Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00768/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00768-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 12:22 Securities Fraud

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 As discussed below, the court construes both documents as oppositions to the motion.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAULINE ASPENLIND,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0768 GEB EFB PS

vs.

AMERICA’S SERVICING COMPANY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a California Corporation, 

Defendant. 

 /

This action, in which plaintiff is proceeding pro se, was referred to the undersigned

pursuant to Local Rule 72-302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Defendant has filed a motion

to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and alternatively for a more definite statement

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition to that motion, as well as

a “motion to strike” defendant’s motion to dismiss – a motion not authorized under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.1

 Having reviewed the submitted briefing, the court recommends that

defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) be granted without leave to

amend. 

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I. BACKGROUND

This action is proceeding on the original complaint, which is thirty-six pages in length

and comprised of rambling factual allegations and uncontextualized, incomplete legal citations.

Plaintiff makes numerous allegations against defendant America’s Servicing Company

(erroneously sued as American Service Company), the successor-in-interest to an unidentified

party with whom plaintiff claims she executed an “alleged” promissory note in exchange for

financing on her real property located at 2565 Virginiatown Road, Lincoln, California (the

“subject property”). Compl., at 3:1-7. Plaintiff alleges that America’s Servicing Company

(“ASC”) has proceeded to foreclose on the property, and she makes numerous allegations

regarding the purported illegality of the foreclosure. In particular, she alleges that the

promissory note was altered after she signed it, that it was deposited in “an account (like a

checking account)” and “collected from the Federal Reserve Bank [for] approximately 9 times

the amount of the note.” Compl., at 3:4-8. Plaintiff alleges that the altered note was “made in

order for issuer to create credit out of thin air,” and that this “created credit” is nothing more than

a bookkeeping entry that does not actually exist. Compl., at 3:7-8; 6:10- 8:15. 

Plaintiff further alleges that when ASC’s predecessor sold the note, the note was “treated

by the bank as an asset that could be exchanged for cash,” and that “ASC’s scheduled

foreclosure action is fraudulently double dipping in that the note is an exchangeable instrument

and an asset and the house is an asset.” Compl, at ¶¶ 25, 26. Plaintiff alleges that “ASC is

collecting an exchange and not a loan” and that “this exchange is a criminal conversion.” 

Compl., at ¶¶ 30-31. Plaintiff also alleges that ASC “charges usurious rates on money,” and

“extorts hard-earned dollars in exchange for non-existent money created by touch of computer

keys.” Compl., at ¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiff makes further vague allegations regarding ASC’s

purported violations of the “Monetary Control Act of 1980,” “current cases that are Stari Decisis

[sic],” and, among other things, a publication entitled “Modern Money Mechanics, Federal

Reserve Bank of Chicago.” See, e.g., Compl., at 7:6-28. 

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2

 In lieu of recommending an outright grant of defendant’s motion based on plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the order to show cause, the court finds that the untimeliness and

frivolousness of plaintiff’s opposition(s) serve as an alternate basis for its recommendation of

dismissal. The court otherwise discharges the order to show cause.

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These allegations culminate in plaintiff setting forth two causes of action: (1) fraud, and

(2) a violation of her rights under “the Ninth Article in amendment to the Constitution,” which

defendant, and the court, construe as alleging violations of plaintiff’s purported rights pursuant

to the Ninth Amendment. Compl., at ¶ 62.

Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and

alternatively for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). Plaintiff failed to file a timely

opposition to defendant’s motion. The court therefore ordered plaintiff to show cause for such

failure, and directed her to file an opposition within ten days. See Local Rule 78-230(b) (timing

of opposition). The court cautioned plaintiff that failure to respond to the order or to file an

opposition would be deemed a statement of non-opposition, and would result in a

recommendation that defendant’s motion be granted. Plaintiff did not timely respond to the

order, but did eventually file an opposition – more than twenty days after she was ordered to do

so.2

 Despite plaintiff’s failure to abide by this court’s order, the court has reviewed the

opposition, which, as discussed below, confirms that defendant’s motion to dismiss should be

granted.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint should only be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v.

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). Dismissal may be

based either on the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to

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support cognizable legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex. Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976);

Church of Scientology of California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1984). The court construes

the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor.

Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In a case

where plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court has an obligation to construe the pleadings

liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the

court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of a claim

that are not plead. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, “[t]he court is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted

deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

B. Application

1. Ninth Amendment

One of plaintiff’s two causes of action is premised on defendant’s alleged violations of

her constitutional rights under the Ninth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that foreclosure of the

subject property is a violation of her rights under “the Ninth Article in amendment to the

Constitution” – specifically her “right of privacy” and to her “right to enjoy private property, and

for the protection against fraud.” Compl., at ¶ 62. 

The Ninth Amendment does not independently create a constitutional right for purposes

of stating a claim. Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing

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 The Ninth Amendment states, “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,

shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” It has been argued

that the Ninth Amendment protects rights not enunciated in the first eight amendments. See

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Wise v. Bravo, 666

F.2d 1328, 1332 (10th Cir.1981). “Nevertheless, the ninth amendment has never been recognized

as independently securing any constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim.” 

Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 748.

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Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986)).3

 It is “not a source of rights as

such; it is simply a rule about how to read the Constitution.” San Diego County Gun Rights

Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American

Constitutional Law 776 n.14 (2d ed. 1988)) (emphasis in original). 

Even if the Ninth Amendment did create a constitutional right for purposes of stating a

claim, plaintiff has not, nor can she, allege that defendant is a state actor for purposes of making

out a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

“The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is. . .

[whether] the alleged infringement of federal rights [is] fairly attributable to the government.” 

Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he party

charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a governmental

actor.” Sutton, 192 F.3d at 835 (citation and quotations omitted). Section “1983 excludes from

its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrong.” Id. (citing American

Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant is a private entity – a California corporation – and

does not, and cannot, allege that it is a governmental actor for purposes of § 1983. Compl., at 

¶ 4. Accordingly, her cause of action brought pursuant to the Ninth Amendment must be

dismissed without leave to amend.

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2. Fraud

With regard to plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud, she alleges that:

ASC falsely represented that INJURED owe “loaned” money and

has collected money on an adulterated note that before it was

adulterated it paid for the exchange of money and has failed to

inform INJURED that the note was adulterated after INJURED

signed it and that INJURED don’t owe any more money beyond

the already made exchange as per Stari Decisis prevailing case

law.

Compl., at ¶ 47. 

Plaintiff’s allegations of alleged fraud surrounding the promissory note executed to

secure financing for her property are vague, confusing, and largely unintelligible. Defendant

moves to dismiss this claim for failure to allege fraud with the required particularity pursuant to

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 A complaint alleging fraud must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). That rule provides, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must

state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice intent,

knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(b). 

“To avoid dismissal for inadequacy under Rule 9(b), [a] complaint would need to state

the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the

parties to the misrepresentation.” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal quotations omitted); see also Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir.

1993) (“The complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places, benefits received, and

other details of the alleged fraudulent activity.”). 

Plaintiff fails to state any of these necessary elements, let alone with the particularity

required under Rule 9(b). The allegations are so vague that is nearly impossible to discern the

basic facts surrounding the purported fraud. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to clarify her

allegations through either of the documents submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion to

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dismiss. 

The court notes that plaintiff filed two documents in apparent opposition to defendant’s

motion to dismiss. The first, entitled “Amended Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike

Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss and Amended Motion for Final Judgment on the

Pleadings with Proposed Order,” invokes the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, alleges that defense

counsel are not licensed to practice law, and asserts that plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the

pleadings, or default judgment, because defendant did not file an answer to the complaint. The

second document, styled “Opposition to America’s Servicing Company’s Reply to Plaintiff’s

Amended Responses to Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, a More Definitive Statement,” 

again attacks defense counsel’s eligibility to practice law, and asserts that defendant’s motion

should not be granted, because, among other things, it is unsupported by an affidavit. 

Both “oppositions” merely muddy the water of her already murky complaint and, instead

of attacking the merits of defendant’s motion, present only frivolous arguments against it. For

example, plaintiff’s assertion that the motion to dismiss should be “stricken” because it is not

supported by an affidavit, is misplaced. Plaintiff misunderstands the nature of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, which merely attacks the sufficiency of the complaint. Defendant does not present any

facts beyond those alleged in the complaint, and thus the motion need not be converted to one for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 

Plaintiff has also asserted that defense counsel are not entitled to practice law. She

makes the curious claim that defense counsel are “foreign agents” “owing allegiance to a foreign

power,” i.e., the Crown of England, and therefore should not be permitted to represent defendant. 

See Pl.’s Opp’n, at 10-11 (docket no. 12). The allegations are facially frivolous. Moreover, the

court takes notice that defense counsel are, in fact, licensed to practice law. See Def.’s Req. for

Jud. Ntc. (docket no. 9) (attaching documents from the State Bar of California’s database

showing that the attorneys are indeed eligible to practice law); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (requiring

acceptance of facts “subject to reasonable dispute”); In re Tyrone F. Conner Corp., Inc., 140

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B.R. 771, 781-82 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Cal. ex rel. RoNo, L.L.C. v. Altus Fin. S.A., 344 F.3d 920,

931 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff’s oppositions also attempt to invoke the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, refer to

numerous, uncontextualized legal citations, and request judgment on the pleadings, or default

judgment, based on defendant’s failure to file an answer. Plaintiff again misinterprets or ignores

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not require a responsive pleading to be filed until

the court has ruled on defendant’s Rule 12(b) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). 

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which

relief may be granted, and recommends dismissal on that basis. Further, plaintiff’s claims, and

arguments in opposition to dismissal, are patently frivolous. The court recommends that the

dismissal be without further leave to amend. As evidenced by plaintiff’s complaint and the

failure of her (untimely) oppositions to address the merits of defendant’s motion, the court finds

that amendment would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal

of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper where amendment would be futile). 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s May 14, 2007, Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss be granted without leave

to amend; and,

2. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

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District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 15, 2008.

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