Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_23-cv-00267/USCOURTS-azd-4_23-cv-00267-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bryan Barten,

Plaintiff,

v. 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Company,

Defendant.

No. CV-23-00267-TUC-CKJ (MSA)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Bryan Barten’s motion to compel discovery.

(Doc. 58.) The motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. 64, 72.) Oral argument was requested 

but is not deemed necessary. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted in part.

Background1

In April 1995, Plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic as a result of an automobile 

accident. (Doc. 1 ¶ 6.) At the time, he was covered under an insurance policy issued by 

Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. (Id. ¶ 7.) The policy 

requires that Defendant pay all reasonable charges for reasonably necessary products and 

services for Plaintiff’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. (Id. ¶ 8.)

Since the accident, Plaintiff has had various needs arising from his injuries, 

including the need for attendant care, physical therapy, and medically necessary assistive 

devices. (Id. ¶ 10.) However, in the past, Defendant refused to pay certain benefits, denied 

benefits, and made misrepresentations to Plaintiff about the benefits he was owed. (Id.

1 These factual allegations are taken from the complaint. (Doc. 1.)

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¶ 11.) As a result, in 2012, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for breach of contract and 

insurance bad faith. (Id.) That lawsuit eventually settled. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Since then, Defendant has reverted to its old bad-faith ways. (Id.) For example, 

although Defendant has enough information in its file to pay Plaintiff’s claims for attendant 

care and equipment, Defendant has ignored that information, made Plaintiff jump through 

needless hoops, asked for repetitive information, and grossly underpaid the benefit. (Id.) 

Defendant has also ignored many of Plaintiff’s phone calls and emails. (Id. ¶ 13.) In 

addition, Defendant has required information beyond reasonable proof of loss before 

reimbursing Plaintiff for his out-of-pocket expenses and failed to provide adequate 

explanations for its coverage decisions. (Id. ¶ 14.) As a result, Plaintiff filed this second 

lawsuit, alleging a single claim of insurance bad faith. (Id. ¶¶ 17–20.)

Legal Standard

A party may obtain discovery as to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 

party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to prove or disprove a fact “of consequence 

in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. In determining whether information sought

by a party is proportional to the needs of the case, the Court must consider “the importance 

of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access 

to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving 

the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 

likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to adequately respond to 14 requests for 

production (RFP). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) (authorizing parties to serve requests to 

produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or other tangible things).

Defendant objects to the RFPs on numerous grounds. Below, the Court (I) rules on

Defendant’s objections generally. The Court then (II) applies those rulings to each 

individual RFP.

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I. Defendant’s Objections

A. Relevancy

The RFPs seek two categories of information. The first concerns information about 

Defendant’s handling of Plaintiff’s claim (e.g., the requests seek Plaintiff’s claim file,

documents outside the claim file that concern Plaintiff, and communications about Plaintiff 

sent to or between Defendant’s employees). These RFPs seek relevant information. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant handled his claim in bad faith. Plainly, any information 

Defendant has regarding its handling of the claim will tend to prove or disprove Plaintiff’s

allegation. This is true regardless of whether the information is within or outside the claim 

file. See Sell v. Country Life Ins., 189 F. Supp. 3d 925, 932–33 (D. Ariz. 2016) (explaining 

that emails outside the claim file were relevant to the plaintiff’s bad-faith claim); see also 

Comput. Sci. Corp. v. Endurance Risk Sols. Assurance Co., No. 20-cv-01580, 2022 WL 

1192782, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2022) (rejecting the insurer’s argument that “a search 

for emails outside of . . . [the] claims file [was] ‘unnecessary and burdensome’” and holding 

that “all documents, wherever maintained, regarding [the insurer’s] handling of Plaintiff’s 

claim [were] clearly relevant to [the] Breach of Contract claim”).

The second category concerns information about financial incentives that Defendant

might offer to employees who deny more claims (e.g., the requests seek Defendant’s 

economic performance measures, combined ratio goals, and severity goals). These RFPs 

also seek relevant information. If Defendant offers financial benefits to adjustors who deny 

more claims, then those incentives could have led to the wrongful denial of Plaintiff’s 

claim. See Ingram v. Great Am. Ins., 112 F. Supp. 3d 934, 940 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“Evidence 

regarding whether [the insurers] ‘set arbitrary goals for the reduction of claims paid’ and 

whether ‘[t]he salaries and bonuses paid to claims representatives were influenced by how 

much the representatives paid out on claims’ is relevant to whether Defendants acted 

unreasonably and knew it.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Zilisch v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins., 995 P.2d 276, 280 (Ariz. 2000))); Suljanovic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 

No. 20-CV-534, 2021 WL 634143, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 2021) (collecting cases 

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holding that information about financial incentives is relevant and discoverable).

Defendant argues that, before discovery may be had into its financial condition, 

Plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that Defendant is liable for punitive 

damages. This argument misses the mark. Plaintiff’s claim is for bad faith. If Defendant’s 

adjustors have financial incentives to deny valid claims, information about those incentives 

is proof that Defendant acted in bad faith. In other words, the information is relevant toward 

liability, not just damages.

Defendant further argues that it has no incentive to deny Plaintiff’s claim because 

the claim qualifies for reimbursement by the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association 

(MCCA). However, Defendant concedes that “the MCCA might not reimburse all of the 

policy benefits paid by State Farm.” And, as Plaintiff points out, “[i]nterest on payments 

made by an insurer, penalty interest, and attorney fees are not reimbursable by MCCA.” 

Thus, the MCCA does not eliminate the possibility that Defendant’s adjustors are 

motivated by improper financial incentives. Moreover, the information would be relevant 

even if the MCCA did fully reimburse Defendant, as that evidence would tend to disprove

a fact of consequence, i.e., it would tend to disprove that Defendant acted in bad faith. See 

Barten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., No. CV-12-00399-TUC, 2015 WL 11111475, at *2 

(D. Ariz. June 10, 2015) (“The Court finds that the MCCA reimbursement goes to 

Defendant’s motive or lack thereof to deny payment of attendant care services and is, 

therefore, relevant to the bad-faith claim.” (emphasis added)).

B. Temporal Scope

Plaintiff has limited the temporal scope of a few of his RFPs, but he generally seeks 

discovery of information from as far back as September 2015, when the first case settled.

Defendant argues that this length of time is overbroad. According to Defendant, because 

the statute of limitation on Plaintiff’s bad-faith claim is two years, Plaintiff should only be 

able to seek information from two years before this lawsuit was filed. 

The Court disagrees that the statute of limitation should dictate the temporal scope 

of discovery. A party may seek discovery as to “events that occurred before an applicable 

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limitations period” when “the information sought is otherwise relevant to issues in the 

case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 (1978). In a bad-faith case, 

information outside the limitation period can be relevant to provide context and possibly 

show a continuing pattern of bad-faith claims handling. Cf. Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., 

Inc., 238 F.R.D. 648, 652 (D. Kan. 2006) (holding that “information from the two-years 

and three-months prior to the April 2002 liability period may be relevant to demonstrate 

the pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct alleged by Plaintiffs”).

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff, however, that the discovery period should extend 

to September 2015. Instead, the Court finds that a period of three years before the liability 

period is proportional to the needs of this case (so a five-year period in total).2 See Anderson 

v. St. Paul Cos., Nos. CV 04-3236, CV 04-9392, 2006 WL 8434063, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 

12, 2006) (examining cases that “suggest a presumptive five-year discovery period”). The 

Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that because Defendant has already 

produced some documents from September 2015, it has impliedly consented to produce all 

other types of information from that date onward as well.

C. Geographic Scope

Several of Plaintiff’s RFPs seek information about financial incentives that apply 

companywide. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, as to these requests, a regional

limitation does not make sense: if a policy applies to every adjustor nationwide, then it 

applies to those who handled Plaintiff’s claim, and it is relevant. Indeed, Defendant asserts 

that it has already “produced documents related to corporate wide programs/goals with 

respect to its Management Incentive Plan and Enterprise Incentive Plan . . . .”

A few of Plaintiff’s RFPs also seek information specific to “the Zone, Section, 

Teams, and Units which encompass Arizona.” Defendant objects to these RFPs on the 

ground that Plaintiff’s policy is “handled by Michigan . . . adjustors” and that there is a 

“complete absence of Arizona related claims handling.” In response, Plaintiff argues that 

“the claims handling standards applicable here are the Arizona standards,” because the 

2 To the extent that Plaintiff’s RFPs specify a shorter period, or that Plaintiff agreed 

to a shorter period during the meet-and-confer process, the shorter period controls.

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Court held in the previous case that “Arizona tort law of bad faith applies to State Farm’s 

dealing with [him].” 

If Defendant has targets, goals, plans, measurements, or incentives that vary by 

region, then the targets, goals, plans, measurements, or incentives that apply to those who 

handled Plaintiff’s claim are relevant and discoverable. However, it is not clear to the Court 

that Arizona is the relevant region. If Plaintiff’s claim arose in Michigan and is handled by

Michigan adjustors, and if Defendant has targets and goals that vary by region, then it 

seems that the Michigan adjustors would be subject to the targets and goals applicable to 

Michigan. On the other hand, it might be that any regionwide goals are based on the 

insured’s, and not the adjustors’, location. The parties must meet and confer on this issue.

D. Form of Disclosure

Several RFPs seek electronically stored information in “native” form. Defendant 

objected on the ground that the federal rules permit it to produce information in a 

“reasonably usable” form. To the extent Defendant’s objections suggest that Defendant

alone can dictate the form of production, that is incorrect. The rule allows the requesting 

party to specify the form of production, and the “reasonably usable” language applies only 

if the “request does not specify a form” for production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). Of 

course, the requesting party’s specification does not necessarily govern either; if there is a 

dispute that cannot be resolved through the meet-and-confer process, then the issue is for 

the Court to resolve. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee notes to 2006 Amendment.

In any event, it appears that the issue has been resolved here. In his motion, Plaintiff 

agreed “to limit his requests for native format to those items that are created in readily 

available commercial products” (e.g., emails from Outlook must be produced in native 

form). Defendant did not take issue with Plaintiff’s suggestion in its response brief (or even 

discuss the issue regarding form of production), so the Court presumes that Defendant 

agrees with Plaintiff’s proposal.

. . . .

. . . .

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E. Boilerplate Objections

1. Vague and Ambiguous

Defendant objected to certain terms as “vague” and “ambiguous.” Plaintiff asserts 

that the challenged terms are commonly used in the insurance industry, and Defendant has 

not disputed that assertion or otherwise explained the objections. Therefore, the objections 

are overruled.

2. Unduly Burdensome

Defendant objected to several RFPs on the ground that complying with them would 

be “unduly burdensome.” Most of the undue-burden objections pertain to Plaintiff’s 

requests for production of electronically stored information in “native” form. Specifically, 

Defendant objected that compliance would be unduly burdensome because native form is 

not reasonably accessible to it in the ordinary course of business. That objection was 

mooted because, as noted above, Plaintiff is now requesting native form only when it is 

easily accessible.

Two objections suggest that compliance would be an undue burden because the 

information sought (texts and other forms of instant communication) is “not captured by 

State Farm in its ordinary course of business.” While “[a] party need not provide discovery

of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 

accessible because of undue burden or cost,” it is that party’s burden to “show that the 

information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Defendant has not made that showing here. “Not captured 

in the ordinary course of business” does not necessarily mean that retrieving the data would 

require “undue burden or cost,” and Defendant has not otherwise explained the objections. 

The objections are overruled.

The remainder of Defendant’s undue-burden objections are based on relevance and 

proportionality. As explained in this Order, Plaintiff’s requests are relevant. And, as limited 

by Plaintiff’s concessions and by this Order, the Court finds that they are proportional. The 

objections are overruled.

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3. Privilege, Work Product, and Proprietary Information

In response to one RFP, Defendant provided a privilege log indicating that certain 

documents had been withheld on the ground that they were protected by attorney-client 

privilege or the work-product doctrine. Plaintiff does not challenge that assertion of 

privilege. 

Defendant objected to other RFPs on the ground that, because they were overbroad, 

they “potential[ly]” sought information protected by attorney-client privilege or the workproduct doctrine. Defendant objected to other RFPs “to the extent [they sought] 

confidential, proprietary business information.” “[G]rounds for objection must be stated 

with specificity,” and Defendant’s assertions of potential protection are “too general to 

merit consideration.” Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 409 (C.D. Cal. 

2005) (citing Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981)). In responding to the 

RFPs, Defendant may assert privilege or work-product doctrine as appropriate. Defendant 

may also seek a protective order if necessary. The Court does not address these objections 

further in this Order.

II. Plaintiff’s RFPs

A. RFP Number 1

RFP Number 1 sought the “entire claim file(s), and any other files and documents 

maintained by any unit/office within State Farm, in their native formats, regarding Bryan 

Barten’s claim for benefits under the automobile insurance policy under which Mr. Barten 

was an insured at the time of the accident that rendered him a quadriplegic.” Defendant 

objected that (1) the RFP was overbroad, vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome to 

the extent it sought documents outside the “Claim File,” as Defendant defines that term; 

(2) information outside the “Claim File” was irrelevant and disproportional to the needs of 

the case; and (3) the request for native form was disproportional to the needs of the case

and unduly burdensome.

(1) Overruled. The RFP is not overbroad, vague, or ambiguous. Defendant has not 

adequately explained why compliance with the RFP would be unduly burdensome. (2) 

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Overruled. (3) Mooted.

B. RFP Number 2

RFP Number 2 sought “[a]ll documents in native format maintained by or in the 

possession or control or available to State Farm regarding Bryan Barten.” Defendant 

objected that (1) the RFP was overbroad because (a) it used the term “all,” (b) it was not 

limited to information relating to Plaintiff’s claim, and (c) it was unrestricted in time; (2) 

the RFP sought information that was irrelevant and disproportional to the needs of the case; 

and (3) the request for native form was disproportional to the needs of the case and unduly 

burdensome.

(1)(a) and (b) Overruled. Defendant does not dispute that its relationship with 

Plaintiff relates exclusively to Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. As such, the request for “all” 

documents concerning Plaintiff is not overbroad. (1)(c) Sustained. The RFP is temporally 

limited to the five years preceding this lawsuit (June 12, 2018). (2) Overruled. (3) Mooted.

C. RFP Numbers 3 and 4

RFP Number 3 sought “[c]ommunications, in native format, as it pertains to Bryan 

Barten, between and among employees (both current and former), agents, representatives, 

or assigns of State Farm, related to Bryan Barten.” RFP Number 4 sought 

“[c]ommunications, in native format, to and from employees (both current and former), 

agents, representatives, or assigns of State Farm, and those outside State Farm, related to 

Bryan Barten.” The RFPs specified several forms of communications sought (e.g., interoffice and intra-office memos/notes, emails, voicemails, text, and other forms of instant 

communication). Defendant objected that (1) the RFPs were overbroad because (a) they

were not limited to communications relating to Plaintiff’s claim, and (b) they were

unrestricted in time; (2) the RFP sought information that was irrelevant and disproportional 

to the needs of the case; (3) the request for native form was disproportional to the needs of 

the case and unduly burdensome; and (4) the request to produce “text and other forms of 

instant communication,” which are not captured in the ordinary course of business, was 

unduly burdensome.

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(1)(a) Overruled. Defendant does not dispute that its relationship with Plaintiff 

relates exclusively to Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. As such, the request is not overbroad.

(1)(b) Sustained. The RFP is temporally limited to the five years preceding this lawsuit 

(June 12, 2018). (2) Overruled. (3) Mooted. (4) Overruled. Defendant has not adequately 

explained why compliance would be unduly burdensome.

D. RFP Numbers 12 and 13

RFP Number 12 sought “[n]otes, claim entries, management log entries, and 

communications from management at every level regarding Bryan Barten’s insurance 

claim.” RFP Number 13 sought “Claim Committee notes, reports, memos, [and] emails, 

regarding Bryan Barten’s insurance claim.” Defendant objected that the RFPs sought 

information that was irrelevant and disproportional to the needs of the case. These

objections are overruled.

E. RFP Numbers 14 and 27

RFP Number 14 sought “[w]ritten communications from any Claims Consultants to 

management of claims adjusters regarding the handling of Personal Injury Protection/NoFault medical claims for the past 5 years.” RFP Number 27 sought “State Farm intracompany memos, emails, and other communications to and from State Farm employees 

regarding handling Personal Injury Protection/No-Fault medical claims from 2016 through 

2022.” Defendant objected that (1) the RFPs were overbroad because (a) they were not 

limited to information concerning Plaintiff’s claim, (b) they were not limited to a 

reasonable period of time, and (c) they were unrestricted in geographic area; and (2) the 

RFPs sought information that was irrelevant and disproportional to the needs of the case,

including information about other people’s claims.

(1)(a) Mooted. Plaintiff has narrowed these RFPs to seek information related only 

to his claim. (1)(b) Overruled as to RFP 14; sustained as to RFP 27. The RFPs are

temporally limited to the five years preceding this lawsuit (June 12, 2018). (1)(c) Mooted.

(2) Overruled to the extent the RFP seeks information relating to Plaintiff; mooted to the 

extent it seeks information about other policyholders.

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F. RFP Number 7

RFP Number 7 sought “[d]ocuments setting forth the Business Plan, goals, 

milestones, targets, and other economic performance measures/measurements for State 

Farm from 2016 through the present.” Defendant objected that (1) the terms “the Business

Plan,” “goals,” “milestones,” “targets,” and “other economic performance measures/

measurements” were vague and ambiguous; (2) the RFP was overbroad because (a) it was 

not limited to information concerning Plaintiff’s claim, (b) it was not limited to a 

reasonable period of time, and (c) it was unrestricted in geographic area; and (3) the RFP 

sought information that was irrelevant and disproportional to the needs of the case.

(1) Overruled. Defendant has not explained what is vague or ambiguous about the 

disputed terms. (2)(a) Overruled. The RFP seeks information that applies companywide, 

meaning it would apply to Plaintiff’s claim. (2)(b) Mooted. Plaintiff has narrowed the 

temporal scope to 2020 onward. (2)(c) Overruled. The RFP seeks information that applies 

companywide, which makes a geographic restriction unnecessary. (3) Overruled.

G. RFP Numbers 15, 16, and 17

RFP Number 15 sought “[t]he budgets, goals, financial targets, financial 

measurements, and financial results, for the past 5 years for the claims departments for: 

State Farm, its parent, and affiliated companies, and for the Zone, Section, Teams, and 

Units which encompass Arizona.” RFP Number 16 sought “[t]he combined ratio goals for 

the past 5 years for the Zone, Section, Teams, and Units which encompass Arizona.” RFP 

Number 17 sought “[t]he actual combined ratio results for the past 5 years for the Zone, 

Section, Teams, and Units which encompass Arizona.” Defendant objected that (1) the 

terms “goals,” “financial targets,” “financial measurements,” “financial results,”

“combined ratio goals,” and “combined ratio results” were vague and ambiguous; (2) the 

RFPs were overbroad because (a) they were not limited to documents concerning 

Plaintiff’s claim or the personnel who handled Plaintiff’s claim, and (b) they were not 

limited to a reasonable period of time; and (3) the RFPs sought information that was 

irrelevant and disproportional to the needs of the case.

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(1) Overruled. Defendant has not explained what is vague or ambiguous about the 

disputed terms. (2)(a) Overruled in part to the extent that the information sought is relevant 

and proportional to the needs of the case. The parties must confer as to whether this RFP 

targets the appropriate personnel. (2)(b) Overruled. The five-year period is proportional to 

the needs of the case. (3) Overruled.

H. RFP Numbers 24 and 25

RFP Number 24 sought “State Farm’s severity goals for 2015 through 2023.” RFP 

Number 25 sought “State Farm’s reported severities for 2015 through 2023.” Defendant 

objected that (1) the terms “severity goals” and “reported severities” were vague and 

ambiguous; (2) the RFPs were overbroad because (a) they were not limited to documents 

concerning Plaintiff’s claim and to the personnel who handled Plaintiff’s claim, (b) they 

were not limited to a reasonable period of time, and (c) they were unrestricted as to 

geographic area; and (3) the RFPs sought information that was irrelevant and 

disproportional to the needs of the case.

(1) Overruled. Defendant has not explained what is vague or ambiguous about the 

disputed terms. (2)(a) Overruled. The RFP seeks information that applies companywide, 

which means it would apply to Plaintiff’s claim. (2)(b) Mooted. Plaintiff has narrowed the 

temporal scope to 2020 onward. (2)(c) Overruled. The RFP seeks information that applies 

companywide, which makes a geographic restriction unnecessary. (3) Overruled.

* * *

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 58) is granted in part. 

2. In accordance with the rulings in this Order, Defendant is ordered to search 

for and produce documents responsive to RFP Numbers 1–4, 7, 12–17, 24–25, and 27. 

Such production must be delivered to counsel for Plaintiff no later than 14 days from the 

date this Order is docketed.

3. Because Plaintiff’s motion is granted only in part, and because the parties 

have been conferring on the issues addressed in this Order, Plaintiff’s request for fees is 

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denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C).

Dated this 10th day of June, 2024.

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