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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NADEEM HASSAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-17252

v. D.C. No.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of CV-04-02251-PHXDepartment of Homeland Security;  FJM

AL GALLMANN, Acting District ORDER AND Director, Phoenix District Office, AMENDED Citizenship and Immigration OPINION Service,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 13, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed September 11, 2008

Amended January 19, 2010

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, John M. Walker, Jr.,* and

N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

*The Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the

Second Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Eric G. Bjotvedt, Esq., Phoenix, Arizona, for plaintiff/

appellant, Nadeem Hassan.

Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Esq. USDOJ, Washington, D.C., for

defendants/appellees, Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security et al. 

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ORDER

The Opinion filed September 11, 2008, slip op. 12719, and

appearing at 543 F.3d 564 (9th Cir 2008), is amended as follows:

1. At slip op. 12723, following the “Analysis” heading,

substitute the first two paragraphs with:

“Hassan argues that the government inappropriately denied

his application for adjustment of status. The government,

however, denied Hassan’s application as a matter of discretion. The government concluded that Hassan posed a threat to

national security. As the district court correctly noted, judicial

review of the denial of an adjustment of status application —

a decision governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1255 — is expressly precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Moreover, judicial

review of a discretionary determination is also expressly precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The denial of Hassan’s adjustment of status application on the basis that he

poses a threat to national security is a determination committed to the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary

of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); cf.

Hosseini v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of

Hosseini’s adjustment of status claim because the BIA alternatively denied relief as a matter of discretion.”). Therefore,

this court lacks the authority to review Hassan’s claim under

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 

However, “[w]e retain jurisdiction to review constitutional

claims, even when those claims address a discretionary decision.” Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th

Cir. 2003). Hassan asserts that his due process rights were

violated because the government failed to follow its own regulations during the decision-making process. Specifically,

Hassan contends that the government deprived him of the

opportunity to rebut evidence against him in violation of its

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regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). This regulation

provides that, if a decision 

will be adverse to the applicant or petitioner and is

based on derogatory information considered by the

Service and of which the applicant or petitioner is

unaware, he/she shall be advised of this fact and

offered an opportunity to rebut the information and

present information in his/her own behalf before the

decision is rendered.

Id.

Hassan’s argument fails. Hassan was aware of the information against him. He was questioned about his involvement in

the terrorist organization. He was given the opportunity to

explain his association during the course of that questioning.

The regulation that Hassan cites requires no more of the government. Accordingly, Hassan has failed to raise a colorable

constitutional argument, and a litigant must raise a colorable

constitutional violation before this court has jurisdiction to

review his otherwise unreviewable claim. See, e.g., SanchezCruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2001).” 

2. At slip op. 12725, substitute the final paragraph of the

opinion with: “For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case.”

With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the

petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en

banc, and Judge Walker so recommends. 

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing

en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to

rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED.

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Absent further order of the court, no further petitions for

rehearing or rehearing en banc will be considered.

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Nadeem Hassan, a citizen of Pakistan, appeals the district

court’s dismissal of his complaint seeking mandamus relief

and challenging the government’s denial of his application for

adjustment of status and cancellation of his permission to

return to this country. We lack jurisdiction to review the government’s actions and affirm the district court’s dismissal. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

Background

In January 2002, while physically present in the United

States, Hassan applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident pursuant to section 245 of the Immigration

and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). In October

2004, the government had not yet acted on his application, so

he filed this mandamus action in the United States District

Court to compel the government to act on the application. In

2005, the government questioned him about possible ties to a

group the government suspected of having links to terrorists.

While his adjustment application was still pending, Hassan

traveled outside the United States to Saudi Arabia. He

received a travel document from the government, Form I-512,

commonly referred to as an “advance parole.” It granted him

permission to return to the United States, so long as his application for adjustment remained pending. While Hassan was

abroad, the government denied his adjustment application and

revoked the advance parole. When he attempted to return to

the United States, he was denied admission, placed in expe1204 HASSAN v. CHERTOFF

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dited removal proceedings, and removed. He then amended

his complaint in this action to challenge the denial of status

adjustment and revocation of advance parole. 

The district court held that under the REAL ID Act of

2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), both the denial of the adjustment of status and the revocation of the advance parole were

discretionary decisions that the court lacked jurisdiction to

review. The statute the court relied upon with respect to

adjustment of status provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of

relief under section . . . 1255 of this title . . . .” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). The statute the district court relied on to

determine that it lacked jurisdiction to review the revocation

of advance parole is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any other

decision . . . of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under

this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General

or the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . .” 

Analysis

[1] Hassan argues that the government inappropriately

denied his application for adjustment of status. The government, however, denied Hassan’s application as a matter of

discretion. The government concluded that Hassan posed a

threat to national security. As the district court correctly

noted, judicial review of the denial of an adjustment of status

application — a decision governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1255 — is

expressly precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Moreover, judicial review of a discretionary determination is also

expressly precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The

denial of Hassan’s adjustment of status application on the

basis that he poses a threat to national security is a determination committed to the discretion of the Attorney General or

the Secretary of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); cf. Hosseini v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1018,

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1021 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We lack jurisdiction to review the

BIA’s denial of Hosseini’s adjustment of status claim because

the BIA alternatively denied relief as a matter of discretion.”).

Therefore, this court lacks the authority to review Hassan’s

claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 

However, “[w]e retain jurisdiction to review constitutional

claims, even when those claims address a discretionary decision.” Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th

Cir. 2003). Hassan asserts that his due process rights were

violated because the government failed to follow its own regulations during the decision-making process. Specifically,

Hassan contends that the government deprived him of the

opportunity to rebut evidence against him in violation of its

regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). This regulation

provides that, if a decision 

will be adverse to the applicant or petitioner and is

based on derogatory information considered by the

Service and of which the applicant or petitioner is

unaware, he/she shall be advised of this fact and

offered an opportunity to rebut the information and

present information in his/her own behalf before the

decision is rendered.

Id.

[2] Hassan’s argument fails. Hassan was aware of the information against him. He was questioned about his involvement

in the terrorist organization. He was given the opportunity to

explain his association during the course of that questioning.

The regulation that Hassan cites requires no more of the government. Accordingly, Hassan has failed to raise a colorable

constitutional argument, and a litigant must raise a colorable

constitutional violation before this court has jurisdiction to

review his otherwise unreviewable claim. See, e.g., SanchezCruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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The only remaining question pertains to the revocation of

Hassan’s advance parole. The district court ruled that it lacked

jurisdiction to consider the issue because the revocation of

advance parole, like the grant of advance parole, is discretionary. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (stating that the Attorney

General may “in his discretion parole into the United States

. . . any alien”); see also Samirah v. O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545,

548 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The Attorney General . . . has the discretion to revoke advance parole after it has been granted.”).

[3] On appeal, Hassan argues that the district court had

jurisdiction to review the revocation. He claims that the government lacked any discretion to revoke his advance parole

because no statute or regulation expressly authorizes revocation. We disagree. The statutory and regulatory provisions

governing the grant of parole provide for the revocation of

parole when it no longer serves its purpose. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (“[W]hen the purpose of such parole shall, in

the opinion, of the Attorney General, have been served the

alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from

which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to

be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.”); 8 C.F.R.

§ 212.5(e)(2)(i) (providing that DHS “shall” terminate parole

“upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was

authorized or when in the opinion of [certain enumerated

DHS officials], neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United

States”); see also Samirah, 335 F.3d at 548 (interpreting these

provisions as granting DHS authority to revoke advance

parole). 

[4] DHS complied with these regulations when it revoked

Hassan’s advance parole. It is undisputed that Hassan was

granted advance parole solely to allow him to return to this

country while his application for status adjustment was pending. Thus, once Hassan’s application for adjustment of status

was denied, he was no longer eligible for advance parole. See

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U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., Adjudicator’s Field Manual § 54.3 (2008) (providing

that an applicant for adjustment of status is eligible for

advance parole only if his application has not yet been

decided). The revocation inevitably followed from DHS’s discretionary decision to deny the adjustment of status. Under

these circumstances, DHS was required by its own regulation

to terminate the advance parole, the parole having served its

purpose. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). 

The district court properly rejected Hassan’s argument that

it had jurisdiction to review the revocation of advance parole

as an ultra vires. The revocation was lawfully authorized. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case. 

AFFIRMED.

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