Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02230/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02230-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HOLLYNN D’LIL,

Plaintiff,

v.

RIVERBOAT DELTA KING, INC.; 

CITY OF SACRAMENTO; OLD 

SACRAMENTO BUSINESS 

ASSOCIATION, INC.,; and DOES 

1 through 50, Inclusive, 

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:11-2230 WBS AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Hollynn D’Lil, a paraplegic, brought this 

action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 

12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and analogous state laws against 

defendants Riverboat Delta King, Inc. (“Delta King”) and the City 

of Sacramento arising out of physical obstacles she allegedly 

encountered while visiting the Delta King. Plaintiff separately

settled all claims against both defendants, but was unable to 

agree on attorney’s fees and costs with Delta King and now 

requests the court to determine the award. 

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I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action on August 23, 2011 and 

asserted claims for (1) the public services provisions of the 

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, against the city; (2) section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against the city, 29 U.S.C. § 794; (3) 

the public accommodations provisions of the ADA against Delta 

King and the city, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; (4) California Health and 

Safety Code section 19955 against Delta King and the city; (5) 

California Government Code section 4456 against the city; (6) the 

California Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”) against Delta King and 

the city, Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq.; (7) the Unruh Civil Rights 

Act against Delta King and the city, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq.; 

(8) California Government Code section 11135 against the city; 

(9) California Government Code section 12948 against Delta King 

and the city; and (10) state law negligence against Delta King 

and the city.

In a thirty-five-page exhibit attached to her 

Complaint, plaintiff alleged numerous barriers that prevented her 

from fully enjoying the Delta King. Plaintiff and the city of 

Sacramento reached a separate settlement in December 2014. In 

July 2014, Delta King moved for summary judgment limited to the 

issues of 1) the slope of the gangways; 2) vertical access to the 

fourth and fifth decks; 3) leveling of the cambered decks; 4) 

removal of raised thresholds; and 5) the configuration of the 

doors. The court denied Delta King’s motion for summary judgment 

in its entirety. D’Lil v. Riverboat Delta King, Inc., 59 F. 

Supp. 3d 1001 (E.D. Cal. 2014). That Order more fully discusses 

the facts of this case. 

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As the trial date approached, the parties agreed to a 

bifurcated trial in which the first phase would be a bench trial,

followed by a jury trial limited to three significant issues. 

The primary reason for bifurcating the trial was to render the 

case digestible for the jury and avoid having to instruct and 

inevitably confuse the jury about the intricacies of every 

alleged barrier and the corresponding federal and state access 

guidelines. The bench trial commenced on January 22, 2015, and 

after 4 days of trial, Delta King and plaintiff reached a 

settlement. 

In the Consent Decree memorializing the settlement, the 

parties agreed that plaintiff “shall be deemed to be the 

‘prevailing party.’” (Consent Decree ¶ 24 (Docket No. 159).) To 

say that the parties disagree about the appropriate award of fees 

and costs is a gross understatement. Plaintiff seeks a minimum 

fee award of $789,760 and costs of $218,893, for a total award of 

$1,008,653 without even considering her requested enhancement. 

Delta King contends plaintiff has already been overcompensated in 

the amount of $74,294.43 and thus the court should award 

plaintiff absolutely no fees or costs. Together, the parties 

submitted no less than 4,470 pages of briefing, declarations, and 

exhibits to “aid” the court in determining the appropriate 

award.1

 

1 Continuing with the tradition of “what appears to be 

petty bickering,” D’Lil, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 n.2, Delta King 

filed seventeen objections to Mr. Thimesch’s declaration, 

primarily on the grounds that his statements are argumentative. 

(Docket No. 188-1.) Suffice to say, the court understands the 

difference between argument and evidence. In Mr. Thimesch’s 

second declaration, plaintiff also raised many objections to 

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II. Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, a federal court may 

award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to the prevailing party in an 

action under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; see also Cal. Civ. Code 

§§ 52(a), 55 (authorizing an award of attorney’s fees to a 

prevailing party in suits brought under California civil rights 

statutes). A plaintiff prevails “when actual relief on the 

merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship 

between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a 

way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 

U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). Here, defendant does not dispute that 

plaintiff was the prevailing party and is entitled to an award of 

reasonable attorney’s fees under the Consent Decree, but argues

that the fees plaintiff requests are exorbitant and unreasonable. 

The court calculates a reasonable amount of attorney’s 

fees by following a two-step process. First, the court 

determines the lodestar calculation--“the number of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable 

hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Second, the court may adjust the lodestar figure “pursuant to a 

variety of factors.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 

1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 

1975) (enumerating factors on which courts may rely in adjusting 

the lodestar figure). There is a strong presumption that the 

 

Delta King’s evidence. Because the court has not relied on any 

objectionable evidence, the parties’ objections are overruled as 

moot. 

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lodestar amount is reasonable. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 

F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In determining the size of an appropriate fee award, 

the Supreme Court has emphasized that courts need not “achieve 

auditing perfection” or “become green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox 

v. Vice, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2217 (2011). Rather, 

because the “essential goal of shifting fees . . . is to do rough 

justice,” the court may “use estimates” or “take into account 

[its] overall sense of a suit” to determine a reasonable 

attorney’s fee. Id. Awarded fees should be “adequate to attract 

competent counsel,” without “produc[ing] windfalls to attorneys.” 

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1984).

A. Lodestar Calculation

1. Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff submits an 837-page billing statement 

itemizing the time spent by attorneys Timothy Thimesch and 

Michelle Thimesch. (Docket No. 174.) Ms. Thimesch billed 38.7 

hours, and defendant does not dispute the reasonableness of that 

time. Defendant hotly disputes the reasonableness of Mr. 

Thimesch’s claimed 2,032.3 hours.

As an initial impression and based on its familiarity 

with this case, the court agrees that Mr. Thimesch’s claimed 

2,032.3 hours far exceed a reasonable number of hours expended on 

this case. The court questions not only the reasonableness of 

this amount of time, but also whether Mr. Thimesch’s records 

accurately reflect the time he actually worked. Unfortunately, 

this is not the first time a court has questioned the accuracy of 

Mr. Thimesch’s representations as to the hours he worked. In 

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another case in this district, a judge reduced Mr. Thimesch’s 

hours by 26.6 for time purportedly spent preparing a motion for 

summary judgment after the case had settled and several 

additional hours for attending a hearing that never occurred. 

See Riker v. Distillery, No. Civ. 2:08-00450 MCE JFM, 2009 WL 

4269466, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009).

2

a. Block Billing

Attorneys are often criticized for “block billing” 

because it “makes it more difficult to determine how much time 

was spent on particular activities.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. 

Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). “Block billing is a 

practice where the amount of time spent by an attorney on each 

discrete task is not identified, but instead all hours spent 

during the course of a day on multiple tasks are billed 

together.” Yeager v. Bowlin, No. Civ. 2:08-102 WBS JFM, 2010 WL 

1689225, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010). “The California State 

Bar’s Committee on Mandatory Fee Arbitration has concluded that 

block billing ‘hides accountability’ and may ‘increase time by 

10% to 30%’ by lumping together tasks.” Id.

Mr. Thimesch’s billings include significant block 

billing. For example, on August 22, 2014, Mr. Thimesch billed 

14.6 hours for work on plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment, describing his tasks only as 

“working on all opposition documents simultaneously.” (Docket 

No. 174 at 479.) The following two days, Mr. Thimesch billed 

 

2 Judge England ultimately vacated his decision in Riker

after the parties settled attorney’s fees on appeal. (See 2:08-

CV-450 MCE-JFM, Docket No. 123.) 

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another 18.1 each day with the exact cursory description. (Id.

at 580.) This pattern continued with 17.8 hours billed on August 

25, 2014 and 19.2 hours billed on August 26, 2014 for “working on 

all opposition documents simultaneously.” (Id. at 584-85.) 

Billing 87.8 hours over a five-day period justified only as 

“working on all opposition documents simultaneously” deprives the 

court of even the slightest bit if information “to determine how 

much time was spent on particular activities.” Welch, 480 F.3d 

at 948. Another example of block billing occurred during trial 

when Mr. Thimesch billed 5 hours justified only by the 

explanation that he “called []Karl Danz regarding trial prep.” 

(Docket No. 174 at 784.) 

In preparing his opposition to defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment alone, Mr. Thimesch billed approximately 226

hours, and most of this time is billed in large blocks with very 

little explanation. Although the summary judgment motion raised 

some difficult issues such that an opposition would necessitate 

more time than in a routine ADA case, plaintiff also submitted 

significant briefing on unnecessary issues. The court agrees 

with defendant that the total time expended in opposing the 

summary judgment motion was unreasonable. In light of the 

extensive block billing throughout the case, the inadequate 

explanations for the work undertaken in those entries, the 

court’s familiarity with the issues raised in the summary 

judgment motion, and plaintiff’s over-investment of time on 

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issues that were irrelevant to the motion for summary judgment,

the court will deduct 75 hours from Mr. Thimesch’s billings.3

b. Parsing of Related Tasks

In reviewing Mr. Thimesch’s 837-page billing statement, 

which has 3,442 entries, another reason his timesheets likely

overstate the time he expended is readily apparent. At the 

opposite extreme from block billing, a vast majority of Mr. 

Thimesch’s billings divide related tasks so that time expended on 

what truly is one task receives two or more billing entries. For 

example, Mr. Thimesch repeatedly billed .1 of an hour to receive 

an email and, as a separate entry, an additional .1 of an hour to 

respond to that email. (See, e.g., id. at 45, 49, 58, 59, 64, 

91, 133, 143, 158, 186, 216, 223, 789.) As another example, Mr. 

Thimesch billed .1 to review the court’s minutes from the bench 

trial and an additional .1 to review the court’s revised minutes. 

(See id. at 783.) Reviewing the initial and revised minutes 

together could not have taken 6 minutes total, but Mr. Thimesch 

managed to bill 12 minutes for this simple task. Because most 

entries are divided even when a task is entirely related, the 

average time entry for all of Mr. Thimesch’s entries is .35, or 

21 minutes. (Second Thimesch Decl. ¶ 32 (Docket No. 197-1).) 

While this approach may initially seem like an adequate 

response to block billing criticisms, it is similarly subject to 

abuse. It is commonly understood that attorneys round up time in 

 

3 This deduction is less than 4% of Mr. Thimesch’s total 

claimed time, which is a very conservative estimate compared to 

the California State Bar’s Committee on Mandatory Fee 

Arbitration’s estimated 10% to 30% increase that results from 

block billing. Yeager v. Bowlin, 2010 WL 1689225, at *1. 

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their billing entries so that a 4-minute task would be billed at 

.1 of an hour (6 minutes). When every task is parsed into 

separate billing entries, the attorney receives the benefit of 

each minute that was not spent working, but was simply added from 

rounding up. Although these extra minutes may seem miniscule, 

they can make a significant impact on the overall time billed 

when, as in this case, the billing statement has 3,442 entries.4 

If 65% of the entries received the benefit of only one extra 

minute from rounding up, the total extra time would equal

approximately 37 hours. Given the incredible number of entries 

billed at .1 of an hour that likely received the benefit of more 

than one minute from rounding up, the court finds that this is a 

conservative estimate of the amount of time overstated due to 

separating related tasks and rounding up each entry. The court 

will therefore deduct 37 hours from Mr. Thimesch’s billings. 

c. Bench Trial

Throughout the four days of the bench trial, the court 

observed Mr. Thimesch spend several hours on issues that were 

either undisputed, irrelevant, or were supposed to be relegated

to the second phase of trial before the jury. The court 

repeatedly advised Mr. Thimesch to avoid duplication and save any 

questions relevant to the jury phase or both phases for the

 

4 The court recognizes that Mr. Thimesch did not bill 

“attorney time” in every billing entry. The extraordinary number 

of entries, however, makes it impractical and unreasonably 

burdensome for the court to determine how many entries actually 

bill attorney time. The court also recognizes that many of Mr. 

Thimesch’s entries are billed in increments even lower than 6 

minutes. Even with these entries, the added benefit from parsing 

the entries and rounding up is undeniable. 

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second phase. (See, e.g., Jan. 27, 2015 Tr. at 347:6-348:15.) 

To exclude this wasted time during trial and in preparation for 

it, the court will deduct 5 hours from Mr. Thimesch’s billings.

d. Work on Lawson’s Unrelated Claims

Mr. Thimesch also represented William Lawson, who 

visited the Delta King and allegedly experienced barriers that 

the plaintiff in this case did not. Mr. Thimesch mentioned 

joining Mr. Lawson in this case as the trial approached, but 

never sought to do so and, if he had, would have had difficulty 

overcoming the late filing of any motion to amend. Although Mr. 

Thimesch contends that the time expended with Mr. Lawson should 

be included because plaintiff intended to call Mr. and Mrs. 

Lawson as witnesses, the court will exclude entries that do not 

appear from their descriptions to have any relation to trial 

preparation. To the contrary, they appear to be repeated 

communications with Mr. Lawson about and research and work done 

in contemplation and settlement of his potential case. Most of 

the entries even identify Mr. Lawson, not plaintiff, in the 

client column. Because Mr. Lawson was not a plaintiff in this 

case, the fees attributable to his threatened lawsuit and 

settlement cannot be assessed against defendant in this case. 

Based on the court’s independent review of the billings to 

exclude time attributable to Mr. Lawson’s potential case and 

settlement of his claims, the court will deduct 19.9 hours from 

Mr. Thimesch’s billings. 

e. Travel Time

Mr. Thimesch maintains his office in his home in Walnut 

Creek and billed 143.9 hours for travel time from Walnut Creek to 

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Sacramento. Judges in this district have repeatedly held that it 

is unreasonable for attorneys who routinely try cases in this 

district but maintain offices elsewhere for their own convenience 

to shift their travel costs to their adversary. See Riker, 2009 

WL 4269466, at *3; Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 

2:03-1843 DFL CMK, 2005 WL 3287233, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 

2005). A primary reason for this limitation is that a fee-paying 

client would consider any added costs of retaining an out-of-town 

lawyer and could either negotiate a reduced cost for travel or 

elect to hire local counsel. Martinez, 2005 WL 3287233, at *5. 

Although Mr. Thimesch represents that he has now decided to cease

his practice in this district, he has filed 40 cases in this 

district, and the plaintiff in this case brought 9 of those 

cases. In light of Mr. Thimesch’s history of practice in this 

district, it is not reasonable to make defendant shoulder the 

increased cost of his travel to Sacramento just because Mr. 

Thimesch has chosen to live in Walnut Creek. Defendant concedes, 

however, that one hour per trip to Sacramento on non-trial days 

would be reasonable because that is generally the maximum time 

local counsel would charge for travel time and that all of Mr. 

Thimesch’s travel time on trial days is reasonable. The court 

will therefore deduct 106.9 hours from Mr. Thimesch’s hours. 

f. Clerical Tasks

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[i]t simply is not 

reasonable for a lawyer to bill, at her regular hourly rate, for 

tasks that a non-attorney employed by her could perform at a much 

lower cost.” Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 

1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on denial of reh’g, 

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984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Bakewell v. Astrue, No. 

Civ. 3:10–01525–JE, 2013 WL 638892, at *3 (D. Or. Jan.9, 2013) 

(“[C]osts associated with clerical tasks are typically considered 

overhead expenses reflected in an attorney’s hourly billing rate, 

and are not properly reimbursable.”); accord Johnson v. Allied 

Trailer Supply, No. Civ. 2:13-1544 WBS, 2014 WL 1334006, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 

274, 288 n.10 (1989)).

Mr. Thimesch generally appears to recognize that he 

cannot seek reimbursement for clerical tasks as he often 

indicated “clerical” or “paralegal” in many of his billing 

entries and accounted for that time in separate columns for which 

he does not seek reimbursement. In reviewing his billings, 

however, the court noticed that at least one entry designated as 

“clerical” and involving a clerical task appears to have 

inadvertently been billed as attorney time. (See Docket No. 174 

at 538.) 

Defendant also objects to tasks, such as preparing 

subpoenas, that should not have been billed as attorney time. 

For example, on May 24, 2012, Mr. Thimesch described his work as 

“drafted []a 215‐page discovery package consisting of notices of 

deposition, requests to produce, interrogatories, request for 

admission, and 5 subpoenas; revision to final.” (Id. at 50.) He 

then billed 5.3 attorney hours, 1.3 paralegal hours, and .5 

clerical hours. (Id.) The court agrees with defendant that the 

calculated attorney time on these primarily routine tasks 

overstates the true attorney time and, based on the description, 

was comprised of more than 30 minutes of clerical time. Mr. 

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Thimesch also billed attorney time when he “logged and paid a 

litigation expense” on at least seven occasions, billing 1.4 for 

these clerical tasks. (See id. at 51, 52, 740.) 

Other similar entries, such as receiving a fax 

regarding a subpoena and receiving emails to continue a 

deposition, are also clerical tasks that should not be billed at 

an attorney rate. (See, e.g., id. at 56, 156, 536.) On several 

occasions, Mr. Thimesch also solicited advice and sample filings 

from other attorneys. Although this practice is not

questionable, his time to simply “receive[]” sample documents

back from other attorneys and “preserve” them to the “case 

notebook” are clerical tasks. (See id. at 406.) In fact, Mr. 

Thimesch consistently and extensively bills his time to 

“preserve” his research and work to the “case notebook.” (See, 

e.g., id. at 325, 391.) The court will therefore deduct 7 hours

to account for attorney time billed for clerical tasks. 

g. Lack of Billing Judgment

“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client 

also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to 

statutory authority.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the court cannot 

fathom that, upon receiving Mr. Thimesch’s billings, a fee-paying 

client would submit payment without objection or even termination 

of the attorney-client relationship. A client surely would not 

expect to pay Mr. Thimesch approximately $56 for every voicemail 

he leaves, text message he sends, or email he receives. Even 

assuming it has become the standard practice to bill for these 

tasks, attorneys must exercise billing judgment before submitting 

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the bill to their client, and most attorneys would exclude or 

limit such offensive charges. Not only is it clear that Mr. 

Thimesch did not exercise judgment in finalizing his billings in 

this case, he had no incentive to do so because he was never 

going to submit the bill to his client. 

The time billed for phone calls made during trial 

illustrate the lack of efforts made to meaningfully review the 

billing. From the first day of trial on January 22, 2015 and 

through January 26, 2015, Mr. Thimesch logged entries for twentyfour phone calls, totaling 2.1 hours. On one occasion, Mr. 

Thimesch billed .25 of an hour to call Karl Danz when his 

billings indicate that he merely “left [a] message to return call 

regarding trial prep.” (Docket No. 174 at 784.) Surely, his 

voice message did not total 15 minutes and Mr. Thimesch meant to 

bill less time. This apparent clerical error underscores the 

court’s finding that Mr. Thimesch’s lengthy billings were not 

adequately reviewed. Although this error may be readily 

apparent, many errors would be less obvious and it is not

feasible for the court to review all 3,442 entries to catch even 

the obvious errors. The court has no reason to believe that Mr. 

Thimesch labored to ensure the accuracy of his billings, 

especially because he lacked the same incentive to do so as an 

attorney submitting a bill to a client. 

In light of the lack of billing judgment apparent 

through the excessive entries for voicemails, text messages, 

and merely receiving emails or correspondences and the court’s 

finding that Mr. Thimesch did not closely review his 837-page 

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billing to correct inadvertent errors, the court will deduct 20

hours from Mr. Thimesch’s time. 

h. Extent of Plaintiff’s Success

The Supreme Court has instructed that “the extent of a 

plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper 

amount of an award of attorney’s fees.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

440. “Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that 

is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours 

spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering 

the amount of a reasonable fee.” Id. On the other hand, in a 

case with claims that “involve a common core of facts or [are] 

based on related legal theories,” it is “difficult to divide the 

hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. at 435. In those 

cases, “the district court should focus on the significance of 

the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the 

hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. In such 

cases, “a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not 

have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court 

did not adopt each contention raised.” Id. at 440.

The Ninth Circuit has “applied Hensley’s degree of 

success principles to a variety of fee-shifting statutes, 

including . . . Americans With Disability Act claims.” Aguirre 

v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 

2006). In ADA cases such as this, a single claim may allege the 

existence of numerous “unrelated and distinct” barriers that are 

“premised on different sections of the ADA Accessibility 

Guidelines to determine liability.” Kalani v. Nat’l Seating & 

Mobility, Inc., No. Civ. 2:13-00061 JAM CK, 2014 WL 3956669, at 

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*4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). When a plaintiff prevails only on a limited 

number of barriers, courts have reduced the plaintiff’s award of 

attorney’s fees in light of the limited success of the 

litigation. See, e.g., id. (reducing plaintiff’s fee award by 

90% when, of the 39 alleged barriers, plaintiff prevailed on only 

2, defendants prevailed on 16, and 21 were mooted). This type of 

reduction makes sense only when the court can identify and 

compare the total barriers at issue and the barriers successfully 

remediated through the litigation. 

Here, however, the parties’ assessments of the barriers 

at issue and the success plaintiff obtained through the Consent 

Decree are best described as ships passing in the night. Both

sides attempt to tally the barriers at issue at the time of trial 

and those remediated through the Consent Decree and then quantify 

the degree of plaintiff’s success. According to plaintiff, 54 

barriers went to trial and the Consent Decree corrected 196 

barriers, thus plaintiff “achieved an astounding 360% of the 

relief that went to trial.” (Pl.’s Reply at 1:23-24.) 

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that only 5 barriers went 

to trial and the Consent Decree corrected 1/2 of 1 of those 

barriers and thus calculates plaintiff’s success at 10%. (See

Def.’s Opp’n at 4:10-14.) The true percentage still lies only in 

the eyes of the beholder.

5

 

5 The fact that the parties still cannot even agree as to 

the barriers that were at issue at the time of trial only 

underscores the frustration the court experienced with this case 

when attempting to decipher a manageable way to try this case 

before a jury. 

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With the exception of three significant issues, the 

parties agreed the court would decide all remaining issues. The 

Stipulated Bifurcation Order articulated the issues for the jury 

as:

a. Whether the lack of vertical (wheelchair) access to 

the fourth and fifth levels of the Delta King are a 

violation of law. 

b. Whether, after 1989, an “alteration” to the Delta 

King occurred which triggered application of ADAAG 

or Title 24 standards.

c. Whether providing (wheelchair) vertical access to 

the fourth and fifth levels of the Delta King is 

“readily achievable.”

(Stipulation and Order to Bifurcate at 2:2-10 (Docket No. 107).) 

The parties did not itemize the issues for the bench trial 

because, as the court understood it, the bench trial involved 

numerous discrete barriers and a determination as to whether they 

complied with the applicable standards.6 These barriers were 

identified in plaintiff’s Barrier Matrix.7 When the bench trial 

 

6 As defense counsel explained at one of the Pretrial 

Conferences and the court understood at the time of trial, 

whether the jury found that an alteration or “triggering 

modification” had been completed affected what standards

controlled the alleged barriers addressed during the bench trial. 

(See Jan. 7, 2015 Tr. at 4:16-6:7.) 

7 The court recognizes that defendant mooted claims based 

on some of the barriers in plaintiff’s initial Matrix by bringing 

the barrier at issue into compliance during the early stages of 

litigation. The Supreme Court has rejected the “catalyst theory” 

under the ADA and a plaintiff may not recover fees when a 

defendant voluntarily remediates barriers “without a 

corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the 

parties.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). Defendant 

recognizes, however, that plaintiff’s billings render it 

impossible to excise time spent on barriers that were mooted. 

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commenced and during the four days it dragged on, neither party 

seemed to know whether all of the barriers in the Matrix remained 

in dispute. Instead, plaintiff’s lead witness tediously walked 

through the Barrier Matrix like a maze that would somehow be 

understood at the end. 

When the parties cannot agree on a manageable breakdown 

of the barriers at issue at the time of settlement, reducing any 

award for limited success under on a barrier-by-barrier basis 

does not make sense. Moreover, one of the primary benefits of 

the Consent Decree was relieving the parties and the court from 

having to decipher the relevance and ultimate merits of the 

fifty-three barriers in plaintiff’s Matrix. (See Docket No. 

138.) The court will not now forgo this significant benefit of 

the Consent Decree and attempt to distill what could never be 

articulated at trial. Cf. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (“A request 

for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major 

litigation.”). 

Plaintiff’s calculation of her success also has 

apparent flaws. For example, plaintiff includes 113 barriers 

attributable to the potential related case that Mr. Thimesch

contemplated filing on behalf of Mr. Lawson. Although defendant 

may have agreed to settle Mr. Lawson’s potential claims from his 

“unrelated incident” at Delta King as part of a global settlement 

agreement, (First Thimesch Decl. ¶ 5 (Docket No. 181)), Mr.

Lawson was not a plaintiff in this case and the alleged barriers 

he encountered were thus not at issue. Any award of fees in this 

case cannot compensate plaintiff’s counsel for time expended or 

results obtained in relation to potential claims by an individual 

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who was not a party to this case. Excising only the results 

plaintiff attributes to Mr. Lawson, plaintiff’s own assessment 

quickly drops from a 360% success to a 153% success. 

It is also not possible to assess plaintiff’s success 

at or even near 100% because there are significant barriers 

litigated in this case that will remain unremediated or were 

remediated only under the “readily achievable” standard. For 

example, two of the five barriers at issue in defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment were the “leveling of cambered decks” and 

the “configuration of the doors.” D’Lil, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1005. 

Although plaintiff defeated defendant’s motion as to those 

barriers, she did not ultimately prevail in obtaining defendant’s 

agreement to level the decks or widen all of the guestroom doors. 

Nor did plaintiff succeed on the issue of whether the Delta King 

was altered and thereby subject to the more demanding

accessibility requirements.

8 For example, while plaintiff 

obtained vertical access to the fourth and fifth decks through a 

“portable lift/stair crawler device,” (Consent Decree ¶ 15.b), 

she concedes that the lift does not comply with the current ADA 

Design Standards or the California Building Code because it 

requires assistance. 

 

8 Whether the Delta King was altered was central to the 

case because, if it was altered, the ADA mandates that the 

altered areas comply with the newer and more demanding ADA Design 

Standards. See generally id. at 1006 (explaining that the ADA 

requires (1) removal of all barriers where removal is “readily 

achievable” and (2) for newly constructed or alterations to 

existing facilities, that the construction or alteration comply 

with the Design Standards in place at the time of construction or 

alteration). 

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At the same time, however, it is disingenuous for 

defendant to argue, as it emphatically does, that it offered to 

remediate all barriers under the “readily achievable” standard as 

of February 25, 2013 and that plaintiff’s fees should thus cease 

as of that date. In its February 25, 2013 settlement offer, 

defendant identified the “elevator or lift access to the fourth 

and fifth decks” and “‘roll-in’ showers in the two ‘accessible’ 

rooms” as two of the four remaining barriers. (Post Decl. Ex. B 

(Docket No. 188-5) (emphasis added).) Defendant stated, “The law 

doesn’t require these changes . . . . Removal of these five 

barriers (at least as proposed by plaintiff) is not readily 

achievable.” (Id.) In the Consent Decree, plaintiff ultimately 

obtained some form of vertical access and one roll-in shower. 

(See Consent Decree ¶¶ 15.a, 15.b.) The parties disputed whether 

providing any vertical access was “readily achievable” at the 

time of trial and, through a lift, plaintiff prevailed in 

establishing that access was readily achievable. 

Overall, plaintiff unquestionably retracted some of her 

demands in order to reach a settlement with defendant. 

Quantifying a percentage of success, however, is almost 

impossible in light of the parties’ irreconcilable views of the 

case and the seemingly moving target as to the barriers actually 

at issue. As an extremely conservative estimate, and taking into 

account deductions already made for block billing and inefficient 

trial time, the court finds that plaintiff expended at least 25

hours in opposing defendant’s motion for summary judgment and 

performing site inspections and 7 hours preparing to go to trial 

on significant issues on which she ultimately did not prevail. 

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The court will therefore deduct 32 hours from Mr. Thimesch’s time 

to account for time expended on proving that the Delta King was 

altered, that the cambered decks should be leveled, that more 

than two doors should be reconfigured, and that two roll-in 

showers should be provided. 

i. Time Spent Preparing Plaintiff’s Reply

Mr. Thimesch also added 50 hours to his total time to 

account for time expended in replying to defendant’s opposition 

to this motion, which he indicates is less than the 56.3 hours he 

actually expended. Although Mr. Thimesch attributes this 

duration of time to defendant’s lengthy opposition, he neglects 

to mention that his unwieldly billings and motion were what 

prompted that length. Nor does Mr. Thimesch’s explanation that 

he expended over 50 hours “in connection with the reply” 

sufficiently explain how he spent that time. Taking into account 

all of these considerations, the court finds that 20 hours was a 

reasonable amount of time to expend on the reply and will 

therefore deduct 30 hours from Mr. Thimesch’s billings. 

j. Off-Set of Fees Paid by the City of 

Sacramento

Defendant also argues that 81.95 hours should be 

excluded because they are attributable to time Mr. Thimesch 

expended on separate claims against the city. At an hourly rate 

of $310, this would equal $25,404.50 in fees. It is undisputed 

that the city has already paid Mr. Thimesch $370,000 in fees as 

part of a settlement with plaintiff. Because the court will offset the total award by this amount, it is unnecessary to deduct 

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the additional 81.95 hours as they can be viewed as part of the 

$370,000. 

k. Total Hours

With the aforementioned deductions of 332.8 hours, the 

total time remaining is 1,699.5 hours. The court’s overall 

impression is that this is still an extraordinary number of hours 

and pushes the envelope of reasonableness. Given the unique 

issues in this case, however, the court cannot conclude that it 

was necessarily unreasonable for Mr. Thimesch to complete the 

investigations, research, and discovery he did. The court 

therefore finds it reasonable for Mr. Thimesch to be compensated 

for 1,699.5 hours. 

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The court must multiply the reasonable hours expended 

in this litigation by a reasonable hourly rate to calculate the 

lodestar amount. To determine the reasonableness of the hourly 

rates claimed, the court looks to “the prevailing market rates in 

the relevant community,” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, “for similar work 

performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 

reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 

1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986). The burden is on the party seeking fees 

“to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates 

are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar 

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience 

and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. 

a. Availability of Local Counsel

Both of plaintiff’s attorneys practice primarily in the 

Northern District and seek hourly rates of $560. Mr. Thimesch 

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recognizes that $560 per hour exceeds the prevailing market rate 

in the Sacramento legal community, but argues that $560 per hour 

is the prevailing rate in the Bay Area and the court should 

calculate plaintiff’s fees under the rates in that locality. 

In general, “the relevant community is the forum in 

which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 

500 (9th Cir. 1997). As a narrow exception, “rates outside the 

forum may be used if local counsel was unavailable, either 

because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack 

the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required 

to handle properly the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th 

Cir. 1992)); accord Rosales v. El Rancho Farms, No. Civ. 1:12-

01934 AWI JLT, 2015 WL 4460918, at *23 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2015).

Describing this case as a “high-risk” section “55/303”

9

case Mr. Thimesch argues that there is a “complete lack of other 

attorneys practicing in the Eastern District handling” such 

cases. (Pl.’s Mem. at 6 (Docket No. 179).) Based on his 

“intimate[ ] familiar[ity]” with the ADA plaintiff’s bar, regular 

meetings with the same group on a semiannual basis, as well as “a 

 

9 “Section 55” refers to section 55 of the California 

Civil Code, (see Compl. ¶ 75), which provides for injunctive 

relief to remedy a violation of several enumerated California 

statutes. “Section 303” refers to section 303 of the ADA, or 42 

U.S.C. § 12183, (see Compl. ¶ 58), which, in summary, provides 

that for newly constructed facilities or for alterations made to 

existing facilities, facilities are required to be “readily 

accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities,” § 

12183(a)(1)-(2). In describing this case as a “section 55/303 

case,” Mr. Thimesch attempts to distinguish the building 

modifications he sought from more routine ADA cases that Mr. 

Thimesch describes as seeking only readily achievable 

modifications. 

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survey [he] conducted on Pacer of Eastern District filings,” Mr. 

Thimesch “certifie[s] that there are no firms outside the bay 

area handling Section 55/303 cases.” (First Thimesch Decl. ¶ 

95.) Mr. Thimesch further asserts that, because the Eastern 

District is “unattractive for handling” ADA cases for numerous 

reasons, he and his “handful of Section 55/300 [sic] colleagues” 

have “drastically limited” their Eastern District practice. (See

id. ¶¶ 96-98.)

If Mr. Thimesch and his handful of colleagues have 

drastically limited their ADA practice in the Eastern District, 

then someone has stepped in to pick up the slack because there is 

certainly no shortage of ADA cases in this district. As to Mr. 

Thimesch’s other complaints about litigating ADA cases in this 

district, they are unfounded and incorrect. Mr. Thimesch 

complains that the “atmospherics and low hourly fee rates 

typically awarded” make this district an “exceedingly 

unattractive market for handing [sic] cases.” (Id. ¶ 96.) He 

further faults this district for “provid[ing] considerable 

advantages to opponents” and for its “lack of a settlement 

procedure.” (Id.) 

The court is unsure what advantages Mr. Thimesch thinks 

opponents have in litigating ADA cases in this district. To the 

extent that Mr. Thimesch’s assessment may be construed as 

suggesting bias on the part of the judges of this court, it is

unwarranted and borders on offensive. The court’s general 

experience with ADA cases in this district is that the plaintiffs 

almost invariably prevail. Surely the court did not give 

defendant an advantage in this case when it denied its motion for 

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summary judgment in its entirety. The Eastern District also 

offers early mediation and settlement conferences through its 

free Voluntary Dispute Resolution Program, see E.D. Local R. 271, 

and recently began referring ADA cases for mandatory early 

settlement conferences with a magistrate judge. That Mr. 

Thimesch is dissatisfied with this district’s prevailing rate is 

one thing, but it does not justify painting a false picture of 

ADA litigation in the district. 

In seeking the narrow exception providing for rates 

outside of the district, the court would also expect Mr. Thimesch 

to provide evidence other than his own opinion to show that there 

was not a single local attorney qualified and available to take 

this case. Cf. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (emphasis added)

(“[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory 

evidence--in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits--that the 

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill, experience and reputation.”); Jordan v. 

Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987); Bd. of 

Trs. v. Core Concrete Const., Inc., No. Civ. 11-02532, 2012 WL 

380304, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012). 

For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of an 

out-of-district fee when the fee applicant provided “numerous 

declarations of San Francisco and Sacramento attorneys which 

directly support their contention that Sacramento attorneys and 

law firms with the requisite expertise and experience to handle 

this type of complex institutional prison reform litigation were 

unavailable.” Gates 987 F. 2d at 1405; see also L.H. v. 

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Schwarzenegger, 645 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 

(applying an out-of-district rate for a “complicated [case] 

requiring expertise in class action litigation, civil rights 

litigation, and youth law” because plaintiff “tendered evidence,” 

including supporting declarations from nine other attorneys, that 

there were no Sacramento firms with the experience, capability, 

and willingness to undertake such a suit). 

Similarly, in Horsford v. Board of Trustees, a state 

appellate court found that Bay Area rates should have been 

awarded when the plaintiff explained his seven unsuccessful 

attempts in retaining local counsel. 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 398

(2005). To corroborate this declaration, plaintiff in that case

submitted declarations from several local civil rights lawyers 

stating that they had turned down plaintiff’s request to serve as 

counsel, as well as another declaration explaining the reasons 

for local counsel’s reluctance to take a case against the 

particular defendant. Id. 

In stark contrast to the evidence in those cases, Mr. 

Thimesch submitted only his opinions as to the unavailability of 

local counsel. Mr. Thimesch seems to assume that this case 

necessitated a lawyer from a suburb of Oakland because not a 

single attorney in the local community could have handled it. 

Sacramento is not exactly Mayberry RFD. It is the seat of state 

government and a major metropolitan area with a robust and 

sophisticated bar. That hourly rates are generally lower in 

Sacramento than the Bay Area is more likely attributable to the 

reduced cost of doing business in Sacramento, not the lack of 

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experience or expertise of the bar.10 

Even if the court accepts Mr. Thimesch’s representation 

that there are no lawyers in Sacramento who currently maintain a

“section 55/303 practice,” this does not necessitate hiring a 

lawyer outside of the Sacramento area. Seeking building 

modifications under the ADA and analogous state statues may, as 

Mr. Thimesch believes, require a harder fight than seeking only 

“readily achievable” modifications. It does not, however, 

necessarily require substantially greater expertise and legal 

acumen, especially if counsel hires a slew of experts as Mr. 

Thimesch did. More importantly, through the Consent Decree in 

this case, Mr. Thimesch achieved relief more akin to what would 

be accomplished in a routine case under the “readily achievable” 

standard. Plaintiff may have obtained some concessions from 

defendant because she sought building modifications, but she did 

not achieve the heart of the modifications she fought to impose. 

Mr. Thimesch’s value as a lawyer in this case thus did not turn 

on his “section 55/303” expertise. Mr. Thimesch has simply made 

no showing that the complexities or dynamics of this case were of 

such a level that local counsel could not or would not have 

handled it. 

Mr. Thimesch also indicates that most counsel are 

reluctant to pursue building modifications under section 55 

 

10 A higher cost of doing business in the Bay Area likely 

stems from the increased cost of maintaining an office there. 

Mr. Thimesch, however, does not appear to have any increased cost 

of doing business in Walnut Creek because it seems he maintains 

his office in his residence without any support staff. His 

overhead therefore is likely less, not more, than the typical

lawyer maintaining an office in Sacramento. 

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because the mandatory award of fees for the “prevailing party” 

applies regardless of which party prevails. See Jankey v. Song 

Koo Lee, 55 Cal. 4th 1038, 1047 (2012) (contrasting the mandatory 

award of fees “to all prevailing parties, including prevailing 

defendants” under section 55 with the ADA’s discretionary award 

of fees for prevailing defendants only if the claims were 

frivolous). Although at oral argument Mr. Thimesch suggested he 

bore this risk, the court assumes that any award of fees if 

defendant had prevailed would have been against Mr. Thimesch’s

client, not him. Regardless of who would bear responsibility for 

an award of fees, Mr. Thimesch has not shown that local counsel 

would have been unwilling to represent plaintiff in this case 

because of that risk.

In light of the lack of evidence before the court and 

the court’s own familiarity with local counsel and the expertise 

necessary to litigate this case, the court is not persuaded that 

there was not a single qualified local counsel or counsel from a 

nearby community that charges rates consistent with those in 

Sacramento who would have been willing and able to handle this 

case. Accord Lema v. Comfort Inn Merced, No. Civ. 1:10-00362 

SMS, 2014 WL 1577042, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014) (awarding 

Mr. Thimesch a rate based on the prevailing rates in the Eastern 

District); see also Knox v. Chiang, No. Civ. 2:05-02198 MCE CKD, 

2013 WL 2434606, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2013) (concluding that 

an affidavit from another attorney opining it is “doubtful that 

any (perhaps one or two) local Sacramento attorneys would be 

willing to take on and pursue such a case . . . does not 

demonstrate that local counsel was unavailable”). Accordingly, 

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Mr. Thimesch should be awarded attorney’s fees at the prevailing 

market rate in Sacramento. 

b. Prevailing Rate in Sacramento

The court must now determine the reasonable rate in 

Sacramento for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable 

skill, experience, and reputation. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210-

11. “The hourly rate for successful civil rights attorneys is to 

be calculated by considering certain factors, including the 

novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill required to try 

the case, whether or not the fee is contingent, the experience 

held by counsel and fee awards in similar cases.” Moreno v. City 

of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). 

1. Timothy Thimesch

Mr. Thimesch has 25 years of experience and has handled

section “55/303 cases” since 1994. (First Thimesch Decl. ¶¶ 91, 

99.) He founded his own practice in 2000 and has successfully

litigated cases achieving building modifications to provide

disabled access to numerous institutions such as banks, hotels, 

recreational facilities, and theaters. (See id. ¶ 106.) 

In Sacramento, judges have recently determined that the

current prevailing rate for experienced attorneys handling 

routine disability access cases is $300. See Loskot v. Annie’s 

Panda Garden, No. Civ. 2:13-00213 JAM JEM, 2015 WL 2235521, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. May 12, 2015) (awarding an hourly rate of $300 to an 

attorney with 38 years of experience in an ADA case that was “not 

complicated”);11 Johnson, 2014 WL 1334006, at *6 (finding an 

 

11 The court in Loskot indicated that it had considered 

attorney Thomas E. Frankovich’s experience and reputation in 

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hourly rate of $300 to be reasonable for attorneys with twenty 

and twenty-nine years of experience in a routine disability 

access case).

Mr. Thimesch’s experience is consistent with attorneys 

awarded $300, which is the higher end of the prevailing rate for 

routine ADA cases. From the court’s general experience with ADA 

attorneys awarded $300 per hour, Mr. Thimesch handled this case 

at an equal or even better level. This case was also more 

complicated and necessitated more research than a routine ADA 

case. See, e.g., Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1114 (explaining that the 

complexity of a case is relevant in determining the prevailing

hourly rate). Neither plaintiff nor defendant have provided any 

evidence or cited authority discussing the prevailing market rate 

in Sacramento for an experienced attorney handing a non-routine 

ADA case. Defense counsel in this case charged defendant only 

$250 per hour, which is significantly less than recent awards to 

attorneys with similar experience in routine ADA cases.12 

In Sacramento, “[a] rate of $400 is generally reserved 

 

finding his reasonable hourly rate, but the opinion does not 

indicate Mr. Frankovich’s years of experience. The California 

State Bar website indicates that Mr. Frankovich was admitted to 

the practice of law in June 1977 and thus had 38 years of 

experience at the time of the Loskot decision. 

12 Defendant cites cases such as Riker, along with 

declarations of Charles Coyne and Laurence Berman, to argue that 

the reasonable rate for an experienced ADA attorney in the 

Eastern District is $250. 2009 WL 4269466, at *2. Although this 

rate is the hourly fee defense counsel charged in this case, the 

court must consider rates awarded in the last two years. See

Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that the district court abused its discretion by relying 

on market rates that were in effect more than two years before 

the time the attorney worked).

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for complicated civil rights cases litigated by attorneys with 

thirty or more years of experience.” Loskot, 2015 WL 2235521, at 

*6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also, 

e.g., Deocampo v. Potts, No. Civ. 2:06–1283 WBS CMK, 2014 WL 

788429, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (awarding $400 hourly 

rate to attorney with “thirty-five years of legal experience” and 

“record of high-profile representations in civil rights 

matters”); Lehr v. City of Sacramento, No. Civ. 2:07–1565 MCE 

GGH, 2013 WL 1326546, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013) (awarding 

$400 per hour to a “highly qualified civil rights attorney with 

over 40 years of relevant litigation experience” in a complex 

class action). Although civil rights practice is a broader 

category than disability access practice, reasonable hourly rates 

in civil rights cases are instructive in determining the 

reasonable hourly rate for ADA cases. See, e.g., Luna v. Hoa 

Trung Vo, No. Civ. 1:08:1962 AWI SMS, 2011 WL 2078004, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. May 25, 2011) (using rate set in a prior “fully 

contested civil rights” case as a reference point for determining 

the applicable rate for an ADA case). 

Here, while this case was not a routine ADA case and 

arguably merits slightly more than $300, Mr. Thimesch did not 

present himself to be a highly experienced trial lawyer. For 

example, Mr. Thimesch repeatedly tried to use defendant’s 

statement of undisputed facts that was submitted in support of 

its motion for summary judgment as evidence at trial. (See Jan. 

22, 2015 Tr. at 61:17-65:5.) The court also had to explain to 

Mr. Thimesch why motions in limine would be unnecessary during a 

bench trial. (See Jan. 7, 2015 Tr. at 11:7-16.) 

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While the court does not dispute that Mr. Thimesch has 

garnered significant ADA expertise in his twenty-five years of 

practice, at times he also seemed to struggle with the issues in 

this case. He did not appear to come into this case with a 

strong understanding of the more complex issues that were unique 

to this case. Even in his area of expertise, Mr. Thimesch’s 

billings show that he relied heavily on experts to determine the 

applicable federal and state access requirements. These 

observations are similar to a recent assessment of Mr. Thimesch 

by another judge in this district: “Despite Mr. Thimesch’s 

enthusiastic account of his qualifications, the Court has 

observed nothing in his presentation and management of this case 

that would rank him above or below the median fee.” Lema, 2014 

WL 1577042, at *5. In that case, which was in Fresno, the court 

awarded Mr. Thimesch $300 per hour. Id.13 

Mr. Thimesch also argues that a higher rate than the 

prevailing rate for routine ADA cases is merited because he 

sought building modifications and did not rely on the easier 

“readily achievable” standard. Mr. Thimesch has not shown, 

however, that greater expertise is necessary to seek building 

modifications. As previously explained, most of the remediations 

plaintiff achieved are akin to those achieved under the readily 

achievable standard and thus any expertise gained from trying 

building modification cases did not significantly enhance 

 

13 Since Mr. Thimesch states in his declaration that, with 

the exception of a few non-disability access cases, he practices 

exclusively in section “55/303” cases, (see First Thimesch Decl. 

¶ 100), the court assumes Lema was also a section “55/303” access 

case that is comparable to the present case.

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plaintiff’s recovery in this case. Any increased work 

necessitated by a case seeking building modifications is also 

compensated through the greater number of hours expended on the 

case. 

With all of these considerations in mind, the court 

finds the prevailing market rate in Sacramento for this case may 

slightly exceed the higher end of a routine ADA case because this 

case raised unique issues. At the same time, however, Mr. 

Thimesch neither displayed an expertise requiring a significantly 

higher rate than $300 nor showed that his expertise substantially

increased plaintiff’s success in this case. The court therefore 

finds that a reasonable fee for Mr. Thimesch in this non-routine 

ADA case is $310 per hour. 

2. Michelle Thimesch

Plaintiff likewise requests a rate of $560 per hour for 

Ms. Thimesch. Ms. Thimesch has over 25 years of transactional 

experience, including experience related to tax transfers and tax 

investment vehicles. (See Michelle Thimesch Decl. ¶ 1 (Docket 

No. 173).) For this case, Ms. Thimesch conducted transactional

research related to preservation easements and appeared at three 

mediations in 2015. (See id. ¶¶ 2-3.) 

Ms. Thimesch has not submitted any evidence identifying 

the prevailing market rate in Sacramento for a transactional 

attorney of similar skill and experience. Nor has she explained 

whether she maintains her own practice or works as an associate 

for Mr. Thimesch. See Johnson, 2014 WL 1334006, at *6

(discussing whether an attorney is a partner or associate when 

determining the reasonable rate). Plaintiff has failed to 

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satisfy her burden of showing that her requested hourly rate is 

in line with those prevailing in the community, and this could be 

fatal to her fee request. See Schultz v. Ichimoto, No. Civ.

1:08–526 OWW SMS, 2010 WL 3504781, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 

2010) (“If the prevailing party fails to meet this standard, the 

fee request is reduced or excluded altogether.”). The court 

nonetheless will award Ms. Thimesch $275 per hour in light of her 

duration of experience and the limited role she served in this 

case. 

Accordingly, the lodestar in this case is $537,487.50, 

calculated as follows:

Timothy Thimesch 1699.5 x $310 = $ 526,845.00

Michele Thimesch 38.7 x $275 = $ 10,642.50

TOTAL ATTORNEY’S FEES = $ 537,487.50

Over half a million dollars in attorney’s fees for a 

case that necessitated opposing one motion for summary judgment, 

several site inspections, and a four-day bench trial is generous 

to say the least. Without doubt, it is “adequate to attract 

competent counsel.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 894-95. Although the 

court questions whether the awarded fee gives Mr. Thimesch a 

“windfall[],” id., there is a “strong presumption that the 

lodestar amount is reasonable,” Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 n.4,

and the court will therefore adhere to it. 

B. Costs

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 

292(f) govern the taxation of costs to losing parties, subject to 

limits set under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 

(enumerating taxable costs). While costs taxable under § 1920 

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and Local Rule 292(f) are more limited, the ADA authorizes a 

court to award “reasonable . . . litigation expenses[] and costs”

to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; accord Lovell v. 

Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). “The Ninth 

Circuit has stated that out-of-pocket expenses, although not 

normally taxable as costs, may be recovered as part of an 

attorney’s fee award . . . if they represent costs normally 

charged to the client.” Pac. W. Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 

693 F. Supp. 865, 874 (E.D. Cal. 1988); see also Buckhannon Bd. & 

Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 

598, 624 n.1 (2001) (noting that the award of litigation expenses 

and costs in § 12205 was modeled after § 1988 and the Court has 

“interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently across 

statutes”). For example, “because the term ‘litigation expenses’ 

normally encompasses expert witness fees, [the Ninth Circuit has 

held] that the statutory provision provides direct authority for 

the award of expert witness fees.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1058. 

Here, plaintiff seeks litigation expenses and 

costs in the amount of $218,890. Although defendant does not 

dispute that plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable 

litigation expenses and costs as the prevailing party, it 

disputes the reasonableness of plaintiff’s requested costs and 

litigation expenses. The court finds that Mr. Thimesch has 

adequately justified his costs for trial exhibits, service, court 

costs, Westlaw charges, and deposition costs. (See Second 

Thimesch Decl. ¶¶ 87-88, 90-94.)

1. Meals

With the exception of meals during trial, defendant 

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objects to numerous expenses for meals consumed during the course 

of Mr. Thimesch’s work on this case. Although some attorneys may 

charge clients for meals under certain circumstances and with the 

client’s consent, the court agrees that it is unreasonable to 

assess the cost of these meals against the losing party. 

Regardless of whether he was working on this case or not, Mr. 

Thimesch and his experts would have to eat and his meals did not 

advance plaintiff’s case in any way. The court will therefore 

deduct $1,184.83 from Mr. Thimesch’s taxable expenses. (See

Berman Decl. ¶ 52 (itemizing the meals expensed) (Docket No. 188-

2).) 

2. Hotel Expenses 

Mr. Thimesch seeks reimbursement for numerous hotel 

expenses. Defendant does not object to expenses for Mr. 

Thimesch’s hotel stay during trial. When rooms at the Delta King 

were booked in order to complete inspections, the court also 

finds these expenses reasonable because defendant has not 

indicated that it would have provided plaintiff with unrestricted 

access to guest rooms for similar durations without charge. (See

Second Thimesch Decl. ¶¶ 89.c, 89.d, 89.f, 89.g.) 

On August 1, 2012, Mr. Thimesch argues it was 

reasonable for him and Karl Danz (one of plaintiff’s many 

experts) to stay in a hotel overnight because they concluded a 

pre-mediation conference that day and had a settlement conference

the next day. Mr. Thimesch’s billings, however, reflect that the 

pre-mediation conference concluded at 5:30 p.m. and the 

settlement conference did not commence until the afternoon on the 

following day. (See Docket No. 174 at 78-79.) Although Mr. 

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Thimesch might have determined that an overnight stay was 

preferable for him, it was neither necessary nor a reasonable 

litigation expense. Mr. Thimesch’s lives approximately 70 miles 

from the Delta King and this courthouse. This is no greater 

distance than many people commute every day. Because the court 

has already determined that Mr. Thimesch should not be reimbursed 

for travel from Walnut Creek, overnight stays for Mr. Thimesch’s 

convenience and to avoid fees for travel time are not reasonably 

taxed against defendant. The court will therefore deduct 

$1,304.73 for hotel expenses for Mr. Thimesch’s or his expert’s

convenience. (See Second Thimesch Decl. ¶¶ 89.a, 89.e; Pl.’s Ex. 

325 at 4-5, 39, 223, 287.)

3. Expert Witness Fees 

a. Mr. Attwood

Barry Attwood, plaintiff’s lead expert who testified 

for most of the bench trial, indicates that his expenses and fees 

for this case were $86,002.56. (Docket No. 325 at 470.) Mr. 

Attwood’s trial testimony was central to plaintiff’s case, and 

Mr. Thimesch has adequately explained the necessity of his 

attendance at various events throughout the litigation. The 

court agrees with defendant, however, that the time he billed in 

assisting Mr. Thimesch prepare the opposition for summary 

judgment and draft jury instructions is more akin to work one 

would expect a lawyer to perform and, assuming it was appropriate 

work for an expert like Mr. Attwood, the amount of hours billed 

were excessive when considered in light of the hours Mr. Thimesch 

billed for the same work. The reasonableness of the time 

expended is also difficult to assess because, although Mr. 

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Attwood’s bill is similar to that of an attorney, he has 

significant entries that are block billed without adequate 

descriptions. Through Mr. Attwood’s trial testimony, the court 

found that he was knowledgeable about the intricacies of the ADA, 

but despite his expenditure of almost 100 hours preparing his 

Matrix and reports, the Matrix had numerous errors. In light of 

all of these considerations, the court will deduct $10,000 from 

Mr. Thimesch’s expenses. 

The court also questions the reasonableness of

requiring defendant to pay Mr. Attwood’s flat fee of $3,500 for 

expert testimony at trial when he has already billed for every 

minute he spent preparing for trial and the court did not hold 

full trial days. The first day of trial lasted less than five 

hours and the second and third days lasted less than three hours 

each. On the two days when Mr. Attwood testified for less than 

three hours, his normal rate of $250 per hour sky-rocketed to 

over $1,166 per hour when calculated in light of his $3,500 flat 

fee. Because Mr. Attwood seeks to bill similar to an attorney, 

with entries for every phone call and email, it is reasonable for 

his fee for trial testimony to be taxed against defendant at his 

hourly rate of $250, not an exorbitant flat fee. Moreover, 

because the court’s own calendar dictated the limited trial days, 

defendant should not be punished for Mr. Attwood having to 

testify over the course of several days. The court will 

therefore deduct $7,750 from Mr. Thimesch’s expenses to account 

for Mr. Attwood’s unreasonable trial testimony fees. 

b. Mr. Danz

Plaintiff also hired Karl Danz, a contractor, as an 

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expert witness and incurred $30,797.27 in fees for his services. 

Although defendant complains that Mr. Danz duplicated Mr. 

Attwood’s efforts, plaintiff has sufficiently explained how Mr. 

Attwood’s primary purpose was to identify barriers under the ADA 

and Mr. Danz’s primary purpose was to propose modifications and 

determine the costs of those modifications. Although the parties 

settled before Mr. Danz testified, this distinction is consistent 

with the representations Mr. Thimesch made at trial regarding Mr. 

Danz’s anticipated testimony. While defendant also objects to 

the travel time for Mr. Attwood and Mr. Danz, defendant’s own 

expert was not located in Sacramento and defendant has not 

identified experts with similar experience in Sacramento. The 

court therefore will not deduct Mr. Danz’s fee. 

c. Mr. Cole

Plaintiff’s next expert was David Cole, an independent 

marine consultant. The court agrees with defendant that this 

expert was unnecessary and unreasonable because, by October 2012, 

defendant had unequivocally admitted that the authority of the 

United States Coast Guard and other maritime regulations had 

ceased “before or during 1984-1989” when the Delta King was 

restored to a hotel. (Post Decl. Ex. G at 3 (Docket No. 188-6).) 

Plaintiff needlessly pressed forward on this issue at summary 

judgment as well. See D’Lil, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1010 n.5 

(“Plaintiff repeatedly argues that Delta King is no longer a 

‘boat.’ Although Delta King points out how it is similar to a 

boat in many respects, it does not argue that it is a ‘boat’ or 

is exempt from the ADA as a ‘boat.’”). The court will therefore 

deduct $1,000 from Mr. Thimesch’s expenses because it was not 

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reasonable to hire a marine consultant. 

d. Mr. Reynolds

Although defendant similarly objects to plaintiff’s 

marine architect as unnecessary, his testimony focused on the 

access infrastructure and aided plaintiff in prevailing at 

summary judgment. See id. at 1009. The court therefore finds 

that plaintiff was reasonable in seeking his expertise. 

e. Mr. Lerner

Next plaintiff seeks reimbursement for services by 

Arnie Lerner. From the redacted consulting services agreement

plaintiff submitted, the court cannot decipher what services Mr. 

Lerner actually provided. (See Pl.’s Ex. 325 at 76-77.) Mr. 

Lerner, who was not listed as a potential witness for trial in 

the Final Pretrial Order, seems to have replicated any services 

provided by Mr. Attwood and Mr. Danz. Because plaintiff never 

intended to call Mr. Lerner as an expert at trial and his 

services appear duplicative of experts plaintiff had already 

hired, the court will deduct Mr. Lerner’s fee of $1,500 from Mr. 

Thimesch’s expenses. 

f. Dr. Blanck

Plaintiff’s next expert was Dr. Peter Blanck who 

addressed “what equality means to persons with disabilities.” 

(Second Thimesch Decl. ¶ 123.) Although Dr. Blanck’s testimony 

and purpose likely overlapped with Mr. Attwood, plaintiff 

emphasizes that it was necessary to have an expert on this issue 

who was a “believable witness that the jury could relate to.” 

(Id.) While Dr. Blanck’s report was not necessary to plaintiff’s 

success at summary judgment, the court did reference it in its 

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decision. See D’Lil, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1015 (“A trier of fact 

could also find that being able to hear a live band playing on a 

higher deck is not equivalent to being able to watch the band and 

partake in the live music experience. These findings would be 

consistent with the opinion of plaintiff’s expert, Peter Blanck, 

Ph.D., that the alternate seating and ability to hear the live 

music does not offer an equivalent accommodation and is 

stigmatizing for disabled patrons.”). Overall, the court 

understands Mr. Thimesch’s desire to have a witness the jury 

could relate to on these less than tangible issues, but agrees 

with defendant that the work likely duplicated that of Mr. 

Attwood. The court also agrees with defendant that it was 

unreasonable for Dr. Blanck to expend 10 hours at $500 per hour 

preparing for his 1-hour deposition. In light of the unnecessary 

duplication and excessive time spent preparing for his 

deposition, the court will deduct $3,500 from Mr. Blanck’s 

$10,000 fee. 

g. Mr. Finklea and Mr. Ebert

Mr. Thimesch justifies expenses for Dan Finklea and 

Scott Ebert on the grounds that he has a “long history with 

[them] in assisting at inspections and in investigations” and 

“utilization of their skills when possible reduced the higher 

fees I would have faced if I had instead involved Atwood and 

Danz.” (First Thimesch Decl. ¶ 142.) For the inspection on July 

16, 2013, however, Mr. Attwood and Mr. Thimesch also attended the 

inspection, (see Docket No. 174 at 506; Pl.’s Ex. 325 at 463), 

thus Mr. Finklea’s attendance was unnecessary. The court will 

therefore deduct $1,350.50 for Mr. Finklea’s charges for that 

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inspection.

Mr. Ebert works for Ebert Enterprises, Inc., which does 

business as My PC Partners. His bills indicate only that he 

served as a “technician” for the inspections and provided “legal 

and tech assistive services.” (Pl.’s Ex. 325 at 472.) The court 

is at a loss in determining what expertise or services he offered 

to the case. Although Mr. Thimesch now says Mr. Ebert was not 

going to testify at trial, Mr. Thimesch identified him as witness 

in the Final Pretrial Order. (See Docket No. 108 at 9.) Mr. 

Thimesch now explains that Mr. Ebert served as a legal assistant 

at trial, but Mr. Thimesch has not sought to recover his fees by 

showing his reasonable number of hours and reasonable fee. Even 

if the court treated Mr. Ebert as a legal assistant, the cursory 

description in the bill for a block billed total of 52.5 hours 

could not pass muster under the lodestar analysis. The court 

will therefore deduct his fees of $7,537.50 from Mr. Thimesch’s 

requested expenses. 

Similarly, because Mr. Ebert has not adequately 

accounted for his time as either an expert witness or legal 

assistant and his contribution to the case remains unclear, the 

court will deduct the $664.59 expensed for his hotel room during 

trial. (Pl.’s Ex. 325 at 405, 411.)

III. Total Award

With deductions for unreasonable litigation expenses 

and costs of $35,792.15, the total litigation expenses and costs 

the court will tax against defendant is $183,097.90. The total 

award of attorney’s fees and costs together is $720,585.40, to 

which the $370,000 in fees and costs paid by the city must be 

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off-set, for a total award of $350,585.40. 

The hearing on this motion was set for August 24, 2015

at 2:00 p.m. Although both defense counsel and defendant’s 

representative appeared for the hearing, plaintiff did not appear 

because of his calendaring error. To provide plaintiff with the 

opportunity for oral argument, the court reset the hearing for 

the following day. Mr. Thimesch agreed at oral argument that his 

award of fees should be reduced to compensate defendant for 

appearing at the originally scheduled hearing. The court will 

therefore deduct $750 (3 hours at defense counsel’s hourly rate 

of $250) to account for the two attorneys and one representative 

who attended the hearing on behalf of defendant. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

attorney’s fees be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in part. 

Defendant is directed to pay $349,835.40 in attorney’s fees,

litigation expenses, and costs to Mr. Thimesch. 

Dated: August 28, 2015

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