Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_16-cv-01088/USCOURTS-alnd-3_16-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

LUANNA POAG, WILLIAM )

ROBERT HARRY, and MIRIAM )

ANN HANEY, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-1088-CLS

)

CITY OF FLORENCE, )

ALABAMA, GUY LAMBERT, )

JEFF STANFIELD, and JOHN )

HAMM, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Luanna Poag, William Robert Harry, and Miriam Ann Haney, filed 

a First Amended Complaint on August 12, 2016, against defendants City of Florence,

Alabama (“the City”), and Guy Lambert, Jeff Stanfield, and John Hamm, all of whom

are police officers for the City.1

 The First Amended Complaint asserts claims pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful search and seizure (Counts I and II), unlawful arrest

1

 Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint). The caption of the First Amended Complaint also

lists four additional defendants: Zach Maxwell; Dustin Key; Jason Novak; and Eric Pollard. See

id. at 1. Even so, the body of the First Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations against

those defendants. The court will presume that, when drafting the First Amended Complaint,

plaintiffs’ attorney simply copied the heading from the original Complaint, which did name those

additional defendants, see doc. no. 1 (Complaint), but that plaintiffs did not intend to assert any

claims against those four additional defendants in the First Amended Complaint. That presumption

is further supported by the fact that plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss all claims against

Maxwell, Key, Novak, and Pollard on August 12, 2016, the same date the First Amended Complaint

was filed. See doc. no. 16 (Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Certain Defendants). 

FILED

 2016 Oct-12 PM 03:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:16-cv-01088-CLS Document 28 Filed 10/12/16 Page 1 of 30
and detention (Count III), excessive force (Count IV), and failure to train (Count V),

as well as supplemental state law claims for false arrest/false imprisonment (Count VI)

and trespass (Count VII, improperly labeled as “Count V”).2

 The case presently is

before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).3

 Upon consideration of the

motion, briefs, and First Amended Complaint, the court concludes that the motion is

due to be granted. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a

complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that 

pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation

2 See doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint).

3

 Doc. no. 20. 

2

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of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S., at

555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]”

devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570. 

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard

is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a

complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s

liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule

8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint states

a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But where

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not

“show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

8(a)(2). 

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In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis and alterations supplied). 

II. ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Luanna Poag and Robert Harry reside together at 2404 Chickasaw

Drive: an address that is located in an upper-middle-class, single-family, low-crime,

residential neighborhood in Florence, Alabama.4

 Chickasaw Drive is approximately

three-quarters of a mile in length, and there are approximately fifty-five homes on the

street. As is usual in urban areas, odd-numbered and even-numbered properties are

located on opposite sides of the street.5

 There are “more than twelve” homes either

within or bordering what plaintiffs refer to as “the ‘2400 block of Chickasaw Drive.’”6

The house occupied by plaintiffs Poag and Harry is an all-brick, ranch-style home of

approximately 1,500 square feet, and it is situated on a lot of approximately 138 feet

by 125 feet.7

 The home has a front porch with an entrance and a large picture window

4

 Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 5, 7, 25. 

5 Id. ¶ 26. 

6 Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 

7 Id. ¶ 30. 

4

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facing Chickasaw Drive, and an attached carport located on the northern side.8

 The

distance from the northwest corner of the carport to the northern property line is

approximately forty feet.9

An “older couple” resided at 2410 Chickasaw Drive on July 4, 2014.

35. At all times relevant to this matter, an older couple resided at

2410 Chickasaw Drive, in Florence, Alabama. The 2410 property is

located north of the Poag/Harry property. The lot of the 2410 property

is approximately 138 feet by 125 feet with a brick, ranch-styled home

located on the lot. The 2410 residence has a front porch and entrance that

face Chickasaw Drive. The distance from the northwest corner of the

2410 residence to the Poag/Harry property line is approximately 75 feet.

36. Thick trees, bushes, and an intermittent fence physically

separate the 2410 property from the Poag/Harry property. Any view of

the Poag/Harry home, including the carport, from the front porch of the

2410 residence, would be obstructed by the structure of [the] 2410 home

itself and/or by the trees, bushes, and an intermittent fence located along

the property line. It is not possible for someone who is sitting on the front

porch of the 2410 residence to observe any activities in the Poag/Harry

home, carport or curtilage.

Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 35-36 (alteration supplied). 

Plaintiff Miriam Ann Haney is a friend of both Poag and Harry, and she was an

overnight guest in their home on July 4, 2014.10 The three plaintiffs were inside the

home during the afternoon hours of that national holiday, preparing for a holiday cookout. The weather was clear, and the home and surrounding areas were lit by the

8 Id. ¶ 31.

9 Id. ¶ 32. 

10 Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶ 11. 

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afternoon sun.11 

38. In the afternoon hours on July 4, 2014, as Ms. Haney and Ms.

Poag were sitting on the couch talking, Ms. Haney looked through the

“storm door” of the carport entrance and noticed men walking around

inside the carport of the Poag/Harry home. Ms. Haney informed Ms.

Poag of what she saw.

39. Ms. Poag, who was unarmed, and was wearing sweat pants and

a t-shirt, opened the door that led to the carport.

40. Upon opening the door, Ms. Poag was immediately faced with

two armed police officers from the City of Florence, Defendants Guy

Lambert and Jeff Stanfield, who had guns pointed directly at her. With

guns drawn, Defendants Stanfield and Lambert began yelling commands

and orders at Ms. Poag, demanding that she leave the interior of her home

and place her hands on the wall of the carport. One of the officers, either

Defendant Lambert or Defendant Stanfield, was in “swat” type attire and

had a large assault rifle pointed directly at Ms. Poag. The other officer,

either Defendant Lambert or Defendant Stanfield, was in a regular police

uniform and had his service weapon pointed directly at Ms. Poag.

41. When Ms. Poag went to the door, she was not armed, nor did

she appear to be armed. Ms. Poag was not injured, nor did she exhibit

any signs of being injured. She was not, initially, nervous or fearful, nor

was she acting in a nervous or fearful manner. She was not dressed in an

unusual manner for the time of day or season. She did not attempt to

evade the interaction with Defendants Stanfield and/or Lambert, nor was

she acting in an evasive manner. Ms. Poag was not intoxicated, nor was

she acting in an intoxicated manner. Ms. Poag was not having an

emotional breakdown or psychotic break, nor was she behaving in an

emotional or psychotic manner. Ms. Poag was not having a heart attack

or other medical emergency, nor did she appear to be having a heart

attack or other medical emergency. 

42. Upon seeing Defendants Stanfield and Lambert in her carport

11 Id. ¶ 37. 

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Case 3:16-cv-01088-CLS Document 28 Filed 10/12/16 Page 6 of 30
and even after being confronted by Defendants Stanfield and Lambert at

gunpoint, Ms. Poag did not lock the doors, shut the curtains, slam the

door in the officers’ faces, refuse to answer a ringing phone, shout or

cuss, instruct anyone in the house to run or hide, attempt to discard

evidence of some crime, or attempt to flee. She saw Defendants Lambert

and Stanfield in her carport and did nothing more than open the carport

door and comply with their forceful and armed demands.

 Id. ¶¶ 38-42. 

Officers Lambert and Stanfield did not possess, or present Poag with, a warrant

before asking her to leave the interior of her home, and they did not obtain her consent

before requiring her to leave.12 They also did not

inform Ms. Poag they had received a call about activities on the

Poag/Henry property; ask Ms. Poag for identification; briefly question her

about the events of the day; ask whether she heard a gunshot; ask whether

she, or anyone else in the home, had fired a gun on the property or in the

home that day; ask whether she, or anyone in the Poag/Harry home had

been shot; inquire about whether she, or anyone in the home, was in need

of law enforcement assistance; inquire about whether she, or anyone in

the home, was in need of medical assistance or emergency medical

services; ask whether she, or anyone in the home, had shouted anything

such as “help murder.”

Id. ¶ 44. Once Lambert and Stanfield detained Poag at gunpoint in her carport, Poag

was not free to leave.13

46. After hearing the commotion, Plaintiffs Harry and Haney both

came to the door that lead [sic] to the carport of the Poag/Harry home. As

with Ms. Poag, Plaintiffs Harry and Haney were immediately faced with

two armed police officers from the City of Florence, Defendants Guy

12 Id. ¶ 43. 

13 Id. ¶ 44. 

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Case 3:16-cv-01088-CLS Document 28 Filed 10/12/16 Page 7 of 30
Lambert and Jeff Stanfield, who had guns pointing directly at them. With

guns drawn, Defendants Lambert and Stanfield began barking orders at

Plaintiffs Harry and Haney, demanding that they leave the home and

place their hands on the wall of the carport next to where Ms. Poag was

already detained. 

47. When Plaintiffs Harry and Haney went to the door, neither

were [sic] armed, nor did either appear to be armed. Neither was injured,

nor did either exhibit any signs of being injured. Neither was initially

nervous or fearful, nor was either acting in a nervous or fearful manner. 

Neither was dressed in an unusual manner for the time of day or season. 

Neither attempted to evade the interaction with Defendants Stanfield

and/or Lambert, nor was either acting in an evasive manner. Neither was

intoxicated, nor was either acting in an intoxicated manner. Neither was

having an emotional breakdown or psychotic break, nor was either

behaving as though he or she were having an emotional or psychotic

episode. Neither was having a heart attack or any other medical

emergency, nor did either give the appearance of having a heart attack or

any other medical emergency.

48. Upon discovering there were police officers on the Poag/Harry

property, and even after Plaintiff Poag had already [been] forced from the

home and detained at gunpoint, neither Plaintiff Harry nor Plaintiff Haney

locked the doors, shut the curtains, slammed the door in the officers’

faces, refused to answer a ringing phone, shouted or cussed, instructed

anyone in the house to run or hide evidence of some crime, or attempted

to flee. They merely responded to a commotion in the carport and

complied with Defendant Stanfield and Lambert’s forceful and armed

demands.

 Id. ¶¶ 46-48 (alteration supplied). 

Officers Lambert and Stanfield did not possess, or present Harry and Haney

with, a warrant before asking them to leave the interior of the home, and they did not

8

Case 3:16-cv-01088-CLS Document 28 Filed 10/12/16 Page 8 of 30
obtain Harry and Haney’s consent before requiring them to leave.14 As with Poag, the

officers did not provide Harry or Haney with any information about why they were

present in the home carport, and they did not ask any questions to determine whether

anyone in the home had been shot or needed police assistance.15 Once Lambert and

Stanfield detained Harry and Haney at gunpoint in the carport, they were not free to

leave.16

Soon after Officers Lambert and Stanfield entered the carport and detained

plaintiffs, defendant John Hamm arrived on the scene with four other officers, who

“took positions” on the property.17 The seven armed officers surrounded plaintiffs,18

even though none of them observed any suspicious or illegal activity, had a physical

description of any potential suspects or victims, asked for clarification as to the address

of the 911 call that had resulted in their dispatch to Poag and Harry’s property,

attempted to independently corroborate the statements made by the 911 caller,

observed any guns, or saw or heard anything that would lead them to believe that

anyone in the residence was in need of emergency assistance.19 Officer Hamm then

14 Id. ¶ 49. 

15 Id. ¶ 50. 

16 Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶ 50. 

17 Id. ¶ 52. The four other officers who arrived with defendant John Hamm were Zach

Maxwell, Dustin Key, Jason Novak, and Eric Pollard — the same officers who were named in

plaintiff’s original Complaint but omitted from the First Amended Complaint. See supra, note 1. 

18 Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶ 52. 

19 Id. ¶ 53. 

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entered the carport and joined Officers Lambert and Stanfield in their detention of

plaintiffs.20 

“Shortly thereafter,” Officers Stanfield and Hamm moved from the carport to the

interior of the home and searched the home, with their weapons drawn, for

approximately five minutes.21 They did not have a warrant to conduct such a search.22

In addition, plaintiffs allege that:

58. At some point after the incident, Plaintiffs learned a neighbor

had called 911 on July 4, 2014 to report hearing what sounded like a

gunshot and someone saying the words “help murder.” The caller, who

was the older male resident of the 2410 residence, acknowledged that he

was the individual who called 911 on July 4, 2014. Because he was

aware of “Neighborhood Watch” signs, he called 911 to report what

sounded like a high caliber gunshot, and a woman utter the words “help

murder.” He stated the sounds came from 50 feet away from where he

was sitting on the front porch of the 2410 property. He called 911 to

report what he heard, even though he thought the sounds could have

come from the television set. He admitted he was perplexed. He also

informed the undersigned that with the exception of speaking with the

undersigned, her deceased father, Robert Gonce, and the 911 dispatcher,

he had only spoken to one (1) police officer, who he believed was a

sergeant. He stated he reported to that officer the very same information

he reported to the undersigned and to Mr. Gonce.

59. On July 4, 2014, the 911 caller’s report was based solely on

what the 911 caller reported, that was solely “auditory.” The 911 caller

never observed anything. Rather the 911 caller reported to the

undersigned that he heard two things: a gun shot and the words “help

murder,” and he thought those sounds could have come from a television set. 

20 Id. ¶ 54.

21 Id. ¶ 55. 

22 Id. ¶¶ 56-57. 

10

Case 3:16-cv-01088-CLS Document 28 Filed 10/12/16 Page 10 of 30
60. No one else in the neighborhood, not even the 911 caller’s

spouse, reported hearing a gunshot or the words “help murder” on July 4,

2014. No one, not even the 911 caller’s spouse, could corroborated [sic]

the 911 caller’s statements about what he heard.

Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 58-60 (emphasis in original, footnotes

omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Constitutional Claims Against The Individual Officers

The individual defendants — Florence Police Officers Guy Lambert, Jeff

Stanfield, and John Hamm — assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity for

plaintiff’s constitutional claims. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

governmental officials who are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages in

their personal, or individual, capacities, but only so long as “their conduct violates no

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine

requires that a defendant claiming immunity must initially “prove that ‘he was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.’” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson

v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). That threshold inquiry is easily

satisfied here, as the individual defendants were engaged in law enforcement functions

11

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on the date and at the time of the events that led to plaintiffs’ complaint. 

The next step generally is to apply a two-part test. The first step is for the court

to determine whether the facts, viewed “in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury,” show that “the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If that question is answered affirmatively,

the court will proceed to analyze the second aspect of the two-part inquiry: i.e.,

“whether the right was clearly established.” Id. Strict adherence to the order of those

two inquiries is not required, however. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236

(2009) (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while

the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as

mandatory.”). Instead, in appropriate cases, it is within a district court’s discretion to

assume that a constitutional violation occurred in order to address, in the first instance,

the question of whether such a presumed violation was “clearly established” on the

date of the incident leading to suit. Id.

When determining whether the unlawfulness of an official’s actions was “clearly

established,” the pertinent question is whether the state of the law on the date of the

defendant’s alleged misconduct placed defendants on “fair warning that their alleged

treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741

(2002) (alteration supplied); Williams v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d

12

Case 3:16-cv-01088-CLS Document 28 Filed 10/12/16 Page 12 of 30
1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (same). 

The Supreme Court has rejected the requirement that the facts of previous cases

must always be “materially similar” to those facing the plaintiff. Hope, 536 U.S. at

739. Instead, in order for a constitutional right to be deemed “clearly established,” 

its contours “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that

an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very

action in question has previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell [v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,] 535, n. 12, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411; but

it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be

apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034,

97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987).

Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (alteration in original). An officer can receive “fair notice” of

his or her unlawful conduct in various ways. 

First, the words of the pertinent federal statute or federal

constitutional provision in some cases will be specific enough to establish

clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances and to

overcome qualified immunity, even in the total absence of case law. This

kind of case is one kind of “obvious clarity” case. For example, the

words of a federal statute or federal constitutional provision may be so

clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to establish that

the conduct cannot be lawful.

Second, if the conduct is not so egregious as to violate, for

example, the Fourth Amendment on its face, we then turn to case law. 

When looking at case law, some broad statements of principle in case law

are not tied to particularized facts and can clearly establish law applicable

in the future to different sets of detailed facts. See Marsh [v. Butler

County, Ala.], 268 F.3d [1014,] 1031-32 n.9 [11th Cir. 2001]. For

example, if some authoritative judicial decision decides a case by

determining that “X Conduct” is unconstitutional without tying that

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determination to a particularized set of facts, the decision on “X Conduct”

can be read as having clearly established a constitutional principle: put

differently, the precise facts surrounding “X Conduct” are immaterial to

the violation. These judicial decisions can control “with obvious clarity”

a wide variety of later factual circumstances. These precedents are hard

to distinguish from later cases because so few facts are material to the

broad legal principle established in these precedents; thus, this is why

factual differences are often immaterial to the later decisions. But for

judge-made law, there is a presumption against wide principles of law. 

And if a broad principle in case law is to establish clearly the law

applicable to a specific set of facts facing a governmental official, it must

do so “with obvious clarity” to the point that every objectively reasonable

government official facing the circumstances would know that the

official’s conduct did violate federal law when the official acted. 

Third, if we have no case law with a broad holding of “X” that is

not tied to particularized facts, we then look at precedent that is tied to the

facts. That is, we look for cases in which the Supreme Court or we, or the

pertinent state supreme court has said that “Y Conduct” is

unconstitutional in “Z Circumstances.” We believe that most judicial

precedents are tied to particularized facts and fall into this category. . . .

When fact-specific precedents are said to have established the law, a case

that is fairly distinguishable from the circumstances facing a government

official cannot clearly establish the law for the circumstances facing that

government official; so, qualified immunity applies. On the other hand,

if the circumstances facing a government official are not fairly

distinguishable, that is, are materially similar, the precedent can clearly

establish the applicable law. 

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350-52 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original,

alterations supplied). See also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“We do

not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”).

1. Search and seizure claims

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Plaintiffs assert that defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights when

they: (1) “entered the carport and curtilage of the Poag/Harry home without consent,

a warrant, or exigent circumstance and without probable cause” (Count I);23 (2)

“entered the interior of the Poag/Harry home without consent, a warrant or exigent

circumstance and without probable cause” (Count II);24 and (3) “entered Plaintiff

Poag’s and Plaintiff Harry’s home and arrested and detained at gunpoint Plaintiffs

Poag, Harry, and Haney without consent, a warrant or exigent circumstance and

without probable cause.”25

As an initial matter, the court observes that the carport of Poag and Harry’s

home was entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protection as the interior of the

home itself. “A home’s curtilage, ‘[t]he private property immediately adjacent to a

home[,] is entitled to the same protection against unreasonable search and seizure as

the home itself.’” United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012)

(quoting United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006)) (alterations in

original). 

“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures

inside a home [or its curtilage] without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” 

23 Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶ 81. 

24 Id. ¶ 83. 

25 Id. ¶ 35. 

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Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (alteration supplied). 

But we have also recognized that this presumption may be overcome in

some circumstances because “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”[Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S.

398, 403 (2006)]; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. [45], [47], 130

S. Ct. 546, 548, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2009) (per curiam). Accordingly, the

warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions. Brigham

City, supra, at 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943.

One well-recognized exception applies when “‘the exigencies of

the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a]

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57

L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978); see also Payton, supra, at 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371

(“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the

house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably

be crossed without a warrant”).

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-60 (2011) (first, fifth, and sixth alterations in

original, other alterations supplied). 

One exigency that will justify a warrantless search is the “emergency aid”

exception. Under that exception, “law enforcement officers may enter a home [or its

curtilage] without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or

to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403-04

(alteration supplied) (citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.

103, 118 (2006)). The police officers’ subjective intent is irrelevant; instead, the

officers must only demonstrate “an objectively reasonable basis for believing . . . that

a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47

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(alteration in original, citations and internal quotation marks omitted).26

Here, defendants Lambert, Stanfield, and Hamm assert that they were justified

by exigent circumstances when they stepped onto plaintiffs’ carport and, thereafter,

entered into both the sunroom and the home itself, as well when they detained

plaintiffs. They rely primarily on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.

Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2002). The pertinent facts of that case were stated

as follows:

At 10:22 p.m. on August 4, 1999, Officer Norman Bernard of the

Alexander City Police Department received a dispatch from a 911

operator to investigate a report of gunshots and arguing emanating from

3785 Washington Street. Officer Bernard proceeded immediately to the

location of the disturbance. En route, the officer received a second

dispatch from the 911 operator indicating the caller was reporting

continued gunshots and arguing. Officer Bernard arrived at the

designated address at approximately 10:29 p.m., within a minute of the

second dispatch from the emergency operator. Providing back-up in a

separate patrol car was Officer Marcus Billips, who also responded to the

emergency dispatch.

Upon arrival, Officer Bernard pulled into the driveway of the

residence located at 3785 Washington Street, a mobile home occupied by

Appellant. The officer illuminated the residence with his headlights and

spotlight. On the porch of the residence were Appellant and his wife,

Lena Holloway. Due to the high-risk nature of the 911 call, Officer

Bernard drew his service weapon as he exited his vehicle. From behind

26 There technically also remains a requirement that a search conducted under emergency

circumstances be supported by probable cause. United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337-38

(11th Cir. 2002). That inquiry, however, is effectively subsumed by the emergency inquiry. As the

Eleventh Circuit has held, “in an emergency, the probable cause element may be satisfied where

officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.” Id. at 1338.

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his car door, Officer Bernard instructed Appellant and his wife to raise

their hands into view. Appellant complied; his wife did not. As directed,

Appellant stepped off the porch and walked towards Officer Bernard and

Officer Billips. As Appellant proceeded towards the officers, a third

individual, later identified as neighbor Mike Machado, emerged from

behind a horse trailer parked in the yard. The neighbor also was ordered

to raise his hands and walk towards the officers. Both Appellant and his

neighbor were instructed to lie on the ground facing away from the

officers, their palms facing up.

Although the two men were compliant, Mrs. Holloway refused to

leave the porch, and instead sat down on a chair. Despite several verbal

commands, Mrs. Holloway refused to move. Suddenly, a child appeared

in the doorway of the residence. The child was ordered back into the

house. Ultimately, because of Mrs. Holloway’s unresponsiveness,

Officer Bernard threatened to employ his pepper spray. Finally, with

encouragement from Appellant, Mrs. Holloway stepped off the porch, but

refused to raise her hands. By this time, Sergeant Randy Walters, who

had arrived on the scene to provide additional support, stepped in to

secure Mrs. Holloway.

After Mrs. Holloway was placed under control, Officer Bernard

turned his attention to Appellant. The officer handcuffed Appellant and

quickly patted him down to see if he was concealing a weapon. Officer

Billips then engaged in the same procedure with respect to Mr. Machado. 

Once they were secured, the two men were placed separately in the

officers’ patrol cars. Altogether, approximately ten minutes elapsed from

the time the officers arrived on the scene to the time those present were

secured.

Having placed Appellant safely into his patrol car, Officer Bernard

approached the residence to check for victims and weapons on the

premises. In doing so, the officer observed several beer cans strewn

about the yard and porch. As he stepped onto the porch, Officer Bernard

saw a shotgun shell on top of the picnic table. Glancing around for a

corresponding weapon, the officer located a model 870 Remington

shotgun leaning against the side of the mobile home, approximately three

feet from where Appellant had been standing when the officers first

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arrived. The safety was disengaged. Additional shotgun shells, two

expended and one live, were found lying in the grass by the side of the

residence. Officer Bernard locked the weapon in the trunk of his patrol

car and returned to the house to continue his search for victims and

investigate the disturbance. No victims were found.

After ensuring that everyone on the scene was safe, Officer

Bernard approached Appellant to inform him of the 911 call and to

explain the officers’ reasons for securing those present on the premises.

As Officer Bernard was explaining the officers’ actions, Appellant

interrupted to describe what had transpired earlier that evening. 

According to Appellant, the commotion began when three males standing

on the railroad tracks behind Appellant’s mobile home started throwing

rocks at his house and horses. In an effort to ward off the men, Appellant

fired his shotgun into the air above the railroad tracks.

In light of his conversation with Appellant, Officer Bernard left to

speak with Sergeant Walters. According to Sergeant Walters, Appellant’s

account of the evening’s events matched an account given by Mrs.

Holloway. Based on this information, Sergeant Walters determined there

was sufficient cause to arrest Appellant. Appellant was then placed under

arrest by Officer Bernard at approximately 11:05 p.m., 36 minutes after

the officers first arrived on the scene.

Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1332-33 (footnote omitted). Holloway ultimately was indicted

by a federal grand jury for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).27 He moved to suppress any evidence of the firearm seized on

27 That statute provides, in pertinent part, that: 

It shall be unlawful for any person – 

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[]

. . . . 

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the property, claiming that the search of his home violated the Fourth Amendment. 

The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that

decision on appeal. Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1333, 1341.

The Eleventh Circuit found in the Holloway case that the officers “did not

violate the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search of

[Holloway’s] home.” Id. at 1338 (alterations supplied). When the officers arrived at

the Holloway residence, everything they observed was consistent with the dispatch

reports of arguing and gunshots. Id. They were, therefore, justified by the exigent

circumstances presented in entering the home without a warrant to conduct a search. 

Id. It was irrelevant that the officers did not ultimately locate any victims, because

they “reasonably believe[d] an emergency situation necessitate[d] their warrantless

search.” Id. at 1340 (alterations supplied). The officers also were justified by safety

concerns in temporarily securing the individuals present at the Holloway home prior

to conducting their search, because they had “reasonable cause to believe they were

entering a volatile and potentially dangerous situation based on the prior report of

gunshots.” Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1340. Finally, once the officers were lawfully

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or

affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or

ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (alteration and ellipsis supplied). 

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present inside the home, they were justified in seizing Holloway’s gun, which was in

plain view. Id. As such, “neither the emergency search of [Holloway’s] residence nor

the seizure of the shotgun violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 1341 (alteration supplied). 

This court agrees with defendants that the Holloway decision precludes a finding

that plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizures

were violated. As in Holloway, the officers in this case received a dispatch based upon

a 911 call indicating a potentially life-threatening situation, including a report of

gunshots and a cry of “help murder.”28 Therefore, even though Officers Lambert and

Stanfield did not possess a warrant, their entry into the carport of the house occupied

by Poag and Harry was justified for the purpose of determining whether anyone inside

posed a threat, was injured, or needed police assistance. The subsequent, warrantless

entry of Officers Stanfield and Hamm into the interior of the home itself was justified

for the same reason. Finally, the officers were justified in temporarily detaining

plaintiffs until they knew whether plaintiffs, or anyone else who might be inside the

home, presented a threat to their own safety or to the safety of others. 

28 Plaintiffs focus on the fact that the neighbor who placed the 911 call acknowledged that

the gunshot noises he heard could have emanated from the television. But it appears that the

neighbor only made that acknowledgment after the fact, during an interview with plaintiffs’

attorney. There is no indication that the neighbor made any such acknowledgment during his 911

call, or that the officers had any other reason to believe that the reported gunfire actually might have

been television noise.

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Because the defendant officers were justified in their warrantless entry into both

the carport and the home itself, and in their temporary detention of plaintiffs, no Fourth

Amendment violation occurred. At the very least, in light of Holloway, defendants did

not violate any of plaintiffs’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and 

plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claims are due to be

dismissed. 

2. Excessive force claim

Plaintiffs also contend that defendants’ detention of them while they conducted

a search of the premises constituted excessive force.29 “The Fourth Amendment’s

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be

free from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284

F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95

29 Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶ 87 (alleging that defendants “entered Plaintiff

Poag’s and Plaintiff Harry’s home and arrested and detainment [sic] Plaintiffs Poag, Harry, and

Haney at gunpoint, which was an unreasonable and excessive use of force, and was without consent,

a warrant or exigent circumstance and without probable cause”). Defendants assert that the

excessive force claim should not be considered independently, and, indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has

held that claims for excessive force used during an unlawful arrest are subsumed by the underlying

unlawful arrest claim. Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Under this Circuit’s

law, however, a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in the illegal

stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive force claim.”). However, if, as here, the

underlying arrest or seizure has been deemed to be constitutional, the excessive force claim should

be considered independently. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Once

summary judgment is granted in Ferraro’s favor on the wrongful arrest claim, Lee’s claim that the

officer used excessive force must be analyzed independently.’). 

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(1989)). The reasonableness inquiry is an objective one: “the question is whether the

officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham,

490 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted). In other words, “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will

not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force;

nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force

constitutional.” Id. (citations omitted) (alteration supplied).

The court may consider a number of factors when determining whether the force

applied was “reasonable” under the circumstances, including: (1) the “severity, or lack

of severity, of the alleged crime in issue,” id. at 396; (2) “whether the person against

whom the force was used posed an immediate threat to the safety of the police or

others,” id.; (3) “the need for the application of force,” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d

1156, 1170 n.18 (11th Cir. 2000); (4) “the relationship between the need and the

amount of force used,” id.; (5) “the extent of the injury inflicted,” id.; (6) “whether the

force was applied in good faith or maliciously and sadistically,” id.; (7) “the possibility

that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous,” id.;

(8) “the possibility that the suspect may be armed,” id.; (9) “the number of persons

with whom the police officers must contend at one time,” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1170

n.18; and (10) “whether the suspect was resisting or fleeing.” Id. 

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“Use of force must be judged on a case-by-case basis ‘from the perspective of

a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Post

v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Graham, 490

U.S. at 396) (alteration supplied). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about

the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at

396-97.

The only use of force plaintiffs allege is defendants’ use of guns to secure

plaintiffs in the carport while they determined whether anyone in the house either

posed a danger to the officers or needed assistance. It is important to note that

defendants did not shoot plaintiffs, or even touch plaintiffs with their guns; instead,

they simply pointed the guns at plaintiffs in order to coerce their cooperation. The

Eleventh Circuit has held that “an officer’s drawing a weapon and ordering a person

stopped to lie on the ground does not necessarily constitute excessive force during an

investigatory stop.” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1171-72. There is no reason to conclude,

under the circumstances presented here, that defendants’ use of guns in a show of force

was disproportionate to the demands of the situation. Defendants did not know any

whether crime had been committed, but the potential crimes reported to them by

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dispatch included murder, the most violent of all crimes. As such, it was reasonable

for defendants to assume that plaintiffs might present an immediate threat to their own

safety or the safety of others. Defendants did not know whether plaintiffs were armed

or otherwise dangerous, or whether they might attempt to flee. Finally, plaintiffs were

not injured during the conrontation, and there is no indication that defendants acted

maliciously or sadistically. 

In light of the foregoing circumstances, this court concludes that plaintiffs have

not stated a viable claim for violation of their right to be free from excessive force. At

the very least, they have not stated a clearly established violation of that right. As

such, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

excessive force claim is due to be dismissed. 

B. Constitutional Claim Against the City of Florence

Plaintiffs assert the following to support their “Failure to Train” claim against

the City of Florence: 

89. The City of Florence failed to train its police officers,

including Defendants named herein, with the necessary training so that

such officers could reasonably respond to incomplete, inaccurate and/or

uncorroborated information provided by a 911 caller without an excessive

show of force, excessive use of police presence, without drawing

weapons, and without violating the civil rights of innocent citizens.

90. The City of Florence failed to provide its officers with the

necessary training regarding exceptions to the warrant requirement, such

[that] officers could reasonably respond to an incomplete, inaccurate

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and/or uncorroborated information [sic] provided by a 911 caller without

an excessive show of force, excessive use of police presence, without

drawing weapons, and without violating the civil rights of innocent

citizens.

91. These failures to train render the City of Florence liable, as the

duties assigned to police officers, and the need for more or different

training is so obvious, and the inadequacy is so apparent, that the lack of

training has and will likely continue to result in police officers violating

the civil rights of innocent citizens.

92. As a result of the City’s conduct, Plaintiff have been caused to

suffer injuries and damages, including embarrassment and humiliation,

and to incur expenses.

Doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 89-92 (alteration supplied). 

The City asserts that plaintiffs’ claim is precluded by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

 There, the Court held that a municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

on a theory of respondeat superior: in other words, “a municipality cannot be held

liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Id. at 691. Instead, a municipality may

be held accountable in damages for the conduct of a particular governmental actor only

when the plaintiff shows that execution of the municipality’s official “policy” or

“custom” effectively was the cause of the injury complained of. Id. at 694. Thus, “[t]o

impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that

constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy

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or custom caused the violation.” T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole

County, 610 F.3d 588, 603 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d

1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)) (alteration supplied). 

This court agrees that plaintiffs cannot proceed with their claim against the City,

because plaintiffs have not demonstrated any underlying violation of their

constitutional rights. Accordingly, all of plaintiff’s federal claims against the City of

Florence are due to be dismissed. 

C. State Law Claims

Jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining claims — for false arrest/false

imprisonment and trespass under Alabama law — was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1367,

the statute governing supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. In cases where

the court’s jurisdiction is based solely upon a federal question, the district court has

discretion to entertain state claims that are “supplemental” to the federal claim. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a). The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

when:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction, or

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(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling

reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (alteration and emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court added a

gloss to this statutory language in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343

(1988), when observing that

a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage

of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case

brought in that court involving pendant [now “supplemental”] state-law

claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly

belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out

of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the

federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the

case without prejudice.

Id. at 349-50 (emphasis supplied) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent [now

supplemental] jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining

state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7 (alterations supplied); see

also L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir.

1984) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly

encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims”) (emphasis supplied).

Here, all of plaintiff’s federal claims have been eliminated, and there is no

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independent basis for this court to assert jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.30

Accordingly, this court will decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state

law claims, and will exercise its discretion to dismiss those claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In accordance with the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims

asserted in plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. It is ORDERED that

all of plaintiffs’ federal claims (Counts I-V) are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Plaintiffs’ state law claims (Counts VI and VII) are DISMISSED, but without prejudice

to plaintiffs’ right to refile them in a state court. Costs are taxed to plaintiffs. The

Clerk is directed to close this file. 

DONE this 12th day of October, 2016.

______________________________

United States District Judge

30 Plaintiffs cannot assert federal jurisdiction based on satisfaction of the requirements of the

diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because complete diversity of citizenship is not present. See 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (requiring that, in addition to an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, the

civil action must be between “citizens of different States”). All plaintiffs and defendants are citizens

of Alabama. See doc. no. 17 (First Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 5, 8, 11, 14, 17. 20, 23. 

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