Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01871/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01871-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM R. BUSTER,

Petitioner,

v.

KNOWLES,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 01871 LJO WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 18]

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 23, 2001, Petitioner was convicted of mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon,

with further findings on two sentence enhancements, i.e., that he had been armed with a knife and

that he had caused great bodily injury. After a court trial, prior serious felony convictions for

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robbery and burglary, both on June 21, 1991, were found true. The court sentenced Petitioner to

state prison for an aggregate term of thirty-eight years to life in state prison. This sentence was

calculated as twenty-five years to life for assault with a deadly weapon, plus three years for the great

bodily injury plus two five-year enhancements (Cal.Penal Code § 667(a)(1)) for the prior robbery

and burglary convictions.

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”)

struck one five-year enhancement from the sentence, because the two prior convictions had not been

“brought and tried separately,” as the statute requires. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence

in all other respects. The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on

January 28, 2004. The Stanislaus County Superior Court filed the amended abstract of judgment on

February 27, 2004.

Petitioner filed the following pro se post-conviction collateral challenges:

First Petition

May 6, 2004 Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Stanislaus County Superior Court

June 25, 2004 Petition denied

Second Petition

August 3, 2004 Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Stanislaus County Superior Court

September 15, 2004 Petition denied

Third Petition

March 9, 2005 Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Court of Appeal

June 16, 2005 Petition denied

Fourth Petition

October 26, 2005 Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in California Supreme Court

August 2, 2006 Petition denied

Petition filed the present petition on December 13, 2006.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

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Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Stanislaus 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

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Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is barred by the statute of

limitations. Petitioner opposes the motion.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

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 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth

Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is

filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. 1

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v.

Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The

Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition

to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and

will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end

before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period

does not, however, toll for the time during which a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001). 

The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (2002) that under

California’s collateral review process, the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a

new petition in a higher court are within the scope of the statutory word “pending.” Id. at 2140. 

Thus, as in Nino v. Galaza, tolling occurs during the intervals between petitions in the state courts. 

The Supreme Court examined this principle in light of California’s unique original writ system

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where the timeliness of a petition is determined according to a “reasonableness” standard. Carey v.

Saffold, 122 S.Ct. at 2139. Thus, the California Supreme Court’s denial of the petition “on the

merits and for lack of diligence” cannot, by itself, indicate that a petition is timely under California’s

reasonableness standard. Id. at 2141 (explaining that there are a variety of reasons why the California

Supreme Court may have included the words “on the merits,” and therefore those words cannot by

themselves indicate that the petition was timely). The Court further explained that had the California

Supreme Court “clearly ruled that Saffold’s 4 1⁄2 – month delay was ‘unreasonable,’ that would be the

end of the matter” and the petition would not be pending for purposes of tolling. Id. at 2141. In

other words, where a California prisoner delayed "unreasonably" in seeking further review of his

petition, he is not entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(2). Saffold was remanded back to the Ninth

Circuit to determine whether Saffold’s 4 1⁄2 month delay between state habeas petitions was

unreasonable and therefore, insufficient for statutory tolling. Id.

A judgment, if appealed, becomes final when the United States Supreme Court denies a

petition for writ of certiorari, or when the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari expires, which is

ninety days after the state court denies discretionary review. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-60

(9 Cir. 1999). In this case, the court agrees with Respondent that because the California Supreme th

Court denied review on January 28, 2004, the judgment against Petition became final ninety days

later, on April 28, 2004. The one-year limitations period started running the next day, April 29,

2004, and absent tolling, expired on April 27, 2003. 

Respondent concedes that Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during the time his first

and second state habeas corpus petitions were pending. Thus, Respondent agrees that Petitioner is

entitled to tolling of fifty-one days on the first petition and forty-four on the second petition.

On March 9, 2005, almost six months after his second superior court petition was denied,

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state appellate court. This petition was

denied on June 16, 2006. Respondent concedes that Petitioner is entitled to tolling for a hundred

days while this petition was pending. He argues, however, that Petitioner is not entitled to tolling

during the period before this petition was filed. The court must agree. See Evans v. Chavis, 546

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U.S. 189, 201 (2006)(unexplained delay of six months during interval between lower court's denial

of state habeas petition and filing of notice of appeal from that decision could not be “reasonable”

under state law, therefore state habeas petition was not considered to be “pending” for purposes of 

AEDPA’s limitations period.)

Finally, on October 26, 2005, Petitioner filed his petition in the California Supreme Court

more than four months after the Court of Appeal denied his petition. The petition was denied on

August 2, 2006. Respondent concedes that Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the 281 days

that this petition was pending before the California Supreme Court, but argues that he is not entitled

to tolling during the time before he filed the petition on October 26, 2005. The court must again

agree. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 201. 

Adding together the above tolling segments, Petitioner is entitled to 476 days of statutory

tolling. Thus, the expiration of his statute of limitations is extended from April 29, 2005, to August

17, 2006. Petitioner, however, did not file the present petition until December 13, 2006. The court

finds that the petition is therefore untimely and, absent equitable tolling, is barred by the statute of

limitations.

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at th

1288-1289.

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Petitioner’s claims of ignorance of the law and illiteracy are insufficient to justify equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se th

prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause);

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. 1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). th

Further, Petitioner is only entitled to a reasonably adequate opportunity to present his claims to the

courts, see, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996), not to the assistance of

someone trained in the law. Id. at 356, 360. The court concludes, therefore, that Petitioner is not

entitled to equitable tolling in this case.

Petitioner may seek to appeal from the judgment of the court in this case. Petitioner cannot

proceed on such an appeal absent a certificate of appealability. The controlling statute, 28 U.S.C. §

2253, provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge,

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not

be taken to the court of appeals from--

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises

out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

In the present case, the court finds no denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, a 

certificate of appealability will be denied.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED;

3) Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of appointment of counsel is DENIED [Doc. 24];

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4) This petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED as barred by the statute of limitations;

5) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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