Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01237/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rebham Pero Aduord, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Loretta E. Lynch, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01237-PHX-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Rebham Pero Aduord, through counsel, has filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued detention by the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) during removal proceedings. (Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner seeks a bond redetermination hearing. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Respondents (the 

government) filed a response arguing that Petition should be dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 14.) Petitioner has not filed a reply, 

and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be 

denied. 

I. Background 

 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Kenya. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Petitioner asserts that he 

entered the United States on or about May 28, 2011 as a lawful permanent resident. (Id.) 

On January 14, 2014, Petitioner was convicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court of 

endangerment and driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and was sentenced 

to four months in jail and two years’ probation. (Id.) On December 5, 2011, DHS placed 

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Petitioner in removal proceedings and issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging him 

with removability pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act (Act or INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), because within five years of admission, 

Petitioner was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of one 

year or longer may be imposed. (Doc. 1 at 2.) 

 On July 9, 2014, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Petitioner was a danger and 

a flight risk and denied bond. (Id.; Doc. 14-1 at 1.) On August 21, 2014, Petitioner, 

proceeding pro se, appeared before an IJ and filed an application for relief from removal. 

(Id.) The IJ set the case for an individual hearing on January 13, 2015. (Id.) On or about 

November 25, 2014, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a request for a bond 

redetermination hearing under Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). (Id.

at 3.) On December 10, 2014, the IJ denied the motion for a bond redetermination 

without conducting a hearing. (Id.) 

 On January 8, 2015, the IJ granted Petitioner’s motion to continue, and reset the 

final hearing to May 18, 2015. (Id.) At the May 18, 2015 hearing, Petitioner submitted 

an amended I-589 application for relief from removal. (Id.) Over Petitioner’s objection, 

the IJ continued the hearing to January 13, 2016, stating that the continuance was 

necessary to permit the IJ to review the changes to Petitioner’s application for relief from 

removal. (Id.) Respondents state that the IJ subsequently reset the hearing to September 

21, 2015. (Doc. 14 at 3.) Petitioner has not filed a reply and has not clarified the status 

of his hearing date. Because Respondents have not presented any evidence to 

substantiate that the hearing was reset to September 21, 2015, the Court assumes that 

Movant remains in DHS custody awaiting a hearing. 

 On July 2, 2015, Petitioner filed the pending Petition arguing that his continued 

detention violates the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1.) The government argues that the 

Court should dismiss the Petition because Petitioner has not named the proper 

respondent, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, his request for bond 

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redetermination is moot because he already had a bond hearing, and his detention is not 

improper. (Doc. 14.) 

II. Proper Respondent 

 Petitioner brings his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241, which extends habeas relief to persons, “in custody under or by color of 

the authority of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a 

writ of habeas corpus must be “directed to the person having custody of the person 

detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see also, 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus must “name the person who has custody over” the petitioner). If the petition fails 

to name the petitioner’s custodian as the respondent, the court lacks personal jurisdiction 

over the custodian and cannot grant relief. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 

410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner 

who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful 

custody.”). 

 The Petition names six respondents: Loretta Lynch, the Attorney General of the 

United States; Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of DHS; Sarah Saldana, the Director of U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Thomas Homan, the Executive Associate 

Director of U.S. Immigrations Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations; John 

Gurule, the Director of the Arizona ICE Field Office; and Thomas Giles, the Deputy 

Director of the Arizona ICE Field Office. (Doc. 1 at 1.) The government argues that in a 

habeas petition challenging physical confinement the only proper respondent is the 

warden of the facility housing the prisoner. (Doc. 14 at 5.) The government cites the 

“immediate custodian rule” of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), and contends 

that Michael Donohue, the warden at the Eloy Detention Center, is the only proper 

respondent. (Id.) Donohue was not named in the Petition, therefore, the government 

seeks to dismiss the Petition on the ground that it does not name the proper respondent. 

(Doc. 14 at 4.) 

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 In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the 

proper respondent to a habeas petition challenging a petitioner’s present physical 

confinement is “the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the 

Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” Id. at 435. However, the 

Court expressly declined to resolve whether this rule, known as the “immediate custodian 

rule,” applies to petitions filed by aliens detained pending removal. Id. at 435 n.8. 

 Prior to Padilla, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that that the Attorney 

General and the Secretary of Homeland Security were proper respondents to an 

immigration detainee’s § 2241 petition. Armentero v. Immigration and Naturalization 

Serv., 340 F.3d 1058, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (Armentero I). The court declined to apply 

the “immediate custodian rule,” concluding that “the most appropriate respondent to 

petitions brought by immigration detainees is the individual in charge of the national 

government agency under whose auspices the alien is detained.” Id. at 1071. However, 

after the Supreme Court decided Padilla, the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for 

rehearing in Armentero and withdrew its original opinion. By the time the case was 

decided, the petitioner had absconded and, therefore, the court dismissed the action on 

other grounds. Armentero v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 412 F.3d 1088, 1088 

(9th Cir. 2005) (Armentero II). Nevertheless, Judge Berzon, in dissent, indicated that she 

would reaffirm the holding in Armentero I. Armentero II, 412 F.3d at 1090; see also

Rivera v. Holder, ___ F.R.D. ___ , 2015 WL 1632739, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 

2015) (declining to apply “immediate custodian rule” in immigration context); BogarinFlores v. Napolitano, 2012 WL 3283287, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (same). There 

is no other Ninth Circuit authority addressing this specific issue. 

 Accordingly, in the absence of any Ninth Circuit authority precluding Petitioner 

from naming the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security as 

respondents in this matter, the Court will not recommend dismissal of the Petition on that 

basis. However, the Court recommends that Respondents Saldana, Homan, Gurule, and 

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Giles be dismissed, because the rationale articulated in Armentero I does not extend to 

these Respondents. 

III. Petitioner’s Claims based on the IJ’s Bond Decisions 

 A. The District Court’s Jurisdiction to Review a Bond Determination 

 Petitioner challenges the denial of bond. He argues that the Immigration Court’s 

July 9, 2014 order finding that he posed a danger and flight risk was “arbitrary and 

capricious,” and “not based on substantial evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Respondents argue 

that under Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to review the discretionary decisions denying Petitioner bond. (Doc. 14 at 6.) 

As discussed below, the Court agrees. 

 After an alien is detained, the DHS district director makes an initial custody 

determination and may allow the alien to be released on bond. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d). 

If the alien disagrees with the determination, he may request a bond redetermination 

hearing before an IJ at any time before the issuance of an administratively final order of 

removal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d). The alien may then appeal the IJ’s bond decision to 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3). As Respondent’s 

argue, the IJ’s discretionary decisions granting or denying bond are not subject to judicial 

review. See § 1226(e); Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1058. Accordingly, this Court lacks 

authority to review the IJ’s discretionary bond decisions. 

 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 In addition to challenging the IJ’s discretionary bond decisions, Petitioner argues 

that the IJ’s December 20, 2014 order denying his motion for bond redetermination 

without holding a hearing violated the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Respondents 

argue that the Court should dismiss this claim for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. (Doc. 14 at 6-7.) 

 On May 16, 2014, Petitioner was charged as removable under 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). (Doc. 1 at 2.) On July 9, 2014, an IJ denied Petitioner bond 

because he was a danger and a flight risk. (Doc. 14-1 at 1.) Petitioner did not appeal that 

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bond determination to the BIA. Rather, he filed a motion for custody redetermination. 

(Doc. 1 at 3.) On December 10, 2014, the IJ denied the motion without a hearing. (Id.) 

Petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA. 

 Aliens who are detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing. Leonardo 

v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). If a detained alien is dissatisfied with 

the IJ’s bond determination, he may file an administrative appeal so that “the necessity of 

detention can be reviewed by . . . the BIA.” Prieto–Romero, 534 F.3d at 1059. If the 

alien remains dissatisfied, he may file a petition for habeas corpus in the district court. 

See V. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1200-03 (9th Cir. 2011). The alien may then 

appeal in the appropriate circuit court of appeals. Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160. 

 Here, Petitioner filed the pending petition for habeas review of the IJ’s adverse 

bond determination before appealing to the BIA. “This short cut [is] improper. 

[Petitioner] should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA 

before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision.” Leonardo, 646 F.3d 

at 1160 (citing Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (a petitioner 

“must exhaust administrative remedies before raising . . . constitutional claims in a 

habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”)). Once the BIA 

issued a decision, Petitioner could have properly pursued habeas relief in this Court. 

Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160. 

 Because Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court 

recommends that Petitioner’s challenge to the IJ’s July 9 and December 10, 2014 

decisions be dismissed. 

IV. Prolonged Detention 

 Petitioner has been detained by DHS for approximately sixteen months and he 

alleges that his prolonged detention “is an unconscionable denial of liberty to a legal 

permanent resident . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 6, 7.) Respondents assert that Petitioner’s detention 

is not prolonged and does not support his release from custody. (Doc. 14 at 10.) 

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 The record before the Court at this time reflects that a final order of removal has 

not been issued, and that Petitioner is being detained pending a decision on whether he is 

to be removed from the United States. (Doc. 1 at 2-3.) It appears that Petitioner is being 

detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that he has been afforded an initial bond hearing.1

 

(Doc. 1 at 2.) Under § 1226(a), the Attorney General has the discretionary authority to 

detain an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United 

States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 

 In Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062, the court construed “the Attorney General’s 

detention authority under § 1226(a) as limited to the ‘period reasonably necessary to 

bring about an alien’s removal from the United States[.]’” Id. at 1063 (quoting Zadvydas 

v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001)). The court, however, found no basis for habeas relief 

even though the petitioner’s “removal was certainly delayed by his pursuit of judicial 

review of his administratively final removal order,” because there was no evidence that 

he was “unremovable because his destination country will not accept him or his removal 

is barred by our own laws.” Id. at 1063 (internal citation omitted). 

 Based on the record before the Court, a final order of removal has not issued and, 

therefore, Petitioner is being detained during removal proceedings. The Supreme Court 

has held that “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible 

part of that process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). Additionally, 

Petitioner’s removability is distinguishable from the “removable-but-unremovable limbo” 

of the detainees in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See Pietro-Romero, 534 F. 

3d at 1063. Petitioner has not presented any evidence, such as a lack of repatriation 

agreement with Kenya, or a finding that he is entitled to mandatory relief from removal, 

which would prevent his removal if an eventual petition for review of a final order of 

removal were ultimately denied. See id; see also Kumar v. Gonzales, 555 F. Supp. 2d 

1061, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (applying the rationale of Zadvydas to determine whether an 

 

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 Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing is moot. (Doc. 1 at 7.) 

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alien’s detention of nearly one year before the issuance of a final order of removal was 

justified and concluding that the petitioner’s detention was lawful). 

 Additionally, much of the delay in holding an individual hearing to determine 

whether Petitioner will be removed from the United States is attributable to a continuance 

Petitioner requested (Doc. 1 at ¶ 14), and to his submission of an amended I-589 

application that required additional consideration by the IJ. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 14-18.) 

Additionally, Petitioner has been afforded a bond hearing. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s current detention is not unconstitutionally indefinite and does not entitle him 

to § 2241 relief. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 530-31 (concluding that an immigrant’s 

request for a continuance helped justify the “somewhat longer than average” length of his 

detention); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003) (delay attributable to 

immigrant can help justify continued detention). 

V. Conclusion 

 The Court recommends that Respondents Saldana, Homan, Gurule, and Giles be 

dismissed. The Court also recommends that the Petition be denied because this Court 

lacks authority to review the IJ’s discretionary bond determinations, Petitioner failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies, and because Petitioner’s detention during removal 

proceedings does not warrant § 2241 relief. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED the Respondents Saldana, Homan, Gurule, and Giles 

be dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States 

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Dated this 26th day of October, 2015. 

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