Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01318/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01318-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COREY Z.,

1

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 19-cv-1318-MMP

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

[ECF No. 29]

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

406(b), in which Plaintiff’s counsel requests an award of fees for representing Corey Z.

(“Plaintiff”) in connection with this Social Security appeal. [ECF No. 29.] The 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”) filed a response indicating it neither 

supports nor opposes the motion. [ECF No. 32.] Though Plaintiff was served with the 

pending motion and notified of the opportunity to respond, he did not file an objection. 

[See ECF No. 29 at 2; ECF No. 29-1 at 18.] The parties have consented to the undersigned

1 In accordance with Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(6)(b), the Court refers to all non-government 

parties by using their first name and last initial.

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for all purposes. [ECF No. 33.] Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the 

motion suitable for determination without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the denial of 

his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under

Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. [ECF No. 1.] The Court granted Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment and denied Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment, remanding the matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with its 

opinion. [ECF Nos. 24, 27.

2

] Pursuant to the parties’ Joint Motion for the Award and 

Payment of Attorney Fees and Expenses Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d) and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court awarded attorney’s 

fees in the amount of $4,200.00 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).

3 [ECF 

Nos. 25, 26.] 

On remand, Plaintiff was found disabled under the Social Security Act from 

November 2, 2014 through December 31, 2019, thereby entitling him to $ 91,225.00 in 

past-due benefits. [ECF No. 29-1 at 4; ECF No. 29-3 at 16.]

Throughout this action, Plaintiff has been represented by the Law Offices of 

Lawrence D. Rohlfing Inc., CPC (“Counsel”). Counsel now moves for an attorney fee 

award under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $22,806.25, which represents twentyfive percent (25%) of Plaintiff’s total past-due benefits awarded. [ECF No. 29.] Counsel

2 On April 6, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Order re Cross-Motions for Summary 

Judgment noting the Court’s prior March 12, 2020 Order, ECF No. 24, was incorrectly 

captioned. [ECF No. 27.]

3 “Under EAJA, a party prevailing against the United States in court, including a successful 

Social Security benefits claimant, may be awarded fees payable by the United States if the 

Government’s position in the litigation was not ‘substantially justified.’” Gisbrecht v. 

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)).

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also seeks an order requiring it to reimburse Plaintiff in the amount of $4,200.00 for the 

EAJA fees previously paid. [Id.; ECF No. 29-1 at 4.] 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

42 U.S.C. § 406(b) governs fees for representation of individuals claiming Social 

Security disability benefits for proceedings in court. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 794. “Under 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b), a court entering judgment in favor of [a Social Security] claimant who 

was represented by an attorney ‘may determine and allow as part of its judgment a 

reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the pastdue benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.’” Crawford v.

Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting § 406(b)(1)(A)). 

Contingent-fee agreements are the “primary means by which fees are set for 

successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 

at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1147. “[Section] 406(b) calls for court review of

such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in 

particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The Ninth Circuit has instructed “a district 

court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect 

‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements, . . . looking first to the contingentfee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness[.]’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting 

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). 

In determining the reasonableness of a fee award under § 406(b), the relevant inquiry 

is “whether the amount need be reduced, not whether the loadstar amount should be 

enhanced.” Id.4 District courts should consider “the character of the representation and the 

results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. “A fee resulting from a 

contingent-fee agreement is unreasonable, and thus subject to reduction by the court, if the 

attorney provided substandard representation or engaged in dilatory conduct in order to 

4

 District courts can “consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing the 

reasonableness of the fee.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 

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increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits, or if the benefits are large in comparison 

to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). The attorney must establish the fees sought are reasonable. 

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807.

Finally, any fee award under § 406(b) must be offset by the amount of attorney’s 

fees awarded under the EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 

III. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directive in Gisbrecht, the Court begins with the 

agreement. Plaintiff and Counsel entered a written contingent-fee agreement dated June 5, 

2019 and then entered the same agreement again on January 2, 2020. Pursuant to the written 

agreement, Plaintiff and his counsel expressly agreed “the fee for successful prosecution 

of this matter” is “25% of the past due benefits awarded upon reversal of any 

unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court.” [ECF No. 35 at 3 ¶ 4; ECF No. 

29-2 ¶ 4.] The parties further agreed counsel would “seek compensation under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act and such amount shall credit to the client for fees otherwise payable 

for that particular work.” [ECF No. 35 at 3 ¶ 4; ECF No. 29-2 ¶ 4.] The parties entered into 

this fee agreement prior to initiating this federal action, and nothing in the record suggests 

the agreement was reached by improper means. The firm spent 22.5 hours5 litigating this 

matter in federal court, resulting in an order granting Plaintiff summary judgment and 

remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. [ECF No. 29-1 at 15 ¶ 5, 29-5.] 

In accord with this agreement, the requested fee of $22,806.25 equates to 25% of Plaintiff’s 

total past-due benefits awarded. As the requested fees is “not in excess of 25 percent of the 

total past-due benefits to which [Plaintiff] is entitled,” Counsel is entitled to the requested 

fees, provided the fees are found reasonable. See § 406(b)(1)(A)).

5 In support of its fee motion, Counsel provided a breakdown of the time spent on this 

matter reflecting 2.8 hours in paralegal time and 19.7 hours in attorney time. [See ECF No. 

29-5.] 

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The Court next considers the reasonableness of the fee and “whether the amount 

need be reduced.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149. Neither the character of the representation, 

nor the results achieved warrant a reduction of the fee award. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at

808. Nothing in the record suggests Counsel delayed the case. To the contrary, Counsel 

secured an order granting Plaintiff summary judgment and remanding the case for further 

administrative proceedings in less than nine months and then successfully obtained a 

substantial benefit award for Plaintiff upon remand. [See ECF Nos. 1, 27, 29-3.] Though 

Plaintiff was required to amend his complaint several times, such amendments did not 

delay the disposition of the case or otherwise reflect substandard performance warranting

a reduction in fees. In addition, the amount of time spent litigating does not necessitate a 

reduction in fees. See, e.g., Sean M. v. Kijakazi, No. 18-cv-2272, 2023 WL 5015399, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2023) (“The Court agrees with Counsel that Counsel’s experience and 

expertise in Social Security law helped facilitate a favorable outcome for [the plaintiff] and 

with fewer hours billed.”). 

Finally, the Court considers the lodestar calculation “as an aid in assessing the 

reasonableness of the fee.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. Counsel’s effective hourly rate of 

approximately $1,013.61 for the 22.5 total attorney and paralegal hours spent on the case 

is within the range of rates found reasonable in similar Social Security cases involving this 

same attorney and firm. See, e.g., Bartle v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-1431, 2023 WL 5811845, 

at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2023) (approving 25% of past-due benefits, consisting of 

$26,000.00 for 20.7 hours, making the effective hourly rate approximately $1,256.04); 

Edward D. O. v. O’Malley, No. 20-cv-01551, 2024 WL 4520344, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 

2024) (approving 17% of past-due benefits, consisting of $27,000 for 25.3 attorney and 

paralegal hours, making the effective hourly rate approximately $1,067.19); Watkins v. 

O’Malley, No. 21-cv-101, 2024 WL 2702444, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2024) (approving

25% of the past-due benefits, consisting of $31,317.93 for 20.0 hours, making the effective

hourly rate approximately $1,566.00); French v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-92, 2023 WL 

8458252, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2023) (approving 19.2% of past-due benefits, consisting 

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of $23,787.00 for 21.3 attorney and paralegal hours, making the effective hourly rate of

$1,116.76); Marie S. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2196, 2023 WL 2637388 at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 

24, 2023) (approving 16% of past-due benefits, consisting of $18,000 for 24.5 hours, 

making effectively hourly rate of $735.00). Counsel also submitted a billing statement 

detailing the work performed on Plaintiff’s case, and the Court finds the number of hours 

expended was reasonable. [See ECF No. 29-5.] In sum, the Court finds none of the factors 

support reducing the fee award, and Counsel’s requested fees are reasonable. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the motion for attorneys’ fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and APPROVES an award in the amount of $22,806.25. 

Consistent with the Commissioner’s statement of position, see ECF. No. 32, the Court 

declines to order the Commissioner to make this payment but rather DIRECTS any fees 

ultimately withheld for counsel be made payable to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. 

Rohlfing, Inc., CPC as set forth in Counsel’s motion. The Court further ORDERS the Law 

Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Inc., CPC to reimburse Plaintiff in the amount of 

$4,200.00 for EAJA fees received. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 23, 2024 _____________________________________________

HON. MICHELLE M. PETTIT

United States Magistrate Judge

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