Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01084/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01084-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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06cv1084

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEVERLY HADRICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security

Administration,

Defendant. 

 

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Case No. 06-CV-1084-LAB (JMA)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION AND PETITION FOR AWARD

OF ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO

THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE

ACT 

[Doc. 25]

I. BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2007, the Honorable Larry Alan Burns issued

an Order Adopting Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) and Remanding

for Further Proceedings [Doc. 24]. On May 23, 2008, Plaintiff

Beverly Hadrick filed a motion and petition for attorney’s fees

under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA” or “Act”), 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d). Defendant Michael J. Astrue opposes

Plaintiff’s motion as untimely. 

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion for

attorney’s fees is DENIED.

Case 3:06-cv-01084-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 09/08/08 Page 1 of 6
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA provides for an award of

attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs in social security

cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Act, however, limits the

time during which a plaintiff may file a fee application. “A

party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within

thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court

an application for fees and other expenses . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The EAJA defines “final

judgment” as “a judgment that is final and not appealable.” Id.

§ 2412(d)(2)(G). Accordingly, in order to be timely, a plaintiff

seeking attorney’s fees must file her application within thirty

days after a “judgment that is final and not appealable.” 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), unsuccessful social security

applicants may seek judicial review of the Commissioner of Social

Security's final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Once a

claimant brings an action under § 405(g), the district court may

remand to the Commissioner of Social Security Administration only

under sentence four or sentence six of § 405(g).” Hoa Hong Van

v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2007) (footnotes

omitted). Sentence four of § 405(g) provides that “[t]he court

shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of

the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without

remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “A

remand under sentence four is essentially a determination that

the agency erred in some respect in reaching a decision to deny

benefits . . . .” Van, 483 F.3d at 605 (citation and quotations

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omitted). “A sentence four remand becomes a final judgment, for

purposes of attorney’s fees claims brought pursuant to the EAJA .

. . upon expiration of the time for appeal.” Akopyan v.

Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 (1993); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501

U.S. 89, 102 (1991); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 568 (9th

Cir. 1995). A plaintiff who obtains a sentence four remand, even

if remanded for further administrative action, is considered a

prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees claims. 

Akopyan, 296 F.3d at 854. 

In contrast, sentence six remands may be ordered only in two

situations: “where the Commissioner requests a remand before

answering the complaint, or where new, material evidence is

adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency.” 

Akopyan, 296 F.3d at 854. “Unlike sentence four remands,

sentence six remands do not constitute final judgments.” Id. at

855. 

III. DISCUSSION

The September 5, 2007 Order Adopting Report and

Recommendation and Remanding for Further Proceedings was

unquestionably issued pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) in

that it partially reversed the decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security pursuant to the Court’s finding that the agency

had erred in some respect in reaching its decision to deny

benefits to Plaintiff. The September 5, 2007 Order also clearly

constituted the Court’s judgment in this case. At its

conclusion, the Order explicitly states that “the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with the

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instructions proposed in the R&R, terminating this case.” Sept.

5, 2007 Order at 3 (emphasis in original). 

Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

that “[e]very judgment and amended judgment . . . be set out in a

separate document.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). A judgment is

entered, for purposes of the Federal Rules, “when the judgment is

entered in the civil docket” and the earlier of the following

events occurs: (1) the judgment is set out in a separate

document or (2) 150 days have run from the entry of the judgment

in the civil docket. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2). 

Here, although the September 5, 2007 Order was clearly the

judgment in the case, it arguably was not the “separate document”

of judgment required by Rule 58. Therefore, judgment was

entered, pursuant to Rule 58, 150 days after entry of the

September 5, 2007 Order, or February 4, 2008. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 6(a)(3) (providing that the last day of any time period

governing the filing of motion papers cannot end on a Saturday,

Sunday, or legal holiday). The time for filing a notice of

appeal, when an agency of the United States is a party, is within

60 days after judgment is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). 

Thus, the judgment became “final and not appealable” on April 4,

2008. The 30 day time frame under the EAJA for Plaintiff to file

her application for attorney’s fees began to run upon expiration

of the 60 day appeal period, and ended on May 5, 2008. See 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Because Plaintiff did not file her

application for attorney’s fees until May 23, 2008, the Court

finds that the application was not timely filed under the EAJA.

//

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Plaintiff urges the Court to find that equitable tolling

applies under the specific facts of this case. Pl.’s Reply at 3. 

She first argues that equitable tolling applies to the period of

time her counsel spent unsuccessfully negotiating with

Defendant’s counsel regarding EAJA fees. Id. Plaintiff cites no

authority supporting this position, however, and the Court does

not find it to be a reasonable one. Moreover, the Court notes

that the settlement negotiations regarding Plaintiff’s attorney’s

fees, which apparently took place between October 14, 2007 and

December 12, 2007 (see id.), occurred before judgment became

final and not appealable in any event. Her time to file the

application for fees under the EAJA had not even started to run

at that point. Plaintiff next argues that equitable tolling

should apply because Defendant’s counsel’s “general office

policy” over the past nine years has been to refrain from

asserting arguments of untimeliness. Id. at 3-4. Again,

Plaintiff has cited no authority supporting this position, and

the Court is not persuaded that equitable tolling should apply in

such a case.

Finally, Plaintiff cites various cases to support her

proposition that the Court should avoid an “overly technical”

approach to the EAJA and should broadly interpret the EAJA fee

time limits. Id. at 4-7. The Court has carefully reviewed each

of the cases cited by Plaintiff -- language from which she has

very selectively cited -- and finds that none of them has any

applicability to this matter and none compels the result she

urges.

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for

attorney’s fees is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 8, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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