Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00502/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00502-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carlos Gonzalez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-0502-PHX-DGC (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Carlos Gonzalez. Doc. 1. Following a jury trial in

Maricopa County Superior Court in 2006, Petitioner was found guilty of second degree

murder and aggravated assault, both “dangerous” offenses under Arizona law. Doc. 11, Exh.

E, F. On May 5, 2006, the trial court entered judgments of conviction and sentenced

Petitioner to 20 years in prison for the murder conviction and a consecutive term of 11.25

years for the aggravated assault conviction. Doc. 11, Exh. H. Petitioner was also sentenced

the same day to 9.75 years in prison for three prior felonies he had committed. Id. Thus, the

total sentence imposed was 41 years. Id.

On direct appeal, Petitioner’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there were no arguable issues of law to present and asking the

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Arizona Court of Appeals to review the record for fundamental error. Doc. 11, Exh. K.

Petitioner then filed his own Supplemental Brief on May 24, 2007. Doc. 11, Exh. X. The

Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on October 25, 2007, in which it denied

Petitioner’s claims and affirmed his convictions and sentences. Doc. 12, Exh. BB. After a

motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, Petitioner filed a pro se

Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court on February 10, 2008 Doc. 12, Exh. EE,

FF, II. The Court summarily denied the petition on May 12, 2008. Doc. 12, Exh. JJ.

Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

Doc. 1 at 3.

On June 3, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Doc. 12, Exh. LL. Through appointed

counsel, he filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on September 30, 2009, alleging

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel with respect to a question submitted by

the jury regarding accomplice liability and transferred intent. Doc. 12, Exh. OO. After

briefing was completed, the trial court summarily denied the petition for post-conviction

relief on April 20, 2010. Doc. 12, Exh. XX. Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals or in the Arizona Supreme Court. Doc. 11 at 5. Petitioner also sought

post-conviction relief in the other case for which he was sentenced on the same day as the

instant case, but that request was dismissed and has no bearing on this matter. Doc. 12, Exh.

RR

Petitioner filed his habeas petition in this court on March 14, 2010. Doc. 1. Petitioner

alleges one ground for relief: that the trial court’s answer to the jury’s question about

accomplice liability and transferred intent was incorrect as a matter of law thus calling into

question the jury’s verdict. Petitioner alleges that the erroneous answer allowed the jury to

convict on a legal theory in contravention of the Due Process Clause and the Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. On July 29, 2011, Respondents filed a

Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with attachments. Doc. 11, 12.

Petitioner filed a Reply on August 8, 2011. Doc. 13.

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DISCUSSION

Respondents contend in their limited answer to the petition that Petitioner’s claim is

procedurally defaulted because he failed to “fairly present” the claim in state court. Because

the court agrees that Petitioner’s claim was not properly raised in the state court, and that he

would be unable to go back and raise it now, the court will recommend that the claim be

denied as procedurally defaulted. 

A. Procedural Default 

1. Legal Standards

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A

petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at

845. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

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unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

2. Application

Petitioner failed to present the claim he presents in this habeas action in his direct

appeal in the state court. A review of his brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals and his

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court shows no mention of the jury question

issue and thus no claim that the trial court’s answer to the question violated the Due Process

Clause. Doc. 11, Exh. X, Doc. 12, Exh. II.

Regarding his petition for post-conviction relief in the state court, Petitioner also

failed to allege a Due Process Clause violation based on the trial court’s response to the jury

question. Doc. 12, Exh. OO. Instead, Petitioner argued that his trial and appellate counsel

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1

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

Additionally, because Petitioner failed to previously raise the claim, it would be precluded

if he tried to go back and raise it now. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2.

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provided ineffective assistance with respect to the jury question issue. Doc. 12, Exh. OO at

6-10. He claimed that his trial counsel did not know the applicable law and thus did not

object to the trial court’s inaccurate statement of the law in response to the jury question. Id.

He further contended that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to identify the jury

question issue and raise it on direct appeal. Id. However, as Petitioner acknowledges in his

reply, after the trial court denied his state petition for post-conviction relief, he did not seek

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. 13 at 6. Thus, even if this court construed

Petitioner’s habeas claim to also allege ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim would still

not have been exhausted in light of his failure to seek appellate review of his petition for

post-conviction relief. 

 Having failed to fairly present his claim in the state court, Petitioner has failed to

exhaust his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he

returned to the state court.1

 As a result, the claim is procedurally defaulted. 

Although Petitioner addresses the procedural default issue in his reply, he fails to

establish cause for the default and actual prejudice. He first contends that the Arizona Court

of Appeals should have identified the jury question issue in its search for fundamental error

on direct appeal. He fails to establish, however, how that excuses his failure to present the

issue in the state courts. 

Petitioner next contends in his reply that his post-conviction relief lawyer failed to file

a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. He argues that his lawyer’s ineffective

assistance in failing to do so establishes cause for the procedural default. However,

ineffective assistance of counsel can establish sufficient cause only when it rises to the level

of an independent constitutional violation. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. Petitioner has not

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raised ineffective assistance of his post-conviction relief counsel as a claim in his habeas

petition, nor has he presented sufficient facts to establish that his counsel’s actions rise to the

level of an independent constitutional violation. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of his post-conviction relief counsel does not establish cause for the

procedural default. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that failing to consider his claim on the

merits would result in a miscarriage of justice. 

B. Conclusion

Having determined that Petitioner’s claim for relief is procedurally defaulted, the

court will recommend that the petition be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and

jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

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findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 26th day of October, 2011.

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