Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00782/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00782-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lorenzo Santiago DeBarge, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Linda Avery, 

Defendant.

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No. CV 06-0782-PHX-EHC (MHB)

ORDER

Plaintiff Lorenzo Santiago DeBarge brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Maricopa County intake nurse Linda Avery (Doc. # 11). Avery moved to

dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA) (Doc. # 29). Plaintiff responded, and Avery replied (Doc. ## 32-33).

The Court will grant Avery’s motion and dismiss this action without prejudice. 

I. Background

Plaintiff’s sole count in his Second Amended Complaint was that his Eighth

Amendment rights were violated by Jane Doe Intake Nurse when she deliberately ignored

his obvious need for medical attention when he was evaluated by her upon entering the

Fourth Avenue Jail on November 17, 2005 (Doc. # 11 at 4). Plaintiff alleges he entered the

jail with a chipped tooth, a bleeding mouth, head wounds, a burst blood vessel in his left eye,

and a finger that was ‘”spurting’” blood where his fingernail had been ‘”bitten off’” (id.).

The Court ordered Avery to answer the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff eventually

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 Notice required under Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2003).

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substituted Linda Avery for the Jane Doe Intake Nurse, and she filed a Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. # 23, 29).

In her motion, Avery contended that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as required by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (id.). In support, Avery submitted

(1) an affidavit of Susan Fisher, (2) a copy of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO)

Inmate Grievance Procedure, (3) blank copies of grievance forms, and (4) copies of

grievances Plaintiff has filed (id., Exs. A-D). Fisher, a Sergeant assigned to the Inmate

Hearing Unit, attested that inmates are notified of the grievance procedure when they receive

the MCSO Rules and Regulations (id., Ex. A, Fisher Aff. ¶ 4). Fisher further attested that

her search of the grievance records reflected that Plaintiff filed twelve grievances while in

Maricopa County custody, two of which were related to medical care on November 17, 2005,

but that the first grievance was informally resolved and the second grievance was untimely

(id. ¶¶ 8-13). 

The Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond and the

evidence necessary to successfully rebut Avery’s contentions (Doc. # 30).1

 In response,

Plaintiff stated that he did fully exhaust his claim and attached copies of his grievances (Doc.

# 32). 

In her reply, Avery contended that Plaintiff failed to timely grieve his claim and that

exhaustion according to the jail’s procedural rules is required. She points out that Plaintiff

filed his first grievance regarding Plaintiff’s November 17, 2005 entry to the jail in January

2006 and failed to appeal that grievance. Plaintiff attempted to begin the grievance process

again in April 2006, after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit (Doc. # 33).

II. Legal Standard

A. Exhaustion

Plaintiff must first exhaust ‘“available’” administrative remedies before bringing this

action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.

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2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). He must complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the

administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).

Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement

in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method

to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). 

III. Analysis

As stated, Defendant bears the burden of proving lack of exhaustion and therefore

must demonstrate that there were remedies available to Plaintiff. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119; Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37. Avery contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim

that she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs upon his entry into the

Fourth Avenue Jail on November 17, 2005. 

Plaintiff responds that he did exhaust his claim and submits copies of an initial

grievance, an institutional appeal, and an external appeal (Doc. # 32). But Plaintiff has failed

to properly exhaust his claim because these grievances were filed after Plaintiff filed his

Complaint in this matter. The PLRA mandates that an inmate exhaust remedies before filing

a lawsuit; exhausting remedies during the course of the lawsuit does not comply with the

requirement. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2002). The statute itself

states that “[n]o action shall be brought . . . until [the prisoner’s] administrative remedies .

. . are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In addition, requiring dismissal where the inmate

fails to exhaust before filing provides a strong incentive that will promote the Congressional

objectives behind the exhaustion requirement—affording officials time and opportunity to

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address complaints internally, filtering out frivolous claims, and development of an

administrative record. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200-01. See also Holcomb v. Fleeman, 2007

WL 3231588, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (inmate’s concession that he did not obtain a Director’s

level decision until after the lawsuit was filed “is fatal to his action”) (citing Woodford, 126

S. Ct. at 2383; McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201). Plaintiff’s attempt to exhaust after he

filed his Complaint does not constitute exhaustion.

Moreover, the grievance Plaintiff filed in January 2006 does not constitute exhaustion

because it was untimely (having been filed more than two months after his November 17,

2005 entry to the jail) and because he failed to appeal it. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92. And the

evidence reflects that Plaintiff was very familiar with the grievance procedure, having filed

numerous grievances about a variety of issues while incarcerated in the Maricopa County Jail

(Doc. # 29, Exs). In sum, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing

suit. The Court finds that Avery has met her burden to establish nonexhaustion. The Court

will grant her motion and dismiss this action without prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 29) is granted.

(2) This action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The Clerk of

Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2009.

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