Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00327/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00327-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

KAREN H. JACKSON, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11-cv-327-MEF

) (WO – Do Not Publish)

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., ) 

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 26), filed byDefendants Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”), BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (“BACHLS”), and

Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) (collectively “Defendants”). After a careful review of

the arguments of counsel and the relevant law, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1337, and 1367(a). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and

the court finds adequate allegations in support of both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may

move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a

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complaint; thus, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that

all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). To survive a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need not contain

“detailed factual allegations,” but must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if

doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.

In addition to considering the properly pleaded allegations in a complaint, the court

also may consider on a motion to dismiss any exhibits attached to the complaint, see Tello

v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005), as well as “documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 

III. BACKGROUND

Accepting as true the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint (Doc. # 23), the

Court finds the following facts:

Plaintiff is a lawyer, and in October 2004, obtained a business mortgage from

Countrywide on the building where she operates her law practice. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) In

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2006, Plaintiff refinanced her residential mortgage, also with Countrywide. (Am. Compl. ¶

9.) In July 2008, Countrywide was acquired by BACHLS.1

Plaintiff alleges that she has always made timely payments on both mortgages and has

not been delinquent. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Despite her non-delinquency, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants have mishandled her mortgages through a variety of contrivances.

Regarding Plaintiff’s residential mortgage, Plaintiff alleges that her troubles began in

late 2009, when Defendants wrongfully assessed charges to her account. (Am. Compl. ¶¶

15-16.) In January 2010, Defendants notified Plaintiff that she had “fallen behind in her

payments.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) One month prior, Defendants allegedly began reporting

Plaintiff’s residential mortgage account as past due to credit reporting agencies. (Am.

Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff received several letters from Defendants in the following months

stating that no payment had been received for her residential mortgage. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) 

Throughout 2010, Defendants sent to Plaintiff numerous statements indicating that her

residential mortgage account was “in default.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Defendants also noticed

Plaintiff during this period that Defendants intended to accelerate her residential mortgage. 

(Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff responded to these developments when

she submitted to Defendants a list of Plaintiff’s payments on her residential mortgage and

requested that Defendants correct their records to reflect that Plaintiff was not in default on

her residential mortgage. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) Defendants apparently did not respond

 Plaintiff also alleges that BANA “is the alter-ego of [BACHLS].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) 1

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positively to Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff alleges that on October 16, 2010, she was denied

an application for credit based on Defendants’ “misrepresentation to creditreporting agencies

[(“CRAs”)] that her [residential] mortgage account was in default.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants continue to report negative credit information to the CRAs

despite the fact that Plaintiff has never been delinquent. Plaintiff alleges that she filed a

statement of dispute with the CRAs in October of 2010, and received a report from Experian

on October 22, 2010. (Am. Compl., Ex. A.) 

Defendants’ alleged handling of Plaintiff’s business mortgage follows a similar track. 

Problems began in late 2009, when Defendants wrongfully informed Plaintiff that there was

no proof of insurance on file for her business mortgage account property. (Am. Compl. ¶

17.) Despite sending the required proof of insurance at least twice, Defendants continued

to send notices to Plaintiff stating that it had no proof of insurance on file. (Am. Compl. ¶¶

18, 23, 24.) On account of Defendants’ continued insistence that Plaintiff had not obtained

insurance on her business mortgage property, Defendants wrongfully assessed a $900

“Hazard Insurance Payment” charge to Plaintiff’s business mortgage account. (Am. Compl.

¶ 25.) Several months later, in October of 2010, Defendants “unilaterally and wrongfully

increased payment amount” on Plaintiff’s business mortgage account, and proceeded to

automatically withdraw the higher payment from Plaintiff’s bank account. (Am. Compl. ¶

27.) Plaintiffresponded bynotifying her bank of the unauthorized withdrawal and then filing

with her bank a stop payment form. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 31.) Defendants’ allegedly

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excessive and unauthorized withdrawals continued, causing Plaintiffto draft a November 17,

2010 letter toDefendants recounting the problems with her business mortgage account. (Am.

Compl. ¶ 36.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants returned $577.89 to Plaintiff’s bank account,

but requested payment for the same amount. (Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) On January 18, 2011,

Defendants sent to Plaintiff a notice of intent to accelerate Plaintiff’s business mortgage

account. (Am. Compl. ¶ 39.) On January 21, 2011, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

“stopped recording payments made by Plaintiff as ‘Regular Payment’ and instead recorded

them as ‘Misc. Posting’ on her accounts.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 40.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ wrongful conduct continued when Defendants

cancelled Plaintiff’s two credit card accounts, citing “seriously delinquency” as the reason. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 41, 43.) Plaintiff alleges that she was not delinquent in either account. (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 42, 44.)

Plaintiff first Complaint (Doc. # 1) was dismissed with leave to re-file on November

7, 2011 (Doc. # 22). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges several state law causes of

action: fraudulent misrepresentation and/or suppression (Count I); negligent and/or wanton

hiring, training, and supervision of the employees of Defendants responsible for handling or

servicing Plaintiff’s accounts (Count II); negligent and/or wanton servicing of Plaintiff’s

accounts (Count III); breach of contract (Count IV); intentional infliction of emotional

distress (Count VII); and defamation (Count VIII). Plaintiff also brings claims (Counts V

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and VII) under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et

seq., and (Count VI) the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.

In the Court’s first MemorandumOpinion and Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint

with leave to re-file, the Court was unable to conclude, based upon Plaintiff’s pleadings,

whether Defendants qualified as “debt collectors” for purposes of the FDCPA. (Mem. Op.

6-8.) The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s FCRA claim without prejudice because she did

not allege that Defendants were notified by a CRA of Plaintiff’s credit dispute. (Mem. Op.

8.) In so concluding, the Court declined, for the time being, to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. (Mem. Op. 9.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The FDCPA Claims (Counts V and VII)

Defendants persist in their arguments that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims fail as a matter

of law. (Br. in Support 5-7.) “The FDCPA was enacted by Congress to ‘eliminate abusive

debt collection practices by debt collectors.’” Ausar-El ex rel. Small, Jr. v. BAC (Bank of

America) Home Loans Servicing, LP, 448 F. App’x 1, 1 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added)

(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). A “debt collector” is a “term of art[,]” id., and is statutorily

defined as:

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails

in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, or

who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed

or due or asserted to be owed or due another . . . .

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§ 1692a(6). In determining whether BACHLS (the same BACHLS here) was a debt

collector, the Eleventh Circuit in Small, Jr. noted this general “debt collector” definition, but 

then focused on language found later in the same definitional subsection: “For the purpose

of [§] 1692f(6) of this title, [the term ‘debt collector’] also includes any person who uses any

instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of

which is the enforcement of security interests.” Id. In concluding that “an enforcer of a

security interest only qualifies as a ‘debt collector’ for the purpose of § 1692f(6)[,]” the

Eleventh Circuit relied upon the statutory interpretation doctrine of expressio unius est

exclusio alterius. Small, Jr., 448 F. App’x at 1. In other words, because Congress defined

a security interest enforcer as a debt collector only for purposes of § 1692f(6), it necessarily

must have intended for security interest enforcers not to qualify as debt collectors under any

other section of the FDCPA. 

Additionally, because “a party’s general, not specific, debt collection activities are

determinative of whether [that party] meet[s] the statutory definition of debt collector[,]” 

Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 2006), this court is inclined to follow

the Eleventh Circuit’s determination that BACHLS is not a “debt collector” except for

violations of § 1692f(6). Small, Jr., 448 F. App’x at 1 (citing Montgomery v. Huntington

Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2003)). This legal conclusion renders meaningless

Plaintiff’s assertions that she can establish “debt collector” status based upon individual

communications fromDefendants to Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Resp. 5.) The Court also concludes that

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BANA and Countrywide are not “debt collectors” except for violations of § 1692f(6). 

Plaintiff alleges that BANA is merely an “alter-ego” of BACHLS. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) As

an “alter-ego,” BANA should be treated no differently than BACHLS. Furthermore,

Countrywide is alleged to be the original mortgagee for both mortgages. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) 

As mortgagee, Countrywide is a security interest holder or enforcer and, accordingly, is not

a debt collector except for the purposes of § 1692f(6).

Plaintiff’s FDCPA causes of action rely upon §§ 1692d(5), 1692e(2), (5), (8), (10) &

(11), and 1692f(1). Nowhere is there a claim under § 1692f(6). Because Defendants qualify

as “debt collectors” only for purposes of § 1692f(6), Plaintiff’s FDCPA causes of action

(Counts V and VII) are due to be dismissed with prejudice.

B. The FCRA Claim (Count VI)

Defendants submit that Plaintiff’s FCRA claim should be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). (Br. in Support 7.) First, Defendants state that a number of the alleged FCRA

violations – those asserted under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) – do not give rise to a private right

of action. (Br. in Support 7.) The Eleventh Circuit has held that the FCRA “explicitly bars

private suits for violations of [§ 1681s-2(a)].” Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x

364, 369-70 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 34 (3d

Cir. 2011); Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FCRA claims arising under § 1681s-2(a) are due to be dismissed.

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Plaintiff also asserts claims under § 1681s-2(b)(1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges (1)

that Defendants failed to correct reporting errors after receiving notice of Plaintiff’s dispute,

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87, 88), and (2) that Defendants failed to give Plaintiff notice of the results

of any investigation conducted as a result of Plaintiff’s credit dispute, (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93,

94). Plaintiff’s latter theory can be dispensed with because no such duty is found within §

1681s-2(b)(1). The furnisher is required to “report the results of the investigation to the

consumer reporting agency[.]” § 1681s-2(b)(1)(C). There is no statutory duty to report the

investigation results directly to the consumer, in this case the Plaintiff.

Defendants make two arguments as to Plaintiff’s failure-to-correct claim under §

1681s-2(b). First, Countrywide argues that Plaintiff’s factual allegations reveal that Plaintiff

cannot state a viable FCRA claim against Countrywide under § 1681s-2(b). Plaintiff asserts

in the Amended Complaint that she filed her dispute with the CRAs in October of 2010. 

(Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff also asserts, however, that Countrywide no longer owned her

mortgages as of January of 2010. Section 1681s-2(b) is triggered only when a furnisher of

information receives notice of a credit dispute. Based upon the factual allegations,

Countrywide could not have received such notice until many months after it no longer had

any interest (and consequently, any information to furnish or correct) in Plaintiff’s

mortgages. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FCRA failure-to-correct claim is due to be dismissed as

to Defendant Countrywide.

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Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege that the CRAs notified

Defendants ofthe credit dispute, which, Defendants argue, is a necessary triggering event for

their obligations under § 1681s-2(b). Several courts of appeals have held that to state a claim

under § 1681s-2(b), “the plaintiff must show that the furnisher received notice from a

consumer reporting agency . . . that the credit information is disputed.” Downs v. Clayton

Homes, Inc., 88 F. App’x 851, 853-54 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Young v. Equifax Credit Info.

Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 639-40 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Green v. RBS Nat. Bank, 288 F.

App’x 641, 642-43 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he FCRA does provide a private right

of action for a violation of § 1681s-2(b), but only if the furnisher received notice of the

consumer’s dispute from a consumer reporting agency”). 

Plaintiff was put on notice of this pleading requirement by Defendant’s first motion

to dismiss (Doc. # 14, at 7), and requested that the Court dismiss her FCRA claim with leave

to re-file. The Court indulged Plaintiff’s request and allowed her to file an amended

complaint. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she herself notified the CRAs,

but still omits the necessary allegation: that the furnisher of information received notice of

Plaintiff’s dispute from a CRA. In spite of Plaintiff’s persistent failure to effectively allege

her FCRA claim, the Court can draw a reasonable conclusion from the Amended Complaint

that Defendants actually received notice of Plaintiff’s credit dispute. See 15 U.S.C. §

1681i(a)(2) (stating that the CRA shall provide notice of a consumer’s dispute to the

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furnisher of information); (Am. Compl., Ex. A (“We completed investigating any items you

disputed with the sources of the information . . . .”)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (concluding 

that plaintiffs must “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”). 

Despite the existence of this plausible inference that Defendants BANA and BACHLS were

contacted by at least one CRA about Plaintiff’s credit dispute, BANA and BACHLS are

nevertheless entitled to respond to a clearly pleaded complaint. Plaintiff will be directed to

re-plead her FCRA failure-to-correct claim as to BANA and/or BACHLS. No further

amendments will be allowed without leave of Court and good cause, however. 

C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

1. Preemption of Defamation Claim (Count VIII)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims, “to the extent that [they] relate to

Defendant[s’] reporting and investigative duties under the FCRA,” are preempted. (Br. in

Support 9.) The only claim in the Amended Complaint that so relates is Count VIII,

Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by §

1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff counters that § 1681h(e)’s savings clause is applicable because

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants’ conduct was malicious and done with a willful intent

to injure Plaintiff.

Both parties cite Lofton-Taylor v. Verizon Wireless as support. 262 F. App’x 999

(11th Cir. 2008). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of

the defendant on the plaintiff’s claims for defamation and invasion of privacy, ruling that

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they were preempted by § 1681h(e) because the summary judgment evidence revealed that

the information furnished was neither false nor disclosed with malice or willful intent to

injure the consumer. Id. at 1002. In so concluding, the Eleventh Circuit expressly withheld

an opinion on “whether the preemption language in § 1681t(b)(1)(F) [was] broad enough to

also preclude [the plaintiff’s] claims.” Id. at 1003. Accordingly, Lofton-Taylor does not

offer much guidance on the interaction of §§ 1681h(e) and 1681t(b)(1)(F).

Several other courts of appeals have concluded that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts state

law defamation claims arising out of a furnisher’s obligations under § 1681s-2,

notwithstanding the savings clause of § 1681h(e). In Purcell v. Bank of America, the Seventh

Circuit addressed the interaction of §§ 1681h(e) and 1681t(b)(1)(F): “Section 1681h(e)

preempts some state claims that could arise out of reports to credit agencies; § 1681t(b)(1)(F)

[simply] preempts more of these claims.” 659 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis

added). The Seventh Circuit explained the interaction of the two preemption provisions by

noting that §§ 1681t(b)(1)(F) and 1681s-2 were enacted together twenty-six years after §

1681h(e), and reasoning that the “extra federal remedy in § 1681s-2 was accompanied by the

extra preemption in § 1681t(b)(1)(F) . . . .” Id. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit found that

a reading of § 1681h(e) that “defeat[ed] the later-enacted system in § 1681s-2 and §

1681t(b)(1)(F), would contradict fundamental norms of statutory interpretation.” Id.; see

also Macpherson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 665 F.3d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding

Purcell’s reasoning persuasive); Marshall v. Swift River Academy, LLC, 327 F. App’x 13,

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15 (9th Cir. 2009) (state law claims based upon information provided by furnisher to CRA

were preempted by § 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 316 F.

App’x 744, 751 (10th Cir. 2009) (state law libel and false-light invasion of privacy claims

preempted by§ 1681t(b)(1)(F)). Based upon the above-cited authorities, the Court concludes

that Plaintiff’s argument that § 1681h(e)’s savings clause applies over § 1681t(b)(1)(F) for 

Plaintiff’s defamation claim (based upon duties found within § 1681s-2(b)) is due to be

rejected. Plaintiff’s defamation claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s remaining allegations regarding her claims for

fraud (Count I), negligent hiring (Count II), negligent servicing (Count III), breach of

contract (Count IV), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII) are legally

deficient and that the claims are due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

a. Negligent Servicing (Count III)

Plaintiff’s claim for negligent or wanton loan servicing offers a breach of contract

dish, but is listed on the menu as a tort. “Alabama [law] does not recognize a tort-like cause

of action for the breach of a duty created by contract.” Blake v. Bank of America, N.A., No.

3:11cv242, 2012 WL 607976, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 2012) (Fuller, J.) (published). A “‘

negligent failure to perform a contract . . . is but a breach of the contract.’” Id. (quoting

Vines v. Crescent Transit Co., 85 So. 2d 436, 440 (Ala. 1956)); see also Barber v. Business

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Prods. Ctr., 677 So. 2d 223, 228 (Ala. 1996) (stating that “a mere failure to perform a

contractual obligation is not a tort”).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had a duty to responsibly handle and service

Plaintiff’s accounts and that Defendants breached that duty. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-66.) These

alleged duties and breaches clearly would not exist but for the contractual relationship

between the parties. There is no duty owed to the general public to properly service

mortgage accounts. Plaintiff complains, however, that some of her grievances concerning

Defendants’ alleged malfeasance (false representations concerning property insurance,

unilateral increases in amount of withdrawal, and harassing conduct) are not covered by the

contract and cannot be pleaded as breach of contract claims. 

The Court first notes that concomitant with any contractual relationship is an implied

covenant (a contractual duty) of good faith and fair dealing. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79

(1933) (every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also

Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. City of Fairfield Healthcare Auth., 837 So.2d 253, 267 (Ala.

2002) (“There is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the

effect of destroying or injuring the rights of the other party to receive the fruits of the

contract; . . . in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.” (quoting Sellers v. Head, 73 So. 2d 747, 751 (Ala. 1954))); Restatement (Second)

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of Contracts § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and

fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.”). 

Second, in attempting to argue that she cannot assert some of her grievances under a

breach of contract theory, Plaintiff actually concedes the opposite: “The contract does not

require (or allow) Defendants to [unilaterally] increase the amount of money they

automatically withdraw . . . .” (Pl.’s Resp. 19 (emphasis added).) By arguing that the

contract does not allow Defendants to engage in certain conduct, Plaintiff is, in fact, arguing

that Defendants are in breach of the contract. 

Finally, there are other causes of action available (other than the non-existent claim

of negligent or wanton servicing) for some of these grievances. In sum, because Alabama

law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent or wanton mortgage servicing, Blake,

2012 WL 607976, at *4, Count III is due to be dismissed with prejudice.

b. Fraud (Count I)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not satisfied the heightened pleading requirement

for fraud claims under Rule 9(b), which states that “[i]n alleging fraud . . ., a party must state

with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . . Malice, intent, knowledge, and

other conditions of a persons mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[t]he particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is

satisfied if the complaint alleges ‘facts as to time, place, and substance of the defendant’s

alleged fraud, specifically the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when they

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occurred, and who engaged in them.’” U.S. ex re. Matheny v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 

No. 10-15406, 2012 WL 555200, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 2012) (quoting Hopper v. Solvay

Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009)); see also Ziemba v. Cascade Intern.,

Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting the pleading standards are satisfied if the

plaintiff alleges precisely what statements were made in what documents, when, where and

by whom, the content, the manner in which theymisled the plaintiff, and what the defendants

obtained as a consequence of the fraud).

The Amended Complaint comes nowhere close to satisfying the heightened pleading

requirement of Rule 9(b). In pleading Count I, Plaintiffrefers to “aforementioned fraudulent

representations,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 57), but nowhere in the factual allegations, aside from an

all-encompassing reference to fraudulent “conduct under the circumstances,” (Am. Compl.

¶ 51), are any fraudulent representations truly aforementioned. The same is true with respect

to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants fraudulently suppressed unidentified “material

facts[.]” (Am. Compl. ¶ 58.) A comparison of what Plaintiff has actually pleaded regarding

Defendants’ alleged fraud to what Plaintiff is required to plead under Rule 9(b) reveals how

devoid the Amended Complaint is of necessaryfactual allegations. The persistent references

to “Defendants” genericallythroughoutthe entireAmendedComplaint is troubling generally,

but it is lethal to Plaintiff’s fraud claims. Plaintiff must identify with specificity who

engaged in the fraudulent acts. Moreover, there are no details concerning the alleged

fraudulent acts, much less any identification at all of the fraudulent acts themselves, or when

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they occurred. In short, Plaintiff’s fraud count more or less consists of a bare recitation of

the elements of the cause of action, which is insufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading

standard of Rule 9(b). Count I is due to be dismissed with prejudice.

c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Tort of Outrage)

(Count VII)

“The tort of outrage is an extremely limited cause of action.” Potts v. Hayes, 771 So.

2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000). In order to recover, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s

conduct (1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused

emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Id.

(quoting Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So. 2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990)). 

Alabama courts have allowed recovery on a tort of outrage claim in three narrow

circumstances: (1) wrongful conduct in the family-burial context; (2) barbaric methods

employed to coerce an insurance settlement; and (3) egregious sexual harassment. Id. (citing

cases); see also Little v. Robinson, 72 So. 3d 1168, 1172-73 (Ala. 2011). Although the

Alabama Supreme Court has cautioned against an interpretation of the tort of outrage as

being viable only in those three circumstances, Little, 72 So. 3d at 1173, it is not this Court’s

commission to redefine the present boundaries of state law claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

tort of outrage claim, which is related to Defendants’ alleged debt collection efforts and

which does not fall into one of the presently recognized contexts in which a tort of outrage

claim is appropriate, is due to be dismissed.

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d. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision (Count II)

“To sustain a claim for negligent or wanton hiring or supervision, training and/or

retention, ‘the plaintiff must establish that the allegedly incompetent employee committed

a common-law, Alabama tort.’” Leahey v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d

1322, 1328-29 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (quoting Thrasher v. Ivan Leonard Chevrolet, Inc., 195 F.

Supp. 2d 1314, 1320 (N.D. Ala. 2002); see also Thomas v. Util. Trailer Mfg. Co., No.

1:05cv914, 2006 WL 2480057, at *3 (M.D. Ala. 2006). First, Plaintiff’s negligent or wanton

hiring claim is due to be dismissed because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s other

tort claims. Second, the usual common-law Alabama tort many plaintiffs seek to prove in

advance of proving negligent and or wanton hiring in the debt collection context is invasion

of privacy. As stated by the Judge Kallon in the Northern District of Alabama, “[c]reditordebtor cases in which courts have upheld an invasion of privacy claim present far more

egregious facts” than those alleged in the present case. Leahey, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1328

(citing Jacksonville State Bank v. Barnwell, 481 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1985) and Black v. Aegis

Consumer Funding Grp., Inc., No. 99cv412, 2001 WL 228062, at *4-7 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8,

2001)). Plaintiff has not alleged an invasion of privacy cause of action nor do the alleged

facts support such a cause of action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s negligent or wanton hiring

claim is due to be dismissed with prejudice.

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e. Breach of Contract (Count IV)

“The elements of a breach-of-contract claim under Alabama law are (1) a valid

contract binding the parties; (2) the plaintiff[’s] performance under the contract; (3) the

defendant’s nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages.” Shaffer v. Regions Fin. Corp., 29

So. 3d 872, 880 (Ala. 2009). In contrast to her tort claims, Plaintiff has stated a viable breach

of contract claim. Plaintiff alleges, and the Court must accept as true, that Plaintiff has never

been in default on either of her mortgages. Despite her own performance, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants have not performed their obligations through their actions, which include 

reporting Plaintiff’s accounts as being in default, force placing insurance on Plaintiff’s

accounts when she already had such insurance, and charging tax payment fees on Plaintiff’s

accounts when she had already paid such taxes. (Pl.’s Resp. 20.) Defendant’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is due to be denied.

V. CONCLUSION 

Consistent with the reasoning set forth above, it is ORDERED: 

(1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 26) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part;

(2) Counts I, II, III, V, VII, and VIII are DISMISSED as to all Defendants with

prejudice; 

(3) Count VI is DISMISSED with prejudice as to Defendant Countrywide, and

DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendants BANA and BACHLS, but

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subject to the limitations set forth in the opinion; and, 

(4) Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a Second Amended Complaint on or before

March 21, 2012. Failure to file a Second Amended Complaint by this date

will result in dismissal of the action with prejudice.

DONE this 7th day of March, 2012.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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