Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02950/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02950-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1

 The Honorable Richard Tallman, United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Honorable Susan Illston, United States District Judge,

Northern District of California, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 10/12/05**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JUAN D. MARTINEZ, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

MONTEREY COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

LIFT STAY

[Doc. No. 53]

BEFORE: TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, FOGEL, District Judge, and ILLSTON, District

Judge.1

Plaintiffs move to lift the stay of the instant litigation imposed by this Court’s order of

August 4, 2005 (“August 4 Order”). The Court has reviewed the briefing submitted by the

parties and of amicus curiae Edward J. Costa. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will

be denied.

Case 5:05-cv-02950-JF Document 81 Filed 10/12/05 Page 1 of 10
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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have failed to obtain preclearance of a change in voting

procedures as required under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 

“Section 5 governs changes in voting procedures, with the purpose of preventing jurisdictions

covered by its requirements from enacting or seeking to administer voting changes that have a

discriminatory purpose or effect.” Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 12 (1996). Defendant

Monterey County is a covered jurisdiction and therefore must obtain federal preclearance of any

voting practice different from the practices in effect on November 1, 1968. Id. at 11. A covered

jurisdiction may obtain administrative preclearance of a change in voting procedure by

submitting the enacting legislation to the Attorney General of the United States; “[i]f the

Attorney General does not formally object to the new procedure within 60 days of submission,

the jurisdiction may enforce the legislation.” Id. at 12. Alternatively, a covered jurisdiction may

obtain judicial preclearance “by securing in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia a declaratory judgment that the new procedure ‘does not have the purpose and will not

have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . . .’” Id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).

Plaintiffs allege that a change in voting procedures occurred when proponents of

Proposition 77, an initiative measure that has been placed on the ballot for a statewide special

election on November 8, 2005, circulated a petition containing text that differed from the text of

the measure that had been submitted to California’s Attorney General for preparation of a title

and summary pursuant to state law. Plaintiffs filed the instant action on July 20, 2005, naming as

defendants Monterey County, the State of California and California’s Secretary of State, Bruce

McPherson. Plaintiffs filed the operative amended complaint on July 28, 2005. In conjunction

with the filing of both pleadings, Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)

preventing Defendants from going forward with preparations to place Proposition 77 on the

ballot absent Section 5 preclearance, as well as an order to show cause why a preliminary

injunction should not issue.

On August 4, 2005, this Court issued an order denying without prejudice Plaintiffs’

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28 2 Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

application for TRO, granting Plaintiffs’ motion to convene a three-judge panel and staying

litigation of the instant action pursuant to the Colorado River2 abstention doctrine. The Court’s

decision to abstain rested in large part upon the fact that the issue of whether Proposition 77

should appear on the ballot was being litigated vigorously in a parallel state action commenced

by California’s Attorney General. At the time this Court issued its ruling denying Plaintiffs’

application for TRO, the California Superior Court had issued an order directing that Proposition

77 be stricken from the ballot on the ground that the discrepancies between the text submitted to

the Attorney General and the text included in the petition were inconsistent with the requirements

of California’s Constitution and Elections Code; however, the California Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District, had stayed that order pending disposition of a petition for writ of mandate

filed by the initiative measure’s proponents. This Court reasoned that a state court determination

that there has been a violation of state law sufficient to preclude inclusion of Proposition 77 on

the ballot would moot the instant action, and that a contrary determination would bear

significantly upon Plaintiffs’ claim that there has been a material change in voting procedures. 

The Court requested that the parties notify it immediately of any change in the status of the state

court proceedings.

On August 9, 2005, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of

mandate, thus effectively reinstating the Superior Court’s order that Proposition 77 be stricken

from the ballot. On August 10, 2005, proponents of the initiative measure filed an emergency

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On August 12, 2005, that court granted the

petition for review, stayed the judgment of the Superior Court and directed that the California

Secretary of State go forward with preparations for including Proposition 77 on the ballot for the

November 8 special election. The court concluded that there was an insufficient showing that the

discrepancies between the version of the initiative measure submitted to the Attorney General

and the version that was circulated for signature were likely to have misled the persons who

signed the initiative petition, and that under such circumstances it would be inappropriate to deny

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

the electorate the opportunity to vote on Proposition 77 at the special election. The court retained

jurisdiction to resolve the question of substantial compliance with California law after the

election. On August 15, 2005, Defendant Monterey County filed a status report advising this

Court of the California Supreme Court’s order. On the same date, the state printer received the

final version of the Voter Information Guide; subsequently, the process of printing, binding and

distributing approximately twelve million copies of the guide began. 

On September 1, 2005, Plaintiffs electronically filed a document entitled, “Status

Report.” This document notified this Court of the developments in the state court proceedings

and included a “suggestion” that the Court act sua sponte to lift the stay imposed by the August 4

Order. Plaintiffs did not submit paper courtesy copies of the document as required by this

Court’s standing order with respect to any pleading requesting judicial action, nor did their

counsel contact chambers to inform the Court that the document suggested or required any action

by the Court. Later that day, Defendant McPherson electronically filed a letter objecting to

Plaintiffs’ “suggestion” that the Court act in the absence of a noticed motion and orderly briefing. 

On September 8, 2005, chambers staff discovered both Plaintiffs’ status report and Defendant

McPherson’s letter in the course of a routine review of the docket in this case. On September 9,

2005, the Court issued an order directing Plaintiffs to file a noticed motion if they wished to seek

relief from the stay and further directing all parties to provide paper courtesy copies of future

filings to all members of the three-judge panel. On September 22, 2005, Plaintiffs filed the

instant motion as well as renewed motions for a TRO and a preliminary injunction. The mailing

of the ballot pamphlets commenced on September 24, 2005. According to Defendants, the

pamphlets cost $3.9 million to print and will cost an additional $3 million to mail. On

September 26, 2005, this Court set an expedited briefing schedule on the instant motion and

deferred action on Plaintiffs’ remaining motions pending a determination as to whether the stay

should be lifted. Briefing on the instant motion was completed on October 6, 2005.

II. DISCUSSION

As noted above, this Court has stayed the instant litigation pursuant to the Colorado River

abstention doctrine, under which a federal court may defer to a parallel state court proceeding

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

based upon “considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of

judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d

1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817). The Ninth Circuit has

enumerated six factors to be considered in determining whether Colorado River abstention is

appropriate: 

In Colorado River, the Court articulated four factors for determining whether

sufficiently exceptional circumstances exist to warrant abstention: (1) whether

either the state or federal court has exercised jurisdiction over a res; (2) the

inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal

litigation; and (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction. In Moses

H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., the Court added two more

considerations: (5) whether federal or state law controls the decision on the

merits; and (6) whether the state court can adequately protect the rights of the

parties.

40235 Washington Street Corp. v. Lusardi, 976 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations

omitted).

At the time it issued its August 4 Order, this Court concluded that while the first two

factors were not implicated in the instant action, the last four factors mandated abstention. The

issue of whether Proposition 77 should appear on the ballot was being litigated in a parallel state

court action; the state action was filed before the instant action and was further along; the state

courts’ determination of the state law questions at issue in the parallel action would bear upon –

and could potentially moot – the questions at issue in the instant action; and Plaintiffs’ position

was represented adequately in the state court action, although Plaintiffs themselves were not

parties to that action.

Plaintiffs assert that these bases for abstention no longer exist in light of the California

Supreme Court’s ruling that Proposition 77 will appear on the ballot and that issues of substantial

compliance with state election law will be determined only after the election. Plaintiffs assert

that the California Supreme Court’s order in essence approves the alleged change in voting

procedures and is the functional equivalent of a legislative action adopting that change. Plaintiffs

argue that under these circumstances, the question of Section 5 preclearance now is squarely

presented in this action, and cite Lopez for the proposition that this Court must ensure that the

election does not go forward with Proposition 77 on the ballot absent preclearance. See Lopez,

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

519 U.S. at 20 (stating that “[i]f a voting change subject to § 5 has not been precleared, § 5

plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting implementation of the change”).

However, Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Lopez ignores numerous critical differences between

that case and this one. In Lopez, the plaintiffs alleged that judicial consolidation ordinances that

resulted in a single, countywide municipal court constituted election changes subject to Section 5

preclearance. Lopez, 519 U.S. at 15. The three-judge panel convened to address the claim

agreed. Id. The panel, the plaintiffs and the county then spent several years attempting to reach

agreement on a judicial election plan. During that period the panel permitted a special election to

go forward under an interim plan for which preclearance was obtained. Id. at 18. However, in

1996, four years after the plaintiffs commenced the action, the panel ordered the county to hold a

regularly-scheduled election under the very same plan that the panel had determined had not been

precleared as required. Id. at 19. The plaintiffs filed an emergency application in the United

States Supreme Court to enjoin the 1996 election.

The Supreme Court determined that the panel’s order that an election go forward under a

plan that had not been precleared was contrary to the principles embodied in Section 5 and in

precedent. Id. at 20. The court concluded that the county had been on notice for several years

that its electoral changes were subject to Section 5, but had failed to obtain administrative or

judicial preclearance of those changes. Id. at 21. The court noted that it was an open question

whether a district court ever could permit a covered jurisdiction to conduct an election under a

voting plan that had not been precleared, and suggested that “[a]n extreme circumstance might be

present if a seat’s unprecleared status is not drawn to the attention of the [covered jurisdiction]

until the eve of the election and there are equitable principles that justify allowing the election to

proceed.” Id. at 21-22 (quoting Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1991)). However, the

court concluded that no such exigency existed with respect to the election at issue in Lopez.

In contrast, the type of exigency discussed in Lopez and Clark does exist here. While in

Lopez it was determined years before the subject election that Section 5 was implicated, there has

been no such determination in this case, and it is by no means evident as a matter of law what

that determination will be. The Court in fact is being asked to make the determination on the eve

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

of the election. The State of California has spent millions of dollars to print and mail the Voter

Information Guide and the ballot pamphlets, which include information on Proposition 77;

indeed, it appears that absentee voting on Proposition 77 already is occurring. 

Plaintiffs cannot be faulted for failing to move expeditiously in this Court initially,

because the Court itself stayed the present federal action while awaiting a ruling by the California

courts. However, the same cannot be said with respect to Plaintiffs’ activity after the California

Supreme Court restored Proposition 77 to the ballot on August 12, 2005. Plaintiffs did not even

suggest that this Court should lift the stay until they filed their status report on September 1,

nearly three weeks later. Even then, as noted above, they chose not to file a noticed motion and

failed to comply with the express requirements of this Court’s Standing Order. Plaintiffs cite no

authority suggesting that this Court had a duty to act sua sponte. They did not file a cognizable

motion to lift the stay until September 22, almost two weeks after the Court advised them

specifically that they should do so and nearly six weeks after the California Supreme Court’s

decision. In a very real sense, Plaintiffs have created the exigent circumstances under which they

now urge the Court to act. 

Applying the Colorado River factors in light of the present situation, the Court concludes

that abstention remains appropriate. The California Supreme Court has concluded that the

November 8 election should go forward with Proposition 77 on the ballot and expressly has

retained jurisdiction to make a post-election determination as to whether the measure’s

proponents complied substantially with California’s election laws notwithstanding the

discrepancies in the two versions of the measure. That court’s ultimate determination of this

issue may well moot the instant action; at the very least, its explication of California law will

inform this Court’s analysis of whether the discrepancies constitute a change in California’s

voting procedures sufficient to trigger Section 5. 

While it is true, as Plaintiffs argue, that the question of whether the proponents of

Proposition 77 have complied substantially with state election law is distinct from the federal

question of whether there has been a change in voting procedures within the meaning of Section

5, amicus curiae notes correctly that the California Supreme Court itself has jurisdiction to

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

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(JFLC2)

decide, as a collateral matter, whether the asserted change in California’s voting procedures

requires Section 5 preclearance. See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 268-69 (1982). Given

the close relationship between the legal issues in the two cases, continued abstention by this

Court will avoid the type of piecemeal litigation eschewed in Colorado River.

In the event that the instant action is not rendered moot either by the decision of the

California Supreme Court or the voters’ rejection of Proposition 77, this Court clearly is

empowered to address Plaintiffs’ Section 5 claim after the election. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S.

190, 193 (1978); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 441 (1971). In Berry, the plaintiffs filed

suit four days prior to scheduled primary and general elections, alleging that a change in state

voting law had not been precleared as required by Section 5. The plaintiffs’ request for

declaratory and injunctive relief was not acted upon until after the elections, at which point a

three-judge panel concluded that Section 5 was implicated and prospectively enjoined further

elections under the new law absent preclearance; however, the panel refused to set aside the

elections that already had been conducted under the new law. On appeal, the United States

Supreme Court affirmed the determination that preclearance was required under Section 5, but

reversed and remanded insofar as the three-judge panel had declined to order relief with respect

to the elections that had occurred under the new law. On remand, the district court was

instructed to issue an order allowing the appellees thirty days within which to apply for approval

of the new law under Section 5. Berry, 438 U.S. at 193.

In Perkins, the plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin citywide elections for mayor and

aldermen, alleging that changes in the locations of polling places, changes in the municipal

boundaries and a change from ward to at-large election of aldermen were subject to preclearance

under Section 5. Pending the designation of a three-judge panel, the district court temporarily

restrained the elections, but subsequently the three-judge panel dissolved the injunction and

dismissed the complaint. The elections were held pursuant to the challenged changes. On

appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the changes implicated Section 5. However,

the court declined to set aside the elections and instead remanded to the district court with

instructions to enjoin future enforcement of the changes until the changes were precleared and to

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

fashion an appropriate remedy with respect to the election that already had occurred. The court

noted that “[i]n certain circumstances for example, it might be appropriate to enter an order

affording local officials an opportunity to seek federal approval and ordering a new election only

if local officials fail to do so or if the required federal approval is not forthcoming.” Perkins, 400

U.S. at 396-97.

While Berry and Perkins are not precisely on point, these cases leave no doubt that this

Court may fashion an appropriate post-election remedy for the Section 5 violation alleged by

Plaintiffs if and when it is determined that a change requiring Section 5 preclearance has

occurred. The alternative is to enjoin an election that is less than four weeks away, in which

absentee voting already has commenced, and in connection with which the State of California

already has expended millions of dollars in public funds. While post-election determination of

Section 5 issues ordinarily is not desirable, the Court concludes that the equities and the totality

of the circumstances presented in this case render continued abstention the most appropriate of

the several undesirable courses open to it.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to lift the stay is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to

terminate Plaintiffs’ remaining motions without prejudice.

DATED: October 12, 2005

/s/ electronic signature authorized 

__________________________________

RICHARD TALLMAN

United States Circuit Judge

/s/ electronic signature authorized 

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

/s/ electronic signature authorized 

__________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-2950 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO LIFT STAY

(JFLC2)

Copies of Order served on:

Joaquin Guadalupe Avila avilaj@seattleu.edu

Leroy W. Blankenship blankenshipl@co.monterey.ca.us, edwards-jamesg@co.monterey.ca.us

Thomas S. Knox tknox@klalawfirm.com, hharman@klalawfirm.com

Zackery P. Morazzini zackery.morazzini@doj.ca.gov

James F Sweeney jfs@sweeney-greene.com, ndb@sweeney-greene.com

John David Trasvina jtrasvina@maldef.org, ekensinger@maldef.org

Case 5:05-cv-02950-JF Document 81 Filed 10/12/05 Page 10 of 10