Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01866/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01866-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALEJANDRO PRADO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-1866 WBS KJN P (TEMP) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

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the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2). 

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

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 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

 Plaintiff has identified Warden Gary Swarthout and nine other prison officials at CSPSolano as the defendants in this action. Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled and uses a cane, and 

he has fallen twice when leaving the shower area because of a cement block impediment. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has filed inmate grievances about this situation, but appeals coordinators 

have failed to timely process and respond to his complaints. Plaintiff claims that the defendants 

have violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). He also claims that 

they have frustrated his constitutional right to file a grievance, denied him equal protection, and 

inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In terms of 

relief, plaintiff requests injunctive relief and damages. (See generally Compl. at 1-14.) 

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DISCUSSION 

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 

complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to 

the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his 

claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended 

complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must allege facts demonstrating how 

the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal constitutional or statutory 

rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The amended complaint must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362; May 

v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 

268. 

If plaintiff elects to proceed in this action by filing an amended complaint, the court 

advises him of the following legal standards that appear to govern the claims he is attempting to 

assert in this action. First, plaintiff’s primary claim appears to be that defendants are 

discriminating against him based on his disability. Title II of the ADA provides that: 

no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or 

be subject to discrimination by such entity. 

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In any amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, plaintiff must allege facts showing that 

defendants discriminated against him or treated him differently because of a disability. See 

Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (Title II of the ADA requires 

intentional discrimination); see also Rucker v. Trent, No. C 11-4312 YGR (PR), 2012 WL 

4677741 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2012) (“the ADA prohibits discrimination because of a 

disability, not inadequate treatment for a disability”). In this regard, to state a claim under the 

ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he or she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he 

or she was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a 

public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by 

reason of his or her disability. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2007); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Insofar as plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim based on prison officials’ interference 

with his pursuit of an inmate grievance, he is advised that prisoners have no stand-alone due 

process rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 

640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 

there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process). Put another way, 

prison officials are not required under federal law to process inmate grievances in a specific way 

or to respond to them in a favorable manner. Because there is no right to any particular grievance 

process, plaintiff cannot state a cognizable civil rights claim for a violation of his constitutional 

rights based on allegations that prison officials ignored or failed to properly process grievances. 

See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-1485 LJO YNP (PC), 2010 WL 445203 at *5 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals 

failed to state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Williams v. Cate, No. 1:09-cv0468 OWW YNP (PC), 2009 WL 3789597 at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no 

protected liberty interest in the vindication of his administrative claims.”). 

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to pursue a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 

Equal Protection Clause, he is advised that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction 

that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 

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Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection 

Clause, plaintiff “must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least 

susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent.” Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Dep’t, 

565 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District, 

158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at 

least in part because of a plaintiff's protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 

(9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 

(9th Cir.1994)). Plaintiff is cautioned that individuals with disabilities do not constitute a 

“suspect” class, so allegations that defendants discriminated against him based on his disability 

are subject to rational basis review. In this regard, any regulation, policy, or practice will be 

upheld if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 

Finally, insofar as plaintiff is attempting to assert an Eighth Amendment Cruel and 

Unusual Punishment claim, he is advised that to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on 

inadequate medical care, he must allege facts showing defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In the Ninth 

Circuit, a deliberate indifference claim has two components: 

First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by 

demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This 

second prong – defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent – is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) 

harm caused by the indifference. Indifference “may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.” (internal citations omitted) 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“In determining deliberate indifference, we scrutinize the particular 

facts and look for substantial indifference in the individual case, indicating more than mere 

negligence or isolated occurrences of neglect.”). 

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In applying the deliberate indifference standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it 

can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical 

needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not 

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). In addition, mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and 

prison medical staff as to the proper course of treatment for a medical condition do not give rise 

to a § 1983 claim. See Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012); Toguchi v. Soon 

Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th 

Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 

U.S. at 104-05. To establish a deliberate indifference claim arising from a delay in providing 

medical care, however, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the delay was harmful. See 

Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 

(9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985). In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 

provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 

plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 

 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number 

assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an amended 

complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be 

dismissed without prejudice. 

 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil 

rights action. 

Dated: May 13, 2016 

ec 

prad1866.14 

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