Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02839/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02839-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDY REED,

Plaintiff,

 v.

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF

THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES,

MOTION PICTURE TECHNICIANS,

ARTISTS AND ALLIED CRAFTS OF THE

UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES AND

CANADA, LOCAL 16 et al., 

Defendants /

No. C 05-2839 MMC

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

On August 8, 2005, the Court issued an order to show cause why the instant action

should not be remanded, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Defendants International

Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (“IATSE”), Motion Picture Technicians, Artists and

Allied Crafts of the United States, its Territories and Canada, Local 16 (“Local 16"), F.X.

Crowley (“Crowley”), Richard J. Putz (“Putz”), and Rod McLeod (“McLeod”) filed a response

to the order to show cause on August 22, 2005. Plaintiff Sandy Reed filed a reply to

defendants’ response on August 29, 2005. Having read and considered the papers filed by

plaintiff and defendants, the Court will REMAND the instant action, for the following

reasons:
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1. Claims brought under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)

are not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.

§ 185, because the statutory right to be free from discrimination exists independently of

private agreements, such as collective bargaining agreements and union constitutions and

bylaws, and, consequently, cannot be altered or waived by means of any such agreement. 

See, e.g., Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1993)

(finding FEHA claim not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA because where “nonnegotiable

rights exist independently of rights established by contract, evaluation of the claim asserted

does not require consideration of the terms of any bargaining agreement”); see also Ackley

v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding a

“union constitution is considered a contract between the union and its members” for

purposes of § 301).

Audette v. Int’l Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 195 F.3d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999), on which defendants rely, is distinguishable from Ramirez, as the Ninth Circuit

itself expressly recognized, and, consequently, from the instant action as well. See id. at

1113. In Audette, the claim at issue was for discriminatory and retaliatory breach of a

settlement agreement, which, unlike the instant action, and as the Ninth Circuit observed,

did not “not involve a free-standing claim of discrimination.” See id. at 1113.

2. The duty of fair representation set forth in § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations

Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), has no bearing on the instant claims, as plaintiff alleges

she is not a member of the union. See Simo v. Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile

Employees, 322 F.3d 602, 614 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding duty of fair representation under

NLRA “does not apply where the union is not representing the workers in question”); see

also Karo v. San Diego Symphony Orchestra Ass’n, 762 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1985)

(holding union’s duty of fair representation does not extend to persons who are “not

employees in the bargaining unit”). Plaintiff’s allegation that an unauthorized grievance

was purportedly filed on her behalf does not serve to distinguish the instant action from the

above-cited cases finding the duty of fair representation arises only as to union members. 
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3. As none of the claims remaining in the instant action raises a federal question,

and there is no allegation of diversity jurisdiction, the Court declines to assume

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

(authorizing district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction have been dismissed); see also Carnegie-Mellon

University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under

the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity –

will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims”).

Accordingly, the Court hereby REMANDS the instant action to the California

Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge