Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00288/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00288-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Zachary M. White, who is currently confined in an Arizona State 

Prison, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. BACKGROUND 

a. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows: 

On the evening of November 16, 2007, White had invited 

several of his friends to a party at his apartment. White and a few other men went outside to smoke, and White took a 

handgun out of his pants so the group could shoot out the streetlights. After the others persuaded him not to fire the gun, he put it away and shot at the lights with a slingshot instead. They eventually went back inside and played “drinking games.” They then played a game that involved taking turns binding each other to a chair with duct tape. As 

C. was sitting in the chair, White brought out his gun and placed it against C.’s head. C. touched the barrel of the gun 

Zachary M. White, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

CV-16-00288-PHX-DJH (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 1 of 14
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and told White to “do it.” White then pulled the trigger, killing C. 

(Doc. 12-4, Ex. D, at 3.) 

 A grand jury indicted Petitioner for two counts of second-degree murder and one 

count of misconduct involving weapons. (Id. at 3-4.) 

 At Petitioner’s first trial, a jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder and 

weapons misconduct. (Id. at 2-4.) Petitioner appealed that conviction on the basis that the 

trial court had erred in refusing to accept his guilty plea on the weapons misconduct 

charge. (Id. at 4.) The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed and subsequently vacated 

White’s conviction and sentence for second-degree murder, affirmed his conviction and 

sentence for weapons misconduct, and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Id. at 

13.) 

 After a second trial, a jury convicted Petitioner of manslaughter. (Doc. 12-9, Ex. I, 

at 2.) The court imposed a maximum sentence of 21 years imprisonment to be served 

concurrently with the sentence for weapons misconduct that was imposed after the first 

trial. (Id.) 

b. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL AFTER SECOND TRIAL 

 In a timely, direct appeal, Petitioner raised five issues: (1) the trial court 

improperly granted a second trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy 

Clause; (2) the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s claim for mistrial based on 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct during opening statements; (3) the trial court erred in 

finding a witness was unavailable to testify and allowing the state to read that witness’s 

testimony; (4) the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence; and (5) the trial court erred 

in treating his manslaughter conviction as a dangerous-nature offense. (Doc. 12-8, Ex. H, 

at 17-41.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences 

on January 7, 2013. (Doc. 12-9, Ex. I.) On June 12, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 2 of 14
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

denied review. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. J, at 2.)1 

c. PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 On August 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Doc. 13-2, Ex. K.) On December 13, 2013, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a notice 

with the trial court stating that counsel could not find a colorable claim for review. (Doc. 

13-4, Ex. M.) 

 On January 22, 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition. (Doc. 13-8, Ex. Q.) 

Petitioner raised nine complaints that can be summarized into four broad issues: (1) the 

trial court erred in calculating Petitioner’s pre-trial incarceration credit; (2) the trial court 

erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; (3) Petitioner received 

ineffective assistance of counsel during trial; and (4) Petitioner received ineffective 

assistance of counsel during both the direct appeal and PCR process. (Id.) The state trial 

court denied the PCR Petition on May 15, 2015. (Doc. 13-9, Ex. R.) The Arizona Court 

of Appeals granted review, but subsequently denied the PCR Petition on December 30, 

2015. (Doc. 14-1, Ex. T.) 

d. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 On February 1, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner asserts three grounds for relief, which allege the following: 

(1) a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against Double Jeopardy; (2) a violation of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; and (3) a violation of the 

Fifth Amendment right to due process of law based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 

(Doc. 1 at 6-8.) 

 

1

 On January 23, 2014, the prosecution moved to amend the sentence nunc pro 

tunc to delete a three-year term of community supervision, which was imposed in error. (Doc. 14-3, Ex. V.) Petitioner filed an answering brief opposing the prosecution’s motion. (Doc. 14-4, Ex. W.) The trial court granted the motion to correct the clerical error 

under Rule 24.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus clarifying that Petitioner was to serve a flat time sentence of 21 years imprisonment. (Doc. 14-5, Ex. X.) 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of this order on April 18, 2015. (Doc. 14-6, Ex. Y.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the amended sentence on June 5, 2015. (Doc. 14-10, 

Ex. CC.) 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 3 of 14
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On April 28, 2016, Respondents filed an Answer. (Doc. 11.) Respondents asserted 

that the second and third allegations in the timely Petition were procedurally barred. (Id. 

at 10-11.) However, Respondents agreed that part of the first allegation—that the second 

trial violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from Double Jeopardy—was 

properly exhausted and should be addressed on the its merits. (Id.) Respondents further 

asserted that the trial court did not commit a Double Jeopardy violation, and that 

Petitioner’s claim in Ground One fails on the merits. (Id.) 

 On May 13, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 26.) In the Reply, Petitioner 

largely restated the previously asserted allegations without providing new support to 

refute Respondents’ claims. (Id.) 

II. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

a. THE PETITION 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Petitioner’s PCR proceedings were dismissed on December 30, 2015, and Petitioner filed 

the instant Petition on February 4, 2016. Therefore, the Petition is timely. 

 Petitioner raises three separate grounds in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus: 

(1) a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against Double Jeopardy; (2) a violation of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; and (3) a violation of the 

Fifth Amendment right to due process of law based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 

(Doc. 1.) The Court analyzes each claim below. 

b. LAW

i. Procedural Default 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 4 of 14
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or a brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal 

claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. 

at 31–32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for 

purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the 

proper forum, . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991), superseded in part by, 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(b). Principles of comity also require federal courts to respect state 

procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. 

Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal 

review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 5 of 14
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet 

the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732). See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to 

those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-

89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 6 of 14
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need 

not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008). Lastly, “[t]o qualify 

for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the procedural default rule,” a 

petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the 

conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 

(quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) 

(petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the 

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have 

voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be credible, such a claim 

requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, 

or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

ii. Merits Review

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, 132 

S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011); (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 

2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in 

light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 

102. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which 

demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 7 of 14
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. 

Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

c. DISCUSSION 

i. Ground One (a) 

 Ground One (a) claims that the indictment was multiplictious in violation of the 

Double Jeopardy Clause because it charged a single act in two different counts. (Doc. 1 at 

6.) Ground One (a) is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because Petitioner raises 

the claim for the first time. Although Petitioner raised five other claims in state court, he 

never specifically attacked the validity of the indictment. (Doc. 12-9, Ex. I.) Claims 

raised for the first time on habeas review are not exhausted because they were not fully 

and fairly presented to state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A claim is only “fairly 

presented” to the state courts when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact 

[he] was asserting a claim under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 8 of 14
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Here, this claim was never presented. 

The failure to fairly present these grounds has resulted in procedural default because 

Petitioner is now barred from returning to state courts. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a), 

32.4(a). See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (1991) (“[I]f the petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred . . . there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.”). 

ii. Ground One (b) 

 Ground One (b) claims that the second trial was barred by the Fifth Amendment’s 

Double Jeopardy Clause. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Ground One (b) is properly exhausted. Petitioner 

raised this precise Double Jeopardy violation in his second direct appeal to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 12-8, Ex. H.) The Arizona Court of Appeals directly addressed 

and rejected this claim on its merits. (Doc. 12-9, Ex. I.) Therefore, this claim is exhausted 

for purposes of federal habeas review. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 

(9th Cir. 2005) (reasoning, in part, that “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted 

for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”) 

(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

 Petitioner contends that conducting a second trial—after the Arizona Court of 

Appeals vacated Petitioner’s conviction for second degree murder on April 19, 2010—

was barred by the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. (Doc 1 at 6; see also

Doc. 12-8, Ex. H.) The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that retrial is not 

barred “when a defendant obtains reversal of a conviction on appeal for reasons other 

than insufficient evidence,” as was the case here. (Doc. 12-9, Ex. I.) Furthermore, the 

Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument that a reversal based on structural error 

prohibits retrial as the law clearly states that structural error mandates a reversal, but does 

not bar retrial. (Id.) This Court must determine if that ruling was contrary to clearlyestablished federal law. 

 This Court finds that the ruling of the Arizona Court of Appeals was not contrary 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 9 of 14
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

to clearly-established federal law. The Supreme Court has held that in all cases except 

those reversed on grounds of insufficient evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 

prevent a retrial. See, e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442 (1981) (when a case 

is reversed for any reason, but insufficient evidence, “the original conviction has been 

nullified” and “‘the slate wiped clean”); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719–20, 

(1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (reasoning 

that the Double Jeopardy Clause “does not preclude the Government’s retrying a 

defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to 

conviction”). In this case, Petitioner’s original conviction for second degree murder was 

overturned because the trial court had erred in refusing to accept his guilty plea on the 

weapons misconduct charge, not because of insufficient evidence. (Doc. 12-4, Ex. D.) 

Therefore, the Double Jeopardy clause did not prevent a retrial. Furthermore, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals correctly applied established federal law by rejecting Petitioner’s 

reliance on State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235 (App. 2007) for the unsupported assertion that 

the trial court committed a structural error that bars retrial. (Doc. 12-9, Ex. I.) 

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground One 

(b) of his habeas petition be denied. 

iii. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to prevent violations against 

“double jeopardy” in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner raised this claim in 

Ground One (b). Because the Court has determined Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment 

argument fails, as detailed above, Petitioner’s counsel did not provide ineffective 

assistance for failing to raise them. See Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 

(9th Cir. 1982) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 

iv. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 10 of 14
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

making the following statements during closing argument.2 (Doc. 1 at 8.) “Now, let’s 

look at what he did afterwards. Mr. White didn’t intend to kill his friend, he didn't want 

to kill his friend; but he did murder his friend and then he tried to cover it up, he tried to 

blame his friend.” (Doc. 1 at 16.) “Ladies and gentlemen, that illustrates, those 

circumstances that I talked to you about, manifesting an extreme indifference to human 

life.” (Id.) “Zachary White murdered his friend.” (Doc 1 at 17.)3

 “I’m trying to think of a 

good example here as well because I think Mr. Villarreal’s argument that you need to 

focus on the time of the shooting is flawed.” (Doc. 1 at 19.) “We have a series of events 

that were placed in motion that showed the Defendant’s complete disregard for the power 

of his weapon, explains to you why he felt it was okay to put the gun to his friend’s head, 

and explains to you why he pulled the trigger. Because he thought it was a toy.” (Doc. 1 

at 20.) 

 Ground Three is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because Petitioner raises 

the claim for the first time. In his direct appeal after the second trial, Petitioner asserted 

prosecutorial misconduct based upon the “prosecutor’s comment in opening statement” 

that “was designed to make the jury believe that Appellant had exhorted his friends not to 

call the police....” (Doc. 12-8, Ex. H, at 41.) Petitioner did not argue prosecutorial 

misconduct based upon statements made during closing argument. Petitioner’s claim is 

unexhausted because he did not previously argue these new facts and legal theory. See 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32–33. 

 

2

 Petitioner also writes that indictments “may not be substantively amended without reconvening a grand jury.” The Court does not consider this a separate prosecutorial misconduct argument. Even if it is a separate argument, Petitioner’s conclusory sentence also does not warrant habeas relief. See United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 886 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned that issues adverted to in a 

perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived, and that it is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

3

 Petitioner also includes the following line argued by his counsel: “[O]ne thing the prosecutor says is ‘in a sense it was an accident....’” (Doc. 1 at 18.) Petitioner’s 

counsel did not commit prosecutorial misconduct. 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 11 of 14
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Petitioner’s claim also fails on its merits. The appropriate standard of federal 

habeas review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, 

and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 

181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (explaining 

petitioner not entitled to relief in the absence of a due process violation even if the 

prosecutor’s comments were “undesirable or even universally condemned”)). Petitioner 

fails to demonstrate that any of the statements were improper. Prosecutors and defense 

lawyers are given “wide latitude” in closing arguments. See United States v. Sayetsitty, 

107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997). “Prosecutors have considerable leeway to strike 

‘hard blows’ based on the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” 

United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 652 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Berger v. United 

States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 

 In his Reply, Petitioner argues a prosecutor may not “express personal opinions” 

or make “improper remarks about the defendant.” (Doc. 26 at 3.) Petitioner adds that the 

prosecutor may not ask jurors to “act as a conscience for the community” or inflame the 

passions of the jury. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit has “consistently cautioned against 

prosecutorial statements designed to appeal to the passions, fears and vulnerabilities of 

the jury.” United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

prosecutor’s statements presented above do not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Ground One (a) is unexhausted 

and procedurally defaulted because Petitioner raises the claim for the first time. Ground 

One (b) is properly exhausted and is addressed on its merits. Nevertheless, under Ground 

One (b), Petitioner has not established that the state court’s decision “was contrary to” 

federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court. 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 12 of 14
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Grounds Two and Three are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and they also fail 

on the merits. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 13 of 14
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 2nd day of November, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:16-cv-00288-DJH Document 27 Filed 11/03/16 Page 14 of 14