Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02025/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Doris Ann Randall, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Social Security Administration 

Commissioner, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-13-02025-PHX-NVW 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Doris Ann Randall seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her 

disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. 

Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by 

substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be 

affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was born in February 1953. She has a high school education and has 

worked as a collections coordinator, data entry clerk, office clerk, and administrative 

assistant. She is obese and has type II diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, and chronic kidney 

disease. She has had stent surgery related to coronary artery disease. She had a full knee 

replacement on her left knee in March 2011 and on her right knee in April 2012, one 

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month before the administrative hearing before the ALJ. At the time of the hearing 

Plaintiff was still using a walker following the right knee replacement. 

On June 5, 2010, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging 

disability beginning April 8, 2010. On May 17, 2012, she appeared with a non-attorney 

representative and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. An impartial vocational expert 

also testified. 

On June 26, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 

decision. On October 7, 2013, Plaintiff sought review by this Court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); 

accord Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings 

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). 

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III. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at 

step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity and determines whether the claimant is still 

capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, 

where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is 

disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of 

the Social Security Act through December 31, 2014, and that she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since April 8, 2010, the alleged onset date. At step two, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus with 

diabetic neuropathy, coronary artery disease status post myocardial infarction with stent 

surgery, obesity, bilateral knee replacement surgery, and stage three chronic kidney 

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disease. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff: 

has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 

20 CFR 404.1567(a) except: the claimant can occasionally push and/or pull 

with the lower extremities; the claimant can occasionally climb using ramps 

and stairs; the claimant cannot climb using ladders, ropes or scaffolds; the 

claimant can frequently balance and stoop; the claimant cannot kneel or 

crawl; the claimant can occasionally crouch; the claimant can frequently 

perform handling, fingering and feeling; the claimant must avoid hazardous 

environments. 

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as an 

administrative assistant as it is generally performed in the national economy. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Credibility. 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine 

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; 

and, if so with no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the 

rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In making a credibility 

determination, an ALJ “may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on 

a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the claimant’s allegations.” 

Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). But “an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies between 

the claimant’s testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, among 

other factors.” Id. 

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First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. Second, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

symptoms not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the ALJ’s residual 

functional capacity assessment. The ALJ noted, but did not find conclusive, that Plaintiff 

had received unemployment compensation during the relevant period, which required her 

to certify she was willing and able to engage in work activity, a certification inconsistent 

with a claim for disability. 

Plaintiff testified that she was terminated from her last job in April 2010 because 

of her absenteeism due to illness. She said she had been hospitalized in December 2009 

for her thyroid and in January 2010 for her blood pressure and diabetes. She said she was 

on short-term disability leave until the end of March 2010 and terminated on April 8, 

2010. At the hearing in May 2011, Plaintiff testified that her primary problem is diabetic 

neuropathy although she also has lower extremity edema that gets worse with sitting, 

standing, and walking. 

Plaintiff testified that she has neuropathy from her toes to her hips, which 

prevented her from realizing that her knees were so bad, but finally she had left knee 

replacement surgery in March 2011. Although her right knee worsened in 2011, she 

waited until April 2012 to have right knee replacement surgery because of some family 

issues. At the hearing in May 2012, Plaintiff said her knees were feeling better, but her 

neuropathy was getting worse. She wondered if the knee pain had disguised the 

neuropathy pain and now she was feeling the neuropathy more. She testified that after 

the March 2011 surgery she was able to quit using a walker in May 2011, but began using 

a cane in August 2011 and went back to using a walker in January or February 2012. She 

used a walker at the administrative hearing one month after the right knee replacement 

surgery. 

Plaintiff testified that she could feel her feet, but they are “numb and tingly” and 

she has pain from her calf to her hip. She also said she has to look down at her feet when 

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walking because she cannot feel them, yet she continued to drive a car until her recent 

knee replacement surgery. She testified that she has numbness in two fingers on each 

hand, and she has difficulty typing because she does not know which keys her fingers are 

hitting, but she has no problem buttoning buttons, tying bows, or using zippers. She said 

she also has lots of lower back pain due to arthritis, but if the pain goes down to her legs 

she cannot tell because of the neuropathy. 

Plaintiff testified that she gets shortness of breath when she walks and when she 

does housework. In April 2010, Plaintiff was advised regarding a diet plan to manage her 

diabetes and chronic kidney disease, and she reported that she avoids processed food and 

“cooks meals from scratch.” In April 2011, Plaintiff was advised by a cardiovascular 

nurse practitioner to stop smoking, exercise as tolerated, and decrease her calorie intake. 

The ALJ found the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms 

and limitations diminished because the allegations are greater than expected in light of 

the objective evidence of record. The ALJ noted in detail numerous records showing 

normal or negative findings and normal functioning. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms and 

limitations inconsistent with records of generally successful treatment during the relevant 

period. The ALJ noted records showing Plaintiff’s improvement after both knee 

replacement surgeries, cortisone injections, and physical therapy. Moreover, the ALJ 

identified in detail numerous records showing Plaintiff reported that she was feeling 

better and was not taking pain medication. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s credibility was further undermined by her activities of 

daily living, which were compatible with competitive work. In August 2010, Plaintiff 

reported that she cooked, washed dishes, watched television, and used a computer. She 

said that she drove to get prescription medications about every two weeks and to get 

groceries about once a month. She said that she did laundry, but it took her a day to do 

one load. She said that she had difficulty doing housework more than thirty minutes at a 

time because of pain, numbness, and burning sensation. She reported sleeping from zero 

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to fourteen hours a day and taking naps one to three times a day for one to four hours 

each, depending on her pain. Plaintiff also said she wore glasses for reading and 

computer work and she used a cane and walker to assist with her balance. 

Plaintiff testified that she is able to perform personal care independently. She said 

she has a shower bench to get in and out of the bathtub. She also testified that before the 

right knee replacement surgery (one month before the hearing) she did her own minor 

shopping and drove to medical appointments. She said that her daughter had been doing 

Plaintiff’s major grocery shopping for the past five or six months, i.e., the period during 

which she was postponing her right knee replacement because of family issues. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the fact that Plaintiff 

worked consistently for 25 years as part of the credibility determination. The ALJ must 

consider all of the information presented about a claimant’s symptoms, including 

information about a claimant’s prior work record, but the ALJ is not obligated to identify 

each piece of information considered and explain the weight given to each. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1529(c)(3). 

Thus, substantial evidence supports finding that the ALJ provided specific, clear, 

and convincing reasons for partially discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 

testimony. 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional 

Capacity. 

A claimant’s residual functional capacity is “what an individual can still do despite 

his or her limitations.” Social Security Ruling 96-8p. The residual functional capacity 

determination is “a function-by-function assessment based upon all of the relevant 

evidence of an individual’s ability to do work-related activities.” Id. A residual 

functional capacity finding involves a detailed assessment of how a claimant’s medical 

impairments affect his ability to work. In determining a claimant’s residual functional 

capacity, the ALJ “must consider all relevant evidence in the record, including, inter alia, 

medical records, lay evidence, and ‘the effects of all symptoms, including pain, that are 

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reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.’” Robbins v. SSA, 466 

F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform “sedentary 

work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a)” with certain exceptions. “Sedentary work” is 

defined as involving “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or 

carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools” and requiring primarily sitting 

with only occasional walking and standing. The ALJ imposed the following limitations 

on sedentary work: no climbing using ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no hazardous 

environments; only occasionally pushing and/or pulling with the lower extremities; only 

occasionally using ramps and stairs; only occasionally crouching; frequently, but not 

continuously, balancing and stooping; frequently, but not continuously, handling, 

fingering, and feeling. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by not including in the residual functional 

capacity any limitations resulting from her use of a cane or walker, such as her ability to 

handle, finger, or feel while standing and walking. Plaintiff testified that she used a 

walker or cane inconsistently throughout the relevant period, primarily shortly before and 

after knee replacement surgeries. She testified that her knee pain appeared to be resolved 

by the surgeries. Plaintiff has not identified any objective evidence or medical opinion to 

support finding that Plaintiff continues to need to use a walker or cane on a long-term 

basis. But it was unnecessary for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff did not need a walker or 

cane because sedentary work requires only occasional lifting and carrying of small items, 

which could be transported on a belt, in a pocket or shoulder bag, or by pushing a 

wheeled cart—as Plaintiff likely does when grocery shopping. Plaintiff’s ability to cook 

meals, “pick up” after herself, and carry laundry demonstrates that she is capable of 

occasionally lifting and carrying small items regardless of whether she uses a walker or 

cane. 

Plaintiff further contends the ALJ erred by finding that she is capable of sitting for 

up to six hours in an eight-hour work day because she testified that if she sits for a long 

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period of time her legs swell and she is taking Lasix to control her edema. In fact, 

Plaintiff testified that if she sits, stands, or walks too long her “ankles, feet, and legs swell 

up like four times their size and that’s why I’m taking the Lasix.” Even if the ALJ found 

her testimony fully credible, Plaintiff suggested that Lasix and frequent urination 

controlled the edema. But in fact, the ALJ identified objective medical evidence 

contradicting Plaintiff’s allegation regarding the severity of her edema. 

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred by failing to acknowledge that she has severe 

numbness in two fingers on each hand and spasms that prevent her from effectively using 

a computer keyboard. Plaintiff testified that she had no problem with buttons or zippers 

or tying bows. She also reported that she uses a computer. Further, the evidence Plaintiff 

identifies as supporting her claims of numbness do not show that anyone tested and found 

neuropathy in her fingers or opined that she is unable to use a computer keyboard. In 

March 2009, Plaintiff reported left leg pain and numbness and that her endocrinologist 

told her she needed a neurology consultation for diabetic neuropathy. In an emergency 

room in November 2010 Plaintiff complained of tingling over the left hip and left foot 

with intermittent sharp pains in the sole of her foot. She reported a history of diabetic 

neuropathy, but said she had “never had anything like this before,” and it was different 

than the diabetic neuropathy. In December 2010, Plaintiff reported to her neurologist left 

leg pain, which was improving, and “no complaints of new weakness, sensory loss, visual 

changes,” or “new involuntary movements.” In January 2011, Plaintiff reported to her 

neurologist “resolution of her previously described left leg pain” and “no complaints of 

new weakness, sensory loss, visual changes,” or “new involuntary movements.” The 

neurologist wrote: “Diabetic radiculopathy resolved.” In April 2011, she reported 

“tingling/burning of feet, numbness/tingling of hands,” but demonstrated normal gait and 

normal range of motion of extremities. The notes for July 2011 say the same. As the 

ALJ noted, in May 2011 Plaintiff told her physical therapist she sits at her computer 

throughout the day. 

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The ALJ did not err in determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. The 

ALJ provided a narrative description of how the evidence supports each conclusion in the 

residual functional capacity assessment and explained any inconsistencies or ambiguities 

in the evidence. The ALJ expressly “generously considered the claimant’s subjective 

complaints of numbness and tingling in the extremities and swelling of the lower 

extremities” and included related limitations despite the medical records showing only 

“objective findings of +1 edema and minimal complaints of hand numbness or pain.” 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall 

terminate this case. 

Dated this 24th day of October, 2014. 

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