Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00264/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00264-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1 Defendant University of Phoenix Online is owned and operated by Defendant

Apollo Group, Inc. They will be referred to as the University.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joy T. Darden, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Apollo Group, Inc.; University of Phoenix

Online; Heather Phillips, individually and

in her capacity as a manager, 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 05-264-PHX-EHC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel [dkt. 9] and

Plaintiff's Motion for Ext ension of Time [dkt. 8]. Defendants filed a Response [dkt. 10] to

the Motion for Extension of Time. 

Pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [dkt. 6] and

Defendants' Request for Summary Disposition [dkt. 7] of its Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff

has not filed a Response to either of these Motions.

Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff is an African-American female over 40 years old. In November 1999, Plaintiff

began working for the Defendant University of Phoenix Online1 as an online academic

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counselor. In August 2000, Plaintiff was promoted to lead academic counselor. From 2000

to 2002, she received awards for Outstanding Customer Service and Superior Performance.

From 2003 to 2004, Plaintiff was harassed by white managers, who subjected her to

harsher discip line and more frequent reprimands for performance and attendance than

white employees engaging in the same conduct. During 2003, Plaintiff experienced

harassing and differential treatment related to her leave for a work-related injury. In

September 2003, Plaintiff was subjected to monitoring of her telep hone calls and frequent

individual meetings with her manager. Further, Plaintiff was not allowed to perform her

duties as lead counselor, those duties being given to a newly hired employee. 

On October 8, 2003, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opport unit y

Commission (EEOC) based on her former manager's allegedly harassing conduct. Although

the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, Plaintiff did not file suit before t he expiration of the

90-day period. 

In February of 2004, Plaintiff was assigned a new manager, who harassed Plaintiff.

On June 24, 2004, the University announced it was seeking an Academic Trainer in

the Student Services Dep artment. On June 25, 2004, Plaintiff submitted an application for

this position to Defendant Heather Phillips, an Employee Development Manager with the

University. The University interviewed 22 applications for the position. See Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss. [Dkt. 6, p. 2].

On July 8, 2004, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Phillips and Jessica

Wilhelmsen, an Academic Trainer with the Universit y . Plaintiff alleges that the interview

was not conduct ed in a professional manner because "Defendant Phillips did not use an

interview quest ionnaire and asked questions examining Plaintiff's personality as opposed

to questions examining her work experience." [Dkt. 1, ¶ 29]. T hose questions included

"'What three words would describe how others see you?,"' "'How do you feel about peer

reviews?,'" "'When training, what would you do to keep the new employees involved in

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activities?'" and "'How would y ou int eract or how would you react if they appear

overwhelmed?.'" [Dkt. 1, ¶ 30].

On July 9, 2004, Plaintiff was notified that she was not chosen for a second

int erview. She requested an explanation. On July 27, 2004, Defendant Phillips responded

that Plaintiff had not been chosen for a second interview because she was not the right

fit for the position, for which Defendants sought a person skilled in "interaction with the

new counselors in training." [Dkt. 1, ¶ 36]. Defendant Phillips also advised that Plaintiff was

bet t er suited for "an advanced level or continuous education trainer position." [Dkt. 1, ¶

35]. A "white, young female" was selected for the position of academic trainer. [Dkt. 1, ¶

37].

Plaintiff alleges that the University "intent ionally promotes white employees

between [the] approximate ages of 23 and 32 to management and trainer positions." [Dkt.

1, ¶ 7]. Plaintiff further alleges that she was t he only African-American among the 12

academic counselors employed by the University. Plaintiff alleges that two AfricanAmerican employees have been promoted during her tenure with the University.

On July 28, 2004, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge of discrimination on the basis of race

and age. On October 26, 2004, the EEOC dismissed the charge, issuing Plaintiff a right to

sue letter. On January 24, 2005, Plaint iff filed a Complaint, alleging three counts: (1) race

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

et seq.; (2) violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.;

and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Discussion

A. Motion to Appoint Counsel

On July 26, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. [Dkt . 9]. Under Title

VII, the Court may appoint counsel "in such circumstances as the court may deem just."

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). In t he Title VII context, courts look primarily at three factors

in determining whether to appoint counsel: "(1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the

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2

 The EEOC's Dismissal and Notice of Rights is similarly inconclusive. It gave the

reason for dismissing Plaintiff's charge by checking a box next to t he following statement:

The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon it s investigation,

the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obt ained establishes

violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the respondent is in

compliance with the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues that

might be construed as having been raised by this charge.

[Dkt. 1, attach.]. The EEOC did not check the box next to the statement: "The facts alleged

in the charge fail to state a claim under any of the statutes enforced by the EEOC." [Dkt.

1, attach.]. 

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efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel on his or her own; and (3) the merit of the

plaintiff's claim." Johnson v. Unit ed St at es Treasury Dept., 27 F.3d 415, 416-17 (9th Cir.

1994) (internal quotation omitted).

Plaintiff's only stated financial resource is her disability income. [Dkt. 9, p. 3].

Plaint iff alleges that she has contacted at least six law offices: two declined representation,

two required a retainer she could not p rovide, and two charged a consultation fee Plaintiff

could not afford. [Dkt. 9, pp. 2-3].

When evaluating the merits of a T itle VII claim for purposes of deciding a motion

to appoint counsel, "the court need normally look only to a determination by an

administrative agency, the EEOC." Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, 662 F.2d

1301, 1309 (9th Cir. 1981) (improper to deny appointment of counsel on ground t hat if the

plaintiff's case had merit an attorney would accept representation).

Here, the EEOC has not made a determination as to t he merit s of Plaintiff's claim. In

a letter advising Plaintiff of the dismissal of her charge, the EEOC advised that "[t]his

dismissal is not a statement on the merits of your case." [Dkt . 1, attach.]. The EEOC did not

dismiss for lack of reasonable cause, but because it found that "the information in the file

does not indicate that any further invest igat ion of your case would necessarily result in

any finding of discrimination." [Dkt. 1, attach. (emphasis added)].2

 

Because the EEOC did not address whether there is reasonable cause to believe the

claim has merit, the Court will examine whether Plaintiff's Title VII claim has merit.

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Plaintiff alleges that (1) she was not promoted despite her qualifications for the

position; (2) "no person of color over the age of 33 has ever been hired or promoted to an

academic trainer position at the University" [Dkt. 9, ¶ 4]; and (3) "only 'two' persons of

color under the age of 33 were ever promoted to counseling services management

p ositions at the University" [Dkt. 9, aff., ¶ 5]. If proven, these allegations arguably state a

prima facie case of employment discriminat ion. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (plaintiff must prove "she applied for an available position for

which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination"). 

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants proffered reason for not promoting

Plaintiff was that she was not the right fit for an Academic Trainer position. Defendants so

found aft er interviewing Plaintiff and 21 other applicants. During Plaintiff's interview,

Defendants inquired about Plaintiff's personality, specifically her ability to relate to new

employees. T his was argubably a reasonable inquiry given the personal interactions

required of a trainer. These facts, if proven, arguably p rovide "a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason" for rejecting Plaintiff. See Id., at 254-56. 

At this juncture, Plaintiff must "demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the

true reason for the employment decision." Id., at 256. Plaintiff has alleged facts that permit

the inference that Defendants' proffered reason for failing to promote Plaintiff- that she was

not the right fit- was not the true reason for the employment decision. 

First, Plaintiff's employment history arguably justifies an inference that Defendants

did not promote Plaintiff based on animus against Plaintiff on the basis of her race and age.

Plaintiff alleges that she harassed by white managers, who subjected her to harsher

discipline and more frequent reprimands for performance and attendance than white

employees engaging in the same conduct. Plaintiff further alleges that she exp erienced

harassing and differential treatment related to her leave for a work-related injury. Plaintiff

alleges that she was subjected to monitoring of her telephone calls and frequent individual

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3

 The probative value of Plaintiff's stat ist ics is uncertain. The Ninth Circuit has

instructed that "statistical evidence derived from an extremely small universe has little

predictive value and must be disregarded." Aragon, 292 F.3d at 663 (no inference of

discrimination where three of four workers fired were white) (quotation omitted).

"Furthermore, the statistics must show a stark pattern of discrimination unexplainable on

grounds other than race." Ibid (quotation omitted).

Here, neither the number of Academic Trainers nor the number of counseling

management positions have been given, and t hus the statistics are incomplete. Discovery

may remedy this deficiency. 

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meetings wit h her manager. Plaintiff further alleges that this conduct continued when she

was assigned to a new manager in February 2004. Plaintiff alleges that she was not allowed

t o perform her duties as lead counselor, those duties being given to a newly hired

employee. 

Second, Plaintiff offers statistical evidence to allegedly demonstrate Defendants'

animus against minorities and those over age 33. Plaintiff has alleged that no person of

color over the age of 33 has been employed as an Academic Trainer. Plaintiff further alleges

that only two persons of color under the age of 33 have held counseling management

positions. Statistics may constitute circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Aragon v.

Republic Silver State Disposal, 292 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2002). 3

Based on Plaint iff's financial resources, her efforts to obtain an attorney, and the

merits of her claim, t he Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion fo Appointment of Counsel

p ursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B), subject to finding an attorney for Plaintiff. Because

"Congress has never created a fund for payment of court-appointed counsel in T itle VII

cases," the Court will search the local legal communit y for an attorney to represent Plaintiff.

Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of California, 742 F.2d 515 (9th Cir.

1984). The Court will inform the parties of the result of this search by further Court order.

B. Motion to Dismiss

On June 10, 2005, Defendants answered Counts One and Two and filed a Motion

to Dismiss Count Three and Defendant Phillips. [Dkt. 6]. Plaintiff has not filed a Response

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to the Motion t o Dismiss. In addressing a Motion to Dismiss the claim of a Plaintiff who

has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that "the district

court should determine if counsel would aid its resolution before disposing of the case on

it s merits." Johnson, 939 F.2d at 825. Here, counsel would not aid the resolution of t he

Motion to Dismiss because, as discussed below, Count Three will not be dismissed and

whether to dismiss Defendant Phillips turns on established Ninth Circuit law. 

1. Count Three: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Plaint iff has not sufficiently alleged extreme and outrageous

conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants cite

Mintz v. Bell Atlantic Systems Leasing Int'l., 183 Ariz. 550, 555, 905 P.2d 559, 564 (Ct. App.

1995), where the Court found as follows:

Because of its legitimate business purpose, the bare fact that Bell Atlant ic

called Mintz back to work sooner than her doctor recommended or t hat Bell

Atlantic hand delivered a letter to Mintz in the hospital cannot be regarded

as "atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community," even in light

of Mintz's known susceptibility to emotional problems.

T his case is distinct from Mintz because Plaintiff has alleged a pattern of

discrimination over the course of two years, which allegedly includes monitoring Plaintiff's

telephone calls, subjecting her to frequent meetings wit h her manager, reprimanding her

for infractions that were overlooked when committed by white employees, differential

treatment in Plaintiff's use of the leave policy, and allegedly culminating in failing to

promote Plaint iff on the basis of her race and age. See Coffin v. Safeway, 323 F. Supp. 2d

997, 1005-06 (D. Ariz. 2004) (t he "Court encounters little difficulty distinguishing Mintz"

where plaintiff alleged verbal and physical sexual harassment over an eight-month period).

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2. Defendant Phillips

Plaintiff sues Defendant Phillips "individually and in her capacity as a manager"

with the Universit y . [Dkt. 1, caption]. Under Title VII and the AEDA, Plaintiff cannot

maintain claims against Defendant Phillips in her individual capacity. The Nint h Circuit has

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found in a Title VII case that "civil liability for employment discrimination does not extend

to individual agents of the employ er who committed the violations, even if that agent is a

supervisory employee." Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.

1998) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's supervisor because supervisor could not be liable

under Title VII); Coffin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 ("an employee that is a supervisor cannot

be held liable under Title VII"). Nor can an emp loyee be liable under the ADEA. Miller v.

Maxwell's Int'l., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993) ("because of the similarities in the Title VII and

the ADEA statutory schemes," employees cannot be liable under ADEA); Rohm v. Homer,

367 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284-85 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (dismissing supervisor and employee

because the statutory scheme of the ADEA "itself indicat es that Congress did not intend

to impose individual liability on employees"). Because she cannot be individually liable

under Title VII and the AEDA, Defendant Phillips, in her individual capacity, will be

dismissed from Plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims.

Plaintiff has alleged t hat Defendant Phillips took part in the course of conduct

constituting intentional infliction of emotional distress; Defendant Phillips in her individual

cap acit y is a party to the claim for emotional distress. Defendant Phillips in her official

capacity is subject to all claims.

C. Other Motions

Defendants filed a Request for Summary Disposition [dkt. 7] of the Motion to

Dismiss on the ground that Plaintiff failed to file a Response. Having reached the merits of

the Motion to Dismiss, the Request for Summary Disposition is moot.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time [dkt. 8] to file a Response t o

Defendants' Answer and to Defendants' Request for Summary Disposition. Plaintiff is not

permitted to file a reply t o Defendants' Answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) ("the court may

order a reply to an answer"). The Request for Summary Disposition is moot. Plaint iff's

Motion for Extension of Time will be denied as moot. 

Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion t o Appoint Counsel [dkt. 9] is GRANTED,

subject to finding an attorney to represent Plaintiff. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant s' Motion to Dismiss [dkt. 6] is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Defendant Phillips in her individual capacity

is dismissed from Counts One and Two of the Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Request for Summary Disposition

[dkt. 7] is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Mot ion for Extension of Time [dkt. 8] is

DENIED as moot.

DATED this 3rd day of March, 2006.

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