Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04117/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04117-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

At issue is the Court’s March 18, 2020 Order (Doc. 23) (the “Order”) regarding 

Plaintiff Mona Lisa Lacy’s Application for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social 

Security Act (the Act). The Order reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge

(AR 12–40)

1 denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits and remanded the case to the 

Social Security Administration for a calculation of benefits. (Order at 12) Defendant Social 

Security Commissioner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 25) (the “Motion”), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 26). 

Defendant then filed a reply. (Doc. 27) The Court now remands the case for further 

proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance on September 

16, 2014 for a period of disability beginning September 4, 2014. (AR 15) Plaintiff’s claim 

1 Administrative Record (Doc. 10).

Mona Lisa Lacy,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-18-04117-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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was denied initially on February 18, 2015, and upon reconsideration on August 13, 2015. 

(AR 15) Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 

on June 15, 2017. (AR 15) On November 28, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s Application. 

(AR 33) On September 20, 2018, the Appeals Council denied a request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision. (AR 1)

Upon reviewing the ALJ’s decision Court found that “the ALJ failed to provide 

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Nolan’s opinion and Plaintiff’s subjective 

testimony.” (Order at 12) The Court based its conclusions primarily on the ALJ’s 

evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical record, what the Court believed to have been the incorrect 

standard of review of the medical records by the ALJ, and the testimony and medical 

opinions related to Plaintiff’s impairment. After determining that the ALJ committed 

reversible error, the Court found that “the record has been fully developed and, as a result, 

a remand for further proceedings would not be useful.” (Order at 12) Next, the Court found 

that “based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ would have been required to find 

Plaintiff’s disabled had she credited Dr. Nolan’s opinion.” (Order at 12)

Defendant now argues that the Court “did not properly assess whether the facts of 

this case justify the extraordinary remedy of remand for payment of benefits.” (Doc. 25 at 

2) Specifically, Defendant points to one error: the Court did not consider the record as 

whole and failed to explain why it concluded the record as a whole did not create serious 

doubt about Plaintiff’s alleged disability. Defendant focuses on this error in the Motion but 

also pointed out that he would reserve the right to challenge the Court’s conclusions that 

the ALJ failed to properly support her findings on further appeal. Defendant generally 

asserts that, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, “serious doubt” exists as to whether 

Plaintiff is actually disabled. (Doc. 25 at 3)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Reconsideration is appropriate only in rare circumstances. Kona Enters., Inc. v. 

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may grant a motion under 

Rule 59(e) if the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 

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clear error, the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or there is an intervening change in 

controlling law. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. ANALYSIS

Because the record contains conflicting evidence documenting the severity of 

Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia-related impairment, the Court agrees with Defendant that it 

committed clear error in determining that additional proceedings would serve no useful 

purpose. Accordingly, it is necessary to further develop the record in this case, so the 

ordinary remand rule applies. Although the ALJ erred in rejecting the treating physician’s 

opinion and Plaintiff’s own testimony, the credit-as-true rule does not apply. There are still 

outstanding issues to be resolved in this case, most importantly determining what true 

limitations are caused by Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to 

remand the case for further development of the record.

Importantly, Plaintiff’s impairments are well-documented and the ALJ herself 

recognized that Plaintiff suffered medically-determinable impairments. (AR 22, 30) 

Nevertheless, an outstanding issue remains because the record is not clear, and at times 

conflicting, as to the extent of Plaintiff’s limitations due to fibromyalgia and the associated 

symptoms. Defendant points to numerous medical records that identify normal findings 

that appear to be inconsistent with disabling fibromyalgia as well as evidence suggesting 

malingering. (Doc 25 at 4–6) 

Moreover, Defendant also points to other evidence in the record that he asserts is 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s alleged completely disabling symptoms, including Plaintiff’s 

daily activities, prior work history, and conflicting medical opinions between treating and 

reviewing physicians. (Docs. 25 at 4–6; 27 at 2–3) The Court agrees with Defendant that 

these outstanding issues cast “serious doubt that Plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits” 

and create conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps in the record, which the ALJ must resolve. (Doc. 

25 at 7) Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 2015). Indeed, it is the ALJ’s 

duty to resolve conflicts, gaps, or ambiguities in the record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 

F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s response for several reasons. First, 

Plaintiff seems to mischaracterize Defendant’s argument regarding the credit-as-true rule. 

Indeed, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Commissioner does not appear to question the 

application of the well-known credit-as-true rule.” (Doc. 26 at 3) Furthermore, Plaintiff 

summarizes Defendant’s argument as “the belief that ‘even though all condition[s] of the 

credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt 

that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.’” (Doc. 26 at 3) It is true that Defendant does not 

question the application of the credit-as-true rule in general. There is no argument that the 

rule must be changed or otherwise abandoned. However, Defendant clearly argues that the 

conditions of the rule are not present here and it should not be applied. The three prongs of 

the credit-as-true rule, where a reviewing court can credit certain evidence as true, are 

(1) an ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting that evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that 

must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 

made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence 

credited.

See, e.g., Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Even if all the conditions 

of the creid-as-true rule are satisfied, a court must remand for further proceedings when the 

evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled. 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014). Nowhere does Defendant agrees 

that there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 

disability can be made. The crux of Defendant’s argument is that there are issues and 

conflicting evidence in the record, which viewed as a whole, create serious doubt that 

Plaintiff was disabled. Defendant actually argues that the second factor of the credit-astrue rule is not met, and it must be viewed in light of the whole record and whether serious 

doubt exists.

Second, the Commissioner is entitled to file a motion under rule 59(e) and such 

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motion is not akin to litigating the case twice. It offers limited grounds for the Court to 

review a judgment it issued without asking litigants to engage in the appellate process 

immediately. It offers protection against litigating the case twice because only limited 

grounds are available to file such motion and a Court has broad discretion in granting it. 

Defendant identified clear error the Court committed, and it is a proper ground for the filing 

of a rule 59(e) motion. 

Third, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to address the “false standard” the Court 

found the ALJ applied when evaluating Plaintiff’s medical records and whether they fully 

supported her symptoms. (Doc. 26 at 7–8) Defendant points out in his reply that this was a 

mischaracterization of the ALJ’s decision but, more importantly, that Defendant did not 

challenge such error in the Motion because “he is challenging only the remedy here” and 

not the Court’s conclusions that the ALJ erred in assessing the merits of Plaintiff’s 

disability. (Doc. 27 at 3, fn.3)2 Accordingly, the Defendant did not waive an argument on 

such standard, which is related to the first prong of the credit-as-true rule, but focused his 

Motion on the second prong of such rule. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court found no error “in weighing the desktop 

reviewer’s opinion, which is far from a finding that opinion would be substantial evidence 

sufficient to drive the outcome of this case.” (Doc. 26 at 5) Plaintiff further argues that “if 

the Commissioner’s argument were accepted, there would never be a remand for award of 

benefits, because state agency reviewer’s assessments appear in all hearing records.” (Doc. 

26 at 5) This argument misconstrues the Court’s statement. When reviewing the ALJ’s 

decision and reasoning on her weighing of Dr. Sapin’s opinion, the Court concluded she 

did not commit error in according great weight to such opinion. (Order at 11) Indeed, the 

ALJ accorded great weight to such opinion and little weight to another non-treating 

physician’s opinion and Plaintiff argued it was unclear why. (Order at 11) The Court found 

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Indeed, the Commissioner stated in his Motion that he was only challenging the 

remedy but reserved the right on a potential appeal to also challenge the Court’s 

determination that the ALJ erred in assessing the merits of Plaintiff’s alleged disability. 

(Doc. 25 at 3, fn. 3)

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it was clear why the ALJ did so. (Order at 11) The Court concluded that the ALJ did not 

commit error in weighing Dr. Sapin’s opinion, which means did not commit error in 

according great weight to such opinion. Plaintiff’s argument on this point is unpersuasive 

and miscontrues the Court’s conclusion. Furthermore, as Defendant pointed out in his 

reply, the Court is not saying that each time a desktop reviewer’s opinion is present, it 

would mean that a remand for further proceedings is necessary. Quite the opposite, the 

Court clarifies that when, like in this case, it finds that an ALJ did not commit reversible 

error when weighing such opinion, then the ALJ’s conclusion on this issue must be 

considered appropriately. A lot of decisions by federal courts reviewing ALJ’s decisions

find that such weighing is in error, this is not the case here.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 25);

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED amending the Court’s prior Order (Doc. 23) to the 

extent it is inconsistent with this Order;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter for further consideration 

consistent with this Order; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter an amended 

judgment accordingly. This matter shall remain closed.

Dated this 13th day of May, 2020.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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