Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01804/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01804-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Queen first filed his Petition on August 19, 2009; then

he filed an Amended Petition on August 31, 2009, which differed

from the original because it contained the Petitioner’s signed

verification. (Pet. 14; Am. Pet. 14.)

1 09cv1804 IEG (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADLEY DWAYNE QUEEN,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 09cv1804 IEG (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [DOC. NO. 4] AND

ORDER DENYING EVIDENTIARY

HEARING [DOC. NO. 28]

Petitioner Bradley Dwayne Queen, a state prisoner

represented by counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [doc. nos. 1, 4].1

 On

October 30, 2009, Respondent filed a Motion for Enlargement of

Time to File Answer [doc. no. 5]. This Court granted the

request, but before the Answer was due, Queen filed a Motion to

Stay Proceedings Pending State Court Exhaustion [doc. nos. 6, 7]. 

Respondent filed a second Motion for Enlargement of Time to File

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Answer which was granted, and the Court also issued an Order

Setting Briefing Schedule on Petitioner’s Application to Stay

Proceedings [doc. nos. 8-10]. This Court issued a Report and

Recommendation Denying Petitioner’s Application to Stay

Proceeding Pending Exhaustion of State Court Remedies on March 4,

2010 [doc. no. 18]. On May 13, 2010, United States District

Judge Irma E. Gonzalez issued an Order Denying Motion for Stay

and Abeyance [doc. no. 22]. The district court dismissed grounds

two and three of the Petition, the unexhausted claims, and set a

new briefing schedule. (Order Den. Stay Abeyance 8.) Respondent

filed an Answer on May 28, 2010 [doc. no. 23]. Queen requested

additional time to file a Traverse, which was granted [doc. nos.

26-27]. On July 28, 2010, Queen filed a Traverse [doc. no. 28]. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 6, 2005, Jason Olea met a friend for food and

drinks in Pacific Beach. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol.

2, 83-85, Oct. 6, 2006.) After eating, Olea returned to his car. 

(Id. at 87.) As he was getting into his truck, Queen approached

him and asked for the time. (Id. at 88.) Olea responded; then

Queen pulled open the door to the car. (Id.) He pointed a gun

at Olea and demanded his money and wallet. (Id. at 88-89.) Olea

surrendered the items and Queen ran away on foot. (Id. at 89.) 

Next, Olea got out of his car and followed Queen, staying some

distance behind him. (Id. at 90.) Queen crossed a street and

stopped running. (Id. at 91.) He turned around and fired a shot

at Olea. (Id. at 90-91.) Olea dropped to the ground and called

911. (Id. at 91-92.) He was not hit by the bullet. (Id. at

92.)

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The next day, December 7, 2005, a San Diego Police Officer

stopped Queen for a routine traffic violation. (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 63, Oct. 4, 2006.) During a search of

Queen’s car, the officer discovered a wallet and ran a check on

the identification cards found inside. (Id.) He discovered the

wallet had been stolen from Olea during a robbery the night

before. (Id. at 65.) The officer arrested Queen. (Id.)

Queen was charged with robbery, in violation of California

Penal Code section 211, and intentionally discharging a firearm

during the commission of the robbery, in violation of California

Penal Code section 12022.53(c). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 1, 1-2, Mar. 30, 2006.)

On September 28, 2006, Queen’s attorney filed a motion to

continue the trial to allow her to seek discovery of jury panel

information. (Id. at 62, 67, Sept. 28, 2006.) On October 4,

2006, the day before trial was set to begin, Superior Court Judge

Charles G. Rogers heard the continuance motion along with motions

in limine. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 1, 6.) 

Queen requested discovery because he believed there was a

disparity in the number of Hispanic and African American

individuals in San Diego County who were summoned and ultimately

served on juries, compared to their population in San Diego

County. (Id. at 60-61.) 

Queen’s attorney requested permission to join a similar

discovery motion filed in another superior court case and

requested the continuance to pursue the matter. (Id. at 7-8.) 

The court heard extensive argument regarding the request for a

continuance. (Id. at 8-27.) The trial judge concluded that

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“there has not been a sufficient showing to allow or require a

continuance for the purposes of discovery, and, therefore, the

motion to continue . . . is denied.” (Id. at 29.) Judge Rogers

also denied Queen’s request to join a motion pending in an

unrelated case. (Id.)

On October 6, 2006, Queen’s trial began. (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 2, 75.) The jury found Queen guilty of

robbery as well as intentionally and personally discharging a

firearm. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 258, Oct. 12,

2006.) On January 26, 2007, the trial court sentenced Queen to

the lower term of two years for robbery and a consecutive twentyyear term for the gun enhancement, which totaled twenty-two years

in state prison. (Id. at 262, Jan. 26, 2007.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Queen appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal, alleging the trial court abused its discretion by not

reviewing police disciplinary records and by denying Queen’s

request for a continuance to investigate whether the jury panel

represented a fair cross-section of the community. (Lodgment No.

3, Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9, 20, People v. Queen, No. D050235

(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2008).) The appellate court affirmed the

judgement against Queen in an unpublished opinion filed on March

14, 2008. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Queen, No. D050235, slip

op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2008).) On April 14, 2008,

Queen filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court

raising only whether he was entitled to discovery to show the

exclusion of groups from the jury panel. (Lodgment No. 7, People

v. Queen, No. [S162620] (Cal. filed Apr. 14, 2008) (petition for

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review at 2).) On May 21, 2008, the state supreme court

summarily denied review. (Lodgment No. 8, People v. Queen, No.

S162620, order at 1 (Cal. May 23, 2008).)

On July 8, 2009, Queen filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 9, In re

Queen, HC19645 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 8, 2009) (petition for

writ of habeas corpus at 5).) Queen alleged the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his request for police

disciplinary records. (Id.) He also argued there was improper

exclusion of certain groups of individuals from the jury pool. 

(Id.) The superior court denied Queen’s petition on August 31,

2009. (Lodgment No. 10, In re Queen, No. HC19645, slip op. at 2

(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2009).) Next, Queen filed his federal

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 1].

As noted above, Queen requested a Stay of Proceedings

Pending State Court Exhaustion [doc. no. 6, 7]. This Court

issued a Report and Recommendation Denying Petitioner’s

Application to Stay Proceedings Pending Exhaustion of State Court

Remedies [doc. no. 18]. The district judge adopted the Report

and Recommendation and dismissed the unexhausted claims [doc. no.

22]. Thus, the only issue that remains is whether the trial

court’s refusal to continue Queen’s case to allow him to obtain

discovery to support his claim that the selection of the jury

panel denied him due process and his right to a jury composed of

a fair cross-section of the community. (Am. Pet. 4.) On May 28,

2010, Respondent filed an Answer [doc. no. 23]. On July 28,

2010, Queen filed a Traverse [doc. no. 28].

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The Court has review the Amended Petition, Respondent’s

Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Petitioner’s

Traverse, and the lodgments. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court recommends that Queen’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED.

In his Traverse, Queen requested an evidentiary hearing. 

(Traverse 2, 7.) As explained below, the Court DENIES Queen’s

request for an evidentiary hearing.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Queen filed his petition after April 24, 1996, it is

subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2008); Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2008); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Queen filed his Petition on August 31, 2009; AEDPA

applies to his case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained “in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C.A § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d

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at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990);

Mannhald v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

 A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding federal courts have no authority to review a state’s

application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas relief

only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation).

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgement

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

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(2003), stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas

court to adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question

that matters under section 2254(d)(1) –- whether a state court

decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law.” (Id. at 71 (citation

omitted).) In other words, a federal court is not required to

review the state court decision de novo. (Id.) Rather, a

federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis

under section 2254(d)(1). (Id.)

The “novelty” in section 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to

‘Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.’” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis in

original removed). Section 2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies

only the Supreme Court as the font of ‘clearly established’

rules.” (Id.) “[A] state court decision may not be overturned

on habeas corpus review, for example, because of a conflict with

Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264-65. “[A] writ

may issue only when the state court decision is ‘contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative

decision of the Supreme Court.” (Id. (citing Childress v.

Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v.

DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); see Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996).)

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant

to the judgement of a State court, a determination of a

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factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed

to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

Queen presented the only exhausted claim in his current

federal Petition to the California Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court. (See Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s

Opening Brief at 9, 20, People v. Queen, No. D050235; Lodgment

No. 7, People v. Queen, No. [S162620] (appellant’s pet. for

review at 11).) The state appellate court addressed Queen’s

claim. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Queen, No. D050235, slip op.

at 5-10.) The California Supreme Court, however, summarily denied

his petition for review. (See Lodgment No. 8, People v. Queen,

No. S162620, order at 1.) This Court gives deference to the last

reasoned state court decision, the opinion of the California

Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804

(1991).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Whether Queen’s Claim Presents a Federal Question

Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights were

violated by “the trial court’s refusal to continue his trial in

order to allow him to present evidence in support of his claim

that the means used to select a jury panel in San Diego County

denied him a fair cross section of the community.” (Am. Pet. 4;

see also Traverse 5-7.) Queen alleges this violated his right to

due process as well as his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Am. Pet. 4; Traverse 5-7.) He explains, “The

denial of the continuance denied [him] due process of law . . .

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because it precluded him from presenting further evidence . . .

that he was denied his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to a representative jury pool.” (Am. Pet. 5

(citations omitted).)

Respondent contends that the Petitioner’s claim

“fundamentally fails to state a federal question in that it

challenges the trial court’s denial of a continuance motion.” 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4.) Respondent explains that

“[t]he question on habeas review, is not whether the trial court

erred but whether the Court of Appeal applied the proper federal

precedent as established by the United States Supreme Court in

disposing of Petitioner’s claim.” (Id. at 5.) Generally,

“whether a trial court grants or denies a continuance motion does

not usually raise a federal question because the decision rests

within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (Id.) In this

case, “the Court of Appeal properly considered and rejected

Petitioner’s federal constitutional claim.” (Id. at 7.)

“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

68 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Habeas relief is not

available for an alleged error in the state court’s

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at

67-68; Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991);

see also Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 409 (1989) (“[T]he

availability of a claim under state law does not of itself

establish that a claim was available under the United States

Constitution.”).

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Generally, whether to grant a “continuance is traditionally

withing the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every

denial of a request for more time that violates due process . . .

.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (citing Avery v.

Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940)); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461

U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (“[B]road discretion must be granted trial

courts on matters of continuances . . . .”). To determine

whether the denial of a continuance “is so arbitrary as to

violate due process[]” a court must consider “the circumstances

present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to

the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Ungar, 376

U.S. at 589-90 (citing Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385

(1957); Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1959);

United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491 (2nd Cir. 1959).

Thus, the trial court’s simple denial of a continuance does

not present a federal question; however, the inquiry does not end

there. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278 (1945). A court must

also consider whether that denial resulted in a due process

violation. Id.

B. Whether The Trial Court’s Denial Of Queen’s Motion to

Continue Violated His Right To Due Process

In September of 2006, Queen sought to obtain discovery to

learn the procedures used to draw jurors from the community. 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Queen, No. D050235, slip op. at 6.) 

In support of the request, defense counsel submitted her

declaration. (Id.) The court of appeal explained:

[O]n information and belief, [defense counsel

alleged] that there existed “a disparity

between the number of Hispanics and/or

African Americans living in San Diego County

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and the number of Hispanics and/or African

Americans who are both called to serve, and

those who actually serve on juries in San

Diego County.” The declaration did not

allege that the underrepresentation was

caused by any improper practices in the jury

selection process.

(Id.) The trial court denied Queen’s discovery motion and motion

to continue “based upon its belief that the discovery would not

show a systematic exclusion of certain groups.” (Id.)

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a

continuance and stated:

“It is uncontroverted that ‘[i]n California, the

right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative

cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally

and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal

Constitution [citation] and by article I, section 16 of

the California Constitution [citation].’ [Citation.] 

‘In order to establish a prima facie violation of the

fair-cross section requirement, the defendant must show

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a

“distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the

representation of this group in venires from which

juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in

relation to the number of such persons in the

community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due

to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury

selection process.’ [Citation.]” [People v. Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1194, 920 P.2d 1254, 1267-68, 56 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 49, 63 (1996).]

Where a defendant seeks to ascertain whether an

improper jury selection process exists, that defendant

has certain rights to discovery: “Here we consider not

whether defendant has made a prima facie case, but the

prior question of whether defendant was wrongly denied

the discovery of information necessary to make such a

case. . . . [U]pon a particularized showing supporting

a reasonable belief that underrepresentation in the

jury pool or the venire exists as the result of

practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make

a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant’s

relevant requests for information designed to verify

the existence of such underrepresentation and document

its nature and extent.” [Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th at 1194,

920 P.2d at 1268, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63 (emphasis

omitted).] 

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Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Queen’s motion for a continuance to obtain

discovery of juror underrepresentation. In support of

his motion[,] . . . Queen did not even attempt to make

a “particularized showing supporting a reasonable

belief that underrepresentation in the jury pool or the

venire exists as a result of practices of systematic

exclusion[]” . . . . Rather, Queen’s motion only

alleged the bare fact of underrepresentation. . . . 

Queen’s reliance on United States v. Rodriguez-Lara

[421 F.3d 932, 946 (2005) (9th Cir. 2005),] is

similarly unavailing as in that case the defendant

alleged in his motion for discovery “a plausible theory

of systematic exclusion: specifically, that the use of

voter registration records as the sole source of names”

for the jury pool systematically underrepresented

Hispanics. Although counsel for Queen alleged on

information and belief that there was systematic

exclusion of certain minority groups, counsel did not

attempt to show that exclusion was the result of

practices “of systematic exclusion.”

Queen asserts that the court abused its discretion

because it was “speculating” as to the ultimate success

of Queen’s motion because of its opinion that any

underrepresentation in the jury venire was caused by

economics, and not by practices of systematic

exclusion. Assuming that there was insufficient

evidence in the record from which the court could find

that underrepresentation was caused by economics, not a

systematic problem with the jury selection process, the

court’s reasoning for denying Queen’s motion does not

change the result in this matter. As we have

explained, ante, Queen failed to meet his burden of

making a particularized showing supporting a reasonable

belief that underrepresentation in the jury pool or

venire exists as the result of practices of systematic

exclusion, and therefore it was not error for the court

to deny his motion for a continuance.

(Id. at 8-10 (citation omitted).)

On October 4, 2006, the day before trial was set to begin,

Judge Rogers heard Queen’s motion for a continuance along with

motions in limine. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 1,

6.) There was extensive argument. (Id. at 8-29.) As the

California Court of Appeal noted, Queen presented no evidence of

systematic exclusion of Hispanic or African American individuals. 

(Id. at 24-27.) Nor did Queen offer any evidence, or even any

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explanation, except that his counsel speculated that a juror’s

ability to “opt-out” of jury service at a particular location may

exclude certain racial groups. (Id. at 24-25.) Queen simply

relied on the number of people in San Diego County compared with

a perception of the number who actually present themselves for

jury service. (Id. at 25.) Queen introduced no evidence. (Id.

at 24-27.)

Although Petitioner argues in his Traverse that he was

denied an opportunity to make a particularized showing that there

was a systematic cause for underrepresentation because the trial

judge concluded it was an economic reality, this argument fails. 

(Traverse 6 (citing Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 945-46).) The

trial court heard Queen’s motion, and as the appellate court

explained, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a

continuance because Petitioner did not attempt to make a

particularized showing that underrepresentation was the product

of systematic exclusion. (See Lodgment No. 6, People v. Queen,

No. D050235, slip op. at 9.) Instead, he relied on the alleged

fact of underrepresentation. (Id.) The court of appeal

considered Rodriguez-Lara and found Petitioner’s argument

unconvincing because Queen did not offer a plausible theory that

any underrepresentation was caused by systematic exclusion. (Id.

at 9-10.) Underrepresentation alone is insufficient. Duren v.

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (holding that any

underrepresentation of a distinct group during the jury selection

process must be caused by a systematic exclusion to constitute a

constitutional violation). Regardless of whether the trial judge

considered an alternative explanation for any

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underrepresentation, Petitioner failed to make a particularized

showing that there was systematic exclusion. He had the

opportunity to do so, and his argument fell short.

Queen asserts that the California Court of Appeal

unreasonable applied Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979),

clearly established Supreme Court law, to the facts in his case. 

(Traverse 6-7.) The contours of the Sixth Amendment’s fair

cross-section requirement are not clearly established. In

Berghuis v. Smith, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1388 (2010), the

Court considered a fair cross-section habeas claim challenging a

juror-assignment procedure that “assigned prospective jurors

first to local district courts, and, only after filling local

needs, made remaining persons available to the countywide Circuit

Court, which heard felony cases like Smith’s.” Justice Ginsburg,

writing for the Court, reversed the Sixth Circuit’s grant of

habeas relief. “[O]ur Duren decision hardly establishes –- no

less ‘clearly so’ –- that Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the

community.” Id. at 1392. The Court continued, “In Taylor [v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537-38 (1975)], we ‘recognized broad

discretion in the States’ to ‘prescribe relevant qualifications

for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions.’” Id. at

1395; see also Clay v. Bowersox, 367 F.3d 993, 1004 (8th Cir.

2004).

In Clay, “[t]he state courts denied Clay’s motion for postconviction discovery because he ‘does not allege that any

particular cognizable group was underrepresented.’” Clay, 367

F.3d at 1004. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court and

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agreed that Clay was not entitled to habeas relief based on the

denial of jury-selection discovery, noting that “‘Clay cites no

authority –- nor can the Court find any –- which indicates that

the [state] motion court committed constitutional error by

denying the request.’” Id. (citing Duren, 439 U.S. 357). 

Queen’s claim faces the same obstacle.

Alternatively, the state court’s denial of a continuance to

pursue discovery concerning the court’s jury-selection process

was not an unreasonable application of Ungar v. Sarafite, 376

U.S. 575. “There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a

denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due

process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present

in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial

judge at the time the request is denied.” Id. at 589. 

The state appellate court considered the circumstances of

Queen’s case and the reasons he presented to the trial judge for

a continuance. It reasonably determined there was no

constitutional violation. Therefore, the Petition should be

DENIED. 

C. Evidentiary Hearing

In his Traverse, Queen requested an evidentiary hearing. 

(Traverse 2, 7.) Based on the finding in this Report and

Recommendation that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief,

his request for an evidentiary hearing is denied. See Bashor v.

Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an

evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be

resolved on the basis of the state court record). As a result,

Queen’s request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Queen’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus should be DENIED. Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary

hearing is DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to he

United States District Court judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties on or before September 17, 2010. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any

reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before

September 30, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 27, 2010 ______________________________ RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Gonzalez

 All parties of record

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