Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00764/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00764-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas R. Phillips, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. CV 07-764-PHX-MHM (HCE)

ORDER

Plaintiff Thomas R. Phillips, who was formerly in the custody of the Arizona

Department of Corrections (ADC), filed this civil rights action against various ADC officials.

Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiff did not exhaust prison administrative

remedies before filing this lawsuit. (Doc. #18). They also request attorney’s fees. The

motion is fully briefed. (Doc. ##23, 24).

The Court will grant the motion to dismiss and deny the request for attorney’s fees.

I. Background

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the conditions of his confinement

violated the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. #5). Specifically, Plaintiff stated that he was forced

to sleep on a mattress on the floor because he was housed with two other inmates in a cell

designed to hold only two inmates. In addition, Plaintiff stated that the mattress was

unsanitary and quickly became infected with “silver fish” insects, that he was urinated on by

the other inmates because his mattress was on the floor, and that the ventilation system

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constantly re-circulated dust around the floor. Plaintiff claimed that as a result of these

conditions he developed skin irritations (bumps and rashes), and experienced headaches and

“draining” eyes. Plaintiff also claimed that he raised these issues to each of the named

Defendants, but that nothing was done to remedy the situation. The Court ordered

Defendants to answer the Amended Complaint. (Doc. #6).

II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust

1. Legal Standard

Plaintiff must first exhaust “available” administrative remedies before bringing an

action challenging the conditions of his confinement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35

(9th Cir. 2005). He must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the

applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). Exhaustion is

required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless

of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 741 (2001). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-21

(2007). Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter

of abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the

pleadings to decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad

discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation

omitted). 

2. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies

because he filed this lawsuit on April 11, 2007, which was before he completed the

administrative appeal process. (Doc. # 18 at 2). In support of their motion, Defendants

submit the affidavit of Aurora Aguilar, ADC Hearing Officer (id., Ex. A, Aguilar Aff. ¶ 1);

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various inmate grievance documents and responses (id., Attach. 1); and ADC Department

Order (DO) 802, Inmate Grievance System, which establishes the procedures for the inmate

administrative grievance process (id., Ex. B). 

The DO provides a four-step grievance process, which is generally as follows: (1) an

inmate must submit an inmate letter to his assigned Correctional Officer (C.O.) III,

attempting to informally resolve a complaint within 10 days after becoming aware of a

problem; (2) if the inmate is not satisfied with the response, he may file a formal grievance

to the Grievance Coordinator within 10 calendar days of receipt of the response to the inmate

letter; (3) if the inmate is not satisfied with that response, he may file a grievance appeal to

a higher official—the Deputy Warden or Warden—within 10 calendar days of the receipt of

the Coordinator’s response; and (4) if the inmate is not satisfied with the response to his

grievance appeal, he may appeal to the ADC Director within 10 calendar days of receipt of

the response from the Warden or Deputy Warden. The Director has 30 days from receipt

to respond to an appeal. (Id., Ex. B).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 11, 2007, but did not file

his Director’s Appeal until April 17, 2007. (Doc. #18 at 6; Attach. 1 at 8.) They assert that

the PLRA requires full exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a § 1983

complaint. (Doc. #18 at 4-5). Plaintiff concedes that he filed this lawsuit before he got the

final response from the Director but asserts that he did so out of ignorance. (Doc. #23 at 2).

In their Reply, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff concedes failure to exhaust before

filing and he claims no exception to the PLRA exhaustion rule, the Court must grant their

motion to dismiss. (Doc. #24 at 1). 

C. Analysis

Defendants have met their burden to demonstrate Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. The PLRA mandates that an inmate

exhaust remedies before filing a lawsuit; exhausting remedies during the course of the

lawsuit does not comply with the requirement. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1120-21

(9th Cir. 2002). The statute itself states that “[n]o action shall be brought . . . until [the

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prisoner’s] administrative remedies . . . are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In addition,

requiring dismissal where the inmate fails to exhaust before filing provides a strong incentive

that will promote the Congressional objectives behind the exhaustion requirement—affording

officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally, filtering out frivolous claims,

and development of an administrative record. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200-01. See also

Holcomb v. Fleeman, 2007 WL 3231588, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (inmate’s concession that

he did not obtain a Director’s level decision until after the lawsuit was filed “is fatal to his

action”) (citing Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2383; McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201).

Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

without prejudice.

III. Request for Attorney’s Fees

A prevailing defendant is awarded attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 only where

the action is found to be “unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.” Legal Services

of Northern Calif., Inc. v. Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 141 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Vernon v. City

of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994)). This standard is applied with particular

strictness where plaintiff proceeds pro se. Miller v. Los Angeles, 827 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15-16 (1980)); see also DeNardo v. Johnstone,

772 F. Supp. 462, 465 (D. Alaska 1991) (before awarding fees to a defendant where the

plaintiff appears pro se, the court should be able to find that the plaintiff knew or should have

known that his case was without merit). A court cannot assume that a pro se plaintiff has the

same ability as one represented by counsel to recognize objective merit or lack thereof.

Miller, 827 F. 2d at 620. But, for example, if the pro se plaintiff makes repeated attempts to

bring a claim that has been previously found frivolous, an award to defendants may be

appropriate. Id. 

Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff misrepresented that he appealed requests for

administrative relief to the highest level. (Doc. #18 at 7). Defendants argue that

misrepresentation was a factor that the Court considered in permitting this case to go forward

in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (Id.) However, because exhaustion is an

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affirmative defense, the representation had no bearing on the Court’s determination to send

this case forward. See Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 919-21. And while it is true that Plaintiff appears

to have misrepresented that he appealed requests for administrative relief to the highest level,

it is not clear that he was aware of the significance of this issue, and there is no evidence that

he made repeated attempts to litigate without exhausting his remedies. The Court, therefore,

declines to award Defendants attorney’s fees.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #18) is granted.

(2) Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice.

(3) Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees (contained in Doc. #18) is denied.

(4) This action is terminated, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2008.

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