Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01455/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01455-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DINA RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05cv1455 WQH(POR)

ORDER

vs.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge,

The matter before the court is the review of the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #

21) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter, recommending that Plaintiff’s

Motion for Reversal and/or Remand (Doc. # 12) should be denied and Defendant’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 14) should be granted.

BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2001, Plaintiff Dina Rodriguez filed an application for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”) and Supplemental

Security Income (“SSI”) payments under Title XVI of the Act. (Administrative Record

(“A.R.”) at 15.) The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff

subsequently requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Plaintiff

appeared and testified at the hearing, which occurred on June 27, 2003. On September 8,

2004, the ALJ issued his written decision denying Plaintiff’s applications. After the Appeals

Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision became the final determination of the

Case 3:05-cv-01455-WQH-POR Document 23 Filed 03/19/07 Page 1 of 7
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Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”).

On July 21, 2005, Plaintiff initiated this action, pursuant to Section 405(g) of the Act,

seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. # 1.) On August 3,

2005, this Court referred the matter to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). (Doc. # 4.) 

On June 7, 2006, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Reversal and/or Remand, asserting that

the ALJ erred in the following ways: (1) by disregarding the opinion, diagnosis and mental

residual functional capacity assessment of Dr. Strobl; (2) by inadequately weighing the treating

physicians’ opinions; and (3) by relying upon information from a medical textbook. (Doc. #

12.) On July 25, 2006, Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that

the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. (Doc. # 14.)

On February 5, 2007, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal and/or Remand should be denied and

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. (Doc. # 21.) On

February 20, 2007, Plaintiff filed her Objections to Report and Recommendation

(“Objections”). (Doc. # 22.) Defendant did not file a response.

The duties of the district court in connection with the Report and Recommendation of

a Magistrate Judge are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28

U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court “must make a de novo determination of those portions of

the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

RULING OF THE COURT

After de novo review of all findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court adopts the

Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The Court supplements the Report and

Recommendation as follows.

Plaintiff objects that the Report and Recommendation fails to mention that Plaintiff filed

an application for DIB in addition to her application for SSI payments. (Objections at 1-2.)

Plaintiff is correct: she also applied for DIB. (A.R. at 15.) However, Plaintiff does not

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1

 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types of physicians: “(1)

those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant

(nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The opinion

of a treating physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of non-treating physicians

because the treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and

observe the patient as an individual.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citations omitted). “Likewise, greater weight is accorded to the opinion of an examining

physician than a non-examining physician.” Id.

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contend, and the Court does not find, that this omission alters the analysis of her claim.

Plaintiff next makes a series of objections related to the ALJ’s treatment of the evidence

provided by Dr. Donald L. Strobl. (Objections at 2-6.) First, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate

Judge’s statement that the ALJ “adopted [Dr. Strobl’s] diagnosis.” (Report and

Recommendation at 20.) Based upon Dr. Strobl’s evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

suffered from “pain disorder associated with both psychological factors and a general medical

condition.” (A.R. at 36.) On June 3, 2003, Dr. Strobl wrote on a Mental Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment form: “Diagnosis: PTSD 307.89.” (A.R. at 248.) On the same day, Dr.

Strobl wrote in his records: “Diagnosis (DSM-IV): Axis I: 307.89.” (A.R. at 291.) “Diagnosis

Code 307.89” in the “DSM-IV” is listed as “pain disorder associated with both psychological

factors and a general medical condition.” Am. Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Ed., Diagnosis Code 307.89 (1994). Plaintiff argues that

the ALJ erred by not characterizing Dr. Strobl’s diagnosis as “PTSD,” or “post-traumatic stress

disorder.” Plaintiff asserts: “Dr. Strobl’s diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder is quite

different from the ALJ’s diagnosis of ‘pain disorder associated with both psychological factors

and a general medical condition.’” (Objections at 3.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, there

is nothing in Dr. Strobl’s records to show that he viewed “PTSD” as “quite different” from

“Diagnosis Code 307.89” in the DSM-IV. Indeed, in Dr. Strobl’s own records related to

Plaintiff, he makes no mention of post-traumatic stress disorder, or “PTSD,” and instead

simply writes Plaintiff’s “Diagnosis” as “307.89.” (A.R. at 291; see generally A.R. at 286-92.)

Plaintiff further objects to the ALJ’s characterization of Dr. Strobl as an “examining

physician”1

 (A.R. at 29), and to the Magistrate Judge’s statement that “the ALJ did not reject

Dr. Strobl’s diagnosis, but rather he granted moderate weight to his opinion” (Report and

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Recommendation at 20). However, even if the Court were to find that Dr. Strobl was

Plaintiff’s treating physician, and even if the Court were to agree with Plaintiff that the ALJ

“effectively rejected Dr. Strobl’s functional assessment” (Objections at 5), the ALJ articulated

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Strobl’s functional assessments, based upon

substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ first noted that “Dr. Strobl failed to cite any

psychiatric findings in support of his diagnosis or GAF assessment” (A.R. at 19; see also A.R.

at 20). See Matney on Behalf of Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“The ALJ need not accept an opinion of a physician--even a treating physician--if it is

conclusionary and brief and is unsupported by clinical findings.”) (citing Magallanes v.

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). The ALJ later explained that he discounted Dr.

Strobl’s functional assessments because of Dr. Strobl’s reliance on Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints: 

Dr. Strobl simply accepted at face value the claimant’s subjective complaints.

His mental status examination . . . distinguishes between impairment ‘by history’

and impairment ‘by interview.’ Dr. Strobl found impairment of concentration

only ‘by history’ not ‘by interview.’ In other words, he found impairment of

concentration only because the claimant reported it, not because he himself

observed any evidence of it during [the] mental status exam. In his functional

assessment, Dr. Strobl explicitly states that he is relying on the claimant’s self

report of impairment when he states that his assessment of her ability to sustain

concentration and persist in work tasks is based on the fact that ‘she reports that

this would be impossible.’ Dr. Strobl’s mental status examination of the

claimant is not impressive for severity of mental impairment. Behavior was

‘apprehensive’ and eye contact was only ‘fair.’ Affect was appropriate to

‘depressed’ and ‘anxious’ mood, but was otherwise entirely normal.

Significantly, intelligence was average, speech and though[t] processes were

normal, and memory was intact. For all her complaints about memory loss, Dr.

Strobl found none on examination.

(A.R. at 29-30.) Elsewhere in his opinion, the ALJ engaged in a thorough discussion of the

reasons for his finding “that subjective allegations [of Plaintiff] in this case are not fully

credible.” (A.R. at 31; see also A.R. at 22-25 (detailing why Plaintiff’s “complaints are

inconsistent with the evidence”), 31-33 (detailing the ALJ’s credibility findings).) Plaintiff has

not objected to that portion of the ALJ’s opinion. Therefore, even if the ALJ “effectively

rejected” Dr. Strobl’s opinions, he articulated a permissible basis for doing so: Dr. Strobl’s

reliance upon Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. As the Ninth Circuit has stated:

Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ. Because [Dr.]

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2

 See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 & n.3.

3

 Plaintiff was seven months pregnant when she saw Dr. Close. (A.R. at 17.)

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McConochie’s diagnoses were based on the self reporting of an unreliable

person, the ALJ decided to accord them less weight. This he could legitimately

do; an opinion of disability premised to a large extent upon the claimant’s own

accounts of his symptoms and limitations may be disregarded, once those

complaints have themselves been properly discounted.

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750).

Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s treatment of the evidence provided by Dr. Ngoc M.

Pham, Plaintiff’s treating physician until November 2002. (Objections at 7-9.) The ALJ gave

greater weight to the functional assessments provided by examining physician Dr. Frederick

W. Close. Plaintiff concedes that “Dr. Close’s opinion may be substantial evidence to remove

controlling weight normally awarded the opinion of a treating physician,” and “[t]he ALJ could

cho[o]se Dr. Close’s opinions over Dr. Pham’s opinions.” (Objections at 9.) However,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately specify his reasons for choosing Dr. Close’s

opinions over those of Dr. Pham.

The ALJ stated that the functional assessments provided by Dr. Pham, who “is not

board certified,” “are inconsistent with the well-supported opinions of . . . Dr. Close, a boardcertified orthopedist whose report of examination is far more thorough and detailed than any

report by Dr. Pham. Dr. Pham’s assessments are also inconsistent with the well-supported

opinions of the state-agency physicians, Dr. Miya and Dr. Haaland. Dr. Haaland is a boardcertified orthopedic surgeon.” (A.R. at 27.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Pham’s opinions “are in

the form of ‘checklists’ decried in Batson v. Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2004).”2

(A.R. at 28.) The ALJ then cited many specific findings which contradicted Dr. Pham’s

assessments, including “Dr. Close’s April 2, 2002, finding that [Plaintiff] had a normal gait;

above normal 5+/5 lower extremity strength; normal sensation; and grossly normal ranges of

motion to her lumbar spine, cervical spine, upper extremities, and lower extremities.” (A.R.

at 28.) The ALJ also cited Dr. Close’s opinion that after pregnancy,3

 Plaintiff “should be able

to lift/carry fifty pounds occasionally; lift/carry twenty-five pounds frequently; stand/walk for

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4

 The ALJ had previously summarized the Physical Capacities Evaluation form

completed by Dr. Pham on November 18, 2002: “Without providing a diagnosis or citing

objective medical findings, Dr. Pham checked boxes to report the claimant to have a residual

functional capacity to lift/carry ten pounds occasionally, lift/carry ten pounds frequently,

stand/walk for less than two hours of an eight hour day, and sit for an undefined amount of

time with the need to alternate between sitting and standing every thirty minutes and undefined

limitations to pushing/pulling with all extremities . . . and having undefined environmental

limitations . . . .” (A.R. at 18.)

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eight hours of an eight hour day; sit for eight hours of an eight hour day; and perform frequent

bending, stooping, and crouching.” (A.R. at 28.) This opinion differed significantly from the

opinion of Dr. Pham.4

 With respect to the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Pham’s functional

assessments, the Court finds that the ALJ satisfied his duty to “make findings setting forth

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.”

Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations and quotations omitted).

Finally, Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s characterization of the diagnosis provided by

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Roy Kaplan. The ALJ stated that “I do not give great weight

to [Dr. Kaplan’s] functional assessments, because they are based primarily on his diagnosis of

fibromyalgia which is not a medically determinable impairment in this case.” (A.R. at 27.)

Plaintiff does not contest the finding that fibromyalgia is not a medically determinable

impairment in her case; instead, she argues that “[t]here is no evidence that Dr. Kaplan’s

opinions were based on a diagnosis of fibromyalgia.” (Objections at 10.) Contrary to

Plaintiff’s assertion, there is substantial evidence indicating that Dr. Kaplan’s opinions were

based upon his diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (A.R. at 258 (“FMS”), 259 (“Fibromyalgia

Syndrome”), 261 (“Fibromyalgia Syndrome”), 269 (“Fibromyalgia Syndrome”), 274

(“Fibromyalgia Syndrome”).) With respect to Dr. Kaplan’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia, the ALJ

found that the diagnosis was not a medically determinable impairment by setting forth specific,

legitimate reasons that were based on substantial evidence in the record. (A.R. at 23-25.)

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision that, during the time period at issue,

Plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Act and was not entitled to DIB or SSI

payments was free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the Court ADOPTS the Report and

Recommendation (Doc. # 21) in its entirety and supplements the Report and Recommendation

as set forth supra; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal and/or Remand (Doc. # 12) is DENIED;

and (3) Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 14) is GRANTED. The

Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

DATED: March 19, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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