Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03101/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03101-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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Case No.16-CV-03101-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LAMONT CARL CHAPPELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE COMPUTER INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-CV-03101-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Plaintiff Lamont Carl Chappell, proceeding pro se, sues Defendant Apple Computer 

Incorporated (“Defendant” or “Apple”) for racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Before the Court is 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 23 (“Def. Mot.”). Having considered the submissions of 

the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS with leave to 

amend Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is an African-American male. ECF No. 20 (First Amended Complaint, or 

“FAC”), at. ¶ 4. Plaintiff worked for Defendant, a corporation located in Cupertino, California, 

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“in various senior manager roles” from 1992 to 1997. Id. ¶¶ 5–9. During this period, Plaintiff 

“had a successful record of achievement.” Id. ¶ 9.

After working at other companies from 1997 until 2009, id. ¶¶ 13–15, Plaintiff began 

looking for a new job in April 2009 and contacted Defendant, id. ¶ 8. Specifically, Plaintiff 

contacted Jae Allen (“Allen”), the “vice president of Operations division” at Defendant. Id. ¶ 10. 

Plaintiff knew Allen from Plaintiff’s prior employment at Defendant. Id. Plaintiff asked Allen “to 

help [Plaintiff] get an interview to join the Operations division in a senior manager or director 

role.” Id. Plaintiff states that Allen “complied eagerly, as [Allen] was familiar with [Plaintiff’s] 

prior record at Apple.” Id. 

Allen referred Plaintiff to Walter Freeman (“Freeman”). Id. ¶ 11. In August 2010, 

Freeman interviewed Plaintiff for a position as “Global Sourcing Manager” in AppleCare Field 

Services. Id. ¶ 11 & Ex. A. Within one week of the interview, Plaintiff was informed that 

Plaintiff was denied the position. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff states that he was denied the job despite being 

“the most qualified for the position interviewed for with Walter Freeman.” Id ¶. 19. According to 

Plaintiff, Freeman’s “qualifications and experience were far inferior to [Plaintiff’s], which was 

very obvious [to Plaintiff] during the interview.” Id. ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff further alleges that he “found out within a week that [he] was denied the position, 

even though [his] resume and experience far exceeded the Apple manager’s [he] interviewed 

with.” Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff then asked Allen whether Plaintiff’s consulting company could be 

considered for a supplier role with Defendant. Id. ¶ 20. Allen again directed Plaintiff to Freeman. 

Id. Freeman told Plaintiff that Apple was not interested, but Freeman did not do any “due 

diligence” into Plaintiff’s company prior to rejecting Plaintiff’s offer. Id.

Plaintiff “continued to have discussions with Apple Inc. from August 2010 to August 

2011” in order “to address the discrimination” that Plaintiff alleged about his application process. 

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Id. ¶ 28. According to Plaintiff, “[o]n August 18, 2011 Apple Inc. human resources executive 

Pam Oyanagi officially ended discussions” with Plaintiff about Plaintiff’s discrimination 

allegation. Id. ¶ 29 & Ex. B. 

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) on August 23, 2011. Id. ¶ 30. On March 3, 2016, the EEOC issued 

Plaintiff a right to sue letter. Id. ¶¶ 31–32 & Ex. C. 

On June 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant. ECF No. 5. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendant violated Title VII by failing to employ Plaintiff 

because of Plaintiff’s race. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2. Plaintiff stated that Plaintiff interviewed for positions in 

Defendant’s Computer Operation’s Division in August and September 2010. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff’s 

complaint provided August 2010 as the date that the “alleged discrimination occurred.” Id. 

Plaintiff stated that he filed an EEOC charge regarding Defendant’s conduct in August 2011. Id. 

at ¶¶ 2–3.

On July 1, 2016, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant argued that Plaintiff had failed to 

timely exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant lawsuit. Id. at 3. 

Specifically, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff filed his administrative charge with the EEOC “a 

full year after the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred, far beyond the 180-day time period 

within which Plaintiff was required to file his charge of discrimination.” Id. at 3. Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss also asserted that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim for racial discrimination, 

even assuming that Plaintiff timely filed his administrative charge. Id. at 8.

Plaintiff amended his complaint on July 22, 2016. See FAC. Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint included allegations regarding Plaintiff’s “continued . . . discussions with Apple Inc. 

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from August 2010 to August 2011, to address the discrimination alleged by Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 28. In 

light of Plaintiff’s amendment of his complaint, the Court denied as moot Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss on July 24, 2016. ECF No. 21. 

On August 5, 2016, Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) 

and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Def. Mot. Defendant again asserted that 

Plaintiff had failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies and that Plaintiff had failed to 

state a claim. Id. at 5–12. Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s motion to dismiss on August 19, 2016. 

ECF No. 32 (“Pl. Op.”).

1 Defendant replied on August 26, 2016. ECF No. 34.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The party asserting federal subject 

matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proving its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto 

Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). The party carries that burden by putting forth “the 

 

1

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss refers to numerous specific emails 

that Plaintiff had with individuals that worked at Apple. Pl. Op. at 2–4. The details of these 

emails were not alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. For purposes of ruling on Defendant’s motion 

under 12(b)(6), the Court does not consider these additional details as they are outside of the 

pleadings. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that, on a motion to 

dismiss, the Court is limited to “allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the 

complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.”). The Court does, however, consider 

the fact that Plaintiff had communications with Defendant from 2010 to 2011, which is alleged in 

Plaintiff’s complaint. See FAC ¶ 28. The Court also considers the email that Plaintiff received 

from Oyanagi, which is attached to Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. Ex. B. 

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss also raises an “evidentiary 

objection” to page 2, lines 9–13, of Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 5. However, the lines to 

which Plaintiff objects are Defendant’s legal argument, and are thus not asserted by Defendant as 

“evidence.” See Def. Mot. at 2. Moreover, because the Court evaluates Plaintiff’s complaint in 

the context of Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), evidence or “evidentiary 

objections” are not relevant at this stage of the proceedings. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 

(9th Cir. 2001) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.”).

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manner and degree of evidence required” by whatever stage of the litigation the case has reached. 

Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an 

action for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). 

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 

However, a court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, 

Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and a “court may look beyond the 

plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into 

one for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor must the 

Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011). Mere “conclusory 

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” 

Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. Leave to Amend

If the court concludes that a motion to dismiss should be granted, it must then decide 

whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave 

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to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose 

of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 

technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Nonetheless, a district court may deny leave to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, bad faith 

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 

522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues in its motion to dismiss that Plaintiff filed an untimely charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC. Def. Mot. at 5. Defendant further contends that, even assuming 

that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge was timely, Plaintiff’s complaint has failed to state a claim for relief. 

Id. at 9–10. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff failed 

to timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and accordingly grants with leave to 

amend Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Title VII. Title VII makes it unlawful for an 

employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s race.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “In order to bring a Title VII claim in district court, a plaintiff must first 

exhaust [his] administrative remedies.” Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 

2001). More specifically, “[t]imely exhaustion of administrative remedies is a statutory 

requirement to filing suit under Title VII.” Ilaw v. Daughters of Charity Hlth. Sys., 2011 WL 

4368717, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2011) (emphasis added). 

Under Title VII, timely exhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a charge with the EEOC 

“within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If, however, a plaintiff has initially instituted proceedings with a state 

or local agency with authority to grant relief from the allegedly unlawful employment practice, a 

plaintiff has “three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred” to file 

a charge with the EEOC, or a plaintiff has “thirty days after receiving notice that the state or local 

agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier.” Id.

“[A]lthough Title VII requires that plaintiffs timely exhaust administrative remedies, 

‘filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit 

in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, 

and equitable tolling.’” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982)). Accordingly, because the 

timely exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement, the Court will 

analyze Defendant’s exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies argument in the context of 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim, rather than Rule 

12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Blank, 2014 WL 1577313, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 17, 2014) (noting that a defendant’s exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies argument 

“must be analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim, and not 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction”); see also Ilaw, 2011 

WL 4368717, at *3–4 (dismissing a Title VII claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff’s 

failure to timely exhaust his administrative remedies appeared on the face of plaintiff’s 

complaint); Pellerin v. Huron Consulting Grp., Inc., 2010 WL 3769334, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 

2010) (same). 

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that he interviewed for a position with Defendant in August 2010. 

FAC ¶ 11. Plaintiff states that he “found out within a week that [he] was denied the position.” Id. 

¶ 12. The face of Plaintiff’s FAC shows, however, that Plaintiff did not file a charge with the 

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EEOC until August 23, 2011. Id. ¶ 30. Accordingly, even assuming that Plaintiff interviewed 

with Defendant on August 31, 2010, and thus assuming that Plaintiff found out that he was not 

hired a week later in September 2010, Plaintiff filed his charge with the EEOC well outside of the 

180-day window. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Moreover, even if Plaintiff instituted 

proceedings with a state or local agency prior to filing his charge with the EEOC—a fact that 

Plaintiff does not allege—Plaintiff’s EEOC charge would still be untimely under the longer 300-

day window applicable to individuals that have first filed with an authorized state or local agency. 

Id.

Plaintiff contends that his EEOC charge is timely because Defendant “shut off negotiations 

on [Plaintiff’s] discrimination claim” on August 18, 2011. Pl. Op. at 3. Plaintiff attached to his 

FAC an email that was sent to Plaintiff by Pam Oyanagi (“Oyanagi”), an Apple Employee 

Relations Consultant, on August 18, 2011. FAC Ex. B. Oyanagi’s email refers to Defendant’s 

investigation into Plaintiff’s discrimination allegation, and states that “Apple considers this matter 

closed.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that he filed his charge with the EEOC soon after receiving this 

email, on August 23, 2011, within the statutory window. See FAC ¶ 30.

Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive. In Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco, 

the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ failure-to-hire claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 

accrued on the date that “the plaintiffs received notice they would not be hired,” even though the

plaintiffs did not know that they were not hired for a discriminatory reason until years later. 535 

F. 3d 1044, 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). Lukovsky’s holding is equally applicable to failure-to-hire 

claims brought under Title VII, and it has been applied in Title VII cases where plaintiffs failed to 

timely exhaust Title VII’s administrative remedies. See, e.g., Rivera v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 

2016 WL 374180, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016) (applying Lukovsky and dismissing Title VII 

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claim because the plaintiff failed to timely file an EEOC charge of discrimination within 180 days 

of receiving notice that he was not hired). 

Accordingly, under Lukovsky, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim accrued at the time that Plaintiff 

learned that he was not hired. See Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1051. Here, Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that 

Plaintiff learned that he was not hired one week after his interview in August 2010. FAC ¶ 12. 

Thus, from the face of Plaintiff’s FAC, Plaintiff failed to timely file a charge with the EEOC 

within the time window required by Title VII. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s FAC states that Plaintiff “continued to have discussions with Apple 

Inc. from August 2010 to August 2011, to address the discrimination alleged by Plaintiff.” FAC ¶ 

28 (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff’s FAC shows that Plaintiff was aware in August 2010 that 

Defendant failed to hire Plaintiff for a potentially discriminatory reason. Plaintiff’s argument 

regarding when his discrimination claim accrued is accordingly less compelling than the argument 

that the Ninth Circuit rejected in Lukovsky. See Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048 (recognizing that the 

plaintiffs had no reason to believe that a discriminatory motive was behind their discharge until 

years after the plaintiffs were notified they did not receive the job). 

In sum, the face of Plaintiff’s FAC shows that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge was untimely filed. 

Plaintiff’s claim accrued in August 2010—or, at the latest, the first week of September—and 

Plaintiff filed his EEOC charge over 300 days after this date. Plaintiff accordingly failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court, a requirement of Title VII. 

See Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 707. 

Nonetheless, although Plaintiff’s filing with the EEOC was untimely, as stated above, Title 

VII’s “time period for filing a charge remains subject to application of equitable doctrines such as 

tolling or estoppel.” Nat’l R. R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). “Where 

the running of the statute of limitations appears on the face of a complaint, a plaintiff must allege 

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facts to support a plausible claim that the equitable tolling doctrine applies in order to survive a 

motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Ilaw, 2012 WL 

381240, at *4 n.4. 

Here, Plaintiff’s FAC does not allege any facts to indicate that equitable tolling or estoppel 

is warranted. “A party asserting equitable tolling must demonstrate that: (1) he has been diligent 

in pursuing his rights, and (2) extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing on time.” 

Ilaw v. Daughters of Charity Hlth. Sys., 2012 WL 381240, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012). 

Plaintiff refers in his opposition to the “negotiations” that Plaintiff had with Defendant between 

August 2010 and 2011. Pl. Op. at 2–4. However, Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that these 

communications warrant equitable tolling of Title VII’s filing requirements. The doctrine of 

equitable tolling “is to be applied sparingly and is reserved only for ‘extreme cases,’ which is 

typically only ‘when the statute of limitations was not complied with because of defective 

pleadings, when a claimant was tricked by an adversary into letting a deadline expire, [or] when 

the EEOC’s notice of the statutory period was clearly inadequate.” Ilaw, 2012 WL 381240, at *5–

6 (quoting Scholar v. Pac Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267–68 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Long v. Paulson, 

349 F. App’x 145, 146 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff] failed to show that his alleged inability to 

receive notice of his claim due to his hospitalization was anything more than ‘a garden variety 

claim of excusable neglect’ which does not justify the application of equitable tolling” (quoting 

Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). Plaintiff’s FAC alleges no facts that 

indicate that any similar “extraordinary circumstances” are present here. See Ilaw, 2012 WL 

381240, at *7 (dismissing Plaintiff’s Title VII claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff did “not 

ple[a]d the existence of any extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from filing” on time). 

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss.2 However, because it is 

not clear that amendment of Plaintiff’s FAC is futile, and because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se,

3

the Court will allow Plaintiff leave to amend to allege sufficient facts, if any, as to why his Title 

VII claim should not be dismissed with prejudice for failure to timely exhaust. See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1127 (“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the 

pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to 

amend. Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

herein, Plaintiff shall do so within thirty (30) days of this Order. Failure to meet the thirty-day 

deadline to file an amended complaint or failure to cure the deficiencies identified in this Order 

will result in a dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff may not add new causes of 

action or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to Rule 15 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

 

2 Given the untimeliness of Plaintiff’s administrative filing with the EEOC, the Court need not 

reach Defendant’s additional argument that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because Plaintiff 

has failed to allege a prima facie case for racial discrimination. Def. Mot. at 9–10. 

3

In denying as moot Defendant’s first motion to dismiss, the Court referred Plaintiff to the Federal 

Pro Se Program. ECF No. 21, at 2. The Court again refers Plaintiff to the Federal Pro Se 

Program, which provides free legal advice to pro se individuals. Appointments may be made with 

the Federal Pro Se Program by calling (408) 297-1480, or by stopping by Room 2070 at the San 

Jose Courthouse, 280 South First Street, San Jose, CA 95113. More information is available at 

hppt://www.cand.uscourts.gov/helpcenterssj. 

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