Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02682/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02682-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOANG MINH TRAN,

CDCR #AA-5994,

Civil No. 10cv2682 BTM (BLM)

Plaintiff,

ORDER: 

1) GRANTING DEFENDANT

GILL’S MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED

COMPLAINT PURSUANT 

TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) 

(ECF Dkt. No. 19)

AND

2) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS

FOR FAILURE TO AMEND

AND/OR PROSECUTE

 vs.

WILLIAM D. GORE, Sheriff; 

E. SCHROEDER, San Diego Sheriff Officer;

BRANDT O. PILE, San Diego Sheriff Officer

(erroneously sued as “PILE DOE”); WILSON

DOE; San Diego Sheriff Officer; BROWN

DOE, San Diego Sheriff Officer; JOHN DOES,

GBDF Doctors; JANE DOES, GBDF Doctors;

JOHN DOES, 5A Rover Sheriff Officer; JANE

DOE, GBDF Nurse; JOHN GILL, M.D., San

Diego County Medical Service Division;

LIZZIE WOMACK, R.N.; SARANDI

MARINA, San Diego County Medical Services

Division; JOHN DOES 1-3, San Diego Sheriff

Officers,

Defendants.

In this civil rights case, Hoang Minh Tran (“Plaintiff”), formerly incarcerated at George

F. Bailey Detention Facility (“GFBDF”) in San Diego, is proceeding in pro se and in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

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I. Procedural Background

In his Amended Complaint (ECF Dkt. No. 7), Plaintiff alleges violations of his First,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising in August 2009 while he was a pretrial

detainee at GFBDF. 

Plaintiff names only the following Defendants: Brandt O. Pile (erroneously sued as “Pile

Doe”), Wilson Doe, Brown Doe, John Gill, Jane Doe, M.D., Lizzie Womack, and Sarandi

Marina. See Amend. Compl. (ECF Dkt No. 7) at 1, 4. All other persons listed in the caption of

this case were either dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b), see

May 23, 2012 Order (ECF Dkt. No. 4), or were named as Defendants in Plaintiff’s original

Complaint (ECF Dkt. No. 1), but not-renamed as parties in his Amended Complaint (ECF Dkt.

No. 7). “[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citation omitted). 

Defendants Pile, Marina and Womack have filed Answers to Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (ECF Dkt. Nos. 21, 22). However, the U.S. Marshal was unable to execute service

upon Defendants “Brown Doe” and “Wilson Doe” because officials at GFBDF, where Plaintiff

indicated they could be found, were “unable to identify” either official “due to multiple staff

members with the same last name.” (ECF Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) The docket does not show service

(either attempted, unexecuted, or executed) upon “Jane Doe, M.D.” Thus, while Plaintiff’s IFP

status entitled him to U.S. Marshal service, his failure to either adequately identify Brown Doe,

Wilson Doe, or Jane Doe, M.D., or otherwise provide the U.S. Marshal with more complete

information as to their identities and where theymight be served, requires dismissal of any claim

as to these purported parties pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d

1415, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1994) (where a pro se plaintiff fails to provide the Marshal with accurate

and sufficient information to effect service ofthe summons and complaint, the court’s sua sponte

dismissal of the unserved defendants is appropriate).

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Currently before the Court is Defendant Gill’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiff has filed a

Response in Opposition (ECF Dkt. No. 24), to which Defendant Gill has filed a Reply (ECF Dkt.

No. 20). 

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff divides the claims in his Amended Complaint into three “counts,” each asserting

factual allegations against different defendants, and each invoking various bases of constitutional

injury. See Amend. Compl. at 2-3 (“Count 1”); 4-5 (“Count 2); and 6-8 (“Count 3”).

In “Count 1”, Plaintiff claims that on August 1, 2009, while he was a pretrial detainee at

GFBDF, Deputies Brown and Wilson “deliberately deprived [him] of his hygiene items” which

were necessary for his “well-being” and “sanitary clean[liness].” (Amend. Compl. at 2.) 

Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges to have complained to Defendant Pile, a Sergeant in the

Administrative Segregation Module where he was housed, that Brown and Wilson had deprived

him of the “welfare package” they had given every other inmate in order to retaliate against him

for his “alleged role [i]n a high-profile escape by a similar[ly] named inmate” who had been

“wrongfully released on 10/29/2008 under Plaintiff’s wife’s bail bond money.” (Id.; see also 

Pl.’s Decl. [ECF Dkt. No. 7-2, 7-3].) Plaintiff claims that “[a]lthough Pile agreed to give [him]

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a hygiene package,” he never received one. (Amend. Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that both 2

On October 8 or 9, 2008, Plaintiff, Hoang Minh Tran was arrested, booked into the San Diego

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County Jail and charged with possession of stolen property. (Pl.’s Decl. [ECF No. 7-2] ¶ 4.) Plaintiff’s

co-defendant, Tuan Tran, who shared Plaintiff’s nationality and sur-name, and who resembled him

physically, was arrested on the same day. See People v. Tran, 2011 WL 2164555 (Cal. Ct. App. June

2, 2011) (No. D055728) (unpub.), review denied, (Aug. 17, 2011) at *1; see also Bias, 508 F.3d at 1225

(noting that a court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”). In his Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff claims GFBDF officials mistreated him based on his “alleged” role in his codefendant’s escape. However, a jury found Plaintiff guilty of aiding Tuan Tran’s escape by swapping

his standard-issue identification wristband with him. Plaintiff was sentenced to an eight-month prison

term for aiding a prisoner’s escape in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 4534, and his conviction was

subsequently upheld on appeal. Tran, 2011 WL 2164555 at *1-2.

In a San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Inmate Grievance/Appeal of Discipline form 2

dated August 1, 2009, attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as Exhibit A, Plaintiff requested a

“jailhouse welfare package” and complained his verbal requests to Deputies Wilson and Brown were

all “futile.” (Pl.’s Ex. A [ECF No. 7-1] at 2.) Plaintiff demanded “fair and equal treatment” and an

“internal investigation.” (Id.) The bottom of the form, reserved for “official use” is signed illegibly by

a “receiving staff member” and designated as ARJIS #5412 with the following response: “Ordered stores

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his placement and the conditions in “solitary confinement” for “19 long days” imposed an

“extraordinary hardship” upon him because he was unable to brush his teeth or wash, his

administrative grievances went unanswered, and he was subjected to a “living hell on top of [his]

frail health.” (Id. at 2, 7.) 3

In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges that from June 1, 2009 to August 6, 2009, Defendants “John

Gill, M.D., Jane Doe M.D., Lizzie Womack and Sarandi Marina (R. Nurses)” “denied ... his

external hemorrhoid medication (Docusate Sodium 100 mg).” (Amend. Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff

alleges to have made “verbal complain[ts]” to the Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU)

“Rover Deputies John Doe(s) 1-3” and “nurses” whose job it was to deliver daily medication to

inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims to have filed “written grievances on the matter to GFBDF

supervisor[s] from the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department.” In support, Plaintiff points to

his Exhibit B, which appears to be a copy of an San Diego County Sheriff’s Department “Inmate

Grievance/Appeal of Discipline” form dated August 6, 2009. (Pl.’s Ex. B [ECF Dkt. No. 7-1]

at 5.) In this grievance, Plaintiff claims to have filed medical sick call requests “in the past more

than fifty five days” asking to be “seen by a county health care physician.” Plaintiff complains

of both “chronic hemorrhoid exterior pain” and a “weak heart.” (Id.) This form is marked

“received byRN #6557” on August 7, 2009. (Id.) However, Plaintiff contends GFBDF officials

“purposefully failed to act” in response to his grievances “for more than sixty-five (65) painful

days.” (Amend. Compl. at 4.) 

During that time, Plaintiff again alleges “all of the named defendants,” including several

unidentified and unserved Does, denied himmedication for his painful hemorrhoids, in violation

of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and “in retaliation” for the “deep public

on 7/30/09. Transaction of $19.54 for purchase of commissary on 7/31/09. Transaction #402057190.”

On August 1, 2009, Plaintiff claims to have been suffering from an “assault” and “post- 3

operative hernia injury” which had occurred on “3/2/09.” (Amend. Compl. at 3; see also Pl.’s Decl.

[ECF No. 7-2].) These allegations are part of separate civil action Plaintiff is litigating against a

different set of defendants and which is currently pending before Judge Sabraw in Tran v. Gore, et al.,

S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 10cv0464 GPC (DHB). In fact, the Declaration Plaintiff attaches to his

Amended Complaint in this case is identical, except for the first page, to a Declaration he submitted in

support of his First Amended Complaint in Tran v. Gore, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 10cv0464 GPC

(DHB) (ECF No. 34-1). 

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embarrassment” caused by his “alleged” role in another inmate’s “high-profile escape.” (Id. at

4-5.)

In “Count 3” Plaintiff alleges that on August 6, 2009, Deputies Brown and Wilson

“unlawfully confiscated [his] personal property,” including a HolyBible, and denied his “rights

to his Catholic religious practice,” which caused him to suffer anxiety attacks and “severe

emotional distress.” (Amend. Compl. at 6.)

Plaintiff concludes that “all named defendants” named in Counts 1-3 deprived him of

property, medical care, and “wrongfully confine[d]” in Ad-Seg without a hearing, and that

“retaliation ... lie[s] at the heart of these unconstitutional acts.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffseeks general

and punitive damages as well as an injunction preventing “future reprisal” and no “contact

whatsoever upon [his] release.” (Id. at 10.)

III. Defendant Gill’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

Defendant Gill seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on grounds that: (1) it fails to allege facts sufficient to show that he

conspired and/or retaliated against Plaintiff; (2) it fails to allege facts sufficient to show he 

denied Plaintiff medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) his medical care 4

claims are unexhausted. (Def.’s P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [ECF Dkt. No. 19-1] at 2-7.)

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence ofsufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside

Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s complaint must

provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Id.

Allegations of failure to provide medical care to pre-trial detainees arise under the Due Process 4

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny

is appropriate onlyafter the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionallyassociated

with criminal prosecutions. . . . [and] the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the

Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance

with due process of law.”); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because

[plaintiff] had not been convicted of a crime, but only arrested, his rights derive from the due process

clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.”). 

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(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the

defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted, however, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

The court need not accept as true allegations that are conclusory, legal conclusions,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”);

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (on motion to dismiss court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does

not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555).

Claims asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 519-20;

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and

Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, [courts] continue to construe pro se

filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that

courts “have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to

construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.”)).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may

not generally consider materials outside the pleadings, except for exhibits which are attached. 

See FED.R.CIV.P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part

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of the pleading for all purposes.”); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194,

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th

Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir.

1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal ... is the complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at

1197 n.1. The court may also review “materials of which the court may take judicial notice.” 

Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), including public records and “proceedings

in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have

a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. Nov.

2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

B. Conspiracy and/or Retaliation Claims

Defendant Gill first seeks dismissal on grounds that, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims

against him are “predicated on conclusory allegations of a conspiracy to violate [his] Eighth

Amendment rights,” they are insufficient to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be

granted. (Def.’s P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [ECF Dkt. No. 19-1] at 3-4.) The Court

agrees.

To state a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing two or more

persons intended to accomplish an unlawful objective of causing him harm and took some

concerted action in furtherance of that goal. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839,

856–57 (9th Cir. 1999). In other words, Plaintiff “must show ‘an agreement or “meeting of the

minds” to violate constitutional rights.’” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citing Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002)); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853

(9th Cir. 1998) (to state claim for conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts showing

an agreement among the alleged conspirators to deprive himof his rights); Delew v. Wagner, 143

F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (to state claim for conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must allege

at least facts from which such an agreement to deprive him of rights may be inferred). 

Conclusory allegations of wide-spread conspiracy, however, are insufficient to state a valid

§ 1983 claim. Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see also

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations

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of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss.””); Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092 (holding conclusory allegations of conspiracy insufficient

to support a claim under section 1983). 

With respect to Defendant Gill specifically, Plaintiff alleges only that he acted with

“deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s medical needs by denying him external hemorrhoid

medication for a period lasting 65 days. (Amend. Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges to have

“plead[ed] to the (GFBDF) jail officials,” including “5A Rover Deputies John Does 1-3” and

“nurses who[] deliver[ed] daily medications to inmates,” and to have filed administrative

complaints with “jail officials” regarding his “vulnerability” and “frail health condition,” and

to have suffered from painful bowel movements and a bleeding rectum, (id. at 5), yet his

Amended Complaint contains no further factualsupport to suggest orshow that Defendant Gill’s

action or failure to act with regard to his medical care was the result ofsome agreement with any

other person intended to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Hart, 450 F.3d at 1069;

Margolis, 140 F.3d at 853. Instead, it merely contains “conclusory allegations” of wrongdoing

which are insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.”

Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268; Aldabe, 616 F.3d at 1092; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (noting a complaint

does not satisfy either FED.R.CIV.P. 8 or FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) if it only “tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

To state a claim based on retaliation, Plaintiff must plead: (1) a particular state actor took

some adverse action against him; (2) the adverse action was taken because he engaged in

conduct protected by the First Amendment; (3) the adverse action actually chilled the exercise

of his First Amendment rights; and (4) the adverse action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate penological purpose or goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir.

2005). 

Just as his Amended Complaint contains only vague and conclusory allegations of a

widespread conspiracy involving “all defendants,” including Gill, to deprive him of personal

property and deny him medical care, it also fails to include any factual support for a claim based

on retaliation. While Plaintiff alleges all Defendants “took adverse action,” e.g., denied him a

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“welfare package,” hemorrhoidmedication, and a Bible, and “wrongfullyconfin[ed]” himin AdSeg. (Amend. Comal. at 2-8), he does not allege these acts were taken against him because he

exercised any constitutional right, or that his First Amendment rights were in any way “chilled”

as a result. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)

(retaliation claim requires allegation that constitutionally protected conduct was a “substantial”

or “motivating” factor in the defendant’s decision to act); Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127

(9th Cir. 2001) (“[Without alleging a chilling effect, a retaliation claim without allegation of

other harm is not actionable.”) (citation omitted).

Instead,Plaintiff alleges onlythat “the named defendants act[ed] maliciouslyin retaliation

for his ‘alleged’ high-profile escape.” (Amend. Compl. at 5.) Thus, even if the Court were to

presume GFBDF officials segregated Plaintiff because they suspected he was involved in

another inmate’s escape and limited his privileges as a result, these allegations actually defeat,

and do not support, his claim of retaliation. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th

Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (plaintiff must allege retaliatory action “does not advance legitimate

penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.”);Procunier v. Martinez,

416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974) (recognizing “the preservation of internal order and discipline, [and]

the maintenance of institutional security against escape” as legitimate penological interests). 

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to alleges facts

sufficient to state either a conspiracyor retaliation claim, and GRANTS Defendant Gill’s Motion

to Dismiss those claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

C. Inadequate Medical Treatment Claims

Next, Defendant Gill argues Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim

against him related to his medical care. (Def.’s P&As in Supp. of Mot. [ECF Dkt. No. 19-1] at

5-6.) 

Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, applies to pretrial detainees, Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979), courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the same standards in

both cases. See Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(applying deliberate indifference standard to medical care claims raised by estate of suicidal

pretrial detainee); see also Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir 2003)

(applying deliberate indifference standard to diabetic pretrial detainee’s claims of inadequate

medical treatment). 

A prison or jail official cannot be liable for deliberate indifference unless he or she

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In

other words, the pretrial detainee must allege the official was “(a) subjectively aware of the

serious medical need and (b) failed adequately to respond.” Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d

1081, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). Thus, “[d]eliberate indifference

is a high legal standard,” and claims of medical malpractice or negligence are insufficient to

establish a constitutional deprivation. Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004)).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges only that “[f]rom June 1, 2009 to August 6,

2009,” he “was denied ... external hemorrhoids medication (Docusate Sodium 100 mg) by

defendants John Gill, M.D., Jane Doe, M.D., Lizzie Womack, and Sarandi Marina (R. Nurses).” 

(Amend. Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff further claims to have complained to and to have filed “written

grievances on the matter” with “ASU 5S Rover Deputies John Does 1-3” and unidentified nurses

who “deliver[ed] daily medications.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims to have “plead[ed] to the

(GFBDF) jail officials (supervisory) for immediate intervention,” but to no avail. (Id.) Nowhere

in his Amended Complaint, however, does Plaintiff identify Dr. Gill as one of the persons to

whom he complained. 

5

In his Opposition, Plaintiff points to another of his cases, Tran v. County of San Diego, S.D. 5

Cal. Civil Case No. 10cv0464 GPC (POR), in which he claims Defendant Gill “was in charge of the San

Diego County Medical Division” at GFBDF “at the time of this instant offense” and that he was also

responsible for treating Plaintiff’s “seizure disorder,” and that his “fail[ure] to prescribe Dilantin” from

October 12, 2008 to January 4, 2009 resulted in Plaintiff suffering a “grand mal seizure” and

hospitalization at UCSD Medical Center. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2-3.) These allegations are not before this

Court, however, nor does the fact that Plaintiff is suing Dr. Gill in another case based on a separate

allegation of inadequate medical treatment provide factual support of his deliberate indifference claims

in this case. And while Plaintiff also claims in his Opposition that he submitted “multiple medical

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Defendant Gill does not argue that Plaintiff’s medical needs were not sufficiently

“serious” to warrant constitutional protection. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)

(noting that a “serious” medical need exists [under the Eighth Amendment] if the failure to treat

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.”). Defendant Gill does assert, however, that Plaintiff’s medical care claims

of “deliberate indifference,” much like his conspiracy and retaliation claims, are merely

“conclusory allegations with no factual support” and are insufficient to show that he had the

“sufficiently culpable” state of mind required to suggest any “deliberate indifference” on his

part. (Def.’s P&A’s in Supp. of Mot. at 6.) Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff “never

clarifies or established any interaction between himself and Dr. Gill,” and that his pleading

contains no “identification of specific actions taken by Dr. Gill.” Instead, Plaintiff merely

includes Gill in a “list” of defendants who are alleged to have denied Plaintiff “an over-thecounter oral stool softener.” (Id.)

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint indeed fails to allege facts

sufficient to show that Dr. Gill was personally responsible for the denial of his hemorrhoid

medication, that he was aware of Plaintiff’s serious medical need, and that even if he knew of

Plaintiff’s plight, that he subjectively failed to adequately respond under the circumstances. 

Conn, 591 F.3d at 1096. “Deliberate indifference” exists only when a prison official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the officials must both be aware of

the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057; see

also Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[Difference of medical opinion” 

/ / /

grievance[s] to defendant Dr. John Gill” related to his hemorrhoid medication (Pl.’s Opp’n [ECF Dkt.

No. 24 at 3), Defendant Gill is correct to note that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains “no

allegation about conveying said concerns or grievances to Dr. Gill” specifically. (Def.’s P&As in Supp.

of Mot. at 5.) See also Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n. 1 (“In determining the propriety of a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as

a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”); Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d

232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993) (“If a complaint fails to state a claim even under the liberal requirements of the

federal rules, the plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency by inserting the missing allegations in a document

that is not either a complaint or an amendment to a complaint.”).

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between a prisoner and his physicians concerning the appropriate course of treatment are

“insufficient as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.”). 

Thus, while Plaintiff claims “jail officials ... purposefully failed to act” in response to his

“dire grievance petitions,” and that he suffered for 65 days with painful hemorrhoids as a result,

his Amended Complaint, at least with respect to Dr. Gill, contains only the type of “unadorned

... the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” that are insufficient to state a plausible

claim upon which a claim for § 1983 relief can be granted. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (a

complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

For these reasons, Defendant Gill’s Motion to DismissPlaintiff’sinadequate medical care

claims is GRANTED pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

D. Exhaustion

Finally, Defendant Gill claims Plaintiff “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

with respect to the claim that [he] violated [Plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights” and therefore

those claims must also be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (Def.’s P&A’s in Supp.

of Mot. to Dismiss [ECF Dkt. No. 19-1] at 7-8.) Specifically, Defendant notes that while

Plaintiff claims to have filed “many administrative grievances and other protests,” he does not

“specifically identify the exhaustion of remedies as to Dr. Gill.” (Id.)

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Compliance with the exhaustion requirement is mandatory. 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Section 1997e(a) “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Id. at 532; see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 739-40&n.5 (2001)(requiring exhaustion regardless of whether the specific remedysought

by the prisoner is “available” within the administrative grievance procedure). However, nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense, and Defendant Gill carries the burden of

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raising and proving its absence. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).

Here, Gill argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust “in accord with Jones” because he

simply “check[ed] a box on [his] form [Amended Complaint],” and “alleged actions from

various defendants at different periods of time,” but his “generic statements ... as to exhaustion

do not “specify the areas in which he initiated administrative remedies as to Dr. Gill.” (Def.’s

P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 7.) But Jones clearly holds that the “failure to exhaust

[under § 1997e(a)] is an affirmative defense ...[and] inmates are not required to specially plead

or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” 549 U.S. at 216. Instead, it is Defendant Gill

who must “demonstrate” Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, by providing documentary evidence,

including affidavits, which serve as proof of Plaintiff’s administrative grievance records and do

more than simply“describe the inmate appeals process.” Id.; Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20 (noting 

defendant prison officials’ “superior access to prison administrative records in comparison to

prisoners, especially, as is often the case, when prisoners have moved from one facility to

another.”). In this case, Defendant Gill fails to provide any evidence whatsoever as to Plaintiff’s

administrative grievance record. Therefore, he has not carried his burden under Jones or Wyatt.

Moreover, to the extent Defendant suggests Plaintiff’s incomplete or non-specific

allegations related to exhaustion by themselves satisfy his burden of proving Plaintiff’s failure

to exhaust, he is mistaken. In Wyatt, the Ninth Circuit found that while exhaustion is an

affirmative defense, “[a] prisoner’s concession to non-exhaustion is a valid ground for

dismissal.” 315 F.3d at 1120. However, Plaintiff’s exhaustion allegations fall far short of

“conceding” his failure to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). First, while he is not required to plead

exhaustion at all, when asked on the Court’s formCivil Rights Complaint, “Have you previously

sought and exhausted all forms of informal or formal relief from the proper administrative

officials regarding the acts alleged in Part C above? [E.g., CDC Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form

602, etc]?”, Plaintiff checked the “Yes” box. (Amend. Compl. at 9.) 

And while Plaintiff does further claimthat “many” of his administrative grievances “went

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exhaustion–nor does it necessarily establish that he failed to exhaust any of his claims. See

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (finding dismissal under § 1997e(a) inappropriate where “the record

is not clear” regarding prisoner’s exhaustion concession); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d

926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here can be no ‘absence of exhaustion’ unless some relief

remains ‘available,’” therefore, “a defendant must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained

available, whether at unexhausted levels ofthe grievance process, or through awaiting the results

of the relief already granted as a result of that process.”). 

Thus, because Defendant Gill shoulders the burden of establishing non-exhaustion, but

provides the Court with nothing more than Plaintiff’s own contradictory statements regarding

his attempts to use GFBDF’s administrative grievance process as proof, the Court DENIES his

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims to the extent it is premised on a failure to exhaust pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119; Jones, 549 U.S. at 216 (“[I]nmates are

not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”).

IV. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

(1) DISMISSES Defendants WILSON DOE, San Diego Sheriff Officer; BROWN

DOE, San Diego Sheriff Officer; JOHN DOES, GBDF Doctor, San Diego County Medical

Division; JANE DOES, GBDF Doctor, San Diego County Medical Service Division; JOHN

DOES, 5A Rover San Diego Sheriff Officer; JANE DOES, GBDF Nurses, and JOHN DOES

1-3, San Diego Sheriff Officers, for failure to amend and/or prosecute pursuant to S.D. CAL.

CIVLR 15.1, 41.1, FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a), and FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m); and

(2) GRANTS Defendant Gill’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for

failing to state a claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [ECF Dkt. No. 19]. However, Plaintiff

is GRANTED thirty (30) days in which to file and serve a Second Amended Complaint which

addresses the deficiencies of pleading identified in this Order. Plaintiff is further cautioned that

should he elect to amend, his Second Amended Complaint must be complete in itself, and that

any claim not re-alleged shall be considered waived. See S.D. CAL.CIVLR 15.1; King v. Atiyeh,

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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If Plaintiff does not file and serve a Second Amended Complaint within that time, this

case shall proceed on Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF Dkt. No. 7), but only as to the

Defendants who were named, served by the U.S. Marshal, and who have Answered: Brandt O.

Pile (erroneously sued as “Pile Doe”), Lizzie Womack, and Sarandi Marina (ECF Dkt. No. 22).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 14, 2012

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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