Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00546/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00546-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv0546 JM(NLS)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

R. JAMES NICHOLSON, in his official

capacity as Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

Defendant.

Defendant R. James Nicholson, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, moves for

summary judgment on Plaintiff Carlos Ramirez’s employment discrimination

complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion

for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. The court grants summary

judgment in favor of Defendant on all claims except the claim arising from Plaintiff’s

March 14, 2005 demotion. 

BACKGROUND

On March 14, 2006 Plaintiff commenced this employment discrimination action

seeking relief from alleged age and national origin discrimination and review of the

administrative decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) denying his

claims of discrimination. Plaintiff is presently a 73 year old Filipino who, in “1987,

went to work for the Department of Veteran’s Affairs (“DVA”) as a file clerk (GS-3).”

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(Compl. ¶¶6-8). Over the years, Plaintiff was promoted and achieved the pay grade of

GS-13. (Compl. ¶7). 

In mid-2002 Plaintiff began to socially interact with a Caucasian female coworker, Ms. Pastorek, who was about 20 years younger than Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶10-

11). Plaintiff “felt that he needed to inform management of the situation because this

female coworker was one of plaintiff’s subordinates.” (Compl. ¶11). Plaintiff informed

his second level supervisor, Michael Dusenberry, of the situation. Plaintiff was

informed by Dusenberry that Plaintiff should tell his first line supervisor, Mark Daniels,

of the situation so that either plaintiff or his girlfriend could be moved out of the same

chain of command. (Compl. ¶12). When informed of the relationship, Daniels

allegedly became agitated and shouted at Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶14). Almost immediately

thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that, among other things, he suffered the following adverse

consequences: in 2003 he was subjected to an unjustified formal reprimand, he was

transferred to a different work section, his work was ignored, he was required to provide

weekly written reports on his work, there was a proposal to terminate his employment,

and he was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). Id. In 2004, Plaintiff

was subjected to further alleged acts of harassment consisting of a continuation of the

PIP, the denial of a pay grade increase, and a demotion. 

In May 2004 Plaintiff contacted a DVA Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)

Counselor and thereafter filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the DVA.

(Compl. ¶16). After exhausting his claims within the DVA, on June 28, 2005 plaintiff

filed a “mixed case” appeal to the MSPB. (Compl. ¶16). On February 14, 2006 the

MSPB issued a decision adverse to Plaintiff. Id.

The parties do not dispute the following background facts. Shortly after Plaintiff

informed management about his relationship with Ms. Pastorek, Plaintiff was

transferred to a then recently vacated Triage Team Coach position in April 2003.

Plaintiff agreed to the transfer as he recognized that he and Ms. Pastorek could not work

in the same chain of command. The Triage Coach position did not affect Plaintiff

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1

 Mr. Daniels and Ms. Meyers wed in June 2005.

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financially. 

Following the transfer and at all relevant times, Barbara Meyers was Plaintiff’s

immediate supervisor, and Mark Daniels her immediate supervisor. Mark Daniels

supervised about 180 employees and was the direct supervisor of Barbara Meyers.1

Between April 16, 2003 and March 15, 2004 Plaintiff was subjected to 27 complained

of acts consisting of reprimands, suspensions, Report of Contacts (“ROC”), Letters of

Counseling, Extension of the Performance Improvement Plan , Admonishments, denial

of within grade pay increase, and lastly, on March 15, 2004 Plaintiff was demoted to

a GS-11 pay grade position as a Senior Veterans Service representative. (Exhs. M, AW,

Z, AA, Y, AB, AX, AC, AD, AE, AF, AG, AH, AL, AK, AL, AM, AN, AO, AP, AQ,

AR, AS, AT, AU, AZ, AV). Plaintiff continues to work at the GS-11 pay grade. The

parties also do not dispute that prior to Plaintiff’s promotion to Team Coach, and after

his demotion, Plaintiff received fully satisfactory to excellent work-related appraisals.

Based upon the above generally described conduct, Plaintiff alleges two claims

for discrimination based on age and race or national origin. Plaintiff challenges his

demotion and alleged workplace harassment under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq., as amended; Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-20003(16) (based on national origin); and

the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), codified in various sections of Title 5 of the

United States Code. Plaintiff also seeks review of the MSPB decision denying his

claims. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff opposes the

motion.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951

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(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). The moving party bears the initial

burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions

of the file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). There is “no

express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with

affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in

original). The opposing party cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials of a

pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by

the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’ designate ‘specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. At 2553

(citation omitted). The opposing party also may not rely solely on conclusory

allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 994

(1962). Any doubt as to the existence of any issue of material fact requires denial of

the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). On a motion

for summary judgment, when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it

must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the

evidence were uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th

Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc.,

939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992)).

The Scope of Plaintiff’s Claims 

Discrete Acts of Discrimination

Defendant argues that all of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred with the exception

of Plaintiff’s demotion claim. A federal employee must seek EEO counseling within

45 days of the date of the alleged discriminatory act. 29 C.F.R. §1614.105(a)(1). An

employee who fails to timely contact an EEO Counselor regarding an unlawful

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employment practice cannot challenge that practice in court. Ledbetter v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., __U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2166-67 (2007). The term

“employment practice” refers to “a discrete act or single ‘occurrence’ that takes place

at a particular point in time.” Id. at 2169. A plaintiff cannot recover for discrete acts

of discrimination as to which timely claims for relief have not been made. Id. ; Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2002). Discrete acts include,

for example, employment terminations, failure to promote, denial of transfers,

reprimands, and refusals to hire. Id. at 114.

Here, Defendant has come forward with admissible evidence to show that

plaintiff filed his EEO charge on April 28, 2004 and that all allegedly discrete acts of

employment discrimination are barred prior to March 13, 2004. The court concludes

that the only timely claim relates to Plaintiff’s demotion. All other claims are timebarred under Ledbetter and Morgan. The starting point in the analysis begins with 29

C.F.R. §1614.105(a)(1) which provides that “An aggrieved person must initiate contact

with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.”

In Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, the Supreme Court concluded that discrete acts of

discrimination are subject to the statutory filing requirements. The statute there

provided that the EEOC charge had to be filed within either 180 or 300 days after an

“alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1). The

court categorically held that discrete acts of discrimination had to be filed within the

appropriate time period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110 (“discrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed

charges”). “Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or

refusal to hire are easy to identify . . . . [and a plaintiff] can only file a charge to cover

discrete acts that ‘occurred within the appropriate time period.” Id. at 114. 

Here, the complained of acts of alleged discrimination identified by the

Government (reprimands, suspensions, ROCs, Letters of Counseling, extension of the

PIP plan for Plaintiff, admonishments, denial of within grade pay increase, and failure

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to promote) are discrete acts subject to the 45 day EEO counseling period identified in

29 C.F.R. § §2000e-5(e)(1). Consequently, the court concludes that all discrete

discrimination claims, except the March 15, 2005 demotion claim, are dismissed with

prejudice as untimely. 

In sum, the only timely discrete act of discrimination is the March 14, 2004

demotion.

Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff argues that the principles articulated in Ledbetter should not apply to the

present case because he alleges a hostile work environment claim not subject to the 45

day limitation of 29 C.F.R. §1614.105(a)(1). A hostile environment claim, in contrast

to a discrete discrimination claim, is not based on discrete acts but occurs over an

extended period of time and any “single act of harassment may not be actionable on its

own.” Id. at 115. In light of the often repeated nature of the hostile work environment

claim, an unlawful employment action cannot fairly be said to occur on a particular day

or series of days. Id. An example of a hostile work environment claim occurs when an

individual is subject to racial or sexual epithets in the workplace. A single epithet may

“engender offensive feelings in an employee [but] does not sufficiently affect the

conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.” Id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank,

FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). However, a hostile work environment claim

lies when such individual discrete acts occur over a period of time such that the

cumulative effect of the individual acts is actionable. As noted by the Supreme Court,

In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim

exits, we look to ‘all the circumstances,’ including the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s wok performance.

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116. In Morgan an employee claimed unlawful employment

practices occurred when he was subject to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts

and had experienced a racially hostile work environment throughout the term of his

employment. The Supreme Court held that claims based upon discrete discriminatory

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2

 Although Plaintiff urges this court to accept the hostile work environment claim because the

agency accepted this claim at the administrative level, counsel for Plaintiff at the time of oral

argument acknowledged, in essence, that his hostile work environment claim is weak and that the crux

of his case is the demotion claim. Moreover, this court does not defer to the agency’s determinations,

rather the court exercises de novo review in the present case. 

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acts are actionable only if those acts occurred within the applicable statutory filing

period. Hostile work environment claims, in contrast, are actionable for acts occurring

beyond the statutory filing period as long as the acts were part of the same hostile work

environment and at least one act occurred within the filing period. Id.

Here, the only evidence cited by Plaintiff in support of his hostile work

environment claim is the Plaintiff’s declaration.2

 (Oppo. at p.18:16). The identified

declaration represents that prior to his transfer to the supervisory position of Team

Coach he received “fully satisfactory appraisals” but that after he informed management

of his workplace relationship with Ms. Pastorek he was treated differently. In his new

position as Team Coach he met frequently with management (Ms. Myers and Mr.

Daniels) and during these meetings “Mr. Daniels was hyper-critical” of his

performance. (Ramirez Decl. ¶12). After Mr. Daniels was informed of the workplace

relationship Mr. Daniels “was openly hostile to” Plaintiff. “He criticized everything I

did, including the minutia of my job; things that I had been doing without problem for

years were suddenly ‘unacceptable.’” Id. Mr. Daniels complained of the format used

to create a report and when he turned in late reports, “even though before I informed

him of my relationship with Ms. Pastorek, such reports could be turned in days late or

even skipped altogether. It was as if I could do nothing right. He simply screamed at

me during most of these closed-door meetings.” Id. Plaintiff also declares that after the

disclosure of his workplace relationship, he was ignored at the weekly meeting of

coaches and others with supervisory functions. (Ramirez Decl. ¶13). Plaintiff also

represents that his unit was generally meeting its goals. After his workplace

relationship was disclosed, “Mr. Daniels was quick to publically point out during these

meetings any perceived minor problems with my unit’s operation.” Id. Plaintiff’s

declaration, (Ramirez Decl. ¶¶12, 13), attributes such criticisms and comments to the

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fact that he informed management that he was having a relationship with a younger coworker. Notably absent are any allegations that he was treated differently on account

of his national origin or age. 

Viewing additional circumstances, Plaintiff identifies the statements of a coworker who stated that when he first came to the San Diego VA office in his current

position, Daniels made statements to the effect that he got rid of the “old-times” at the

Albuquerque VA (Daniels prior place of employment). Plaintiff also submits evidence

that Daniels made an age-related comments. (PSSMF 105). Those statements were to

refer to older employees as “old dogs,” “ you can’t teach dogs new tricks,” and a

reference to older employees as “deadwood.” (PSSMF 106-110). With respect to the

racial claim, Myers once made a remark about the “Filipino Mafia,” and once stated that

Ramirez appeared to be operating on “Filipino time.” The court notes that these

comments appear to be relatively isolated events, not directed towards Plaintiff, and the

comments were non-threatening. See Morgan, 536 U.S. 116; Mondero v. Salt River

Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2005) (alleged discriminatory comment not tied

directly to challenged adverse employment action did not create issue of material fact).

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide context in which to view the majority of these

isolated statements. 

According to Plaintiff, the hostilities suffered in the workplace were the result of

the disclosure of his relationship with a younger co-worker, 21 years his junior.

(Ramirez Decl. ¶¶12, 13). The conduct of a highly critical supervisor, like that alleged

by Plaintiff against Meyers, (Ramirez Decl. ¶¶12, 13), may engender offensive feelings

in an employee but does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to

implicate either ADEA or Title VII. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. Congress passed

the ADEA “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than

age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and

workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”

29 U.S.C. §621. Plaintiff himself attributes the alleged discrimination not to his age or

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3

 Where an individual is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination

plaintiff, the same actor inference gives rise to a “strong inference [] that there was no discriminatory

action”. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1096. Here, the court concludes that the same-actor inference does not

apply with equal force to the present case because Ms. Myers, while recommending Plaintiff for the

position, (Myers Decl. ¶3), was not solely responsible for Plaintiff’s promotion as in Coghlan. 

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national origin, but to the fact of his relationship with a co-worker. Plaintiff repeatedly

attributes the change in his fully satisfactory work-place appraisals to the disclosure of

his relationship with Ms. Pastorek. (Ramirez Decl. ¶12, 13). This is the type of

circumstantial evidence generally considered too indefinite and insubstantial to create

a genuine issue of material fact in the employment context. Coghlan v. American

Seafoods Co., LLC., 413 F.3d 1090,1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (“when the plaintiff relies on

circumstantial evidence, that evidence must be ‘specific and substantial’ to defeat the

employer’s motion for summary judgment”). 

The circumstances of alleged hostile work environment here do not appear to be

the type of conduct that Congress targeted when it sought to promote employment based

upon ability, and not age. See 29 U.S.C. §621. The evidence submitted by Plaintiff fails

to link the hostilities suffered by him to any right protected by ADEA or Title VII.

Rather, Plaintiff himself attributes the hostilities suffered to his workplace relationship

with a younger coworker. (Ramirez Decl. ¶¶12, 13). Further undermining Plaintiff’s

claim is the fact that his supervisor, Ms. Myers, was instrumental in promoting Plaintiff

to Team Coach.3

 Id. at 1096. Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff fails to meet

his summary judgment burden with respect to establishing a hostile work environment

claim.

In sum, the only surviving unlawful employment practice claim is the claim based

upon the March 14, 2005 demotion. The court also grants summary judgment in favor

of Defendant and against Plaintiff on the hostile work environment claim. 

The Demotion

The parties do not dispute that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach

applies to Plaintiff’s claims. 

Under that framework, the burden of production first falls on the

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 While the inferential leap argued by Plaintiff is somewhat of a “stretch,” the court is required

to construe all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff as the non-moving party. 

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plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. He may do so by showing that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he held (or for the position to which he wished to be

promoted), (3) he was terminated or demoted from (or denied a promotion to) that position, and (4) the job went to someone outside the protected

class. The burden of production then shifts to the employer, who must

present evidence sufficient to permit the factfinder to conclude that the

employer had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Finally, if the employer meets that burden, then the

McDonnell Douglas framework drops out of the picture entirely, and the plaintiff bears the full burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer intentionally discriminated against him. Id. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742.

Coghlan, 413 at 1094 (citations omitted). The court proceeds to apply the McDonnell

Douglas framework. 

The Prima Facie Case

Here, Plaintiff clearly establishes that he (1) belongs to a protected class

(Filipino) and (2) that he was demoted. Although a very close call, the court concludes

that Plaintiff has come forward with some evidence to establish the other two elements

of a prima facie case - whether he was satisfactorily performing the functions of the

Team Coach position and whether he was replaced by a younger non-Filipino

individual. The court notes that the Ramirez declarations fail to affirmatively declare

that he was satisfactorily performing his job as Team Coach. (Ramirez Decls.). Rather,

Plaintiff declares that both prior to and after his time in the Team Coach position, he

obtained fully satisfactory or excellent performance reviews in the other positions he

held with the VA. (Ramirez Decl. ¶4; Pl. Exhs. 10-17). As Plaintiff satisfactorily

performed his work related responsibilities adequately in these positions, both prior to

and after his time as Team Coach, Plaintiff concludes that a reasonable jury could find

from this limited evidence that Plaintiff was satisfactorily performing his job

responsibilities as there is some overlap in responsibilities between the position Plaintiff

held prior to his promotion (Supervisor Veterans Claims Examiner, Def. Exh. E), and

the Team Coach position.4

 With respect to whether similarly situated non-Filipino or

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substantially younger employees were treated differently, Plaintiff fails to direct the

court’s attention to any evidence supporting this element. However, Plaintiff

represents, without citation to the record, that he was replaced by “a white man 40 years

his junior.” (Oppo. at p.16:16). The court notes that Defendant does not dispute that

Scott Fitzgerald, a younger white employee, replaced Plaintiff in the Team Coach

position after Plaintiff was demoted. In sum, giving Plaintiff the benefit of all

reasonable inferences, the court concludes that Plaintiff has established a prima facie

case. 

Defendant disputes whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case by

coming forward with evidence to show that Plaintiff was not satisfactorily performing

his employment responsibilities and that there is no evidence that Plaintiff was replaced

by a younger individual. Whether Plaintiff was satisfactorily performing his

employment responsibilities is better discussed in the context of whether Defendant has

demonstrated that it had legitimate reasons to demote Plaintiff.

Legitimacy of the Demotion

Turning to the question of whether Defendant is entitled to summary judgment

as a result of establishing legitimate non-discriminating reasons for Plaintiff’s

demotion, Defendant comes forward with substantial evidence to show that Plaintiff

was not adequately performing his employment related responsibilities as Team Coach.

The evidence shows that Plaintiff spent two weeks training with his predecessor to the

position, Scott Fitzgerald, and that he had access to the Team’s Operations Manual and

met regularly with his supervisor. The evidence establishes that Plaintiff experienced

numerous performance related issues while in the position of Team Coach. (Exhs. Y,

Z, AA, AB, AC, AD, AE, AF, AG, AH, AI, AK, AN, AP, AR, AS, AT, AU). Plaintiff

also received discipline ranging from a letter of admonishment to a fourteen-day

suspension. (Exhs. AE, AW, AY, AZ). Further, the March 15, 2004 demotion

memorandum provided to Plaintiff identifies a series of 12 separate instances where

Plaintiff’s performance fell below that required of the Team Coach position. (Exh.

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AV). The 12 separately identified deficiencies were previously disclosed to Plaintiff

on VA Form 119s and Plaintiff signed and acknowledged each write-up. This evidence

strongly supports Defendant’s determination to demote Plaintiff and establishes

legitimate reasons for the demotion.

In light of Defendant’s evidentiary showing, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to

demonstrate that the proffered reasons were pretextual. Coghlan, 413 at 1094. Plaintiff

challenges each of the 12 separate instances of misconduct identified on the VA Form

119s. (Oppo. at pp.6-9). In large part, Plaintiff argues and comes forward with some

evidence to dispute whether the disciplinary actions were warranted under the

circumstances and makes the evidentiary objection that Defendant has failed to present

the underlying evidence supporting (or contradicting) the statements contained on the

Form 119s. For example, with respect to the VA Form 119 issued on September 22,

2003, Plaintiff was written up for failing to provide adequate back up training examples

as he was instructed to do. (Def. Exh. 22). In rebuttal to this write-up, Plaintiff declares

that he was deprived of the opportunity to provide adequate training examples because

“Mr. Daniels interrupted [his] presentation while [he] was still making [] opening

remarks and before [he] had even gotten to the point of presenting any examples of

what the staff was to do.” (Ramirez Decl. ¶21). The court concludes that whether

Plaintiff’s evidence tends to undermine the validity of this Form 119 presents a genuine

issue of material fact.

Other instances of performance deficiencies relate to the preparation of weekly

reports. The Form 119s indicate that Plaintiff failed to provide timely weekly Triage

reports and that his reports contained significant errors. (Def. Exh. 22, VA Form 119s

dated 11-10-03, 12-15-03, 1-14-04, 1-20-04, 1-22-04, 2-05-04, 2-18-04). Plaintiff

makes the general claim that Defendant has not submitted supporting documentation

to support the statements contained in the challenged Form 119s. With respect to the

12-15-03 report, Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to submit timely Triage reports

but declares that he requested an extension on the due date for at least one of the

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 The court notes that it is not the role of the court to resolve factual disputes on summary

judgment.

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reports. (Ramirez Decl. ¶59). With respect to the 1-20-04 write-up, Plaintiff indicates

that he had a heavy workload and his request for an extension of time was denied even

though such requests were routinely granted. (Ramirez Decl. ¶26). With respect to

errors on the reports and their timeliness, Plaintiff generally declares that such reports

were routinely submitted late (or not at all) and that he is not sure he was ever shown

the actual errors identified on the 2-24-04 write-up. (Ramirez Decl. ¶¶31-33). Plaintiff

also argues that he was required to present both a “Monday Morning Report” and a

“Weekly Triage Report” and that other supervisors only had to prepare a “Monday

Morning Report.” He also represents that he was treated differently than other

supervisors because he had to present a more detailed and complicated report than other

supervisors. (Pl. Exh. 43, pp.504, 434). The court notes that Defendant has presented

evidence that the reports required of Plaintiff were the same reports that Scott Fitzgerald

had been providing when he was Team Coach.5

 (Def. Exh. L, Fitzgerald Depo. at

p.20:16-19). 

 While Plaintiff has not rebutted and created genuine issues of material fact with

respect to all of the work-related criticisms set forth on the Form 119s, he does

generally present evidence, albeit a thin evidentiary showing, from which a jury could

reasonably conclude that some of the Form 119s may have been a pretext for

discrimination. Seen in light of the evidentiary record as a whole, and providing

Plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, the court concludes that genuine

issues of material facts preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant on

the demotion claim. 

In sum, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. The court grants summary judgment on all claims except those

claims related to his demotion. 

The MSPB DECISION

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In challenging his demotion under the CSRA, Plaintiff must show that MSPB’s

decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion; obtained without complying

with established procedures; or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C.

§7703(c); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Mgt., 470 U.S. 768, 774 n.5 (1985). In a

“mixed case,” that is, one involving a challenge to a personnel action and a claim of

discrimination, the district court has jurisdiction to review both the lawfulness of the

personnel action as well as the discrimination claim. Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d

1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1993). The discrimination claim is reviewed de novo and the

personnel decision is reviewed under the more deferential standard identified above.

In reviewing the administrative record, the court must consider evidence in the record

that both supports and undermines the Board’s decision. Id, 

In Plaintiff’s case, MSPB applied the correct legal standard and its decision is

supported by substantial evidence. The MSPB found that the performance standards

were valid, the performance standards were communicated to Plaintiff; and that he

failed to meet one or more critical elements; and he was provided an opportunity to

improve his performance. (Exh. BC). 

In his opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that the ALJ’s decision complied with

the requirements of 5 U.S.C. §7703(c). Rather, Plaintiff contends that he was denied

due process in the MSPB action because he was provided with inadequate time to

complete discovery. The ALJ ruled one day before the discovery cutoff date that he

could proceed with six depositions even though Defendant sought to preclude the

deponents’ depositions. Plaintiff contends that there was insufficient time to complete

discovery and therefore he could not adequately prepare his case before the MSPB. 

The court concludes that Plaintiff’s procedural due process argument is not

persuasive. The MSPB received Plaintiff’s appeal on July 1, 2005 and, on July 5, 2005,

the Board issued its discovery order requiring discovery to be completed by September

5, 2005. (MSPB ER, 2297). On August 5, 2005 the Board set a hearing date of October

5, 2005. Shortly thereafter, on August 16, 2005, Plaintiff sought to dismiss the action

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6

 The court notes that Defendant did not move for a protective order to prevent the depositions

from going forward until October 16, 2006.

7

 The court notes that Plaintiff has failed to identify any relevant additional evidence that

would have been provided by the six proposed deponents. In the present case, Plaintiff never moved

to take the depositions of the six proposed deponents nor did he submit their declarations. If the six

proposed deponents possessed relevant testimony, one would anticipate that Plaintiff would have

taken their depositions in relation to this action. Accordingly, even if the ALJ committed error,

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate any prejudice.

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without prejudice because he needed additional time to complete discovery. (MSPB

ER, 2278-79). On August 18, 2005 the Board denied the parties joint motion to dismiss

the appeal for 60 days, but effectively granted the parties joint motion in part by

extending the discovery cutoff date by 45 days and setting a hearing date of November

17, 2005. (MSPB ER, 2271-72). On October 6, 2005 Defendant filed a protective

order with regards to the depositions of six VA employees. The Board denied the

protective order on or about October 19, 2005 and on October 31, 2005 the Board

denied Plaintiff’s third motion to delay the hearing and compel discovery.

Here, the court concludes that Plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to conduct

discovery yet failed to do. Plaintiff was not deprived of the opportunity to depose the

witnesses yet was dilatory in waiting too long to set the employees’ depositions. The

ALJ allowed the parties to conduct discovery over a two month period of time (July 5,

2005 - September 5, 2005), but Plaintiff waited until six of the eight weeks had expired

(August 16, 2005) before he moved to dismiss the action in order to complete

discovery.6

 During this period of time it appears as though Plaintiff did not take any

steps to depose the six witnesses, nor did he seek to obtain declarations from them even

after his third motion to continue was denied on October 19, 2005. (MSPB ER, 2271-

72). Seen in this light, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to

continue , see Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, 146 F.3d 1071, 1074

(9th Cir. 1998) (court has inherent authority to control its docket), nor did it violate

Plaintiff’s due process rights.7

In sum, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant and against

Plaintiff on all claims except Plaintiff’s March 15, 2004 demotion claim. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 27, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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