Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01162/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01162-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 07cv1162

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES TWAIN CLEMANS, Jr.,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

____________________________________ 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No.07cv1162 WQH (PCL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART RESPONDENTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 6]

On June 27, 2007, Charles Twain Clemans, Jr. (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner incarcerated at

High Desert State Prison, currently proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docs. 1, 2.) In response, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,

arguing that the Petition is barred by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s

(“AEDPA’s”) statute of limitations, that it fails to state a federal claim, and that one of the claims is not

ripe for review. (Doc. 6.) After reviewing all the pertinent arguments and documentation, the Court

recommends that Respondent’s motion be GRANTED in part and denied in part.

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 07cv1162

BACKGROUND

In February 1996, Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of attempted murder while personally

using a firearm and inflicting great bodily injury (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 664/187(a), 12022.5, 12022.7) and

one count of shooting into an occupied dwelling (Cal. Pen. Code § 246). (Lodgment 10, at 1.) In July

1996, the San Diego County Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of 28 years in prison. 

(Id.)

Challenges to his credit-earning status

On May 16, 2005, Petitioner submitted a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 602 appeal, challenging his credit-earning status for work he completed in the Inmate

Work/Training Incentive Program (IWTIP) at Pleasant Valley State Prison. (Lodgment 2.) This appeal

was denied the same day at the informal level of review. (Lodgment 3.) Petitioner then sought review

at the first formal level of review, but his appeal was screened out on June 9, 2005 because the CDCR

did not have the authority to alter Petitioner’s credit-earning status, which was set by state statute. 

(Lodgments 2 and 4.) On September 30, 2005, Petitioner filed another 602 appeal at the informal level

of review, challenging his credit earning status. (Doc. 20, at 24.) On November 16, 2005, the CDCR

responded at the informal level of review, but its response was not included in the materials submitted

by Petitioner. (See id.) After several more attempts to submit appeals to the Director’s Level of

Review, Petitioner received notification on May 10, 2006 from N. Grannis, Chief of the Inmate Appeals

Branch, that he needed to complete the review process at the Second Level of Review before proceeding

at the Director’s Level. (Id. at 35.) On February 22, 2006, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, challenging his credit-earning status. (Lodgment 5.) 

On June 28, 2006, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment 6.) 

According to an Order dated April 11, 2006 from the San Diego County Superior Court,

“Petitioner also filed three separate Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Fifth District Court of

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 07cv1162

Appeal, two of which were denied and one was voluntarily dismissed so that the Petition could first be

filed in Superior Court.” (Doc. 20, at 14.) In the San Diego County Superior Court, Petitioner filed a

third habeas corpus petition dated February 14, 2006. (Id.) The main contention in the third habeas

petition was that CDCR was not applying credits earned in the IWTIP to his sentence and refused to

provide him with a computation review hearing. (Id. at 15.) The Court decided that “[b]ecause it is the

duty of the Director of Corrections to determine prison behavior and work-time credits, judicial

intervention, if ever needed, will be postponed until defendant has exhausted available administrative

remedies.” (Id.) The Court refused to make “any finding or ruling that Petitioner is, or is not entitled to

post-sentence work-time credit” because there was not a full record of administrative responses given to

the Court. (Id. at 16.) The Superior Court ordered the CDCR to provide an explanation to the Court as

to “why, or why not, Petitioner is entitled to credit he believes he has earned.” (Id. at 17.) Upon

receiving the response from the CDCR on May 23, 2006, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s writ of

habeas corpus on June 14, 2006 so as to allow Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies

available through the CDCR. (Id. at 11.) The Superior Court told Petitioner that “if in 120 days the

CDCR has still not provided the opportunity for Petitioner to have the computation hearing, he will not

be prevented from filing and having reviewed a subsequent habeas corpus petition regarding this issue.” 

(Id.) 

Challenges to his parole period 

On June 1, 2005, Petitioner submitted a CDCR 602 appeal, requesting a legal status summary

sheet and alleging that the imposition of a three-year parole period following his release from incarceration would violate the terms of his sentence. (Lodgment 7.) This appeal was partially granted on June

28, 2005 at the informal level of review. (Id.) The prison provided him a legal status summary sheet,

but denied his request for a review of his parole period as the CDCR did not have the authority to alter

the time set for his parole period. (Id.) On July 7, 2005, Petitioner then sought review at the formal

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 07cv1162

level of review, requesting a prison-term computation review hearing and a review of his credit-earning

status. (Id.) However, his appeal was screened out on August 15, 2005 because Petitioner had changed

the issue in his appeal and the CDCR required clarification of the issue to be appealed in order to

process his request. (Lodgment 8.) Petitioner did not amend and resubmit his appeal to the formal level

of review. On August 30, 2005, Petitioner filed in the San Diego County Superior Court a state petition

for writ of habeas corpus challenging his anticipated parole period. (Lodgment 9.) On October 20,

2005, the Superior Court denied his petition on the merits because Petitioner did not establish that he

was entitled to relief on the issue of his parole release date. (Lodgment 10, at 1-2.) Finally, on March

10, 2006, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court,

challenging his parole release date. (Lodgment 11.) On June 28, 2006, the California Supreme Court

summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment 12.) 

Instant petition

On June 27, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus along with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (Docs. 1, 2.) The Petition sets forth three grounds for relief. 

In grounds one and two, Petitioner alleges that he is being improperly denied good conduct and worktime credits in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as equity

principles. (Doc. 1, at 6-7; doc. 2, at 3.) In ground three, Petitioner alleges that imposition of a parole

period following his release from incarceration would violate his sentence, which ultimately would

violate a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 8; doc. 2, at 37.) 

On September 20, 2007, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a Notice of Lodgment. (Doc. 6.) Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Petition should be dismissed because it was filed after the expiration of

the statute of limitations, because it fails to state a federal claim, and because its third claim is not ripe

for review. (Doc. 6, at 2.) Petitioner, through counsel, submitted an Opposition to Respondents’

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 07cv1162

Motion to Dismiss on October 29, 2007. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner claims that his Petition should not be

dismissed because it was filed timely under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(D) and 2244(d)(1)(A). (Id. at

2, 5.) Respondents filed a Reply arguing that the Opposition did not challenge Respondents’ claims

that the Petition fails to state a federal claim or that ground three is premature. (Doc. 10, at 2.) 

Respondents also argued that the factual predicate of Petitioner’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(D) were, at the latest, June 10, 2005 for grounds one and two, and August 16, 2005 for

ground three. (Id.) Furthermore, Respondents argued that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) does not apply to

the instant case. (Id. at 4.) 

On January 24, 2008, Petitioner moved the Court for an extension of time to file another

Response to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 13.) Petitioner notified the Court that he wanted

to fire his attorney and make his own arguments against Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. (Id. at 1.) 

The Court granted Petitioner’s motion, (doc. 14), and pro se Petitioner filed his Amended Response on

February 28, 2008, (doc. 20). Petitioner alleged that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies

until October 14, 2006. (Doc. 20, at 2.) Respondent filed a reply on March 13, 2008, arguing that

Petitioner still did not file his federal claims within the statute of limitation period. (Id. at 22.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if

it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the Petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The Ninth Circuit considers a

motion to dismiss as a request for the Court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. See O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. Although not addressed by

Respondents, the Court will also consider whether Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies. 

See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The California Supreme Court did not address the merits of Petitioner’s credit-earning status

claim in its June 28, 2006 summary dismissal. See Lodgment 7. 

6 07cv1162

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner Failed To Exhaust His Administrative Remedies As To Grounds One And Two

Before a federal court will consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, a petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state’s highest court. Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 523-24 (1982). “As a general rule, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting the federal claim to the appropriate state courts . . . in the manner required by

the state courts, thereby ‘afford[ing] the state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of

legal error.’” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474

U.S. 254, 257 (1986)). If a petitioner fails to present his claims to the state courts in a procedural

context in which the merits of the claims were considered, the claims have not been fairly presented to

the state courts and are not, as a result, eligible for federal habeas corpus review. Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). Dismissal of such claims should be without prejudice. Hines v. Napolitano,

2008 WL 357652, at *3 (S.D. Cal. February 8, 2008). 

Here, in grounds one and two of his habeas petition, Petitioner claims a state-created liberty

interest in retaining his already earned conduct credits. However, as explained by the San Diego County

Superior Court on June 14, 2006, Petitioner had not fully exhausted his administrative remedies in the

CDCR. (Doc. 20, at 11.) For this reason, the Court denied his petition but provided him the opportunity

to refile a habeas petition regarding this issue if in 120 days the CDCR did not respond to Petitioner’s

request concerning his credit-earning status. Since the issuance of the June 14, 2006 Order, Petitioner

has not further pursued his remedies in the CDCR or gone back to state court to have a California judge

address the merits of this issue.1

 As a result, Petitioner’s claims regarding his credit-earning status as set

forth in grounds one and two of his petition are not eligible for federal habeas review at this time.

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 07cv1162

B. Limitation Period Expired As To Ground Three, But Not As To Grounds One Or Two

AEDPA established a one-year statute of limitation period in which to file a federal writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (West

2006). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action; 

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

In most cases, the date on which the limitation period begins running is the day that the

petitioner’s direct review became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In the situation where a state

prisoner is challenging a parole board decision or credit-earning status, AEDPA’s statute of limitations

is calculated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) — “the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D); see Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Board of

Prison Term’s denial of an inmate appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered

the commencement of the limitation period). The date on which the factual predicate of the claim

presented could have been discovered “is not dependent on when [the petitioner] complied with

AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement. Rather, it is determined independently of the exhaustion requireCase 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 07cv1162

ment by inquiring when [the petitioner] could have learned of the factual basis for his claim through the

exercise of due diligence.” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082. Thus, “the statute of limitations will begin to run

before exhaustion of state remedies and thus before the federal petition can be filed.” Id. at 1083. The

Ninth Circuit has determined that the start of the limitation period for a particular claim is the day after a

petitioner receives notification of a decision on the merits regarding the claim from the appropriate state

agency responsible for first reviewing a particular prisoner claim and issuing a final decision. See id. at

1082; Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In either the § 2244(d)(1)(A) or the § 2244(d)(1)(D) case, the one-year statute of limitations

period “is tolled during the pendency of a ‘properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.’” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1081 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). The period may also be tolled for equitable reasons if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). After accounting

for tolling, if the limitation period for filing a federal habeas claim has expired, then dismissal of the

claim with prejudice is appropriate. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481-82 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, all three grounds of Petitioner’s petition should be subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); as

such, “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence” must be determined. With regard to Petitioner’s

credit-earning status (grounds one and two of his petition), the San Diego County Superior Court

refused to address the merits of this issue because Petitioner had not fully exhausted his administrative

remedies in the CDCR. The Court provided Petitioner with the opportunity to return to the California

courts if the CDCR did not provide a satisfactory final response at a computation hearing. (See Order

dated June 14, 2006.) Yet, there is no record of Petitioner further pursing this issue either in the CDCR

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The California Supreme Court did not address the merits of Petitioner’s credit-earning status

claim in its June 28, 2006 summary dismissal. See Lodgment 7. 

3

 Petitioner did not present any reasons why the limitation period should be equitably tolled in

any writings to this Court. 

9 07cv1162

or in the California courts.2 Because neither the government nor the Petitioner has provided any

documentation of a final decision either of the CDCR or the California courts addressing the merits of

this particular issue, the Court must presume that no such decision was ever made by either governmental body. As the start of the limitation period for a particular claim under § 2244(d)(1)(D) is the day

after a petitioner receives notification of a decision on the merits regarding the claim from the appropriate state agency responsible for first reviewing a particular claim, the limitation period with regard to

grounds one and two never started. Thus, the statute of limitations period has not expired as to

Petitioner’s credit-earning status as set forth in grounds one and two of the habeas petition.

With regard to ground three in which Petitioner alleges that imposition of a parole period

following his release from incarceration would violate his sentence, Petitioner did not receive a final

decision on the merits from the appropriate CDCR review board as he did not fully exhaust this route of

appeal. However, the San Diego County Superior Court did reach the merits of Petitioner’s parole issue

in its October 20, 2005 Order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the limitation period

began the day after the Order was issued, on October 21, 2005, and 139 days elapsed before Petitioner

filed his petition in the California Supreme Court. The limitation period was tolled during the time that

Petitioner pursued his petition in the California Supreme Court, from March 10, 2006 until June 28,

2006, when the California Supreme Court denied his petition. Then, more than 360 additional days

elapsed before Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. As a result, because more

than a year elapsed before Petitioner pursued his remedies in federal court,3

 his claim regarding his

parole period must be dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 07cv1162

C. Petitioner Has Failed To State A Claim With Regard to Ground Two of His Habeas Petition

The Petition contains three grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner has a state-created liberty interest

protected by the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in retaining his already earned

conduct credits; (2) Petitioner is also entitled to his earned credits under government estoppel or

equitable estoppel principles; (3) Petitioner has a state-created liberty interest protected by the U.S.

Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment in being released on parole as “part of” his sentence. (Doc. 1, at

6-8.) Respondent argues that the Petition fails to state a federal claim because he does not allege that

any of his federal rights were violated, and he does not cite any federal law or any constitutional

provisions to support his claims. 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state prisoner must allege a violation of

federal laws or the U.S. Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991). Habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the interpretation or application of state

law. A federal district court does not have general supervisory authority over the proper application of

state law. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). Instead, federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d

1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989). Habeas relief is “available only where ‘the Constitution or other federal law

specifically protects against the alleged unfairness or guarantees the procedural right in state courts.’” 

Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (quoting Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.

1985)). 

Here, in grounds one and three, Petitioner sets forth specific factual allegations that are tied to

violations of the Constitution. As such, Petitioner has stated claims cognizable on federal habeas

review. However, Petitioner has failed to state a claim with regard to ground two, in which he asks this

court to grant him his work credits on the basis of governmental estoppel and generalized equity

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 07cv1162

principles. Petitioner does not cite federal law or make reference to any constitutional provisions in

such a request. Thus, ground two must be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, ground three regarding Petitioner’s parole period should be dismissed

with prejudice for failure to act within AEDPA’s statute of limitation time frame. Ground two regarding

work credits due to Petitioner on the basis of equity should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Ground one regarding the work credits due to Petitioner on the basis of a constitutionally protected

liberty interest should be dismissed without prejudice so as to allow Petitioner to pursue his potential

remedies in the CDCR and the California courts. This report and recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the U.S. District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District

of California. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 18, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendations.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than April 25, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: April 4, 2008

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court 

cc: The Honorable Hayes; all counsel of record

Case 3:07-cv-01162-WQH-PCL Document 24 Filed 04/04/08 Page 11 of 11