Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02633/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02633-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARL CHILDS, Jr.,

CDCR #F-14068,

Civil No. 13cv2633 CAB (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF Doc. No. 2] 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

AND 1915A(b)

AND

(3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO AMEND

[ECF Doc. No. 5]

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Director/Secretary;

PARAMO, Warden; HERNANDEZ,

Assoc. Warden; BENYARD, Correctional

Captain; WALKER, Medical Doctor; 

J. PAYNE, Correctional Sergeant;

J. REYES, Correctional Officer; J. CHUA,

Doctor; STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

Earl Child, Jr., (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has

initiated a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff claims Defendants, most of whom are RJD correctional and medical

officials, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and violated his right to due

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process in September and October 2013. See Compl. (ECF Doc. No. 1) at 1, 4-6. 

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that on September 30, 2013, he was placed in

Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) based on “false” confidential information

provided by a fellow inmate. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims to have had his “medical care

appliances,” confiscated prior to placement in Ad-Seg, to have had “all privileges”

suspended during his time there, and to have been denied due process based on an

October 3, 2013 classification committee’s decision to retain him in Ad-Seg until

transfer to another facility. Id. at 5, 6. Plaintiff seeks general and punitive damages, as

well as “emergency injunctive relief” requiring the return of his medical appliances and

his “legal work & property,” as well as court-ordered access to the law library and

immediate release from Ad-Seg to RJD’s ‘C’ yard. See Suppl. to Compl. (ECF Doc. No.

3) at 3-5.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee; instead he has filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2).

In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion seeking leave to “amend for the first time.” 

(ECF Doc. No. 5).

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’sfailure to prepay the

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entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a

prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay

the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

/ / /

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 1

2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), (b); Judicial

Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1, 2013). However,

the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. 

Id.

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of

the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews

v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement,

the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in

the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the

prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s

income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP application, Plaintiff has submitted the certified copies of his

trust account statements required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statements,

as well as the attached prison certificate issued by a trust account official at RJD where

he is currently incarcerated verifying his account history and available balances. 

Plaintiff’s statements show an average monthly balance of $37.50, average monthly

deposits of $25.00, and an available balance of $19.83 at the time of filing. Based on

this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF

Doc. No. 2) and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $7.50 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

However, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds in

Plaintiff’s account are available at the time this Order is executed pursuant to the

directions set forth below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event

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shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based

solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total owed in this case shall be collected

and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) AND 1915A(b)(1)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the PLRA

also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damagesfrom

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

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The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not, in

so doing, “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

/ / /

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C. Improper Defendants

i. State of California

As an initial matter, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff names the State of

California as a Defendant in the caption of his Complaint, any claims he may wish to

pursue must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and

§ 1915A(b) for both failing to state a claim and for seeking damages against a defendant

who is immune. The State of California is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the State

and its Department of Corrections, which is an arm of the State, are not “persons” within

the meaning of § 1983); see also Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per

curiam) (“There can be no doubt . . . that [a] suit against the State and its Board of

Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless [the State] has consented to

the filing of such a suit.”). 

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue the State of California pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, his Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

(iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

ii. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff also names Matthew Cate, the Secretary of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and D. Paramo, the Warden of RJD as

Defendants. See Compl. at 1-2. However, his Complaint contains virtually no

allegations that either of these individuals knew of or took any part in any constitutional

violation. “Because vicarious liability isinapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must

plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v.

Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt

acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). 

/ / /

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First, Plaintiffincludes Secretary Cate and Warden Paramo as parties because they

are “responsible for the overall care of all California State Prisons” and “all prisoners at

RJD[]” respectively. See Compl. at 2. Plaintiff includes no further details as to what

Cate or Paramo specifically did, or failed to do, which resulted in the violation of any

constitutional right. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that FED.R.CIV.P. 8 “demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555, 570). 

Thus, to the extent it appears Plaintiff seeks to sue Secretary Cate and Warden

Paramo only by virtue of their positions within the prison and/or their supervisory duties

over other correctional or medical officials, in order to avoid the respondeatsuperior bar,

his pleading must include sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678, and include a description of personal acts by each individual defendant

which show a direct causal connection to a violation of specific constitutional rights. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor is only liable for the

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and with deliberate indifference, failed to act to

prevent them. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. If

there is no affirmative link between a defendant’s conduct and the alleged injury, asthere

is none alleged here, there is no deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth no facts which might be

liberally construed to support any sort of individualized constitutional claim against

Secretary Cate or Warden Paramo, both of whom are purportedly being sued based on

the positions they hold and not because of any individually identifiable conduct alleged

to have caused Plaintiff injury. “Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983

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claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The

inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities

of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing

Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71). 

Based on these pleading deficiencies, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state

a claim against either Cate or Paramo and his Complaint requires dismissal as to both

these parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d

at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims

Plaintiff alleges his “right tomedical care/treatment” and the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment were violated when Defendant Payne

confiscated his medical appliances prior to placing him in Ad-Seg on September 30,

2013. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff alleges to have complained to various “counselors, nurses,

[and] mental health Doctor Solarno, Soto, and [] Parker,” and was “seen by a nurse”

named McFarthor (none of whom is named as a Defendant), who told him to make a

request. Plaintiff alleges he did so on October 6, 7 and 8, 2013, and on October 9, 2013,

was seen by “Dr. Mrs. Ch[au]” who “gave him two copies of [his] appliance chronos,”

and told him to “file a complaint.” Id.

As to Plaintiff’s medical care, only “deliberate indifference to a [his] serious

illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

105 (1976). First, Plaintiff must allege a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that

“failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

(9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). “The existence of an

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment

ortreatment; the presence of a medical condition thatsignificantly affects an individual’s

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daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” Id. at 1059-60.

Here, Plaintiffidentifies himself as a participant in the “mental health (EOP) unit,”

and contends he has medical “chronos” permitting his use of a “vision vest,” sunglasses,

contact lens & cleaner, [and] orthopedic soft . . . shoes,” see Compl. at 4, but his

Complaint contains no further factual content describing the nature of his physical of

mental condition or disability, or how the temporary denial of his medical appliances

while in Ad-Seg affected his daily activities, “result[ed] in further significant injury,” or

caused an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059;

see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Second, even if Plaintiff had alleged a medical need that was sufficiently

objectively serious, he must also include in his Complaint enough factual content to

show that any of the individuals he has identified as Defendants were “deliberately

indifferent” to his needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; see also Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when a prisoner

can show that the official he seeks to hold liable “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and

he must also [have] draw[n] the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994). Specifically, Plaintiff must allege “factual content,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,

which demonstrates “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to [his] pain or possible

medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d

1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is

one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow

v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted);

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” and claims of medical

malpractice or negligence are insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. 

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Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff claims only that Defendant Payne denied him

access to medical appliances that were previously authorized by Dr. Chau when he

placed Plaintiff in Ad-Seg on September 30, 2013, “knowing” that Plaintiff could be

injured. See Compl. at 4. Plaintiff concludes that this denial amounted to “cruel and

unusual punishment.” Id. However, Plaintiff offers no further facts from which the

Court might plausibly infer that Payne, or any other named Defendant deliberately chose

to disregard a substantial or obvious risk to his health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Nor does Plaintiff allege that he was ever actually injured as a result. Resnick,

213 F.3d at 449 (“In a constitutional tort, as in any other, a plaintiff must allege that the

defendant’s actions caused him some injury.”) (citation omitted). 

Thus, without more, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims related to the denial of

his medical appliances contain only the “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a[n

Eighth Amendment] cause of action,” are “supported by mere conclusory statements,”

and therefore, “do not suffice” to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick,

213 F.3d at 446.

E. Due Process

Plaintiff also claims his “due process rights” were denied because he was “placed

in Ad-Seg (hole) for no reason,” on September 30, 2013, and remained “locked up” as

of October 30, 2013, the date of the filing of his Complaint, “due to some confidential

inmate [who] made a false statement against [him].” See Compl. at 5. Plaintiff contends

that unspecified Defendants failed to “investigate t[he] matter,” and that as a result, he

has had to “sit in the dungeon” without privileges “pending [a] transfer” which “could

take up to 120 days or more.” Id.

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty

without the procedural protectionsto which he is entitled. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.

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209, 221 (2005). To state a due process claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at

stake. Id. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from

state law. Id. 

The Due Process Clause by itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in

avoiding more adverse conditions of confinement, and under state law, the existence of

a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the condition of confinement at issue. Id. at 221-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests created by prison

regulations are generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes “atypical and

significant hardship” on the inmate “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

Id. at 221 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th

Cir. 2007).

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the

Constitution because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, sufficient facts related

to the conditions in Ad-Seg which show “the type of atypical, significant deprivation

[that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” 515 U.S. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary

versus discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the

prisoner’s confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his

environment” when compared to those shared by prisonersin the general population; and

(3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted

custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to allege a due process violation, Plaintiff’s Complaint must contain

sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that his

30-day stay in Ad-Seg imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-

84. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, fails to include any “further factual enhancement”

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which might suggest any major disruption in his environment, any comparison to the

conditions of his previous confinement in the general population, or any mention

whatsoever as to its potential effect on the length of his sentence. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff must

offer more that “naked assertions devoid offurther factual enhancement” in order to state

a due process claim; and instead must include “sufficient factual matter,” id., which

demonstrates “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of his confinement that

would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due process. 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485;see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996),

amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). This he has failed to do; therefore the Court

finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-Seg, and

thus, has failed to state a due process claim. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th

Cir. 1997) (concluded that prisoners have no liberty interest in remaining free from

administrative segregation or solitary confinement); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d

1080, 1091 (9th Cir.1985) (finding that administrative segregation is the type of

confinement that should be reasonably anticipated by inmates at some point in their

incarceration), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; see also

Myron, 476 F.3d at 718 (finding no “atypical and significant deprivation” where prisoner 

failed to allege conditions at level IV prison differed significantly from those at a level

III prison). 

Indeed, in Sandin itself, the Supreme Court held that placing an inmate in

administrative segregation for thirty days, the same amount of time Plaintiff alleges he

spent in Ad-Seg at the time his Complaint wasfiled in this case, “did not present the type

of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty

interest.” 515 U.S. at 486.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint also failsto state a due process

claim as to any named Defendant upon which relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d

at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. 

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III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion “to amend for the first time” in which he asks the

Court to “let [him] know what he needs to do to amend his case.” See ECF Doc. No. 5

at 1. 

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in pro se, and he has been provided with “notice

of the deficiencies in his complaint,” the Court will also GRANT his Motion and provide

him with an opportunity to “effectively” amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202,

1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).2

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect the $7.50 initial filing fee assessed by this

Order from Plaintiff’s prison trust account, and shall forward the remaining $342.50

balance of the full fee owed by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s account in

an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and shall

forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds

$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS

ACTION.

/ / /

Finally, the Court notes that while Plaintiff need not allege in his Complaint that he has 2

exhausted all administrative remedies as are available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), see

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (concluding that the “failure to exhaust is an affirmative

defense under the PLRA, and . . . inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate

exhaustion in their complaints.”), it appears from the face of his pleading that his purported

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment may not have been fully exhausted prior to the initiation of

this suit. See Compl. at 7 (noting that Plaintiff “tried to exhaust, and will continue to do so.”)

Plaintiff is hereby advised that “[t]he available remed[y] must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint

under § 1983 may be entertained.” McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (quoting Booth

v. Churner, 523 U.S. 731, 738 (2001) (emphasis added)). “Exhaustion subsequent to the filing

of suit will not suffice.” Id.

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3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

A. Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b); and 

5. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (ECF Doc. No. 5) is GRANTED. Plaintiff

shall have forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is entered into the Court’s

docket in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of

pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to his original pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc.

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended

pleading supersedes the original.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citation omitted) (“All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil

action shall remain dismissed without prejudice and without further Order of the Court

based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

DATED: March 6, 2014

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States District Judge

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