Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05267/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05267-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 17, 1997 Decided December 30, 1997 

No. 96-5267

JACQUELINE P. TAYLOR, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AND 

RICKI HELFER, CHAIRMAN, FDIC,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv01916)

Robert C. Seldon argued the cause for appellants. With 

him on the brief was Joanne Royce.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was Mary Lou 

Leary, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

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Attorney. John D. Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered 

an appearance.

Before: WILLIAMS, SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: Three former employees of the 

Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") have sued the corporation, claiming that it retaliated against them for making 

protected disclosures, in violation of the RTC Whistleblower 

Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(q), and the First Amendment. When 

the RTC's statutory life expired, its statutory successor, the 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), was substituted as defendant. On the FDIC's motion for dismissal or, 

alternatively, for summary judgment, the district court dismissed the statutory counts of the complaint under Rule 

12(b)(6) and entered summary judgment for the defendant on 

the constitutional counts. This appeal followed. Except to 

the extent that we vacate for want of jurisdiction, we affirm.

* * *

The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 created the RTC to manage and resolve 

savings and loan cases. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b). With the 

exception of its CEO, the RTC had no employees of its own; 

it drew them instead from the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1441a(b)(8). In 1991, appellants Bruce Pederson and Jacqueline Taylor were senior attorneys in the RTC's Western 

Regional Office in Denver, attached to the Professional Liability Section ("PLS"), whose assigned task was to bring suits 

against disloyal fiduciaries of failed savings and loans. The 

third appellant, Juan Luis Burgos-Gandia, occupied a different office (Dallas) and served in a different capacity. A 

fourth ex-employee plaintiff, Richard Dunn, is not a party to 

this appeal but will be conspicuous by his absence.

Pederson and Taylor's conflict with the RTC began in 1992, 

when they took issue with a reorganization of their office 

initiated in anticipation of the RTC's 1995 statutory sunset. 

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See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m)(1). In March of 1992, Pederson 

circulated a memo to RTC management detailing his concerns 

that the reorganization would hinder the PLS. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 786. To no avail; the reorganization went on as 

planned and on May 11 of 1992, he and Taylor were selected 

for return to the FDIC as part of the "put-back" program.1

In anticipation, they were assigned to a "Special Projects 

Unit" which occupied a different Denver office and, according 

to Pederson and Taylor, constituted a professional purgatorythey were denied meaningful work, support staff, computer links and supplies, and they were ostracized by former 

colleagues afraid to be seen with them. J.A. 754-55.

Having achieved little with his internal memo, Pederson 

changed forum and theme: During the summer and into the 

fall of 1992, he and Taylor communicated with the General 

Accounting Office ("GAO") and testified before the Senate 

Banking Committee, alleging now that the reorganization was 

concocted to protect well-connected malefactors by hamstringing their PLS pursuers. The GAO and RTC's Inspector General investigated; reports issued in the summer of 

1993 found no illicit cronyism, but concluded that the reorganization had been handled poorly.

The put-back program was canceled in July 1992, but 

Pederson and Taylor remained in their Special Projects exile. 

There, they contend, they were subject to continual retaliation and discrimination until their May 1995 resignations 

(which they characterize as constructive discharges).

Appellant Burgos was employed as a litigator in RTC's 

Dallas office. His troubles started, he alleges, when he 

notified his superiors of overbilling by outside counsel. In 

response, RTC management allegedly assigned him to undesirable cases, including some in which the RTC had already 

defaulted. Burgos claims that in one of these cases, Crabb v. 

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., his superiors continued 

__________

1 Appellants' briefs have not directed us to any evidence associating Taylor with any protest activity of hers, with or without 

Pederson, before the May 1992 "put-backs." In the summary 

judgment analysis we assume in her favor that such evidence exists.

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to litigate despite a settlement, against the wishes of the 

client (another branch of the RTC) and in order to conceal 

their earlier default. Burgos urged his supervisors to abandon the litigation; when they did not heed him, he directed 

outside counsel to withdraw a pending motion. Burgos's 

superiors ordered him to rescind that instruction; when he 

refused, they countermanded it themselves. Burgos then 

filed an "Informative Motion" with the Crabb court, disclosing 

the role of his superiors in the decision to continue litigation, 

as well as his opposition to that decision.

The RTC notified Burgos that he would be fired for this 

insubordination; in fact it simply placed him on paid administrative leave. Eventually informed that he would be demoted 

two pay grades, he resigned on January 8, 1995. Like Taylor 

and Pederson, Burgos characterizes his resignation as a 

constructive discharge.

* * *

As we have said, the district court dismissed the statutory 

claims of Pederson, Taylor and Burgos and granted the FDIC 

summary judgment on the constitutional ones. But there was 

another ex-employee, Dunn, who had joined the original 

claim. (A fifth plaintiff, the Government Accountability Project, was also a party to the district court litigation but has 

withdrawn from the action.) Although the district court 

dismissed the statutory claims of all plaintiffs, it initially 

withheld judgment on Dunn's constitutional claims. To avoid 

delay in their appeal, the three plaintiffs now before us filed a 

Motion to Direct Entry of Final Judgment without waiting for 

the disposition of Dunn's claims, arguing in the words of Rule 

54(b) that there was "no just reason for delay." The court 

then issued an order, observing that grant of the plaintiffs' 

motion would be "just and proper," and ordering that the 

clerk "be directed" to enter final judgment dismissing their 

claims.

Rule 54(b) mediates between the sometimes antagonistic 

goals of avoiding piecemeal appeals and giving parties timely 

justice. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 

U.S. 1, 8 (1980). In a case involving multiple claims or 

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parties, it allows the district court to "direct the entry of a 

final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 

claims or parties only upon an express determination that 

there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 

direction for the entry of judgment." Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b). The district court functions as a "dispatcher," determining in its sound discretion when a claim should 

proceed on to appellate resolution, and when it should await 

its fellows.2 Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S at 8.

Here, the district court's order clearly gave the "express 

direction" that the rule requires, but did it make the necessary "express determination"? Given plaintiffs' invocation of 

Rule 54(b)'s "no just reason for delay" formula in their motion 

for entry of judgment under that rule, and the court's obvious 

embrace of their position, it is as clear as these things get 

that the court was convinced that the rule's criteria were 

satisfied. Our circuit has never decided precisely what a 

Rule 54(b) "express determination" requires. In Kelly v. 

Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218 (5th 

Cir. 1990), a deeply split Fifth Circuit considered the issue en 

banc, the majority finding it sufficient that the order and 

related parts of the record revealed an "unmistakable intent 

to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b)." Id. at 

1220. There was no need, said the majority, for the district 

judge to "mechanically recite the words 'no just reason for 

delay.' " Id. The majority, however, never really answered 

the dissenters' point that "express," the Rule's modifier of 

"determination," does not normally mean "implied." Id. at 

1222; accord Granack v. Continental Casualty Co., 977 F.2d 

1143, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1992).

__________

2 The district court may not, of course, use Rule 54(b) to certify a 

judgment that is not final by ordinary standards. See CurtissWright, 446 U.S. at 7-8; Tolson v. United States, 732 F.2d 998, 999 

(D.C. Cir. 1984). It is clear that the dismissals and summary 

judgments at issue here possess the requisite finality; they dispose 

of all the claims of the appellants here.

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Without some convincing answer to the Fifth Circuit dissenters' challenge, we do not know how our circuit could 

reject their analysis. Certainly no such answer emerged at 

oral argument. Were we to apply the dissenters' view, we 

would be compelled to dismiss the appeal. Here that would 

be clearly wasteful in the short run: the case would vanish 

from the docket of a panel that has invested much time on the 

merits. Our dismissal of this appeal, besides following the 

rules as understood by the Fifth Circuit dissenters, would 

have its pay-off in future cases, by inspiring closer district 

court focus on the criteria of Rule 54(b) and by removing 

ambiguities as to what they actually require.

In this case, happily, we need not bite this distasteful 

bullet. The government raised the Rule 54(b) issue in a 

motion for dismissal or summary affirmance before a motions 

panel of this court. The motion was denied, see March 31, 

1997 Order, Taylor v. FDIC (No. 96-5267), and that decision 

is law of the case, preclusive for all matters decided expressly 

or by necessary implication. See Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The panel's decision 

is binding, even though the adequacy of the determination is 

a jurisdictional prerequisite. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 

F.3d 1389, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Law of the case, yes; law of the circuit, no. The order of 

the motions panel went unpublished and will bind no panel of 

this court in any other case. See D.C. Cir. Rule 28(c). Thus 

the issue that so divided the Fifth Circuit remains unresolved 

here. Cf. U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 

1051 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Future Rule 54(b) certifications with 

similar deficiencies may not be expected to survive in this 

court.").

While on the subject of Rule 54(b), we note that some 

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nation" be literally express but also expect the district court 

to supply a statement of reasons. The lack of such a statement may leave the appellate court uncertain whether the 

district judge exercised its discretion soundly, or indeed 

whether it exercised its discretion at all. See, e.g., United 

States v. Ettrick Wood Products, Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1218 

(7th Cir. 1990); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975). Its presence aids 

both the circuit reviewer and the district decisionmaker. See 

Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, 543 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1976). 

With a clear statement of reasons, "discretion carefully exercised is rarely upset." Ettrick Wood, 916 F.2d at 1218.

As law of the case removes the Rule 54(b) problem from 

our purview, we proceed to the merits.

* * *

Pederson and Taylor were employed in the same office and 

allege largely the same pattern of disclosure and retaliation. 

We examine their claims as a unit, then those of Burgos.

The district court dismissed Pederson and Taylor's statutory claims under Rule 12(b)(6). We review this disposition de 

novo, Alicke v. MCI Communications Corp., 111 F.3d 909, 

912 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and find that we cannot agree.

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when, taking the 

material allegations of the complaint as admitted, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969), and construing them in 

plaintiffs' favor, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

the court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to allege all the 

material elements of their cause of action. See, e.g., Kowal v. 

MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 

1994).

Pederson and Taylor's statutory count claims that the RTC 

violated the RTC Whistleblower Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(q), 

which prohibits discharge of or discrimination against employees because of their disclosure of information to the RTC, 

the Thrift Depositor Oversight Board, the Attorney General, 

or any appropriate Federal banking agency. But not all 

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disclosures qualify for protection. The statute was amended 

effective December 17, 1993 to include disclosures of "gross 

mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or 

safety." The 1991 enactment, by contrast, protected only 

disclosures relating to "a possible violation of any law or 

regulation." Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 251, 105 Stat. 2236 

(1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1831j.

The legal import of this is not that disclosures before the 

amendment are governed by the old statute and those after 

by the new. That would be akin to allowing discrimination 

against female employees if it were based on the fact that 

they had been women before the passage of Title VII. The 

relevant acts are the alleged retaliations. Those after the 

amendment are actionable if they came in response to disclosures (whenever made) in the broader class; 3

retaliation 

before the amendment is actionable only if the instigating 

disclosure revealed a possible violation of law or regulation.4

Thus, to state a claim for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), 

Pederson and Taylor must allege 1) a qualifying disclosure 

that 2) contributed to 3) retaliation, where what is required 

for a disclosure to qualify depends on the date of the alleged 

retaliation. This they achieve; ¶ 20 of their Complaint alleges that they "reported their concerns to the RTC Office of 

__________

3 The greater the interval between pre-December 17, 1993 disclosures and later adverse decisions, of course, the harder it will be for 

the plaintiff to show the causal link. But that is just a practical 

issue of proof.

4 Pederson and Taylor argue that the amendments should be 

given retroactive effect, so that pre-amendment retaliations (if there 

were any) for then-unprotected disclosures would become actionable 

when the disclosures became protected. This approach would 

"attach[ ] new legal consequences to events completed before [the 

amendments'] enactment," Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 

U.S. 244, 270 (1994). Landgraf says that statutes should not be 

read to produce such retroactivity in the absence of clear Congressional intent, see id., which is completely absent here. See Walleri 

v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 965 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (D. 

Or. 1997).

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Inspector General regarding ... staffing decisions that potentially violated personnel laws and regulations." Paragraphs 29-42 (Pederson) and 47-52 (Taylor) allege retaliation, 

and WW 128-32 (Pederson) and 153-56 (Taylor) recapitulate 

and allege the causal links.

The FDIC argues that the allegations of ¶ 20 are in essence 

legal, not factual, and need not be accepted as true for the 

purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The underlying notion is 

sound: Courts accept plaintiffs' allegations of fact, not their 

conclusions of law. See Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. If plaintiffs 

include the text of a disclosure in their pleadings, and then 

claim that it revealed a possible violation of law, we are not 

bound to accept that legal conclusion. If, however, they 

merely allege that they "disclosed a possible violation of law," 

that is a statement of material fact that must be accepted as 

true for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. We may not draw upon facts 

from outside the pleadings. See Henthorn v. Dep't of the 

Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In consequence, a 

vague and conclusory complaint may survive a 12(b)(6) motion 

where more detail would disclose fatal weaknesses; defendants' remedy "is not to move [for] dismissal but to serve 

contention interrogatories ... or to proceed to summary 

judgment." Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc.,

757 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 1985).

Here in fact the FDIC's motion to dismiss requested 

summary judgment in the alternative, and if summary judgment is the correct disposition, we may convert and affirm on 

those grounds. Cf. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 

(1937). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings 

and record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c); 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

We examine the facts in the record and reasonable inferences 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Wardlaw 

v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1993), but do not 

accept bare conclusory allegations as fact. See Harding v. 

Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993). What this standard 

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comes down to is that Pederson and Taylor must show, with 

respect to each essential issue on which they will bear the 

burden of proof at trial, either that the issue is conceded in 

their favor or that it turns on a genuinely disputed question 

of fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986).

From Pederson and Taylor's brief we learn that the personnel laws and regulations alleged to have been violated are 

5 U.S.C. § 3502(a) and 5 CFR § 351.201. Appellants' Br. at 

26. The former instructs the Office of Personnel Management to prescribe regulations for retention preferences in a 

reduction in force; the latter obliges agencies to follow 5 

CFR Part 351 during a reduction in force. How the reorganization possibly violated these requirements is not apparent, 

especially given the FDIC's uncontroverted assertion that the 

reorganization did not constitute a reduction in force and 

hence was not governed by these sections.5

At oral argument, Pederson and Taylor's counsel explained 

that they did not respond to the FDIC's assertion because it 

was so ludicrous. Dignified silence is a dangerous tactic at 

best; here it proves fatal. Pederson and Taylor fail to offer 

any evidence that the cited laws even apply, much less were 

possibly violated. Their statement of genuine issues of material fact, filed pursuant to Local Rule 108(h), makes only the 

cryptic claim that the reorganization violated the law by 

failing to promote "the efficiency of the service," J.A. 294, a 

phrase that appears nowhere in 5 CFR Part 351. We conclude that there is no genuine issue of fact here: The 

memorandum to RTC management concerning the reorgani-

__________

5

5 CFR § 351.201 limits its coverage to occasions on which an 

agency "releases a competing employee from his or her competitive 

level by furlough for more than 30 days, separation, demotion, or 

reassignment requiring displacement...." It is not at all clear 

that the reorganization entailed any releases from "competitive 

level," since FDIC employees on loan to the RTC were by statute 

entitled to "be returned to a similar position." 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1441a(q)(8)(B)(i).

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zation did not relate to any potential violation of law or 

regulation.

Pederson and Taylor had also asserted that the reorganization was undertaken to protect disloyal savings and loan 

fiduciaries; these assertions may well relate to possible violations of some law. They were made in the first instance, 

however, not to RTC superiors or the Attorney General but 

to GAO and the Senate Banking Committee, J.A. 380, reaching any statutorily covered recipients only indirectly. Plaintiffs argue that it should make no difference. But the RTC 

Whistleblower Act affords its special protection (beyond that 

provided by the First Amendment) only for the act of "provid[ing] information to" designated entities. 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1441a(q)(1). It seems reasonable that Congress would 

afford special protection for communications directed to the 

specified entities, all ones with a capacity to remedy wrongs 

brought to their attention, and would withhold the protection 

from communications that only drift into such hands by 

happenstance. Appellants' reading would completely thwart 

this channeling function.

Still, Pederson and Taylor's March 1992 memo arguably 

discloses gross mismanagement and hence might qualify under the amended statute. Thus, they would be protected, 

after December 17, 1993, from retaliation for that memo. 

Their problem is that they fail to identify such retaliationor, 

indeed, any post-1993 retaliation at all. They focus primarily 

on their selection for the put-back program and exile in the 

Special Projects Unit. The reassignment occurred May 11, 

1992too early to be proscribed retaliation given that the 

March 1992 memo was not protected at that time, and also, 

even if proscribed, too early to be actionable when this suit 

was filed in September 1994, given the two-year limitations 

period of the RTC Whistleblower Act.

Beyond this, Pederson points to a search of his computer 

and Taylor to an alleged "gag order" imposed in violation of 

her First Amendment rights in March 1994. Pederson's 

claim fails because the computer search took place, according 

to his affidavit, "[o]n or about March 12, 1993," J.A. 760, again 

too early to be proscribed, given that he had at that time 

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made no disclosures protected by the pre-December 1993 

law.6 Taylor's claim fails because the "gag order," attached 

to her affidavit, does little more than set out the principle 

"that attorneys do not discuss client matters with the media 

absent express client permission." J.A. 685. Although the 

memo clearly asserted the author's view that Taylor's "media 

contacts" violated the principle of client loyalty and confidentiality, and would justify at least a "formal reprimand," the 

author explicitly refrained even from that. To the limited 

extent that the memo goes beyond directing Taylor's attention to the policy, evidently of general application within the 

RTC and not unique to her, it does not qualify either as 

retaliation or discrimination, and is on its face no more than a 

responseperhaps a testy oneto Taylor's (unprotected) 

media communications, not to the March 1992 internal memo.

Both Pederson and Taylor suggest that their career advancement has been hindered "since May 1992 until the 

__________

6 Pederson attempts to make the computer incident do double 

duty, offering the search itself as an example of retaliation, and 

arguing also that his disclosure of the search was disclosure of a 

Fourth Amendment violation "directly to senior management." Appellants' Reply Br. at 13. Because this disclosure may have taken 

place as early as March 12, 1993, it pre-dates the amendments and 

would, if qualifying for Whistleblower Act protection, extend Pederson's protection back to that date. We assume that the search did 

qualify as a possible illegality. Nothing in Pederson's affidavits, 

however, supports the claim that he disclosed it to senior management, or to any listed entity. There is evidence that Pederson 

discussed the matter with Barbara Shangraw, who herself had 

ordered the search, but the conversation was at her request for the 

purpose of driving home to Pederson the policy against using 

corporate facilities for personal purposes. J.A. 1218, 1444. We 

assume arguendo that a disclosure of an illegality to the perpetrator 

herself could in some instances qualify (as where the whistleblower 

tells a covered person of an illegality that, unbeknownst to the 

whistleblower, had been ordered by the covered person). But we 

do not think that protesting about the legality of a search to a 

superior who ordered it, in the context of a meeting called by the 

superior to discuss its fruits, can fairly be characterized as a 

disclosureexcept of the employee's view of the event.

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present." J.A. 336-37, 758-59. Ascertaining the relevant 

dates for their various allegations is not easy, but we can find 

only a few incidents occurring after December 17, 1993. 

None of the actual failures to promote fell after that date. 

Pederson applied for various section chief positions, all before 

the fall of 1993, J.A. 758-59, and Taylor, so far as her affidavit 

reveals, applied for nothing after August 1993. J.A. 679-82.

Two allegations do stretch across the December 1993 

threshold. First is the repeated failure to designate either 

Pederson or Taylor the acting section chief when their superiors temporarily left the office. J.A. 337, 759. To make out a 

prima facie case of retaliation under the RTC Whistleblower 

Act, a plaintiff must show that a protected disclosure was a 

contributing factor in the adverse action complained of. See 

12 U.S.C. § 1441a(q)(5) (prescribing use of 5 U.S.C. § 1221's 

burden of proof system); 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). This does 

not absolve the plaintiff of the need to offer evidence that 

would amount at least to a prima facie showing of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 

802 (1973).

Pederson and Taylor have both failed to cross that modest 

threshold. McDonnell Douglas requires the plaintiff to show 

(among other items) that he "applied and was qualified" for 

the vacancy, as well as that the employer, though rejecting 

plaintiff, continued to seek applicants of plaintiff's qualifications. Id. Pederson and Taylor offer no such evidence with 

respect to the acting section chief position.

Equally damaging for Pederson and Taylor, we do not 

believe that temporary designation as acting section chief is 

one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" 

compassed by the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(q)(1). The phrase 

"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" is identical 

to the language of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Courts 

applying Title VII have consistently focused on "ultimate 

employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating ... [and not] interlocutory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect 

upon employment conditions...." Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 

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227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc); accord Dollis v. Rubin, 77 

F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995). This circuit has never 

decided the issue. See Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis,

116 F.3d 1549, 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting issue without 

deciding). But see Hayes v. Shalala, 902 F. Supp. 259, 266-

67 (D.D.C. 1995) (rejecting Page).

We need not decide that precise issue either; what defeats 

these claims (besides want of a prima facie case) is not that 

the denials complained of were mediate but that they were 

minor. The federal courts cannot be wheeled into action for 

every workplace slight, even one that was possibly based on 

protected conduct. Cf. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 

(6th Cir. 1987) (finding no adverse action where employer 

required employee to sign form acknowledging circumstances 

of transfer and failed properly to document sick leave).

Pederson's allegation that he was refused permission to 

attend an internal RTC course on alternative dispute resolution, J.A. 1771-72, the second qualifying claim, also fails for 

want of a prima facie case. Assuming that exclusion from 

this one seminar amounted to such a denial of training 

opportunities as to represent an adverse action, see Page, 645 

F.2d at 233, Pederson has failed to show how his treatment 

differed from that of similarly-situated employees.

Finally, both Taylor and Pederson allege a continuing

indeed, "unrelenting"pattern of retaliation extending up 

until their resignations. In part this fails for lack of specificity, but the more serious flaw is that the specific elements of 

the litanyisolation, misdirected mail, poor telephone service, 

unsuitable worksimply constitute the consequences of the 

initial reassignment. Even if that reassignment was retaliatory, it was not wrongful, since at that point Pederson and 

Taylor had made no disclosures qualifying them for RTC 

Whistleblower Act protection; and even if it were wrongful, 

any resulting claim would have been time-barred at the point 

when Pederson and Taylor filed suit. Absent some evidence 

that officials aggravated conditions in appellants' occupational 

Siberia, the new statute could not render the continuing 

consequences of an innocent action wrongfulunless the 

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amendment affirmatively called for remediation of the past 

innocent act. In any case, an untimely suit "cannot be 

revived by pointing to effects within the limitations period of 

unlawful acts that occurred earlier." Dasgupta v. University 

of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138, 1140 (7th Cir. 

1997); see Palmer v. Barry, 894 F.2d 449, 453 (D.C. Cir. 

1990). Just as the failure of appellants' superiors to relieve 

them from life in Special Projects, though occurring within 

the limitations period, cannot revive their claim or toll the 

statute of limitations, neither can that inaction constitute 

post-December 17, 1993 retaliation.

Nor does the concept of "continuing violation" assist Pederson and Taylor in showing that the continuation of their grim 

working conditions amounted to a post-1993 retaliation. For 

statute of limitations purposes, a continuing violation is "one 

that could not reasonably have been expected to be made the 

subject of a lawsuit when it first occurred because its character as a violation did not become clear until it was repeated 

during the limitations period," Dasgupta, 121 F.3d at 1139, 

typically because it is only its cumulative impact (as in the 

case of a hostile work environment) that reveals its illegality, 

id. But the banishment of Pederson and Taylor to Special 

Projects, as they allege it, amply manifested itself as a 

possible retaliation from the start. Just as the continuing low 

pay entailed by a demotion cannot toll the statute of limitations covering the demotion, so continuing hardship in Special 

Projects cannot qualify as a post-1993 retaliation.

One final issue remains. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a continuance to take discovery, a decision 

that they assign as error and that we have no difficulty in 

affirming under the abuse of discretion standard appropriate 

to Rule 56(f). That takes care of discovery with respect to 

the grants of summary judgment by the district court, but 

what of a converted 12(b)(6) dismissal? When a district court 

converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it must allow all parties both a "reasonable opportunity 

to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 

Rule 56" and a chance "to pursue reasonable discovery." 

First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d 

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1375, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)). The district court allowed the former, in 

the form of affidavits. As to discovery, since we are converting the 12(b)(6) motion on appellate review, we do not have 

the benefit of the district court's determination of the necessity of discovery before summary judgment on the statutory 

count. It is possible that the district court, in denying the 

continuance, implicitly found no need for discovery before 

summary judgment on this count, but it is equally possible 

that it had already flagged the count as failing to state a 

claim, in which case the question of discovery would not arise.

We believe the soundest course, in this case, is to decide 

the discovery question de novo. Pederson and Taylor, in 

their motion for a continuance, make much of the fact that 

retaliatory animus may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 

J.A. 137. Discovery, they claim, is necessary to allow them to 

ferret out such proof. But the weakness of Pederson and 

Taylor's case is not that it lacks evidence of animusthough 

it doesbut that it lacks a showing of unlawful retaliation. 

Discovery will not help on this front, and Pederson and 

Taylor do not suggest that it will. There is no genuine issue 

of fact as to the existence of proscribed retaliation. Accordingly, we would rule as did the district court on discovery, 

and, having converted the 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for 

summary judgment, affirm the district court's dismissal of 

Pederson and Taylor's statutory claim because a grant of 

summary judgment would have been correct.

* * *

The district court granted summary judgment for the 

FDIC on the First Amendment claims of Pederson and 

Taylor, reasoning that the voluntary nature of their departure 

precluded the equitable relief sought. Reviewing this determination de novo, we find that voluntary resignation bars not 

merely relief but also federal jurisdiction.

To be sure, Pederson and Taylor term their resignations 

"constructive discharges." We rejected that characterization 

in our denial of a preliminary injunction, see Taylor v. 

Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

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("Taylor I"), and although that decision lacks authoritative 

weight for this appeal, see University of Texas v. Camenisch,

451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981), reconsideration has not changed our 

opinion. "[A] constructive discharge occurs where the employer creates or tolerates discriminatory working conditions 

that would drive a reasonable person to resign." Katradis v. 

Dav-El of Wash., 846 F.2d 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). It does not occur when 

an employee leaves an unpleasant but objectively tolerable 

job because alternatives have become more attractive, even if 

the employer's misbehavior creates the unpleasantness or, as 

we observed in the earlier appeal, its largesse affirmatively 

increases the appeal of the employee's alternatives. The 

standard may vary with the character of the job for which the 

employee was hired and thus, indirectly, with the employee's 

skills; conditions that are conventional for a stevedore may 

be intolerable for a lawyer, and perhaps vice versa. But the 

standard cannot ebb and flow with the tide of a particular 

employee's specific job alternatives. Here, Pederson and 

Taylor endured whatever the RTC inflicted until May 1995, 

when they took advantage of the severance package offered 

by the Voluntary Separation Incentive Program. They do 

not suggest that any simultaneous increase in the wattage of 

harassment drove them out. Thus no triable issue of fact 

exists on the question of constructive discharge.7

A finding that no constructive discharge occurred will have 

different consequences according to the type of relief requested. Pederson and Taylor seek reassignment to their 1991 

positions, injunctive relief against future harassment, and 

damages. We examine each in turn. The request for reassignment appears in the original complaint, J.A. 125, and was 

__________

7 Pederson and Taylor sought leave to amend their complaint in 

order to offer new evidence bearing on constructive discharge. The 

district court denied their motion, and we uphold that decision 

under the abuse of discretion standard, given both the lateness of 

the filing of the proposed amended complaint and its failure, 

together with the additional affidavits (included in the Joint Appendix) to firmly close the gaps in their case.

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made when Pederson and Taylor were still employed by the 

RTC. They left the RTC during the pendency of this litigation, and what used to be reassignment now accordingly 

would require reinstatement. Since the original complaint 

simply asks for "an order restoring" them to their 1991 

positions, we could read it as in fact requesting reinstatement. 

This would be consistent with the desires expressed in a 

proposed amended complaint rejected by the district court. 

To save this element of the First Amendment count, however, 

would require more than turning reassignment into reinstatement to account for the changed circumstances. The plaintiffs' voluntary departure creates a large hole in their cause of 

action: In requesting reinstatement, they seek a remedy for 

injury that is in large part self-inflicted. This is true whether 

we treat the defect as a matter of standing or the merits.

Article III standing requires the plaintiff to show causationthat his injury is "fairly traceable to the defendant's 

allegedly unlawful conduct." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 

751 (1984). Our rejection of Pederson and Taylor's claim of 

constructive discharge is concomitantly a decision that their 

voluntary acts are sufficient independent causes of their 

separation from the RTC.

This is quite consistent with their (theoretically) having a 

claim against the RTC for its earlier mistreatment. Suppose 

an employer wrongly denied an employee $25 in wages, upon 

which the employee left in a huff. Plainly he would have no 

claim to reinstatement, however valid his demand for $25 

damages. Had Pederson and Taylor remained, they might 

have been entitled to some sort of restoration to their earlier 

status; having left under circumstances for which the RTC is 

not legally culpable, however, they cannot claim that the RTC 

has deprived them of their jobs, even if its prior treatment of 

them, though falling short of constructive discharge, was 

actionable. Failing to show causation, they lack standing.

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Similarly, wrongful discharge (either actual or constructive) 

is a necessary element of a claim for reinstatementdiscrimination and voluntary resignation are not enough. See, e.g., 

Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep't, 802 

F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (8th Cir. 1986); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.,

796 F.2d 340, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1986). Our rejection of the 

allegation of constructive discharge thus would also serve to 

resolve this claim against plaintiffs on the merits.

The appropriate treatment of cases in which the standing 

inquiry overlaps with the merits so precisely is not entirely 

clear. We have disposed of cases on standing grounds after 

the merits-laden determination that a plaintiff's claim "ha[d] 

no foundation in law," Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 907 

(D.C. Cir. 1997)something we think could fairly be said of a 

reinstatement claim made in the face of voluntary resignation. 

See also Arjay Assocs. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 

1989) (affirming dismissal for lack of standing after concluding plaintiff lacked enforceable right). But cf. Lewis v. 

Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that 

element essential to both standing and merits should be 

reviewed only for facial sufficiency of pleadings in standing 

analysis); ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1975) 

(disposing of case on merits after determining that standing 

and merits inquiries overlapped). In this case, the consequences of a disposition based on lack of standing do not 

differ greatly from those of one on the merits. On either 

approach, plaintiffs' request for reinstatement fails as a result 

of their voluntary resignation. The chief distinction is that 

after finding no standing, we may not affirm the district 

court's grant of summary judgment but must vacate and 

remand with instructions to dismiss. See Ramallo v. Reno,

114 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (vacatur and remand 

with instructions to dismiss is appropriate disposition when 

appellate court loses jurisdiction). This disposition is employed regardless of whether the missing element of standing 

is required for the substantive cause of action. See Clajon 

Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1573 (10th Cir. 

1995) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction despite identity of 

issues). Consequently, we will dispose of the reinstatement 

claim on standing grounds.

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The original complaint also sought a permanent injunction 

against future retaliation. As we held before, Pederson and 

Taylor's resignation moots this request by eliminating the 

possibility of future harm and the utility of the injunction. 

Taylor I, 56 F.3d at 1502-05. We have no jurisdiction over a 

moot claim. Finally, they ask for compensatory damages, a 

demand clearly not mooted by termination of employment. 

See Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 468-71 (D.C. Cir. 1986). To 

the extent that this request rests on the RTC Whistleblower 

Act, which explicitly offers a damages remedy as well as 

reinstatement, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(q)(3), it falls with their 

statutory claim, as discussed above.

Pederson and Taylor could also conceivably be seeking 

damages under the First Amendment. The defendant in this 

suit, however, is the FDIC, and no cause of action for 

damages for constitutional violationswhether called a Bivens action or notis to be implied against government 

agencies. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994). 

Pederson and Taylor also name the RTC CEO (succeeded by 

the Chairman of the FDIC) as a defendant, but they name 

him in his official capacity and allege no unlawful acts on his 

part.8

As we have no jurisdiction over Pederson and Taylor's 

constitutional claims to equitable relief, we vacate the district 

court's grant of summary judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.

* * *

__________

8 Even supposing that appellants intended to proceed against the 

CEO individually, a suit for damages under the First Amendment 

would not get off the ground. We will not infer a Bivens remedy 

where Congress has created "comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United 

States...." Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983). Here Congress's enactment of the RTC Whistleblower Act precludes a Bivens action under the First Amendment. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 367-

90 (refusing to imply Bivens remedy under the First Amendment 

given Civil Service Reform Act); Walleri v. Federal Home Loan 

Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1583-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (same with 

respect to FDIC Whistleblower Act).

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The third appellant is Burgos, who also brings statutory 

and constitutional claims. We find his statutory complaint 

facially inadequate and affirm the district court's dismissal; 

we also affirm the grant of summary judgment on his constitutional claim.

The retaliation that Burgos points to is, primarily, the 

demotion that led to his resignation. Although the complaint 

may be read to suggest that his assignment to "problem 

cases" also constituted retaliation for disclosures about overbilling by outside law firms, counsel appeared to abandon this 

aspect at oral argument, describing it as merely stage-setting; 

nor does Burgos mention it in his briefs. Appellants' Br. at 

27, 32-34; Appellants' Reply Br. at 17-20.

The demotion came in response to Burgos's filing his 

"Informative Motion" with the district court in the Crabb

litigation. As far as the RTC Whistleblower Act is concerned, Burgos encounters the immediate difficulty that the 

Act protects disclosures only to the entities specified: the 

RTC, the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board, the 

Attorney General, or an appropriate banking agency. 12 

U.S.C. 1441a(q). It does not protect communications to 

courts. Although the "Informative Motion" states that a copy 

is being sent to the RTC Inspector General, Burgos himself 

does not claim that that copy played any role in his demotion; 

his superiors were amply infuriated by his filing in court.

* * *

Burgos argues also that his demotion violated his First 

Amendment rights, invoking the principle giving government 

employees some protection from discipline for their speech. 

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. 

Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Nothing in this 

doctrine automatically withholds protection for disclosures to 

courts. Nonetheless, the district court granted summary 

judgment to the defendant, and we affirm.

Pickering directs courts to strike "a balance between the 

interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 

matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 

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employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 

performs through its employees." Id. at 568. Connick

makes clear that the doctrine covers only speech on a matter 

of public concern, i.e., of "political, social, or other concern to 

the community." Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; see F.D.R. Fox 

v. District of Columbia, 83 F.3d 1491, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The public concern inquiry is one of law, Connick, 461 U.S. 

at 150 n.10; Fox, 83 F.3d at 1493, to be determined by 

looking at "the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Connick, 138 U.S. at 

147-48. The district court concluded that Burgos's "Informative Motion" did not involve a matter of public concern. 

Reviewing de novo, we agree.

Burgos in his briefs claims that he disclosed to the court 

that his supervisors were continuing to litigate a moot case, 

Appellants' Br. at 34, in order to cover up their earlier 

default, Appellants' Br. at 19-20. This sort of governmental 

misbehavior certainly sounds like an object of public concern, 

although as a preliminary matter, it is not altogether clear 

how the alleged cover-up was supposed to function. Litigating a settled case does not seem an effective strategy for 

concealing a default; presumably, the shirkers would want to 

slink away from court, not call attention to their neglect by 

bringing motions to vacate. But we need not try to unravel 

this tangle, for a glance at the actual "Informative Motion" 

cuts clean through.

What that motion discloses is the following: The opposing 

party had asked for sanctions against Burgos. He recommended to his superiors that litigation be discontinued and 

unilaterally instructed outside counsel to withdraw the pending motion to vacate the judgment. He refused an order to 

change his instructions to the outside counsel, calling it 

"unethical," and his superiors overrode his wishes. J.A. 

1080-83. There is no mention of mootness, and none of an 

attempt to camouflage default, but prominent reference to the 

fact that sanctions were being sought.

The content, form, and context of the motion lead to the 

conclusion that, as Burgos's First Affidavit admits, it was 

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intended to "identify[ ] who was responsible for the direction 

of this litigation and that [Burgos] had ordered the Motion to 

Vacate to be withdrawn." J.A. 997. Neither of these elements, without more, is a matter of public concern; released 

to the public, this motion would reveal no more than "the fact 

that a single employee is upset with the status quo." Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. The purpose of the communication was 

to avoid personal sanctions, not to expose wrongdoing. 

Whatever the outcome with respect to the former (Burgos 

does not tell us), there was no real gesture towards the latter, 

and the incidental and unexplained reference to "unethical 

conduct" does not change this fact. Of course a speaker 

might combine an effort to deflect blame with a Connickqualifying revelation of government dereliction. But to say, 

"He did it," or "He made me do it," where "it" is already 

established, is just garden-variety finger-pointing. And rhetorical embellishments marginally increasing the associated 

obloquy do not elevate it to a matter of public concern. 

Accordingly, disciplinary actions taken in response to Burgos's affidavit could not offend the First Amendment.

* * *

With respect to Pederson and Taylor, we convert the 

government's 12(b)(6) motion on the statutory counts to a 

motion for summary judgment and affirm. On the constitutional count, finding no jurisdiction over the equitable claims 

we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand with 

instructions to dismiss. We find no constitutional cause of 

action for damages, and affirm the grant of summary judgment. With respect to Burgos, we affirm both the dismissal 

of the statutory count and the grant of summary judgment on 

the constitutional count.

So ordered.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the opinion of the 

court save for its treatment of appellants' request for equitable relief as a matter of constitutional standing. See opinion 

at 17-19. Rather, because there was insufficient evidence to 

show that appellants were constructively discharged, given 

their voluntary departures, see opinion at 16-17, their request 

for equitable relief fails for lack of an evidentiary foundation. 

This finding seems to me to be the fundamental one. On 

their pleadings, appellants' injury is traceable to appellees' 

actions; that the court cannot credit the pleadings is not a 

standing analysis, but a determination of evidentiary sufficiency. See Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 

1997); Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 

83, 101 (1968)).

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