Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00095/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00095-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER GRAFF; RICK DISNEY, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF TEHACHAPI; JEFF KERMODE; 

KEVAN EMPRY; SCOTT KECHAM; AND 

MIKE CHRISTIAN,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-00095-LJO-JLT

MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(ECF No. 74)

Pending before the Court is Defendants the City of Tehachapi, Jeff Kermode, Kevan Empey, 

Scott Kecham, and Mike Christian’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, filed 

July 20, 2016 (ECF No. 74), and Defendants’ submitted bill of costs (ECF No. 73). Plaintiffs Rick 

Disney and Peter Graff timely filed an opposition on August 11, 2016 (ECF No. 76), and objections 

to the bill of costs (ECF No. 75). Defendants filed their reply on August 17, 2017 (ECF No. 78). The 

Court deems the matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See E.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 

230(g). Having considered the record in this case, the parties’ briefing, and the relevant law, the 

Court DENIES Defendants’ motion and GRANTS IN PART the request for costs for the reasons set 

forth below.

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BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2013, Plaintiffs Rick Disney and Peter Graff (together, “Plaintiffs”) brought a 

suit in the Superior Court of Kern County against the City of Tehachapi (“City”), Jeff Kermode, 

Kevan Empey, Scott Kecham, Mike Christian, and Does 1-11 (collectively “Defendants”) for 

breach of contract and retaliation in violation of public policy. ECF No. 1. On November 18, 2013, 

Kern County Superior Court sustained the City’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ complaint with leave to 

amend. On December 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in which they 

alleged violations of Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and sought penalties under the 

Private Attorney General Act, California Government Code § 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”). 

The City removed to federal court on January 22, 2014, on the basis of federal question 

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. ECF No. 1. On January 29, 2014, the City moved to 

dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule1

12(b)(6). ECF No. 6. Plaintiffs timely opposed the motion, and the City timely replied. ECF Nos. 

10, 11. On March 10, 2014, this Court granted in part Defendants’ motion with leave to amend. 

ECF No. 13. 

On March 31, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), omitting their 

PAGA claim. ECF No. 14. On April 21, 2014, Defendants again moved to dismiss the SAC under 

Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs’ timely opposed, and Defendants’ replied. ECF Nos. 17, 20, 22. On July 

11, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion, dismissing Plaintiffs’ 

first cause of action under Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5; all claims against the City of Tehachapi; as 

well as dismissing, without leave to amend, all claims that did not arise out of Plaintiffs’ claim that 

their first amendment rights had been violated. ECF No. 26. In October 2014, the Court dismissed 

the City as a Defendant. ECF No. 36. 

On November 3, 2014, Defendants Christian, Empey, Kecham, and Kermode filed a motion 

to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), violations of Rule 4(m), failure to comply with 

service requirements, and Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim. ECF No. 39. Plaintiffs timely filed 

their opposition on November 21, 2014, and Defendants responded on November 26, 2014. ECF 

 

1 Hereinafter, references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Nos. 42, 45. On December 18, 2014, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the 

grounds that Plaintiffs’ service did not comply with Rule 41(b) or 4(m), but granted Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Defendants Empey, Ketcham, and Christian. 

ECF No. 49. 

On June 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued the following minute order: 

In light of the information contained in defendant’s mid-discovery status 

conference report that discovery efforts are proceeding appropriately [ECF No. 

58], the Court VACATES the mid-discovery status conference set for 6/8/2015 

at 09:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston. Counsel are 

reminded of their obligation to complete all discovery within the time frames 

set forth in the Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs SHALL show case in writing 

within 14 days why sanctions should not be imposed for their failure to 

cooperate in the filing of a joint mid-discovery status conference statement. 

ECF No. 59. Subsequent to Plaintiffs filing a declaration on July 28, 2015, the Magistrate Judge 

discharged the show cause order and set a date for the pretrial conference. ECF Nos. 60-62. 

In light of the parties’ notice of settlement filed March 7, 2016, ECF No. 64, this Court 

vacated the pretrial conference. ECF No. 65. On March 9, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued an 

Order after Notice of Settlement, in which she vacated all pending dates, conferences, and hearings, 

and ordered the parties to file a stipulated request for dismissal by April 15, 2016. ECF No. 66. The 

parties did not file any stipulated request for dismissal. 

More than three weeks after the deadline, on May 9, 2016, the Magistrate Judge ordered the 

parties and counsel to show cause within 14 days why sanctions should not be imposed for their 

failure to comply with the Court’s orders, or, alternatively, to file the joint request for dismissal. 

ECF No. 67. Defendants filed their Response to the show cause order on May 23, 2016. ECF No. 

68. Plaintiffs failed to file a response. 

On June 22, 2016, this Court issued an Order adopting in full the Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations, dismissing the action with prejudice, and directing the Clerk of 

Court to close the case. ECF No. 71. A judgment issued on June 22, 2016. ECF No. 72. The City 

filed a bill of costs on July 6, 2016, and the instant motion on July 20, 2016. ECF Nos. 73, 74. 

Plaintiffs filed objections to the bill of costs and oppose Defendants’ motion. ECF Nos. 75, 76. 

//

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//

DISCUSSION

I. Attorneys’ Fees

A court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a 

civil rights action, including those brought under § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“Section 1988”) (“In 

any action ... to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ..., the court, in its discretion, may allow 

the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs ... .”). A court may do so 

only upon “a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). 

This rigorous standard applies to prevailing defendants and not plaintiffs because the 

“policy considerations which support the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present in 

the case of a prevailing defendant.” Id. at 418-19 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 

422 (“To take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against plaintiffs simply because they do 

not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would 

undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement” of civil rights statutes such 

as section 1983). Thus Section 1988 “operates asymmetrically,” by allowing a prevailing plaintiff 

to routinely recover attorneys’ fees, but only allows a prevailing defendant to recover fees in 

“exceptional circumstances where the court finds that the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, 

unreasonable, or groundless.” Braunstein v. Ariz. Dept. of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2011)) 

(internal quotations omitted); Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990) (attorney’s fees 

may be awarded against an unsuccessful § 1983 plaintiff only “in exceptional circumstances”).

The prevailing defendant “bears the burden of establishing that the fees for which it is 

asking are in fact incurred solely by the need to defend against those frivolous claims.” Harris v. 

Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct., 631 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2011). An action is frivolous when the 

claim “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 

Alternatively, a claim is vexatious when the litigation was pursued with an “improper purpose, such 

as to annoy or embarrass the defendant.” Douglas v. Pfingston, 284 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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A claim is not frivolous merely because the “plaintiff did not ultimately prevail.” EEOC v. Bruno’s 

Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22). 

Here, Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and emphasize Plaintiffs’ 

counsel’s mismanagement of the case.2 Defendants primarily complain about Plaintiffs’ counsel’s 

conduct, unresponsiveness. However, “a defendant must demonstrate that the work for which it 

asserts that it is entitled to fees would not have been performed but for the inclusion of the frivolous 

claims in the complaint.” Harris v. Maricopa Cty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 

2011) (emphasis added). This, Defendants fail to do. And although Plaintiffs’ counsel characterizes 

his own conduct as “disrespectful and unprofessional,” (ECF No. 76, 2:4), the attorney’s 

performance deficiencies do not demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous. See, e.g., Lopez 

v. Cty. of San Mateo, No. 15-CV-03804-TEH, 2016 WL 1213912, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016) 

(“Plaintiff’s claims are not frivolous merely because Plaintiff’s attorney may not have performed 

his best in representing Plaintiff in this action.”). 

Defendants also argue that the majority of claims against them were dismissed. However, 

this alone does not mean that the suit was groundless or brought frivolously. See Hughes v. Rowe,

449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (“The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a 

sufficient justification for the assessment of fees.”). “An action becomes frivolous when the result 

appears obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit.” Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 

F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422); also see Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (a plaintiff’s civil rights claim is “frivolous” under the Christiansburg test 

if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact”). 

In this case, the Court evaluated the suit and found it necessary to allow Plaintiffs multiple 

opportunities to amend the complaint. See, e.g., Gallardo v. Hanford Joint Union Sch. Dist., No. 

1:12-CV-01612 GSA, 2015 WL 4661636, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015) (after carefully 

considering the complaint, finding it necessary to give plaintiff opportunities to amend, and thus 

denying attorneys’ fee award to prevailing defendants). Here, also, at least one of Plaintiffs’ claims 

 

2 To the extent that Defendants mean to move for Rule 11 sanctions related to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct throughout the 

litigation, it is untimely and improperly done. The Court declines to impose sanctions.

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survived the motions to dismiss. Defendants concede that the parties reached a settlement 

agreement and actually filed a notice of settlement. For these reasons, the Court does not find 

Plaintiffs’ complaint frivolous or vexatious. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs brought their case 

on a good faith belief that they were seeking redress for a perceived constitutional violation, which 

is the purpose Congress contemplated when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whatever the professional 

failings of Plaintiffs’ attorney, these do not rise to the level of “exceptional circumstances” for 

which Defendants should recover fees. 

II. Costs

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) governs the taxation of costs to the prevailing party in 

a civil matter. Unless a court order provides otherwise, costs (other than attorneys’ fees) “should be 

allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). This rule creates a presumption that costs 

will be taxed against the losing party. Ass’n of Mexican–American Educators v. California, 231 

F.3d 572, 591-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The burden is on the losing party to “show why costs 

should not be awarded,” Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999); Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc. v. 

TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1995)). But if the losing party shows why costs should 

not be awarded, the rule “vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs.” Id. at 591; 

Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (“the losing party must show 

why costs should not be awarded”).

The district court retains broad discretion to decide how much to award, if anything. Padgett 

v. Loventhal, 706 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the type of costs that may be awarded 

under Rule 54(d) are limited to those enumerated by statute in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1924. Crawford 

Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1987). The district court has discretion 

under Rule 54 to determine what constitutes a taxable cost within the meaning of Section 1920. 

Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1990). This discretion is also 

“a power to decline to tax, as costs, the items enumerated in § 1920.” Crawford Fitting Co., 482 

U.S. at 442. Although a district court must “‘specify reasons’ for its refusal to tax costs to the 

losing party,” a court need not specify reasons for its “decision to abide the presumption and tax 

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costs to the losing party.” Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 945 (citing Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v. 

California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)) (“The presumption itself provides all the 

reason a court needs for awarding costs, and when a district court states no reason for awarding 

costs, [the reviewing court] will assume it acted based on that presumption.”).

In this case, on July 6, 2016, Defendants timely filed a bill of costs in the amount of 

$2,700.10 for court fees and other costs associated with the litigation. ECF No. 73. Defendants 

provide this itemization:

Fees of the Clerk (filing fee) $400

Internal Copy Fees $103.65

Westlaw Legal Research $1864.00

Eddings Attorney Support Services (courier) $192.50

Courtcall and Casefax $139.95

Total $2700.10

Id. at 1, 2.

On July 21, 2016, Plaintiffs filed objections to the bill of costs arguing that: (1) costs for 

legal research are considered attorneys’ fees; (2) ”Eddings Attorney Support Services,” are 

unexplained; and, (3) court calls are not enumerated in § 1920; thus, these three items are not 

taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. ECF No. 75. Plaintiffs do not object to the filing fees.

Title 28 of United States Code Section 1920 provides a specific list of qualifying taxable 

costs for which a prevailing party may recover: 

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use 

in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where 

the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and 

salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under 

section 1828 of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)-(6). 

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Prevailing parties cannot recover costs for courier, mail, or telephone charges because they 

are outside the scope of § 1920. See Tasakos v. Welliver Mental Prods. Corp., No. 04-6205, 2005 

WL 627633, at *2, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4654 at *5 (D.Or. Mar. 16, 2005) (citing cases). Also, 

computer based legal research is not taxable as costs that may be recovered by a prevailing party. 

See Trustees of Const. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 

1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006). Because these expenses are not authorized by Section 1920, the Court 

reduces Defendants’ request by $ 2,196.45 (Westlaw legal research expenses: $1864.00; courier 

fees: $192.50; faxes and telephone calls: $139.95), for an adjusted recoupable cost total of $503.65 

($2700.10 less $2196.45). See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-442 

(1987) (a district court may not tax costs beyond those authorized by § 1920). 

Defendants request $103.65 for “internal copy fees,” ECF No. 73 at 2, and Section 1920 

allows recovery of costs for photocopies and transcripts if these were “necessarily obtained.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1920(2), (4). But Defendants fail to include any declaration from counsel that these copy 

costs were necessarily incurred. See ECF Nos. 74-1 (Lehman Decl.) (fails to mention copies); 74-3 

(Youril Decl.) (same); 74-2 ¶ 38 (Maddox Decl.) (mentions but does not explain the copy costs). 

Because Defendants fail to provide any explanation of the copy costs, the Court cannot determine 

whether these copies were necessary or merely made for convenience. See, e.g., Independent Iron 

Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 678 (9th Cir. 1963) (costs related to copying 

depositions that “were merely useful for discovery” are not taxable); Arboireau v. Adidas Salomon 

AG, No. 01–105, 2002 WL 31466564, at *6-7, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20342, at *18 (D.Or. June 

14, 2002) (a party cannot recover costs for copies prepared for the convenience of the attorneys). 

As a result, the Court declines to tax fees for $103.65 for these unexplained “copy costs.” ECF No. 

73, Bill of Costs at 2. 

The only remaining possible recoupable costs are filing fees. Section 1920 specifically 

enumerates that a prevailing party may recover costs for fees to the court clerk. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1920(1). Therefore, the Court will tax costs of $400 for the “filing fee” as requested by 

Defendants in their bill of costs. ECF No. 73 at 1-2. 

//

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for 

an award of attorney’s fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (ECF No. 74), is DENIED. Defendants’ 

bill of costs (ECF No. 73) is GRANTED IN PART, to the extent that the Clerk of Court SHALL

levy costs of $400 against Plaintiffs. 

Finally, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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