Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02225/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted December 22, 2015*

Decided December 28, 2015 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2225 

DOROTHY CAIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF MUNCIE, INDIANA, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division. 

No. 13-cv-01127 

Sarah Evans Barker, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Dorothy Cain, a former Parks Department employee for the City of Muncie, 

Indiana, sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 

2000e-17, claiming that she suffered sex discrimination and was retaliated against when 

she complained. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, and Cain 

appeals. We dismiss the appeal. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

Case: 15-2225 Document: 19 Filed: 12/28/2015 Pages: 3
No. 15-2225 Page 2 

We recount the evidence in the light most favorable to Cain, the party opposing 

summary judgment. See Carter v. Chicago State Univ., 778 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). For 

many years Cain worked part-time at the Parks Department (a division of the City rather 

than a separate entity, see Peirick v. Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep’t, 

510 F.3d 681, 694 (7th Cir. 2007); City of Peru v. Lewis, 950 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). 

She worked year-round in some years and seasonally in others. In February 2012 she 

applied for a full-time position and was told by her supervisor, Ivan Gregory, that she 

was the most experienced applicant. A male applicant was hired, though, and when 

Cain pressed for an explanation, Gregory pointed her to the mayor. The mayor, in turn, 

told Cain that the hire had been a political favor. But he also promised that the new 

employee soon would be transferred to a different department, which would give Cain 

another chance at the full-time position. Cain complained informally to a Human 

Resources officer, characterizing the mayor’s intervention as sex discrimination. 

Soon after, male coworkers began engaging in conduct that Cain viewed as 

harassing. One man, wearing only underwear, approached her in the Parks Department 

garage and taunted, “You want to tuck a buck?” (apparently referring to placing 

currency in strippers’ underwear). Gregory, the supervisor, saw this incident but simply 

walked away laughing. Another time, again with Gregory present, that same male 

coworker showed Cain a photo of himself with another male employee partially 

exposing their buttocks to the camera. The second man later asked Cain on several 

occasions—all with Gregory present—if she wanted to see his pierced penis. Several 

other times Cain also witnessed unnamed male coworkers urinating near the garage. 

Meanwhile, Cain also began receiving reprimands. On one occasion Gregory and 

the Human Resources director verbally rebuked her after she and a coworker had 

argued about cleaning a work area. Another time Cain was given a written warning by 

Gregory and the director after she confronted two coworkers (including the man 

involved in the underwear incident) and accused them of improperly discarding 

cleaning supplies and protective clothing. When another coworker later complained that 

Cain had tried telling him how to perform an assigned task, Gregory and the Human 

Resources director gave her a second written warning. 

In August 2012, about a month after she received that second warning, Cain filed 

an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging 

that she had been passed over for promotion and subjected to a hostile work 

environment because of her sex. Cain also alleged that she had been retaliated against 

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No. 15-2225 Page 3 

for complaining about not getting the full-time job. Two months later (at the end of the 

season) Gregory laid off Cain and nine other part-time employees. Although layoffs for 

seasonal employees were routine, Cain reacted by filing a second administrative charge 

with the EEOC, this time alleging that she had been fired in retaliation for submitting the 

earlier charge. The following spring Cain learned that she was not being rehired, a 

decision that Gregory attributed to her conduct underlying the reprimands received the 

previous season. Cain then filed with the EEOC a third administrative charge alleging 

that the decision not to rehire her was retaliatory. 

In her complaint Cain alleged that the City had engaged in discrimination by 

passing her over for full-time work and fostering a “sexually hostile work environment.” 

She also alleged that the City had retaliated against her for complaining of 

discrimination and harassment by condoning the hostile work environment, issuing 

undeserved disciplinary actions, firing her, and not rehiring her. At summary judgment, 

however, the district court concluded that Cain, who was represented by counsel, had 

abandoned her theory that the decision not to give her the full-time position was 

discriminatory, since Cain did not respond to the City’s argument on that theory. The 

district court reasoned that the harassing incidents, although “unfortunate,” were not 

severe or pervasive enough for a jury reasonably to find that Cain was subjected to a 

hostile work environment. The district court further concluded that the evidence at 

summary judgment was not sufficient for a jury reasonably to find that the allegedly 

retaliatory conduct was causally linked to Cain’s administrative complaints. Essentially, 

the court explained, Cain was relying on “suspicious timing” and speculation that the 

warnings she received for her own conduct were pretextual. 

Cain, now pro se, filed a notice of appeal. In her appellate brief, she summarizes 

the factual allegations she made in the district court and says that we “should review” 

the grant of summary judgment on her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. 

Cain’s brief does not include, however, any assertion or argument that the district court 

erred in analyzing the evidence at summary judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); 

Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). Although we construe pro se 

filings liberally, even pro se litigants must follow procedural rules. See McNeil v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 

(7th Cir. 2008). Cain has not presented any appellate claim for us to review. See Ball v. 

City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 2014). Her appeal therefore is DISMISSED. 

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