Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02593/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02593-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0402 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDA GUZMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv2593-CAB-AGS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES [Doc. No. 32]

On December 20, 2018, this Court issued an order granting Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. [Doc. No. 

30.] On March 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. [Doc. No. 32.] On 

April 19, 2019, Defendant filed an opposition to the motion. [Doc. No. 36.] On April 25, 

2019, Plaintiff filed a reply to the opposition. [Doc. No. 37.] After a careful review of 

the submissions of the parties, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has submitted an application for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, (“EAJA”) 28 U.S.C. section 2412. Defendant opposes the motion 

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on the grounds that the fees requested are unreasonable. The Court grants Plaintiff's 

application, as set forth below.

The EAJA shifts the burden of attorney's fees from the private litigant to the 

government in order to reduce the chance that the expense of legal representation will 

deter defense against unreasonable government action. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 

580, 582 (9th Cir.1984). “[A] litigant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs if (1) [s]he is 

the prevailing party, (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially 

justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust, and (3) the requested 

attorney's fees and costs are reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Carbonell v. INS, 

429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th 

Cir.2002)) (further citation omitted).

A. Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

An applicant for Social Security benefits who receives a remand under sentence 

four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant 

later succeeds in obtaining the requested benefits. Shalala v. Shaefar, 509 U.S. 292, 302, 

113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993); Garnica v. Astrue, 378 Fed. Appx. 680, 681 

(9th Cir. 2010). The Court remanded this action to the ALJ pursuant to sentence four of 

42 U.S.C. section 405(g). [Doc. No. 30 at 19-20.] Plaintiff is therefore a prevailing party. 

See Shalala, 509 U.S. at 302.

B. The Commissioner does not argue that her position was substantially justified.

The government bears the burden of showing that its position was, as a whole, 

substantially justified. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.2001) 

(“Gutierrez II ”). To meet this standard, the government must advance a position that is 

“justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a 

reasonable person.” Le v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.2008) (citation and 

internal quotations omitted). In making this determination, a court “must focus on two 

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questions: first, whether the government was substantially justified in taking its original 

action; and, second, whether the government was substantially justified in defending the 

validity of the action in court.” Gutierrez II, 274 F.3d at 1258–59 (quotations, citations, 

and modifications omitted). The Commissioner must show that his position was 

substantially justified “with respect to the issue on which the court based its remand.” 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir.1995). It is an abuse of discretion to find 

“that an agency's position was substantially justified when the agency's position was 

based on violations of ... the agency's own regulations....” Gutierrez II, 274 F.3d at 1259–

60 (citing Mendenhall v. NTSB, 92 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.1996)).

Here, the Commissioner does not argue that her position was substantially justified 

or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

C. The requested attorney's fees are reasonable.

Plaintiff's counsel seeks an order awarding a total of $117,132.11 in attorney's 

fees.

1 That amount accounts for 5 hours of attorney time at the 2017 rate of $196.79 per 

hour, 77 hours of attorney time at the 2018 rate of $201.60, and 3.1 hours of attorney 

time at the 2019 rate of $201.60 per hour. The Commissioner argues that the number of 

hours Plaintiff's attorneys claim to have spent litigating this action is unreasonable. 

Specifically, the Commissioner asserts that the work could have been accomplished in 

48.8 hours and suggests an award of $10,418.83. [Doc. No. 36 at 8.]

The EAJA directs the court to award reasonable fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

In determining whether a fee is reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the 

reasonable hourly rate, and the results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 

154 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), abrogated on other grounds 

by Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, (1989); 

 

1 Plaintiff states that she is not seeking any fees for preparing the reply to the motion for attorneys fees.

[Doc. No. 37 at 4.]

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Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 515 (9th 

Cir.2000); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.1998).

Here, the Commissioner does not dispute the reasonableness of the rates, but rather 

the number of hours expended. The Court finds that the requested rates, based upon the 

EAJA rates found on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals website, are reasonable.

As to the number of hours expended, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted detailed 

billing records showing the number of hours expended for each task. [Doc. No. 32 at 9 -

15.] The Commissioner disputes the reasonableness of the hours spent on particular tasks 

and then suggests what she thinks would have been a reasonable amount of time for each 

task. [Doc. No. 36 at 6-8.] However, the Court sees no reason to dispute Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s representation that all hours were reasonably expended. The Administrative 

Record in this case was over 1100 pages long, and Plaintiff had complicated mental and 

physical health diagnoses, all of which had to be evaluated against Social Security 

regulations and guidelines. Given the complexity of the matter, as well as the fact that 

Plaintiff’s counsel submitted over 56 pages of briefing in this matter (not including the 

motion for attorneys’ fees), 82.1 hours of attorney time is not unreasonable. See 

Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 

D. Payment of EAJA fees.

The Commissioner asserts that any EAJA fees awarded must be made payable to 

Plaintiff, not to her attorney. [Doc. No. 36 at 8, citing Astrue v. Ratliff (“Astrue”), 130 

S.Ct. 2521, 2528 (2010).] Plaintiff does not disagree the standard in Astrue applies, but 

requests that if Plaintiff does not owe a government debt that qualifies for offset, then 

payment should be made in the name of her attorney. [Doc. No. 37 at 4.] Pursuant to 

Astrue, if the government determines Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the 

government shall cause the payment of the award to be made directly to Plaintiff’s 

attorney. 

/ / / / / 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount 

of $17,132.11 is GRANTED. If the government determines Plaintiff does not owe a 

federal debt, then the government shall cause the payment of the award to be made 

directly to Plaintiff’s attorney. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 29, 2019

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