Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00302/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00302-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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The factual history is provided for background only and does not form the basis of the 1

court’s decision; the assertions contained therein are not necessarily taken as adjudged to be true. 

The legally relevant facts relied upon by the court are discussed within the analysis. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS

CONFERENCE - INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS

LOCAL 404M,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN,

Defendant.

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CIV-F-08-0302 AWI TAG

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. History1

 Plaintiff Graphic Communications Conference represents 17 pressroom employees

(“Workers”) of Defendant the Bakersfield Californian. The Workers are covered under a

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that runs through August 2009. On January 15, 2008,

Defendant announced its intention to subcontract all pressroom employment, as well as other

functions, to Brad Mosely, Inc. (“BMI”), and to terminate the Workers on March 17, 2008. The

Workers’ benefits would end on that date with the exception of health care coverage which

would end on March 31, 2008. Plaintiff filed a grievance January 17, 2008 in accordance with

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Article XXIII, Grievance and Arbitration Procedure of the CBA. The grievance has proceeded to

arbitration. Defendant and Plaintiff have agreed to Douglas Collins as arbitrator. The arbitration

will take place on March 26, 2008 with all briefs to be filed by March 31, 2008. Arbitrator

Collins is required to issue his judgment within 30 days of the submission of briefs, but the

parties have agreed to request that he do so by April 21, 2008.

Defendant intends to move forward with the subcontract and terminate all Workers on

March 17, 2008. BMI has hired six of the Workers in some capacity; the others would lose their

jobs in the pressroom. The contract between Defendant and BMI (“BMI Contract”) specifies that

if implementation of the contract is delayed due to intervention by a third party (i.e. Plaintiff),

Defendant must pay BMI $333,333 per month in compensation. Plaintiff has filed this suit,

seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the Workers from being terminated. Docs. 1 and 5. 

The court’s jurisdiction is based on the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §185(a)). 

Defendant opposes the motion. Doc. 17. A hearing on the matter was held on Friday, March 14,

2008.

Plaintiff also filed a motion to strike a declaration which made reference to and relied

upon a document which was not filed as an attachment. Doc. 34. Defendant stated the omission

was accidental and promptly filed the missing document. Docs. 35 and 38. In response, Plaintiff

withdrew its motion to strike at the hearing. 

II. Legal Standards

A preliminary injunction may issue if a moving party establishes: (1) a likelihood of

success on the merits and the possibility of immediate irreparable injury, or (2) the existence of

serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips heavily in its favor.

See Metro Publishing, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of

irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v.

Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). Alternatively, the traditional test

requires a plaintiff to establish “(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the

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possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiffs if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of

hardships favoring the plaintiffs, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).”

Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918-9 (9th Cir. 2003),

quoting Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). To

receive temporary injunctive relief under any articulation of the relevant test, the moving party

must show a “significant threat of irreparable injury, irrespective of the magnitude of the injury.”

Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1397 n.1 (9th Cir.

1997), quoting Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 868 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989).

III. Discussion

Courts are ordinarily barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act from issuing injunctions in

labor disputes. See 29 U.S.C. §104. The U.S. Supreme Court has carved out a narrow exception

permitting injunctions enjoining a strike in cases involving arbitration. See Boys Markets, Inc. v.

Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970). Subsequent precedent has made clear that

injunctions enjoining the employer in cases involving arbitration (commonly termed “reverse

Boys Markets” situations) are similarly permitted. See Newspaper & Periodical Drivers’ &

Helpers’ Union, Local 921 v. San Francisco Newspaper Agency, 89 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir.

1996). Plaintiff seeks a reverse Boys Markets injunction. 

In reviewing motions for preliminary injunctions of this nature, courts review “the

following considerations: (1) whether the collective bargaining agreement contains a mandatory

arbitration provision; (2) whether the underlying dispute is arbitrable; (3) whether the party

seeking arbitration is prepared to arbitrate; and (4) whether the issuance of an injunction would

be warranted under ordinary principles of equity. The fourth consideration turns on whether

breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed;

whether the breaches have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the Union; and whether the

Union will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the Agency from its issuance.”

Newspaper & Periodical Drivers’ & Helpers’ Union, Local 921 v. San Francisco Newspaper

Agency, 89 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Amalgamated Transit Union, etc. v.

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As discussed below, the case law in this field is fragmented. The precise relationship 2

between the Greyhound II factors to those considerations listed in San Francisco Newspaper is

unclear.

4

Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other

grounds. In addition, any injunction must comply with Ninth Circuit precedent in Amalgamated

Transit Union v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1977), commonly referred to as

Greyhound II. As Plaintiff has not met standard required by Greyhound II, the court limits its 2

analysis on the factors contained therein. 

A. Greyhound II Factors

There is some confusion in interpreting Greyhound II, which dealt with a reverse Boys

Markets situation. The opinion states:

An undertaking to preserve the status quo pending arbitration would be to Greyhound

what an undertaking not to strike would be to a union. The promisee of each undertaking

would obtain its benefits in exchange for a consideration furnished by it. In this case,

however, the Union’s promise to submit the dispute to arbitration and not to strike could

not have been given in exchange for an express promise by Greyhound to preserve the

status quo because no such promise was made.

Moreover, no basis exists for finding such a promise implied in fact. While a promise to

submit a dispute to arbitration may justify a finding of an implied duty not to strike, such

a promise does not imply a duty on the part of the employer to preserve the status quo

pending arbitration. The source of this difference is that a strike pending arbitration

generally will frustrate and interfere with the arbitral process while the employer’s

altering the status quo generally will not. The implication of a duty not to strike may be

essential to carry out promises to arbitrate and to implement the private arrangements for

the administration of the contract. Ordinarily there will exist no such necessity to imply a

duty to preserve the status quo. In any event, it is clear that in this case the arbitration of

the dispute will be unaffected by Greyhound’s alteration of the status quo. Should

Greyhound be wrong in its position in arbitration the situation can be restored

substantially to the status quo ante.

Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1977). 

Based on the plain text, there are two factors in determining if an action can be enjoined: (1) an

explicit or implicit promise to preserve the status quo and (2) deleterious effect on arbitration. 

The second factor has been termed the “frustration of arbitration” standard and has been widely

adopted. “The arbitration process is rendered meaningless only if any arbitral award in favor of

the union would substantially fail to undo the harm occasioned by the lack of a status quo

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injunction....The arbitral process is not rendered ‘meaningless,’ however, by the inability of an

arbitrator to completely restore the status quo ante or by the existence of some interim damage

that is irremediable. The ‘frustration of arbitration’ standard preserves the effectiveness of the

arbitral process which the parties have agreed upon. By requiring more than a minimal showing

of injury for the issuance of an injunction, the standard also guards against undue judicial

interference with the employer’s ability to make business decisions.” Newspaper & Periodical

Drivers’ & Helpers’ Union, Local 921 v. San Francisco Newspaper Agency, 89 F.3d 629, 634

(9th Cir. 1996), quoting Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 935

F.2d 1370, 1378 (2nd Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit has said courts “focus into a single

concept the twin ideas of irreparable injury and frustration of arbitration. An injunction in aid of

arbitration is appropriate, therefore, only when the actual or threatened harm to the aggrieved

party amounts to a frustration or vitiation of arbitration.” International Ass’n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1981). The first factor, on

the other hand, has been universally criticized as problematic by the other circuits.

The confusion begins with the fact that the precise relationship between these two factors

is unclear. From the plain text, it appears that both factors need to be met before any injunction

can issue. Reading the two factors to be conjunctive renders the employer’s promise to enter

arbitration (distinct in the Greyhound II framework from a promise to preserve the status quo)

potentially illusory as the employer would be free to undermine the arbitration by making

changes that are irreversible. This error in the analysis has been explicitly pointed out and

criticized by at least two other circuits. See Independent Oil & Chemical Workers, Inc. v. Procter

& Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 930-31 (1st Cir. 1988) (“the courts must not interfere unless

the actions taken or threatened by one of the parties would render the outcome of any arbitration

which might follow meaningless. Elementary logic suggests this to be an appropriate point of

demarcation for a very basic reason: notwithstanding the deference normally due to the

arbitration agreement, a dispute-resolution mechanism which would be unable to repair the

damage done by a party’s unilateral actions would be useless. Such mechanisms would

themselves become manipulable, warping the systemic balance and binding parties to inaction in

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the face of imminent harm. That, then, represents the frontier past which judicial intervention

seems justified; the need to prevent the siren song of open labor-management warfare from

becoming an industrial anthem demands that courts not permit one party to turn the other into an

unwilling Ulysses. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia exception runs

afoul of these prudential principles. [Greyhound II] has as its premise what amounts to a lopsided

vision of the covey of obligations arising in connection with collective bargaining pacts. Under

such a view, an arbitration clause implicitly binds the union not to strike, but does not implicitly

bind the employer to preserve the status quo”); International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 282 (7th Cir. 1981) (“The [Greyhound II] approach

breaks down, however, once it is conceded that a duty to preserve the status quo pending

arbitration may be implied in order to prevent frustration of the arbitral process. For then the

search for an express obligation-actively undertaken-to preserve the status quo is superfluous,

and the propriety of a status quo injunction comes to depend on whether the employer action

sought to be enjoined will in fact frustrate the arbitral process”). They, along with the Fourth

Circuit have adopted a rule that permits injunctions solely when a frustration of arbitration type

change is threatened. See Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, 554 F.2d

115, 122 (4th Cir. 1976) (in rejecting the argument that no injunction should issue because there

was no agreement to preserve the status quo, nevertheless stated “The reasonableness of our

holding is consonant with the Ninth Circuit decision in Greyhound Lines II wherein that court

also recognized that: ‘in any event, it is clear that in this case the arbitration of the dispute will be

unaffected by Greyhound’s alteration of the status quo. Should Greyhound be wrong in its

position in arbitration the situation can be restored substantially to the status quo ante.’”)

Other circuits have come to a conclusions similar to a disjunctive reading of the

Greyhound II factors, finding an injunction appropriate when there is either a frustration of

arbitration type change or an explicit promise to preserve the status quo. See Niagara Hooker

Employees Union v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 935 F.2d 1370, 1378 (2nd Cir. 1991)

(“Independent of whether an injunction is available under the ‘frustration of arbitration’ standard,

we also hold that a union may obtain a status quo injunction where an employer has clearly

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violated an express promise to maintain the status quo pending arbitration or to refrain from

using some method of self-help, where the dispute is arbitrable and the traditional requirements

of equity, including irreparable harm, have been satisfied); Gulf Coast Industrial Workers’ Union

v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 712 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1983) (“while strikes over arbitrable

grievances can be enjoined -- where the bargaining agreement contains an agreement to arbitrate

them and not to strike -- so as to enforce the agreement of the parties about how such grievances

are to be resolved, a different rule obtains where, as here, the parties’ agreement does not both

specify arbitration as the means of resolving the dispute in question and forbid self-help by strike

or other economic weapon. That rule appears to be that only where the arbitration process to

which the parties have agreed will be frustrated or rendered nugatory by one party’s self-help

measure will use of that measure be enjoined -- and only then when the injunction is otherwise

warranted under ordinary principles of equity”); Local Union No. 884, United Rubber, Cork,

Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 61 F.3d 1347, 1355 (8th Cir. 1995) (“As

we have held in other arbitration cases...the labor arbitration cases also allow for a preliminary

injunction in aid of arbitration where there is an express agreement in the collective bargaining

agreement to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. There is generally no requirement,

however, that an express agreement to maintain the status quo is necessary in these cases before a

federal court can issue a Boys Markets type of injunction”). As the Fifth Circuit points out,

“Adding implied undertakings to such a hard fought out, complex and specific thing as a

collective bargaining agreement -- where bargaining over what is to be omitted is likely to be

fully as strenuous as that over what is included -- is a parlous business, however, and one inviting

arbitrary court action.” Gulf Coast Industrial Workers’ Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 712 F.2d

161, 165 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983). 

These criticisms have been born out by the application of Greyhound II within the courts

of the Ninth Circuit. Greyhound II has not been often cited and has been inconsistently applied. 

One Northern District case reads the two factors as disjunctive, acting as distinct and separate

means of obtaining an injunction. Oakland Local, American Postal Workers Union v. United

States Postal Service, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13960, *3 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“Courts allow for

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exceptions to this policy when the injunction is necessary to protect the arbitration process itself

or when there was an implied promise by the union to maintain the status quo pending resolution

of the dispute. Plaintiff meets the requirements for both exceptions.”) (emphasis added). Another

Northern District case arguably conflated the two prongs, collapsing it into the frustration of

arbitration standard. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Simpson Mfg. Co., 1983

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19362, *8-9 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (“Here, if the Company binds itself contractually

to the new site, the promise to arbitrate will be rendered hollow. It is unrealistic to expect an

arbitrator to order the Company to refrain from relocating when the relocation is already a fait

accompli. Consequently this Court concludes that the Company impliedly promised to maintain

the status quo pending arbitration of the present dispute”) (emphasis added). 

The Ninth Circuit authority discussing the situation has not absolutely clarified the

situation but suggests that both factors are necessary for any injunction to issue. One case

characterized Greyhound II’s holding as “the injunction was improperly issued where it was clear

that ‘the arbitration of the dispute [would] be unaffected by Greyhound’s alteration of the status

quo,’ and where there was ‘neither an express nor implied in fact promise by Greyhound to

preserve the status quo.’” Newspaper & Periodical Drivers’ & Helpers’ Union, Local 921 v. San

Francisco Newspaper Agency, 89 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1996), citations omitted. Another

Ninth Circuit opinion stated, “A preliminary injunction requiring an employer to preserve the

status quo pending arbitration is improper absent either an express or implied-in-fact promise by

the employer to do so....Furthermore, the situation can be restored substantially to the status quo

ante if the union prevails on its breach of contract claims in arbitration.” Utility Workers of

America, Local No. 246 v. Southern California Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Binding Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that Plaintiff must show that both factors are met before

any injunction can issue. 

B. Explicit or Implicit Promise to Preserve the Status Quo

In this case, the court finds that the CBA includes an implicit promise to preserve the

status quo pending arbitration. Plaintiff represents, “Article XXIII of the CBA establishes a

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grievance and arbitration procedure for the resolution of disputes arising out of the interpretation

or application of the CBA or any violation of the CBA. (Article XXIII, Section 2) Article XXIII

requires that any grievance not resolved through the Joint Standing Committee (comprised of two

representatives of management and two representatives of the union) may be referred to

arbitration by the union or the employer. (Article XXIII, Sections 6 and 7).” Doc. 1, Complaint,

at 3:22-28. Section 3 states, “When any grievance arises, there shall be no interruption of work

or other violation of this Agreement, but the dispute shall be settled as promptly as possible in

the following manner...” Doc. 8, Part 2, CBA at 16, emphasis added. Section 7 states, “Only the

Union or the Employer may require arbitration of the other party to this Agreement.” Doc. 8, Part

2, CBA, at 17. Defendant, through careful reading of Section 3 through 6, argues that Section 3

only applies to Plaintiff and is not a bilateral promise to preserve the status quo. Doc. 17,

Defendant’s Opposition, at 11:21-28. Defendant is correct that Sections 3 through 6 only refers

to Plaintiff Union. However, that reading of the CBA would essentially leave Section 7 dangling

and non-operative. Section 6 states “the Union may appeal in writing the grievance to

arbitration.” Doc. 8, Part 2, CBA, at 17. The CBA does not similarly state when Defendant may

appeal to arbitration. Defendant does not represent that it may not require arbitration of

grievance disputes, so the court reads the Section 3 “no interruption of work” requirement as

applicable to both parties. 

C. Frustration of Arbitration/ Irreparable Injury

 As to frustration of arbitration, Plaintiff contends, “Arbitrator Collins may not be able to

force The Californian to breach its agreement with BMI if it has already been implemented

before he rules. Even an order of reinstatement may be a hollow remedy, especially when these

employees have been forced to disrupt their lives to cope with this termination.” Doc. 6,

Plaintiff’s Brief, at 8:8-11. Plaintiff supplements, “The subcontracting carries with it the threat

of permanent loss of jobs, because even for the relatively short time between the beginning of

subcontracting and the decision from the arbitrator, the employees face economic hardship while

waiting for the arbitrator’s decision, including loss of health care, and other economic hardships

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and diversions that could make it difficult to return to work if the arbitrator orders

reinstatement....They will be discouraged from returning, will be without union representation in

the interim, and may be left with the belief that their Union was powerless to prevent this

egregious and extreme violation of the CBA. This, too, is a form of irreparable harm.” Doc. 33,

Plaintiff’s Reply, at 9:5-15. 

Permanent loss of employment which an arbitrator can not reverse clearly constitutes

irreparable injury and a frustration of arbitration. Defendant states in argument, “If the Union

prevails in the arbitration, the arbitrator will be able to reinstate the employees and award them

full back pay if it finds a violation of the contract by this act....The arbitrator will be able to issue

a decision resolving the matter; and if the Union prevails, the arbitrator would have the authority

to order the displaced employees reinstated and paid any back pay owed to them. Furthermore,

there would be nothing preventing the Employer from fully complying with that order.” Doc. 17,

Defendant’s Opposition, at 13:7-8 and 14:9-12, emphasis in original. Plaintiff notes that “those

statements are not made under oath.” Doc. 33, Plaintiff’s Reply, at 8:14-15. At the hearing on

March 14, 2008, Defendant’s counsel made the following categorical statements: Arbitrator

Collins would have full authority to reinstate the Workers and the CBA notwithstanding

Defendant’s contract with BMI; Defendant would fully comply with such an order; and

Defendant would make alternate arrangements with BMI. The court specifically relies on these

representations in ruling on this motion and considers Defendant (and any of its representatives)

estopped from arguing otherwise in any other forum. 

Plaintiff notes the contract between BMI and Defendant specifies, “BMI shall have

exclusive possession and control of the TBC Facility and TBC shall not consent to or take any

action or fail to take any action that could impair or restrict BMI’s ability to perform the

Services.” Doc. 19, Ex. A, BMI Contract, at 10. However, the BMI Contract as a whole is one

for labor services, and not a sale of any assets. Again, the court relies on Defendant’s

representations that it would fully comply with an order in favor of Plaintiff, including making

alternate arrangements with BMI. Plaintiff admits the BMI Contract “calls for the press

operations to continue in the same building in which it now runs, using the same equipment now

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being used.” Doc. 6, Plaintiff’s Brief, at 2:7-9. The change involves no shifting of physical

facilities or sale of physical equipment. In other cases where frustration of arbitration has been

found, physical or ownership changes appear to be the root cause of irreversibility. For example,

the Northern District issued an injunction because the physical relocation of a business was

threatened. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Simpson Mfg. Co., 1983 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 19362, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (“[the Company] has given notice to its lessor that it will

not renew its lease of the Redwood City facility, and pending approval by its attorney, the

Company is now prepared to sign contracts for the construction of the Vacaville facilities. If

these contracts are executed, the possibility that the Union could convince an arbitrator to order

the Company to refrain from relocating would be greatly diminished if not extinguished since

relocation would be a fait accompli.”). In contrast, the First Circuit found that an employer’s

proposal to put off sale of a warehouse building but to stop operations from the warehouse

pending the arbitrator’s decision was not a “frustration of arbitration.” International Brotherhood

of Teamsters, etc., Local Union No. 251 v. Almac’s, Inc., 894 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990)

(“Almac’s President Segal testified that ‘If I can start tomorrow and buy more merchandise, I can

start in thirty days and buy more merchandise. The facility is there. All our equipment is there.

We have not dismantled anything. We don’t intend to dismantle anything.’ Clearly, Almac’s can

comply with an arbitrator’s order to restock the distribution center”); see also International Ass’n

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1981)

(“The proposed sale of the Sintered Specialties Division would have resulted in the immediate

loss of employment by 113 Panoramic workers represented by the Union. The purchaser, SSI,

has no duty to rehire these employees and has expressed no specific desire to do so. Where, as

here, employer action threatens a permanent loss of jobs, a damage remedy is inadequate”)

emphasis added. In another case cited by Plaintiff, involving subcontracting, the Eastern District

of New York did issue an injunction. Bakery Drivers Union, Local 802 v. S. B. Thomas, Inc.,

1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17085 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In that case, the union represented sales persons

who sold and delivered the employer’s bread products to restaurants and hotels; the employer

decided to subcontract some of these activities while discontinuing service to several

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establishments. The court found that “When a bakery discontinues service to customers, its

competitors immediately solicit the accounts and offer attractive terms in order to win them over.

New relationships are established overnight, and it is virtually impossible to recapture lost

business. This is particularly true for restaurant accounts.” Bakery Drivers Union, Local 802 v. S.

B. Thomas, Inc., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17085, *14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). At base, it was not

subcontracting that was the key consideration but the loss of business relationships between

salespersons and customers. That is not a factor in this case. 

In general, the hardships caused by temporary loss of employment does not constitute

irreparable harm. “The injury complained of here is loss of employment for sixteen persons. The

Union argues that loss of employment constitutes irreparable harm because awards of backpay

and reinstatement, traditional remedies for such an injury, cannot fully compensate employees for

the repossessions, foreclosures, and injury to credit stature which could accompany

unemployment. We disagree insofar as loss of employment is, as it is here, solely the result of job

eliminations by a solvent employer. Absent some indication of action on the part of the employer

which could jeopardize its ability to reinstate affected employees or to pay them wages for the

period of unemployment, we hold that loss of employment, even if occasioned by employer

action which is subject to arbitration, is not irreparable harm and will not support a claim by the

union for injunctive relief.” Aluminum Workers International Union Local Union No. 215 v.

Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 443 (6th Cir. 1982). “If disruption of workers’

lives and habits was deemed sufficient harm on which to bottom injunctive relief, then the

exception would swallow the rule, and the courts would be mired hip-deep in matters which

Congress intended to remit to an arbitral forum.” Independent Oil & Chemical Workers, Inc. v.

Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 932 (1st Cir. 1988).

Similarly, loss of union representation for a short period of time does not qualify. 

Plaintiff cites to an Eastern District opinion for the proposition that “withdrawal of recognition

inflicted on a union, is often irreparable.” Reichard ex rel. NLRB v. Foster Poultry Farms, 425 F.

Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The facts in that case distinguish it from the one at hand. 

In Reichard, the employer refused to recognize and bargain with a newly formed union. The

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court found evidence that the employer was actively trying to undermine the union by telling the

workers it did not exist and that they should not pay dues. Reichard ex rel. NLRB v. Foster

Poultry Farms, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The employer was enjoined to

recognize the union pending resolution of a National Labor Relations Board administrative

proceeding which was expected to last between two to three years. In this case, Defendant

recognizes Plaintiff Union. Further, Defendant states the parties to the case have agreed to ask

Arbitrator Collins to issue a decision by April 21, 2008. Doc. 21, Chaffin Declaration, at 5:9-13. 

The harm in Reichard was the prospect of a newly formed union falling apart during the

pendency of a long administrative process due to the hostile actions of the employer. 

Health insurance coverage is different. Several courts have stated that loss of health

insurance constitutes irreparable harm categorically. See Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060, 1062

(2nd Cir. 1979) (“the threatened termination of benefits such as medical coverage for workers

and their families obviously raised the spectre of irreparable injury”); United Steelworkers of

America v. Ft. Pitt Steel Casting, Div. of Conval-Penn, Inc., 598 F.2d 1273, 1280 (3rd Cir. 1979)

(“[T]he possibility that a worker would be denied adequate medical care as a result of having no

insurance would constitute ‘substantial and irreparable injury.’ Moreover, the risk of irreparable

injury was not appreciably lessened merely because the employees allegedly would remain

covered for 30 days after premium payments were terminated and because the employees

thereafter would have the option to convert to individual policies. There was no assurance at the

time the injunction was issued that the strike would end within 30 days; thus there was a

significant risk that absent an injunction, the employees would be without insurance coverage. In

addition, the likelihood that all of the employees could have exercised their right to obtain

individual policies was problematic, because while the employees were on strike, they were not

collecting their wages”); American Federation of Government Employees v. Callaway, 398 F.

Supp. 176, 194 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (in dicta, “loss of broad-form medical-hospital insurance” is

irreparable harm); Texaco Independent Union of Coraopolis Terminal v. Texaco, Inc., 452 F.

Supp. 1097, 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (“the suspension of health insurance protection could cause

serious injury to employees that could not be remedied through arbitration”). Other courts have

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required evidence of how loss of coverage would specifically affect individuals adversely. See

Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir.1975) (loss of health insurance not to constitute

irreparable harm when need for health services was only “conjectural”); Gonzalez v. Chasen, 506

F. Supp. 990, 999 (D.P.R. 1980) (loss of health insurance coverage constitutes irreparable harm

where existing health issues documented). The Eighth Circuit has implied (without discussion)

that diminution in scope of health coverage does not constitute irreparable harm. See Local

Union No. 884, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 61

F.3d 1347, 1354 (8th Cir. 1995) (“If the arbitrator agrees with Local 884 that the health benefits

under the 1991 Master Agreement remained in effect pursuant to section (g) of the 1993

Memorandum of Agreement, then the arbitrator can order BF to repay all monthly premium

payments and deductibles that the employees were wrongly deprived of and require reinstatement

of the levels of medical and dental coverages for which the 1991 Master Agreement provided”). 

The only case coming from a court under the purview of the Ninth Circuit is ambiguous on the

matter of proof: “There is, however, one area in which I find that lay-offs will likely result in

irreparable harm, the kind of harm that cannot be remedied by an after-the-fact arbitration award.

If lay-offs are effected by the end of this month, October, health care coverage for laid-off

workers will terminate on November 30, 1982, before the grievance and arbitration process is

likely to be completed. Substantial evidence in the record supports the finding, and I find, that the

lack of health care benefits will result in many cases in the inability to obtain needed medical

treatment and, in some cases, in the termination of current necessary treatment for employees or

their dependents now covered by health insurance. The harm likely to result from termination of

health benefits will be irremediable. Thus, with respect to health benefits only, I find that without

injunctive relief pending arbitration, the award will be rendered a hollow formality.” United

Auto., etc. Local 645 v. General Motors Assembly Div., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19159, *3-4

(C.D. Cal. 1983). 

In this case, one of the Workers did submit a declaration stating “Some of the seventeen

employees receive health insurance through their jobs at The California[n]. We have been told by

The California[n] that it will end health insurance on March 31, 2008.” Doc. 9, Willard

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Declaration, at 3:16-18. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of specific health care issues faced by

any individual. Absent that evidence, the court cannot find irreparable harm. Defendant argues

“The arbitrator could award [Workers] reimbursement of [their ] retirement draw or amounts

[they] may have to pay for medical expenses.” Doc. 17, Defendant’s Opposition, at 13:27-28. At

the hearing, Defendant further represented that the arbitrator could order compensation for outof-pocket medical costs or COBRA payments as part of an award in Plaintiff Union’s favor. 

IV. Order

Plaintiff Graphic Communications Conference- International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Local 404M’s motion for preliminary injunction against Defendant the Bakersfield Californian is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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