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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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f FI L·E D 

Uflired States Court of .t\pp,:ais UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Ckcuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DODD INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., 

a Colorado corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY ) 

COMPANY; FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE ) 

UNDERWRITERS, INC.; FIDELITY AND GUARANTY) 

INSURANCE COMPANY; and FIDELITY AND ) 

GUARANTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

) 

) 

F£B 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECK.ER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1390 

(D.C. No. 87-B-585) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before LOGAR, SEYMOUR, and T.ACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff Dodd Insurance Services, Inc. appeals from an order 

of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of 

defendants based on a magistrate's report. Plaintiff contends the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment on its claims of 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1390 Document: 010110098446 Date Filed: 02/05/1991 Page: 1 
f 

• misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and 

punitive damages, and further in failing to allow plaintiff to 

amend its complaint. We affirm. 

This case results from the termination of agency agreements 

entered into by the T. B. Dodd Agency (Dodd) and plaintiff, Dodd's 

successor insurance agency. On July 1, 1977, Dodd entered into an 

agency agreement with defendant Fidelity and Guaranty Life 

Insurance Company (F&G Life). This agreement provided for 

termination by either party at any time upon written notice to the 

other. The other three defendants, United States Fidelity and 

Guaranty Company, Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 

Inc., and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company (collectively 

USF&G) entered into an agency agreement with plaintiff on 

September 1, 1984. That agreement made no reference to the 1977 

agreement between Dodd and F&G Life, but contained a provision 

stating that it superseded all previous agreements between USF&G 

and plaintiff. That agreement further contained the following 

provision concerning termination: 

Either party may terminate this Agreement upon written 

notice to the other. The Agent [plaintiff] and Company 

[USF&G] agree that such notice shall be effective 

immediately if either party has failed to comply with 

any provision of this agreement. If notice is given by 

the Company to the Agent and the Agent has complied with 

all the provisions of this Agreement: (1) the effective 

date of such termination will be at least one hundred 

eighty (180) days from the date notice is given; and (2) 

the Company will, at the Agent's request, offer its 

Limited Agency Agreement to the Agent. 

Finally, the agreement required USF&G and plaintiff to make a good 

faith effort to provide for rehabilitation and avoid termination 

of the agreement. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1390 Document: 010110098446 Date Filed: 02/05/1991 Page: 2 
f 

When Dodd became involved in bankruptcy proceedings, its 

owners sold the company to plaintiff by a Purchase Agreement dated 

January 17, 1985. In February 1985, Dodd and plaintiff sent the 

following notice to defendants: 

This is to advise that all first year and renewal 

commissions becoming payable on or after January 17, 

1985, on all business including Life, Accident and 

Health Policies, issued by or through ... [defendants] 

pursuant to Agency Agreements dated September 1, 1984 

and July 1, 1977, and credited to the account of T. B. 

Dodd Agency, Inc., have been sold and transferred 

to ••. [plaintiff] by Purchase Agreement dated January 

17, 1985, and you are hereby directed to pay such 

commissions directly to .•. [plaintiff]. 

We also agree to the transfer of the Agency Agreements 

and the Profit-Sharing Agreement of ... [defendants]. 

We further agree that any profit sharing earned during 

the calendar year 1985 shall likewise be tranferred 

to ••• [plaintiff]. 

On March 24, 1987, a representative of USF&G notified 

plaintiff that the 1984 agency agreement was to be terminated 

effective April 4, 1987. Plaintiff was offered a limited agency 

agreement. It accepted the limited agency agreement and executed 

it on March 30, 1987. This agreement states that it supersedes 

all previous agreements between USF&G and plaintiff. 

We review a district court's grant of a motion for summary 

judgment under the same standard applied by that court. Burnette 

Y.:.. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 1988). We 

must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. 

Id. In answering this question, we view all facts and inferences 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. If we 

find there is no genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the 

district court unless it misapplied the law. Osgood Y.:.. State Farm 

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Appellate Case: 89-1390 Document: 010110098446 Date Filed: 02/05/1991 Page: 3 
, 

' ) Mut. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Our review of 

legal questions is de novo. Carey Y..!. United States Postal Serv., 

812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987). 

We agree with the magistrate's determination that these three 

agreements by their plain language make clear that defendants were 

entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for breach of 

contract, willful and wanton breach of contract, and wrongful 

termination. The 1977 contract between Dodd and defendant F&G 

Life allowed for immediate termination upon written notice. 

Plaintiff succeeded to that contract and was bound by its terms. 

With respect to the other defendants, plaintiff's agreement to the 

limited agency agreement superseded any rights to notice that 

might have accrued under the 1984 contract with defendants USF&G. 

Thus, there was no breach of any of the contracts and no wrongful 

termination. 

We further agree with the district court that the 

misrepresentation claim does not meet the requirements of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The complaint did not identify 

specifically those persons who were alleged to have made the false 

representations nor did it specify when or how the alleged 

misrepresentations were made. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank Y..!. 

Carlstadt, 800 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir. 1986). The district 

court had no obligation to sua sponte construe the motion for 

summary judgment as a motion for a more definite statement. 

We further agree with the district court that plaintiff has 

made no showing of the existence of a fiduciary duty between 

plaintiff and defendants. A bare allegation in the pleadings of a 

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Appellate Case: 89-1390 Document: 010110098446 Date Filed: 02/05/1991 Page: 4 
fiduciary relationship is insufficient to overcome defendants' 

motion for summary judgment on this claim. See Vreeken Y-=.. Davis, 

718 F.2d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim in negligence which is 

in essence a restatement of its claims for breach of contract. We 

find no basis in the allegations that would support a negligence 

claim where we have found that there has not been a breach of the 

contracts. See Strey Y-=.. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 749 F.2d 

1437, 1441 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870 (1986). 

Because plaintiff has failed to establish a cause of action on any 

of its claims sufficient to withstand defendants' motion for 

summary judgment, the district court did not err in refusing to 

award punitive damages. 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying its motions to amend the complaint by 

including claims of defamation, concealment, deceit, fraud, and 

misrepresentation. We review the denial of motions to amend on an 

abuse of discretion standard. Leave to amend pleadings out of 

time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court. Las Vegas Ice and Cold 

Storage Co.~ Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 

1990). The district court is required, however, to state the 

reasons for denying leave to amend. Federal Ins.~ Y-=.. Gates 

Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987). In this case, 

the district court stated two adequate reasons for denying 

plaintiff's motion. First, the proposed amendments were untimely 

and filed substantially after the action was commenced. First 

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Appellate Case: 89-1390 Document: 010110098446 Date Filed: 02/05/1991 Page: 5 
City Bank, N.A. Y..!.. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 

1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1987) (district court acts within bounds of 

its discretion when it denies leave to amend for untimeliness or 

undue delay). Second, plaintiff failed to show it could frame a 

complaint that would allege claims upon which relief could be 

granted. Schepp Y..!.. Fremont County, Wyoming, 900 F.2d 1448, 1451 

(10th Cir. 1990) (district court justified in denying motion to 

amend if proposed amendment could not have withstood a motion to 

dismiss). We cannot say that under these circumstances the 

district court abused its discretion. The order of the district 

court based on the magistrate's report is AFFIRMED. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-1390 Document: 010110098446 Date Filed: 02/05/1991 Page: 6