Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01426/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01426-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON HOLLINGSWORTH,

Booking # 15746082,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF 

CORRECTIONS; DANIEL PARAMO

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01426-WQH-BLM

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On June 6, 2016, Plaintiff, Jason Hollingsworth, an inmate currently incarcerated 

at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California 

filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

Because Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the 

Court granted him leave to proceed without full prepayment of the civil filing fees 

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required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 5.)

Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the 

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff has now 

filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 5.)

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-Answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” 

or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 

962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of State law.” Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). 

2. Davis-Bacon Act

Plaintiff claims that pursuant to the “Davis Bacon Act of 1931” that inmates 

“building medical centers around the prison” must be paid the “prevailing wage.” (FAC 

at 3.) Plaintiff claims inmates are being paid “around $0.95/an hour” while the current 

“prevailing wages is about $55/an hour.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges Warden 

Paramo and “other ‘unknown’ staff” are “illegally paying inmates” in order to receive 

“bonuses.” (Id.)

The Davis-Bacon Act provides, in part, that all construction contracts for certain 

federally funded public work projects are required to pay workers the “prevailing wage” 

as determined by the Secretary of Labor. 40 U.S.C. § 3142 (a)-(b). While Plaintiff does 

not make clear whether he was ever one of the inmates working on these projects, his 

claim fails as the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no “private cause of action for 

employees” under the Davis-Bacon Act. Operating Engineers Health & Welfare Trust 

Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act must be 

dismissed, without leave to amend, for failing to state a claim.

3. Equal Protection claims

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 

An equal protection claim may be established in two ways. First, Plaintiff may allege 

facts to show that Defendants have intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of 

his membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

686 (9th Cir. 2001); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).

Absent any allegation that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class or that 

Defendants acted on the basis of his status as a member of a protected class, Plaintiff may 

only establish an equal protection claim by showing that he was intentionally treated 

differently than similarly situated individuals and that the Defendants’ actions against 

him lacked a rational basis or legitimate purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 

U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 (1972); 

Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004). To state 

an equal protection claim under this theory, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was 

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (2) there is no rational 

basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

Plaintiff claims that he is a “Level 1” inmate and as such, he does not have access 

to the same programs and privileges as a “Level 3” inmate. (FAC at 5.) “‘Discriminatory 

purpose’ ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It 

implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at 

least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 

group.” Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal citation 

omitted).

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Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that Defendants intentionally treated 

him differently than other similarly situated inmates, i.e. Level 1 inmates, or that they 

lacked a rational basis for doing so. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

4. State Law Claims

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to include state law claims based on usury, the Court 

exercises its discretion to dismiss Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims without prejudice 

because Plaintiff has not identified a violation of a federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 

(“The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [state law 

claims] that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 

form part of the same case or controversy . . . if the district court has dismissed all claims 

over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 

U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims 

should be dismissed as well.”).

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be 

dismissed for failing to state a plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

5. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, and he has now been provided 

with notice of his pleading deficiencies, the Court will grant him leave to amend as to his 

equal protection claims only. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)) (“A district court should 

not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not be cured by amendment.’”).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), 

and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file 

an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

2. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2017

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