Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00137/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00137-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NICHOLAS LEVI RIANTO, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-00137 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

ERIC HOLDER, )

 ) 

Respondent. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

Mr. Nicholas Rianto (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on

January 20, 2011. Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Response”) (Doc. 9) on

April 19, 2011. Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 10) to the

response on April 29, 2011. 

I. Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Indonesia. On

June 1, 1999, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS) admitted Petitioner to the United States as an immigrant.

See Response, Exh. 1 & Exh. 2. 

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On September 9, 2002, Petitioner was convicted by the

United States District Court, Eastern District of California, on

two counts of unauthorized use of the identification of another

person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), and two counts

of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Pursuant to

each of these four convictions Petitioner was sentenced to

concurrent terms of twelve months and one day imprisonment. See

id., Exh. 3. 

On January 11, 2006, Petitioner was convicted by the

State of California of burglary in the second degree. Pursuant

to this conviction Petitioner was sentenced to serve a term of

sixteen months imprisonment. See id., Exh. 4. On May 30, 2007,

Petitioner was convicted by the State of California of

submitting a non-sufficient funds check and sentenced to two

days imprisonment. See id., Exh. 5. 

The Court notes that Petitioner was, therefore,

convicted of four crimes involving fraud within five years of

the date he was admitted to the United States. Petitioner was

afterwards convicted of burglary and sentenced to a term of

sixteen months imprisonment, from which he was released in 2007.

Petitioner was thereafter convicted of kiting a check, a crime

for which he served two days imprisonment. Petitioner was last

released from incarceration in June of 2007, and was not

thereafter in the custody of state or federal criminal

authorities.

In 2010 Petitioner came to the attention of Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) when he applied for a

replacement for his lost “green card.” On October 14, 2010,

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more than three years after Petitioner was released from

criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging Petitioner as removable

pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien who was convicted of an

aggravated felony under INA section 101(a)(43)(F), i.e., a crime

of violence where a sentence of one year or more has been

imposed. See id., Exh. 6. Petitioner was taken into custody

and ordered held without bond. See id., Exh. 7. 

On November 8, 2010, the government withdrew the charge

regarding Petitioner having committed an aggravated felony, and

alleged additional allegations of criminal convictions. The

government ultimately charged Petitioner with two new grounds of

removability under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(i), codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), i.e., that he had committed a crime

involving moral turpitude within five years of admission

(presumably the unauthorized use of another’s identification and

mail fraud), and under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), i.e., that he had committed two crimes

involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single course of

conduct, i.e., mail fraud. See id., Exh. 8. 

On November 10, 2010, Petitioner appeared before the

immigration judge (IJ) for his custody redetermination hearing.

The IJ denied the request for redetermination and both parties

waived appeal. See id., Exh. 9. On February 3, 2010, the IJ

sustained the charges of removability and ordered Petitioner

removed to Indonesia. See id., Exh. 10 & Exh. 11. Petitioner

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filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) on

February 14, 2011. See id., Exh. 12. The appeal is pending.

In the section 2241 petition Petitioner asserts that 8

U.S.C. § 236 of the INA does not provide jurisdiction for his

continued detention. Petitioner argues that Respondent contends

his detention is authorized by In the matter of Saysan, 24 I&N

602 (2008). Petitioner asserts that the “when released”

language found in section 236(c) belies the contention that this

section authorizes his continued detention.

II. Analysis

A. Applicable law

The Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a

Department of Homeland Security detainee who is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2010). 

Federal law provides authorization for the detention of

removable aliens in two separate circumstances. Section 236(c)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1226, governs the detention of aliens who are not under

an administratively final order of removal. Respondents contend

that Petitioner is being detained pursuant to section 1226(c),

which requires the detention of some aliens pending the finality

of their removal proceedings. The IJ agreed, concluding that he

was without jurisdiction to release Petitioner on bond.

However, for the last several years the United States

District Courts have consistently determined that section

1226(c) does not authorize the detention of an alien, pending

the finality of their removal proceedings, when the alien is not

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1 Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009,

on September 30, 1996. The Act included transitional rules that were

effective from October 9, 1996, to October 8, 1998, after which the

permanent rule, codified at section 236, took effect. Congress used

the same language pertaining to mandatory detention in the

transitional rule as it does in the permanent rule. See IIRIRA §

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taken into ICE custody upon their release (or within a very

brief period thereafter) from incarceration upon completion of

the criminal sentence for the crime or crimes providing the

basis for their removability. 

Section 1226(c) (emphasis added) provides:

(c) Detention of criminal aliens

(1) Custody 

The Attorney General shall take into custody

any alien who-- 

(A) is inadmissible by reason of having

committed any offense covered in section

1182(a)(2) of this title, 

(B) is deportable by reason of having

committed any offense covered in section

1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D)

of this title, 

(C) is deportable under section

1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis

of an offense for which the alien has been

sentence [FN1] to a term of imprisonment of

at least 1 year, or 

(D) is inadmissible under section

1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable

under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, 

when the alien is released, without regard to

whether the alien is released on parole,

supervised release, or probation, and without

regard to whether the alien may be arrested

or imprisoned again for the same offense. 

As noted supra, Petitioner was released from custody

for the crimes found as the basis for removability in 2003,

seven years prior to being taken into custody as presumably

authorized by section 1226(c).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting the

IRIRA,1 and some District Courts, including courts considering

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303(b)(3), found at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (notes). 

2 The language used in the transitional rule is exactly the same

as that used in the permanent rule. See IIRIRA § 303(b)(3), found at

8 U.S.C. § 1101 (notes), and INA § 236(c). Thus, in accordance with

the rules of statutory construction, the language in question should

be interpreted in the same way. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486

U.S. 281, 291, 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). That interpretation would

follow the same logic as the Supreme Court’s long-standing rule that

identical words used in different parts of the statute must have the

same meaning. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S.

155, 203 n.12, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).

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the transitional rules applicable to pre-1998 immigrants, have

found that, under the plain meaning of the statute quoted supra,

mandatory detention does not apply to criminal aliens if they

are not taken into immigration custody immediately after being

released from state custody.2 See Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d

7, 10 (1st Cir. 2009) (“if the reference to ‘when the alien is

released’ is read to encompass any release from any non-DHS

custodial setting ... that phrase is completely disjointed from

the text that precedes and follows it”); Monestime v. REilly,

704 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Khodr v. Adduci, 697

F. Supp. 2d 774, 779-80 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Scarlett v. DHS, 632

F. Supp. 2d 214, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (agreeing with the district

courts that have held “the statute does not apply when the alien

was not taken into immigration custody at the time of his

release from incarceration on the underlying criminal charges”);

Garcia v. Shanahan, 615 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

(holding that “the plain language of the statute ... manifests

Congress’ clear intent that there must be a nexus between the

date of release and the removable offense”); Waffi v. Loiselle,

527 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488 (E.D. Va. 2007) (holding that “the

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mandatory detention statute ... does not apply to an alien ...

who has been taken into immigration custody well over a month

after his release from state custody” for an offense enumerated

within section 236(c)); Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d

1221, 1228-30 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“Thus, if Congress had intended

for mandatory detention to apply to aliens at any time after

they were released, it easily could have used the language

‘after the alien is released, ‘regardless of when the alien is

released,’ or other words to that effect. Instead, Congress

chose the word ‘when,’ which connotes a much different

meaning.”); Alikhani v. Fasano, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (S.D. Cal.

1999); Velasquez v. Reno, 37 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672 (D.N.J. 1999)

(holding that the plain language of the statute provides that an

alien is to be taken into custody at the time the alien is

released); Pastor-Camarena v. Smith, 977 F. Supp. 1415, 1417-18

(W.D. Wash. 1997); Montero v. Cobb, 937 F. Supp. 88, 95 (D.

Mass. 1996). These courts concluded Congress did not intend to

subject those aliens who are released from custody and not

immediately taken into immigration custody to mandatory

detention under section 236(c), when they have been taken into

immigration custody months or years after their release. These

courts have found that Congress intended mandatory detention to

apply only to those aliens taken into immigration custody

immediately after their release from criminal custody. But see

Sulayao v. Shanahan, No. 09-7347, 2009 WL 3003188 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 15, 2009); Saucedo-Tellez v. Perryman, 55 F. Supp. 2d 882,

885 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The Court, however, is not bound by these

two decisions and respectfully disagrees with the analysis

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supporting those decisions.

Respondents contend that they have a strong interest in

detaining Petitioner during the pendency of his removal

proceedings. Respondents contend

When Congress adopted 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in

1996, it recognized that immigration

officials may not have sufficient personnel

or adequate detention space immediately to

effectuate the provision. As a result,

Congress provided that the effective date

could be delayed for up to two years: 

 If the Attorney General, not later than

10 days after the date of the enactment of

this Act, notifies in writing the Committees

on the Judiciary of the House of

Representatives and the Senate that there is

insufficient detention space and Immigration

and Naturalization Service personnel

available to carry out section 236(c) [8

U.S.C. § 1226(c)]of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, as amended by subsection

(a), or the amendments made by section 440(c)

of Public Law 104-132, the provisions in

paragraph (3) [setting forth Transition

Period Custody Rules] shall be in effect for

a 1-year period beginning on the date of such

notification, instead of such section or such

amendments. 

 The Attorney General may extend such

1-year period for an additional year if the

Attorney General provides the same notice not

later than 10 days before the end of the

first 1-year period. After the end of such

1-year or 2-year periods, the provisions of

such section 236(c) shall apply to

individuals released after such periods. 

 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) §

303(b)(2), Division C of Pub. Law 104-208,

110 Stat. 3009. 

After quoting this legislative history, Respondent

argues:

 During this time IIRIRA § 303(b)(3)

applied, not Section 1226(c). The TPCR

contained a provision identical to Section

1226(c)(1) requiring immigration officials to

take custody of described criminal aliens

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3

This Court’s de novo review of statute reveals that it

clearly does not apply to individuals who were released

from custody for a removable offense before the effective

date of the mandatory detention provision. Although this

statute was enacted on September 30, 1996, implementation

of the mandatory detention provision was deferred for two

years, until October 9, 1998. See Thomas v. Hogan, 2008 WL

4793739 at *1 (M.D. Pa. October 31, 2008) (discussing

history of § 1226(c)). The two-year delay between passage

of § 1226(c) and its enforcement suggests that Congress did

not intend this statute to apply to offenses committed

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upon “release.” However, unlike the present

Section 1226(c)(2), the TCPR provided for

individualized bond determinations for aliens

who could prove both legal entry into the

United States and that they did not present

a substantial risk of flight or threat to

persons or property. See IIRIRA § 303(b)(3).

This provision applied until its sunset in

1998.

 After the sunset of the TPCR, the

government has taken the position that the

term “when released,” as used in 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c), refers to “release” from state

criminal custody, irrespective of whether the

custody occurred as a result of an offense

listed in Section 1226(c). In re Matter of

Kotliar, 24 I & N Dec. 124 (BIA 2007); Matter

of West, 22 I & N Dec. 1405, 1409-10 (BIA

2000); In re Rojas, 23 I & N Dec. 117 (BIA

2001). Not all Courts have adopted the

position of the government. However, in this

case, this Court need not address the

viability of the government’s positions in

these cases. Because Petitioner’s convictions

post-date the sunset of the TPCR and form the

basis of the charges of removability, the

issue does not apply to him.

Respondent argues Petitioner’s detention pending the

finality of his removal proceedings is required because

“Petitioner’s crimes involving moral turpitude create the

sufficient nexus to justify his detention under 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c)(1) as the convictions occurred after ‘Transition Period

Custody Rule’(TPCR),” citing Ortiz v. Napolitano, 667 F. Supp 2d

1108, 1111 (D. Ariz. 2009).3

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before October 9, 1998, the date of its enforcement.

Ortiz v. Napolitano, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (D. Ariz. 2009).

Ortiz is not relevant to this case. The invidual in Ortiz was

convicted of state crimes, committed in 1991 while the individual was

paroled into the United States, and served his time and was released

prior to the effective date of the mandatory detention provisions of

the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

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The Court is not convinced by Respondent’s argument.

The crimes forming the basis for Petitioner’s removability

occurred in 2002, long after the expiration of the sunset

provisions regarding section 1226(c). Additionally, Petitioner

was not received into federal custody after the completion of

state crimes, but instead was taken into federal custody more

than three years after he completed his two-day sentence for the

state crimes. Neither did Petitioner come to the attention of

ICE because of any state criminal detention or accusation.

Therefore, there is no “nexus” between Petitioner’s 2002 crimes

and his detention in 2010. The holding in Ortiz supports this

conclusion:

However, as the Magistrate Judge explained,

every District Court that has considered this

issue has found that the mandatory detention

provision does not apply to individuals who

were released from custody for the removable

offense well before the effective date of the

mandatory detention provision. See, e.g.,

Pastor-Camarena v. Smith, 977 F.Supp. 1415,

1417 (W.D.Wash.1997) (holding that “[t]he

plain meaning of [‘when the alien is

released’] is that it applies immediately

after release from incarceration, not to

aliens released many year [sic] earlier.”).

The Government's Objection never squarely

addresses the numerous district court cases

cited by the Magistrate Judge and instead

argues that this Court should defer to the

interpretation of the Board of Immigration

Appeals as applied in Matter of Saysana, 24

I. & N. Dec. 602, 2008 WL 3978211 (BIA Aug.

27, 2008).” 

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In this case, the BIA considered whether the

“release” from custody “must be directly tied

to the basis for detention under [section

1226(c) ].” However, under Chevron, the Court

need not even reach the question of whether

to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a

statute unless the statutory language is

unclear. Here, this Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Anderson and the many other

district courts which have considered this

issue and concludes that the statute clearly

requires a nexus between the deportable

offense and the release from custody.

 Because of this required nexus, which did

not exist here, the Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge’s report and finds that

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus should be granted.

Because there is no established “nexus” between

Petitioner’s 2002 and 2006 crimes and his alleged “mandatory”

detention in 2010, the petition for habeas relief should be

granted.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Rianto’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order that

Respondent shall either release Petitioner from custody under an

order of supervision, or provide a hearing to Petitioner, within

60 days of the filing of this Order, before an Immigration Judge

with the power to grant him bail unless Respondent establishes

that he is a flight risk or will be a danger to the community.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

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court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 25th day of May, 2011.

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