Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00408/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00408-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM JOHN DAUGHTERY, CDCR

#F-79985,

Plaintiff,

v.

DENNIS WILSON, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 08cv0408-WQH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS CITY

OF SAN DIEGO AND SAN DIEGO

POLICE DEPARTMENTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 42]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

On March 3, 2008, Plaintiff William John Daughtery, a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil

rights suit against Defendants Wilson, Tagaban, Griffin and Lemus

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 1. After having been granted

leave to do so by the Court [Doc. No. 24], Plaintiff filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 19, 2008, which added the City of

San Diego and the San Diego Police Department as Defendants [Doc.

No. 25].

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-2- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

On July 29, 2008, the City of San Diego and the San Diego

Police Department (“Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss the FAC

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Doc.

No. 42 (pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Plaintiff timely

opposed the motion [Doc. No. 51] and Defendants filed a reply on

August 28, 2008 [Doc. No. 52]. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed two

documents [Doc. Nos. 54 & 56], which the Court construed as surreplies [Doc. Nos. 53 & 55].

 This Court finds the issues appropriate for decision on the

papers and without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule

7.1.(d)(1). See Doc. No. 49. The Court has considered the FAC,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants’

Reply, Plaintiff’s “Answer to Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint” [Doc. No.

54], and Plaintiff’s “Supplemental to Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss First Amended Complaint” [Doc. No. 56] and all supporting

documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth

below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. No. 42] be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on March 9, 2006,

San Diego Police Officers Wilson and Tagaban used excessive force

prior to arresting him in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Doc. No. 1. He further alleged that San Diego Police

Sergeant Griffin and Detective Lemus were “integral participants” in

the allegedly unlawful beating because they witnessed it but did

nothing to intervene. Id. at 2, 4. 

///

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-3- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

In his FAC, filed on June 19, 2008, Plaintiff reasserts the

same claims against the four officers, verbatim, and adds an

additional cause of action, listed as “Count 5," against the City of

San Diego and the San Diego Police Department. FAC at 7. Under

Count 5, Plaintiff alleges that the City of San Diego and the San

Diego Police Department violated his Fourth Amendment rights and

committed the “state tort[s]” of “Gov’t Code § 810 et seq., assault

and battery P.C. 245 and negligence in failure to provide medical

assistance.” Id. Plaintiff elaborates on this allegation,

explaining that “[b]oth the City of San Diego and the Police

Department are liable for injuries proximately caused by acts or

omissions of employees of public entities acting within scope of

their employment, if the acts or omissions would, apart from this

section, have given rise to a cause of action against those

employees.” Id. (paraphrasing Government Code § 815.2). In other

words, Plaintiff claims that both entities are “vicariously liable

under the doctrine of respondeat superior” for the officers’

conduct. Id. Plaintiff asks the Court to invoke pendant

jurisdiction over his state claim. Id.

The City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department now

move to dismiss the FAC. Doc. No. 42.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, “we do not require heightened fact pleading of

specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

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-4- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

1955, 1974 (2007). “However, the court is not required to accept

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”

Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th

Cir. 1994)). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately

will prevail, but whether he has properly stated a claim upon which

relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must

construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any

benefit of doubt. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988)). This rule of liberal construction is

“particularly important” in civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal

interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint the court is not,

however, permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are

not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

If the court concludes that dismissal is appropriate, the

court has discretion to dismiss the complaint either with or without

leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (concluding that the PLRA did not strip district

courts of this discretion). Because the language of § 1915(e)(2)

parallels the language of Rule 12(b)(6), the Ninth Circuit has

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1 Collectively, these portions of the Government Code (Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 810 et seq.) are known as California’s Tort Claims Act. For purposes of

clarity, the Court will use this term when referring to the applicable sections

of the Government Code.

-5- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

suggested that there is no reason to depart from its longstanding

policy that when dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other

facts.” Id. at 1127.

DISCUSSION

The City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department

seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s FAC based upon several alleged

deficiencies in the pleadings. As an initial matter, Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s FAC must be dismissed because his pleadings

do not show compliance with applicable California Government Code

sections1, which require that all claims for money or damages

against local public entities be presented to the public entities

prior to commencement of any lawsuits. Defs.’ Mem. at 3-4, 8-11.

Further, Defendants submit that the dismissal should be with

prejudice because the deadline for Plaintiff to present his claims

to the City of San Diego has passed and cannot be revived by this

Court, so Plaintiff cannot amend his pleadings to remedy this

deficiency. Id. at 11-15. Defendants next argue that to the extent

Plaintiff’s claim is premised upon a violation of California’s Penal

Code, Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed with prejudice because the

Penal Code does not create enforceable individual rights. Id. at

15-16. Finally, Defendants contend that even if the Court finds

that Plaintiff sufficiently plead compliance with the California

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2 Plaintiff claims to have two mental disabilities. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.

He attaches records in support of his claim but does not explicitly specify which

disabilities he believes fall within the ambit of the state code.

-6- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Government Code’s claim presentation requirement, Plaintiff’s claim

still must be dismissed because Count 5 is time-barred. Id. at 16-

20. 

In response, Plaintiff acknowledges that his Opposition does

not address each point raised by Defendants, but asks that the Court

consider several arguments that weigh against granting Defendants’

motion. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. First, Plaintiff seeks permission from

the Court to present late claims to the City of San Diego and the

San Diego Police Department and thereafter amend his pleadings

before this Court. Id. at 4. Second, Plaintiff cites to California

Code of Civil Procedure section 358 in arguing that for individuals,

like himself, who had two or more disabilities at the time the right

of action accrued, the statute of limitations did not attach until

the disabilities were removed.2 Id. at 3. Third, Plaintiff relies

upon California Civil Code sections 51 and 51.7 and argues that his

action is subject to a three-year statute of limitation, not a twoyear limitations period, as Defendants argue. Id. at 6. Finally,

to the extent the Court is inclined to address Defendants’ argument

that Plaintiff’s FAC is untimely, Plaintiff requests that the Court

conduct a trial on this affirmative defense prior to deciding on the

motion to dismiss. Id. at 7 (citing Cal. Code Civ. P. § 597).

Defendants rebut Plaintiff’s arguments in their Reply and reassert that Plaintiff’s Count 5 must be dismissed with prejudice.

In response to Plaintiff’s mental disability allegations, Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s “ability to commence and fully and

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-7- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

impressively engage in the prosecution and defense of his action”

nullifies any mental disability defense. Defs.’ Reply at 2.

Additionally, Defendants contend that in seeking relief from the

California Government Code’s claim presentation requirement,

Plaintiff confuses the law relating to extensions of time for the

commencement and filing of a legal action with the law prohibiting

any extension for the presentation of a claim to a public entity in

advance of commencing a legal action. Id. at 3. In regard to the

other code sections Plaintiff cites, Defendants argue that none are

applicable to the operative complaint or have any bearing on the

relief sought in Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 6.

In two subsequent filings by Plaintiff, which the Court

construed as sur-replies [Doc. Nos. 53 & 55], Plaintiff further

elaborates on his arguments. In his “Answer to Defendants’ Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint”

(hereinafter “Answer to Defendants Reply”), Plaintiff argues that

the date of accrual of his claim did not commence until March 2008

when he “emerged” from his “mentally disabled ‘fog.’” Answer to

Defs.’ Reply at 3. In his “Supplemental to Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss First Amended Complaint” (hereinafter “Supplemental

Opposition”), Plaintiff contends that California Code of Civil

Procedure section 338 (which provides for a three year limitations

period), not section 335.1, sets forth the applicable statute of

limitations. Suppl. Opp’n at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff submits

that he did not have to first present his claim to the appropriate

public entity because § 1983 claims are not subject to California’s

Tort Claims Act. Id. at 3. 

/// 

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3 Additionally, as Defendant points out, the California Penal Code does

not contain a section “815.2.” 

-8- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

A. Claims Alleging Violations of California’s Penal Code

On page 3 of his FAC, Plaintiff alleges that the City of San

Diego and the San Diego Police Department are liable for injuries

proximately caused by their employees pursuant to “P.C. 815.2." FAC

at 3. In Count 5, Plaintiff further alleges that the same

Defendants violated “P.C. 245." Id. at 7. 

Presuming Plaintiff’s use of “P.C.” refers to the California

Penal Code, Defendants are correct that these allegations fail to

state a claim. California’s Penal Code does not create enforceable

individual rights. Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1189

(9th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s dismissal of pro

se plaintiff’s claims against arresting officers where claims were

based on alleged California Penal Code violations); c.f. Cal. Penal

Code § 684 (West 2008) (“A criminal action is prosecuted in the name

of the people of the State of California, as a party, against the

person charged with the offense”). As such, Plaintiff has not

stated a legally cognizable claim or one for which relief could be

granted.3 See Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755. 

Because Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the California Penal

Code are legally barred, Plaintiff’s claims also could not possibly

be cured by amendment to his FAC and, thus, dismissal with prejudice

is appropriate. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127, 1130. Accordingly, to the

extent Plaintiff asserts claims against the City of San Diego and

the San Diego Police Department premised upon California Penal Code

violations, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion be GRANTED

and Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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-9- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

B. Plaintiff’s Lack of Compliance With the California Tort

Claims Act’s Claim Presentation Requirement

At one point in Count 5, Plaintiff wrote “Cal. Penal Code

815.2" and then crossed out “Penal” and inserted “Government.” FAC

at 7. He also paraphrased California Government Code section 815.2,

which indicates that Plaintiff in fact is alleging that Defendants

are liable under this code section. See Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895

(explaining that the court must construe pro se pleadings

liberally). Government Code section 815.2 provides as follows:

(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately

caused by an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity within the scope of his employment if

the act or omission would, apart from this section,

have given rise to a cause of action against that

employee or his personal representative.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public

entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an

act or omission of an employee of the public entity

where the employee is immune from liability.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2 (West 1995). Plaintiff explains that he

believes the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department

are vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior,

and pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, for the acts of the

arresting officers. FAC at 7. 

Defendants submit that Plaintiff cannot pursue a civil action

against them premised on Government Code section 815.2 because

Plaintiff has not plead compliance with the California Tort Claims

Act’s claim presentation requirement. Defs.’ Mem. at 3, 8. 

1. The Requirements of the California Tort Claims Act

The California Tort Claims Act provides that “no suit for

money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause

of action for which a claim is required to be presented ... until a

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4 The “board” referred to is the California Victim Compensation and

Government Claims Board. 

-10- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and

has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been

rejected by the board...” Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.44; Ovando v.

County of Los Angeles, 159 Cal. App. 4th 42, 62-63 (2nd Dist. 2008)

(confirming continued applicability of claim presentation

requirement to those seeking money or damages from a local public

entity); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 905 (imposing presentation

requirement and listing limited exceptions, none of which are

applicable to the facts of this case). The purpose of the claims

presentation requirement is to afford public entities (1) the

opportunity to remedy the condition giving rise to the injury (thus

minimizing the risk of harm to others), (2) the time to investigate

while evidence is still available, and (3) the chance to settle

meritorious claims without incurring the cost of litigation. Shirk

v. Vista Unified School Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 213 (2007). In

light of this overriding purpose, the requirement set forth in

Government Code section 945.4 applies equally to individuals

sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison. Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 945.6(c). 

The California Court of Appeal provided a thorough overview

of the Tort Claims Act’s presentation requirement in Doe v.

Bakersfield City School District, 136 Cal. App. 4th 556 (5th Dist.

2006), explaining:

Under the Tort Claims Act, a person may not sue

a public entity for personal injury or wrongful death

unless he or she first presented a written claim to

the public entity within six months following the

accrual of the claim and the public entity rejected

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-11- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

the claim. [Cal. Gov’t Code](§§ 911.2, 945.4; Munoz v.

State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776,

39 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ( Munoz ).) If a claim is presented

late, the public entity, within a prescribed time, may

send the claimant written notice that the claim is

being returned without action due to its untimely

presentation. In that instance, the claimant's only

recourse is to apply for leave to present a late

claim. (§ 911.3, subd. (a).)

A claimant has a period of one year from the

accrual of the claim to present a written application

to the public entity for leave to file a late claim.

§§ 911.4, 911.6.) If the public entity denies leave to

present a late claim, the claimant can petition the

court under section 946.6 for an order relieving him

or her of the requirement of presenting a claim. The

court must relieve the petitioner from presentation

and claim requirements if it finds the claimant's

application under section 911.4 was made within a

reasonable time, was denied or deemed denied under

section 911.6, and the “failure to present the claim

was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes

that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the

claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the

requirements of Section 945.4.” (§ 946.6, subd.

(c)(1).) In determining whether relief is warranted,

the court will consider the petition, any supporting

or opposing affidavits, and any other evidence

presented at the hearing. 

Bakersfield City School Dist., 136 Cal. App. 4th at 566-567.

Filing a late-claim application with a government entity

within one year after the cause of action accrued is a

jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition under the

Tort Claims Act. See Munoz, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1779. In other

words, if the underlying application to file a late claim was made

more than one year after the cause of action accrued, the court is

without jurisdiction to grant relief from the claim presentation

requirement. Brandon G. v. Gray, 111 Cal. App. 4th 29, 34 (1st

Dist. 2003); see also Ellis, 176 F.3d at 1190 (explaining that after

the one-year deadline passes, the court has no discretion to grant

applications). “Notwithstanding these rules, ‘[i]t is well settled

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-12- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations

of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented

or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act.’”

Bakersfield City School Dist., 136 Cal. App. 4th at 567.

Because claim presentation is mandatory, failure to expressly

plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects

the complaint to dismissal for failure to state a claim. California

courts repeatedly have explained that “submission of a claim to a

public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition

precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars

the action.’” Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 699,

708 (Cal. 1989) (quoting Lutz v. Tri-City Hospital, 179 Cal. App. 3d

807, 812 (4th Dist. 1986)); see also Del Real v. City of Riverside,

95 Cal. App. 4th 761, 767 (4th Dist. 2002) (“The filing of a claim

is a condition precedent to the maintenance of any cause of action

against the public entity and is therefore an element that a

plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail”). If a

plaintiff nonetheless files a civil action but fails to allege facts

demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation

requirement, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to

state a cause of action. See State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32

Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (2004) (complaint subject to demurrer in state

court) and Burke v. City of El Cajon, 2007 WL 2915067, *6 (S.D. Cal.

2007) (recognizing that complaint subject to dismissal pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in federal court).

///

///

/// 

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5 Even if the Court liberally construed Plaintiff’s allegations in his

FAC that he filed a “Citizen’s Complaint” with the Internal Affairs Division of

the San Diego Police Department (FAC at 8) as alleging compliance with the claim

presentation requirement, Plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient. Plaintiff did

not attach a copy of his Citizen’s Complaint to the FAC, state the date on which

the “Citizen’s Complaint” was filed, or otherwise allege compliance with the sixmonth deadline. Additionally, the California Government Code requires that a

claim be presented and acted upon by the public entity before a lawsuit may be

filed. Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. Plaintiff acknowledges in his FAC that he did

not comply with this requirement in that he describes his Citizen’s Complaint as

“pending at present.” FAC at 8. Furthermore, Plaintiff essentially concedes in

his Opposition that he has not presented a proper claim to the appropriate public

entity because he asks for relief from the claim presentation deadline or for the

opportunity to file an application to present a late claim. See Pl.’s Opp’n at

3-6. 

-13- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

2. Plaintiff’s Arguments Pertaining to the Claim

Presentation Requirement

On its face, Plaintiff’s FAC does not contain any allegation

suggesting that Plaintiff complied with the Tort Claims Act’s claim

presentation requirement or is entitled to be excused from complying

with the same.5 In fact, in his Opposition Plaintiff acknowledges

as much by seeking permission now to file an application to present

a late claim. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. As such, it appears Count 5 of

Plaintiff’s FAC does not include sufficient facts to state a claim

for relief and that it, therefore, should be dismissed. Twombly,

127 S.Ct. At 1974; see also Burke, 2007 WL 2915067 at *6. 

Nonetheless, as noted above, Plaintiff presents several

arguments against dismissal. Plaintiff’s first argument, which he

raises for the first time in his Supplemental Opposition, is that a

§ 1983 action is not subject to the Tort Claims Act. Suppl. Opp’n

at 3-4. While it is true that claims against a public entity based

on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not meet the requirements of the Tort

Claims Act, see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 134 (1988),

Plaintiff’s allegations against the City of San Diego and the San

Diego Police Department are premised upon violations of California

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-14- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Government Code section 815.2, see FAC at 7, for which claim

presentation is a prerequisite to suit. Count 5 plainly seeks to

impose respondeat superior liability on Defendants via Government

Code section 815.2 and Plaintiff cannot pursue that claim without

having complied with the Tort Claims Act’s presentation requirement.

Moreover, it ultimately would not benefit Plaintiff to attempt to

convert Count 5 into a pure § 1983 claim because the Supreme Court

has long held that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely

because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,

691-692 (1978). Therefore, Plaintiff’s first argument fails to

alter this Court’s finding that Count 5 should be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s other arguments to avoid dismissal are likewise

unavailing. For instance, Plaintiff attempts to rely upon

California Code of Civil Procedure section 358 and Government Code

section 945.6(b) to excuse his failure to comply with the Tort

Claims Act’s presentation requirement. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-6. However,

these statutes do not address nor excuse a failure to present a

claim to a public entity; they merely provide possible relief for

failure to timely file suit. Accordingly, the Court remains

convinced that Count 5 should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Tort Claims

Act’s claim presentation requirement. The question is whether the

dismissal should be with or without prejudice.

The Court will construe Plaintiff’s remaining arguments as

requests that the dismissal be without prejudice. See Thompson, 295

F.3d at 895 (court must construe pro se pleadings liberally).

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-15- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Plaintiff argues that he should be excused from complying with the

presentation requirement because he suffers from mental disabilities

and the failure was the result of these disabilities or excusable

neglect. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the Court should find

that the claim did not begin to accrue (or the limitations period

should be tolled) until his mental disability abated. Pl.’s Opp’n at

3-6. Under either scenario, Plaintiff requests additional time to

present his claim to the Defendants and the ability to then amend

his federal complaint. 

a. Relief Based on Excusable Neglect and/or Alleged

Physical and Mental Incapacity

Plaintiff first argues that the Court should provide him with

relief pursuant to Government Code section 946.6(c). Pl.’s Opp’n at

3-6. Government Code section 946.6(c) provides that a court may

provide relief from the requirements of section 945.4 if “[t]he

failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect” or “[t]he person who sustained the

alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally

incapacitated during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for

the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability

failed to present a claim during that time.” Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 946.6(c). Plaintiff claims that his failure was due both to

excusable neglect and to physical and mental incapacity. FAC at 5.

However, section 946.6(c) makes clear that courts may only grant

relief if the plaintiff first filed an application to submit a late

claim within a year of the accrual date and the claim was denied.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 946.6(c) (“The court shall relieve the petitioner

from the requirements of Section 945.4 if the court finds that the

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6 In framing this argument, the Court construes Plaintiff’s pro

se pleadings liberally and affords Plaintiff any benefit of doubt. Thompson, 295

F.3d at 895. Plaintiff’s arguments in his sur-reply suggest an understanding

that if the underlying application to file a late claim was made more than one

year after the cause of action accrued, the Court would be without jurisdiction

to grant relief from the claim presentation requirement, see Brandon G., 111 Cal.

App. 4th at 34 and Ellis, 176 F.3d at 1190, and thus, unable to allow Plaintiff

leave to amend his FAC. 

-16- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

application to the board under Section 911.4 was made within a

reasonable time not to exceed that specified in subdivision (b) of

Section 911.4 [one year] and was denied or deemed denied...”); see

also Munoz, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1779. Because Plaintiff makes no

allegation that he filed an application to submit a late claim, this

Court cannot provide Plaintiff with any relief pursuant to section

946.6(c) and it does not provide a basis for dismissing Count 5

without prejudice. 

b. Relief Arising From Allegedly Delayed Accrual Date

Alternatively, Plaintiff submits that this Court should

exercise its jurisdiction and allow him leave to amend his pleadings

because his claim did not actually accrue until March 2008.6 Answer

to Defs.’ Reply at 2-3. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that:

the date of accrual must not commence on the date of

the complained incident, but rather on the date that

he “became aware or reasonably should have been aware”

that tortious conduct had occurred, which in the

instant case would be March 2008 when he “emerged”

from his mentally disabled “fog” and was able to

conduct coherent, linear, cogent, deductive reasoning

with clarity, i.e. he was no longer non compos mentis

(in toto).

Answer to Defs.’ Reply at 3. Plaintiff’s argument suggests that

even if Count 5 is dismissed, the dismissal should be without

prejudice because if the claim accrued in March 2008, the one-year

period for applying for leave to file a late claim would not expire

until March 2009. Thus, Plaintiff would have time to submit an

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-17- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

application to file a late claim, obtain a decision from the public

entity or waiver from the court, and then cure his pleadings by

alleging compliance with the Tort Claims Act. 

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument. Under California

law, a cause of action generally accrues “at the time when the cause

of action is complete with all of its elements.” Grisham v. Philip

Morris U.S.A., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 623, 634 (2007) (quoting Fox v.

Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 806-807 (2005)). In

Count 5, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are responsible for the

misconduct of their employees. FAC at 7. The alleged misconduct of

Defendants’ employees is that the arresting officers used excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 4-6.

To establish a claim for excessive force, Plaintiff must

establish that (1) the officer was acting under the color of law,

that is, he was performing his official duties, (2) he used

excessive force in performing those duties, and (3) the officer’s

acts were the proximate cause of damages sustained by Plaintiff. 3B

Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 165.20 & 165.40 (5th ed.). “[A]ll

claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive

force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop,

or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Thus, the elements of Plaintiff’s

claim are that officers used unreasonable force in arresting him. 

Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that, on March 9, 2006, Officer

Wilson, “a uniformed officer, driving [a] marked patrol car,”

approached him and “gripped [his] throat” and “bang[ed] [his]

forehead into [the] concrete sidewalk.” FAC at 4. He further

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7 The analysis would be the same under the state standard described in

California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (applying to claims of “assault,

battery or injury to ... an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of

another”). Plaintiff alleges that he was battered and injured by Officers Wilson

and Tagaban and that their conduct was wrongful. 

-18- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

alleges that Officer Tagaban, “also in uniform and driving [a]

marked squad car,” “beat[] [his] head and left shoulder with [a]

metal 2 foot flashlight with batteries installed” numerous times

until he lost consciousness. Id. at 4-5. Thereafter, Plaintiff

describes his arrest and conviction. Id. at 5. The FAC does not

describe any conduct that occurred on any date other than March 9,

2006. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FAC clearly states that all of the

alleged wrongs occurred on March 9, 2006 and Plaintiff’s claims,

therefore, accrued on March 9, 2006.7

In his supplemental pleadings, Plaintiff argues that he was

in a “mentally disabled ‘fog’” and that the accrual date should be

delayed until March 2008, when he “emerged” from that “fog.” Ans.

to Defs.’ Reply at 3; Suppl. Opp’n at 5. The law does provide that

“[a]n important exception to the general rule of accrual is the

‘discovery rule,’ which postpones accrual of a cause of action until

the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of

action.” Grisham, 40 Cal. 4th at 634. “A plaintiff has reason to

discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to

suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” Id. 

While it is unclear the degree of mental incapacity necessary

to delay accrual of a claim, the Court finds persuasive the

standards applied in similar claim presentation circumstances. For

instance, to justify tolling of the one-year late claim application

deadline pursuant to California Government Code section 911.4(c)(1),

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-19- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

a plaintiff must demonstrate evidence that he is “mentally

incapacitated.” Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 220

Cal. App. 3d 702, 717 (6th Dist. 1990). Moreover, it is the

petitioner’s burden to make such a showing by a preponderance of the

evidence. Id. (citing Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d

468, 474 (1967)). Similarly, in analyzing application of California

Government Code section 946.6 (which allows a plaintiff to seek

relief from the court if a timely application to file a late claim

is denied by the public entity), the California Supreme Court has

explained:

The subdivision is designed to assure both that the

claimant was disabled during the filing period and

that the disability was the reason the claimant could

not file timely. A person can be disabled yet be able

to file a timely claim. The decisions construing

subdivision (c)(3) and its predecessor apply the

disability provision in just this way: they analyze

the extent of the injured person's disability and

determine whether it was so great as to preclude

filing a timely claim or authorizing someone to do so.

Draper v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.3d 502, 509 (1990). These

sections demonstrate a legislative intent that (1) the disability

rise to the level of “mental incapacity,” (2) the burden of

demonstrating mental incapacity falls on the party seeking relief

and must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, and (3) the

claimant must show that the disability was the reason the claimant

could not file in a timely manner. Plaintiff has not satisfied this

burden.

Initially, Plaintiff does not allege that he did not discover

the claim or the factual basis for it until March 2008. FAC at 1-7.

Second, the fact that Plaintiff subsequently was prosecuted for, and

convicted of, the crimes that led up to the March 9, 2006 arrest

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-20- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

indicates that Plaintiff was competent and aware of the factual

basis for the current claims, the alleged illegal arrest on March 9,

2006. Finally and most importantly, the medical records that

accompany Plaintiff’s Opposition do not support Plaintiff’s argument

that he was in a “mentally disabled fog” that prevented him from

understanding the factual basis of his claims and filing an

appropriate claim.

Plaintiff submitted medical records covering the period of

March 2006 through July 2007 and from an appointment on March 20,

2008. Pl.’s Opp’n at 19-82. The 2006 and 2007 records show that

Plaintiff experienced headaches and depression, at times expressed

suicidal ideations, and was treated with anti-depressants. Id. at

20, 28-80. The records also indicate several medical visits in

which Plaintiff reported that he was asymptomatic and that his

outlook on life improved when he was taking Zoloft and other

medication. Id. at 42, 44, 50, 76. However, the records do not

contain any complaints or indications that Plaintiff was

experiencing a “mentally disabling fog” or did not understand what

was going on around him. Id. at 20, 28-80. And, none of the

physician notes or other records reflect any concerns regarding

competency, an inability to understand what was happening around or

to him, or an inability to perform important tasks such as filing a

claim. Id. The records also reflect that Plaintiff complained

about being beat up by the police in 2006. Id. at 45, 70, 75, 78.

The March 20, 2008 records reflect that Plaintiff was not currently

experiencing any medical symptoms but that he wanted to see a

psychiatrist to determine whether his past head injuries contributed

to his past criminal conduct. Id. at 21-23, 25-26. Accordingly,

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8 For the same reasons, the Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument to

the extent he asserts that the deadline for filing a late claim should be tolled

due to his claimed mental deficiencies.

-21- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

the medical records establish that Plaintiff was competent, was able

to perform important tasks, such as filing a claim, and knew that he

had been arrested and believed that the officers had used excessive

and unreasonable force in doing so. The records do not support

Plaintiff’s claim that he had a mental disability that prevented him

from filing a timely claim.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of having been

in a “mentally disabled fog” do not satisfy his burden of showing by

a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged disability rose to

the level of mental incapacity, nor do they demonstrate how the

“mentally disabled fog” actually prevented him from presenting his

claim in a timely manner. See Santee, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 717;

Draper, 52 Cal.3d at 509. Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s

argument that his claim did not accrue until March 2008 and his

attendant argument that Count 5 must be dismissed without

prejudice.8

3. Conclusion Regarding Dismissal for Failure to Comply

with California’s Tort Claims Act

In sum, because “submission of a claim to a public entity

pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort

action and the failure to present the claim bars the action,’”

Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at 708, Plaintiff’s failure to present the

allegations against Defendants described in Count 5 bars suit on

that claim. As such, dismissal of Count 5 is appropriate. Burke,

2007 WL 2915067, at *6. Further, because it is apparent that

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9 Plaintiff also cites California Civil Code sections 51 and 51.7 as

providing a three-year time limit for commencing civil actions. FAC at 6.

However, neither section lists a statute of limitations nor creates enforceable

individual rights. 

-22- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Plaintiff did not present a claim to the appropriate public entity

or timely apply for leave to present a late claim, and because it

now is too late for Plaintiff to do so, Plaintiff could not possibly

cure his FAC by alleging other facts. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

Accordingly, this Court finds that it would be futile to grant

Plaintiff leave to amend Count 5 and, therefore, RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ motion be GRANTED and Count 5 against the City of San

Diego and the San Diego Police Department be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

C. The Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims in Count 5 also are

barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in

California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Defs.’ Mem. at

16. Since Plaintiff’s allegations arise from Officers Wilson and

Tagaban’s alleged use of excessive force on March 9, 2006, and

Plaintiff did not file his FAC until June 19, 2008, Defendants

contend that Count 5 is time-barred. Id. 

Plaintiff counters that the Court should apply California

Code of Civil Procedure section 338, which provides for a three-year

statute of limitations on actions premised “upon a liability created

by statute” [Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 338(a)].9 Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.

Plaintiff also requests that, because untimeliness is an affirmative

defense, the Court conduct a separate trial on all special defenses

prior to deciding the instant motion to dismiss. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a specific statute

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of limitations, the Court looks to the statute of limitations for

personal injury actions in the forum state. Maldonado v. Harris,

370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). Under California law:

To determine the statute of limitations which applies

to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the

nature of the cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of

the cause of action. [T]he nature of the right sued

upon and not the form of action nor the relief

demanded determines the applicability of the statute

of limitations under our code.

Marin Healthcare Dist. v. Sutter Health, 103 Cal. App. 4th 861,

874-875 (3rd Dist. 2002) (quoting Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8

Cal. 4th 1, 22-23 (1994)). Here, the “gravamen” of Plaintiff’s FAC

is Plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured as a result of Officers

Wilson and Tagaban’s use of excessive force. Therefore, section

335.1, which addresses personal injury actions, dictates the

applicable statute of limitations, not section 338, which provides

only the statutory authority for asserting that Defendants are

vicariously liable for the officers’ actions. See Burke, 2007 WL

2915067 at *3 (rejecting argument that statute of limitations under

section 338 instead of section 335.1 applies to a vicarious

liability claim against a city based upon personal injuries

inflicted by one of its officers). 

Applying the two-year statute of limitations, it appears that

Plaintiff’s claim is, in fact, time-barred. As previously

discussed, Plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date of his arrest,

March 9, 2006. Plaintiff, therefore, had until March 8, 2008, to

file a civil action against the City of San Diego and the San Diego

Police Department. While Plaintiff filed his original federal

complaint on March 3, 2008, he did not amend his complaint to add

claims against the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police

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10 Plaintiff first moved to amend his complaint on April 30, 2008. Doc.

No. 18. This date also falls beyond the two-year statute of limitations.

11 In the Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 15, the committee

explains that paragraph (c)(1) was added to “to make it clear that the rule does

not apply to preclude any relation back that may be permitted under the

applicable limitations law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee Notes (1991

Amendment) (acknowledging that the applicable limitations law generally will be

state law). The committee further clarified that “[w]hatever may be the

controlling body of limitations law, if that law affords a more forgiving

principle of relation back than the one provided in this rule, it should be

available to save the claim.” Id. In this case, California law is less

stringent than federal law as to relation-back because, in some instances, it

allows for new defendants to be added (as opposed to merely allowing a change in

a defendant’s name) by way of the use of Doe defendants. Compare Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(c)(1)(C) with Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 474. 

-24- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Department until June 19, 2008.10 Thus, unless Plaintiff

demonstrates that Count 5 relates back to the original complaint,

Plaintiff’s claims against the City of San Diego and the San Diego

Police Department are untimely as a matter of law.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to benefit

from the relation-back doctrine. Defs.’ Mem. at 16-17. Rule 15 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an amendment to

a pleading may relate back to the date of the original pleading when

“the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows

relation back.”11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A). In this case,

California law provides the applicable statute of limitations, so

this Court looks to California’s policy regarding relation back. In

California, “[t]he general rule is that an amended complaint that

adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the

original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of

the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original

complaint is filed.” Woo v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 4th 169,

176 (4th Dist. 1999) (citing Liberty Transport, Inc. v. Harry W.

Gorst Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 417, 428 (2nd Dist. 1991), disapproved

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-25- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

on other grounds in Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 115-116

(1991)). “A recognized exception to the general rule is the

substitution under [California Code of Civil Procedure] section 474

of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the

original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the

original complaint.” Id. Only if the requirements of section 474

are satisfied can the amended complaint substituting a new defendant

for a fictitious Doe defendant and filed after the statute of

limitations has expired be deemed filed as of the date the original

complaint. Id. (citing Austin v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 56 Cal.

2d 596, 599 (1961)). 

In this case, though Plaintiff has not squarely addressed the

relation-back issue, the Court finds it appropriate to consider

briefly whether it would apply to Count 5. California law requires

Plaintiff to have listed Doe defendants in his original complaint in

accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Id.

Section 474 allows the use of Doe defendants “[w]hen the plaintiff

is ignorant of the name of a defendant.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 474.

The amended pleading may then substitute a named defendant for a Doe

defendant “when [the defendant’s] true name is discovered.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff did not name any Doe defendants in his original

complaint and he did not allege the substance of Count 5. He also

cannot plausibly claim that, at the time he filed his original

complaint, he was ignorant of the names of the City of San Diego and

the San Diego Police Department, since he listed all of the

individual defendants as “San Diego Police” officers, sergeants or

detectives and alleged that he filed a Citizen’s Complaint with the

San Diego Police Department. Compl. at 2, 6. Accordingly, the

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12 Plus, of course, Plaintiff was able to initiate his federal action

within the two-year limitations period - he simply failed to include Defendants

at that time. 

-26- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Court finds that Plaintiff has neither sought the benefit of, nor

satisfied the requirements for, California’s relation-back doctrine.

The allegations against the City of San Diego and the San Diego

Police Department, contained in Count 5 of the FAC, therefore, do

not relate back to the date of the original complaint. Woo, 75 Cal.

App. 4th at 176. 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, in the form

of tolling of the statute of limitations, due to his mental issues

and incarceration, the Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments

unpersuasive. For the same reasons discussed previously in regard

to the claim presentation requirement, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has not plead facts demonstrating that his mental illness

was so debilitating that it prevented him from being able to comply

with the statute of limitations. The fact that Plaintiff is

incarcerated also does not entitle him to tolling because California

Penal Code section 2601 expressly provides prisoners the right to

initiate civil actions and Plaintiff has not alleged that he was

prevented from taking advantage of this right.12 See Cal. Penal Code

§ 2601. Accordingly, tolling does not save Plaintiff’s action from

being untimely.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Count 5 of

Plaintiff’s FAC is untimely. The Court, therefore, RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ motion, alternatively, be GRANTED on this basis and

Count 5 against the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police

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13 The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request that the Court conduct a

trial on Defendants’ statute of limitations affirmative defense prior to deciding

the motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s

authority for his request is California Code of Civil Procedure § 597 and this

Court’s conduct is not governed by California’s procedural rules. Furthermore,

the Supreme Court has confirmed that even though the statute of limitations is

raised as an affirmative defense, if the allegations of the complaint “show that

relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

127 S.Ct. 910, 920-21 (2007).

-27- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Department be DISMISSED.13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation and (2) granting Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department

and Count 5 of Plaintiff’s FAC.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no

later than November 14, 2008. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

December 5, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: October 23, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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-28- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

COPY TO:

HONORABLE WILLIAM Q. HAYES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES

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