Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03493/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03493-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

On November 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed a notice of his intent

to file an opposition. In this notice, Plaintiff stated that he

anticipated filing his opposition by November 26, 2007. 

Nonetheless, no opposition has been filed to date.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE CARPIAUX,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF EMERYVILLE, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-3493 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff asserts several claims against Defendants, all

agents of the City of Emeryville (the City), in connection with an

allegedly unlawful search of his property on July 23, 2004. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Although Plaintiff was informed by order of the Court that he must

file an opposition to Defendants’ motion by November 8, 2007, he

has not filed an opposition.1 The matter was taken under

submission on the papers. Having considered the record and the

papers submitted by Defendants, the Court grants their motion.

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2

The facts recited in this section are taken from the amended

complaint, Plaintiff’s deposition and documentary evidence

submitted by Defendants.

2

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff has resided in his home, located at 1264 Ocean

Avenue in Emeryville, California, since 1968. He is interested in

engineering, and uses his house and yard as a workspace. Over the

years, he has worked on projects relating to, among other things,

high-depth submarines, automobile transmissions and solar-powered

cars.

Since at least 1984, the condition and use of Plaintiff’s

property have been a matter of concern to the City. In 1987 or

1988, the City seized a laboratory Plaintiff had constructed within

a forty-foot aluminum container placed in his yard. Similarly, in

1993, the City seized the equipment and materials Plaintiff had

been using to build his submarine.

On numerous occasions since 1994, the Emeryville City Council

has passed resolutions declaring Plaintiff’s property a public

nuisance and ordering Plaintiff to abate various violations of the

City’s code. These violations have included, among other things:

dismantled and inoperative vehicles and automobile parts on the

property; an accumulation of dirt, litter and debris in vestibules,

doorways, and adjoining sidewalks; a mass of lumber, junk, trash,

debris and salvage materials visible from the street; abandoned or

inoperable heavy machinery; hazardous pools, ponds and excavations;

an accumulation of garbage and refuse creating a harborage for

rodents; failure to contract garbage service; exposed wiring and

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inadequate electrical fixtures; and use of an unvented stove as a

heat supply. Plaintiff believes the City Council’s actions

represent unjustifiable interfere with his enjoyment of his

property. He also believes that, in passing the resolutions, the

City Counsel was harassing him in order to advance its agenda of

gentrification.

On July 19, 2004, the City applied to the Alameda County

Superior Court for a warrant permitting its agents to inspect

Plaintiff’s property for violations of the municipal code and City

Council resolutions. The application was accompanied by the

declarations of Victor Gonzales, the City’s chief building

official, and Defendant Nancy Templeton, the City’s community

preservation officer. The declarations stated that, based on the

signatories’ personal knowledge, numerous code violations could be

witnessed from the public right-of-way.

The court found that good cause existed to believe that

Plaintiff had violated the municipal code and the City Council’s

resolutions, and issued a warrant. The warrant ordered appropriate

officials to “enter, investigate, and search the Property for the

purpose of identifying violations of Housing, Fire, Plumbing,

Electric, Building, Health & Safety, and Emeryville Municipal Codes

and applicable City Council Resolutions.” Larsen Dec. Ex. R. It

permitted forced entry and inspection of Plaintiff’s yard and the

interior of his residence, from boundary to boundary, even in his

absence.

On July 21, 2004, Defendant Michael Guina, a deputy city

attorney, sent Plaintiff a copy of the inspection warrant along

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with a notice that City staff would conduct an inspection of his

property on July 23, 2004 at 11:00 a.m. These documents were also

taped on the gate to Plaintiff’s property, where Plaintiff

acknowledges he saw them prior to the search.

On July 23, 2004 at approximately 11:00 a.m., a group of City

officials including Mr. Gonzales and Defendants Templeton, Guina

and Neal arrived at Plaintiff’s property to execute the warrant. 

Plaintiff met the group at the gate and objected to the search,

claiming that he had not received proper notice. According to

Plaintiff, Defendant Guina hesitated to execute the warrant over

Plaintiff’s objections, but Defendant Neal, a police captain for

the City, said, “It’s good enough for me, let’s go.” Id. Ex. A at

64.

Captain Neal opened the gate and the group entered Plaintiff’s

yard. Plaintiff attempted to accompany them during the search, but

Captain Neal took him by the neck, locked his arm, and said, “You

stay here.” Id. at 66. Captain Neal restrained Plaintiff in this

position for “at least a couple minutes” but less than five

minutes, then released him. Id. at 67, 70. Plaintiff then

accompanied the rest of the group as they inspected his property. 

Plaintiff testified that he did not experience any pain during or

after the incident with Captain Neal, that he did not say anything

to Captain Neal as he was being restrained, and that Captain Neal’s

hold did not leave any marks on his body. Id. at 68-69.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

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evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods:

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

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evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party’s prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party’s

“burden of contradicting [the moving party’s] evidence is not

negligible.” Id. This standard does not change merely because

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resolution of the relevant issue is “highly fact specific.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia

Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but

merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation

was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983

for the actions of their employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. More specifically,

municipalities may be held liable for inadequate police training

“only where failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to

the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact,” and

“the identified deficiency in a city’s training program [is]

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3Originally, Plaintiff also charged Defendants Guina,

Templeton and James with liability for violating these

constitutional provisions, but the Court dismissed these claims on

an earlier motion.

8

closely related to the ultimate injury.” City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 388, 391 (1989).

A. Claims against Captain Neal

Plaintiff’s first cause of action charges Captain Neal with

acting under color of law to deprive him of the right to be free

from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right not to be

deprived of life or liberty without due process of law, the right

to be free from the use of excessive force by police officers, the

right to equal protection of the laws and the right to be free from

interference within the zone of privacy.3

1. Unreasonable search and seizure

The Fourth Amendment proscribes “unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Allen v. City of Portland, 73

F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995). Because the inspection of

Plaintiff’s home was conducted pursuant to a warrant, his claim

must fail if the warrant was validly issued. See Steagald v.

United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981) (“[T]he entry into a

home to conduct a search or make an arrest is unreasonable under

the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant.”) To

satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must

issue on probable cause, be supported by a sworn declaration, and

describe with particularity the place to be searched. U.S. Const.

amend. IV.

The warrant at issue here satisfies all of these requirements. 

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4

The Court notes also that the warrant meets the requirements,

including the notice requirement, applicable to inspection warrants

under California law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1822.50 et seq.

9

It was supported by the declarations of Mr. Gonzales and Ms.

Templeton, who described specific violations of the municipal code

that could be seen from the public right-of-way. These statements

provided probable cause for the warrant. See United States v.

Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005) (the “totality of the

circumstances” must provide a “fair probability” of a legal

violation). In addition, the warrant meets the Fourth Amendment’s

particularity requirement; it describes the area subject to

inspection as the property located at 1264 Ocean Avenue, “from

boundary to boundary,” including “the interior of the main

residence, any detached buildings, and all exterior yards.” Larsen

Dec. Ex. R.; see Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)

(“It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a

search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify

the place intended.”).

Because the search of Plaintiff’s property was supported by a

validly executed warrant,4 his rights under the Fourth Amendment

were not violated.

2. Excessive use of force

Under the Fourth Amendment, any force used during the

execution of a search warrant must be objectively reasonable under

the circumstances. Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 778 (9th

Cir. 2004). Evaluating the reasonableness of the force “requires a

careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

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individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Because questions of

reasonableness are not well-suited to precise legal determination,

the propriety of a particular use of force is generally an issue

for the jury.” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440-41 (9th Cir.

1994). However, “on summary judgment, the court may make a

determination as to reasonableness where, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the evidence compels

the conclusion that [the defendant’s] use of force was reasonable.” 

Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1992).

In conducting the inspection, Defendants sought to further a

valid governmental interest, namely, abating a public nuisance and

putting an end to Plaintiff’s violations of the municipal code. 

Captain Neal’s restraint on Plaintiff’s physical liberty was done

to prevent Plaintiff from interfering with the inspection, and only

after Plaintiff had tried to stop the inspectors from entering his

property. In addition, Plaintiff’s description of the incident

indicates that Captain Neal used a minimal amount of force to

restrain him; he took hold of Plaintiff’s neck and arm to prevent

him from following the inspection team. By Plaintiff’s own

account, Captain Neal caused him no pain or injury, nor did

Plaintiff complain to Captain Neal of pain during the incident. 

Additionally, Captain Neal released Plaintiff after a short amount

of time, at which point he was permitted to witness the inspection

and ensure that his personal items were not unduly disturbed. 

Under the circumstances, the de minimis use of force Captain Neal

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employed to restrain Plaintiff was reasonable from his perspective

at the time, and thus cannot serve as the basis for a Fourth

Amendment claim. See Hupp v. City of Walnut Creek, 389 F. Supp. 2d

1229, 1232-33 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (while excessively tight handcuffing

can constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, where there was no

physical manifestation of injury or contemporaneous complaint about

tight handcuffs, no claim could lie); Gonzalez v. Pierce County,

2005 WL 2088367, at *9 (W.D. Wash.) (no Fourth Amendment claim

where there was no injury or “more than de minimis discomfort”);

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use

of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.”).

3. Equal protection, due process and privacy claims

Because Plaintiff does not claim that he was discriminated

against on the basis of his membership in a protected class, he can

succeed on his equal protection claim only by demonstrating that he

“has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly

situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment.” Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564 (2000)). “Disparate government treatment will survive

rational basis scrutiny ‘as long as it bears a rational relation to

a legitimate state interest.’” Id. (quoting Patel v. Penman, 103

F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Plaintiff has come forward with no evidence demonstrating that

he has been treated differently from other individuals who have

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violated the City’s municipal code and have refused to comply with

orders to correct such violations. Thus, he has no basis for an

equal protection claim. To the extent Plaintiff bases his claim on

being treated differently from individuals who do not use their

property as a workshop in the way that he does, his claim must also

fail. The City has a legitimate interest in enforcing its laws and

in abating public nuisances. Plaintiff has not shown that the

actions taken in response to the condition in which he maintains

his property lack a rational relation to these interests.

As for Plaintiff’s due process and privacy claims, it is not

clear to what set of facts these claims apply. The Court

interprets them as relating either to the alleged use of an invalid

warrant to inspect Plaintiff’s premises or to Captain Neal’s use of

force when executing the warrant. However, these events are best

analyzed as claims brought under the Fourth Amendment. As

discussed above, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his Fourth Amendment

claims.

4. Qualified immunity

Defendants argue that Captain Neal is entitled to qualified

immunity on the claims asserted against him. This defense protects

government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

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(1986)). A defendant may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief

about the facts or about what the law requires in any given

situation. Id. “Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if

the right asserted by the plaintiff was not ‘clearly established’

or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful.” Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d

624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, the court must engage in the following inquiries. At the

outset, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged

the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Conn v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). In other words, the court must

ask, “Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right?” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197

(2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If this inquiry yields a

positive answer, then the court proceeds to determine if the right

was “clearly established.” Id.

The inquiry as to whether the right at issue was clearly

established must be made in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202. “Although earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’

facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that

the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a

finding.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). As the

Supreme Court has explained, “[O]fficials can still be on notice

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that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances.” Id. at 753. The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the existence of a clearly established right at the time of

the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). 

If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

question is whether, under that law, a reasonable official could

have believed his or her conduct was lawful in the situation

confronted. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th

Cir. 1993). If the law did not put the officer on notice that his

or her conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

Therefore, qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when he

or she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient,

reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances he or

she confronted. Id. at 206. The defendant bears the burden of

establishing that his or her actions were reasonable, even though

he or she violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Doe v.

Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995);

Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Maraziti,

953 F.2d at 523. 

The Court has already found that Captain Neal did not violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. But even if he had, he is

entitled to qualified immunity because: 1) Plaintiff has not shown

that the rights he claims were violated were “clearly established”

under the law; and 2) Defendants have produced sufficient evidence

to show that Captain Neal could have reasonably believed that his

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actions were lawful under the circumstances at the time.

As discussed above, the inspection of Plaintiff’s property was

done pursuant to a validly issued warrant. It was reasonable for

Captain Neal and other members of the inspection team to execute

the warrant, which demonstrated no facial defect, over Plaintiff’s

objections. Given Plaintiff’s attempts to prevent the inspection

team from executing the warrant, it was also reasonable for Captain

Neal to believe that momentarily restraining Plaintiff in a way

that did not cause him any pain, thereby enabling the team to go

about its work without interference, would not be unlawful. None

of Captain Neal’s actions were contrary to law, let alone clearly

established law at the time of Defendants’ search. Accordingly,

Captain Neal is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

constitutional claims on the alternative ground of qualified

immunity.

B. Claims against the City

Plaintiff’s second cause of action charges the City and its

Police Department with liability for the alleged civil rights

violations caused by the individual Defendants. Specifically, he

argues that, under Monell, “Neal and other police officers were

inadequately trained and instructed as to proper and lawful

practice in the stopping, detention, and arrest of individuals,

which led directly to Plaintiff’s mishandling.” Am. Compl. at 14.

In the first instance, the Court has ruled that Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were not violated by the search of his

property, and thus there can be no basis for the City’s liability. 

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence

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that the City’s training of its police is inadequate in a way that

amounts to deliberate indifference of the rights of its residents. 

Therefore, Monell’s requirements have not been satisfied and

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is dismissed.

II. Tort Claims

A. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiff asserts a claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress (IIED) against Defendants based on their

behavior during the inspection of his property and on what he

characterizes as a long campaign against him and his way of life. 

The elements of a cause of action for IIED are: (1) extreme and

outrageous conduct; (2) intended to cause or done in reckless

disregard for causing; (3) severe emotional distress; and

(4) actual and proximate causation. See Cervantez v. J.C. Penney

Co., Inc., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). The conduct must be so

extreme as to “exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

civilized community,” id., and the distress so severe “that no

reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to

endure it.” Fletcher v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.

3d 376, 397 (1970).

Plaintiff has not demonstrated outrageous conduct beyond all

bounds of what is accepted in a civilized society. While he argues

that Defendants “acted in such a manner as to intentionally

denigrate and smear [his] reputation, to wrongfully shame and

embarrass him, and to cause him to feel shock and fear,” Am. Compl.

at 16, the evidence demonstrates that Defendants were simply

attempting to get Plaintiff to comply with the municipal code and

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United States District Court

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stop maintaining his property as a public nuisance. No reasonable

juror could conclude from the evidence in the record that

Defendants’ aim was to humiliate and denigrate Plaintiff, let alone

that they used outrageous tactics to do so. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

must be dismissed.

B. Trespass

Plaintiff claims that Defendants trespassed onto his property

when they conducted their inspection. The cause of action for

trespass is an unauthorized entry onto the land of another. Church

of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1244,

1252 (2002). However, “[a] public employee is not liable for an

injury arising out of his entry upon any property where such entry

is expressly or impliedly authorized by law.” Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 821.8. Because, as discussed above, Defendants’ inspection was

made pursuant to a validly executed warrant, it was authorized by

law. Thus, Plaintiff’s trespass claim is dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety. 

The clerk shall enter judgment for Defendants and close the file. 

Each party shall bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/13/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE CARPIAUX,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF EMERYVILLE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-03493 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on December 13, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Andre Carpiaux

1264 Ocean Avenue

Emeryville, CA 94608

Dale L. Allen

Dirk Donald Larsen

Joshua Mark Bryan

Low, Ball & Lynch

505 Montgomery Street, 7th Flr

San Francisco, CA 94111

Dated: December 13, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-03493-CW Document 76 Filed 12/13/07 Page 18 of 18