Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00603/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00603-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALLISON WARREN, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0603-WS-M

 )

COOK SALES, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ filing styled “Consent Motion for Order 

Certifying this Case as a Collective Action for Settlement Purposes and Authorizing Notice of 

Settlement” (doc. 50). The Court understands that plaintiffs filed this Consent Motion pursuant 

to a compromise settlement they negotiated with defendants. The Court further understands that 

defendants object to neither the Consent Motion nor the form and contents of this Order.

I. Background.

Plaintiffs Allison Warren, Chester Dampier, Sherri Mullinax and Evelyn Clem

(collectively, the “Named Plaintiffs”) brought this action seeking unpaid overtime compensation

under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), against defendants, 

Cook Sales, Inc. and Cook Portable Warehouses of Mississippi, LLC. The Complaint (doc. 1) 

alleged that plaintiffs were employed by defendants as sales representatives and/or lot managers, 

that they routinely worked more than 40 hours per week, and that defendants failed to pay them 

overtime pay of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of 

40, as required by the FLSA. Plaintiffs brought their Complaint as a putative FLSA collective 

action, on their own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly-situated sales representatives, 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). On January 28, 2016, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Filing Consents 

to Join Suit (doc. 15) reflecting that Gladys Swain, Charlotte Smith, Amanda Mathis and 

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Shannon Rose (collectively, the “Original Opt-Ins”) had executed consent forms and sought to 

join this action as parties plaintiff.1 

For its part, Cook Sales vigorously disputed plaintiffs’ theory of liability and denied that 

the challenged compensation practices and policies were violative of the FLSA. Most notably, 

Cook Sales maintained that plaintiffs’ claims were defeated by the retail and service 

establishment exemption found at Section 7(i) of the FLSA.2 Additionally, Cook Sales asserted 

that its conduct was not willful, such that the FLSA’s two-year limitations period, rather than the 

three-year alternative, should apply; and objected that this case was ill-suited for treatment as a 

collective action because the Named Plaintiffs and putative opt-ins were not similarly situated. 

(See doc. 9.)

On March 9, 2016, while plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification (doc. 14) was 

pending, the parties jointly requested that these proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of 

mediation. (Doc. 31.) To facilitate their negotiations, the parties entered into a Tolling 

Agreement (doc. 34) that would toll the running of the statute of limitations as of December 22, 

2015, for the claims of sales representatives in the putative class. The Court granted the joint 

motion to stay via Order (doc. 33) entered on March 10, 2016. In the ensuing five months, the 

parties have worked diligently together and with mediator Fern Singer to forge an agreement that 

would resolve this matter in its entirety. They have now achieved that objective, subject to 

judicial approval.

 

1 A fifth individual, Janice Anderson, also executed a Consent to Join form that 

plaintiffs filed contemporaneously with the others. (See doc. 15-1, at 9.) On May 11, 2016, 

however, the Court entered an Order (doc. 37) dismissing Anderson’s opt-in claims without 

prejudice based on plaintiffs’ representation that she no longer wished to participate in this 

action. For that reason, Anderson is not considered among the Original Opt-Ins identified supra

as part of plaintiffs’ January 28 Notice of Filing Consents. She remains eligible to join this 

action as an opt-in plaintiff and participate in the settlement as a Future Opt-In if she so chooses.

2 That exemption provides that an employer does not violate the FLSA’s overtime 

requirements by employing an employee of a retail or service establishment for more than 40 

hours per workweek if “(1) the regular rate of pay of such employee is in excess of one and onehalf times the minimum hourly rate applicable to him under section 206 of this title, and (2) more 

than half his compensation for a representative period (not less than one month) represents 

commissions on goods or services.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(i).

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To effectuate the parties’ mediated settlement, plaintiffs request an order from this Court 

certifying this case as an FLSA collective action for settlement purposes, approving the 

distribution of the parties’ proposed Notice of Settlement to putative opt-in plaintiffs, and 

otherwise adopting the parties’ proposed sequence and timing of subsequent steps in the 

settlement implementation process.

II. Collective Action Certification.

Pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, an action to recover unpaid overtime 

compensation “may be maintained against any employer ... by any one or more employees for 

and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 

216(b) (emphasis added). In contrast to the traditional Rule 23 framework in which similarly 

situated persons’ interests may be litigated without their formal consent, the FLSA features an 

opt-in mechanism for similarly situated employees. See id. (“No employee shall be a party 

plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and 

such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”); Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 

488 F.3d 945, 950 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Unlike class actions governed by Rule 23 ..., FLSA 

collective actions require potential class members to notify the court of their desire to opt in to 

the action.”).

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he key to starting the motors of a collective 

action is a showing that there is a similarly situated group of employees.” Morgan v. Family 

Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Anderson, 488 F.3d at 952 

(“To maintain a collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are 

similarly situated.”) (citations omitted). “[U]ltimately, whether a collective action is appropriate 

depends largely on the factual question of whether the plaintiff employees are similarly situated 

to one another.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1262. In ascertaining whether the “similarly situated” 

requirement has been satisfied, the Eleventh Circuit has endorsed a pragmatic two-stage analysis. 

“[A]t the initial stage the district court’s decision to certify a class is based primarily on 

pleadings and affidavits,” such that “courts apply a ‘fairly lenient standard’ for determining 

whether the plaintiffs are truly similarly situated.” Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953 (citations omitted). 

If certification is granted using this fairly lenient standard at the initial stage, then “putative class 

members are given notice and the opportunity to ‘opt-in.’ The action proceeds as a 

representative action throughout discovery.” Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 

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1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). This standard “may be most useful when making a 

certification decision early in the litigation before discovery has been completed.” Anderson, 

488 F.3d at 952. The parties agree for settlement purposes that the “fairly lenient standard” 

described in Anderson and Hipp is properly applied here.

“[N]either Congress nor the Eleventh Circuit has precisely defined ‘similarly situated’ in 

the context of a motion” like the one presented here. Williams v. Omainsky, 2016 WL 297718, 

*4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 21, 2016). Nonetheless, the parties identify three guiding principles, all of 

which find support in the case law. First, “the similarities necessary to maintain a collective 

action under § 216(b) must extend beyond the mere facts of job duties and pay provisions.” 

Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953 (citation omitted). Second, plaintiffs’ burden of showing classwide 

similarity “is not heavy” and may be satisfied by “detailed allegations supported by affidavits.” 

Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219 (citations omitted). Third, the decision of whether or not to certify a 

collective action pursuant to § 216(b) “remains soundly within the discretion of the district 

court.” Id.

The parties have agreed for settlement purposes that this case is properly certified as a 

collective action pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA. On that basis, they ask that the Court grant

such certification of the FLSA claims and allow a reasonable opportunity for potential opt-in 

plaintiffs (the “Potential Opt-Ins”) to sign consent forms and join in the settlement of this action 

pursuant to § 216(b). There appears to be no dispute among the parties for settlement purposes 

that plaintiffs have satisfied the “similarly situated” test. In particular, plaintiffs point to

declarations executed by the Named Plaintiffs some time ago reflecting that all of them were 

sales representatives for Cook Portable Warehouses who worked significant overtime hours 

without receiving overtime premium pay and who performed similar duties of selling and renting 

portable storage sheds to prospective customers. (See doc. 14, Exhs. A-D.) Plaintiffs also 

indicate that a common issue affecting the overtime claims of Named Plaintiffs, Original Opt-Ins 

and Potential Opt-Ins is whether Cook Sales meets the requirements of the retail or service 

establishment exemption found at 29 U.S.C. § 207(i). Although the parties disagree as to 

whether the § 207(i) exemption applies, they agree for purposes of settlement that the Named 

Plaintiffs, Original Opt-Ins and Potential Opt-Ins are similarly situated and that § 216(b) 

certification should be granted. Upon careful consideration, and in furtherance of the parties’

settlement, the Court grants that request. This case will be certified as an FLSA collective 

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action, as to which notice shall issue to all sales representatives employed by Cook Sales 

between December 22, 2012 and December 22, 2015, a liability period commencing three years 

prior to the effective date of the parties’ Tolling Agreement.

III. Authorization to Provide Notice of Settlement.

By the terms of the parties’ Release and Settlement Agreement (doc. 51, Exh. 2), Cook 

Sales shall pay the sum of $495,000.00 into a common fund, referred to as the “Gross Fund,” to 

settle the claims of the Named Plaintiffs, Original Opt-Ins, and Potential Opt-Ins who elect to 

join this action in a timely manner. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Pursuant to that Settlement Agreement, the 

parties have agreed that, subject to court approval, the Gross Fund will also be used to pay 

attorney’s fees, litigation costs and expenses of plaintiffs’ counsel in an amount not to exceed

$148,500.00, which constitutes 30% of the Gross Fund. (Id. at ¶ 4.a.)3 The Settlement 

Agreement also provides that the Gross Fund will be used to compensate each of the four Named 

Plaintiffs and each of the four Original Opt-Ins with a “service payment” of $5,000, for an 

aggregate total of $40,000. (Id. at ¶ 4.b.)4 And the Settlement Agreement provides that the 

Gross Fund will be used to pay all costs, fees and expenses of a Settlement Claims 

Administrator, not to exceed $15,000. (Id. at ¶ 4.c.)

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Gross Fund less plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, 

costs and expenses; the Settlement Claims Administrator’s fees, costs and expenses; and the 

service payments to Named Plaintiffs and Original Opt-Ins, shall be referred to as the Net Fund. 

(Id. at ¶ 4.d.) The parties have agreed that the Net Fund will be used to pay back pay and 

liquidated damages to Named Plaintiffs, Original Opt-Ins, and any Potential Opt-Ins who timely 

submit consents to join the class (the “Future Opt-Ins”). The Net Fund will be used to make 

settlement payments to Future Opt-Ins in accordance with a formula based on the number of 

 3 Notably, the Settlement Agreement neither requires that plaintiffs’ counsel be 

compensated in the amount of $148,500 nor conditions the settlement on judicial approval of 

plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees, costs and expenses in any particular sum. (Id. at ¶ 4.f.) 

4 The service payments are designed to compensate these individuals for their 

efforts in the investigation of this litigation, their participation in discovery, and their preparation 

for and attendance at mediation, all for the benefit of themselves and Potential Opt-Ins.

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weeks each employee is reported to have worked during the liability period. (Id. at ¶ 8.)5 

Payments to Future Opt-Ins will be allocated evenly between back pay and liquidated damages.

According to the Settlement Agreement, “[t]he amounts allocated to Future Opt-Ins pursuant to 

this formula shall revert to Defendants for any Potential Opt-Ins who fail to timely file a claim 

form.” (Id.)

With respect to Named Plaintiffs and Original Opt-Ins, however, the Settlement 

Agreement fixes payments from the Net Fund in the following amounts, inclusive of back pay 

and liquidated damages (without regard to the formula utilized in computing settlement 

payments to Future Opt-Ins):

Evelyn Clem $1,955.53

Chester Dampier $2,672.56

Amanda Mathis $987.88

Sherri Mullinax $2,084.45

Shannon Rose $832.98

Charley Smith $1,770.11

Gladys Swain $2,361.97

Allison Warren $2,888.16

Cook Sales will pay the employer’s portion of all taxes due on the back pay awards to Named 

Plaintiffs, Original Opt-Ins, and Future Opt-Ins. 

The Court need not and does not make any final determination at this time with regard to 

approval of this settlement. The Consent Motion does not request such final approval; rather, it 

is quite properly confined to a request for preliminary approval to furnish Potential Opt-Ins with 

a Notice of Settlement. The parties propose that the following procedural path govern this 

action, in sequential order: (i) the Court approves the Notice of Settlement and authorizes

plaintiffs to distribute such notice to Potential Opt-Ins; (ii) plaintiffs provide notice to Potential 

Opt-Ins of their right to join the collective action and, if they do so in a timely manner, their right 

to file objections to the proposed settlement; and (iii) the Court conducts a final approval hearing 

to ascertain whether the settlement should be approved after the deadline expires for Future Opt-

 5 The expectation is that the formula will yield payments to Future Opt-Ins of 

approximately $45.00 per week, which plaintiffs’ counsel believes – based on extensive damage 

modeling – to be “very close to” the damages to which these individuals would otherwise have 

been entitled for working 45 minutes off the clock per day during each week of employment as 

sales representatives for Cook Sales. (Smith Decl. (doc. 51), ¶ 26.)

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Ins to join and to interpose any objections they may have. In support of this protocol, the parties 

cite various unpublished case authorities from the Middle District of Florida.

Along with their Consent Motion, the parties have submitted a five-page proposed Notice 

of Settlement. (Doc. 51, Exh. 3.) All parties have agreed to the form and contents of this 

proposed Notice, and have stated their position that this document “fairly and clearly inform[s] 

Potential Opt-Ins of their legal options with respect to participating, or not, in the settlement of 

this litigation and their right to object to the Settlement.” (Doc. 50, at 20.) After review, the 

undersigned deems the proposed Notice to be appropriate. The “Notice of Settlement” is hereby 

approved for dissemination and transmission to Potential Opt-Ins.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. The Consent Motion for Order Certifying Collective Action for Settlement 

Purposes and Authorizing Notice of Settlement (doc. 50) is granted;

2. The Court certifies for settlement purposes a class consisting of all sales 

representatives employed by Cook Sales, Inc., during the period spanning from 

December 22, 2012 through December 22, 2015;

3. The proposed Notice of Settlement (doc. 51, Exh. 3) is approved and the parties 

are hereby authorized to distribute such document to Potential Opt-Ins;

4. At the parties’ request, Simpluris Class Action Settlement Administration is 

appointed to serve as the Settlement Claims Administrator in this action;

5. Pursuant to the parties’ request, within 15 days after entry of this Order, Cook 

Sales shall provide the Settlement Claims Administrator with a spreadsheet listing 

the names, employee identification numbers, dates of employment (during the 

period of December 22, 2012 through December 22, 2015), state(s) of 

employment, most recent mailing addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses 

(if available) and Social Security numbers of all Potential Opt-Ins. This sensitive 

employee data is confidential and must be handled with great care. The parties 

and the Settlement Claims Administrator are ordered to devise and implement 

appropriate security measures to protect all such data from any unnecessary thirdparty access or disclosure. Prior to mailing the Notice of Settlement to Potential 

Opt-Ins, the Settlement Claims Administrator shall take reasonable steps to 

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attempt to confirm accuracy of names and addresses through the U.S. Postal 

Service’s National Change of Address database;

6. Within 14 days after receiving the spreadsheet from Cook Sales, the Settlement 

Claims Administrator shall mail the Notice of Settlement (in substantially the 

form found at doc. 51, Exhibit 3) to Potential Opt-Ins. The Notice of Settlement 

shall be accompanied by the Consent to Join Form, the Settlement Share Form, 

and a pre-addressed, postage-paid return envelope.

7. For any Notice of Settlement returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Claims 

Administrator shall promptly undertake to locate such Potential Opt-In via 

reasonable electronic search utilizing available identifying information from the 

spreadsheet. Should such an electronic search be successful, the Settlement 

Claims Administrator shall promptly mail an additional Notice of Settlement and 

accompanying documentation to that individual.

8. The Settlement Claims Administrator shall mail a reminder postcard 

approximately 30 days after the initial mailing of the Notice of Settlement for any 

Potential Opt-In who has not yet submitted a Consent to Join Form.

9. Defendants and their counsel must abide by the provisions of paragraph 15 of the 

Settlement Agreement with regard to non-interference with the claims 

administration process.

10. The Settlement Claims Administrator shall provide electronic copies of all 

executed Consent to Join Forms and any Objections to all counsel in a timely 

manner. It is plaintiffs’ counsel’s responsibility to file all Consent to Join Forms 

(as a single, consolidated docket entry) and any and all Objections with the Clerk 

of Court within 15 days after the claims bar date.

11. The Court must still determine whether proposed settlement is fair, adequate and 

reasonable, and whether it satisfies the legal test set forth in Lynn’s Food Stores, 

Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982) and Crabtree v. Volkert, Inc., 

2013 WL 593500 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013).

12. The parties’ memoranda of law (accompanied by exhibits as appropriate) seeking 

final approval of the settlement pursuant to Lynn’s Food and responding to the 

Objections must be filed on or before December 30, 2016. Copies of responses 

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to Objections must also be served on the opt-in plaintiff(s) who raised such 

Objections.

13. A final approval hearing is scheduled for January 18, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in 

Courtroom 2A of the United States Courthouse, 113 St. Joseph Street, Mobile, 

Alabama.

14. In light of the foregoing determinations, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional 

Certification and to Facilitate Notice (doc. 14) and is moot. Likewise, defendant 

Cook Sales’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief (doc. 32) relating to 

that now-superseded Motion for Conditional Certification is moot.

DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of August, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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