Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01912/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01912-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jalen R. Morago,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 19-01912-PHX-JJT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On March 22, 2019, Petitioner Jalen R. Morago, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Lewis, filed a pro se document entitled “Petitioner’s Motion for Federal

Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition Expansion of Time,” which the Court construed as a petition

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In a June 5, 2019 Order, the Court

dismissed the petition and gave Petitioner 45 days to file an amended petition in compliance

with the Order. On July 8, 2019, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition (Doc. 9). On August

26, 2019, Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 15). Petitioner filed his Reply on

September 16, 2019 (Doc. 16).

BACKGROUND

On August 13, 2014, Petitioner was convicted by jury trial in Maricopa County

Superior Court, case number CR2013-421379, of unlawful flight from a law enforcement

vehicle and aggravated assault, and was sentenced to an 18-year term of imprisonment. See

State v. Morago, 2015 WL 6468132 (Ariz. Ct. App. October 27, 2015); (Doc. 10).

Case 2:19-cv-01912-JJT Document 17 Filed 01/22/20 Page 1 of 8
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Petitioner filed a timely appeal arguing that “the court erred by denying his motion

for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated assault charge.” Morago, 2015 WL 6468132. The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on October 27,

2015. See id.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed two requests for extensions of time to file a petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Exhs. F, H.) The court granted the requests, and

Petitioner had until January 28, 2016, to file his petition for review. (Exhs. G, I.) The Arizona

Supreme Court dismissed the matter on February 18, 2016, after Petitioner failed to file a

petition for review. (Exh. J.) On February 19, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued its Order

and Mandate. (Exh. K.)

While his direct appeal was pending, Petitioner initiated post-conviction relief

proceedings on August 20, 2014, by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (PCR). (Exh.

L.) Appointed counsel moved to dismiss the notice, without prejudice and subject to re-filing,

since Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending. (Exhs. M, N.) The court granted the motion and

dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding with leave to re-file within 30 days following the issuance

of the order and mandate. (Exh. O.)

Petitioner filed another Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on December 17, 2015. (Exh.

P.) Appointed counsel subsequently filed a Notice of Completion, stating that “after a

thorough review of the record and transcripts, and after considering Petitioner’s input,

counsel tenders a good faith belief that no basis in fact and/or law for post-conviction relief

exists on this record that the defendant is willing to raise.” (Exhs. Q, R.) Counsel requested

an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se PCR petition.

After the Court granted Petitioner an additional extension of time and appointed

advisory counsel (Exhs. S, T), Petitioner filed his PCR petition on August 5, 2016, raising

seven claims for relief (Exhs. U, V). On November 29, 2016, the trial court dismissed the

PCR petition, finding that Petitioner’s claims were precluded and/or meritless. (Exh. W.)

On December 29, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion for an extension of time to file a

petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. X.) The trial court denied the

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motion and Petitioner, subsequently, moved for reconsideration of the court’s order. (Exhs.

Y, Z.) The motion was denied. (Exh. AA.)

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a second motion for an extension of time to file a petition

for review, but the court denied the motion again. (Exhs. BB, CC.) Petitioner did not file a

petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court.

On August 31, 2017, Petitioner filed another Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and

PCR petition. (Exh. DD.) The trial court dismissed the PCR petition as untimely and

successive. (Exh. EE.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of

Appeals on October 14, 2017. (Exh. FF.) The court granted review, but denied relief on

March 29, 2018. (Exh. GG.) Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme

Court (Exh. HH), but the court denied the petition on October 5, 2018 (Exh. II). The Court

of Appeals issued its Order and Mandate on November 5, 2018. (Exh. JJ.)

In his amended habeas petition, Petitioner raises five grounds for relief. In Ground

One, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when his Rule 32 counsel failed to raise Petitioner’s

“colorable ineffective assistance of counsel claims or arguments.” In Ground Two, Petitioner

asserts that he was denied due process in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

because his attorney was incompetent and misrepresented “statements of fact and law.” In

Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that conviction in CR2007-149277 violated the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and his Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent was violated when his trial attorney “failed to move to

suppress [Petitioner’s] involuntary waiver of Miranda warnings.” In Ground Five, Petitioner

asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment

when his trial attorney “failed to conduct a Wade hearing to determin[e] the reli[]ability of

[Petitioner’s] identification.” (Docs. 10, 9.)

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DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s amended habeas petition is

untimely and must be dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

“[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending Petitioner not be counted toward” the limitations

period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state

petition that is not filed, however, within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed”

and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is]

the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state court, but

before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th

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Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction

relief is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department

of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See

Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The petitioner

was “not entitled to tolling during the interval between the completion of one round of state

collateral review and the commencement of a second round of review.”). Moreover, filing

a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations period that ended

before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003).

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for equitable tolling

to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a

timely petition. See id. at 648-49 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s amended habeas petition is untimely. After trial and

sentencing, Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. After the appellate court denial, Petitioner filed two requests for extensions of time

to file a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. The court granted the requests,

and Petitioner had until January 28, 2016, to file his petition for review. However, a petition

for review was never filed. Therefore, Petitioner’s convictions became final on January 28,

2016.

Petitioner, however, initiated PCR proceedings on December 17, 2015. Petitioner’s

PCR proceeding remained pending until December 29, 2016 – when the time expired for

Petitioner to file a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Although Petitioner

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filed multiple requests for extensions of time to file a petition for review, those requests were

denied, and Petitioner never filed a petition for review in Arizona Court of Appeals or

Arizona Supreme Court. The statute of limitations began running the next day and expired

on January 1, 2018. Petitioner did not initiate his habeas proceedings until March 22, 2019.

Accordingly, absent any tolling, his amended habeas petition is untimely by over a year.

Petitioner is not entitled to any additional statutory tolling. Petitioner’s

commencement of his second PCR proceeding on August 31, 2017, did not toll the

limitations period. The state court dismissed these proceedings as untimely and successive.

Thus, the PCR proceedings were not “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See, e.g.,

Pace, 544 U.S. at 414-17; Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005)

(recognizing and applying Pace).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

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In his Reply, Petitioner addresses the merits of his claims, states that his claims are

not procedurally defaulted, and argues that his second PCR proceeding was properly filed

and, as such, he is entitled to statutory tolling up until those proceedings were terminated.

The Court disagrees. As stated in this recommendation, the trial court dismissed the PCR

petition as untimely and successive. (Exh. EE.) The Court of Appeals granted review, but

summarily denied relief, and the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied the petition.

Thus, the second PCR petition was not properly filed and did not toll the limitations period.

Petitioner has also failed to argue let alone demonstrate – that he has been diligently

pursuing his rights and that an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way – or establish a

“causal connection” between an extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely

petition. Moreover, a petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance

of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not,

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any equitable tolling. Petitioner’s amended

habeas petition is untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s amended habeas petition is untimely, the Court

will recommend that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9) be

denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 9) be DENIED and

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72,

6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within

which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the

Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure timely

to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further review.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DATED this 22nd day of January, 2020.

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