Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03162/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03162-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO LMH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bobby Joe Jackson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Chaplain Bristow, et al., 

 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 05-3162-PHX-MHM (GEE)

ORDER

In this civil rights action brought by a former county jail inmate, Defendants moved

to dismiss for lack of exhaustion (Doc. #12). Plaintiff responded, and Defendant replied

(Doc. ##14-15). The Court will grant the motion as to Count III but deny it as to Counts I

and II.

I. The Exhaustion Requirement

Plaintiff must first exhaust “available” administrative remedies before bringing this

action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.

2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). He must complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life,

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through

the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

Case 2:05-cv-03162-MHM-GEE Document 20 Filed 11/17/06 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Plaintiff sued “Bustow” but it is now apparent that the Defendant’s name is Sarahlyn

Bristow (Reply, Ex. 3). The Court will require the Clerk to update the docket to reflect the

proper name.

- 2 -

Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of

abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to

decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad

discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation

omitted). 

II. Parties’ Contentions

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brought three counts alleging that while at

the jail, he was subjected to (1) a lack of privacy in the restroom area, (2) restrictions on his

religious exercise, and (3) exposure to lead paint fumes and conditions that were

overcrowded, unsanitary and unhealthy (Doc. #7 at 4-6). The Court required Defendants

Chaplain Bristow1

 and Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio to answer except to the extent

that the claims were brought pursuant to Hart v. Hill (Doc. #8).

Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that Plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies for

Counts II and III (Doc. #12). They did not address the lack of privacy claim in Count I.

Plaintiff, for his religious exercise claim in Count II, alleged in his First Amended Complaint

that Chaplain Bristow stopped his grievance and made it seem as though Plaintiff should seek

an outside contractor to lead prayer services (Doc. #7 at 5). For his conditions claim in

Count III, Plaintiff asserted that officers stated that the issues were not grievable and that the

roaches were the fault of the inmates (Id. at 7). 

Defendants, to support their exhaustion defense, submitted the affidavit of Sergeant

Zelean Tademy, who tracks and processes grievances for the Inmate Hearing Unit (Tademy

Aff. ¶ 2, Ex. 1, Doc. #12). Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegation that his religious

exercise claim was stopped by Chaplain Bristow is inconsistent with jail records which show

Case 2:05-cv-03162-MHM-GEE Document 20 Filed 11/17/06 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

that Plaintiff filed twelve grievances, none of which concerned religious exercise (Id. at ¶ 8).

Plaintiff’s statement that he did not grieve the conditions claim in Count II is also

inconsistent with jail records showing that he filed one grievance regarding unhealthy

conditions (Id.). Defendants did not attach a copy of any grievances to their motion.

Plaintiff’s Response is directly contrary to Defendants’ position – he states that he

grieved the religious exercise claim but claims that he did not grieve the conditions claim

(Resp. at 3, Doc. #14). He submits a copy of his religious exercise grievance in which he

claimed that he was denied the right to attend Friday Juma services at the Lower Buckeye

Jail (Ex. A, Doc. #14). Chaplain Bristow responded that she visited Plaintiff and advised him

to write his mosque for verification that he was Muslim. Once he was verified, he would be

provided with a religious diet and the chaplain would call a mosque to ask for a volunteer to

visit Plaintiff (Id.). Attached to the grievance is a follow-up note from Bristow that she had

requested someone from the Islamic Community of Tempe to visit Plaintiff. Plaintiff then

signed the grievance under a line indicating that it had been resolved informally or

withdrawn (Id.). According to Plaintiff, Bristow stopped the grievance process by making

it seem that it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to get someone to lead Juma prayer services

(Resp. at 6, Doc. #14). Plaintiff also claims that Bristow never returned the grievance to its

proper channels in the grievance system, but he does not fully explain this allegation (Id.).

Plaintiff seeks to excuse his failure to file a grievance on his conditions claim by

arguing that he was not aware of the violations until May 2006 (Resp. at 3, Doc. #14). He

further claims that the violations were purposely hidden so he could not grieve them, and he

was hindered from filing a grievance because the sheriff did not make an announcement that

the Madison Street Jail was being remodeled because of the violations (Id. at 4-5). Finally,

Plaintiff contends that the process is flawed and in support he submits the affidavit of an

inmate named Karl Minnick, who attests to his difficulties with the system (Id. at 7 & Ex. B).

Defendants replied that Plaintiff conceded that he did not exhaust administrative

remedies (Doc. #15). They do not contest that Plaintiff filed a grievance on religious

exercise, but they assert that it was resolved informally, as were other grievances on lack of

Case 2:05-cv-03162-MHM-GEE Document 20 Filed 11/17/06 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

privacy and unsafe shower conditions (Reply at 3-4 & Ex. 1-3, Doc. #15). In support, they

submit Bristow’s affidavit attesting that she spoke to Plaintiff, and he agreed that his

grievance was resolved and signed it indicating so (Bristow Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. 3, Doc. #15).

According to Defendants, informal resolution does not constitute exhaustion (Reply at 4,

Doc. #15). They also contend that Plaintiff was able to file twelve grievances and did not

provide support for his claim that he was prevented from exhausting his remedies, and that

the Minnick affidavit is not specific to Plaintiff’s experience with the grievance process (Id.

at 2-5).

III. Analysis

A. “Available” Grievance Process

As stated, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating what remedies are

“available.” See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119; Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37. Defendants submitted

copies of the jail’s grievance policy and evidence that Plaintiff filed twelve grievances. The

Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s contentions that process was rendered unavailable

because there was no announcement that the jail was being remodeled and that the process

was flawed as shown by Minnick’s affidavit. The remodeling of the jail is not relevant to

Plaintiff’s knowledge that the conditions were unsanitary nor do Minnick’s attestations bear

relevance to Plaintiff’s individual experience with the jail’s grievance system. Also, Plaintiff

has not countered Defendants’ contention that he submitted grievances on twelve occasions.

The Court is persuaded that a grievance process was available at the jail.

B. Count I: Lack of Privacy

For the lack of privacy claim in Count I, Defendants did not set forth any contentions

regarding absence of exhaustion in their motion. In their Reply, they seem to imply that this

claim was not exhausted because it was informally resolved. It is unclear whether they are

seeking dismissal of this claim as unexhausted. Even if they are, Plaintiff has not had an

opportunity to address their contentions because they were asserted in the Reply. To the

extent that Defendants may be seeking dismissal of Count I, their motion is denied.

Case 2:05-cv-03162-MHM-GEE Document 20 Filed 11/17/06 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

C. Count II: Religious Exercise 

For the religion claim, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff filed a grievance that

was informally resolved. Defendants have not explained why an informal resolution

constitutes lack of exhaustion. The Ninth Circuit squarely held that an inmate’s remedies are

exhausted “once he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an intermediate level of

review or been reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are available.”

Brown, 422 F.3d at 935. Once a prisoner has won all the relief that was available, his

remedies are exhausted. Id. (citing Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th

Cir. 2004)). Exhaustion is not required “when no pertinent relief can be obtained.” Brown,

422 F.3d at 935.

Defendants have not carried their burden of showing that Plaintiff had an available

remedy once his grievance was informally resolved. Bristow attested that in response to

Plaintiff’s grievance, she contacted the Islamic Community of Tempe to request a visit for

Plaintiff (Bristow Aff. ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. 3, Doc. #15). She then talked to Plaintiff who agreed the

matter was resolved (Id. ¶ 6). There is no evidence in the record that once Bristow told

Plaintiff she would seek a visit that Plaintiff had any type of relief available in the grievance

system. Plaintiff believed that the grievance process had concluded because it was his

responsibility to get someone to lead Juma prayer services. The words “informally resolved”

themselves indicate that the grievance process has reached its conclusion. Accordingly, the

Court denies Defendants’ motion on Count II.

D. Count III: Conditions

For Count III, Defendants contend that Plaintiff conceded that he did not grieve roach

infestation, lead paint exposure and unsanitary conditions, and he also filed a grievance on

unsafe shower conditions but did not appeal it. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

asserted that he was told that the issues were not grievable. In his Response, he failed to

develop this assertion. Instead, he employed a different angle; he argued that without an

announcement from the jail that it was being remodeled he could not grieve the claims and

that the claims were purposely hidden. This assertion is not believable, as roach infestation,

Case 2:05-cv-03162-MHM-GEE Document 20 Filed 11/17/06 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

lead paint fumes that allegedly caused Plaintiff to suffer a sore throat and headaches, and

unclean cells are not hidden conditions. The inconsistency between Plaintiff’s allegations

in his Complaint and his Response, and the lack of feasability of contentions in his Response,

does not show that the remedy was unavailable to Plaintiff. Defendants have carried their

burden on Count III, and this claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #12) is granted in part and denied in

part. 

(2) Count III regarding conditions is dismissed without prejudice for lack of

exhaustion. Counts I and II remain.

(3) The Clerk of Court must update the docket sheet to reflect that “Chaplin Bustow”

is “Chaplain Sarahlyn Bristow”. 

DATED this 16th day of November, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-03162-MHM-GEE Document 20 Filed 11/17/06 Page 6 of 6