Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01420/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01420-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL SALCIDO,

CDCR #J-81054,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WARDEN PARAMO; CHIEF MEDICAL 

OFFICER; PUGA; C/O SANCHEZ; 

UNITED RENTALS ATV; SGT. 

ALVAREZ; CDCR APPEALS 

COORDINATOR; C/O CRAWFORD,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01420-LAB-JLB

ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) AND § 1915A(b)(1)

I. Procedural History

Paul Salcido (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the California Medical 

Facility (“CMF”) located in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, initially filed a 

civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eastern District of 

California. On July 29, 2019, United States Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone determined 

that the events giving rise to the claims found in Plaintiff’s Complaint occurred when he 

was previously housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) and 

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transferred the entire action to the Southern District of California. (ECF No. 2.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence 

a civil action at the time he filed his Complaint; instead, he later filed a Motion to Proceed 

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 6.)

On August 28, 2019, this Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and 

simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. (See ECF No. 7 at 8-9.) 

Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the deficiencies 

of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (See id.) Plaintiff was cautioned that 

“[d]efendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived.” (Id. citing See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 

pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).)

On January 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

However, he no longer names Defendant Chief Medical Officer in his FAC. Thus, the 

claims against this Defendant are deemed waived.

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 

claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 

purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 

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bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

C. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

On June 17, 2017, Defendant Sanchez instructed Plaintiff, along with another 

inmate, to “ride in the back bed area of an ATV utility vehicle.” (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff 

claims Sanchez told him to “hold on because inmates aren’t supposed to ride back there.” 

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(Id.) Plaintiff, as well as the other inmate, were thrown from the vehicle as Sanchez was 

driving the vehicle at approximately thirty miles per hour which Plaintiff contends was a 

“reckless operation of ATV.” (Id.) Plaintiff “tumbled several times, ultimately coming to 

a stop on [his] right side/back area.” (Id.) Sanchez stopped the ATV and asked Plaintiff 

“are you ok?” (Id.) Sanchez also told Plaintiff “don’t move, we’ll get you some help.” 

(Id.) However, Defendant Crawford purportedly “instructed” other inmates to “lift 

[Plaintiff] up and carry [him] to TTA.” (Id.) 

During the examination, it was noted that Plaintiff had “bruising and discoloration” 

on his “right, upper rib area,” as well as his lower back. (Id.) Plaintiff was given “morphine 

for the pain and taken into x-ray.” (Id.) Later, Plaintiff was released and told to “take it 

easy and try to rest and that [he] would be given something for the pain.” (Id.) 

Approximately forty five minutes later, Defendant Alvarez opened Plaintiff’s cell door and 

“asked [him] how [he] was feeling.” (Id.) Plaintiff told him that he was “in a great deal of 

pain” and Alvarez told him to “get some rest.” (Id.) Alvarez also informed Plaintiff that 

he would “send [Plaintiff’s] time card over” so Plaintiff could “sign it to get paid.” (Id.) 

However, that did not happen and Plaintiff is unable to work “due to the extent of [his] 

injuries.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages in the amount of $3,000,000, 

punitive damages in the amount of $3,500,00 and other damages including “lost wages 

(including workman’s compensation) [and] medical bills.” (Id. at 11.)

C. Defendants Paramo and Puga

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Paramo is “responsible for the custody, treatment, 

training . . . of all inmates under his charge.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant 

Puga should be held liable for his “supervisory authority over inmates” at RJD but alleges 

no facts against this Defendant in this body of his FAC. (Id. at 2.) To the extent that 

Plaintiff names either Warden Paramo or Puga as a Defendant and seeks to hold them liable 

in their supervisory capacity, he has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against 

these Defendants. While RJD’s Warden Paramo or Puga may be subject to suit under 

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§ 1983, Plaintiff fails to include “further factual enhancement” to describes when, how, or 

to what extent, Defendants Paramo or Puga personally caused him any injury. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). There is no respondeat superior liability 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993).

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, [Plaintiff] must plead that 

each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 at 676; see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment 

Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff 

must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged 

in” in order to state a claim).

Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be 

granted as to either Warden Paramo or Puga, they must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d 

at 1004.

D. Sergeant Alvarez

Plaintiff also seeks to hold Alvarez liable in his supervisory capacity but he also 

seeks to hold Alvarez liable for alleged “due process” violations by failing to compensate 

him for his lost wages. (FAC at 4, 7.) For the same reasons as set forth above as to 

Defendants Paramo and Puga, the supervisory claims against Defendant Alvarez also fail. 

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim relating to his “lost wages” against 

Alvarez. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that “the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not create a property or liberty interest in prison 

employment.’” Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ingram v. 

Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cir. 1986), and citing Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of 

Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 

1077 (9th Cir. 1997); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986); 

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 

414, 416 (8th Cir. 1986) (“There is no constitutional right to prison wages and any such 

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compensation is by the grace of the state.”). Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate either a 

liberty or property interest in his prison employment arising directly under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.

Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be 

granted as to Alvarez, he must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

E. United Rentals ATV

Plaintiff names this Defendant as the entity that “provid[ed] the vehicle that was 

faulty/unsafe,” see FAC at 2, but he has not alleged any facts to show this Defendant is a

“person acting under color of state law.” See West; 487 U.S. at 48; Sutton v. Providence St. 

Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (party charged with constitutional 

deprivation under § 1983 must be a person who may fairly be said to be a governmental 

actor) (citation and quotations omitted). Private parties, entities, business organizations, or 

institutions do not generally act under color of state law. See Price v. Hawai’i, 939 F.2d 

702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). In fact, section “1983 excludes from its reach merely private 

conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrong.” Sutton, 193 F.3d at 835 (citing Am. Mfrs. 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also Ouzts v. Md. Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[P]urely 

private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not within the protective orbit of section 

1983.”); accord Skylstad v. Reynolds, 248 Fed. App’x 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2007).

Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be 

granted as to United Rentals ATV, this Defendant must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d 

at 1004.

F. CDCR Appeals Director

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “Appeals Director for CDCR” should be held liable 

for “engaging in abuse of discretion by refusing to properly address” the reasons for 

denying Plaintiff’s grievance at the “Director’s Level Review.” (FAC at 2.) However, 

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these allegations without more are insufficient to support any claim for relief under § 1983. 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners do not have a “separate 

constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”) (citation omitted); 

Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due process not violated simply 

because defendant fails properly to process grievances submitted for consideration); see 

also Todd v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 615 Fed. Appx. 

415, 415 (9th Cir. 2015) (district court properly dismissed claim based on improper 

“processing and handling of [...] prison grievances,” since prisoners have no “constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860) 

(quotation marks omitted); Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 Fed. Appx. 545, 547 (9th Cir. 

2014) (district court properly dismissed § 1983 claims against defendants who “were only 

involved in the appeals process”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860). Simply “‘[r]uling 

against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the 

violation.’” Ellington v. Clark, 2010 WL 3001427, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2010) (quoting 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be 

granted as to the CDCR Appeals Director, this Defendant must be dismissed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 

621 F.3d at 1004.

G. Remaining Claims and Defendant

As to Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendants Sanchez and Crawford, 

however, the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC contains Eighth Amendment allegations

sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening 

required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (failure to protect claims under the Eighth 

Amendment require a showing that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive 

risk to inmate health or safety.”).

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H. Leave to Amend

Because the Court has determined that some of Plaintiff’s claims survive the sua 

sponte screening process, the Court will give Plaintiff the opportunity to either: (1) notify 

the Court of the intent to proceed with his Eighth Amendment claims against Sanchez and 

Crawford only; or (2) file an amended pleading correcting all the deficiencies of pleading 

identified by the Court in this Order. Plaintiff must choose one of these options within 

forty-five (45) days from the date this Order is filed. If Plaintiff chooses to proceed as to 

his claims against Sanchez and Crawford only, the Court will issue an Order directing the 

U.S. Marshal to effect service of his FAC and dismiss the remaining claims and defendants.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court DISMISSES all claims against Defendant Chief Medical Officer as 

these claims are deemed waived. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928.

2. The Court DISMISSES all claims against Defendants Warden Paramo, Puga, 

Alvarez, United Rentals ATV, and CDCR Appeals Director for failing to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

3. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this 

Order in which to either: (1) Notify the Court of the intention to proceed with the claims 

against Sanchez and Crawford only; or (2) File an Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself 

without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1546; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928.

4. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to provide Plaintiff with a blank 

copy of its form complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2020

HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS, CHIEF JUDGE

United States District Court

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