Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-00355/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-00355-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

and 

ENEDINA ROSALES 

NO. CIV. S-99-0355 FCD JFM 

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MIKE LEAVITT, SECRETARY OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Defendant.

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This matter is before the court on a motion to intervene

filed by applicants Larry and Brenda Buggs, Mary Ellen Deegan,

Gloria Jefferson, Sylvia McGinnis, Shawn Spencer, Debra Zaccaro,

and Grandparents as Parents (collectively, “applicants”). 

Defendant Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”)

does not oppose applicants’ intervention. Plaintiff Enedina

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material 

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

Rosales (“Rosales”) joins the applicants’ motion. Plaintiff

State of California Department of Social Services (“DSS”) opposes

the motion. For the reason’s set forth below,1 applicants’

motion to intervene is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

DSS commenced this litigation on February 24, 1999, to

compel the federal government to conform its interpretation of

the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Foster Care (“AFDCFC”) statute to the interpretation in Land v. Anderson, 55 Cal.

App. 4th (2d Dist. 1997). Under such an interpretation,

California agencies would be entitled to matching federal funds

when AFDC-FC payments were made. Rosales intervened in the

action on her own behalf and as a representative of those foster

care parents who had been denied benefits under the Secretary’s

interpretation of the AFDC-FC statute. The court dismissed the

action concluding that the Secretary’s interpretation of 42

U.S.C. § 672 was reasonable and that there was an insufficient

showing that the Secretary acted in an arbitrary and capricious

manner in denying approval of California’s plan amendment. Cal.

Dept’t of Social Services v. Shalala, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (E.D.

Cal. 2000). The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the

Secretary’s interpretation of § 672 was unreasonable. Cal. Dep’t

of Social Services and Rosales v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“CDSS/Rosales”). 

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3

Following the Ninth Circuits decision in CDSS/Rosales, the

court ordered: (1) defendant Secretary to approve California’s

plan amendment; and (2) plaintiff DSS and defendant Secretary to

pay retroactive AFDC-FC benefits to Rosales and similarly

situated relative foster care families who were denied benefits

as a result of the Secretary’s erroneous interpretation of § 672.

(Order, filed February 20, 2004). 

Thereafter, DSS filed a motion to amend the court’s Order to

extend the date by which DSS was required to issue an All County

Letter informing county welfare departments and other affected

agencies of the procedures and time line for implementing the

court’s order. Subsequently, Rosales filed a motion to compel

performance by the Secretary. On August 17, 2004, the court

issued an Amended Order affirming the requirement that DSS and

the Secretary comply with CDSS/Rosales. In particular, the court

ordered DSS to immediately make AFDC-FC payments to Rosales. 

(Amended Order, filed August 17, 2004, at 7-8). In addition, the

court ordered DSS to comply as follows:

For all foster care cases in which dependency

jurisdiction was open on or after March 3, 2003, DSS

shall make AFDC-FC payments for the entire period,

subsequent to December 23, 1997, in which the child was

entitled to AFDC-FC payments under CDSS/Rosales and was

otherwise eligible for such benefits and those benefits

were not paid. For purpose of retroactive payments,

foster homes approved on or after March 2, 2003 shall

be considered to have met the federal approval

standards.

....

DSS shall issue a directive to all County Welfare

Departments and Chief Probation Officers and other

appropriate parties (“All County Letter”) to review all

foster care cases open on or after March 3, 2003 to

determine eligibility in accordance with CDSS/Rosales

and consistent with this judgement. Each such case

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shall be so reviewed during the next regular six-month

review to which the case would be subjected in the

normal course of business, but no later than eight

months from the date of the issuance of this order. 

DSS shall pay all benefits which are found to be due as

a result of those reviews within 30 days of the

determination of eligibility.

(Amended Order at 6-7).

On April 20, 2005, Rosales requested DSS to provide

information regarding compliance with the court’s Amended Order. 

Specifically, Rosales requested the number of cases reviewed and

the results of that review. (Letter to Paul Reynaga, dated April

20, 2005, Ex. A to Mot. to Intervene). Subsequent to the close

of the review period on April 30, 2005, DSS responded to Rosales

on May 11, 2005, stating that such information was not required

by the court’s Amended Order. (Letter to Marjorie Shelvy, dated

May 12, 2005, Ex. B to Mot. to Intervene). Finally, on May 25,

2005, DSS responded to a request from Rosales for information

regarding written instructions provided to the counties

concerning Notices of Action in relation to the CDSS/Rosales

reviews. (Letter to Marjorie Shelvy, dated May 25, 2005, Ex. C

to Mot. to Intervene). In its response, DSS informed Rosales

that no written instructions were given to the counties regarding

Notices of Action in connection with CDSS/Rosales. (Id.) In

addition, DSS concluded that Notices of Action were not required

to be sent if no change in benefits occurred during the normal

six-month review period. (Id.) 

Applicants bring this motion for intervention as of right

pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

or, in the alternative, for permissive intervention pursuant to

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2 All further references to the Rules are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted. 

5

Rule 24(b).2 In addition, applicants move to intervene pursuant

to Rule 71. 

STANDARD

I. Rule 24

Rule 24 provides two grounds for intervention in federal

court: intervention as of right and permissive intervention. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (West 2006). 

Rule 24(a)(2) governs applications for intervention as of

right and provides: 

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims

an interest relating to the property or transaction

which is the subject of the action and the applicant is

so situated that the disposition of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s

ability to protect that interest, unless the

applicant’s interest is adequately represented by

existing parties.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). In the absence of a statute conferring an

unconditional right to intervene, the applicant must demonstrate

that: (1) the application is timely; (2) the applicant has an

interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (3) absent

intervention, applicant’s interest will be impaired; and (4) the

existing parties inadequately represent the applicant’s

interests. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,

131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). The rule is construed

broadly in favor of the applicants. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v.

Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995).

Applicants also may seek permissive intervention under Rule

24(b), which provides:

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Upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to

intervene in an action . . . when an applicant’s claim

or defense and the main action have a question of law

or fact in common. . . . In exercising it discretion,

the court shall consider whether the intervention will

unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

rights of the original parties. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). A court may grant permissive intervention

where the applicant demonstrates (1) independent grounds for

jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s

claim or defense, and the main action, have a common question of

law or fact. Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1308 (quotations and citation

omitted). Even if the applicant satisfies these requirements,

the court has discretion to deny intervention based upon other

considerations relevant to the individual circumstances of the

case before it. See Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th

Cir. 1998); Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1989).

In reviewing a motion to intervene, the court generally

should accept as true the allegations and evidence submitted by

the applicant. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v.

Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2001). 

II. Rule 71

Rule 71 permits a non-party to enforce an order of the court

in the same manner as a party if the order was made for the

benefit of such a non-party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71 (West 2006). As

a preliminary matter, a court must first determine if the nonparty is a person or entity “in whose favor” an order has been

entered. Dunn v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 594 F. Supp. 239,

242 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). If the “in whose favor” threshold is met, a

non-party may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court to

“render such orders as may be necessary to effectuate and prevent

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the frustration of orders it has previously issued.” Id.

(quoting U.S v. N.Y. Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977)). 

ANALYSIS

I. Intervention as of Right 

Applicants first assert that they should be permitted to

intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a). Timeliness is "the

threshold requirement" for intervention as of right. United

States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 588 (9th Cir. 1990). If the

court finds “that the motion to intervene was not timely, [it]

need not reach any of the remaining elements of Rule 24.” 

Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1302 (quoting United States v. Washington, 86

F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996)). In determining whether a

motion is timely, the court considers: (1) the stage of the

proceedings; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the

reason for and length of the delay. United States ex rel.

McGough v. Covington Techs., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992). 

“[A]ny substantial delay weighs heavily against intervention.” 

Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1302 (citations omitted). 

In this case, applicants contend that their motion to

intervene as of right is timely. However, applicants seek to

intervene and gain full-party status in a case where substantial

time has passed since the court entered its final judgment. 

Applicants filed this motion more than seventeen months after the

court issued its Amended Order, almost nine months after the

completion of the court-ordered review period, and almost eight

months after the cessation of informal efforts between the

parties regarding compliance with the court-ordered review. This

case is well past the final stages of the proceedings. The fact

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that final judgment was entered in this litigation weighs heavily

against allowing intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a). 

See Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1303 (concluding that, although the case

was still in the pre-trial stages, the fact that the court had

“substantively--and substantially--engaged the issues” in the

case weighed heavily against intervention as of right). 

In addition, applicants argue that no prejudice to the

existing parties will occur if this motion is granted. (Mot. to

Intervene at 9). However, applicants request that DSS “provide

full and complete discovery regarding compliance with and

communications regarding this court’s judgment.” (Id. at 15). 

Although applicants may be limiting their request for discovery

to issues surrounding compliance with the court’s Amended Order,

as a general rule, intervenors are permitted to litigate fully

once admitted to suit. Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1304 (citations

omitted). Allowing applicants full-party status to re-open and

to potentially re-litigate issues previously resolved in this

case will inevitably cause prejudice to DSS insofar as such fullparty participation may resurrect litigation which was completed

over seventeen months ago. Id. Such an action counsels against

granting applicants’ motion to intervene. 

Finally, applicants contend that the timing of the motion to

intervene was driven by the timing of DSS’ “recent failure” to

comply with the court ordered review. (Mot. to Intervene at 9). 

As noted above, this case was resolved more than seventeen months

ago and the court-ordered review period was completed almost nine

months ago. The “informal efforts” to resolve the compliance

issues, which involved correspondence between DSS and Rosales’

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counsel, ceased in May 2005. (Id. at Ex. A). Applicants,

however, proffer no explanation as to why they waited almost

eight months after DSS’ “recent failure” before filing this

motion. Characterizing DSS’ actions as “recent” will not save

applicants’ argument. Rather, applicants’ eight-month delay

represents a “substantial lapse of time,” which “weighs heavily

against intervention.” Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1304 (citations

omitted). Applicants’ delay, coupled with the fact that

litigation was completed nearly a year and a half ago,

“undermines [applicants] assertion of a right to full-party

status.” Id. 

For the foregoing reasons, applicants fail to demonstrate

that their motion to intervene as of right is timely. Because

timeliness is the threshold requirement of Rule 24(a), the court

need not reach any of the other elements. Wilson, 131 F.3d at

1302. Accordingly, applicants’ motion to intervene pursuant to

Rule 24(a) is DENIED. 

II. Permissive Intervention

In the alternative, applicants seek permissive intervention

pursuant to Rule 24(b). Permissive intervention may be granted

where the applicant demonstrates (1) independent grounds for

jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) a common question

of law or fact exists between the applicant’s claim or defense

and the main action. Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1308 (quotations and

citation omitted). However, even if these requirements are

satisfied, the court has discretion to deny intervention,

considering such factors as whether the intervention would unduly

delay the action or unfairly prejudice existing parties. 

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3 The court’s analysis regarding the adequacy of

representation by existing parties would apply equally to

applicants’ motion to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a). 

10

Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 412. In addition, the court should

consider whether the applicant’s interest is adequately

represented by the existing parties. Venegas, 867 F.2d at 530. 

Like a motion for intervention as of right, “a finding of

untimeliness defeats a motion for permissive intervention.” Id.

(quoting Washington, 86 F.3d at 1507). A court considers the

same three factors to determine timeliness under Rule 24(b) as it

does under Rule 24(a). Id. However, in the context of

permissive intervention, a court analyzes the timeliness element

more strictly than as with intervention as of right. Id. (citing

United States v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Applicants’ motion for permissive intervention is untimely for

the same reasons as its motion for intervention as of right

discussed above. 

Further, applicants fail to demonstrate how Rosales does not

adequately represent their interests.3 Applicants admit that

they “do not seek to introduce any new claims or issues — only to

ensure complete and effective compliance with the existing

rulings of this Court and the Ninth Circuit.” (Mot. to Intervene

at 13-14). The thrust of applicants’ argument is that DSS failed

to comply with the court’s Amended Order in that it did not

require the counties to send Notice of Action letters in

connection with the court-ordered review. (Id. at 1-2). Each of

the individual applicants contend that (1) a review of their

eligibility for AFDC-FC benefits was required by CDSS/Rosales;

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and (2) they have not received benefits or notice that the

required CDSS/Rosales review was completed. (See id. at 4-7). 

Although Rosales received past due benefits owed to her in

connection with this litigation, she was again appointed the

foster parent of her grandson in 2003, which she asserts entitled

her to additional AFDC-FC benefits. (Id. at 7). Rosales, like

the individual applicants, has not received any benefits since

2003, nor has she received any Notice of Action. (Id.) Rosales

joined this motion to intervene, indicating her willingness to

advance applicants’ argument that DSS’ is not in compliance with

the court’s Amended Order. This willingness undermines

applicants’ contention of inadequate representation. 

Accordingly, applicants’ motion for permissive intervention

pursuant to Rule 24(b) is DENIED. 

III. Rule 71

Applicants contend that Rule 71 provides an alternative

method for intervention because they are beneficiaries of the

court’s Amended Order. (Mot. to Intervene at 14). Applicants

are correct that Rule 71 permits a non-party to enforce an order

of the court if that the order was made for the benefit of such a

non-party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71. Nevertheless, applicants must

“enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if a

party, for example, by a motion to compel.” Brennan v. Nassau

County, 352 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted and

emphasis added). In this case, applicants have not filed a 

motion seeking the court to compel DSS’ compliance with the

court’s Amended Order.

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4 The court does not make any findings regarding a

determination as to the likely applicability of Rule 71 to

applicant Grandparents as Parents, which is an organization that

provides services to individuals who may be eligible for AFDC-FC

benefits. Like the individual applicants, Grandparents as

Parents must meet the threshold requirement of showing that the

court’s Amended Order was entered for its benefit.

12

In connection with the filing of a substantive motion by a

non-party pursuant to Rule 71, the court must make an initial

determination regarding standing thereunder. Dunn, 594 F.Supp.

at 242. Provided that the individual applicants4 were eligible

for AFDC-FC benefits under CDSS/Rosales, they are likely persons

“in whose favor” the court’s Amended Order was issued. See Id.

However, applicants proffered no evidence, in the form of

declarations or affidavits, to support the contention that they

are non-parties “in whose favor” the Amended Order was issued. 

Therefore, the court cannot make a determination regarding the

applicants’ standing under Rule 71. 

 If applicants wish to proceed pursuant to Rule 71,

applicants may do so by filing a motion to compel DSS’ compliance

with the court’s Amended Order. Such a motion should be

accompanied by evidence which would permit the court to make the

threshold determination as to the applicants’ standing under Rule

71. Accordingly, applicants’ motion to intervene pursuant to

Rule 71 is DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, applicants’ motion to

intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a) is DENIED. In the

alternative, applicants’ motion for permissive intervention

pursuant to Rule 24(b) is DENIED. In addition, applicants’

motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 71 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 28, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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