Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00467/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00467-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GEORGE DIAZ QUINONES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-00467 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

JAMES KIMBLE and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On March 2, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 12) on August 28, 2007.

Petitioner filed a reply (“Reply”) to Respondents answer to his

petition on September 18, 2007. See Docket No. 13.

I Procedural History

In February of 2003, Petitioner was incarcerated at the

Buckley Unit of the Lewis Prison Complex in Buckeye, Arizona.

See Answer at 2. On February 20, 2003, several corrections

officers at the Buckley Unit were attacked by inmates in a

general prison melee. Id. Petitioner was implicated in an

attack on Sergeant Michelle O’Brien, a detention officer, and

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was also alleged to have assaulted Officer Michael Sharp by

punching him, and to have assaulted Officer Steven Jarol by

hitting him in the shoulder. Id. at 2-3.

Petitioner, along with six other inmates, was charged

with committing assault with the intent to incite a riot or

participating in a riot. Id., Exh. C Petitioner was also

charged with one count of assaulting Officer Jarol and one count

of assaulting Officer Sharp. Id., Exh. C. The state alleged

Petitioner had three prior felony convictions. Id., Exh. C.

After a trial on the charges against him, a jury found

Petitioner guilty of assault with the intent to incite a riot or

participating in a riot and one count of assault, i.e., on

Officer Sharp. Id., Exh. D. The jury found Petitioner not

guilty on the charge of assaulting Officer Jarol. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner admitted two prior felony convictions for

the purpose of sentencing. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was

sentenced to a “super mitigated” term of 10.5 years imprisonment

pursuant to his conviction for assault with the intent to incite

a riot or participating in a riot. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was

sentenced to a concurrent term of 3 years imprisonment pursuant

to his assault conviction. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. C. Petitioner’s appointed

counsel filed an Anders brief, averring he could find no

meritorious issues to raise in Petitioner’s defense. Id., Exh.

F. Petitioner’s appointed counsel did raise the substantive

claims Petitioner believed to be meritorious. Id., Exh. F. On

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Petitioner’s behalf counsel argued he was deprived of his right

to the effective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel

was not adequately prepared, because counsel had not adequately

consulted with Petitioner, because counsel was disorganized, and

because counsel did not ask witnesses questions Petitioner

believed should be asked. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner also

asserted his convictions could not stand because the state’s

witnesses were not credible and because the prosecutor had

engaged in misconduct with regard to plea bargaining. Id., Exh.

F. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences in a memorandum decision filed

February 14, 2006. Id., Exh. G. The Court of Appeals noted

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were

properly raised in an action for post-conviction relief rather

than in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. G. The Arizona Court of

Appeals rejected Petitioner’s other claims on the merits of

those claims. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner did not seek review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 4.

Prior to the issuance of the Court of Appeals’

decision, on June 8, 2005, Petitioner filed an action for postconviction relief in the Arizona Superior Court. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner was appointed counsel, who informed the court he

could find no meritorious issues to raise on Petitioner’s

behalf. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner did not file a pro se petition

for post-conviction relief by the deadline specified by the

state court. Id., Exh. J. Accordingly, the Arizona Superior

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Court dismissed Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief

based on his procedural error on January 11, 2006. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner asserts he filed a petition for review of

the dismissal of his first action for post-conviction relief in

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends the petition

for review was denied. However, Petitioner provides no evidence

that he sought review of the trial court’s decision on his Rule

32 petition by the Arizona Court of Appeals. The public docket

in the Maricopa County Superior Court website database indicates

Petitioner did not seek review of the dismissal entered by the

Superior Court.

Petitioner filed a second action for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on February 28, 2006. Id.,

Exh. K. Petitioner sought permission to pursue a second or

successive post-conviction action, which permission was denied

in a decision issued April 14, 2006. Id., Exh. L. The Arizona

Superior Court concluded Petitioner had not stated the existence

of any factor within the exceptions to the rule prohibiting a

second or successive action. Id., Exh. L. 

Petitioner asserts he filed a petition for review of

the decision denying leave to file a second Rule 32 petition by

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner further alleges that

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied leave to file a second or

successive petition. However, Petitioner provides no proof of

such a petition for review. The public docket in the Maricopa

County Superior Court website database indicates Petitioner did

not seek review of the dismissal entered by the Superior Court.

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Petitioner filed a third action for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on June 29, 2006. Id.,

Exh. M. The action was summarily dismissed on August 4, 2006.

Id., Exh. N. The Superior Court determined Petitioner’s claims

were precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2.(a), Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, because the claims could have been raised in

Petitioner’s direct appeal or in his first action for postconviction relief, but were not raised in those actions. Id.,

Exh. N. In his reply to Respondents’ answer to his petition,

Petitioner provides the first page of a pleading allegedly filed

in the Arizona Court of Appeals, dated August 17, 2006,

indicating an intent to appeal the decision of the Superior

Court entered August 4, 2006. See Reply (Docket No. 13),

Attach. In this “Petition for Review,” Petitioner contends he

did not assault anyone, that his trial should have been severed

from that of his co-defendants, and that his trial counsel was

ineffective. Id., Attach.

In his action for federal habeas relief, Petitioner

asserts he was denied his right to due process of law because

his trial was not severed from that of his co-defendants.

Petitioner also claims he was deprived of his right to the

effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges his trial

counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did not

sufficiently investigate the facts of the case or properly

impeach the testimony of Sergeant O’Brien and because counsel

did not seek to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants.

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Respondents assert Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his federal habeas claims. Because Petitioner has not

shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default, Respondents argue, his habeas petition must be denied.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must exhaust a federal habeas claim in

the state courts before the District Court may grant relief on

the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the

state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by

“fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in

a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.

Ct. 2971 (2005). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

concluded that, in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the

“highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied

if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement regarding a federal habeas claim, the

petitioner must present both the operative facts and the legal

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principles controlling the claim to the state courts. See

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). The

Supreme Court has emphasized that the purpose of exhaustion is

to give the states the opportunity to pass upon and correct

alleged federal constitutional errors. See Baldwin v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if

the petitioner did not present the claim to the state court as

asserting the violation of a specific federal constitutional

right, as opposed to the violation of a state constitutional

right, state rule, or state law, the federal habeas claim was

not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541

U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. A petitioner’s allusion to

“broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial” in their state court

pleadings is not sufficient to establish a federal

constitutional claim was fairly presented to the state courts.

Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999 (internal citations omitted).

B. Procedural default

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2007). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351,

109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

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claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See id.,

489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v. Martinez, 862

F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural default also occurs

when a petitioner did present a claim to the state courts, but

the state courts did not address the merits of the claim because

the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See,

e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590,

2594-95 (1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating

a state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and

independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may not raise

the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and

prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d

627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005,

1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and preclusion bar Petitioner from

now returning to the state courts to exhaust any unexhausted

federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claims not previously fairly

presented to the state courts. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

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975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Federal courts hearing habeas petitions may

not review state convictions, even for

federal constitutional claims, if the state

court judgment procedurally barring the

petitioner’s claims rests on an independent

and adequate state law ground. []. Procedural

default, a particular type of adequate and

independent state ground, applies to bar

federal habeas review when the state court

has declined to address the petitioner’s

federal claims because he failed to meet

state procedural requirements...

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Stewart

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002)

(holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333

(9th Cir. 1992).

C. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

miscarriage of justice, or cause and actual prejudice to excuse

his default of the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, 111

S. Ct. at 2555-56. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the

petitioner’s procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

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cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that the alleged error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires

Petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to due

process of law because his trial was not severed from that of

his co-defendants. 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim by

presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally

correct manner, i.e., by raising it in his direct appeal.

Petitioner alleges he raised this claim in his third action for

post-conviction relief and alleges he exhausted the claim by

presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals, attaching a copy

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of a pleading doing so purportedly filed in the state court.

However, the claim was procedurally defaulted by Plaintiff’s

failure to raise the claim in his direct appeal. Plaintiff did

not properly exhaust the claim in the state courts by raising it

in the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct

manner.

Petitioner also claims he was deprived of his right to

the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges his

trial counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did

not sufficiently investigate the facts of the case.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals found the claim not ripe because the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure require that an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim be raised in an action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Petitioner did not completely exhaust this claim in

his first action for post-conviction relief because he did not

properly pursue any claims raised in his first action for postconviction relief to Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner contends his trial counsel did not properly

impeach the testimony of Sergeant O’Brien.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals found the claim not ripe because the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure require that an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim be raised in an action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Additionally, Petitioner did not properly exhaust

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this claim in his first action for post-conviction relief

because he did not properly pursue any claims raised in his

first action for post-conviction relief to Arizona Court of

Appeals. 

Petitioner also alleges his trial counsel was

ineffective because counsel did not seek to sever his trial from

that of his co-defendants. 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this by presenting

it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct

manner. Petitioner did not allege this factual basis for an

ineffective assistance claim in any of his state court postconviction proceedings.

 In reply to Respondents’ assertion his claims are

procedurally defaulted, Petitioner restates his assertion that

he is factually innocent of the crimes of conviction, but

provides no evidence of factual innocence other than his

statements. Petitioner asserts his factual innocence is

established by the trial errors he alleges. Additionally,

Petitioner asserts as cause for his procedural default of his

claims that he was only afforded access to a law library once

per week. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claims stated in his

petitioner for federal habeas relief. 

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review

of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

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124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, Petitioner would have to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could have found

him guilty of the offenses of conviction. See Dretke, 541 U.S.

at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832,

842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

The miscarriage of justice exception is

concerned with actual as compared to legal

innocence ... To be credible, a claim of

actual innocence must be based on reliable

evidence not presented at trial. Given the

rarity of such evidence, in virtually every

case, the allegation of actual innocence has

been summarily rejected.

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1502-

03 (1998). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that the “actual

innocence” exception to the statute of limitations is concerned

with actual, as opposed to legal, innocence and must be based on

reliable evidence not presented at trial. See Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S. Ct. 151, 865-66 (1995). A habeas

petitioner’s “late-offered” testimony is not “new” if it was

available at trial, nor is evidence which is a mere “repackaging

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of the record as presented at trial” considered “new.” Hubbard

v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,

543 U.S. 1070 (2005). If Petitioner does not present

supplementary post-trial evidence establishing he is factually

innocent, he may not avoid the procedural bar to consideration

of the merits of his habeas claims. See Coley v. Gonzales, 55

F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioner has not presented such evidence as would

allow him to proceed beyond his procedural default of his

claims. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

consideration of the merits of his claim based on a showing that

an actual miscarriage of justice will occur. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal habeas

claims in the state courts. Petitioner has not shown cause for,

nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of his claims.

Additionally, Petitioner has not made the requisite showing of

factual innocence to establish that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice would occur if the Court does not consider the merits of

his habeas claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Quinones’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

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Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 24th day of September, 2007.

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