Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01947/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01947-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JDDL

JDN

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Selena Alicia Coronado, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV-04-1947-PHX-DGC (BPV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Selena Alicia Coronado filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against thirteen officials from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC). Dkt. #1. Upon

screening the complaint, the Court dismissed Defendants Dora Schriro, James Baird, Terry

Stewart, Robert Jones, Bennie Rollins, and Charles Ryan. Dkt. #3. Before the Court are a

motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Dr. Dale Palmer,

Larry Clausen, and Barbara Ribbens. Dkt. ##45-46. Plaintiff has filed a single response to

both motions, and Defendants have replied. Dkt. ##53, 55. The Court will deny the motion

to dismiss and grant the motion for summary judgment. The Court will dismiss the claims

against the remaining four Defendants – CRN Hendrix, Nurse Practitioner Sanders, Dr.

Tuttle, and Mary Hennessy – for failure to serve.

I. Background.

In July 2002, Plaintiff was in an automobile accident that resulted in numerous broken

bones and required pins to be put in her right shoulder and both wrists, as well as a metal

plate in her right forearm. Dkt. #47, Ex. A at 16:9-17:3, 19:21-20:19. Shortly thereafter,

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Plaintiff arrived at the ADC Perryville complex and was housed in the Lumley Unit. Dkt.

#1 at 5. In early 2003, she became ill and suffered from constant vomiting, high fever, and

weight loss. Id. Plaintiff alleged that contrary to the information provided to her family by

Warden Hennessy, Plaintiff was not seen by a doctor and was not receiving care. 

Plaintiff spoke to Deputy Warden Ribbens, who sent Plaintiff to the medical unit. Id.

A nurse from the Santa Maria Unit who happened to come to Lumley provided Plaintiff with

antibiotics for a staph infection she had developed. Id. Plaintiff alleged that Hendrix – a

nurse in the Lumley Unit – insisted there was no infection and that Plaintiff did not have pins

in her wrist. Hendrix stated that Plaintiff had wires. Id. Yet, Plaintiff claimed that the

infection was obvious and her wrist was swollen and painful. A short time later the pin in

her wrist pushed its way through her skin and then popped out. Id. Plaintiff was taken to the

Maricopa Medical Center (MMC) where Dr. Bodell informed her that her wrist had been set

improperly and she needed surgery immediately. Id. Plaintiff did not get surgery; she was

given a splint, and in October 2003 Dr. Rodriguez prescribed Naproxen for pain

management. Id. When the Naproxen was unsuccessful at alleviating pain, Plaintiff was put

on Indomethacin, and then several other types of antibiotics. Id.

In early 2004, the two pins in Plaintiff’s right shoulder pushed themselves through her

skin thereby causing a “big gash” from which puss drained. Id. at 5A. Plaintiff again

became ill and suffered from vomiting, high fever, and weight loss. Id. Plaintiff lost her job

due to work absences. The accumulating puss caused her arm to swell up and she was placed

on antibiotics for a staph infection only after “Hendrix and [Nurse Practitioner] Sanders saw

fit.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Hendrix and Sanders refused to refer Plaintiff to a doctor

despite her constant pain and requests that she be taken to the emergency room. Id. Plaintiff

further alleges that Hendrix and Sanders denied her access to medical care and denied

medication for an apparent infection. Id. at 2A. She also alleges that Sanders improperly set

Plaintiff’s wrist. Id. Hendrix and Sanders were named in both of Plaintiff’s counts

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1

The Court dismissed Count I on screening for failure to state a claim against a named

Defendant. Dkt. #3.

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concerning medical care (Counts II and III). Id. at 5A-6.1

Plaintiff claims that after September 2002 her pain became progressively worse, a fact

she reported to Hendrix, Sanders, Dr. Palmer, Dr. Tuttle, Facility Health Administrator

Clausen, and Deputy Warden Ribbens. Id. at 6; Dkt. #47 ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges in Count III

that Palmer and Tuttle refused to provide medical treatment after requests from Plaintiff and

her family. Dkt. #1 at 2A-2B, 6-6A. Plaintiff alleges in Counts II and III that Ribbens and

Hennessy failed to investigate the delay of surgery or refer Plaintiff to a doctor after they

were made aware of the problem. Id. at 2A-2B, 5-6A. 

In the summer of 2004, Plaintiff was housed at the Pima County Jail for 2-3 weeks to

attend a court hearing. Dkt. #47, Ex. A at 73:6-74:9. During that time she was treated by Dr.

Austin. Id. at 74:10-15. Plaintiff alleges that upon her return to Perryville on July 6, 2004,

Dr. Austin called the prison to inform them that Plaintiff needed to be seen immediately

because a pin had come out at the jail and another was likely to come out soon. Dkt. #1 at

6A. Two days later, Plaintiff talked to Clausen about a grievance and explained how sick she

had become from other pin problems. Id. at 6-6A; Dkt. #47 ¶ 6. In regard to Dr. Austin’s

comments, Clausen told Plaintiff that “if it wasn’t in writing, it didn’t mean a thing.” Dkt.

#1 at 6A. Plaintiff claims that she also spoke to Clausen on several other occasions about her

complaints, but all Clausen would tell her was that he was not a doctor. Id. at 6; Dkt. #47 ¶

5. Plaintiff alleges that Clausen, who is named in both counts, failed to ensure that she

received proper medical care. Dkt. #1 at 2, 5-6A.

Plaintiff required assistance when making her bed, getting dressed, bathing, and using

the toilet facilities. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that the pain medication given to her was

inadequate, which kept her from sleeping most nights. Id. at 5A. She claims that she spoke

and wrote to everyone she could think of, yet there was no resolution and she remained in

pain and in constant fear of losing her arm. Id. at 6A, 5A.

/ / /

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Plaintiff’s response also includes other grievances, grievance appeals, and responses

from 2005 and 2006 regarding the treatment of her arm and wrist. Dkt. #53, Attachs. 13-21.

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II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). Dkt. #45. The form civil rights complaint that Plaintiff filed includes three

questions regarding administrative remedies and provides boxes for the plaintiff to check

either “yes” or “no.” These questions are: (1) Are remedies available at your institution?

(2) Did you submit a request for relief on this count? (3) Did you appeal your request for

relief to the highest level? Dkt. #1 at 5-6. Below these questions there is a space provided

for Plaintiff to explain why she may not have filed a request for relief or appealed it to the

highest level. Id. For both counts, Plaintiff checked “yes” on the first two questions and left

the third question unanswered. Id. She did not provide any explanation for why the last

question for each count was unanswered. Defendants argue that these responses amount to

a concession by Plaintiff that she did not exhaust her available administrative remedies and

her action should therefore be dismissed. To support their motion, Defendants have

submitted a copy of the Inmate Grievance Procedure, Policy DJ-3. Dkt. #45, Ex. A.

The Court issued an order informing Plaintiff of her obligation to respond and the

evidence necessary to rebut Defendants’ arguments. Dkt. #48. In her response, Plaintiff

argues that she did exhaust the grievance system, but that she was not given any of her

paperwork when she was transferred to a new unit. Dkt. #53 at 2. She claims that she

requested copies of her paperwork from Clausen, the Central Office, and her Correctional

Officer (CO) III Gomez, but they did not respond. Id. Attached to her response are copies

of numerous grievances from 2003 and 2004 addressing the surgery that was scheduled but

never received, the pins popping out of her wrist and shoulder, the unbearable pain, and

repeated requests for proper medical treatment. Id. Attachs. 1-9.2

 Plaintiff’s evidence

includes documents showing that Plaintiff filed an Inmate Grievance Appeal on her

complaint regarding the failure to receive surgery and the continued pain she was suffering.

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Id. Attachs. 10-11 (Case No. B02-04404)). 

In their reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not complete the grievance process

as to her complaints against Deputy Warden Ribbens. Dkt. #55. They point to an inmate

letter Plaintiff filed which they contend refers in part to Plaintiff’s encounter with Ribbens

and forms the basis of the Plaintiff’s allegations against Ribbens. Id. Ex. A, Attach. 1.

Defendants assert that because Plaintiff did not appeal this specific inmate letter to a formal

grievance, she did not exhaust remedies as to Ribbens. Id. at 3-4.

Defendants admit that their investigation of Plaintiff’s grievances revealed “a

completed grievance process generally relating to Coronado’s medical treatment and

scheduled surgeries.” Id. at 4. But Defendants argue that these grievances do not constitute

exhaustion against Palmer and Clausen because Plaintiff failed to comply with the ADC

grievance policy requiring her to file an inmate letter with the assigned CO III within 10

workdays of the action that caused the complaint. Id. (citing Dep’t Order (DO) 802.08 §

1.1). Defendants note that Plaintiff filed her inmate letter initiating this completed grievance

process on April 13, 2004; thus, for this completed grievance process to apply to Palmer and

Clausen, they would have had to engage in some actionable conduct relating to Plaintiff’s

medical claim within the 10 workdays before the inmate letter. Id. at 4. Within 10 workdays

prior to Plaintiff’s inmate letter, Clausen received a telephone call regarding Plaintiff’s

medical care and Palmer examined Plaintiff; however, both Defendants argue that their

conduct during this time frame did not constitute action that caused her complaint “as

required by DO 802.08 § 1.1.” Id. at 4-5. 

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s entire complaint if the Court finds that

some but not all of her claims have been exhausted. Dkt. #55 at 5. They put forth this

argument to preserve it in case the Supreme Court adopts the “total-exhaustion rule” in its

forthcoming ruling in two cases addressing this issue. Id. at 6 (citing to Jones v. Bock, 05-

7058, consolidated with Williams v. Overton, No. 05-7142, cert. granted (U.S. Mar. 6,

2006)).

/ / /

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A. The PLRA Exhaustion Requirement.

A prisoner may not bring a lawsuit with respect to prison conditions under § 1983

unless all available administrative remedies are exhausted. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden

v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35

(9th Cir. 2005). She must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the

applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). Exhaustion is required

for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the

type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,

741 (2001). 

This Circuit has made clear that § 1997e(a) “is not a jurisdictional requirement that

the plaintiff must plead and establish. Instead § 1997e(a) establishes an affirmative defense,

waived if the defendant does not raise it.” Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir.

2005). The Supreme Court has affirmed this proposition. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921

(2007) (stating that the “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and . . .

inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints”).

Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of

abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to

decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the

method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).

B. Analysis.

1. Concession to Nonexhaustion. 

As stated, Defendants bear the burden of proving failure to exhaust, and therefore

must demonstrate that there were remedies available to Plaintiff. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119; Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37. Although lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense, a

claim may be dismissed if it is clear from the record that the plaintiff concedes failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

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Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion and her evidence demonstrating that she

appealed a grievance to the highest level show that she has not conceded nonexhaustion.

Defendants also admit that Plaintiff exhausted her claims about medical treatment and

scheduled surgeries. Dkt. #55 at 4. 

2. Defendant Ribbens.

Defendants attempt to prove failure to exhaust as to Defendant Ribbens by proffering

the copy of Plaintiff’s April 9, 2003 inmate letter and the response by Ribbens. Dkt. #55,

Ex. A. Defendants argue that this inmate letter response is the only connection that Ribbens

had to any of Plaintiff’s grievances and, because this response was not appealed, Ribbens

should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a grievance must alert prison officials to the

claims the plaintiff has included in the complaint. Porter, 534 U.S. at 525 (purpose of

exhaustion requirement is to give officials “time and opportunity to address complaints

internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case”). The purpose of a grievance is to

alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a specific official that he

or she may be sued. See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004). The inmate

letter form and the inmate grievance form advise the inmate to describe the problem or

grievance; there are no instructions to name individual officials. Dkt. #55, Ex. B, Attach. 1.

 Plaintiff’s grievances were sufficient to provide the prison with a fair opportunity to address

the problem and to put the prison on notice of her potential claim. Moreover, Ribbens was

aware of the problem Plaintiff was having in obtaining proper treatment. Dkt. #47, Ex. D,

Ribbens Aff. ¶¶ 6, 8, 10. The Court finds that by completing the grievance process and

alerting officials to the problem giving rise to this suit, Plaintiff availed herself of the

administrative process as to claims regarding her treatment at the prison, including those

against Ribbens. See Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants’

request for dismissal of the claims against Ribbens is denied.

3. Defendants Clausen and Palmer.

As explained above, Plaintiff did not have to specifically name in her grievances the

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officials that may be sued. Plaintiff’s grievance sufficiently alerted prison officials, including

Clausen and Palmer, to the problem and Plaintiff’s potential claim. In addition, both Clausen

and Palmer were well aware of Plaintiff’s medical problem. Clausen personally responded

to most of Plaintiff’s grievances and grievance appeals. See Dkt. #55, Ex. B, Attach. 1.

Palmer attested that he was one of the physicians Plaintiff saw during the relevant period of

time that she alleges medical personnel made her condition worse. Dkt. #47, Ex. B, Palmer

Aff.

Finally, Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff failed to comply with the deadlines set

forth in the grievance policy is unpersuasive. Dkt. #55 at 4. Prison officials responded to

Plaintiff’s inmate letter concerning her inadequate medical treatment and to all of her

subsequent appeals. Dkt. #55, Ex. B, Attach. 1. Not a single response by prison officials

mentions a failure to comply with the procedural rules. If any procedural deficiency existed,

it was waived by Defendants.

4. Total Exhaustion.

Defendants’ remaining argument for dismissal for nonexhaustion was rendered moot

with the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007), which rejected

the total exhaustion rule. Even so, this argument would not apply because the Court does not

find that either of Plaintiff’s claims were unexhausted. Defendants’ motion to dismiss will

be denied. 

III. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Defendants were not

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, (2) Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity from suit, and (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. Dkt. #46.

The Court informed Plaintiff of her obligation to respond and the requirements for opposing

the motion as set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. #49.

Plaintiff has responded that Defendants were in fact deliberately indifferent to her medical

needs by failing to treat her, which resulted in staph infections and the loss of the use of her

arm. Dkt. #53. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Local Rules of

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3

To the extent that Defendants seek summary judgment for Plaintiff’s failure to

comply with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1, their request is denied. See Dkt. #55 at 7.

Because Plaintiff did not submit a separate statement of facts, Defendants’ statement of facts

is deemed undisputed.

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Civil Procedure because she failed to submit a separate statement of facts, and they contend

that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Dkt. #55.3

A. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The disputed evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

Summary judgment may be entered against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

B. Eighth Amendment.

States are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment from incarcerating inmates in

conditions that constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Pursuant to this obligation, state

officials who act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs are liable

in a § 1983 action. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Indications that a prisoner

has a “serious” need for medical treatment include the existence of an injury that a reasonable

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of

a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, and the existence

of chronic and substantial pain. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc). 

/ / /

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A state prison official is deliberately indifferent if he both knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to an inmate’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus,

to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged harm was

“sufficiently serious” and that the official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302-3 (1991)). Mere negligence or

medical malpractice does not establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Broughton v.

Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). But a prisoner does not have to prove that

he was completely denied medical care in order to demonstrate deliberate indifference.

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference may be shown

when an official denies, delays, or intentionally interferes with treatment or by the way that

a medical professional provides care. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

A difference of medical opinion is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). To prevail on a claim involving choices

between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show that the course of treatment

the doctors chose was medically unacceptable in light of the circumstances and that it was

chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

In cases involving complex medical issues where a plaintiff contests the type of

treatment she received, expert opinion will almost always be necessary to establish the

necessary level of deliberate indifference. See Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390

(9th Cir. 1988). Thus, although there may be subsidiary issues of fact in dispute, unless

Plaintiff can provide expert evidence that the treatment she received equated with deliberate

indifference, thereby creating a material issue of fact, summary judgment should be entered

for Defendants.

C. Analysis.

1. Serious Medical Need.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not shown that she had a serious medical need.

They contend that she “acknowledged [in her deposition] that no medical provider advised

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her that her condition presented a substantial risk of serious physical harm.” Dkt. #47 ¶ 30

(citing Ex. A at115:19-118:13). The Court cannot find such an acknowledgment in

Plaintiff’s deposition. Notably, Defendants themselves describe Plaintiff’s injuries as

“significant and complicated and . . . requir[ing] multiple diagnostic studies and specialist

referrals.” Dkt. #46 at 2.

Plaintiff has filed a verified complaint in this case. A verified complaint may be used

as an affidavit opposing summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets

forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th

Cir. 1995). Plaintiff states in her verified complaint that she suffered “constant pain” that

was so severe she could not sleep most nights. Dkt. #1 at 5A. She also states that she could

not use her wrist or move her fingers. Id. at 5. The copies of grievances submitted by

Defendants reflect that Plaintiff complained about the immobility of her right arm for 2 years,

and refer to the “excruciating pain” that she was in, and that she “continued to suffer from

a great deal of pain.” Dkt. #55, Ex. B, Attach. 1 (citing to grievance appeal responses dated

5/27/04 and 7/8/04). Because Defendants have failed to submit any evidence that refutes

Plaintiff’s claims that she suffered chronic and severe pain, the Court finds that Plaintiff had

a serious medical need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d

198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that the existence of chronic and substantial pain are

examples of indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment). 

2. Deliberate Indifference.

a. Defendant Palmer.

In support of their argument that Palmer was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical need, Defendants submit Palmer’s affidavit. Dkt. #47, Ex. B. Palmer

attested that when he first saw Plaintiff he requested an outside orthopedic consultation for

her injuries. Id. ¶ 7. He stated that he continued to provide Plaintiff in-house treatment, to

make outside consultation requests as needed, and to process administrative paperwork

necessary for various treatments. Id. ¶¶ 21, 33, 42, 46, 74-75, 78-79, 94, 112, 115.

Defendants also submit Plaintiff’s deposition, in which she testified that she did not know

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4

Specifically, Plaintiff objects to paragraph 4 – a summary of her medical history that

includes “a 10/96 gunshot wound to her right side, arm, and back” – and paragraph 41 – a

review of her medical records that states Plaintiff told a nurse who examined her wrist that

“I can move it now that I took the pin out.” Dkt. #47, Ex. B, Palmer Aff. ¶¶ 4, 41. Plaintiff

asserts that these statements are false. Dkt. #53 at 1.

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what attempts Palmer made to get a referral for surgery on her wrist. Id. Ex. A at 45:17-23.

Finally, the evidence demonstrates that Palmer prescribed medications to Plaintiff as

appropriate. Id. Ex. B, Palmer Aff. ¶¶ 43, 112-13, 115. Plaintiff’s medical records, which

were attached to Palmer’s affidavit, show that Plaintiff was regularly treated by other prison

medical providers between many of her appointments with Palmer. Id. ¶¶ 19, 41, 46, 48-53

60-78, 80-94. Palmer averred that the care he provided to Plaintiff was at all times within

the accepted standard of medical care. Id. ¶ 134. He further attested that his review of her

medical records and overall treatment lead him to conclude that Plaintiff received continually

good medical care, and her condition continues to improve. Id. ¶ 135.

Defendants have met their initial burden of establishing a lack of a triable issue of fact

as to deliberate indifference on the part of Palmer. Plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment

by merely demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In her unsworn response, Plaintiff argues that Palmer neglected to provide her

“applicable care.” Dkt. #53 at 1. She contends that had Palmer adequately treated her

medical condition, she never would have suffered from staph infections. Id. But she

provides no evidence to support this contention. Plaintiff further contends that statements

in Palmer’s affidavit are incorrect. The statements to which she objects, however, concern

discrepancies that do not affect the issue of whether Palmer was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s serious medical need.4

 Plaintiff’s allegation that Palmer was deliberately

indifferent is not corroborated by any other testimony or other persuasive evidence. This

Circuit “has refused to find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only evidence presented is

‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

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Palmer’s conduct might constitute negligence. But indifference, negligence, or

medical malpractice do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Broughton,

622 F.2d at 460 (citations omitted). On this record, a jury could not reasonably find that

Palmer acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical condition. The Court will

grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Palmer.

b. Defendant Clausen.

A prison official’s involvement with the processing of an administrative appeal cannot

constitute a constitutional violation. Dkt. #46 at 8 (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,

249 (1983)). But prison officials who are not physicians may still be liable for deliberate

indifference if they intentionally deny or delay access to medical care. Estelle, 429 U.S. at

104-05. When a prisoner attempts to hold a prison employee responsible for deliberate

indifference, the prisoner must establish individual fault. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634

(9th Cir. 1988). Sweeping conclusory allegations will not be sufficient to prevent summary

judgment. Id. “The prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s

deliberate indifference.” Id. She must prove that the specific prison official was deliberately

indifferent and that this indifference was the actual and proximate cause of her injury. Id.

State officials are subject to suit under § 1983 only if “they play an affirmative part in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th

Cir.1987).

Defendants contend that because Clausen did not provide Plaintiff with medical care,

but only responded to her administrative complaints, the claim against him should be

dismissed because disagreement with responses to grievances do not rise to a constitutional

violation. Dkt. #46 at 8. In his affidavit, Clausen states that he is not a physician and he does

not provide any sort of treatment to patients at the prison. Dkt. #47, Ex. C, Clausen Aff. ¶ 4.

Clausen further states that he responded to a number of inmate letters filed by Plaintiff, and

that his responses were based on a review of ADC records and Plaintiff’s medical reports Id.

¶¶ 2, 10-13, 16. Also, Clausen personally met with Plaintiff on two occasions to discuss the

status of her medical treatment. Id. ¶¶ 14-15). As to the delay in surgery for Plaintiff,

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Clausen averred that Maricopa Medical Center (“MMC”) cancelled two surgeries that had

been set for June 23 and August 6, 2004. As a result, Clausen filed a Vender Deficiency

Report complaining about the abrupt and last minute cancellations of the surgery and stated

that due to MMC’s conduct, “essential medical treatment [had] not been provided to offender

Coronado.” Id. ¶ 17; Dkt. #54 Ex. I. In light of the problems with MMC, Clausen

transferred Plaintiff’s care to St. Mary’s Hospital in Tucson. Dkt. #47, Ex. C., Clausen Aff.

¶ 17.

Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact as to the claims against Clausen. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden

shifts to Plaintiff to set forth facts showing that a genuine dispute remains. Plaintiff claims

that Clausen violated her Eighth Amendment rights by not fully investigating the “incident

reports written by security officials on his medical staff’s behavior towards” her, and that

Clausen was deliberately indifferent to her by failing to treat her medical condition. Dkt. #53

at 2-3. Plaintiff has not provided copies of incident reports written by security officials. 

Plaintiff’s allegations would not support a finding that Clausen was deliberately

indifferent. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Clausen was directly linked to a

constitutional violation or that there are material facts in dispute as to whether Clausen acted

with deliberate indifference. 

More importantly, the evidence reflects that Clausen did not disregard a known risk

to Plaintiff’s health. In his role as the health administrator, Clausen responded to Plaintiff’s

grievances and ensured that Plaintiff got appointments to see a medical provider (Dkt. #54,

Ex. B, F-G), investigated Plaintiff’s complaints concerning medical staff (id. Ex. C-D),

confirmed that consultant and Medical Review Committee recommendations were forwarded

to Central Office appropriately (id. Ex. E), and met with Plaintiff to discuss the surgery

cancellation by MMC and subsequent medical plan (id. Ex. G). This evidence, as well as his

vender complaint, preclude any finding of deliberate indifference by Clausen. The Court will

grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Clausen.

/ / /

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5

Contrary to Defendants’ contention in a footnote (Dkt. #46 at 8 n. 1), the Court has

already determined that Count II sufficiently states a claim for relief against Ribbens

(Dkt. #3 at 4). 

JDDL - 15 -

c. Defendant Ribbens.

The Court ordered Defendant Ribbens to answer the allegations that she refused to

refer Plaintiff to a doctor after Plaintiff developed an infection from the pins, and refused to

provide Plaintiff medical treatment after repeated requests from Plaintiff and her family.

Dkt. #3 at 4.5

Defendants submit the affidavit of Ribbens, who attested that when conducting one

of her “health and welfare” walks in April 2003 she spoke to Plaintiff. Dkt. #47, Ex. D,

Ribbens Aff. ¶ 6. Upon seeing Plaintiff’s condition, she immediately took Plaintiff to the

health unit where she was informed by Hendrix that medical was aware of Plaintiff’s

condition and was taking care of Plaintiff’s medical situation. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Because Ribbens

is not a medical provider, she did not solicit any additional information about the care

provided to Plaintiff. Id. Ribbens stated that she was not aware of Plaintiff’s difficulties in

getting an operation until she saw one of Plaintiff’s grievances in April 2003. Upon

receiving the grievance, Ribbens telephoned Hendrix who informed her that Plaintiff would

be examined again. Id. Ribbens attested that she was never made aware that Hendrix did

not actually see Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 9. Ribbens further attested that in her position as Deputy

Warden, she had no access to inmate medical records nor any authority to modify medical

decisions unless there was some conflict with security considerations. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Finally,

Ribbens averred that she had no involvement in the provision or denial of medical services

to Plaintiff nor did she ever intend to violate Plaintiff’s rights regarding her medical care.

Id. ¶¶ 17-18. 

Ribbens’ actions do not demonstrate a “purposeful act or failure to respond to

[Plaintiff’s] pain or possible medical need.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. As such, Defendants

have established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding Ribbens’ liability

for an Eighth Amendment violation.

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Given the summary judgment rulings above, the Court need not address Defendants’

arguments regarding qualified immunity and injunctive relief.

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Plaintiff merely asserts in response that Ribbens violated her rights when Ribbens

accepted Hendrix’s explanation of medical care provided to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that

when Ribbens saw her wrist “swollen due to infection of pin,” Ribbens was obligated to do

more. Dkt. #53. But the record establishes that Ribbens’ limited involvement with Plaintiff

consisted of Ribbens personally escorting Plaintiff to medical in an attempt to ensure that

Plaintiff received care. Because Ribbens is not a physician, she was in no position to

evaluate whether the care that a medical professional advised her Plaintiff was receiving was

adequate. 

Plaintiff’s general allegations that Ribbens was deliberately indifferent will not

prevent summary judgment. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. Plaintiff has presented no affidavits or

other evidence to support her allegations. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to introduce some

“significant probative evidence tending to support” her claim. Rivera v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). The Court

will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Ribbens.6

IV. Defendant’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees.

Defendants request that the Court award their taxable costs and attorneys’ fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Under this statute, a district court may award attorney’s fees

to a prevailing defendant only if the plaintiff’s underlying claim is frivolous or without

foundation. Maag v. Wessler, 993 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court cannot find that

Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous or without foundation, and therefore will deny Defendants’s

request for attorneys’ fees.

V. The Unserved Defendants.

Rule 4(m) provides that “[i]f service of the summons and complaint is not made upon

a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on

its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to

that defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiff filed her complaint on September 17, 2004.

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Dkt. #1. Plaintiff subsequently attempted to serve process on Defendants Hendrix, Sanders,

Tuttle, and Hennessy. The summons for each Defendant were returned unexecuted because

the Marshal was unable to locate the individuals at the address provided. Dkt. ##4-6, 11.

Given that more than two years have elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint, the

Court will dismiss the action against these Defendants pursuant to Rule 4(m). 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. #45) is denied.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #46) is granted. The claims

against Defendants Dale Palmer, Larry Clausen, and Barbara Ribbens are dismissed.

3. Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees is denied.

4. Plaintiff’s motion for trial (Dkt. #53) is denied.

5. Plaintiff’s action against Defendants Hendrix, Sanders, Tuttle, and Hennessy

is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m).

DATED this 7th day of June, 2007.

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