Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08045/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Grand Canyon Trust; Center for Biological 

Diversity; Sierra Club; Havasupai Tribe, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Michael Williams, Forest Supervisor, 

Kaibab National Forest; United States 

Forest Service, an agency in the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, 

Defendants, 

and 

Energy Fuels Resources (USA), 

Incorporated; EFR Arizona Strip LLC, 

DefendantsIntervenors.

No. CV13-8045-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 

 This case arises out of the renewed operation of the Canyon Uranium Mine 

(“Canyon Mine”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants U.S. Forest Service and Michael 

Williams, Supervisor of the Kaibab National Forest, violated environmental and 

historical preservation laws by allowing the mine to resume operations. Energy Fuels 

Resources (USA) Inc. and EFR Arizona Strip LLC (together, “EFR”) have intervened as 

defendants on the ground that they own unpatented mining claims at Canyon Mine and 

conduct operations pursuant to a valid Plan of Operations (“Plan”) approved by the 

Forest Service. Docs. 31, 35. Plaintiffs have filed a motion for a preliminary injunction 

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that seeks to halt mine operations. Doc. 36. The motion is fully briefed. For reasons that 

follow, the Court will deny the motion.1

I. Background. 

 Canyon Mine is a breccia pipe uranium mine located in the Kaibab National 

Forest. The site occupies approximately 17 acres of surface land in Northern Arizona 

and is approximately six miles south of the Grand Canyon National Park boundary and 

35 miles southeast of the Havasupai Reservation. AR 10596, 10628. After having 

conducted exploration activities on the site from 1978 to 1985, Energy Fuels Nuclear, 

Inc., (“EFN”) submitted to the Forest Service a Plan for the Canyon Mine site that 

proposed the development of a uranium mine. AR 10594. After completing an 

Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) under the National Environmental Policy Act 

(“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., the Forest Service issued a Record of Decision 

(“ROD”) approving the Plan, with modifications, on September 26, 1986. 

 Red Butte, a prominent mesa located four miles south of Canyon Mine, is a sacred 

site to the Havasupai Tribe. AR 10605. The Tribe filed a lawsuit challenging the ROD 

on several grounds, including that the Forest Service’s approval of the Plan violated its 

first amendment right to free exercise of religion at the Canyon Mine site. The Forest 

Service’s decision was upheld by the District Court and Ninth Circuit. See Havasupai 

Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff’d sub. nom., Havasupai 

Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Operations started under the Plan, but work was stopped and the mine was placed 

on standby status when uranium prices dropped in 1992. Doc. 39-4 at 12; AR 10594. All 

surface facilities for the mine had been constructed and the vertical underground shaft 

had reached approximately 50 feet. Doc. 39-4 at 12. Denison Mines (“Denison”) 

acquired Canyon Mine from EFN in 1997. Doc. 39-4 at 12; AR 10594. 

 

1

 Oral argument was scheduled for August 23, 2012, but the Court concluded that 

the parties’ briefs were sufficient for the Court to make a fully informed decision. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for oral argument was denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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 Since the 1986 ROD, the National Historical Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 

16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq., which requires federal agencies to “take into account the effect 

of the[ir] undertaking[s] on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included 

in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register,” 16 U.S.C. § 470f, was amended to 

define “historic properties” to include “[p]roperties of traditional religious and cultural 

importance to an Indian tribe . . . [that] may be determined to be eligible for inclusion in 

the National Register,” 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6). Pursuant to that amendment, the Forest 

Service determined in 2010 that Red Butte is eligible for inclusion in the National 

Register of Historic Places as a traditional cultural property (“TCP”). See Doc. 39-6 at 

54-55. Canyon Mine is located within the Red Butte TCP boundary. AR 10606. 

 On July 21, 2009, the Secretary of the Interior published notice of his intent “to 

withdraw approximately 633,547 acres of public lands and 360,002 acres of National 

Forest System lands for up to 20 years from location and entry under the Mining Law of 

1872.” Notice of Proposed Withdrawal, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,887 (July 21, 2009) (“the 2009 

Notice”). After completing an EIS, the Secretary issued a ROD (the “Withdrawal”) on 

January 9, 2012, “withdraw[ing] from location and entry under the Mining Law, subject 

to valid existing rights, approximately 1,006,545 acres of federal land in Northern 

Arizona for a 20-year period[.]” AR 10310. The EIS noted that the withdrawal area 

included four mines with approved Plans that predated the 2009 Notice (including the 

Canyon Mine), and assumed that mining operations would therefore occur in the 

withdrawal area. AR 10314-15. 

 On September 13, 2011, Denison advised the Forest Service that it intended to 

resume mining operations at Canyon Mine under the existing Plan. AR 8611. The letter 

stated that it was Denison’s position “that no action is required by [the Forest Service] in 

connection with Denison’s resuming mining operations under the Plan.” Id. In a followup letter dated November 1, 2011, Denison confirmed that “the resumption of active 

mining operations will not require any changes to Denison’s previously approved mining 

operations under the [Plan] and ROD.” AR 10241-44. Thereafter, the Forest Service 

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requested that Denison postpone resuming mining activities while it conducted a mineral 

examination to verify the validity of the Canyon Mine’s mining claims. Roberts, Decl., 

Doc. 59 at 1-7, ¶¶ 14-15. Denison voluntarily agreed to postpone mining activities in 

response to the Forest Service’s request. Id., ¶ 16. 

 Forest Service mineral examiners evaluated the Canyon Mine mining claims and 

issued a Valid Existing Rights Determination on April 18, 2012 (“VER Determination”). 

Doc. 39-4 at 8. The Forest Service also released a Canyon Mine Review (“Mine 

Review”) on June 25, 2012. AR 10593-637. The review “concluded that no 

modification or amendment to the existing [Plan] is necessary; that no correction, 

supplementation, or revision to the environmental document is required; and that 

operations at the Canyon Mine may continue as a result of no further federal 

authorization being required.” AR 10592. 

 Following a corporate merger transaction, Denison was renamed EFR. AR 10475. 

The news release announcing the merger noted that “[s]haft sinking is expected to begin 

at Canyon mine in the fourth quarter 2012, pending regulatory approval[.]” AR 10478. 

EFR resumed mining operations after the Forest Service completed the Mine Review. 

Doc. 59 at 1-7, ¶ 17. 

 Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts eight claims for relief: (1) the Forest Service violated 

NEPA by failing to supplement the 1986 EIS; (2) the Forest Service violated NEPA in 

deciding not to supplement the 1986 EIS; (3) the Forest Service violated NEPA by 

approving mining operations on lands subject to the Withdrawal; (4) the Forest Service 

violated NHPA by approving mining operations on lands subject to the Withdrawal; 

(5) the Forest Service violated NHPA by not completing a NHPA § 106 consultation as 

required under 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(1); (6) the Forest Service violated the Organic 

Administration Act of 1897 and the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) by 

approving mining operations on lands subject to the Withdrawal; (7) the Forest Service’s 

VER Determination violated the Mining Law of 1872, the Federal Land Policy 

Management Act (“FLPMA”), the Withdrawal, the Organic Administration Act of 1897, 

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and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); and (8) the Forest Service violated its 

regulations and the APA when it decided not to modify the Canyon Mine existing Plan. 

Doc. 1. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction on claims three, four, and five. Doc. 39. 

 Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss seven of Plaintiffs’ eight claims under 

Rule 12(b)(1) on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, fourth, sixth, 

seventh, and eighth claims do not challenge final agency action; (2) Plaintiffs’ fourth 

claim is barred by res judicata; and (3) Plaintiffs’ fourth claim is time-barred. Doc. 71. 

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to stay briefing and consideration of the motion to dismiss 

to allow discovery on jurisdictional defenses. Doc. 74. Because Plaintiffs do not ask the 

Court to stay its consideration of the preliminary injunction motion, the Court will 

resolve that motion with this order. 

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

A. Legal Standard.

 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as a matter of 

right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation 

omitted). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show “that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Id. at 20. The test includes a sliding scale. If a plaintiff shows that 

the balance of hardships will tip sharply in his favor, he need not make as strong a 

showing of the likelihood of success on the merits – the existence of serious questions 

will suffice. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th 

Cir. 2011). 

B. Serious Questions and the Balance of Hardship. 

 To determine whether Plaintiffs can obtain a preliminary injunction by raising 

serious questions as opposed to showing a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court 

will first consider the balance of hardships. Plaintiffs argue that they will suffer the 

following harms if the Court does not promptly enjoin operation of the Canyon Mine: 

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(1) deprivation of an opportunity to participate in the procedural processes of NEPA and 

NHPA “at a time when such participation is calculated to matter” (Doc. 39 at 27 (ellipses 

omitted) (quoting Save Strawberry Canyon v. Dep’t of Energy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 

1189 (N.D. Cal. 2009))); (2) injury to the Havasupai Tribe’s traditional cultural and 

religious interest in the Red Butte TCP (id.); and (3) injury to Plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the 

Kaibab National Forest and the Grand Canyon National Park because the mineshaft will 

drain perched aquifers and degrade regional springs (id. at 28-29). Although the Forest 

Service has previously considered many environmental, cultural, and religious interests 

with respect to the Canyon Mine, and continues to do so (see Doc. 53 at 32-33), Plaintiffs 

have shown a likelihood of irreparable injury. See, e.g., Los Padres Forestwatch v. U.S. 

Forest Serv., 776 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051-52 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that Plaintiff will 

suffer procedural and substantive environmental harm due to alleged NEPA violation); 

Save Strawberry Canyon, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1887 (finding “absent an injunction, 

plaintiff is highly likely imminently to suffer irreparable injury from the alleged NEPA 

breach.”). 

 The Court notes, however, that Plaintiffs significantly delayed seeking injunctive 

relief. The Forest Service issued a press release announcing that it had completed the 

Mine Review on June 25, 2012. AR 10638-39. On the same day, the Forest Service 

notified Plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity and Havasupai Tribe of its Mine 

Review decision. AR 10642, 10690-91. Plaintiffs did not file suit until March 7, 2013 

(Doc. 1), and did not seek a preliminary injunction until April 24, 2013 (Doc. 36). This 

unexplained ten-month delay in seeking injunctive relief “implies a lack of urgency and 

irreparable harm.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., Inc., 762 F.2d 1374, 

1377 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 Defendant-Intervenors identify the following harms that will result from an 

injunction of mine operations: (1) they “will be forced to shut down [their] active 

operations and return the Mine to ready-standby status” at a cost of “at least $945,000” 

per year (Doc. 55 at 27 (citing Roberts Decl., Doc. 59, ¶ 29)); (2) they may “lose most of 

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[their approximately $3.5 million] investment in preparing the Mine for active operations 

since the price of uranium increased in recent years” (id. (citing Doc. 59, ¶ 30)); (3) they 

may “lose the opportunity to capitalize on current uranium market prices and generate 

any of [their] $86 million in expected revenue” (id. (citing Doc. 59, ¶ 31)); (4) “the value 

of [their] unpatented mining claims . . . will be reduced or eliminated” (id. (citing 

Doc. 59, ¶ 31)); and (5) they “will be forced to lay off all twenty-two employees,” and 

replacing the employees “would require at least eight to twelve months, due to their very 

specialized skill and knowledge base” (id. (citing Doc. 59, ¶¶ 32-34)). Although the 

Court finds the alleged effect on the value of the mining claims and the alleged loss in 

expected revenue to be somewhat speculative, see Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1136-39, the 

Court concludes that Defendant-Intervenors have demonstrated a likelihood of significant 

harm. See Amoco Prod. Co v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (noting that 

“the oil company petitioners had committed approximately $70 million to exploration to 

be conducted during the summer of 1985 which they would have lost without chance of 

recovery had exploration been enjoined” and reversing the entry of a preliminary 

injunction). 

 The harm identified by each side of this litigation is serious. Potential injuries to 

Plaintiffs are procedural, religious, and aesthetic, while potential injuries to Defendants 

are financial. Although persons can differ on the respective importance of these kinds of 

injuries, the question is not which side’s potential injury is greater, but whether the 

balance of hardships “tips sharply” in Plaintiff’s favor. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 

632 F.3d at 1131. Given the significant financial losses that might be caused to 

Defendant-Intervenors by an injunction, as well as Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking injunctive 

relief, the Court cannot conclude that the balance tips “sharply” in Plaintiffs’ favor. As a 

result, Plaintiffs cannot obtain a preliminary injunction by raising serious questions; they 

must show a likelihood of success on the merits. 

 C. Likelihood of Success – Claims Three and Four. 

 Claim three alleges that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to prepare 

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environmental assessments or impact statements regarding the VER Determination. 

Claim four alleges that the Forest Service violated NHPA by failing to initiate and 

complete a § 106 consultation in connection with the VER Determination. Defendants 

argue that Plaintiffs’ claims fail because they do not challenge final agency action, a 

jurisdictional requirement under the APA. Doc. 53 at 23. Defendant-Intervenors argue 

that Plaintiffs have not shown that they are adversely affected or aggrieved by the VER 

Determination because no affidavits refer to the VER Determination, let alone complain 

of it. Doc. 55 at 12-13. Additionally, both Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors argue 

that the procedural requirements of NEPA and NHPA were not triggered because the 

VER Determination does not constitute “major Federal action” or a federal 

“undertaking.” Doc. 53 at 22-28, 30-31; Doc. 55 at 13-18. The Court will consider the 

jurisdictional argument first. 

 Because neither NEPA nor NHPA authorizes a private right of action, Sierra Club 

v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1988); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United 

States, 417 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005), Plaintiffs’ third and fourth claims challenge 

the VER Determination under the judicial review provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 702-706; Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). To obtain judicial 

review under the APA, Plaintiffs must establish that (1) that there has been a final agency 

action adversely affecting them, and (2) they have suffered legal wrong or their injury 

falls within the “zone of interests” of NEPA and NHPA. See Ocean Advocates v. U.S. 

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 861 (9th Cir. 2005); see also San Carlos Apache 

Tribe, 417 F.3d at 1096. 

 “‘[F]inal agency action’ is a jurisdictional requirement imposed by [the APA].” 

Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 264 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 5 U.S.C. 

§ 704); see also Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 

591 (9th Cir. 2008). For an agency action to be final, it must: (1) “mark the 

consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) “be one by which rights 

or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” 

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Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 

see also Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(“The core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and 

whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties.”). Both 

conditions must be met for the agency’s action to be considered final, and Plaintiffs bear 

the burden of proving that jurisdiction is proper. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Tuggle, 607 

F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1099 (D. Ariz. 2009). Because claims three and four both challenge 

the VER Determination, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the VER Determination satisfies 

the Bennett final agency action test. 

 1. Consummation of Decisionmaking.

 To satisfy the first prong of Bennett, the action must be the agency’s “last word on 

the matter,” Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 465 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), and “not . . . of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature,” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 

178. In examining the agency action, courts ask whether “[i]t is devoid of any suggestion 

that it might be subject to subsequent revision or further agency consideration or possible 

modification.” Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 543 F.3d at 592 (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). 

 Plaintiffs assert that the VER Determination is the Forest Service’s final word on 

the validity of the Canyon Mine mining claims and that it constitutes final agency action 

because the Forest Service “fails to identify what later process would follow the VER 

Determination for Canyon Mine.” Doc. 63 at 14. Defendants disagree, and argue that 

the VER Determination “is an internal document that the agency uses as a tool in later 

decisionmaking processes or adjudications” (Doc. 53 at 22-23), and that it cannot 

constitute final agency action because “[a]dditional processes would be needed before the 

Forest Service could revoke or invalidate the Plan, even if as a first step the VER 

Determination had reached a finding of invalidity” (id. at 23). 

 The VER Determination confirmed that the Canyon Mine claims were valid at the 

time of the Withdrawal. Doc. 39-4 at 8; Doc. 39-6 at 1. According to the Forest 

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Service’s handbook, a VER Determination is not binding; it is a “statement of belief and 

not [a] formal determination.” AR 7311. This is because “[n]o adjudicative power has 

been given to the Forest Service.” Id. Even though a claim “may lack the elements of 

validity and be invalid in fact, . . . it must be recognized [by the Forest Service] as a claim 

until it has been finally declared invalid by the Department of the Interior or Federal 

courts.” AR 7280; see also AR 7312 (indicating that the mineral examination report 

“will be the basis for a decision on whether or not to contest the claim,” but that it is the 

Department of Interior’s role to rule on claim validity). The U.S. Bureau of Land 

Management (“BLM”), an agency within the U.S. Department of Interior, decides 

whether to contest a mining claim. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.100(a); see also AR 7691 (“The 

Department of Interior (BLM) is the adjudicator of mining claims for the federal mineral 

estate including minerals located on National Forest System Lands.”). The Forest 

Service is an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. See generally AR 7691. 

In any BLM action to challenge mining claims, a VER Determination would serve only 

as evidence. See AR 5901 (“the mineral report can be a powerful tool when submitted 

into evidence at a contest hearing.”). 

 This discussion suggests that the VER Determination is the last action the Forest 

Service can take on the validity of the Canyon Mine mining claims. Because no further 

Forest Service action can be expected, the first prong of the Bennett finality test is 

satisfied. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 543 F.3d at 593. 

 2. Legal Consequences. 

 In determining whether the agency action is “one by which rights or obligations 

have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow,” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 

177-78, courts examine whether the action “impose[s] an obligation, den[ies] a right, or 

fix[es] some legal relationship,” Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 465 F.3d at 986-87 (citations 

and emphasis omitted); see also Cabaccang v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 

627 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The imposition of an obligation or the fixing of a 

legal relationship is the indicium of finality in the administrative process.”). As indicated 

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above, the VER Determination has no binding effect. It is a “statement of belief and not 

[a] formal determination.” AR 7311. 

 Plaintiffs argue, nonetheless, that the VER Determination had legal consequences 

for the Canyon Mine because it was a prerequisite for mining operations to resume. 

Doc. 63 at 14-15 Plaintiffs point to an email from Forest Service archeologist/tribal 

liaison Michael Lyndon stating that he was told by a Forest Service geologist “that 

Denison will not be doing any ‘shaft sinking’ at the site until the minerals exam is 

complete.” AR 10348. From this, Plaintiffs argue that “EFN [sic] recognized that 

mining could not proceed without the VER Determination.” Doc. 63 at 14. Additionally, 

Plaintiffs submit that “[i]t is Forest Service policy (FSM 2803.5) to only allow operations 

on mining claims within a withdrawal that have valid existing rights (VER).” Doc. 63 at 

16 (emphasis omitted) (citing Doc. 39-6 at 4).2

 

 Defendants argue that the VER Determination is an internal document that the 

agency uses as a tool in later decision-making processes or adjudications, but has no legal 

effect by itself. Doc. 53 at 22-23. Defendants point to the BLM Handbook – guidance 

that the Forest Service purports to follow (AR 7691) – which provides that a VER 

Determination serves only two functions: (1) “a professionally prepared and technically 

reviewed report on the merits of the mining claim”; and (2) “a powerful tool when 

 

2

 FSM 2803.5 is not part of the record in this case, but assuming Plaintiffs describe 

it accurately, the policy does not necessarily render the VER Determination one that has 

legal effect, by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow. Forest Service policy is to act consistently with BLM directions with respect to mining claims (AR 7691), and it is not clear that the BLM would require a validity determination before mining operations could resume or continue in a 

withdrawal area under a valid Plan approved before the withdrawal. See AR 11600 (H3809-1 – Surface Management Handbook, § 8.1.1.1: “A Notice or Plan submitted before 

the withdrawal is not exempt from the validity determination requirement if the BLM has not accepted or approved it at the time of the withdrawal.” (emphasis added)); see also 

AR 11602 (H-3809-1 – Surface Management Handbook, § 8.1.5: “Accepted Notices or approved Plans of Operations that were in place prior to the withdrawal or segregation date are not subject to the mandatory valid existing rights determination procedures at 43 C.F.R. § 3809.100(a). These operations may continue as accepted or approved and do not require a validity examination unless or until there is a material change in the activity. . . . The BLM still retains the discretion to assess the validity of any mining claim on any lands that the BLM administers when it would be in the public interest and may choose to do so when there are ongoing operations in withdrawn or segregated lands.”). 

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submitted into evidence at a contest hearing.” AR 5901. The Court agrees with 

Defendants. The limited purpose of a VER Determination is confirmed by Forest Service 

policy providing that the mineral report is “the basis for a decision on whether or not to 

contest the claim.” AR 7312. Thus, although the VER Determination may constitute the 

Forest Service’s view of the Canyon Mine claims’ validity, “[t]his expression of views 

lacks the ‘status of law or comparable legal force.’” Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 543 

F.3d at 594 (citing Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr., 911 F.2d at 264). The Forest Service did “not 

alter the physical reality or the legal standards used to assess that reality simply by 

opining” that the mining rights under the Plan were valid. Id. at 595 (citing Nat’l Ass’n 

of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (agency action that “left the 

world just as it found it . . . cannot be fairly described as implementing, interpreting, or 

prescribing law or policy”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court also agrees 

with Defendant-Intervenors that in issuing the VER Determination, the Forest Service “is 

not approving or denying a privilege (such as a permit) but is verifying only ‘whether 

rights conferred by Congress under the Mining Law have come into existence.’” Doc. 55 

at 14 (quoting Wilderness Soc., 824 F. Supp. at 953) (brackets omitted). The VER 

Determination did not augment any rights or obligations pertaining to the Canyon Mine, 

but simply recognized the state of those existing rights and obligations and “left the world 

just as it found it.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 415 F.3d at 16. 

 As a result, the Court concludes that the VER Determination does not “impose an 

obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship,” Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr., 911 F.2d 

at 264, but instead is more advisory – it expresses an opinion as to the status of the 

Canyon Mine claims. The VER Determination may have had the practical effect of 

paving the way for mining operations to resume, but a practical effect is not synonymous 

with a legal consequence. See Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 543 F.3d at 596-96 (noting 

that it is erroneous to “conflate[] a potential practical effect with a legal consequence 

(emphasis in original)). Thus, although the first Bennett requirement is satisfied, 

Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed in satisfying the second 

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requirement. Because Plaintiffs have not shown that the Court will have jurisdiction to 

review their third and fourth claims under the APA, they have not shown that they are 

likely to succeed on the merits of these claims. The Court need not address the parties’ 

other arguments on these claims. 

 D. Likelihood of Success – Claim Five.

 Claim five alleges that the Forest Service violated NHPA by permitting mining 

operations to resume at the Canyon Mine without having reopened and completed a § 106 

consultation to assess the mine’s likely effects on the Red Butte TCP. Specifically, the 

claim alleges that the Forest Service violated NHPA by determining in the Mine Review 

that 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3) applied and not § 800.13(b)(1). Doc. 1, ¶¶ 94-98; Doc. 39 

at 17-20. Before considering the likelihood of success on the merits of this claim, the 

Court will determine whether the claim challenges final agency action – a jurisdictional 

requirement. 

 1. Final Agency Action. 

 The fifth cause of action does not appear to challenge any agency action, let alone 

final agency action. From the complaint and Plaintiffs’ briefing, the Court could construe 

the claim as challenging the Forest Service’s decision to apply 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3) 

and not (b)(1), but this determination is not “agency action” for APA judicial review 

purposes. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882 (“The meaning of ‘agency action’ for purposes of 

§ 702 is set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), see 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (“For the purposes of 

this chapter . . . ‘agency action’ ha[s] the meaning[g] given . . . by section 551 of this 

title’), which defines the term as ‘the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, 

sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,’ 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551(13).”) Because NHPA, like NEPA, is a “stop, look, and listen” statute, see San 

Carlos Apache Tribe, 417 F.3d at 1097-98, a § 106 consultation is like an EIS in that both 

are preliminary and procedural agency actions, and accordingly the decision to not 

complete a § 106 consultation is reviewable under the APA only if review is also sought 

of a final agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Northcoast Envtl. Ctr. v. Glickman, 

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136 F.3d 660, 670 (9th Cir. 1998) (“There is no reason plaintiffs cannot challenge the 

sufficiency of an agency EIS when a discrete agency action is called for.”). Plaintiffs 

have not established that their fifth cause of action challenges final agency action, and 

thus the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of this claim. 

Because this issue was not raised by the parties, the Court will also address Plaintiffs’ 

likelihood of success on the merits of claim five. 

 2. Merits of Claim Five. 

 The Court will rely on NHPA regulations, promulgated by the Advisory Council 

on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), to guide its review of Defendants’ compliance with 

NHPA. See Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“We rely on NEPA regulations, promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality 

(“CEQ”), to guide our review of an agency’s compliance with NEPA.” (citing Blue 

Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.1998)); see 

also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989) (holding that CEQ 

regulations are entitled to substantial deference). To show a likelihood of success on the 

merits of their fifth cause of action, Plaintiffs must establish that the Forest Service’s 

decision to comply with 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3) rather than (b)(1) was arbitrary and 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)-(2)(A). This is a “highly deferential” standard of review. Nw. 

Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 The § 800 regulations provide federal agencies with guidance in implementing and 

engaging in the NHPA § 106 consultation process. Section 800.13 deals with postreview discoveries. In the case of such a discovery, federal agencies must engage in a 

full § 106 consultation process “[i]f the agency has not approved the undertaking or if 

construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced.” See 36 C.F.R. 

§ 800.13(b)(1). But if the agency “has approved the undertaking and construction has 

commenced,” § 800.13(b)(3) instructs the agency to engage in an expedited review. 

Significantly, neither (b)(1) nor (b)(3) describes the scenario the Forest Service faced 

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here – the undertaking had been approved, construction had commenced, operations 

ceased, and, under the prior undertaking, operations were set to resume. 

 The Forest Service acknowledged in the Mine Review that its prior NHPA § 106 

consultation did not address the Red Butte TCP because at the time Red Butte was not 

eligible for listing on the National Register. AR 10602-03. The Forest Service 

determined that the Red Butte TCP “could be considered a newly ‘discovered’ historic 

property” because it “was only recorded as a TCP and evaluated as eligible for inclusion 

on the [National Register] after the ROD but before the project has been completed.” 

AR 10603. Turning to 36 C.F.R. § 800.13, the Forest Service determined that paragraph 

(b) applied “[b]ecause there was no prior planning for inadvertent discoveries during the 

EIS analysis.” AR 10602. 

 Because “construction for the Mine has commenced,” the Forest Service 

determined that (b)(3) applied. Id. The Forest Service acknowledged that “[t]he Canyon 

Mine project is a somewhat unusual situation in that the Section 106 process was 

completed more than 20 years ago, but there was a long period of inactivity.” AR 10603. 

Additionally, the Forest Service noted that “it is unlikely that there can be an adequate 

discussion or response within [48 hours] . . . [n]evertheless, the current situation seems to 

fall within the intent of 26 C.F.R. 800.13.b, and consulting with the tribes to seek 

reasonable ways to minimize the effects would be prudent.” AR 10603-04. The Forest 

Service notified the Havasupai Tribe and other area tribes, the Arizona State Historic 

Preservation Office (“SHPO”), and ACHP of its determination to proceed under 

§ 800.13(b)(3). See AR 10643-44, 10690-91, 10737-38, 10784-85, 10831-32, 10878-79, 

10925-26, 10972-73, 11019-20, 11066-67, 11113-14, 11160-61, 11207-08, 11254-55. 

 Plaintiffs argue that “before construction recommenced” (Doc. 39 at 18-19 

(emphasis omitted)), the Forest Service was required to engage in a complete § 106 

consultation in accordance with § 800.13(b)(1)’s mandate. But (b)(1) does not say 

“recommenced.” Plaintiffs also argue that (b)(3) applies only if “‘construction’ is, in 

fact, occurring” (Doc. 39 at 17), and submit that the provision serves as an emergency 

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measure to ensure historic properties are not inadvertently damaged during project 

implementation (id. at 18). Plaintiffs contend that because construction was not ongoing 

at Canyon Mine, the process outlined in § 800.13(b)(3) does not logically apply. Instead, 

Plaintiffs argue that § 800.13(b)(1) applies because construction at Canyon Mine had not 

yet commenced when Denison revealed its intent to resume mining operations. Doc. 39 

at 18. In support of their argument, Plaintiffs submit that both ACHP and SHPO advised 

the Forest Service that § 106 consultation was necessary and that it was appropriate to 

proceed under § 800.13(b)(1) rather than § 800.13(b)(3). 

 In a letter dated August 1, 2012, ACHP informed the Forest Service that it ought 

to proceed under § 800.13(b)(1), and not (b)(3), and complete a full § 106 consultation. 

AR 11334-36. ACHP restated this opinion in a letter dated February 6, 2013. 

AR 12346-47. Plaintiffs argue that ACHP’s interpretation of its regulations is entitled to 

substantial deference. Doc. 39 at 19. The Court does not agree. ACHP’s opinion is less 

an interpretation of its regulation than it is an opinion as to how the regulation applies to 

a particular factual scenario. Moreover, Defendants submit that ACHP has subsequently 

determined that (b)(1) did not apply. Doc. 53 at 29-30 (citing Doc. 53-4, ¶¶ 4-5, 8). 

Regardless of the resolution of this factual dispute, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that 

ACHP’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to substantial deference under 

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 454, 461 (1997). The regulation is not ambiguous, and 

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence – legislative history or otherwise – supporting 

ACHP’s conclusion that “[t]he intent of Section 800.13(b)(3) is to provide an expedited 

review process where construction activities have begun and would be ongoing[.]” Id. 

The text of the regulation does not refer to “ongoing” construction. Section 800.13(b)(3) 

plainly applies where “construction has commenced” and (b)(1) where “construction . . . 

has not commenced.” See 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b). Judicial deference to ACHP’s 

statement in the letters would permit ACHP “to create de facto a new regulation” on the 

issue of post-review discoveries after an undertaking has been approved and construction 

is set to recommence. See Christiansen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000). 

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 Notes from a telephone call indicate that SHPO considered the resumption of 

mining operations to be a “new undertaking” (Doc. 39-7 at 54), and that it was necessary 

to complete a § 106 consultation (id.). Plaintiffs do not identify the significance of 

SHPO’s opinion, and the Court cannot find that it is of any more significance than 

ACHP’s letters. 

 In summary, because it appears that the plain language of § 800.13(b)(3) applies to 

this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed in showing that the 

Forest Service’s decision to comply with that provision was arbitrary and capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)-

(2)(A). 

 E. Conclusion.

 Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of claims 

three, four, or five, the Court therefore will deny their request for preliminary injunction. 

The Court need not address the remaining preliminary injunction requirements. 

See Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 906 n.15 (9th Cir. 2007).

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 36) is 

denied. 

 Dated this 9th day of September, 2013. 

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