Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02810/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIMACO LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

RAYMOND HADDEN, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15-cv-2810 BTM (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”) of Climaco Lopez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se. (ECF 

No. 1.) Respondent filed an answer to the Petition (ECF No. 13), and Petitioner did not 

file a traverse.

United States Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt submits this Report and 

Recommendation to United States District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. After a thorough review of the 

record, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be 

DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 27, 2013, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an information on 

behalf of the people of the State of California in the Superior Court of California, County 

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of San Diego, North County Division charging Petitioner with six counts of sexual 

intercourse/sodomy with a child ten years old or younger in violation of California Penal 

Code section 288.7(a) (counts one, two, three, four, five, and six), six counts of committing 

a forcible lewd act upon a child in violation of California Penal Code section 288(b)(1)

(counts seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve), and two counts of making a criminal 

threat in violation of California Penal Code section 422 (counts thirteen and fourteen). 

(ECF No. 14-5 at 2-5.) As to count thirteen, the information further alleged Petitioner 

personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, within the meaning of Penal Code section 

1192.7(c)(23). (Id. at 5.)

On August 15, 2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual 

intercourse/sodomy with a child ten years old or younger in violation of Penal Code section

288.7(a) (counts one, three, and five). (ECF No. 14-1 at 6-7; ECF No. 14-2.) On 

September 23, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty five years to life in state prison. 

(ECF No. 14-3 at 1.) Petitioner is currently in custody at the Centinela State Prison in 

Imperial, California. (ECF No. 14-6 at 2.) 

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction, but instead filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Superior Court in case number HCN1396 on June 1, 2015. (ECF 

No. 14-6.) In his petition before the Superior Court, Petitioner claimed (1) his counsel was 

ineffective, and (2) the state court violated the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11(b) when it purportedly failed to personally address Petitioner in 

open court to confirm that he accepted the plea with full knowledge and understanding. 

(Id. at 3-12.) The Superior Court denied Petitioner’s writ on June 30, 2015. (ECF No. 14-

7.)

Petitioner appealed this decision by filing another petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the California Supreme Court in case number S228680 on August 17, 2015. (ECF No. 

14-8.) In that Petition, Petitioner again claimed his counsel was ineffective on substantially 

similar bases: (1) failing to interview a “material witness,” (2) misadvising him about his 

sentence, and (3) coercing him into accepting the plea. (Id. at 3-13.) Petitioner also 

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claimed that the trial court should not have accepted his guilty plea because it was 

involuntary. (Id.) On November 10, 2015, the California Supreme Court summarily 

denied Petitioner’s petition of habeas corpus with a citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 

464, 474 (1995). Respondent does not assert that Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims, 

so this Court presumes the California Supreme Court adjudicated Petitioner’s claims on 

the merits.1(ECF No. 14-9.)

On December 14, 2015, Petitioner filed this Petition. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed 

an answer to the Petition on June 9, 2016. (ECF No. 13.) Petitioner did not file a traverse.

2

 

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) govern federal habeas corpus petitions. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

326-27 (1997). Under AEDPA, a petition for habeas relief will not be granted with respect 

to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the 

adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (quotations omitted); see also

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). 

A court may grant habeas relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court 

applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if it 

decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 

685, 694 (2002). A court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable determination” 

clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme 

 

1 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state 

court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim 

on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”)

2 This Court set July 15, 2016 as Petitioner’s deadline to file a traverse. (ECF No. 12 at 2.)

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Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. 

Id. In performing this analysis, the court presumes factual findings made by the state court 

to be correct, and “[t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Lambert v. 

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2004). Clear and convincing means that the court

“must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate 

review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Taylor 

v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).

In deciding a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal court is not called upon to 

decide whether it agrees with the state court determination; rather, the court applies an

extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was 

objectively unreasonable. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004); see 

also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). “A state court’s determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for 

the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-

06 (1991).

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two claims in his petition. First, in Ground One, Petitioner claims 

his trial attorney was ineffective when he advised Petitioner to enter a plea because counsel 

purportedly (1) failed to “investigate any avenue of defense” and failed to spend a sufficient 

amount of time with Petitioner, (2) misadvised Petitioner about the consequence of his plea

and the nature of his plea deal, and (3) coerced Petitioner into pleading guilty. (ECF No. 

1 at 6-11.) Second, in Ground Two, Petitioner claims the trial court violated both “Court 

Rule 11(b)(1)” and the Fifth Amendment because the court “failed to ensure that 

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Petitioner’s plea was with knowledge and understanding”; was voluntary and did not result 

from “force, threat or promises”; and was supported by a factual basis. (Id. at 12-13.)

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

As to Ground One, Petitioner contends his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel was violated by his trial attorney for the reasons set forth above when 

he advised Petitioner on his plea. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees certain rights to criminal defendants, including 

the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. For a petitioner to 

succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must satisfy both prongs of the 

two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 

Washington: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense. 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984); see also Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985) (reaffirming Strickland and applying it to ineffective 

assistance claims arising out of guilty pleas). While a petitioner must satisfy both prongs, 

a court is not required to address both prongs if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing 

on one prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland

test obviates the need to consider the other.” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

Prong one, the deficiency prong, requires a petitioner to identify “material, specific 

errors and omissions” showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Conclusory allegations not 

supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). “A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel

may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that

the advice he received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In determining whether a petitioner has met his burden under Strickland, “a court must 

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indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).

Prong two, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, requires a showing that 

counsel’s alleged constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea 

process. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In order to satisfy the prejudice prong in the context of guilty 

pleas, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id.; see 

also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

In Harrington, the Supreme Court discussed the application of Strickland to 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims and its relationship to § 2254(d)’s deferential 

standard of review. 562 U.S. 86, 86 (2011). When analyzing an argument under Strickland

in the context of § 2254(d), “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application 

of the Strickland standard was unreasonable,” which is a different question from “asking 

whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Id. at 101.

Petitioner raised Ground One – his ineffective assistance of counsel claims – in his 

habeas corpus petitions before the California Superior Court (ECF No. 14-6 at 3-6) and the 

California Supreme Court (ECF No. 14-8 at 3-6). The California Supreme Court denied 

the petition without comment (ECF No. 14-9), and thus, there is no reasoned decision from 

the state’s highest court. Therefore, this Court “looks through” to the underlying Superior 

Court decision and presumes that it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s claims. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804.

As to one specific component of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

the complaint that his attorney failed to investigate and interview an unidentified “material 

witness,” Respondent argues that the case of Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267

(1973), is dispositive. Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s guilty plea 

operated as a break in the chain, barring Petitioner from challenging any pre-plea 

constitutional violations. However, in making this argument, Respondent misconstrues 

Petitioner’s claim. The holding in Tollett to does not apply here. 

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In Tollett, the petitioner sought habeas relief on the grounds that “he was deprived 

of his constitutional right because Negroes had been excluded from the grand jury that 

indicted him . . . .” 411 U.S. at 267. The Supreme Court held:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has 

preceded it in criminal process. . . [Petitioner] may not thereafter raise 

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights 

that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack 

the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea. 

Id. at 267. The Supreme Court further explained that if the plea is voluntarily and 

intelligently entered, it will not be vacated because defense counsel did not advise on 

“every conceivable constitutional plea in abatement . . . .” Id. However, the Supreme 

Court in Tollett distinguished those cases where counsel’s pre-plea deficiencies are alleged 

to have impacted the voluntariness and informed nature of the plea itself.

Counsel’s failure to evaluate properly facts giving rise to a 

constitutional claim, or his failure properly to inform himself of facts 

that would have shown the existence of a constitutional claim, might in 

particular fact situations meet this standard of proof [relating to 

ineffective assistance of counsel]. Thus, while claims of prior 

constitutional deprivation may play a part in evaluating the advice 

rendered by counsel, they are not themselves independent grounds for 

federal collateral relief.

Id. at 266-67. Therefore, Tollett bars federal habeas review of claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel that both preceded and are not related to the validity of the plea. See 

id. at 266; Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) overruled on other grounds

(relying on Tollett to decline considering petitioner’s allegation that his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to prevent the use of his confession because it is a “pre-plea 

constitutional violation”).

Petitioner ties his allegations regarding the deficiencies of counsel’s pre-plea 

investigation to the validity of his guilty plea, and specifically the intelligent and informed 

nature of his guilty plea, alleging:

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It is difficult to determine when an attorney’s preparation, prior to 

advising a client to plea[d] guilty is so insufficient as to constitute 

ineffective assistance. [Petitioner] believes that in this case, [counsel’s 

ineffectiveness] had to do with the amount of time or the lack of time 

spent [sic] between the defense counsel and appellant, or the lack of time 

spent investigating the fact of the claim. And at the very least [sic] 

counsel should, as he must, be sure that appellant was admitting guilt 

knowingly and voluntary[il]y. Advising a guilty plea without 

investigating the client’s only potential defense usually constitutes 

ineffective assistance.

(Pet. at 10.) According to Petitioner, his plea was not intelligently entered because his 

counsel did not have the necessary information to assess the advantages and disadvantages 

of trial versus a guilty plea. Therefore, the Court concludes that Tollett does not bar habeas 

review. 

Accordingly, the Court turns to whether the underlying state court’s decision 

denying relief for Petitioner’s Ground One claims was objectively reasonable. The state 

court denied relief based on its application of the Strickland test. In doing so, the court 

provided the following rationale:

A petitioner may seek habeas corpus relief if he accepted a plea 

bargain as the result of incompetent advice from defense counsel, and 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffective 

assistance, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on proceeding to trial. (Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 

58-59; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 936-938.)

To show ineffective assistance of counsel Petitioner must make 

a showing that his attorney’s actions in advising him to take the plea 

were not an informed choice among tactical alternatives. People v. 

Pope (1979) 23 Ca1.3d 412, 424. Petitioner must also show that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. In re Jackson (1992) 2 C.4th 578. The burden of 

proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is on the petitioner. 

He must also show that it is reasonably probable a more favorable result

would have been obtained in the absence of counsel’s failings. People 

v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 955, 966. It does not appear that

Petitioner’s attorney was ineffective when he advised him to accept a 

plea of 25 years to life when he faced an indeterminate term of up to 

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150 years to life plus additional time in prison for various determinate 

terms.

Further, even assuming that Petitioner could establish that his 

attorney was ineffective, he could not credibly establish that a more 

favorable result was reasonably probable or that he would insist on 

proceeding to trial. The Court can deny a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus based on the credibility of the Petitioner’s declarations or

statements in support of the petition. In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Ca1.4th 

924, 945-946. In Alvernaz, the Petitioner’s statements were self-serving

and uncorroborated and, therefore, lacked credibility. Here, Petitioner’s 

statements are also self-serving, and uncorroborated.

(ECF No. 14-7 at 2.) Thus, the state court determined that Petitioner failed to satisfy the 

Strickland test for his Ground One claims.

The Court concludes that the state court reasonably applied the Strickland test in 

concluding Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner was required to 

identify the material, specific errors or omissions that show counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 

Petitioner identified none.

Instead, Petitioner first argues in a conclusory fashion that his counsel’s advice was 

deficient because counsel failed to sufficiently familiarize himself with Petitioner’s case 

by communicating regularly with Petitioner, failed to pursue any and all defenses, failed to 

conduct any precursory or pretrial investigations, and failed to interview or pursue

“material” witnesses. (Pet. 7-10.) Petitioner does not present evidence or articulate any

specific facts in support of this argument. For example, as to his allegation regarding 

counsel’s failure to interview material witnesses, Petitioner fails to identify a single witness

who he contends would have provided favorable testimony. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 

486-87 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting habeas petition’s ineffective assistance claim because 

“there is no evidence in the record that this witness actually exists, other than from 

[Petitioner’s] self-serving affidavit. . . . [and] no evidence that this witness would have 

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provided helpful testimony for the defense”). Therefore, the state court reasonably 

concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate his trial attorney provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel in preparing Petitioner’s case.

Next, Petitioner argues in Ground One that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance because counsel purportedly did not advise Petitioner that his guilty plea 

included a life sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of 

sexual intercourse/sodomy with a child ten years old or younger in violation of Penal Code

section 288.7(a) in exchange for a “stipulated term in the State penitentiary of 25 years to 

life.” (ECF No. 14-1 at 4, 6-7; ECF No. 14-2.) According to Petitioner, counsel advised 

Petitioner that this guilty plea would lead to a 25 year sentence only. (Id.) Generously 

construed, Petitioner contends that his plea was unintelligent and involuntary because his 

counsel failed to advise him as to the consequences of his guilty plea.

Failing to adequately advise of the consequences of the plea may satisfy the 

Strickland test. See, e.g., Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 

gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome of the plea, combined with erroneous 

advice on the possible effects of going to trial, fell below the level of competence required 

for a defense attorney). Here, however, the transcript from Petitioner’s change of plea 

hearing demonstrates that at the time he pleaded guilty Petitioner knew he would receive a 

stipulated sentence of “25 years to life” and that he was waiving certain constitutional 

rights. (ECF No. 14-1 at 4-7.) The trial court engaged in the following colloquy;

confirming no less than three times that Petitioner understood he could receive a life 

sentence as a consequence of his guilty plea:

Q [Court]. This form indicates that you are going to be pleading to 

Counts One, Three, and Five. Each of those are felony counts, a 

violation of Penal Code Section 288.7(a). The D.A. has agreed to 

dismiss the balance, and you will be receiving a stipulated term in the 

State penitentiary of 25 years to life. Is that your understanding of the 

agreement in this case?

A [Petitioner]. Yes.

. . . . 

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Q [Court]. You have the following Constitutional rights: The right to a

speedy and public trial by jury; the right to confront and cross-examine

witnesses; the right to remain silent; and the right to present evidence

on your behalf. Do you understand those rights?

A [Petitioner]. Yes.

Q [Court]. Do you now give up those rights so that you can plead guilty 

this morning?

A [Petitioner]. Yes.

Q [Court]. Do you understand that the maximum possible consequence 

of your plea is life imprisonment--

A [Petitioner]. Yes.

. . . . 

Q [Court]. Do you understand that you will be serving a life term in the 

State penitentiary as a result of this plea?

A [Petitioner]. Yes.

(ECF No. 14-1 at 4-6 (emphasis added).) 

On this record, the state court reasonably concluded that even if Petitioner could 

establish that counsel failed to advise Petitioner that his plea bargain included a life 

sentence, Petitioner cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Indeed, the 

record supports the conclusion that Petitioner understood the life sentence of his plea by 

the time of Petitioner’s change in plea hearing. Further, there was no evidence beyond 

Petitioner’s present self-serving and uncorroborated statements that, but for his counsel’s 

failure to properly advise him of the penalties he faced, Petitioner would have insisted on 

proceeding to trial. As a result, it was reasonable for the state court to conclude that the 

outcome of the plea process was unaffected by counsel’s alleged (and unsubstantiated) 

failure to advise Petitioner of both his waiver of rights and the “life” portion of his “25 

years to life” stipulated sentence. Thus, the state court reasonably applied Strickland in 

denying Petitioner’s claim.

Petitioner’s final argument in Ground One is that his trial counsel coerced Petitioner 

into accepting his plea bargain, which allegedly violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel. He explains his claim as follows:

The defense counsel through the interpreter, told appellant, that he only 

have two options (1) go to prison for the rest of his life or (2) take the 

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plea[] offered by the prosecution, but never told him that on the plea 

offered was also the possibility of spending the rest of his life in prison. 

. . . Appellant ignoring his rights agreed to the plea offered, was 

contrary to his voluntari[]ness, where he wanted to confront his accuser, 

but for the misadvise of his counsel, who he trusted. . . . And 

recom[m]ended a plea deal with the fact that it is the plea or life behind 

prison walls. . . . Forcing a client to plea[d] guilty despite his repeated 

protestations of innocence, is generally ground for reversal.

(ECF No. 1 at 6-7, 9-10.)

A plea is involuntary if it is the product of threats, improper promises, or other forms 

of wrongful coercion. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A plea is

unintelligent if the defendant is without the information necessary to assess the advantages

and disadvantages of a trial as compared to entering a guilty plea. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56. 

The representations made by a defendant at the plea hearing carry a “strong presumption 

of verity” and “constitute a formidable barrier” to a defendant challenging the voluntariness 

of the plea in a collateral proceeding. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

Petitioner included some of the same allegations of coercion in arguing ineffective 

assistance of counsel within his petitionsto the California Superior Court and the California 

Supreme Court. (ECF Nos. 14-6 and 14-8.) The state court rejected Petitioner’s allegations 

of coercion in the context of analyzing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 

although it did not specifically reference coercion.3 Within its analysis, the state court 

found Petitioner’s allegations to be “self-serving and uncorroborated” statements and 

concluded “he could not credibly establish that a more favorable result was reasonably 

probable or that he would insist on proceeding to trial.” (ECF No. 14-7 at 2.) Thus, the 

state court addressed Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, which 

included Petitioner’s allegations of coercion, and concluded that Petitioner failed to make 

 

3 As set forth above, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment (ECF No. 14-9), 

and thus, there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court. Therefore, this Court “looks 

through” to the underlying Superior Court decision and presumes that it provides the basis for the higher 

court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804.

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a sufficient showing that warrants relief under either of the Strickland prongs. (ECF No. 

14-7 at 2); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99 (“it may be presumed that the state court 

adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural 

principles to the contrary”). 

Here, the evidence in the record provides strong support for the state court’s 

conclusion that Petitioner’s coercion claim failed to establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel under Strickland. Petitioner pleaded guilty and then confirmed his understanding 

of the plea agreement as well as the voluntariness of his agreement under oath in front of a 

judge. (ECF No. 14-1 at 4-7.) Specifically, Petitioner confirmed that no one “made any 

other promise or . . . threatened [him] in order to get [him] to plead guilty.” (Id. at 4-5.) 

Petitioner did all of the above with the assistance of a Spanish-speaking interpreter. (See 

ECF No. 14-1 at 3.) In accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea, the trial court found that 

Petitioner made a “voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his Constitutional rights” 

and that there was “a factual basis for the plea.” (ECF No. 14-1 at 8.) This Court concludes 

that the state court reasonably determined that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to 

demonstrate that his plea was involuntary.

In sum, the state court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s Ground One challenges to his 

guilty plea on the basis of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Further, the state court’s adjudication of 

Ground One also was based on a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented at the state court proceeding. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, 

the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Ground One.

B. Claim that Trial Court Failed to Ensure Guilty Plea was Knowing and 

Voluntary

As to Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated Rule 11(b)(1) and 

the Fifth Amendment because it “failed to ensure that Petitioner’s plea was with knowledge 

and understanding.” (ECF No. 1 at 12.) Petitioner raised this claim in his habeas corpus 

petitions before the California Superior Court (ECF 14-6 at 12) and the California Supreme 

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Court (ECF No. 14-8 at 12). The California Supreme Court denied the petition without 

comment (ECF No. 14-9), and thus, there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest 

court. Therefore, this Court “looks through” to the underlying Superior Court decision and 

presumes that it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims. See 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. 

The California Superior Court denied Petitioner’s Ground Two claiming the trial 

court failed to ensure the voluntariness of his guilty plea as follows: “Petitioner also asserts 

that the trial Court failed to inform him of his constitutional rights. However, Petitioner’s 

plea form and the minutes of his August 15, 2014 plea hearing both clearly show that he 

was advised of his constitutional rights and waived them when he entered his plea.” (ECF 

No. 14-7 at 2.) For reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that the California 

Superior Court reasonably determined that Petitioner was “advised of his constitutional 

rights and waived them when he entered his plea” in light of the evidence presented at the 

state court proceeding. 

1. Fifth Amendment 

Petitioner claims habeas relief should be granted because the trial court violated the 

Fifth Amendment when the court purportedly failed to ensure that his plea was voluntary. 

(ECF No. 1 at 12.) Also, according to Petitioner, the trial court was required to “determine 

that there [was] a factual basis for the plea” but failed to do so in his case. (Id. at 13.) 

Because a defendant waives several constitutional rights when he enters into a guilty

plea, the waiver must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 

or privilege” in order to be valid under the due process clause. McCarthy v. United States, 

394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). A guilty 

plea violates due process and is therefore void if a defendant does not enter into the plea 

knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 466. A plea may be involuntary “either because the 

accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is waiving 

[or] because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot 

stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 

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(1976). Further, a guilty plea “cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an 

intelligent admission that [the accused] committed the offense unless [the accused]

received ‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.’” Morgan, 426 U.S. at 

645 (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). 

The “constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record 

accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were 

explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 

175, 183 (2005). The Supreme Court in Bradshaw held that the defendant had been 

properly informed of the nature of the charges against him because “his attorneys 

represented on the record that they had explained to [defendant] the elements of the 

aggravated murder charge [and because defendant] himself then confirmed that this 

representation was true.” Id. at 183. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Henderson held that 

the defendant did not receive adequate notice of the charge against him because neither the 

trial judge nor defense counsel explained the nature of the charge to defendant. See

Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. On these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the 

defendant’s plea in Henderson was involuntary in violation of the Constitution. See id. 

Here, the state court reasonably determined that Petitioner’s plea was not involuntary 

in violation of the Fifth Amendment and, thus, that the trial court satisfied its constitutional 

obligations. The court’s conclusion is supported by (1) the court’s colloquy with Petitioner 

during the plea hearing, and (2) Petitioner’s signature on the plea form. (ECF No. 14-1; 

ECF No. 14-2; ECF No. 14-1 at 4.)

First, the state court reasonably determined that Petitioner entered into the guilty 

plea knowingly and voluntarily through its inquiry at the plea colloquy. During the plea 

hearing, the trial court asked Petitioner “Do you understand the charges against you, 

possible defenses to the charges, and consequences of your plea of guilty?” to which 

Petitioner answered “Yes.” (ECF No. 14-1 at 4.) Furthermore, the trial court informed 

Petitioner of his constitutional rights and confirmed that Petitioner understood that those 

rights would be waived if Petitioner pleaded guilty. (Id. at 5.) The trial court next laid out 

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the maximum possible consequences of Petitioner’s guilty plea, which included life 

imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, lifetime parole, possible deportation, a life term in the State 

penitentiary, registration as a sex offender, and an extended period of involuntary 

commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator law. (Id. at 5-6.) The Court asked 

Petitioner directly if Petitioner understood each of those consequences individually, to 

which Petitioner responded “Yes.” (Id.) Finally, after confirming Petitioner understood 

the consequences of his plea, the court asked Petitioner in simple terms “Are you pleading 

guilty because you unlawfully engaged in sexual intercourse with a child under ten years 

old on three separate occasions?” to which Petitioner responded “Yes.” (Id. at 7.)

Next, the state court reasonably determined that Petitioner entered into the guilty 

plea knowingly and voluntarily because Petitioner’s signature and initials on the plea form 

demonstrate Petitioner’s understanding of the specific charges against him and the 

consequences of his plea. The plea form reiterates the charges against Petitioner and the 

constitutional rights Petitioner forgoes in pleading guilty. (ECF No. 14-2.) The trial court 

even went as far as to ask Petitioner during the plea hearing if he recognized the plea form, 

if Petitioner signed and initialed the form “after [Petitioner] read and understood everything 

on the form,” and if Petitioner had the correct understanding of the agreement laid out on 

the plea form. (Id. at 4.) In response to all of these questions, Petitioner responded “Yes.” 

(Id.) Additionally, Petitioner’s initials in the box next to Question 7f on the plea form 

indicate that his attorney explained to him all other possible consequences of his guilty 

plea. (ECF No. 14-2 at 2.)4

2. Rule 11(b)(1) 

Petitioner also claims the trial court violated “Court Rule 11(b)(1)” when it

purportedly failed to ensure that his plea was voluntary. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) Although 

 

4 Specifically, Petitioner indicated on the plea form at Question 7f that he understood the following were 

possible consequences of his guilty plea: Consecutive sentences; Lifetime registration as a sex offender; 

Cannot possess firearms or ammunition; Blood test and saliva sample; Priorable (increased punishment 

for future offenses); Prison prior; Mandatory imprisonment; Mandatory State Prison; Sexually Violent 

Predator Law; Reduced conduct/work credits; Loss of public assistance; AIDS education program. 

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Petitioner does not specifically identify the “Court Rule” to which he is referring, this Court 

presumes Petitioner is referring to Rule 11(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, which sets forth district courts’ responsibilities when considering and accepting 

guilty pleas in federal court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). Rule 11(b)(1) is binding on “all 

criminal proceedings in the United States district courts, the United States courts of 

appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States,” but Rule 11 does not govern state 

court proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(1). Because Petitioner pleaded guilty in state 

court and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 only applies in federal court proceedings, 

Rule 11 is not applicable here.

Even if Rule 11(b)(1) were applicable here, Petitioner still fails to demonstrate that 

the state court erred when it determined that the trial court satisfied its obligation to ensure 

that his plea was voluntary. To comply with Rule 11(b)(1), a judge must “inquire into the 

defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea” 

and “the judge [must] satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea.” McCarthy, 

394 U.S. at 467. In McCarthy, the Supreme Court found a defendant’s plea involuntary in 

violation of Rule 11(b)(1) because the district judge did “not personally inquire whether 

the defendant understood the nature of the charge.” Id. at 464.

Here, unlike in McCarthy, the trial court judge repeatedly inquired into Petitioner’s 

understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea as addressed 

more thoroughly above. Given the extent of the court’s inquiry into Petitioner’s 

understanding of the charge, a reasonable conclusion is that the court fell well within the 

requirements laid out in Rule 11. It follows that the California Superior Court’s finding

that Petitioner was “advised of his constitutional rights and waived them when he entered 

his plea” was a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

Therefore, the state court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s Ground Two challenges to 

his guilty plea was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Further, the state court’s adjudication of Ground Two also was based on a reasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

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Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief be 

DENIED as to Ground Two. 

C. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 13.) Evidentiary 

hearings in § 2254 habeas cases are governed by AEDPA, which “substantially restricts 

the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 

1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), included below, 

control this decision: 

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in 

State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing 

on the claim unless the applicant shows that —

(A) the claim relies on —

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 

that was previously unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 

previously discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

In order to determine whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the Court must first 

“determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim.” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078).

If such a factual basis does not exist, then the Court must “ascertain whether the petitioner 

has ‘failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State court.’” Id. at 669-70.

A district court’s ability to conduct an evidentiary hearing is further limited by the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). See Stokley v. 

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Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the decision in Pinholster “dramatically

changed the aperture for consideration of new evidence” in federal habeas courts).

Pursuant to Pinholster, a federal court may not consider new evidence developed at a 

federal court evidentiary hearing on claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

both the standard set forth in § 2254(d) and the standard set forth in § 2254(e)(2) are 

satisfied. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 184-85. Therefore, a court must first review the state 

courts’ rejection of a petitioner’s claims decided on the merits to determine whether a 

petitioner has “satisfied § 2254(d)(1)’s threshold obstacle to federal habeas relief.” Id. at 

206 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This review is limited to the state court record. Id.

Here, all of Petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits by the state courts. 

(See ECF No. 14-7.) Thus, Petitioner can only proceed to develop additional evidence if 

either 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2) is first satisfied. See Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 

1076 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 203, n.20) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing 

is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief.”). 

For all the reasons discussed above in sections V.A.-V.B. of this Report and 

Recommendation, Petitioner has failed to satisfy § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing should be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Court issue an 

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that 

Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED THAT any party to this action may file written objections with 

the District Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than December 12, 2016. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the District Court and served on all parties no later than December 27, 2016. The parties 

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

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raise those objections on appeal of the District Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2016

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