Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00518/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00518-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ENGINEERING ARRESTING 

SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

ATECH, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-00518-MHH

(FILED UNDER SEAL)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Engineered Arresting System Corporation (ESCO) alleges that defendants 

Atech, Inc., SCAMA AB, and Phillip Ahagen infringed on ESCO’s “BAK-12” 

trademark in violation of the Lanham Act when the defendants responded to a United 

States Air Force solicitation for BAK-12 and PORTARREST-IV/BAK-12 mobile 

aircraft arresting systems. (Doc. 39, p. 17). In addition to its trademark infringement 

claim, ESCO asserts claims of false designation of origin and false advertising in 

violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and common law unfair competition and 

 

1 The Court is issuing this opinion during a declared national emergency concerning COVID19. To enable parties to pursue their rights during this emergency, the Court is continuing its 

work. For information about the timing of appeals, please review the information provided in the 

conclusion of this opinion. The Court is including this procedural information in each opinion that 

it issues during the national emergency.

FILED

 2020 Mar-31 PM 02:28

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 1 of 17
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trademark infringement claims. (Doc. 39, pp. 19–21). The Court already has held 

that the defendants did not infringe ESCO’s trademarks. (Doc. 146, pp. 38, 41 –

SEALED). The defendants now ask the Court to enter judgment in their favor on 

the balance of ESCO’s claims. (Doc. 154). For the following reasons, the Court 

grants the defendants’ motion. 

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute 

as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a motion 

for summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), 

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 

“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials 

in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

When considering a summary judgment motion, a district court must view the 

evidence in the record and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party. Asalde v. First Class Parking Sys. LLC, 898 F.3d 1136, 1138 

(11th Cir. 2018). Because ESCO is the non-movant, the Court will present the 

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 2 of 17
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evidence in the light most favorable to it.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case concerns a USAF procurement of aircraft arresting systems for the 

Polish Air Force (PAF). An aircraft arresting system is a mechanical system used 

to rapidly decelerate aircraft as they land. (Doc. 136-35, p. 2, ¶ 5). An aircraft 

arresting system absorbs the forward momentum of aircraft landing in small spaces 

or emergencies to prevent the aircraft from overrunning the landing zone. (Doc. 

136-35, pp. 2–3, ¶ 5). 

An aircraft arresting system consists of an energy absorber and an engagement 

system. (Doc. 136-35, p. 4, ¶¶ 10–11). An energy absorber is a friction brake, 

hydraulic brake, or textile brake. (Doc. 136-35, p. 4, ¶ 10). The engagement system 

connects the landing aircraft to the energy absorber. (Doc. 136-35, p. 4, ¶ 11). An 

engagement system may consist of a net, cable, or engineered materials. (Doc. 136-

35, p. 4, ¶ 11). The landing aircraft makes contact with the engagement system, and 

the energy absorber dissipates the kinetic energy of the aircraft. (Doc. 136-35, p. 4, 

¶¶ 10–11). 

ESCO is the world’s leading designer and manufacturer of military aircraft 

arresting systems. (Doc. 136-35, p. 3, ¶ 6). The BAK-12 arresting system is one of 

ESCO’s main products. (Doc. 136-35, p. 3, ¶ 6). The BAK-12 system is a 

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 3 of 17
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mechanical rotary friction brake that uses a cable-hook system to decelerate a 

landing aircraft. (Doc. 136-35, p. 4, ¶ 13). 

On October 23, 2012, USAF issued a solicitation to procure for PAF “two (2) 

BAK-12 Above Grade Fixed Hook Cable Systems” and “one (1) PORTARRESTIV/BAK-12 ‘Mobile’ Hook Cable System.” (Doc. 39-2, pp. 4–5). At the time of 

the solicitation, ESCO was the only manufacturer of the BAK-12, (Doc. 136-7, p. 

37), and ten of ESCO’s BAK-12 systems were installed across five PAF bases, (Doc. 

136-36, p. 2, ¶ 5). 

In response to the solicitation, ESCO submitted a proposal to USAF. (Doc. 

103-4, p. 34). Defendants Atech and SCAMA submitted a joint proposal. (Doc. 

136-8, pp. 15–16; Doc. 136-32, p. 3 – SEALED). SCAMA represented that it “[wa]s 

technically qualified and capable of engineering and supplying on a turnkey basis 

fully functional aircraft arrester systems as specified under the mentioned USAF 

solicitations.” (Doc. 136-28, p. 15 – SEALED). Atech made similar representations 

that it could provide “USAF Standard BAK-12 equipment.” (Doc. 163-4, p. 7 –

SEALED).2 USAF understood that Atech “was presenting itself as a new competitor 

to ESCO . . . .” (Doc. 74-1, p. 3, ¶ 7). 

After evaluating the proposals, USAF determined that “multiple vendors were 

 

2 Currently, Atech and SCAMA both sell BAK-12 systems, systems they identify on their websites

as the “USAF standard.” (Doc. 160-4, p. 2; Doc. 160-5, p. 2).

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capable of providing th[e] requested equipment[,]” including ESCO and 

SCAMA/Atech. (Doc. 74-1, p. 2, ¶ 5). The “Defense Contract Management Agency 

conducted a pre-award survey [] to assess Atech’s overall production capability.” 

(Doc. 74-1, p. 3, ¶ 9). Based on the survey results, “DCMA concluded that Atech

had the capability to satisfy the contract, if awarded.” (Doc. 74-1, p. 3, ¶ 9). 

Following the pre-award survey, Jeffrey S. Smith, the contracting officer responsible 

for the BAK-12 contract, “concluded . . . that Atech’s proposal was the lowest price 

technically acceptable offer.” (Doc. 74-1, p. 3, ¶ 10). USAF awarded the PAF 

contract to the defendants on May 21, 2013. (Doc. 136-33, p. 2). 

ESCO sued the defendants on March 21, 2014, (Doc. 1), and amended its 

complaint on May 15, 2014, (Doc. 39). In its amended complaint, ESCO alleges

trademark infringement in violation of § 32 of the Lanham Act. (Doc. 39, pp. 17–

18). The Court has held, as a matter of law, that “BAK-12” is a generic mark. (Doc. 

146, p. 24 – SEALED). The Court maintains that holding as it examines Ethe 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on ESCO’s false designation of origin 

and false advertising claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and ESCO’s common 

law unfair competition and trademark infringement claims. (Doc. 154). 

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III. ANALYSIS

A. § 43(a) of the Lanham Act 

ESCO asserts an unfair competition claim and a false designation of origin 

claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The claims pertain to Atech/SCAMA’s 

representations to USAF that they could provide “USAF standard” BAK-12 

systems. (Doc. 162-1, p. 15 – SEALED). To establish liability under § 43(a) of the 

Lanham Act, “a plaintiff must show (1) that it had trademark rights in the mark or 

name at issue and (2) that the other party had adopted a mark or name that was the 

same, or confusingly similar to its mark, such that consumers were likely to confuse 

the two.” Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations and 

citation omitted). 

“To satisfy the first element of § 43(a) . . . a plaintiff need not have a registered 

mark.” Tana, 611 F.3d at 773. But to receive protection under § 43(a), a mark must 

be “distinctive,” i.e., capable of distinguishing the holder’s goods from others’ 

goods. Tartell v. S. Fla. Sinus & Allergy Ctr., Inc., 790 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 

2015). The Eleventh Circuit recognizes four categories of “distinctive” marks: (1) 

generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. Gift of Learning 

Found., Inc. v. TGC, Inc., 329 F.3d 792, 797–98 (11th Cir. 2003). 

The Court has held that “BAK-12” is a generic mark. (Doc. 146, p. 24 –

SEALED). “Generic marks . . . are generally incapable of receiving trademark 

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protection . . . .” Tana, 611 F.3d at 774 (citing Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 

F.3d 1351, 1358 (11th Cir. 2007)). Atech and SCAMA argue that an unfair 

competition claim cannot be based on a generic mark. (Doc. 154, pp. 2–3). The 

Court agrees. See Gift of Learning, 329 F.3d at 802 (concluding that “descriptive” 

mark that did not acquire secondary meaning could not sustain an unfair competition 

claim under Florida law, a claim analogous to unfair competition under the Lanham 

Act); see also Knights Armament Co. v. Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., 654 F.3d 1179, 

1189 n.19 (11th Cir. 2011) (“As . . . [plaintiff] did not have enforceable rights in the 

. . . mark prior to [defendant’s] first use of the mark, [plaintiff] does not prevail on 

its remaining unfair competition counterclaims.”). “Accordingly, there is no need 

to engage in an analysis of likelihood of confusion . . . .” Gift of Learning, 329 F.3d 

at 802.

ESCO argues that “[a]ffirmative reliance on consumer mistake and confusion 

is actionable [under § 43(a)] even if . . . BAK-12 is generic. Such a holding is 

mandated by Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co. . . . .” (Doc. 162-1, p. 6 – SEALED). 

As ESCO concedes in its response brief, Kellogg requires only “that the defendant[s] 

use reasonable care to inform the public of the source of its product.” Kellogg v. 

Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113–14 (1938). The defendants did so here: 

“[B]ased on the assertions Atech made during the procurement process, the USAF 

understood that Atech was presenting itself as a new competitor to ESCO . . . .” 

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(Doc. 103-9, p. 4, ¶ 7). Accordingly, the Court’s conclusion is consistent with 

Kellogg, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on ESCO’s unfair 

competition and false designation of origin claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 

B. False Advertising 

To establish a claim for false advertising under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff 

must show that:

(1) the defendant’s statements were false or misleading; (2) the 

statements deceived, or had the capacity to deceive, consumers; (3) the 

deception had a material effect on the consumers’ purchasing decision; 

(4) the misrepresented service affects interstate commerce; and (5) [the 

plaintiff] has been, or likely will be, injured as a result of the false or 

misleading statement.

Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order v. Fla. Priory of Knights Hospitallers, 702 

F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 

ESCO bases its false advertising claim on “[the defendants’] claims that the 

BAK-12 systems . . . are the ‘USAF Standard’ (or similar variations of this same 

claim); and . . . [the defendants’] use of the [USAF] Contract . . . to obtain additional 

business.” (Doc. 162-1, p. 20 – SEALED). ESCO points to Atech’s claim on its 

website that it sells BAK-12 systems, systems that are “[t]he current USAF 

operational Aircraft Arresting System.” (Doc. 162-1, p. 20 – SEALED (quoting 

Doc. 160-4, p. 2)). ESCO also points to SCAMA’s claim on its website that it sells 

“the USAF standard BAK-12.” (Doc. 162-1, p. 20 – SEALED (quoting Doc. 160-

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 8 of 17
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5, p. 2)). These statements satisfy the first element of a false advertising claim under 

§ 43(a) only if they are “claims that are literally false as a factual matter or claims 

that may be literally true or ambiguous but which convey a false impression.” 

Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(quotations and citation omitted).

ESCO has not demonstrated that Atech and SCAMA’s “USAF standard” 

language is literally false. See Hickson Corp., 357 F.3d at 1261. On the record in 

this case, ESCO cannot meet that burden. Christopher Peisher, a USAF Aircraft 

Arresting System Engineer, stated that “‘[t]he USAF considers the term ‘BAK-12’ 

to be the USAF’s equipment designation for an aircraft arresting system that 

complies with the military standard for such systems.’” (Doc. 149, pp. 29–30 

(quoting Doc. 103-2, p. 3, ¶ 3)). Mr. Peisher testified that if a manufacturer were to 

provide to USAF a system that incorporated the technical data package that USAF 

has for the BAK-12 system, he would call such system a “BAK-12.” (Doc. 136-7, 

pp. 183–84). Thus, Atech’s representation on its website that BAK-12 systems are 

“[t]he current standard USAF operational Aircraft Arresting System” and SCAMA’s 

representation that it has sold “the USAF standard BAK-12” are literally true. 

ESCO argues that these statements, even if not literally false, could mislead 

consumers in at least three ways: (1) by representing that the defendants’ systems 

are the same as the USAF’s system; (2) by representing that the USAF has tested the 

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defendants’ systems; and (3) by representing that the defendants are USAF-approved 

suppliers of BAK-12 systems. (Doc. 162-1, p. 21). To establish that a representation 

is literally true but misleading, a plaintiff must “‘present evidence of deception’ in 

the form of consumer surveys, market research, expert testimony or other evidence.” 

Hickson Corp., 357 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 

1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002)). ESCO has not done so 

in this case. 

ESCO has provided no evidence to support its contention that “USAF 

standard” misrepresents to consumers that the defendants’ systems are the same as 

USAF’s systems. The record here tends to support the opposite conclusion: The 

USAF inspected and approved Atech’s BAK-12 system. (Doc. 136-7, p. 37, tpp. 

139–40 – SEALED; Doc. 136-23, pp. 41–42, tpp. 157–58; Doc. 136-33, p. 2).

Because USAF has inspected and approved Atech’s BAK-12 system, the defendants 

use of “USAF standard” legitimately may “be interpreted by consumers to mean that 

. . . Defendants’ systems have been tested by the USAF . . . and/or [] Defendants are 

USAF-approved suppliers of [BAK-12] systems . . . .” (Doc. 162-1, p. 21 –

SEALED). And ESCO has provided no evidence that a consumer would be misled 

by the defendants’ use of “USAF standard.” ESCO’s unsubstantiated assertions do 

not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56. 

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ESCO argues that the defendants made to the USAF and the PAF several false 

or misleading statements that could support a false advertising claim. (Doc. 162-1, 

pp. 12–15). ESCO’s argument seems to be that, while not actually false, the 

defendants’ statements confused or misled USAF and PAF officials. (Doc. 162-1, 

pp. 10–11). ESCO points to the Brand Name Justification, which, ESCO argues, 

“incorrectly indicated that SCAMA and Atech were distributors, vendors, or sellers 

of products manufactured by ESCO.” (Doc. 162-1, p. 12). This argument fails 

because ESCO equates “products manufactured by ESCO” and “BAK-12.” The 

Court has rejected that characterization of BAK-12. (Doc. 146, p. 28 – SEALED) 

(“Any manufacturer can produce a BAK-12 according to USAF’s drawing package 

of technical specifications for the BAK-12.”). And the argument assumes 

misleading statements by the defendants, using the USAF’s alleged confusion as 

evidence that the defendants in fact made a misleading statement. There is no 

evidence to support this assumption. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that the 

defendants expressly disclaimed affiliation with ESCO. According to Jeffrey S. 

Smith, the USAF contracting officer for the BAK-12 contract, “the USAF 

understood that Atech was presenting itself as a new competitor to ESCO . . . .” 

(Doc. 103-9, p. 4, ¶ 7). According to Mr. Smith, “Atech’s proposal did not state that 

Atech was simply a re-seller of distributor of ESCO’s BAK-12 systems . . . nor did 

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 11 of 17
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Atech in any way suggest that it would provide ESCO-assembled products to the 

USAF if awarded the contract.” (Doc. 103-9, p. 4, ¶ 7). 

Regarding the PAF, ESCO argues that “it is clear that the PAF wanted 

ESCO’s systems and parts for this project . . . . Unsurprisingly, the PAF was 

confused that it did not receive ESCO’s systems.” (Doc. 162-1, pp. 13–14 –

SEALED). This argument suffers from the same defects as ESCO’s argument 

regarding the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations to the USAF. First, it 

improperly equates “BAK-12” and ESCO’s products. While ESCO makes BAK-12 

systems, ESCO no longer is the sole manufacturer of BAK-as systems. Second,

USAF solicited and evaluated the bids for “two (2) BAK-12 Above Grade Fixed 

Hook Cable Systems” and “one (1) PORTARREST-IV/BAK-12 ‘Mobile’ Hook 

Cable System” for PAF. (Doc. 39-2, pp. 4–5; Doc. 74-1, p. 2, ¶ 5; Doc. 74-1, p. 3, 

¶ 9). USAF “concluded . . . that Atech’s proposal was the lowest price technically 

acceptable offer,” (Doc. 74-1, p. 3, ¶ 10), and USAF awarded the PAF contract to 

the defendants, (Doc. 136-33, p. 2). If PAF was confused, USAF is responsible for 

the confusion, not the defendants. There is no evidence that the defendants made 

statements, false or otherwise, to PAF. 

C. Alabama Unfair Competition 

Under Alabama law, “‘no word or combination of words can be exclusively 

appropriated if it is merely descriptive of . . . the quality, style, character, grade, or 

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class of goods.’” Fuqua v. Roberts, 110 So. 2d 886, 889 (Ala. 1959) (quoting 87 

C.J.S. Trade-Marks, etc. § 33 p. 268)); cf. Jefferson Home Furniture Co., Inc. v. 

Jefferson Furniture Co., Inc., 349 So. 2d 5, 8 (Ala. 1977) (concluding that unfair 

competition claim failed where plaintiff did not demonstrate that generic geographic 

name acquired secondary meaning). “BAK-12” is generic as a matter of law. (Doc. 

146, p. 24 – SEALED). Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on ESCO’s unfair competition claim under Alabama law. 

D. ESCO’s Request for Additional Discovery

ESCO has asked the Court to defer ruling on the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment until “ESCO is allowed to obtain the discovery it needs . . . .” 

(Doc. 159, pp. 1–2, ¶ 2). ESCO claims that it needs to conduct discovery on the 

following: 

(1) the status of the Contract and whether the equipment has been put 

into operation, what drawings for BAK-12 systems were used or 

possessed by Defendants prior to and during the fulfilment of the 

Contract, and Defendants’ communications with the Polish Air Force . 

. . after the Contract was awarded and through the present; (2) any 

testing of Defendants’ relevant arresting systems, by the United States 

Air Force . . . or otherwise and any approval . . . by USAF of Defendants 

as a supplier of the relevant systems; (3) advertising/promotional 

activities related [sic] Defendants’ systems, including . . . Defendants’ 

responses to solicitations other than the Polish systems and use of or 

reliance on the Contract in relation to the same, and various claims 

made on Defendants’ website; (4) . . . Defendants’ profits related to its 

sales of those systems; and (5) Defendant Philip Ahagen’s involvement 

in and control over the activities of Defendants Atech and SCAMA. 

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 13 of 17
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(Doc. 159, pp. 3–4, ¶ 5). 

“Before entering summary judgment the district court must ensure that the 

parties have had an adequate opportunity for discovery.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. 

Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1990). For the district court 

to grant a non-moving party’s Rule 56(d) request to defer consideration of a motion 

for summary judgment, the non-moving party “must show that ‘postponement of a 

ruling on the motion will enable [it], by discovery or other means, to rebut the 

movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.’” Smedley v. Deutsche 

Bank Tr. Co. Americas, 676 Fed. Appx. 860, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fla. 

Power, 893 F.2d at 1316) (alteration in original). ESCO has not made that showing 

here. 

ESCO does not need more discovery from the defendants regarding its unfair 

competition claim. ESCO contends that additional discovery “will reveal that 

Defendants took additional efforts . . . to maintain and engender [] continued 

confusion by the PAF and to palm off its products as ESCO’s products or equivalent 

to ESCO’s products . . . .” (Doc. 159, pp. 4–5, ¶ 8(a)). The Court granted summary 

judgment as to ESCO’s unfair competitions claim is based on the Court’s prior 

holding that “BAK-12” is a generic mark. Additional discovery will not change the 

fact that “BAK-12” is generic as a matter of law. Moreover, as discussed, in its 

communications with USAF—communications provided to ESCO—Atech 

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expressly disclaimed affiliation with ESCO. (Doc. 103-9, p. 4, ¶ 7). Accordingly, 

ESCO is not entitled to additional discovery regarding its unfair competition claim. 

Regarding false advertising, ESCO took 30(b)(6) depositions of SCAMA, 

(Doc. 136-8), and Atech, (Doc. 136-14). ESCO took the depositions of USAF 

Aircraft Arresting System Engineer Christopher Peisher, (Doc. 136-7), and USAF 

Contracting Officer Jeffrey Smith, (Doc. 136-23). “ESCO has all the defendants’ 

proposal documents, all of the defendants’ pre-award communications with USAF, 

all of the defendants’ pre-award communications between the various individuals 

who worked on the proposal, and communications among USAF personnel.” (Doc. 

146, p. 20 – SEALED (citations omitted)). These are the types of discovery 

materials that ESCO needs to demonstrate false advertising by the defendants. 

ESCO asserts that it still needs from the defendants three categories of 

information: (1) the current status of the USAF contract, (2) defendants’ 

communications with PAF, and (3) the “drawing packages Defendants relied on in 

connection with the Polish systems . . . .” (Doc. 159, p. 6, ¶ 9(b)). According to 

ESCO, all three categories “would confirm that [the defendants’] advertising related 

to their ability to provide ‘USAF standard’ systems is literally false, or . . . 

misleading to consumers . . . .” (Doc. 159, p. 6, ¶ 9(b)). 

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 15 of 17
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ESCO had ample opportunity to discover all three categories of information. 

ESCO had the opportunity at SCAMA’s deposition to ask about the company’s 

communications with PAF and the process by which the defendants executed the 

USAF contract. ESCO did not have the same opportunity at Atech’s deposition—

the scope of that deposition was limited to issues of personal jurisdiction—but since 

then, ESCO has had an adequate opportunity to discover and supplement the record 

with the information it now seeks. Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, none 

of this information is relevant, given the fact that USAF handled the bid solicitation 

and award for the PAF contract, and USAF knew that ESCO and Atech/SCAMA 

were offering competing BAK-12 products.

ESCO would like to have information about the current status of the USAF 

contract and the defendants’ post-contract sales to show that “Defendants have [] 

used and intend to use the Contract to sell additional BAK-12 systems or parts, 

presumably without explaining to potential customers that the Polish systems . . . are 

untested and Defendants are not USAF-approved suppliers of those systems.” (Doc. 

159, pp. 5–6, ¶ 9(a)). But USAF has approved Atech/SCAMA as producers of BAK12 systems. If Atech or SCAMA says this is so, neither is providing misleading 

information. 

Thus, no more discovery is needed on ESCO’s false advertising claim. 

Case 5:14-cv-00518-MHH Document 171 Filed 03/31/20 Page 16 of 17
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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on ESCO’s remaining claims, (Doc. 154), and denies ESCO’s 

Rule 56(d) request to defer consideration of the motion for summary judgment, 

(Doc. 159). The Court will enter a separate order closing this case. 

The recent General Order Regarding Court Operations During the Public 

Health Emergency Caused by the COVID-19 Virus (N.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2020) does 

not affect the deadline to challenge a final order or judgment on appeal. See

https://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/general-order-regarding-court-operations-duringpublic-health-emergency-caused-covid-19-virus, p. 2, ¶ 7. The parties are reminded 

that under Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party may 

request an extension of time for a notice of appeal. In addition, pursuant to Rule 

4(a)(6), a party may ask a district court to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal 

for 14 days. Parties are advised to study these rules carefully if exigent 

circumstances created by the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency require motions 

under FRAP 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6).

DONE and ORDERED this March 31, 2020.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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