Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01993/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01993-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL MACIAS GARCIA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv1993-LAB (WMc)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION, AND

DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

Respondent moved to dismiss Petitioner Garcia’s amended petition for writ of habeas

corpus as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

Garcia filed his original petition on October 27, 2008. Because it included both exhausted

and unexhausted claims, the Court dismissed it pursuant to Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

510 (1982), giving Garcia leave to amend it in order to omit the unexhausted claims. The

Court found the “stay and abeyance” procedure inappropriate, because Garcia’s

unexhausted claims were meritless. After several extensions, Garcia filed his amended

petition on April 30, 2009. Respondent then moved to dismiss it as untimely. Although the

original petition was timely, the amended petition was filed after AEDPA’s 1-year limitations

period.

The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge William McCurine for a report and

recommendation pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636. Judge McCurine

issued his report and recommendation (the “R&R”) on October 12, 2010, recommending

Case 3:08-cv-01993-LAB-WMC Document 37 Filed 01/13/11 Page 1 of 4
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- 2 - 08CV1993

denying the motion. Respondent filed his objections on October 29 and Garcia filed his reply

to the objections on December 6.

A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge's report and

recommendation on dispositive matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). "The district judge must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly

objected to." Id. "A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which specific written objection is made.

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). "The statute

makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and

recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise." Id.

Garcia argues his amended petition relates back to his original petition. Respondent

in turn argues that because that petition was dismissed, there is nothing for the amended

petition to relate back to. (Obj. to R&R, 2:3–4 (“‘[R]elation back’ has meaning only in the

context of amendments to existing pleadings . . . “)) In his motion to dismiss, Respondent

cited Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150 (9th cir. 2006), and he now cites Libberton v. Ryan,

583 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Neither of those cases presents an analogous situation. Rather, the facts of Anthony

v. Cambra, 236 F3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000) are analogous and that holding controls. In

Anthony, the district court had dismissed a mixed habeas petition containing one exhausted

and five unexhausted claims, and the petitioner filed an amended petition raising his

exhausted claim. The district court determined it should have given the petitioner a chance

to amend his petition, rather than dismissing it outright, and ordered that the amended

petition should be treated as if it were filed as of the date of the original petition. The

respondent appealed, raising the issue of timeliness because the amended petition was filed

after AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period had expired. The respondent argued the amended

petition should be considered a new petition because the original petition had been

dismissed.

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In Anthony, the district court realized that a petitioner who files a mixed petition should

be given an opportunity to amend the petition before dismissal. “Because the court’s

dismissal ‘did not afford petitioner such an opportunity,’ construing the [later-filed] petition

as an amendment—as opposed to new (and time-barred) petition—was, in the court’s view,

the appropriate remedy.” 236 F.3d at 573. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s

decision:

[W]e agree with the district court that its outright dismissal of Anthony's

[original] petition was improper. This court has made clear that district courts

must provide habeas litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed

petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering

dismissal.

Id. at 574. The correctness of this ruling was later confirmed in Rhines v. Weber:

if a petitioner presents a district court with a mixed petition and the court

determines that stay and abeyance is inappropriate, the court should allow

the petitioner to delete the unexhausted claims and to proceed with the

exhausted claims if dismissal of the entire petition would unreasonably

impair the petitioner's right to obtain federal relief.

544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005) (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 520). 

Rasberry cites Anthony and confirms that, under the circumstances presented there,

it remains good law. 448 F.3d at 1155 (“[I]n Anthony, the district court exercised its equitable

power to accept the new petition nunc pro tunc to the date of the original habeas filing—the

district court had mistakenly dismissed the first petition, so it corrected the mistake by

relating the second petition back to the first.”) Rasberry itself deals with a different situation,

where the original petition was wholly unexhausted and the amended petition presented new

claims.

In this case, after Garcia filed his original petition and was told it appeared to be

mixed, he asked for stay and abeyance, and Respondent asked for dismissal outright.

Neither party suggested an order requiring amendment on pain of dismissal, but in view of

Anthony’s holding the Court is now convinced that was the required course. In short, rather

than dismissing the petition outright, the Court should have ordered Garcia to amend his

complaint to delete the unexhausted claims, or face dismissal. Only if he then failed or

refused to amend should his original petition have been dismissed. 

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In order to correct its error, see Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1155 (noting court’s equitable

power to correct its own mistakes, and confirming Anthony permits this), the Court therefore

reconsiders its order of August 26, 2009. That order is modified so that instead of

dismissing the petition it requires Garcia to amend his petition or face dismissal. There is

no reason to revisit the Court’s orders extending time to file the amended petition. Because

Garcia filed his amended petition within the time permitted, the amended petition relates

back to the original petition.

The objections are therefore OVERRULED, the R&R is ADOPTED, and

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Docket number 29) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 12, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01993-LAB-WMC Document 37 Filed 01/13/11 Page 4 of 4