Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02455/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02455-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JUDAH ALVEY and TONI-REED ALVEY, ) No. 2:09-cv-02455-REJ

husband and wife, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) OPINION AND ORDER

)

SCOTTSDALE HEALTHCARE CORP., )

an Arizona corporation, )

)

Defendant. )

Philip Jeffrey Nathanson

NATHANSON LAW FIRM

8765 E. Bell Road, Suite 101

Scottsdale, AZ 85260

 Attorney for Plaintiffs

Ronald J. Stolkin

FENNEMORE CRAIG PC

3003 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2600

Phoenix, AZ 85012-1627

 Attorney for Defendant

Case 2:09-cv-02455-REJ Document 53 Filed 08/24/11 Page 1 of 13
JONES, Judge:

Plaintiffs Judah Alvey (“plaintiff”) and his wife, Toni-Reed Alvey, bring this civil rights

action against plaintiff’s former employer, defendant Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., alleging

claims for sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, religious discrimination, and retaliation

under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff has exhausted his remedies and received a

right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

Defendant now moves for summary judgment (# 45) on all of plaintiff’s claims. I have

thoroughly reviewed the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons explained

below grant defendant’s motion in its entirety.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise specified. Relevant and material

disputed facts are addressed as necessary below.

Plaintiff is a white Jewish male of Hispanic national origin. In August 2007, Gary

Purcell, a Security Supervisor II and the Area Lead Officer for defendant’s Osborn Campus, and

William Self, the third shift Security Supervisor for the Osborn Campus, interviewed plaintiff for

potential employment as a Hospital Security Officer with defendant. During plaintiff’s

interview, Purcell asked plaintiff if he was Jewish. Plaintiff’s Controverting Statement of Facts

(“P’s SOF”), Exhibit 10, Deposition of William Self (“Self Depo.”), p. 15. Purcell and Self hired

plaintiff as a Hospital Security Officer on September 17, 2007.

Plaintiff first worked at defendant’s Osborn Campus, where Self directly supervised him. 

Purcell supervised both Self and plaintiff. Declaration of Gary Purcell (“Purcell Dec.”), ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff’s interactions with Self are central to his sexual harassment and religious discrimination

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and harassment claims. In his sexual harassment claim, plaintiff alleges that Self grabbed

plaintiff’s head and tried to force it into Self’s crotch during a training session. Plaintiff’s

Complaint, ¶ 9. Purcell states that on November 30, 2007 plaintiff told him that this event

occurred on October 22, 2007. Purcell Dec., ¶ 7. Plaintiff does not dispute that date, nor does he

offer an alternative date on which the alleged incident might have occurred.

Self gave plaintiff several negative performance write-ups during his employment at the

Osborn Campus, although plaintiff disputes that he performed unsatisfactorily. Self gave

plaintiff his first write-up on November 18, 2007, for being 30 minutes late to a security shift

meeting. On November 22, 2007, Self counseled plaintiff on the proper procedure for checking

security on the first floor. On November 29, 2007, Self issued plaintiff a Verbal Performance

Improvement Recommendation/Counseling form, which stated that plaintiff exhibited continuing

difficulties properly completing department paperwork, following shift policies, responding to

priority calls and properly using his security radio. The next day, November 30, plaintiff

complained to Purcell that Self was hassling and harassing him because he was not one of the

“good ol’ boys” and was not like the other security officers. Purcell Dec., ¶ 5. At some

unspecified point before plaintiff transferred to the Shea Campus in January 2008, Self told

plaintiff that he (Self) had been a member of the “boot boys” or “black boot boys” in high school,

which plaintiff understood to be an anti-Semitic group. Defendant’s Statement of Facts (“D’s

SOF”), Exhibit 1 (Deposition of Judah Alvey) (“D’s Alvey Depo.”)), p. 85. 

On December 13, 2007, Self completed a Staff Member Performance Appraisal of 

plaintiff after his first 90 days on the job. In the appraisal, Self gave plaintiff an overall rating of

“fully competent,” or a “3” out of a possible “4.” Declaration of William Self (“Self Dec.”),

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Exhibit E (Staff Member Performance Appraisal), p. 1. In the “staff member comment” portion

of the appraisal, plaintiff reviewed Self positively, but explains that he felt intimidated while 1

writing his comment because Self was “practically standing over [him].” P’s SOF, Exhibit 1

(Deposition of Judah Alvey (P’s Alvey Depo.”)), p. 5.2

On January 10, 2008, Self issued plaintiff a “Verbal Counseling/Warning” after plaintiff

was dispatched to one area and allegedly responded to a different area. Self Dec., ¶ 9, Exhibit F

(Verbal Counseling Warning). On January 11, 2008, plaintiff gave Self a written response in

which he contested the warning, and asked Self to read and sign it. Self told him that he would

not sign it because he did not agree with it. 

On January 23, 2008, in relation to the alleged “crotch incident,” plaintiff filed assault

charges against Self with the Scottsdale Police Department. Defendant alleges, and plaintiff does

not dispute, that around this time Purcell informed a man named “Smith,” presumably a person

with managerial authority who worked for defendant, that he thought Self and plaintiff should be 3

separated. Purcell Dec., ¶ 12.

After consulting with Purcell and Frank Kroll, the Area Lead Officer at the Shea Campus,

Smith decided to transfer plaintiff from the Osborn Campus to the Shea Campus and transfer

another officer from the Shea Campus to the Osborn Campus. Id. Although the transfer was not

Plaintiff wrote: “[Self] is a great supervisor and constantly encouraged me to 1

pursue excellence. He has never made me feel that I couldn’t achieve my goals. It has/is a

pleasure & privilege to serve on the hospital security team.” Staff Member Performance

Appraisal, p. 5. 

The page number is of the exhibit, not the deposition. 2

No party identifies who “Smith” is and what his position was. 3

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official until February 3, 2008, plaintiff began working at the Shea Campus on January 22, 2008. 

Plaintiff’s transfer did not change his wages or hours, although plaintiff states that Self told him

that it was a disciplinary transfer. D’s Alvey Depo., pp. 85-86. After the transfer, plaintiff’s

supervisors were Kroll and Rowan Sutton, the Security Supervisor at the Shea Campus.

On January 25, 2008, plaintiff met with Carol Lynn Hill, the then-Manager of Employee

Relations at the Shea Campus. Plaintiff asserts that during the meeting he made harassment and

discrimination claims against Self. P’s SOF, Supplemental Facts, ¶ 8; Exhibit 7 (Alvey Events),

p. 2. Hill states that plaintiff showed up at her office unannounced and that she did not believe at

the time that plaintiff was making a complaint or asking her to take any action. Declaration of

Carol Lynn Hill, ¶ 3.

Between January 2008 and July 2008, no incidents took place. Between August 2008 and

November 2008, however, plaintiff was involved in several incidents with co-workers. On

August 22, 2008, plaintiff got into an argument with another security officer, Brian Krek. During

this argument, Krek allegedly made several profane statements to plaintiff and plaintiff then put

his finger on Krek’s chest. P’s SOF, Exhibit 6 (Dispatch Office Incident Memorandum), pp. 1-2. 

The parties dispute whether plaintiff merely touched Krek or whether the contact was forceful or

threatening in nature. In late September 2008, plaintiff claimed that co-worker Villa gave him an

improper smoking citation. 

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Meanwhile, on September 8, 2008 plaintiff filed a charge of racial and religious

harassment and discrimination as well as unlawful retaliation with the EEOC. Defendant

contends that it received a copy of the filing on September 17 or 18, 2008.4

On November 20, 2008, plaintiff met with John Donahue of Human Resources (“HR”)

and Senior HR Consultant Shannon Wainman concerning his participation in department teambuilding courses. Plaintiff states that Donahue told him “[i]f you don’t like what’s going on

around her[e], why don’t you go work somewhere else.” Alvey Events, p. 3; D’s Alvey Depo.,

pp. 146-47. 

On December 1, 2008, plaintiff and Villa engaged in a heated argument after they both

responded to an important dispatch call involving a possible child abduction (referred to in the

briefs as the “code pink incident”). After Villa notified Sutton via radio that he and plaintiff

were engaged in a heated argument, Sutton ordered them into his office to discuss the dispute. 

Plaintiff and Villa continued to argue and speak over one another, so Sutton determined the

meeting was not productive and ended it. Plaintiff walked out of Sutton’s office but returned in a

few seconds and said something to Villa that Sutton interpreted as a threat. Sutton twice ordered

5

plaintiff to leave the office. Sutton then sought Kroll’s guidance on what should be done. Kroll

instructed Sutton to send plaintiff home and to have him report to Kroll the following morning.

Defendant mentions both dates. Compare D’s SOF, ¶ 39 (September 17), with 4

D’s SOF, Exhibit 4, ¶ 6 (September 18). 

Plaintiff states that he said: “If I ever saw him driving around with the janitorial 5

girl in the car and responding to an incident, that I would be reporting him.” P’s Alvey Depo.,

p. 92. Sutton, however, stated in a post-incident report that he heard plaintiff say: “If I ever see

you on the street driving your car.” Declaration of Frank Kroll, ¶ 8, Exhibit C (Rowan Sutton

Security Services Report), p. 2. 

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On December 2, 2008, plaintiff met with Kroll and Martin Whitfield, a senior security

officer, regarding the incident with Villa. Plaintiff was placed on paid suspension pending an

investigation. That same day John Donahue made the decision to terminate plaintiff’s

employment for threatening Villa. Plaintiff was terminated on December 8, 2008.

Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed his termination through defendant’s internal

appeal process. Plaintiff then filed this action in the Arizona federal district court on March 18,

2011.

STANDARD

Summary judgment should be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the moving

party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the non-moving party must go

beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A scintilla of evidence, or evidence that is merely colorable or not

significantly probative, does not present a genuine issue of material fact. United Steelworkers of

America v. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989).

The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Reasonable doubts as to the existence of a

material factual issue are resolved against the moving party. T.W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at

631. Inferences drawn from facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Id. at 630-31. 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 2:09-cv-02455-REJ Document 53 Filed 08/24/11 Page 7 of 13
DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims, contending that (1) 

certain of plaintiff’s claims are barred by a 180-day statute of limitations; and (2) plaintiff cannot

establish that he was subjected to actionable sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, religious

discrimination, or retaliation. Plaintiff, in turn, contends that the limitations period is 300, not

180 days; that the limitations period does not apply under a continuing violations theory; and

there are sufficient factual disputes in relation to his claims to preclude summary judgment.

I. Statute of Limitations

Title VII establishes two general time limitation periods within which a plaintiff must file

an administrative charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); MacDonald v. Grace

Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2006). Generally, a Title VII plaintiff must file

an administrative charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the last act of alleged discrimination. 

MacDonald, 457 F.3d at 1081-82. The limitations period is extended to 300 days if a plaintiff

“has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Defendant contends that the 180-day limitation period applies to plaintiff’s discrimination

claims because he did not initially institute proceedings with the Arizona Civil Rights Division

(“ACRD”). That argument does not take into account the effect of the work-sharing agreement

in place between the EEOC and the ACRD, which neither party discusses. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.

Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988), for a general discussion of work-sharing

agreements. 

In this case, plaintiff admits that he did not file a charge of discrimination with the

ACRD. He also concedes that alleged incidents occurring up through the end of October 2007

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are time-barred for purposes of liability. See D’s SOF, ¶¶ 70, 76, and P’s SOF, ¶¶ 70, 76. 

Defendant, in turn, states that it is “using the 300 day time period for purposes of this Motion,”

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11 n.4; consequently this court will consider

events within the 300-day time period for purposes of liability, i.e., events occurring after

November 13, 2007. And as plaintiff correctly points out, time-barred events may be considered

as evidence to support timely events. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.

101, 103 (2002). 

6

II. Sexual Harassment, Hostile Sexual Work Environment, and Sex Discrimination Claims

a. Sexual Harassment

Plaintiff contends that Self grabbed his head and tried to force it into Self’s crotch during

a training session, purportedly on October 22, 2007. Defendant has submitted evidence that Self

and plaintiff did not work together between October 19 and October 31, 2007, which plaintiff has

not disputed. See D’s SOF ¶ 13; P’s SOF, ¶ 13; see also Purcell Dec., ¶ 8, Exhibit B (plaintiff’s

time records), and Exhibit C (Self’s time records). Assuming, however, that the event happened

at all, it is time-barred for purposes of liability. Summary judgment on this claim is, therefore,

appropriate.

b. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff also alleges a claim of hostile work environment based on the so-called “crotch

event.” Claims based on a hostile environment “will not be time barred so long as all acts which

constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls

I find that plaintiff’s “continuing violation” theory lacks factual support sufficient 6

to establish the necessary company-wide, systematic, discriminatory practice. See Lyons v.

England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).

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within the time period.” National R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 127. Plaintiff describes

other conflicts he had with Self, yet he fails to offer evidence of any other incident of sexual

harassment. Because it appears that plaintiff’s hostile work environment sexual harassment

claim is based, at best, on an isolated incident that may or may not have occurred and that is, in

any event, time-barred, summary judgment on this claim is appropriate.

c. Sex Discrimination

Plaintiff also asserts, based on an alleged statement by a female officer, Officer

Schroeder, that he was discriminated against based on sex because similarly situated females

were treated more favorably than he was treated. Plaintiff admits that the statement is hearsay,

7

and has made no effort to explain how or why that statement would be admissible at trial. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, 2010 Amendments, Advisory Committee Notes (“burden is on the proponent

to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is

anticipated”). Plaintiff concedes that other than the inadmissible evidence concerning Officer

Schroeder, he makes no claim that any other women received more favorable treatment than he

because of gender or sex. D’s Alvey Depo., p. 122. Consequently, summary judgment on this

claim is appropriate. 

III. Religious Discrimination

Plaintiff points to only two incidents to support his claim of religious discrimination. The

first, which is time-barred for purposes of liability, is that during his job interview, Purcell asked

him if he was Jewish. Of course, plaintiff was in fact hired for the job.

See D’s SOF, ¶¶ 72-74; P’s SOF, ¶¶ 72-74. 7

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The second incident is that at some point, Self allegedly told plaintiff that in high school,

he had been one of the “black boot” or “boot” boys. D’s Alvey Depo., p. 85. From that, plaintiff

believed that Self “hated [him] because [he] was Jewish.” Id.

Even accepting both incidents as timely, plaintiff offers nothing more in support of his

religious discrimination claim. In particular, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence, as part

of his prima facie case, that similarly situated non-Jewish employees were treated more favorably

than he was treated. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Indeed,

a fair review of the record in this case reveals no evidence, let alone a scintilla of evidence, that

plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because he is Jewish. Summary

judgment is, therefore, appropriate on this claim. 

IV. Retaliation

Plaintiff contends that he was terminated in retaliation for having filed a complaint with

the EEOC on September 8, 2008, and for making internal discrimination complaints to HR in

January 2008. See Complaint, ¶¶ 11-14; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion, p. 6. 

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee for opposing an

unlawful employment practice. Retaliatory discharge claims follow the same burden-shifting

framework described in McDonnell Douglas: To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, 

plaintiff must prove (1) that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse

employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2007). The causal

link can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the employer's knowledge of the

protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse

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action. Id. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden shifts to

the defendant employer to offer evidence that the challenged action was taken for legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons. See Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th

Cir.1996). If the employer provides a legitimate explanation for the challenged decision, plaintiff

must show that defendants’ explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible discrimination. 

See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).

It is beyond dispute that plaintiff’s complaints about perceived discrimination qualify as

protected activity, and that his termination qualifies as an adverse employment action. 

With respect to causation, plaintiff relies on the temporal proximity between his

complaint to the EEOC on September 8, 2008, which defendant received on September 17 or 18,

2008, and his termination on December 8, 2008. In the Ninth Circuit, “causation can be inferred

from timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected

activity.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002):

But timing alone will not show causation in all cases; rather, in order to support

an inference of retaliatory motive, the termination must have occurred fairly soon

after the employee’s protected expression.

Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

In this case, there is a gap of less than three months between September 17 or 18, when

defendant received plaintiff’s EEOC charge, and December 8, 2008, when he was terminated. 

Under Ninth circuit precedent, that timing may be sufficient to give rise to an inference of

causation and establish plaintiff’s prima facie case.

The court need not make a definitive ruling on timing, however, because even if plaintiff

has made his prima facie case, his claim does not survive under McDonnell Douglas because he

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has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating pretext. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065 n.10. 

Defendant has submitted evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for plaintiff’s discharge;

specifically, plaintiff’s intervening argument with and threatening behavior toward his co-worker

Villa, which took place in the presence of plaintiff’s supervisor one day before Donahue made

the decision to terminate him. Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to show that defendant did

not believe its reason for termination, did not believe plaintiff’s behavior was threatening, or that

the reasons given are unworthy of credence. As explained in Villiarimo, at summary judgment, a

court “need not draw all possible inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor, but only all reasonable ones.” 

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065 n.10 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

 I conclude that plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable

fact finder to find that defendant’s proffered reason for plaintiff’s termination was a pretext for

unlawful retaliation. Accordingly, summary judgment on the retaliation claim is appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (# 45) is GRANTED on all claims. Any

other pending motions are denied as moot, and this action is dismissed with prejudice. 

DATED this 24th day of August, 2011.

 /s/ Robert E. Jones 

ROBERT E. JONES

U.S. District Judge

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