Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-00290/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-00290-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

CLARENCE V. KNIGHT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M.J. NIMROD,

Defendant. 

No. C 00-0290 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 59]

Before the Court is plaintiff Clarence V. Knight’s motion to for leave to file a second amended

complaint [Docket No. 59]. After reading and considering the arguments presented by the parties, the

Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 78. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Knight is alleging that defendant Matthew Nimrod violated his First Amendment rights

by refusing to process his inmate appeal because it was filed against Nimrod himself. This is a civil

rights action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The pretrial conference in this matter is scheduled

for September 11, 2007, with the trial to start on September 19, 2007. 

Knight is seeking leave to file a second amended complaint to add a claim for injunctive and

declaratory relief. Knight filed his original complaint on January 26, 2000. On April 6, 2000, Knight

filed an amended complaint. Knight, who until recently has proceeded pro se, asserts that he did not

previously seek injunctive and declaratory relief because he mistakenly believed that doing so would

preclude him from simultaneously seeking monetary damages. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Otherwise, a party may amend a pleading only by leave

of court or by the written consent of the adverse party. See id. Generally, Rule 15 advises that “leave

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[to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316

F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). This policy is applied even more liberally with pro se litigants. See Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). In assessing whether to grant leave, the court considers whether

the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue

delay in litigation; (4) is futile; or (5) if the plaintiff has previously amended his or her complaint. See

AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006); Nunes v. Ashcroft,

375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). The first

factor is the most important. “Prejudice [to the opposing party] is the touchstone of the inquiry under

rule 15(a).” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (internal citations omitted). The party opposing the

amendment has the burden of showing prejudice. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187

(9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

The defendant opposes the motion to amend because it comes on the eve of the pretrial

conference and contends the amendment should not be granted because “it is unfairly vague, futile,

unduly prejudicial to both Defendant and the state, and will further delay this case.” Docket No. 81, at

1-2. Nimrod understands the amendment as adding a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and

an official capacity injunctive claim. He argues both are futile and should not be allowed. 

1. Second Amended Complaint

This is Knight’s second amended complaint. A factor to be considered in granting a motion to

amend is whether the moving party has previously amended his or her pleading. A district court’s

discretion to deny an amendment is especially broad when the court has already given a plaintiff one

or more opportunities to amend his or her complaint. See Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616,

622 (9th Cir. 2004); Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., 363 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2003). Given that this is

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Knight’s second amended complaint, the Court will weigh this in making its determination of whether

an amendment will prejudice the defendant. 

2. Waiver

The defendant argues that the plaintiff waived any request for injunctive and declaratory relief

in his amended complaint. Knight counters that he did not include a request for injunctive and

declaratory relief based on his misunderstanding of the applicable law of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He was

acting pro se at the time of the first amended complaint, and upon receiving the advice of counsel that

such a claim is allowed under section 1983, seeks to now amend his compliant accordingly. The Ninth

Circuit has instructed that the policy of freely allowing amendments is to be applied even more liberally

with pro se litigants. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff filed

his amended complaint while he was representing himself, so that must be weighed in favor of allowing

the amendment. Moreover, to argue that a claim not raised in a prior complaint is waived counters the

very purpose of allowing amendments to pleadings. Therefore, the Court does not find Nimrod’s

“waiver” argument particularly compelling.

3. Prejudice and Undue Delay

The defendant contends that because his prior dispositive motions did not address Knight’s

injunctive, declaratory, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, he will be forced to expend further time and

resources in drafting a revised motion for summary judgment if the plaintiff is permitted to file a second

amended complaint. Knight responds that he “seeks only to add injunctive and declaratory relief to his

requested forms of relief, not to add any new claims based on due process.” Docket No. 108, at 3. 

Prejudice may exist where a motion to amend is brought late in the litigation. See Solomon v.

North Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network

Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the

proceedings supports a district court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the

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complaint”).

Here, however, the defendant has not made any convincing showing that additional discovery

will be needed to respond to a claim for injunctive relief. The plaintiff is not adding any new

substantive legal theories of liability or attempting to introduce any new facts into this action. The only

change is that, in additional to monetary relief, Knight is now also seeking injunctive relief.

Additionally, the Court recently extended the discovery deadline in this matter to allow the plaintiff

additional time to conduct three depositions. See Docket No. 136. The defendant has not made any

similar indication that it wishes to conduct any additional discovery. 

Finally, the defendant’s claim that it would be prejudiced by not having a chance to file a

summary judgment motion against the injunctive relief claim is not persuasive. The defendant filed a

prior motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity against the plaintiff’s section

1983 claim, which was denied on September 5, 2006. See Docket No. 46. A request for injunctive

relief would not have played any factor in the qualified immunity analysis. And as will be discussed

in the following section, a state official may be sued as an individual in his official capacity for

injunctive relief, so a summary judgment motion filed on this basis would fail in any event. 

4. Futility

The defendant argues that denial of the amendment is warranted due to its futility. Relying on

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the defendant contends that the

amendment seeking injunctive relief against Nimrod in his official capacity is prohibited by Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity. The defendant’s second futility argument is that a generalized due

process claim is not available where an allegation of infringement upon a constitutional right may be

analyzed under a more specific constitutional protection, citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273

(1994).

The plaintiff’s reliance on Will is misplaced. While an individual may not be sued in his official

capacity for monetary relief under section 1983, the Will Court noted that an individual may be sued in

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his official capacity for injunctive relief. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10.

The plaintiff’s invocation of the principle of Albright is somewhat more appropriate. In Albright,

the Court reiterated that “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the

more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”

Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S 386, 395 (1989)). The plaintiff’s claim

rests specifically upon the First Amendment, so a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

may in fact be futile. On the other hand, the plaintiff repeatedly insists in his briefing that he is not

adding any claim other than a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. It appears that the plaintiff is

in fact merely invoking the Fourteenth Amendment as the vehicle for applying the First Amendment

to the state of California. If so, this is entirely appropriate. The First Amendment applies to the states

through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,

517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996). To the extent, however, the plaintiff is asserting a stand alone substantive

due process claim, that is futile and will not be allowed.

CONCLUSION

Weighing these factors, the Court finds that an amendment will not prejudice the defendant,

cause undue delay, or be futile. Accordingly, plaintiff Knight’s motion for leave to amend his complaint

[Docket No. 59] is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 6, 2007 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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