Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01721/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01721-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANIE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06 CV 1721 JM (AJB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security 

Defendant.

Plaintiff Janie Brown brought this action for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s (“Commissioner’s”) final administrative decision denying Plaintiff disability insurance

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court hereby affirms the Commissioner’s decision,

denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grants Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 55-year-old woman who completed one year of college and previously worked

as an in-home caregiver. (A.R. at 14.) Plaintiff initially applied for disability insurance benefits on

September 8, 2004. (Id.) The application was denied both initially and on reconsideration. (See id.

at 24-33.) On October 5, 2005, Plaintiff testified at an administrative hearing at the Office of

Disability Adjudication and Review. On March 30, 2006, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

Case 3:06-cv-01721-JM-AJB Document 11 Filed 11/28/07 Page 1 of 8
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issued a written decision denying her application. (Id. at 10-20.) The Appeals Council adopted these

findings on June 29, 2006. (Id. at 4-8.)

In her application, Plaintiff alleged that she was disabled due to both back pain and psychotic

depression. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff has not worked since the alleged disability onset date of February

18, 2002. (Id.) Her date of last insurance (“DLI”) was December 31, 2003. 

On the alleged onset date, Plaintiff injured her lumbar spine when she lifted a patient into a

wheelchair. (See id. at 109.) Thereafter, she saw numerous medical professionals for both her

physical and mental difficulties. Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Eric Korsh, her primary treating physician,

treated Plaintiff for her back injury beginning on April 1, 2002. (Id. at 207.) Dr. Korsh diagnosed

Plaintiff with lumbar strain and referred her for psychological counseling due to symptoms of

depression. (Id.) The doctors who treated and evaluated Plaintiff regarding her alleged psychological

disability include: (1) Dr. Thomas Harpley, a clinical psychologist who performed a consultative

evaluation on October 10, 2002 (id. at 183-94) and issued progress reports as a secondary treating

physician through December 12, 2003 (id. at 174-82); (2) Dr. Bruce Dow, a psychiatrist who began

treating Plaintiff on January 7, 2003 (id. at 132-39); and (3) Dr. Mounir Soliman, a consultative

examining psychiatrist who evaluated Plaintiff on December 13, 2004 (id. at 146-50).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to give controlling weight to the opinion of

treating psychiatrist Dr. Dow regarding the disability onset date. (Memo. of Pts. and Auths. in

Support of Brown’s Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Brown MSJ”) at 5.) While Plaintiff alleged both

physical and mental disability, she challenges the ruling only in regard to the latter. Defendant argues

that the ALJ arrived at the correct conclusion and appropriately disregarded Dr. Dow’s 2005 opinion

that Plaintiff was disabled.

A. Legal Standards

This court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether the decision is

supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750

(9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a

preponderance.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). Any relevant evidence that “a

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” may constitute substantial

evidence. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. If more than one reasonable interpretation of the evidence

before the ALJ exists, the court must affirm the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence. Sandgathe v.

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995).

Even where substantial evidence supports the final decision, however, the court will overturn the

decision if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. Benetiz v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir.

1978); Flake v. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 1968). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that she is disabled. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999). By definition, a disability is an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The date of onset of the disability also bears

on a claimant’s ability to receive disability insurance benefits. Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079,

1081 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Swanson v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1061, 1065 (9th

Cir. 1985)); Soc. Sec. R. (“SSR”) 83-20, Policy Statement). Plaintiff must prove that she became

disabled before her DLI. See Morgan, 945 F.2d at 1080; 42 U.S.C. § 423(c).

The ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry to determine whether a social security claimant is

disabled. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, if a

claimant is currently working, the claimant is not disabled. Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 24. Step two

requires a determination of whether the claimant’s impairment is “severe.” Id. If the claimant’s

impairment is not severe, the claimant is not disabled. Id. At step three, the ALJ must determine if

the claimant’s impairment is listed in the Listing of Impairments of Appendix 1, Subpart P,

Regulations No. 4 (“Appendix 1”), or whether the claimant’s impairment is equal to an impairment

included in Appendix 1. See id. at 24-25. If the impairment is included in Appendix 1 or is equal to

a listed impairment, the claimant is presumptively disabled. See id. At step four, if the claimant has

a severe impairment that is not enumerated in Appendix 1, the ALJ determines whether the claimant

can perform his or her past work. Id. at 25. If the claimant can perform past work, the claimant is not

disabled. Id. At step five, if the claimant is unable to perform past work, the burden shifts to the ALJ

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Defendant argues that Plaintiff mis-characterizes the ALJ’s decision as assigning an onset

date. This is a valid argument. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ should not have rejected Dr. Dow’s

opinion “regarding the disability onset date.” (Brown MSJ at 5.) The thrust of Plaintiff’s motion,

however, is that the ALJ should not have rejected Dr. Dow’s opinion that Plaintiff was disabled during

the relevant time period. Thus, the court does not deny Plaintiff’s motion due to this inaccuracy.

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to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. Id. If the claimant is able to perform other

work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. 

Finally, where an examining physician’s opinion is contradicted by another physician, the

examining physician’s opinion “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.

1995). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff claims that the court should reverse and remand the Commissioner’s final ruling

because the ALJ should have given controlling weight to Dr. Dow’s opinion regarding the date of

disability onset. Dr. Dow stated that Plaintiff became disabled in January 2003 due to “bipolar

disorder, with depression and psychosis.” (A.R. at 16.) In his January 20, 2004 report, he found her

condition markedly impaired. In his August 18, 2005 report, he labeled her pre-DLI condition severe.

(See Brown MSJ at 9.) The ALJ disagreed and held that the evidence – “including the reports of

record from Dr. Dow” – was inconsistent with this statement and did not establish that Plaintiff was

disabled for a period of at least 12 months prior to the DLI. (A.R. at 16.) The ALJ then resolved this

case at the fifth stage of the inquiry, determining that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past work

but able to work as an assembler and office helper. (See id. at 18-19.) Plaintiff levels two primary

attacks against the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Dow’s opinion.1 

1. Non-Compliance with Prescribed Treatment and Medication

Plaintiff disputes the ruling that her non-compliance with prescribed treatment and medication

supports the conclusion that she was not disabled. (Brown MSJ at 6.) She claims that the ALJ

improperly relied on her non-compliance in rejecting Dr. Dow’s 2005 opinion. 

Plaintiff argues that her non-compliance is acceptable under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530(c). (Brown

MSJ at 6-7.) She first cites Dr. Dow’s January 20, 2004 report, which discussed her history through

January 2004 with several medications. Dr. Dow reported that Plaintiff discontinued Zyprexa because

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Plaintiff’s husband became responsible for monitoring her medication. (Brown MSJ at 8.)

3

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that her non-compliance in December 2004 and

January 2005, mentioned in Dr. Dow’s March 10, 2005 report, bears no relevance to whether Plaintiff

became disabled pre-DLI. 

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it caused headaches, Risperdal because it caused constipation, and Prozac because it “no longer

controlled her voices.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also cites Dr. Dow’s March 10, 2005 report, which

attributed her non-compliance in December 2004 and January 2005 to a decrease in Geodon to a nontherapeutic level. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff claims that she errantly decreased the Geodon because the

drug “made her manic . . . and increasingly paranoid.”2

 (Id. at 8.) Thus, Plaintiff allegedly failed to

take her prescribed medication due to (1) undesirable side effects and (2) her mental “condition.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s argument regarding non-compliance fails to persuade.3

 “Impairments that can be

controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for

SSI benefits.” Warre v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). A

claimant’s non-compliance with prescribed treatment can prevent a finding of disability unless the

claimant has an “acceptable reason[]” for the failure. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1530(b), (c). This regulation

requires the ALJ to consider the claimant’s “physical, mental, educational, and linguistic limitations,”

and provides examples of acceptable reasons for non-compliance. 20 C.F.R § 404.1530(c). 

In regard to the relevant time period, the ALJ appropriately cited the non-compliance to

explain why Plaintiff’s periodic reported symptoms of psychosis did not lead to a disability finding.

(See A.R. at 15.) The ALJ listed numerous instances of non-compliance, including medication noncompliance in January 2003, failure to attend appointments and take medications as prescribed in

March 2003, failure to take medications in April 2003, and failure to attend appointments from July

through December 2003. (Id. at 15-26.) The ALJ appeared to conclude that Plaintiff’s mental

condition could be controlled effectively with treatment and medication. (See, e.g., id. at 16 (“On

April 15, 2003, the claimant was again noncompliant with prescribed treatment, and stated that her

hallucinations returned when she stopped taking medications; however, her hallucinations disappeared

when she again started her medications.”).) To that end, the non-compliance helps create a full picture

of the chronology of events leading to Plaintiff’s claim.

Plaintiff argues that her non-compliance is excused under 20 C.F.R § 404.1530(c), but her

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offered excuses do not adequately address the instances of non-compliance cited by the ALJ. The

court notes that it is unclear whether Plaintiff discontinued Zyprexa on Dr. Dow’s advice or on her

own, due to headaches (see A.R. at 181); to the extent she did so on Dr. Dow’s advice, this is

excusable. Regardless, Plaintiff does not sufficiently explain her failure to attend prescribed treatment

sessions or her one-week “experiment” during which she stopped all medications. (See id. at 177 (Dr.

Harpley’s report regarding April 15, 2003 treatment).) The instances of non-compliance were one

factor among many contributing to the ALJ’s finding. Thus, the court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion

regarding non-compliance is supported in the factual record and applies the correct legal standards.

See Warre, 439 F.3d 1006.

2. Description of Plaintiff’s Pre-DLI Status by Treating Mental Health

Practitioners

Plaintiff also claims the ALJ erroneously rejected Dr. Dow’s opinion on the ground that, prior

to the DLI, her treating mental health practitioners found she had “only moderate restrictions as to

functioning, and was not precluded from understanding, remembering, or carrying out simple

repetitive tasks.” (Brown MSJ at 9.) Plaintiff emphasizes that Dr. Dow concluded that she was

severely impaired pre-DLI. (See id.) She also states that the vocational expert found this level of

impairment constituted disability and would preclude all types of employment. (See id.) 

“Cases in [the Ninth Circuit] distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1)

those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining

physicians).” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. In general, the ALJ should accord the greatest weight to the

opinion of a treating physician, a lesser degree of weight to the opinion of an examining physician,

and the least weight to the opinion of a nonexamining physician. See id. This framework mandates

that the ALJ not casually reject a treating doctor’s opinion. See id. (ALJ cannot reject treating

doctor’s opinion without either “clear and convincing reasons,” where opinion is uncontradicted by

another doctor, or “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record,”

where opinion is contradicted) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Applying the strictures of this framework here, Plaintiff’s argument fails. The ALJ found that

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the 2005 opinion of Dr. Dow, a treating physician, was contradicted not only by the opinions of other

physicians but also by Dr. Dow’s own earlier notes. Specifically, the ALJ cited (1) the 2002 and 2003

reports of Dr. Harpley, a secondary treating physician, which show intermittent improvement and

setbacks believed to be caused by non-compliance with prescribed treatments(A.R. at 15-16), and (2)

the December 2004 opinion of Dr. Soliman, an examining physician, who agreed that “the record was

consistent with a residual functional capacity on a psychiatric basis for the performance of simple

repetitive tasks” (id. at 17). Moreover, Dr. Dow did not opine that Plaintiff was disabled pre-DLI until

August 18, 2005 – two years after the time period in question. This opinion contradicted some of the

treatment notes Dr. Dow recorded contemporaneously with his treatment of Plaintiff in 2003. (See,

e.g., A.R. at 16 (“Dr. Dow’s opinions of April through August 2005 are not supported by ongoing

objective medical evidence of record regarding the time period prior to the claimant’s date last

insured.”)) Dr. Dow reported throughout 2003 that Plaintiff’s condition was improving and that

Plaintiff was “‘emotionally pretty good’” and “‘feeling much better.’” (See id.) Dr. Dow also

reported in January 2004 that “[Plaintiff]’s depression was largely resolved.” (Id. at 17 (also noting

that Dr. Dow “declared [Plaintiff] permanent and stationary”).) The ALJ thus considered many of Dr.

Dow’s observations during the relevant time period more credible and accorded them greater weight

than Dr. Dow’s contradictory opinions years later. 

In sum, the court concludes that the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standard and rejected

Dr. Dow’s opinion based on specific and legitimate reasons with substantial evidentiary support. See

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

3. Need for Medical Advisor to Establish Date of Onset

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have enlisted a medical advisor to assist in

establishing a disability onset date. (Brown MSJ at 10.) Plaintiff cites Morgan, in which the court

held that, where the evidence regarding the onset of the claimant’s mental impairment was ambiguous

and required inference, the ALJ should have requested a medical expert’s help. 945 F.2d at 1080

(citing Soc. Sec. R. (“SSR”) 83-20). Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reliance on this case is illfounded because Morgan “requires a finding of disability as a condition precedent to mandating

medical expert testimony to assist the ALJ in determining the precise onset date of disability.” (Astrue

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MSJ at 5.) Here, Defendant points out, the condition precedent was not met because the ALJ never

found Plaintiff disabled. (Id.) 

The case law applying the rule in Morgan and SSR 83-20 does not clarify whether a finding

of disability must occur before the ALJ must secure a medical advisor. Compare Armstrong v.

Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding ALJ should have used

medical advisor, where ALJ determined that disability existed after DLI, and dispute related only to

accuracy of onset date) with DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1991) (pre-Morgan,

applying SSR 83-20 and holding ALJ should have used a medical expert, where ALJ had concluded

that claimant was not disabled at any point). These cases suggest that the rule requires consultation

with a medical advisor where the medical evidence regarding the claimant’s mental health is

ambiguous and indefinite, regardless of whether the ALJ determined a date of onset.

Here, the record contains numerous treatment and consultation reports from the alleged onset

date in February 2002 to 2005 and beyond. Unlike the evidence in DeLorme, where the “brief notes”

made by the doctors treating the claimant’s back problems did not reveal “how extensive or how

continuous his mental symptoms were,” 924 F.2d at 848, the thorough evidence in this case is neither

ambiguous nor indefinite regarding Plaintiff’s mental state. The court therefore does not find remand

for consultation with a medical advisor necessary and denies Plaintiff’s request for such relief. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision has substantial

evidentiary support and is free from legal error. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. Accordingly, the

court hereby AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 28, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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