Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05248/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05248-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 1999 Decided May 28, 1999

No. 97-5202

National Mining Association,

Appellant

v.

United States Department of the Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

Nos. 97-5203, 97-5204, 98-5248

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 88cv03464)

(No. 89cv01167)

(No. 89cv01751)

(No. 97cv01418)

---------

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Thomas C. Means argued the cause for the appellant.

John A. MacLeod, J. Michael Klise and Harold P. Quinn, Jr.

were on brief for the appellant

Ellen D. Katz, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellees. Lois J.

Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and Martin W. Matzen,

Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on brief

for the appellees. John T. Stahr, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

Glenn P. Sugameli argued the cause for appellee National

Wildlife Federation. Thomas J. FitzGerald was on brief.

Before: Wald, Silberman and Henderson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Section 510(c)

of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977

(SMCRA) requires a surface mining permit applicant to file

"a schedule listing any and all notices of violations of this

chapter and any law, rule, or regulation of the United States,

or of any department or agency in the United States pertaining to air or water environmental protection incurred by the

applicant in connection with any surface coal mining operation

during the three-year period prior to the date of application."

30 U.S.C. s 1260(c). The section further provides that

"[w]here the schedule or other information available to the

regulatory authority indicates that any surface coal mining

operation owned or controlled by the applicant is currently in

violation of this chapter or such other laws referred to this

subsection [sic], the permit shall not be issued until the

applicant submits proof that such violation has been corrected

or is in the process of being corrected to the satisfaction of

the regulatory authority, department, or agency which has

jurisdiction over such violation." Id. To implement section

510(c) the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement, United States Department of the Interior, (OSM) promulgated three final rules: the Ownership and Control Rule,

53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 (1988); the Permit Information Rule, 54

Fed. Reg. 8982 (1989); and the Permit Rescission Rule, 54

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Fed. Reg. 18,438 (1989). In consolidated district court actions the National Mining Association (NMA) challenged all

three final rules and the district court granted summary

judgment to OSM in each action. See National Wildlife

Fed'n v. Babbitt, Nos. 88cv3117, 88cv3464, 88cv3470 (D.D.C.

filed Aug. 31, 1995); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, Nos.

89cv1130, 89cv1167 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 31, 1995); National

Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, Nos. 89cv1751, 89cv1811 (D.D.C.

filed Aug. 31, 1995). In NMA v. United States Dep't of

Interior, 105 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1997), (NMA I) this court

reversed the district court, holding that the Ownership and

Control Rule's broad construction of the statute--that OSM

could block permits based on ongoing environmental violations by "upstream" owners or controllers of the permit

applicant--"conflicts with the plain meaning of section

510(c)," 105 F.3d at 693, which authorizes denial of a permit

based on violations only of "downstream" operations, that is,

ones that are "owned or controlled by the applicant," 30

U.S.C. s 1260(c). We further concluded that, "because the

permit-information rule and the permit-rescission rule are

centered on the Ownership and Control Rule, they too must

fall." 105 F.3d at 693. Finding the ownership and control

defect so fundamental to OSM's permit blocking regime, the

court vacated all three rules in toto, without reaching NMA's

objections to other aspects of the rules.

In response to the decision in NMA I, OSM issued an

Interim Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,450 (1997), (IFR), which

largely reenacts the provisions of the three vacated rules but

without the offending "upstream" provisions.1 NMA challenged the new IFR in the district court by moving for

enforcement of the NMA I mandate in the consolidated

actions and by filing a separate action, No. 97cv01418, to

independently challenge the IFR. In each case NMA raised

many of the objections we found it unnecessary to reach in

NMA I. The district court denied the motions for enforce-

__________

1 OSM has since proposed new permit rules. See 63 Fed. Reg.

70,580 (Dec. 21, 1998) (proposed rules); 64 Fed. Reg. 23,811 (May 4,

1999) (reopening and extending comment period to May 10, 1999).

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ment, dismissed the consolidated actions and granted summary judgment in the newly filed IFR action, rejecting each

of NMA's challenges. Reviewing the IFR de novo, as we

must, see National Coal Ass'n v. Lujan, 979 F.2d 1548, 1553

(D.C. Cir. 1992), we reverse the district court's summary

judgment in No. 97cv01418, challenging the IFR. Because

our review of that action disposes of the issues raised in

Appeal Nos. 97-5202, 97-5203, 97-5204 (from the mandate

enforcement denials in Nos. 88cv03464, et al.), we dismiss

those appeals as moot.2 We now address seriatim NMA's

various objections to the IFR.3

I. "Ownership and Control"

NMA asserts that the IFR reaches more broadly downstream than the statute permits in two respects.

First, NMA contends the IFR authorizes permit-blocking

based on an applicant's ownership and control not only of a

violating "operation," as the statute explicitly directs, but also

of other entities that in turn own or control a violating

operation. NMA is correct that the IFR authorizes permitblocking based on apparently limitless downstream violations.

See 30 C.F.R. s 773.15(b)(1) ("Based on a review of all

reasonably available information concerning violation notices

__________

2 In an order filed August 20, 1997, denying NMA's motion to

recall and enforce the mandate in NMA I, we stated: "[A]ny

challenges appellant wishes to raise concerning the revised regulations should be presented in the first instance in the form of a new

complaint." Accordingly, we resolve NMA's challenges in its appeal

from the summary judgment in No. 97cv01418, the action NMA

filed (on June 20, 1997) specifically to challenge the IFR.

3 We do not address NMA's due process arguments which are

addressed to OSM's 1994 procedural rules, see 43 C.F.R. ss 4.1370-

4.1377. The 1994 rules were not challenged below but were contested in a separate action, No. 88cv3464, an appeal from which is

pending in this court. See NMA v. Department of Interior, No.

96-5274 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 11, 1996). NMA has represented that

it "would not oppose deferring consideration" of due process to the

other appeal. Reply Br. at 20.

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involving either the applicant or any person owned or controlled by the applicant, ... the regulatory authority may not

issue the permit if any surface coal mining and reclamation

operation owned or controlled by the applicant is currently in

violation....") (emphasis added); id. s 773.20 (authorizing

regulatory agency to rescind permit "[w]hen the regulatory

authority finds that the permit was improvidently issued"

under 30 C.F.R. s 773.15(b)(1)). The statute itself, however,

requires not that the violating operation be directly owned by

the applicant but that it be either "owned or controlled by the

applicant." 30 U.S.C. s 1260(c) (emphasis added). OSM has

construed this language to include a downstream operation

controlled, albeit not owned, by the applicant through ownership and control of intermediary entities. This view is consistent with, if not mandated by, the statutory language which,

as noted, applies to any violating operations "controlled by

the applicant," not only those directly owned by him. Accordingly, the agency's construction must be upheld. See

National Coal Ass'n v. Lujan, 979 F.2d 1548, 1555 (D.C. Cir.

1992) ("We must defer to [OSM's] interpretation of

[SMCRA's] 'same penalties' provision unless the agency's

reading is contrary to the statute's instruction, or is unreasonable.") (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).

Second, NMA asserts the IFR oversteps OSM's statutory

authority insofar as it allows permit blocking based on a

violation by an entity that the applicant formerly owned or

controlled but does no longer. On this we agree. The

statute expressly authorizes permit-blocking "when an operation owned or controlled is currently in violation" of environmental laws. 30 U.S.C. s 1260(c). The legislative history

indicates, as the statutory language suggests, that the Congress intended to authorize a permit block only when an

applicant, through ownership or control, is in violation at the

time of application. See S. Rep. No. 85-128 at 79 ("This

subsection prohibits issuance of a mining permit if the application indicated the applicant to be in violation of the act or a

wide range of other environmental requirements.") (emphasis

added). For violations of an operation that the applicant "has

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controlled" but no longer does, and for which it therefore

lacks power to effect abatement, the Congress authorized

permit-blocking only if there is "a demonstrated pattern of

willful violations of this chapter of such nature and duration

with such resulting irreparable damage to the environment as

to indicate an intent not to comply with the provisions of this

chapter." 30 U.S.C. s 1260(c). Thus, to the extent the IFR

authorizes permit-blocks based on past ownership and control

without such a pattern,4 it contravenes the statute and cannot

be upheld.

NMA also challenges the IFR's rebuttable presumptions of

ownership or control set forth in 30 C.F.R. s 773.5(b). IFR

section 773.5(b) "presumes" ownership or control from certain

relationships between the applicant and a downstream entity

"unless a person can demonstrate that the person subject to

the presumption does not in fact have the authority directly

or indirectly to determine the manner in which the relevant

surface coal mining operation is conducted." Under subsections (1) to (6) of section 773.5(b) the rebuttable presumption

applies to a person who (1) is an officer or director of a

company, (2) operates a surface coal mining operation, (3)

controls the assets of an entity, (4) is general partner in a

partnership, (5) owns 10 to 50 per cent of an entity or (6)

owns or controls the coal to be mined (through lease, sublease

or other contract) and has either the right to receive the coal

after mining or the authority to determine the manner in

which the surface coal mining operation is controlled.5 NMA

contends that the presumptions in subsections (1), (3), (4) and

__________

4 The IFR does not explicitly authorize such a block but OSM has

so applied it at least once. See Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v.

Babbitt, C.A. No. 95-0227 (W.D. Va filed Apr. 4, 1995) (dismissing

for unripeness).

5 The presumptions have been omitted from OSM's new proposed

rules. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 70,583-84 ("The current presumptions

that ownership or control exists would be replaced with a requirement that the regulatory authority make a finding of actual ownership or control.").

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(5) are invalid. We agree as to subsections (1) and (5) but not

as to subsections (3) and (4).6

In reviewing regulatory presumptions we must defer to the

agency's judgment, see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.

ICC, 580 F.2d 623, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1978), but "an evidentiary

presumption is 'only permissible if there is a sound and

rational connection between the proved and inferred facts,

and when proof of one fact renders the existence of another

fact so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume

the truth of [the inferred] fact ... until the adversary disproves it,' " NMA v. Babbitt, No. 98-5320, slip op. at 8-9

(D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 1999) (quoting Secretary of Labor v.

Keystone Chem. Co., 151 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original)). " 'If

there is an alternate explanation for the evidence that is also

reasonably likely, then the presumption is irrational.' " Id. at

9 (quoting Keystone Chem. Co., 151 F.3d at 1101). The

presumptions enumerated in subsections (1) and (5) fail this

test because the relationships identified in them do not sufficiently indicate ownership or control.7 Being an officer or

__________

6 Because NMA has not specifically challenged the presumptions

in subsections (2) and (6), we do not decide their validity.

7 SM points out that SMCRA itself requires that several of the

same relationships be identified in a mining permit application. See

30 U.S.C. s 1257(b)(4) ("The permit application ... shall contain,

among other things-- ... if the applicant is a partnership, corporation, association, or other business entity, the following where

applicable: the names and addresses of every officer, partner,

director, or person performing a function similar to a director, of

the applicant, together with the name and address of any person

owning, of record 10 per centum or more of any class of voting

stock of the applicant and a list of all names under which the

applicant, partner, or principal shareholder previously operated a

surface mining operation within the United States within the fiveyear period preceding the date of submission of the application...."). The statute requires this, however, only for entities

upstream from the applicant, not for downstream entities whose

ownership or control may disqualify an applicant. In any event, to

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director does not by itself enable an entity to control the

company or its operations, as subsection (1) presumes. See

American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance:

Analysis and Recommendations s 1.08(a)(c) (Proposed Final

Draft 1992) ("A person is not in control of a business organization solely because the person is a director or principal

manager of the organization"); Louis Loss & Joel Seligman,

Securities Regulation 1724 & n.46 (3d ed. 1990) ("[A] person's

being an officer or director does not create any presumption

of control.") (emphasis in original); Burgess v. Premier Corp.,

727 F.2d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A director 'is not automatically liable as a controlling person. There must be some

showing of actual participation in the corporation's operation

or some influence before the consequences of control may be

imposed.' ") (interpreting section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. s 78j; quoting Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981); citing Cameron v.

Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 194-195 (5th Cir.

1979), modified, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)).

Nor has OSM offered any basis to support subsection (5)'s

presumption that an owner of as little as ten per cent of a

company's stock controls it. While ten per cent ownership

may, under specific circumstances, confer control, OSM has

cited no authority for the proposition that it is ordinarily

likely to do so.8 Accordingly we hold that the presumptions

in subsections (1) and (5) are invalid.9

__________

require identification of a particular relationship does not mean to

presume control from it.

8 In its brief OSM referred the court to several regulations

promulgated by other agencies but none of them presumes control

based simply on a ten per cent ownership stake, although another

Department of Interior regulation does so. See 30 C.F.R.

s 206.101(b) ("based on the instruments of ownership of the voting

securities of an entity, or based on other forms of ownership: ...

(b) Ownership of 10 through 50 percent creates a presumption of

control"). We do not consider the validity of section 206.101 here.

9 Because we invalidate these presumptions on the ground they

do not sufficiently show control, we need not address NMA's

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By contrast the presumptions in subsections (3) and (4) are

well-grounded. There is nothing strained about section (3)'s

presumption that one "[h]aving the ability to commit the

financial or real property assets or working resources of an

entity" controls it. The ability to control assets goes hand-inhand with control and is typically entrusted, along with

general managerial authority, to a single officer, often the

president. See University of R.I. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2

F.3d 1200, 1214 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[T]he hand that holds all the

purse strings presumably controls the dependent entity."); 2

W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations

s 466 (rev. ed. 1998). As for subsection (4)'s presumption

that control vests in each general partner, it naturally flows

from "the tenet of partnership law that a general partner has

control of partnership affairs as against the outside world."

Moving Phones Partnership L.P. v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1051, 1055

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Uniform Partnership Act s 9 (1914);

Picone v. Commercial Paste Co., 215 Miss. 114, 60 So.2d 590

(1952)); see DSE, Inc. v. United States, 169 F.3d 21, 32 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) ("A General Partner in a limited partnership has all

the rights and powers of a General Partner in a General

Partnership. Thus, a General Partner in a limited partnership is also presumptively in control of the limited partnership for purposes of the [SBA] affiliation regulation.").10

II. Statute of Limitations and Retroactivity

NMA next contends the IFR violates the five-year statute

of limitations governing penalty enforcement, 28 U.S.C.

s 2462, because it authorizes permit-blocking based on viola-

__________

alternative contention that the presumptions violate established

principles of stockholder and director liability.

10 We do not address NMA's contention that the IFR's rebuttable

presumptions of ownership shift the burden of proof to the permittee in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 556(d). The challenged burden framework is set out not in the

IFR but in OSM's procedural rules, see 43 C.F.R. ss 4.1374(b),

4.1384(b), which are subject to appeal in a separate pending action.

See supra note 3.

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tions more than five years old. In addition, it claims the IFR

has retroactive effect in blocking permits based on violations

that attached to an applicant before November 2, 1988, the

effective date of the Ownership and Control Rule. We conclude the section 2462 limitation period does not apply to the

permit blocks because the Congress intended to exempt them

from its scope but agree that the IFR is impermissibly

retroactive insofar as it reaches back before November 2,

1988.

Section 2462 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an

action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil

fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall

not be entertained unless commenced within five years

from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the

same period, the offender or the property is found within

the United States in order that proper service may be

made thereon.

28 U.S.C. s 2462. By the statute's express terms, its limitation period is inapplicable where "otherwise provided by Act

of Congress"--and SMCRA so provides. Section 510(c) expressly directs the appropriate regulatory authority to deny

permits "[w]here the schedule or other information available

to the regulatory authority indicates that any surface coal

mining operation owned or controlled by the applicant is

currently in violation" of environmental laws, irrespective of

when the claim first accrued. 30 U.S.C. s 1260(c) (emphasis

added). Because the statute expressly requires permit blocking based on current, ongoing violations, whenever first committed, we conclude that the Congress intended to exempt

permit denials from section 2462's limitation period. Cf.

Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 924-29 (6th Cir.

1991) (s 2462 not applicable to assessing tax-fraud penalties

under 26 U.S.C. s 6701 because "[i]t is the Court's view that

it was the intent of Congress in enacting Section 6701 that

there be no statute of limitations governing the assessment of

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penalties"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 827 (1992); Lamb v. United

States, 977 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1992) (following Mullikin).11

The rule against retroactivity is not so easily avoided. An

administrative rule is retroactive if it "takes away or impairs

vested rights acquired under existing law, or creates a new

obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in

respect to transactions or considerations already past." Association of Accredited Cosmetology Schs. v. Alexander, 979

F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). OSM's view

of controller liability, first promulgated in the 1988 Ownership

and Control Rule and retained in the IFR, imposes a "new

disability," permit ineligibility, based on "transactions or considerations already past," namely pre-rule violations by mine

operators over whom permit applicants acquired control before the rule's effective date.12 Before the rule took effect

there was no clear liability under the statute for violations by

entities indirectly controlled by the applicant. While OSM's

construction of section 510(c)--to impose liability for such

downstream violations--is a reasonable one, see supra Part I,

it is not mandated by the statutory language. Where before

there was "a range of possible interpretations" of the statutory language--including imposing liability only for violations

by the applicant's own, directly controlled operations--the

__________

11 We recognize that the Fourth Circuit has held that section 2462

does apply to permit blocking under section 510(c). See Arch

Mineral Corp. v. Babbitt, 104 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1997). The Arch

court, however, based its holding on the premise that, contrary to

OSM's position, a permit block is an "action, suit or proceeding for

the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture," without

considering whether the Congress in enacting SMCRA intended to

exempt such blocks from section 2462. Because we hold that the

Congress intended no limitation period for the permit blocks, we

need not decide whether such blocks are, as Arch held, "penal" or,

as OSM maintains, "remedial."

12 In the case of pre-rule violations by operators over whom an

applicant assumed control after the rule issued, the regulation is not

retroactive because the applicant's disability is "in respect to" its

assumption of control, a transaction occurring after the effective

date.

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rule established "a precise interpretation," which "in a sense

changes the legal landscape." Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Inc.

v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

513 U.S. 1147 (1995). Applying the rule's specific interpretation to impose liability based on pre-rule acts therefore gives

it retroactive effect which OSM can do only if authority

therefor is "conveyed by Congress in express terms." Bowen

v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (citations

omitted); see also Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Inc., 23 F.3d at

422-25. Because section 510(c) contains no "express terms"

authorizing retroactive liability, we hold that the IFR is

invalid insofar as it block permits based on transactions

(violations and control) antedating November 2, 1988, the

Ownership and Control Rule's effective date.

III. The Notice of Violation Schedule

Next, NMA asserts the IFR is ultra vires in that it directs

applicants to submit information not expressly required to be

included in a permit application under section 507(b) of

SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. s 1257(b), or in the notice of violation

schedule under section 510(c). This court has already held,

however, "that the Act's explicit listings of information required of permit applicants [in sections 507 and 508] are not

exhaustive, and do not preclude the Secretary from requiring

the states to secure additional information needed to ensure

compliance with the Act." In re Permanent Surface Mining

Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981). Because section 510 is by its

terms no more exhaustive than sections 507 and 508, we

conclude the Secretary may require schedule information not

specifically listed in any of the cited provisions of the Act.

NMA also contends the IFR's schedule provisions are

arbitrary in requiring that an applicant submit information in

the control of "third parties," namely, entities it is presumed

to control under 30 C.F.R. s 773.5(b). Again we disagree.

The IFR provides an escape hatch for an applicant who is

unable to obtain the specified information. It can use that

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very inability to rebut the presumption of control and thereby

avoid liability.

IV. Improvidently Issued Permits

Next, NMA contends the IFR regulations authorizing a

regulatory agency to suspend or rescind an "improvidently

issued permit" (IIP), see 30 C.F.R. ss 773.20(c), 773.21, are

ultra vires because section 510(c) authorizes only denials of

new permits. While it is true that section 510(c) does not

expressly provide for suspension or rescission of existing

permits, the IFR rescission and suspension provisions reflect

a permissible exercise of OSM's statutory duty, pursuant to

section 201(c)(1) of SMCRA, to "order the suspension, revocation, or withholding of any permit for failure to comply with

any of the provisions of this chapter or any rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto." 30 U.S.C. s 1211(c). The

IIP provisions simply implement the Congress's general directive to authorize suspension and rescission of a permit "for

failure to comply with" a specific provision of SMCRA--

namely, section 510(c)'s permit eligibility condition. In addition, apart from the express authorization in section 1211(c),

OSM retains "implied" authority to suspend or rescind improvidently provided permits because of its express authority

to deny permits in the first instance. See Gun S., Inc. v.

Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 862 (11th Cir. 1989) (although "neither

the [Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. ss 921 et seq.,] nor its

regulations explicitly authorizes suspension" of permittee's

firearm importation permit, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms, which is authorized to grant permit, "must necessarily retain the power to correct the erroneous approval of

firearms import applications") (citations omitted).

NMA also contends the IIP provisions impinge on the

"primacy" afforded states under SMCRA insofar as they

authorize OSM to take remedial action against operators

holding valid state mining permits without complying with the

procedural requirements set out in section 521(a) of SMCRA,

30 U.S.C. s 1271(a). On this point we agree.

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Under SMCRA's state primacy regime, once a state permit

plan is approved "the Secretary's role is primarily one of

oversight" and "the state has the primary responsibility for

achieving the purposes of the Act." In re Permanent Surface

Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d at 519; see also 30 U.S.C.

s 1201(f) ("[T]he primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for

surface mining and reclamation operations subject to this

chapter should rest with the States...."). Even the Secretary's oversight role is strictly circumscribed by the Act. "As

long as the state properly enforces its approved program, it is

the exclusive 'on the scene' regulatory authority," 653 F.2d at

519 (footnote omitted), and the Secretary's role is limited to

making "such inspections of any surface coal mining and

reclamation operations as are necessary to evaluate the administration of approved State programs," 30 U.S.C.

s 1267(a). Nevertheless, "[i]n the event that a State has a

State program for surface coal mining, and is not enforcing

any part of such program, the Secretary may provide for the

Federal enforcement, under the provisions of section 1271 of

[title 30], of that part of the State program not being enforced

by such State." 30 U.S.C. s 1254(b). Section 1271 sets out

specific procedural requirements to be met before the Secretary may take remedial action against a state permittee

(whether based on a federal inspection or section 1254(b) or in

the course of enforcing a state program under section

1271(b)13). First, if the Secretary "determines that any permittee is in violation of any requirement of [SMCRA] or any

permit condition required by [SMCRA]" that does not create

an imminent danger to health and safety,14 then the Secretary

can issue a notice of violation setting a time period in which to

__________

13 Section 1271(b) authorizes the Secretary, if he believes that

violations have occurred because a state has failed to effectively

enforce a state program, to assume enforcement of all or part of the

state program, enforcing permit conditions, granting new or revised

permits and issuing necessary orders. 30 U.S.C. s 1271(b).

14 Section 521 provides for prompt remedial federal action in the

case of a violation that creates an "imminent danger." See 30

U.S.C. s 1271(a)(1)-(2).

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abate the violation and providing opportunity for public hearing. 30 U.S.C. s 1271(a)(3). Only after the abatement period has expired and upon a "written finding ... that the

violation has not been abated" can the Secretary suspend the

violating operations, in an order setting out "the steps necessary to abate the violation in the most expeditious manner

possible." Id. The IFR's IIP enforcement provisions, by

contrast, permit OSM to issue a notice of violation to a

permittee and to order cessation of mining operations by a

specified date--unless the permittee by then undertakes remedial measures "to the satisfaction of the responsible agency"--when OSM "has reason to believe that a State surface

coal mining and reclamation permit meets the criteria for an

improvidently issued permit in [30 U.S.C.] s 773.20(b) or the

State program equivalent, and the State has failed to take

appropriate action on the permit under State program equivalents of [30 C.F.R.] ss 773.20 and 773.21." 30 C.F.R.

s 843.21(a). Because the Congress established specific procedures in section 521(a)(3) of SMCRA that the Secretary

must follow before taking remedial action against a state

permittee, we conclude those procedures must be used when

OSM seeks to revoke a permit issued by the state under its

state plan.

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss as moot Appeal Nos.

97-5202, 97-5203 and 97-5204. In Appeal No. 97-5248 we

reverse the district court's judgment insofar as it rejected

NMA's claims that the IFR authorizes permit blocks based

on violations by operations no longer controlled by an applicant, establishes rebuttable presumptions of ownership and

control, allows impermissibly retroactive permit blocks and

violates state primacy and we remand to the district court for

remand to OSM to amend its permit block regime accordingly.

So ordered.

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