Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01574/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01574-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP SANDERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

OFFICER C. ARANAS, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________)

1: 06-CV-1574 AWI SMS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DISMISSING

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

(Document #17)

BACKGROUND

On November 6, 2006, Plaintiff Phillip Sanders (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint. The

complaint appears to allege violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. On June 19,

1007, Defendant Officer C. Aranas filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for a

more definite statement. Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on the failure to allege a th

cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9 Cir. 1984). In considering a th

motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in

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the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's

favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). 

Essentially, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the plaintiff's compliance

with the liberal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 5A

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356, at 294-96. 

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires sufficient

allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them. McKeever v. Block,

932 F.2d 795, 798 (9 Cir.1991); Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern. Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1472, th

1482 (9 Cir. 1986). “The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified th

pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.” Swierkiewicz

v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1976 (2007) (quoting Swierkiewicz). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies

only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A]

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim

that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9 Cir. th

1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9 Cir. 1982)). th

ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that on or about June 6, 2006, Plaintiff noticed a police car pull up

in front of his house and Defendant Officer C. Aranas (“Defendant”) get out. Defendant went

toward Plaintiff’s neighbor’s house, where Plaintiff lost view of him. 

The complaint alleges that after about five minutes of waiting and looking to see where

Defendant was, Plaintiff went out the back door. Defendant had entered the premises through a

hole in the fence, had his gun drawn, and was looking in the side garage door that had been left

open. The complaint alleges that Defendant had his back to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then walked to

the middle of the backyard, put his hands out in plain view, and said in a loud voice, “officer,

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don’t shot [sic.]”.

The complaint alleges that Defendant asked whether he was Phillip Sanders. When

Plaintiff said yes, Defendant told Plaintiff to get on the ground. Defendant then handcuffed

Plaintiff and searched him. 

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was taken to jail. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff

was not released for three days “without ever going to the court or D.A. reject.” 

The complaint alleges Defendant searched and arrested Plaintiff without reasonable

cause. Plaintiff was detained in jail for three days without reasonable cause.

The complaint alleges that Defendant was acting outside the policies of the Fresno Police

Department. 

DISCUSSION

A. Basis For Action

The complaint does not state the statutory basis of this action. Based on the complaint’s

references to the Fourth Amendment, it appears this action is being brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in part:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by

the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9 Cir. th

2006).

Here, it is unclear if Plaintiff is pursuing this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or

some other statute. As such, the complaint is subject to dismissal because Defendant cannot

reasonably respond to a complaint where he does not know the action’s basis. 

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B. Individual Capacity Versus Official Capacity

The complaint does not state whether Plaintiff is suing Defendant in his individual

capacity or official capacity. To establish a defendant’s personal liability in an action brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law,

caused the deprivation of a federal right. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)

Civil rights actions are generally brought against individuals in their official and/or

individual capacity. Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government

official for actions he takes under color of state law. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165. Official-capacity

suits, in contrast, “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of

which an officer is an agent.” Id. at 165-66; Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9

th

Cir. 1994). An official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity because the entity is the real party in interest. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-55;

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9 Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Sacramento th

County, 98 F.3d 434, 446 (9 Cir. 1996). th

The complaint fails to state whether Plaintiff is suing Defendant in his individual or

official capacity. When a Section 1983 complaint is ambiguous as to the capacity in which a

state official is being sued, as is the case here, the court presumes that he is being sued in his

personal capacity. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, because the complaint is subject to dismissal for other reasons, Plaintiff

is advised that in any amended complaint Plaintiff should clarify whether Defendant is being

sued in his individual or official capacity.

C. Fourth Amendment

The complaint alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The

Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV. Defendant

moves to dismiss the complaint because the complaint’s allegations are vague. Defendant

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argues that the complaint’s references to “reasonable cause”, the lack of specificity on the

impermissible search, and inconsistent assertions regarding damages cause Defendant to be

unable to frame an adequate responsive pleading. The court agrees.

1. Arrest / Seizure

 The complaint is unclear on how Plaintiff believes Defendant violated his Fourth

Amendment right against unlawful arrest and seizure. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was

arrested. An arrest is lawful without a warrant if it is supported by probable cause. United

States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9 Cir. 1989). It is well established that under the Fourth

th

Amendment, to arrest a suspect on probable cause, the facts and circumstances within the

officer's knowledge must be “sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution,

in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is

about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); Moreno v. Baca,

431 F.3d 633, 639 (9 Cir. 2005). The complaint fails to allege that Defendant did not have th

probable cause. Rather, the complaint alleges Defendant had no “reasonable cause” for his

actions. Because the complaint does not allege Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest him, it

does not state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The court does note that, in some circumstances, probable cause is not needed for an

officer to seize an individual. A warrantless stop or detention, short of a full custodial arrest, is

permitted upon a showing that “the officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably

to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons

which whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

30 (1968). From the complaint it is impossible to determine if Plaintiff is alleging that

Defendant did not have reasonable suspicion for a seizure pursuant to Terry.

The fact Plaintiff may be on parole would change the cause needed to arrest him. Under

California and Federal law, probable cause is not required to arrest a parolee for a violation of

parole, nor is a parole officer required to personally effect the arrest of a parolee. United States v.

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Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 814 (9 Cir.1991). If an officer reasonably believes a parolee is in

th

violation of his parole, the officer may arrest the parolee. United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320,

1324 (9 Cir. 1984). Without knowing whether Plaintiff was on parole, it is impossible to th

determine if the complaint states a Fourth Amendment violation given the complaint’s references

to “reasonable cause”.

2. Search

The complaint is also unclear on how Plaintiff believes Defendant’s search violated his

Fourth Amendment rights. First, it is unclear if Plaintiff is contesting Defendant’s search of his

garage or his person or both. Second, Plaintiff’s use of the term “reasonable cause” makes it

difficult to respond to this claim.

A full search of a person is per se reasonable if it is incident to a lawful arrest. United

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). In addition, a search for weapons is permissible

“for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an

armed and dangerous individual.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; United States v. Flatter, 456 F.3d 1154,

1157 (9 Cir. 2006). The complaint is unclear on whether Plaintiff is challenging Defendant’s th

search after the arrest.

The Fourth Amendment ordinarily prohibits the warrantless entry into a person's house. 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,

454-455 (1971). However, an arresting officer may, upon reasonable suspicion, conduct a

“protective sweep” of premises incident to arrest for the purpose of protecting the safety of the

officers. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). It is unclear if Plaintiff is challenging

Defendant’s action when he looked into Plaintiff’s garage. 

In addition, whether Plaintiff was on probation or parole changes the standard needed to

search either Plaintiff’s person or Plaintiff’s garage. If search without a warrant is a condition of

probation, the Fourth Amendment authorizes warrantless searches if they are supported by

reasonable suspicion. United States v. Knights 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). In addition, if a

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parolee has signed a parole condition allowing searches without a warrant by a law enforcement

officers, an officer may conduct a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee's person or

residence. Samson v. California, – U.S. – 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2198-2202 (2006); United States,

474 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (9 Cir. 2007); Fitzgerald v. City of Los Angeles, 485 F.Supp.2d 1137, th

1143 (C.D.Cal. 2007). However, for such a suspicionless search to be valid, the officer

conducting the search must have prior knowledge of the person's parole status. Samson, 26

S.Ct. at 2202 n.5.; Fitzgerald, 485 F.Supp.2d at 1143; In re Jaime P., 40 Cal.4th 128, 137 (2006)

Without knowing whether Plaintiff was on probation or parole, it is impossible to determine if

the complaint states a Fourth Amendment violation.

D. Leave to Amend 

For the reasons discussed above, the complaint must be dismissed. When dismissing a

complaint, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “leave to amend should be granted unless the district

court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”

Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9 Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); th

Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9 Cir. (9 Cir. 1996). By this order, the court has given th th

Plaintiff notice of the complaint’s pleading deficiencies. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th

Cir. 2000) (if court determines that complaint fails to state claim, leave to amend may be granted

to extent that complaint’s deficiencies can be cured); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9

th

Cir. 1987) (prisoner must be given notice of deficiencies and opportunity to amend prior to

dismissing for failure to state a claim). Thus, the court will dismiss the complaint with leave to

amend. 

E. Qualified Immunity

In the motion to dismiss, Defendant requests that the court find that Defendant is entitled

to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials performing

discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 

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Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The test to determine whether a law

enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis. Moreno v.

Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9 Cir. 2005) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). First, th

the court must determine whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201;

Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638; Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 792 (9 Cir. 2003). th

If the court finds that the officer violated the plaintiff’s' constitutional rights, the court next

determines whether that right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638; Johnson, 340 F.3d at 792. 

“Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of

litigation.’” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 

 As such, the court is mindful that the court should rule on the issue of qualified immunity early

in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is

dispositive. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. However, in this case, the court cannot rule on qualified

immunity at this time. Because the complaint’s allegations are vague as to what searches are at

issue in this action, whether there was probable cause, whether Plaintiff was on parole or

probation, and other issues it is impossible to determine if taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true,

Defendant would be entitled to qualified immunity. 

ORDER

Accordingly, based on the above memorandum opinion and order, the court ORDERS

that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

3. Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within thirty days of this order’s date of

service; and

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4. Plaintiff is FOREWARNED that failure to file an amended complaint within

thirty days will result in this action’s dismissal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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