Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05474/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05474-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 423
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Withdrawal 28 USC 157
Cause of Action: 28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREG BRAUN, Chapter 11 Trustee, CASE NO. CV-F-04-5474 LJO

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs. (Doc. 45)

THOMAS O’BRIEN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Pursuant to a notice filed on November 18, 2005, Plaintiff Greg Braun, as Plan Agent and Former

Chapter 11 Trustee of Coast Grain Company, renews his motion for partial summary judgment as to his

Fifth and Sixth Claims for relief against defendant Dairy Feed Group. Defendant Dairy Feed Group filed

an opposition on December 2, 2005. Greg Braun filed a reply on December 9, 2005. 

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, as well as the Court’s file, the Court

finds that the matter may be submitted on the pleadings without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule

78-230(h). 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Overview

A Chapter 11 involuntary petition was filed against Coast Grain Company on October 17, 2001.

Coast Grain’s Third Amended Chapter 11 Plan was approved by the Bankruptcy court which appointed

Greg Braun as the Plan Agent to implement the plan. Coast Grain, the bankrupt estate, is the majority

shareholder in Coast Grain de Mexico, a Mexican corporation. Greg Braun was appointed sole

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administrator of Coast Grain de Mexico on March 10, 2003.

The Claims bar date set by the Court was April 11, 2002 and extended to October 2, 2002 for

certain creditors. Braun contends that Dairy Feed Group was not extended time to file its proof of claim.

On June 26, 2003, Dairy Feed Group filed a proof of claim for $873,300.00 as “money owed,” and

which is alleged to be secured by the assets of Coast Grain de Mexico.

B. Prior Court Order on Braun’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

On January 7, 2005, Braun moved for partial summary judgment on the fifth and sixth claims

for relief. In the prior motion, as in this motion, plaintiff sought to adjudicate that defendant has no

ownership interest in Coast Grain de Mexico. Plaintiff argued that Mexican law applies to determine

who is the owner of the shares of Coast Grain de Mexico. Defendant relied on California law. 

1. Choice of Law

This Court thus first performed a choice of law analysis. At the direction of Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court turned to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Restatement

of Conflicts") to determine whether Mexico’s or California’s laws apply. Restatement of Conflicts §

302 (1971) states that "[i]ssues involving the rights and liabilities of a corporation ... are determined by

... the local law of the state of incorporation" unless "some other state has a more significant relationship

to the occurrence and the parties." The "internal affairs" doctrine is a conflict-of-laws principle that

recognizes that only one state should have the power to regulate matters peculiar to the relationship

among the corporation, its officers and directors, and its shareholders. In re Sagent Technology, Inc.,

Derivative Litigation, 278 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1090 (N.D.Cal. 2003); see also Restatement (Second) of

Conflicts § 302 (1971). Under the "internal affairs" doctrine, the rights of shareholders in a foreign

company are determined by the law of the place where the company is incorporated. Batchelder v.

Kawamoto, 147 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Court thus found that the laws of Mexico apply to this case:

“the parties dispute who is the owner the shares of Coast Grain de

Mexico, the Mexican corporation. Thus, the dispute involves the internal

affairs of the Mexican corporation. Therefore, the laws of Mexico

determine who is the owner of the shares of Coast Grain de Mexico.”

(Doc. 38, p. 4-5.)

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2. Denial of Motion without Prejudice

Next, the Court turned to the applicable provision of the Mexican Commercial law cited by the

parties - Ley General de Sociedades Mercantile, Articulo 128 y 129. The Court noted that the parties

did not provide any expert testimony on the Mexican law at issue in the case, and that expert testimony

is needed to prove foreign law. (Doc. 38, p. 6.) The Court found that plaintiff had not carried his burden

of proof because Braun did not provide an expert opinion as to what the Mexican law says or how it is

applied. 

In addition, the motion was denied due to the request of defendant for additional discovery.

There was a volume of discovery documents which had been lately produced, and coupled with the

language barrier, made on-going discovery reasonable and necessary. Accordingly, the Court denied

the motion without prejudice.

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Initially, it is the moving party's burden to establish that there is "no genuine issue of material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56( c); British

Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978). When plaintiff is the moving party,

plaintiff’s burden of proof is: (1) to demonstrate affirmatively (by admissible evidence) that there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to each element of its claim for relief, entitling it to judgment as a

matter of law; and (2) to demonstrate the lack of any genuine issue of material fact as to affirmative

defenses asserted by the defendant. Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed Civ. Pro.

Before Trial, §14:140 (the Rutter Group 2005) and cases cited therein. Thus, plaintiff must establish

not only the elements of his claim, by undisputed material facts, but also that the defendants’ affirmative

defenses do not raise triable issues of fact. Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Rule 56(e) requires the party against whom the motion is made to “set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Absent such a showing, a properly supported motion for

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summary judgment may be granted if the court finds it appropriate.” Nelson, Robbins, et al v. Louisiana

Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material

issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First National Bank

of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968); T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. The

opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”Matasushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted). The opposing party’s evidence is to be believed and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor

of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court must not weigh the evidence and must

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732,

735 (9th Cir.1997); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S.Ct. 2072,

2077 (1992) (“Because this case comes to us on petitioner Kodak's motion for summary judgment, the

evidence of respondents is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in their favor.").

The court, however, has no duty to search the record, sua sponte, for some genuine issue of

material fact; the court may rely entirely on the evidence of the moving party. Guarino v. Brookfield

Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992). If the motion is based on deposition testimony,

the court may rely exclusively on portions highlighted by the moving party and need not comb the

deposition to discover conflicting testimony. Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, supra, 980 F.2d

at 403. The court is not obligated to consider matters not specifically brought to its attention. Thus, it

is immaterial that helpful evidence may be located somewhere in the record. The opposition must

designate and reference specific triable facts. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (DC

Cir. 1988). Inferences drawn from the evidence, however, must be viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456, 112

S.Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992).

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment as to the fifth and sixth claims for relief. The fifth

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 The Stock Purchase Agreement between the Weinberg entities and Dairy Feed Group, discussed infra, contains

a choice of law provision indicating that the law of California applies to the transaction. (Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber Decl.,

Exh. A §8.9.)

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claim is against Dairy Feed Group and seeks a “determination of the nature, extent and validity of

defendant’s ownership claim in Coast de Mexico.” (Complaint ¶29.) The sixth claim for relief is an

objection to and request for disallowance of Dairy Food Groups proof of claim at of $873,300 which

Dairy Feed Group alleges is secured by an interest in Coast de Mexico. (Complaint ¶31-33.)

B. Mexican or California Law

The parties continue to dispute whether Mexico or California law applies. Defendants’ argument

for California law is that the defendant Dairy Feed Group’s transaction with the Weinbergs occurred in

California and that both Dairy Feed Group and the Weinbergs are California residents.

 The problem with this argument is that it ignores the third entity, the Mexican corporation Coast

Grain de Mexico. As between Weinberg and Dairy Feed Group, California law may apply.1 The issue

before the Court, however, is to determine how their purported transaction affects the corporation Coast

Grain de Mexico. As discussed in detail in the Court’s prior order on plaintiff’s motion, the Restatement

of Conflicts states that a corporation’s “internal affairs” are controlled by the law of the place of

incorporation. The place of incorporation is Mexico. 

Dairy Feed Group argues that it “does not seek to vote the stock” or “take any action attributable

to shareholder status,” and implicitly argues that the “internal affairs” are not triggered. To the contrary,

Dairy Feed Group is seeking ownership of Coast Grain de Mexico, which it can only do by owning

stock. Therefore, who owns the stock is the quintessential aspect of the “internal affairs,” of the

corporation.

C. Stock Purchase Agreement between Weinberg and Dairy Feed Group

The additional evidence the Court has, which the Court did not have in the prior motion, is Ms.

Weinberg-Gewelber’s declaration and the Stock Purchase Agreement. 

The Stock Purchase Agreement involves the sale of the stock in Coast Grain Company, a

California Corporation. The Sellers are not the Weinbergs, individually, but the Weinbergs in their

trustee capacity. The Sellers are “Marcha Weinberg, Trustee of Marcha’s Trust U/D/T dated December

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7, 1992 and Marcha Weinberg, Robert A. Weinberg and Rhona Weinberg Gewelber, trustees of the Bob

and Marcha Weinberg Decedent’s trust U/D/T dated February 14, 1991” and the Buyer is “Dairy Feeds

Group.” The Stock Purchase Agreement was entered on October 3, 2001. (Exh. A to Ms. WeinbergGewelber Decl.) 

The Stock Purchase Agreement does not mention Coast Grain de Mexico. The Stock Purchase

Agreement refers to “affiliates” and “subsidiaries,” but there is not any language which explicitly

transfers the Coast Grain de Mexico stock to Dairy Feed Group. That is probably why Ms. WeinbergGewelber testifies in her declaration that,

“When I signed the October 3, 2001 stock purchase agreement, I assumed

without specific discussion that by transfer of stock the entire company

was being transferred, including Coast de Mexico and any stock in that

Mexican company that Coast Grain Company, I, and my family owned

shares of. I had no intention for any stock or assets of Coast de Mexico

to be withheld from the Dairy Feeds Group, and assumed the Dairy Feeds

Group would actually or beneficially own all of the Coast de Mexico as

part of the October 3, 2001 transaction.” (Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber Decl.

¶8.)

Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber then states that she signed a proxy, dated February 8, 2002, to transfer Coast

De Mexico’s stock to the Dairy Feeds Group, with the intent to transfer all shares of Coast de Mexico

to Dairy Feed Group. (Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber Decl. Exh. B.) The proxy which she attaches at Exh.

B is problematic. It states: 

“In exercise of the rights granted me by the articles of incorporation and

by-laws of Coast Grain de Mexico, SA de CV, I hereby appoint you my

proxy with adequate authority to attend in the name and stead of Coast

Grain Company, the general ordinary shareholders meeting to be held on

February 8, 2002 and vote thereat in such manner as you deem expedient

my vote.” (Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber Decl. Exh. B.) 

The problem is twofold. First, by February 8, 2002, Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber had sold her stock in Coast

Grain Company, pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement, and she had no shares to proxy. She

testifies she “understood” from an accountant that she had “authority” from Coast Grain Company. (Ms.

Weinberg-Gewelber Decl.¶9.) Her understanding is irrelevant.

Second, the proxy does not mention in any way a transfer of shares of Coast Grain de Mexico.

There is no testimony as to what happened at the February 8, 2002 shareholder meeting. The only

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 (Woolman decl., Exh. F and G.) Exhibit F and G were exhibits to the deposition of attorney Bruce Varner, and

numbered exhibit 5 and 11 at the deposition. They purport to be shareholder minutes, in Spanish. The exhibits were not

properly authenticated by him - other than to say that he received these documents from the Mexican attorney. The deposition

excerpts of attorney Bruce Varner are themselves not property authenticated. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

“repeatedly held that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of

America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing several cases). In a summary judgment motion, documents

authenticated through personal knowledge must be “attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of [F.R.Civ.P.] 56(e)

and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence.” Canada v. Blain’s Helicopters,

Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987); Orr, 285 F.3d at 773-774. A deposition or an extract therefrom is authenticated in

a summary judgment motion when it identifies the names of the deponent and the action and includes the reporter’s

certification that the deposition is a true record of the deponent’s testimony. Orr, 285 F.3d at 774. Generally, this is

accomplished by attaching the cover page of the deposition and the reporter’s certification to every deposition extract

submitted. Orr, 285 F.3d at 774. Here, defendant offers excerpts of deposition testimony which are not properly

authenticated. The excerpts lack the reporter’s certification and the name of the action. Nonetheless, the Court has considered

the excerpts of Bruce Varner’s deposition.

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 But, even this evidence is lacking - it does not show the transfer actually took place and her intent is not relevant.

Plaintiff also objects to this testimony on the ground that it is an improper opinion under FRE 702, her opinion is irrelevant.

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minutes of the February 8, 2002 meeting are in Spanish and not properly authenticated.2 Ms. WeinbergGewelber states “at the time I signed the proxy(ies), my intent was to transfer all shares of Coast de

Mexico to the Dairy Feeds Group, or to whomever the Dairy Feeds Group might designate to hold the

shares for its benefit.” (Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber Decl. ¶9.) This is defendants best evidence that shares

of Coast Grain de Mexico were intended to transferred to Dairy Feed Group.3

In addition, plaintiff pointed out additional problems with the Stock Purchase Agreement. No

individual members of the Weinberg family are parties to the Stock Purchase Agreement and they only

executed the agreement in their capacities as trustees. The shares in Coast Grain de Mexico are owned

by the individual members of the Weinberg family, and are not owned by the Weinbergs as trustees.

Thus, the individual members of the Weinberg family could not have transferred their shares in Coast

Grain de Mexico without being parties to the Stock Purchase Agreement. To transfer their shares in

Coast Grain de Mexico to Dairy Feed Group, the individuals would have had to do so by a separate

agreement.

A final substantive issue with the Stock Purchase Agreement is that it calls for the delivery of

the “stock certificates” to the buyers at the closing. (Ms. Weinberg-Gewelber Decl. Exh. A, ¶ 2.3(b).)

If Ms. Weinberg-Gewelberg did intend to transfer the shares of Coast Grain de Mexico to Dairy Feed

Group, as she states in her declaration, Dairy Feed Group has not produced the share certificates. The

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 Defendants claim that the certificates do not exist. Defendants’ Disputed Fact no. 6 states “Coast Grain de Mexico

never issued certificates for any stock transfer,” citing to an February 11, 2002 letter from a Mexican attorney, Jorge Murillo.

Murillo states “please advise what to do regarding the shares certificates for I am not aware of their existence.” This fact is

not supported by competent evidence. The letter is not properly authenticated and there is a lack of foundation as to what

Murillo means. 

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 Plaintiff also points out that Section 8.2 of the Stock Purchase Agreement is an integration clause and that the

agreement is the “entire agreement between the parties.” 

6

 Alejandro Osuna-Gonzalez is a lawyer licensed in Mexico and a graduate of the Law School of the Universidad

Iberoanmericana, Tijuana in 1995. He received a LLM from Univ. of Pittsburgh, Pa. He has written articles on international

commercial law and a case book on international sales. Since 1998, he has taught foreign investments, international

commercial law and international sales and trade in Mexico and Puerto Rico. He founded the law firm of Osuna and Rivero

in Tijuana focusing on international commercial law, Mexican corporate law, real estate law and civil and commercial

litigation. Defendants neither object to Osuna as an expert nor to any of his opinions.

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delivery of the stock certificates was specifically called for in the Stock Transfer Agreement.4

In short, there is no issue of fact from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the

Stock Purchase Agreement transferred or intended to transfer the Coast Grain de Mexico Shares.5

D. Shareholder Registry

Dairy Feed Group argues that the Shareholder Registry was not in existence until 2003 and

implicitly argues that the Registry does not have the full force as Braun argues. 

Braun’s main argument is that the Mexican law requires recordation of the shares the

Shareholder Registry in order to be considered a “shareholder.” Braun’s expert testified: “Neither

[Thomas O’Brien or Dairy Feed Group] can be acknowledged as a shareholder in Coast Grain de Mexico

absent a recorded entry in the Shareholder’s Registry.” (Osuna Decl. ¶ 9, p.5:1-3.) However, the

Registry did not exist until 2003. The Registry, dated 2003, retrospectively documents issuance of stock

certificates for 1991, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999. (Braun Decl. Exh. B, p. 1 (1991), p. 3 and 4 (1995),

p.5 (1996), p.7 (1997), p.8 (1999).) Each entry in the Registry was made on October 30, 2003, and not

contemporaneously with the stock issuance. If the ownership does not exist unless Registered, than any

stock ownership prior to 2003 did not exist. 

Nonetheless, the requirement of a Shareholder Registry is undisputed. The Mexican law is

undisputed. Plaintiff’s expert Alejandro Osuna-Gonzalez states share ownership in a Mexican

Corporation requires an entry on the shareholder registry.6 The Mexican law, Ley General de Sociedades

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Mercantile, Articulo 128 y 129, requires that a company maintain a registry of shares, including name,

address and nationality of the shareholder, and the number and kind of shares. (Osuna Decl. ¶7.) A

person is not considered a shareholder of a Mexican corporation if the name does not appear on the

shareholder registry. Neither Dairy Feed Group nor Thomas O’Brien is identified on Coast Grain de

Mexico’s shareholder registry of shareholders. (Osuna Decl. ¶9.) 

Plaintiff is correct that Defendants have not provided an alternative Mexican Shareholder

Registry nor admissible evidence that the Mexican Shareholder Registry is not what it purports to be.

Plaintiff, however, presents expert testimony, based on a review of the books of Coast Grain de Mexico

and review of official documents on file in the Tijuana office of the Public Registry, that no change to

the stock took place after 1999. 

Defendants argue there is a mistake in the shareholder registry because it ignores the intention

of the Weinbergs’ as shareholders. Defendants argue that the documentation of the transaction or the

formalities of the transaction may be missing, but the Weinbergs and Dairy Feed Group agree that Dairy

Feed Group owns the Weinbergs’ shares in Coast Grain de Mexico.

The applicable Mexican law, to which there is undisputed expert opinion, is that the formalities

must be observed for the shareholder to be recognized as such. The Stockholder Registry does not

record Dairy Feed Group’s alleged ownership.

E. Purported Shareholder Minutes

Defendants submit shareholder minutes which purport to transfer the shares from the Weinbergs

to Dairy Feed Group. The minutes are not in English. (Woolman Decl. Exh. F and G.) The minutes

are unsigned. (Woolman Decl. Exh. F and G.) Defendants have not provided a translation. Defendants

have not presented expert testimony as to the meaning of the purported minutes. Defendant does not

present evidence that the purported shareholder meeting even occurred or what occurred at the meeting.

Plaintiff’s unrefuted expert testifies that the unsigned minutes have no meaning under Mexican

law. (Osuna Decl. ¶12.)

Plaintiff’s unrefuted expert testifies that if the minutes are not recorded, they do no have any

force. (Osuna Decl. ¶12-13.)

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Mexican law applies to this case and to this motion. It is unrefuted what that law means and how

it is applied in this case before the Court. Defendants have not shown that there has been compliance

with the Mexican law to prove or show ownership. It is undisputed that defendants are not named in

the Shareholder Registry. It is undisputed that the proxies and minutes do not transfer the shares in

Coast Grain de Mexico to defendants under Mexican law. Accordingly, the motion should be granted.

Plaintiff objected to nearly all of defendant’s evidence on various grounds, including lack of

authentication and hearsay. The Court does not need to reach the objections, because even considering

the substance of the evidence, the motion should be granted.

F. Sixth Claim for Relief

Since the Court finds that Dairy Feed Group does not have shares in Coast Grain de Mexico, the

sixth claim for relief is moot. The motion should be granted as to this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed more fully above, the Court GRANTS this motion as follows:

1. The motion for partial summary judgment as to Defendant Dairy Feed Group as to the

Fifth Claim for Relief is GRANTED.

2. The motion for partial summary judgment as to Defendant Dairy Feed Group as to the

Sixth claim for relief is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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