Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02326/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Respondents’ Exhibits appear at docket 17.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carl Elliot, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-2326-PHX-SRB (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 1. Respondents filed an Answer, doc. 15, to the Petition to which Petitioner

has replied, doc. 19 For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Background

A. Charges and Sentences

On July 15, 2004, Petitioner was indicted in the Pinal County Superior Court in Cause

Number CR-2004-00960 (the “2004 case), on one count of burglary in the second degree; one

count of sexual abuse of a person under 15 years of age, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime

against children; one count of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 18, a class 6 felony;

and one count of sexual assault of a person 15 years of age or older, a class 2 felony.

(Respondents’ Exh. A)1

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 The Honorable Stephen F. McCarville presided. 

- 2 -

Before the 2004 case was resolved, Petitioner was indicted in Cause Number CR-2005-

01225 (the “2005 case”), on one count of sexual assault with a person 15 years of age or older,

a class 2 felony, arising out of a separate incident. (Respondents’ Exhs. B, C,) 

On March 13, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty in the 2004 case to one count of burglary in

the second degree, a class 3 felony; and pled no contest in the 2005 case to attempted sexual

assault as a class 3 felony. (Respondents’ Exh. E) The state court2

 accepted Petitioner’s pleas,

suspended imposition of sentence in both matters, and placed Petitioner on concurrent 5-year

terms of probation. (Respondents’ Exh. F) 

Shortly thereafter, Petitioner absconded and was indicted in Cause Number CR-2006-

00993 (the “2006 case”) with one count of failing to inform the Sheriff’s Department of his new

address and register as a sex offender, a class 4 felony. (Respondents’ Exh. G) The State filed

petitions to revoke probation in the 2004 and 2005 cases, alleging that Petitioner had failed to

maintain an approved residence and that his whereabouts were unknown. (Id.) 

A year later, it was discovered that Plaintiff had moved to Florida when, on August 16,

2007, he was indicted in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida with one

count of failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.

(Respondents’ Exh. H) Petitioner was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 30 months in

federal prison. (Id.) On direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the

Florida District Court’s judgment and sentence and Petitioner was released from federal custody

on September 29, 2008. (Id.) 

Upon Petitioner’s release, he was returned to the custody in the State of Arizona based

on outstanding warrants for his arrest. (Respondents’ Exh. P) On January 26, 2009, Petitioner

pled guilty before the Honorable Boyd T. Jackson in the Superior Court of Arizona, Pinal

County, to one count of failure to inform the Sheriff’s Department of a new address, a class 4

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

felony.3 (Respondents’ Exh. I) That same day, Petitioner admitted violating the terms of his

probation in the 2004 and 2005 cases. (Respondents’ Exhs. I, N) 

On March 30, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced in all three cases to a combined total of 8

years’ imprisonment - 4.5 years’ imprisonment in the 2006 case, to run consecutively to

concurrent terms of 3.5 years’ imprisonment in the 2004 and 2005 cases. (Respondents’ Exh.

J) Petitioner was given credit for 427 days presentence incarceration in the 2004 case, and 282

days of presentence incarceration in the 2005 case. (Respondents’ Exh. L) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On May 15, 2009, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Arizona

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Respondents’ Exh. K) On January 14, 2010, Petitioner,

through counsel, filed a petition. (Respondents’ Exh. L) Petitioner asserted that, pursuant to

A.R.S. § 13-712(B), he was entitled to presentence incarceration credit for the time he was in

federal custody because the State of Arizona had placed a “hold” on him, and his federal

conviction and sentence were ultimately reversed. (Id.) Petitioner further argued that he was

only given 181 days of presentence-incarceration credit in the 2005 case despite the state court’s

intent to award him credit for 282 days, and that the imposition of a prosecution fee was illegal.

(Respondents’ Exh. L) 

The court denied Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief on June 3, 2010. The

Court found that the issue of the prosecution fee had been resolved and, therefore, was moot.

The Court further found that Petitioner was not entitled to presentence incarceration credit for

his time in federal custody because, at the time, he was not in Arizona custody pursuant to his

Arizona offenses. (Respondents’ Exh. N) Although the Court denied Petitioner’s other claims,

it ordered that the sentencing document in the 2005 case be corrected to reflect that Petitioner

was entitled to 282 days preincarceration credit. (Respondents’ Exh. N) 

On July 13, 2010, Petitioner filed a timely petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. O; doc. 15 at 5, n. 6) Petitioner presented one claim - that the

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

state court abused its discretion by denying him credit for time he served in federal custody. 

(Respondents’ Exh. O) He argued that he was entitled to credit for the time served in

federal custody because he was in federal custody both on federal charges and pursuant to

the Arizona probation hold, and the federal sentence was ultimately vacated. (Id.) The

Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief, finding that Petitioner had failed

to cite any authority to support his claim that, while in federal custody, he was also serving

time for three Arizona offenses. (Respondents’ Exh. P) The appellate court further found

that there was nothing in the record to show that, without the Arizona detainer, Petitioner

would have spent less time in federal custody before that conviction and sentence were

overturned. (Id.) As a result, the court found that the post-conviction court correctly ruled

that Petitioner was not entitled to presentence incarceration credit against his Arizona

sentences for time served in custody in Florida. (Id.) 

C. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

 On October 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court. (Doc. 1) The Court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend to allege a violation

of federal constitutional or statutory rights. (Respondents’ Exh. S) On December 27, 2010,

Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 6) The Amended

Petition includes a single claim that Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by the denial of presentence incarceration credit against his Arizona sentences

for the 14 months he spent in federal prison in Florida. (Doc. 6 at 6) 

Respondents concede that the Petition is timely under the AEDPA limitations period. 

(Doc. 15 at 6-8) Respondents argue that the Amended Petition should be dismissed because

it does not state a federal claim and, therefore, is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his Reply, Petitioner re-urges the merits of his

claim, and adds two news claims. He also requests an evidentiary hearing and the

appointment of counsel. (Doc. 19) The Court finds that his matter is suitable for resolution

on the pleadings, and that an evidentiary hearing is not required. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

D. Appointment of Counsel 

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 In his Reply, Petitioner, for the first time, asserts a double-jeopardy claim arguing that

the failure to give him presentence incarceration credit for time spent in federal custody violates

the double jeopardy clause. (Doc. 19 at 5-8) Petitioner is merely re-casting his sentencing

claim as a double jeopardy claim. The Court will not consider this argument because it was

raised for the first time in Petitioner’s reply. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th

Cir. 1994) (claim raised for first time in traverse will not be considered); Lewis v. Witek, 927

F.Supp. 1288, 1291 n. 2 (C.D.Cal.1996) (same). Moreover, despite the “Double Jeopardy”

label, Petitioner is still asserting a state-law claim. 

Petitioner’s Reply also asserts, for the first time, a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel during his post-conviction proceeding, an “of-right” proceeding. (Doc. 19 at 8-16)

Again, this claim is not properly raised for the first time in Petitioner’s reply in support of his

petition for habeas corpus relief. Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507. Moreover, it appears that this

claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review because it was

not presented on appeal of the denial of Petitioner’s Rule-32 petition. (Respondents’ Exh. O);

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

- 5 -

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) authorizes the district court to appoint counsel for

indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief when “the interests of justice so

require.” Id. However, appointment of counsel is only mandatory if the circumstances

indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations. Chaney v.

Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Kreiling v. Field, 431 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir.

1970).

Petitioner does not provide any argument in support of his request for counsel. He

has not established that counsel is necessary to prevent the violation of due process and the

Court does not find any reason to appoint counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d

622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial of the appointment of counsel where petitioner

presented issues coherently).

II. Analysis 

In his only ground for relief,4

 Petitioner argues that the state court violated his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him presentence incarceration credit against

his Arizona sentences for the 14 months he was incarcerated in federal prison, on federal

charges, in Florida. 

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus

petitions:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United

States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[a] habeas petition must allege the

petitioner’s detention violates the constitution, a federal statute or a treaty.” Franzen v.

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Franzen v. Deeds 493 U.S. 1012 (1989)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(3)). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors of state

law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,

780 (1990)); see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 349 (1993) (stating that “mere error

of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be

corrected on federal habeas.”). The purpose of habeas proceedings under § 2254 is to ensure

that state convictions satisfy federal constitutional requirements applicable to states. Burkey

v. Deeds, 824 F.Supp. 190, 192 (D.Nev. 1993). A habeas petitioner cannot “transform a

state law issue into a federal one by merely assertion a violation of due process.” Poland v.

Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389

(9th Cir. 1996)). 

Petitioner argues that he was denied presentence incarceration credit against his

Arizona sentences for time spent in federal custody for a conviction and sentence that was

later vacated. (Doc. 6) Petitioner’s claim of sentencing error involves the interpretation

and application of Arizona sentencing law, A.R.S. § 13-712(B). Such sentencing error

claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes,

37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that petitioner’s claim that the state court erred in

imposing consecutive sentences was not cognizable in federal habeas); Christian v. Rhode,

41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding that “claim regarding merger of convictions for sentencing is exclusively concerned

with state law and therefore not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”); Sturm

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

v. California Adult Authority, 396 F.2d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1967) (noting that “a state court’s

interpretation of its [sentencing] statute does not raise a federal question.”).

Although Petitioner alleges violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution, his conclusory allegations do not transform his state-law claim

into a federal one. Poland, 169 F.3d at 584.

Because Petitioner’s sentencing claim constitutes a challenge to the application of

state law, it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; McGuire,

502 U.S. at 67-68; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal court has no

authority to review state application of state law); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-

19 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to consider alleged errors in violation of state sentencing law). 

Accordingly, the Petition should be dismissed. In view of the determination that

Petitioner’s claim in not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, the Court need not

consider Respondents’ alternative argument regarding procedural default.

In accordance with the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 6, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v.

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party=s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of August, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-02326-SRB Document 20 Filed 08/30/11 Page 8 of 8