Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01668/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01668-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERDELLA SHAW, individually

and as a representative of the

ESTATE OF MAURICE SHAW,

No. 2:01-cv-1668-MCE-PAN

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, a

municipality; et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This case proceeded to a jury trial on January 4, 2006. On

January 19, 2006, the jury reached a verdict in favor of

Plaintiff and against Defendants San Joaquin County, Baxter Dunn

(“Dunn”), and Robert Hart, M.D (“Hart”). Compensatory damages in

the amount of $758,200 were awarded. Given the jury’s finding

that Defendants Dunn and Hart acted with deliberate indifference

towards Plaintiff’s decedent, Maurice Shaw, the jury reconvened

on February 21, 2006 to consider whether punitive damages should

be awarded against either Dunn or Hart. Following completion of

the punitive damages portion of the trial, the jury awarded

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Plaintiff an additional $100,000 as against Defendant Hart, only. 

All Defendants now move for a new trial under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59.

Defendants’ primary argument in seeking a new trial rests

with their contention that the verdict reached against them is

contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Defendants Dunn

and Hart assert, on the basis of the evidence presented, that the

jury simply could not have found that they acted with conscious

disregard towards Maurice Shaw so to have made the requisite

finding of deliberate indifference. Similarly, with respect to

the liability of Defendant San Joaquin County, defense counsel

further contends that the evidence adduced at trial was

insufficient for the jury to have determined that there was a

custom or practice on the County’s part in ignoring inmates’

rights that supported a verdict against the County pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants also make several other arguments in favor of

granting a new trial in this matter. They argue that the Court

erred with respect to several evidentiary rulings. First,

Defendants allege that the Court improperly failed to instruct

the jury on a qualified immunity defense purportedly available to

Defendants Dunn and Hart. Second, according to Defendants, the

admission into evidence of the Institute of Medical Quality

(“IMQ”) Report was improper. Third, Defendants contend that the

court should not have admitted evidence of other jail suicides

during the initial liability phase of the trial. Finally,

Defendants allege that in any event the compensatory damages

awarded to Plaintiff were grossly excessive and amount to a

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miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial.

With respect to Defendants’ initial argument that the

verdict reached cannot be reconciled with the weight of the

evidence, a stringent standard must be applied by the Court. 

Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th

Cir. 1984). A motion for new trial may be granted on this ground

only if the verdict is against the “great weight” of the evidence

or if “it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously

erroneous result.” Id., see also Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d

1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987). It would amount to an abuse of

discretion on the part of the court to grant a new trial on any

lesser showing, and the court cannot extend relief simply because

it would have arrived at a different verdict. Silver Sage

Partner, LTD v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 818-19

(9th Cir. 2001).

The Court cannot grant a new trial given this rigorous

standard. In its view, there was more than sufficient evidence

from which the jury could have reached its decision finding both

the County and the individual Defendants (Hart and Dunn) liable. 

Evidence showed, for example, that all Defendants were well aware

that staffing levels at the San Joaquin County Jail, along with

medical supervision, training, and monitoring, were inadequate

and had been inadequate for some time. Evidence further showed

that all Defendants knew of Maurice Shaw’s condition, yet failed

to take necessary ameliorative measures despite Maurice Shaw’s

rapidly deteriorating mental and emotional condition. Further,

defendants had knowledge that other emotionally unstable inmates

had succeeded in taking their own lives at the jail in the past. 

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Consequently Defendants’ Motion for New Trial on grounds of

insufficiency of the evidence must be denied.

Defendants’ remaining arguments are equally unavailing. The

Court’s review of the record does not indicate that defense

counsel even requested a jury instruction on the issue of

qualified immunity. Even if such an instruction had been

requested, however, as discussed in its ruling on the

concurrently filed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, the

instruction would properly have been denied since the issue of

qualified immunity should properly be made by the Court in this

instance following the jury’s factual determinations as to

Defendants’ conduct. Hence there was no error in failing to

provide a qualified immunity instruction in any event. In

addition, because the Court believes that the IMQ Report and

evidence of other jail suicides were properly admitted into

evidence given the circumstances of this case, no error occurred

with respect to admission of materials falling into those

categories.

As indicated above, Defendants argue as a final matter that

even if a verdict in favor of Defendants may have otherwise been

indicated, the amount of compensatory damages awarded were

grossly excessive. The amount of the jury awarded damages should

not be disturbed, however, unless the award is “grossly excessive

or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or based

only on speculation or guesswork.” Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,

Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Just as Defendants could not sustain their burden of proof in

arguing that a finding of liability was against the clear weight

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of the evidence, their similar attack against the amount of

damages awarded must also fail. The Court simply cannot

determine that the compensatory damages awarded here were beyond

all reason, as it is required to do in order to reject the jury’s

award of such damages.

For all these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for New Trial is

hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 17, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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