Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04051/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04051-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORIS CROSLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

 CITY OF PITTSBURG, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-04051 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON AUGUST 31, 2007 AT 9:00 A.M.

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available

at the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit

the citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. Cf. N.D. Civil

Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their

reliance on such authority.

The Court has asked a number of questions pertaining to whether Plaintiffs do

continue to assert specific causes of action against Defendants and whether Plaintiffs do

continue to assert causes of action premised on the factual allegations in the First

Amended Complaint. See Defendants’ Motion, Questions 3, 4, and 10. If Plaintiffs are

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withdrawing any causes of action, or if they will not be pursuing causes of action based

upon a particular theory of liability, the Court requests that they file notice of that intent,

in writing, in advance of the hearing.

The Court reserves issuing a tentative ruling on Defendants’ motion and tentatively

DENIES Ms. Crosley’s motion.

Each party shall have twenty (20) minutes to address the following questions:

Plaintiff Crosley’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

1. In support of her motion, Ms. Crosley argues that she is “taking the facts in the

light most favorable to Defendants.” (See, e.g., Reply Br. at 2:5-13.) If the

Court accepts as true the Defendants’ version of the facts regarding the alleged

warrantless entry, those facts could support a finding that they broke the

threshold of Ms. Crosley’s apartment. However, the facts presented in

opposition to Defendants’ motion, and incorporated by reference in support of

Ms. Crosley’s motion, suggest that the Defendant Officers did not enter Ms.

Crosley’s apartment. Because Defendants are the non-moving party, the Court

must take the facts in the light most favorable to them. Therefore, what is Ms.

Crosley’s best argument that the evidence submitted in support of her opposition

to Defendants’ motion, which she incorporated by reference into her motion,

does not create a genuine issue of material fact on the alleged warrantless entry

into her home?

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

1. In their reply brief, in the section addressing racial discrimination under state

law, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action

should be dismissed. Plaintiffs concede that they will dismiss the Third and

Fifth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action appear to

extend beyond allegations of racial discrimination. Are Defendants arguing that

the Court should grant summary judgment on these causes of action based on

their allegations that Plaintiffs have not proved the merits of their Section 1983

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claims on the other bases asserted (i.e. the alleged Fourth Amendment and First

Amendment violations), or is this simply an error on Defendants’ part as to

which state law causes of action encompassed the race discrimination claims?

2. Are Defendants moving for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Seventh Cause of

Action (False Arrest and Imprisonment)? If so, where in Defendants’ motion

can the Court find argument on that cause of action? 

3. Is Mr. Collins maintaining his cause of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress? If so, does he contend that the argument at pages 24-25 of

the opposition brief addresses that claim as to both Plaintiffs? If not, why should

the Court not grant Defendants’ motion as unopposed as to that cause of action?

4. Are Plaintiffs pursuing their Section 1983 claim to the extent it is premised on

alleged violations of freedom of association and “interferences with the zone of

privacy,” or are they, as Defendants assert in reply, abandoning those claims?

a. If Plaintiffs are pursuing those claims, what is their best argument that

Defendants’ motion should be denied as to those claims?

5. With respect to Ms. Crosley’s excessive force claim, is she relying exclusively

on an alleged violation of Fourth Amendment rights, as her opposition brief

suggests, or does she also premise this claim on substantive due process

grounds? See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44, 855

(1998) (holding that analysis was not governed by Graham because no search or

seizure occurred; plaintiff’s section 1983 claim was premised upon substantive

due process and governed by the “shocks the conscience” standard). 

a. If Ms. Crosley also relies on a substantive due process theory, where in

the opposition can the Court find Ms. Crosley’s legal argument on that

basis?

b. If the Court were to conclude that the substantive due process argument

was raised in Ms. Crosley’s opposition, what is her best argument that the

evidence shows that the Defendant Officers’ conduct was not merely

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negligent and that it satisfies the “shocks the conscience” test? See

generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that

although there is no specific state of mind requirement to violate Section

1983, mere negligence may not be sufficient to state a claim).

c. If the Court were to conclude that Ms. Crosley has not addressed the

excessive force claim based on an alleged violation of her substantive due

process rights, what is Defendants’ best argument that she should not be

permitted to proceed at trial on such a claim, even if the Court granted

their motion on the alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment rights? 

(See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 26b (asserting violations of “right to be

free from the use of excessive force by police officers, which is

guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution”).

6. With respect to her excessive force claim premised upon alleged violations of

her Fourth Amendment rights, on what basis does Ms. Crosley contend that she

was “seized,” as a matter of law? See, e.g., Edenfield v. Estate of Willets, 2006

WL 1041724 at *7-*8 (D. Hawaii Apr. 14, 2006) (noting that “the Ninth Circuit

has not addressed whether inadvertent injuries that a police officer inflicts on a

hostage or innocent bystander while attempting to stop another person constitute

a seizure under the Fourth Amendment” and discussing out-of-circuit authorities

that have addressed issue and analyzing whether plaintiffs were the “intended

object” of the defendants’ conduct). See also Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157,

163-64 (4th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing situation where an officer uses excessive

force directed toward person intended to be seized but injures another innocent

bystander in the process from situation where officer uses excessive force

directed at innocent person mistakenly believed to be a suspect; latter situation

will give rise to a seizure while former will not); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz-Cosme,

906 F.2d 791, 794-796 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that innocent hostage

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who was shot by police, when police were aiming at another, was “seized”); cf.

Tubar v. Clift, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (rejecting

defendants’ arguments on “innocent bystander” theory and denying motion for

partial summary judgment on qualified immunity where both occupants of

vehicle were suspects in possible crime).

a. Does Ms. Crosley have any additional authority to support her position

on this issue? 

b. Does Ms. Crosley have any authority to suggest that the law on this point

was clearly established as of July 1, 2005?

7. If the Court concludes that Ms. Crosley was not seized, is she also relying on the

alleged warrantless entry to support her excessive force claim? 

a. If so, and in light of Defendants’ position that the facts are disputed as to

whether the Defendant Officers entered her home, what is Defendants’

best argument that summary judgment should be granted on that claim?

b. Does either party have any authority to suggest that the reasoning of the

“innocent bystander” line of cases, cited in question 6, would not apply

with equal force to the warrantless entry claim?

8. Mr. Collins testified that Officer Pratt advised him that he (Officer Pratt) would,

rather than could, arrest Mr. Collins for trespassing. (See Declaration of Peter J.

Edrington in Support of Defendants’ Motion, Ex. 6 (K. Collins Depo. at 90:1-7). 

Taking those facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Collins, what is Defendants’

best argument that Mr. Collins would have felt free to leave or terminate the

encounter?

9. With respect to Mr. Collins’ claim that the Defendant Officers violated his First

Amendment rights, what retaliatory action does Mr. Collins contend the

Defendant Officers took in response to his verbal complaints about their

conduct? See McKinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1995).

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10. Do Plaintiffs continue to maintain their claims against Chief Baker and the City

premised on alleged patterns and practices regarding “the use of unnecessary and

excessive force,” as alleged in paragraph 29 of the First Amendment Complaint?

a. If so, what specific evidence in the record supports a finding that such

patterns and practices exist?

11. Is the Court correct that Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Baker stem from policy

level activities, rather than his personal involvement in the July 1, 2005 incident?

12. With respect to the claims against Chief Baker and the City do Plaintiffs allege

that a specific “policy” existed or are their claims premised upon a “custom or

practice” theory? If the former, is there a specific written policy at issue? 

a. How do Plaintiffs respond to Defendants’ argument that the deposition

testimony on which they rely does not state that Chief Baker would

expect officers to arrest or detain an individual who declined to identify

themselves or who asked to be left alone?

b. What is Plaintiffs’ response to the Defendants’ reply argument on Monell

liability?

13. Is Ms. Crosley’s cause of action alleging assault and battery separate and distinct

from her Section 1983 excessive force claim?

a. Would Ms. Crosley agree that the evidence in the record more

appropriately speaks to cause of action for battery, rather than assault? If

not, where in the evidence is there evidence that Ms. Crosley was

threatened with harm by the Defendant Officers? See CACI 1301. 

b. If Ms. Crosley’s battery claim is asserted as concomitant to her federal

claim (i.e. that the officers used unreasonable force in effectuating an

arrest and therefore are liable under state law for assault and/or battery)

and if the Court concludes that the Defendants are not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Crosley’s excessive force claim,

would they concede they are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law

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on her cause of action for assault and battery? See, e.g., Edson v. City of

Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1273-1274 (1998) (holding that a

plaintiff asserting a state law battery claim against a police officer must

establish that the police officer used unreasonable force).

c. If Ms. Crosley is asserting her cause of action for assault and/or battery

as an alternative basis of liability, what is Defendants’ best argument that

the evidence that Officer Pratt allegedly stated “So f-ing what,” after it

was brought to his attention that Ms. Crosley had been knocked to the

ground, not sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact on the issue of

whether he intended to harm her? See CACI 1300. 

14. Plaintiffs assert that “[v]iolations of civil rights are outrageous.” Do Plaintiffs

have any authority that supports that proposition as a matter of law?

15. Are there any other issues the parties wish to address?

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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