Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01073/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01073-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT AVILA, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

STUART SHERMAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:18-cv-01073-NONE-JDP

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO DENY THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS AND TO DECLINE TO 

ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

ECF No. 1

Petitioner Robert Avila, Jr., a state prisoner without counsel, seeks a writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. He offers three grounds for why habeas relief is warranted: 

first, he argues that a jury instruction allowing “propensity” evidence violated his right to due 

process, see id. at 19; second, he contends that it was error to instruct the jury that evidence of 

uncharged crimes could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, see id. at 26; and third, he

argues that he was denied his right to be present at all critical stages of the trial because he was 

absent during a readback of the victim’s testimony, see id. at 32. All three issues were raised and 

rejected on the merits in the California Court of Appeal, see Lodged Doc. No. 18, and the 

California Supreme Court denied the petition for review without comment. Because these 

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

decisions were not contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we recommend that the court deny the 

petition and decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

I. Background

We set forth below the basic facts of the underlying offenses, as summarized by the 

California Court of Appeal. A presumption of correctness applies to these facts. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Defendant Robert Avila, Jr., was charged with seven counts of 

committing a lewd or lascivious act upon D.B.,1 a child under 14 

years of age (Pen. Code,§ 288, subd. (a) [counts 1-7]); and 11 

counts of committing a forcible act of sexual penetration upon D.B. 

(id.,§ 289, subd. (a) [counts 8-18]). Later, at the prosecution’s 

request, counts 16 through 18 were dismissed. The information 

alleged that defendant perpetrated the offenses underlying counts 1 

through 7 between January 1988 and July 18, 1988, when D.B. was 

13 years old; and perpetuated the offenses underlying counts 8 

through 15 between August 1988 and November 1989, when D.B. 

was at least 14 years old. The information also alleged that the 

special supplementary statute of limitations for certain sex crimes 

against minors (id.;·§ 803, subd. (f)(l)) controlled.

The jury found defendant guilty as charged. In a bifurcated 

proceeding, the trial court deemed the criminal action timely under 

Penal Code section 803, subdivision (f)(l). Defendant received an 

aggregate sentence of 84 years: eight years on each of counts 1 and 

8 through 15; and two years on each of counts 2 through 7. 

Lodged Doc. No. 18 at 2. 

II. Discussion

General Federal Habeas Legal Standards

A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 

(2000). Section 2254 of Title 28, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), governs a state prisoner’s habeas petition. See Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 97 (2011). To decide a § 2254 petition, a federal court examines the decision of the 

last state court that issued a reasoned opinion on petitioner’s habeas claims. See Wilson v. Sellers, 

138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). We must defer to that decision and cannot grant habeas relief for 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state proceeding unless it was contrary to 

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

If obtaining habeas relief under § 2254 is difficult, “that is because it was meant to be.” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. As the Supreme Court has put it, federal habeas review “disturbs the 

State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish 

some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises 

of federal judicial authority.” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). Our habeas review authority serves as 

a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for 

ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102-03 (emphasis added). 

Petitioner’s First Claim: The Constitutionality of “CALCRIM No. 1191”

Petitioner first claims that one of the jury instructions used in his case, “CALCRIM No. 

1191,” was an unconstitutional violation of due process. See ECF No. 1 at 19. This instruction 

allowed the jury to consider evidence of uncharged sex offenses to find that a criminal defendant 

had a propensity to commit the charged act. Id.

1

 On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal 

considered and rejected this claim, noting that it was bound by a decision of the California 

Supreme Court that rejected a similar due process challenge to the California Rule of Evidence on 

which the jury instruction was based. See Lodged Doc. No. 18 at 11; see also People v. Falsetta, 

21 Cal. 4th 903, 922 (1999) (“We conclude, consistent with prior state and federal case law, that 

section 1108 [the relevant section of the state evidence code] survives defendant’s due process 

challenge.”). 

Petitioner contends that Falsetta itself is unconstitutional. See ECF No. 1 at 21. But this 

argument fails: petitioner has not shown that his state proceeding (bound by Falsetta) “resulted in 

a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 

 

1 As an illustration, part of the jury instruction stated: “If you decide that the defendant committed 

the uncharged offenses, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the 

defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also 

conclude that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit Lewd and Lascivious Acts with 

a Child under the age of 14 and Sexual Penetration by Force, as charged here.” ECF No. 1 at 19.

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

(emphasis added). Petitioner cites no holding of the Supreme Court suggesting that the 

instruction at issue or the California Supreme Court’s decision in Falsetta are unconstitutional. 

Indeed, as petitioner acknowledges, the Supreme Court has expressly withheld judgment on that

question. See ECF No. 1 at 21; see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (“[W]e 

express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted 

the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.”). For this 

reason, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed decisions denying habeas petitions in similar 

contexts. See, e.g., Delira v. Runnels, 213 F. App’x 580, 581 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The admission of 

[propensity] evidence was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, as the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question whether propensity evidence 

violates the Due Process Clause.”); Salazar v. Galaza, No. 04-17063, 2005 WL 3113475, at *1 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the jury instructions 

regarding prior sexual offenses did not violate Salazar’s due process rights is not contrary to 

clearly established federal law.”); Turner v. Mayle, 84 F. App’x 866, 868 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Turner 

claims that California Evidence Code § 1108 violates due process by allowing admission of 

evidence of prior sexual crimes . . . . We reject this argument because the Supreme Court has 

explicitly left open the question of whether the admission of evidence of other crimes solely to 

prove propensity violates due process.”). Here, likewise, the Court of Appeal’s decision on 

propensity issue was not contrary to clearly established federal law, and we have no authority to 

second-guess it.

Petitioner’s Second Claim: The Burden of Proof 

Petitioner’s second claim is related to the first: he argues that, by instructing the jury that 

uncharged crimes could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence and used as evidence for a 

propensity to commit the charged crimes, the jury instructions violated his right to have the 

charged crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See ECF No. 1 at 26. The California Court of 

Appeal considered this claim and rejected it on the merits, holding that it was not “reasonably 

likely” that “a jury could interpret the instructions to authorize conviction of the charged offenses 

based on a lowered standard of proof”—that is, lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. Lodged 

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Doc. No. 18 at 16 (citations and international quotations omitted); see also Boyde v. California, 

494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990) (describing this “reasonable likelihood” standard for evaluating a claim 

that a jury instruction is ambiguous and prone to an unlawful interpretation). 

We agree with the California Court of Appeal. The trial court gave two instructions that 

are relevant here. The first was CALCRIM No. 220, which generally described the beyond-areasonable doubt standard:

The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against . . . defendant 

is not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased 

against . . . defendant just because he has been arrested, charged 

with a crime[,] or brought to trial. A defendant in a criminal case is 

presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the 

People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they

must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless I specifically tell 

you otherwise. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt leaves you with an 

abiding conviction that the evidence is true. The evidence need not 

eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to 

some possible or imaginary doubt.

In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a

reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all 

the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless 

the evidence proves . . . defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not 

guilty.

Lodged Doc. No. 18 at 14 (emphasis added). The second was CALCRIM No. 1191, the 

“uncharged offenses” instruction to which petitioner objects above:

The People presented evidence that . . . defen[dant] committed [sex] 

crime[s] . . . that were not charged in this case. . . . You may 

consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that . . . defendant, in fact, 

committed the uncharged offenses.

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of

proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a

preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely 

than not that the fact is true. If the People have not met this burden 

of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely.

If you decide that . . . defendant committed the uncharged

offense[s], you may, but are not required to . . . conclude from that

evidence that . . . defendant was disposed or inclined to commit 

sexual offenses, and based on that decision[,] also conclude that . . . 

defendant was likely to commit, and did commit, lewd and 

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14, and sexual 

penetration by force[,] as charged here. If you conclude that . . . 

defendant committed the uncharged offenses, that conclusion is 

only one factor to consider, along with all the other evidence. It is 

not sufficient by itself to prove that . . . defendant is guilty of lewd 

and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14, or sexual 

penetration by force. The People must still prove each charge 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Lodged Doc. No. 18 at 15 (emphasis added). These instructions do not create a reasonable 

likelihood of misinterpretation by the jury. On the contrary, the instructions explain that, even if 

the jury concludes that the defendant was disposed to commit sexual offenses, the charged 

offenses must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt—as the federal Constitution requires. See In 

re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The California Court of Appeal violated no federal law in 

concluding that the instructions in this case complied with this federal constitutional requirement. 

See also Schultz v. Tilton, 659 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a similar2 California 

jury instruction “in no way suggests that a jury could reasonably convict a defendant for charged 

offenses based merely on a preponderance of the evidence”). 

Petitioner’s Third Claim: Required Presence at Trial’s Critical Stages

Petitioner’s third and final claim is that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to 

be present at all critical stages of the trial by allowing a readback of the victim’s testimony when 

he was not in the courtroom. ECF No. 1 at 32; see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 

(1983) (recognizing a criminal defendant’s right to be present at all “critical stages” of a trial, but 

not enumerating these stages in detail). Defense counsel was present and agreed to waive his 

client’s presence. 

The California Court of Appeal considered this claim on the merits and rejected it, 

observing that the United States Supreme Court has never held that a testimony readback is a 

“critical stage” of trial at which a defendant must be present, and that the California Supreme 

 

2 The instruction at issue in Schultz said, in relevant part: “[I]f you find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant committed prior sexual offenses, that is not sufficient by itself to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crimes. If you determine an 

inference properly can be drawn from this evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to 

consider, along with all other evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been proved 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime.” 659 F.3d at 943.

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Court had repeatedly held that it is not. See Lodged Doc. No. 18 at 26. The Court of Appeal was 

correct: The United States Supreme Court has indeed never held that a readback is critical stage at 

which a defendant must be present. See, e.g., La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“The Court . . . has never addressed whether readback of testimony to a jury is a ‘critical 

stage of the trial’ triggering a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to be present.”). A 

defendant has the right “to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, 

reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Snyder v. 

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). Given the lack of Supreme Court precedent on point, 

a reasonable jurist may think that the desire to be present at a testimony readback did not 

implicate such a fundamental right—the testimony had already been offered, and defendant 

already had a chance to confront the witness. The California Court of Appeals thus did not 

produce “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(d)(1); see also La Crosse, 244 F.3d at 708 (“Given the divergence of opinion on this issue 

and the lack of clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court, we cannot say that the 

California court’s determination [that defendant did not need to be present during readback] was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”).

III. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute right to appeal a district 

court’s denial of a petition; he may appeal only in limited circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Rule 11 Governing § 2254 Cases requires a 

district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order adverse to a 

petitioner. See also Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(a); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th 

Cir. 1997). A certificate of appealability will not issue unless a petitioner makes “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires 

the petitioner to show that “jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of 

his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; accord Slack v. 

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Thus, we recommend that the court not issue a certificate of 

appealability.

IV. Findings and Recommendations

The court should deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, and decline to 

issue a certificate of appealability. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the 

U.S. District Court judge presiding over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of 

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty days of the service of the findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 

objections to the findings and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. 

That document must be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” The district judge will then review the findings and recommendations under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

No. 205.

Case 1:18-cv-01073-DAD-JDP Document 13 Filed 06/09/20 Page 8 of 8