Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02264/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02264-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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By order filed October 13, 2015, the Court took the matters under submission.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUTH FEMATT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MONTEREY MECHANICAL CO., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 15-2264 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AFFORDING

PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND;

CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT

CONFERENCE

Before the Court are two motions: (1) defendants Monterey Mechanical Co.

(“Monterey”) and Jim Troup’s (“Troup”) “Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint,”

filed September 11, 2015, and (2) defendant Tod Mundy’s (“Mundy”) “Motion . . . to Dismiss

Claims in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint,” filed September 11, 2015. Plaintiff Ruth

Fematt has filed opposition to each motion, to which defendants have replied. Having read

and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court

rules as follows:1

1. The Second Claim for Relief, titled “Sexual Harassment/Hostile Work

Environment - Negligence (42 USC § 2000e-2(a))” and alleged against Monterey only, is

subject to dismissal, as plaintiff alleges harassment by supervisors Troop and Mundy only

(see FAC ¶ 11, 62, 69), and a negligence claim against an employer pertains where

harassment is committed by co-workers. See Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,

Case 3:15-cv-02264-MMC Document 42 Filed 10/21/15 Page 1 of 6
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Defendants do not challenge the First Claim for Relief, by which plaintiff alleges

Monterey is vicariously liable for harassment by Troop and Mundy.

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Defendants do not challenge the Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth through

Nineteenth Claims for Relief, all but the last of which are alleged only against Monterey,

with the last being alleged only against Mundy.

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256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding, under Title VII, “[w]hen harassment by coworkers is at issue, the employer’s conduct is reviewed for negligence,” whereas “[w]hen

harassment by a supervisor is at issue, an employer is vicariously liable”).2

 Although

plaintiff correctly notes that a complaint may seek “relief in the alternative,” see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(3), plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support a finding that either Troop or Mundy is

not a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious liability, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.

Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013) (holding “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious

liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible

employment actions against the victim”).

2. The Fourth Claim for Relief,3

 titled “Termination of Employment (Gender, Race or

Color) (28 USC § 2000e-2(a))” and alleged against Monterey only, is subject to dismissal. 

Plaintiff does not allege she resigned, see Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S.

129, 141 (2004) (holding “[u]nder the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s

reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to

a formal discharge for remedial purposes”), and, to the extent the claim is based on her

decision to take “an extended medical leave” (see First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 56),

plaintiff’s allegation that she took such leave after being transferred from a position in

Concord, California, to a position in Oakland, California, that would result in additional

wages but higher commuting expenses (see FAC ¶¶ 55-56), is insufficient to support a

finding she was subjected to a level of working conditions equivalent to discharge, see,

e.g., Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding “constructive

discharge cannot be based upon the employee’s subjective preference for one position

over another”); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1247 (1994) (holding

“demotion, even when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a

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Plaintiff also appears to allege that the decision to transfer her to the Oakland office

was made in July 2014 (see FAC ¶ 54), which was prior to August 28, 2014, the date she

alleges she submitted her charge to the EEOC (see FAC ¶ 87).

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constructive discharge”).

3. The Fifth Claim for Relief, titled “Termination of Employment (Race or Color) (42

USC ¶ 1981)” and alleged against each defendant, is subject to dismissal for the reasons

stated above with respect to the Fourth Claim.

4. The Sixth Claim for Relief, titled “Retaliation (Race or Color) (42 USC § 1981)”

and alleged against each defendant, is challenged to the extent it is alleged against Troop

and Mundy only.

 a. To the extent the Sixth Claim is alleged against Troop, it is subject to

dismissal as, even assuming Troop made the challenged decision to transfer plaintiff to

Oakland (see FAC ¶¶ 51-52, 56), plaintiff does not allege Troop was aware of plaintiff’s

having earlier complained to “Human Resources” that Mundy had subjected her to “racial

comments” (see FAC ¶ 49) or plaintiff’s having “expressed her opposition to racial

discrimination in employment in [a] formal charge she filed . . . with the EEOC (see FAC

¶ 87).4 See Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding, to

establish claim of retaliation, plaintiff must show defendant was “aware” of plaintiff’s

“protected activity” prior to imposing challenged “adverse action”).

 b. To the extent the Sixth Claim is alleged against Mundy, it is subject to

dismissal, as plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support a finding that Mundy made the

decision to transfer plaintiff to Oakland. See Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 867

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding individual defendant not liable for retaliatory action, where

defendant was “not responsible” for decision to take such action).

5. The Seventh Claim for Relief, titled “Racial Harassment/Hostile Work

Environment (Supervisor/Vicarious Liability) (42 United States Code § 1981)” and alleged

against each defendant, is challenged to the extent it is alleged against Troop and Mundy

only.

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 a. To the extent the Seventh Claim is alleged against Troop, it is subject to

dismissal, as plaintiff fails to include in the FAC any allegations from which it could be

inferred that Troop engaged in any harassment based on plaintiff’s race or national origin,

let alone a “pattern of ongoing and persistent harassment severe enough to alter the

conditions of employment” because of plaintiff’s race or national origin. See Nichols, 256

F.3d at 871-72 (setting forth standard for hostile work environment claim).

 b. To the extent the Seventh Claim is alleged against Mundy, it is subject to

dismissal. Although plaintiff alleges Mundy, on an unspecified number of occasions, stated

she “look[ed] like a greasy/sweaty Mexican” (see FAC ¶ 32), and, on one occasion,

referred to her “genitalia and feminine parts” as “fish tacos” (see FAC ¶ 26), plaintiff fails to

allege those comments were of such frequency as to have “alter[ed] the conditions of

employment.” See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 871; see also, e.g., Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642-44 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiff could not base racial

harassment claim on “only a few incidents” including two “racially related epithets”). 

Further, although plaintiff alleges Mundy “repeatedly poked and punched [her] arms and

forearms” (see FAC ¶ 21) and once “hit [her] on the buttocks with [a] roll of blueprints” (see

FAC ¶ 44), plaintiff fails to allege the circumstances under which that behavior occurred,

such that it could reasonably be inferred Mundy acted in such manner because of plaintiff’s

race or national origin. See, e.g., Kang v. U. Lim America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 814, 817

(9th Cir. 2002) (finding national origin harassment claim cognizable, where Korean

plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly told plaintiff Koreans were required to work harder than

persons of other national origins, while verbally abusing plaintiff and throwing office

equipment and supplies at him, as well as “striking [him] in the head with a metal ruler on

approximately 20 occasions”).

6. The Eighth Claim for Relief, titled Racial Harassment/Hostile Work Environment -

Negligence (42 United States Code § 1981)” and alleged against each defendant, is

subject to dismissal for for the reasons stated above with respect to the Seventh Claim. 

Further, with respect to Monterey, the Eighth Claim is subject to dismissal for the reasons

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stated above with respect to the Second Claim. See Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d

794, 801, 803-07 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding, with respect to racial harassment claim under

§ 1981, employer subject to vicarious liability, not negligence, where harassing employee is

“supervisor”).

7. The Eleventh Claim for Relief, titled “Hostile Work Environment (Sex) (Cal. FEHA

§ 12940(j))” and alleged against each defendant, is challenged only to the extent the claim

is asserted against Troop. With respect to Troop, the claim is subject to dismissal, as the

claim is based on two incidents that are alleged to have occurred during a six-year period

of employment (see FAC ¶ 36 (alleging Troop, at a meeting, once “clutched and squeezed

[plaintiff’s] upper left thigh”); FAC ¶ 37 (alleging Troop, at a “Christmas party,” once

“squeeze[d] and scour[ed] [plaintiff’s] shoulders”)), which incidents, standing alone, are

insufficient to constitute a “concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or a

generalized nature.” See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 Cal. App. 3d 590,

610 (1989); see also id. at 611-12 (holding “isolated instances of sexual harassment do not

constitute a hostile work environment”; citing, as example, case where defendant “engaged

in mildly offensive verbal conduct on three occasions and twice touched plaintiff’s hair”).

8. The Twelfth Claim for Relief, titled “Hostile Work Environment (Race of Color)

(Cal. FEHA § 12940(j))” and alleged against each defendant, is subject to dismissal, for the

reasons stated above with respect to the Seventh Claim.

9. The Thirteenth Claim for Relief, titled “Termination of Employment - (Race or

Color & Sex) (Cal. FEHA § 12940(a))” and alleged against Monterey only, is subject to

dismissal for the reasons stated above with respect to the Fourth Claim.

10. The Twentieth Claim for Relief, titled “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress”

and alleged against each defendant, is challenged to the extent it is alleged against Troop. 

As pleaded, the Twentieth Claim is derivative in nature (see FAC ¶ 139-41), and, given that

each claim alleged against Troop, specifically, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh

and Twelfth Claims, is subject to dismissal, the Twentieth Claim is likewise subject to

dismissal to the extent alleged against Troop.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions to dismiss are hereby

GRANTED, and (1) the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth Claims for

Relief are hereby DISMISSED, (2) the Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief are hereby

DISMISSED to the extent they are alleged against Troop and Mundy, and (3) the Eleventh

and Twentieth Claims for Relief are hereby DISMISSED to the extent they are alleged

against Troop.

If plaintiff wishes to amend to cure any or all of the above-identified deficiencies,

plaintiff is afforded leave to file, no later than November 6, 2015, a Second Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff may not, however, add new claims or new defendants without first

obtaining leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If plaintiff does not file a Second

Amended Complaint by the date specified, the instant action will proceed on the remaining

claims in the FAC against Monterey and Mundy.

Additionally, in light of the above, the Case Management Conference is hereby

CONTINUED from November 13, 2015, to December 11, 2015, at 10:30 a.m. A Joint Case

Management Conference Statement shall be filed no later than December 4, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2015 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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