Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY C. ENGEL,

2:03-CV-2403-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MICHAEL BARRY, ET AL.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

On or about May 1, 2006, Plaintiff Mary C. Engel filed a

Motion to Amend the Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.1

Plaintiff alleges the Court committed a number of reversible

errors in its April 21, 2006, Order. Primarily, Plaintiff

alleges the Court erroneously construed her invasion of privacy

claim as one under state rather than federal law.

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Case 2:03-cv-02403-MCE -KJM Document 96 Filed 05/19/06 Page 1 of 4
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Plaintiff goes on to argue the Court was in error for granting

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim, due process claim, conspiracy claim, and

deliberate indifference claim. The Court finds no error in its

earlier ruling and, consequently, denies Plaintiff’s Motion to

Amend the Judgment in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

The Court has previously set forth a detailed factual

background for this action in its Order of August 17, 2004, which

is incorporated by reference and need not be reproduced herein.

(Mem. & Order 2-5).

ANALYSIS

1. Privacy Claim

The Court steadfastly maintains its position that

Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy was pled solely as a

state law claim. On that basis alone, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Amend the Judgment can be denied. However, in an abundance of

caution and in order that Plaintiff can be fully satisfied the

Court addressed her every grievance, the Court will undertake an

analysis of a federal privacy complaint as though it had been

properly pled.

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Case 2:03-cv-02403-MCE -KJM Document 96 Filed 05/19/06 Page 2 of 4
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3

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint is far from a

model of clarity and, certainly, bends the liberal pleading rules

to their farthest extreme. Nonetheless, to the extent a federal

claim for privacy could be drawn from the Complaint, it is

subject to the bar set forth in Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477

(1994). Pursuant to Heck, a Section 1983 action that would call

into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or

confinement is not cognizable, and does not, therefore, accrue

until and unless the plaintiff can prove that her conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal. Id. at 486-87. 

Thus, when a plaintiff files a Section 1983 action, the court

must determine whether “...a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has

already been invalidated.” Id. While Plaintiff’s conviction has

been “set aside,” it has not been invalidated and continues to

stand as a legal reality and, consequently, as a bar to certain

of her claims. See Mem. & Order, February 9, 2005; see also Heck

at 486-87.

Plaintiff plead nolo contendere to the charge of child

endangerment. In order to receive and accept such a plea from an

accused, a factual basis for the plea must have been stated by

the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant while under oath. 

In order for Plaintiff to succeed on this Section 1983 claim

alleging an unconstitutional invasion of her privacy under the

Fourth Amendment, the underlying factual basis for her conviction

would need to be largely, if not entirely, invalidated.

Case 2:03-cv-02403-MCE -KJM Document 96 Filed 05/19/06 Page 3 of 4
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Destroying the factual basis upon which her conviction rests

would certainly imply the invalidity of her conviction. Such a

result is strictly prohibited by Heck.

CONCLUSION

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that she properly

pled a federal claim for invasion of privacy and denies her

Motion to Amend the Judgment on that ground. However, as a

secondary and independent basis for denying her Motion, the Court

finds that, to the extent a federal cause of action for invasion

of privacy could be drawn from the Complaint, it is barred by the

Heck doctrine. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 18, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-02403-MCE -KJM Document 96 Filed 05/19/06 Page 4 of 4