Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02413/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02413-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Terrell Barnes, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-02413 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

) 

Dennis R. Smith, )

) 

Respondent. )

____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID C. CAMPBELL:

Mr. Terrell Barnes (“Petitioner”), who is incarcerated

at the Federal Correctional Institute in Phoenix, Arizona, filed

a pro se motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis on December 7, 2011. On January 20,

2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On March 8, 2012, the Court

granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and denied the

motion for preliminary injunctive relief and ordered Respondent

to answer the petition. Respondent filed a pleading captioned

as “Opposition to Writ of Habeas Corpus” (“Response”) (Doc. 12)

on March 30, 2012. 

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On April 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion seeking to

introduce new evidence (Doc. 13) and a motion seeking discovery

(Doc. 14). On April 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a reply (Doc.

15) to the response to his petition. On May 10 Petitioner filed

a motion (Doc. 16) seeking to compel discovery from Respondents.

I Procedural Background

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury in the Southern

District of Texas on one count of aiding and abetting possession

with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. On July 19, 1996, Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of twenty years imprisonment followed by

ten years of supervised release pursuant to these convictions.

See Response, Exh. A. 

Respondent avers Petitioner is projected to complete

this sentence on August 26, 2013, based on credits for good

conduct. See id., Exh. A & Exh. C. Petitioner’s mandatory

release date from federal custody is January 13, 2016. Id.,

Exh. A. Respondent avers that, should Petitioner successfully

complete a prison residential drug abuse treatment program

(“RDAP”), Petitioner, has “a 3621(e) conditional release date of

February 13, 2013.” Id., Exh. A.

Petitioner was placed at the Federal Correctional

Institute (“FCI”) in Phoenix, Arizona, on or about August 6,

2010. Petitioner alleges he applied for participation in a

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1 As explained more thoroughly infra, in 1990 Congress required

the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to provide substance abuse

treatment for inmates. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Accordingly, the BOP

instituted prison residential drug abuse treatment programs known as

“RDAP”. To provide an incentive for inmates to participate in RDAP,

Congress amended section 3621 in 1994, authorizing the BOP to reward

inmates who successfully completed RDAP with eligibility for early

release from incarceration. See id. § 3621(e)(2)(B). The statute

permits BOP to consider only those inmates convicted of “nonviolent”

crimes for early release. Id.

2 Prison staff noted that placement in RDAP was based on a

prisoner’s eligibility for treatment, the availability of space in the

program, and the prisoner’s projected release date.

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prison residential drug abuse treatment program (“RDAP”)1 and

that he was placed on a wait list for this program. Petitioner

asserts that in December of 2010 he was reassigned to the RDAP

housing unit. 

Petitioner asserts he was officially enrolled in RDAP

on November 7, 2011, after being on the wait list for

participation in this program for eleven months. Petitioner

contends that, based on the policy adopted by FCI, although he

will have completed RDAP, which under some circumstances might

qualify him for as much as a year of early release time, he will

only be eligible for a sentence reduction of six months.

 Petitioner asserts at some point he was informed by

prison staff that many inmates are not placed in RDAP in time

for them to complete the program and be eligible for the entire

reduction in their sentence for completion of RDAP.2 Petitioner

contends that FCI decisions regarding prisoners’ eligibility for

participation in RDAP creates a disparity in treatment between

short and long-term inmates within 36 months of their release,

in violation of the United States Constitution’s promise of

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3 The policy at issue appears to determine the number of months

of early release eligibility based on the length of the sentence

imposed on the prisoner.

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equal protection.3

On January 20, 2012, Petitioner initiated this section

2241 action alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) violated

the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and Petitioner’s right

to equal protection of the law by arbitrarily using a sliding

scale for inmate sentence reduction (“DAP wait/RDAP

participants”) and arbitrarily expanding the federal prison

Residential Drug and Alcohol Program (“RDAP”) “without crediting

mandatory participants towards the overall entrance date.” In

Ground One of the petition, Petitioner alleges two causes of

action under the APA; Petitioner asserts that “improper

application of the Sliding Scale Sentencing Reduction (“SSSR”)

rule” creates “a disparity impact among short and long term

inmates.” Doc. 6. Petitioner also contends that the SSSR was

implemented “without notice.” Id. In Ground Two of the

petition Petitioner asserts that BOP officials arbitrarily

expanded the RDAP without crediting mandatory participation

towards the official entrance date.

II Analysis

“The scope of habeas review under § 2241 extends both

to constitutional and statutory questions.” Barapind v. Reno,

225 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). “A motion pursuant to §

2241 generally challenges the execution of a federal prisoner’s

sentence, including such matters as the administration of

parole, computation of a prisoner’s sentence by prison

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officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type

of detention and prison conditions.” Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d

144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001). 

In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of

1994, Congress required the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to make

substance abuse treatment available to federal prisoners with a

treatable substance abuse problem. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). As

an incentive for participation in substance abuse treatment,

Congress authorized the BOP to offer early release to prisoners

who are convicted of a “nonviolent” offense and who undergo drug

abuse treatment. See id. § 3621(e)(2)(B). See also Warren v.

Crabtree, 185 F.3d 1018. 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Congress delegated to the BOP the authority to

administer the drug abuse programs, see 28 C.F.R. § 550.56, and

gave the BOP the discretion to determine which prisoners may

participate in RDAP and which prisoners are eligible for

sentence reductions. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241, 121

S. Ct. 714, 722 (2001). The language of section 3621(e)(2)(B)

is permissive, stating the BOP “may” grant early release to

prisoners convicted of non-violent crimes who complete substance

abuse treatment; the federal courts have concluded the statute

does not guarantee even statutorily-eligible inmates an early

release. See, e.g., Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1225 & 128-

29 & n.5 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2011); Bellis v. Davis, 186 F.3d 1092,

1094 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Lopez, 531 U.S. at 241, 121 S.

Ct. at 722.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

section 2241 prisoner may not challenge the BOP’s individualized

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4

There is no ambiguity in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3625.

The plain language of this statute specifies that the

judicial review provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706,

do not apply to “any determination, decision, or order”

made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621–3624. The BOP has

authority to manage inmate drug treatment programs,

including RDAP, by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3621. To find that

prisoners can bring habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

to challenge the BOP’s discretionary determinations made

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621 would be inconsistent with the

language of 18 U.S.C. § 3625. Accordingly, any substantive

decision by the BOP to admit a particular prisoner into

RDAP, or to grant or deny a sentence reduction for

completion of the program, is not reviewable by the

district court.

Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1227.

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determination relating to that prisoner’s eligibility for

release upon completion of RDAP or eligibility for RDAP, but

that the BOP’s categorical denial of early release pursuant to

section 3621 is reviewable as a violation of the Administrative

Procedures Act. See Close v. Thomas, 653 F.3d 970, 973-74 (9th

Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1606 (2012); Reeb, 636 F.3d

at 1225 & 128-29.4 Cf. Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1279

& n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the BOP’s decision to admit

a prisoner to RDAP was not reviewable but that whether the BOP

exceeded its statutory authority in determining a category of

inmates which could be excluded from RDAP was reviewable).

Petitioner’s claim with regard to the policies

governing an inmate’s priority to be received into RDAP appears

to be precluded by a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals:

 Congress directed BOP to provide RDAP

services to eligible offenders “with priority

... based on an eligible prisoner’s proximity

to release date,” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(1)(C),

as calculated by applying the definition of

“date of release” in § 3624(a). Our

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conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the

early release at issue here is discretionary:

“[t]he period a prisoner convicted of a

nonviolent offense remains in custody after

successfully completing a treatment program

may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons....”

18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

“Proximity to release date” cannot logically

be equated with “proximity to earliest

potential release date.” Accordingly,

Close’s argument fails. The statute

unambiguously does not require BOP to account

for subsection (e) early release when

calculating inmates’ “proximity to release

date” and their resulting RDAP wait list

placement.

Close, 653 F.3d at 975-76. 

Additionally, in Close the Ninth Circuit concluded that

the APA was not violated by the implementation of regulations

and policies regarding inmates’ eligibility for RDAP and BOP

decisions regarding the “sliding scale” or SSSR provisions. See

id. at 976 (upholding the validity of the rule specifying that

RDAP-eligible inmates would be ranked on the RDAP wait-list

based on their “proximity to release” using the good-time

release date). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

relief on the basis of his APA claim.

Due Process and Equal Protection claims

There is no constitutionally protected right of a

convicted person to early release under section 3621(e) and,

therefore, Petitioner was never entitled to a sentence reduction

and he has not been deprived of a statutory or constitutional

right by the denial of some portion of the reduction. See,

e.g., Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1229 n.4; Zacher v. Tippy, 202 F.3d

1039, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000); Wottlin v. Fleming, 136 F.3d 1032,

1036 (5th Cir. 1998).

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Similarly, in Reeb the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

denied a the Petitioner’s claim that application of a sliding

scale (SSSR) utilizing an inmate’s proximity to release to

determine eligibility for participation in RDAP and the amount

of available early release time did not violate the petitioner’s

right to equal protection of the law because the petitioner had

not presented any facts demonstrating that he was treated

differently from others who were similarly situated to him.

benefit. See 636 F.3d at 1229.

III Conclusion

Petitioner has not established that he was denied his

constitutional rights or that the Administrative Procedures Act

has been violated.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Barnes’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s motion

seeking to introduce new evidence (Doc. 13), and his motion

seeking discovery (Doc. 14), and his motion (Doc. 16) seeking to

compel discovery from Respondents, all be denied. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

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file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2012.

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