Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01256/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01256-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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3:16-cv-01256-DMS (WVG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES RAY CATHY,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. McCAIN; M. McKENZIE; 

SERGEANT CASTRO; G. 

HERNANDEZ,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01256-DMS (WVG)

ORDER: DISMISSING ACTION 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Charles Ray Cathy (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently incarcerated at Kern Valley 

State Prison located in Delano, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed an action 

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims his 

constitutional rights were violated while he was housed at Calipatria State Prison. (See 

Compl., ECF No. 1, at 1.) 

Plaintiff has prepaid the initial civil filing fee required to commence a civil action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). In addition, Plaintiff has filed a “Motion for 

Verification of Plaintiff’s Pending Suit and Recognition of PLU Status,” along with a 

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3:16-cv-01256-DMS (WVG)

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“Motion for Service of Summons and Complaint by United States Marshal.” (ECF Nos. 

4, 6.)

I. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Even though Plaintiff paid the filing fee, the Court can conduct a sua sponte review 

of Plaintiff’s Complaint because he is “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] is 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Section 1915A, enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”), requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints, or any portions 

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A similar screening provision of the PLRA would apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint even if 

he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

A. Eighth Amendment violations

Plaintiff alleges that he is a “validated/documented Crip.” (Compl. at 4.) He further 

alleges that Defendants McCain and McKenzie were aware of his gang status. (Id. at 4-5.) 

On November 11, 2015, while Plaintiff was housed at Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”), 

Defendants McCain and McKenzie came to his cell and informed him that he would be 

changing cells. (Id. at 1, 4-5.) Other inmates informed Plaintiff that the cell he was being 

moved to housed an inmate from a rival gang. (Id. at 4-5.) These inmates also informed 

Plaintiff that the officers were aware of this issue and “were trying to set me up in a 

gladiator like scenario.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “McKenzie and 

McCain then came back to my cell and told me that the guy in the other cell” is, in fact, a 

member of a rival gang and the “Sergeant wants to send you to [administrative segregation]

since you refused to move.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff was then sent to administrative 

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3:16-cv-01256-DMS (WVG)

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segregation (“ad-seg”) and was not placed with the inmate from the rival gang. (Id. at 6.)

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety and well-being of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–

33 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To state an Eighth 

Amendment failure to protect claim, however, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

plausibly show that (1) he faced conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to 

his health or safety, and (2) the individual prison officials he seeks to hold liable were 

“deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must 

show that the defendant both knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to 

his health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, Plaintiff must allege “the official 

[was] both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exist[ed], and [that] he . . . also dr[e]w that inference.” Id.

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no facts to plausibly suggest that he faced 

a “substantial risk of serious harm” at the time he was sent to ad-seg. While Plaintiff was 

allegedly going to be housed with a member of a rival gang, and even assuming the facts 

as true that the intent was to set up a “gladiator fight,” there are no facts to show that he 

suffered any harm because he was never actually exposed to a risk based on his own 

allegations. Moreover, when Plaintiff objected to being housed with an inmate from a rival 

gang, prison officials responded by placing him in ad-seg as opposed to moving him into 

that cell. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or 

safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably.” Id. at 844. Plaintiff 

does not allege any facts to support a finding that the Defendants responded unreasonably 

to a substantial risk of harm. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege 

facts sufficient to find “deliberate indifference” on the part of any named Defendant.

/ / /

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For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims must be 

dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims

Plaintiff also alleges that he was placed in ad-seg without due process. The Due 

Process Clause protects prisoners against deprivation or restraint of “a protected liberty 

interest” and “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although 

the level of the hardship must be determined in a case-by-case determination, courts look 

to:

1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon 

inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s 

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). Only if an inmate has 

alleged facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest does the court next consider 

“whether the procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts which show that 

being placed in ad-seg for an unspecified period of time subjected him to any “atypical and 

significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.; Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 584. Plaintiff does not compare the conditions of his confinement before or after 

his placement in ad-seg. Nor does he allege the duration of his time housed in ad-seg, or 

the degree of restraint it imposed. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 

486-87). 

/ / /

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3:16-cv-01256-DMS (WVG)

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Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no “factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that Defendants’ actions “presented a 

dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of Plaintiff’s sentence or caused him to 

suffer an “atypical” or “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584-85.

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s due process must be dismissed for failing 

to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

II. Motion for Verification of Plaintiff’s Suit and Recognition of PLU Status

Plaintiff has also filed a motion in which he “requests for the Court to verify 

Plaintiff’s current activity in the above matter to secure his “P.L.U.”1status with Kern 

Valley State Prison and any other State facility. (Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 4, at 1.) Plaintiff 

claims that “Legal Officer Valdez” will not provide Plaintiff with photocopies and has 

denied him “Priority Legal User” status. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to amend 

his Complaint to add an access to courts claim, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion because 

the facts as alleged are insufficient to state a claim. 

Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of 

their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. 

Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 

(9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme Court held that “the 

fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 

inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners 

with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are trained in the law.” 

Id. at 828. To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner 

must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a non-frivolous legal attack on his conviction, 

 

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 “Inmates who have established court deadlines may apply for Priority Legal User (PLU) status to 

the prison law libraries. Inmates who are granted PLU status based on their applications shall receive 

higher priority to prison law library resources than other inmates.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3122(b) 

(2015).

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sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has 

suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An 

“actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing 

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; 

see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 

1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that any CDCR official’s refusal to grant him PLU 

status or failure to comply with photocopy procedures on any particular occasion precluded 

his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction 

or sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right 

to access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], 

directly or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”). In 

addition, Plaintiff must also, but has failed to, describe the non-frivolous nature of the 

“underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403, 415 (2002). 

In short, unless Plaintiff can show that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or 

that he was “so stymied” by CDCR officials’ actions that “he was unable to even file a 

complaint,” direct appeal, or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous,” his 

access to courts claim must be dismissed. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. 

at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ... the predicate claim [must] be 

described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable’ 

nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s “Motion for Verification of Plaintiff’s Pending Suit and 

Recognition of PLU Status” is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. The Motion is 

GRANTED to the extent that Court’s docket verifies that Plaintiff has filed a civil rights 

action in this Court, however, the Court declines to interfere with the CDCR’s regulations 

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in determining whether Plaintiff is entitled to PLU status as he has failed to show that he 

has been denied access to the courts.

Conclusion

For all the reasons set out above, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is granted forty five (45) days leave from the date 

this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete 

in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. 

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be 

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 

1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

(2) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Verification of Plaintiff’s Pending Suit and 

Recognition of PLU Status” is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

(3) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Service of Summons and Complaint” is DENIED as 

moot in light of the Court’s dismissal, without prejudice, of the entire action. 

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form civil rights complaint to Plaintiff.

Dated: June 28, 2016

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