Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06396/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06396-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 On April 19, 2005, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment strip search claims, conspiracy claims, verbal

abuse/harassment claims, due process claims, equal protection claims, and Eighth Amendment exercise claim were

dismissed from this action, with prejudice, for failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted, and

defendants Carey and Tyson were dismissed from this action, with prejudice, based on plaintiff’s failure to state any

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT LEE ROBINS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. ATCHUE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:01-CV-6396-REC-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS BE GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART, AND PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS BE DENIED

(Docs. 80 and 84) 

I. Findings and Recommendations

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims For Failure to Exhaust

1. Procedural History

Plaintiff Robert Lee Robins, Jr. (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed August 4, 2003, against defendants Atchue, Ritchie,

DeLuna, Sullivan, Winett, Todd, Vaughn, Shilay, Whitlach, Schmidt, Chapman, Grounds, Craven,

Cramer, Dam, and Eskardari for retaliation; against defendants Atchue, Ritchie, and White for

excessive force; against defendant De Luna for denial of medical treatment; and against defendants

Atchue, Jelleschitz, Johnson, and Cramer for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

based on the strip searches.1 (Docs. 29, 30.) On November 30, 2005, pursuant to the unenumerated

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claims upon which relief may be granted against them. (Doc. 30.) On March 7, 2006, defendants Leonard and

Crowell were dismissed from this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (Doc. 92.) Defendant

Cramer remains unserved.

2

 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion

on June 10, 2005. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. 33.)

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portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), defendants Atchue, Chapman, Craven, Dam,

DeLuna, Eskandari, Grounds, Jelleschitz, Johnson, Ritchie, Schmidt, Sullivan, Todd, White,

Whitlach, and Winett (“defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust the available

administrative remedies. (Doc. 80.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on December 27, 2005, and

defendants filed a reply on January 12, 2006.2 (Docs. 83, 84, 88.). On March 1, 2006, defendants

Vaughn and Shilay-Stromberg filed a notice of joinder in the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 91.)

2. Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement

applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought by the

prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative process can

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

“All ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards,

nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth, 532 U.S.

at 739 n.5). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-

1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Based on the general principle that

summary judgment is on the merits while dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust is not on the

merits, the failure to exhaust nonjudicial administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject

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to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d

at 1119 (citations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues

of fact. Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative

remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

3. Discussion

a. Strip Searches by Defendant Atchue

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that onApril26, 2000, defendants Atchue,

Ritchie, and White conspired to assault and batter plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Atchue

and Ritchie acted to retaliate against him for a lawsuit plaintiff filed against defendant Atchue, for

filing inmate appeals, and for testifying against defendant Ritchie in court. Plaintiff alleges that on

April 27, 2000, defendant Atchue called him a nigger, and defendants Atchue and Ritchie assaulted

and battered him while defendant White watched. Plaintiff alleges he was stripped twice and the

second search was conducted so that defendant Atchue could view plaintiff’s genitals and make

harassing comments. Plaintiff alleges defendant Atchue filed a false report subjecting plaintiff to

a District Attorney’s Office referral in retaliation for the suit plaintiff filed. 

Defendantsmove to dismiss the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against defendant

Atchue stemming from the alleged strip searches on the ground that plaintiff did not exhaust.

Defendants submit three inmate appeals concerning the events of April 26 and 27, 2000, all

exhausted through the Director’s level of review, and contend that none of the appeals grieved the

alleged strip searches. (Motion, Def. Ex. 2, pp. 24-31, Log. No. CCI 00-1058; Ex. 4, pp. 56-91, Log.

No. CCI 00-1453; Ex. 5, pp. 93-106, Log. No. CCI 00-1307.) Plaintiff contends that in sections F

and H of log number CCI 00-1453, he clearly raised the issue of strip searches. (Opp., 1:25-26.)

Appeal number 00-1453 grieved a “racial attack” against plaintiff in which defendants

Atchue and Ritchie used racial epithets against him. (Def. Ex. 4, pp. 56-91, Section A; Pla. Ex. p.

9, Section A.) In section F, which is utilized to pursue an appeal to the second level of review,

plaintiff wrote, “[A]nd later during a strip search sexually harassed petitioner with unwarranted

statements because petitioner filed a civil action against her for past misconduct . . . .” (Id.) In

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section H, which is utilized to pursue an appeal to the Director’s level of review, plaintiff wrote,

“The second level does not address nor disputes that later during a strip search L. Atchue made

sexually harassing statements to petitioner in R&R.” (Id.)

The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. “Any inmate or parolee under the

department’s jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which

they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Id. at 3084.1(a).

Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal level, first formal level, second formal

level, and third formal level, also known as the “Director’s Level.” Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084.5

(2006). Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement does not require that inmates draft grievances

with the precision of an attorney, laying out every fact, identifying every defendant by name, and

identifying which constitutional rights were violated by which actions or omissions. However,

satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires that inmates, in their grievances, place prison

personnel on fair notice as to the events that subsequently give rise to suit. 

Appeallog number 00-1453 concerns inappropriate racial and harassing statements allegedly

made to plaintiff by Atchue, Ritchie, and Taylor. Review of the appeal does not support plaintiff’s

position that he grieved the strip searches in the appeal. Rather, the mention of the strip search in

the two sentences identified by plaintiff is clearly incidental and not the focus of plaintiff’s

grievance. The grievance involves statements made to plaintiff and one of the harassing statements

at issue was allegedly made during a strip search. It is in this context that the strip search is

mentioned. The incidental mention of a strip search in the later stages of the pursuit of the appeal

does not transform the appeal into one grieving the inappropriate use of strip searches by defendant

Atchue. A review of the second and Director’s level responses to the appeal confirms that prison

officials did not treat this incidental mention as a grievance and address it. (Def. Ex. 4, pp. 56-62.)

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims against defendant Atchue

stemming from the strip searches and recommends that the claims be dismissed, without prejudice.

/// 

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b. Retaliatory Failure to Provide Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that defendant DeLuna, a registered nurse, acted with deliberate indifference

to plaintiff’s medical needs when he denied plaintiff treatment for his injuries on April 27, 2000.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant DeLuna denied him medical care and submitted a false report in

retaliation for plaintiff’s use of the grievance system and legal system. 

Defendants move for dismissal of the retaliation claim against defendant DeLuna on the

ground that plaintiff did not exhaust. Defendants submit a copy of the appeal plaintiff exhausted

concerning the failure of DeLuna to provide plaintiff with medical care, and contend that the appeal

did not state that defendant acted in retaliation against plaintiff. (Def. Ex. 2, pp. 24-31, Log. No. CCI

00-1058.) Plaintiff contends that in appeal log number CCI 00-1307, he used the words “[t]he

retaliatory conduct,” and that defendant DeLuna refused to provide him with medical care and was

a knowing participant in the retaliatory acts. (Opp., 2:6-9; Ex., p. 11.)

Appeal log number 00-1058, cited to by defendants, grieved the failure of defendant DeLuna

to provide plaintiff with medical care. The appeal is devoid of any claim that defendant DeLuna

acted to retaliate against plaintiff. Appeal log number 00-1307, cited to by plaintiff, did not grieve

defendant DeLuna’s conduct. The appeal grieved the conduct of defendants Atchue, Ritchie, and

White. Examination of the appeal does not support plaintiff’s contention that it exhausted plaintiff’s

retaliation claim against defendant DeLuna. Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary is meritless. The

court finds that plaintiff failed to exhaust his retaliation claim against defendant DeLuna and

recommends that the claim be dismissed from this action, without prejudice.

c. Retaliatory Assessment of SHU Term

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Sullivan, Winett, Todd, Vaughn, Shiley, Whitlach, Schmidt,

Chapman, Grounds, Craven, Cramer, Dam, and Eskardari assessed him a one-year SHU term in

retaliation for the grievances and lawsuits he filed. Defendants move for dismissal of this retaliation

claim on the ground that plaintiff did not exhaust. Defendants submit three exhausted inmate

appeals concerning the events surrounding the imposition of the SHU term, and contend that none

of the appeals grieved plaintiff’s claim that the SHU term was assessed in retaliation against

plaintiff. (Motion, Def. Ex. 1, pp. 2-22, Log. No. CCI 00-2324; Ex. 3, pp. 33-54, Log. No. CCI 00-

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2108; Ex. 6, pp. 108-117, Log. No. CCI 01-0081.) Plaintiff contends that in appeal log number CCI

00-2108, he wrote, “because he had filed a civil complaint on Correctional Officer L. Atchue,” and

that the actions taken were unquestionably retaliatory. (Opp., 2:10-13.)

Appeal log number 00-2108, cited to by plaintiff, grieved alleged due process violations. The

appeal did not grieve the assessment of the SHU term on the ground that it was imposed to retaliate

against plaintiff. Although plaintiff contended in the appeal that he was placed in administrative

segregation on the false charge of battery on a peace officer because he filed a civil complaint against

defendant Atchue, that sentence does not constitute a grievance of plaintiff’s claim that he was later

found guilty and assessed a SHU term in retaliation for filing lawsuits and grievances. The court

finds that plaintiff did not exhaust the claim that defendants assessed a SHU term against him in

retaliation for filing grievances and lawsuits, and the court recommends that the claim be dismissed

from this action, without prejudice. 

d. Strip Searches in Administrative Segregation

Plaintiff alleges that while he was in administrative segregation, defendants Jelleschitz,

Johnson, and Cramer conducted strip searches, intimidated plaintiff by staring at him, and made

sexuallyharassing comments during the searches. Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust

the administrative remedies against any of the defendants. Defendants contend that although

plaintiff filed three appeals concerning strip searches in administrative segregation, he did not

exhaust any of the appeals through the Director’s level of review. (Def. Ex. 11, pp. 189-193, Log

Number CCI 00-1947; Ex. 12, pp. 195-204, Log Number CCI 00-1789; Ex. 13, pp. 204-215, Log

Number CCI 00-2784.) Plaintiff contends that appeal log numbers 00-1947 and 00-1789 were

partially granted, which exhausted the process. Defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s contention

concerning this claim in their reply. 

Plaintiff filed three appeals concerning the strip searches by female officers in administrative

segregation. Although there is no evidence that plaintiff exhausted appeal number 00-2784, both

00-1947 and 00-1789 were partially granted “in the matter of the strip searches being performed by

the opposite sex.” (Def. Ex. 11, p. 191; Ex. 12, p. 196.) Plaintiff’s appeals were denied as to 

///

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plaintiff’s request that employees be reprimanded because the request was outside the scope of

plaintiff’s authority. (Id.)

Receipt of a Director’s level decision is not always a prerequisite to exhaustion. Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2005). In a situation such as this where the appeals grieved the

claim set forth in the lawsuit and the appeals were granted in part as to the facts underlying the claim,

defendants must do more than argue that plaintiff failed to pursue the appeals to the Director’s level

of review in order to meet their burden as the moving parties. Id. Defendants are required to set

forth evidence that after plaintiff’s appeals were partially granted at the first level of review, further

relief was available via the appeals process, thus necessitating pursuit of the appeal to the next level

of review. Id. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the claim

against defendants Jelleschitz and Johnson stemming from the strip searches conducted in

administrative segregation.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

In his opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff moves for sanctions on the

ground that defendants acted in bad faith by altering or intentionally tampering with section H of

appeal log number CCI 00-1453. (Def. Ex. 4, p. 64.) Plaintiff seeks sanctions up to and including

judgment against defendants. Defendants opposed plaintiff’s motion in their reply. 

Plaintiff did not articulate the legal basis for his motion and defendants did not speculate in

their opposition. The court has inherent power to sanction parties or their attorneys for improper

conduct, Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447

U.S. 752, 766 (1980); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001), and in light of plaintiff’s

failure to specify otherwise, the court presumes that it is this power plaintiff seeks to invoke. The

imposition of sanctions under the court’s inherent authority is discretionary. Air Separation, Inc. v.

Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 45 F.3d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). The court’s “inherent power

‘extends to a full range of litigation abuses.’” Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S.

at 46-47). However, in order to sanction a litigant under the court’s inherent powers, the court must

make a specific finding of “bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 994.

Although mere recklessness is insufficient to support sanctions under the court’s inherent powers,

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“recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an

improper purpose” is sufficient. Id. at 993-94. A litigant may be sanctioned for acting for an

improper purpose, even if the act was “a truthful statement or non-frivolous argument or objection.”

Id. at 992. “[I]nherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S.

at 44. 

Section H is the section inmates must fill out if they seek to pursue their appeal to the

Director’s level of review. Although this section is blank on the copy submitted to the court by

defendants and is filled out in the original submitted to the court by plaintiff, there is no indication

that the copy was tampered with or altered. Rather, it appears to be a copy of plaintiff’s appeal made

before plaintiff filled out section H and submitted the appeal to the Director’s level of review. The

court notes that defendants did not claim that plaintiff failed to pursue his appeal to the Director’s

level of review. To the contrary, defendants submitted evidence that the appeal was exhausted

through the Director’s level of review and included in their exhibits a copy of the Director’s level

decision. (Motion, 10:9-14; Ex. A, Grannis Dec., ¶9; Ex. B, Whitlach Dec., ¶6; Ex. 4, pp.56-58.)

Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that defendants acted in bad faith or tampered with

evidence. As the moving party, plaintiff must do more than point to a discrepancy between his

exhibit and defendants’ exhibit, and assert it was intentional and he is entitled to sanctions. The

court is not inclined to view with favor an attempt by one party to use what appears to be an

unintentional mistake or omission by the other as the basis for a motion for sanction based on bad

faith conduct. The court would view plaintiff’s motion differently if defendants had submitted the

incomplete copy and set forth the argument that plaintiff failed to pursue his appeal beyond the

second level of review. Defendants did no such thing, however. The court shall recommend that

plaintiff’s motion for sanctions be denied.

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust the available administrative

remedies as mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), filed November 30, 2005, be

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

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a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

claims against defendant Atchue stemming from the strip searches be

GRANTED and the claims be dismissed, without prejudice;

b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant

DeLuna be GRANTED and the claim be dismissed, without prejudice

c. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim against defendants Sullivan,

Winett, Todd, Vaughn, Shiley, Whitlach, Schmidt, Chapman, Grounds,

Craven, Cramer, Dam, and Eskardari for the retaliatory assessment of a SHU

term be GRANTED and the claim be dismissed, without prejudice; and

d. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim against defendants Jelleschitz and

Johnson stemming from strip searches conducted in administrative

segregation be DENIED, without prejudice; and

2. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, filed December 27, 2005, be DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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