Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06617/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06617-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE PEREZ-SERRANO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

CV F 04-6617 AWI

(CR F 02-5190 AWI)

ORDER DIRECTING

ATTORNEY FOR

PETITIONER TO SUBMIT

DECLARATION AND

RELATED ORDERS

(28 U.S.C. § 2255)

In this case, petitioner Jorge Perez-Serrano (“Petitioner”) seeks relief under 28 U.S.C.

section 2255 from the sentence of 188 months of imprisonment that was imposed by this

court on December 22, 2003, following petitioner’s entry of a plea of guilty to a single count

of violation of 21 U.S.C. §846 and 841(a)(1), conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. 

Although Petitioner’s pleadings are voluminous, his grounds for relief boil down to a single

contention – that he was deprived of legal counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right.

In support of his motion pursuant to section 2255, Petitioner sets forth the history of

his representation at various stages of his case. Petitioner alleges he was initially represented

at his first appearance before the magistrate judge by Marc Ament of the Federal Public

Defender’s Office. E. Marshall Hodgkins appeared for Petitioner from May 30, 2002, until

November 19, 2002, when Anthony J. Solare was substituted as counsel. Mr. Solare

apparently represented Petitioner through the period of time leading up to Petitioner’s change

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of plea on September 22, 2003. At the change of plea hearing on September 22, 2003, the

attorney appearing for Petitioner stated his appearance as “Mark DuBose appearing for

Anthony Solare from San Diego on behalf of Mr. Perez , your Honor.” The transcript of the

record of the change of plea hearing indicates the change of plea was trailed until Petitioner

signed the plea agreement, whereupon the case was called and Mr. DuBose again stated his

appearance and Petitioner entered a plea of guilty. 

Similarly, on December 22, 2003, the attorney appearing for Petitioner at his

sentencing hearing stated his appearance as “Mark DuBose appearing for Anthony Solare on

behalf of Mr. Jorge Perez-Serrano, who is present before the court.” The record reflects Mr.

DuBose was familiar with Petitioner’s case and was able to present arguments for downward

departure on the basis of minor role in the enterprise and alleged errors in the criminal history

calculation. There is nothing in the transcripts of either the change of plea or sentencing

hearings that indicates Petitioner’s attorney provided deficient representation or that

Petitioner objected in any way to Mr. DuBose’s performance, nor does Petitioner claim that

Mr. DuBose’s performance was in any way sub-standard.

The court generally agrees with the factual background Petitioner provides reflecting

which attorneys represented Petitioner at specific points in his case. Petitioner makes two

additional factual allegations that are critical to his claim for habeas relief. First, Petitioner

claims that Mark DuBose has not been admitted to practice before this court; that is, before

the District Court of the Eastern District of California. Second, Petitioner claims the name

“Mark DuBose” does not appear in the list of attorneys licenced to practice law in the state of

California. From this, Petitioner alleges Mark DuBose is not an attorney licensed to practice

in California. 

The core of Petitioner’s legal argument is the contention that, if his attorney was not

authorized to practice before the federal court, or if his attorney was not licensed to practice

in California at the time he represented Petitioner, then Petitioner suffered ineffective

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assistance of counsel and the ineffective assistance is presumed to be prejudicial. In other

words, Petitioner contends he suffered a per se violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel because his attorney was not admitted to the bar of this court and/or was not admitted

to the California state bar.

Normally, an appellant or petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel “bears the heavy burden of establishing that his ‘counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Bellamy v. Cogdell. 974 F.2d 302,

306(2nd Cir. 1992) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). Courts

have, under limited circumstances, presumed prejudice – and therefore a Sixth Amendment

violation – where the nature of the depravation was such that the rule requiring demonstration

of prejudice in some specific fashion would not be susceptible to intelligent, evenhanded

application because the record would be unlikely to reflect the depravation. Such

circumstances include the failure to provide any counsel or where the counsel is prevented

from discharging his normal functions. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1332 (9th

Cir. 1978) (discussing examples of depravation of counsel based on failure to provide or

prevention from discharging normal functions). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the guarantee of a right to counsel means a guarantee

of a right to representation “by an attorney admitted to practice law.” United States v.

Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the

per se rule has been applied to the situation where a defendant has been represented by a

person posing as a lawyer, but who has never been admitted to the membership of any bar. 

Id. at 599-600; United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 697 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the

scope of application of the per se rule in the context of provision of representation by persons

who are not members of any bar has been very narrow in Ninth Circuit cases. The Ninth

Circuit has made it clear that the per se rule does not apply where counsel is provided by a

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person who is a member of a state bar, but who is disbarred by the bar association of that

state. See, e.g., Hoffman, 733 F.2d at 601 (court refuses to apply per se rule where attorney

representing defendant was disbarred in his home state of Florida but did not report that fact

to the district court in Arizona); United States v. Ross, 338 F.3d 1054, 1056 (one-time

admission of attorney to a state bar was “enough to overcome a claim of status-based per se

ineffective assistance”). Of particular pertinence to Petitioner’s argument, the Ross court

held that admission to practice in a federal court “is based on state bar membership, not an

independent evaluation of competency. ‘“It is inconceivable that the failure to take this purely

formal step [could cause] any prejudice to [an] appellant.”’ [Citations.]” Id. 

Petitioner contends he is entitled to the presumption of prejudice in his sixth

amendment claim because the attorney representing Petitioner during the change of plea

haring and at the sentencing hearing was not admitted to practice before this court and

because his name did not appear among the members of the California State Bar. Based on

the foregoing discussion, the court rejects Petitioner’s first claim. The court will not presume

Petitioner suffered ineffective assistance because his attorney was not admitted to practice

before this court. 

As to Petitioner’s second claim, the court lacks the facts necessary to make a

determination. Petitioner admits the name of a Marcus Edward DeBose does appear on the

list of members in good standing of the California Bar (SBN 216328), and that the listed

address of Marcus E. DuBose is the same as the listed address of Solare & Associates, the

firm of Petitioner’s attorney of record. The court will not assume at this point that Mark

DuBose and Marcus Edward DuBose are different people and will not assume for purposes

of this motion that Mark DuBose is not a member in good standing of the state bar. Rather,

the court will order that Mark DuBose submit a declaration stating his full name and State

Bar Number, whether he was the individual who represented Petitioner at the times in

question, and the status of his bar membership, if any, at the time in question. Upon

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submission of a proper declaration, the court will decide Petitioner’s motion for habeas relief

in accordance with the foregoing discussion.

THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:

1. Marcus Edward DuBose shall complete a declaration stating his full name, address,

State Bar Number, if any, and his state bar membership status as of September 22,

2003, and December 22, 2003. Marcus Edward DuBose shall also state whether he

complied, as of the foregoing dates, with the requirements of Local Rule 83-180

regarding admission to the bar of this court. Marcus Edward DuBose shall also state

whether he was the person who represented Petitioner at his change of plea hearing

and at his sentencing hearing on September 22, 2003, and December 22, 2003,

respectively.

2. The clerk of the court shall serve this order on:

Marcus Edward DuBose, 

Pacific Law Center

4225 Executive Square, Suite 1550

La Jolla, California, 92037

3. Markus Edward DuBose shall file and serve the declaration not later than fourteen

(14) days from the date of service of this order.

4. Petitioner and the United States shall not respond to this order unless directed to do so

by this court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

h2ehf UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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