Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00502/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00502-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ERIC W. RUND,

NO. CIV. S-05-00502 FCD GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary

judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication of issues

brought by defendant Charter Communications, Inc. (“defendant” or

“Charter”) and a cross-motion for summary judgment brought by

plaintiff Eric Rund (“plaintiff”).1 By its motion, defendant

seeks adjudication in its favor on plaintiff’s complaint,

alleging claims for (1) physical disability discrimination in

violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); 

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2 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are

undisputed.

3 Defendant filed objections to the vast majority of 

plaintiff’s evidence submitted in opposition to defendant’s

motion. (Docket #69). The court does not, however, rule on said

objections herein because even considering all of plaintiff’s

proffered evidence, it does not raise a triable issue of fact.

2

(2) failure to accommodate a physical disability in violation of

FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4) wrongful 

termination in violation of Labor Code § 132a; (5) breach of

contract; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 

(7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (8) negligent

supervision. Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion and filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment in his favor on the issue of

physical disability discrimination in violation of FEHA.

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS

defendant’s motion and DENIES plaintiff’s cross-motion. 

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff’s employment with defendant began in 1998 when

defendant purchased Sonic Communications, plaintiff’s employer at

that time. (Pl.’s Separate Statement of Disputed Facts in Resp.

to Def.’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“PRUF”), filed Feb.

7, 2007 [Docket #60], ¶ 1).3 Plaintiff worked at defendant’s

Portola, California office, which is located in a wooded and

mountainous area in Northern California. (PRUF ¶ 2). The

Portola office is one of defendant’s smaller offices, employing

approximately four to six employees at any given time. (PRUF 

¶¶ 3-4). 

During his tenure working at Charter, plaintiff held both a

System Technician and System Technician I position. (PRUF ¶ 7). 

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3

As a System Technician I, plaintiff’s duties included installing

cable sources, performing cable repairs, maintaining cable

services, installing satellite dishes, and maintaining antennas

amplifiers and microwave equipment. (PRUF ¶¶ 9-10). 

Approximately fifty percent of plaintiff’s installation jobs and

fifty percent of his service calls involved bending and

maneuvering into “crawl spaces” averaging twenty inches by twenty

inches. (PRUF ¶¶ 12-13). Plaintiff was also frequently required

to climb ladders, bend or lay down, walk on uneven surfaces, and

kneel. (PRUF ¶¶ 14-19).

Plaintiff took a leave of absence from Charter from May

through October of 2003 to have knee replacement surgery. (Id.

¶¶ 21-22). Plaintiff needed the surgery because he suffered an

injury in 1998 which caused the cartilage in his knee to

dissipate over time. (Id. ¶ 23). Defendant granted plaintiff’s

request for a leave of absence and did not make negative or

disparaging remarks about his injury or his need to take leave. 

(PRUF ¶ 25). 

Plaintiff also filed for workers’ compensation benefits

around the time he requested a leave of absence. (PRUF ¶ 50). 

No one at Charter made negative statements or expressed

dissatisfaction about plaintiff’s filing for workers’

compensation benefits. (PRUF ¶ 53). 

Plaintiff returned to work on October 1, 2003. (PRUF ¶ 27). 

Plaintiff’s supervisor, Ron Morton (“Morton”), welcomed him back

to work following his leave of absence. (PRUF ¶ 26). Plaintiff

submitted a note to defendant signed by his treating physician,

Deane A. Stites, M.D., detailing certain work restrictions for

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4 Plaintiff attempts to dispute this fact, citing

Morton’s deposition testimony that plaintiff would not have been

fired if he could climb with hooks and grappling gear,

plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he did climb ladders within

six weeks of returning to work, and plaintiff’s declaration

submitted on the motions, that he had no work restrictions. None

of this evidence disputes the fact that defendant received a note

from plaintiff’s treating physician informing defendant of

plaintiff’s medical restrictions. Accordingly, the court treats

the fact as undisputed. 

5 Plaintiff tries to dispute this fact by offering

evidence that his treating physician later removed plaintiff’s

work restrictions. The fact that the restrictions were later

(continued...)

4

plaintiff, due to his medical condition, including “no climbing

poles, no ladders, no prolonged kneeling or walking on uneven

surfaces.”4 (PRUF ¶¶ 27-28; Dep. of Eric Rund (“Rund Dep.”),

filed January 26, 2007, Ex. 10). 

Plaintiff’s position was modified to a “light duty” position

because of plaintiff’s medical condition. (PRUF ¶ 31). 

Defendant provided plaintiff with an “Offer of Available Modified

Work” which specified that his duties would include “[l]imited

work with the following restrictions: no climbing poles or

ladders, no prolonged kneeling or walking on uneven surfaces.” 

(PRUF ¶ 32). Morton selected specific jobs that plaintiff could

complete considering his restrictions. (PRUF ¶ 34). The other

employees in the Portola office shared responsibility for

completing the tasks plaintiff could not complete. (PRUF ¶ 33).

In January 2004, defendant received a Final Disability

Evaluation completed by plaintiff’s treating physician in which

he concluded plaintiff’s medical restrictions were permanent and

stationary. (PRUF ¶ 35; Morton Decl. in Supp. of Def.’s MSJ

(“Morton Decl.”), filed Jan. 26, 2007, Ex. C).5

 Defendant

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5(...continued)

removed in June 2005 does not put the fact that Charter received

this information from plaintiff’s physician in January 2004 in

dispute.

6 Plaintiff claims this fact is in dispute; however, he

provides no evidence that defendant did not receive this

information from plaintiff’s treating physician. 

5

allowed plaintiff to continue working his “light duty” position

after receiving this information about the permanent nature of

his restrictions. (PRUF ¶ 34).

On June 21, 2004, Robert Fickel (“Fickel”), Director of

Human Resources at Charter, sent a letter to plaintiff stating

that Charter could no longer allow plaintiff to work the

“modified light duty” position. (Rund Dep., Ex. 16). Fickel

requested that plaintiff suggest some reasonable accommodations

which would allow him to perform the essential functions of his

original position. (Id.) Fickel stated defendant would consider

any reasonable accommodations which would not impose an “undue

hardship on Charter.” (Id.) 

A week later on June 28, 2004, plaintiff’s treating

physician indicated again that plaintiff had medical restrictions

“as far as his squatting, kneeling, and lifting regarding his

knee replacement.”6 (PRUF ¶ 38; Rund Dep., Ex. 17). The

physician also indicated that these restrictions would “probably

be on a permanent basis.” (PRUF ¶ 38; Rund Dep., Ex. 17). 

On June 29, 2004, plaintiff responded to Fickel’s letter. 

(Rund Dep., Ex. 18). Plaintiff wrote, “As per our conversation,

I am giving you accommodations that would allow me to more easily

complete my duties.” (Id.) Specifically, plaintiff requested a

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6

“bucket truck equipped with a CLI and power inverter.” (Id.;

PRUF ¶ 41). Plaintiff asserted the proposed accommodations would

allow him to “reach areas when working overhead” and “CLI

equipment would allow me to complete the CLI drive-out and

complete the repairs more easily.” (Rund Dep., Ex. 18). 

Plaintiff admitted that he could not kneel or squat for extended

periods of time but claimed he had learned to “crawl” on his back

to accomplish his duties. (Id.; PRUF ¶ 41). 

Fickel responded to plaintiff’s letter on September 8, 2004. 

(Rund Dep., Ex. 19). Fickel acknowledged that plaintiff

requested a bucket truck with a CLI and power inverter and

explained that Charter did not believe this was a reasonable

accommodation. (Id.) Fickel stated that this accommodation

would not allow plaintiff to complete his essential job functions

because there were “locations that cannot be reached by bucket

truck.” (Id.) Further, Fickel stated, “[T]his would not address

the aspects of your job that require you to climb, kneel and

squat, and we do not know of any reasonable accommodation that

would allow you to perform these functions.” (Id.) Fickel

explained that defendant needed someone that could complete all

essential job functions; therefore, as of September 10, 2004,

Fickel stated that plaintiff would be “removed from the payroll,

and separated from employment.” (Rund Dep., Ex. 19). 

Prior to plaintiff’s termination, defendant did not receive

communication from plaintiff’s treating physician lifting the

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7 Plaintiff disputes this fact and cites a note from his

treating physician attached to the Decl. of Larry Baumbach in

Supp. of Opp’n to Def.’s MSJ (“Baumbach Decl.”), filed Feb. 2,

2007, Ex. A. The attached note is dated June 2005 and is not

relevant to the information possessed by Charter at the time of

plaintiff’s dismissal in September 2004. As such, the court

disregards this evidence and finds the instant fact undisputed. 

7

medical restrictions.7 (PRUF ¶ 37). 

Plaintiff claims that his termination amounted to unlawful

physical disability discrimination in violation of FEHA and

public policy. (Complaint for Damages (“Compl.”), filed Mar. 11,

2005, ¶¶ 8, 29). In addition, plaintiff claims defendant fired

him in retaliation “solely because he had a disability and filed

a workers’ compensation claim.” (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff further

alleges defendant breached an “oral contract of employment which

was modified and re-enforced by certain policies, practices,

assurances and other express and implied statements of Defendants

[sic].” (Id. ¶ 34). Plaintiff claims the oral contract provided

plaintiff “would be terminated only for cause.” (Id.) Plaintiff

also contends the retaliation by defendant caused him severe

emotional distress. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 46). Additionally, plaintiff

asserts defendant knew or should have known that its employees

were engaging in unlawful behavior. (Id. ¶ 49). Finally,

plaintiff claims defendants failed to reasonably accommodate

plaintiff’s needs based on his physical disability. (Id. ¶ 62). 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

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8

material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, "the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show "that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

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8 Due to the similarity between federal and state

discrimination laws, California courts follow federal precedent

in applying FEHA. Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th

317, 354 (2000). 

9

ANALYSIS

A. Physical Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that defendant “engaged

in a pattern and practice of unlawful physical disability

discrimination in violation of FEHA.” (Compl. ¶ 9). Plaintiff

asserts that a manager at Charter engaged in disability

discrimination when the manager terminated plaintiff because he

falsely believed plaintiff could not perform his job duties. 

(Id. ¶ 7). Plaintiff claims defendant “violated FEHA by failing

to adequately supervise, control, discipline and/or otherwise

penalize the conduct, acts, and failures to act of Defendant’s

Manager.” (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges he filed charges with

the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) against

defendant and received a Right-to-Sue Notice. (Id. ¶ 16).

In evaluating disability discrimination claims under FEHA,

California courts have adopted the three-step burden-shifting

test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).8 See Yanowitz v.

L’Oreal USA, Inc. 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005). Thereunder,

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. In doing so, plaintiff may produce indirect

evidence that gives rise to an inference of discriminatory

motive. See Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,

121 (1985). Ultimately, plaintiff must show that he (1) suffered

from a disability or was regarded as disabled; (2) was otherwise

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10

qualified to do the job; and (3) suffered an adverse employment

action because of [his] disability. Diaz v. Federal Express

Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

Once plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden shifts

to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the adverse employment action. See EEOC v. Hacienda

Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989). The ultimate burden

of persuasion, however, remains with the plaintiff. Texas Dep’t.

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 

If the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. The

plaintiff may demonstrate pretext in one of two ways: “(1)

indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation

is unworthy of credence because it is internally inconsistent or

otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that

unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” 

Chuang v. Univ. of Calif. Davis, Board of Trustees, 225 F.3d

1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The factual inquiry regarding

pretext requires a new level of specificity. Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 255. Plaintiff must produce specific and substantial evidence

that the defendant’s reasons are really a pretext for

discrimination. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc.,

292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2002). 

To set forth a prima facie case of physical disability

discrimination, first plaintiff must establish that he suffered

from a disability or was regarded as disabled. From the outset,

plaintiff pressed this case on the theory that he was disabled in

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9 Plaintiff attempts to dispute this fact with the note

from his treating physician dated June 2005. That note has no

bearing on plaintiff’s condition at the time of his termination

in September 2004. 

11

that he had medical restrictions which prevented him from

performing his essential job functions without an accommodation. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 7, 21, 28, 62). Indeed, plaintiff admits that,

following his knee surgery and return to work, his treating

physician recommended certain work restrictions, including no

climbing poles or ladders, kneeling or walking on uneven

surfaces, which restrictions his physician ultimately said would

likely be permanent. (PRUF ¶ 28).9 

However, in his cross-motion for summary judgment on this

issue, plaintiff raised a theory which was not set forth in his

complaint. Plaintiff referred to a note from his treating

physician, Dr. Stites, dated June 13, 2005. (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Def.’s MSJ (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), filed Feb. 7, 2007 [Docket #58], at

5). The note states in relevant part, “[Mr. Rund] has been

totally released from my care concerning his right knee. Mr.

Rund has no limitations with lifting, climbing ladders, driving

or walking on uneven surfaces.” (Id. at Ex. A). Plaintiff

argues this note proves that plaintiff was not disabled and that

defendant’s belief that plaintiff was disabled was erroneous. 

(Id. at 6). Plaintiff also made the following statement in his

declaration submitted on the motions: “I was physically able and

capable of performing all essential functions of my job without

accommodation.” Plaintiff asserts that the court should not

consider him disabled but “regarded as disabled” by defendant. 

(Id.) 

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10 See Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d

895, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that when issues are raised in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment which are outside the

scope of the complaint, the court should construe the opposition

as a motion to amend the pleadings). 

11 Discovery has closed and the deadline for filing

dispositive motions was February 27, 2007. (Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Order, filed Oct. 26, 2006, at 3).

12

The theory plaintiff set forth in his cross-motion is

contradictory to the theory asserted in his complaint and will

not be considered by the court. Even if the court construes

plaintiff’s assertion of a new theory as a motion to amend his

complaint,10 plaintiff has not shown “good cause” to amend the

pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), as is

required by the court’s Pretrial Scheduling Order. (Status

(Pretrial Scheduling) Order, filed Oct. 26, 2006.) Furthermore,

even if such “good cause” could be demonstrated, in order to

successfully amend the complaint, plaintiff would also have to

show that leave to amend is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a) which states “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” 

Plaintiff’s theory that he was regarded as disabled, and not

in fact disabled, clearly conflicts with statements made in his

complaint. Whether or not he was actually disabled during his

employment at Charter is a fact that has not changed since his

termination and could have been asserted in the complaint;

therefore, the interests of justice do not require granting

plaintiff leave to amend his complaint at this late stage in the

proceedings.11 Accordingly, this court will consider only the

allegations in plaintiff’s complaint for the purpose of ruling on

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13

the instant motions. As to the first element of plaintiff’s

prima facie case, the court finds sufficient evidence that

plaintiff was disabled.

To prove the second element of a prima facie case, plaintiff

must establish that he was capable of performing his job

functions with or without an accommodation. Again, plaintiff

admits that his treating physician recommended certain work

restrictions including no climbing poles or ladders, kneeling or

walking on uneven surfaces due to his medical condition. (PRUF ¶

28). Plaintiff also admits that climbing ladders, kneeling and

walking on uneven surfaces were essential job functions of his

System Technician I position at Charter. (PRUF ¶ 20). 

Plaintiff’s job duties directly conflicted with his work

restrictions. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he provided

defendant with a note from his physician lifting those

restrictions before his termination. Instead, plaintiff cites a

note from his physician dated June 2005 indicating plaintiff no

longer had medical restrictions. (Baumbach Decl., Ex. A).

However, as discussed above, the note is not relevant to the

instant motion. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he could

complete his job duties with or without an accommodation before

he was terminated from his employment with defendant.

Finally, to demonstrate the third element of a prima facie

case, plaintiff must establish that he suffered an adverse

employment action because of his disability. The fact that

plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action is not in

dispute. Both parties admit that plaintiff was terminated. (PRUF

¶ 48). Plaintiff, however, proffers no evidence that his

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12 Plaintiff asserts that Morton testified in his

deposition that a bucket truck was available to plaintiff. 

Morton testified that the Portola office had a bucket truck which

was normally used by another employee. (Deposition of Ron Morton

(“Morton Dep.”), at 57). Furthermore, plaintiff admitted in his

deposition that there was not a safe bucket truck available for

use on a regular basis. (Rund Dep., Volume 1, page 101). 

Plaintiff admitted that he expected Charter to purchase a bucket

truck or obtain one from another system. (Id.) 

14

termination was because of his claimed disability. As plaintiff

cannot establish all of the requisite elements of a prima facie

case, the court must grant summary judgment in favor of

defendant. 

Notwithstanding the above, even if plaintiff could establish

a prima facie case, defendant has provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Defendant proffers

evidence that it terminated plaintiff’s employment because

plaintiff could not perform his essential job functions with or

without a reasonable accommodation. (Def.’s MSJ at 8). Per

plaintiff’s treating physician, plaintiff could not perform the

essential job functions without an accommodation, and the only

accommodations suggested by plaintiff were use of a bucket truck

and crawling on his back in lieu of kneeling. (PRUF ¶ 41). 

Defendant determined that use of a bucket truck was unreasonable

because one could not be assigned to plaintiff exclusively, and

there were many areas in the territory that were so heavily

wooded they could not be reached via the bucket truck.12 (PRUF

¶¶ 44, 47). Additionally, defendant concluded that plaintiff

crawling on his back instead of kneeling was not a reasonable

accommodation because of his prior back injury and because of

safety issues. (Morton Decl. ¶ 10). 

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15

Because defendant has met its burden with respect to the

reasons for terminating plaintiff, the burden shifts to plaintiff

to demonstrate the proffered reasons are pretextual. However,

plaintiff has provided no evidence to support a conclusion that

defendant’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons are pretextual. 

Plaintiff contends defendant mistakenly believed plaintiff could

not perform his job functions. However, defendant’s belief was

based on information provided to it by plaintiff and plaintiff’s

treating physician. Plaintiff never told defendant that his

medical restrictions had been lifted. In fact, plaintiff engaged

in communications with defendant regarding potential

accommodations for his claimed medical restrictions. Plaintiff’s

bald assertions that defendant’s beliefs about his disability

were mistaken do not refute defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. 

Plaintiff also points to statements made by Morton to

support his allegation of pretext. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8). Morton

was asked during his deposition, “Would it be a fair statement

that, if Mr. Rund could climb with hooks and grappling gear, that

he would still be employed with Charter?” Morton responded,

“Yes, uh-huh.” (Morton Dep. at 64). Climbing poles with hooks

and grappling gear is not listed as an essential job function of

the System Technician I position. (Rund Dep., Ex. 3). Plaintiff

alleges Morton’s statement supports a conclusion that plaintiff

was fired solely because he could not perform a task that was not

essential to his position. Morton was plaintiff’s supervisor but

plaintiff has provided no evidence that Morton had any influence

over employment decisions at Charter. On the contrary, all of

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16

the communication regarding plaintiff’s termination was from

Fickel, Director of Human Resources. Morton’s statement

regarding the reasons for plaintiff’s termination is essentially

conjecture and is not substantiated by admissible evidence. 

As plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of

discrimination or even if he could, he has proffered no evidence

that defendant’s stated reasons for his termination are

pretextual, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this

claim is GRANTED. Accordingly, plaintiff’s cross-motion for

summary judgment is DENIED.

B. Failure to Accommodate a Physical Disability in Violation of

FEHA 

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that from June 2003 until

September 2004, defendant did not reasonably accommodate

plaintiff’s needs based on his physical disability. (Compl. 

¶ 62). Plaintiff claims defendant knew of his knee injury and

did not provide reasonable accommodations that were necessary

because plaintiff could no longer climb telephone poles with

hooks. (Id. ¶¶ 60-62). Plaintiff states he was “willing and

able to perform the duties and functions of his position if such

reasonable accommodation had been made by Defendant.” (Id. ¶

63). 

Plaintiff contends that defendant did not engage in an

interactive process with plaintiff to assess a reasonable

accommodation. (Pl.’s Opp’n, at 9). Plaintiff maintains that

had defendant done so, defendant would have “learned that the

treating physician had released [him] from all limitations and

that its termination of Plaintiff was based on inaccurate,

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outdated information that could easily have been updated[.]” 

(Id.) 

In Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Association, the Ninth

Circuit discussed what is required in the interactive process

between an employee and employer when the employee cannot perform

his job functions without an accommodation. 239 F.3d 1128 (9th

Cir. 2001). “The interactive process requires communication and

good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between

employers and individual employees, and neither side can delay or

obstruct the process.” Id. at 1137. In Humphrey, the

accommodation the employer and employee previously agreed upon

was not effective. Id. at 1138. The employer was aware of a

different accommodation which would likely be effective and

failed to suggest or discuss this accommodation with the

employee. Id. Instead, the employee was terminated. Id. at

1138-39. The court held the employer failed to engage in the

interactive process. Id. at 1139. The court explained: “Given

[the employer’s] failure to engage in an adequate interactive

process, liability is appropriate if a reasonable accommodation

without undue hardship to the employer would otherwise have been

possible.” Id. 

Humphrey is distinguishable from the instant case because

defendant did engage in an interactive process with plaintiff and

because there was no reasonable accommodation available. Here, 

defendant contacted plaintiff on June 21, 2004 to request

potential reasonable accommodations which would enable plaintiff

to perform his duties. (Rund Dep., Ex. 16). Plaintiff responded

with two suggestions, a bucket truck and permission to crawl on

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his back. (Rund Dep., Ex. 18). Defendant considered both of

these suggestions and determined that neither of them would allow

plaintiff to complete all of his essential job functions. 

(Morton Decl. ¶¶ 9-10). The Portola area was heavily wooded such

that a bucket truck would not assist plaintiff in reaching all

locations. (PRUF ¶ 2). Additionally, plaintiff’s position was

manual in nature and necessitated physical activity such as

kneeling, squatting, and climbing ladders. (PRUF ¶ 20). 

Defendant determined that plaintiff’s suggestion of crawling on

his back would not allow him to complete his duties, especially

in light of his previous back injury. (Morton Decl. ¶ 10). 

Defendant concluded that due to the small number of employees in

the Portola office, it would be an undue burden to reassign

someone to all the unreachable locations or maintain a “light

duty” position for plaintiff. (Morton Decl. ¶ 8). 

Defendant engaged plaintiff in communication regarding

potential accommodations for his medical restrictions and did so

in good faith. Neither plaintiff nor defendant was aware of a

reasonable accommodation which would not be an undue hardship on

defendant but would allow plaintiff to complete his job duties. 

The fact that neither plaintiff nor defendant could determine a

reasonable accommodation for plaintiff’s particular restrictions

does not indicate a breakdown of the interactive process which

can be attributed specifically to defendant. (See Allen v.

Pacific Bell, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2002)

(holding there was no reasonable accommodation available for a

technician with medical restrictions which limited him to a desk

job, the employer took all necessary and reasonable steps to

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accommodate the technician, and therefore, the employer was not

liable for failure to engage in the interactive process). 

Plaintiff claims a proper interactive process would have

resulted in defendant learning that plaintiff no longer had

medical restrictions. (Pl’s Opp’n at 9). Plaintiff also had a

duty to participate in the interactive process in good faith. 

Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1137. Plaintiff had a duty to accurately

represent to defendant his medical restrictions and to work with

his employer to determine a reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff

had an opportunity to respond to defendant’s request for

reasonable accommodations. At that time, he could have informed

defendant that he had no medical restrictions if, in fact, that

was the case. Instead, plaintiff wrote to defendant to suggest

accommodations. Defendant received no communication from

plaintiff or plaintiff’s treating physician at any point during

this process to indicate that plaintiff’s restrictions had been

lifted. Furthermore, plaintiff’s contention that his medical

restrictions had been removed prior to this interactive process

lacks supporting evidence. As discussed above, the note from

plaintiff’s treating physician dated June 2005 sheds no light on

his condition from June through September of 2004, the time frame

in which the communication regarding a reasonable accommodation

occurred. Plaintiff has brought forth no evidence that defendant

did not engage in the interactive process or that defendant

engaged in the interactive process in bad faith.

Defendant’s motion is therefore GRANTED with respect to this

claim.

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C. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA

Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated California

Government Code § 12940 by retaliating against him because he had

a physical disability and because he filed a workers’

compensation claim. (Compl. ¶ 21). Plaintiff filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the DFEH alleging retaliation. (Compl. ¶

24). 

FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against any of its employees because he has filed a complaint for

violations arising under FEHA. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h) (West

2006). To establish a case of retaliation, plaintiff must prove

(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection

between the two. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th

Cir. 1987) (citing Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State Univ.,

797 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under McDonnell Douglas,

once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation, the

burden shifts to the defendant to set forth a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. Stegall v. Citadel

Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). However,

“[o]nly the burden of production shifts; the ultimate burden of

persuasion remains with the plaintiff.” Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at

1376 (citing Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). If defendant can make this showing, the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the alleged

explanation is a pretext for impermissible retaliation. 

Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1377. 

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13 Clearly, “having a disability” is not a protected

activity for purposes of a retaliation claim under FEHA.

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Defendant asserts plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie

case of discrimination. (Def.’s MSJ at 11). Defendant claims

that the actions plaintiff mentions in his complaint, filing a

workers’ compensation claim and having a disability, are not

“protected activities” under FEHA. (Id.) Furthermore, defendant

notes that there was an approximately fifteen to sixteen month

lapse in time between plaintiff filing a workers’ compensation

claim and defendant terminating his employment. (Id. at 12). 

Defendant asserts that this lapse in time demonstrates that there

was no causal connection between the two events. (Id.)

 Defendant cites no legal authority nor has the court found

any, to support the contention that filing a workers’

compensation claim is not a protected activity under FEHA.13 As

such, the court will not dismiss this claim on the ground that

plaintiff did not engage in a “protected activity.” 

Nevertheless, summary judgment is properly granted in favor

of defendant as plaintiff has no evidence of a causal connection

between his “protected activity” and his termination. Plaintiff

may support his allegation of causation with either direct

evidence or circumstantial evidence. “Causation sufficient to

establish the third element of the prima facie case may be

inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s

knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in protected activities and

the proximity in time between the protected action and the

allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas,

809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff filed a workers’

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14 Plaintiff disputes this fact but gives no explanation

or basis for his contentions. 

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compensation claim when he took his leave of absence from Charter

in May 2003. (PRUF ¶ 50). Upon returning from his leave of

absence, plaintiff was reinstated at Charter to his former

position on a “light duty” basis. (PRUF ¶ 31). Plaintiff admits

that he was welcomed back to Charter by his supervisor upon his

return to work. (PRUF ¶ 26). Plaintiff continued to work a

“light duty” position for ten months from October 2003 until

September 2004.14 (PRUF ¶ 39). Approximately sixteen months

elapsed from the time plaintiff filed his workers’ compensation

claim until defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment. 

Furthermore, in June 2004, plaintiff’s treating physician

indicated that his medical restrictions would likely be

permanent. (Id. ¶ 38). In light of the lengthy lapse of time

between the filing of the workers’ compensation claim and

plaintiff’s termination, coupled with defendant’s discovery of

the permanent nature of plaintiff’s injury three months before

the termination, the court finds a lack of circumstantial

evidence to support a finding of causation. Plaintiff has

offered no other evidence to support his claim of retaliation. 

Defendant’s motion as to this claim must be GRANTED. 

D. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff claims his termination was in violation of public

policy as set forth in California Labor Code § 132a. (Compl. 

¶ 6). Section 132a of the California Labor Code makes it

unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for

filing a workers’ compensation claim. Defendant argues that the

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California Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) provides the

exclusive remedy for workplace injures; and therefore, the claim

must be dismissed. (Def.’s MSJ at 12). 

Plaintiff cites City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.

4th 1143 (1998) to support his argument that the WCA is not the

exclusive remedy for this type of claim. (Pl.’s Resp. at 8-9). 

In Moorpark, the California Supreme Court explained that Section

132a was not an exclusive remedy for a plaintiff bringing a cause

of action for disability discrimination. Moorpark, 18 Cal. 4th

at 1154. However, for claims brought under Section 132a, “the

Workers Compensation Appeals Board [is] the exclusive forum....” 

Id. at 1156. Consequently, plaintiff may bring claims outside of

Section 132a which are related to his allegation of disability

discrimination, but a claim under Section 132a is only allowable

before the Workers Compensation Appeals Board. See Greenly v.

SaraLee Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90868, *30 (D. Cal. 2006) 

Furthermore, even if plaintiff’s claim could be properly

brought before this court, similar to plaintiff’s claim for

retaliation under FEHA, plaintiff cannot establish a causal link

between the filing of the workers’ compensation claim and his

termination. 

For these reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment

as to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of

Section 132a is GRANTED. 

E. Breach of Contract

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges he entered into an oral

employment contract with defendant. (Compl. ¶ 34). 

Specifically, plaintiff asserts that “it was implicitly agreed

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15 In plaintiff’s complaint, he repeatedly refers to a

“Manager” at Charter but does not ever identify the “Manager” by

name. The court assumes plaintiff is referring to Fickel. 

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that Plaintiff would not be impeded in his job duties and would

be terminated only for cause.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleged

defendant breached the terms of the contract when it terminated

plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 35). 

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to this claim,

arguing plaintiff was an at-will employee at Charter. (Def.’s

MSJ, at 13). To support its argument, defendant provides an

Employee Acknowledgment Form signed by plaintiff on January 7,

1999. (Rund Dep., Ex. 2). The form states, “I [plaintiff]

acknowledge that this Employee Handbook is neither a contract of

employment nor a legal document, and that I have an employmentat-will relationship with Charter Communications.” (Id.) 

Further, defendant cites to plaintiff’s deposition testimony

wherein he admits no one at Charter made representations that his

employment was not at-will. (Def.’s MSJ, at 14). 

Plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion did not address

this claim. As plaintiff has provided no evidence of the

existence of an oral contract between plaintiff and defendant,

and defendant’s evidence establishes the contrary, defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on this issue is GRANTED. 

F. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s failure

to protect plaintiff from retaliation and the offensive conduct

of a Charter employee15 was outrageous conduct done “with the

intent to cause, or with reckless disregard for the probability

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of causing Plaintiff to suffer from severe emotional distress.”

(Compl. ¶¶ 40, 45-46). Plaintiff claims this failure to act

damaged plaintiff’s “interests and well-being.” (Id. ¶ 40) 

Likewise, plaintiff also alleges defendant’s conduct amounts to

negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id. ¶ 44-47). 

The California Workers’ Compensation Act provides the

exclusive remedy for employee injuries sustained under the normal

conditions of employment. Cal. Lab. Code § 3601. Where an

employee’s injury falls within the protection of the Workers’

Compensation scheme, as laid out in Labor Code § 3600, the Code

precludes a cause of action against the employer. Id.

In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, 43 Cal. 3d

148, 160 (1987), the California Supreme Court warned that

exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision risk undermining the

legislative compromise of the Workers’ Compensation Act by

permitting the employee to pursue a cause of action merely by

tailoring the claim to fall within the scope of an exception. 

Id. at 160. With respect specifically to emotional injuries, the

doctrine therefore requires that such injuries fall within the

exclusive remedy provision of Section 3601 unless the basic

conditions of Section 3600 are not met and the employer’s conduct

contravenes fundamental public policy or exceeds the risks

inherent in the employment relationship. Livitsanos v. Superior

Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 815 (1992).

In that regard, the California Supreme Court has held that a

claim alleging violation of FEHA falls outside the scope of Labor

Code §§ 3600 and 3601. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18

Cal. 4th 1143, 1148 (1998). Correspondingly, courts have found

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that emotional injuries arising from discrimination and

harassment are by nature outside the scope of the employment

relationship and thus are not precluded by the exclusive remedy

provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Taylor v. Beth Eden

Baptist Church, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2003)

(citing Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575

(2003) (holding that exclusivity did not apply to claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress against employer based

on allegation that employer had retaliated against plaintiff for

refusing to fire female sales associate who plaintiff's

supervisor thought was unattractive); Fretland v. County of

Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1491-92 (1999) (holding that

work-related injury discrimination is not a normal risk of the

compensation bargain and therefore, claims for negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress against employer

were not barred by exclusivity rule); Accardi v. Superior Court,

17 Cal. App. 4th 341 (1993)(holding that claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress against employer based on

alleged harassment was not barred by the exclusivity rule because

sexual harassment was "outside the normal employment

environment")). 

Here, however, plaintiff has not established any such

discrimination, retaliation or harassment claims and thus, the

instant claims for intentional and negligent infliction of

emotional distress must likewise be dismissed because they are

barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Defendant’s motion is

GRANTED as to these claims.

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16 Because summary judgment has been granted with respect

to all the claims set forth in the complaint, the court need not

separately address defendant’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s

claim for punitive damages. As plaintiff has no viable

substantive claim against defendant, he has no claim for any

damages against defendant. 

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G. Negligent Supervision

Plaintiff alleges defendant knew or should have known that

its employee (plaintiff’s “Manager”) was engaging in unlawful

behavior. (Compl. ¶ 49). Plaintiff also asserts that defendant

knew or should have known its employee’s behavior would cause

plaintiff emotional distress. (Id. ¶ 51). Further, plaintiff

claims defendant had the authority to regulate its employee’s

conduct and failed to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55). Plaintiff alleges

defendant’s failure to act had the effect of “ratifying,

encouraging, condoning, exacerbating, increasing, and/or

worsening said conduct, acts, and failures to act.” (Id. ¶ 56). 

Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s conduct caused plaintiff pain

and suffering, extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional

distress. (Id. ¶ 58). 

As set forth above, plaintiff has proffered no evidence of

wrongdoing or unlawful behavior by defendant or its employees,

and therefore defendant’s motion is GRANTED on this claim.16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in its entirety and plaintiff’s cross-motion

for partial summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court 

///

///

///

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is directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2007 

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