and County of San Francisco 

v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). 

B. Defendant’s Motion and Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant Allenby requests dismissal of this action in its entirety, with prejudice, on the 

ground that Defendant Allenby, former Acting Director of the Department of State Hospitals,2

is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Defendant argues that currently, the parameters of a 

civil detainee’s constitutional rights, if any, associated with environmental exposure to Valley 

Fever, even as to those who are allegedly at greater risk of contracting the disease, is not clearly 

established, and that this case should be dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 12(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice of two documents submitted for the 

Court’s review: Exhibit “1”, a true and correct copy of Governor Edmond G. Brown, Jr.’s 

announcement, dated December 31, 2014, appointing Pamela Ahlin as the Director of the 

 

2 Defendant asserts that “Defendant Cliff Allenby was the acting Director of the Department of 

Mental Health and DSH between January 2011 through December 2014, ” (Compl., p. 5, ¶8; RJN, Exh. 1), that 

“DSH had jurisdiction over state hospitals in California, including CSH,” (Compl., p. 6, ¶9; Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code §§ 4000, 4100), and that “[t]he Department of Mental Health was renamed the Department of State Hospitals 

effective June 27, 2012,” ((Cal. Stat. 2012, c. 24 (A.B.1470), §63). (ECF No. 47 at 3:14-17, n. 1.)

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California Department of State Hospitals, and Exhibit “2”, a memorandum filed in Sullivan v 

Kramer, et al., No. 14-15872 (9th Cir. July 1, 2015). (Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), ECF 

No. 48.) Defendant argues that the Court has authority to take judicial notice because Exhibit 

“1”, the Governor’s announcement, is an official record of the California Governor’s Office, 

and Exhibit “2” is a court record.3 Plaintiff has not objected to the Court taking judicial notice 

of these two exhibits. These appear to be the type of documents readily capable of judicial 

notice. Both documents are matters of public record whose authenticity is not disputed, and the 

Court finds them directly related to matters at issue. Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice 

of Defendant’s Exhibits “1” and “2”.

C. Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not free Defendant Allenby 

from liability, because the law is very clear as to the violations Defendant Allenby committed. 

Plaintiff supports his argument with examples, including the following:

On November 28, 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil 

Rights Division conducted an investigation of conditions and 

practices at Atascadero State Hospital in Atascadero, California, 

and found numerous deficiencies in the operation of four mental 

health facilities. The investigation concluded with a Consent 

Judgment and Agreement upon the expected conditions, 

practices, and treatment of patients. Plaintiff argues that this 

proves that Defendant was aware of the measures needed to meet 

the requirements of the law.

On September 26, 2012, the Fresno County Superior Court Grand 

Jury visited Pleasant Valley State Prison concerning the Valley 

Fever issue and found that “a large state mental health facility 

was under construction resulting in disruption of the ground in 

the customarily windy region.” (Fresno County 2012-2013 Grand 

Jury Report #3 at 2 ¶4, ECF No. 52, Exh. C.) Plaintiff argues 

that this shows that the right to safe conditions was clearly 

 

3

“Courts may only take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable 

dispute, including “matters of public record.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001); see

Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908-09 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). “Facts are indisputable, and thus subject to judicial 

notice, only if they either ‘generally known’ . . . or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned[.]” Id. at 909. In particular, the Court “may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct 

relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 

244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial notice of the 

“relevant state court documents, because those documents have a direct relationship to [petitioner’s habeas] 

appeal”), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Moreno v. Harrison, 245 Fed.Appx. 606 (9th Cir. 2007).

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established when Defendant was in the position of Executive 

Director.

The Department of State Hospitals has a requirement for testing 

for Valley Fever by a Registered Nurse for all patients on 

admission, with no follow-up test after admission. (Nursing 

Policy and Procedure 201 at 1 and Infection Control Manual No. 

3.5 at 1, (ECF No. 52, Exh. E.) 

Plaintiff also argues that his right to be free from exposure to an environmental hazard 

stems directly from the holding of Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), which the Court 

concluded “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” In Helling, the issue 

was whether exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke violated the plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment rights even though the plaintiff alleged only future harm. The Court found that it 

could violate the plaintiff’s rights despite the absence of an existing injury. Helling also 

acknowledged other situations in which environmental factors can pose an unreasonable risk to 

an inmate’s health, such as exposure to “infectious maladies such as hepatitis and venereal 

disease” caused by overcrowding, unsafe drinking water, and “toxic or other substances.” 

Plaintiff also asserts that the Helling decision was relied upon to hold that inmates have the 

right to be free from exposure to another environmental toxin, asbestos.

Plaintiff submits exhibits containing copies of other reports and notices addressing the 

dangers of Valley Fever, arguing that someone in Defendant’s position would have understood 

that his conduct was within the scope of an established prohibition, and that failing to 

implement measures to limit exposure of inmates with heightened susceptibility to Valley

Fever was unconstitutional. 

D. Analysis

As discussed above, a qualified immunity analysis requires two prongs of inquiry: “(1) 

whether ‘the facts alleged show the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) if 

so, whether the right was clearly established’ as of the date of the involved events ‘in light of 

the specific context of the case.’” Tarabochia, 766 F.3d at 1121. These prongs need not be 

addressed in any particular order. Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. This is a case where the Court can 

“rather quickly and easily decide that there was no violation of clearly established law before 

turning to the more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional 

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question at all.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239. Accordingly, the Court skips the first step of the 

Saucier qualified immunity analysis.

It is well established that a civil detainee’s right to safe conditions is protected by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 

(1982); Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 

2011) (setting forth objective Youngberg standard and explaining that “in the face of known 

threats to patient safety, state officials may not act (or fail to act) with conscious indifference, 

but must take adequate steps in accordance with professional standards to prevent harm from 

occurring” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In Youngberg, the Supreme Court

“noted that the right to personal security constitutes a ‘historic liberty interest’ protected 

substantively by the Due Process Clause.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (quoting Ingraham v. 

Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)). “[T]hat right is not 

extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 

(citing see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978)). “If it is cruel 

and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be 

unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all—in 

unsafe conditions.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16. 

Turning to the contours of Plaintiff’s right in this case -- to be safe from exposure to 

Valley Fever -- the Court finds that the contours are not defined, because case law at the district 

court level concerning exposure to Valley Fever is unsettled, notwithstanding whether the 

plaintiff is a prisoner or civil detainee. There is no binding precedent addressing the rights of 

civil detainees who are at increased risk of contracting Valley Fever. “Regardless of whether 

the court looks only to the state of the law as it existed in 2006, or as it exists today, the Court 

would still conclude that the right at issue [not to be exposed to Valley Fever] was not clearly 

established.” Smith v. Schwarzenegger, 137 F.Supp.3d 1233, 1242 (E.D.Cal. 2015) (citing see

Jones v. Hartley, No. 1:13-cv-1590-AWI-GSA-PC, 2015 WL 1276708, at *2-3 (E.D.Cal Mar. 

19, 2015) (“Courts have yet to find that exposure to valley fever spores presents an excessive 

risk to inmate health.” (collecting cases)); Smith v. California, 2015 WL 3953367 at *3 

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(E.D.Cal. June 6, 2015) (recognizing contrary conclusions in Valley Fever cases within this 

district). Also see Cunningham v. Kramer, No. 1:15-cv-01362-AWI-MJS-PC, 2016 WL 

1545303 (E.D. Cal., April 15, 2016) (Court’s determination that civil detainee failed to state a 

claim under § 1983 that public officials violated his liberty interests by housing him in a facility 

located in an area where Valley Fever was endemic and not taking any protective measures, 

despite increased risk to detainee of contracting Valley Fever due to his ethnicity, was not 

erroneous, despite circuit court cases finding cognizable claims based on similar allegations; 

circuit court cases cited by detainee were unpublished, and thus not binding precedent, and 

other precedent established that officials named as defendants in detainee’s action would have 

been entitled to qualified immunity on facts alleged in detainee’s complaint.)

Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive. He refers to investigations, reports, and notices

concerning the dangers of exposure to Valley Fever spores in detention facilities in the areas 

where the spores are prevalent. However, Plaintiff fails to establish that the law is clearly 

established regarding Plaintiff’s rights as a civil detainee to be free from exposure to Valley 

Fever. As argued by Defendant, the existence of an investigation at Atascadero State Hospital, 

a Consent Decree involving Napa State Hospital and Metropolitan Hospital, a Fresno Superior 

Court Grand Jury report concerning Pleasant Valley State Prison, and a case decision that 

exposure to second-hand smoke may be unconstitutional are not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims 

against Defendant Allenby and do not contradict the case law that recognizes that the law is not 

clearly established regarding Valley Fever rights. There is no evidence that Defendant Allenby 

was aware of any investigations or received any of the reports or notices submitted or described 

by Plaintiff. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free 

from exposure to Valley Fever was not clearly established at the time that Defendant Allenby 

allegedly violated that right, and that Defendant Allenby did not have a fair and clear warning 

that his alleged conduct was unlawful. Therefore, even if all the material facts alleged against 

Defendant Allenby in the complaint are true, Defendant Allenby is entitled to qualified 

immunity from suit for his alleged conduct. The Court finds that the deficiencies outlined 

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above are not capable of being cured by amendment, and therefore further leave to amend 

should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 

(9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Defendant Allenby’s motion for judgment on the pleadings shall 

be granted, and this case shall be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Allenby’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed on July 6, 

2016, is GRANTED;

2. This case is DISMISSED, with prejudice, on the ground that Defendant Allenby 

is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim

against him; and

3. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2016 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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