Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00659/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00659-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN WAYNE NORWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

ORDER VACATING ALJ’S 

DECISION AND REMANDING FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Steven Wayne Norwood (“Plaintiff”), through counsel, filed this action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act’), to obtain judicial 

review of a “final decision” of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 

(“Defendant”) denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Act. 

(See Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and Defendant filed a 

cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment. (See Docs. No. 14, 15). After a thorough review of the pleadings and exhibits 

filed by the parties along with the entire record submitted in this matter, and for the reasons 

set forth below, the ALJ’s decision is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 10
2

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who was born on February 1, 1959, is currently 58 years of age. AR5at 93. 

Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as an electronics tester. AR at 60, 225. Plaintiff 

alleges that he has been disabled since January 1, 2005, and suffers from cervical and 

lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, left elbow neuropathy, right shoulder joint 

derangement, anxiety disorder, and alcohol abuse. AR at 55. 

On June 12, 2012, Plaintiff protectively filed a Title II application for a period of 

disability and disability insurance benefits. AR at 53. On the same day, Plaintiff also filed 

a Title XVI application for supplemental security income. Id. Both applications allege a 

disability onset of January 1, 2005. Id. 

The Defendant initially denied Plaintiff’s claims on December 15, 2012 and again 

on April 5, 2013. Id. On May 23, 2013 the Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing in 

front of a United States Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Id. On July 10, 2014, with his 

attorney present, the Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing. AR at 68. John P. 

Kilcher, a vocational expert, also appeared at the hearing. Id. The ALJ denied benefits in a 

written decision dated August 4, 2014. AR at 50, 61. 

Plaintiff filed a request for review of the hearing decision before the appeals council

on October 6, 2014. AR at 49. On January 20, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review. AR at 34-38. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on March 24, 2015. (See Doc. No. 1). Defendant 

filed an answer on August 7, 2015. (See Doc. No. 11). On October 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed 

a motion for summary judgment seeking reversal or remand of the Defendant’s 

administrative decision. (See Doc. No. 14). Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary 

judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on November 6, 2015. (See Doc. No. 15). 

 

5 AR refers to the administrative record lodged with this Court. 

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 10
3

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards 

A. Qualification for Disability Benefits 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Act, an applicant must show that: (1) 

she suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to result in 

death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 

twelve months; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of performing the 

work that she previously performed or any other substantially gainful employment that 

exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 2(A). An applicant must 

meet both requirements to be “disabled.” Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step 

sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial 

gainful activity.” If she is, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). If she is not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines 

whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 

the disability claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the impairment is 

severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which determines whether the 

impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary 

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Appendix 1 to Subpart P. If the impairment meets or 

equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be 

disabled. If a condition “falls short of the [listing] criterion” a multiple factor analysis is 

appropriate. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003). Of such analysis, “the 

Secretary shall consider the combined effect of all the individual’s impairments without 

regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such 

severity.” Id. at 1182 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B)).

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 10
4

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If the impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed to be disabling, the 

evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment 

prevents the claimant from performing work she has performed in the past. If the 

claimant cannot perform her previous work, the fifth and final step of the process 

determines whether she is able to perform other work in the national economy 

considering her age, education, and work experience. The claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits only if she is not able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 

416.920(g)(1).

B. Judicial Review of an ALJ’s Decision

Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of

a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial

review is limited. The Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of

Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Green v. Heckler,

803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a

preponderance. Sandgathe v. Charter, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997)(citation

omitted). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995)). The Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)(citing Jones v. Heckler, 760

F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985)). If the evidence supports more than one rational

interpretation, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577,

579 (9th Cir. 1984)(citing Allen v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 726 F.2d 1470,

1473 (9th Cir. 1984). When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and

resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v.

Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 10
5

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s conclusions, the Court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the

proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching a decision. See Benitez v.

Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social Security

Administrator for further proceedings. Id. “If additional proceedings can remedy defects

in the original administrative proceeding, a social security case should be remanded.”

Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Lewin v. Schweiker, 654

F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)).

C. ALJ’s Reliance On The Vocational Expert

The Secretary routinely relies on resources such as the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (4th ed. 1977) (“DOT”), as well as the Selected Characteristics

of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, U.S. Dep’t of Labor

(1981) (Selected Characteristics). Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.

1990). The Secretary generally trusts these publications in evaluating whether a claimant

is able to perform other work in the national economy. See Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d

794, 798 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568, 404.1569. Social Security

Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p3 provides that “[w]hen a [vocational expert]...provides evidence

about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative

responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that [vocational expert]...evidence 

and information provided in the [DOT].” SSR 00-4p requires that an adjudicator ask the 

vocational expert “if the evidence he or she has provided” is consistent with the DOT and 

obtain a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict. Error could result when an ALJ 

accepts a vocational expert’s testimony which deviates from the DOT without 

acknowledging and offering a basis for that deviation. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119, 793-

794 (9th Cir. 1997). Yet no error results where the ALJ asks the vocational expert to 

identify any conflicts between testimony and the DOT, the expert identifies

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 10
6

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

none, and the claimant’s attorney does not challenge the expert’s testimonial

representations during cross-examination. Wentz v, Commissioner Soc. Sec. Admin., 401

Fed.Appx. 189, 191 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding “the ALJ met his obligations under

Massachi and SSR 00-4p to investigate potential conflicts with the DOT”).

II. The ALJ’s Decision

In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, from January 1, 

2005, as defined by the Social Security Act. AR at 61. The ALJ first found that no 

evidence was offered indicating Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

January 1, 2005. AR at 55. In reliance on the record evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff 

suffered from the following severe impairments: “cervical and lumbar spine degenerative 

disc disease; left elbow neuropathy; right should joint derangement; anxiety disorder; and 

alcohol abuse (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c).” Id. However, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets the 

standards set in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404. 

1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). AR at 56. 

In support of its finding that Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity to 

perform light work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally 

and 10 pounds frequently. AR at 57. In addition, the ALJ found Plaintiff could stand or 

walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, occasionally 

stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, and climb stairs. Id. Further, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

could occasionally reach overhead with his right dominant arm. Id. The ALJ also found 

that Plaintiff is limited to working in nonpublic situations and is able to work around 

coworkers and peers but it precluded him from working jointly with them. Id.

Plaintiff was found to have past relevant work history as an electronics tester. AR 

at 60. The ALJ defined this employment as relevant because Plaintiff performed the job

long enough to learn it and within fifteen years from the date of adjudication. Id. In 

addition, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s work earnings were at substantial gainful activity 

levels for the years he performed the job. Id. 

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 10
7

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At Plaintiff’s hearing on July 10, 2014, the ALJ examined John P. Kilcher, a 

vocational expert. AR at 84. The vocational expert classified Plaintiff’s past work 

experience as “light exertion and semi-skilled.” AR at 85. In addition, the ALJ examined 

Mr. Kilcher with regard to the scope of Plaintiff’s employment options despite Plaintiff’s 

limitations. AR at 84-88. The ALJ posed various hypotheticals assessing jobs Plaintiff 

could perform with his restrictions. Mr. Kilcher stated that Plaintiff was able to perform 

the job duties of his past relevant work as an electronics tester. AR at 60, 87-88. In 

addition, Mr. Kilcher outlined that Plaintiff could perform light, unskilled jobs such as an 

assembler (DOT 706.684-022). AR at 88. Mr. Kilcher stated that there were 

approximately 1,000 such jobs available in San Diego County region and approximately 

750,000 nationally. Id. Mr. Kilcher also stated Plaintiff could likely work as a hand 

packager (DOT 920.587-018) and machine tender (DOT 920.685-042). AR at 89. 

In assessing the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ also relied on the 

report of Dr. Lichtenstein, Plaintiff’s treating physician. AR at 58. Dr. Lichtenstein wrote 

on June 15, 2010 that he had seen the Plaintiff on November 5, 2008. Id. Dr. Lichtenstein 

wrote that Plaintiff’s back pain had worsened. Id. Exam results showed mild tenderness, 

reduced range of motion, negative straight leg raising, and normal reflexes. Id. There 

were few other significant exam findings. Id. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff described a variety of mental impairments and related 

symptoms. AR 79. These primarily included anxiety and difficulty functioning socially. 

Id. However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had only mild restrictions in daily living. 

AR at 56. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was a graduate student, worked on a master’s 

thesis, and prepared for the law school entrance exam. Id. In addition, the ALJ noted the 

Plaintiff traveled between California, Arizona, Hawaii, and took a trip to Mexico. Id. 

In their decision, the ALJ determined that the vocational expert’s testimony is 

consistent with the information contained in the DOT. AR at 61. In addition, the ALJ 

concluded, based on Mr. Kilcher’s testimony, the Plaintiff is capable of making a 

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10
8

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

successful adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

econconmy. AR at 88. The ALJ deermined that Plaintiff was “not disabled.” AR at 61.

III. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks reversal or remand on the instant matter on the grounds that the 

vocational expert’s testimony deviated from the DOT and its companion publication 

without stating a persuasive basis for doing so. (See Doc. No. 14 at 4). Defendant crossmoves for summary judgment, contending that (1) there was no conflict between the 

vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT; and (2) notwithstanding the conflict, the ALJ 

properly resolved it by satisfying the SSR 00-4p requirements as no apparent conflicts 

existed. (See Doc. No. 15 at 4).

In order to be accurate, an ALJ’s hypothetical to a vocational expert must set out

all of the impairments. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing

Baugus v. Sec’y, 717 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1983)). The ALJ’s depiction of the

claimant’s limitations set out in the hypothetical must be “accurate, detailed, and

supported by the medical record.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999).

If the assumptions included in the hypothetical are not supported by the record, the

vocational expert’s opinion that a claimant can work does not have evidentiary value.

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456.

Plaintiff’s contentions rest on a premise that the ALJ erred by not directly asking 

the vocational expert if his testimony was consistent with the DOT, and by not finding

Plaintiff’s inability to reach overhead especially significant.

The Court agrees. While the ALJ’s final determination found the vocational 

expert’s testimony to be consistent with the DOT, the ALJ did not ask the vocational 

expert about this consistency on the record. AR at 61. “If the ALJ relies on a vocational 

expert, however, she is required to insure that the vocational expert's testimony is 

consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) by asking the vocational 

expert if there is a conflict.” See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00–4p; see also 

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 10
9

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152–54 (9th Cir.2007). Garcia v. Colvin, No. ED 

CV 12-1365-PJW, 2013 WL 4605488, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013).

Here, the ALJ found the Plaintiff was able to occasionally reach overhead with his 

right dominant arm. AR at 57. The ALJ also found that the Plaintiff could perform his 

past relevant work as an electronics tester. AR at 60. However, the occupation of 

electronics tester, categorized by DOT 726.684-026 requires the physical demand of 

reaching and handling. (See Doc. No. 15, Exhibit 1). The DOT classifies this position as 

requiring reaching “frequently.” Id. This means that the reaching aspects occurs from 1⁄2 

to 2/3 of the time. Id. 

Though the vocational expert determined that Plaintiff could work as an electronics 

tester among other potential professions, because Plaintiff has the longest work 

experience as an electronics tester and because the ALJ has determined this is Plaintiff’s 

relevant work experience, the Court finds that the issue should be remanded for 

clarification. The ALJ did not ask the vocational expert on the record whether his

testimony conflicted with the DOT. Because there is a potential conflict between the 

vocational expert's testimony and the DOT, and because that conflict was left 

unexplained in the ALJ's decision, this Court remands for further proceedings. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The decision whether to reverse and remand for further proceedings or reverse and

simply award benefits is within the Court’s discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,

1175–78 (9th Cir. 2000). Where no useful purpose would be served by further

administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is 

appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. Id. at 

1179; Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made, and it is not clear from the record that the ALJ 

would be required to find the claimant disabled if all the evidence were properly 

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 10
10

15-cv-00659 JAH(PCL)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evaluated, remand is appropriate. Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 

2003).

Here, the evidence shows a potential conflict between the vocational expert’s 

testimony and the DOT. Thus, the case must be remanded for further evaluation in 

accordance with the five-step sequential process. Additionally, the ALJ shall further 

evaluate the medical evidence and make appropriate findings in accordance with this 

opinion.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is REVERSED 

and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DATED: March 28, 2017

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-00659-JAH-PCL Document 17 Filed 03/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 10