Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-30164/USCOURTS-ca5-15-30164-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30164

SETH B., by and through his parents and next friends Donald and Cheryl B.; 

DONALD B.; CHERYL B., 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and its 

implementing regulations, parents who disagree with a school district’s 

evaluation of their child may be entitled to an independent educational 

evaluation (IEE) at public expense. The parents of Seth B., a child who had 

previously been diagnosed with autism, asked the Orleans Parish School Board 

for such an evaluation. After the board assented, Seth’s parents obtained the 

IEE and sought reimbursement. The school board denied their request on the 

ground that the IEE did not conform to state criteria. A state administrative 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 13, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-30164

2

hearing officer and the district court subsequently ruled that reimbursement 

was not warranted. We vacate and remand.

I 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) seeks “to ensure 

that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate 

public education.”1 To this end, it establishes a process by which school 

districts and parents collaborate to develop individualized education programs

for students with disabilities. As part of this process, school districts evaluate 

children to assess any disabilities and determine their educational needs.2 The

IDEA and its implementing regulations also afford the parents of a child with 

a disability the right to an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at public 

expense.3 To be eligible for public funding, an IEE must meet the same criteria 

used by the school district in its evaluation, “to the extent those criteria are 

consistent with the parent's right to an independent educational evaluation.”4

Seth B. attended public school in New Orleans. He had been diagnosed 

with autism and was identified as a child with a disability under IDEA. In 

August 2011, Seth’s parents sent the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) a 

request for an IEE. The board granted the request, offering reimbursement up 

to $3,000 on condition that the IEE comply with Louisiana Bulletin 1508.5

Bulletin 1508 contains the state-mandated evaluation criteria for learning 

disabilities, and OPSB, like all other Louisiana public school authorities, 

applies Bulletin 1508 in its evaluations. The district provided a list of qualified 

evaluators and a link to a digital version of Bulletin 1508.

 

1 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

2 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C), (d)(1), (d)(3)(A)(iii). 3 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502.

4 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e)(1).

5 See Bulletin 1508—Pupil Appraisal Handbook, LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. CI 

[hereinafter “Bulletin 1508”].

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After some correspondence with the board concerning the $3,000 cost 

cap, Seth’s parents engaged Dr. Patricia Brockman to produce Seth’s IEE. In 

April 2012, they sent OPSB Dr. Brockman’s report. OPSB responded the next 

month with a letter outlining 31 ways in which the IEE allegedly did not meet

Bulletin 1508 criteria. The board invited Seth’s parents to have Dr. Brockman 

contact them to discuss the alleged areas of noncompliance. The parents did 

not reply to this letter, and there is no indication that Dr. Brockman ever 

contacted the board. However, Seth’s IEE was discussed in an administrative 

hearing, ongoing at this time, concerning whether Seth was receiving a free 

appropriate public education.

On December 26, 2012, several months after OPSB sent its objections, 

Seth’s parents sent the board invoices from the IEE totaling $8066.50 and 

requested reimbursement. The board allegedly did not receive the request until 

January 31, 2013. On February 28, it denied the request in a letter to Seth’s 

parents, noting that it could not reimburse them for a noncompliant evaluation

and that some of the invoices appeared unrelated to the completion of the IEE.

In April 2013, Seth and his parents requested an administrative due 

process hearing.6 An ALJ heard preliminary arguments from counsel from 

both sides. On August 14, 2013, he ruled against Seth and his parents, finding 

that their counsel had stipulated to the IEE’s noncompliance with Bulletin 

1508 and that he therefore lacked jurisdiction to award reimbursement.

Seth and his parents sought review in federal district court pursuant to 

the IDEA.7 The district court received affidavits, exhibits, and depositions and 

heard oral argument, but did not allow a full trial on the merits. Rather, on 

January 20, 2015, it granted summary judgment for OPSB. The court found

that the board had not waived its right to challenge Seth’s IEE, that the IEE 

 

6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).

7 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).

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did not comply with Bulletin 1508, and that reimbursement was therefore 

disallowed.

This appeal followed. The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, 

Inc., the National Disability Rights Network, the National Federation of the 

Blind, and the National Association of the Deaf filed amicus briefs urging 

reversal. The National School Boards Association, the National Association of 

State Directors of Special Education, and school board associations from 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas filed an amicus brief urging affirmance.

II

Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C), which formed the basis for this action, 

a district court must (i) “receive the records of the administrative proceedings”;

(ii) “hear additional evidence at the request of a party”; and (iii) base “its 

decision on the preponderance of the evidence” and “grant such relief as the 

court determines is appropriate.” The district court is required to “accord ‘due 

weight’ to the hearing officer’s findings,” but it “must ultimately reach an 

independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence.”8 Thus, “the 

district court’s ‘review’ of a hearing officer’s decision is ‘virtually de novo.’”9

Accordingly, in IDEA proceedings, summary judgment “is not directed to 

discerning whether there are disputed issues of fact, but rather, whether the 

administrative record, together with any additional evidence, establishes that 

there has been compliance with IDEA's processes and that the child's 

educational needs have been appropriately addressed.”10

 

8 Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 1997) 

(citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) and Teague Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Todd 

L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1993)). 

9 Id. (quoting Teague, 999 F.2d at 131). 10 Wall v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Sch. Dist., 945 F.Supp. 501, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see 

Sylvie M. v. Bd. of Educ., 48 F.Supp.2d 681, 694 (W.D. Tex. 1999), aff'd, 214 F.3d 1351 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (“The standard of review used by [district] courts reviewing cases under IDEA 

differs from the traditional summary judgment standard . . . [T]he court reviews the record 

‘virtually’ de novo, including the decisions of the state level and independent hearing officers, 

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We have never articulated the standard of review for the appeal of a 

district court’s determination that an IEE does not merit reimbursement. 

Plainly, however, the district court’s inquiry was one of both fact and law, in 

that the court both interpreted the requirements of federal and state 

educational regulations and analyzed whether appellants’ IEE and the board’s 

conduct conformed to those requirements. “Mixed questions should be 

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard if factual questions 

predominate, and de novo if the legal questions predominate.”11 Here, the 

validity of the district court’s ruling turns in large part on the interpretation 

of regulatory text. We therefore review the ruling de novo.12 Within this 

analysis, however, we review the district court’s underlying factual findings for 

clear error.13

III

We first consider whether OPSB waived its right to refuse 

reimbursement. Appellants and amici contend that it did, both because the 

board failed to initiate a hearing to contest Seth’s IEE and because it 

unnecessarily delayed in complying with its duties under IDEA’s 

implementing regulations. We disagree.

1. Initiation of the due process hearing

 

and the materials considered in the underlying state administrative proceedings. While 

according ‘due weight’ to the hearing officer's findings, the court must ultimately reach an 

independent decision based on a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 

206, and Michael F., 118 F.3d at 252).

11 Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., L.L.C., 691 F.3d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Hussaini v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 1998) (unpublished)); see also 

id. (a mixed question of law and fact “involve[s] legal conclusions based upon factual 

analysis”).

12 Cf. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying the 

same standard in reviewing a “district court's decision that a school district failed to provide 

a FAPE under IDEA”).

13 Id.; Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 207 (5th Cir. 1992).

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Disputes over IEE reimbursement are governed by an implementing 

regulation of the IDEA, 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, which reads in relevant part:

(b) Parent right to evaluation at public expense.

[...]

(2) If a parent requests an independent educational 

evaluation at public expense, the public agency must, 

without unnecessary delay, either—

(i) File a due process complaint to request a hearing to 

show that its evaluation is appropriate; or

(ii) Ensure that an independent educational 

evaluation is provided at public expense, unless the 

agency demonstrates in a hearing pursuant to §§ 

300.507 through 300.513 that the evaluation obtained 

by the parent did not meet agency criteria.14

In this case, after appellants requested an IEE at public expense, OPSB 

neither requested a hearing to show that its own evaluation was appropriate, 

nor did it request a hearing to show that appellants’ evaluation failed to meet 

relevant criteria. Rather, appellants requested a hearing on the subject of 

reimbursement. They now claim that the regulation required OPSB to request 

a hearing, and that by failing to do so, the board waived its right to refuse 

reimbursement.

The plain text of the regulation contradicts appellants’ reading. § 

300.502(b)(2)(ii) excuses an agency from paying for an IEE if the agency simply

“demonstrates in a hearing . . . that the evaluation obtained by the parent did 

not meet agency criteria.”15 It does not require the agency to “initiate” or 

“request” the hearing. In contrast, under (b)(2)(i), the agency must “file” a 

complaint and “request” a hearing if it wishes to decline reimbursement on the 

ground that its own evaluation was appropriate. This distinction strongly 

 

14 34 C.F.R. § 300.502; see LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. XLIII, § 503 (2014) (its virtually 

identical state counterpart).

15 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).

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favors reading § 300.502(b)(2)(ii) not to require the agency to initiate a 

hearing.16

Appellants and amici refer us to Department of Education commentaries 

suggesting that § 300.502(b)(2)(ii) gives a school district the duty to initiate a 

hearing in this context. This contradicts the unambiguous text of the 

regulation. “If [a] regulation is unambiguous, we may . . . consider agency 

interpretation, but only according to its persuasive power.”17 The most 

squarely relevant commentary cited, a 2001 opinion letter, states that if an 

IEE does not comply with district cost criteria, “[t]he public agency must, 

without unnecessary delay, initiate a hearing to demonstrate that the 

evaluation obtained by the parent did not meet the agency's cost criteria.” In 

so opining, however, the Department was responding to school district policies

purporting to exercise “sole judgment” over the issue of compliance.18 Its 

statement that the districts might be required to “initiate” hearings was 

incidental to its broader point that they could not legally claim “sole 

judgment.”19 Perhaps not coincidentally, the letter does not engage in any 

 

16 See BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States, 775 F.3d 743, 755 n.86 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(“[D]ifferent words within the same statute should, if possible, be given different meanings.”) 

(quoting Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 991 (7th Cir. 2001)). 17 Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2006); see id. at 408 n.12 (“The 

weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 

its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 

pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 

control.”) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

18 Letter to Petska, 35 IDELR 191 at *2 (U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special Educ. & 

Rehab. Servs. [hereinafter OSEP] 2001).

19 See id. (“If the total cost of the IEE exceeds the maximum allowable costs and the 

school district believes that there is no justification for the excess cost, the school district 

cannot in its sole judgment determine that it will pay only the maximum allowable cost and 

no further. The public agency must, without unnecessary delay, initiate a hearing to 

demonstrate that the evaluation obtained by the parent did not meet the agency’s cost 

criteria.”). OPSB claims only that it was not required to initiate the review process, not that 

it has “sole judgment” over the issue of compliance.

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detail with the text of § 300.502(b)(2).20 We find this guidance of questionable

value and opt instead to follow the clear text of the regulation itself.

Appellants and amici also cite several out-of-circuit cases in support of

their reading of § 300.502(b)(2)(ii). We find these cases unpersuasive. In Evans 

v. District No. 17, the Eighth Circuit required a school district to reimburse 

parents for the cost of their IEE because the district never “initiated a hearing 

. . . to show the inappropriateness of the [parents’] evaluation, or to show that 

its evaluation [was] appropriate.”21 That holding turned on an earlier version 

of § 300.502(b) that (unlike the current version) did not explicitly contemplate 

a district’s refusal to reimburse for reasons of noncompliance with relevant 

criteria, or distinguish between such a refusal and a refusal based on the 

adequacy of the district’s own evaluation.22 The same is true of a subsequent 

Seventh Circuit case cited by appellants.23 More recently, in an unpublished 

 

20 See id. Another opinion letter cited in the briefs, Letter to Anonymous, 22 IDELR 

637 (OSEP 1995) ((“If a public agency believes the IEE obtained by the parent did not meet 

its [cost] criteria, it must either initiate a due process hearing or pay for the IEE.”), addressed 

an earlier version of the regulation that (unlike the current version) did not explicitly 

contemplate a district’s refusal to reimburse for reasons of noncompliance with relevant 

criteria. Petitioners also refer to a comment accompanying the 1999 issuance of revised IDEA 

regulations, to the effect that school agencies must either initiate a due process hearing or

provide an IEE at public expense. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children With 

Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities,

64 Fed. Reg. 12406, 12607 (March 12, 1999). In context, however, this comment appears to 

be addressing agencies’ options when parents initially request IEEs. As noted above, although 

§ 300.502(b)(2)(i) plainly requires agencies to either file or pay in that context, the text of the 

regulation imposes no such requirement when an agency confronts a noncompliant IEE. See 

id. (“The purpose of requiring the public agency to either initiate a due process hearing if it 

wishes to challenge a parent's request for an IEE, or otherwise provide an IEE at public 

expense, is to require public agencies to respond to IEE requests . . . . There is no 

corresponding need to specify that a parent also has the right to initiate a due process hearing 

since if a public agency does not do so it must provide the IEE at public expense.”) (emphasis 

added).

21 841 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1988).

22 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.503 (1987). The decision cites § 300.505(b), but quotes directly 

from § 300.503. § 300.505(b) then concerned language requirements for IDEA due process 

hearing notices and does not appear relevant here.

23 Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994).

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opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held without explanation that, because a school 

board had failed to file a due process request challenging parents’ IEE under 

either § 300.502(b)(2)(i) or § 300.502(b)(2)(ii), the parents were entitled to 

reimbursement.24 The decision does not examine the text of the regulation in 

any detail and appears to elide the clear distinction in the wording of the two 

clauses at issue. These deficiencies are also present in various lower court 

decisions cited in the briefs.25

In sum, neither the plain text of the regulation nor binding precedent 

required OPSB to initiate a hearing in order to contest appellants’ right to 

reimbursement. This result conforms with the broader purpose of § 300.502(b), 

that is, to ensure parents’ rights to an IEE at public expense and to due process 

in the event of a reimbursement dispute. These rights can be vindicated just 

as well in a hearing initiated by the parents as in one initiated by a school 

district, as the Sixth Circuit recognized in P.R. v. Woodmore Local School 

District.26 In that case, the court held that § 300.502(b)(2)(i) was not violated 

when a school board objected to an IEE by defending the appropriateness of its 

own evaluation in a due process hearing initiated by the parents. The court 

reasoned that the “object” of the regulations “is to afford Parents an 

opportunity to challenge and the School District to defend the appropriateness 

of its Evaluation in an impartial hearing,” which had occurred. It continued:

As long as the object of the regulations is accomplished, there is no 

reason to exalt form over substance. Their purpose is not served by 

holding that there must be reimbursement at public expense when it is 

the parents rather than the public agency that initiates the due process 

 

24 Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 581 F. App’x 760, 765-66 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(“The Board did not file a due process request, and it cannot now defend its evaluation or 

challenge the IEE.”).

25 See D.H. v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR 38 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Red Clay 

Consolidated Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 52265 (Del. State Educ. Agency 2005).

26 256 F. App’x 751 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

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hearing where the appropriateness of the School District’s Evaluation is 

challenged and confirmed.27

The Sixth Circuit’s insight applies with even greater force in the context of 

§ 300.502(b)(2)(ii), whose plain text – unlike that of (b)(2)(i) – does not require

the agency to initiate a hearing.

2. Timeliness

OPSB did not have to initiate a hearing in order to preserve its objection 

to Seth’s IEE. This is not to say, however, that the board could wait

indefinitely, forcing appellants to either demand a hearing or forsake 

reimbursement. Rather, under § 300.502(b)(2)(ii), OPSB had to “demonstrate” 

the IEE’s noncompliance with relevant criteria “without unnecessary delay.”

We find that OPSB fulfilled this duty.

Appellants sent the board an e-mail on August 25, 2011, stating that “we 

are requesting an Independent Educational Evaluation for our son Seth . . . . 

Seth is entitled to receive a comprehensive IEE at public expense.” However, 

the record indicates that appellants did not submit invoices until over a year 

later. Only then could OPSB know with certainty that appellants sought an 

IEE at public expense28 – especially since for much of that period, appellants

knew of the board’s objections to the evaluation, but took no apparent action 

to address them.29 We see no reason to penalize OPSB for failing to

 

27 Id. at 755. Indeed, such a holding might force school districts to file duplicative 

hearing requests (i.e., in cases where parents first requested a hearing) in order to preserve 

their objections to parents’ IEEs. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special Educ. & Rehab. 

Servs., Dear Colleague Letter 1, 4 (April 15, 2015), 

http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/dcl04152015disputeresolution2q20

15.pdf (criticizing agencies who file due process complaints after parents already have a 

pending complaint with a state agency on the same issue). 

28 Parents always have the right to an IEE at private expense. See 34 C.F.R. 

§ 300.502(c), (e)(1).

29 Petitioners claim that they attempted to make the needed corrections during this 

time, but nothing in the record suggests they apprised OPSB of their efforts. They do not 

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preemptively seek a hearing on the topic of reimbursement when appellants

had not actually requested reimbursement, and when the board had reason to 

believe they might not. Rather, on these specific facts, the board’s delay in 

“demonstrating” the IEE’s noncompliance should be measured from the 

submission of the invoices.

Appellants’ invoices accompanied a letter dated December 26, 2012, 

which OPSB claims it did not receive until January 31, 2013.30 Roughly three 

months later, on April 30, 2013, appellants requested an IDEA due process 

hearing. From this point, any further delays were a function of the 

administrative process, not OPSB’s sole inaction.31 Depending on whose 

records are credited, then, either three or four months passed during which 

OPSB reasonably could have moved to “demonstrate” the IEE’s 

noncompliance, but did not. We will consider this period in determining 

whether OPSB acted “without unnecessary delay.”

At the outset, we observe that there is little case law or regulatory 

guidance speaking directly to this question. Appellants and amici cite 

numerous rulings of lower courts and state agencies, but most of these rulings 

appear to involve school districts failing to timely respond to parents’ initial 

requests for IEEs “without unnecessary delay.” Thus, in many of the cited 

cases, upon receiving a parent’s IEE request, the school district took no 

action—neither granting the request, nor filing for a due process hearing to 

demonstrate the adequacy of their own evaluation.32 In others, after receiving 

 

seem to have contacted OPSB staff to discuss the deficiencies, as OPSB suggested in its letter 

outlining those deficiencies. 

30 The district court made no findings as to when the letter was sent or received.

31 Petitioners do not allege interference or dilatory conduct on OPSB’s part.

32 See, e.g., Fullerton Sch. Dist., 58 IDELR 177 (Cal. State Educ. Agency, Jan. 30, 

2012); Nicole L. v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR 192 (Tex. State Educ. Agency, 

Oct. 18, 2004). 

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an IEE request, the school district waited three months or longer to request a 

due process hearing to show the adequacy of its own evaluation.33

These cases provide limited guidance in the case before us, in which the 

board delayed not in responding to or challenging parents’ initial IEE inquiry, 

but in contesting their right to reimbursement after the IEE had been 

completed.34 When a parent first requests an IEE, the school placement or 

educational plan for the child may be contingent on the outcome of the IEE. A 

months-long delay before even starting the process of holding a due process 

hearing on the need for an independent evaluation is a significant amount of 

time when compared to the length of the school year. In contrast, once the IEE 

has been completed, school officials can consider it immediately before 

reimbursement issues are resolved. Thus, the IEE’s function is not vitiated

when only reimbursement is delayed.

To be sure, keeping parents waiting for three or four months before 

action is taken on reimbursement may be a significant burden, considering the 

cost of IEEs. But such a delay does not have the same effect (or even any effect) 

on a child’s educational plan as failing to take action on an initial request for 

an IEE does. Here, any delay by OPSB did not affect whether the IEE could be 

 

33 See, e.g., Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. J.S., No. C 06-0380 PVT, 2006 WL 

3734289, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) (school district waited “almost three months” after 

IEE request to file for a due process hearing so that it could demonstrate that its own 

evaluation was appropriate); L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR 293 (Cal. State Educ. Agency, 

June 20, 2007) (school district waited three months to request a due process hearing to 

demonstrate that its evaluation was appropriate); Bd. Of Educ. of the Monticello Central Sch. 

Dist., 37 IDELR 143 (N.Y. State Educ. Agency, June 4, 2002) (school board waited 20 months 

after IEE request before initiating a due process hearing on the appropriateness of its own 

evaluation).

34 Recall that the board replied eight days after receiving petitioners’ initial letter, 

agreeing to provide the IEE at public expense (contingent on compliance with certain 

specified criteria) and providing the names of qualified evaluators in the area.

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considered in relation to Seth’s schooling plan.35 We also note that during the 

period at issue, OPSB explained its bases for denying reimbursement in a 

detailed letter to appellants and urged them to contact the board with any 

questions. Arguably, this letter was an attempt to informally resolve the 

dispute.36 In light of these facts, we conclude that OPSB did not 

“unnecessar[ily] delay” in “demonstrating” the IEE’s noncompliance.

IV

We next consider whether appellants were denied their procedural rights 

in the district court proceeding. Appellants contend that the district court

improperly placed the burden of persuasion on them. The district court 

reasoned that “the burden of persuasion [should] fall[] where it usually does, 

on the party seeking relief.” Appellants argue that the typical presumption 

should not apply in IEE reimbursement disputes, since 34 C.F.R. § 

300.502(b)(2)(ii) requires the agency, not the parents, to “demonstrate” 

noncompliance with relevant criteria. However, this requirement applies only 

to administrative due process hearings.37 § 300.502(b)(2)(ii) does not purport 

to govern the appeal of an hearing officer’s decision to the federal district court. 

Rather, such an appeal arises under the IDEA’s procedural safeguards 

provision.38 As the court below noted, several circuits have interpreted this 

 

35 Indeed, the record suggests that petitioners relied on the IEE at the 2012 

administrative hearing concerning whether Seth was receiving FAPE, and that the IEE was 

extensively discussed in that proceeding.

36 In its guidance, the Department of Education has exhorted school districts to “strive 

to resolve [IDEA] disputes informally.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special Educ. & Rehab.

Servs., Dear Colleague Letter 2 (April 15, 2015), 

http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/dcl04152015disputeresolution2q20

15.pdf.

37 The requirement for a school district to “demonstrate” non-compliance applies only 

to hearings made “pursuant to §§ 300.507 through 300.513,” all of which outline the 

procedures for due process hearings before an administrative officer. See 34 C.F.R. § 

300.502(b)(2)(ii).

38 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (“Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision 

made [in an impartial due process hearing] . . . shall have the right to bring a civil action . . . 

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provision to place the burden of persuasion before the district court on the 

party appealing an IDEA hearing officer’s decision.39 This result conforms to

“the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their 

claims.”40 The district court sensibly followed this default rule, and did not err 

in allocating appellants the burden of persuasion.

Appellants further argue that the district court erred in refusing to hold 

an evidentiary hearing with witnesses. Although such a hearing might have 

been helpful, it was not required in this case. IDEA gives any party aggrieved 

in a due process hearing “the right to bring a civil action” in a federal district 

court without regard to the amount in controversy. The district court must 

both “receive the records of the administrative proceedings” and “hear 

additional evidence at the request of a party.”41 Whether this latter phrase 

requires a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing where witnesses testify 

and are cross-examined is apparently an issue of first impression. Certainly, 

however, the text itself does not require such a hearing.42 And the district court

did not decide the case on the basis of the administrative record alone. On the 

contrary, it received additional evidence in the form of exhibits, affidavits, and 

depositions, and it held oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. 

 

which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court 

of the United States . . . .”).

39 See Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2012); J.W. v. Fresno Unified 

Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010); Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D., 616 F.3d 

632, 636 (7th Cir. 2010).

40 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005).

41 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).

42 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a hearing as “[a] judicial session, usu. open to the 

public, held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses 

testifying.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). In the context of 

administrative law, Black’s defines a hearing as “[a]ny setting in which an affected person 

presents arguments to a decision-maker.” Id.

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We thus conclude that the district court did not fail to “hear additional 

evidence.”43

V

Having determined that OPSB did not waive its right to refuse

reimbursement and that the proceedings before the district court were 

procedurally sound, we approach the crux of this dispute: whether appellants’ 

IEE failed to “meet agency criteria,” precluding reimbursement.44 Before

considering whether Seth’s IEE complied with Bulletin 1508’s criteria, we 

must determine the criteria relevant to that inquiry. Appellants argue that 

many of the IEE’s 31 alleged nonconformities are illusory because they relate 

to criteria that were never legally applicable to Seth’s IEE in the first place.45

Their argument has several facets.

First, appellants contend that OPSB may only apply criteria “employed 

at the initiation of an evaluation,” and not “content-based” criteria. They cite 

34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e)(1), which provides that “[i]f an independent educational 

evaluation is at public expense, the criteria under which the evaluation is 

obtained, including the location of the evaluation and the qualifications of the 

 

43 The ALJ does appear to have erred by failing to hold a due process hearing where 

the parties could confront and cross-examine witnesses, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(2), but 

district courts are permitted to “grant such relief” as they determine appropriate. See 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). Thus, a remand was not necessarily required to address the procedural 

failing below.

44 Petitioners argue that they are at least entitled to partial reimbursement for the 

elements of the IEE that are not implicated in the board’s allegations of noncompliance. 

However, even assuming that compliant elements can be meaningfully defined and isolated 

from the evaluation as a whole, nothing in the text of 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 invites such a 

piecemeal approach, nor have petitioners cited relevant authority. Rather, the regulation 

makes clear that the right to reimbursement pertains to the IEE as a whole, not to its 

subparts. Therefore, the IEE as a whole must meet agency criteria in order to merit 

reimbursement.

45 For the time being, we will consider only the Bulletin 1508 criteria relating to the 

form, procedures, and content of the evaluation itself. We address OPSB’s cost criteria in a 

subsequent section.

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examiner, must be the same as the criteria that the public agency uses when 

it initiates an evaluation.”46

Appellants do not explain how to distinguish “initiation” criteria from 

“content-based” criteria. Moreover, the phrase “when it [i.e., the agency] 

initiates an evaluation” could plausibly be understood to identify the 

evaluations relevant to determining criteria applicable to IEEs, not to limit

those criteria. In other words, the regulation can be read to simply subject IEEs 

(i.e., evaluations initiated by parents) to the same criteria as agencies’ own 

evaluations (i.e., evaluations initiated by agencies). Nonetheless, appellants’ 

reading – that the phrase is language of limitation, not identification – is also 

plausible as a purely textual matter.47

When confronted with ambiguity in regulatory text, we look to agency 

interpretations.48 In comments on § 300.502(e), DOE has explained that IEEs 

must meet substantive requirements applicable to school-conducted 

evaluations:

We do not believe it is necessary to add language to the regulations 

regarding the review of existing data, input from the child's 

parents, the scope of the evaluation, or the instruments used to 

evaluate the child, because an IEE must meet the agency criteria 

that the public agency uses when it initiates an evaluation . . . . 

 

46 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e)(1) (emphasis added).

47 Plaintiffs cite A.S. ex rel. S. v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 534, 551 (D. 

Conn. 2002), in which a district court held with little analysis that “[t]he plain language of 

the applicable regulations requires only that a parent's expert meet the same criteria that 

the Board used when initiating its evaluation, not that the expert employ a methodology 

approved by the Board.” Although not binding, this holding does seem to support petitioners’ 

approach. However, it is unclear from the facts provided in Norwalk whether (a) the Board’s 

“methodological” concerns in that case were rooted in Board criteria that were not “initiating” 

criteria, or (b) whether the Board’s “methodological” concerns had no origin in Board criteria 

of any sort. If the latter, then the statement quoted above need not be read as interpreting 

the term “initiating.” To the extent it does interpret that term to exclude consideration of 

non-“initiating” criteria, we find it unpersuasive for the reasons described above.

48 Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2006) (“If [a] regulation is 

ambiguous, the agency's interpretation . . . is ‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation.’”) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 

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Similarly, [the IDEA regulations] provide[] that an evaluation 

conducted by a public agency must use a variety of assessment 

tools and strategies to gather relevant functional, developmental, 

and academic information about the child, including information 

provided by the parent, that may assist in determining whether 

the child is a child with a disability . . . . These requirements also 

apply to an IEE conducted by an independent evaluator, since these 

requirements will be a part of the agency’s criteria.49

This interpretation is consistent with IDEA’s underlying purposes.50 It

would seem perverse to enforce non-substantive criteria such as those 

pertaining to an evaluation’s location, but wholly exempt IEEs from 

substantive criteria concerning, for example, valid assessment strategies and 

reporting methods. As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress wrote extensive 

procedural safeguards into IDEA in part to ensure substantively sound 

educational outcomes.51 A rule wholly exempting IEEs from substantive 

criteria would diminish the rigor of the IDEA process, with attendant 

heightened risk of compromised results. Appellants’ “initiation” argument thus

fails.

Second, appellants appear to argue that Bulletin 1508’s criteria, 

including those that require a multidisciplinary team, are generally 

inapplicable to an IEE because that document is oriented toward schools and 

does not address IEEs in detail.52 This argument also fails. Under 

 

49 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool 

Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,690 (Aug. 14, 2006) (emphasis 

added). 

50 Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 517 (1982) (ambiguous statutes should be 

interpreted according to statutory purposes).

51 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (discussing “the legislative 

conviction that adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases 

assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP”).

52 With regard to the multidisciplinary team requirement specifically, petitioners 

argue that the use of the singular “examiner” in 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a)(3)(i), which defines 

an IEE as “an evaluation conducted by a qualified examiner who is not employed by the public 

agency responsible for the education of the child in question,” indicates that IEEs need not 

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§ 300.502(e)(1), IEEs must use the same “criteria that the public agency uses.” 

The public agency in this case, OPSB, uses Bulletin 1508, and the Bulletin 

therefore applies to the IEE.

Third, appellants claim that only the portions of the IEE relating to their 

areas of disagreement with the board had to comply with Bulletin 1508 

criteria. They invoke DOE guidance allowing an IEE to be limited to the scope 

of disagreement between parents and an agency. Perhaps, but this guidance 

does not directly address reimbursement.53 OPSB cites an August 2011 letter

from appellants, in which they stated that “Seth is entitled to receive a 

comprehensive IEE at public expense,” as evidence that they implicitly agreed 

to be bound by the criteria applicable to all evaluation components. Appellants

dispute whether this was really a request for a comprehensive IEE and 

whether “comprehensive” has any ascertainable legal meaning here. We see no 

need to wade into this debate. Under 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) and (e), a school 

board has no duty to pay for an IEE demonstrated not to meet agency criteria. 

Here, appellants claim reimbursement for the entire IEE, so the entire IEE 

must meet Bulletin 1508’s criteria to the extent those criteria are otherwise 

applicable. This is true whether or not portions of the IEE relate to areas of 

agreement, and regardless of any intentions the parents may have previously 

expressed.54

 

involve multiple specialists. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the singular 

includes the plural. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 130 (2012) (quoting the rules of construction outlined in 1 

U.S.C. § 1). Thus, the fact that “examiner” is singular is hardly dispositive.

53 Letter to Baus, 65 IDELR 81 at *2 (OSEP 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/policy 

/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/acc-14-012562r-baus-iee.pdf.

54 If petitioners agreed with some elements of the school’s evaluation, it would seem 

more appropriate for them to have not tested those areas in the first place, rather than testing 

them (allegedly) inadequately and then disputing reimbursement. Petitioners would surely 

respond that they only tested in areas of agreement because OPSB made them. Yet if their 

complaint is that the school district required them to have a comprehensive IEE, then they 

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Fourth, appellants claim that Seth’s IEE was a reevaluation, not an 

initial evaluation, and that initial evaluation criteria are therefore 

inapplicable. Indeed, many of the IEE’s 31 alleged nonconformities derive from 

Bulletin 1508 criteria that apply to initial evaluations.55 Even assuming the 

IEE was a reevaluation,56 we nonetheless find that initial evaluation criteria 

were applicable. The district court found that appellants suspected Seth had a 

previously undiagnosed learning disability.57 Under Bulletin 1508, this

required them to comply with initial evaluation criteria.58

Fifth, and finally, running through appellants’ briefs is the underlying

contention that Bulletin 1508 is so onerous as to cumulatively and inherently 

violate parents’ right to an IEE.59 We cannot agree. The Bulletin 1508 criteria

at issue, although extensive, address the quality and thoroughness of 

evaluations. This is not a case, for example, where agency criteria effectively 

allow only agency employees to conduct IEEs, constraining parents and 

undermining the independence of evaluations without necessarily advancing 

 

should have disputed this prior to obtaining one. Now that they have, the IEE must comply 

with applicable criteria to merit reimbursement.

55 See Bulletin 1508 § 513 (“All initial evaluations shall include the following 

documented components . . .”).

56 See Letter to Baus, 65 IDELR 81 at *1 (OSEP 2015), https://www2.ed.gov 

/policy/speced/guid /idea/memosdcltrs/acc-14-012562r-baus-iee.pdf (“An initial evaluation . . . 

is the first completed assessment of a child to determine if he or she has a disability under 

IDEA, and the nature and extent of special education and related services provided. Once a 

child has been fully evaluated for the first time in a State . . . any subsequent evaluation of a 

child would constitute a reevaluation.”).

57 Petitioners dispute this factual finding, but we do not find it clearly erroneous in 

light of the record evidence cited below. 58 Bulletin 1508’s “Reevaluation Procedures” state that “when a different 

exceptionality is suspected, initial criteria and procedures for the suspected exceptionality 

shall be followed.” Bulletin 1508 § 1105. The Bulletin 1508 “procedures” associated with 

Seth’s suspected additional exceptionality, Specific Learning Disability, incorporate the 

initial evaluation procedures by reference. Id. § 719(C) (“Conduct all procedures described 

under § 513 [the section pertaining to initial evaluation components].”);

59 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e)(1).

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the goal of rigor.60 Allowing parents to ignore Bulletin 1508’s criteria can

complicate subsequent efforts to compare the IEEs to the districts’ own 

evaluations, undermining a key function of the IEE. Moreover, much of the 

burden of compliance in this case appears related to appellants’ unique

circumstances.61 In light of these circumstances, appellants might have sought 

to limit the scope of their IEE, and thereby avoid triggering some criteria,

before obtaining the evaluation, whether in negotiation with OPSB or in an 

IDEA due process hearing.62 Instead, they obtained a lengthy IEE that 

implicated many Bulletin 1508 criteria. Under § 300.502(b) and (e), the IEE 

had to meet those criteria to merit reimbursement.

We do not doubt that Bulletin 1508 imposed a heavy burden in this case.

Indeed, the record suggests that Seth’s parents faced an uphill battle in 

deciphering its criteria and locating and assembling the requisite evaluators. 

Despite their diligence and willingness to spend thousands of dollars, they

were unable to produce a perfectly compliant IEE. The record also indicates 

that OPSB – which had a “‘natural advantage’ in information and expertise” 

in this context63 – could have been more helpful in explaining the relevant 

requirements and processes.64 Although these facts give us pause, for the 

 

60 See Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 

Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,689 (Aug. 14, 2006)

(forbidding such a policy). 61 In particular, Seth’s family was unwilling to use one of OPSB’s two recommended 

providers because that provider employed Seth’s father, requiring a broader search and 

closing off a potentially inexpensive option closer to home. Petitioners also appear to have 

suffered unexpected setbacks once they found providers, including one evaluator’s 

unexpected health and administrative problems and another’s unwillingness to make needed 

revisions to the evaluation. Finally, Seth’s IEE happens to be subject to extensive initial 

evaluation criteria because Seth’s parents suspected an additional exceptionality.

62 See Letter to Baus, 65 IDELR 81 at *2.

63 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60 (2005) (quoting School Comm. of 

Burlington v. Dep’t of Ed., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985)).

64 Bulletin 1508 consists of 35 dense pages of detailed directives. When OPSB 

approved Seth’s parents’ request for an IEE, its employee essentially just sent them a copy 

of the Bulletin with instructions to stick to it. 

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reasons we have offered, we cannot conclude that the application of Bulletin 

1508 violated the right to an IEE in this specific case.

VI

The Bulletin 1508 criteria implicated in OPSB’s 31 alleged areas of 

noncompliance apply to Seth’s IEE. We may therefore consider whether the 

IEE complies with those criteria. As we have noted, the ALJ below resolved 

this question against appellants, apparently on the basis of an alleged 

stipulation as to the IEE’s noncompliance. Appellants deny that they so 

stipulated, and the record is ambiguous as to this point.65 Nonetheless, in a 

subsequent filing with the district court, appellants wrote: “Plaintiffs admit 

that the IEE obtained by them does not contain some elements or components 

required by Louisiana Bulletin 1508 criteria. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs submit 

that the information contained in the IEE substantially complies with the 

Bulletin 1508 criteria.”

The district court upheld the ALJ’s noncompliance finding. It did not 

address appellants’ argument that the IEE was substantially compliant. 

Rather, citing the ALJ’s finding and OPSB’s recital of the 31 alleged areas of 

noncompliance, it simply held that “the parties agree that the IEE obtained by 

Plaintiffs does not meet Bulletin 1508 criteria” and that “Plaintiffs are not 

entitled to reimbursement because the IEE at issue does not comply with 

Bulletin 1508 criteria.”

The degree of compliance necessary for an IEE to “meet agency criteria” 

under 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 is not explicitly defined in IDEA, its implementing 

 

65 The board alternatively contends that it “demonstrated” the IEE’s noncompliance 

at the 2012 due process hearing between the parties, which preceded the ALJ’s ruling. We 

disagree. The purpose of that hearing was to determine whether Seth was receiving FAPE, 

not whether the IEE merited reimbursement. Although the IEE appears to have been 

extensively discussed at the hearing, the record lacks any evidence that the ALJ decided 

whether the IEE actually met agency criteria. Without such a determination, we cannot say 

that OPSB “demonstrated” the IEE’s deficiency in 2012.

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regulations, or the case law, nor is there any directly relevant agency guidance. 

Yet standards akin to substantial compliance are already deployed in other 

IDEA contexts.66 For example, we consider substantial compliance in 

determining whether school districts have provided education “in conformity 

with” students’ individualized education programs (IEPs), as IDEA requires.67

We are persuaded that substantial compliance also suffices in the IEE 

context. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 nowhere demands perfect adherence to agency 

criteria.68 Indeed, such a requirement is in tension with core purposes of the 

right to an IEE and of the IDEA generally.

As the Supreme Court has emphasized, IDEA’s procedural safeguards, 

including the right to an IEE, are essential to the statutory scheme.69 Through 

them, Congress sought to “giv[e] parents and guardians a large measure of 

 

66 See, e.g., Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 812 (5th 

Cir. 2003) (“‘Procedural defects alone do not constitute a violation of the right to a FAPE 

unless they result in the loss of an educational opportunity.’”) (quoting T.S. v. Indep. Sch. 

Dist. No. 54, 265 F.3d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 2001)). 67 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 346, 

349 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more 

than a de minimis failure to implement all elements of that IEP, and, instead, must 

demonstrate that the school board or other authorities failed to implement substantial or 

significant provisions of the IEP.”); see also Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App'x 968, 

975 (6th Cir. 2012); Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 484 (4th 

Cir. 2011); A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 370 F. App'x 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2010); Fisher ex rel. 

T.C. v. Stafford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 289 F. App'x 520, 524 (3d Cir. 2008); Van Duyn ex rel. Van 

Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2007); Neosho R–V Sch. Dist v. Clark, 

315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).

68 According to Merriam-Webster, “meet” (as in “meet agency criteria”) can refer to 

either substantial or strict conformity, although it more often denotes the latter. See 

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 723 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “meet” as “to 

conform to esp. with exactitude and precision”); id. at 242 (defining “conform” as “to be similar 

or identical”). See also Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821 (statutory language requiring “special 

education and related services” to be provided “in conformity with” an IEP does not impose a 

textual “requirement of perfect adherence to the IEP”) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)).

69 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982) (“When [IDEA’s] elaborate and 

highly specific procedural safeguards . . . are contrasted with the general and somewhat 

imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the importance 

Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid.”).

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participation at every stage of the administrative process,”70 and to ensure that 

the process produced substantively sound results.71 The right to an IEE at 

public expense serves these purposes, both because it enables parents to 

genuinely and consequentially take part in the IDEA process and because it 

allows them to introduce additional and different data into that process, 

informing its ultimate outcomes.72

A substantial compliance standard for IEE reimbursement also 

advances these purposes. First, it safeguards parents’ ability to participate in

the IDEA process through IEEs by preserving a realistic possibility of

reimbursement. The state criteria that govern IDEA evaluations can be 

complex. Given this, and given their “natural advantage in information and 

expertise” in this context,73 school agencies may be able to find ambiguities or 

inconsequential nonconformities in any IEE. If they are allowed to deny 

reimbursement in turn, they will effectively be able to treat parents’ right to 

an IEE as a privilege to be granted at their discretion, since few parents can 

afford to spend thousands of dollars out of pocket on an evaluation. Second, by 

ensuring reimbursement for generally sound IEEs that may happen to be 

deficient in isolated or trivial ways, a substantial compliance standard will 

encourage parents who might not otherwise have obtained and submitted IEEs 

to do so, leading to better-informed IDEA outcomes.

 

70 Id. at 205.

71 See id. at 206 (discussing “the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with 

the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished 

in the way of substantive content in an IEP”).

72 See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005) (by virtue of their right 

to an IEE at public expense, parents “are not left to challenge the government without a 

realistic opportunity to access the necessary evidence, or without an expert with the 

firepower to match the opposition.”).

73 Id. at 60 (quoting School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Ed., 471 U.S. 359, 368 

(1985)).

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The board worries that “[i]f this Court were to adopt the Plaintiffs’ 

implicit criterion of “substantial” compliance . . . . [b]ased on an unreasonably 

low standard, presumptively a couple of paragraphs–or even a prescription pad 

with ‘OHI,’ ‘Autism,’ or ‘SLD’ with little more–would suffice as an IEE.” 

Although the slippery slope is always a concern when the law accepts lessthan-perfect compliance,74 we find the risk acceptable here, given the strong

statutory interests favoring a substantial compliance standard and the use of

such standards elsewhere in the IDEA case law. We do not suggest that “a 

couple of paragraphs” or a “prescription pad” notation will now pass muster. 

Indeed, the determination will necessarily turn on the particular facts and 

agency criteria at issue in each case. “Substantial compliance,” allowing 

reimbursement in this context, means that insignificant or trivial deviations 

from the letter of agency criteria may be acceptable as long as there is 

substantive compliance with all material provisions of the agency criteria and 

the IEE provides detailed, rigorously produced and accessibly presented data.

In so holding, we are mindful of our limited expertise.75 To be sure, a

substantial compliance standard presumes that adjudicators can reliably 

identify which deviations are “substantial,” requiring some engagement with 

substantive questions of special education practice. Yet this is nothing new.

IDEA already requires district courts to review the factual findings of 

administrative hearing officers “virtually de novo.”76 In turn, they must “reach 

. . . independent conclusion[s] based upon the preponderance of the evidence”77

 

74 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985) (discussing filing deadlines).

75 Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (“[T]his Court's 

lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with 

the informed judgments made at the state and local levels” concerning “the most persistent 

and difficult questions of educational policy . . . .”).

76 See Teague Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1993) (adopting 

this interpretation and citing cases).

77 Id.

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as to such questions as whether students require more or less restrictive 

learning environments,78 whether IEPs are “reasonably calculated to enable 

[children] to receive educational benefits,”79 and whether schools’ failures in 

implementing IEPs implicate “significant provisions of . . . IEP[s]” or are

instead “de minimis.”80 Seeing “substantial compliance” as a comfortable fit 

within a regimen constructed to promote exchange and cooperative 

engagement for the benefit of student and school, we doubt applying a 

substantial compliance standard to IEEs will pose a greater challenge, or 

stretch courts’ role farther than the statute itself contemplates.

VII

Seth’s IEE will “meet agency criteria” and merit reimbursement if it 

substantially complies with Bulletin 1508. As noted above, the district court 

did not squarely address this factually specific question. We therefore remand

for analysis under a substantial compliance standard. If the court below (or, 

upon further remand, the administrative hearing officer) finds the IEE 

substantially compliant, it should award reimbursement.

In any event, however, appellants will not be entitled to the full cost of 

the evaluation they obtained. Appellants knew of OPSB’s $3,000 cost cap for 

IEEs, yet they spent over $8,000. The Department of Education has explained 

that IDEA allows schools to enforce reasonable cost criteria for IEEs as long as 

parents in unique circumstances have the opportunity to request exemption.81

Here, OPSB offered appellants an opportunity to demonstrate unique 

 

78 Id. at 132-33. 79 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982); see, e.g., R.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 607 F.3d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 2010).

80 Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2000).

81 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool 

Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46689-90.

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circumstances in its correspondence with them over the cost cap, but 

appellants did not respond. Therefore, the $3,000 cap binds them.82

We VACATE and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

 

82 Petitioners also object to having been required to pay the cost of the IEE upfront. 

However, as DOE has explained, “The IDEA does not address whether funding should be 

paid as reimbursement or as a cash advance. If the parent requests advance funding for IEErelated expenses and the public agency denies that request, the parent could request a due 

process hearing . . . if the parent believes that denial of advance funding would effectively 

deny the parent the right to a publicly-funded IEE.” Letter to Petska, 35 IDELR 191 at *2 

(OSEP 2001). Petitioners made no such request. Furthermore, OPSB offered petitioners the 

opportunity to demonstrate unique circumstances that would justify the board’s paying 

directly for the IEE, but petitioners did not respond.

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JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The majority’s creation―from whole cloth―of a substantial-compliance 

standard in Part VI is a dramatic judicial amendment of the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) without textual or precedential justification. It is both a usurpation of regulatory authority and an invitation for courts 

to engage in arbitrary decisionmaking. And, the majority provides scant direction on what substantial compliance really means. I respectfully dissent.

I.

Though my colleagues observe that this court has used a substantialcompliance standard in other applications of the IDEA, those cases involved a 

distinct statutory basis. All of the cases cited by the majority relate to whether 

a school’s alleged failure to develop or implement an individualized education 

plan (“IEP”) deprived students of a free and appropriate public education 

(“FAPE”).1 That is an inquiry considerably different from whether an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”) complies with state criteria. 

Title 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e)(1) has a plain textual mandate: The criteria 

under which an IEE is obtained at public expense “must be the same as the 

criteria that the public agency uses when it initiates an evaluation.” (Emphasis added.) And if the agency (the school) demonstrates that “the evaluation 

obtained by the parent did not meet agency criteria,” it need not pay for it. 

34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). There is no qualifying language

 

1 See Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 811–12 (5th 

Cir. 2003); Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2000); Woods 

v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968, 975 (6th Cir. 2012); Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. 

Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 484 (4th Cir. 2011); A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 370 

F. Ap’x 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2010); Fisher ex rel. T.C. v. Stafford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 289 F. App’x 

520, 524 (3d Cir. 2008); Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 821–

22 (9th Cir. 2007); Neosho R–V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003); 

T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 265 F.3d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 2001).

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such as “substantially” or “mostly.” 

In contrast, where courts have applied a “substantial compliance” standard to determine whether a school denied a student a FAPE in its development of or implementation of an IEP, the IDEA is less specific. “It is wellsettled that, without a claim that the FAPE was deficient, procedural defects 

are not actionable.” T.S., 265 F.3d at 1095; see also Adam J., 328 F.3d at 812 

& n.23 (adopting the approach in T.S.). Thus, to assert that a school failed to 

follow IDEA regulations regarding an IEP, the claimant must make an overall

allegation that a FAPE itself was denied.

The IDEA does not prescribe substantive standards for what constitutes 

a FAPE. As explained in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 

(1982),2 the IDEA provides a number of “highly specific procedural safeguards” 

but “general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions.” “Noticeably 

absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children.” Id. at 189.

There must be a “lost educational opportunity” for there to be a FAPE violation.

See Adam J., 328 F.3d at 812.

Procedural defects alone do not necessarily result in lost educational 

opportunities. Therefore, given the lack of guidance in the IDEA regarding the 

substance of a FAPE, and, thus, what an IEP is supposed to achieve, it is not 

surprising that in that context courts employ a “substantial-compliance” standard and excuse minimal procedural violations. See, e.g., id.3 The requirement 

 

2 Rowley is the case often cited by courts in discussing the substantial-compliance 

standard. See, e.g., Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 346, 349; Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821–22; Clark, 

315 F.3d at 1027 & n.3. 3 Although determining whether a FAPE has been provided is a completely different 

inquiry from determining whether an IEE is eligible for public reimbursement, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1401(9)(D) does explain that a FAPE is “provided in conformity with the [IEP].” Thus, there 

is some textual basis for requiring schools, in order to provide a FAPE, to comply with all of 

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that, to be reimbursed at public expense, an IEE must meet the same standards as for school-initiated evaluations does not bear, however, on the substantive question of what constitutes a FAPE. 

Instead, there is good reason for schools to be required to pay only for 

those IEEs that fully comply with state evaluation criteria, as the majority 

comes close to acknowledging.4 Regardless of who is paying, schools must consider an IEE in their educational determinations only “if it meets agency criteria.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1). Because school-conducted evaluations must 

meet federal criteria,5 it is not surprising that IEEs that do not meet those 

same criteria are not particularly helpful to the schools. Requiring a school to 

pay for an evaluation that it need not consider drains scarce resources from 

other programs. 

II.

The majority’s decision to apply a “substantial-compliance” standard is 

in tension with its earlier holding, in the last portion of Part V, that the IEE 

must comply with Bulletin 1508’s criteria. Implicit in the parents’ claim that 

they need only “substantially comply” with Bulletin 1508’s requirements is a 

contention that they can flout (or fail to comply with) some of Bulletin 1508’s 

criteria. Yet, if parents can ignore some of the criteria, to what extent do they 

need to comply with Bulletin 1508 at all? 

 

the procedural requirements governing IEPs. Some of the critiques I make here of a 

substantial-compliance standard for IEE reimbursements could apply to a substantialcompliance standard in the context of FAPE violations. Yet, though the substantialcompliance standard for FAPE violations is the established rule in this circuit, see Adam J., 

328 F.3d at 812, there is no Fifth Circuit precedent on the requirements for IEE 

reimbursement. 

4 “Allowing parents to ignore Bulletin 1508’s criteria can complicate subsequent 

efforts to compare the IEEs to the districts’ own evaluations, undermining a key function of 

the IEE.”

5 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)–(c) (outlining requirements for school-conducted 

evaluations).

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The majority provides meager guidance to the district courts on what 

“substantial compliance” looks like in the context of IEE reimbursement. Is 

meeting six out of ten criteria enough, or does it matter what kind of criteria 

are at issue? According to my colleagues, “[s]ubstantial compliance . . . means 

that insignificant or trivial deviations from the letter of agency criteria may be 

acceptable as long as there is substantive compliance with all material provisions of the agency criteria . . . .”

That definition collapses on itself. Substantial compliance is “substantive compliance.” What is material and what is insignificant? The majority 

offers little indication. Instead, this so-called “standard” asks judges to act as 

policymakers to determine which agency criteria are and are not important. 

Apparently, “substantial compliance” also requires the IEE to “provide[] 

detailed, rigorously produced and accessibly presented data.” Yet, data can be 

detailed, rigorously produced, and accessibly presented and still not be useful 

if it measures the wrong types of abilities. Thorough methodology does not 

compensate for categorical errors. That part of the definition is also unhelpful. 

At this point, there is no way to know what constitutes substantial compliance; instead, that term sends a nod to district courts that “you will know it 

when you see it.” That is a standardless and, for the most part, useless pronouncement that lends itself to abuse. In contrast, a bright-line rule, requiring 

an IEE to comply with all agency criteria in order to be reimbursed, is much 

easier to administer and removes boundless discretion from the district courts. 

III.

The school board articulated thirty-one ways in which Seth’s IEE failed 

to comply with state criteria, in addition to its failure to adhere to the cost cap. 

Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the district court’s decision, the 

district court grouped those thirty-one allegations into four groups and 

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analyzed each one to find non-compliance.6 Notably, on appeal the parents do 

not combat these findings by demonstrating that the IEE actually adhered to 

Bulletin 1508;7 instead, they advance the notion that the IEE need not comply 

with all of Bulletin 1508. Given the majority’s holding that the IEE was required to comply with it, and the parents’ failure to demonstrate such compliance, this should have been an easy case. 

This conclusion is further strengthened if we look beyond the arguments

and examine the record submitted to the district court.8 Even assuming that 

some of the thirty-one areas of non-compliance were mere formatting deficiencies, as the parents imply,9 there are also significant missing components from 

the IEE. Many of those missing elements relate to how Seth’s impairments 

should be addressed in a school setting. 

 

6 According to the majority, the district court “simply held . . . that ‘Plaintiffs are not 

entitled to reimbursement because the IEE at issue does not comply with Bulletin 1508 

criteria.’” Thus, the majority implies that the court accepted the school board’s allegations 

without conducting further analysis. That is a mischaracterization of the opinion, whose 

entire sentence reads, “Plaintiffs are not entitled to reimbursement because the IEE at issue 

does not comply with Bulletin 1508 criteria with respect to the four areas of testing above.”

(Emphasis added.) Though the district court’s analysis was somewhat limited, it did address 

each of these four areas of non-compliance. 7 Indeed, the parents earlier admitted that the IEE did “not contain some elements or 

components required by Bulletin 1508 criteria.” Nevertheless, the parents briefly did reference a chart submitted to the district court in which they disputed the thirty-one counts of 

non-compliance. Yet they did not elaborate on those arguments in their submissions before 

us. Failure adequately to brief an issue on appeal is waiver. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A);

United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 1992).

8 Absent adequate argumentation in a brief, we are not required to comb through the 

record to look for points presented in the district court. Beaumont, 972 F.2d at 563. Nonetheless, I have conducted additional, albeit limited, analysis of the thirty-one areas of alleged 

non-compliance, and my findings are summarized above.

9 The parents contend that any failure to follow Bulletin 1508 was inconsequential.

Thus, although acknowledging that the IEE was missing some components, they contended

that the IEE “substantially” complied with Bulletin 1508’s criteria. It is true that some of 

the thirty-one areas of non-compliance appear less significant and probably would have been 

easy to correct. For example, the IEE did not provide Seth’s achievement scores using chronological age norms; instead, it used grade-based norms. Nevertheless, even though the school 

board offered to provide guidance to help the parents bring the IEE into full compliance, the

parents failed to do so. 

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For example, the IEE did not contain a description of Seth’s educational 

needs in prioritized order.10 Similarly, the IEE did not contain an assessment, 

conducted at school, of Seth’s gross motor abilities to evaluate the extent to 

which they affected his ability to participate in educational activities.11 Perhaps most significantly, the IEE did not evaluate or review the extent to which 

existing interventions12 were working.13

Although the IEE contained plenty of data regarding Seth’s overall abilities, and it did make recommendations for future improvement, there was little analysis of past performance and accommodations. The effectiveness of 

current and prior learning strategies, however, is an important data point in 

planning future interventions. Therefore, even if some of the areas of noncompliance were minor, there is no doubt that the IEE failed to comply with 

Bulletin 1508 in significant ways. Thus, even if we purport to apply a 

substantial-compliance standard, the IEE is fatally non-compliant.

 

10 In the district court, the parents noted that the school board had not included a 

prioritized list of educational needs in its previous evaluations. Even if the parents are correct, “two wrongs don’t make a right.” Bulletin 1508 states that a prioritized list is required.

See Bulletin 1508, LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. CI at § 513(B)(1)(g) (2009). Indeed, if the 

school did fail to include such a list in prior evaluations, there was even more reason for the 

IEE to include it, because IEEs frequently are designed to supplement school-board 

assessments. 

11 The physical-therapy evaluation did assess Seth’s overall gross motor skills, as the

parents note, but there is no indication that the physical therapist evaluated Seth in an educational environment, as Bulletin 1508 requires. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. CI

§ 1507(C)(1)(b)(i).

12 Interventions are learning strategies that are tailored to individual students’ specific needs. See, e.g., Bulletin 1508, LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. CI, § 301. Bulletin 1508 

requires evaluations to contain an analysis of existing interventions. See id. § 513(B)(1)(c).

13 The IEE states that documentation of evidence-based interventions was not provided as part of Seth’s educational records. Nevertheless, the IEE later refers to teachers 

who mentioned interventions and to accommodations that were based on a 2010 evaluation 

of Seth conducted by the school, so its failure to analyze at least these interventions more 

fully is inexplicable. The IEE also mentions IEP progress reports, so its earlier statement 

that there was no documentation from the school regarding Seth’s performance is 

contradictory. 

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IV.

The majority contends that absent a substantial-compliance standard, 

schools will treat IEE reimbursement “as a privilege to be granted at their discretion” and thus effectively deny parents’ right to an IEE, undermining the 

purposes of the Act.14 Yet, if the majority is concerned that school districts will 

employ arcane criteria and exacting formatting requirements to avoid paying 

for IEEs, there is already a mechanism built into the regulation to protect 

against such impositions. Section 300.502(e)(1) requires an IEE to follow the 

same criteria that the school uses to conduct its evaluations “to the extent those 

criteria are consistent with the parent’s right to an [IEE].” If the school’s criteria effectively prohibit parents from ever having an IEE conducted at public 

expense, parents are entitled to bring a due-process hearing to challenge these 

criteria. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(1) (2015). If such criteria are inappropriately burdensome or irrelevant to parents, the proper approach is to strike 

down the criteria, holding that parents need not comply with them, rather than 

holding that the criteria do apply but parents need to comply with them only 

“substantially.”

In this court, the parents challenge some of the requirements in Bulletin 

1508 as infringing their right to an IEE, including the imposition of contentbased criteria, the necessity of a multidisciplinary team, and applying the 

criteria for initial evaluations as opposed to reevaluation criteria.15 The majority concludes that the application of all of these criteria was appropriate. 

Because the majority determines that Bulletin 1508 is not “so onerous as to 

cumulatively and inherently violate parents’ right to an IEE,” application of 

the criteria in the bulletin cannot infringe on the parents’ right to an IEE.

 

14 The majority’s reliance on purposivism is misguided. See infra Part V. 15 Though the parents challenged the application of more specific criteria in the district court, they do not press those challenges before us, so they are waived.

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Thus, there is no need for the majority to spin a substantial-compliance standard to protect from the supposedly intrusive application of Bulletin 1508. 

V.

The majority’s decision to impose a judge-made standard on IEE reimbursements is deeply flawed. The majority cites not one single word in the 

IDEA or its accompanying regulations that points to the existence of a 

substantial-compliance standard for IEE reimbursement.16 Instead, the 

majority looks broadly to the purported purposes of the IDEA to discover a 

heretofore hidden substantial-compliance standard.17 Such purposivism is but

another name for license to refashion a statute or regulation to suit the judge’s

personal whims.

That is not to say that purpose is irrelevant, but it is operationalized via

the text. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 20 (explaining that textualism “routinely takes purpose into account, but in its concrete manifestations as deduced 

from a close reading of the text”). The danger arises when purpose is disembodied from the text. Indeed, “[t]he most destructive (and most alluring) 

 

16 Indeed, the majority observes, “The degree of compliance necessary for an IEE to 

‘meet agency criteria’ under 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 is not explicitly defined in IDEA, its implementing regulations, or the case law, nor is there any directly relevant agency guidance.” 

17 The majority’s flawed approach is encapsulated in its footnote urging us to interpret 

ambiguous statutes according to their purpose. This misses the point that in regard to whether IEEs must meet all agency criteria, there is no ambiguity. In the absence of language to 

the contrary, the plain implication of the text is that IEEs need to comply fully with local 

regulatory requirements. The regulatory drafters did not say that IEEs “may be required” 

to comply with agency criteria; instead they stated that IEEs “must” comply. 34 C.F.R. 

§ 300.502(e)(1); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 112–15 (2012) (explaining that “[m]andatory words,” such as “must” 

“impose a duty,” and “permissive words grant discretion”). 

Thus, by the majority’s own reasoning there is no need to surmise regulatory purpose, 

because there is no ambiguity. Even if there were, the proper approach would be to use the 

various textual canons of statutory interpretation to resolve any textual uncertainties. See, 

e.g., POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2014) (applying textual 

canons and explaining that “[a]nalysis of the statutory text, aided by established principles 

of interpretation, controls”).

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feature of purposivism is its pure manipulability.” Id. at 112–15. “Any provision of law or of private ordering can be said to have a number of purposes, 

which can be placed on a ladder of abstraction.” Id. Law then becomes whatever the judges wish it to be. 

The majority opinion not only serves as an example of such personalpreference decisionmaking but also provides little direction to district courts 

on how its new extra-textual standard operates. Instead, the majority invites

the district judges to engage in the same sort of judicial arbitrariness, as they 

apply their own notions to decide what is and is not substantially compliant.

Not only is such purposivism inappropriate, it is unnecessary. As I have explained, if the concern is that parents will be prohibited from obtaining IEEs, 

the regulations already provide an avenue for them to challenge the imposition 

of overly burdensome criteria.

Judges must resist the siren call to become lawmakers. I respectfully 

dissent.

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