Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-mc-00159/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-mc-00159-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOES 1 TO 100, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-mc-0159-TLN-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff The Republic of Kazakhstan (“Kazakhstan”), a sovereign nation, commenced this 

miscellaneous civil action and filed a motion to compel compliance with a subpoena issued to

non-party Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”). (ECF Nos. 1, 6.) Facebook and other non-parties, 

Respublika and LLC Media-Consult, have opposed the motion, and Kazakhstan filed a reply 

brief. (ECF Nos. 22, 24, 28.)1 

After carefully considering the parties’ written briefing, the court’s record, and the 

applicable law, the court DENIES the motion without prejudice.

2

 

 

1 Based on the parties’ stipulation, and for good cause shown, the court approved a special 

briefing schedule with respect to the motion. (ECF No. 20.)

 

2 On the court’s own motion and pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the motion was submitted for 

decision without oral argument on the record and written briefing. 

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BACKGROUND3

Kazakhstan alleges that, in or before August 2014, its governmental computer systems 

and the email accounts of some of its government personnel were illegally hacked by unknown 

individuals, who thereby obtained access to thousands of sensitive, proprietary, confidential, and 

attorney-client privileged government documents (the “Materials”). (ECF Nos. 7 at 4, 8-23 at 9.) 

Starting in August 2014, a substantial amount of the Materials were uploaded on an archive 

website, https://mega.co.nza, hosted by Mega Limited (“Mega”), a company based in New 

Zealand. (ECF No. 8-23 at 10.) Links to the archives of Materials on the Mega website were 

also posted on another website, http://www.kazaword.wordpress.com (the “Kazaword Website”). 

(Id.; ECF No. 24 at 8.) However, according to Kazakhstan, it first discovered the alleged 

hackings around January or February 2015, when Respublika made two initial posts containing 

some of the Materials on its Facebook page. (ECF Nos. 7 at 6, 8-23 at 9-10.) Since then, more of 

the Materials have been posted by Respublika on its Facebook page (the “Respublika Facebook 

Page”), and on its own website (the “Respublika Website”), as well as by an individual named 

Muratbek Ketebaev (“Ketebaev”) on his own Facebook page (the “Ketebaev Facebook Page”). 

(ECF No. 7 at 6.)

On March 12, 2015, Kazakhstan commenced an action in the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York against Doe defendants (i.e., the unknown persons who 

purportedly perpetrated the hackings), alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”), see 1:15-cv-1900-ER-HBP (S.D.N.Y.) (the “Main Action”). (ECF 

No. 7 at 6.) The next day, on March 13, 2015, the assigned district judge, Judge Edgardo Ramos, 

issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining the “Defendants, their affiliates 

 

3

The background facts, disputed and undisputed, are taken from the parties’ filings in this 

miscellaneous action as well as the main action pending in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York. The court outlines such background facts for the sole purpose of 

providing some context for the court’s resolution of the pending motion, and nothing in this order 

should be construed so as to make any binding factual findings for purposes of the case overall. 

Citations to the docket in this miscellaneous action are styled “ECF No. __” and citations to the 

docket in the main action pending in the Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:15-cv-1900-

ER-HBP, are styled “Main Action ECF No. __.” 

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employees, agents, and representatives, and all persons acting in concert with or participating 

with Defendants,” from “using, disclosing, disseminating, posting, displaying, sharing, 

distributing, hosting, copying, viewing, accessing, providing access to or making available to

anyone, in any manner whatsoever,” the Materials. (ECF Nos. 7 at 7, 8-7 at 2-3.) Within days of 

issuance of the TRO, of which a notice was posted on the Respublika Facebook Page, the two 

initial posts containing the Materials were removed from the Respublika Facebook Page. (ECF 

No. 7 at 7.) However, posting of the Materials subsequently resumed on the Respublika 

Facebook Page, the Respublika Website, and the Ketebaev Facebook Page. (Id. at 8-9.) After a 

March 20, 2015 hearing, at which only Kazakhstan appeared, Judge Ramos essentially converted 

the TRO into a preliminary injunction. (Id. at 7-8.)

Subsequently, on June 25, 2015, Respublika and its owner, LLC Media-Consult 

(collectively, “Respublika”), entered some type of special appearance in the Main Action as

interested non-parties, and ultimately filed a motion for clarification of the preliminary injunction 

on August 4, 2015. (Main Action ECF Nos. 28, 35.) In short, Respublika asserted that it is a 

newspaper, presently only available online, that frequently criticizes the Kazakhstan government 

and has (along with its individual journalists) allegedly been subjected to a campaign of 

harassment and intimidation by the Kazakhstan government in Kazakhstan and other countries, 

including criminal charges, civil suits, seizures, arrests, and firebombs. According to Respublika,

it has not been involved with any hackers, nor has it instructed or encouraged any unauthorized 

access to the Materials. Instead, Respublika obtained the Materials from the Kazaword Website 

and other sources, and then reported on the Materials and republished them in its capacity as a 

news organization. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan had allegedly been using the court’s preliminary 

injunction to pressure Facebook and the web host of Respublika’s website, Black Lotus 

Communications, to remove Respublika’s posts and articles regarding the Materials. Respublika 

argued that application of the court’s order to block Respublika’s publication, as a news 

organization, of posts and articles regarding the Materials violates the First Amendment, and is 

part of Kazakhstan’s long-standing campaign to censor Respublika and remove criticism of 

Kazakhstan’s government from the Internet. As such, Respublika requested Judge Ramos to 

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clarify that Respublika was not subject to the preliminary injunction. (See generally Main Action 

ECF Nos. 28, 35.)

In its August 25, 2015 opposition to the motion for clarification, Kazakhstan disputed

many of Respublika’s contentions. According to Kazakhstan, Respublika and Ketebaev, who is

the husband of the editor and founder of Respublika, Iryna Petrushova, have been using the 

Materials to promote the cause of Mukhtar Ablyazov, who was allegedly convicted of theft from 

a bank in Kazakhstan and who is purportedly a prime suspect in, and major beneficiary of, the 

alleged hacking. More specifically, Kazakhstan contends that Respublika and Ketebaev have 

been using the Materials as part of an ongoing propaganda campaign that portrays Ablyazov and 

his accomplices as innocent victims of a frame-up orchestrated by the Kazakhstan government, 

and that Respublika is actually receiving financial support from Ablyazov. In light of those 

contentions, Kazakhstan argued that it was entitled to expedited discovery and an evidentiary 

hearing to determine whether Respublika and Ketebaev were acting in concert or participation 

with the hackers, thereby forfeiting their First Amendment protection. (See generally Main 

Action ECF No. 43; see also ECF No. 7.) 

In an order dated October 27, 2015, Judge Ramos, declining to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing, granted Respublika’s motion for clarification and found, based on the record before him, 

that the preliminary injunction did not apply to Respublika. (Main Action ECF No. 57.) The 

order reasoned that Kazakhstan had not established a likelihood of success on the merits against 

Respublika, because it did not have “sufficient evidence to indicate that Respublika was in any 

way responsible for the alleged hacking or acted in concert with the hackers.” (Id.) The order 

further stated, in part, that:

The fact that Respublika may have used or posted certain of the 

Stolen Materials on its website, is not, without more, sufficient to 

subject it to the Injunction. The First Amendment grants persons a 

near absolute right to publish truthful information about matters of 

public interest that they lawfully acquire. See Smith v. Daily Mail 

Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). The Supreme Court 

affirmed that the Daily Mail rule applies even if a re-publisher of 

information that is of public concern knew that its source had 

obtained the information illegally. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 

U.S. 514, 535 (2001). Thus, the Daily Mail rule protects the 

publication of the kazaword documents by anyone other than those 

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directly involved in their purported theft. Daily Mail Publishing 

Co., 443 U.S. at 103.

(Id.) However, Judge Ramos noted that the order was without prejudice to Kazakhstan’s ability 

to reapply for the imposition of the injunction against Respublika should Kazakhstan obtain 

sufficient evidence to support such an order. (Id.)

Thereafter, on November 12, 2015, Kazakhstan served the subpoena at issue in this action 

on Facebook. (ECF No. 1, Ex. 1.) The subpoena essentially requests Facebook to produce 

documents sufficient to show the names, email addresses, IP addresses, and MAC addresses of:

(1) the administrators and user, respectively, of the Respublika Facebook Page and the Ketebaev 

Facebook Page; (2) the users of the Facebook accounts who removed the initial posts of Materials 

on the Respublika Facebook Page; and (3) the users of the Facebook accounts that created the 

subsequent posts of Materials on the Respublika Facebook Page and the Ketebaev Facebook 

Page, for the time period of March 13, 2015 to the present. (Id.) The subpoena called for 

production of the documents on December 2, 2015, in Sacramento, California. (Id.) Facebook 

and Respublika both strongly object to the subpoena, and no documents were ultimately 

produced. Despite extensive meet-and-confer efforts, Kazakhstan, Facebook, and Respublika 

were unable to reach an informal resolution of their discovery dispute. Consequently, this 

miscellaneous action and motion to compel Facebook’s compliance with the subpoena were filed 

on December 10, 2015, and December 15, 2015, respectively. 

DISCUSSION 

Kazakhstan’s motion to compel, which was extensively briefed with voluminous 

supporting materials, raises interesting and complex issues involving, inter alia, the intersection 

of the rights of an alleged hacking victim to discover the identity of the purported hackers with

the well-established reporters’ privilege rooted in the First Amendment, all against a backdrop of 

troubling international conflicts. As noted above, the court has carefully reviewed all the

submitted materials for the limited purpose of providing context for the parties’ discovery 

dispute.4 However, as a threshold matter, Facebook contends that Kazakhstan has not received 

 

4

The court has not considered the “Notice of New Authority Relevant to Issues on Review,” with 

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proper authorization in the Main Action to issue the subpoena to Facebook. For the reasons 

discussed below, the court agrees, and thus ultimately declines to reach the more substantive 

issues raised by the motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) provides that “[a] party may not seek discovery 

from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a 

proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these 

rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Here, a Rule 26(f) conference 

has not taken place, because Kazakhstan has yet to identify and serve any defendants with whom 

to confer.5 Nor does Kazakhstan contend that the Main Action is a proceeding exempt from

initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 

otherwise expressly authorized issuance of the Facebook subpoena. Furthermore, Facebook and 

Respublika have not stipulated to issuance of that subpoena. Therefore, unless such expedited 

discovery was authorized by court order, the subpoena must be quashed. See Deuss v. Siso, 2014 

WL 4275715, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) (quashing subpoena issued to non-party without 

authorization prior to Rule 26(f) conference); Desilva v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys. 

Inc., 2010 WL 3119629, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2010) (same).

Kazakhstan primarily contends that the subpoena to Facebook was authorized, because the 

Southern District of New York has already authorized discovery to be taken from Respublika and 

Ketebaev on topics purportedly similar to the subject matter of the subpoena issued to Facebook. 

That argument is unavailing. On October 28, 2015, Judge Ramos, after narrowing the proposed 

scope of questions, granted Kazakhstan’s motion for the issuance of a Letter of Request to the 

Central Authority of the Republic of Poland for assistance in obtaining the deposition testimony

 

an attached opinion by the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, filed by Respublika after 

submission of the instant motion. (ECF No. 30.) As such, Kazakhstan’s objections to that filing 

(ECF No. 32) are dismissed as moot. 

5

To be sure, Kazakhstan has met and conferred extensively with Respublika and Facebook with 

respect to this discovery dispute. However, Respublika and Facebook have not been named as 

parties to the Main Action, and therefore such meet-and-confer efforts did not amount to a Rule 

26(f) conference between parties. 

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of Ketebaev. (Main Action ECF Nos. 61, 65.) Thereafter, on November 13, 2015, the assigned 

magistrate judge, Judge Henry Pitman, also granted in part Kazakhstan’s motion for expedited 

discovery and authorized Kazakhstan to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Respublika as a nonparty witness with respect to specified topics, with the deposition to take place in London, United 

Kingdom. (Main Action ECF No. 69.) Even assuming, without deciding, that the subject matter 

of the Facebook subpoena is similar to the topics of questioning authorized in the abovementioned orders, those orders plainly did not authorize any expedited third-party discovery from 

Facebook.

Kazakhstan also argues that Judge Ramos, at the March 20, 2015 hearing on Kazakhstan’s 

motion for a preliminary injunction, broadly authorized expedited discovery, including the

subpoena to Facebook, based on his finding that Kazakhstan met the standard for a preliminary 

injunction. (ECF No. 7 at 8.) However, the court ultimately finds that argument unpersuasive

when the entire record in the Main Action is considered. As an initial matter, Judge Ramos did 

not issue any written order authorizing such expedited discovery. Indeed, the order following the 

March 20, 2015 hearing, at which only Kazakhstan appeared, merely granted the preliminary 

injunction, but did not reference or define the scope of any expedited discovery. (See Main 

Action ECF No. 10.) Moreover, even if Judge Ramos had intended to broadly authorize such

expedited discovery orally at that time, subsequent case events strongly call into question whether 

such potential authorization remains operative. Most notably, Judge Ramos subsequently 

clarified that the preliminary injunction did not apply to Respublika, finding that Kazakhstan had 

not established a likelihood of success on the merits against Respublika. As such, the court finds 

it implausible that broad and essentially undefined expedited discovery with respect to 

Respublika and affiliated persons remains authorized, if indeed it was initially authorized.6 

Additionally, since the March 20, 2015 hearing in the Main Action, Kazakhstan actually 

requested, and was granted, leave to conduct specific expedited discovery involving Respublika 

 

6 Kazakhstan characterizes the “judicially-approved purpose” of the discovery sought as follows: 

“to find out who posted [Stolen Materials] on these websites and to use the discovery process to 

go as far as we can to try to identify who the posters are or who is behind the websites[.]” (ECF 

No. 28 at 13.) 

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and Ketebaev. As noted above, Kazakhstan was authorized to take the depositions of Respublika

and Ketebaev with respect to defined topics. Such more specific authorizations further belie the 

continued existence of any broad, essentially undefined authorization to conduct expedited 

discovery.

Therefore, based on the record before the court in this action and in the Main Action, the 

court finds that Kazakhstan’s subpoena to Facebook is unauthorized and must be quashed, but 

without prejudice to its reissuance at a later juncture upon appropriate authorization from the 

Southern District of New York.

In many cases, the authorization of expedited discovery by court order may be relatively 

straightforward and involve largely matters of case scheduling and logistics. However, in this 

case, the court deems it particularly important that the scope of authorized expedited discovery 

directed to Facebook, if any, be clearly defined, for the reasons discussed below.

As a preliminary matter, the court has some concerns regarding the proposed discovery

from Facebook in light of Judge Ramos’s holding that Kazakhstan had not established a 

likelihood of success on the merits against Respublika and that the preliminary injunction did not 

apply to Respublika. Kazakhstan essentially argues that it wishes to compare the IP addresses

likely to be produced in response to the Facebook subpoena (i.e. those associated with the 

administrators, users, and posters on the Respublika Facebook Page and the Ketebaev Facebook 

Page) with the known IP addresses of computers that were used to access the allegedly hacked 

accounts during the relevant time periods, hoping to find a match leading to discovery of the 

hackers’ identities. But that type of discovery at least appears to come dangerously close to a 

fishing expedition, particularly given that it involves non-parties, whose identities are clearly 

known to Kazakhstan, but against whom Kazakhstan has yet to state any claim.7 Moreover, the 

court notes that, on October 28, 2015, Judge Ramos granted Kazakhstan’s motion for the issuance 

 

7

To be sure, in granting the motion for clarification, Judge Ramos observed, as a general matter,

that Kazakhstan “may reapply for the imposition of an injunction against the use of the Stolen 

Materials by Respublika should it obtain sufficient evidence to support such an order.” (Main 

Action ECF No. 57.) However, that order expressed no opinion regarding the propriety and 

timing of any particular discovery, let alone the type and scope of discovery sought here. 

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of letters rogatory to the New Zealand High Court for assistance in obtaining evidence from 

Mega, the host of the website where the Materials were first uploaded, to identify the persons 

who uploaded the Materials. (Main ECF Nos. 21, 60.) Additionally, as noted above, Kazakhstan 

has already been authorized to take the depositions of Ketebaev and the Respublika with respect 

to specified topics. Therefore, the court in the Main Action may well conclude that Kazakhstan 

should first be required to exhaust those discovery efforts before pursuing any expedited 

discovery from Facebook.

Furthermore, as referenced above, the proposed discovery from Facebook, which involves 

Respublika, a news organization, raises significant concerns regarding the reporter’s privilege and 

the First Amendment. Kazakhstan contends that it does not seek journalistic information or 

content, such as reporter’s notes, drafts, or communications. However, it does seek the names, 

email addresses, IP addresses, and MAC addresses of administrators and posters on the 

Respublika Facebook Page and the Ketebaev Facebook Page. Such persons may well be 

journalists, writers, and other staff or contributors to Respublika, whose identifying information

and location may be entitled to protection, especially in light of the serious allegations of 

oppression and intimidation by Kazakhstan made by Respublika.8 See, e.g., Bursey v. United 

States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972). This issue is likely to manifest with respect to several 

other discovery endeavors in the Main Action, including the depositions of Respublika and

Ketebaev. In authorizing the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Respublika, Judge Pittman 

acknowledged as much, noting that numerous objections based on privilege were likely to be 

asserted, that the deposition transcript “may wind up being very thin,” and that motion practice 

regarding the privilege issues would inevitably ensue. (See Main Action ECF No. 63.) 

Consequently, the court finds that the above-mentioned issues are best resolved by the 

court in the Main Action, which is in a better position to globally guide the scope of discovery in 

 

8

To be clear, the court here need not, and does not, make any factual finding or determination 

that a campaign of oppression, intimidation, and harassment by Kazakhstan against Respublika

actually exists—the court merely notes that such issues have been raised here as well as in other 

fora.

 

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light of the full record and other discovery endeavors in that case.9 For those same reasons, even 

if this court had determined that the subpoena to Facebook was properly authorized, the court 

would have been strongly inclined to transfer the motion to the Southern District of New York 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f). The court recognizes that the parties expended 

substantial time and effort in briefing the substantive issues raised by Kazakhstan’s motion, but, 

fortunately, such effort is unlikely to have been wasted. In the context of any future motion for 

authorization by Kazakhstan in the Main Action, the parties (including Respublika and Facebook) 

will have an opportunity to raise their respective arguments concerning the proposed discovery

before the court in the Main Action.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Kazakhstan’s motion to compel (ECF Nos. 1, 6) is DENIED.

2. The November 12, 2015 subpoena issued by Kazakhstan to Facebook is QUASHED, 

but without prejudice to its reissuance at a later juncture upon appropriate 

authorization from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

3. The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this order on the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York, referencing the case number of the Main 

Action, 1:15-cv-1900-ER-HBP, in the proof of service. 

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this miscellaneous action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2016

 

 

9

In providing the above preliminary and generalized discussion of the issues raised, the court 

expresses no opinion regarding how such issues should ultimately be resolved. 

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