Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01226/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NHIA KAO VANG, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

STEVEN DECKER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-01226-MCE-EFB 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through this action, Plaintiffs Nhia Kao Vang, Chao Xiong, David Vang, Chong 

Yang, Chue Hue Vang, and Pang Her (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege violations of 

federal law arising out of the 2007 criminal investigation and prosecution of Plaintiffs 

Chue Hue Vang, Nhia Kao Vang and David Vang (collectively, “the Vang Plaintiffs”) for 

an alleged plot to obtain military weapons to overthrow the government of Laos. 

Plaintiffs allege violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

Plaintiffs also allege state law tort claims for malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest, 

wrongful imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 

 1

 Although Plaintiffs do not specifically bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, the FTCA is Plaintiffs’ only potential route for their claims to defeat sovereign 

immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2679. The Court therefore construes Plaintiffs’ claims as being brought under the 

FTCA. 

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Finally, Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief. On July 31, 2012, Defendants 

Jones and the United States’ (collectively, “Defendants”) moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 (ECF No. 9.) Defendants also moved to 

dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 

Defendant Steven Decker, a special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives who was sued in his individual capacity, has not been served pursuant to 

Rule 4, and therefore does not join the present motion. On August 22, 2012, Plaintiffs 

filed a timely reply. (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss is GRANTED.3

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiffs are three Hmong couples residing in West Sacramento and Fresno, 

California. Plaintiffs contend that the Hmong people who remain in Laos are subject to a 

genocide carried out by the Laotian government. Plaintiffs further contend that the 

United States, which called on the Hmong people to fight on its behalf against 

pro-communist forced during the Vietnam War, has failed to aid the Hmong people in 

their plight in Laos. Plaintiffs were involved in efforts to bring about a peaceful solution 

to the Hmong genocide in Laos. 

Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang served as secretary to an individual identified as General 

Vang Pao and was interested in producing a documentary film concerning the Hmong 

plight, as well as interested in raising money and increasing the overall support for aiding 

the Hmong people in Laos. 

 2

 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted. 

3

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders this matter submitted 

on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h). 

4

 Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are derived from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (ECF No. 2.) 

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Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang was told by an individual named Locha Thao that a meeting to 

discuss documentary film production was going to be held in Sacramento. Locha Thao 

received this information from Defendant Decker. On February 7, 2007, Plaintiff Chue 

Hue Vang met at a Sacramento restaurant with other Hmong elders and Defendant 

Decker. At the meeting, the group gave Defendant Decker maps that they had created, 

which showed the locations of Hmong people trapped in the jungles of Laos. Plaintiff 

Chue Hue Vang primarily served as an interpreter at the meeting. Defendant Decker 

later asked the group to follow him across the street to a mobile trailer where weapons of 

various kinds were on display. Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang understood the meeting and the 

display of weapons to mean that the United States was interested in assisting the 

Hmong people in escaping from Laos. At no time during this meeting was there any 

discussion, plan, or agreement regarding a military takeover of Laos, nor did Plaintiff 

Chue Hue Vang make any agreement regarding the purchase, possession, or 

transportation of weapons. 

Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang attended a second meeting on February 18, 2007, where 

a documentary film was discussed. After the meeting, Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang was 

invited to go to a new location at the Doubletree Hotel in Sacramento. He understood 

the meeting at the hotel to be connected to the documentary film project. However, at 

the hotel, Defendant Decker showed Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang and other Hmong elders 

several AK 47s. Defendant Decker led a discussion about a military-backed effort to 

save the trapped Hmong people in Laos. Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang was confused by the 

conversation, as he knew that General Vang Pao did not have the money to fund the 

type of effort Defendant Decker was discussing. According to Plaintiffs, the discussion 

focused on using weapons as a means to help the Hmong people in Laos defend 

themselves and escape; an overthrow of the Laotian government was never mentioned. 

Again, Plaintiff Chue Hue Vang inferred that the United States supported this plan. 

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Plaintiff Nhia Kao Vang was also asked to attend a meeting to discuss helping the 

Hmong people in Laos. He was asked to attend the meeting “with an American 

government person,” and was asked to drive a Hmong doctor to the meeting. The group 

went to a hotel where Defendant Decker showed Plaintiff Nhia Kao Vang and others a 

display of weapons. At no point was a military takeover of Laos discussed. Plaintiff Nhia 

Kao Vang was also asked to go on a trip to Washington, D.C. He agreed to go on the 

trip, with six other individuals. Plaintiffs allege that this trip was simply for tourism and 

“had nothing to do with any kind of fundraising effort” as Defendant Decker later claimed. 

Plaintiff David Vang was told by Locha Thao to prepare a document called “the 

Popcorn document.” Defendant Decker told Locha Thao to ask Plaintiff David Vang to 

do so. The Popcorn document detailed a plan for a military coup of Laos. Locha Thao 

also told Plaintiff David Vang that Defendant Decker had stated that the United States 

not only supported the coup described in the Popcorn document but was going to fund 

the operation and provide arms and special forces for it. Plaintiff David Vang was also 

told that the United States would pay him $5000 for preparing the document. Plaintiff 

David Vang thus prepared the Popcorn document with the understanding that the 

operation detailed therein was a government-backed military operation. 

The Criminal Case5

As a result of the above listed facts, a criminal complaint was filed before this 

Court on June 4, 2007, charging the Vang Plaintiffs, among others, with conspiracy to 

violate the Neutrality Act and conspiracy to receive and possess missiles, among other 

things. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Decker intentionally deceived the grand jury, as 

Defendant Decker knew that the Vang Plaintiffs did not have any criminal intent to enter 

into an illegal conspiracy to overthrow the Laotian government, or to possess military 

equipment unlawfully. (ECF No. 2 at 10.) 

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 The facts regarding the criminal case against the Vang Plaintiffs are taken from reference to the 

docket in that case unless otherwise stated. (ECF No. 10-1). The Court may consider documents 

referenced in a complaint, or which a complaint in some way depends on, in a motion to dismiss without 

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 

1076 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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Arrest warrants were returned executed on June 4, 2007, for Plaintiff Chue Hue 

Vang, and on June 5, 2007, for Nhia Kao Vang. An arrest warrant was returned 

executed on June 14, 2007, for Plaintiff David Vang. On June 14, 2007, the Vang 

Plaintiffs were charged with numerous counts arising from the alleged conspiracy to 

overthrow the government of Laos. Plaintiffs were held in custody until they were 

released on bond on July 13, 2007. 

On March 9, 2009, the Vang Plaintiffs, among others, filed a Motion to Dismiss for 

Outrageous Government Conduct. Plaintiffs alleged that both the undercover agents 

and the prosecutors engaged in misconduct throughout the prosecution and the 

underlying investigation. (ECF No. 10-3.) The Court denied the motion on May 11, 

2009, but provided that Plaintiffs could renew the motion after further discovery. 

Ultimately, a Second Superseding Indictment was returned on June 24, 2010. 

Plaintiffs filed numerous motions to dismiss, including a renewed Motion to Dismiss for 

Outrageous Government Conduct. On November 12, 2010, the Court granted in part 

and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Counts One, Three, Four, and Five. The 

Court dismissed Counts Four and Five on the grounds that the Second Superseding 

Indictment “fail[ed] to put each defendant on notice of the nature of charges against him 

in order to allow him to prepare a defense or to ensure he is being prosecuted on the 

basis of the facts presented to the grand jury” and “fail[ed] to apprise each defendant of 

the specific conduct he engaged in the allegedly violates the [Neutrality] Act.” (ECF 

No. 10-6.) 

Subsequently, on January 10, 2011, the government moved to dismiss all 

charges against the Vang Plaintiffs “in the interests of justice.” (ECF No. 10-8.) The 

Court granted the motion that same day. 

Administrative Claims 

On July 12, 2011, Plaintiffs Nhia Kao Vang, Chao Xiong, David Vang, and Chong 

Yang served FTCA claims on the United States. On July 29, 2011, Plaintiffs Chue Hue 

Vang and Pang Her served their FTCA claims on the United States. 

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On July 18, 2011, and August 11, 2011, respectively, the Government acknowledged 

receipt of the claims. More than six months have passed since the submission of 

Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims, and the government has neither accepted nor denied the claims. 

STANDARDS 

A. Standard under Rule 12(b)(6) 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant a fair notice 

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (1997) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed 

factual allegations. Id. However, “a plaintiff’s obligations to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading 

must contain something more than a “statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion 

[of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)). 

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Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). “Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see 

how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 

nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . 

have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 

complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed 

even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a 

recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974)). 

B. Standard under Rule 12(b)(1) 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a 

case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Accordingly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at 

any point during the litigation, through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Int’l Union of Operating 

Eng’rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2009). Lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction may also be raised by the district court sua sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. 

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 

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Indeed, “courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter 

jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Id.; see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the action if subject matter jurisdiction is 

lacking). 

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 

facial attack and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the 

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may 

challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal 

sufficiency of the pleadings. Id. 

When a party makes a facial attack on a complaint, the attack is unaccompanied 

by supporting evidence, and it challenges jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). If the motion to 

dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the factual allegations of the 

complaint to be true, and determine whether they establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is granted only if the 

nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

However, in the case of a facial attack, district courts “may review evidence beyond the 

complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 

Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 

allegations.” Thornill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing the 

motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist and must 

present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are 

challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the 

mere assertion that factual issues may exist. 

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Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 

1976)). Furthermore, the district court may review any evidence necessary, including 

affidavits and testimony, in order to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. 

McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. 

If the nonmoving party fails to meet its burden and the court determines that it lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005)); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 

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ANALYSIS 

A. Section 1983 Claims 

Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action alleges that Defendants violated their First 

Amendment right to freedom of speech and right to petition the government for redress 

of grievances, as well as their Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 

due process. (ECF No. 2 at 22.) Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action alleges that Defendants 

violated Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights by interfering with 

their spousal relationships. (ECF No. 2 at 56.) 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under the color of 

state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To act under state law, a defendant must “exercise 

power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer 

is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). 

“There is no valid basis for a claim under § 1983” brought against a federal official acting 

under color of federal law. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In the present case, while Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Jones is liable under § 1983 

for violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Plaintiffs make no allegation that Defendant 

Jones acted under the color of state law. Defendant Jones is clearly a federal actor and 

acted under the color of federal, rather than state, law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed 

to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Jones under § 1983. 

Furthermore, § 1983 provides recourse to persons who have been deprived of 

their constitutional rights by the actions of a person acting under color of law. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (emphasis added). The United States is not a “person” within the meaning of 

§ 1983. See Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing 

suit against federal agencies pursuant to § 1983); Fixel v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 

593, 596 (D. Nev. 1990) (“The United States is not a ‘person’ and cannot be sued under 

§ 1983) (citing Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239 (3d Cir. 1970)). 

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Plaintiffs argue that the United States waived its sovereign immunity in § 1983 

actions when it signed the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (“ICCPR”), and that the doctrines of treaty estoppel and judicial estoppel prevent 

the government from claiming sovereign immunity in such actions. However, “it is 

axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the 

existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 

206, 212 (1983). Before a court may exercise jurisdiction over any suit against the 

government, there must be “a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign 

immunity, together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver.” United States v. 

White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003). “The government’s waiver of 

sovereign immunity cannot be implied, but ‘must be unequivocally expressed in statutory 

text.’” Jachetta, 653 F.3d at 903. “Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, courts have 

no subject matter jurisdiction over cases against the government.” Kaiser v. Blue Cross 

of Cal., 347 F.3d 1107, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212). “The 

ICCPR contains no explicit language waiving sovereign immunity of the United States.” 

Godfrey v. Ross, No. CIV 2:11-2308 WBS EFB, 2012 WL 507162, *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb 15, 

2012). Rather, the ICCPR “contains general statements affirming the rights of 

individuals to live free from discrimination and oppression.” Id. Accordingly, the ICCPR 

is not a waiver of sovereign immunity, id., and Plaintiffs’ argument fails. 

Moreover, the United States is not judicially estopped from asserting its sovereign 

immunity. The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that “where a party assumed a 

certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he 

many not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary 

position . . . .” Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895). “This rule . . . ‘generally 

prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying 

on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 

532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000)). 

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The government has not taken any contrary positions regarding its sovereign immunity in 

the present litigation. Thus, it is not judicially estopped from raising its sovereign 

immunity as an affirmative defense against Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in this case, the 

Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the 

government. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims is therefore 

granted. 

B. Bivens Violations 

Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action alleges violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to Bivens. (ECF No. 2 at 26, citing 403 U.S. 

388.) Bivens created a remedy for violations of constitutional rights committed by federal 

officers acting in their individual capacities. Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de 

Mexicall, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Bivens, 

403 U.S. 388)). Thus, to state a Bivens claims, a plaintiff must allege that persons acting 

under the color of federal law violated his constitutional rights. Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 

774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

An action under Bivens is therefore identical to one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

except for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under 

Bivens. Id. 

1. Sovereign Immunity 

“In a suit against the United States, there cannot be a right to money damages 

without waiver of sovereign immunity.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 

(1976). The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Bivens actions against the United 

States. Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1984). 

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The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims against 

the government. 

Moreover, “[i]t has long been the rule that the bar of sovereign immunity cannot 

be avoided by naming officers and employees of the United States as defendants.” 

Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Larson v. Domestic & 

Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 1949)). Claims against federal officials in 

their official capacities are essentially claims against the United States. Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 

436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Thus, a Bivens action “can be maintained against a 

defendant in his or her individual action only, and not in his or her official capacity.” 

Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Daly-Murphy, 837 F.2d 348 

(9th Cir. 1987)). As such, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Jones in his personal 

capacity are essentially claims against the United States, and therefore is without merit. 

Plaintiffs argue that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), protects their claim 

against Defendants. However, Ex Parte Young “provides a narrow exception to 

Eleventh Amendment immunity for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 

against unconstitutional actions taken by state actors in their official capacities.” 

Rounds v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56). The Eleventh Amendment precludes states from 

being sued in federal court, and thus bars § 1983 suits against state governments. See, 

e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 

1350 (9th Cir. 1982). Ex Parte Young is thus inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ case as it is 

sovereign immunity and not Eleventh Amendment immunity that bars Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the 

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims against both the United States and Defendant 

Jones in his official capacity is granted. 

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2. Claim against Defendant Jones in his Personal Capacity 

Sovereign immunity does not bar actions for damages, including a Bivens claim, 

against a federal employee in his individual capacity for violations of a plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. Gilbert, 756 F.2d at 1459. However, the plaintiff “must plead that 

each [g]overnment-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Moreover, “vicarious liability is 

inapplicable to Bivens . . . .” Id. Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains no allegation that 

Defendant Jones was personally involved in the facts giving rise to Plaintiffs’ Bivens 

claims. Rather, Plaintiffs assert only that Defendant Jones “is the director of the United 

States of America Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms.” (ECF No. 2 at 3.) 

Plaintiffs plead no other facts to suggest that Defendant Jones, through his “own 

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. As such, 

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Defendant Jones in his individual capacity. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims against Defendant Jones in his 

individual capacity is therefore granted. 

C. FTCA Claims 

Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action alleges state law tort claims for malicious 

prosecution, wrongful arrest, and wrongful imprisonment. (ECF No. 2 at 40.) Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth Cause of Action asserts that Defendants are liable for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. (ECF No. 2 at 53.) As noted above, while Plaintiffs do not 

specifically bring suit under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)(1), 2679(d)(1), the FTCA is 

Plaintiffs’ only potential route for their claims to defeat sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2679. The FTCA specifies that the “United States shall be liable . . . to tort claims in 

the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 

circumstances.” Id. § 2676. 

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The terms of the FTCA create liability for the government if the act is a tort in the state 

where the conduct occurred. Id. § 2671. The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for any tort 

claim resulting from the act or omission of a government employee acting within the 

scope his or her employment, with the exception of Bivens remedies for constitutional 

tort claims. See id. § 2679. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for claims against the 

federal government arising from torts committed by federal employees who are acting 

within the scope of their employment. Id. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2679(d)(1). Thus, Plaintiffs may 

properly bring suit against Defendants for their state law tort claims. 

However, the FTCA has a two-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 

“[T]he statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) is jurisdictional . . . .” Marley v. United 

States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009). “As a general rule, a claim accrues ‘when a 

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’” 

Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gibson v. United 

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under California law, “[t]he elements of a 

tortious claim of false imprisonment are: (1) the non-consensual, intentional confinement 

of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, 

however brief.” Bulfer v. Dobbins, No. 09-CV-1250 JLS (POR), 2011 WL 530039, *14 

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011) (quoting Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485 

(2000)). “False arrest is not a different tort; it is merely ‘one way of committing a false 

imprisonment.” Id. (quoting Martinez v. City of L.A., 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 

1998)). “A cause of action for false arrest accrues on the arrest and is actionable 

immediately.” Id. (quoting Mohlman v. City of Burbank, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1037 (1986)). 

A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues, and the two-year 

statute of limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff suffers the severe emotional 

distress. Thomas v. Hickman, No. 1:06-CV-0215 AWI SMS, 2009 WL 1273190, *19 

(E.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (quoting Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 4 Cal. App. 4th 857, 

889 (1992)). 

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In early June of 2007, the Vang Plaintiffs were arrested and charged with counts 

arising from an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government of Laos. (ECF 

No. 10-1.) Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest and false imprisonment thus accrued in June 

2007, and the statute of limitations for those claims expired in early June 2009. 

Assuming that Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress at the time of the Vang 

Plaintiffs’ arrest, as Plaintiffs allege that they were “quite literally scared to death over the 

decision by the [United States] to bring these false charges,” Plaintiffs’ cause of action 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress also accrued at the time of the arrest. 

The Vang Plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss for outrageous government 

conduct on March 9, 2009. (ECF No. 10-3.) Thus, at the very latest, Plaintiffs knew or 

had reason to know of Defendants’ tortious conduct, and their injuries arising therefrom, 

by March 2009. Under this view, Plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful arrest, wrongful 

imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress accrued in March 2009, and 

the statute of limitations for those claims expired in March of 2011. However, Plaintiffs 

did not present their tort claims to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives until July of 2011. (ECF No. 2 at 6-7.) Thus, whether Plaintiffs’ claims 

accrued in June 2007 or March 2009, Plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful arrest, wrongful 

imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by the FTCA’s 

statute of limitations. Because the FTCA’s statute of limitations is jurisdictional, Marley, 

567 F.3d at 1032, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss the claims is therefore granted. 

The two-year statute of limitations does not, however, bar Plaintiffs’ malicious 

prosecution claim. A common law action for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to 

establish that “the underlying prosecution: (1) was commenced by or at the direction of 

the defendant and terminated in [the plaintiff’s] favor; (2) was brought without probable 

cause, and (3) was initiated with malice.” Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863 (1989)). 

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A malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying prosecution terminates in the 

plaintiff’s favor. Geiche v. City of S.F., No. C 08-3233 JL, 2009 WL 1948830, *3 (N.D. 

Cal. July 2, 2009) (citing Babb v. Sup. Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846 (1971)); see also Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1994). “The theory underlying the requirement of 

favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the innocence of the accused, and 

coupled with the other elements of lack of probable cause and malice, establishes the 

tort, that is, the malicious and unfounded charge against an innocent person.” Jaffe v. 

Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150 (1941). The California Supreme Court has indicated that 

“if . . . the dismissal is on technical grounds, or for procedural reasons, or for any other 

reason not inconsistent with [the plaintiff’s] guilt, it does not constitute a favorable 

termination.” Id.; see also Babb, 3 Cal. 3d at 750-751. Moreover, California courts have 

held that a dismissal “in the interests of justice” is not a favorable termination for 

purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, as it “does not necessarily imply factual 

innocence, but rather may reflect the result of a negotiated or pragmatic disposition of 

the case.” People v. Matthews, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1056 (1992) (citing People v. 

Glimps, 92 Cal. App. 3d 323-24 (1979)). 

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the prosecution of 

the Vang Plaintiffs terminated in their favor. The charges against the Vang Plaintiffs 

were dismissed in part on their own motion and in part “in the interests of justice.” These 

dismissals do not constitute a favorable termination for purposes of a malicious 

prosecution claim under California law, as they do not “necessarily imply” the Vang 

Plaintiffs’ “factual innocence.” Matthews, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1056. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 

have failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

the claim is granted. 

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D. Requests for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 

In each cause of action, Plaintiffs request that the Court enjoin Defendants from 

retaliating against Plaintiffs for bringing suit and committing an act in retaliation for 

Plaintiffs’ previous attempts to bring justice for the Hmong people in Laos. Plaintiffs also 

seek an affirmative injunction and ask that the Court require Defendants to issue a 

declaration that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ civil rights, and that Plaintiffs are factually 

innocent of the criminal charges brought against them. 

As established above, neither § 1983 nor Bivens affords Plaintiffs relief in the 

present case. See supra. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

requests for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to both § 1983 and Bivens is 

granted. 

To the extent that Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 

the FTCA, these claims also fail. The FTCA provides federal jurisdiction only for civil 

claims against the United States “for money damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The 

FTCA does not provide for injunctive relief. Id. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the FTCA is also 

granted. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED with leave to amend. Not later than twenty (20) 

days following the date of this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed, Plaintiffs 

may file an amended complaint. If no amended complaint is filed within said twenty- (20) 

day period, without further notice to the parties, the causes of action dismissed by virtue 

of the Memorandum and Order will be dismissed with prejudice. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 16, 2012 

__________________________________ 

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

DEAC_Signature-END: 

c4d6b0d3 

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