Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00728/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00728-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In 2011, Jesus Aleman was convicted of various serious crimes. The trial court sentenced him 

to life with the possibility of parole plus 120 years-to-life. In this action, he claims the Court should 

grant his habeas petition due to ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, instructional error 

by the trial court, bias by the trial court and because of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court finds 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any grounds for the relief he seeks and recommends his petition be 

DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2011, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, shooting at an 

inhabited dwelling, and shooting from a motor vehicle. (Doc. 13, Ex. A, p. 55) The jury found true the

firearms and gang enhancements. (Id.) As a result, the trial court sentenced him to a custodial term of 

life with the possibility of parole plus a term of 120 years-to-life.

JESUS ALEMAN,

 Petitioner,

v.

CDCR, Director,

Respondent.

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Case No. 1:14-cv-00728-LJO-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS 

(Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

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Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the ―5th

DCA‖), which affirmed the conviction. (Lodged Document (―LD‖) 19; Doc. 13, Ex. A) He next

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, but that court denied it. (LD 20) Petitioner 

then filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court that was denied. (LD 22) In its 

summary denial, the court cited People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995), and In re Swain, 34 

Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949). (Id.) 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA‘s unpublished decision1:

First Trial

Shortly before 5:40 p.m. on October 3, 2009, Raylyne Subia was driving her white Pontiac to 

the Super 7 on Inyo Street, Tulare, to get gas. With her was Alexander Espino, a northern gang 

associate. They were on Inyo, waiting for a train to pass, when a black Honda Civic pulled up 

next to the driver's side of the Pontiac. There were perhaps five people in the Honda, all staring. 

Subia saw the Honda's driver and front passenger with a gun, although she was not sure if each 

had his own gun or if the driver passed the gun to the passenger.

Once the train passed, Subia continued on to the Super 7. The black car came back around 

toward Inyo, then pulled over on I Street, near to where Subia and Espino were pumping gas. 

The driver pointed a gun at Subia. Espino took his own gun out in response, but did not point it 

at anyone. Subia did not remember where they went when they left the Super 7. Shown a 

photographic lineup by police, Subia and Espino each identified defendant as the person who 

pointed the gun. 

Shortly after the incident at the Super 7, Isabel Rodriguez, her sister Mireya Rodriguez, brother 

Antonio Rodriguez, and friend Lovina Gonzalez, were in the garage of the Rodriguez apartment 

in the 100 block of West Owens, at I Street, in Tulare. Also present were George Vieira, 

Anthony Brooks, and Raymond. Everyone was just ―hang[ing] out,‖ talking, and Raymond 

may have been smoking a cigarette. The car door to the garage was open. Isabel did not see 

anyone with a weapon.

According to Isabel, three vehicles passed by while the teenagers were in the garage. The 

people in the first two vehicles merely stared. The third vehicle, a black Honda, passed by on I 

Street. Isabel saw two people in the front, and either two or three people in the back. Defendant 

was driving. Jesus Vargas, whom Isabel knew from school and who associated with southern 

gang members, was the front seat passenger. The first time they passed, no weapon was 

displayed. They drove slowly by and ―mugged‖ those in the garage (―staring at [them] real 

ugly‖), then turned down Owens Street and went around the block. The black Honda drove past 

again and made a U-turn. On one occasion when they passed, Vargas ―threw up a three‖ with 

his fingers—something southerners do—and said something. After the car made the U-turn, 

defendant pulled out a revolver and started shooting. Isabel heard three or four shots, about a 

second's pause, and then a couple more. She did not remember if defendant said anything to 

those in the garage before he started shooting. She just remembered people screaming. 

 

1

The 5th DCA‘s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

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Defendant, who was closest to Isabel, held the gun with his arm extended, while Vargas held 

the steering wheel. When defendant first pointed the gun, Isabel was outside of the garage. The 

others were still inside it. Defendant was pointing the gun at the entrance of the garage.

Mireya said she had been shot, then fell to the ground. Isabel and Lovina picked her up and 

tried to move her inside, as shots were still being fired. Isabel called 911. Other than Mireya, 

no one was injured in the shooting.

Officer O'Donohoe of the Tulare Police Department was the first officer on the scene. He 

arrived at approximately 5:45 p.m., and found Mireya lying on the cement walkway between 

the doors of the two apartments closest to I Street. She was conscious and vomiting, and near 

her navel was what appeared to be the entrance wound of a small caliber bullet. O'Donohoe 

took a statement from Isabel, who was wearing a red 49ers jacket.

No shell casings were found at the scene, suggesting the gun used was a revolver. Police 

counted five shots to the structure itself, including two that went through the back wall of the 

garage into the apartment beyond, plus a sixth to Mireya.

Mireya died from a gunshot wound to the abdomen. The bullet, which lodged in her spine and 

was determined to be .22 caliber, went through the abdominal aorta, causing her to bleed to 

death internally.

A day or two after the shooting, defendant, who was under arrest, waived his rights and spoke to 

Detectives Brian and James Haney. Defendant, whose moniker was ―Brown Boy,‖ denied 

being involved in any kind of gang, but admitted hanging out with the South Side Kings, a 

southern gang. On Saturday, he drove to Mulcahy Park in the black four-door Honda Civic that 

belonged to his father-in-law. He arrived at the park around 5:30 or 5:40 p.m. There were about 

10 people at the park. He stayed until around 8:00 p.m., but some northerners came and there 

was shooting, so he just walked to his friend's house. He left the car at the park. When he 

returned, the police came, so he gave the keys to his friend ―Charito,‖ who took the car. 

Defendant did not want to get caught because he did not have a license. When the fight broke 

out at the park, Charito had a .45–caliber gun. Defendant stated that he himself never carried a 

gun.

After further discussion, defendant denied being involved in an incident in which he shot a gun 

from his car. He related that before he went to the park, he went to the fairgrounds. When he 

left, he drove down Inyo Street and got stopped by a train. A white car pulled up next to him. A 

woman was driving. The man in the car lowered the window and pointed a gun at defendant. 

Defendant recognized the man as being a northerner. After the train passed, the white car went 

to the Super 7. Defendant drove past and turned around and slowly drove past again, and the 

man took out the gun again. Defendant then just left for the park. Defendant admitted Jesus 

Vargas was in the car with him when this happened. Told Vargas had talked to the detectives, 

defendant insisted he only went to the park. He denied anyone in his car had a gun, but 

admitted a Sureño known as ―Mundo‖ and someone called ―Morte‖ (meaning death) were also 

in the car. Defendant denied ever going on I Street. Defendant admitted taking the Marquis 

Auto Sales license plate frame and the crown decal off of the car.

Eventually, defendant said he did not mean for someone to get hurt. Defendant was not trying 

to hurt anyone or scare them; he was not the one who shot. Defendant named Charito as the 

person who shot. After further discussion, defendant said he was not trying to kill anyone. Told 

he had been picked out of photo lineups and asked whether he wanted to kill someone or just to 

scare them, defendant said ―scare.‖ He admitted shooting more than once, although he did not 

know how many times, with a small, .22–caliber gun. Defendant claimed Vargas, Michael 

(whose nickname was ―Bullet,‖ but whose last name defendant did not know), and Morte also 

shot. After the shooting, the guns—which belonged to the gang—disappeared. Morte took them 

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both. 

Defendant said he felt bad about what happened. Asked what caused him to do it, defendant 

said some fat guy acted like he had a gun. Defendant did not see a gun, but that was how he had 

gotten shot once before. Defendant admitted being involved in gangs since he was 12. He 

claimed Morte was the one who pointed the gun at the man in the white car. As for the house at 

which the shooting occurred, defendant frequently passed by there. It was close to Super 7. The 

people at the house called him a ―scrap.‖

Tulare Police Officer Guzman testified as an expert in criminal street gangs. He explained that 

a gang is three or more people who associate together on a regular basis, and who have common 

symbols, numbers, and colors that they use to identify themselves. They usually ―hang out‖ in a 

certain area. They have a hierarchy, and they collectively and individually engage in criminal 

activity to benefit the gang. Sureños—also known as southerners—are a gang that started in the 

prison system. South Side Kings, or SSK, is a local clique that falls under the umbrella of the 

Sureño gang. The primary activities of the southern gang are homicide, attempted homicide, 

drive-by shooting, robbery, drug sales, extortion, rape, and assault with deadly weapons. The 

South Side Kings claim what they call the southwest, which is on the west side of Tulare in the 

area of Mulcahy School. They wear blue and claim the number 13, while their rivals—

Norteños or northerners—wear red and claim the number 14. South Side Kings have usually 

had orders to do what they have to, including fighting, stabbing, and shooting, when they come 

across rival gang members.

Guzman researched defendant, whose moniker was Brown Boy and who had a tattoo of three 

dots, which represented the number 13, on a finger. In Guzman's opinion, defendant was an 

active southern gang member. Through hypothetical questions, Guzman opined the shooting in 

this case promoted and benefitted the gang. He explained that ―scrap‖ is a derogatory term used 

by northern gang members to disrespect southern gang members. Respect is important in the 

gang culture. A gang member cannot let an insult, such as being called a scrap, go; to do so 

would allow the gang member to be seen as weak by both fellow and rival gang members, and 

weakness is not welcome in a gang. The shooting would benefit the gang by intimidating and 

inflicting fear on rival gang members. It would also benefit the gang by intimidating citizens in 

the area.

Retrial on Count 1

Shortly before 5:40 p.m. on October 3, 2009, Raylyne Subia and Alexander Espino, a 

northerner, were waiting near the Super 7 in Tulare for a train to pass, when a black Honda 

containing a ―carload of people‖ pulled up alongside. Someone in the car said something about 

South Side Kings, and one of the vehicle's occupants waived a gun at Subia and Espino.

Subia and Espino continued on to the Super 7. A black Honda drove by and pulled over to the 

curb on I Street while Subia was pumping gas, and the driver pointed a gun at her. Espino 

pulled out his own gun, but did not point it. The couple got in Subia's car and left. The Honda 

was headed southbound on I Street, and Subia went the opposite way. When Subia 

subsequently was shown a photographic lineup, she identified defendant as the person she 

thought was the Honda's driver.

Shortly after the incident at the Super 7, Isabel Rodriguez was at her house at the intersection of 

I Street and Owens. She, her sister Mireya, brother Antonio, friends Lovina Gonzalez and 

Raymond, and Antonio's friends George Vieira and Anthony Brooks, were in the garage, talking 

and ―hanging out.‖ Nobody had any weapons. 

A black Honda containing four or five people drove slowly by, headed southbound on I Street. 

Defendant was driving. Isabel recognized the front passenger as Jesus Vargas, with whom she 

had gone to school and whom she knew to associate with southerners. At some point, Vargas 

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threw up three fingers, a gang sign signifying southerners. Isabel believed he did this the first 

time the car drove by. Those in the car were looking at those in the garage, and Isabel stared at 

them as they passed. She did not hear anyone in the garage say anything to the people in the 

Honda at any time.

The car went around the block and then came back by, again slowly heading southbound. Isabel 

did not see any weapons. The car then turned around and came back north, traveling ―pretty 

slow‖ in the middle of the road. Defendant, who was still the driver, pulled out a revolver she 

believed was .22 caliber, and started shooting. Vargas held the steering wheel while defendant 

fired. Isabel was standing outside of the garage. Everyone else was in the garage. While 

defendant was still firing, Mireya said she was shot and fell to the ground. Isabel and Lovina 

tried to pick her up because she said she could not walk, but they were unable to carry her. As 

they put her on the ground, Isabel saw she had been shot in the stomach. Isabel called 911. 

Defendant turned west on Owens and drove off. Isabel believed six or seven shots were fired.

At approximately 5:45 p.m. on Saturday, October 3, 2009, Officer O'Donohoe of the Tulare 

Police Department responded to a dispatch of a shooting at a multi-residence dwelling in the 

100 block of West Owens in Tulare. He was the first officer on the scene, and arrived to find 

Mireya lying on the ground with people surrounding her. She was still alive, but had an 

entrance wound for what appeared to be a small caliber handgun next to her navel. She was 

vomiting. Mireya subsequently died. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to the abdomen. 

A bullet that was approximately .22 caliber was recovered from her spine. It had gone through 

her abdominal aorta, causing her to bleed to death within minutes. Assuming Mireya was 

standing when shot, the track of the bullet was front to back, approximately horizontal, and 30 

degrees right to left. 

Six bullet holes were found inside the garage. Several went completely through the wall shared 

by the garage and residence beyond. No shell casings were found, indicating the weapon used 

was probably a revolver. Twenty-two-caliber revolvers typically hold six-to-eight rounds. No 

gun was ever found in this case.

At the time of the shooting, Lovina was wearing a red hat. Isabel, Mireya, and Lovina 

associated with northerners, but nobody inside the garage was wearing red clothing aside from 

the hat. Although Isabel was wearing a red jacket when interviewed by the police, she did not 

put it on until after the shooting. The day after the shooting, Isabel was shown photographic 

lineups and identified defendant as the driver and Vargas as the passenger.

Vargas was arrested early on the morning after the shooting. Defendant was arrested that 

evening. Although he was on foot at the time, he confirmed he drove a black Honda. At the 

time of his arrest, he was wearing a black shirt with a light blue-and-white logo and letter S on 

the front. In the experience of Tulare Police Detective Brian Haney, this was consistent with 

attire that Sureño gang members would wear.

Haney executed a search warrant at defendant's residence. While he was there, a black Honda 

driven by defendant's girlfriend pulled up. The car was consistent with the Honda visible on the 

video taken at Super 7 of the incident involving Subia and Espino. In the trash next to the 

driveway was a discarded decal consistent with the crown decal described by witnesses to the 

shooting. No blue clothing or gang indicia were found in the residence. However, a CD case 

with ―SSK‖ on the front was found in the driver's map pocket of the Honda. A metal dog tag on 

the ignition key ring had ―Kings‖ with a crown on the front. No ammunition or ballistics 

evidence was found in the car.

Haney interviewed defendant following his arrest and after advising defendant of his rights. 

Defendant admitted being in the area of Super 7, and said he recognized Espino and knew him 

to be a northerner. Defendant said he himself associated with the southerners. Defendant 

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admitted driving a four-door, black Honda Civic, and said it belonged to his live-in girlfriend. 

Defendant admitted the car had had a crown decal in the back window, but said he took it and 

the Marquis Auto Sales license plate frame off of the car after the shooting.

Defendant admitted being involved in the shooting. He said he was driving the Honda, and 

there were three other people in the car. Defendant identified Jesus Vargas as the front 

passenger, but would not identify, by full name, the two people in the back. He related that 

after the incident at Super 7, he proceeded southbound on I Street and passed the victim's 

residence. He saw several people in the garage and believed they were northerners. He drove 

past the residence, then made a U-turn and came back. He then fired a .22–caliber handgun at 

the people he thought were northerners.

Officer Guzman testified as a gang expert. SSK—South Side Kings—is a clique of the Sureño 

gang that had about 15 to 20 members at the time of trial, and possibly 30 members in 2009. In 

the prison system in the 1960's, inmates from Southern California formed the Mexican Mafia to 

protect themselves from other prison gangs, like their main rivals the Nuestra Familia. 

Sureños—southerners—identify with the color blue and the number 13, the latter representing 

the 13th letter of the alphabet, M, which shows allegiance to the Mexican Mafia. A tattoo of 

three dots is common and goes back to the number 13. Northern gang members, also known as 

Norteños, are the rivals of Sureños. Norteños identify with the color red and the number 14. 

The latter represents the 14th letter of the alphabet, N, for northern or ―Norte.‖ Four dots is a 

common Norteño tattoo. 

A Sureño will commonly hold up three fingers to indicate his allegiance to the southern gang. 

Hand signs usually are shown to rival gang members as a form of disrespect. Guzman had 

investigated and heard of cases in Tulare in which Sureños identified themselves to rival gang 

members, by hand signs or shouting their gang name, just before committing a crime against 

those rivals. Rival gangs go into each other's areas and commit crimes. Doing so shows 

disrespect to the gang in whose territory the crime is committed. The 100 block of West Owens 

is considered a northern area.

In 2009, the primary activities of the Sureño gang, including the South Side Kings, were 

murder, attempted murder, robbery, carjacking, drug sales, possession of firearms, assault with 

deadly weapons, drive-by shooting, and battery. Guzman knew, and had researched, defendant. 

Defendant was a member of the South Side Kings. During a contact on September 24, 2009, 

defendant admitted to Guzman that he was an active southern gang member and had been one 

since he was 13 years old. Defendant said he was jumped in by three South Side Kings 

members for 13 seconds. At the time of his arrest in this case, defendant was with other 

southern gang members. Defendant was wearing a South Pole-brand shirt, which is commonly 

used by southern gang members because it has a blue S written on it. In addition, defendant's 

inmate classification questionnaire stated he associated with southerners and he did not get 

along with northerners.

Guzman opined that as of October 3, 2009, defendant was an active member of the South Side 

Kings Sureño gang. Guzman further opined that Jesus Vargas, with whom he was familiar from 

prior contacts, was also an active member of the South Side Kings Sureño gang on that date. 

Isabel and Mireya were associates of the northern gang, as shown by gang-related writing found

on a mirror in their home.

In answer to hypothetical questions based on the evidence adduced at trial, Guzman opined that 

a shooting such as occurred in this case was committed in association with a criminal street 

gang, in that it involved a carload of southern gang members associating together. He further 

opined it would benefit the Sureños by inflicting fear and intimidation on a rival gang and its 

associates, and by earning respect.

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(Doc. 13, Ex. A, pp. 56-67)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 

7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located 

within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(―AEDPA‖), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds 

by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute‘s 

enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed 

by its provisions.

B. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless the 

petitioner can show that the state court‘s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that ―was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

A state court decision is ―contrary to‖ clearly established federal law ―if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court‘s] cases, or ―if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.‖ 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

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In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an ―unreasonable application‖ of federal law is an objective test that turns on ―whether 

it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree‖ that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has ―said time and again that  ̳an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.‘‖ Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court 

―must show that the state court‘s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.‖ Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court‘s adjudication of the petitioner‘s claims ―resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.‖ Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court‘s factual finding is unreasonable when it is ―so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.‖ Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court‘s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). ―[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court‘s ultimate decisions.‖ Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had ―a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‘s verdict.‖ Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness).

C. Review of Petitioner‘s Claims

The petition alleges the following as grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial 

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counsel; (2) error to instruct jury on ―kill zone‖; (3) judicial bias; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; (5) 

error in reasonable doubt instruction; and (6) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence, or

to elicit evidence on cross-examination, of provocation by the victims. Petitioner believes such 

evidence would have resulted in a conviction for second degree murder rather than first degree murder. 

i. The 5th DCA‘s Opinion

The Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner‘s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as follows:

Despite finding defendant committed attempted premeditated murder with respect to the live 

victims, the jury in his first trial could not unanimously agree whether his killing of Mireya 

constituted first degree or second degree murder. The jury in the retrial of count 1 convicted 

defendant of first degree murder. Defendant now points to evidence of alleged provocative 

conduct by the victims (for example, wearing red and shouting profanity or insults at defendant 

and his group) that was presented in the first trial, but not the second. He faults his trial 

attorney for not presenting this evidence, or at least eliciting it through cross-examination, and 

says counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him because it is reasonably probable the 

absence of the evidence made the difference between a conviction of second degree murder and 

a conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances. Defendant's claim lacks merit.

The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant. (People v. Pope

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425.) ―To secure reversal of a conviction upon the ground of ineffective 

assistance of counsel under either the state or federal Constitution, a defendant must establish 

(1) that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., 

that counsel's performance did not meet the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent 

attorney, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a 

more favorable result absent counsel's shortcomings. [Citations.]  ̳A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. 

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003; see generally Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 

U.S. 668, 687–694.) This is a ― ̳high bar,‘‖ and surmounting it is not easy. (Harrington v. 

Richter (2011) 562 U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 770, 788].) 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, the defendant ―must 

establish deficient performance based upon the four corners of the record‖ (People v. 

Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1003), which ―must affirmatively disclose the lack of a 

rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Ray (1996) 

13 Cal.4th 313, 349.) ―Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.... 

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, 

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties 

inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant 

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action  ̳might be 

considered sound trial strategy.‘ [Citation.]‖ (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 

689; accord, People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 876.) In addition, the defendant must 

prove prejudice ―as a  ̳demonstrable reality,‘ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors 

or omissions of counsel. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)

In the present case, defense counsel asked the first jury to consider a verdict of voluntary 

manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or heat of passion. From the jury's verdicts on the 

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attempted murder counts—and even the numerical split on the murder charge (nine votes for 

first degree murder and three votes for second degree murder)—it was readily apparent the 

strategy was completely unsuccessful.

Under the circumstances, counsel reasonably employed different tactics at the retrial. Although 

he argued to the court, unsuccessfully, that the court might base voluntary manslaughter 

instructions on the theory that when defendant shot into the garage, he was still angry from his 

confrontation with Subia and Espino, counsel did not expend much effort in an attempt to 

garner a voluntary manslaughter verdict from evidence that simply did not demonstrate the 

requisite provocation. (See, e.g., People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 759 [for objective 

component of heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter, victim's conduct must have been 

sufficiently provocative to cause ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without 

due deliberation and reflection; standard is not reaction of ― ̳reasonable gang member,‘‖ and 

insults and gang-related challenges are insufficient to merit voluntary manslaughter instruction]; 

People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 [victim's calling defendant derogatory name 

insufficient to cause ordinary person to lose reason and judgment under objective standard; 

hence, defendant not entitled to voluntary manslaughter instruction].) Rather, recognizing his 

client had confessed—a circumstance that ―did not bode well for a successful defense‖ (People 

v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212)—defense counsel used his questioning of Detective 

Haney to try to plant the notion defendant's incriminating statement was the product of the 

detectives threatening to arrest his girlfriend and have his child taken away from him if he did 

not confess, and he focused on attacking the eyewitness identifications of defendant as the 

shooter.

―It is not deficient performance for a criminal defendant's counsel to make a reasonable tactical 

choice. [Citations.] Reasonableness must be assessed through the likely perspective of counsel 

at the time.‖ (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 445, fn. omitted; see People v. Slaughter

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1221–1222 [record on appeal failed to show use of different tactics at 

retrial was unreasonable under the circumstances].)

Moreover, defendant has manifestly failed to establish prejudice. ―To prove first degree murder 

of any kind, the prosecution must first establish a murder within section 187—that is, an 

unlawful killing with malice aforethought. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 

764, 794.) Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188.) Express malice exists when there is an 

intent to kill, while implied malice exists ―when no considerable provocation appears, or when 

the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.‖ (Ibid. ) 

Where the killing occurs upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the malice aforethought 

required for murder is negated and the offense is reduced to voluntary manslaughter. (People v. 

Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306.) 

―Provocation of a kind, to a degree, and under circumstances insufficient to fully negative or 

raise a reasonable doubt as to the idea of both premeditation and malice (thereby reducing the 

offense to manslaughter) might nevertheless be adequate to negative or raise a reasonable doubt 

as to the idea of premeditation or deliberation, leaving the homicide as murder of the second 

degree; i.e., an unlawful killing perpetrated with malice aforethought but without premeditation 

and deliberation.‖ (People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903.) In the present case, however, 

not only was defendant prosecuted for first degree murder on the theory the murder was willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated, he was also prosecuted on the alternate theory of so-called driveby murder.

Section 189 establishes drive-by murder as a separate category of first degree murder. (People 

v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 163–164; see People v. Chavez (2004) 118 

Cal.App.4th 379, 385–386.) ― ̳―A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder 

requires more than a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.]  ̳Deliberation‘ refers to careful 

weighing of considerations in forming a course of action;  ̳premeditation‘ means thought over in 

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advance. [Citations.]‖'‖ (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 172.) Drive-by first degree 

murder, by contrast, does not require a showing of premeditation and deliberation. Rather, 

―[e]ven without a showing of premeditation, if defendant was shown to have intentionally 

discharged his firearm from a motor vehicle with the specific intent to inflict death, then his 

crime was murder in the first degree by operation of section 189.‖ (People v. Sanchez (2001) 

26 Cal.4th 834, 849; accord, People v. Chavez, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 386–387 [drive-by 

murder requires specific intent to kill, but not premeditation, in order to constitute first degree 

murder under § 189].)

We are aware of no authority, and defendant cites none, in which provocation has been held to 

negate, or raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of, intent to kill. (See People v. Rogers

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 878–880 & cases cited [discussing CALJIC No. 8.73 (counterpart of 

CALCRIM No. 522), relating provocation to premeditation]; but see People v. Cole (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 1158, 1211–1212 [provocation as related to mental state required for murder by torture, 

i.e., intent to inflict extreme pain].) We know, from the jury's unanimous finding on the driveby special circumstance, that, whatever jurors concluded with respect to premeditation, they at 

least unanimously agreed defendant committed a drive-by murder with respect to which he 

harbored express malice. Given the jury's finding, the killing could not be anything less than 

first degree murder. (Cf. People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 665 [under felony-murder 

rule, killing in commission of felonies enumerated in § 189 constitutes first degree murder even 

if killer acted in unreasonable self-defense]; People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 75 [if 

jury found murder by lying in wait, provocation was irrelevant because, under § 189, murder 

could not be reduced to second degree murder].)

(Doc. 13, Ex. A, pp. 67-72).

ii. Federal Standard

Effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are reviewed according to Strickland's two-pronged test. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 

1433 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.1986); see also Penson v. Ohio, 

488 U.S. 75(1988) (holding that where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the 

assistance of counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is presumed; the 

implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present but ineffective). 

To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that counsel‘s deficient 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, Petitioner must establish that he 

suffered prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional 

errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 694. A ―reasonable probability‖ is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what 

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counsel could have done; rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. 

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1998). 

With the passage of the AEDPA, habeas relief may only be granted if the state-court decision 

unreasonably applied this general Strickland standard for ineffective assistance. Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009). Accordingly, the question ―is not whether a 

federal court believes the state court‘s determination under the Strickland standard ―was incorrect but 

whether that determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold.‖ Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Knowles, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. In effect, the AEDPA standard is ―doubly 

deferential‖ because it requires that it be shown not only that the state court determination was 

erroneous, but also that it was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). 

Moreover, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to 

reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)(―[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering 

the rule‘s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in 

case-by-case determinations‖). 

The state court identified the appropriate federal standard by applying Strickland.

2

 Thus, the 

only issue is whether the state court‘s adjudication, i.e., that defense counsel‘s representation was 

neither deficient nor prejudicial, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that it was not. 

iii. Analysis

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to present or elicit potential 

provocation evidence in re-trial on the murder charge after such evidence had been presented in the first 

trial. In rejecting that argument, the 5th DCA reasoned that a reasonable attorney could have concluded 

that different tactics were required at the re-trial because it was clear that the jury at the first trial had 

rejected his defense of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion or a sudden quarrel arising 

from Petitioner‘s earlier encounter with Subia and Espino. Under those circumstances, the state 

 

2

The 5th DCA cited Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 390-391, which, in turn, refers to Strickland.

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appellate court reasoned that a change in tactics was not unreasonable and that the tactic chosen, to 

suggest that Petitioner‘s acknowledgment of his involvement in the shooting of the victim was the 

result of the interrogator‘s threats regarding Petitioner‘s girlfriend and child, was likewise not 

unreasonable. 

Deficient performance‖ in the context of an ineffectiveness claim means unreasonable 

representation falling below professional norms prevailing at the time of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688–89. To show ―deficient performance,‖ a petitioner must overcome a ―strong presumption‖ that his 

lawyer ―rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment.‖ Id. at 690. The Court must then ―determine whether, in light of all the 

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the range of professionally competent 

assistance.‖ Id. The Supreme Court in Strickland recognized that ―it is all too easy for a court, 

examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or 

omission of counsel was unreasonable.‖ Id. at 689. Accordingly, to overturn the strong presumption of 

adequate assistance, a petitioner must demonstrate that ―the challenged action cannot reasonably be 

considered sound trial strategy under the circumstances of the case.‖ Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 

1085 (9th Cir.1999).

Furthermore, reasonable tactical decisions, including decisions with regard to the presentation 

of the case, are ―virtually unchallengeable.‖ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–90. ―The decision whether to 

call any witnesses on behalf of the defendant, and if so which witnesses to call, is a tactical decision of 

the sort engaged in by defense attorneys in almost every trial.‖ United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 

1294, 1321 (2nd Cir.1987); Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir.1991) (a tactical decision 

not to call a particular witness cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, even 

if the defendant disagrees with the decision). 

Petitioner has not alleged or otherwise demonstrated that the decisions made by his attorney 

were not a matter of sound trial tactics or that they lacked any rational tactical purpose. See e.g., 

People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581-582 (Reviewing courts will reverse convictions on the 

ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no 

rational tactical purpose for his act or omission). To the contrary, the record shows that the jury in the 

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first trial was split, with nine members voting for guilt on first degree murder, despite the fact that 

defense counsel sought to elicit evidence of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from the 

earlier encounter with Subia and Espino. Given that circumstance, it was not only reasonable, but 

eminently reasonable, for defense counsel to pursue a different defense strategy in the re-trial. Since 

Petitioner had in essence confessed to the crime already, any potential defense would have necessarily 

had to account for his acknowledgment of guilt. At the second trial, counsel‘s attempt to portray 

Petitioner‘s confession as the result of police duress and threats, while unsuccessful, was, nevertheless, 

a reasonable tactic under the circumstances. Thus, Petitioner has not shown deficient performance.

On the prejudice prong, the 5th DCA noted that Petitioner was prosecuted for first degree 

murder under two separate theories, i.e., premeditation and as a drive-by murder. Under California law, 

as the appellate court pointed out, proof of a drive-by murder requires neither premeditation nor 

deliberation. Under state law, if Petitioner discharged his firearm from a vehicle with the specific 

intent to inflict death, the crime is a first degree murder regardless of deliberation or premeditation. 

Under the circumstances in this case, the evidence supporting a first degree murder conviction for 

drive-by murder is overwhelming, as confirmed by the jury‘s finding regarding the drive-by special 

circumstance. Thus, Petitioner cannot show prejudice because counsel failed to elicit evidence of a 

sudden heat of passion at the second trial since such evidence would not have had any effect on the 

drive-by murder theory of first degree murder.

B. ―Kill Zone‖ Instructional Error

Petitioner next contends that the trial court erred in allowing the term ―kill zone‖ to be used in 

an instruction on attempted murder. Petitioner appears to argue, as he did in state court, both that the 

term was inflammatory and poorly defined in the instruction. 

1. The 5th DCA‘s Opinion

The 5th DCA denied Petitioner‘s instructional error claim as follows:

Defendant fired multiple shots at a group of people in, and just outside, a garage. With respect 

to counts 2 and 3, which charged him with attempted premeditated murder, the jury was 

instructed in pertinent part, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 600:

―The defendant is charged in Counts 2 AND 3 with attempted murder.

―To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People must prove that:

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―1. The defendant took direct but ineffective steps toward killing another person;―

AND

―2. The defendant intended to kill that person. [¶] ... [¶]

―A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at the same time intend to 

kill everyone in a particular zone of harm or  ̳kill zone.‘ In order to convict the defendant 

of the attempted murder of ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, ISABEL RODRIGUEZ, 

LOVINA GONZALEZ, ANTHONY BROOKS, AND GEORGE VIE[I]RA, the People 

must prove that the defendant not only intended to kill ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, 

ISABEL RODRIGUEZ, but also either intended to kill LOVINA GONZALEZ, 

ANTHONY BROOKS, RAYMOND LOPEZ, AND GEORGE VIE[I]RA, or intended to 

kill everyone within the kill zone. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant 

intended to kill ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, ISABEL RODRIGUEZ, LOVINA 

GONZALEZ, ANTHONY BROOKS, AND GEORGE VIE[I]RA or intended to kill, 

LOVINA GONZALEZ, ANTHONY BROOKS, RAYMOND LOPEZ, AND GEORGE 

VIE[I]RA by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not 

guilty of the attempted murder of ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, ISABEL RODRIGUEZ, 

LOVINA GONZALEZ, ANTHONY BROOKS, AND GEORGE VIE[I]RA.‖

Defendant now contends use of the term ―kill zone‖ in the instruction was inflammatory and 

unnecessary, and, hence, constituted reversible error. Alternatively, he says that if use of the 

term was proper, the trial court was required to define it because it has a technical legal 

meaning, and failure to do so was prejudicial error. We reject both claims.

The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the crime of attempted murder. (People v. 

Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 317 (Bland).) ―A person who intends to kill only one is guilty of 

the attempted (or completed) murder of that one but not also of the attempted murder of others 

the person did not intend to kill.‖ (Ibid.) Thus, in order to be convicted of multiple counts of 

attempted murder, each involving a different victim, the prosecution must prove the perpetrator 

acted with the specific intent to kill each victim. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) 

―The defendant's mental state must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder victim. 

Someone who intends to kill only one person and attempts unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of 

the attempted murder of the intended victim, but not of others.‖ (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 

328.)

A person who shoots at a group of people may nevertheless be found guilty of the attempted 

murder of everyone in the group, even if he or she primarily targeted only one of them, if the 

person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within what has been termed the ― ̳kill zone.‘ ‖ 

(Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 329.) ― ̳The intent is concurrent ... when the nature and scope of 

the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator 

intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity. For 

example, an assailant who places a bomb on a commercial airplane intending to harm a primary 

target on board ensures by this method of attack that all passengers will be killed. Similarly, 

consider a defendant who intends to kill A and, in order to ensure A's death, drives by a group 

consisting of A, B, and C, and attacks the group with automatic weapon fire or an explosive 

device devastating enough to kill everyone in the group. The defendant has intentionally created 

a ―kill zone‖ to ensure the death of his primary victim, and the trier of fact may reasonably infer 

from the method employed an intent to kill others concurrent with the intent to kill the primary 

victim....Where the means employed to commit the crime against a primary victim create a zone 

of harm around that victim, the factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that 

harm to all who are in the anticipated zone.‘‖ (Id. at pp. 329–330; see People v.Vang (2001) 87 

Cal.App.4th 554, 563–564.)

The kill zone theory thus ―addresses the question of whether a defendant charged with the 

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murder or attempted murder of an intended target can also be convicted of attempting to murder 

other, nontargeted, persons.‖ (People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 138.) ―[A] shooter may 

be convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder on a  ̳kill zone‘ theory where the evidence 

establishes that the shooter used lethal force designed and intended to kill everyone in an area 

around the targeted victim (i.e., the  ̳kill zone‘) as the means of accomplishing the killing of that 

victim. Under such circumstances, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the shooter intended to kill not only his targeted victim, but also all others he knew were in 

the zone of fatal harm. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 745–746; see 

People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 789 [intent required for attempted murder can be 

satisfied by intent to kill particular person and by generalized intent to kill someone]; but see 

People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 225, 230–231 [indiscriminate firing of single shot at 

group of persons, without more, does not amount to attempted murder of everyone in group].) 

As stated in Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 330–331: ―Even if the jury found that defendant 

primarily wanted to kill [the driver of the car] rather than [the driver's] passengers, it could 

reasonably also have found a concurrent intent to kill those passengers when defendant and his 

cohort fired a flurry of bullets at the fleeing car and thereby created a kill zone. Such a finding 

fully supports attempted murder convictions as to the passengers.‖ (Fn.omitted.)

Defendant does not challenge application of the theory of concurrent intent to his case, but says 

the legal principles should have been conveyed to the jury without using the term ―kill zone.‖ 

Use of this ―irrelevant and inflammatory‖ term, he contends, violated his federal constitutional 

rights and requires reversal of his convictions on counts 2 and 3. He recognizes that the court in 

People v. Campos (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228 (Campos) held otherwise, but urges us not to 

follow that decision.

We agree with the Attorney General that defendant's claim has been forfeited by his failure to 

object to use of the term ―kill zone‖ at trial. We previously have concluded CALCRIM No. 600 

correctly states the law. (People v. Lawrence (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.) ―A trial court 

has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request 

from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification [or modification] of an otherwise 

correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Lee

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638; see also Campos, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.)

In any event, we agree with Campos on the merits. That case rejected the argument use of the 

phrase ―kill zone‖ is inflammatory, argumentative, and inappropriate, saying: ―An instruction is 

argumentative when it recites facts drawn from the evidence in such a manner as to constitute 

argument to the jury in the guise of a statement of law. [Citation.]  ̳A jury instruction is [also] 

argumentative when it is ― ̳of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable 

to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.‘ [Citations.]‖ ' [Citation.] [¶] CALCRIM 

No. 600 merely employs a term,  ̳kill zone,‘ which was coined by our Supreme Court in Bland

and referred to in later California Supreme Court cases. [Citation.] It does not invite inferences 

favorable to either party and does not integrate facts of this case as an argument to the jury. 

Other disparaging terms, including  ̳flight‘ [citation],  ̳suppress[ion] of evidence‘ [citation] and 

 ̳consciousness of guilt‘ [citation] have been used in approved, longstanding CALJIC 

instructions. We see nothing argumentative in this instruction.‖ (Campos, supra, 156 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1244.)

Defendant argues, however, that inclusion of the term in the attempted murder instruction 

improperly suggested he ―was a person of bad character prone to committing violent acts within 

a lethal territory created by [defendant] and his companions, a  ̳kill zone.‘‖ Since inviting jurors 

to consider bad character as a basis for conviction violated due process, he claims, federal 

constitutional error occurred.

We categorically reject the notion that use of the phrase ―kill zone‖ suggests anything about a 

defendant, or that it is irrelevant to the issues, or poses a threat of prejudicing jurors against a 

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defendant. It does not run afoul of the principle that jury instructions must be neutral and 

nonargumentative. (See, e.g., People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1276, overruled on 

another ground in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835; People v. Wright (1988) 45 

Cal.3d 1126, 1143.) If anything, use of the term emphasizes the requirement of an intent to kill 

in a way ―zone of harm‖ or ―zone of danger‖ (either of which, we suspect, would come under 

challenge for improperly stating, or creating an ambiguity with respect to, the mental state 

required for attempted murder) do not. That the phrase ―zone of fatal harm‖ might convey the 

same requirement does not mean ―kill zone‖ is improper. 

Moreover, contrary to defendant's alternative claim, the trial court did not err by failing to 

define ―kill zone‖ for jurors. As defendant acknowledges, the California Supreme Court has 

rejected the argument such a definition is required. (E.g., People v. Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 

pp. 137–138; People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 756–757; Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 

331, fn. 6.) Defendant's assertion we should address the issue despite this adverse authority 

necessarily fails. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

(Doc. 13, Ex. A, pp. 77-82).

2. Federal Standard

The issue of whether a jury instruction is a violation of state law is neither a federal question nor 

a proper subject for habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). ("We have stated 

many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. 

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O‘Connor, J., 

concurring) (―mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, 

may not be corrected on federal habeas‖). Indeed, federal courts are bound by state court rulings on 

questions of state law. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 

942 (1989). 

In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, the inquiry is not how reasonable jurors could or would 

have understood the instruction as a whole; rather, the Court must inquire whether there is a 

―reasonable likelihood‖ that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 

Constitution. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72 & n. 4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 

(1990). However, a determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the 

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred. 

See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the Court also must determine 

that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict before 

granting habeas relief. See Id. at 146–47 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)).

In determining whether instructional error warrants habeas relief, a habeas court must consider 

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― ̳whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates 

due process‘ ... not merely whether  ̳the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally 

condemned.‘‖ Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 

141, 146-47 (1973)); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (challenge in habeas to the trial court‘s 

jury instructions is reviewed under the standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637--whether the 

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‘s verdict). The burden 

of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack 

on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to 

establish plain error on direct appeal. Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ―protects the accused against conviction 

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 

he is charged.‖ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In a criminal case, an evidentiary device 

must not undermine the fact-finder‘s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to 

find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. County Court of Ulster County, N. Y. v. Allen, 442 

U.S. 140, 156 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 

The United States Supreme Court has held that ―the Constitution does not require that any 

particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government‘s burden of proof. Rather, 

taken as a whole, the instructions must correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.‖ 

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). This standard reduces the chance that an innocent person will 

be conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362. Winship does not require that every single fact upon 

which the jury relies be proven to a reasonable doubt. Many facts not proven to that standard may, 

collectively, allow the jury to infer that an element of the crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

To enforce Winship‘s rule, judges must instruct juries that they cannot return a guilty verdict unless the 

government has met this burden. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 275, 278 (1972). A jury conviction 

based upon an impermissibly low quantum of proof violates the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth 

Amendment. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). A judge can violate a defendant‘s rights 

by giving an instruction that undercuts the force of an otherwise proper beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

instruction. See, e.g., Cool, 409 U.S. at 102-103; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979).

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When a jury instruction is susceptible to a reading that would render the verdict unconstitutional 

and another that would generate a proper verdict, the reviewing court considers the challenged 

instruction in light of the full jury charge and in the context of the entire trial. See Naughten, 414 U.S. 

at 145-147(consider charge as whole); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 675 (1975)(consider context 

of whole trial). The court must then decide whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 

applied the challenged instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. A verdict 

remains valid if a jury instruction only tangentially undercut a proper beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

instruction. Naughten, 414 U.S. at 149-150.

3. Analysis

Under California law, attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill; implied malice will not 

suffice. People v. Lee, 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 (2003). First degree murder may be found when the 

prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor killed with malice aforethought, intent to 

kill, premeditation, and deliberation. People v. Memro, 11 Cal.4th 786, 862 (1995); see also Cal. 

Pen.Code §§ 187, 189. Intent to kill is rarely proved by direct evidence; usually it must be inferred 

from circumstantial evidence. People v. Ramos, 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1207–1208 (2004).

In People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313 (2002), the California Supreme Court held that attempted 

murder requires the specific ―intent to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. The defendant's mental 

state must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder victim. Someone who intends to kill only 

one person and attempts unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the intended 

victim, but not of others.‖ Bland, 28 Cal.4th at 328. Bland also held, however, that there could be a 

concurrent intent such that ―a person who shoots at a group of people [may still] be punished for the 

actions towards everyone in the group even if that person primarily targeted only one of them.‖ Id. at 

329. Concurrent intent can be inferred ― ̳when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a 

primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary 

victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity,‘‖ an area referred to as a ―kill zone.‖ Id. Bland

noted that ―[t]his concurrent intent theory is not a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions, as is 

the doctrine of transferred intent. Rather, it is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a 

given case: a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.‖ 

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Id. at 331.

Petitioner focuses on the fact that the language in the instruction itself referring to ―killing‖ 

individuals in the ―zone of harm‖ or ―kill zone,‖ was inflammatory, prejudicial, and not clearly defined 

in the instructions. First, to the extent that Petitioner is contending simply that the trial court instructed 

the jury contrary to California law, such a contention would be beyond the purview of this Court in a 

federal habeas proceeding. As explained previously, the issue of whether a jury instruction is a 

violation of state law is neither a federal question nor a proper subject for habeas corpus relief. Estelle 

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68. (―We have stated many times that  ̳federal habeas corpus relief does not lie 

for errors of state law.‘‖); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348–49 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 

(―mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be 

corrected on federal habeas‖). As discussed earlier, this Court is in fact bound by state court rulings on 

questions of state law. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d at 1399. 

Second, to the extent that Petitioner is charging a federal constitutional violation, he must show 

the purported instructional error ―so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.‖ Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780. Petitioner has failed to meet that 

burden.

Initially, the Court notes that Petitioner has never contended that the instruction as given was 

not a correct statement of California law. Rather, he complains that the phrase ―kill zone‖ itself would 

inflame and prejudice the jury against him. In its decision in this case, however, the 5th DCA pointed 

out that the California appellate court had previously rejected the contention that the phrase was 

inflammatory, argumentative, and inappropriate, citing People v. Campos, 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1244 

(2007). The 5th DCA ―categorically‖ rejected to notion that the phrase ―kill zone‖ suggested anything 

negative about Petitioner or posed a threat of prejudicing the jurors, noting that more euphemistic 

phrases like ―zone of harm‖ or zone of danger‖ did not squarely focus on the intent to kill in the manner 

that ―kill zone‖ did. As such, the phrase about which Petitioner complains was less likely to confuse or 

mislead the jury than a more circumspect and watered-down phrase might do. 

Regarding the failure to provide a precise definition of ―kill zone,‖ the 5th DCA pointed out that 

the California Supreme Court had previously rejected such an argument, citing People v. Stone, 46 

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Cal.4th 131, 137-138 (2009). Stone emphasized that, in Bland, the state high court had noted that the 

―kill zone‖ theory was ―not a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions,‖ but was simply a 

reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given case. Id. Thus, under California law, no further 

definition of ―kill zone‖ is required, and Petitioner has not identified, nor is the Court aware of, any 

federal authority for the proposition that federal due process requires that such a phrase be defined in a 

jury instruction. 

Indeed, the California Supreme Court has expressly held that no set definition of ―kill zone‖ 

exists; rather, the phrase is ―necessarily defined by the nature and scope of the attack‖ in any given 

situation. People v. Perez, 50 Cal.4th 222, 232 (2010). A determination of state law by a state appellate 

court is binding in a federal habeas action, Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988), unless the 

interpretation is an ―obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue.‖ Mullaney v. Wilbur, 

421 U.S. 684, 691 n. 11 (1975); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (federal habeas court must 

respect a state court's application of its own law and must not engage in de novo review). A federal 

court has no basis for disputing a state's interpretation of its own law. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 

738, 739–740 (1990). 

As a whole, the instructions adequately instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof for 

attempted murder and the role of a ―kill zone‖ in the jury‘s deliberations of guilt. The jury is presumed 

to have followed those instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). Accordingly, the 

state court decision is not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Hence, the claim should be denied.

C. Judicial Bias

Petitioner next argues that his conviction was the result of judicial bias. In addition to 

contesting the merits of this claim, Respondent also argues that it is unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted. 

1. Exhaustion

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity 

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to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 

(1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and 

fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's 

factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 

112 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th 

Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court reiterated the rule as 

follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies 

requires that petitioners ―fairly presen[t]‖ federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

State the ―opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners' federal 

rights‖ (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity 

to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal 

court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ―fairly presented‖ (and thus exhausted) his federal 

claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based 

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the 

Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, 

even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim 

on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the 

relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for 

reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

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Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added), as amended by Lyons v. 

Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-5 (9th Cir. 2001).

2. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that Petitioner‘s claim must be rejected because it is procedurally 

defaulted. Respondent points out that, in denying Petitioner‘s state habeas claim, the state court cited 

Swain and Duvall. After reviewing the facts and applicable law, the Court agrees that the nature of the 

procedural bar means that the claim fails to meet the exhaustion requirement because it has not been 

―fairly presented‖ to the state courts.

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a procedural default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 

433 U.S. 72, 86–87 (1977). Federal courts ―will not review a question of federal law decided by a state 

court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question 

and adequate to support the judgment.‖ Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); LaCrosse v. 

Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001); see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Park v. 

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (2000) (―A district court properly refuses to reach the merits of a 

habeas petition if the petitioner has defaulted on the particular state‘s procedural requirements . . . .‖); 

see also Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). This concept has been commonly 

referred to as the procedural default doctrine. This doctrine of procedural default is based on concerns 

of comity and federalism. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-32. If the court finds an independent and 

adequate state procedural ground, ―federal habeas review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate 

cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the 

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.‖ Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-805 (9th 

Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The mere occurrence, however, of a procedural default will not necessarily bar a federal court 

from reviewing claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In order for the procedural default 

doctrine to apply and thereby bar federal review, the state court determination of default must be 

grounded in state law that is both adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law. 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; see also Fox Film Corp., 296 U.S. at 210. Put 

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another way, the procedural default doctrine will apply only if the application of the state procedural 

rule provides ―an adequate and independent state law basis‖ on which the state court can deny relief. 

Park, 202 F.3d at 1151, quoting, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30.

―For a state procedural rule to be  ̳independent,‘ the state law basis for the decision must

not be interwoven with federal law.‖ LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). ―A state law is so interwoven if  ̳the state has 

made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the 

determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.‘‖ Park, 202 F.3d at 1152 

(quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)). 

To be deemed adequate, the state law ground for decision must be well-established and 

consistently applied. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a state court‘s 

exercise of judicial discretion will not necessarily render a rule inadequate, the discretion must entail 

― ̳the exercise of judgment according to standards that, at least over time, can become known and 

understood within reasonable operating limits.‘‖ Id. at 377 (quoting Morales, 85 F.3d at 1392). 

Under California law, a citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995), indicates that a 

petitioner has failed to state his claim with sufficient particularity for the state court to examine the 

merits of the claim, and/or has failed to ―include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence 

supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations.‖ 

Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474. 

Like Duvall, a citation to Swain stands for the proposition that a petitioner has failed to state his 

claim with sufficient particularity. In Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth 

Circuit found that the Swain citation indicated that the claims were unexhausted because their pleadings 

defects, i.e., lack of particularity could be cured in a renewed petition. Kim, 799 F.2d at 1319.

In Kim, the Ninth Circuit also stated that it was ―incumbent‖ on the district court, in 

determining whether the federal standard of ―fair presentation‖ of a claim to the state courts had been 

met, to independently examine Kim‘s petition to the California Supreme Court. Id. at 1320. ―The mere 

recitation of In re Swain does not preclude such review.‖ Id. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

where a prisoner proceeding pro se is unable to meet the state rule that his claims be pleaded with 

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particularity, he may be excused from complying with it. Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1462 (9th

Cir. 1992)(citing Kim, 799 F.2d at 1321). ―Fair presentation‖ requires only that the claims be pleaded 

with as much particularity as is practicable. Kim, 799 F.2d at 1320. 

Petitioner‘s state petition shows, as Respondent has noted, that Petitioner failed to supply the 

state courts with critical documents needed to resolve the issue, i.e., specific and relevant pages from 

the Reporter‘s Transcript that, Petitioner contends, would have shown judicial bias. This is so despite 

the fact that Petitioner was in possession of such documents. (LD 22). Accordingly, the California 

Supreme Court‘s denial of this claim with citations to Swain and Duvall indicates that the claim was 

not ―fairly presented‖ to the state high court and that Petitioner could have re-submitted a state habeas 

petition with greater specificity but did not. Petitioner‘s failure to do so means that the claim is 

unexhausted. Accordingly, it should be denied on that ground.

3. Federal Standard

―The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal.‖ Marshall 

v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980). In addition, ―justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.‖ 

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). As stated by the United States Supreme Court: A fair 

trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of 

actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 

probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to 

try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). See also 

Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). A trial judge ―must be ever mindful of the sensitive role [the 

court] plays in a jury trial and avoid even the appearance of advocacy or partiality.‖ Kennedy v. Los 

Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds by Hunter v. 

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (quoting United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir.1974)).

To sustain a claim of judicial bias, ―there must be an 'extremely high level of interference' by 

the trial judge that creates 'a pervasive climate of partiality and unfairness.‖' Duckett v. Godinez, 67 

F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1982)). 

See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (judicial bias resulted in a denial of due process where the 

same judge who had sat as the 'grand jury' before which witnesses had testified also presided at a 

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contempt hearing at which those witnesses were adjudged in contempt for their previous conduct before 

the judge); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (violation of due process where judge had a direct 

personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial). However, in 

attempting to make out a claim of unconstitutional bias, a plaintiff must ―overcome a presumption of 

honesty and integrity‖ on the part of decision-makers. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 

Finally, if a criminal defendant is not tried by an impartial adjudicator, the error is structural, i.e., 

reversal is required without consideration of whether the error was harmless. Neder v. United States, 

527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989) (denial of ―right to an 

impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury‖ can never be harmless error) (citation omitted).

4. Analysis of Merits

a. Standard of Review

For the four remaining claims, no reasoned decision is available. Rather, those claims were 

raised in the California Supreme Court and summarily denied. When a state court decision on a 

petitioner's claims rejects some claims but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas 

court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. 

Williams, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013). Thus, where, as here, 

such circumstances exist, the California Supreme Court‘s summary denial of Petitioner‘s state habeas 

petition was on the merits.

Moreover, where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but, as here, provides no 

reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to 

determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852,

860 (9th Cir. 2011); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 

F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir.2002) (when there is an adjudication on the merits but no reason for the 

decision, the court must review the complete record to determine whether resolution of the case 

constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 

976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (―Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply 

reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine whether the 

state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.‖). ―[A]lthough we independently 

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review the record, we still defer to the state court‘s ultimate decisions.‖ Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 

1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). ―Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the 

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court 

decision is objectively unreasonable.‖ Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no reasoned decision is available, 

the petitioner still has the burden of ―showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.‖ Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. Thus, this Court will independently review the remaining four 

claims to determine if no reasonable basis for denying relief existed. 

b. Merits Analysis

Here, even if the claim was exhausted, it still lacks merit on independent review. Citing to 

specific portions of the trial transcript, Petitioner contends the trial judge showed bias by his ―continual 

interjection‖ into witnesses‘ testimony, causing ―jurors to decide the case in a way‖ the judge thought 

correct. (Doc. 1, p. 8) In support of his contention, Petitioner cites two episodes at trial. The first 

involved witness Isabel Rodriguez. During her testimony, she stated Petitioner‘s car had ―flipped it‖ 

and ―turned around.‖ (4 RT 63) However, on redirect and re-cross-examination, she indicated the car 

eventually wound up in front of her house, a fact that appeared to be inconsistent with her previous 

description of a U-turn. (4 RT 107-108) Using a diagram of the area, the judge asked Rodriguez to 

clarify which direction the car had been headed when the shots were fired. (4 RT 107-108) Rodriguez 

then indicated that the car had made a complete circle, not simply a U-turn. (4 RT 110)

Later, Rodriguez admitted she used to associate with or ―hang out‖ with gang members but that 

she was not doing that at the time of the crimes. Rodriguez was asked to clarify what she meant by 

―hang out‖ and ―associate‖ with gang members. (4 RT 67) On cross-examination, she was asked 

whether she knew the gang members. (4 RT 85) The court interjected that the witness had testified she 

said ―hi‖ to the gang members once in a while but did not say she talked to them. (4 RT 87) Counsel 

then attempted to elicit from Rodriguez further details about how much and how often she talked to 

gang members. (4 RT 87)

The first episode cannot in any way be considered indicative of bias or prejudice. To the 

contrary, the judge was simply performing the appropriate judicial function of clarifying what was 

otherwise a potentially confusing and contradictory statement by Rodriguez regarding the actual 

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direction of the car when the shots were fired. As to the second episode, even if one could infer some 

overzealousness on the part of the judge as to clarifying Rodriguez‘s testimony, any ―interference‖ in 

the witness‘s testimony was de minimis. Certainly, the judge‘s conduct did not rise to the level of 

creating a pervasive climate of partiality or unfairness. 

The second area of dispute occurred prior to the re-trial when the judge advised Petitioner that, 

if he chose to testify at the retrial, the convictions from the first trial were admissible for impeachment

purposes. (8 RT 365-366) Petitioner had requested that those convictions from the first trial not be 

revealed to the jurors at the re-trial. (8 RT 365) In advising Petitioner, the judge made clear that the 

decision whether to testify at his re-trial was solely Petitioner‘s choice. (8 RT 366) Petitioner does not 

indicate how this advisement is either a violation of state law or in contravention of his federal due 

process rights. In his state petition, he argued that the trial court essentially threatened him if he 

testified and that the potential for impeachment at the retrial forced him to forego a defense used at the 

first trial. However, as Respondent points out, Petitioner did not testify in the first trial, thus 

contradicting any contention that Petitioner‘s testimony was vital to that defense. 

Far from establishing any ongoing or pervasive pattern of bias or prejudice by the trial judge, 

the record shows that the judge attempted to control the presentation of evidence in a clear and 

comprehensible manner for the jury and in such a way as to avoid confusion or misunderstanding. 

Nothing in this record even remotely suggests that the judge was biased against Petitioner. Moreover, 

even if such de minimis actions by the trial court could technically be considered error, they were 

harmless under Brecht. 

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner‘s next claim is that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suggesting to the jury 

that it should convict him because other gang members had been convicted. 

1. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

For the same reasons set forth in the preceding claim, this claim is also unexhausted and should 

be dismissed on that ground.

2. Federal Standard

Under clearly established federal law, a prosecutor's improper comments will be held to violate 

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the Constitution only if they ―so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process.‖ Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Darden 

v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 181–183 (1986)); see Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th 

Cir.2000). Prosecutorial misconduct deprives the defendant of a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due 

Process Clause if it prejudicially affects the substantial rights of a defendant. United States v. 

Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1539 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982)).

The standard of review of claims concerning prosecutorial misconduct in a § 2254 proceeding is 

the narrow standard of due process, and not the broad standard that applies in the exercise of 

supervisory power; improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant's constitutional rights. 

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 

(9th Cir.1996)). This Court must thus determine whether the alleged misconduct has rendered a trial 

fundamentally unfair. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 183. It must be determined whether the 

prosecutor's actions constituted misconduct and whether the conduct violated Petitioner's right to due 

process of law. Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir.2000).

To grant habeas relief, this Court must conclude that the state court's rejection of the 

prosecutorial misconduct claim ―was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Parker, 132 

S.Ct. at 2155 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 767–87). The standard of Darden v. 

Wainwright is a very general one that provides courts with more leeway in reaching outcomes in caseby-case determinations. Parker, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 

124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)).

In determining whether the prosecutor's remarks rendered a trial fundamentally unfair, the 

remarks must be analyzed in the context of the entire proceeding. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 

385 (1990); Darden, 477 U.S. at 179–182. Furthermore, counsel are ―given latitude in the presentation 

of their closing arguments, and courts must allow the prosecution to strike hard blows based on the 

evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom.‖ Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253–

1254 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1415 (9th Cir.1993)). A reviewing 

court should consider challenged remarks in light of the realistic nature of closing arguments at trial. 

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―Because 'improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear,' 

'a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most 

damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the 

plethora of less damaging interpretations'.‖ Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir.) (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646–647 (1974)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 937 (1998). Finally, 

even when prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation, such misconduct 

provides grounds for habeas relief only if that misconduct is prejudicial under the harmless error test 

articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–638 (1993). Shaw v. Terhune, 380 F.3d 473, 

478 (9th Cir.2004). 

Factors to be considered in determining whether habeas corpus relief is warranted include 

whether the prosecutor manipulated or misstated the evidence; whether his comments implicated other 

specific rights of the accused; whether the objectionable content was invited or provoked by defense 

counsel's argument; whether the trial court admonished the jurors; and the weight of evidence against 

the defendant. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 

L.Ed.2d 431 (1974).) ―[T]he Darden standard is a very general one, leaving courts 'more leeway...in 

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations [ ]' (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 

(2004))....‖; Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012). Thus, even where a prosecutor's 

argument, questions or behavior are found improper, relief is limited to cases in which a petitioner can 

establish that the misconduct resulted in actual, substantial prejudice.

3. Analysis

As with the previous claim, even if the claim were exhausted, it is without merit on 

independent review by this Court. The petition argues that the prosecution, in closing argument, 

―suggested that jurors convict Petitioner just as other members of SSK gang had [been] convicted....‖ 

(Doc. 1, p. 10) Petitioner cites to a specific portion of the trial transcript that does not support his

claim. Instead, that passage includes a summary of evidence of shootings committed by two different 

groups of South Side Kings gang members during 2006 and 2009, elicited by the prosecution as

prerequisite requirements for the gang enhancements. At no point in the record did the prosecutor 

suggest in any way that jurors should convict Petitioner merely because other members of his gang 

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had previously committed crimes. More to the point, such an inference cannot reasonably be drawn 

from the prosecutor‘s comments, taken as a whole. Petitioner‘s logic appears to be that, in a case 

involving gang charges, the prosecutor cannot even mention the predicate gang crimes because this 

would suggest to the jurors that the prosecutor believed the accused should be convicted simply 

because he was a member of a gang that committed crimes. Obviously, this is not the law in 

California, and the Court is unaware of any federal authority holding that such reasonable and 

germane comments in closing argument would necessarily render the trial ―fundamentally unfair.‖ 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 183. Moreover, even if, by some tortured reading of the 

prosecutor‘s comments, those comments could be considered error, the error did not have a 

―substantial and injurious‖ effect on the outcome of the case, given the overwhelming evidence of 

Petitioner‘s guilt of at least the drive-by murder. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623.

E. Reasonable Doubt Instruction

Petitioner contends that the reasonable doubt instructions given to the jury, i.e., CALCRIM 

Nos. 200 and 222, unlawfully reduced the prosecution‘s burden of proof

1. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

For the same reasons set forth in the preceding claims, this claim is also unexhausted and 

should be dismissed on that ground.

2. Analysis

Again, even if exhausted, the claim would lack merit upon independent review. As discussed 

supra, in determining whether instructional error warrants habeas relief, a habeas court must consider 

― ̳whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates 

due process' ... not merely whether  ̳the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally 

condemned.‘‖ Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 

141, 146–47 (1973)); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (challenge in habeas to the trial court's 

jury instructions is reviewed under the standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637—whether 

the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.). 

Here, the jury was instructed with revised version of CALCRIM No. 220 as follows:

The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant is not evidence that the 

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charge is true. You must not be biased against the defendant just because he has been arrested, 

charged with a crime, or brought to trial.

A defendant in a criminal trial is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the 

People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People 

must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless I 

specifically tell you otherwise.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the 

charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is 

open to some possible or imaginary doubt.

In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 

impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. 

Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an 

acquittal and you must find him not guilty.

(1 Clerk's Transcript on Appeal (―1 CT‖) 180; 2 CT 292)

The jury was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 222, which state, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

You must decide what the facts are in this case. You must use only the evidence that was 

presented in this courtroom. ―Evidence‖ is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits 

admitted into evidence, stipulations between the parties, and anything else I told you to 

consider as evidence.

Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, 

the attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not 

evidence. Only the witnesses' answers are evidence. The attorneys' questions are significant 

only if they helped you to understand the witnesses' answers. Do not assume that something is 

true just because one of the attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.

Petitioner argues that the two instructions in combination served to reduce the prosecution‘s 

burden of proof to something less than ―beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ (Doc. 1, p. 12) Petitioner 

explains that the two instructions, in combination, limited the jury‘s consideration of evidence to that 

presented at trial and ―precluded them from considering the lack of other evidence to corroborate the 

eye witnesses testimony.‖ (Doc. 1, p. 36) (emphasis supplied). 

This contention, however, is unsupported by the instructions when read as a whole. The 

instructions merely advise the jury that it may not consider evidence that was not presented at trial, e.g., 

evidence gleaned from media or newspapers, or discovered through some other source. Nothing in the 

instructions suggests, even remotely, that jurors could not consider the lack of evidence as to a 

particular element of a charged offense. Moreover, Petitioner does not cite to any particular element of 

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any charge that would have been especially susceptible to such a construction, even were it reasonable 

inferable from the jury charge as a whole. Moreover, Petitioner has not cited, and the Court is unaware 

of, any United States Supreme Court authority that requires that jurors be expressly instructed on the 

lack or absence of evidence vis-à-vis reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the state court adjudication 

rejecting this claim was not objectively unreasonable.

F. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Finally, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims 

three, four, and five in the instant petition. 

1. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

For the same reasons set forth in the preceding claims, this claim is also unexhausted and 

should be dismissed on that ground.

2. Federal Standard and Analysis

In challenges to the effective assistance of appellate counsel, the same standards apply as with 

the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Smith 

v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). In Smith, the United States Supreme Court indicated that an appellate 

attorney filing a merits brief need not and should not raise every non-frivolous claim. Robbins, 528 

U.S. at 288. Rather, an attorney may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of 

success on appeal. Id. As a result, there is no requirement that an appellate attorney raise issues that 

are clearly untenable. Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Gillhan v. 

Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977). 

In preceding sections of this Findings and Recommendation, this Court rejected Petitioner‘s 

contentions regarding claims three, four, and five as lacking merit. Since Petitioner‘s ineffectiveness 

claim for appellate counsel is based on counsel‘s purported failure to raise claims three, four, and five 

on direct appeal, it necessarily follows that no legitimate basis exists for a claim of ineffective 

assistance on the part of appellate counsel for failing to raise those meritless issues. Featherstone v. 

Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show the state court‘s adjudication of this issue was contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Thus, claim six should be denied.

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner‘s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1), be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 days

after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

―Objections to Magistrate Judge‘s Findings and Recommendation.‖ Replies to the Objections shall be 

served and filed within 10 days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. The 

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge‘s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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