Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01536/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01536-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JDDL

WO BL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Milton Lee Tucker, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Ralph Kluff, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 03-1536-PHX-RCB (JRI)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

and 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff filed an Amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint, alleging that his

constitutional rights were violated when (1) Defendants Ralph Kluff, ACI Manager, and Ken

Willy, ACI Supervisor, allowed Plaintiff to operate an unsafe power tool during a training

session on May 12, 1999; and (2) Defendants Librarian Jones and Correctional Officer

Crouch denied him access to the courts because Defendant Jones would not provide him the

address of the court and Defendant Crouch failed to determine the status of his case (Doc.

#11). Currently pending is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #50).

I. Defendants Willy and Jones

In a footnote, Defendants indicate that Willy and Jones have not been served and

should be dismissed (Doc. #50). “If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon

a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on

its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to

that defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). On July 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed his Amended

Complaint naming Willy and Jones as Defendants (Doc. #11). Neither Defendant has been

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served. However, because Plaintiff is entitled to notice prior to the dismissal of his action

as to the unserved Defendants, Plaintiff will be provided 30 days from the date of this order

to either serve Defendants Willy or Jones or show good cause why this action should not be

dismissed as to either Defendant. 

The Court, upon a showing of good cause, may extend the time for service for an

appropriate period. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). It should be noted that this Court is not inclined to

grant additional time in which to serve Defendants. First, this case has been pending for

more than three years, far beyond any “appropriate period” this Court would be inclined to

extend to Plaintiff for service. Second, to date, Plaintiff has not shown good cause for the

failure to serve Defendants. “So long as the prisoner has furnished the information necessary

to identify the defendant, the [M]arshal’s failure to effect service ‘is automatically good

cause within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).’” Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 10082, 1085-

86 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1426 (7th Cir. 1996).

ADOC has provided the Marshal Service with updated addresses for Defendants Willy and

Jones (Doc. #21). The Marshal Service attempted to serve these Defendants at those

addresses, and even went to Defendant Jones’ last place of employment (Docs. ##22, 26).

Despite repeated attempts, the Marshal Service were unable to serve Defendants Willy and

Jones (Id.). Based on the record, the Marshal Service’s failure has not resulted in the lack

of service. The failure to serve Defendants is the result of Plaintiff being unable to provide

sufficient information regarding Defendants’ whereabouts. Moreover, this Court has already

indicated that it will not require Defendants Kluff and Crouch to do the research for Plaintiff

(Doc. #44). Although it might seem unfair due to Plaintiff’s incarceration, this Court is loath

to place such a burden on those who are either not parties to the instant action or not privy

to information, particularly when a non-party has already attempted to provide this Court

with such information.

II. Motion to Dismiss

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 The proper spelling of Defendant Kluff’s name is Cluff.

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Defendants Kluff1 and Crouch filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing, inter alia, that

(1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Count II, and (2) Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by the relevant statute of limitations (Doc. #50). Plaintiff responded that

he does not have access to legal materials, the instant motion is intended to harass him, the

Court already rejected Defendants’ statute of limitations argument, and he did not file a

grievance because the administration refuses to process expired grievances, “so there was no

point in continuing” (Doc. #56). Plaintiff further argues that the courts have made a mess

of his case and as a result, illegally and unconstitutionally made it impractical to pursue his

grievance (Id.). Plaintiff offered to exhaust his remedies, however, if this Court would issue

an order showing that the administrative remedies were not “useless” (Id.).

A. Count I - Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that Count I is time-barred (Doc. #50). Plaintiff insists that he has

aggressively pursued his action as evidenced by his filings in the state courts, but does not

have access to legal materials, resulting in a fundamentally unfair proceeding (Doc. #45).

Plaintiff believes that the instant action is not barred by the statute of limitations (Id.).

“Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations.” TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the Court borrows Arizona’s statute of

limitations, which is two-years. Id.

Plaintiff was injured on May 12, 1999, and filed the instant action on August 7, 2003,

more than four years later (Docs. ##1, 11). Accordingly, unless the limitations period is

tolled, Plaintiff’s action is barred by the requisite limitations period. This Court also borrows

Arizona’s tolling rules. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 992. “If an action is commenced within the

time limit for the action, and the action is terminated in any manner other than by abatement,

voluntary dismissal, dismissal for lack of prosecution or a final judgment on the merits, the

plaintiff . . . may commence a new action for the same cause after the expiration of the time

so limited and within six months after such termination.” Ariz. Stat. § 12-504.

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Plaintiff alleged that he filed a complaint in the Pinal County Court in July 2000

which was within the two-year limitations period (Doc. #45). Plaintiff alleged that the

Arizona Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on August 22, 2002 (Id.). Plaintiff had six

months pursuant to § 12-504 to file the instant action. However, Plaintiff did not file the

instant action until almost a year later in August 2003 (Doc. #1). Consequently, Plaintiff’s

action is not timely under Arizona’s “savings statute.”

Finally, Plaintiff claims that because this Court previously denied a Motion to Dismiss

due to the statute of limitations, Defendants may not again seek such relief (Docs. ##44, 56).

However, the Court denied the prior motion because the issue had not been fully briefed; the

merits were not addressed. Defendants are not barred from reasserting this defense. Thus,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Count I will be granted.

B. Count II - Failure to Exhaust

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner may

not bring a lawsuit with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless all

available administrative remedies are exhausted. See Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016, 1017

(9th Cir. 2006). Exhaustion is mandated “regardless of the relief offered through

administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). It is required in

all inmate suits regarding prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002). To be

“properly exhausted,” the prisoner “must complete the administrative review process in

accordance with the applicable rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit

in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). 

 Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court considers exhaustion as a matter

of abatement in an unenumerated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) motion and “may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. The Court has

broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988). The proper

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remedy when a “prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies . . . is dismissal of the claim

without prejudice.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

An inmate may use the prison grievance system for issues relating to “[p]roperty,

staff, visitation, mail, food services, institutional procedures, Department Written

Instructions, program access, medical care, religion, and conditions of confinement.” To file

an inmate grievance, the inmate must first submit a complaint to their assigned Correctional

Officer III. If the complaint is not resolved at this level, the inmate may submit a formal

Inmate Grievance to the Institution/Unit Grievance Coordinator. The inmate may appeal the

Grievance Coordinator’s decision to the Warden or Deputy Warden, and then to the Director.

The Director’s response is final (Doc. #50, ex. A, attachment 1).

Defendant Crouch and Aurora Aguilar, a Hearing Officer, attested that Plaintiff did

not grieve his complaint about Defendant Crouch’s failure to determine the status of his case

(Doc. #50, exs. A, B). The record demonstrates that Plaintiff did file an inmate grievance

concerning a missed court deadline due to the inability to copy documents (Doc. #50, ex. C).

However, Plaintiff’s grievance did not mention the actions of Defendant Crouch and the

grievance was resolved at the Correctional Officer level (Id.). Defendant Crouch has

demonstrated that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Count II

because (1) Plaintiff’s grievance did not refer to Defendant Crouch’s failure to check on the

status of his case, and (2) Plaintiff not pursue his remedies through the entire administrative

process. 

Plaintiff’s contentions that filing grievances was useless, and that his failure to do so

was in response to the Court’s action, is without merit. Plaintiff did not attempt to grieve the

claims in Count II, and cannot rely merely on his belief that such attempt would be useless

or futile. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 (providing that exhaustion is mandated “regardless of

the relief offered through administrative procedures”); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d

926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a prisoner has exhausted his administrative

remedies if he has been “reliably informed” that there were no available remedies). Further,

Plaintiff is required to exhaust prior to bringing the instant action, and may not place the

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blame for his failure to do so with the Court. See Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d

1047,1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (providing that a prisoner must exhaust available administrative

remedies before bringing suit). Thus, his offer to grieve his claims while this action is

pending is of no avail. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Count

II.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants Kluff and Crouch’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #50) is granted.

Defendants Kluff (Cluff) and Crouch are dismissed from this action. 

(2) Within 30 days from the date of this Order Plaintiff must either serve Defendants

Willy or Jones with his Amended Complaint or show good cause why Defendants Willy or

Jones should not be dismissed without prejudice.

(3) If, within 30 days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff fails to serve Defendant

Willy or Jones or show good cause why they should not be dismissed, the Clerk of Court

must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice.

Dated this 18th day of October, 2006.

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