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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 24-1133 

GWENDOLYN D. CUNNINGHAM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, United States Secretary of Defense, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:22-cv-00165 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2024 — DECIDED JANUARY 3, 2025 

____________________ 

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Gwendolyn Cunningham, a Black 

woman, alleges that the Department of Defense discriminated 

against her when it failed to promote her into a newly created 

position in its civil service. She sued Lloyd Austin, III, in his 

official capacity as Secretary of Defense, under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The district court 

granted summary judgment in Austin’s favor, reasoning that 

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2 No. 24-1133

the Department offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its promotion decision and Cunningham failed to offer evidence that the Department’s reasons were pretextual.

We agree and therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. Background

Gwendolyn Cunningham first joined the Department of 

Defense in 1988, working as a part-time secretary in the Defense Finance Accounting Service (“DFAS”). Cunningham

only had a high school diploma, but through a dedicated career of public service she ascended the General Schedule 

(“GS”) ranks. In 2012, DFAS promoted Cunningham to a GS12 supervisor position leading its benefits team. She held this 

position for 10 years, until her eventual promotion to a GS-13 

position in 2022.

Five years into Cunningham’s tenure as supervisor of the 

benefits team, her manager, Howard Locke, was promoted to 

Director of the Human Resources Shared Services Center. 

That left his prior GS-14 role, Benefits Division Chief, vacant. 

Recognizing that DFAS lacked a path for GS-12 employees to 

advance into the GS-14 Division Chief role, Locke sought to 

both hire a new Division Chief and reorganize DFAS to enable 

internal promotion in the future. After a desk-audit by the 

classification team, DFAS converted a vacant GS-12 position 

into a GS-13 supervisor position, which would oversee both 

the benefits and workers’ compensation teams. Because the 

new GS-13 supervisor position would report to the Benefits 

Division Chief, Locke delayed the hiring process for the new 

position until the incoming Chief could participate. He did so 

despite a DFAS policy mandating that managers make hiring 

decisions within a specified timeframe.

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No. 24-1133 3 

Meanwhile, Cunningham applied for the GS-13 position. 

So did Emmanuel Griffin and two other DFAS employees. 

Griffin, a Black man, was the team leader of DFAS’s customercare call center. While Griffin lacked Cunningham’s supervisory responsibilities, such as issuing performance evaluations 

and disciplining employees, he, too, held a GS-12 position. 

Griffin also had a long career in public service. Prior to joining 

DFAS, Griffin served in the United States Air Force for 23 

years. He also worked for a private corporation, training more 

than 1,000 employees and handling workers’ compensation 

matters, and for the City of Indianapolis, where he participated in human resources program design. Griffin held a 

Bachelor of Science degree and an MBA.

In April of 2018, DFAS hired Andrew Hartz, a White man, 

as the GS-14 Benefits Division Chief. In May, Hartz, along 

with Shante Jones, the Supervisor of Talent Management and 

Integration, began reviewing resumes and interviewing for 

the GS-13 supervisor position. They crafted four categories on 

which to evaluate the candidates: (1) HR and Benefits Subject 

Matter Expertise (“SME”), (2) Supervisory/Leadership Skills, 

(3) Teamwork and Process Innovation, and (4) Customer Service. They also developed six standardized interview questions to ask each candidate, four of which were behavioral. 

Griffin and Cunningham emerged as the top two candidates for the position. Cunningham’s subject matter expertise, 

in particular, garnered praise from Hartz, who regarded her 

as the “Best SME.” But her resume and interview performance left him unconvinced of her suitability for the job. Cunningham’s resume included only five years of relevant experience and listed an incorrect phone number for her supervisor, giving Hartz the impression that it was incomplete. Hartz 

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also felt “disappointed” in Cunningham’s answers to his

standardized interview questions. When asked to describe

how she would approach training the growing number of 

benefits team members, Cunningham responded that she 

would train each employee herself. Hartz commented in his 

interview notes that her approach “doesn’t scale well.” Indeed, Hartz described several of Cunningham’s interview answers as “tactical,” rather than “strategic,” meaning her responses reflected short-term thinking.

Griffin, on the other hand, earned high marks for his resume and interview. His many years of education and experience in both the public and private sectors impressed Hartz. 

Hartz also felt that Griffin gave “strategic” responses to the 

standardized interview questions and demonstrated strong

leadership skills. When ranking Griffin and Cunningham 

across the four identified categories, Cunningham received 

higher marks only for her subject matter expertise, as Griffin 

lacked extensive experience in federal benefits. Hartz found

that Griffin matched Cunningham in the leadership category 

and outperformed her in the process innovation and customer 

service categories. Hartz thus chose Griffin for the position, 

believing him to be the better overall candidate. 

Hartz explained his hiring decision to a disappointed Cunningham in a subsequent meeting. In her deposition, Cunningham relayed her impression of Hartz’s reasoning, stating:

I felt like maybe he [Hartz] wanted something 

different organization-wise or structure – or for 

the benefits division, and, you know, maybe he 

felt like he could take that or do that with someone other than myself.

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No. 24-1133 5 

Cunningham also remarked that Hartz “probably thought 

Mr. Griffin was more suitable for the job” because she was 

“direct” in her communication and didn’t engage in “daily 

chitchat” with coworkers. Firm in her belief that she was the 

more qualified applicant, Cunningham nevertheless departed

the meeting with Hartz convinced that he preferred to work 

with a male and had discriminated against her based on her 

sex. When asked during her deposition to explain the basis 

for this belief, she stated that it was “heartfelt.”

In August of 2018, Cunningham filed a complaint with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging Hartz 

failed to promote her because of her race, sex, and age.1 The 

EEOC found Cunningham had not demonstrated discrimination and informed her of her right to sue in federal court.

Upon receiving notice of her right to sue, Cunningham 

commenced this action. In her complaint, Cunningham renewed her allegations that DFAS had discriminated against 

her based on her sex (and her race, in combination with her 

sex), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

when it failed to promote her into the new GS-13 supervisor 

position. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DFAS, reasoning that Cunningham had not proffered 

evidence of sex discrimination beyond her own heartfelt belief that Hartz preferred to hire a man. This appeal followed.

1 Cunningham also filed a second EEOC complaint in August of 2024, 

alleging DFAS discriminated against her by failing to non-competitively 

promote her. As Cunningham has acknowledged, she abandoned her noncompetitive promotion claim before the district court. She therefore does 

not pursue it on appeal, and we do not reach its substance.

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II. Discussion

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869, 873 (7th Cir. 

2024). When “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law,” summary judgment is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

While we “construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor,” the moving party may 

prevail at summary judgment “‘by showing an absence of evidence to support’ the nonmoving party’s claims.” Lewis v. 

Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 597 (7th Cir. 2020)). 

Title VII “prohibits an employer from ‘discriminating 

against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 

such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” 

Igasaki v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th 

Cir. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)); see also Logan v. 

City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must proffer evidence 

that “would permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that 

[the plaintiff] was subjected to an adverse employment action 

based on a statutorily prohibited factor.” McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2009)

(finding that a plaintiff alleging discrimination on the basis of 

her sex must demonstrate that the adverse employment action occurred “at least in part because she is female”). 

In Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., we clarified that employment discrimination plaintiffs may carry this burden 

through either direct or circumstantial evidence, and that “all 

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No. 24-1133 7 

evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a 

whole.” 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016). One method for 

demonstrating that an employer’s failure to promote a plaintiff was the product of prohibited discrimination is through 

the burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Bragg v. Munster 

Med. Rsch. Found. Inc., 58 F.4th 265, 271 (7th Cir. 2023). Because 

the parties proceeded under McDonnell Douglas, we do too.

At McDonnell Douglas’s first step, the plaintiff must show 

that she was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) qualified 

for the position, (3) rejected for the position, and that (4) the 

position was given to a person outside the protected class who 

was similarly or less qualified than the plaintiff. Logan, 4 F.4th 

at 536. “If an employee meets each element of her prima facie 

case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action.” Lewis, 36 F.4th at 760. If an employer does so, the burden “shifts back to the employee to show why the employer’s 

explanation is pretextual.” Id.

Cunningham and DFAS agree that Cunningham has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination.2

2 Cunningham does not argue on appeal that she has stated a prima 

facie case of race discrimination, acknowledging that Griffin, too, is Black. 

See Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Sch., 829 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding the 

plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of race discrimination

where both she and the person promoted were Black). 

Instead, Cunningham raises an intersectional discrimination claim, alleging that she was passed over for the promotion because of the combination of her sex and race. We do not reach the issue of whether intersectional theories of discrimination are viable under Title VII. Whether 

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Cunningham is a woman, she was qualified for the GS-13 position, and she did not receive it. Griffin, a man, who was either similarly or less qualified, received the promotion. At issue is whether DFAS has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for selecting Griffin and whether its rationale is pretextual. 

A. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Hiring Rationale

An employer’s genuine belief that another candidate’s vision for the organization or skillset makes them better suited 

for the job is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory hiring rationale. 

See Barnes v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ill., 946 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 

2020) (hiring manager’s belief that another candidate was better suited for the job because of his “thoughtful approach to 

taking over the position” constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory hiring rationale); Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 

F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009) (employer’s genuine belief that 

another candidate was better qualified was a legitimate nondiscriminatory hiring rationale). 

Here, Hartz concluded from applicant resumes and interviews that Griffin’s skillset and strategic vision made him best 

suited for the job. That Hartz relied on subjective assessments 

to reach this conclusion does not render DFAS’s explanation 

illegitimate. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., 401 F.3d 803, 

814 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that employers “may legitimately 

use subjective qualifications” to choose between qualified 

Cunningham claims that DFAS discriminated against her because she is a 

woman, or because she is a Black woman, she must offer evidence that 

DFAS decided not to promote her at least in part on account of her sex. See 

Barnes-Staples v. Carnahan, 88 F.4th 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2023). Cunningham

has not carried this burden.

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No. 24-1133 9 

candidates); Kinney v. St. Mary's Health, Inc., 76 F.4th 635, 647 

(7th Cir. 2023) (“[S]uperior interview performance ... can be a 

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for hiring.”); Groves v. S. 

Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 51 F.4th 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding 

that an employer’s determination that the plaintiff’s interview 

“did not go well” was subjective, yet an “entirely proper” basis for the hiring decision).

Nor does DFAS’s decision to ask behavioral interview 

questions, rather than substantive ones, render its reliance on 

interview performance illegitimate. Our court is not “a superpersonnel department that reexamines an entity’s business 

decisions.” Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 341 (7th 

Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). When hiring for the GS-13 position, DFAS encountered a common HR dilemma: whether to 

prioritize subject matter expertise or difficult-to-measure intangibles, such as skilled customer service, familiarity with 

process improvement, and passion for the position evinced by 

thorough interview preparation. DFAS chose the intangibles, 

and we will not second guess its decision. 

Having found that DFAS articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decision, we next consider 

whether Cunningham offered sufficient evidence to create a 

genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

B. Pretext 

An otherwise legitimate, nondiscriminatory hiring rationale is pretextual if the hiring manager did not “sincerely 

believe[]” the rationale when making his final decision. Little 

v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004). In 

other words, to be pretext, a hiring rationale must be “a lie” 

or “phony,” Barnes-Staples, 88 F.4th at 716, “allowing an 

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inference that the [defendant’s] true intent was discriminatory,” Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 744 (7th Cir. 

2022). When an employer honestly believed it promoted the 

best candidate, its reasoning is not pretext, “even if its decision was inaccurate, unfair, ... foolish, trivial, or baseless.” 

Barnes-Staples, 88 F.4th at 716 (citation omitted); see also Blise 

v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n employer’s decision to favor one candidate over another can be 

mistaken, ill-considered or foolish, [but] so long as [the employer] honestly believed those reasons, pretext has not been

shown.” (citation omitted)). Cunningham bears the burden of 

proving that Hartz’s stated reason for selecting Griffin was 

false. Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 824–25 (7th 

Cir. 2006). 

Cunningham’s own admissions make it difficult for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Hartz’s rationale for selecting Griffin was pretextual. When asked during her deposition 

why she thought Hartz selected Griffin, Cunningham replied 

that Hartz “wanted something different organization-wise” 

and “maybe ... felt like he could take that or do that with 

someone other than myself.” She also acknowledged that 

Hartz “probably thought Mr. Griffin was more suitable for the 

job.” In Cunningham’s own telling, then, Hartz’s belief that 

Griffin would better accomplish the organizational transformation Hartz sought was not pretext; it was true.

Even setting aside Cunningham’s deposition statements, 

she has failed to present evidence of pretext. Cunningham 

clearly believes she was better qualified than Griffin, but for a 

disparity in qualifications to support an inference of pretext

under Title VII, the plaintiff’s credentials must “be so superior 

to the credentials of the person selected for the job that no 

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No. 24-1133 11 

reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, 

could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for 

the job in question.” Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180–

81 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). This is “a high evidentiary 

bar,” Riley, 829 F.3d at 894, and Cunningham does not clear it. 

Griffin had a 23-year military career, private sector experience, and familiarity with federal benefits through his leadership of the customer care center. He impressed Hartz in his 

interview with his strategic approach to the benefits division’s 

future. In short, a reasonable person could have selected Griffin for the GS-13 supervisor position; the difference between 

his credentials and Cunningham’s does not support an inference of pretext.

Hartz’s reliance on subjective assessments of the candidates’ interview performances does not support an inference 

of pretext either. As we have previously explained, “subjective evaluations of a job candidate are often critical to the decisionmaking process.” Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1176 (citation 

omitted). So, “absent evidence that subjective hiring criteria 

were used as a mask for discrimination, the fact that an employer based a hiring or promotion decision on purely subjective criteria will rarely, if ever, prove pretext under Title VII.” 

Id. (citation omitted); see also Groves, 51 F.4th at 771 (finding 

that consideration of the plaintiff’s interview performance 

was “entirely proper,” given no evidence suggesting that the 

plaintiff’s membership in a protected class influenced the hiring decision). Here, Cunningham presented no evidence that 

Hartz’s subjective evaluation of her, based on her responses 

to standardized interview questions, masked a discriminatory intent. 

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Cunningham’s argument that DFAS violated its own policies during the GS-13 hiring process fares no better. While 

“an employer’s divergence from its standard hiring practices 

can establish, or at least be evidence of, pretext,” Barnes-Staples, 88 F.4th at 717, DFAS’s policy deviations do not evidence 

sex discrimination. As Cunningham herself acknowledged, 

DFAS delayed its hiring for the GS-13 position because it 

wanted the GS-14 Division Chief to select the candidate, a decision that impacted all candidates equally. See id. (finding no 

evidence of pretext where the purported policy violation “affected all candidates equally”). So did Hartz’s interview questions, which, in any event, did not violate DFAS policy.

The remainder of Cunningham’s pretext arguments also 

lack merit. Hartz’s use of terms such as “tactical” and “strategic” to evaluate all applicants, male and female, reflects the 

broader organizational mission and lexicon of the Department of Defense, not hidden sex discrimination. That Locke 

did not non-competitively promote Cunningham in 2017 does 

not bear on whether Hartz discriminated against her in his 

2018 hiring decision. And while the district court misstated 

the law when it dismissed Cunningham’s statistical evidence 

out of hand, for statistics to support an employment discrimination claim, the plaintiff must also proffer individualized evidence of discrimination. See id. at 719 (holding “data alone” 

cannot demonstrate discrimination, but “‘must be coupled 

with other evidence, which does most of the work.’” (quoting 

Baylie v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank, 476 F.3d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 2007))). 

Cunningham has not done so here.

In short, Cunningham has offered no evidence that 

DFAS’s hiring rationale was pretextual. Armed with only her 

heartfelt belief that Hartz preferred to work with a man, she

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No. 24-1133 13 

cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Payne 

v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that a 

plaintiff cannot “thwart summary judgment by speculating as 

to the defendant/employer’s state of mind”).

* * * 

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. 

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