Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04236/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04236-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

June 11, 1996 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-4236 Seamons v. Snow 

May 8, 1996 by The Honorable David M. Ebel 

Please be advised of the following corrections to the captioned decision: 

On page three, footnote two, the word pendent is misspelled as pendant. 

On page five, footnote four, apostrophes should be added to "Plaintiffs'" 

and "Defendants."' 

Please make the appropriate corrections to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

1 ......... >"~, ' 

'-''k: z "-//(cr(.Lv~"¥ 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-4236 Document: 01019276898 Date Filed: 05/08/1996 Page: 1 
Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

~EDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

May 23, 1996 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-4236 Seamons v. Snow 

May 8, 1996 by The Honorable David M. Ebel 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision: 

Attorney Dan R. Larsen's name was misspelled as "Larson." Larsen is the correct 

spelling. 

Please make the appropriate correction to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

;1tL1JJo~ 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-4236 Document: 01019276898 Date Filed: 05/08/1996 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAY 08 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SHERWlN SEAMONS, JANE SEAMONS, ) 

individually, and as natural ) 

parents of BRIAN SEAMONS, a minor, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) No. 94-4236 

v. ) 

) 

DOUGLAS SNOW, individually and in ) 

his capacity as the Coach at Sky ) 

View High School, and agent of Sky ) 

View High School and the Cache ) 

County School District; MYRON ) 

BENSON, individually, and as ) 

Principal of Sky View High School, ) 

and agent of Sky View High School ) 

and the Cache County School ) 

District; SKY VIEW IDGH SCHOOL; ) 

THE CACHE COUNTY ) 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees, ) 

) 

-------------------- ) 

Appellate Case: 94-4236 Document: 01019276898 Date Filed: 05/08/1996 Page: 3 
NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION ) 

FUND; AMERICAN CIVIL LffiERTIES ) 

UNION WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT; ) 

EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; NATIONAL ) 

WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; WOMEN'S ) 

LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ) 

) 

AnriciCuriae. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 94-CV-4) 

Robert R. Wallace of Hanson, Epperson & Smith, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah (DavidS. 

Doty, North Salt Lake, Utah, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Carol Clawson, Office of the Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah (Jan C. Graham, 

Utah Attorney General, and Brent A Burnett, Dan R. Larson and Barbara E. Ochoa, 

Office of the Attorney General, on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees. 

Julie Goldscheid, Deborah A Ellis and Yolanda S. Wu, of the NOW Legal Defense and 

Education Fund, on the brief for Anrici Curiae. 

Before EBEL and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and COOK, Senior District Judge.* 

* Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

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EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

On October 11, 1993, Plaintiff-Appellant Brian Seamons was tied unclothed to a 

horizontal towel bar with athletic tape by his Sky View High School football teammates 

in the boys' locker room. Brian Seamons and his parents, Sherwin and Jane Seamons, 

filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against 

Defendants-Appellees Douglas Snow (the football team coach), Myron Benson (the 

principal), and Lynn Nelson, 1 individually and as employees and officers of the Sky View 

High School and the Cache County School District. Sky View High School and the 

Cache County School District were also named as defendants. Plaintiffs' complaint 

included federal causes of action under 42 U.S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and Title IX (20 

U.S. C. § 1681(a)). Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and 

punitive damages. The district court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 2 This is an appeal from the Memorandum Decision and 

Judgment of the district court dismissing the case. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S. C. § 1291 and reverse in part, affirm in part and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

Lynn Nelson was dismissed from this action, without prejudice, by stipulation of 

the Plaintiffs. 

2 Plaintiffs had also stated their intent to raise various pendant state law claims. The 

proposed state law claims, however, were dismissed without prejudice and are not the 

subject of this appeal. Plaintiffs' federal causes of action were dismissed with prejudice. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On October 11, 1993, Brian Seamons was assaulted by five of his upper-class 

football teammates in the locker room at Sky View High School. 3 Brian was grabbed as 

he came out of the shower, forcibly restrained and bound to a towel rack with adhesive 

tape. Brian's genital area was also taped. After Brian was restrained, one of his 

teammates brought a girl that Brian had dated into the locker room to view him. All of 

this took place while other members of the team looked on. 

Brian reported this incident to school administrators and other authorities, 

including the football coach, Douglas Snow (the "coach"), and the school principal, 

Myron Benson (the "principal"). The coach brought Brian before the football team, 

accused Brian of betraying the team by bringing the incident to the attention of the 

administration and others, and told Brian to apologize to the team. When Brian refused 

to apologize, the coach dismissed Brian from the team. The five individuals who 

assaulted Brian were permitted to play in the next football game. The school district 

responded to the whole incident by canceling the final game of the season, a state playoff game. 

Brian alleges that he was subjected to a "hostile environment" because he was 

branded as the cause of the football team's demise, and that he was threatened and 

3 Because this case was decided on a motion to dismiss, for purposes of our review 

we accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint. Arnold v McClain, 926 F.2d 

963, 965 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

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harassed. Eventually the principal suggested to Brian and his parents that Brian should 

leave the high school. Brian did so and enrolled in a distant county. 

Brian does not complain of the original assault against him. However, he does 

allege that the Defendant's response to that assault was sexually discriminatory and 

harassing. 4 For example, Brian contends Defendants expected him to conform to a 

macho male stereotype, as evidenced by their suggestion to him that he "should have 

taken it like a man." In addition, the coach reportedly explained the incident by stating 

"boys will be boys," and characterizing the assault as "hazing," or consistent with 

"pranks" that are rites of passage on the football team. 

Brian alleged the following bases for recovery in the district court: (1) Defendants 

Cache County School District and Sky View High School created and tolerated a hostile 

educational environment in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S. C. § 1681(a); (2) Defendants are 

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Brian's constitutional rights to procedural due 

process, substantive due process, freedom of association, freedom of speech, familial 

association, and for violating Brian's right to equal education and equal protection; (3) 

4 In Plaintiffs response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss in the district court, 

Plaintiffs characterize the "crux" of their complaint as follows: 

[N]owhere in the Complaint do plaintiffs allege or argue that the 

defendants should have protected Brian from the initial assault by 

members of the football team .... the crux [of the Complaint] is 

what District personnel affirmatively did and failed to do thereafter. 

Doc. 24 at xv, Aplt. App. at 86. 

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Sky View High School and the School District had a policy of deliberate indifference to 

Brian's constitutional rights in violation of§ 1983; ( 4) Sky View High School and the 

School District failed adequately to train their coaches, faculty and administrators in 

violation of 42 U.S. C. § 1983; and (5) Defendants conspired to violate Brian's 

constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S. C. § 1985. In addition, Brian sought 

injunctive relief, attorney's fees under 42 U.S. C. § 1988(b), and punitive damages. 

With respect to the claims under Title IX, the district court determined that a 

plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent, and that Brian failed, as a matter of law, to 

allege sufficient facts to support his claim that Defendants were motivated by an intent to 

discriminate against him on the basis of his sex. In addition, citing "important 

distinctions" between Titles VTI and IX, the district court refused to apply the negligence 

based Hostile Environment/Sexual Harassment doctrine of Title VIT to this case. The 

court stated that even if this doctrine did apply, Brian failed to set forth any factual 

allegations supporting a claim of sexual harassment. 5 

With respect to the§ 1983 claims, the court held that Brian failed to demonstrate 

he was deprived of any constitutional right: (1) Brian's procedural due process rights were 

5 The district court concluded that Plaintiffs Jane and Sherwin Seamons did not have 

standing as individuals to assert a claim under Title IX. The court also concluded that 

Title IX does not provide a cause of action against individual defendants such as Snow 

and Benson. Further, the court concluded that Sky View High School was not subject to 

suit under Title IX because under state law it did not have a corporate existence separate 

from the Cache County School District. None of these district court rulings have been 

appealed. Thus, we express no opinion with respect to them in this opinion. 

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not violated because he was not dismissed from school without a hearing; rather, he left 

voluntarily; (2) Brian's substantive due process rights were not violated because he failed 

to demonstrate that Defendants intentionally deprived him of an interest in liberty or 

property protected by the Constitution; (3) Brian failed to allege any facts showing 

Defendants intended to deprive him of his right to freedom of group association; (4) 

Brian failed to allege facts in support of his claim that Defendants violated his or his 

parents' right to freedom of speech, and the coach's dismissal of Brian from the team for 

not apologizing was protected by qualified immunity; ( 5) Brian's claims to equal 

education and equal protection failed because he failed to show he was treated differently 

from other similarly situated students on the basis of a protected status; ( 6) Brian's right 

to familial association was not violated because there were no facts tending to show 

Defendants directed their conduct at an intimate relationship with knowledge that the 

conduct would adversely affect that relationship; and finally (7) Brian's claim based on 

Defendants' alleged failure to train was not supported by facts demonstrating "deliberate 

indifference" on the part of Defendants. Because Brian's § 1983 claims failed, the district 

court dismissed the claims for attorney's fees and punitive damages. 

With respect to the § 1985 claim, the district court determined that Brian failed to 

allege facts supporting an inference that Defendants reached a "meeting of the mindS" or 

that Defendants were "discriminatorily motivated" to deprive him of equal protection. 

Finally, with regard to remedies, the district court found that Brian no longer had a 

"personal stake" in the outcome of the case because he no longer attends Sky View High 

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School. Therefore, the district court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief. Based on 

the foregoing conclusions, the district court dismissed Brian's complaint in its entirety. 

He now appeals the district court's disposition of his Title IX claim, his procedural and 

substantive due process claims, his First Amendment freedom of speech claim, and his 

claim for injunctive relief. Brian also appeals the district court's conclusion with respect 

to Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity. 6 

II. DISCUSSION 

We review an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim .de 

llQY.Q. Boone y. Carlsbad Bancorporation. Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1551 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

Dismissal is inappropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the plaintiff can prove no 

set of facts in support of his claims to enti tie him to relief. ld. The court must accept as 

true all the factual allegations in the complaint, construe them in a light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, and resolve all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. Arnold v. McClain, 

926 F.2d 963, 965 (lOth Cir. 1991); Freeman y. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 

360, 361 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

6 While the district court concluded that Jane and Sherwin Seamons did not have 

standing to pursue their Title IX claims in their individual capacities, the court did not 

make such a determination with respect to their other claims. However, we need not 

address this standing issue on appeal because we address the claims on the merits with 

respect to Brian, and make no distinction between Brian and his parents in doing so. 

With respect to the First Amendment freedom of speech claim, we do not believe that 

Jane and Sherwin Seamons have stated a Section 1983 claim against these defendants. 

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of all claims brought by Jane and Sherwin Seamons. 

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TITLE IX 

Title IX prohibits educational institutions that receive federal assistance from 

discriminating on the basis of sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1990). Title IX states: 

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under 

any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 

ld. To state a cause of action under Title IX, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she was 

excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in an 

educational program; (2) that the program receives federal assistance; and (3) that the 

exclusion from the program was on the basis of sex. Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 

713 F. Supp. 139, 143-44 (W.D. Pa.), .affd, 882 F.2d 74 (3d. Cir. 1989). 

There is no dispute that qualifying educational programs were involved here. 

However, the question is whether Brian has alleged that he was excluded from such 

programs on the basis of sex. Brian alleges that Cache County School District and Sky 

View High School created and tolerated a hostile educational environment because: (1) 

the District failed to adopt and publish Title IX grievance procedures and to designate a 

Title IX coordinator; (2) the District knew or should have known of prior incidents of 

sexual harassment at Sky View High School; and (3) the District and the High School 

failed properly to investigate the taping incident and to take disciplinary action against the 

students involved, creating a hostile educational environment. Brian argues that these 

acts and/or omissions were "on the basis of sex" because of the masculine stereotypes 

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imposed on him when the coach stated that this conduct amounted to nothing more than 

"hazing" which Brian should have taken "like a man," and when the conduct was 

trivialized by saying "boys will be boys." 

However, there is an important difference between (1) a "hostile" environment 

created primarily by a student body which disapproved of Brian's response to his assault 

and which, rightly or wrongly, attributed responsibility to Brian for the cancellation of 

the school's post-season football game, and (2) a sexually charged hostile environment 

cognizable as sexual harassment. The elements Brian must prove to succeed on a claim 

of sexual harassment are: (1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he was 

subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; ( 4) that the 

sexual harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as unreasonably to alter the 

conditions of his education and create an abusive educational environment; and ( 5) that 

some basis for institutional liability has been established. Davis y. Monroe County Bd. 

ofEduc., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Assumed as true, the facts alleged in the complaint, together with all reasonable 

inferences therefrom, fail to satisfy the third element listed above. 7 Brian has failed to 

7 Because Brian fails to allege sexual discrimination, we do not reach any of the 

other issues that are raised by Brian's Title IX claim. For example, although Title IX 

does protect against sexual harassment hostile educational environment, Franklin v. 

Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992), it is unclear what liability, if any, 

the school district might have for the acts of its students. .c.t:. Graham y. Independent Sch. 

Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991 (lOth Cir. 1994) (declining to impose liability under§ 1983 to 

a school district for the independent conduct of its students). It is also unclear what 

(continued ... ) 

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allege facts sufficient to indicate that the conduct being challenged (which it must be 

remembered, post dates the locker room assault) was "sexual" in nature, as defined in the 

hostile environment context. Brian fails to allege any facts that would suggest he was 

subjected to unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, or that sex was 

used to contribute to a hostile environment for him. 

Brian points to comments made by school officials such as "boys will be boys" 

and "he should take it like a man" to support his argument that he was subjected to a 

sexually hostile school environment. These statements, however, fall short of showing 

sex discrimination. The qualities Defendants were promoting, team loyalty and 

toughness, are not uniquely male. The fact that the coach, and perhaps others, described 

these qualities as they pertain to his situation in terms of the masculine gender does not 

convert this into sexual harassment. Brian has not alleged that Defendants would have 

acted differently if a similar event had occurred in the women's athletic program. To the 

contrary, Brian's complaint alleges that such hazing has also occurred to women at Sky 

View High School and that it has similarly gone unaddressed by school officials. Aplt. 

7 

( ••• continued) 

liability, if any, an individual or institutional defendant may have for creating a sexual 

harassment hostile environment when it was caused by such defendant's mere negligence 

or gross negligence and not as a result of any deliberate intention to discriminate on the 

basis of sex. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75. cr. Roberts y. Colo State Bd. ofAgric., 998 

F.2d 824, 832-33 (lOth Cir.) (applying Title IX to cancellation of women's baseball 

program), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). Because we decide Brian's Title IX claim 

solely on the basis that he has failed to allege sexual discrimination, we decline to address 

the other challenges to his Title IX claim. 

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App. at 18, 22. Furthermore, Brian's claim that the school district discriminated based on 

sex because it failed to provide Title IX grievance procedures to the students is 

insufficient to state a claim here because the school district's alleged failure to adopt Title 

IX's grievance policy and procedures was not itself an act of discrimination based on sex. 

The facts as alleged tend to show only that Brain was treated as he was because 

others felt he "betrayed" the team by reporting the incident to the relevant authorities and 

by failing to apologize. Brian's complaint itself states that he was dismissed from the 

team for refusing to apologize to his teammates. We recognize that the hostility of the 

school environment may have increased after the school board sought to punish the 

perpetrators and to show its disapproval of the hazing incident by canceling the play-off 

game. However, again, this cannot be viewed as an attempt by these Defendants to 

exacerbate or create a hostile sexual environment for Brian. Because Brian has failed to 

allege facts sufficient to show that the actions or inaction of school officials in response 

to the conduct was based on his sex, we conclude that he has not stated a claim under 

Title IX. 

SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 

A. Preemption 

Defendants initially contend that Brian's § 1983 causes of action are precluded by 

the existence of comprehensive remedies available under Title IX. ~ Middlesex 

County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) ("When 

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the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they 

may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 

1983. "). The Sixth Circuit in Lillard y. Shelby County Bd. ofEduc., 76 F.3d 716, 722-24 

(6th Cir. 1996), held that § 1983 claims are not supplanted by the private right of action 

under Title IX. The court concluded that, in contrast to National Sea Clamroers where 

"allowing the section 1983 action to enforce the rights at issue would have effectively 

circumvented the implicit congressional intention to foreclose private rights of action" 

(under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection Research, and 

Sanctuaries Act), Title IX plaintiffs who bring a § 1983 action predicated on 

constitutional provisions do not circumvent Title IX procedures or gain access to 

remedies not available under Title IX. hi.. at 723. The National Sea Clammers doctrine 

"speaks only to whether federal statutory rights can be enforced both through the statute 

itself .and through section 1983"; it does not "stand for the proposition that a federal 

statutory scheme can preempt independently existing constitutional rights, which have 

contours distinct from the statutory claim." Id. (emphasis in original). The Sixth Circuit 

also noted that the private right of action under Title IX is "implied," and that the only 

enforcement mechanism expressly provided for under the statute was a procedure for the 

termination of federal financial support for institutions violating Title IX. Id. (citing 

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 683 (1979)). Based on this observation, 

the court concluded that Title IX does not have a "comprehensive enforcement scheme," 

and thus, there is no indication in Title IX that Congress intended to foreclose a Title IX 

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plaintiff from bringing a § 1983 action. hl; but see Pfeiffer y. Marion Center Area Sch. 

Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming the lower court's conclusion that 

plaintiffs constitutional claims were "subsumed" by Title IX and otherwise barred by the 

National Sea Clamrners doctrine); Mabry y. State Bd. for Community Colleges and 

Occupational Educ., 597 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D. Colo. 1984), affd on other grounds, 

813 F.2d 311 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987). We agree with the Sixth 

Circuit, and conclude that Brian's § 1983 action is not barred by Title IX. 8 

B. Procedural Due Process 

A plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a sufficient property or liberty interest to 

invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Board of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). If a sufficient property interest is found, 

the government cannot deprive an individual of that interest without due process. 

Gillihan y. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 939 (lOth Cir. 1989). Due process ordinarily 

"requires an opportunity for 'some kind of hearing' prior to the deprivation of a significant 

property interest." Miller y. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 353 (lOth Cir. 1991) 

(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096 (1992). 

8 Of course, the 1983 action could not be predicated on a violation of Title IX itself. 

Such a duplicative effort would be barred . .cf.. Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 813-14 

(lOth Cir. 1989) ("[A] right created solely under Title Vll cannot serve as the basis for an 

independent remedy under Section 1983 .... [However,] if a plaintiff can show a 

constitutional violation by someone acting under color of state law, then the plaintiff has 

a cause of action under Section 1983, regardless of Title Vll's concurrent application."). 

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Brian claims that he had constitutionally protected property interests (1) in his 

education at Sky View High School, (2) the advanced placement courses and credits, and 

(3) participation in interscholastic athletics. He also claims he had constitutionally 

protected liberty interests in: (1) attending public school in the district where he resides; 

(2) bodily integrity, which includes the right to be free from sexual assault and 

harassment at school; (3) living with his family and not being forced to attend school in a 

district far removed from his family; (4) not being dismissed from the Sky View football 

team; and (5) his reputation and standing in the community. 

We assume, based on Utah law, that Brian has a constitutionally protected interest 

in receiving public education. ~ Goss y. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) (applying 

Ohio law). However, the "Supreme Court has stressed that '[h ]istorically, th[ e] guarantee 

of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive 

a person of life, liberty, or property."' Archuleta y. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (lOth Cir. 

1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (emphasis and alterations 

in original)). The word "deprive" in the Due Process Clause indicates that something 

more than mere negligence is required to trigger the protections of the Clause. Daniels, 

474 U.S. at 330; see also Davidson y. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) ("[T]he 

protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are ... not 

triggered by lack of due care .... "). We have held that there must be an "element of 

deliberateness in directing the misconduct toward the plaintiff before the Due Process 

Clause is implicated." Archuleta, 897 F.2d at 498. Brian's complaint stops short of 

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alleging school district officials took any deliberate action to remove him from school. In 

fact, the complaint alleges that the decision to transfer to another school was made by 

Brian and his parents. 

With regard to the specific components of education which Brian claims were lost 

(~, the right to participate in sports, to take advanced placement classes, and to attend a 

particular school), we do not believe that Brian has a constitutional right to those 

particular incidents of education. We have interpreted ~ to speak only in general 

terms regarding the "educational process." Albach y. Odie, 531 F.2d 983, 985 (lOth Cir. 

1976). In Albach we explained that the innumerable separate components of the 

educational process, such as participation in athletics and membership in school clubs, do 

not create a property interest subject to constitutional protection. Id. Furthermore, to the 

extent Brian was deprived of his reputation or standing in the community as a result of 

Defendant's conduct, he still fails to state a procedural due process claim. The Supreme 

Court, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), concluded that damage to an 

individual's reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest, is not enough to 

establish a due process violation. See also Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 

1262, 1268-69 (lOth Cir. 1989). Brian has failed to allege a protectible property or 

liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. 

C. Substantive Due Process 

In support of his substantive due process claim, Brian cites a Fifth Circuit case 

which held that school children have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity and that 

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school district and school officials can be held liable for omissions which manifest a 

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of a student. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). DQe, however, 

involved a male teacher who had notoriously sexually molested female students and had 

repeated sexual intercourse with at least one of the students. State action was not at issue 

and the plaintiffs liberty rights were clear. The facts involving Brian are very different. 

In this case, fellow students were perpetrators of the underlying assault. That incident 

escalated, in part, because of the Defendants' methods of attempting to remedy the 

problem. As noted before, Brian has stipulated that he does not seek to hold Defendants 

liable for the actual locker room incident. He alleges, however, that Defendants violated 

his rights by failing to investigate the incident, failing to discipline the perpetrators, 

failing to adopt or follow procedures designed to protect his property and liberty interests, 

and forcing him off the football team. 

Again, although Brian was removed from the football team, he has no 

constitutionally protected property interest in participating in the school's athletic 

program. Albach, 531 F.2d at 985. Most of the remaining substantive due process claims 

revolve around the School District's failure to protect Brian from the taunting and 

hostility of his fellow students. However, those concerns fail to satisfy the state action 

component required under the Due Process Clause. 

[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to 

protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private 

actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a 

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guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security . . . . [By] its language 

[the Due Process Clause] cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative 

obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through 

other means. 

DeShaney y. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). "[A] 

State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute 

a violation of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 197. 

We have applied this principle in the context of a claim that a school district had a 

duty to protect a student from his fellow students. In Graham y. Independent Sch. Dist. 

No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994-95 (lOth Cir. 1994), we held that schools have no duty under 

the Due Process Clause to protect students from assaults by other students, even where 

the school knew or should have known of the danger presented. If the state takes a 

person into custody or holds him against his will, the state assumes some measure of a 

constitutionally mandated duty of protection. Id. at 994. Compulsory attendance laws 

for public schools, however, do not create an affirmative constitutional duty to protect 

students from the private actions of third parties while they attend school. Id. (citing 

Maldonado y. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 914 

(1993)). Inaction by the state, in the face of a known danger, is not enough to trigger a 

constitutional duty to protect unless the state has a custodial or other "special 

relationship" with the victim. ~Graham, 22 F.3d at 995. "The affirmative duty to 

protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament ... but from 

the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf." DeShaney, 

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489 U.S. at 200. The school district in this case did not limit Brian's freedom to act on 

his own behalf, and therefore, no special relationship arose triggering a constitutional 

obligation to protect Brian from other students. 

In addition to the "special relationship" doctrine, we have held that state officials 

can be liable for the acts of third parties where those officials "created the danger" that 

caused the harm. Ublrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 

S. Ct. 924 (1996). However, we stated that a claim brought under the "danger creation" 

theory must be predicated on "reckless or intentional injury-causing state action which 

'shocks the conscience.'" Id. "'[I]t is not enough to show that the state increased the 

danger of harm from third persons; the[§] 1983 plaintiff must also show that the state 

acted with the requisite degree of culpability in failing to protect the plaintiff.'" Id. at 

573 (quotingLeffall y. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (second 

alteration in original)). "That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of 

outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience 

shocking." 1d.. at 574. 

Brian has failed to allege facts to support that Defendants acted with an intent to 

harm him. In fact, the complaint alleges that school officials attempted to punish the 

football team for the assault on Brian by canceling the remaining game of the season. 

The complaint further indicates that Brian received a written apology from the team 

concerning the incident. Whether or not these efforts amounted to the correct response, 

they reflect that Defendants did not intend to harm Brian or unreasonably to place him at 

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risk of harm. The complaint, at most, alleges that Defendants were negligent or that they 

made poor choices in dealing with Brian's predicament. However, "[t]he Due Process 

Clause is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised [government] decisions." 

Collins v City of Harker Heights. Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992) (quotation omitted). 

Furthermore, Defendants' conduct does not "shock the conscience," as we have come to 

understand the term. The "shock the conscience" standard requires a high level of 

outrageousness, Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574, which simply is not present here. 

D. Freedom of Speech 

The government may not "deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 

constitutionally protected interests--especially, his interest in freedom of speech"--even 

though the person has no right to the valuable governmental benefit and "even though the 

government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons." Peny y. Sindennan, 

408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that lack of a contractual "right" to tenure is 

immaterial when the decision not to renew a teaching contract is based on the teacher's 

exercise of his right of free speech). Brian and his parents assert that Defendants violated 

their First Amendment right to freedom of speech by discouraging them from making 

statements to the press about the incident, and by removing Brian from the football team 

because he refused to apologize for informing authorities of the incident. The district 

court disposed of this issue by holding that merely discouraging another from speaking 

out on an issue does not constitute a First Amendment violation and, in any event, 

Defendants were protected by qualified immunity. 

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We agree with the dismissal of the First Amendment claims of Sherwin and Jane 

Seamons individually because the only conduct of the defendants that was directed at 

them individually were discussions (ultimately unsuccessful) to persuade them not to 

speak out publicly about the incident together with statements by the defendants pursuant 

to their own First Amendment rights that Sherwin and Jane Seamons perceived as hostile 

to them or their position. The essence of the First Amendment is to allow all parties the 

opportunity for attempts to persuade as well as the opportunity for robust, even hostile, 

exchanges of conflicting views. We see no allegations against these defendants that 

violates any of the individually held First Amendment rights of Sherwin or Jane Seamons. 

With regard to Brian, it appears he was denied a benefit (participation on the 

football team) because of his decision to tell his parents and school officials about the 

incident in the locker room. Brian's actions certainly constitute speech; the question is 

whether this "speech" is entitled to First Amendment protection. In situations such as 

this, which do not involve "school-sponsored expressive activities,"~ Hazelwood 

School Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988), the school district's ability to 

restrict a student's speech requires a showing that such speech would "substantially 

interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students." 

Tinker y. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). It is well established ihat 

students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 

speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506 (holding that "First Amendment 

rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are 

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t. 

available to teachers and students"). In Tinker, the Supreme Court set forth the relevant 

analytical framework for addressing the question of how to accommodate First 

Amendment rights in the school environment: A student's personal expression may be 

restricted where the forbidden conduct "in class or out of it, which for any reason--

whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior--materially disrupts classwork or 

involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others .... " Id. at 513 (holding 

that the Des Moines School District could not punish high-school and junior high-school 

students for wearing black arm bands to school in protest of the Vietnam war where the 

students merely caused discussion outside the classrooms and neither interrupted school 

activities nor sought to intrude in the school's affairs or the lives of others). However, 

"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right 

to freedom of expression," ill at 508, and the "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 

unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" cannot justify the 

prohibition by school officials of a particular expression of opinion, lll at 509. "Thus, if 

the speech involved is not fairly considered part of the school curriculum or schoolsponsored activities, then it may only be regulated if it would 'materially and 

substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of 

the school."' Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1057 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting Tinker, 

393 U.S. at 509), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1218 (1992); ~ alsQ Hazelwood School Dist y. 

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988) (holding that Tinker applies to situations where 

an educator attempts to silence a student's personal expression, but that educators are 

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... 

entitled to exercise greater control over expressive activity which bears the imprimatur of 

state sponsorship(~, school-sponsored publications or theater productions) in order to 

"assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that 

readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of 

maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the 

school"). 

Applying these guiding principles to the case before us, we conclude that Brian 

properly states a claim that his speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. The 

complaint indicates that Brian's speech was responsibly tailored to the audience of school 

administrators, coaches, family and participants who needed to know about the incident. 

Brian's behavior neither disrupted classwork nor invaded the rights of other students. His 

speech was not part of a school-sponsored expressive activity such that listeners might 

believe that Brian's speech had the imprimatur of school sponsorship. We simply see no 

overriding school interest in denying Brian the ability to report physical assaults in the 

locker room. At most, the school's interest here was based on its fear of a disturbance 

stemming from the disapproval associated with Brian's unpopular viewpoint regarding 

hazing in the school's locker rooms. Under Tinker, that is not a sufficient justification to 

punish Brian's speech in these circumstances. 

The district court did not make a determination as to whether Brian's speech was 

protected by the First Amendment. It s~mply foreclosed the issue by holding that 

Defendants were protected by qualified immunity because the officials involved did not 

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" . "know or reasonably should have known that the action [they] took within [their] sphere 

of official responsibility would violate [Brian's] constitutional rights .... " Seamons y. 

SnQw, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1121 (D. Utah 1994). Based on our reading of the complaint, 

resolving all reasonable inferences in Brian's favor, we conclude that the district court 

was premature in granting qualified immunity to Defendants. 

The doctrine of qualified immunity generally shields government officials 

performing discretionary functions "from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

In Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 397 (lOth Cir. 1993), we stated that "a reasonably 

competent public official should know the law governing his conduct." A "precise factual 

correlation between the then-existing law and the case at-hand is not required." Patrick y. 

Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249 (lOth Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). The law is clearly' 

established, "when it is well developed enough to inform the reasonable official that his 

conduct violates that law." Id. In determining whether the law involved was clearly 

established, we examine the law as it was at the time of the Defendants' actions. Hilliard 

y. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1518 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 

1013 ( 1991 ). "[T]he plaintiff need not show that the specific action at issue has 

previously been held unlawful," he need only show that the alleged unlawfulness was 

apparent in light of preexisting law. Id. "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly 

established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the 

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. . • 

, . 

clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as 

the plaintiff maintains." Medina y. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 

(1Oth Cir. 1992). Considering these principles, we conclude that the complaint in this 

case properly states a claim, and that it is premature, absent a factual record, to grant 

qualified immunity on the basis of these pleadings. 

In light of the well established principle that the government may not deny a 

benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected interests,~' 408 U.S. at 

597, and the well established framework of the Tinker analysis, we cannot say at this 

point that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Resolving all reasonable 

inferences in Brian's favor, the complaint states a claim that Defendants violated clearly 

established law when Brian was dismissed from the football team because of his speech. 

However, this does not foreclose Defendants from reasserting their entitlement to 

qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgement should Brian's allegations in the 

complaint prove to be unfounded. U Behrens y. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996) 

(holding that a defendant's immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified immunity 

determination on a motion to dismiss does not deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction 

over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, following denial of defendant's 

motion for summary judgment). Based on our review of the complaint in this case, we 

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' . 

. , . 

conclude that the district court erred in its determination that Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).9 

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 

Injunctive relief is not appropriate in this case. The district court properly 

determined that Brian no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of the case because 

he no longer attends Sky View High School. Brian, however, argues that as long as the 

"hostile environment" persists at Sky View High, he is precluded from attending school 

there. He contends he wants the court to "correct the hostile educational environment 

that exists within the high school and the District." Furthermore, Brian contends that his 

younger siblings attend schools within the Cache County School District, and thus, they 

have a stake in the outcome of the case. 

The Supreme Court, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976), held that 

those seeking injunctive relief must have a personal stake in the outcome. "The plaintiff 

must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 

injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury 

must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." City of Los An&eles y. 

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

9 Of course, the qualified immunity defense does not apply to defendant Cache 

County School District. Our conclusion that the complaint states a valid First 

Amendment claim means that on remand Brian's First Amendment claim against the 

School District is reinstated as well. 

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. . 

Brian has remedied the immediate problem by leaving the school. The question 

whether he would be subject to any hostility upon returning to Sky View High School 

calls for speculation and conjecture. Indeed, the record suggests Brian may already have 

graduated from high school. In any event, Brian does not allege in the complaint that he 

wants to return to the school. As for Brian's younger siblings, Brian cannot assert their 

rights. Warth y. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (holding that the plaintiff "generally 

must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the 

legal rights or interests of third parties"). In any event, the incident complained of 

appears to have been specifically oriented to Brian and there is nothing in the complaint 

to suggest that Brian's younger siblings would suffer any constitutional deprivations if 

they were to attend Sky View High School. Therefore, we conclude that Brian is not 

entitled to injunctive relief in this action. 

ill. CONCLUSION 

Based on the forgoing discussion, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of all 

claims, with the exception of Brian Seamons' First Amendment freedom of speech claim 

against all defendants. We REVERSE the district court's order dismissing Brian 

Seamons' First Amendment freedom of speech claim, and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 10 

10 It is premature at this time to consider Brian's request for attorney's fees and 

(continued .. ) 

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.l. 

10( ••• continued) 

punitive damages. We have considered all other issues raised on appeal and have 

concluded that they are without merit. 

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• 

No. 94-4236, Seamons, et al. v. Snow, et al. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I concur in the court's opinion except as to the Title IX claim. As to that claim, I 

concur in the result. 

I write separately to express my disagreement with the court's analysis of 

Plaintiffs Title IX claim. I cannot agree that the alleged harassment in this case was not 

based on sex within the meaning of Title IX. The majority writes that statements such as 

"boys will be boys" and "take it like a man" are not sufficiently sex related to state a 

claim. I believe, however, that these statements can only be understood as a response to 

the original hazing incident. In my view, this incident was clearly sexual in nature. 

Members of the football team taped Plaintiff to a towel rack while he was naked, taped 

his genitals, and then displayed their captive to a girl Plaintiff had dated. These actions 

clearly derive their power to embarrass and to intimidate from their sexual and sex-based 

nature. It is hard for me to believe that the display of the male genitalia to a female for 

other than medical or educational reasons has a non-sexual connotation. The coach's 

statement that "boys will be boys" clearly relates to and flows out of the original sexual 

harassment. As such, it may be considered to be a continuation by the school official of 

the student-initiated sexual harassment, even if the statement by itself is not sexual in 

nature. ~Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (lOth Cir. 1987) (Title Vll 

Appellate Case: 94-4236 Document: 01019276898 Date Filed: 05/08/1996 Page: 31 
.. • ' . 

sexual harassment claim does not require sexual advances or other sexual conduct; rather, 

conduct which ''would not occur but for the sex of the employee" violates Title Vll). 

Thus, although I concur in the result for other reasons, I cannot wholeheartedly accept the 

court's reasoning on this one issue. 

2 

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