Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00761/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00761-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1319 Clean Water Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Doc. 160 is Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. At a hearing on

April 5, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Convert the Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order to a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 181). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Save Our Sonoran, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Lt. General Robert B. Flowers, in his

capacity as Commander, U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-02-0761-PHX-SRB

ORDER

This action challenges a permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers

("Corps") authorizing work in desert washes located on a 608-acre parcel of land where

Defendant 56th & Lone Mountain, L.L.C. ("Lone Mountain") plans to construct a gated

residential community. Before the Court are Lone Mountain's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

First Supplemental Complaint ("FSC") brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) (Doc. 175) and Plaintiff Save Our Sonoran, Inc.'s ("SOS") Motion for Preliminary

Injunction (Doc. 1601

). 

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 1 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

I. BACKGROUND

At a public auction in 2001, the State of Arizona sold to Lone Mountain a 608-acre

parcel of undeveloped land in north Phoenix known as Section 16. Prior to its sale, Section

16 was used by neighbors and others for hiking, horseback riding and other recreational

activities. Section 16 slopes down from nearby desert foothills and peaks and contains flora

and fauna typical of the Central Arizona Uplands subsection of the Sonoran Desert including

giant saguaro cacti, and ironwood and palo verde trees. The salient feature of Section 16, for

purposes of this lawsuit, are the desert washes that cris-cross the property and carry water

during periods of rain. Pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Corps

has determined that 31.3 acres of washes, or 5% of the Section 16, constitute "waters of the

United States," putting those washes under the Corps' jurisdiction and requiring a permit for

any dredge and fill activities associated with them ("jurisdictional washes"). 

Lone Mountain proposes to construct on Section 16 a gated residential community

consisting of 794 single-family homes. In order to proceed with its project, Lone Mountain

sought a permit from the Corps to place fill material and conduct activities that would impact

7.5 acres of jurisdictional washes that flow through the property. The permit sought by Lone

Mountain proposed sixty-six projects affecting the jurisdictional washes including the

placement of road and utility crossings, pad fill, remediation, drainage and flood control

measures. 

On June 1, 2001, the Corps announced a thirty-day public comment period regarding

Lone Mountain's proposed development and permit application. According to Plaintiff,

"hundreds of citizens, mostly area residents, objected to permit issuance," as did the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS")

(First Supplemental Compl. ("FSC") at 6.) The comments "urged the Corps to employ

improved biological evaluation methodologies encompassing uplands as well as washes," to

require mitigation measures to compensate for lost uplands, to require an environmental

impact study ("EIS") or, "an expanded scope of assessment encompassing the direct, indirect

and cumulative impacts of the underlying development project on a wide range of issues,

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 2 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

including habitat, flooding and drainage, and traffic and other infrastructural and quality of

life impacts on the surrounding area." (FSC at 6.) Although some of those commenting

requested a public hearing on the proposed permit, the Corps did not hold one. 

The Corps conducted an Environmental Assessment ("EA"), as required by the

National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and issued a finding of no significant impact

("FONSI"). The Corps concluded that the sixty-six dredge and fill projects would not

significantly affect the environment or disturb the habitats of any endangered species. The

Corps limited its analysis in the first EA ("EA 1") to "the area of direct impact to waters of

the U.S., plus the immediately contiguous upstream and downstream washes that might be

indirectly affected by work in waters of the U.S." (EA 1 at 3-4.) The Corps then issued the

requested permit to Lone Mountain on March 13, 2002, subject to certain conditions. 

Plaintiff filed its original Complaint in April 2002 against the Corps, its Commander,

and Chief of the Regulatory Branch ("Federal Defendants") and Lone Mountain, alleging

violations of NEPA, CWA and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). In May 2002, Plaintiff

obtained a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and then, after a hearing, the district court

ordered a preliminary injunction. See Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 227 F. Supp. 2d

1111 (D. Ariz. 2002). The district court opinion by Judge Martone noted that "while the

waters of the United States constitute about 5% of the total area, the washes are a dominant

feature of the land and no development of the property could occur without affecting the

washes." Id. at 1113.

The district court decision focused on EA 1's scope of analysis and found that it

"raises substantial questions." Id. at 1114. In particular, the court observed that in

subparagraph D(1), "the Corps discusses the crossings as though they were 'merely a link' in

a corridor type project. But the washes run through the property the way lines run through

graph paper." Id. The court took particular exception to the fact that in subparagraph D(2),

"the Corps limited its review to the area immediately adjacent to the crossings. Yet the

location of all of the uplands and all of the washes dictate where construction will be." Id.

The court also took issue with subparagraph D(3), in which the Corps noted that only 5% of

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 3 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

the site is jurisdictional waters of the United States, but which the court found "would be far

more significant if the 5% were separated from the rest of the site. But that 5% runs through

the entire 608 acres the way capillaries run through tissue." Id. Finally, in subparagraph

D(4), the court found that while the Corps' statement that "cumulative federal control and

responsibility are limited" is true in one sense because Section 16 is private property, "federal

control of this entire section could be extensive" because of the Corps' "duty to protect the

waters of the United States." Id.

The district court concluded "that there are serious questions on the merits in this

case" and granted Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court ordered that the

permit from the Corps was temporarily suspended and that the Federal Defendants and Lone

Mountain were "preliminarily enjoined from any activities that are within the scope of [the

permit] anywhere in section 16 . . . ." Id. At 1115. In granting the preliminary injunction,

the court encouraged the Corps "to consider the preparation of a new Environmental

Assessment with a scope of analysis under [NEPA] as though federal action included the

entire project on all of section 16." Id. at 1115. After obtaining the preliminary injunction,

SOS learned that Lone Mountain was continuing some activities on the site, and sought

clarification from the court as to the scope of the injunction. In June 2002, the court clarified

that the injunction was for "any activity in section 16 in furtherance of the project as planned

for which the permit was sought," effectively halting all work on Section 16. (Order by J.

Martone, June 24, 2002.) 

Lone Mountain, but not the Corps, appealed the district court's orders. The Ninth

Circuit upheld the orders under a deferential standard of review, holding that "the district

court's order was grounded in its factual findings." Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408

F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005), amending and superseding on denial of hearing, 381 F.3d

905 (9th Cir. 2004) ("A district court's order with respect to preliminary injunctive relief is

subject to limited review and will be reversed only if the district court 'abused its discretion

or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of

fact.'") (quoting United States v. Peninsula Communications, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 839 (9th

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 4 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Cir. 2002)). The Court of Appeals found that "[t]he district court correctly held that the

Corps had improperly constrained its NEPA analysis to the washes, rather than considering

the development's effect on the environment as a whole." Id.

Following the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Corps issued another public notice on June

6, 2005 announcing a thirty-day comment period on a supplemental site-wide EA. On

October 28, 2005, the Corps issued a second environmental assessment ("EA 2"), another

FONSI, and a letter of permit modification to Lone Mountain. The following month

Defendants sought to dissolve the preliminary injunction, which was based on EA 1. This

Court, on February 28, 2006, vacated the first preliminary injunction and the clarification

issued in 2002. The Court found the preliminary injunction to be moot because "the only

complaint presently pending before this Court challenges a permit issued pursuant to an

environmental assessment that has been superceded and replaced." (Order by J. Bolton Feb.

28, 2006 at 3.) 

In March 2006, the Court, in light of EA 2, allowed Plaintiff to file a supplemental

complaint. In the FSC, Plaintiff alleges that "[a]lthough the 'expanded EA' may facially

comply with the Ninth Circuit's mandate regarding the scope of analysis, Plaintiff maintains

that it does not meaningfully expand upon the old EA and does not adequately assess the full

impacts of the Corps permit and the underlying development." (FSC ¶ 26.) The FSC asserts

that during the public comment period for EA 2, "Over one hundred comments were filed,

nearly all opposing the project and requesting a public hearing and an EIS [Environmental

Impact Statement]." (FSC ¶ 22.) Plaintiff also claims that FWS and EPA both "stressed the

need to fully assess the functional interrelationships of upland and wash habitats," and that

the agencies were denied the opportunity to review EA 2 before its release. (FSC ¶ 22.) For

relief, Plaintiff has requested: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Corps "violated NEPA and

Section 404 of the CWA in approving the Section 16 permit and underlying development

project without, inter alia, an EIS and adequate mitigation and public interest review"; (2)

that the Court set aside the Corps' decisions "as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

and not in accordance with law and procedures required" under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 5 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

and (D); (3) a permanent injunction against the Corps "from taking any steps to approve or

allow to commence or continue dredge and fill and any other activities directly or indirectly

dependent on [Corps] approval . . . anywhere on Section 16"; (4) Plaintiff's costs and

attorney's fees. (FSC at 11-12.) 

On March 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new TRO to restrain Lone Mountain

from activities outlined in the modified permit. At a hearing on April 5, 2006, the Court

granted Plaintiff's motion for a TRO, and the subsequent Order restrained Defendants from

causing the discharge of dredge or fill materials into those portions of Section 16 determined

by the Corps to constitute jurisdictional waters of the United States. At that same hearing,

the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to convert the motion for a TRO to a motion for a

preliminary injunction. Two issues are now before the Court: Plaintiff's Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction and Lone Mountain's Motion to Dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS 

A. Motion to Dismiss

Lone Mountain has moved to dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the claims asserted. “[W]hen considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review

any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the

existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988); see

also Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2000). The

plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of federal jurisdiction. Tosco Corp. v.

Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001).

Lone Mountain argues that when the Corps issued EA 2 and a FONSI in October

2005, "a live controversy no longer existed between the parties." (Mot. to Dismiss at 1.)

Alternatively, Lone Mountain argues that the FSC "fails to allege facts sufficient to support

Article III standing." (Mot. to Dismiss at 2.)

1. Live Controversy

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 6 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Lone Mountain argues that Plaintiff's claims became moot when the Corps issued EA

2 and a FONSI in October 2005, which superseded and replaced EA 1, issued in 2002. (Mot.

to Dismiss at 1.) Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts

to actual "cases" and "controversies," and precludes a court from taking action on a case once

it becomes moot. See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). "A 'moot action'

is one where issues are no longer live or parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome." Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982). "The burden of demonstrating

mootness is a heavy one." Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citation

omitted); Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir.

1998). Generally, a case becomes moot when "(1) it can be said with assurance that there

is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim relief or

events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." Los

Angeles County, 440 U.S. at 632 ("When both conditions are satisfied it may be said that the

case is moot because neither party has a legally cognizable interest in the final determination

of the underlying questions of fact and law.") A case is not moot if the court can provide any

effective relief, even if it is not the precise relief originally sought. See, e.g., Glickman v.

Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (holding that the plaintiffs' challenge to

a generic advertising program was not mooted by discontinuation of the program because the

plaintiffs were seeking a refund for assessments against them for such advertising).

Plaintiff argues that Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow it to

"correct jurisdictional defects . . . with subsequent facts or events." (Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to

Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Resp.") at 2.) Rule 15(d) permits a "party to serve a supplemental

pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the

date of the pleading sought to be supplemented." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Permission to

supplement should be "freely granted where such supplementation will promote the

economic and speedy disposition of the controversy between the parties, will not cause undue

delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice the rights of any other parties."

Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 1989). The goal of Rule 15(d) is "to promote

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 7 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

judicial efficiency." Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir.

1997) (citing Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Lone Mountain argues that "none of the authorities cited by Plaintiff suggest that Rule

15 overrides Article III of the Constitution or otherwise provides a legitimate basis for

allowing a plaintiff to continue to prosecute a case that has become moot." (Lone Mountain's

Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) For support, Lone Mountain relies primarily on

Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Pacific Lumber Co. to argue that there

is no longer a live case or controversy before the Court. (Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (citing Envtl.

Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001).) In Pacific

Lumber, the defendant had applied to FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service for an

Incidental Take Permit ("ITP") under ESA in order to log some of the defendant's holdings

in old growth forest. Soon after the defendant filed its application, the plaintiffs filed suit

under Section 7(d) of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d), which prohibits any irreversible or

irretrievable commitment of resources while consultation with FWS is taking place. The

district court issued a TRO and then a preliminary injunction. The court then held hearings

regarding the presence of coho salmon, a species covered by ESA, on the defendant's land.

Before the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the agencies involved

issued a biological opinion and ITP to defendant. The court then held a hearing on the

defendant's motion to dismiss based on the defendant's assertion that the issuance of the ITP

and biological opinion mooted the case because there was no longer an ongoing consultation

with FWS. On the same day it heard arguments on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the

district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the preliminary

injunction and the presence of coho salmon in certain watersheds and streams on the

defendant's property. Two months later, the district court granted the defendant's motion to

dismiss and dissolved the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the issuance of the ITP

mooted the case. 

The defendant appealed, asking the Ninth Circuit to vacate the order and statements

filed by the district court after the case had become moot and which outlined the reasons why

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 8 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

the district court granted a preliminary injunction. While the parties agreed "that the district

court lost jurisdiction with the issuance of the biological opinion," the plaintiffs argued that

the defendant lacked standing to appeal because the lower court's final judgment "was

entirely in [the defendant's] favor." Id. at 1073. Thus, the issue before the Ninth Circuit was

whether the defendant was an "aggrieved" party with standing, despite the favorable

judgment in the court below. The court of appeals, finding only one Third Circuit case on

point and determining that it should follow the Third Circuit rather than create an

"intercircuit conflict," held that "the district court's decision to flout the dictates of Article

III and render an opinion in spite of knowing the cause was moot did render [the defendant]

an 'aggrieved party.'" Id. at 1077 (noting that even "dicta entered after a court has lost

jurisdiction over a party inflicts a wrong on that party of a different order than that which

exists in the usual case of extraneous judicial pronouncement.")

Pacific Lumber is not on point here. The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether

the defendant was an "aggrieved" party with standing to request that the court of appeals

vacate statements made by the lower court after it had rendered a decision in the defendant's

favor. The court answered in the affirmative and remanded to the lower court to vacate its

order rendered after the case had become moot. Here, the Court has not issued a decision

in Defendants' favor and then made statements which have no impact on the case. Rather,

the Court has merely said that with the issuance of EA 2, the questions surrounding EA 1

became moot. Nor have the parties agreed that this Court has lost jurisdiction with the

issuance of EA 2 as the parties had in Pacific Lumber. It would hardly serve the goal of

judicial efficiency if the Court dismissed the case entirely and required Plaintiff to file an

entirely new Complaint based on the very same issues. The basis of any newly-filed

complaint would still be that the Corps did not properly conduct its EA, and Plaintiff's claims

and demands for relief would presumably remain the same. In addition, the same permit that

precipitated this litigation in 2002, although now modified, has been reissued. Therefore,

there remains a case or controversy before the Court, and the case is not moot.

2. Standing

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 9 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Lone Mountain also argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit on behalf of its

members. (Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) Lone Mountain contends that "the interest of SOS and its

members is based on past recreational activities while the Property was owned by the State

and ownership of land somewhere near the Property. There are no allegations describing

how the challenged agency action, i.e., the Corps' issuance of a permit under the CWA,

affects these interests in any tangible way." (Mot. to Dismiss at 11.) In particular, Lone

Mountain asserts that the FSC "fails to contain any allegations describing a legitimate interest

in those [jurisdictional] washes or how any of SOS's members are injured in a concrete and

personal way by the Corps' issuance of the permit." (Mot. to Dismiss at 12.) Lone Mountain

continues, "At best, the Supplemental Complaint asserts a generalized grievance regarding

the State's decision to sell the Property in 2001 to a private real estate developer and, more

broadly, the urbanization that has taken place during the past decade, which has reduced open

space and recreational opportunities in that portion of Phoenix." (Mot. to Dismiss at 12.)

Plaintiff submitted two declarations with its response from SOS members attesting

that they own property a block or two from Section 16, and that Lone Mountain's

development would negatively affect them. The two members say certain washes that run

through their properties also flow into Section 16. (Decl. of Linda Bentley ("Bentley Decl.")

at ¶ 4; Decl. of Michael Feibus at ¶ 4.) One member says "[t]he washes running through my

property and Section 16 also contribute to the lush desert flora and the presence of fauna on

my property and to the aesthetics and value of my property." (Bentley Decl. at ¶ 6.)

During the proceedings related to EA 1, the Ninth Circuit held that SOS members who

submitted declarations similar to Bentley's and Feibus's had standing. See Save Our Sonoran,

408 F.3d at 1120-21. Five SOS members in all submitted affidavits in 2002: Cynthia Foster,

Gail Dudley, Julia Broccardo, Anita Carr, Nancy L. Whiting, and Susan Kantrowitz. At the

April 5, 2006 hearing on Lone Mountain's Motion to Dismiss, Lone Mountain pointed out

that the new declarations filed with Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss were not

by the same people whom the Ninth Circuit had previously held had individual standing.

Lone Mountain said it would challenge whether the two new declarations conferred standing

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 10 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

on SOS, but said it would concede standing if the same people who filed affidavits in the

original action have not moved and have the same interest in Section 16 that they had in

2002. (Tr. 69:6-19.) The Court said the standing issue would be resolved if the original

declarants are still members of SOS and live in the same place they did in 2002. (Tr. 74:19-

25, 75:1.) 

Plaintiff has since submitted a declaration by one of the original five declarants stating

that she is still a member of SOS, resides at the same address, and that the statements set

forth in her original affidavit remain true and unchanged. (Decl. of Nancy Whiting dated

April 6, 2006 ("Whiting Decl.") at ¶¶ 1-4.) In her original affidavit, Whiting said she lives

and owns property within one-quarter mile of Section 16, which she and her family and

neighbors used for recreational purposes, that Lone Mountain's proposed developed "will

destroy the quality of these experiences," destroy the rural setting, and devalue her property.

(Aff. of Nancy I. Whiting dated May 21, 2002 ("Whiting Aff.") at 1.) Whiting said, "most

importantly, because of the surrounding development on all sides of Section 16, the native

wildlife and natural vegetation within Section 16 will be totally destroyed. The devastation

of Section 16 will negatively effect [sic] the environment by eliminating nature's balance for

miles around this area." (Whiting Aff. at 1.) Because Ms. Whiting has now affirmed the

statements she made in her original affidavit, she has individual standing. Likewise, because

at least one member of SOS who filed an affidavit in the initial proceeding still has standing,

SOS itself has standing. Lone Mountain has conceded the standing issue because at least one

member of SOS still lives in the same place she did in 2002.

Because the Court has found that this case is not moot and that Plaintiff has standing,

Lone Mountain's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

B. Preliminary Injunction 

Plaintiff has now moved for a preliminary injunction against the modified Permit

2000-01928-RWF ("the Permit"). In its motion for a TRO, now converted to a motion for

a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff sought to restrain "any and all activities pursuant to [the

Permit], including actions in furtherance of the broader development project facilitated by

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 11 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

the permit, throughout all of the affected area known as Section 16 . . . ." (Pl.'s Mot. for

Temporary Restraining Order ("Mot. for TRO") at 11.) Specifically, Plaintiff requested a

restraint on any dredge and fill activities in the washes on Section 16, and "any developmentrelated activity on Section 16" including "vegetation removal, road placement, blading,

bulldozing and other pre-construction activity, and any and all construction activity." (Mot.

for TRO at 11.) The Court granted Plaintiff's motion for a TRO, which will remain in effect

until the Court rules on this motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court ordered that

Defendants "are temporarily restrained from authorizing or engaging in activities causing the

discharge of dredge or fill materials within those portions of [Section 16] determined by the

Corps to constitute jurisdictional 'waters of the United States' within the meaning of the

Clean Water Act." (Order dated April 27, 2006.) 

1. Preliminary Injunction Standard

The Ninth Circuit has described two alternative sets of criteria for preliminary

injunctive relief. See Save Our Sonoran, 408 F.3d at 1120. The "traditional" criteria require

a plaintiff to show "'(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of

irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships

favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).'" Id.

(quoting Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Alternatively, a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction if it can show either: "(1) a

likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) the

existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping

sharply in [the movant's] favor. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 516

(9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

The Peak Computers standard is a sliding scale in which the required degree of

irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases. Diamontiney v. Borg, 918

F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, if a party can show a strong chance of success on the

merits, he need only show a possibility of irreparable harm. Peak Computers, 991 F.2d at

517 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Where, on the other hand, a party can show

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 12 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

only that serious questions are raised, he must show that the balance of hardships tips sharply

in his favor. Id. 

Plaintiff offers several reasons for why the Court should issue a preliminary

injunction. First, Plaintiff argues that EA 2 does not adequately address the concerns raised

by FWS or ESA, which Plaintiff contends, on information and belief, "continue to consider

[EA 2] to be inadequate under NEPA." (Mot. for TRO at 5.) Second, Plaintiff takes issue

with the Corp's assessment that impacts to wildlife would be minimal. (Mot. for TRO at 5-

6.) Third, Plaintiff argues that the Corps should have looked at the impact on the local

community of Volatile Organic Compounds ("VOCs") and Carbon Monoxide ("CO")

emissions from the increased traffic resulting from the development, and not just the impact

on Maricopa County. (Mot. for TRO at 6.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Corps failed to

assess the local impacts of growth, land use patterns and habitat loss, and instead only looked

at the impacts on the State of Arizona and Maricopa County. (Mot. for TRO at 6-7.)

Plaintiff raises additional concerns in the Motion related to compensatory mitigation for the

removal of upland vegetation and whether the Corps used up-to-date "drainage/flood date

in reaching its conclusions." (Mot. for TRO at 7.) 

In its Reply to Lone Mountain's Response, Plaintiff argues further that the Corps

should have prepared a detailed EIS because "(1) the project at issue may have a significant

impact on the quality of the human environment, i.e., an EIS should have been prepared;

and/or (2) the expanded EA was inadequate in its own right." (Pl.'s Reply at 3.) Plaintiff

also argues in its Reply that the Corps failed to provide a thirty-day public comment period

on the FONSI before finalizing its action. (Pl.'s Reply at 10-11.) 

2. Standard of Review

Plaintiff's action challenges the adequacy of the Corps' NEPA analysis. "The

Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") governs judicial review of agency decisions under

NEPA." Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the APA, a reviewing

court must set aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The court must also set

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 13 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The regulations define "significantly" in terms of both context and intensity. 40

C.F.R. § 1508.27. The contextual inquiry means that "the significance of an action must be

analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected

region, the affected interests, and the locality. Significance varies with the setting of the

proposed action. For instance, in the case of a site-specific action, significance would usually

depend upon the effects in the locale rather than in the world as a whole. Both short- and

long-term effects are relevant." Id. § 1508.27(a). "Intensity . . . refers to the severity of

impact. . . ." Id. § 1508.27(b). In evaluating intensity, the regulations list a number of

considerations including "both beneficial and adverse" impacts, "[t]he degree to which the

proposed action affects public health or safety," "unique characteristics of the geographic

- 14 -

aside agency action that is "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or

short of statutory right," or "without observance of procedure required by law." Id. §

706(2)(C)-(D). In applying the "arbitrary or capricious" standard, "the reviewing court 'must

consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and

whether there has been a clear error of judgment.'" Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490

U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

402, 415 (1971)). "Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the

ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its

judgment for that of the agency." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, overruled on unrelated

grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).

3. National Environmental Policy Act

"Congress, through NEPA, imposed procedural requirements on federal agencies

designed to force an agency to consider the environmental consequences of its proposed

activity." Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995). "A section 404 permit

issued by the Corps is a 'Federal action' to which NEPA applies." Save Our Sonoran, 408

F.3d at 1121 (citing Tillamook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 288 F.3d 1140, 1142

(9th Cir. 2002)). 

Under NEPA, a federal agency must "produce an environmental impact statement

('EIS') when proposing to engage in an action that will significantly affect the human

environment." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).2

 Generally, though, an agency will first

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 14 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

area,"and "cumulative impacts" when considered along with related actions. Id. §

1508.27(b)(1-3, 7).

- 15 -

prepare an EA to determine whether an EIS is required. Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1505 (noting

that if the proposed action "will significantly affect the human environment, an EIS is

required") (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4). An EA is a "concise

public document" that "[b]riefly provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis for determining

whether to prepare an [EIS] or a [FONSI]." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1). An EA must "include

brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives [to the proposal], of the

environmental impacts of the proposed act and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and

persons consulted." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b). If an EIS is not required, the agency must issue

a FONSI. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e). The agency must include with the FONSI "a convincing

statement of reasons to explain why a project's impacts are insignificant." Nat'l Parks &

Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). 

When an agency decides not to prepare an EIS, "the decision not to do so may be

overturned only if it is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.'" Anderson, 371 F.3d at 486. A court reviewing an agency's

compliance with NEPA must ensure "that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at [the]

environmental consequences" of the proposed agency action. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427

U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976). See also Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,

222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The arbitrary and capricious standard requires a court

to ensure that an agency has taken the requisite 'hard look' at the environmental consequences

of its proposed action, carefully reviewing the record to ascertain whether the agency

decision is founded on a reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors.") (citations and internal

quotations omitted); Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 730. "The court must defer to an agency

conclusion that is fully informed and well-considered, but need not rubber stamp a clear error

of judgment." Anderson, 371 F.3d at 486 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 15 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

4. The Clean Water Act

Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Corps to regulate and issue federal permits

"for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal

sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). "Navigable waters," defined by Congress as "waters of the

United States," can include "intermittent streams," "natural ponds," and tributaries of

navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). See, e.g., United States v.

Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that "navigable

waters" include "normally dry arroyos through which water may flow, where such water will

ultimately end up in public waters such as a river or stream, tributary to a river or stream,

lake, reservoir, bay, gulf, sea or ocean within or adjacent to the United States"); Quivira Min.

Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that gully that flowed into

a navigable stream after intense rain was a water of the United States). 

A "discharge" is defined as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from

any point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) and (16). "Dredged material" is "material that is

excavated or dredged from waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c). "Fill

material" includes "replacing any portion of a water of United States with dry land; or

changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States." Id. §

323.2(e)(1)(i)-(ii). 

The parties do not contest the Corps' determination that the washes at issue in this case

are navigable waters and thus under the jurisdiction of the federal government, or that

development impacting those jurisdictional washes requires a CWA Section 404 permit. The

issue, rather, is the scope of the Corps' EA analysis under NEPA outside of the washes

themselves. 

The Corps' NEPA implementing regulations govern the Corps' scope of analysis.

Under those regulations, the Corps "is considered to have control and responsibility for

portions of the project beyond the limits of Corps jurisdiction where the Federal involvement

is sufficient to turn an essentially private action into a Federal action. These are cases where

the environmental consequences of the larger project are essentially products of the Corps

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 16 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

permit action." 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B, § 7(b)(2). The regulations outline typical factors

to consider when determining whether sufficient "control and responsibility" exists,

including,

(i) Whether or not the regulated activity comprises "merely a

link" in a corridor type project (e.g., a transportation or utility

transmission project).

(ii) Whether there are aspects of the upland facility in the

immediate vicinity of the regulated activity which affect the

location and configuration of the regulated activity.

(iii) The extent to which the entire project will be within Corps jurisdiction.

(iv) The extent of cumulative Federal control and responsibility.

Id.

As the district court previously found, "the development of the entire section with 794

houses is directly dependent upon, and the product of, the Corps' permit action. Without a

permit to allow for 66 separate and dispersed crossings, the private project could not go

forward." Save Our Sonoran, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 (finding that there were "serious

questions as to whether the Corps had correctly confined its analysis"). In holding that the

lower court did not abuse its discretion, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Corps "has

responsibility under NEPA to analyze all of the environmental consequences of a project."

Save Our Sonoran, 408 F.3d at 1122. Thus, "while it is the development's impact on

jurisdictional waters that determines the scope of the Corps' permitting authority, it is the

impact of the permit on the environment at large that determines the Corps' NEPA

responsibility," which "extends even to environmental effects with no impact on

jurisdictional waters at all." Id. As the Ninth Circuit held, "Lone Mountain cannot begin

developing any portion of the land in the absence of an appropriately broad NEPA analysis

by the Corps." Id.

5. EA 2

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 17 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

The original district court opinion granting the first preliminary injunction states: "A

single issue dominates the merits of the claims and the defenses. Plaintiff claims that the

Corps of Engineers' Environmental Assessment was too narrow in scope. The Corps simply

looked at the washes and not the remainder of the section and found that there was no

significant impact under [NEPA]." Save Our Sonoran, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1113 (emphasis

added). The court focused almost exclusively on the section of EA 1 discussing the Corps'

scope of analysis under NEPA and found that EA 1's scope of analysis "raises substantial

questions" because it was so narrowly focused. Id. at 1114. The district court concluded its

order granting Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction by encouraging the Corps "to

consider the preparation of a new Environmental Assessment with a scope of analysis under

[NEPA] as though federal action included the entire project on all of section 16." Id. at 1115.

The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or base its decision

on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. Save our Sonoran,

408 F.3d at 1121 ("The district court correctly held that the Corps had improperly

constrained its NEPA analysis to the washes, rather than considering the development's effect

on the environment as a whole."). 

The Corps has now prepared EA 2, and it is this Court's job to determine whether EA

2 satisfies the requirements of NEPA and CWA. 

In EA 1, a 35-page document, the Corps' discussion of its scope of analysis concluded:

[T]he Federal involvement in this project is not sufficient to

extend the scope of analysis to the entire Lone Mountain site.

The environmental consequences of the larger project are not

essentially the products of the Corps' permit action. The Corps'

scope of analysis for this permit action is the area of direct

impact to waters of the U.S., plus the immediately adjacent

upland areas where the upland activity is a direct result of the

permitted activity, plus the immediately contiguous upstream

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 18 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

and downstream washes that might be indirectly affected by

work in waters of the U.S.

(EA 1 at 3-4.) 

EA 2, now a 79-page document plus attachments, begins with a history of the

controversy and explains:

While the Corps believes the scope of analysis for the Decision

Document dated March 1, 2002 is appropriate and in accordance

with its regulations and existing case law interpreting the

application of those regulations, this expanded EA has been

prepared in response to the court's recommendation, with the

concurrence of Lone Mountain, in the interest of avoiding

further litigation and for the purpose of determining whether to

reinstate, modify or revoke the permit. The scope of the

analysis for the expanded EA is the entire 608-acre development

site owned by Lone Mountain. This expanded assessment is

based upon the Corps' knowledge of the project area and

vicinity, comments that were received in response to the June 1,

2001 and June 6, 2005 public notices, information received from

Jones & Stokes and WestLand Resources, Inc. on behalf of the

applicant, and specific concerns identified in connection with

the aforementioned litigation.

(EA 2 at 3.) 

Plaintiff's motion lists four primary arguments for why EA 2 is deficient: (1) that the

Corps did not adequately address the concerns raised by EPA and FWS; (2) that the Corps'

discussion of wildlife impacts is inadequate; (3) that the Corps failed to assess various local

impacts such as land use patterns and increased emissions of VOCs and CO; and (4) that the

Corps failed to adequately discuss compensatory mitigation. (Mot. for TRO at 5-7.) Plaintiff

also argued at the hearing that the Corps was obligated to submit a draft EA for comment

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 19 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

before its final publication. The Court will discuss each of these issues in turn beginning

with the public comment argument.

a. Comment Period on Draft EA

At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that the Corps violated NEPA by failing to hold a

public comment period on a draft of EA 2 prior to issuing the final version. (Tr. 15:10-11.)

Plaintiff said the Corps merely announced in advance that it was going to prepare an

expanded EA, but that no one got to review the expanded EA before it was issued. (Tr.

16:10-16.) Plaintiff argued that Executive Order ("EO") 11,988 and guidance from the

Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") require a public comment period on a draft EA

when the proposed federal action is located on a floodplain, and that Ninth Circuit case law

requires a public comment period regardless of whether the action is on a floodplain. (Tr.

15:13-24 (citing Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2004).) 

If an agency decides to allow a project to take place in a floodplain, EO 11,988 states

that the agency must "prepare and circulate a notice containing an explanation of why the

action is proposed to be located in the floodplain" and "provide opportunity for early public

review of any plans or proposals for actions in floodplains . . . ." Exec. Order No. 11,988

Sec. 2(a)(2)(ii) & 2(a)(4), 42 Fed. Reg., 26,9511 (May 24, 1977). "Floodplain" is defined as

"the lowland and relatively flat areas adjoining inland and coastal waters including flood

prone areas of offshore islands, including at a minimum, that area subject to a one percent

or greater chance of flooding in any given year." Id. Sec. 6(c).

It is not clear from the record that Section 16 is in a floodplain. Plaintiff says

"Obviously, the project is located in and around wetlands/floodplains." (Pl.'s Reply to Lone

Mountain's Resp. at 9.) But saying that Section 16 is in a floodplain subject to EO 11,988

does not make it so. Plaintiff has only directed the Court to page 55 of EA 2, which says "the

southeastern portion of [Section 16], near 64th Street, is located within a FEMA-mapped AO

flood zone. Lone Mountain has stated that the project design in this AO floodplain area

meets the City of Phoenix requirements for construction in an AO zone." (EA 2 at 55.)

However, Plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the record indicating that Section 16 is in the

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 20 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Plaintiff submitted a letter from FWS dated December 13, 2005 in support of its

motion for a TRO. The Court will not consider this letter as it is outside of the administrative

- 21 -

"lowland and relatively flat areas adjoining inland and coastal waters" and "subject to a one

percent or greater chance of flooding in any given year," as defined in EO 11,988.

Plaintiff also cited dicta from Anderson v. Evans for the proposition that the Corps

was required to submit the EA and FONSI for public comment prior to its final publication.

371 F.3d at 487 ("The public must be given an opportunity to comment on draft EAs and

EISs . . . ."). In a subsequent Ninth Circuit case, the court held that "Although we have not

established a minimum level of public comment and participation required by the regulations

governing the EA and FONSI process . . . a complete failure to involve or even inform the

public about an agency's preparation of an EA and a FONSI . . . violates these [the CEQ's]

regulations." Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 97o (9th Cir.

2003) (citations omitted). That is not the situation before this Court. The Corps has opened

public comment periods twice on the very same proposed project, first in 2001 and then in

2005. EA 2 summarizes and responds to the comments made by other agencies and the

public during both public comment periods. Pages 42 to 59 address the comments made in

2001 prior to the issuance of EA 1. Pages 59 to 71 addresses the comments submitted in

June 2005. Thus, the Corps has fulfilled the purpose of NEPA by including the public in the

process and there is no procedural injury. See id. ("[T]he purpose of NEPA . . . is to ensure

that federal agencies are informed of environmental consequences before making decisions

and that the information is available to the public.") (citation and quotations omitted).

b. EPA and FWS Concerns

Plaintiff argues that the Corps did not adequately address the concerns raised by FWS

and EPA, which Plaintiff contends, on information and belief, "continue to consider [EA 2]

to be inadequate under NEPA." (Mot. for TRO at 5.)

 Plaintiff also argued at the hearing that the Corps failed to follow its own regulations

by not adequately consulting and considering FWS's comments to EA 2.3

 (Tr. 20:13-18.)

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 21 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

record. See Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. United States, 100 F.3d 1443, 1450

(9th Cir. 1996) ("Judicial review of an agency decision typically focuses on the

administrative record in existence at the time of the decision and does not encompass any

part of the record that is made initially in the reviewing court.") (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411

U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 718 (9th

Cir. 1993)). In Southwest Center, the court said materials outside the administrative record

may be reviewed "(1) if necessary to determine whether the agency has considered all

relevant factors and has explained its decision, (2) when the agency has relied on documents

not in the record, or (3) when supplementing the record is necessary to explain technical

terms or complex subject matter." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted) (noting that

the Court may also consider such materials "when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad

faith.”). None of these situations are present in this case. 

- 22 -

Plaintiff directed the Court to 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c), which requires the Corps to consult with

FWS and its state counterpart "with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources by

prevention of their direct and indirect loss and damage due to the activity proposed in a

permit application. The Army will give full consideration to the views of those agencies on

fish and wildlife matters in deciding on the issuance, denial, or conditioning of individual or

general permits."

Section 7 of ESA prohibits a federal agency from authorizing, funding, or carrying

out any action that is "likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or

threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such

species . . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If the agency determines its action may affect listed

species or critical habitat, then it must undertake a "formal consultation" with FWS. 50

C.F.R. § 402.14(a). The consultation process allows the FWS "to determine whether the

federal action is likely to jeopardize the survival of a protected species or result in the

destruction or adverse modification of its critical habitat and, if so, to identify reasonable and

prudent alternatives which will avoid the action's unfavorable impacts." Sierra Club, 65 F.3d

at 1505 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A)).

In EA 2, the Corps determined:

No federally listed threatened or endangered aquatic or upland

species or designated critical habitat occurs on or in the vicinity

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 22 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

FWS's previous concerns appeared to focus primarily on the disturbance of potential

habitat for the cactus ferruginous pygmy owl ("CFPO"). EA 2 says that surveys for CFPO

have been conducted four times on Section 16 between 2000 and 2004, and "no CFPO were

identified during any [of] these intensive field surveys." (EA 2 at 29.) Nor is Section 16

"included within a recovery area identified under FWS's draft recovery plan for the pygmyowl." (EA 2 at 66.) 

- 23 -

of the subject property. Neither the permit action nor the

planned development would affect any species listed as

endangered or threatened or their critical habitat, pursuant to

[ESA]. Therefore, consultation with the FWS is not required.

(EA 2 at 12.) Because no threatened or endangered species or designated critical habitat

were found, the Corps was not obligated to undertake formal consultation with FWS. This

is confirmed by EA 2's discussion of threatened or endangered species4

 and critical habitat

on pages 28-29, 41, 43-44, 46, 54, 55-56, 66.

Plaintiff argues that "The Ninth Circuit states that it is 'significant' that both . . . EPA,

and . . . FWS disagree with the analysis in [EA 1]." (Mot. for TRO at 5.) What the Ninth

Circuit said is, "It is significant at the onset to recall that two federal agencies, the EPA and

the FWS – not the usual suspects in opposing the action of a federal agency – disagreed with

the acreage limitations set forth in the permit applications and thus with the Corps'

interpretation of its NEPA responsibility. . . ." Save Our Sonoran, 408 F.3d at 1122. The

court of appeals made this observation in upholding the district court's determination that the

Corps violated NEPA "by failing to conduct an appropriately broad NEPA analysis." Id. In

EA 2, the Corps addressed these concerns and broadened its NEPA analysis to the entirety

of Section 16, and no longer confined its analysis to those aspects of the project with direct

impacts to jurisdictional waters, the immediately adjacent upland areas, and the immediately

contiguous upstream and downstream washes that might be indirectly affected. Therefore,

EA 2 has addressed this concern of FWS, EPA and the court of appeals by broadening its

NEPA analysis to the entire site. 

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 23 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

Moreover, EA 2 addresses EPA's comments on pages 42, 50-51, 60, and 64-65, and

it addresses FWS's comments on pages 42-46, 52-54, 60 and 65. EA 2 reflects the Corps'

consideration of EPA's and FWS's opinions. Thus, although FWS and EPA may still

disagree with the Corps' analysis, the Corps' NEPA obligation is satisfied when it

"consider[s] and respond[s] to the comments of other agencies." Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 431 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005); Hells Canyon Pres. Council

v. Jacoby, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1242 (D. Or. 1998) ("An agency is required to consider the

comments of other agencies, but it does not have to defer to them when a disagreement

exists.") (citations omitted). 

c. Wildlife Impacts 

EA 2 discusses issues related to wildlife in general at pages 11-14, 27-29, 38-39, 52-

56, and 64. Plaintiff disagrees with EA 2's analysis that "because of past disturbance and the

'fragmented' nature of the site, impacts to wildlife will be minimal." (Mot. for TRO at 5

(citing EA 2 at 39).) The Corps determined that within Section 16 "urban wildlife habitats

would be adversely impacted by the proposed development," but that "on a regional or

statewide scale, these impacts are not considered cumulatively significant." (EA 2 at 39.)

EA 2 observes that Section 16 is "in the center of an area in which the majority of upland

habitat has already been fragmented or otherwise altered from prior development activity."

(EA 2 at 38.) EA 2 notes that while "364 acres of Sonoran Desert Scrub habitat would be

lost" by the proposed development, "approximately 244 acres of natural undisturbed open

space would remain upon completion of the entire project." (EA 2 at 38.) 

While Plaintiff may disagree with the Corps' assessment, the Court cannot say that

the Corps has not "considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection

between the facts found and the choices made." Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat'l Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).

d. Increased Emissions and Other Local Impacts

Plaintiff contends that while EA 1 concluded "VOC and CO emissions from Lone

Mountain traffic would not be a significant source of VOCs or CO on a County-wide basis",

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 24 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

the Corps was obligated to provide "analysis of the contribution of VOCs and CO from Lone

Mountain traffic on the local/impacted community and/or the Cave Creek area." (Mot. for

TRO at 6 (citing EA 1 at 20).) Plaintiff also argues that the Corps' analysis is deficient when

it discusses "growth, land use patterns, and habitat loss" and "fails to provide any meaningful

baseline data regarding the impacted community." (Mot. for TRO at 6.) 

Under CEQ's regulations, in analyzing the "significance" of the proposed federal

action, the Corps is to consider both the context and intensity of the action. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.27. EA 2 provides analysis of both the context and the intensity of Lone Mountain's

proposed action. It discusses the project context in terms of waters of the U.S. as well as

growth, land use patterns, and habitat loss and the cumulative effects within and outside of

Section 16. (See EA 2 at 30-40.) The analysis summarizes indirect and cumulative effects

from the proposed permit action by "following the requirements of NEPA and of the CEQ's

and the Corps' regulations and policy . . . to place the consequences of the permit action and

development into the context of other past actions, present actions, or reasonable future . .

. actions . . . ." (EA 2 at 30.) The discussion begins by looking at State and County land

use patterns and then focuses specifically on Section 16 beginning on page 35. In discussing

cumulative impacts, EA 2 notes that "projecting future impacts based upon the number of

building permits issued annually in Maricopa County, the project again is a relatively

insignificant component of the anticipated growth in Maricopa County and thus associated

impacts to vegetation and wildlife." (EA 2 at 39.) 

The reviewing court must "defer to an agency's determination of the scope of its

cumulative effects review." Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059,

1071 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 413-14). Here, the Corps has analyzed the

cumulative effects at the State, County and local level and reached the conclusion that those

effects would be insignificant. The decision appears fully informed and well-considered,

and, thus, the Corps has fulfilled its NEPA obligation in discussing the significance of the

proposed federal action.

e. Compensatory Mitigation

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 25 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 -

Plaintiff's final argument takes issue with the Corps' determination that "[n]o

compensatory mitigation would be required by the Section 404 permit for the removal of

upland vegetation during project development." (EA 2 at 24.) Plaintiff believes that

"mitigation of such impacts should be discussed and provided as part of [EA 2]." (Mot. for

TRO at 7.) Lone Mountain argues that the Corps "lacks legal authority to impose mitigation

requirements based on activities outside the Corps' jurisdiction." (Lone Mountain's Resp. at

15 (citing Mango, 199 F.3d at 93 and n.7).) In Mango, the court held that "permit conditions

are valid if they are reasonably related to the discharge, whether directly or indirectly." 

EA 2 does discuss mitigation requirements at pages 40-41, and the modified permit

imposes specific mitigation requirements. Those requirements reasonably relate to the

permitted discharge and are within the Corps' jurisdiction to impose. The Corps would have

exceeded its authority by imposing mitigation requirements outside its jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court concludes that the Corps has taken the requisite "hard look" at the

environmental consequences of Lone Mountain's development project. EA 2 goes beyond

the usual "concise" and "brief" discussion required of EAs and provides sufficient evidence

and analysis of why the Corps decided to issue a FONSI to Lone Mountain. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.9(a) & (b). As required by the Corps' NEPA regulations, EA 2 discusses the need for

the proposal, alternatives to it, the environmental impacts of the proposal and alternatives,

as well as the persons and agencies consulted. See id. § 1508.9(b). The Court finds that the

Corps' decision not to prepare an EIS is founded on a reasoned evaluation of the relevant

factors and that the Corps has provided a convincing statement of reasons to explain why the

project's impacts are insignificant. See Nat'l Parks, 241 F.3d at 730. The Corp's decision not

to prepare an EIS is in accordance with the law and neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse

of discretion. The Court's standard of review, ultimately, is a narrow one, and the Court "is

not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Overton Park, 401 U.S.

at 415. 

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 26 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

All that remains is a balance of hardships. Plaintiff has not demonstrated either a

strong likelihood of success on the merits or raised serious questions going to the merits of

the Corps' compliance with NEPA. Therefore, Plaintiff must show that the balance of

hardships tips sharply in its favor. Lone Mountain's project has been on hold for four years.

The Corps has now fulfilled its requirements under NEPA and CWA. Plaintiff's hardship

and major contention appears to be with any development on Section 16. This the Court

cannot enjoin, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the balance of hardships tips sharply

in its favor.

IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant Lone Mountain's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

First Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 175).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction (Doc. 160 and 181). 

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2006.

 

Case 2:02-cv-00761-SRB Document 204 Filed 05/02/06 Page 27 of 27