Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00277/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00277-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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In his opposition, Plaintiff refers to another case 1

pending in this court involving Officer Van Dalen, Maxey v. Van

Dalen, et al.,1:05-cv-1385 AWI LJO, and suggests that “this

should be a class action.” (Doc. 20-2, filed May 30, 2006, at

5:11-26.) Plaintiff has made no showing that the requirements of

a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure have been met. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976

F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs bear the

burden of establishing each of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites

(citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH PUCKETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHIEF OF POLICE DYER, et al., 

Defendants.

CV-F-05-0277 OWW DLB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION

FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

(DOC. 15)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Joseph Puckett (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at Fresno

County Jail proceeding in propria persona, brings an action

against two defendants, Fresno Chief of Police Jerry Dyer and

Officer Van Dalen (collectively “Defendants”), under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint and for

a more definite statement. (Doc. 15, filed May 15, 2006.) 

Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Doc. 20, filed May 30, 2006.) 1

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1985)). To the extent Plaintiff is moving for class

certification, the motion is denied without prejudice.

Part of the complaint is written on a form with its own 2

pagination. Moreover, two pages of the complaint, those numbered

4 and 5 on the copy scanned into the court’s Case

Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system, appear to be

in reverse order. The court will refer to pages of the complaint

as they are automatically numbered on the copy available on

CM/ECF.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The complaint alleges that, in July of 2004, while riding

his bicycle, Plaintiff was approached by Officer Van Dalen. 

Compl. 2. Plaintiff alleges that, without provocation, the 2

officer handcuffed him and threw him to the ground. Id. The

officer allegedly kicked Plaintiff on his back and head while he

was on the ground. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the officer

continued to strike him as other officers arrived. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Van Dalen made a false report

about the arrest, which stated that Plaintiff resisted arrest. 

Id. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered head injuries,

including a concussion, and that he continues to experience back

pain and severe headaches. Id. Plaintiff alleges that his

injuries were caused by Chief Dyer’s failure to properly

supervise his employees and his deliberate indifference to the

patterns, practices, customs, and policies that violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 4, 6.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6)

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In

testing the sufficiency of a complaint against a Rule 12(b)(6)

challenge, a court must “accept all material allegations in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d

578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The court need not, however, “accept

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55

(9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979). The Ninth Circuit construes pro se

pleadings liberally on a defendant’s motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895

(9th Cir. 2002). The court may consider the complaint itself

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along with any material properly considered as part of the

complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the complaint fails

to state a claim on which relief can be granted, leave to amend

“shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a); Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir.

1990).

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(e)

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

for a motion for a more definite statement if a pleading “is so

vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to

frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Motions

for a more definite statement are disfavored, but are within the

court’s discretion and may sometimes be appropriate. Osborne v.

County of Riverside, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

“[P]roper pleading under Rule 8 requires a pleading to contain

allegations of each element of the claim. If it does not, and if

the deficiency is not so material that the pleading should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a more definite statement is

appropriate.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.36[1] (Matthew

Bender 3d ed.). 

A defendant may not use a Rule 12(e) motion to determine the

legal theory upon which plaintiff plans to proceed. See, e.g.,

Bryson v. Bank of N.Y., 584 F. Supp. 1306, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);

Sopkin v. Mo. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 222 F. Supp. 984, 985 (W.D.

Mo. 1963) (“The failure to characterize a claim as in contract or

tort is not such vagueness or ambiguity that the defendant cannot

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frame a responsive pleading in an ordinary case such as this.”). 

“[E]ven though a complaint is not defective for failure to

designate the statute or other provision of law violated, the

judge may in his discretion . . . require such detail as may be

appropriate in the particular case.” Thompson v. City of Shasta

Lake, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996)).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Specify the Facts Supporting Each Cause of

Action

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted because he does not allege “which

constitutional right(s) were violated by which specific

defendant(s) by way of which specific act(s).” Mot. 2:18-19. 

Plaintiff also fails to state which of the facts presented in the

narrative portion of the complaint apply to which causes of

action. Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege

specific acts that support his claims. Defendants do not contend

that the facts alleged are insufficient to support any cause of

action that Plaintiff brings.

A plaintiff need not specify the precise nature of a claim

so long as the facts alleged provide the defendant adequate

notice of a claim. Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data

Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying motion to

dismiss unfair competition cause of action, which plaintiff did

not explicitly allege, where facts pled gave defendant adequate

notice of such a claim). Here, Plaintiff realleges and

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It appears that the references to the City of Fresno, 3

which is not a named defendant, and Ed Winchester, who is the

former Fresno Chief of Police and is also not a named defendant,

are the result of drafting errors by Plaintiff. This portion of

the complaint appears to be an altered version of another

document (an earlier complaint). It appears that in some places

“Ed Winchester,” or another noun, has been deleted from the

typewritten text and “Dyer” or “Chief Dyer” has been written in

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incorporates by reference his narrative recitation of the facts

under both the first and second causes of action. 

Defendants do not contend that any of the claims lack

factual support as they obviously allege injury caused by Officer

Van Dalen’s use of excessive force under color of state law. 

Defendants appear to be requesting that, rather than

reincorporating all of the facts, Plaintiff reiterate under each

cause of action the facts on which it is based. Defendants are

essentially contending that by reincorporating all the facts,

Plaintiff has alleged too much under each cause of action. At

this stage, Plaintiff has fulfilled the notice pleading

requirements of Rule 8(a) by alleging causes of action and

alleging facts that provide adequate notice of the conduct on

which the causes of action rest.

B. References to Conduct of “City of Fresno” and “Ed

Winchester”

Defendants also contend the complaint is subject to

dismissal because it refers to acts by entities that are not

named defendants in this lawsuit. In the second cause of action,

the complaint refers to culpable conduct by the “City of Fresno”

and “Ed Winchester,” and neither is listed as a defendant in this

lawsuit. The second cause of action also refers to culpable 3

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by hand.

Defendants contend that both the first and second 4

causes of action allege conduct by individuals who are not named

defendants. The first cause of action, however, does not mention

anyone other than named defendants.

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conduct by the “Chief of Police” and “Chief Dyer.” 

Defendants have not explained why the references to the

“City of Fresno” and “Ed Winchester” render the second cause of

action subject to dismissal with respect to Chief Dyer. Rather,

despite the confusing switching of subjects, the second cause of

action straightforwardly states a claim for the supervisory

liability of Chief Dyer: “The acts of defendant Police Officers

are the direct and proximate result of the deliberate

indifference of defendants, City of Fresno and Dyer and their

supervisory officials and employees to violations of

plaintiff[’s] constitutional rights.” Compl. 4 (emphasis in

original); see, e.g., Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th

Cir. 1989) (“A supervisor may be liable if there exists either

(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional

deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.”); Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’” failure to train or supervise

supported Section 1983 action against a supervisor (quoting City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). The complaint’s

mention in the second cause of action of culpable acts of

individuals who are not defendants is not grounds for dismissal.4

These references are, however, properly subject to a motion to

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It appears that pages 4 and 5 of the complaint have 5

been scanned into CM/ECF in reverse order. The failure of

Plaintiff to number each page of the complaint exacerbates this

problem. This error may have contributed to Defendants’

confusion regarding the complaint. Plaintiff is directed to

ensure that all documents he files with the court comply with

Local Rule 7-130(d): “Each page shall be numbered consecutively

at the bottom and shall provide a brief description of the

document on the same line.”

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strike, as they are irrelevant.

C. Motion for a More Definite Statement

In support of their motion for a more definite statement,

Defendants reiterate their objection that Plaintiff fails to

relate the facts in the narrative to the particular claims

against Defendants. Defendants do not contend, and it is not 5

the case, that the facts alleged are so ambiguous that Defendants

cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being asserted and so

cannot frame a responsive pleading. 

Defendants again argue that the complaint improperly refers

to conduct of individuals who are not defendants in this lawsuit. 

Defendants urge that they cannot frame a responsive pleading if

they cannot discern which Defendants are being sued, under which

causes of action they are being sued, and which acts give rise to

these claims. However, the first cause of action plainly refers

to the conduct of both Defendants, the only two named in the

caption of the complaint. The second cause of action is

explicitly brought against Chief Dyer. While the complaint’s

mentions of the City of Fresno and Ed Winchester potentially

create ambiguity as to whether they are also defendants, these

references do not impair the moving parties’ ability to frame a

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responsive pleading.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff should be directed to amend

his complaint to specify the date of the alleged events, rather

than merely stating that they happened in “July of 2004.” Compl.

2. In Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp.

940 (E.D. Cal. 1981), Judge Karlton discussed the merits of

granting the plaintiff’s motion for a more definite statement of

defendant’s counterclaim and ordering that the counterclaim

specify key dates on which alleged conduct occurred. Id. at 949. 

The plaintiff contended that this information was necessary to

enable it to determine whether to plead a statute of limitations

defense. Id. Judge Karlton held that Rule 8(e) does not require

pleading with such specificity. Id. Rather, the date of alleged

misconduct “is exactly the sort of information which should be

obtained through the discovery process.” Id.; see also William

W. Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil

Procedure before Trial 9:358 (2006). 

In this case, Plaintiff has sued only two individual

Defendants. Defendants have the means of determining on which

day in July of 2004 the alleged conduct occurred, as the date of

arrest is a matter of public record. If public records do not

sufficiently inform Defendants on this point, they may simply

issue an interrogatory seeking this information or may ask

Plaintiff to elaborate in a deposition as to the date and time of

the incident. The absence of a specific date does not impair

Defendants’ ability to frame a responsive pleading, and so is not

grounds for granting a motion for a more definite statement.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss (Doc. 15) is DENIED and Defendants’ motion for more

definite statement (Doc. 15) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2006 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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