Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-231/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL No. 1917

Case No. C-07-5944-SC

ORDER DENYING BEIJING- MATSUSHITA COLOR CRT CO.'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This Order Relates To:

Best Buy Co., Inc. v. Hitachi 

Ltd., No. 11-cv-05513-SC;

Costco v. Hitachi Ltd., No. 11-cv- 06397-SC;

Target Corp. v. Chunghwa, No. 11- cv-05514-SC;

Tech Data v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 

13-cv-00157-SC.

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is Defendant Beijing-Matsushita Color CRT 

Company's ("Defendant" or "BMCC") motion to dismiss certain Direct 

Action Plaintiffs' ("Plaintiffs" or "DAPs") complaints for lack of 

personal jurisdiction.1 ECF No. 2118 ("MTD"). The motion is fully 

 1 The complaints in question are filed under seal in Best Buy Co. 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 1 of 21
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

briefed. ECF Nos. 2239-4 ("Opp'n") (filed under seal), 2363

("Reply").2

 Finding this matter suitable for disposition without 

oral argument, Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), the Court DENIES the motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant is a Chinese company with its principal place of 

business in Beijing, China. See Target SAC ¶ 38; Best Buy FAC ¶

44; Sears Compl. ¶ 40; Tech Data FAC ¶ 46. During the time 

relevant to the Complaints, Defendant was a joint venture, and its

shareholders included MT Picture Display Co. Ltd. ("MTPD"), a 

subsidiary of Defendant Panasonic Corporation ("Panasonic"), which 

owned 50 percent of Defendant. Id. Three Chinese companies owned 

the remainder. See id. Plaintiffs allege that MTPD controlled 

Defendant, classified it as a business unit, monitored its 

activities, and assigned its directors responsibility over 

Defendant. ECF No. 2339-5 ("Loh Decl.") Ex. D at 6, 11, 12, 17, 

18, 27, 37, 38 (filed under seal). Originally, MTPD was formed as 

a joint venture between Defendants Panasonic and Toshiba, with 

 

v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 3:11-cv-05513-SC; Costco v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 3:11-cv-06397-SC; Target Corp. v. Chunghwa, No. 3:aa-cv-05513- SC; and Tech Data v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. 3:13-cv-00157-SC. The 

Court refers to the complaints according to each plaintiff's name, 

but the relevant pleadings are variously in their first or second 

amended stages. The parties refer to the pleadings in this way, so 

the Court follows suit.

2 Defendant also asks the Court to take judicial notice of a 

California Superior Court case quashing a summons for Defendant on 

personal jurisdiction grounds. ECF Nos. 2372 ("RJN"), 2372-1 

("Quash Order"). Plaintiffs object. ECF No. 2376. The Court 

GRANTS Defendant's motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, 

because the Quash Order is a state court decision, but the Court 

otherwise finds the Quash Order uncompelling: it is an unpublished 

California court decision; it was based on different facts and 

arguments; and it evaluated Defendant's contacts with California 

alone, not with the United States (which is the proper forum to 

consider for this case's purposes).

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 2 of 21
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Panasonic owning 64.5 of MTPD and Toshiba owning the remaining 

35.5, but Panasonic purchased Toshiba's share on March 30, 2007, 

making MTPD Panasonic's wholly owned subsidiary. Best Buy FAC ¶

43; Tech Data FAC ¶ 45; Target SAC ¶ 37. Panasonic personnel moved 

interchangeably through Defendant, MTPD, and related entities.

Plaintiffs allege that between at least 1998 and 2007, 

Defendant conspired to fix prices of CRTs ultimately sold in the 

United States. See Best Buy FAC ¶¶ 1, 4, 14, 44; Tech Data FAC ¶¶ 

1, 4, 15, 46; Target SAC ¶¶ 1, 3, 14, 38. This included attending 

meetings with co-conspirators regarding the prices of CRTs sold to 

corporate affiliates, which manufactured finished CRT Products like 

televisions and computer monitors for sale in the United States. 

See Best Buy FAC ¶¶ 116-30, 146; Tech Data FAC ¶¶ 121-34, 142; 

Target SAC ¶¶ 109-24, 140. The co-conspirators allegedly ensured 

that all original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"), including their 

affiliates, paid supracompetitive prices for CRTs around the world, 

including in the United States. See Best Buy FAC ¶ 127; Tech Data 

FAC ¶ 132; Target SAC ¶ 120. 

Defendant allegedly participated in price-fixing meetings in 

China between 1998 and 2007. See, e.g., Loh Decl. Ex. E ("Samsung 

Interrogs.") at 29-85 (summarizing Defendant Samsung SDI's pricefixing meetings with alleged co-conspirators, including Defendant); 

id. Ex. F ("Yang Depo.") 402:3-22 (stating that Defendant and other 

alleged co-conspirators conducted meetings in China); id. Ex. G 

("Lu Depo.") 238:2-23 (same); id. Ex. O (meeting notes from a 

discussion among alleged co-conspirators, including Defendant, 

regarding CRT marketing information, including sales to United 

States customers like Wal-Mart, Circuit City, and Sears). The 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 3 of 21
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

alleged co-conspirators coordinated pricing decisions in relation 

to United States market conditions, and discussed CRT prices in 

U.S. dollars. Id. Ex. H ("Mar. 9, 2001 Notes") at CHU00029193E 

(noting that Defendant Orion, as well as other unnamed customers, 

would see an increase in orders as the United States market's high 

season drew closer), CHU00029194E (stating that though Defendant 

did not attend that meeting, another party was responsible for 

delivering price increase news to Defendant so that producers would 

not confuse customers by providing lower prices); id. Ex. I ("Aug. 

23, 1999 Notes") at CHU00029179.02E (confirming that Defendant had 

raised CRT prices from USD 29.50 to USD 30.50 following 

communications with another alleged co-conspirator).

Importantly for this particular case, Defendant asserts that 

it never sold any CRTs or CRT Products to United States customers -

- rather, it sold the majority of its CRTs to customers in China. 

ECF No. 2118-1 ("Kinoshita Decl.") ¶¶ 21-23. It sold certain CRTs 

to Defendant Panasonic, which then sold them in the United States, 

but Defendant avers that it had no control over or responsibility 

for Panasonic's volume or pricing decisions. Id. Certain 

deposition testimony states, however, that Defendant sold CRTs to 

AKEI, which the witness states was a New Jersey-based Matsushita 

affiliate. Loh Decl. Ex. K ("Liu Depo.") 423:17-424:11. Further, 

Panasonic and Defendant exchanged frequent emails regarding Chinese 

television makers' sales to the United States. See Loh Decl. Ex. L 

("Jun. 13, 2002 Email"). Defendant supplied this information to 

Panasonic, which included certain Chinese manufacturers' sales to 

Best Buy and the American military, among others. Loh Decl. Ex. M 

("Sept. 11, 2003 Email"). Other emails concern discussions among 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 4 of 21
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Defendant, Panasonic, and MTPD about price and volume increases to 

the United States. Loh Decl. Ex. N ("Sept. 11, 2006 Email").

Plaintiffs sued Defendant under federal and state antitrust 

and competition laws, based on their allegations that Defendant 

fixed prices on CRTs that it or its affiliates sold in the United 

States. Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks 

either general or specific jurisdiction over it, and that some 

Plaintiffs' service on Defendant was improper, owing to what 

Defendant claims is the Court's error in prior orders concerning 

methods of serving foreign defendants.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Jurisdiction - Rule 12(b)(2)

Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

defendants may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The Court may consider evidence presented in affidavits and 

declarations determining personal jurisdiction. Doe v. Unocal 

Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff bears the 

burden of showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006). "[T]his demonstration requires that the plaintiff 

make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to 

withstand the motion to dismiss." Id. (quotations omitted). 

"[T]he court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff 

. . . ." Id. (quotations omitted). "The plaintiff cannot simply 

rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, but uncontroverted

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true." Mavrix Photo, 

Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 5 of 21
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

(quotations and citations omitted). The Court may not assume the 

truth of allegations that are contradicted by affidavit. Data 

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 1977).

Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

only if (1) a statute confers jurisdiction and (2) exercising 

jurisdiction would comport with constitutional due process. See

Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 

1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004). Since the federal Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 22, fulfills the statutory requirement for jurisdiction in 

this case, the question on this motion is whether exercising 

jurisdiction would comport with due process. For a court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 

consistent with due process, the defendant must have "certain 

minimum contacts" with the relevant forum "such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 

463 (1940)). If a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts, 

personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction 

or specific jurisdiction. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 

F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). The relevant forum for this 

case's minimum contacts analysis is the United States. Go-Video, 

Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co. Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 

1989).

///

///

///

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 6 of 21
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Waiver

Plaintiffs first argue that Defendant waived its personal 

jurisdiction defense. As a general rule, if a party files a 

responsive pleading or makes a Rule 12 motion but does not raise 

personal jurisdiction as a defense, the party waives the right to 

raise personal jurisdiction later. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h); 

Parker v. United States, 110 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiffs cite to some of Defendant's earlier MDL filings, in 

other plaintiffs' cases, to support their contention that Defendant 

has waived its personal jurisdiction argument in this case by not 

raising it in other cases. See Opp'n at 11 (citing various 

filings). Plaintiffs argue that because their complaints are 

essentially the same as the other plaintiffs' were, and Defendant 

is represented by the same counsel, Defendant must have waived its 

personal jurisdiction defense in this case by not raising it in 

previous, separate cases. Id. at 11-12 (citing In re Polyester 

Staple Antitrust Litig., No. 3:03-CV-1516, 2008 WL 906331, at *16-

18 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2008)). Plaintiffs also contend that simply 

by being part of this litigation for over five years, Defendant has 

waived its personal jurisdiction defense by implication.

Plaintiffs are correct about the basic law of Rule 12 and 

waiver, but they are wrong about how it works in this particular 

instance. The Ninth Circuit has held that even if actions are 

closely related -- as when different plaintiffs sue the same 

defendant in different cases but based on the same facts --

defendants do not waive their personal jurisdiction defense by 

raising it only in a later action, so long as the defendant is not 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 7 of 21
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

independently seeking affirmative relief in the same court

concerning the same transaction or occurrence. Dow Chem. Co. v. 

Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Fahmy v. 

Jay-Z, No. CV 07-5715 CAS (PJWx), 2008 WL 4792383, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 

Oct. 29, 2008) (citing Calderon). In this case, even though 

Defendant has been haled into court by numerous plaintiffs 

regarding the same alleged activity, Defendant has not 

affirmatively decided to seek relief on its own, thereby consenting 

to the jurisdiction of this Court. See Calderon, 422 F.3d at 836. 

Defendant has not therefore waived its personal jurisdiction 

defense in Plaintiffs' cases. In answering some of the earlier 

pleadings, Defendant expressly reserved its right to raise a 

personal jurisdiction later, and it has never otherwise waived that 

right in these particular cases. See MTD at 7 n.12 (citing 

responsive pleadings). Plaintiffs' separate argument that 

Defendant waived its personal jurisdiction defense in these cases 

by participating in this MDL for years is wrong for the same 

reasons stated above, and because it is based on one non-binding, 

out-of-circuit case. In the Ninth Circuit, Defendant is free to 

change its litigation strategy in these Plaintiffs' cases even if 

it took a separate course in other cases.

B. Service

Defendant argues that the Best Buy, Costco, Sears, and Target 

complaints were not properly served on it, because it is a Chinese 

corporation and, under Rule 4, the complaints should have been 

served to its foreign process agent.3

 Instead, per court order, 

 3 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant waived this defense, but the 

Court rejects this argument for the same reasons the Court rejected 

Plaintiffs' personal jurisdiction waiver argument.

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 8 of 21
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

those plaintiffs served Defendant by mail at the Washington, D.C. 

office of Defendant's counsel. Defendant contends that the Court's 

order and Plaintiffs' service contravene Rule 4, the Hague 

Convention,4 Ninth Circuit precedent, and Defendant's due process 

rights.

On June 27, 2012, the Court issued an Order permitting some of 

the DAPs to serve Defendant by mail at its D.C. counsel's offices 

under Rule 4(f)(3), which provides for service on a defendant in a 

foreign country "by other means not prohibited by international 

agreement as the Court orders." ECF No. 1241 ("Service Order"). 

This Rule's purpose is to require a process by which a defendant 

gets actual notice of claims against it, and an opportunity to be 

heard. Id. at 2 (citing Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 

284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Defendant argues, first, that the Service Order is facially 

deficient because Rule 4(f) empowers courts to authorize service of 

process "at a place not within any judicial district of the United 

States," but the Service Order specifically permits service in 

Washington D.C., which is obviously within a United States judicial 

district. Neither the Ninth Circuit nor any lower court has taken 

up Defendant's interpretation, likely because the court orders 

generally crafted under Rule 4(f)(3) require transmission of 

service papers to a foreign defendant via a domestic conduit like a 

law firm or agent -- ultimately, the foreign individual is served

and thereby provided notice outside a United States judicial 

 4 In this case, the "Hague Convention" is short for the Hague 

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 

Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 

361.

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 9 of 21
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

district, in accordance with Rule 4's plain language. Rio, 284 

F.3d at 1016 ("Applying th[e] proper construction of Rule 4(f)(3) . 

. . , trial courts have authorized a wide variety of alternative 

methods of service including . . . delivery to defendant's 

attorney."); Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Solutions, No. 

11-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 

2011) (discussing service on a foreign defendant via domestic 

counsel under Rule 4(f)(3)). There is no contradiction here.

Second, Defendant argues that, contrary to Rule 4(f)(3), 

service on Defendant is "prohibited by international agreement" 

because although China is a signatory to the Hague Convention, it 

objected to Article 10 of the Convention, which allows for service 

"by postal channels" or through judicial officers, official, or 

other persons in the state of destination provided that the 

signatory does not object. MTD at 24. Defendant contends that

because China objected to Article 10, service on Defendant can only 

be effected through the Chinese Central Authority in Beijing. Id. 

Defendant therefore claims that the Service Order "contradicts 

clear dicta" from Rio, is inconsistent with Rule 4(f)(3), and 

violates the Hague Convention. Defendant is wrong on each point. 

While Rio did involve a non-signatory country, its reasoning is 

still applicable so long as service on Defendant is court-directed 

and not prohibited by an international agreement. See In re LDK 

Solar Secs. Litig., No. C-07-05182 WHA, 2008 WL 2415186, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. June 12, 2008). In this case, as in In re LDK Solar, 

Plaintiffs did not seek to effect service by Chinese postal 

channels: Defendant was served through its counsel's Washington, 

D.C. office. Id. The Hague Convention does not prohibit this, and 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 10 of 21
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

as this Court has noted, it is a common method of service under 

Rule 4(f)(3). Richmond Techs., 2011 WL 2607158, at *13; In re LDK 

Solar, 2008 Wl 2415186, at *3. 

Finally, the Court finds that this method of service was 

reasonably calculated to apprise Defendant of the pendency of the 

action and afford it an opportunity to be heard. Rio, 284 F.3d at 

1016-17 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 

306, 314 (1950)). Defendant obviously has notice of the action, 

and Freshfields is skillfully representing its interests. The 

Court therefore finds that service effected under the Service Order 

comports with due process. The Court accordingly rejects 

Defendant's argument that it was improperly served in this case.

C. Personal Jurisdiction

There are two forms of personal jurisdiction: "specific" and 

"general." "A court may exercise specific jurisdiction where the 

cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection to 

the defendant's contacts with the forum." Glencore Grain Rotterdam 

B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 

"Alternatively, a defendant whose contacts are substantial, 

continuous, and systematic is subject to a court's general 

jurisdiction even if the suit concerns matters not arising out of 

his contact with the forum." Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales 

de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.9 (1984)). 

Plaintiffs do not argue that the Court has general jurisdiction 

over Defendant. They only argue that the Court should exercise 

specific jurisdiction.

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 11 of 21
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction depending 

on "the nature and quality of the defendant's contacts in relation 

to the cause of action." Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287. The Ninth 

Circuit applies a three-prong test when analyzing a claim of 

specific jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully 

direct his activities or consummate some transaction 

with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or 

relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; 

and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with 

fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be 

reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first 

two prongs, and if he or she fails to satisfy either, specific

jurisdiction is not established. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 

1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff satisfies these prongs, the 

burden shifts to the defendant "to present a compelling case" that 

the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Burger King 

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court has specific jurisdiction over 

Defendant because (1) Defendant purposefully directed its CRT 

conspiracy activity at the United States, or purposefully availed 

itself of U.S. laws and markets; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims arise 

out of Defendant's conspiracy activity in the United States. 

Plaintiffs also contend that exercising personal jurisdiction over 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 12 of 21
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Defendant would be reasonable. Defendant opposes all of these 

points.

The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test for purposeful 

direction: "the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) 

causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in 

the forum state." Id. When considering the first prong, 

"something more than mere foreseeability" of an effect in the forum 

state is necessary. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805 (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). And as the Ninth Circuit has 

warned, "the foreign-acts-with-forum-effects jurisdictional 

principle must be applied with caution, particularly in an 

international context." Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, 

Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). The parties do not argue the first prong here 

-- that Defendant committed some intentional act -- but they do 

dispute whether Sharp has established that Defendant purposefully 

directed activities at the United States and that Sharp's claims 

against Defendant arose out of, or result from, Defendant's forumrelated activities.

An antitrust defendant "expressly aims" an intentional act at 

a forum state when its allegedly anticompetitive behavior is 

targeted at a resident of the forum, or at the forum itself. See

In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 

716, 743 (9th Cir. 2013). Defendant provides a declaration that it 

contends controverts all of Plaintiffs' allegations of purposeful 

direction. See generally Kinoshita Decl. That declaration, from a 

former employer of Defendant who now works for Panasonic, 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 13 of 21
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

establishes that Defendant had its principal place of business in 

China; never manufactured CRTs outside China; was never registered 

or licensed to do business in the United States; never held 

property in the United States; never operated offices, plants, or 

warehouses in the United States; never had shipping addresses, 

phone listings, or bank accounts in the United States; never paid 

property or income tax in the United States; never had employees 

located in the United States; never solicited business in the 

United States or hosted an English-language website; never had a 

registered agent for process in the United States; never maintained 

inventory in the United States; never sold CDTs or CPTs in the 

United States; and shipped and sold the majority of its CRTs to 

Chinese customers. Id. ¶¶ 7-23. It also asserts that none of 

Plaintiff's evidence suggests any inference that Defendant directed 

its conduct toward the United States, and avers that even though 

Panasonic bought CRTs from Defendant in China and sold them (or 

incorporated them into products sold in) the United States, 

Defendant had no control over the CRTs after they left its 

possession. See MTD at 14-15. Defendant therefore concludes that 

Plaintiff fails to make an uncontroverted, prima facie case for 

purposeful direction or availment. Id. at 17-18.

Neither Defendant's motion nor its reply brief responds to the 

more detailed facts that Plaintiff provides in support of its 

argument for specific jurisdiction. As described above, supra

Section II, Plaintiffs provide specific evidence supporting their 

allegations that Defendant, on its own and with co-conspirators, 

fixed CRT prices abroad and ensured that United States customers 

paid supracompetitive prices. Defendant specifically shared CRT 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 14 of 21
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

marketing information, including sales to United States customers 

like Wal-Mart, Circuit City, and Sears, with co-conspirators, 

including Samsung Defendants. See Loh Decl. Ex. O. The alleged 

co-conspirators coordinated pricing decisions in relation to United 

States market conditions, and discussed CRT prices in U.S. dollars. 

Mar. 9, 2001 Notes at CHU00029194E (stating that though Defendant 

did not attend that meeting, another party was responsible for 

delivering price increase news to Defendant so that producers would 

not confuse customers by providing lower prices); Aug. 23, 1999 

Notes at CHU00029179.02E (confirming that Defendant had raised CRT 

prices from USD 29.50 to USD 30.50 following communications with 

another alleged co-conspirator). 

Further, deposition testimony never controverted by Defendant 

states specifically that Defendant sold CRTs to AKEI, which the 

witness states was a New Jersey-based Matsushita affiliate that 

sold televisions in the United States. Liu Depo. 423:17-424:11. 

Regardless of whether Defendant coordinated sales with Panasonic, 

direct sales to a United States business would suffice to show 

purposeful direction of anticompetitive activity to the United 

States. As to the relationship between Panasonic and Defendant, 

Defendant claims that any information it shared with Panasonic was 

publicly available customs information about products not 

manufactured by Defendant, and that the fact that a Panasonic 

employee, Mr. Kinoshita, shared his CRT-related travel and meeting 

schedule with Defendant is irrelevant. See Reply at 3-4 (citing 

Loh Decl. Exs. L-N). The Court rejects Defendant's arguments. 

Ownership or control over Panasonic would be one thing, but in this 

case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant specifically coordinated 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 15 of 21
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

with Panasonic such that the prices of products ultimately sold by 

Panasonic would be inflated due to the price-fixed CRTs they 

contained. Defendant does not have to direct Panasonic's activity 

in order for this to count as purposeful direction: it is enough 

for Defendant to have known that Panasonic was going to sell these 

goods in the United States, which evidence shows Defendant indeed 

knew. This is all sufficient to show purposeful direction. 

Regarding the last prong of specific jurisdiction analysis, 

Plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that Defendant's United 

States-directed actions were a "but-for" cause of their claims. 

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat., Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088

(9th Cir. 2000); Unocal, 248 F.3d at 924. This "but-for" test 

requires "some nexus between the cause of action and the 

defendant's activities in the forum." Shute v. Carnival Cruise 

Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 387 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other 

grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). The Court finds that Plaintiffs 

establish this by pleading that they paid artificially high prices 

for CRT Products, directly as a result of Defendant's activities.

The Court finds that Sharp has met the standard for specific 

jurisdiction. The next issue is whether exercising jurisdiction 

would be reasonable. Defendant argues that it would not be. In 

determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign 

defendant would be reasonable, the Court must consider seven 

factors:

(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful 

interjection into the forum state, (2) the burden on the 

defendant in defending in the forum, (3) the extent of 

the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's 

state, (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating 

the dispute, (5) the most efficient judicial resolution 

of the controversy, (6) the importance of the forum to 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 16 of 21
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective 

relief, and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.

Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. 

at 476-77). It is Defendant's burden to demonstrate 

unreasonableness. Id. at 1088.

Defendant argues exercising jurisdiction over it would be 

unreasonable given the burden it would bear to defend itself, its 

lack of contacts with the United States, its limited involvement in 

the alleged conspiratorial activity, and the existing Defendants' 

joint and several liability. 

First, the Court agrees that Defendant's burden would be 

substantial, but the inconvenience for Defendant must be so great 

as to constitute a deprivation of due process, which is not the 

case here. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. 

Second, costliness and evidentiary complexity are simply parts 

of modern, multinational litigation, especially when the claims at 

issue concern an international price-fixing conspiracy. Defendant 

contends that the Court should be unwilling to find that serious 

burdens on it, a foreign defendant, are outweighed by "minimal 

interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State," MTD at 

20 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115 

(1987)), but this case is not like Asahi: there, the plaintiff was 

a Taiwanese corporation and the defendant was Japanese, and the 

only question left in the case was an indemnification claim, 

leaving California with little interest in adjudicating the matter 

and plaintiff with no interest in litigating the case in 

California. Id. at 114. Here, the DAPs are American corporations 

alleging to have been harmed by purchasing price-fixed goods from 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 17 of 21
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Defendant and other alleged co-conspirators. These are not minimal 

interests.

Third, Defendant contends that because it is a Chinese 

citizen, China's sovereignty creates a high barrier to finding 

reasonableness in this forum. MTD at 20 (citing Glencore Grain, 

284 F.3d at 1126). Defendant also cites the Supreme Court's recent 

reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 

746, 761 (2014), in which the Supreme Court stated that the Ninth 

Circuit should have paid more heed to the risks of international 

comity given its expansive holding on general jurisdiction. The 

Supreme Court's concern was based on due process's requirement of 

"fair play and substantial justice." Id. (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 

U.S. at 316). Critically, in Glencore Grain, the court found no 

conduct directed to or related to a United States forum because the 

contracts giving rise to that case's dispute were negotiated 

abroad, involved only foreign companies, and required performance 

in a foreign country. 284 F.3d at 1124. In the present case, as 

noted above, Defendant specifically directed price-fixing activity 

toward and into the United States. Even though much of the alleged 

conspiracy-related activity occurred abroad, just as it did with 

many other Defendants, the end target and end result was the United 

States. Further, the Court does not find general jurisdiction in 

this case: only specific jurisdiction is at issue, which lessens 

the concerns of comity raised in Daimler AG. This case is to some 

degree international in character, which would weigh in Defendant's

favor, see Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav. Co., Inc., 1 F.3d 

848, 852 (9th Cir. 1993), but in this case the Court finds that 

Defendant's United States-oriented activity plus the narrower 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 18 of 21
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

jurisdictional basis of specific jurisdiction mitigates that 

concern.

Fourth, Defendant contends that United States federal courts 

have no significant interest in adjudicating claims against it. 

MTD at 20 (citing Leonis, 1 F.3d at 852). Not so. Plaintiffs are 

United States citizens who allege that they were harmed by

Defendant, which directed its activities toward the United States. 

That gives United States federal courts an interest in hearing this 

case. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.

Fifth and sixth, Defendant argues that adjudication against it 

in this forum is not necessary to grant Plaintiffs complete relief, 

since all Defendants would be jointly and severally liable for any 

alleged harm resulting in Defendant's anticompetitive activities. 

Further, Defendant asserts that injunctive relief would be merely 

symbolic because the alleged conspiracy ended more than six years 

ago, and Defendant ceased manufacturing CRTs before that. MTD at 

20-21. The Court disagrees: these factors ask the Court to 

consider the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy

and the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in 

convenient and effective relief, and in this case, since the Court 

has handled the MDL for years, the efficiency, effectiveness, and 

convenience of this matter's resolution are best served by keeping 

the case in this forum, regardless of the ultimate remedy (if any) 

granted to Plaintiffs. While some evidence and many witnesses 

related to Defendant may be abroad, the same is true of most 

parties in this case, and a combination of modern technology and 

coordination among the parties has so far ensured that evidentiary 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 19 of 21
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

matters are handled efficiently. See Reply at 10-11 (expressing 

concern about the location of witnesses and evidence). 

Finally, concerning the existence of an alternative forum, 

Defendant contends that while Plaintiffs' allegations support no 

damages claims anywhere, the locus of Defendant's activity in China 

suggests that Plaintiffs could sue Defendant there, where private 

antitrust actions are permitted and where any judgment obtained 

against Defendant would need to be enforced anyway. MTD at 20-21; 

Reply at 10-11. Plaintiffs note that China has a shorter 

limitations period, Opp'n at 21 (citing In re World War II Era 

Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 

2001) (discussing statutes of limitation in China)), which weighs 

against finding China an adequate alternative forum. Defendant 

contends that since Plaintiffs have had notice of potential claims 

since at least November 2007, they have no excuse for not bringing 

their case in China within the limitations period. Reply at 10-11. 

The Court does not find Defendant's argument compelling. It is not 

clear, based solely on this statute of limitations dispute, whether 

China has the same tolling rules as the United States, and given 

the significance of those doctrines to this case (especially where 

fraudulent concealment is concerned), the Court is in no position 

to find China an adequate alternative forum. This factor counts 

toward neither party.

The Court finds, under the circumstances described above, that 

exercising specific jurisdiction over Defendant for the purposes of 

this case would be reasonable.

///

///

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 20 of 21
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the Court DENIES Defendant BeijingMatsushita Color CRT Company's motion to dismiss the various Direct 

Action Plaintiffs' complaints.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2437 Filed 03/13/14 Page 21 of 21