Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00090/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KISHOR KUMAR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-00090-JCS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING SUA SPONTE REMAND

TO STATE COURT

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Kishor Kumar removed this unlawful detainer case from the California Superior 

Court for Contra Costa County, where it was assigned case number PS18-1280. There is no 

indication that Merlyn Kumar, a codefendant, consented to Kishor Kumar’s removal. For the 

reasons discussed below, Kishor Kumar has not met his burden to show that this case falls within 

federal subject matter jurisdiction. The undersigned therefore recommends that the case be

REMANDED sua sponte to state court.

Although Kishor Kumar and Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) have 

consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes, Merlyn Kumar 

has not consented (or otherwise appeared in this action). Because not all parties have consented to 

magistrate judge jurisdiction, this case will be reassigned to a randomly selected district judge for 

all further proceedings, including action on the recommendations of this report. Any party may 

file objections to these recommendations no later than February 22, 2019.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction and may only hear cases falling 

within their jurisdiction. Generally, a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if 

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the action could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removal 

statutes are construed restrictively so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. 

v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108−09 (1941). The Ninth Circuit recognizes a “strong presumption 

against removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Any doubts as to removability should be resolved in favor of remand. Matheson v. 

Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The defendant bears the 

burden of showing that removal is proper. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th 

Cir. 2004). A district court may remand a case to state court sua sponte if it determines that 

jurisdiction is lacking. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Smith v. Mylan, Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1043 (9th 

Cir. 2014).

B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The only basis for removal addressed in any detail in Kishor Kumar’s notice of removal 

(dkt. 1) is civil rights removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443. Although the text of that statute permits 

removal of actions “[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such 

State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or 

of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof,” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), the Supreme Court and Ninth 

Circuit have held that “‘the petitioners must assert, as a defense to the prosecution, rights that are 

given to them by explicit statutory enactment protecting equal racial civil rights,’” and must 

identify “‘a state statute or a constitutional provision that purports to command the state courts to 

ignore the federal rights.’” Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

California v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635, 636 (9th Cir. 1970), and citing Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 

780, 788–92 (1966)) (emphasis added). Kishor Kumar asserts only that the California Civil Code 

provisions regarding evictions “discriminate[] unfairly against Ethnic-Surname Americans (all of 

whom are presumed to be unfamiliar with legal proceedings and/or illiterate in the English 

language and therefore ignorant of their rights).” Kishor Kumar makes no showing that “EthnicSurname Americans” are a “racial” classification, that “Ethnic-Surname Americans” are in fact 

less familiar with applicable legal proceedings that the public as a whole, that any “explicit 

[federal] statutory enactment protecting racial civil rights” prohibits state procedures that favor 

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defendants who understand the law, or that any provision of the California Civil Code “purports to 

command the state courts to ignore [any] federal rights.” See Patel, 46 F.3d at 999. Accordingly, 

Kishor Kumar has not shown that removal is proper under § 1443. If Kishor Kumar believes that 

the state courts have otherwise neglected his rights under state or federal law, his recourse is 

through the state appellate process, not removal to federal district court. 

The caption of Kishor Kumar’s notice of removal also cites 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To 

establish “diversity jurisdiction” under that statute, a removing defendant must show that there is 

complete diversity of the parties—i.e., no defendant is a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff—

and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 

519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Kishor Kumar’s notice of removal does not address either of those 

requirements. To the contrary, the notice of removal asserts that “THIS IS NOT BASED on 

grounds of diversity of citizenship.” Notice of Removal at 9. Kishor Kumar therefore has not met 

his burden to show that the case is properly removed under § 1332.

Although the notice of removal does not invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331, Kishor Kumar briefly asserts that Wells Fargo’s attorneys have “caused [him] 

harm . . . under title 42 USC 1983 and 1985.” Notice of Removal at 2. Federal question 

jurisdiction must arise from the claims of the plaintiff’s complaint, and unlawful detainer is a 

claim arising under state law rather than federal law. See, e.g., Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. v. 

Villegas, C 10-05478 PJH, 2011 WL 204322, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011). Any violation of 

federal law by Wells Fargo or its counsel would at most provide grounds for a defense or 

counterclaim based on federal law, which would not justify removal. See Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (holding that “a case may not be removed to federal court on 

the basis of a federal defense”); Vaden v. Discovery Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (“Nor can 

federal jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.”).

Because Kishor Kumar has not shown that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the 

case should be remanded. The Court need not address procedural defects in Kishor Kumar’s 

removal, including the lack of any indication that Defendant Merlyn Kumar consented to removal.

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C. The Undersigned Does Not Recommend Awarding Fees

If a case is improperly removed, “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of 

just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c). An award of attorneys’ fees may be appropriate where removal has been 

“sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party,” and 

“the standard for awarding fees should turn on the reasonableness of the removal.” Martin v. 

Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140−41 (2005).

This case presents a close call as to whether fees should be awarded. Kishor Kumar’s 

removal is objectively unreasonable. On the other hand, Kishor Kumar is indigent and 

unrepresented, and there is no indication that Wells Fargo has incurred significant attorneys’ fees 

as a result of the improper removals. The undersigned recommends that the Court decline to 

require Kishor Kumar to pay Wells Fargo’s attorneys’ fees, but advises Defendants that further 

unwarranted removals may result in sanctions.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that this case be 

REMANDED sua sponte to the California Superior Court for Contra Costa County, but that no 

attorneys’ fees be awarded. Any party may file objections to the recommendations stated herein 

no later than February 22, 2019.

Defendants, who are not represented by counsel, are encouraged to consult with the 

Federal Pro Bono Project’s Legal Help Center in either of the Oakland or San Francisco federal 

courthouses for assistance. The San Francisco Legal Help Center office is located in Room 2796 

on the 15th floor at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102. The Oakland office is 

located in Room 470-S on the 4th floor at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612. Appointments 

can be made by calling (415) 782-8982 or signing up in the appointment book located outside 

either office. Lawyers at the Legal Help Center can provide basic assistance to parties 

representing themselves but cannot provide legal representation.

Dated: February 8, 2019 ______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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