Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01428/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01428-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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08cv1428-JM (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CATHARINE J. TOMOVICH a/k/a

CATHIE J. TOMOVICH,

Plaintiff,

v.

WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON, L.L.P.,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 08cv1428-JM (BLM)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND

EXPENSES AND (2) SETTING

SETTLEMENT DISPOSITION

CONFERENCE.

[Doc. No. 29]

On April 21, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and

expenses incurred during the instant action. Doc. No. 29 (Motion).

Defendant opposed the motion, Doc. No. 31 (Opp’n), and Plaintiff filed

a reply, Doc. No. 33 (Reply). The Court set a hearing date of June 9,

2009, and took the matter under submission. Doc. No. 32. Plaintiff’s

motion for attorney’s fees and expenses is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART as follows.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns allegedly-wrongful debt collection practices by

Defendant, a debt collector. In August 2008, Plaintiff filed a

complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(FDCPA), and California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Case 3:08-cv-01428-BLM Document 34 Filed 08/07/09 Page 1 of 14
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Doc. No. 1 (Complaint). Defendant’s alleged wrongdoing arises from

efforts to collect money owed by Plaintiff, including phone calls and

letters, some of which improperly stated that Defendant would commence

litigation against Plaintiff if she failed to satisfy the debt. Id.

Approximately six months after Plaintiff filed the Complaint, the

case settled. Doc. No. 25. In the interim, the parties attended a

settlement conference with this Court, and Plaintiff filed two unopposed

motions to compel, which, because the case settled shortly thereafter,

were denied as moot. Doc. Nos. 16, 20, 28. Pursuant to a consent

decree, on April 16, 2009, this Court assumed jurisdiction over the

case, including the jurisdiction to adjudicate fee disputes arising from

the settlement agreement. Doc. No. 27.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests an award of $73,389 in fees incurred by

attorneys Elizabeth Arleo and Shaun Khojayan, as well as $2,250 in

paralegal fees, and $5,138.45 in litigation expenses. Reply at 10. In

sum, Plaintiff requests $80,777.45 for prosecuting this action and

recovering fees. Plaintiff calculates the attorneys’ fees by the

lodestar method, which multiplies an attorney’s hourly rate by the

number of hours they expended. Motion at 2; Hensley v. Eckhart, 461

U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (describing lodestar method). 

Plaintiff states that Ms. Arleo expended 140.3 hours on the matter,

including on the fees motion and reply, at the rate of $385/hour. Reply

at 10 (total hours); Motion at 2 (hourly rate). Plaintiff also requests

compensation for 53.5 hours of Mr. Khojayan’s time, at an hourly rate of

$420. Reply at 10; Motion at 2. Of the 193.8 total requested attorney

hours, much of the time was spent on discovery, approximately 80.7

hours. Arleo Decl. at 4-5 (approximately 52.5 hours spent by Ms. Arleo

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Plaintiff attached declarations and exhibits to both the original fees motion

and the reply. All citations are to the original motion and accompanying declarations,

unless noted in the plural, i.e. Timesheets, or accompanied by II, i.e., “Arleo Decl.

II,” which refer to documents accompanying the reply. 

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on discovery); Khojayan Decl.,1 Ex. 2 (“Khojayan Timesheet,” claiming

approximately 28.2 hours for discovery-related work). 

Plaintiff argues that the requested sum is reasonable. In support,

she cites her attorneys’ “aggressive and efficient” and “precise and

thoughtful” work, Reply at 7, and argues that her attorneys should be

“rewarded fully, not punished, for their exceptional skill, preparation

and effort,” id. at 4. Based on the positive result obtained, the

undesirability of FDCPA cases, and her attorneys’ experience, Plaintiff

requests an award of all claimed fees and expenses. Doc. No. 29-2

(memorandum accompanying motion, “Pl. Mem.”) at 7-9. 

Defendant argues that the requested fees are unreasonable and

excessive, and requests that the Court award no more than $20,000 to

Plaintiff’s attorneys. Opp’n at 4, 12-16. In support, Defendant

characterizes Plaintiff’s attorneys’ work as “boilerplate copies of

other pleadings and discovery requests routinely used by Plaintiff’s

counsel in prosecuting other similar non-complex cases.” Id. at 2-3.

Defendant also contests Ms. Arleo’s and Mr. Khojayan’s hourly rates.

Both sides submit expert declarations supporting their respective

positions on these rates. Arleo Decl., Ex. 3; Opp’n, Exs. 1-9. 

I. Legal Standard. 

In FDCPA actions, the prevailing party may be awarded “reasonable

attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

“The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours

expended in the litigation and must submit evidence of those hours

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worked.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437). “The party opposing the fee

application has burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence

to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the

hours charged ...” Id. at 1397-98 (citations omitted). 

There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is

reasonable. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992).

However, courts routinely reduce the lodestar figure to reflect the

nature of the case. See Blum v. Stevenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)

(court may cut lodestar to arrive at reasonable fee);Tutor-Saliba Corp.

v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (listing factors

to consider when determining fee awards); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild,

Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975). When a court decides that

reductions are warranted, it may “make across-the-board percentage cuts

either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure,”

Gates, 987 F.2d at 1399, and/or “exclude from the initial fee

calculation hours that were not reasonably expended,” Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 433-34. When making such reductions, a court must “provide a concise

but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee awards.” Id. at 437.

II. Hourly Rates.

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts compare the

requested amount with the rate “prevailing in the community for similar

services of lawyers with reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. Plaintiff requests $385/hour for

Ms. Arleo and $420/hour for Mr. Khojayan. Pl. Mem. at 7. In light of

the simple nature of the instant case, these rates are excessive.

In support of her attorneys’ requested rates, Plaintiff largely

relies on a declaration by William Hensley, submitted in another fees

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The Court’s analysis in this regard in no way concerns the merits of the pending

fees motion in Gonzales. 

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motion pending in this District. Arleo Decl., Ex. 3 (Hensley Decl.)

(filed in Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 05cv171-JAH (RBB)

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2005)). However, Mr. Hensley’s statements do not

pertain to the instant case.2

 First, Gonzales is a significantly more

complicated case; a years-long class action that proceeded to trial, and

involved a class certification challenge, multiple dispositive motions,

and motions in limine. This case, on the other hand, is a simple one.

It concerns a single plaintiff and a single defendant, and the action’s

factual basis is almost entirely comprised of five allegedly improper

debt-collection letters and a number of phone calls to Plaintiff.

Complaint. Discovery was straightforward, and Plaintiff took only one

deposition. Arleo Decl. at 4-5. Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims are not

complex, and several of them could be resolved by answering simple

factual questions, i.e., did Defendant cease certain debt-collection

communications after Plaintiff requested that it do so. Complaint.

Second, Mr. Hensley’s declaration compares Plaintiff’s attorneys

with those of the nation’s largest law firms, concluding that the

attorneys’ hourly rates “would be gauged by the rates applicable to

complex litigation in the top civil/commercial firms in the San Diego

County community.” Hensley Decl at 5. Most notably, Mr. Hensley

justifies Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates by comparing them to those

charged in the 2001-08 Enron securities class-action litigation,

prosecuted by Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP. Hensley Decl.

at 13-14. Fees charged in that case, a historic and notoriously complex

action, in no way inform the reasonable hourly rate in this case. Nor

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does this case compare to the “complex litigation” undertaken by the

nation’s largest firms. Hensley Decl. at 5. Although the rates of

local attorneys practicing at large firms may help determine reasonable

fees, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently compare the rates those attorneys

would charge in similar cases, i.e., simple FDCPA litigation. Hensley

Decl.

However, recent, local cases provide guidance. In 2007, a court in

this district awarded Ms. Arleo $350/hour for her work on another FDCPA

case. Langley v. Check Game Solutions, 2007 WL 2701345 at *7 (S.D. Cal.

Sept. 13, 2007). Ms. Arleo also received $350/hour in Hess v. Ramona

Unified School District, 2008 WL 5381243 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2008)

However, both of those cases were more complex than this one. Hess, a

multiple-plaintiff Title IX action against a school district, required

more than two years to resolve, and largely centered on a hotlycontested preliminary injunction. There, Ms. Arleo was awarded

$350/hour, because of the “complexities and circumstances of the case.”

Ibid. Similarly, Langley involved counter-claims, a motion to compel,

and a motion to dismiss. Langley, 2007 WL 2701345. In contrast, the

instant case was simple, resolved within a matter of months, and

entailed nothing more than two unopposed motions to compel, which were

rendered moot when the case settled shortly thereafter. Doc. No. 28. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff repeatedly states that her attorneys,

particularly Ms. Arleo, are experienced in FDCPA litigation. See e.g.,

Pl. Mem. at 8 (“Plaintiff’s counsel is experienced and able counsel.

Elizabeth Arleo has extensive experience prosecuting consumer, FDCPA and

other class actions”). In light of this experience, prosecuting a noncomplex FDCPA case like this one should not be unduly challenging, such

that Plaintiff’s attorneys merit increased compensation.

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The Court also notes the non-complex nature of some of the work for

which the attorneys billed: for example, 4.2 hours preparing an

“evidentiary timeline,” Arleo Decl., Ex. 1 (“Arleo Timesheet”) at 2-3

(1/2/09-2/3/09), 1.5 hours to efile documents, id., and .5 hours to

“research, revise and finalize Complaint and summons to ensure documents

have defendant’s correct information and address,” Khojayan Timesheet at

1 (8/6/08). 

For the reasons given above, this case is less factually and

procedurally complex than the two in which Ms. Arleo was awarded

$350/hour. The court therefore finds $300/hour to be reasonable for Ms.

Arleo. Similarly, based on the simplicity of this case and the nature

of the work required of the attorneys, the Court finds a rate of

$350/hour to be reasonable for Mr. Khojayan. 

III. Discovery.

The Court is concerned about the large number of hours billed for

discovery, particularly given the lack of voluminous documents and the

fact that Plaintiff required only one deposition. See also Langley, at

*7 (court “particularly concerned” about time spent by Ms. Arleo on

discovery). Ms. Arleo spent approximately 52.5 hours on discovery,

Arleo Timesheet at 4-5, and Mr. Khojayan spent approximately 28.2 hours,

Khojayan Timesheet, for a total of 80.7 hours. Of this time, Mr.

Khojayan spent approximately 10.6 hours preparing for a 2.5 hour

deposition. Khojayan Timesheet (12/8/08-1/7/09). Including travel

time, conferring with Ms. Arleo, and Ms. Arleo’s telephonic appearance,

Plaintiff requests reimbursement for 16.5 hours related to the

deposition. Khojayan Timseheet; Arleo Timesheet(1/27/09). Although the

deposition yielded an important admission, Khojayan Decl. at 1-2, the

amount of time surrounding the deposition, more than four hours per hour

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of questioning, is unreasonable. The Court therefore reduces time

claimed for the deposition by 33%, and subtracts 4.1 hours from Mr.

Khojayan’s, and .7 hours from Ms. Arleo’s, total claims.

The remaining 64.2 hours spent on discovery largely concerned

written discovery, including two motions to compel and a protective

order. Arleo Timesheet; Arleo Decl. at 4-5; Khojayan Timesheet. In

light of the case’s factual and legal simplicity, including that of the

allegations, the time spent on written discovery is unreasonable. For

example, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the necessity for, or

fruitfulness of, three sets of written discovery, each of which required

an inordinate number of attorney hours. Nor do Plaintiff’s attorneys’

billing statements reflect sufficient efficiency to merit a full fee

award. 

Examples of this inefficiency include .8 hours billed by Mr.

Khojayan to “prepare and finalize personal appearance deposition

subpoena,” an activity that should take an experienced attorney a matter

of minutes, and 5.7 hours to prepare a protective order, which also

should be a routine matter for an experienced attorney. Khojayan

Timesheet (8/8/08, subpoena); Arleo Timesheet (1/9/09-2/18/09,

protective order) & Timesheet (1/12/09, same). Mr. Khojayan also bills

1.3 hours to review the third set of discovery which, aside from

boilerplate language, only consisted of two questions occupying six

lines of text. Khojayan Timesheet (12/12/08-12/15/08, billing); Decl.

Stuart, Ex. J (discovery request). This, too, undermines Plaintiff’s

arguments regarding her attorneys’ efficiency.

Therefore, based on the simplicity of the case, the excessive

number of hours attributed to routine discovery, and Plaintiff’s failure

to demonstrate the alleged efficiency of her attorneys, the Court finds

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the requested hours to be unreasonable and reduces the remaining 64.2

hours spent on discovery by 50%. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397 (fee

applicant bears burden of showing request is reasonable). Because the

billing statements reflect that roughly 30% of those hours were spent by

Mr. Khojayan, and 70% by Ms. Arleo, the Court deducts 9.6 hours from Mr.

Khojayan’s total, and 22.5 hours from Ms. Arleo’s total. 

IV. The Fees Motion and Reply.

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for approximately 35 hours spent

drafting the instant fees motion and reply, Reply at 10, rendering fees

the most time-consuming issue in the case. This request is

unreasonable. First, in light of the factual and legal simplicity of

the fees arguments, and the lack of novel issues presented, the time

claimed is excessive. This is particularly true because Plaintiff’s

primary support for her attorneys’ hourly rates, the Hensley

Declaration, already was prepared on behalf of a different fees motion.

Second, some tasks which were performed by attorneys should have been

performed by a paralegal, i.e., compiling exhibits, Khojayan Decl. II

(3/20/09), and 1.5 hours reviewing timesheets, Reply, Ex. 10 (4/15/09).

Third, almost half of the hours claimed were expended on two

identically- and generically-described, consecutive 8-hour days. Reply,

Ex. 10 (5/20/09 & 5/21/09, billing 16 hours to “draft reply brief and

Arleo decl in response to defendant’s opposition to fee application”).

This is insufficiently precise for such a large amount of time. 

Therefore, the Court reduces by 50% the 35 hours claimed for the

fees motion and reply. See Langley, 2007 WL 2702345 at *7 (finding 20

hours spent on reply in fees dispute “unreasonable”). Based on the

respective attorneys’ time spent on the fees dispute, the Court

therefore reduces Ms. Arleo’s total time by 15 hours, and Mr. Khojayan’s

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total by 2.5 hours. 

V. Other Adjustments.

The Court also finds the following hours and expenses to be

unreasonable, and deletes or reduces them:

• Pre-Complaint Work: Plaintiff’s attorneys bill approximately 11.7

hours of pre-complaint research and communication, despite

straightforward facts and claims. Arleo Timesheet (1/16/08-

8/4/08); Khojayan Timesheet (8/5/08-8/7/08); see also Langley, 2007

WL 2701345 at *7 (in similar FDCPA case, court found all factual

information in complaint was within Plaintiff’s personal knowledge

and could have been “obtained from a one-hour interview (at most)

and a review of [Defendant’s collection letters]”). The Court

reduces this amount by 33%, and thus deducts 2.5 hours from Ms.

Arleo’s total, and 1.3 hours from Mr. Khojayan’s total, based on

the proportion of the attorney’s pre-complaint work.

• Administrative Duties: Plaintiff’s attorneys request approximately

4.9 hours of attorney-rate compensation for performing

administrative duties, i.e., efiling documents, Arleo Timesheets,

preparing the civil cover sheet and declaration of service,

Khojayan Timesheet (8/5/08), and preparing documents for an

attorney service to pick up, Khojayan Timesheet (8/7/08). It is

unreasonable for Plaintiff to request attorney rates for

administrative duties. The Court therefore deducts 3 hours from

Mr. Khojayan’s total and 1.9 hours from Ms. Arleo’s, and awards

this time at the uncontested paralegal rate of $125/hour. 

• Communications: Ms. Arleo bills for 41 calls and emails between

herself and Plaintiff, totaling approximately 14.3 hours. Arleo

Timesheet. In light of the limited facts underlying the case,

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Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently justify this amount of

communication, and the relatively short duration of the case, this

time is unreasonable. The Court thus reduces the claimed time by

40%, and deducts 5.7 hours from Ms. Arleo’s total.

• Inaccurate Accounting: At the end of his first timesheet, Mr.

Khojayan claims the sum of the billed entries equals 39.5 hours.

In fact, the entries add up to 35.2 hours. The Court therefore

deducts 4.3 hours from Mr. Khojayan’s total. In his second

timesheet, Mr. Khojayan claims the sum of the billed entries equals

14 hours. In fact, the entries add up to 14.2 hours. The Court

therefore adds .2 hours to Mr. Khojayan’s total. Also, Ms. Arleo

concedes that she billed twice for one hour of the same activities

on 2/5/09 and 2/6/09, Reply at 8, n.12, and one hour is thus

deducted from her total.

• Paralegal Expenses: Plaintiff requests 15.5 hours’ compensation for

Mr. Khojayan’s paralegal, Ms. Rico, to research and make copies of

cases regarding Defendant’s litigation history. While this

research was relevant to the instant case, the time spent was

excessive. The Court thus reduces the claimed time by 50%, and

deducts 7.2 hours from Ms. Rico’s total. 

VI. Expenses.

Plaintiff requests $5,138.45 in expenses. Reply at 10. However,

many of these expenses are unsupported. Particularly alarming are large

online research fees claimed at times the billing attorney conducted

little or no research. For example, Ms. Arleo requests $984 in August

2008 Lexis fees, Arleo Decl., Ex. 4, but her timesheet shows no research

at that time. Likewise, Mr. Khojayan requests $732 in online research

fees on 1/4/09, Khojayan Decl., Ex. 4, but his timesheet for the same

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day shows only .4 hours of research. Further, that research was on a

potential class action, which, because the claim is “unrelated,” is noncompensable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35. 

Excepting the research described above, the expenses claimed by Mr.

Khojayan are well-supported. Khojayan Decl., Ex. 4. However, many of

Ms. Arleo’s expenses are not specified beyond “Lexis,” “Copy,” or “UPS.”

Arleo Decl., Ex. 4. Although cross-reference with Ms. Arleo’s timesheet

reveals support for some of the online research expenses, e.g., January

2009, much remains ambiguous. Absent descriptions of what was

researched, copied, or shipped, the Court cannot assess the

reasonableness of these expenses. A court may reduce requests that are

poorly documented or described. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d

1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Altergott v. Modern Collection

Technologies, 864 F.Supp. 778, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (deducting fees

where Plaintiff failed to specify the documents copied and the number of

copies made). The Court therefore deducts $1,800, representing the

approximate sum of unsupported expenses, from the total award. 

VII. Final Award and Order To File Joint Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff requests compensation for 140.3 hours expended by Ms.

Arleo on this matter. Reply at 10. After making the adjustments

described in this Order, 91 hours remain. Plaintiff also requests

compensation for 53.5 hours of Mr. Khojayan’s time. Reply at 10; Motion

at 2. After adjusting the request as described above, 28.9 hours

remain. Finally, Plaintiff requests compensation for 18 hours of Ms.

Rico’s time. Motion at 11. After adjusting the request as described

above, 15.7 hours remain. 

When multiplied by Ms. Arleo’s reasonable hourly rate of $300, Mr.

Khojayan’s reasonable hourly rate of $350, and Ms. Rico’s hourly rate of

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3 The proposed order shall be e-mailed pursuant to section 2(h) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California's Electronic Case Filing

Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, available at www.casd.uscourts.gov

(follow link for "General Order 550, Procedural Rules for Electronic Case Filing").

13 08cv1428-JM (BLM)

$125, the Court arrives at a total lodestar figure of $39,377.50

($27,300 + $10,115 + $1,962.50). 

Plaintiff also requests $5,138.45 in litigation expenses. After

adjusting this figure as described above, the Court finds an award of

$3,348.45 to be reasonable. When combined with the adjusted lodestar

figure of $39,377.50, the Court finds a total award of $42,725.95 to be

reasonable. On or before August 31, 2009, Defendant shall remit to

Plaintiff $42,725.95 (forty-two thousand, seven-hundred twenty-five

dollars and ninety-five cents), and file a notice of payment by

September 3, 2009. 

The parties are ordered to file a joint motion for dismissal of

this case, signed by counsel of record, no later than September 17,

2009. A proposed order on the joint motion for dismissal must be emailed to the district judge's chambers3 on the same day.

If the fully executed joint motion for dismissal is not filed by

September 17, 2009, then all counsel of record and unrepresented parties

are required to appear in person for a Settlement Disposition

Conference. The Settlement Disposition Conference will be held on

September 22, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom G.

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If counsel of record fails to appear at the Settlement Disposition

Conference, or the parties fail to file the signed joint motion for

dismissal in a timely manner, the Court will issue an Order to Show

Cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to comply with

this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 7, 2009

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01428-BLM Document 34 Filed 08/07/09 Page 14 of 14