Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02881/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02881-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUIS REYNALDO JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. CLAYS, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-2881 TLN DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are several of plaintiff’s motions, which the 

court will address in turn.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on a first amended complaint on a claim for retaliation in violation 

of the First Amendment against defendants Baker and Speer. Specifically, in his complaint 

plaintiff alleges that defendants Baker and Speer conducted a cell search and seized his legal 

papers and typewriter because plaintiff had previously filed an administrative grievance against 

defendants’ fellow correctional officer and because plaintiff acts as a jailhouse lawyer and has 

assisted fellow inmates in filing lawsuits against prison staff. (Doc. Nos. 24 & 25) On May 22, 

2014, the assigned district judge in this case denied defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP 

/////

Case 2:11-cv-02881-TLN-DAD Document 86 Filed 06/04/14 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

status and directed defendants to file a responsive pleading in this matter within thirty days. 

(Doc. No. 81)

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

First, plaintiff has filed a motion in which he contends that the Office of the Attorney 

General should not represent the defendants because of a potential conflict of interest. 

Specifically, plaintiff argues that the Office of the Attorney General has a duty to investigate and 

prosecute the defendants for the conduct he complains of in this action, namely, taking plaintiff’s 

property under false pretenses and as an act of retaliation.

Plaintiff is advised that the Attorney General has a duty to represent any state officer or 

agency. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 12511 (“The Attorney General has charge, as attorney, of all 

legal matters in which the State is interested. . . . ”); id. § 12512 (“The Attorney General shall . . . 

prosecute or defend all causes to which the State, or any State officer is a party in his or her 

official capacity.”); id. § 12511.5 (“The Attorney General may defend a public or private provider 

of health care . . . against any claim that the civil rights of a person in state custody were violated 

in the provision of health care services . . . .”). The Attorney General also has a duty to represent

the public interest. See D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal.3d 1, 15 (1974). In 

D’Amico, the California Supreme Court explained:

In the course of discharging this duty [to defend all cases in which 

the state or one of its officers is a party] he is often called upon to 

make legal determinations both in his capacity as a representative

of the public interest and as statutory counsel for the state or one of 

its agencies or officers. In the great majority of such cases no 

conflict will result because in representing the interest of his ‘client’ 

the Attorney General will take a position consistent with what he 

deems to be in the public interest. In the exceptional case the 

Attorney General, recognizing that his paramount duty to represent 

the public interest cannot be discharged without conflict, may 

consent to the employment of special counsel by a state agency or 

officer. However, unless the Attorney General asserts the existence 

of such a conflict, it must be concluded that the actions and 

determinations of the Attorney General in such a lawsuit are made 

both as a representative of the public interest and as counsel for the 

state agency or officer.

Id.

/////

Case 2:11-cv-02881-TLN-DAD Document 86 Filed 06/04/14 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Here, the Attorney General has not indicated the existence of any conflict of interest. In 

addition, the court finds that this case does not present the “exceptional case” where the Attorney 

General faces a conflict of interest. See Neighbors v. Kemp, No. CIV S-06-1611 DFL EFB P, 

2006 WL 3500872 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006) (rejecting prisoner-plaintiff’s similar argument 

that state attorney’s general office had a conflict of interest because it had a duty to prosecute 

those who violated his constitutional rights). Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion 

for relief from the Office of the Attorney General representing the defendants in this action.1

Also pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. In his 

motion, plaintiff contends that the defendants opened his mail from the court without him being 

present and delayed delivering him his mail for three days in violation of his constitutional rights. 

As an initial matter, plaintiff’s motion does not comply with Local Rule 231 which requires that a 

motion for preliminary injunctive relief be accompanied by: (1) a declaration signed under 

penalty of perjury on the question of irreparable injury; (2) a memorandum of points and 

authorities addressing all legal issues raised by the motion; and (3) evidence of notice to all 

persons who would be affected by the order sought. 

Moreover, “[t]he proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to 

demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm 

in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Here, plaintiff’s 

allegations fall far short of making the showing required for the granting of preliminary injunctive 

 

1

Plaintiff has also filed with the court several motions seeking relief against defendants based on 

defense counsel’s failure to oppose or respond to plaintiff’s motion concerning the Attorney’s

General purported conflict of interest. Under this court’s April 17, 2013 order, the parties are 

required to brief all motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions concerning 

discovery, motions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 11, 12, 15, 41, 55, 56, 59, and 

60, and Local Rule 110. Opposition to all other motions need be filed only as directed by the 

court. Defense counsel was not required to respond to plaintiff’s pending motion. Accordingly, 

the court will deny plaintiff’s motion to find defendants in default and motion for sanctions. 

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to stay these proceedings until the court rules on plaintiff’s 

motion concerning the Attorney General’s purported conflict of interest. In light of the court’s 

decision to deny plaintiff’s pending motion, the court will also deny plaintiff’s motion for a stay. 

Case 2:11-cv-02881-TLN-DAD Document 86 Filed 06/04/14 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

relief. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). It is well established that 

“[m]ail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail.” See

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1986). In this regard, defendants did not violate 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights when they opened his mail from the court outside of his presence. 

See id. In addition, the three-day delay that plaintiff allegedly experienced in receiving his mail 

also does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because he has not alleged that he 

suffered any “actual injury” from this minor delay. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1996); 

Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s 

motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 

Finally, plaintiff has filed a motion in limine to prevent defense counsel from introducing 

plaintiff’s criminal history as well as a motion for a settlement. As to plaintiff’s motion in limine,

as noted above, on May 22, 2014, the court ordered defendants to file their responsive pleading in 

this action within thirty days. At this juncture, therefore, plaintiff’s motion in limine is

premature. If and when the court issues a pretrial order later in these proceedings, the court will 

set a schedule for when the parties are allowed to file motions in limine. As to plaintiff’s motion 

for a settlement, plaintiff should contact defense counsel with his settlement offers and should not 

file them with the court. Plaintiff is further advised that, insofar as he seeks a court-supervised 

settlement conference, the court will not order a mandatory settlement conference between the 

parties until after it has ruled on any forthcoming summary judgment motions. Accordingly, the 

court will deny plaintiff’s motion in limine and motion for a settlement.

In closing, the court observes that plaintiff has now filed an inordinate number of motions 

in this case. Plaintiff is cautioned that improper and superfluous filings impede the progress of a 

case, and the court may impose restrictions on plaintiff’s filings if he does not exercise 

appropriate restraint in the future. See De Long v. Jennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 

1990) (“There is strong precedent establishing the inherent power of federal courts to regulate the 

activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate

circumstances.”) (quoting Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1989)). Although 

plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is required to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

Case 2:11-cv-02881-TLN-DAD Document 86 Filed 06/04/14 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and the Local Rules of Court. Plaintiff’s failure to obey court orders and the local and federal 

rules and meet his responsibilities in prosecuting this action may justify dismissal, including 

dismissal with prejudice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1992).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order preventing the Attorney General 

from representing defendants in this action based on a conflict of interest (Doc. No. 62) is denied;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to find defendants in default for failing to oppose his motion for a 

temporary restraining order and motion for sanctions (Doc. Nos. 67 & 73) are denied;

3. Plaintiff’s motion for a stay (Doc. No. 83) is denied;

4. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. No. 80) is denied;

5. Plaintiff’s motion in limine is denied (Doc. No. 82) without prejudice to its renewal, as 

appropriate, at a later stage of these proceedings; and

6. Plaintiff’s motion for a settlement (Doc. No. 84) is denied.

Dated: June 3, 2014

DAD:9

john2881.mots

Case 2:11-cv-02881-TLN-DAD Document 86 Filed 06/04/14 Page 5 of 5