Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01393/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01393-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The court recognizes that plaintiff’s complaint states a claim for an Equal Protection

violation based on racial discrimination. Defendant does not address this claim in his motion. 

The court will not address this issue sua sponte and that claim remains. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORMAN GREGORY, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1393 FCD EFB P

vs.

B.C. ADAMS, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel suing for alleged civil rights violations. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He claims that defendants violated his Eight Amendment rights and retaliated

against him for pursuing a grievance. Defendant Adam is the sole remaining defendant. 

Defendant Adams filed a motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2007. Defendant

contends in his motion that (1) the undisputed facts establish that he did not violate plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights, and (2) that he did not retaliate against plaintiff for filing an inmate

grievance.1

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I. Facts

At all times relevant to the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate lawfully incarcerated at

Folsom State Prison (hereafter “FSP”). Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, (“Compl.”), at 4; Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Decl. of B. Adams, (“Adams Decl.”), at 2:1-7. Defendant Adams

was a lieutenant at Folsom State Prison. Compl., at 3.

Plaintiff alleges that on April 23, 2004, he was in the #2 dining hall when Officer

Ramirez was assaulted by an inmate. Id. Plaintiff claims that after the assault, Officer Ramirez

stumbled and many of the inmates in the dining hall laughed. Compl., at 4. Soon after,

defendant Adams (the facility Lieutenant) and other prison staff responded to the assault. Adams

Decl., at 2:4-5. Defendant Adams noticed that there were two tables of inmates (which included

plaintiff) that were standing and cheering loudly. Id., at 2:5-12. Adams became concerned that

the cheering inmates may cause a riot or provoke another attack on staff or inmates and he

therefore ordered them to sit down and be quiet. Id. Adams states that the inmates did not obey

his order. Id., 2:14. Subsequently, Adams (the facility Captain) ordered plaintiff and seven

other inmates to be placed in handcuffs and taken to a holding cage in the prison canteen where

they were held in cells and handcuffs for approximately five-and-one-half hours for “disobeying

[an] order.” Compl., at 4-6; Adams Decl., at 2:13-19, 3:1-4, Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A. The eight

inmates, including plaintiff, were black. Compl., at 4. 

Plaintiff claims that he suffers from arthritis and tendinitis and must wear medical braces

daily. Compl., at 14. During the hours that plaintiff was cuffed and detained, Adams and two

other officers frequently walked back and forth from #5 building to the program office. As they

did so plaintiff repeatedly asked them to remove the cuffs but they did not. Pl.’s Opp’n, Decl. in

Supp. (“Pl.’s Decl.”), at ¶ 23. Plaintiff also contends that, while in the holding cage, he

complained to Medical Technical Assistant White that he had a lot of back and wrist pain from

the handcuffs being too tight and being left on for too long. Id., at ¶ 26. Plaintiff asked White to

remove the cuffs. Id. White spoke to prison custody staff who told him that the handcuffs were

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 Plaintiff filed a first level appeal regarding the alleged discrimination and cruel and

unusual punishment against defendant Adams, which was denied on August 17, 2004, by

defendant Palmer. Compl., at 35-37. Plaintiff filed a second level appeal, which was granted in

part on September 9, 2004, insofar as it was investigated, but was denied in all other respects.

Id., at 38-41. Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Director’s level, which was denied on December 28,

2004. Id., at 42-43.

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to remain on. Id., at ¶ 27. White asked plaintiff if he had suffered any injuries in the assault on

Officer Ramirez and plaintiff responded that he was not involved in the assault. Id., at ¶ 25;

Compl., at 5-6. White noted on plaintiff’s medical sheet that plaintiff had suffered no injuries. 

Compl., at 6. Plaintiff continued to ask Adams to remove the cuffs every time he saw him walk

by. Pl.’s Decl., at ¶¶ 30, 31. When plaintiff was allowed to return to his cell, he required the

assistance of other inmates because pain in his wrists was causing him difficulty in grasping the

stair handrail, and pain in his back made it difficult for him to walk. Id., ¶ 40.

Plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance (appeal FSP-04-0950) against defendant Adams

and involved staff on April 23, 2004. Id; Adams Decl., at 2:20-22. That grievance, FSP-04-

0950, alleged that defendant Adams discriminated against plaintiff and tortured him. Id., at 25; 

Adams Decl., at 2:20-22.

Upon review of the grievance, Adams noticed that plaintiff included allegations that he

was subjected to torture when he was placed in handcuffs. Adams Decl., 2:20-22. Adams

claims that plaintiff was “lawfully” placed in handcuffs and that he did not subject plaintiff to

“torture.” Id., at 3:13-18. Plaintiff met with Adams for an informal review during which Adams

asked him how to resolve the matter. Compl., at 7. On May 19, 2004, Adams spoke with

plaintiff and asked him what it would take to make the first grievance, FSP-04-0950, “go away.” 

Id. Plaintiff told Adams that he wanted an apology and release from administrative segregation

of the inmates who had been placed there following the incident in the dining hall on April 23,

2004. Id., at 31. Plaintiff claims that Adams replied that he would die before apologizing to

“scum” like plaintiff. Id., at 7.2

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 At the hearing on the RVR, the hearing officer found plaintiff’s allegations

unsubstantiated, but the disposition was an assessment of 0 days credit forfeiture, counseling and

reprimanding. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C at 9. 

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On May 25, 2004, Adams issued plaintiff a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”), also

referred to as a “CDC 115,” for making false allegations against staff. Compl., at 8; Part 2, at 1-

3; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C, at 4. This RVR stated that “inmate Gregory made the allegation that I

‘tortured’ him. This charge is very serious and if unfounded, Inmate Gregory must be held

accountable.”3 Id., at 4. Defendant cited to Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College

Edition, for the definition of “torture,” and also to the California Code of Regulations (“Cal.

Code Regs.”), Title 15, § 3391 regarding the filing of false allegations against a peace officer. 

Id., at 4-5. This tit-for-tat exchange of false allegations claims seems to have taken on a life of

its own. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second grievance on June 10, 2004, against Adams for

filing false reports against him. Compl., Part 2, at 6. The second grievance, FSP-04-01012,

asserted allegations of retaliation by Adams. Id. Plaintiff claims that, later, Adams called

plaintiff into his office and told plaintiff that his latest complaint regarding him would not “go

anywhere” because he (Adams) had been “doing this a long time and knows how to stop

complaints.” Id. The appeal was reviewed, however, and on August 17, 2004, at the first level,

was granted in part, insofar as it was investigated. Compl., Part 2, at 24-26. Plaintiff filed a

second level appeal, which was granted in part, insofar as it was investigated, on September 20,

2004. Id., at 31-35. Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Director’s Level on January 4, 2005, which

was denied. Id., at 36- 39.

Plaintiff claims that the defendant generally knew or should have known that punishing

him for allegedly laughing at Officer Ramirez would violate his Eight Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that retaliating against him for filing a grievance

regarding defendant’s conduct would and did violate his First Amendment right to petition the

government for redress of grievances.

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II. Summary Judgment Standards 

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) avoids unnecessary trials in cases

with no disputed material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986). 

Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of

genuine disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be

determined through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility

determinations of conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

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 On January 20, 2006, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035, 119 S.Ct. 2392, 144

L.Ed.2d 793 (1999), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir.1988).

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 The nonmoving party with the burden of proof “must establish each element of his

claim with significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Barnett v. Centoni,

31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). A complete failure of proof on an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial, and entitles

the moving party to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

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bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). There can be no genuine issue as to any

material fact where there is a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case because all other facts are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323.

Thus, to overcome summary judgement an opposing party must show a dispute that is

both genuine, and involving a fact that makes a difference in the outcome.4

 Two steps are

necessary. First, according to the substantive law, the court must determine what facts are

material. Second, in light of the appropriate standard of proof, the court must determine whether

material factual disputes require resolution at trial. Id., at 248. 

When the opposing party has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the

moving party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). The moving party need only point to matters

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish

genuine material factual issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.5

 The opposing

party must demonstrate that the disputed facts are material, i.e., facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc.

v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that disputes are

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 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F. 3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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genuine, i.e., the parties’ differing versions of the truth require resolution at trial, see T.W. Elec.,

809 F.2d at 631. The opposing party may not rest upon the pleadings’ mere allegations or

denials, but must present evidence of specific disputed facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.6

Conclusory statements cannot defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. See Scott

v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249, 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the proponent must adduce

evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American Int’l Group, Inc. v.

American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322).

If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary judgment is

inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other

hand,“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment.

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion, i.e., whether the defendant used excessive force

in violation of the Eight Amendment.. Equally critical is that “deliberate indifference” is an

essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, to withstand defendant’s motion,

plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a

genuine issue for trial, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989), and he 

must do so with evidence upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the

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evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252. 

III. Discussion

A. Excessive Force in Violation of the Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff claims that defendant Adams used excessive force and subjected him to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment by ordering

him handcuffed and detained following the assault on Officer Ramirez, in which plaintiff was not

involved. Overly tight handcuffs can constitute excessive force. Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d

1057, 1062 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that placing a detainee in handcuffs was unlawful where

officers were investigating tax fraud and the handcuffs caused the plaintiff pain); Palmer v.

Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1993) (no reasonable officer could believe that fastening

handcuffs so tightly around his wrist that they caused Palmer pain and left bruises that lasted for

several weeks was constitutional). 

Where prison officials are accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). The Court considers the following

factors: the need for application of force; the relationship between the need and the amount of

force used; the extent of the injury inflicted; the threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials”; and “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (citing

Whitley v. Albers, 476 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).

In considering those factors in this case, plaintiff has presented evidence that defendant

Adams ordered him to be handcuffed and placed in a holding cell in the dining hall and that he

was not released, despite his continuous pleas and complaints of pain to Adams and his

subordinate officers, until more than five hours had elapsed. It remains to be seen whether his

testimony in that regard will be credited by the trier of fact. In his motion for summary judgment,

Adams claims that restraining plaintiff in this manner was necessary to restore discipline in the

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dining hall following the assault on Officer Ramirez. Missing, however, is an explanation why it

was necessary that plaintiff be handcuffed in excess of five hours, in addition to being detained in

a cell, to achieve that purpose. On the facts before the court, defendant has not been established

as a matter of law that the use of handcuffs was necessary. If a jury concludes that restraining

plaintiff in both handcuffs and a cell in excess of five hours was not necessary, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used is disproportionate.

Plaintiff submits evidence that he suffers from arthritis and tendinitis, that he was wearing

a wrist brace at the time the handcuffs were placed on him, that he informed the Medical

Technical Assistant (“MTA”) that he had a chrono for waist chains due to his condition, that he

repeatedly called out to have the cuffs loosened because he was in acute pain, and that those

appeals were ignored for a protracted period of time. Although he apparently did not seek

medical treatment afterward, that fact, alone, is not dispositive. The malicious and sadistic use of

force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or

not significant injury is evident. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623,

628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of

force, not de minimis injuries).

The evidence on this motion does not show that plaintiff posed a threat that could be

“reasonably perceived” by defendant Adams. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley, 476 U.S. at

321). Although he was among a group that included some inmates who laughed and became loud

and was temporarily detained, defendant makes no allegation that plaintiff himself laughed or

incited other inmates to do so. Plaintiff’s evidence, on the other hand, is that he was not involved

in any way with the attack on Officer Ramirez, that he was about to eat breakfast with the other

inmates in the dining hall when the attack occurred, that following the attack laughter ensued

among a large number of inmates including black, white and Hispanic inmates, and that plaintiff

was included in a small group of black inmates rounded up and detained in an effort by defendant

Adams to restore discipline in the dining hall. If his testimony as to these facts is believed at trial,

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a reasonable jury could well conclude that Adams could not have reasonably perceived that

plaintiff posed a threat that required him to be celled and continuously cuffed for more than five

hours.

As to the final factor, whether the use of force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. at 7, plaintiff’s version of the facts could be believed by a jury, and if so, is

specific enough that it establishes that defendant Adams did not make “any efforts to temper the

severity of a forceful response.” Id. (citing Whitley, 476 U.S. at 321). Plaintiff’s testimony shows

that his many appeals for loosening his cuffs were ignored, particularly by defendant Adams.

Therefore, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the record on this

motion establishes that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff’s claim of excessive

force. The court therefore recommends denying defendant’s motion on this basis.

B. Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment

Plaintiff claims that after he was released from the handcuffs and holding cell, he

immediately filed a grievance against defendant Adams for racial discrimination and for the use

of excessive force, which he described as “torture.” He claims that because of this grievance,

Adams retaliated against him by filing a Rules Violation Report alleging that plaintiff made false

allegations against him and citing to a dictionary definition of “torture” in defense of plaintiff’s

allegations. This RVR did not result in plaintiff losing time credits or being sent to administrative

segregation but did result in counseling and a reprimand.

Inmates have a right to be free from retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally

protected rights. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55

F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth

Circuit treats the right to file a prison grievance as a constitutionally-protected First Amendment

right. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Hines v. Gomez, 853 F. Supp. 329

(N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the right to utilize a prison grievance procedure is a constitutionally

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protected right, cited with approval in Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995));

Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75 (2nd Cir. 1996) (retaliation for pursing a grievance violates the

right to petition government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments); Jones v. Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679-80 (2nd Cir. 1995) (right not to be subjected

to false misconduct charges as retaliation for filing prison grievance); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870

F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (filing disciplinary actionable if done in retaliation for filing inmate

grievances); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2nd Cir. 1988) (“Intentional obstruction of a

prisoner’s right to seek redress of grievances is precisely the sort of oppression that section 1983

is intended to remedy” (alterations and citation omitted)); Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943 (6th Cir.

1988) (false disciplinary filed in retaliation for complaint about food actionable).

In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead facts that suggest that retaliation

for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the

defendant’s conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The plaintiff must also plead facts that suggest an absence of legitimate correctional goals for the

conduct he contends was retaliatory. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (citing Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532). The

evidence shows that defendant filed an RVR against plaintiff for plaintiff’s filing of a grievance

accusing defendant of “torture.” In the context of the RVR, defendant cited to a dictionary

definition of “torture” in argument that plaintiff was falsely accusing him of something he did not

do. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C at 37. He also cited to Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3391, which states that

“[a]n inmate/parolee who makes a complaint against a departmental peace officer, knowing it is

false, may be issued a serious disciplinary rule violation . . . .” The parties may differ on the

definition of torture, but there is no dispute that plaintiff actually did feel he had been “tortured.” 

Whether the underlying grievance was found to have merit is not determinative. He clearly had

the right to complain in the form of a grievance. He provided enough basis for the grievance to

show that, although not successful, he had a subjective good faith belief in the truth of his

assertions. He provided in his grievance a factual basis for this allegation by describing the pain

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he endured from being cuffed for more than five hours. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude

on plaintiff’s evidence that plaintiff was disciplined as retaliation for having exercised his right to

file a grievance rather than for misconduct (lying) in the process of doing so. In short, plaintiff

has submitted sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether defendant’s filing of the RVR was

motivated by retaliation and did not serve a legitimate correctional goal. Accordingly, the

undersigned recommends denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim as

well. 

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendant’s April 6, 2007, motion for

summary judgment be denied.

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 15, 2008.

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