Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-04529/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-04529-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-03-04529 RMW

KJ

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 10/3/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WILLIAM SYVERSON, PATRICK BOONE,

LEE DESHLER, ROBERT FLOWERS,

BARRY GERARD, TINA GLEISNER,

THOMAS GOMEZ, EDWIN "DANA"

GOODLOE, ROLF MARSH, DANIEL

MOCZAN, JAMES PAYNE, and ANTONIO

RIVERA, individually and on behalf of others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

No. C-03-04529 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Re Docket Nos. 87, 93, 97, 98]

Defendant International Business Machines ("IBM") brings this motion to dismiss plaintiffs'

claim for declaratory and injunctive relief for violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act

("OWBPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f), and plaintiffs' disparate impact age discrimination claim as to

defendant's individual terminations of employees in violation of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621. The court heard oral argument on the motion on July

27, 2007. The court has read the moving and responding papers. For the reasons stated below, the

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court grants defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first claim with prejudice and grants defendant's

motion to dismiss part of plaintiffs' second claim with twenty days' leave to amend. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former employees of defendant. Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 1. Plaintiffs

allege they are members of a class of persons protected by the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Id. ¶ 6. 

From July 1, 2001 through May 4, 2005, defendant began involuntary group terminations of

its workforce, called Resource Actions. Id. ¶ 48. Defendant performed at least 50 Resource Actions

during this period. Id. ¶ 49. As a result of these Resource Actions, tens of thousands of employees

were purportedly terminated from their employment by defendant. Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiffs allege that

defendant's procedures allowed managers directly responsible for making termination decisions to

use highly subjective criteria in implementing the Resource Actions. Id. With regard to group

terminations, plaintiffs allege that defendant refused to consider older individuals for placement

elsewhere in the company, retained younger employees to perform work formerly performed by

individuals 40 years of age or older who were selected for termination, recruited extensively at

colleges and universities, terminated employees over the age of 40 in order to no longer have to

contribute funds to their Future Health Accounts, and made stereotypical comments based on age. 

Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiffs also allege that from July 1, 2001 through May 4, 2005, defendant engaged in the

practice of age discrimination in implementing individual terminations independent of the Resource

Actions. Id. ¶¶ 54, 55. 

In both the Resource Actions and individual terminations, defendant offered severance

packages to employees selected for termination in exchange for signing a General Release and

Covenant Not to Sue ("Release"). Id. ¶ 8. All named plaintiffs terminated pursuant to defendant's

Resource Actions signed the Release with the exception of plaintiff Tina Gleisner. Id. ¶ 23. 

Previously, this court entered an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint with

prejudice, holding that the Release was written in a manner understood by an average individual

selected by defendant for employment termination and that it was knowing and voluntary under the

OWBPA. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Release did not meet the minimum

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 Defendant does not move to dismiss plaintiffs' disparate impact discrimination claim with regard

to the group terminations.

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requirements under the OWBPA and was therefore not enforceable as a matter of law. Syverson v.

International Business Machines Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiffs bring two causes of action against defendant. In the first cause of action, plaintiffs

allege that the Release is illegal on its face because it violates the OWBPA and regulations

implementing the OWBPA. SAC ¶ 58. In the second cause of action, plaintiffs allege a violation of

the ADEA based on the subjective use of procedures and criteria for implementing the group

termination Resource Actions, and for plaintiffs individually terminated allegedly based on age. Id.

¶ 66, 67. For the first cause of action, plaintiffs seek an injunction preventing the reinstatement of

the Release, an injunction requiring defendant to inform all employees terminated between July 1,

2001 and May 4, 2005 that the Release is invalid, and an injunction preventing IBM from engaging

in further acts of discrimination against plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs also seek an order equitably

tolling the statute of limitations period for all persons terminated during the same time period. Id. ¶

3. For the second cause of action, plaintiffs seek an injunction preventing defendant from engaging

in further acts of discrimination against plaintiffs, an order requiring defendant to reinstate plaintiffs

or award plaintiffs front pay, an award of back pay, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees. Id. at

17, 18.

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' first cause of action for violation of the OWBPA. 

Defendant also moves to dismiss that portion of plaintiffs' second cause of action that purport to

allege a disparate impact discrimination claim for non-group terminations.1

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint.

Dismissal can be based on the "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1988). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all material allegations

in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

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 The parties do not dispute that the OWBPA is an amendment to the ADEA.

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Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 

'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions." Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations and edit marks omitted). Moreover,

"[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Id. (citations omitted). The court is

not required to accept conclusory legal allegations "cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network,

18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Right to Affirmative Relief Under the OWBPA

In 1990, Congress amended section 626 of the ADEA by enacting the OWBPA, which "is

designed to protect the rights and benefits of older workers" and "governs the effect under federal

law of waivers or releases on ADEA claims." E.E.O.C. v. UBS Brinson, Inc., 2003 WL 133235, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Oubre v. Entergy, 522 U.S. 422, 427 (1998)). Plaintiffs' complaint

seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for defendant's noncompliance with the OWBPA. Defendant

argues that the OWBPA does not establish a right to affirmative relief. Plaintiffs argue that courts

have recognized a cause of action under the OWBPA when such a claim is brought in conjunction

with discrimination claims under the ADEA because the OWBPA is part of the ADEA.2

 Defendant

also contends that the text and structure of the OWBPA supports that the OWBPA only sets out

terms for the validity of ADEA waivers. Plaintiffs argue that because the OWBPA is an amendment

to the ADEA, the ADEA's general enforcement provision, which existed before the OWBPA,

provides for affirmative relief for violations of the OWBPA. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed

the issue of whether there is a right to affirmative relief under the OWBPA. Moreover, although

several other courts have addressed this issue, courts appear to disagree on whether there is a right to

a claim for violation of the OWBPA. 

Defendant argues that the text of the OWBPA contains no rights-creating language. 

Defendant also argues that the OWBPA is styled a "Waiver" provision, and thus only provides that

non-knowing or involuntary waivers are unenforceable as to ADEA claims. Plaintiffs argue that

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 The employees also brought claims under the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act and the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 

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section 626(c)(1) of the ADEA which provides, "[a]ny person aggrieved may bring a civil action in

any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to

effectuate the purposes of this chapter," gives rise to a right to relief for violations of the OWBPA.

Because the OWBPA is an amendment to the ADEA, and it is part of the same chapter as the quoted

section of the ADEA, plaintiffs argue that there is affirmative relief under the OWBPA. Plaintiffs

argue that section 626(c)(1) of the ADEA supports affirmative relief under the OWBPA because the

OWBPA was "introduced into the code not as a free-standing statute, but as multiple modifications

to various existing sections of the ADEA." See Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info.

Sys., Inc. ("Bull"), 16 F. Supp. 2d 90, 105 (D. Mass. 1998). Because one purpose of the OWBPA

was to protect older workers from signing away their ADEA rights, plaintiffs further contend that it

would run contrary to make relief unavailable for violations for the OWBPA. See Krane v. Capital

One Servs., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 589, 605 (E.D. Va. 2004). 

Defendant relies on the Tenth Circuit opinion in Whitehead v. Okla. Gas & Electric Co., 187

F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 1999), in arguing that there exists no right to affirmative relief under the

OWBPA. In Whitehead, employees sued their employer under the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act ("ERISA"), OWBPA, and other federal statutes.3

 187 F.3d at 1188. The Tenth Circuit

held that dismissal of the OWBPA claim was proper because the employees did not assert a separate

ADEA claim. Id. at 1192. The Tenth Circuit held that "[t]he OWBPA simply determines whether

an employee has, as a matter of law, waived the right to bring a separate and distinct ADEA claim." 

Id. In addition, as defendant argues, courts in different districts have similarly held that the OWBPA

does not create an independent cause of action. See, e.g., UBS Brinson, 2003 WL 133235, at *3

(holding that most courts have determined that the OWBPA does not establish age discrimination by

itself). In UBS Brinson, the court recognized that "[v]irtually every court that has decided the issue

of whether a violation of the OWBPA, by itself, establishes age discrimination has concluded that it

does not." Id. at *3. In Halstead v. American International Group Inc., 2005 WL 885200, at *2 n.5

(D. Del. 2005), the court held that "[b]y its plain terms, the [OWBPA] protects older employees

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-03-04529 RMW

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from waiving their rights under the ADEA unknowingly or involuntarily. It does not, however,

create an independent right of action." In Halstead, the plaintiff signed a release form in exchange

for $147,000. Id. at *1. The plaintiff argued that the release was invalid because it was executed

under duress. Id. at *2. The plaintiff then brought claims under the ADEA and the OWBPA. Id. at

*1. The court concluded that the OWBPA "merely establishes minimum requirements for waivers

in order to protect employees." Id. at *2. 

Plaintiffs argue that Whitehead is distinguishable because plaintiffs in that case brought a

claim for violation of ERISA, and did not allege a violation of the non-OWBPA provisions of the

ADEA. Further, plaintiffs argue, in Bull, the district court allowed the state attorney general to

proceed with claims under the OWBPA, holding that "the broad enforcement scheme articulated in

subsection (c) of section 626 [of the ADEA] covers the waiver requirements articulated in

subsection (f) of that section [the OWBPA]." 16 F. Supp. 2d at 105. There, plaintiffs filed an age

discrimination action claim against defendant Bull HN Information Systems ("Bull") for violations

of the OWBPA and the ADEA. Id. at 94. Bull's severance plan requiring laid off employees to sign

a waiver of rights, including ADEA rights, before receiving severance pay. Id. at 94-95. Under the

waiver agreement, employees gave up their right to sue Bull for claims arising out of their

employment. Id. at 95. The waiver agreement further provided that employees would be

responsible for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of defending a claim if they later brought a claim

against Bull. Id. Over 50 employees were then laid off pursuant to Bull's employment termination

program. Id. The employees were given the revised release and severance agreement. Id. Bull

moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action, arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon

which relief was granted. Id. Bull argued that the only remedy provided under section 626(f) of the

OWBPA for an invalid waiver agreement was that the waiver agreement was ineffective as a

defense in an age discrimination suit. Id. at 105. The district court disagreed with Bull's reading of

the OWBPA, noting that because the waiver agreement held former employees responsible for the

costs of defending a suit, the agreement would act as a deterrent to individuals bringing ADEA

claims. Id. at 106. The court reasoned that because the agreement would have a chilling effect on

employees challenging the validity of the waiver agreement, the consequences of bringing a suit

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against a valid waiver would be to pay devastating penalties in the form of attorney's fees and costs

of defending the suit. Id. 

Although the Bull court's holdings are supported by policy concerns implicated by the facts

of that case, the court finds that defendant's arguments are supported by the plain text of the

OWBPA. The OWBPA provides in relevant part:

(f) Waiver

(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the

waiver is knowing and voluntary. Except as provided in paragraph (2), a waiver may

not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum--

(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that

is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by the

average individual eligible to participate;

***

(3) In any dispute that may arise over whether any of the requirements, conditions,

and circumstances set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), or (H) of

paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), have been met, the party

asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of proving in a court of

competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to

paragraph (1) or (2).

(4) No waiver agreement may affect the Commission's rights and responsibilities to

enforce this chapter. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with the protected

right of an employee to file a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding

conducted by the Commission.

29 U.S.C. § 626(f). As defendant argues, the plain text of the OWBPA does not contain any rightscreating language. Nothing in section 626(f) suggests that the provision on release requirements

gives any equitable rights other than voiding the release. Plaintiffs' argument that section 626(b)

provides broad relief for violations of the ADEA does not change the express text of the OWBPA,

which does not provide for such affirmative relief. The plain text of the OWBPA is consistent with

those cases holding that the OWBPA only sets out the terms of an effective waiver and does not

create an independent cause of action. See, e.g., Halstead, 2005 WL 885200, at *2; UBS Brinson,

2003 WL 133235, at *3. In particular, the Whitehead court specifically noted that dismissal of the

suit was proper because an action under the OWBPA, by itself, could not give rise to a claim. As

the Tenth Circuit held, based on its plain text, the OWBPA only sets out the requirements for a

waiver of ADEA claims. Whitehead, 187 F.3d at 1191-1192 ("This language strongly indicates that

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4

 Plaintiffs also rely upon Krane for the proposition that they can assert an OWBPA claim for

declaratory and injunctive relief. In Krane, the district court followed the Bull court's reasoning and

concluded that 

[t]aken together, the relevant authorities, viewed in perspective of the statutory text

and the statutory scheme involved, lead to the conclusion that, under section 626(c),

an employee can seek declaratory and injunctive relief for a violation of the OWBPA

provisions respecting waivers found in section 626(f). 

However, the court also held that "a violation of section 626(f), standing alone, or without an

accompanying ADEA age discrimination claim, is not viable because there is no monetary damage

that can flow simply from a violation of the waiver provisions in section 626(f)." Id. Krane is not

applicable here since, as noted above, the Release cannot be lawfully used and defendant has

represented that it will no longer use the Release. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-03-04529 RMW

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the OWBPA simply determines whether an employee has, as a matter of law, waived the right to

bring a separate and distinct ADEA claim."). 

Moreover, unlike in Bull, the waiver at issue here does not make plaintiffs responsible for

attorney's fees and expenses of defending against a suit brought under the ADEA. Here, because the

Ninth Circuit has already held the Release to be invalid, defendant's continued use of the Release

would be contrary to the purpose of the OWBPA. Defendant also represented at oral argument on

the motion that it has ceased using the defective waiver. Therefore, since defendant can no longer

lawfully use and is not currently using the Release, the Bull court's concern that an agreement would

have a chilling effect on employees bringing claims under the ADEA is not implicated here.4

In sum, the court concludes that the OWBPA, by its plain terms, does not create an

independent cause of action. Therefore, the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'

OWBPA claim with prejudice. 

C. Individual Terminations

Defendant also moves to dismiss those parts of plaintiffs' second cause of action asserting a

claim for relief on a theory of disparate impact age discrimination with respect to individual

terminations. Defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to identify the specific employment practice that

purportedly caused a disparate impact on older workers who were individually terminated. Plaintiffs

argue that they have stated a claim with enough specificity to survive a motion to dismiss. 

In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, plaintiff must: "(1) identify the

specific employment practices or selection criteria being challenged; (2) show disparate impact; and

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 The police officer pay plan gave raises to all police officers in an attempt to keep their salaries

competitive with the surrounding region. Smith, 544 U.S. at 242. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-03-04529 RMW

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(3) prove causation." Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)). To state a claim for disparate

impact under the ADEA, a plaintiff is responsible for identifying the specific employment practice

that led to the statistical disparities. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005). In Smith,

the Supreme Court considered a police officer pay plan that was relatively less generous to older

workers than to younger workers.5 Id. at 241-42. A higher percentage of police officers under 40

received raises greater than 10% than police officers over the age of 40. Id. at 242. Nevertheless,

the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs' claim failed to allege sufficient facts to support a disparate

impact claim under the ADEA because they did not identify any specific test, requirement, or

practice within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on older workers. Id. at 241. The court

reasoned that the failure to identify the specific practice being challenged is an omission that could

lead to employers being liable for many innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances. Id. 

Here, plaintiffs' allegations that defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of age

discrimination by treating older employees less favorably than younger employees are vague and

conclusory. In Rose, the Ninth Circuit held that employment decisions left up to the subjective

discretion of a company's managers are subject to disparate impact analysis. 902 F.2d at 1424-25. 

In the present case, plaintiffs do not name who made the employment decisions with regard to

individual terminations. Plaintiffs also fail to name the specific times, places, and people involved

in the individual termination decisions and fail to identify the specific employment practices relevant

to the decisions. Moreover, plaintiffs have also failed to allege facts supporting a conclusion that a

specific employment practice has caused a disparate impact on ADEA protected workers. Thus,

plaintiffs do not sufficiently plead a claim for relief on a theory of disparate impact age

discrimination with respect to individual terminations.

Nevertheless, dismissal with prejudice is not warranted. Plaintiffs may be able to amend

their complaint to cure these deficiencies. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

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6

 Plaintiffs appear to seek limited discovery prior to filing an amended complaint. The court denies

plaintiffs' request. "The purpose of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) is to enable defendants to challenge

the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting themselves to discovery." See Rutman Wine

Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 

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182 (1962) ("Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend shall be 'freely given when justice so requires';

this mandate is to be heeded.").6

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first claim

with prejudice and grants defendant's motion to dismiss those parts of plaintiffs' second claim

asserting disparate impact age discrimination with respect to individualized terminations with

twenty days' leave to amend. 

DATED: 10/3/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

Jeffrey Neil Young jyoung@me-law.com

Patrick McTeague pmcteague@me-law.com

Teresa Demchak tdemchak@gdblegal.com

Morris J. Baller mballer@gdblegal.com

Heather Mills hmills@gdblegal.com

Christopher Platten cplatten@wmpr.com

Counsel for Defendants:

Jeffrey D. Wohl jeffwohl@paulhastings.com

Kerri N. Harper kerriharper@paulhastings.com

Laura N. Monfredini lauramonfredini@paulhastings.com

Jennifer A. Blackstone jenniferblackstone@paulhastings.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 10/3/07 /s/ MAG 

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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