Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17454/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17454-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

C.B., a minor,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF SONORA; MACE

MCINTOSH, Chief of Police;

HAL PROCK, Officer,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 11-17454

D.C. No. 

1:09-cv-00285-

AWI-SMS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Oliver W. Wanger, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

May 16, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed September 12, 2013

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Paul J. Watford,

Circuit Judges, and Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Zilly;

Concurrence and Dissent by Judge McKeown

* The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly, Senior United States District Judge

for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel vacated a jury verdict and the district court’s

judgment and remanded in an action arising out of the

handcuffing and removal from school of then eleven-year-old

C.B. by Sonora police officers.

The jury rendered a verdict ostensibly in favor of

defendants, but the district court concluded that the verdict

was incomplete and inconsistent and, after extensive

extemporaneous colloquies with the jurors, directed them to

re-deliberate. The jury eventually returned a verdict in favor

of C.B. The panel held that the verdict form and protracted

unscripted discussions between the district judge and the

jurors were so confusing and potentially misleading as to

require a new trial. The panel further held that police officers

were entitled to qualified immunity as to C.B.’s claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the law was, and still is, not clearly

established that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from

school to a relative’s place of business implicates Fourth

Amendment rights. 

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge

McKeown stated that she concurred in the majority’s decision

to remand this case for a new trial. She also concurred in the

remand of the state law claims. She dissented from that part

of the opinion which held that police officers were entitled to

qualified immunity on C.B.’s Fourth Amendment claims

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 3

because the facts demonstrated that C.B.’s prolonged

detention was an obvious violation of the Fourth

Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable

seizures.

COUNSEL

Cornelius J. Callahan and Stephanie Y. Wu, Borton Petrini,

LLP, Modesto, California, for Defendants-Appellants.

John F. Martin and Christine Hopkins, Law Offices of John

F. Martin, Walnut Creek, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

ZILLY, Senior District Judge:

This case involves a verdict form and protracted

unscripted discussions between the district judge and the

jurors that were so confusing and potentially misleading as to

require a new trial. This case arises out of the handcuffing

and removal from school of then eleven-year-old C.B. by

Sonora Police officers. Trial proceeded against City of

Sonora, Sonora Chief of Police Mace McIntosh, and Sonora

Police Officer Harold (Hal) Prock on four claims: false

imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) under state law, and unlawful seizure and excessive

force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jury rendered a verdict

ostensibly in favor of defendants, but the district court

concluded that the verdict was incomplete and inconsistent

and, after extensive extemporaneous colloquies with the

jurors, directed them to re-deliberate. The jury eventually

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4 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

returned a verdict in favor of C.B. Defendants unsuccessfully

moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or

remittitur, and now appeal. We hold that defendants are

entitled to a new trial, and that individual defendants

McIntosh and Prock are entitled to qualified immunity on the

two federal claims.

BACKGROUND

A. C.B.’s Handcuffing and Removal from School

At the time of the events at issue in this case, C.B. was

taking medication for attention-deficit and hyperactivity

disorder; the medication helped C.B. focus and not get too

easily distracted. On Monday, September 29, 2008, C.B.

forgot to take his medication before going to school, and he

proceeded to have a difficult day. Sometime during the first

three periods, after one of the breaks, a broadcast on the

handheld transceivers (“walkie talkies”) used by school

personnel indicated that C.B. had not returned to class. Karen

Sinclair, a physical education (“P.E.”) instructor and the

disciplinarian for Sonora Elementary School, who is

generally called “Coach,” assisted in getting C.B. back to

class before going to teach her own class. Later that morning,

around 11:20 a.m., Kerri McCluskey, the school counselor,

brought C.B. to Coach Sinclair’s office, and indicated that

C.B. needed to be there for a while. After having a brief

conversation with Coach Sinclair about his “rough day,” C.B.

went behind a barrier in the room to have some quiet time. 

About twenty minutes later, C.B. told Coach Sinclair that he

was ready to return to class, and she said, “okay.”

Coach Sinclair’s office was designated in C.B.’s plan

under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 5

29 U.S.C. § 794, as a place where C.B. could go when he was

non-responsive or needed to “cool down”; it was considered

a “safe zone” for C.B. Coach Sinclair’s professional

relationship with C.B. dated back to when C.B. was in

kindergarten, and she was familiar with C.B.’s habit of

becoming unresponsive and then taking off. In fact, when

C.B. was in the fourth grade, he had run away from P.E. class

and ended up in the school parking lot. On that occasion,

school personnel had learned that C.B. was missing, but had

not yet located him when Coach Sinclair received a call

indicating that C.B. was in the parking lot. C.B. had been

found by John Large, who later advised Coach Sinclair that

C.B. said he was “tired of feeling the way he felt and he

wanted to go out into traffic and kill himself.” Coach Sinclair

asked C.B. about this statement, and C.B. explained

“sometimes I feel like running into traffic.” At trial, C.B.

admitted that he had previously told Coach Sinclair he

wanted to run into traffic.

Coach Sinclair had this prior incident in mind as the

events of September 29, 2008, unfolded. Around noon,

Coach Sinclair received word that C.B. was being

unresponsive on the playground. Coach Sinclair went outside

and attempted to speak with C.B. She began by commenting,

“you’re having a rough day today,” and she indicated she was

aware that he had not taken his medication. Coach Sinclair

then invited C.B. to come to her office. C.B. did not respond. 

At trial, C.B. indicated that he had made a conscious decision

not to speak.

During this interaction, Coach Sinclair was concerned

about C.B. running across the playground and out an

unlocked gate, which opens to Greenley Road, an arterial on

which traffic often exceeds the 35 mile-per-hour limit. For

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6 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

some time, Coach Sinclair attempted to persuade C.B. to

return with her to her office. She then told C.B. that she

would have to call the police if he would not come inside

with her. According to Coach Sinclair, C.B. looked up for

the first time during the incident and said, “Call the police.” 

In contrast, C.B. testified he did not say anything in response

to Coach Sinclair’s statement that he could either “go to her

office or she was going to call the cops.” C.B. indicated at

trial that he thought Coach Sinclair was “just saying that to

get me to go inside” and that he “didn’t believe her.”

Coach Sinclair used a walkie talkie to request that

someone in the front office call the police to assist with an

out-of-control youth. C.B. remained seated on the bench,

looking at the ground, while the police were in transit. Chief

McIntosh arrived before Officer Prock; Officer John Bowly

also responded to the scene, but was not named as a

defendant in this case. Coach Sinclair advised them both

orally and via hand signals that C.B. was “a runner” and had

not taken his medication.

After being informed that C.B. was “a runner,” Officer

Prock likewise had concern about C.B.’s welfare if he were

to run. He observed that the school grounds could be easily

exited. He described nearby Greenley Road as “a busy

roadway” on which “everybody usually travels on an average

or close to 40, 45 miles an hour.” Moreover, Officer Prock

testified that, if C.B. had attempted to run away, he and his

colleagues would have needed to apprehend and restrain him,

which itself might have resulted in injuries to C.B.

Officer Prock attempted to engage C.B. in conversation

for approximately four to five minutes, trying even to joke

with him. C.B. remained unresponsive. Based on his

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 7

training, Officer Prock viewed this behavior as “passively

resisting” authority, perhaps while thinking about the next

move. The efforts to coax C.B. into communicating having

proven futile, Chief McIntosh gave a hand signal to Officer

Prock indicating that handcuffs should be used. A gesture

was made (touching wrists together), rather than an audible

verbal cue given, so as not to trigger C.B. to run. Chief

McIntosh viewed handcuffs as a means of preserving C.B.’s

safety, allowing the officers to control C.B. without using

physical force if he decided to run.

Officer Prock asked C.B. to stand up and put his hands

behind his back, and C.B. complied. Officer Prock then

applied the handcuffs. Coach Sinclair observed Officer Prock

put his pinky finger between the handcuffs and C.B.’s wrists

to make sure the handcuffs were not too tight. Coach Sinclair

subsequently laughed with Ms. McCluskey about how loose

the handcuffs were. Although C.B. testified at trial that the

handcuffs hurt and caused red marks around his wrists, he

acknowledged that he did not contemporaneously tell Officer

Prock or his colleagues that the handcuffs were too tight or

otherwise complain about them, and he indicated that the

officers were “not mean” to him.

After placing C.B. in handcuffs, Officer Prock went to

retrieve his vehicle, leaving C.B. with Chief McIntosh and

others, who walked with C.B. to the upper parking lot. While

Officer Prock was pulling his vehicle to C.B.’s location in the

upper parking lot, Officer Bowly left the scene. During this

time, Officer Prock received contact information for C.B.’s

guardians, and he called C.B.’s uncle. Officer Prock testified

that he asked the uncle to come and pick up C.B., but the

uncle indicated he could not close his business to do so and

requested that Officer Prock bring C.B. to the business. At

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8 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

trial, Officer Prock explained that, only after he had

completed the call with C.B.’s uncle, did he take steps to

place C.B. in his patrol vehicle.

Chief McIntosh testified that handcuffs remained on C.B.

while he was in Officer Prock’s vehicle because “it is not a

safe environment inside the patrol car with somebody that is

not restrained.” Officer Prock transported C.B. to his uncle’s

business and released him. By that time, C.B. had begun

communicating with Officer Prock, and Officer Prock was no

longer concerned about C.B. running away. The entire

interaction, from police arriving at the school to C.B. being

placed into his uncle’s care, took roughly thirty minutes.

At trial, when asked about their decision to remove C.B.

from the school and transport him to his uncle’s business,

both Chief McIntosh and Officer Prock described the

procedure for taking temporary custody of a juvenile who is

beyond the control of his or her guardian or custodian. Chief

McIntosh’s and Officer Prock’s understanding was that

school authorities did not want C.B. on the campus because

he was uncontrollable. Chief McIntosh cited to Section 601

of the California Welfare and Institutions Code (“Cal. W&I”)

as the applicable statute. The law provides in relevant part:

Any person under the age of 18 years . . . who

is beyond the control of [his or her parents,

guardian, or custodian] . . . is within the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may

adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 9

Cal. W&I § 601(a). A related provision authorizes a peace

officer, without a warrant, to take into temporary custody a

minor when such officer has “reasonable cause for believing

that such minor is a person described in Section 601.” Cal.

W&I § 625(a).

B. Resubmission to the Jury

The jury’s initial answers on the verdict form were

favorable to defendants, finding no liability on the excessive

force and unlawful seizure claims, and finding that, although

C.B. had proven the elements of his IIED claim, defendants

had established the affirmative defense of privilege.1 The

jury nevertheless awarded damages for the IIED claim,

recording them in response to Question 11C. The jury did not

record any findings concerning the false arrest claim.

After declaring this initial verdict inconsistent and

incomplete, the district judge instructed the jurors to

deliberate further:

Ladies and gentlemen, the verdicts that

have been returned have what the law calls an

inconsistency in them because we have a

typographical error in our verdict form that,

quite frankly, misled you. And so let me

1 On the verdict form, Questions 1 and 3 asked whether the respective

constitutional violations, excessive force and unlawful seizure, had been

proven. Question 5 inquired whether City of Sonora had a longstanding

practice or custom causing the use of excessive force against juveniles. 

Questions 6, 7, and 8 concerned the IIED claim, with the first two

interrogatories aimed at liability and the last involving the affirmative

defense. The jury initially answered “no” to Questions 1, 3, and 5, and

“yes” to Questions 6, 7, and 8.

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10 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

explain to you what happens with this verdict

form.

You found no liability on either of the

civil rights claims under federal law. You

found that there was intentional infliction of

emotional distress and that it caused harm or

damage.

You then found that there was privilege,

which is a defense to the claim, and it wipes

out the claim. And so this should have said C,

if you find that the conduct is privileged, then

there is no damage because the privilege, in

effect, says the conduct’s okay. If you don’t

find the privilege, then you can award

damages, but you can’t award damages if you

find that the conduct is privileged.

And so I have changed this instruction

from 11D to 11C, because 11C are the

damages for emotional distress.2

And then you did not make any findings

on the false arrest claims. So that’s one

additional claim that you need to decide,

2 The instruction to which the district judge referred appeared on the

verdict form, directly after Question 8 regarding the affirmative defense

to the IIED claim. Although the district judge announced his intention to

correct the typographical error by substituting “11C” for “11D,” thereby

instructing the jury not to award damages on the IIED claim if it found

defendants had prevailed on the affirmative defense to that claim, the final

verdict form completed by the jury still contained the erroneous reference

to Question 11D, which pertained to damages on the false arrest claim.

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 11

because you haven’t at least recorded on your

verdict form that you have decided that.3

In the remaining remarks on this occasion, and in the

subsequent conversations with the jurors, the district court

never clarified that the reason it had declared the verdict

inconsistent was not because the jury’s answers to Questions

1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 conflicted with each other, but rather

because, in light of the answers indicating no liability on the

IIED claim, the jury should not have responded to Question

11C regarding damages for the IIED claim.

The jury’s confusion concerning why it was being asked

to deliberate again manifested itself in the following handwritten question:

Clarify question 8 [sic]

if we said yes to all on page 23 of Jury

Instruction #20 doesn’t that mean we answer

yes to page 9 in verdicts of trial jury?

3 The verdict form told the jury that, if it answered “yes” to Question 8,

meaning it found defendants had proven their affirmative defense as to the

IIED claim, it should not answer Question 11D (regarding damages for the

false arrest claim), but that, if it answered “no” to Question 8, it should

answer Question 9 (concerning liability on the false arrest claim). The

verdict form failed to tell the jury to answer Question 9 if it responded

“yes” to Question 8. Thus, the verdict form essentially advised the jury

that, if it found in favor of defendants on the affirmative defense to the

IIED claim, it did not need to answer Questions 9 and 11D or consider the

merits of the false arrest claim. In rendering its initial verdict, the jury had

complied with this directive, answering “yes” to Question 8 and not

responding to Questions 9 or 11D.

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12 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

The instruction referenced in the jury’s note defined the

elements of the affirmative defense to the IIED claim. 

Question 8, on page 9, of the verdict form, asked whether the

affirmative defense had been proven. The appropriate answer

to the jury’s question was “yes.” The district judge, however,

launched into a long lecture about the elements of the

affirmative defenses to the IIED and false arrest claims and

the scenarios under which Question 11 concerning damages

should and should not be answered. During the course of this

discussion, one of the jurors asked a question that provided

insight into the difficulty the jury was having:

JUROR SEAT NUMBER EIGHT: Okay. 

So the fact that we answered affirmative yes

to questions 6 and 7.

THE COURT: Yes.

JUROR SEAT NUMBER EIGHT: I

guess our question is how does that affect our

response to number 8? Is it conflicting?

Still failing to understand that the jurors were struggling with

whether their prior answers to Questions 6, 7, and 8 were

viewed by the district court as inconsistent with each other

(rather than with the response to Question 11C), the district

court repeated the elements of the affirmative defense to the

IIED claim.

As yet unsatisfied, the same juror asked another similar

question, which produced a confusing response from the

district judge:

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 13

JUROR SEAT NUMBER EIGHT: And

that is not a conflict?

THE COURT: It’s not a conflict because

it’s an affirmative defense. It’s potentially a

conflict depending on what you think of the

conduct and the states of mind. But that’s for

you to determine.

[Emphasis added.] After expressing a few more thoughts, the

district judge repeated his puzzling statement:

And so, there is a potential inconsistency, but

that depends on what you find the intentions,

the states of mind are and the conduct is in

light of the law. And you’re the only people

who can make those decisions. We cannot

tell you how to do it. The attorneys have told

you how to do it in their arguments, but it’s

for you to make the ultimate decisions.

[Emphasis added.] After substantial additional colloquy, the

jury requested permission to retire again to the jury room. 

Approximately five minutes later, the jury returned to the

courtroom and was excused for the evening.

When proceedings resumed the next morning, the district

judge began another extensive colloquywith the jury. During

this session of supplemental instruction, a juror asked for a

transcript of the explanation given the previous day. After a

sidebar discussion with counsel, instead of providing the

requested transcript, the district judge attempted to repeat his

comments from the earlier evening. The district judge first

summarized the claims brought by C.B., two federal and two

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14 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

state law claims, and the affirmative defenses raised in

connection with the state law claims, and then told the jurors:

And there should be consistency -- and

that was your concern -- between those

findings. The consistency is a function of

how you find the facts, which evidence you

believe, how much weight you give to the

evidence.

[Emphasis added.] The district judge did not specify which

“findings” needed to be consistent, and this statement could

have been interpreted by the jury as indicating that its

answers to Questions 1–5, concerning the federal law claims,

could not conflict with its responses to Questions 6–9,

regarding the state law claims. In fact, however, the jury was

not required to reach the same result on all of the claims, and

it could have found Chief McIntosh and Officer Prock liable

for intentional infliction of emotional distress without

concluding that they had violated C.B.’s constitutional rights.

The jury deliberated for approximately four more hours,

and returned a verdict opposite to the one they initially

reached, finding liability against all defendants on all claims,

and awarding damages. After denying defendants’ motions

for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur, the

district court entered judgment against all defendants.

DISCUSSION

A. New Trial

Given the nature of the jury’s superfluous and missing

answers, the district court should not have required the jury

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 15

to engage in further deliberations. The decision to resubmit

an inconsistent verdict for clarification when the jury is still

available and the decision to give supplemental jury

instructions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Duk

v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 320 F.3d 1052, 1057–58 (9th Cir.

2003); Jazzabi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 979, 982 (9th

Cir. 2002). Whether a supplemental jury instruction

misstates the law, however, is reviewed de novo. Jazzabi,

278 F.3d at 982. When a district court provides a jury with

a general verdict form accompanied by written questions on

one or more issues of fact, and the jury’s answers to those

questions are consistent with each other but not with the

general verdict, the district court may “approve, for entry

under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment according to the

answers, notwithstanding the general verdict.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 49(b)(3)(A); see Nimnicht v. Dick Evans, Inc., 477 F.2d

133, 135 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412,

415 (9th Cir. 1993).

On appeal, defendants have not argued that the district

court erred in failing to enter judgment in accordance with the

jury’s initial verdict, as authorized by Rule 49(b), but they

have challenged the district court’s actions in connection with

resubmission of the case. Our review is therefore limited to

whether the verdict form and the protracted unscripted

discussions the district judge had with the jurors were so

confusing and potentially misleading that defendants are

entitled to a new trial. “When a [deliberating] jury makes

explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away

with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326

U.S. 607, 612–13 (1946). “[T]he judge’s last word is apt to

be the decisive word,” and when that last word concerns “a

vital issue and [is] misleading, the error is not cured by a

prior unexceptional and unilluminating abstract charge.” Id.

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16 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

at 612. In evaluating whether a supplemental instruction was

proper, the Court must look beyond whether it was “correct,

so far as it went” and whether, when read in light of the

original instruction, it “fairly presented the issues.” Powell

v. United States, 347 F.2d 156, 158 (9th Cir. 1965). Rather,

the ultimate inquiry is “whether the charge taken as a whole

was such as to confuse or leave an erroneous impression in

the minds of the jurors.” Id.

We conclude that the unscripted supplemental

instructions, together with the problematic verdict form, gave

the jury the misimpression that its initial answers to

Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were internally inconsistent and

needed to be revised. By failing to adequately explain that

the verdict had been resubmitted to the jury because the

answers to Questions 6, 7, and 8 were inconsistent with the

award of damages in Question 11C, the district court failed to

alleviate the jury’s confusion as to why it was being asked to

re-deliberate. Moreover, in telling the jurors that “there

should be consistency . . . between those findings,” without

further explanation, the district judge unwittingly indicated to

the jury that its previous answers concerning liability on the

federal law and IIED claims were incorrect because they were

not consistent with each other. The erroneous and incomplete

directions following Question 8 in the verdict form

compounded the problem. The district judge’s insistence that

Question 9 regarding liability on the false arrest claim needed

to be answered effectivelyoperated as a instruction to the jury

to answer “no” to Question 8, which was the only response to

Question 8 that required the jury to proceed to Question 9. In

sum, in more than one way, the district court improperly sent

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 17

a message to the jurors that they got it wrong the first time. 

Defendants are entitled to a new trial.4

B. Qualified Immunity

We must also decide whether McIntosh and Prock are

entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims. We

apply the customary standards of review, namely de novo

review as to the denial of qualified immunity raised in a

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law,5construing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, and giving significant deference to the jury’s verdict. 

A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 452–53 (9th Cir.

2013).

4 On appeal, defendants assign error to the district court’s denial of their

motion in limine to exclude testimony by Coach Sinclair about prior

incidents ofstudent handcuffing at Sonora Elementary School. In light of

our ruling, we need not decide whether any error in admitting the evidence

of previous handcuffings would itself warrant a new trial.

5 The record reveals that defendants attempted to move for judgment as

a matter of law before the jury began deliberating, but the district court

delayed the matter, indicating that it “reserved that right” to defendants. 

Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law was eventually

brought after the jury had rendered a verdict, and was therefore more akin

to a motion under Rule 50(b), but the district court treated it as defendants’

“reserved” motion under Rule 50(a), citing in its order, as the governing

legal standard, only Rule 50(a). Thus, contrary to C.B.’s assertion that

defendants were precluded from bringing a Rule 50(b) motion by a failure

to make a proper Rule 50(a) motion, see Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police

Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1081–83 (9th Cir. 2009), we deem defendants’

post-trial motion as a consolidated Rule 50(a) and 50(b) motion. See

E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“Rule 50(b) ‘may be satisfied by an ambiguous or inartfully made

motion’ under Rule 50(a),” and it is given a “liberal interpretation” to

avoid overly harsh results).

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18 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

Qualified immunity analysis consists of two steps: (1)

whether the facts the plaintiff alleges make out a violation of

a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly

established at the time the defendant acted. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009). We need not

decide whether C.B.’s constitutional rights in fact were

violated here, because in our view the officers’ conduct did

not violate a clearly established right. See id. at 243–44.

We begin with the officers’ assertion of qualified

immunity on C.B.’s Fourth Amendment unlawful custody

claim. As the source of their authority to take C.B. into

temporary custody, the officers invoked Cal. W&I § 625(a),6

which they contend authorized them to take C.B. into custody

if he was an out-of-control juvenile within the meaning of

Cal. W&I § 601(a). Whether § 601(a) applies in this setting

is unclear. Subsection 601(a) applies when a minor is

“beyond the control” of “his or her parents, guardian, or

custodian,” but does not make reference to school officials,

in contrast to § 601(b), which does. Nonetheless, because the

term “custodian” in § 601(a) is ambiguous and California

6 C.B. accuses defendants of post hoc rationalization, indicating that the

statute was not referenced in the reports concerning this incident and was

not mentioned during the depositions of Chief McIntosh and Officer

Prock. The statute was, however, discussed in defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, and the issue of whether the statute provided a basis

for qualified immunity was squarely before the district court in advance

of trial. The district court, however, concluded that defendants had not

presented evidence establishing Chief McIntosh and/or Officer Prock

knew enough about C.B.’s medical condition to invoke Cal. W&I § 625. 

In making such ruling, the district court improperly confined its reading

of the statute to subsection (c), which authorizes a warrantless seizure of

a juvenile “found in any street or public place suffering from any sickness

or injury which requires care, medical treatment, hospitalization, or other

remedial care.” Cal. W&I § 625(c).

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 19

courts have not squarely resolved the question, no clearly

established law informed the officers that school officials

were not “custodians” within the meaning of § 601(a). See

Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442–43 (9th Cir.

1991); see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

That leaves the question of whether a reasonable officer

could have believed (even if mistakenly) that C.B. was

beyond the control of school officials within the meaning of

§ 601(a). See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1443. Even if we were to

construe § 625(a)’s “reasonable cause” standard as requiring

probable cause for such belief, as C.B. contends, the officers

are entitled to qualified immunity. The officers were

informed by school officials that C.B. (1) was out of control,

(2) was “a runner,” (3) had been “yelling and cussing,” (4)

had not taken his medications, and (5) could not remain at

school any longer. No clearly established law would put a

reasonable officer faced with these circumstances on notice

that taking C.B. into temporary custody under § 625(a) was

unlawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). 

Moreover, the officers investigated further by talking to C.B.,

but C.B. was unresponsive. No clearly established law at the

time suggested that the officers were required to conduct

additional investigation beyond talking to C.B. before they

could rely on the information they received from school

officials, particularly when a prolonged investigation might

increase the risk of C.B. running away and onto a busy road,

from which he was separated only by an unlocked gate.

In ruling on defendants’ consolidated Rule 50(a) and

50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district

court failed to conduct this second part of the qualified

immunity analysis. With respect to plaintiff’s unlawful

seizure claim, the district court did not cite a single case in

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20 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

which police officers were held to have violated the Fourth

Amendment by transporting a disruptive child from a school

to a guardian’s home or place of business.7 Moreover, in

citing our decision in Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th

Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020, vacated in part

on remand, 661 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011), as support for

applying the “special need” doctrine first announced in N.J.

v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the district court failed to

recognize that the events at issue in this case transpired

before Greene was decided.8

The district court also ignored precedent from other

circuits indicating that handcuffing during the course of an

otherwise lawful arrest ordinarily fails to state an excessive

force claim. See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362 (4th Cir.

7 The only authorities on which the district court relied did not deal with

the situation in which a school official wants a student removed from

campus, and the cases were themselves at odds concerning whether a

single instance of misconduct is sufficient to indicate that a juvenile is

“beyond control,” within the meaning of Cal. W&I §§ 601 & 625. See In

re D.J.B., 96 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); In re David S., 91 Cal.

Rptr. 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).

8 The “special need” doctrine involves a two-part inquiry: (i) whether

the action at issue was justified at its inception; and (ii) whether the action

as actually conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” T.L.O.,

469 U.S. at 341. The dissent contends that the “special need” test

governs. Even under the more demanding “reasonable cause” standard of

Cal. W&I § 625(a), however, we conclude that the law was not clearly

established concerning whether the officers could rely primarily on the

representations ofschool officials in deciding to take custody of C.B., and

thus, we need not decide whether the “special need” doctrine applies or

whether it was satisfied. The dissent’s reasoning that C.B.’s detention did

not meet the second prong of the “special need” test reaches too far by

deciding questions of fact more appropriately reserved for a jury.

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 21

2002); Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001);

Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2001). Indeed,

no clearly established law suggests that handcuffing a

juvenile when lawfully taking him into temporary custody

violates the juvenile’s Fourth Amendment rights, absent a

showing that the handcuffs caused injury or that the officer

ignored complaints about the handcuffs, neither of which

C.B. alleged in this case. See Hupp v. City of Walnut Creek,

389 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Wall v.

County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2004); LaLonde

v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2000); Palmer

v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Because the law was, and still is, not “clearly established”

that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from school to a

relative’s place of business implicates Fourth Amendment

rights, McIntosh and Prock are entitled to qualified immunity

with regard to plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–41 (2002) (the “state of

the law” must have given “fair warning” to the officer that the

conduct in question was unconstitutional).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the verdict and judgment are

vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

The district court is instructed to enter judgment as a matter

of law in favor of individual defendants McIntosh and Prock

as to C.B.’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of

qualified immunity. In light of our rulings, we do not address

whether defendants are entitled to an offset of the amount

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22 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

paid in settlement by the Sonora School District and Karen

Sinclair.

VACATED, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

I concur in the majority’s decision to remand this case for

a new trial. I also concur in the remand of the state law

claims. I respectfully dissent from Part B, which holds that

Officers McIntosh and Prock are entitled to qualified

immunity on C.B.’s Fourth Amendment claims. The facts

demonstrate that C.B.’s prolonged detention was

unconstitutional. In light of existing precedent, the district

court did not err in denying the motion for judgment as a

matter of law premised on qualified immunity.

Three police officers arrived at the playground of Sonora

ElementarySchool in response to a dispatch reporting an “out

of control juvenile.” Upon arrival, the officers found C.B., an

80-pound 11-year-old child, seated calmly and silently on a

bench, staring at the ground. A school official whispered

“Runner. No medicine.” and made corresponding hand

gestures to the officers, but did not explain what medicine

C.B. had failed to take or what it meant to be a “runner.” 

Indeed, some of his medicines were at the school, though no

one bothered to check. Based on this meager information,

without making further inquiries, and after no more than five

minutes of unsuccessfully attempting to engage C.B. in

conversation, the officers ordered C.B. to stand up with his

hands behind his back, handcuffed him, placed him in the

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 23

back of a police vehicle, and transported him while

handcuffed to his uncle’s business.

At trial the officers testified that they had no reason to

believe C.B. had committed anycrime or threatened anyone’s

safety, nor was there any evidence that the child was a danger

to himself. It is undisputed that C.B. did not act out of

control, did not make any attempt to run away, and was

compliant throughout. Under these circumstances, C.B.’s

prolonged detention was unreasonable, the standard set out by

the Fourth Amendment as well as the Supreme Court in New

Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Imposing this standard

on law enforcement agents is nothing new. Though

responding to a school’s request, police officers cannot

escape the reasonableness standard when they intercede as

law enforcement. The police are not surrogate school

officials for managing internal school problems. The officers

here may well have been genuinely motivated to assist the

school in some way, but good intentions cannot trump

established law. 

The officers’ focus on the meaning of the “reasonable

cause” standard under California Welfare and Institutions

Code § 625(a) is misplaced. That section is inapplicable on

its face to C.B.’s scenario. Section 625(a) allows a peace

officer who has “reasonable cause” for believing a minor fits

into one of the categories described in § 601 to take the minor

into temporary custody without a warrant. Both §§ 601(a)

and (b) describe minors who “persistent[ly] or habitual[ly]

refuse[] to obey . . . reasonable . . . orders”—§ 601(a)

addresses disobedience towards “parents, guardian[s], or

custodian[s],” while § 601(b) concerns disobedience towards

“school authorities,” where a school attendance review board

or probation officer determines that available services are

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24 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

insufficient to correct the minor’s disobedience.1 Because

Sonora Elementary School is not C.B.’s parent, guardian, or

custodian under § 601(a),2and the requisite determination had

not been made under § 601(b), the California welfare statute

does not come into play.

Even if § 625(a) were applicable through § 601(a), the

“reasonable cause” standard mirrors the “reasonableness”

standard in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–43, and state precedents

make clear that C.B. was not “beyond control.” The officers

1

I agree with the district court that § 625(c), which authorizes the

warrantless seizure of a juvenile in need of medical treatment or

hospitalization, was not a legitimate basis for seizure. Because that

section is inapplicable, I also agree with the majority that § 625(a) should

be the focus of our analysis.

2 On its face, the term “custodian” does not apply to school officials. 

See In re Rita M.P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057 (1970) (dealing with a

custodianship relationship, where the custodian was a probation officer

who had custody of the minor child while the child awaited placement in

a foster home). This point is buttressed by the grouping together of

parents, guardians, and custodians in § 601(a), indicating that “custodian”

should be narrowly construed to parallel the level of specificity of

“parent” and “guardian.” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.

576, 586 (2008) (noting that under the rule of ejusdem generis, “when a

statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that

general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics

it follows”). Moreover, “school authorities” are specifically and

separately addressed in § 601(b), which contains requirements and

conditions not present in § 601(a). If school authorities qualified as

custodians under § 601(a), they would not need to make the determination

required under § 601(b), rendering the latter provision superfluous. 

United States v. 144,744 pounds of Blue King Crab, 410 F.3d 1131, 1134

(9th Cir. 2005) (“It is an accepted canon ofstatutory interpretation that we

must interpret the statutory phrase as a whole, giving effect to each word

and not interpreting the provision as to make other provisions meaningless

or superfluous.”) (citations omitted).

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 25

had no evidence that there had been any persistent or habitual

disobedient conduct on the part of C.B. A single act of

defiance is ordinarily not enough to establish that a minor is

beyond control under § 601(a) unless that single act is

sufficiently serious. See In re Bettye K., 234 Cal. App. 3d

143, 149 (1991) (“A single act in violation of parental

authority is ordinarily insufficient, by itself, to establish a

finding that a minor is beyond parental control within the

meaning of Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601, subd. (a). . . .”). 

C.B.’s conduct—sitting silently on a schoolyard bench,

even taken in conjunction with a dispatch to investigate an

“out of control juvenile”—is incomparable to those single

acts of defiance that have been deemed sufficiently serious

under § 601(a) and hardly compares even to those that have

been found insufficiently serious. See, e.g., In re D.J.B.,

18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 786–87 (1971) (holding that leaving a

parent’s home without consent was not a sufficiently serious

single act of defiance); In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124,

1128 (1970) (holding that lying about spending the weekend

at a beach 40 miles from home but actually intending to go to

Mexico and being picked up 600 miles away at the Mexican

border was a sufficiently serious single act of defiance). Not

surprisingly, the cases under § 601(a) deal with parents,

guardians, and custodians, not school officials. Contrary to

the majority’s assertion, it is abundantly clear that the officers

had no authority to proceed under California law because

§§ 601 and 625 are inapplicable to C.B.’s situation.

Putting §§ 601 and 625 aside, the Fourth Amendment

requires that seizures be objectively reasonable in light of the

facts and circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

397 (1989). This inquiry requires a balancing of “the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

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26 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

Amendment interests against the importance of the

governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). In T.L.O., the Supreme Court

addressed how that balance should be struck in the context of

a search conducted by a teacher or school official in the

school setting. 469 U.S. at 328. Taking into consideration a

school’s special need to maintain an orderly educational

environment and a teacher’s lack of familiarity with the

“niceties of probable cause,” the Court held that school

administrators acting on their own authority should be held to

a standard more lenient than probable cause that focuses

instead on the question of “reasonableness” according to the

“dictates . . . of common sense.” Id. at 341–43. The Court

set out a twofold inquiry for determining the reasonableness

of a school search: (1) whether the search was justified at its

inception, and (2) whether the search as ultimately conducted

was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances

justifying the search in the first place. Id. at 341–42.

At a minimum, Officers McIntosh and Prock must be held

to T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard, an issue the majority

acknowledges “is a matter involving questions of fact more

appropriately reserved for a jury,” and thus should not be

resolved by granting qualified immunity. Although T.L.O.

was decided in the context of a school search, that standard

has since been applied to school seizures. See, e.g., Doe v.

State of Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir.

2003) (“In applying the Fourth Amendment in the school

context, the reasonableness of the seizure must be considered

in light of the educational objectives [the school official] was

trying to achieve.”) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342); Wallace

v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995);

Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1987). T.L.O. itself

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 27

also involved school authorities acting alone, and the Court

expressed “no opinion” as to the appropriate standard to be

applied to police conduct in the school setting. Id. at 347 n.7. 

But the rationale behind T.L.O.—particularly the need to

accommodate teachers’ unfamiliaritywith the probable cause

standard—indicates that the participation of police officers

can only raise the standard of suspicion required. In short,

T.L.O. set a floor of reasonableness. 

Some courts have held that T.L.O.’s reasonableness

standard applies to school seizures by law enforcement

officers, see, e.g., Grey ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d

1295 (11th Cir. 2006),3 while others have applied probable

cause to police conduct in the school setting, see, e.g., Picha

v. Wielgos, 410 F.Supp. 1214, 1219–21 (N.D. Ill. 1976). We

need not bridge this divide. As counsel for Officers

McIntosh and Prock acknowledged at oral argument, the

appropriate standard for police officers in the school setting

is no lower than T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard for school

administrators.

Applying T.L.O.’s twofold reasonableness inquiry,C.B.’s

seizure was justified at its inception. Officers McIntosh and

Prock were dispatched to investigate an “out of control

juvenile.” They reasonably relied on the school official’s

representation that C.B. was a runner and had not taken his

3

In Grey, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Eleventh

Circuit explained that T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard applied to a

deputy sheriff who detained and handcuffed a nine-year-old student for

under five minutes after she allegedly threatened to hit her teacher in gym

class, that the deputy sheriff violated the student’s Fourth Amendment

rights, and that the deputy sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity

because the violation was obvious. Id. at 1304–07. 

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28 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

medication when they initially detained C.B. and attempted

to engage him in conversation. But once they discovered that

C.B. was simply sitting silently on a schoolyard bench, they

could no longer rely solely on the school official’s

unexplained allegation that C.B. was beyond control and her

request to remove C.B. from school—any continued

detention of C.B. was not “reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first

place.” Id. at 341. Aside from the fear that C.B. might run

away—a fear I find objectively unpersuasive in light of

Officers McIntosh and Prock’s own testimony at trial that

C.B. never attempted to run, nor would he have been able to

while surrounded by four standing adults—the officers do not

cite any concrete objectives or interests advanced by C.B.’s

prolonged detention. Nor did the officers make any basic

assessment of the situation once they arrived on the

scene—by, for instance, asking the school official what C.B.

had done to prompt the dispatch to begin with—which might

have uncovered facts on which they could make a judgment.4

Without more, a school official’s request for the officers to

intercede and a disabled 11-year-old child’s refusal to talk to

the officers is hardly a reasonable justification for an

extended detention. The officers’ conduct was objectively

unreasonable and was “excessively intrusive in light of the

age . . . of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id. at

342. They had no authority to proceed under either

California law or the Fourth Amendment.

Because C.B.’s seizure was unconstitutional, I turn to the

second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, namely

4 The majority’s lengthy recitation of C.B.’s history at the school and

information known by school officials is, of course, irrelevant since the

officers knew none of these circumstances.

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C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA 29

whether C.B.’s constitutional right was “clearly established”

at the time of the officers’ misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In my view, it would have been

“clear to a reasonable officer” in September 2008 that C.B.’s

seizure was “unlawful in the situation [Officers McIntosh and

Prock] confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 199, 202

(2001).

The majority is mistaken that T.L.O. has never been

applied to seizures. The officers had fair warning based on

cases in the Ninth and other circuits that T.L.O.’s

reasonableness standard applied to their conduct, meaning

that C.B.’s seizure was required to be justified at its

inception, and the seizure ultimately effected was required to

be related in scope to the circumstances justifying it. See,

e.g., Doe, 334 F.3d at 909 (citing T.L.O. and holding that, in

the school context, “the reasonableness of the seizure must be

considered in light of . . . educational objections”); Grey, 458

F.3d at 1304–06 (“apply[ing] the reasonableness standard

articulated in [T.L.O.] . . . to school seizures by law

enforcement officers”); Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1012–14 (noting

that “several circuit courts have relied upon [T.L.O.] to find

that seizures of students by teachers also come within the

ambit of the Fourth Amendment” and concluding that “in the

context of a public school, a teacher or administrator who

seizes a student does so in violation of the Fourth

Amendment . . . when the restriction of liberty is

unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and

apparent”); Edwards, 883 F.2d at 884 (citing T.L.O. for the

proposition that “courts have always sought to accommodate

both the interests protected by the Constitution and the

interests in providing a safe environment conducive to

education in the public schools” when applying the Fourth

Amendment in the school context).

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30 C.B. V. CITY OF SONORA

Even without reference to these cases, an official can have

fair warning that his conduct is unconstitutional when that

violation is obvious. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.

259, 271 (1997) (“[A] general constitutional rule already

identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious

clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the

very action in question has [not] been previously held

unlawful.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The prolonged detention of a compliant disabled 11-year-old

child sitting on a schoolyard bench based on the paltry

information relied on by Officers McIntosh and Prock is an

obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment’s general

proscription against unreasonable seizures.

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