Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-99006/USCOURTS-ca9-07-99006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS S. MICKEY, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

No. 07-99006

v.  D.C. No.

ROBERT L. AYERS, For California CV-93-00243-RMW

State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent-Appellee. 

DOUGLAS S. MICKEY, 

Petitioner-Appellee, No. 07-99007

v. D.C. No. 

ROBERT L. AYERS, For California CV-93-00243-RMW

State Prison at San Quentin, OPINION

Respondent-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 9, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed June 7, 2010

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

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COUNSEL

J. Frank McCabe, San Francisco, California, and Neoma D.

Kenwood, Berkeley, California, filed the briefs and argued

the cause for the petitioner-appellant-cross-appellee.

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Alice B. Lustre, Deputy Att’y General of California, argued

the cause and filed the brief for the respondent-appellee-crossappellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General

of California, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General of California, and Glenn R. Pruden, Deputy Attorney

General of California also were on the brief.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We consider an appeal and a cross-appeal presenting consolidated issues arising out of a California double murder conviction and death sentence.

I

A

A California jury convicted Douglas S. Mickey of two firstdegree murders, making special circumstance findings that

authorized the death penalty. The state court jury returned a

death verdict. The facts, as aptly discussed by the California

Supreme Court in People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612 (1991),

and undisputed by the parties, can be summarized as follows:

1

In September 1980, Mickey lived on an Air Force base in

Japan with his wife, who worked as a nurse, and her two children. Mickey did not have a job and his family was experiencing financial difficulties. On September 17, 1980, Mickey

flew to California, his home state. He stayed with Edward

Rogers, a longtime friend. Mickey disclosed to Rogers that he

traveled to California in order to rob and murder Eric Lee

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Hanson. After that, Mickey planned to travel to Alaska to kill

his wife’s ex-husband in order to obtain life insurance proceeds for his wife and children, who were beneficiaries under

the policy. Although Hanson, a drug dealer, was a longtime

friend of his, Mickey had a grudge against him. Mickey

believed that Hanson had stolen some of Mickey’s personal

property. As a result, Mickey had stolen some of Hanson’s

marijuana crop, burying it in the ground. When Mickey

returned to California, he retrieved the stolen loot and began

consuming it, along with alcohol.

On September 22, Mickey drove to Hanson’s home in

Placer County in a car he borrowed from Rogers, arriving

around 11 p.m. He armed himself with a rifle, also borrowed

from Rogers, to which Mickey attached a homemade silencer.

Mickey stayed overnight with Hanson and his girlfriend,

Catherine Blount. Though Mickey observed Hanson counting

a wad of money, he did not act on his plan to kill Hanson, and

he left the next day. 

On September 28, Rogers dropped Mickey off at Hanson’s

home, around midnight. This time, Rogers and Mickey established a rendez-vous point at a public telephone booth a few

miles from Hanson’s home. Mickey had armed himself with

his own knife and Rogers’s pistol. Hanson and Blount invited

Mickey inside the home. 

Shortly thereafter, Mickey murdered Hanson and Blount.

He first bludgeoned Hanson with a baseball bat and slit his

throat from ear to ear down to the spinal cord. He then

stabbed Blount seven times in the chest. Three of the blows

pierced her heart. Mickey left the house, taking substantial

property with him, and drove away in Hanson’s Volkswagen.

He left no fingerprints. 

Mickey then met up with Rogers. They transferred the

stolen property to Rogers’ pick-up truck and wiped the Volkswagen clean of fingerprints. Rogers convinced Mickey not to

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go back and burn the house to the ground. They abandoned

the Volkswagen and returned to Rogers’ house. They stashed

the goods and Mickey tended to a wound suffered during the

murders. The next day, September 30, Mickey fled to Japan.

2

Within a few days, the State secured a statement from Rogers implicating himself and Mickey in the crimes, in exchange

for Rogers’ immunity. The State soon thereafter filed a complaint against Mickey for the double homicide, alleging five

special circumstances making the crimes capital offenses.

Sheriff Donald Nunes traveled to Japan, where Mickey was

arrested on October 14, 1980. Nunes advised Mickey of his

Miranda rights and Mickey declined to speak at that time,

asking to speak to a friend who was an attorney. Although

Mickey desired to waive extradition, the Japanese government

would not permit a waiver.

3

Mickey sat in a Japanese prison until 1981. On January 12

of that year, federal marshal Robert LaRoche arrived with

Sheriff Nunes and Detective Curtis Landry and, more importantly, an extradition warrant. Nunes and Landry accompanied LaRoche in order to collect evidence and to interview

witnesses. On January 16, 1981, at about 3:30 p.m. Tokyo

time, LaRoche, Nunes, Landry, and Mickey began the journey

back to California. The law enforcement officials picked up

Mickey from the Japanese detention center. Mickey was alert,

healthy, jovial, and talkative, and engaged in small talk with

Nunes, whom he recognized. Mickey continued to initiate

small talk with Nunes on the three-hour ride to the Tokyo airport.

Around 8 p.m. Tokyo time, after waiting about an hour at

the airport, Landry, who suffered from halitosis, offered

Mickey a mint for Mickey’s bad breath. The mint came from

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a bowl in Mickey’s wife’s house, which Landry had visited

the prior day to conduct an interview. After Mickey appeared

to recognize the mint, Landry asked Mickey if he knew its

origin. Mickey said yes and put his head in his hands. The

group then boarded the plane. Mickey sat next to Nunes and

resumed small talk. He spoke of his family and hobbies and

was generally pleasant and talkative. He expressed no signs

of grief.

Nunes later switched seats with Landry to take a nap. Landry and Mickey then enjoyed several cups of coffee, and

Mickey picked up where he left off with Nunes. He spoke of

philosophy, politics, food, football, family, and California. He

asked Landry about his family. Landry answered, and eventually, in the course of discussion, referenced that he watched

Mickey play high-school football and knew of his brother’s

suicide. About two hours later, Mickey suddenly asked Landry whether Hanson and Blount were buried together. Landry

replied that they had been cremated and their ashes scattered.

At this point, Mickey started crying uncontrollably. He said

that nothing would have happened if Hanson had not reacted

as he had to the news of Mickey’s theft of Hanson’s marijuana crop. This lasted about twenty minutes. Landry did

nothing. An hour later, Mickey resumed conversing about his

family, his hobbies, and politics. The plane then landed in

Hawaii, around 1:30 a.m. Tokyo time (6:30 a.m. Hawaii

time). Mickey said to Landry, “Curt, I would like to continue

our conversation at a later time.” Landry replied, “Fine, yes.”

After Mickey was checked into a Honolulu jail, LaRoche,

Nunes, and Landry discussed what to do. Nunes called the

Placer County District Attorney’s office, which told him to

ask Mickey if he wanted to speak and, if Mickey said yes, to

Mirandize and then to interrogate him. Landry did so, starting

the interrogation at 12:42 p.m. Hawaii time, or 7:42 a.m.

Tokyo time. Mickey confirmed that he had requested the conversation and then waived his Miranda rights. During the

four-hour interrogation, Mickey was alert and aware and lost

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and regained his composure several times. His answers to

Landry’s questions implicated himself in the murders and the

planning. The next day, the group returned to California,

where Mickey was incarcerated. While in prison there, he

made further statements regarding his role in planning and

executing the murders to a jailhouse informant.

B

The trial did not begin until two and a half years later.1

1

The guilt phase trial began on June 21, 1983 and ran until

July 20, 1983. At trial, the prosecution relied on Mickey’s

statements to police officers, family and friends, Edward Rogers, and a jailhouse informant. The State also introduced some

of the letters Mickey penned to his wife, which showed his

financial motive for the murders. And it introduced numerous

photographs of the crime scene.

Mickey provided very little resistance in the way of a

defense, likely because, as counsel told the trial judge before

trial started, the strategy was to focus on the penalty phase

because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Mickey did

not testify and merely contested whether the prosecution met

its burden as to the required mental state. He pointed to his

statements, admitted by the prosecution, as evidence of selfdefense or diminished capacity from voluntary intoxication.

The jury convicted Mickey of both murders in the first degree

and, for each of the murders, made special circumstance find1Mickey was represented by Fred P. Tuttle III and Lyle H. Shattuck

throughout this time period. The trial was originally set for November 9,

1981, but the state and the defense jointly sought and obtained a continuance of six months. The defense successfully sought further continuances.

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ings of multiple murders, intentional murder for financial

gain, felony-murder-robbery, and felony-murder-burglary.2

At the penalty phase, the prosecution largely rested on the

nature of the crimes themselves, although it did attempt to

prove prior domestic abuse through testimony of Mickey’s

ex-wives. Mickey, however, put on what the California

Supreme Court called “substantial” evidence in mitigation.

Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d at 639. Thirty lay witnesses testified as to

their interaction with Mickey. Without exception, all portrayed him as a good, loving, hardworking child and youth.

Notably lacking from the penalty phase was any mention of

Mickey’s pattern of sexual exhibitionism in his youth and

young adulthood, which culminated in two and a half years of

sexual abuse of his step-daughter immediately prior to the

murders. The defense successfully excluded this evidence. 

Instead, defense counsel cast Mickey as a good child who

began drifting through life after experiencing tragedy.

Defense counsel told the jury of the death of Mickey’s halfbrother in an automobile accident when Mickey was five

years of age. Defense counsel also emphasized the death of

his mother, a possible suicide, in an automobile accident

when Mickey was seventeen years old, and conveyed that

Mickey was very close to his mother and felt the loss deeply,

turning to alcohol to dull the pain. Counsel also showed the

jury that soon after that Mickey’s grandfather died, and after

that, his brother committed suicide.

Counsel argued that, as a result of these experiences,

Mickey began abusing drugs, eventually branching out from

the alcohol he abused after his mother’s death into more serious drugs like marijuana, mushrooms, PCP, and LSD. Mickey

became entangled with the drug culture, through which he

met Hanson. Two experts, Drs. Jules Burstein and David

2The fifth special circumstance allegation—of a heinous, atrocious, or

cruel murder—was set aside by the trial judge prior to trial. 

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Smith, explained the effect of the drug abuse on Mickey. Both

testified that Mickey lacked the capacity to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to law at

the time of the murders because of “polysubstance” drug

abuse combined with a delusional system in which Hanson

was the oppressive master and Mickey the apprentice. They

based their findings largely on interviews with Mickey himself. The prosecution produced its own expert on rebuttal to

counter Burstein and Smith.

Despite this thirty-witness presentation, the jury returned a

death verdict.

2

Mickey appealed his convictions to the California Supreme

Court. He raised numerous issues arising from the guilt and

penalty phases. The California Supreme Court affirmed the

judgment in a thorough, ninety-five-page opinion. Mickey, 54

Cal. 3d at 612. It did rule for Mickey on two minor issues,

holding that Mickey was eligible for only one of the multiple

murder special circumstance findings because one case could

only support one such finding, no matter how many murders.

Id. at 678. It also held that the murder-for-financial gain special circumstance findings were inappropriate because the

murder was committed neither as a murder-for-hire nor for

insurance proceeds. Id. at 678-79. Neither of these two holdings affected the ultimate affirmance of the death penalty

because the remaining special circumstance findings were

upheld. 

Relevant for our purposes, the California Supreme Court

rejected Mickey’s argument that the trial judge erroneously

denied his motion to suppress his in-flight and Hawaii admissions. The court held that there was no due process violation

for the in-flight admissions because there was no state coercion. Rather, the defendant initiated the discussion. The same

was true of the Hawaii admissions. Moreover, it held that

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there was no Miranda violation with respect to the in-flight

admissions because there was no custodial interrogation. And

there was no Miranda violation for the Hawaii admissions

because the defendant started the conversation.

The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.

Mickey v. California, 506 U.S. 819 (1992).

3

Mickey then began pursuing federal habeas relief. After he

successfully moved for a stay of his execution and appointment of counsel, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in 1995. Proceedings on that petition were stayed pending

exhaustion of certain claims in state court, which was completed in 1996. Mickey also filed for postconviction relief in

the California Supreme Court challenging his death sentence,

but that petition was denied in 1997.

Mickey filed an amended federal habeas petition at the end

of 1997, raising numerous claims. The district court awarded

summary judgment to the state on all but three of his claims.

To evaluate these remaining claims, the district court held an

evidentiary hearing, which included testimony by a new

social historian, David Lisak; a new expert, Dr. Donald Stonefield; the two original penalty phase experts, Burstein and

Smith; and various other new and old lay witnesses. The district court then denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

with respect to the voluntariness of incriminating statements

claim and the guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, but granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus with

respect to the penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel

claim.

The district court granted certificates of appealability

(“COA”) on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims at the

guilt and penalty phases. Mickey appeals the district court’s

ruling on ineffective assistance at the guilt phase. The state

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cross-appeals the district court’s ruling on ineffective assistance at the penalty phase. Mickey’s opening brief requested

a COA on the inadmissibility claim involving the extrajudicial

incriminating statements, which we granted.

II

Mickey first claims that his statements on the plane from

Tokyo to Hawaii and in the Hawaii jail are constitutionally

inadmissible. In Mickey’s view, his right against involuntary

admissions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), was

violated because he was coerced by mistreatment in Japan and

by a mental illness he suffered. Mickey also argues his rights

under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were violated

because he was reinterrogated after invoking his right to

counsel and involuntarily waived his rights.

Since Mickey filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus

before the enactment of AEDPA, we review Mickey’s claims

under pre-AEDPA standards. State court findings of fact,

including whether a waiver of Miranda was knowing and

intelligent, are thus accorded a “presumption of correctness.”

Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 416 (9th Cir. 1991) (en

banc). However, we review the voluntariness of a confession

or Miranda waiver de novo. Id. at 415-16.

A

We turn first to Mickey’s Due Process Clause claim.

Mickey argues his in-flight and Hawaii statements were involuntary for two reasons. First, he alleges coercion by poor conditions and a lack of contact with his family in the Japanese

prison in which he was incarcerated pending extradition.

Mickey also points to Landry’s gift of a mint in the Tokyo airport, which Mickey correctly recognized as coming from a

bowl of mints in his wife’s home.

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1

[1] An admission “is involuntary if coerced either by physical intimidation or psychological pressure.” United States v.

Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 730 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States

v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003)). We look

to see “whether a defendant’s will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (internal

quotation marks omitted). When assessing the voluntariness

of an admission, we consider “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused

and the details of the interrogation.” Id. at 434; see Shi, 525

F.3d at 730. 

[2] Here, we agree with the district court that the Japanese

prison conditions did not overcome Mickey’s will. As an initial matter, we agree with the district court that Mickey exaggerates his prison conditions. His family, for example, visited

him three or four times while he was in prison, and the other

abuses he alleges are unsupported by the record. Moreover,

the California Supreme Court affirmed, and the district court

agreed, that when the officers picked Mickey up from the Japanese prison and transported him to Hawaii, Mickey “was

alert and in good health; he was also jovial and extremely

talkative.” Mickey, 53 Cal. 3d at 643. He was so talkative that

the federal marshal hoped he would stop talking. This behavior continued on the plane, where Mickey directed a running

conversation with whomever was the occupant of his airplane

row. Throughout this trip, the officers did not threaten Mickey

physically or psychologically. In fact, they did not ask him

any questions. The officers merely reciprocated Mickey’s

desire to engage in “small talk” about traffic, philosophy, politics, and mutual acquaintances in California. We cannot rule

that Mickey’s will was “overborne” by these normal prison

conditions, which the evidence shows Mickey weathered

quite well, in light of our case law holding incriminating

statements in far worse conditions were voluntary. E.g., Shi,

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525 F.3d at 719 (holding that incriminating statement issued

after nineteen-hour confinement by a native Chinese speaker

on a ship was voluntary).

[3] Even if we believed Mickey’s account, it is wellestablished that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). In

other words, “[t]here must be some causal connection

between the police conduct and the confession.” United States

v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1992). We are satisfied

that the actions of the Japanese prison officials are not at all

connected to the behavior of American police.

2

[4] Mickey also argues that Landry’s gift of a mint from

Mickey’s home undermined the voluntariness of Mickey’s

confession by “softening up” Mickey. But the totality of the

circumstances convince us that Mickey’s will was not overborne by the gift. The mint was given at 8 p.m., but the first

incriminating statement did not occur until four hours later,

with several hours of calm small talk that continued the earlier

small talk intervening. Given that Mickey acted the same

before and after the mint, it is hard to see how the mint is

“causally related” to Mickey’s statements. Connelly, 479 U.S.

at 164. Additionally, this type of behavior is a far cry from the

type of police behavior typically associated with coercion.

E.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968) (police

withheld food and prevented sleep during eighteen-hour interrogation); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (police

officers held gun to the head of wounded individual to extract

confession); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966)

(police placed individual in closed cell without windows, provide limited food, and use coercive tactics for sixteen days).

We conclude that Mickey’s in-flight statements were voluntary.

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[5] There is nothing in the record to suggest any additional

physical or psychological coercion accompanied Mickey’s

admissions in Hawaii, which occurred in a standard police

interrogation after Mickey asked to speak with Detective Landry. Mickey at times suggests he was excessively fatigued at

the time of the statements due to the flight. But we have held

that statements of defendants in far worse health were not

involuntary. Kelley, 953 F.2d at 564-65 (statements from a

handcuffed suspect in heroin withdrawal); United States v.

Lewis, 833 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1987) (statements after defendant was administered a general anaesthetic); United States v.

Martin, 781 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1985) (statements of a groggy

defendant under the influence of Demerol). Here, by contrast,

Mickey has not overcome the presumption of correctness of

the state court finding that Mickey was “alert and aware” during the Hawaii interrogation. Since Mickey’s will was not

overborne by the Hawaii trip, his statements in Hawaii also

were not involuntary for purposes of the Due Process Clause.

B

Second, we consider Mickey’s claims that his in-flight and

Hawaii statements were taken in violation of his Fifth

Amendment Miranda rights. Mickey argues that he was interrogated on the plane to Hawaii and in the Hawaii jail notwithstanding invoking his right to counsel in Japan. Mickey also

argues his Miranda waiver in Hawaii was involuntary. 

[6] A suspect who invokes the right to counsel may not be

interrogated unless he initiates the conversation. Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Mickey told Nunes at the time

of his arrest that he did not want to speak without first consulting a friend, who was an attorney. We assume this constitutes an invocation of the right to counsel under Edwards. 

[7] Miranda and Edwards, however, only apply to interrogations, which consist of “any words or actions on the part of

the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and

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custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to

elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). Casual conversation

is generally not the type of behavior that police should know

is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. United

States v. Tail, 459 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Polite conversation is not the functional equivalent of interrogation.”);

United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 849 (11th Cir.

1984) (“Incriminating statements made in the course of casual

conversation are not products of a custodial interrogation.”).

Here, on the airplane the police asked no questions and only

responded to Mickey’s desire for small talk. They engaged in

casual conversation of the type generally not subject to

Edwards. 

[8] Mickey argues that the small talk, though casual, does

not fall under this general rule. In his view, Landry had reason

to know his behavior might elicit an incriminating response

because he was “softening up” Mickey by participating in a

discussion of the connections between their two families,

including Landry’s knowledge of Mickey’s brother’s suicide.

But, Landry did not intend and had no reason to know that his

statements about his various family members and how they

interacted with Mickey’s family were likely to elicit an

incriminating response in the context of a conversation ranging from California, philosophy, and politics to family, food,

and football. See United States v. Hackley, 636 F.2d 493, 498

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that a statement from a conversation

about defendant’s cousin in which police mentioned their

inability to reach her after her arrest was not interrogatory).

Here, the small talk was not interrogational. Moreover,

Mickey initiated the discussion of California connections

between the two men. His words and deeds thus can be “fairly

said to represent a desire” to “open up a more generalized discussion relating . . . indirectly to the investigation.” Oregon

v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983). Since Mickey was

not interrogated and, in any event, initiated the discussion on

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the airplane, his Miranda and Edwards rights were not violated on the flight. 

[9] Similar reasoning applies to the Hawaii statements.

Mickey initiated the conversation with Landry that led to the

statements in the Hawaii jail while disembarking from the airplane, by saying: “I would like to continue our conversation

at a later time.” This statement is more of an initiation than

that of the defendant in Bradshaw itself, where the defendant

merely asked “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”

462 U.S. at 1045. At the Hawaii jail, furthermore, Mickey

was re-Mirandized and waived his rights in writing. Mickey

argues this waiver was involuntary. But the same standard of

voluntariness in due process claims also applies to Miranda

waiver claims. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169-70. Accordingly,

Mickey’s waiver was not involuntary for the reasons discussed in Part II.A. We are satisfied that Mickey’s Miranda

rights were not violated during the flight and in Hawaii.

III

Mickey next argues that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial.3 A defendant’s Sixth

Amendment rights are violated if counsel’s representation

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and such

deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). There is a strong presumption of competence because of the bias of hindsight. Bell

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002). Prejudice results when

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reason3As noted in footnote 1, Mickey was represented by two attorneys, Tuttle and Shattuck. We consider their combined performance because the

record does not indicate that their representation was not joint. The word

“counsel” refers to both attorneys’ joint representation. 

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able probability” is that which is “sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id.4

A

Under California law at the time of Mickey’s offense,

defendants could argue that they lacked the capacity to deliberate or to premeditate that was required for first degree, or

death-penalty eligible, murder. People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d

379 (1969); see Cal. Penal Code § 25(a) (abolishing diminished capacity defense for crimes committed after 1982).

Mickey argues that his counsel were deficient for failing to

investigate and present such a mental health defense. In particular, he contends that counsel failed to call examining psychiatrist Dr. David Axelrad, failed adequately to investigate a

diminished capacity defense, and presented an unbelievable

self-defense theory. In Mickey’s view, this deficiency prejudiced him by conceding an element of the offense, his capacity to deliberate. We disagree.

As an initial matter, we distinguish between two duties the

parties conflate. On the one hand, counsel must investigate

relevant defenses. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Rios v.

Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2002). On the other hand,

counsel must reasonably select and present a defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966,

980 (9th Cir. 2001). These are different duties. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (contrasting “whether

counsel should have presented a mitigation case” with

“whether the investigation support[ed] counsel’s decision not

to introduce mitigating evidence . . . was itself reasonable”)

(emphasis modified); Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706

(9th Cir. 2004). It is true that evaluation of the two duties

4As discussed in Part II, we review Mickey’s claims under pre-AEDPA

standards. We review the district court’s ruling on ineffective assistance

of counsel de novo. Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.

1995). 

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overlaps: counsel will be hard pressed to satisfy the duty to

select a defense when counsel fails to investigate the best

defense. E.g., Phillips, 267 F.3d at 980. But counsel may fail

to investigate a particular defense and still, luckily, present

the best one. He may also properly investigate various

defenses, but unreasonably select among the alternatives. The

inquiries also overlap at the prejudice stage: with respect to

defective investigations, the test for prejudice is whether the

noninvestigated evidence was powerful enough to establish a

probability that a reasonable attorney would decide to present

it and a probability that such presentation might undermine

the jury verdict. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535.

1

[10] Guided by this distinction, we first consider counsel’s

performance of their “duty to make reasonable investigations

or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. An investigation must be more than cursory. Rios, 299 F.3d at 805-06

(holding that counsel must interview more than one witness

before abandoning a particular defense). For mental health

defenses, counsel cannot ignore “abundant signs” of mental

illness, Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 1998),

or rest on a “preliminary examination,” Daniels v. Woodford,

428 F.3d 1181, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2005). At the same time, of

course, counsel need not investigate interminably. Hendricks

v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1995). 

[11] Here, Mickey’s counsel conducted a significant investigation into a mental health defense. Counsel employed no

fewer than four mental health experts for the guilt phase. Dr.

Frederick Whipple, a forensic psychiatrist, evaluated Mickey

on March 23, 1981, only two months after Mickey’s extradition to the United States and over two years before the start

of his trial. In July 1981, still nearly eighteen months before

trial, counsel hired another psychiatrist, Dr. A. David Axelrad, who examined Mickey several times over the course of

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three months. Axelrad, in turn, hired two clinical psychologists, Grant L. Hutchinson and Thomas L. Morrison, to assist

in evaluating Mickey. Hutchinson evaluated Mickey on September 21, 1981. Morrison also administered psychological

testing to assist Axelrad. This investigation was sufficient. See

Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (holding that hiring of only two

mental health experts was not deficient).

Even if there were deficiencies in that investigation, they

are justified by a “reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; see

Wood v. Allen, 130 S. C.t 841, 850-51 (2010) (holding that

state court’s factual finding that counsel made a strategic

decision not to investigate further a mental illness that, if reasonable, would make counsel’s investigation not deficient,

was reasonable under AEDPA review). Turk v. White, 116

F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 1997), is instructive as an application of

this principle. In that case, counsel chose a self-defense theory

instead of a mental health defense theory because the former

was the “strongest defense.” Id. at 1266. In particular, a mental health defense “would have been inconsistent with a

defense based upon the facts as presented by both [the defendant] and as contained within the officers’ reports” because

the self-defense theory “required [defendant] to prove that he

acted reasonably, while the insanity defense required [defendant] to prove that he did not understand what he was doing.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that counsel

acted reasonably in relying on the defendant’s communications and police reports in light of this conflict. Id. We also

held that this reasonable strategy justified counsel’s decision

not to investigate further a mental health defense. Id. at 1267.

[12] The same is true here: any deficiencies are justified by

the reasonable strategic decision to investigate a defense consistent with Mickey’s extrajudicial statements. After counsel

lost motions to exclude Mickey’s statements on the airplane

to Hawaii, in the Hawaii jail, and to a jailhouse informant, he

was faced with a situation in which the jury would hear

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incriminating admissions in the defendant’s own words, qualified only by self-defense rhetoric. But, just as in Turk, here a

mental health defense would require counsel to prove that the

defendant could not act reasonably, while his assertions of

self-defense assumed he could. Faced with this evidence, it

was reasonable for counsel not to investigate a conflicting

mental health defense beyond the four experts he consulted.

2

[13] Nor were counsel deficient in failing to present a

mental health defense. Counsel need not present a defense just

because it was viable. In Hendricks, for example, we blessed

counsel’s decision to forego a mental health defense because

it was not entirely persuasive, was subject to serious crossexamination, and would expose the jury to the defendant’s

other crimes. 70 F.3d at 1037. The Supreme Court recently

affirmed this type of reasoning in Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S.

Ct. 383 (2009), where it strongly suggested that counsel’s

decision to forego a defense because it would prompt the

introduction of damaging evidence was not deficient. Id. at

385-86.

[14] Here, there were numerous reasons justifying counsel’s decision not to present a mental health defense and

instead to rely on reasonable doubt and argue a self-defense

theory. First, a mental health defense was unlikely to persuade

a jury. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 610-11 (9th Cir.

2004) (holding counsel need not put on an unpersuasive

defense). A mental health defense would have presented evidence that Mickey lacked the capacity to premeditate or deliberate about the killings. But Mickey flew from a foreign

country to commit the murders, planned a rendez-vous with

his accomplice, did not kill the pair the first time he visited

them for fear of getting caught, wiped down the car he drove

to eliminate fingerprints, and assembled and brought weapons

to the crime scene. In light of the established facts of the

crime, it was reasonable for counsel to believe that a jury

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would likely be skeptical of an argument that Mickey lacked

the ability to deliberate and plan. Furthermore, the mental

health defense based on delusions about Hanson would not

explain Mickey’s murder of Blount, who slept in a different

room than Hanson and, according to Mickey’s own experts,

was not a part of Mickey’s delusional scheme. Finally, this

mental health defense conflicted with Mickey’s own statements. Mickey claimed self-defense during interviews in

which the police described him as alert and cognitively stable.

But if he was in a delusional state at the time of the murders,

how could he be defending himself? Counsel were not deficient in deciding not to portray his client as a flip-flopper. See

Turk, 116 F.3d at 1266-67. 

Second, a mental health defense was likely to open the door

to evidence of Mickey’s deviant sexual behaviors. Belmontes,

130 S. Ct. at 385-86 (commenting on superior performance of

counsel in excluding damaging evidence while presenting a

defense); Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (holding counsel acted

reasonably when not exposing the jury to the defendant’s

other crimes). The experts who would have testified to Mickey’s alleged mental health defense and its effect on him based

their diagnosis on his sexualized relationship with his mother.

This reliance, in turn, would have opened the door to issues

of Mickey’s sexual exhibitionism and his two and a half year

sexual abuse of his step-daughter starting when she was eight

years old. It is no overstatement to say that a jury would not

look favorably upon a defendant with a pattern of sexual misbehavior that had recently escalated into years-long sexual

abuse of his own step-daughter. Counsel successfully

excluded this evidence from the penalty phase, and reasonably took steps to avoid opening the door to it here. 

Third, counsel reasonably took into account the climate of

the times. Mickey was tried at a time of hostility to mental

health defenses. Although such defenses were available to

Mickey, California had recently abolished them prospectively

by plebiscite. Cal. Penal Code § 25(a). They had also voted

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merely five years earlier to expand the death penalty pursuant

to the Briggs Initiative, and outrage existed over the diminished capacity defense of the killer of the San Francisco

mayor George Moscone and supervisor Harvey Milk. The

people also were soon to vote out three California Supreme

Court justices for their perceived efforts to frustrate the death

penalty. Robert Lindsey, Deukmejian and Cranston Win As 3

Judges Are Ousted, New York Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at A30.

3

Mickey responds with two reasons why counsel’s decisions

regarding a mental health defense cannot be justified on the

grounds that a mental health defense was inconsistent with the

self-defense theory. Mickey first argues that a mental health

defense is not inconsistent with his self-defense rhetoric in his

Hawaii statements because his schizophrenia, diagnosed after

trial, explains the statements as the product of disease. At the

time of trial, however, none of the four guilt-phase experts or

the two penalty-phase experts even raised as a possibility, let

alone concluded, that Mickey had schizophrenia. In fact, three

of the four experts found no evidence of psychological abnormality. Even the penalty-phase expert Dr. Burstein, testifying

in habeas proceedings with the advantage of twenty years of

hindsight, could only suggest that he may have reached a

diagnosis of schizophrenia with certain other information, and

the district court found his testimony incredible.

[15] Mickey next argues that the introduction of mental

health evidence in the penalty phase undermines any claim of

inconsistency to justify counsel’s decisions. But there is no

requirement of consistency between the two phases. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1041. Furthermore, Mickey misunderstands

the purpose of the evidence in the two phases. In the guilt

phase, mental health evidence would explain why Mickey

was not guilty because he lacked capacity. In the penalty

phase, mental health evidence would explain why, though he

had capacity, he was less culpable. It is reasonable to think

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that the same evidence might be useless for the former but

helpful for the latter given the facts of the crime. In other

words, it was reasonable for counsel to save their best argument against the death penalty—mental health—for the phase

in which it would be most effective. Thus, counsel were not

deficient in the investigation and presentation of a mental

health defense.

B

In any event, the Supreme Court’s recent cases dictate that

any deficiency in representation was not prejudicial because

it is not “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”

of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In Belmontes, for

example, the Court emphasized that the difference between

what the petitioner wanted counsel to present and what he

presented was marginal, that the new evidence the petitioner

wanted presented opened the door to harmful evidence, and

that the facts of the crime matter. 130 S. Ct. at 386-90. In Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 454 (2009), the Court similarly emphasized the great effect on the prejudice

determination of the large difference between the evidence

counsel presented and should have presented. Even though

both cases were penalty-phase cases, they could not be clearer

in their instruction: whether prejudice results matters.

Here, any deficiency in counsel’s performance does not

create a “reasonable probability” that the “result of the proceeding would have been different,” such that we lack confidence in the outcome of the trial, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,

because the evidence of Mickey’s guilt for premeditated murder was overwhelming. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. at 390 (finding

no prejudice primarily because the evidence in favor of the

death penalty was “simply overwhelming”). Mickey visited

Hanson prepared to commit the crime once before he did so,

assembled and brought weapons to Hanson’s home twice,

enlisted an accomplice from whom to obtain weapons and

transportation and with whom to split the proceeds, set up a

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rendez-vous with that accomplice, and wiped his fingerprints

off of the getaway vehicle. 

Moreover, Mickey’s response to all of this evidence—that

he spontaneously acted in self-defense—sharply conflicted

with the physical evidence and his pre-trial statements. The

physical evidence showed that Hanson’s throat was slashed

from ear to ear down to the spinal cord and Blount was

stabbed seven times in the chest so hard three of the blows

pierced her heart. Yet Mickey maintained both to police on

the way back from Japan and to a jailhouse informant before

trial in California that he acted in self-defense. 

[16] Additionally, there was ample other evidence of

Mickey’s premeditation and deliberation. His accomplice,

Rogers, testified that Mickey traveled from Japan intending to

kill Hanson. Mickey’s own letters to his wife, furthermore,

also showed that he traveled to California to alleviate his family’s financial problems by killing Hanson. Given this substantial evidence of premeditation, we do not think there is a

“reasonable probability” that the results of the guilt phase of

the trial would have been different, such that we lack confidence in the trial’s outcome, if counsel had deployed a mental

health defense to contest Mickey’s capacity to deliberate.

Therefore, we conclude that Mickey’s constitutional right to

effective assistance of counsel was not violated in the guilt

phase of his trial.

IV

In its cross-appeal of the district court’s grant of the habeas

petition regarding the penalty phase of Mickey’s trial, the

State contends that the district court erroneously held that

Mickey was denied effective assistance of counsel. Mickey

had argued before the district court that counsel ineffectively

investigated and failed to present a mitigation case that

Mickey suffered a harmful childhood. He also argued that

counsel ineffectively utilized the penalty-phase experts and

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failed to provide them with adequate information. The district

court accepted Mickey’s arguments and ruled that these errors

prejudiced Mickey.

A

The State first argues that counsel did not perform deficiently with respect to investigating adequately and presenting

evidence of childhood abuse and mental health issues. The

State also argues that, in any event, Mickey did not suffer

prejudice from any deficiency. We agree with the State on

both points.

1

We first consider counsel’s investigation of abuse in Mickey’s childhood. Mickey first argues counsel’s preparation was

too late and too little. We are guided by the Supreme Court’s

recent decision in Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17-20

(2009). In that case, the Court held that the timeliness and

scope of counsel’s investigation was reasonable. Id. at 17-18.

Van Hook first claimed, as does Mickey, that counsel began

its investigation of mitigating evidence and preparation for the

penalty phase too late. Id. at 18. The Court held otherwise, on

the grounds that counsel was in touch with penalty-phase witnesses the entire three months between indictment and trial,

was in touch with an expert “more than a month before trial,”

sought records seven weeks before trial, and “looked into” hiring a mitigation specialist five weeks before trial. Id. (emphases added).

[17] When we compare Van Hook to this case, we are persuaded that Mickey’s counsel timely prepared. Counsel hired

an investigator in February, 1981, immediately after appointment by the court. That investigator accompanied counsel to

Japan and interviewed the defendant’s then-current wife at

that time. The investigator also hired three individuals to

assist him on the case. In July 1981, still eighteen months

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before trial, counsel hired Dr. Axelrad to psychologically

evaluate Mickey, as a supplement to forensic psychiatrist Dr.

Whipple’s evaluation and report in March 1981. Axelrad in

turn hired two clinical psychologists, Hutchinson and Morrison, to assist in evaluating Mickey. Hutchinson evaluated

Mickey on September 21, 1981, and Morrison also administered psychological testing to assist Axelrad. Additionally, in

January 1983, over five months before the guilt phase and

seven months before the penalty phase, counsel hired the

National Jury Project, a jury selection consultant. The first

meeting took place on March 18, 1983, five months before the

penalty phase. Soon after that, in April 1983, counsel hired a

social worker intern to prepare a social history. She completed

her report well before the penalty phase began. Her report

summarized Mickey’s life, based primarily on reports by

Mickey because of the division of labor between social historian and investigator established by counsel. Finally, in May

1983, counsel hired two experts solely for the penalty phase,

Smith, and Burstein. These experts provided extensive testimony regarding Mickey’s life and mental state during the

penalty phase. In light of the timeline of this investigation and

the much shorter investigation in Van Hook, we cannot hold

that counsel did not timely investigate Mickey’s childhood. 

Mickey also claims, as Van Hook did, that his counsel did

not conduct a sufficiently broad investigation of his childhood. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 18-19. The Court in Van Hook

disagreed with the petitioner, calling this a “gross distortion.”

Id. at 18. Counsel, the Court recounted, conducted several

interviews with four individuals—Van Hook’s mother and

father, a caregiving aunt, and a family friend Van Hook visited after the crime—and learned all about Van Hook’s childhood, including his drinking as a toddler, his parents’

alcoholism, his father’s domestic abuse, and his mental health

issues. Counsel, therefore, did not need to “interview other

family members—his step-sister, two uncles, and two aunts—

as well as a psychiatrist who once treated his mother” because

“there comes a point at which evidence from more distant relMICKEY v. AYERS 8113

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atives can reasonably be expected to be only cumulative, and

the search for it distractive from more important duties.” Id.

at 19. It “was not unreasonable for his counsel not to identify

and interview every other living family member or every therapist who once treated his parents.” Id.; see Cox v. Ayers, 588

F.3d 1038, 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that counsel who interviewed nine individuals conducted sufficient

investigation); Williams, 384 F.3d at 613-14 (holding that

counsel who investigated family and life history, drug use,

and mental state of defendant, “interviewed a number of witnesses suggested by [the defendant],” obtained various

records, and compiled a client history conducted an adequate

investigation); Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th

Cir. 1998) (holding investigation was not deficient in part

because “[c]ounsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into [defendant’s] history”). 

[18] Similarly, counsel’s investigation here was sufficiently broad. Counsel hired an investigator who interviewed

over forty potential witnesses, thirty of whom testified in the

penalty phase, spanning Mickey’s life, in an investigation that

took him or counsel to Japan, Hawaii, Alabama, Nevada,

Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Louisiana. Counsel learned

about Mickey’s childhood, including his relationship with his

mother, his half-brother’s death, his mother’s death, his positive reputation with his peers and teachers, his productive

school life, and his descent into the drug culture. The investigation also covered Mickey’s adult life, including his career,

his relationship with his wife, ex-wives, and step-children,

and his relationship with Hanson. As in Van Hook, it was not

unreasonable for counsel to go only as far as they did, stopping after interviewing forty witnesses. This is especially true

because the forty witnesses, without exception, stated and

then testified that Mickey enjoyed a fairly good childhood.

None testified to abuse. 

[19] Mickey argues, however, that despite this breadth,

counsel’s investigation was deficient because it failed to

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uncover evidence of psychiatric illness prior to his drug abuse

and because it failed to uncover physical, emotional, and sexual abuse in Mickey’s childhood. For support Mickey points

to a new social history of his life completed in 1996. We are

not persuaded that this new social history changes the analysis. 

[20] First of all, the new social history does not establish

that Mickey had psychological problems before his drug use.

It reported that Mickey engaged in a “16-year period of virtually uninterrupted drug and alcohol abuse, beginning in 1964,

and accelerating after the death of his mother in 1966.” This

substance abuse, the report continued, “seems to have had an

exacerbating effect on the grandiose and persecutory beliefs

that Doug began to develop during the mid-1970s.” Thus,

Mickey is simply incorrect that there was undiscovered evidence of pre-drug abuse psychiatric disturbance for counsel to

investigate.

The same is true of the new social history with respect to

the purported abuse. It is black-letter law that counsel cannot

be found deficient for believing what his client plausibly tells

him: “when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe

that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or

harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may

not later be challenged as unreasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 691; Cox, 588 F.3d at 1048-49 (holding counsel not responsible for defendant’s failure to mention abuse); Raley v. Ylst,

470 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2006). 

But, both the 1983 social history’s finding of no abuse and

the new 1996 social history’s findings of rampant abuse and

family problems are based on Mickey’s self-reporting. The

1983 social history was based solely on interviews with

Mickey. In it, Mickey described his childhood as “peaceful,”

saw his father as “quiet, gentle and a little distant,” claimed

that his parents “never fought with each other,” and described

only “fanciful” sexual thoughts about his mother, in addition

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to a pattern of sexual exhibitionism. Mickey portrayed no

abuse and no incest. The new social historian’s interview with

Mickey apparently yielded different results, according to the

paragraphs in the new social history that are attributed solely

to Mickey. Mickey now recalls “many beatings” of his

brother, that his dad was “nuts and swinging away and Mom

was supporting him all the way,” that he was himself “repeatedly victimized” by his father, that his mother would “remark

on [his] aroused state” when they touched, that she “masturbated him manually” on at least one occasion, and that his

parents repeatedly destroyed or forced him to destroy family

pets. 

[21] To be sure, the new social history does not rely solely

on Mickey. But few of the other declarations on which it

relies are cited for the new abuse and incest Mickey now documents, and the cited declarations do not appear to support

the new findings. For example, the declarations of family

friends Fleming and Kimbrough, used to support many of the

new findings of abuse and incest, are relatively mild, demonstrating only that Mickey loved his dog and then it died and

that Mickey’s mother inappropriately showed a neighbor the

pre-adolescent Mickey’s medical problem involving undescended testicles. These declarations hardly support a conclusion that Mickey was forced to kill his dog or that Mickey

was sexually abused. Similarly, the declarations by other family members that purportedly demonstrate that Mickey’s

father was an alcoholic, or the declarations by neighbors that

claim that Mickey’s mother was “oversexed,” are too vague

to support Mickey’s new allegations of abuse and incest. The

new report thus amounts to a change in story. We refuse to

find counsel deficient for not uncovering evidence that

Mickey did not tell the original investigators, especially when

forty witnesses confirmed Mickey’s original story.

Since counsel were not deficient in their investigation into

abuse, they also were not deficient in failing to present evidence of the same abuse. But, even if counsel were deficient

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in uncovering this purported abuse, the testimony of the forty

witnesses provides an additional reason that counsel were not

deficient in not presenting it. If counsel presented Mickey’s

new story regarding abuse, assuming Mickey or someone else

would have testified to it, then surely the State could have put

on some of the forty witnesses to contradict Mickey or the

other witness. Williams, 384 F.3d at 611 (holding counsel

may refuse to call witnesses because of their weakness on

cross-examination).

Moreover, counsel reasonably chose not to present evidence of abuse because such evidence would have opened the

door to prosecution rebuttal evidence showing Mickey’s sexual deviancy, including the molestation of his step-daughter.

Counsel need not present evidence that may do more harm

than good. In Williams, for example, we held that counsel

need not have presented evidence concerning the defendant’s

“family and life history, drug use, and mental state” because

such would open the door to evidence concerning the defendant’s significant gang activity. 384 F.3d at 613-15; see Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. at 385-86 (strongly suggesting that counsel

did not deficiently perform by presenting meager mitigation

case because presentation of more mitigation evidence would

open the door to rebuttal evidence); Cox, 558 F.3d at 1051-52

(upholding counsel’s strategic choice to present a mitigation

defense other than childhood abuse). 

[22] In this case, if counsel had attempted to introduce

childhood abuse evidence, the prosecution most likely would

have responded by introducing rebuttal evidence of Mickey’s

sexual deviancy, including years-long sexual abuse of his

step-daughter. Starting in his late teenage years and running

through the time of the crime, Mickey had exhibited himself

in public. This pattern escalated into a two and a half year

sexual abuse of his step-daughter. From the case’s inception,

counsel successfully strove to exclude this evidence of Mickey’s sexual deviancy. But introduction of the purportedly

since-discovered evidence regarding Mickey’s childhood

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would have opened the door to this harmful evidence, just like

introduction of a mental health defense in the guilt phase

would have opened the door to similar harmful evidence, see

supra Part II, at 8108. The experts who would have testified

to Mickey’s alleged childhood abuse and its effect on him

could not help but mention his newly discovered sexual relationship with his mother, which one of them calls “the single

most damaging and shaping fact of Doug’s life.” And that discussion, of course, would raise the issue of Mickey’s teenage

exhibitionism, and then his adult exhibitionism, and then his

molestation of his step-daughter. An expert who testified to

the sexual abuse and its effect on Mickey would be subject to

cross-examination on the molestation. Cal. Evid. Code 721(a).

Counsel surmised, reasonably, that the penalty phase jury

might not look kindly upon evidence that the defendant routinely exhibited himself in public and sexually abused his

step-daughter.

2

The State also argues that Mickey did not suffer prejudice

from any deficiencies he claims. In its view, even if counsel

should have presented Mickey as an abused and mentally ill

individual before his mother’s death and his descent into drug

use, instead of as a good child who started drifting into drugs

after his mother’s death, such a choice does not “undermine[ ]

confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694. We agree.

Even if Mickey’s claims regarding deficiency had merit,

the Supreme Court’s recent cases indicate that Mickey cannot

show prejudice. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. at 383; Van Hook, 130

S. Ct. at 19. In Belmontes, the Court accepted, without deciding, that counsel should have presented more mitigating evidence. But it held that Belmontes did not suffer prejudice in

any event, disagreeing with our holding that the aggravation

evidence was “scant” and would have been outweighed by

more mitigating evidence. Id. at 390. The Supreme Court first

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reaffirmed that the prejudice inquiry is holistic and so must

“consider all the relevant evidence that the jury would have

had before it if [counsel] had pursued the different path.” Id.

at 386. In Belmontes, if counsel had introduced more mitigation evidence, the door would have been opened for the prosecution to introduce Belmontes’ boasts regarding his ganglandstyle murder of another individual several years before his

most recent murder. Id. at 385. That, the Supreme Court, held,

was the “elephant in the courtroom” in the prejudice determination. Id. at 390. The aggravation evidence thus could not be

considered “scant.” Id.

This case is strikingly similar to Belmontes in this respect.

Even if counsel were deficient in not uncovering and introducing the new, abused version of Mickey’s childhood,

Mickey did not suffer prejudice because the prosecution

would have introduced rebuttal evidence of Mickey’s sexual

deviancy, including sexual abuse of his step-daughter, as discussed above. It is no overstatement to say that a jury would

not look favorably upon a defendant with a pattern of sexual

misbehavior that had recently escalated into sexual abuse of

his own step-daughter. This sexual deviancy is this case’s “elephant in the courtroom,” and makes it so that any deficiency

does not create a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Moreover, the Supreme Court in Belmontes and Van Hook

reaffirmed that the facts of the crime play an important role

in the prejudice inquiry. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. at 390-91. In

Belmontes, the Court emphasized that Belmontes “was convicted on extremely strong evidence that he committed an

intentional murder of extraordinary brutality.” Id. The aggravating evidence, “in particular, the circumstances of the

crimes—was simply overwhelming.” Id. The jury viewed

numerous autopsy photographs showing the 15 to 20 blows

from a steel dumbbell upon the victim and heard evidence that

Belmontes committed the crime solely to steal $100. Id. 

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In Van Hook, the Court similarly held that, even if counsel

performed deficiently, Van Hook suffered no prejudice in part

because of the facts of the crime. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 19-

20. In particular, the Court stressed that Van Hook committed

the murder alone in an aggravated robbery with premeditation, escalating a pattern of robberies of gay men to the killing

and disfiguring of his victim in this case. Id. at 19. Such facts

of the crime, the Court held, outweighed by themselves the

sum of the mitigating evidence Van Hook wanted counsel to

present. Id.

The jury in this case, like the jury in Belmontes and Van

Hook, was confronted by a particularly violent crime. The

evidence demonstrated that Mickey, like Belmontes, committed a double murder in order to steal a small amount of property. And, as in Van Hook, the jury heard evidence that

Mickey committed this crime intentionally, planning it out

carefully by flying from Japan, enlisting an accomplice to

procure weapons and transportation, and calling off his first

attempt for fear of capture. Additionally, as in Belmontes, the

jury saw ten pictures that chronicled the positions of the

bodies of Hanson, whose throat was slashed to the spinal cord

from ear to ear, and Blount, who was stabbed seven times in

the chest so hard three of the blows penetrated her heart. 

[23] The State’s near-exclusive reliance on the facts of the

crime at the penalty phase strengthens our conclusion that

there is not a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would

have been different had Mickey presented a different mitigation case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. During the penalty

phase, the prosecution presented only four witnesses, who testified to domestic abuse by Mickey. 54 Cal. 3d at 639. The

defense, by contrast, put on thirty lay witnesses and two

experts who testified as to Mickey’s positive characteristics

and his mental defects. Id. at 640. The testimony covered all

aspects of Mickey’s life, ranging from the tragedy he experienced at five years of age when his half-brother died, the deep

loss he felt when his mother died in a potential suicide when

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he was 17 years old, his decline into drug use, his ability to

adapt well to life in prison, and his mental state on the night

of the murders. This disparity indicates that the jury sentenced

Mickey to death almost exclusively on the facts of the crime,

despite what the California Supreme Court called a “substantial” penalty-phase presentation by the defense. Id. at 639.

Since the harmful sexual deviancy evidence would have been

admitted in the penalty phase had counsel taken Mickey’s

proposed path and since the jury must have relied heavily on

the gruesome facts of the crime despite the “substantial” mitigation case, our “confidence in the outcome” is not undermined by Mickey’s counsel’s alleged deficiencies, Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694, and we are persuaded there was no prejudice.

B

1

[24] The State also argues that counsel’s interaction with

the penalty-phase mental health experts was not deficient. We

agree. Counsel put on two mental health experts in the penalty

phase. Smith, a toxicologist, testified that Mickey suffered

from toxic psychosis, a self-induced drug disorder stemming

from Mickey’s poly-drug substance abuse. Burstein, a psychiatrist, testified that Mickey was delusional at the time of the

crime, plagued by a borderline personality disorder exacerbated by his use of multiple types of drugs. These experts provided substantial testimony before the penalty phase jury.

Mickey, however, points to three deficiencies. First, he

argues that counsel should have better coordinated the

experts’ testimony. The experts, for example, differed as to

whether Mickey needed to be intoxicated for a diagnosis of

toxic psychosis. But surely counsel cannot be faulted for the

fact that their experts gave inconsistent sworn testimony. We

do not expect counsel to manipulate experts to get their stories

straight, Mod. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3, so it is not deficient for

them to refrain from doing so.

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Mickey also argues that counsel should have deployed the

penalty phase experts in surrebuttal of the prosecution’s

expert. But such testimony might not even have been allowed

by the trial judge. People v. Lamb, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 614

(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). And it is not deficient to refuse to join

a battle royale of experts. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037 (citing

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1525 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“[E]ven where there is a strong basis for a mental defense . . .

an attorney may forego that defense where the attorney’s

experts would be subject to cross-examination based on

equally persuasive psychiatric opinions that reach a different

conclusion.”); see Williams v Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th

Cir. 2004) (holding that counsel may refuse to call experts

because of their weakness on cross-examination). It was reasonable for counsel to conclude that surrebuttal was unlikely

to strongly influence the jury.

Mickey next argues that counsel were deficient in the communication of medical-related information and the facts of the

crime to the experts Burstein and Smith. This, too, is unavailing. With respect to Burstein, Mickey claims that counsel

were deficient in providing a garbled tape of the Hawaii interview with police. But, Burstein notably does not claim he ever

requested a better version or a transcript. Mickey also claims

that counsel should have provided access to the testimony of

the accomplice Rogers and Mickey’s ex-wife Rochelle for

corroboration of Mickey’s history of drug use. But Mickey’s

drug use was not in dispute. Conveying such additional information was therefore unnecessary. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d

892, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding counsel must bring relevant facts to attention of experts). We decline to rule that

counsel must provide, unsolicited, access to fact witnesses. Id.

(holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the

crime).

Finally, Mickey claims that counsel should have provided

a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (“MMPI”),

given in 1981, and naval discharge records to Burstein. But

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these are not the type of public or readily available evidence

counsel must obtain, and then provide to experts. Rompilla v.

Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-84 (2005) (holding counsel must

examine public information, like prior conviction records,

prosecutor is likely to use); see Raley, 470 F.3d at 801 (ruling

sufficient counsel’s provision of “basic background information” on defendant to experts). In any event, “reasonable professional judgments [can] support[ ] limitations on

investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. See Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that

counsel may render ineffective assistance “where he neither

conducted a reasonable investigation nor made a showing of

strategic reasons for failing to do so” (emphasis added)).

Here, there was such a judgment. Counsel knew that Burstein

administered his own MMPI. It is not until now that Burstein

claims that a change between the two MMPIs might have

been significant, testimony the district court found incredible.

With respect to the second penalty-phase expert, Smith,

Mickey claims that counsel should have provided access to

the Hawaii interview tape, Rogers’ testimony, Mickey’s

1980-81 letters to his wife, the navy discharge records, the exwife Rochelle, a gourd and necklace of Mickey’s, and family

history information. As an initial matter, it is not deficient

performance to fail to provide information beyond an expert’s

expertise because an expert cannot testify beyond his expertise. Cal. Evid. Code § 720(a); see Korsak v. Atlas Hotels,

Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). Smith is

a toxicologist, studying drug-related disorders. The Hawaii

interview, in which a sober Mickey allegedly hallucinates, is

thus of little use to him. Furthermore, Mickey’s long-term

drug use was not in dispute. Thus, access to Mickey’s 1980-

81 letters, ex-wife Rochelle, the navy discharge records, and

Rogers’ testimony, all of which primarily established that

Mickey was a long-term drug user, was unnecessary. Mickey

is also incorrect about the gourd and necklace—both were

available for trial, if only Smith asked. Finally, at the time of

the trial, Smith’s research on the genetic links of certain disMICKEY v. AYERS 8123

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eases was in the nascent stages, so it was not deficient to fail

to provide him with Mickey’s family history.

2

Even assuming counsel’s interaction with the penalty phase

experts was deficient, Van Hook and Belmontes again compel

the conclusion that prejudice did not result. In both cases, the

Court reasoned that the omission of cumulative evidence and

minor additional details from the penalty phase did not prejudice the defendant. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. at 387; Van Hook,

130 S. Ct. at 19. The same is true here: correcting the deficiencies Mickey criticizes does not create a “reasonable probability” of a different result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

The lack of prejudice with respect to the first two alleged

deficiencies is particularly clear. Mickey did not suffer prejudice from an alleged deficiency in coordinating the experts’

testimony with respect to whether Mickey needed to be intoxicated for a diagnosis of toxic psychosis because there is no

evidence that more coordination would eliminate this inconsistency. The deficiency thus does not create a reasonable

probability of a different outcome. 

Nor did Mickey suffer prejudice from counsel’s failure to

employ the two penalty-phase experts to surrebut the prosecution’s rebuttal expert. Even assuming that the trial court judge

would allow such surrebuttal, it is widely accepted that the

absence of marginal and cumulative evidence is not prejudicial. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. at 386-90; Van Hook, 130 S. Ct.

at 19. Here, Mickey’s experts on surrebuttal would merely

have added a few additional details to their testimony, again

explaining why they were right and the prosecution expert

wrong. In particular, the experts would have clarified why

their diagnoses of toxic psychosis with borderline personality

disorder disease was superior to the prosecution’s diagnosis of

a slightly different disease (atypical personality disorder) and

why their focus on particular pieces of evidence was justified.

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Such marginal, cumulative comments do not create a “reasonable probability” of altering the jury’s calculus. It is not per

se prejudice to not get the last word.

Finally, Mickey did not suffer prejudice because counsel

could have better prepared the experts Burstein and Smith

with respect to medical materials and basic facts of the crime.

As for the medical materials, Burstein testified during his

deposition that the new medical information, a MMPI from

1981, would not change his testimony on the ultimate question of Mickey’s diagnosis. While he qualified that testimony

somewhat during the district court hearing, he ultimately

stood by his original diagnosis and the district court discredited his speculation as to the importance of the MMPI, calling

him a partial “advocate.” Similarly, Smith did not even claim

that the new information would alter his testimony.

Nor would the new medical information radically buttress

the experts’ testimony, causing it to shift from mere “artifice”

to gamechanging revelation that creates a reasonably probability of a different outcome. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d

1073, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1998). Burstein’s testimony, on Burstein’s own view, would have been additionally supported

only by hearsay statements from Mickey’s ex-wife regarding

delusions. But such hearsay is of little value, especially since

Mickey’s ex-wife did not distinguish between drug-induced

and non-drug-induced delusions. The same is true for Smith’s

testimony, which would only have been bolstered by additional evidence of Mickey’s uncontested drug use and family

history, the latter of which was unhelpful given the state of

genetic research at the time of the trial.

Nor was Mickey prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient

performance in preparing Burstein and Smith regarding the

basic facts of the crime. It is true that the prosecutor confronted Burstein with the inconsistency of his mental health

theory, based on Mickey’s self-reporting, and Mickey’s premeditation and planning. But Burstein responded that such

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planning was consistent with his diagnosis. Thus, Burstein’s

testimony would not have been significantly improved by

more information about the crime. Rather, it suffered from a

fundamental weakness that could not be remedied, that is, that

a jury was unlikely to believe that a defendant suffering as

Burstein diagnosed could act as the facts of the crime showed

that Mickey did. Mickey’s claim that these additional, minor

improvements to Burstein’s testimony create a “reasonable

probability” of swaying the jury is, as the Court described a

similar interpretation of the facts in Belmontes, “fanciful.”

130 S. Ct. at 391. 

[25] The contrast between this case and Porter, where the

Court did find prejudice for failure of counsel to deploy adequately mental health experts, confirms our assessment. 130

S. Ct. at 454. In that case, the Court emphasized that counsel

presented no evidence at all concerning Porter’s mental health

sufferings with respect to his service in the Korean war and

brain abnormalities. Id. at 454-55. Here, by contrast, counsel

presented extensive expert testimony. Overall, even assuming

Mickey is right that counsel were deficient in a few respects

regarding the expert testimony, this case is a far cry from

those in which counsel’s interaction with experts prejudiced

the defendant. Our confidence in the state court outcome is far

from undermined. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Mickey’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated in the penalty phase of his trial.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the writ of

habeas corpus for the guilt phase and REVERSED with

respect to the grant of the writ of habeas corpus for the penalty phase.

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