Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01699/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01699-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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07cv1699-L (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY ROBERT BRATTON, III,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Case No. 07cv1699-L (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge M. James Lorenz pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

 On August 27, 2007, Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing pro se,

filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Doc. No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner is not challenging his

conviction or sentence, but rather the Board of Parole Terms’ (“BPT”)

decision finding him to be unsuitable for parole. Id. On November 1,

2007, Respondent moved to dismiss the petition as procedurally

defaulted. Doc. No. 6 (“Resp. Mtn.”). Petitioner timely opposed

Case 3:07-cv-01699-L-BLM Document 8 Filed 03/20/08 Page 1 of 11
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1Both Petitioner and Respondent submitted lodgments which, confusingly, are

labeled with overlapping numbers. Doc. Nos. 1, 6, 7. To clarify citation, those

lodgments attached to Petitioner’s petition, Doc. No. 1, are referred to as “P.

Lodg.”, while the letter attached to his opposition, Doc. No. 7, is called “P. Supp.

Lodg.” Likewise, the lodgments accompanying Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Doc. No.

6, are referred to as “R. Lodg.”

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Respondent’s motion. Doc. No. 7 (“Pet. Opp.”). For the reasons set

forth below, the Court recommends that Respondent’s motion be GRANTED

and the instant petition be DISMISSED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 1974, Petitioner, then eighteen years old, murdered

his neighbor, a deaf and mute adult female, and stole approximately

eighteen dollars from her piggy bank. Petitioner’s Lodgement 3 at 2.

(“P. Lodg.”).1 Petitioner killed the victim by shooting her four times

in the head and stabbing her approximately twenty-eight times. R. Lodg.

5 at 76. There also is evidence that Petitioner raped the victim,

though this was not proven at trial. Id. at 76-77. In April of the

following year, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder,

first degree burglary, and first degree robbery, in violation of

California Penal Code (“PC”) §§ 187, 211, and 459. P. Lodg. 1. Though

Petitioner originally was sentenced to death, this sentence later was

reduced to life imprisonment. Id.; Pet. at 2. 

 Petitioner was incarcerated in 1975, Pet. Lodg. 4 at 1, and his

first parole hearing was in 1980. Pet. Lodg. 3. The BPT denied parole

that year, and in six subsequent annual hearings. Id. In 1987, the BPT

gave Petitioner a 1992 parole release date, citing Petitioner’s lack of

criminal history, post-release employment options, self-improvement, and

understanding of his guilt. P. Lodg. 4 at 60. In 1992, before

Petitioner was to be released, the BPT rescinded Petitioner’s parole,

stating that the gravity of the commitment offense and unfavorable

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2Petitioner has filed at least three previous habeas petitions in the Southern

District of California. Bratton v. Alameida, 02cv691-BTM (BEN); Bratton v. Hernandez,

06cv1195-L (RBB); Bratton v. Hernandez, 06cv2771-LAB (AJB). However, as the current

petition is the most recent, and the only one to address the 2006 parole denial, “the

factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). It is therefore not “second

or successive” such that it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id.

3 07cv1699-L (BLM)

psychiatric evaluations rendered their previous decision a “fundamental

error.” P. Lodg. 9 at 83-84. 

Petitioner’s fourteenth parole hearing was held in September 2006,

and he again was denied release based on the brutality of the underlying

crimes, Petitioner’s failure to address his motivations for the murder,

and unfavorable psychiatric reports. P. Lodg. 12 at 87-91. Challenging

the BPT’s September 2006 decision, Petitioner filed habeas corpus

petitions in the California Superior Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme

Court, which were denied at all three levels. R. Lodg. 2-4, 6. The

most recent opinion, from the California Supreme Court, was a summary

denial stating: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See

People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.)” P. Lodg. 2. 

In August 2007, Petitioner filed the petition currently before this

Court.2 Doc. No. 1. 

DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (LEXIS through 2005 legislation).

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B. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s petition on state procedural grounds, and that the petition

is thus procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed. Resp. Mot.

Petitioner argues that there was no such default, and that his petition

is thus properly before this Court. Pet. Opp. 

A habeas petition is procedurally defaulted when the last reviewing

state court dismissed it for failure to comply with a state rule of

procedure. Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997); Lambright v. Stewart, 241

F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). When the procedural rule is

independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment, federal

review of the claims is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate

either cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the

alleged constitutional violations, or that failure to consider the

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Carter v.

Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). Procedural default is an

affirmative defense, and once the respondent has adequately pled the

existence of independent and adequate state procedural grounds, the

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. Bennett

v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). 

1. The Duvall Denial Constitutes an “Independent and Adequate”

State Procedural Ground Upon Which the California Supreme

Court “Actually Relied”

The last court to review Petitioner’s claims was the California

Supreme Court, which issued a one-sentence denial of the petition,

citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). R. Lodg. 2; See

Carter, 385 F.3d at 1197 (one-sentence summary denial of petition

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incorporating unelaborated case citation sufficient for procedural

default). Petitioner’s claim is thus procedurally defaulted if this

citation to Duvall is an “independent and adequate” state procedural

ground upon which the California Supreme Court “actually relied.”

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). In

the instant case, the state court relied on independent and adequate

state grounds in denying Petitioner’s claims.

A state court’s denial is not independent when “it fairly appeared

to rest primarily on resolution of [the petitioner’s federal] claims, or

to be interwoven with those claims.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735; Park v.

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Coleman, 501

U.S. at 733). Here, the California Supreme Court cited to page 474 of

its previous holding in Duvall. R. Lodg. 2. This portion of Duvall

describes a habeas petitioner’s duty under California law to “state

fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought,” and

“include copies of reasonable documentary evidence supporting the

claim.” Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474; see King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823

(9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing Duvall page 474 as requiring petitioner to

plead with particularity). This requirement is described in depth, and,

though page 474 contains numerous citations to California authorities,

there are none to federal law. Id.

The cited portion of Duvall describes a California procedural rule,

and, in denying Petitioner’s claims, the state supreme court relied

exclusively on this citation. R. Lodg. 2. As there was no mention of

federal law, the state court’s denial could not have rested on, or been

interwoven with, such authority, and was thus “independent.” See

Carter, 385 F.3d at 1197 (denial independent when “[n]o analysis of

federal law enters into the [] equation”); Valerio, 306 F.3d at 775-76

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(habeas petition procedurally defaulted when state court clearly and

expressly relied on state law). 

To be procedurally defaulted, a petitioner’s claims also must be

denied on “adequate” grounds. “A state procedural rule constitutes an

adequate bar to federal court review if it was ‘firmly established and

regularly followed’ at the time it was applied by the state court.”

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ford v.

Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 425 (1985)). The burden of proving adequacy is

upon the state, and if the state does so, then the burden shifts to the

petitioner to assert “specific factual allegations that demonstrate the

inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule.” Bennett v.

Mueller, 322 F.3d at 585-86 (9th Cir. 2003). 

When describing a habeas petitioner’s duty to plead with

particularity and support his claims with documentary evidence, the

Duvall court summarized a long-standing rule, citing a series of cases

dating from the 1920's to the 1990's, when the opinion was written.

Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474. Since then, California appellate courts have

continued to affirm the Duvall requirements. E.g., In re Hawthorne, 35

Cal. 4th 40 (2005); In re Seaton, 34 Cal. 4th 193 (2004); see also Resp.

Mem. at 3 (enumerating state cases discussing Duvall). Likewise, the

Ninth Circuit has followed the California Courts, citing Duvall page 474

as requiring pleading with particularity and supporting documentary

evidence. See, e.g., Griffey v. Lindsey, 345 F.3d 1058, 1066 n.11 (9th

Cir. 2003) (vacated on other grounds as moot); King, 340 F.3d 823; see

also Jones v. Woodford, 2008 WL 505230 at *36, 03cv1463-J (RBB) (S.D.

Cal. 2008). These requirements are thus well-established, have been

consistently applied for the better part of a century, and were firmly

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3Though he does not challenge the established nature of the Duvall requirements,

Petitioner does argue that he plead with sufficient particularity when he completed the

required form habeas petition. Pet. Opp. at 2-5. However, it is well established that

federal habeas courts are not permitted to review state court applications of state

procedural rules, and this Court thus lacks jurisdiction to address these contentions.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Poland, 169 F.3d at 584. 

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in place when Petitioner submitted his state supreme court petition in

2007. See Carter, 385 F.3d at 1198 (California procedural rule dating

back to 1947 as independent and adequate procedural bar to federal

review); Poland, 169 F.3d at 583-85 (state rule adequate when

“consistently and regularly followed”) 

The burden therefore shifts to Petitioner to prove that the Duvall

rules were not firmly established and regularly followed at the time the

California Supreme Court denied his petition. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-

86. Petitioner fails to make any arguments in this respect, much less

support his burden with “specific factual allegations.”3 Id. Moreover,

the Court’s independent review of the law found no support for such an

argument. Petitioner thus fails to show that the state supreme court’s

citation to Duvall constituted anything but an adequate ground upon

which to deny his claims.

The California Supreme Court also must have “actually relied” on

the Duvall rule in its denial of Petitioner’s petition. Valerio, 306

F.3d at 773. As Duvall was the only rationale provided by the supreme

court, it was necessarily the one upon which it actually relied. 

For the above reasons, the California Supreme Court’s citation to

Duvall constituted “actual reliance” on an “independent and adequate”

procedural rule. Petitioner’s claims are therefore procedurally

defaulted.

///

///

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8 07cv1699-L (BLM)

2. As Petitioner Neither Suffered Cause and Prejudice, Nor Argues

Actual Innocence, His Claims are Procedurally Defaulted

To overcome procedural default, Petitioner must demonstrate either

cause for his default and prejudice resulting from the alleged

constitutional violations, or that he is actually innocent, such that a

failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (standard based on “the important

interest in finality” served by state procedural rules and the

“significant harm ... that results from the failure of federal courts to

respect them”); Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner does not meet this burden.

“‘[C]ause’ under the cause and prejudice test must be something

external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed

to him,” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (emphasis in original), while

prejudice is that resulting from the alleged constitutional errors, id.

at 750. Unless a petitioner demonstrates excusable cause for his

procedural default, a reviewing federal court need not reach the

question of prejudice. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982); Smith

v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Petitioner must

therefore make an initial showing that external factors caused his

failures to plead with particularity and support his claims with

documentary evidence. 

Petitioner contends that his state court pleadings were

sufficiently particular, and that the California Supreme Court therefore

erred in denying his petition. Pet. Opp. at 2-5. He does not, however,

address the causes for his failure to plead with particularity; by

stating, for example, that he lacked facts at the time of pleading, or

suffered ineffective assistance of counsel when drafting the claims.

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See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (enumerating external factors

that may excuse procedural default). Petitioner therefore fails to

excuse his non-compliance with the Duvall specificity requirement.

Petitioner does, however, imply that he is not to blame for the

other source of procedural default- his failure to submit documentary

evidence. Pet. Opp. at 3-5; P. Supp. Lodg. Though he concedes that his

California Supreme Court petition neither referred to nor was

accompanied by any exhibits, he appears to contend that this was not his

fault. Pet. Opp. at 4. Although his argument is not entirely clear,

Petitioner seems to state that, before filing his petition in the

California Supreme Court, he mailed the court his exhibits, but that

they never arrived. Id. This error was further compounded when, as he

had apparently mailed his only copies, he was subsequently unable to

refer to any exhibits when drafting his petition. Id. 

This argument does not demonstrate excusable cause sufficient to

overcome procedural default. It is both unclear and uncorroborated by

evidence. See 28 foll. § 2254, Rule 2(c) (habeas petitioner must state

facts supporting claims); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir.

1995) (habeas petitioner must support conclusions with evidence).

Petitioner merely states that he “did not have any available documents

to send to support his contentions” and therefore “did not refer to any

exhibits in the California Supreme Court petition.” Pet. Opp. at 4.

These bare statements, absent supporting evidence, such as proof of

efforts to obtain any missing documents or external factors impeding

Petitioner’s efforts, are insufficient to show cause for his procedural

default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488; Davis v. Woodford, 384

F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner must offer explanation for

procedural default).

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Because Petitioner has not established cause, the Court need not

address the question of prejudice. Engle, 456 U.S. at 134; Smith, 510

F.3d at 1147. The Court may therefore only reach the merits of

Petitioner’s habeas claims if, “in light of new evidence, ‘it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,’” and whose continued incarceration

would therefore constitute a “miscarriage of justice.” House v. Bell,

547 U.S. 518, 519, 536 (2006)(citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324,

327 (1995)). 

Petitioner has presented no such evidence here, nor does he argue

that he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted.

To the contrary, he has consistently admitted and taken full

responsibility for his actions, including the murder. See P. Lodg. 4 at

8-9. The miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default is

therefore inapplicable to this case.

In sum, Duvall provides independent and adequate state procedural

grounds for the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s

claims. As Petitioner neither demonstrates cause for his procedural

default, nor contends actual innocence, a reviewing federal court may

not look beyond the default to the merits of the petition. Accordingly,

this Court recommends granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation; (2) granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the

Petition; and (3) dismissing this action in its entirety with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 11, 2008, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

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all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than May 2,

2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: March 20, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE M. JAMES LORENZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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