Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01430/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01430-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAillDited States Court of Appeals . Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RODNEY E. ELLIOTT, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY OF WHEAT RIDGE; WHEAT RIDGE ) 

MUNICIPAL COURT named as City of ) 

Wheat Ridge Municipal Court; ) 

CHARLES J. ROSE, Judge; RANDALL J. ) 

DAVIS, Judge; DAVID DAWSON, ) 

Patrolman; DARIN SCHANKER, City ) 

Attorney; DAN WILDE, Mayor; VANCE ) 

EDWARDS, Councilperson; JEAN ) 

FIELDS, Councilperson; KEN SILER, ) 

Councilperson; TONY SOLANO, ) 

Councilperson; DONALD R. EAFANTI, ) 

Councilperson; RAE JEAN BEHM, ) 

Councilperson; DENNIS HALL, ) 

Councilperson; and CLAUDIA WORTH, ) 

Councilperson, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

MAR 0 2 1995 

PATRICK FISHER -- Clerk 

No. 94-1430 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. 93-F-2742) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Rodney E. Elliott, Arvada, Colorado, Pro Se Plaintiff-Appellant .. 

Christina M. Habas of Watson, Nathan & Bremer, P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 94-1430 Document: 01019281769 Date Filed: 03/02/1995 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

The appellant, Mr. Elliott, was issued a speeding citation by 

the appellees. His requests for a jury trial and appointed 

counsel were denied, and he was found guilty of the violation in a 

hearing before a judge in the municipal court. Mr. Elliott filed 

suit against the City, the judges, the prosecutor assigned to his 

case, and various City officials alleging that his conviction 

violated his due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

that the ordinance itself was unconstitutional. The defendants 

made motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, which the district court granted; Mr. Elliott appealed. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same legal standard used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56 (c). James v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 997-98 

(lOth Cir. 1994). Even read in the light most favorable to Mr. 

Elliott, his allegations do not raise any genuine issues of 

material fact. The appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. 

In 1982, Colorado decriminalized its traffic code so that 

most minor traffic violations are now classified as civil 

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Appellate Case: 94-1430 Document: 01019281769 Date Filed: 03/02/1995 Page: 2 
offenses. The Colorado Supreme Court has upheld this scheme 

against a challenge to its constitutionality. People v. Lewis, 

745 P.2d 668, 671 (Colo. 1987). At least twelve other states have 

also decriminalized minor traffic violations. These statutory 

schemes have been uniformly held to be constitutional. See, e.g., 

State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703 (Me. 1983); Nettleton v. Doughtie, 

373 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1979); People v. Schomaker, 323 N.W.2d 461 

(Mich. Ct. App. 1982). Mr. Elliott was convicted under a City of 

Wheat Ridge traffic ordinance validly enacted pursuant to the 

Colorado statutory scheme. 

Mr. Elliott contends that this ordinance is unconstitutional 

in that it does not provide him with a right of jury trial as 

guaranteed by the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. The Sixth 

Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases does apply to 

the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

However, this right is limited to criminal cases. The Supreme 

Court has held that "there is a category of petty crimes or 

offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial 

provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment 

jury trial requirement . applied to the states." Duncan v. 

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). Offenses are generally 

considered petty if they involve a sentence of six months or less. 

See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). Thus, the primary 

limitation on declaring an act to be a civil infraction as opposed 

to a criminal one is in the possible punitive measures available. 

If an arrest and imprisonment is authorized, or a large fine, then 

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Appellate Case: 94-1430 Document: 01019281769 Date Filed: 03/02/1995 Page: 3 
despite a legislature's classification of an act as non-criminal, 

the rights afforded to a criminal defendant still apply. See 

Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Court, 570 P.2d 52 (Ore. 1977) 

(Oregon legislature's attempt to decriminalize driving under the 

influence statute unsuccessful); see also State v. Bennion, 730 

P.2d 952, 954-55 (Idaho 1986). In the case of minor speeding 

violations that impose small fines as the only sanction, such as 

here, there can be no question that a state may classify such an 

infraction as civil; thus, there is no Sixth Amendment right to a 

jury trial. Compare Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 

538 (1989). 

Mr. Elliott's claim of the right to appointed counsel was 

also properly denied. This right attaches only in prosecutions 

where a defendant is actually sentenced to jail. Scott v. 

Illinois, 440 u.s. 367 (1979). 

The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial for civil cases 

does not apply in state proceedings. Eilenbecker v. District 

Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (1890); see also Firelock, 

Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Colo. 1989). 

Mr. Elliott also makes a general Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment claim that he has been denied due process, but he has 

failed to identify any liberty or property interest of which the 

Appellees have deprived him. He has also attempted to state a 

RICO claim. As we cannot discern any plausible basis for these 

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Appellate Case: 94-1430 Document: 01019281769 Date Filed: 03/02/1995 Page: 4 
claims, we agree that the grant of summary judgment was 

appropriate. 

Because we find that the district court properly granted 

summary judgment on all of Mr. Elliott's claims, we do not need to 

address the propriety of the grant of the Motion to Dismiss. 

The Order of the District Court Granting the Motion for 

Summary Judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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