Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05422/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05422-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEVERLY J. STEVENSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-05422 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON April 27, 2007:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available

at the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit

the citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. Cf. N.D. Civil

Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their

reliance on such authority. The parties shall not file written responses to the questions posed in

this notice.

The Court tentatively GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice to

Plaintiff refiling a complaint following a final decision by the Commissioner on her claim for

benefits.

Case 3:06-cv-05422-JSW Document 28 Filed 04/26/07 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Each party shall have twenty (20) minutes to answer the following questions:

1. Does any party contend that this action is now moot in light of the ALJ’s

decision? If not, on what legal or factual basis?

a. In her opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues that she was denied a

“91-5p hearing,” and appears to complain about the ALJ’s decision not to

reopen or revise determinations on prior applications. These allegations

are not alleged in the Amended Complaint. Is Plaintiff arguing that by

deciding she did not meet the criteria to reopen or revise determinations

on her prior applications, the March 30, 2007 decision is not “fully

favorable,” and required a hearing? If so, why can Plaintiff not raise this

issue in the first instance with the Appeals Council? Is Plaintiff asking

for leave to amend and, if so, why would those allegations not be subject

to dismissal on the same bases raised by Defendant in the current

motion?

b. Does Plaintiff find fault with the notice of the ALJ’s decision because it

does not advise her of the right to a hearing? See 20 C.F.R. § 404.948(a)

(“Decision wholly favorable. If the evidence in the hearing record

supports a finding in favor of you and all the parties on every issue, the

[ALJ] may issue a hearing decision without holding an oral hearing. 

However, the notice of the decision will inform you that you have the

right to an oral hearing and that you have a right to examine the evidence

on which the decision is based.”). Why could she not raise this issue in

the first instance with the Appeals Council?

c. If Plaintiff intends to seek review of the March 30, 2007 decision, why is

Defendant not correct that Plaintiff has not yet exhausted administrative

remedies?

d. What is the relevance to the motion to dismiss, if any, of the material

included with the Ragnes Declaration?

Case 3:06-cv-05422-JSW Document 28 Filed 04/26/07 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2. As the Court reads the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s claims are as follows:(1)

Defendant violated her procedural due process rights by failing to process her

claim for benefits without undue delay; (2) Defendant placed an improper hold

on her request for reconsideration of the denial of benefits; (3) Defendant failed

to properly administer reconsideration level processing; and (4) Defendant

unduly delayed in administering all steps to exhaustion of Plaintiff’s

administrative remedies. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.)

a. Does the Court correctly understand Plaintiff’s claims?

b. What is the statutory basis underlying jurisdiction on each of these

claims?

c. Plaintiff seems to argue that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction of

her claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory

Relief Act. However, these statutes do not provide an independent basis

for subject matter jurisdiction. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108

(1977) (“the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter

jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action”); Luttrell

v. United States, 644 F.2d 1274, 1275 (9th Cir. 1980) (“28 U.S.C. §§ 2201

and 2202 create additional remedies in the form of declaratory judgment

relief for federal litigants, but do not in an of themselves confer subject

matter jurisdiction on the courts.”). Is Plaintiff truly contending that the

APA and Declaratory Relief Act provide a distinct basis for subject

matter jurisdiction? If so, on what authority does she rely?

d. Does Defendant contend that Plaintiff has not presented these claims to

the Commissioner? 

e. Is there any dispute that the Plaintiff has standing? The Court inquires

because it is not clear how the declarations and injunctions Plaintiff seeks

in her Amended Complaint will be likely to redress the alleged harm she

has suffered. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

Case 3:06-cv-05422-JSW Document 28 Filed 04/26/07 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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(1992) (noting that third element of standing is that “it must be ‘likely,’

as opposed to merely ‘speculative,” that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision”).

3. Is Defendant making a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction? 

4. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Supreme Court concluded that

the action did “arise under” the Constitution but also stated that “it is just as

fruitless to argue that this action does not also arise under the Social Security

Act. For not only is it Social Security benefits which appellees seek to recover,

but it is the Social Security Act which provides both the standing and substantive

basis for the presentation of their constitutional contentions.” Id. at 760-61. The

Court then held that “the third sentence of [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g) precludes resort

to federal-question jurisdiction for the adjudication of appellees’ constitutional

claims.” 

a. What is Plaintiff’s best argument that this case does not “arise under” the

Social Security Act, such that this Court would have federal-question

jurisdiction over her procedural due process claim? See, e.g., Telecare

Corp. v. Leavitt, 409 F.3d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding claims did

not arise under Medicare statute because the plaintiff could not invoke

“the specialized administrative and judicial review procedures” of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g)); 

b. Does Plaintiff dispute that the goal of this lawsuit is to speed up the

process by which she may seek Social Security benefits? See, e.g.,

Kaiser v. Blue Cross of California, 347 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003)

(finding plaintiffs’ claims “inextricably intertwined” with claim for

benefits and, therefore, § 405(h) provided exclusive basis for jurisdiction

over most causes of action, with the exception of defamation and

invasion of privacy). 

Case 3:06-cv-05422-JSW Document 28 Filed 04/26/07 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5. Does Defendant concede that the Court would have jurisdiction over the claims

based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1361, even if they “arise under” the Social Security Act,

if Plaintiff met the standards required to assert mandamus jurisdiction? See

Briggs v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989).

a. What is Plaintiff’s best argument that she has exhausted all other avenues

of relief, and what authority does she have to show that the Defendant

owes her a “clear nondiscretionary duty?” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S.

602, 619 (1984).

6. What is Plaintiff’s best argument that she meets the requirements for waiver of

exhaustion of administrative remedies?

7. How will the discovery Plaintiff seeks to compel from Defendant assist the Court

in resolving the dispute regarding jurisdiction?

Dated: April 26, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-05422-JSW Document 28 Filed 04/26/07 Page 5 of 5