Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02262/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02262-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Tony Goodrum,

Petitioner,

v.

Cynthia Y. Tampkins,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:11-cv-2262-AJB-LL

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, (Doc. No. 91); 

(2) DENYING THE SECOND 

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS, (Doc. No. 75); 

AND

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Before the Court is Petitioner Tony Goodrum’s (“Petitioner”) Second Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). (Doc. No. 75.) On February 23, 2018, 

Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler issued a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) 

recommending the Petition be denied. (Doc. No. 91.) On June 18, 2018, Petitioner filed 

objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 96.) Respondent replied to the objections on June 28, 

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2018. (Doc. No. 97). For the reasons outlined below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and 

DENIES the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct. Petitioner may rebut this presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1992) (holding that 

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn therefrom, are entitled to 

statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the California 

Court of Appeal opinion:

Goodrum lived with his girlfriend Ieisa Wilson, her two children, and 

another couple in a house on Brookhaven Road. Goodrum and the victim 

Dwayne Stamps, were friends. About a year earlier Stamps had rented a room 

in the Brookhaven house for a few months. In the past, Goodrum and Stamps 

had argued, even to the point of pushing or shoving each other, but they had 

never had a fist fight and Stamps had never made any threats to kill Goodrum 

or anyone else. Goodrum and Stamps had not seen each other for several 

months. Some animosity had developed between them because Stamps had 

borrowed and not returned Wilson’s car (Wilson and Goodrum viewed it as a 

theft of Wilson’s car).

On September 24, 2002, Stamps had been terminated from a drug 

rehabilitation program, his girlfriend Lorraine Murray had complained about 

not being happy with the relationship, and he had backed her vehicle into a 

pole or tree, damaging it. After stopping at a bar, Stamps and Murray drove 

to the Brookhaven residence, arriving about 9:00 p.m. At the time of his death, 

about 30 minutes later, Stamps had a blood alcohol level of .17 percent.

When Stamps and Murray arrived, the garage door to the Brookhaven 

residence was propped open six to seven inches with a pipe. The lights were 

on in the garage, which was often used by the residents of the house as an 

additional living space. Goodrum was inside the garage with a woman playing 

dominoes. Goodrum, the woman, and her friend had used methamphetamine 

that day “for a few hours at least.”

When Stamps knocked loudly on the garage door, Goodrum responded 

by opening the door. Stamps walked in and said he was looking for Jason Cruz 

who had his earring and other belongings. He was rude to the woman, 

suggesting in a lewd manner that he knew her and told her that if she saw Cruz 

to tell him that he was going to kill him.

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Stamps entered the house, took Wilson into the bedroom and accused 

her of saying “mean things” about him. According to Wilson, Stamps 

threatened to kill her. When Goodrum entered the bedroom, Stamps accused 

Goodrum of having his diamond earring. Goodrum said the earring was in a 

duffel bag, which he took out of a closet, carried out to the garage, and set 

down in from of Murray’s vehicle. Stamps and Goodrum argued in the garage 

and exchanged blows both in the garage and in front of Murray’s vehicle. 

According to Goodrum, Stamps said he was going to get a gun and shoot 

everyone in the house.

Stamps went to Murray’s vehicle and pulled out a roofing hammer, 

which was described as looking like a tomahawk, hatchet, or axe. According 

to Goodrum, Stamps threatened, “I’m gonna fuck you up. I’m gonna fuck you 

up.” Goodrum pulled out a knife and picked up a trash can with his other hand. 

The men continued arguing but did not raise their weapons. Goodrum told 

Stamps to leave.

There were other people in the garage area, including the woman with 

whom Goodrum had been playing dominoes, Murray, and Goodrum’s friend 

Howard Herring. According to some of the witnesses, things calmed down; 

both men put down their weapons, they hugged, Stamps apologized, and said 

he loved Goodrum as a brother. According to Goodrum, things did not calm 

down. Stamps made a comment that he was “gonna get [his] strap and shoot 

everybody in the house.” Goodrum responded he was going into the house 

and when he came back he was “gonna be shootin’ sparks.” Goodrum 

retrieved a rifle from between the mattress and box springs of the bed in the 

master bedroom. He cocked the rifle in the bedroom.

When Goodrum entered the garage with the rifle, Stamps stood near the 

rear of the driver’s side of a car parked in the garage. When Stamps became 

aware of the gun, he said something like, “Go ahead and shoot me.” According 

to several witnesses, including neighbors, Stamps was not holding anything 

in his hands. A neighbor across the street saw Goodrum advance toward 

Stamps. Herring and Goodrum, as well as another neighbor, testified Stamps 

started walking towards Goodrum. Goodrum fired twice at Stamps, hitting 

him once in the head and once in the chest.

Herring testified that after the first shot, Stamps turned, grabbed his 

stomach and said something like, “I can’t believe you shot me.” Herring saw 

blood in the area of Stamps’s heart. As Stamps turned, Goodrum fired a 

second shot and Stamps collapsed to the ground. According to Murray, the 

first shot hit Stamps in the face and he staggered. The second one hit him in 

the heart, he fell to the ground, and Goodrum was preparing to fire again when 

Murray shouted at him to stop.

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According to Goodrum, when he entered the garage, Stamps 

commented in a sarcastic or mocking tone of voice, “Oh, he’s got a gun. What 

are you going to do with a gun?” Goodrum thought Stamps was hiding 

something behind his back, possibly a gun. Stamps kept advancing despite 

Goodrum’s warning that he was “a damn good aim.” Goodrum fired when 

Stamps started moving a pipe from behind his legs. After the first shot, Stamps 

continued to swing the pipe up, so Goodrum fired again. A pipe was later 

found near Stamps’s body.

Stamps died as a result of the gunshot wounds, either of which was 

potentially fatal. The head wound likely would have caused immediate 

unconsciousness and it would have been unlikely Stamps would have been 

able to speak or move after the wound was inflicted. The barrel of the rifle 

was two feet or further from the head wound when it was inflicted. In contrast, 

the barrel of the rifle was touching or nearly touching Stamps when the chest 

wound was inflicted. It is possible that if the chest wound were inflicted first 

that Stamps might have remained standing and able to speak.

Goodrum presented evidence that after the shooting Murray had told 

some people that earlier in the evening Stamps stated he thought he was going 

to die that night and purposely drove into ongoing [sic] traffic and hit a light 

pole, in an effort to kill them both. She said Stamps was upset about being 

terminated from the drug rehabilitation program and was afraid if he “got a 

dirty test” he would be sent back to jail. He told her he was not going back to 

jail; they would have to kill him first. She also said Stamps had grabbed a pipe 

and had advanced toward Goodrum. Murray denied making any of these 

statements.

(Doc No. 76-15 at 2–5.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 27, 2002, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged Petitioner 

with one count of murder, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. (Lodgment 

No. 1, Vol. 1, Doc. No. 76-1 at 1–2.) After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of voluntary 

manslaughter, the jury found the firearm allegations to be true, and Petitioner was 

sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. (Id. at 201–03.)

On September 23, 2011, Petitioner filed the Petition in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) This 

Court concluded Petitioner had failed to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2)(B) to proceed with a second or successive petition and dismissed the case. 

(Doc. No. 25.) A motion for relief from judgment was denied on October 23, 2012. (Doc.

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No. 39.) Petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit on November 26, 2012, and the Ninth 

Circuit granted relief on June 9, 2016, remanding the case to this Court. (Doc. No. 64;

Goodrum v. Busby, 824 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2016).) Petitioner filed a Second Amended 

Petition and lodgments in this case on March 12, 2017, and Respondent filed an Answer 

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer on June 9, 2017. 

(Doc. Nos. 75–76, 83.) Petitioner filed a Traverse on October 7, 2017. (Doc. No. 88.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Petition is governed by the AEDPA, applying a “‘highly deferential standard 

for evaluating state-court rulings,’ which demands that state-court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 & n.7 (1997)). Federal habeas relief may be granted 

if the state court (1) applied a rule different from the governing law provided by the United 

States Supreme Court; or (2) correctly identified the governing legal principle, but 

unreasonably applied it to the facts of the case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, 

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); 

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–18 (9th Cir. 1989).

As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its 

burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed 

de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner objects on three grounds. First, Petitioner argues the R&R improperly 

made a credibility finding without conducting an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. No. 96 at 12.) 

Second, Petitioner claims the R&R’s analysis regarding Petitioner’s ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim is erroneous. (Id. at 19.) Finally, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 28.)

A. Howard Herring’s Credibility

The Court will first address Petitioner’s objection that the R&R found Howard 

Herring (“Herring”) incredible without an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 12.) First, Petitioner

contends the prosecution presented perjured testimony of Herring to secure his conviction.

(Id. at 8.) Specifically, Petitioner claims the prosecutor and police coerced Herring’s 

testimony that Stamps did not have a pipe in his hands when Petition shot him, thereby 

defeating Petitioner’s self-defense argument. (Doc. No. 75 at 53–66.) The R&R analyzed 

Petitioner’s claim that Herring gave perjured testimony under the three-prong test in Napue 

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The R&R determined that under the first prong of Napue, 

Petitioner must establish that Herring’s testimony was “actually false.” (Doc. No. 91 at 17.) 

However, the R&R noted that given Herring’s “questionable credibility and the lack of 

evidence to support several of Herring’s claims, as well as evidence in the record 

contradicting some of Herrings’ claims, Goodrum has not established Herring committed 

perjury at his trial at the behest of Rivera, Cooper or Sergott.” (Id. at 20.) Petitioner objects, 

arguing the Magistrate Judge erred when he made a credibility determination as to 

Herring’s credibility without conducting an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. No. 96 at 12.) 

However, upon reviewing the R&R, the record, and the law de novo, the Court 

disagrees with Petitioner’s characterization of the Magistrate Judge’s findings. The R&R, 

in analyzing the first prong under Napue, was looking at whether the “testimony (or 

evidence) was actually false.” (Doc. No. 91 at 10 (quoting Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 

1057, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2008)).) The Magistrate Judge conducted such an analysis by 

reviewing the evidence contained in the record. The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion did not

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solely rest on Herring’s credibility. Instead, the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that 

Petitioner could not demonstrate that Herring’s testimony was “actually false” rests on the 

inconsistencies in the record, and the lack of evidence suggesting Herring’s statements 

were in fact “actually false.”

Specifically, Petitioner’s claim that Herring’s testimony was “actually false,” and 

coerced is without evidentiary support in the record. (Doc. No. 91 at 20.) Petitioner fails to 

prove that Herring’s testimony was “actually false” because the record reflects inextricable

ambiguities and inconsistencies regarding Herring’s testimony. See Tapia v. Tansy, 926 

F.2d 1554, 1563 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Contradictions and changes in a witness’s testimony 

alone do not constitute perjury and do not create an inference, let alone prove, that the 

prosecution knowingly presented perjured testimony.”); Williams v. Biter, No. CV 10-0694 

VAP FMO, 2012 WL 7687945, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. CV 10-0694 VAP SS, 2013 WL 990455 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 

2013) (“As an initial matter, petitioner has failed to show that Detective Koman’s 

testimony on this issue was actually false. At most, petitioner has shown inconsistencies in 

Detective Koman’s testimony. Mere inconsistencies in testimony, however, do not 

establish actual falsity.”).

The evidence shows that these inconsistencies were prevalent. For example, Herring 

testified on direct examination at trial that as Stamps began walking toward Petitioner, he 

was gesturing with his hands but did not have anything in his hands. (Lodgment No. 3, 

Vol. 1, Doc. No. 76-5 at 137–38.) Herring also stated he had previously put the pipe near 

the driver’s side of the car in the garage near Stamps’ body. (Lodgment No. 3, Vol. 2, Doc.

No. 76-6 at 6–7.) Then, on cross-examination, Herring testified first he did not know where 

the pipe was at the time of the shooting. (Id. at 23.) Later, Herring stated he told police 

Stamps “had a metal pipe or something.” (Id. at 37.) The detective who interviewed 

Herring, Maria Rivera (“Rivera”), testified at trial on cross-examination that Herring told 

her during his first interview that he “thought [Stamps] had a metal pipe in his hand.” (Id.

at 152.) On redirect examination, Rivera said Herring told her he assumed Stamps had the 

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pipe because it was lying next to him. (Id. at 154.)

Furthermore, Herring states in his affidavit that Rivera threatened Herring with a 

perjury charge if Herring told the truth about Stamp holding a pipe. (Doc. No. 91 at 18.) 

But Rivera has never testified that Herring told her the victim was never holding a pipe. 

(Id.) Rather, Rivera has only stated that Herring was unsure whether the victim in fact had 

a pipe. (Id.) The record also does not supporting a finding that Rivera threatened Herring, 

and the Magistrate Judge points out evidence which actually contradicts Petitioner’s 

claims. (See id. at 17–20.) As such, the R&R essentially further details Herring’s 

unsupported claims and concludes that there is a lack of evidence in the record supporting 

his contentions. (Id.) Thus, the R&R found under the first prong of the Napue test that 

Herring’s testimony did not appear to be false when made.

What the R&R does not do, however, is put this Court in the place of a fact-finder 

to make determinations about Herring’s character in order to ascertain whether Herring’s 

version of the events was false. The Court did not need to listen to live testimony to 

determine what the record already clearly established. Rather, the R&R’s analysis leaned

on the internal inconsistencies between Herring’s affidavit and the facts in the record to 

conclude that Petitioner could not prove that Herring’s testimony was actually false when 

made. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections on this ground.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Petitioner argued his counsel was ineffective for three reasons: (1) counsel failed to 

locate and interview Herring; (2) counsel failed to adequately challenge the prosecution’s 

fingerprint expert; and (3) counsel failed to move to dismiss the case based on law 

enforcement’s failure to preserve exculpatory evidence, i.e., the pipe found at the scene. 

(Doc. No. 91 at 25.)

In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must 

establish two criteria: (1) counsel’s performance was so deficient as to fall short of the 

guarantee of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and (2) counsel’s errors were so 

prejudicial that the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

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U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This Strickland standard is highly deferential to trial counsel based 

upon the ease of second-guessing one’s counsel after an adverse conviction or sentence is 

entered. Id. at 689. When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “a court 

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance[.]” Id. This standard is heightened when raised in a 

federal habeas petition. Harrington, 562 U.S. 86 at 100–01.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688. “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice 

can be demonstrated by showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see 

also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The Court need not address both the 

deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing 

of either one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

1. Counsel’s Failure to Locate and Interview Herring

Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to locate and interview Herring 

before and after the preliminary hearing. (Doc. No. 75 at 80–94.) Petitioner contends that 

had counsel done so, Herring would have testified at the preliminary hearing that Stamps 

was advancing on Petitioner with a metal pipe at the time Petitioner shot him, thereby 

providing Petitioner with a viable self-defense argument. (Id.) Therefore, according to 

Petitioner, this would have changed the outcome of the preliminary hearing and he would 

not have been held to answer on the murder charge. (Id.) The R&R concluded that there 

was no basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on allegations of counsel’s 

failure to locate and interview Herring. (Doc. No. 91 at 26–31.) Petitioner objects to the 

R&R, arguing that not only should Herring have been secured for the preliminary hearing,

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but that “Goodrum’s claim is much broader. Goodrum has made clear that his trial counsel 

was deficient not only in failing to locate Herring for the preliminary hearing but also that 

he was deficient in failing to investigate and interview Herring afterwards.” (Doc. No. 96 

at 20.)

First, as to counsel’s efforts to locate Herring before the preliminary hearing,

counsel stated on the first day of the preliminary hearing that he had subpoenaed and served 

Herring prior to the preliminary hearing and a warrant had issued that morning as a result 

of Herring’s failure to appear. (Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 1, Doc. No. 76-3 at 224.) Counsel 

told the court he had made a “good faith effort” to locate Herring and that Herring was a 

“material witness for the preliminary hearing purposes as well as perhaps some future 

proceedings.” (Id.) The prosecution also claimed to not have been able to locate Herring 

and that he “[did] not want to be found at this point.” (Id. at 225.) Despite these attempts, 

the court still granted a one-week continuance to give the defense time to locate Herring. 

(Id. at 226.) Petitioner contends he provided locations for his attorney to search for Herring. 

(Doc. No. 75-4 at 3–9.) But this does not necessarily prove counsel did not search for 

Herring in the places mentioned by Petitioner. Given the totality of the circumstances, and 

counsel’s efforts, Petitioner fails to prove that the attorney did not act as a reasonable 

attorney in trying to locate Herring. After the attempts to subpoena and locate Herring, 

there was no “showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 

as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687. 

Second, Plaintiff objects that counsel “failed to hire an investigator” and “failed to 

interview Herring” after the preliminary hearing. (Doc. No. 96 at 20.) But once it became 

clear from the preliminary hearing that Herring’s statement to Rivera was unfavorable to 

Petitioner’s defense, counsel could have made a reasonable strategic decision that any 

further attempt to locate Herring for the defense could be harmful. Therefore, counsel could 

have determined strategically that Petitioner’s case was stronger if Herring was not located 

or investigated and did not testify for either the defense or the prosecution. Strickland, 466 

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U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (“In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.”); Silva v. Yates, No. 07CV537-WQH (JMA), 2008 WL 2339498, at *19 

(S.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (stating that “counsel’s decision not to hire a private investigator 

was reasonable.”). Accordingly, because there were no errors made in this circumstance, 

the Court need not consider whether Goodrum was prejudiced by his attorney in failing to 

successfully locate Herring. Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED. 

2. Counsel’s Failure with Fingerprint Expert

Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively challenge the 

prosecution’s fingerprint expert. (Doc. No. 75 at 95–106.) Petitioner contends counsel 

should have sought an independent fingerprint expert to determine whether any fingerprints

could be found on the pipe. (Id.) Petitioner also presented an affidavit by a fingerprint 

expert, Kurt Kuhn, which states that law enforcement’s handling of the pipe likely 

destroyed or degraded any fingerprint evidence on the pipe, and that any prints recovered 

from the pipe should have been run through more data bases. (Doc. No. 75-2 at 16.)

Respondent contends defense counsel did consult a fingerprint expert and any argument 

that further investigation of whether there were fingerprints on the pipe would have helped 

the defense is simply speculation. (Doc. No. 83-1 at 4–42.)

The Magistrate Judge ultimately agreed with Respondent, and Petitioner objected on 

the ground that this Court has previously noted, “the expert to which counsel referred was 

actually the prosecution’s witness, and she never said the print located on the weapon 

belonged to an officer.” Goodrum v. Hoshino, No. CIV. 11-2262 IEG JMA, 2013 WL 

499861, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013). Petitioner thus objects that there is a factual issue 

as to whether counsel consulted with his own expert or not. (Doc. No. 96 at 24.) But 

contrary to Petitioner’s claim that counsel only consulted with the prosecution’s expert, it 

appears from the record that defense counsel did consult with his own fingerprint analyst.

As Respondent noted, exhibits and lodgments Petitioner provided to the California Court 

of Appeal contained a letter from Petitioner’s counsel to Petitioner which states the 

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following:

There is no written report from the fingerprint expert from Arcana Forensic.

The only fingerprints found on the pipe, after examination by both the police 

and my expert, were the bloody prints left by the police officer who arrived 

at the scene. Both you, Stamps, and the female witness were eliminated as 

placing the prints on the pipe. She also examined Stamps’[s] clothing and 

agreed that the shooting was done at close range. I was present during the 

examination of the evidence. 

(Lodgment No. 13, Doc. No. 76-21 at 145) (emphasis added).

Petitioner claims the letter was referring to a prosecution witness, but yet the record 

does not reflect this position, and Petitioner does not support this position with any other 

evidence. In fact, the prosecution witness actually testified to the contrary that she did not 

compare the fingerprints to those of any law enforcement personnel. (Lodgment No. 3, 

Vol. 3, Doc. No. 76-7 at 3.) Thus, the evidence reflects that counsel for Petitioner did 

consult with an expert, but the expert merely confirmed that the only fingerprint found on 

the pipe was those of a law enforcement officer. See Carpenter v. Kernan, No. C 06-7408 

JSW (PR), 2009 WL 3681684, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009) (“First, Petitioner has not 

provided any evidence in his petition that shows that defense counsel did not investigate 

the possibility of calling a DNA and fingerprint expert whose testimony would be helpful 

to Petitioner.”). Petitioner essentially expected counsel to either use unhelpful testimony 

from the expert or to keep perusing for other experts until someone more favorable 

appeared. But even if Petitioner’s counsel had used this expert’s opinion, it could have had

a harmful effect on Petitioner’s case because it showed that there were no fingerprints on 

the pipe. See Hernandez v. Smith, 100 F. App’x 615, 617 (9th Cir. 2004) (“There are several 

potentially sound tactical reasons for defense counsel’s decision to forego having his 

fingerprint expert testify. Defense counsel may have believed the expert witness’s 

equivocal testimony would do more harm than good.”). 

Petitioner also claims that if counsel cross-examined the fingerprint expert more 

vigorously about the possibility that any fingerprints that had been on the pipe were 

destroyed or degraded, this would have helped the defense by planting doubt in the jury’s 

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mind about the expert’s conclusions. (Doc. No. 96 at 32.) However, based on the other

evidence presented at trial, even if the jury had concluded that Stamps’ fingerprints may

have possibly been on the pipe but was destroyed, that is not sufficient for this Court to 

conclude that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” or “a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. This is especially 

true because the conclusion that it was possible that the fingerprint of Stamps existed on 

the pipe would have been based on pure speculation. 

Therefore, there was no error or prejudice by counsel in his decision to not use the

expert’s analysis of the pipe. Nor was there error or prejudice in not questioning the expert 

in accordance to Petitioner’s standards. Petitioner’s objection is therefore OVERRULED. 

3. Counsel’s Failure to Move to Dismiss for Failure to Preserve 

Evidence

Lastly, Petitioner protests that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss 

the case due to law enforcement’s alleged failure to preserve exculpatory evidence, namely, 

the pipe, by tossing the pipe onto a wet lawn. (Doc. No. 75 at 106–13.) The R&R found 

that there was no bad faith failure on the part of law enforcement to preserve evidence.

(Doc. No. 91 at 33.) Petitioner objects to the R&R’s conclusion, and reiterates that “[i]n 

light of the apparent value of the [metal pipe], which was known to [law enforcement at 

the scene], [their] actions . . . are sufficient to establish that [they] made ‘a conscious effort 

to suppress exculpatory evidence,’ thereby acting in bad faith.” (Doc. No. 96 at 27 (quoting

United States v. Zaragoza-Moreira, 780 F.3d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 2015).)

The state’s loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence violates due 

process when the evidence “possess[es] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the 

evidence was [lost or] destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be 

unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” California v. 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). However, “unless a criminal defendant can show 

bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 

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constitute a denial of due process of law.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); 

Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547–48 (2004) (per curiam). “The presence or absence of 

bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the 

police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or 

destroyed.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n. *; United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168, 1172 

(9th Cir. 2013). Even negligence in failing to preserve potentially useful evidence is not 

sufficient to constitute bad faith and does not violate due process. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 

58. “Bad faith requires more than mere negligence or recklessness.” United States v. Flyer, 

633 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2011).

The facts from the record do not demonstrate that the officers failed to preserve 

potentially useful evidence in bad faith. The first officer on the scene, Officer Brian French, 

saw Stamps lying in the garage and coughing up a large amount of blood. (Lodgment No. 

3, Vol. 3, Doc. No. 76-7 at 19.) Stamps was lying on a “large amount of debris and clutter” 

including glass and “a metal pole that was underneath him, protruding form between his 

legs.” (Id. at 20.) Officer French tried to administer first aid to Stamps. (Id.) Because 

Stamps was lying in a very narrow and cramped area with a lot of debris, Officer French 

and Officer Fischer tried to pull Stamps out of the garage area to continue with their first 

aid, but could not do so because of a metal pole tangled in Stamps’ legs. (Id. at 22.) Officer 

Fischer then grabbed the pole and threw it onto a grass area nearby. (Id. at 22–23.) As 

Officer Fischer did so, Petitioner told Officer Fischer that the pole was evidence.

(Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 1, Doc. No. 76-3 at 19.) The pipe was preserved for testing, but 

Petitioner contends counsel should have moved for dismissal because police failed to 

preserve any fingerprint evidence from the pipe when they removed it from between 

Stamps’ legs and tossed it onto the lawn. (Lodgment No. 3, Vol. 3, Doc. No. 76-7 at 22–

23.)

At best, Petitioner, has only established that Officer Fischer’s actions in tossing the 

poll while trying to save Stamps was negligent. Petitioner argues that Officer Fischer knew 

that the pipe was potentially exculpatory evidence because Petitioner told him so. 

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(Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 1, ECF No. 76-3 at 19.) However, Petitioner ignores a critical fact. 

Officer French’s testimony makes clear that while in the garage, after Officer Fischer 

tossed the pole onto the lawn, “[Petitioner] said something like, ‘that pole is evidence. That 

pole there was evidence” after [Officer Fischer] threw it.” (Id.) This testimony 

demonstrates that the officers were not on notice about the nature of the potential evidence

on the pole until after they began administering aid to Stamps, and after Petitioner alerted 

the officers of the potential evidentiary value of the pole. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish 

the officers’ “knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or 

destroyed.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n. * (emphasis added). Based on these facts, 

counsel could have made a reasonable, strategic decision that a motion to dismiss based on 

the failure to preserve exculpatory evidence would not have been successful. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). (Doc. No.

75 at 113–22.) Evidentiary hearings in § 2254 cases are governed by AEDPA, which 

“substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja 

v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court may not grant an 

evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner’s claim relies on (1) “a new rule of constitutional 

law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” or “a factual 

predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence” and (2) the underlying facts would sufficiently “establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Where the 

issues raised by the Petitioner can be resolved by reference to the state court record, no 

evidentiary hearing is required. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 183 (2011). 

Here, the Court has conducted a de novo review of Petitioner’s claims and has 

considered the state court record. This Court concludes there was no Napue violation in 

regards to Petitioner’s perjury claim. This Court also concludes that Petitioner did not 

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establish an ineffective counsel claim. Accordingly, he is not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing because his claims can be resolved by reference to the state court record. Id.; 

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (if record refutes petitioner’s factual 

allegations or otherwise precludes relief, an evidentiary hearing is not required); Gandarela 

v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (evidentiary hearing properly denied 

where petitioner “failed to show what more an evidentiary hearing might reveal of material 

import”).

D. Certificate of Appealability

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000). Here, the Court finds that 

reasonable jurists could not debate the Court’s conclusion to dismiss Petitioner’s claims 

and therefore DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. No. 

96), ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, (Doc. No. 91), DENIES Petitioner’s Second 

Amended Petition, (Doc. No. 75), and DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2019

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