Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00033/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00033-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Contract Dispute

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SE PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0033-WS-C

 )

TAMMY T. CENTER, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

(doc. 90). The Motion has been briefed and is ripe for disposition.

I. Background.

A. Nature of the Case.

Plaintiff, SE Property Holdings, LLC (“SEPH”), brought this fraudulent transfer action 

seeking to have certain transfers of property made by Charles Trammell and Belinda Trammell 

(collectively, the “Trammells”) set aside and declared null and void under Alabama law. 

Plaintiff’s position is that the Trammells owe it millions of dollars pursuant to certain guaranties 

they executed in favor of SEPH’s predecessor during the period of 2005-2007. When the 

borrowers defaulted on their loan repayment obligations, SEPH looked to the Trammells to make 

good on their guaranty commitment. Between 2011 and 2013, and after SEPH demanded 

payment from and filed suit against them, the Trammells transferred ownership of various assets 

(including a house on Lake Martin, a beach condominium unit in Baldwin County, tens of 

thousands of shares of UPS stock, and ownership interests in limited liability companies) to 

LLCs and other family members. Plaintiff maintains that, as a result of these transfers, the 

Trammells were left with assets valued far less than their debts.

Based on these allegations, SEPH has asserted claims under the Alabama Uniform 

Fraudulent Transfer Act, Ala. Code §§ 8-9a-1 et seq., against the Personal Representative of the 

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Estate of Charles H. Trammell (the “Estate”),1 Belinda R. Trammell, Amy T. Brown, Tammy T. 

Center, Trammell Family Orange Beach Properties, LLC (“Trammell Orange Beach”), and 

Trammell Family Lake Martin Properties, LLC (“Trammell Lake Martin”).2 As pleaded in the 

First Amended Complaint, SEPH maintains that the following transfers by Charles and Belinda 

Trammell were fraudulent under Alabama law: (i) their execution of a deed to Trammell Orange 

Beach of the Baldwin County beach condominium unit in January 2011; (ii) their execution of a 

deed to Trammell Lake Martin of the Lake Martin house in January 2011; (iii) their transfer of a 

90% ownership/membership interest in Trammell Orange Beach and Trammell Lake Martin to 

Brown and Center in December 2011, such that each LLC (which had previously been owned 

50% by Charles Trammell and 50% by Belinda Trammell) was now owned 45% by Brown, 45% 

by Center, 5% by Charles Trammell, and 5% by Belinda Trammell; (iv) Charles Trammell’s 

transfer of UPS stock to relatives or family-controlled LLCs in 2012; and (v) transfer upon 

Charles Trammell’s death of his interest in the Trammells’ principal residence and additional 

UPS stock shares to Belinda Trammell, leaving his Estate with a value of less than $200,000, 

some $5.8 million lower than Charles Trammell’s net worth in 2008. (Doc. 55, ¶¶ 19, 21, 23, 24, 

28.) Defendants Belinda Trammell, Center and Brown are alleged to have liquidated some of 

these fraudulently transferred assets and expended the proceeds for their own use and benefit. 

(Id., ¶ 24.)

In the First Amended Complaint, SEPH parlays the foregoing allegations into claims of 

actual fraudulent transfer pursuant to Alabama Code § 8-9A-4(a) (Count One); constructive 

fraudulent transfer pursuant to Alabama Code § 8-9A-4(c) (Count Two); constructive fraudulent 

transfer pursuant to Alabama Code § 8-9A-5(a) (Count Three); and conspiracy (Count Four). 

SEPH now moves for summary judgment as to Count Three (and only Count Three) of the First 

 1 According to uncontradicted factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint, 

Charles Trammell died on or about October 24, 2013. (Doc. 55, ¶ 2.)

2 Defendants Brown and Center are the adult daughters of Charles and Belinda 

Trammell. Trammell Orange Beach and Trammell Lake Martin are family-held Alabama 

limited liability companies in which Charles Trammell, Belinda Trammell, Brown and Center 

have possessed various ownership/membership interests at various times.

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Amended Complaint.

3

 Counts One, Two and Four are not implicated by plaintiff’s Rule 56 

Motion, and therefore will not be addressed herein.

B. Relevant Facts.4

1. The Loans and Guaranties.

Between 2005 and 2007, SEPH’s predecessor (Vision Bank) entered into certain loan 

agreements with companies called Bama Bayou, LLC (formerly known as Riverwalk, LLC) and 

Marine Park, LLC, whereby those entities became indebted to Vision Bank (and, later, SEPH) 

for certain commercial loans. (Braswell Aff. (doc. 92, Exh. A), ¶ 4 & Exh. A-1.)5 In connection 

with those loans, Riverwalk, LLC signed a promissory note for $6 million in Vision Bank’s 

 3 In their principal brief, defendants note that “SEPH then proceeds to argue only 

on the basis of Ala. Code § 8-9A-5(a),” not § 8-9A-4(c). (Doc. 100, at 2-3.) Of course, that 

limitation in plaintiff’s summary judgment brief makes sense because the Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment is aimed solely at Count Three, which is a claim brought pursuant to § 8-

9A-5(a). By contrast, Alabama Code § 8-9A-4(c) is the statutory basis for Count Two, as to 

which no summary judgment motion has been filed. The point is that, for purposes of this Order, 

only § 8-9A-5(a) is germane to the analysis.

4 The Court remains mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record, 

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, defendants’ 

evidence is taken as true and all justifiable inferences are drawn in their favor. Also, federal 

courts cannot weigh credibility at the summary judgment stage. See Feliciano v. City of Miami 

Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Even if a district court believes that the evidence 

presented by one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the 

basis of credibility choices.”). Therefore, the Court will “make no credibility determinations or 

choose between conflicting testimony, but instead accept[s] [defendants’] version of the facts 

drawing all justifiable inferences in [their] favor.” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th

Cir. 2008).

5 The loans were made to finance a massive real estate development project in 

Orange Beach, Alabama. For example, a March 2, 2007 loan agreement between Vision Bank 

and Marine Park, LLC, indicated that the borrower sought a loan of $5 million “for the 

acquisition of that certain land located within the Bama Bayou development in the City of 

Orange Beach ... and for the construction thereon of a marine park consisting of a 500 seat 

theatre, 1000 seat stadium and 134,000 gallon aquarium and related improvements ... to be 

known as GulfWorld Marine Park.” (Braswell Aff., Exh. A-1 at 14.) And the Bama Bayou 

project was conceived as a development on the north bank of the Intracoastal Waterway at its 

intersection with the Foley Beach Express, incorporating commercial, retail, resort, residential, 

marina, hotel and entertainment venues. (Doc. 100, Exh. 2, at 4.) Despite these loans, the Bama 

Bayou and GulfWorld Marine Park developments never came to pass.

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favor on March 24, 2005; Riverwalk, LLC signed a promissory note for $5 million in Vision 

Bank’s favor on June 12, 2006; Bama Bayou, LLC signed a promissory note for $5 million in 

Vision Bank’s favor on September 27, 2007; and Marine Park, LLC signed a promissory note for 

$5 million in Vision Bank’s favor on March 2, 2007. (Id.) Those loans and notes were fully 

funded by Vision Bank and its participant banks. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 6.)

In connection with those loans, Charles and/or Belinda Trammell executed at least four 

guaranties in Vision Bank’s favor. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 5.) First, on March 20, 2005, Charles 

Trammell executed a Limited Continuing Guaranty with respect to Riverwalk’s indebtedness in

the March 24, 2005 promissory note. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 5 & Exh. A-2.) In that guaranty, Charles 

Trammell agreed to be liable for up to $315,000 in principal of the note, 100% of all interest 

accruing at any time, and 100% of collection costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees. 

(Id., Exh. A-2 at ¶ 14.) Second, in May 2006 Charles Trammell and Belinda Trammell each 

executed Limited Continuing Guaranties with respect to Riverwalk’s indebtedness in the June 

12, 2006 promissory note. (Braswell Aff, ¶ 5 & Exh. A-3.) In those guaranties, the Trammells 

each agreed to be liable for up to $280,000 in principal of the note, 100% of all interest accruing 

at any time, and 100% of collection costs, expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees. (Id., Exh. A3 at ¶ 14.) Third, on January 26, 2006, Charles and Belinda Trammell jointly executed a Limited 

Continuing Guaranty with respect to Marine Park’s indebtedness in the March 2, 2007 

promissory note. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 5 & Exh. A-4.)6 In that guaranty, the Trammells agreed to be 

liable for up to $280,000 in principal of the note, 100% of all interest accruing at any time, and 

100% of collection costs, expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees. (Id., Exh. A-4 at ¶ 14.) And 

fourth, on September 27, 2007, Charles and Belinda Trammell jointly executed a Limited 

Continuing Guaranty with respect to Bama Bayou’s indebtedness in the September 27, 2007 

 6 It bears noting that, while SEPH (as Vision Bank’s successor by merger) holds the 

Bama Bayou loans, notes and guaranties, the Marine Park, LLC promissory note was 

subsequently transferred to FNB Bank, which is not a party to these proceedings. (Braswell Aff., 

¶ 15.) SEPH’s objective is to collect on the Bama Bayou loans and guaranties, not the Marine 

Park loans and guaranties, which it no longer holds and which it has no direct interest in 

enforcing. Nonetheless, the Marine Park loan and guaranty are pertinent to the issues presented 

on summary judgment here. After all, Vision Bank held the Marine Park debt at the time of the 

challenged transfers, and the Trammells’ financial obligations under the Marine Park guaranty 

bear on their solvency or lack thereof when the challenged transfers occurred.

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promissory note. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 5 & Exh. A-5.) In that guaranty, the Trammells agreed to be 

liable for up to $280,000 in principal of the note, 100% of all interest accruing at any time, and 

100% of collection costs, expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees. (Id., Exh. A-5 at ¶ 14.)7

2. The Defaults and Plaintiff’s Collection Efforts.

Plaintiff’s evidence is that, even though the loans had been fully funded, Bama Bayou, 

LLC and Marine Park, LLC defaulted under the loans and notes. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 6.) Vision 

Bank subsequently demanded payment from the borrowers and guarantors, including Charles 

and Belinda Trammell. (Id.) When payment was not forthcoming, Vision Bank sued Bama 

Bayou, Marine Park, Charles and Belinda Trammell, and others in the Circuit Court of Mobile 

County, Alabama, on January 16, 2009 (the “Bama Bayou Action”). The Bama Bayou Action 

remains pending today. To date, it has not gone to trial; indeed, the Court’s understanding is that 

no trial setting is in place at this time.

Pursuant to its collection efforts, on March 20, 2009, Vision Bank foreclosed on multiple 

parcels of real property that secured its loans to Bama Bayou and Marine Park, purchasing such 

property via credit bid. (Id., ¶ 7.) In the wake of that foreclosure, large deficiencies remained on 

both the Bama Bayou and Marine Park loans. (Id.) Indeed, SEPH’s calculations are that, as of 

September 23, 2016, Charles Trammell (or, more accurately, the Estate) was indebted to SEPH 

in the amount of $4,872,895 in principal and interest pursuant to his guaranties of Bama Bayou’s 

indebtedness. (Id., ¶ 8.) SEPH further calculates that, as of the same date, Belinda Trammell 

was indebted to SEPH in the amount of $2,524,791.84 in principal and interest pursuant to her 

guaranty of Bama Bayou’s indebtedness. (Id.) Such calculations exclude costs of collection, 

which are claimed to be well in excess of a million dollars.

 7 Charles Trammell also took on certain indebtedness obligations with respect to a 

$3 million loan that Vision Bank made to Sundance, LLC. (Braswell Aff., ¶¶ 9-10.) In 

particular, he executed a Continuing Guaranty in Vision Bank’s favor on September 19, 2007, 

whereby he agreed to be liable for up to $900,000 in principal. (Id., ¶ 10 & Exh. A-7.) When 

Sundance defaulted, litigation ensued. (Id., ¶ 11.) Pursuant to a compromise resolution of that 

litigation, Charles Trammell, Sundance and others executed a promissory note on February 12, 

2012, wherein they collectively agreed to pay Vision Bank the sum of $428,118.22. (Id. & Exh. 

A-8.) The Sundance note from February 2012 was paid in full in approximately January 2015. 

(Doc. 92, Exh. F, at #7.)

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3. The Challenged Transfers.

As noted, the claims asserted by SEPH herein focus on four specific transfers of property 

by Charles and Belinda Trammell. Most of those transfers were made to defendants Brown and 

Center (their daughters), either directly or through entities established and controlled by the

Trammells; however, SEPH also seeks relief on transfers made by Charles Trammell to Belinda 

Trammell upon the former’s death. Relevant facts pertaining to each such transfer include the 

following:

On January 26, 2011, after the Bama Bayou Action was underway, Charles and Belinda 

Trammell transferred ownership of their Baldwin County beach condominium unit to defendant 

Trammell Orange Beach, an Alabama limited liability company then owned 50% by Charles 

Trammell and 50% by Belinda Trammell. (Doc. 92, Exh. F, at #8; doc. 92, Exh. M, at #8.) On 

the same date, Charles and Belinda Trammell transferred ownership of their Lake Martin house 

to defendant Trammell Lake Martin, an Alabama limited liability company then owned 50% by 

Charles Trammell and 50% by Belinda Trammell. (Doc. 92, Exh. F, at #8; doc. 92; Exh. M, at 

#8.) The LLCs paid neither monetary consideration nor other property to the Trammells in 

exchange for these valuable transfers of real property. (Id.)

Belinda Trammell testified that, when she and Charles Trammell formed the defendant 

LLCs, they had planned to give their daughters (defendants Center and Brown) an ownership 

interest in those entities. (Doc. 92, Exh. E, at 53.) Defendant Center confirmed her 

understanding that, as part of their estate planning, her parents intended to give Center and 

Brown an interest in those LLCs. (Doc. 92, Exh. B, at 66.) The Trammells followed up on this 

plan on or about December 12, 2011, with each of Charles and Belinda Trammell transferring a 

22.5% ownership/membership interest in each of Trammell Orange Beach and Trammell Lake 

Martin to each of Center and Brown. (Doc. 92, Exh. F, at #8; doc. 92, Exh. M, at #8.) Pursuant 

to these December 2011 transfers, then, Trammell Orange Beach came to be owned 45% by 

Center, 45% by Brown, 5% by Charles Trammell, and 5% by Belinda Trammell. The same was 

true of Trammell Lake Martin. Again, both of those entities had previously been owned 50% by 

Charles Trammell and 50% by Belinda Trammell, with the daughters holding no ownership 

interest at all. (Id.) Brown and Center paid no money or property to their parents in 

consideration for these ownership interests in the LLCs. Indeed, Center confirmed in her 

testimony that “[t]here was no money exchanged,” that the transactions were set up as gifts, but

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that Center and Brown “did do consideration with [their] emotional support and help” to their 

parents. (Doc. 92, Exh. B, at 78-79.)8 To that end, Charles and Belinda Trammell filed a gift tax 

return with the IRS for the 2011 tax year reporting gifts of a 22.5% interest in Trammell Orange 

Beach and Trammell Lake Martin given by each of them to each of Brown and Center. (Doc. 

92, Exh. V.)

In April 2012, Charles Trammell transferred or caused to be transferred 12,551 shares of 

UPS stock that he owned individually to Trammell Orange Beach, and an additional 12,551 

shares of UPS stock that he owned individually to Trammell Lake Martin. (Doc. 92, Exh. F, at 

#8; doc. 92, Exh. B, at 95; doc. 93, Exh. W, at 25.) Collectively, those shares were valued at 

close to $2 million at the time of the subject transfers. (Doc. 93, Exh. BB, at 53.)9 There is some 

indication in the summary judgment record that those shares may have been funneled through 

Brown’s and Center’s hands before reaching the LLCs. (Id. at 52-58.) Nonetheless, regardless 

of whether the transactions were direct or indirect, the net result was that Trammell transferred 

more than 25,000 shares of UPS stock from his personal holdings to the defendant LLCs (which 

were at that time owned 45% by Center, 45% by Brown, and just 5% each by Charles and 

Belinda Trammell) in April 2012. No money or property changed hands as consideration for 

these UPS stock transfers, and Charles Trammell submitted a gift tax return in connection with 

same. (Doc. 92, Exh. B, at 96; doc. 93, Exh. BB, at 47-51.)

Charles Trammell died on October 24, 2013. At the time of his death, his remaining UPS 

stock interests (which apparently totaled 8,798 shares) transferred to Belinda Trammell via a 

payable-on-death account. (Doc. 92, Exh. B at 17.) Likewise, Charles Trammell’s interest in the 

couple’s primary residence passed to Belinda Trammell by operation of law in accordance with 

their joint tenancy. (Id. at 18.) In the wake of those transfers, the assets remaining in the 

 8 In her deposition, Center elaborated as follows: “I’m sure at times I may have 

[paid money] to help them out. But the support that I’m referring to is my father was very sick. 

... My father passed away with acute Leukemia. So he was in and out of the cancer center, and 

blood transfusions. ... The blood transfusions that my dad would have took four hours, the 

process. ... So his care was very time consuming. And we had to help my mom, because she 

couldn’t handle that.” (Doc. 92, Exh. B, at 29-30.)

9 The Court takes judicial notice that the closing price of UPS stock on April 30, 

2012, was $78.14 per share. Multiplied across the 25,102 shares that Charles Trammell 

transferred to the LLCs, that share price yields a valuation exceeding $1.9 million.

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defendant Estate of Charles Trammell had a total valuation of $199,700. (Doc. 92, Exh. C.)10 

By way of comparison, Charles Trammell had notified Vision Bank in June 2009 that his 

personal and jointly owned assets exceeded $4.5 million. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 12 & Exh. A-9.)

The centerpiece of SEPH’s argument on summary judgment is that the Trammells’ 

transfers of the beach condo and Lake Martin house to the defendant LLCs, and their transfers of 

90% of their interests in the LLCs to defendants Center and Brown, were constructive fraudulent 

transfers as a matter of law; and that Charles Trammell’s transfers of 25,102 shares of UPS stock 

to the defendant LLCs, and his transfers of his remaining shares of UPS stock and his interest in 

his personal residence to Belinda Trammell upon his death, were likewise constructive 

fraudulent transfers. Those transactions lie at the heart of the pending Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 

56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the 

district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). 

Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to 

show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 

'a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden 

of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party 

has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility 

determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBHSiegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 10 Those assets included Charles Trammell’s 5% interest in Trammell Orange Beach 

(valued at $80,000), his 5% interest in Trammell Lake Martin (valued at $90,000), a 1963 

Chevrolet Impala (valued at $20,000), a pontoon boat (valued at $5,000), a 2006 Bombadier 

Seadoo (valued at $3,000) and additional clothing and personal effects valued collectively at less 

than $2,000.

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“Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual 

determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

A. Elements of § 8-9A-5(a) Cause of Action.

As noted, Count Three of the First Amended Complaint asserts a claim against 

defendants for constructive fraudulent transfer pursuant to Alabama Code § 8-9A-5(a). That 

subsection provides as follows: “A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose 

claim arose before the transfer was made if the debtor made the transfer without receiving a 

reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and the debtor was insolvent at the time 

or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer.” Ala. Code § 8-9A-5(a); see also 

Baggett v. Baggett, 870 So.2d 735, 739 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (“A constructive fraudulent transfer 

occurs when a debtor transfers assets to another without consideration, and the debtor was, or 

became, insolvent at the time of the transfer.”) (citations omitted); SE Property Holdings, LLC v. 

Braswell, 2013 WL 4498700, *5 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 21, 2013) (under § 8-9A-5(a), “a transfer is 

fraudulent if the debtor did not receive ‘reasonably equivalent value’ and if the debtor was 

‘insolvent’”).

To prevail on Count Three, then, SEPH must prove each of the following elements: (i) 

that SEPH is a creditor of Charles and Belinda Trammell; (ii) that SEPH’s claim against Charles 

and Belinda Trammell arose before the transfers were made; (iii) that Charles and Belinda 

Trammell made the transfers without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange; and

(iv) that the Trammells were insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the transfers. 

1 Ala. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. § 18.20 (3d ed.); see also Lord Abbett Municipal Income Fund, 

Inc. v. Southern Farms, Inc., 2015 WL 9474287, *8 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2015) (“Under § 8-9A5(a), Lord Abbett must establish (1) that its claim arose before the transfers were made, (2) that 

RDG-II made the transfers without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange, and (3) 

that RDG-II was insolvent at the time of the transfers or became insolvent as a result of the 

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transfers.”).11 Inasmuch as defendants dispute SEPH’s ability to establish any of these elements 

(much less all of them), the Court will consider each in turn.

B. The Existence of a Creditor/Debtor Relationship.

The plain language of the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “AUFTA”)

requires a creditor/debtor relationship as a prerequisite to a viable constructive fraudulent 

transfer claim. See Ala. Code § 8-9A-5(a) (“a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 

creditor ...”) (emphasis added). The statute defines “creditor” as “[a] person who has a claim.” 

Ala. Code § 8-9A-1(4). The term “debtor” is defined as “[a] person who is liable on a claim.” 

Ala. Code § 8-9A-1(6) (emphasis added). And the AUFTA defines “claim” as “[a] right to 

payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 

contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 

Ala. Code § 8-9A-1(3).

To satisfy the debtor/creditor element of its § 8-9A-5(a) cause of action, SEPH presents 

evidence that the Trammells were indebted to it (or its predecessor, Vision Bank) at the time of 

the challenged transfers. In particular, SEPH has come forward with competent record evidence 

to show each of the following: (i) SEPH’s predecessor loaned millions of dollars to Bama Bayou, 

LLC from 2005 to 2007; (ii) in connection with those loans, Charles and Belinda Trammell 

executed multiple continuing guaranties in favor of SEPH’s predecessor, pursuant to which they 

guaranteed payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars of principal on each loan, all unpaid and 

accrued interest on each loan, and all costs of collection, including reasonable attorney’s fees; 

(iii) Bama Bayou defaulted on all of those loans; (iv) Charles and Belinda Trammell never paid 

SEPH or its predecessor the sums they had promised to pay in the continuing guaranties; and (v) 

the Trammells are presently indebted to SEPH in the sum of millions of dollars in principal, 

accrued interest and costs of collection.

These record facts are plainly sufficient to satisfy SEPH’s initial burden on summary 

judgment of showing that it is a creditor and that the Trammells are debtors within the meaning 

 11 Notably, the transferor’s intent is not relevant to the analysis of a claim brought 

under Alabama Code § 8-9A-5(a). See, e.g., McPherson Oil Co. v. Massey, 643 So.2d 595, 596 

(Ala. 1994) (“without regard to the actual intent of the grantor, the law infers constructive fraud 

when it appears that an indebted grantor has conveyed property to a family member without 

receiving valuable consideration”).

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the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 (“The moving party 

bears the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are 

no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.”). The foregoing facts (as to 

each of which SEPH has made a showing via record evidence) would entitle SEPH to a directed 

verdict if not contradicted at trial; indeed, those facts (if not rebutted) show that the Trammells 

executed binding, enforceable guaranties in SEPH’s favor, then failed or refused to pay when the 

borrowers defaulted.12 Thus, SEPH has met its burden of making an affirmative showing of the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of the debtor/creditor element. See Rich

v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 716 F.3d 525, 530 (11th Cir. 2013) (“When the 

moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with credible evidence that would 

entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.”) (citation omitted); Burger King Corp. 

v. E-Z Eating, 41 Corp., 572 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment movant 

“always bears the initial responsibility of ... identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”) (citation 

omitted).

SEPH having met its initial burden as to the debtor/creditor element of its § 8-9A-5(a) 

cause of action, the burden shifts to defendants to demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of 

material fact. See Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 (after movant meets initial burden, “the burden shift[s] 

to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes 

summary judgment”). In their brief, defendants state in conclusory fashion that “SEPH has 

failed to prove that it has a right to payment from the Estate of Charles Trammell and Belinda 

Trammell.” (Doc. 100, at 3.) In the context of the relevant Rule 56 analysis, however, that 

argument is unpersuasive. SEPH’s evidence shows that the Trammells made promises to pay

Vision Bank, that they failed to fulfill those obligations, that they transferred certain assets to the 

 12 Such guaranties are enforceable under Alabama law like any other contracts. See, 

e.g., Eagerton v. Vision Bank, 99 So.3d 299, 304 (Ala. 2012) (“Rules governing the 

interpretation and construction of contracts are applicable in resolving a question as to the 

interpretation or construction of a guaranty contract. ... Absent fraud in the inducement, an 

absolute guaranty will be enforced according to its terms ....”) (citations omitted).

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other defendants (the LLCs, Center and Brown) after SEPH attempted to enforce those promises 

to pay, and that they continue to owe SEPH millions of dollars today. If no other evidence were 

presented at trial, that showing would establish that the Trammells were liable on SEPH’s claim 

for payment. Thus, that evidence (if uncontroverted) would entitle SEPH to a directed verdict on 

the issue of whether it was a “creditor” for AUFTA purposes, and whether the Trammells were 

“debtors” for AUFTA purposes, at the time of the challenged transfers. Accordingly, defendants 

cannot withstand summary judgment on this point by making an unsupported blanket statement 

that SEPH has not proven a right to payment. On the evidence before the Court, it has. If there 

is other evidence casting doubt – or creating genuine issues of material fact – on the existence of 

such a right to payment, then it is incumbent on defendants to submit it as part of the summary 

judgment record.

Stated differently, to meet their burden and defeat SEPH’s summary judgment motion, 

defendants must come forward with evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of 

fact. See Rich, 716 F.3d at 530 (“If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is 

entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, comes forward with 

significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact”) 

(emphasis added and citation omitted).13 Of course, “[a] factual dispute is genuine only if a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Information Systems and 

Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). Defendants allude to 

the question of SEPH’s “right to payment” as one that “is being extensively litigated and

vigorously contested in the” Bama Bayou Action in state court. (Doc. 100, at 4.) Merely making 

such a statement, however, does not discharge defendants’ burden on summary judgment in this 

case. To defeat summary judgment on the creditor/debtor element of Count Three, defendants 

must come forward with evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable fact on the question of 

 13 See also Dietz v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(“Once the movant adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 

show that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial.”) (emphasis added); Burger 

King, 572 F.3d at 1313 (“If the movant succeeds in demonstrating the absence of a material issue 

of fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of fact.”); 

Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006) (“To 

survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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whether the Trammells owed money to SEPH when the allegedly fraudulent transfers were 

made. Defendants have cited no evidence. They have explained neither the legal nor the factual 

grounds for their objections in the Bama Bayou Action to SEPH’s claim for payment.14 Simply 

put, defendants have not met their burden on summary judgment here. Accordingly, for Rule 56 

purposes, the Court concludes that SEPH is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 

creditor/debtor element of its § 8-9A-5(a) claim set forth in Count Three of the First Amended 

Complaint.

C. The Timing of Plaintiff’s Claim and the Trammells’ Transfers.

The second element of SEPH’s claim asserted under Alabama Code § 8-9A-5(a) is that 

plaintiff must establish that its claim “arose before the transfer was made.” The summary 

judgment record unambiguously demonstrates that this element is satisfied. Plaintiff’s evidence, 

which has been neither controverted nor opposed by defendants, reveals the following timetable: 

The Trammells executed guaranties in favor of Vision Bank in 2005, 2006 and 2007. The 

borrower (Riverwalk / Bama Bayou) defaulted. Vision Bank demanded payment from the 

Trammells and others. When no such payment was forthcoming, Vision Bank filed suit against 

them in state court in January 2009. The Trammells transferred their interests in the beach 

condo, the Lake Martin house, the LLCs, and the UPS stock during the period of January 2011 

through October 2013. Given this unrebutted factual showing, no reasonable finder of fact could 

conclude that SEPH’s claim did not arise before the subject transfers were made. This element 

of Count Three is plainly satisfied. Defendants do not maintain otherwise.

 14 It appears that defendants are placing all their eggs in the “right to payment” 

basket. Certainly, it is true that, for purposes of establishing whether one is a debtor or creditor, 

the AUFTA defines “claim” as requiring a “right to payment.” See Ala. Code § 8-9A-1(3). 

However, the statute clarifies that the “right to payment” qualifies as a claim for AUFTA 

purposes “whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 

contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 

Id. It is not necessary for SEPH to have received a judgment in the Bama Bayou Action that the 

Trammells owed it money; rather, it suffices for SEPH to make an unrebutted showing in this 

action based on record facts that the Trammells owed money to SEPH (or its predecessor) when 

they made the subject transfers. Plaintiff has made that affirmative showing here, and defendants 

have not discharged their burden of rebutting it with evidence showing the existence of a genuine 

factual dispute.

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D. Whether the Trammells Received a Reasonably Equivalent Value.

The third element of a constructive fraud claim brought pursuant to Alabama Code § 8-

9A-5(a) is that the Trammells must have made the transfers “without receiving a reasonably 

equivalent value in exchange for the transfer.” This element is hotly debated in the parties’ 

summary judgment briefs. For its part, SEPH relies on undisputed record facts that no money or 

property was given to Charles and Belinda Trammell in exchange for the beach condo and Lake 

Martin house when they transferred such real property to the LLCs; that no money or property 

was given to the Trammells in exchange for the 90% interest in the two LLCs that they 

transferred to their daughters (Center and Brown); and that no money or property was given to 

Charles Trammell in exchange for the thousands of shares of UPS stock that he transferred to the 

LLCs, or the remaining UPS stock and primary residence that he transferred to Belinda 

Trammell upon his death. In response, defendants criticize SEPH’s argument as championing an 

excessively narrow definition of “value,” and contend that the requisite value was exchanged in 

the form of support, tax savings and better asset management.

The appropriate analytical starting place is, of course, the statute itself. Alabama’s 

version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides as follows: “Value is given for a 

transfer if, in exchange for the transfer, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or 

satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor.” 

Ala. Code § 8-9A-3(a). Where, as here, the transfers were made between family members, with 

the Trammells transferring property to their daughters (and/or to LLCs whose ownership was 

also largely transferred to those same daughters), the Alabama Supreme Court instructs that the 

“value” element must be scrutinized with particular care.15

 15 See, e.g., Reese v. Smoker, 475 So.2d 506, 508 (Ala. 1985) (“The Court 

recognizes that conveyances of property between family members in the face of a pending suit 

against the transferor must be carefully scrutinized.”); Waddle v. Great Southern Phosphate Co., 

63 So. 462 (Ala. 1913) (“Where the contract is between near relations, as between husband and 

wife, father and son, and the like, it will be subjected to a closer scrutiny ... than if the parties to 

it were strangers. ... Such purchases are so often made a cover for a debtor’s property, are so 

frequently resorted to for the purpose of withdrawing his property from the reach of his creditors 

and preserving it for his own use, and they hold forth such temptations for fraud, that they 

require close scrutiny.”) (citations omitted).

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Significantly, it is incorrect to equate the AUFTA concept of “reasonably equivalent 

value” with the common-law notion of consideration. In the AUFTA constructive-fraud context, 

Alabama courts distinguish between “valuable consideration” (which does not give rise to a 

constructive fraudulent transfer) and merely “good consideration” (which can). See, e.g., 

McPherson Oil Co. v. Massey, 643 So.2d 595, 596 (Ala. 1994) (“[T]he law infers constructive 

fraud when it appears that an indebted grantor has conveyed property to a family member 

without receiving valuable consideration.”); Reese v. Smoker, 475 So.2d 506, 508 (Ala. 1985) 

(“The term ‘constructive fraud’ is generally used in referring to those instances where a grantor, 

indebted at the time, conveys property on a good as distinguished from a valuable 

consideration.”). Where, as here, the creditor has made a showing on summary judgment that 

the grantees paid no money or property to the grantors in exchange for the transferred asset, an 

inference of constructive fraud arises; therefore, defendants bear the burden of proving the 

existence of valuable and adequate consideration. See McPherson Oil, 643 So.2d at 596 (“When 

that inference of constructive fraud arises, the burden then shifts to the grantee to prove the 

existence of such consideration.”); Reese, 475 So.2d at 508 (“The burden is upon the grantee to 

show a consideration both valuable and adequate.”) (citation omitted).

In evaluating whether valuable – as opposed to simply good – consideration has been 

given for a challenged transfer, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act as adopted in Alabama (and 

other jurisdictions, for that matter) contemplates that courts must examine the nature and 

adequacy of the consideration from the standpoint of the creditor, not that of the debtor or the

transferee of the subject property. In that regard, the Comments to the Uniform Fraudulent 

Transfer Act clarify that “[v]alue is to be determined in light of the purpose of the Act to protect 

a debtor’s estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the debtor’s unsecured creditors. 

Consideration having no utility from a creditor’s viewpoint does not satisfy the statutory 

definition.” Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 1984, § 3, comment 2 (emphasis added). Courts 

have embraced this principle. As one federal court applying Alabama’s version of the Uniform 

Fraudulent Transfer Act explained, “Whether a debtor received reasonably equivalent value is to 

be determined in light of the AUFTA’s purpose – to protect creditors. ... Accordingly, the value 

of consideration given for an alleged fraudulent transfer is determined from the standpoint of the 

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debtor’s creditors.” Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 667 (N.D. Tex. 2011) 

(citations omitted).16

Defendants’ primary argument on summary judgment is that reasonably equivalent value 

was given by defendants Brown and Center for their parents’ transfers of the beach condo, the 

Lake Martin house, the UPS stock and the LLCs because Brown and Center furnished 

“emotional support” to Charles and Belinda Trammell. In particular, defendants rely on Center’s 

deposition testimony that she and her sister provided emotional support to the Trammells while 

Charles Trammell was undergoing difficult blood transfusions and Belinda Trammell was 

experiencing health issues of her own. The first, most glaring shortcoming with this argument is 

that Alabama’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act expressly excludes unperformed promises of 

support from the definition of “value” given for a transfer. See Ala. Code § 8-9A-3(a) (“value 

does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor”). Thus, promises of 

future support have been deemed insufficient as a matter of law to constitute “reasonably 

equivalent value” for a debtor’s asset transfers to a third party. See, e.g., In re Ventimiglia, 362 

B.R. 71, 83 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In general, a promise of future support is not considered a 

fair equivalent of property transferred.”); Springfield Ins. Co. v. Fry, 267 F. Supp. 693, 696 

 16 See also In re TransTexas Gas Corp., 597 F.3d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 2010) (“To 

measure reasonably equivalent value, we judge the consideration given for a transfer from the 

standpoint of creditors. ... The proper focus is the net effect of the transfers on the debtor’s 

estate, [and] the funds available to the unsecured creditors.”) (citations omitted); In re Sergio, 

552 B.R. 9, 21 (Bankr.D. Mass. 2016) (“[A] determination of whether indirect benefits suffice as 

fair consideration turns on whether the debtor’s net worth has been preserved and creditors’ 

interests have not been injured as a result of the transfers.”) (citation omitted); In re David Cutler 

Industries, Ltd., 502 B.R. 58, 73 (Bankr.E.D. Pa. 2013) (for UFTA purposes, “the court 

determines whether value was received from the vantage of the creditor,” and the “touchstone” 

of the “reasonably equivalent value” analysis is “whether the parties exchanged comparable 

realizable commercial value”) (citation omitted); In re Blixseth, 489 B.R. 154, 184 (Bankr.D. 

Mont. 2013) (“in the context of the California Fraudulent Transfer Act ... reasonably equivalent 

value must be determined from the creditors’ standpoint, not from the debtor’s”); ASARCO LLC

v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 337 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (under Delaware’s version of 

UFTA, “[t]he determination of whether the debtor received REV should be made from the 

standpoint of the debtor’s creditors, by looking at the net effect of the transfer on the unsecured 

creditors”); In re 3dfx Interactive, Inc., 389 B.R. 842, 863 (Bankr.N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Because the 

policy behind fraudulent conveyance law is to preserve assets of the estate, reasonably equivalent 

value is determined from the standpoint of the estate’s creditors, it is not determined from the 

defendant’s perspective.”).

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(N.D. Okla. 1967) (“ordinarily a transfer of property in consideration of future support is held to 

be invalid, at any rate, as to existing creditors whose rights are prejudiced by such transfer”); 

American Surety Co. of New York v. Edwards & Bradford Lumber Co., 57 F. Supp. 18, 27 (N.D. 

Iowa 1944) (“That a conveyance by an insolvent in consideration of future support is void so far 

as it puts the property of the grantor out of the reach of creditors, is well settled.”) (citation 

omitted).17

A larger, more fundamental problem with defendants’ reliance on “emotional support” as 

constituting reasonably equivalent value for the transfer of millions of dollars of real property 

and UPS stock shares from the Trammells to their daughters lies in the legal requirement that 

value be viewed from the standpoint of the creditor, not the debtor. As the above-cited 

authorities demonstrate, consideration having no utility from a creditor’s vantage point may be 

“good” consideration supporting a valid contract, but it cannot constitute reasonably equivalent 

value under § 8-9A-5(a), as a matter of law. Courts in Alabama and elsewhere routinely find no 

reasonably equivalent value where the consideration is cited as love and affection, a moral 

obligation, or some other intangible psychological benefit to the debtor, for the simple reason 

that such consideration (while it might be “good”) lacks “value” from a creditor’s standpoint, 

such that the exchange injures creditors’ interests. Pursuant to that line of reasoning, the 

Alabama Supreme Court has repeatedly “held that a conveyance given in return for ‘love and 

 17 On summary judgment, defendants make much of the word “unperformed” in the 

statutory definition, insisting that there is no evidence that the support given by Brown and 

Center was “future support or [an] unperformed promise to furnish support.” (Doc. 100, at 18.) 

This argument is unavailing. If, at the time the transfers were made, the support had already 

been given, then that support could not constitute valuable consideration absent evidence of a 

previous agreement (i.e., Brown and Center agree to provide emotional support in 2009 and 

2010, and the Trammells agree to transfer property to them in 2011), none of which is found in 

the summary judgment record. If defendants are suggesting that Brown and Center’s past 

support somehow created a moral obligation for the Trammells to transfer property to them, that 

argument fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., Rubenstein v. C.I.R., 134 T.C. 266, 277-78 (2010) 

(“Petitioner suggests that his father had a moral obligation to compensate him for his caregiving. 

The satisfaction of a moral obligation, however, does not constitute ‘value’ within the meaning 

of the FUFTA.”). Although they have been vague in their briefs, defendants’ theory is 

apparently that the Trammells gave property to their daughters in exchange for their daughters 

providing emotional support to them thereafter. That kind of “unperformed promise to furnish 

support” (at the time the transfer was made) cannot constitute reasonably equivalent value for 

AUFTA purposes, as a matter of law.

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affection’ is supported by ‘good,’ rather than ‘valuable’ consideration, and is thus a voluntary 

conveyance and void against existing creditors.” McPherson Oil, 643 So.2d at 596 (citations 

omitted); see also Matter of Treadwell, 699 F.2d 1050, 1051 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Even if the love 

and affection of the daughters for their father increased $4,000 worth, it is of no benefit to the 

creditors. That his love and affection for them motivated the gift does not satisfy the intent of 

the statute, ... [which is] to prevent the debtor from depleting the resources available to creditors 

through gratuitous transfers of the debtor’s property.”); In re Earle, 307 B.R. 276, 292 n.7 

(Bankr.S.D. Ala. 2002) (“The Court notes that conveyances made only in return for ‘love and 

affection’ are deemed to be made for good, but not valuable, consideration under Alabama state 

law for fraudulent transfer purposes.”).

18 Simply put, then, any promises by Brown and Center 

 18 Courts in other states construing similar language drawn from the Uniform 

Fraudulent Transfer Act or its analogues have likewise cast a jaundiced eye on arguments that a 

family member’s love, affection, emotional support or psychic satisfaction may amount to a 

“reasonably equivalent value” for fraudulent transfer purposes. See, e.g., In re Marlar, 252 B.R. 

743, 760 (8th Cir. BAP 2000) (“Since the question of fair consideration as it pertains to an 

alleged fraudulent conveyance must be determined from the standpoint of creditors ... it is clear 

that no fair equivalent is exchanged when the conveyance is simply for natural love and 

affection. The creditor’s interest will not be protected since the debtor’s property has departed 

without any fair equivalent taking its place.”) (citation omitted); Federal Refinance Co. v. Klock, 

352 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2003) (“And although [debtor’s] brief includes a perfunctory assertion 

that the transfer was in fact adequately supported by the love and affection of his children, he 

points us to no case law that suggests that, for purposes of the UFCA, such intangibles may 

supplant money, property, or satisfaction of an antecedent debt as fair consideration.”); Janvey v. 

Golf Channel, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560, 574 (Tex. 2016) (“[L]ove and affection, and other types of 

consideration that have no utility from a creditor’s viewpoint, do not confer value for an 

exchange. Rather, consideration must go beyond some speculative, ephemeral[,] psychic 

satisfaction to constitute value or reasonably equivalent value.”) (internal quotation marks and 

footnotes omitted); United States v. Major, 551 B.R. 531, 541 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (“transfers of 

money or property to a family member in exchange for ‘love and affection’ do not constitute 

reasonably equivalent value”); Mann v. Hanil Bank, 920 F. Supp. 944, 954 (E.D. Wisc. 1996) 

(“These benefits, to constitute ‘reasonably equivalent value’ under the Wisconsin statute, must 

go beyond some speculative, ephemeral psychic satisfaction that might result from doing a favor 

for a friend.”); In re Young, 152 B.R. 939, 949 (D. Minn. 1993) (“emotional support received in 

exchange for a transfer, without more, cannot satisfy the requirement for reasonably equivalent 

value”); In re Simione, 229 B.R. 329, 335 (Bankr.W.D. Penn. 1999) (“where a conveyance of 

property is made in consideration of an agreement to support the grantor in the future, it is 

invalid as to creditors if by the conveyance the grantor renders himself unable to pay his debts”) 

(citation omitted); In re Guerrera, 225 B.R. 32, 36 (Bankr.D. Conn. 1998) (“[i]t has been 

determined that intangible, psychological benefits do not constitute reasonably equivalent 

(Continued)

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to provide emotional support to their parents subsequent to the subject transfers, or any gratitude, 

love, affection or sense of moral obligation felt by the Trammells for their daughters’ past 

support, may or may not constitute “good” consideration for the transfers, but they do not and 

cannot as a matter of law rise to the level of “valuable” consideration from the standpoint of 

creditors, which is the operative query in a constructive fraudulent transfer analysis.

Defendants’ alternative arguments for “reasonably equivalent value” fare no better. 

Specifically, they maintain that the Trammells received reasonably equivalent value in the form 

of “tax savings” and “better asset management.” (Doc. 100, at 17.) To support this theory, 

defendants point to a letter from the Trammells’ lawyer dated January 11, 2010, in which the 

lawyer advised the Trammells that “[b]eginning a gifting program with your children, 

grandchildren, and in-laws could also help lower estate taxes, protect assets, and allow better 

asset management.” (Doc. 100, Exh. 5, at 3.) The problem, once again, is that the Trammells’ 

creditors (and, particularly, SEPH) did not benefit from these transfers in the specified (or any)

ways. That the Trammells may have enjoyed favorable tax treatment and “better asset 

management” (whatever that means)19 by transferring their beach condo, their Lake Martin 

 

value”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Doe v. Ewing, 517 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 

(Mich.App. 1994) (“Gifts or the satisfaction of moral obligations do not constitute equivalent 

value for purposes of determining whether the conveyance was fraudulent.”); Jahner v. Jacob, 

252 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (N.D. 1977) (“Love and affection is a sufficient consideration for a deed. ... 

But ‘love and affection’ is not that ‘fair consideration’ required by [the UFCA]. ... 

[C]onveyances to family members for love and affection have frequently been held fraudulent as 

to creditors.”) (citations omitted); Royal Indem. Co. v. McClendon, 323 P.2d 1090, 1092 (N.M. 

1958) (“By the weight of authority a transfer of property in consideration of future support is 

held to be invalid when the rights of existing creditors are thereby prejudiced.”). And the 

Comments to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act on the topic of “value” explain that “[t]he 

definition does not specify all the kinds of consideration that do not constitute value for the 

purposes of this Act – e.g., love and affection.” Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 1984, § 3, 

comment 2.

19 By all appearances, “better asset management” is another way of saying “place 

your assets beyond the reach of your creditors,” which is precisely the sort of practice that the 

AUFTA was enacted to prevent. And if “tax savings” were valuable consideration under the 

AUFTA, then no transfer could ever be constructively fraudulent as long as it funneled assets

from a more wealthy to a less wealthy family member. That result would frustrate the statute’s 

purpose.

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house, their LLC interests, and their UPS stock shares to their daughters had no utility – and 

yielded absolutely no value – for their creditors. Under the AUFTA, “value” is gauged in light 

of the statute’s purpose of protecting creditors from being prejudiced by the depletion of a 

debtor’s assets. The above-cited transfers served to deplete the Trammells’ assets to a 

considerable degree, with no countervailing utility or benefit to creditors; therefore, notions of 

“tax savings” and “better asset management” from the Trammells’ perspective do not furnish the 

necessary reasonably equivalent value or valuable consideration necessary to pass muster under 

§ 8-9A-5(a).20

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds on this record as a matter of law that the 

Trammells did not receive a reasonably equivalent value for any of the subject transfers. 

Therefore, SEPH has satisfied the third element of its claim for constructive fraudulent transfer 

set forth in Count Three of the First Amended Complaint.

E. Whether the Trammells Were Insolvent at the Time of the Transfers.

The fourth element of a constructive fraudulent transfer cause of action brought under § 

8-9A-5(a) is that plaintiff must establish that “the debtor was insolvent at the time or the debtor 

became insolvent as a result of the transfer.” Ala. Code § 8-9A-5(a). The statute provides that 

 20 Defendants’ reliance on In re Northlake Foods, Inc., 715 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 

2013), for the proposition that tax benefits constitute reasonably equivalent value for a transfer is 

misplaced. In Northlake Foods, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that “[t]he purpose of voiding 

transfers unsupported by reasonably equivalent value is to protect creditors against the depletion 

of a bankrupt’s estate,” but that a transfer should not be voided where “the debtor’s net worth has 

been preserved, and the interests of the creditors will not have been injured by the transfer.” Id.

at 1255-56. Under the specific circumstances alleged in the pleading, the Northlake Foods panel 

concluded that this test was satisfied. Here, however, the test is not satisfied. Notwithstanding 

their purported goals of “tax savings” and “better asset management,” the Trammells depleted 

their assets without preserving their net worth, all at great injury to their creditor, SEPH. 

Whatever tax benefits the Trammells might have enjoyed from their “gifting program” did not

redound to the benefit of their creditors or preserve assets from which SEPH could collect the 

millions of dollars owed by the Trammells; to the contrary, those transfers drained the 

Trammells’ coffers without replacing the transferred assets with anything approaching equivalent 

value. Under Northlake Foods, the result of the analysis in this case is thus unchanged. Also, it 

bears noting that the reasonably equivalent value issue in Northlake Foods was being addressed 

at the pleadings stage, not at summary judgment. Unlike the Court in the case at bar, the 

Eleventh Circuit in Northlake Foods was constrained to accept as true all factual allegations in 

the complaint (including benefit allegations set forth in the pleading), and did not have access to 

the clarifying vehicle of discovery to make a reasonably equivalent value determination.

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“[a] debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at 

a fair valuation.” Ala. Code § 8-9A-2(a); see also Kaye, 453 B.R. at 668 (“Under the AUFTA, a 

debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a 

fair valuation.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On summary judgment, the 

parties vigorously dispute whether the AUFTA’s test for “insolvency” was satisfied at the time 

of the subject transfers.

In an attempt to bypass the need to weigh the Trammells’ debts and assets at the time of 

the transfers, SEPH invokes the statutory presumption of insolvency, to-wit: “A debtor who is 

generally not paying his debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.” Ala. Code § 8-

9A-2(b). However, SEPH has not made a showing on summary judgment sufficient to support a 

conclusion as a matter of law that the Trammells were “generally not paying [their] debts as they 

bec[a]me due.” The only evidence submitted by SEPH on this point is testimony that the 

Trammells did not fulfill their guaranty obligations when Vision Bank demanded payment in or 

around early 2009. (See Braswell Aff., ¶¶ 6-8.) That showing leaves many relevant questions 

unanswered. As the comments to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act explain:

“In determining whether a debtor is paying its debts generally as they become 

due, the court should look at more than the amount and due dates of the 

indebtedness. The court should also take into account such factors as the number 

of the debtor’s debts, the proportion of those debts not being paid, the duration of 

the nonpayment, and the existence of bona fide disputes or other special 

circumstances alleged to constitute an explanation for the stoppage of payments.”

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 1984, § 2, comment 2. On the summary judgment record 

presented, the Court has no information about the number of the Trammells’ debts, the 

proportion of those debts not being paid, the duration of nonpayment and so on. On this record, 

the Court likewise cannot evaluate whether the Trammells did or did not have “bona fide 

disputes or other special circumstances” that might have influenced their stoppage of payments 

on the Bama Bayou / Riverwalk and Marine Park loans.21 Simply put, SEPH (as the movant on 

 21 The Court is aware, of course, that a central issue being litigated in the Bama 

Bayou Action pending in state court since 2009 is whether the Trammells were actually indebted 

on the subject guaranties, and if so to what extent. On the summary judgment record presented, 

the Court cannot evaluate whether the Trammells’ dispute over liability in the Bama Bayou

Action is or is not grounded in a bona fide dispute. On this fragmentary evidentiary showing, the 

Court cannot make a definitive finding on summary judgment as to whether the Trammells were 

generally paying their debts as they became due.

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summary judgment) has not come forward with proof that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and that the Trammells were generally not paying their debts as they became due at the time 

of the challenged transfers of the beach condo, the Lake Martin house, the LLC interests, the 

primary residence and the UPS stock. As such, the Court cannot find on summary judgment that

AUFTA’s presumption of insolvency set forth at Alabama Code § 8-9A-2(b) is applicable here.

In the absence of a statutory presumption of insolvency, the critical question for purposes 

of the insolvency element is whether the sum of the Trammells’ debts was greater than their 

assets at a fair valuation at the time of the subject transfers. To shoulder its summary judgment 

burden, SEPH presents evidence tabulating in detail Charles and Belinda Trammell’s assets and 

liabilities immediately after each challenged asset transfer (i.e., the beach condo and Lake Martin 

house transfers on January 26, 2011; the LLC membership interest transfers on December 12, 

2011; the UPS stock transfer on April 25, 2012; and the UPS stock and principal residence 

transfer on October 24, 2013). In its principal brief, SEPH offers charts summarizing the 

evidence for each line item of assets and liabilities. (Doc. 91, at 13-21.) In each instance, 

SEPH’s evidence reflects that Charles and Belinda Trammell’s liabilities exceeded their assets

by a wide margin after the transfer took place, so as to satisfy the statutory definition of 

insolvency.

22

In response, defendants advance three specific criticisms against the validity of SEPH’s 

calculations of the Trammells’ assets and liabilities. First, defendants contend that the liability 

figures used by SEPH are inflated by millions of dollars in interest and collection costs on the 

Bama Bayou debt that they believe the Mobile County Circuit Court will set aside in the Bama 

Bayou Action. This objection centers on a ruling issued by Circuit Judge Stewart in Bama 

Bayou on October 26, 2016, setting aside certain foreclosure sales performed by Vision Bank in 

 22 Specifically, SEPH’s calculations (again, grounded in cited record evidence) 

show that as of January 26, 2011, Charles Trammell’s assets were fairly valued at $2.81 million 

while his debts were $4.58 million; that on the same date, Belinda Trammell’s assets were fairly 

valued at $0.35 million while her debts were $1.68 million; that as of December 12, 2011, 

Charles Trammell’s assets were fairly valued at $2.71 million as compared to debts of $6.02 

million; that on the same date Belinda Trammell’s assets were fairly valued at $0.31 million as 

compared to debts of $2.24 million; that as of April 25, 2012, Charles Trammells’ assets were 

fairly valued at $0.83 million, while his debts were $5.36 million; and that after the transfers 

upon his death on October 24, 2013, Charles Trammell’s Estate’s assets were $29,700 as 

compared to debts of $6.61 million.

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March 2009. (Doc. 100, Exh. 1.) After commencing the Bama Bayou Action in January 2009, 

Vision Bank foreclosed on real property securing its loans to Bama Bayou and Marine Park, and 

ultimately purchased that property through credit bids. (Braswell Aff., ¶ 7.) Judge Stewart ruled 

in October 2016 that Vision Bank’s credit bids were “on their face so grossly inadequate as to 

shock the judicial conscience,” and that “the extremely low bids at the foreclosure sale raise the 

presumption of unconscionableness and the grossly inadequate prices coupled with substantial 

evidence of misconduct justifies setting aside the foreclosure sale.” (Doc. 100, Exh. 1, at 2.) On 

that basis, she “set[] aside the foreclosure sale and declare[d] the foreclosure deeds null, void and 

of no force and effect.” (Id.)

Defendants’ argument is that SEPH’s liability calculations for insolvency purposes fail to 

take into account the effect of the state court order, whose likely corollary (according to 

defendants) is that interest and collection costs accruing after those March 2009 foreclosure sales 

will be set aside.23 In so arguing, defendants point to provisions in the relevant mortgage 

documents for the real property on which foreclosures were set aside, which provisions specify

that the status quo will be restored if foreclosure proceedings are determined adversely to the 

lender.24 If the status quo must be restored, then that implies that SEPH should not be able to 

claim as costs of collection the attorney’s fees it incurred in the foreclosure battle.25 At the very 

 23 Defendants posit that one effect of the “grossly inadequate” credit bids by Vision 

Bank was to create the illusion of millions of dollars in indebtedness that did not exist (or would 

not have existed had Vision Bank made reasonable, fair bids at the foreclosure sales). Thus, 

according to defendants, interest was computed based on the grossly inflated debt figure, and 

collection costs were incurred in the course of SEPH’s attempts to defend its “grossly 

inadequate” credit bids and collect that grossly inflated debt figure. And the resulting inflated 

interest and collection costs were plugged into the asset/liability analysis by SEPH as proof of 

the Trammells’ insolvency here.

24 Representative of those clauses is the following contract language: “In case the 

Lender shall have proceeded to enforce any right or remedy under this Mortgage by foreclosure 

... and such proceedings ... shall have been determined adversely to the Lender, then and in 

every such case the Borrower and the Lender shall be restored to their former positions and 

rights hereunder ... as if no such proceeding had been taken.” (Doc. 100, Exh. 3, § 2.14 

(emphasis added).)

25 There is also a reasonable argument to be made that accrued interest should be 

ratcheted downward because the amount of principal remaining on the loans would have been 

substantially lower had Vision Bank made reasonable bids at the foreclosure sales. The

(Continued)

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least, Judge Stewart’s ruling in the Bama Bayou Action appears to affect the “liability” side of 

the ledger for Charles and Belinda Trammell in significant and material ways, yet SEPH’s 

calculations do not take it into account.

Second, defendants maintain that SEPH’s asset/liability calculations are flawed because 

the liability side of the ledger includes hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney’s fees whose 

reasonableness is contested. Recall that, as part of the Limited Continuing Guaranties they 

signed, the Trammells agreed to be responsible for Vision Bank / SEPH’s costs of collection, 

including “reasonable” attorney’s fees.26 On their face, these agreements limit the Trammells’ 

exposure to only those attorney’s fees that are “reasonable.” Even if such a limitation were not 

supplied by contract terms, it would be implied by Alabama law as a matter of public policy.

27 

As a general proposition, “[t]he starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is 

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly 

rate.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Defendants correctly observe that SEPH has made no such 

evidentiary showing of reasonableness, but instead appears to have lumped all attorney’s fees it 

 

counterargument, however, is that “status quo” could be construed as meaning that interest 

accrues on the full amount of principal (unreduced by any actual or hypothetical foreclosure sale 

proceeds) from March 2009 through the present day. In that event, of course, accrued interest 

(and, hence, the Trammells’ liabilities) would be higher, not lower, than SEPH’s calculations. 

The Court expresses no opinion as to the proper means of implementing the “status quo” 

provisions in the mortgages in light of the ruling in the Bama Bayou Action setting aside the 

foreclosure sales as unconscionable.

26 For example, in the May 2006 guaranties they executed as to the Riverwalk loan, 

each of Charles and Belinda Trammell agreed to the following provision: “Guarantor agrees to 

pay reasonable actual attorney’s fees and all other costs and expenses which may be incurred by 

the Bank in the enforcement of this Guaranty.” (Doc. 92, Exh. A-3 at ¶ 10.) Other relevant 

guaranties include similar language.

27 See, e.g., Willow Lake Residential Ass’n, Inc. v. Juliano, 80 So.3d 226, 241 

(Ala.Civ.App. 2010) (“Alabama law reads into every agreement allowing for the recovery of 

attorney’s fees a reasonableness limitation.”); Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Howard, 2013 

WL 951652, *6 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2013) (“Alabama law imposes a reasonableness constraint on 

all fee-shifting contracts, as a matter of public policy.”).

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has incurred into the “costs of collection” column as a conclusory total on the liability side of the 

ledger.

Third, defendants take aim at SEPH’s “assets” calculations by asserting that SEPH has 

systematically excluded the Trammells’ interests in limited liability companies, to-wit: Gulf 

World, LLC; Bama Bayou, LLC; Trammell Family Orange Beach Properties, LLC; and 

Trammell Family Lake Martin Properties, LLC. Particularly significant, defendants argue, is 

Gulf World, LLC, the entity that purportedly owns the Bama Bayou parcels as to which the 

foreclosure sales were set aside by the Bama Bayou order. Because those foreclosure sales were 

set aside, defendants reason, Gulf World must be construed as owning those parcels (which are 

worth millions of dollars) at all relevant times, including the dates of the challenged transfers by 

the Trammells.28 The result, defendants maintain, is that the “asset” side of the ledger proposed 

by SEPH in its insolvency analysis drastically understates the Trammells’ assets at the time of 

the challenged transfers.29

 28 As evidence of the value of the parcels, defendants refer to pleadings from the 

Bama Bayou Action, which in turn cite appraisals showing those parcels were valued at a 

minimum of $25,697,000 as of April 2009. (Doc. 100, Exh. 2, ¶ 166.) Such evidence is not 

admissible in its present form; nonetheless, it is properly considered on summary judgment 

because all indications are that defendants can reduce it to admissible form (via the appraisals 

and/or appraisers themselves) at trial. See Rule 56(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. (recognizing that “[a] 

party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form 

that would be admissible in evidence”); Brannon v. Finkelstein, 754 F.3d 1269, 1277 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2014) (hearsay statement “should be considered on summary judgment here because it can 

be reduced to an admissible form at trial”).

29 SEPH’s counterarguments are not persuasive on summary judgment. First, SEPH 

argues that the Trammells’ interests in the LLCs do not qualify as “assets” within the meaning of 

the AUFTA. In particular, plaintiff reasons that the statute defines an “asset” as “[p]roperty of a 

debtor,” but excludes “[p]roperty to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law.” 

Ala. Code § 8-9A-1(2)(b); see also Wheeler Bros. Inc. v. Jones, 167 F. Supp.3d 1283, 1301 

(M.D. Ala. 2016) (“The definition of ‘asset’ under Ala. Code § 8-9A-1 states that it is property 

of the debtor but does not include property to the extent that it is exempt under non-bankruptcy 

law.”); Flirt v. Kirkpatrick, 175 So.2d 755, 758 (Ala. 1965) (“A sale or other disposition of 

property which is by law exempt from payment of debts cannot be impeached by creditors as 

fraudulent, since creditors cannot be deemed concerned with property not subject to their 

demands.”). A basic defect with this argument is that the Trammells waived any exemptions that 

might otherwise be available. See, e.g., doc. 92, Exh. A-3, ¶ 10 (“Guarantor hereby waives any 

rights of exemption, both as to personal and real property, under the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, the State of Alabama, or any other state or jurisdiction as to any debt, liability or 

(Continued)

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The cumulative effect of all of these objections is to create considerable uncertainty as to 

whether “the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a fair 

valuation,” as necessary to establish insolvency under the AUFTA. An example illustrates the 

point. On January 26, 2011 (the date on which the Trammells transferred their interests in the 

beach condo and the Lake Martin house to family-owned LLCs), the summary judgment record 

reflects Charles Trammell’s debts consisted of $1.775 million in principal that he guaranteed on 

the Bama Bayou, Marine Park and Sundance debts, plus interest and collection costs. (Braswell 

Aff., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff’s evidence identifies $1,818,806.09 in accrued interest and late fees, as well 

as $977,332.53 in costs of collection. But the October 26, 2016 order in the Bama Bayou Action 

 

obligation hereunder.”). By all appearances, the effect of that waiver is to render the Trammells’ 

interests in LLCs not “generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law” because they are not exempt 

at all. Even if those waivers were not enforceable or were otherwise invalid, SEPH’s argument 

that an interest in an LLC is not an AUFTA “asset” fails because it proves too much. Among the 

transfers that SEPH seeks to have set aside as fraudulent in these proceedings are the Trammells’ 

transfers of 90% of their interests in Trammell Orange Beach and Trammell Lake Martin to their 

daughters in October 2011. If those interests in LLCs are not AUFTA “assets” (and SEPH has 

argued that LLC interests do not count as AUFTA assets for purposes of the insolvency 

analysis), then there was no AUFTA “transfer,” which the statute defines as “[e]very mode ... of 

disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset.” Ala. Code § 8-9A-1(13) 

(emphasis added); see also Wheeler Bros., 167 F. Supp.3d at 1301 (“[t]he plain language of the 

AUFTA says that a transfer has to be of an asset”). If there were no AUFTA “transfer,” then no 

cause of action for constructive fraudulent transfer is available to SEPH under § 8-9A-5(a). 

Simply put, SEPH cannot have it both ways. An interest in an LLC is either an “asset” or it is 

not. Plaintiff’s Count Three is predicated on such an interest being an “asset,” which directly 

contradicts its attempts to argue otherwise in its insolvency analysis. SEPH’s second 

counterargument is that defendants have not proven the value of those LLC interests or even 

whether Belinda Trammell has an interest in Gulf World, LLC. But as summary judgment 

movant, SEPH bears the initial burden of showing what the Trammells’ assets are and how they 

are valued. If SEPH concedes that Charles Trammell had an interest in Gulf World at the time of 

the subject transfers, then it must make an affirmative showing on summary judgment to value 

that interest. If SEPH contends that Belinda Trammell has no interest in Gulf World, then it 

likewise must make such a showing. It has not done so; therefore, the evidentiary burden does 

not shift to defendants to come forward with evidence showing genuine issues of material fact on 

those matters. At any rate, there is evidence in the summary judgment record that “the value of 

Mr. Trammell’s interest in Gulf World, LLC is a function of the value of the assets of the LLC, 

which mainly consist of millions of dollars in real property and damages from the lawsuit 

pending in Mobile County.” (Doc. 92, Exh. G, at #2.) Those statements can be reduced to 

admissible form at trial, and therefore are properly considered on summary judgment as 

supporting a genuine issue of material fact.

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likely reduces both interest and costs of collection, and SEPH offers no evidence as to reasonable 

estimates of those figures in the wake of the judicially-undone foreclosures. Moreover, SEPH’s 

collection cost figures appear to consist primarily of attorney’s fees as to which no showing of 

reasonableness has been made. Thus, for summary judgment purposes, we know only that 

Charles Trammell’s debts included some amount of interest and collection costs. We do not 

know – and, on this record, cannot hazard a reasonable estimate – how much. On the asset side 

of the equation, SEPH identifies $27,033 that Charles Trammell held in joint bank accounts, 

$29,700 in automobiles and other personal property, $78,500 in his share of his personal 

residence, and $2,675,063 in UPS stock shares. (Doc. 91, at 13.) But SEPH does not identify 

Charles Trammell’s interests in LLCs, much less assign any fair market valuation to those 

interests. The resulting gaps on both the liabilities and assets side of the equation preclude the 

Court from making any definitive determination at this time as to whether Charles Trammell was 

insolvent after transferring the beach condo and Lake Martin house to family-owned LLCs. This 

analysis would yield similar results for summary judgment purposes at each of the critical 

junctures for both Charles and Belinda Trammell.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact as 

to whether defendants Charles Trammell and Belinda Trammell were insolvent at the time of the 

challenged transfers. Because insolvency is a necessary element of proof for Count Three (a 

cause of action asserted pursuant to Alabama Code § 8-9A-5(a)), that finding precludes entry of 

summary judgment at this time.30

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 90) is granted in part, 

and denied in part;

2. Because the summary judgment record reveals no genuine issues of material fact, 

the Motion is granted as to the following elements of Count Three: (i) SEPH’s 

 30 See Sibille v. Davis, 2016 WL 1178662, *9 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2016) (“[T]he 

value of the property is a disputed issue of fact. Therefore, the court cannot calculate, on the 

basis of undisputed facts, whether ... he became insolvent as a result of the October 2012 

transfers. Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied as to Sibille’s claims that the October 

2012 transfers were constructively fraudulent.”).

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status as a creditor and the Trammells’ status as debtors; (ii) the timing of SEPH’s 

claim against the Trammells (i.e., that it arose before the subject transfers were 

made); and (iii) that the Trammells made the transfers without receiving a 

reasonably equivalent value. Those issues having been resolved on summary 

judgment, they need not and will not be litigated at trial, pursuant to Rule 56(g), 

Fed.R.Civ.P.;

3. The Motion is denied as to the insolvency element of Count Three. The evidence 

and argument at trial on Count Three will be limited to the questions of whether 

Charles and Belinda Trammell were insolvent within the meaning of Alabama 

Code § 8-9A-2 at the time of, or became insolvent as a result of, the challenged 

transfers. The Court will also accept evidence and argument on the question 

(raised for the first time on summary judgment in defendants’ brief) of whether 

Charles Trammell’s death effected “transfers” of his interest in the primary 

residence and remaining UPS stock to Belinda Trammell within the meaning of 

the AUFTA;31

4. Review of the court file confirms that on September 26, 2016, Magistrate Judge 

Cassady entered an Order (doc. 89) referring this case to mediation. On October 

 31 The Court did not address that issue on summary judgment because it was 

unnecessary to do so to resolve in full the issues raised in SEPH’s Motion. The Court also 

questions the need to address whether those transfers were constructively fraudulent at all in 

order to afford complete relief to SEPH in this litigation. The assets ostensibly transferred from 

Charles Trammell to Belinda Trammell upon the former’s death consisted of an $81,000 interest 

in the couple’s personal residence and UPS stock valued at $831,323.02 (8,798 shares priced at 

$94.49 on October 24, 2013). (Doc. 91, ¶ 52.) These transfers are different than the others at 

issue in this litigation because they were made from one debtor to another, rather than from a 

debtor to a third-party person or entity. If plaintiff’s position is ultimately vindicated at trial, 

then Belinda Trammell is indebted to SEPH in an amount exceeding $2 million. (Braswell Aff., 

¶ 8.) Logic and common sense suggest that SEPH could use the assets transferred to her upon 

Charles Trammell’s death in its efforts to collect on that debt, without ever needing to litigate 

whether the passage of those assets to her upon her husband’s death constitutes a “transfer” for 

AUFTA purposes. Stated differently, it is not readily apparent on this record why it matters 

whether the 8,798 shares of UPS stock and the ownership interest in the residence are deemed 

property of the Estate of Charles Trammell or property of Belinda Trammell. Either way, they 

would appear to be assets reachable by SEPH to collect on the underlying debt. The Court will 

entertain briefing and/or argument on this threshold question at an appropriate time.

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21, 2016, Judge Cassady entered a follow-up Order (doc. 97) providing that the 

parties must conduct their first mediation conference by no later than November 

10, 2016. Although that deadline expired more than seven weeks ago, it appears 

the parties have not complied. They are ordered to show cause, on or before 

January 5, 2017, why they have not conducted a mediation session to date (if in 

fact they have not). The Court understands that a mediation scheduled for 

November 10, 2016 was canceled at the eleventh hour due to an “emergency 

scheduling conflict” with the mediator (doc. 101), but it is unclear whether the 

parties ever rescheduled mediation in the intervening seven weeks; and

5. This action remains set for a Final Pretrial Conference before the undersigned on 

January 10, 2017 at 10:00 a.m., with nonjury trial to follow during the February 

2017 term. The Court is aware of defendants’ Motions to Continue and to Stay 

(docs. 102 & 107), and anticipates ruling on same in short order. The parties must 

file their Joint Pretrial Document by no later than January 6, 2017.

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of December, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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