Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-00393/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-00393-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrim

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LINDA J. HOWARD,

Plaintiff,

vs.

HIGHLANDS MEDICAL

CENTER, CUMBERLAND

HEALTH AND REHAB, and

BRAD HINTON,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 5:15–cv–00393-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS

Plaintiff, Linda Howard, commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Jackson

County, Alabama, against Highlands Medical Center, Cumberland Health and Rehab, and

Brad Hinton. Her state-court complaint alleged violations of

TITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act, the Genetic [Information] Nondiscrimination Act, the Older Workers

Benefit Protection Act of 1990, the Equal Pay Act, Alabama Code § 25-1-

21 [Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1997], and/or the

Americans with Disabilities Act.

Doc. no. 1-1 (State Court Complaint) ¶ 5 (alterations supplied). Defendants properly

removed the action to this court on March 5, 2015.

1 The action presently is before the

court on defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

1 Doc. no. 1 (Notice of Removal).

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FILED

 2015 Aug-10 PM 04:01

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:15-cv-00393-CLS Document 15 Filed 08/10/15 Page 1 of 10
and plaintiff’s motion to remand.

2

I. MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff contends that this court should remand this properly-removed action,

because state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over the claims asserted herein.

3

Upon consideration, the motion is denied.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a claim

for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), which requires

that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard does

not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the

Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S., at

555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid

of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557.

2 Doc. no. 3 (Motion to Dismiss).

3 Doc. no. 5 (Plaintiff’s Response Brief), at 6–7.

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To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570.

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is

not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint

pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it

“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement

to relief.’” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a motion to

dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true,

we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and

generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a

prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed

with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states

a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556.

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as

the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 490

F.3d, at 157-158. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged — but it has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are

no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

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factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (alterations in citations and emphasis supplied).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against Non-Juridical Entities

Defendants contend that plaintiff has named two non-juridical entities as

defendants: “Highlands Medical Center”; and, “Cumberland Health and Rehab.”

4 They

contend that those two entities are operated by Jackson County Health Care Authority,

a juridical entity that is the proper defendant in this case.

5

In her response brief, plaintiff

“la[id] out [her] intentions as to who should be sued, the Jackson County Health Care

Authority and Brad Hinton.”

6 Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against “Highlands Medical

Center” and “Cumberland Health and Rehab” will be dismissed, and plaintiff will be

ordered to amend her complaint.

7

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants next contend that plaintiff’s claims under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Title VII should be dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to

4 See doc. no. 1-1 (State Court Complaint).

5 Doc. no. 3 (Motion to Dismiss), at 5–6.

6 Doc. no. 5 (Plaintiff’s Response), at 2 (alterations supplied).

7 Plaintiff also has asserted claims against three fictitious defendants. See doc. no. 1-1 (State

Court Complaint). There being no fictitious party pleading in federal court, this court will,sua sponte,

dismiss all fictitious parties.

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plead exhaustion of her administrative remedies.

8

Before a plaintiff can bring an action under either statute, she must file a timely

charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and

receive a dismissal and notice of rights — or, in the case of the ADEA, allow a statutory

time to lapse after filing the charge. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

421 F.3d 1169, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005) (Title VII); Bost v. Federal Express Corp., 372

F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (ADEA).

In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed a copy of the

“Dismissal and Notice of Rights” she received from the EEOC on December 2, 2014.

9

That document provides that plaintiff may bring an action for defendants’ alleged

violations of Title VII and the ADEA, among other statutes. Accordingly, defendants’

motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to plead exhaustion of her administrative

remedies is due to be denied.

C. Failure to State a Claim Under Title VII

Defendants next contend that plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title VII.

10

Plaintiff “concedes that the Title VII claim was inappropriate, due to undersigned

counsel’s mistake.”

11 Accordingly, plaintiff’s Title VII claimis due to be dismissed.

8 Doc. no. 3 (Motion to Dismiss), at 6.

9 Doc. no. 5 (Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Response), at ECF 9.

10 Doc. no. 3 (Motion to Dismiss), at 7.

11 Doc. no. 5 (Plaintiff’s Response), at 3.

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D. Failure to State a Claim Under GINA

Defendants also contend that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Genetic

Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”).

12 Again, plaintiff concedes that

“undersigned counsel was also unaware of GINA’s inapplicability, given, in Defendants’

words, the ‘relatively obscure, yet complex statutory and regulatory scheme’ it

contains.”

13 Accordingly, plaintiff’s GINA claimis due to be dismissed.

E. Election of Remedies Under the ADEA and AADEA

Defendants next contend that, because plaintiff has brought a claim under the

federal ADEA, she is precluded from also asserting a claim under the corollary Alabama

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“AADEA”). The AADEA provides that a

plaintiff cannot simultaneously pursue an age discrimination claim under both federal and

state statutes, but must, instead, elect her remedies:

Any person aggrieved may elect to pursue their remedies under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act[,] 29 U.S.C. Section 621[,] or in the alternative bring

a civil action in the circuit court of the county in which the person was

or is employed for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the

purposes of this article. However, if an action is brought in the federal

court, any action pending in the state court shall be simultaneously

dismissed with prejudice. Further, any party bringing action under this

section shall only be entitled to one recovery of damages. Any damages

assessed in one court will offset any entitlement to damages in any other

state or federal court. In any action, a person shall be entitled to a trial by

12 Doc. no. 3 (Motion to Dismiss), at 8.

13 Doc. no. 5 (Plaintiff’s Response), at 3.

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jury of any issue of fact in any action for recovery of amounts owed as a

result of a violation of this article, regardless of whether equitable relief

is sought by any party in the action. Any employment practice authorized

by the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act shall also be

authorized by this article and the remedies, defenses, and statutes of

limitations, under this article shall be the same as those authorized by the

federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act except that a plaintiff shall

not be required to pursue any administrative action or remedy prior to

filing suit under this article.

Ala. Code § 25-1-29 (1975) (alterations and emphasis supplied). Indeed, this court

previously has found that claims based upon both the ADEA and the AADEA are

“duplicative.” Collins v. Compass Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1330 (N.D. Ala.

2013) (Kallon, J.); see also King v. Adtran, No. 5:13-cv–1362-CLS, 2014 WL 6983312

(N.D. Ala. December 10, 2014) (Smith, J.). Accordingly, plaintiff’s AADEA claims are

due to be dismissed.

F. Failure to State a Claim for Breach of Contract

Defendants next contend that plaintiff’s claims for breach of her employment

contract are due to be dismissed.

14

In Count Three of plaintiff’s complaint, “Breach of

Contract,” she alleges that defendants failed “to abide by the terms of Plaintiff’s

employment contract by terminating Plaintiff without just cause, failing to properly

supervise other employees, and failing to provide [unemployment] benefits.”

15

Under Alabama law, a contract for employment is presumed to be “at will.” Ex

14 Doc. no. 3 (Motion to Dismiss), at 11.

15 Doc. no. 1-1 (State Court Complaint) ¶ 15(a) (alteration supplied).

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parte Michelin North America, Inc., 795 So. 2d 674, 677 (Ala. 2001). Absent an

allegation to the contrary in plaintiff’s complaint, this court must presume that plaintiff’s

employment was “at will.” Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract are due

to be dismissed.

G. Failure to State a Claim for Negligence

It is axiomatic that, in order to state a cognizable claim for negligence, a plaintiff

must show that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty. See, e.g., Smith v. AmSouth Bank,

Inc., 892 So. 2d 905, 909 (Ala. 2004). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants

breached the duties: to investigate allegations of plaintiff’s misconduct; to exercise

reasonable care when conducting such an investigation; to inform plaintiff “of her rights”;

to prevent “potential false allegations”; and, to “maintain . . . video equipment.”

16

Plaintiff

cited no authority interpreting Alabama law — nor could this court discover any —

recognizing any of those alleged duties. Accordingly, plaintiff’s negligence claims are

due to be dismissed.

H. ADEA Claim Against Defendant Brad Hinton

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s ADEA claim against Brad Hinton, her former

supervisor, is due to be dismissed. Defendants correctly contend that Hinton cannot be

16

It appears that plaintiff also attempts to plead a negligentsupervision claim. To state a claim

of negligent supervision, however, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that an employee

committed a tort that is recognized under Alabama law. As stated above, plaintiff has failed to allege

any tort that is recognized under Alabama law. Accordingly, her negligent supervision claim, to the

extent she asserts one, is due to be dismissed.

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Case 5:15-cv-00393-CLS Document 15 Filed 08/10/15 Page 8 of 10
held liable under the ADEA, because that statute permits relief only against an employer,

not a supervisor or other employee. See, e.g., Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4

(11th Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals “cannot be held liable under the ADEA or Title

VII” because relief under those statutes is granted against the employer, not individual

employees). Accordingly, plaintiff’s ADEA claim against Hinton is due to be

dismissed.

17

I. Motion for Sanctions

Defendants request “sanctions on the subjects of” its motion to dismiss, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

18 The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[w]here, as

here, a case is removed from state court, Rule 11 does not apply to pleadings filed before

removal.” Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1091 (11th Cir. 1994)

(alteration supplied). Even so, a brief filed “in opposition to a motion to dismiss [is]

sanctionable if [it] resulted in the continuation of a baseless lawsuit.” Id. (alterations

supplied). Plaintiff’s brief in response to defendants’ motion to dismiss did not continue

a baseless lawsuit.

19 To the contrary, plaintiff admitted in her brief that some of her

17

It appears that plaintiff concedesthat her ADEA claimagainst Hinton is due to be dismissed,

as she contends only that “the negligence and breach of contract claims against Hinton should not be

dismissed.” Doc. no. 5 (Plaintiff’s Response Brief), at 5. This court already has found that all of

plaintiff’s negligence claims are due to be dismissed. See supra Part III.G.

18 Doc. no. 3 (Motion to Dismiss), at 16–17.

19 See doc. no. 5 (Plaintiff’s Response Brief).

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claims were due to be dismissed as “inappropriate.”

20 Accordingly, defendants’ motion

for sanctions is due to be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s Title

VII, GINA, AADEA, breach of contract, and negligence claims, as well as all claims

asserted against defendant Brad Hinton and fictitious defendants, and all of such claims

are DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to plaintiff’s ADEA claim. The

motion to remand is DENIED. Plaintiff is ORDERED to amend her complaint to name

“Jackson County Health Care Authority” as the proper defendant within seven days of this

order.

DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of August, 2015.

______________________________

United States District Judge

20

Id. at

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