Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02516/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02516-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLIE JACKSON, #1127789, 

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

C.D.C.R., et al.,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 12-2516 CRB (PR)

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket #145 & 168)

I.

Plaintiff Charlie Jackson is currently incarcerated at the Northern Nevada

Correctional Center in Carson City, Nevada. But on June 11, 2012, while he was

incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison in San Quentin, California (SQSP),

plaintiff filed a pro se prisoner complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this court

challenging various conditions of his confinement at SQSP. After several rounds

of dismissals with leave to amend and amended complaints, plaintiff filed the

operative Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleging that at various times in

2010, while he was at SQSP, SQSP doctors Fong, Burton and Freiha denied him

treatment for his mental illnesses (including depression and anxiety) despite his

asking them for treatment. 

Per order filed on January 30, 2014, the court screened the TAC under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A and found that, liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations appear

to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs against doctors Fong, Burton and Freiha. (The court found that plaintiff

also appeared to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against doctor Sprick, but Sprick

later was dismissed without prejudice because he could not be located.) 

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1

Because defendants Fong and Burton moved for summary judgment

before defendant Freiha, plaintiff filed two sets of opposition papers.

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Defendants Fong, Burton and Freiha now move for summary judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on the ground that plaintiff failed to

properly exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit, as required

by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). They also argue that they

are entitled to qualified immunity. After being advised of what is required of him

to oppose defendants’ motion, plaintiff filed an opposition and defendants filed a

reply.1

II. 

Plaintiff claims defendants Fong, Burton and Freiha were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment

when they denied him treatment for his mental illnesses. 

Plaintiff specifically alleges that he met with Fong on June 15, 2010 “for

the purpose of a mental health consultation,” but during the consultation Fong

“told the plaintiff he did not qualify for inclusion in the mental health program.” 

TAC (dkt. #103) ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff also alleges that he “was seen on June 30, 2010 by Dr. Frieha (or

Freihas) [sic] in response to the C.D.C.R. form 7362 health care services request

form he submitted on June 24, 2010.” Id. ¶ 8. During this meeting, plaintiff

“detailed his extensive history of mental illness dating back to age four,” but

Freiha “denied plaintiff’s request informing him he does not ‘dictate the program

and would not be provided treatment.’” Id.

Plaintiff further alleges that on August 27, 2010, he met with Burton, who

denied plaintiff’s request to be “placed in ad-Seg [administrative segregation] to

deal with mental health issues.” Id. ¶ 13. 

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III.

“The PLRA mandates that inmates exhaust all available administrative

remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison conditions,’ including, but not

limited to, suits under § 1983.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.

2014) (en banc) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). To the extent

that the evidence in the record permits, the appropriate procedural device for

pretrial determination of whether administrative remedies have been exhausted

under the PLRA is a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. at 1168. 

The burden is on the defendant to prove that there was an available

administrative remedy that the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Id. at 1172. If the

defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to present evidence

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. Id.

The ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant, however. Id.

If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner

shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under

Rule 56. Id. at 1166. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment

should be denied and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the

facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id.

IV.

The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall

be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although once within the discretion of the district court,

exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v.

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Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). All available remedies must now be

exhausted; those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be

‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Id. (citation omitted). Even when the prisoner

seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages,

exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

(2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a prerequisite to all prisoner suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at

532. PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” of available

administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). Proper

exhaustion requires using all steps of an administrative process and complying

with “deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id. at 90.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

provides any inmate or parolee under its jurisdiction the right to appeal “any

policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff that

the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon

his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). To

initiate an appeal, the inmate or parolee must submit a CDCR Form 602

describing the issue to be appealed to the appeals coordinator’s office at the

institution or parole region for receipt and processing. Id. § 3084.2(a) - (c). The

appeal must name “all staff member(s) involved” and “describe their involvement

in the issue.” Id. § 3084.2(a)(3). CDCR’s appeal process consists of three formal

levels of appeals: (1) first formal level appeal filed with one of the institution’s

appeal coordinators, (2) second formal level appeal filed with the institution head

or designee, and (3) third formal level appeal filed with the CDCR director or

designee. Id. §§ 3084.7, 3084.8. A prisoner exhausts the appeal process when he

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completes the third level of review. Id. § 3084.1(b); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d

681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010). A “cancellation or rejection” of an appeal “does not

exhaust administrative remedies.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). 

Defendants properly raise failure to exhaust in a Rule 56 motion for

summary judgment and argue that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust available

administrative remedies as to his deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

claim against them before filing suit. Defendants specifically argue that plaintiff

did not file an appeal in a manner that complied with the California Code of

Regulations because he waited nearly two years to file an appeal, and the appeal 

consequently was cancelled as untimely. They note that the regulations require

an inmate to submit an appeal within 30 days from when the incident or issue

occurred. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8. 

In support, defendants submit evidence showing that from 2009 to 2014,

plaintiff submitted only one inmate appeal regarding inadequate mental health

treatment by defendants Fong, Burton or Freiha. Almares Decl. (dkt. #171) ¶¶ 5-

6; Robinson Decl. (dkt. #170) ¶¶ 7-8. In March 2012, plaintiff submitted appeal

SQ-HC-12036540, complaining that the mental health department at SQSP was

deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs. He specifically noted the

encounters he had with Fong, Burton and Freiha in 2010, and asked that they be

disciplined and fined. Almares Decl. Ex. A; Robinson Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. B. On

March 28, 2012, SQ-HC-12036540 was screened, canceled and returned to

plaintiff at the first level of review because there was too large of a lapse in time

between when the events in the appeal occurred and when plaintiff filed the

appeal. Almares Decl. Ex. A; Robinson Decl. Ex. B. The decision explained that

plaintiff failed to file an appeal within 30 days of first having knowledge of the

action or decision being appealed, as required by the regulations; and that

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plaintiff could not resubmit the cancelled appeal unless he filed a separate appeal

regarding the cancellation and that separate appeal was granted. Id.

In April 2012, plaintiff filed a separate appeal challenging the cancellation

decision in SQ-HC-12036540 on the ground that he was mentally and physically

unable to file the appeal before March 2012. Almares Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 & Ex. B. The

new appeal was assigned log number SQ-HC-12036596. Id. On April 26, 2012,

SQ-HC-12036596 was denied at the first level of review on the ground that

plaintiff’s medical records and other information provided by the medical records

department confirmed that plaintiff was mentally and physically able to file 

SQ-HC-12036540 within the time limit set by the regulations. Id. Ex. B. 

Plaintiff appealed, but the second level of review affirmed the first-level decision

on May 31, 2012, and the third level of review canceled and closed the appeal on

January 11, 2013 because plaintiff had been discharged from CDCR. Robinson

Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. C. 

The evidence submitted by defendants meets their burden of showing that

there was an available administrative remedy that plaintiff failed to properly

exhaust in connection with his deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

claim against defendants Fong, Burton and Freiha. See Albino, 747 F.3d at

1172. The burden now shifts to plaintiff to present evidence showing that there

is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. See id.

Under the law of the circuit, evidence of actions by prison officials

preventing proper exhaustion meet plaintiff’s burden of production because, if

true, such actions would make administrative remedies effectively unavailable. 

See Williams v. Paramo, No. 13-56004, 2015 WL 74144, at *7 (9th Cir. Jan. 7,

2015). So would improper screening of a prisoner’s administrative grievances. 

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See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). But to fall within this

exception, the prisoner must show “that he attempted to exhaust his

administrative remedies but was thwarted by improper screening.” Id. He must

show “(1) that he actually filed a grievance or grievances that, if pursued through

all levels of administrative appeals, would have sufficed to exhaust the claim that

he seeks to pursue in federal court, and (2) that prison officials screened his

grievance or grievances for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by

applicable regulations.” Id.

A.

Plaintiff argues that the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA do not

apply to him in this case because he filed the operative TAC after he was released

from SQSP (and before he was incarcerated again in Nevada). Not so.

Under the law of the circuit, “individuals who are prisoners (as defined by

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)) at the time they file suit must comply with the exhaustion

requirements of [the PLRA].” Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1023-24 (9th

Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). A former prisoner who files suit after he is

released from prison consequently need not comply with the exhaustion

requirements of the PLRA. See id. at 1024. But a prisoner who files suit before

he is released from prison must comply with the exhaustion requirements of the

PLRA. See Anderson v. Deleon, No. C 12-6055 SI (PR), 2014 WL 3595020, at

*6 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (“Although [the plaintiff] is now out of custody, the

exhaustion requirement in § 1997e(a) applies because he was a prisoner at the

time he filed this action, and the statute plainly requires exhaustion by a

‘prisoner.’ [The plaintiff’s] subsequent release from custody after he filed this

action does not excuse the need to exhaust before filing this action.”); accord

Dixon v. Triesch, No. 1:12cv01449 LJO DLB, 2003 WL 6670436, at *3 (E.D.

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Cal. Dec. 18, 2013); Smedley v. Reid, No. 08cv1602 BTM (BLM), 2010 WL

391831, at **3-4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2010). The deciding factor is whether the

individual was a prisoner at the time he filed suit, not whether he was a prisoner

at the time he filed any subsequent amended pleadings. Because it is undisputed

that plaintiff was a prisoner at SQSP when he filed this action in 2012, he must

comply with the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA. 

B.

Plaintiff argues that the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA do not

apply to the operative TAC under the rationale of Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d

1002 (2010). Plaintiff’s reliance on Rhodes (and its progeny) is misplaced.

In Rhodes, the Ninth Circuit addressed the holding in McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002), that exhaustion must occur prior to the filing of

the original complaint. The issue was whether new claims brought in an

amended complaint were barred under McKinney if plaintiff had failed to

exhaust them before he filed the original complaint. The court held that the new

claims, which were based on actions that took place after the original complaint

was filed, were not barred under McKinney so long as plaintiff exhausted them

prior to the filing of the amended complaint. 621 F.3d at 1006. And in the

subsequent case of Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014), the court

added that even new claims based on actions that took place before the original

complaint was filed, were not barred under McKinney so long as plaintiff

exhausted them prior to the filing of the amended complaint. 739 F.3d at 1220. 

But the court in neither Rhodes nor Cano eliminated the well-established

requirement that a plaintiff must properly exhaust by using all steps of the

administrative process and complying with “deadlines and other critical

procedural rules.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. The plaintiffs in both Rhodes and

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Cano properly and fully exhausted available administrative remedies as to the

new claims they brought in their amended complaints. Neither Rhodes nor Cato

excuse as a matter of law plaintiff’s failure to properly exhaust by filing a timely

appeal under CDCR’s regulations. 

C.

Plaintiff argues that if the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA apply to

him, the court should excuse his failure to file a timely appeal based on mental 

incapacitation. Plaintiff specifically argues that he was unable to file a timely

appeal in connection with his claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs in and around 2010 because he was “mentally incapacitated” in 2010. 

Opp’n (dkt. #164) at 15. 

Plaintiff raised essentially the same claim to CDCR in April 2012, when

he sought reinstatement of his cancelled untimely appeal on the ground that he

was mentally and physically unable to file the appeal before March 2012. See

Almares Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 & Ex. B. The claim was rejected on the ground that

plaintiff’s medical records and other information provided by the medical records

department confirmed that plaintiff was mentally and physically able to file a

timely appeal in 2010. Id. Ex. B. Here, a review of the record of health care

inmate appeals plaintiff filed while in the custody of CDCR also compels that his

incapacitation claim be rejected. The record shows that plaintiff was able to file 

a timely appeal of defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs in June and August 2010 because plaintiff filed at least three

health care appeals during that time – SQ HC 11017200 filed August 4, 2010; SQ

HC 11017279 filed August 12, 2010; and SQ HC 11017666 filed October 4,

2010. See Robinson Decl. Ex. A. 

Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient evidence to rebut defendants’ showing

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The court need not decide whether defendants also are entitled to

qualified immunity.

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that plaintiff did not properly exhaust available administrative remedies in

connection with his deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against

them by using all steps of CDCR’s administrative process and complying with its

“deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. The

court is satisfied that defendants have met their ultimate burden of proving failure

to properly exhaust by setting forth uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff failed

to follow prison deadlines and procedures when he submitted his appeal nearly

two years after defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference. See Williams, 2015

WL 74144, at *7 (noting that evidence of failure to follow prison procedures may

be sufficient for summary judgment for failure to properly exhaust). 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (dkt.

#145 & 168) for failure to properly exhaust under the PLRA is GRANTED.2

 

The clerk is instructed to enter judgment in accordance with this order and

to close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Feb. 17, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\CR.12\Jackson, C.12-2516.msj.wpd

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