Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01889/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01889-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eric Joseph Natzel, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-01889-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

issued by United States Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns (Doc. 24). Petitioner raised 

four grounds for relief in the Petition. In the Reply, however, he withdrew Grounds One, 

Three and Four.1

 (Doc. 23). Thus, as the Magistrate Judge did, this Court will only 

consider Petitioner’s claim in Ground Two. Petitioner alleges in Ground Two that his 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a lesser-included offense 

jury instruction regarding the first of two child abuse counts charged against him. After a 

thorough analysis, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Arizona State courts’ 

rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the 

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Accordingly, the 

 

1

 The Petition was filed pro se. After Respondents filed their Answer to Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 12), Attorney Guy F. Brown filed a notice of appearance on Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 17). Through counsel, Petitioner then filed his 

Reply. (Doc. 23). 

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Magistrate Judge recommends the Petition be denied. (Doc. 24 at 10). 

 Petitioner filed an Objection to the R&R ("Objection") (Doc. 29) on February 24, 

2014. Respondents then filed a Response to Petitioner’s Objection (Doc. 35) on May 5, 

2014. Petitioner subsequently filed a Reply to Respondents’ Response (Doc. 36) on May 

19, 2014. The R&R did not authorize a reply and Petitioner did not seek leave to file 

one. Out of an abundance of caution, however, the Court has considered it. 

I. Background 

The Magistrate Judge set forth a full procedural and factual background in the 

R&R. The Court need not repeat that information here. Moreover, Petitioner has not 

objected to any of the information in the background section. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 149 (1989) (The relevant provision of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C), “does not on its face require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the 

subject of an objection.”) 

II. Analysis 

 Petitioner raises three issues in his Objection. First, Petitioner claims the 

Magistrate Judge erred by failing to address Respondents’ assertion of a procedural bar to 

Plaintiff’s claim and proceeding directly to the merits. Second, Petitioner claims the 

Magistrate Judge erred in determining that trial counsel's decision not to request a lesserincluded offense instruction was a reasoned choice to pursue an "all or nothing" defense. 

Third, Petitioner claims the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to order an evidentiary 

hearing. 

 The district judge "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly 

objected to.”); U.S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (same). The judge "may 

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by 

the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). 

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A. Procedural Bar 

 According to Petitioner, the Magistrate Judge erred by proceeding directly to the 

merits of his ineffective assistance claim rather than first addressing the procedural bar 

argument asserted by Respondents. Petitioner claims that Respondents' assertion of a 

procedural bar was so "grossly erroneous and improper" that it called into question the 

quality of Respondents' subsequent analysis of the merits of Petitioner's claim. (Doc. 29 

at 5 n.1). Petitioner claims the Magistrate Judge "consciously and deliberately elected to 

evade any written analysis of the alleged procedural bar . . . ." (Doc. 29 at 5). 

 The Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's decision to proceed directly to 

the merits without addressing Respondents' asserted procedural bar. Addressing the 

merits of a habeas case without first considering a procedural bar is authorized by statute, 

which provides that "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the 

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in 

the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(2). In addition, case law establishes that a 

federal court may proceed to the merits without addressing an alleged procedural bar. 

See Flourney v. Small, 681 F.3d 1000, 1004 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) ("While we ordinarily 

resolve the issue of procedural bar prior to any consideration of the merits on habeas 

review, we are not required to do so when a petition clearly fails on the merits."); 

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A]ppeals courts are 

empowered to, and in some cases should, reach the merits of habeas petitions if they are 

. . . clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar."). 

 Moreover, the Magistrate Judge's decision to proceed directly to the merits in no 

way harmed Petitioner. Even if the Magistrate Judge had considered the procedural bar 

asserted by Respondents and found it to be "grossly incorrect" as Petitioner claims, the 

remedy was to reject the procedural bar and proceed to the merits. Although the 

Magistrate Judge did not expressly reject the procedural bar, the decision to proceed 

directly to the merits had the same effect as if the procedural bar had been rejected. 

Petitioner's objection on this basis is rejected. 

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 B. Merits of Claim 

 Next, Petitioner argues the Magistrate Judge erroneously found that trial counsel's 

decision not to request a lesser-included offense instruction on one of the charged 

offenses was a reasoned decision based on an "all or nothing" strategy. Petitioner does 

not object to the Magistrate Judge's discussion of the relevant legal standards, including 

the strict standards to establish ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984) and the highly deferential standard for habeas relief under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). (See R&R at 5-8). 

Rather, Petitioner claims the Magistrate Judge "engaged in an improper evaluation of the 

state trial and appellate courts' treatment of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim." The Court disagrees. 

 As noted above, Petitioner claims his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance 

by failing to request a lesser-included offense jury instruction regarding the first of two 

child abuse charges. The first child abuse offense with which Petitioner was charged 

requires that the conduct be done intentionally or knowingly.2

 See A.R.S. § 13-

3623(A)(1). Petitioner contends his attorney should have requested a lesser-included 

instruction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3623(A)(2), which provides that if the offense is 

committed recklessly or negligently, the offense level is reduced and the potential 

punishment is less. 

 Under the AEDPA, a habeas corpus petition cannot be granted unless the State 

court decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or 

was (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The petitioner 

bears the burden of proving the standards for habeas relief have been met. Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). When applying this highly deferential standard of 

 

2

 The second child abuse charge is less serious and based on different conduct than 

the first offense and is not part of Petitioner's claim. 

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review, "the federal court should review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." 

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Court has 

reviewed the Memorandum Decision issued by the Arizona Court of Appeals on May 2, 

2012. (Doc. 12, Exh. J). That decision was issued after Petitioner filed a Petition for 

Review of the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 12, Exh. 

H, I). 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a convicted 

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong 

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is 

“extremely limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d 

on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered 

sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689. 

 In addition to showing counsel’s deficient performance, a petitioner must establish 

that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To 

show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. at 694; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999); Ortiz v. 

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The prejudice component “focuses on the 

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question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable 

or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

It is not enough to merely show “that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 

outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 

 A habeas court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong without deciding 

whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 697; Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 

1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland). The court, however, may not assume 

prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 

1155. 

 In the context of a habeas petition, a petitioner must do more than demonstrate to 

the federal court that the State court applied Strickland incorrectly. Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-

99. Rather, a petitioner must show the State court “applied Strickland to the facts of his 

case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. Because the standards created by 

Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” review under both standards in 

tandem is even more deferential. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) 

(citations omitted). “[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. 

The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

 In its Memorandum Decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's 

claim that the trial court failed to consider his ineffective assistance claim when it denied 

his petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 12, Exh. J at 5). The Court of Appeals 

stated: 

We presume the court rejected the claim that trial counsel had 

been ineffective in this regard because it denied the petition. Additionally, we reject [Petitioner's] apparent suggestion that we can infer the court did not consider this claim because the 

state conceded error on this issue and the court had stated in 

its minute entry it had denied the petition for post-conviction 

relief for the reasons set forth in the state's response. The 

state did not concede counsel had been ineffective for not 

requesting the instruction; it asserted counsel had made a 

reasonable tactical decision, which is not a viable basis for 

granting relief. 

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(Id.)

3

 Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Petitioner's claim because trial 

counsel had made a reasonable tactical decision not to request the lesser-included offense 

instruction. 

 Here, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals 

decision affirming the trial court was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law, or was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Petitioner, for example, 

asserts in his Objection that "[i]f the failure to seek a lesser-included jury instruction was 

the result of a mistaken belief on the part of defense counsel, that failure cannot possibly 

constitute a legitimate tactical choice." (Doc. 29 at 7). Petitioner, however, presents no 

evidence to show counsel's decision was the result of a mistaken belief. Rather, the 

evidence in the record supports the conclusion reached by the State court, that it was a 

reasonable tactical decision. (Doc. 12, Exh. M at 52-112 (defense counsel's closing 

argument)). 

 Petitioner at no point in the trial presented any evidence or argument to indicate he 

acted negligently or recklessly.4

 Petitioner's defense was that his daughter's death was 

the result of a horrible accident in which she climbed into the toy box to play and the lid 

closed, thereby trapping her and causing her to suffocate. He presented a starkly different 

set of facts from the State, which alleged Petitioner forced his daughter into the toy box 

and closed the lid. Petitioner maintained this defense throughout the trial, including 

closing argument. Petitioner never suggested he did anything, negligently, recklessly, or 

otherwise, to contribute to his daughter's death. The record supports the conclusion that 

the defense strategy was to present two unambiguously different scenarios for the jury. 

 

3

 As referenced in the Court of Appeals decision, the trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner's post-conviction relief petition, including the ineffective assistance claim, "[f]or the reasons stated in the State's written response." (Doc. 12, Exh. H). 

4

 As the Magistrate Judge noted, "although there was some testimony presented at trial suggesting that it was theoretically possible that noise the victim made while locked 

inside the toy box could have been heard within the residence, Petitioner never claimed, 

as a defense, and there was no evidence suggesting that he heard the screams but merely chose to ignore them." (Doc. 24 at 9). 

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The record further supports that trial counsel acted consistently with that strategy and, as 

the State court concluded, made the reasonable decision not to request a lesser-included 

offense instruction, thus avoiding the risk of distorting the clear picture he was attempting 

to present. 

 Additionally, the timing and manner of defense counsel's decision to withdraw the 

instruction supports the State court's conclusion that it was a reasonable tactical decision. 

The record reflects that trial counsel withdrew the lesser included instruction after nearly 

all of the evidence in the trial had been presented. (Doc. 12, Exh. S at 146). This is not a 

situation where counsel failed to consider a lesser included instruction. Instead, the 

instruction had apparently previously been requested and counsel withdrew the request 

shortly before the close of evidence. (Doc. 12, Exh. S at 146). This suggests a strategic 

decision to pull the instruction based on the absence of any evidence to support it, and 

maintain the defense theory that the incident was purely an accident for which Petitioner 

bore no responsibility. 

 By failing to present evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to show his 

attorney's decision was not a reasonable tactical decision, Petitioner has failed to 

overcome the strong presumption under Strickland that counsel rendered adequate 

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Although Petitioner claims 

throughout his Objection that counsel's decision not to seek the lesser-included 

instruction was based on a "mistaken belief," that claim appears to be based on nothing 

more than speculation. Such speculation is insufficient to overcome Strickland's 

presumption. For these reasons, the Court concludes Petitioner has failed to show that 

the State court's decision denying his ineffective assistance claim satisfies the standards 

for habeas relief. Thus, Petitioner's objection that that Magistrate Judge erred in reaching 

this same conclusion is rejected. 

C. Evidentiary Hearing 

Lastly, Petitioner claims he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner did 

not, however, request an evidentiary hearing in his Petition, Memorandum, or Reply. 

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(See Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 2 at 37; Doc. 23). Consequently, the Magistrate Judge did not 

address the issue in the R&R. Because the issue is raised for the first time in Petitioner's 

Objection, the Court declines to consider it because it has not been fairly presented for 

adjudication. See Brown v. Roe, 279 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a district 

court is not required to consider claims raised for the first time in a party's objection to a 

magistrate judge's recommendation). 

 Even if the Court considered Petitioner's claim that he is entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing, it would be denied. The standard for holding an evidentiary hearing in a habeas 

case is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which states: 

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State 

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that – 

(A) the claim relies on - (i) a new rule of constitutional 

law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

 Evidentiary hearings, however, are not authorized for claims adjudicated on the 

merits in the State court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400-1401 (2011). Such 

claims are subject to review under § 2254(d)(1), which asks whether a State court’s 

decision on the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. Id. at 1398. "[R]eview under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Id. 

Evidence introduced in federal court would, therefore, have no bearing on the Court's 

review under § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400. As a result, evidentiary hearings pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) are inapplicable to claims decided on the merits in State court. Id. at 

1401. 

 As the above analysis demonstrates, the State court adjudicated Petitioner's 

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ineffective assistance claim on the merits. Applying § 2254(d)(1), this Court has 

determined that the State Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court was not 

contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. Under Pinholster, the Court's analysis was limited to the record 

before the State court that decided the claim on the merits. The Court could not consider 

any newly presented evidence. Petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing to present new evidence.

III. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Burns' R&R (Doc. 24) is accepted and 

adopted. Petitioner's Objections (Doc. 31) are overruled. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis

on appeal are denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action 

and enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 15th day of August, 2014. 

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