Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01119/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01119-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 05:7703 Discrimination - Review of Agency Act

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Because there is no “Civil Rights Act of 1966," the court 1

assumes, as it did in its November 19, 2007 order, that plaintiffs

intended to reference 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A law enforcement

department is a person under § 1983. Anthony v. County of

Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1451 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Monell

v. Dept. of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZAKIYA VAUGHN, as an 

individual and Guardian Ad

Litem for JAMONTE VAUGHN,

JAMARCO VAUGHN and JALEN

VAUGHN, minors and real

parties in interest,

NO. CIV. S-07-1119 LKK/KJM 

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (FBI);

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF;

SACRAMENTO CITY POLICE;

RICHMOND CITY POLICE; ALAMEDA

COUNTY SHERIFF,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs have brought suit against the Sacramento City

Police for violations of their Fourteenth Amended rights and their

rights under the “Civil Rights Act of 1966 (as amended).”1

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Shaw v. State of Cal. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d

600 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiffs did not submit a Statement of Disputed and 2

Undisputed Facts nor any declarations or affidavits in support of

their opposition to defendants’ motion. For this reason, much of

what is described in this section is taken from the plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint, and is included simply to orient the reader to

the allegations. The court does not rely on these allegations in

resolving the instant motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

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Plaintiffs allege that the police acted in a racially

discriminatory manner when searching their residence for a thirdparty suspect. Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment.

The court resolves the motion on the papers, without oral

argument. As explained herein, defendant’s motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS2

According to plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiff Zakiya Vaughn

is the parent of Jamonte, Jamarco, and Jalen Vaughn, who are also

named as plaintiffs. They allege that on June 14, 2006, officers

of the City of Sacramento entered their home for the purpose of

searching for the husband of Zakiya Vaughn, who was suspected of

a crime. At the time, the plaintiff children were inside the home

and Zakiya Vaughn was outside. The police entered the home, using

“extreme force” by breaking the front door and “ransack[ed]” the

premises. Amended Compl. ¶ X. While the plaintiff children were

still inside, the police used tear gas in the home. Plaintiffs

allege that these actions occurred pursuant to a City custom and

practice of “ignor[ing] the safety of innocent parties of AfricanAmerican descent who occupy premises where [the] police department

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had suspected a law violator was also on the premises . . . .” Id.

During the incident, the police officers also allegedly used racial

epithets and racist gestures towards plaintiff Zakiya Vaughn. The

plaintiffs allege that their Fourteen Amendment rights and rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were violated. They seek damages for

property damage and emotional distress. 

Defendants have tendered evidence that the City has several

policies that may be relevant to the incident that forms the basis

of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, and that none of these

policies provide for the racial discrimination alleged. There is

a written policy prohibiting “biased-related enforcement actions,”

stating that “officers contact . . . search, and/or arrest persons

only in accordance with established laws, legal and ethical

guidelines, department recognized training standards, and in a

manner that is free from racial, cultural, biased or discriminatory

intentions.” Declaration of Sergeant Robert McCloskey In Support

of City’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication (“McCloskey

Decl.”) ¶ 5, Ex. A. The Sacramento Police Department’s written

policy regarding “General / Professional Conduct” similarly

requires that all officers “respect and protect the rights of all

individuals” and “act reasonably within the limits of their

authority as defined by statute and judicial interpretations, to

ensure the rights of . . . the individual . . . are protected.” Id.

¶ 6, Ex. B. The Department’s use of force policy mandates that

officers “use only the amount of force which reasonably appears

necessary . . . .” Id. ¶ 7, Ex. C. Finally, Department policy

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states that searches must be conducted “professionally and

respectfully” and that “the safety of all concerned persons [is]

the primary consideration.” Id. ¶ 8, Ex. D.

As countervailing evidence, the plaintiffs have tendered

evidence of a portion of a report ostensibly prepared by a

consulting firm, which concluded that there was evidence of racial

profiling by the Sacramento Police Department in conducting traffic

stops. See Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment by

Defendant City of Sacramento, Ex. A. The tendered excerpt of the

report does not disclose when this study was conducted.

Finally, the defendant contends that it served all plaintiffs

with requests for admissions, to which plaintiffs did not respond.

Declaration of Marcos Kropf In Support of City’s Motion for Summary

Judgment or Adjudication (“Kropf Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-5, Ex. A-D.

Plaintiffs do not dispute this. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for

Summary Judgment by Defendant City of Sacramento at 2. Accordingly,

these matters are deemed admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). These

admissions include that the City of Sacramento has never violated

the constitutional rights of any of the plaintiffs, the City does

not have a policy of violating anyone’s constitutional rights, the

City does not have a policy of treating people differently based

on race, the City has a policy of conducting searches and arrests

in compliance with the Constitution and the law, and the City has

a policy of not using racial epithets or racial gestures against

anyone. SSUF ¶¶ 1-15.

II. STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER 

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FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

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summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat’l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

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In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat’l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.’" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093

(9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962) (per curiam)); see also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County

of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

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F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A public entity may only be liable under § 1983 if the

constitutional violation occurred as a result of an official

municipal policy or custom. Monell v. New York Dep’t of Soc. Serv.,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A custom that is not official agency

policy may create § 1983 liability if it is “permanent and wellsettled.” Id.; see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

Cir. 1996) (only a “persistent and widespread” custom, rather than

“isolated or sporadic incidents” of Constitutional violations, meet

the Monell standard). An agency may not be liable on a respondeat

superior theory, but only if there is evidence that there is “an

affirmative link between the policy and the specific constitutional

violation alleged.” City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821

(1985). 

Here, the defendant have met their initial burden on summary

judgment to tender evidence that would permit a factfinder to

conclude that there is no custom or policy that caused the alleged

deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights. Defendant has put forth evidence

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of the official policies of the Sacramento Police Department

regarding the manner in which searches are conducted, the use of

force, and general directives regarding the treatment of

individuals that officers encounter. See McCloskey Decl. Ex. A-D.

All of these policies direct officers to act reasonably, in

accordance with the law, and without racial bias. See id. Moreover,

the plaintiffs have admitted that the City of Sacramento has

policies of not violating the Constitutional rights of persons, of

conducting searches and arrests lawfully, and of not treating

persons differently based on race, of not using racial epithets or

gestures. SSUF ¶¶ 11-15. The plaintiffs have also admitted that the

City does not have a policy of violating the Constitutional rights

of anyone nor of treating people differently based on their race.

SSUF ¶¶ 9-10. 

In response, the plaintiffs offer a portion of a report

concluding that there are racial disparities in the Sacramento

Police Department’s traffic stops. See Plaintiff’s Response to

Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant City of Sacramento, Ex.

A. This does not suffice to show that a genuine issue of material

fact exists. First, the excerpt of the report tendered as evidence

does not describe when the author’s observations were made, and

thus is little evidence of what the City’s customs were at the time

of the incident involving plaintiffs. Second, even if there were

a custom of performing traffic stops in a racially biased manner

at the time of the event giving rise to plaintiffs’ complaint, this

is minimal circumstantial evidence that such a custom affected the

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Because this is dispositive to the instant motion, the court 3

need not resolve whether the injury of which plaintiffs complain

constituted a violation of their rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("a complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial"). 

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manner in which searches of homes for suspects were conducted.

Finally, the plaintiff have not offered any evidence from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that such a custom was “persistent

and widespread” and was the cause of the injury of which plaintiffs

complain. See Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. The paucity of plaintiffs’ 3

evidence causes the court to conclude that no reasonable jury could

find in their favor at trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS defendant City

of Sacramento’s motion for summary judgment.

The Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 15, 2008.

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