Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05932/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05932-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIOLETA GRIGORESCU,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SAN 

MATEO COUNTY COMMUNITY 

COLLEGE DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05932-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Docket No. 29

Plaintiff Violeta Grigorescu filed her second amended complaint (“SAC”) against the San 

Mateo County Community College District (“District”) and two of its employees, Eugene 

Whitlock and Charlene Frontiera (collectively “Defendants”). The Court previously dismissed 

Ms. Grigorescu’s first amended complaint with leave to amend. Docket No. 25. Ms. Grigorescu’s 

SAC asserts various federal law violations, which include 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1981, and 

Title VII. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC. Docket 

No. 29 (“Mot.”). Having considered the Parties’ briefs, accompanying submissions,1and the oral 

argument of counsel, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss, but provides Ms. Grigorescu leave to amend.

///

///

///

 

1 Submissions include documents of which the Court previously took judicial notice. See Docket 

No. 25. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Factual Background

In 2004, Ms. Grigorescu started to work for the District as a lab tech at the College of San 

Mateo (“CSM”). See SAC ¶¶ 1, 35. Starting in 2011, Ms. Grigorescu began to experience 

problems with her employment with the District when she organized a group called Friends of 

CSM Gardens.” Id. ¶¶ 5, 41. In September 2011, Friends filed a lawsuit against, inter alia, the 

District in state court. See Friends of the Coll. of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., No. CIV 508656 (Cal. Super. Ct.).3

In July 2014, Mr. Whitlock became Vice Chancellor of Human Resources. Id. ¶ 57. Mr. 

Whitlock, an attorney, advised and represented the District in the state environmental lawsuit that 

Friends filed against the District in 2011. Id. 

In October 2014, a full-time position for a physics teacher became available. Id. ¶ 59. In 

March 2015, Ms. Grigorescu applied for the position, but Mr. Whitlock removed her from the 

application pool and accused her of “dishonesty and . . . misrepresenting her educational 

credentials.” Id. ¶ 60. 

In June 2015, Mr. Whitlock informed Plaintiff that he was recommending her suspension 

and termination on the ground that she had “falsely claimed she had a master’s degree and the 

equivalency of a minor in mathematics.” Id. ¶ 77. Shortly thereafter, a Skelly hearing4took place 

before a District employee who upheld the proposed suspension and termination. An 

administrative hearing followed the Skelly hearing. The administrative hearing officer later issued 

her findings and recommendations stating there was insufficient cause to terminate Ms. 

 

2 Much of the facts alleged in the SAC are pled in the FAC and discussed in Docket No. 25. For 

purposes of brevity, the Court will not recite the facts in detail, unless where necessary. 

3 The environmental litigation made its way through the intermediate court of appeal and state 

supreme court. See Friends of the Coll. of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Cmty. Coll. 

Dist., 11 Cal. App. 5th 596 (2017). 

4 A Skelly hearing is a pre-termination hearing for a public employee, in which the employer must 

provide, at minimum, “notice of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges 

and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, 

to the authority initially imposing discipline.” Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 215 

(1975).

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Grigorescu’s employment because the District did not meet its burden to establish dishonesty or 

falsified information. However, the hearing officer found Ms. Grigorescu engaged in a pattern of 

dishonesty by misrepresenting that she possessed a minor in mathematics, but this dishonesty did

not support termination.

In December 2015, Ms. Grigorescu filed a complaint with the California Department of 

Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) against the District. In her complaint, Ms. Grigorescu 

asserted that Mr. Whitlock and Ms. Frontiera had personal animosity against her and that the 

adverse employment actions were also motivated by “intentional disability discrimination.” 

Subsequently, after receiving her right-to-sue notice, Ms. Grigorescu filed a lawsuit in state court.

The state-court filing contained allegations related to disability discrimination and/or failure to 

accommodate. 

After filing the state court action, Ms. Grigorescu continued to have problems with her 

employment. She sought a flexible work schedule to teach a class at San Francisco State 

University (“SFSU”) on Friday mornings, but the District refused to accommodate her schedule. 

SAC ¶¶ 84, 87. 

In March 2016, Ms. Grigorescu learned of the District’s intent to suspend and terminate 

her from her lab tech position because she missed six consecutive Fridays. SAC ¶ 91. This event 

prompted her to file an amended petition and complaint in the state court action, which asserted 

multiple causes of action centered on disability discrimination and/or failure to accommodate.5

In April 2016, Ms. Grigorescu was informed of the proposed termination due to her 

decision to accept employment at SFSU that conflicted with her employment at CSM on Fridays. 

SAC ¶¶ 83–93. Thereafter, in June and July 2016, a second Skelly hearing took place. Id. ¶ 95. 

This time, the hearing officer recommended termination “due to prior discipline: alleged 

 

5 Ms. Grigorescu subsequently filed additional amended pleadings in state court. In May 2018, 

the state court issued a tentative ruling denying Ms. Grigorescu’s writ petition. In the tentative, 

the state court denied the writ petition because Ms. Grigorescu did not lodge an administrative 

record or file moving papers in support of the writ. Since the tentative ruling, there has been no 

other filings in the state court action or hearings scheduled. The case is still marked “Active,” and 

the court has not ruled on the employment discrimination causes of action asserted in the operative 

amended complaint.

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misrepresentation of her math minor, and alleged misrepresentation of her Baccalaureate high 

school diploma.” Id. ¶ 96. In January 2017, Ms. Grigorescu’s employment as a lab tech was 

terminated. Id. ¶ 97. Mr. Whitlock did not allow Ms. Grigorescu to return to campus to retrieve 

her personal belongings until September 2018, with close supervision and prearrangement. Id. ¶¶ 

4, 98.

B. Procedural Background

The District terminated Ms. Grigorescu’s employment on January 19, 2017. SAC ¶ 97. 

On February 13, 2018, Ms. Grigorescu filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that she was subject to retaliation and discrimination on the basis 

of sex, national origin, age, and disability. 

On September 2018, after receiving a notice of right to sue from the EEOC, Ms. 

Grigorescu filed the instant action. On April 24, 2019, this Court dismissed Ms. Grigorescu’s 

FAC with leave to amend. Ms. Grigorescu subsequently filed this SAC alleging the following 

eight claims for relief:

• First Claim for Relief (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Defendants Mr. Whitlock and Ms. 

Frontiera retaliated against Ms. Grigorescu for exercising her First Amendment 

rights through her activism with Friends.

• Second and Eighth Claims for Relief (42 U.S.C. § 1981): Defendants Mr. 

Whitlock and Ms. Frontiera harassed Ms. Grigorescu, failed to promote, and 

ultimately terminated her employment because of her race.

• Third through Seventh Claims for Relief (Title VII): Defendants terminated, 

discriminated, and harassed Ms. Grigorescu because of her race/national origin 

and gender, and retaliated against her because she engaged in protected activity by 

opposing unlawful employment practices.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 

complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a plaintiff’s “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must 

. . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.’” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 

F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true 

and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a 

complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (internal quotation marks omitted).6 “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Third through Seventh Claims (Title VII)

Ms. Grigorescu asserts various Title VII claims. The Court previously dismissed these 

claims for failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies but gave Ms. Grigorescu leave to 

amend to allege a better factual basis for equitable tolling. She has not done so. 

To litigate a Title VII claim in federal district court, a plaintiff must have timely exhausted 

her administrative remedies. See Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1995). With 

respect to Title VII,

a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the 

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, except that when 

the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a state 

or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such 

practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto 

upon receiving notice thereof, such EEOC charge shall be filed by 

 

6 A court “need not . . . accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 

judicial notice or by exhibit.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

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or on behalf of the person aggrieved within 300 days after the 

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within 30 days

after receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated 

the proceedings under the state or local law, whichever is earlier.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (emphasis added). The 180 day limit applies here because Ms. Grigorescu 

did not initiate the DFEH charge until January 18, 2018, which was 365 days after the termination.

Following this Court’s prior dismissal on timeliness grounds, Ms. Grigorescu filed the 

SAC which makes one new factual allegation regarding timeliness of her EEOC charge and 

supplies additional details relating to the state court litigation to support her equitable-tolling 

argument. She also makes a continuing-violation argument. 

1. Continuing Violation

“A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act occur[s] on the day that it happen[s].” Nat'l 

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). Discrete 

acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to 

identify. Id. at 114. “[A] Title VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete discriminatory or retaliatory 

acts must file his charge within the appropriate time period—180 or 300 days—set forth in 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). A charge alleging a hostile work environment claim, however, will not 

be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful 

employment practice and at least one act falls within the time period.” Id. at 122 (emphasis 

added). 

“Generally, a Title VII plaintiff may not base a claim on conduct occurring outside the 

statutory time period for filing a charge (i.e., 300 days before the charge is filed). However, under 

the continuing violations doctrine, acts that fall outside the statutory time period may be 

actionable.” Scott v. Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC, 888 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122). “When it would be unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to perceive 

offensive conduct as Title VII harassment before the limitations period runs, or the earlier 

discrimination may only be recognized as actionable in light of events that occurred later . . . , the 

continuing violation doctrine applies.” Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 344 

(7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). “On the other hand, the continuing violation 

doctrine has delineated limits. Where a pattern of harassment spreads out over years, and it is 

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evident long before the plaintiff sues that she was a victim of actionable harassment, she ‘cannot 

reach back and base her suit on conduct that occurred outside the statute of limitations.’” Id. In 

determining whether the continuing violation doctrine applies to certain events, the court must 

look to each event or to a series of events to see if the plaintiff should have been aware that the 

events constituted actionable harassment. See Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 255 F. 

Supp. 2d 591, 606 (E.D. Tex. 2003). 

Ms. Grigorescu alleges that after her termination in January 2017, the District banned her 

from the campus, and she was unable to retrieve her personal belongings until September 27, 

2018—thereby creating a “continuing violation.” SAC ¶¶ 97, 98. 

However, her termination, if done on the basis of race, national origin or sex, as Ms. 

Grigorescu alleges, was a discrete and completed act on which she could sue under Title VII and 

which she should have recognized as actionable. The continuing violation doctrine thus does not 

extend the running of the statute of limitations beyond her termination, 

Furthermore, the alleged ban on her access after termination does not constitute an 

“unlawful employment practice” under Title VII because she does not allege facts inferring that

the ban was in furtherance of a discriminatory policy or practice against Romanians. See Edner v. 

NYCTA-MTA, 134 F. Supp. 3d 657, 665 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (no continuing violation doctrine after 

discrete act of termination because plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that any post-termination

acts were in furtherance of discriminating against Haitian employees or that they occurred within 

the 300-day period); see also Burkhart v. Am. Railcar Indus., Inc., 603 F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 

2010) (no continuing sexual harassment violation where employee’s allegations that fell within the 

statutory period complained about shunning from her coworkers, her later suspension, and her 

termination—all of which are not related to continuing sexual harassment).

The alleged ban, therefore, cannot have the effect of extending the window to file an 

administrative complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see also Davis v. Louisiana State Univ., 876 

F.2d 412, 413 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Davis's claims accrued when she was expelled and barred from the 

campus; it matters not, for purposes of prescription, that she remains expelled and barred now.”). 

Ms. Grigorescu’s post-employment allegations cannot be considered as an adverse employment 

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action because access to campus is not a post-employment benefit. Cf. Bryant v. Covina-Valley 

Unified Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 6016924, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018) (“courts have extended Title 

VII’s antiretaliation provision to actions undertaken post-employment [where an employer denies 

a plaintiff a post-employment benefit, such as challenging unemployment compensation in 

retaliation for filing a prior EEOC charge].”) As such, the Court finds that the continuing 

violation doctrine does not apply. 

2. Equitable Tolling

Ms. Grigorescu filed two DFEH complaints in December 2015 and in January 2018. SAC, 

Exs. A, B. Ms. Grigorescu concedes neither were timely for exhausting the EEOC-charge 

requirement, the latter of which being “90 days out-of-time” because she filed with the EEOC

after 300 days from the last discrete discriminatory act—January 19, 2017. But, Ms. Grigorescu

was actually governed by the 180-day deadline since she did not initiate her claim with the DFEH 

until 365 days after her termination, which makes her administrative charge tardy. 

Ms. Grigorescu asserts she is entitled to equitable tolling on her failure to timely exhaust 

administrative remedies on her federal claims based on her state court lawsuit. 

“Long-settled equitable-tolling principles instruct that generally, a litigant seeking 

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” Kwai Fun 

Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), aff'd and remanded sub nom United States v. 

Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S.Ct. 1625 (2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Equitable 

tolling is typically granted when litigants are unable to file timely [documents] as a result of 

external circumstances beyond their direct control.” Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling is, however, to be applied only sparingly. Irwin v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). Courts have been generally unforgiving when a late 

filing is due to a plaintiff’s failure “to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.” 

Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 

96). 

The Court previously dismissed Ms. Grigorescu’s Title VII claims for failure to timely 

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exhaust administrative remedies but permitted her leave to amend to allege a better factual basis 

for equitable tolling. Ms. Grigorescu, however, provides no new factual allegations as to why her 

state court filing should equitably toll her time to file an EEOC charge. In other words, Ms. 

Grigorescu has not provided the Court with any “extraordinary circumstances” (or any excusable 

neglect) that prevented her from timely exhausting her federal claims with the EEOC. See e.g., 

Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (equitable tolling appropriate where 

employee did not file on time because her attorney-client relationship, like the rest of her 

relationships with men, was seriously damaged by the egregious conduct—rape and sexual 

assault—that she seeks to redress in her lawsuit against her employer); Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 

(equitable tolling is not warranted for “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect”). 

Ms. Grigorescu argues that she was excused from earlier filing of her EEOC charge 

because the state court suit raised sufficiently similar claim justifying the delay. Equitable tolling 

may be justified where new claims are “like or reasonably related to the allegations contained” in a 

pending action. Green v. Los Angeles Cty. Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 

1989) (quoting Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 728 

(9th Cir. 1984)). Ms. Grigorescu argues that the federal claims before the Court now are “like or 

reasonably related” to the allegations in the 2015 DFEH charge and the state lawsuit that followed. 

But Ms. Grigorescu’s 2015 DFEH charge and subsequent state court action only allege disability 

discrimination claims—there were no claims based on race, national origin, or gender. Such 

claims are not like or reasonably related to the disability claims raised in the state court action. 

See e.g., Beale v. GTE Cal., 999 F. Supp. 1312, 1319 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Beale v. 

GTE-California, 141 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Because the case law does not support Plaintiffs' 

argument that race and national origin discrimination claims are 'like or reasonably related to' age 

or sex discrimination claims, the Court finds that they have failed to exhaust the administrative 

remedies available for their race and national origin discrimination claims.”); Wilson v. United 

Airlines, Inc., 1998 WL 754602, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1998) (“The Court finds that plaintiff's 

disability claims are not ‘reasonably related to’ her initial charge of sex and race discrimination, 

and, consequently, plaintiff is barred from pursuing her disability claims in this action.”). Ms. 

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Grigorescu has not shown why her claim of race and national origin discrimination would 

reasonably be expected to grow out of an investigation into her claim of disability discrimination. 

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC’s Title VII claims with 

prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

B. Second and Eighth Claims for Relief: 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (Race-based Termination 

and Harassment)

The Section 1981 claims are only potentially viable against defendants Mr. Whitlock and 

Ms. Frontiera because the District is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. 

1. Harassment

To demonstrate race-based harassment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that she was subjected 

to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that 

the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s 

employment and create an abusive work environment.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 847 

F.3d 678, 686 (9th Cir. 2017). 

The Court previously found that Ms. Grigorescu failed to plead specific allegations 

demonstrating that Mr. Whitlock and Ms. Frontiera scrutinized her credentials because she was 

Romanian, or that the scrutinization of academic credentials constituted severe or pervasive 

conduct. The SAC alleges the following:

Mr. Whitlock and Ms. Frontiera “jointly or severely [] engaged in a 

severe or pervasive course of conduct directed at Plaintiff . . . . 

includ[ing], but [] not limited to: (i) failing to accommodate 

Plaintiff’s temporary physical disabilities; (ii) interfering with 

Plaintiff’s medical care; (iii) depriving Plaintiff of her preferential 

hiring rights as an adjunct physics teacher; (iv) unjust and 

unwarranted verbal and written criticisms; (v) three unjustified 

suspensions in less than nine months; (vi) initially denying Plaintiff 

an opportunity to interview for a full time, tenure track position as a 

physics teacher; then, when challenged by Plaintiff’s union and 

CSM’s academic senate, provided Plaintiff an inadequate, hostile 

interview; (vii) denying Plaintiff’s repeated requests for an 

alternative work schedule for her lab job to, among other things, 

deprive Plaintiff of the opportunity to teach part-time elsewhere; 

(viii) attempting to terminate her from her classified position as an 

adjunct physics teacher without good cause; and (ix) terminating 

Plaintiff’s employment for pretextual reasons. Each of the 

foregoing acts or omissions to act is an unlawful employment 

practice which violates Government Code §12940, et seq., including 

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Plaintiff’s race.

SAC ¶ 118. Importantly, on their face, none relates to or are predicated on race-based 

discrimination. The only exceptions inferably based on race (based on other allegations in the 

SAC) are: (1) the failure to hire Ms. Grigorescu for the full-time physics professorship because, 

as alleged elsewhere in the SAC, Defendants selected an individual with less experience of a 

different race, and (2) her final termination. As discussed below, Ms. Grigorescu has failed to 

allege a prima facie case of discrimination. In any case, viewed in toto, Ms. Grigorescu has not 

sufficiently alleged a pattern of race-based harassment. See Stewart v. Monogram Biosciences, 

2011 WL 6140899, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (dismissing race-based harassment because 

alleged harassment of supervisor yelling “shut up” or higher scrutiny of plaintiff’s expense 

reimbursement forms were not tied to plaintiff’s race.); accord Roof v. Howard Univ., 501 F. 

Supp. 2d 108, 115 (D.D.C. 2007) (university criticizing its professor’s academic prowess was not 

sufficiently tied to race for race-harassment claim).

As such, because Ms. Grigorescu failed to amend her complaint to plead factual allegations 

to support harassment tied to race, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ms. 

Grigorescu’s Section 1981 claim for race-based harassment with prejudice. 

2. Race-based Termination

With Ms. Grigorescu’s race-based termination claim, the Court previously found that she 

failed to allege facts that show the following: that the candidate who replaced her was similarly 

situated; that she was subjected to stricter credential equivalency requirements relative to other 

similarly situated individuals; and that there existed any anti-Romanian animus. Docket No. 25. 

The Court granted Ms. Grigorescu leave to amend to demonstrate that other similarly situated 

candidates were treated more favorably. 

Ms. Grigorescu claims she was not hired as a full-time instructor and ultimately discharged 

because of her race. SAC ¶ 148. To demonstrate race-based termination, a plaintiff must show 

that she (1) was a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was 

discharged or suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that similarly-situated, nonprotected employees were treated more favorably. McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

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792, 802 (1973); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143–49 (2000). Ms. 

Grigorescu has plainly alleged the first three elements.

As to (4), Ms. Grigorescu alleges that an individual of a different race and inferior 

qualifications filled her position. SAC ¶ 148. Her replacement was not Romanian, recently 

received a master’s degree, and had less teaching experience. Id. However, Ms. Grigorescu did 

not allege that her alleged replacement was hired at or close in time to her termination. If there 

was a substantial gap in time, the new person may not be similarly situated, and an inference of 

discrimination becomes problematic. Despite initially ruling from the bench that Ms. Grigorescu 

pled a prima facie case of race discrimination, the Court further considered the matter and instead

finds she has not alleged a prima facie case and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss without 

prejudice. Ms. Grigorescu may replead her race discrimination claim under Section 1981 to set 

forth factual allegations that her replacement assumed her prior position in a timeframe that would 

lead to a reasonable inference of discrimination, provided she can do so consistent with Rule 11. 

Ms. Frontiera, however, does not appear in the allegations related to this claim. Ms. 

Frontiera is therefore DISMISSED from this claim with prejudice. 

C. First Claim for Relief: 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (Retaliatory Harassment)

Like the Section 1981 claims above, Ms. Grigorescu’s Section 1983 claim is potentially 

viable against defendants Mr. Whitlock and Ms. Frontiera only due to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity. The Court previously found “that there [were] insufficient allegations to support any 

retaliation by Ms. Frontiera. . . . [because there were] no allegations that Ms. Frontiera was ever 

aware of the environmental lawsuit and that, even if she was, her actions against [Plaintiff] were 

connected in any way to [Plaintiff’s] involvement in the lawsuit.” Id. at 15. Similarly, this Court 

found that Mr. Whitlock’s involvement as the lead counsel representing the District in the 

environmental lawsuit was, alone, not enough to show that Ms. Grigorescu’s adverse employment 

action four years later was substantially motivated by retaliation for her participation in the earlier 

litigation. Id. The Court gave Ms. Grigorescu leave to amend. 

To state a claim for violation of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, a 

plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in protected activity; (2) that the defendant took adverse 

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employment action; and (3) that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse 

employment action.” Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(citing Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003)). Defendants do not dispute 

that Ms. Grigorescu ultimately received an adverse employment action. The Parties dispute 

whether Ms. Grigorescu’s engagement in the 2011 environmental litigation constitutes protected 

activity and whether the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor to Ms. 

Grigorescu’s adverse employment action. 

The SAC describes, in detail, Ms. Grigorescu’s “prominent and identifiable” participation 

in the environmental litigation. See SAC ¶¶ 105, 110–11. Ms. Grigorescu also describes the 

length of the on-going environmental litigation and provides additional details regarding Mr. 

Whitlock’s prior role as lead defense counsel for the District. SAC ¶ 112. Ms. Grigorescu’s 

position is that, because the litigation lasted over eight years and because of Mr. Whitlock and Ms. 

Frontiera’s “high position[s] in the District’s managerial hierarchy,” it is reasonably inferred that 

“Defendants [Mr.] Whitlock and [Ms.] Fronteria had both constructive and actual notice of 

Plaintiff’s protective activity[.]” SAC ¶ 113. 

The SAC is quite detailed in pleading Ms. Grigorescu’s involvement in the Friends suit. 

See, e.g., SAC ¶ 105 (Ms. Grigorescu organized support for opposition, disseminated information 

about Friends, recruited, donated money, appeared at meetings, attended court hearings, etc.). The 

SAC is, however, devoid of allegations suggesting Ms. Frontiera “had any motive to take adverse 

action in response to Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment activities.” 

Regarding Mr. Whitlock, the Court already rejected the argument presented in the SAC—

namely, that because Mr. Whitlock served as counsel for the District in the environmental 

litigation, he had a vendetta against Plaintiff when he became Vice Chancellor of Human 

Resources for the District in 2014, three years after Plaintiff’s involvement in the Friends suit. 

The SAC fails to allege facts explaining the lack of temporal proximity between Ms. Grigorescu’s 

protected activity (which began in 2011) and her adverse employment action (her termination in 

2017), six years later.

As pled, the SAC alleges that Mr. Whitlock’s first adverse employment action against Ms. 

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Grigorescu came years after the Friends suit and nine months after he became VCHR. Given the 

time between the adverse action and her earlier involvement in the Friends lawsuit (three years)

and Mr. Whitlock becoming VCHR (nine months), there is insufficient temporal proximity in time 

to imply retaliatory motive absent some other indication. At the hearing, counsel for Ms. 

Grigorescu represented, under his Rule 11 obligations, that he could supplement the pleadings 

with additional factual allegations that Mr. Whitlock took adverse actions against Ms. Grigorescu 

before he assumed the role of VCHR. Stated differently, plaintiff’s counsel represented that there 

are allegations that Mr. Whitlock adversely affected Ms. Grigorescu’s employment as early as 

2011 (by influencing District employees with decision-making authority vis-a-vis Ms. 

Grigorescu’s involvement with Friends). He also represented there is evidence that Mr. Whitlock 

took adverse action against Plaintiff shortly after he became VCHR.

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC’s Section 1983 

claim for retaliatory harassment without prejudice. Ms. Grigorescu shall be given leave to 

amend because of her representations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to the Court.

Plaintiff’s counsel did not make any representations about amending to include Ms. 

Frontiera’s actions. Because Ms. Grigorescu provides no new facts that connect Ms. Frontiera’s 

actions to Ms. Grigorescu’s involvement in the environmental lawsuit, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Ms. Frontiera with prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in 

part. More specifically:

• The Title VII claims are dismissed with prejudice;

• The Section 1981 claim for race-based harassment is dismissed with prejudice; 

• The Section 1983 claim against Mr. Whitlock and Ms. Frontiera for retaliatory 

harassment is dismissed but with leave to amend only against Mr. Whitlock; and 

• The Section 1981 claim for termination against Mr. Whitlock and Ms. Frontiera 

for race-based termination is dismissed but with leave to amend only against Mr. 

Whitlock.

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Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of this order.

This order disposes of Docket No. 29. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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