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Nature of Suit Code: 348
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LAWRENCE MENDEZ, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5116

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:11-cv-00160-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: January 8, 2015

______________________ 

LAWRENCE MENDEZ, JR., Oceanside, California, pro se.

MATTHEW F. SCARLATO, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Principal Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., Director, and DEBORAH A. BYNUM, Assistant Director. 

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2 MENDEZ v. US

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Lawrence Mendez, Jr., a former Marine Corps officer,

appeals a decision of the United States Court of Federal 

Claims (“CFC”) denying his motion for relief under Rule 

60(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal 

Claims (“RCFC”). See Mendez v. United States, No. 11–

160C, 2014 U.S. Claims LEXIS 592 (June 18, 2014) 

(“Claims Decision”). Because the Court of Federal Claims

did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On March 14, 2011, Mendez filed a complaint in the 

CFC, alleging that the preparation and review of his 

Marine Corp fitness report violated a Marine Corps 

regulation, Order P1610.7F. If the report had been correctly processed, Mendez contended that he would not 

have been denied promotion twice, or involuntarily removed from the Marine Corps. Mendez and the United 

States filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. 

Upon review of these motions, the CFC granted judgment on the merits in favor of the United States on all but 

one issue. Mendez v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 374, 

382–85 (2012). It determined that the report had been 

properly prepared and reviewed, but that the person 

conducting the second review of the fitness report had not

resolved all factual discrepancies as required by regulation. Specifically, the CFC found that the reviewer had 

not reconciled conflicting reports regarding Mendez’s 

decision as a commanding officer to allow one of his 

subordinates to return home to care for his wife after a 

surgery. Id. at 382. In light of this failure, the CFC

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MENDEZ v. US 3

remanded the case to the Board for Correction of Naval 

Records (“the Board”), so that the inconsistencies could be 

properly addressed.

On remand, Mendez’s fitness report was amended to 

remove any reference to the surgical care incident. The 

Board, however, still concluded that the fitness report was 

adverse, because there were several other issues regarding his conduct as an officer, including his lack of military 

occupational specialty knowledge, his inability to lead, his 

failure to accept responsibility, and his inappropriate 

behavior toward senior officers. Therefore, the Board 

found that it was unlikely Mendez would have been 

promoted. Accordingly, the Board determined that there 

was no reason to set aside Mendez’s discharge.

Mendez appealed this decision to the CFC, and the 

court concluded that the Board’s decision to modify, but 

not expunge, the fitness report was not arbitrary or 

capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Mendez v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 350, 356 (2012). In 

light of this decision, the CFC entered judgment in favor 

of the Government on December 20, 2012. Mendez then 

appealed this decision to this court, which upheld the 

CFC’s determination. Following an unsuccessful attempt 

to have the case reheard by this court, Mendez filed a 

petition for writ of certiorari to United States Supreme 

Court, which was denied on February 24, 2014. Mendez v. 

United States, 134 S. Ct. 1281 (2014).

On March 26, 2014, Mendez filed a motion to reconsider in the CFC, requesting that the CFC reevaluate its 

prior decision denying his claims for improper discharge 

from the Marine Corps. Because the motion was filed 

well after the 28 day deadline to file a RCFC 59(a) motion 

to reconsider, the CFC treated Mendez’s motion as a 

motion for relief from judgment under RCFC 60(b). 

Additionally, since Mendez filed his motion more than a 

year after judgment and failed to allege any grounds

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4 MENDEZ v. US

which could support a motion under Rule 60(b)(2)-(5), the 

CFC determined that his motion could only be considered 

under Rule 60(b)(6). The court then found, that Mendez 

failed to demonstrate the type of extraordinary circumstances necessary to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 

Accordingly, the CFC denied Mendez’s motion.

Mendez timely appealed the CFC’s decision to this 

court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the CFC’s decision on a Rule 60(b) motion 

for abuse of discretion. Perry v. United States, 558 F. 

App’x 1004, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Brickwood Contractors, 

Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). “An abuse of discretion exists when, inter alia, the 

lower court’s decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” 

Crews v. United States, 424 F. App’x 937, 941 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (quoting Matos by Rivera v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health 

& Human Servs., 35 F.3d 1549, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 

Under RCFC 60(b)(6), the CFC “may relieve a party . . 

. from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any . . 

. reason that justifies relief.” This provision is only available in extraordinary circumstances, however. See 

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquistion Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 

864 (1988); see also Infiniti Info. Solutions, LLC v. United 

States, 93 Fed. Cl. 699, 704 (2010) (citing Fiskars, Inc. v. 

Hunt Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

Such extraordinary circumstances exist if a person can 

demonstrate that he was not at fault for his predicament. 

See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. 

P’ship, 507 U.S 380, 393 (1993) (“To justify relief under 

[Rule 60(b)(6)], a party must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ suggesting that the party is faultless in the 

delay.”); Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 195–

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MENDEZ v. US 5

197 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 604–

609 (1949). 

Mendez argues that the CFC erred because it denied 

his motion as untimely, even though Rule 60(b)(6) has no 

specific time limitations, and incorrectly determined that 

his claims do not demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” that warrant relief from judgment.1

The CFC did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendez’s motion. Mendez is correct that Rule 60(b)(6) has no 

specific time limit, but the CFC did not rest its decision on 

a finding that Mendez had failed to file his motion within 

a proscribed time. While the CFC discussed how Rule 

60(b)(1)–(3) are subject to a one-year limitation period, it

explicitly stated that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not subject 

to such strict time constraints, but must only be made 

within a reasonable time. Claims Decision, 2014 U.S. 

Claims LEXIS 592, at *12. Rather, the CFC denied 

Mendez’s motion because he failed to satisfy the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement of Rule 60(b)(6). In 

denying his motion, the CFC correctly explained that

Mendez could have filed his motion at any time after the 

judgment and was, thus, not faultless for his current 

situation. The CFC also noted—properly—that the 

arguments Mendez raised in his motion for reconsideration were all arguments that he could have raised in his 

original case before the CFC. Absent any evidence that 

he was prevented from raising these issues earlier, the 

CFC correctly determined that Mendez had failed to 

present extraordinary circumstances that warranted

relief. 

1 Mendez does not contest the CFC’s decision to 

treat his untimely RCFC 59 motion as a RCFC 60(b)

motion. 

 

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6 MENDEZ v. US

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the CFC’s order denying Mendez’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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