Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00811/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00811-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABRAHAM MOLABOLA LAGARDE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-cv-00811-LAB-JLB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

JOINT MOTION FOR JUDICIAL 

REVIEW OF FINAL DECISION OF 

THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY 

[ECF No. 17]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Larry Alan Burns, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On April 27, 2018, plaintiff Abraham Molabola Lagarde filed a Complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits.

(ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision is the parties’ Joint Motion for 

Judicial Review of Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (ECF No. 17.) 

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For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s 

decision be AFFIRMED and that this action be dismissed.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2015, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability 

beginning January 1, 2015. (Certified Administrative Record [“AR”] 168-71.) After his

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration (AR 99-103, 109-14), plaintiff 

requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) (AR 117-

18). An administrative hearing was held on August 2, 2017. Plaintiff appeared at the 

hearing with counsel, and testimony was taken from plaintiff and a vocational expert 

(“VE”). (AR 37-73.)

As reflected in his October 27, 2017 hearing decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from his alleged onset 

date through the date of the decision. (AR 15-33.) The ALJ’s decision became the final

decision of the Commissioner on February 22, 2018, when the Appeals Council denied 

plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely civil action followed.

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At Step One, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2015, his alleged onset date. 

(AR 20.)

At Step Two, the ALJ found that that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine; internal hemorrhoids; and, an adjustment disorder with 

depressive and anxiety features. (AR 20.) 

At Step Three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 20-21.)

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Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

to perform the full range of unskilled, light level work, but such work could not require:

lifting more than 20 pounds at a time, on more than an occasional basis; lifting 

and carrying articles weighing more than 10 pounds, on more than an 

occasional basis; standing or walking more than 15 minutes at one time, and 

no more than 6 total hours in an 8-hour workday; sitting more than 15 minutes 

at one time, and no more than 2 total hours in an 8-hour workday; more than 

occasional stooping, bending, twisting, or squatting; working on the floor (e.g. 

kneeling, crawling, or crouching); ascending or descending full flights of 

stairs (but a few steps up or down not precluded); [and] overhead lifting or 

overhead reaching with either extremity.

(AR 21-22.) 

Plaintiff also could not work “in an area without a restroom nearby, for quick 

access,” and must have “the option to take, in addition to standard restroom breaks and 

lunch, 1-2 additional restroom breaks in the a.m. and 1-2 additional restroom breaks in the 

p.m., of about 5 minutes in duration for each such break.” (AR 22.) In addition, plaintiff 

could not work “in other than a low stress environment,” which means: (1) no interaction 

with the general public and no working with crowds of co-workers; and (2) only 

“occasional” verbal interaction with supervisors and co-workers. (AR 22.) Further, 

plaintiff could work at “no more than a low concentration, which means the ability to be 

alert and attentive to only routine unskilled work tasks; and work at no more than a low 

memory level,” which means “the ability to understand, remember, and carry out only 

‘simple’ work instructions.” (AR 22.)

For purposes of a Step Four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile would not be able 

to perform the requirements of plaintiff’s past relevant work as actually or generally 

performed. (AR 26.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to Step Five of the sequential evaluation process. As of the 

alleged onset date, the ALJ classified plaintiff as a younger individual who subsequently 

changed age category to an individual closely approaching advanced age, with at least a 

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high school education. (AR 26.) Based on the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person 

with plaintiff’s vocational profile could perform the requirements of occupations that 

existed in significant numbers in the national economy (i.e., solderer, marker, and 

assembler), the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 26-28.)

III. SOLE ISSUE IN DISPUTE

The sole issue in dispute in this case is whether the ALJ satisfied his burden at Step 

Five in determining that plaintiff was able to do other work. Specifically, plaintiff contends 

that the ALJ erred in relying on the testimony of the VE that plaintiff could perform other 

work because the VE’s testimony was inconsistent with the ALJ’s hypothetical. (See ECF 

No. 17 at 6-7.) In response, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly relied on 

the VE’s opinion that the plaintiff could perform other work based on the hypothetical

given. (Id. at 9.)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984).

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V. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the Commissioner has the burden 

“to identify specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that [a] 

claimant can perform despite [his] identified limitations.” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 

845 (9th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 

1432 (9th Cir. 1995)) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)). In making a disability determination 

at this step, the ALJ relies primarily on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) for 

“information about the requirements of work in the national economy.” Massachi v. 

Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007).

The DOT is “a resource compiled by the Department of Labor that details the 

specific requirements for different occupations.” Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 807 

(9th Cir. 2016). The “DOT’s occupational definitions are the result of comprehensive 

studies of how similar jobs are performed in different workplaces.” Social Security Ruling 

(“SSR”)

1 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (2000). The term “occupation,” as used in the 

DOT, refers to the collective description of those jobs, and each occupation represents 

numerous jobs. Id.; see also Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 807. As such, the DOT “lists maximum 

requirements of occupations as generally performed, not the range of requirements of a 

particular job as it is performed in specific settings.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 

In addition to the DOT, the ALJ “uses testimony from [VEs] to obtain occupational 

evidence.” Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153; see also Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846. Generally, the 

VE’s testimony should be consistent with the DOT. See SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, 

at *2; Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153. But when conflicts occur, neither the DOT nor the VE’s 

 

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“SSRs reflect the official interpretation of the [Social Security Administration] and 

are entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act 

and regulations.” Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2005)).

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evidence automatically trumps. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153 (citing SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL

1898704, at *2). “Thus, the ALJ must first determine whether a conflict exists.” Id. 

“When there is an apparent conflict between the [VE]’s testimony and the DOT—

for example, expert testimony that a claimant can perform an occupation involving DOT 

requirements that appear more than the claimant can handle—the ALJ is required to 

reconcile the inconsistency.” Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846 (citing Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153-

54). The ALJ must ask the VE whether his or her testimony conflicts with the DOT. 

Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153-54; SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4. If it does conflict, 

“the ALJ must then determine whether the [VE]’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable 

and whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the [DOT].” Id. at 1153. A 

failure to ask the VE whether his or her testimony conflicts with the DOT may be harmless 

error if there is no conflict, or if the VE provides “sufficient support for [his or] her 

conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts.” Id. at 1154, n.19; see also Hann v. 

Colvin, No. 12-cv-06234, 2014 WL 1382063, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014). 

B. Analysis

1. The ALJ’s Hypothetical

During the administrative hearing, the ALJ first posed the following hypothetical to 

the VE: 

Okay. Let’s assume then the following [RFC] for an individual of the 

claimant’s age, education, past relevant work as you’ve identified, the ability 

to handle for the first hypothetical light, unskilled work , lifting 20 pounds 

occasionally, lifting and then carrying articles weighing no more than 10 

pounds occasionally. Standing or walking 45 minutes at a time for a total of 

six hours in an eight-hour day, sitting 45 minutes at a time for a total of two 

hours in an eight-hour day, no more than occasional stooping, bending, 

twisting, or squatting, no work on the floor, no kneeling, crawling, or 

crouching, no climbing or descending full flights of stairs. But a few steps up 

or down would be okay. No overhead lifting or reaching with either 

extremity. He would have to have an area to work in with a restroom nearby 

for quick access and must have the option to take in addition to breaks and 

lunch, one to two additional breaks in the morning to go to the restroom of 

five minutes each, and one to two additional breaks in the afternoon to go to 

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the restroom at five minutes each. That would be a total on bad days of 40 

minutes -- let’s see, 20 minutes off-task for the day. Work would also have 

to be unskilled, working in no more than a low-stress level, unskilled work 

environment, which means working with the general public would be none, 

working with crowds of coworkers would not be allowed, and only occasional 

verbal interaction with supervisors and coworkers. Work would also have to 

be unskilled and lower in concentration, which means the ability to be alert 

and attentive to only routine, unskilled work tasks. And work would have to 

be low skilled -- I mean, unskilled and lower in memory, which just means he 

would have the ability to remember, understand, and carry out only simple 

work instructions. . . .

(AR 64-66 (emphasis added).)

This hypothetical includes all of plaintiff’s RFC limitations, with the exception of 

the more restrictive limitations identified by the ALJ with respect to plaintiff’s ability to 

stand, walk, and/or sit. (Compare AR 21-22 with AR 64-66.) In response to this 

hypothetical, the VE gave three examples of occupations such a hypothetical person could 

perform: assembler, solderer, and marker. (AR 66-67.) With respect to each occupation, 

the VE testified that she would erode the numbers available in the national economy by 

approximately 30 percent to allow for the factors in the hypothetical. (See id.)

The ALJ then proposed a second, third, and fourth hypothetical. (AR 67.) In his 

second hypothetical, the ALJ stated, “It’s the same as the first except he could only stand 

30 minutes at a time and only sit 30 minutes at a time.” (Id.) The ALJ then asked the VE,

“Would that change your opinion or your answers at all?” (Id.) The VE responded, “No.” 

(Id.) 

In his third hypothetical, the ALJ stated, “[It] is the same as the first one, except he 

could only stand 15 minutes at a time and only sit 15 minutes at a time.” (Id.) The ALJ 

then asked the VE, “Would that change your previous answers?” (Id.) The VE responded,

“I would probably further erode if standing and sitting are limited to 15 minutes. I would 

erode by a total of 50 percent, maybe even 60 percent.” (Id.)

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In his fourth hypothetical, the ALJ stated, “[It] is the same as the last one that I just 

gave you, except he could only lift 10 pounds occasionally and only lift and carry five 

pounds occasionally.” (Id.) The ALJ then asked the VE, “What would happen to your 

previous answer?” (Id.) The VE responded, “Those jobs are going to be eliminated.” (Id.)

The ALJ’s third hypothetical closely matches

2

the RFC in his decision. The first 

two hypotheticals did not contain all of the restrictions, and the fourth hypothetical was 

substantively more restrictive than the RFC. 

In the Joint Motion, plaintiff does not dispute that the third hypothetical posed to the 

VE reflects all of the limitations found credible by the ALJ and supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. (See ECF No. 17 at 6.) Ordinarily, the inquiry would end here, as 

the ALJ would be entitled to rely on the VE’s testimony. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that the ALJ’s reliance on testimony the VE gave in 

response to the hypothetical was proper where the hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the 

VE contained all of the limitations the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial 

evidence in the record). But plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff could 

perform the occupations of assembler, solderer, and marker, on the basis the ALJ did not 

adequately resolve the discrepancy between the VE’s opinion and the DOT. The Court 

addresses this argument below. 

2. Resolving the Conflict

Each of the occupations identified by the VE are classified in the DOT as “light 

work.” See DICOT 209.587-034 (marker), available at 1991 WL 671802; DICOT 

729.687-010 (assembler), available at 1991 WL 679733; DICOT 813.684-022 (solderer), 

available at 1991 WL 681592. Light work, as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), 

“involves . . . frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 1567(b). Thus, there was an apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony that a person 

 

2 The Court notes that the ALJ’s hypothetical is slightly more restrictive than 

plaintiff’s RFC with respect to lifting and carrying. (See AR 21, 64-65.)

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with plaintiff’s RFC could perform the work of these three positions and the DOT, 

specifically with respect to the lifting or carrying of objects up to 10 pounds. The ALJ was 

required to reconcile this conflict. See Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846.

An ALJ may not rely on a VE’s testimony regarding the requirements of a particular 

job without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the DOT. Massachi, 486 

F.3d at 1152. Further, an ALJ must ask follow up questions of a VE when the expert’s 

testimony is either obviously or apparently contrary to the DOT, and determine whether 

the VE’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable, and whether a basis exists for relying 

on the expert rather than the DOT. See Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808; Massachi, 486 F.3d at 

1153. “The requirement for an ALJ to ask follow up questions is fact-dependent.” 

Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808.

Here, the ALJ specifically asked: “And if I were to look up the DOT and [SCO] and 

read how these jobs were performed, I wouldn’t see mentioned a sit/stand option and the 

other details I gave you physically and mentally, would I?” (AR 71.) The VE responded, 

“No.” (Id.) The ALJ then followed up and asked, “And despite that, you’ve taken that 

into consideration when you selected these jobs and reduce[d] their numbers for us?” (Id.) 

The VE responded, “Yes.” (Id.) The ALJ then asked, “And this is all based on your 

education and experience in the field? (Id.) The VE responded, “Yes.” (Id.)

In his decision, the ALJ explained his determination as follows:

At the hearing, the [VE] was asked if his vocational testimony provided at the 

hearing conflicted, in any way, with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 

(D.O.T.) and the Selected Characteristics Occupational Outlook Handbook 

(S.C.O). The expert responded by stating that the D.O.T. and S.C.O. does not 

mention, in its description of the above cited jobs, all of the limitations given 

in the [RFC] (e.g. the postural changes noted and the detailed mental 

limitations and/or the detailed physical limitations noted). The expert testified 

that based on the expert’s education and experience, such jobs do allow for 

such limitations, in the reduced numbers noted above. The expert’s resume is 

found in the file (Exhibit 10E). No contrary evidence was presented. 

Therefore, the opinions of the expert are accepted and found to be appropriate 

departures from the D.O.T. (SSR 00-4p).

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(AR 27.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ met his burden at Step Five. 

The ALJ recognized the conflict, and then asked the VE whether she took the conflict into 

consideration when she selected the three occupations of assembler, solderer, and marker 

and reduced their numbers. She stated that she had done so. The ALJ then asked whether 

her departure was based on her education and experience in the field. The VE responded 

that she had taken everything into consideration and her responses were based on her 

education and experience. In resolving the conflict, the ALJ specifically noted the VE’s 

qualifications by reference to the VE’s resume. (AR 27.) The ALJ also noted that no 

contrary evidence was presented. (Id.) The Court finds this sufficient. See Bayliss, 427 

F.3d at 1218 (“A VE’s recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or 

her testimony.”); Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435 (“[E]xpert testimony may properly be used to 

show that the particular jobs, [however classified in the DOT], may be ones that a particular 

claimant can perform. In fact it seems an eminently appropriate use of the [VE’s]

knowledge and experience.”); see also SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2-3 (noting that 

a VE “may be able to provide more specific information about jobs or occupations than the 

DOT” and may have “information about a particular job’s requirements” based on the VE’s 

“experience in job placement or career counseling”).

In the Joint Motion, plaintiff contends that the VE did not provide “any rational[e] 

for her departure from the DOT,” arguing that “[i]t appears the [VE] simply misheard the 

ALJ in regards to the occasional lifting of 10 pounds.” (ECF No. 17 at 7.) Plaintiff 

contends that the VE only testified that she was reducing numbers based on other 

limitations in the hypothetical, and not with respect to the occasional lifting of 10 pounds. 

(Id.) The Court disagrees with plaintiff’s characterization of the testimony. The VE’s 

testimony does not suggest that she misheard the ALJ or was confused by his questions.

Moreover, the Court finds that frequent lifting of 10 pounds is not such a common 

and obvious part of being an assembler, solderer, or marker that the ALJ should have 

questioned the VE more closely before concluding that plaintiff could perform such work. 

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See Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 807; see also DICOT 209.587-034; DICOT 729.687-010; 

DICOT 813.684-022.

3

 The DOT’s description of each occupation does not suggest an 

 

3

In the DOT, the occupation of “marker” is defined as follows: 

Marks and attaches price tickets to articles of merchandise to record price and 

identifying information: Marks selling price by hand on boxes containing 

merchandise, or on price tickets. Ties, glues, sews, or staples price ticket to 

each article. Presses lever or plunger of mechanism that pins, pastes, ties, or 

staples ticket to article. May record number and types of articles marked and 

pack them in boxes. May compare printed price tickets with entries on 

purchase order to verify accuracy and notify supervisor of discrepancies. May 

print information on tickets, using ticket-printing machine . . . .

DICOT 209.587-034. Moreover, the occupation of “assembler” is defined as follows:

Assembles mechanical parts of electrical equipment, such as light sockets, 

switches, terminal boards, and plugging devices: Fits together parts, such as 

socket bases, shafts, contact fingers, and springs, in specified sequence, using 

fixtures, screwdrivers, and air nut runners. Tests actions of moving parts and 

listens for unusual sounds to detect defective parts or faulty operation. 

Verifies completed assembly against pictorial drawings. May be designated 

according to type of equipment assembled . . . .

DICOT 729.687-010. Lastly, the occupation of “solderer” is defined as follows:

Solders together components of metal products on production line, using hand 

soldering iron and soft solder: Dips workpieces into chemical solution or 

brushes or powders flux along joints to remove impurities. Places workpieces 

into fixtures or manually holds them together at designated point. Plunges 

soldering iron into chemical to clean tip. Positions tip of heated soldering iron 

and wire or bar of solder to joint until solder melts and seeps into joint. Guides 

iron and solder along seams. Removes workpiece when color indicates that 

solder has cooled and bonded workpieces together. May sweat together 

workpieces coated with solder. May solder with self-fluxing solder. May 

adjust controls of gas flame or electric induction coils to specified point on 

dial to heat soldering iron.

DICOT 813.684-022.

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irreconcilable conflict between these positions and the VE’s testimony. Notably, although 

“light work” is defined in Section 404.1567(b) as involving “frequent lifting or carrying of 

objects weighing up to 10 pounds,” that same section, as well as the DOT “strength”

descriptions for each of the occupations identified by the VE, also state that for these types 

of positions the weight lifted “may be very little” or a “may only be a negligible amount.” 

See 20 C.F.R. § 1567(b); DICOT 209.587-034; DICOT 729.687-010; DICOT 813.684-

022. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ was entitled to rely on the VE’s testimony, 

and did not err in his Step Five determination.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s 

decision be AFFIRMED, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections no later than March 6, 2019. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” A party may respond to the other party’s objections no later than 

March 20, 2019. Id.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2019

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