Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01632/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01632-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE THOMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

ADOLFO GONZALES, Chief Probation 

Officer of San Diego County,

Respondent.

Case No.: 19cv1632-H (BLM)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Bruce Thomas (“Petitioner”) is a state probationer proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc.

No. 1.) Petitioner was sentenced to 180 days in custody and three years of probation 

following a 2017 San Diego County Superior Court conviction for contempt of court for 

violating a criminal protective order imposed as a condition of probation following a 2014 

conviction for resisting arrest. (Id. at 1.) He claims a condition of his current probation 

prohibiting him from coming within 100 yards of the victims and their property, who live 

in a duplex next to his elderly mother, prevents him from living in his mother’s home,

which he will inherit via a living trust through which he holds a property interest, and 

therefore violates his federal constitutional rights to due process, to liberty to travel to her

home, to his property interest therein, to peacefully assemble and be secure there, and to 

the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship. (Id. at 5-10.) 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 21
2

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Adolfo Gonzales, the Chief Probation Officer of San Diego County (“Respondent”)

has filed an Answer and lodged the state court record. (Doc. Nos. 5, 15, 16.) Respondent 

argues habeas relief is unavailable because the Petition is untimely, and, alternately,

because the state court adjudication of Petitioner’s claims is neither contrary to, nor 

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 8-18.) 

Petitioner has filed a Traverse with an attached Notice of Lodgment. (Doc. No. 17.)

He argues his Petition is timely even if it requires equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. (Id. at 9-10.) He also argues he has shown by clear and convincing evidence 

that the state court denial of his claims is based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts and is inconsistent with clearly established federal law. (Id. at 10.)

For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus and DENIES a certificate of appealability.

1

I. STATE PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following background is taken from the opinion of the Appellate Division of the 

Superior Court. (Doc. No. 5-1, Lodgment No. 1.) “Factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed to be correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

Petitioner’s mother, Betty Thomas, 86-years old at the time of trial, lives in a duplex 

which shares a common wall with the home of Florence Weiss, 91 years of age at the time 

of trial. (Doc. No. 5-1, Lodgment No. 1 at 2-5.) The two women were best friends for 

over 20 years until Petitioner and his wife moved in with his mother in 2013 as her 

caretaker. (Id. at 3.) Florence Weiss obtained a civil restraining order in 2013 requiring 

Petitioner to stay 2 yards away from her and her property. (Id.) 

 

1

 Although this case was randomly referred to United States Magistrate Barbara L. 

Major pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court has determined that neither a Report 

and Recommendation nor oral argument are necessary for the disposition of this matter. 

See S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 71.1(d).

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 21
3

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner was arrested for violating the civil restraining order and for resisting arrest

in 2014. (Id.) He was found not guilty of violating the civil restraining order but guilty of 

resisting arrest. (Id.) As a condition of his probation for that conviction, a criminal 

protective order was entered requiring him to stay 2 yards away from Florence Weiss, her 

property, and her daughter Carole Ursetti. (Id.) However, Petitioner “blamed them for his 

arrest and continued and escalated his vendetta against them, resulting in Mrs. Weiss 

installing security cameras on her property.” (Id.) 

On September 1, 2016, Petitioner observed Carole Ursetti moving a potted plant to 

the side of the Weiss home. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner entered Florence Weiss’s property, chased 

her and yelled at Carole Ursetti, all of which was captured by the security cameras. (Id.) 

Petitioner admitted to police he had not been thinking straight in entering the Weiss 

property, and was convicted on June 20, 2017, following a bench trial, of violating 

California Penal Code § 166(a)(4), contempt of court for violating the criminal protective 

order. (Id.) 

On June 22, 2017, a sentencing hearing was held at which Betty Thomas stated

Petitioner will inherit her home upon her passing and the problems lie with Florence Weiss 

and her daughter, although defense counsel admitted Petitioner has anger management 

issues. (Id.) The trial judge invited counsel to address whether the distance in the criminal 

protective order should be increased from 2 yards to 100 yards, and defense counsel argued 

a 100-yard stay away order would preclude Petitioner from living with his mother and was 

unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and interfered with his property rights. (Id.) Petitioner 

was sentenced to 180 days in custody and a 3-year term of probation, which included a

100-yard stay away order. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) In extending the distance in the stay away 

order from 2 to 100 yards, the trial judge stated:

There is nothing vague about staying 100 yards away from Ms. Weiss, Ms. 

Ursetti, their home, their cars, their property. There is nothing vague about 

that. (¶) There is - there is nothing unconstitutional about it, because I’ve 

heard in this case that Mr. Thomas and his wife have another residence, that 

they moved from that residence into Ms. Thomas’, his mother’s home to assist 

with providing her care, and so they are - they are basically guests in his 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 21
4

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

mother’s home. . . . The fact that he may inherit the property at some point in 

the future that - requiring him to stay 100 yards away from these women,

M[s]. Weiss and M[s]. Ursetti, does not violate any of his constitutional rights. 

(Doc. No. 5-1, Lodgment No. 1 at 2, n.1.) 

Petitioner’s counsel filed a brief in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court 

which presented no arguable appellate issues but requested the court review the record for 

errors pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979). (Id. at 2.) Petitioner filed a pro 

se supplemental brief arguing, as he does here, that the 100-yard stay away order “impinged 

on his constitutional rights, including but not limited to his property rights and freedom of 

association with his mother.” (Id. at 2-3.) The Appellate Division of the Superior Court 

affirmed the conviction on May 17, 2018. (Id. at 3.) A minute order filed the next day 

stated the court had reviewed the record pursuant to Wende and had considered Petitioner’s 

supplemental brief but found no arguable appellate issues. (Doc. No. 16-2, Lodgment No. 

5 at 1.) Petitioner did not file a petition to transfer his case to the Court of Appeal. As set 

forth below, Respondent contends the conviction became final for purposes of the one-year 

statute of limitations upon expiration of the time to seek review in the Court of Appeal. 

On August 16, 2017, while his appeal was pending, Petitioner, through counsel, filed 

a motion to modify his probation to reduce the stay away distance from 100 yards to 2 

yards in order to permit him to move back into his mother’s home upon his release from 

custody. (Doc. No. 5-1, Lodgment No. 1 at 3.) On September 22, 2017, the court heard 

from Florence Weiss, Carole Ursetti, Betty Thomas and Petitioner’s wife. (Id.) In denying 

the motion, the judge noted that Petitioner had harassed and intimidated Florence Weiss, 

had been given a “fair chance” with the 2-yard stay away order but violated it, and was 

seen on the security video “chasing after a 90-year old woman when there’s a court order 

requiring him to stay two yards away from her.” (Id. at 3, 4 n.3.) 

About a year later, on September 17, 2018, after his conviction was affirmed on 

appeal, Petitioner, while represented by the office of the public defender, filed a second 

motion to modify the 100-yard stay away order to 2 yards, contending he had been lawCase 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 21
5

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

abiding and intended to obey the stay away order, the court could revoke his probation if 

he violated a 2-yard stay away order, and circumstances had changed in that his mother 

had been released from the hospital and was spending significant amounts of money on 

home health care Petitioner could be providing and Petitioner needed access to her home

to conduct his home business. (Id. at 4.) The San Diego District Attorney filed an 

opposition to the motion contending there had been no change in circumstances warranting 

modification of the probation conditions. (Doc. No. 16-1, Lodgment No. 4.) 

A hearing was held on October 12, 2018, at which Petitioner testified he moved into 

his mother’s home in April 2013 to care for her when she needed help, that prior to that he 

and his wife lived in an apartment and she threatened to divorce him if they did not move 

into his mother’s “nice house,” that he runs a home-based business and cannot afford to 

live elsewhere, and that he has been diagnosed with intermittent explosive behavior 

disorder which causes him to lose jobs for which he collects social security disability 

payments. (Doc. No. 5-1, Lodgment No. 1 at 4-5.) In denying the motion, the trial court 

noted it “did not believe the defendant ‘has insight yet as to how his conduct affects others 

. . . he blames everyone around him for his circumstances.’” (Id. at 5.) The court stated:

So as I mentioned at the outset, this is a motion that requires a balancing of 

competing interests, and Mr. Thomas has raised and does raise some 

legitimate and reasonable points. Those have to be balanced against the points 

that were made by the People in their opposition and, in particular, the input 

of the victims, which I have as I mentioned, I’ve heard from them at least 

twice. And balancing all those factors, I will deny today’s request to modify 

probation.

(Id. at 5.)

Petitioner appealed the denial of that motion to modify the stay away order, and on 

May 7, 2019, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed, stating:

First, we note that the instant criminal protective order (CPO) at issue, 

which ordered the defendant to stay 100 yards away from the protected 

persons and their property, was issued on June 22, 2017, the date of sentencing 

in this case. The constitutional argument was made at the sentencing hearing 

that the CPO would preclude the defendant from living in his residence, his 

mother’s home, and was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 21
6

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

argument was presented again in the defendant’s supplemental appellate brief 

after his appointed counsel filed a People v. Wende brief, in the first appeal in 

this case. This court reviewed the entire record on appeal and the defendant’s 

supplemental brief; we affirmed the judgment of conviction, which included 

the CPO. As such, the renewed challenge to the originally imposed CPO on 

constitutional grounds is untimely in this second appeal in the same case, and 

the Appellate Division’s prior decision is final and not subject to 

reconsideration or further appeal.

Penal Code section 1203.3 gives the trial court authority to modify the 

terms of probation during the probations period. “A change in circumstances 

is required before a court has jurisdiction to . . . modify probation.” (People 

v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095.) This was the second time the 

defendant had sought a modification of the CPO and had a hearing on the 

issue, and been denied a modification of the CPO from 100-yards away from 

the victims to 2-yards away from the victims and their property. The trial 

court relied on its recollection of the trial evidence and statements taken at 

subsequent hearings and its review of the separate 2014 criminal matter that 

initially led to the imposition of a first CPO and the basis for the underlying 

charge in this case. The court noted that the defendant’s interest in his 

residence had not changed; he was an invited guest in his mother’s home and 

had no ownership rights in the property. The court weighed the competing 

interests of the parties, the defendant’s history of harassment and intimidation 

of the victims, its belief that the defendant had no insight into his conduct, and 

denied the defendant’s motion to modify the CPO by reducing the stay away 

order from 100-yards to 2-yards.

The standard of review applicable to the trial court’s denial of 

appellant’s motion to modify his probation is abuse of discretion. (People v. 

Leal (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 829.) The standard of review is highly 

deferential and the sentencing court abuses its discretion only when its 

determination is arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the bounds of reason under 

a totality of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 843.)

We find no error with the trial court’s ruling, and the denial of the 

motion to modify the CPO is affirmed.

(Id. at 5-6.)

On July 24, 2019, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for a transfer to the 

Court of Appeal in order to appeal that decision. (Doc. No. 5-2, Lodgment No. 2.) 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 21
7

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner argued in the petition for transfer that the Appellate Division had erred in relying 

on the record of his initial appeal of his conviction and in failing to consider his 

constitutional arguments because he was appealing the denial of his motion to modify his 

probation, not his conviction and sentence. (Id. at 7.) On August 8, 2019, the Court of 

Appeal denied the petition, stating: “The petition for transfer has been read and considered 

by Justices Huffman, O’Rourke and Irion. The petition is denied.” (Doc. No. 5-3, 

Lodgment No. 3 at 1.) As set forth below, Petitioner argues the one-year statute of 

limitations was triggered by that order because that is what he is challenging here, and, 

alternately, that he is entitled to equitable tolling for a delay in filing that petition to transfer

caused by circumstances outside his control.

II. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

(1) Petitioner’s right to peaceably assemble in his house and to be secure therein to 

live with his wife and take care of his aging mother as protected by the First Amendment 

to the United States Constitution was violated by the 100-yard stay away order because it 

exceeded the trial court’s discretion to balance the interests of the parties where there was 

no violence by Petitioner toward the protected parties and the trial judge stated “we almost 

always issue 100 yard stay away orders.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

(2) Petitioner was deprived of his liberty and property without due process of law 

in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by 

the 100-yard stay away order because he is being forced to find alternative living 

arrangements from a house he lived in for 20 years and will inherit by way of a living trust

without affordable housing alternatives except motel rooms and homeless shelters, and was 

deprived of due process of law by the Court of Appeal’s denial of his petition to transfer 

his case from the Appellate Division of the Superior Court. (Id. at 7.) 

(3) Petitioner was deprived of his liberty to travel to his mother’s house without due 

process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

by the 100-yard stay away order which prohibits him from living with or near his aging 

parent and taking care of her. (Id. at 8.) 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 21
8

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(4) Petitioner was denied the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship 

without due process of law in violation of the United States Constitution by the order 

requiring him to stay 100 yards away from his home.2

 (Id. at 10.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

A one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 begins to run at the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Respondent correctly contends, and Petitioner does not dispute, there is support in 

the record only for § 2244(d)(1)(A) to provide the triggering date for the one-year statute 

of limitations, which began to run when Petitioner’s conviction “became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” (Doc. 

 

2

 The claims are identified, enumerated and addressed in this Order based on a liberal 

construction of the pro se federal Petition. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 

(9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe 

the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”), quoting Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 

365 (1982); see also Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 

liberal construction of pro se prisoner habeas petitions is especially important with regard 

to which claims are presented).

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 21
9

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

No. 15-1 at 11; Doc. No. 17 at 9.) Respondent argues that date is 30 days after the Appellate 

Division’s May 18, 2018 order affirming the conviction, which was the deadline for the 

Court of Appeal to transfer the case to itself on its own motion since Petitioner did not file 

a petition for transfer. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 11.) Petitioner argues that date is August 8, 2019, 

when the Court of Appeal denied the appeal of his motion to modify the terms of his 

probation because that is what he is challenging here. (Doc. No. 17 at 7.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a California misdemeanor conviction becomes final 

immediately upon the denial of a petition for transfer by the state appellate court.

McMonagle v. Meyer, 802 F.3d 1093, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Because a 

misdemeanant may not appeal to the California Supreme Court where the petition to 

transfer has been denied, “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A) is the date the United States 

Supreme Court denied certiorari or the expiration of the 90-day deadline for filing a petition 

for certiorari following the denial of the petition for transfer. Id. at 1097. Unlike the 

petitioner in McMonagle, however, Petitioner here did not file a petition for transfer to the 

Court of Appeal in his original direct appeal of his conviction and sentence from the 

affirmance by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court but allowed the time to do so 

to expire. As Respondent correctly observes, the Court of Appeal has 30 days in which to 

transfer appellate jurisdiction to itself on its own motion, see Cal.R.Ct. 8.1008(a)(1)(B) 

(“The Court of Appeal may order transfer . . . [o]n its own motion, within 30 days after the 

appellate division decision is final in that court.”), but only if transfer would “secure 

uniformity [of decision] or [to] settle an important question of law.” Cal.R.Ct. 8.1002. 

When a petitioner fails to seek review in the state appellate court, however, the conviction 

is final upon the expiration for doing so, and Respondent provides no support for finding 

it is when the time expires for the state court to transfer the case to itself on its own motion. 

See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the one-year 

statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1)(A) begins to run for a California prisoner upon the 

expiration for seeking review in the state appellate court). 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 21
10

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Appellate Division’s order is dated May 17, 2018, but it is file-stamped the next 

day, May 18, 2019. (Doc. No. 16-2 at 1.) Petitioner had 15 days from the date of that

order to file a petition to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal. Cal.R.Ct. 8.1006(b)(1)

(“The petition must be served and filed in the Court of Appeal after the appellate division 

issues its decision in the case but no later than 15 days after the decision in final in that 

court.”); but see Cal.R.Ct. 8.1006(b)(2) (“The time to file a petition for transfer may not be 

extended, but the presiding justice may relieve a party from a failure to file a timely petition 

for transfer if the time for the Court of Appeal to order transfer on its own motion has not 

expired.”) Because 15 days after May 18, 2018 fell on a Saturday, the conviction became 

final under state law at the latest on Monday, June 4, 2018. Cal.Code Civ.Proc., § 12a(a). 

The instant federal Petition was filed on August 29, 2019, one year and 86 days later. As 

will be seen, whether the conviction became final 15 days after May 17, 2018 when the 

Appellate Division’s order is dated, or its May 18, 2018 filing date, or 30 days thereafter 

as Respondent contends, is not dispositive. Rather, if the expiration of time for seeking 

direct review of the conviction includes an additional 90 days to seek certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court the Petition is timely, and if not, it is untimely. 

In Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012), the petitioner appealed his conviction 

to an intermediate appellate court but did not seek discretionary review in the state’s 

highest court of criminal appeals. Id. at 138. The Supreme Court declined to allow 

petitioner the benefit of the 90-day period to seek certiorari with respect to the triggering 

date under § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it would have lacked jurisdiction over a petition for

certiorari from the lower state court, noting that “[w]e can review, however, only 

judgments of a ‘state court of last resort’ or of a lower state court if the ‘state court of last 

resort’ has denied discretionary review.” Id. at 150-54, citing Sup.R.Ct. 13.1. Because 

Petitioner did not petition the Court of Appeal for transfer of the Appellate Division’s May 

18, 2018 order affirming his conviction and sentence, the United States Supreme Court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider a petition for certiorari from the Appellate Division of the 

Superior Court, and the time for seeking direct review of the conviction under 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 21
11

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) expired on the last day Petitioner could have filed a petition to transfer his 

case to the Court of Appeal, at the latest on June 4, 2018. Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 154;

Roberts, 627 F.3d at 771; McMonagle, 802 F.3d at 1097.

The one-year limitations period began to run the next day, June 5, 2018. See

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “in computing any 

period of time prescribed or allowed by . . . any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, 

or default from the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.”) Absent 

tolling of the limitations period, Petitioner had one full year, until June 4, 2019, to timely 

file a federal habeas petition. The instant federal petition was filed 86 days later, on August 

29, 2019. The Petition is timely under that scenario only if the limitations period was tolled 

for at least 86 days. 

Although unclear, Petitioner appears to imply that the limitations period began to 

run after his second appeal was denied on August 8, 2019, in which he appealed the denial 

of his motion to modify his probation and raised the constitutional claims he presents here, 

because that is the decision he is challenging in his federal habeas Petition. (Doc. No. 17 

at 7.) However, as set forth above, the state court in that second appeal refused to address

his constitutional claims, stating: “This court reviewed the entire record on appeal and the 

defendant’s supplemental brief; we affirmed the judgment of conviction, which included 

the CPO. As such, the renewed challenge to the originally imposed CPO on constitutional 

grounds is untimely in this second appeal in the same case, and the Appellate Division’s 

prior decision is final and not subject to reconsideration or further appeal.” (Doc. No. 5-1, 

Lodgment No. 1 at 5.) There is no basis to find that the one-year statute of limitations 

began to run at the conclusion of that second appeal because the constitutional claims in 

the instant federal Petition were not properly raised or addressed by the state court and 

were found to be untimely. See Randel v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 

2010) (holding that a state court denial as untimely of a request to reopen direct appeal did 

not restart the statute of limitations). If a new or modified judgment of conviction had been

entered as a result of the denial of the motion to modify the terms of probation it could 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 21
12

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have restarted the limitations period. See Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 769 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (holding that under California law an amended judgment awarding a defendant 

credit for time served constitutes a new judgment restarting the statute of limitations). 

However, there is no indication in the record that happened here, as Petitioner’s motion to 

modify his sentence was denied and the conditions of his probation were not altered. See

Smith v. Williams, 871 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that an amended judgment 

of conviction is considered a “new judgment, starting a new one-year statute of 

limitations,” provided it constitutes the judgment of conviction under which the petitioner 

is being held); Gonzalez, 873 F.3d at 772 (recognizing that although the correction of a 

typographical or scrivener’s error alone is insufficient to restart the statute of limitations 

because the judgment itself is not changed, only its erroneous written record, an amended 

judgment altering the number of presentence credits to which petitioner was entitled 

restarted statute of limitations); Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081-83 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that traditional rules of claim accrual apply to habeas proceedings). Thus, the 

Petition can only be timely if the statute of limitations was tolled for at least 86 days.

The one-year statute of limitations is subject to statutory tolling. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2) (providing that the statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending” in state court.) That provision does not apply here because 

Petitioner made no collateral attacks on his conviction. Even if his appeal of the motion to 

modify the parole conditions could be considered a collateral attack within the meaning of 

§ 2244(d)(2), the state court found the constitutional claims untimely, and it is therefore

categorically excluded from statutorily tolling of the limitations period. See Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“What we intimated in Saffold we now hold: 

When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that (is) the end of the matter’ 

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”), quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)

(holding that an untimely state petition does not statutorily toll the limitations period).

/ / /

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 21
13

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The statute of limitations “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). Petitioner “is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ 

only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649, 

quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

Petitioner states that on or about May 14, 2019, after the Appellate Division of the 

Superior Court denied his second appeal on May 7, 2019, he “requested his public appeal 

counsel to transfer his appeal to the Court of Appeal. Counsel informed Petitioner after 

[the] Appellate Division ruling that he could no longer be represented by public counsel.” 

(Doc. No. 17 at 9.) Petitioner states he improperly filed such a petition himself on May 21, 

2019, but it was rejected because he was represented by counsel. (Id.) After he informed 

his counsel of those events, counsel filed the petition to transfer on May 29, 2019. (Id.) 

The Court of Appeal denied the petition for transfer on August 8, 2019, and Petitioner filed 

the instant federal Petition on August 29, 2019. He contends he is entitled to 51 days of

equitable tolling for the delay caused by those events. (Id.) 

As set forth above, Petitioner needs tolling for at least 86 days after the limitations 

period began to run on June 5, 2018 and before he filed the instant Petition on August 29, 

2019. The delay he identifies, May 14-29, 2019, represents only 15 days. In any case, the 

events he contends tolled the limitations period involve his appeal of the denial of his 

motion to modify the conditions of his probation, not the appeal of his conviction and 

sentence. As set forth above, that second appeal is not relevant to the calculation of the 

statute of limitations. Rather, it appears Petitioner contends he thought he had to wait to 

file his federal habeas Petition until the state appellate court ruled on his petition to transfer 

the appeal of his motion to modify the conditions of his probation. That is not an 

“extraordinary circumstance” which prevented him from timely filing his federal Petition. 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; see Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(holding that petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication or inability to calculate the statute of 

limitations is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling).

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 21
14

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed after expiration of 

the one-year statute of limitations and is DENIED as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d).

B. Merits

Alternately, the Petition fails on the merits. In order to obtain federal habeas relief 

with respect to a claim which was adjudicated on the merits in state court a federal habeas 

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in 

a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state 

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases 

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. 

To satisfy § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must show the factual findings relied upon by the state 

court are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

Petitioner’s original appeal of his conviction and sentence was denied by the 

Appellate Division of the Superior Court in a minute order with a box checked that the 

judgment of conviction was affirmed unanimously, and stating:

Following a review of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende, and 

consideration of the supplemental brief, the Appellate Division finds no 

arguable issues.

Appellant’s appointed counsel Joyce Sweet filed a written waiver of oral 

argument. Respondent also filed a written waiver of oral argument.

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 21
15

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Earlier today, the Appellate Division issued an Order denying Appellant’s 

request to augment the record, and his request to continue oral argument and 

for the appointment of another appellate counsel.

The Presiding Judge, the Honorable Charles R. Gill placed all of this orally 

on the record, and the appellant was present in Court and got up and exited 

the courtroom as the judge was making this record.

(Doc. No. 16-2, Lodgment No. 5 at 2.)

Thus, Petitioner’s constitutional claims were summarily denied by the appellate 

division of the superior court on direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, and he did 

not appeal further. The lower court, the trial court, had previously summarily denied the 

claims, stating: “The fact that he may inherit the property at some point in the future that -

requiring him to stay 100 yards away from these women, M[s]. Weiss and M[s]. Ursetti, 

does not violate any of his constitutional rights.” (Doc. No. 5-1, Lodgment No. 1 at 2 n.1.) 

As noted above, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, in denying Petitioner’s 

appeal from the denial of his motion to modify the conditions of his probation, refused to 

revisit its denial of the constitutional claims it had rejected in the original appeal. In 

applying the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to a summary denial, the Court “must 

determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported the state court’s decision; 

and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the United 

States Supreme] Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

1. Claim One

Petitioner alleges in claim one that his right to peaceably assemble in his mother’s 

house and to be secure therein to live with his wife and take care of his aging mother as 

protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, was violated by the 

imposition of a 100-yard stay away order because it exceeded the trial judge’s discretion

in balancing the interests of the parties because there was no violence by Petitioner toward 

the protected parties and the trial judge stated “we almost always issue 100 yard stay away 

orders.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) Respondent answers Petitioner is unable to show that the state 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of 21
16

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court adjudication of any claim presented is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law because Petitioner has identified no clearly established 

United States Supreme Court authority controlling his claims. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 14-18.) 

Petitioner replies that he raised different constitutional claims in his appeal of the denial of 

his motion to modify his probation than he did on direct appeal, and the Appellate 

Division’s determination that the claims were the same and its refusal to address them in 

his second appeal amounts to an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2), and that court’s disregard of the clearly established federal law he cited in 

support of his claims is unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). (Doc. No. 17 at 10.)

The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protection of freedom of 

association includes intimate human relationships, stating:

Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected “freedom of 

association” in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has 

concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human 

relationships must be secured against undue intrusions by the State because 

of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is 

central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association 

receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another 

set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purposes 

of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment - speech, 

assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. 

The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an 

indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).

The Supreme Court has recognized that “cohabitation with one’s relatives” is 

included in those intimate relationships, and that “[f]amily relationships, by their nature, 

involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with 

whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but 

also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” Id. at 619-20. Nevertheless, Petitioner’s 

First Amendment rights are subject to reasonable, narrowly-tailored restrictions. Ward v. 

Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of 21
17

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

868, 875 (1987) (noting that probation conditions are permissible when they “assure that 

the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not 

harmed by the probationer’s being at large.”) When “fundamental rights” are affected, 

“[t]he test for validity of probation conditions . . . is whether the conditions are primarily 

designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public.” United States v. 

Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988), citing United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 

567 (9th Cir. 1981).

The state court could have reasonably denied Petitioner’s First Amendment claim 

on the basis that the 100-yard stay away order was necessary to protect the victims and to 

prevent a repeat of a violation of the original 2-yard stay away order. The 100-yard stay 

away order was imposed following a criminal conviction arising from a violation of a 

criminal protective order to stay 2-yards away from the victims, which in turn was imposed 

as a result of a criminal conviction for resisting arrest arising from a complaint of a 

violation of an initial civil 2-yard stay away protective order. The record contains findings 

that Petitioner harassed and intimidated the victims, that he was given a fair chance to live 

in his mother’s house by the imposition of the 2-yard stay away order which he violated

when he was seen on security camera footage chasing an elderly woman over an unjustified

and insignificant dispute over the placement of a potted plant, that he has anger 

management issues and intermittent explosive behavior disorder, lacks insight into “how 

his conduct affects others [and] he blames everyone around him for his circumstances,”

and “has demonstrated by his own behavior in the past that he won’t abide by a two-yard 

restraining order.” (Doc. No. 5-1, Lodgment No. 1 at 2-5.) His contentions that the 100-

yard stay away order is unreasonable because his actions did not involve violence, and that 

a 2-yard stay away order will sufficiently protect the victims, do not support a finding that 

the parole condition is not narrowly drawn. See Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374 (holding that 

probation conditions are narrowly drawn when they “protect the public from a situation 

that might lead to a repetition of the same crime.”) Because the restriction on his right to 

association is justified by the record and is narrowly tailored to serve important government 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of 21
18

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

interests in protecting the victims from a repeat of the crime for which Petitioner was 

convicted, the state court adjudication is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 

874; Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374 (holding that when fundamental rights are affected, “[t]he 

test for validity of probation conditions is whether the conditions are primarily designed to 

meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public.”) 

Neither is Petitioner entitled to federal habeas relief on the basis that the state court 

adjudication of claim one is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. As set 

forth above, the reasonableness of the 100-yard stay away order has ample factual support 

in the state court record, and Petitioner has made no showing that those factual findings are 

unreasonable. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (holding that the factual findings relied upon 

by the state court must be objectively unreasonable to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).)

Even assuming Petitioner is correct that the state court erroneously found he raised the 

same constitutional claims in his original appeal as in his motion to modify the conditions 

of his probation, and erroneously refused to address the constitutional claims raised in his 

second appeal and presented here, and assuming 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) can be satisfied

on that basis, he must still show that a federal constitutional violation occurred in order to 

obtain federal habeas relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22 (2007).

When a federal habeas court addresses a claim which has not been adjudicated on 

the merits in state court or when 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) has been satisfied, de novo review 

is required. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2002). Under such a

review, “state court judgments of conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality 

and legality and may be set aside only when a state prisoner carries his burden of proving 

that (his) detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded against 

state action by the Federal Constitution.” Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 

2005) (en banc). Were the Court to consider claim one under a de novo review, it would 

find it fails to provide a basis for federal habeas relief for the reasons discussed above.

/ / / 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of 21
19

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Claim Two

Petitioner alleges in claim two he was deprived of liberty and property without due 

process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution by the 100-yard stay away order because he is being forced to find alternative 

living arrangements from a house he lived in for 20 years and will inherit by way of a living 

trust, and without which he is unable to find affordable housing except motel rooms and 

homeless shelters. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) He also claims in a wholly conclusory fashion that 

he was deprived of due process by the Court of Appeal’s denial of his petition to transfer 

his case from the Appellate Division of the Superior Court. (Id.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through 

the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person may be deprived of liberty or property 

without due process of law. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976). Due 

process rights are flexible and depend largely on the specific factual circumstances along 

with a weighing of the governmental and private interests involved. Id. “The requirements 

of procedural due process apply only to the deprivations of interests encompassed by the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of Regents of State 

Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). Even to the extent Petitioner can show his 

liberty or property interests were interfered with by the imposition of the 100-yard stay 

away order condition of his probation, he was represented by counsel at trial and on appeal

and has identified no errors in those proceedings rising to the level of a due process

violation. In any case, this claim fails for the same reason as claim one, because any 

restriction on hisfundamental liberty or property rights arising from the 100-yard stay away 

probation condition is reasonable and narrowly drawn. See Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374 

(holding that when fundamental rights are affected, “[t]he test for validity of probation 

conditions is whether the conditions are primarily designed to meet the ends of 

rehabilitation and protection of the public,” and that probation conditions are narrowly 

drawn when they “protect the public from a situation that might lead to a repetition of the 

same crime.”)

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of 21
20

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Claim Three

Petitioner alleges in claim three he was deprived of the liberty to travel to his 

mother’s house without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution by the 100-yard stay away order which prohibits him from 

living with or near his aging parent and taking care of her. (Doc. No. 1 at 8.) Freedom to 

travel is often tied to other fundamental rights, such as free speech, free assembly and free 

association, and is a basic right. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (“freedom to 

travel is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen’s ‘liberty.’”) This claim fails for the 

same reason as claim one. See Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374 (holding that when fundamental 

rights are affected, “[t]he test for validity of probation conditions is whether the conditions 

are primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public,” and 

that probation conditions are narrowly drawn when they “protect the public from a situation 

that might lead to a repetition of the same crime.”)

4. Claim Four

Petitioner alleges in his fourth and final claim, in a wholly conclusory fashion, that 

he was denied the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship without due 

process of law as a result of the order requiring him to say 100 yards away from his home. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 10.) The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States 

Constitution provides that: “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and 

immunities of citizens in the several states.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The Privileges 

and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 

or immunities of citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme 

Court has identified the “fundamental” rights protected by those clauses generally as:

protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right 

to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 

happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the 

Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right 

of a citizen of one State to pass through or reside in any other State for the 

purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the 

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of 21
21

19cv1632-H (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any 

kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either 

real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are 

paid by the other citizens of the State, may be mentioned as some of the 

particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced 

by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which 

may be added the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws 

or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised.

 

Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898).

Petitioner has not alleged he was deprived of any fundamental right protected by 

those clauses not already discussed, and this claim fails for the reasons set forth above. 

In sum, the state court adjudication of Petitioner’s claims is neither contrary to, nor 

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court would also deny the claims under a de 

novo review. The Petition is DENIED on that basis as an alternate to untimeliness. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The threshold for granting a Certificate of Appealability is “relatively low.” 

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). “At the COA stage, the only 

question is whether the applicant has shown that ‘jurists of reason could disagree with the 

district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the 

issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Buck v. 

Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 773 (2017), quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. Petitioner has not 

met that standard, and a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is 

DENIED. The Court DENIES a Certificate of Appealability. 

DATED: April 2, 2020 

_____________________________________

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-01632-H-BLM Document 18 Filed 04/02/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of 21