Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03227/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03227-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NUMA BARNES,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-03227-RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

In this action plaintiff Numa Barnes challenges defendants’ right to pursue a non-judicial 

foreclosure on her residence. In 2013, defendants successfully moved before the previouslyassigned judge to dismiss the complaint on res judicata grounds, in light of a prior action filed by 

Barnes in state court arising from the same foreclosure proceedings. Barnes appealed, and earlier 

this year the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum decision vacating and remanding. The appellate 

court explained: 

In dismissing this action on the basis of res judicata, the district 

court applied the standard used to analyze the preclusive effect of 

prior federal court judgments. However, “[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 

federal courts are required to give state court judgments the 

preclusive effects they would be given by another court of that 

state.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Unlike the federal courts, “which apply a ‘transactional nucleus of 

facts’ test, ‘California courts employ the primary rights theory to 

determine what constitutes the same cause of action for claim 

preclusion purposes.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Case 3:13-cv-03227-RS Document 84 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 4
CASE NO. 13-cv-03227-RS

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The appellate disposition directed this court, “to determine in the first instance the 

preclusive effect to be given Barnes’s prior California state court action under the correct 

standard.” Following the remand, defendants again moved to dismiss, asserting that under the 

California standard the result is the same and this action is still barred by res judicata. 

Despite having been put on notice by the Ninth Circuit memorandum and defendants’ 

moving papers that the critical issue after remand is whether this action implicates the same 

“primary rights” as the prior state case, the res judicata discussion in Barnes’ opposition brief was

virtually word-for-word identical to that in the brief she submitted in 2013—and it did not directly 

discuss the relevant standard or those issues. In light of Barnes’ failure to address the question, 

much less establish that her present action does not involve the same primary right or rights under 

California law, dismissal likely would have been warranted. Nevertheless, giving Barnes every 

benefit of the doubt, an order for further briefing issued instead, providing her one further 

opportunity to submit argument and authority directed at showing that her present action is not 

barred by res judicata “under the correct standard.” 

Under California law, res judicata applies where (1) a claim raised in the present action is 

identical to a claim litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final 

judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party 

to the prior proceeding. See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal.4th 788, 797 (2010). 

There is no tenable argument that the state court judgment was not a final judgment in favor of the 

defendants in this action, given that Barnes failed to amend after demurrers were sustained with 

leave to amend to do so.

Barnes’ supplemental briefing therefore argues only that the claims raised in the present 

proceeding do not involve the same “primary right” as those in the state action. She insists her 

present claim is that alleged defects in the “securitization” of her loan deprive defendants of any 

right to foreclose, whereas in the state action she was complaining of so-called “dual tracking”—

the practice of a lender to initiate foreclosure proceeding while a borrower’s loan modification 

application is still pending. As Boeken makes clear, however:

Case 3:13-cv-03227-RS Document 84 Filed 12/05/16 Page 2 of 4
CASE NO. 13-cv-03227-RS

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery 

might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for 

relief. ‘Hence a judgment for the defendant is a bar to a subsequent 

action by the plaintiff based on the same injury to the same right, 

even though he presents a different legal ground for relief.’ 

[Citations.]” Thus, under the primary rights theory, the 

determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two actions 

involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm, 

they generally involve the same primary right. 

Boeken, 48 Cal. 4th at 798. 

Barnes’ state court complaint invoked her alleged primary right not to suffer a wrongful 

foreclosure on her residence. Although the present action articulates different legal theories as to 

why the foreclosure allegedly is wrongful, there is no basis to conclude it involves any different 

“primary right.”1 Nor does Barnes offer any plausible basis under which an amendment would 

avoid the res judicata bar.

Barnes does argue that defendants engaged in allegedly wrongful conduct with respect to 

continuing the foreclosure sale while this action was pending. Although Barnes has made no 

showing that any such allegations support an actionable claim for relief, this dismissal order is 

without prejudice to any claims arising subsequent to the filing of this action. The motion to 

dismiss is granted, without leave to amend. A separate judgment will issue.

 

1

 Because res judicata applies, this Court may not adjudicate the merits of the claims. It is worth 

noting, however, that the theories advanced by Barnes in this action appear similar to those that 

generally have not been accepted as tenable. See, Vasquez v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 5158538, 

at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (collecting cases). As Vasquez explains, “[b]orrowers commonly 

attack a lender’s standing to foreclose by challenging irregularities in the securitization process” 

but “[s]uch challenges are almost universally dismissed.” Id. at *3. Although the recent decision 

in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 62 Cal.4th 919 (2016) holds that borrowers may have 

standing to challenge void assignments, at least in the post-foreclosure context, it does not appear 

that generic attacks on “securitization” like those alleged here are now more viable. 

Case 3:13-cv-03227-RS Document 84 Filed 12/05/16 Page 3 of 4
CASE NO. 13-cv-03227-RS

4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

Case 3:13-cv-03227-RS Document 84 Filed 12/05/16 Page 4 of 4