Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00139/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00139-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 00:0000 Cause Code Unknown

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK TRUJILLO,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0139 GEB KJM PS

vs.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

motion came on for hearing before the undersigned on November 29, 2006. Plaintiff appeared

pro se; defendants were represented by Bobbie Montoya. Upon review of the documents in

support and opposition, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS

FOLLOWS:

Defendants contend plaintiff’s claim under the Family Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”) is barred by the statute of limitations. FMLA provides for a two year statute of

limitations, which is extended to three years where the employer’s conduct was a willful

violation. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c). There is no provision for tolling the statute while administrative

remedies for other claims are being pursued. Plaintiff was terminated May 26, 2000. This action

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 Plaintiff does not appear to contest the government’s contention that his asserted civil

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rights claims based on disability discrimination can only be pursued under Title VII and that any

state law claims are preempted by Title VII. See Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704,

711-12 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Substance abuse can only be a basis of protected disability if the plaintiff is not a 2

current user and has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.3. Although at oral argument plaintiff contended the employer knew he was receiving

inpatient and outpatient treatment prior to his termination, plaintiff admitted at deposition the

reasons for this treatment were not provided to the employer, that the substance abuse continued

through the end of 2000, and that his rehabilitation treatment was not completed until mid-2001. 

Trujillo Dep. at 38:1-42:7. 

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was filed more than three years later, on January 22, 2004 and thus plaintiff’s claims made under

FMLA are time barred.

Defendants further contend plaintiff cannot maintain an action under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against the federal government. While this contention

is correct, defendants concede plaintiff can assert an action under the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab

Act”) for discrimination based on disability. Accordingly, the court will construe plaintiff’s

claims as made under that statute. See Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169,

1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (employer under the ADA does not include the United States); 29 U.S.C. 

§ 791. The Rehab Act incorporate the rights and remedies under Title VII. Boyd v. United

States Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410, 412 (9th Cir. 1985).1

Governmental employers must make reasonable accommodations to the known

physical or mental limitations of a qualified disabled employee. Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558,

561 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s claimed disability is substance abuse, namely crack cocaine and

alcohol. Trujillo Dep. at 36:23-37:25. It is undisputed that defendant USPS, plaintiff’s

employer, did not know about this alleged disability until plaintiff filed an EEO complaint in

June 2000, a month after he was terminated. Trujillo Dep. at 48:17-49:2, 49:15-50:1, 50:14-18. 2

Thus, because there was no known disability of which defendants were aware, plaintiff cannot

make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Summary judgment should therefore be

granted on this claim.

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Plaintiff also alleges a claim that he was terminated in retaliation for filing an

EEO complaint in November 1999. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he was subjected to an adverse

employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse

action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). By filing an EEO complaint and

subsequently being terminated, plaintiff meets the first two prongs of the prima facie case for

retaliation. The court will assume arguendo, for purposes of summary judgment, that a causal

link can be inferred from plaintiff’s evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The burden then shifts to defendants to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment. Ray v. Henderson,

217 F.3d at 1240. If the defendants meet this burden, the plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of

demonstrating that reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. 

Here, the articulated reason is that plaintiff had been progressively disciplined for

being repeatedly absent without leave (“AWOL”) and that he was terminated for irregular

attendance and being AWOL. Defs.’ Exs. A, B; Pl.’s September 22, 2006 Opp’n (Opp’n),

Attach. no. 7 (“Notice of Removal”). Plaintiff does dispute two of the dates (12/4/99 and

12/19/99) specified in the April 26, 2000 notice of removal. The undisputed facts, however,

establish plaintiff did not work a full shift on December 4, did not work at all on December 19

and did not properly fill out any paperwork for a shift switch with another worker for either of

those days. Kelly Decl. ¶ 4; Trujillo Dep. at 161:11-20, 162:7-16. Plaintiff also contends he

should not have been charged with being AWOL from March 18 to March 22, 2000, but the

undisputed facts establish plaintiff was not cleared for return to work until March 23; because his

FMLA leave had already been exhausted at that time, his absence from work was unexcused. 

Kelly Decl. ¶ 5; Opp’n, Attach. no. 11. Because plaintiff fails to rebut the nondiscriminatory

reason articulated by the employer, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the

retaliation claim.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be granted and this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

"Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 11, 2006.

006

trujillo.57

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