Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01078/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01078-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TREVOR ALLEN HOBAUGH,

Plaintiff,

v. 

AMADOR COUNTY SHERIFF 

DEPARTMENT, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:24-CV-1078-DMC-P

ORDER

 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 

initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

Case 2:24-cv-01078-WBS-DMC Document 6 Filed 05/22/24 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 

concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 

of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 

1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 

to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 

required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Amador County Sheriff’s 

Department; and (2) Deputy Sheriff Jennifer Trantham. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. In his first claim, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Trantham made “slanderous statements” to Plaintiff’s “peers” in 

jail, which resulted in Plaintiff being assaulted on several occasions, both in and out of custody. 

See id. at 3. 

II. DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff’s complaint suffers two key defects. First, as to Defendant Trantham, 

Plaintiff has not alleged the nature of the statements made and, as a result, the Court cannot 

determine whether they establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on 

disregard for inmate safety. Second, as to Defendant Amador County Sheriff’s Department, 

Plaintiff has not alleged any custom or policy which caused the violation of Plaintiff’s rights by 

Defendant Trantham. 

A. Deliberate Indifference to Safety

 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 

Case 2:24-cv-01078-WBS-DMC Document 6 Filed 05/22/24 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 

two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 

that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

 Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to 

protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 

1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) 

objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious 

harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. 

See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, 

however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials 

know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a 

mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the 

plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually 

knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, 

even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

 Here, without knowing what statements were allegedly made by Defendant 

Trantham, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff’s claim establishes either element 

outlined above. Objectively, it is impossible to determine whether Defendant Trantham’s 

unknown statements created a substantial risk of harm. Subjectively, it is impossible to determine 

Case 2:24-cv-01078-WBS-DMC Document 6 Filed 05/22/24 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

whether the unknown statements demonstrated knowledge of and disregard for a risk to Plaintiff’s 

safety. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend the complaint to set for the statements 

allegedly made by Defendant Trantham. 

B. Municipal Liability

 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 

whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 

Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. 

at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 

government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 

under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 

the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 

plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 

custom of the municipality. See id. 

 Plaintiff has alleged a disregard for a safety risk by Defendant Trantham. Plaintiff 

has not, however, alleged the existence or implementation of any municipal custom of policy 

which caused this violation. Absent such a connection, Defendant Amador County Sheriff’s 

Department cannot be liable. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 

Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 

Case 2:24-cv-01078-WBS-DMC Document 6 Filed 05/22/24 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between 

each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 

with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 

service of this order.

Dated: May 21, 2024 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:24-cv-01078-WBS-DMC Document 6 Filed 05/22/24 Page 5 of 5