Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-05434/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-05434-29/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN EARL CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

NATIONAL PASSENGER RAILROAD

CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-05434 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF'S

APPLICATION FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND

NON-STATUTORY COSTS

AND GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO REVIEW TAXED

COSTS

Plaintiff John Earl Campbell moves for an award of attorneys'

fees in the amount of $994,606 and non-statutory costs of $44,702. 

Defendant National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak) opposes

the motion. Amtrak asks the Court to review the Clerk’s taxation

of costs for Plaintiff. Plaintiff opposes this motion. The

motions were taken under submission on the papers. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court grants

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and non-statutory costs. 

The Court awards attorneys’ fees in the amount of $770,596 and nonstatutory costs in the amount of $44,702. The Court grants in part

Amtrak’s motion to review taxed costs and denies it in part and

awards Plaintiff $12,011.93 in statutory costs.

On February 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed the fourth declaration

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of Pamela Price requesting attorneys’ fees and non-statutory costs

incurred in responding to Amtrak’s objections to his bill of costs

and objecting to Defendant Deely’s bill of costs. This declaration

is not considered in this order; it will be considered separately

so that Defendants may file an opposition, if they wish to do so.

BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2005, Plaintiff, represented by Price and

Associates, filed suit against Defendants Amtrak and Joe Deely, an

Amtrak manager and district supervisor. On February 22, 2006,

Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (FAC) alleging claims

for (1) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2)

retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) retaliation in

violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA);

(4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (5) and 

(6) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment. In his opposition to

Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims for

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On

April 3, 2008, the Court granted summary judgment to Deely on all

claims and summarily adjudicated the two retaliation claims in

favor of Amtrak. The Court denied Amtrak's motion with regard to

the wrongful termination and failure to promote claims based on

racial discrimination. A jury trial was held from February 9, 2009

to March 3, 2009. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff,

awarding him $676,916 including $297,716 for back pay, $259,200 for

future pay, and $120,000 for non-economic damages. The Court

granted Plaintiff's post-trial motion for re-instatement and denied

Amtrak's post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the

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1

The information in the table is a compilation of the

information in the tables included in Pamela Price’s declaration,

first supplemental declaration and third supplemental declaration.

2In Plaintiff’s first table summarizing the fees requested for

each attorney, he included $5,312 for Mr. Howard Moore. See First

Declaration of Pamela Price, Ex. G. In the updated table

summarizing fees requested, Plaintiff does not include fees for Mr.

Moore. See Third Declaration of Pamela Price, Ex. N. The Court

assumes the omission of Mr. Moore was an oversight.

3

verdict or a new trial. 

Plaintiff now moves to recover attorneys' fees and costs. In

support of this request, Plaintiff submits time records indicating

the hours billed by each attorney together with each attorney's

requested billing rate and years of experience. The following is a

summary of Plaintiff's attorneys' records.1

Attorney Yrs of

Experience

Proposed

Rate

Hours Fee App

Hours

Total

Fees

Pamela Price 26 $750 589.75 46.65 $477,299

Daniel De La

Vega

1 $400 384.50 $163,412

Kendra Fox

Davis

2 $400 394.95 $167,853

Renee

Sanchez

2 $400 273.30 $116,152

Ok-Hee Shim 3 $425 57.50 $ 25,875

Grace Chung not given $250 70.35 $ 17,587

Howard Moore 47 $625 8.5 $ 5,312

Paralegals/

Law Clerks

Yrs of

Experience

Proposed

Rate

Hours Fee App

Hours

Fees

Monique

Beaver

$200 32.70 $ 6,500

Charla Gray $200 47.00 $ 9,400

George

Khoury

$200 25.70 $ 5,140

TOTAL $994,5302

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3This amount is computed from Plaintiff’s motion in which he

requests $39,879 in non-statutory costs, Ms. Price’s second

supplemental declaration stating that additional costs in the

amount of $1,170 were incurred, and her third supplemental

declaration stating that additional costs in the amount of $3,653

were incurred. 

4

Plaintiff also requests a total of $$44,702 in costs.3

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Amtrak objects to statements in the Price declaration. The

Court has reviewed these evidentiary objections and has not relied

on any inadmissible evidence. The Court will not discuss each

objection individually. To the extent that the Court has relied on

evidence to which Amtrak objects, such evidence has been found

admissible and the objections are overruled.

LEGAL STANDARD

A district court may authorize an award of attorneys' fees to

a prevailing party in a civil rights action under the Civil Rights

Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). The purpose of section 1988

is to ensure that victims of civil rights violations have

representation from competent counsel so that they may effectively

access the judicial process. Id. A prevailing plaintiff should

ordinarily recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances

would render that award unjust. Id. The exception based on

special circumstances only applies in unusual cases. Mendez v.

County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Such an unusual circumstance might arise where, at the outset of

the case, there was a strong likelihood of success on the merits

and of a substantial judgment so that litigants with similar claims

would not be dissuaded from bringing suit by the lack of

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4Amtrak cites Franchitti v. Bloomberg, L.P., 411 F. Supp. 2d

453 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), which was superseded by the above-cited case.

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availability of an award of attorneys’ fees. Id. In determining

whether to apply the special circumstances exception, the court

must evaluate whether allowing attorneys’ fees would further the

purposes of section 1988 and whether the balance of equities favors

or disfavors the denial of fees. Id. 

 DISCUSSION

I. Special Circumstances 

Amtrak argues that Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees must

be denied because Plaintiff committed perjury while testifying,

which qualifies as a special circumstance that renders an award of

attorneys’ fees unjust. It is undisputed that Plaintiff, on direct

examination by his attorney, admitted that he had testified falsely

at his deposition by stating that he had not cut out the brakes of

the locomotive, the safety rule violation for which Amtrak claimed

it fired him. 

In support of its argument, Amtrak cites Franchitti v.

Bloomberg, L.P., 411 F. Supp. 2d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)4 and the

dissent in Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98, 101-02 (6th Cir. 1982). 

Amtrak acknowledges that there is no Ninth Circuit case addressing

this issue.

Amtrak’s cases are distinguishable. In Franchitti, the court

addressed a motion to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing

defendant where the plaintiff’s case was frivolous, unreasonable,

groundless and brought in bad faith. 411 F. Supp. 2d at 469. The

court found that the plaintiff made up most of the events about

which he testified. Id. However, the court denied the defendant’s

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request for attorneys’ fees because it, too, had dissembled at

trial. Id. at 470. The denial of a defendant’s attorneys’ fee

application would not have a chilling effect on a plaintiff’s

ability to obtain legal representation and access to the courts. 

Franchitti is not applicable to this case. 

In Price, the court held that the plaintiff’s perjury was not

a circumstance that would render the award of fees unjust and that

the award of attorneys’ fees was necessary to avoid chilling a

victim’s ability to obtain competent counsel. Id. 690 F.2d at 101.

The dissent argued that, on equitable principles, attorneys’

fees should not be awarded because the plaintiff’s “deliberate and

repeated falsehoods under oath” in the district court were as

reprehensible as the defendants’ discriminatory conduct. Id. at

103-04. The dissent reasoned that an award of attorneys’ fees

would provide “an incentive for civil rights plaintiffs and their

counsel to win cases and attorney’s fees through deception and

unethical conduct, thereby undermining the integrity of the

judicial process.” Id. at 104. The Court is not persuaded by the

reasoning of the dissent. 

In balancing the equities, the Court finds that denying an

award of attorneys’ fees under the circumstances here, where

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in a civil rights case, would

more likely chill a victim’s ability to find competent counsel than

undermine the integrity of the judicial process. Furthermore, it

was not apparent from the beginning that there was a strong

likelihood that Plaintiff would win on the merits or that he would

be awarded a substantial judgment. This case was intensely

litigated over the course of four years and Plaintiff’s recovery of

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damages was not certain until the jury reached a verdict. 

Therefore, Amtrak’s argument for a denial of Plaintiff’s attorneys’

fees based on special circumstances is not persuasive.

Alternatively, Amtrak argues that the rates and hours sought

by Plaintiff’s attorneys are not reasonable and must be reduced

significantly.

II. Lodestar Calculation

If the court determines that an applicant is a prevailing

party who should be awarded attorneys' fees under section 1988, it

must next determine what fees are reasonable. In the Ninth

Circuit, reasonable attorneys’ fees are determined by first

calculating the “lodestar.” Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d

1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by

multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably

expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales

v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). There is

a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a

reasonable fee. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262. However, the court may

adjust the award from the lodestar figure upon consideration of

additional factors that may bear upon reasonableness. Kerr v.

Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).

A. Hourly Rate

Determining a reasonable hourly rate is a critical inquiry. 

Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

n.11 (1984)). The fee applicant has the burden to produce

evidence, other than the declarations of interested counsel, that

the requested rates are in accordance with those prevailing in the

community for attorneys of comparable skill and reputation. Id. at

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1263. In establishing the reasonable hourly rate, the court may

take into account: (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues;

(2) the special skill and experience of counsel; (3) the quality of

representation; and (4) the results obtained. Cabrales v. County

of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988). Other factors

that can be considered are (1) the time and labor required; 

(2) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance

of the case; (3) time limitations imposed by the client or

circumstances; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 

(5) the “undesirability” of the case; and (6) awards in similar

cases. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3. These factors are subsumed

in the initial lodestar calculation, and should not serve as

independent bases for adjusting fee awards. Morales, 96 F.3d at

363-64. 

1. Pamela Price

Plaintiff seeks $750 per hour for the services of lead

attorney Pamela Price, on the ground that this is the prevailing

rate for attorneys with similar skills and experience in the San

Francisco Bay Area. In support of the requested $750 per hour

rate, Plaintiff submits the declarations of Ms. Price and attorneys

Bill Lann Lee, William McNeill, James Finberg and John Burris.

Ms. Price states that she graduated from the University of

California School of Law, Boalt Hall, in 1982; she then worked in

public interest law firms; and, in 1991, she opened her own law

firm, specializing in civil rights. Ms. Price has been a panelist,

teacher and author in the area of civil rights litigation and she

has been the lead counsel on many notable civil rights cases. 

Regarding her hourly rate, Ms. Price states that in 2001, she was

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awarded $375 per hour in Croskey, et al. v. Contra Costa County, 

C 73-0906 JCS, and, in a 2009 case that settled out of court, she

requested and received a rate of $575 per hour.

All three of the attorneys who submit declarations have

practiced law in the Northern District of California for many

years. Mr. Lee states that he has been practicing from 1974 to the

present as a civil rights attorney in private practice and as

Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the United States

Department of Justice. He states that he presently works at the

Lewis Feinberg law firm where his billing rate is $750 an hour. He

states that Ms. Price is known as a skillful litigator who has a

wealth of experience and knowledge in prosecuting civil rights

cases and who achieves excellent results for her clients. He

believes that $750 per hour is a reasonable rate in the Northern

District for a lawyer with her experience and abilities.

Mr. Finberg has been practicing since 1983 and, during that

time, has served as an attorney in many complex class actions. He

states that, in 2008, his hourly rate was $750 and, in 2009, his

hourly rate is $775. To support his hourly rate, Mr. Finberg cites

fees he received in settlements of class action lawsuits. However,

class actions are distinguishable from the instant case because

they are generally more complex than cases brought by one

plaintiff. Mr. Finberg states that he is familiar with Ms. Price,

who is known as a skillful litigator with experience and knowledge

in prosecuting civil rights cases, and that he believes that $750

per hour is within the range of rates awarded to attorneys in the

Bay Area with her experience and background.

Mr. McNeill states that he has specialized in employment

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5The plaintiffs objected to the magistrate judge’s order. The

case settled, however, and the objections were withdrawn.

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discrimination cases since 1973, that he has known Ms. Price for

many years, working with her on some cases, and that she has

exceptional knowledge of the legal issues in discrimination cases

and has achieved excellent results for clients. He states that he

is familiar with the rates charged by attorneys in the San

Francisco Bay Area and that the rate of $750 per hour is consistent

with the market rate for senior attorneys with the length and

breadth of Ms. Price’s experience and reputation. Mr. Burris

similarly states that he has known Ms. Price for many years, he has

worked with her on a number of cases and the market rate for an

attorney of her skills and expertise is as high as $750 per hour. 

Amtrak argues that Ms. Price should be awarded $450 per hour,

which is in line with the hourly rate set by the court in Freitag

v. California Dep’t of Corrections, C 00-2278 TEH. In December,

2008, Magistrate Judge Zimmerman recommended an hourly rate of $525

for Ms. Price based upon her September, 2008 fee request at a rate

of $550 per hour.5 Amtrak also submits Ms. Price’s June 15, 2007

letter to this Court, indicating that her rate was $500 per hour. 

Amtrak’s Exhibit Binder, Ex. H. And, Amtrak submits the

declarations of Douglas A. Kahn and Dylan Carp. Mr. Kahn is an

attorney with twenty-two years of experience in employment law and

was selected by his peers, in 2008, as one of Northern California’s

super lawyers. He currently bills at $380 per hour. Mr. Carp is

one of Defendants’ attorneys. He submits the resume of Patrick

Mullin, who also represents Defendants. According to Mr. Mullin’s

resume, he has been practicing as a trial attorney since 1976 in

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the areas of employment law, unfair competition and trade secrets,

has tried over sixty cases to verdict, and lectures on trial

practice. Mr. Carp states that Mr. Mullin’s hourly rate is $495.

The attorneys’ declarations submitted by both parties support

a market rate from $380 to $775 per hour for experienced employment

and civil rights attorneys in the Northern District. In

considering the Cabrales factors, the Court finds that the issues

presented in this case were not especially novel or complex. On

the other hand, Ms. Price’s expertise and quality of representation

were outstanding and the results she achieved were excellent. In

regard to the Hensley factors, this litigation extended over a

four-year period, and the drain on the resources of Ms. Price’s

small law firm was substantial, especially in the months preceding

and during the trial. Finally, Ms. Price states that civil rights

suits based on racial discrimination are difficult to prove,

allegations of race discrimination are likely to elicit bias in

jurors and, consequently, these cases are not “desirable.” Many of

these factors support a finding that Ms. Price should be awarded a

rate that is at the high end of the market rate in her community. 

In balancing these factors, the Court concludes that the

appropriate rate for Ms. Price’s work is $700 per hour. This rate

is in line with the overall market rate for experienced civil

rights attorneys of similar abilities and experience in the

Northern District and takes into account the difficulties

encountered in representing Plaintiff. 

2. Kendra Fox-Davis

Plaintiff seeks $400 per hour for the services of attorney

Kendra Fox-Davis, on the ground that this is the prevailing rate

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for attorneys with similar skills and experience in the San

Francisco Bay Area. In support of the requested $400 per hour

rate, Plaintiff submits the declarations of Ms. Fox-Davis and

attorneys Michael Begert and Robert Rubin.

Ms. Fox-Davis states she graduated from the University of

California, Los Angeles, School of Law in 2006 with a

specialization in critical race studies and public interest law and

policy. After graduation she was a fellow with the Lawyers’

Committee for Civil Rights (LCCR), and for the last two years, she

has been a staff attorney for LCCR. Ms. Fox-Davis indicates that,

during the three years since her graduation, she has been cocounsel on two significant civil rights cases. She states that she

was co-lead counsel on Plaintiff’s case; Ms. Price states that Ms.

Fox-Davis was primarily responsible for organizing, tracking and

maintaining exhibits and other documents.

Although Ms. Fox-Davis does not indicate what hourly rate she

seeks, experienced attorney Michael Begert states that $400 per

hour is commensurate with fees charged by attorneys with similar

experience. Experienced attorney Robert Rubin states that he has

been Ms. Fox-Davis’ supervisor for three years and knows that she

is an excellent lawyer and that $400 per hour is consistent with,

if not below, the market rate for an attorney having Ms. Fox-Davis’

qualifications and experience.

Amtrak argues that Ms. Fox-Davis’ fee should be $255 per hour. 

It points out that no declarant states what Ms. Fox-Davis charges,

and that neither Mr. Begert nor Mr. Rubin indicate what the market

rate is for attorneys with three years of experience who are

primarily responsible for the organizing and tracking of documents

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during the litigation of a case. In his declaration, Mr. Carp

states that Christine Young, a two-year associate at his firm, has

second chaired parts of a three month jury trial and her billing

rate is $245 per hour. 

 The Court finds that the requested $400 rate for Ms. Fox-Davis

is beyond the market rate for attorneys with her level of

experience. Therefore, the Court finds that a reasonable rate for

Ms. Fox-Price is $265 per hour.

3. Daniel Martinez de la Vega

Plaintiff seeks $400 per hour for the services of attorney

Daniel Martinez de la Vega. Ms. Price states that, although Mr. de

la Vega graduated from law school in 2007, he acted as second-chair

during the trial. He assisted Ms. Price with the pretrial

preparation and trial and was primarily responsible for the

witnesses, including interviews, statements and scheduling. Ms.

Price states that this case was Mr. de la Vega’s second trial since

he graduated from law school and $400 is the market rate for an

attorney of his skill and expertise.

Amtrak argues that a rate of $400 per hour is shockingly high

and unreasonable for an attorney who has been out of law school for

only two years. It points out that there is no evidence submitted

about what his rate is or what attorneys admitted to the bar in

2008 charge. It argues his rate should be $245 per hour.

There is insufficient evidence regarding the reasonable market

rate for an attorney with the limited experience of Mr. de la Vega. 

Ms. Price’s declaration is that of an interested party and there

are no declarations from objective witnesses. Furthermore,

Plaintiff does not argue against Amtrak’s suggested rate of $245

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per hour. The Court concludes that $245 is a reasonable market

rate for Mr. de la Vega.

4. Other Junior Associates

Plaintiff seeks a rate of $425 per hour for the services of

attorney Ok-Hee Shim, $400 per hour for the services of attorney

Renee Sanchez and $250 per hour for the services of attorney Grace

Chung. Ms. Price states that Ms. Shim graduated from the

University of California, Hastings College of the Law, in 2005 and

her work on this case included serving Defendants and preparing for

the initial case management conference. Ms. Price believes $425 is

a reasonable rate for Ms. Shim’s services and is consistent with

the market rate charged by other Bay Area law firms for associates

with comparable experience. Ms. Price states that Ms. Sanchez’s

role was limited to conducting discovery during the pre-trial stage

of this case. Ms. Price states that Ms. Sanchez was admitted to

practice law in California in 2006 after graduating from New

College of California School of Law. Based upon her knowledge and

experience, Ms. Price believes a reasonable rate for Ms. Sanchez’

services is $400 per hour. Ms. Price states, in her first

supplemental declaration, that Ms. Chung is a first year associate

who assisted her with the fee application. Ms. Price believes that

$250 per hour is a reasonable rate for Ms. Chung’s services.

Amtrak argues that Plaintiff provides no evidence for the

rates he seeks for these three attorneys. It argues that 

reasonable hourly rates for Ms. Shim and Ms. Sanchez are $275 and

$265 respectively. Amtrak does not address the rate requested for

Ms. Chung because fees for her services were first requested in Ms.

Price’s supplemental declaration, which was submitted after Amtrak

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had filed its opposition. 

Plaintiff has failed to submit sufficient evidence in support

of the reasonableness of the rates requested for these three

attorneys. As discussed previously, Ms. Price’s testimony cannot

be heavily weighed. Plaintiff has not objected to Amtrak’s

suggested rates for attorneys Shim and Sanchez. Therefore, the

Court concludes that a reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Shim is $275

and a reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Sanchez is $265. Because

there is no evidence of a reasonable rate for Ms. Chung, the Court

awards her the same rate that is awarded to Mr. de la Vega, which,

as previously discussed, is $245 per hour. 

5. Howard Moore

Plaintiff seeks $625 per hour for the services of attorney

Howard Moore. In his declaration, Mr. Moore states that, since

1961 when he began practicing law, he has specialized in civil

rights cases and criminal defense, has litigated numerous

employment discrimination cases and class actions, and has lectured

on civil rights matters at many universities and professional

associations. In this case, he conducted the deposition of one of

the key witnesses. He states that, for the purposes of this motion

only, his hourly rate for services rendered is $625. He explains

that it is lower than the rate requested for Ms. Price because he

did not have responsibility as lead counsel.

Amtrak argues that Mr. Moore’s statement, that his $625 hourly

rate is for this motion only, does not indicate what his rate

actually is and whether he is charging a higher or lower rate than

usual for his work on this case. It argues that his rate should be

$400 to account for his lesser responsibilities on this case.

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6In its opposition, Amtrak indicates that this paralegal bills

at $120 per hour, but Mr. Carp’s declaration indicates an hourly

rate for the paralegal of $160.

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Amtrak’s argument is unpersuasive. The Court finds that an

attorney of Mr. Moore’s experience and knowledge is entitled to at

least the $625 per hour rate that he requests in this case.

6. Paralegals and Law Clerks

Plaintiff requests $200 per hour for the services of her

paralegal and two law clerks. Ms. Price states that paralegal

Monique Beaver assisted her during the discovery phase of the case,

that law clerk Charla Gray worked on the opposition to Defendants’

motion for summary judgment and that law clerk George Khoury

assisted during the trial with preparation of exhibits and the

final presentation of the case to the jury.

Amtrak argues that the rate for the paralegal and law clerks

should be $120 per hour. It bases this on the fact that, in 2003,

Ms. Price’s paralegal was awarded $105 per hour in Freitag, C 00-

2278 TEH, and $120 represents a fourteen percent increase. It

presents evidence that a paralegal who worked for Jackson Lewis,

Defendants’ law firm, bills at a rate of $160 per hour. See Carp

Dec. at ¶ 6.6

Plaintiff fails to submit sufficient evidence to support the

rates requested for the paralegal and law clerks. The evidence

before the Court is that one paralegal at Defendants’ law firm

bills at $160 per hour. The Court will award a rate of $160 per

hour.

B. Number of Hours

In calculating a reasonable number of hours, the applicant

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must justify his or her claim by submitting detailed time records. 

The court may adjust these hours downward if the documentation is

inadequate, or the hours are duplicative, excessive or unnecessary. 

Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210. An upward adjustment of the lodestar

is appropriate only in extraordinary cases, such as when the

attorneys faced exceptional risks of not prevailing or not

recovering any fees. Id. at 1212.

1. Block Billing

Amtrak argues that approximately forty-four percent of the

total hours billed by the Price law firm are block-billed. 

It argues that the block-billed hours should be reduced by thirty

percent, which would mean a thirteen percent reduction in the total

number of hours billed.

Block billing is a time-keeping method where an attorney

enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather than

itemizing the time spent on a specific task. Mendez, 540 F.3d at

1129 n.2. It can be appropriate to reduce hours that are blockbilled by twenty percent. Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480

F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007).

In support of its argument, Amtrak submits the declaration of

James Schratz, an attorney who specializes in auditing fee

applications in fee shifting cases such as this. He identified

block-billed entries as the ones in which semicolons were used by

the timekeeper because, in general, the timekeepers used semicolons

to separate individual tasks.

The entries identified by Amtrak do not meet the definition of

block billing provided in Mendez because individual tasks are

specified. The Court concludes that the entries Amtrak identifies

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as block-billed are detailed enough for the Court to assess the

reasonableness of the hours billed. Therefore, a reduction for

block billing is not necessary. 

2. Hours Spent on Dismissed Claims

Amtrak argues that hours for legal services spent before the

Court issued its April 3, 2008 Order on Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment should be reduced by fifty percent because the

Court dismissed many of Plaintiff's claims in that order. 

Where a plaintiff succeeds on only some of his claims, the

court must address whether the plaintiff failed to prevail on

claims that were unrelated to the successful claims. Schwarz v.

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

1995). If the unsuccessful and successful claims are based on

different facts and legal theories, the hours spent on the

unsuccessful claims should be disallowed. Id. On the other hand,

if the successful and unsuccessful claims involve a common core of

facts or are based on related legal theories, the court should

"focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the

plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the

litigation," so that a plaintiff who has achieved substantial

relief should not have attorneys' fees reduced because the court

did not adopt each contention raised. Id. 

As discussed above, in his FAC, Plaintiff alleged against both 

Amtrak and Deely two claims for emotional distress and two claims

for retaliation based on his protected activity of filing

complaints in which he had alleged racial discrimination in

Amtrak's employment practices. Plaintiff also alleged against

Amtrak alone claims of race discrimination in violation of 42

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U.S.C. § 1981 and wrongful termination in violation of public

policy. Plaintiff's § 1981 race discrimination claim was based on

Amtrak's failure to promote him on six different occasions and its

termination of his employment. In its April 3, 2008 Order, the

Court granted judgment in favor of Deely on all claims and judgment

in favor of Amtrak on the retaliation claims and five of the six

failure to promote claims. Plaintiff himself moved to dismiss the

emotional distress claims. After the April 3, 2008 Order, the two

claims that remained were the § 1981 race discrimination claim

based on Amtrak's failure to promote Plaintiff on one occasion and

its termination of Plaintiff and the claim for termination in

violation of public policy.

Fee auditor Schratz has categorized Plaintiff's attorneys'

records into billings for services that occurred prior and

subsequent to the April 3, 2008 Order. According to Mr. Schratz,

fees and costs in the first category total $304,005. Mr. Schratz

suggests that one half of that amount be disallowed to account for

the time invested in legal and factual claims that did not come to

fruition and did not significantly benefit the litigation. 

Plaintiff cites Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d

1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991), for the proposition that, in

litigation, losing is part of winning and that "a lawyer who takes

on only those battles he is certain of winning is probably not

serving his client vigorously enough." Also, citing Cunningham v.

County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1989),

Plaintiff argues that Amtrak’s' "unifactor approach" has been

rejected by the Ninth Circuit. In Cunningham, the court rejected

an approach in lodestar calculations that tied the number of hours

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accepted as reasonable to the proportion of the defendants against

whom the plaintiff ultimately prevailed. Id. at 486. 

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's

analysis was proper because it examined the importance of each

defendant to the plaintiff's case, the claims brought against each

defendant and the degree to which each factor shed light on the

significance of the overall relief obtained. Id.

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was premised upon actions

Defendants took in response to his complaints of race

discrimination. His emotional distress claims were based upon race

discrimination and retaliation for complaining of the

discrimination. Therefore, these claims are based upon the same

common core of facts as his successful race-based claims. 

Furthermore, all the failure to promote claims were based on a

common core of facts and the same legal theories. Therefore, all

of Plaintiff’s claims were related and aided in the litigation of

the successful race-based claims. Amtrak’s argument regarding

reductions for dismissed claims is unpersuasive.

3. Excessive Conferencing and Clerical Work

Based upon Mr. Schratz’s declaration, Amtrak argues that the

total number of hours billed for inter-office conferences should be

reduced. Mr. Schratz states that inter-office conferences in three

large fee applications he audited amounted to two percent of the

total fees requested. Thus, he postulates that two percent of

total fees is a reasonable amount to bill for conferencing. His

audit of Plaintiff’s fee application shows that Plaintiff’s

attorneys attribute over six percent of their total fee request to

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conferencing. Therefore, Amtrak urges a four percent reduction of

Plaintiff’s billing for conferencing. The Court does not find this

methodology persuasive.

The Court has reviewed the hours billed for conferencing and

finds that they are not excessive. Therefore, no reduction is

required.

Amtrak argues that 10.25 attorney hours that were billed for

clerical tasks should be disallowed. In his audit of Plaintiff’s

fee applications, Mr. Schratz found 7.15 hours billed for

calendaring or docketing, .10 hours billed for clerical work and

three hours billed for a press release. Plaintiff does not respond

to this argument.

Clerical and secretarial work is not compensable as attorneys'

fees. Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536,

1543 (9th Cir. 1992) vacated in part on other grounds at 984 F.2d

345 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, the calendaring, docketing and clerical

work hours are not compensable. Writing a press release, however,

is not clerical work and will not be disallowed as such. 

Therefore, 8.75 hours are disallowed as non-compensable clerical

work. However, Amtrak does not indicate who billed these hours and

the Court will not comb through the billing records to find them. 

Thus, the Court will allocate this time to a paralegal because a

paralegal was the most likely to have performed clerical work.

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7Total fees have been rounded up or down to the nearest

dollar.

8The number of hours submitted for Ms. Beaver has been reduced

by 8.75 to adjust for the non-compensable clerical work.

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III. Adjusted Lodestar Calculation

The following table reflects the lodestar adjustments, as

discussed above. 

Attorney Rate Hours Fee App Hrs Total Fees7

Pamela Price $700 589.75 46.65 $445,480

Daniel De La

Vega

$245 384.50 $ 94,203

Kendra Fox

Davis

$265 394.95 $104,662

Renee Sanchez $265 273.30 $ 72,425

Ok-Hee Shim $275 57.50 $ 15,813

Grace Chung $245 70.35 $ 17,236

Howard Moore $625 8.50 $ 5,313

Monique Beaver $160 23.958 $ 3,832

Charla Gray $160 47.00 $ 7,520

George Khoury $160 25.70 $ 4,112

TOTAL $770,596

Thus, the final total of fees awarded is $770,596.

IV. Non-Statutory Costs

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the prevailing party may recover those

out-of-pocket expenses that would normally be charged to a fee

paying client. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 2005). 

As with attorneys' fees, an applicant seeking reimbursement of

costs has the burden of providing sufficient detail to support its

request for reimbursement of costs. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The

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requested expenses must be reasonable. Dang, 422 F.3d at 814. 

Amtrak argues that Plaintiff's request for non-statutory costs

incurred from November 1, 2005 through June 30, 2009 should be

denied because it is impossible to tell from the summary of costs,

submitted in Exhibit H to the Price Declaration, what actual costs

he wants reimbursed. In his reply, Plaintiff argues that Exhibit H

is accurate and also submits Exhibit J to the Price Supplemental

Declaration, which lists the total costs billed by month. He

indicates that actual costs are detailed in the monthly billing

statements submitted with the first Price Declaration.

Plaintiff's reply explaining that the specific costs are

detailed in the monthly billing statements remedies the 

insufficient detail in Exhibits H and J. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

request for reimbursement of $44,702 in non-statutory costs is

granted.

V. Statutory Costs 

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) authorizes the Court

to grant the prevailing party its statutory costs. “Rule 54(d)

creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to prevailing

parties, and it is incumbent upon the losing party to demonstrate

why the costs should not be awarded.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal.,

178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Nat’l Info. Servs.,

Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

The determination of taxable costs is governed by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1920 and, more particularly, Civil L.R. 54-3, which specifically

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enumerates the standards for costs recoverable in this District. 

The Court may only tax costs explicitly authorized by § 1920. 

See Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78

(9th Cir. 1990); see also Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,

Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987). Section 1920 permits the taxing of

costs for: 

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for

printed or electronically recorded transcripts

necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and

witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the

costs of making copies of any materials where

the copies are necessarily obtained for use in

the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of

this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed

experts, compensation of interpreters, and

salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special

interpretation services under section 1828 of

this title. 

B. Analysis

As a prevailing party, Plaintiff filed a Bill of Costs

totaling $15,376.14. After disallowing several items, the Clerk

taxed costs for Plaintiff in the amount of $12,444.89. Amtrak

challenges the Clerk’s taxation of fees for service of subpoenas,

deposition transcripts, witness fees, copies and expenses incurred

by Plaintiff’s counsel to depose Timothy Sheridan. It does not

challenge the Clerk’s taxation of $250.00 for the docket fee. 

1. Fees for Service of Subpoenas

The Clerk awarded Plaintiff $630.00 for fees for service of

subpoenas. Of this total, Amtrak objects to $150.00 for the

attempted service of process on Steve Shelton on the basis that,

because he is an Amtrak employee, a subpoena was not necessary. In

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addition, Amtrak objects to $115.00 for service of process on Ryan

Peterson because he did not appear at trial or at any deposition. 

Plaintiff maintains that service of process on Mr. Shelton was

necessary because Amtrak refused to agree to produce him for

February 9, 2009, the first day of trial. He provides a letter

from Amtrak’s counsel, which states that if Plaintiff sought to

have Mr. Shelton testify on either the first or second day of

trial, he would have to serve Mr. Shelton personally. Amtrak did

not a file a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition and, accordingly, did

not respond to Plaintiff’s proffer of this letter. Based on this

letter, it appears that the subpoena of Mr. Shelton was required. 

With regard to Mr. Peterson, Plaintiff asserts that he was a

potential third-party witness who could have been called at trial. 

Even though he was not called, it was necessary to serve him in

case his testimony was needed. 

Because Amtrak does not show that service of process on these

individuals was not necessary, the Court does not modify the

Clerk’s award of $630.00 for service fees. 

2. Fees for Deposition Transcripts

Noting that Plaintiff only partially prevailed in this action,

Amtrak asks the Court to reduce his award for deposition

transcripts by two-thirds. However, Amtrak does not explain how it

reached this figure, except to say that the “depositions were

pertinent at least in part to the claims on which Defendants

prevailed” and that a reduction by two-thirds accounts “for Mr.

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9 The Clerk disallowed $2,688.74 from Plaintiff’s claim of

$10,674.94 for deposition transcript costs, which should have

reduced his claim to $7,986.20. However, the Clerk taxed $7,886.20

for such costs. (Docket No. 321.) The Court accounts for this

inadvertent arithmetic error here and in its calculations below. 

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Deely’s complete success and Amtrak’s partial success.” Mot. at 2.

As discussed above, all of Plaintiff’s claims were related and

aided in the litigation of the successful race-based claims. 

Accordingly, the Clerk’s award for deposition transcripts remains

unchanged. Plaintiff is awarded $7,986.209 for the cost of

deposition transcripts necessarily obtained for use in this case.

3. Witness Fees and Expenses

Amtrak argues that Plaintiff waived recovery of costs for

Tashea Campbell because he failed to make a timely claim. Civil

Local Rule 54-1(c) provides that a party waives costs if they are

not claimed within fourteen days from the date judgment enters. 

Although judgment entered on October 9, 2009, Plaintiff did not

claim costs for Ms. Campbell until November 20, 2009. Because he

did not claim Ms. Campbell’s costs in accordance with Civil L.R.

54-1, the Court disallows Plaintiff’s recovery for her expenses. 

With regard to Chris Clipper, Mark Schulthies, Richard Barnes,

Mary Gotthardt and Richard Barrows, Amtrak asserts that Plaintiff

can recover no more than forty dollars per day for witness fees. 

This is incorrect. Although witnesses are paid a forty dollar

attendance fee for each day they attend trial proceedings, they are

also entitled to reimbursement for their actual travel expenses to

the court’s location and to payment of a subsistence allowance when

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an overnight stay is necessary. 28 U.S.C. § 1821; Civil L.R. 54-

3(e). These costs are taxable. See id. §§ 1821(c)(4) and 1920(3);

Civil L.R. 54-3(e). 

Plaintiff has proffered sufficient documentation to support

the recovery of expenses for Chris Clipper ($474.54), Mark

Schulthies ($227.33), Richard Barnes ($193.99) and Mary Gotthardt

($105.89); Amtrak does not argue that these expenses were

unreasonable. The Court therefore does not disturb the Clerk’s

calculation of costs for these witnesses. However, Plaintiff has

not provided sufficient documentation as to the one-day appearance

of Richard Gaylin Barrows. Plaintiff only offers a check stub

dated March 26, 2007 for what appears to be costs attributed to Mr.

Barrows’s deposition; no further explanation is provided. Because

Plaintiff has not provided documentation to show that these costs

were taxable, the Court reduces Mr. Barrows’s costs to $40, the

attendance fee available under section 1821. 

Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff witness costs in the

amount of $1,041.75. 

4. Copying Costs

Amtrak asserts that Plaintiff’s award for copying costs should

be reduced by two-thirds because he only partially prevailed in

this action. For the reasons stated above, the Court declines to

reduce his award. Accordingly, the Court taxes copying costs in

the amount of $2,103.98. 

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5. Costs for Counsel’s Travel to Depose Witness

The Clerk taxed $238.96 for expenses incurred by Plaintiff’s

counsel to travel to Seattle, Washington to depose Tim Sheridan. 

However, Civil Local Rule 54-3(c)(2) does not permit the taxing of

the expenses of counsel to attend depositions. Accordingly, the

Court disallows Plaintiff’s claim in the bill of costs for his

counsel’s travel to Seattle.

In summary, the Court disallows Plaintiff’s claims for Tashea

Campbell’s witness expenses and his counsel’s travel costs to

depose Mr. Sheridan. The Court reduces Mr. Barrows’s witness

expenses to $40. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff

$12,011.93 in costs, as follows: $630.00 for service of subpoenas;

$7,986.20 for deposition transcript costs; $1,041.75 for witness

fees and expenses; $2,103.98 for copying costs; and $250.00 for the

docket fee. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for an award of

attorneys' fees and costs is granted (Docket # 267) and Amtrak’s

motion for review of taxation of costs is granted, in part (Docket

# 323). Attorneys' fees are awarded in the amount of $770,596,

non-statutory costs are awarded in the amount of $44,702, and 

statutory costs are awarded in the amount of $12,012. Amtrak shall

pay these amounts forthwith. If Defendants wish to file an

opposition to Plaintiff’s request for additional fees and nonstatutory costs as stated in Ms. Price’s fourth supplemental

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declaration, they must do so within two weeks from the date of this

order. If Plaintiff wishes to file a reply, he may do so one week

thereafter. Plaintiff’s request for additional fees and nonstatutory costs will be taken under submission.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2010 _____________________

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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