Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03087/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CAVAZOS,

CDCR #J-26206, Civil

No. 12cv3087 MMA (MDD)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING

INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE

AND GARNISHING BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a);

[Doc. No. 2] 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1);

[Doc. No. 3] 

AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL

TO EFFECT SERVICE OF

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) & 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

Mr. GARZA, CDCR Correctional

Officer;

Mr. PAYAN, CDCR Correctional

Officer;

Mr. FLORES, CDCR Correctional

Officer,

Defendants.

Robert Cavazos (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at Sierra

Conservation Center in Jamestown, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims various Calipatria

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State Prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights while he was incarcerated

there in September and October 2010, by refusing to move him to another cell after he

reported a serious water leak. Plaintiff claims Defendants further refused to provide

him with dry linens and clothing, forcing him at one point to sleep “nearly naked

under [his] bed.” (Compl. at 3.) When Defendants again refused to move him four

days later and after another rain storm, Plaintiff slipped and fell in the water which has

accumulated in his cell, injuring his leg, elbow, and back. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks

general, compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2], as well as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 3]. 

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of

the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing

fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s

failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire

fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of

the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the

six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the

average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average

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monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless

the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed

at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s

account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing

fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. His trust account statement shows an average monthly

balance of $79.31, average monthly deposits of $52.50, and a balance of $80.01 in his

account at the time of filing. Based on this financial information, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF Doc. No. 2] and assesses an initial partial

filing fee of $15.86 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or

his designee, shall collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds in Plaintiff’s account

are available at the time this Order is executed pursuant to the directions set forth

below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial

partial filing fee.”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance shall be

collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because he is “untrained in the law,”

expects that “complexities of legal issues will arise,” and he will face “obstacles in

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obtaining ... evidence” to support his claims. See Pl.’s Mot. at 5. 

Nevertheless, “[t]here is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983

action.” Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v.

Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust

Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute

right to counsel in civil proceedings.”) (citation omitted). Federal courts do not have

the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States

District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in

U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Plaintiff is correct to note that districts courts do have discretion, however,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request” that an attorney represent indigent

civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” See Agyeman v.

Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at

1525. “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance

requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits

and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting

Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v.

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the

assistance of counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). 

However, so long as a pro se litigant, like Plaintiff in this case, is able to “articulate

his claims against the relative complexity of the matter,” the “exceptional

circumstances” which might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. Id.

(finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when district court denied

appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have fared

better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert testimony.”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates his ability to articulate essential facts

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supporting his Eighth Amendment claims. Thus, at least at this initial pleading stage

of the case, the Court finds he appears to have an adequate grasp of the facts

supporting his case as well as the relatively straightforward Eight Amendment issues

involved. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. In fact, as discussed below, Plaintiff’s

Complaint alleges facts sufficient to survive the initial screening required by 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Thus, because Plaintiff has not satisfied the

stringent standards required for an appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1), Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF Doc. No. 3] must

be DENIED without prejudice at this time. 

III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see

also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In

addition, courts “have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil

rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit

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of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz

v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may not, however,

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive

the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).1

 See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27. Accordingly, the Court further finds Plaintiff is entitled

to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the

court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”);

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States

marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice. 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc.

No. 2] is GRANTED.

3. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the

initial filing fee assessed in this Order, and shall forward the remainder of the $350

filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s account in an amount equal

to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and shall forward payments

to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

1

 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of,

and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12[] motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” 

Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. The Clerk shall issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF Doc.

No. 1] upon Defendants and shall and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S.

Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff

with a certified copy of this Order and a certified copy of his Complaint and

summons so that he may serve Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,”

Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and accurately as

possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the instructions

provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Upon receipt, the

U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendants as

directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of service shall be advanced

by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

6. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint

within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and §

1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on 

the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on

the merits,” the defendant is required to respond). 

7. Plaintiff shall serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been

entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or

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other document submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with

the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the

manner in which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendants,

or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service. Any paper received by the Court

which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of

Service will be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 3, 2013

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

 

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