Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_24-cv-02061/USCOURTS-arwd-2_24-cv-02061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

AIDEN JONES PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 2:24-cv-02061-TLB-MEF

CAPTAIN JACOB SHOOK

(Jail Administrator); 

LIEUTENANT SAMANTHA SMITH

(Assistant Jail Administrator);

EMILY HANUSKA

(Detention Deputy); 

KATHEY EZELL

(Detention Deputy); and 

LIEUTENANT JOHN GRIFFITH DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge, 

referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation. 

The case is before the Court for preservice screening for the second time pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A.0F

1

 Under § 1915A, the Court must screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 8, 2024. (ECF No. 2). After seeking an extension of 

time to file his in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application, he was granted IFP status on June 25, 2024. 

(ECF Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10). Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Crawford County Justice Center, 

1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 

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but his Complaint centers on his incarceration in the Johnson County Detention Center (“JCDC”) 

from October 2023 to January 2024. (Id. at 8). 

A. The Original Complaint

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff raises numerous claims in his lengthy 

Complaint. The majority, however, name only the Johnson County Detention Center as the party 

responsible for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Johnson County Detention Center is 

not a person or a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 

1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (jails are not legal entities amenable to suit); see also Ketchum v. City 

of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that “departments or subdivisions” 

of local government are not “juridical entities suable as such”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. 

Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and 

sheriff’s department as parties because they are not suable entities). Because the Johnson County 

Detention Center is not subject to suit under § 1983, the Court will only address those claims 

attributed to suable persons or entities.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kathey Ezell, a Detention Deputy, “cut off Plaintiff’s 

communication abilities on the phone and the NCIC communication machine.” (ECF No. 2 at 11). 

Plaintiff states that Defendant Ezell took this action after placing Plaintiff in lockdown for calling

Ashley Zachary.1F

2 Plaintiff does not indicate how long he was in lockdown. Plaintiff says he was 

not told that he could not contact Ms. Zachary until the following day at his bond hearing for his 

2 Plaintiff does not identify Ms. Zachary in the body of his Complaint. Plaintiff filed two other 

cases in this District at the same time as this case. In Jones v. Patton, Case No. 2:24-cv-02060-

PKH-MEF, Plaintiff identified several state cases relevant this his federal filings. The Court takes 

judicial notice that Ms. Zachary is Plaintiff’s former girlfriend and was granted a domestic order 

of protection against Plaintiff in Zachary v. Jones, Case No. 36DR-23-256. Plaintiff is currently 

the Defendant in at least three open criminal cases in Johnson County, one for felony criminal 

mischief and trespass, one for violation of a no-contact order, and one for harassment and 

cyberbullying. All three cases involve Ms. Zachary.

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pretrial release. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff alleges this lack of communication impeded his ability to 

contact his attorney or anyone outside the jail, and violated his right to prepare his legal defense,

as well as his “Sixth Amendment right to access to legal counsel and a fair trial.” (Id.). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lieutenant Samantha Smith, Assistant Jail Administrator,

systematically denied him access to legal materials, instructing him to consult his public defender. 

(ECF No. 2 at 12). He alleges she denied him this access despite knowing that he was representing 

himself in a domestic relations case in state court. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges this “severely limited” 

his “ability to effectively prepare his legal defense, initiate legal actions and access the courts.” 

(Id.). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lieutenant John Griffith “rejected and returned” paperwork 

brought to him by his family without justification. (ECF No. 2 at 13). He alleges he had to invoke 

the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice so that the facility would allow him access to his 

documents. (Id.). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Emily Hanuska, a Detention Deputy, oversees the food 

planning for the facility, and the meals provided to inmates are “grossly insufficient and do not 

conform to any recognized dietary standards.” (ECF No. 2 at 14). Plaintiff alleges he weighed 

165 pounds upon arriving at JCDC, and he weighed 145 when he left. (Id. at 15). He alleges this 

is evidence of the “malnutrition and the insufficient caloric and nutritional content of the provided 

meals.” (Id. at 16). 

Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations as to Defendant Captain Jacob Shook, Jail 

Administrator, in his Complaint. 

Plaintiff proceeds against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (ECF 

No. 2 at 9). He seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, “non-economic compensatory damages,” 

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compensatory and punitive damages, costs of this litigation, and any other relief the Court deems 

just and proper. 

On August 13, 2024, the undersigned entered a preservice screening Report and 

Recommendation. (ECF No. 14). It was recommended that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant 

Hanuska, concerning the adequacy of the inmate diet provided in JCDC, remain for further review. 

It was further recommended that all of Plaintiff’s claims against all other Defendants be dismissed 

without prejudice. (Id.). 

On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a Motion to Amend his Complaint and requested 

an extension of time to file. (ECF No. 15). This Motion was granted on August 30, 2024. (ECF 

No. 16). On September 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document labelled “Plaintiff’s Supplement to 

Complaint.” (ECF No. 18). The Hon. Timothy L. Brooks, U.S. District Judge, directed the Clerk 

to docket this as Plaintiff’s timely-filed Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 19). 

“It is well-established that an amended complaint supercedes an original complaint and 

renders the original complaint without legal effect.” In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees 

Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005). The Court will, therefore, consider only the allegations 

in the Amended Complaint for the purpose of preservice screening. In his Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiff does not provide any dates other than to state that he did not receive mail until January 9, 

2024, the day before his release on a nolo-contendere plea. (ECF No. 19). His allegations appear 

to focus on his time in isolation in E-pod, which he identifies as a period of 11 days. The Court 

will, therefore, infer that the allegations in the Amended Complaint focus on his 11-day isolation 

in E-pod. 

B. The Amended Complaint

Under sections labelled “Jacob Shook,” Plaintiff raises several complaints. 

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• Plaintiff alleges he was punitively reassigned to E-pod after he was charged with a 

violation of a no-contact order. Plaintiff alleges he thought the no-contact order 

only applied to him after he was released, and alleges he was deliberately not told 

that it applied during his incarceration. (ECF No. 18 at 2). Instead, he alleges that 

“they ... waited for him to be charged with the offence.” (Id.). Based on these 

statements and his allegations in his original Complaint, the Court will infer that, 

in violation of a protective order, Plaintiff contacted Ms. Zachary while 

incarcerated in JCDC. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shook was responsible for 

his re-assignment, “as he is the jail administrator and is the one who assigns inmates 

to various pods based on there [sic] charges.” (Id.). 

• Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied due process as a pretrial detainee because

his “communications” were cut off for the 11 days he was in lockdown. (Id.). 

Plaintiff alleges he was moved to isolation only after he was charged. (Id. at 4). 

• He alleges the lockdown cell was punitive because it had no light in it, so he sat in 

darkness for 23 hours a day for the 11 days with no access to communications. He 

alleges only that one cell was devoid of light. (Id. at 2-3). 

• Plaintiff alleges the conditions in E-pod were punitive in nature and violated his 

rights as a pretrial detainee. (Id. at 3). 

• Plaintiff alleges his Fourth Amendment Rights were violated upon intake into 

JCDC when he was subjected to a “degrading search procedure as the search was 

conducted with no individualized suspicion of contraband.” (Id. at 4). He further 

alleges he attempted to refuse the search but was told he would not see the judge 

for a bond hearing if he refused the search. (Id.). Plaintiff does not identify who 

was personally involved in the search. 

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• Plaintiff alleges he was pro se in one of his cases but was denied legal mail for it 

because the mail was not brought or sent by an attorney. (Id.). 

Plaintiff does not identify how Defendant Shook was involved these claims, other than to 

state that he is responsible for upholding JCDC policies because he is the jail administrator. (Id. 

at 2). He further alleges that Shook is “fully aware of who he hires and has a duty to train.” (Id.). 

As his last claim against Defendant Shook, Plaintiff states that, as the Chief Deputy Sheriff, 

he “significantly hindered plaintiff’s ability to contact his public defender by having him 

transported over 3 hrs away to Malvern in Hot Spring County.” (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges this 

hindered his ability to contact his public defender, as he had to wait to be brought to the phones at 

Hot Spring County Jail. (Id.). He further alleges he was unable to contact his public defender for 

over a month. (Id.). Notably, the Hot Spring County Jail staff are not Defendants in this case. 

Plaintiff alleges that Shook was “fully aware” that a transfer would impede his right to counsel. 

(Id.). 

In the section labelled Samantha Smith, Plaintiff alleges that she denied him access to the 

courts by stating that his mail had to come from an attorney regarding his protection order case. 

(Id. at 5-6). He alleges she also refused to print a legal document for him. (Id. at 6), 

In the section labelled John Griffith, Plaintiff alleges that he denied him access to 

documents brought to Plaintiff by his family. As grounds for the denial, Griffith stated that mail 

must be brought by an attorney. (Id. at 6-7). Plaintiff alleges other inmates were able to receive 

mail similar to what was denied to Plaintiff. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges he “had to invoke the 

department of justice so that Jacob Shook would allow the mail.” (Id.). 

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In a section labelled Kathy Etzell,2F

3 Plaintiff alleges that Etzell is directly responsible for 

inmate’s access to the NCIC communications. When Plaintiff was placed in E-pod, Etzell 

hindered Plaintiff’s ability to contact the outside world or use the kiosk with his inmate ID for 11 

days. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges this was punishment for his charge of violating a protective order, 

and it violated his rights as a pretrial detainee. (Id. at 8). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being 

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are 

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or 

it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to 

vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re 

Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we 

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is 

discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe 

the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal 

3 Plaintiff alleges this is a corrected version of the spelling. 

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framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). However, the complaint must still allege 

specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8thCir. 1985).

III. ANALYSIS

A. PreTrial Detainee – Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges that the light in his E-pod cell was out, while other cell lights in E-pod 

were not. As a pretrial detainee,3F

4 this Court analyzes Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims 

under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Stearns v. Inmate Services Corporation, 

957 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 525 n.16 (1979)). In 

articulating the standard governing pretrial detainees’ claims related to conditions of confinement, 

the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) held that the government may detain 

defendants prior to trial and “may subject them to the restrictions and conditions of a detention 

facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise 

violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-37. There are two ways to determine whether conditions of 

confinement rise to the level of punishment. First, “a plaintiff could show that the conditions were 

intentionally punitive.” Id. at 538. Alternatively, “if there is no expressly demonstrated intent to 

punish, the plaintiff could also show that the conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate 

government purpose or were excessive in relation to that purpose.” Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907

(quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39). “Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention 

amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 

1996). “There is a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.”

Id. “In considering whether the conditions of pretrial detention are unconstitutionally punitive, 

4 There is some question as to whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at this point because he has 

pleaded guilty to at least one criminal case, as discussed in State v. Reider, Case No. 2:24-cv02059-TLB, another of Plaintiff’s cases pending in this District. As the lack of dates provided 

makes it impossible to discern the timeline in question, however, the Court will analyze his claims 

under the standard for a pretrial detainee. 

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[courts] review the totality of the circumstances of a pretrial detainee’s confinement.” Morris v. 

Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010). 

In this case, the imposition upon Plaintiff was de minimis. Nothing in Plaintiff’s allegation 

concerning a light being out for a short period of time permits the inference that anyone expressly 

intended to punish him. Nor does he allege that he became ill or suffered any other injury because 

the light in his cell was out for his 11-day stay in isolation. 

B. PreTrial Detainee – Placement in Isolation

Threaded throughout Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is the argument that he is exempt 

from any form of inmate disciplinary action because he is a pretrial detainee and cannot be 

punished. Plaintiff’s argument misconstrues the law. Here, Plaintiff admits that he violated a nocontact order by contacting Ms. Zachary while incarcerated in JCDC. He was then placed in 

isolation for 11 days, which kept him from contacting Ms. Zachary again. “Security of the criminal 

justice process, enforcement of a court’s orders, protection of victims and witnesses are legitimate 

penological interests ...” Avery v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, No. 5:18-CV-05075, 2020 WL 

714176, at *9 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 12, 2020), aff'd, 839 F. App’x 26 (8th Cir. 2021) (unpublished). 

No punishment can be inferred from these facts. 

As to Plaintiff’s more general exemption argument, “there exists no basis in the Due 

Process Clause or elsewhere in the Constitution for requiring that discipline not be imposed upon 

a pretrial detainee for violations of institutional discipline without the particular procedural 

mechanisms invoked by plaintiff here, including notice, a hearing or specific findings, a right to 

counsel, and an independent investigation of the charges.” Swearengin v. Chamberlain, No. 4:22-

CV-403 SRW, 2022 WL 16527241, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2022) (quoting Smith v. Copeland, 

892 F.Supp. 1218, 1233 (E.D. Mo. 1995)). Only when a condition or restriction of pretrial 

confinement is “arbitrary or purposeless” is the action a punishment that violates Due Process if 

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inflicted upon pretrial detainees. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Maintaining the “security, good order and 

discipline” of a facility is always a legitimate penological interest. Kaden v. Slykhuis, 651 F.3d 

966, 968 (8th Cir. 2011). Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that, as pretrial detainee, he is exempt from 

disciplinary action for breaking facility rules or violating court orders lacks merit. 

C. Hiring, policies and training - Defendant Shook

Plaintiff fails to state any plausible constitutional claim against Defendant Shook. 

“Liability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation 

of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362, 370 (1976)). Plaintiff merely identifies Defendant Shook as the Jail Administrator for 

JCDC, and responsible for hiring, upholding policies, and training. This allegation alone is 

insufficient to support a claim. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 654, 694 (1978)

(a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based solely on a respondeat superior 

theory of liability).

D. Denial of Access to Courts - Defendants Shook, Smith, Ezell, and Griffith

Plaintiff fails to state a plausible denial of meaningful access to courts claim against these 

Defendants based on his allegations that he was not able to use the phone or NCIC device for 11

days while under lockdown; that paperwork brought to him by his family during his isolation was 

returned; that he was not provided legal materials and was instead instructed to speak with his 

public defender; and that he was transferred to another facility in order to impede access to his 

public defender. The Supreme Court has held “the fundamental constitutional right of access to 

the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful 

legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons 

trained in the law.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 

817 (1997)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court “did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a 

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law library or legal assistance.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Instead, prison officials must provide 

“some means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of 

fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Bear v. Fayram, 650 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). These means may include, but they are not 

limited to, prison libraries, jailhouse lawyers, private lawyers on contract with the prison, or some 

combination of these and other methods. Id.

Further, an inmate cannot prevail on an access-to-courts claim unless he can demonstrate 

that he suffered prejudice or actual injury because of the prison officials’ conduct. See Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 351-2; see also Farver v. Vilches, 155 F.3d 978, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); 

Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 1997) (to prevail on access-to-courts claim, 

inmate must show actual injury or prejudice even if denial of access to library is complete and 

systematic); McMaster v. Pung, 984 F.2d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 1993). “To prove a violation of the 

right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must establish the state has not provided an 

opportunity to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner’s sentence or conditions of confinement in 

a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably 

meritorious underlying legal claim.’” Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff states that he was represented by a public defender. Plaintiff fails to allege 

that he suffered any prejudice or actual injury in any of his pending state cases. Instead, he merely 

makes vague and conclusory allegations that his ability to prepare for his cases was impeded or 

limited. See Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337 (even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient 

to state a claim). Thus, he fails to state a plausible denial of meaningful access to courts claim 

against these Defendants. 

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E. Defendant Hanuska

Plaintiff makes no allegations against Defendant Hanuska in his Amended Complaint. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) 

Plaintiff/Petitioner is warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on 

the case for future judicial consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. 

Referral Status: This case should not remain referred because all matters have been 

recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation. 

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation 

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are 

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the 

district court.

DATED this 13th day of December 2024. 

/s/ Mark E. Ford

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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