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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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Case No.: 5:15-cv-05492-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

STEVE CASTRO,

Plaintiff,

v.

G.L.R. CONSTRUCTION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-05492-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 49, 50, 55

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 5, 2016, the court dismissed Plaintiff Steve D. Castro’s original “Employment 

Discrimination Complaint” against Defendants G.L.R. Construction, Silicon Valley Crane, Inc., 

Joe O. Alexander Builder, Inc. and Andrew Shin Law Firm upon a finding that the form of the 

document was inconsistent with the pleading standard described by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8. Dkt. No. 45. Plaintiff was permitted leave to amend and filed an amended complaint 

on August 18, 2016, which seems to add several new defendants and claims to this action. Dkt. 

No. 47. 

Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Presently before the court are 

three matters: (1) a motion to dismiss filed by Silicon Valley Crane (Dkt. No. 49), (2) a motion to 

dismiss filed by Andrew Shin Law Firm (Dkt. No. 50), and (3) a motion to strike filed by Andrew 

Shin Law Firm (Dkt. No. 55). These matters are suitable for decision without oral argument 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and will be granted for the reasons explained below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

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Case No.: 5:15-cv-05492-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 

The factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” such 

that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 556-57. A complaint that falls short of the Rule 

8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a 

cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. 

Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must generally accept as 

true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court 

must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United 

States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a 

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Also, the court generally does not consider any material beyond the pleadings for a Rule 

12(b)(6) analysis. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 

(9th Cir. 1990). Exceptions to this rule include material submitted as part of the complaint or 

relied upon in the complaint, and material subject to judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-69 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Pro Se Pleadings

Where, as here, the pleading at issue is filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, it must be 

construed liberally. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In doing so, the court 

“need not give a plaintiff the benefit of every conceivable doubt” but “is required only to draw 

every reasonable or warranted factual inference in the plaintiff's favor.” McKinney v. De Bord, 

507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974). The court “should use common sense in interpreting the 

frequently diffuse pleadings of pro se complainants.” Id. A pro se complaint should not be 

dismissed unless the court finds it “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521

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Case No.: 5:15-cv-05492-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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(1972).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Untimely Opposition Will be Stricken

Plaintiff filed documents in opposition to the motions to dismiss on September 30, 2016. 

Dkt. Nos. 53, 54. Andrew Shin Law Firm moves to strike these documents as untimely. This 

argument is well-taken. 

“District courts have the inherent power to strike items from their docket for litigation 

conduct.” Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Nos. 14-16161, 14-17272, 2016 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 16007, at *38, 2016 WL 4527560 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2016). Here, because the motions to 

dismiss were not served electronically, Civil Local Rule 7-3(b) required that Plaintiff file any 

opposition no later than September 23, 2016. The documents Plaintiff filed on September 30, 

2016, were therefore a week late, and Plaintiff did not convincingly explain why he could not 

comply with the deadline promulgated by the Local Rules. Under these circumstances, it is not 

enough for Plaintiff to suggest an inability to access a computer from September 27th to October 

1, 2016, because the opposition was already late on the earliest date of that period. 

Consequently, Plaintiff has not established good cause for his untimely pleadings. And 

because Plaintiff’s failure to comply with deadlines has continued even after the court issued a 

warning in its previous dismissal order,1the motion to strike the opposition will be granted. 

B. The Amended Complaint Fails to Satisfy the Applicable Pleading Standard 

As it did with the original complaint, the court has reviewed Plaintiff’s amended pleading 

in search of “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 

751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Silicon Valley Crane and Andrew Shin Law Firm argue that 

 

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 Addressing this same issue, the court notified Plaintiff that “he is expected to abide by all 

procedural rules in the future including those imposing filing deadlines” and that “[f]uture noncompliance may not be overlooked.” Dkt. No. 45. Thereafter, Plaintiff failed to timely file an 

amended complaint, even with an extended deadline. Dkt. Nos. 46, 48. 

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Case No.: 5:15-cv-05492-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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such allegations are still missing. The court agrees. 

Although it is not entirely clear, it appears Plaintiff has attempted to re-plead a claim for 

employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court previously 

explained that “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show 

(1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to 

an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class 

were treated more favorably.” Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). But despite 

this explanation, the content of the amended complaint fails to rectify the deficiency that required 

dismissal of the original complaint. To the extent any facts are discernable in the amended 

complaint, they are still not presented in a manner that reveals their significance to the elements of 

a Title VII claim. Indeed, any analysis of a possible Title VII claim cannot proceed past the first 

element since it is not apparent to which protected class Plaintiffs purports to belong. 

The same can be said of any other claim Plaintiff has attempted to assert in the amended 

complaint. For example, some of that document’s attachments suggest that Plaintiff has intended 

to state causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. “[T]o establish a § 1981 claim, the plaintiff must 

prove intentional or purposeful discrimination.” DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. 

Ass’n, 879 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1989); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 

375, 391 (1982) (“§ 1981 . . . can only be violated by purposeful discrimination.”). Generally, 

there are three elements that must be pled to state a claim under § 1981: “(1) the plaintiff is a 

member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; 

and (3) the discrimination concerns one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” Keum 

v. Virgin America Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 944, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Much like a Title VII claim, 

any analysis of a purported § 1981 claim fails at the first element because the court cannot locate 

an allegation identifying Plaintiff as a racial minority. 

On a more fundamental level, Plaintiff’s style of pleading still consists of incoherent, 

stream-of-consciousness laced sentences and phrases that impede a review of the amended 

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Case No.: 5:15-cv-05492-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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complaint on its substance. Even if examined with liberality, the document falls far short of 

providing fair notice of the claims and alleging enough facts to state the elements of each claim 

plainly and succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 

(9th Cir. 1984). And considering the state of all of Plaintiff’s pleadings thus far, the court 

concludes that Plaintiff will never satisfy that standard, even as to the new claims and new 

defendants included in the amended complaint. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has again failed to allege sufficient facts to raise or present 

a cognizable legal theory, and because the amended complaint is, like its predecessor, confusing 

and rambling, the motions to dismiss will be granted and all of Plaintiffs claims will be dismissed. 

See Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981); McHenry v. Renne, 84 

F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996). This dismissal will be without leave to amend because 

permitting further amendment would be futile. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 

F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 

(9th Cir. 2008).

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the motion to strike (Dkt. No. 55) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s 

opposition and the supporting documents (Dkt. Nos. 53, 54) is STRICKEN. 

The motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 49, 50) are also GRANTED, and the amended 

complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

The hearing scheduled for October 20, 2016, is VACATED. Judgment will be entered in 

favor of Defendants and the Clerk shall close this file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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