Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00346/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00346-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Morgan,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, Arizona Department of

Corrections, et al.

Defendants. 

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CV-06-0346-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand filed on October 30, 2007.

(Doc. No. 43.) Defendants filed a response on November 27, 2007 and Plaintiff timely

replied. (Doc. Nos. 46, 49.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was

assigned to Magistrate Judge Guerin for a report and recommendation. The Magistrate

recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order

granting Plaintiff’s Motion.

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in Pima County Superior

Court asserting claims against Defendants ADOC, Warden Greg Fizer and Deputy Warden

Howard Kinsler. Plaintiff’s action arose from events that allegedly occurred while Plaintiff

was in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that the Unit

where he was housed aired an episode of the television show Dateline that portrayed Plaintiff

as a prison informant. (Complaint, ¶23.) Plaintiff alleges that Kinsler and Fizer watched the

Dateline program and knew that Plaintiff was housed at the Unit, but took no steps to protect

Plaintiff from retribution by fellow inmates. (Complaint, ¶ 24.) Shortly after the program

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aired, Plaintiff was attacked and beaten by inmates for being a “snitch.” (Complaint, ¶25.)

The complaint presented four claims: (1) negligence and/or gross negligence (against all

Defendants), (2) aiding and abetting tortuous conduct (against Defendant ADOC), (3)

intentional infliction of emotional distress (against all Defendants), and (4) violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (against all Defendants). (Doc. No. 1.) On July 10, 2006, Defendants removed

the action to the District Court of Arizona on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 

On September 27, 2007, the District Court adopted this Court’s Report and

Recommendations and granted in part a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants. (Doc. No.

40.) The District Court concluded that Defendants were entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claim, but that Plaintiff’s state law claims could survive if Plaintiff’s complaint were

amended in order to allege those claims solely against the State of Arizona pursuant to

A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F), which mandates that “[a]ny and all causes of action which may arise

out of tort caused by the director, prison officers or employees of the department, within the

scope of their legal duty, shall run only against the state.” In addition, the Court declined to

reach the issue of whether amendment of the complaint would be futile because the State of

Arizona, if named, would be protected from suit in federal court pursuant to their Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Instead, the Court advised the parties that, following amendment of

the complaint, either party would be free to seek remand of this action back to state court.

The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s action without prejudice and granted Plaintiff leave

to amend his complaint. 

On October 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, which alleges claims

against the State of Arizona for negligence and/or gross negligence, aiding and abetting

tortuous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. No. 42.) Along with

his amended complaint, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Remand, arguing that this

Court should decline to accept jurisdiction over the case now that only state law claims

remain. 

Discussion

By statute “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the

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United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,

to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place

where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). One category of cases over which the

district courts have original jurisdiction are “federal question” cases; that is, those cases

“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It

is long settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's

well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law. See Gully v. First National Bank, 299

U.S. 109 (1936). The “well-pleaded complaint rule” is the basic principle marking the

boundaries of the federal question jurisdiction of the federal district courts. See Franchise

Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1,

9-12 (1983). Only state court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court

may be removed to federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

The well-pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may

avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. See id. 

28 U.S.C. §1367(a) provides that “in any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other

claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they

form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”

However, a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if any

of four factors are met: (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the

claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has

original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for

declining jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c). 

In the present case, Plaintiff’s action was removed from state to federal court by the

original Defendants because the action included a federal claim under §1983. That claim has

now been dismissed, however, and only state law claims remain. Thus, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1367(c)(3), it is appropriate for this Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over

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this action. The Supreme Court has stated, and the Ninth Circuit has “often repeated, that

‘in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.’” Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988)).

Defendant argues that this action should not be remanded but should instead be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, which provides that “the court shall review, before

docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in

a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity” and dismiss the complaint if it seeks relief from a

governmental entity immune from suit. Defendant argues that it is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity in federal court and therefore the Court should, before considering

Plaintiff’s motion for remand, dismiss the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. Section

1915A is ill-suited for application to the present action, however. It is a part of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act and was designed to ease the burden placed on the federal courts by

frivolous lawsuits filed by pro se prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 967 (9th Cir. 1998). This case was originally filed in state court by

a Plaintiff who, although in prison, is represented by counsel, did not attempt to invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal courts, and is not proceeding in forma pauperis. Moreover, it is

disingenuous of Defendant to argue for application of 28 U.S.C. §1915A on Eleventh

Amendment grounds when it was Defendant’s counsel who originally sought removal of this

case to federal court. Although Defendant’s counsel was representing other state defendants

at the time, it was Defendant’s counsel who sought dismissal of those defendants in favor of

an action against the State. To now argue for dismissal of the State, rather than remand, on

Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, would work an unnecessarily harsh and unfair

result for the Plaintiff. Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing a State

to waive immunity to remove a case to federal court, then ‘unwaive’ it to assert that the

federal court could not act, would create a new definition of chutzpah.”) Because it is

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 It is unclear whether Defendant intends to assert these arguments in their own right or

pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. §1915A which directs the court to dismiss, at the

screening stage, pro se prisoner complaints which fail to state a claim. Either way, the

arguments do not entitle Defendant to relief for the reasons stated in this Report and

Recommendation. 

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“entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the

merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities,” the Magistrate recommends

that the Court permit remand of this action. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962).

 Defendant also argues that this action should not be remanded because Plaintiff’s

claims are time-barred under Arizona law and because Plaintiff did not comply with an

Arizona statute requiring Plaintiff to serve Defendant with a Notice of Claim prior to filing

suit.1

 These arguments are appropriately raised in a motion to dismiss or motion for

summary judgment; no such motion is currently pending before this Court. Moreover,

because these arguments arise solely under Arizona law and concern the merits of Plaintiff’s

surviving state law claims, this Court would defer to the state court’s consideration of these

issues – should Defendant raise them – following remand of this case.

Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, enter an order GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand. (Doc. No. 43.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV-06-0346-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 26th day of February, 2008.

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