Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00297/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00297-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Astrid L. Dobek, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 03-297-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment as to the

parental loss of consortium claims asserted by Plaintiff Astrid Dobek’s children. United

States Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Guerin issued a Report and Recommendation on May

15, 2007. In that Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Guerin recommended

denying Defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment. Defendant filed an objection to

the Report and Recommendation. Plaintiffs did not file any objection to the Report and

Recommendation.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for clear error the

unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp.,

170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204

(D. Or. 1998).

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As the Report and Recommendation throughly discusses the facts and law pertinent to the

partial motion for summary judgment, the Court will not repeat that entire discussion. Rather, the

relevant facts and law will be addressed only to the extent necessary to resolve the specific objection

filed by Defendant.

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III. DISCUSSION1

A. Defendant’s Objection

Defendant objects to the Report and Recommendation on the ground that it applied the

incorrect standard of review to the parental loss of consortium claims asserted by Astrid

Dobek’s children. Defendant argues that there is only one controlling case in Arizona that

sets the standard of review for parental loss of consortium claims, and pursuant to that case

(Villareal) a child asserting the loss of consortium of a parent must show that the parent-child

relationship has been destroyed or nearly destroyed due to the injury suffered by the parent.

See Villareal v. State, Dept. of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213 (1989). Subsequent to

Villareal, however, the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed the standard of review in the

context of a parent asserting a claim for the loss of consortium of a child. See Pierce v.

Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 162 Ariz. 269, 272, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1989). In Pierce,

the Arizona Supreme Court held that a parent could recover for the loss of consortium of a

child if there has been a significant interference with the parent-child relationship due to the

injury suffered by the child. See id. According to Defendant, despite the fact that Arizona

law allows a child to assert the loss of consortium of a parent and also allows a parent to

assert the loss of consortium of a child, the standard of review for these intertwined claims

must be drastically different under Arizona law. Thus, Defendant submits that while a parent

asserting the loss of consortium of a child only has to show a significant interference with

the parent-child relationship to recover for loss of consortium, a child asserting the loss of

consortium of a parent must show that the parent-child relationship is destroyed or nearly

destroyed (i.e., the child inexplicably must meet a much higher standard than a parent

asserting the same claim). The Court disagrees with Defendant’s position. The Report and

Recommendation considered the arguments at bar and correctly resolved the issue as follows:

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There are no disputed issues of material fact for purposes of this Motion. The parties

dispute whether Plaintiffs can make the threshold showing necessary to state a claim

for parental loss of consortium and, more specifically, the parties dispute what the law

requires to establish the claim. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs must prove that the

parent-child relationship has been destroyed or nearly destroyed. Plaintiffs assert that

the correct standard is a lower standard - whether the parent's injuries are severe

enough to cause a "significant interference" in the parent-child relationship. Both

parties agree that only after a plaintiff satisfies the judge that the plaintiff's injuries

meet the threshold standard, is the claim submitted to the trier of fact to determine the

degree of interference and the amount recoverable. 

. . . 

This Court agrees with the Plaintiffs' reading of the applicable law[] and concludes that,

under Arizona law, a cause of action for parental loss of consortium exists when a

parent suffers a severe, permanent, and disabling injury that substantially interferes

with the parent's capacity to interact with his children in a normally gratifying way.

Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 162 Ariz. 269, 272, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165

(1989) (citing Villareal v. State, Dept. of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 480, 774 P.2d 213,

219 (1989)). Evidence of a significant interference in the parent-child relationship

must exist; however, the injury need not be the functional equivalent of death or even

be categorized as "catastrophic." Id. Defendant argues that the Court cannot consider the legal standard set forth in Pierce

because Pierce applies only to filial loss of consortium claims, ie. claims by parents for

loss of a child's consortium. According to Defendant, Villareal sets forth a separate

and "extremely high threshold" for claims brought by children for loss of a parent's

consortium: the parent's mental or physical impairment must be so overwhelming and

severe that the parent-child relationship is destroyed or nearly destroyed. See Villareal, 160 Ariz. at 480, 774 P.2d at 219. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive and

concludes that Arizona case law does not support the distinction suggested by

Defendant. Villareal does set forth the standard urged by Defendant. Villareal,

however, is part of an evolving line of cases analyzing the loss of consortium cause of

action in Arizona. 

Villareal was the first Arizona Supreme Court case to recognize a cause of action by

a child for loss of a parent's consortium. In Villareal, the court noted that the Arizona

courts had been chipping away at its previous 1954 decision holding that neither a wife

nor a minor child had a separate cause of action for damages resulting from the

negligent injury of the husband and father. 160 Ariz. at 477, 774 P.2d at 216 (citing

Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954)). In overruling

Jeune, the court stated, "When we find that the common law or 'judge-made law' is

unjust or out of step with the times, we have no reluctance to change it." Id. (citations

omitted). The court noted that the court of appeals had recognized a cause of action

for parents' loss of an injured minor child's consortium, id. (citing Ruben v. Ely, 146

Ariz. 390, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ct.App.1985) and that the Supreme Court had extended that

ruling by allowing parents to recover for loss of an adult child's consortium. Id. (citing

Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986). In recognizing a child's

claim for loss of consortium of his parent, the Villareal Court specifically recognized

the value of a child's relationship with a parent, and stated: 

We believe that children have a right to enjoy a mutually beneficial

relationship with their parents. The loss of a parent's love, care,

companionship and guidance can severely impact a child's

development and have a major influence on a child's welfare and

personality throughout life. Because every individual's character and

disposition impact on society, it is of highest importance to the child

and society that we protect the right to receive the benefits derived

from the parental relationship.

160 Ariz. at 478, 774 P.2d at 217. 

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Just months after the Villareal decision, the Arizona Supreme Court, in an opinion

authored by the same Justice who wrote Villareal, issued its ruling in Pierce, which

considered "plaintiff's petition for review regarding the test that must be satisfied before

parents may maintain a cause of action for loss of a child's consortium." Pierce, 162

Ariz. at 270, 782 P.2d at 1163. The Pierce decision regarded claims for loss of

consortium by a parent as analogous to claims for loss of consortium by children. In

setting forth the legal standard for a loss of consortium claim by a parent, the Pierce

court specifically referenced Villareal; the Pierce court stated that it was operating

"within the guidelines established in Reben, Frank, and Villareal," and in fact cited

specifically and exclusively to Villareal in holding that "parents may maintain a cause

of action for loss of their child's consortium when the child suffers a severe, permanent,

and disabling injury that substantially interferes with the child's capacity to interact

with his parents in a normally gratifying way." 162 Ariz. at 272, 782 P.2d at

1165.[Before announcing the standard for loss of consortium claims, the Pierce court

noted that Reben, Frank, and Villareal, had all involved a severe and permanent injury

that had reduced the individual's ability to exchange love, affection, companionship,

comfort, care and society. The court specifically noted that other jurisdictions had also

recognized loss of consortium claims in situations where the injuries did not so severely

damage the parent-child relationship. 162 Ariz. at 272, 782 P.2d at 1165 (citations

omitted). Notably, in this discussion, the Pierce court did not distinguish loss of

consortium claims brought by parents from those brought by children.] 

In setting forth the standard by which to judge loss of consortium claims, the court

concluded that although evidence of a significant interference in the parent-child

relationship must exist, the injury need not be catastrophic to permit recovery. Id. The

court held: "[P]arents may maintain a cause of action for loss of their child's

consortium when the child suffers a severe, permanent and disabling injury rendering

the child unable to exchange love, affection, care, comfort, companionship and society

in a normally gratifying way." 162 Ariz. at 273, 782 P.2d at 1166.

Thus, it appears that Arizona courts treat loss of consortium claims as one body of law,

regardless of whether the plaintiff is a child or a parent. See Barnes v. Outlaw, 192

Ariz. 283, 284-85, 964 P.2d 484, 485-86 (1998) (noting that the focus of the loss of

consortium cause of action has shifted over time from a property right in the services

of another to the intangible values of a relationship, such as companionship and

affection, and summarizing the evolution from Jeune to Villareal). There does not

appear to be any basis in the Arizona court's holdings or reasoning for concluding that

children claiming the lost consortium of a parent must satisfy a different and more

stringent legal standard than parents claiming the lost consortium of a child. As set

forth in Villareal and Pierce, the policies underlying the recognition of parental loss of

consortium claims do not permit such a distinction. The parent-child relationship is

acknowledged to be "mutually" valuable, whether the loss in that relationship be to the

parent or to the child. Accordingly, this Court concludes that under Arizona law,

Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims should be considered in light of the standard set

forth in Pierce. Under that standard, in order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs

must demonstrate that Astrid Dobek's injuries are "sufficiently severe" enough to

warrant a cause of action for loss of consortium.

See Report and Recommendation at 3-7. Defendant’s objection is denied.

B. Remaining Issues

As to the remaining issues that were not objected to by the parties, the Court has reviewed

the entire record and concludes that Magistrate Judge Guerin’s recommendations are not

clearly erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Johnson v. Zema Systems

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The Court notes that Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ response to its objection

because the response was allegedly two days late. However, a review of the record and applicable

rules for computing response times shows that the response was timely. See FED.R.CIV.P. 6(a), (e);

FED.R.CIV.P. 5(b)(2)(B). Defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. #103) is denied.

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The parties may also choose to engage in a private sector settlement conference as well.

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Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204 (D.

Or. 1998). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

(1) United States Magistrate Judge Guerin's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #99) is

accepted and adopted.

(2) Defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment as to the loss of consortium claims of

Astrid Dobek’s children (Doc. #81) is denied.

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(3) The Clerk of the Court shall terminate the referral to Magistrate Judge Guerin. The

parties shall file with this Court a Joint Proposed Pretrial Order (a form is attached to this

Order) and any Motions in Limine within 30 days of the filing date of this Order; any

responses to the Motions in Limine shall be due in 10 days and no replies will be permitted

unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(4) Alternatively, if the parties so choose, they may engage in a settlement conference with

a Magistrate Judge at no cost to the parties.3

 If the parties choose this option, they should

contact the Court which can set up the conference and stay the remaining deadlines.

DATED this 16th day of July, 2007.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

*, )

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Plaintiff(s), ) CV *-*-TUC-FRZ

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vs. ) PROPOSED JOINT PRETRIAL ORDER

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Defendant(s). ) ) 

Pursuant to the Scheduling Order previously entered, following is the proposed

Joint Pretrial Order which shall, upon approval of the Court, become the Final Pretrial

Order. 

I. 

IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

II.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Briefly state the facts and cite the statutes which give this Court jurisdiction. 

III.

NATURE OF ACTION

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Provide a concise statement of the type of case, the cause of action, and the relief sought.

IV.

STIPULATIONS AND UNCONTESTED FACTS 

V. 

CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT

The following are issues of fact to be tried and determined upon trial. Each issue of fact

must be stated separately and in specific terms, followed by the parties' contentions as to each

issue.

Issue:

Plaintiff(s) contends:

Defendant(s) contends:

VI. 

RELEVANT UNCONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 

(i.e. burdens of proof; standards of review)

VII. 

RELEVANT CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW

The following are issues of law to be tried and determined upon trial. Each issue of law

must be stated separately and in specific terms, followed by the parties' contentions as to each

issue.

Issue:

Plaintiff(s) contends:

Defendant(s) contends:

VIII.

LIST OF WITNESSES

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Each party shall provide a list of witnesses intended to be called at trial. Each

witness shall be indicated as either fact or expert. A brief statement as to the testimony of

each expert witness shall also be included.

IX. 

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Each party shall provide a list of numbered exhibits. A statement of either

UNCONTESTED or CONTESTED shall follow each listed exhibit. If contested, a brief

statement of the objection by the opposing party shall follow the listed exhibit.

(eg - 1. Laboratory Report from the Clinical Immunology Diagnostic Laboratory dated June

15, 2004. CONTESTED - Relevance, foundation and hearsay.)

X. 

LIST OF DEPOSITIONS

Portions of depositions that will be read at trial must be listed by page and line number.

A statement of either UNCONTESTED or CONTESTED shall follow. If contested, a brief

statement of the objection by the opposing party shall follow the listed portion of the

deposition to be offered.

XI. MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiff(s) have filed the following Motions in Limine:

Defendant(s) have filed the following Motions in Limine:

XII. JURY TRIAL or BENCH TRIAL

For a Jury Trial

Trial briefs (only upon request of the Court), proposed voir dire, interrogatories to the

jury, stipulated jury instructions and instructions which are not agreed upon, shall be filed

10 days prior to Trial.

For a Bench Trial

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Trial briefs (only upon request of the Court), shall be filed 10 days prior to Trial.

Parties are referred to LRCiv 52.1 regarding the filing of proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

XIII. PROBABLE LENGTH OF TRIAL

 CERTIFICATION

The undersigned counsel for each of the parties in this action do hereby approve and

certify the form and content of this proposed Joint Pretrial Order. 

 Attorney for Plaintiff(s) Attorney for Defendant(s)

This proposed Joint Pretrial Order is hereby approved as the Final Pretrial Order on 

this day of , 2007.

 FRANK R. ZAPATA

United States District Judge

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