Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01483/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01483-45/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OF CECIL ELKINS, JR., et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HIPOLITO PELAYO,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01483-AWI-SAB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

TO DISQUALIFY DEFENSE COUNSEL 

AND MOTION TO REMOVE TIMOTHY 

BRAGG AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM

(ECF Nos. 203, 204, 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 

223, 224)

Currently before the Court are a motion to disqualify defense counsel and a motion to

remove guardian ad litem Timothy Bragg brought by the estate of Cecil Elkins, Jr.; Creasha 

Elkins; minors Valiecia Elkins, Dylan Elkins, and Devin Elkins; and Tina Terrel1(collectively 

(“Plaintiffs”) which were referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and 

Local Rule 302. (ECF No. 219). 

Oral argument on the motions was held on February 26, 2020. Counsel Michael J. Curls 

and Nichelle Jones appeared for Plaintiffs and counsel Robert Rogoyski appeared for Hipolito 

Pelayo (“Defendant”). Having considered the moving, opposition and reply papers, the 

declarations and exhibits attached thereto, and arguments presented at the February 26, 2020 

1 The claims of Cecil Elkins, Sr. were dismissed with prejudice on September 16, 2019. (ECF No. 199.) 

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hearing, as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

This matter was filed on September 12, 2013 based on an incident that occurred on 

November 13, 2012 in which Cecil Elkins, Jr. was shot and killed by law enforcement. (ECF 

No. 1.) The plaintiffs remaining in this action are Creasha Elkins, the decedent’s surviving 

spouse; Valiecia Perez, the decedent’s daughter; Tina Terrel, the decedent’s mother; and his 

minor sons, Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins. (Id.) Initially, Creasha Elkins filed a petition for 

appointment as guardian ad litem for Valiecia Perez, Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins. (ECF Nos. 

6,7.) No order issued addressing the petitions. 

After Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins were placed in dependency proceedings, Cecil 

Elkins, Sr. filed a petition for appointment as their guardian ad litem. (ECF Nos. 118, 119.) On 

June 28, 2016, the petitions for appointment of guardian ad litem were granted and Cecil Elkins 

was appointed as guardian ad litem for Devin Elkins and Dylan Elkins. (ECF No. 121.) On June 

28, 2016, a petition for appointment of guardian ad litem was granted and Creasha Elkins was 

appointed as guardian ad litem for Valiecia Perez. (ECF No. 122.) 

On July 30, 2016, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted and 

judgment was entered in the action. (ECF Nos. 126, 127.) Plaintiffs filed an appeal that was 

processed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 13, 2016. (ECF Nos. 128, 129.) On 

June 13, 2018, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the action. (ECF No. 133.) The 

mandate issued on August 2, 2018. (ECF No. 134.) On remand, the pretrial order issued setting 

this matter for a jury trial. (ECF No. 141.) Subsequently, on December 10, 2018, a notice was 

filed informing the Court that Cecil Elkins, Sr. was deceased. (ECF No. 163.) 

On March 12, 2019, proposed orders were filed to substitute Dennis Elkins as guardian 

ad litem for Devin Elkins and Dylan Elkins. (ECF Nos. 169, 170.) On March 13, 2019, orders 

were filed appointing Dennis Elkins as guardian ad litem for Devin Elkins and Dylan Elkins. 

(ECF Nos. 171, 172.) On March 28, 2019, a motion for reconsideration of the order appointing 

Dennis Elkins as guardian ad litem for Devin Elkins and Dylan Elkins was filed by Defendant. 

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(ECF No. 178.) On May 3, 2019, United States District Judge Anthony Ishii filed an order 

granting the motion to disqualify Dennis Elkins as guardian ad litem for the minor Plaintiffs as 

unopposed. (ECF No. 186.) 

On June 5, 2019, proposed orders were filed seeking appointment of Timothy Bragg as 

guardian ad litem for Plaintiffs Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins. (ECF Nos. 191, 192.) On June 

7, 2019, Timothy Bragg was appointed as guardian ad litem for Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins. 

(ECF No. 193.) 

On September 16, 2019, an informal telephonic conference was held at which time 

defense counsel reported a possible settlement with the minor plaintiffs. (ECF No. 200.) 

Plaintiffs’ counsel objected stating that they were unaware of any settlement efforts with their 

minor clients. (Id.) On November 12, 2019, Defendant filed a request that this action be 

referred to a settlement judge regarding the minor plaintiffs’ claims. (ECF No. 202.) On 

November 17, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the instant motions to disqualify defense counsel and remove

Mr. Bragg as guardian ad litem. (ECF Nos. 203, 204.) The request for a settlement referral was 

denied without prejudice. (ECF No. 205.) 

On January 14, 2020, oppositions to the motions were filed. (ECF Nos. 212, 213.) 

Plaintiffs filed replies on January 21, 2020.2 (ECF Nos. 214-218.) On February 7, 2020, the 

matters were referred to the undersigned for the issuance of findings and recommendations. 

(ECF No. 209.) On February 13, 2020, Defendant filed a request for leave to file a notice of new 

facts and a related motion. (ECF No. 223.) Plaintiffs’ filed a response on February 14, 2020. 

(ECF No. 224.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Disqualification of Counsel 

The Local Rules of the Eastern District of California (“L.R.”) provide that attorneys 

practicing in this court are required to “comply with the standards of professional conduct 

2 On February 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a notice of errata stating that documents 214 and 215 were erroneously filed 

and requested that they be disregarded. The Court shall disregard ECF Nos. 214 and 215. 

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required of members of the State Bar of California and contained in the State Bar Act, the Rules 

of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, and court decisions applicable thereto, 

which are hereby adopted as standards of professional conduct in this Court. In the absence of an 

applicable standard therein, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar 

Association may be considered guidance.” L.R. 180(e). 

Rule 4.2 of the Rules of the California State Bar states, “In representing a client, a lawyer 

shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a person 

the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 

consent of the other lawyer.” CA ST RPC Rule 4.2(a). This rule applies even where the 

represented person initiates or consents to the communication and the lawyer is to immediately 

terminate communication with the represented person. Comment [1] to CA ST RPC Rule 4.2.

The prohibition against communicating “indirectly” with a person represented by 

counsel in paragraph (a) is intended to address situations where a lawyer seeks to 

communicate with a represented person through an intermediary such as an agent, 

investigator or the lawyer’s client. This rule, however, does not prevent 

represented persons from communicating directly with one another with respect to 

the subject of the representation, nor does it prohibit a lawyer from advising a 

client concerning such a communication. A lawyer may also advise a client not to 

accept or engage in such communications. The rule also does not prohibit a 

lawyer who is a party to a legal matter from communicating on his or her own 

behalf with a represented person in that matter.

Comment [3] to CA ST RPC Rule 4.2.

Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility also provides that a lawyer 

shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to 

be represented by another lawyer in the matter without the consent of the other lawyer or if 

authorized to do so by law or a court order. This rule applies even if the represented person 

initiates or consents to the representation and the lawyer must immediately terminate 

communication. Comment [3] to Model Rules. 

The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies in 

circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the 

matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the 

fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the 

circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement 

of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious.

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Comment [8] to Model Rules. 

“The authority of a trial court to disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in 

every court [t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers.” Beltran 

v. Avon Prod., Inc., 867 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing City & Cnty. of S.F. v. 

Cobra Solutions, Inc. (“Cobra Solutions”), 38 Cal.4th 839, 846 (2006) and United States v. 

Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1996)). Disqualification of counsel due to an ethical 

violation is a discretionary exercise of the trial court’s inherent powers.” Crenshaw v. MONY 

Life Ins. Co., 318 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2004); Wunsch, 84 F.3d at 1114. The federal 

court is to apply state law in determining matters of disqualification of counsel. In re Cty. of Los 

Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000); W. Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 

F.Supp.3d 1074, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 

Motions to disqualify counsel’ are especially prone to tactical abuse because 

disqualification imposes heavy burdens on both the clients and courts: clients are 

deprived of their chosen counsel, litigation costs inevitably increase and delays 

inevitably occur. As a result, these motions must be examined ‘carefully to 

ensure that literalism does not deny the parties substantial justice.’ At the same 

time, we recognize that disqualification of counsel is necessary under certain 

circumstances, to protect the integrity of our judicial process by enforcing 

counsel’s duties of confidentiality and loyalty.

Sharp v. Next Entm’t, Inc., 163 Cal.App.4th 410, 424 (2008) (quoting People ex rel. Dept. of 

Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems Inc. (“SpeeDee Oil”), 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145–

1146 (1999)); see also Beltran, 867 F.Supp.2d at 1077 (disqualification is a drastic remedy that is 

generally disfavored and imposed only when absolutely necessary). 

Disqualification of counsel may be necessary to prevent attorneys from breaching their 

ethical duties, and it also protects the judicial process from any taint of unfairness that might 

arise from conflicts of interests. Sharp, 163 Cal.App.4th at 425. “Ultimately, disqualification 

motions involve a conflict between the clients’ right to counsel of their choice and the need to 

maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.” Id. (quoting Cobra Solutions, 38 

Cal.4th 839, 846 (2006)). “In considering a motion to disqualify, the district court must make 

findings supported by substantial evidence.” Beltran, 867 F.Supp.2d at 1077.

/ / /

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B. Disqualification of Guardian Ad Litem

Pursuant to Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a minor may sue by a next 

friend or guardian ad litem. Fed. R. Civ. P 17(c)(12). “The court must appoint a guardian ad 

litem--or issue another appropriate order--to protect a minor or incompetent person who is 

unrepresented in an action.” Id. “The role of the guardian ad litem is to protect the incompetent 

person’s rights in the action, to control the litigation, to compromise or settle, to direct the 

procedural steps, and make stipulations.” Elliott v. Versa CIC, L.P. (“Versa”), 328 F.R.D. 554, 

556 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Golin v. Allenby, 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 644 (2010).

The Court has the discretion to “remove a guardian ad litem if [he] acts contrary to the 

best interests of the minor or incompetent plaintiff, has a conflict of interest with the minor or 

incompetent plaintiff, or demonstrates an inability or refusal to act.” Versa, 328 F.R.D. at 556. 

III.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs move to disqualify defense counsel and remove guardian ad litem Timothy 

Bragg arguing that a conflict of interest has arisen in light of ex parte communications that have 

occurred outside of the presence of Plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs contend that it is apparent that 

substantive communications have occurred because at the September 16, 2019 hearing, Mr. 

Rogoyski announced that a settlement, in principal, had been reached with the minor plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs state that at that time there had been no settlement discussions with their attorneys, 

Michael Curls or Nichelle Jones. Plaintiffs argue that there is an adversarial relationship 

between Plaintiffs’ counsel and Mr. Bragg and Mr. Rogoyski which creates a conflict of interest. 

Plaintiffs argue that they are prejudiced to the extent that Mr. Bragg shared any 

information with Mr. Rogoyski regarding the family dynamics in this matter. Further, Plaintiffs 

argue that Mr. Rogoyski may be providing legal counsel to Mr. Bragg on motions to file, such as 

which actions should be initiated in probate court to protect the minors against Dennis Elkins or 

filing a motion to approve the minors’ compromise or advising Mr. Bragg on how to eliminate 

Plaintiffs’ counsel to recover attorney fees in this matter. Further, Plaintiffs contend that they are 

now in a position that they cannot conduct candid conversations with Mr. Bragg regarding this 

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matter due to concern that he would not honor the attorney client privilege that would exist 

between counsel and the minor plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek to remove Mr. Bragg as guardian ad 

litem and disqualify Mr. Rogoyski and the State Attorney General’s Office as counsel in this 

case and to enjoin Mr. Rogoyski and his office from sharing information learned from Mr. Bragg 

with newly substituted counsel. 

Plaintiffs contend the Mr. Rogoyski contacted the minors’ foster mother to arrange 

depositions while knowing that they were represented by counsel. After Mr. Elkins Sr.’s death, 

Plaintiffs’ counsel was informed by the foster mother that she was contacted by Mr. Rogoyski 

and informed that Dennis Elkins was deliberately committing fraud against the minor plaintiffs 

by cutting them out of Mr. Elkins Sr.’s estate. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Rogoyski has 

continued to have ex parte communications with Mr. Bragg after his appointment as guardian ad 

litem. 

Plaintiffs argue that despite the lack of case law addressing a counsel’s ability to have ex 

parte communications with a guardian ad litem, it is clear from the applicable rules, case law, 

and other opinions that such conduct violates the rules. Plaintiffs contend that by the time their 

counsel contacted Mr. Bragg to discuss case strategy his mind was made up and he was poisoned 

against Plaintiffs’ counsel. When Mr. Curls contacted Mr. Bragg to introduce himself, Mr. 

Bragg informed him that he was committed to accepting a settlement offer from the defense. 

Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Bragg’s decision to accept an offer based solely on the representations 

of defense counsel creates an incurable conflict of interest. Mr. Rogoyski informed Plaintiffs’ 

counsel that Mr. Bragg was researching the validity of the attorney client contract between their 

office and the minor plaintiffs. Further, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Rogoyski has placed himself in 

a position as advocate for Defendant Pelayo as well as the minor plaintiffs and their guardian ad 

litem. 

Defendant counters that counsel’s actions have been proper at all times and this motion 

has been brought as a form of gamesmanship to prevent the minor plaintiffs from settling their 

claims. As to the motion to disqualify the guardian ad litem, Defendant argues that Mr. Curls 

and Ms. Jones do not have standing to move for disqualification of the state appointed attorney 

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and guardian ad litem. To the extent that Plaintiffs’ counsel believe they can no longer cooperate 

or communicate with Mr. Bragg, Defendant asserts that the California Rules require counsel to 

withdraw from representation and they cannot fire a client representative. Defendant also argues 

that the motion provides no evidence or explanation as to how Mr. Bragg has a divided loyalty to 

some other party than the minor plaintiffs. To the extent that the minor plaintiffs’ interests are 

diverse to the other plaintiffs represented by Mr. Curls and Ms. Jones this inures to the detriment 

of Mr. Curls and Ms. Jones. 

Defendant contends that while Plaintiffs’ counsel contend that they should have been 

included in any settlement negotiations regarding the minor plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

undertook representation of the minor plaintiffs’ uncle, Dennis Elkins, who was trying to defraud 

the minor plaintiffs in the probate court. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel became 

subject to a disqualifying conflict of interest based on their joint representation of Dennis Elkins 

and the minor plaintiffs. Defendant contends that under the State’s ethics rules, Mr. Curls and 

Ms. Jones should have disqualified themselves from representing the minor plaintiffs due to this 

conflict of interest but did not do so. 

Defendant contends that after Mr. Bragg, who was the attorney appointed to represent the 

minors in the state court after they were removed from their mother’s custody, discovered the 

fraud by Dennis Elkins he filed a motion to be appointed guardian ad litem in the state probate 

action. Mr. Bragg concluded that Jones and Curls could no longer represent the minors in this 

federal action due to their conflict of interest, as well as evidence that they were allowing Dennis 

Elkins to interfere with settlement efforts. Mr. Bragg investigated and felt that settlement of the 

minor plaintiffs’ claims may be in their best interest but he was informed by Ms. Jones that the 

paternal uncle was unwilling to settle the claims at this time. Mr. Bragg informed defense 

counsel that he would assume the role as attorney for settlement negotiations because he had 

been appointed their attorney under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 317. In 

reliance on these statements, Mr. Rogoyski began settlement negotiations directly with Mr. 

Bragg. Further, Defendant asserts that when settlement of the minor plaintiffs’ claims was 

broached with Mr. Curls and Ms. Jones, they threatened to file a complaint with the State Bar 

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against Mr. Bragg because he did not conduct an investigation into their litigation costs and fees. 

Defendant contends that because Mr. Bragg assumed the dual role as attorney and guardian ad 

litem their communications were proper at all times. 

Plaintiffs reply that Mr. Rogoyski’s sole purpose in contacting Mr. Bragg about 

settlement of the minor plaintiffs’ claims in this action was to persuade Mr. Bragg to settle the 

case for a nominal “less than cost of defense” settlement without the input of Plaintiffs’ counsel 

of record. Plaintiffs contend that there was never any settlement offer extended on behalf of the 

minor plaintiffs and therefore Dennis Elkins could not have interfered with settlement of their 

claims in this action. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the California Welfare and Institutions Code 

does not allow Mr. Bragg to step into the shoes of attorney of record in this federal case. Since 

Mr. Bragg had no discussions on the merits of the action with Mr. Combs or Ms. Jones, Plaintiffs 

contend that he had to have had substantive communications on the merits with Mr. Rogoyski. 

Plaintiffs argue that because Mr. Bragg made the decision to settle this action solely based on his 

communications with Mr. Rogoyski a conflict of interest exists necessitating the removal of Mr. 

Rogoyski and the Office of the Attorney General in this matter. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. 

Rogoyski has failed to consider what would happen if the other plaintiffs were to receive a 

sizeable judgment in the case after the minor plaintiffs accepted a less than cost of defense 

settlement based solely on the advice of defense counsel. 

Plaintiffs reply that they do have standing to seek to remove the guardian ad litem

because they remain the attorney of record for the minor plaintiffs. Further, they contend that 

Mr. Bragg shared confidential information about the case with opposing counsel that sabotages 

counsel’s ability to effectively present their case. 

Defendant filed a request to file a notice of new facts. Defendant contends that Plaintiff 

Creasha Elkin’s statement in opposition to the motion to dismiss that she should be able to 

continue on the survival cause of actions without the participation of the Plaintiffs Dylan Elkins 

and Devin Elkins demonstrates that a conflict of interest exists between the minor plaintiffs and 

the other plaintiffs in this action. Defendant contends that this is further evidence that attorneys 

Jones and Curls should have withdrawn due to disqualifying conflicts of interest in this case. 

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Plaintiffs respond that there are no new facts asserted in the request to file new facts. 

Plaintiffs assert that the new facts are merely defense counsel’s narrative that some of the 

plaintiffs and their counsel seek to inhibit Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins from recovery in this 

action which is not true. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Rogoyski is attempting to represent both 

Defendant Pelayo and Plaintiffs Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins in this matter which he cannot 

do.3 

IV.

DISCUSSION

Here, Plaintiffs seek to disqualify Mr. Rogoyski and remove Mr. Bragg as guardian ad 

litem based on ex parte discussions to settle the claims of Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins. The 

Court must first determine whether inappropriate ex parte communications occurred, and if the 

communications are improper, whether disqualification of Mr. Rogoyski is the appropriate 

remedy. Further, the Court must determine if Mr. Bragg should be removed as guardian ad litem 

for Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins.

A. Whether the Communication between Defense Counsel and the Guardian Ad 

litem Violated the Rules of Professional Conduct

The parties agree that there is no case on point addressing an opposing counsel’s ability 

to have ex parte communications with a guardian ad litem whose wards are represented by 

counsel without the consent of the counsel for the wards. Rule 4.2 of the Rules of the California 

State Bar provides that “a lawyer shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject 

of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 

matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.” CA ST RPC Rule 4.2(a). “A 

guardian ad litem is not a party to the action, but merely a party’s representative, an officer of the 

court.” In re Christina B., 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453 (1993) (internal citations omitted); 

Williams v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.App.4th 36, 47 (2007); see also Serway v. Galentine, 75 

Cal.App.2d 86, 89 (1946) (a guardian ad litem is an officer and representative of the court); J.W. 

3 The Court has considered all argument presented in the parties pleading. The Court shall only address those 

arguments it finds necessary for the decision of the current motions. 

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v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 964 (1993). The guardian ad litem’s duties are 

essentially ministerial. In re Christina B., 19 Cal.App.4th at 1453 

The guardian ad litem’s purpose is to protect the rights of the incompetent person. 

He or she has the right to control the litigation on behalf of the incompetent 

person. “Among his powers are the right to compromise or settle the action, to 

control the procedural steps incident to the conduct of the litigation, and, with the 

approval of the court, to make stipulations or concessions that are binding on the 

[incompetent], provided they are not prejudicial to the latter’s interests.

Id. at 1453–54 (internal citations omitted); accord In re Sara D., 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 668 (2001). 

The role of the guardian ad litem in the proceedings is more than an attorney, but less than a 

party. In re Josiah Z., 36 Cal. 4th 664, 678 (2005), as modified (Aug. 10, 2005); In re Christina 

B., 19 Cal.App.4th at 1454; In re Josiah Z., 36 Cal.4th at 678. The guardian ad litem is like an 

agent with limited powers. Williams, 147 Cal.App.4th at 47; Brown v. Alexander, No. 13-CV01451-RS, 2015 WL 7350183, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015). “The guardian may make 

tactical and even fundamental decisions affecting the litigation but always with the interest of the 

guardian’s charge in mind.” In re Christina B., 19 Cal.App.4th at 1454. 

Here, Mr. Bragg is not only the minors’ guardian ad litem in this matter, he is the

attorney for the minors in the state dependency proceedings and represented to Mr. Rogoyski 

that there was a conflict of interest between the minors and their counsel in this case. When Mr. 

Rogoyski asked who would be representing the minors, Mr. Bragg stated that he would not be 

hiring counsel but would represent them himself. The Court finds and the parties agree that there 

is no case on point addressing the unique circumstances presented here.

Mr. Bragg and Mr. Rogoyski relied on Section 317 of the California Welfare and 

Institutions Code which governs the appointment of counsel in juvenile dependency cases in 

determining that Mr. Bragg had the authority to represent the minors in this action. Pursuant 

section 317, “[a] primary responsibility of counsel appointed to represent a child or nonminor 

dependent pursuant to this section shall be to advocate for the protection, safety, and physical 

and emotional well-being of the child or nonminor dependent.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 

317(c)(2). Under section 317, counsel is charged in general with representation of the child’s 

interests. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317(e)(1). Mr. Bragg and Mr. Rogoyski relied on his 

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appointment to represent the general interests of the minors in determining that Mr. Bragg had 

the authority to engage in settlement discussions with Mr. Rogoyski on behalf of the minors.

Section 317 states that “[c]ounsel shall represent the parent, guardian, child, or nonminor 

dependent at the detention hearing and at all subsequent proceedings before the juvenile court.” 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317(d). The representation includes “representing the parent, 

guardian, or the child in termination proceedings and in those proceedings relating to the 

institution or setting aside of a legal guardianship.” Id. Although the language of the statute 

provides that counsel is charged in general with protecting the child’s interest, the authority to 

act would be within the dependency proceedings and would not extend to proceedings in this 

court. 

The Court finds that Mr. Rogoyski and Mr. Bragg were negotiating in the good faith 

belief that Mr. Bragg could represent the minors based on his appointment in the state court 

proceedings. However, Mr. Rogoyski knew that the minors were represented by Mr. Curls and 

Ms. Jones in this action and he did not have their consent to speak with Mr. Bragg regarding the 

case. Defendant contends that Mr. Bragg sought the communication, but this rule applies even 

where the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. Comment [1] to CA 

ST RPC Rule 4.2. The purpose of the rule is “to the preservation of the attorney-client 

relationship and the proper functioning of the administration of justice.... It shields the opposing 

party not only from an attorney’s approaches which are intentionally improper, but, in addition, 

from approaches which are well intended but misguided.”4 San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. ex 

rel. Contreras (“Contreras”) v. First Student, Inc., 213 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1230 (2013) (quoting 

Mitton v. State Bar, 71 Cal.2d 525, 534 (1969). 

In determining the meaning of rule 4.2, “[a] bright line test is essential. As a practical 

matter, an attorney must be able to determine beforehand whether particular conduct is 

permissible; otherwise, an attorney would be uncertain whether the rules had been violated until 

... he or she is disqualified.” Contreras, 213 Cal.App.4th at 1231. Further, the rule “must be 

4 Rule 4.2 was formerly Rule 2-100. 

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interpreted narrowly because ‘a rule whose violation could result in disqualification and possible 

disciplinary action should be narrowly construed when it impinges upon a lawyer’s duty of 

zealous representation.’ ” Id. (quoting Snider v. Superior Court 113 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1197–

1198 (2003)). 

California courts have stated that the guardian ad litem is like an agent with limited 

powers. Williams, 147 Cal.App.4th at 47. Therefore, cases addressing whether an opposing 

attorney’s contact with employees of a company violated Rule 4.2(b) are helpful in determining

whether the contact here was appropriate. Rule 4.2(b) prohibits communication with officers, 

directors, partners, managing agents, and current employees, members, agent, or other 

constituents of the organization in connection with any matter that could be binding upon or 

imputed to the organization for the purposes of civil or criminal liability. In determining whether 

an employee is a party under the rule, courts consider the precise nature of the communication 

that opposing counsel had with the individual. Contreras, 213 Cal.App.4th at 1231. 

Here, Mr. Rogoyski communicated with Mr. Bragg to discuss settlement of the minors’ 

claims in this matter. These are clearly communication about the subject matter of the case. The 

overriding purpose of Rule 4.2 “is to prohibit one side to a dispute from obtaining an unfair 

advantage over the other side as a result of having ex-parte access to a represented party.” 

Contreras, 213 Cal.App.4th at 1235. “If a party’s counsel is present when an opposing attorney 

communicates with a party, counsel can easily correct any element of error in the communication 

or correct the effect of the communication by calling attention to counteracting elements which 

may exist.” Id. at 1230. Plaintiffs argue that based on Mr. Rogoyski’s discussions with Mr. 

Bragg, Mr. Bragg’s mind was made up about settlement. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Bragg made 

that determination based solely on the representations of Mr. Rogoyski. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

asserts that Mr. Bragg’s decision to settle this action was based on the one-sided representations 

of Mr. Rogoyski. In this instance, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not have the opportunity to counter any 

representation made by Mr. Rogoyski in his efforts to settle this matter. This is precisely the 

type of communication with an opposing party that could create an unfair advantage and would 

fall under Rule 4.2.

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A 2002 formal ethics opinion issued by the North Carolina State Bar relied on by 

Plaintiffs supports the finding that the communication here would violate Rule 4.2. On January 

24, 2003, the North Carolina State Bar issued an opinion regarding direct contact with a lawyer 

appointed as a guardian ad litem for a minor plaintiff. 2002 Formal Ethics Opinion 8, located at 

https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/adopted-opinions/2002-formal-ethics-opinion-8/ (last 

visited February 20, 2020). 

In this personal injury action, a mother, father, and child were represented by counsel and 

a private attorney was appointed as guardian ad litem for the minor plaintiff. During a settlement 

conference, the defense attorneys asked to meet privately with the guardian ad litem to discuss 

the child’s case. The counsel for plaintiffs denied the request maintaining that the guardian ad 

litem is their client and the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit defense counsel from talking 

to their clients without their consent. The defendants argued that, as an attorney, the guardian ad 

litem represented the child and had a professional responsibility to exercise independent 

professional judgment on behalf of the child which included making an independent inquiry of 

the defendants’ proposals and positions. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs’ attorneys 

could not interfere with the guardian ad litem’s decision on whether to communicate privately 

with defense counsel. The question addressed in the opinion was “If a guardian ad litem is a 

lawyer, is he or she still a client represented by counsel for the purposes of Rule 4.2,5thus 

prohibiting direct contact by opposing counsel without consent of the guardian ad litem’s

lawyer?” Id. The opinion states,

Rule 17(a) and (b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure require an 

action to be brought by the “real party in interest” and, in the case of a minor, by a 

general guardian or, if there is none, by an appointed guardian ad litem. As a 

party, the guardian ad litem may choose to be represented by legal counsel and 

permit legal counsel to make decisions about the strategy for the litigation. . . . 

The fact that the guardian ad litem is a lawyer does not make him or her cocounsel for the purpose of litigating the case. Therefore, opposing counsel must 

comply with Rule 4.2 and respect the decision of the guardian ad litem’s trial 

5 Rule 4.2 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct provides “[d]uring the representation of a client, a 

lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 

represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to 

do so by law or a court order. It is not a violation of this rule for a lawyer to encourage his or her client to discuss 

the subject of the representation with the opposing party in a good-faith attempt to resolve the controversy.”

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counsel to deny a request to communicate privately with their client, the guardian 

ad litem.

The role and responsibilities of a guardian ad litem are established by the court 

making the appointment as well as by statute and case law. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. 

1A-1, Rule 17; Satler v. Purser, 12 NC App 206, 182 SE 2d 850 (1971). These 

remain the same whether the person appointed is a lawyer or not. Nevertheless, if 

a lawyer is appointed, he or she must fulfill the responsibilities of the guardian ad 

litem in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of the Rules of 

Professional Conduct. This means that the lawyer must be honest, avoid conflicts 

of interest, and exercise professional judgment in making decisions about matters 

that are within the purview of the guardian ad litem such as whether a settlement 

proposal should be accepted.

Id. The opinion held that “a lawyer who is appointed the guardian ad litem for a minor plaintiff 

in a tort action and is represented in this capacity by legal counsel, must be treated by opposing 

counsel as a represented party and, therefore, direct contact with the guardian ad litem, without

consent of counsel, is prohibited.” Id. 

Defendant relies on an ethics opinion out of the District of Columbia to argue that the 

communication did not violate the rule against communicating with the opposing party. The 

District of Columbia opinion held that “a lawyer appointed to act as a guardian ad litem in a 

child abuse and neglect proceeding in the District of Columbia represents the child and the best 

interests of the child. In the absence of a conflict between the two interests, the guardian ad 

litem is the child’s lawyer.” (Ethics Opinion 295, ECF No. 212-1 at 10.) Under the Professional 

Rules of Conduct, “the guardian ad litem may not communicate about the subject of the litigation 

with either of the child’s parents without notification of and the consent from the parent’s 

lawyer. The guardian ad litem may communicate directly with a represented parent if the sole 

purpose of the communication is to obtain information about how to contact the child or to 

schedule a meeting with the child. Such communication would be administrative in nature and 

would not be ‘about the subject of the representation.’ ” Id. 

The Court finds that this opinion does not support Defendant’s position that the 

communication here was allowable for several reasons. First, juvenile dependency is a special 

proceeding governed by its own laws and rules and the guardian ad litem in dependency 

proceedings does not serve the same functions as a guardian ad litem in adversary proceedings. 

In re Charles T., 102 Cal.App.4th 869, 875 (2002). In the dependency proceedings, a guardian 

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ad litem acts closer to the functions of minor’s counsel which is both more and less than a 

traditional guardian ad litem in an adversarial proceeding. Id. at 878. 

Second, in this case Mr. Bragg is not the minors’ attorney for purposes of this action. 

While he has been appointed as guardian ad litem by this court and is representing the minors in 

state court proceedings, the minors are represented by Mr. Curls and Ms. Jones in this federal 

action. The State rules regarding his appointment in juvenile proceedings do not make Mr. 

Bragg counsel for the minors in this action. To the extent that Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ 

counsel has an impermissible conflict of interest, Mr. Bragg has not filed a motion to substitute 

counsel or brought this issue before the Court. 

Mr. Bragg did not seek to be appointed to represent the minors in this action and he was 

not their attorney in this action. Rule 4.2 prohibits counsel from either directly or indirectly 

communicating with an opposing party about the subject of the litigation. The Court finds that 

Mr. Rogoyski violated Rule 4.2 by having settlement discussions with the minors’ guardian ad 

litem.

B. Disqualification of Defense Counsel

Having found that a violation of the Rules of Professional Responsibility has occurred, 

the next issue is the appropriate remedy. Sanctions may be imposed where there is 

impermissible ex parte contact which would unfairly prejudice the opposing party, including

disqualification as counsel. Lewis v. Tel. Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1558 (9th Cir. 

1996). Where the court finds a violation of Rule 4.2, “its remedial powers are limited to 

ameliorating effects of the violation on the proceeding before it. Contreras, 213 Cal.App.4th at 

1231. The court must focus on identifying an appropriate remedy for any improper effect that 

the attorney’s misconduct may have in the case. Id. Plaintiffs seek to have Mr. Rogoyski and 

the Office of the Attorney General disqualified from acting as counsel in this matter. 

In a proceeding to disqualify counsel under California law, the trial court engages in the 

delicate balancing process explained in William H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court 149 Cal.App.3d 

1042, 1048 (1983). Elliott v. McFarland Unified Sch. Dist., 165 Cal.App.3d 562, 567 (1985).

The court must weigh the combined effect of a party’s right to counsel of choice, 

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an attorney’s interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of 

replacing disqualified counsel and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification 

proceeding against the fundamental principle that the fair resolution of disputes 

within our adversary system requires vigorous representation of parties by 

independent counsel unencumbered by conflicts of interest. 

Elliott, 165 Cal.App.3d at 567; accord Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F.Supp.2d 796, 814 

(N.D. Cal. 2004). Disqualification is a drastic measure that is disfavored, but “the paramount 

concern must be the preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice 

and in the integrity of the bar.” Concat LP, 350 F.Supp.2d at 814 (quoting State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 72 Cal.App.4th 1422 (1999). A lawyer is not disqualified “for 

every instance of misconduct, ethical breaches will result in disqualification where it is necessary 

‘to mitigate the unfair advantage a party might otherwise obtain if the lawyer were allowed to 

continue representing the client.’ ” Doe v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.App.5th 199, 205 (2019). 

1. Confidential Communications

At the core of the disqualification jurisprudence in California is a concern for the 

confidentiality of lawyer-client communications. Neal v. Health Net, Inc., 100 Cal.App.4th 831, 

840 (2002). Plaintiffs do not argue that Mr. Rogoyski obtained attorney-client information. Nor 

does it appear that they can as based on the motion, it is apparent there has been little

communication about this case between Mr. Bragg and Plaintiffs’ counsel that would have been 

communicated through any settlement discussions. 

On March 29, 2019, Mr. Bragg was notified by Mr. Rogoyski that a motion had been 

filed in this action to reconsider the appointment of Dennis Elkins as guardian ad litem based on 

alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in the state probate action. (May 9, 2019 Decl. of Timothy 

Bragg ¶¶ 6, 8, attached to Notice of Motion and Motion to Appoint Guardian Ad Litem for 

Probate and Civil Litigation; Memorandum of Points and Authorities-Amended, ECF No. 212-1 

at 17-21.) The minors’ uncle, Dennis Elkins, had filed a probate petition failing to list them as 

heirs to the estate. Mr. Bragg spoke to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Ms. Jones that same day regarding the 

failure to include the minors in the probate pleadings. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Mr. Bragg had learned from 

both Ms. Jones and Mr. Rogoyski that Defendant had offered to settle this action. (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

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Mr. Bragg found that settlement may be in the best interest of the minors, but he had been 

informed by Ms. Jones that Dennis Elkins was unwilling to settle the matter on behalf of the 

minors at that time.6 (Id.) Mr. Bragg determined prior to being appointed guardian ad litem that 

there was a potential conflict of interest between the minors and Dennis Elkins based on his 

failure to include the minors as heirs in the probate pleadings for their grandfather. (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

Mr. Bragg was appointed as guardian ad litem on June 7, 2019. (ECF No. 193.) 

“A party seeking disqualification of an attorney is not required to disclose the actual 

communications it contends are confidential, but conclusory statements are insufficient. There 

must be some showing of the nature of the communications or a statement of how the

communications relate to the current representation without disclosing what was actually 

communicated.” Elliott, 165 Cal.App.3d at 572. 

At the February 26, 2020, Plaintiffs stated that they do not know what was communicated 

between Mr. Bragg and Mr. Rogoyski, but as they did in their motion, argued that there must 

have been substantive communication between Mr. Bragg and Mr. Rogoyski. Further, in their 

motion, Plaintiffs argued “to the extent that Mr. Bragg shared any information about the family 

dynamics in this matter, Plaintiffs are prejudiced.” (Mot. to Disqualify Counsel 7, ECF No. 

203.) However, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that substantive communication must have 

occurred is not sufficient to demonstrate that disqualification is necessary. Further, Plaintiffs’ 

statement that information about their family dynamics might have been shared is less than a 

conclusory allegation. 

Mr. Rogoyski stated at the February 26, 2020 hearing that he received no confidential 

communication about the matter during his discussions with Mr. Bragg. Mr. Bragg was 

available at the hearing, but Plaintiffs did not request to question him themselves on the 

communications that occurred to determine if information that would be harmful to their case 

had been disclosed to Mr. Rogoyski. Plaintiffs have failed to show that information has been 

obtained by Mr. Rogoyski that would provide Defendant with an unfair advantage in this action. 

6 The declarations states “the paternal uncle, Cecil Elkins Sr.” however, Cecil Elkins Sr. was the minors’ grandfather 

and the decedent in the probate action. The Court finds this to be a typographical error and that the reference to the 

paternal uncle is to Dennis Elkins. 

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2. Impairment of Relationship with Mr. Bragg

Plaintiffs also argue that any information communicated by their counsel to Mr. Bragg is 

subject to attorney client privilege, however there are no allegations that any communication of 

attorney-client privileged information was obtained by Mr. Rogoyski. Plaintiffs’ argument 

appears to be that they cannot share any such information with Mr. Bragg for fear that he would 

share such information with Mr. Rogoyski. However, this is not sufficient to demonstrate that 

Mr. Rogoyski or Mr. Bragg should be disqualified in this matter. Rather the remedy would be 

for the Court to order no further communication between Mr. Rogoyski or Mr. Bragg. 

3. Conflict of Interest

Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Rogoyski has created a conflict of interest that requires his and 

the Attorney Generals Office’s disqualification in this matter. “Attorneys have a duty to 

maintain undivided loyalty to their clients to avoid undermining public confidence in the legal 

profession and the judicial process.” SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal.4th at 1146.

“A conflict arises when the circumstances of a particular case present ‘a 

substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially 

and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to 

another current client, a former client, or a third person.’ (Rest.3d Law 

Governing Lawyers [ (1998), Conflicts of Interest,] § 121.) If competent 

evidence does not establish such a conflict, the attorney is not disqualified for a 

conflict.” (In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 843–844, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 

593.)

Sharp, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 425–26. 

When a law firm is simultaneously representing clients that have conflicting interests, 

with a few exceptions, “disqualification follows automatically, regardless of whether the 

simultaneous representations have anything in common or present any risk that confidences 

obtained in one matter would be used in the other.” W. Sugar Coop., 98 F.Supp.3d at 1081–82 

(quoting SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal.4th at 1147). This is because the primary value at stake is the duty 

of loyalty and a “strict per se rule recognizes that a client cannot be expected to sustain trust and 

confidence in his or her counsel who is also representing the client’s adversary in litigation.” W. 

Sugar Coop., 98 F.Supp.3d at 1082. A conflict of interest may also arise where an attorney has 

acquired confidential information in the course of a relationship with a nonclient which will or 

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may appear to be useful in the attorney’s representation in an action on behalf of a client. Oaks 

Mgmt. Corp. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 4th 453, 464 (2006).

“The most egregious conflict of interest is representation of clients whose interests are 

directly adverse in the same litigation.” SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal.4th at 1147. The duty of loyalty 

the attorney owes one client cannot compromise the duty owed another. Id. Rule 1.7 of the 

Rules of the State Bar of California addresses conflicts of interests with current clients. 

Specifically, a lawyer shall not, without informed consent from each client, represent a client if 

the representation is directly adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter. CA ST 

RPC Rule 1.7(a). The lawyer is also unable to represent a client without informed consent where 

there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially limited 

by the lawyer’s responsibilities to or relationship with another client a former client, a third 

person, or the lawyer’s own interests. CA ST RPC Rule 1.7(b). 

Plaintiffs argue that where a substantial relationship exists between counsel and the 

person holding the information access to information is presumed and disqualification is 

mandatory. “The cases that employ a nonrebuttable presumption that counsel obtained 

confidential information are for the most part those in which an attorney is claimed to have 

violated conflict of interest rules protecting the confidentiality of client information and the party 

seeking disqualification cannot prove the disclosure without giving up the protection the rule was 

designed to provide.” Gregori v. Bank of Am., 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 304 (1989), modified (Feb. 

17, 1989). The “presumption does not come into play under this case law unless the party 

seeking disqualification shows not only an apparent conflict of interest or impropriety but the 

likelihood that, as a result of the conflict or impropriety, the attorney acquired confidential 

information useful to his client.” Id. at 304. Plaintiffs contend that because any information 

communicated to Mr. Bragg by their attorneys would be subject to attorney client privilege 

Plaintiffs cannot communicate with Mr. Bragg on the reasonableness or lack thereof of 

Defendants’ settlement offer. However, speculation that future communication between Mr. 

Bragg and Mr. Rogoyski might occur is not sufficient to require disqualification in this matter. 

As stated above, the Court can issue a protective order prohibiting communication between Mr. 

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Bragg and Mr. Rogoyski.

Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Rogoyski communicated substantive matters related to the 

case to Mr. Bragg, engaged in settlement dialogue, reported his intent to file a motion for 

approval of a minor’s compromise on Mr. Bragg and the minors’ behalf, conducted research on 

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s ability to recover attorney fees, and reported to the minors’ foster mother 

and Mr. Bragg that action should be taken against Dennis Elkins as a result of the petition that he 

filed in the probate court demonstrating that he is acting as an advocate for the minors such that a 

conflict of interests exists. 

Other than reporting the conduct of Dennis Elkins to the minors’ foster mother and Mr. 

Bragg which does not involve communication regarding the subject matter of this litigation, the 

conduct attributed to Mr. Rogoyski is consistent with acting in the interest of his client to attempt 

to settle this matter. This is not competent evidence demonstrating that Mr. Rogoyski has 

become an advocate for the minors. 

Further, even if the reports of misconduct against the minors by Dennis Elkins to their 

foster mother and Mr. Bragg could be construed as advocacy on behalf of the minors, Plaintiffs 

do not have standing to seek disqualification because he is advocating for their clients. 

“[F]ederal courts generally limit standing to bring disqualification motions to clients or former 

clients (see Vapnek et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (The Rutter Group 

2010) ¶ 4:322.12)[.]” Kennedy v. Eldridge, 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 (2011); see also Concat 

LP, 350 F.Supp.2d at 818 (citations omitted) (“as a general rule, courts do not disqualify an 

attorney on the grounds of conflict of interest unless the former client moves for 

disqualification.”) Courts have found standing to move for disqualification of counsel in cases 

where the movant has a sufficient “personal stake” in the motion because “the ethical breach so 

infects the litigation in which disqualification is sought that it impacts the moving party’s interest 

in a just and lawful determination of her claims.” Concat L.P, 350 F.Supp.2d at 818 (quoting 

Colyer v. Smith, 50 F.Supp.2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). Here, Plaintiffs have not 

demonstrated by competent evidence that the ethical breach, the settlement discussions between 

Mr. Rogoyski and Mr. Bragg, so infected the litigation to impact Plaintiffs interest in the just and 

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lawful determination of their claims. Therefore, they do not have standing to bring a 

disqualification motion on the ground that Mr. Rogoyski has become an advocate for their 

clients.

4. Disqualification of Counsel is Not Appropriate 

Although the Court has found that Mr. Rogoyski violated the Rules of Professional 

Conduct by speaking to Mr. Bragg about settling the minors’ claims in this action, 

“[d]isqualification is inappropriate . . . simply to punish a dereliction that will likely have no 

substantial continuing effect on future judicial proceedings.” Gregori, 207 Cal.App.3d at 309. 

Here, for the reasons discussed, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Mr. Rogoyski obtained 

information that would impact their interest in the just and lawful determination of the claims at 

issue in this action. In this instance, the defendant has been represented by the Office of the 

Attorney General since 2013 and specifically by Mr. Rogoyski since September 2018. (ECF No. 

137.) A motion to dismiss is currently pending and following resolution of the motion this 

matter will be set for trial. 

Balancing the combined effect of Defendant Pelayo’s right to counsel of choice, Mr. 

Rogoyski’s interest in representing his client, and the financial burden that would occur should 

counsel be disqualified at this stage of the proceedings against the fundamental principle that the 

fair resolution of disputes within our adversary system requires vigorous representation of parties 

by independent counsel unencumbered by conflicts of interest, the Court finds that 

disqualification of Mr. Rogoyski is not appropriate in this matter. Further, since Plaintiffs have 

not demonstrated that disqualification of Mr. Rogoyski would be appropriate, no reason exists to 

disqualify the entire Office of the Attorney General. Under the circumstances presented here, 

disqualification would serve no legitimate purpose and would unfairly deprive Defendant of his 

counsel of choice. Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify Mr. Rogoyski and the entire Office of the 

Attorney General is denied.

B. Guardian ad litem

Plaintiffs also seek to remove Mr. Bragg as guardian ad litem for Dylan Elkins and Devin 

Elkins based upon his discussions with Mr. Rogoyski to attempt to settle their claims in this 

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matter. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Bragg has acted contrary to the best interests of the minors by 

attempting to reach a settlement agreement with Mr. Rogoyski without researching the costs and 

expenses that were incurred by Plaintiffs’ counsel over the course or this action. Plaintiffs state 

that Mr. Bragg is ready to settle for less than the costs of defense settlement. Plaintiffs also 

contend that Mr. Rogoyski has created a conflict with the remaining Plaintiffs because he has 

made up his mind that settlement is in the minors’ best interest and their attorneys would not 

provide him with confidential information because he might disclose it to opposing counsel.

“The role of the guardian ad litem is to protect the incompetent person’s rights in the 

action, to control the litigation, to compromise or settle, to direct the procedural steps, and make 

stipulations.” Versa, 328 F.R.D. at 556 (quoting Golin, 190 Cal.App.4th at 644. “A guardian ad 

litem is a party’s representative and an officer of the court, and owes a duty of loyalty to the 

incompetent person, and not to other parties interested in the litigation.” In re Conservatorship 

of Straczynski, No. D052288, 2009 WL 613876, at *5 (Mar. 11, 2009) (citing Williams, 147 

Cal.App.4th at 47 and In re Christina B., 19 Cal.App.4th at 1453). The Court has the duty to 

appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the rights of the child and the inherent authority to make 

decisions in the best interest of the child even over the objection of the parent. “[A] court has the 

right to select a guardian ad litem who is not a parent if that guardian would best protect the 

child’s interests.” Williams, 147 Cal.App.4th at 49. The minor “is always the ward of every 

court wherein his rights or property are brought into jeopardy, and is entitled to the most jealous 

care that no injustice be done him. The guardian ad litem is appointed merely to aid and to 

enable the court to perform that duty of protection.” Id. at 49–50. 

The Court has the discretion to “remove a guardian ad litem if [he] acts contrary to the 

best interests of the minor or incompetent plaintiff, has a conflict of interest with the minor or 

incompetent plaintiff, or demonstrates an inability or refusal to act.” Versa, 328 F.R.D. at 556; 

see also, M.K. through Hall v. Harter, 716 F.Supp. 1333, 1336 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (courts ability to 

remove guardian ad litem is limited to those situations where there is a conflict between the 

representative and the minor or where there is an inability or refusal to act.) 

Basically, Plaintiffs’ counsel are seeking to remove Mr. Bragg as guardian ad litem in 

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this matter because he wishes to settle this matter without doing any investigation into the costs 

and expenses that have been incurred over the past eight years of litigation. Plaintiffs contend 

that Mr. Bragg made the decision to settle this case based solely on the representations of Mr. 

Rogoyski. However, Plaintiffs did not present any evidence, such as testimony by Mr. Bragg 

that his decision is based solely on his discussions with Mr. Rogoyski. Plaintiffs speculate that 

this must be the basis of Mr. Bragg’s belief that settlement is in the best interest of the minor

because he did not discuss settlement with Plaintiffs’ counsel, but there is ample information 

contained in the public record that could inform Mr. Bragg’s decisionmaking process, such as the 

multiple complaints that have been filed, the pleadings and orders on the three motions to 

dismiss that have been decided, the pleadings and order on the motion for summary judgment, 

and the pleadings on the currently pending motion to dismiss as well as the filings challenging 

Dennis Elkins appointment as guardian ad litem in this matter. (See ECF Nos. 1, 10, 16, 19, 20, 

21, 25, 35, 36, 41, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 54, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 103, 104, 105, 126, 134, 

164, 167, 178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 209.) 

Further, the decision to settle a matter rests with client and not the attorney. CA ST RPC 

Rule 1.2(a). To the extent that counsel disagrees with the decision to settle the matter, this does 

not indicate that Mr. Bragg is acting contrary to the best interest of the minors. Rather, if 

counsel feels that they cannot work with Mr. Bragg due to his desire to settle this matter, this 

would more appropriately be brought as a motion to withdraw from representation. CA ST RPC 

Rule 1.16(b)(4); see Hunter v. Sokoloff, No. 14-CV-05031-JST (LB), 2019 WL 5655013, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019) (granting motion to withdraw as attorney where deteriorating attorneyclient relationship made it unreasonably difficult to continue representing the client); see also

Versa, 328 F.R.D. at 557 (denying motion to remove guardian ad litem because competent 

guardians ad litem conspire with counsel to obtain higher settlement awards). Counsels’

disagreement with Mr. Bragg’s determination that it would be in the best interest of the minors to 

settle this action is not a reason to remove Mr. Bragg as guardian ad litem in this matter.

Plaintiffs also argue that Mr. Bragg has created a conflict of interest because they cannot 

convey any confidential information to him because he might convey such information to 

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opposing counsel. Plaintiffs contend that candid communications about the case are not possible 

with Mr. Bragg due to fear that attorney client privileged information would be disclosed. 

However, the Court shall order, and is confident that since it is now decided that the 

communication is not allowed, Mr. Bragg shall refrain from any communication with opposing 

counsel in the future without the consent of Plaintiffs’ counsel. 

Plaintiffs question what will happen if they obtain a large verdict in this action after the 

minors settle for less than counsel believes they should. However, as in any litigation, there is no 

guarantee that the plaintiffs will prevail, much less that they will be awarded a large verdict at 

trial in this action. At the February 26, 2020 hearing, counsel for Defendant stated that, should 

Defendant prevail at trial, he will seek costs in this action. He also stated that based upon his 

knowledge gained due to his research and the dismissal of claims of the estate of Cecil Elkins, 

Sr., he believes that only the minors would have the financial ability to pay an award of costs in 

this matter. Mr. Bragg could reasonably determine that given the chances of succeeding at trial, 

the chance of an appeal if a large verdict is awarded, the risk of an award of costs should 

Defendant prevail in this action, and the amount of time that this litigation has been proceeding,

it would be in the best interest of the minors to settle this action. The Court does not find that 

Mr. Bragg’s belief that it is in the best interest of the minors to settle this action is contrary to the 

minors’ interests.

Finally, Defendant argues that a conflict of interest has been demonstrated by Plaintiffs’ 

counsel due to their representation of Dennis Elkins and their willingness to allow him to control 

this litigation despite his misrepresentations to the state probate court that Mr. Elkins, Sr. did not 

have any grandchildren. Plaintiffs’ counsel responds, “as has been explained ad nauseum,”

Dennis Elkins statements to the probate court were merely based on the mistaken belief by his 

and his attorney that Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins were not heirs of Cecil Elkins, Sr. because 

they thought that the adoption was final at the time that the probate petition was filed. 

However, the minors’ situation in this action raises serious concerns regarding whether 

their interests would be protected absent an independent guardian ad litem. The minors have 

been taken from the custody of their mother and are in dependency proceedings. Their uncle 

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filed a probate petition in state court for their grandfather stating that he had no grandchildren. 

The Court finds it deeply troubling that Plaintiffs’ counsel has so easily accepted the assertion 

that the failure to list the minors as heirs on the probate petition was a mistake and have taken a 

position that is potentially adverse to the interests of the minors. The minors’ father was 

deceased years prior to the death of their grandfather. The fact that the minors were later 

removed from their mother’s custody and placed in dependency proceedings cannot reasonably 

be thought to terminate their right to inherit as heirs of their deceased father, even if their 

mother’s parental rights were later terminated. The Court declines to find a conflict of interest 

requiring Plaintiffs’ counsel to withdraw exists based on the evidence provided in response to the 

motions filed here. But given the circumstances presented, especially the uncle omitting the 

minors from the probate petition which would have deprived them of a significant inheritance, 

the Court finds that Mr. Bragg is qualified and well situated to act as guardian ad litem for the 

minors. He is their attorney in the dependency proceedings; he is their guardian ad litem in the 

state court probate proceedings; and he is aware of the prior probate petition that would have 

adversely affected the rights of the minors. 

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Mr. Bragg has acted contrary to the best interests of 

the minors, has a conflict of interest with the minors, nor that he has demonstrated an inability or 

refusal to act on behalf of the minors. The Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion to remove Mr. Bragg 

as guardian ad litem for Dylan Elkins and Devin Elkins. 

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V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify defense counsel is DENIED;

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to remove Timothy Bragg as guardian ad litem for Dylan Elkins 

and Devin Elkins is DENIED; and

3. Timothy Bragg shall refrain from any communication with defense counsel unless 

so authorized by Plaintiffs’ counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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