Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_00-cv-01846/USCOURTS-alnd-2_00-cv-01846-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

JOHN FORREST PARKER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-B-1846-S

 )

MICHAEL HALEY, Commissioner, Alabama )

Department of Corrections, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

John Forrest Parker, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, filed this petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Parker is represented by counsel.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 6, 1989, Parker was convicted in the Circuit Court of Colbert County of capital

murder. A sentencing hearing was held before the same jury the next day, and the jury recommended

a sentence of life imprisonment without parole by a vote of 10-2. On June 21, 1989, the trial court

sentenced Parker to death by electrocution. On September 20, 1991, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to be held on the Batson issue

and for the trial judge to make new written findings regarding the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances, weigh those circumstances, and enter a proper sentencing order. Parker v. State, 587

So.2d 1072 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). On return to remand, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed.

Parker v. State, 610 So.2d 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the

judgment of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Parker, 610 So.2d 1181. The United

States Supreme Court denied Parker’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama

on June 28, 1993. Parker v. Alabama, 509 U.S. 929 (1993).

FILED

 2005 Sep-30 PM 04:08

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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This federal action was stayed from January 29, 2002 until August 12, 2002 and again from December 9, 2003 1/

until August 10, 2004, at the request of both parties, awaiting decisions by the United States Supreme Court

in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) and Schriro v. Summerlin, ____ U.S. ____, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159

L.Ed.2d 442 (2004).

2

On December 2, 1994, Parker filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 32

of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Circuit Court of Colbert County. Rule 32

evidentiary hearings were conducted August 1-3, 1996. On November 7, 1996, Parker filed an

amended Rule 32 petition. Additional Rule 32 hearings were conducted on November 12, 1996.

On August 5, 1997, the Rule 32 petition was denied. On April 30, 1999, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the Rule 32 petition. The Alabama Supreme Court denied

Parker’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on December 17,

1999. The federal petition for writ of habeas corpus before this court was filed on December 11,

2000.1/

FACTS OF THE CASE

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals attached as an appendix to its

opinion the amended sentencing order of the trial court prepared after remand and the appellate court

specifically found that the amended order was supported by the record. The amended sentencing

order recited the facts of this case:

The Court finds from the evidence introduced at trial that the

defendant, John Forrest Parker, and his friend, Kenneth Eugene

Smith, on the morning of March 18, 1988, went to the home of

Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett in rural Colbert County, Alabama, with the

intent to kill said Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett. The Court further finds

from said evidence that the day before, Billy Gray Williams had paid

the defendant the sum of One Hundred and No/100 ($100.00) Dollars

to use for purchasing a weapon to be used in said murder, but that the

defendant used that money for drugs to “shoot up.” The Court further

finds that the defendant was promised One Thousand and no/100

($1,000.00) Dollars for the killing by Billy Gray Williams, and that

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As a matter of internal organization each claim is addressed below with the corresponding state proceeding in 2/

which the claim was made, if in fact is was identified.

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he would be paid the balance when the job was done. The Court

further finds that Kenneth Eugene Smith and the defendant, John

Forrest Parker, drove to the residence of Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett

in the defendant’s vehicle. The Court further finds that the defendant

shot up 3 cc’s of Talwin on the way to said residence. The Court

further finds that the defendant had been unsuccessful in securing a

gun for “the job” and that he brought with him a survival knife. The

Court further finds that the defendant drove his vehicle to Elizabeth

Sennett’s home and that Kenneth Eugene Smith sharpened the

defendant’s knife all the way down there. The Court further finds that

they parked the defendant’s car in the rear of the Sennett home. The

court further finds that the defendant and Mr. Smith asked Elizabeth

Dorlene Sennett for permission to use the bathroom, which she gave

them. While in the bathroom, the defendant put cotton socks on his

hands. The Court further finds that when he came out of the

bathroom, the defendant jumped Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett and

started hitting her and together he and Kenneth Eugene Smith killed

her by hitting her with a galvanized pipe, holding her down with a

small blue chair and stabbing her while she was asking them not to

hurt her. The Court further finds that the defendant and Kenneth

Eugene Smith took a VCR and a stereo to make it look like a

burglary, which was in accordance with their plan, and that they also

broke the glass in the medicine cabinet to further this plan. The Court

further finds from the evidence that the defendant and Kenneth

Eugene Smith threw away the survival knife they had used for the

killing, and that the defendant threw the stereo off a bridge and

burned his clothes after the killing. The Court further finds that the

defendant was paid the additional Nine Hundred and no/100

($900.00) Dollars after the killing.

610 So.2d 1178-79.

THE § 2254 CLAIMS 2/

A. Exclusion of jurors on the basis of race and gender

B. Improper closing arguments by the prosecutor

C. Erroneous jury instruction on reasonable doubt

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D. Prosecution’s failure to disclose Brady information

E. Ineffective assistance of counsel

F. Medicating of petitioner prior to and at trial without informing counsel and the court

G. Trial court’s failure to strike venirepersons who could not be impartial

H. Trial court’s override of jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment without parole

I. Admission of statement and other evidence resulting from illegal arrest

J. Trial court’s denial of request for change of venue

K. Trial court’s refusal of motion for recusal

L. Petitioner’s statement extracted in violation of Miranda

M. Trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser included offenses 

N. Challenge to Rule 32 process whereby judge reviews his/her own errors

O. On remand for resentencing petitioner was not provided opportunity to present evidence on

aggravating and mitigating circumstances

P. Illegal arrest based on lack of jurisdiction of the Colbert County police officers

Q. Statements were the result of illegal and unconstitutional duress

R. Grand jury which indicted petitioner was selected in discriminatory and unconstitutional

manner

APPLICABLE LAW: WHERE CLAIM WAS ADJUDICATED 

 ON THE MERITS IN STATE COURT

Because Parker’s federal habeas petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to his case. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429 (2000); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court discussed the

“contrary to” and “unreasonable application” phrases of § 2254(d).

A state-court decision will ... be contrary to our clearly established

precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in our cases. ... A state-court decision will

also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the

state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from our precedent.

....

A state-court decision that correctly identifies the governing legal rule

but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case

... would qualify as a decision “involv[ing] an unreasonable

application of ... clearly established Federal law.”

....

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[A] federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application”

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law was objectively unreasonable.

....

[U]nder § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause, then a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.

....

[The phrase “clearly established Federal law”] refers to the holdings,

as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.

529 U.S. at 405-12.

It is Parker’s burden, as petitioner, to show that the state court applied a Supreme Court case to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641 (2003);

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002).

[Section] 2254(d) dictates a “‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,’ Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333

n.7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), which demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)

(per curiam). 

Bell v. Cone, ____ U.S. ____, 125 S.Ct. 847, 853, ____ L.Ed.2d ____ (2005).

“[W]hether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record the court

had before it.” Holland v. Jackson, ____ U.S. ____, 124 S.Ct. 2736, 159 L.Ed.2d 683 (2004).

In this case, numerous hearings were conducted, including hearings on the Rule 32 petition.

The record before the state courts is also before this court. There has been no challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence adduced in the state court hearings; therefore, this court need not conduct

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As recently as March 22, 2005, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that federal habeas relief is not due 3/

to be granted unless the conditions set forth in § 2254(d)(1) are met. Brown v. Payton, ____ U.S. ____ , ____

S.Ct. ____ , ____ L.Ed.2d ____, 2005 WL 645182 (2005). The Court emphasized that a state court decision

involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent only if it applies the

Court’s precedents to the facts in “an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. The Court criticized the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals for second-guessing the state court’s application of Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370

(1990) to similar but not identical facts, stating [e]ven on the assumption that [the California Supreme Court’s]

conclusion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and it is therefore just the type of decision that AEDPA

shields on habeas review.”

7

an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) and (f). This court has familiarized itself with

the entire record in this case including pretrial, trial and post-trial hearings in addition to the

thorough findings of fact and decisions entered by the trial court based upon the evidence adduced

during the hearings. Moreover, the appellate courts’ opinions on direct appeal were comprehensive.

Although the appellate court opinion on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition was not as

comprehensive as the opinion on direct appeal, the appellate court reviewed an extremely detailed

and comprehensive order from the trial court denying the Rule 32 petition. This court’s review

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is simplified by the solid evidentiaryand legal foundation laid by the state

trial and appellate courts. When reviewing the state court decisions this court has continued to heed

the admonishment of the Supreme Court related to state court findings.3/

A. Whether Jurors were Excluded on the Basis of Race and Gender

1. Batson discussion

Petitioner raised a Batson claim on direct appeal. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing with directions that “the prosecution shall be required

to give racially neutral reasons for the use of peremptory challenges against black venire members.”

 587 So.2d at 1077. After remand, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial judge,

with commendable thoroughness and a conscientiousness warranted

by the sentence imposed in this case, entered a written order in which

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she made specific findings of fact and concluded that the principles

of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69

(1986), were not violated by the prosecution’s use of its peremptory

strikes to remove eight black venire members. That order is attached

to this opinion as Appendix I.

The findings and conclusions contained in that order are fully

supported by our own independent review of the record and are

approved by this Court. We find that no violation of the principles of

Batson v. Kentucky, supra, or Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.

1987), occurred in this case. See Ex parte Bird and Warner, 594

So.2d 676 (Ala. 1991).

610 So.2d at 1172.

The trial court’s order, Appendix I to the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

stated in pertinent part:

The Court having proceeded to consider the testimony given by the

District Attorney, Gary Alverson, on behalf of the State, as well as

having considered all of the testimony and evidence presented on

behalf of the defendant, and the court noting for the record that 59

jurors from the original jury venire were present, having responded

to subpoenas issued by the defendant, and the Court further having

considered the original jury venire list which was stipulated to by the

parties and which is already a part of the record on appeal, beginning

with No. 3, S.A. and ending with No. 129, M.W., which list also

reflects the strikes made by the State and the strikes made by the

defendant, and the Court having considered all of the testimony and

evidence presented in open Court, and based upon said evidence and

testimony, the Court does find that the venire consisted of 79

prospective jurors, 10 of which were excused, leaving the number at

69. There were 9 black jurors on said venire, and 60 white jurors.

The 9 black venire members comprised 13% of the venire. The

blacks comprised 8% of the trial jury.

The Court further finds that the State presented evidence which

indicated that venire member No. 3, a black female named S.A., was

stricken by the State because she was the daughter of E.A., who was

being prosecuted by the District Attorney at that time for the offense

of Theft of Property in the First Degree.

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The Court further finds that venire member No. 21, a black female,

was stricken by the State because she knew the victim’s husband’s

girlfriend, D.T. The victim’s husband had procured this defendant

and his co-defendants to kill his wife, and D.T. was a prospective

witness for the defendant at the time of selection of the jury. The

District Attorney also testified that she was stricken because she was

related to one R.C. who had been prosecuted for violation of the

Alabama Uniform Controlled Substance Act and because of her

statement that she was generally opposed to the death penalty. The

State further presented evidence that B.R., white veniremember No.

92, was struck for the same general reasons by the State. The State

further presented evidence that said veniremember T.C. indicated

during voir dire that she had some knowledge and training in

psychology. The District Attorney testified that he struck all

veniremembers who had training in the field of psychology because

they might place undue emphasis on defense witness Dr. Crowder’s

testimony. The District Attorney testified that white veniremember

No. 129, M.W., white veniremember No. 92, B.R., white

veniremember No. 63, R.L., white veniremember No. 58, S.L., white

veniremember No. 9, R.B., and white veniremember No. 82, M.N.,

were all stricken for that same reason, inasmuch as they responded

during voir dire that they had some knowledge and training in the

field of psychology.

With respect to veniremember No. 25, a black male by the name of

J.D., the State indicated that the reason they struck said

veniremember was because he indicated during voir dire that he had

has [sic] difficulty staying overnight, and white veniremember 53,

J.J., and white veniremember No. 40, P.H., were stricken for the same

reason by the State. The State further presented evidence that J.D.

had stated during voir dire: “I really don’t want to be here” and that

that was an additional reason the State struck veniremember No. 25,

J.D.

The State presented evidence that they had stricken veniremember

No. 67, a black female by the name of W.M., because she indicated

during voir dire that she has worked with members of the family of

Billy Gray Williams, the black co-defendant to the defendant in this

case, whose case had been tried at the time; that she had heard

discussions regarding this case, and white veniremember No. 68,

B.M., was stricken for the same reason inasmuch as she stated during

voir dire that she knew the family of the defendant, John Forrest

Parker, in this case, the co-defendant of Billy Gray Williams.

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With respect to veniremember No. 77, black female C.M., the State

presented evidence that they had stricken her because the District

Attorney had information that she was a cousin to R.M. and J.M.,

who had been prosecuted by the District Attorney on drug charges

and further on the ground that drug use and violations were factually

related to this case. The State further offered as an excuse for striking

veniremember C.M. she had a child born out of wedlock and that the

defendant in this case likewise had a child born out of wedlock, and

the State indicated that they felt like veniremember C.M. would be

sympathetic toward the defendant and his case for this reason.

With respect to veniremember No. 83, a black female, A.O., the State

presented evidence that they struck veniremember A.O. because she

was married to T.O., who is the brother of W.E.O., who at the time

of the trial of this cause had a pending criminal case against him for

sale of cocaine. Further, this veniremember’s husband, T.O., was a

defendant in a civil forfeiture case arising out of the same sale of

cocaine case against W.E.O., at the time this case was tried, and,

further, veniremember A.O. stated during voir dire that she knew the

attorney for the defendant, Gene Hamby, through her work with the

City of Sheffield.

With respect to veniremember No. 20, black male, E.L.W. the State

offered as evidence of the reason for their striking veniremember

E.L.W. that he had a series of traffic offenses in recent years,

indicating a disregard for the law, and the State offered testimony that

they also struck veniremember No. 129, M.W. with a similar type

record for the same reason.

With respect to veniremember No. 121, black female by the name of

M.A.W., the State indicated that they struck veniremember M.A.W.

because she had indicated during voir dire that she had training in the

area of psychology. The State struck white veniremember No. 129,

M.W., white veniremember No. 92, B.R., white veniremember No.

63, R.L., white veniremember No. 58, S.L., white veniremember No.

9, R.B., and white veniremember No. 82, M.N. for the same reason,

in addition to black veniremember No. 21, T.C., who was struck for

this reason, among others, by the State.

Black veniremember No. 113, C.T., served on the trial jury in this

case.

On cross-examination the District Attorney, Gary Alverson, testified

that his information regarding traffic tickets was obtained from the

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local police department and the Colbert County Circuit Clerk’s

records; that the State was particularly concerned about jurors with

more than one traffic ticket. The District Attorney testified that

information on veniremembers’ relatives regarding felony cases,

pending or disposed of, was obtained from the circuit court files in

the Circuit Clerk’s office in Colbert County.

No evidence was presented during the hearing which contradicted the

State’s evidence that veniremember T.C. was related to R.C., who

had been prosecuted by the District Attorney on a drug case; that

veniremember C.M. was related to R.M. and J.M., who were

prosecuted by the District Attorney on drug charges; that

veniremember A.O. was related to T.O., who was a defendant in a

forfeiture case where the State was the plaintiff at the time of the trial,

and that she was related to W.E.O., who was a defendant in a sale of

cocaine case brought by the State at the time of this trial. Further, the

State’s testimony with respect to pending charges and convictions of

relatives of these veniremembers was uncontradicted.

The District Attorney testified that he did not ask members of the jury

venire whether or not anyone had children born out of wedlock

because he felt it would embarrass the veniremembers to whom they

would apply. The District Attorney obtained this information through

other sources, namely through local law enforcement officers and his

investigator’s efforts in Colbert County, Alabama.

The Court further finds that Juror No. 88, M.Q., testified that he had

a first cousin who had been convicted of a felony (breaking into some

houses) but that he thought it was in Franklin County. Said juror also

testified that he did not have more than one regular traffic ticket but

had traffic tickets when he was part of the railroad crew which was

discharged for violating the speeding regulations for trains.

Veniremember No. 46, L.H., testified that she had a family member,

namely an uncle by marriage, who had been convicted of a felony in

Colbert County.

Juror No. 8, J.R.A., testified that he had a relative who had been

convicted of a felony, namely, making whiskey, fifteen years ago.

Juror No. 78, N.G.M., testified that he had a brother who had been

convicted of a felony twenty years ago in Lawrence County, Alabama

(as an accessory to a robbery).

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Juror No. 85, W.G.P., testified that he had had more than one traffic

conviction; however, only one was in Colbert County, and it was

seven to eight years ago.

Juror No. 11, J.S., testified that she had more than one traffic ticket,

namely, two old ones, one from Florence, Lauderdale County,

Alabama, and one from Muscle Shoals, Colbert County, Alabama,

another one in 1987 in Lauderdale County, and one in Sheffield,

Alabama, in 1988.

Juror No. 64, L.L., testified that she had a relative in Florida, an uncle

on her mother’s side, who was convicted of a felony 12-15 years ago;

said juror thought it was a manslaughter case, and the conviction was

in the State of Florida.

Juror No. 41, G.H., foreman of the trial jury, testified that he had a

first cousin who had been convicted of what he thought was a felony

in Madison County, Alabama. Said juror further testified that during

the past ten years he has had two speeding tickets, one in Colbert

County and one in Lauderdale County.

Juror No. 66, T.R.M., testified that he had had a couple of traffic

tickets, one in Leighton, Colbert County, Alabama, and one in

Lauderdale County, from Rogersville in 1982.

Based on the testimony presented by the District Attorney, the Court

finds that it was the practice of the District Attorney to check

municipal police departments, the district court and the circuit court

in Colbert County, Alabama, for traffic violations and further finds

that the practice of the District Attorney’s office was to strike jurors

who had a series of traffic violations within the recent past, and

further finds that said practice was not rebutted by the testimony of

the jurors called on behalf of the defendant, the Court finding that

none of those jurors had more than one traffic ticket from Colbert

County, either municipal, district or circuit court, in the recent past,

and although some had more than one traffic ticket, said convictions

were in other circuits. The information concerning out-of-Circuit or

out-of-State convictions was not shown to be known to the District

Attorney at the time of striking of the jury. The Court further finds

that of the jurors who testified on behalf of the defendant one would

have been stricken by the State pursuant to the State’s practice,

namely veniremember No. 46, L.H., and the District Attorney agreed

that he overlooked her relationship by marriage to a person who had

been convicted of a felony in Colbert County, Alabama. The Court

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further finds from the evidence that if the State had sought additional

verification of its traffic information on veniremembers through the

computer record from the State Department of Public Safety, the

State would only have been able to get jurors’ traffic records for the

last five years. The District Attorney further testified that with

respect to his practice that he intended to strike all jurors who had

training in the field of psychology, that he overlooked the information

obtained during the lengthy voir dire with respect to juror No. 11, J.S.

The District Attorney testified that that was his mistake. The Court

does not find that there was a significant disparate treatment of

members of the jury venire with the same characteristics, or who

answered a question in the same manner.

The Court finds that there was no proof that there was a pattern of

strikes against black jurors on this particular venire. The State had 28

strikes available and struck 8 black veniremembers and 20 white

veniremembers, thus using 29% of its strikes to strike black

veniremembers.

The Court does not find that there was any specific evidence of any

past conduct of the State’s attorney in using peremptory challenges to

strike all blacks from the jury venire. Although the defendant asked

the Court to take judicial notice of the jury lists in several cases, the

majority of which were not tried before the undersigned judge, the

undersigned judge has no knowledge from the evidence presented at

this hearing why the particular jurors were chosen in these other

cases, and does not find that mere juror lists is proof of intentional

past discriminatory practice on the part of the District Attorney. In

two of the cases submitted by defendant, the State struck fewer black

veniremembers than the defense, (CC-87-137 and -138).

The Court further finds that the State’s attorney’s questions and

statements during voir dire were very detailed, and much more than

a desultory voir dire.

The Court does not find from the evidence that the State’s questions

directed to the challenged veniremembers, both in the sense of the

questions that were asked, and in the sense of the questions that were

not asked were calculated to enable the State to strike the black

veniremembers.

The Court does not find that there was a significant disparate

treatment ofmembers ofthe jury venire with the same characteristics,

or who answered a question in the same or similar manner.

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The Court does not find that the voir dire examination of members of

the venire on behalf of the State was designed to provoke certain

responses which were likely to disqualify black veniremembers but

not white veniremembers. TheCourt does not find that there was any

circumstantial evidence of intent on the part of the District Attorney

to strike the jurors for other reasons than race-neutral reasons.

Although the State did strike all but one black veniremember on the

venire, the court finds from the evidence that the percentage of black

jurors on the venire was 13% and the percentage of black jurors on

the trial jury was 8%.

With respect to the testimony of David Thompson, former

investigator for the District Attorney, this Court finds that said David

Thompson was not the investigator for the District Attorney at the

time of the jury selection in this case. To the contrary, he had been

gone from his employment with the District Attorney’s office for

nearly two years (from August 1987 until May 1989). This Court

further finds that said investigator did little, if any, jury investigation

for the District Attorney’s office. Based on the testimony of Assistant

District Attorney Ronald Hudson, this Court simply finds that said

witness’ testimony was not believable. This Court further finds that

the District Attorney’s office had in fact explained the Batson

decision to said David Thompson while he was one of the

investigators for the District Attorney’s office. This Court further

finds that this District Attorney’s office was the first in the State to

apply Batson to the defense at the trial level.

Based on all of the evidence presented in open Court, this court finds

that the prosecution’s strikes were race-neutral, this court specifically

finding no pattern of strikes against black jurors on this particular

venire, no proof of any intentional past conduct of the State’s attorney

in using peremptory challenges to strike all blacks from the jury

venire, no proof that the voir dire was a desultory voir dire; and no

disparate treatments of members of the venire who gave similar

answers or with respect to whom the State had similar information.

This Court finds that the defendant in this case had a public trial by

an impartial jury as guaranteed by Amendment VI of the Constitution

of the United States of America.

See also, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90

L.Ed.[2d] 69 (1986); Powers v. Ohio [499 U.S. 400], 111 S.Ct. 1364

[113 L.Ed.2d 411] (1990); Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.

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15

1987); Harrell v. State, 555 So.2d 263, 268 (Ala. 1989); Stephens v.

State, 580 So.2d 11 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990), affirmed, 580 So.2d 26

(Ala.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859, 112 S.Ct. 176 [116 L.Ed.2d 138]

(1991); Bryant v. State, 516 So.2d 938 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987); Ex parte

Bird and Warner, 594 So.2d 676 (1991); and Jackson v. State [594

So.2d 1289] (Ala. Cr. App. 1991).

610 So.2d at 1173-77.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits peremptory strikes based solely on

race, and established a three step process for evaluating those claims. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322 (2003) the United States Supreme Court reviewed the three step Batson process:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory

challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that

showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral

basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties’

submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has

shown purposeful discrimination.

537 U.S. at 328 (citations omitted).

In Batson, the Court said that the defendant could establish a prima facie showing in the

following manner:

[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable

racial group [citation omitted] and that the prosecutor has exercised

peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the

defendant’s race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact,

as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges

constitute a jury selection practice that permits “those to discriminate

who are of a mind to discriminate.” [Citation omitted.] Finally, the

defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant

circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice

to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.

....

In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing,

the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For

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Petitioner is white.

4/

16

example, a “pattern” of strikes against black jurors included in the

particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Similarly, the prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire

examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an

inference of discriminatory purpose. We have confidence that trial

judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if

the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory

challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black

jurors.

476 U.S. at 96-97.

The Batson Court continued:

Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts

to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for

challenging black jurors. ... The trial court then will have the duty to

determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.

476 U.S. at 98. 

In footnote 21, the Court wrote: 

In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that “a finding

of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact” entitled to

appropriate deference by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 ... (1985). Since the trial judge’s findings in

the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation

of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings

great deference. Id. at 575-576....

In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court held that in a trial of a white criminal defendant,4/

a prosecutor is prohibited from excluding black jurors on the basis of race. Obviously, when this

case was tried in 1989, Powers had not been decided; however, by the time it was remanded on

direct appeal for an evidentiary hearing, Powers had been decided. 

In the Batson hearing, petitioner demonstrated that with its first twelve strikes, the

prosecution struck eight of the nine black jurors, members of a cognizable racial group. (E.H.,

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17

pp.28-30). He was entitled to rely on the fact that the practice of peremptory challenges permits

“those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.” Batson, supra. While this “pattern” of

strikes against black jurors might give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, petitioner has

identified no other relevant circumstances that would be relevant to whether the petitioner

established a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. Petitioner’s assertion that the

prosecutor’s proffered reasons for the strikes were shams and pretexts for racial discrimination is

not relevant to the first Batson step but rather would go to the third Batson step.

The Miller-El Court explained that at the third step,

[T]he issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can

be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by

how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by

whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial

strategy.

537 U.S. at 339.

The state court’s finding on the issue of discriminatory intent is accorded significant

deference as the trial court is in a superior position to make credibility determinations. 537 U.S.

at 339. On federal habeas review, “[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on

the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” 537 U.S. at 340.

At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified concerning his reasons for the strikes and

the petitioner then submitted testimony of white jurors who were not stricken by the prosecutor. The

testimony by petitioner’s witnesses went not to petitioner’s prima facie case but, rather, to whether

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Interestingly, L.H. was in fact stricken from the venire by petitioner with his fourteenth strike; therefore, unlike 5/

the other white jurors identified by petitioner, L.H. did not actually sit on petitioner’s jury. (Supplemental

transcript, p. 136)

18

the reasons given by the prosecutor for striking black jurors were not credible because he did not

apply the same standards to white jurors. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the trial court did not

impermissibly shift the evidentiary burden to petitioner. Rather, she looked to the petitioner for

testimony that would tend to show that the prosecutor’s race neutral reasons for the strikes were not

credible. 

At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor explained his reasons for striking eight of the nine

black jurors, and the trial court’s order accurately reflects the explanations given and that white

jurors were also stricken for many of the same reasons. (EH, pp. 17-26). Petitioner presented

testimony of white jurors who were not stricken for reasons that the prosecutor used for striking

black jurors; however, the trial judge in effect found that with only two exceptions, the white jurors

identified by petitioner were not similarly situated to the black jurors who were stricken. With

respect to the two jurors who should have been stricken, the trial court found that the prosecutor’s

failure to do so was based on his mistake. The white juror (L.H.), whose uncle had been charged

with or convicted of a felony in Colbert County, had a different last name than her uncle and there

was no testimony about whether the uncle’s prosecution occurred within the five year period that was

the scope of the prosecutor’s research. (EH, p. 64) Even though J.S., a white juror, was not 5/

stricken despite having taken psychology classes, six other white jurors, in addition to the black

jurors T.C. and M.W., were stricken – thus lending credence to the prosecutor’s statement that it was

an error on his part that she was not stricken as he had intended to strike everyone who had training

or courses in psychology. (EH, p. 18-21, 25-26, 32).

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19

Based on a review of the Batson evidentiary hearing, the voir dire proceedings, and the trial

court’s order following the Batson evidentiary hearing, the Court concludes that the state court’s

decision was not contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable application of Batson and its progeny.

Further, the state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings. 

2. J.E.B. discussion

In the amended petition, petitioner argued that “[t]he practice of the prosecutor in this case

in striking female jurors deprived Mr. Parker of due process and equal protection of the law in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States.” (Amended petition, p. 15).

On direct appeal the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not remand for an evidentiary

hearing on the issue of whether the prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove women from the

venire. The court stated:

There was no objection made in the circuit court at any time to the

alleged gender bias of the prosecution. While I adhere to my position

that gender discrimination is prohibited under state law, that

argument has been explicitly rejected by the other members of this

Court, see Daniels v. State, 581 So.2d 536, 539 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990),

cert. denied, 581 So.2d 541, (Ala. 1991), and Dysart v. State, 581

So.2d 541, 542-43 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), cert. denied, 581 So.2d 545

(Ala. 1991), and apparently by a majority of the members of the

Alabama Supreme Court, see Ex parte Dysart, 581 So.2d 545 (Ala.

1991).

587 So.2d at 1077-78.

In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held

that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination in jury

selection on the basis of gender. Until J.E.B., there was no prohibition against striking jurors on the

basis of sex. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), the Supreme Court held that “A new

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20

rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions [such as Batson] is to be applied retroactively to all

cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which

the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), the

United States Supreme Court held that Batson should not be applied retroactively on collateral

review of convictions that became final before Batson was announced. Similarly, J.E.B. should not

be applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final before J.E.B. was

announced. Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 28, 1993, when the United States Supreme

Court denied certiorari. J.E.B. was not decided until April 19, 1994; therefore, J.E.B. should not be

applied retroactively in this case.

Because there was no clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent on this issue

at the time of the state appellate court’s decision, the decision was not contrary to nor did it involve

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

B. Whether the Allegedly Improper Closing Arguments of the Prosecutor 

Denied Petitioner Due Process, a Fair Trial and a Reliable Sentencing 

Proceeding in Violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered petitioner’s claims of

improper closing arguments and stated:

The appellant argues that the prosecutors’ improper closing

arguments deprived him of a fair trial and a reliable sentencing

proceeding. There was no objection to any argument of the

prosecutors either at the guilt or the sentence phase of the trial.

Because there was no objection at trial and because this is a death

case, we must consider whether the prosecutors’ remarks constitute

plain error. “Plain error exists when the error is so obvious that the

failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of

the proceedings...; in other words, ‘plain error’ exists when a

substantial right of the defendant has or probably has been adversely

affected.” Ex parte Smith, 581 So.2d 531, 532 (Ala. 1991). Accord,

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Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d at 481-82. “‘Error’ is ‘plain error’ only

when it ‘has or probably has adversely affected the substantial rights

of the [defendant],’ Rule 39(k), A.R.App.P., and plain error is to be

acted upon ‘in the same manner as if the defendant’s counsel had

preserved and raised [the] error for appellate review.’ Johnson v.

State, 507 So.2d 1351, 1356 (Ala. 1986).” Ex parte White, 587 So.2d

1236 (Ala. 1991).

A. GUILT PHASE ARGUMENT

Early in his closing argument at the guilt phase of the trial, the

assistant district attorney stated:

“What do we have that would go toward tying John Parker to

this crime. Of course, the most obvious things we’ve got is

his statement. We got a confession from him. And I know

good and well that you don’t think that that statement came

any other way but than the way Mr. May said it did. I’ve

known Ronnie May for a long time and worked with him for

a long time and, of course, when we put a witness on the

witness stand we vouch fortheir credibility just as the defense

does when they call a witness. But I can assure you right now

that what Ronnie May testified to you about–about anything,

but particularly about the statement that I’m talking about

right now that was given to him on March the 31 by Mr. st

Parker. I can assure you he told you the truth, what was told

him by Mr. Parker. And I don’t for any one minute think that

any of y’all think he would get up and make it up or fabricate

it or anything like that. But I can assure you, ladies and

gentlemen, what he told you is the truth with regard to that

statement.” 

R. 1575. That same assistant district attorney also stated:

“We’ve got other testimony [in addition to the statement].

We’ve got the testimony of Donald Buckman. Mr. Buckman

came in here and testified before you and I can assure you he

didn’t have anything against John Parker.

R. 1576.

“Is that person [the forensic pathologist] best qualified to tell

you about it, about the possible murder weapon or is it the

doctor that worked on the person in the emergency room and

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22

was primarily trying to save her life. Again, I’m not try[ing]

to in any way run down Dr. McKinley. I know Dr. McKinley.

He’s a personal acquaintance of mine and I can assure he’s –

when he came in here and said what he did the other day he

was giving you his opinion, his best opinion, but again I say

to you; who is best qualified to give that opinion?”

R. 1581-82.

In the State’s final closing argument, the district attorney stated:

“There is no such thing as a case that you couldn’t look at

long enough and hard enough and find some kind of little

inconsistency in the testimony and the reason for that is, I

submit to you at least from the State’s witnesses they were

trying very hard to tell you the truth and the truth as they saw

it. Like Mr. Hudson said, we vouch for the credibility of

those witnesses by putting them on the stand and I submit to

you that they’ve told the truth, ...”

R. 1611.

Obviously, the above-quoted comments of the prosecutors were

improper attempts to bolster witnesses by vouching for their

credibility.

“‘Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching for his credibility

are normally improper and error.’ United States v. Ellis, 547

F.2d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 1977). The test for improper

vouching is whetherthe jury could reasonably believe that the

prosecutor was indicating a personal belief in the witness’

credibility. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 537 (9th

Cir. 1980) (citing Ellis, supra). This test may be satisfied in

two ways. First, the prosecution may place the prestige of the

government behind the witness, by making explicit personal

assurances of the witness’ veracity. See United States v.

Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371, 372 (5th Cir. 1972); Gradsky v.

United States, 373 F.2d 706, 709-10 (5th Cir. 1967).

Secondly, a prosecutor may implicitly vouch for the witness’

veracity by indicating that information not presented to the

jury supports the testimony. See United States v. Brooklier,

685 F.2d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining United States

v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980)).”

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United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 465 U.S. 1034, 104 S.Ct. 1308, 79 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984). The

question in this case is whether those comments constitute “plain

error.”

In Murry v. State, 562 So.2d 1348, 1353-56 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988), this

Court thoroughly considered a similar issue. Applying the principles

there set out, we conclude that the prosecutors’ arguments in this case

do not constitute plain error. The remarks, although clearly

erroneous, do not “undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial

and contribute to a miscarriage of justice.” Murry, 562 So.2d at

1354. Those remarks must be viewed in the context of the

prosecutors’ entire argument and in the course of the entire trial. 

“[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis

of a prosecutor’s comments standing alone, for the statements or

conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be

determined whether the prosecutor’s conduct affected the fairness of

the trial.” Murry, 562 So.2d at 1354 (quoting United States v.

Swafford, 766 F.2d 426, 428 (10th Cir. 1985)). In his closing

argument, defense counsel did not contend that the appellant’s

confession was false. Indeed, he argued that the appellant is “not

denying that he was out there the 18 . His statement says he was.” th

R. 1591. He also argued: “As I said, there’s no question, John Parker

and Kenny Smith were there and what did he tell Ronnie May. ‘We

were going out there to commit a burglary.’” R. 1596.

Furthermore, as this Court stated in Murry, “we are confident that the

remark[s] did not undermine the fairness of the trial, because any

prejudice which might have resulted from the comment[s] was cured

by the court’s extensive cautionary instructions in its oral charge to

the jury.” 562 So.2d at 1355. In her instructions to the jury, the trial

judge charged: 

“In determining what the true facts are in the case, you are

limited to the evidence that has been presented from the

witness stand as opposed to matters that have been stated by

the attorneys in the course of the trial. What the attorneys

have said both for the State and for the Defendant is not

evidence in the case. What they have argued to you at various

points in the trial is not evidence. They have a right and they

have a duty at the appropriate time in the trial to comment on

the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the

evidence as they argue their respect[ive] positions to you.

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24

What they say is not evidence and you should put what they

say in a proper category in your thinking and it should not be

in the evidence category, just as the indictment in the case

should not be in the evidence category.”

R. 1641-42.

In addition, we find in this case, as we did in Murry, that:

“when the remark is considered in the context of defense

counsel’s arguments and subsequent instructions by the court,

it did not ‘induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment

rather than its own view of the evidence.’ [ United States v.

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 84 L.Ed.2d

1 (1985)]. Finally, while the failure to object certainly does

not preclude review in a capital case, it does weigh against

any claim of prejudice. See, e.g., Ex parte Bush, 431 So.2d

563 (Ala.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 200, 78

L.Ed.2d 175 (1983).”

562 So.2d at 1355-56.

We find that other remarks of the prosecutors which are objected to

on appeal for the first time were within the range of legitimate

argument and do not constitute improper comment.

B. SENTENCE PHASE

The appellant complains that during the prosecutor’s argument during

the sentence phase of the trial, the prosecutor improperly 1) urged the

jury to recommend death based upon unsubstantiated allegations of

criminal behavior that had never been charged nor proven, 2)

exhorted the jury to “do the right thing” and to sentence the appellant

to death, and 3) argued that the appellant would kill again. 

Even accepting the appellant’s contention that these comments

constituted error, which we do not, any error would be harmless

because the jury, by a vote ten to two, recommended life without

parole. The present situation is analogous to that in Leverett v. State,

462 So.2d 972, 977 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), where the Court stated:

“[T]he verdict clearly indicates that the jury was not in any

manner inflamed or influenced by these bits of evidence. See

Morgan v. State, 35 Ala. App. 269, 45 So.2d 802 (1950).

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Error in the admission of evidence which is shown by the

verdict to have had no effect on it or to have caused the

defendant no prejudice is not reversible. 24B C.J.S. Criminal

Law § 1915(13) (1962). Thus, there is no reversible error

where the defendant was acquitted of the offense with respect

to which the improper evidence was admitted, although he

was convicted of another offense. Id. See also Middleton v.

State, 27 Ala. App. 564, 176 So. 613, 614 (1937); Hanson v.

State, 27 Ala. App. 147, 168 So. 698, 700 cert. denied, 232

Ala. 585, 168 So. 700 (1936); Lee v. State, 16 Ala. App. 53,

75 So. 282, 283 (1917).”

See also Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440, 448, n.13 (11 Cir. 1990) th

... (“Here, however, the sentencing jury returned an advisory sentence

of life imprisonment. Hence, any errors in the advisory jury’s

perception of what constituted mitigating factors would be

harmless.”).

587 So.2d at 1093-96. [footnote omitted]

On certiorari review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed but expounded on the context of

the remarks:

The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly resolved the numerous

issues discussed in its opinion. We find it necessary to discuss only

one of those issues–whether it was plain error for the prosecutors to

personally vouch for the credibility of two of the state’s primary

witnesses.

Ronnie May, who was an investigator with the Colbert County

Sheriff’s Department and who had been the chief investigator in this

case, sat with the prosecutors during the trial and helped them present

the state’s case. May also served as a witness for the state; he

testified that Parker made to him a detailed statement relating the

circumstances surrounding his activities at the Sennett residence on

the day of the murder. May further testified as to the content of that

statement. Because Parker had refused to give a signed statement or

to allow May to tape record his statement, May had prepared notes

after his interview with Parker, and he used those notes at trial to

refresh his memory. Therefore, whether May’s rendition of Parker’s

statement was credible was an important issue that had to be resolved

by the jury. Parker contends that plain error occurred when the chief

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26

deputy district attorney, Mr. Hudson, made the following closing

argument during the guilt phase of the trial:

“What do we have that would go toward tying John Parker to

this crime? Of course, the most obvious thing we’ve got is

his statement. We got a confession from him. And I know

good and well that you don’t think that that statement came

any other way but ... the way Mr. May said it did. I’ve known

Ronnie May for a long time and worked with him for a long

time and, of course, when we put a witness on the witness

stand we vouch for [his] credibility just as the defense does

when they call a witness. But I can assure [you] right now

that what Ronnie May testified to you about–about anything,

but particularly about the statement that I’m talking about

right now that was given to him on March the 31 by Mr. st

Parker. I can assure you he told you the truth, what was told

him by Mr. Parker. And I don’t for any one minute think that

any of y’all think he would get up and make it up or fabricate

it or anything like that. But I can assure you, ladies and

gentlemen, what he told you is the truth with regard to that

statement.”

Parker further contends that plain error occurred when the district

attorney, Mr. Alverson, made the following closing argument in

rebuttal during the guilt phase of the trial:

“There is no such thing as a case that you couldn’t look at

long enough and hard enough and find some kind of little

inconsistency in the testimony and the reason for that is, I

submit to you at least from the state’s witnesses they were

trying very hard to tell you the truth and the truth as they saw

it. Like Mr. Hudson said, we vouch for the credibility of

those witnesses by putting them on the stand and I submit to

you that they’ve told the truth....”

As the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly recognized in its opinion,

610 So.2d 1171, the prosecutors’ remarks were an improper attempt

to bolster May’s testimony by personally vouching for his credibility.

Remarks such as these have been soundly condemned. [Citations

omitted]. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S.Ct.

1038, 1048, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the United States Supreme Court

succinctly stated the dangers inherent in a prosecutor’s vouching for

the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses:

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27

“The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses

and expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of

the accused pose two dangers: such comments can convey the

impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known

to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant

and can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely

on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the

prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the

Government and may induce the jury to trust the

Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the

evidence. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. [78], at 88-

89, 55 S.Ct. [629], at 633 [79 L.Ed. 1314, 1935].”

However, the Court of Criminal Appeals also correctly recognized

that whether the prosecutors’ remarks constituted plain error

depended on whether those remarks, when viewed in the context of

the entire closing argument and in the context of the entire trial,

undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial and, thus, constituted

a miscarriage of justice. See Ex parte Smith, 581 So.2d 531, 532

(Ala. 1991) (“‘[p]lain error’ exists when the error is so obvious that

the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity

of the proceedings...; in other words, ‘plain error’ exists when a

substantial right of the defendant has or probably has been adversely

affected”). In United States v. Young, supra, 470 U.S. at 11, 12, 16,

105 S.Ct. at 1044, 1045, 1047 the Court noted:

“Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would

not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction

obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding. Instead, ... the

remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to

determine whether the prosecutor’s behavior amounted to

prejudicial error. In other words, the Court must consider the

probable effect the prosecutor’s [remark] would have on the

jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly....

....

“Especially when addressing [a claim of] plain error, a

reviewing court cannot properly evaluate a case except by

viewing such a claim against the entire record. We have been

reminded:

In reviewing criminal cases, it is particularly important for

appellate courts to relive the whole trial imaginatively and not

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to extract from episodes in isolation abstract questions of

evidence and procedure. To turn a criminal trial into a quest

for error no more promotes the ends of justice than to

acquiesce in low standards of criminal prosecution. Johnson

v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 202, 63 S.Ct. 549, 555, 87

L.Ed. 704 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

“It is simply not possible for an appellate court to assess the

seriousness of the claimed error by any other means. As the

Court stated in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310

U.S. [150], at 240, 60 S.Ct. [811], at 852 [84 L.Ed. 1129

1940], ‘each case necessarily turns on its own facts.’”

Considering these principles, we cannot say that the prosecutors’

remarks rose to the level of plain error. Viewed in context, these

remarks, although inappropriate and amounting to error, were not

such as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. This

conclusion is based on our exhaustive review of the record,

particularly the prosecutors’ remarks during closing argument; May’s

testimony; Parker’s statements and arguments that showed his theory

of the case; and the trial court’s oral charge to the jury.

Parker’s theory of the case was essentially that Charles Sennett had

hired Parker and Kenneth Smith to assault and threaten Sennett’s

wife, but not to kill her; that Parker and Smith had, in fact, gone to

the Sennett residence on the day of the murder and had assaulted Mrs.

Sennett; that the injuries received by Mrs. Sennett during the assault,

although severe, were not necessarily life threatening; that Charles

Sennett had come home shortly after the assault and killed his wife;

and that Charles Sennett had committed suicide once he became a

suspect in the case.

May testified on direct examination, in pertinent part, as follows:

“Q. If you would – if you have to refer to that to refresh your

recollection, do so, but if you would, tell us what you recall

him saying to you on that occasion.

“A. Initially Mr. Parker told me that on March the 18 , 1988, that th

Billy Gray Williams and Kenneth Smith had used his car to

go to the Sennett home to kill Mrs. Sennett. He said he had

been given $1,000 cash money to allow them to do that, to

use his car. During this portion of the conversation I asked

him if he had – was using any kind of drugs and he said he

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29

was not that day, on the 31 is when we’re talking about. I st

asked him if he was a drug addict and he said he was, but that

he had not used any narcotics on the 31 . I asked him if he st

was telling me the truth about Mr. Smith and Mr. Williams

using his car and he stated that at that time he was. I told him

I didn’t believe him and he said, ‘Okay. I’ll tell you the

truth.’ And he told me that on March the 18 , 1988, that th

somewhere in the early morning around 9:30 or that

proximity, he and Kenneth Smith drove to Mrs. Sennett’s

home, which is located on Coon Dog Cemetery Road. That

they went in his car, a 1978 Pontiac. He stated that on the

way down that he shot up 3 cc’s of Talwin and that the only

weapon they had with them was a survival knife. Mr. Parker

stated he drove the car and Kenneth rode in the passenger’s

side. That he gave Kenny the knife on the way to the house

and that Kenny sharpened the knife all the way down there.

He stated they went to the driveway, pulled to the rear of the

house near the little patio and rear door and that they got out

and went to the door. He said he couldn’t explain why when

Mrs. Sennett came to the door that they didn’t jump her then.

He just said he knows it didn’t happen. He said they asked

her something about hunting on the property, that her husband

had told them that it would be okay to come down and check

out the property. At which time he said she went to the

telephone and made a phone call and came back to the door

and told them she had talked to her husband and he said it

was okay for them to check out the property. He stated that

he and Mr. Smith walked into the wooded area behind the

house on the back side of the pond and stayed back there for

some time. He had no idea how long. He said they came

back to the house.

He and Mr. Smith were wearing cotton gloves because it was

raining and cool that morning. They went back to the door and

asked to use the bathroom and that Mrs. Sennett allowed them

to come into the house. John said that when he went into the

bathroom he pulled on some cotton socks over his hands and

after he left the bathroom that he went through the kitchen and

they jumped Mrs. Sennett and starting hitting her trying to

knock her down. That he had [taken] along a piece of

galvanized pipe to the house with him and that Kenny had the

knife. He said that Kenny Smith did all of the stabbing. I

asked him that a couple of times and he gave me the same

answer both times that Kenny did all the stabbing to Mrs.

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30

Sennett. He said they hit her with a piece of pipe and with

some other things there in the den and on one occasion used

this small blue chair to hold her down so they could get her to

be unconscious. When he mentioned the chair he made some

sort of indication toward the head and shoulder area. He stated

at one time he hit Mrs. Sennett squarely on top of the head and

knocked her back against the rock fireplace and that she was

asking them not to hurt her. He said he did not remember

covering Mrs. Sennett with anything while he was there. He

did say they took a VCR and he did state the following day that

they–he found a stereo in his car that he threw in the river. He

stated that Kenny took that VCR with him that afternoon. He

said that he did not recall throwing any items into the pond.

That he had upon leaving Mrs. Sennett’s home had gotten back

into his car and drove to Billy Gray Williams’s house located

on Tuscaloosa Street in Florence where they collected the

remainder of their $1,000 a piece, which his was $900. He

stated he had been given a hundred dollarsthe day before to go

buy a handgun and that he had spent that on drugs to shoot up.

He said they were supposed to make the house appear as

though it was a burglary gone bad so they broke out the

medicine cabinet windows, the doors in the medicine cabinet,

and turned some things over and messed some things up in the

house. He stated that Billy Williams was to hold the money

and pay them after the job was done. He stated that the

clothing that he had on [on] the day of the murder, that he had

burned them....”

May testified on cross-examination, in pertinent part, as follows:

“Q. Now, I believe that it is correct that John Parker did not tell

you how many times Mrs. Sennett was stabbed?

“A. No, sir.

“Q. Nor where?

“A. No, sir.

“Q. And I believe that I’m correct that you said that John Parker

said that he did not know how [Mrs. Sennett] got covered up?

“A. To the best of my recollection that’s what he said, sir. That he

didn’t recall how she got covered up.

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31

“Q. But when you found her she was covered with an afghan that

had, I believe, twenty-three holes, is that correct?

“A. That’s what Mr. Kilbourn stated, yes, sir.

“....

“Q. And I believe–am I correct that John Parker did not tell you

whether or not Mrs. Sennett was alive at the time they left, is

that correct?

“A. No, sir, I was going to get back around to that point when he

became upset and said he didn’t want to say anything else. He

did not say that, no, sir.

“Q. Now, did John Parker tell you that they did not turn over the

china cabinet?

“A. Yes, sir, he did.

“Q. When you arrived there at the scene on March the 18th, 1988,

tell the jury again the condition of the china cabinet?

“A. The china hutch was located as you enter the den, to your right

as you enter the area of the den. The base of the china hutch

was still in place. The upper portion was turned and pushed

forward and the upper left hand corner of the hutch as you face

it–upper right hand corner as you face it was leaned or propped

up on a chair there near the dining room table and all the china

and dishes and things were strewn forward toward the den.”

Although Parker’s attorneys attempted to cast doubt on certain parts

of May’s testimony by questioning him as to why he had not made

more extensive notes following his interview with Parker, they

primarily attempted to show that Parker’s statement was basically

consistent with Parker’s theory of the case. One of Parker’s attorneys

stipulated during closing argument that Parker had gone to the Sennett

residence with Smith on the day of the murder and that Parker and

Smith had assaulted Mrs. Sennett. Parker’s attorney argued to the jury

that it could find from the evidence presented that Parker was not

present at the Sennett residence at the time Mrs. Sennett was killed and

that the survival knife was not the murder weapon. He further argued

to the jury that, consistent with May’s testimony, Charles Sennett, not

Parker, had covered Mrs. Sennett’s face with the afghan and then

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32

stabbed her to death, and that Charles Sennett had turned over the

china cabinet in an attempt to make it appear more convincing that

Mrs. Sennett had been killed during a burglary. Parker’s attorney also

suggested to the jury that Parker told May that Smith had stabbed Mrs.

Sennett because, his attorney contended, Parker knew that he had not

done it. In other words, Parker took the position that his statement to

May was based on an assumption that because Mrs. Sennett had been

stabbed on the day that he and Smith were at her house, then Smith

must have stabbed her. A careful reading of May’s testimony shows

that it was not inconsistent with Parker’s “assault” theory of the case.

Furthermore, the prosecutors told the jury that its decision should be

based on the evidence. One of Parker’s attorneys made the following

statement to the jury during his closing argument: “Think about what

you’ve heard form the witness stand. Remember what I had to say and

what Mr. Hudson or Mr. Alverson are going to have to say is not

evidence.” In addition, the trial court had given the following

instruction to the jury prior to the opening arguments: “[A]n attorney’s

statements and an attorney’s arguments are not evidence and you

should disregard any remark, statement, or argument which is not

supported by the evidence or by the law as given to you by the court.”

Also, the trial court gave the following instruction immediately after

the closing arguments:

“In determining what the true facts are in the case, you are

limited to the evidence that has been presented from the

witness stand as opposed to matters that have been stated by

the attorneys in the course of the trial. What the attorneys have

said both for the state and for the defendant is not evidence in

the case. What they have argued to you at various points in the

trial is not evidence. They have a right and they have a duty at

the appropriate time in the trial to comment on the evidence

and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence as they

argue their respect[ive] positions to you. What they say is not

evidence and you should put what they say in a proper category

in your thinking and it should not be in the evidence category,

just as the indictment in the case should not be in the evidence

category.”

We need not decide whether the prosecutors’ remarks would have

constituted plain error if May had testified that Parker had admitted to

killing Mrs. Sennett. Suffice it to say that we agree with the Court of

Criminal Appeals that with regard to May, the remarks, given their

context, did not constitute plain error.

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Teddy Lynn White, a convicted felon, testified that Parker had tried to

buy a gun from him prior to the date on which Mrs. Sennett was

murdered. White further testified that Parker told him at the time that

he tried to buy the gun that he (Parker) had been hired to kill someone.

One of Parker’s attorneys sought to impeach White’s testimony by

eliciting from White the fact that White had been convicted of

burglary; the fact that Parker’s live-in girlfriend had had a child by

White; and the fact that White was aware that Parker had previously

provided information to the police concerning White’s criminal

activities. Therefore, whether White’s testimony was credible was

also an important issue that had to be resolved by the jury. Again, the

Court of Criminal Appeals correctly recognized in its opinion that the

prosecutors had made the remarks relating to the truthfulness of the

state’s witnesses in an improper attempt to bolster White’s testimony

by personally vouching for his credibility (as well as for May’s), but

that the remarks did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the

trial. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that with regard

to White the prosecutors’ remarks did not rise to the level of plain

error. Although we do not condone their remarks, in personally

vouching for the credibility of White, neither prosecutor stated the

witness’s name, as Mr. Hudson did with respect to Investigator May.

For this reason, and because of the clear admonitions given to the jury

by the attorneys and the trial court to base its decision on the evidence

alone and not on the statements made by the attorneys during closing

arguments, we conclude that Parker’s right to a fair trial was not

adversely affected by the prosecutors’ remarks.

Although we are acutely aware that “[a] criminal trial does not unfold

like a play with actors following a script,” Geders v. United States,

425 U.S. 80, 86, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1334, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976), and that

an attorney caught up in the passion of a jury argument may

occasionally say too much, we nonetheless cannot overlook the fact

that prosecutors must avoid making personal guarantees as to the

credibility of the state’s witnesses. Remarks such as those made by the

prosecutors in this case constitute error and, under the appropriate

circumstances, would require the reversal of a conviction.

610 So.2d at 1182-87.

In his reply brief, petitioner argues:

The appellate court found no plain error largely on an analysis which

concentrated on the fact that the prosecutor vouched for the credibility

of their investigator and that the defense did not contest the confession

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34

to which he testified. Parker, 587 So.2d at 1095. But in fact, the

prosecutor vouched for all his witnesses:

We’ve got the testimony of Donald Buckman. Mr. Buckman

came in here and testified before you and I can assure you he

didn’t have anything against John Parker.

***

... I submit to you at least from the State’s witnesses they were

trying very hard to tell you the truth and the truth as they saw

it. Like Mr. Hudson said, we vouch for the credibility of those

witnesses by putting them on the stand and Isubmit to you that

they’ve told the truth, ...

Id. at 1094.

Those other witnesses directlyattacked Mr. Parker’s theory of the case

and testified to conversations regarding the acquiring of a handgun, the

intent to commit a murder and the fact that it was a contract murder.

None of these issues were conceded by the defense. This situation is

that much more egregious because the State failed to turn over the

criminal record of one of the witnesses who testified and perjured

himself, one of the witnesses that they vouched for during their

argument. There is a reasonable probability that but for the prejudicial

vouching for the Government’s witnesses the outcome of the trial

would have been different.

(Reply brief, pp. 22-23).

In closing argument, the prosecutor stated about Buckman:

We’ve got the testimony of Donald Buckman. Mr. Buckman came in

here and testified before you and I can assure you he didn’t have

anything against John Parker. I’m sure if he had the defense would

have known about it ....[A]s I recall his testimony he said that around

10:00 to 10:30 the morning that he later found out that night that Mrs.

Sennett had been killed, that morning that the Defendant Mr. Parker

and Mr. Smith came to his house. That they came in the brown Grand

Prix that he testified belonged to Mr. Parker. That Mr. Parker was

driving and Mr. Smith was on the passenger’s side and the purpose of

them coming over there was to try to see if he could procure a gun for

them. You remember his testimony. His conversation was with

Smith, but you remember how he went into some detail about how he

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35

bent down and talked through the window across over to Mr. Smith.

Across Mr. Parker and over to Mr. Smith, had that conversation about

the gun, and as I recall it he said they were looking for anything from

a .38 to .45. He also stated he recalled seeing, I believe a 5 of th

whiskey in the seat between [them]. I think he went on to say that as

he recollected the seal had not been broken on the bottle at that point

in time. So that puts these two individuals together that morning by

a third independent witness. It puts them coming there in the vehicle

belonging to Mr. Parker and asking about a gun.

R-1576-79. 

With respect to the comment about vouching for the credibility of the state’s witnesses in

general, the prosecutor stated:

There is no such thing as a case that you couldn’t look at long enough

and hard enough and find some kind of little inconsistency in the

testimony and the reason for that is, I submit to you at least from the

State’s witnesses they were trying very hard to tell you the truth and

the truth as they saw it. Like Mr. Hudson said, we vouch for the

credibility of those witnesses by putting them on the stand and I

submit to you that they’ve told the truth, but you can’t look at this case

from just one point. You can’t look at this case from some narrow

angle. You can’t focus in on one small aspect of this case and decide

the guilt or innocence of the Defendant in this case based on that.

You’ve got to look at all of the evidence . You’ve got to look at the

overall picture. You’ve got to put it all together like a puzzle and once

that puzzle is assembled then you must arrive at your verdict.

R-1611. 

“To find prosecutorial misconduct, a two-pronged test must be met: (1) the remarks must be

improper, and (2) the remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant.”

United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 (11 Cir. 1991). “Remarks prejudicially affect the th

substantial rights of the defendant when they “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id., quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

643 (1974). In making this determination, the question is “whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’

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36

that, but for the prosecutor’s offending remarks, the outcome of the [guilt or] sentencing [proceeding]

would have been different. Id., quoting Williams v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 1276, 1783 (11 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). 

The court instructed the jury:

In determining what the true facts are in the case, you are limited to the

evidence that has been presented from the witness stand as opposed to

matters that have been stated by the attorneys in the course of the trial.

What the attorneys have said both for the State and for the Defendant

is not evidence in the case. What they have argued to you at various

points in the trial is not evidence. They have a right and they have a

duty at the appropriate time in the trial to comment on the evidence

and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence as they argue their

respected positions to you. What they say is not evidence

and you should put what they say in a proper category in your thinking

and it should not be in the evidence category....

R-1641-42.

The court further instructed the jury: 

You’re the sole judges as to the weight that should be given to all of

the testimony in the case. ....

You ladies and gentlemen of the jury, take the testimony of the

witnesses, together with all proper and reasonable inferences

therefrom, apply your common sense, and in an impartial and honest

way determine what you believe to be the truth. You should weigh all

of the evidence and reconcile it, if you can reasonabl[y] do so, but if

there is irreconcilable conflict in the evidence you ought to take that

evidence which you think is worthy of credit and give it just such

weight as you think it is entitled to receive. In doing so you may take

into consideration any interest which any witness might have shown

to have in the outcome of this case.

If you believe that anymaterial part of the evidence of any witness was

willfully false, you may disregard all of the testimony of such witness.

R-1655-56.

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Considering the complete context of the “vouching comments,” together with the court’s instruction

to the jury concerning the jury’s weighing of the evidence, this court concludes that the decisions of

the Alabama appellate courts that there was no plain error was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Donnelly v. DeChristoforo nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts. 

C. Whether the Trial Court’s Instruction on Reasonable Doubt

violated the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

Petitioner argues it is reasonably likely that the jury applied the challenged jury instruction

on reasonable doubt in such a way to deprive him of due process and a fair trial. Specifically, he

argues that the challenged instruction equates reasonable doubt and moral certainty.

The trial court gave the following challenged jury instruction on reasonable doubt:

The phrase “reasonable doubt” is self explanatory and efforts to define

it do not always clarify the term, but it may help you some to say that

the doubt which would justify an acquittal must be an actual and

substantial doubt and not a mere possible doubt. A reasonable doubt

is not a mere guess or surmise and is not a forced or capricious doubt.

If, after considering all of the evidence in this case you have an abiding

conviction of the truth of the charge, then you are convinced beyond

a reasonable doubt and it would be your duty to convict the Defendant.

The reasonable doubt which entitles an accused to an acquittal is not

a mere fanciful, vague, conjectural or speculative doubt, but a

reasonably substantial doubt arising from the evidence and remaining

after a careful consideration of the testimony, such as reasonable, fairminded and conscientious men and women would entertain under all

the circumstances. Now, you will observe that the State is not required

to convince you of the Defendant’s guilty [sic] beyond all doubt, but

simply beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. If, after

comparing and considering all the evidence in this case, you’re [sic]

minds are left in such a condition that you cannot say you have an

abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant’s guilt then

you’re not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Defendant

would be entitled to an acquittal.

R. 1639-41.

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On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals dealt with this issue as follows:

The trial judge did not violate the holding of Cage v. Louisiana, 498

U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), in instructing the jury

on reasonable doubt. In that case, the jury was instructed that a

reasonable doubt “must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave

uncertainty,” that “[i]t is an actual substantial doubt,” and that a

finding of guilt requires a requiring “moral certainty.” 498 U.S. at

____, 111 S.Ct. at 329 (emphasis omitted). The objectionable

language in the instruction involves the combination of the words

“grave uncertainty,” “actual substantial doubt,” and “moral certainty”

which “suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal

under the reasonable doubt standard.” 498 U.S. at ____, 111 S.Ct. at

329-30.

In this case, the trial judge employed the terms “actual and substantial

doubt” and “moral certainty” in defining reasonable doubt. However,

her instructions did not employ the term “grave uncertainty.” Here, as

in Gaskins v. McKellar, 500 U.S. 961, 111 S.Ct. 2277, 114 L.Ed.2d

728 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari), the

instructions do not contain the same flaw as the instructions in Cage.

“We have specifically examined petitioner’s claim that the trial

court’s instruction to the jury on ‘reasonable doubt’ was ‘plain

error.’ In that examination, we have compared the trial court’s

jury instruction regarding ‘reasonable doubt’ with the

instruction recently reviewed by the United States Supreme

Court in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112

L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), and condemned by that Court as violative

of Cage’s constitutional rights. The instruction given in this

case does not contain the same infirmity that the Supreme

Court of the United States found in the trial court’s instruction

in Cage. We hold, therefore, that there is no ‘plain error’

affecting the substantial rights of the petitioner, and thus, no

legal reason to grant to petitioner a new trial.”

Ex parte White, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala. 1991).

587 So.2d at 1085.

In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), the Supreme Court reviewed the following jury

instruction:

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39

“If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to

constitute the defendant’s guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that

doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence

demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must

be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial

basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as

would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the

unsatisfactory character of the evidence or law thereof. A reasonable doubt

is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt

that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an

absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.” 554 So.2d 39, 41

(La. 1989) (emphasis added).

498 U.S. at 40. 

The Court held:

In construing the instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could

have understood the charge as a whole. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.

307, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). The charge

did at one point instruct that to convict, guilt must be found beyond a

reasonable doubt; but it then equated a reasonable doubt with a “grave

uncertainty” and an “actual substantial doubt,” and stated that what

was required was a “moral certainty” that the defendant was guilty. It

is plain to us that the words “substantial” and “grave,” as they are

commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is

required for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard. When

those statements are then considered with the reference to “moral

certainty,” rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a

reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a

finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the

Due Process Clause.

498 U.S. at 41.

In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), the Supreme Court explained how challenged jury

instructions in general are to be reviewed:

The only question for us is “whether the ailing instruction by itself so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.” ... It is well established that the instruction “may not be

judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of

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40

the instructions as a whole and the trial record. (citations omitted). In

addition, in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at

issue here, we inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that

the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates

the Constitution. 

502 U.S. at 72 (citations omitted).

In Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994), the Supreme Court concluded that there was no 

Cage violation based on references to “reasonable doubt” and “moral certainty” in the following jury

instruction:

“‘Reasonable doubt’ is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and

prudent person, in one of the graver and more important transactions

of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true

and relying and acting thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit

you, after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to

have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the

accused. At the same time, absolute or mathematical certainty is not

required. You may be convinced of the truth of a fact beyond a

reasonable doubt and yet be fully aware that possibly you may be

mistaken. 

You may find an accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of the

case, provided such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any

doubt of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an actual

and substantial doubt reasonably arising from the evidence, from the

facts or circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the lack of

evidence on the part of the State, as distinguished from a doubt arising

from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful

conjecture.” 

511 U.S. at 18.

The Court explained:

[In Cage] we did not hold that the reference to substantial doubt alone

was sufficient to render the instruction unconstitutional. ... Rather, we

were concerned that the jury would interpret the term “substantial

doubt” in parallel with the preceding reference to “grave uncertainty,”

leading to an overstatement of the doubt necessary to acquit. In the

instruction given in Victor’s case, the context makes clear that

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“substantial” is used in the sense of existence rather than magnitude of

the doubt, so the same concern is not present. 

In any event, the instruction provided an alternative definition of

reasonable doubt: a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to

hesitate to act. ... [T]o the extent the word “substantial” denotes the

quantum of doubt necessary for acquittal, the hesitate to act standard

gives a common sense benchmark for just how substantial such a

doubt must be. We therefore do not think it reasonably likely that the

jury would have interpreted this instruction to indicate that the doubt

must be anything other than a reasonable one.

Victor also challenges the “moral certainty” portion of the instruction.

... The moral certainty to which the Cage instruction referred was

clearly related to the defendant’s guilt; the problem in Cage was that

the rest of the instruction provided insufficient context to lend

meaning to the phrase. But the Nebraska instruction is not similarly

deficient.

Instructing the jurors that they must have an abiding conviction of the

defendant’s guilt does much to alleviate any concerns that the phrase

“moral certainty” might be misunderstood in the abstract. ... The

instruction also equated a doubt sufficient to preclude moral certainty

with a doubt that would could a reasonable person to hesitate to act.

In other words, a juror morally certain of a fact would not hesitate to

rely on it; and such a fact can fairly be said to have been proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurors were told that they must be

convinced of Victor’s guilt “after full, fair, and impartial

consideration of all of the evidence.” The judge also told them: “In

determining any questions of fact presented in this case, you should be

governed solely by the evidence before you. You should not indulge

in speculations, conjectures, or inferences not supported by the

evidence. There is accordinglyno reasonable likelihood that the jurors

understood the reference to moral certainty to allow conviction on a

standard insufficient to satisfy Winship, or to allow conviction on

factors other than the government’s proof. Though we reiterate that

we do not countenance its use, the inclusion of the “moral certainty”

phrase did not render the instruction given in Victor’s case

unconstitutional.

511 U.S. at 20-22.

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In petitioner’s case, the reference to “a reasonably substantial doubt arising from the evidence

and remaining after a careful consideration ofthe evidence” refers to existence rather than magnitude

of doubt. Further, the term “reasonable doubt” was defined while the term “moral certainty” was not

and the jury was instructed 

“If, after comparing and considering all the evidence in this case, your

minds are left in such a condition that you cannot say you have an

abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant’s guilt then

you’re not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Defendant

would be entitled to acquittal.” 

Because the trial court emphasized that the jurors should consider the evidence in determining

whether they had a reasonable doubt or “abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant’s

guilt,” there is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the challenged references to allow

conviction on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.

The state court’s decision was not contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable application

of Cage and its progeny. 

D. Whether the State Failed to Disclose Brady Information Relevant to a Witness’s Testimony

On appeal, this issue was addressed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals as follows:

The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to disclose other

convictions of state’s witness Teddy Lynn White in addition to his

conviction for burglary, and that the prosecution failed to disclose the

fact that White was given favorable treatment in exchange for his

testimony.

Five days before jury selection proceedings began, the prosecutor

copied his entire file and gave it to defense counsel. R. 105-06. See

Ex parte Monk, 557 So.2d 832 (Ala. 1989). Apparently, either on that

occasion or on an earlier date, the prosecutor gave the defense a copy

of White’s statement containing his admission that he had been

convicted for burglary. Immediately before White testified at trial,

defense counsel complained that the State had not given the defense

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43

any exculpatory information and that the defense did not have any

information “of what [White’s] criminal record is.” R.1474.

At trial, White testified as a witness for the State to the effect that a

week or two before the murder, the appellant had attempted to

purchase a gun from White. White testified that the appellant said “he

was going to kill somebody. Said that him and Kenny Smith was

getting $9000 each.” R. 1482. On direct examination, White was

specifically asked whether and admitted that he had been convicted of

a felony “on more than one occasion.” R. 1483 (emphasis added). On

cross-examination, White testified that all of his convictions had been

for burglary, and that he presently was in prison for third and second

degree burglary. White testified that he had not been promised

anything in exchange for his testimony, and that, in fact, while he was

in the county jail, “[t]hey [were] talking about putting more charges on

[him].” R. 1487-88.

At the hearing on the motion for new trial it was discovered that, at the

time he testified, White was serving time for four convictions, all

received on February 23, 1989, in Lauderdale County: burglary in the

third degree, unlawful breaking and entering of a vehicle, theft of

property in the second degree. (R. 2667). It was also discovered that

White had a prior burglary felony conviction (R. 1893). for which he

had been incarcerated in 1985.

With regard to this issue, the district attorney’s position was that the

defense knew that White had prior convictions and that the defense

could have discovered those convictions on their own. The district

attorney argued that his office “is not obligated to go out and get

material or obtain materials for the defense,” and that his office “can’t

be charged with the knowledge or information that every State agency

in the State of Alabama has.” R. 1918.

At the hearing on the motion for new trial, it was also established that

White, who testified in the appellant’s trial on June 6, 1989, was

approved for release on the Supervised Intensive Restitution (SIR)

Program on June 12, 1989, and was released on the SIR program on

June 14, 1989. The evidence shows that White was originally

scheduled for release on May 24, 1989, but that that release was held

up on May 19, 1989, which was the same date White gave a statement

concerning the appellant to Investigator Ed Sasser at the Elmore

Correctional Facility. The “hold up” was “[a]pparently because of a

protest from Mr. Steve Graham who is the District Attorney in

Lauderdale County.” R. 1846. (The appellant was prosecuted by the

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44

district attorney of Colbert County.) However, White was placed on

SIR despite the protest of the district attorney.

A supervision officer for the SIR program testified at the hearing that

to his knowledge White was not afforded any kind of “favor” or award

in being placed on the SIR program in exchange for his testimony. He

testified that this case “is not unusual. It is typical of basically the way

most of them go.”

White testified at the hearing that he was not promised anything for his

testimony and that while he was in jail in Lauderdale County the jailer

told him that “they was going to bring up some more charges on me.”

R. 1876-77. However, a detective told him that “they were still

investigating and if they did come up with some more then he would

let me know about it. And as far as he knew he wasn’t going to bring

anything against me as far as anything that he had.” R. 1877. White

testified that he was not offered or promised anything in exchange for

his testimony. R. 1884. Investigator Ray also testified that he was not

aware of any promise made to White in exchange for his testimony.

The appellant’s discovery rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), were not violated because

the prosecutor is not required to disclose evidence he does not possess.

“While it is true that under Brady the good faith of the prosecutor in

not disclosing information is irrelevant, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at

1196, Brady does require that the information requested be known to

the prosecution. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct.

2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Antone v. Strickland, 706 F.2d

1534, 1544 (11 Cir. 1983) (Kravitch, J., concurring specially) [, cert. th

denied, 464 U.S. 1003, 104 S.Ct. 511, 78 L.Ed.2d 699 (1983)]....

[T]hat knowledge may be presumed, as when the information is in the

prosecutor’s files, see Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110, 96 S.Ct. at 2400.”

United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1535 (11 Cir. 1983), cert. th

denied, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1614, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984).

Here, there is no evidence that the prosecution suppressed any

evidence whatsoever. The contention that White’s testimony was

secured by a promise of favorable treatment in regard to SIR is

supported only by a coincidence of facts interpreted through conjecture

and speculation. The defense knew before trial that White was going

to testify. There is no evidence that the prosecution had obtained

White’s complete criminal record or that the prosecutor had

knowledge of all of White’s prior criminal convictions.

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587 So.2d at 1085-87.

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) the United States Supreme Court held that "the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad

faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87. “Impeachment evidence, [] as well as exculpatory evidence,

falls within the Brady rule." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Impeachment

evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 682. In United States v.

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that Brady applies in situations

“involv[ing] the discovery, after trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but

unknown to the defense.” Subsequent to the state court’s decision in this case, the Court extended

Brady to apply to evidence “known to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.” Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).

In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), the United States Supreme Court stated:

“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to

the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” The

prejudice component is satisfied if the petitioner can show that there is a reasonable probability that

his conviction or sentence would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. Id. at 296. 

There was no evidence that White was released on SIR in exchange for his testimony at

petitioner’s trial. (R.1861, 1884). There is also no evidence that either the prosecutor or a police

investigator working with him was aware of the various charges upon which White had been

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convicted. In light of the Supreme Court precedent in existence at the time of the decision of the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals relating to this issue, the state court’s decision was not contrary

to nor did it involve an unreasonable application of Brady or its progeny. Further, it was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceedings.

Although not addressed by the state appellate court, there is no reasonable probability that

had the evidence of the various felonies for which White had been convicted been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. White was the prosecution’s last

witness. (R-1488). His testimony was that a week or two before the murder, Parker and Kenny

Smith came to his house and that Smith waited in Parker’s car while Parker talked to White. He

testified that:

[Parker] was talking about he wanted to buy a gun that he was hired to

kill somebody .... Said that him and Kenny Smith was getting

$9,000.00 each.

Q. Did he ever indicate who he was going to kill?

A. No, he just said somebody had hired him and Kenny Smith to kill somebody.

And he told me he had been to their house already. He told me that. 

Q. Did he tell you when he had been to their house?

A. No, he said the man took him there and him and Kenny – what they were

doing was, you know, getting close to this person so that she wouldn’t be

suspicious of them – I shouldn’t say she because I didn’t know it was a she.

But whoever the person was would trust them and they would be walking

around on the land and stuff acting like they was hunting.” 

R- 1479-83. 

At best, White’s testimony was corroborative of the earlier testimony of Donald Buckman and

Officer May.

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Buckman testified that Parker and Smith came to his house the morning of the murder in

Parker’s car, that Parker was driving and Smith was in the passenger seat, that he [Buckman] kneeled

next to the driver’s side of the car and talked across to Smith who “asked me did I know where he

could find a gun at,” and that he told Smith that he “didn’t know right off.” R.1257-62.

May testified concerning Parker’s statements to him:

Initially Mr. Parker told me that on March the 18 , 1988, that Billy th

Gray Williams and Kenneth Smith had used his car to go to the

Sennett home and kill Mrs. Sennett. He said he had been given

$1,000.00 cash money to allow them to do that, to use his car.... I

asked him if he was telling me the truth about Mr. Smith and Mr.

Williams using his car and he stated that at that time he was. I told

him I didn’t believe him and he said, “Okay, I’ll tell you the truth.”

And he told me that on March the 18 , 1988, that somewhere in the th

early morning around 9:30 or that proximity, he and Kenneth Smith

drove to Mrs. Sennett’s home. ... That they went in his car a 1978

Pontiac. ... Mr. Parker stated that he drove the car and Kenneth road

[sic] in the passenger’s side. ... He stated they went to the driveway,

pulled to the rear of the house near the little patio and rear door and

that they got out and went to the door. He said he couldn’t explain

why when Mrs. Sennett came to the door that they didn’t jump here

[sic] then. ... He said they asked her something about hunting on the

property, that her husband had told them that it would be okay to come

down and check out the property. At which time he said she went to

the telephone and made a phone call and came back to the door and

told them she had talked to her husband and he said it was okay for

them to check out the property. He stated that he and Mr. Smith

walked into the wooded area behind the house on the back side of the

pond and stayed there for sometime. He had no idea how long. He

said they came back to the house. ... They went back to the door and

asked to use the bathroom and that Mrs. Sennett allowed them to come

into the house. John said that when he went into the bathroom he

pulled on some cotton socks over his hands and after he left the

bathroom that he went through the kitchen and they jumped Mrs.

Sennett and started hitting her trying to knock her down. That he had

took along a piece of galvanized pipe to the house with him and that

Kenny had the knife. He said that Kenny Smith did all of the

stabbing..... That he had upon leaving Mrs. Sennett’s home had gotten

back into his car and drove to Billy Gray Williams’s house located on

Tuscaloosa Street in Florence where they collected the remained [sic]

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of their thousand dollar a piece, which his was $900.00. He stated he

had been given a hundred dollars the day before to go buy a handgun

and that he had spent that on drugs to shoot up. 

R-1416-20.

Even if White’s criminal history had been disclosed and his testimony had been discredited

or disallowed altogether, it is not reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding would have

been different in light of the testimony of Officer May and Buckman. 

This court finds no fault with the state appellate court’s failure to address the prejudice

component of Brady but simply points out that even if the prosecutor’s failure to produce White’s

criminal history, the specific details of which he was unaware, could be construed as sufficient to

constitute “suppression,” Parker could not overcome the prejudice component of Brady and Bagley.

E. Whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial

The principles in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), govern all ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. The state courts’ decisions in this case were not “contrary to” clearly

established federal law as determined by the United States SupremeCourt because both the trial court

and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that Strickland was the controlling law with

respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

In Strickland the United States Supreme Court established a national standard for judging the

effectiveness of criminal defense counsel. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness

must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. The Court elaborated:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show

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that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires

showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Id. at 687.

In reviewing the performance prong of Strickland, the Court stated:

In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance

inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable

considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as

reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are

guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.

No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can

satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by

defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how

best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would

interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel

and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical

decisions.

Id. at 688-89. 

In Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 956 (2003), the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated on the Strickland performance prong:

[W]e must bear in mind that the “touchstone of a lawyer’s

performance under the Constitution” is “reasonableness.” Chandler

[v. United States], 218 F.3d [1305] at 1319 [(11 Cir. 2000)]. As we th

have explained:

The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would

have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would

have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at

the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense

counsel acted at trial. . . . We are not interested in grading

lawyers’ performances; we are interested in whether the

adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.

Waters [v. Thomas], 46 F.3d [1506] at 1512 [(11th Cir.

1995)](quoting White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218,

1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, “[t]he

relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were

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50

strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Putman

[v. Head], 268 F.3d [1223] at 1244 [(11th Cir.

2001)](quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,

481, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1037, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000).

This recognizes that “[t]o uphold a lawyer’s strategy,

a court ‘need not attempt to divine the lawyer’s mental

processes underlying the strategy,’” but instead must

simply determine whether the course actually taken by

counsel might have been reasonable. Id. (quoting

Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315 n. 16).

Crawford, 311 F.3d at 1314.

“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “There

is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct is the result of trial strategy and ‘strategic choices

made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable.’” Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1519 (11 Cir. 1987), (quoting Strickland,

th

466 U.S. at 690). “Counsel’s competence . . . is presumed and the defendant [petitioner] must rebut

this presumption by proving that his attorney’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing

professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy.” Kimmelman v. Morrison,

477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986) (internal citation omitted). The respondent never acquires the burden of

showing competence, rather the petitioner must disprove the presumption of competence. Chandler

v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204 (2001). Whether

conduct by counsel was a tactical decision is a question of fact. Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184,

1199 (11th Cir. 1999). “Whether the tactic was reasonable, however, is a question of law. . . .” Id.

Counsel’s challenged conduct is viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of the conduct.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Collier, 177 F.3d at 1200. It is critical to understand that the petitioner

bears the burden of proof in the § 2254 action. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this court

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may assume that counsel’s decision was strategic. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 600 (11th Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984). 

In reviewing the prejudice prong, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland stated:

It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every

act or omission of counsel would meet that test, and not every error

that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the

reliability of the result of the proceeding. . . .

The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in

the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the

judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or

jury acted according to law. An assessment of the likelihood of a

result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of

arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,” and the like. A

defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker,

even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assessment of

prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is

reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards

that govern the decision. It should not depend on the idiosyncracies

of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward

harshness or leniency. Although these factors may actually have

entered into counsel’s selection of strategies and, to that limited extent,

may thus affect the performance inquiry, they are irrelevant to the

prejudice inquiry. Thus, evidence about the actual process of decision,

if not part of the record of the proceeding under review, and evidence

about, for example, a particular judge’s sentencing practices, should

not be considered in the prejudice determination.

The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the

question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors.

When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether

there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder

would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. When a

defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this

case, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that,

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absent the errors, the sentencer–including an appellate court, to the

extent it independently reweighs the evidence–would have concluded

that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not

warrant death.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-95.

1. Whether counsel was ineffective in presenting the motion to suppress because he failed to

demonstrate: (1) that petitioner was arrested at his home, (2) that the authorities lacked

probable cause to arrest him at his home without a warrant, and (3) that there were insufficient

intervening events to break the causal relationship between petitioner’s arrest and his

statement

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant’s claims concerning arrest at home and intervening

events are irrelevant because the trial court found that the tip of an

anonymous informant was sufficiently corroborated to supply probable

cause for the appellant’s arrest. The appellant argues that his counsel

should have shown that some of the informant’s information was

available to “anyone”, that it did not evidence involvement in the

crime, and that there were inaccuracies in the informant’s statement

and the warrant affidavit. However, in light of the fact that the

informant described in the [sic] detail the VCR stolen during the

murder and accurately stated where it could be found, the additional

information was not likely to affect the trial court’s finding.

Therefore, the appellant failed to demonstrate that he had been

prejudiced by the alleged errors of his counsel.

Tab #R-61, p.2. See also, Tab #R-60, pp.8-10.

The underlying claim was presented on direct appeal and decided adversely to petitioner. See

this court’s discussion of the underlying claim at Section I, infra.

2. Whether trial counsel for petitioner was ineffective for not retaining an expert to

testify at the suppression hearing concerning petitioner’s inability to understand and

waive his constitutional rights against self incrimination while under the influence of

drugs and alcohol

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

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held:

With regard to the claims concerning the expert witness, the appellant

wanted to show that the statement he had made to police was not

knowing, voluntary and intelligent because of his drug and alcohol

use. However, intoxication, short of mania or such impairment of the

will and mind that would cause a person to become unconscious of his

words, will not render a statement inadmissible. Nobles v. State, 541

So.2d 587 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989). None of the three experts the

appellant called at the Rule 32 hearing established that such a state

existed in the present case.

The appellant’s Rule 32 experts also testified that the appellant was

suffering from a diminished mental capacity. However, mental

impairment is only one factor that affects the validity of a waiver of

rights and the voluntariness of a confession. Dobyne v. State, 672

So.2d 1319 (Ala. Cr. App. 1994). Here, the appellant had been given

his Miranda rights and had initiated a conversation prior to giving his

statement. An experienced police officer had detected no signs of drug

or alcohol intoxication. After considering all the evidence, the trial

judge stated that nothing presented at the Rule 32 hearing would have

changed her ruling on the appellant’s motion to suppress.

The appellant failed to show that he was prejudiced because his

counsel did not call expert witnesses to testify at the suppression

hearing. He therefore also failed to show that his counsel was

ineffective.

Tab #R-61, p.2. See also, Tab #R-60, pp.61-63.

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3. Whether trial counsel for petitioner failed to investigate and present evidence and

expert testimony at the sentencing phase of the trial concerning petitioner’s brain

damage and drug addiction

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant contends that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing

because he failed to investigate and present evidence, including the

testimony of an expert, concerning the appellant’s brain damage and

drug addiction. He argues that, had his counsel properly prepared, the

jury verdict probably would have been unanimous, instead of 10-2, for

life imprisonment without parole, and the trial court would have

abided by their recommendation.

The appellant also presents the following claims of “severe

shortcomings” in the trial testimony: (1) erroneous and baseless

testimony by his own psychologist; (2) insufficient exploration of the

effects of his head injuries; (3) inadequate testing and testimony from

his psychologist; (4) mistaken assertions concerning the effects of

Ritalin; (5) failure to closely examine his severe addiction; (6) failure

to adequately explore his state of mind at the time of the crime and to

seek an expert opinion on the effect of intoxication on intent to kill;

(7) failure to present evidence of domination by accomplice Kenny

Smith; (8) incorrect testimony by the State’s expert; and (9) other

unconsidered aspects of the appellant’s history.

In order to present a valid affirmative defense, a defendant must show

that, at the time he committed the offense, he was suffering from a

severe mental disease or defect, § 13A-3-1, Alabama Code 1975, or

that involuntary intoxication rendered him incapable of appreciating

the criminality of his conduct or conforming his conduct to the

requirements of law. § 13A-3-(2)(c), Alabama Code 1975. The

appellant called a psychiatrist/toxicologist and 2 neuropsychiatrists,

one of whom was an expert in drugs, to testify at the Rule 32 hearing.

They did not establish that the appellant suffered from a mental

disease or defect or from involuntary intoxication severe enough to

provide a defense. They also did not establish that he could not form

the intent to kill because he was so intoxicated as to be “incapable of

discriminating between right and wrong.” Crosslin v. State, 446 So.2d

675 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983). The appellant therefore failed to show that

he was prejudiced by the absence of the desired expert testimony at

trial.

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With regard to the claims concerning the trial testimony, the

appellant’s mother, his former teacher, and a psychologist testified

concerning the appellant’s head injuries, drug history, low average IQ,

poor judgment skills, and low self esteem. His Rule 32 experts

testified that he was impressionable and easily led. The appellant

failed to show, however, that there was any witness who could testify

that he was, in fact, dominated by the accomplice. He also failed to

show that his claims of erroneous or omitted witness testimony

amounted to anything more than a difference of opinion between

experts or cumulative evidence.

The trial court stated in its order that much of the appellant’s expert

testimony was rebutted by his own actions at the time of the crime,

including his “premeditated, purposeful and goal directed plan to

engage in the murder ... for pecuniary gain” and his “attempt to destroy

evidence and avoid detection and apprehension.” The court found

that, even if the testimony desired by the appellant had been presented

at sentencing, the court would have imposed the death penalty. The

appellant therefore failed to state a claim of ineffective of counsel

under Strickland v. Washington, supra.

Tab #R-61, pp.2-3. See also, Tab #60, pp.51-68.

4. Whether trial counsel failed to retain a qualified pathologist and failed 

to adequately cross examine the prosecution’s pathologist witnesses at trial

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant contends that his trial counsel failed to retain and

prepare a qualified pathologist and failed to adequately examine the

State’s pathology witnesses at trial. He argues that a defense

pathologist like his Rule 32 expert could have thwarted the testimony

of the State’s expert that the victim’s wounds were caused by a

serrated knife similar to the appellant’s and could also have cast doubt

on the time of the offense.

However, the testimony desired by the appellant was essentially

cumulative evidence. The appellant concedes that an emergency room

doctor who testified for the State and the appellant’s own trial

pathologist testified that, in their opinion, the appellant’s knife was not

the murder weapon. They also agreed that the victim had been stabbed

very shortly before the rescue squad arrived. Based on their testimony,

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56

the appellant was able to present his theory of his innocence, which

was the victim’s husband stabbed the victim after he and his

accomplices [sic] had assaulted her and left. The appellant was not

prejudiced because his counsel failed to produce an additional expert

witness to testify to further evidence which was cumulative.

Tab #R-61, p.3. See also, Tab #R-60, pp.42-44, 68-69.

5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine and place on the record

the fact that petitioner was medicated before and during trial and that such

medications affected his ability to participate adequately in his defense and made him

appear detached from the trial

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant contends that his trial counsel erred in failing to

determine and state for the record that, before and during trial, the

appellant was taking medications prescribed by the jail physician that

affected his ability to participate adequately in his defense and made

him appear detached. However, the appellant’s own expert testified

that the medication error was discovered and corrected more than 20

days before trial. Moreover, the expert’s testimony was that the

medication could cause certain side effects, not that it actually had.

[Footnote omitted]. Absent any evidence that the appellant’s

participation in the trial was affected by medication, his counsel was

not ineffective for failing to note the medication for the record.

Strickland v. Washington, supra, requires a showing of prejudice.

Tab #R-61, pp.3-4. See also, Tab #R-60, pp.68-69.

The appellate court appears to have been under the misunderstanding that all medication ceased prior

to trial when, in fact, according to Rule 32 hearing testimony, Parker continued to receive medication

while on trial. The trial judge addressed both the issues of the medication error and the continued

medication during trial in the order denying the Rule 32 petition:

Petitioner states that trial counsel was ineffective for its failure to

determine and place on the record medications prescribed to the

petitioner while incarcerated before and during his trial (petition

II.A.5.(h)(2)). At the Rule 32 hearing, Dr. Emmanuel Hriso testified

Case 2:00-cv-01846-SLB-PWG Document 41 Filed 09/30/05 Page 56 of 117
57

that petitioner was prescribed Hydralazine, an antihypertensive

medication, instead of hydroxyzine, an anti-anxiety medication. H.

723. Petitioner’s exhibit 4 demonstrates that the medication error was

discovered and corrected on May 9, 1989, more than twenty days

before trial.

The petitioner also elicited testimony from Dr. Hriso that the correct

medication would not have affected his understanding of the trial, but

may have made him appear indifferent and tired to the jury. H. 726.

However, this Court spoke to and observed the petitioner during trial.

R. 1561. This Court finds that while Dr. Hriso speculated to possible

effects of the medication, R. 727, no evidence indicated whether the

petitioner was made to take this medication, how he believed the

medication affected him, or whether he believed he had need for this

medication. The Court finds that without evidence of how the correct

medication affected petitioner’s participation in his own defense, the

Court is unable to find the defendant was prejudiced by this. Without

a showing of how petitioner was prejudiced, this Court finds that there

is similarly no evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to

place these medications in the Court record.

Tab #R-60, pp.68-69.

6. Whether trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the testimony of Teddy Lynn

White who allegedly lied about being threatened with new charges and promises of

a lighter sentence if he testified at trial and at the hearing on the motion for new trial

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant contends that his counsel failed to adequately investigate

information concerning alleged perjury by Teddy Lynn White, who,

the appellant says, lied after he was threatened with new charges and

promised a lighter sentence if he testified. White testified at trial that,

a week or two before the victim was murdered, the appellant and an

accomplice came to his house and he sold the appellant a gun while

the accomplice remained in the car. White denied that there had been

any “deal” in exchange for his testimony.

The appellant’s counsel subsequently learned that White had been

placed in the SIR program shortly after he testified. The counsel then

included in his motion for new trial the allegation of a deal. At the

hearing on the motion, the SIR officer and White denied that there was

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58

anything improper in White’s placement in the program. White was

called to testify again at the Rule 32 hearing. He initially refused to

answer questions and the trial judge, with the consent of the parties,

consulted alone with him. White then testified that he had not been

offered anything for his testimony, although, he said, the prosecutor

had told him that he would face up to six new charges if he did not

testify.

The appellant argues that the trial court went beyond the agreed scope

of questioning during the meeting in chambers and thereby violated his

right to confrontation. However, the trial court offered to remove the

interview with White from the record, and the appellant declined. The

appellant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s

questioning.

The appellant also has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for

failing to further investigate this matter. The claim of perjury was

raised on direct appeal, and this court found that White stated at trial

that he was not promised anything in exchange for his testimony and

that “[t]hey [were] talking about putting more charges on [him].” This

court further found that any contention that favorable treatment was

promised with regard to SIR was conjecture and speculation. White’s

testimony at the Rule 32 hearing was not new evidence but was instead

essentially similar to his previous statements. The appellant has

offered no evidence that any further investigation by his counsel was

warranted. He therefore has failed to show either defective

performance or prejudice, as required by Strickland v. Washington,,

supra.

Tab #-61, p.4. See also, Tab #R-60, pp.7-8.

This court notes that the appellate court decision is inaccurate in only one respect–the court misstates

the substance of White’s testimony at Parker’s trial. White actually testified that a week or two before

the murder, Parker, accompanied by Smith, who waited in the car, attempted to purchase a gun from

White. (R. 1479-82). On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals accurately portrayed

the substance of White’s testimony. 587 So.2d at 1085. The appellate court correctly stated that

White has consistently denied being offered “a deal” at trial, in a hearing on a motion for new trial

and in a Rule 32 hearing.

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59

The underlying claim was presented as a Brady claim on direct appeal and decided adversely

to petitioner. See this court’s discussion of the Brady claim at section D, supra.

7. Whether trial counsel failed to adequatelyinform petitioner of his right to independent

counsel when counsel asked to be relieved because of inadequate experience and

reluctance to represent petitioner and failed to present witnesses in their motion to be

relieved or at a subsequent hearing ordered by the Court of Criminal Appeals

This claim was not addressed by the appellate court on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32

petition; however, the trial court addressed this claim in the order denying the Rule 32 petition:

The petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to “adequately” inform

petitioner of his right to independent counsel when counsel asked to

be relieved of representation due to inadequate experience (petition

II.A.5.(b)(8)) was raised and addressed on appeal. The appellate court,

as noted above, found that petitioner’s trial counsel was competent and

had the requisite experience required by statute. Parker v. State, 587

So.2d at 1101-1103. This Court was not privy to any conversation

between trial counsel and petitioner regarding the information

provided the petitioner regarding the right to independent counsel.

This Court finds that no evidence of the “adequacy” of such

information provided the petitioner was presented at the Rule 32

hearing, and thus under Rules 32.3 and 32.6, A.R.Cr.P., the petitioner

wholly failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue.

Tab #R-60, p.47.

8. Whether trial counsel Hamby’s conflict of interest based on prior legal representation

of the victim’s husband violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

concluded that this was one of petitioner’s claims that was not “sufficient to show that his counsel

was ineffective. In a death penalty case, the appellant must show that, but for the errors, the sentencer

would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant

the death penalty Strickland v. Washington, supra.” (Tab #R-61, pp.4-5). In addition, the trial court

found that no conflict of interest existed because Mr. Sennett was deceased and the criminal case

Case 2:00-cv-01846-SLB-PWG Document 41 Filed 09/30/05 Page 59 of 117
Parker argues that counsel said Charles Sennett did not plan to have his wife killed and then failed to explain 6/

how the plan evolved so that Sennett did kill his wife. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Sennett

paid Parker and his accomplices to have Mrs. Sennett beaten which Parker and Smith did. Counsel argued that

the motive was to frighten Mrs. Sennett so that he could continue to control her and prevent her from leaving

him. Counsel stated that Sennett did not plan to have his wife killed and didn’t plan to kill his wife and then

60

“was not a matter which involved the same or similar matters as the previous representations of

Charles Sennett, not a matter using information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of

the former client.” Tab #R-60, p.22.

9. Whether trial counsel failed to articulate a coherent theory in closing argument

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

concluded that this was one of petitioner’s claims that was not “sufficient to show that his counsel

was ineffective. In a death penalty case, the appellant must show that, but for the errors, the sentencer

would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant

the death penalty. Strickland v. Washington, supra.” (Tab #R-61, pp.4-5. See also, Tab #R-60,

pp.20-21).

The trial court stated in the order denying the Rule 32 petition:

As the Court on appeal noted, “Parker’s theory of the case was

essentially that Charles Sennett had hired Parker and Kenny Smith to

assault and threaten Sennett’s wife, but not to kill her, that Parker and

Smith had, in fact, gone to the Sennett residence on the day of the

murder and had assaulted Mrs. Sennett; that the injuries received by

Mrs. Sennett during the assault, although severe, were not necessarily

life threatening; that Charles Sennett had come home shortly after the

assault and killed his wife; and that Charles Sennett had committed

suicide once he became a suspect in the case.” Ex parte Parker, 610

So.2d at 1180. 

....

The Court also notes that failing to convince the jury of the defense’s

theory does not make trial counsel inadequate, ineffective or

incompetent.

Tab # 60, p. 21.6/

Case 2:00-cv-01846-SLB-PWG Document 41 Filed 09/30/05 Page 60 of 117
continued:

 “But why does he do it? Because remember he’s a manic depressant. He has a problem. He comes

[home] and finds his wife and it hadn’t been somebody waving the knife and tearing things up and

running [around] and scaring his wife. It’s been much worse than he [ever] imagined it would be and

he knows his wife knows that he had this done to her. What can he do? He looses [sic] it, he covers

her and he stabs her with another knife, not this knife.” 

R-1593-1603.

61

10. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to jury charges precluding

manslaughter, misstating the law regarding conspiracy to commit murder and capital

murder, and instructing on reasonable doubt

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

concluded that this was one of petitioner’s claims that was not “sufficient to show that his counsel

was ineffective. In a death penalty case, the appellant must show that, but for the errors, the sentencer

would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant

the death penalty. Strickland v. Washington, supra.” Tab #R-61, pp.4-5. See also, Tab #R-60, p.29.

See also discussion at section C regarding reasonable doubt charge and discussion at section M

regarding failure to give lesser included offense instructions.

11. Whether trial counsel was ineffective at trial for failing to object to prosecutorial

misconduct in closing argument for vouching for the credibility of state’s witnesses

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held that this claim was insufficiently specific for the court to consider on appeal under Rule 32.6(b),

Ala. R.Crim.P.; however, the court further held:

... The appellant’s claim of improper prosecutorial comment is

insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The

prosecutor’s remarks were reviewed under the plain error rule and

were found to be not so prejudicial as to undermine the fairness of the

trial. The appellant therefore failed to show that, but for his counsel’s

failure to object, the outcome of the trial probably would have been

different and the death penalty probablywould not have been imposed.

Strickland v. Washington, supra.

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62

Tab #R-61, p.5. See also, Tab #R-60, pp.19-20.

See also this court’s discussion of the underlying claim of prosecutorial misconduct in section B.

12. Whether trial counsel was ineffective at trial for failing to object to Doyle v. Ohio

violations where state’s witness Ronnie May’s commented on petitioner’s refusal to

speak and invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held that this claim was insufficiently specific for the court to consider on appeal under Rule 32.6(b),

Ala. R.Crim.P. The court further held that “[h]is claim of Doyle violations is without merit, as neither

of the statements cited by the appellant used his silence as evidence of his guilt.” Tab #R-61, p. 5.

See also, Tab #R-60, p.46, n.4.

13. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek additional funding when the

original investigator approved for funding failed to provide adequate work product

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to adequately utilize the investigator funded by the trial court and for

failing to seek additional funding when the investigator’s work was

left uncompleted. However, the appellant admits in his brief to this

court that his counsel took over the work of the investigator. The

appellant failed to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

under Strickland v. Washington, supra, because he has not pleaded or

shown that his defense was prejudiced by his counsel’s action.

Tab #R-61, p.5. See also, Tab #60, p.15.

14. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise petitioner of his right to

testify at the suppression hearing and to further advise him that by doing so he would

not waive his right to remain silent at trial

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

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The appellant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

advise him that he could testify at the suppression hearing without

waiving his right to remain silent at trial. He argues that his testimony

would have been helpful because he could have testified to his

ingestion of “extensive amounts” of marijuana and beer.

However, the appellant did not propose to testify that he was

intoxicated [to] a degree that would have rendered his statement

inadmissible. See Nobles v. State, supra. He therefore failed to plead

or show that, had his counsel told him that he could testify, the

outcome of the trial probably would have been different.

Tab #R-61, p.5. See also, Tab #R-60, pp.47-48.

15. Whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to competently cross-examine Donald

Buckman as to when the conversation between Buckman and co-defendant Kenneth

Smith took place and by failing to object to the alleged hearsay testimony concerning

the conversation during which petitioner was present but did not participate 

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

competently cross-examine State’s witness Donald Buckman with

regard to his conversation with the accomplice. He argues that the

counsel made no attempt to discredit Buckman concerning where the

conversation took place or whether he was certain of the day of the

week. He also argues that the counsel failed to object to an allegedly

prejudicial hearsay conversation between Buckman and the

accomplice.

The appellant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged

errors of his counsel. Buckman testified at trial that his conversation

occurred on the day of the murder, when he was not at work. He

stated at the Rule 32 hearing that he believed that the day was

Saturday; however, the State introduced evidence that he had also been

“off” on Friday, the day of the murder. Buckman’s testimony was

insufficient to show that, had the appellant’s counsel cross-examined

him more aggressively, the outcome of the trial probably would have

been different. The appellant’s claim concerning the alleged hearsay

conversation also was insufficient, as he failed [to] establish that the

conversation was, in fact, hearsay or that it was prejudicial to the

appellant. Strickland v. Washington, supra.

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Tab #R-61, pp.5-6. See also Tab #R.60, pp.26-27 and pp. 45-47.

16. Whether trial counsel was ineffective during jury selection by rehabilitating juror

Whilhite who expressed a strong view in favor of capital punishment, by failing to

move to strike the jury array due to underrepresentation on the basis of race and

gender and by failing to strike juror Mansell for cause.

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

The appellant contends that his counsel was ineffective during jury

selection. He argues that the counsel should have challenged Jurors

Wilhite and Mansell for cause. ... He also argues that his counsel

should have moved to strike the jury, due to underrepresentation on the

basis of race and gender.

However, Juror Wilhite informed the trial court that he would follow

the law and the court determined that, although Juror Mansell had seen

the victim brought into the hospital, he had no predisposition toward

the case. A proper challenge for cause exists only when the

prospective juror’s opinion or bias is so fixed that he cannot ignore it

and try the case impartially on the law and the evidence. Ex parte

Rutledge, 523 So.2d 1118 (Ala. 1988). As there was no such showing

of fixed opinion or bias in the present case, the appellant cannot show

that he was prejduiced by his counsel’s failure to challenge these two

jurors.

[H]e stated no factual basis for his claim of underrepresentation of race

and gender. The appellant failed to show either deficient performance

by his counsel or prejudice to his defense with regard to these claims.

Strickland v. Washington, supra.

Tab #R-61, p.6. See also, Tab #R-60, pp. 3,31-33. See also, discussion in Section G.

17. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to place on the record, during the

motion for change of venue, an ex parte discussion with the trial judge and district

attorney during which the judge indicated her intention to grant a change in venue and

that the hearing on the motion would be a mere formality.

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held:

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The appellant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

place on the record an ex parte discussion with the trial judge and offthe-record discussion with the prosecutor, wherein, he says, the judge

clearly indicated her intention to grant a change in venue and indicated

that the hearing on the motion would be a mere formality.

However, the appellant’s counsel testified that he had merely assumed

that the judge intended to change venue. He made this assumption, he

said, because the trial judge was present during an informal discussion

of the difficulties of moving accomplice Kenny Smith’s trial to

Birmingham and then, sua sponte, the judge called a hearing on a

change of venue in the appellant’s trial. The trial court noted in her

order on the appellant’s petition that no such conversation concerning

a change of venue ever occurred. The appellant has not shown that his

counsel’s performance was deficient because the counsel failed to put

an erroneous claim on the record.

The appellant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing

to adequately press for a change of venue and failing to produce the

necessary experts on pretrial publicity. However, this court found on

direct appeal that the trial court’s refusal to move the appellant’s trial

was based on all the evidence, exhibits, testimony, and arguments that

had been offered in Smith’s venue hearing. This court further found

that the court’s refusal to grant the change was not an abuse of

discretion. As the appellant has not shown that he was prejudiced by

the actions of his counsel, he has failed to state a claim under

Strickland v. Washington, supra.

Tab #R-61, p.6. See also Tab R-60, pp.3-6; R. 32, TR. 63-64. See also discussion in Section J.

18. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a record, to 

object or to provide adequate representation in eight additional ways

In the amended petition, petitioner identifies nine alleged inadequacies of counsel:

[i] At one point, Mr. Heflin attempted to make a motion concerning his

belief that the Petitioner ha[d] been brought into court in shackles in

front of prospective jurors. Instead of continuing with his objections,

Heflin accepts at face value the assertions of the District Attorney and

investigators that Mr. Parker was not seen. R-719.

[ii] Trial counsel’s [sic] failed to object to the introduction of wrongdoing

not the subject of a criminal conviction. R-1770.

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[iii] Trial counsel failed to object adequately to the trial court’s override of

the jury’s recommendation of life without parole (Petition

II.A.5(e)(4)).

[iv] Trial counsel failed to articulate to the sentencing court reasons why

Petitioner’s life should be spared.

[v] Trial counsel allowed peremptory challenges to be done off the record.

R-904.

[vi] Trial counsel failed to object to investigator Ronnie May, a key

prosecution witness, from being present throughout the trial

proceedings, (petition II.A.5(h)(1)).

[vii] Trial counsel failed to object when the district attorney provided

unsworn and unconfronted testimony whether or not the petitioner had

been informed of his right to refuse to provide blood samples of saliva

to the State (petition II.H.1),

[viii] Trial counsel failed to file a motion or make appellate arguments

attacking the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on

persons with mental infirmities like those of Mr. Parker (petition

II.A.5.(e)(1)).

[ix] The lack of such compelling evidence, which would have been readily

available to trial counsel, reflected their inadequate representation.

Had counsel presented such testimony, the results of the trial would

have been different.

Amended petition, pp.124-25.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held with respect to these claims:

A review of the record reveals that none of the appellant’s claims are

sufficient to show that his counsel was ineffective. In a death penalty

case, the appellant must show that, but for the errors, the sentencer

would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant the death penalty. Strickland v.

Washington, supra.

Tab #R-61, p.5.

The trial court made specific findings with respect to each of these claims.

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[i] Heflin’s failure to pursue a motion concerning his belief that the Petitioner 

has been brought into court in shackles in front of prospective jurors.

The trial court stated in the order denying the Rule 32 petition:

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective due to the lack of

challenge at trial and on direct appeal that security measures taken

[sic] trial prejudiced the petitioner and destroyed juror impartiality

(petition II.A.5.(d)(3) and (g)(2)). The Court finds that the measures

taken at trial were pursuant to the motion of trial counsel to limit the

visibility of restraints on the petitioner. R. 2078-2079. The Court

granted this motion. R.. 2125-2126. This Court finds that no evidence

concerning destruction of juror impartiality was presented during the

Rule 32 hearing. Not one juror was called as a witness to testify as to

what the jury did or did not see or hear. Further, no evidence was

presented that, assuming the jury could see or hear petitioner’s

restraints, demonstrated the effect this had on the jury. The Court

finds that under Rule 32.6, this claim must be denied.

Tab #R-60, p.49.

This court notes that Rule 32.6 requires:

The petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds

upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual

basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has

been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to

warrant any further proceedings.

Nevertheless, petitioner was provided an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 32 petition and failed to

present any evidence or testimony with respect to this claim. 

[ii] Trial counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of 

wrongdoing not the subject of a criminal conviction. R-1770.

The trial court in the order denying the Rule 32 petition observed:

Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to object to the introduction

and consideration of wrongs not the subject of criminal convictions

(II.A.5.(f)(2)) is erroneous. This issue was raised on direct appeal, and

the appellate court remanded the case to this Court for resentencing

with instructions to consider the petitioner’s lack of convictions as a

mitigating circumstance. Parker v. State, 587 So.2d at 1100. This

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68

court did so and the appellate court held that “[t]he amended order of

the trial court is proper, is supported by the record, and fully complies

with the requirements of sec. 13A-5-47(d).” Parker v. State, 610

So.2d at 1172-1173. Thus, any failure to object to the court’s

consideration of wrongs not the subject of criminal convictions has

already been cured by the appellate courts of this state and thus would

have no effect on the ultimate sentence imposed in this case.

Tab #R-60, p.27.

See this court’s discussion of underlying claim at Section H, supra.

[iii] Trial counsel’s failure to object “adequately” to the trial court’s override 

of the jury’s recommendation of life without parole (Petition II.A.5(e)(4)).

The trial court stated in the order denying the Rule 32 petition:

Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to object adequately to this

Court’s rejection of the jury verdict for life without parole (petition

II.A.5(e)(4)) is incorrect. This issue was addressed on appeal and this

Court’s rejection of the jury verdict held to be proper. This Court

notes that the sentencing opinion of this court was upheld by the

appellate court. See A.16., supra. Additionally, this Court finds that

trial counsel raised this very point in its motion for new trial. R.2181.

Tab #R-60, p.27.

The underlying claim was addressed in Section H of this opinion.

[iv] Trial counsel’s failure to articulate to the sentencing 

court reasons why Petitioner’s life should be spared.

The trial court dealt with this issue in the order denying the Rule 32 petition:

Petitioner’s allegation that trial counsel failed to articulate reasons why

petitioner’s life should be spared (II.A.5.(f)(3)) is without merit. A

review of the sentencing hearing testimony and the closing arguments

presented thereafter reveal that trial counsel presented every factor

petitioner now contends was not, but should have been, argued before

this Court. The Court granted petitioner’s motion limiting the District

Attorney from referring to the atrociousness or viciousness of the

victim’s death. R. 1767-1768. The prosecutor, in his closing

arguments, pointed out the mitigating circumstances presented,

including the age of the Defendant, the lack of any significant criminal

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69

history, and the possibility of diminished mental capacity. R. 1769.

The prosecutor continued his argument by recognizing that “what’s

really been proven in this case is that John Parker had problems. That

he was of low average or borderline intelligence.... That he had a drug

problem. That he had problems controlling his emotions. That he had

problems, he had problems.” R. 1774. The defendant’s attorney then

argued to the jury: “There was never anything normal. Not from when

he was little. And they can talk all day long and make great speeches,

but I just don’t believe this boy is a candidate for the electric chair.”

R. 1779. This Court finds that petitioner’s trial counsel did an

excellent job establishing why petitioner’s life should be spared, as

proven by the jury’s 10-2 vote for life without parole.

Tab #R-60, pp.49-50.

[v] Trial counsel allowed peremptory challenges to be done off the record. R-904.

The trial court stated:

The petitioner claims he was prejudiced on appeal by the failure to

transcribe all court proceedings fully (petition II.A.(5)(d)(2) and II.Q.).

This Court notes that this claim too is being raised for the first time in

the Rule 32 petition, and that no objections were raised at trial or

claims made on appeal. This Court also notes that no evidence of this

claim was presented at the Rule 32 hearing. Under Alabama Rules of

Criminal ProcedureRule 19.4(a), there is no requirement that the court

reporter record and transcribe bench conferences, sidebar discussions

or the actual striking of the jury. See Roberts v. State, WL 272419 at

18. The Court also notes that no specifically requested material by any

of petitioner’s counsel is stated to be untranscribed.

Tab #R-60, p.36.

[vi] Trial counsel’s failure to object to investigator Ronnie May, a key 

prosecution witness presented throughout the trial proceedings

The trial court stated in the order denying the Rule 32 petition:

The question of whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in

allowing Investigator Ronnie May, a witness, to be present at the

prosecution’s table throughout the entire trial proceeding (petition

II.A.5.(h)(1) and II.H.2.) and whether trial counsel failed to object

thereto were not raised at trial nor on appeal and are therefore barred

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from being raised now. However, this Court finds that even if this

issue had been previously raised, no error occurred.

Under Rule 615, Alabama Rules of Evidence, every party to litigation

may have a representative present who is exempt from the

exclusionary rule. Rule 615(2) A.R.E. Likewise, a person who’s [sic]

presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the

party’s cause is exempt from exclusion. Rule 615(3) A.R.E. Under

either of these subsection, the state’s action in allowing the

investigating officer to be present throughout the trial was clearly

appropriate. See also Ex parte Lawhorn, 581 So.2d 1179 (Ala. 1991)

[Alabama appellate courts have time and again refused to hold it an

abuse of discretion on the part of a trial court to allow a sheriff, police

chief, or similarly situated person who will later testify to remain in the

courtroom during trial]; sec. 286.01, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence.

Tab #R-60, p.30.

[vii] Trial counsel’s failure to object when the district attorney allegedly provided 

unsworn and unconfronted testimony whether or not the petitioner had been 

informed of his right to refuse to provide blood samples and saliva to the State

The trial court dealt with this claim in the order denying the Rule 32 petition in the following

manner:

The Court finds that the petitioner has provided no evidence

concerning whether or not the petitioner had been informed of his right

to refuse to provide samples of blood and saliva to the state (petition

II.H.1.). The Court further finds a lack of any evidence presented at

the Rule 32 hearing regarding whether or not the prosecutor provided

“unsworn and unconfronted testimony” regarding petitioner’s right to

refuse to provide the same.

. . . .

The petitioner’s allegations that the district attorney provided unsworn

and unconfronted testimony concerning whether or not the petitioner

had been informed of his right to refuse to provide samples of blood

and saliva to the state (petition II.H.1.) were not raised at trial nor on

appeal. This Court finds that this claim is barred form further

consideration by this Court under Rule 32.2(3) and (5), A.R.Cr.P.

Tab #60, pp. 29-30,41.

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[viii] Trial counsel’s failure to attack the constitutionality of 

imposing the death penalty on persons with mental infirmities.

In the order denying the Rule 32 petition, the trial court stated:

The petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective due to its

failure to file a motion attacking the constitutionality of the death

penalty for “someone like Mr. Parker” (petition II.A.5.(e)(1)). As

previously found by this Court, this petitioner was competent to stand

trial and had the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his

actions. (Supra A.6. and A.7.). All mitigating circumstances required

of this court to be considered before sentencing were so considered.

This facts of this particular case are not all that unusual regarding the

mental state or mental capacity of petitioner. See, e.g. Dobyne v.

State, 672 So.2d 1319. This Court finds this contention to be without

merit. See also Williams v. State, 1996 WL 497198 [death penalty

imposed on individual claiming mental deficits].

Tab #R-60, pp.41-42.

Having reviewed the trial transcript and Rule 32 evidentiary hearing transcript as well as the

state courts’ decisions, the court concludes that the decisions of the state courts on the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel were not contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of

Strickland v. Washington nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

F. Whether Parker’s Constitutional Rights were Violated When Authorities Medicated Him

In his amended habeas petition, petitioner argues he was deprived of his rights to due process,

confrontation and counsel under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when state authorities

medicated him without informing counsel and the court. Specifically, he alleges that prior to and

during trial he was given hydroxyzine four times a day and that the effect of the medication was to

make him feel “kinda doped up” during the trial, to make him look apathetic, indifferent and tired,

and to impair his ability to consult with his attorney.

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This claim was not raised as an independent claim in state court. Rather, it was raised as an

instance of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), reh. denied,

490 U.S. 1031 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the procedural default rule applies where a claim

has never been presented to the state courts. 

"When a procedural default bars state litigation of a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may

not obtain federal habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice." See Wilson v. Jones,

902 F.2d 923, 925 (11th Cir. 1990), reh. denied, 927 F.2d 615 (11th Cir. 1991), citing Bennett v.

Fortner, 863 F.2d 804, 806 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989); see also Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). 

Petitioner ignored respondent’s assertion of procedural default and has therefore failed to

make any showing of cause and prejudice for his failure to present this claim as an independent

constitutional claim in state court. No further review of this claim is necessary.

The court notes that this claim has also been presented and addressed in this court in the

context of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See discussion at E.(5)

G. Whether the Failure to Strike Venirepersons whoCould Not be Impartial with Regard to Guilt

and/or Sentencing was a Violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel moved to strike prospective jurors Almon Whitehead, Ovie

Crosswhite, and Elmer Watkins for cause. He alleges that Whitehead should have been struck due

to his knowledge about facts of the case and his opinion that petitioner was involved and that the trial

court’s refusal to strike him for cause violated hisrights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

 He argues that Crosswhite and Watkins should have been struck due their bias in favor of the death

penalty and that the trial court’s refusal to strike them for cause violated his rights under the Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

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This issue was raised and addressed on direct appeal. The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals observed that the jurors indicated that they could set aside their views and base their

decisions on the evidence presented at trial and what the judge said was the law. The court concluded:

The trial judge did not commit error in denying the appellant’s

challenge for cause to venire members Almon Whitehead, Ovie

Crosswhite, and Elma Watkins. Defense counsel was allowed to voir

dire each of these venire members individually outside the presence

and hearing of the other members.

Whitehead was a reserve state trooper who had received some

information connected with the case from a friend who was a nurse at

the emergency room when the victim’s body was brought in and from

a friend who was with the Alabama Bureau of Investigation and who

took part in the investigation of the murder. Defense counsel was

permitted to explore the content of what Whitehead knew and what he

had been told. On examination, Whitehead made it clear that what he

had been told would not influence his judgment and that his judgment

would be based on the evidence presented at trial. The appellant

argues that his “assurances are simply not credible.” Appellant’s brief

at 51.

Watkins was a retired Sheffield police officer who expressed his

opinion that capital punishment should be imposed for any kind of

murder. However, he testified that he could base his decision on the

evidence and “go with what the Judge said the law was.” 

Crosswhite expressed his personal views favoring capital punishment

but indicated that he could set those views aside and “follow the law”

as instructed by the trial judge.

 “[A] proper challenge for cause exists onlywhen a prospective juror’s

opinion or bias is so fixed that he or she could not ignore it and try the

case fairly and impartially according to the law and the evidence.” Ex

parte Rutledge, 523 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Ala. 1988). “[A] trial court’s

ruling on a challenge for cause based on bias is entitled to great weight

and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of

an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Rutledge, 523 So.2d at 1120.

Here, there is no showing that any of these three veniremembers had

such a fixed opinion that it would bias the verdict or influence the

decision. Siebert v. State, 562 So.2d 586, 595-96 (Ala. Cr. App.

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1989), affirmed, 562 So.2d 600 (Ala.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 963, 111

S.Ct. 398, 112 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990).

“In challenging a juror for cause, the test to be applied is that

of probable prejudice.... While probable prejudice for any

reason will serve to disqualify a prospective juror, qualification

of a juror is a matter within the discretion of the trial court....

 This Court must look to the questions propounded to, and the

answers given by, the prospective juror to see if this discretion

was properly exercised.... A reversal is not appropriate absent

abuse of this discretion.... “Ultimately, the test to be applied

is whether the juror can set aside her opinions and try the case

fairly and impartially, according to the law and the evidence....

This determination, again, is to be based on the juror’s answers

and demeanor and is within the sound discretion of the trial

judge. Thus, a prospective juror should not be disqualified for

prejudices or biases if it appears from his or her answers and

demeanor that the influence of those prejudices and biases can

be eliminated and a verdict rendered according to the

evidence.”

Knop v. McCain, 561 So.2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1989). See also Wood v.

Woodham, 561 So.2d 224, 227 (Ala. 1989). “Thus, even though a

prospective juror admits to a potential bias, if further voir dire

examination reveals that the juror in question can and will base his

decision on the evidence alone, then a trial judge’s refusal to grant a

motion to strike for cause is not error.” Perryman v. State, 558 So.2d

972, 977 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989).

We recognize that there are occasions where a juror’s claim of

freedom from prejudice and impartiality cannot be accepted and

should not be believed. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031,

104 S.Ct. 2885, 2889, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). “[T]he simple

extraction of an affirmative response from a potential juror does not

necessary absolve that juror of probable prejudice.” Woodham, 561

So.2d at 228. However, we do not consider this to be such an

occasion. Our review of the questioning of these three venire

members by the trial judge, defense counsel, and the prosecutor

convinces this court that each challenge for cause of these three venire

members was properly denied.

“The qualification of a juror is a matter within the discretion

of the trial court. Clark v. State, 443 So.2d 1287, 1288 (Ala.

Cr. App. 1983). The trial judge is in the best position to hear

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a prospective juror and to observe his or her demeanor. A trial

judge’s rulings on a juror’s qualification are entitled to great

weight on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly

shown to be an abuse of discretion.”

Ex parte Dinkins, 567 So.2d 1313, 1314 (Ala. 1990).

587 So.2d at 1083.

Petitioner relies upon Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) to support his claim that

Crosswhite and Watkins should have been struck for cause due to their clear bias in favor of the death

penalty which would interfere with their abilities to be impartial jurors. Morgan v. Illinois was

decided after the appellate court’s decision on this issue. Moreover, Morgan v. Illinois is

distinguishable from this case. In Morgan v. Illinois, the Supreme Court had to review the

constitutional adequacy of the voir dire. In this case, both defense counsel and the prosecutor had

ample opportunity to question the jurors on voir dire concerning their position on the death penalty.

(R. 788-98, 825-31). In Morgan v. Illinois, the Court stated:

A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case

will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed,

because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the

presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances

is entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the

requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause

any prospective juror who maintains such views. If even one such

juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is

disentitled to execute the sentence.

504 U.S. at 729. (emphasis added).

The Court specifically noted that its reversal was limited to the death sentence and did not have any

bearing on the validity of petitioner’s conviction. 504 U.S. at 739, n. 11.

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Neither Crosswhite (juror #23) nor Watkins (juror #119), who petitioner challenged for their

bias in favor of the death penalty, actually sat on petitioner’s jury because petitioner used his first

peremptory strike to strike Crosswhite and his third peremptory to strike Watkins. (Jury list,

supplemental record, pp. 135-36). Morgan v. Illinois is therefore inapplicable to petitioner’s case.

The state court’s decision was not contrary nor did it involve an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent. Further, the decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. (Voir dire testimony:

Whitehead, R-578-86; Crosswhite, 788-98; Watkins, 825-31).

Furthermore, in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88-89 (1988), the Supreme Court held that

the fact that a defendant was required to use a peremptory challenge to cure a trial court’s failure to

remove a juror for cause did not violate either the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury or the

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The court held:

So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had

to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean that

the Sixth Amendment was violated.

487 U.S. at 88. See also Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1132-33 (11 Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 th

U.S. 1077 (1992). The Ross court noted:

Had Huling sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to

death, and had petitioner properly preserved his right to challenge the

trial court’s removal for cause, the sentence would have to be

overturned.... But Huling did not sit. Petitioner exercised a

peremptory challenge to remove him, and Huling was thereby removed

from the jury as effectively as if the trial court had excused him for

cause. 

487 U.S. at 85-86.

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As previously stated, Crosswhite and Watkins were struck by petitioner’s first and third peremptory

strikes. In addition, Whitehead (juror #125) was struck by petitioner’s second peremptory strike.

(Jury strike list, supplemental record, pp. 135-36).

In United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) the United States Supreme Court

stated:

After objecting to the District Court’s denial of his for-cause

challenge, Martinez-Salazar had the option of letting Gilbert sit on the

petit jury and, upon conviction, pursue a Sixth Amendment challenge

on appeal. Instead, Martinez-Salazar elected to use a challenge to

remove Gilbert because he did not want Gilbert to sit on his jury. This

was Martinez-Salazar’s choice. The District Court did not demand –

and Rule 24(b) did not require – that Martinez-Salazar use a

peremptory challenge curatively.

In choosing to remove Gilbert rather than taking his chances on

appeal, Martinez-Salazar did not lose a peremptory challenge. Rather,

he used the challenge in line with a principal reason for peremptories:

to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury.

... Moreover, the immediate choice Martinez-Salazar confronted – to

stand on his objection to the erroneous denial of the challenge for

cause or to use a peremptory challenge to effect an instantaneous cure

of the error – comports with the reality of the jury selection process.

Challenges for cause and rulings upon them, ... are fast paced, made

on the spot and under pressure. Counsel as well as court, in that

setting, must be prepared to decide, often between shades of gray, “by

the minute.” 146 F.3d at 661

528 U.S. at 315-16.

As in Ross, 487 U.S. at 91, n. 5, and Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316, there is no assertion

that the trial court in Parker’s case deliberately misapplied the law in order to force the petitioner to

use a peremptory challenge to correct the court’s alleged error. This claim is without merit.

H. The Claim that the Override of the Jury’s Verdict of Life Imprisonment without Parole

by the Trial Judge, and the Decision of the Alabama Courts Affirming the Override was

a Violation of Petitioner’s Rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

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Petitioner argues that the trial court should have given him the benefit of the mitigating factor

of no significant prior history, that the trial court should not have found the aggravating factor of

murder for pecuniary gain, that the trial court should not have minimized the effect of the jury’s

recommendation of life without parole as a mitigating factor and that “judicial override” of a jury

verdict is unconstitutional. This claim was raised on direct appeal.

1. Whether the trial court should have given petitioner benefit 

of mitigating factor of no significant prior criminal history

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court improperly rejected the

mitigating circumstance of § 13A-5-51(1) that “[t]he defendant has no significant history of prior

criminal activity” while further finding that the trial court found the existence of two nonstatutory

mitigating circumstances – (1) the jury’s recommendation of life without parole and (2) petitioner’s

remorse. 587 So.2d at 1098-99. The court remanded the case to the trial court for the trial judge

to enter specific written findings as to each aggravating circumstance enumerated in § 13-5-49 and

each mitigating circumstance enumerated in § 13A-5-51 as required by § 13A-5-47(d) and to weigh

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine if the aggravating circumstances

outweigh the mitigating circumstances and to enter a proper sentencing order pursuant to § 13A-5-

47(d). Id.

On remand, in the amended sentencing order, the trial court addressed each mitigating factor

and each aggravating factor. In doing so, the trial court found that no significant prior history was

a mitigating factor; therefore, this attack on the trial court’s action is not properly before this court

in this action.

2. Whether the trial court should not have found the

aggravating factor of murder for pecuniary gain

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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial judge properly found the existence

of the aggravating circumstance that “[t]he capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain.” 587

So.2d at 1098. Petitioner questions the evidence used at trial to support the element of murder for

hire as unreliable; however, petitioner was convicted of capital murder for pecuniary gain in violation

of § 13A-5-40(a)(7). 

In Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), 603 So.2d 412 (Ala. 1992), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 925 (1993), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

[O]ur capital murder statute contemplates that certain aggravating

circumstances will be established by certain capital verdicts. This

practice of permitting the use of an element of the underlying crime as

an aggravating circumstance is referred to as "double-counting" or

"overlap." This practice has been upheld. See Lowenfield v. Phelps,

484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed. 2d 568 (1988) (upholding

Louisiana's capital offense statute in which the intent to kill more than

one person is both an element of the capital offense and an aggravating

circumstance).

....

"The use of 'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a

means of genuinely narrowing the class of death- eligible persons and

thereby channeling the jury's discretion. We see no reason why this

narrowing function may not be performed by jury findings at either the

sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase." 

Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. at 244-45, 108 S.Ct. at 554. Our

statutes that allow double-counting recognize that the jury, by its guilty

verdict, finds the aggravating circumstance encompassed in the

indictment to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 13A-5-45(e) provides, as follows: 

"At the sentence hearing the state shall have the burden of proving

beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating

circumstances. Provided, however, any aggravating circumstances

which the verdict convicting the defendant establishes was proven

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As stated at the beginning of this opinion, this case was stayed twice pending decisions by the Supreme Court. 7/

In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment

requires a jury, rather than a judge, to find the aggravating circumstance that renders defendant death-eligible.

Subsequently in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. ____ , 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), the Supreme

Court held that Ring does not apply retroactively to a death penalty case already final on direct review.

Petitioner’s case became final on direct review on June 28, 1993 when the United States Supreme Court denied

the petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama. 509 U.S. at 929. Ring and Schriro do not,

however, overrule Lowenfield because Ring and Schriro do not involve an aggravating factor that was also an

element of the capital offense. By convicting Parker of murder for pecuniary gain in violation of 13A-5-

40(a)(7), the jury necessarily found the aggravating factor that the capital offense was committed for pecuniary

gain.

80

beyond a reasonable doubt at trial shall be considered as proven

beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of the sentence hearing." 

Section 13A-5-50 provides, as follows: 

"The fact that a particular capital offense as defined in section 13A-5-

40(a) necessarily includes one or more aggravating circumstances as

specified in section 13A-5-49 shall not be construed to preclude the

finding and consideration of that relevant circumstance or

circumstances in determining sentence.

....

Accordingly, we conclude that the aggravating circumstance that

“[t]he capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain” was

established, as a matter of law, by appellant’s conviction for the capital

crime of murder for hire, and the trial court correctly so charged the

jury.

603 So.2d at 379-80. 

The Lowenfield case had been decided prior to Parker’s trial and subsequent appeal. The

decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in finding that the trial judge’s finding that the

capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain was proper was not contrary to and did not involve

an unreasonable application of Lowenfield nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.7/

3. Whether the trial court should have given weight to the jury’s

recommendation as a mitigating factor, i.e., whether the “judicial 

override provision of § 13A-5-47(e) is unconstitutional

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The trial court recognized the jury’s recommendation of life without parole as a mitigating

factor but explained other factors she considered in addition to the jury’s recommendation:

B. The court does find that the jury's recommendation is a mitigating

factor, and the Court has considered said mitigating factor at this

sentence hearing. However, the Jury was allowed to hear an emotional

appeal from the defendant's mother. Although the defendant's mother

attempted to blame the defendant's drug addiction on the medication

the defendant had taken as a child for his condition diagnosed as

"hyperactivity," there was no proof that such was the case. Dr. James

Crowder testified that a child taking ritalin as prescribed for treatment

for hyperactivity would have no withdrawal symptoms from said drug

when such drug was discontinued. The Court does not find that the

defendant's problems during his childhood is a mitigating factor. He

was appropriatelytreated for said condition according to the testimony

of Dr. Crowder.

610 So.2d at 1180. 

Parker argues that a trial court cannot restrict nor override a jury based upon mitigating facts about

the defendant’s family history. Parker’s mother's attempt to blame his drug addiction on medication

he had taken as a child was based purely on speculation and conjecture and was without any support

in other trial testimony. In other words, proven drug addiction would have been “family history;”

however, the unproven cause of the addiction is not “family history.” 

Parker further argues that “[t]he Alabama capital statute which permits the standardless

judicial override of a jury’s verdict of Life Imprisonment Without Parole is unconstitutional facially

and as applied to John Parker.” The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this claim:

The appellant contends that the trial judge’s rejection of the jury’s

recommendation of life imprisonment without parole and her

imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional and resulted in

the arbitrary and standardless imposition of the sentence of death.

The appellant’s argument that the jury override provision of the

Alabama statutory sentencing scheme, Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-47(e),

is unconstitutional is without merit. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.

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447, 464-65, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164-65, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984).

Frazier v. State, 562 So.2d 543, 550 (Ala. Cr. App.), reversed on other

grounds, 562 So.2d 560 (Ala. 1989), and cases cited therein.

Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), requires that in order

for a trial judge to reject a jury’s recommendation of life without

parole, “the facts suggesting a sentence of death [must be] so clear and

convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” The

“Tedder standard” is not constitutionally required. Johnson v. Dugger,

911 F.2d at 452; Ex parte Jones, 456 So.2d 380, 382 (Ala. 1984), cert.

denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 838 (1985). The

appellant has advanced no reason or argument to convince this court

otherwise.

587 So.2d at 1098 (Footnote omitted).

In 1995, in Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995) the United States Supreme Court upheld

Alabama’s capital sentencing statute. The Court held that Alabama’s sentencing is similar to

Florida’s sentencing statute that was upheld as constitutional in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.

447(1984). The Court recognized that the statutes differed in that the trial judge in Florida must give

“great weight” to the jury’s recommendation while the trial judge in Alabama must only “consider”

the jury’s recommendation. The Court stated:

We have rejected the notion that “a specific method for balancing

mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentence proceeding is

constitutionally required.” Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179,

108 S.Ct. 2320, 2330, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). Equally settled is the

corollary that the Constitution does not require a State to ascribe any

specific weight to particular factors, either in aggravation or

mitigation, to be considered by the sentencer. See, e.g., Blystone v.

Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-307, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083, 108

L.Ed.2d 255 (1990); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-115,

102 S.Ct. 869, 876-877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Proffitt, supra, 428 U.S.

at 257-258, 96 S.Ct., at 2969 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and

STEVENS, JJ). To require that “great weight” be given to the jury

recommendation here, one of the criteria to be considered by the

sentencer, would offend these established principles and place within

constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that properly rest within

the State’s discretion to administer its criminal justice system. We

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therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment does not require the State

to define the weight the sentencing judge must accord an advisory

verdict.

513 U.S. at 512. 

The Alabama appellate court decision with respect to the “weight” to be given a jury’s

recommendation by the trial judge was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable

application of Spaziano and Franklin v. Lynaugh, the precursors of Harris v. Alabama. Further, the

decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding.

I. Whether the Admission of Petitioner’s Statement and Other Evidence were the Result of an

Illegal Arrest and a Violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

This claim was raised and addressed as follows on direct appeal:

The appellant maintains that his warrantless arrest at his home was

illegal because it was without probable cause. He also argues that

because his arrest was illegal, his subsequent statement was

inadmissible.

In Williams v. State, 565 So.2d 1233, 1236 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), this

Court found that there was probable cause to arrest the appellant's

accomplice. "The information obtained from the anonymous

telephone informant and corroborated by the sheriff's department

satisfies the totality-of-the circumstances test for determining probable

cause set out in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76

L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)." Williams, 565 So.2d at 1235. The facts

supplying the probable cause for the arrest of Williams, Smith, and the

appellant are virtually identical.

We find that, based on the specific facts presented in this case, the

corroboration of the anonymous telephone informant supplied

probable cause for this particular appellant's arrest. See Alabama v.

White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

In determining the legality of the appellant's arrest, this Court need not

decide whether the appellant was actually arrested inside his home or

whether any warrantless arrest of the appellant at his home constituted

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a violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63

L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The statements of the appellant were given to

Investigator May at the county courthouse. In New York v. Harris, 495

U.S. 14, 21, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1644-1645, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990), the

United States Supreme Court held that "where the police have

probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar

the State's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his

home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the

home in violation of Payton." Therefore, the appellant's statements at

the courthouse would have been admissible even if this Court were to

accept the appellant's argument that he was arrested without a warrant

inside his residence.

587 So.2d at 1088.

Because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals relied on the opinion in Williams v. State, 565 So.2d

1233 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), this court must look to the pertinent portion of the opinion in which the

appellate court discussed Williams’ allegation that his statements were the product of an illegal arrest

and concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Williams when he was taken into custody.

Mrs. Sennett was murdered on March 18, 1988. Alabama Bureau of

Investigation Investigator Harold Carson testified that an anonymous

informant supplied information that the defendant, Kenny Smith, and

John Parker were involved in the murder of Mrs. Sennett. The

informant supplied the names of these individuals, where they lived,

and a description of their vehicles. The informant also provided the

following information: that the defendant lived in a residence owned

by Charles Sennett, the victim's husband; that the three suspects had

gone to Coffee High School together and had been close friends; that

the murder was originally planned for Wednesday but on that day the

victim changed her mind and went to Birmingham with Mr. Sennett,

who went to a doctor; that on the day of the murder the defendant

purchased a waterbed at Waterworld in Florence with part of the

money he was paid to kill Mrs. Sennett; that a Samsung VCR was

taken from the Sennett residence and that the informant had seen that

VCR at the Smith residence; and that the VCR did not have the remote

control unit.

Before the defendant was taken into custody, Investigator Carson

corroborated all of this information except the location of the VCR in

the Smith residence. The theft of the VCR is significant in

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establishing the probable cause to arrest Williams because the fact of

the theft had not been made public and the crime scene, the den of the

Sennett residence, had been carefully preserved and isolated. This,

coupled with the fact that the VCR's remote control unit had not been

taken, supports the reasonable inference that the informant was

credible and his information reliable. Additionally, Investigator

Carson knew that Mr. Sennett, the victim's husband, had given three

statements in which he denied any involvement in his wife's murder,

that a number of inconsistencies had been discovered in Mr. Sennett's

account of the events, that he was a suspect, and that Mr. Sennett had

committed suicide on March 25, 1988. Based on the information

obtained from the informant, a warrant to search the Smith residence

was obtained by Colbert County Sherif's Investigator Ronnie May

early on the afternoon of March 31, 1988. 

Later, on that afternoon, a "joint" decision was made by all of the

officers involved in the Sennett murder investigation to arrest all three

suspects and to execute the search warrant at 3:00 that afternoon. The

"team" assigned to take the defendant into custody consisted of

Colbert County Sheriff John Aldridge, ABI Investigator Carson, and

Florence police officer Glenn Masonia. They went to the defendant's

residence in Florence around 3:00 "to take him into custody and ask

him to come to be interviewed." The defendant was not at home so

Sheriff Aldridge and Investigator Carson returned to the Sheriff's

Office in Tuscumbia. Officer Masonia was left to watch the

defendant's residence and wait for his return.

Aldridge and Carson returned to the defendant's residence around 5:00

that same afternoon, having "received a call from [the] Florence Police

Department that they had made contact with [the defendant] and he

was with them." When Aldridge and Carson arrived, the defendant

and his girlfriend, Katherine Corbin, were sitting in the defendant's car

parked on the street in a location close to the defendant's residence.

Officer Masonia was sitting in his police car which was parked behind

the defendant's car.

At the suppression hearing, Investigator Carson testified: "We got out

of our car. Mr. Williams got out. I asked him for his driver's license

for identification.... and we asked him if he would come over, come

and sit down in the car with us, we needed to talk to him [about the

Sennett murder] and he agreed." Carson also testified that he and the

sheriff "both got out of the car and walked up to the side where Mr.

Williams was sitting." Carson testified that before the defendant got

into Carson's car, Carson "just patted his pockets down to make sure

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he didn't have a weapon on him." Once in the car, the defendant was

given his Miranda rights. Carson "asked if he would accompany us to

the courthouse in Tuscumbia and he said, yes and asked could he drive

his car and ... we told him we would rather he rode with us and he said

let me go tell my girlfriend to follow us over there." Carson stated that

he "discouraged" the defendant from driving his own car because "we

wanted to make sure that he came over here." The defendant got out

of Investigator Carson's car and, without any officer accompanying

him, went to his car and had a conversation with his girlfriend and

then "voluntarily came back and got in the car."

The defendant was taken to the courthouse. His girlfriend following

in the defendant's car. By the time Investigator Carson returned to the

courthouse with the defendant, suspects Smith and Parker had already

been arrested and had given statements implicating the defendant.

Smith's residence had been searched and the VCR taken from the

Sennett residence had been discovered.

Carson testified that before he began questioning the defendant at the

courthouse, he had been informed of Smith’s statement but that he

“didn’t know anything about what Parker had said.”

The information obtained from the anonymous telephone informant

and corroborated by the sheriff’s department satisfies the totality-ofthe-circumstances test for determining probable cause set out in

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527

(1983).

. . . .

...[W]e find that there existed probable cause to arrest the defendant

when he was initially “taken into custody and asked to come to be

interviewed.”

Here, the details of the informant’s tip as corroborated are sufficient

both in number and specificity to establish the informant’s credibility.

The details of the tip also support the inference that the informant had

an adequate basis of knowledge, because those details indicate quite

clearly that the informant either had personally observed the facts or

had learned them from an actual participant in the crime. See 1

LaFave § 3.3(e) at 671-72.

Much of the information obtained from the informant was of the sort

readily available to the public and thus was entitled to little weight in

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the probable cause determination. However, the information

concerning the VCR is significant because it indicates that the

informant obtained that information in a reliable manner. The fact that

the VCR had been taken during the murder was discovered by the

investigating officers only several days after the murder and was a fact

known only by them and a few family members. The additional fact

that the VCR in the Smith residence did not have with it a remote

control unit and that the remote control unit to the stolen VCR was

still in the Sennett residence support the inference that the informant

knew what he or she was talking about. “Although it is clear that an

uncorroborated anonymous tip is not sufficient to establish probable

cause, nevertheless when, as in this case, the information is

sufficiently detailed as to remove suspicion of rumor or revenge; and

that information is verified through independent investigation; and the

cumulative effect of all information gathered meets the standard set

forth in [Gates], probable cause is established.” United States v.

Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 533 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933, 104 th

S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). See also State v. Calhoun, 502

So.2d 808, 811 (Ala. 1986). 

565 So.2d at 1234-37. (Emphasis added).

The appellate court decision in Parker’s case was not contrary to nor did it involve an

unreasonable application of Illinois v. Gates, supra, and New York v. Harris, supra. Further, the

decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceedings involving Parker and Williams, both of whom were charged

with the murder of Mrs. Sennett.

J. The Claim that the Decision of the Trial Court Rejecting 

Petitioner’s Request for a Change of Venue Violated the Sixth, 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Denied Him a Fair Trial.

Parker argues that the denial of his request for change of venue violated the Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments and denied him a fair trial. He alleges that there was widespread news

coverage in Colbert County of the death of Mrs. Sennett, the suicide of Mr. Sennett , the arrest and

alleged confessions of Williams, Smith, and petitioner, and the trial of Williams. Parker also alleges

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that while the court allowed individual voir dire of the jurors who indicated knowledge of the case

from a source other than the news media, the court denied petitioner’s request for individual voir dire

of the remaining jurors who indicated that they had knowledge of the case. He argues that “[t]here

was both actual and presumed prejudice that resulted from the widespread publicity, the prior trial

of a co-defendant and the extensive knowledge and opinions of the venire panel regarding this case.”

(Amended petition, p. 149).

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial judge did not

abuse her discretion in denying petitioner the unlimited right to question each venire member

separately and individually. The appellate courtrelied upon both state and federal law in holding that:

The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the appellant

the unlimited right to question each venire member separately and

individually. 

"In Brown v. State [571 So.2d 345, 349 (Ala. Cr. App.), cert.

quashed, 571 So.2d 353 (Ala. 1990), remanded, 501 U.S.

1201, 111 S.Ct. 2791, 115 L.Ed.2d 991 (Ala. Cr. App.

1991)], this Court thoroughly examined this issue and

recognized that the general rule is that 'the decision whether

to voir dire prospective jurors individually or collectively is

within the sound discretion of the trial court.' However, this

Court held that where the defendant demonstrates that the

nature of the pretrial publicity raises a significant possibility

of prejudice, and a veniremember acknowledges some

exposure to that publicity, due process may require individual

examination of each veniremember who has been exposed to

the pretrial publicity about the extent of their knowledge of

the case and may require an independent determination by the

trial judge with regard to each veniremember as to whether

the member's knowledge had destroyed his or her ability to

be fair and impartial.

Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474, 484 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), affirmed,

577 So.2d 531 (Ala. 1991). In Brown, this Court held that the trial

judge abused his discretion by not permitting individual voir dire

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under the circumstances of that particular case. This Court adheres

to the principle that even in a death case, "[a]s a general rule, the

decision whether to voir dire prospective jurors individually or

collectively is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Brown,

571 So.2d at 349. See also Henderson v. State, 583 So.2d 276 (Ala.

Cr. App. 1990); Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d at 484. Furthermore, in

Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493

(1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant has no

Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment right under the Constitution of the

United States to question the prospective jurors about the specific

contents of news reports to which they had been exposed.

Following the guidelines this Court set forth in Brown, we find that

under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge did not abuse her

discretion in either refusing to permit unlimited individual voir dire

of each member of the jury venire or in refusing to permit defense

counsel to question the venire members about the specific content of

the media reports to which they had been exposed.

First, we find that the pretrial publicity in this case, although quite

substantial, was not as extensive or as prejudicial as that presented

in Brown. The murder in this case occurred on March 18, 1988.

Three people were involved in the commission of that murder--Billy

Gray Williams, Kenneth Eugene Smith, and the appellant. These

three individuals were allegedly hired by the victim's husband,

Charles Sennett, a minister of the Church of Christ, to kill his wife,

Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett. Mr. Sennett committed suicide on March

25, 1988, seven days after the murder.

In March and April 1988, there was extensive media coverage of the

crime. The coverage continued to a lesser degree in May, June, and

August. Williams was tried in January 1989 and was sentenced in

February 1989. The media also covered the removal of Smith's trial

to Jefferson County in March 1989. The appellant's trial began on

May 30, 1989.

Although the crime in this case was horrible, it was not as sensational

or lurid as that in Brown, which involved the brutal stabbing deaths

of a mother and her ten-year-old daughter. At the time of the crime,

Brown was on parole from a conviction of assault of his landlord.

That assault had occurred while Brown was on parole from a

conviction for having murdered his aunt, his grandmother, and his

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great-grandmother when he was 14 years old. See Brown, 571 So.2d

at 350-51.

Second, in this case, the trial judge did allow individual and

extensive voir dire of those venire members who indicated that they

had formed an opinion about the case or who had a knowledge of the

case from some sources other than the media. However, the trial

judge did not allow defense counsel to individually question each

member of the venire who merely indicated that they had been

exposed to some media report of the crime.

"THE COURT: ... I'm not going to grant the request with

respect to individual voir dire of everyone who stood up and

said they read something about it in the paper. I am going to

grant the request with respect to peoplewho after being asked

that stood up and said that they had formed some conclusion

about this and I have already granted that on the record. And

if the Defendant wants to follow up with any more general

questions and any more possible individual voir dire may

arise from that I certainly will go ahead and consider [a]

request at that time, but I do not think you have laid the

proper predicate for individual voir dire of those people.

R.663-64.

During the third day of jury selection, defense counsel renewed his

motion for individual voir dire of every venire member who

indicated that they had read or heard any media report of the crime.

The trial judge responded:

"THE COURT: Let me just say this; I'm going to overrule the

motion at this time. If you do not ask it tomorrow I'm going to ask

a general question one more time, if there's anybody who has thought

about it because it is obvious that people think about this overnight

and then think about something the next morning and I think the

question should be asked and if you don't do it or you don't do it I’m

going to do it; if there is anybody who has thought about it overnight

who thinks they may have a fixed opinion based on--or have an

opinion or preconceived notion about this. I'm going to ask it or you

can ask based on anything--for that matter, based on anything that

they have read or based on anything that they have heard in court the

last four days. You know, there may be some that think differently

just because they've been in court for four days and heard what the

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questions are that you have asked them and I think it's an appropriate

question to be asked. I just looked and most of the people who stood

up and said they had read something about it in the media have

already all been individually voir dired."

R. 885-86.

Finally, we note that the voir dire in this case was quite extensive and

thorough, and that the attorneys themselves were permitted to ask

their own questions. The voir dire in this case in no way compares

with the almost cursory voir dire in Brown.

Our review convinces this Court that the trial judge did not abuse her

discretion in denying defense counsel unlimited individual voir dire

and in denying defense counsel's request to examine each venire

member about the specific contents of any medial report they had

read or heard.

"[O]ur own cases have stressed the wide discretion granted to the

trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity and

in other areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias.

Particularly with respect to pretrial publicity, we think this primary

reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense. The

judge of that court sits in the locale where the publicity is said to

have had its effect, and brings to his evaluation of any such claim his

own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that might

influence a juror. The trial court, of course, does not impute his own

perceptions to the jurors who are being examined, but these

perceptions should be of assistance to it in deciding how detailed an

inquiry to make of the members of the jury venire."

Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1906.

587 So.2d at 1078-80.

The Court of Criminal Appeals further held:

We also find that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in

denying the appellant's motions for change of venue.

The appellant filed his motion for a change of venue on May 16,

1988. During the hearing on that motion, it was stipulated that all

the evidence, exhibits, testimony, and arguments given in the change

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of venue hearing in the case of the appellant's alleged accomplice,

Billy Gray Williams, would be admitted into evidence in the

appellant's case. The trial court denied this motion on August 10,

1988.

Following the trial and conviction of Williams on February 24, 1989,

the trial judge set a hearing on the issue of venue, although there was

no motion for change of venue pending at that time. The appellant

filed an amended motion for change of venue on March 7, 1989.

That motion was heard on March 9, 1989, after a different trial judge

had granted a motion for a change of venue in the trial of Kenneth

Eugene Smith, another alleged accomplice of the appellant. It was

stipulated that all the exhibits involved in the Smith case would be

admitted into evidence in the appellant's case. The appellant's

amended motion for a change of venue was denied on March 21,

1989.

On this appeal, the attorney general admits that there was extensive

media coverage of this crime.

"The exhibits submitted in support of John Parker's Motions for

Change of Venue reveal intensive, detailed and widespread coverage

of the death of Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, the suicide of Charles

Sennett, the arrest and the alleged confessions of Billy Gray

Williams, Kenneth Eugene Smith and John Forrest Parker, and the

trial of Billy Gray Williams (R. 2203-2421). These news stories

were circulated and broadcast throughout Colbert County, Alabama,

by newspapers, radio and television (R.64-84). These stories covered

the details of the alleged crime, and detailed John Parker's alleged

involvement in the death of Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, which

implicated John Parker as having confessed to taking Elizabeth

Dorlene Sennett's life and implied his guilt during the coverage of the

Billy Gray Williams trial.

Appellee's brief at 114-15.

As best this Court can determine, the record indicates that ultimately

65 members of the 93-member venire indicated that they had some

prior knowledge of the crime. Of that 65, 24 members indicated that

their knowledge was from a source other than the news media,

primarily conversations with other people. Of those 24, only two

members were struck for cause due to their fixed opinions.

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The appellant's accomplice Williams was tried approximately three

months before the appellant. In Williams v. State, 565 So.2d 1233,

1237-38 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), this Court found that there was no

error in the denial of the motion for change of venue in that case.

The trial judge in Williams also presided over this case.

"Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on a

motion for change of venue will not be overturned.... In order to

grant a motion for change of venue, the defendant must prove that

there existed actual prejudice against the defendant or that the

community was saturated with prejudicial publicity.... Newspaper

articles or widespread publicity, without more, are insufficient to

grant a motion for change of venue.... As the Supreme Court

explained, in Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-

43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961):

"'To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion

as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is

sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's

impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It

is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or

opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented

in court....'

"The standard of fairness does not require jurors to be totally

ignorant of the facts and issues involved.... Thus, '[t]he

proper manner for ascertaining whether adverse publicity

may have biased the prospective jurors is through the voir

dire examination.'"

Ex parte Grayson, 479 So.2d 76, 80 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

865, 106 S.Ct. 189, 88 L.Ed.2d 157 (1985).

"An accused is entitled under § 15-2-20 to a change of venue

if he can demonstrate that he cannot receive a fair trial in the

county where he is to be tried. It is well established in

Alabama, however, that the existence of pretrial publicity,

even if extensive, does not in and of itself constitute a ground

for changing venue and thereby divesting the trial court of

jurisdiction of an offense.... [J]urors do not have to be totally

ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a particular case

in order to reach an unbiased verdict.... To satisfy her burden

of proof in the present case, [the defendant] had to establish

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that prejudicial pretrial publicity has so saturated Lamar

County as to have a probable prejudicial impact on the

prospective jurors there, thus rendering the trial setting

inherently suspect. This required a showing that a feeling of

deep and bitter prejudice exists in Lamar County as a result

of the publicity....

"Whether to change venue is discretionary with the trial

judge.... In determining whether there has been an abuse of

that discretion, an appellate court reviews the trial judge's

order de novo, without any presumption in favor of that

order.... 

"... In Primm v. State, 472 So.2d 1149, 1155 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1985), the court, quoting Anderson v. State, 362 So.2d

1296, 1299-1300 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), correctly stated:

'"Generally newspaper articles which objectively report the

commission of a crime, do not carry inflammatory headlines,

and do not editorialize on the facts in a manner to inflame the

community or create an atmosphere of prejudice are an

insufficient basis on which to grant a motion for a change of

venue. Gray v. state, 56 Ala. App. 131, 319 So.2d 750

(1975)."'

In Mathis v. State, [280 Ala. 16, 189 So.2d 564 (1966), cert. denied,

386 U.S. 935, 87 S.Ct. 963, 17 L.Ed.2d 807 (1967)], the following

is stated:

"'"In Godau v. State, 179 Ala. 27, 60 So. 908, 910 [1913], it

was said:

"'"'So long as we have newspapers we may expect to have

through them the report of crimes, and it is not to be

unexpected that, when a homicide is committed ... the

newspapers of the community, answering the public interest,

will furnish the defendant with at least some material upon

which to base an application similar to the one under

discussion.'

"'"Also in McClain v. State, 182 Ala. 67, 62 So. 241, 243

[1913], it was said:

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"'"'We are not prepared to concede ... that the sensational

language of a newspaper reporter or special correspondent

used in "writing up" such cases ... may be safely taken as a

reflection of general public sentiment; nor that it may be

lightly assumed that such statements as those ... shown are

capable of permanently molding and fixing the opinions of

the more intelligent classes of the people to the extinction of

their sense of fair play, and the suppression of their sober

second thought.'

"'"The mere belief of the defendant or of his witnesses that he cannot

receive an impartial trial is not sufficient to entitle him to a change

of venue...."'

280 Ala. at 18, 189 So.2d at 566 (quoting Campbell v. State,

257 Ala. 322, 324-25, 58 So.2d 623 (1952)."

Ex parte Fowler, 574 So.2d 745, 747-48 (Ala. 1990).

Applying the principles of Grayson and Fowler to this particular

case, we find that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in

denying the appellant's motions for change of venue.

587 So.2d at 1080-81.

In Irwin v. Dowd, supra, the court found actual prejudice where 8 of the 12 jurors had an

opinion that the petitioner was guilty. In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) the

court presumed prejudice where the pretrial publicity was sufficiently prejudicial and inflammatory

and the pretrial publicity saturated the community where the trial was held. Petitioner argues that

he has shown both actual and presumed prejudice. The state appellate court concluded in effect that

petitioner had not shown presumed prejudice based upon the pretrial publicity. 

This court has reviewed the news articles contained in the record. (Supplemental record).

The news articles relied upon by petitioner were “essentially factual and [were] not directed at

arousing or inciting the passion of the community.” Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1462 (11 Cir. th

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1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1161 (1995). Many of the articles focused on the investigation of the

crime before there were any suspects. While some of the articles or reports indicated that the victim

had been stabbed repeatedly and beaten, the reports recounted this in a factual rather than

sensational manner. No photographs of the crime scene accompanied the newspaper articles. There

were no articles or editorials that discussed or dwelt on the nature of the murder and the appropriate

punishment. 

In general, the news articles report that the victim’s husband, who was a minister,

committed suicide when he was told that he was suspect in her death, that authorities believed the

minister had hired three men to kill his wife with $3,000 that he had borrowed from the woman with

whom he was having an affair, and that petitioner, Williams and Smith, had been charged with

capital murder.

The prospective jurors as a group were questioned several times concerning whether they

would be able to set aside prior knowledge of the case based on something they had read, heard, or

seen and base their decision solely on the testimony and evidence presented at trial. (R. 394-402,

898-900). Of the venire members with prior knowledge of the crime, 17 members indicated that

their knowledge was from a source other than the news media. (R-399-401; Amended petition, p.

147). Those 17 members were questioned in detail concerning their ability to set aside prior

knowledge and base their decision solely on the testimony and evidence presented at trial. Of those

17, three were struck from the venire due to their fixed opinions. (R-546, R-566, R-596). A fourth

member of the venire who had knowledge from the news media was subsequently struck from the

venire based upon her fixed opinion which became evident based on voir dire examination

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concerning her views on the death penalty and whether she could consider life without parole and

mitigating circumstances. (R-877-78). 

With respect to whether petitioner can show actual or presumed prejudice based on the

pretrial publicity, this court would add some facts that are relevant. Eight of the 14 jurors seated

for the case (R-904) had knowledge about the case from the news media (James Ayers, R-395; Joni

Simpson, R-397; Roy Mitchell, R-398; Glenn Pettus, R-399; Gary Highfield, R-399; Jerry

Hutchens, R-399; and Teddy Mansell, R-399). Three of the eight seated jurors with prior

knowledge also had knowledge from sources other than the media (James Ayers, R-400; Teddy

Mansell, R-401; Gary Highfield, R-401). In response to questioning by the prosecutor or defense

counsel, all eight of the jurors with prior knowledge indicated by their silence that they could set

aside that prior knowledge and decide the case based solely on the evidence and the testimony heard

in the courtroom. (R-401-02; 899-900). In addition, the three jurors who were questioned on

individual voir dire both explained the prior knowledge they possessed and indicated affirmatively

that they could set aside that prior knowledge and decide the case based solely on the evidence and

testimony in the courtroom. (R-491-97, 550-53, 596-604).

The decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was not contrary to nor did it

involve an unreasonable application of Mu’Min and Irwin v. Dowd. Further, the decision was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceedings. 

K. The Claim that the Refusal to Grant Petitioner’s Motion for Recusal of the Trial 

Judge Denied Him His Rights Under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

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Petitioner filed a Motion for Recusal requesting that Judge Johnson recuse herself from the

case based upon her order in CC88-107, State of Alabama v. Billy Gray Williams in which she made

findings of fact that Williams hired petitioner and Smith to kill Mrs. Sennett, that petitioner and

Smith killed Mrs. Sennett, and that petitioner and Smith were paid for killing Mrs. Sennett.

Petitioner argues that by imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole upon Williams,

Judge Johnson indicated a bias and predisposition toward the guilt of petitioner prior to any

evidence being heard in his trial and further indicated a bias or predisposition toward a sentence of

death for petitioner if convicted of a capital offense. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this issue on direct appeal in the

following manner:

The appellant argues that the trial judge should have granted his

motion to recuse because that judge, in sentencing Billy Gray

Williams to life imprisonment without parole, had determined that

Williams had hired the appellant and Smith to murder Mrs. Sennett,

that the appellant and Smith had actually murdered Mrs. Sennett, and

that the appellant and Smith had been paid for the contract killing.

The appellant argues that the trial judge was biased and prejudiced

and had prejudged his case because she had been the judge in the

trial of the appellant's alleged accomplice Williams, who was tried

and convicted prior to the appellant's trial. 

We hold that the trial judge who presided over the appellant's trial for

capital murder was not disqualified because that same judge had

previously presided over the trial of the appellant's alleged

accomplice in the commission of the same murder for hire.

"To disqualify a judge for bias, the bias must be shown to be

personal." Ex parte Whisenhant, 555 So.2d 235, 238 (Ala. 1989),

cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 3230, 110 L.Ed.2d 676 (1990).

"[T]he fact that the trial judge had presided over the

defendant's previous two sentencing trials was not grounds

for disqualification. A trial judge need not recuse himself

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solely on the ground that he was the 'same trial judge who

had heard the case and imposed the death penalty' in a

defendant's prior trial. Ex parte Whisenhant, 482 So.2d

1241, 1245 (Ala. 1983).

Whisenhant, 555 So.2d at 238.

"Ordinarily, a judge's rulings in the same or a related case

may not serve as the basis for a recusal motion. Jaffe v.

Grant, 793 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

480 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 1566, 94 L.Ed.2d 759 (1987). The

judge's bias must be personal and extrajudicial; it must derive

from something other than that which the judge learned by

participating in the case. Id. at 1188-1189. An exception to

this general rule occurs when the movant demonstrates

'pervasive bias and prejudice.' Id. at 1189 (quoting United

States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1002-03 (5th Cir., Unit B

(1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73

L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982))."

McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir.

1990). In this case, the appellant has made no showing of pervasive

bias and prejudice and this Court has found no indication that such

was present. Our independent review of the record convinces this

court that the trial judge was fair and impartial.

587 So.2d at 1097-98.

Petitioner argues that the decisions of the Alabama courts were contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and/or were based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Petitioner relies upon Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) to support his

argument that “[w]here a trial judge has formed opinions, even from a judicial source such as a trial

of a codefendant if they ‘reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair

judgment impossible,’ due process requires recusal of the judge from the case.” 

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In Liteky, the Supreme Court in interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal statute dealing

with disqualification of a judge, explained:

First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for

a bias or partiality motion. ... Second, opinions formed by the judge

on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of

the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a

basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.

Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or

disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their

cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They

may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial

source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of

favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.

510 U.S. at 555.

The Liteky Court held that the judge’s conduct “occurred in the course of judicial

proceedings, and neither (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2)

displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.”

510 U.S. at 556.

The only references to petitioner in the Order of Court on Imposition of the Sentence of Life

Imprisonment without Parole in CC88-107 State of Alabama v. Billy Gray Williams are found in

the following pertinent portion of the findings of fact:

The Court finds from the evidence introduced at trial that the

defendant, Billy Gray Williams, at that time twenty one (21) years

old, in early March, 1988, for the sum of One Thousand and no/100

($1,000.00) Dollars agreed with Charles Sennett, the husband of the

victim, to hire Kenneth Eugene Smith and through said Smith, John

Forrest Parker to kill Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett. That Defendant,

Billy Gray Williams, did kill Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, and with the

intent that Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett be killed agreed with said

Kenneth Eugene Smith and John Forrest Parker that they would be

paid for said killing. That Kenneth Eugene Smith and John Forrest

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Parker did kill Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett on March 18, 1988 and

Defendant, Billy Gray Williams, was paid One Thousand and no/100

($1,000.00) Dollars that day by Charles Sennett, and Kenneth

Eugene Smith and John Forrest Parker were paid the balance of the

total sum of Three Thousand and no/100 ($3,000.00) Dollars for said

contract killing, namely Two Thousand and no/100 ($2,000.00)

Dollars.

The Court considers the aggravating circumstances as set out and

enumerated in Section 13A-5-49 of the Code of Alabama of 1975, as

amended.

A. The Court finds from the evidence introduced at the

punishment hearing before the jury that the defendant, Billy Gray

Williams, committed this murder for pecuniary gain, for money.

That he and Kenneth Eugene Smith and John Forrest Parker were

in fact all paid for committing the intentional killing of Elizabeth

Dorlene Sennett. The Court finds that this is an aggravating

circumstance pursuant to Section 13A-5-49(6) of the Code of

Alabama of 1975, as amended.

R. 2049-50.

In denying the motion to recuse, the trial judge explained her findings concerning Parker in the

Williams case:

[T]here seems to be confusion about the question of the Court’s

sentence hearing and sentence order in the Billy Gray Williams’ case,

which was CC88-107, which has been tried and disposed of. Under

Section 13A-5-47 the trial court is ordered and mandated by law to

make a written finding of facts in capital cases. That’s what I did in

that case, that is in the Billy Gray Williams’ case. That is based on

a findings of facts from the evidence introduced at the hearing in that

case. That has nothing to do with this case. ... [T]here has not been

one sentence of evidence in this case, State of Alabama versus John

Forrest Parker presented at this time. The order of the court on

imposition of sentence of life imprisonment without parole was an

order and is an order that was summarized in the findings of facts

based on the evidence heard in the Billy Gray Williams’ case as

mandated by the Code of Alabama. It in no way reflects on this

Court’s opinion which this Court doesn’t have an opinion about

anything in this case at this time. ... [T]he order as it appears in the

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case of; [sic] State of Alabama versus Billy Gray Williams, which

was my findings of fact mandated by the Code of Alabama is based

on the facts in that case and that case only. ... I’m going to deny the

Motion for Recusal.

(R.59-62).

The appellate court decision was not contrary to nor did it involve an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. Further, it was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings.

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L. The Claim that the Admission of Testimony Concerning Mr. Parker’s Alleged 

Statement, Extracted from Mr. Parker While his Judgment was Impaired and 

Without a Valid Waiver of His Rights to Remain Silent and to Have Counsel 

Present with Him During Interrogation Violated His Rights Under the Fifth, 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

Petitioner argues:

The evidence presented at John Parker's suppression hearing revealed

that he had consumed at least 6 to 8 beers and 5 to 8 more marijuana

joints from sometime prior to noon until approximately 3:30 p.m.

(RT. Vol. 2, 237-239). Dr. James Edward Crowder testified that

John Parker had an I.Q. of 78 which was in the border line range of

intellectual ability, just above mental retardation. (RT. Vol. 2, 255).

He further testified that if John Parker had consumed the amount of

beer and marijuana, previously testified to, that in his opinion, then

his judgment would be impaired to some extent. (RT. Vol. 2, 259-

260). John Parker's impaired state rendered him incapable of

executing an intelligent waiver of a know[n] Constitutional right as

his [sic] required under Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) and

its progeny. Any statement obtained from Mr. Parker in this

custodial setting deprived Mr. Parker of his rights to be free from

compulsory self-incrimination and his right to have counsel present

during questioning in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Alabama courts

erred in upholding the admission of the unlawfully obtained

statement.

(Amended petition, p. 152). 

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

The appellant argues that his statement was involuntary because he

was under the influence of marijuana and alcohol at the time the

statement was given and because he had an IQ of 78, which is just

above mental retardation. Appellant's brief at 82-83.

However, just as there was evidence that the appellant's judgment

was impaired, there was contradictory evidence that the appellant

knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, and repeatedly waived his rights

under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d

694 (1966). In addition, the State's evidence is that the appellant

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requested to speak to Investigator Ray and thereby initiated the

taking of his statements.

We have reviewed the testimony adduced both at the hearing on the

motion to suppress and at trial. In Williams v. State, 461 So.2d 834,

838 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983), reversed on other grounds, 461 So.2d 852

(Ala. 1984), this Court collected the principles of appellate review of

a trial judge's determination of the admissibility of a confession or

statement based on conflicting evidence of voluntariness. Applying

those principles to the facts of this case, we find no error in the

admission of the appellant's statement. "Before a confession is

admissible, the trial judge must be satisfied by a preponderance of

the evidence that it was voluntarily made.... This finding will not be

disturbed on appeal unless it is evident that the determination was

palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence." Ex parte Singleton,

465 So.2d 443, 445 (Ala. 1985). See also Jackson v. State, 562

So.2d 1373, 1380 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990).

(R-56, 587 So.2d at 1088-89)

In reply, petitioner states:

As set out in detail in the Amended Petition the decisions of the

Alabama courts were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, and/or were based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

Parker maintains that his impaired state rendered him incapable of executing a valid waiver of his

Miranda rights. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court held: 

A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment

of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there

has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in

each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding

that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the

accused.

In the Johnson case, the petitioner was tried, convicted and sentenced without the assistance of

counsel.

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In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 (1963), the Supreme Court reiterated that “[i]f an

individual's 'will was overborne' or if his confession was not 'the product of a rational intellect and

a free will,' his confession is inadmissible because coerced.” The Townsend case, unlike the case

here, involved that administration of drugs (phenobarbital to ease withdrawal and scopolamine

allegedly used as a “truth serum”) by a police physician. There is no allegation in this case that

drugs were administered to Parker while in police custody. 

Neither Johnson nor Townsend was factually similar to Parker’s case. Moreover, Parker has

not identified a factually similar United States Supreme Court case. The decision of the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals was not contrary to a factually similar United States Supreme Court

decision nor did it involve an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court law. 

Finally, the decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. At the suppression hearing, Investigator

Ronnie May testified that after Parker arrived at the sheriff’s office and was advised of his rights

by Investigator Hargett, that Parker asked to speak to him [May], that May advised Parker again of

his Miranda rights, that petitioner stated he understood those rights and still wished to speak to May.

Petitioner did not want May to tape record the conversation or make notes, that petitioner then

proceeded to tell him the details of events before, during and after the crime. (R-140-48). May

testified that he did not appear under the influence of drugs or alcohol and appeared to know and

understand what he was saying. (R-150-51). Petitioner specifically denied having “shot up any

Talwin” that day prior to talking to May. (R-155). 

Investigator Doug Hargett of the Colbert CountySheriff’s Office testified at the suppression

hearing that he advised petitioner of his Miranda rights both at the apartment and at the Colbert

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County Courthouse, that he explained those rights and asked if petitioner understood them and that

petitioner verbally acknowledged that he understood and also signed a waiver. (R-203-04).

Investigator Hargett also testified that he had experience and training in determining whether a

person appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that petitioner did not appear to be

under the influence of alcohol or drugs. (R-209-210). Angela Fountain, petitioner’s girlfriend,

testified that petitioner’s drinking was a daily habit, that in some ways petitioner appeared under the

influence at the courthouse, “but in other ways he was upset,” that petitioner could handle his

alcohol “on certain occasions.” (R-238-39, 249). Dr. James Edward Crowder, clinical

psychologist, testified that, in his opinion, based upon 6-8 beers and 5-6 marijuana cigarettes,

petitioner “would have had a reduction in his ability to withstand pressure. He would have had a

reduction in his ability to withstand frustration and that he would have had to some extent an

impairment in his judgment.” (R-259-60). Dr. Crowder further testified that a person sometimes

develops a tolerance to alcohol and can function at higher levels of alcohol due to the fact that they

are experienced drinkers. (R-262).

M. The Claim that the Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses Which were 

Supported by the Evidence Presented at Trial Denied Mr. Parker Due Process 

and a Reliable Sentencing Procedure in Violation of the Sixth, Eighth,

 and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), the United States Supreme Court found an

Alabama statute that prohibited lesser included offense instructions in capital cases to be

unconstitutional when lesser included offenses existed under state law and such instruction were

generally given in noncapital cases. In Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998), the United States

Supreme Court held that a state trial court is not required to instruct a jury on lesser included

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offenses of the charged offense if these offense would not be lesser included offenses under state

law. 

Petitioner argues that the trial court should have given a jury instruction on intentional

murder because the jury could have found that the state did not meet its burden on proving the issue

of pecuniary gain. He further argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on reckless murder

because the jury could have found that petitioner did not possess a particularized intent to kill as

evidence by the theory that petitioner and a co-defendant assaulted the victim but that the victim’s

husband then killed her.

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

The trial judge properly refused to instruct the jury on murder as a

lesser included offense of capital murder for hire because there was

no rational basis for such an instruction. See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A5-41.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the charged offense of capital

murder for hire and on the lesser included offenses of conspiracy to

commit murder, assault in the first and second degree, and

manslaughter. At trial, the appellant did not object to the trial judge's

oral charge.

The State’s evidence shows that the appellant participated in the

murder of Mrs. Sennetts and that he received financial compensation

for his actions. 

The appellant's defense was that he did participate in an assault on

Mrs. Sennetts but that he left her alive and that she was stabbed to

death by Mr. Sennetts after the assault had occurred. In his closing

argument, defense counsel argued that there was "no question" that

the appellant was guilty of assault and conspiracy to commit assault,

but that the appellant was not guilty of murder.

Here, neither the evidence presented by the prosecution nor that

presented by the defense provides a rational basis for a verdict of

murder. Following the principle collected in Holladay v. State, 549

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So.2d 122, 128-29 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988), affirmed, 549 So.2d 135

(Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1012, 110 S.Ct. 575, 107 L.Ed.2d 569

(1989), we find that the trial judge properly refused to instruct the

jury on intentional murder as a lesser included offense of the crime

charged. See also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491,

115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991).

Under any view of the evidence, there is no basis for an instruction

on reckless murder as defined by Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-2(a)(2),

because the appellant's actions were directed solely at the victim and

therefore did not "manifest[ ] extreme indifference to human life."

Northington v. State, 413 So.2d 1169 (Ala. Cr. App. 1981), cert.

quashed, 413 So.2d 1172 (Ala. 1982).

(R-56, 587 So.2d at 1083-84).

Petitioner argues the decisions of the Alabama courts were contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and/or were based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals referred to Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) wherein the

United States Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that due process principles

underlying Beck require the jury in a capital case be instructed on every lesser included noncapital

offense supported by the evidence. The court in Schad stated:

Our fundamental concern in Beck was that a jury convinced that the

defendant had committed some violent crime but not convinced that

he was guilty of a capital crime might nonetheless vote for a capital

conviction if the only alternative was to set the defendant free with

no punishment at all. ....

We repeatedly stressed the all-or-nothing nature of the decision with

which the jury was presented. [citation omitted]. As we later

explained in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455, 104 S.Ct. 3154,

3159, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), “[t]he absence of a lesser included

offense instruction increases the risk that the jury will convict ...

simply to avoid setting the defendant free.... The goal of the Beck

rule, in other words, is to eliminate the distortion of the factfinding

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process that is created when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing

choice between capital murder and innocence.” See also Hopper v.

Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 609, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2051-2052, 72 L.Ed.2d

367 (1982).

501 U.S. at 646-47. 

The decision of the Alabama Court ofCriminal Appeals was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of either Beck nor Schad. Further, it was not based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding, specifically the

testimony that Parker was paid $1,000.00 and Parker’s theoryof defense that he and Smith assaulted

the victim and her husband then killed her.

N. Whether Trial Court’s Testimony Regarding its Personal Recollections Deprived 

Petitioner of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Confrontation

and Whether Alabama’s System of Allowing Judges to Review Their Own 

Court’s Errors in the Rule 32 Process is Inherently Unconstitutional and 

a Violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

Petitioner argues that in the order denying the Rule 32 petition, the trial judge in several

instances acted as a witness by relying on her recollection of events prior to and at trial and in so

doing deprived him of his right to confrontation.

Respondents argue that this claim is procedurally barred from federal review because it was

raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition. Oats v. Singletary, 141

F.3d 1018, 1027 n.24 (11 Cir. 1998). In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), remand, 894 F.2d th

871 (7th Cir. 1990) the Supreme Court held that a "procedural default does not bar consideration

of a federal claim on ... habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case

'clearly and expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar." The Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals clearly and expressly held on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition:

Case 2:00-cv-01846-SLB-PWG Document 41 Filed 09/30/05 Page 109 of 117
Moreover, this claim does not state a basis for federal habeas relief. 8/

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(Emphasis added.) 

In this claim, petitioner attacks not his conviction but the collateral review process. “While habeas relief is

available to address defects in a criminal defendant’s conviction and sentence, an alleged defect in a collateral

proceeding does not state a basis for habeas relief.” Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259,1262 (11 Cir. 2004), th

cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 436 (2004); Spradley v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11 Cir. 1987). th

110

A review of the record reveals that the appellant’s claims have been

raised for the first time in his appellate brief to this court. This court

will not consider an argument that is raised for the first time on

appeal; its review is limited to evidence and arguments that have

been considered by the trial court. Eastland v. State, 677 So.2d 1275

(Ala. Cr. App. 1996).

(R-61).

"When a procedural default bars state litigation of a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may

not obtain federal habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice." See Wilson v.

Jones, 902 F.2d 923, 925 (11th Cir. 1990), reh. denied, 927 F.2d 615 (11th Cir. 1991), citing

Bennett v. Fortner, 863 F.2d 804, 806 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989); see also

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). Petitioner makes no attempt to show cause for his

procedural default and prejudice resulting therefrom.8/

O. Whether Petitioner was Denied Due Process and a Fair Hearing on Remand for

Resentencing when the Trial Judge Conducted No Additional Hearing (Other

than the Batson Issue) and Gave Petitioner No Opportunity to Present

Evidence or Argument, or Allow Petitioner to Speak on his Own Behalf

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Petitioner argues he was denied due process and a fair hearing on remand because he was

not given an opportunity to present argument and evidence before findings of fact were made by the

judge. In effect, he appears to argue that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing comporting

with § 13A-5-47 based on the remand.

Respondents argue that this claim has not been raised at any time in state court and is

therefore procedurally defaulted. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), reh. denied, 490 U.S.

1031 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the procedural default rule applies where a claim has

never been presented to the state courts. This claim was, in fact, never presented in state court and

is therefore procedurally barred from federal review.

Parker has made no showing of cause for his procedural default nor prejudice resulting

therefrom. In his reply brief Parker ignores the procedural default argument of respondent

altogether and argues that the decisions of the Alabama courts were contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or were based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Because this claim was not previously raised in state court, there were

no decisions of Alabama courts that could be contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law or that could be based on an unreasonable determination of facts

based on evidence in state court proceedings.

Furthermore, the appellate decision clearly contemplated a new sentencing order in

compliance with 13A-5-47(d) but not necessarily a new sentencing hearing. The trial judge had the

transcripts from the original sentencing hearing before the jury (R.1673-1784) (consisting of

witnesses & arguments) and the judge (R.1808-19) (consisting only of argument) and could refer

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In Ward v. State of Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 552 (1942), the United States Supreme Court held “The sheriff of 9/

Morris County had no power to arrest petitioner in Titus county. Without the boundaries of Morris County he

had no more authority than any private citizen.” In Hill v. State, 665 So.2d 1024 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was faced with the question of “whether a deputy can make a warrantless

arrest outside the deputy’s jurisdiction.” The court adopted the prevailing view that “if the circumstances were

such that a private citizen would have had the authority to make a citizen’s arrest under the same circumstances,

then the extrajurisdictional warrantless arrest is legal.” § 15-10-7 reads in pertinent part:

(a) A private person may arrest another for any public offense:

(1) Committed in his presence;

(2) Where a felony has been committed, though not in his presence, by the person arrested;

 or

(3) Where a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe that the

 person arrested committed it. (Emphasis added).

In Issue I, this court concluded that the appellate court’s holding that officers had probable cause to arrest

Parker was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law nor was the decision

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the sate court proceedings. Thus,

if this court were to address the merits of this claim, the court would find the claim to be without merit.

112

to the transcripts when correcting the defects in the sentencing order as identified by the appellate

court.

P. Whether Petitioner's Arrest was Illegal in that Colbert County Police 

Officers Lacked Jurisdiction for the Arrest of Petitioner and Any Subsequent

Statements were the Result of that Illegal Arrest. (see also argument I)

In support of this claim, petitioner argues in the amended petition that he was arrested at his

home on Huntsville Road by Colbert County investigator Doug Hargett and that his residence was

not in Colbert County; therefore, his arrest was illegal and any statements obtained from that arrest

should have been suppressed.

Respondents argue that this claim was not raised in state court and is, therefore, procedurally

defaulted from federal review. Although petitioner made a passing reference to Issue I when 9/

presenting this claim in the amended habeas petition, he has not identified where in state court he

presented a separate claim based on the alleged extrajurisdictional warrantless arrest. Further, the

court has studied Issue I of the federal petition, issues VII and VIII raised on direct appeal (Tab #RCase 2:00-cv-01846-SLB-PWG Document 41 Filed 09/30/05 Page 112 of 117
113

30), and claim I(B) on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition. (Tab #R-49). Petitioner did

not refer to the fact that his residence was not in Colbert County but that he was arrested by a

Colbert County officer at that residence anywhere (either as a substantive claim or as part of an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim) other than in this Issue P where it is raised for the first time

on federal review. 

This claim is therefore procedurally barred from federal review under Teague, supra.

Further, there has been no showing by petitioner of cause for the procedural default nor prejudice

resulting therefrom. Because this claim was not previously raised in state court, there were no

decisions of Alabama courts that could be contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal laws or that were based on an unreasonable determination of facts based

on evidence in state court proceedings.

Q. The Claim that Parker’s Statements were the Result of Illegal and Unconstitutional Duress

In the amended federal habeas petition, petitioner alleged that he was told by the police that

if he did not cooperate and make a statement his girlfriend would have her child removed from her

custody. Respondents acknowledge that this claim was raised for the first time in the Rule 32

petition and argues that the claim is therefore procedurally defaulted. In theRule 32 petition (Claim

II.D.) petitioner argued that his statements were involuntary due to a combination of factors

including low intelligence and educational level, intoxication, and police coercion. In the Rule 32

petition, petitioner alleged in pertinent part:

5. Involuntariness is also evident based on police coercion. The

State did not contest that Ms. Fountain was threatened with

the loss of custody of her child if she did not cooperate with

the police. (R. 236). The threat was communicated to Mr.

Parker. 

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6. The police also placed Ms. Fountain in a room with Mr.

Parker for the purpose of telling him that co-defendants were

incriminating him, which was untrue. (R. 236-237). Within

minutes of Ms. Fountain’s communication, Mr. Parker is

alleged to have asked to speak to Investigator May and to

have recanted his prior written statement which denied

participation in the crime.

(Tab #R-43, p.17.) 

In the order denying the Rule 32 petition, Judge Johnson stated:

[A] reading of the suppression hearing testimony reveals that the

petitioner initiated the conversations with Investigator May (R. 139-

140); was read his Miranda rights at least twice before making a

statement (R. 142-143); had the presence of mind to ask Investigator

May not to write anything down or to tape record the conversation

(R. 144); and was able to go into great detail concerning the events

surrounding the murderin this case (R. 146-148). The next day, after

being advised of his Miranda rights yet again, the petitioner made

further statement regarding property taken from the Sennett’s home

(R. 151) and the destruction of the clothing he wore while

committing this crime (R. 152). Petitioner appeared to be coherent.

(R. 152. This chain of events show the working of a competent,

rational mind and not any form of police coercion (petition II.D and

II.E). If police coercion was present, petitioner failed to adduce any

evidence of it at the Rule 32 hearing.

In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the trial court’s

finding on voluntariness need only be supported by a preponderance

of the evidence. Seawright v. State, 479 So.2d 1362, 1367 (Ala.

Cr.App. 1985) .... “The test for the voluntary nature of an

extrajudicial confession or inculpatory statement is whether in light

of all the surrounding circumstances, the statement was free from

inducement, threat or promise, either expressed or implied, which

would have produced in the mind of the accused any fear of harm or

hope of favor.” Seawright, 479 So.2d at 1367, citing Rogers v. State,

365 So.2d 322 (Ala. Cr. App.), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 334 (Ala.

1978).

Harris v. State, 1997 W.L. 187105 (Ala. Cr. App.) (Tab #R-60, pp. 12-13).

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On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, this claim was not raised as an

independent claim but, rather, as part of the claim that trial counsel failed to demonstrate that there

were insufficient intervening events to break the causal relationship between Mr. Parker’s arrest and

his statement. (R-49, pp. 21-24). Because this claim was not raised as in independent claim on

appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, this claim is procedurally barred from federal review.

In O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) because of the petitioner's failure to fairly

present claims to the state courts, his habeas claims were unexhausted but they were also

procedurally defaulted because the state remedy was no longer available. That is likewise the case

here, and there has been no showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default.

Because of the procedural default, this court will not look back to the ruling on the Rule 32

petition to determine whether it was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal

law nor whether it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court proceedings.

R. Whether the Claim that the Grand Jury which Issued Parker’s Indictment

was Selected in a Discriminatory and Unconstitutional Manner

Petitioner alleges in the amended federal habeas petition that “[t]he racially discriminatory

selection of the grand jury tainted John Parker’s capital proceedings from the very beginning and

violated his rights to equal protection, due process, a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a fair crosssection protected by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. This claim was raised as Claim P in the amended Rule 32 petition (Tab #R-43, p.

342). In the order denying the Rule 32 petition, Judge Johnson stated:

5. The petitioner claims he was denied his rights to grand and

traverse jury pools chosen from a fair cross section of the

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community (petition II.P.). This Court notes that this claim

is being raised for the first time in the Rule 32 petition. This

Court also notes that no evidence of this claim was presented

at the Rule 32 hearing. However, the method of jury pool

selection in the State of Alabama has been repeatedly upheld.

In Cothren v. State, the Court stated that, “the jury venire was

randomly drawn selected from a list of licensed drivers in

Shelby County. This Court has repeatedly upheld this

method of random selection against constitutional challenges.

Cothren v. State, 1997 WL 15337 (Ala. Cr. App.) at p. 9; see

also Dobyne v. State, 672 So.2d 1319 (Ala. Cr. App.), on

remand, 672 So.2d 1353 (Ala. Cr. App. 1994), aff’d, 672

So.2d 1354 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1571, 134

LED. 2d 670 (1996). See A.2., supra.

(Tab #R-61, p. 36). 

This issue was not raised on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition and it is therefore

procedurally barred from federal review. This issue too is both unexhausted but also procedurally

defaulted because no state remedy is now available. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, supra. There has been

no showing of cause for the failure to raise this claim on appeal from the denial of the Rule 32

petition or prejudice resulting therefrom.

Moreover, because of the procedural default, the court need not look back to the ruling on

the Rule 32 petition to determine whether it was contrary to orinvolved an unreasonable application

of federal law. Because Parker presented no evidence on this issue at the Rule 32 hearing, the trial

court’s decision could not have been based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in state court proceedings.

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is due

to be DENIED.

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A separate Final Judgment consistent with this Memorandum of Opinion will be entered

simultaneously herewith.

As to the foregoing it is so ORDERED this the 30th day of September, 2005.

 

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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