Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01551/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01551-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

2

 Plaintiff indicates that he seeks relief for constitutional violations pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Federal inmates seeking damages for violations of their

constitutional rights by individual employees of CCA must seek relief pursuant to Bivens,

rather than §§ 1983 and 1985. See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d

1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (immigration detainee seeking relief from individual CCA

employees had to bring suit pursuant to Bivens), cert. denied sub nom. Gerber v. Agyeman,

125 S. Ct. 2941 (2005). 

3

 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of filings in this case.

JDDL-K

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Reginaldo Torrez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Correctional Corporation of America, et

al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-1551-PHX-SMM (JRI)

ORDER 

Plaintiff Reginaldo Torrez, who is confined in the Federal Correctional Institution in

Big Spring, Texas, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint alleging constitutional violations,

international treaty violations pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATS)1

, and state law

claims.2

 (Doc.# 1.)3 He has also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc.#

3.) The Court will dismiss this action in part and order Plaintiff to show cause why his

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remaining claims should not be dismissed as time-barred. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Doc.# 3.) Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. The filing fee will

be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the

amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees

according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

III. Complaint

Plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, alleges four claims for relief in his Complaint in

connection with injuries he suffered during transport on a Corrections Corporation of

America (CCA) bus and treatment therefor. He sues CCA; John Doe, the CCA bus driver;

and Dr. G. Sabal, a CCA physician. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, compensatory, and punitive

relief.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts: Plaintiff was a federal pretrial detainee in the

custody of CCA at relevant times. On October 24, 2003, Plaintiff and other federal inmates,

were being transported in a CCA bus from the federal courthouse in Phoenix back to CCA’s

Central Arizona Detention Center (CADC) in Florence, Arizona. Plaintiff was shackled hand

and foot but was not secured by a seat belt. As the bus driver attempted to reverse out of the

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4

 According to Plaintiff, the bus driver had been attempting to reverse out of the

parking garage at the time. (Doc.# 1 at 8.)

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garage, he hit a pillar. Plaintiff was thrown against a fiberglass bench injuring his shoulder.4

Before continuing to CADC, the bus driver informed the inmates that anyone who was

injured would be taken to the hospital. (Id.) After arrival at CADC, Plaintiff was left in

handcuffs in a small room for two hours, despite “excruciating pain.” (Id.) At about 9:30

p.m., a CCA captain photographed Plaintiff’s injury and a medical staff member looked at

the injury and prescribed pain pills to Plaintiff, but no x-rays were taken. (Id. at 8-9.) The

staff member told Plaintiff that a doctor would be available the next day. (Id. at 9.) On

October 25, 2003, Dr. Sabal examined Plaintiff’s shoulder and told him that it was broken.

(Id.) Dr. Sabal ordered x-rays and provided a sling for Plaintiff’s arm. (Id.) On October 26,

2003, Plaintiff was transported to a private clinic where his shoulder was x-rayed and he

received an injection and pain pills. (Id.) The next day, Plaintiff was approached by CCA

officials and asked to sign a form releasing CCA from liability for the accident. (Id. at 9-10.)

Plaintiff refused to sign. (Id. at 10.) 

On November 6, 2003, Plaintiff went to sick call because he had not been notified of

the x-ray results and he continued to suffer from extreme shoulder pain. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that he repeatedly reported to sick call over the next month complaining of extreme

pain but continued not to be informed of x-ray results and to receive only pain medication

and no other treatment. (Id.) On November 28, 2003, Plaintiff submitted a CCA inmate

grievance because of the “extreme pain” he was suffering without being provided care other

than pain medication. (Id.) The same morning he submitted the grievance, Dr. Sabal

prescribed more medication, but when Plaintiff attempted to pick up the prescription, the

pharmacist told Plaintiff there was no medication for him, leaving Plaintiff without any pain

relief. (Id. at 11.) On December 1, 2003, Plaintiff went to sick call again because of pain.

(Id.) Instead of prescribing pain medication, Dr. Sabal took away the sling he had previously

provided to Plaintiff. (Id.) When Plaintiff inquired why and stated that he needed the sling,

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Dr. Sabal allegedly told Plaintiff he did not care. (Id. at 11, 12.) 

On December 4, 2003, Plaintiff returned to sick call and was prescribed pain

medication for 30 days. (Id. at 12.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to New

Mexico for 90 days before being transferred to Big Spring on April 6, 2004. (Id.) Plaintiff

requested and received pain medication throughout this period but did not receive other

treatment or evaluation. (Id.) On April 15, 2004, Plaintiff reported to sick call at Big Spring

because his arm was going numb and weak. (Id.) X-rays were ordered and Plaintiff’s

previous x-rays reviewed and he was informed on August 24, 2004 that there was a

“thickening” of the clavicle from the prior injury. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff continued to suffer

from severe pain. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, a December 21, 2004, Big Spring medical

report indicated that Plaintiff’s shoulder had healed improperly and that it would have to be

re-broken and re-set, which would be painful. (Id.) It is unclear from the Complaint whether

in fact that has occurred. 

On January 22, 2005, Big Spring medical staff limited Plaintiff from lifting more than

30 pounds due to his shoulder injury. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, medical reports document

that he has continued to suffer pain and a burning sensation in his shoulder. (Id.) On May

9, 2005, a spinal x-ray was ordered because of pain radiating from his shoulder to his neck

and left arm and a narrowing of the disc space between C5-C6 and C6-C7 with some

osteophytosis was found. (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff alleges that he has continued to suffer pain

and limited use of his shoulder and arm. (Id. at 14.) 

Plaintiff asserts on information and belief that the inmates who signed the release

forms were appropriately treated. (Id. at 10.) He contends that he was not appropriately

treated because he refused to sign a release. (Id. at 10, 17, 18.) The Court construes the

Complaint to allege claims for retaliation by CCA and/or Dr. Sabal against him for refusing

to sign the release and/or filing a grievance regarding treatment of his shoulder. The Court

also construes the Complaint to allege deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs against Dr. Sabal in late 2004. Plaintiff also alleges that CCA, the bus driver, and Dr.

Sabal were negligent with respect to care for his shoulder. 

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IV. Federal Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges several claims based on violations of federal law. He alleges

violations of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to Bivens. He also

alleges claims under the ATS. Plaintiff also appears to be attempting to allege claims under

the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA). Plaintiff’s FTCA and ATS claims will be dismissed and

he will be ordered to show cause why his Bivens claims should not be dismissed as timebarred. 

A. Bivens

To state a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must allege that persons acting under color of

federal law violated his constitutional rights. Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991)). Thus, an action under

Bivens is identical to one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 except for the replacement

of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens. Id.

To state a valid constitutional claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must allege an affirmative

link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,

371-72, 377 (1976). Further, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant’s acts were more than

merely negligent. Alfrey v. United States, 276 F.3d 557, 568 (9th Cir. 2002); see Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (plaintiff must plead more than mere negligence in

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action).

1. CCA

Plaintiff alleges violation of his constitutional rights by CCA. A Bivens action may

not be brought against a private company acting under color of federal law in operating a

prison. Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). Accordingly, Plaintiff may

not seek monetary relief against CCA for constitutional violations. Plaintiff’s allegations that

CCA violated his constitutional rights will be dismissed. 

2. John Doe 

Plaintiff sues a fictitious John Doe Defendant, i.e., the bus driver. Plaintiff’s

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constitutional claims against this Defendant will be dismissed for two reasons. First, the use

of anonymous type appellations to identify defendants is generally disfavored. Rule 10(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to include the names of the

parties in the action. As a practical matter, it is impossible in most instances for the United

States Marshal or his designee to serve a summons and complaint or amended complaint

upon an anonymous defendant. Second, even if Plaintiff named the bus driver by his true

name, Plaintiff fails to allege more than negligence against him and therefore fails to state

a constitutional violation against him under Bivens. Plaintiff’s allegations that the bus driver

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights will be dismissed. 

3. Dr. Sabal

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Sabal acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The failure to state

a claim includes circumstances where a defense is complete and obvious from the face of the

pleadings. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying former

§ 1915(d) now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). In the absence of waiver, a court may

raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert,

998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir.

2003) (appropriate to dismiss prisoner’s complaint sua sponte as time-barred under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 956 (4th Cir.

1995) (en banc) (same); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Moore v.

McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104,

107-08 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). 

In a Bivens action, the Court applies the statute of limitations of the forum state for

personal injury actions. Pesnell v. Arsenault, 490 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007); see

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 274-76 (1985); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991

(9th Cir. 1999); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). The Arizona statute

of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See A.R.S. § 12-542(1); MaddenTyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Vaughan, 927 F.2d at

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478. 

It appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that his claims against Dr. Sabal

accrued more than two years before he filed his Complaint and that it is, therefore, timebarred. His complaint was filed on August 10, 2007 and signed on August 8, 2007. (Doc.#

1 at 30.) For his claim to be timely, they must have accrued no earlier than August 8, 2005,

two years before his Complaint was filed. “[A] claim generally accrues when a plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Cabrera v. City

of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff alleges that he suffered

severe pain since the accident and that Dr. Sabal acted with deliberate indifference to his

serious medical need in October - November, 2003. Thus, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims

against Dr. Sabal accrued no later than October-November 2003, but Plaintiff did not file this

action until more than four years later. The Court will therefore order Plaintiff to show cause

why his constitutional claims against Dr. Sabal should not be dismissed for failure to state

a claim as facially time-barred.

B. Failure to State a Claim Under the FTCA

Claims for money damages may be sought for negligent acts or omissions of

employees or agents of the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (“FTCA”). See Vander v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 268 F.3d 661,

663 (9th Cir. 2001); Westbay Steel, Inc. v. United States, 970 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1992).

Claims under the FTCA may only be brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346(b), 2679(a); Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984)

(individual agencies of the United States may not be sued). Further, under the statutory

procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), a “tort claimant may not commence proceedings

in court against the United States without first filing his claim with an appropriate federal

agency and either receiving a conclusive denial of the claim from the agency or waiting for

six months to elapse without a final disposition of the claim being made.” Jerves v. United

States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992); see Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th

Cir. 2000) (a claimant under the FTCA must comply with § 2675(a) before a district court

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can exert subject matter jurisdiction over the claim); Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635,

638 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly held that this ‘claim

requirement of section 2675 is jurisdictional in nature and may not be waived.’” Jerves, 966

F.2d at 519 (quoting Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985)).

In this case, Plaintiff has not named the United States as a Defendant for purposes of

seeking relief under the FTCA. Further, he does not allege that he has presented any claim

for negligence against federal officers or agents to the appropriate federal agency prior to

commencement of this action as required by § 2675(a). For both these reasons, Plaintiff fails

to state an FTCA claim. 

C. Failure to State a Claim Under the ATS

Plaintiff claims violations of the ATS. These claims are predicated upon his status

as a Mexican citizen and the allegedly inappropriate care he received for his shoulder injury.

Essentially, he alleges that the failure to promptly and appropriately treat his injury

constituted “torture” in violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights Treaty, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights. (Doc.# 1 at 6, 8, 9.) 

The ATS provides that, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil

action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The ATS does not give rise to a statutory cause of

action but only confers jurisdiction on federal courts in limited circumstances. Sosa v.

Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004). To state a claim pursuant to the ATS, a

plaintiff must allege a violation of “‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ international norms.”

Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002); see Presbyterian Church of

Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Universal

Declaration of Human Rights Treaty does not “of its own force impose obligations as a

matter of international law.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734. The International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights was ratified by the United States “on the express understanding that it was

not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in federal courts.” Id.

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5

 Under the Act, torture is defined to mean, “any act, directed against an individual

in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than

pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether

physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining

from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual

for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having

committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based

on discrimination of any kind[.]” Mental pain or suffering refers to “prolonged mental harm

caused by or resulting from ‘the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe

physical pain or suffering;’ the administration or application, or threatened administration

or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt

profoundly the senses or the personality; the threat of imminent death; or the threat that

another individual will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering,

or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures

calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note at § 3.

JDDL-K - 9 -

at 735. Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that he has been subjected to torture

as defined under the Torture Victims Protection Act.5

 Plaintiff’s ATS claim will be

dismissed.

V. State Tort Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges that the bus driver negligently caused the accident resulting in

Plaintiff’s injury. He alleges that CCA and/or the driver were negligent for failing to

properly secure Plaintiff and/or for failing to use seat belts or other safety equipment to

reduce or prevent injury in the event of an accident. He alleges that CCA and Dr. Sabal were

negligent with respect to his medical care for his injuries resulting from the accident. These

claims appear to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Arizona law provides that

any action for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action

accrues. A.R.S. § 12-542; see A.R.S. § 12-550. Plaintiff alleges facts supporting that he

knew of the injuries giving rise to his tort claims no later than December 21, 2004, but he did

not commence this action until August 8, 2007, more than two years later. Thus, any state

tort law claim appears to be time-barred. Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why any

state law tort claim is not barred by the statute of limitation.

///

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VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted. (Doc.# 3.)

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and no initial partial filing fee is assessed. 

(3) Plaintiff’s Bivens claims against Defendant John Doe and CCA and his ATS

and FTCA claims against all Defendants are dismissed. 

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(4) Plaintiff must file a written response to this Order in which he shows cause

why his Bivens claims against Defendant Sabal and his state tort law claims against all of the

Defendants should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim as time-barred no later than

November 10, 2007.

(5) If Plaintiff fails to file a written response in which he attempts to show cause

why his Bivens claims against Defendant Sabal and his state tort law claims against all of the

Defendants should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim as time-barred by November

10, 2007, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of

this action with prejudice.

DATED this 16th day of October, 2007.

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