Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00066/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00066-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

---

1

18-cv-0066-BTM-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DON ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

ESA MANAGEMENT, LLC dba 

EXTENDED STAY AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-cv-0066-BTM-NLS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND [ECF No. 7]

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Don Allen’s motion to remand this 

action to state court. (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s 

motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

On August 4, 2016, Plaintiff initiated an action against ESA Management, 

Inc. in the Superior Court of California in the County of San Diego. In September 

2017, after the court entered default in the case, counsel for Defendant ESA 

Management, LLC contacted Plaintiff and informed him that it was the proper 

defendant, not ESA Management, Inc. Plaintiff, via e-mail, provided counsel for 

Defendant with the complaint but no effort was made at that time to remove the 

case to federal court. Plaintiff sought leave from the court to file an amended 

37-2016-00026756-CU-PO-CTL

Case 3:18-cv-00066-BTM-NLS Document 15 Filed 06/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 4
2

18-cv-0066-BTM-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

complaint relating back to its original filing date and properly naming Defendant. 

Defendant specially appeared and opposed the motion. On November 17, 2017, 

Plaintiff was permitted to file a first amended complaint properly naming 

Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently served Defendant with the summons, 

amended complaint, and notice of hearing on December 11, 2017. 

On January 10, 2018, Defendant removed this action from state court. 

(ECF No. 1.) Because Defendant had failed to provide the Court with sufficient 

facts to establish diversity jurisdiction, the Court issued an order to show cause 

requiring Defendant to establish its sole member Extended Stay America, Inc.’s 

citizenship. (ECF No. 4.) On February 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed this instant motion 

to remand. On February 16, 2018, based on Defendant’s response to the order 

to show cause, the Court issued an order stating that Defendant had adequately 

established diversity jurisdiction. However, because Plaintiff grounds his motion 

to remand on both the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and the timeliness 

of the removal, the Court addresses that latter argument below. 

DISCUSSION

In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 

courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 

defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the 

district court and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(a). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) requires a defendant to file a 

notice of removal “within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through 

service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for 

relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.” However, “if the case 

stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed 

within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a 

copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may 

first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 

Case 3:18-cv-00066-BTM-NLS Document 15 Filed 06/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 4
3

18-cv-0066-BTM-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). “A case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on 

the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than one year after 

commencement of the action, unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has 

acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” § 

1446(c)(1). 

Here, there is no dispute that Defendant was not formally served until 

December 11, 2017. However, it is also undisputed that Plaintiff commenced this 

action on August 4, 2016, more than one year before Defendant filed its notice of 

removal. The Ninth Circuit has made it clear that the statute’s one-year deadline 

for removing diversity cases applies only to cases in which there is no basis for 

diversity jurisdiction when the case is filed in state court. See Ritchey v. Upjohn 

Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the timeliness of this 

removal depends on whether the case was initially removable under diversity 

jurisdiction. 

The parties disagree as to whether the case was initially removable. 

Plaintiff argues that as plead, this case was not removable under diversity 

jurisdiction because both parties were citizens of California and the amount-incontroversy could not be ascertained. Defendant, on the other hand, contends 

that the case was initially removable but does not explain why. In Harris v. 

Bankers Life & Co., 425 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit joined 

other circuits in holding that the “ground for removal must be revealed

affirmatively in the initial pleading in order for the first thirty-day clock under § 

1446(b) to begin.” As noted by Plaintiff, the initial pleading did not state an 

amount-in-controversy and also stated that Plaintiff and Defendant were both 

citizens of California. As such, the grounds for removal were not “apparent within 

the four corners of the initial pleading . . . .” See Harris, 425 F.3d at 695. 

Because the case was not initially removable, then the one-year time limit under 

section 1446(c)(1) applies in this case and Defendant’s removal is barred. 

Case 3:18-cv-00066-BTM-NLS Document 15 Filed 06/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 4
4

18-cv-0066-BTM-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant argues that its removal is timely because it was not formally 

served until December 11, 2017 and it removed to federal court within thirty days

of service. While the Supreme Court in Murphy Brothers, Incorporation v. 

Michetti Pipe Stringing, Incorporation, 526 U.S. 344, 348 (1999) does make it 

clear that a defendant’s time for removal is not triggered until it is formally served 

and made a party to the action, the Supreme Court there did not address the 

implications of section 1446(c)(1). The Court’s independent research has 

revealed that district courts have repeatedly applied the one-year time bar to 

later-added defendants. See First Mechs. Trust Co. v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 

630 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (applying the one-year time limit to a 

defendant that removed within thirty days of being served, but was added more 

than one year after commencement of the case in state court); see also U.S. 

Airways, Inc. v. PMA Capital Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 699, 704–07 (E.D. Va. 

2004). Therefore, the Court applies the one-year time bar here. Because 

Defendant removed this case under diversity jurisdiction more than a year after it

commenced in state court, and in absence of a showing that Plaintiff acted in bad 

faith, the Court holds that Defendant’s removal is barred under section 

1446(c)(1). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion to remand (ECF No. 7) 

is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of 

California, San Diego. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 13, 2018

Case 3:18-cv-00066-BTM-NLS Document 15 Filed 06/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 4