Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00349/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00349-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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 Plaintiff occasionally refers to CDCR as “DOCR” (short 1

for Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation). For the sake

of consistency with the complaint and prior decisions in this

case, the district court will use CDCR in this memorandum

decision. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SPENCER PETERSON III, 

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION, RONALD HANSEN,

DERRAL ADAMS, AND DOES 1-20, 

Defendants.

1:06-CV-00349 OWW LJO

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS

(DOC. 20) 

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an employment discrimination case filed by Spencer

Peterson III (“Plaintiff”), a California Correctional Officer,

against the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and two of Plaintiff’s former 1

supervisors, Ronald Hansen and Derral Adams (collectively

“Defendants”). On March 28, 2006, Defendants removed this case

from Superior Court for the County of Kings. (Doc. 1.) 

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2

Plaintiff essentially alleges that, because of his race, he was

deprived of promotional opportunities, timely performance

evaluations, and the opportunity to pursue a graduate degree. 

The original complaint raised claims under (1) Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and (3) and

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code §

12940 et seq. The second and third claims were dismissed,

leaving only the Title VII claim. (Doc. 17.) CDCR now moves for

summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit more than six months after receiving

his 90 day right-to-sue notice. (Doc. 20 at 2.) Plaintiff does

not dispute the timing of his filing. Rather, he asserts that

the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because 

(a) he was led to believe that filing a case before the State

Personnel Board (“SPB”) was a necessary prerequisite to suit, and

(b) he filed suit within thirty (30) days of SPB’s issuance of a

decision denying his request for re-hearing. (Doc. 22. at 2.)

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an African-American resident of Visalia,

California. (See Compl. at ¶3.) In 1986, Plaintiff began

working for CDCR at the California Medical Facility, in

Vacaville, California, where he maintained an “exemplary”

employment record. (Compl. at ¶9.) In 1997, he was transferred

to a position within the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility

(“SATF”) in Corcoran, California. (Id. at ¶10.) While at

Corcoran, Plaintiff was promoted to the rank of Correctional

Sergeant. (Id. at ¶11.) 

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3

Beginning in March 2004, Plaintiff asserts that he “began to

suffer racially discriminatory employment practices.” (Id. at

¶12.) Specifically, the complaint alleges three types of

discriminatory activity occurred. First, the complaint alleges

that Defendant Hansen refused to “approve or sign” plaintiff’s

regular performance evaluation:

[I]n November 2003, plaintiff’s supervisor conducted

plaintiff’s regular performance evaluation, submitting

plaintiff’s evaluation up the chain of command to

Custody Captain, defendant Ron Hansen, for his approval

pursuant to established CDCR practice/procedure. 

Without justification or explanation, defendant Hansen

refused to approve or to sign plaintiff’s evaluation. 

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the evaluation

remains unsigned and unapproved by defendant Hansen, as

of the date of filing of this complaint.

(Id. at ¶12a.) Second, the complaint alleges that Defendant

Adams refused to approve Plaintiff’s request to pursue a graduate

degree: 

[O]n February 4, 2004, without justification or

explanation, defendant Warden Derral Adams refused to

sign an Endorsement form required in order for

plaintiff to be admitted to a Doctoral educational

program through the University of LaVerne, for which

plaintiff was otherwise qualified and admitted. 

Plaintiff submitted this Endorsement form to defendant

Warden Adams on three separate occasions; nevertheless,

defendant Warden Adams remained steadfast in his

refusal to sign the form. Defendant Warden Adams’

refusal to sign the plaintiff’s Endorsement form caused

a delay in plaintiff’s entry into the Doctoral program

of approximately a year, in turn resulting in monetary

damages, and other damages including lost opportunity

costs, to plaintiff.

(Id. at ¶12b.) Finally, the complaint alleges that on various

occasions Plaintiff was either passed over for promotion to

Lieutenant or was denied the opportunity to apply for a

promotion, despite being qualified to serve as a Lieutenant. 

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4

On March 16, 2004, plaintiff interviewed for promotion

to Correctional Lieutenant. Although plaintiff was

rated as competitive, he was denied the promotion. 

On June 17, 2004, plaintiff again interviewed for

promotion to Correctional Lieutenant. Again plaintiff

rated well; again he was denied the promotion. 

On December 6, 2004, plaintiff again interviewed for

promotion to Correctional Lieutenant. Defendant Hansen

sat as head of the promotions panel for this

promotional opportunity. Although all interviews,

including those earlier interview(s) in which plaintiff

had rated competitive, and although plaintiff performed

better than he had in the prior, March 16, 2004

interviews, Defendant Hansen’s panel inaccurately rated

plaintiff as non-competitive; thereafter and thereupon,

candidates other than plaintiff, who were not AfricanAmerican, and who were in truth less qualified for the

position than was plaintiff, were promoted instead of

plaintiff. 

On April 14, 2005, CSATF conducted interviews for

Correctional Lieutenant. Defendants CDCR, plaintiff

believes, defendants Adams and/or Hansen participated

in causing plaintiff to not be notified that these

Lieutenant’s position interviews were occurring, and

thereby caused plaintiff to be improperly excluded from

participating in these interviews, although plaintiff

had properly applied for the position and had properly

requested, as part of that application process, to be

included among the interviews. 

(Id. at ¶12c-f.)

On April 28, 2005, Plaintiff filed a race discrimination

complaint with CDCR’s Office of Civil Rights, complaining that he

was not “given equal consideration for promotional advancement,”

that the Custody Captain refused to sign his employee performance

evaluation, and that the Warden refused to allow him to enroll in

the Doctoral program. (See Doc. 5-3 at ¶I and Ex. A.) 

On May 11, 2005, CDCR’s Discrimination Investigations Unit 

responded in writing to Plaintiff’s April 28, 2005 complaint. 

CDCR concluded that the allegations did “not warrant an Equal

Employment Opportunity (EEO) investigation at this time,” and

informed Plaintiff of his appeal rights:

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5

If you wish to appeal our decision, you must file your

complaint with the State Personnel Board, Appeals

Division...within 30 days of receipt of this letter. 

You may also present your complaint to the California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing and/or the

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 

(Plaintiff’s Exh. B.)

On May 25, 2005, Plaintiff appealed CDCR’s decision to the

State Personnel Board (“SPB”). (See Doc. 5-3, ¶¶ III, IV & XI

and Ex. C & D.) 

On June 6, 2005, before action was taken on his SPB appeal,

Plaintiff filed a similar complaint with the EEOC’s Fresno

office, asserting that his rights under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 had been violated by CDCR’s conduct. 

On July 11, 2005, Plaintiff received a letter from

California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”),

explaining that the EEOC had “referred” Plaintiff’s EEOC

complaint to DFEH. (Doc. 20, Ex. 2.) Nevertheless, DFEH

explained, DFEH would not be responsible for processing the

complaint. That responsibility would remain with the EEOC. 

Accordingly, DFEH explained that it was closing Plaintiff’s case

“on the basis of ‘processing waived to another agency.’” (Id.) 

DFEH further explained that its letter would serve as Plaintiff’s

“right-to-sue notice.” In pertinent part, the letter states:

NOTICE TO COMPLAINANT OF RIGHT-TO-SUE

Since DFEH will not be issuing an accusation; this

letter is also your right-to-sue notice. According to

Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), you may

bring a civil action under the provisions of the Fair

Employment and Housing Act against the person, employer

labor organization or employment agency named in the

above-referenced complaint. The lawsuit may be filed

in a State of California Superior or Justice Court. 

Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b),

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6

provides that such a civil action must be brought

within one year from the date of this notice. Pursuant

to Government Code section 12965, subdivision (d)(1),

this one-year period will be tolled during the pendency

of the EEOC’s investigation of your complaint. You

should consult an attorney to determine with accuracy

the date by which a civil action must be filed. The

right to file a civil action may be waived in the event

a settlement agreement is signed. Questions about the

right to file under federal law should be referred to

the EEOC. 

The DFEH does not retain case records beyond three

years after a complaint is filed. 

Remember: The Right-To-Sue Notice allows you to file a

private lawsuit in State court. 

Sincerely, 

Wanda J. Kirby

Deputy Director

Enforcement Division.

(underlining in original, bold emphasis added).

On August 9, 2005, the Department of Justice declined to

pursue Plaintiff’s claim and sent him a notice of his right to

sue within 90 days. The letter states, in its entirety

Dear Mr. Peterson, III:

Because you filed the above charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Commission

has determined that it will not be able to investigate

and conciliate that charge within 180 days of the date

the Commission assumed jurisdiction over the charge and

the Department has determined that it will not file any

lawsuit(s) based thereon within that time, and because

you have specifically requested this Notice, you are

hereby notified that you have the right to institute a

civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 41 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., against the

above-named respondent. 

If you choose to commence a civil action, such

suit must be filed in the appropriate Court within 90

days of your receipt of this Notice. If you cannot

afford or are unable to retain an attorney to represent

you, the Court may, at its discretion, assist you in

obtaining an attorney. If you plan to ask the Court to

help you find an attorney, you must make this request

of the court in the form and manner it requires. Your

request to the court should be made well before the end

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7

of the time period mentioned above. A request for

representation does not relieve you of the obligation

to file suit within this 90-day period. 

This Notice should not be taken to mean that the

Department of Justice has made a judgment as to whether

or not your case is meritorious. 

Sincerely, 

Brad Schlozman

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Civil Rights Division

by Karen L. Ferguson

Supervisory Civil Rights Analyst

Employment Litigation Section. 

cc: San Francisco District Office, EEOC

California Dept. of Corrections

(emphasis added).

Meanwhile, Plaintiff’s SPB action, filed on May 25, 2005,

was still pending. On August 30, 2005, a SPB administrative law

judge conducted a full adversary evidentiary hearing on all of

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. Defendants Adams and Hansen

all testified under oath. (Id. at ¶ V.) On September 23, 2005,

the ALJ wrote a proposed decision, ruling that Plaintiff failed

to establish a prima facie claim of race discrimination and

granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Id. at ¶ VI.) The SPB

adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision as its own on October 3,

2005. (Id. at ¶ VII.) 

On November 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed a request for rehearing

of the SPB’s decision.

In early November 2005, the 90-day statute of limitations

for filing Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claim expired. 

On January 27, 2006, Plaintiff’s request for re-hearing of

the SPB’s decision was denied. Under California Government Code

section 11519(a) the SPB’s decision became final on February 26,

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8

2006. (Id. at ¶X.) Plaintiff had thirty days to seek judicial

review. Cal Gov. Code § 11523. 

Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court for the County of

Kings on March 28, 2005, within the thirty day time limit set

forth in section 11523, but, as discussed, not within the 90 day

time limit set forth in the EEOC’s Notice of right-to-sue letter.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

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9

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is brought pursuant to

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race....” A person claiming to be aggrieved by an

unlawful employment practice may file a complaint with the Equal

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Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 

The EEOC may thereafter choose to pursue the matter or may

dismiss it after an investigation, if there is no “reasonable

cause to believe that the charge is true...” Id. If the matter

is dismissed, the EEOC must “promptly notify the person claiming

to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action.” Id. Upon

receipt of notice of dismissal, the aggrieved party has ninety

days within which to file a civil action:

If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to

subsection (b) of this section is dismissed by the

Commission...the Commission...shall so notify the

person aggrieved and within ninety days after the

giving of such notice a civil action may be brought

against the respondent named in the charge...by the

person claiming to be aggrieved....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 

Here, it is undisputed that the United States Department of

Justice notified Plaintiff on August 9, 2005, by certified mail,

that he had ninety days within which to sue. That ninety day

notice period would have expired some time in early to midNovember, three months later. Plaintiff did not file his lawsuit

until March 28, 2006, six and one-half months after receiving the

90 day right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Plaintiff does not

dispute the timing of his filings in relation to the various

deadlines. However, he submits that his untimeliness should be

excused by the application of either state or federal equitable

tolling doctrines.

//

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//

//

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The two cases cited by Plaintiff in support of applying 2

the California tolling doctrine involve federal causes of action

without their own statutes of limitations. Alberti v. City and

County of San Francisco, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (1998),

concerns Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, to

which the court applied California’s one-year statute of

limitations for personal injury actions because there is no

11

A. Equitable Tolling.

Title VII’s statute of limitations “is not a jurisdictional

requirement; it may be waived, and equitably tolled.” Sloan v.

West, 140 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff asserts

that his case should be deemed timely filed under either

California or Federal equitable tolling principles. 

1. Application of California Equitable Tolling

Doctrine.

Plaintiff suggests that California’s equitable tolling

doctrine may be applied to his Title VII claim. (Plaintiff

dedicates the bulk of his opposition brief to discussing why

Plaintiff’s circumstances satisfy California’s equitable tolling

doctrine.) As a threshold matter, however, Plaintiff is mistaken

about the applicability of California’s equitable tolling

doctrine to a Title VII claim. Plaintiff cites a number of cases

in which state tolling doctrines are applied to federal claims,

but none involving Title VII. This is because state tolling

doctrines are only applicable to federal claims that borrow

statute of limitations periods from state law. For example,

because neither 42 U.S.C. § 1981 nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contain

their own statutes of limitation, the applicable limitations

period is borrowed from state law. Donoghue v. Orange County,

848 F.2d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1987). In that context, state

tolling doctrines may be applied to federal claims. Id. 

2

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statute of limitations provided by Congress. Similarly, in

Donoghue, 848 F.2d at 930 & n.3, the Ninth Circuit applied state

tolling doctrines to § 1983 and § 1985 claims, both of which

borrow statutes of limitations from state law, but not to a §

1986 claim, which contains its own statute of limitations. 

Finally, Retail Clerks Union Local 648, AFL-CIO v. Hub Pharmacy

Inc., 707 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1983), concerned claims

brought under § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, which

also looks to state law for the applicable statute of limitations

and, accordingly, to state law for equitable tolling doctrines. 

Id. at 1034. 

12

However, where the applicable federal statute already has its own

statute of limitations, state tolling doctrines do not apply. 

See id. at 930 n.3 (refusing to apply California’s state tolling

doctrine to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which

contains its own one-year statute of limitations). “When

Congress has provided a federal statute of limitations for a

federal claim...state tolling provisions are not applicable.” 

Brown v. Hartshorne Public School Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961

(10th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply state tolling doctrine to

Title VII claim) (citing Davis v. Smith's Transfer, Inc., 841

F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir. 1988); Garrison v. Int'l Paper Co., 714

F.2d 757, 759 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983)). State tolling doctrines do

not apply to Title VII claims. 

B. Application of the Federal Tolling Doctrine.

1. Threshold Issue: Does The Strict Construction Rule

Apply to State Government Entities?

Defendant cites Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498

U.S. 89, 93-94 (1990), for the proposition that because the

statute of limitations contained within Title VII is “a condition

on the [government’s] waiver of sovereign immunity [it] must be

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strictly construed.” Irwin, however, was a suit brought by an

individual against a federal government agency. Here, Plaintiff

brings a Title VII action against a state government entity. The

federal government voluntarily waived its sovereign immunity when

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under such

circumstances, courts apply a canon of statutory construction --

sometimes called the “sovereign immunity canon” –- that requires

all waivers of sovereign immunity to be read narrowly in favor of

the sovereign. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94; United States v.

Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (waiver of sovereign

immunity “must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign”

and “not enlarge[d]...beyond what the language requires”). In

contrast, the States did not consent (at least not directly) to

application of the Civil Rights act of 1964 to state government

entities. Rather, Congress validly abrogated the states’

sovereign immunity, to apply the terms of Title VII to the

states. See Jones v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 205

F.3d 428, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Defendant cites no authority for

the proposition that the sovereign immunity canon applies to

provide additional protection to state entities under Title VII. 

Cf. id. (suggesting that the so-called “no-interest rule,” under

which interest can be awarded against the United States only

pursuant to an express waiver of immunity from interest, does not

apply to the states; “abrogation of the states’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity does not require the same level of

specificity”). 

//

//

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2. Analysis.

There is no question that the ninety-day period within which

to file a civil action after dismissal of the charge by the EEOC

is a statute of limitations subject to the federal equitable

tolling doctrine. Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380

(9th Cir. 1997). As a general rule, to determine whether

equitable tolling is available in a particular case, a court must

examine “whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling

the statute of limitations in given circumstances.” Valenzuela

v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1986)(citing

Burnett v. N.Y. Central Railroad, 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965)). 

Equitable tolling is, however, to be applied “only sparingly.” 

Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). For

example, equitable tolling may be applied “where the complainant

has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into

allowing the filing deadline to pass,” id., or “when

extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control [such

as severe mental incapacity], made it impossible to file a claim

on time,” Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, courts are generally “much less forgiving in receiving

late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence

in preserving his legal rights.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. 

Here, as evidence of “misconduct,” Plaintiff points to the

April 28, 2005 letter sent by CDCR’s Discrimination Investigation

Unit to Plaintiff, denying Plaintiff’s civil rights claim and

informing him:

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15

If you wish to appeal our decision, you must file your

complaint with the State Personnel Board, Appeals

Division...within 30 days of receipt of this letter. 

You may also present your complaint to the California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing and/or the

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit B.) This letter, Plaintiff asserts, was

“wrongful” because it misled him “into a wholly unneeded SPB

proceeding, knowing it [would] be so lengthy [that his]

limitations periods [would] expire.” (Doc. 22 at 7.) But this

letter is not evidence of misconduct or trickery. CDCR correctly

informed him of the manner by which he could appeal their

decision. It nowhere directly suggested that he had to file an

appeal with the SPB in order to exhaust his administrative

remedies. 

The essence of Plaintiff’s claim for equitable tolling is

essentially that he operated under a mistaken understanding of

how he should exhaust his state administrative remedies. He came

to believe that pursuing a state appeal of CDCR’s determination

through the SPB was the final step he would be required to take

to fully exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff explains

in his declaration:

I pursued the SPB administrative action as an

alternative dispute resolution to civil litigation, for

the purpose of seeking redress for [] the racially

discriminatory treatment visited upon me by the CDCR

upon which my complaints to EEOC and DFEH, and this

suit, are based. I also pursued all three of these

proceedings in order to fulfill the mandate that I

exhaust my administrative remedies prior to initiating

the present lawsuit if I was unsuccessful in resolving

the matter through one or another from among the SPB,

the EEOC, or the DFEH proceedings. Thus, once I

pursued administratively with the SPB to the point that

I understood I had to file in court to pursue it

further, it was my belief that, together with the

receipt of right to sue notices from EEOC and DFEH,

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when the SPB issued its final decision, I had finally

accomplished what was required of me, before being

allowed to file suit properly. 

(Plaintiff’s Decl., Doc. 24, at ¶3.) Plaintiff suggests that his

confusion over the administrative exhaustion requirement, coupled

with CDCR’s letter instructing him to file a complaint with the

SPB if he wished to appeal CDCR’s internal decision, justifies

the application of equitable tolling. 

The Ninth Circuit has applied equitable tolling in some

cases where the plaintiff misunderstood various aspects of the

complex legal scheme applicable to discrimination cases. For

example, in Valenzuela, 801 F.2d at 1174, the plaintiff received

a 90-day right to sue letter from the EEOC. 801 F.2d at 1172. 

She filed a Title VII complaint within the 90-day period, but

filed it in California state court, rather than federal court. 

Id. at 1172-73. The claims filed in state court were dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff subsequently re-filed in

federal court, but after the expiration of the 90-day period. 

Id. The defendant moved to dismiss on statute of limitations

grounds. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that initial filing in

state court tolled the statute of limitations because “the

purpose underlying the 90-day time period was satisfied. 

[Defendant] was not confronted by a stale claim. Nor was it

deprived of an opportunity to preserve the appropriate evidence.” 

Id. at 1175. The Valenzuela court placed particular emphasis on

the plaintiff’s diligence:

//

//

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Throughout these proceedings, [plaintiff] exercised

great diligence, however unartfully, in pursuing her

claim. Her only misfortune lay in the selection of an

inappropriate forum. That selection, however, was not

without a reasonable basis [because at the time of the 

selection, it was not clear whether federal courts had

exclusive jurisdiction in Title VII cases]. 

Id. 

But, Valenzuela is distinguishable from the instant case. 

The plaintiff in Valenzuela did at least file some kind of state

court action within the 90-day window. In contrast, Plaintiff

filed no court claims until more than six months after receiving

his 90-day right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. Plaintiff asserts

that he thought he had to pursue his SBP appeal to its completion

prior to pursuing a claim in court, but Plaintiff nowhere

explains how he reconciles this misunderstanding with the

explicit instruction in the EEOC letter that he must file his

complaint within 90 days and with the explicit warning in the

letter he received from the DFEH indicating that he should

consult the EEOC with any questions about his right to file under

federal law. 

Another potentially relevant case is Sloan v. West, 140 F.3d

1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, a federal employee was

terminated by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. 

Plaintiff pursued numerous avenues for relief, including

initiating a complaint with the Army's Equal Opportunity Office

(“EEO”), alleging that he was fired because of racial animus. 

The EEO investigator recommended a finding of no discrimination. 

Sloan requested a hearing before the EEOC, which was subsequently

held. But, before the EEOC could issue a decision, Sloan

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requested that the matter be remanded to the Army's EEO office

for final determination, so that he could appeal his case to the

Merit System Protection Board (“MSPB”) as a “mixed claim” of

civil service procedural violations and discrimination, rather

than pursuing the discrimination claim alone through the EEOC. 

The EEOC remanded the case as requested, and the Army eventually

issued a finding of no discrimination. Sloan then appealed the

EEO decision to the MSPB, which eventually ruled that it did not

have jurisdiction over the matter because no “adverse action” had

been taken against Sloan. In the portion of the Sloan opinion

that is relevant here, the Ninth Circuit noted that: 

Ordinarily, if the MSPB finds it lacks jurisdiction

over either the entire case, or over one of the claims,

it will dismiss the complaint and/or claims; advise the

employee to seek appropriate review of any extrajurisdictional non-discrimination claims through other

channels within the agency; and advise the employee to

pursue any discrimination claims by filing a complaint

with the agency EEO and otherwise exhausting

administrative remedies pursuant to Title VII. 29

C.F.R. § 1614.302(b) (1997). When a discrimination

complaint is dismissed by the MSPB for lack of

jurisdiction, the statute of limitations for filing the

complaint with the agency EEO is considered to have

been tolled by filing the complaint with the MSPB.

Id. at 1257-58. 

Here, Plaintiff’s filing of the SPB appeal is somewhat

similar to Sloan’s filing of the MSPB appeal. The MSPB was

created by the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et.

seq., as a “quasi-judicial Government agency to adjudicate

Federal employee appeals of agency personnel actions.” Id. at

1258-59. The SPB serves a similar function. Among other things,

the SPB oversees California’s Civil Service System. See

http://www.spb.ca.gov/aboutspb.htm. But, Sloan only stands for 

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In an apparent attempt to explain his confusion over 3

the administrative exhaustion doctrine and the various filing

deadlines, Plaintiff further asserts that “he is a layperson

without formal legal education or training...” (Id. at ¶4.) 

However, Plaintiff then acknowledges that he consulted with an

“attorney with a pre-paid legal service about pursuing redress

for the discrimination [he] suffered....” 

 Pursuant to that advice, [Plaintiff] understood that

[he] was required to exhaust administrative remedies

prior to initiating suit with the EEOC, DFEH, and with

the SPB. [He] also understood that no time limitation

would bar [him] from pursuing a lawsuit until some time

after [he] received right to sue letters from EEOC and

DFEH and until [he] had pursued the SPB administrative

matter to a point when, it would be plain, that my next

available step was to file in court.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff reiterates these two points in paragraphs 5

through 7 of his declaration.

5. As a layperson unskilled in the law, I found the

three different administrative proceedings confusing;

but I tried my best to fulfill these requirements and

to achieve resolution of my complaint, before filing

suit. It was my confusion about the interactions

between these various requirements that caused me to

file with the SPB a document that I titled “EEO

Complaint Appeal.”

6. I believed that I had not fulfilled all of the

prerequisites to filing my lawsuit until the point in

time when I received the SPB final decision in response

to my request for rehearing. At that point it was

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the proposition that Plaintiff’s filing of his SPB appeal would

have tolled the statute of limitations for filing his race

discrimination complaint with the EEOC in the first place. Sloan

does not stand for the proposition that the filing of an SPB

appeal tolls the deadline for filing his federal civil rights

lawsuit once the EEOC explicitly notified him that he had 90 days

within which to file his lawsuit.3

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clear to me that my next step was to file in court.

Thus, I filed my lawsuit on 2/27/06, which was within

30 days after I received the SPB decision served by

mail from Sacramento on 01/27/06.

7. At all times throughout these proceedings I have

pursued, I believe diligently, what I believed pursuant

to the advice I received were all the available and

appropriate remedial procedures. I have done so with

the utmost of good faith.

Although Plaintiff does appear to have pursued those

remedies he thought necessary in good faith, Plaintiff’s

acknowledgment that he consulted an attorney weighs against the

application of equitable tolling. Once a claimant retains

counsel, “tolling ceases because [the claimant] has gained the

means of knowledge of [his or her] rights and can be charged with

constructive knowledge of the law's requirements.” Leorna v.

United States Dept. of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997). 

However, although Plaintiff acknowledges having consulted an

attorney, he appears not to have retained one to act on his

behalf during the administrative process. The extent of the

lawyer’s involvement is not clear, but it does not appear from

the record that Plaintiff’s consultation with an attorney was

extensive enough to charge him with constructive knowledge of the

nuances of the applicable administrative process. The principle

enunciated in Leorna does not control here. 

20

Although Valenzuela and Sloan do not directly support

tolling in this case, they are just fact-specific examples of a

broader inquiry into “whether congressional purpose is

effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in [the] given

circumstances.” Valenzuela, 801 F.2d at 1174. The supreme court

has held that Title VII as a whole has a “remedial purpose,”

while particular purpose of the 90-day limitations period is to

“give prompt notice to the employer.” Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)(“By holding compliance

with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to

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filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as

well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial

purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the

particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt

notice to the employer.”).

Here, Plaintiff exhibited diligence in his efforts to pursue

his discrimination claims throughout the end of 2005 and early

2006. CDCR must have been aware of these efforts, as it was a

party to the SPB appeal. The parties received notice of the

SPB’s adoption of the ALJ’s decision on October 3, 2005.

Plaintiff requested rehearing on November 4, 2005, but did not

receive a response until January 27, 2006. Although the request

for rehearing may ultimately have been unnecessary for the

purposes of exhausting his administrative remedies, Plaintiff

asserts that he thought it was required. At the very least, CDCR

was on continuous notice of Plaintiff’s efforts. 

In addition, the notice Plaintiff received on May 11, 2005

from CDCR’s Discrimination Investigations Unit is ambiguous, if

not confusing, as to whether Plaintiff was required to file an

appeal before the SPB prior to filing suit. Plaintiff reasonably

relied upon the various notices he received and the advice of an

attorney to reach the conclusion that he must fully exhaust all

available administrative remedies prior to pursuing judicial

relief. 

Accordingly, although this case presents a very close call,

the general remedial purposes of Title VII are served by tolling

the statute of limitations, while the specific purpose of the

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tolling statute -- to give prompt notice to the employer -- is

not compromised by the exercise of equitable tolling. CDCR’s

motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, CDCR’s motion for summary

judgment on statute of limitations grounds is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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