Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01499/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROL C.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security,

1

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv1499-AJB(MSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING JOINT MOTION FOR 

JUDICIAL REVIEW [ECF NO. 20]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony J. 

Battaglia, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local

Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. On 

June 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial 

 

1

 On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See 

https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited on January 24, 2020). The Court 

substitutes Andrew Saul for his predecessor, Nancy A. Berryhill, as the defendant in this action. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing that “[a]ny action instituted in accordance with this 

subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of 

Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person 

holding the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant.”). 

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review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for a 

period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for Judicial Review. For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Judgment be entered 

reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further 

administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff filed her first application for disability insurance 

benefits, alleging disability beginning on April 2, 2008. (Certified Admin. R. 170, ECF No. 

15 (“AR”).) After the application was denied initially and on reconsideration, on 

November 27, 2009, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). (Id.) On November 9, 2010, a hearing was held before ALJ Larry Parker (“the 

first ALJ”), during which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (Id. at 143-66.) A 

vocational expert (“VE”) was also present. (See id.) On November 24, 2010, the first ALJ

found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 167-79.) On January 20, 2011, Plaintiff

requested that the Appeals Council review the first ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 230-32.)

On February 9, 2011, before the Appeals Council made its decision, Plaintiff filed a 

second application for disability benefits, alleging disability beginning on November 25, 

2010. (Id. at 373-81.) After Plaintiff’s second application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration, on November 1, 2011, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Id.

at 247-48.)

On July 27, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the first 

ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 190-96.)

On October 10, 2013, a hearing was held on Plaintiff’s second application before 

ALJ Peter Valentino (“the second ALJ”), during which Plaintiff was represented by 

counsel. (Id. at 98-42.) Two medical experts and a VE were also present. (See id.) On 

October 29, 2013, the second ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 200-15.)

/ / /

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On November 14, 2013, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review of the second

ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 357-59.)

On November 2, 2012, Plaintiff appealed the denial of her first application by 

filing a complaint in district court, and on January 7, 2014, the district court reversed 

and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. See Cooper v. Colvin, 

Civil Case No. 12cv2673 AJB (DHB), 2014 WL 50810 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2014) (“Carol C. I”). 

On August 27, 2014, pursuant to the order of the district court, the Appeals Council 

vacated the denials of benefits for Plaintiff’s first and second applications. (AR at 227-

28.) The Appeals Council consolidated the matters and ordered further administrative 

proceedings. (Id.)

On July 24, 2017, a hearing was held before the second ALJ (ALJ Valentino) on 

Plaintiff’s first and second applications, during which Plaintiff was represented by 

counsel. (Id. at 33-97.) Two medical experts, Dr. Arthur Lorber, M.D. and Dr. Julian 

Kivowitz, M.D., and a VE were also present. (See id.) On March 2, 2018, the second ALJ

found that Plaintiff was not disabled (“the second ALJ’s decision after remand”). (Id. at 

4-20.) On June 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) 

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJS’ FINDINGS

In rendering their decisions, both the first and second ALJs followed the 

Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

A. The First ALJ’s Decision

At step one, the first ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since April 2, 2008, the alleged onset date. (AR at 172). At step two, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following impairments: headache syndrome, right knee 

internal derangement, fibromyalgia, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. (Id.) At 

step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (Id. at 173.) Next, the ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as 

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defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that she must avoid concentrated exposure to 

cold, vibrations and hazards, and she is limited to performing simple tasks.” (Id. at 174.)

At step four, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical 

person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC would be unable to perform any of her

past relevant work. (Id. at 177-78.) The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the 

sequential evaluation process. (Id. at 178-79.) Based on the VE’s testimony that a 

hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC could perform the 

requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy—such as production inspector, hand packager, and production assistant—the 

first ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.)

B. The Second ALJ’s Decision

At step one, the second ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since November 25, 2010, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 202.) At step 

two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following impairments: “fibromyalgia, bilateral 

knee pain due to internal derangement and torn meniscus, status post multiple knee 

surgeries, irritable bowel syndrome, depression, and anxiety disorder” (post-traumatic 

stress disorder and panic disorder). (Id. at 202-03.) At step three, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in the Commissioner’s 

Listing of Impairments. (Id. at 206.) Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC

to do the following work:

perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and which involves 

lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time, frequently lifting and carrying of 

up to ten pounds, standing or walking up to six hours in an eight-hour 

workday, and sitting intermittently during the remaining time; except she 

must avoid concentrated exposure to cold, vibrations, and hazards; and is 

limited to simple, repetitive tasks and limited public contact. 

(Id.)

/ / /

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At step four, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical 

person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC would be unable to perform any of her 

past relevant work. (Id. at 213-14.) The ALJ proceeded to step five of the sequential 

evaluation process. (Id. at 214-15.) Based on the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical 

person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC could perform the requirements of 

occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national economy—such as

garment folder, assembler (small products), and bagger (garments)—the second ALJ

found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.)

C. The District Court’s Previous Decision to Remand

In reviewing the denial of Plaintiff’s first application for disability benefits, 

Magistrate Judge David H. Bartick issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

recommending that the case be remanded for further administrative proceedings. See

Carol C. I, 2014 WL 50810, at *2. Judge Bartick concluded that the first ALJ erred by 

rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Gayle Jensen, Psy.D. Id. at 

*17. Judge Bartick found that the four reasons given by the first ALJ for rejecting Dr. 

Jensen’s opinion were not specific and legitimate, and were not supported by 

substantial evidence. Id. Neither party filed objections. Id. at *1. District Judge 

Anthony J. Battaglia adopted the R&R and remanded the case for further administrative 

proceedings. Id.

D. The Second ALJ’s Decision After Remand

After the case was remanded, the second ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 2, 2008, the alleged onset date. 

(AR at 6.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following impairments: 

headache syndrome, right knee internal derangement, fibromyalgia, depressive 

disorder, and anxiety disorder. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 

severity of one of the impairments listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. 

(Id. at 7.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform the following work:

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lift and/or carry ten pounds frequently, twenty pounds occasionally; she 

can stand and/or walk for four hours out of an eight-hour workday one 

hour at a time; she can sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday one 

hour at a time with a sit/stand option; she could use foot pedals 

occasionally; she could do postural activities occasionally except she is not 

to climb ladders, kneel or crawl; she is to avoid all exposure to unprotected 

heights and dangerous machinery; and she is limited to simple, repetitive 

tasks.

(Id. at 9.) 

At step four, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical 

person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC would be unable to perform any of her 

past relevant work as a medical assistant. (Id. at 18-19.) The ALJ proceeded to step five 

of the sequential evaluation process. (Id. at 19-20.) Based on the VE’s testimony that a 

hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC could perform the 

requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy—such as cashier, small products assembler, and document preparer—the 

second ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.)

III. DISPUTED ISSUES

As reflected in parties’ Joint Motion for Judicial Review, Plaintiff is raising the 

following two issues as the grounds for reversal and remand: 

1. Whether the ALJ2 properly considered the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician, Dr. Jensen (J. Mot. Jud. Review 5, ECF No. 20 (“J. Mot.”)); and

2. Whether the ALJ properly considered the testimony of medical expert, Dr. 

Kivowitz, regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment. (Id.)

/ / /

/ / /

 

2 For the remainder of this R&R, “the ALJ” or “the ALJ’s decision,” when used to refer to an ALJ or 

decision in the administrative record, refers to the second ALJ’s decision after remand, unless noted 

otherwise. 

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of 

judicial review is limited, and the denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record and contains no legal error. Id.; Molina 

v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)); 

see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, an ALJ’s decision must be upheld. 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). This includes deferring to an

ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis v. 

Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). Even if the reviewing court finds that 

substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision 

if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and 

reaching his or her decision. See Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 

1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

V. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Did Not Properly Consider the Opinion of Treating Physician, Dr. Jensen

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons for 

assigning little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Jensen. (J. 

Mot. at 8.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he concluded that Dr. 

Jensen’s opinion was unsupported by objective clinical findings, and inconsistent with 

the record and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. (See id. at 8-10.) The Commissioner 

asserts that the ALJ’s reasons for affording little weight to Dr. Jensen’s opinion are 

specific, legitimate, and supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 14-21.) 

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1. Applicable law

Three types of physicians may offer opinions in Social Security cases: “(1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the 

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the 

claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A treating physician’s opinion is generally given more weight than that of a physician

who did not treat the claimant. See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1).

A treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight if inconsistent 

with other substantial evidence in the record. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 

2007). However, “[t]o reject the opinion of a treating physician which conflicts with that 

of an examining physician, the ALJ must ‘make findings setting forth specific, legitimate

reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.’” Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 

(9th Cir. 1987)). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough 

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, 

and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (per 

curiam) (citing Swanson v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 

1985)); see also Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The ALJ must 

do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and 

explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct. . . . [I]t is incumbent on the ALJ 

to provide detailed, reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the physicians’

findings.”). 

2. Analysis

a. The first ALJ’s reasoning

The first ALJ considered Dr. Jensen’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to complete 

a normal workweek without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms or 

perform activities within a schedule. (AR at 177.) The first ALJ gave the opinion little 

weight, stating the following:

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The undersigned has also considered the [October 2010] checklist form 

completed by Dr. Jensen, wherein she opines the claimant is unable to 

complete a normal workweek without interruptions from psychologically 

based symptoms or perform activities within a schedule. Not only does this 

opinion contradict her own report completed in April 2009 as well as Dr. 

Engelhorn’s evaluation, this form is internally contradictory. Dr. Jensen 

claims the claimant cannot complete a normal workweek, yet she also 

states the claimant has no difficulties whatsoever completing both simple 

and complex tasks and has no deficiencies of concentration, persistence or 

pace resulting in frequent failure to complete tasks in a time [sic] manner. 

Finally, Dr. Jensen provided no objective medical records or clinical findings 

to support this form. The Administrative Law Judge gives Dr. Jensen’s 

opinion little weight since it is not supported by acceptable clinical and 

laboratory findings and conflicts with the weight of the medical evidence. 

In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned notes that the Social Security 

Administration may only give controlling weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion when the treating physician’s opinion is supported by the 

appropriate signs and diagnostic tests and is not inconsistent with the other 

evidence of record.

(Id. (internal citations omitted).) The district court summarized the first ALJ’s findings as 

follows: “[t]he ALJ dismissed [Dr. Jensen’s opinion contained in the October 2010 

checklist form] on the basis that it: (1) contradicted Dr. Jensen’s own report completed 

in April 2009;3(2) contradicted Dr. Engelhorn’s evaluation; (3) contained internal 

inconsistencies; and (4) was not supported by objective evidence.” Carol C. I, 2014 WL 

50810, at *11. In its 2013 decision remanding the first ALJ’s decision, the district court 

found that the first ALJ committed legal error by giving little weight to Dr. Jensen’s 

opinion contained in the October 2010 checklist form. See id. at *1, *11-17. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 

3

 Dr. Jensen’s October 2010 checklist form and April 2009 report referenced in the first ALJ’s decision 

are not contained in the administrative record currently before the Court. 

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b. The second ALJ’s reasoning 

The second ALJ’s decision before remand cited an opinion from Dr. Jensen that 

Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in her ability to “maintain regular attendance and be 

punctual,” and “moderately limited” in her ability to “complete a normal workday

without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, performing at a consistent 

pace without an unreasonable number of and length of rest periods,” and “accept 

instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors.” (AR at 685-86.) 

This opinion, and the records upon which it is based, are included in the administrative 

record currently before the Court. (Id. at 547, 685-86.) The second ALJ gave the opinion 

“some” weight, stating the following:

On April 13, 2011, Dr. Jensen completed a questionnaire indicating that the 

claimant had no limitations in all domains, except for marked impairment in 

maintaining regular attendance and being punctual, and moderate 

limitations in completing a normal work day and accepting instructions and 

responding appropriately to criticism. The undersigned gives this only 

some weight. The undersigned agrees that the claimant would have mostly 

no functional limitations. Such a finding is consistent with the claimant’s 

normal activities of daily living and ability to care for her young son. The 

undersigned also finds that the claimant would have moderate limitations 

in some areas of social functioning, such as responding to criticism given 

her history of abuse and history of anxiety disorders. However, the 

undersigned does not agree that the claimant would have marked 

limitation in any areas, particularly maintaining attendance. Her ability to 

care for her young son and run a household, sometimes alone, her normal 

mental status examination at her consultative examination, and her ability 

to attend many medical appointments (many of which yielded no or few 

objective findings) all show that she was able to leave the house frequently 

and attend to tasks regularly. 

(Id. at 211-12 (internal citations omitted).)

In the second ALJ’s decision after remand, the ALJ again considered Dr. Jensen’s 

opinion that Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in her ability to “maintain regular 

attendance and be punctual,” and “moderately limited” in her ability to “complete a 

normal workday without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, 

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performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number of and length of rest 

periods,” and “accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors.” (Id. at 685-86.) The ALJ assigned “little” weight to the opinion, stating the 

following:

The undersigned has considered and gives little weight to G. Jensen, Ph.D., 

who filled out a temporary off work form on April 29, 2008 and filled out a 

residual functional capacity [RFC] questionnaire on April 13, 2011 opining 

none, moderate, and marked limitations. The undersigned has given little 

weight to this opinion because it is not supported by objective evidence 

and it is inconsistent with the record as a whole. Dr. Jensen primarily 

summarized in the treatment notes the claimant’s subjective complaints, 

diagnoses, and treatment, but he did not provide objective clinical or 

diagnostic findings to support the functional assessment. This opinion is 

inconsistent with the objective findings already discussed . . . in this 

decision, which show mostly normal mood and affect. This opinion is also 

inconsistent with the claimant’s admitted activities of daily living that have 

already been described . . . in this decision. 

(Id. at 18 (internal citation omitted).)

4

 

“It is well established that the district court may not resolve a social security case 

de novo and reach its own conclusions from the evidence.” Guttilla v. Astrue, Civil No. 

09cv2259 MMA(RBB), 2010 WL 5313318, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010) (citing Garner 

v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.1984)). The Court limits its inquiry to the reasons 

the ALJ stated in his decision. See id. The Court will therefore address each of the ALJ’s 

stated reasons for discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Jensen.

 

4 The April 29, 2008 “temporary off work form” and the April 13, 2011 functional capacity 

questionnaire were not included in the administrative record previously provided to the district court. 

(See AR at 177 (first ALJ’s decision referring to Dr. Jensen’s “checklist form” and April 2009 report, as 

well Dr. Engelhorn’s evaluation)); see also Carol C. I, 2014 WL 50810, at *11-12 (referring to Dr. 

Jensen’s October 2010 “checklist form” and April 2009 report, as well as Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion). 

They are, however, part of the administrative record before the Court in this case. (See AR at 547 

(Claim for Disability Insurance Benefits Doctor’s Certificate dated April 29, 2008), 658-86 (Mental Work 

Restriction Questionnaire dated April 13, 2011).) 

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i. Objective evidence

In the second ALJ’s decision after remand, the first reason the ALJ gave for 

affording Dr. Jensen’s opinion little weight is that the opinion was not based on 

objective evidence because “Dr. Jensen primarily summarized in the treatment notes 

the claimant’s subjective complaints, diagnoses, and treatment, but he did not provide

objective clinical or diagnostic findings to support the functional assessment.” (Id.) In 

reaching this conclusion, the ALJ did not cite a specific portion of the record or explain 

why Dr. Jensen’s extensive treatment records are “primarily” a “summary” of Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints, rather than objective clinical or diagnostic findings. 

While Dr. Jensen’s opinion is based, at least in part, on Plaintiff’s self-reported 

symptoms, “the rule allowing an ALJ to reject opinions based on self-reports does not 

apply in the same manner to opinions regarding mental illness.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 

F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Psychiatric evaluations may appear subjective, 

especially compared to evaluation in other medical fields. Diagnoses will always depend 

in part on the patient’s self-report, as well as on the clinician’s observations of the 

patient. But such is the nature of psychiatry.”); see also Poulin v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 865, 

873 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted) (“A physical or mental impairment must 

‘result[] from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are 

demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’

However, unlike a broken arm, a mind cannot be x-rayed[.]”).

Further, Dr. Jensen did not “primarily summar[ize]” Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints. Rather, Dr. Jensen provided objective clinical and diagnostic findings. 

Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Jensen on April 25, 2008, complaining of migraine headaches, 

severe anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and obsessivecompulsive disorder (“OCD”), as well as grief, and severe relational difficulties. (AR at 

542.) On April 25, 2008, Dr. Jensen completed a psychiatric diagnostic evaluation of 

Plaintiff, which resulted in a diagnosis, treatment plan, and prognosis. (Id. at 542-43.) 

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The record also contains progress notes from over forty visits beginning in 2011. (Id. at 

678-90, 1553-97.)5 

On April 29, 2008, Dr. Jensen completed a “Claim for Disability Insurance Benefits 

Doctor’s Certificate,” in which she diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder 

with recurrent and severe psychotic features, PTSD, and general anxiety disorder. (Id. at 

547.) Dr. Jensen reported: “[f]earfulness every day for 27 days, vegetative symptoms, 

insomnia, loss of appetite, hopelessness and helplessness, social withdrawal, 

heightened worry, frequent nightmares, flashbacks.” (Id.) Plaintiff continued treatment 

with Dr. Jensen two to four times per month until April 6, 2011. (Id. at 687.)

On April 13, 2011, Dr. Jensen completed a “Mental Work Restriction

Questionnaire,” where she stated that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

(1) major depressive disorder—recurrent, moderate to severe; (2) obsessive-compulsive 

disorder; (3) panic disorder without agoraphobia; (4) PTSD; and (5) insomnia. (Id. at 

685-86.) The questionnaire asked Dr. Jensen to “identify the tests she administered 

which verify or tend to verify the existence of the impairment or disorder,” and she 

responded: (1) “[e]ndorses 5 symptoms DSM-IV6crit. for Major Depressive Episode;”

(2) “[e]ndorses the 4 criteria from DSM-IV for O.C.D.;” (3) “[e]ndorses 7 symptoms DSMIV crit. for Panic Attack;” (4) “[e]ndorses 7 symptoms DSM-IV crit. for PTSD;” and 

(5) “[m]eets 5 criteria from DSM-IV for Primary Insomnia.” (Id. at 685.) Dr. Jensen also

noted that Plaintiff was “very sensitive” to medication and had “severe side effects from 

all the depression and anxiety medications she ha[d] tried.” (Id. at 686.)

 

5 The Court notes that the administrative record contains multiple copies of Dr. Jensen’s records. The 

first set of copies is located in AR at 542-49 (containing Dr. Jensen’s records from 2008), 678-90 

(containing Dr. Jensen’s records from January 2011 to April 2011), and 1553-97 (containing Dr. Jensen’s 

records from May 2011 to March 2013). The second set is located in AR at 2063-107. Additional 

copies of the 2008 records are located in AR at 2446. For ease of reference, citations to a document in 

the record will be to the first set of copies containing the document, as the copies appear in the record. 

6

“DSM-IV” refers to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 

Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000).

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On April 13, 2011, Dr. Jensen completed an “Evaluation Form for Mental 

Disorders,” which asked her to describe, under the “mental status examination” section, 

Plaintiff’s attitude, behavior, intellectual functioning/sensorium, and affective status. 

(Id. at 688.) Dr. Jensen stated that Plaintiff “can be emotionally labile” and “very 

sensitive to criticism [and can] become defensive.” (Id.) With respect to intellectual 

functioning, Dr. Jensen noted that “[p]rolonged concentration (e.g. for reading) can be 

difficult for [Plaintiff] if she is poorly rested, anxious, tearful or experiencing a migraine.”

(Id.) Dr. Jensen stated that Plaintiff suffers from anxiety, depression, and fearfulness, 

gets upset if her routines are disturbed, and is extremely cautious about locking doors. 

(Id.) Dr. Jensen also noted that Plaintiff can perform all activities of daily living 

“although sometimes it is very effortful.” (Id. at 689.) With respect to Plaintiff’s “ability 

to adapt to stresses common to the work environment including . . . interaction with 

supervisors,” Dr. Jensen wrote “unknown.” (Id.) Under “diagnosis,” Dr. Jensen cited 

multiple sections of the DSM. (Id. at 690.) Dr. Jensen additionally noted that Plaintiff 

can perform tasks “unless she has a migraine or a flare up of fibromyalgia.” (Id. at 689.)

Finally, Dr. Jensen stated that Plaintiff could not handle medication, and therefore it was 

unlikely that Plaintiff’s symptoms would improve. (Id. at 690.) 

In the context of psychology and psychiatry, Dr. Jensen’s records constitute

objective clinical and/or diagnostic findings. See Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049; see also Poulin, 

817 F.2d at 873-74 (“[W]hen mental illness is the basis of a disability claim, clinical and 

laboratory data may consist of the diagnosis and observations of professionals trained in 

the field[.]”). The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s first proffered reason was not

specific and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence in the record to 

discount Dr. Jensen’s opinion.

ii. Inconsistency with the record

The second reason the ALJ afforded Dr. Jensen’s opinion little weight is that the 

opinion was “inconsistent with the objective findings already discussed . . . in this 

decision, which show mostly normal mood and affect.” (AR at 18.) The findings to 

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which the ALJ referred include the opinion of Dr. Nicholson, an examining psychiatrist,

which the ALJ assigned significant weight, and the opinion of Dr. Kivowitz, a 

nonexamining psychiatrist, which the ALJ gave great weight. (Id. at 15, 18.)

1. Examining psychiatrist’s Dr. Nicholson’s opinion

The second ALJ’s decision after remand states the following regarding Dr. 

Nicholson’s opinion:

The claimant underwent a psychiatric consultative examination with Dr. 

Nicholson on September 26, 2011. The claimant was neatly and casually 

groomed. The claimant made good eye contact and good interpersonal 

contact with the interviewer. The claimant was generally cooperative. The 

patient was able to volunteer information spontaneously. There was no 

psychomotor agitation or retardation. The claimant appeared to be 

genuine and truthful. There was no evidence of exaggeration or 

manipulation. The claimant did not appear to be under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol. The claimant was coherent and organized. There was no 

tangentially or loosening of associations. The claimant was relevant and 

non-delusional. There was no bizarre or psychotic thought content. The 

claimant denied any plan for self-harm or any plan to harm others. The 

claimant denied recent auditory or visual hallucinations. The claimant did 

not appear to be responding to internal stimuli during the interview. Her 

mood was depressed and affect was dysphoric. It was appropriate and 

congruent with thought content. The claimant was not tearful. Her speech 

was normally and clearly articulated, without stammering, dysarthria, 

neologisms, tangentiality, circumstantiality or loosened, unusual or blocked 

associations. The claimant was alert and oriented to time, place, person 

and purpose. The claimant appeared to be of average intelligence. The 

claimant’s fund of knowledge was grossly intact. Insight and judgment 

appeared to be grossly intact. She was diagnosed with anxiety disorder not 

otherwise specified, obsessive compulsive disorder, and depressive 

disorder not otherwise specified.

. . . . 

The undersigned has considered and gives significant weight to Dr. 

Nicholson who opined mild and moderate limitations. This was based on 

an in-person exam, well-supported by objective, medically acceptable 

clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, the assessment is complete, 

specific facts are cited upon which the conclusion is based, and is largely 

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consistent with the record as a whole. Therefore, it is given significant 

weight.

(Id. (internal citations omitted).)

The Court initially notes that in Carol C. I, one of the reasons the first ALJ assigned 

little weight to Dr. Jensen’s opinion was because the ALJ found that it was inconsistent 

with the opinion of an examining psychiatrist, Dr. Engelhorn, to which the first ALJ gave 

great weight. See id., 2014 WL 50810, at *11-12. District Judge Battaglia remanded the 

case, in part, because the first ALJ “failed to set forth a detailed and thorough summary 

of the conflicting opinions” and instead “simply concluded that the two opinions were 

contradictory.” See id. at *1; see also id. at *12 (citations omitted). 

In his decision after remand, the second ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Jensen’s 

opinion because it was inconsistent with the opinion of an examining psychiatrist, Dr. 

Nicholson. (See AR at 15, 18.) The second ALJ’s written decision states that Dr. Jensen’s 

opinion was “inconsistent with the objective findings already discussed . . . in this 

decision, which show mostly normal mood and affect.” (Id. at 18.) The description of 

Dr. Nicholson’s opinion as “show[ing] [that Plaintiff had] mostly normal mood and 

affect” is not a detailed and thorough summary of the reasons for discounting Dr. 

Jensen’s opinion. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (“[t]o reject the opinion of a treating 

physician which conflicts with that of an examining physician, the ALJ must ‘make 

findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on 

substantial evidence in the record.’”); Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22 (“The ALJ must do 

more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain 

why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct. . . . [I]t is incumbent on the ALJ to 

provide detailed, reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the physicians’

findings.”). Notably, as stated by the ALJ in the same written opinion, Dr. Nicholson 

found that Plaintiff’s “mood was depressed and affect was dysphoric.” (AR at 15

(emphasis added).) 

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“If the ALJ’s explanation is inadequate, the reviewing court may not search the 

record for reasons that support his decision.” Langdon v. Astrue, No. 12–CV–2624 AJB 

(NLS), 2013 WL 5592483, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)). Despite this Court’s guidance in Carol C. I. when 

remanding the case, the decision of the second ALJ after remand, just like the decision 

of the first ALJ, did not set forth a detailed and thorough summary of the allegedly 

conflicting opinions. 

2. Nonexamining psychiatrist Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion 

The second ALJ’s decision after remand states the following regarding Dr. 

Kivowitz’s opinion:

Dr. J. Kivowitz, M.D., Board certified psychiatry and neurology, reviewed 

the medical records prior to the hearing and was present to hear the 

claimant’s testimony and offer his own medical expert testimony. Dr. 

Kivowitz reviewed the medical records. Dr. Kivowitz stated that in his 

opinion the claimant had the following medically determinable 

impairments: major depression disorder, excessive[sic] compulsive 

disorder, PTSD, borderline personality disorder, anxiety disorder. She has 

had GAF scores of 60, indicating moderate symptoms.

In Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion, these impairments do not singly or in combination 

meet or equal a medical Listing.

Dr. Kivowitz opined the claimant’s impairments would cause the following 

limitations: simple repetitive tasks.

. . . . 

The undersigned has given great weight to the opinion of the impartial 

medical expert Dr. Kivowitz. In this case specifically, Dr. Kivowitz is a 

mental health specialist, he has an awareness of all the evidence in the 

record, and he has an understanding of social security disability programs 

and evidentiary requirements. Most importantly, his opinion regarding the 

claimant’s functional limitations is highly credible because it is wellsupported by the objective medical evidence already discussed in this 

decision.

(AR at 15, 18 (internal citations omitted).)

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Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion, as described by the ALJ, does not address Plaintiff’s mood 

and affect, let alone show a “mostly normal mood and affect.” For the same reasons 

discussed above with regard to Dr. Nicholson’s opinion, the decision of the second ALJ 

after remand did not set forth a detailed and thorough summary of the allegedly 

conflicting opinions. The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s second proffered reason 

for assigning little weigh to Dr. Jensen’s opinion was not specific and legitimate reason 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.

iii. Activities of daily living

The third reason the ALJ afforded Dr. Jensen’s opinion little weight is that the 

opinion was “inconsistent with the claimant’s admitted activities of daily living that have 

already been described . . . in this decision.” (Id. at 18.) The ALJ stated the following 

regarding Plaintiff’s activities of daily living:

Despite the alleged impairment, the claimant has engaged in a somewhat 

normal level of daily activity and interaction. The claimant admitted 

activities of daily living including [that] she cares for her young son, flew on 

a plane to Florida with her son, drives, takes her son to school, does light 

household chores, and she does exercises. In a function report, the 

claimant acknowledged she feeds, cleans and bathes her son, has no 

problem with personal care, prepares meals, does laundry, does some 

cleaning, goes out alone, shops in stores, handles her finances, goes out 

with her mother once a week, has no problem getting along with family, 

friends, neighbors or others, and follows instructions okay. She told Dr. 

Nicholson she does laundry, drives, handles bills, and is able to go out on 

her own.

It appears that despite her impairment, she has engaged in a somewhat 

normal level of daily activity and interaction. It should be noted that the 

physical and mental capabilities requisite to performing many of the tasks 

described above as well as the social interactions replicate those necessary 

for obtaining and maintaining employment.

(Id. at 10 (internal citations omitted).)

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “does not state how a finding that [Plaintiff] would 

have a marked impairment in maintaining attendance is contradicted by her daily 

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activities.”

7

 (J. Mot. at 10.) Plaintiff further points out that “Dr. Jensen also noted that 

[Plaintiff] could perform activities of daily living.” (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that 

the key issue is “whether the ability to perform those activities are transferrable into the 

more grueling work environment.” (Id.) The Commissioner contends that “[t]he ALJ is 

not stating that [Plaintiff’s] activities are equivalent to work-related functions, but that 

they include physical and mental capabilities and social interactions that replicate those 

necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment.” (Id. at 20.)

“An inconsistency between a treating physician’s opinion and a claimant’s daily 

activities is a specific and legitimate reason to discount the treating physician’s opinion.” 

Varao v. Berryhill, Case No.: 17-cv-02463-LAB (RNB), 2018 WL 3707093, at *6 (S.D. Cal.

Aug. 3, 2018) (citing Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014); Morgan v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600-02 (9th Cir. 1999)). In this case, 

Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Jensen opined that Plaintiff was “markedly limited”

in her ability to “maintain regular attendance and be punctual,” and “moderately

limited” in her ability to “complete a normal workday without interruptions from 

psychologically based symptoms, performing at a consistent pace without an 

unreasonable number of and length of rest periods,” and “accept instructions and 

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors.” (Id. at 685-86.) The ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living are inconsistent with the work limitations

identified by Dr. Jensen because the “physical and mental capabilities requisite to 

performing many of the tasks [in Plaintiff’s activities of daily living] as well as the social 

interactions replicate those necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment.” (AR 

at 10.) The ALJ did not explicitly state how Plaintiff’s activities of daily living are 

inconsistent with her alleged inability to maintain regular attendance and be punctual. 

Some of Plaintiff’s activities of daily living identified by the ALJ, especially taking a child 

 

7 Plaintiff does not address whether a moderate impairment in Plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal 

workday or to deal with supervisors is contradicted by her daily activities. 

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to school and flying on an airplane with a child, reasonably require some level of 

punctuality. Caring for oneself, one’s child and one’s home also typically involve tasks 

requiring some punctuality, such as the scheduling of various appointments related to 

healthcare, personal care, home repair, etc. The ALJ is incorrect, however, that “many”

of the tasks in Plaintiff’s activities of daily living are inconsistent with an ability to 

maintain regular attendance at a job, especially given the fact that Plaintiff would likely 

have to continue at least some of her activities of daily living in addition to working fulltime. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Several courts, including 

this one, have recognized that disability claimants should not be penalized for 

attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations.”) (listing cases). 

Furthermore, Dr. Jensen did not specifically opine that Plaintiff was limited in 

“obtaining and maintaining employment.” (See AR at 10.) Rather, Dr. Jensen opined 

that Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in attendance and punctuality, and “moderately 

limited” in completing a workday, working at a consistent pace, and dealing with 

criticism from supervisors. (Id. at 685-86.) While all of these limitations are likely to 

affect Plaintiff’s ability to obtain and maintain employment, the ALJ did not specifically 

address any of the particular limitations identified by Dr. Jensen. Courts have 

recognized “critical differences” between activities of daily living and activities required 

for full-time work, including more flexibility in scheduling and greater ability to obtain 

assistance from others in activities of daily living than in work activities, as well as not 

being held to a minimum standard of performance required by an employer. See, e.g.,

Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The failure to recognize these 

differences is a recurrent . . . feature of opinions by administrative law judges in social 

security disability cases.”); see also Vallandingham v. Colvin, No. CV 14–4847 RNB, 2015 

WL 1467189, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2015) (“Evidence that plaintiff performed some 

household and social activities on th[e] limited basis . . . does not convince the Court 

that plaintiff engaged in activities that resembled those necessary for engaging in 

competitive, full-time employment at the light exertional level.”) (citing Ghanim, 763 

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F.3d at 1165 (claimant’s performance of basic chores, sometimes with help, and 

attendance at occasional social events did not show that claimant engaged activities 

transferable to a work setting)). For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 

third proffered reason was not legally sufficient reason for giving Dr. Jensen’s opinion

little weight. 

iv. Conclusion

In light of the reasons given in the ALJ’s decision, the Court finds that the ALJ did 

not provide specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record 

for discounting Dr. Jensen’s opinion. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; see also Lusardi v. 

Astrue, 350 F. App’x 169, 173 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f the ALJ rejects significant probative 

evidence, he must explain why.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to 

properly evaluate the opinion of Dr. Jensen.

B. The ALJ Improperly Considered Dr. Kivowitz’s Testimony Regarding Plaintiff’s 

Mental Impairment

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to “articulate some basis” for rejecting a 

portion of Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion that Plaintiff was functionally restricted to “only

occasional contact with supervisors, peers and the public.” (J. Mot. at 22-24.) The 

Commissioner concedes that the ALJ did not “explicitly address why he did not adopt 

the limitation,” (id. at 26), but contends that the ALJ was not required to adopt all the 

limitations that Dr. Kivowitz assessed, (id. at 25).

8

/ / /

 

8

Instead, the Commissioner states: (1) “[c]ontrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, only the ALJ is 

responsible for assessing the RFC—not a doctor,” (J. Mot. at 25 (citations omitted)); (2) “[n]or is the ALJ 

required to incorporate all limitations afforded by each and every doctor,” (id. (citation omitted));

(3) “the ALJ did find that Plaintiff was only mildly limited in her social interactions with others,” (id. at 

26 (internal citations omitted)); and (4) there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff could not “get 

along” with supervisors, peers or the public, (id.). None of these arguments directly respond to 

Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ failed to “articulate some basis” for rejecting this particular portion 

of Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion. (Id. at 22.) 

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1. Applicable Law

Pursuant to Social Security Ruling 96-8P, “[t]he RFC assessment must always 

consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an 

opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not 

adopted.” 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). “The Commissioner may reject the opinion 

of a non-examining physician by reference to specific evidence in the medical record.” 

Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). While the 

Commissioner “need not discuss all evidence presented to her . . . . she must explain 

why ‘significant probative evidence has been rejected.’” Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 

1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Finally, in Smolen v. Chater, the court 

held that by “disregarding” only “some” of the opinions of treating physicians and 

making contrary findings, the ALJ “effectively rejected them.” 80 F.3d 1273, 1286 (9th 

Cir. 1996). 

2. Analysis

During the ALJ’s examination of Dr. Kivowitz at the administrative hearing, Dr. 

Kivowitz agreed that a moderate limitation restricted Plaintiff to simple and repetitive 

tasks. (AR at 66.) The ALJ asked, “Any further functional restrictions?” (Id.) Dr. 

Kivowitz replied, “Only occasional contact with supervisors, peers and the public.” (Id.) 

The ALJ stated the following regarding Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion:

Dr. J. Kivowitz, M.D., Board certified psychiatry and neurology, reviewed 

the medical records prior to the hearing and was present to hear the 

claimant’s testimony and offer his own medical expert testimony. Dr. 

Kivowitz reviewed the medical records. Dr. Kivowitz stated that in his 

opinion the claimant had the following medically determinable 

impairments: major depression disorder, excessive compulsive disorder, 

PTSD, borderline personality disorder, anxiety disorder. She has had GAF 

scores of 60, indicating moderate symptoms.

In Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion, these impairments do not singly or in combination 

meet or equal a medical Listing.

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Dr. Kivowitz opined the claimant’s impairments would cause the following 

limitations: simple repetitive tasks.

. . . .

The undersigned has given great weight to the opinion of the impartial 

medical expert Dr. Kivowitz. In this case specifically, Dr. Kivowitz is a 

mental health specialist, he has an awareness of all the evidence in the 

record, and he has an understanding of social security disability programs 

and evidentiary requirements. Most importantly, his opinion regarding the 

claimant’s functional limitations is highly credible because it is wellsupported by the objective medical evidence already discussed in this 

decision.

(Id. at 15, 18.)

The parties do not dispute that despite giving great weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Kivowitz, a nonexamining physician, the ALJ omitted any reference to the portion of Dr. 

Kivowitz’s testimony that Plaintiff was restricted to only occasional contact with 

supervisors, peers, and the public. (J. Mot. at 24, 26.) As noted above, the 

Commissioner does not directly respond to Plaintiff’s contentions that (1) the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment conflicts with the omitted portion of Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion, (id. at 24), and 

(2) under SSR 96-8P the ALJ must therefore “explain” why he did not adopt this 

conflicting opinion from a “medical source,” (id.). 

The ALJ’s omission of the portion of Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion about which he made 

contrary findings, can be treated as a rejection of that opinion. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1286. The opinion was significant and probative because it was at least partially 

consistent with Dr. Jensen’s opinion that Plaintiff was limited in her ability to “accept 

instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors,” (AR at 685-86), to 

which ALJ gave little weight, (id. at 18). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly cautioned 

against the “cherry-picking” portions of medical records while ignoring others. See

Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1164-66 (finding that the ALJ improperly cherry-picked portions of 

an examining physician’s findings); Kelly v. Berryhill, 732 F. App’x 558, 561 (9th Cir. 

2018) (finding that the ALJ improperly cherry-picked portions of an MRI and ignored 

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abnormal findings); Miller v. Berryhill, 730 F. App’x 526, 527 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that 

the ALJ repeatedly cherry-picked portions of the record to support a finding of 

inconsistency with the record). The ALJ should therefore have explained his reason for 

disregarding the portion of Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion that supports Plaintiff’s claim. See

Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1394-95. Based on the above, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate 

Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff asks the Court to “revers[e] the final decision and award[] benefits.” (J. 

Mot. at 27.) She contends that the Court should credit the opinion of Dr. Jensen as true 

and award benefits. (See id. at 11-12, 27-28.) In the alternative, Plaintiff moves the 

Court to remand for further proceedings.” (Id. at 27.) The Commissioner maintains that 

“a finding for payment of benefits would be erroneous” and requests that the Court 

affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 28-29.) 

The reviewing court may enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing”

the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand 

the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. The reviewing 

court has discretion in determining whether to remand for further proceedings or award 

benefits. Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 

F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Remand for further proceedings is warranted where 

additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects in the decision. Kail v. 

Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). Remand for the payment of benefits is 

appropriate where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative 

proceedings, where the record has been fully developed, or where remand would 

unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to which the disabled plaintiff is entitled. 

Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 

716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985); Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980).

The Court has discretion to credit the opinion of a treating physician as true 

where the Commissioner fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting such an 

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opinion. See, e.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-23 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding an 

abuse of that discretion); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004)

(same); Lester, 81 F.3d at 821 (same). The Court is mindful that the Commissioner 

disagrees with the validity of this “credit-as-true” rule. (See J. Mot. at 28.) The Court is 

also mindful that Plaintiff first filed her application for benefits in March of 2009, (AR at 

170), and since that time, two ALJs have considered Plaintiff’s application on three 

separate occasions, (id. at 170-79 (first ALJ’s decision), 200-15 (second ALJ’s decision), 4-

20 (second ALJ’s decision after remand)), and the district court’s remand of the case for 

further administrative proceedings, Carol C. I, 2014 WL 50810, at *1. 

In Ghanim, however, the Ninth Circuit did not apply or even acknowledge the 

credit-as-true rule where substantial evidence did not support an ALJ’s rejection of 

treating medical opinions. 763 F.3d at 1166. Instead, the court simply remanded the

case for further administrative proceedings. Id. Additionally, in Marsh v. Colvin, the 

court did not apply or acknowledge the credit-as-true rule where the ALJ had failed to 

even mention a treating doctor’s opinion that the claimant was “pretty much 

nonfunctional.” 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015). Instead, the court simply 

remanded the case to afford the ALJ the opportunity to comment on the doctor’s 

opinions. Id. at 1173-74. Finally, in Dominguez v. Colvin, the Ninth Circuit made clear 

that even if a district court finds sufficient grounds to award benefits, “[a] district court 

is generally not required to exercise such discretion[.]” 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015)

(citations omitted); see also Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017)

(internal citation omitted) (“Even if we . . . credit the claimant’s testimony as true, it is 

within the court’s discretion either to make a direct award of benefits or to remand for 

further proceedings. . . . [The credit-as-true] rule was intended to deter ALJs from 

providing boilerplate rejections without analysis.”). 

In this case, further administrative proceeding would serve a useful purpose. See

Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 407 (citation omitted) (“Unless the district court concludes that 

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand 

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with a direction to provide benefits.”). The issues to be addressed on remand include 

the weight to afford Dr. Jensen’s opinion that Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in her 

ability to “maintain regular attendance and be punctual,” and “moderately limited” in 

her ability to “complete a normal workday without interruptions” and “accept 

instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors,” (AR at 685-86); 

the weight to afford Dr. Kivowitz’s opinion that Plaintiff was limited to “[o]nly occasional 

contact with supervisors, peers and the public,” (see id. at 66); and whether either or 

both opinions warrant a finding that Plaintiff is unable to perform any job that exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy, (see J. Mot. at 29); see also Harman v. 

Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In cases where the testimony of the 

vocational expert has failed to address a claimant’s limitations as established by 

improperly discredited evidence, we consistently have remanded for further 

proceedings rather than payment of benefits.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Judgment be entered 

reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further 

administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 14, 2020, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than February 21, 2020. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2020

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