Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01717/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01717-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ace B. Freemon, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Defendants 

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No. CV 09-1717-PHX-JAT (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Ace B. Freemon filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

multiple officials from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) (Doc. #6). Before the

Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #22), which Defendants oppose

(Doc. #27).

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose during his confinement at the ADC Eyman ComplexBrowning Unit (Doc. #6 at 1). He named the following Defendants: (1) Director Charles

Ryan; (2) Security Threat Group (STG) Coordinator Lieutenant George Smith; (3) STG

Investigator Lisa Celaya; (4) Deputy Warden Freeland; (5) STG Chair Robert Patton; and

STG Committee Members (6) J. Freeland, (7) R. Bock, and (8) J. Kimble (id.). In Count I

of his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated his due process

rights when, during the process to validate Plaintiff as an STG member, they failed to provide

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 1Ryan, J. Freeland, Bock, Kimble, and Patton filed an Answer (Doc. #18); Smith and

Celaya have not been served (see Doc. #38, Order providing additional time to serve these

Defs.).

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him notice of the allegations against him (id. at 4-4(B)). In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they subjected him to conditions-ofconfinement that constituted cruel and unusual punishment, including limited food and

outdoor recreation, constant lighting, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs

stemming from a serious hand injury (id. at 5-5(B); see id. at 4(C)-4(D)). 

The Court screened the First Amended Complaint and directed Defendants to respond

(Doc. #7), and Defendants filed an Answer (Doc. #18).1

 Plaintiff then filed his Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #22).

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

A. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief relates to an injury he received in 2005 while

working as an inmate recreation aid (id. at 2). He states that he suffered a serious injury to

his left hand, which left a sensory nerve and a motor nerve cut (id.). Plaintiff proffers copies

of a 2006 medical evaluation from the county hospital hand clinic and ADC medical records

documenting his treatment and pain-medication prescriptions (id., Ex. A). Plaintiff avers that

he continues to suffer numbness in part of his left hand as well as pain, for which he takes

daily pain medication and uses silicone gel pads held with ace bandages (id. at 3; Doc. #23,

Pl. Decl. ¶ 3). Plaintiff explains that since 2006, ADC physicians have issued Special Needs

Orders (SNOs) requiring that Plaintiff be restrained with side restraints rather than behindthe-back restraints due to his injury (Doc. #22 at 3; Doc. #23, Pl. Decl. ¶ 5). He attaches a

copy of the side-restraints SNO that was authorized by Dr. Jeffrey A. Sharp on May 28,

2008, and was to be in effect for one year (Doc. #22, Ex. B). Plaintiff alleges that in

September 2008, Ryan and Deputy Warden Freeland rescinded all SNOs for alternative

restraint methods (id. at 3-4). 

Plaintiff further alleges that his hand injury severely limits his ability to write legibly

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or for any length of time, which in turn prevents him from writing to his family or drafting

legal documents (id. at 4). Plaintiff states that he must rely on another inmate to draft legal

documents, and he submits the declaration of William Mark Isbell, an ADC inmate who

avers that he has drafted all of Plaintiff’s legal documents due to Plaintiff’s inability to write

legibly (id., Ex. C, Isbell Decl. ¶¶ 1-3). Plaintiff contends that he has requested permission

to obtain a typewriter in his cell as a reasonable accommodation for his condition, and he

proffers a copy of the response to his July 31, 2008 inmate letter about a typewriter (id., Ex.

D). This response informs Plaintiff that he must go through medical and then only a court

can order a typewriter (id.). Plaintiff also proffers a copy of an ADC memorandum

documenting that typewriters are authorized on a case-by-case basis when there is a court

order (id., Ex. E).

Plaintiff therefore requests a court order allowing him to purchase and possess a

typewriter (id. at 5). He submits that his condition constitutes a disability and, under the

Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, the ADC is required to make

reasonable accommodations (id. at 6). He argues that a typewriter is not an unreasonable

accommodation, and that ADC has allowed and still allows typewriters for individual

prisoners who have a court order; thus, the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiff’s favor (id.

at 6, 9). Plaintiff maintains that there is a likelihood of success on the merits in this case,

particularly with respect to his medical care claims (id. at 7-8). And finally, he argues that

this relief will serve the public interest because it adheres to federal law (id. at 8). 

B. Defendants’ Response

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion and argue that his requests for a typewriter and

side restraints are unrelated to the due process and conditions-of-confinement claims in the

underlying complaint (Doc. #27 at 1-2, 10). Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s motion raises

entirely new issues and seeks affirmative relief rather than relief that would simply maintain

the status quo (id. at 2). 

Defendants contend that even if Plaintiff’s motion was related to his claims, he has

not shown an irreparable injury or a likelihood of success on the merits (id. at 4). They assert

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that ADC prohibits possession of typewriters for security reasons and to prevent inmates

from using typewriter parts to fashion weapons; however, inmates with qualifying disabilities

and a court order are provided typewriters (id. at 4-5). Defendants note that there is no

evidence that after receiving the response to his 2008 inmate letter, Plaintiff ever attempted

to have his need for a typewriter evaluated by medical personnel (id. at 5). They also point

out that Plaintiff does not indicate whether he is right or left-handed nor has he shown that

typing with his injury would be any easier than writing (id.). Defendants submit that without

a showing of a medical need, there is no showing of irreparable harm (id. at 6).

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that he should be provided a typewriter as an

accommodation under the ADA, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has met none of the

requirements for establishing that he has a qualifying disability (id. at 6-7). 

Lastly, as to the request for side restraints, Defendants assert that because there is no

evidence that Plaintiff exhausted this claim through the ADC administrative grievance

process, the request for relief related to this claim must be denied (id. at 9). They also assert

that Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable harm because he alleges no facts showing an

irreparable injury or harm, and his request for relief comes almost two years after the

rescission of SNOs, suggesting that the change in restraints is not significant (id. at 9-10).

And Defendants maintain that there is little likelihood of success on the merits because side

restraints are not as secure and behind the back restraints (id. at 10).

C. Plaintiff’s Reply

Plaintiff replies that his request for injunctive relief concerns harm that is related to

his underlying claims (Doc. #32 at 1-2). He also maintains that Ryan and Freeland are aware

of his claims concerning side restraints because he tried to resolve the problem though the

ADC grievance system (id. at 2, 6). Plaintiff contends that Ryan’s and Freeland’s rescission

of the SNO issued by physicians clearly constitutes deliberate indifference; thus, injunctive

relief is appropriate (id. at 4).

As to the request for a typewriter, Plaintiff argues that his declaration sufficiently

evidences that Plaintiff’s condition constitutes a qualified disability, that he is unable to draft

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28 2

See Prince v. Schriro, et al., CV 08-1299-PHX-SRB (JRI) (Doc. #32, Order adopting

R & R at Doc. #28).

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legal papers or communicate with family, and that ADC allows typewriters for other inmates

(id. at 5). 

III. Preliminary Injunction Standard

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy and “one that should

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (quoting 11A C. Wright, A.

Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, pp. 129-130 (2d ed. 1995)). To

obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show “that he is likely to succeed on

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that

the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”

Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008); Am. Trucking

Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). The movant has the

burden of proof on each element of the test. Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184

F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000).

IV. Analysis

The Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction as a request for an

order for both a typewriter and an SNO for side restraints.

A. Typewriter

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s request for a typewriter is unrelated to the

underlying claims and therefore inappropriate (Doc. #27 at 1). Defendants are correct that

an injunction should not issue if “is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying

wholly outside the issues in the suit” (id., citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43

(11th Cir. 1997)). But “where the preliminary relief is directed to the prisoner’s access to the

Courts, a nexus between the preliminary relief and the ultimate relief sought is not required.”

Prince v. Schriro, et al., 2009 WL 1456648, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2009),2

 citing

Dimaontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s request for a typewriter

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relates to his alleged inability to draft legal documents and litigate this action, i.e. his access

to the court. Therefore, the Court need not consider the merits of the underlying suit in

determining whether to grant the request for an injunction. See Dimaontiney, 918 F.2d

at 796. 

Although there is a constitutional right of access to the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 821 (1977), there is no constitutional right to a typewriter in prison. Lindquist v.

Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit has held that

inmates have no right to a typewriter to prepare legal documents as long as there remains

some other means of preparing legal documents. Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th

Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1036 (2009).

Plaintiff submits that he is effectively unable to handwrite his documents (Doc. #22

at 4; Doc. #23, Pl. Decl. ¶ 10). See id. (if handwritten documents are permitted by court

rules, it is a sufficient alternative to a typewriter). As Defendants point out, however,

Plaintiff does not explain how his hand injury and pain would be less affected by typing than

by writing. More importantly, the record shows that the ADC provides typewriters to those

with a “qualifying disability” and a court order (Doc. #22, Ex. E; Doc. #27 at 4). Yet

Plaintiff does not indicate whether he went through—or attempted to go through—medical

to request evaluation for a typewriter following his 2008 inquiry about a typewriter. And

while Plaintiff avers that he has a “qualifying disability,” the medical records he submits are

not recent—they are all from 2006 (Doc. #22, Ex. A). Absent recent medical records and

more specific facts supporting Plaintiff’s request for a typewriter, such as evidence that he

has pursued or attempted to pursue the avenues available for obtaining a medical opinion

supporting authorization for a typewriter, an injunction is not appropriate at this time.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for an order for a typewriter will be denied.

B. Side Restraints

At the outset, the Court notes that, contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Plaintiff did not

wait two years to bring this request for injunctive relief in the pending motion. In his request

for relief in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff specifically sought an order for

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 3The proper avenue for a raising a failure-to-exhaust claim is through an unenumerated

12(b) motion. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988).

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reinstatement of the side-restraint SNO (Doc. #6 at 6 ¶ F). 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff suffered a hand injury and permanent nerve

damage in his left hand, or that he was issued a side-restraints SNO by ADC physician Dr.

Sharp that was to be in effect through May 2009 (see Doc. #22, Exs. A-B). Nor do

Defendants deny that Ryan and Freeland rescinded the SNO in September 2008. 

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to claim that he exhausted his remedies is

incorrect (see Doc. #27 at 9). Plaintiff indicated in his declaration that he exhausted remedies

for this issue (Doc. #23, Pl. Decl. ¶¶ 8-9). Plaintiff also indicated in his First Amended

Complaint that he exhausted administrative remedies for all his claims (Doc. #6 at 4, 5).

And, despite Defendants’ contentions otherwise, the allegation that Ryan and Freeland were

deliberately indifferent when they rescinded the side-restraints SNO is clearly set forth as one

of Plaintiff’s claims (id. at 4(D), 5(B)). Regardless, as Plaintiff asserts, he is not required to

plead exhaustion, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), and Defendants submit no

evidence that he failed to exhaust remedies for this claim.3

Defendants proffer no affidavits or other evidence to support their claim that side

restraints are less secure than behind-the-back restraints (see Doc. #27 at 10). And their

contention that “it is not self-evident that one type of restraint is more painful than another”

is belied by evidence that an ADC physician ordered a side-restraints SNO due to Plaintiff’s

injury and “neuropathic pain” (id; Doc. #22, Ex. B). As to whether Plaintiff has shown a

likelihood of success on the merits, the Court notes that intentionally interfering with an

inmate’s physician-prescribed treatment may constitute deliberate indifference. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976).

Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts indicating that

he is subject to a threat of irreparable harm. To meet the irreparable harm requirement,

Plaintiff must do more than simply allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. Caribbean

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Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This requires

Plaintiff to demonstrate by specific facts that there is a credible threat of immediate and

irreparable harm. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Plaintiff shows that he previously had a siderestraints SNO; however, he does not sufficiently demonstrate the specific harm he is

presently facing absent reinstatement of the SNO. Although Plaintiff alleged that in

November 2008, during transport from his cell to the shower, he was “notified” that

alternative restraint methods would no longer be used, he does not state whether officers

actually employed the behind-the-back restraints nor does he indicate the harm he suffered,

if any, as a result (Doc. #22 at 3). Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief related to side

restraints will therefore be denied.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate entitlement

to a preliminary injunction, particularly an injunction that alters rather than maintains the

status quo. See Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that

mandatory, as opposed to prohibitory, injunctions are subject to heightened scrutiny). His

motion will be denied without prejudice to refiling.

IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate is withdrawn as to Plaintiff’s

Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #22), and it is denied without prejudice.

DATED this 1st day of July, 2010.

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