Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00373/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made applicable to the

Bankruptcy proceedings through Rule 9024 of the Bankruptcy Code.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In re The Roman Catholic Church of

Diocese of Tucson aka the Diocese of

Tucson, 

Debtor. _________________________________

Phillip Gregory Speers, 

Appellant/Plaintiff,

vs.

The Roman Catholic Church of Diocese of

Tucson aka the Diocese of Tucson,

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Appellee/Defendant. )

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No. CV 06-373-TUC-MHM

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case No. 4-04-BK4721-JMM

Bankruptcy Adversary No. 4-05-AP-00197

ORDER

Plaintiff/Appellant Phillip Gregory Speers appeals from the Order entered by the

Honorable James M. Marlar, Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona,

entered on June 14, 2006. (Doc. 35-28). That Order denied the Appellant’s Rule 60(b)

Motion for Relief1

 from the Bankruptcy Court’s January 30, 2006 decision. The parties have

filed their respective briefs and record excerpts for the purposes of this appeal. (Doc. 27, 36,

Case 4:06-cv-00373-MHM Document 40 Filed 02/22/08 Page 1 of 6
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A Proof of Claim is a creditor’s submission to a bankruptcy court that is required in

order to make a claim against a debtor’s bankruptcy estate. It is the mechanism that allows

a creditor to be included in the debtor’s reorganization plan.

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39, 10-23, 28-29 and 35). This Court’s appellate jurisdiction has been invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 158(a). 

I.

Background

According the record below, the Appellant taught second grade at St. Francis of Assisi

School in Yuma, Arizona during the 1999-2000 school year. Toward the end of the school

year, five female students accused the Appellant of having molested them. While criminal

charges were pending against the Appellant, the parents of his accusers brought suit against,

among others, the Diocese of Tucson. The parents alleged that the Diocese was responsible

for the Appellant’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Against the

Appellant’s urging, the Diocese settled those claims. 

On September 20, 2004, the Diocese filed for Chapter 11 reorganization. On April

15, 2005, Appellant filed a Proof of Claim2

 in the Bankruptcy Court, attaching a complaint

captioned for the Pima County Superior Court. The Appellant filed essentially the same

complaint in Pima County Superior Court against the Diocese and several other entities on

June 23, 2005. Both complaints alleged employment discrimination, retaliatory conduct,

harassment in violation of public policy, breach of contract, professional negligence, fraud

and conspiracy to commit fraud, slander per se, libel per se, abuse of process, conspiracy to

commit violation of civil rights, breach of non-delegable duty, fault, obstruction of justice -

destruction of evidence, obstruction of justice - secretion of evidence, witness tampering,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful imprisonment, malicious prosecution,

respondeat superior/vicarious liability and outrageous conduct. The Pima County action was

removed by the Defendants to the Bankruptcy Court. Appellant subsequently succeeded on

his Motion to Remand the claims against the non-debtor Defendants, and that action is

pending in the Pima County Superior Court (Doc. 35-25).

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 Several additional filings were made with the Bankruptcy Court in this same time

period by both Appellant and the various defendants; they are not relevant to the disposition

here and are thus not addressed.

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The Diocese objected to the Appellant’s claim and filed a Motion to Dismiss on

October 18, 2005. After briefing and a hearing on the issue, the Bankruptcy Court denied

the Motion to Dismiss, but ordered the Appellant to file an amended complaint that complied

with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require a short and plain

statement of the claim, captioned with the names of the parties and the title of the action, and

in the form of limited, numbered paragraphs.3

 If the appellant failed to do so within twenty

days, his complaint would be dismissed with prejudice.

The Appellant filed his amended complaint on January 9, 2006, twenty-five days after

the Bankruptcy Court’s order. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Complaint with

prejudice and disallowed the claim against the Diocese’s bankruptcy estate, finding the

Appellant’s filing untimely. 

Four months later, on May 31, 2006, the Appellant filed a Motion for Relief from

Judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Citing Rule 6(e) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Appellant argued that the Bankruptcy Court had erred

in dismissing the amended complaint as untimely. According to the Appellant, the

Bankruptcy Court should have computed the due date for the amended complaint by adding

three days to the prescribed period. Because that would have resulted in the amended

complaint falling due on a Saturday, the Appellant urged that Rule 6(a) allowed for the filing

to occur on the next day that was not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. The Appellant

argued that his filing on January 9, 2006 was therefore timely and thus the Bankruptcy Court

should not have dismissed the complaint and denied his claim. The Appellant offered several

additional arguments that his claims should not have been dismissed. 

In its June 14, 2006 memorandum decision, the Bankruptcy Court denied the Motion

for Relief on the basis that the Appellant had not brought it within a reasonable time. Judge

Marlar noted that Rule 60(b) motions should be liberally construed, but cited the court’s

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compelling interest in finality of judgments. In his denial, Judge Marlar pointed to the fact

that the Appellant did not file an appeal, despite the fact that the main issue involved a simple

computation of time that did not require extensive research or writing. Judge Marlar

indicated that the Appellant could have sought an extension of the ten-day appeal period

instead of waiting four months to seek relief from the judgment. The Appellant timely

appealed the decision to this Court.

II.

Discussion

In an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court, this Court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b)

motion for abuse of discretion. Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985);

 Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004). This Court will not consider

the merits of the underlying decision; the review is limited to the merits of the denial of the

Motion for Relief from the judgment. Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1995).

A. Abuse of Discretion

In applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court is not empowered to substitute

its judgment for that of the Bankruptcy Court. United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638,

646 (9th Cir. 2000). Unless the Bankruptcy Court made an error of law, relied on a clearly

erroneous finding of material fact or ruled in an irrational manner, it is entitled to wide

latitude in its decision. Id. 

This Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

Appellant relief under Rule 60(b). The parties appear to agree that the Bankruptcy Court

applied the correct law. (Doc. 27, pp. 9-11; 36, pp. 11-12). Rule 60(b) provides that a court

may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or

misconduct by the opposing party; (4) void judgments; (5) judgments that have been

satisfied, released or discharged; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Judge Marlar

considered the appropriate factors and determined that it was unreasonable for the Appellant

to have waited 120 days to file the Motion for Relief. (Doc. 29-10, pp. 4-5). Such a

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Although the merits of the underlying decision are not before the Court, this Court

disagrees with the Appellant’s characterization that the Bankruptcy Court “admitted its prior

error.” This Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court merely recited the Appellant’s arguments

regarding the computation of time, rather than addressing whether Rule 6 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure actually applies to judges’ orders.

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determination is supported by the facts in the record. The Appellant immediately knew of

the grounds for seeking relief but did not appeal the order (in ten days or otherwise), nor did

he advise the Court that he needed an extension of time to properly research and brief the

issues. (Doc. 29-9, p. 3). The Bankruptcy Court correctly noted that there is a compelling

interest in finality of judgments. (Id.) Under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of

discretion to deny the Appellant’s Motion for Relief from the judgment made four months

later.4

The Appellant also asserts several reasons to reverse the decision of the Bankruptcy

Court that are not properly before this Court. He urges this Court to consider the nature of

the bankruptcy proceedings below, including the fact that the Bankruptcy Court

“misconstrued the nature of the attachment” to the Proof of Claim form. (Doc. 27, p. 11).

This Court may not properly make such an inquiry; it is limited to the question of whether

the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in denying the Motion for Relief. Maraziti, 52

F.3d at 254.

B. Excusable Neglect

The Appellant argues that the four-month delay in filing his Motion for Relief was

reasonable under the circumstances, and therefore should be considered excusable neglect.

The Appellant did not, however, raise his excusable neglect claim with the Bankruptcy Court

in his Motion for Relief; it appears for the first time in his appeal to this Court. Ordinarily,

an appellate court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Dream

Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004). The Bankruptcy Court

appropriately considered the Appellant’s Motion, applied the correct legal standard, and

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denied relief. This Court’s role is only to determine whether that constitutes an abuse of

discretion. This Court finds that it does not.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Bankruptcy Court’s Order filed June 14, 2006 is affirmed.

DATED this 21st day of February, 2008.

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