Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01912/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01912-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDCR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01912-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 1) 

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

I. Background

Plaintiff, Vince Williams, is a prisoner in the custody of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on March 2, 2015 

which is before the Court for screening (Doc. 17). 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred while he was an inmate at Pleasant Valley State 

Prison. Plaintiff names twenty-two Defendants and seeks monetary relief. It appears that Plaintiff 

is complaining about how the endemic Valley Fever occurrence was handled during the time that 

he was housed at PVSP. Plaintiff does not delineate any specific claims or identify any of his 

rights under the United States Constitution that he feels were violated. Plaintiff's allegations are 

very general and do not state any cognizable claims. 

Plaintiff may be able to amend to correct the deficiencies in his pleading and is being 

given the pleading requirements and what are the most likely applicable legal standards to apply 

to any claims he hopes to state and leave to file a second amended complaint. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

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U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

If he chooses to file a second amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as 

concise as possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were 

violated by each Defendant and its factual basis.

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. 

Plaintiff but fails to link any of the named Defendants to his factual allegations. Plaintiff 

must clarify which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation of his constitutional 

rights and their factual basis as his Complaint must put each Defendant on notice of Plaintiff=s 

claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). 

D. Claims for Relief

1. Eighth Amendment 

a. Conditions of Confinement 

AThe Eighth Amendment=s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment, but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement.@ Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). A[W]hile conditions 

of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they >must not involve the wanton 

and unnecessary infliction of pain.=@ Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 

AWhat is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .@ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). 

A[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.@ Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, A[b]ecause 

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against 

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life=s necessities are 

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sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.@ Id. (quotations and 

citations omitted).

Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison 

officials may be held liable only if they acted with Adeliberate indifference to a substantial risk of 

serious harm.@ Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference 

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in 

objective terms, Asufficiently serious . . . .@ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must Aknow[] of and 

disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .@ Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a 

prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of 

confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk 

by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials may avoid 

liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence 

of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the 

part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official=s conduct 

must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.

b. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). "A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ' "significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain." ' " Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc))

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first Ashow a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@ 

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Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

The existence of a condition or injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual=s daily activities, and the existence of chronic or substantial pain are indications of a 

serious medical need. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. 

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (quotation marks omitted); Doty v. 

County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). If Plaintiff has contracted disseminated 

Valley Fever, it would be accepted as serious medical need for screening purposes. 

Deliberate indifference is Aa state of mind more blameworthy than negligence@ and 

Arequires >more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner=s interests or safety.=@ Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). ADeliberate indifference 

is a high legal standard.@ Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). AUnder this 

standard, the prison official must not only >be aware of the facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,= but that person >must also draw the 

inference.=@ Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have been 

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter 

how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 

(9th Cir. 2002)). 

In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). More generally, deliberate indifference Amay 

appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 

may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, A[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial.@ Id.; 

see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (A[A] finding that the defendant=s activities resulted in 

>substantial= harm to the prisoner is not necessary.@).

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2. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's 

misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, any allegations that a Defendant is somehow liable 

because a subordinate violated Plaintiff's rights is not cognizable. 

3. Damages

Critically lacking from Plaintiff's pleading is any allegation that he sustained a 

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compensable injury, i.e. that he actually contracted Valley Fever. 

A[T]he basic purpose of a ' 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for 

injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.@ Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 

(1978). For this reason, no compensatory damages may be awarded in a ' 1983 suit absent proof 

of actual injury. Id., at 264; accord, Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 

307 (1986). However, Athe denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal 

damages without proof of actual injury.@ Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. Nominal damage awards for 

the Aabsolute@ right to procedural due process Arecognizes the importance to organized society 

that [this] righ[t] be scrupulously observed@ while Aremain[ing] true to the principle that 

substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury.@ Id. Thus, a court is 

obligated to award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes the violation of his right to 

procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 

(1992).

If Plaintiff did not contract Valley Fever, he cannot receive compensatory damages in a 

suit under section 1983. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). Further, where a prisoner 

challenges conditions of confinement and seeks injunctive relief, transfer to another prison 

renders the request for injunctive relief moot absent some evidence of an expectation of being 

transferred back. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 

F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053, 

n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiff=s transfer, such that he is now housed at California 

Medical Facility in Vacaville, CA rather than PVSP, rendered any claims for injunctive relief 

moot.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with 

leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of 

time to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later 

than thirty days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any second amended complaint how the conditions 

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complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second amended complaint must allege in specific 

terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless 

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed 

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's second amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short 

and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his second amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a second 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order;

and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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