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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

CARMEN ARCHULETA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

THE COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS, 

DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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FILED 

United Statea Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

JUiJ 2 0 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1370 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 82-M-91) 

Richard c. LaFond and Jay Khandke, Denver, Colorado, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Carolyn Lievers, Deputy Attorney General, Human Resources Section, 

(Duane Woodard, Attorney General, Charles B. Howe, Deputy Attorney 

General, and Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, with her on the 

brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and BROWN,* 

District Judge. 

BROWN, District Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Senior 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Carmen Archuleta was terminated from her 

job with the Colorado Department of Youth Services. She filed suit 

in the district court against her former employer and supervisors. 

Plaintiff asserted various claims, including a claim that the 

defendants retaliated against her for filing a prior sex discrimination complaint ( 4 2 u.s. c. § 2 oooe-3) , a claim for sexual 

harassment amounting to a constructive discharge (42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-2), as well as claims for deprivation of the right to 

procedural and substantive due process (42 u.s.c. § 1983). The 

district court dismissed the claim under § 2000e-2 because the 

plaintiff had not submitted it first to the EEOC. The court also 

granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims. The 

claim for retaliation was tried to the court. After hearing all 

of the evidence, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to 

show that the defendants retaliated against her because of the 

prior sex discrimination complaint. Plaintiff appeals the district 

court's entry of judgment on these claims in favor of the 

defendants. We affirm. 

Plaintiff began working as a Youth Service Worker in June of 

1974. She consistently received standard or above standard job 

performance evaluations from her supervisors, defendants Grant and 

Davis. In February of 1979, plaintiff received her first below 

standard evaluation. In subsequent months she received two more 

substandard evaluations, and, after a hearing with her appointing 

authority, the department terminated her employment. Plaintiff 

appealed her termination to the Colorado State Personnel Board. 

2 

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In that proceeding, she alleged that she had been terminated 

without cause and had been discriminated against on account of her 

sex. A hearing officer determined that the department had 

dismissed the plaintiff without cause. The hearing officer found 

that the defendant Davis had acted with maliciousness and bad faith 

toward the plaintiff in giving her unjustifiably low performance 

evaluations. Addendum to App. Brief at 11. The hearing officer 

also found that plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination was not 

supported by the evidence. Id. at 8-11. The officer ordered the 

department to reinstate the plaintiff and suggested that she be 

placed with a different supervisor. Id. at 12. 

Plaintiff was reinstated in October of 1980. She was given 

a new supervisor and was assigned to a juvenile detention unit for 

boys. Plaintiff alleged that numerous instances of sexual 

harassment occurred at this center. 1 After numerous requests, she 

was transferred to Lookout Mountain, a facility for female 

juveniles. Plaintiff was diagnosed as being pregnant in March 

1985. She took maternity leave in July of 1985 and returned to 

work on January 27, 1986. The parties' accounts of the plaintiff 1 s 

return to work after her maternity leave differ in several 

respects. The plaintiff contends that she found out after working 

on January 27th that she was supposed to work a double shift the 

next day. When plaintiff went home on January 28th, however, she 

found that her baby was sick. Plaintiff called her supervisor to 

tell him that she could not work the shift that evening because her 

1 Plaintiff filed the instant suit in January of 1982. 

3 

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baby was sick and also because her doctor had given her a note 

stating that she should not be working double shifts. Plaintiff 

contends that the supervisor accused her of faking the note and 

then told her to bring the baby to work if there was no other 

alternative. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that 

plaintiff was given her work schedule on January 13, two weeks 

before she returned to work. on January 28, plaintiff requested 

a schedule change and was told by her supervisor that the request 

would be considered for the next scheduling period. Shortly before 

plaintiff's January 29 shift was to start, she called her 

supervisor at his home and told him she could not come to work 

because she did not have a babysitter. The defendants contend 

there was no mention of the child being sick. The plaintiff's 

supervisor was forced to fill in for her. The defendants assert 

that the supervisor, a male, had to violate department policy by 

working the late shift at a facility for female juveniles. The 

supervisor tried several times during the shift to contact the 

plaintiff, but was told that she was unavailable. A man 

identifying himself as the plaintiff's attorney called the 

supervisor during the shift and argued with him about the 

plaintiff's schedule. The plaintiff subsequently called the 

supervisor and told him that she was on medical leave. Plaintiff 

did not report to work on January 29 or on February 1, which was 

her next scheduled shift. The facility director then sent 

plaintiff a letter of termination for not reporting to work as 

scheduled. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 4 
I. Retaliation - 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-3. 

The first issue raised by appellant is whether the district 

court erred in ruling against her on the claim for retaliation 

under 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-3. That section makes it unlawful for an 

employer to discriminate against an employee because of the 

employee's opposition to an employment practice made unlawful under 

Title VII or because of the employee's participation in an 

investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII. In order to 

establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must 

show: 1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination or 

participation in a proceeding arising out of discrimination; 2) 

adverse action by the employer subsequent to the protected 

activity; and 3) a causal connection between the employee's 

activity and the adverse action. Allen v. Denver School Board, 928 

F.2d 978 (lOth Cir. 1991). In this case, the plaintiff alleged 

that she engaged in protected activity by filing the sex 

discrimination complaint with the Colorado State Personnel Board 

after her termination in 1979. Plaintiff alleged that this 

activity prompted various employees of the Department to harass her 

after she was reinstated. Plaintiff further contended that her 

ensuing termination in 1986 was caused by this allegation of sexual 

discrimination in the 1980 complaint. 

The plaintiff presented evidence of problems that occurred 

after her reinstatement in 1980. Based on this evidence, the 

district court determined that the plaintiff had made out a prima 

facie case of retaliation. The court was particularly concerned 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 5 
by the fact that plaintiff was assigned to a facility for male 

juveniles after she was reinstated. The defendants responded by 

producing evidence of the circumstances surrounding the alleged 

incidents of harassment and plaintiff's discharge and by asserting 

that plaintiff was dismissed for legitimate reasons. The plaintiff 

contended that these asserted reasons were a pretext for 

discrimination. After hearing all of the evidence, the court 

concluded that the plaintiff had not been retaliated against for 

filing a sex discrimination complaint. Although the court did not 

specifically determine whether the 1986 termination was justified, 

the court found that the termination was not caused by the prior 

sex discrimination charge. Tr. IV at 131. The court indicated 

that some of the plaintiff's problems with the agency may have been 

caused by the hearing officer's findings that plaintiff had been 

unjustly fired in 1979 and that defendant Davis had acted 

maliciously in giving her low evaluations. The district court 

noted that some people in the agency did not agree with these 

findings. The court reiterated, however, that the prior sex 

discrimination complaint played no part in the plaintiff's 

subsequent problems with the department. Id. at 134-35. 

Appellant contends that the district court erred because it 

ruled that by losing the sex discrimination claim in 1980, 

plaintiff was barred as a matter of law from showing retaliation. 

This argument misconstrues the district court's findings. After 

discussing the difficulties inherent in determining what motivates 

any conduct, the court concluded that the defendants did not 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 6 
retaliate for the claim of discrimination, stating: "But I am 

satisfied that it was not the sex discrimination charge which, 

after all, the hearing officer absolved the agency of, but it was 

the finding of malice and animus that was, at least for some of the 

persons acting on behalf of the agency, was somewhat influential." 

Tr. IV at 131. In response to an objection from plaintiff's 

counsel that the motivations of the agency could not be separated 

in this manner, the court explained that it was simply "contrary 

to logic ... , contrary to common sense .•• , [and] contrary to 

human nature" to believe that the defendants retaliated after being 

absolved on the sex discrimination complaint. Id. 

Clearly, a plaintiff need not be successful on an original 

charge of discrimination in order to have a valid claim of 

retaliation. See Romero v. Union Pacific Railroad, 615 F.2d 1303, 

1307 (lOth Cir. 1989). There is no indication in the record, 

however, that the district court ruled that losing the sex 

discrimination complaint barred the plaintiff as a matter of law 

from showing retaliation. Rather, the court found that plaintiff 

failed to show as a factual matter that the adverse actions were 

taken because of the prior discrimination complaint. The 

determination of what motivates an employer's conduct is "both 

sensitive and difficult," and is treated as a pure question of fact 

subject to Rule 52 (a)'s clearly erroneous standard. Pitre v. 

Western Electric Company, 843 F.2d 1262, 1266 (lOth Cir. 

1988) (citing United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. 

Aikens, 460 u.s. 711, 103 s.ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) and 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 7 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 

66 (1982)). See also Love v. RE/MAX of America. Inc., 738 F.2d 

383, 386 (lOth Cir. 1984)(The determination of whether a causal 

connection exists between protected activity and an adverse employment action is subject to review under the "clearly erroneous" 

standard) . Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, 

the factfinder•s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 

84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 

The district court's determination that plaintiff was not 

retaliated against for filing the prior sex discrimination charge 

is not clearly erroneous. Appellant failed to show that her filing 

of a sex discrimination complaint played any part in the subsequent 

problems with her employer. As the district court indicated, there 

is some evidence in the record that personal animosity may have 

played a part in the plaintiff's termination in 1986. Title VII 

prohibits discrimination based only on certain enumerated factors, 

however, one of which is an employee's opposition to sex 

discrimination. Title VII does not ensure that employees will 

always be treated fairly or that they will be discharged only for 

meritorious reasons. Although the dismissal of an employee without 

cause may contribute to an inference of unlawful discrimination, 

it does not require such a finding. In the instant case, there was 

testimony that the plaintiff "did not fit in" because she had taken 

on the department and prevailed on her claim that she was fired 

without cause. Some people in the department may have held a 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 8 
grudge against the plaintiff because of that ruling. Be that as 

it may, plaintiff's allegation in 1980 that she was fired without 

cause in violation of departmental regulations was not an activity 

protected by Title VII. 2 There was a noticeable lack of evidence 

tying any of the plaintiff's problems to the 1980 claim of sex 

discrimination. As the district court noted, the hearing officer 

exonerated Davis on the charge of sex discrimination. Although 

retaliation could occur whether or not the plaintiff prevailed on 

this claim, the record bears no suggestion that plaintiff's 

supervisors bore a grudge against her for alleging sex 

discrimination. After her reinstatement, plaintiff had no contact 

at all with her former supervisors. There was testimony which, if 

believed, indicated that the Division of Youth Services does not 

discriminate against its employees on the basis of sex. There was 

some evidence that the plaintiff had personality conflicts with 

several co-workers, both male and female. In sum, there was a lack 

of direct or circumstantial evidence to support the plaintiff's 

claim. The problems that arose after plaintiff's reinstatement in 

1980 occurred under different supervisors and bore no apparent 

2 Appellant contends that under Title VII it was unlawful for 

the defendants to take any action against her arising out of her 

participation in the 1980 personnel hearing. Section 2000e-3 is not 

so broad, however. It prohibits discrimination against an employee 

because the employee participated "in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 

u.s.c. § 2000e-3. "This subchapter" refers to subchapter VI (Equal 

Employment Opportunities) of Chapter 21 on Civil Rights. To the 

extent appellant alleged in 1980 that she was terminated without 

cause in violation of state regulations, the personnel hearing was 

unrelated to Title VII's provisions against discrimination and was 

not a proceeding within the purview of § 2000e-3. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 9 
relationship to the charge of sex discrimination. Taken as a 

whole, the record does not establish that any actions taken against 

the plaintiff were in retaliation for activity protected under 

Title VII. 

II. Sex Discrimination - 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2. 

Appellant's next contention deals with her claim of sex 

discrimination under § 2000e-2. Appellant states that this claim 

was based on both pregnancy and sex discrimination. The district 

court ruled that to the extent she was not alleging retaliation, 

plaintiff had to submit this claim to the EEOC before pursuing it 

in court. Appellant contends this was error because the § 2000e2 claim was reasonably related to charges previously filed with 

EEOC. Citing Brown v. Hartshorne Public School District #1, 864 

F.2d 680, 682 (lOth Cir. 1988) (Judicial relief may be sought 

without exhausting administrative remedies if the discrimination 

alleged is reasonably related to a charge already submitted to 

EEOC) . We agree with the district court that the allegations here 

raised matters unrelated to plaintiff's prior EEOC charge. 

Plaintiff explained to the district court that the § 2000e-2 claim 

encompassed two allegations: 1) that after being reinstated 

plaintiff was harassed in retaliation for engaging in protected 

activity, and 2) that after 1980 the defendants engaged in 

pregnancy-based sex discrimination and sexual harassment that 

amounted to a constructive discharge. Tr. VI at 10-11. The 

plaintiff's first allegation was the subject of her claim under 

§2000e-3. Plaintiff was allowed to go forward on the retaliation 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 10 
claim and presented all of the evidence in support of that claim 

to the court. Thus, the court did not err in dismissing the claim 

under § 2000e-2 insofar as it was based on retaliation. Moreover, 

we agree with the district court that plaintiff's second 

allegation, concerning sexual harassment and pregnancy-based 

discrimination that was not retaliatory in nature, raised matters 

that were unrelated to plaintiff's prior EEOC complaint. The 

allegation that a new supervisor at a different facility engaged 

in sexual harassment or pregnancy-based discrimination in 1986 was 

not shown to be reasonably related to the issues raised in the EEOC 

complaint dealing with plaintiff's 1980 termination. 

III. Substantive Due Process - 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 

Appellant's final argument is that the court erred in 

dismissing her claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 for deprivation of the 

right to substantive due process. 3 This claim was brought against 

defendants Grant and Davis, plaintiff's former supervisors, and was 

based on the low job evaluations plaintiff received in 1979. 

Appellant contends that the defendants' evaluations were malicious 

and caused her appointing authority to terminate her employment in 

1980. 4 Appellant argues that Grant and Davis are liable for 

3 Appellant initially alleged that she was also deprived of 

a right to procedural due process after she was reinstated in 1980. 

That argument was waived by appellant's counsel at oral argument. 

4 The plaintiff alleged that the performance evaluations 

written and adopted by defendants Davis and Grant were arbitrary 

and that these evaluations led to her termination in 1980. Although 

it is not in the record before us, the parties apparently 

stipulated in the district court that the opinion of the hearing 

officer would serve as evidence of what happened in 1979. Because 

of this and because there is no contrary evidence in the record, 

11 

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arbitrarily depriving her of a property right in continued 

employment. 5 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 

that a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 

property without due process of law . . " U.S. Const. Amend. 

XIV. Although the phrase "due process" connotes a right to a fair 

hearing, the Supreme Court has recognized that the clause contains 

a substantive component as well. See ~, Moore v. City of East 

Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494, 97 s.ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). If 

an individual's right to property is entitled to the protection of 

substantive due process, the state may not arbitrarily take that 

property from the owner. Cf. Harrah Independent School District 

we assume for purposes of this opinion that the plaintiff's 

allegations are true-- i.e. that Davis' substandard evaluations of 

the plaintiff were unfounded and arbitrary and that these led to 

her termination in 1980. 

The district court indicated that plaintiff could not state 

a claim against Grant and Davis because they did not have the 

authority to fire the plaintiff. Only her appointing authority had 

such authority. An individual may be liable under § 1983, however, 

if that individual while acting under color of state law causes the 

deprivation of a federal right. In this context, we find that 

plaintiff raised a genuine factual issue as to whether her 

supervisors caused her termination through their low evaluations 

and their apparent recommendation that she be fired. Cf. Wulf v. 

City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 864 (lOth Cir. 1989). For example, 

we note that the hearing officer concluded in his analysis that 

"the higher authorities who directly took the actions appealed . . • acted in reliance on Davis and his reports and evaluation. . •• 11 See Doc. 36, Exhibit A, Analysis of Evidence at 5. 

Plaintiff did not argue in the district court that her 

termination in 1986 was a deprivation of the right to substantive 

due process caused by defendants Grant and Davis. We therefore do 

not address that issue. 

5 Plaintiff does not argue that she was deprived of a liberty 

interest. our discussion therefore pertains only to plaintiff's 

property interest in continued employment. 

12 

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v. Martin, 440 u.s. 194, 99 s.ct. 1062, 59 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979) .

6 

The appellees do not contest the assertion that plaintiff had 

a property right in continued employment with the Department of 

Youth Services. Plaintiff could not be terminated from her 

position as a Youth Services worker without cause. After she 

received substandard evaluations from Davis in 1979, and after 

being provided an opportunity to respond to the charges against 

her, plaintiff was notified that her employment was terminated. 

Under Colorado law, such a termination was subject to an appeal to 

6 For purposes of this opinion, we assume, without holding, 

that the plaintiff's property interest is entitled to the 

protection of substantive due process. As we noted in Jacobs, 

Visconsi & Jacobs v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1119 (lOth 

Cir. 1991), it is not clear what interest is required to trigger 

substantive due process guarantees. It appears that the Supreme 

Court has not expressly determined whether all property is entitled 

to such protection. In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 

474 u.s. 214, 106 s.ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), a university 

student brought a substantive due process claim, alleging that he 

had a property interest in continued enrollment in an educational 

program and that the university had arbitrarily deprived him of 

that right. The majority in Ewing assumed for purposes of the 

opinion that such a property right was protected by substantive due 

process, but held that any such right was not violated because the 

university had not acted arbitrarily in dismissing the student from 

the program. In a concurrence, Justice Powell asserted that not all 

property rights are entitled to the protection of substantive due 

process. He contended that "[w]hile property interests are 

protected by procedural due process even though the interest is 

derived from state law rather than the Constitution, 

substantive due process rights are created only by the 

Constitution." Ewing, 474 u.s. at 229. Justice Powell would have 

held that the student's interest was not entitled to the protection 

of substantive due process, noting that as a state law contract 

right it bore "little resemblance to the fundamental interests that 

previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the 

Constitution." Id. at 229-30. Cf. Harrah Independent School 

District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 99 S.Ct. 1062, 59 L.Ed.2d 248 

(1979) (Reviewing non-renewal of a tenured teacher's contract under 

a substantive due process analysis). 

13 

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the Colorado State Personnel Board. Plaintiff appealed her 

termination to the Personnel Board, which ordered the Department 

of Youth Services to reinstate the plaintiff with back pay and 

benefits and to expunge the substandard evaluations from her 

personnel file. Plaintiff was also awarded attorney's fees. 

We find that under these facts the plaintiff cannot state a 

claim for deprivation of the right to substantive due process. The 

essence of the plaintiff's claim is that her supervisors caused 

the state to arbitrarily deprive her of the right to continued 

employment. Under the procedures established by the state to 

ensure that an employee is not terminated without cause, however, 

the plaintiff's property right in continued employment was 

reinstated through a post-termination hearing. All of the property 

rights that plaintiff asserted to have been wrongfully taken were 

restored by the decision of the State Personnel Board. In these 

circumstances, the plaintiff cannot now complain that the state has 

deprived her of property. Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539, 

104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 

concurring) ("When adequate remedies are provided and followed, no 

uncompensated taking or deprivation of property without due process 

can result.") Appellant does not dispute the fact that she 

received constitutionally adequate procedural due process when she 

was terminated. The plaintiff was given notice and an explanation 

of the disciplinary charges against her. She was then was afforded 

a pre-termination hearing with her appointing authority at which 

she presented her side of the story. After the appointing 

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authority decided nonetheless to terminate her, plaintiff followed 

the procedures set up by the state and was afforded an extensive 

post-termination hearing. The presiding hearing officer at the 

latter hearing found that plaintiff had been terminated without 

cause. 

Appellant asserts two reasons why she should be allowed to 

pursue the claim for deprivation of substantive due process. 

First, she argues that the deprivation of such a right is complete 

at the time of the official's action and that the existence of a 

post-deprivation remedy is irrelevant. Second, appellant maintains 

that the remedy provided by the State Personnel Board was 

inadequate because the Board could not award her damages for 

emotional distress or punitive damages. 

As appellant argues, courts have recognized that "if 

substantive constitutional rights are violated, the 

constitutionally recognized deprivation is complete at the time of 

the action, irrespective of the procedures available before or 

after the deprivation." Kauth v. Hartford Insurance Company of 

Illinois, 852 F. 2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1988) . See Zinermon v. 

Burch, 494 u.s. ___ , 110 s.ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). The 

rationale supporting this view is that procedural due process 

ensures that a state will not deprive a person of life, liberty or 

property unless fair procedures are used in making that decision; 

substantive due process, on the other hand, guarantees that the 

state will not deprive a person of those rights for an arbitrary 

reason regardless of how fair the procedures are that are used in 

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making the decision. Williams-El v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 224, 228 

{8th Cir. 1989). Based on this distinction, some courts have 

indicated that the fact that a fair state procedure exists in which 

the person could pursue a remedy for the deprivation does not 

preclude an action under § 1983 for violation of substantive due 

process. See ~' Williams, supra. Conversely, at least one 

circuit has stated that the availability of an adequate state postdeprivation hearing may preclude an action for substantive due 

process in some circumstances. See Kauth, 852 F.2d at 958 ("Given 

the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Parratt and Hudson, 

however, we believe that in cases where the plaintiff complains 

that he has been unreasonably deprived of a state-created property 

interest, without alleging a violation of some other substantive 

constitutional right or that the available state remedies are 

inadequate, the plaintiff has not stated a substantive due process 

claim.") 7 We need not decide the difficult question of when, if 

ever, the existence of an adequate state procedure in which the 

plaintiff could seek a remedy for the deprivation of his or her 

property precludes a claim for substantive due process. Cf. 

Zinermon v. Burch, supra. We decide only that because a 

procedurally adequate post-termination hearing actually resulted 

7 The references in the quoted material are to Parratt v. 

Taylor, 451 u.s. 527, 101 s.ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 {1981) and 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 

(1984). These cases stand for the proposition that in certain 

circumstances a person deprived of the right to property by an act 

of a state official cannot state a § 1983 claim for violation of 

the right to procedural due process if the state makes available 

a constitutionally adequate post-deprivation remedy. 

16 

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in the plaintiff's reinstatement, together with back pay for the 

temporary deprivation of her employment, the plaintiff cannot now 

state a substantive due process claim under § 1983 predicated on 

the loss of employment. 

It would be unrealistic in this case to treat procedural and 

substantive due process as completely separate matters. Although 

the two are not interchangeable, both serve as safeguards against 

abusive state action. Where the state action is the dismissal of 

a tenured public employee, the procedural safeguard required by the 

Constitution typically includes a pre-termination as well as a 

post-termination hearing. See Cleveland Board of Education v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 

(1985). Such was the case here. The plaintiff was provided with 

a pre-termination hearing. Although the plaintiff was erroneously 

terminated after this initial hearing, that decision was corrected 

at a post-termination hearing and the plaintiff was reinstated with 

back pay. Thus, the procedure required by the Due Process Clause 

served its purpose-- it protected the plaintiff against arbitrary 

state action by restoring to her the property that was taken. 

Although ideally an unfounded disciplinary action would be detected 

at an initial pre-termination hearing, sometimes a mistaken 

decision will only become apparent through a more elaborate posttermination hearing. In Loudermill, the Supreme Court recognized 

that a pre-termination hearing is intended to serve as an initial 

and limited check against mistaken decisions. 470 U.S. at 545-46. 

It need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge. 

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Id. Such a limited pre-termination hearing serves to balance the 

competing interests of the individual employee and the state as the 

employer. Id. at 542-43. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 u.s. 134, 

168-70, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 {1974) (Powell, J., 

concurring). Although appellant contends that substantive rights 

and procedural rights must be viewed separately, we decline to 

adopt an impractical view of substantive due process that might 

undermine the balance outlined in Loudermill by effectively 

requiring a government employer to conduct a full evidentiary 

hearing before terminating an employee. See Loudermill, 470 u.s. 

at 546 {"To require more than [notice and an opportunity to 

respond] prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted 

extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.") See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

348, 96 s.ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ("At some point the benefit 

of an additional safeguard to the individual affected . . . and to 

society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, 

may be outweighed by the cost.") In this case, we conclude that the 

procedure established by the state provided the plaintiff with both 

procedural and substantive due process. 

Appellant recognizes that her property rights were restored 

but contends that the remedy provided by the Personnel Board was 

inadequate. She seeks punitive damages and damages for emotional 

distress, both of which she could not obtain from the Personnel 

Board. The fact that plaintiff could obtain more relief under § 

1983 does not mean that the remedy for the temporary deprivation 

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of her property was constitutionally inadequate. In Parratt v. 

Taylor, 451 u.s. 527, 544, 101 s.ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), 

a plaintiff alleging a deprivation of property without due process 

argued that he should be allowed to sue under § 1983 rather than 

pursue a state tort remedy because the state did not allow all of 

the relief that was available under § 1983. The Supreme Court 

rejected this argument, stating: 

Although the state remedies may not provide the 

respondent with all the relief which may have 

been available if he could have proceeded under 

§ 1983, that does not mean that the state 

remedies are not adequate to satisfy the 

requirement of due process. The remedies 

provided could have fully compensated the 

respondent for the property loss he suffered, 

and we hold that they are sufficient to satisfy 

the requirements of due process. 

Parratt, 451 u.s. at 544. Although the Parratt case did not 

specifically address the issue of substantive due process, the 

Court's conclusion that the available remedy was adequate to 

satisfy the requirements of due process is significant. We believe 

that the same principle would apply here, where the plaintiff has 

been fully compensated for the property loss she suffered, 

notwithstanding the fact that greater relief might be obtained 

under § 1983. 

IV. Conclusion. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 

is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1370 Document: 01019297083 Date Filed: 06/20/1991 Page: 19