Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01458/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01458-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL W. BRISENO,

Petitioner, No. C 04-1458 PJH

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

v.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, Director, 

California Dept. of Corrections,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, filed by state prisoner, Michael W. Briseno (“Briseno). Having reviewed the parties’

papers, the record, and having carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal

authorities, the court hereby DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background

Briseno pled guilty to thirty-two felony counts of sexual misconduct with children. On

May 12, 2000, the Santa Clara County Superior Court sentenced him to a determinate term

of nine years and four months in prison, to be followed by a consecutive indeterminate term

of 210 years to life. On July 11, 2001, the California Court of Appeal dismissed Briseno’s

direct appeal for failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause, and the California

Supreme Court denied review on October 10, 2001. Subsequently, on September 23,

2002, the California Court of Appeal denied Briseno’s petition for state habeas relief, and

the California Supreme Court denied review on January 15, 2003. Briseno filed the instant

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 1 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

petition for federal habeas relief with this court on April 14, 2004. 

The state subsequently moved to dismiss Briseno’s petition as untimely, and on April

28, 2005, this court denied the motion and reinstated the briefing schedule on the petition. 

However, on May 31, 2005, the state again moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds

that it contained unexhausted, procedurally defaulted, and non-cognizable claims. On

September 6, 2005, the court granted in part and denied in part the state’s motion. The

court dismissed two claims as unexhausted, one as procedurally barred, and one as noncognizable. Following that order, four claims remained. 

The state filed its answer and opposition on October 6, 2005, and Briseno filed his

traverse on January 5, 2006. Briseno, however, submitted with his traverse three new

declarations as exhibits, not previously submitted to the state courts. The state

subsequently objected to the new declarations in a reply to petitioner’s traverse, on

grounds that the three new declarations were not presented to the state court, added

additional facts that change the evidentiary bases for petitioner’s claims, and therefore

rendered Briseno’s claims unexhausted. Thereafter, on February 3, 2006, Briseno filed a

formal motion to expand the record in order to include the three declarations under Habeas

Rule 7. 

The court denied without prejudice Briseno’s motion to expand the record on

September 28, 2006. It concluded that Briseno had not demonstrated the threshold due

diligence required for expansion of the record, nor had he demonstrated the relevance and

necessity of the subject declarations. Additionally, the court advised Briseno that prior to

expanding the record, he would need to address the effect of any expansion of the record

on the exhaustion of his claims before the state courts. 

Briseno subsequently filed a renewed motion to expand the record on October 10,

2006, and the state responded on October 27, 2006. On February 22, 2007, this court

issued an order noting that because the motion was intertwined with the merits of Briseno’s

claims, it would consider the renewed motion in conjunction with this order on the merits. 

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 2 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

II. Factual and State Court Procedural Background

Because the California courts denied Briseno’s habeas petitions in postcard denials,

there are no written, reasoned state court decisions on any of the issues raised by Briseno

in his habeas petition. Nor are there any state court decisions setting forth the facts

relevant to this petition. Accordingly, this court was required to conduct an independent

review of the record, and what follows is based on that review. 

Briseno was originally charged with thirty-three counts of child molestation stemming

from his alleged conduct with six boys under the age of fourteen. The facts underlying

Briseno’s guilty plea were drawn from the preliminary hearing, which consisted of testimony

by two investigating police officers as to statements made by five of the six victims. Exh. B,

Record Transcripts (“R.T.”) at 22; Exh. A, Clerks Transcripts, at 1-68. Information

regarding the sixth victim, Briseno’s son, was based on observations by one of the other

victims.

Briseno was a music teacher at an elementary school. He met several of his victims

during the course of providing them music lessons. John Doe 1 was a ten year-old boy who

received private music lessons from Briseno during the summer of 1997. Briseno twice

attempted and twice committed lewd acts on John Doe 1 in a park, in Briseno’s car, and in

Briseno’s bedroom.

John Doe 2 was an eleven year-old boy, who went over to Briseno’s house to play

video games with Briseno’s six year-old son (John Doe 6). Over several months, Briseno

attempted one lewd act and committed seven lewd acts on John Doe 2. John Doe 2 also

saw Briseno molest and orally copulate his son.

John Doe 3 was a thirteen year-old boy. During the summer of 1997, John Doe 3

accompanied John Doe 2 to Briseno’s house to play video games. Over the course of the

summer, Briseno committed five lewd acts, attempted two lewd acts, and twice orally

copulated John Doe 3. He also showed John Doe 3 pornographic videos and photographs

of John Doe 2 and his son.

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 3 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

That report was not included in the record before this court. At subsequent pretrial

proceedings, Briseno claimed that Dr. Donk evaluated him during the middle of the night, and

that Donk fell asleep numerous times during the evaluation.

2

The record suggests that Briseno filed a written motion to determine his competency,

see R.T. at 3, but the motion itself was not included in the record before this court.

Accordingly, the court relies on the transcripts from that hearing. See id. at 3-37.

4

John Doe 4 was a ten year-old boy who took music lessons from Briseno in early

1997. Briseno committed ten lewd acts on John Doe 4 at a school and at Briseno’s home. 

Briseno also videotaped himself sodomizing and orally copulating John Doe 4.

John Doe 5 was a ten year-old boy who took music lessons from Briseno in 1991. 

He reported between 10 and 28 acts of molestation by Briseno.

The San Jose, California Police Department (“SJPD”) began investigating Briseno in

1997 following two police reports that Briseno was molesting young boys. Subsequently, a

lengthy investigation took place, during which the SJPD interviewed numerous witnesses

and victims. Briseno was arrested on June 8, 1998, on charges related to John Does 1-3. 

Several days after his arrest, SJPD officers interviewed Briseno in jail. Briseno waived his

Miranda rights, and confessed to engaging in sexual conduct with those victims who had, at

that time, been interviewed and had provided accounts of Briseno’s conduct as pertained to

them. 

In October 1998, Briseno’s retained counsel, Thomas Salciccia (“Salciccia”),

questioned his competency, and the court appointed an expert, Dr. Donk, to evaluate

Briseno. R.T. 5-6. After evaluating Briseno, Dr. Donk opined that he was competent to

proceed.1

 The trial court subsequently reviewed the doctor’s report, and found that Briseno

was competent.

During pretrial proceedings that took place on September 27 and 28, 1999, Salciccia

again moved the trial court to suspend the proceedings and to determine Briseno’s

competence under California Penal Code § 1368.2

 In support, counsel submitted letters

written by Briseno and argued that he suffered from impairment of reasoning, an emotional

disturbance, and irrational behavior. R.T. 4. In response, the prosecution noted that Dr.

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 4 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The court further stated:

Based upon my reading of the correspondence of you to the District Attorney

and to your attorney and some of the statements that you’ve made in open court,

the best advice I can ever give any defendant is to take the advice of their own

lawyer. . . . And you’ve retained your attorney who, I assure you, I’ve known for,

if I say it quick, 40 years. So I know of my own knowledge that he is trained,

experienced, and totally responsible and capable of giving you advice.

Now, from my reading of the correspondence and, again, the statements that

you’ve indicated to me, it’s my feeling that you may have some reservation or

some difficulty in accepting his advice, and what I wanted to do was to tell you

from the bench the power or hopefully your respect as to some of the facts which

I think you’re laboring under a misapprehension. 

The primary one is that your attorney or any attorney or you do not have the

power or the ability to say anything you want to the jury. What evidence the jury

hears is strictly controlled by the court. In other words, the judge determines

what evidence comes before a jury. What evidence is relevant. What evidence

is admissible. 

5

Donk had found Briseno competent to stand trial. The court also allowed Briseno to

address it on the record at the hearing. 

The trial court subsequently found that Briseno was competent and declined to

suspend the criminal proceedings. In support, it asserted:

[t]o be quite honest with you, Mr. Briseno, in addition to the testimony and the

statements that you have just made in open court, they do not, in my view, or

I’m convinced in any judicial officer’s view, constitute remotely the concept or

the type of mental disorder that would justify a finding that you were incapable

of proceeding to trial and that you failed to understand the nature and

circumstances of the offense or that you’re unable to aid your counsel. 

R.T. 8. It later added:

Your correspondence indicates to me that you have a clear understanding of

the circumstances, the penalty, punishment, and that you disagree with the

law, and that is not unusual for . . . a defendant to disagree with it or for that

matter [with] other people.

R.T. 12.3

 

The court then afforded Briseno an opportunity to ask it any pertinent questions. 

Briseno responded that he did not “have very many questions,” but offered that 

The only thing I would like to say is when I did turn myself in I didn’t turn

myself in to cause more problems. I wanted to do the opposite. The last

thing I want to do is have a jury trial and I don’t want to have a jury trial, all

right, and I’m not going to have a jury. I understand everything you said

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 5 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Immediately following the guilty plea, the prosecution inquired regarding the necessity

of admissions regarding probation eligibility allegations. R.T. 36. The trial court responded,

that “the crimes speak for themselves. There’s no requirement of taking a plea as to the effect

of a probation ineligible standard.” R.T. 36. The court then stated “I’ve advised the defendant

of the consequences of his plea that he is not eligible,” and then inquired again, “You

understand you’re not eligible for probation in this matter, Mr. Briseno?” R.T. 36. Briseno

replied “Yes.” R.T. 36.

6

makes total sense to me.

R.T. 13.

Prior to taking the plea, the trial court advised Briseno of the consequences,

including the maximum possible penalties, of his guilty plea. R.T. 19-21. These

consequences included the possibility that Briseno “could be sent to [prison] for a

determinant sentence of ten years and eight months to be followed by a consecutive

sentence of 360 years to life,” that he would be required to register as a sex offender, that

he could be placed on parole for up to seven years and sent back to prison for one year for

each violation of parole, and that all of the child molestation charges were strike offenses

with serious future consequences if he were to commit another future offense. R.T. 19-21. 

Prior to entering his plea, Briseno assured the court that he was satisfied with his

representation. R.T. 21. Briseno subsequently entered an open guilty plea to all of the

charges, except the 33rd charge, involving his son, John Doe 6, which the state agreed to

dismiss. R.T. 19-37. The trial court also advised Briseno that he was not eligible for

probation, which Briseno clarified that he understood.4

 

On March 7, 2000, defense counsel filed a motion on Briseno’s behalf to withdraw

his guilty plea. C.T. 164. Briseno argued in support that it was his understanding that the

dismissed charge concerning his six year-old son would not become public, but that it had

been leaked to the press. He sought to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial based

on the damage to his reputation that the leaked information caused him. Counsel also

again argued that Briseno should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he was

incompetent, arguing that Dr. Donk’s report was unreliable, and offering additional

correspondence from Briseno as evidence of his incompetency. At a March 31, 2000

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 6 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

Prior to sentencing, on May 4, 2000, Briseno filed a motion to fire his retained

defense attorney, Salciccia, and to have a different attorney appointed for him. The court

denied the motion, finding that “[t]here is simply no basis that I find whatsoever for

substitution of counsel in this matter.” R.T. 41. It also concluded that the motion would

“cause a disruption of the orderly process of justice.” R.T. 41. The court then proceeded to

sentencing. 

At the sentencing hearing, the court initially allowed several witnesses to testify on

behalf of Briseno in terms of his community service and reputation, but prevented him from

calling all of the witnesses he sought to have testify. The court found that the proffered

testimony was relevant only to his suitability for probation, and noted again that Briseno

was not eligible for probation, which defense counsel confirmed that he understood. R.T.

51. Nevertheless, Salciccia sought to introduce the witness testimony to counterbalance

what he claimed was a “draconian” sentence recommended by the probation officer. R.T.

53. He advised the court, “Your Honor, we’re not asking for probation.” R.T. 54. The court

ultimately ruled that the witness testimony was irrelevant because it was “required to

confine the defendant in the state prison, period,” since he was statutorily ineligible for

probation, and that he did “not qualify for probation by any conceivable stretch of

imagination or leniency based upon his prior good conduct, his future good conduct. It is

simply unavailable.” R.T. 54.

Prior to sentencing, Briseno elected to give a statement. He stated that he “had a

mental illness,” and suffered from “pedophilia.” R.T. 63. He asserted that he “gave [his] life

to children to the extent that it made [him] mentally ill.” R.T. 63. Briseno further admitted

that he was “very ashamed of what [he] did,” but that he “never showed any type of force.” 

R.T. 63. In fact, Briseno stated that he believed that he was the one who was “very

vulnerable.” R.T. 63. Briseno also asserted his displeasure with the legal system,

contending that “[his] sincere confession was betrayed with gross unethical injust betrayal.” 

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 7 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

R.T. 64. 

The court subsequently sentenced Briseno to the sentence recommended in the

probation report. In doing so, it found that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed

the mitigating circumstances. R.T. 69. The court noted that Briseno’s crimes involved five

victims between the ages of ten and fourteen occurring “over a substantial period of time,”

and that, contrary to Briseno’s assertion otherwise, there was evidence that he had

threatened his victims. It further noted that Briseno’s crimes “were not crimes of

opportunity” or “sudden impulses,” but that they were “planned, contrived,” and “repeated.” 

R.T. 70. The court also stated that Briseno’s “attempt to blame other individuals,” including

the victims, “shock[ed] its conscience.” R.T. 69.

ISSUES

Briseno raises the following claims for relief in his federal habeas petition:

(1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his

Sixth Amendment rights when his trial counsel encouraged him to

plead guilty despite counsel’s knowledge of his incompetence;

(2) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of

his Sixth Amendment rights when his trial counsel failed to advise him

of the consequences of his guilty plea; 

(3) that he was denied due process because his guilty plea was neither

knowing nor voluntary since his counsel failed to advise him of the

consequences of his guilty plea; and 

(4) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his

Sixth Amendment rights when his trial counsel failed to obtain a

certificate of probable cause from the trial court, thus precluding him

from appealing certain issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). Because the petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the provisions of that act

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 8 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

apply here. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a district

court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a

claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, falling within the first

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decided a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). “Clearly established Federal law” under

§ 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at

the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72

(2003). This “clearly established” law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of

[Supreme] Court decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision.” Id.

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause” of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the

Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 1174. However, this standard “requires the state court decision to

be more than incorrect or erroneous.” Id. For the federal court to grant habeas relief, the

state court’s application of the Supreme Court authority must be “objectively unreasonable.” 

Id. at 1174-1175. The “objectively unreasonable” standard is different from the “clear error”

standard in that “the gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by

conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. at 1175; see also Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, “[i]t is not enough that a habeas

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 9 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm conviction that the

state court was erroneous . . . Rather, the habeas court must conclude that the state

court’s application of federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75;

see also Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068.

As for state court findings of fact, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may not grant a

habeas petition by a state prisoner unless the adjudication of a claim on the merits by a

state court resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). The “clearly erroneous” standard of unreasonableness that applies in

determining the “unreasonable application” of federal law under § 2254(d)(1) also applies in

determining the “unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence” under §

2254(d)(2). See Torres v . Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107-1108 (9th Cir. 2000). To grant

relief under 2254(d)(2), a federal court must be “left with a firm conviction that the

determination made by the state court was wrong and that the one [petitioner] urges was

correct.” Id. at 1108.

However, when the state court decision does not articulate the rationale for its

determination or does not analyze the claim under federal constitutional law, a review of

that court’s application of clearly established federal law is not possible. See Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 2 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, Federal

Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 32.2, at 1424-1426 & nn. 7-10 (4th ed. 2001). 

When confronted with such a decision, a federal court must conduct an independent review

of the record and the relevant federal law to determine whether the state court’s decision

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, “clearly established federal

law.” Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

When a state court does not furnish a basis for its reasoning, we have no

basis other than the record for knowing whether the state court correctly

identified the governing legal principle or was extending the principle into a

new context. . . .[A]lthough we cannot undertake our review by analyzing the

basis for the state court’s decision, we can view it through the ‘objectively

reasonable’ lens ground by Williams [, 529 U.S. 362]. . . . Federal habeas

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 10 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

review is not de novo when the state court does not supply reasoning for its

decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal

law. . . . Only by that examination may we determine whether the state

court’s decision was objectively reasonable.

Id.

DISCUSSION

As noted, because all of the above issues were raised only in Briseno’s state habeas

petitions, which were denied by both the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme

Court in postcard denials, there are no written, reasoned state court decisions on any of the

above issues. Accordingly, this court has conducted an independent review of the record

and the relevant federal law in determining whether the state court’s decision was “contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.” Delgado,

223 F.3d at 982.

I. Motion to Expand the Record

Briseno seeks to expand the record to include: (1) a January 3, 2006 declaration

from his trial counsel, Salciccia; (2) a December 22, 2005 declaration from petitioner

himself; and (3) a January 1, 2006 declaration from his brother, Modesto Briseno

(“Modesto”). Some of the information in the recent declarations was actually contained in

prior declarations submitted by Briseno and Salciccia to the state courts. What follows is a

discussion of the previous filings, and the information in the recent declarations that

constitutes “new” evidence.

A. Salciccia Declarations

Salciccia previously submitted two declarations and one letter exhibit in filings with

the state courts. Specifically, Salciccia submitted a March 7, 2000 declaration in support of

Briseno’s motion to withdraw his plea before the state trial court. Briseno’s appellate and

state habeas counsel, Jill Lansing, also submitted a June 20, 2001 letter from Salciccia as

an exhibit to Briseno’s state habeas petition, in addition to a December 20, 2001

declaration from Salciccia in support of the petition.

The essence of all of Salciccia’s declarations is that he did not believe that Briseno

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 11 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

was competent, and that he does not believe Briseno would have pleaded guilty if he had

known the sentence he would receive. Salciccia also attests in his declarations and letters

that he did not inform, nor did he hear Briseno informed of the mandatory minimum

sentence he would serve under his guilty plea. 

In his submissions prior to the most recent January 2006 declaration, Salciccia did

not attest to the advice that he provided Briseno regarding the possible sentence, except to

state that Briseno had been advised of the maximum penalty, and that Salciccia believed

that the worst possible sentence would have been sixty years. However, in his most recent

declaration, filed more than six years after Briseno pled guilty, Salciccia attempts to guess

as to the advice he gave Briseno regarding the sentence. He notes that although he

“cannot now recall exactly what advice [he] gave to Mr. Briseno about the likely sentence

should he plead guilty,” he “believe[s] that [he] probably tried to communicate [his]

concerns that [Briseno] would receive a sentence of at least sixty years.” Salciccia also

offers greater detail in support of his competency concerns in the latest declaration. 

B. Briseno Declarations

Briseno’s latest declaration contains more “new” information than that in the latest

Salciccia declaration. In his prior December 4, 2001 declaration submitted to the state

appellate courts, Briseno asserted that he was never advised of the mandatory minimum

sentence by Salciccia or the court; that he believed at the time of his plea that he would

receive a ten-year prison sentence and be released back into the community; and that if he

had known of the sentence he would receive, that he never would have pled guilty. He

asserted:

I welcomed the opportunity to go to trial. I gave it up reluctantly, and I gave it

up based upon a gross misconception of what the result would be. Had I

known that by virtue of my plea I would never be released from prison, I

would have gone to trial. He further stated that “[n]o one told [him] that the

good [he] had done in [his] lifetime would be of no value in securing [him] a

lenient sentence.” 

Contrary to his prior declaration, Briseno now additionally “explains” or “clarifies” in

his December 2005 declaration, that:

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 12 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

• Salciccia never told him that there was no possibility that he would receive a

probationary sentence. He states that he was “completely shocked” when the judge

stated at sentencing that he was not eligible for a probationary sentence. He further

asserts that it “came as a complete surprise” to both him and Salciccia, and that he

believes that Salciccia was also unaware that he was not eligible for probation;

• Salciccia did not advise him that he was likely to receive a sixty-year sentence;

• Salciccia did not advise him that he would receive at least one indeterminate life

sentence; 

• Salciccia did not discuss the likelihood of parole with him;

• Salciccia did not discuss the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually violent

predator following his sentence; and

• Salciccia did not advise him that some of his witnesses might not be allowed to

testify at sentencing.

Additionally, Briseno attests that had he understood several of the above facts -

including that he was not eligible for probation, that he would receive an indeterminate life

sentence, and that he would likely receive at least a sixty-year sentence – he would not

have pled guilty but instead would have exercised his right to jury trial.

C. Modesto Declaration

Modesto, Briseno’s brother, did not submit any declarations before the state courts,

so the instant declaration clearly constitutes “new” evidence. In his declaration, Modesto

attests that he was “closely involved with” Briseno’s defense, and has been a longtime

friend of Briseno’s trial counsel, Salciccia, who he asserts represented Briseno on a pro

bono basis. Modesto asserts that Briseno’s “mental confusion . . . led him to be unable to

grasp the real seriousness of his situation.” He contends that Briseno also always believed

that he would “get out of prison.”

Modesto also attests that he was “privy to conversations” between Briseno and

Salciccia and that he never heard Salciccia tell him or Briseno about a mandatory minimum

sentence, that he was likely to receive a sentence of at least sixty years to life in prison,

that he was facing an indeterminate life sentence, that a parole board would make future

decisions about his case, or provide the practical realities of a life sentence. Modesto

does, however, recall that Salciccia advised Briseno “in terms of a range of 40 to 60 years

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 13 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

depending on how he presented to the probation department.”

D. Analysis

The requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), governing requests for evidentiary

hearings, also apply to decisions regarding expansion of the record under Rule 7. See also

Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). Section 2254(e)(2)

provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing unless the

applicant shows that:

(A) the claim relies on–

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the opening paragraph of the

section to provide that where a petitioner has indeed exercised diligence to “develop the

factual bases” of his claims in state court, the requirements of section 2254(e)(2)(A)& (B)

do not apply to his request for an evidentiary hearing, or in this case, to his motion to

expand the record. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435 (2000); Holland v. Jackson, 542

U.S. 649, 652-53 (2004). In other words, a petitioner who has exercised such diligence will

be taken out of the purview of section 2254(e)(2). Griffey v. Williams, 345 F.3d 1058 (9th

Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds as moot, 349 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner

died); Williams, 529 U.S. at 430 (showing under 2254(e)(2) “applies only to prisoners who

have ‘failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court proceedings’”). 

Diligence “depends upon whether petitioner made a reasonable attempt, in light of

the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” 

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 14 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 435). Diligence requires in

the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in

the manner prescribed by state law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. 

Here, Briseno requested an evidentiary hearing in conjunction with his habeas

petitions in the state appellate courts, which this court must presume that the state

appellate courts denied on the merits in their postcard denials. Thus, Briseno can be said

to have exercised some degree of diligence in so far as he requested an evidentiary

hearing. However, it is unclear to the court why Briseno did not raise the above “new”

information contained in the recent declarations in his prior declarations filed before the

state appellate courts. None of the “new” information is information that could not have

been discovered and included in the prior declarations through the exercise of due

diligence. It was all information that would have been within the knowledge of the

declarants at the time their prior declarations were filed in state court. As for Modesto

Briseno, who did not file a declaration in state court, there is no explanation as to why

counsel failed to submit a declaration from Modesto in state court. Thus, as discussed

below in the specific claims raised by Briseno, the “new” information appears to be an

attempt by Briseno to improve upon and enlarge his claims before this court. Accordingly,

as the state has pointed out, the “new” evidence could have the effect of rendering

Briseno’s claims unexhausted.

Nevertheless, the court concludes that it is unnecessary to resolve the diligence and

exhaustion issues associated with Briseno’s request to expand the record because, having

reviewed and considered the “new” information in the recent declarations submitted by

Briseno in conjunction with his federal habeas claims, it is clear that even upon

consideration of the “new” information in the expanded record, Briseno is not entitled to

federal habeas relief.

////

////

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 15 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

II. Trial Counsel’s Knowledge of Briseno’s Alleged Incompetency and

Encouragement to Enter Guilty Plea

Briseno contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of

his Sixth Amendment rights when his trial counsel, Salciccia, encouraged him to plead

guilty despite counsel’s knowledge of Briseno’s incompetence. He argues that Salciccia

was aware that he could not understand basic concepts about the workings of the criminal

justice system, and that he held a “pathological optimism” regarding the eventual outcome

of the case, but encouraged him to plead guilty nonetheless. He further suggests that

Salciccia simply “stood by” and allowed the trial court to make erroneous statements and

rulings regarding his competence when trial counsel could and should have taken a more

active role. Briseno also contends that trial counsel “should have allowed” the case to

proceed to jury trial.

A defendant may not collaterally attack his guilty plea’s validity merely because he

made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175,

186 (2005). A defendant who enters a guilty plea on the advice of counsel may generally

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the

advice he received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir.

1988). A defendant must satisfy the two-part standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984), i.e., that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient

performance prejudiced his defense, and establish the prejudice requirement by showing

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59; Iaea v.

Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In support of this claim, Salciccia has submitted a declaration in which he attests that

he was “not able to clearly communicate” with Briseno, and as a result of mental illness,

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 16 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

that Briseno was unable to assess the circumstances realistically. He asserts that he never

felt like he was “getting through” to Briseno regarding the different functions of a judge and

jury because Briseno “always harbored the notion that the jury would acquit him if they

heard how much he had been through and how much he loves children.” Salciccia further

attests that he did not believe that Briseno “understood that by pleading guilty, he almost

certainly would spend most of the rest of his life (or close to it) in prison.” Salciccia

concludes that he does “not believe [Briseno] ever understood what was happening to him

in court” because he “simply was not playing with a full deck.” Briseno’s brother, Modesto,

also attests that Briseno’s “mental confusion . . . led him to be unable to grasp the real

seriousness of his situation.” He contends that Briseno also always believed that he would

“get out of prison.” 

There are several problems revealed by this court’s review of the instant claim. First

and most significantly, the court notes that the claim does not expressly challenge the trial

court’s competency determination in and of itself. Nevertheless, Briseno’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim appears to be a thinly-veiled attempt to challenge exactly that.

 There is no dispute that Salciccia believed that Briseno was incompetent; in

fact, Salciccia raised the issue of Briseno’s competency on three different occasions before

the trial court. However, Briseno wrongly implies that it was his counsel’s role to somehow

determine his competency. Moreover, Briseno also presumes for purposes of his

ineffective assistance claim that the trial court’s competency ruling was inaccurate. That

issue simply is not before this court. And, even if it were, this court’s review of the record

suggests that the trial court did not violate Briseno’s due process rights in the course of its

numerous competency rulings. 

A trial court must ensure that a criminal defendant is competent to enter a guilty

plea. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). State court determinations of

competence to stand trial are entitled to a presumption of correctness in a federal habeas

proceeding. See Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1986). A federal court may

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 17 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

overturn a state court competency finding only if it is not fairly supported by the record. 

See id. The test for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant "has sufficient

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding

– whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against

him." Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Dusky v. United States,

362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). Due process requires a trial court to order a psychiatric

evaluation or conduct a competency hearing if the court has a good faith doubt concerning

the defendant's competence. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir.

1994); see also Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 644 (9th Cir. 2004).

The standard for competency to waive counsel and plead guilty is identical to the

standard for competency to stand trial. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396-99; see also United

States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1994) (filing of meritless motions without logical or

legal foundation does not in itself justify denial of defendant's 6th Amendment right to

represent himself). A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial, however, is not all

that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty or waive his right to counsel. 

In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is

competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is

knowing and voluntary. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400 (citations omitted). To determine

whether a defendant's guilty plea is "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

alternative courses of action," North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970), a trial court

must follow the guidelines set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). 

See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12. Under Boykin, the record of the plea proceeding must

reflect that the defendant voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial, the right to confront his

accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-

29 (1992).

There is nothing in the record that suggests the trial court violated Briseno’s due

process rights in the competency procedures or standards it utilized, or in its ultimate

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 18 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

conclusion that Briseno was competent. At one point, the trial court temporarily stayed the

proceedings and appointed an expert to evaluate Briseno’s competency. It considered the

motions filed by Salciccia, the supporting evidence, the expert’s opinion, and Briseno’s own

testimony in concluding that he was competent. The trial court even re-evaluated Briseno’s

competency on the same day that he pled guilty. It followed the guidelines for ensuring that

Briseno’s plea was voluntary and intelligent, and that he voluntarily waived his right to a jury

trial in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Boykin. See R.T. at 20-21. 

As for Salciccia’s representation, it was the trial court’s role - not Briseno’s counsel -

to make the ultimate competency determination. The record belies Briseno’s suggestion

that his counsel could have done more with respect to raising his competency concerns. 

Salciccia repeatedly raised his concerns regarding Briseno’s competency with the trial

court; and the trial court simply found, contrary to Salciccia’s concerns and opinion

otherwise, that Briseno was indeed competent to plead guilty. Briseno’s characterization of

Salciccia’s role at the competency and plea proceedings as “mute” and “silent” is

inaccurate and not supported by the relevant transcripts. Nor was Salciccia, as Briseno

suggests, required to “forcefully” resist his entry of a guilty plea, or to engage in

obstructionist behavior or behavior that violated the rules of courtroom decorum.

Additionally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Briseno’s free will was

overborne by Salciccia’s advice to Briseno regarding whether to plead guilty, given the fact

that the trial court reasonably determined that Briseno was indeed competent. In fact, as

noted, the plea transcripts demonstrate otherwise, as Briseno expressly confirmed that he

had not felt any pressure to plead guilty. R.T. 21. 

For these reasons, the court concludes that Salciccia’s performance fell well within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and that Briseno is

unable to demonstrate that his performance was deficient. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56. 

Having concluded that Briseno has not demonstrated deficient performance, the court is

not required to address the prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 19 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Therefore, the state court’s denial of relief on this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

III. and IV. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Advise Briseno re: Consequences of a Guilty

Plea and the Knowing and Voluntary Nature of Briseno’s Plea

Because they are related, the court addresses claims two and three together. In

claim two, Briseno contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation

of his Sixth Amendment rights when his trial counsel failed to advise him of the

consequences of a guilty plea; and, in claim three, that he was denied due process

because his guilty plea was neither knowing nor voluntary since his counsel failed to advise

him of the consequences of a guilty plea. 

Specifically, Briseno contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to advise him of the following consequences of his guilty plea, thereby rendering his

plea involuntary:

(1) that he was likely to receive consecutive prison terms of at least fifteen

years to life; 

(2) that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of at least fifteen years in

prison;

(3) that he was likely to be sentenced to at least one indeterminate life term;

and

(4) that he was statutorily ineligible for probation.

The legal standards are the same as those set forth above with respect to the

previous claim. Additionally, in advising a defendant, “[c]ounsel cannot be required to

accurately predict what the jury or court might find, but he can be required to give the

defendant the tools he needs to make an intelligent decision.” Turner v. Calderon, 281

F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel who advised defendant to reject offer of 15-years-tolife was not deficient where evidence showed that petitioner informed of potential death

penalty at trial, and counsel had allowed petitioner to think about offer overnight). 

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 20 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

Erroneous advice regarding the consequences of a guilty plea is insufficient to establish

ineffective assistance. Petitioner must establish a “‘gross mischaracterization of the likely

outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with . . . erroneous advice on the probable effects of

going to trial.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

In his January 2006 declaration, Briseno’s trial counsel, Salciccia, confirms that he

believed that Briseno would be sentenced to a range of forty to sixty years in prison. He

states, though, that he “cannot now recall exactly what advice [he] gave to Briseno about

the likely sentence should he plead guilty.” Salciccia presumes that he communicated his

concern that Briseno would receive a sentence of at least sixty years.

Briseno, however, asserts in his December 2005 declaration that Salciccia never

advised him that he was “almost certain to receive a minimum sentence of sixty years to

life.” Briseno states that had only a “very brief” discussion with Salciccia regarding the

possible sentence prior to pleading guilty. He contends that Salciccia never told him that

he was not eligible for a probationary sentence, that the witnesses he sought to have testify

at his sentencing might not be allowed to testify, that there was a mandatory minimum

sentence of fifteen years to life, or that he would receive at least one indeterminate life

sentence. Briseno further asserts that Salciccia never explained parole eligibility to him, or

that he could be detained following his sentence in state custody as a sexually violent

predator in civil commitment proceedings. 

In terms of new information in the 2005 declaration, Briseno asserts that had he

understood the above facts, he would not have pled guilty but would have exercised his

right to trial by jury because he believes that “a jury trial . . . would have exposed the many

injustices which were done to [him] in the handling of [his] case.”

Briseno’s brother, Modesto, attests that he was “privy to conversations” between

Briseno and Salciccia and that he never heard Salciccia tell him or his brother about a

mandatory minimum sentence; that Briseno was likely to receive a sentence of at least

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 21 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

sixty years to life in prison; that Briseno was facing an indeterminate life sentence; that a

parole board would make future decisions about Briseno’s case; or provide the practical

realities of a life sentence. Modesto does, however, recall that Salciccia advised Briseno

“in terms of a range of 40 to 60 years depending on how he presented to the probation

department.”

Prior to addressing the merits of the instant claim, the court begins by noting that

Briseno makes several statements in his December 2005 declaration that contradict not

only Salciccia’s, and even his brother Modesto’s declaration, but also prior statements he

made in his own previous declaration and on the record before the trial court. For

example, as discussed in more detail below, following sentencing, Briseno has completely

changed his story regarding his desire to have a jury trial. Additionally, in his previous

declaration, Briseno attested that he had been advised regarding parole. See Exh. F, at

Exh. B ¶ 3. Briseno now asserts that Salciccia did not discuss the likelihood of parole with

him.

Turning to the specific factors underlying the instant claim, the court begins first with

Briseno’s contention, new to his December 2005 declaration, that Salciccia did not advise

him that he was statutorily ineligible for probation. Salciccia does not address the issue in

any of his declarations. However, review of the record confirms that, even if not by

Salciccia, Briseno was clearly advised by the trial court - on more than one occasion - that

he was not eligible for probation prior to entering his guilty plea. Accordingly, to the extent

that Salciccia indeed failed to advise Briseno of this fact, and that such failure constituted

deficient performance under Strickland, Briseno was not prejudiced because the record

confirms that both Briseno and Salciccia advised the trial court on the record that they were

aware Briseno was statutorily ineligible for probation. See Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d

958, 968 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Sophanthavong, 378 F.3d at 871.

The other three factors underlying Briseno’s ineffective assistance claim - the fact

that his sentence would at a minimum be fifteen years and was likely to be at least sixty

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 22 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

years, the fact that the sentence could include one indeterminate life sentence, and the fact

that consecutive rather than concurrent sentences could be imposed – are related in the

sense that they are premised upon interpretation of the same California statute. Briseno

and the state briefed these issues extensively in the habeas proceedings before the state

appellate courts. Before the state courts, Briseno argued as a basis for this claim that

California Penal Code section 667.61 required the trial court to impose mandatory minimum

terms of fifteen years to life, which had to be imposed consecutively, for a minimum term of

210 years to life, given the number and type of charges to which Briseno pled guilty. See

Exh. F at 20; Exh. L at 11-12. However, the state pointed out in its brief before the state

appellate court, that, contrary to Briseno’s interpretation, section 667.61 did not require the

trial court to impose consecutive sentences; nor did it require a mandatory life sentence. 

Instead, the state noted that the statute could be interpreted such that it was within the trial

court’s discretion to determine whether or not to impose concurrent or consecutive

sentences, a decision that would also impact the length and nature of Briseno’s sentence.

Briseno appears to now acknowledge in his habeas briefs before this court that the

state is correct regarding its interpretation of section 667.61. He concedes in his traverse

that the trial court had discretion under that statute, but nevertheless argues that it was

“virtually certain” that he would receive a sentence that would keep him in prison for the

rest of his life “given the number of separate victims, the vulnerability of the victims, the

seriousness of the offenses, the admitted allegations of substantial sexual conduct [], and

the circumstances of the offenses, including the abuse of trust.” Briseno argues that it was

ineffective assistance for Salciccia to fail to advise him of the “virtual certain[ty]” of

consecutive sentences, along with at least one indeterminate life sentence.

Briseno’s assertion that Salciccia did not advise him of the fact that his sentence

would likely be at least sixty years contradicts both Salciccia’s and Modesto’s declarations. 

However, even if that factual dispute were resolved in Briseno’s favor, and assuming that

Salciccia did not advise him that he was likely to receive consecutive sentences, one of

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 23 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

which was an indeterminate life sentence, and that such failures constituted deficient

performance, Briseno is still not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

That is because Briseno is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result. 

See Weaver, 455 F.3d at 966 (noting that court is “well-advised to bypass scrutinizing a

criminal defense attorney’s representation if the defendant cannot show that he was

prejudiced by it”). First, as was the case regarding Briseno’s probation eligibility, even if

Salciccia did not advise him that the sentence he received would likely result in lifetime

imprisonment, review of the record confirms that the trial court clearly did advise Briseno of

this fact prior to accepting his guilty plea. See R.T. 19-21. Second, this case is very similar

to a recent Ninth Circuit decision on point. In Weaver, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a habeas

petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's allegedly deficient advice about the probable

length and concurrency of sentences under a plea bargain, given the unlikelihood that the

defendant, who professed a desire to avoid multiple public trials in order to spare him and

his family humiliation and publicity, would have otherwise rejected the plea offer and

insisted on risking trial on four brutal rape charges. Id. at 968-969. 

Like Weaver, there are numerous references in the record to Briseno’s desire in this

case to avoid a trial, and in particular, to avoid publicity regarding the alleged incestuous

nature of the charges involving his six year-old son, John Doe 6. See C.T. 152, 167, 168-

69, 174. Because the state indeed dismissed the charges against Briseno involving his son

in exchange for his guilty plea, Briseno, like the petitioner in Weaver, possessed reasons

for pleading guilty independent of the length of the sentence or the strength of the

prosecution’s case against him. See Weaver, 455 F.3d at 967-68. This fact is reinforced

by Briseno’s statements on the record at his change of plea hearing that “the last thing I

want to do is have a jury trial.” R.T. 13.

Briseno’s assertion in his latest declaration (attached to his traverse) that he would

have gone to trial by jury had Salciccia advised him of the nature of a probable sentence

simply is not credible in light of his statements on the record and the history of this case. It

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 24 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Section 1237.5 provides:

No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon

a plea of guilty or nolo contendre, or a revocation of probation following an

admission of violation, except where both of the following are met:

(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed

under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional,

or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings.

(b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such

appeal with the clerk of the court.

25

is clear to the court that these statements are simply a response to the deficiencies in

Briseno’s original arguments on this claim, as pointed out by the state in its opposition. 

Given the fact that the record reveals both independent reasons for Briseno’s guilty plea

and that the trial court advised him of the potential nature of his sentence, Briseno has not

shown that he was prejudiced by Salciccia’s allegedly deficient performance. Additionally,

because Briseno was not prejudiced by counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, in part

because the trial court properly advised him regarding the likely nature of his sentence prior

to his guilty plea, his plea was not rendered unknowing and involuntarily in violation of his

due process rights.

In conclusion, the state court’s denial of relief on this claim was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

V. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Obtain a Certificate of Probable Cause

Finally, Briseno argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in

violation of his Sixth Amendment rights when his trial counsel failed to obtain a certificate of

probable cause from the trial court, thus precluding him from appealing certain issues.

A. Certificates of Probable Cause

In the case of a judgment of conviction following a guilty plea, California Penal Code

section 1237.5 authorizes an appeal only as to a particular category of issues and requires

that steps in addition to filing a notice of appeal be taken. In re Chavez, 30 Cal.4th 643,

650 (Cal. 2003).5

 In order to challenge any issues concerning the validity of a guilty plea, a

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 25 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

After Briseno’s appeal, the Judicial Council of California repealed Rule 31(d) and

moved its provisions, as amended to former Rule 30(b), effective January 1, 2004. See

People v. Perez, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), review granted, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d

145 (Cal. June 13, 2007). It then renumbered Rule 30(b), as Rule 8.304(b).

Rule 8.304(b) has been subsequently criticized because when the Judicial Council

revised Rule 31(d), it appears to have inadvertently omitted the language containing the sixtyday time limit for filing the request for the certificate. See People v. Perez, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 683,

688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) review granted, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 (Cal. June 13, 2007); but see id.

at 689 (noting that Rule 8.308(a) requires that request be filed “in addition to notice of appeal,”

while requiring that notice of appeal be filed within 60 days of judgment).

26

defendant must first obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court, and an

appeal of any such issues will not be operative unless the defendant does so. See id. The

procedural requirement is applied in a “strict manner,” People v. Mendez, 19 Cal.4th 1084,

1096-97 (Cal. 1999), “regardless of other procedural challenges being made.” Chavez, 134

Cal.Rptr.2d at 60. “For example, a defendant who has filed a motion to withdraw a guilty

plea that has been denied by the trial court must still secure a certificate of probable cause

in order to challenge on appeal the validity of the guilty plea.” Id. 

However, a certificate is not required if the issue(s) to be appealed arose after the

entry of the plea and do not affect the validity of the plea. See Mendez, 19 Cal.4th at 1096. 

This generally includes claims of error in the sentencing procedure or in the sentence

imposed. See Chavez, 30 Cal.4th at 650 n.3; but see People v. Shelton, 37 Cal.4th 759,

766 (Cal. 2006) (where plea agreement specifies a particular sentence, then challenge to

sentence is a challenge to validity of plea and certificate must be obtained).

At the time that Briseno appealed to the California courts, former California Rule of

Court 31(d) set forth the applicable deadlines, as well as other conditions, for filing a

request for a certificate for probable cause, and provided in pertinent part: 

If a judgment of conviction is entered upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,

the defendant shall, within 60 days after the judgment is rendered, file as an

intended notice of appeal the statement required by section 1237.5 of the

Penal Code; but the appeal shall not be operative unless the trial court

executes and files the certificate of probable cause required by that section. 

Within 20 days after the defendant files the statement the trial court shall

execute and file either a certificate of probable cause or an order denying a

certificate and shall forthwith notify the parties of the granting or denial of the

certificate.6

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 26 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

The purpose in requiring a certificate of probable cause following guilty pleas is “to

promote judicial economy by screening out wholly frivolous guilty plea appeals before time

and money are spent on such matters as the preparation of the record on appeal, the

appointment of appellate counsel, and, of course, consideration and decision of the appeal

itself.” Chavez, 30 Cal.4th 643, 651 (quoting Mendez, 19 Cal.4th at 1095). Under section

1237.5, the trial court has the discretion to deny a certificate when an appeal would raise

frivolous and vexatious issues. People v. Hoffard, 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1178-79 (Cal. 1995);

see also Ramis v. People, 74 Cal.App.3d 325, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (concluding that

superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying certificate of probable cause where

the record indicated that defendant did not have any grounds for setting aside his plea);

People v. Nigro, 39 Cal.App.3d 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (concluding that record supported

trial court’s denial of certificate where it showed that in pleading nolo contendere, defendant

conceded that he “knew quite well” what he was doing and did not support defendant’s

vague, subjective feeling of pressure or coercion). 

B. Factual Background

It is undisputed that Briseno told Salciccia that he wanted to file an appeal in this

case. There is, however, some dispute as to the substance of the conversation between

Salciccia and Briseno regarding the issues to be appealed and Briseno’s likelihood of

success on appeal. In Salciccia’s declarations and letter exhibits filed before this court and

the state appellate courts, Salciccia states that he told Briseno that he believed that

Briseno had a potential appellate claim based on the allegedly “draconian” nature of his

sentence. There is nothing in all of Salciccia’s declarations to suggest that he believed that

Briseno had any arguable pre-plea claims or claims related to the validity of his guilty plea,

which would have required a certificate of probable cause. See Exh. F, at Exh. A,

Salciccia’s December 20, 2001 decl. in support of state court appeal (“Regarding filing a

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 27 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

According to the appellate court’s docket, the notice of appeal was received in the

California Court of Appeal on February 5, 2001. 

28

notice of appeal, I told Mr. Briseno I did not do appellate work, but that I thought he had a

chance on appeal since the sentence was so draconian.”); Exh. F. at Exh. C, Salciccia’s

June 20, 2001 letter exhibit to state court appeal (“With regards to discussing an appeal

with Mr. Briseno, I told him that I felt that the sentence was draconian that I thought he had

some chance of an appeal, but that I did not do appellate work.”).

However, in Briseno’s current declaration, he suggests that, in addition to the

sentencing issues, he discussed appealing the trial court’s competency determination and

its denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea with Salciccia. This statement, however,

does not appear in any of Briseno’s prior declarations. See Exh. 5, Traverse (Briseno’s

April 30, 2001 declaration in support of motion for relief from default); Exh. F, at Exh. B

(Briseno’s December 4, 2001 declaration in support of state court appeal). 

It is nevertheless undisputed that Salciccia advised Briseno that he was not an

appellate attorney, but that he would prepare the notice of appeal for Briseno to file pro se. 

Salciccia advised Briseno to file it as soon as possible so that the court would appoint an

appellate attorney who was more familiar with appellate procedure and requirements right

away. Salciccia’s declarations are silent on the issue, but Briseno claims that Salciccia did

not discuss a certificate of probable cause with him. Salciccia prepared the notice of

appeal, and Briseno filed it pro se on June 15, 2000. The notice of appeal stated that

Briseno was appealing from the “Probation and Sentencing Order . . . entered on May 12,

2000.” Briseno did not file a request for a certificate of probable cause, which under Rule

31(d), would have been due sixty days following judgment, on approximately July 12, 2000.

Appellate counsel, Jill Lansing, was subsequently appointed. It is, however, unclear

from the record when that appointment took place, and that information is absent from any

of the declarations before this court.7

 On May 10, 2001, Lansing filed a motion on

Briseno’s behalf requesting that a certificate of probable cause be issued, and that relief

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 28 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

At the time the state appellate courts considered these motions in 2001, California

courts appeared to employ a more liberal standard for granting relief from failure to timely file

a request for a certificate of probable cause than they currently do. Prior to the California

Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Chavez, California courts relieved a defendant from default

when a showing of good cause was made. See Chavez, 30 Cal. 4th at 655-656 (discussing

People v. Sturns, 77 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1391 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)). However, in 2003, in

Chavez, the California Supreme Court held that the rule that California courts had been relying

on to allow relief where good cause was shown did not apply to cases where the defendant

failed to timely request a certificate of probable cause. In Chavez, the California Court of

Appeal granted the defendant's request for writ relief from his failure to timely file that request,

holding that he had shown good cause within the meaning of California Court Rule 45(a). The

Supreme Court reversed, though, concluding that former rule 45(e) did not authorize an

appellate court to grant relief from a failure to make a timely request for a certificate of

probable cause even if good cause was shown. 

29

from default for failure to file a timely request be granted. In that motion, Briseno stated

that he desired to challenge the trial court’s ruling on his post-plea motion to withdraw his

guilty plea and to fire Salciccia. 

Specifically, the motion asserted that “there are a number of potential issues on

appeal, including the competency issue,” as set forth in Lansing’s accompanying

declaration, that were barred by Briseno’s failure to seek and obtain a certificate of

probable cause. In her accompanying declaration, Lansing asserted that there may be

issues as to the trial court’s determination regarding Briseno’s competency. Additionally,

Lansing asserted that there appeared to be an issue regarding Salciccia’s failure to raise

ineffective assistance of counsel itself as grounds for withdrawal of Briseno’s guilty plea.

According to Lansing, the underlying ineffective assistance of counsel took the form of

Salciccia’s failure to advise Briseno regarding a mandatory minimum sentence and that

Briseno’s guilty plea would result in a life term.

The appellate court summarily denied the motion on June 6, 2001. On June 20,

2001, Briseno filed a subsequent motion for relief from default, again requesting that a

certificate of probable cause be issued, this time attaching the June 20, 2001, letter from

Salciccia as an exhibit (discussed above). The California Court of Appeal also summarily

denied that request on July 11, 2001.8 

Subsequently, in November 2001, Briseno filed his opening brief on direct appeal. 

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 29 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Briseno also filed a reply, which reiterated the same arguments made in his opening

brief. Exh. E.

30

Briseno did not argue that the trial court erred in its competency determination, but instead

argued only that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because Salciccia did

not raise ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for withdrawal of Briseno’s guilty

plea. Exh. C. Briseno contended that the underlying ineffective assistance consisted of

Salciccia’s failure to warn him that he would spend the rest of his life in prison, and

Salciccia’s allowing him to plead guilty when Salciccia believed he was incompetent. Exh.

C at 16. Briseno argued that since Salciccia was also the same counsel who filed his

motion to withdraw, Salciccia did not raise these instances as grounds for withdrawal of his

guilty plea. According to Briseno, he was prejudiced by this failure because he contends

that he would have been allowed to withdraw his plea had these grounds been raised. Exh.

C. at 17.

In opposition, the state argued that the appeal should be dismissed because

Briseno’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel challenged the validity of his guilty

plea, which required that he obtain a certificate of probable cause, which he did not do.9

Exh. D. The California Court of Appeal agreed, and on September 23, 2002, dismissed the

appeal. Exh. I. The court noted that Briseno’s “notice of appeal indicate[d] that his appeal

was based upon the court’s post plea order imposing sentence and denying probation,” but

that “in his appellate briefs defendant seeks only to challenge his trial counsel’s failure to

raise, or his trial counsel’s failure to secure independent counsel to raise, issues going to

the validity of defendant’s guilty pleas as part of defendant’s motion to withdraw those

pleas.” Exh. I (emphasis added). Because this issue “in effect challenge[d] the validity of

[Briseno’s] guilty pleas,” the court dismissed the appeal based on Briseno’s failure to obtain

a certificate of probable cause, citing California Penal Code § 1237.5, California Rule of

Court 31(d); and relevant California Supreme Court cases. Id.

Briseno then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review of the California

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 30 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

Court of Appeal’s dismissal order, arguing that the state appellate court erred in dismissing

the appeal based on the absence of a certificate of probable cause. The state supreme

court denied review on December 2, 2002. Briseno then raised the underlying ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, already addressed above in this order, in habeas petitions

before the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. As noted, both

courts denied habeas relief on the merits in postcard denials.

C. Legal Standards

When a defendant instructs counsel to file a notice of appeal, and counsel fails to

do so, it constitutes deficient performance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477

(2000). “Counsel’s failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing a

notice of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the

defendant’s wishes.” Id. However, in cases “where the defendant neither instructs counsel

to file an appeal nor asks that an appeal not be taken,” the question then becomes whether

counsel consulted with the defendant on the issue. Id. at 478. If counsel did consult with

the defendant, then “counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by

failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an appeal.” Id.

However, if counsel did not consult with the defendant, then counsel’s performance is

deficient if there is reason to think that a rational defendant would want to appeal or that

this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in

appealing. Id. at 480. 

A petitioner must also show prejudice (i.e., meet the second Strickland prong) to be

entitled to habeas relief in a failure-to-appeal case. Id. at 483-84; see also id. at 

477-78 (rejecting Ninth Circuit's bright-line rule that failure to file a notice of appeal unless

directed not to do so by defendant is per se ineffectiveness). To show prejudice, the

petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed. See

id. at 484. Evidence that there were nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or that the defendant

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 31 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

promptly expressed a desire to appeal often will be highly relevant in determining whether

the petitioner has shown prejudice. 

D. Analysis

Because there do not appear to be any United States Supreme Court or Ninth

Circuit cases directly on point, the court finds that the above legal standards pertaining to

notices of appeal are instructive. However, the court notes that this case differs from Roe

and Ninth Circuit cases interpreting Roe because, following consultation with Briseno and

at least partially in accordance with Briseno’s desires, Salciccia did draft a notice of appeal

from the sentence imposed for Briseno to file pro se, which Briseno did. Unlike the other

cases, what is at issue is counsel’s alleged failure to file the document - a request for a

certificate of probable cause – required under California law for Briseno to appeal

additional issues related to the validity of his guilty plea. 

That said, turning to the issue of deficient performance, as with the issues discussed

above, the court finds it very suspicious that Briseno previously filed two declarations with

the state appellate courts that did not contain his most recent assertion that he discussed

with and indicated to Salciccia that he desired to appeal the trial court’s competency

determination and its denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Given the

inconsistency in the three declarations filed by Briseno himself, and when compared to the

consistency in Salciccia’s declarations and letter exhibits, the veracity of Briseno’s most

recent revelation is called into doubt. Accordingly, based on this court’s review of the

record, it appears that Salciccia believed that Briseno’s only viable claims pertained to his

sentence and communicated this to him. Given the record, it would not have been deficient

performance for Salciccia to determine that a trial court would not grant a certificate of

probable cause as to other issues related to the validity of Briseno’s plea, nor would it have

been deficient performance for Salciccia to simply file a notice of appeal as to these claims.

Nevertheless, even if this court were to credit Briseno’s recent statement that he did

in fact request Salciccia to file the documents necessary for him to appeal the competency

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 32 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

determination and the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, thereby leading

to a conclusion that Salciccia’s failure to file a request for the certificate was deficient, the

court concludes that Briseno has not demonstrated prejudice.

It is in evaluating prejudice that the failure to file notice of appeal cases provide less

guidance. Unlike those cases involving counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal, in this

case, had Salciccia filed a request for a certificate of probable cause, an appeal of those

issues would not have been automatic. Instead, the state trial court would have been

afforded an opportunity to review the request, and to deny the request if in its discretion it

determined that the issues were frivolous or vexatious. Accordingly, in evaluating the

prejudice issue, this court must consider the likelihood that the state court would have

found the claims Briseno asserts that he would have raised, frivolous or vexatious.

Briseno’s argument in his traverse regarding the claims that he would have raised

had a request for a certificate been filed with the state court is also suspect. In setting forth

potential claims, Briseno relies to a large degree on his related motion papers and briefs

before the state appellate court. However, his current reading and interpretation of the

state court documents regarding his potential claims is significantly broader than the

potential claims actually stated in those motion papers and briefs. It therefore appears to

the court that in his traverse, Briseno has strategically attempted to enlarge the issues that

he claims he would have raised from those that he claimed he would have raised in his

filings before the state appellate court. Not only does this constitute a revisionist approach

to history, but it also poses exhaustion problems since the state courts were not given the

opportunity to consider the issues that Briseno now claims he would have raised. 

Nevertheless, the court has considered the potential claims Briseno currently asserts he

would have raised in determining that he is unable to show prejudice based on Salciccia’s

failure to request a certificate of probable cause.

Specifically, Briseno now contends that he would have challenged: (1) the trial

court’s findings of competence both at the time he entered his plea and a year earlier; (2)

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 33 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Again, Briseno’s long list of potential claims is highly suspect. Specifically, the court

notes that Briseno saw fit to raise only the ineffective assistance claims listed at (3) above in

his direct appeal, which the California Court of Appeal subsequently dismissed.

34

the trial court’s failure to follow the appropriate procedure for determining competence; (3)

trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in the proceedings leading up to and including the

entry of Briseno’s guilty pleas; (4) “issues stemming from the apparent conflict between the

court’s statements to [Briseno] prior to [Briseno’s] pleas wherein [the judge] assured

[Briseno] that he would consider any evidence supporting [Briseno’s] arguments for

leniency, including hearing testimony from mitigation witnesses at sentencing;” and (5) the

trial court’s denial of Briseno’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.10

The court begins by noting that it has already addressed above in this order in

conjunction with federal habeas claims 1-3 why potential claim (3) lacks merit. That is

because claim (3) above is premised on the very ineffective assistance claims raised in this

federal habeas petition and denied by the state appellate courts in Briseno’s state habeas

petition. However, the court does not conclude that this ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, based on Salciccia’s failure to prepare a request for a certificate of probable cause,

fails simply because one of the potential claims Briseno asserts he would have raised lacks

merit.

Instead, the court concludes that Briseno is unable to demonstrate prejudice

because it is highly probable that the state trial court would have denied a certificate of

probable cause as to the above potential issues, and thus Briseno would not have been

permitted to appeal those issues anyway. This is because the trial court would very likely

have concluded, given the record, that the above issues were frivolous and/or vexatious. 

Potential issues one and two relate directly to the trial court’s determination regarding

competence, as does part of the potential issue three (ineffective assistance of counsel

claim) as it relates to Salciccia’s beliefs regarding Briseno’s competence, and potential

issue five regarding the trial court’s denial of Briseno’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

The trial court would have been extremely likely to consider these issues frivolous and

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 34 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11Briseno’s argument that prejudice can be established by any “possibility” that the trial

court would have granted a certificate of probable cause is misguided. The Supreme Court’s

decision in Roe is clear that the standard for measuring prejudice in this case is one of

“reasonable probability.” 528 U.S. at 485. Moreover, the case Briseno relies on, United States

v. Kwan, is factually distinguishable from this one, and involved an attorney’s affirmative

misrepresentations as to his expertise in immigration law and as to the immigration

consequences of the defendant’s guilty plea. 407 F.3d 1005, 1015-1017 (9th Cir. 2005). For

all of the reasons above, there was a very high probability that the trial court would have

denied the certificate, given the record in this case.

35

vexatious given the number of times that Briseno (via Salciccia) raised competency issues

with the trial court and the number of times that the trial court determined Briseno was

indeed competent to proceed. This conclusion is supported by the trial court’s statements

on the record as set forth above in the factual background section of this order. 

As for the remaining potential claims set forth in Briseno’s traverse, it is also

extremely likely that the trial court would have denied a certificate as to them as frivolous

and/or vexatious. First, review of the record and the transcripts demonstrates that contrary

to Briseno’s assertion, the trial court never promised Briseno “leniency.” In fact, quite the

opposite is true. The trial court repeatedly advised Briseno that he was statutorily ineligible

for probation, and appropriately advised him regarding the potential length of his sentence. 

Additionally, given the trial court’s repeated admonishments regarding the consequences of

Briseno’s guilty plea, as discussed at length above, it is highly probable that the trial court

would have denied a certificate of probable cause as to Briseno’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim to the extent that it was based on Salciccia’s alleged failure to advise Briseno

regarding the consequences of his guilty plea.11 

For all of these reasons, this court concludes that Briseno cannot show prejudice

based on Salciccia’s failure to file a request for a certificate of probable cause. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of relief on this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

VI. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Briseno also requests an evidentiary hearing on the above claims in his traverse.

The standards set forth above regarding expansion of record are relevant to Briseno’s

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 35 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

request for an evidentiary hearing. As noted, Briseno did exercise diligence in so far as he

requested an evidentiary hearing before the state appellate courts in conjunction with his

state habeas petition. 

 However, even though Briseno may have exercised diligence in making the request

before the state court, there is no per se requirement for an evidentiary hearing. Turner,

281 F.3d at 890. A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance

of counsel claims only if he can demonstrate that, if his allegations were proven at the

evidentiary hearing, deficient performance and prejudice would be established. See id. 

Here, as discussed in detail above, this court has considered the “new” information

submitted by Briseno in conjunction with his request to expand the record, and it is not

clear to the court “what more an evidentiary hearing might reveal of material import.” See

Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying petitioner’s request for

evidentiary hearing regarding his assertion of actual innocence). Because Briseno’s claims

may be resolved by reference to the state court record and the documentary evidence he

has submitted, the court denies his request for an evidentiary hearing. See Griffey, 345

F.3d at 1067 (even where petitioner had shown diligence entitling him to evidentiary

hearing, Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioner was not entitled to evidentiary hearing

because his claims could be resolved by reference to the state court record and the

documentary evidence he submitted); see also Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th

Cir. 1994).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Briseno’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED because the appellate court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law; nor was it based on an 

////

////

////

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 36 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. This order fully

adjudicates this case and terminates all pending motions. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 17, 2007

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-01458-PJH Document 38 Filed 09/17/07 Page 37 of 37