Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05853/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05853-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Property Damage

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE BILLINGSLEY, WAVA ) 

BILLINGSLEY AND CALIFORNIA ) 

AGRI SPRAYERS, INC., a )

California Corporation, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

LOVELAND INDUSTRIES, INC. ) 

dba UAP WEST, a Colorado )

Corporation, and Does 1 ) 

through 50 inclusive, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-02-5853 REC DLB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT. (Doc. 29) 

 

On November 8, 2004, the Court heard oral argument regarding

Defendant UAP’s (“UAP”) Motion for Summary Judgment. On January

11, 2005, the Court received the last of the supplemental filings

it permitted. Upon due consideration of the written and oral

arguments of the parties and the record herein, the Court denies

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as set forth below.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiffs Wayne Billingsley, Wava Billingsley and

California Agri Sprayers, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are

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the owners and operators of an almond orchard located in Tulare

County (“the subject orchard”). Defendant Loveland Industries’

dba UAP West (“UAP”) is a supplier of agricultural fertilizers.

The subject orchard consists of approximately 80 acres and

is located on the northwest corner of APN 338-070-066 (1/2 mile

w/o Rd. 176 and Ave. 8). The almond trees on the property were

planted in or about 1976 or 1977, making them approximately 24

years old at the time of the alleged incident. Mr. Dudley Steele

has been employed by Plaintiffs for approximately 15 years and is

the farm manager and representative for Plaintiffs for the

subject orchard.

UAP is an agricultural chemical company that supplies

fertilizer to farms and orchards in California. It is common

practice for fertilizer companies to provide orchard owners with

fertilizer “rinsate.” Rinsate is water that contains trace

amounts of fertilizer resulting from the capture of water used to

rinse fertilizer transport tanks. Rinsate contains between one

and one and one-half percent nitrogen and generally provides

trace amounts of supplemental nutrition to an orchard’s soil.

Fred Valov is a licensed Pest Control Advisor (“PCA”) and

former UAP salesman who has been employed by various agricultural

companies. Mr. Valov was Mr. Steele’s primary PCA for the

orchards managed by Mr. Steele. 

In the early spring of 1999, while employed by UAP, Mr.

Valov approached Mr. Steele about UAP supplying rinsate to the

subject orchard. At that time, Plaintiffs had an existing

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agreement with Simplot, Mr. Valov’s former employer, to supply

rinsate to the subject orchard by depositing it directly into the

subject orchard’s irrigation reservoir (sump). The agreement

with Simplot had existed at least during the prior two years. 

Mr. Steele verbally agreed with Mr. Valov to an arrangement on

behalf of Plaintiffs. UAP subsequently placed a tank on the

subject orchard next to the irrigation sump to store rinsate. 

Depending on the volume of rinsate it produced UAP would

periodically deposit rinsate into the tank. There is a dispute

as to whether UAP deposited anything other than rinsate at the

subject orchard.

Mr. Valov left UAP’s employ in November of 2000. Mr. Steele

did not contact anyone at UAP to terminate the agreement. The

rinsate tank remained in the subject orchard and UAP continued to

occasionally deposit rinsate there.

The subject orchard was irrigated in the spring of 2001. 

After this irrigation, the almond trees in the orchard suffered

extensive damage. Mr. Steele contacted Mr. Valov who in turn

contacted UAP. UAP responded and performed an investigation. 

Mr. Steele also contacted the California Department of Toxic

Substances Control (“DTSC”) claiming that chemical contamination

had occurred. On February 20, 2002, DTSC inspected the subject

orchard and took water samples from the sump. The DTSC results

indicated that, at least at the time the samples were taken,

there were no hazardous materials in the sump. DTSC submitted

the sample results to Mr. Harry Andrus, an Agriculture Consultant

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UAP’s moving papers indicate that the subject orchard had 1

80,000 trees, but in the declaration of Dr. Dale Rush, UAP’s

expert, he states that the orchard had only 8,000 trees.

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with the University of California extension, for analysis of the

possible effects of the constituents in the results on almond

trees. Mr. Andrus informed DTSC that the irrigation panel did

not indicate that there was anything present in the irrigation

sump that would damage almond trees. 

The subject orchard consists of approximately 8,000 trees.1

Plaintiffs dispute UAP’s expert’s assertion that, after the

incident, approximately 58 almond trees were dead and 97 more

trees appeared to have 25% to 50% damage, but Plaintiffs offer no

alternative estimate. It appears undisputed that in April of

2001 at least some of the trees were damaged and/or dead. 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of

California in Tulare County on June 12, 2002, against UAP and Doe

Defendants, alleging a single cause of action for trespass. 

Plaintiffs allege that in November 2000 and continuing

thereafter, UAP trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property and dumped

unknown but allegedly hazardous chemicals into the subject

orchard’s reservoir/irrigation sump. Plaintiffs allege that upon

subsequent irrigation these unknown chemicals caused the almond

trees in the subject orchard to die and that the subject

orchard’s soil is damaged to an unknown extent. 

UAP removed the action to federal court based on diversity

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 Plaintiffs’ “points and authorities” is devoid of legal 2

citation and would more properly, and conveniently, have been

included in Plaintiffs’ statement of disputed facts.

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on July 15, 2002. Plaintiffs added J.R. Simplot Company

(“Simplot”) as a Defendant on June 19, 2003. The Court approved

Simplot’s motion for good faith settlement determination and

Plaintiffs stipulated the dismissal of Simplot from this action. 

UAP filed its motion for summary judgment and statement of

undisputed material facts (“UMF”) on May 4, 2004. Plaintiffs

filed three oppositions that were based on a need for further

discovery. On November 3 and November 4, 2004, Plaintiffs filed

a memorandum of points and authorities and a statement of 2

disputed facts. 

At oral argument, it became apparent that UAP had not

received Plaintiffs’ late filings. The Court issued an order

granting UAP time to respond. The Court also granted Plaintiffs

time to respond and ordered Plaintiffs to “offer specific proof

regarding results of expert tests conducted at the orchard that

contradict the declaration and testimony of UAP’s expert, Dr.

Dale Rush.”

 On December 8, 2004, UAP filed its supplemental response to

Plaintiffs’ substantive opposition. In response to the Court’s

mandate Plaintiffs then filed a declaration by Mr. Valov, the

former UAP employee and the Pest Control Advisor (PCA) for the

subject orchard for approximately the last 12 years. UAP filed

evidentiary objections to Mr. Valov’s declaration.

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III. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). 

Materiality is determined by the substantive law governing a

claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all inferences drawn

from it must be construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106

S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to

the nonmoving party to defeat summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809

F.2d at 630. 

The nonmoving party “may not rely on the mere allegations in

the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment,” but must

set forth by affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific

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facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party may not simply state

that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence at trial; it

must produce at least some “significant probative evidence

tending to support the complaint.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank

v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 20 L. Ed.

2d 569 (1968)).

B. Trespass

1. Entry

To succeed on a claim for trespass, Plaintiffs will have to

demonstrate an “unauthorized entry” onto Plaintiffs’ property. 

Such entry is the “essence of the cause of action for trespass.” 

Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1480 (1986). If there is a

consensual entry there is no tort because lack of consent is an

element of the claim. Id. 

If a party is granted permission to enter property subject

to a specific condition or for a specific use and the party

exceeds the scope of that permission, then the entry becomes

unauthorized. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1377

(2003) (discussing Mendelson v. McCabe, 144 Cal. 230 (1904)). 

Whether UAP trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property depends on whether

UAP had consent and, if so, whether UAP exceeded the scope of

that consent. 

a) UAP’s Consent to Enter the Subject Orchard

UAP argues that it had consent to enter Plaintiffs’ property

and that this consent was never revoked. It is undisputed that,

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at least at some point in time, UAP had permission to enter the

subject orchard to deposit rinsate into the tank pursuant to the

agreement made in 1999 between Mr. Steele and Mr. Valov. It is

also undisputed that Mr. Steele did not contact UAP to terminate

the agreement. These undisputed facts are sufficient at this

time to carry UAP’s initial burden of demonstrating that it had

consent to enter the property.

b) The Scope of Consent Granted

The scope of UAP’s consent depends upon the terms of the

agreement. Mr. Valov avers that he is personally aware of the

agreement between UAP and Mr. Steele regarding the rinsate. 

Valov Decl. at ¶ 15. The agreement was that UAP would place a

5,000 gallon storage tank at the reservoir, only rinsate would be

placed in the tank, no rinsate would be put directly into the

reservoir, and that Mr. Bilbrey was to monitor the rinsate in the

tank and “calibrate and control” the amount of rinsate that went

into the reservoir. Id. 

UAP objects to this information as hearsay and lacking

foundation. UAP argues that Mr. Valov testified “that he had no

specific conversations with anybody at UAP about the specifics of

the alleged rinsate agreement between UAP and Mr. Steele.” 

Def.’s Objections to Valov Decl. at 2. The testimony cited is as

follows: 

Q. Okay. I don’t want to put words in your mouth. 

When you left [UAP] on November 10th [2000], what was

your understanding of the disposition of the

arrangement between UAP and Mr. Steele, the rinsate

arrangement?

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A. Well, Mr. Landrigan made the comment to Mr. Bilbrey

when I left that he started - had Danny put a list

together to bring all this equipment in, because he

made the comment that, “You brought the business,

you’re talking [taking?] the business.” Meaning

they’re not going - they’re not going to have the

business. And we also had that tank marked down to

bring in. And so, to us, obviously, we’re taking all

your equipment off your ranches or our clients that

that terminates the association with it and - 

Q. So are you saying that it was your understanding

that the agreement between UAP and Mr. Steele was

terminated at the moment you terminated your employ?

A. And/or Dan.

Q. And/or Danny?

A. Because Dan was part of the equation.

Q. Did you have any specific conversations with Mr.

Cannella about the status of the arrangement?

A. I never did when we set it up, and I didn’t when I

left.

Q. But, needless to say, you had a very clear

understanding, in your own mind, that with you leaving

UAP, the arrangement between UAP and Mr. Steele

regarding rinsate would be terminated?

A. Yeah. And Mr. Landrigan supported that by - with

the equipment, taking it all off. He said they brought

the business, they’re going to take the business. 

Yeah. We had assumed that then we tell you to come

take the tank that that contract was null and void.

Valov Depo. 124:14-25, 125:1-12. 

This objection is overruled. To the extent UAP is arguing

that Mr. Valov lacked knowledge of the agreement after his

termination with UAP, there is no evidence that UAP renegotiated

the agreement with Mr. Steele. The only agreement apparently

ever in place was the one that was negotiated by Mr. Valov and of

which he has personal knowledge. See Valov Depo. 86-89.

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 The Court notes that UAP’s UMF No. 14, which is undisputed 3

by Plaintiffs states only that no one at UAP was instructed to

remove the tank “after” both men left UAP’s employ. Def.’s UMF No.

14 (emphasis added). This fact does not establish whether UAP was

ever instructed to remove the tank.

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c) Plaintiffs’ Burden

To survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs can proceed on one

of two routes. The first is to offer affirmative evidence that

the agreement was in fact terminated and that UAP no longer had

consent to enter. Plaintiffs argue that the agreement between

Plaintiffs and UAP was terminated when Mr. Danny Bilbrey, the

“fieldman” of Mr. Valov, and Mr. Valov terminated their

employment. The deposition testimony of both Mr. Bilbrey and Mr.

Valov supports this. See Bilbrey Depo. 67:13; Valov Depo.

124:18-24. The legal issues regarding whether either Mr. Valov

or Mr. Bilbrey were agents of UAP and whether they could

unilaterally terminate the oral agreement were not briefed by the

parties and the Court will not consider them.3

The second route is to offer evidence that UAP exceeded the

scope of its consent, thereby making the entry unauthorized. 

Under the terms of the agreement negotiated by Mr. Steele, the

scope of UAP’s consent to enter the property could have been

exceeded if 1) something other than rinsate was deposited into

the tank, 2) materials were deposited someplace other than the

tank, or 3) Mr. Bilbrey failed to monitor the rinsate going into

the sump. 

Plaintiffs’ filings and discovery requests are focused

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 The Court notes that counsel for Plaintiffs has failed to 4

comply with Local Rule 5-133(j) which requires that, upon the

filing of any document making reference to a deposition, a copy of

the entire deposition shall be filed with the Court.

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primarily on the first issue, although Plaintiffs do argue the

second issue as well. See Doc. 62 at 9. Because the second

issue provides a basis for the denial of summary adjudication,

the Court will not consider the first issue further. 

As to the second issue, Mr. Valov testified that he has

witnessed UAP trucks dumping directly into the sump. Valov Depo.

65:4-6 (“I know at one time I saw somebody dumping into that

pond, and it was UAP”); 108:3-6 (“We had a red UAP truck, and it

was backed up there, and it was backed up to the sump. The tank

sat right here, and they were backed up right here with the twoinch hose going into the sump”). Mr. Bilbrey likewise testified

that he is “pretty sure” he observed a UAP truck dumping directly

into the sump rather than the tank. Bilbrey Depo. 63:1-3 (“There

was one time I was pretty sure he was going directly into the

sump and not into the tank”). Further, Mr. Barton testified at

his deposition that he had deposited materials directly into the

sump on occasion. See Leverett Decl. Ex. 5, Barton Depo. 56,

66:18-67:17.4

It is apparent based on this evidence that there is a

triable issue of fact as to whether UAP exceeded the scope of its

consent, thereby committing a trespass. This finding precludes

the entry of summary adjudication as to this issue. 

///

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2. Damages

UAP argues that even if it did enter Plaintiffs’ property

without consent, summary judgment is still appropriate because

Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate damages. UAP cites “5 Witkin,

Summary 9th (1990) Tort, § 590” for the proposition that a

plaintiff in a trespass action must show that it “suffered damage

proximately caused by the defendant.” Defs.’ Mot. at 8. The

Court can find no such support in either the hard copy or online

versions of Witkin. As far as the Court can discern, section 590

relates to invasion of privacy. The section on trespass to land

begins at section 604 and does not specifically state whether

damages are a necessary element of a claim for trespass to land. 

See 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law § 604 (9th ed. 1988,

Supp. 2005). 

In Intel, supra, 30 Cal. 4th at 1352, the California Supreme

Court, in discussing whether injunctive relief was appropriate in

a case involving trespass to chattels, stated that “damage to the

property is not an element of the cause of action” in the case of

trespass to real property. Absent contrary authority, this

fairly recent decision is the current state of the law. 

Accordingly, because demonstrating damages proximately caused by

UAP is not an element, an apparent lack of a genuine issue of

fact as to damages would not warrant summary adjudication.

Even if damages were an element, there is a genuine dispute

of material fact as to this issue. UAP argues that in the course

of its investigation its expert, Dr. Rush, found no hazardous

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materials capable of damaging an almond orchard; that the DTSC

results likewise found no hazardous materials capable of the

damage complained of; that witnesses observed Simplot trucks

dumping directly into the sump; and that the subject orchard was

dying because it was old and in generally poor health. 

That witnesses observed Simplot trucks dumping into the sump

does not absolve UAP of liability. Under California’s

alternative liability theory, if a plaintiff cannot identify

which of two or more defendants caused an injury, the burden

shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that they were not

responsible. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86 (1948). As

mentioned, UAP trucks were witnessed dumping materials directly

into the sump, and the fact that Simplot trucks were also

observed dumping does not demonstrate that UAP was not

responsible. 

As to the DTSC test results, Plaintiffs point out that the

DTSC samples were taken nearly a year after the alleged incident

and are thus of limited value. Mr. Fujitsubo acknowledged in his

deposition testimony that it is “very difficult” to determine

whether hazardous materials had ever been in the sump based on

the sample that was taken. Fujitsubo Depo. 34:9-23. Further,

Mr. Steele testified that by the time DTSC came to take samples,

the sump would have been flushed out “several hundred times.” 

Steele Depo. 171:3-10. The weight to be given the DTSC test

results is a matter for a trier of fact at trial rather than the

Court on summary judgment. 

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The most significant factual issue for trial involves the

testimony of the parties’ experts. Dr. Dale Rush is UAP’s expert

and avers that:

13. In approximately April of 2001, shortly after UAP

was informed of the alleged damage at the subject

orchard, UAP immediately responded by performing an

investigation. I personally participated in this

investigation at the subject orchard and subsequently

visited the orchard numerous times thereafter.

14. As part of the initial investigation, water and

sediment samples were taken from the tank and/or tail

water holding pond. The analysis of these samples

confirmed the tank and pond contained only low levels

of fertilizer residues and no other pesticides or

chemicals that are capable of damaging almond trees.

15. During my visual inspection in approximately Aril

of 2001, I observed that the subject orchard, including

the sections of the orchard that had not suffered any

alleged damage, was in generally poor and dilapidated

condition. I noted approximately 58 almond trees in

the northeast corner were dead and 97 more trees

appeared to have 25% to 50% damages; the subject

orchard had approximately 8,000 trees, and the orchard

was in overall severe decline largely due to age and

neglect. In addition, the orchard appeared to be over

20 years old and in need of replanting.

Rush Decl. ¶¶ 13-15.

In contrast, Mr. Valov, who is listed as an expert on

Plaintiffs’ expert witness disclosure, see Doc. 73, avers, among

other things, that:

16. In April of 2001, when the orchard in question was

damaged, the orchard had already received its fall 2000

and spring 2001 nitrogen fertilizer applications. By

February, 2001 the maximum amount of fertilizer which

could safely be applied to the orchard without concern

for causing tip burn or leaf burn had been applied. 

When one observes tip burn or leaf burn on the trees

the orchard has received a toxic amount of fertilizer

and the feeder roots of the trees have been affected.

17. I personally inspected the orchard in question in

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 UAP’s objection to this statement as inconsistent with Mr. 5

Valov’s prior deposition is overruled as the prior testimony does

not directly contradict Mr. Valov’s statements. To the extent they

can be deemed inconsistent, that issue goes to Mr. Valov’s

credibility and is one for the trier of fact. Also, Mr. Valov

stated that when he went out with Mr. Steele and “took a look and

smelled the ground and the dark whatever it was come out of the

sump came up here . . ..” Valov Depo. 132:25 - 133:1-3 (emphasis

added).

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April of 2001 at the request of Mr. Steele, the orchard

manager. I observed water coming out of the irrigation

valves. The water coming out of the irrigation valves

was black in color and viscous and had an extremely

strong odor of rotten eggs, which indicates the

presence of sulfur. I observed that the vegetation in 5

the orchard that had come into contact with the

irrigation water was dead or dying. Later, almost

daily visits during approximately a three week period,

I observed the trees starting to defoliate and some of

the trees dying or dead, and an increase in tip burn

and in some instances almost total leaf burn.

19. Based upon the pattern of damage of the trees and

the damage and death of the vegetation in the orchard,

the only source of the damages was from the irrigation

water which came from the orchard reservoir. . . . 

22. I have personally reviewed test results which

analyzed the orchard soil prior to April, 2001. I have

also reviewed test results which analyzed the orchard’s

soil after April, 2001. The same laboratory performed

both of the composite soil analys[e]s. Based upon the

comparison of the two composite soil analys[e]s, it is

evident that a significant reduction in ph levels in

the affected area of the orchard is evident, despite

the fact that between the time the two tests were

conducted the soil in the affected area had been

significantly supplemented with lime to raise the ph

levels. The only logical explanation is that a

significant amount of some acidifying agent was applied

to the affected area. 

Valov Decl. ¶¶ 16-22. Mr. Valov concludes that, based upon his

“education, experience, personal knowledge of the cultural

practices on the subject orchard, [and] based upon the test

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results from the tests taken prior to April, 2001 and after

April, 2001,” the damage to the orchard was caused by nitrogen

toxicity and the addition of N-pH uric acid which killed the

feeder roots of the trees and created a low ph level in the soil

that allowed heavy metal levels to increase to toxic levels in

the trees. Valov Decl. at 9-10. Mr. Valov also refutes the

conclusions of Dr. Rush as follows:

I have reviewed the Declaration of Dale Rush. First,

Dale Rush makes no reference to the specific test

results even though the test results were conducted by

him or for him and/or for UAP. Second, Dale Rush has

not had the constant contact with the orchard while I

have had constant contact and knowledge or the cultural

practices including soil amendments and crop nutrients

on an almost daily basis for fifteen plus years. 

Third, the orchard, though it was approximately twenty

plus years old, was healthy and productive and was

maintained in a manner consistent with good agronomic

practices and in an manner consistent with practices in

the area. . . . 

Id. at 10. 

UAP objects generally to Mr. Valov’s declaration because it

relies on unauthenticated documents that are not before the

Court. These objections are overruled. As mentioned, Plaintiffs

proffer Mr. Valov as an expert witness. Under Rule 703 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may rely on inadmissible

evidence that is “of the type reasonably relied upon by experts

in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences on the

subject.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. That the test results Mr. Valov

refers to are not before the Court does not alter the Court’s

ability to consider Mr. Valov’s statements.

The Court notes that neither party has submitted any test

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results to the Court, but rather both parties have relied on

their respective experts’ interpretations of the supposed test

results. There are questions of fact regarding not only what

tests were conducted and when but also on what those test results

indicated. While no one appears to dispute that the pH of the

subject orchard was low, there are questions of fact as to what

created the low pH, and whether it could have been the result of

UAP’s conduct. 

Additionally, there is a dispute as to whether the subject

orchard was dying due to old age and neglect, as Dr. Rush avers,

or whether the damage was the result of chemicals and an older

orchard may still be viable, as Mr. Valov avers. 

Accordingly, while Plaintiffs need not demonstrate damages

as an element of their claim to survive summary judgment, even if

they were so required the record indicates that there are genuine

issues of material fact as to whether the subject orchard

sustained damage that could be properly attributed to UAP’s

conduct. Summary adjudication on this issue is thus DENIED. 

IV. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(f) Requests

The Court is uncertain as to whether Plaintiffs, in

submitting their substantive opposition to the motion for summary

judgment, intended to withdraw their argument that further

discovery warranted a denial of summary judgment. This motion is

governed by Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Because the Court has determined that summary judgment is

inappropriate even without this further discovery, this argument

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is dismissed as moot. This determination does not preclude

Plaintiffs from making appropriate discovery motions to the

magistrate. 

V. Failure to Comply with Local Rules

Plaintiffs failed to comply with several provisions of the

Local Rules of the Eastern District of California including

various subsections of Rules 5-133, 56-260 and 78-230.

Plaintiffs’ counsel is ordered to obtain a copy of the Local

Rules and adhere to them in all further proceedings before this

Court. Failure to do so may result in sanctions.

ACCORDINGLY, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Ia40ijDated: May 6, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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