Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15059/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15059-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SIE ERVINE, as an individual and as

Executor of the Estate of Charlene

Elaine Ervine, deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DESERT VIEW REGIONAL MEDICAL

CENTER HOLDINGS, LLC; GEORGES

TANNOURY, M.D., a domestic

corporation; GEORGES TANNOURY,

M.D., an individual,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15059

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-01494-

JCM-GWF

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 12, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed May 29, 2014

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Mary H. Murguia,

Circuit Judges, and Lynn S. Adelman, District Judge.

*

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

 

*

 The Honorable Lynn S. Adelman, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

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2 ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS

SUMMARY**

Rehabilitation Act / Americans with Disabilities Act

The panel vacated in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summaryjudgment on claims under the Rehabilitation

Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act against health

care providers for failure to communicate effectively with a

person who was deaf.

The panel held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring

claims for injunctive relief under Title III of the Americans

with Disabilities Act because he did not show a real and

immediate threat that he would be denied effective

communication by the defendants, either as a patient in his

own right or as a companion to another patient. The panel

vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of the defendants as to these claims and remanded with

instructions to dismiss them without prejudice for lack of

jurisdiction.

The panel held that the district court erred in concluding

that the plaintiff’s claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, brought individually and on behalf of his wife’s estate,

were untimely under Nevada’s two-year statute of limitations

for personal injuries. The panel held that so long as an

alleged violation of § 504 is a discrete and independently

wrongful discriminatory act, it causes a new claim to accrue

and a new limitations period to run. The panel reversed the

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS 3

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendants as to the Rehabilitation Act claims.

COUNSEL

Dale H. Boam, Salt Lake City, Utah, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for the plaintiffs-appellants. With him on

brief was Norman N. Hirata, Las Vegas, Nevada.

Eric K. Stryker, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &

Dicker LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada, argued the cause and filed

the brief for defendant-appellee Desert View Regional

Medical Center Holdings, LLC.

John H. Cotton, Cotton, Driggs, Walch, Holley, Woloson &

Thompson, Las Vegas, Nevada, argued the cause and

Christopher G. Rigler filed the brief for defendants-appellees

Georges Tannoury, M.D., a domestic corporation and

Georges Tannoury, M.D., an individual.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We are presented with claims under the Rehabilitation

Act against health care providers for failure to communicate

effectively with a person who is deaf.

I

Charlene Ervine, who was deaf, died of cancer in

November 2009. In the years before her death, she sought

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4 ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS

treatment at Desert View Regional Medical Center, a hospital

serving Pahrump, Nevada, and from Dr. Georges Tannoury,

a practitioner who owned Specialty Medical Center in that

town. Her husband, Sie Ervine, who is also deaf,

accompanied her on many of her medical visits. Both Mr.

and Mrs. Ervine communicated primarily through American

Sign Language.

Mr. Ervine contends that Desert View and Dr. Tannoury

on several occasions failed to take the steps necessary to

communicate effectively with the Ervines about Mrs.

Ervine’s treatment. Specifically, neither provided the Ervines

with an interpreter during their visits and neither was

prepared to provide an interpreter when necessary.

According to Mr. Ervine, Desert View had refused to

provide a sign-language interpreter from the first time Mrs.

Ervine visited the hospital, in August 2007. As to Dr.

Tannoury, Mrs. Ervine reported—as early as April 2008—to

the Nevada Deaf and Hard of Hearing Advocacy Resource

Center (“Advocacy Resource Center” or “the Center”) that

she was having problems with her doctor, who refused to

provide her with an interpreter. Despite the Center’s help, her

difficulties with Dr. Tannoury’s office continued. On

November 12, 2008, an administrative assistant informed the

Center that Dr. Tannoury’s office did not “provide sign

language interpreters” because it was “a private practice.” 

The assistant later explained that Dr. Tannoury made such

decisions and had “refused to provide” interpreters. The

Ervines’ difficulties with Desert View and Dr. Tannoury

continued until Mrs. Ervine’s death.

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ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS 5

II

Mr. Ervine, individually and on behalf of his wife’s

estate, sued Desert View and Dr. Tannoury1on September 1,

2010, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as well as negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. 

He filed an amended complaint on September 14.

Dr. Tannourymoved for summary judgment, arguing that

the Ervines knew or should have known of their injuries well

before the two-year statute of limitations period. Mrs. Ervine

complained to the Advocacy Resource Center about Dr.

Tannoury’s failure to provide her with an interpreter in April

2008 and discussed suing him by June. Desert View joined

Dr. Tannoury’s motion, similarly insisting that Mrs. Ervine

knew the hospital had denied her an interpreter the first time

she visited, in August 2007. “There was no interpreter,” Mr.

Ervine testified during his deposition, “and that was wrong of

the hospital.” In short, according to them, the Ervines’ claims

accrued once, the first time each denied Mrs. Ervine an

interpreter. As that happened more than two years before Mr.

Ervine filed, his suit was untimely, they contended.

To the contrary, asserted Mr. Ervine in opposition, in this

case “each denial of effective communication is a separate

and unique injury starting the clock over each time.” Because

1 Mr. Ervine sued Georges Tannoury, M.D., an individual, as well as

Georges Tannoury, M.D., a domestic corporation. We refer to both,

collectively, as “Dr. Tannoury.” He also sued Specialty Medical Center

and Kerry Malin, its employee. Both have been dismissed and neither is

a party to this appeal.

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6 ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS

Dr. Tannoury and Desert View refused to provide interpreters

as late as March 2009 or August 2009, respectively, his suit

was timely.

The district court granted in part and denied in part the

motion for summary judgment. As relevant here, it denied

summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds because

no competent evidence established when the Ervines’ causes

of action accrued. The court declined to consider, as

inadmissible hearsay, entries in a logbook detailing Mrs.

Ervine’s discussions with the Advocacy Resource Center.

On a motion for reconsideration, however, the court

determined that Mr. Ervine had manifested an adoption or

belief in the truth of the logbook statements, rendering them

admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). Such, coupled

with his deposition, “establish[ed] that his claims are timebarred.”

Apparently, the district court agreed with Desert View

and Dr. Tannoury that the Ervines had one claim of

discrimination against each of them, which accrued the first

time each denied the Ervines an interpreter. Despite

acknowledging the argument that “each refusal to provide an

interpreter is an independent discriminatory act,” the court

did not analyze such argument or explain why it was

incorrect.

Mr. Ervine timely appealed.

III

Unlike the other claims, Mr. Ervine brings claims under

Title III of the ADA solely as an individual, not on behalf of

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ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS 7

Mrs. Ervine’s estate. Before turning to the timeliness of his

complaint, we consider whether he has standing to assert such

claims. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d

939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[A] disabled individual

claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy

requirement of Article III by demonstrating his standing to

sue at each stage of the litigation.”).

Neither Desert View nor Dr. Tannoury argued to the

district court that Mr. Ervine lacked standing, and the court

did not discuss standing in its orders. But “standing is not

subject to waiver,” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742

(1995), and “[f]ederal courts are required sua sponte to

examine jurisdictional issues such as standing,” Bernhardt v.

Cnty. of L.A., 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover,

“every federal appellate court has a special obligation to

satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of

the lower courts in a cause under review.” Bender v.

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Damages are not an available remedy to individuals under

Title III of the ADA; individuals may receive only injunctive

relief. Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)). So Mr.

Ervine must not only demonstrate the familiar requirements

for standing—injury-in-fact, traceability, redressability—but

also “a sufficient likelihood that he will be wronged again in

a similar way.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.,

364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of L.A. v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). That is to say, he must

show he faces a “real and immediate threat of repeated

injury.” Id. (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496

(1974)).

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8 ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS

An ADA plaintiff establishes such a real and immediate

threat if “he intends to return to a noncompliant place of

public accommodation where he will likely suffer repeated

injury.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948; see, e.g., Fortyune,

364 F.3d at 1082 (holding that plaintiff who suffered

discrimination only once was likely to suffer repeat injury

where he returned to place of public accommodation often

and discrimination was pursuant to written policy).

Alternatively, a plaintiff who “has visited a public

accommodation on a prior occasion” demonstrates a real and

immediate threat if he “is currently deterred from visiting that

accommodation by accessibility barriers.” Doran v.

7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see also

Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1136–37. Title III of the ADA

“explicitly provides that it does not require ‘a person with a

disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has

actual notice that a person or organization . . . does not intend

to comply’ with the ADA.” Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1136

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)). When a plaintiff sought

an injunction against a 7-Eleven store 550 miles away from

his home, we held he had standing: he was “currently

deterred from visiting the store”; it was “conveniently located

near his favorite fast food restaurant in Anaheim”; and he

planned to visit Anaheim once a year for his annual trips to

Disneyland. Doran, 524 F.3d at 1038, 1040–41. He did not

intend, however, to visit the 7-Eleven until it removed the

challenged access barriers. Id. at 1041.

Mr. Ervine seeks an injunction ordering Desert View and

Dr. Tannoury to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and

services” to him “to ensure effective communication.” 28

C.F.R. § 36.303(c)(1). But he has not expressed any intent to

return to Desert View or to Dr. Tannoury’s practice for

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ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS 9

medical treatment. He admitted in his deposition that he had

never been a patient at Desert View and had no reason to

believe that he would ever be a patient of Desert View in the

near future. And he has not been denied an interpreter in

Pahrump since his wife’s death.

Although he does not intend to return to either medical

provider, Mr. Ervine asserts “that he is currently aware of

barriers to access at Desert View Hospital and Dr.

Tannoury’s, and that these barriers currently deter him.” As

Desert View and Dr. Tannoury point out, such assertions,

made for the first time in his opening brief, are completely

unsupported by the record. Mr. Ervine did not allege in his

complaint that he was deterred from seeking medical services

because of discrimination. Instead, he alleged that he was

denied effective communication when he accompanied his

wife to her appointments, so he was not able “to effectively

understand her medical issues and to better understand how

he could help and support her.” The failure to provide an

interpreter continued “up to and including the date of Mr.

Ervine’s wife’s death,” but not necessarily beyond. And, as

noted, Mr. Ervine has never been a patient of Desert View

and has no imminent plans to return. He cannot manufacture

standing through bald assertion, contradicted by the record. 

See Doran, 524 F.3d at 1041 (holding that plaintiff had

standingwhere his “deposition testimonydemonstrate[d] both

. . . deterrence . . . and his intention to return in the future”);

Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1137–38 (holding that plaintiff met

standing requirements by stating in his deposition “that he is

currently deterred from attempting to gain access” to

defendant’s store).

Mr. Ervine also asserts that Desert View is the only

regional hospital where he lives. Using Desert View’s

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10 ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS

services is thus a question of “when,” not “if.” Once again

though, there is no evidence in the record regarding the

number of accessible hospitals near Mr. Ervine, nor their

distance from his home. And even if his assertion is accurate,

it would not show that a visit to Desert View, much less a

failure to provide effective communication to him, is

“certainly impending.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,

158 (1990). On this record, the prospect that Desert View

“will engage in (or resume)” conduct harmful to Mr. Ervine

is simply “too speculative to support standing.” See Friends

of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,

528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).

To be clear, Mr. Ervine does not lack standing to pursue

injunctive relief merely because he has never been a patient

of either Desert View or Dr. Tannoury. The ADA’s

implementing regulations impose an obligation on public

accommodations “to provide effective communication to

companions who are individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R.

§ 36.303(c)(1). But it is not the presence or “absence of a

past injury” that determines Article III standing to seek

injunctive relief; it is the imminent “prospect of future

injury.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 951 (citing Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 & n.2 (1992)). Mr.

Ervine has not shown a real and immediate threat that he will

be denied effective communication by Desert View or Dr.

Tannoury either as a patient in his own right or as a

companion to another patient.

Because Mr. Ervine’s complaint is “jurisdictionally

defective” and he has failed to introduce any evidence to cure

the defect, he lacks standing to bring his ADA claims. See id.

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at 954.2 The district court should therefore have dismissed

the claims for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 955; see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

IV

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits

organizations that receive federal funds, including health care

providers, from discriminating against individuals with

disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b)(3)(A)(ii). Health

providers who receive federal funds must “provide

appropriate auxiliary aids to persons with impaired sensory

. . . skills, where necessary to afford such persons an equal

opportunity to benefit from the service in question.” 45

C.F.R. § 84.52(d). “[A]uxiliary aids may include brailled and

taped material, interpreters, and other aids for persons with

impaired hearing or vision.” Id. § 84.52(d)(3). Unlike Title

III of the ADA, Section 504 permits individuals to seek

damages as a remedy in certain circumstances. See Mark H.

v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 930, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). We

must decide whether Mr. Ervine’s claims under the

Rehabilitation Act, brought individually and on behalf of his

wife’s estate, are timely.

The statute of limitations for claims under Section 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act is provided by analogous state law. 

Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 n.11,

amended, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001). All parties agree that

the analogous state law here is Nevada’s two-year statute of

limitations for personal injuries. Nev. Rev. Stat.

2 Because we conclude that Mr. Ervine lacks standing to bring his ADA

claim, we need not consider Dr. Tannoury’s argument that, having sold his

medical practice, he is not susceptible to such claim.

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12 ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS

§ 11.190(4)(e); cf. Douglas, 271 F.3d at 823 n.11 (“[B]oth

parties agree that California’s one-year statute of limitations

for personnel [sic] injuries governs [plaintiff’s] Section 504

claim.”). Mr. Ervine filed his complaint on September 1,

2010.3 His suit is timely insofar as the claims accrued on or

after September 1, 2008.

Although the limitations period is adopted from state law,

a claim under the Rehabilitation Act accrues according to

federal law. See Bishop v. Children’s Ctr. for Developmental

Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2010); cf. Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (“[T]he accrual date of a

§ 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not

resolved by reference to state law.”). “A federal claim

accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury that is the basis of the action.” Pouncil v. Tilton,

704 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2012).

A

Our court has not decided whether each discrete

discriminatory act causes a new claim to accrue under Section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act. But we have discussed such

claims under Section 501 of the Act. See Cherosky v.

Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2003). In

Cherosky, employees of the Postal Service claimed their

employer discriminated against them by refusing to provide

3 Mr. Ervine filed an amended complaint on September 14, 2010, which

the district court described as the date he “filed a complaint.” At present,

it does not matter whether he sued on September 1 or September 14, 2010. 

Thus, we assume for the purposes of this opinion that the amended

complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(c).

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ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS 13

respirators. Id. at 1245. Under the relevant federal

regulations, they were required before suing to consult with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission “within 45

days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.” 

Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a), (a)(1)). The employees

failed to consult with the EEOC within 45 days of the denial

of respirators, and were unable to “point to any discrete,

discriminatory act that occurred within the 45-day period.” 

Id. Nonetheless, they argued their claims were timely under

the “continuing violations doctrine.” Id. at 1246.

We turned to National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), to resolve their claims.

Although Morgan concerned Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, we noted that “[i]t applies with equal force to the

Rehabilitation Act and to actions arising under other civil

rights laws.” Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1246 n.3; see also, e.g.,

Pouncil, 704 F.3d at 581 (applying Morgan to § 1983 free

exercise and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act claims).

Of course, this case is not subject to a 45-day consultation

deadline; it is governed by the statute of limitations borrowed

from state law. Although the deadlines may be different,

there is no reason to suppose that Section 504 claims accrue

differently from Section 501 claims. Both claims accrue

according to federal law. Thus, we also turn to Morgan for

guidance.

Morgan distilled several principles that are relevant to the

claims at issue here:

First, discrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are

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14 ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS

related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. 

Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new

clock for filing charges alleging that act. . . .

The existence of past acts and the employee’s

prior knowledge of their occurrence, however,

does not bar employees from filing charges

about related discrete acts so long as the acts

are independently discriminatory and charges

addressing those acts are themselves timely

filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee

from using the prior acts as background

evidence in support of a timely claim.

536 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added).

In Pouncil, we emphasized that an act must be “discrete”

or “independently wrongful” to cause a new claim to accrue. 

704 F.3d at 581. If the act is merely the “delayed, but

inevitable, consequence” of a prior discriminatory act, it will

not cause a new statute of limitations to run. See id. So, for

example, the claim of a professor who was denied tenure in

a discriminatory fashion accrued when the discriminatory

decision was made, not when the professor’s contract expired. 

Id. at 577–78 (discussing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.

250 (1980)).

Pouncil maintained that the denial by prison officials in

2008 of his request for a conjugal visit with his second wife

violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause and

RLUIPA. Id. at 570. Prison officials had previously denied

in 2002 his request for a conjugal visit with his first wife,

each time citing the same prison regulation. Id. We

concluded that the second denial was “a separate, discrete act,

rather than a mere effect of the 2002 denial.” Id. at 581. It

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ERVINE V. DESERT VIEW REG’L MED. CTR. HOLDINGS 15

was an “independentlywrongful” act because Pouncil’s claim

did “not rely on any acts that occurred before the statute of

limitations period to establish a violation” of his rights. Id.

Or, as we “put it another way, the 2008 denial relied on a new

application of the regulation to a new request for a conjugal

visit, it did not rely on the 2002 denial as barring all

subsequent requests for conjugal visits.” Id.

We apply these principles to the Rehabilitation Act: So

long as an alleged violation of Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act is a discrete and independently wrongful

discriminatory act, it causes a new claim to accrue and a new

limitations period to run. A claim under the Act will not be

untimelymerely because similar, even identical, violations of

the Act occurred outside the statutory period.

B

It is beyond dispute that Mr. Ervine alleges a series of

discrete and independently wrongful discriminatory

violations of the Rehabilitation Act. His complaint discusses

Desert View and Dr. Tannoury’s “acts and omission [sic]

including failing or refusing to provide [the Ervines] with

effective communication through interpreters, even after

[they] requested interpreters.” He contends “[d]efendants

failed to afford qualified interpreters at key points in the

treatment process including diagnosis, testing and decisions

requiring informed consent.” And those “violations caused

all [the Ervines’] compensable injury.” See Cherosky,

330 F.3d at 1246 n.4 (“To illustrate the meaning of the term

‘discrete discriminatory act,’ the Court identified the

following examples: ‘termination, failure to promote, denial

of transfer, or refusal to hire.’” (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at

122)).

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The summary judgment evidence supports such

characterization of their complaint. Logbooks4from the

Advocacy Resource Center are replete with allegations that

the Ervines were denied an interpreter during particular

medical appointments. And at least one alleged

discriminatory act appears to have taken place in November

2008, within the limitations period. On November 12, the

Center called Dr. Tannoury’s office to inquire whether Mrs.

Ervine would have an interpreter at her November 17

appointment. The office manager’s assistant informed the

Center that Dr. Tannoury’s office, being a private practice,

did not provide sign language interpreters.5

Nothing about the Rehabilitation Act claims suggests that

failure to provide interpreters was merely a delayed but

inevitable consequence of a prior discriminatory decision. 

Even if the alleged violations were the result of a

discriminatory policy, that would not render the Ervines’

claims for discrete discriminatory acts untimely. See

Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1247 (“Just as the wrong in Bazemore

[v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986),] accrued each time the salary

policywas implemented, the alleged wrong here occurred and

accrued when the policy was invoked to deny an individual

employee’s request.”); see also Pouncil, 704 F.3d at 581.

4 The parties dispute on appeal whether the logbooks are admissible

evidence. We assume, arguendo, that they are.

5 Whether this or any other alleged violation is actually meritorious and

timely is not properly before us. We leave it to the district court to answer

such question in the first instance, using the legal standard we announce

here. Similarly, we leave for the district court to consider the evidentiary

sufficiency of the claims against Desert View.

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C

Because each and everydiscrete discriminatoryact causes

a new claim to accrue under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, any discriminatory acts that Desert View or Dr.

Tannoury took after September 1, 20086are actionable. “All

prior discrete discriminatory acts,” however, “are untimely

filed and no longer actionable.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.

V

Mr. Ervine lacks standing to bring his claims under Title

III of the ADA. We vacate the grant of summary judgment

as to those claims, and remand with instructions to dismiss

them without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

The district court erred in finding the claims under

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act untimely. Because we

are returning the Rehabilitation Act claims to the district

court for proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion, we

also return the state law claims, which no party has discussed.

VACATED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

 

6

See supra note 3.

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