Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02931/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02931-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LAMBERT, an individual;

BEVERLY LAMBERT, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SANTA ROSA, a chartered city;

MATTHEW A. SANCHEZ, individually and

as a police officer of the Santa Rosa

Police Department; ALISSA JOHNSON,

individually and as a police officer

of the Santa Rosa Police Department;

and DOES 1 to 25,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-02931 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT SANTA

ROSA'S MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

Defendant City of Santa Rosa moves for summary judgment on

Plaintiff William Lambert's § 1983 claim under Monell v. Department

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Plaintiff Beverly

Lambert's claim for loss of consortium, to the extent that it is

Case 4:05-cv-02931-CW Document 64 Filed 08/22/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

Defendant Matthew Sanchez did not move for summary judgment,

and the parties previously stipulated to dismiss all causes of

action against Defendant Alissa Johnson.

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based on the Monell claim.1 Although Plaintiffs filed an

opposition to Defendant Santa Rosa's motion, they concede that

Defendant Santa Rosa cannot be held liable under Monell. The

matter was submitted on the papers. Having considered all of the

papers filed by the parties and the evidence cited therein, the

Court grants Defendant Santa Rosa's motion.

BACKGROUND

On March 22, 2004, Plaintiffs were having a discussion with

their adult son, Jon Lambert; the talking turned into yelling. 

Mrs. Lambert was sitting in the couch. When she tried to get up

from the couch, her husband pushed her back so that she could not

get up. She began kicking at his legs and swinging her arms. Mr.

Lambert then slapped her two or three times. When Mrs. Lambert got

up, she called 911.

The Santa Rosa dispatcher directed Defendant Sanchez and

Officer Johnson to the Lambert home, reporting that there was a

family disturbance and that the parties had been drinking. When

the officers arrived at the Lambert home, they interviewed Mr. and

Mrs. Lambert separately. Both parties admitted that Mr. Lambert

had struck Mrs. Lambert. After interviewing Mr. Lambert, Defendant

Sanchez determined that probable cause existed to arrest Mr.

Lambert for domestic violence. Mr. Lambert does not dispute the

issue of probable cause. But the parties dispute what happened

next. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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According to Mr. Lambert, Defendant Sanchez asked to see his

identification. Mr. Lambert stated that his wallet, with his

identification, was in the dining room; he began to walk from the

living room to the dining room. Defendant Sanchez told him to

stop. Mr. Lambert stopped. Defendant Sanchez instructed Mr.

Lambert to turn around and put his hands behind his back. Mr.

Lambert did not; instead, he asked to go to the bathroom. 

Defendant Sanchez then grabbed him and spun him around, twisting

his left arm behind his back and knocking him to the ground. 

Defendant Sanchez had his knee in Mr. Lambert's back and was

twisting his right leg. Mr. Lambert begged him to stop, stating

that Defendant Sanchez had broken his leg. Defendant Sanchez then

used his taser gun on Mr. Lambert's leg.

According to Defendant Sanchez, he attempted to arrest Mr.

Lambert in the living room and advised Mr. Lambert to place his

hands on his head. Mr. Lambert did not comply with this request. 

Nor did he comply with Defendant Sanchez's further commands;

instead, he resisted arrest. Defendant Sanchez called for backup. 

He performed a leg sweep, knocking Mr. Lambert to the ground. Once

on the ground, Mr. Lambert continued to resist being handcuffed,

and Defendant Sanchez utilized a taser. After tasering Mr.

Lambert, Defendant Sanchez was finally able to handcuff Mr.

Lambert.

Mr. Lambert sustained a fracture of his right tibia, and was

taken to the hospital, before being taken to jail. The fractured

tibia has required two surgeries and resulted in many months of

recuperation.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant Santa Rosa,

Defendant Sanchez and Defendant Johnson. The first amended

complaint alleges common law assault and battery and violation of

Mr. Lambert's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

California Civil Code § 52.1. In addition, Mrs. Lambert seeks

damages for loss of consortium related to Mr. Lambert's injuries. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

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(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

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burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs acknowledge that a municipality, such as Defendant

Santa Rosa, can be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where

the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at

issue; respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach

under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. Plaintiffs also

acknowledge that a single act of misconduct by a police officer is

insufficient to establish an official policy or custom on the part

of a municipality. Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765,

770 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, they concede that, even though

there are disputed facts, Defendant Santa Rosa cannot be held

liable under Monell.

But Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Santa Rosa can be held

vicariously liable on their State law claims. As Defendant Santa

Rosa clarifies in its reply, however, its motion was not seeking

summary judgment on the State law causes of action, except to the

extent that the loss of consortium claim is based on an alleged

federal civil rights violation by Defendant Santa Rosa.

Because it is undisputed that the Monell claim fails as a

matter of law, the Court grants Defendant Santa Rosa summary

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Defendant Santa Rosa's motion for judicial notice (Docket No.

56) is also GRANTED.

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judgment on Plaintiff William Lambert's Monell claim and grants

Defendant Santa Rose partial summary judgment on Plaintiff Beverly

Lambert's loss of consortium claim, to the extent that the

consortium claim is based on the Monell claim asserted against

Defendant Santa Rosa.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Santa

Rosa's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 52) on the Monell

claim and the consortium claim, to the extent that the consortium

claim is based on the Monell claim.2 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/22/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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