Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03706/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03706-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 896
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Arbitration
Cause of Action: 09:0010 Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROYAL ALLIANCE ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HENRY T. MORA, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 3:15-cv-03706-JST 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION 

AWARD AND GRANTING 

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO 

CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD 

AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Re: ECF Nos. 19, 23, 30

Petitioner Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. (“Royal Alliance”) moves to vacate an 

arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority under 9 U.S.C. § 

10(a)(4). ECF No. 19. Respondents oppose the motion and have filed a cross-motion to confirm 

the arbitration award. ECF No. 23. For the reasons stated below, Royal Alliance’s motion to 

vacate is denied, and Respondents’ motion to confirm is granted.

Respondents have also moved for attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 30. For the reasons stated 

below, this motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns two joined disputes between Royal Alliance, a brokerage firm, and its 

former clients Michele R. Lewis (“Lewis”), Henry T. Mora (“Mora”), and Lionel Gonzalez 

(“Gonzalez” collectively with Lewis and Mora “Respondents”), for breach of fiduciary duty and 

negligent supervision. Pursuant to Royal Alliance’s customer agreements, the disputes were 

required to be submitted to arbitration before a FINRA (The Financial Industry Regulatory 

Authority) panel. ECF No. 25 at 6. Royal Alliance alleges that Lewis filed the first claim against 

Royal Alliance on July 3, 2013. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6. Two weeks later, Mora and Gonzalez filed the 

second claim on July 18, 2013. Id. at ¶ 8. In their claims, Respondents, inter alia, alleged: (1)

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 1 of 11
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Royal Alliance’s registered representatives recommended unsuitable securities investments for 

Respondents, and (2) Royal Alliance breached its contracts with Respondents (“Customer 

Agreements”) by failing to properly supervise its representatives. Id. at ¶ 6, 8. Respondents 

sought attorneys’ fees in both claims. Id.

On September 5, 2014, Respondents filed a motion before the Mora/Gonzalez panel, 

requesting to join the Lewis Arbitration to the Mora/Gonzalez Arbitration. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11. 

Royal Alliance opposed the motion. Id. at ¶ 12. On October 21, 2014, the Mora/Gonzalez panel 

granted Respondents’ motion, and consolidated both arbitrations before the Mora/Gonzalez panel. 

Id. at ¶ 14.

Royal Alliance then filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of Consolidation before the 

Director of FINRA Dispute Resolution (the “Director”). Id. at ¶ 16. Royal Alliance asserted that 

the cases should have been consolidated in front of the Lewis panel because Lewis was the 

“lower-numbered” case and that Respondent’s Motion to Join was “blatant ‘forum shopping.’” Id.

After Royal Alliance filed its motion but before the Director ruled on it, FINRA issued a 

document called “The Neutral Corner,” which provided a “‘refresher’ on FINRA Rule 12312”—

the FINRA rule governing joinder of claims. Id. at ¶ 17. In addition to addressing FINRA rules 

on multiple claimants and multiple respondents, the refresher contained the following: “If a party 

files a motion to consolidate or sever, the panel in the lower-numbered case will decide the 

motion, unless the parties agree otherwise.” Id.

On December 24, 2014, the Director denied Royal Alliance’s motion because “at the time 

of the original consolidation motion, [Royal Alliance] never requested that FINRA assign the 

motion to the lower-numbered panel.” Id. at ¶ 18. In response, Royal Alliance sent a letter to the 

Director requesting that the Director reconsider its motion, which was also denied by the Director. 

Id. at ¶ 19-20.

Royal Alliance filed another motion for reconsideration of joinder, but this time with the 

Mora/Gonzalez panel. Id. at ¶ 22. The Mora/Gonzalez panel also denied Royal Alliance’s 

motion, finding among other things that the “Neutral Corner” release was “issued after the panel’s 

Order and that ‘[n]othing in the guidance indicated that it was to apply retroactively.’” Id. at ¶ 23.

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 2 of 11
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

On July 15, 2015, the Mora/Gonzalez panel awarded Respondents compensatory damages 

of $1,085,456, punitive damages of $75,000, attorneys’ fees of $184,000, and costs of $57,231.05. 

Id. at ¶ 26.

Royal Alliance filed their petition in this Court on August 13, 2015. ECF No. 1. They 

challenge the decision to consolidate the Lewis arbitration before the higher-numbered 

Mora/Gonzalez panel rather than the lower-number Lewis panel, and also challenge the award of 

attorneys’ fees. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. Accordingly, they request that the Court vacate the award to 

Lewis but not to Mora and Gonzalez, as well as vacate all awarded attorneys’ fees. Id. at 9-10.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court’s review of an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is 

“both limited and highly deferential.” Coutee v. Barington Capital Group, L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 

1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The party seeking to vacate 

the award has the burden of proving that vacatur is appropriate under § 10(a)(4). U.S. Life Ins. v. 

Superior Nat’l Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010).

A court may vacate an arbitration award only “if that award is completely irrational, 

exhibits a manifest disregard of the law,” or otherwise violates the Federal Arbitration Act 

(“FAA)”. Id. at 1133. The FAA allows for vacatur of an arbitration award under only four 

circumstances:

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, 

upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 

controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 

mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.

9 U.S.C § 10(a).

“This is a high standard for vacatur; [i]t is not enough . . . to show that the [arbitrator] 

committed an error—or even a serious error.” Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 

London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 3 of 11
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Indeed, “[n]either erroneous legal conclusion nor substantiated factual findings justify federal 

court review of an arbitral award under the statute, which is unambiguous in this regard.” Bosack 

v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Manifest disregard of the law” means “something more than just an error in the law or a 

failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.” Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). To vacate an 

arbitration award on this ground, “[i]t must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognized 

the applicable law and then ignored it.” Id. Thus, “to demonstrated manifest disregard, the 

moving party must show that the arbitrator ‘underst[oo]d and correctly state[d] the law, but 

proceed[ed] to disregard the same.” Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 

2007) (quoting San Martine Compania De Navegacion, 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)).

“An award is completely irrational only where the arbitration decision fails to draw its 

essence from the agreement.” Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 642 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). This standard is “extremely narrow.” Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1106 (citations omitted). 

“An arbitration award draws its essence from the agreement if the award is derived from the 

agreement, viewed in light of the agreement’s language and context, as well as other indications of 

the parties’ intentions.” Lagstein, 607 F.3d at 642 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]he question is whether the award is ‘irrational’ with respect to the contract, not whether the 

panel’s findings of fact are correct.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[courts] do not decide the 

rightness or wrongness of the arbitrators’ contract interpretation, only whether the [arbitrator]’s 

decision ‘draws its essence’ from the contract.” Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1106 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Royal Alliance moves this Court to vacate the entire arbitration award to Respondent 

Lewis, and to vacate the award of attorneys’ fees. Respondents oppose Royal Alliance’s motion, 

cross-petition to confirm the FINRA arbitration Award, and also seek attorneys’ fees for defending

against Royal Alliance’s petition to vacate. The Court discusses each of these issues in turn.

A. Consolidation of the Lewis Arbitration with the Mora/Gonzalez Arbitration

Royal Alliance argues that the order granting consolidation of the two arbitrations into a 

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 4 of 11
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

single matter before the Mora/Gonzalez panel “exceeded the scope of the arbitrators’ powers 

under FINRA Rules” because “FINRA’s procedural rule provides that only an arbitration panel in 

a ‘lower-numbered’ case has the power to decide a motion to consolidate unless the parties agree 

otherwise.”1 ECF No. 19 at 16. It further argues that, by allowing the case to nevertheless 

proceed before the higher-numbered Mora/Gonzalez panel, the arbitration panel “allowed the 

Respondent and their counsel to engage in a blatant act of ‘arbitrator shopping,’ in violation of 

FINRA’s Rules and established procedures.” Id.

FINRA Code Rule 12312 titled “Multiple Claimants” provides:

(a) One or more parties may join multiple claims together in the same arbitration if the 

claims contain common questions of law or fact and:

 The claims assert any right to relief jointly and severally; or

 The claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions 

or occurrences. 

(b) After all responsive pleadings have been served, claims joined under paragraph (a) of 

this rule may be separated into two or more arbitrations by the Director before a panel is 

appointed, or by the panel after the panel is appointed. A party whose claims were separated by 

the Director may make a motion to the panel in the lowest numbered case to reconsider the 

Director’s decision.

See ECF No. 26-2 at 19. 

Royal Alliance does not rely on the text of the rule itself; nor could it, as the rule says 

nothing about consolidation occurring before the lower-numbered panel (with the exception of 

subsection (b), which is not relevant here). Instead, Royal Alliance relies on Volume 4 of “The 

Neutral Corner” a FINRA-issued document that it describes as a “refresher” on FINRA Rule 

12312. ECF No. 19 at 17.

The document, which has been filed with the Court as an exhibit to Royal Alliance’s 

motion, was issued in December 2014, approximately two months after the Mora/Gonzalez panel 

granted Respondents’ motion to join on October 21, 2014. ECF No. 19-18. It is eighteen pages 

long and covers various topics including ‘Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in Florida Arbitrations,” 

 

1 Royal Alliance argues, and Respondents do not dispute, that their arbitration agreements required 

the arbitration to be conducted in accordance with FINRA rules, and that under federal law, 

arbitration panels must conduct their proceedings in accordance with the applicable agreement. 

See ECF No. 19 at 18.

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 5 of 11
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“Dispute Resolution and FINRA News,” and “A Closer Look at Motions to Consolidate or Sever 

Claims.” Id. at 1. On the subject of motions to consolidate or sever, the document discusses the 

role of FINRA and arbitrators in relation to such motions, the relevant FINRA Code Rules, and 

factors to consider when resolving these motions. Id. at 12-14. Royal Alliance relies on a 

sentence at the top of page 14, which states: “If a party files a motion to consolidate or sever, the 

panel in the lower-numbered case will decide the motion, unless the parties agree otherwise.” Id.

at 13.

Royal Alliance’s position borders on the frivolous. First, it is highly doubtful that the 

“law” the panel supposedly disregarded is even law at all. Rule 12312 says nothing about 

requiring consolidation to occur before a lower-numbered panel rather than a higher-numbered 

one. Though Royal Alliance relies on the language quoted above from The Neutral Corner, there 

is no indication that this refresher should be considered as a binding rule on FINRA arbitrations. 

On the contrary, Respondents suggest that The Neutral Corner is written by FINRA staff members 

merely as guidance for arbitrators, and cannot be considered part of the FINRA Code Rules 

because it was not approved by the SEC. ECF No. 25 at 27 n.9. Royal Alliance does not dispute 

these contentions — indeed, its own motion describes The Neutral Corner not as newly established 

law but as “an explanation of the proper construction of the existing rule’s language.” ECF No. 19 

at 18. Further, even if The Neutral Corner could be considered binding, it was issued two months 

after the panel granted the motion to join, and the panel explicitly held that the document was not 

retroactive. Though Royal Alliance asserts that The Neutral Corner reflected FINRA’s 

“long[-]standing policy” to consolidate cases before the lower-numbered panel, ECF No. 19 at 17, 

the document itself says nothing about the length of time the policy, if it is one, has been in effect. 

ECF No. 19 at 17.

Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that FINRA rules require consolidation to 

occur before the lower-numbered panel, Royal Alliance has failed to show that the panel 

“understood and correctly stated” that rule, “but proceeded to disregard the same.” Though Royal 

Alliance contends that it argued to the panel that the motion to join should be heard before the 

lower-numbered panel, ECF No. 28 at 4, it provides no support for this contention, nor for the 

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 6 of 11
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

further contention that the panel agreed with Royal Alliance and therefore “understood and 

correctly stated” this rule before proceeding to disregard it. See Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104 

(“[T]here must be some evidence in the record, other than the result, that the arbitrators were 

aware of the law and intentionally disregarded it.” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Finally, the Court notes that though Royal Alliance accuses Respondents of “blatant” 

arbitrator shopping, it provides little support for this contention, asserting only that Respondents 

“apparently viewed” the Lewis panel as unfavorable and “perceived” the Mora/Gonzalez panel “to 

be more friendly.” ECF No. 19 at 17. In fact, as Respondents explain in their brief, the panels for 

the Lewis and Mora/Gonzalez panels were chosen through identical procedures, which involved

both parties ranking possible arbitrators by preference, and FINRA then choosing the panel by 

formula using the parties’ rankings. ECF No. 25 at 11. Though members of the original 

Mora/Gonzalez panel later withdrew, they were replaced by new arbitrators who were also chosen 

through an established procedure that involves choosing the next highest-ranked arbitrator and, if 

none are available, a randomly chosen one. Id.

In sum, Royal Alliance has failed to identify a rule of law that the Mora/Gonzalez panel 

manifestly disregarded in consolidating the two arbitrations. Accordingly, the Court denies the 

motion to vacate the order to consolidate and the award in the Lewis case.

B. Award of Attorneys’ Fees to Respondents

Royal Alliance contends that the panel also erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to 

Respondents. It acknowledges that the customer agreements at issue in the case “provided for 

attorneys’ fees . . . in connection with collection of monies owed or deficiencies in Respondents’ 

accounts,” but argues that “there was no breach of the customer agreement, and no evidence was 

offered at the arbitration hearing of any breach of the customer agreements.” ECF No. 19 at 20. 

In their opposition, Respondents contend that “Royal Alliance breached its “know your customer”

provision and it failed to purchase securities for the Respondents which were consistent with their 

customer objectives, risk tolerance, time horizon, and liquidity needs.” ECF No. 25 at 32. Royal 

Alliance rejoins that “the fatal flaw” with Respondents argument is that “the customer agreements 

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 7 of 11
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

do not contain a Know Your Customer Rule.” ECF No. 28 at 5.

Royal Alliance’s contention must be rejected for multiple reasons. First, as Respondents 

note, the arbitration panel does not provide any reasoning for its ruling. See ECF No. 19-25 at 1-

11. “An arbitrators’ award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a 

complete record of their proceedings,” and if that is the case, “it is all but impossible to determine 

whether they acted with manifest disregard of the law.” Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This case exemplifies that 

principle. Though Royal Alliance contends that the arbitration panel’s decision was flawed 

because it incorrectly interpreted the customer agreements at issue, there is no evidence at all of 

the panel’s reasons, much less evidence to support Royal Alliance’s characterization of them. 

Second, even if this Court could fully consider the arbitration panel’s reasoning in 

awarding attorneys’ fees, it is apparent that the panel’s decision was not “completely irrational” 

and did not manifestly disregard the law. Indeed, the panel’s decision appears to be wholly 

reasonable under California Civil Code § 1717 and the applicable provisions of Royal Alliance’s 

customer agreements.

California Civil Code § 1717 states: 

In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides

that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that 

contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the 

prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party 

prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified 

in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees 

in addition to other costs. Where a contract provides for attorney’s 

fees, as set forth above, that provision shall be construed as 

applying to the entire contract, unless each party was represented by 

counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract and the fact 

of that representation is specified in the contract. (emphasis added)

The California Supreme Court explains that “section 1717 was enacted to establish 

mutuality of remedy where a contractual provision makes recovery of attorney’s fees available for 

only one party, and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney’s fees provisions.” PLCM 

Group, Inc. v. Drexler, (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1090-91 (citing Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 

863, 870). 

Royal Alliance’s Customer Agreements with Respondents contained the following 

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 8 of 11
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

language: “[Respondents] shall pay the reasonable costs of collection of any monies owed or 

deficiency in [Respondents’] accounts including, but not limited to attorney’s fees and costs.” 

ECF No. 26-1–26-3 at 2. It is undisputed that Respondents were not represented by counsel in the 

negotiation and execution of the contracts. ECF No. 31 at 4. Under these circumstances, section 

1717 mandates that Royal Alliance’s attorneys’ fees provision is reciprocal in nature and applies 

to the entire contract.

Respondents state that in their briefing before the arbitration panel, they discussed “the 

agreements’ provisions regarding customer objectives, risk tolerance, time horizon, and liquidity 

needs. Respondents also noted that a ‘know your customer rule’ was stated within the customer 

agreement.” ECF No. 25 at 31. Respondents then argued that Royal Alliance “breached its know 

your customer provision and it failed to purchase securities for the Respondents which were 

consistent with their customer objectives, risk tolerance, time horizon and liquidity needs.” Id. at 

32.

Royal Alliance argues that the arbitrators exceeded their power in agreeing with the 

Respondents’ contentions because the “Customer Agreements do not contain a Know Your 

Customer Rule.” ECF No. 28 at 5. Rather, it argues that “the provisions in Section VI and on 

page 5 of the customer agreements consist primarily of definitions of terms used throughout the 

customer agreements.” Id. In other words, Royal Alliance’s argument appears to be that the 

“Know Your Customer” section on page 5 of the contract did not create an obligation that could 

have been breached.

The section is captioned “Know Your Customer” in boldface. The language of the section 

reads in part as follows:

The FINRA Rule 2090 (Know Your Customer) requires [Royal Alliance] to use reasonable 

diligence and to know and retain the essential facts concerning each customer with regard 

to the opening and maintenance of every account. . . . To comply with the regulation, 

[Royal Alliance] will ask for the name, address, date of birth, social security number, and 

other information for control persons/authorized parties associated with the account.

ECF No. 26-3 at 5 (emphasis added). In the face of this clear language, Royal Alliance’s attempt 

to characterize section VI merely as “definitions of terms used throughout the customer 

agreements” is unsustainable. ECF No. 28 at 5. Moreover, to the extent that this section is 

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 9 of 11
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

ambiguous, it should be construed against the drafter — Royal Alliance. See Fed. Express Corp. 

v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 406 (2008) (construing ambiguities against the drafter encourages 

precise expression).

At best, therefore, Royal Alliance has demonstrated only a legitimate factual dispute over 

the proper interpretation of a contractual clause in its customer agreements. This is insufficient to 

meet its burden of proving that the award issued by the Mora/Gonzalez panel is “completely 

irrational.” See Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104. Accordingly, its motion to vacate the award of 

attorneys’ fees is denied.

C. Respondent’s Request for Post-Arbitration Attorneys’ Fees

Respondents moved this Court for an award of post-arbitration attorneys’ fees, arguing that 

“[b]ecause the [Respondents] were already determined to be the prevailing party, and Royal 

Alliance was determined to have breached the contract, [Respondents] are entitled to recover their 

post-arbitration attorneys’ fees on this separate and distinct ground.” ECF No. 31 at 4.

As discussed above, Cal. Civil Code § 1717 mandates that the attorneys’ fees provision in 

the Customer Agreements is reciprocal in nature and applies to the entire contract. In support of 

their motion, Respondents rely on Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum 

Corp., 791 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986). There, in affirming the district court’s award for postarbitration attorneys’ fees, the Ninth Circuit held that an appellant’s motion to vacate an

arbitration award is an action “based on the contract and therefore the contractual provision for 

attorney fees applies.” Id. at 1340.

In its opposition to Respondents’ motion for post-arbitration attorneys’ fees, Royal 

Alliance once again contends that its “customer agreements do not contain a Know Your 

Customer Rule.” ECF No. 34 at 3. As the Court has previously stated, this argument is

unpersuasive.

Royal Alliance’s motion to vacate the arbitration award is based on its customer 

agreements and therefore the same contractual provisions for attorneys’ fees apply here. See

Cypress Equip. Fund v. Royal Equip. Inc., No. C-96-3783 MMC, 1997 WL 106137 at *14-15 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 1997) (awarding post-arbitration attorneys’ fees for defending against petition 

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 10 of 11
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

to vacate pursuant to parties’ contract). Accordingly, Respondents’ motion for post-arbitration 

attorneys’ fees is granted.

CONCLUSION

Royal Alliance’s motion to vacate the arbitration award is denied. Respondents’ crossmotion to confirm the arbitration award and their motion for post-arbitration attorneys’ fees are

both granted. Respondents shall file a motion for their attorneys’ fees within 14 days after the 

issuance of this order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-03706-JST Document 38 Filed 03/10/16 Page 11 of 11