Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01156/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FABIAN NAVA,

CDCR #AH-0190,

Plaintiff,

vs.

P. VELARDI; J. SILVA; AVELINO 

CANLAS; M. MELLON; ROGELIO 

ORTEGA; S. ROBERTS; KYLE 

SEELEY; J. WALKER; ROBERT 

WALKER; DAVID CLIFTON ,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-01156-AJB-BLM

ORDER:

1) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS 

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 

TO Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

[ECF No. 28]

AND

2) ISSUING AN ORDER TO SHOW 

CAUSE WHY DEFENDANTS 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR 

FAILING TO PROSECUTE

Introduction

Fabian Nava (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD”) in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), is 

proceeding with a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed pursuant to the Civil Rights 

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 13).

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Defendants Seeley, Rogelio Ortega, Robert Walker and Jason Silva have filed a 

Motion to Dismiss all claims against them alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See Defs. Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 28).

1 The Court issued a briefing 

schedule, determined that no proposed findings and recommendations by the magistrate 

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 72.3(a) would be 

necessary, and permitted Plaintiff an opportunity to file an Opposition. On October 27, 

2016, Plaintiff filed his Opposition but Defendants have not filed a Reply. (ECF No. 35.)

Having considered the Motion on the papers submitted, the Court GRANTS in part, 

and DENIES in part, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

I. Factual Allegations

On February 18, 2010, Plaintiff was “sent to an orthopedic specialist” by prison 

officials. (FAC at 11.) At that time, Plaintiff claims he was informed that he “had no 

option (for life) but to wear a pair of orthopedic shoes/boots, or plaintiff would suffer 

physical harm.” (Id. at 11; Ex. 1, CDCR Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono dated 

February 22, 2010.) Approximately two years later on January 31, 2012, Plaintiff had an 

x-ray of his right knee and claims that it “confirmed a 3mm metallic fragment” in his right 

knee which was “causing plaintiff severe pain.” (Id. at 11.) However, Plaintiff alleges Dr. 

Kyle Seeley “refused to provide him with adequate footwear and pain management” on the 

grounds that it was “too costly for the [CDCR or RJD] to worry about fixing.” (Id.)

On March 16, 2012, Plaintiff was examined by Nurse Practitioner Pamela Velardi

who then rescinded Plaintiff’s chrono for orthopedic shoes. (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

Defendant Velardi made a note in his chart that Plaintiff indicated he would file a grievance 

 

1 No other Defendants have yet to be served, although the U.S. Marshal has returned 

summonses as unexecuted as to Defendants Velardi, Mellon, Clifton and Canlas (ECF Nos. 

22-25). No summons has been returned for Defendants S. Roberts and J. Walker nor have 

these Defendants joined in the Motion currently pending before the Court.

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and further claims Defendant Velardi commented that filing a grievance “would be a 

mistake.” (Id.) Instead of providing Plaintiff with his orthopedic shoes, Defendant Velardi 

issued Plaintiff “a pair of shoe insoles because it was ‘much less expensive than the 

footwear.’” (Id. Ex. 4, Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono dated April 17, 2012.)

Plaintiff was “performing his assigned duties as a Housing Unit Porter” on January 

25, 2013 when his “right leg/knee/ankle caused him to suffer pain and he lost his balance 

then fell down a flight of stairs.” (Id. at 11.) He alleges that his supervisor, Correctional 

Officer McGee2 witnessed the fall. (Id.) Plaintiff was examined by Dr. M. Mellon whom

he claims was already aware of Plaintiff’s knee condition but refused to provide him 

treatment. (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Mellon “falsified the 

record” by indicating that no one had witnessed his fall. (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance on May 7, 2012. (See FAC, Ex. 6, 

Patient/Inmate Health Care Appeal dated May 7, 2012.) Plaintiff claims both Defendants 

Velardi and Seeley continued to refuse Plaintiff “adequate medical care because of cost 

and due to plaintiff filing medical grievance(s).” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff then sought 

assistance from the “Prison Law Office” who then contacted Defendant Seeley regarding 

Plaintiff’s medical care. (Id.) However, Plaintiff claims Defendant Seeley provided the 

Prison Law Offices with “falsehoods.” (Id.) 

On September 20, 2013, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Rogelio Ortega who was 

Plaintiff’s primary care physician. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ortega informed 

him that he was “working on getting plaintiff surgery.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed another 

grievance claiming that RJD medical staff was refusing Plaintiff adequate medical care 

based on Defendant Velardi’s previous actions. (Id. at 11, Ex. 12, Patient/Inmate Health 

Care Appeal dated December 16, 2013.) 

 

2

 Correctional Officer McGee is not a named Defendant.

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Plaintiff claims Defendant Ortega prescribed physical therapy for him. (Id.) 

However, when Plaintiff was taken to see the physical therapist, David Clifton, he refused 

to provide Plaintiff with treatment “based on [Clifton’s] opinion that Plaintiff needed 

surgery first.” (Id. at 13.) Defendant Clifton also believed that Plaintiff should take a 

different pain medication but allegedly told Plaintiff that “he doubted plaintiff would get 

proper pain medication or surgery as it was very expensive and therefore, RJD would not 

approve it as a matter of policy.” (Id.)

On February 13, 2014, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ortega subscribed “Lyrica” 

for his “severe pain” despite the fact that a narcotic would be more effective. (Id.) 

Defendant Ortega informed Plaintiff that the reason he provided this medication was 

because the RJD “medical staff were fed up with plaintiff filing grievances.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims that Dr. R. Walker denied the request for Lyrica “even though it was proven that 

plaintiff was in severe pain and required medication.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was seen a few weeks later by Dr. Avenilo Canlas who became is primary 

care physician. (Id.) Plaintiff requested pain medication for his “severe ongoing pain.” 

(Id.) However, Plaintiff claims Defendant Canlas, following the previous denial by 

Defendant Walker, refused Plaintiff’s request and informed him that he would not order it 

for Plaintiff “especially since you continue to file grievance(s).” (Id.) 

On July 14, 2014, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Jason Silva. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant Silva “acknowledged plaintiff’s severe medical conditions” but based on 

Plaintiff’s history of filing medical grievances “decided not to order any treatment not 

already ordered previously, regardless of plaintiff’s pain, injury level or need.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Silva told him that RJD was “strapped for money right now 

due to all the construction on every medical facility at RJD.” (Id.) 

After his examination with Defendant Silva, Plaintiff filed another administrative 

grievance requesting pain medication and medical care for his “knee/ankle/leg injuries.” 

(Id. at 14-15.) While Plaintiff alleges Defendant Silva must respond to the initial level of 

this grievance, he has not responded to date. (Id. at 15.) On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff 

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claims “Dr. Silva finally ordered plaintiff pain medication of Lyrica.” (Id.) However, he 

alleges that he was “forced” to sign a “contract stating he could discontinue the medication 

for any reason.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that RJD staff “shopped around” to obtain new 

medical test results for Plaintiff’s condition which they used to show that there was “no 

damage than previously known to be present in Plaintiff.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he 

continues to suffer “irreparable harm” as a result of Defendants’ actions. (Id. at 16.)

Discussion

II. Legal Standards 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Rule 

12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive merits, 

“a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to 

dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, courts may consider exhibits that are attached to the complaint. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the 

pleading for all purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, 

Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the 

complaint may be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.) However, 

exhibits that contradict the allegations of a complaint may fatally undermine the 

complaint’s allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff can “plead himself out of a claim by including . . . details contrary 

to his claims.” (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 

1998) (courts “are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 

contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”))); see also Nat’l Assoc. for the 

Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th

Cir.2000) (courts “may consider facts contained in documents attached to the complaint” 

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to determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 

570 (2007)).

“All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

The Court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 

(citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986) (on motion to dismiss, court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.”). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not 

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). 

Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 

a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 

to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ 

a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when a plaintiff has not 

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“nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must 

be dismissed.”)). 

“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual 

content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

B. Pro Se Litigants 

“In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi 

v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). The rule, however, “applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil 

rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 

733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts 

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). 

III. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants Seeley, Ortega, Walker and Silva move to dismiss all claims against 

them found in Plaintiff’s FAC. (Defs. Mot. at 2.) Specifically, they claim Plaintiff has 

failed to alleges facts sufficient to state a claim “under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (Id.) As stated above, Plaintiff has filed 

an Opposition. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s FAC and finds that there is no attempt 

to allege a Fourteenth Amendment claim and Defendants have not addressed Plaintiff’s 

conspiracy claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (See FAC at 8, 18.) Therefore, 

the conspiracy claims remain in the action.

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A. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care Claims

1. Standard of Review

Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 104 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “A determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two 

elements: (1) the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and (2) the nature of the 

defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 

1997) (en banc) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

First, “[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access 

to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment 

violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), 

citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-104. “A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat 

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 914 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 

“The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly 

affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are 

examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” Id., 

citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 

865 F.2d 198, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, none of the Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to 

plausibly show that his medical needs were ‘serious,’ and thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

FAC is sufficiently pleaded in this regard.

Therefore, the Court must next decide whether Plaintiff’s FAC further contains 

sufficient “factual content” to show that Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to 

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his needs. McGuckin, 914 F.2d. at 1060; see also Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Claims against Defendant Seeley

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Seeley, the Chief Medical Officer, was deliberately 

indifferent to his serious medical needs when he refused to supply Plaintiff with orthotic 

shoes which were a form of treatment for his medical condition. (See FAC at 11-12.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Seeley denied Plaintiff this treatment due to their expense. 

(Id.) In support of his showing for the need of these orthotic shoes, Plaintiff supplied a 

“Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono” dated February 22, 2010. (Id., Ex. 1.) In this 

“chrono” it is noted that “the treatment of [Plaintiff’s] condition mandates the exclusive 

use of this footwear to prevent physical harm.” (Id.) At the top portion of this form, it 

informs the prescribing physician to “[c]ircle P if the accommodation is to be permanent, 

or T if the accommodation is to be temporary.” (Id.) The “P” is circled next to the 

indication that orthotic footwear is to be provided to Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that this demonstrates “deliberate indifference” on the part of 

Defendant Seeley when he removed this accommodation for Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.)

In response, Defendants argue that a decision to review a chrono is to be made annually, 

as also stated on the form. (Defs.’ Mot. at 23-24.) In addition, Defendants argue that the 

decision to deny Plaintiff’s “is supported by multiple examinations showing normal stance 

and gait, ability to walk unassisted, full range of motion in the ankle, ability to tiptoe well, 

ability to work, absence of atrophy in the lower extremities, ability to squat, normal muscle 

strength, and apparent ability to accommodate the ankle pain with the insoles.” (Id. at 24.) 

Defendants then refer to a number of medical documents Plaintiff has attached to his FAC 

as exhibits. (Id.) 

However, Plaintiff argues that the annual review of a permanent “chrono” is to 

review the inmate’s information and not a review of the necessity for the permanent chrono 

itself. Moreover, as Plaintiff notes in his Opposition, he alleges in his FAC that the decision 

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by Seeley to deny Plaintiff the orthotic shoes was based on their cost, along with claims of 

retaliation for filing grievances, and not on the medical examinations or tests that came 

after Defendant Seeley’s treatment of Plaintiff. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; see also FAC at 12.) 

Defendants argument would have this Court interpret many medical records and arrive at 

conclusions that are outside the allegations found in Plaintiff’s FAC. In order to show 

“deliberate indifference,” a Plaintiff must demonstrate that “(a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.) Here, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against 

Defendant Seeley. 

3. Defendants Ortega and Silva

Plaintiff alleges that in 2013 Defendant Ortega was his primary physician. (See FAC 

at 10.) Plaintiff also acknowledges that Defendant Ortega informed him that he was 

“working on getting plaintiff surgery” and prescribed physical therapy. (Id. at 11.) He 

also acknowledges that Defendant Ortega prescribed the medication Plaintiff wanted even 

though Defendant Ortega expressed doubts that it would be approved due to cost. (Id.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff received several examinations from Defendant 

Ortega and Silva, was provided different pain medications and their “progress notes recited 

comprehensive examinations, diagnostic testing, and treatment.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 25.) 

Plaintiff argues that multiple “meaningless medical procedures” is not indicative of 

adequate medical care. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 15.) 

The Court agrees with Defendant Ortega that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show 

that he was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendant Ortega prescribed physical therapy, medication and informed Plaintiff that 

he was seeking to get authorization for Plaintiff to receive surgery. None of these 

allegations rise to the level of “deliberate indifference.” 

However, with respect to Defendant Silva, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Silva told 

Plaintiff that based on Plaintiff’s history of filing medical grievances he “decided not to 

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order any treatment not already ordered previously, regardless of plaintiff’s pain, injury 

level or need.” (See FAC at 14.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Silva waited two months 

to prescribe medication and he suffered severe pain as a result. (Id.) The Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Silva allegedly refused to provide treatment as a result of 

Plaintiff’s grievance history does sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment inadequate 

medical care claim.

4. Defendant Walker

Defendants maintain that Defendant Walker was not Plaintiff’s primary care 

physician and was only involved in Plaintiff’s care when he “denied a non-formulary 

request for Mr. Nava to receive Lyrica.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 26.) Plaintiff argues it is irrelevant 

that Defendant Walker was not his primary care physician but instead, he argues that 

Defendant Walker denied the Lyrica as a matter of prison policy rather than an individual 

review of Plaintiff’s medical condition and medical needs. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 16.) In 

furtherance of that argument, Plaintiff argues that he was given Lyrica several months later 

but his medical records do not reflect a change in his medical condition so there is no valid 

reason why he was denied this medication for over six months. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff 

claims that when the decision was made to allow him to take this drug, there is no 

documentation to show how the “change of denial of pain medication into an approval”

took place. (Id.)

Throughout the Defendants’ Motion, they point to evidence in the record that 

requires interpretation that is beyond the scope of a motion to dismiss. At this stage of the 

proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state an Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendant Walker. 

B. Retaliation claims

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation in violation of his 

First Amendment rights. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 27-28.) In order to state a retaliation claim, 

Plaintiff must allege facts to support the following five factors: “(1) an assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

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protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment right, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional 

goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 

31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th 

Cir. 2000); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997).

Defendants only argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation claim because he 

has not alleged facts supporting the first element of the claim in that there are no facts to 

show that Defendants took any “adverse action” against him. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 27-28.) 

However, throughout his FAC, Plaintiff claims he was denied medical treatment because 

he was filing multiple administrative grievances. Of fundamental import to prisoners are 

their First Amendment “right[s] to file prison grievances,” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and to “pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.” Schroeder v. 

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Seeley refused “Plaintiff adequate medical treatment care 

because of cost and due to Plaintiff filing medical grievances.” (FAC at 12.) Plaintiff 

alleges Defendant Ortega provided Plaintiff with a less costly, less effective pain 

medication because “medical staff were fed up with Plaintiff filing grievances.” (Id. at 13.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Silva, due to Plaintiff filing medical grievances, “decided 

not to order any treatment not already ordered previously, regardless of Plaintiff’s pain, 

injury level or need.” (Id. at 14.) Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

has stated a retaliation claim against these Defendants.

However, as to Defendant Walker, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a 

retaliation claim. While Defendant Walker did deny Plaintiff’s request for pain 

medication, he did so through the grievance process. There are no allegations that Walker 

was aware of any of Plaintiff’s prior grievances, nor is there an allegation that Walker 

denied Plaintiff’s grievance because of his past history. Therefore, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim against Defendant Walker.

/ / /

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IV. Remaining Defendants

A review of the Court’s docket indicates that Plaintiff has failed to properly serve 

Defendants Velardi, Canlas, Mellon, S. Roberts, J. Walker and Clifton. See Walker v. 

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1994) (where a pro se plaintiff fails to provide 

the Marshal with sufficient information to effect service, the court’s sua sponte dismissal 

of those unserved defendants is appropriate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m)). 

Accordingly, this Court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause no later than thirty days 

(30) after this Order is filed, why the claims against these Defendants should not be 

dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). If Plaintiff wishes to 

proceed with his claims against these Defendants he must provide the Court with proof of 

proper service within thirty (30) days from the date this Order is filed. Otherwise, 

Defendants Velardi, Canlas, Mellon, S. Roberts, J. Walker and Clifton will be dismissed 

from this action without prejudice.

Conclusion

For all the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) GRANTS Defendant Ortega’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims;

2) DENIES Defendants Silva, Seeley. and Walker’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims;

3) DENIES Defendants Silva Seeley or Ortega’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

retaliation claims;

4) GRANTS Defendant Walker’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claims.

5) Defendants will serve and file an Answer to Plaintiff’s FAC within the time 

set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(4)(A) to the remaining claims.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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It is further ordered that:

6) Plaintiff must show cause no later than thirty (30) days from the date this 

Order is filed why the claims against Defendants Velardi, Canlas, Mellon, S. Roberts, J. 

Walker and Clifton should not be dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). If Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with documentation demonstrating 

proper service on these Defendants within thirty (30) days from the date this Order is filed, 

the claims against them in this action will be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2017

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