Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-234/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

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MDL No. 1917

Case No. C-07-5944-SC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART THE THOMSON 

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

This Order Relates To:

Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Hitachi 

Ltd., No. C-13-1173-SC;

Electrograph Systems, Inc. v. 

Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05724;

Alfred H. Siegel v. Technicolor 

SA, No. 13-cv-05261;

Best Buy Co., Inc. v. Technicolor 

SA, No. 13-cv-05264; 

Interbond Corporation of America 

v. Technicolor

SA, No. 13-cv-05727;

Office Depot, Inc. v. Technicolor 

SA, No. 13-cv-05726;

Costco Wholesale Corporation v. 

Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05723;

P.C. Richard & Son Long Island 

Corporation v. Technicolor SA, No. 

13-cv-05725;

Schultze Agency Services, LLC v. 

Technicolor SA, Ltd., No. 13-cv- 05668;

Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Kmart 

Corp. v. Technicolor SA, No. 3:13- cv-05262;

Target Corp. v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05686 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 2440 Filed 03/13/14 Page 1 of 39
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I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court are Defendants Thomson SA's ("Thomson 

SA") and Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc.'s ("Thomson Consumer") 

(collectively "Defendants" or the "Thomson Defendants') motions to 

dismiss the above-captioned Sharp Plaintiffs' ("Sharp")1 first 

amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as the 

complaints of various direct action plaintiffs ("DAPs").2 ECF No. 

2235-4 ("TSA MTD Sharp"), 2236 ("TC MTD Sharp") (filed under seal), 

2353 ("TC MTD DAP"), 2355-10 ("TSA MTD DAP") (filed under seal).3 

The motions are fully briefed.4 Finding this matter suitable for 

disposition without oral argument, Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), the Court 

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part each Thomson Defendant's motion. 

///

 1 "Sharp" collectively includes Sharp Electronics Corporation 

("SEC") and Sharp Electronics Manufacturing Company of America, 

Inc. ("SEMA"). Sharp's complaint is filed under seal at ECF No. 

2030-4.

2 When convenient to do so, the Court refers collectively to Sharp 

and the DAPs as "Plaintiffs."

3 The DAPs' pleadings appear under seal in the following cases: 

Best Buy Co, Inc. v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05264; Siegel v. 

Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-00141; Costco Wholesale Corp. v.

Technicolor SA (f/kla Thomson SA) et al., No. 13-cv-05723; 

Electrograph Systems, Inc. v. Technicolor SA, No. 2: 13-cv-05724; 

Interbond Corp. of Am. v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05727;

Office Depot, Inc. v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05726; P.C. Richard 

& Son Long Island Corp. v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05725; Sears, 

Roebuck & Co. v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05262; Schultze Agency 

Services, LLC v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05668; and Target Corp. 

v. Technicolor SA, No. 13-cv-05686. Rather than citing pertinent 

paragraphs from each DAPs' complaint, the Court often refers to one 

or two example pleadings, since the DAP complaints are essentially 

identical.

4 ECF Nos. 2377-4 ("DAP Opp'n to TC") (filed under seal), 2378-4 

("DAP Opp'n to TSA") (filed under seal), 2286 ("Sharp Opp'n to 

TC"), 2289-4 ("Sharp Opp'n to TSA") (filed under seal), 2317 ("TC 

Reply Sharp"), 2319 ("TSA Reply Sharp"), 2397 ("TC Reply DAP"), 

2398-4 ("TSA Reply DAP") (filed under seal).

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II. BACKGROUND

As it must on a motion to dismiss, the Court takes all of the 

following allegations as true. 

Thomson SA is a French holding company with its principal 

place of business in Issy-les-Moulineaux, France. Sharp FAC ¶ 71; 

Office Depot FAC ¶ 23. Thomson SA "sold its CRTs internally to its 

television-manufacturing division, which had plants in the United 

States and Mexico, and to other television manufacturers in the 

United States and elsewhere." Id. Thomson SA sold its CRT 

business in 2005, but Sharp alleges that between March 1, 1995, and 

December 2007 (the "Relevant Period"), Thomson SA "manufactured, 

marketed, sold and/or distributed [products containing CRTs ("CRT 

Products")] either directly or through its subsidiaries or 

affiliates throughout the United States." Id. Further, after 

selling its CRT business to defendant and alleged co-conspirator 

Videocon Industries, Ltd. ("Videocon"), Thomson SA remained in a 

close working relationship with Videocon. Id. Under this 

relationship, Thomson SA helped Videocon set up and run its CRT 

business, had a seat on Videocon's board, maintained at least a 10 

percent ownership stake in Videocon during the Relevant Period, and 

used Videocon and other subsidiaries or affiliates to manufacture, 

market, sell, or distribute CRT Products directly or indirectly 

throughout the United States. Id.

Defendant Thomson Consumer Electronics Corporation5 is a 

wholly owned United States-based subsidiary of Thomson SA, through 

 5 Plaintiffs sometimes refer to Thomson SA and Thomson Consumer 

collectively as "Thomson," but since resolution of this motion 

requires the Court to evaluate the two entities' relationships and 

connections to this jurisdiction, the Court refers to them 

separately.

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which Thomson SA manufactured CRTs. Sharp FAC ¶ 72; Office Depot 

FAC ¶ 24. Plaintiffs contend that "[Thomson SA] dominated and/or 

controlled the finances, policies, and/or affairs of [Thomson 

Consumer] relating to the antitrust violations alleged in [the 

complaints]." Sharp FAC ¶ 72; Office Depot FAC ¶ 25. Thomson 

Consumer is based in Indiana, and its CRT plants were located in 

Pennsylvania and Indiana. Sharp FAC ¶ 72. Videocon bought those

plants, and as stated above, Plaintiffs contend that Thomson 

Consumer and Thomson SA worked together, using Videocon, to 

continue the CRT conspiracy in the United States after 2004. See

Office Depot FAC ¶¶ 23-27; Sharp FAC ¶¶ 71-75.

Plaintiffs sued the Thomson Defendants under federal and state 

antitrust laws. They allege that Thomson SA fixed prices on CRTs 

that its subsidiary Thomson Consumer sold in the United States. 

Plaintiffs allege specifically that Thomson SA was never merely a 

holding company or corporate shell, but rather that it had 

controlling roles in its subsidiaries, exercising central 

management functions over them, and that it derived between 40 and 

50 percent of its revenue from the United States, which Thomson 

SA's CEO called "[Thomson SA's] most important market." See Sharp 

FAC ¶ 73; Electrograph FAC ¶ 39; Office Depot FAC ¶¶ 23-26. 

Further, Plaintiffs assert that Thomson SA's management and board 

of directors set its and Thomson Consumer's direction, oversaw 

United States profits and losses for Thomson Consumer's CRT 

businesses, and planned and approved business decisions relating to 

the United States. Id. Plaintiffs refer to five senior executives 

who transitioned between executive and board roles with Thomson SA 

and Thomson Consumer between 1997 and the present. Id. Plaintiffs

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also state that other Thomson SA "Executive Officers" had 

operational responsibilities in the United States, being based out 

of Thomson Consumer's offices despite purportedly being employees 

of Thomson SA. Id.

Plaintiffs also allege that between 1995 and 2005, "Thomson" -

- referring jointly to Thomson SA and Thomson Consumer --

participated in numerous CRT-price-fixing meetings in the United 

States and abroad. Sharp FAC ¶ 196; Office Depot FAC ¶ 138; 

Electrograph FAC ¶ 152. Only Thomson Consumer attended some of 

these meetings, but Sharp notes that Thomson SA's employees met 

with other alleged co-conspirators to discuss price-fixing among 

various parties, that some of these discussions concerned the 

United States CRT market, and that Thomson SA participated in 

numerous confidential meetings allegedly related to the CRT 

conspiracy in Europe. Id. 

Both Thomson Defendants move to dismiss on laches, statutes of 

limitations, and pleading grounds. Thomson SA also moves to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. With its jurisdictional 

motions, Thomson SA files several declarations and exhibits stating

(among other things) that Thomson SA is purely a holding company, 

with no operations, offices, employees, property, books, records, 

bank accounts, agents, registrations, or business activities in the 

United States. ECF Nos. 2235-1 ("Roberts Decl.") Exs. 1-6 (copies 

of annual reports, declarations, affidavits, and orders from other 

courts), 2355-8 ("Roberts Decl. DAP") Exs. 1-6 (same as Sharp 

case). The declarations, exhibits, and affidavits also assert that

Thomson SA has never manufactured CRTs or CRT Products in the 

United States or elsewhere, and that Thomson SA and Thomson 

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Consumer maintain separate corporate structures, offices, finances, 

and business activities. According to the declaration, Thomson 

Consumer -- over which the Court undisputedly has jurisdiction --

was solely responsible for CRT sales, marketing, and pricing in the 

United States. 

Sharp asserts claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 

U.S.C. et seq.; the California Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 16700 et seq.; the California Unfair Competition Law 

("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; New York's 

Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 340 et seq.; the New York Unfair 

Competition Law ("UCL"), N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349 et seq.; the New 

Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J. Stat. § 56:9-1 et seq.; and the 

Tennessee Antitrust Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-101 et seq. All 

of Sharp's claims are subject to four-year statutes of limitations, 

except the New York UCL and the Tennessee Antitrust Act, which have 

three-year statutes of limitations. 

The DAPs are a group of opt-out plaintiffs alleging the same 

essential facts described above. See, e.g., Electrograph FAC ¶¶ 1, 

125-181, 152-55, 188-90, 234-38 (providing a representative DAP 

pleading). The primary difference between their actions and 

Sharp's case is that they filed their complaints in November 2011 

(without naming either Thomson Defendant), later located additional 

evidence implicating Thomson Consumer, and sought to amend their 

complaints adding Thomson Consumer on March 26, 2013, a motion the 

Court denied primarily for insufficient facts on September 26, 

2013. ECF No. 1959 ("Order Denying Amendment"). The Court had 

found that, given the DAPs' paucity of allegations supporting their 

claims, it would have been a prejudicial waste to add Thomson 

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Consumer to the case. Id. The DAPs filed complaints adding, among 

other entities, the Thomson Defendants on November 11-13, 2013, and 

some DAPs amended their complaints on December 20, 2013. The DAPs 

now add substantially more detail to their pleadings, some of which 

comes from defendants who settled in late 2013. The Thomson 

Defendants moved to dismiss the new DAP complaints on January 27, 

2014. The DAPs assert a variety of causes of action against the 

Thomson Defendants, including federal and state claims that largely 

overlap with Sharp's, with additional state claims from Kansas, 

Michigan, and Minnesota. The DAPs' allegations (and the parties' 

arguments concerning them) overlap substantially with Sharp's, and 

where they do not, the Court notes any relevant distinctions.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Jurisdiction - Rule 12(b)(2)

Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

defendants may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The Court may consider evidence presented in affidavits and 

declarations determining personal jurisdiction. Doe v. Unocal 

Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff bears the 

burden of showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

defendants. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006). "[T]his demonstration requires that the plaintiff 

make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to 

withstand the motion to dismiss." Id. (quotations omitted). 

"[T]he court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff 

. . . ." Id. (quotations omitted). "The plaintiff cannot simply 

rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, but uncontroverted 

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allegations in the complaint must be taken as true." Mavrix Photo, 

Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quotations and citations omitted). The Court may not assume the 

truth of allegations that are contradicted by affidavit. Data 

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 1977).

Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant

only if (1) a statute confers jurisdiction and (2) exercising 

jurisdiction would comport with constitutional due process. See

Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 

1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004). Since the federal Clayton Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 22, fulfills the statutory requirement for jurisdiction in 

this case, the question on this motion is whether exercising 

jurisdiction would comport with due process. For a court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

consistent with due process, the defendant must have "certain 

minimum contacts" with the relevant forum "such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 

463 (1940)). If a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts, 

personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction 

or specific jurisdiction. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 

F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). The relevant forum for this 

case's minimum contacts analysis is the United States. Go-Video, 

Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co. Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 

1989).

///

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B. Failure to State a Claim - Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). "Dismissal can be based 

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). However, "the tenet that a court 

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 

is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened 

pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 

which requires that a plaintiff alleging fraud "must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." See Kearns v. 

Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). "To satisfy 

Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and 

how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or 

misleading about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it 

is false." United States ex rel Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 

Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

///

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IV. THOMSON SA'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE SHARP COMPLAINT

A. Personal Jurisdiction

There are two forms of personal jurisdiction: "specific" and 

"general." "A court may exercise specific jurisdiction where the 

cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection to 

the defendant's contacts with the forum." Glencore Grain Rotterdam 

B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 

"Alternatively, a defendant whose contacts are substantial, 

continuous, and systematic is subject to a court's general 

jurisdiction even if the suit concerns matters not arising out of 

his contact with the forum." Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales 

de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.9 (1984)).

Thomson SA argues that the Court lacks either general or 

specific jurisdiction over it. Before Sharp filed an amended 

complaint, Thomson SA had moved to dismiss on jurisdictional 

grounds and Sharp, opposing that motion but working with a somewhat 

bare pleading, had relied primarily on an agency theory of 

jurisdiction premised on the relationship between Thomson SA and 

Thomson Consumer. Now Sharp has added facts to its complaint, and 

also asserts more targeted arguments, mainly in support of a 

specific jurisdiction finding. As discussed below, the Court finds 

that Sharp has pled facts supporting a finding of specific 

jurisdiction, and Thomson SA's responses fail to controvert Sharp's 

pleadings. The Court does not address general jurisdiction or 

Sharp's alternative motion for jurisdictional discovery in this 

Order.

///

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i. Specific Jurisdiction

Courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction depending 

on "the nature and quality of the defendant's contacts in relation 

to the cause of action." Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287. The Ninth 

Circuit applies a three-prong test when analyzing a claim of 

specific jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully 

direct his activities or consummate some transaction 

with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or 

relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; 

and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with 

fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be 

reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first 

two prongs, and if he or she fails to satisfy either, specific

jurisdiction is not established. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 

1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff satisfies these prongs, the 

burden shifts to the defendant "to present a compelling case" that 

the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Burger King 

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).

Sharp argues that the Court has specific jurisdiction over

Thomson SA because (1) Thomson SA purposefully directed its CRT 

conspiracy activity at the United States and (2) Sharp's claims 

arise out of Thomson SA's conspiracy activity in the United States. 

Sharp also contends that exercising personal jurisdiction over

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Thomson SA would be reasonable. Thomson SA opposes all of these 

points.

The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test for purposeful 

direction: "the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) 

causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in 

the forum state." Id. When considering the first prong, 

"something more than mere foreseeability" of an effect in the forum 

state is necessary. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805 (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). And as the Ninth Circuit has 

warned, "the foreign-acts-with-forum-effects jurisdictional 

principle must be applied with caution, particularly in an 

international context." Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, 

Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). The parties do not argue the first prong --

that Thomson SA committed some intentional act -- but they do 

dispute whether Sharp has established that Thomson SA purposefully 

directed activities at the United States and that Sharp's claims 

against Thomson SA arose out of, or result from, Thomson SA's

forum-related activities.

An antitrust defendant "expressly aims" an intentional act at 

a forum state when its allegedly anticompetitive behavior is 

targeted at a resident of the forum, or at the forum itself. See

In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 

716, 743 (9th Cir. 2013). Sharp alleges that Thomson SA oversaw 

worldwide sales of CRTs to the United States, and also that in 

2003, Thomson SA's worldwide general manager for marketing and 

sales negotiated with one of Sharp's subsidiaries' managers 

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regarding Thomson SA's sales of CRTs to a Sharp subsidiary in the 

United States. Sharp FAC ¶ 73. Sharp also pleads that Thomson SA 

was involved in CRT production and pricing discussions relating to 

Mexican-made CRTs sold in the North American market, though it is 

unclear whether these CRTs were meant for sale in the United 

States. Id. Further, Sharp provides a list of meetings in which

Thomson SA allegedly took part, some of which explicitly concerned 

price-fixing agreements between Thomson SA and other alleged coconspirators concerning the sales of CRT Products in the United 

States. Id. ¶ 196. Thomson SA's declarations do not controvert 

these pleadings. They concern primarily issues of general 

jurisdiction, like the corporate relationship between Thomson SA 

and Thomson Consumer, but they do not controvert Sharp's facts and 

pleadings regarding Thomson SA's United States-targeted activity. 

As to this prong, Thomson SA argues that it did not make or sell 

CRTs in the United States, and that many of Sharp's pleadings 

concern the ambiguous "Thomson" entity instead of Thomson SA or 

Thomson Consumer specifically.

Defendant fails to rebut Sharp's contentions on this issue. 

In a multinational price-fixing conspiracy like the one at issue in 

this case, defendants do not have to make the price-fixed product 

themselves within the bounds of the forum state in order for the 

state to have jurisdiction. They only have to target intentional 

acts (e.g., price-fixing activities) toward the forum state, 

knowing the effects of the activity will be felt there. In re W. 

States, 715 F.3d at 743; see also Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting 

Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2012). Thomson SA's

briefing on this issue largely misses the point or misreads Sharp's 

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pleadings. It makes some valid points about the FAC's occasional 

reference to "Thomson" instead of Thomson SA or Thomson Consumer 

individually -- a confusing move when it has not been definitively 

established that they are effectively the same entity -- but

Thomson SA never directly addresses the fact that Sharp actually 

pleads Thomson SA's direct involvement in price-fixing discussions 

concerning products actually sold to and purchased in the United 

States. See TSA MTD Sharp at 12-13; TSA Reply Sharp at 4. 

The Court is not persuaded by Thomson SA's argument that it is 

equally plausible that some of these meetings related to European 

CRT operations. Sharp has pled that those meetings were 

specifically related to the United States CRT market. Moreover, 

given the size of the North American market and, as this Court has 

discussed numerous times, the fact that worldwide CRT effects could 

have direct and known effects in the United States as a result of 

an anticompetitive market, it is not plausible to argue that 

Thomson SA's alleged discussions with huge, multinational CRT 

business partners were somehow structured to avoid directing any 

price-fixing activity to the United States, which all parties agree 

was one of the largest CRT markets. Thomson SA frequently cites 

the Court's now-withdrawn order on Thomson SA's previous motion to 

dismiss Sharp's complaint, but that complaint did not include the 

present pleadings that Thomson SA fails to controvert or address.

Thomson SA cites Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, 

Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that 

express aiming requires more than a broad allegation that a foreign 

act has foreseeable effects in the forum state, but again that is 

not what Sharp asserts in this case. Sharp pled that Thomson SA 

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had actual discussions with Sharp agents about CRT sales to the 

United States, while at the same time Thomson SA was engaged in 

price-fixing discussions with other co-conspirators. This is not 

merely a foreseeable effect, and Thomson SA's contention that it 

did not manufacture or sell CRTs in the United States itself does 

not change the fact that Sharp has pled that Thomson SA expressly 

aimed price-fixing activity at the United States.

Regarding the last prong of specific jurisdiction analysis, 

Sharp must make a prima facie showing that Thomson SA's United 

States-directed actions were a "but-for" cause of its claims. 

Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088; Unocal, 248 F.3d at 924. 

This "but-for" test requires "some nexus between the cause of 

action and the defendant's activities in the forum." Shute v. 

Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 387 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled 

on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Thomson SA argues that if 

Sharp cannot establish that Thomson SA aimed any intentional acts 

at the United States, it cannot meet this prong, so the Court 

cannot find specific jurisdiction. TSA MTD Sharp at 14; TSA Reply

Sharp at 4. As noted above, the Court finds that Sharp satisfies 

the "intentional acts" prong, so Thomson SA's argument is 

inapposite. Moreover, Sharp has established that its claims arise 

out of Thomson SA's activities in the forum. Sharp bought CRTs in 

the United States from Thomson SA's affiliates, subsidiaries, or 

co-conspirators, and it alleges that Thomson SA fixed the prices of 

CRTs that its subsidiaries sold. 

The Court finds that Sharp has met the standard for specific 

jurisdiction. The next issue is whether exercising jurisdiction 

would be reasonable. Thomson SA argues that it would not be. In 

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determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign

defendant would be reasonable, the Court must consider seven 

factors:

(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful 

interjection into the forum state, (2) the burden on the

defendant in defending in the forum, (3) the extent of 

the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's

state, (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating 

the dispute, (5) the most efficient judicial resolution 

of the controversy, (6) the importance of the forum to 

the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective 

relief, and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.

Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. 

at 476-77). It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate 

unreasonableness. Id. at 1088.

Thomson SA argues that the burden imposed on it outweighs 

other concerns. TSA MTD Sharp at 15 (citing Terracom v. Valley 

Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995); Menken v. Emm, 503 

F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007)). On this point, Thomson SA 

contends that it would hold a significant burden in such a 

complicated case, that many documents related to its now-sold CRT 

business would be in France, that it would have to contend with 

French criminal laws related to evidence used in foreign judicial 

proceedings, and that exercising jurisdiction over it would raise 

concerns regarding French sovereignty.

The Court agrees that Thomson SA's burden would be 

substantial, but the inconvenience for Thomson SA must be so great 

as to constitute a deprivation of due process. See Panavision, 141 

F.3d at 1323. The Court does not find Thomson SA's arguments on 

this point to rise to that level. Costliness and evidentiary 

complexity are simply parts of modern, multinational litigation; 

foreign litigants must always deal with their home states' laws; 

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and if vague concerns about foreign sovereignty always outweighed

the merits of finding jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, it is 

unlikely that a foreign corporation would ever be successfully sued 

here. True, if Thomson SA lacked any contacts with the United 

States at all, and this forum had no interest whatsoever in hearing 

this dispute, holding Thomson SA accountable in the United States 

would raise due process concerns, but the Court finds that none of 

those factors exist now.

Nor is the Court convinced by Thomson SA's other arguments on 

these points. First, as noted above, the Court has found that

Thomson SA purposefully interjected its activities into the United 

States when in negotiated with Sharp's subsidiaries for the sale of 

CRTs in the United States market, even if Thomson SA's involvement 

in various price-fixing meetings did not rise to that level (which 

it does). 

Second, the fact that Thomson SA's stock was owned by the 

French government in 1999 does not raise sovereignty concerns 

substantial enough to find jurisdiction unreasonable. Thomson SA 

does not explain how pre-1999 corporate ownership actually affects

Sharp's claims at the present time. Moreover, in this context it 

is important to note that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction here 

is a limited form of jurisdiction -- specific jurisdiction -- and 

not general jurisdiction, so concerns about Thomson SA's exposure 

to litigation (and the sovereignty concerns that entails) are more 

limited. See Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 

(9th Cir. 1984); Sinatra v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 

1200 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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Third, exercising jurisdiction over Thomson SA would not be 

inefficient merely because Thomson Consumer is undisputedly within 

the Court's jurisdiction too. Both entities can be, and it is not 

plausible that a wealthy, multinational corporation like Thomson SA 

would be somehow overstressed at litigating one case, based on 

specific jurisdiction, in the United States. Even evaluated 

asymmetrically, with Thomson SA's burden being accorded the highest 

value in this analysis, the Court finds that Thomson SA fails to 

meet its burden to show unreasonableness. Exercising specific 

jurisdiction is reasonable in this case.

B. Thomson SA's Other Arguments

Thomson SA argues that even if the Court has jurisdiction over 

it, the Court should dismiss some or all of Sharp's claims because 

(1) they are time-barred under various statutes of limitations, (2) 

they are barred by the doctrine of laches, and (3) they otherwise 

fail to state cognizable claims.6

 

i. Statutes of Limitation

Sharp filed this opt-out case in March 2013. Thomson SA left 

the CRT industry in 2005, and the Court has held that parties to 

this case knew or should have known of the possibility of bringing 

suit by November 2007, when various governments issued press 

releases concerning the CRT price-fixing conspiracy and lawsuits 

were filed around the world. Sharp must therefore account for the 

gap between potential limitations dates and its filing of this 

suit, because all of its claims are subject to three- or four-year 

 6 Thomson SA incorporates by reference portions Thomson Consumer's 

motion to dismiss on these issues, TSA MTD Sharp 17 n.3, and Sharp 

incorporates by reference its opposition brief from that matter. The Thomson Defendants and the DAPs do the same cross-incorporation 

of briefs in their case as well.

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statutes of limitations. Sharp argues that Thomson SA's withdrawal 

argument fails, that fraudulent concealment tolls at least part of 

the relevant limitations periods, that related class-action suits 

toll its claims under American Pipe, and that governmental-action 

tolling applies to some of its other claims.

a. Withdrawal

Thomson SA argues that the statutes of limitation on Sharp's 

claims began to run in July 2005, when Thomson SA sold its CRT 

assets. TSA Reply Sharp at 9. It notes that, per Sharp's 

pleadings, it sold its CRT assets and transferred related employees 

to Videocon at that time, after which Thomson SA retained an equity 

investment as a minority shareholder in Videocon. Id. at 11 

(citing Sharp FAC ¶ 75). After that, according to Thomson SA, 

Sharp pleads nothing plausibly suggesting that Thomson SA 

participated in CRT- or conspiracy-related activities anywhere in 

the world, and the latest CRT-related action Thomson SA took 

allegedly occurred in Europe in November 2004, still beyond the 

statutory period. Id. (citing Sharp FAC ¶ 196). 

Sharp maintains that the issue of withdrawal is irrelevant 

because even if Thomson SA had withdrawn from the conspiracy in 

2005, the fact that the conspiracy remained concealed until at 

least November 2007 means that fraudulent concealment could still

apply to toll Sharp's claims. Sharp notes that in Thomson SA's

motion, it relies on a superseded version of the Eleventh Circuit 

case Morton's Market, Inc. v. Gustafson's Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823 

(11th Cir. 1999), amended by 211 F.3d 1224 (2000). Thomson SA 

cites the earlier, pre-amendment version of Morton's Market, in 

which the Eleventh Circuit had held without qualification that 

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claims against a defendant that "effectively withdrew" from the 

conspiracy prior to the limitations period, because it had sold all 

of its interests in the allegedly price-fixed industry. 198 F.3d 

at 837, 839. The Eleventh Circuit amended its opinion, however, to 

state that filings as to that defendant were untimely unless the 

statute of limitations were tolled by fraudulent concealment, in 

which case the defendant would be liable for pre-withdrawal pricefixing activity. 211 F.3d at 1224. 

This conclusion is in line with the way this Court has treated 

the matter of withdrawal at this posture. Generally, it is a factsensitive affirmative defense, and even if a defendant argues that 

it had withdrawn from the conspiracy at the relevant time, it could 

still be liable for its pre-withdrawal price-fixing activity if the 

plaintiff adequately pled fraudulent concealment. See In re Rubber 

Chems. Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 777, 788 (N.D. Cal. 2007); 

In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944-SC, 

2013 WL 4505701, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2013). Based on the 

record, the Court cannot find that Thomson SA had actually 

withdrawn from the conspiracy in 2005, because the full extent of 

Thomson SA's relationships with Videocon and Tech Displays remains 

somewhat unclear, and it is not possible for the Court to find at 

this time that Thomson SA had completely withdrawn from the 

conspiracy. The Court therefore finds it inappropriate to dismiss 

Sharp's claims based on Thomson SA's alleged withdrawal from the 

conspiracy at this time, turning instead to the question of whether 

Sharp has adequately pled fraudulent concealment in its FAC.

///

///

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b. Fraudulent Concealment

The doctrine of fraudulent concealment focuses on actions that 

a defendant took to prevent a plaintiff from learning of grounds 

for filing a suit. See Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 

1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). To invoke the doctrine, plaintiffs 

must allege facts demonstrating that they could not have discovered 

the alleged violations by exercising reasonable diligence. 

Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964 

(N.D. Cal. 2010). A fraudulent concealment claim must be alleged 

with particularity under Rule 9(b). Noll v. eBay, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 

462, 468 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

Thomson SA contends that Sharp failed to plead with 

specificity that Thomson SA itself, as opposed to other defendants, 

affirmatively concealed its alleged participation in the 

conspiracy. TSA Reply Sharp at 10 (citing Sharp FAC ¶¶ 232-37). 

It also argues that Sharp fails to plead that any defendant

fraudulently concealed the conspiracy after Thomson SA's sale of 

its CRT assets in 2005, or that Sharp itself undertook any specific 

acts of diligence to discover potential claims. Id. at 10-11. 

In context, it is clear from the entire FAC, read along with 

Sharp's specific allegations of conspiracy-related conduct and 

fraudulent concealment, that Sharp meets the pleading standard for 

fraudulent concealment. Sharp pleads as to Thomson SA, for 

example, that on several specific dates Thomson SA held or attended 

meetings concerning CRT price-fixing in France, Luxembourg, and 

England, and that the parties to those meetings agreed to keep them 

secret. See Sharp FAC ¶¶ 196, 232-49 (discussing, in part, a 

Thomson entity's concern about consequences if meeting information 

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were released in the European Union). Elsewhere, as often 

discussed in this case, Sharp explains that such secret meetings 

have been a pattern among the alleged co-conspirators. The Court 

finds these facts particular and substantial enough to indicate 

that Sharp has pled fraudulent concealment.7 Accordingly, the 

Court finds that Sharp's claims are tolled under the doctrine of 

fraudulent concealment until November 14, 2007, the latest date on 

which the Court has found such tolling appropriate given worldwide 

press releases and lawsuits concerning this alleged conspiracy.

With Sharp's claims tolled until November 14, 2007, Sharp must 

still account for the nearly-six-year delay between November 2007 

and March 15, 2013, when it filed its case.

c. American Pipe Tolling

American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 

(1974), held that commencement of a class action suspends the 

statute of limitation as to all putative members of the class up to 

and until class certification is denied or the plaintiff opts out 

of the class. Id. at 554; Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 

1135-36 (9th Cir. 2008); Emp'rs-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 

Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 925 

(9th Cir. 2007). "Tolling is fair in such a case because when the 

complaint is filed defendants have notice of the 'substantive 

claims being brought against them.'" Williams, 517 F.3d at 1136 

 7 The Court is not convinced by Thomson SA's arguments that Sharp 

failed to allege due diligence, since that pleading requirement is 

only meaningful when facts exist that would "excite the inquiry of 

a reasonable person," Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc., 858 

F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1988), and in this case, Sharp makes clear 

that it had no notice of the existence of an alleged price-fixing 

conspiracy until November 2007. 

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(quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352-53 

(1983)). "However, the tolling rule does not 'leave[] a plaintiff 

free to raise different or peripheral claims following denial of 

class status.'" Id. at 1136 (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 354 

(Powell, J. concurring)) (alterations in original). 

While courts should permit tolling when a lawsuit raises 

claims that "concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as 

the subject matter of the original class suit," it is still 

important to "make certain . . . that American Pipe is not abused 

by the assertion of claims that differ from those raised in the 

original class suit." Crown, 462 U.S. at 354; see also In re TFTLCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, C 12-4114 SI, 

2013 WL 254873, at *2 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2013) (declining to 

apply American Pipe to state law claims not asserted in the 

original class complaint); accord In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 

436 F.3d 782, 793-97 (7th Cir. 2006) (same). 

Sharp contends that its claims against Thomson SA are tolled 

under American Pipe from January 28, 2008, when two putative direct 

purchaser classes filed complaints against Thomson SA, until March 

16, 2009, when the earlier complaints were consolidated into the 

familiar Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' complaint, which did not name 

Thomson SA as a defendant. Sharp Opp'n at TC at 10-12. Sharp then 

makes a somewhat unclear argument suggesting that tolling might 

extend further than March 16, 2009, because Thomson SA was 

potentially on notice of future liability, but it does not explain 

this point further or cite law supporting it. Id. at 12. Finally, 

Sharp contends that an out-of-district case, In re Linerboard 

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Antitrust Litigation, 223 F.R.D. 335 (E.D. Pa. 2004), should apply 

to toll Sharp's state-law claims as well.

The Court finds that American Pipe tolls Sharp's federal 

claims against Thomson SA between January 28, 2008, and March 16, 

2009, but this is only 413 days (one year, one month, and sixteen 

days), so Sharp is left several months to a year short of the 

limitations period on its federal claims. American Pipe does not 

toll any of Sharp's state law claims because the direct purchaser 

class actions it cites in support of its argument only asserted 

federal claims, and in any event, none of the states whose law 

Sharp cites would adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling, as noted in 

the Court's concurrently filed order on the Defendants' Joint 

Motion to Dismiss.8

 Further, Sharp would not be able to toll any 

of its indirect purchaser claims based on any direct purchaser 

case.

///

 8 The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that "[a]doption of [cross- jurisdictional tolling] would run the risk that Tennessee courts 

would become a clearinghouse for cases that are barred in the 

jurisdictions in which they otherwise would have been brought." 

Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tenn. 

2000). New Jersey limits tolling to former class members, and only 

to the extent their claims were raised in the original putative 

class actions, so Sharp cannot rely on that case since the DPP 

class did not assert a New Jersey claim. Del Sontro v. Cendant 

Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 (D.N.J. 2002). New York law is 

unsettled, but the Court follows the Southern District of New York 

in declining to import American Pipe into New York state law. 

Soward v. Deutsche Bank AG, 814 F. Supp. 2d 272, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 

2011). California explicitly forecloses American Pipe's 

application to cross-jurisdictional actions. Hatfield v. Halifax 

PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Clemens v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1025 ("California's interest 

in managing its own judicial system counsel[s] us not to import the 

doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling into California law.").8

Florida Statute section 95.051(1) sets out the exclusive list of 

Florida tolling doctrines, which does not include cross- jurisdictional tolling.

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Therefore, all of Sharp's claims will be dismissed as timebarred unless any of those claims is tolled by governmental action.

d. Governmental Action Tolling

Sharp argues that its claims are tolled by 15 U.S.C. § 16(i), 

which reads: 

Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted 

by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish 

violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not 

including an action under section 15a of this title, the 

running of the statute of limitations in respect to 

every private or State right of action arising under 

said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter 

complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended 

during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter . . . .

Sharp's brief avoids addressing exactly which claims would be 

tolled, but to be clear, § 16(i) only applies to federal law, not 

state law. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (stating that the statute only applies 

to an express list of federal law); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation 

Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1958) ("[T]he definition contained in 

[Section] 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive. Therefore it is of no 

moment . . . that [a statute] may be colloquially described as an 

'anti-trust' statute."). Accordingly, the only questions remaining 

in the parties' briefs is whether § 16(i) tolls Sharp's federal 

claim, and whether New York's Donnelly Act, which includes a 

tolling provision modeled on the federal provision, will also toll 

Plaintiff's Donnelly Act claim.

For § 16(i) to apply to a federal claim, a plaintiff must show 

by a "comparison of the two complaints on their face[s]" that there 

is a significant overlap between the two actions, such "that the 

matters complained of in the government suit bear a real relation

to the private plaintiff's claim for relief." Leh v. Gen. Petro. 

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Grp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965). On this point, Thomson SA argues 

that the indictments on which Sharp relies are limited to 

allegations that the indicted defendants participated in a 

conspiracy involving color display tubes ("CDTs," a type of CRT)

"for use in computer monitors and other products with similar 

technological requirements." TC MTD Sharp at 15; TC MTD Sharp Exs. 

A-D ("Indictments"). Thomson SA contends that the indictments 

contain no allegations regarding the color picture tube ("CPT", a 

different type of CRT") market, and that they also all concern 

alleged anticompetitive activities taking place in Asian markets, 

not in North America or Europe. TC MTD Sharp at 15-16. Thomson SA

also argues that because the indicted individuals are fugitives, it 

is unlikely that any proceedings will occur in their cases, so 

permitting governmental-action tolling would essentially allow 

plaintiffs like Sharp to toll their claims forever. TSA Reply

Sharp at 13-14 (citing Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schs. v. U.S. 

Dep't of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006); Credit Suisse 

Secs. (USA) LTD v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1420 (2012)). The 

Ninth Circuit addressed the latter point in Dungan v. Morgan DriveAway, Inc., 570 F.2d 867, 868-72 (9th Cir. 1987), holding that §

16(i) must be applied in a way that both strengthens private 

antitrust enforcement and provides a statute of repose.

The Court is not convinced by Thomson SA's contention that the 

indictments based on CDTs, instead of CPTs, renders the markets so 

different that these actions are dissimilar for purposes of §

16(i). Sharp's case, like the other plaintiffs in this action, 

concerns both CDTs and CPTs, and the Court has often noted the 

similarity in these markets. See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube 

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(CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-5944-SC, 2013 WL 5391159, at *3-4 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013) (discussing the CRT market generally, 

including CPTs and CDTs). Further, the Court rejects Thomson SA's

attempt to limit the indictments' relevance to particular criminal 

defendants or geographical regions. This is a worldwide, 

multinational antitrust case, and Sharp's allegations (like the 

other plaintiffs') are premised partly on the contention that 

price-fixing in one region tends to affect prices elsewhere. See

Sharp FAC ¶ 224. 

The Court is also not convinced that permitting tolling based 

on the Indictments, even when the indicted individuals are 

fugitives and their cases have been inactive for some time, 

produces an "absurd result." Thomson SA cites case law supporting 

the uncontroversial rule of statutory construction stating that 

statutes should not be interpreted in a way that would produce 

absurd results. See Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schs., 464 F.3d at 

1008. This is not really an issue of statutory interpretation, 

though: it is an application of the statute to facts.

The more apt case is Credit Suisse, a case concerning the 

tolling provision of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 

1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). That provision has nothing to do with 15 

U.S.C. § 16(i). Section 16(b) allows a corporation or security 

holder of that corporation to sue corporate insiders who realize 

profits resulting from purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of 

the corporation's securities within a six-month period, though they 

must bring suit within two years after the date the profit was 

realized. A separate part of the Securities Exchange Act, § 16(a), 

requires insiders to publicly disclose such transactions. Thomson 

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SA appears to be analogizing to the rule the Supreme Court reviewed 

in Credit Suisse: a Ninth Circuit holding that § 16(b) applied to 

toll a plaintiff's claims even if she already knew of the conduct 

at issue (and had sued on it). See id. at 1419-20. 

That holding was based on the Ninth Circuit's view that §

16(b) tolled all actions brought under it until the § 16(a)

disclosure was filed. Id. at 1419. According to the Ninth 

Circuit, such a rule was necessary because otherwise, an 

unscrupulous insider could avoid the salutary effect of § 16(b) by 

failing to file § 16(a) disclosures, thereby concealing from 

prospective plaintiffs the information necessary to file § 16(b) 

claims. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding first that the 

statute's plain language started a two-year clock from the time the 

insider realized a profit from the sale, not from the time a §

16(a) statement was filed. Id. The Supreme Court then noted that 

the Ninth Circuit's rule was inequitable in part because insiders 

would be compelled either to file potentially unnecessary § 16(a) 

disclosures or face § 16(b) litigation in perpetuity, even though 

plaintiffs had been aware of the grounds for their suit for years. 

Id. at 1419-20.

None of Thomson SA's cases counsels interpreting § 16(i) to 

say anything other than what it does: when the federal government 

brings an antitrust action, private plaintiffs with similar enough 

cases per laws interpreting § 16(i) can toll their claims for the 

pendency of the government's case plus one year. See Credit 

Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1419 (stating that in analyzing a tolling 

provision, courts are to refer first to the statute's text, instead 

of beginning with equitable principles). Even if the Court were to 

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evaluate Thomson SA's arguments in terms of equity here, the facts 

have not established that it would be inequitable for Sharp to toll 

its claims: the government has not concluded the cases for which it 

issued the Indictments, and the Court is in no position to assume 

(as Thomson SA does) that those cases may as well be put to rest 

forever. The Court does not know this, and if the government does 

close those cases, the parties will then know very clearly when the 

tolling period will end. At present, Sharp is entitled to the 

tolling benefit of § 16(i). See Leh, 382 U.S. at 65 (tolling based 

on government action does not turn on the government's success in 

proving its complaint's allegations); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 336 (1971) (the purpose of 

§ 16(i) is to enable private litigants to benefit from government 

suits and use the benefits accruing from those suits). 

The Court holds that § 16(i) tolls Sharp's federal claims from 

February 10, 2009, when the first indictment issued, until today.

The same reasoning applies to Plaintiff's claims under the Donnelly 

Act, which the parties do not fully address in their briefing. 

Since the Donnelly Act's tolling provision maps to the federal law, 

Sharp's Donnelly Act claim is tolled for the pendency of the 

federal criminal proceedings.

ii. Laches

Thomson SA also argues that Sharp's claims are barred by 

laches, an equitable time limitation on a party's right to bring 

suit that requires a showing of (1) unreasonable delay in filing 

the suit and (2) prejudice to Defendant. Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. 

Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002). A laches 

defense raised at the motion to dismiss posture requires exclusive 

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reliance on the factual allegations in the complaint. Kourtis v. 

Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other 

grounds, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). Courts have 

noted that this postural requirement poses a nearly insurmountable 

obstacle to a favorable resolution of a defendant's fact-dependent 

laches claim. See Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley v. 

Salazar, No. 09-cv-02502-EJD, 2011 WL 5038356, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 24, 2011); Italia Marittima, S.P.A. v. Seaside Transp. Servs., 

LLC, No. C-10-0803-PJH, 2010 WL 3504834, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 

2010). 

In examining Sharp's FAC, it is difficult not to find some 

delay, but the Court cannot find that Sharp's delay was 

unreasonable based only on the FAC's allegations. As noted above, 

some of Sharp's claims are time-barred, but some are tolled, and 

there is a "strong presumption" that laches is inapplicable to 

claims brought within a statutory period. See Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 

835-36. Thomson SA is, of course, not barred from raising laches 

on a more developed record.

iii. Failure to State Claims

Thomson SA argues that Sharp fails to plead claims because (1) 

it pleads no facts plausibly suggesting that it satisfies the 

Illinois Brick ownership or control exception; (2) it fails to 

plead facts establishing that Thomson SA had a significant 

aggregation of contacts with New York and New Jersey; and (3) 

separately, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

Sharp's claims, because the FAC pleads no facts plausibly 

suggesting that Thomson SA's alleged foreign conduct caused a 

"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on 

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domestic commerce under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements 

Act ("FTAIA"), 15 U.S.C. § 6a.9

First, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), 

which generally bars federal antitrust suits by indirect 

purchasers, permits indirect purchasers to sue if the direct 

purchaser of the allegedly price-fixed good was a division or 

subsidiary of a co-conspirator. See In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) 

Antitrust Litig., 911 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 

In re ATM Fee, 686 F.3d 741, 755 (9th Cir. 2012); Royal Printing 

Co. v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

Thomson SA contends that Sharp fails to plead sufficient facts

demonstrating that its purchases from direct purchasers demonstrate 

sufficient ownership and control to meet this Illinois Brick

exception. The Court finds that Sharp has pled enough to state the 

ownership or control exception given Sharp's pleadings about the 

relationship between Thomson SA and Thomson Consumer.

Second, Thomson SA's argument about its relationship to New 

Jersey is moot, but its argument that it lacks a significant 

aggregation of contacts with New York merits some consideration. 

Thomson SA argues that because Sharp has not alleged that it 

purchased any CRTs or CRT Products in New York, but only that it 

warehoused purchased CRT Products in New York, Sharp has failed to 

 9 Sharp raises, in a footnote, the fact that the Ninth Circuit and 

courts in this district have questioned whether FTAIA presents a 

jurisdictional issue or whether it is an element of a claim. Opp'n 

to TSA at 24 n.24. The Court need not decide this issue, because 

resolution of the FTAIA question does not require it. Separately, 

Thomson SA argues that Sharp fails to state a claim under New York 

General Business Law section 349, the New York UCL, but the Court 

has found that cause of action to be time-barred, so the argument 

here is moot. That section is separate from the Donnelly Act's 

tolling provision, New York General Business Law section 342-c.

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allege sufficient contacts with New York to survive a due process 

challenge to the application of New York law. TC Reply Sharp at 

15; TSA Reply Sharp at 15. 

Thomson SA cites the recent case AT&T Mobility LLC v. AU 

Optronics Corp., 707 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2013), to support 

its contention that the Court's due process analysis is limited to 

examining where the allegedly price-fixed products were purchased 

and where the allegedly anti-competitive conduct giving rise to the 

conspiracy occurred. TC Reply Sharp at 15. Thomson SA misreads 

AT&T Mobility and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 

312-13 (1981), as the Court has explained in relation to a 

different Thomson SA in In re CRT, 2013 WL 4505701, at *6. AT&T

and Allstate do not limit the Court to those two considerations: 

rather, read together, they require the Court to evaluate, with 

respect to each defendant, whether a plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient conspiratorial conduct within a state such that 

application of that state's law is neither arbitrary nor 

fundamentally unfair. Id.; see also In re TFT-LCD, No. C-12-3802-

SI, 2013 WL 1164897, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013). Sharp 

contends that because Sharp Electronics Corporation ("SEC") is a 

New York corporation, albeit with a principal place of business in 

New Jersey, the effects of the CRT conspiracy on the New York 

market plus the fact that SEC warehoused CRT Products in the state 

merit application of New York law to Thomson SA within the limits 

of due process. Sharp Opp'n to TC at 25 & n.25. 

The Court finds for Sharp here: Thomson SA's alleged conduct 

resulted in a New York-based company being harmed, and this is 

sufficient to give New York an interest in applying its own law to 

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the controversy, especially given Allstate's "modest restrictions 

on the application of forum law" and "highly permissive standard." 

See Experience Hendrix LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd., -- F.3d --

, Nos. 11-35858, 11-35872, 2014 WL 306600, at *4 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Allstate and AT&T, and quoting AT&T, 707 F.3d at 1111).

Finally, Thomson SA's FTAIA argument fails. The FTAIA 

excludes from Sherman Act claims: "(1) export activities and (2) 

other commercial activities taking place abroad, unless those 

activities adversely affect domestic commerce, imports to the 

United States, or exporting activities of one engaged in such 

activities within the United States." Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. 

Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161 (2004). Thomson SA argues that

the alleged meetings and other conspiratorial activities took place 

outside the United States and targeted the world CRT market instead 

of the United States specifically, since Thomson SA and other 

defendants are citizens of foreign countries, and the foreign 

conduct had an indirect and attenuated effect in the United States. 

TSA MTD Sharp at 25. Thomson SA claims that these amounts to a 

"trickle-down" claim insufficient to ground jurisdiction under the 

FTAIA, so the Court must refuse jurisdiction. Id. Sharp responds 

that its claims are based solely on domestic or import commerce, so 

by its terms, the FTAIA does not apply at all. Sharp Opp'n to TSA

at 24. Sharp argues further that even if the FTAIA applied, its 

allegations would fit within the FTAIA's domestic injury exception, 

which permits Sherman Act claims arising from conduct involving 

trade or commerce with foreign nations if (1) the underlying 

conduct cause a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 

effect" on American domestic, import, or some export commerce; and 

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(2) the effect gave rise to the injury. Id. at 25 (citing 

Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(2)). 

Sharp is correct. First, while Thomson SA claims that Sharp 

pleads no facts suggesting that Thomson SA set prices of or engaged 

in anticompetitive conduct regarding CRTs imported in the domestic 

market -- since Sharp only pled that it purchased CRTs and CRT 

Products from Thomson Consumer -- Thomson SA is wrong that Sharp 

pled nothing plausibly suggesting Thomson SA's conduct regarding 

CRTs imported to the United States. Sharp specifically pled that 

Thomson SA met with another co-conspirator and discussed CRT pricefixing for the United States market. Sharp FAC ¶ 196 (under seal). 

Thomson SA represents that Sharp's allegations only concern 

trickle-down effects, but that is not true. Sharp's allegations 

regarding Thomson SA do not allege purely "participation in foreign 

meetings regarding foreign commerce," they concern participation in 

foreign meetings regarding United States commerce, even if Sharp 

ultimately purchased the allegedly price-fixed CRTs from Thomson 

Consumer. This is not excluded under the FTAIA. Empagran, 542 

U.S. at 161. 

V. THOMSON CONSUMER'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE SHARP COMPLAINT

Thomson SA and Thomson Consumer filed separate motions, but 

their briefs and arguments overlap in most places, with the obvious 

exception of Thomson SA's specific jurisdiction argument. Thomson 

Consumer's brief primarily concerns laches, statutes of limitation, 

and Sharp's purported failure to plead various federal and state 

claims, all of which the Court discussed at length, see supra. 

Thomson SA's brief incorporates Thomson Consumer's brief on most of 

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these issues, so the Court's analysis is identical.

A. Laches

Thomson Consumer's laches argument is the same as Thomson 

SA's. The Court's ruling is accordingly the same as above: the 

Court cannot find that Sharp's delay was unreasonable based only on 

the FAC's allegations.

B. Statutes of Limitation

Thomson Consumer's argument that Sharp's claims are timebarred is the same as Thomson SA's. The Court's ruling is also the 

same: fraudulent concealment applies until November 2007, but all 

of Sharp's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred, 

except the federal claim and the New York Donnelly Act claim, which 

are both tolled by government action. The only aspect of the 

Court's analysis that would change here is that, as in the Tech 

Displays America action, American Pipe tolling could not apply to 

Thomson Consumer based on any DPP class action because Thomson 

Consumer was never named as a defendant in any of those cases. 

See, e.g., Tech Data Corp. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 07-MD-1827, 

2012 WL 3236065, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012). It tolls claims 

against Thomson SA, but not for long enough to save the claim from 

being untimely absent governmental action tolling.

C. Pleading Matters

Thomson Consumer's pleading arguments are the same as Thomson 

SA's. The Court's rulings on them are the same as above.

VI. THE THOMSON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE DAP COMPLAINTS

Thomson SA and Thomson Consumer file motions to dismiss in the 

aforementioned DAP cases, which as the Court notes below are 

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virtually the same as their briefs in the Sharp matter, discussed 

at length above. The main difference is that the Court had once 

considered and denied the DAPs' requests to add the Thomson 

Defendants to their complaints. See ECF No. 1959 ("Order Denying 

Amendment"). The difference between then and now, as discussed in 

the concurrently filed Order in Mitsubishi's motion to dismiss, is 

that the DAPs now provide substantially more facts explaining why 

the Thomson Defendants should be in this case, instead of listing 

and relying on unacceptably vague boilerplate.

However, in most respects, the DAP-Thomson dispute is the same 

as the Sharp-Thomson dispute, and for brevity's sake the Court 

rules on all of the issues in this Order, incorporating the above 

analysis and relevant parts of the Order on Mitsubishi's motion to 

dismiss.

First, the Court rejects Thomson SA's argument that the DAPs

fail to plead facts supporting an uncontroverted finding of 

specific jurisdiction. The DAPs plead sufficient facts to support 

a finding that Thomson SA directed its price-fixing activities 

toward the United States. They also provide evidence, which 

Thomson SA fails to rebut, that Thomson SA targeted the United 

States by setting price targets for United States purchases, 

approving various pricing plans from its French headquarters, 

exchanging information about United States CRT operations in 

meetings at its French headquarters, and sharing worldwide market 

information (with the knowledge that the United States was the 

world's largest CRT market). See Best Buy Compl. ¶¶ 29-30, 151; 

ECF No. 2378-1 ("Loh Decl.") Exs. C, P-T (meeting notes, agendas, 

and emails indicating that Thomson SA was targeting the United 

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States and approving United States-targeted price-fixing activity). 

As above, Thomson SA refers to its own declarations and affidavits, 

but these do not directly controvert any of the DAPs' allegations 

about Thomson SA's United States-targeted activity, nor does 

Thomson SA respond to the facts the DAPs provide with their 

opposition brief. The Court finds, as above, that Thomson SA 

directed price-fixing activity toward the United States, that this 

activity was a but-for cause of the DAPs' injuries, and that it 

would be reasonable to exercise specific jurisdiction over Thomson 

SA.

As to each Thomson Defendant, the Court makes the same 

findings on laches, statutes of limitations, and pleading matters 

described above. Nothing in the Thomson Defendants' briefs in the 

DAP cases changes this analysis. Accordingly, the Court rejects 

the Thomson Defendants' laches arguments at this time, for reasons 

described above and in the concurrently filed Order on Mitsubishi's 

motion to dismiss.

American Pipe tolling does preserve the DAPs' claims against 

Thomson SA for reasons described above, but only for a short time -

- even with the benefit of the short tolling period on which the 

DAPs rely, their claims would be untimely. See DAP Opp'n to TSA at 

17-18. Since Thomson Consumer had not been named as a defendant in 

the earlier cases on which the DAPs rely, American Pipe does not 

toll claims against it. Tech Data Corp. v. AU Optronics Corp., 

2012 WL 3236065, at *5.

Further, DAPs do not state that any of the direct purchaser 

complaints on which they rely raised the same state causes of 

action, which is grounds for the Court to reject the application of 

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American Pipe to the DAPs' state law claims. See In re TFT-LCD 

(Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, C 12-4114 SI, 2013 

WL 254873, at *2 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2013) (declining to 

apply American Pipe to state law claims not asserted in the 

original complaint); accord In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 

782, 793-97 (7th Cir. 2006) (same). 

Finally, for the sake of thoroughness, the Court is not 

persuaded that Kansas, Michigan, or Minnesota -- the three states 

not also discussed in the Sharp case or the Joint Motion to Dismiss 

-- would adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling based on federal class 

actions asserting federal claims. In the DAPs' case Seaboard Corp. 

v. Marsh Inc., 284 P.3d 314, 327 (Kan. 2012), the Kansas Supreme 

Court stated specifically that Kansas has declined to adopt 

American Pipe principles, and applied tolling instead based on a 

specific state statute. In Mair v. Consumers Power Co., 384 N.W.2d 

256, 260-61 (Mich. 1984), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a 

federal administrative complaint did not put a defendant on notice 

of a state claim. In Lee v. Grand Rapids Bd. of Educ., 148 Mich. 

App. 364, 367-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), the Michigan Court of 

Appeals cited Mair to describe Michigan law's occasional 

application of tolling when a defendant has notice of a state law 

claim, which is not the case when a federal complaint does not 

include the state law cause of action, as in this case. It is 

possible that Minnesota courts would analogize to American Pipe's 

cross-jurisdictional tolling principles in some circumstances, but 

the application of this rule in Minnesota courts appears to depend 

on whether the defendant had notice of the state law claims, which, 

as stated above, does not appear to be the case where federal 

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plaintiffs did not plead the same Minnesota causes of action 

against the same defendants. See Bartlett v. Miller & Schroeder 

Muns., 355 N.W.2d 435, 439-40 (Minn. 1984).

The Thomson Defendants' pleading arguments are rejected in the 

DAP cases for the reasons explained above.

The Court finds that all of the DAPs' state law claims against 

the Thomson Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as untimely, 

except any Donnelly Act claims, which are tolled by governmental 

action. The federal claims are also tolled by governmental action.

 

VII. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in 

part the Thomson Defendants' motions to dismiss. All Plaintiffs' 

state law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as untimely, except 

their Donnelly Act claims, which are tolled by the federal criminal 

proceedings. All Plaintiffs' federal claims are also tolled.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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