Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03724/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03724-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GMYL, L.P.,

Plaintiff,

v.

PETER COPPOLA BEAUTY LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03724-VC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT, SETTING 

ASIDE DEFAULT, GRANTING 

MOTION TO STRIKE, AND DENYING 

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME

Re: Dkt. Nos. 58, 62, 69

"Judgment by default is a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case 

should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits." United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 

730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 

1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Despite Peter Coppola's baffling and inexcusable failure to appear 

previously, it now appears possible for GMYL to resolve its case against him on the merits: 

Coppola has finally appeared and filed a putative answer to the complaint, and seems ready to 

proceed with this litigation.

 The Eitel factors confirm that default judgment is inappropriate here. Although the 

intransigence of Coppola and his Florida counsel has delayed the litigation and created some 

"possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff," Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471, this possibility can be mitigated 

by proceeding expeditiously with the litigation now. In addition, any financial prejudice to the 

plaintiff as a result of the intransigence of Coppola and his Florida counsel could potentially be 

remedied by sanctions. And although Coppola's default was not "due to excusable neglect," id. 

at 1472, this is just one factor among many.

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Meanwhile, "the merits of [the] plaintiff's substantive claim," "the sufficiency of the 

complaint," and (relatedly) "the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts," id. at 1471-

72, all weigh against default judgment. The complaint alleges that GMYL uses its "COPPOLA" 

mark to sell "premium wine" and "related goods including gourmet Italian food products, wine 

accessories, home décor, and personal products." Complaint ¶1. But the defendants aren't alleged to 

have sold wine, gourmet Italian food products, wine accessories, or home décor: they're alleged to 

have sold hair care products. And while the complaint also alleges that GMYL runs "hotels and 

resorts where [it] also provides and/or offers for sale a variety of luxury products including 

shampoos, conditioners, soaps, and lotions," Complaint ¶1, the fact that these hair care products are 

only alleged to be sold at GMYL's own "hotels and resorts" seems to minimize the likelihood of 

confusion with the defendants' products sold elsewhere. In this light, it is not clear that there is a 

reasonable likelihood of confusion between GMYL's products and the defendants' products. 

Additionally, though the complaint alleges that Peter Coppola's companies "have shifted from the 

trademark known as 'PETER COPPOLA' to a trademark that emphasizes just the word 'COPPOLA,'" 

the nature and significance of this shift in "emphasis" seems likely to give rise to disputes of material 

fact.

Combined with "the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

favoring decisions on the merits," Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472, this means that four of the Eitel factors 

weigh against entry of default judgment. Accordingly, GMYL's motion for default judgment is 

denied.

It's not clear why Peter Coppola has not yet moved to set aside the Clerk's entry of default 

against him. But there is no point in delaying this litigation any further, and the Court can set 

aside an entry of default sua sponte. Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger 

Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 385-86 (7th Cir. 2008); Investcorp Ret. Specialists, Inc. v. Ohno, No. 

07-cv-1304-RMW, 2007 WL 2462122, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2007); cf. Kingvision Pay-PerView Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court would be within 

its discretion to refuse to set aside the default here, because it was caused by Peter Coppola's 

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culpable conduct. See Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests. Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 

922, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2004). But the Court would also be within its discretion to set aside the 

default, because (as discussed above) Coppola may well have a meritorious defense to the 

complaint, and GMYL will not be further prejudiced if this litigation proceeds expeditiously 

now. See id. Because default judgment is inappropriate here, and it would be counterproductive 

to let Peter Coppola remain in default without entering default judgment against him, the Court 

exercises its discretion to set aside the entry of default.

The unopposed motion to strike Peter Coppola's answer is granted. And because the 

Court has denied GMYL's motion for default judgment, Peter Coppola's motion for an extension 

of time to respond to GMYL's motion for default judgment is denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2016

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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