Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01403/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01403-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHY WESTFALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-01403-L-NLS

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; AND (2) GRANTING 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Pending before the Court in this mortgage foreclosure action is a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by Defendant Bank of 

America, N.A. (“Defendant” or “Bank of America”). Defendants Nationstar Mortgage 

Servicing (“Nationstar”), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) and 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) filed a notice of joinder in 

Bank of America’s motion. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant replied. For the 

reasons which follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is granted 

leave to amend.

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I. Background

On October 28, 2004, a grant deed was recorded in Plaintiff’s name as purchaser of a 

home in Carlsbad, California. (See Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Ex. A.) In 

June 2006, Plaintiff obtained a $795,000 loan from Aegis Wholesale Corporation

(“Aegis”). The loan was secured by a deed of trust. (See RJN Ex. B.) It listed Aegis as the 

lender, Commonwealth Land Title (“Commonwealth”) as the trustee, and MERS as the 

beneficiary, solely as nominee for the lender. In 2012, the beneficial interest under the 

deed of trust was assigned from Aegis to Deutsche Bank. In September 2014, another 

assignment was recorded, reflecting that Deutsche Bank assigned the beneficial interest 

under the deed of trust to Nationstar. At the same time, a substitution of trustee was 

recorded, reflecting that Veriprise Processing Solutions, LLC was substituted in place of 

Commonwealth, the original trustee.

In February 2015, a notice of default was recorded, reflecting that Plaintiff had 

defaulted on her loan as of February of 2015. On May 15, 2015, a notice of trustee’s sale 

was recorded. On June 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging: (1) 

violations of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.

(“RESPA”), (2) violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.

(“TILA”), (3) wrongful foreclosure, (4) quiet title, (5) cancellation of instruments, (6) 

violation of California Civil Procedure Code § 2923.5, (7) violation of California Unfair 

Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code §17200, et. seq. (“UCL”), and (8) unjust 

enrichment. As of the date of the motion to dismiss, the property had not been foreclosed, 

and the Court has not been otherwise notified. 

Plaintiff claims Aegis was not the real lender providing the funds used to close escrow 

for the purchase of her property, that funds were advanced by the real lender Bank of 

America, and therefore, the loan was fraudulently originated. She argues that the loan and 

chain of title is broken, and that Defendants must be enjoined from taking any actions to 

foreclose.

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II. Legal Standard

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted where the complaint

lacks a cognizable legal theory. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 622 F.3d

1035, 1041(9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Alternatively, 

a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory, yet fails to 

plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 

530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume the truth of all factual 

allegations and construe them most favorably to the nonmoving party. Huynh v. Chase 

Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997, 999 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006). However, legal conclusions 

need not be taken as true merely because they are couched as factual allegations. Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 

286 (1986). Similarly, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not 

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1998).

III. Discussion

A. RESPA Violations

a. 12 U.S.C. §2605

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to respond to her qualified written request 

(“QWR”) in violation of 12 U.S.C. §2605(e)(1)(B). Defendant argues this claim is time 

barred. Claims for damages under §2605 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. 

12 U.S.C. §2614. The statute begins to run at the time of the alleged failure to respond. 

Falcocchia v. Saxon Mtg., Inc., 709 F.Supp.2d 860 (E.D. Ca. 2010). Plaintiff alleges she 

submitted her QWR in 2014. Therefore, her §2605 claim was timely filed.

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff fails to allege she had submitted a QWR. (See 

Mot at 7.) Plaintiff attached the QWR to her opposition brief. Generally, courts may not 

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consider material outside the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). 

However, documents referenced in the complaint whose authenticity is not questioned by 

the parties, but which are not attached to the complaint, may also be considered without 

converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Fecht v. 

Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (superseded by statute on other 

grounds). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the QWR. To the extent 

Defendant’s motion is based on the contention that Plaintiff did not allege she submitted 

a QWR, the motion is DENIED.

b. 12 U.S.C. §2607

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant violated RESPA by giving or accepting 

kickbacks and unearned settlement fees in violation of 12 U.S.C. §2607. Defendant again 

argues for dismissal based on the statute of limitations. The statute for a claim under 12 

U.S.C. §2607 is one year from the date of the alleged violation. 12 U.S.C. §2614. 

Plaintiff’s complaint was filed approximately nine years after the alleged violation. (See

Compl. ¶ 61-65.) When, as here, the motion to dismiss is based on the statute of 

limitations bar, it may be granted if, “[a]ccepting as true the allegations in the complaint, 

as [the Court] must when reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ... the 

running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Hyunh, 465 F.3d at 997 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The expiration of the limitations period 

for the §2607 claim is apparent on the face of the complaint.

However, the statute may be equitably tolled in the appropriate circumstances. The 

tolling suspends the limitations period until the borrower discovers or reasonably could 

discover the violation. Merritt v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 759 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 

2014). If the plaintiff can show that he or she did not discover the violation because he or 

she did not have a reasonable opportunity, the statute is tolled even when the defendant 

did not attempt to conceal it. Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp, 811 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2016). 

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Plaintiff alleges in general terms that the statute should be tolled because Defendant 

fraudulently concealed its violations. (Compl. ¶65.) She does not allege, however, why 

she was unable to discover the violation for nine years. (See id. ¶¶61- 65.) Accordingly, 

her pleading is insufficient to meet the notice pleading requirement of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a) or the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) for alleging fraud. 

Without additional facts, Plaintiff cannot avail herself of equitable tolling. Accordingly, 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the RESPA claim for §2607 violations is GRANTED.

The Court next considers whether to grant leave to amend. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. 

v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 2004). Leave to amend 

shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "This policy is to 

be applied with extreme liberality." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 

1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In the 

absence of any apparent or declared reason -- such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, futility of amendment, etc. -- the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 

‘freely given.’" Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Dismissal with prejudice and 

without leave to amend is not appropriate without an apparent or stated reason why leave 

should not be granted. Id. Because it may be possible for Plaintiff to allege sufficient 

facts to avail herself of equitable tolling, LEAVE TO AMEND IS GARANTED.

B. TILA Violations

Next, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA claim as time barred. A one-year 

statute of limitations applies to claims for TILA violations. 15 U.S.C. §1640e. Plaintiff 

alleges that the violations occurred at the time of the loan transaction in 2006. She filed 

this lawsuit in June 2015. It therefore appears from the face of the complaint that, the 

TILA claim is time barred. Plaintiff argues the statute of limitations should be equitably 

tolled. (Compl. ¶ 74.) 

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“Equitable tolling is generally applied in situations ‘where the claimant has actively 

pursued his [or her] judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory 

period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s 

misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.’” O’Donnell v. Vencor, Inc., 465 

F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.2006). “Equitable tolling may be applied if, despite all due 

diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his 

[or her] claim. Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir.2000)(focus is 

on whether plaintiff’s delay was excusable); overruled on other grounds by SocopGonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1194-96 (9

th Cir. 2001)(en banc). “If a reasonable 

plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations 

period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit 

until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.” Id. at 1178. In the context of 

TILA damages, “the district courts...can evaluate specific claims of fraudulent 

concealment and equitable tolling to determine if the general rule would be unjust or 

frustrate the purpose of the Act and adjust the limitations period accordingly.” King, 784 

F.2d at 915. 

Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts demonstrating her inability to timely discover 

her TILA claim. Her allegation that she was unable to discover it due to, “among other 

things, the fraud committed against [Plaintiff] by the defendants” (Compl. ¶ 74), is to 

general to meet the pleading requirements. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is 

GRANTED. Because it may be possible for Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts, the motion 

is granted with LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Quiet Title

Defendant moves to dismiss the quiet title claim because Plaintiff has not tendered the 

amount she owes. Plaintiff argues she is not required to tender because Defendant’s 

fraudulent activity and lack of standing to collect the debt. (Compl. ¶ 85.)

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks, among other things, to set aside the foreclosure 

proceedings and prevent the sale of her property. “A valid and viable tender of payment 

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of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed 

of trust.” Karlsen v. Am.Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 (1971); see also 5 

Miller & Starr Cal. Real Estate §13:256 (4th ed. 2015). “Therefore, as a condition 

precedent to an action by the trustor to set aside the trustee’s sale on grounds that the sale 

is voidable, the trustor must pay, or offer to pay, the secured debt, or at least all of the 

delinquencies and costs due for redemption, before the action is commenced or in the 

complaint. This includes an action by the trustor to quiet title against the lender or other 

purchaser in foreclosure. Without an allegation of such a tender in the complaint that 

attacks the validity of the sale, the complaint does not state a cause of action.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that she meets the tender requirement because she alleges damage 

claims against Defendants, which would be offset against any amount she owes on the 

loan. (Compl. ¶ 86.) “[W]hen the person making the claim has a counterclaim or set-off 

against the beneficiary, whether liquidated or unliquidated, it is deemed that the tender 

and counter-claim offset each other, and if the offset is equal to or greater than the 

amount due, a tender is not required; otherwise the amount of the tender is reduced by the 

amount of the offset.” 5 Miller & Starr §13:256; see also Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal. 

App.4th 89 (2011). Plaintiff’s allegation falls under an exception to the general tender 

rule. In the alternative, tender is not required because Plaintiff alleges the title documents 

are void. See Cheung v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 987 F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D. Cal 2013); see 

also Fleming v. Kagan, 189 Cal.App.2d 791 (1961). Defendant’s motion to dismiss the 

quiet title claim is DENIED.

D. Cancellation of Instruments

a. Deed of Trust and Promissory Note

Defendant further moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for cancellation of instruments. 

Pursuant to California Civil Code §3412, “[a] written instrument, in respect to which 

there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a 

person against whom it is void or voidable, may upon his application, be so adjudged, 

and ordered to be delivered up or cancelled.” Cal. Civ. Code §3412. Cancellation requires 

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the written instrument to be void, or voidable. See generally Robertson v. Super. Ct.

(Brooks), 90 Cal.App.4th 1319 (2001).

Defendant argues the cancellation claim is time barred. Ordinarily, a four-year 

statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure 343 applies in a suit to 

cancel a written instrument. Robertson, 90 Cal.App.4th at 1326. However, when the 

alleged claim involves fraud or mistake, the applicable statute is for three years from the 

time of discovery of the facts constituting fraud or mistake. Id.; Zakaessian v. 

Zakaessian, 70 Cal. App. 2d 721, 725 (1945); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §338(4). 

The deed of trust and the note Plaintiff seeks to cancel were executed in 2006. 

Accordingly, they are barred by the four-year statute of limitations. However, because 

Plaintiff claims the documents are fraudulent, she may be able to avail herself of the 

three-year statute of limitations, which accrues upon discovery. Plaintiff’s only relevant 

allegation regarding discovery is that it was “recent.” This conclusory statement is 

insufficient to meet the pleading requirements. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss the cancellation claim with respect to the note and deed of trust is GRANTED. 

Because it may be possible for Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts regarding discovery to 

bring the claim within the tree-year statute of limitations, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND.

b. Notice of Default, Notice of Trustee’s Sale and Assignment 

The notice of default, notice of trustee’s sale, and the assignment were executed on 

February 12, 2015, May 12, 2015, and December 19, 2012, respectively. The cancellation 

claim is therefore not time barred. Alternatively, Defendant argues Plaintiff as the

borrower lacks standing to sue over alleged defects in the transfer or assignment of a 

borrower’s promissory note. (Mot. at 14.) However, a borrower has standing to sue for 

wrongful foreclosure on grounds that the assignment of the note and deed of trust is void. 

Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 62 Cal.4th 919 (2016). Defendant’s standing 

argument is therefore rejected.

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Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s claim, based on the allegation that the 

assignment was invalid because it was made by MERS, fails because MERS acted in its 

capacity for the lender, Aegis. Plaintiff counters that Aegis was never a valid beneficiary, 

thus rendering the assignment void, and precluding Aegis from trying to collect on the 

note or foreclosing under the deed of trust. In the absence of legally effective assignment

of the deed of trust, Plaintiff claims, Defendants have no standing to foreclose on her 

property, thus rendering the notice of default and notice of trustee’s sale they recorded 

null and void.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim for cancellation of the 

assignment, notice of default and notice of trustee’s sale. Defendant’s motion in this 

regard is therefore DENIED.

E. Violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.5

Defendant also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for violation of California Civil 

Code Section 2923.5, which provides that a notice of default may not be recorded unless 

the borrower is contacted by the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent and 

provided options to avoid foreclosure. Plaintiff’s claim in this regard is based on the 

theory that the mortgage servicer’s declaration, signed by Jennifer Talbot for Nationstar 

in September 2014, regarding compliance, was false. However, because the related notice 

of default was rescinded in January of 2015 (see RJN Ex. G), this claim appears to be 

moot.1 Alternatively, Nationstar, MERS and Deutsche Bank argue that section 2923.5 

does not apply at all. It applies only if several requirements are met, including that the 

property at issue “is the principal residence of the borrower.” Cal. Civ. Code §2924.15. 

Plaintiff admits the property is her “secondary residence.” (Compl. at 2.) Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss it is therefore GRANTED.

 

1 The requirement imposed by California Civil Code §2923.5 may be preempted by 

the federal Home Owner’s Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §1464 (“HOLA”). Because the parties do 

not raise the issue, and the claim is dismissed on other grounds, the Court does not 

address preemption.

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F. Violation of the UCL

Defendant further moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim for lack of statutory 

standing. To have standing under the UCL, a plaintiff must show (1) a loss or deprivation 

of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact; and (2) that the economic 

injury was the result of, or caused by, the unfair business practice that is the gravamen of 

the claim. Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 81 (2013). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in deceptive business practice with respect 

to mortgage servicing, assignment of deeds of trust and the filing of fraudulent 

foreclosure documents. She alleges she has suffered injury including the imminent loss of 

her property, damage to her creditworthiness, and money paid to Defendants as a result of 

their unfair business practices. (Compl. ¶ 102.) She also states that she paid for services 

of a forensic loan auditor and attorney to protect her constitutional and property rights.2

Id. Plaintiff’s allegation of a diminished credit score caused by Defendants’ unfair 

business practices is sufficient to support standing under the UCL. Alborzian v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 235 Cal.App.4th 29 (2015). For purposes of pleading, 

Plaintiff has sufficiently established standing under the UCL. 

Defendant also maintains that Plaintiff did not allege any unlawful act so as to support 

a UCL claim. “An unlawful business practice under section 17200 is an act or practice, 

committed pursuant to a business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.” 

Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Yolo County Super. Ct. (Preciado), 135 Cal.App.4th 263, 287 

(2006)(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant’s argument is rejected 

because, as discussed above, some of Plaintiff’s claims survive Defendant’s motion. 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL claim is DENIED.

 

2 As to her claims that she had to pay for an attorney, the proper focus is on whether 

Plaintiff undertook expenditures in response to, and to counteract, effects of Defendants’

alleged misconduct, rather than in anticipation of litigation. These expenses therefore do 

not appear to lend themselves to a UCL claim. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. LT Napa 

Partners LLC, 234 Cal.App.4th 1270 (2015).

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G. Unjust Enrichment

Finally, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. The claim is 

based on the contention that this is an action based in equity, and that Defendant was not 

legally authorized to collect money from Plaintiff because it was not the rightful loan 

servicer, thus acquiring a benefit at her expense. However, it is undisputed that Defendant 

was, at least for a time, the loan servicer on Plaintiff’s loan. For example, Plaintiff sent 

Defendant a QWR on September 22, 2014, presumably because she believed Defendant 

was the loan servicer. Plaintiff fails to sufficiently articulate a plausible factual theory to 

show that Defendant wrongfully acquired a benefit at her expense by collecting her

mortgage payments. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim is 

therefore GRANTED. Because it may be possible for Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts in 

support of this claim, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part as follows: 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for violation of RESPA under 12 

U.S.C. §2605 is DENIED.

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for violation of RESPA under 12 

U.S.C. §2607 is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

3. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for TILA violations is GRANTED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

4. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the quiet title claim is DENIED. 

5. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for cancellation of the note and deed of 

trust is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for cancellation of the notice of 

default, notice of trustee’s sale and assignment is DENIED.

7. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for violation of California Civil Code 

Section 2923.5 is GRANTED.

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8. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL claim is DENIED.

9. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim is GRANTED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

10.No later than April 29, 2016, Plaintiff may file and serve an amended 

complaint, if any. 

11.Defendant’s response, if any, shall be filed and served no later than the time 

specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3). If Plaintiff does not file 

an amended complaint as provided herein, Defendant’s answer, if any, shall be 

filed and served no later than May 13, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2016

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