Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00146/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Grace & Digital Information Technology

Co., Ltd.,

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

Fidelity Information Services, et al.,

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 05-00146 JW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND AND DEEMING

AS MOOT FIDELITY DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

I. INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit arises out of a business dispute between Plaintiff Grace & Digital Information

Technology Co., Ltd. ("Grace") and one of its former business partners, ALLTEL Information

Services, Inc. ("AIS"). There are five named defendants in this lawsuit. Defendants Fidelity

Information Services, Inc. ("FIS"), Fidelity National Financial, Inc. ("FNF"), and Fidelity National

Information Services, Inc. ("FNIS") (collectively "Fidelity Defendants") variously are successors-ininterest to AIS. Defendants Zhang Enzhao ("Zhang") and Prosten Technology Holdings Limited

("Prosten") (collectively "Chinese Defendants") allegedly interfered with Grace's business

relationship with AIS. Grace originally filed this lawsuit in Monterey County Superior Court, alleging

Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Intentional

Interference with Contract. (Notice of Removal, Docket Item No. 1, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 29-47.) Fidelity

Defendants removed. Presently before this Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Remand. (See Plaintiff's

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1

 Because Grace refers to AIS as "AIS" and Fidelity Defendants refer to AIS as "FIS," this

Court uses "AIS" and "FIS" interchangeably.

2

 This Court acknowledges that this issue is disputed. Fidelity Defendants contend that AIS

agreed to pay Grace only until CCB actually paid AIS. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion, hereinafter Fidelity Defendants' Opposition, Docket Item No. 23, at 2:26.) Grace contends

that, actually, AIS agreed to pay Grace "upon the award of contracts[.]" (Plaintiff's Motion at 2:23-

24.) This Court's presentation of the background facts is not intended to be, and should not be

interpreted as, a definitive resolution of this issue. 

2

Motion for Remand, hereinafter Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Item No. 8.) This Court finds it

appropriate, pursuant to Civil L.R. 7-1(b), to take Plaintiff's Motion under submission, without oral

argument, for a decision based upon the parties' papers. For the reasons set forth below, this Court

GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Grace, a Chinese corporation with its principal place of business in China, provides

consulting and information technology services to financial institutions and other entities. (Notice of

Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 1.) AIS, which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of ALLTEL Corporation, sold

banking-related software and services. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 2, 11.) Defendant FIS is a

successor-in-interest to AIS, and Defendant FNF later acquired FIS.1 (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 2;

see also Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 3 ("FNF is the 100% owner of FIS").) Defendant FNIS is a

successor-in-interest to FIS. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 4.) 

On June 21, 2001, Grace and AIS entered into a written contract wherein Grace agreed to

assist AIS in selling AIS's software and services to China Construction Bank Corporation ("CCB"), a

Chinese corporation with its principal place of business in China. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶¶ 5,

12.) In exchange, AIS agreed to pay Grace a percentage of the fees paid to AIS by CCB.2 The term of

this contract was 10 years. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 13; Plaintiff's Motion at 2:25.) On July 1,

2001, Grace and AIS extended the term to 15 years. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 14; Plaintiff's Motion

at 2:26-27.) 

On July 20, 2001, AIS signed an agreement with CCB, under which CCB paid $3,344,940.50

in fees to AIS. (Declaration of Jim N. Wilson in Support of Plaintiff's Motion, hereinafter Wilson

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Decl., Docket Item No. 25, ¶ 4.) Pursuant to AIS's agreement with Grace, AIS, in turn, paid Grace

$289,983. (Wilson Decl. ¶ 4.)

On July 23, 2001, AIS negotiated a series of software licenses ("July Software License") with

CCB. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 16.) These licenses were worth $78 million in fees to AIS. 

(Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 16.) In December 2001, AIS negotiated another series of software

licenses ("December Software License") with CCB. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 17.) These licenses

were worth $98 million in fees to AIS. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 17.) Grace claims that it never

received its share of these fees. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 18.) Fidelity Defendants argue that these

agreements never became effective. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 2:17-19 ("[E]ven though

CCB signed these agreements, none of them ever became effective because CCB never received the

mandatory approvals of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation"); Fidelity

Defendants' Opposition at 2:21-22 ("Unfortunately for both Fidelity and Grace, however, it was not to

be").)

On January 11, 2002, CCB terminated its President, Wang Xuebing, amid allegations of

improprieties relating to his work for a previous employer. Wang was later convicted and sentenced

to 15 years in prison. (Wilson Decl. ¶ 6.) Fidelity Defendants claim that, at some point, CCB

informed AIS that, "CCB had placed all projects sponsored by former President Wang, including the .

. . [December 2001] agreements . . . , under review and indefinite suspension[,]" and then later

"informed FIS that it deemed these agreements null and void." (Wilson Decl. ¶ 6.)

Thereafter, Fidelity Defendants claim, AIS "urgently sought assistance from Grace to get CCB

to reinstate the contracts[,]" but that Grace failed to take any action. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition

at 3:7; see also Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 3:7-8 ("Grace did nothing, except to suggest that

FIS sue CCB"); Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 3:9-10 ("[N]o one even answered the telephone at

Grace's Beijing office"); Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 3:10-12 ("FIS sought diplomatic

assistance through the U.S. embassy, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the PRC-American

Chamber of Commerce [to get in contact with CCB], and it pursued every other potentially helpful

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contact, with no support from Grace, all without success").) On March 28, 2002, AIS allegedly wrote

a letter to Grace, notifying Grace that AIS would terminate their agreement in one month. (Fidelity

Defendants' Opposition at 4:15-17.) According to Fidelity Defendants, "Grace did nothing, and the

Agreement expired on April 28, 2002, one month after FIS sent its notice of termination." (Fidelity

Defendants' Opposition at 4:22-23.) Grace disputes the effectiveness of AIS's alleged termination. 

(Plaintiff's Reply at 6:17-7:3.)

Grace later engaged Defendant Prosten, a publicly traded company headquartered in Hong

Kong, as its new local sales/marketing agent in China. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 3:25-4:5.) 

In May 2002, AIS organized an all-expense-paid golf trip to Pebble Beach. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1

¶ 19.) The foursome included: Jim Wilson (a senior AIS officer), Defendant Zhang (CCB's new

President), Zhou Jianhua (Zhang's personal friend and next-door neighbor), and Bobby Yip (an

executive director of Prosten). (Notice of Removal Ex.l 1 ¶ 19; Plaintiff's Motion at 3:7-12; Fidelity

Defendants' Opposition at 5:5-10; Plaintiff's Reply to Fidelity Defendants' Opposition, hereinafter

Plaintiff's Reply, Docket Item No. 37, at 4:17-18.) Grace alleges that this golf trip interfered with

Grace's continuing contractual relationship with AIS. According to Grace, at this golf trip, "Messrs.

Zhang, Zhou, Yip and Prosten . . . colluded with Jim N. Wilson, President, Financial Services --

International of AIS . . . , in causing AIS to renege on its obligation to pay Grace [its] . . . commissions

under the Grace-AIS Agreement by concocting 'new contracts' ostensibly to replace the July Software

License and December Software License, which had been procured through Grace's efforts." (Notice

of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 21.) Specifically, Grace alleges that, in exchange for helping AIS to renege on its

obligations to Grace, AIS paid Zhang over $1 million, which was disguised as a consulting fee to

Prosten, and paid (and continues to pay) Zhou $3,500 per month. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 22.) 

Fidelity Defendants contend that the golf trip to Pebble Beach occurred after it had legitimately

terminated its agreement with Grace. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 5:6.)

Grace filed suit against Fidelity Defendants, claiming Breach of Contract and Breach of the

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Grace filed suit against Chinese Defendants,

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claiming Intentional Interference with Contract. 

III. STANDARDS

A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. WILLIAM W.

SCHWARZER, A. WALLACE TASHIMA & JAMES M. WAGSTAFFE, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE

TRIAL § 2:1081 (2005). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The defendant seeking

removal of an action to federal court bears the burden of establishing grounds for federal jurisdiction. 

Id. § 2:609. Removal statutes are construed restrictively, so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Ethridge

v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he removal statute is strictly

construed against removal jurisdiction"). Doubts as to removability are resolved in favor of

remanding the case to state court. SCHWARZER ET AL., supra, § 2:606 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas

Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) and Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

1992)). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. This Court Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over this Lawsuit

Fidelity Defendants "remove[d] this case based on alienage jurisdiction, 28 USC §

1332(a)(2)." (Notice of Removal ¶ 2.) Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) provides district courts with

original jurisdiction over "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum . . . of

$75,000, and is between-- . . . citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." Plaintiff

Grace is a Chinese company with its principal place of business in China. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶

1.) Fidelity Defendants are United States corporations with their principal places of business in the

United States. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶¶ 2-4.) Defendant Zhang is a Chinese citizen. (Notice of

Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 5.) Defendant Prosten is a Cayman Islands company with its principal place of

business in Hong Kong, China. (Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶ 8.) 

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits between, on the one hand, aliens

(and only aliens) and, on the other hand, citizens (and only citizens). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2);

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SCHWARZER ET AL., supra, § 2:345 ("Diversity based on alienage exists where there are one or more

aliens on one side of the lawsuit, and one or more citizens of a state on the other"). Furthermore,

federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits between citizens of different states--even

if aliens are on both sides of the lawsuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3); Transure, Inc. v. Marsh &

McLennan, Inc., 766 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he language of [28 U.S.C.] section

1332(a)(3) is broad enough to allow aliens to be additional parties on both sides of [a] dispute

[between diverse citizens]"). Federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits

between aliens. Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 991

(9th Cir. 1994) ("[D]iversity jurisdiction does not encompass a foreign plaintiff suing foreign

defendants") (citing Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1983)); SCHWARZER ET AL.,

supra, § 2:349 ("There is no alienage jurisdiction, however, in actions by one foreign subject (alien)

against another").

What about lawsuits such as this one, wherein an alien sues citizens and aliens? Do federal

courts have subject matter jurisdiction over them? The answer is no. "[I]f an alien plaintiff sues an

alien and a citizen of a state, there is no diversity jurisdiction . . . ." 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.77 (3d ed. 2005); see also SCHWARZER ET AL., supra, § 2:354

("Example: P (citizen of Japan) sues D1 (Swiss citizen) and D2 (citizen of New York). There is no

alienage jurisdiction (because alien on each side) and no diversity jurisdiction (because P is not a

U.S. citizen).") (citing Faysound, ltd. v. United Coconut Chemicals, Inc., 878 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir.

1989).

B. Fidelity Defendants Fail to Prove that Chinese Defendants Are Fraudulently Joined

Fidelity Defendants argue that Chinese Defendants' presence can be ignored because they have

been fraudulently joined to this lawsuit. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 6:4-8.) Under the

doctrine of fraudulent joinder,"a non-diverse defendant is deemed fraudulent, and the defendant's

presence in the lawsuit is ignored for purposes of determining diversity, '[i]f the plaintiff fails to state

a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules

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of the state.'" Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis

added). The burden of proving fraudulent joinder is a heavy one. SCHWARZER ET AL., supra, § 2:680

("The removing defendant has the heavy burden of alleging and proving the nondiverse party's joinder

is 'sham' or 'fraudulent'"). In fact, some courts have held that a removing defendant must prove

fraudulent joinder by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2:682. Fidelity Defendants have not

satisfied their heavy burden.

1. Fidelity Defendants Incompletely and Incorrectly Apply California's Choice of Law

Principles

First, Fidelity Defendants argue that, under California's choice of law principles, California

courts would apply Chinese law against Chinese Defendants. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at

6:20-22, 7:1-12:11.) Since Chinese law does not recognize claims for Tortious Interference with

Contractual Relations, Fidelity Defendants argue, Grace fails to state a claim against Chinese

Defendants. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 6:20-22, 7:1-12:11.) Fidelity Defendants' arguments

suffer from a number of infirmities. 

As an initial matter, Fidelity Defendants only address the conflict of law between California

and China. They fail to address other fora's interests in having their laws applied to this lawsuit. For

example, Prosten is a Cayman Islands corporation with its principal place of business in Hong Kong. 

Fidelity Defendants fail to state why Cayman Islands and Hong Kong lack interest in having their laws

applied to this lawsuit. As Grace notes, Hong Kong law does recognize claims for Tortious

Interference with Contractual Relations. (Plaintiff's Reply at 13:2-7.) 

Moreover, Fidelity Defendants incorrectly apply California's choice of law principles. In

choosing law, California courts apply a three-part test: 

First, we determine whether the two concerned states have different laws. Second, we

consider whether each state has an interest in having its law applied to this case. Finally, if

the laws are different and each state has an interest in having its own law applied, we apply

the law of the state whose 'interests would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to

the policy of the other state.'

Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Servs., Inc., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1844, 1851 (1995) (citing North

American Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905 (1995)). California's threeCase 5:05-cv-00146-JW Document 48 Filed 05/23/05 Page 7 of 11
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3

 Some commentators have criticized this fusion. In particular, they argue that the fusion of

Professor Baxter's "comparative impairment" approach with Professor Currie's "governmental interest

analysis" approach distorts the policies underlying Professor Currie's methodology. See Herma Hill

Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the

California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 577, 578 (1980) ("[T]his Article concludes that, if the

California Supreme Court wishes to continue to use Currie's methodology to resolve choice of law

cases, it should reject comparative impairment analysis as inconsistent with that approach"); see also

id. (citing Leo Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict

of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1978), which argued that the use of comparative impairment should

be abandoned and that California should return to the doctrinal purity of governmental interest

analysis). 

8

part test fuses two choice of law approaches: (1) Professor Brainerd Currie's "governmental interest

analysis" approach, which informs the first and second parts, and (2) Professor William Baxter's

"comparative impairment" approach, which informs the third part.3

 Fidelity Defendants recite this test

correctly, but they apply it incorrectly. 

Under California's choice of law principles, California's and China's respective "governmental

interests" in having their laws applied to this lawsuit must be ascertained in light of the purposes

underlying their respective laws. To determine a state's "governmental interest" in having its law

applied to a given case, courts apply a two-step process. First, they ascertain the purpose that led to

the adoption of a given law in wholly domestic cases. DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY & LARRY

KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 146 (6th ed. 2001) (citing Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90

COLUM. L. REV. 277, 299 (1990)). Second, they determine which contacts bring a multistate case

within that purpose. Id. "Underlying both steps is the assumption that a law should be interpreted and

applied in a way that advances its purpose." Id. Fidelity Defendants altogether fail to examine the

purposes underlying California's recognition of claims for Tortious Interference with Contractual

Relations and China's non-recognition of such claims. Instead, Fidelity Defendants conflate

California's "governmental interest analysis" approach to choice of law with the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS's "most significant relationship" approach to choice of law. (See

Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 9:3-11.)

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2. Chinese Defendants Can Consent to Personal Jurisdiction in California

Second, Fidelity Defendants argue that Grace's lawsuit fails because the state court lacks

personal jurisdiction over Chinese Defendants. (See Fidelity Defendants' Opposition at 12:12-17:11.) 

This is unpersuasive because a defendant can consent to personal jurisdiction. SCHWARZER ET AL.,

supra, § 3:64 ("Local courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who consent to local

personal jurisdiction . . . regardless of 'minimum contacts'"). To establish fraudulent joinder, Fidelity

Defendants must prove that no possible cause of action has been stated against Chinese Defendants. 

See Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Chinese

Defendants could feasibly consent to personal jurisdiction, Fidelity Defendants cannot prove that no

possible cause of action has been stated against them.

3. It Is Not Obvious that the State Court Would Dismiss this Lawsuit on Grounds of

Forum Non Conveniens

Third, Fidelity Defendants argue that Grace's lawsuit fails because, as a matter of state law,

the state court would dismiss it on grounds of forum non conveniens. (Fidelity Defendants' Opposition

at 17:12-20:3.) "In assessing a forum non conveniens motion the trial court looks first to whether the

alternative forum is a suitable place for trial. If it is then the court looks to the private interests of the

litigants and the public interest in keeping the case in California." Century Indem. Co., 58 Cal. App.

4th 508, 512 (1997) (citations omitted). Fidelity Defendants' argument is unpersuasive because the

resolution of forum non conveniens motions largely falls within the state court's discretion. Am.

Cemwood Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 87 Cal. App. 4th 431, 436 (2001) ("The balancing of

private and public interests is a task squarely within the trial court's discretion"). Because the state

court enjoys wide latitude in resolving a forum non conveniens motion, Fidelity Defendants cannot

prove that Grace's claim against Chinese Defendants obviously fails as a matter of state law. In any

event, this Court has little familiarity with state law-based forum non conveniens because it always

applies federal law to forum non conveniens motions. Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 511-

12 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[S]everal circuits have held that a forum non conveniens motion in federal court

is governed by federal law. . . . We join these circuits and hold that federal rather than state law

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governs.").

Because Fidelity Defendants have failed to establish the basis of this Court's jurisdiction, this

Court remands this lawsuit to Monterey County Superior Court. If, through an amended pleading,

motion, order, or other paper, Defendant later learns that this lawsuit is in fact removable, it may file a

notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 

Accordingly, this Court also deems as moot Fidelity Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue (Docket

Item No. 21).

Dated: May 23, 2005

05cv146mtr-mtv

/s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

David W. Shapiro dshapiro@bsfllp.com

Frank E. Merideth meridethf@gtlaw.com

Stuart H. Singer ssinger@bsfllp.com

William Thomas Dzurilla wdzurilla@bsfllp.com

Dated: May 23, 2005 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:/s/JWchambers 

Ronald L. Davis

Courtroom Deputy

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