Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01242/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01242-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIZER R. DICKERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW MOUNTS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-CV-01242-OWW-LJO

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION, WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE

GRANTED

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

Plaintiff Kizer R. Dickerson is a state parolee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this civil rights action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action, along

with a request for a temporary restraining order, on September 11, 2006. (Docs. 1 & 3.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must conduct an initial review of the

complaint to determine whether it sufficiently states a claim. The court must dismiss a complaint

or portion thereof if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim,

leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured

by amendment.

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must accept as true the allegations

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick

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28 Plaintiff has since been released from custody and remains on parole under the same conditions imposed

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upon him prior to the revocation. (Doc. 3 at 3.) 

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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that his parole conditions are “unconstitutionally vague.” 

The complained of parole conditions are (1) that he is “not to view, possess or have access to

videotapes, films, magazines or photographs depicting any type of sexual activity or sexually

oriented material,” and (2) that he is not permitted to ingest alcohol. (Doc. 3-2, Plaintiff’s Decl.

at ¶¶ 2-3.) On January 4, 2006, Plaintiff underwent a routine urine test, which, according to

parole authorities, produced a positive result for ingestion of alcohol. (Doc. 1, Compl.. at ¶15.)

A few days later, on January 9, 2006, parole officers conducted a “routine” search of Plaintiff’s

residence, at which time the officers seized material they believed was pornographic. (Id. at

¶14.) The next day, January 10, 2006, Plaintiff was arrested for violating the conditions of his

parole, specifically for using alcohol and for possession of sexually oriented material. (Id. at

¶15.) A probable cause hearing was held on January 24, 2006, followed by a revocation hearing

on February 9, 2006. Plaintiff’s parole was revoked and he was apparently remanded to

custody. (See id. at ¶¶ 18 & 23; Doc. 3 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that he was denied the right to

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speak and present witnesses at either the probable cause or the revocation hearing, in violation of

his due process rights. Plaintiff also alleges that the conditions of his parole were

“unconstitutionally vague,” that he was subject to an illegal search, and that parole officials

unreasonably seized his property. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and injunctive relief,

including an order requiring defendants to discharge plaintiff from parole supervision and

expunge his records of the parole violation..

When a prisoner or parolee challenges the legality or duration of his custody, or raises a

constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release, his sole federal remedy is to

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 90-91 (2005); see also

Goldyn v. Hayes, 444 F.3d 1062, 1064 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006)(state prisoner remains in “custody” for

purposes of habeas jurisdiction while on parole). Similarly, a challenge to the legality of

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restrictions placed on a parolee must be brought as a habeas corpus action. See Williams v.

Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003)(probation restrictions “define[] the perimeters of []

confinement”). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the revocation of his Parole stemmed from the imposition of

allegedly unconstitutional parole conditions and resulted from searches and hearings that

otherwise violated his constitutional rights. These allegations go to the heart of the “perimeters

of [his] confinement” and to the legality of the revocation of his parole. Although Plaintiff also

challenges the current imposition of these same parole conditions upon him, any finding by this

court that the conditions are unconstitutional would be the equivalent of a finding as to “the

legality or duration of his [prior] custody.” 

Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment

under § 1983. But, prior to bringing any such action, plaintiff must first “prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994). “A claim . . . bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that

has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488.

Plaintiff may not at this time bring a civil rights action arising out of his allegedly

wrongful parole conditions or revocation. Plaintiff’s sole potential remedy in federal court is a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, before filing any such petition in federal court,

Plaintiff must first exhaust all remedies available in the state system, including the filing of a

habeas corpus action in state court, if such an action is available in the state system on these

facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Accordingly, this action is HEREBY DISMISSED, without

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The

underlying action having been dismissed, Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

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emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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