Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02509/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02509-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CORY DEAN RUNGE,

Petitioner,

 vs.

M .S. EVANS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-2509 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

AND RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

This is a habeas case brought pro se by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Before the court for ruling are petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel and

respondent's opposed motion to dismiss. 

DISCUSSION

1. Petitioner's motion for counsel

Petitioner moves for appointment of counsel. The Sixth Amendment's right to

counsel does not apply in habeas corpus actions, Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722,

728 (9th Cir. 1986), but 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) authorizes appointment of counsel to

represent a habeas petitioner whenever "the court determines that the interests of justice

so require and such person is financially unable to obtain representation." 

Petitioner has presented his claims well, indeed well enough, as discussed below, to

defeat respondent's motion to dismiss. The interests of justice do not require appointment

of counsel. 

2. Respondent's motion to dismiss

Respondent contends that this petition is barred by the statute of limitations. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

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1 February 26, 2006, is the date the petition was placed in the institution's mail for

delivery to the court, according to petitioner's certificate of service. It thus is deemed to be the

date of filing. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner's

federal habeas petition is deemed filed when prisoner delivers petition to prison authorities for

mailing), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 

2

The statute of limitations is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one

year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion

of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an

application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondent asserts, and petitioner does not dispute, that he pleaded guilty in 2002.

He did not appeal, so direct review was completed March 18, 2002, when the time to

appeal expired. This petition thus was due on March 18, 2003. See Patterson v. Stewart,

251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (clarifying method of calculating deadline). Because it

was not filed until February 26, 2006, it is untimely unless tolling applies or the limitations

period began running on one of the other three possible starting dates provided in the

statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).1

Petitioner does not argue for different starting date, and statutory tolling for state

collateral review proceedings is not available because petitioner did not file his first state

petition until after expiration of the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed....”). Petitioner does,

however, contend that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

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3

The one-year limitation period can be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute

of limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler),

128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v.

United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Equitable

tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of time should be granted

only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a

petition on time." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[r]ather

than let procedural uncertainties unreasonably snuff out a constitutional claim, the issue of

when grave difficulty merges literally into ‘impossibility’ should be resolved in [petitioner's] 

favor.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). When a prisoner is proceeding

pro se, his allegations regarding diligence in filing a federal petition on time must be

construed liberally. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Mental illness, such as petitioner alleges here, can be a basis for equitable tolling. 

See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). "Where a habeas petitioner's

mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to meet the AEDPA filing deadline, his delay

was caused by an 'extraordinary circumstance beyond [his] control,' and the deadline

should be equitably tolled." Id. (quoting Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.

2003)). 

Petitioner's opposition to the motion to dismiss is signed under penalty of perjury, so

it is itself evidence of the facts alleged in it. Because respondent did not file a reply to

petitioner's opposition, despite petitioner having raised the equitable tolling issue, these

facts are uncontested. Petitioner alleges that he had serious and continuous mental

difficulties during the relevant period, and has provided some exhibits to back up the claim.

He was housed in the Mental Health Ward of the prison from the time he was first

incarcerated until the date the opposition was filed, and has taken anti-psychotic

medications for twenty years. He alleges that the delay in his discovering the grounds for

the petition was because of his mental illness. 

///

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Petitioner has established his entitlement to equitable tolling. The motion to dismiss

will be denied. 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner's motion for counsel (document number 3 on the docket) is DENIED.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (document number 4 on the docket) is DENIED. 

Respondent shall file an answer to the order to show cause and the record within sixty days

of the date of this order. If petitioner wishes to file a traverse (response) to the answer, he

shall do so within thirty days of the date the answer is served upon him. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 15, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge 

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