Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03279/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03279-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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F' I LED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Ci,,:,_;=: 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR 2 0 1990 

.&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

GARY LEE McCOLPIN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

COMMISSIONERS OF CITY OF WICHITA, ) 

WICHITA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-3279 

(D.C. No. 89-3008-S) 

(D. Kansas) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

On January 9, 1989, petitioner Gary Lee Mccolpin, an inmate 

of the Kansas State Penitentiary, filed an action in federal district court claiming that on or about March 26, 1985, defendants 

violated his constitutional rights. The district court held that 

the applicable statute of limitation, K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4) (two 

years), had run, and dismissed the action. We dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the district court's order, finding that 

"appellant can make no rational argument on the law or facts in 

support of the issues raised on appeal." Mccolpin v. Commissioners, No. 89-3057, slip op. at 2 (10th Cir. June 20, 1989). 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3279 Document: 01019966400 Date Filed: 03/20/1990 Page: 1 
Mccolpin then filed a "Motion on Newly Discovered Evidence" 

in the district court on August 10, 1989. This motion did not, 

however, present any evidence. Rather, it asserted that, although 

the district court properly applied the Kansas limitation statute, 

K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), to this action, the running of the statute 

was tolled under K.S.A. § 60-515(a), with the result that 

McColpin's action was not barred. The district court found that 

this motion had to be treated as a motion to alter or amend 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and that, because it was not 

filed within ten days after entry of judgment, the motion had to 

be denied. 

The case is before us again on a motion for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis. This time we grant the motion in order to 

consider the merits of the statute of limitations argument, in 

light of a statutory amendment affecting a prior decision of this 

court on which petitioner relies. 

On appeal, petitioner renews his contention that Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 60-515(a) tolled the limitation statute such that his 

§ 1983 action was not barred. He quotes to us the first paragraph 

of that section, which provides, in relevant part: 

60-515. Persons under legal disability. 

(a) Effect. if any person entitled to bring an action 

. at the time the cause of action accrued or at any 

time during the period the statute of limitations is 

running, is ..• an incarcerated person or imprisoned 

for a term less than such person's natural life, such 

person shall be entitled to bring such action within one 

year after the person's disability is removed, except 

that no such action shall be commenced by or on behalf 

of any person under the disability more than eight years 

after the time of the act giving rise to the cause of 

action. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-3279 Document: 01019966400 Date Filed: 03/20/1990 Page: 2 
Because he falls within the scope of the quoted language, 

petitioner argues that his action is not barred. His argument 

closely tracks this court's opinion in Brown v. Bigger, 622 F.2d 

1025 (10th Cir. 1980), in which we held that the above-quoted 

language must be read literally, and that "[n]otwithstanding the 

fact appellant was able to bring this suit while incarcerated, his 

right to bring the action is not barred until one year after 

release from prison or eight years after the cause of action 

arose." Id. at 1026. 

Petitioner apparently is not aware that § 60-515(a) was 

amended in 1981 and, effective July 1 of that year, the following 

paragraph was added: 

Notwithstanding the foregoing provision [quoted above], 

if a person imprisoned for any term has access to the 

court for purposes of bringing an action, such person 

shall not be deemed to be under legal disability. 

This paragraph specifically overrules our Bigger holding. 

Accordingly, because petitioner had access to the court during the 

nearly four years that he delayed before bringing his§ 1983 

action, his action was barred under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-

513(a)(4), and his substantive argument on this appeal is devoid 

of merit. 

Of course, that argument, if it was to be presented at all, 

should have been urged in petitioner's motion for rehearing of the 

district court's order dismissing his action, and to this court in 

the appeal of that order. The current motion in no sense presents 

any ''new evidence" under Rule 60(b). It merely attempts to assert 

a legal argument which could have been, but was not, advanced 

before judgment was entered. In these circumstances it was not 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-3279 Document: 01019966400 Date Filed: 03/20/1990 Page: 3 
error to treat the motion as one to alter the judgment under Rule 

59(e), and to deny the motion as untimely. 

AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

-4-

Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-3279 Document: 01019966400 Date Filed: 03/20/1990 Page: 4