Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00949/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00949-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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1 By the court’s count, the parties have filed some nineteen

motions before this court, while the number of motions before the

assigned magistrate judge approaches the astronomical. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EL DORADO IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

a political subdivision of the

State of California,

NO. CIV. S-03-949 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

TRAYLOR BROS., INC., an 

Indiana corporation,

Defendant.

 /

AND RELATED COUNTER-CLAIMS.

 /

Once again the court is required to address this case.1

Presently there are two issues before the court. First, Traylor

Brothers (“TBI”) moves to strike the expert report of Mark

Korkowski and to preclude his testimony at trial as to opinions

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2 TBI actually seeks a broader preclusion order including 

all the information contained in the report. Since, in addition

to the experts opinions and reasons, the report also contains

factual matter, such an order would be clearly too broad.

2

contained in the report and the reasons therefore.2 The second

motion seeks preclusion of all El Dorado Irrigation District’s

(“EID”) rebuttal expert testimony.

I. 

FACTS

In June of 2005, Magistrate Judge Hollows held a Rule 26(f)

conference during which he outlined the manner in which experts

were to be disclosed. In the subsequent Discovery Plan Order

and Schedule, dated July 6, 2005, the court set out the

following relevant dates:

- September 1, 2005 Rule 26 Expert Designation

- September 23, 2005 Rebuttal Expert Designation

With regards to the latter, the court stated that: 

All parties are cautioned that a rebuttal designation

must be done in good faith; it is not to be utilized

by a party as a means of obtaining a unilateral

extension of the initial disclosure. The court will

impose sanctions for an unjustified abuse of the

expert disclosure process which may include a striking

of the expert.

Order of July 6, 2005 at 6. 

This court issued a Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Conference

Order dated July 20, 2005 wherein the court ordered that, in

accordance with Judge Hollows’ order, discovery would be left

open such that it would be completed by January 12, 2006, with

motions to compel before Judge Hollows to be filed no later than

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December 22, 2005. That order retained the expert disclosure

dates set out by the magistrate judge - adding the following

direction: “All experts so designated are to be fully prepared

to render an informed opinion at the time of designation so that

they may fully participate in any deposition taken by the

opposing party.” Order issued July 20, 2005 at 4. 

On September 1, 2005, EID served its Expert Witness

Disclosure, which included Mr. Korkowski and seven others. EID

served expert reports as well, but did not include one for Mr.

Korkowski. On September 23, 2005, EID served its Rebuttal

Expert Witness Disclosure, which contained a total of seventeen

witnesses, six of which were on the previous list. For the six

persons that were doubly designated, it only provided rebuttal

reports for two of them. There were no reports provided for the

eleven other designated rebuttal experts. 

On December 2, 2005, one week before the expiration of the

expert deposition cut-off date, EID sent TBI an expert report

for Mark Korkowski. TBI wrote on December 5, 2005 to object to

the Korkowski report and request withdrawal. They also

requested that EID withdraw the rebuttal witness disclosures. 

EID responded on December 6, 2005, by stating that the rebuttal

disclosure complied with the Federal Rules and court orders and

asked TBI to clarify why more information was needed. It also

stated that it was not clear that Mr. Korkowski even needed to

produce a report. On December 7, 2005, TBI responded by

providing EID until the close of business to withdraw the

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rebuttal designation. 

II.

STANDARDS

Rule 37(b)(2) provides that when 

a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule

26(f), the court in which the action is pending may

make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,

and among others the following:

. . .

(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient

party to support or oppose designated claims or

defenses, or prohibit that party from introducing

designated matters in evidence; . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) provides as follows:

A party that without substantial justification fails

to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or Rule

26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as

required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure

is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at

a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information

not so disclosed. In addition to or in lieu of this

sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an

opportunity to be heard, may impose other appropriate

sanctions. In addition to requiring payment of

reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused

by the failure, these sanctions may include any of the

actions authorized under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), (B), and

(C) and may include informing the jury of the failure

to make the disclosure.

III.

ANALYSIS

A. MARK KORKOWSKI

It is clear that the Korkowski report was provided very

late, approximately three months after it was due. The central

question relative to the motion is whether EID was required to

provide a report at all. Various sources inform resolution of

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that question, the magistrate judge’s statements at the Rule

26(f) conference held in July, his subsequent order, this

court’s scheduling order, and finally, Rule 26 itself. 

The most logical starting place is Rule 26(a)(2)(B) which

provides:

(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the

court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a

witness who is retained or specially employed to

provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties

as an employee of the party regularly involve giving

expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report

prepared and signed by the witness. 

It is undisputed that Mr. Korkowski is an employee of EID,

and EID asserts that he does not regularly provide it with

expert testimony. It thus claims that under the Rule no report

was required. While the language of the Rule, vel non, does

appear to support the District’s position, analysis does not end

there. Repeatedly, courts that have addressed the issue at bar

have concluded that the Rule does require a written report

despite the expert being employed by the tendering party in

other than a forensic capacity. See, e.g., Minnesota Min. and

Mfg. Co. v. Signtech, USA, Ltd., 177 F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Minn.

1998), where the court concluded that all employees who will

give expert testimony (and not hybrid fact/expert testimony) are

required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) to produce a report. The court

found that a purpose of the recent revisions to the Federal

Rules was to “to accelerate the exchange of basic information

about the case and to eliminate the paper work involved in

requesting such information.” Id. at 460 (quoting the Advisory

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Committee Notes on the 1993 Amendments). Likewise, the court in

McCulloch v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co. held that if

employees were going to be testifying as expert witnesses (even

if they were primarily fact witnesses) the Rule should be

construed to require reports from them on the theory that by

being required to provide expert testimony “they can fairly be

viewed as having been retained or specially employed” by the

company in question. 223 F.R.D. 26, 28 (D. Conn. 2004); see also

KW Plastics v. United States Can Co., 199 F.R.D. 687, 688-690

(M.D. Ala. 2000); Prieto v. Malgor, 361 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th

Cir. 2004) (“allowing a blanket exception for all employee

expert testimony would ‘create a category of expert trial

witness for whom no written disclosure is required’ and should

not be permitted.”) Some cases distinguish when an employee

should be required to submit a report on the basis of whether

they are primarily providing fact testimony or expert testimony.

While Korkowitz’s testimony falls into both categories, he would

be providing expert testimony in certain key areas (namely with

respect to certain damages).

At least one question that is raised by the evolving Rule

26(a)(2)(B) jurisprudence is its effect on the actual language

of the Rule. It may well be that at some point it is not

unreasonable to conclude that the weight of authority construing

a Rule defines its meaning, despite its language apparently

contradicting that construction. I need not decide, however,

whether we have reached that point in the instant case. The

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language of the Rule contemplates modification by order of the

Court. As the proceedings in the instant case demonstrate,

various orders in the case clearly required a written report. 

In that connection, this court turns next to the Discovery Plan

Order and Schedule issued by Judge Hollows on July 6, 2005,

after this court referred the matter to him for a Rule 26f

conference. The order contains the following relevant

provisions:

For purposes of this Order “experts” are categorized

as “percipient” and “Rule 26” experts. Percipient

experts are persons who, because of their expertise,

have rendered expert opinions in the normal course of

their work duties which happen to be pertinent to the

issues in the case. Another term for the opinion of a

percipient expert is “historical opinion.” Percipient

experts are experts who, unless also designated as

Rule 26 experts, are limited to testifying to their

historical opinions and the reasons for them. That is,

they may be asked to testify to their opinions given

in the past and the whys and wherefores concerning the

development of that opinion. However, they may not be

asked to render a current opinion for the purposes of

the litigation.

Order filed July 6, 2005 at 4-5.

It is plain from the order that Judge Hollows intended that

all witnesses/experts who were to give anything more than

“historical opinion” be designated as Rule 26 experts. It is

equally plain that EID proposes that Korkowski render opinions

well beyond historical opinion. Moreover, if there were any

room for uncertainty (it does not appear to the court there is),

a review of the hearing transcript makes crystal clear Judge

Hollows’ intention.

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At the hearing Judge Hollows said: 

We’ll talk about non-expert depositions, and let me

define for you what will come out in the scheduling

order. There’s a thing called Rule 26 experts, then

there’s a thing called percipient experts. Percipient

experts, if I can just keep those categories separate

for the moment for those experts who have expertise,

and much more than the common layperson, but they’re

not retained for purposes of this litigation to give

opinions, ultimate opinions in this litigation. 

And so for example, someone running the tunnel machine

might be very expert in that, but is not going to be

asked to give an opinion as to whether it operated

properly, or so forth and so on. 

And so those experts are, you know, they’re lay

people, and they’ll be in the non-expert, in terms of

discovery, you’ll be able to get those - - they won’t

be giving reports, you can just go ahead and depose

those people. 

You can combine those categories, though, and for

instance, a tunnel operator, a machine person might

also be giving opinions as to why that person thought

the machine operated properly. 

In that case, they’re both a percipient and a Rule 26

expert and so you need to designate carefully with

respect to those experts, because I want all Rule 26

type experts designated that would include the

percipient expert that’s going to give an opinion with

respect to issues in this litigation.

But a pure percipient expert is what you did an why

you did it, that type of thing, way back when, but

that’s as far as it goes with respect to percipient

experts, and I’ll describe this more fully in any type

of written order that I do.

I just don’t want any key experts hidden because they

weren’t retained, they weren’t given a retainer, they

weren’t paid for purposes of this litigation. That’s

not the be-all alpha and omega of expert disclosure

here.

Transcript of June 29, 2005 Hearing at 29-31.

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3 Which is part of Mr. Korkowski’s proposed testimony.

4 It is true that this court’s Status Order provides that “No

modifications of the discovery requirements found in the Federal

Rules is ordered.” Order filed July 20, 2005 at 3. Clearly that

order addressed the matters contained in the Status Order itself,

and common sense, much less the terms of the order, suggested that

it in no way contradicted the orders issued by Judge Hollows just

9

Moreover, in response to queries by both sides, Judge

Hollows emphasized, that “when in doubt, disclose them out.” 

Id. at 31. Specifically, when EID’s attorney, Mr. Stump,

observed that the line was blurry with regards to their

employees who would testify on the operation and maintenance

costs, etc.3 Judge Hollows stated that “[i]t sounds like Rule 26

to me, it really does. . . . So again, if you have any doubt,

disclose them as a Rule 26 expert, get that report out.” Id. at

32 (emphasis added). 

All of this makes it clear that Judge Hollows intended, and

made clear his intention, that all persons who were going to be

giving any present opinion testimony be designated as a “Rule

26" expert. The transcript also makes it plain that all such

experts were to submit a report. Judge Hollow’s order also

states that: “Rule 26(a)(2)(b) reports shall be prepared in

conformance with that rule to the greatest extent possible, and

shall be served by September 15, 2005.” As EID appears to have

belatedly realized, Judge Hollows was specific about what was

required in the way of disclosures, and was also clear that if

there was any doubt the parties were to err on the side of full

disclosure.4 This court finds incredible any claim that EID did

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days before in response to this court’s referral of the matter of

discovery to him. If EID thought there was ambiguity, they had

ample opportunity to make inquiry. The fact that they did not do

so is, in itself, telling. 

5 It is irrelevant, even if true, that counsel for EID did

not obtain, and thus did not read, a transcript of the hearing 

until over a month after their disclosures and reports were due.

6 In some small part, the court’s determination is informed

by the fact that the court has the highest weighted case load per

judge in the entire federal system.

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not know what Judge Hollows intended. They were at the hearing,

specifically asked about an employee’s testimony, and were told

that if there was any doubt they should treat them as Rule 26

experts.5

It is crucial that this court defend the 26(f) order,

otherwise chaos follows.6 That in itself justifies granting

TBI’s motion. A second reason also justifies the remedy the

defendant seeks. 

Korkowski’s report, and testimony premised on that report, 

should not be allowed because it contains the first mention of a

great deal of information on certain damages that TBI had not

previously provided. As the cases on employee expert reports

cited above emphasize, the revisions made to Rule 26 in 1993

were intended to increase the amount of information available

early on in the process. See, e.g., Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co.

v. Signtech, USA, Ltd., 177 F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Minn. 1998). In

this respect, EID has been less than forthcoming. Indeed, Judge

Hollows has noted that EID has been holding back on information,

or disclosing it only after much foot dragging. While he

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7 Although declining to terminate the case, the judge wrote

“the undersigned warns both parties that the court’s patience is

running thin at this point. More resources are being devoted to

this case than should be necessary. The parties have been warned

that preclusion sanctions could be issued for future misconduct.”

Id. at 5. He also found that “[w]hile not rising to the level of

obduracy required for preclusion or termination sanctions, EID’s

conduct in the remaining matters is at best carelessness which

could have been avoided, and carelessness which impacted TBI in a

prejudicial way.” Id. at 6. 

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declined to recommend terminating sanctions recently at TBI’s

request, he did caution that eventually this strategy would

backfire and speculated that this court was unlikely to allow

EID to suddenly provide a whole raft of information at trial

which had not been previously disclosed. See Findings and

Recommendations issued Oct. 31, 2005 at 5.7 In an order dated

August 17, 2005, Judge Hollows was discussing the exact damages

which are now in Korkowski’s report when he stated that:

EID, and TBI for that matter, are cautioned that they

will not be permitted to supplement their Rule 26

document disclosures via the “trickle” method. Except

for non-privileged Rule 26 documents which could not

have been discovered thus far in the exercise of

reasonable diligence, the time has come and gone for

initial disclosures. Experts may not be funneled new

supporting documents which should have already been

produced at this time, nor is it likely that the trial

judge will look kindly on the attempted use of

supporting Rule 26 documents which were not produced

in accordance with court orders. Unless substantial

justification is found, sanctions are mandatory, and

documents not produced for initial disclosures without

valid excuse will be precluded from use. 

While the court is not examining the disclosure of

documents at this time, his warning still clearly applies. 

This court recognizes that striking the Korkowski report is

likely to substantially adversely affect certain of EID’s damage

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8 Of course, Mr. Korkowski may testify as a percipient

witness, but all expert testimony addressed in the belated report

will be prohibited. 

12

claims, but there appears to be no reasonable explanation why

the report was not provided as required. If the orders of this

court are to have any meaning, it is necessary to strike the

report and preclude the testimony.8

B. REBUTTAL EXPERT DISCLOSURE

On the question of rebuttal experts, there simply appears

to be no justification for EID’s conduct. Judge Hollows was

strenuous in his emphasis on the importance of not hiding the

ball or gaming the discovery process by submitting a lengthy

rebuttal expert list instead of noticing these experts in the

initial list. This appears to be exactly what EID has done. 

The directions that Judge Hollows provided in his order are as

follows:

III. Expert Designation

The court assigns the following disclosure

schedule for Rule 26 experts (includes a person who is

a hybrid Rule 26/percipient expert): September 1, 2005

for the parties to designate their experts; September

23, 2005 for all parties to designate rebuttal experts

due to designations made previously by an opposing

party. All parties are cautioned that a rebuttal

designation must be done in good faith; it is not to

be utilized by a party as a means of obtaining a

unilateral extension of the initial disclosure. The

court will impose sanctions for an unjustified abuse

of the expert disclosure process which may include a

striking of the expert.

July 6, 2005 Order at 6 (emphasis added).

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Judge Hollows was even more emphatic at the hearing,

stating that: 

The most important aspect of what we’re doing here is

expert disclosures. In getting my papers together, my

thoughts were to have experts disclosures in . . .

August 15th, ‘05, rebuttal experts, true rebuttal

experts, September 5, ‘05, and I would define rebuttal

much like we do at trial, it’s something you can’t

have anticipated. I don’t want any holding back on

the initial disclosures and then all of a sudden the

rebuttal expert list comes out, and it’s a mile long.

Transcript of June 29, 2005 Hearing at 19. 

EID initially designated only eight experts. When it came

time for rebuttal experts, however, they designated seventeen

experts, five of which were on the earlier list. While there

may be situations where this sort of “mile long” list would be

warranted in light of the other party’s initial list, there does

not appear to be any such unusual situation here. 

Until the reply brief submitted at the last hour, EID had

done absolutely nothing to explain why the list was so long, why

these experts would truly be “rebuttal experts” or why they

could not have been anticipated on the earlier list. In a

declaration attached to its reply brief, EID belatedly tries to

explain why all these people really are rebuttal experts, that

is, why their testimony could not have been anticipated

previously, and why it is truly rebuttal testimony. Sadly, its

reasons simply are unconvincing. For virtually all of the

experts, the claim is that it could not have anticipated that

TBI’s experts would testify as to the reasonableness,

competence, or necessity of certain aspects of the project. It

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9 At the final Pretrial Conference, the court will provide

a schedule including provision for motions in limine which will

give EID an opportunity to make the irrelevance case.

10 Indeed, given the fact that the case has been

significantly over-litigated, the failure of EID to inquire by way

of contention interrogatories or otherwise concerning TBI’s

position is incomprehensible.

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is difficult to see how that was not foreseeable.

Rather, it appears that EID mostly objects to the relevance

of such testimony, which is a different issue than the matter of

the forseeability of such testimony9 which is at issue in this

motion.10 Expert reports were only provided for George Ashton

and Patricia Galloway, and it is not clear if EID concedes that

they are the only ones they intended to give non-percipient

testimony.

The second question is whether EID was required to provide

some sort of explanation as to what each of their designated

rebuttal experts would be testifying on and why they are

properly rebuttal experts. It seems clear that the answer is

yes.

Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires that: “In addition to the

disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party shall disclose to

the other parties the identity of any person who may be used to

present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence.” Rule 26(a)(1)(A) (on initial disclosures)

requires that “the name and, if known, the address and telephone

number of each individual likely to have discoverable

information that the disclosing party may use to support its

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claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying

the subject of the information . . .” (Emphasis added). EID

relies only on paragraph 26(a)(2)(A) when arguing that they were

not required to provide anything other than the identify of the

experts, while TBI argues that paragraph 26(a)(1)(A) requires

that the subjects of the information be provided as well. 

A blanket list, with no identifying information, is close

to useless and would require a vast expenditure of resources on

the part of TBI to make the disclosure meaningful. Prior to

filing the present motions, TBI requested that EID provide such

information, but it refused. This therefore appears to be

either another instance of EID obdurance, or worse, failing to

act in good faith. 

Rule 37(b) provides the court with broad powers to fashion

a sanction for EID’s discovery abuse. “A party that without

substantial justification fails to disclose information required

by Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure is harmless,

permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a

motion any witness or information not so disclosed.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37. 

Thus, an element to the decision should be whether all of

this was harmless. EID suggests it is not an error, and if so

it was harmless. TBI, however, fairly claims they could not

properly formulate their strategy on who to depose or even

generally on what they would need to do at trial without knowing

more about what all those seventeen persons were going to

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testifying to at trial. Moreover, of course, without a report

of their opinions, deposition is likely to be extended and

conceivably fruitless.

EID cites to the number of times that TBI cancelled

depositions, etc. Given the failure to make information

available, TBI can hardly be faulted in determining not to go

forward. 

In light of the utter lack of justification for EID’s

behavior the court also hereby STRIKES the rebuttal expert list. 

Accordingly, the court hereby ORDERS that:

1. The report and any expert testimony of Mark Korkowski

is STRICKEN;

2. EID's rebuttal expert disclosure is STRICKEN; and

3. EID's cross-motion for conditional relief is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 24, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 2:03-cv-00949-LKK -GGH Document 406 Filed 01/24/06 Page 16 of 16