Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00121/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00121-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Masum James Vijan,

Petitioner

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents

CV-09-0121-PHX-DGC (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson,

Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

on May 5, 2009 (Doc. 13), supplemented with various exhibits (Doc. 14). On September

2, 2009, Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 24). Petitioner filed a Reply on September

30, 2009 (Doc. 25).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s petition for review, the Arizona Court of Appeals

described the factual background as involving “an altercation during which Vijan had struck

an acquaintance with the end of a shotgun and had then driven his vehicle into the victim’s

parked vehicle.” (Exhibit L, Mem. Dec. 2/7/07 at 1.) (Exhibits to the Response, Doc. 24, are

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referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.” Exhibits to the Amended Petition, Doc. 13, including

those at Doc. 14 are referenced herein as “Pet. Exhibit.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted in Pinal County Superior Court on one count of aggravated

assault and one count of criminal damage. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) Following a jury trial,

Petitioner was convicted on both counts. (Exhibit B, M.E. 2/14/03; Exhibit L, Mem. Dec.

2/27/07 at 1.) Petitioner, through post-trial counsel, filed a Motion to Vacate the Verdict

(Exhibit E), arguing that trial counsel had been using drugs and was impaired at the time of

trial, and had used drugs with Petitioner during trial leaving Petitioner impaired during trial.

After an evidentiary hearing (Exhibit F, R.T. 2/24/04), the trial court found the allegations

unconvincing and denied the motion to vacate. (Exhibit G, M.E. 2/25/04.) 

On March 25, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to serve consecutive, presumptive terms,

totaling nine years, composed of 7.5 years on the aggravated assault charge, and 1.5 years

on the criminal damage charge. (Exhibit I, Sentence 3/25/04; Exhibit L, Mem. Dec. 2/27/07

at 1-2.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel from trial counsel who used drugs with Petitioner and was disciplined and suspended

by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Exhibit J, Opening Brief.) His convictions and sentences

were affirmed by a decision filed March 16, 2005. (Exhibit L, Mem. Dec. 2/27/07 at 2.)

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Amend. Pet., Doc. 13 at 3.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On July 18, 2005, Petitioner filed through counsel a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(Pet. Exhibit, Doc. 14-1 at 5). He filed a PCR petition arguing the trial court failed to give

proper weight to the mitigating factor of Plaintiff’s mental illness. (Exhibit N, Pet. Rev. at

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Exhibit B, PCR Pet.) The trial court summarily denied relief on September 13, 2006.

(Exhibit K, Pet. Rev. at Exhibit A, M.E. 9/13/06.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit K).

In a Memorandum Decision issued February 27, 2007 (Exhibit L), the petition was denied.

 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Exhibit M) and a Petition for Review by the

Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit N). That petition was denied on August 17, 2007, and the

mandate was issued October 5, 2007. (Exhibit O, Docket at 3.)

E. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On December 2, 2008, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(Exhibit P). The trial court summarily denied relief on January 8, 2009. (Exhibit Q, M.E.

1/8/09.) Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Amend. Pet., Doc.

13 at 5.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his original Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 20, 2009 (Doc. 1). The

Court reviewed the Petition and found that Petitioner alleged a state PCR proceeding was

ongoing, and gave Petitioner 30 days to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed

as premature. (Doc. 6, Order 3/13/09.) Petitioner failed to comply, and on April 21, 2009,

judgment (Doc. 7) was entered dismissing the case. 

Petitioner subsequently filed a response, motions to extend and amend the petition.

The motions were granted, judgment vacated, and the Amended Petition (Doc. 13) was filed

on May 5, 2009. Petitioner’s Amended Petition asserts a single ground for relief, alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner argues that he should not be barred by the

statute of limitations because he is untrained, illiterate, seriously mentally ill, not advised by

counsel of the statute of limitations, and precluded by prison regulations from obtaining

assistance from other inmates. Service and a response were ordered. (Doc. 12, Order

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5/5/09.)

Response - On September 2, 2009, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”)

(Doc. 24). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely, barred by the statute of

limitations, and that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

Reply - On September 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 25). Petitioner argues

that he is indigent, untrained in the law, and seriously mentally ill, that prison regulations and

state laws on the unauthorized practice of law precluded him from gaining assistance, that

the legal resources available to him were limited, and that he did not have fair notice of the

statute of limitations.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a

1-year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on "the

date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner’s direct review

ended when his convictions and sentences were affirmed by a decision filed March 16,

2005. (Exhibit L, Mem. Dec. 2/27/07 at 2.) Although Petitioner did not seek review by the

Arizona Supreme Court, his judgment did not become final until 30 days later when his time

to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a).

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1

 Although the Arizona Court of Appeals did not issue its mandate until October 5,

2007 (Exhibit O, Docket at 3), the date of the actual ruling controls. See White v. Klitzkie,

281 F.3d 920, 924 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002)(absent rule to contrary, date of decision not mandate

controls).

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Thus, Petitioner’s judgement became final after Friday, April 15, 2005, and his one year

began to run on April 16, 2005.

3. Normal Expiration of Year

Barring any applicable tolling, Petitioner’s limitations period would have commenced

running on April 16, 2005 and it expired on April 15, 2006, one year later. 

4. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statutory tolling applies during

the entire time during which the application is pending, including interludes between various

stages of appeal on the application. The “AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of

the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction

application.’ ” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v.

Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999)). See also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

217 (2002). 

First PCR Petition - Petitioner commenced his first PCR proceeding on July 18,

2005, when he filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. As of that date, 93 days elapsed

since his one year began running on April 15, 2005. That PCR proceeding remained

pending until August 17, 2007, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied review.1

 As of

that date, Petitioner had 272 days remaining on his one year, thus leaving his one year to

expire on May 16, 2008. 

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Second PCR Petition - Petitioner did not commence his second PCR proceeding until

December 2, 2008 (Exhibit P). By that date, his one year had been expired for over six

months. Once the habeas statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief

filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Summary re Statutory Tolling - Based on the foregoing, Petitioner is entitled to

statutory tolling during the pendency of his first PCR proceeding, extending the expiration

of his one year to May 16, 2008.

5. Timeliness of Federal Habeas Petition

The undersigned presumes for purposes of this Report and Recommendation that the

filing of Petitioner’s Amended Petition (Doc. 13) relates back in time to January 20, 2009

when he filed his original Petition (Doc. 1). But see Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 1138

(9th Cir. 2008) (relation back only if original and amended claims have common core of

operative facts). By that date, however, Petitioner’s limitations period had been expired for

over 8 months. Thus, Petitioner’s habeas petition was untimely.

6. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period.

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available in our

circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of

his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The petitioner must

additionally show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness, and that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it

impossible to file a petition on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations

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omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

While the standard for establishing entitlement to equitable tolling is high, the

standard for an evidentiary hearing on such a claim is not so rigorous. Indeed, a habeas

petitioner asserting equitable tolling “should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes

‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’ ” Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919

(9th Cir.2003). Moreover, when evaluating a pro se habeas petitioner’s allegations of such

extraordinary circumstances, the court must “construe pro se habeas filings liberally.” Id.

(quoting Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.2005)). 

Availability of Equitable Tolling after Bowles - Respondents argue based on Bowles

v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), that the Ninth Circuit has wrongly concluded that equitable

tolling is available under the habeas limitations period. In Bowles, the Court found that the

general appellate time limits under 28 U.S.C. § 2107 were jurisdictional and thus not subject

to exceptions on equitable grounds, even when appealing the denial of a habeas petition.

However, some six months prior to Respondents Answer, the Ninth Circuit rejected

Respondents’ reasoning and refused to extend Bowles to the time limits on original habeas

petitions. See Caldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009)

(decided February 25, 2009). Moreover, the Supreme Court recently resolved the matter in

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 2549 (2010), where they explicitly held that

the habeas statute of limitations was not jurisdictional, and was subject to equitable tolling.

Relevant Time Periods - Here, the relevant time periods, when the one year was

running, are April 16 to July 18, 2005 (in the interim between direct appeal and the first PCR

petition), and August 17, 2007 and May 16, 2008 (in the interim between the first PCR

petition and the expiration of the one year).

Petitioner asserts a number of circumstances which he argues establish grounds for

equitable tolling, including his mental illness, his lack of notice of the limitations period and

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lack of legal training, counsel’s failure to advise him of the limitations period, and his lack

of legal resources and assistance.

Petitioner’s Mental Illness - Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling

because he is “seriously mentally ill.” (Reply, Doc. 25 at 2.) However, Petitioner provides

scant support for this claim, and makes no allegations about how his mental illness precluded

him from making a timely filing. 

It is true that an evaluation done during trial, in November, 2003, resulted in a

diagnosis of a depressive disorder, polysubstance abuse, paranoid personality disorder, and

schizoid personality disorder. (Pet. Exhibit, Doc. 14-1, Pet. PCR, Exhibit 1 at 4.) It was

noted that Petitioner “was not oriented to the month of the year, the date of The month, or

day of the week . . . thought processes were racing and preoccupied with paranoia.” (Id.) 

However, the same report concluded that Petitioner’s “intellectual ability is estimated to be

in the average to above average range,” with a “fair general fund of information,” and his

“highest school achievement was to the 9th grade.” (Id.) 

"Where a habeas petitioner's mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to meet

the AEDPA filing deadline, his delay was caused by an "extraordinary circumstance beyond

[his] control," and the deadline should be equitably tolled." Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d

919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). “However . . .mental incompetence is not a per se reason to toll

a statute of limitations. Rather, the alleged mental incompetence must somehow have

affected the petitioner's ability to file a timely habeas petition.” Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310,

320 (3rd Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214

(2002). “[M]ental illness tolls a statute of limitations only if the illness in fact prevents the

sufferer from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and acting

upon them. Any other conclusion would perpetuate the stereotype of the insane as raving

maniacs or gibbering idiots.” Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 -192 (7th Cir. 1996)

(applying equitable tolling to Rehabilitation Act). 

Petitioner fails to connect his mental condition to his failure to file a timely petition.

While Petitioner may have suffered from those diagnoses, he makes no connection between

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them and his failure to file a timely habeas petition. He does not, for example, suggest that

he was so mentally incompetent that he could not have prepared a timely federal habeas

petition. He simply states that he was mentally ill. 

Petitioner also proffers nothing as to his mental status subsequent to trial. Petitioner’s

subsequent pro se filings in his state proceedings (see eg. Exhibit M, Motion for

Reconsideration; Exhibit N, Pet. Rev.; Exhibit P, PCR Not.), his federal civil rights case in

this Court (Vijan v. Philips & Associates, P.C., CV-06-1817-PHX-DGC-JRI (PS)), and in

the instant proceeding, all reflect that Petitioner is not so affected by his mental illness as to

be unable to pursue a federal habeas petition. He does not suggest that his condition was

significantly worse at the time his limitations period was running, as opposed to the times

when he was make those filings.

Further, Petitioner does not suggest that additional evidence would be available at an

evidentiary hearing to establish such mental illness during the relevant time period, or its

effect on his ability to file a timely federal habeas petition.

In sum, Petitioner simply makes the broad allegation that he suffers from mental

illness and thus is entitled to equitable tolling. That allegation is not sufficient to warrant an

evidentiary hearing, and much less so to establish a basis for equitable tolling.

Lack of Notice of Statute of Limitations & Lack of Legal Training - Petitioner

casts himself as “unlearned in law and basically illiterate of the law,” and complains that he

was unaware of the statute of limitations, and that due process precludes enforcement until

he is given fair notice of the statute. (Reply, Doc. 25 at 3-4.) 

With regard to Petitioner’s notice of the statute, “it is well established that ignorance

of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt

filing.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000) (quotation marks and citation

omitted) (as cited in Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154). Cf. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d

1146, 1148 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (lack of access to AEDPA, as opposed to

knowledge of it, might be cause for equitable tolling). 

Withe regard to Petitioner’s lack of legal prowess, “[i]t is clear that pro se status, on

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2

 Arguably, Petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel in his state PCR

proceeding, and thus cannot rely upon any failure of such counsel to establish grounds for

equitable tolling. See Holland, 560 U.S. at ___ , slip dissent at 2-3 (Alito, J., dissenting in

part), citing Lawrence v. Florida, 549 u.S. 327, 336-337 (2007) (“Attorney miscalculation

is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the postconviction context

where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel.”)). However, this rationale draws

from the law of cause and prejudice, and depends upon a finding of a constitutionally

significant cause to avoid federalism concerns, which concerns are less significant in the

limitations arena than in the procedural default realm.

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its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th

Cir. 2006). A prisoner's “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance

because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171

(5th Cir. 2000). See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro

se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling”).

Counsel’s Failure to Advise - Moreover, appellate and PCR2

 counsel’s failure to

advise Petitioner of the statute of limitations does not escalate Petitioner’s ignorance to an

exceptional circumstance. Although an attorney's behavior can establish the extraordinary

circumstances required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is

insufficient. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). A “garden variety claim

of excusable neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing

deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.’ ” Holland, 560 U.S. at _____ (slip opinion at

19). Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances.

Id. An unadorned failure to advise about a limitations period would, at best, be simple

negligence. Cf. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing equitable

tolling where petitioner's counsel was hired almost a year in advance, failed to do anything

to prepare the petition or to respond to numerous letters and phone calls, and withheld

petitioner's file for over two months after the limitations period expired); Holland, supra

(discussing potential for finding of extraordinary circumstances where counsel misinformed

petitioner about filing deadline, failed to communicate conclusion of state appeals, and failed

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 The first part of Petitioner’s one year expired between April 16 and July 18, 2005

(in the interim between direct appeal and the first PCR petition). During that time, Petitioner

managed to prepare his first state PCR notice, only after which was he appointed counsel.

(Pet. Exhibit, M.E. 1/8/09 at 2.) Respondents also point to Petitioner’s filing a civil rights

action in this Court in Vijan v. Philips & Associates, P.C., CV-06-1817-PHX-DGC-JRI (PS).

However, as reflected in this Court’s docket in that case, that action was pending only from

July 24, 2006 to June 8, 2007, and thus no filings in that case were prepared during the times

that Petitioner’s federal imitations period was actually running.

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to communicate with petitioner at all over a period of years, all despite repeated requests by

petitioner). 

Lack of Legal Resources & Assistance - Petitioner complains that the Arizona

Department of Corrections has removed “law libraries and law books” from the prison, and

denied him any other form of assistance because: (1) prison paralegals are precluded from

offering legal advice; and (2) prison regulations precluding inmates from helping each other

with legal matters, and prohibitions on the practice of law by unauthorized persons kept

ADOC employees and inmates from assisting him. Petitioner asserts that “[h]ad someone

trained in the law assisted Vijan with the preparation of his petition at the time Vijan

requested assistance while at the Buckley prison, his petition would have been timely filed.”

(Reply, Doc. 25 at 2.) He argues that “[w]hile at the Buckley Unit petitioner attempted to

locate someone trained in the law to legally advise him regarding the filing of his petition and

his claims and to assist him with preparing his petition and was told by staff at the resource

library that the unit paralegal assistant could not legally advise him nor assist him with

preparing the petition per ADC policy and state law regarding the unauthorized practice of

law.” (Amend. Pet. Doc. 13 at 17.) 

The undersigned presumes the accuracy of Petitioner’s description of the limited legal

resources and assistance available to him in the Arizona prisons. However, those conditions

did not preclude Petitioner from making a timely filing.

The bulk, and final portion of Petitioner’s one year expired between August 17, 2007

and May 16, 2008 (in the interim between the first PCR petition and the expiration of the one

year).3

 The Court notes that Petitioner’s original habeas petition asserts that it was “[o]n or

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 That original Petition (Doc. 1) was filed January 20, 2009, suggesting that the date

of “December 1, 2009" was a scrivener’s error, and that Petitioner intended to refer to

December 1, 2008. 

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about December 1, 2009 [sic]4 . . . when petitioner learned of the one year limitation of the

AEDPA.” (Pet. Doc. 1 at 20.) However, in Petitioner’s second PCR Notice, he represented

that he was “assisted in the preparation of this Notice by a fellow inmate.” (Exhibit P, PCR

Not. at 11.) That Petition was dated October 20, 2008, and specifically alleged that PCR

counsel “did not advise defendant of the need to seek federal review by habeas corpus within

one year of the mandate.” (Id. at 10.) Thus, contrary to the allegations of his original federal

Petition, at least as of October 20, 2008, Petitioner had obtained the assistance of another

inmate, and was aware that a one year statute of limitations applied. And yet, Petitioner did

not file his original federal habeas petition until January 20, 2009, some three months later.

Even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for a time,

equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing afterwards.

"If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting

to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation between the

extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary

circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing." Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129,

134 (2nd Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, thirty days after elimination of a roadblock should be

sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner offers

no explanation for the 90 days that elapsed between the time he became aware of the

limitations period and his commencement of this proceeding. 

It appears that Petitioner may have made a tactical choice to proceed in the state courts

first, not filing his federal petition until a week or so after his second PCR proceeding had

been dismissed. (See Pet. Exhibit, M.E. 1/8/09.) If so, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable

tolling for an erroneous tactical choice. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.

2008) (“failure to file a timely petition [as] the result of oversight, miscalculation or

negligence on [petitioner’s] part . . . would preclude the application of equitable tolling”). Cf.

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Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner diligent where time expended

on federal civil suit to obtain law library materials to be able to file habeas petition). 

Summary - Petitioner fails to proffer facts which would show extraordinary

circumstances that made it impossible for him to make a timely federal habeas filing. While

Petitioner suggests a number of factors to establish an impediment, they are either not

extraordinary circumstances, or he fails to make allegations that connect those factors to his

actual failure to timely file his petition. With regard to the only supported contention, e.g.

his lack of assistance in the prison, Petitioner fails to proffer facts to explain his lack of

diligence in filing his federal petition once he became aware of the limitations period, and

was capable of making substantive filings, e.g. his second PCR notice. Under these

circumstance, the undersigned finds no basis for equitable tolling.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth herein,

the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts

this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be

denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 22, 2009 (Doc. 13) be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

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Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or

recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: July 29, 2010 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\09-0121-013r RR 10 07 14 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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