Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02803/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02803-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CESAR A. RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. HATTON, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16cv2803-JAH (BLM)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [Doc. No. 11] 

AND GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [Doc. No. 

6]

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Cesar A. Rodriguez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, originally filed 

his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 3, 2016 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1. In his Petition, Rodriguez alleges that he was deprived of his 

due process rights under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Id. 

Specifically, Petitioner argues: (1) Criminal statutes that do not give someone the

opportunity to know what the governing law is are unconstitutionally vague; (2) 

California’s second degree murder statute is unconstitutional and void for vagueness 

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under Johnson; and (3) the California Board of Parole Hearings’ thirty-year application of 

California Penal Code §3041 (a)-(b) is arbitrary and made those provisions 

unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. Id. at pgs. 6-8. 

On January 26, 2017, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus. Doc. No. 6. Respondent argues the petition must be barred by the 

statute of limitations and dismissed with prejudice. Id. at pg. 3. Specifically, Respondent 

contends the one-year statute of limitations began to run the day after the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), was passed

on April 25, 1996. Petitioner is not entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling. Id. at 

pgs. 5-10. As a result, Respondent argues the ruling in Johnson does not apply to 

Petitioner’s claims. Id. at pg. 6. Petitioner filed a response in opposition to motion to 

dismiss on February 15, 2017. Doc. No. 10. 

On July 5, 2017, the Honorable Barbara L. Major, United State Magistrate Judge, 

issued a report and recommendation (“Report”) addressing the motion and 

recommending this Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. Doc. 11 at pg. 11. Objections to the Report were due by August 4, 2017. Id. 

Petitioner filed a letter which the Court construes as an objection to the Report on August 

1, 2017. Doc. No. 12. Petitioner argues the Report was wrong in its understanding and 

application of Johnson. Id. at pg. 1. 

After careful consideration of the pleadings and relevant exhibits submitted and for 

the reasons set forth below, this Court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s Report and 

GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

The district court’s role in reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the court “shall 

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report...to which objection is 

made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

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recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” Id. The party objecting to the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation bears the responsibility of specifically 

setting forth which of the magistrate judge’s findings the party contests. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b). It is well-settled, under Rule 72(b), that a district court may adopt those 

portions of a magistrate judge’s report to which no specific objection is made, provided 

they are not clearly erroneous. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). 

II. Analysis

a. Statute of Limitations

Judge Major found a one year statute of limitations applied to Petitioner’s federal 

habeas corpus petition. AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal 

prisoners for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The 

one-year limitation applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in custody pursuant to 

state court judgment. Id. Here, Petitioner was confined as a result of a state court 

judgment. Doc. No. 11 at pgs. 3-5. Pursuant to 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitation period runs

from the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Id. Here, Petitioner pled guilty to 

second degree murder on January 27, 1982. Lodg. 1:3. Petitioner was sentenced on 

February 24, 1982. Id. Petitioner’s conviction became final on April 26, 1982. Id. 

Since Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the enactment of AEDPA, the statute 

of limitations expired on April 24, 1997. Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2001). The instant action was not filed until November 3, 2015. Doc. No. 1. The Court 

adopts the magistrate judge’s finding as it is not clearly erroneous.

b. Commencement of the Statutory Period

Judge Major found that the latest start date was the date Petitioner’s judgment 

became final upon expiration of the time for him to seek such review and no later date 

would apply. Doc. No 11 at pgs. 5-8. Petitioner claims that under Johnson, his start date 

should be June 26, 2015, the day of the Johnson ruling. Doc. No. 11 at pg. 5. Petitioner 

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argues because he filed his petition in San Diego County Superior Court on June 24, 

2016, it is timely. Id.

Judge Major clarified that the Johnson ruling does not apply to Petitioner’s 

situation. Johnson was narrowly applied to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) 

and not the California second degree murder statute under which Petitioner was 

convicted. Id. at pg. 6. Moreover, Judge Major also clarified that California Penal Code 

§ 3041’s language is dissimilar to the language found in the ACCA’s residual clause. 

Thus, the ruling in Johnson has no impact on § 3041. Id. at pg. 7. Accordingly, Judge 

Major found the appropriate start date for analyzing the one year statute of limitations is 

the date Petitioner’s judgment became final upon expiration of the time for him to seek 

review under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Id. at pg. 8. The Court adopts the findings of the Report 

as it is not clearly erroneous. 

c. Statutory Tolling

Judge Major found the Petition untimely as “[n]one of Petitioner’s state petitions 

were filed before the April 24, 1997 expiration of the statute of limitations.” Id. at pg. 9. 

The court noted that even if Petitioner’s earliest filing date of April 24, 2001 were used to 

calculate potential tolling, Petitioner would still be four years late. Id. Petitioner did not 

file his state habeas corpus petition until April 24, 2001. Yet an untimely petition does 

not reinitiate the limitations period once it has already run. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, Judge Major determined Petitioner is not entitled to 

statutory tolling. Doc No. 11 at pg. 9. The Court finds the Report’s analysis is not 

clearly erroneous and adopts the findings of the magistrate judge.

d. Equitable Tolling 

Lastly, Judge Major found Petitioner did not satisfy the requirements laid out in 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (equitable tolling is appropriate in cases 

where Petitioner exercises adequate diligence in pursuing his rights unless extraordinary 

circumstances prevent Petitioner from doing so). Id. at pg. 10. The magistrate judge 

noted Petitioner did not file the instant petition until more than nineteen years after the 

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date of his conviction and only after AEDPA’s limitations period expired. Id. Moreover, 

the magistrate judge also found Petitioner was not diligent in pursuing his rights after the 

tolling period. Id. at pgs. 10-11; Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(finding diligence is required to show Petitioner is eligible for equitable tolling). In 

addition, the magistrate judge did not find any extraordinary circumstance restrained 

Petitioner from filing his habeas petitions. Doc. No. 11 at pgs. 10-11. Thus, the 

magistrate judge found there was not sufficient equitable tolling to deem Petitioner’s 

petition timely. Id. at pg. 11. The Court finds the Report’s analysis is not clearly 

erroneous and adopts the findings of the magistrate judge.

e. Petitioner’s Objection to the Report

Petitioner filed a letter which the Court construes as an objection to the Report on 

August 1, 2017. Doc. No. 12. The letter indicates that Petitioner believes the Report was 

wrong in its understanding and application of Johnson. Id. at pg. 1. 

The Court only needs to consider objections that are filed in a timely manner and 

specific in nature. See Thomas, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985). This Court’s independent 

review of the record, the relevant lodgments presented by the parties, and the Report 

(Doc. No. 11), reveals that the Magistrate Judge provided a cogent analysis of each of the 

four claims presented by Petitioner. After reviewing Petitioner’s Objections, this Court 

finds that Petitioner does not specifically object to the procedural background of the 

federal or state proceedings (Id. at pgs. 1-3); to the lengthy and extensive transcriptsupported factual background (Id. at pgs. 3-11); or to the scope of review (Id. at pg. 3)

utilized by the magistrate judge. The Petitioner’s objections do not point to specific 

findings or conclusions in the Report, but instead appear to be general objections to the 

Report’s analysis and conclusions, making the same arguments made in the original 

federal habeas petition. Id. at pgs. 1-17. For these reasons, the Court determines 

Petitioner’s objection to be general in nature.

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The Court conducted a de novo review, independently reviewing the Report and all 

relevant papers submitted by both parties, and finds the Report provides a cogent analysis

of the issues presented in the motion.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The finding and conclusions of the magistrate judge presented in the Report (Doc. 

No. 11) are ADOPTED in the entirety;

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) is GRANTED;

3. The Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) is DIMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

DATED: September 21, 2017

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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