Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02010/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02010-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Otis James Childers, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2010 PHX ROS (VAM)

)

State of Arizona, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Otis James Childers ("petitioner"), filed a pro se Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner raises one ground for relief in the amended petition. 

(Doc. 7 at p. 5). Respondents filed an answer opposing the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 15). Petitioner filed a

traverse to the answer. (Doc. 16).

I. BACKGROUND

On January 16, 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty in CR 2002-

016154 to solicitation to possess narcotic drugs for sale, a Class

4 felony, with one historical prior felony. (Doc. 15 at Exhibits

E,F). On February 18, 2003, the trial court sentenced petitioner

to 4.5 years in prison, with credit for 96 days of pre-sentence

incarceration. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit G). The trial court also

ordered that the sentence be served concurrently with sentences

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petitioner was already serving for other crimes in CR 2001-014829

and CR 2001-012170. (Id.). Petitioner was given notice of his

appeal and post-conviction relief rights and petitioner signed the

document on February 18, 2003. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit H). In

particular, the notice informed petitioner that he could seek

review of his guilty plea and sentences via a petition for postconviction relief if filed within 90 days of entry of judgment and

sentence. (See id.). 

On July 1, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for production of

documents, and on July 10, 2003, a motion requesting additional

pre-sentence incarceration credit. It appears that petitioner

asked for credit for all the time served in his two previous cases

(CR 2001-14829 and 2001-012170). (Doc. 15 at Exhibits I and J). 

In a minute entry filed on August 11, 2003, the trial court

informed petitioner it had no jurisdiction to consider his claims

unless he filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit K). 

On August 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief again asking for additional presentence credit. 

(Doc. 15 at Exhibit L). On September 11, 2003, the trial court

dismissed the notice, stating petitioner "is entitled to

presentence incarceration credit only from the time he was

actually in custody in this case" and that the 96-day pre-sentence

credit was correct. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit M). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals challenging the dismissal and raising a new claim,

namely, that he agreed to plead guilty in the current case (CR

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2002-016154) "because [in a settlement conference] the Judge

stated 'I only had to do the time I had left to do on "CR 2001-

012170 and CR 2001-014829" because the plea on CR 2002-0161[5]4

will run concurrent with both of them. If not for that statement

from the judge [I] would have [gone] to trial ..." Petitioner

concludes that he was promised credit for the time served on his

other two cases in the settlement conference. (Doc. 15, Exhibit N

at p. 3). On January 12, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals

denied the petition for review without comment. (Doc. 15 at

Exhibit O). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review without

comment on May 2, 2005. (Id. at Exhibit Q). On July 5, 2005

petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition. On November 9,

2005, petitioner filed an amended petition raising the following

ground for relief:

GROUND I: THE 14TH AMENDMENT GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING

AND VOLUNTARY BECAUSE I WAS MADE TO BELIEVE THAT I WAS

GOING TO ONLY DO THE TWO YEARS I HAD LEFT IN ANOTHER

INCARCATION [sic] SETTING BEFORE BRINGING ME BEFORE THE

SUPERIOR COURT.

ON FEBRUARY 18, 2003 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA

MARICOPA COUNTY SENTENCED THE PETITIONER IN THE CASE OF

CR 2002-016154 TO A TERM OF 4 1⁄2 YEARS IN PRISON TO RUN

CONCURRENT WITH CR 2001-014829 AND CR 2001-012170. 

HOWEVER THE JUDGE STATED TO PETITIONER "YOU TAKE THIS

PLEA YOU ONLY HAVE TO DO THE TWO YEARS YOU HAVE LEFT.["] 

I BELIEVED I WAS GOING TO BE RELISED [sic] 7-7-05 .... I

WAS TOLD THE JUDGE STARTED MY TIME ALL OVER. I LOST 368

DAYS OF [INCARCERATION] CREDITS BECAUSE OF THE PLEA,

.... [WHEREFORE] THE PETITIONER PRAYS THAT THIS COURT

SEES FIT TO GRANT THIS PETITION TO AMEND AND GRANT

PETITIONER WITH 368 DAYS CREDIT BECAUSE THE JUDGE AND

THE STATE ACTED IN AN "ODD" MANNER.

(Doc. 7 at p. 5).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents first seek denial of the amended petition on the

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basis that the claim raised was not properly exhausted in state

court. 

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall

not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

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to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

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(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhausted

if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment, the claims

must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate

somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal

claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the petitioner need not recite

"book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at

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277-78 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat

similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may refuse

to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

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1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

8

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1

 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, (citation

omitted), or that "some interference by officials,"

(citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

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constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

 Respondents assert petitioner did not properly exhaust his

state remedies regarding his habeas claim. Specifically, they

contend petitioner only alleged before the trial court a claim

that he was wrongfully denied 368 days of pre-sentence

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incarceration when he was not given credit for time served on his

two previous convictions, CR 2001-012170 and CR 2001-014829. 

However, when he filed a petition for review, he raised a new

claim that his plea was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent

because the trial judge induced him to plead guilty by telling him

he would receive additional pre-sentence incarceration credit for

time served on his prior cases. 

Upon review, the claim raised in the amended habeas petition

was not presented in petitioner's Rule 32 notice filed in the

trial court. Although, petitioner did raise the claim presented

in the amended petition in his petition for review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, that court could not consider a claim not first

presented to the trial court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c)(limiting

claims in petition for review to those claims which were presented

to the trial court). Because petitioner did not raise, in his

Rule 32, the claim now presented to this Court, the claim has not

been properly exhausted. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

351 (1989) ("where the claim has been presented for the first and

only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be

considered unless 'there are special and important reasons

therefor," .... Raising the claim in such a fashion does not, for

the relevant purpose, constitute fair presentation."); Roettgen

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Submitting a new

claim ... in a procedural context in which its merits will not be

considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair

presentation.").

Moreover, even if petitioner had presented this issue to the

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trial court, review of his petitions for review to both the

Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court show that

petitioner never presented the claim now raised in the amended

habeas petition in the state courts as a violation of federal law

or the U.S. Constitution. (See Doc. 15 at Exhibits N and P). As

a result, the federal nature of petitioner's habeas claim has not

been properly exhausted. The time to present such a claim in

state court has long passed. Petitioner has presented no

convincing basis for failing to properly raise the federal nature

of his habeas claim in state court. Therefore, the claim is

procedurally defaulted.

The Court may ignore the procedural default if petitioner can

show that failure to consider his claim will result in his

conviction even though he is actually innocent. See Murray, 477

U.S. at 496; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Petitioner has made no such

showing, nor does he allege actual innocence (only failure to

correctly calculate his pre-sentence incarceration credit and

whether this rendered his guilty plea invalid). As a result,

petitioner's habeas claim has been procedurally defaulted and

should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

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(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 28th day of March, 2006.

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