Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05499/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSEANNE SAKAMOTO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL LEAVITT,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-05499 SI

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY

By letter briefs, the parties seek resolution of a dispute regarding the release of plaintiff’s medical

records. Defendant seeks an order compelling plaintiff’s physicians to release the records or, in the alternative,

an order compelling plaintiff to sign a release for this information. 

At the February 15, 2005 casemanagement conference,the Court ordered plaintiffto informdefendant

by March 15, 2005 whether she would be asserting medicalor emotionaldistress claims. In a March 15, 2005

letter, plaintiffstated thatshe “will assert thatshe saw her regular personaldoctor because ofthe discrimination

and retaliationshe suffered at her workplace,” but “would not assert that she sought psychiatric treatment” for

these injuries. Def.’s April 22, 2005 Letter Br., Ex. A. Defendant has issued subpoenas to various of plaintiff’s

medical providers, but theywill notrelease the records without a signed release from plaintiff or a court order

mandating production. Plaintiff has refused to sign a medical release for her records or to stipulate thatshe will

not present evidence of extraordinary emotional distress or medical consequences of emotional distress. 

Defendant argues that, by providing her own testimony as evidence of the medical consequences of

Case 3:03-cv-05499-SI Document 170 Filed 07/07/05 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the alleged discrimination, plaintiff is placing her mental health in controversy. If she does this, her medical

records become relevant to questions of causation for and the magnitude of emotional distress. According to

defendant, the medicalrecords already produced demonstrate that plaintiff suffered from migraine headaches

and possible depression before the alleged discrimination, and that she is taking anti-anxiety medication.

Plaintiff submits a copy of a subsequent letter from her counsel to defense counsel, further stating that “Ms.

Sakamoto is not seeking the testimony of any health care professional on the issue of her emotional distress,”

“[n]or is she claiming unusually severe emotional distress or a diagnosable or ongoing medical condition.”

Plaintiff contends that defendant is trying to conduct a fishing expedition into Ms. Sakamoto’s medicalrecords

in order to “manufacture” a pre-existing condition. Pl.’s April 22, 2005 Letter Br. at 1. 

This dispute presents an issue regarding waiver of the federal privilege protecting the psychological

treatment relationship. Another court in this district has recognized that the “psychotherapist-patient privilege”

may extend to “medicalrecords involv[ing] mental health (including physical conditions tied to mentalhealth),”

which should be considered psychological records. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 634 (N.D. Cal.

2003). The question here is whether plaintiff’s intention to give testimony that she saw her personal doctor

would waive the privilege.

The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, and multiple approaches to the waiver issue have

developed in the district courts. Under the broad approach, some courts have held that a simple allegation of

emotionaldistress in a complaint constitutes waiver. See Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D.

Cal. 1999); Sarko v. Penn-DelDirectoryCo., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Penn. 1997). Here, however, the parties

agree that plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress damages, by itself, does not waive the privilege. Under the

narrow approach, courts have held that “there must be an affirmative reliance on the psychotherapist-patient

communications before the privilege will be deemed waived.” Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 636; Vanderbilt v.

Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997). There is also a “middle ground approach” that finds

waiver only when a plaintiff alleges more than “garden-variety emotional distress,” which is “ordinary or

commonplace emotional distress” rather than distress “resulting in a specific psychiatric disorder.” Fitzgerald,

216 F.R.D. at 637 (citation omitted). In applying this “garden-variety” approach, courts have analogized to

case lawapplyingFed.R.Civ. P. 35(a), which governs court orders for physicaland mentalexaminations when

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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a party’s condition is in controversy. See, e.g., Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D.

445, 449 n. 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216 (D.N.J. 2000). These courts find

waiver if: 

(1) the plaintiff pleads a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional

distress; (2) the plaintiff alleges a specific mental or psychiatric injury; (3) the plaintiff pleads

a claim for unusually severe emotional distress; (4)the plaintiff plans to offer expert testimony

to support a claim of emotional distress; and/or (5) the plaintiff has conceded that his or her

mental condition is “in controversy” for purposes of Rule 35(a).

Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 637-38, citing Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179 F.R.D. 579, 579 (N.D. Cal.

1998). 

Here, the Court finds it appropriate to adopt the middle ground approach to waiver. Doing so, it finds

that plaintiff has not waived her privilege, because at this point she has alleged only garden-variety emotional

distress. She has not pled a separate cause of action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

According to plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Sakamoto will not assert that she sought psychiatric treatment for any

injury caused; she is not claiming unusually severe emotional distress or a diagnosable or ongoing medical

condition;she will not offer the testimony of any health care professional on the issue of her emotionaldistress;

and she has not conceded that her mental condition is in controversy. Given these representations, plaintiffis

restricted to her own testimony about her emotionaldistress and may not seek compensation for any medical

expenses she incurred as a result ofher emotionaldistress or any damages for extraordinary emotionaldistress.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to compel is DENIED without prejudice to reconsideration in the

event that plaintiff’s allegations later exceed the scope of garden-variety emotional distress.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-05499-SI Document 170 Filed 07/07/05 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSEANNE SAKAMOTO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL LEAVITT,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-05499 SI

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY

By letter briefs, the parties seek resolution of a dispute regarding the release of plaintiff’s medical

records. Defendant seeks an order compelling plaintiff’s physicians to release the records or, in the alternative,

an order compelling plaintiff to sign a release for this information. 

At the February 15, 2005 casemanagement conference,the Court ordered plaintiffto informdefendant

by March 15, 2005 whether she would be asserting medicalor emotionaldistress claims. In a March 15, 2005

letter, plaintiffstated thatshe “will assert thatshe saw her regular personaldoctor because ofthe discrimination

and retaliationshe suffered at her workplace,” but “would not assert that she sought psychiatric treatment” for

these injuries. Def.’s April 22, 2005 Letter Br., Ex. A. Defendant has issued subpoenas to various of plaintiff’s

medical providers, but theywill notrelease the records without a signed release from plaintiff or a court order

mandating production. Plaintiff has refused to sign a medical release for her records or to stipulate thatshe will

not present evidence of extraordinary emotional distress or medical consequences of emotional distress. 

Defendant argues that, by providing her own testimony as evidence of the medical consequences of

Case 3:03-cv-05499-SI Document 170 Filed 07/07/05 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the alleged discrimination, plaintiff is placing her mental health in controversy. If she does this, her medical

records become relevant to questions of causation for and the magnitude of emotional distress. According to

defendant, the medicalrecords already produced demonstrate that plaintiff suffered from migraine headaches

and possible depression before the alleged discrimination, and that she is taking anti-anxiety medication.

Plaintiff submits a copy of a subsequent letter from her counsel to defense counsel, further stating that “Ms.

Sakamoto is not seeking the testimony of any health care professional on the issue of her emotional distress,”

“[n]or is she claiming unusually severe emotional distress or a diagnosable or ongoing medical condition.”

Plaintiff contends that defendant is trying to conduct a fishing expedition into Ms. Sakamoto’s medicalrecords

in order to “manufacture” a pre-existing condition. Pl.’s April 22, 2005 Letter Br. at 1. 

This dispute presents an issue regarding waiver of the federal privilege protecting the psychological

treatment relationship. Another court in this district has recognized that the “psychotherapist-patient privilege”

may extend to “medicalrecords involv[ing] mental health (including physical conditions tied to mentalhealth),”

which should be considered psychological records. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 634 (N.D. Cal.

2003). The question here is whether plaintiff’s intention to give testimony that she saw her personal doctor

would waive the privilege.

The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, and multiple approaches to the waiver issue have

developed in the district courts. Under the broad approach, some courts have held that a simple allegation of

emotionaldistress in a complaint constitutes waiver. See Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D.

Cal. 1999); Sarko v. Penn-DelDirectoryCo., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Penn. 1997). Here, however, the parties

agree that plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress damages, by itself, does not waive the privilege. Under the

narrow approach, courts have held that “there must be an affirmative reliance on the psychotherapist-patient

communications before the privilege will be deemed waived.” Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 636; Vanderbilt v.

Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997). There is also a “middle ground approach” that finds

waiver only when a plaintiff alleges more than “garden-variety emotional distress,” which is “ordinary or

commonplace emotional distress” rather than distress “resulting in a specific psychiatric disorder.” Fitzgerald,

216 F.R.D. at 637 (citation omitted). In applying this “garden-variety” approach, courts have analogized to

case lawapplyingFed.R.Civ. P. 35(a), which governs court orders for physicaland mentalexaminations when

Case 3:03-cv-05499-SI Document 170 Filed 07/07/05 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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a party’s condition is in controversy. See, e.g., Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D.

445, 449 n. 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216 (D.N.J. 2000). These courts find

waiver if: 

(1) the plaintiff pleads a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional

distress; (2) the plaintiff alleges a specific mental or psychiatric injury; (3) the plaintiff pleads

a claim for unusually severe emotional distress; (4)the plaintiff plans to offer expert testimony

to support a claim of emotional distress; and/or (5) the plaintiff has conceded that his or her

mental condition is “in controversy” for purposes of Rule 35(a).

Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 637-38, citing Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179 F.R.D. 579, 579 (N.D. Cal.

1998). 

Here, the Court finds it appropriate to adopt the middle ground approach to waiver. Doing so, it finds

that plaintiff has not waived her privilege, because at this point she has alleged only garden-variety emotional

distress. She has not pled a separate cause of action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

According to plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Sakamoto will not assert that she sought psychiatric treatment for any

injury caused; she is not claiming unusually severe emotional distress or a diagnosable or ongoing medical

condition;she will not offer the testimony of any health care professional on the issue of her emotionaldistress;

and she has not conceded that her mental condition is in controversy. Given these representations, plaintiffis

restricted to her own testimony about her emotionaldistress and may not seek compensation for any medical

expenses she incurred as a result ofher emotionaldistress or any damages for extraordinary emotionaldistress.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to compel is DENIED without prejudice to reconsideration in the

event that plaintiff’s allegations later exceed the scope of garden-variety emotional distress.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-05499-SI Document 170 Filed 07/07/05 Page 6 of 6