Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02404/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02404-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2404

JOHN BERRON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS CONCEALED CARRY LICENSING REVIEW BOARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 2839 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.

____________________

No. 15-2405

RONALD DESERVI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEREMY MARGOLIS, Chair of the Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 3881 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

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2 Nos. 15-2404 et al.

____________________

No. 15-2931

SETH GHANTOUS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS CONCEALED CARRY LICENSING REVIEW BOARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 3544 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

____________________

No. 16-1170

FOTIOS MOUSTAKAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EDWARD A. BOBRICK, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 9294 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 31, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 17, 2016

____________________

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Nos. 15-2404 et al. 3

Before EASTERBROOK and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and 

YANDLE, District Judge.

*

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In the wake of McDonald v. 

Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), which held that the Second 

Amendment applies to the states, we concluded that the 

constitutional right to “keep and bear” arms means that 

states must permit law-abiding and mentally healthy persons to carry loaded weapons in public. Moore v. Madigan, 

702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). Illinois then enacted a system for 

issuing and enforcing permits to carry concealed firearms. 

430 ILCS 66/1 to 66/95. We have consolidated four appeals 

filed by persons who asked for concealed-carry permits and 

were turned down. Three district judges, presiding in these 

four suits, all ruled against the applicants.

Illinois issues a concealed-carry license to anyone who 

satisfies the statutory qualifications (see 430 ILCS 66/25), files 

the necessary paperwork, and pays the fees, unless the applicant would “pose a danger to himself, herself, or others, 

or a threat to public safety as determined by the Concealed 

Carry Licensing Review Board”. 430 ILCS 66/10(a)(4). Lawenforcement agencies are entitled to present public-safety 

arguments against granting an application. See also 430 ILCS 

66/15 (details about objections by law-enforcement agencies), 

66/20 (details about the Board’s composition and operations).

When these suits began, plaintiffs had a compelling position. They say that they met all statutory requirements but 

did not receive licenses because one or more lawenforcement agencies objected. The state police told them 

 * Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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4 Nos. 15-2404 et al.

that objections had been lodged, but not by whom or why. 

This left them unable to reply. More than 60 years ago the 

Supreme Court established that, when an agency is asked to 

reject an application, the agency must reveal at least a fair 

summary of the objection; otherwise a hearing is pointless. 

See Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Gonzales v. 

United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955). Legitimately confidential 

details, such as an informant’s identity, may be withheld, 

but the applicant is entitled to know the basics. Yet under 

the agency’s initial regulations no disclosure at all was required, and nothing is exactly what these plaintiffs received.

Illinois soon realized that the initial regulations, which 

had been drafted and issued in haste, were deficient in this 

respect and others. It adopted a new set of regulations that 

took effect on January 6, 2015. See 39 Ill. Register 1518–27

(Jan. 23, 2015). Under the revised regulations, the Board first 

considers whether the objection appears “on its face” to be 

an adequate reason to deny an application. 20 Ill. Admin. 

Code §2900.140(e). If so, the Board “shall send the applicant 

notice of the objection, including the basis of the objection 

and the agency submitting the objection.” Ibid. The applicant 

has 15 days after receipt of this notice “to submit any additional material in response to the objection”. Id. at 

§2900.140(e)(1). If the facts or their significance are disputed, 

the Board may hold a hearing to receive testimony from both 

the applicant and a representative of the objecting lawenforcement agency. Id. at §2900.140(c).

These changes in the Board’s procedures led the district 

judges to think that plaintiffs’ problems have been solved. 

The judges concluded that an injunction against a superseded regulation would be inappropriate, and that a judgment 

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Nos. 15-2404 et al. 5

entitling the plaintiffs to concealed-carry licenses would be 

equally inappropriate, because the validity of the objections 

to their applications remains undetermined. All three judges 

wrote that plaintiffs’ proper recourse is to apply for licenses 

under the new rules.

None of the four plaintiffs has filed a fresh application 

with the Board. Plaintiff Seth Ghantous instead filed suit in 

state court. The court directed the Board to issue a concealed-carry license. That has been done; the license was 

mailed to him on May 23, 2016. His claim is moot, and we 

remand his suit with instructions to dismiss. See United 

States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). A second 

plaintiff, John Berron, also sued in state court and obtained a 

remand. But he lost again before the Board, so his suit is not 

moot.

The three unlicensed plaintiffs predict that, if they do 

apply under the new regulations, the Board will not reveal 

enough to permit them to respond with material evidence or 

relevant arguments. This amounts to a contention that 

§2900.140(e) is so blatantly unconstitutional that it can be 

swept away by a federal injunction no matter how it 

works—that it is unconstitutional “on its face,” in the argot 

of adjudication. Yet the Supreme Court insists that, with few 

exceptions, statutes and regulations be evaluated in operation (“as applied”) rather than peremptorily. See, e.g., Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 

U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–30 (2006).

Section 2900.140(e) calls for disclosure of “the basis of the 

objection”. We can imagine the Board being stingy with information—for example, saying only “agency X objects beCase: 15-2404 Document: 63 Filed: 06/17/2016 Pages: 10
6 Nos. 15-2404 et al.

cause the applicant is routinely in trouble with the law” or 

perhaps just repeating the language of 430 ILCS 66/10(a)(4). 

That sort of disclosure would be useless. But it is easy to imagine the Board being forthcoming—revealing why the objecting agency thinks the applicant dangerous and listing the 

history of arrests, domestic disturbances, threats of violence, 

or other reasons why a law-enforcement agency may think

that this person’s being armed in public poses risks to others. Which course the Board chooses affects whether the 

regulation as administered comports with the Constitution.

A federal court should not assume that the state will 

choose the unconstitutional path when a valid one is open to 

it. State and federal agencies may flesh out a vague scheme 

in the course of administrative adjudication. See, e.g., Civil 

Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); 

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Letter Carriers and 

Broadrick deal with claims under the First Amendment; their 

holdings are no less applicable to claims under the Second 

Amendment. We therefore agree with the district judges that 

it would be premature to consider plaintiffs’ objections to 

§2900.140(e). Likewise plaintiffs’ prediction that the Board 

will write unilluminating decisions in proceedings under the 

new regulations, depriving them of their right to effective 

administrative or judicial review, is unripe.

Plaintiffs advance three broader objections to both the 

statute and the amended regulations. They start with a contention that requiring them to obtain a concealed-carry license is itself unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, just as prior restraint of speech is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The problem with this argument 

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is that everyone is entitled to speak and write, but not everyone is entitled to carry a concealed firearm in public.

When holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 

570 (2008), that the Second Amendment establishes personal 

rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding persons enjoy these rights, even at home. 554 U.S. at 626–28, 635. We 

concluded in United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 

2010) (en banc), that under Heller a person convicted of domestic violence may be barred from firearm ownership, and 

in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 

2015), that an alien not authorized to be in the United States 

similarly is not entitled to own a gun. Other decisions have 

approved additional substantive limits. Licensure is how 

states determine whether the requirements have been met.

If the state may set substantive requirements for ownership, which Heller says it may, then it may use a licensing 

system to enforce them. In Heller itself the plaintiff conceded 

that licensure is constitutional, 554 U.S. at 631, and the Court 

did not question that concession. Courts of appeals uniformly hold that some kind of license may be required. See, e.g., 

Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013); Kwong v. 

Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 

712 F.3d 865, 883 n.11 (4th Cir. 2013). (In citing these decisions we do not express any opinion on the validity of those

licensing systems; we cite them only for the proposition that 

the Second Amendment does not prohibit all licensing.)

Although plaintiffs call the concealed-carry license redundant with the basic firearms-ownership licenses that 

they already possess, the different degrees of danger posed

by possessing a weapon at home (the basic license) and carrying a loaded weapon in public (the concealed-carry liCase: 15-2404 Document: 63 Filed: 06/17/2016 Pages: 10
8 Nos. 15-2404 et al.

cense) justify different systems. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 937. 

Illinois requires all applicants for a concealed-carry license to 

complete a firearms-training course tailored to situations 

that those who carry guns in public may encounter. See 430 

ILCS 66/25(6) (requiring the course), 66/75 (specifying what 

the course entails). That’s just one of the differences between 

possessing guns at home and carrying guns in public. See 

Shepard v. Madigan, 734 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2013). What’s 

more, circumstances may change between the time someone 

receives a keep-at-home license (which is valid for ten years, 

see 430 ILCS 65/7) and the time he seeks a concealed-carry 

license. Illinois is entitled to check an applicant’s record of 

convictions, and any concerns about his mental health, close 

to the date the applicant proposes to go armed on the streets.

Plaintiffs next maintain that, even if licenses may be required, they must be issued unless the state proves a disqualifying condition by clear and convincing evidence. Neither Heller nor McDonald is concerned with licensing, so this 

contention lacks support in the Supreme Court’s mostapplicable decisions. As a matter of administrative law, the 

proponent of a position bears the burden of showing entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence. See Director, 

OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994). Plaintiffs 

are the applicants for licenses, so they bear the burden of 

showing entitlement. To be more precise, a state may assign 

applicants that burden without transgressing the Constitution. Illinois is a little more generous, placing the burden on 

the state to show why an application should be denied. 430 

ILCS 66/20(g).

Section 66/20(g) uses a preponderance standard, which is

the norm in civil litigation. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. 

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Nos. 15-2404 et al. 9

Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387–90 (1983); Grogan v. Garner, 498 

U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 

Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014); Halo Electronics, Inc.

v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., No. 14–1513 (U.S. June 13, 2016), slip 

op. 12. We do not see why the Second Amendment would 

alter that standard, which applies to disputes about other 

kinds of property such as zoning and home ownership, occupational licenses such as law licenses, and other valuable 

licenses of all kinds, such as driver’s licenses.

Finally, plaintiffs contend that the Board is biased because five of its seven members must have work experience

with law-enforcement agencies:

The Board shall consist of:

(1) one commissioner with at least 5 years of service as a federal 

judge;

(2) 2 commissioners with at least 5 years of experience serving as 

an attorney with the United States Department of Justice;

(3) 3 commissioners with at least 5 years of experience as a federal agent or employee with investigative experience or duties 

related to criminal justice under the United States Department of 

Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of 

Homeland Security, or Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

(4) one member with at least 5 years of experience as a licensed 

physician or clinical psychologist with expertise in the diagnosis 

and treatment of mental illness.

430 ILCS 66/20(a). The Constitution requires administrative 

panels to be impartial. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 

471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). As far 

as we can tell, however, the Supreme Court has never suggested that one’s work experience compromises partiality. 

Due process requires disinterested adjudicators but not inexperienced or naïve ones. A rule forbids the participation of 

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10 Nos. 15-2404 et al.

any member of the Board whose current activities present a 

conflict of interest. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §2900.120. Past activities, by contrast, do not create disqualifying conditions unless they concern the applicant in question. Cf. Williams v. 

Pennsylvania, No. 15–5040 (U.S. June 9, 2016).

One of the district judges who heard plaintiffs’ cases is a 

former Director of the Illinois State Police, yet plaintiffs have 

not argued that this disqualifies him under 28 U.S.C. §455. 

Other district judges were criminal prosecutors or represented criminal defendants; they, too, routinely draw on their 

experience as a source of knowledge and wisdom without 

compromising impartiality in their judicial positions. Six of 

the Seventh Circuit’s nine active judges (including two 

members of this panel) worked as lawyers in the United 

States Department of Justice; that does not perpetually disqualify them in all cases involving the interests of the United 

States or calling for an assessment of law-enforcement practices. Members of the Securities and Exchange Commission 

almost always have experience in the securities industry; 

this provides a basis for knowledgeable decision rather than 

a ground of disqualification. Illinois believes that a Concealed Carry Board staffed by people with experience in law 

enforcement (including the experience of being a federal 

judge) will do a better job predicting which applicants 

would threaten public safety if armed in public; the Constitution permits it to follow that path.

In appeal No. 15-2931, filed by Seth Ghantous, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions 

to dismiss as moot. In the other appeals, the judgments are 

affirmed.

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