Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_11-cv-00643/USCOURTS-alsd-1_11-cv-00643-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DR. RONALD CLARKE, et al., *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO: 11-00643-CG-B

*

SOPRAMCO CV8, *

*

Defendant. *

Report and Recommendation

This action is before the Court on Defendant Sopramco CV8’s 

(hereinafter “Sopramco”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 53). The motion has been referred to the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge for entry of a Report and 

Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Upon 

consideration, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Sopramco’s Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint be GRANTED and that all 

claims against Sopramco CV8 be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Background Facts

Plaintiff Dr. Ronald Clarke commenced this action against 

Defendants Tolbert Enterprises, LLC (“Tolbert”)1 and Sopramco, on 

November 15, 2011 (Doc. 1). Defendants filed motions to 

 

1 In an Order dated March 26, 2013, the Court granted 

Defendant Tolbert’s Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ 

claims against Defendant Tolbert for failure to state a claim. 

See (Docs. 51, 57). 

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dismiss, and in response thereto, Plaintiff requested leave to 

file an amended complaint. (Docs. 19, 22, 28). Plaintiff was 

granted leave to amend his complaint, and on August 10, 2012, 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Docs. 35, 36). In the 

amended complaint, Plaintiffs Dr. Ronald Clarke and Paradise 

Land Enterprises, L.L.C. (hereinafter “Paradise Land”) allege 

that Dr. Clarke is an officer and member of Paradise Land and 

that Paradise Land secured a mortgage through Regions Bank on 

December 12, 2002 for real property located at 2040 Schillinger 

Road, Mobile, Alabama 36695. 

According to Plaintiffs, Regions Bank subsequently assigned 

the mortgage to Sopramco, and on December 1, 2008, the property 

was sold at a foreclosure sale wherein Sopramco was the highest 

bidder. (Doc. 36 at 2). Plaintiffs further assert that they 

made repeated requests to Sopramco for information regarding the 

debt in an effort to redeem the property. However, Sopramco did 

not provide the requested information until August 10, 2009, and 

at that time, Sopramco demanded that Plaintiffs submit the 

redemption amount within ten (10) days. Plaintiffs assert that 

due to the short notice, they were unable to tender the 

redemption amount. Sopramco sold the subject property to 

Defendant Tolbert on October 14, 2009, and Tolbert received a 

redemption deed that it subsequently recorded. On November 30, 

2009, Plaintiffs learned of the sale to Tolbert, and Paradise 

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Land filed a complaint for redemption in the Circuit Court of 

Mobile County, Alabama (without tendering the redemption 

amount). Plaintiffs assert that the state complaint was 

ultimately dismissed on summary judgment, and on appeal, the 

Alabama Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. (Docs. 1 at 3; 36 at 

3).

In the instant action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 

Sopramco and Tolbert discriminated against Plaintiff Clarke on 

account of his race, and against Paradise Land on account of its 

status as a minority owned entity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 

1981. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants refused to 

provide them with the information required to successfully 

exercise their redemption rights. Plaintiffs seek compensatory 

and punitive damages, in addition to attorney’s fees and 

restoration of the right to redeem the real property.

Defendant Sopramco filed the instant Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 53) 2 , and seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) on several grounds: 

 

2 Defendant Sopramco’s original motion to dismiss was 

rendered moot by Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Pintando v. 

Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (llth Cir. 2007) 

(“As a general matter, an amended pleading supersedes the former 

pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, 

and is no longer a part of the pleader’s averments against his 

adversary”)(quoting Dresdner Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG in 

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Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Amended Complaint fail to 

plead a claim for discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 

1981 with the requisite specificity, factual basis, 

or plausability; Plaintiffs’ redemption claim fails 

to state a claim for relief; Plaintiffs’ claims are 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations 

periods; Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by res 

judicata and issue preclusion; and Plaintiff Clarke 

lacks standing to assert either a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981, or a claim for redemption. 

(Doc. 53).

In an Order dated March 13, 2013 (Doc. 54), Plaintiffs were 

directed to file a response to Defendant’s motion by March 27, 

2013. Plaintiffs did not file a response; however, on April 18, 

2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file their response 

out of time (Doc. 55). Although Plaintiffs were granted leave 

to file their response out of time, to date, no response has 

been filed. Accordingly, Defendant Sopramco’s motion is ripe 

for resolution.3

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

Although Plaintiffs have not responded to Sopramco’s motion, 

Sopramco, as the Rule 12(b)(6) movant, bears the initial burden 

 

Hamburg v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (llth Cir. 

2006)).

3 Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ failure to respond, the Court 

has analyzed the merits of Defendant’s motion.

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of demonstrating that it is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s

claims. See, e.g., Continental Motors, Inc. v. Jewell Aircraft, 

Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1296, n.26 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (“as the 

movant in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, JA bears the burden of 

explaining why Count III is legally deficient, with citations to 

authority as appropriate”); Superior Energy Services, LLC v. 

Boconco, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30196, 2010 WL 1267173, *5 

(S.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2010) (“When attacking a complaint in a 

motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the moving party bears 

the burden to show that the complaint should be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”); 

Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Bender, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

10908, 2010 WL 500448, *2 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2010) (“Because the 

defendant presented a Rule 12(b)(6) motion..., he at all times 

bore the burden of demonstrating entitlement to dismissal.”). 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ “lack of response to the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion 

does not trigger the kneejerk granting of such Motion on an 

abandonment theory.” See Gailes v. Marengo County Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1765, 2013 WL 81227, *5 (S.D. Ala. 

Jan. 4, 2013) (“the Court will not treat a claim as abandoned 

merely because the plaintiff has not defended it in opposition 

to a motion to dismiss”). Rather, it remains Sopramco’s burden 

as movant to establish its entitlement to relief under Rule 

12(b)(6). In light of these circumstances, the Court 

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scrutinizes Sopramco’s Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the 

following legal standard: “the Court will review the merits of 

the [movant]’s position and, if it is clearly incorrect or 

inadequate to satisfy the [movant]’s initial burden, will deny 

the motion despite the [nonmovant]’s failure to respond. If, 

however, the [movant]’s presentation is adequate to satisfy its 

initial burden, the Court will not deny the motion based on 

arguments the [nonmovant] could have made but by silence elected 

not to raise.” Id.

Additionally, in evaluating the sufficiency of a 

plaintiff’s pleadings, the court makes reasonable inferences in 

the plaintiff’s favor, “but [is] not required to draw 

plaintiff’s inference.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 

Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, 

“unwarranted deductions of fact” in a complaint are not admitted 

as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the 

plaintiff’s allegations. Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 681, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)

(stating conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be assumed 

true”).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that although Rule 8 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require 

detailed factual allegations, it does demand “more than an 

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unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id., 

556 U.S. at 678. A complaint must state a plausible claim for 

relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. The mere possibility that the 

defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion 

to dismiss. Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim 

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 

929 (2007). In the instant case, the undersigned finds that 

Sopramco has met its burden under 12(b)(6).

B. Defendant’s Contentions

1. Race Discrimination Claim

As noted supra, Sopramco asserts that this action should be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects an individual’s right 

to be free from discrimination in the “making, performance, 

modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of 

all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 

contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a),(b). To state a 

claim for non-employment discrimination under § 1981, a 

plaintiff must allege (1) he is a member of a racial minority, 

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(2) the defendant intended to racially discriminate against him, 

and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the 

activities enumerated in the statute.

In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert that 

Defendants: 

intentionally and with malice discriminated against 

the Plaintiffs . . . by refusing to allow them to 

redeem the subject property on the basis of Dr. 

Clarke’s race and the racial minority status and 

ownership of Paradise. Specifically, said 

Defendants deliberately refused to provide 

Plaintiffs with the information required to 

successfully exercise their redemption interest.

(Doc. 36 at ¶ 9). Plaintiffs further assert that Sopramco 

initiated proceedings to foreclose on the subject property, 

purchased the property in the foreclosure sale, provided 

Plaintiffs with redemption information on August 10, 2009 and 

gave Plaintiffs ten (10) days to redeem the property, and then 

sold the property to Tolbert two months later on October 14, 

2009. (Id., at ¶¶ 5-6). Accepting these allegations as true, 

they are not sufficient to state a claim for race discrimination 

under section 1981. Plaintiffs do not offer any information 

regarding the race of Dr. Clarke or the owners of Paradise. 

Further, Plaintiffs have not offered any facts from which it can 

be reasonably inferred that Sopramco’s actions were motivated by 

racial biases or were discriminatory in nature. In the absence 

of such factual allegations, Plaintiffs have failed to state a 

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plausible claim of race discrimination against Sopramco. As the 

Eleventh Circuit has explained, “while a plaintiff is not held 

to a very high standard in a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, some minimal pleading standard does exist.” 

Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms, 372 F.3d 1250, 1271 (citation 

omitted). Indeed, “notice pleading still requires a plaintiff 

to provide the defendant with fair notice of the factual grounds 

on which the complaint rests.” Id. Wholly conclusory 

allegations of law are insufficient to meet even liberal 

standards of federal pleading. Id., 372 F.3d at 1273. 

Plaintiffs’ wholly conclusory assertion that Sopramco 

discriminated against them on account of their race or racial 

status falls well short of even the most generous reading of 

pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Section 1981 claim is due to be 

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

2. Redemption Claim

Plaintiffs’ redemption related claim, based upon Ala. Code 

§ 6-5-252, is likewise due to be dismissed. Section 6-5-252 

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Anyone desiring and entitled to redeem may make a

written demand to the purchaser or his or her 

transferees for a statement in writing of the debt 

and all lawful charges claimed by him or her, and 

such purchaser or their transferees shall, within 

10 days after such written demand, furnish such 

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person making the demand with a written, itemized 

statement of all lawful charges to the purchaser or 

his or her transferee. If the purchaser or his or 

her transferee fails to furnish a written, itemized 

statement of all lawful charges within 10 days 

after demand, he or she shall forfeit all claims or 

right to compensation for improvements and the 

party so entitled to redeem may, on the expiration 

of the 10 days, file his or her complaint without a 

tender to enforce his or her rights under this 

article and file a lis pendens with the probate 

court.

Code of Alabama 6-5-252.

As best the Court can determine, Plaintiffs claim that 

Sopramco interfered with their right to redeem the subject 

property in violation of § 6-5-252, and are thus liable to 

Plaintiffs for the damages Plaintiffs suffered as a result. The 

gist of Plaintiffs’ claim is that “. . .Defendants deliberately 

refused to provide Plaintiffs with the information required to 

successfully exercise their redemption interest.” (Doc. 36, ¶ 9). 

Defendant contends that the instant action, including Plaintiffs’ 

redemption related claim, is barred by res judicata. According 

to Defendant, the instant action involves the same set of 

operative facts as the previously filed state court action, and 

the redemption claim was expressly asserted, litigated and 

adjudicated in state court. Thus, it is barred by the doctrine 

of res judicata and issue preclusion.

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a party from 

relitigating a cause of action that was, or could have been, 

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raised in a previous suit between the parties that resulted in a 

final judgment on the merits.” Sherrod v. School Bd. of Palm 

Beach County, 272 Fed. App’x 828, 829 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 

In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 

2001)). “A party seeking to invoke res judicata must satisfy 

four elements: ‘(1) the prior decision must have been rendered 

by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there must have been a 

final judgment on the merits; (3) both cases must involve the 

same parties or their privies; and (4) both cases must involve 

the same causes of action.’” Id. (quoting In re Piper Aircraft,

supra). 

In the instant case, Plaintiffs acknowledge, in their 

amended complaint, that Paradise filed a complaint for 

redemption against Defendants Sopramco and Tolbert in the 

Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama on November 30, 2009, 

that Paradise’s claim against Sopramco was dismissed, and that 

on appeal, the dismissal was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 36 at ¶ 7). Thus, there is no question that the 

prior decision was rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction. 

It is equally clear that the decision dismissing the state court 

action is final and that it was entered on the merits. Indeed, 

in granting Sopramco’s motion to alter or modify order denying 

Sopramco’s motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed 

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Paradise’s claims against Sopramco, and the dismissal was 

affirmed on appeal. (Docs. 1 at 3; 36 at 3). 

In addition, both actions involve near identical parties. 

Paradise named Sopramco was as a defendant both in this action, 

and in the state court action. Although it does not appear that 

Plaintiff Clarke was a party to the state court action, as the 

owner and an officer of Paradise, he is clearly in privy with 

Paradise; thus, the undersigned finds that both actions involve 

the same parties or their privies. Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 

725 F.2d 627, 631-32 (11th Cir. 1984) (“A final judgment on the 

merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 

relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that 

action.”). The undersigned further finds that while a 

redemption claim was asserted in the state court action and in 

this action Plaintiffs seek to assert a closely related claim 

for interference with their redemption rights, assuming arguendo

that such a claim is actionable, it could have been raised in 

the state court action because it arises out of the same nucleus 

of operative facts as the redemption claim and involves the 

foreclosure of Plaintiffs’ property. Therefore, the claim is 

barred by res judicata. See Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 

F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003) (Causes of action in a second 

suit are barred if they could have been raised in the first 

suit.); Olmstead, 725 F.2d at 632 (Res judicata “extends not 

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only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous 

litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of 

the same ‘operative nucleus of fact.’”); Pleming v. UniversalRundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Res 

judicata acts as a bar ‘not only to the precise legal theory 

presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories 

and claims arising out of the same operative nucleus of fact.’”)

(citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ redemption 

related claim is due to be DISMISSED due to res judicata.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that Defendant Sopramco’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended 

Complaint be GRANTED 4 and that Plaintiffs’ claims against 

Sopramco CV8 be DISMISSED with prejudice.

Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who 

objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

 

4 In light of the instant recommendation, the undersigned 

has not addressed the other arguments raised in Defendant 

Sopramco CV8’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72.4. 

In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate 

Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this 10th day of July, 2013.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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