Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-02357/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-02357-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

For good cause appearing the Court will grant both motions to exceed the page

limitation of Local Rule 7.2(e) [Doc. Nos. 215 & 223].

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DREAM PALACE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

MARICOPA COUNTY, 

Defendant. _________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-97-2357-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Pending before the Court are a Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 [Doc. No. 205] and a First Supplemental Fees Application [Doc. No. 225] filed by

Plaintiffs Dream Palace, et al. Also pending before the Court are two motions for permission

to exceed the page limitation of Local Rule 7.2(e): a Motion to Exceed Page Limit filed by

Defendant Maricopa County [Doc. No. 215] and a Request for Leave to File a Reply

Memorandum in Excess of Page Limitation of Rule 7.2(e) filed by Plaintiffs [Doc. No. 223].1

Having considered all briefs, supplemental authorities and materials submitted by the

parties, the Court now makes the following ruling: 

BACKGROUND

Dream Palace is a non-alcoholic, erotic dancing establishment featuring non-obscene,

sexually oriented dances performed on stage, at table side, and in semi-private booths.

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Plaintiffs are Dream Palace, and several of its individual dancers and managers. On April 23,

1997, in reliance on A.R.S. § 11-821(B), Maricopa County ("Defendant") enacted its original

version of Ordinance P-10, a framework for sexually oriented businesses in Maricopa County.

 The ordinance contains licensing requirements as well as time, place, and manner regulations.

 On or about November 23, 1997, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint alleging that the

County lacked authority under A.R.S. § 11-821 to enact Ordinance P-10. Further, the complaint

alleged that the license and permit requirements were facially invalid as a prior restraint on

protected speech. Alerted to the potential problems, the Arizona Legislature drafted and passed

Senate Bill 1162, which amended A.R.S. § 11-821(B) to clarify that counties have the authority

to license and regulate new or existing sexually-oriented businesses, including authority to

impose permit requirements on dancers and managers. Senate Bill 1162 also created A.R.S. §

11-821.02, which further clarified that the counties have authority to regulate the existing

businesses. The Bill also added § 13-1422, which imposed statewide hours of operation on all

sexually oriented businesses which are not licensed to serve alcohol. On June 1, 1998, the

Governor signed the bill into law and it took effect on or about August 21, 1998. 

On June 17, 1998, Defendant once again amended Ordinance P-10, addressing a number

of the constitutional challenges presented in Plaintiffs’ original complaint. In the wake of the

adopted amendments, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, again challenging several

provisions in the ordinance on First Amendment and state law grounds. Plaintiffs

simultaneously filed eight motions for partial summary judgment and Defendant filed a single

cross-motion for summary judgment on all issues. On September 30, 1999, this Court granted

summary judgment in favor of Defendant on all issues except two. First, with regard to the

provision of Ordinance P-10 requiring an adult entertainment business to obtain a license to

operate, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the procedural

safeguards in place were insufficient with respect to pre-existing businesses because there was

no guarantee that a pre-existing business like Dream Palace could continue to operate pending

the outcome of an appeals process. Second, with regard to the provision of Ordinance P-10

requiring dancers to wear identification cards, this Court granted summary judgment in favor

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

of Plaintiffs, holding that the requirement that nude and semi-nude dancers wear identification

cards was invalid. Instead of requiring the dancers to wear a work identification card while on

the premises, the Court found that the purpose of the ordinance could be achieved by requiring

the dancers to maintain the identification card on the premises.

Plaintiffs subsequently appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, once again

challenging several of the provisions in the ordinance on constitutional grounds. On September

27, 2004, the Ninth Circuit held that the "vast majority of the provisions in the ordinance"

withstood constitutional scrutiny. Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1022

(9th Cir. 2004). However, the Ninth Circuit found in favor of Plaintiffs on two issues. First,

with regard to the provision of Ordinance P-10 stating that the information supplied by manager

and employee work permit applicants shall be maintained in confidence subject only to the

public record laws of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit held that while the required disclosures were

valid, Plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the county from disclosing to

members of the public information supplied by work permit applicants. Second, with regard

to the provision of Ordinance P-10 banning "specific sexual activity," the Ninth Circuit held that

the provision amounted to an "unconstitutional burden on the enjoyment of protected

expression." Dream Palace, 384 F.3d at 1021. In rendering this decision, the Ninth Circuit

stated that the county could rectify the unconstitutional language of the provision with a wellcrafted ordinance. Id. The county has since re-drafted the definition of "specific sexual activity"

to conform with constitutional norms regarding expressive activity protected under the First

Amendment. 

After the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision, Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for

Attorneys' Fees, claiming that they are entitled to $388, 842.63 for the fees and recoverable nontaxable costs incurred in litigating these claims. (Doc. No. 205). Defendants responded by

arguing that Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees is groundless because they were the

overwhelming losers in the actions before both this Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

(Doc. No. 216) In the alternative, Defendant argues that even if Plaintiffs were entitled to

receive fees for prevailing on four minor issues, they are only entitled to a total fee award of

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

$1,871.40. (Doc. No. 216). In addition to a Reply contesting Defendant's arguments (Doc. No.

222) , Plaintiffs filed a First Supplemental Fees Application requesting additional fees for costs

incurred preparing the original fees application as well as the costs incurred preparing the Reply

to Defendant's Response and attempting to settle the fee dispute non-judicially (Doc. No. 226).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court has discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to "the

prevailing party" in a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. "Congress

intended to permit the...award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits."

Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, (1980) (per curiam). A party "prevails" when the

resolution of a claim "materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying

the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.

103, 111-12 (1992). A party need not prevail on every issue in order to obtain attorney's fees;

rather, fees are available so long as a party prevails on an important matter, even when the party

ultimately does not prevail on all issues. Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent

School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 790 (1989). Typically, fees are determined by calculating a lodestar

amount, which is arrived at by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on achieving

the obtained results by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 433 (1983).

From the initial fee calculation, the district court should exclude hours that were not "reasonably

expended," including hours that are "excessive redundant or otherwise unnecessary." Hensley,

461 U.S. at 434. (citation omitted). The district court, in its discretion, "may attempt to identify

specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the

limited success." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-437. "The most critical factor is the degree of

success obtained." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

When a plaintiff is only partially successful, the court will engage in a two-step inquiry

to determine the appropriate reduction in the lodestar. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. First, the court

will identify unsuccessful claims that are wholly unrelated to the successful claims and then

exclude the hours spent on unsuccessful claims. See Hensley 461 U.S. at 434-435. Second, if

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then the court must evaluate the significance

of the overall relief obtained by plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the

litigation. If plaintiff obtained "excellent results," full compensation may be appropriate, but

if only "partial or limited" success was obtained, full compensation may be excessive. See

Hensley 461 U.S. at 435-436. 

 

DISCUSSION

A. Prevailing Party 

Plaintiffs challenged Ordinance P-10 on numerous grounds, failing on the majority of

these claims. However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on four issues. The issues

on which Plaintiffs prevailed are listed below: 

(1) In regard to the provision of Ordinance P-10 requiring an adult entertainment business to

obtain a license to operate, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants,

holding that the procedural safeguards in place were insufficient with respect to pre-existing

businesses because there was no guarantee that a pre-existing business like Dream Palace

could continue to operate pending the outcome of an appeals process. 

(2) With regard to the provision of Ordinance P-10 requiring dancers to wear identification

cards, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the

requirement that nude and semi-nude dancers wear identification cards was invalid.

(3) With regard to the provision of Ordinance P-10 stating that the information supplied by

manager and employee work permit applicants shall be maintained in confidence subject

only to the public record laws of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit held that while the required

disclosures were valid, Plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the county from

disclosing to members of the public information supplied by work permit applicants. 

(4) With regard to the provision of Ordinance P-10 banning "specific sexual activity," the

Ninth Circuit held that the provision amounted to an "unconstitutional burden on the

enjoyment of protected expression." Dream Palace, 384 F.3d at 1021. 

B. Fee Award

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

In order to determine the reasonable attorney's fee award, the Court must first

determine a lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. As a preliminary matter, the Court will explain why it

rejects the entire amount requested in Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Fees Application. The

Court will then determine the lodestar using the appropriate legal standards.

i. Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Fees Application

Plaintiffs have filed two separate requests for fees. The initial request for

$388,842.63 was filed on September 21, 2005. In addition, Plaintiffs requested an additional

$33,873 in a "First Supplemental Fees Application," which was filed on August 22, 2006. 

As a preliminary matter, the Court will deny the entire amount requested in the First

Supplemental Fees Application. Plaintiffs had ample time to calculate the fees incurred

preparing the original fees application before filing the original request for fees on

September 21, 2005. Moreover, any additional requests for fees and costs associated with

the time spent preparing the reply memorandum and related papers as well as time spent

attempting to resolve the fees application non-judicially should have appeared in Plaintiffs'

Reply in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, which was filed on August 17,

2006. Finally, in the Order issued on July 16, 2006, granting the parties' Stipulation

Requesting Extension of Due Date for Reply Papers, the Court clearly stated that no further

extensions would be granted. The Court was exceedingly generous in granting numerous

extensions regarding the fees application. Thus, in addition to the other stated reasons, the

supplemental application is untimely. The Court now turns to the merits of the original fees

application.

ii. Reasonable Hourly Rates

 In determining a reasonable fee award, the court considers both the "experience, skill

and reputation of the attorney requesting fees" Trevino v. Gates, 99 F. 3d 911, 924 (9th Cir.

1996), as well as the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). A community's prevailing market rate for legal services is

"indicative of a reasonable hourly rate." Jordan v. Multonomah County, 815 F.2d 1258,

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The Court determined that the appropriate billing rate for Jerome Mooney was $275

per hour given his relative experience and the rate he charged at the commencement of this

action. However, the Court excluded all of the hours billed by Mr. Mooney in the ultimate

lodestar calculation so this rate was not factored into the $110 per hour rate assessed for the

work of all the "other attorneys," which refers to the attorneys other than Mr. Weston and Mr.

Garrou who worked on the prevailing claims in this matter. 

- 7 -

1262-63 (9th Cir. 1987). “[T]he relevant community, is one in which the district court sits.”

Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds,

Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part

on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993). 

The Court finds that the hourly rates used by Plaintiffs in their fees application was

unreasonably high. Plaintiffs used an hourly billing rate of $490 for the services of Mr.

Weston and a rate of $365 for Mr. Garrou. The Court finds that the appropriate hourly rate

for an attorney with Mr. Weston's skill and experience is $350 per hour and that the

appropriate hourly rate for an attorney with Mr. Garrou's skill and experience is $275 per

hour. The Court determined these rates using the information supplied by Plaintiffs'

Declaration of Moving Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees (Doc.

No. 207). In particular, the Court considered the rates charged by attorneys for Quarles &

Brady Streich Lang, LLP in a recent bankruptcy action (Doc. No. 207 at Exhibit A), the

relative experience and skill of Mr. Weston and Mr. Garrou as described in the declaration

of moving counsel (Doc. No. 207 at 2-3), the original hourly rates charged by Mr. Weston

and Garrou at the commencement of this action (Doc. No. 207 at 21) and the ratio of the

hourly rates charged by Mr. Weston against those charged by Mr. Garrou. In addition, the

Court finds that the appropriate rates for the work performed by the other attorneys

associated in this litigation are $110 per hour based on their legal backgrounds and the

amounts they were originally billing when this action commenced.2

 The Court finds that the

relative experience of these other attorneys as well as their reported hourly rates at the time

of the original billing support a rate below that which is requested by Plaintiffs (Doc No.

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

207 at 2-5 and 21-22). The Court also notes that while these hourly rates fall below the rates

requested by Plaintiffs, they exceed the rates suggested by Defendant. 

iii. Reasonable Hours Expended on Litigation

Having determined the reasonable hourly rates for all of the attorneys involved in this

litigation, the Court must next determine the hours reasonably expended. Because Plaintiffs

provided detailed records of the fees charged and hours expended in this extensive litigation,

the Court will exclude the hours spent on unsuccessful claims. In addition, the Court will

exclude the "common time" because these hours are unreasonable given the limited degree

of overall relief awarded to Plaintiffs.

 The Court finds that Plaintiffs achieved very limited degree of success in this

litigation. For example, this Court held that the procedural safeguards of the ordinance were

insufficient with respect to pre-existing businesses like Dream Palace because there was no

guarantee that a pre-existing business could continue to operate pending the outcome of an

appeals process. However, this relative victory must be analyzed in light of the Court of

Appeals ultimate determination that "Ordinance P-10 provides the opportunity for both

access to judicial review and a prompt judicial decision, as the First Amendment requires."

Dream Palace, 384 F.3d 990, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the overall relief obtained

by Plaintiffs regarding the adequacy of procedural safeguards provided by Ordinance P-10

was relatively minor. Next, while this Court held that the requirement that nude and seminude dancers wear identification cards was invalid, the Court found that the purpose of the

Ordinance could be achieved by requiring the dancers to maintain the identification card on

the premises. Again, this success was rather limited in light of the overall relief sought. 

In addition, while Plaintiffs achieved some degree of success in their appeal to the

Ninth Circuit, this success was limited. For example, with regard to the provision of

Ordinance P-10 stating that the information supplied by manager and employee work permit

applicants shall be maintained in confidence subject only to the public record laws of

Arizona, the Ninth Circuit held that while the required disclosures were valid, Plaintiffs

were entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the county from disclosing to members of the

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

public information supplied by work permit applicants. In addition, with regard to the

provision of Ordinance P-10 banning "specific sexual activity," the Ninth Circuit held that

the provision amounted to an "unconstitutional burden on the enjoyment of protected

expression." Dream Palace, 384 F.3d at 1021. In rendering this decision, the Ninth Circuit

stated that the county could rectify the unconstitutional language of the provision with a

well-crafted ordinance. Id. The county has in fact re-drafted the definition of "specific

sexual activity" and adopted narrowly tailored restrictions on the types of expressive

activities erotic dancers may perform. 

In short, the Court finds that Plaintiffs were generally unsuccessful in this matter save

a few minor victories. The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs' original complaint triggered

action by the Arizona Legislature to clarify whether counties have the authority to license

and regulate new or existing sexually-oriented businesses, including authority to impose

permit requirements on dancers and managers. The Court also recognizes that Plaintiffs'

original complaint prompted the county to amend the proposed ordinance to address the

constitutional challenges presented. Yet, while their original complaint prompted a

significant amount of legislative activity in response to the issues they raised, Plaintiffs are

not entitled to attorneys' fees for these efforts because the legislative changes were voluntary

and not judicially sanctioned. See Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., et al. v. West

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, et al., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejecting

the "catalyst theory" as a permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees). Therefore, the

Court finds that the most reasonable way to calculate the time element of the lodestar

calculation is to isolate the hours devoted to working on the successful claims and exclude

the hours labeled as "common time" for all of the claims. This method recognizes Plaintiffs

limited degree of success, but rewards Plaintiffs for the issues on which they did prevail.

Based on Plaintiffs' Summary Chart of Claimed Fees and Costs (Doc No. 206 at

Exhibit A), the Court determines that Plaintiffs are entitled to the hours worked challenging

the provision of Ordinance P-10 requiring the dancers to wear permits. The hours worked

pursuing this claim were summarized by Plaintiffs as follows: 0.3 hours by Mr Weston; 3.85

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

hours by Mr. Garrou; and, 6.03 hours by Mr. Holley and Ms. Behrens. (Doc No. 206 at

Exhibit A).

Next, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to the hours worked challenging the

Amended Adult Business License Requirement, which were summarized by Plaintiffs as

follows: 10 hours for Mr. Weston; 30.18 hours for Mr. Garrou; and, 16.29 hours for Mr.

Holley and Ms. Behrens.(Doc No. 206 at Exhibit A).

 The Court further finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to the hours worked on their

appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the issues of the Ordinance's confidentiality requirements

regarding disclosure of information supplied in permit applications and the Ordinance's ban

on specified sexual activities. The hours worked by each attorney on these two issues was

summarized by Plaintiffs as follows: 15.82 hours by Mr. Garrou and 10 hours by Mr. Brown 

were spent on the confidentiality requirements. Additionally, the hours spent working on

the specified sexual activities ban was summarized as follows: 0.6 hours by Mr. Weston;

13.3 by Mr. Garrou; and, 6.7 hours by Mr. Brown and Ms. Allen. (Doc No. 206 at Exhibit

A). 

//

//

//

//

iv. Lodestar Calculation

Based on the method described above, the Court calculated the lodestar as follows: 

Attorney Hours Rate Total

Weston 10.9 $350/hour $3,815

Garrou 63.15 $275/hour $17,366.25

Others 39.02 $110/hour $4,292.20

$25,473.45

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The twelve Kerr factors bearing on reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees are:(1)

the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal services properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the

attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or

contingent, (7) time limitations, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar

cases. See Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). Here, the Court

paid particular attention to factors (5), (8) and (9).

- 11 -

v. Final Fee Award

The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to $25,473.45 in attorneys' fees for the

work expended in this action. While the lodestar may be adjusted to reflect the degree of

success achieved in this litigation, the Court finds it unnecessary to make such an adjustment

because the overall results achieved were taken into account when calculating the number of

hours reasonably expended in this litigation. Thus, the Kerr factors were subsumed in the

initial lodestar calculation.3

 See McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 252 (9th Cir.

1995). 

Having been heavily involved in this action from the beginning, the Court is wellaware of the degree of success actually achieved by Plaintiffs. Despite the length of time

dedicated to this litigation, Plaintiffs have achieved a very limited degree of success. The

ordinance that prompted this action remained largely unchanged as the majority of the

provisions, including the licensing scheme and operating restrictions, were deemed

constitutional. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiffs are

entitled to only a portion of the amount of attorneys' fees requested. 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Motion to Exceed Page Limit filed by Defendant

Maricopa County [Doc. No. 215] is GRANTED

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to File a Reply

Memorandum in Excess of Page Limitation of Rule 7.2(e) [Doc. No. 223] is GRANTED.

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Fees Application

[Doc. No. 225] is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [Doc. No. 205] is GRANTED IN PART. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Maricopa County shall pay

Twenty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Three and 45/100 dollars ($25,473.45) to

counsel for Plaintiffs.

DATED this 28th day of September, 2006.

Case 2:97-cv-02357-SMM Document 235 Filed 09/29/06 Page 12 of 12