Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-00438/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-00438-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No.: 13-CV-00438-LHK

ORDER REQUESTING CLARIFICATION

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICHARD KATZMAN,

 Plaintiff,

v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN 

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, a special 

district,

 Defendant. 

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Case No.: 13-CV-00438-LHK

ORDER REQUESTING 

CLARIFICATION

 

At the January 12, 2015 hearing in this matter, counsel for Plaintiff stated that the Court had 

dismissed some of Plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment due to “lack of evidence.” Jan. 12, 

2015 Hr’g Tr. 14:6-:9 (“And, you know, we have a situation where we had claims dismissed for 

lack of evidence and we—you know, we—you know, we asked them, is there any evidence of this 

and they said no.”). Plaintiff’s counsel also raised the prospect of “asking the Court to reopen 

claims” based on documents recently produced by Defendant. Id. at 15:2-:3. The Court requests 

clarification as to the statements of Plaintiff’s counsel.

In this Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denying in part 

and granting in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court granted Defendant 

summary judgment on three of Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. See ECF No. 81 (“Order”).

The Court addresses each in turn.

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Case No.: 13-CV-00438-LHK

ORDER REQUESTING CLARIFICATION

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First, the Court granted Defendant’s motion on Plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Protection 

Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Order at 19-20. In his Complaint, Plaintiff brought an action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant excluded Plaintiff from a pension increase granted to all 

other of Defendant’s similarly-situated employees, and therefore violated Plaintiff’s equal 

protection rights. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 28-30. The Court granted Defendant’s motion on the grounds that 

in the public employment context, where a public employee asserts that he or she was arbitrarily 

treated differently from other similarly-situated employees (a so-called “class-of-one” theory), but 

fails to assert that the different treatment was based on the employee’s membership in a protected 

class, that claim cannot be brought under the Equal Protection Clause, pursuant to established U.S. 

Supreme Court precedent. Order at 20 (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 

(2008) (“[T]he class-of-one theory of equal protection—which presupposes that like individuals 

should be treated alike, and that to treat them differently is to classify them in a way that must 

survive at least rationality review—is simply a poor fit in the public employment context.”)); id.

(citing Okwu v. McKim, 682 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2012) (“class of one” theory is not available in 

the public employment context)). Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motion because 

Plaintiff’s claim was legally barred.1Id.

Second, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 

claim for conspiracy to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. In his Complaint, Plaintiff brought 

a separate § 1983 claim alleging that Defendant conspired with the County of Los Angeles to deny 

Plaintiff a pension increase that was granted to other similarly-situated employees, and that 

Defendant therefore conspired to violate Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 32-34. 

Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983. Order at 21 (citing Lacy v. Maricopa

County, 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012)). Therefore, to assert a valid §1983 conspiracy claim, 

there must be an underlying Constitutional violation. Id. The Court then held that because 

 

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The Court also noted in granting Defendant’s motion that “there is an absence of any evidence to 

support Plaintiff’s claim.” Order at 20. This was an allusion to the fact that Plaintiff’s opposition 

“fails to respond to Defendant’s motion as to this claim” and that Plaintiff failed to “identify any 

evidence in the record that would suggest a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. However, the 

dispositive factor in dismissing Plaintiff’s equal protection claim was that Plaintiff’s “class of one”

equal protection claim was legally precluded. See id. (“a ‘class of one’ claim is barred in the public 

employment context.”)

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ORDER REQUESTING CLARIFICATION

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Plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Protection Clause was precluded as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s

claim alleging conspiracy to violate his rights under the Equal Protection Clause was also “legally 

precluded.” Id. (citing Cassettari v. County of Nevada, 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Finally, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim 

under the Impairments Clause of the U.S. and California Constitutions. In his Complaint, Plaintiff 

contended that Defendant enacted its bi-annual audit procedure after Plaintiff’s pension had vested, 

thereby modifying Plaintiff’s pension contract in violation of the Impairments Clause. Compl. ¶¶ 

35-40. The Court held that a claim under the Impairments Clause of both the U.S. and California 

Constitutions was viable only if there had been a “substantial impairment” of the contract at issue. 

Order at 23 (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 

(1983)). Without “substantial impairment,” a claim brought pursuant to the Impairments Clause 

cannot survive. Id. (citing Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978)). The 

Court further held that, even accepting Plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, Defendant’s bi-annual 

audit policy required pension recipients, once every two years, to pay a maximum of ten dollars to 

have the Defendant’s pension audit form notarized. Id. at 24. The Court then held that “[r]equiring 

pensioners to pay, at most, [ten dollars] every two years does not deprive a pensioner of an 

important right, defeat a pensioner’s reasonable expectation of receiving a pension, or otherwise 

substantially impair the contractual relationship between Defendant and its pensioners.” Id.

Therefore, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under the Impairments Clause because it was 

legally insufficient, not for lack of evidence. See, e.g., id. at 25 (“Defendant’s bi-annual audit 

procedure does not substantially impair Defendant’s contractual relationship with its pensioners.”)

Plaintiff shall respond to this Order at the next status conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2015

_________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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