Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01294/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shidan Dahnad, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 14-01294 PHX DJH (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, U.S. District Judge:

 Shidan Dahnad filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (“Petition”) challenging his convictions in the Maricopa County Superior Court on 

two counts of child molestation, each a Class 2 felony. (Doc. 1) As explained below, the 

Court recommends that Dahnad’s Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND1

Prior to the events leading to the charges in this case, Dahnad’s family and the 

victim’s family had been very close friends for several years. (Ex. CCC at ¶ 3) The 

alleged victims2

 were K.S and her sister M.S., who were seven years old and nine years 

old, respectively at the time of the charged events. (Id.) Dahnad was a guest at the sisters’ 

family’s home when, by prior arrangement with Dahnad, the sisters’ parents left home at 

 

1

 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted with Respondents’ Answer, Doc. 9. 

2

 Dahnad was convicted as to the two counts involving K.S., and acquitted on the count against M.S. Hereinafter, K.S. and M.S. collectively are referred to as “sisters” and individually by their initials. 

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4:20 in the morning to take the father to work. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-6) At approximately 4:36 a.m., 

Dahnad opened the door and entered the dark bedroom the sisters shared. (Id. at ¶ 7) 

Based on the sisters’ accusations of what transpired in the bedroom, Dahnad was 

ultimately charged with two counts of child molestation involving K.S. and one count of 

attempted child molestation involving M.S. (Id. at ¶ 23) 

 Following a bench trial, Dahnad was convicted of both counts of child molestation 

involving K.S., and found not guilty of the count involving M.S. (Ex. FF) He was 

sentenced to a concurrent 17-year term of imprisonment on each count. (Ex. YY) 

 Dahnad timely appealed. (Ex. CCC) He raised five issues, as follows: (1) the state 

presented insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on the charge that Dahnad made 

K.S. touch his penis; (2) the state presented insufficient evidence of sexual intent on 

either count; (3) the trial court erred in precluding Dahnad from presenting character 

evidence as part of his affirmative defense; (4) the sisters’ testimony was tainted and 

should have been suppressed as unreliable; and (5) the trial court failed to adequately 

inform Dahnad of the rights he relinquished when he waived his right to a jury trial. (Ex. 

CCC) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision rejecting Dahnad’s 

claims and affirming his convictions and sentences. (Ex. CCC) Dahnad filed a petition 

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which the court denied. (Ex. EEE) 

 Dahnad next initiated a timely action in Maricopa Superior Court seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Ex. FFF) In 

his Rule 32 action, Dahnad argued he was denied his right to the effective assistance of 

counsel at trial regarding: (1) an alleged plea offer; (2) his waiver of right to a jury trial; 

(3) trial counsel’s failure to move for mistrial in light of state’s witness’s mention of 

allegations of Dahnad’s prior acts of sexual misconduct; (4) counsel’s failure to move the 

court to consider a lesser-included offense; (5) counsel’s failure to offer mitigating 

evidence at sentencing involving an expert witness report and polygraph test; and (6) 

counsel’s stipulation to admit inadmissible hearsay evidence. (Ex. HHH) Dahnad further 

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asserted that inadmissible evidence was admitted at trial in violation of Rule 404(b) & (c) 

of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, and that he was subjected to judicial bias. (Ex. HHH)

 The state trial court rejected each of Dahnad’s Rule 32 claims. The court ruled that 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were each without merit and that his claims 

regarding judicial bias and inadmissible evidence were precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure for failure to raise them in his direct appeal. (Ex. 

KKK) Furthermore, the court concluded that even had these two precluded claims been 

preserved for Rule 32 review, each would have failed on the merits. (Ex. KKK)

 Dahnad then sought review of this decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

although he omitted discussion of his claim of judicial bias. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals summarily denied review. (Ex. PPP) Dahnad then petitioned for review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court, which petition was summarily denied. (Exs. QQQ, RRR) 

Dahnad filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court on June 10, 2014. 

(Doc. 1) 

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

A. Exhaustion of Remedies & Procedural Default 

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

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bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Under clearly established Federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”), Dahnad needs to show that his trial counsel’s performance was both (a) 

objectively deficient and (b) caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s performance. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011). The Court has discretion to determine 

which Strickland prong to apply first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 

1998). A habeas court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

determine “whether there is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th

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Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, this Court’s 

“pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 

unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

 Dahnad received objectively deficient representation if his counsel “’fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness’ such that it was outside ‘the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To demonstrate prejudice, Dahnad “must 

show that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694. 

C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition – Legal Standard Of Review 

 On habeas review, this Court can only grant relief if the petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim either “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This is a “’highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings’ which demands that state court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)).

III. DAHNAD’S HABEAS CLAIMS 

 Dahnad’s federal petition raises the following claims for relief: 

(1) He was not sufficiently informed about the nature of the proceedings in order 

to meaningfully waive his constitutional right to a jury trial, in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment; 

(2) He received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in violation of the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments; 

(3) He was prohibited from presenting an affirmative defense and character 

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evidence at trial, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; 

(4) Inadmissible evidence was admitted at trial, in violation of the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments; 

(5) The trial judge was biased and partial, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments; 

(6) Dahnad was convicted based on insufficient evidence, in violation of the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments; and 

(7) The cumulative effect of Grounds One through Six violated Dahnad’s right to 

due process. 

(Doc. 1) Respondents contend that some portions of Ground Two and all of Grounds Five 

and Seven are procedurally barred, and that all remaining claims are without merit. (Doc. 

9) 

A. Dahnad’s Unexhausted/Defaulted Claims

i. IAC 

 Dahnad requests this Court to consider two additional IAC claims that he openly 

admits have not been presented to the state courts. (Doc. 1 at 37-38) These claims are: (1) 

“[w]hether trial counsel was ineffective by holding off-the-record discussions on key 

legal arguments and by waiving his client’s presence during sidebars and in-chamber 

conversations[,]” and (2) “[w]hether trial counsel was ineffective when he stipulated to 

the videotape being admitted while also arguing it was hearsay and unreliable.”3

 (Doc. 1 

at 38, 68-71) Dahnad urges admission of these additional claims under Martinez v. Ryan, 

132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). He maintains that inclusion of these claims will assist the Court 

in reviewing his case under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) by 

further demonstrating that some of trial counsel’s key actions were ineffective rather than 

strategic. (Doc. 1 at 38) Dahnad argues these additional claims are substantial and would 

 

3

 Despite this description of the second unexhausted issue found on page 38 of Dahnad’s 

petition, it is apparent from his discussion located within pages 68 through 71 of the petition 

(Doc. 1) that the issue he intends to present is actually “counsel ineffectively litigated the Rule 

404(b) and (c) issues and in fact opened the door to inadmissible prior bad acts previously ruled 

inadmissible.” 

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have altered the outcome of his post-conviction relief litigation. (Id.) 

 As is noted above, the United States Supreme Court set forth the general rule 

applicable to procedural default of state habeas claims in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722 (1991). “In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state 

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas 

review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default 

and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that 

failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Where there is a constitutional right to 

counsel, attorney error that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause, 

because “if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the 

State.” Id. at 753–54 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). The 

Supreme Court in Coleman held that where there is no constitutional right to counsel, 

attorney error that led to the procedural default cannot constitute cause. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 757. 

 The Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan, carved out an exception to the rule in 

Coleman: 

[W]hen a State requires a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim in a collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for 

a default of an ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances. The first 

is where the state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review 

collateral proceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 

The second is where appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, where the claims should have been raised, was ineffective 

under the standards of Strickland v. Washington. 

132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (citations omitted). However, the prisoner must also 

demonstrate that the underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is a 

substantial one, which is to say the claim has some merit. Id. (citation omitted). 

 The Supreme Court in Trevino v. Thaler, defined the Martinez exception to 

Coleman as “allowing a federal habeas court to find ‘cause,’ thereby excusing a 

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defendant’s procedural default, where (1) the claim of ‘ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel’ was a ‘substantial’ claim; (2) the ‘cause’ consisted of there being ‘no counsel’ or 

only ‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state 

collateral review proceeding was the ‘initial’ review proceeding in respect to the 

‘ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim;” and (4) state law requires that an 

“ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an initial-review collateral 

proceeding.” Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (quoting Martinez, 132 S. 

Ct. at 1318–1319, 1320–1321). The Court in Trevino then expanded the fourth element to 

include situations where the “state procedural framework, by reason of its design and 

operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a 

meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct 

appeal.” Id. at 1921. 

 Dahnad argues that, because some of “numerous hearings, sidebars and inchambers discussions” were not recorded, and because on at least two occasions his 

counsel told the court he did not want Dahnad to participate, the record is not adequate to 

support “[t]he PCR court’s determination that counsel’s decisions were strategic”. (Doc. 

1 at 68) Dahnad, however, refers to only one unreported bench conference. (Id.) Further, 

he does not explain how the incomplete record he alleges is deficient, or in what ways he 

was prejudiced by the deficiency. “Mere conclusory allegations in support of a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.” Green v. 

Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998) (habeas petitioner’s claim that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to ensure that bench conferences were all recorded was not 

supported by facts showing prejudice). In their Answer, Respondents describe the 

unreported bench conference Dahnad cited, as well as two additional chambers or bench 

conferences that Dahnad did not attend. (Doc. 9 at 21-22) Upon review of the record, in 

none of these instances does it appear that either Dahnad’s absence from conferences or 

the lack of a record for at a single bench conference support the finding of a substantial 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which could permit a Martinez exception. 

 Dahnad further argues that his counsel was ineffective in litigating Rule 404(b) 

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and (c) issues when he “opened the door” to evidence of prior bad acts. (Doc. 1 at 69–70) 

Dahnad states that this issue “was not raised as an independent claim of ineffectiveness 

previously”. (Doc. 1 at 68) The factual basis is virtually identical to that supporting his 

third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his counsel’s failure to request a 

mistrial. (Doc. 1 at 54) That claim is addressed on the merits, infra. 

 The evidence Dahnad complains of consists of passing references to a statement or 

statements made by the detective investigating the sisters’ allegations against Dahnad, 

Sergeant Keller, to the sisters’ father. (Doc. 9, Ex. QQ at 23-24 (State’s opening 

statement)) The statement(s) concerned prior allegations against Dahnad for 

inappropriate touching of his female dental patients. (Id.) These references were 

described variously as “possibly touching women, one maybe a minor”; “maybe 

something happening with some other people and him; him doing things like this before” 

(Id. at 64 (State’s direct examination of M.S.)); “[Dahnad] has done this before to 

children” (Id. at 37 (Dahnad’s trial counsel’s opening statement, stating what Sergeant 

Keller told the sisters’ father)); and “at some point you were told that [Dahnad] had done 

some other bad things before you.” (Id. at 103 (Dahnad’s trial counsel’s crossexamination of K.S.)). 

 During the State’s direct examination of Sergeant Keller, the sergeant testified that 

he told the sisters’ father about prior allegations of inappropriate touching involving 

Dahnad’s dental patients. (Doc. 9, Ex. SS at 112) Keller stated that he learned about the 

prior allegations by conducting a background check and because another case involving 

Dahnad “came in” while he was working on the case being tried. (Id.) 

 After the state’s direct examination of Sergeant Keller, Dahnad’s trial counsel 

requested a chambers conference. (Doc. 9, Ex. SS, pp. 115 – 118) Counsel’s purpose in 

requesting the conference apparently was to emphasize his belief that the judge would 

disregard any inadmissible prior act testimony, and to clarify that the State’s position was 

in alignment with the understanding that any prior or additional complaints against 

Dahnad mentioned by Sergeant Keller did not involve molesting children. (Doc. 9, Ex. 

SS at 115-17) The State’s counsel agreed. (Id.) 

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 Dahnad claimed in his petition for post-conviction relief that he received 

ineffective assistance when his trial counsel failed to move for mistrial after Sergeant 

Keller was permitted to testify about other cases being investigated against him. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. KKK) The Maricopa County Superior Court (PCR court) concluded instead that 

Dahnad’s counsel had used this evidence strategically to undermine the sisters’ 

testimony. (Id.) There was evidence at trial that after Dahnad had been accused by the 

girls of [improper touching], at least one of the girls maintained that the contact may have 

been an “accident.” (Doc. 9, Ex. SS at 54, 84) After the sisters’ father told the girls about 

Sergeant Keller’s information of other allegations involving Dahnad, K.S. said, “so, it 

wasn’t an accident” and did not mention the possibility of an accident again. (Id. at 87) 

 In Strickland, the U.S. Supreme Court provided guidance to courts assessing 

claims such as Dahnad’s: 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is 

all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 

counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 

particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . [A] court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (citations omitted). “[T]here is a 

strong presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical reasons rather than 

through sheer neglect”. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 191 (2011) (citations 

omitted). 

 As noted, this same issue is discussed infra in greater detail in Dahnad’s exhausted 

“Claim 2(c) IAC regarding failure to move for mistrial”. For reasons explained in greater 

detail in the Court’s discussion below, Dahnad’s claim lacks merit and does not present a 

substantial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which could permit a Martinez

exception to the procedural bar. 

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ii. Claim 5 – Judicial Bias 

 Dahnad asserts that the trial judge was not “fair and unbiased”, in violation of his 

due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 79 – 82) Dahnad further states that this claim was raised in 

his state PCR action, considered on the merits, and found to lack merit. (Id. at 79) In 

denying relief to the Petition, however, the PCR court noted that this issue had not been 

raised in Dahnad’s appeal and found the issue precluded. (Doc. 9, Ex. KKK at 4) The 

minute entry denying relief went on to state that “even if [the issue] had been raised on 

appeal or was preserved for this Rule 32 motion, it is without merit.” (Id.) 

 This issue was also subject to a procedural bar for Dahnad’s failure to raise it in 

his petition for review. (Doc. 9, Ex. LLL) Accordingly, Dahnad’s claim was not 

exhausted. 

 Additionally, the claim is subject to an implied procedural bar because it was not 

fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available to him, as he is now 

precluded or time-barred from raising his claim in a successive and untimely Rule 32 

petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a)&(b), or 32.4(a). 

 Dahnad has not demonstrated either cause for the default and actual prejudice to 

excuse the default, or a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Court cannot review this 

claim. 

iii. Claim 7 - Cumulative Effect of All Claims Raised 

 Dahnad urges this Court to grant his petition on the basis of a cumulative error 

analysis in which the aggregated effect of many trial errors -- individually considered 

harmless -- would together create a due process violation. He does not assert that this 

claim has been exhausted. It has not. Dahnad failed to raise this claim either on direct 

appeal, in his state PCR action, or in his petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 9, Exs. ZZ, HHH, LLL) Moreover, the claim is subject to an implied 

procedural bar because it was not fairly presented in state court and no state remedies 

remain available to him, as he is now precluded or time-barred from raising his claim in a 

successive and untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a)&(b), or 32.4(a). 

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 Dahnad has not demonstrated either cause for the default and actual prejudice to 

excuse this default, or a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Court cannot review this 

claim. 

B. Dahnad’s Exhausted Claims 

i. Claim 1 - Waiver of Right to Jury Trial 

 Dahnad asserts that he was not sufficiently informed about the nature of the 

proceedings to permit a meaningful waiver of his constitutional right to a jury trial. (Doc. 

1 at 29) The parties agree that the Arizona Court of Appeals considered and denied this 

claim on direct appeal (Id., Doc. 9 at 27-28), but Dahnad argues that this denial was 

“contrary to Supreme Court law and/or an unreasonable application of that law . . .”[,] 

(Doc. 1 at 29) because neither the trial court nor his counsel advised him of certain rights 

he would forfeit by waiving his right to a jury trial. (Id. at 32) Among these nondisclosed 

forfeited rights, Dahnad lists: (1) without jury instructions, he would not know the legal 

standards applied to the facts in his case and would not have the “opportunity to 

contribute or comment” on those standards; (2) the absence of jury instructions would 

remove “fertile grounds in an appeal”; (3) without jury instructions, he would not know 

whether the court had considered his affirmative defense; (4) absent instructions, he 

could not know whether the court considered inadmissible evidence or whether it failed 

to consider evidence of intent; and (5) he may not know the legal standards used by the 

court in ruling on mid-trial motions. (Doc. 1 at 32-33) 

 In addressing these arguments, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained: 

[a] defendant’s right to a jury trial is a right that may be waived provided 

that the waiver is voluntary and intelligently made by the defendant. State 

v. Buttrick, 113 Ariz. 563, 565-66, 558 P.2d 908, 910-11 (1976); Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 18.1(b). The pivotal consideration in determining the validity of 

the waiver is the requirement that a defendant understand that the case will 

be determined by a judge and not a jury. State v. Conroy, 168 Ariz. 373, 

376, 814 P.2d 330, 333 (1991). Whether there is an “intelligent, competent, 

self-protecting waiver” of a jury trial by a defendant depends upon the 

unique circumstances of each case. Buttrick, 113 Ariz. at 566, 558 P.2d at 

911. 

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(Doc. 1, Ex. 1, ¶67) 

 The court of appeals noted that Dahnad had presented the trial court with a printed 

and signed waiver indicating that he understood he was waiving the right to have his guilt 

or innocence decided unanimously by a jury, and that he was consenting to have that 

decision made by a judge. (Id. at ¶68; Doc. 9, Ex. EE) The court further noted that 

Dahnad’s trial counsel had signed the waiver form averring that he had explained to 

Dahnad his right to trial by jury and had also consented to such waiver. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1, 

¶68) The court of appeals described the trial court’s “extensive colloquy” that 

established, among other things, that Dahnad had discussed the waiver with his counsel, 

that he “understood that he had the right to a 12-person jury and that that jury could not 

convict him of the charges unless it unanimously found him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt”, and that he was aware of potential sentencing regarding each count. (Id. at ¶69) 

The appellate court stated that when Dahnad was asked by the trial court whether he had 

any questions regarding the waiver of a jury trial, Dahnad responded that he did not. (Id.) 

The court of appeals agreed with the trial court’s finding that Dahnad had waived his 

right to a jury trial voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. (Id.) 

 The U.S. Supreme Court established that a criminal defendant is able to waive the 

right to a jury trial so long as the waiver is taken with the defendant’s “express, 

intelligent consent.” Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942). See also 

State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 321, 323, 541 P.2d 918, 920 (Ariz. 1975) (finding that the 

defendant had made a “free and intelligent waiver” of his right to a jury trial, where he 

signed the waiver form, discussed the matter with counsel, and was questioned by the 

trial judge). 

 Despite Dahnad’s arguments that he could not have made a meaningful, intelligent 

waiver of his right to a jury trial under the circumstances of his case, he has entirely 

failed to support these arguments. Accordingly, Dahnad has not overcome the deferential 

standard to show that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ holding was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. 

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 Dahnad asserts the following six (6) exhausted claims alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel at trial: (a) regarding a plea offer; (b) when he waived his right to a 

jury trial; (c) when trial counsel failed to move for a mistrial after Sergeant Keller stated 

he had received a telephone call from an additional potential victim; (d) when trial 

counsel did not request a lesser included offense; (e) at sentencing, when trial counsel 

failed to offer Dr. Abel’s report and polygraph test results; and (f) when trial counsel 

opened the door for, and stipulated to, admission of inadmissible hearsay evidence from 

the state’s witness Wendy Dutton. Each of these six IAC claims are discussed in turn, 

below. 

ii. Claim 2(a) IAC regarding plea offer 

 Dahnad argues here, as he did in the PCR court, that trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance concerning a plea offer Dahnad asserts was made after the close of 

evidence but prior to closing arguments. (Doc. 1 at 46-47) In support of this claim, 

Dahnad also states that the trial judge recommended a plea offer discussion at that point. 

(Id. at 46) Additionally, Dahnad complains that he “did not understand the full 

ramifications of a guilty verdict”, and asserts that, based on his attorney’s assurances that 

the trial was going well and on the attorney’s friendship with the judge, his impression 

was that the judge would find him not guilty. (Id. at 48-49) 

 In its decision denying post-conviction relief, the PCR court addressed this claim. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. KKK) The court explained that the record did not support an assertion either 

that the trial judge recommended a plea offer discussion at this time, or that such an offer 

was made. (Id. at 2) Considering Dahnad’s claim that the state had offered him a “nocontest plea to a Class 6 open offense with no jail time and no sex offender terms”, the 

court questioned Dahnad’s assertion, and noted that such an offer would have been 

“clearly more lenient than several other plea offers that were made at previous settlement 

conferences.” (Id.) The court also listed evidence in the record of a prior plea that Dahnad 

had rejected on numerous occasions offering lifetime probation, registration as a sex 

offender, and no initial jail time. (Id.) While the court observed that Dahnad had provided 

evidence of the plea offer underlying this claim (the evidence consisting of a statement by 

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the sisters’ father and a letter from Dahnad’s brother-in-law), it concluded the record was 

not sufficient to support his allegation that the plea offer had been made. (Id.) The court 

further reasoned that even had the offer been made, there had not been a showing that 

Dahnad’s counsel had failed to explain to him the consequences of the plea offer. (Id.) 

The court emphasized that such consequences had been explained to him previously on 

many occasions. (Id.) 

 The Court has reviewed the record that was relied on by the superior court and 

concurs with its factual and legal conclusions. (Doc. 9, Ex. III, ex. 2 [R.T. 3/10/05] at 7]; 

Ex.III, ex. 3 [R.T. 7/18/05] at 7; Ex. PP [R.T. 1/20/06] at 6 and 13-14; Ex. QQ [R.T. 

9/26/06] at 7-9; Ex. HHH, ex. L; Ex. JJJ, ex. A; Ex. YY [R.T. 11/26/06] at 48-49.) 

iii. Claim 2(b) IAC regarding waiver of jury trial 

 Dahnad argues that his waiver of a jury trial was the result of IAC when his 

counsel urged Dahnad to agree to a bench trial after the trial judge was newly assigned to 

Dahnad’s case. (Doc. 1 at 50-54) Dahnad claims he exercised his waiver because his 

counsel convinced him to do so for “inappropriate reasons” made off the record, 

including that defense counsel had known the judge for over thirty years and had 

introduced the judge to his wife. (Id. at 53) Dahnad states that his counsel was ineffective 

for also failing to also mention that the judge had been a career prosecutor and had 

received a derogatory letter about Dahnad from the sisters’ mother almost a year before 

the judge was assigned to Dahnad’s case, while the judge was the presiding criminal 

judge. (Id.) Dahnad believes that his counsel should have known of the letter and either 

asked the judge to recuse himself or requested the judge to not consider the letter. (Id.) 

 Dahnad contends that the PCR court did not know about the inferences and 

promises made by defense counsel to him. What the record indicates, however, is that 

Dahnad raised an IAC claim before the PCR court which is essentially the same as the 

claim he raises here. (Doc. 9, Ex. HHH at 13-15) 

 As is argued by the state, there is nothing improper, let alone ineffective, about 

trial counsel urging Dahnad to accept a bench trial with a judge that counsel knew well 

and whose abilities counsel impliedly respected. It is likely that counsel did not consider 

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the judge’s experience as a prosecutor to be a factor weighing against a bench trial, 

particularly in light of how well he knew the judge. As the Supreme Court instructed in 

Strickland, “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance 

after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 

counsel’s defense after it as proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or 

omission of counsel was unreasonable.” 466 U.S. at 689. 

 Regarding the letter sent to the trial judge in his capacity as presiding criminal 

judge almost a year before he was assigned to Dahnad’s case, this Court finds persuasive 

the state’s argument that this act had no bearing on the judge’s qualifications to serve as 

the trial judge, or on his ability to hear the case in place of a jury. As the state suggests, 

bringing up the letter in a motion in limine may very well have had the effect of 

reminding the judge of this letter that in all probability he had forgotten. “In bench trials, 

judges routinely hear inadmissible evidence that they are presumed to ignore when 

making decisions.” Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (emphasizing “the wellestablished presumption that the judge adhere[s] to basic rules of procedure.” Id. at 347). 

See also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 548, 804 P.2d 72, 81 (1990) (“It is presumed that 

a trial judge, aware of the rules of evidence, will not consider inadmissible evidence in 

making his ruling.”) In fact, the trial judge, when discussing Dr. Abel’s report and 

associated polygraph test, stated “[w]e make rulings all the time ... based upon evidence 

that may have not been admitted, may have been referred to during arguments that the 

Court has heard. And the Court is able to distinguish between what’s admitted and what 

isn’t.” (Doc. 9, Ex. UU [R.T. 10/04/2006] at 148). Indeed, while the trial court convicted 

Dahnad of the charges involving K.S., the trial court acquitted on the charge regarding 

M.S. 

 Dahnad has not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s advice about a bench trial 

was either objectively deficient or caused him prejudice. Thus, Dahnad has failed to show 

that the PCR court’s decision on this issue was contrary to clearly established federal law 

or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

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iv. Claim 2(c) IAC regarding failure to move for mistrial 

 Dahnad argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial 

after Sergeant Keller testified that he had told the sisters’ father that he had received 

information about other investigations of accusations against Dahnad. (Doc. 1 at 54-55) 

Dahnad emphasizes that counsel had stated that had his trial been before a jury, the 

testimony would have resulted in a mistrial. (Id. at 55) Moreover, Dahnad asserts that the 

PCR court’s denial of relief was both a misapplication of federal law and an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. (Id. at 56) 

 The testimony underlying this issue occurred on the third day of trial, while the 

prosecutor was examining Sergeant Keller: 

Q: At some point you heard testimony that you told [the sisters’ father] 

about other incidents with the defendant? 

A: That’s correct. 

Q: How did you find out about those? 

A: I did a background check on the defendant. 

Q: Why did you tell [the sisters’ father] about it? 

A: I had another case that came in while I was working on this case and 

that involved the defendant. And I wanted to let [the sisters’ father] know 

that I have cases – more cases coming in, and that those cases basically are 

under investigation. 

Q: Okay. Was it another case involving those other touchings with 

dental patients or something? 

A: Similar type incidents, yes. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. SS at 112-13). 

 Shortly thereafter, when the prosecutor completed her examination of Sergeant 

Keller, Dahnad’s counsel held a bench conference and then requested a chambers 

conference. At the chambers conference, one of Dahnad’s attorneys, Mr. Debus, engaged 

in the following exchange with the trial judge: 

THE COURT: What’s your problem? 

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MR. DEBUS: My problem is this, it puts us in a very difficult position if it 

were not number one, a bench trial. And, number two, that I’ve known the 

judge for 30 years plus. And I’m confident that the court could disregard 

especially when we get to the root of it, as I said at the bench. If this were a 

jury trial, we would be done because you would absolutely grant a mistrial, 

for this . . .. 

 . . . . 

 What he did is that he went back and dug up the cases from 12, 14 

years ago. And there were I think two of them that were hung juries, or 

something. But it’s all from then. Only thing I want you to know and I want 

[prosecutor] to acknowledge is that there weren’t any other children 

complaints that he was working on, that Dahnad had allegedly molested; it 

is not true. 

THE PROSECUTOR: That’s true. ... 

 . . . . 

 I was very clear after they made that comment about other incidents 

and I said and we can have the court reporter read it – are you talking about 

other dental and things like that. And he said yes. And for the record there 

was a new phone call. It wasn’t just an old allegation. A lady adult – an 

adult when she read about Mr. Dahnad in this case in the paper did call. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. SS at 116-17) 

 Despite Dahnad’s continuing argument that his counsel’s failure to move for a 

mistrial was ineffective representation rather than a strategic decision, the record makes it 

plain that the evidence of Sergeant Keller’s disclosure of other investigations of Dahnad 

to the sisters’ father (who then told his daughters about it) was used by Dahnad’s counsel 

strategically to undermine the sisters’ credibility, specifically that their testimony had 

been influenced after hearing about Keller’s disclosure. Defense counsel addressed the 

information Sergeant Keller disclosed to the sisters’ father and that the father passed on 

to the sisters at various points during trial: in defense’s opening statement (Doc. 9, Ex. 

QQ at 37-40); during direct examinations of K.S. (Id. at 103-04), of M.S. (Id. at 159-60), 

of the sisters’ mother (Id., Ex. RR at 94-95), of the sisters’ father (Id., Ex. SS at 82-89, 

92-97), of forensic interviewer Wendy Dutton (Id., Ex. TT at 135-37), and of defense 

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expert Dr. Guyer (Id., Ex. RR at 163-66, 240-41); as a prominent basis for the defense 

motion to suppress the sisters’ testimony at the end of the defense’s case (Id., Ex. VV at 

4-9); and as a significant issue within defense’s closing argument (Id. at 35-38, 44-46). 

 “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 In its order denying relief, the PCR court reasoned: 

Counsel for Defendant objected to this testimony but did not move for a 

mistrial since he expressed confidence that the judge could disregard the 

testimony and also put on the record that none of the investigations 

involved children. Further, defense counsel used this testimony in an effort 

to show that the child victims had been influenced by the father since the 

father had relayed the information from Sergeant Keller to his children in 

an attempt to convince them that the Defendant had intentionally molested 

them. In other words, defense counsel used this testimony to argue that the 

child victims had been coached or persuaded to tailor their testimony. It is 

clearly a trial tactic to attack the victims’ credibility. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. KKK at 3) Dahnad has failed to show, and the record does not support, that 

the PCR court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, or was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

v. Claim 2(d) IAC concerning failure to negotiate for lesser included 

offense 

 Dahnad next argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the 

inclusion of a lesser included offense, such as delinquency of a minor or assault. (Doc. 1 

at 56-57). He cites State v. Sutton, 104 Ariz. 317, 452 P.2d 110 (Ariz. 1969) for support 

that the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a lesser included offense 

of child molestation. (Id.) Dahnad indicates that in Sutton the court found the trial court 

did not err when it refused a defendant’s request to include an instruction for a lesserincluded offense because the defendant presented an “all-or-nothing situation.” (Id.) He 

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contends, in contrast, that his case did not present an all or nothing situation, because 

“[h]is testimony shows that something happened, but he had no sexual motive and did not 

perform a knowing act.” (Id.) 

 The PCR court discussed and denied this claim on the basis that a lesser-included 

offense was not warranted as Dahnad maintained his “absolute innocence”, and presented 

an all or nothing defense. (Doc. 9, Ex. KKK at 3) In fact, the all or nothing defense as 

successful for Dahnad regarding the charge involving M.S., of which Dahnad was 

acquitted. 

 In Sutton, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that to justify instruction on a lesser 

included offense: 

the state of the record must not be such that defendant can only be guilty of 

the crime charged or not guilty at all. For in these cases, if the jury accepts 

defendant’s version of the [crime], they must acquit; if not, and the state’s 

proof is otherwise sufficient, the only alternative is conviction of the 

offense charged. 

104 Ariz. at 319, 452 P.2d at 112 (citation, emphasis, and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Further, the Sutton court found: 

[d]efendant maintained throughout the trial that he had not committed these 

acts with the two little girls. The state presented evidence showing he had 

in fact molested them. This record presents the “either guilty or innocent” 

situation where courts have refused to allow defendants to seek the shelter 

of a possible conviction of a lesser included offense. 

(Id.) 

 A more recent statement of Arizona law in this regard is found in State v. Speers, 

in which the court instructed that: 

evidence is “sufficient to require a lesser-included offense instruction if two 

conditions are met. The jury must be able to find (a) that the State failed to 

prove an element of the greater offense and (b) that the evidence is 

sufficient to support a conviction on the lesser offense”; in other words, 

“the evidence must be such that a rational juror could conclude that the 

defendant committed only the lesser offense.” 

238 Ariz. 423, 429, 361 P.3d 952, 958 (Ariz.App. 2015) (quoting State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 

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1, 4, 126 P.3d 151 (Ariz. 2006)) (citation omitted). In Speers, although the defendant 

denied molesting girls in the second-grade class he taught, “he did not contest the state’s 

evidence that he had admitted engaging in what he characterized as ‘inappropriate’ 

conduct with them, including kissing, hugging, and ‘patting some of the students on the 

bottom.’” Id., 238 Ariz. at 429-30, 361 P.3d at 958-59. There was evidence of three 

separate victim’s testimony that the defendant had reached into their pocket and touched 

their vagina, while each was sitting on his lap. Id., 238 Ariz. at 430, 361 P.3d at 959. 

 Here, the trial court was faced with the testimony of K.S. that Dahnad placed his 

hand under her panties and touched both her vagina and her anus, and forced her to hold 

his penis, but also with Dahnad’s consistent testimony that he had done nothing 

inappropriate. Unlike the defendant in Speers, Dahnad did not characterize his conduct in 

their bedroom as inappropriate. Accordingly, neither version of events supported a lesser 

included offense. Petitioner’s claim fails under both the Strickland standard and his 

burden established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 vi. Claim 2(e) IAC for failure to offer mitigating evidence 

 Dahnad asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing hearing by 

not requesting admission, for mitigating purposes, of Dr. Abel’s report and results for the 

polygraph test he performed on Dahnad. (Doc. 1 at 58-62) Although Dahnad concedes 

that the trial court ruled Dr. Abel’s report and the polygraph test inadmissible at trial, he 

states that materials inadmissible at trial may be used in mitigation. (Id. at 60) Dahnad 

received the presumptive sentence for his convictions. (Id. at 61-62) He complains, 

however, that the trial judge only briefly stated that he had considered the aggravating 

and mitigating circumstances “alluded to” by the prosecutor and defense counsel, and 

that there is no way to know whether the judge considered either Dr. Abel’s report or the 

polygraph test as mitigating factors. (Id. at 61) 

 At sentencing, the prosecutor provided two aggravating factors, emotional impact 

on the victim and violation of a position of trust, and recognized one mitigating factor, 

that Dahnad had no prior felony convictions. (Doc. 9, Ex. YYY at 38) Defense counsel 

listed as mitigating factors the disruption to the Dahnad family as a result of the 

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prosecution, Dahnad’s compassionate character as testified to by his wife and father-inlaw, the fact that Dahnad was not determined to be a pedophile, the fact that Dahnad’s 

family needed him greatly, and the large disparity between the minimum sentence 

required by his conviction and the terms of plea offers Dahnad had rejected. (Id. at 45-49) 

 In finding this claim without merit, the PCR court noted that Dr. Abel’s report 

contained both favorable and unfavorable conclusions and that the report specifically 

mentioned that Dahnad was rated a medium risk for having molested a child and 

attempting to conceal it, and Dr. Abel’s concern over other accusations against Dahnad of 

inappropriate touching with his dental patients. (Doc. 9, Ex. KKK at 3) The PCR court 

further stated that the report had been available to the judge, as it was attached to a 

motion to modify Dahnad’s release conditions. (Id.) Additionally, regarding the 

polygraph test, the PCR court instructed that under Arizona law polygraph tests are not 

reliable as evidence either at trial or at sentencing hearings. (Id.) 

 The PCR court’s ruling on this issue does not support Dahnad’s petition. As the 

PCR court noted, unless it is stipulated to by both parties, polygraph tests are not 

admissible at trial or sentencing hearings. State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 514, 658 P.2d 

162, 167 (Ariz. 1982). “Arizona courts, along with the vast majority of jurisdictions, 

consider polygraph examinations unreliable. ... [A]ll references to polygraph tests, absent 

stipulation, are inadmissible for any purpose in Arizona.” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 

14 P.3d 997 (Ariz. 2000). 

 The PCR court’s assessment that the report contained both favorable and 

unfavorable information about Dahnad suggests that it accorded this evidence 

questionable mitigation value. Moreover, as the State argues here, the report’s value goes 

more to the issue of culpability than to blameworthiness. Finally, as the PCR court 

observed, the test and the report were available to the judge prior to sentencing. (Id.) The 

trial judge said he would examine the test and report, although he warned defense counsel 

that he did not anticipate that his ruling denying admissibility would change. (Doc. 9, Ex. 

UU [R.T. 10/04/06] at 7-16, 148; Ex. VV [R.T. 10/10/06] at 3-4) While testifying at 

sentencing, Dahnad and his wife separately discussed both the polygraph test and Dr. 

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Abel’s examination. (Id., Ex. YY [R.T.11/28/06] at 24, 41) 

 Applying the Strickland test, and evaluating Dahnad’s representation of the 

question of IAC regarding mitigation evidence, the Court cannot say that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Further, this issue does not support granting 

Dahnad’s petition pursuant to 28 § 2254(d). 

vii. Claim 2(f) IAC when counsel opened the door for, and stipulated to, 

admission of Wendy Dutton’s hearsay evidence 

 

 Dahnad contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the 

admission of the taped forensic interviews of both sisters by Wendy Dutton. (Doc. 1 at 

62-66) Dahnad argues that Ms. Dutton’s taped interview was “the most damning piece of 

evidence” against him, because aside from the two sisters’ testimony at trial, the 

interview was the “only direct evidence . . . that [he] touched them anywhere or that they 

were forced to touch him.” (Id. at 62-63) Dahnad urges this Court to find his counsel 

impermissibly ineffective for failing to object to the admission of Ms. Dutton’s interview. 

(Id. at 62-66) 

 Considering the same claim, the PCR court concluded that defense counsel’s 

actions respecting the interview was a clear trial tactic. (Doc. 9, Ex. KKK at 4) 

 The record supports the conclusion that Dahnad’s counsel’s decision to stipulate 

to the admission of the Dutton interview was a key element of Dahnad’s defense, 

intended to further undercut the credibility of the sisters’ trial testimony by showing that 

Ms. Dutton’s interviews unduly influenced the sisters’ perception of what had occurred 

when Dahnad entered their bedroom. Defense counsel referenced the interviews 

extensively during the testimony of Dr. Guyer, a defense expert witness who criticized 

Dutton’s interviewing technique and the reliability of the interviews. (Doc. 9, Ex. RR 

[R.T. 9/27/06] at 126-241) Similarly, Dahnad’s counsel utilized the videotape and 

transcript of the interview to effectively cross examine Ms. Dutton. (Id., Ex. TT [R.T. 

10/03/06] at 79-139) Defense counsel also used the interview to cross examine both 

sisters and their mother, specifically to question them on inconsistencies between their 

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testimony at trial and what was said in the Dutton interviews. (Id., Exs. QQ [R.T. 

9/26/06] and RR [R.T. 9/27/06]) As noted, defense counsel played portions of the 

videotaped interview during witness testimony in court, and in closing argument also 

referred the judge to portions of the transcript and the tape, encouraging the trial judge to 

view the tape. (Id., Ex. VV [R.T. 10/10/06] at 18-28, 32-34, 48) 

 Given the importance of the sisters’ testimony to the case against Dahnad, defense 

counsel’s strategic decision to admit the Dutton interview for the purpose of undermining 

that testimony finds support in the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 689 (1984) (citations omitted). Moreover, Dahnad has failed to “overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered 

sound trial strategy.’” Id. Here, it is particularly inappropriate to second guess the trial 

strategy that resulted in acquittal of the charge regarding M.S.

viii. Claim 3. Affirmative defense and character evidence 

 Dahnad argues that the trial court erred and violated his due process right to 

present an affirmative defense by precluding: (1) his wife's opinion that he behaved 

appropriately with children and had normal, heterosexual interests; and (2) the opinion of 

his expert, Gene G. Abel, M.D., that Dahnad lacked the character traits common to 

pedophiles. (Doc. 1 at 71-74) 

 In denying relief on Dahnad’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals found 

that the trial court’s preclusion of the proposed testimony of Dahnad’s wife had been 

error, but concluded the error was harmless. (Doc. 9, Ex. CCC at ¶¶ 41-44) The proposed 

testimony the trial court precluded was expected to be that Dahnad “had normal sexual 

desires” and that he “behaved normally around children”. (Id. at ¶ 41; Ex. AA at 2) 

Dahnad’s wife actually testified for the defense at trial. (Id. at ¶ 44) The court of appeals 

explained, 

As part of [Dahnad’s wife’s] testimony, she testified that she and defendant 

had been married for fifteen years and that they had three children, one of 

whom had been born after the offenses in this case occurred. She testified 

that [K.S.] and [M.S.] had spent the night at their home three or four times 

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and that they baby-sat with them “a number of times” when their parents 

had gone on business trips. The following exchange also occurred during 

questioning by defense counsel: 

 

Q. What about your husband’s relationship with the [sisters], 

what was it like? 

A. Just normal, like he acted with any other kids ...

(Emphasis added.) We find that this testimony amounted in essence 

to that which defendant’s motion in limine sought to introduce. That 

is, it informed the trier of fact, the trial judge in this case, that 

defendant had a continuing “normal, heterosexual” relationship with 

his wife and, in her opinion and experience, he behaved “normally” 

and properly around children. Reversal is not warranted on this 

basis. 

 (Id.) 

 Respecting the second affirmative defense, Dahnad’s trial counsel urged the trial 

court that his expert, Dr. Abel, should be permitted “to testify about the general 

characteristics that tests have established offenders to possess and also about whether 

[Abel’s] testing of [Dahnad] revealed that [Dahnad] also possessed those characteristics.” 

(Id. at ¶ 48) The trial judge ultimately denied Dahnad’s motion in limine regarding Dr. 

Abel’s proposed expert testimony. (Id. at ¶ 49) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge’s preclusion of Dr. Abel’s 

testimony on two grounds: (1) that if such preclusion were error, that error was harmless 

because it did not contribute to or affect the verdict (citing State v. Anthony, 218 Ariz. 

439, 446, 189 P.3d 366, 373 (Ariz. 2008)); and (2) that the testimony proffered would 

have “transcended the permissible limits of expert testimony[,]” because that testimony 

was directed to the specific facts of this case. (Id. at ¶ 54, citing State v. Lopez, 170 Ariz. 

112, 118, 822 P.2d 465, 471 (Ariz.App. 1991)) 

In support of its decision finding harmless error regarding Dr. Abel’s proposed 

testimony, the court of appeals noted that his testimony would have included the results 

of Dr. Abel’s testing of Dahnad which placed Dahnad in a “medium risk category for 

having molested a child and attempting to conceal it.” (Id. at 52) Moreover, Dr. Abel’s 

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testimony would have included his statements that he “found it ‘disturbing’ that 

defendant, a dentist, ‘had accusations of inappropriate touching of adult patients, or at 

least patients 17 years of age or older[,]’” that Abel could not determine if Dahnad “ ̔had 

inappropriately touched [K.S. and M.S.],’ and that that decision awaited the trier of fact.” 

(Id.) The court concluded that Dr. Abel’s placement in a medium risk category for child 

molestation and concealment, in particular, “would, at best, have contributed little to 

defendant’s case and might, in fact, have hurt it. The trial court’s verdicts are ‘surely 

unattributable’ to the preclusion of Dr. Abel’s testimony.” (Id. at ¶ 53) 

 Regarding preclusion of expert testimony specific to the facts of the case, the court 

of appeals explained: 

In State v. Lopez, we allowed testimony “directed to ‘general characteristics 

of sex offenders and victims,’ not to the facts of the case.” 170 Ariz. 112, 

118, 822 P.2d 465, 471 (App. 1991) (quoting Tucker, 165 Ariz. at 346, 798 

P.2d at 1355 (App. 1990)). See also Tucker, id. (error to allow expert to 

relate specific facts of the case to the general characteristics of molesters); 

State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (1983) (defense 

expert testimony must be general and not specific in nature). Because the 

expert testimony here was impermissibly directed to the specific facts in 

this case, it was properly excluded. 

(Id. at ¶ 54) 

 A habeas court must defer to the state court’s holding of harmless error “unless it 

was ‘in conflict with the reasoning or the holdings of [Supreme Court] precedent’ or if it 

‘applied harmless-error review in an ‘objectively unreasonable’ manner.’” Inthavong v. 

Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 

12, 17-18 (2003)). If a habeas court finds the state court’s harmless error analysis does 

not meet this standard, set forth in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), then no deference is 

owed the court’s holding, and the “independent harmless error” analysis described in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) applies. Inthavong, 420 F.3d at 1059. 

The Brecht standard is that errors are harmless if they do not have a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 

(quotation omitted). 

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Weighing the evidence introduced at trial supporting a finding of Dahnad’s guilt 

against the character evidence and expert testimony precluded at trial, the preclusion 

cannot be said to have had a substantial injurious effect or influence on the trial court’s 

verdict, which convicted Dahnad of the charges regarding K.S. and acquitted him of the 

charge regarding M.S. 

ix. Claim 4. Inadmissible tainted victim testimony 

 Dahnad argues that Due Process and Confrontation Clause considerations require 

that the girls’ testimony should have been precluded because their testimony had been 

tainted and was unreliable. (Doc. 1 at 74–78) Among Dahnad’s complaints is that the 

girls’ testimony was improperly influenced after their father told them that Sergeant 

Keller had said that there had been prior accusations against Dahnad, and that Ms. Dutton 

improperly questioned the girls and demonstrated bias. (Id. at 76 – 78) 

 Addressing this claim on direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals thoroughly 

assessed both the facts on which Dahnad relied and his Confrontation Clause and due 

process arguments. (Doc. 9, Ex. CCC, at ¶¶ 55–65) 

 Having reviewed all relevant trial transcripts and the case law cited by the parties, 

the Court concludes that Dahnad has failed to demonstrate that state court review 

either: (1) was contrary to or involved the unreasonable application of relevant federal 

law; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 x. Claim 6. Insufficient evidence 

 Dahnad argues that the trial court’s guilty verdict against him was not supported 

by sufficient evidence proving his guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. 1 at 82 – 83) 

Specifically, Dahnad urges there was insufficient evidence either that [K.S.] touched his 

penis or that his actions were motivated by sexual intent. (Id.) These arguments 

supported, all or in part, Dahnad’s following unsuccessful motions: for judgment of 

acquittal at the close of the state’s case (Doc. 9, Ex. UU at 4-5); for the same relief at the 

close of his defense (Doc. 9, Ex. VV at 9 – 11); and for a new trial (Doc. 9, Ex. II). 

 On direct appeal, Dahnad argued these grounds for insufficiency of the evidence 

as separate claims for relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. ZZ at 23-30, Ex. CCC at 23-33) In denying 

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relief, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that, together with evidence introduced at 

trial regarding Dahnad lying in bed with K.S. and touching her genitals, other evidence 

“is sufficient to support the inference that defendant made [K.S.] hold his penis . . .”. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. CCC at ¶¶ 31-33) 

 The court of appeals first noted that “proof of sexual intent is not an element of the 

crime of child molestation as defined by A.R.S. §13-1410.” (Id. at ¶ 35) In so noting, the 

court relied on State v. Simpson, 217 Ariz. 326, 329, 173 P.2d 1027, 1030 (App. 2007). 

The court went on to find that, “[i]n any case, ... there was sufficient circumstantial 

evidence of defendant’s ‘sexual intent.’” This evidence included that Dahnad entered the 

girls’ bedroom early in the morning shortly after being left alone in the house with them, 

did not turn on the lights, got into K.S.’s bed under the covers and placed his hand on her 

genitals and rubbed up and down, under her panties. (Doc. 9, Ex. CCC at ¶ 38) 

 Habeas review of insufficient evidence claims “face a high bar ... because they are 

subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 

(2012). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The first layer of deference is 

accorded by the appeals court to the finder of fact at trial, such that “‘a reviewing court 

may set aside the ... verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier 

of fact could have agreed with the [verdict].’” Id. (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 

4 (2011)). The second layer of deference applies on habeas review, and requires the 

federal habeas court to find the state court decision was “objectively unreasonable” 

before it can grant habeas relief. Id. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 

(2010)). 

 The record in the trial court proceedings as well as in the state court of appeals’ 

direct review amply support the conclusion that a rational trier could have agreed with the 

verdict, based on the evidence admitted at trial. Similarly, these records do not lead this 

Court to find that the state court’s review of the verdict was objectively unreasonable. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Shidan Dahnad’s Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be

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denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists 

of reason would not find the ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the 

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 28th day of July, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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