Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01886/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01886-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAD COWAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING THE DCSS

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS;

[ECF No. 67]

(2) GRANTING GOVERNOR

BROWN’S MOTION TO DISMISS;

[ECF No. 73]

(3) GRANTING MAUREEN

HALLAHAN AND PENNIE

MCLAUGHLIN’S MOTION TO

DISMISS;

[ECF No. 74]

(4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF

DEFAULT;

[ECF No. 70]

(5) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER

SHORTENING TIME

[ECF No. 93]

v.

GOVERNOR JERRY BROWN,

JUDGE MAUREEN HALLAHAN,

COMMISSIONER PENNIE

MCLAUGHLIN, SDCSS LAWYER

NATASHA ESSES, SDCSS

LAWYER DIONNE MOCHON,

SDCSS CASE MANAGER MIA-LEE

CABRERA, TRAC PHAM, SAN

DIEGO CHILD SUPPORT SERVICE,

Defendants.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are three motions to dismiss by: (1) Judge Maureen Hallahan

and Commissioner Pennie McLaughlin (collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”); (2)

Mia Cabrera, Natasha Esses, Dionne Mochon, Trac Pham, and the Department ofChild

Support Services (the “DCSS”) (collectively, the “DCSS Defendants”); and (3)

Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (“Governor Brown”). (ECF Nos. 67, 73, 74.) Plaintiff Chad

Cowan (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, opposes all three motions. (ECF No. 81.) Also

before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default. (ECF No. 70.)

The parties have fully briefed the motions. (ECF Nos. 67, 73, 74, 80, 81, 82, 83,

85, 86, 87, 89.) The Court finds the motions suitable for disposition without oral

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Upon review of the moving papers,

admissible evidence, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS all three motions to

dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Judicial Defendants,

the DCSS Defendants, and Governor Brown. (ECF No. 1.) After the first round of

motions to dismiss, which Plaintiff opposed, Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed

without prejudice. (ECF No. 23.) On December 19, 2014, Plaintifffiled a first amended

complaint. (ECF No. 25.) After the second round of motionsto dismiss, which Plaintiff

failed to oppose, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was again dismissed without

prejudice. (ECF No. 57.) On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint.

(ECF No. 65.) Defendants have now filed a third round of motions to dismiss. (ECF

Nos. 67, 73, 74.) Plaintiff’s allegations remain similar to those in his original

complaint, though with additional details. (See ECF No. 23, at 3; ECF No. 65.)

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges three causes of action: (1) a

declaratory judgment invalidating his alleged contract to pay child support due to fraud

and duress, (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and (3) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

241–242. (ECF No. 65.)

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IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable

legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.

1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule12(b)(6) authorizes a

court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a

complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to

plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. 

While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must

plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted astrue, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual

allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual

content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of

a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

(9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th

Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal

conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the

form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003);

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W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

V. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court is mindful that pro se pleadings are to be liberally

construed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Plaintiff’s filings in this case

reflect that Plaintiff believes that, even though he was born and lives in the United

States, he is not a citizen of the United States. (See, e.g., ECF No. 65, at 12–15 (“There

are two classes of citizens, citizens of the UNITED STEATES [sic] and a citizen of the

state.”.).) “This belief is the hallmark of the sovereign citizen movement.” Gravatt v.

United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2011).

A. Motion for Entry of Default

Default is appropriate against a party who “has failed to plead or otherwise

defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to respond

within the requisite time period and thus default is appropriate. (ECF No. 70.)

However, Defendants have appeared in this lawsuit and taken actions to defend

themselves such as by filing motions to dismiss.(See ECF Nos. 67, 73, 74.) Thus

default is inappropriate. See Direct Mail Specs. v. Eclat Computerized Tech., 840 F.2d

685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default, (ECF No.

70), is DENIED. Additionally, Plaintiff’s motion for an application for order

shortening time to enter judgment, (ECF No. 93), is DENIED as moot.

B. Motions to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s primary contention appears to be that the legal methods by which the

State of California enforces child support obligations do not apply to himand thustheir

use against him constituted duress. (ECF No. 81, at 3.) Plaintiff further appears to

believe that the answer that he signed in his child support proceedings is a “contract.”

(Id.) Plaintiff is wrong on both counts. And despite his protestations to the contrary,

the laws of the United States and the State of California apply to him.

First, the alleged “contract,” form FL-610, is not a contract at all, but a form

answer to a complaintseeking to establish parental obligations, including the payment

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of child support, that Plaintiff signed. (See ECF No. 65, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff was not

agreeing to contract with the DCSS or any other party, but rather he was agreeing to

pay a judgment. (Id.) Second, as Plaintiff admits that the child support enforcement

laws are valid, (ECF No. 81, at 3 (“These tactics approved by federal law . . . .”)), and

has not made any credible argument as to why they do not apply to him, he has failed

to adequately allege duress. Under California law, duress requires that there be a

“wrongful act.” Sheehan v. Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1987).

But because the laws of the United States and the State of California apply to Plaintiff,

the child support enforcement methods were not wrongful acts, but in fact legally

authorized ones. As Plaintiff has failed to allege both a contract and fraud or duress,

Plaintiff’s first cause of action for a declaratory judgment is DISMISSED with

prejudice.

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Additionally, these same events serve as the basis for Plaintiff’s civil rights

causes of action. (ECF No. 65, at 6–12.) Plaintiff essentially argues that being required

to adhere to the laws that he is subject to has violated his rights. As discussed above,

Plaintiff has advanced no credible argument as to why he is not subject to the laws of

the United States or the laws of the State of California As there was neither duress nor

fraud, the Court findsthat Plaintiff has failed to allege any constitutional violations and

thus Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action are also DISMISSED with prejudice

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The DCSS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 67) is GRANTED;

2. Governor Brown’s Motion to Dismiss , (ECF No. 73), is GRANTED;

3. Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 74), is GRANTED;

4. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, (ECF No. 65), is DISMISSED

with prejudice;

5. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default, (ECF No. 70), is DENIED; and

6. Plaintiff’s Application for Order Shortening Time, (ECF No. 93), is

DENIED as moot.

DATED: June 24, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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