Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01252/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01252-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER MEDINA, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No.08cv1252 AJB (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO

DISMISS [Doc. Nos. 45, 46 AND 47]

Before the Court are three motions to dismiss submitted by Defendants County of San Diego,

Officer Mark Ritchie, and Officer Karla Taft; Officer Defendant Leo Nava; and Defendants State of

California (by and through California Highway Patrol) and Officer Tim Fenton (collectively “Defendants”). The Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants County of San Diego, Ritchie, and 

Taft’s motion, [Doc. No. 45]; GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant Nava’s motion

to dismiss, [Doc. No. 47]; DENIES Defendants Fenton’s, [Doc. No. 46-2] and Nava’s requests for

judicial notice, [Doc. No. 47-3]; and GRANTS Defendants State of California and Fenton’s motion to

dismiss, [Doc. No. 46].

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Background

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Jennifer Medina is the widow of Robert J. Medina (“the decedent”). This case involves

the events that occurred on the evening of November 15, 2006, during which Decedent was shot and

killed by Defendants following an extended slow speed police chase involving 18 officers and 13 patrol

units. The following facts are taken from the SAC.

The decedent was a 22-year old active duty Marine, who had recently returned from a tour in

Iraq. The decedent was suffering from post traumatic stress syndrome. His then undiagnosed mental

illness was creating turmoil in his family relationships and adversely impacting his ability to perform at

this command.

Less than a month before this incident, the decedent was arrested outside of his home in the City

of Vista. He had been washing his truck and playing music when sheriff deputies allegedly responded to

a call of a suspicious person in the area. The deputies arrested the decedent for possessing a baton that

was issued to him by the Marine Corps for use in the performance of his guard duty assignment.

On the evening of November 15, 2006, a marital argument arose between the decedent and the

Plaintiff that continued intermittently throughout the evening. Around 1:00 a.m, the decedent informed

his wife Jennifer that he was going out despite her protests not to leave.

At approximately 1:30 a.m, on November 16, 2006, on Highway I-5 near the City of Oceanside,

CHP officers attempted to conduct a traffic stop of the decedent, because officers observed decedent

driving slowly and weaving within his own lane. The decedent’s noncompliance with this traffic stop for

suspected driving under the influence, was the initial violation. Although the decedent started to yield to

the CHP’s attempted traffic stop, he did not stop and continued driving slowly forward and eventually

existed I-5 in the City of Oceanside where a slow speed pursuit ensued. 

Officers attempted to forcibly stop the decedent using spike strips and pursuit immobilization

technique (PIT) maneuvers which proved unsuccessful. The decedent returned to the freeway and

headed south on I-5 traveling within the speed limit. As the pursuit left Oceanside, the CHP officers

requested that an Oceanside canine unit remain in the pursuit. The decedent exited I-5 at Carlsbad and

headed toward Highway 101 south. Several times during the pursuit, as it was nearing Leucadia, the

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decedent almost came to a complete stop. The officers also slowed several times and positioned

themselves to effect an arrest, however, the decedent continued driving slowly forward. By the time the

pursuit entered the community of Leucadia, within the City of Encinitas, there were at least five patrol

cars pursuing the decedent.

Defendant, Deputy Sheriff RITCHIE,1 deployed a spike strip near Leucadia Boulevard. It is

unclear whether or not Deputy RITCHIE made radio contact with pursuing officers prior to attempting

to deploy the spike strip. At the same time and location, CHP officers elected to perform another PIT

maneuver. The decedent swerved to avoid the spike strip and although Deputy RITCHIE did not believe

the decedent was swerving to hit him, pursuing officers allegedly did. Two officers radioed in an

“assault with a deadly weapon” which heightened the threat alert to other law enforcement personnel

monitoring, participating and joining in the pursuit. This radio call caused other law enforcement

officers to believe the decedent was a dangerous threat.

Officers continued their pursuit south on Highway 101 toward Solana Beach. Deputy RITCHIE

passed the slow speed pursuit without activating lights or sirens and when he reached Cardiff, he

deployed another spike. It is unclear whether this was communicated by Deputy RITCHIE to the other

officers involved in the pursuit. The deployed spike strip was not successful and resulted in another

officer radioing in an “assault with a deadly weapon” call when the decedent swerved around the spike

strip. The spike strip disable two CHP patrol vehicles.

Deputy RITCHIE once again entered the pursuit and sped passed it until he reached Lomas

Santa Fe in Solana Beach. At that point, he observed CHP Officers FENTON and Martin attempt

another PIT maneuver on the decedent’s vehicle. Officer FENTON observed that the decedent’s vehicle

had spun out. Officers FENTON and Martin made a u-turn and were right next to the decedent’s vehicle.

The decedent proceeded to drive past them and Officer FENTON yelled to Martin, “Let’s end

this. Let’s end this.” Officers FENTON and Martin executed another PIT maneuver, this time temporarily disabling the decedent’s truck by forcing it into a dirt easement off the sidewalk.

1

 Defendant Officers’ names are capitalized. The names of Officers who are not parties to this

action, appear in lower case.

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Defendant Deputy RITCHIE immediately maneuvered to contain the decedent, ramming the front end of

the decedent’s truck with such force that Deputy RITCHIE’s air bag deployed. Deupty RITCHIE told

another deputy that he was attempting to “PIT” the decedent in order to end the pursuit. Other officers

closed in immediately and pinned in decedent’s truck from the south. CHP officers FENTON and

Martin pinned decedent’s car in from the north. Officer FENTON observed the decedent’s vehicle

cornered by law enforcement vehicles.

By this time, over a dozen officers had converged on the scene and several officers and deputies

had taken up positions around the decedent’s truck and in close proximity to it. Deputy RITCHIE told

homicide investigators that he immediately went to the passenger side of the decedent’s truck with his

gun drawn. Deputy RITCHIE stated that the passenger side window was partially down and he was able

to make eye contact with the decedent and observe his hands on the steering wheel. Plaintiff alleges that

Deputy RITCHIE had no belief that the decedent was armed and did not fear the decedent. Deputy

RITCHIE ordered the decedent to turn off the vehicle and put his hands up.

The decedent did not follow Deputy RITCHIE’s orders. Deputy RITCHIE fired his gun at the

truck’s rear tire which deflated. Deputy RITCHIE again aimed his gun at the decedent and ordered the

decedent to obey his commands. The decedent was still not complying. Deputy RITCHIE fired another

round at the front tire. Deputy RITCHIE again aimed his gun at the decedent and continued to shout

commands. Deputy RITCHIE fired a third shot. Although Deputy RITCHIE told the homicide

investigators that he fired a third shot, he did not tell the investigators the target of his third shot and

none of the investigators asked him to provide an explanation as to the third shot.

Meanwhile, CHP officers NAVA and Carson were responding to a traffic collision when they

heard an “information only” broadcast of the pursuit. Once at the scene of the collision they were told

they were no longer needed. Officers NAVA and Carson then decided, without being requested to assist,

to drive toward the pursuit. After arriving in the vicinity of the pursuit they observed the PIT maneuver

that disabled the decedent’s truck and parked their patrol car on Highway 101.

Officer NAVA told homicide investigators that he exited his patrol car and after seeing Deputy

RITCHIE ram his patrol car into the front bumper of the decedent’s truck, he ran toward the truck and

took a position behind and to the left of Deputy RITCHIE. Officer NAVA also reported to homicide

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investigators that he took a line of fire position where he could view the decedent through the right side

passenger window.

CHP Officers FENTON and NAVA and SDSD Deputy RITCHIE reported to homicide

investigators that after being pinned in by the patrol cars, that the decedent turned the wheels of his

truck to the right toward Deputy RITCHIE and accelerated his vehicle toward Deputy RITCHIE. 

Officer NAVA’s patrol partner, officer Martin, corroborated Officer NAVA’s account to the homicide

investigators. It was this event that purportedly justified the use of deadly force. Officer FENTON’s

partner, officer MARTIN, reported that he had laid down on his seat to kick open his door right before

the gunfire began, and therefore heard, but did not see, the officers open fire on the decedent.

SDSD Deputy TAFT, reported to homicide investigators that she ran across the median of

Highway 101 toward the decedent’s truck with her gun drawn because the officers running toward and

surrounding the truck were “about to take him out.” At the time the four officers fired their weapons at

the decedent, collectively shooting over 37 rounds at him. The decedent was alive when he was pulled

from his truck and first aid was administered by the officers. The decedent died shortly after the

paramedics arrived at the scene.

II. Procedural Background

On December 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants in state court asserting

federal civil rights claims and state tort claims. Plaintiff later dismissed her federal claims. On July 11,

2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants in federal court asserting federal law claims. [Doc.

No. 1.] The case was then before the Honorable John A. Houston. Thereafter, Plaintiff dismissed her

state court action in its entirety and sought leave to file an amended complaint in this matter to add her

state law claims. On May 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against

Defendants, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, assault and battery, negligence,

and violation of California Civil Code § 52.1.2

 [Doc. No. 20.] On May 29, 2009, the Defendants filed

motions to dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 21, 22, 23.] On March 16, 2010, Judge Houston dismissed Plaintiff’s

state law claims. [Doc. No. 40.] In addition, Judge Houston granted the motions to dismiss as to

2

 On February 23, 2010, the court granted the parties’ joint motion and consolidated this action

with the action filed by the decedent’s parents, Medina v. County of San Diego, 08cv1395 JAH (RBB). 

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Defendants State of California and Officer FENTON; Defendants County of San Diego and Deputy

TAFT and Officer NAVA, finding that “Plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations as to the

remaining Defendants’ intent when using lethal force, and fails to sufficiently allege the lethal force

used was unnecessarily excessive in light of the fact she alleges the decedent’s vehicle was in motion

when the other officers shot at decedent.” Id. at 7. Judge Houston denied the motion to dismiss as to

Deputy RITCHIE, because “[t]aking the factual allegations as true and making all reasonable inferences,

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Ritchie’s[] shooting of the decedent was unreasonably excessive

under the circumstances and with intent to harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective is

plausible.” Id. Judge Houston also denied Defendant County of San Diego’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s municipal federal civil rights violation claim, finding that “Defendants’ contention that the

County of San Diego cannot be held liable under section 1983 fails” because “[t]he Ninth Circuit has

held the sheriff acts for the county and not the state when investigating crime.” Id. at 8.

On April 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). [Doc. No. 42.] On

May 28, 2010, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 45, 46, 47.] On July 5, 2010,

Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss. [Doc. No. 48.] On July 12,

2010, the Defendants filed replies in response to Plaintiff’s opposition. [Doc. Nos. 49, 50, 51.] On

March 25, 2011, Plaintiff’s case was transferred from Judge Houston to this Court. [Doc. No. 53.] 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, and allows a

court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may dismiss a

complaint as a matter of law for: (1) "lack of cognizable legal theory," or (2) "insufficient facts under a

cognizable legal claim." SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir.

1996) (citation omitted). However, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains "enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). 

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Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept "legal conclusions" as true. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. -- , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). It is also improper for

the court to assume "the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged." Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). On the other

hand, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1929. The

court only reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing

all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th

Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

II. Leave to Amend

FRCP 15(a) declares that the "court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a). If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject

of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claims on the merits. Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Although there is a general rule that parties are allowed to amend their pleadings,

it does not extend to cases in which any amendment would be an exercise in futility or where the

amended complaint would also be subject to dismissal. Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d

1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991). Dismissal without

leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment. Eminence

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 

DISCUSSION

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983: (1) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim on the decedent’s behalf, and (2) a Fourteenth

Amendment loss of companionship claim on Plaintiff’s behalf. Against Defendant County of San

Diego, Plaintiff alleges a municipal federal civil rights violation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In addition, Defendant Nava argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

 

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I. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff’s first claim seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “used unnecessary, unjustified excessive

force in shooting and killing” the decedent. SAC ¶ 48. Plaintiff’s second claim seeks relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for a loss of companionship in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff

contends that “[t]he killing of [the decedent] without lawful justification constituted an arbitrary abuse

of police power under color of state law, committed with deliberate indifference to the rights of [the

decedent’s] family members.” SAC ¶ 52.

To state a claim for excessive force, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant, acting under

color of state law, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using unreasonably excessive force during

arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). However, a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights are not violated if the use of force is “objectively reasonable” in that the force used was necessary

“in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officers,” without regard to their intention and

motivation. Id. at 397. To state a claim for loss of companionship in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct “shocks the conscience.” See United States

v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). Intent to inflict harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement

objective “shocks the conscience” and gives rise to liability. See Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1140

(9th Cir. 2008). 

The Plaintiffs’ FAC alleged that the decedent’s truck was in motion while the Defendants shot at

the decedent. Judge Houston granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss (apart from Defendant Ritchie),

because “Plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations as to the...Defendants’ intent when using

lethal force, and fails to sufficiently allege the lethal force was unnecessarily excessive in light of the

fact she alleges the decedent’s vehicle was in motion when the other officers shot at decedent.”3

 [Doc.

No. 40 at 7.] In the SAC, Plaintiff attempts to cure the deficiency by alleging the decedent’s vehicle

was “pinned in, which made it impossible for the truck to turn its wheels and travel to the right toward

the officers standing on the passenger side of the truck.” SAC ¶ 39. 

3

 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleged decedent “was able to finish pushing [Defendant Ritchie’s] patrol

car out of the way as he was being fired upon, and as his truck traveled forward, [Defendant] Fenton and

[Defendant] Taft joined in the shooting melee.” FAC ¶ 33. 

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Irrespective of the new allegation concerning a barrier preventing the truck from turning toward

officers on its passenger-side, Plaintiff’s SAC re-affirms that decedent’s truck was moving when Officer

FENTON fired his weapon. In offering conclusory, non-factual, statements concerning the trajectory of

the bullets, the SAC also refers to the “movement of the truck” and the positions of the respective

officers and deputies, thereby conceding the truck was moving when Officer FENTON fired his

weapon. The SAC does not contain any allegations to suggest that Officer FENTON fired his weapon at

Plaintiff while the truck was stationary. (SAC, ¶ 39.) Moreover, the SAC re-affirms that several officers

and deputies were surrounding decedent’s truck and in close proximity to it when decedent extricated

the truck from its position. (SAC, ¶¶ 32, 39.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Defendants County of San Diego and Karla Taft; Defendant Leo Nava; and Defendants State of California (by

and through California Highway Patrol) and Officer Tim Fenton. The Court DENIES without prejudice

Defendant Nava’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.4

 The Court DENIES Defendants

Fenton’s and Nava’s requests for judicial notice as they are not necessary for the resolution of the

current motions. 

II. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims: Defendant Ritchie 

Judge Houston dismissed Defendant Ritchie’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC, finding

plausible Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Ritchie used excessive force in shooting the defendant,

and acted with intent to harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective.5 [Doc. No. 40 at 7.] 

In Defendant Ritchie’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC, Defendant Ritchie contends Plaintiff’s SAC

4

 Until there are allegations supporting a constitutional violation, there can be no determination

as to whether Defendant Nava is entitled to qualified immunity. 

5

 Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that during the police pursuit of the decedent, Defendant Ritchie,

without ensuring radio communication with pursuing officers, placed himself in the direct path of the

pursuit while deploying a spike strip and failed to take cover. Then, Defendant Ritchie again deployed a

spike strip without radio communication which resulted in another “assault with a deadly weapon”

broadcast by other officers. After the decedent’s truck was temporarily disabled, Defendant Ritchie

rammed the decedent’s vehicle with his police car. Ritchie then went to the passenger side of the

decedent’s vehicle with his gun drawn and ordered the decedent to turn off the vehicle and put his hands

up. Ritchie did not believe the decedent was armed and did not fear the decedent. When the decedent

failed to comply, Defendant Ritchie became angry and fired his gun at the vehicle’s tires. Defendant

Ritchie then fired his gun at the decedent while the decedent’s vehicle was pinned in by two patrol cars.

FAC ¶ ¶ 25-33. 

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fails to state facts sufficient to state a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. Specifically, Defendant

Ritchie argues that Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Ritchie shot and killed decedent and contends

that this failure is fatal to Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. [Doc. No. 45 at 3.]

Additionally, Defendant Ritchie contends that vehicle pursuit is not an element of either a Fourth or

Fourteenth Amendment claim. [Doc. No. 45 at 8.] In her Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the fact that

Defendant Ritchie may not have fired the fatal bullet “does not absolve [him] from liability.” [Doc. No.

48 at 4.] In addition, Plaintiff argues that “[p]ursuant to a long line of civil cases, police officers have a

duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other

citizen.” Id. at 3 (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated in

part on other grounds by Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)). 

Plaintiff’s allegations in the SAC as to Defendant Ritchie are essentially unchanged from the

allegations in the FAC. Although Defendant Ritchie is correct in stating that Plaintiff does not contend

Defendant Ritchie shot and killed decedent, this is not a fatal defect. Plaintiff’s allegations in regards to

Defendant Ritchie encompass the Defendant’s conduct up to the actual killing of the decedent, and

whether the Defendant’s bullet killed the decedent is but one factor to be considered in reaching the

merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Taking Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and making all reasonable

inferences, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Ritchie’s shooting of the decedent was unreasonably

excessive under the circumstances and with intent to harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement

purpose is plausible.6

 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment claims is DENIED as to Defendant Ritchie.

III. Municipal Federal Civil Rights Violation Claim 

Plaintiff asserts a municipal federal civil rights claim against Defendant County of San Diego. 

Plaintiff contends Defendant “knowingly and deliberately fostered, maintained and condoned a policy,

practice and custom or otherwise acted in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to the lives and

liberty of such persons such as decedent Medina.” SAC ¶ 56. Plaintiff alleges a failure to train,

supervise, and discipline with respect to the constitutionally appropriate use of force, use of racial

6

 The Court does not consider Plaintiff’s failure to intercede argument, as it was not alleged in

the SAC. 

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profiling, and use of improper pursuit tactics. Plaintiff’s claim is based on the allegation that the San

Diego Sheriff’s Department “has been accused of racial profiling of Hispanic males” and “the law

enforcement activity at issue has been the use of unjustified deadly force in the City of Vista.” SAC ¶

19. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant ratified the officers’ misconduct. 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations of racial profiling and the unjustified use of deadly force

in Vista are conclusory, and as such, are not entitled to an assumption of truth. [Doc. No. 45 at 11-12.] 

Defendant also contends “the SAC fails to allege...a basic element of ratification; that is that an

authorized County policymaker knew of and approved of the subordinate’s unlawful actions and the

basis for the subordinate’s actions at the time the subordinate’s action were occurring.” Id. (emphasis

removed). 

Municipalities, their agents, and their supervisory personnel may be held liable for deprivations

of constitutional rights resulting from their formal policies or customs. Monell v. New York Dept. of

Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-93 (1978). A widespread practice of inadequately training officers

could be considered a “policy or custom” for municipal civil rights claims if the inadequate training

program evidences deliberate indifference to a constitutional right, which was the moving cause of the

alleged constitutional violation. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989). 

The Court finds Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a municipal civil rights violation. Plaintiff

does not offer factual support for her allegations of the Defendant County of San Diego’s failure to train,

supervise, and discipline its officers.7

 Plaintiff’s allegations of racial profiling and unjustified use of

deadly force are likewise unsupported by facts. Plaintiff does not offer facts regarding the specific

allegations and circumstances of the alleged racial profiling and unjustified use of deadly force.8

 

7

 Plaintiff alleges “The [San Diego Sheriff’s Department]. . .has likewise been accused of racial

profiling of Hispanic males. In the case of the [San Diego Sheriff’s Department], the law enforcement

activity at issue has been the use of unjustified deadly force in the City of Vista where [the decedent]

resided and was previously profiled. Less than a month before he was shot and killed, [the decedent]

was arrested outside his Vista home. He had been washing his truck and playing music when sheriff

deputies allegedly responded to a call of a suspicious person in the area. The deputies arrested [the

decedent] for possessing a baton that was issued to him by the Marine Corps for use in the performance

of his guard duty assignment.” SAC ¶ ¶ 19-20. 

8

 It is unclear whether the incident recounted in paragraph 20 of the SAC, in which the decedent

was arrested for possessing a baton, is intended to support Plaintiff’s allegations of racial profiling or

unjustified use of deadly force. 

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Additionally, Plaintiff does not offer factual support for her contention that Defendant County of San

Diego ratified the officers’ alleged misconduct. Without factual support, Plaintiff’s allegations of a

municipal civil rights violation are not sufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s municipal civil rights claim is GRANTED without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants

County of San Diego, Ritchie, and Taft’s motion to dismiss, [Doc. No. 45]; GRANTS IN PART AND

DENIES IN PART Defendant Nava’s motion to dismiss, [Doc. No. 47]; DENIES Defendants Fenton’s

and Nava’s requests for judicial notice [Doc. No. 47-3]; GRANTS Defendants State of California and

Fenton’s motion to dismiss, [Doc. No. 46]; and DENIES Defendant Fenton’s request for judicial notice

[Doc. No. 46-2].

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 26, 2012

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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