Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01794/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01794-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

1 Plaintiff was advised by Order of this Court on numerous occasions as to the

proper procedures to follow when drafting and filing a Response/Opposition to a Motion for

Summary Judgment. More specifically, Plaintiff was directly advised by this Court which

federal and local rules are applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment and how to comply

therewith. She was further advised that noncompliance with those Rules may be deemed a

consent to the denial or granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment and that the Court

may dispose of the motion summarily-without further explanation. (Doc. 55). Despite being

so advised, Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with the Federal and Local Rules.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ramona Lopez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

John E. Potter,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 05-1794-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 47), wherein Defendant requests that the Court enter summary judgment in his favor

and against Plaintiff because there are no genuine issues of material fact, and thus,

Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and LRCiv 56.1. In

response to his motion, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Dismiss in Opposition to Defendants [sic]

Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff’s 1st Response.” (Doc. 60).1

 Plaintiff, however, did

not file a Separate Statement of Facts, nor did her Response conform with the Federal or

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

2 LRCiv 56.1 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

3 Because Plaintiff failed to file a Separate Statement of Facts, contrary to Local Rule

56.1(b), the background facts were gleaned primarily from Defendant’s Memorandum of

Points and Authorities (Doc. 47) and Defendant’s Statement of Facts in Support of its Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) and are based on evidence in the record.

- 2 -

Local Rules of Civil Procedure.2

 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to comport with the

Rules, the Court will address the merits of her claims. 

In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following: Employment

Discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq.

(“Rehabilitation Act”)(Count One); Employment Discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 (“Title VII”)(Count Two);

and Retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII (Count Three).

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff joined the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) as a full time employee in

December 1998 as a mail processing clerk, which is the position she held at all times relevant

to the alleged discriminatory conduct in each of her EEO claims. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 1, 10, 14, 33,

66, 72, 83.)

This lawsuit is based upon the formal EEO complaints Plaintiff filed with the USPS

alleging that she was discriminated on the bases of race, sex, national origin, physical and

mental disability, and retaliation. The complaints were denominated during the administrative

process as Agency Case Nos. 1E-853-0083-00 (EEO 83-00 or the ASP Claim),

1F–853-0062-03 (EEO 62-03 or the Dilettoso Claim), I F-853-0077-03 (EEO 77-03 or the

2003 Rio Salado Claim), and 1F-853-0044-04 (EEO 44-04 or the 2004 Rio Salado Claim).

At the time of the first alleged act of discrimination, Plaintiff was employed as a

“Level 4 Part-Time Flexible (PTF) Mail Processor” at the USPS’s Phoenix Processing and

Distribution Center (or General Mail Facility (GMF)). (Doc. 46 ¶ 10.) In November 2002,

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

4 According to Defendant’s Statement of Facts, said request was made subsequent

to an accusation made against Plaintiff that she was stalking a male manager of the USPS.

Plaintiff allegedly responded by claiming that he was harassing her.

- 3 -

Plaintiff requested that she be transferred to the Rio Salado Station.4

 The request was

granted, and Plaintiff worked as a “Level 5 Mail Processing Clerk,” a position she held when

she made her final claim of discrimination. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 65, 71, 82.) 

A. THE ASP CLAIM: EEO 83-00 (National Origin, Sex, Disability, Retaliation)

It is the policy of the USPS that whenever an employee will be unable to be present

for a shift, the USPS must be notified of said absence prior to the beginning of the shift. On

February 13, 2000, while employed at the GMF of the USPS, Plaintiff was absent from work

because, due to a domestic dispute, she was otherwise occupied in jail. Plaintiff failed to call

GMF prior to the commencement of her shift, thereby violating the USPS policy by both (1)

failing to notify the USPS of her impending absence prior thereto and (2) failing to be present

at work during a designated shift. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 11, 12.) On March 15, 2000, Plaintiff received

a disciplinary action known as a “Letter of Warning” (LOW) for her unapproved absence and

failure to notify thereof. (Doc. 46 ¶ 13.) 

Between November 23, 1999 and July 5, 2000 Plaintiff was disciplined or otherwise

advised that she had violated the USPS policies on numerous occasions. For example,

Plaintiff had been disciplined for: failing to meet the duties and responsibilities of a PTF mail

processor clerk, wandering away from her duty station, failing to report to her machine at

her scheduled time, failure to maintain regular attendance, and for creating a hostile work

environment. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 13, 14.)

Despite her record of policy violations, Plaintiff nevertheless applied for the Associate

Supervisor Program (ASP), a program designed to recruit and select qualified individuals to

fill Associate Supervisor EAS-15 positions. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 15, 16.) Candidates are evaluated

based upon their respective supervisors’ evaluations in pertinent subject areas such as sick

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

5 Carey was working at GMF as Manager, Distribution Operations (MDO) during

the time that Plaintiff was working as Mail Processing Clerk in 2002.

- 4 -

time, leave of absence records, and disciplinary records. (Doc. 46 ¶ 15.) Based upon

Plaintiff’s history of USPS policy violations and other unsuitable conduct, Plaintiff’s

supervisor, JoAnn Hernandez (Ms. Hernandez), gave Plaintiff an unacceptable rating for the

ASP. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 15, 17.) Due to said unacceptable rating, Plaintiff was disqualified from

the ASP. (Doc. 46 ¶ 16.) Consequently, Plaintiff filed formal complaints of discrimination

claiming that she had been discriminated against on the basis of race (Hispanic), sex

(female), mental disability (depression), and retaliation for prior EEO activity when (1) she

was issued a March 15, 2000 LOW for her unapproved absence; (2) was disqualified from

the ASP on August 1, 2000; and (3) was denied FMLA leave. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 19-23.)

An investigation into the ASP issue failed to establish that Plaintiff was discriminated

against. (Doc. 46 ¶ 24.) The administrative judge (ALJ) agreed that the USPS had properly

dismissed the LOW and FMLA issues. Based upon the entire record, the ALJ further found

that the USPS was entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff had failed to establish

that there was a genuine issue of material fact or genuine credibility issues for the USPS’s

articulated reason for disqualifying Plaintiff from the ASP program. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 26-28.)

Plaintiff appealed the decision regarding the alleged discrimination involved in disqualifying

her the from the ASP program, but did not appeal the dismissal of her LOW and FMLA leave

issues, and therefore failed to exhaust the latter two issues. (Doc. 46 ¶ 29.) The EEOC, Office

of Federal Operations (OFO) affirmed the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 46 ¶ 30.)

B. THE DILETTOSO CLAIM: EEO 62-03 (Sex)

On November 1-2, 2002, Plaintiff was advised by Dave Carey (Carey)5

 that David

Dilettoso (Dilettoso) claimed that Plaintiff had been stalking him. Plaintiff responded that

it was Dilettoso who had been harassing her, and thus, she requested that she be transferred

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

6 Plaintiff admitted that she had not complained before to the USPS management

that David Dilettoso was harassing her. [Carey Dec. ¶ 8.]

7 Defendant concedes that for purposes of its Motion for Summary Judgment, his

exhaustion defense for the Dilettoso Claim is a question of fact, and therefore summary

judgment is not appropriate on that basis.

8 According to the record, Plaintiff’s assertion is incorrect. (Doc. 46.) She did not

provide the Court with evidence to the contrary. 

- 5 -

away from Dilettoso to the Rio Salado site. 6

([Doc. 46 ¶¶ 34-37.) Plaintiff was immediately

transferred to Rio Salado. Further, both she and Dilettoso were placed on administrative

leave pending an investigation into their allegations. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 37, 38.)

Subsequent to the investigation, and after 45 days had expired, Plaintiff contacted an

EEO counselor claiming that Carey had told her to wait until after the investigation to file

any EEO claims.7

 (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 42-25.) Consequently, the USPS dismissed her claims for

being untimely; however, the OFO found an equitable basis for Plaintiff’s delay in reporting

this EEO claim and ordered an investigation. After the investigation, the claim was

consolidated with EEO 77-03, and the administrative action was dismissed because the

instant action was filed. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 48, 49.)

Plaintiff asserts that she was subjected to sexual discrimination because she was

improperly “disciplined” when she was transferred from the GMF to Rio Salado, was

assigned to a different shift, and was placed on administrative leave. (Doc. 46 ¶ 39.) Plaintiff

(incorrectly8

) contends that Dilettoso was not placed on administrative leave pending the

investigation. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 38-41.) Plaintiff was taken off administrative leave in June 2003.

According to the record, Dilettoso was not taken off administrative leave prior to the time

Plaintiff was taken off administrative leave. (Carey Dec., ¶ 12.)

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

9 EEO 62-03 and EEO 77-03 were not finally resolved against Plaintiff at the

administrative level, but dismissed per Final Agency Decision (FAD) dated September 2,

2005 because she filed the present action before Plaintiff exhausted her administrative

remedies. (Final Agency Decision, September 22, 2005.)

- 6 -

C. THE 2003 RIO SALADO CLAIM: EEO 77-039

 (Mental Disability and

Retaliation)

After Plaintiff returned from administrative leave, she was reassigned to Rio Salado.

There, the USPS attempted to find work for her within the restrictions for the on-the-job

injury that had been accepted by the Department of Labor (DOL). (Doc. 46 ¶ 51, 52.) When

the USPS located suitable work on a night shift, Plaintiff objected to working that shift

because of her alleged need to sleep during those hours for a mental disability. (Doc. 46 ¶¶

50-53.) She relied upon medical certificates from 2001, even though a more recent medical

certificate did not require that she work a particular shift. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 53, 54.) The USPS

could not locate work that was within her lifting restrictions that was also on the shift she

desired. Thereafter, she contacted an EEO counselor claiming discrimination on the basis

of disability (mental) and retaliation for prior EEO activity. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 50, 57, 58.) 

Plaintiff thereafter submitted an untimely formal complaint, claiming that she could

not timely file the complaint due to medical reasons. However, she did not provide support

for this claim, and actual documentation in the record supports that the delay was not

justified. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 59-61.)

D. THE 2004 RIO SALADO CLAIM – EEO 44-04 (Sex, Disability, Retaliation)

While Plaintiff was assigned to Rio Salado in 2003 and 2004, the USPS tried to

provide Plaintiff with suitable work options within her varied medical restrictions. (Doc. 46

¶¶ 66-77.) Plaintiff had a lifting restriction of twenty (20) pounds or less, and claimed to be

unable to lift items above her shoulder due to severe pain. As stated above, Plaintiff also

claimed to have a mental impairment which prevented her from working night shifts. (Doc.

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 7 -

46 ¶¶ 67-69, 72.) At the USPS’ request, Plaintiff underwent an IME, which revealed no

objective basis for her inability to lift beyond shoulder. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 72, 73.) Despite those

findings, the USPS offered Plaintiff a position that was within her alleged restrictions. (Doc.

46 ¶¶ 74-77.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff refused to perform her duties associated with that

position, claiming that it still violated her medical restrictions. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 74-77.)

Consequently, Plaintiff contacted an EEO counselor, filed a formal complaint, and the claims

were investigated. The USPS issued a Final Agency Decision and concluded that, based

upon the entire record, Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

on the basis of sex or disability. Further, the Agency found that the USPS had, in fact,

articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, and there was no evidence

of pretext by the USPS. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 78-82.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive

law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the

evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 8 -

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden

of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment

need not produce evidence "in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid

summary judgment." Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint

Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

In the context of discrimination complaints, “‘the mere existence of a prima facie

case, based on the minimum evidence necessary to raise a McDonnell Douglas presumption,

does not preclude summary judgment.’” Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 443 (9th

Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1171 (1996) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d

885, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) ). Summary judgment is still appropriate if defendant can rebut the

prima facie case with a non-discriminatory reason. Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th

Cir. 1990) (citing Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1987)). The party opposing

summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's]

pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-88; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint

Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

Conclusory allegations already contained in the pleadings, which are unsupported by

factual evidence, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Lucas

Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir.

1998). Similarly, an affidavit which merely recites conclusory allegations will not defeat

summary judgment. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990);

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

10 After initiating the pre-complaint process within 45 days of the date of the matter

alleged to be discriminatory, if the matter is not informally resolved, the EEO counselor

- 9 -

see also Warren 58 F.3d at 443 (while plaintiff’s burden at the summary judgment stage is

not overly burdensome, plaintiff cannot merely rely on generalizations).

In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must produce some evidence to show

that the government agency intentionally discriminated against her on the bases alleged or

in retaliation for prior activity protected by Title VII. Plaintiff may do so by producing direct

evidence of discrimination or under the now-familiar formula articulated in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Furthermore, the evidence must be sufficient to show that

plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination are more likely than not to be true. St. Mary’s Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion Requirements

Title VII explicitly prohibits discrimination against employees of the federal

government on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Furthermore, it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that Title VII prohibits retaliation

against an employee for engaging in protected activities such as filing EEO complaints. Ray

v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240-42 (9th Cir. 2000). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101 (2002).

Pursuant to Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has

the authority to enforce the provisions of § 2000e-16(a) and "issue such rules, regulations,

orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities

. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). Accordingly, the EEOC has promulgated regulations which

require a federal employee who claims that she has been discriminated against to initiate

contact with an agency EEO Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the alleged

discriminatory matter. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105.10

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

notifies the complainant of the right to file a formal administrative complaint. Patrick, 255

F.3d at 915; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(d). The complainant must then file a formal written

complaint within 15 days after receiving the counselor’s notice. Patrick, 255 F.3d at 915; 29

C.F.R. § 1614.106 (b).

11 Plaintiff had the benefit of counsel at the time.

- 10 -

Claims of unlawful discrimination in federal employment, including those under Title

VII and the Rehabilitation Act, may not be brought unless the plaintiff has first exhausted the

administrative process provided for by federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; See Brown v.

GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003);

Leorna v. U.S. Dept. Of State, 105 F.3d 548, 500 (9th Cir. 1997.) In other words, claims

must be timely pursued within the EEO administrative process, otherwise a plaintiff is barred

from pursuing those claims in federal court. See Johnson v. Treasury Department, 27 F.3d

415, 416 (9th Cir. 1994); Charles v. Garrett, 12 F.3d 870, 873 (9th Cir. 1993).

In the instant case, Plaintiff’s claims unequivocally fall within the purview of Title

VII. Accordingly, Plaintiff was required to timely exhaust her EEO administrative remedies

prior to filing suit in federal district court. Id. Despite Plaintiff’s actual and constructive

notice11 of the time limits involved in filing an administrative complaint, the record reveals

that Plaintiff wholly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her 2003 Rio Salado

Claim. (Doc. 46, ¶59.)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to timely file the 2003 Rio Salado Claim as it was

not filed within 15 days of receiving the counselor’s notice of the right to file. Further,

Plaintiff submitted a letter with her untimely filing conceding that the claim was untimely,

but stated that she was unable to timely file her claim “due to [her] medical condition.”

However, an independent medical examination (IME) conducted one week before the complaint

was due (October 7, 2003) and a medical record dated several days after she filed the formal EEO

Complaint (October 21, 2003) do not support Plaintiff’s assertion that she had a medical condition

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

12 Plaintiff failed to produce for the Court controverting evidence to suggest

otherwise.

13 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claims contained in the “ASP Claim” regarding

her assertion that she was discriminated against when she was issued a LOW and for denial

of FMLA should also be dismissed for failure to exhaust. The Agency properly declined to

accept those issues for investigation and the Administrative Agency affirmed that decision.

Plaintiff did not appeal those issues to the EEOC. Therefore, Plaintiff may not now raise

those issues as part of her lawsuit. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 21-23, 27, 29, 30.) This Court agrees.

Therefore, to the extent those claims were raised by Plaintiff, they are hereby denied.

14 There is no direct evidence in the record of discrimination.

- 11 -

that interfered with her ability to timely file this EEO Complaint.12 (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 59-61, Ex. C-8.)

Given that Plaintiff signed and dated the formal complaint on September 30, 2003, but did

not file it until after it was due, and she has provided no evidence establishing otherwise, this

claim is dismissed.13 (See Ex. C-7, p. 1.)

B. Establishing Claims of Discrimination Under Title VII

Plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination either by presenting direct evidence14

of discrimination or by establishing a prima facie case of race, national origin, or gender

discrimination using indirect evidence.

1. Indirect Evidence: McDonnell Douglas and its Progeny

Where a plaintiff is faced strictly with indirect evidence of discrimination, the proper

legal framework for determining whether a plaintiff’s claims should survive summary

judgment is the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792. 

Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, a plaintiff has the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. More specifically, to survive

summary judgment in an employment discrimination case such as this, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position,

(3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

15 While the burden of production shifts in this framework, the “ultimate burden of

persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff

remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450, U.S. at 253; Bodet v. Coxcom, Inc.,

366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2004)(citations omitted). 

- 12 -

were treated more favorably than plaintiff. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506. If the Plaintiff

succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden (of production)

shifts to the defendant, in this case the USPS, to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

If the USPS is successful in doing so, meeting its burden necessarily causes any presumption

that the employer discriminated against Plaintiff to “drop from the case” and the burden

shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that USPS’s articulated reason(s) is pretext for

unlawful discrimination.15 Bodet v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation

omitted). Plaintiff must then demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the actual reason

for the [adverse] employment decision. A plaintiff may succeed in this “either directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or

indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (U.S. 1981)(citing

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at 804-805).

Where the plaintiff has established a prima facie case with direct evidence of

discriminatory intent, “a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created

even if the evidence is not substantial.” Bodet, 366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation

omitted). However, where a plaintiff relies upon indirect evidence to show that the

employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action is not the actual reason, “[s]uch

evidence...must be ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ in order to create a triable issue with respect

to whether the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of a prohibited ground.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

16 An alleged retaliatory act qualifies as an adverse employment action only if it is

“reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Vasquez v.

County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted).

- 13 -

C. Establishing Claims of Retaliation Under Title VII

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she

engaged in protected activity; (2) her employer thereafter subjected her to an adverse

employment decision16, (3) and there was a causal link between the two. Cohen v. Fred

Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir.

1988). The facts on which the causal connection analysis turns are also pertinent to the

analysis of whether Defendant had legitimate business reasons for his actions. The

application of the facts of this case to this law can be found under §D1.

D. Establishing Claims of Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act

To establish a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff must prove that:

(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) she is a qualified individual able to

perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without reasonable accommodations;

and (3) the Agency acted adversely against her solely because of her disability. Zukle v.

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999); Wong v. Regents of University

of California, 192 F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiff has failed to respond substantively to the assertions contained in Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, and because it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that

the District Court is not obligated to “comb the record,” the Plaintiff is unable to establish

a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court need only consider

evidence set forth in the moving or opposing papers and parts of the record specifically

referred to therein. The Court need not "comb the record" looking for other evidence.

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). More

specifically, Plaintiff has not produced specific evidence that she is a qualified individual

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

17 The Court previously disposed of Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims based

on Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy her burden under the Rehabilitation Act and her failure to

provide specific controverting evidence as required by Fed.R.Civ.P.56. 

- 14 -

able to perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without reasonable

accommodations or that the USPS acted adversely against her solely because of her alleged

disability. Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1045 (9th Cir. 1999); Wong, 192 F.3d at 816 (9th Cir. 1999).

Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, as well as the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case under the

Rehabilitation Act. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-88; Brinson,

53 F.3d at 1049 (9th Cir. 1995); Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1045 (9th Cir. 1999); Wong, 192 F.3d at

816 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is appropriate

for all disability discrimination claims filed under the Rehabilitation Act.

1. EEO 83-00/The ASP Claim

Plaintiff has alleged that in the ASP claim, she submitted a formal complaint of

discrimination in which she alleged that she was not selected to the Associate Supervisor

Program (ASP) because of her race, sex, alleged disability17, and in retaliation for prior

protected activity.

Discrimination

As the Court previously set forth, the burden is on Plaintiff to establish that (1) she

belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position, (3) she was subjected to

an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals were treated more

favorably. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506. 

Plaintiff has successfully established that she is a Hispanic woman, thereby satisfying

the first element of the McDonnell Douglas test. However, Plaintiff has failed to produce

evidence to demonstrate that she was qualified for the position, that she was subject to an

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

18 Arguably, not being selected to the Associate Supervisor Program (ASP) is the

adverse employment action Plaintiff is asserting. In which case, the Court will consider the

element satisfied.

- 15 -

adverse employment action,18 or that similarly situated individuals were treated more

favorably by the USPS. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506. 

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had satisfied each prong of McDonnell Douglas, the

burden of production shifts to the USPS to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for not selecting Plaintiff to the ASP. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The ASP is

designed to recruit and select qualified individuals to fill Associate Supervisor positions.

(Doc. 46, Ex. A-2.) Candidates are evaluated based upon their supervisor’s evaluation, sick

time records, leave of absence records, disciplinary records, safety records, and any other

information considered relevant to personal suitability determination by the Review

Committee. Id.

According to the record, Plaintiff was advised on February 10, 1999 that, under the

USPS policies, an employee is “expected to report to work daily, as scheduled and on time.”

Employees who cannot report to work are to call the office one hour before the scheduled

start time for their shift. (Doc. 46, Ex. A-8.) On February 13, 2000, Plaintiff failed to show

up for her scheduled shift, and she did not call work before her shift began, as she was in jail.

(Doc. 46, A-7.) Consequently, on March 10, 2000, Plaintiff’s supervisor, Ms. Hernandez,

gave Plaintiff a Letter of Warning (LOW). (Doc. 46, A-7.) The record also shows that

Plaintiff had been disciplined by Ms. Hernandez on several other occasions, including: (1)

Discussion on November 23, 1999, on Plaintiff’s failure to meet duties and responsibility of

a PTF Mail Processor Clerk; (2) March 15, 2000 LOW for failure to report for duty/failure

to follow proper notification procedures, resulting in AWOL; (3) May 11, 2000, discussion

regarding wandering away from her work station, reporting to her machine at her scheduled

time, and keeping gainfully employed; (4) June 29, 2000, discussion for failure to maintain

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 16 -

regular attendance; (5) July 5, 2000, discussion for creating a hostile work environment.

(Doc. 46, Ex. A-4, p. 2.)

Despite Plaintiff’s record of disciplinary actions, on or about June 20, 2000, she

submitted an application for the Fall 2000 ASP. (Id, ¶ 3.) As is policy at the USPS,

Plaintiff’s supervisor completed the ASP Candidate Evaluation Form wherein she rated

Plaintiff as “unacceptable” in the work areas of leadership, decision making,

communications, and work conduct. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 4.) On or about July 11, 2000, Plaintiff

was advised that she had not been selected for the position of ASP because she had not met

the acceptable standard for discipline suitability based upon discipline records for the

previous two years. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 5.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the USPS has satisfied its burden under

McDonnell Douglas by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting

Plaintiff to the ASP. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Therefore, the burden shifts back

to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the USPS’s articulated reason is pretext for unlawful

discrimination. Bodet, 366 F.3d at 743 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). Plaintiff proffered

no such evidence. Therefore, she has clearly failed to establish that the USPS's articulated

reason for disqualifying her from the ASP program was a pretext for discrimination against

her based on her race, national origin, sex, or disability. Accordingly, summary judgment

in favor of Defendant is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s ASP discrimination claims.

Retaliation

It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed formal complaints of discrimination claiming that

she had been discriminated against on the basis of race (Hispanic), sex (female), mental

disability (depression), and retaliation for prior EEO activity when she was disqualified from

the ASP on August 1, 2000. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 19-23.) It is clear that filing formal EEO complaints,

such as the complaints filed by Plaintiff, amount to protected activity under Title VII. The

matter, however, of whether Plaintiff has established that the USPS subjected Plaintiff to an

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

19 Dilettoso accused Plaintiff of stalking him, and in response, Plaintiff accused him

of harassing her. Plaintiff then immediately requested that she be transferred away from

Dilettoso, to Rio Salado. The request was granted. 

- 17 -

adverse employment decision is not as unequivocal. However, strictly for the purpose of this

motion, the Court will assume that Plaintiff is asserting a failure to promote argument, and

her failure to be selected for the ASP satisfies that burden. Despite this, Plaintiff again has

wholly failed to provide the Court with any evidence to support the assertion that there was

a causal link between the filing of her complaints and the fact that she was not selected for

the ASP program. Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982); Jordan v.

Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988). In fact, the only evidence in the record regarding

Plaintiff and the ASP that has been brought to the Court’s attention pertains to Plaintiff’s

disciplinary record-which this Court has previously concluded was a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the USPS not selecting Plaintiff to the ASP. Consequently,

summary judgment as to retaliation is granted in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

2. EEO 62-03/The Dilettoso Claim

In EEO 62-03, Plaintiff has alleged that she submitted a formal complaint of

discrimination in which she alleged that she was discriminated on the basis of her sex.

Plaintiff has previously established that she is a woman and therefore, she is a member of a

protected class. However, to prevail on her claim for sex discrimination, she must establish

that she was qualified for the position, she was subjected to an adverse employment action,

and similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at

506. Here, when the issue regarding sexual harassment arose between Plaintiff and

Dilettoso,19 the record evidence shows that both she and Dilettoso were placed on

administrative leave pending and investigation in their allegations. Plaintiff did not produce

any controverting evidence to the contrary. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to produce for the

Court evidence that similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably. See St.

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

20 Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to actually articulate an adverse employment action.

21 Plaintiff failed to produce evidence controverting Defendant’s assertion that she

failed to timely file the 2003 Rio Salado Claim, as it was not filed within 15 days of receiving

the counselor’s notice of the right to file. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in

favor of Defendant for Plaintiff’s failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies.

22 As stated previously, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is completely nonresponsive to the specific arguments made in Defendant’s

motion; despite her burden to do so, she wholly fails to cite to specific evidence in the record

to establish her prima facie claims. For example, she fails to controvert the USPS’s

legitimate business decision regarding available work within her physical restrictions or

provide any evidence that any of the USPS’s decisions were made on the basis of previous

EEO activity on the part of Plaintiff.

- 18 -

Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506.20 As a result, the Court finds in favor of Defendant for summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s Dilettoso Claim for gender discrimination.

3. EEO 77-03/The 2003 Rio Salado Claim

Plaintiff has alleged that in EEO 77-03, she submitted a formal complaint of

discrimination in which she alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of an alleged

disability and retaliation when she was assigned to the Rio Salado Facility as a Mail

Processing Clerk and then denied reasonable accommodation resulting in her adverse

treatment. The Court previously determined that this claim is due to be dismissed for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies.21 Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with

evidence establishing the necessary elements of discrimination based on an alleged disability

and retaliation.22 Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel

Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, summary judgment in

favor of Defendant is appropriate as to this claim.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

23 Plaintiff’s assertions were not supported by evidence for this Motion for Summary

Judgment, as required by LRCiv 56.1 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (because she did not file a

Separate Statement of Facts). However, because the Defendant included them in his

Statement of Facts, they will be accepted as true for the purpose of the instant motion.

- 19 -

4. EEO 44-04/The 2004 Rio Salado Claim

Plaintiff has alleged claims of retaliation and sex discrimination in her EEO 44-04 Rio

Salado claim. On May 27, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a formal complaint of discrimination

in which she alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, an alleged

disability, and retaliation.

While Plaintiff was assigned to Rio Salado in 2003 and 2004, according to the

evidence before the Court, the USPS tried to find suitable work that was within her medical

restrictions. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 66-77.) Plaintiff’s medical restrictions, however, tended to vary.

Plaintiff had a lifting restriction of twenty (20) pounds or less, and she claimed to be unable

lift items above her shoulder due to severe pain. She also claimed to have a mental

impairment which prevented her from working night shifts.23 (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 67-69, 72.) At the

USPS’ request, Plaintiff underwent an independent medical examination, which revealed no

objective basis for her inability to lift beyond shoulder. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 72, 73.) Despite those

findings, USPS offered Plaintiff a position that was within her alleged restrictions. (Doc. 46

¶¶ 74- 77.) However, a short time later, Plaintiff refused to do the job claiming that it violated

her medical restrictions. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 74-77.) Plaintiff contacted an EEO counselor, filed a

formal complaint, and the claims were investigated. The USPS issued a Final Agency

Decision and concluded that, based upon the entire record before it, Plaintiff had failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex or disability. Further, the

Agency found that the USPS had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

actions, and there was no evidence of pretext. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 78-82.) Plaintiff had refused

vacant funded positions that were within her restrictions and refused to pursue any of the

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 20 -

options available to her, such as requesting a change of craft. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 83-86.) In 2003-

2004, Plaintiff continued to be unable to perform her full time duties, and rejected and

objected to the work that was offered to her at the Rio Salado facility. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 72-77,

83-86.) Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination on the basis of sex, disability (mental and

physical) and retaliation for prior EEO activity are not supported by evidence to suggest that

the USPS officials acted on any improper basis when looking for work within Plaintiff’s

restrictions. Id. Consequently, Defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor on the 2004 Rio

Salado claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Local and Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, as well as the EEO administrative requirements. Therefore, the Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in full.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment in his favor and against Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall hereby terminate this

case.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2008.

Case 2:05-cv-01794-SMM Document 67 Filed 06/10/08 Page 20 of 20