Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01255/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01255-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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26 This action is proceeding on the amended petition filed March 12, 2002. 1

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT GALLEGO,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-1255 DFL JFM P

vs.

SILVIA GARCIA, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction on

charges of possession of tar heroin while in prison. In addition to other prior convictions,

petitioner has sustained a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance for sale in

1994. (Answer at 2.) Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial

court’s refusal to allow the defense to present a crucial witness on surrebuttal.1

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 2

Appellate District in People v. Gallego, No. 3 Crim C032900 (March 31, 2000), a copy of which

is attached as Exhibit 1 to Respondent’s Answer, filed March 31, 2000.

 Pruno is a wine manufactured in prison using tomato paste, sugar and plastic bags. The 3

ingredients are mixed in the plastic bags, put in hot water in the toilet in the manufacturer’s cell,

and placed in bags in the toilet where the fermentation process takes place.

2

FACTS2

The events underlying this appeal took place on July 9,

1997. At that time, correctional peace officer Jesse Ramsey was

watching the exercise yard at California State Prison, Sacramento,

also known as “New Folsom,” when he received a radio call from

Sergeant Anthony Gold, instructing him to pay particular attention

to a group on inmates in front of the work center. Gold suspected

that the [petitioner] might be involved in illicit activity. After

watching the [petitioner] for approximately five minutes, Ramsey

suspected [petitioner] was selling drugs. Accordingly, he and cadet

in training Alfonso Petty approached [petitioner] and informed him

that they were going to search him. As a result of this search,

Ramsey found a cellophane bindle in the right front pocket of

[petitioner’s] jeans, which ultimately proved to contain tar heroin.

[Petitioner] contended he did not know that the heroin was

in the pants pocket, as he had just changed into those pants from

the dirty laundry immediately prior to being searched. In his own

defense, [petitioner] then wove a tale of illicit pruno3

manufacturing, slopping drinking habits and contraband-filled dirty

laundry bins. This version of events and circumstances was

supported in various parts by some of [petitioner’s] fellow inmates.

[Petitioner] was apparently an adept pruno maker, but not

an adept pruno drinker as he managed to spill a good portion of a

bag of pruno all over his clothes on July 9, 1997. After spilling the

pruno on his clothes, it was suggested to [petitioner] by his fellow

inmates that he change his clothes since he stank of pruno and

could e disciplined for that. Taking the sage advice of his fellow

inmates, [petitioner] proceeded to the recycling area and took a pair

of shorts out of the clothing cart. Although he was advised that the

clothes in the cart he was digging through contained dirty clothes,

he decided to change into those dirty clothes anyway.

[Petitioner’s] fellow inmates largely corroborated this story. 

In addition, some of his fellow inmates testified that it was not at

all uncommon for various items of contraband to be found in the

recycling area, and specifically in the laundry carts. Inmate

Stevens testified that although he had never personally found drugs

in the recycling area, weapons were sometimes found. Inmate

Holmes, who was a laundry cart clerk at the prison, testified that he

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 [Petitioner] had testified that he was with an inmate Peerson on the day of the search 4

and arrest. The prosecution later established that Peerson was not at New Folsom Prison on July

9, 1997. [Petitioner] also clarified his testimony with regard to his response upon Ramsey’s

discovery of the heroin.

 The proffer of Dotson’s testimony during the motion in limine was first that he had 5

been charged with the same type of offense as the [petitioner,] possession of drugs in prison, and

they were drugs which were found in clothes which he had taken from the dirty laundry bin. His

case had been dismissed. Secondarily, he was being offered to testify that when he was working

in the laundry, he found contraband in the laundry every day.

3

found drug paraphernalia and drugs, including tar heroin, in the

pockets of clothing “all the time.” Inmate Holmes also testified

that rather than turning in the drugs to the correctional officer on

duty, he generally just threw them away to avoid coming under

suspicion himself for being in possession of drugs.

On rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimony of

various correctional officers on a number of issues, including

whether it was common to find contraband, specifically drugs, in

the discarded clothing in the laundry. Officer Waits testified that

he was unaware of drugs being found within the discarded

clothing, although he was aware that various weapons had been

found in the recycling area, although not in the discarded clothing. 

Officer Blog, a laundry worker at the New Folsom work center,

also testified that he had never found illicit drugs in the pockets of

dirty laundry and had never had any inmates turn in any drugs

which had been found in the dirty laundry.

The defense then sought to introduce evidence on

surrebuttal. The [petitioner] was permitted to testify again as to the

conditions under which he worked in the laundry, and to

rehabilitate himself as to two issues upon which he had been

impeached.4

The defense was not, however, permitted to call an inmate

Darrell Dotson to the stand in surrebuttal. Inmate Dotson had

previously been the subject of a motion in limine wherein the court

refused to issue an order to produce Dotson, ruling that his

proposed testimony was not probative and was cumulative. In the 5

context of the request to have Dotson produced for surrebuttal, the

proffer was that Dotson would testify that “he’s found contraband

every day in some form or another, either in the clothing or

washers or dryers [sic] . . . .” The court denied the request, finding

that the testimony was cumulative and was not proper surrebuttal,

as it could have been offered in [petitioner’s] case in chief.

(People v. Gallego, slip op. at 2-5.) 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On May 8, 1998, complaint number 98F00889 was deemed to be an information

and filed in Sacramento Superior and Municipal Courts. The complaint charged petitioner with

possessing heroin in state prison, a violation of California Penal Code § 4573.6. The complaint

further alleged five prior felony convictions, two of which were alleged as serious felonies (Penal

Code § 1197.7, subd.(c)) within the meaning of the “three strikes” recidivist sentencing law,

§§ 667, subdivisions (b) - (i) and 1170.12. Four prior convictions with prior prison terms and reoffenses within five years (§ 667.5, subd.(b)) were also alleged. (CT 10-13.)

On April 21, 1999, after an eight-day jury trial, petitioner was found guilty of

possessing heroin in state prison. The jury also found true the special allegations of prior

convictions and prison terms. (CT 126-28; 131-34.) 

Petitioner was sentenced, pursuant to the three strikes sentencing law to an

aggregate term in state prison of 29 years to life, calculated as a 25 years to life sentence for the

current offense, plus one year for each of the four prior convictions involving a prior prison term. 

(CT 128-30.)

Petitioner appealed the sentence to the California Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District, raising one issue: whether the trial court committed reversible error when it

precluded the defense from presenting a surrebuttal witness. The state appellate court rejected

this claim. On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. On

March 12, 2002, he filed an amended petition. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it precluded

a crucial defense witness on surrebuttal. (Amended Petition at 5.) 

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In the amended traverse, petitioner states that inmate Dotson was subpoenaed to

attend trial in this matter. Some time after the subpoena issued, inmate Dotson was transferred. 

The trial judge subsequently refused to enforce the subpoena of inmate Dotson. Petitioner

contends that Dotson was the best witness the defense could get because Dotson had also been

charged with possession of drugs, but because Dotson was able to prove he had recently changed

clothes in the laundry area, his charges were dismissed. Petitioner contends that Dotson would

have been a particularly compelling witness because Dotson is black and petitioner is white, and

Dotson had nothing to gain from testifying at petitioner’s trial. 

Petitioner argues that the trial judge denied the defense request for an order to

CDC to produce inmate Dotson in time for the defense’s case in chief. Petitioner argues the trial

court then compounded the problem by denying the defense’s motion for Dotson as a surrebuttal

witness, chiding defense counsel for not calling Dotson in the case-in-chief. Thus, petitioner

states that although by law the court may have been correct to find that Dotson’s testimony did

not qualify for surrebuttal, it was the court’s initial action in refusing to enforce the subpoena that

deprived petitioner of presenting a defense.

Petitioner argues that Dotson’s testimony would not have been cumulative

because Dotson was the only witness who would have testified that he also had been found with

drugs in a pair of pants that he had just removed from the recycling bin. (Traverse at 7.) Dotson

would also have testified that he had been searched shortly thereafter, that contraband was found

in his pocket, and that Dotson had also been charged with possession, testimony that none of the

other defense witnesses had given. (Id.) 

III. State Court’s Opinion

The state court addressed this claim as follows:

In his case in chief, the [petitioner] introduced testimony of

his fellow inmates and of himself that contraband of various types,

including tar heroin, was frequently found in the clothing in the

dirty laundry bins. On cross-examination of these inmates, the

prosecution introduced evidence of their various convictions for

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 The opinion cites “Holmes,” rather than Watts, which appears to be a typographical 6

error. Holmes was an inmate witness who testified drugs were found in pockets all the time. 

(RT 574.) Watts was a correctional officer who, along with Officer Blog, testified that no drugs

had ever been found in discarded clothing or laundry. (RT 693, 701; RT 707, 711.)

7

purposes of impeachment. Then in its rebuttal case, the

prosecution introduced the testimony of two officers that

contradicted the testimony of the inmates. Specifically, [Watts]

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and Blog testified that they were unaware of drugs being found in

the laundry at Folsom Prison. In arguing that the testimony of

inmate Dotson was appropriate surrebuttal, [petitioner] argued that

the testimony of each of his other witnesses had been impeached

by their criminal records and only one had testified as to working

in the laundry and finding drugs there. [Petitioner] continues that

argument here and it remains unpersuasive.

As the trial court properly concluded, the testimony of

Dotson could have been appropriately introduced in the defense

case in chief. The matters on which [petitioner] sought surrebuttal

were not new matters introduced by the prosecution for the first

time on rebuttal. In fact, they were matters first introduced by the

[petitioner] in his case in chief; specifically, whether or not

contraband, including tar heroin, was regularly or ever found in the

dirty clothes in the laundry at Folsom Prison. A defendant is not

entitled to present surrebuttal evidence on matters he himself

introduced into the trial. The fact that the prosecution offered

evidence in rebuttal that contradicted the evidence presented by the

defense in its case in chief does not, in and of itself, entitle the

[petitioner] to surrebuttal.

[Petitioner’s] contention that he is entitled to surrebuttal

because his inmate witnesses were impeached by their criminal

records is highly disingenuous. Certainly, the criminal records of

these witnesses should not have been any surprise to the

[petitioner]. These were, after all, witnesses who were incarcerated

in state prison.

In sum, we can see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

refusal to allow Dotson to testify in surrebuttal as to matters which

were initially introduced by the defense in its case in chief, and on

which previous witnesses had already testified.

(People v. Gallego, slip op. at 6-7.) 

IV. Analysis

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment, 

to present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v.

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Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) ("Whether

rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory

Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense’") (quoting California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). “However, that right is not unlimited.” Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, a state law justification for exclusion of

evidence does not abridge a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense unless it is "arbitrary

or disproportionate" and "infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused." United States v.

Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). See also Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-91 (discussion of the

tension between the discretion of state courts to exclude evidence at trial and the federal

constitutional right to “present a complete defense”); Greene, 288 F.3d at 1090. In addition, a

state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it renders the state

proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704,

710 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000);

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996) (plurality opinion suggesting that any justification

by the state court for exclusion of evidence is sufficient to satisfy due process).

[B]oth the defendant and the state have important and legitimate

interests; both must be evaluated and weighed. (Footnote omitted.) 

The exclusion of significant defense evidence implicates

constitutional values. When due process issues are presented, the

court must balance the importance of the evidence against the state

interest in exclusion. In evaluating the significance of the

evidence, the court should consider all of the circumstances: its

probative value on the central issue, its reliability, whether it is

capable of evaluation by the finder of fact, whether it is the sole

evidence on the issue or merely cumulative, and whether it

constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. The weight of

the state's interest likewise depends upon many factors. The Court

must determine the purpose of the rule, its importance, how well

the rule implements this purpose, and how well the purpose applies

in the case at hand. The court must give due weight to the

substantial state interest in preserving orderly trials, in judicial

efficiency, in excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence.

Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983). 

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On April 7, 1999, the trial court heard defense counsel’s motion in limine

concerning two inmate witnesses who had been transferred. (RT 30-31.) Defense counsel

sought the testimony of inmate Darryl Dotson and stated Dotson would testify “I was charged

with the same kind of offense and my case was dismissed. I got clothes out of the yard, put them

on, and was searched and drugs were found on me.” (RT 31.) The prosecution objected that

Dotson’s testimony was irrelevant, cumulative and was outweighed by the burden and expense of

bringing Dotson in to testify. (RT 32.) When the trial court inquired what the probative value of

Dotson’s testimony was, defense counsel responded that Dotson did the same thing as petitioner

– changed clothes in the area, and witnessed the incident where petitioner was searched by

Correctional Officer Ramsey and had been previously assigned to work in the laundry center and

would testify that, while working in the laundry, he found some sort of contraband every day in

clothing or in the washers and dryers. (RT 32.) Defense counsel confirmed that the clothing

that’s washed comes from the recycle area where petitioner picked up the clothing to change into. 

(RT 33.) 

At this point, the trial judge confirmed with defense counsel that “the basic

defense is [petitioner] didn’t know they were there?” (RT 33.) Or, put another way, “Not within

the knowledge of the presence of the narcotics.” (RT 33.) The trial judge then said he did not

see how Dotson helped that defense. (RT 33.) Defense counsel responded, “Dotson helps it by

saying that you pick up a pair of pants and change. You may not know what’s in the pocket.” 

(RT 33.) The trial judge explained that “anybody could testify to that.” (RT 33.) Defense

counsel argued that the officers would not testify to that, claiming the officers would testify that

“everybody’s going to check the pockets. They are not going to put . . . on pants that have

contraband in them.” (RT 33.) Defense counsel continued his efforts to persuade the judge, but

the trial judge found that Dotson’s testimony was not probative. (RT 34.) 

Petitioner initially identified 12 witnesses. (RT 34.) Ultimately, seven inmate

witnesses, plus petitioner, testified for the defense. (Duvall, RT 413; O’Neel, RT 442; Kirkland,

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RT 467; Bernich, RT 507; Stephens, RT 533; Langston, RT 559; Holmes, RT 571; Gallego, RT

582.) Of the seven inmate witnesses, all except Holmes witnessed part of petitioner’s conduct

that day. 

Inmate Stephens testified that he personally had not found drugs in the pockets

while working in the laundry. (RT 538-39.) Outside the presence of the jury, just prior to Inmate

Holmes taking the stand, the trial judge stated, 

Well, I know we had discussed it off the record, that there was no

probative value to hold the testimony about the laundry, but there

has been testimony about two inmates that clothes from the

recycling bin ended up in the laundry, probably it is now. 

(RT 571.) Inmate Holmes testified that drug paraphernalia was found in pockets in the laundry

all the time. (RT 574.) Holmes identified needles, actual drugs, marijuana, heroin, and crank as

items that were found. (RT 574.) Holmes stated that tar heroin was found in the laundry all the

time. (RT 574.) Usually, these drugs were found in the pockets, he added. (RT 575-76.) 

Thus, a review of the record reveals that Inmate Holmes first testified about

finding drugs in pockets in the laundry during petitioner’s case-in-chief (RT 574), and the

prosecution called Officers Watts and Blog to rebut that claim (RT 693,707). Thus, defense

counsel’s attempt to gain Dotson’s testimony on surrebuttal was not appropriate. “If on rebuttal

the prosecution introduces evidence that merely contradicts the [petitioner’s] evidence, then it is

not considered a new or different matter.” (Opinion at 5-6.) 

Moreover, the proffered testimony of Dotson was cumulative because Dotson

would testify that he found contraband in pockets in the laundry, which is what Inmate Holmes

previously testified to. Thus, Dotson’s proposed testimony on the central issue herein, whether

contraband is found in pockets in the laundry, was cumulative. In addition, Dotson’s testimony

concerning petitioner’s conduct on the day in question was also cumulative because six other

inmates testified about petitioner’s conduct on that day. Dotson was not any more credible than

Holmes because he also was a prison inmate and would be impeached with his own criminal

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convictions. By resting its case before revisiting the issue of Dotson’s testimony, the defense

bypassed any opportunity to incorporate Dotson’s testimony in its case-in-chief. Thus, the trial

court did not err by excluding the testimony when offered as surrebuttal. 

Because Dotson’s testimony was cumulative and was not properly brought as

surrebuttal evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dotson’s testimony. 

See United States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 1991). 

On the other hand, Dotson was the sole witness prepared to testify that he got

clothes out of the yard, put them on, was searched and drugs were found, yet his charges were

dropped. However, counsel for petitioner failed to pursue this in his case-in-chief, even

acknowledging during his motion to call Dotson as a surrebuttal witness that:

In the process of in limine discussions before trial, it was

determined that Mr. [Dotson] was not needed for the trial and the

People moved to exclude him and I kind of . . . concurred with

that.

 

(RT 714.) Petitioner could have moved again, before the defense rested, to call Dotson to the

stand to pursue this line of questioning, particularly if trial counsel felt this was a key component

of the defense case. Petitioner did not. Moreover, even if Dotson had been called to testify as to

his own experience, it would not necessarily have demonstrated petitioner was similarly situated. 

The jury could have decided Dotson’s charges were dropped because they were untrue and

petitioner’s charges were not dropped because they were true. 

In addition, a review of petitioner’s case-in-chief reflects that this portion of

Dotson’s testimony did not constitute a major part of the attempted defense. 

The evidentiary ruling of the trial judge appears to this court to have been proper

but, more importantly on federal habeas corpus, it did not cause the trial to be fundamentally

unfair. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

refusing to allow Dotson to testify in surrebuttal is not contrary to United States Supreme Court

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law nor is it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

V. Miscellaneous

In his traverse, petitioner also suggests Officer Ramsey may have lied at trial

about the allegedly suspicious activity in which petitioner may have engaged immediately

preceding the search, pointing out that all of the initial documentary evidence concerning the

incident described the search as random. Although Officer Ramsey’s report in the Rules

Violation concerning the incident does not reflect any suspicious activity on the part of

petitioner, neither does it state the search was random. However, whatever precipitated the

search is not relevant to whether the trial court erred in precluding Dotson as a surrebuttal

witness at trial. 

Finally, petitioner raises new claims in his amended traverse that were not raised

in his amended petition nor in state court proceedings below, for example, ineffective assistance

of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, etc. A traverse is not the proper pleading to raise

additional grounds for relief. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507-08 (9th

Cir.1995). In general, claims not raised in the petition are not cognizable on appeal. See United

States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507). Thus, the

court will not address these additional claims raised solely in the amended traverse.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 16, 2005.

/001; gall1255.157

Case 2:01-cv-01255-DFL -JFM Document 30 Filed 06/20/05 Page 13 of 13