Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00700/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00700-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GANETTE L. GRIMSLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10cv700-CSC

) (WO)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

On November 8, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the

Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Doc. # 16). The Commissioner

objectsto an award offees because his “position wassubstantially justified.” (Def’sRes., doc.

# 22, at 1). 

Contending she was disabled, the plaintiff applied for and was denied child’sinsurance

benefits (CIB) by the Commissioner. After her application was denied, she sought judicial

review in this court. On September 8, 2011, the court concluded that the ALJ erred as a matter

of law and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A Social Security disability claimant is a prevailing party entitled to seek EAJA fees

when the claimant obtains a remand for reconsideration of her case by the Commissioner. See

Shala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993). Thus, the plaintiff is a prevailing party.

Underthe EAJA, the court “shall award” attorney’sfees “unlessthe courtfindsthat the

position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an

Case 1:10-cv-00700-CSC Document 21 Filed 01/27/12 Page 1 of 4
award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). See also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796

(2002). “The government’s position is substantially justified under the EAJA when it is

justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person - i.e. when it has a reasonable basis

in both law and fact. The government bears the burden of showing that its position was

substantially justified.” United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11 Cir. 1995) (quoting

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Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly hasrecognized that “exclusive reliance on the grids is

not appropriate either” (1) “when the claimant is unable to perform a full range of work at a

given residual functional level”; or (2) “when a claimant has non-exertional impairments[i.e.,

impairments not related to strength] that significantly limit basic work skills.” See Phillips v.

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Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11 Cir. 2004) (internal brackets omitted); Allen v. Sullivan,

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880 F.2d 1200, 1202 (11 Cir. 1989); Passopulos v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 642, 648 (11 Cir.

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1992) (“This court has recognized that the grids may be used in lieu of vocational testimony

on specific jobsif none ofthe claimant's nonexertional impairments are so severe asto prevent

a full range of employment at the designated level.”). 

The general rule is that after determining the claimant’s RFC and ability or

inability to return to past relevant work, the ALJ may use the gridsto determine

whether other jobs exist in the national economy that a claimant is able to

perform. However, “[e]xclusive reliance on the grids is not appropriate either

when [the] claimant is unable to performa full range of work at a given residual

functional level or when a claimant has non-exertional impairments that

significantly limit basic work skills.” . . . Therefore, we must determine whether

 Nonexertional activities include maintaining body equilibrium, crouching, bending, stooping,

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using fingers, seeing, hearing or speaking, mental functions and tolerating environmental working

conditions. S.S.R. 83-14. Reliance solely on the grids is inappropriate when nonexertional limitations are

present because the grids take into account only exertional limitations in classifying levels of work as

sedentary, light, medium or heavy and do not address nonexertional limitations. See Sryock v. Heckler, 764

F.2d 834, 836 (11 Cir. 1985). th

Case 1:10-cv-00700-CSC Document 21 Filed 01/27/12 Page 2 of 4
either of these two conditions exists in this case. If either condition exists, the

ALJ was required to consult a vocational expert.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1242 (emphasis and alteration in original and quoting Francis v. Heckler,

749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11 Cir. 1985)). See also, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11 Cir.

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1995); Allen, 880 F.2d at 1202; Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11 Cir. 1985). 

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The ALJ found that Grimsley suffers from both exertional and non-exertional

limitations that affect her residual functional abilities and limit her range of work. Therefore,

the ALJ was then required to consult a vocational expert and make specific findings of fact

regarding Grimsley’s abilities to perform work before relying on the grids. 

If the ALJ concludes that [Grimsley] cannot perform a full range or unlimited

types of work at the sedentary level given her exertional limitations, then the

ALJ must consult a vocational expert to determine whether there are significant

jobs at the sedentarywork levelwithin the national economy that[Grimsley] can

perform. 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1342.

The ALJ did not obtain independent evidence of the existence ofjobs asrequired by the

law of this circuit, and the ALJ failed to explain why in this complex and difficult case, he

chose to base his opinion on the grids as a framework, especially when a vocational expert was

present to testify. The court concluded that “the law of this circuit demands that in order for

the ALJ to conduct the required individualized assessment of Grimsley a vocational expert

should have been consulted at step five of the sequential analysis to determine whether

someone with her compromised abilities can perform any jobs in the national economy.”

(Mem. Op., doc. # 14 at 13-14). Because the ALJfailed to comply with the legal requirement

that he utilize a vocational expert to determine whether Grimsley could perform work at the

sedentary level, the ALJ committed legal error requiring a remand for further proceedings. 

Case 1:10-cv-00700-CSC Document 21 Filed 01/27/12 Page 3 of 4
Thus, the Commissioner’s position in this litigation did not have a reasonable basis in law. 

Pierce requires that the government’s position be reasonable both in fact and law to be

substantially justified. 

The Commissioner argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to fees because “[t]he ALJ’s

finding was reasonable and consistent with the agency’s policy.” (Def’s Res., doc. # 20, at 3). 

The defendant’s position completely missesthe mark. The ALJ must comply with the law of this

Circuit, not merely rely on the ‘agency’s policy.” Moreover, the arguments presented by the

Commissioner merely rehash his arguments in support of the ALJ’s determination. The court

remanded the case because the ALJ failed in his duty to secure and utilize a vocational expert. 

Consequently, the Commissioner’s position was not reasonable in law and was not substantially

justified. The plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees under EAJA.

The plaintiffseeksfeesin the amount of $4,423.97. TheCommissioner does not challenge

any of the hours expended by counsel as unreasonable nor does he challenge the hourly rate. 

Accordingly, upon consideration of the motion, and for good cause, it is

ORDERED that the motion for attorney’s fees (doc. # 16) be and is hereby GRANTED

and the plaintiff be and is hereby AWARDED fees in the amount of $4,423.97.

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Done this 27 day of January 2012.

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 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) authorizes the court to award fees to the prevailing party. See 28 2

U.S.C. § (d)(2)(B). On June 14, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Astrue v. Ratliff, — S.Ct.

—, 2010 WL 2346547 (2010) in which the Court unambiguously held that attorney’s fees are awarded to

the prevailing litigant, not to prevailing litigant’s attorney. See also Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738

(11 Cir. 2008) (“attorney’s fees are awarded to the prevailing party, not to the prevailing party's

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attorney.”). Thus, fees are awarded directly to the plaintiff.

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