Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01573/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01573-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e-2ra Job Discrimination (Race)

---

– 1 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAMMILLE SORRELL,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY 

OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Defendant.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Robert Wilkie (“VA”)’s motion for 

summary judgment. Plaintiff Cammille Sorrell filed an opposition, and Defendant 

filed a reply. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an African-American woman who has been employed by the U.S. 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) since 2010. (FAC ¶ 5; Declaration of 

Klaudia Barsi (“Barsi Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 16.) She works as a Rating Veterans 

Service Representative (“RVSR”), and her duties include making final rating 

decisions on veterans’ disability claims. (Barsi Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has consistently 

received either “exceptional” or “fully successful” marks on her performance 

reviews. (Performance Reviews, ECF No. 18-20.) She has also received regular 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 14
– 2 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pay raises and promotions within her position as an RSVR, from GS 9-1 to 

GS 12-4. (Barsi Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff applied for the positions of Assistant Coach1

and Decision Review Officer,

2 but she was not selected for either position. (FAC ¶¶ 

7, 12; Barsi Decl. ¶ 8.)

On July 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed a FAC against the VA pursuant to Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) et seq. Plaintiff alleges 

discrimination based on her race and/or gender, retaliation, and harassment3for 

(1) being “wrongfully denied” promotions to the Decision Review Officer and

Assistant Coach positions, and (2) for disparate scrutiny of her work by the VA’s 

quality review specialists, which led to errors found in her work. (FAC ¶¶ 7–10, 12–

14; Deposition of Cammille Sorrell (“Sorrell Dep.”) at 170:16–171:5, ECF No. 16-

20.) 

Since 2010, Plaintiff has initiated six EEO claims against the VA, including a 

2014 complaint challenging a non-selection for an Assistant Coach position and a 

2015 complaint challenging a non-selection for a Decision Review Officer position. 

(Barsi Decl. ¶ 8.) However, Plaintiff’s FAC is based on her October 28, 2016 EEO 

complaint (“2016 complaint”) and January 9, 2018 EEO complaint (“2018 

complaint”). (FAC ¶¶ 11, 14.)

First, Plaintiff’s 2016 complaint alleged race and gender discrimination, 

retaliation, and hostile work environment against the VA for a variety of incidents,

including failure to inform Plaintiff about a colleague’s Merit System Protection 

Board hearing, rescheduling of interviews, and for adverse quality reviews. (See 

2016 EEO Complaint, ECF No. 16-14; 2016 Investigative Report, ECF No. 16-18.) 

 

1 Plaintiff refers to the positions of Assistant Coach and Supervisory Veterans 

Service Representative interchangeably. (See Pl.’s Mem. Of P. & A. in Opp’n to 

Def.’s Mot. (“Pl’s Opp’n”) at 1.)

2 Plaintiff refers to the positions of Quality Reviewer and Decision Review Officer 

interchangeably. (See Sorrell Dep. 60:11–14.)

3 Plaintiff has stipulated to withdraw her third cause of action for harassment, which 

the Court summarily dismisses. (See Pl’s Opp’n at 12.)

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 14
– 3 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Based on the charges in Plaintiff’s 2016 complaint, Plaintiff contends that the VA 

engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory conduct evidenced by an incident in 2016 

between a supervisor of the quality review team, Antonio Morabito, and a quality 

review specialist, Eduardo Ortiz. 

By VA policy, all RVSRs have five claims randomly selected for review every 

month, which are then reviewed by quality review specialists. (Declaration of 

Amanda Matthews (“Matthews Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 16.) In July 2016, 

Mr. Morabito assigned Mr. Ortiz to review Plaintiff’s five randomly selected claims. 

(Declaration of Eduardo Ortiz (“Ortiz Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 16-9.) While giving

the assignment, Mr. Morabito “advised [Mr. Ortiz] to be very careful in [his] 

dealings with [Plaintiff] because she has a reputation for putting people on report or 

accusing people of some form of harassment.” (Id. ¶ 4.) After reviewing Plaintiff’s 

work, Mr. Ortiz found errors in two of Plaintiff’s claims, which were confirmed 

through a peer review process. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Second, Plaintiff’s 2018 complaint alleged race and gender discrimination and 

retaliation for the VA’s failure to promote her to an Assistant Coach position—job 

number 377-17-033-NR10031013 (“2017 Assistant Coach position”). (2018 EEO 

Complaint, ECF No. 16-17.) The panel members in charge of selecting the 2017 

Assistant Coach positions were Stacey Bonnett and Marvin Rivas. (Barsi Decl. 

¶ 11; Assistant Coach Ratings at 17, ECF No. 16-19.) The panelists reviewed the 

applicants’ resumes, interviews, and written exercises, and gave numerical scores 

based on each category. (Deposition of Kristina Morabito (“Morabito Dep.”) 57:18–

58, ECF No. 18-24; Declaration of Debra Roybal (“Roybal Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–9, ECF No. 

16-11.) Performance reviews were not a factor in the scoring criteria. See id. 

Plaintiff received one of the lowest scores out of the twelve applicants. (Assistant 

Coach Ratings at 17.) The eight individuals with the highest scores were selected 

for the 2017 Assistant Coach positions. (Id.; Barsi Decl. ¶ 12.) Their race and 

gender were: “(1) Hispanic/male; (2) Caucasian/female; (3) AfricanCase 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 14
– 4 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

American/male; (4) African-American/female; (5) African-American/female; 

(6) Mixed-race/male; (7) Pacific-Islander/female; (8) Caucasian/female.” (Barsi 

Decl. ¶ 12.) 

After Plaintiff filed her 2018 complaint, the VA’s Office of Resolution 

Management (“ORM”) had 180 days to investigate her non-selection claim, by July 

8, 2018. (Declaration of Lisa Holliday (“Holliday Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–6, ECF No. 16-5.) 

Due to ORM’s heavy workload, ORM sent Plaintiff an email requesting a 90-day 

extension. (Id.) Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to the extension. (Id.) Two days into 

the 90-day investigation period, Plaintiff filed her FAC, which included her nonselection claim for the 2017 Assistant Coach position. (See FAC.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary 

judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The 

moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence 

that it “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A material issue of fact is one 

that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties’ 

differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th 

Cir. 1982).

The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment 

is not appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party’s evidence is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary 

judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v.

Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 14
– 5 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; see also Butler v. San Diego 

Dist. Atty’s Off., 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating if defendant produces 

enough evidence to require plaintiff to go beyond pleadings, plaintiff must counter 

by producing evidence of his own). More than a “metaphysical doubt” is required 

to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Plaintiff alleges discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII. In order 

to bring a Title VII claim before a district court, a plaintiff must first exhaust her 

administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c); Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 

1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 

1995)). 

Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that the plaintiff “file a timely

charge with the EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time to investigate the charge.” 

Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

5(b)). Specifically, the plaintiff “must consult a[n EEO] Counselor prior to filing a 

complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter” and “initiate contact with 

a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.” 

Id. at 1104 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)). Failure to comply with the 45-day 

requirement is fatal to the plaintiff’s discrimination claim. Id. If the plaintiff is 

unable to informally resolve the issue, she may file a formal complaint with the 

agency. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106. The agency is then “required to conduct an impartial 

and appropriate investigation of the complaint within 180 days of the filing of the 

complaint unless the parties agree in writing to extend the time period.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.106(e)(2). 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 14
– 6 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Additionally, the “jurisdictional scope” of the plaintiff’s claims before a 

district court depends on the scope of the EEOC charge and investigation. Leong v. 

Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). A court may not 

consider incidents of discrimination that are not included in an EEOC charge, unless 

they are “like or reasonably related to the allegations made before the EEOC, as well 

as ... within the scope of an EEOC investigation that reasonably could be expected 

to grow out of the allegations.” Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1104 (citing Green v. Los Angeles 

County Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1989); Leong, 347 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990)). 

However, even if the incidents are “related to acts” alleged in timely filed charges, 

they are not actionable if time barred. Lyons, F.3d at 1105–06. (“[D]iscrete 

discriminatory acts [such as failure to promote] are not actionable if time barred, 

even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”) 

Defendant requests the Court to summarily dismiss Plaintiff’s non-selection 

claims in both her 2016 and 2018 complaints on grounds that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust her administrative remedies. 

1. October 28, 2016 EEO Complaint

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s 2016 

complaint did not include any non-selection claims, and that even if it did, it would 

be time barred. Plaintiff’s 2016 complaint alleged, in relevant part, that the VA 

attempted “to deter [Plaintiff’s] pursuit of upward mobility” by rescheduling her

interviews for the Decision Review Officer and Assistant Coach positions. (See 

2016 EEO Complaint; 2016 Investigative Report.) The Court does not need to 

address whether Plaintiff’s claims of non-selection are within the scope of her EEOC

charges because they were not timely exhausted. 

Plaintiff initially contacted an EEO counselor on August 22, 2016. (Barsi 

Decl. ¶ 8; ORM Notice, ECF No. 16-15.) Under the 45-day requirement, the 

discriminatory acts must have occurred no later than July 8, 2016. See 29 C.F.R. 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 14
– 7 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

§ 1614.105(a). Because the relevant incidents occurred between February 13, 2015 

and September 24, 2015, (See 2016 EEO Complaint), Plaintiff failed to timely 

challenge any non-selection claims in her 2016 complaint. See Lyons, F.3d at 1105–

06 (“Each incident of discrimination constitutes a separate actionable unlawful 

employment practice” and thus “the statute of limitations period will begin to run 

for each individual claim from the date on which the underlying act occurs.”) (citing 

National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113–14 (2002)). In fact,

on January 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a separate EEO complaint challenging her nonselection for the Decision Review Officer position, which she voluntarily withdrew. 

(Barsi Decl. ¶ 8; 2016 EEO Complaint at 2.) See, e.g., Vinieratos v. U.S., Dept. of 

Air Force Through Aldridge, 939 F.2d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that 

voluntary withdrawal from the administrative process “prevents exhaustion and 

precludes judicial review”). Therefore, the Court summarily dismisses any claims 

of non-selection prior to July 8, 2016, including Plaintiff’s non-selection claim for 

the Decision Review Officer position. 

2. January 9, 2018 EEO Complaint

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her nonselection claim in her 2018 complaint because she prematurely filed her FAC before 

the ORM had a chance to complete its 90-day investigation. 

Defendant properly relies on Harris v. United States, 919 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. 

Cal. 1996) for the proposition that a plaintiff’s voluntary agreement to extend the

180-day investigation period by 90 days, “preclude[s] [her] from filing in federal 

court until the additional 90 day period expires.” (Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. 

of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def’s Mot.”) at 10 (citing Harris, 919 F. Supp. 343 at 346.)) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument that this interpretation would deprive Plaintiff of 

her fundamental right to have her claims heard before a court of law, Plaintiff is not 

“relinquished [of] that right” by waiting an additional 90 days. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 

5.) 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 14
– 8 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The rationale of the 90-day extension is “to permit an agency, with the consent 

of the complainant, to make a more thorough investigation into the merits of the 

complaint.” Harris, 919 F. Supp. at 357. Allowing Plaintiff to bring her nonselection claim before the Court only two days into the 90-day extension “would be 

to strip the 90 day extension provided for in § 1614.108(e) of any of the 

contemplated benefit. The agency would not be able to rely on the 90-day extension 

and the participants would know that at any time between end of the 180-day period 

and the end of the additional 90 days ‘an impatient complainant could take his claim 

to court and abort the administrative proceedings.’” See id. at 346 (citing Vinieratos, 

939 F.2d at 771); see also Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training 

Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that administrative exhaustion 

is necessary to “encourage informal conciliation of employment discrimination 

claims and foster voluntary compliance with Title VII”) (citing Ong v. Cleland, 642 

F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir.1981)). 

Having agreed to such an extension, Plaintiff was obligated to give the ORM 

90 days to complete its investigation, before seeking relief in this Court. Therefore, 

the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her 

claim of non-selection for the 2017 Assistant Coach position. However, even if 

Plaintiff had properly exhausted her administrative remedies, she is unable to prevail 

on the merits. 

B. Discrimination 

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); Lyons, 307 F.3d at 

1103. The parties agree that this case is governed by the burden-shifting framework 

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 14
– 9 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination by showing that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was 

qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and 

(4) similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more 

favorably. Chuang v. University of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). 

If the plaintiff makes the requisite prima facie showing, the burden shifts to 

the employer to articulate some “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 

challenged action.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123–24 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 

U.S. at 802). If the employer meets the burden, the plaintiff must show that the 

articulated reason is pretextual “either directly by persuading the court that a 

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 

that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. (citing 

Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her based on her race 

and/or gender by not promoting her to the Assistant Coach position, and by 

disparately scrutinizing her work. However, she is unable to establish a prima facie 

case of discrimination for either claim. 

1. Non-Selection to the 2017 Assistant Coach Position

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class as an African 

American and a female. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (racial minorities 

are a protected class); Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1981) (females 

are a protected class in claims of gender discrimination). Plaintiff has demonstrated 

that she faced an adverse employment action by being denied a promotion to the 

Assistant Coach position, and that she was qualified for the position—evidenced by 

her positive performance reviews. (See Performance Reviews, ECF No. 18-20; Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 9–10.) However, Plaintiff has not met the minimal degree of proof required 

to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 14
– 10 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treated more favorably. Plaintiff neither identifies who was hired for the Assistant 

Coach positions, nor demonstrates that those hired were outside of the protected 

class. See, e.g., Abram v. City and County of San Francisco, 2008 WL 4462104, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that a conclusory allegation that unidentified “white 

counterparts” were treated more favorably “does not rise to the level sufficient to 

create a material dispute of fact”).

Even if Plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case of racial or gender 

discrimination, Defendant has advanced a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason

for Plaintiff’s non-selection. Plaintiff’s scores based on her written application, 

interview, and writing exercises were lower than those who were hired. (See 

Assistant Coach Ratings at 17; Barsi Decl. ¶ 10; Roybal Decl. ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff contends Defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual in that there is

“direct evidence of Defendant’s discriminatory animus” evidenced by Mr. 

Morabito’s warning to Mr. Ortiz “about Plaintiff’s penchant for filing claims.” (Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 9; see Ortiz Decl. ¶ 4.) Direct evidence consists of “clearly sexist, racist, 

or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the employer.” Coghlan, 413 

F.3d at 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). Though Mr. Morabito’s statement may be relevant for 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, it is not direct evidence of Defendant’s discriminatory 

animus based on Plaintiff’s race or gender. Cf. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 

F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998) (supervisor’s comment that he “did not want to deal 

with another female” is direct evidence of discriminatory animus); Cordova v. State 

Farm Ins., 124 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1997) (employer’s comment that an 

employee was a “dumb Mexican” is direct evidence of discriminatory animus).

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the fact that performance reviews were not a 

factor in the scoring “is so very odd, so out of keeping with how the rest of the world 

conducts hiring and promotion so as to raise an inference of discriminatory intent 

from this fact alone.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–11; see Morabito Dep. 57:18–58:8). Again,

Plaintiff does not point to any evidence that this hiring criteria, which was applied 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 14
– 11 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to all applicants, raises an inference of discriminatory intent against African 

Americans or females. In fact, out of the eight individuals selected for the Assistant 

Coach position, three individuals were African American, and five were females. 

(Barsi Decl. ¶ 12.) Moreover, Plaintiff neither alleges nor points to any evidence 

that the panelists who determined her scores, Ms. Bonnett and Mr. Rivas, had intent 

to discriminate against her. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendant’s hiring 

procedures were motivated by discriminatory intent does not create a triable issue of 

fact. See Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir.1988) 

(“[C]onclusory allegations of alleged discrimination ... will not bar summary 

judgment.”). Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s 

discrimination claim for her non-select to the 2017 Assistant Coach position.

2. Disparate Scrutiny

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination as to her disparate scrutiny claim because the errors found in her work 

do not amount to an adverse employment action. Plaintiff does not refute this claim.

Despite the errors the quality reviewers found in Plaintiff’s work, Plaintiff 

points out she consistently received either “exceptional” or “fully successful” marks 

on her performance reviews, including the section for “quality”—which according 

to Plaintiff is evidence of her “solid, established track record.” (Performance 

Reviews, ECF No. 18-20; Pl.’s Opp’n at 9–10.) But Plaintiff does not point to any 

evidence that disparate scrutiny of her work amounted to an adverse employment 

action necessary to meet the second prong. See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1118 (explaining 

that “mediocre evaluations” that are not “accompanied by meaningful change in 

work assignments” do not “rise to the level of an adverse employment action”); 

Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1126 (finding that even if the action is “irritating,” it not an 

adverse employment action if it does not “materially affect the compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of [the plaintiff]’s employment”). Moreover, Plaintiff is 

unable to show that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 14
– 12 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treated more favorably. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that “other similarlysituated, non-Black, non-female RSVRs were not subjected” to disparate scrutiny of 

their work is not sufficient to satisfy the fourth prong required to establish her prima 

facie case. See Abram, 2008 WL 4462104, at *3 (finding that a conclusory allegation 

that unidentified “white counterparts” were treated more favorably “does not rise to 

the level sufficient to create a material dispute of fact”). Therefore, summary 

judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s discrimination claim for disparate scrutiny. 

C. Retaliation 

Title VII also prohibits an employer “from retaliating against an applicant for 

employment because the applicant has opposed any unlawful employment practice, 

or has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in an employment 

discrimination investigation or proceeding.” Lyons, F.3d 1092 (citing Lam v. Univ. 

of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1558–59 (9th Cir. 1994)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).

The McDonnell Douglas framework also applies to Title VII retaliation 

claims. Surrell v. California Water Serv., Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 

2008). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she was subjected to an adverse 

employment decision, and (3) that a causal link exists between plaintiff's activity 

and the employment decision. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.

1994)). If established, the burden shifts to the defendant to set forth a legitimate, 

non-retaliatory reason for its actions, after which the plaintiff must produce evidence 

to show that the stated reasons were a pretext for retaliation. Id.; McGinest v. GTE 

Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against her by not promoting her to 

the Assistant Coach position, and by disparately scrutinizing her work. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 14
– 13 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Non-Selection to the 2017 Assistant Coach Position

There is no dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activities as a witness 

and a complainant to EEO proceedings, and that she suffered an adverse 

employment action by her failure to be promoted to the Assistant Coach position. 

However, Plaintiff is unable to establish a causal link between her engagement in

protected EEO activity and her non-selection for the Assistant Coach position. 

In order to establish a causal link, “the plaintiff must make some showing 

sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer that the defendant was aware that the 

plaintiff had engaged in protected activity.” Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough 

School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 

686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.1982)). 

Despite Mr. Morabito’s warning to Mr. Ortiz about Plaintiff’s engagement in 

protected activities, (See Ortiz Decl. ¶ 4), Plaintiff is unable to establish a causal link 

that Mr. Morabito or Mr. Ortiz had any involvement or influence in the selection of 

the Assistant Coach position at issue. Cf. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. 

Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Even if a 

manager was not the ultimate decisionmaker, that manager’s retaliatory motive may 

be imputed ... if the manager was involved in the [adverse employment] decision.”); 

Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1026 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII may still be 

violated where the ultimate decision-maker, lacking individual discriminatory 

intent, takes an adverse employment action in reliance on factors affected by another 

decision-maker’s discriminatory animus.”). Plaintiff does not provide any evidence

that those involved in selecting the Assistant Coach position, such as Ms. Bonnett 

and Mr. Rivas, were aware of Mr. Morabito’s statement or of Plaintiff’s engagement 

in protected activity. 

However, even if Plaintiff had been able to raise a triable issue as to the 

existence of a causal link, she has not provided sufficient evidence to rebut 

Defendant’s legitimate reasons for not selecting her for the Assistant Coach 

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 14
– 14 – 17-cv-1573 DMS (NLS)

1 

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

position—for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, summary judgment is also 

warranted as to Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for non-selection. 

2. Disparate Scrutiny

Defendant contends, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff’s disparate 

scrutiny claim of retaliation fails for the same reason as her disparate scrutiny claim 

for discrimination. Although Mr. Morabito warned Mr. Ortiz about Plaintiff’s 

engagement in protected activities, Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that disparate 

scrutiny of her work amounted to an adverse employment action necessary to satisfy

the second and third prongs. See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1118 (2002) (explaining that 

“mediocre evaluations” that are not “accompanied by meaningful change in work 

assignments” do not “rise to the level of an adverse employment action”). Therefore, 

the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 

for disparate scrutiny and summarily dismisses this claim. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2018

Case 3:17-cv-01573-DMS-NLS Document 21 Filed 12/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 14