Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01425/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01425-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON HOLLINGSWORTH,

CDCR #AX-5810,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FLINN SPRINGS OA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01425-DMS-JMA

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

JASON HOLLINGSWORTH (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, 

initiated this civil action in June 2016, by filing a complaint and “demand for trial” based 

on alleged violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff did 

not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he filed a 

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2).

I. Procedural Background

On August 2, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, but sua sponte 

dismissed his complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff was notified of his pleading deficiencies, 

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however, and provided an opportunity to amend. (Id. at 5-10). He has since filed an 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6), which also requires screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim sua 

sponte and “before defendants are served.”) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

II. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges essentially the same facts as his original. Cf.

ECF No. 1 at 2-5. Specifically, he claims to have purchased a manufactured home from 

Defendant James Naill, and to have “entered into a contractual agreement” with Defendants 

Myra O’Leary, the Flinn Springs Owners Association, and Castle Breckenridge 

Management to lease a lot for his home in the Flinn Springs Mobile Home Park, in El 

Cajon, California (ECF No. 6 at 2-4.) 

“Upon [his] incarceration,” however, Plaintiff contends Naill “unlawfully”

transferred the title to his home over to Defendant O’Leary, the manager of Flinn Springs, 

and the Flinn Springs Owners Association (OA). (Id. at 4-6.) Plaintiff claims Defendants

Elizabeth Call, Derek Earley, and Joseph Fox, all attorneys for Flinn Springs OA, and 

Defendant Castle Breckenridge Management Company, each “had a part [in] the illegal 

taking of [his] family home and property,” and “conspired to commit fraud” and to “cover 

up the theft,” even though they “should have known” this violated “all state a federal laws.” 

(Id. at 9.) Plaintiff demands a jury trial and $10 million in damages (Id.)

III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

If a prisoner’s complaint “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity,” the Court “shall review” the pleading “as soon as 

practicable after docketing,” and “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, 

if [it] . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014).

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As noted below, Plaintiff alleges violations of his “civil rights” for alleged violation of “all 

California and United States federal laws,” (ECF No. 6 at 1-3), but he seeks redress from 

private citizens, attorneys, his former home owners’ association, and a property 

management company, none of whom are alleged to be governmental actors. Id. at 2. 

Therefore, § 1915A(a)’s screening provisions do not apply. See Chavez, 817 F.3d at 1168 

(quoting § 1915A(a)); see also Thompson v. Hicks, 213 Fed. Appx. 939, 2007 WL 106785

at *3 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that because a private defendant was not a “governmental 

entity” as described in § 1915A, prisoner’s complaint as to that defendant was not subject 

to dismissal under § 1915A).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, however, his Complaint is still subject to a sua 

sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune 

from such relief,” regardless of whether he seeks redress from a “governmental entity.” See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 

1763 (2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action 

or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted.”); Lopez , 203 F.3d at 1127.

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 

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context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply 

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the 

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

Because Plaintiff claims violations of his “civil rights” under “United States federal 

laws” (ECF No. 6 at 1, 3), and he and is still proceeding without counsel, the Court 

continues to liberally construe his cause of action to arise under its federal question 

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1343 and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (where a 

plaintiff appears in propria persona, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally and 

afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt). “A litigant complaining of a violation of a 

constitutional right does not have a direct cause of action under the United States 

Constitution” and “must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983” instead. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley 

Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Azul–Pacifico Inc. v. City of Los 

Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992)).

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Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 

1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

While Plaintiff’s original complaint specifically invoked the Fourth and Fifth 

Amendments,1 his Amended Complaint is both more broad and more general: he claims 

only that Defendants violated a “contractual agreement to follow all California laws and 

United States federal laws” when they “illegally” transferred his “rights to ownership of 

property.” (ECF No. 6 at 3, 8.) Thus, even assuming Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

alleged the violation of any constitutional right, he stills fails to include plausible facts to 

show that that any of the named Defendants did so while “acting under color of state law.” 

See West; 487 U.S. at 48; Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 

(9th Cir. 1999) (The party charged with a constitutional deprivation under § 1983 must be 

a person who may fairly be said to be a governmental actor) (citation and quotations 

omitted); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Section § 1983 liability 

attaches only to individuals ‘who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in 

some capacity.’”) (citation omitted).

The Constitution protects individual rights only from government action and not 

from private action; it is only when the government is responsible for the specific conduct 

 

1 The Court’s August 2, 2016 Order noted neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendments 

apply to the actions of private citizens. See ECF No. 5 at 8 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 

466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search 

and seizure); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001) (Due Process 

Clause of Fifth Amendment); Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 2010) (Takings 

Clause of Fifth Amendment)).

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of which the plaintiff complains that individual constitutional rights are implicated. Single 

Moms, Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, private 

parties do not generally act under color of state law. See Price v. Hawai’i, 939 F.2d 702, 

707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). Section “1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no 

matter how discriminatory or wrong.” Sutton, 193 F.3d at 835 (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. 

Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 

see also Ouzts v. Md. Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir.1974) (a purely private 

actor may be liable for his misconduct in state court, but his conduct is not actionable under 

Section 1983, regardless of how egregious).

As noted above, Plaintiff seeks to sue only private actors in this case. Therefore, in 

its August 2, 2016 Order, the Court cautioned that in order for him to show that the private 

conduct at issue constituted governmental action, he must allege “something more.” (ECF 

No. 5 at 7) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (“Action 

by a private party pursuant to [§ 1983], without something more, [i]s not sufficient to justify 

a characterization of that party as a ‘state actor.’”)). The Court further noted four different 

ways by which Plaintiff might be able to plead that “something more”: (1) public function, 

(2) joint action, (3) governmental compulsion or coercion, and (4) governmental nexus. 

See id. (citing Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997); Parks Sch. of 

Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); Gorenc v. Salt River Project 

Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, however, still fails to allege facts sufficient to 

plausibly show that any of the private parties or organizations he has named as Defendants 

performed any public function traditionally reserved to the State, acted as willful 

participants in joint action with government agents,2 or was compelled, coerced, or had any 

 

2 While Plaintiff does allege Defendants “conspired” against him, (ECF No. 6 at 1, 8), he 

does not allege any of them entered into an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate 

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connection whatsoever with the State, when they allegedly deprived Plaintiff of his 

manufactured home after he was incarcerated. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Lugar, 457 U.S. 

at 939.

For all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1130. Because “the statute mandates dismissal—even if dismissal comes before 

the defendants are served,” Chavez, 817 F.3d at 1167-68, and Plaintiff has already been 

provided an opportunity to cure his pleading deficiencies to no avail, the Court further finds 

leave to amend would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 

(9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... leave to 

amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint without further leave to amend for failing to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal 

from this Order of dismissal would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 

558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal 

only if appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2017

 

his constitutional rights “in joint action with the State or its agents.” See Tsao v. Desert 

Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Franklin, 312 F.3d at 445.)

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