Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02745/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02745-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. DURAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

OMAR MANDUJANO, ALFREDO 

HERNANDEZ, LUIS HERNANDEZ, and 

JOHN SEAMAN,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-CV-2745-DMS-WVG

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER 

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

[ECF No. 41]

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) Plaintiff David B. 

Duran’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Produced 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Omar Mandujano, 

Alfredo Hernandez, Luis Hernandez, and John Seaman’s (collectively “Defendants”). As 

explained below, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion be GRANTED in part with 

leave to amend and GRANTED in part without leave to amend.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982 on December 7, 2015, alleging Defendants 

violated his rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the United 

States Constitution. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of a forced 

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blood draw that occurred on January 16, 2014. (Compl. 4:3-7.) Plaintiff alleges the 

following: (1) violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by executing an invalid 

search warrant; (2) excessive force was used when executing the search warrant in violation 

of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments; (3) mayhem; (4) assault and bodily injury; (5) 

mental and emotional distress; and (6) pain and suffering. (Compl. 3.) On June 8, 2016, 

Defendants Omar Mandujano, Alfredo Hernandez, and John Seaman each filed their 

respective Answers. (ECF Nos. 12-14.) On June 15, 2016, Defendant Luis Hernandez filed 

his Answer. (ECF No. 16.)

On August 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend along with documents he 

alleges are medical records showing injuries caused by Defendants. (ECF No. 33.) The 

Court granted this motion. (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff filed another Motion to Amend on 

August 18, 2016. (ECF No. 37.) The Court granted the Motion, (ECF No. 37,) and deemed 

the original Complaint, (ECF No. 1,) the Motion to Amend, (ECF No. 33,) and its included 

documents collectively as Plaintiff’s FAC.1(ECF No. 40.) The FAC does not allege any 

new claims.

On September 8, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim. (Mot., ECF No. 41.) In their Motion, Defendants request the Court consider three 

documents when issuing a ruling on the Motion. (Mot. 9:8-10-9.) Defendants argue the 

FAC should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) the blood draw was authorized by 

a facially valid search warrant; (2) Plaintiff cannot recover under the Fourth Amendment 

because the blood draw was completed in a constitutionally valid manner; (3) the FAC 

does not specifically identify the actions of the individual defendants; (4) Plaintiff cannot 

recover on a due process theory; and (5) Plaintiff’s state law claims are time barred. (Mot. 

5:23-6:14.) Defendants also assert that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend as 

there is no possibility the FAC’s deficiencies can be cured. (Mot. 6:14-15.)

 

1 The Court will reference the FAC as a single document. However, references to information found in 

the original complaint will be cited to ‘Compl.’ and references to information found in the amended 

portion will be cited to ‘FAC.’

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Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion on October 14, 2016. (Pl. Opp’n, 

ECF No. 57.) On October 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion. (Pl. Sup. Opp’n, ECF No. 59.) On November 17, 2016, Defendants 

filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition. (Def. Reply, ECF No. 60.)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges that, while housed at the Regional Adult Detention 

Facility, he was served with a search warrant by defendants Mandujano and Hernandez

on January 14, 2014. (Compl. 4:8-19.) The warrant ordered a law enforcement officer to 

“seize [Plaintiff] and take blood and or saliva samples sufficient for DNA [] comparison 

purposes using the least amount of force necessary.” (Id. at 13.) On January 16, 2014, 

Plaintiff was transferred from the detention facility to a hospital in Brawley, California. 

(Id. at 4:26-5:2.) While being transported to the hospital, Plaintiff alleges he overheard 

defendant Mandujano make a phone call, alerting the hospital that Defendants were 

bringing Plaintiff in for a forced blood draw. (Id. at 5:7-10.)

While at the hospital, Plaintiff told Defendants his DNA was already on file with 

the California Department of Corrections, the “Clinca de Sulude,” and the Imperial 

County Sheriff’s Department. (Id. at 5:20-23.) Plaintiff alleges that he was escorted to a 

room where he was joined by Defendants, a phlebotomist, Plaintiff’s attorney, and an 

unknown staff member of the hospital. (Id. at 6:20-7:10.) While in the room, Plaintiff 

claims to have been in full hand and foot restraints. (Id. at 7:28-8:2.) Plaintiff refused the 

blood draw. (Id. at 7:16-17.) Plaintiff alleges an unspecified defendant grabbed his arm 

and forced it down while defendant Mandujano grabbed Plaintiff by his “neck area.” (Id. 

at 7:23-26.) Plaintiff alleges he was being choked during this process. (Id. at 7:27.) Next, 

Plaintiff alleges he was slammed down, and that all Defendants were on top of him, 

pressing their knees into his neck, back, legs, ankles, and arms. (Id. at 8:5-8.) Plaintiff 

was in pain, was panicking, and called out for help. (Id. at 8:9-11.) The phlebotomist 

punctured Plaintiff’s arm three times while attempting to take a blood sample. (Id. at 

8:12-14.) Plaintiff concedes this action was done “due to [his] resistment [sic].” (Id. at 

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8:15.)

Lastly, Plaintiff asserts his allegations can be corroborated by footage taken on 

body cameras worn by Defendants and a camera set up on a tripod in the room. (Id. at 

8:25-28.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states 

a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... it 

[does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Nor does a complaint suffice 

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow [ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to 

say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability” 

fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint. 

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Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court's “judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. The Court 

will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent with 

the challenged pleadings ... [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yello Freight Sys., Inc., 

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

Where, as here, a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights suit, the Court also must 

be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the 

doubt. Garmon v. Cty. of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2016). The rule of liberal 

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In construing a pro se civil rights complaint liberally, however, 

a court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pleaded.” 

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague 

and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. Thus, at a minimum, even the pro se

plaintiff “must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 

engaged in that support [his] claim.” Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 

649 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The Court should grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). Before 

dismissing a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff, a court must give some notice of the 

complaint’s deficiencies. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Nevertheless, when amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of 

leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice/Doctrine of Incorporation

Before proceeding to the merits of the Motion, the Court first must determine 

whether certain records attached to and referenced in the FAC are judicially noticeable or 

acceptable for consideration under the doctrine of incorporation. Defendants have asked 

the Court to incorporate two items: (1) the search warrant; and (2) a video of the event. 

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of a letter advising Plaintiff that 

Plaintiff’s administrative tort claim was being denied.

“Generally, a court may not consider material beyond the complaint in ruling on a 

[motion to dismiss].” Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “However, a court may take judicial notice of 

matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment, as long as the facts noticed are not subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. A court 

may also consider materials “incorporated into the complaint.” Coto Settlement v. 

Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038, (9th Cir. 2010). The doctrine of incorporation by 

reference has been extended “to consider documents in situations where the complaint 

necessarily relies upon a document or the contents of the document are alleged in a 

complaint, the document’s authenticity is not in question and there are no disputed issues 

as to the document’s relevance.” Id. However, “the mere mention of the existence of a 

document is insufficient to incorporate the contents of a document.” Id. A Court is not 

required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to a complaint or 

matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 

F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010.)

i. Search Warrant

Plaintiff attached a copy of the search warrant he claims is the source of Defendants 

authority to conduct the blood draw. (See Compl. at 13.) Plaintiff appears to use the 

language of the warrant in support of his claim of excessive force, claiming Defendants 

were to use “the least amount of force necessary to take” the blood sample. (Compl. 4:24-

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26.) However, Plaintiff also appears to contest the validity of the warrant. Plaintiff states 

he has a “hard difficult [sic] feeling about the ‘legitimate existance [sic]’ of” an authorized 

warrant. (Id. at 4:20-21.) Plaintiff confirms this challenge in his Opposition. (Pl. Opp’n 

10:13-28.)

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has attached a copy of the warrant as an 

exhibit to the FAC, it can properly be considered in the present Motion. (Mot. 41-19:26-

28.) Additionally, Defendants argue the warrant is improperly challenged in the present 

suit. (Def. Rply 4:12-13.)

The Court finds that consideration of the warrant for the present Motion to be 

appropriate without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 

First, the FAC relies in part on the warrant. Plaintiff highlights the language in the warrant 

requiring a minimal use of force as the bar that Defendants exceeded in his excessive force 

claim. Second, Plaintiff has attached the warrant to the FAC. Additionally, there is no 

question as to the warrant’s authenticity as Plaintiff offers it as an exhibit in the FAC and 

Defendants do not challenge it. Moreover, the search warrant displays all of the indicia of 

authenticity by having a stamp of the superior court indicating the date the search warrant 

was filed, a signature of the deputy clerk, the signature of the judge of the superior court 

who authorized the search warrant, and the great seal of the state of California. Lastly, there 

are no disputes as to the relevance of the warrant. For these reasons, the Court finds the 

warrant to be appropriately considered without converting the motion to dismiss into a 

motion for summary judgment.

ii. Video

Near the conclusion of the FAC, Plaintiff states that the video footage captured by a 

camera on a tri-pod at the scene of the blood draw will corroborate his allegations. (Compl.

8:25-28.) Plaintiff again references the video footage in his Opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion as evidence that should have been reviewed by the district attorney and El Centro 

Police Department when adjudicating his administrative claim. (Pl. Opp’n 9:1-8.) Plaintiff 

then again references the video when addressing his civil rights claims. (Id. at 21:19-22.) 

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In Plaintiff’s Supplemental Opposition, Plaintiff states he reviewed the video and 

“observed that the scene of incedent [sic] is’ent [sic] quite rapidly the way it happand 

[sic]!” (Pl. Sup. Opp’n 2:1-4). Plaintiff then states he believes the video was in some way 

modified or manipulated. (Id. at 2:8-9.)

Defendants argue the doctrine of incorporation by reference allows the Court to 

consider the video when ruling on the present motion without converting to a motion for 

summary judgment. (Mot. 9:21-23.) In response to Plaintiff’s claim that the video, as 

submitted, is somehow altered, Defendants argue that “[m]erely stating [Plaintiff] 

remembers the incident differently is insufficient to contest the authenticity of the video 

footage,” and directs the Court to Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) as authority on the 

matter.

The Court finds the video submitted by Defendants and referenced by Plaintiff in 

the FAC is not suitable for consideration without converting the present motion to a motion 

for summary judgment. The Court arrives at this conclusion because the binding law of 

this Circuit states that a Court may incorporate material by reference when its authenticity 

is not in dispute when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Here, Plaintiff has questioned the 

authenticity of the video as submitted by Defendants, stating the video appears to have 

been edited. The Court has reviewed the video a number of times and does not conclude 

the video was altered in anyway. However, this is a motion to dismiss and Plaintiff has 

raised the possibility that the video has been manipulated. While the speculative and 

conclusory statement, without more, may be seriously deficient to preclude consideration 

of the video on a motion for summary judgment or at trial, it is enough, albeit slight, to 

preclude its use and incorporation for the present motion.

Defendants’ reliance on Scott is misplaced. In Scott, a high speed vehicle chase was 

captured on video. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. The video footage capturing the high speed chase 

greatly contradicted the allegations made by the plaintiff. Id. at 379. “There [were] no 

allegations or indications that this videotape was doctored or altered” in any way. Id. at 

378. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court adopted the allegations 

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made by the plaintiff and denied the motion. Id. at 375-76. The court of appeals affirmed 

the ruling. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two 

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record ... a court should not 

adopt [contradicted] version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment.” Id. at 379. Defendants’ reliance on this case fails for two reasons. First, Scott

directed courts to examine video evidence that contradicts a party’s pleadings when 

considering motions for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. Second, the video in 

Scott was not alleged to have been altered in some way, unlike the present case.

iii. Claim and Rejection

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the Rejection of Claim, notifying

Plaintiff the City of El Centro rejected his administrative claims. (ECF No. 41-3.) In this 

request, Defendants argue judicial notice is appropriate because the City of El Centro City 

Clerk’s office maintains the service records, and that it cannot be reasonably disputed that 

the Rejection of Claim was completed and served on Plaintiff. (Id. at 2.) Defendants also 

request the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s claims. (Def. Reply, ECF No. 60-1.) 

The claims, as submitted, mirror the claims attached by Plaintiff to the FAC. The claims 

are dated February 24, 2014 and stamped received on March 3, 2014. (ECF No. 60-1 at4-

5.) Defendants also provide an affidavit of Diane Caldwell, El Centro’s City Clerk stating 

this is the sole claims form received from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 60-2.)

Plaintiff appears to argue the Rejection of Claim should not be judicially noticed. 

(Pl. Opp’n 9.) Plaintiff claims the notice submitted by Defendants is for a different issue 

than the events that occurred on January 16, 2014. (Id. at 9:17-21.) Plaintiff directs the 

Court to the claims forms he attached to the FAC. (Id.) These forms are dated February 24, 

2014. (Compl. at 20, 28.)

The Court takes judicial notice of the Rejection of Claim and claims forms submitted 

by Defendants. The claims submitted by Plaintiff are nearly identical to the claims alleged 

in the FAC. The Rejection of Claim submitted by Defendants indicates that Plaintiff 

submitted a claim with the City of El Centro on March 3, 2014. (ECF No. 41-3 at 6.) This 

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corresponds with claim forms submitted by Defendants that shows Plaintiff’s claim was 

received on March 3, 2014. While Plaintiff attempts to dispute this letter as one from a 

separate incident, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any information to substantiate 

this contention. Plaintiff simply states the Rejection of Claim provided by Defendants is 

from another incident. This is implausible on its face given the nearly identical claims 

asserted in the claims forms and the FAC, the corresponding dates, and the sworn affidavit 

provided by the El Centro City Clerk.

Based on this, the Court judicially notices the claim and Rejection of Claim

submitted by Defendants because the Court has been “supplied with the necessary 

information” to do so. Fed. R. Evidence 201(C)(2); see also Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., 

499 F.3d at 1052.

Having found only the search warrant acceptable for consideration through 

incorporation and judicially noticed the claims forms and Rejection of Claim, the Court

proceeds to the merits of the Motion.

B. § 1983 Claims

i. Applicable Law

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42. U.S.C. § 1983), 

superseded on other grounds by statute, 42 C.F.R. § 430.0. To prevail on a claim for 

violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two 

elements: (1) that a person acting under the color of state law committed the conduct at 

issue; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity 

conferred by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 

U.S. 637, 643 (2004). “Dismissal of a § 1983 claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 

proper if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that gave rise to a plausible inference 

of either element.” Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2015).

/ / /

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ii. Unauthorized Search and Seizure

Plaintiff appears to question the validity of the warrant that was used to execute the 

blood draw. The Court construes this to be an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment rights by Defendants for the execution of an invalid search warrant.

In challenging the warrant, Plaintiff states he is “haveing [sic] a hard difficult [sic] 

feeling about the ‘legitimate existance’ [sic] of such an authorization”. (Compl. 4:20-23.)

Plaintiff offers no other support for this claim in his FAC. This allegation is conclusory 

and lacks any supporting details. This allegation is a “naked assertion[] devoid of further

factual enhancement”, and thus, fails to state a facially plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

677.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff cites numerous state and federal cases regarding the 

sufficiency of a warrant. (Pl. Opp’n 10:27-11:19.) However, Plaintiff makes no argument 

and provides no further factual information to support his original claim. (See id. 10:13-

11:19.)

Given this, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED and 

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by executing an 

invalid search warrant be DISMISSED with leave to amend.

iii. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights by 

using excessive force to obtain his DNA. In the FAC, Plaintiff claims Defendant 

Mandujano grabbed Plaintiff by the his “neck area,” choked Plaintiff, and then Plaintiff 

was “slam[med] down.” (Compl. 7:25-27, 8:4-5.) Plaintiff then alleges that Defendants 

collectively held Plaintiff down by placing their “knee-caps” on Plaintiff’s neck, back, legs, 

and arms. (Id. at 8:6-8.) Plaintiff next alleges the phlebotomist then punctured Plaintiff’s 

arm three times. (Id. at 8:12-15.) Plaintiff then concedes this was “due to my resistment 

[sic].” (Id. at 8:12-15.)

Plaintiff’s own pleadings offer two possible explanations of what may have 

occurred, only one of which results in possible liability for Defendants: either (1) 

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Defendants used excessive force to obtain a DNA sample, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s 

conceded resistance, or (2) Defendants used an appropriate amount of force to restrain 

Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s conceded resistance. In this situation, “something more is 

needed, such as facts tending to exclude the possibility that the alternative explanation is 

true, in order to render [Plaintiff’s] allegations plausible” and not merely consistent. 

Eclectic Props, E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(internal citation omitted).

In his Opposition, Plaintiff cites numerous state and federal cases and various 

portions of the California Vehicle Code as supporting law for his excessive force claim. 

(See Pl. Opp’n at 12-15.) However, Plaintiff offers nothing to cure the factual deficiencies 

of the FAC.

Plaintiff fails to allege “something more” to render his claims plausible. Plaintiff’s 

allegations do not exclude the possibility that Defendants were not using excessive force 

given Plaintiff’s self-stated resistance. Given this, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983 

claim for excessive force against Defendants. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s §1983 claim of Fourth and Eighth 

Amendment violations be DISMISSED with leave to amend.

C. Assault, Battery, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In claims four, and five, Plaintiff alleges claims of assault, bodily injury, and 

emotional distress. The Court construes Plaintiff’s claim of bodily injury to be an allegation 

of battery. It is unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging a claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress or negligent infliction of emotional distress. In California, however, 

there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Potter v. 

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 807 (Cal. 1993). The Court therefore construes 

Plaintiff’s claim of mental and emotional distress as asserting a claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. These claims are state law claims governed by California 

law.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely, and as such must be 

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dismissed without leave to amend. (Mot. At 16-17.) Defendants aver that Plaintiff had six 

months from March 20, 2014, the date Plaintiff was served with the Rejection of Claim 

notice, to file his lawsuit. (Id. 16:13-21.) Plaintiff filed his claim on December 7, 2015, 

“approximately one year and nine months” after he was served with the Rejection of Claim 

notice, thus, Defendants argue, one year and three months past the allowable time to file 

such a lawsuit. (Id. at 16:22-28.)

California’s Government Claims Act provides that a party seeking to recover money 

damages for personal injury from a public entity must submit a claim to the entity within 

six months after accrual. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2; see also City of Stockton v. Superior 

Court, 171 P.3d 20, 25 (Cal. 2007). “No suit for money damages may be brought against 

a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented until a 

written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon or 

has been deemed to have been rejected.” City of Stockton, 171 P.3d at 25 (citing Cal. Gov. 

Code § 945.4.) A suit brought against a public entity must be filed within six months of the 

response from the public entity. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(1). “The deadline for filing a 

lawsuit against a public entity, as set out in the [Government Claims Act], is a true statute 

of limitations defining” when a plaintiff must file a lawsuit for facts set out in a claim. 

Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist., 164 P.3d 630, 634 (Cal. 2007). Subject to exceptions 

not relevant here, “a cause of action against a public employee ... for injury resulting from 

an act ... in the scope of his employment as a public employee is barred if an action against 

the employing public entity for such injury is barred...” Cal. Gov. Code § 950.2.

Plaintiff submitted a claim against the El Centro Police Department on February 24, 

2014. Plaintiff’s claim was rejected on March 18, 2014 and the Rejection of Claim was 

served on Plaintiff on March 20, 2014. Based on this, Plaintiff had until September 22, 

2014 to file his complaint. Plaintiff filed his Complaint on December 7, 2015, over 20 

months after being served with the Rejection of Claim, well past the six months allowed 

by the statute of limitations. Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint against the City of El Centro Police 

Department is time barred. Since Plaintiff’s claim is time barred, his claim against 

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Defendants is also time barred. See Cal. Gov. Code § 950.2. Given this, the Court 

RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED and the claims of assault, battery, 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

D. Mayhem

In claim two, Plaintiff alleges a claim of mayhem. However, mayhem is a criminal 

charge, not a civil claim for which relief can be granted. See Cal. Pen. Code § 203. Given 

this, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED and claim two for 

mayhem be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

E. Pain and Suffering

Plaintiff’s sixth claim of “pain & suffering” is not a claim but rather is a form of

damages. See Beeman v. Burling, 265 Cal.Rptr. 719, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Given this, 

the Court RECOMMENDS these claims be DISMISSED without leave to amend.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss be GRANTED in part with leave to amend and GRANTED in part without 

leave to amend. This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States 

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(1988) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 1, 2017, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document shall 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED no replies to objections will be accepted, and the 

motion will be deemed taken under submission on March 1, 2017. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2017

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