Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-02244/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-02244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 Dora B. Schriro is substituted for her predecessor, Terry Stewart, as Director,

Arizona Department of Corrections. Fed.R.Civ P. 25(d)(1).

2 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. “ ROA-PCR” refers to the

post-conviction record in st at e court (CR-96-410-PC). “ME” refers to the minute entries of

the state court. “RT” refers to the court reporter’s transcript.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Lynn Styers, )

) CV-98-2244-PHX-EHC

Petitioner, )

) DEATH PENALTY CASE

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

) AND ORDER

Dora B. Schriro, et al.,1 )

)

Respondents. )

)

Petitioner James Ly nn St y ers has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging

that he is imprisoned and sentenced to death in violation of the United States Const it ution.

(Dkt . 1.) 2 His amended petition, filed September 3, 1999, raised nine claims. (Dkt. 63.) In

an Order dated September 22, 2000, the Court determined that Claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 were

p rocedurally barred and that Claim 9 lacked merit. (Dkt. 86.) The Court found that the

remaining claims were properly exhausted and subject to review on the merits. (Id.)

Petitioner submitt ed a brief on the merits of these claims. (Dkt. 90.) Respondents filed a

response (Dkt. 97) and Petitioner filed a reply (Dkt. 101).

This Order addresses the merits of Claims 3, 4, 5, and 7. For the reasons set forth

herein, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

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BACKGROUND

The following factual summary is taken in part from the decision of the Arizona

Supreme Court upholding Petitioner’s murder conviction and death sent ence. State v.

Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 108-09, 865 P.2d 765, 769-70 (1993).

Petitioner and his daughter shared an ap artment with co-defendant Debra Milke and

her son, four-year-old Christopher Milke. Petitioner, unemployed and disabled, watched

Christ opher during the day while Milke was at work and at night and on weekends when

Milke was out with friends.

On Saturday, December 2, 1989, Petitioner and Christopher left t he ap artment at

around 11:00 a.m, ostensibly for a trip to the Metrocenter shopping mall, where,

Christopher was told, they would visit Santa Clause. Milke allowed Pet it ioner t o use her

car; his vehicle was in disrepair, and he could not afford to get it fixed. 

Petitioner and Christopher picked up Petitioner’s friend, co-defendant Roger Scott.

Petitioner drove Scott to two drugstores and then the two men and Christ op her ate lunch

at a pizza parlor. After lunch, they drove out to a desert area in nort hwest Phoenix, where

Christopher was shot to death. 

Petitioner and Scott then drove to Metrocenter. They arrived at around 2:30 p.m.

They separated, and Petitioner began to enact the ruse that Christopher had gone missing

at the mall. He enlisted the help of a Sears employee, explaining that Christopher had

disappeared from the Sears restroom. While Petitioner and the employee were searching

the mall, t hey ran into Scott; Petitioner, feigning surprise at the encounter, asked Scott if

he had seen Christopher, and Scott replied t hat he had not. Petitioner called mall security

at 2:30 p.m. The police were called around 4:00 p.m. In his conversations with the officers,

Petitioner repeated the story that he brought Christop her t o Metrocenter to see Santa

Claus and that he had disappeared from t he Sears restroom while Petitioner was in a stall.

Later that evening, when Pet it ioner and a police officer were retracing Petitioner’s

activities, Petitioner first mentioned that he had been with Scot t t hat day. Petitioner said

that he, Christopher, and Scott ran errands and then ate lunch. He said that he took Scott

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home and then went to the mall with Christopher. 

Petitioner called Debra Milke several times while the police were searching

Metrocenter. Petitioner stayed with the police at t he mall until 3:00 a.m. Officers took him

to the police station to get a taped statement, then took him home. Petitioner was arrested

on Sunday evening, December 3.

Scott led police to Christopher’s body in the desert wash. Christop her had been

shot three times in the back of his head. On a road leading from t he scene of the murder,

police located a number of spent .22 caliber shell casings and one live .22 round t hat were

similar to bullets found in Petitioner’s possession and similar to the bullets removed from

the child’s head. Police also located a p air of black tennis shoes belonging to Petitioner

which had been secreted in the parking lot near the Sears store. The shoes had a t read

pattern similar to prints found next to Christopher’s body in the wash.

Petitioner was indicted on counts of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder, child abuse, and kidnapping. A jury convict ed him of all charges. (ROAPCR 76.) With respect to the murder count , the trial court found three statutory

aggravating factors: t hat Pet it ioner was an adult and the victim was under age fifteen,

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(9); that the murder was committed in expectat ion of

pecuniary gain, under § 13-703(F)(5); and that the murder was commit t ed in an especially

heinous and depraved manner, under § 13-703(F)(6). (Id. at 3-5.) Finding no statutory

mitigating factors and no nonstatutory factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,

the court imposed the death penalty. (Id. at 3-7.)

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for

child abuse but affirmed Petitioner’s other convictions and sentences. Styers, 177 Ariz. at

111, 117, 865 P.2d at 772, 778. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in t he Ariz ona

Sup reme Court; it was denied on February 16, 1994. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought

certiorari review in the Unit ed States Supreme Court. Styers v. Arizona, 513 U.S. 855 (1994).

In September 1995, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the

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trial court (PCR court) pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(ROA-PCR 90.) The PCR court dismissed t he p et ition. (ME 1/25/96.) Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court in which he argued t hat t he PCR court

erroneously found his claims precluded. The Arizona Supreme Court then remanded the

case to the PCR court for consideration of the original petition. The PCR court held an

evidentiary hearing and denied t he p et it ion on the merits. (ME 10/20/97.) Petitioner filed

another petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, and it was summarily denied on

November 17, 1998. Petitioner filed his initial petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court on December 16, 1998. (Dkt. 1.) 

AEDPA STANDARD FOR RELIEF

Petitioner’s habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effect ive Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 336 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers t o a decision resolving

a party’s claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural

or other non-substantive ground. Lambert v . Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004).

The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim.

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first ident ify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that

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governs t he sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law

consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court

conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Musladin v . Lamarque, 427 F.3d

653, 655 (9th Cir. 2005) (“AEDPA limits the source of clearly-established federal law to

Supreme Court cases”); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief

cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a

constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided

the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381. Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court aut hority is

binding, circuit court precedent may be of “persuasive value” in determining what law is

clearly established and whether a stat e court applied that law unreasonably. Musladin, 427

F.3d at 655 (collecting cases); see Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069. 

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a st ate court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing

law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite t o t hat reached

by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule t o t he

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974. 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court ’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case”

or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new

context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that princip le t o a new

context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. In order for a federal court to

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find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under §

2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the st at e court’s decision was not merely

incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the

state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court

decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds

unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering a challenge under 2254(d)(2),

stat e court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the

“burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S. Ct. at 2325. However, it is only the state

court’s fact ual findings, not its ultimate decision, that are subject to 2254(e)(1)’s

presumption of correct ness. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 341-42. (“The clear and convincing

evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains only to state-court

determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.”). 

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing st andards presents

difficulties when the state court decided t he merits of a claim without providing its

rationale. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313

F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v . Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In

those circumst ances, a federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether

the state court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law.

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed

independently, a federal court nevertheless defers to the st at e court’s ultimate decision.

Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

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Only when a state court did not decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the claim

be reviewed de novo, because in that circumstance “there is no state court decision on

[the] issue to which to accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also Menendez v.

Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th

Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

CLAIM THREE:

Petitioner alleges that the Arizona courts violated his due process rights and his

right to be free from double jeop ardy by “double-counting” the age of the murder victim

as more than one aggravating circumst ance. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the trial

court improperly double-counted the victim’s age for purposes of aggravat ing Petitioner’s

sentence when it det ermined that the murder was committed in an especially heinous and

depraved manner, pursuant t o A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), and also applied § 13-703(F)(9), which

establishes the age of the vict im (if under fifteen or over seventy) as an aggravating factor.

This claim is without merit.

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the victim’s age may constitute only one

aggravating circumstance. (Opening Br. at 15-16; Reply Br. at 12-13). T he Ariz ona

Supreme Court rejected the double-counting argument, holding that the trial court’s

application of the aggravating factors was constitutionally valid:

Christop her was four years old and defendant was 42. Defendant

claims that the trial court gave the victim’s age double weight by using the

age to support two aggravating fact ors – A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) and (F)(9).

T he trial court did rely, in part, on Christopher’s young age in finding t hat he

was a helpless victim for purp oses of the (F)(6) factor. The use of one fact

to establish two aggravating circumstances is prop er, p rovided the court, in

balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, does not weigh the young

age of the victim twice. It is but one fact; therefore, it cannot be weighed

twice even though it satisfies two separate aggravating factors.

The defendant did not raise the “double-counting” point in the trial

court. The trial court’s special verdict did not expressly recite t hat it weighed

the victim’s y oung age only once. However, trial judges “are presumed to

know t he law and to apply it in making their decisions.” Walton v. Arizona,

497 U.S. 639, 653, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); State v.

Forteson, 8 Ariz.App. 468, 473, 447 P.2d 560, 565 (1968) (“On appeal it is our

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duty to presume that the trial court acted properly.”). Therefore, we p resume

the trial court made proper use of the victim’s age and we find no error. In

conducting our independent review and weighing of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances, we will consider the age of the victim only once.

Styers, 177 Ariz. at 116, 865 P.2d at 777.

This ruling is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. First , t he Unit ed States Supreme has noted that, “We have never

held that aggravating factors could be so duplicative as t o render them constitutionally

invalid.” Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 398 (1999). Next, as the Ariz ona Supreme

Court correctly noted, judges are presumed to know and follow the law, “even when they

fail to so indicate.” Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the trial

court is presumed to have applied the law correctly and weighed the victim’s age only once

when sentencing Petitioner. Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption. Furthermore,

t he Ariz ona Supreme Court has noted that it was not inappropriate for the trial court to use

the child’s age as a fact or in finding helplessness pursuant to § 13-703(F)(6). See State v.

Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 15, 870 P.2d 1097, 1111 (1994) (impermissible double-counting did not

occur when the court applied both the (F)(9) and (F)(6) fact ors even though the

helplessness finding was based up on the age and size of the eight-year-old victim). The

trial court considered ot her circumstances in finding that the victim was helpless, including

the fact that the child trusted and depended upon Petitioner as a parental figure. (ROAPCR at 5-6.) Finally, the supreme court explicitly stated that in its indep endent review of

Pet itioner’s death sentence, it weighed the victim’s age only once, Styers, 177 Ariz. at 116,

865 P.2d at 777. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750, 754 (1990) (finding that

appellate courts are constitutionally p ermitted to affirm a death sentence based on

independent re-weighing despite sentencing error); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86-

87 (1983) (finding no constitutional violation because, regardless of what the sentencing

judge considered, the state supreme court did not consider any t hing improper in

conducting its independent reweighing of aggravation and mitigation).

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not ent it led t o relief on Claim Three.

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CLAIM FOUR:

Petitioner alleges that the evidence was not sufficient to make the requisite finding

under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982), that he actually killed, attempted to kill,

or intended to kill Christopher Milke. Therefore, according to Petitioner, imposition of the

death penalty violates his Eighth Amendment rights.

In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that a felony murder defendant is eligible for the

death penalty only if he actually killed, at t emp t ed to kill, or intended to kill the victim. 458

U.S. at 797. In Tison, the Court expanded Enmund’s rule so that a felony murder defendant

could be sentenced to death if the defendant was a major participant in the underlying

felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. 481 U.S. at 157-58; see also

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 1991) (Enmund satisfied when

defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death and was an active participant in the

felonies). 

A state court’s finding that Enmund/Tison is satisfied is sufficient if “ aft er viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecut ion, any rational trier of fact” could

have made the finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). On habeas review, the provisions of the AEDPA demand an additional level of

deference: a state court’s findings regarding Enmund/Tison are factual determinations

which are p resumed correct and which Petitioner “bears the heavy burden of overcoming.”

Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 377-78 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pope v.

Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n.7 (1987); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (petitioner bears the burden

of overcoming by “clear and convincing evidence” the p resump tion of correctness

applicable to a state court’s factual determinations); Rev illa v. Gibson, 283 F.3d 1203, 1211

(10th Cir. 2002) (same).

The jury convicted Pet it ioner of first-degree murder, under both premeditation and

felony-murder theories, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. (ROA-PCR 76.) In

its special verdict, the trial court found “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

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killed and intended to kill the victim herein.” (Id. at 2.)

Petitioner presented this claim on direct appeal. (Opening Br. at 17-20.) The Arizona

Supreme Court rejected the argument that the trial court’s findings were not supported by

sufficient evidence:

Defendant owned the t ennis shoes found in the parking lot near the

Sears store and which had a t read pattern similar to the partial prints found

in the wash near the body. Defendant purchased two .22 caliber weapons

shortly before the murder, one of which was found in Scott’s ap artment and

could have fired the bullets found in the victim’s head. Defendant

possessed bullets like those found along the road near the wash. Defendant

participated in the two day charade at Metrocenter where he told police that

Christopher had disappeared from a restroom. During that time, he did not,

for several hours, even mention Scott’s name, or t hat Scott had been with

defendant and Christopher that day. Defendant now claims that Scott killed

Christopher; yet defendant participated in the phantom search with the

police without mentioning Scott.

Styers, 177 Ariz. at 114, 865 P.2d at 775. The court further explained that, “The jury ’s

finding of consp iracy and premeditated murder satisfies Enmund. The trial court’s finding

merely confirms it.” Id.

Petit ioner argues that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was inadequate

to support a determination that Petitioner actually shot Christopher Milke or int ended that

the child would be killed. This argument is without merit. 

As noted, the state courts made factual determinations regarding Petitioner’s

participation in the murder. Petitioner’s challenge t o t hese findings is based solely on his

own self-serving trial testimony to the effect that co-defendant Scott, acting on his own

initiative and without any prior knowledge on Petitioner’s part, shot the child and then

turned the gun on Petitioner; according to Petitioner, Scott then threatened to harm Debra

Milke and Petitioner’s daughter if Petitioner did not cooperate with Scott in the

subsequent missing-child ruse. (See RT 10/29/90 at 63, 69-71.) The jury, the trial court, and

the Arizona Supreme Court rejected this scenario, and it is not supported by the remainder

of the evidence adduced at trial, including that summariz ed by the Arizona Supreme Court,

as well as the testimony of witnesses who reported that Petitioner appeared calm and in

good spirits while carrying out the sham search for Christopher Milke at the Metrocenter

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3 In Milke, the Arizona Sup reme Court acknowledged that the § 13-703(F)(6)

aggravating factor is facially vague but correctly noted that the narrowing construction the

court has applied to the factor meets const it ut ional requirements. State v. Milke, 177 Ariz.

118, 125, 865 P.2d 779, 786 (1993) (citing Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 47 (1992); Walton,

497 U.S. at 654). This narrowing construction, adopted in State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42,

52, 659 P.2d 1, 11 (1983), identified the following factors which may lead to a finding of

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Mall. (See RT 10/16/90 at 59, 60, 129.) During the course of the lengthy search, Petitioner

was away from Scott’s presence, was frequent ly in the company of police officers, and was

allowed to make private phone calls, yet he failed to inform anyone of Christopher Milke’s

fate. (See, e.g., 10/29/90 at 125, 128.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational

factfinder could easily find sufficient evidence showing t hat Petitioner was a major

participant in the underlying felonies and that he acted wit h reckless indifference to human

life under Enmund/Tison. Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence to

overcome the presumption of correctness which attaches to the factual determinations

made by the jury, the trial court, and t he Arizona Supreme Court. Therefore, Petitioner is

not entitled to relief on Claim Four. 

CLAIM 5:

Petitioner alleges that the application of Arizona’s “ especially heinous or depraved”

aggravating factor was arbitrary in violation of the Eighth and Fourt eenth Amendments.

Specifically, Petitioner challenges the determination that the senselessness of the murder

and t he help lessness of the victim were sufficient to support a finding that the murder of

Christopher Milke was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner pursuant

to A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6).

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s application

of the heinous or depraved aggravating factor. The supreme court first made reference to

its discussion in co-defendant Milke’s case of the rules applicable t o the heinous or

depraved factor. Styers, 177 Ariz. at 115, 865 P.2d at 776.3 The court then addressed the

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heinousness or depravity: (1) the apparent relishing of the murder by t he killer; (2) the

infliction of gratuitous violence on t he victim; (3) the needless mutilation of the victim; (4)

t he senselessness of the crime; and (5) the helplessness of the victim. These factors are

non-exclusive. State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 338, 916 P.2d 1035, 1054 (1996). 

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application of the factor to Petitioner’s offense:

certainly the victim was helpless and the killing was senseless. The victim,

a four-year-old child, t rust ed defendant, his baby-sitter. Defendant used this

trust and played upon the child’s favorite things – Santa Claus and hunting

for snakes – to lure him into a desolate desert wash so he could execute him.

Christop her was dependent upon defendant for care while he was away from

his mother. He was help less when defendant and Scott took him and killed

him.

Although there was no legal “parent/child” relationship, defendant

and victim did share a special relationship in that defendant was the child’s

full-time caregiver for several months before he killed him. This fact

illustrates the depravity of defendant and makes the crime even more

senseless and the victim especially helpless as to this defendant.

The circumst ances of this crime are indeed shocking, and they

separate this crime from the “norm” of first degree murders. The evidence

supports the especially heinous and depraved aggravating circumstance.

Id. at 115-16, 865 P.2d at 776-77.

Petitioner’s challenge to this ruling is wit hout merit. While the Arizona Supreme

Court has observed that ordinarily a finding of help lessness and senselessness is not

sufficient to support the heinous or depraved fact or, it has never held that such a finding

cannot satisfy the factor. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 146 Ariz . 491, 503, 707 P.2d 289, 301

(1985) (senselessness and helplessness, without other factors, “will [not] ordinarily be

determinative on the question of heinousness or depravity”); State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz.

42, 52-53, 659 P.2d 1, 11-12 (1983) (“The mere existence of senselessness or helplessness

in the victim, in isolation, need not always lead to a holding that the crime is heinous or

depraved, however.”). Indeed, in Petitioner’s case, and those of co-defendants Milke and

Scott, the Arizona Sup reme Court applied its own precedent to determine that the

heinousness or depravity factor had been proved based solely on the child’s helplessness

and t he senselessness of the murder. Milke, 177 Ariz. at 125, 865 P.2d at 786; State v.

Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 143, 865 P.2d 792, 804 (1993). Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s

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assertion, these cases are not the only instances in which the Arizona Supreme Court has

held that helplessness and senselessness alone sufficed for a finding that a murder was

heinous or depraved under § 13-703(F)(6). See State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131, 144, 847 P.2d

1078, 1091 (1992) (holding that, although cruelty was also present, the heinous and

depraved factor was satisfied by the senseless beating death of a helpless infant).

Petitioner also challenges the use of helplessness in sup p ort of the (F)(6) factor on

the grounds that the child’s state of helplessness was a function of his age rather than any

action taken by Petitioner. The Court disagrees. As the Arizona Supreme Court observed,

Christopher Milke was helpless in part because he was in the custody of an adult whom

he trusted and who was serving as his care-giver.

The United States Supreme Court has explained that “federal habeas review of a

state court’s application of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating circumst ance is limited,

at most, to determining whet her the state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as

to constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation.” Lewis v.

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). “A state court’s finding of an aggravating circumstance

in a particular case . . . is arbitrary or capricious if and only if no reasonable sentencer could

have so concluded.” Id. at 783. This Court concludes that a reasonable sentencer could

have determined that Pet it ioner’s offense was heinous and depraved based upon its

senselessness and the helplessness of the victim; application of the factor was not,

therefore, arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim Five.

CLAIM SEVEN:

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel performed ineffectively during the guilt phase

of his trial in violation of his right to effective assist ance of counsel under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Pet it ioner contends that counsel was ineffective in the following

respects: he failed t o challenge the jury panel for cause and move for a continuance; he did

not object when the jury asked for and was provided a dictionary during deliberations; he

failed to object to prejudicial questions asked by t he p rosecution; he failed to object to the

p rosecutor’s closing argument; and he failed to object to the trial court’s consideration of

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the presentence report. 

Clearly established federal law

As previously discussed, when a state court has addressed the merits of a

petitioner’s claim of federal constitutional error, a federal court may grant habeas relief only

if the stat e court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as det ermined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (per curiam);

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 21. For a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

(“IAC”), the applicable law is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

To prevail under Strickland’s t wo-pronged standard, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s rep resentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687-88. The inquiry under Strickland is

highly deferential, and “every effort [must ] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s persp ect ive at the time.” Id. at 689. To prove

deficient performance, a defendant must also overcome “ t he p resumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id.; see

Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486-487 (9th Cir. 2000). To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner

“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

Under the AEDPA, the state court’s decision is subject to another level of

deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002). In order to merit habeas relief a

petitioner must make the additional showing that the state court’s determinat ion t hat

counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Analysis

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4 In his merits brief, Petitioner raises several new allegations of IAC. He now

contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue, failing to

undertake individual voir dire, failing to challenge juror Haley for cause based on the

juror’s exposure to pretrial publicity, and failing to object to the striking of juror Driscoll,

who was dismissed after stating that she could not vote to convict a defendant if doing so

would expose him to the death penalty. Petitioner presented none of these claims in either

his amended habeas petition or his PCR petition, both of which raised only the issue of

IAC based on counsel’s failure to move to strike the panel. (Dkt. 64 at 122; ROA-PCR 90

at 12-13.) 

Petitioner contends t hat it was unnecessary to raise in his amended petition each

instance of alleged IAC. (Dkt. 101 at 23.) The Court disagrees. Because Petitioner has

failed to raise the issues, as required by Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Cases,

they are not properly before this Court. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, ___, 125 S. Ct.

2562, 2573 (2005) (citing Rule 2(c), which instructs Petitioner to “specify all grounds of

relief available” and to “state the facts supporting each ground”); Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (indicating that t he only habeas claims a

district court will consider are t hose contained in the habeas petition itself or those raised

in an amended petition or statement of additional claims). Moreover, allegations of IAC

constitute separate claims, each of which must be exhausted in state court . See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690 (stating that a petitioner making an IAC claim must identify the particular

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Petitioner presented these allegat ions of ineffective assistance in his PCR petition.

After an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court found that “Petitioner has failed to establish,

by a preponderance of the evidence, both prongs of ineffective assistance of counsel as

to all claims raised.” (ME 10/20/97 at 2.) Because the PCR court did not provide a rat ionale

for its decision, this Court has independently reviewed the record and determined, for the

reasons set forth below, that the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable under

Strickland. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. 

(1) Failure to challenge the jury panel and move for a continuance

Cit ing extensive pretrial publicity regarding the murder of Christopher Milke,

including media coverage of the recent trial and conviction of co-defendant Debra Milke,

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move t o st rike the jury

panel for cause and continue the trial.4

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acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged to have been the result of unreasonable

p rofessional judgment). The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that a generic IAC claim is

insufficient to exhaust particular IAC allegations. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044,

1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

Therefore, specific claims of IAC that were not presented in state court are not prop erly

exhausted; rather, they are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted and therefore

unavailable for federal habeas review.

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Background:

Jury selection began with a panel of eighty venire members. (See Dkt. 90, Ex. A.)

Under questioning by the court, forty-nine of these prosp ective jurors indicated that they

had heard of the case. (See RT 10/15/90.) Upon further query, twenty-five panel members

indicated t hat t hey had formed a fixed opinion of Petitioner’s guilt; the court excused each

of these members. (Id.) Seven of the sixt een members who ultimately served as jurors or

alternates had heard of the case. (Id.) At the conclusion of jury selection, defense counsel

put the following comments on the record:

I discussed with Mr. Levy [the prosecutor], my client, the question of, the

issue of venue, and just so that there’s no problems in the future, I

discussed the possibility of requesting a change of venue due t o t he recent

decision in Debra Milke’s case with M r. St y ers. Mr. Styers wishes to

proceed with trial.

Also, in speaking with or researching, doing some research with other

areas of the stat e, it appears that Debra Milke’s case got significant publicity

in other areas of the state. We would be – we wouldn’t be assured of getting

any fairer jury than we have already.

(Id. at 83-84.) After noting that all of the jurors selected had indicated that they could set

aside whatever they had heard and judge the case solely on the merits, the court reit erated

its understanding that counsel had decided not t o move for a change of venue based on

Pet it ioner’s “decision to go forward with trial.” (Id. at 84.) Counsel indicated that the court

was correct. (Id.)

In its initial order reject ing this IAC claim, the PCR court found that the “jury voir

dire result ed in empaneling a fair and impartial jury.” (ME 1/25/96.) Subsequently, during

an evidentiary hearing before t he PCR court, counsel testified that he did not object to the

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5 Rule 18.4(a) of t he Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that either

party may challenge t he ent ire jury panel on the ground that “in its selection there has

been a material departure from the requirement s of law.” In applying this Rule, Arizona

courts have explained that while an accused has a constitutional right to be tried by a fair

and impartial jury , he is not entitled to be tried by any particular jury. State v. Greenawalt,

128 Ariz. 150, 167, 624 P.2d 828, 845 (1981). Therefore, a party who challenges the jury

panel has the burden of demonst rat ing either that the jury was unlawfully empaneled or

that the jurors could not be fair and impartial. Id. 

In determining the merits of a challenge to the panel such as that now advocated by

Petitioner – i.e., alleging t hat a fair and impartial jury cannot be empaneled due to harmful

pretrial p ublicity – the Court employs the standards for assessing prejudice which are

applied in motions seeking a change of venue. Cf. State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 580, 769

P.2d 1017, 1026 (1989). For that reason, even if the Court were to consider Petitioner’s

unexhausted claim that counsel was ineffective for failure to move for a change of venue,

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panel in part because he was aware that other attorneys had made such motions and they

had been denied. (RT 10/17/97 at 42.) The court again denied Petitioner’s IAC claims. (ME

10/20/97.)

Discussion:

The “prerequisite” for Pet itioner’s IAC claim is a demonstration of prejudicial pretrial

publicity such that, if counsel had moved to strike t he p anel, there was a reasonable

probability that trial court would have granted the motion. Turner v . Calderon, 281 F.3d

851, 865 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Baldwin v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 1304, 1314 (11t h Cir. 1998);

Sharp v. Johnson, 107 F.3d 282, 286-87 (5t h Cir. 1997). As discussed below, because

Petitioner has failed to show t he existence of prejudicial pretrial publicity, he is unable to

demonstrate that the trial court would likely have granted a mot ion t o strike the panel and

continue the trial, and he cannot, therefore, satisfy the Strickland standard. 

A criminal defendant facing trial by jury is entitled to be tried by “a p anel of

impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). To ensure this right,

an Ariz ona t rial court can strike a panel due to exposure to pretrial publicity if the

defendant shows that the jurors “have formed preconceived notions concerning the

defendant’s guilt and that they cannot lay those notions aside.”5

 State v. Walton, 159 Ariz.

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571, 580, 769 P.2d 1017, 1026 (1989) (quoting State v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 302, 686 P.2d

1265, 1272 (1984)). A defendant must show that the jury was actually prejudiced by pretrial

publicity, or that the publicity was so outrageous that prejudice could be assumed. Id. 

There is a presump t ion of prejudice based upon pretrial publicity when a defendant

can show that jurors were exposed to publicity “so outrageous that it promise[d] to turn

the trial into a mockery of justice or a mere formality.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 563, 858

P.2d 1152, 1166 (1993); see Chaney, 141 Ariz. at 302, 686 P.2d at 1272 (prejudice is presumed

where pretrial publicit y was so extensive and pervasive that it created a “carnival

atmosphere”). Pretrial publicity meets this threshold, however, only when it is “so unfair,

so prejudicial, and so pervasive that we cannot give any credibility to the jurors’ answers

during voir dire affirming their abilit y t o decide the case fairly.” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 565, 858

P.2d at 1168. Where p rejudice is not presumed, a defendant bears the burden of proving

that pretrial publicity probably deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169. The

focus is on whether the potential jurors “‘could not judge imp art ially the guilt of the

defendant.’” Id. (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984)); see Chaney, 141

Ariz. at 302, 686 P.2d at 1272 (to prove actual prejudice a defendant “must show that the

jurors have formed preconceived notions concerning t he defendant’s guilt and that they

cannot lay those notions aside”). In judging the impact of pretrial publicity on a trial, “the

relevant inquiry is the effect of the publicity on a juror’s objectivity, not the mere fact of

publicity.” Id.

The Court finds that Pet itioner has not met his burden of showing either form of

prejudice. The Arizona Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the burden of

demonstrating presumed prejudice is “extremely heavy” and that “courts rarely presume

prejudice due to outrageous pretrial publicity.” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 564, 858 P.2d at 1167; see

also State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 513-14, 898 P.2d 454, 462-63 (1995); State v. Jones, 197

Ariz. 290, 307, 4 P.3d 345, 362 (2000); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 300, 896 P.2d 830, 840

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(1995); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 34, 734 P.2d 563, 576 (1987); State v. Greenawalt, 128

Ariz. 150, 162-63, 624 P.2d 828, 840-41 (1981). In none of these cases, nor in any case cited

by Petitioner, did the Arizona Supreme Court find presumptive p rejudice due to pretrial

publicity. 

Attempting to demonstrate presumed prejudice, Pet it ioner notes that twenty-four

newspaper articles about the case were published in December 1989, following Christopher

Milke’s murder, and another thirty-three articles appeared through Oct ober 15, 1990, the

day of jury selection in Petitioner’s case. (Dkt. 101 at 37-38.) While Petitioner’s case

generated substantial media interest, the nature of the coverage is distinguishable from the

publicity present in those “rare and unusual cases,” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 565, 858 P.2d at

1168, in which courts have found presump t ive prejudice. The media coverage of

Petitioner’s case was neither as pervasive nor as inflammatory as that in the cases cited by

Petitioner, including Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-727 (1963), where the

defendant’s detailed confession was broadcast on television three times and viewed by

potential jurors, and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-58 (1966), where massive and

sensational publicity led t o outrageous trial conduct and a “carnival atmosphere.” See

also Coleman v Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1538-1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (prejudice presumed where

a small, close-knit community was exposed to pervasive, prejudicial, and inflammatory

p ress coverage). Instead, the coverage of Petitioner’s case consisted largely of fact ual

reports and was no more egregious than t he p retrial publicity that the Arizona Supreme

Court declined to hold presumptively prejudicial in the cases cited above.

Petitioner’s remaining argument concerning prejudicial publicity relies on statistics

from the voir dire process, including the fact that sixty percent of the p anel had heard of

the case and thirty p ercent of the original panel members were dismissed because they had

formed an opinion of Petitioner’s guilt and could not be fair. (Dkt. 90 at 46-47.) These

figures do not support a finding of either presumed or actual prejudice.

In State v. Schmid, 107 Ariz. 191, 193, 484 P.2d 187, 189 (1971), for instance, all of the

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6 Statistics in ot her cases support a finding that the panel in Petitioner’s case

was not prejudiced by pretrial publicity. For example, courts found that impartial juries

were impaneled in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975) (twenty of sevent y -eight

panel members were excused because they had formed an opinion about defendant’s

guilt); Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1331-33 (10th Cir. 2000) (thirty-four of thirty-seven

jurors questioned had prior knowledge of the case, twelve had opinions regarding

defendant’s guilt, and six of the twelve were seated on the jury). In Irvin, by cont rast , over

ninety percent of the 430 prospect ive jurors interviewed held some opinion as to guilt, 268

were dismissed for cause, and eight out of the twelve jurors actually seat ed st at ed they

believed the defendant was guilty. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727. Based on these facts,

and the obvious hostility towards the defendant revealed during voir dire, the Court

determined the defendant could not have received a fair trial. Id. 

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empaneled jurors had p rior knowledge of the case. Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme

Court held that such a degree of familiarity wit h t he case did not, standing alone,

demonstrate a level of prejudice sufficient to necessitate a change of venue. Id. Similarly,

in Bible “almost all” of the 167 prospective jurors had heard about the case, half had an

opinion about the defendant’s guilt, and twenty-three percent had an unqualified or fixed

opinion and were excused for cause. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 563, 566 n.6, 858 P.2d at 1166, 1169

n.6. All of the jurors selected to serve had read or heard of the case, and two of them had

a “qualified” opinion about the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 563, 858 P.2d at 1166. Desp it e

these statistics, t he Ariz ona Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to show that he

was prejudiced by p ret rial p ublicity to the extent that he was deprived of a fair trial. Id. at

566, 858 P.2d at 1169. The court noted that none of the jurors had an unqualified opinion

of the defendant ’s guilt and all of the jurors indicated that they could set aside their

qualified opinions and decide the case based on evidence produced at trial. Id. 

In Petitioner’s case, by contrast, only five of the twelve empaneled jurors had heard

of the case, none of them expressed even a qualified opinion as to Pet it ioner’s guilt, and

the trial court dismissed each of the potential jurors who indicated that he or she had

formed a fixed opinion.6

 Based upon these figures, and the voir dire process engaged in

by the trial court, Petitioner cannot show actual prejudice.

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Finally, as previously noted, the PCR court found that a fair and impartial jury had

been empaneled. This is a factual det ermination entitled to a presumption of correctness

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985); Thompson

v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.

1992). Petitioner has not rebutted this presumption with clear and convincing evidence.

In addition, his IAC claim fails t o take into account the impact of the PCR court’s finding,

the effect of which is to counter Petitioner’s argument that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

failure t o challenge the panel; the court was not likely to grant such a motion when it

believed that the jury was fair and impartial.

For t he reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Petitioner is unable t o

establish that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffect ive. Because Petitioner

cannot show t hat a motion to dismiss the jury panel and continue the trial would have been

granted, he has not demonstrated prejudice under Strickland. Therefore, he is not entitled

to relief on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to make such a motion.

(2) Failure to object when the jury requested a dictionary

Petitioner alleges that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to object when the

jury asked for and was provided a dictionary during their deliberations.

On the morning of November 1, 1990, the jury retired to commence deliberations.

Later that day, according to the court’s minute ent ry , “the jury . . . asked for a dictionary.

Counsel do not object and one is provided to them.” (ME 11/1/90; Dkt. 90, Ex. B.) The jury

returned its verdict the following day.

Pet it ioner first challenged counsel’s performance with respect to this incident in his

PCR petition. Respondents, conceding that the jurors’ consideration of extraneous

informat ion in the form of a dictionary potentially constituted reversible error, requested

a hearing. The PCR court, however, summarily dismissed the petition, finding t hat no

material issues of fact or law exist ed and t hat the claims were precluded. (ME 1/25/96; Dkt.

90, Ex. C.) The Arizona Supreme Court remanded the matter, and an evidentiary hearing

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was held on October 17, 1997. 

At the hearing, Michael Sralik, the jury foreman, test ified that he remembered a

dictionary being requested but did not remember if one was p rovided. (RT 10/17/97 at 6.)

Arthur Hanratty, an investigator for Maricopa County, testified that he interviewed the

other eleven jurors, none of whom could remember a dictionary being present in the jury

room; the jurors signed affidavits to that effect. (Id. at 9-10.) Kathy Jager, a bailiff during

Petitioner’s trial, testified that a juror requested a dictionary and that she forwarded that

request to the judge; she did not see the jurors with a dictionary and “to [her] knowledge”

did not provide one. (Id. at 13-14.) Ann Schroder, a courtroom clerk, could not recall a

request for a dictionary, did not provide one t o t he jury, and did not recall anyone else

providing a dictionary. (Id. at 18.) Karen Jones-Jensen, another bailiff, testified that she

seemed to recall a request for a dictionary, possibly to look up the phrase “reasonable

doubt,” but that she never provided the jury with a dict ionary, that she never saw a

dictionary in the jury room, and that during her t welve y ears of service with the judge he

had never supplied a jury with a dictionary. (Id. at 23-25.) Defense counsel testified that

he remembered nothing about a request for a dictionary, but would have objected to one

being presented to the jury. (Id. at 47-48.)

After the hearing, the PCR court made a finding “that the jury did not utilize a

dictionary during their deliberations.” (ME 10/20/97.) Petitioner contends, pursuant to

§ 2254(d)(2), t hat this finding represented an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in state court. The Court disagrees. 

The PCR court conducted a full and fair hearing and rendered a factual finding that

the jury did not use a dictionary. The PCR court’s factual determination is entitled to a

presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1). Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 1000; see,

e.g., McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1308-09 (11t h Cir. 2005) (state court’s finding

regarding innocuous effect of jury’s reading of Bible passages during deliberations was

entitled to p resump tion of correctness). As described above, the court’s conclusion was

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7 In his merits brief, Petitioner alleges that counsel should have objected when

Mr. Murphy testified about an incident during which he heard Christopher Milke crying

and Petitioner told him he “beat his [Christop her’s] ass” and that he “enjoyed it.” (RT

10/22/90 at 58-59.) Petitioner did not raise this IAC allegation in his amended habeas

petition (see Dkt. 64 at 22-24) and t herefore t he Court cannot consider it. See supra at 15,

n. 4. The Court notes, however, that because the testimony was likely admissible under

Ariz ona Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show motive or intent, counsel did not perform

ineffectively by failing to object.

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supported by the evidence taken at the evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has pointed to no

witnesses or available testimony or other information that was not elicited in state court.

T herefore, he has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness with clear and

convincing evidence. 

Based upon the PCR court’s unrebutted fact ual det ermination that the jury did not

use a dictionary, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s

failure to object to the jury’s request. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

(3) Failure to object to prejudicial questions presented by the prosecution to

witnesses at trial

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor elicited improper character evidence from

several witnesses, including Maureen Sadeik, the stepmother of co-defendant Debra Milke;

John Chiulla and Patrick Murphy,7

 neighbors of Petitioner and Milke; Sandra Pickinpaugh,

M ilke’s sister; and Phillip Wolslagel, a state criminalist. Petitioner contends that counsel

performed ineffectively by failing to object to the p rosecut or’s questions. He further

alleges that counsel’s performance was ineffective with resp ect to testimony elicited from

the criminalist regarding the contents of Petitioner’s notebook.

At the evidentiary hearing before the PCR court, counsel t est ified that his overall

trial st rat egy was to object only when he had a strong basis to do so and when the

objectionable testimony was damaging to Petitioner’s defense. (RT 10/17/97 at 40, 43.) He

further testified that he believed that the prosecutor was emotionally involved in the case

and might be seen by the jury as badgering Petitioner. (Id. at 41.) In analyzing this claim,

the Court notes that counsel’s trial strategy with respect to objections is entitled to

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8 Rule 701 provides:

If the witness is not testify ing as an expert, the witness’ testimony in

the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences

which are (a) rationally based on the p ercep t ion of the witness and (b)

helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ test imony or the

determination of a fact in issue.

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deference under Strickland. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 931 (9th

Cir. 1998) (“While [a defendant] may argue that it may have been better to make a certain

objection, a few missed objections alone, unless on a crucial point, do not rebut the strong

p resumption that counsel’s actions (or failures to act) were pursuant to his litigation

strategy and within the wide range of reasonable performance.”).

Maureen Sadeik: Ms. Sadeik testified for the State. She described her observations

of Petitioner’s conduct toward Debra Milke during a Thanksgiving dinner, when she noted

that Petitioner was “very solicit ous” towards Milke and spoke to her using terms of

endearment such as “dear and “hon.” (RT 10/18/90 at 65.) At the conclusion of her

testimony, the prosecutor asked the following question: “Based up on your observations

of him and his interaction with Debra and his comments to her, how would you describe

the ap p earance of his attachment or his – how – you know whether he seemed to really like

Debra.” (Id. at 72.) Counsel did not object. (Id.) Ms. Sadeik answered that she believed

Petitioner “maybe was falling in love with” Milke. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends that defense counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s

question to Ms. Sadeik about Pet itioner’s relationship with Milke because the question

was designed to elicit prejudicial evidence about Petitioner’s character and motive.

Respondents counter that Ms. Sadeik’s testimony was admissible opinion evidence under

Rule 701 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence because it was rationally based upon the

witness’ personal perceptions and was helpful to the jury in that it provided evidence of

Petitioner’s motive in killing Milke’s child.8

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testimony would likely have been ruled admissible under Rule 701, Petitioner’s criticism of

counsel’s performance is without merit. 

Ms. Sadeik made specific, first-hand observations of Petitioner’s behavior; clearly,

t he inference that Petitioner may have been falling in love with Milke was supported by

those observat ions. Her opinion about Petitioner’s feelings satisfied Rule 701(a) because

it was “predicated upon concrete facts within [her] own observation and recollection.”

United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[b]ecause it is sometimes difficult

t o describe the mental or physical condition of a person, his character or reputation, t he

emotions manifest by his acts . . . witnesses may relate their opinions or conclusions of

what they observed”); see also State v. Ayala, 178 Ariz. 385, 388, 873 P.2d 1307, 1310

(Ct.App. 1994); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 168, 800 P.2d 1260, 1276 (1990); United

States v . Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, evidence concerning the

relationship between Petitioner and Milke was relevant to show Petitioner’s motive for

participating in the conspiracy to murder Milke’s child; i.e., that by carrying out the killing

he would gain favor with Milke and advance in her affections. Because the testimony was

admissible under the rules of evidence, counsel had no basis to object, and if he had

objected the objection would likely have been overruled. 

Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing before the PCR court, counsel testified that he

chose not to object to Ms. Sadeik’s testimony because he anticipated that Pet it ioner would

testify and that the topic of his feelings for Milke would be brought out by the prosecutor.

(RT 10/17/97 at 45.) Petitioner had also informed counsel that he did in fact have romantic

feelings for Milke. (Id.) 

Respondents further contend that Pet it ioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s

performance because, even if an objection had been made and sustained, there was not a

reasonable probability that the outcome of t he trial would have been different. The Court

agrees. The challenged exchange resulted merely in a restatement of the testimony Ms.

Sadeik gave earlier when she described Petitioner’s affectionate behavior toward Milke.

Moreover, on cross-examination defense counsel elicited testimony helpful to Petitioner.

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Under his questioning, M s. Sadeik reiterated her belief that the relationship between

Petitioner and Milke was “plutonic” [sic] (id. at 73); Ms. Sadeik also conceded that Milke

used other people (id. at 74) and testified that Petitioner t ook care of Christopher and

appeared to have a good relationship with the child (id. at 74, 76). See Beck , 418 F.3d at

1015 (noting that cross-examinat ion serves to test the accuracy of the lay witness’s

testimony).

For t he reasons stated above, counsel did not perform ineffectively with respect t o

Ms. Sadeik’s testimony. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

John Chiulla: Petitioner contends that counsel performed ineffectively because he

failed to object when the prosecutor asked M r. Chiulla if Petitioner was a “heavy drinker”

and Chiulla answered in the affirmative. (RT 10/22/90 at 27.) Pet it ioner argues that such

testimony was inadmissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(a). Respondents contend

that counsel’s performance was not deficient because the testimony was not an attack on

Petitioner’s character but was admissible under Rule 402 to show that Chiulla was familiar

with Petit ioner. Respondents also note that the prosecutor made no further mention of

Chiulla’s testimony regarding Petitioner’s drinking habits, so Petitioner was not prejudiced

by counsel’s failure to object . T he Court concludes that, regardless of the admissibility

of the testimony, Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s failure to object was eit her

deficient or p rejudicial. Counsel arguably made a tactical choice not to draw further

attention to testimony which, in the context of the entire trial, was brief and insignificant.

See State v. Noleen, 142 Ariz. 101, 106, 688 P.2d 993, 998 (1984).

Petitioner also alleges t hat counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to

t est imony from Mr. Chiulla indicating that he did not believe Petitioner’s version of t he

crime. On direct examination, Mr. Chiulla recounted a phone conversation with Petitioner

in which Petit ioner detailed his version of the events surrounding the killing of Christopher

M ilke and told Mr. Chiulla that co-defendant Scott was the shooter. (Id. at 33-37.) On

redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Chiulla if he had believed Petitioner’s story;

Chiulla responded, “Not really.” (Id. at 49.) Contrary to Petitioner’s argument , counsel did

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object, on relevance grounds, but the objection was overruled. (Id.) Because counsel did

object to the prosecutor’s question, his p erformance in this instance was not deficient.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Sandra Pickinpaugh: Petitioner alleges that counsel performed ineffectively by

failing to object when Ms. Pickinpaugh, responding to the prosecutor’s questions, testified

that she believed Petitioner would act violently in a negat ive situation and that his

personal circumstances with respect to Ms. Milke constituted a negative environment. (RT

10/22/90 at 53-54.) The testimony occurred during redirect examination. As Respondents

correctly note, this line of inquiry developed during defense counsel’s cross-examination

of Ms. Pickinpaugh (RT 10/22/90 at 47-48), and t herefore counsel was not in a position to

object when the prosecutor revisited the issue. See State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 193,

928 P.2d 610, 617 (1996); State v. Woratzeck, 134 Ariz. 452, 454, 657 P.2d 865, 867 (1982).

The issue becomes, therefore, whether counsel p erformed ineffectively by eliciting the

testimony during cross-examination. See Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir.

2005).

On cross-examination by defense counsel, Ms. Pickinpaugh testified that in her view

Petitioner was a gullible individual who did favors for people; she even accepted counsel’s

characterization of Petitioner as a kind of “ Good Samaritan.” (RT 10/22/90 at 47.) Counsel

next asked Ms. Pickinpaugh if Petitioner had ever acted violently as a favor for someone;

Ms. Pickinpaugh responded that in her recollection Petitioner had never done so. (Id.)

Counsel then inquired whether Petitioner reacted in a particular way when he was upset

or under pressure. (Id.) In response to this question, M s. Pickinpaugh indicated that if

Petitioner was in a positive situation he would react in a p osit ive manner but that if he was

in a negative situation he would react in a negative way, both toward himself and those

around him; he would blame himself but take it out on other people, and he would also

become depressed. (Id. at 48-49.) On redirect examination, the prosecutor pursued this line

of questioning, which p roduced Ms. Pickinpaugh’s testimony that she believed Petitioner

could respond violently to a negative situation “[i]f he was pushed far enough.” (Id. at 54.)

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To withstand scrutiny under Strick land, “counsel’s representation must be only

objectively reasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill.” Dows v. Wood, 211

F.3d at 487 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). T act ical decisions made during trial,

such as those Petitioner’s counsel made with respect to the questioning of Ms.

Pickinpaugh, “are given great deference.” Id. For example, in Phyle v. Leapley, 66 F.3d

154, 159 (8th Cir. 1995), t he Eighth Circuit rejected the habeas petitioner’s claim that trial

counsel was ineffective based on his failure to object to test imony by the key prosecution

witness regarding prior violent acts by the petitioner. Applying the “presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, the Court of Appeals emphasized that trial tactics with respect

to the questioning of witnesses are entitled to special deference:

trial lawyers must take into account [broad, highly subjective factors] as they

make repeated, instantaneous decisions whether to object to a question,

whether to move t o strike a damaging unresponsive answer, or whether to

move for a mistrial when a witness has delivered an unexpected low blow.

When we review such trial decisions, the ineffective assistance standard is

high – they are “virtually unchallengeable” – in part because appellate

judges cannot recreate from a cold transcript the courtroom dynamics that

are an essential part of evaluating the effect iveness of counsel’s

performance. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure

§ 11.10, at 95 (1984).

Phyle, 66 F.3d at 159.

Applying the standard of deference mandated by Strickland, the Court finds that

counsel was not ineffective in his handling of Ms. Pickinpaugh’s testimony on crossexamination. He attempted, with some success, to elicit positive testimony from a State

witness. The fact that counsel’s tactics also elicit ed damaging testimony does not amount

to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689

(judicial scrutiny of counsel’s p erformance must avoid “second-guessing” because “it is

all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to

conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable”). Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Phillip Wolsagel: Petitioner alleges that counsel’s performance was ineffective due

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to his failure to object to information elicited during the testimony of Mr. Wolsagel, a

criminalist with the Phoenix Crime Lab. On direct examination by the prosecutor, Mr.

Wolsagel testified about an entry in notebook found in Petitioner’s apart ment . (RT

10/25/90 at 52-53.) The entry, which, according to a handwriting expert, was written by

Pet it ioner, referred to the price for a quantity of cyanide. (Id. at 53.) Upon questioning by

the prosecutor, Mr. Wolsagel testified that cyanide was a substance with many uses and

that he had heard of cases where it was used to poison humans. (Id.) Counsel did not

object t o t he prosecutor’s question regarding the uses of cyanide; nor did he raise the

subject on cross-examination.

Petitioner contends that the testimony regarding cyanide was inadmissible as

irrelevant and overly prejudicial. Respondents contend that counsel’s performance was

not deficient or prejudicial because the testimony regarding cyanide was admissible to

show premeditation. Without resolving the evidentiary issue regarding the testimony’s

admissibility, the Court finds that counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective

assistance. 

The primary focus of M r. Wolsagel’s testimony was the key forensic evidence

presented by the State, including ballistics and footprint evidence linking Petitioner to the

murder. Defense counsel cross-examined Mr. Wolsagel thoroughly and vigorously on

those topics. (RT 10/25/90 at 59-72.) Apart from the passing reference elicited during the

direct examination of Mr. Wolsagel, t he State made no further reference to the cyanide

issue. Based upon these fact ors, counsel could have made a tactical decision not to object

to the testimony about Petitioner’s notebook “because he did not wish to draw undue

attention to the testimony or because he felt the jury might think the defendant was trying

to conceal more than was actually revealed by the answers.” Noleen, 142 Ariz. at 106, 688

P.2d at 998.

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to

demonst rate that trial counsel’s handling of witnesses constituted ineffective assistance

under Strickland. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

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(4) Failure to object when the prosecutor introduced facts during closing

argument that were not adduced at trial

Petitioner contends that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to object to or

rebut several allegedly improper elements of the prosecutor’s closing argument . In his

amended petition, this claim took the form of an allegation that counsel was ineffective

because he “failed t o object t o t he State’s improper argument . . . that the person who shot

the victim was an accurate shot and co-defendant Roger Scott did not like pistols and

could not hit the broad side of a barn.” (Dkt. 64 at 24.) This was also t he claim raised

before t he st at e court in Petitioner’s PCR petition. (ROA-PCR 90 at 20.) However, in his

brief on the merits, Petitioner fails to discuss this allegation. (Dkt. 90 at 83-91.) Instead, he

sets forth a new IAC claim, contending that the counsel p erformed ineffectively by failing

to object when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by “cloak[ing] himself in the

prestige of the government ,” urging the jury to sympathize with the victim, and unfairly

at t acking Petitioner’s character. (Id. at 83-86.) Petitioner’s failure to exhaust this claim in

state court or present it in his habeas p et ition render it unavailable for habeas review. See

supra at note 4.

With respect to the properly-exhausted IAC claim, challenging counsel’s failure to

object to the prosecutor’s characterization of Scot t as a poor shot, Respondents contend

that Petitioner abandoned the claim by failing to address it in his brief on t he merits.

Without determining whether Petitioner has abandoned or waived the issue by failing to

support it in his merits brief, the Court concludes that the claim does not entitle Pet it ioner

to habeas relief. Two principles militate against a finding that Petitioner is entitled to

relief on this claim. First , t rial counsel, “including prosecutors in criminal cases, are given

wide latitude in their closing arguments to the jury.” State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 426, 799

P.2d 333, 346 (1990). Therefore, in making a closing argument counsel “may summarize the

evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge t he jury to draw reasonable inferences from the

evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions.” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 602, 858 P.2d at 1205; see

State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 402, 783 P.2d 1184, 1194 (1989) (“counsel may comment on

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and argue all justifiable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence

adduced at trial”). Here, the prosecut or drew reasonable inferences from the testimony of

Scott’s mother to the effect that Scott was not familiar with handguns. (RT 10/18/90 at 117-

18.) Second, reviewing courts “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Trial counsel may properly decide t o “ refrain from objecting during closing argument to all

but the most egregious misstatements by opposing counsel on the theory that the jury

may construe their objections to be a sign of desperation or hyper-technicality.” United

States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991); see United States v. Necoechea, 986

F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Because many lawyers refrain from objecting during

opening statement and closing argument, absent egregious misstatements, the failure t o

object during closing argument and opening statement is within the ‘wide range’ of

permissible professional legal conduct.”); Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1003-04 (9th Cir.

2000) (counsel’s failure to object to closing argument in which prosecutor referred to

defendant as “the biggest liar you’ve ever encountered” and defendant’s story as a “piece

of garbage” did not constitute deficient performance).

Applying these principles, the court cannot find that counsel’s failure to object to

the prosecutor’s comments amounted to deficient performance. Counsel’s silence during

the prosecutor’s closing can reasonably be seen as both an acknowledgment of the wide

latitude afforded counsel in making their closing arguments as well as a tactical decision

to avoid appearing desperat e or disruptive. In fact, at the evidentiary hearing before the

PCR court, counsel testified that his decision whether or nor t o object was based on his

assessment of the jurors’ reactions to the prosecutor’s arguments. (RT 10/17/97 at 60.) 

Supporting this interpretation is the fact that, while defense counsel did not raise

any objections during the prosecutor’s closing argument , he did respond to the

prosecutor’s characterization of the evidence concerning Scott’s facility with firearms. In

his closing argument, counsel, noting that Scott’s mother was the only source of

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information concerning Scott’s inexp erience with handguns, directly attacked the

credibility of her testimony:

Now, whose testimony does the State rely on when they tell you

Roger Scott didn’t like guns, he was afraid of guns, he didn’t know how t o

use a gun? That is simply not true, ladies and gentlemen.

You heard testimony from one person in defense of Roger Scott, that

was his mot her. And in evaluating the credibility of that lady, first of all, you

know it’s her son that’s been accused of consp iracy to this. She’s going to

try and protect her son.

(RT 10/31/90 at 69.) Later in his closing argument, counsel recounted Petitioner’s

t est imony t hat Scott did in fact own guns and behaved irresponsibly with them. (Id. at 90.)

These aspects of defense counsel’s argument reduced any p rejudice from his failure to

object to the comments made by the prosecutor.

Complementing defense counsel’s effort to counter the prosecutor’s comments were

the cautionary instructions offered by the court to the jury. Prior to the closing arguments,

the court explained that “what counsel tells you is not evidence. The only evidence you’re

to consider is the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibit s. I’m sure counsel will not

intentionally misstate any item of evidence to you. In the final analy sis, however, it’s your

individual and collective memories of the evidence that counts.” (RT 10/31/90 at 3.)

Following the parties’ arguments, the court instruct ed t he jury “not to be influenced by

sympathy or prejudice” (RT 11/1/90 at 4) and again explained that what the at t orneys say

in t heir closing arguments is not evidence and that the jury “must find the facts from t he

evidence in court” (id. at 5). These instructions sufficiently addressed any prejudice that

might have resulted from the prosecutor’s closing arguments. See United States v. Mares,

940 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Petitioner has failed to show that counsel’s performance with respect to the

prosecutor’s closing argument was either deficient or prejudicial. Therefore, he is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

(5) Failure to object to the trial court’s consideration of the presentence report

Upon sentencing Petitioner, t he t rial court indicated that its had received and

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reviewed a present ence report. (RT 12/14/90 at 3.) The report contained victim impact

information, including the recommendations of family members and a police office that

Petitioner should receive the death sentence. (ROA-PCR 77.) Contending that the court’s

review of such information violated his constitutional rights, Petitioner alleges that

counsel’s failure to object t o the introduction of the report constituted ineffective

assistance. 

In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the

introduct ion of a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of a capital case

violated the Eighth Amendment . In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 830 (1991), the

Supreme Court revisited Booth and overruled it in part, holding that the Eighth Amendment

does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of victim impact evidence but leaving intact

Booth’s prohibition on the admissibility of characterizations and opinions from t he victim’s

family about t he crime, the defendant, or the appropriate sentence to be imposed. Id. at 830

n.2. 

Under Arizona law at the time of Petitioner’s trial, the trial judge, rather t han a jury ,

determined the penalty in a capital case. A.R.S. § 13-703. As noted above, trial judges are

presumed to know and apply the law. Jeffers, 38 F.3d at 415. Therefore, “in the absence

of any evidence to the contrary, [the Court] must assume that the trial judge properly

ap p lied t he law and considered only the evidence he knew to be admissible.” Gretzler v .

Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997); see also State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. at 209, 928

P.2d at 633; State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 66, 906 P.2d 579, 599 (1995); State v. Bolton,

182 Ariz. at 315-16, 896 P.2d at 855-56.

While the trial court reviewed the presentence report, there is no indication that the

court ignored applicable law and considered the sentencing requests contained in the

report when determining Petitioner’s sentence. In the absence of such evidence, this

Court, in accordance with Walton and Gretzler, presumes that the sent encing judge did not

improperly consider the victims’ opinions. Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object

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to the presentence rep ort did not constitute IAC pursuant to Strickland because counsel

was entitled to presume that the trial court would follow the law when passing sentence

and because Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by the failure to object.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Summary

For the reasons set forth above, this Court concludes that the PCR court did not

apply Strickland unreasonably when it denied Petitioner’s IAC claims. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim Seven.

Request for Evidentiary Hearing

In his amended habeas petition, Petitioner made a generic request for an evidentiary

hearing. (Dkt . 63 at 15.) In his memorandum in support of the petition, Petitioner

specifically requested an evidentiary hearing on Claim Eight, IAC at sentencing (Dkt. 64

at 40), a claim which the Court dismissed as procedurally barred (Dkt. 86). In its Order of

September 22, 2000, the Court denied Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing without

prejudice. (Dkt. 86 at 17.) The Court determined that the request had been premature and

invited Petitioner to renew the motion in his brief addressing t he merits of nonprocedurally-defaulted claims. (Id.) In his merits brief, Petitioner did not renew his request

for evidentiary development. (Dkt. 90.) However, his reply includes a general request that

the Court to hold an evident iary hearing “in order that he may have an opportunity to

develop and further establish these Claims.” (Dkt. 101 at 89.) The Court concludes, after

reviewing the record, that none of Petitioner’s properly-exhausted claims warrant

evidentiary development because the allegations contained therein, even if true, do not

entitle him to habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to establish entit lement to habeas relief on

any of his claims. The Court further finds that an evidentiary hearing in t his matter is

neither warranted nor required. 

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Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corp us

(Dkt. 63) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of execution entered by this Court on

December 17, 1998, is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a copy of this Order to

Noel Dessaint, Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ

85007-3329.

DATED this 9th day of January, 2007.

Case 2:98-cv-02244-JAT Document 126 Filed 01/10/07 Page 35 of 35