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Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4141

___________

Depositors Insurance Company; *

Brooke Miller, *

*

Plaintiffs/Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Walgreen *

Company, *

*

Defendants, *

*

General Electric Company; Frank *

Fletcher Companies, LTD, doing *

business as Cheyenne Home *

Furnishings and Cheyenne *

Industries, Inc., *

*

Defendants/Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: September 27, 2007

Filed: November 6, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

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1

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

2

The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Walgreen

Company. 

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RILEY, Circuit Judge.

The district court1

 granted the motions for summary judgment of General

Electric Co. (GE) and Frank Fletcher Cos., LTD, d/b/a Cheyenne Home Furnishings

and Cheyenne Industries, Inc. (Fletcher) (collectively, the defendants2

) and dismissed

the claims of Depositors Insurance Co. (Depositors) and Brooke Miller (Miller)

(collectively, the plaintiffs) based on product liability, implied warranty of

merchantability, and negligence. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Miller owned a home in Des Moines, Iowa, and purchased homeowners

insurance from Depositors. Miller bought an extension cord manufactured by GE and

a lamp manufactured by Fletcher. Miller placed the Fletcher lamp on an end table

near an upholstered chair, plugged the lamp into the GE extension cord, and plugged

the extension cord into an electrical outlet. 

On October 9, 2004, a fire occurred at the Miller residence. The fire damaged

the extension cord, lamp, end table, upholstered chair, and the house. The plaintiffs’

expert, Todd Hartzler, could neither locate the point of origin of the fire nor reach a

conclusion regarding the cause of the fire. Miller paid the $500 deductible on the

insurance policy, Depositors paid $88,503.36 in benefits, and Miller assigned her

subrogation interest to Depositors. 

The plaintiffs filed a complaint, alleging product liability, implied warranty of

merchantability, and negligence claims. The plaintiffs maintained either the GE

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extension cord or the Fletcher lamp cord caused the fire. The defendants moved for

summary judgment on all the claims. The district court granted summary judgment

for the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Libel v. Adventure Lands

of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(c) provides summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” To be a genuine issue

of fact, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To

be a material fact, the factual issue must potentially “affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law.” Id. “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Because the federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over this case pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1332, we apply the law of the State of Iowa. See HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC

Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2007). 

A. Product Liability

The plaintiffs asserted a manufacturing defect in either the GE extension cord

or Fletcher lamp cord caused the fire. In Wright v. Brooke Group, Ltd., 652 N.W.2d

159 (Iowa 2002), the Supreme Court of Iowa adopted the Product Restatement, which

provides a product “contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from

its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and

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The plaintiffs also argued the extension and lamp cords failed to conform to

the defendants’ promises, however, the plaintiffs never identified any promises made

by the defendants. See generally Iowa Code § 554.2314(2)(f) (providing the implied

warranty of merchantability guarantees goods “conform to the promises or

affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any”). “Mere allegations not

supported with specific facts are insufficient to establish a material issue of fact and

will not withstand a summary judgment motion.” Henthorn v. Capitol Commc’n, Inc.,

359 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004). 

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marketing of the product.” Id. at 178; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability

§ 2(a) (1998). “[A] manufacturing defect is a departure from a product unit’s design

specifications.” Id. § 2 cmt. c; see also Parish v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 719

N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2006) (noting, in adopting the Product Restatement, the

Supreme Court of Iowa also adopted the associated commentary). A departure from

the intended design of a product cannot be determined without knowing the actual

intended design of the product. Thus, under Iowa law, an essential element of any

manufacturing defect claim is the intended design of the product. See Wright, 652

N.W.2d at 178-79 (citing “[a] manufacturing defect exists only where an item is

substandard when compared to other identical units off of the assembly line” (quoting

In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050,

1054 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996))). Here, the plaintiffs never offered any evidence showing

(1) the intended design of either the extension or lamp cords or (2) how the

manufacturing of these cords departed from the intended product designs. Therefore,

the plaintiffs failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of essential

elements of the manufacturing defect claims. The district court properly granted

summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ product liability claims. 

B. Implied Warranty of Merchantability

The plaintiffs also brought claims for breach of implied warranty of

merchantability, arguing the extension and lamp cords were not fit for the ordinary

purpose for which cords are used.3

 Iowa Code section 554.2314 provides for an

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Section 554.2314, in relevant part, provides:

1. Unless excluded or modified (section 554.2316), a warranty that the

goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the

seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. . . . 

2. Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . . 

c. are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are

used.

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implied warranty of merchantability.4

 “[W]arranty liability under section

554.2314(2)(c) requires proof of a product defect as defined in Products Restatement

section 2.” Wright, 652 N.W.2d at 182; see also Restatement (Third) of Torts:

Product Liability § 2(a) cmt. n (stating a manufacturing defect claim and an implied

warranty of merchantability claim “rest on the same factual predicate” and thus “these

two claims are duplicative and may not be pursued together in the same case”).

Because the plaintiffs failed to make a showing sufficient to establish a manufacturing

defect in either the extension or lamp cords, the district court properly granted

summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ implied warranty of merchantability claims. 

C. Negligence

The plaintiffs asserted general negligence claims under the res ipsa loquitur

doctrine. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence and a type of circumstantial evidence,

which permits, but does not compel, an inference of negligence upon showing an

injury “would not have occurred absent some unspecified but impliedly negligent act.”

Sammons v. Smith, 353 N.W.2d 380, 385 (Iowa 1984); see also Brewster v. United

States, 542 N.W.2d 524, 528-29 (Iowa 1996) (en banc). “Under Iowa law, res ipsa

loquitur applies when ‘(1) the injury is caused by an instrumentality under the

exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the occurrence is such as in the ordinary

course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.” Brewster, 542

N.W.2d at 529 (quoting Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture, Inc., 498 N.W.2d 682, 686

(Iowa 1993)). 

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In support of this proposition, the district court cited to Highland Golf Club of

Iowa Falls, Iowa v. Sinclair Refining Co., 59 F. Supp. 911, 917-18 (N.D. Iowa 1945),

superseded on other grounds by statute Iowa Code ch. 668, as recognized in McGuire

v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (N.D. Iowa 2003). The plaintiffs

argue the district court erred by citing to a superseded case. 

In Highland Golf Club of Iowa Falls, 59 F. Supp. at 912-13, a golf club brought

a general negligence claim under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine against a gasoline

vendor. A fire occurred in the golf club’s garage while the gasoline vendor was

delivering gasoline. The district court entered a directed verdict for the gasoline

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Res ipsa loquitur depends upon the “defendant’s complete and exclusive control

of the instrumentalities that cause the injury.” Oak Leaf Country Club, Inc. v. Wilson,

257 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Iowa 1977) (quoting Eaves v. City of Ottumwa, 38 N.W.2d

761, 769 (Iowa 1949)). To satisfy the exclusive control requirement, “[t]he injury

must either be traced to a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant

was responsible, or it must be shown that the [defendant] was responsible for all

reasonably probable causes to which the accident could be attributed.” Graber v. City

of Ankeny, Iowa, 616 N.W.2d 633, 643 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (quoting W. Page

Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 248 (5th ed. 1984)).

The exclusive control must have occurred at the time of the negligent act.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 832 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).

The purpose of the exclusive control requirement is “‘to link the defendant with the

probability, already established, that the accident was negligently caused.’” Brewster,

542 N.W.2d at 528 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 248).

“Failure to connect the defendant with the negligent event defeats the application of

res ipsa loquitur.” Id. at 528-29.

 “If it appears that two or more instrumentalities, only one of which was under

defendant’s control, contributed to or may have contributed to the injury, the [res ipsa

loquitur] doctrine cannot be invoked.”5

 Humphrey v. Happy, 169 N.W.2d 565, 569

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vendor because “the situation lack[ed] the element of exclusive control of the

instrumentalities which is necessary to give rise to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”

Id. at 918. The district court never concluded the golf club was negligent. Id. at 919

(recognizing “fires are frequent occurrences and in a great many cases without any

negligence on the part of anyone”). 

In the discussion of the applicable law, the district court noted “[w]here the rule

of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, this does not change the rule that the plaintiff must

plead and prove his freedom from contributory negligence.” Id. at 914. Before Iowa

adopted the principles of comparative fault, “the doctrine of contributory negligence

prohibited any party who caused the injury from recovering.” Jeffrey A. Stone, The

Law of Contribution and Tort-Based Indemnity in Iowa, 55 Drake L. Rev. 113,

116-17 (2006). The enactment of the Iowa Comparative Fault Act abolished the

defense of contributory negligence, relieving the plaintiff from the obligation of

pleading and proving freedom from contributory negligence. See Iowa Code ch. 668.

Insofar as Highland Golf Club of Iowa Falls was decided based on the golf

club’s contributory negligence, the Iowa Comparative Fault Act superseded the

decision; however, the district court also decided Highland Golf Club of Iowa Falls

based on the gasoline vendor’s lack of exclusive control over the instrumentalities

causing the injury. The enactment of the Iowa Comparative Fault Act has not affected

this interpretation of the case. 

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(Iowa 1969) (quoting with approval 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 300 (1941)). “‘Unless

there is vicarious liability or shared control, the logical rule usually is applied, that the

plaintiff does not make out a preponderant case against either of two defendants by

showing merely that [the plaintiff] has been injured by the negligence of one or the

other.’” Novak Heating & Air Conditioning v. Carrier Corp., 622 N.W.2d 495, 498

(Iowa 2001) (en banc) (quoting Town of Reasnor v. Pyland Constr. Co., 229 N.W.2d

269, 272 (Iowa 1975)); see also Pastour v. Kolb Hartware, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 116, 126

(Iowa 1969) (holding if multiple instruments controlled by different defendants caused

the injury, res ipsa loquitur can only apply if the defendants “have been properly

charged as joint tortfeasors or have been in joint control of the instrumentality or

agency causing the injury, or where one was vicariously liable for the other’s

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negligence” (quoting E. H. Schopler, Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of

multiple defendants, 38 A.L.R.2d 905, 906 (1954))). 

Here, the plaintiffs identify two instruments—the GE extension cord and the

Fletcher lamp cord—that potentially could have caused the fire. The plaintiffs never

specifically identify the instrument that caused the fire; rather, the plaintiffs proceed

on the assumption that identifying two instruments that potentially could have caused

the fire is a sufficient basis upon which to apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The

plaintiffs, however, are incorrect. We hold the plaintiffs’ alternative theories of the

instrument that caused the fire precludes the application of the res ipsa loquitur

doctrine. Again, “the plaintiff does not make out a preponderant case against either

of two defendants by showing merely that [the plaintiff] has been injured by the

negligence of one or the other.” Novak Heating & Air Conditioning, 622 N.W.2d at

498 (quoting Town of Reasnor, 229 N.W.2d at 272).

Additionally, the plaintiffs never argued Fletcher and GE are vicariously liable

or joint tortfeasors. Finally, GE’s control over the extension cord and Fletcher’s

control over the lamp are independent acts of control over separate and distinct

instruments. Cf. Town of Reasnor, 229 N.W.2d at 272 (holding two construction

contractors had not shared control when one contractor completed its work before the

other contractor began its work). Here, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants

negligently manufactured the cords. Neither GE nor Fletcher shared control over the

other’s manufacturing operation. The district court properly granted summary

judgment on the plaintiffs’ general negligence claims. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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