Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06734/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06734-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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1 References to section numbers hereinafter refer to sections of Title 28 of the

United States Code unless otherwise specified.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CESAR AMEZCUA REYES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

)

____________________________________)

CV F 03-6734 AWI

(CR F 02-5322 AWI)

ORDER DIRECTING

RESPONDENT UNITED

STATES TO SHOW CAUSE

WHY PETITIONER’S

MOTION PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C., SECTION 2255

SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

(28 U.S.C. § 2255)

INTRODUCTION

In this case, petitioner Cesar Amezcua Reyes (“Reyes”) seeks relief under 28 U.S.C.

section1 2255 from the sentence of 48 months that was imposed by this court on November 10,

2003, following his plea of guilty to two counts of improper entry by an alien in violation of 8

U.S.C., section 1325(a)(1). 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 29, 2002, Reyes was charged by indictment with being a deported alien found

in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C., section 1326. On November 10, 2003, Reyes

entered a plea of guilty to two counts of illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C., section 1325(a)(1)

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as set forth in the Superceding Information. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Reyes waived all

rights to appeal, including the right to attack his sentence collaterally under 28 U.S.C., section

2255. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Reyes was sentenced to terms of 24 months on each count

of violation of 8 U.S.C., section 1325. The two 24-month terms were imposed consecutively for

a total term of confinement of 48 months. Judgment was entered on November 13, 2003.

A Presentence Investigation Report was prepared. Using the 2002 Sentencing

Guidelines, Probation calculated a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of IV. 

Probation noted the guideline range for imprisonment was 77 to 96 months, but the statutory

maximum sentence for violation of 8 U.S.C., section 1325 is 24 months per count. A total term

of 48 months imprisonment was therefore recommended. 

Reyes’ petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 2255 was timely

filed on December 8, 2003.

LEGAL STANDARD

 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides, in pertinent part: “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a

court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... may move

the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” Under section

2255, "a district court must grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under

that section, '[u]nless the motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the

prisoner is entitled to no relief.' " United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1994)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (emphasis in the original). The court may deny a hearing if the

movant's allegations, viewed against the record, fail to state a claim for relief or "are so palpably

incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal." United States v. McMullen,

98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1269, 117

(1997). To earn the right to a hearing, therefore, the movant must make specific factual

allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Id. Mere conclusory statements in a

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section 2255 motion are insufficient to require a hearing. United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 

1194 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).

DISCUSSION

In his plea agreement, Reyes waived his rights to appeal his sentence or to challenge the

legality of his sentence in a subsequent habeas proceeding. As a consequence, each of Reyes’

grounds for challenge in this habeas petition are based on the underlying contention he was

denied effective assistance of counsel. Reyes alleges a number of specific grounds for his habeas

petition, and the court construes each of these grounds as being a claim that he suffered

ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to raise each issue in Reyes’ defense.

Reyes first contends that he was born to a U.S. Citizen and he therefore has “automatic derivative

citizenship.” Reyes contends that as a result of his automatic derivative citizenship, he was

actually a citizen at the time of his second entry into the United States and that he did not commit

a criminal act by entering. Second, Reyes alleges his parents had permits to enter in 1978 when

Reyes was seven years old and they had obtained permission for Reyes to enter as a dependent. 

Third, Reyes contends his sentence for his first illegal entry conviction exceeds the statutory

maximum time.

I. Derivative Citizenship

Alienage is an element of unlawful entry that must be proven by the government. United

States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980) (abrogated on other grounds in United

States v. Smith-Baltiher, 2005 WL 2174475 at *3 (9th Cir. 2005)). Derivative citizenship,

because it negates the element of alienage, is a defense to unlawful entry. Smith-Baltiher, 2005

WL 2174475 at *6. However, in a prosecution for unlawful entry, the government’s burden is

only to prove alienage; the government has no burden to prove the absence of derivative

citizenship status. See United States v. Hodulik, 44 Fed.Appx 656, 660 (6th Cir. 2002). In a

criminal prosecution, affirmative defenses generally are waived if not presented at trial. See,

e.g., United States v. LeMaux, 994 F2d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 1993) (statute of limitations defense

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waived if not presented at trial). By giving up his trial rights as a part of the plea bargain, Reyes

waived the right to present any affirmative defenses and therefor waived his affirmative defense

of derivative citizenship. Reyes also waived the right to bring up any challenges to his sentence

or his conviction in any post-trial proceeding including any petition for habeas corpus pursuant to

section 2255. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992)(collateral attack,

like direct appeal is a statutory right that can be waived). A waiver of the right of appeal or

collateral attack includes waiver of the right to present exculpatory evidence that was discovered

after the plea was taken and the waver of rights given. Id. at 1013. Thus, the court concludes

Reyes has waived the right to collaterally attack his sentence and may not now raise the claim of

derivative citizenship.

Reyes attempts to circumvent his waiver by claiming that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel, presumably because his counsel did not oppose the plea agreement on the

ground of derivative citizenship. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not waived in a

general waiver of appeal rights pursuant to a plea agreement. See Middleton v. United States, 46

F.3d 1143, 1995 WL 37322 at **1 (9th Cir. 1995). Under the standard set by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-692 ((1984), the petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of

counsel must demonstrate that: “(1)counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. Reyes’ petition demonstrates neither deficient

performance or prejudice.

Reyes fails to make any specific allegations that would lead to the conclusion his

counsel’s performance was deficient in any way. Reyes never alleges, for example, that he

informed his counsel of the possibility of derivative citizenship or that he requested the matter be

investigated prior to his plea agreement. Nor does Reyes allege he was never told that, in order

to be guilty of unlawful entry, he would be required to admit he was not a United States citizen. 

What Reyes alleges is that he “just realized there was ineffective assistance of counsel” because

he was convicted in error. This allegation does not suffice to state a claim for ineffective

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assistance. There is a “‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

acceptable professional assistance.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Thus, in the

absence of allegations that specifically shows how counsel’s conduct was deficient, the court

must presume Reyes’ attorneys’ conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional

conduct. Id.

Further, there is no prejudice. Reyes bases his claim of derivative citizenship on his

contention that he was born in Mexico to a mother who was a Mexican national and then

migrated with her to the United States when his mother married a U.S. citizen. Reyes alleges he

was adopted by his step-father after the marriage. Reyes’ pleading leaves unanswered a number

of questions that would be relevant to a determination of derivative citizenship including whether

the step-father was a naturalized citizen, how long he had resided in the United States, when the

adoption occurred and how old Reyes was at the time of the adoption, among others. The court

need not resolve any of these questions, however, because contrary to Reyes’ assertion, there is

no “automatic citizenship” for a child born to a non-citizen in a foreign country who is later

adopted by a U.S. citizen. 

The process by which a child born outside the United States gains citizenship is set forth

in 8 U.S.C., section 1433. The statute specifies five conditions that must be fulfilled before a

certificate of citizenship is issued. Subsection (c) of section 1433 applies the provisions of the

section generally to foreign-born children of non-citizen parents who are adopted by a step-parent

that is a citizen of the United States. Of particular significance to Reyes’ claim, subsection (a)(3)

of section 1433 requires that the child be under 18 years of age and in the custody of the citizen

parent at the time the application for certificate of citizenship is made. By the time Reyes was

charged in the instant action he was over 18 years of age and a certificate of citizenship had

either been issued by that time or else Reyes was not a citizen. In other words, Reyes cannot

now, as an adult, invoke the procedure to attain derivative citizenship through his adoptive father

that he may have been eligible to have been granted as a child. That procedure must have been

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invoked before Reyes reached his eighteenth birthday or not at all. Since Reyes has not

produced a certificate of citizenship, nor has he represented that he was ever granted such a

certificate, the court presumes a certificate of citizenship was never issued. Since a certificate of

citizenship was not issued and since Reyes is now too old to qualify for derivative citizenship as

a child of an adopted citizen parent, he cannot now claim entitlement to derivative citizenship. 

II. Age And Unlawful Entry

Reyes next alleges he actually entered the United States legally in 1978 because he, or

perhaps more accurately his mother, had entry and residence permits. The issue of whether

Reyes entered the country legally because he entered pursuant to a valid permit is, like the issue

of derivative citizenship, an affirmative defense that is waived for the reasons discussed above. 

However, there remains a problem that arises from Reyes’ allegation that he was seven years old

at the time of the first entry into the United States that forms the factual basis of count 1 of the

superceding information. Simply stated, the court is concerned that the facts set forth in the

superceding information that constitute count 1 and the facts admitted to by Reyes in the plea

agreement and in open court do not constitute a crime. 

 “[I]t has been the general rule in [the Ninth] [C]ircuit that ‘constitutional claims may be

raised in collateral proceedings even if the defendant failed to pursue them on appeal.’

[Citations.]” English v. U.S., 42 F.3d 473, 479 (9th Cir. 1994). Certainly, the imposition of a

criminal sanction on the basis of conduct that does not constitute a crime is a constitutional

defect. The court concludes the issue of whether the conduct described in the Superceding

Information constitutes a crime has not been waived.

It is elementary that, while a person may waive a valid defense in the process of entering

a plea of guilty to a particular criminal charge, the court is without jurisdiction to adjudge an

individual guilty of a crime if the facts admitted to do not constitute a crime. Further, the court

lacks jurisdiction to impose a sentence where the facts admitted to do not constitute a crime. “A

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325 occurs only at the time of entry and does not continue thereafter.

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[Citation].” U.S. v. Pruitt, 719 F.2d 975, 978 (9 Cir. 1983). Consequently, for the conduct

described in the plea agreement to be considered a crime, a seven-year-old child must be guilty of

the crime of improper entry if he is an alien and enters the United States with a parent at a time

and place not designated by immigration officers. The court doubts this is the case. 

There does not appear to be an abundance of authority that addresses the mens rea

requirement for either felony or misdemeanor violation of 8 U.S.C., section 1325. The Ninth

Circuit has generally recognized there is a correspondence between sections 1325 and 1326 of

Title 8 of the United States Code. See United States v. Campos-Martinez, 976 F.2d 589, 591

(9th Cir. 1992) (“[s]ections 1325 and 1326 provide the core of the illegal entry prohibitions of

the United States . . . .”) (overruled on other grounds in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523

U.S. 224 (1998)). Although the court has not found any authority that specifically addresses the

mens rea requirement for violation of 18 U.S.C., section 1325, the Ninth Circuit has held that

only general criminal intent is necessary to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C., section 1326. 

United States v. Ortiz-Villegas, 49 F.3d 1435, 1437 (9th Cir. 1995). The court therefore

concludes that, like section 1326, 18 U.S.C., section 1325 describes a crime requiring general

criminal intent. 

It is elementary that, while a general intent crime does not require knowledge that a

particular act constitutes a crime, there is at least a requirement that the act that constitutes the

crime be undertaken volitionally. It can hardly be said that a seven-year-old accompanying a

parent to another country is acting volitionally as that term could fairly be applied here. From the

point of view of a seven-year-old, the accompanying of a parent who enters the United States at a

time and place not designated by immigration officers does not necessarily reflect knowledge of

transit into another country, or of any conscious choice to accompany or not accompany the

parent. The court cannot imagine any set of facts applicable to the conduct of a seven-year-old

child that would satisfy the general intent requirement to support a conviction under 8 U.S.C.,

section 1325. The court therefore concludes that a seven year old child who enters the United

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States at a time or place not designated by immigration authorities while accompanying a

custodial parent commits no crime because the child is incapable as a matter of law of forming

the requisite criminal intent.

III. Jurisdiction to Impose a Twenty-Four Month Sentence on Count One is Lacking

As to both counts of the superceding information, Reyes admitted essentially the same

acts. That is, he admitted he was a citizen of Mexico and not a citizen of the United States and

that he entered the United States at a time and place other than a time or place designated by

immigration. Reyes did not admit that, at the time of his entry in 1978, he had previously been

convicted of an unlawful entry into the United States. Absent proof of a former conviction for

improper entry, a defendant cannot be given a felony sentence under 18 U.S.C., section 1325. 

United States v. Arambula-Alvarado, 677 F.2d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1982). Nothing in the plea

agreement suggests the “unlawful” entry in 1978 was an entry following a prior conviction for

improper entry. Indeed, the possibility there was a prior conviction for improper entry is remote

given Reyes’ youth at the time and the improbability that a child of less than seven years of age

could have suffered a conviction for improper entry.

Notwithstanding the fact that the court finds it very improbable that the facts alleged in

count 1 of the Superceding Information charging improper entry in 1978 constitute a crime, it is

clear that there is no factual basis upon which the court would have jurisdiction to impose a

sentence of 24 months as to that count. The maximum sentence authorized for violation of 8

U.S.C., section 1325 is six months for a first conviction. Thus, the maximum term of

imprisonment the court could have imposed on count 1 of the superceding information was six

months. The court had no apparent authority to impose the term of 24 months that was imposed.

For the reasons set forth above, RESPONDENT UNITED STATES IS HEREBY

ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why Reyes’ motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2255

should not be granted. Respondent United States shall file and serve a response to this order to

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show cause within 30 days of the date of this order. If United States does not respond to this

order to show cause, the court will deem Reyes’ request for relief unopposed. Reyes may file an

opposition to Government’s response to this order to show cause within fifteen (15) days of the

date of service of Governments brief. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2005 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

h2ehf UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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