Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01984/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01984-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Phillip Roberts, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, et al, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-01984-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Defendant City of Phoenix seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claim. For the

following reasons, the motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a Senior Robbery Sergeant in the Violent Crimes Bureau of the Robbery

unit of the Phoenix Police Department. In 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal

Opportunity Division stating Lieutenant Laurel Burgett was discriminating against Officer

Terry Yahweh on the basis of Officer Yahweh’s race. Shortly after filing his complaint,

Plaintiff “was removed from all kidnapping and home invasion investigations and was

removed from a general standby work schedule.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff was later threatened

that any “additional memoranda alleging policy violations would be cause for his removal.”

(Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff also became the target of internal investigations and was transferred

out of the Robbery Unit. 

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Based on these events, Plaintiff filed a two count complaint against the City of

Phoenix. Plaintiff’s first count is for violation of Arizona’s whistle blower statute.

Plaintiff’s second count is for retaliation in violation of Title VII. Defendant seeks dismissal

of the first count on the basis that the whistle blower statute does not apply to City of

Phoenix employees. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standard for Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations as true but

need not accept legal conclusions. Id. 

II. A.R.S. § 38-532 Does Not Apply to City Employees

Plaintiff claims Defendant violated Arizona’s whistle blower protection law. The law

prohibits “an employee who has control over personnel actions to take reprisal against an

employee for a disclosure of information of a matter of public concern by the employee to

a public body which the employee reasonably believes evidences . . . [a] violation of any

law.” A.R.S. § 38-532. Plaintiff claims his complaint to the Equal Opportunity Division

disclosed violations of the law “as well as mismanagement and abuse of authority.” (Doc.

1 at 7). According to Defendant, the law does not apply to employees of the City of Phoenix.

Defendant’s argument depends on the statutory definition of the term “employee.”

The statute provides

“Employee” means an officer or employee of this state or any of its

departments, commissions, agencies or boards. Employee includes

employees and officers of community college districts, school districts

and counties of this state but does not include officers or employees of

a municipal corporation established for the purpose of reclamation and

distribution of water and the generation of electricity.

A.R.S. § 38-531(1). Defendant points out the City of Phoenix–which is a municipal

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1

 It is possible the exclusion of specific municipal corporation employees merely is

a “belt and suspenders” attempt to make sure the employees of municipal corporations are

excluded. See United States v. Carona, 2011 WL 32581, at *10 (9th Cir.) (“The term ‘belt

and suspenders’ is sometimes used to describe the common tendency of lawyers to use

redundant terms to make sure that every possibility is covered.”). It would be strange,

however, to draft an exclusion addressed to specific employees when the general class those

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corporation–is not the state nor a department, commission, agency, board, or county of the

state. Thus, Defendant believes Plaintiff is not an “employee” covered by the statute.

Plaintiff responds that the statute must cover all employees of municipal corporations

because there is a carve out for specific municipal corporation employees. The Arizona

Supreme Court has not decided this issue. Therefore, the Court must predict how the

Arizona Supreme Court would resolve the issue “based on decisions of [Arizona] courts,

decisions from other jurisdictions, treatises and restatements.” Simmonds v. Credit Suisse

Securities (USA) LLC, 2011 WL 135693, at*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011).

Arizona follows “fundamental principles of statutory construction, the cornerstone of

which is the rule that the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language

and, when that language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s

construction.” Janson v. Christenson, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Ariz. 1991). If the plain

language is ambiguous, a court must determine the legislative intent “by interpreting the

statutory scheme as a whole and consider[ing] the statute’s context, subject matter, historical

background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” Hughes v. Johnson, 50 P.3d

821, 823 (Ariz. 2002). Accordingly, the first step is the language of the statute. 

A. Statute is Ambiguous

The statute applies to employees of the state, community college districts, schools

districts, and counties. The statute’s language does not directly address employees of

municipal corporations other than to exclude employees of municipal corporations

established for the reclamation and distribution of water or the generation of electricity. If,

as Defendant suggests, the statute does not apply to all employees of municipal corporations,

the exclusion regarding certain municipal corporations employees is superfluous.1

 This

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employees belong to is not covered by the statute. 

2

 The entirety of the analysis is “[o]n its face, § 38-531 does not include municipal

employees.” Id. 

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reading would be contrary to a court’s duty to avoid rendering any part of a statute

“superfluous, void, contradictory, or insignificant.” Devenir Associates v. City of Phoenix,

821 P.2d 161, 164 (Ariz. 1991). But the text of the statute does not provide any basis for

applying it to all municipal corporation employees; the statute simply does not extend

coverage to all municipal corporation employees. Thus, to read the statute as covering

municipal corporation employees would be contrary to a court’s duty to “not read into a

statute something which is not within the express manifest intention of the Legislature as

gathered from the statute itself.” Patches v. Indus. Comm’n, 204 P.3d 437, 440 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2009). Because either reading of § 38-532 creates problems, the plain language of the

statute is ambiguous. 

B. Case Law Is Not Instructive

The Court has been able to locate only three court decisions potentially on point.

First, the court in Sasser v. City of Phoenix, 2008 WL 4108040, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App.),

squarely addressed the issue and concluded the statute does not cover municipal corporation

employees. That case, however, is unpublished and does not explain its reasoning other than

a straightforward reading of the statutory text.2

 Second, in Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d

250 (Ariz. 1986), a police officer for the City of Globe sued for wrongful discharge after

being fired for whistle blowing activity. In ruling on his wrongful discharge claim, the court

stated “A.R.S. § 38-532 is not applicable to this case.” Id. at 257 (emphasis added). The

context of the quote makes it unclear whether the court was observing § 38-532 does not

apply to city employees or whether the court was merely observing the plaintiff had not

pursued a claim under § 38-532. And third, in Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 69 P.3d

1011, 1015 n.6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), the court noted the officer in Wagner could have

pursued a claim under A.R.S. § 38-532. There is no indication the Galati court was aware

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city employees might not be protected under A.R.S. § 38-532. Viewed together, existing

case law is little help.

B. Legislative History

According to Defendant, the Arizona legislature has rejected attempts to include

municipal corporation employees in the statute on two separate occasions. In 1989, the

Arizona legislature discussed changing the definition of “employee” to include employees

of the “state, or a city, town, county, community college or school district within this state.”

Hearing on S.B. 1423 before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 39th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.

(Ariz. Apr. 4, 1989) (Doc. 13-1 at 7). The legislature rejected this amendment. In 1990,

another amendment was proposed to revise the definition of “employee” to cover individuals

employed by cities. This amendment was opposed by the Deputy Personnel Director of the

City of Phoenix because it was unnecessary based on the City of Phoenix already having a

“specific grievance process, in which they encourage[d] employees to come forward with

problems.” Hearings on H.B. 2122 before the S. Comm. on Gov’t, 39th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.

(Ariz. Apr. 5, 1990). The clear assumption of both proposed amendments is that the whistle

blower law did not already apply to city employees. This is evidence in favor of reading the

current statute as excluding city employees. Cf. Cicoria v. Cole, 215 P.3d 402, 406 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 2009) (“Subsequent legislation that clarifies the statutory scheme is strongly

indicative of the legislature’s original intent.”). 

C. Structure of Statute

Defendant believes the structure of the Arizona whistle blower law’s administrative

remedy shows city employees are not covered by the law. The whistle blower law allows

an aggrieved employee to make a complaint to a community college district, county

personnel board, school district personnel board, or the state personnel board. A.R.S. § 38-

532(H). Defendant argues none of these boards have jurisdiction over city employees.

Therefore, if the whistle blower statute applies to city employees, those employees would not

have an administrative avenue of relief similar to that enjoyed by other public employees.

This argument is faulty, however, because the Arizona Supreme Court has clarified if an

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employee is “covered in the definitional provisions” of the whistle blower statute, the

personnel board has “enforcement authority relative to those employees.” McDonald v.

Campbell, 821 P.2d 139, 144 (Ariz. 1991). In other words, if an employee is protected by

the whistle blower statute, the state personnel board has the authority to hear administrative

complaints made by that employee. Thus, if city employees were protected by the whistle

blower act, they would have the same administrative remedy as other state employees.

Defendant’s arguments regarding the structure of the statute do not weigh in either party’s

favor.

D. Purpose of Whistle Blower Statute

The Arizona Supreme Court “believe[s] that whistleblowing activity which serves a

public purpose should be protected.” Wagner, 722 P.2d at 257. “[T]he decision to expose

illegal or unsafe practices should be encouraged.” Id. Moreover, “[n]o one will disagree

with the proposition that public policy is furthered when the civil rights of our citizens are

protected from abuse.” Id. at 258. These statements counsel in favor of a broad reading of

the whistle blower statute because providing formal protection to city employees for their

whistle blowing activities undoubtedly will encourage such activity. The policy behind the

whistle blower statute supports applying it to city employees.

E. Summary 

The statutory language is ambiguous and either possible reading conflicts with settled

principles of statutory construction. Allowing the employees of municipal corporations to

file suit under § 38-532 would not conflict with the overall structure of the statute and it

would promote the underlying purposes of the statute. But the legislative history indicates

the Arizona Legislature believes the current statute does not cover employees such as

Plaintiff. There are also indications in the caselaw that the statute does not cover city

employees. Viewing the circumstances as a whole, it appears likely the Arizona Supreme

Court would adopt a reading of § 38-532 to exclude city employees. Under this reading, the

motion to dismiss must be granted. 

Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED. Count one of the

complaint is dismissed.

DATED this 10th day of February, 2011.

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