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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JESUS BARRIENTOS GARCIA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff/Petitioner, 

v. 

BENNY JOHNSON, and DUANE L. 

WOODARD, Attorney General, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants/Respondents. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

APPEALS 

FILED 

United States O:>urr of Appeals 

Tenth Ci!::uit 

OCT .. 6 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1043 

(D. Colorado) 

(D.C. No. 88-M-618) 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant Jesus Barrientos Garcia was convicted of firstdegree murder in 1981 and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. In 1988, he filed, prose, a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus alleging that: 1) his confession was obtained in a manner 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1043 Document: 01019974296 Date Filed: 10/06/1989 Page: 1 
· violative of his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination because his Miranda "right to remain silent" and 

"right to cut off questioning" were not respected; 2) his trial 

was rendered fundamentally unfair by the trial court's failure to 

give his requested jury instruction regarding motive as an element 

of the crime of murder and the giving of a jury instruction which 

stated that motive was not an element of murder; and 3) his right 

to due process was violated when the trial court failed to grant 

him a continuance when the inculpatory statements which he had 

made to the police came to light thirteen days before trial. The 

district court referred the case to a magistrate who recommended 

denial of the writ. The district court adopted the recommendation 

and denied the writ. Garcia appeals from that denial. 

We affirm the decision of the district court substantially 

for the reasons set out by the Magistrate in his Recommendation, a 

copy of which is attached and incorporated into this order. 

However, we make the following additional comments with 

regard to the first issue listed above. Garcia argues that the 

district court and the Magistrate erred in affording a presumption 

of correctness, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), to the findings 

of fact concerning the confession issue made by the trial court. 

Garcia argues that Fernandez v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 

1985), requires a habeas court to conduct a de novo review of all 

the findings of fact with regard to the con f essio n issue. That is 

a misconception of the role. In Fernandez, we said: 

"[W]hether there was an intelligent waiver of his 

constitutional rights against self-incrimination . 

is a question of law and fact which requires a full 

examination of all the circumstances involved. When 

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such mixed questions of fact and law are presented to 

federal habeas courts, the federal judge need not defer 

to the legal determinations of a state trial judge." 

Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added). See also Ahmad v. Redman, 782 

F.2d 409, 412-13 (3d Cir. 1986). Subsidiary factual issues such 

as the length and circumstances of the interrogation, the 

defendant's prior experience with the legal process and familiarity with the Miranda warnings, and whether the police engaged in 

intimidation tactics, are entitled to the§ 2254(d) presumption of 

correctness. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 117 (1985); 

Ahmad v. Redman, 782 F.2d at 412-13. 

In this case, the Magistrate expressly limited his deference 

to the state court's "subsidiary factual findings" and not to 

whether the confession was voluntarily given or whether Garcia 

knowingly and intentionally waived his Miranda rights. Garcia 

neither argues that any of the exceptions enumerated in 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2254(d)(l)-(8) should apply nor gives us any other reason why 

the findings below were not correct. 

Garcia argues on appeal, as well as in his Objections to the 

Magistrates Recommendations (hereinafter "Objections"), that his 

right to cut off questioning established by Miranda was violated. 

This right, established as a "critical safeguard" of the right to 

remain silent, Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975), must 

be "scrupulously honored" and requires the pol ice immediately to 

cease the interrogation of a suspect when the suspect "indicates 

in any manner, at any time during questioning, that he 

wishes to remain silent." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-

74 (1966) (emphasis added). See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 

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at 100. Garcia seems to argue that by remaining silent he invoked 

his right to remain silent and to cut off questioning. We 

disagree. 

First of all, Garcia did not remain silent as a way to 

indicate his refusal to answer questions. He was advised of his 

Miranda rights on two different occasions. Garcia concedes that 

on both occasions he acknowledged that he understood his rights 

under Miranda and when he was thereafter asked if he wanted to 

waive those rights, gave no response to the officer. Brief of 

Appellant, Objections at 3-4. See also R. Vol. I at Tab 5, page 

2, 6 (Recommendation by United States Magistrate, citing People v. 

Garcia, 690 P.2d 869 (Colo. App. 1984)); R. Vol. II, vol. 3e, pp. 

9-11, 40-41). After he acknowledged that he understood his rights 

and failed to respond to the officer's question regarding the 

waiver of his rights, "the officer at that juncture and in the 

immediate time frame of having, for the second time, advised him 

of his Miranda rights, asked him the whereabouts of his brother or 

if his brother was in the Laredo area, to which [Garcia] responded 

and, subsequent thereto in that brief period of time, proceeded to 

give further [incriminating] information to the officer .••• " 

R. Vol. I at Tab 5 (Recommendations at p. 6, citing Trial Court 

Transcript, R. Vol. II, vol. 3e, p. 41). Garcia's silence was in 

response to a question regarding his Miranda rights, not one 

concerning the crime itself. See United States v. Obregon, 748 

F.2d 1371, 1381 (10th Cir. 1984) (because questioning regarding 

defendant having been apprised of his constitutional rights was 

not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 

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suspect, such questioning did not amount to "interrogation"). We 

need not decide whether remaining silent in response to questions 

regarding the suspected criminal activity itself can amount to a 

valid invocation of the right to cut off questioning, because it 

is not before us. 

Garcia argues that Christopher v. State of Florida, 824 F.2d 

836 (11th Cir. 1987), controls the facts of this case and should 

have been applied by the Magistrate and the district court. 

Christopher is clearly distinguishable. In Christopher, the 

defendant, after receiving Miranda warnings and answering a number 

of questions, said "I got nothing else to say" two times and 

"[w]hat's the need of me saying anything then" one time. Because 

the police did not stop the interrogation after defendant's 

repeated invocations of his right to silence, the court held that 

the defendant's right to cut off questioning was not scrupulously 

honored. In this case, Garcia never invoked his right to cut off 

questioning. 

Garcia argues that because "an accused's post-request 

responses may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the 

clarity of the initial request itself," Smith v. Illinois, 469 

U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (emphasis in original), the fact that he 

responded to the questions can not be used to undermine his 

initial invocation of the right to remain silent. He also argues 

that even if his assertion of his right to remain silent was 

"equivocal" the police would nonetheless only be able to ask him 

questions to clarify whether he intended to invoke his right to 

remain silent. Because we conclude that Garcia's silence in 

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response to the question concerning the waiver of his Miranda 

rights did not amount to an invocation of his right to cut off 

questioning these arguments are without merit. 

Garcia further argues that his silence did not amount to a 

valid waiver of his right to remain silent. The Supreme Court, in 

Miranda made it clear that "a valid waiver will not be presumed 

simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or 

simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually 

obtained." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475. However, in 

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979), the Supreme 

Court held that the waiver of Miranda rights need not always be 

express: 

"The question is not one of form, but rather whether the 

defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the 

rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was 

unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not 

enough. That does not mean that the defendant's 

silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and 

a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support 

a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. 

The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive 

his rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but in at 

least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the 

actions and words of the person interrogated." 

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 369 (footnote omitted). We 

believe that this is indeed one of these situations. 

In United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 

1980), the defendant did not expressly waive her Miranda rights 

yet the court held that her "subsequent willingness to answer 

questions after acknowledging that she understood her Miranda 

rights is sufficient to constitute an implied waiver under 

Butler." See also Ahmad v. Redman, 782 F.2d at 413-14; Cape v. 

Francis, 741 F.2d 1287 (11th Cir. 1984) (failure affirmatively to 

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invoke right to silence amounts to waiver); United States v. 

Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 49 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v. Foskey, 

636 F.2d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dicta); United States v. 

Stark, 609 F.2d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1979); Farinaro v. Kirk, 675 F. 

Supp. 75, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant effectively waived Miranda 

rights when he was read his rights, indicated his understanding of 

them, and made the incriminating statements shortly thereafter); 

United States v. Huslage, 480 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Pa. 1979) 

(defendants heard Miranda warnings two times). But see United 

States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1985) (merely asking the 

accused if he understood his Miranda rights did not establish 

waiver of right to counsel; Miranda requires the interrogating 

officer to go further and make sure that the accused, knowing his 

rights, voluntarily relinquishes them). 

There is no error in the conclusion below that the statements 

and the waivers by Garcia were "voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently" given. United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866 

(10th Cir. 1986). See also Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 566 

(1987); Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). No force or 

coercion was directed at the accused, United States v. Most, 789 

F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). The accused wanted to turn 

himself in, was read his rights two times, and did not later ask 

for counsel or request that questioning be stopped. See United 

States v. Camacho, 674 F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 

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Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 89-1043 Document: 01019974296 Date Filed: 10/06/1989 Page: 8 
IN THE UNITED ST A TES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Civil Action No. 88-M-618 

JESUS BARRIENTOS GARCIA, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

BENNY JOHNSON and 

( 

F I LED 

OCT 12938 

JMlfS R. MANSPE,\KER 

ay _______ 2f Cl.£RK _ 

) THE STATE OF COLORADO, 

) 

Respondents. 

RECOMMENDATION BY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

Petitioner Jesus Barrientos Garcia, while incarcerated at the Centennial - ,_ 

Correctional FaclUty, brought this habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254. 

Petitioner a.lieges that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, 

by the Colorado state trial court which convicted him, in connection with admission 

of evidence and a disputed jury instruction. 

Pursuant to Local Rule 605 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado, this matter was referred to Magistrate 

Richard B. Harvey. After review of the Petition, respondents' Answer to Order to Show . - Cause flled May 18, 1988, respondents' Errata and Supplemental Authorities filed October 

J, 1988 and the trial transcripts for People v. Garcia, Jefferson County District Court 

Case No. 8ICR399, (hereafter "Trial Court Transcript 11 ), this Magistrate enters the 

following conclusions of law and recommended order for denial of the Petition. 

On December 18, 1981, petitioner was convicted by the Jefferson County 

District Court pursuant to a jury verdict for committing first-degree murder, and 

petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment (!!,!: Petition, p. 1-21 Respondents' Answer. 

p. li 28 U.S.C. §2248). Petitioner subsequently appealed his conviction to the Colorado 

Court of Appeals. In People v. Garcia, 690 P .2d 869 (Colo. App. 1984), the Colorado 

Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's conviction (~, Respondents' Answer, p. 

1 and Appendix IV,, thereof). In People v. Garcia, No. 84SC225, slip order (Colo. Nov. 

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) 

13, 1984) the Colorado Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for writ of certioari 

to tha~ court (~, Respondents' Answer, p. l and Appendix VII, thereof). I note that 

petitioner has exhausted his state remedies wtth respect co the lnstant Petition allegations 

(see, Respondents' Answer, p. 2, para. no. 5). 

I. ADMISSION OF INCULPATORY STATEMENTS 

In Ground One of the Petition, petitioner alleges that his "conviction [was] 

obtained in violation of priviledge [sic] against self-incrimination, violation of Miranda 

warning." (Petition, p. 6). 

In People v, Garcia, 690 P.2d 869 (Colo. App. 1984), the Colorado Court 

of Appeals described this circumstance as follows: 

On Ma'y 18, 1981, the defendant was arrested on a street in 

Laredo, Texas, after having called the police to turn himself 

In for the Colorado slaying. A Laredo police officer read defendant 

his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest. When asked lf he 

understood hls rights, defendant responded affirmatively, Whlte 

being transported to the police station, defendant spontaneously 

stated that he had hitchhiked to Laredo, after having worked 

at Mercy Hospital for the previous three weeks. 

Before being booked, defendant was again advised of his Miranda 

rights and again, defendant stated that he understood hie rights. 

In response to questions regarding whether he needed a lawyer, 

defendant replied, 11No1 I want to- call my grandmother, advise 

her I turned myself in. I just want to get out of Laredo. 11 

Defendant was then asked about what had happended during 

the incident in Colorado. He stc:.ted that he and his brother had 

been playtng cards with Maestas when Maestas claimed defendant 

had been stealing and pulled out a gun, demanding the return 

of his money. Defendant stated that he then hit Mae1mu, a shot 

went out, and the gun fell from Maestas' hand. However, no 

gun or bullet or bullet holes were ever found. 

Defendant then stated that he "went crazy and just started 

beating on (Maestas] until his brother pulled him off after they 

saw .he was seriously hurt." He said that he and his brother then 

left the apartment and parted ways. The arresting officer then 

asked defendant why he turned himself tn. Defendant responded 

that he "Just couldn't take it anymore. 11 

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Appellate Case: 89-1043 Document: 01019974296 Date Filed: 10/06/1989 Page: 10 
) 

Id., at 871-72, The Colorado Court of Appeals proceeded to conclude as follows: 

Defendant's first argument is that, because the Laredo police 

failed to obtain an express oral or written waiver by defendant 

of hi& right to remain silent, the trial court erred in admitting 

into evidence his May 18, 1981, statements to the Laredo police. 

We disagree. 

We agree with defendant that a valid waiver wUl not be presumed 

simply from the silence or the accused after warnings have been 

given, or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact 

"eventually obtained," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 4.36, 86 

S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 h966h People v. Chavez, 632 P.2d 

574 (Colo. 1982). However, here, the defendant was not silent 

after the warnings were given. Rather, he stated on two separate 

occasions that he understood those rights. In addition, defendant's 

confession was not "eventual" - that ts, it was not the result 

of the type of "lengthy interrogation or incommunicado 

interrogation" to which the Supreme Court referred in Miranda. 

Rather, \ here, defendant 1s confession immediately followed his 

statements that he knew and understood his constitutional right 

to remain silent. 

Contrary to defendant's contention, an expr~ss waiver by a 

defendant of his right to remain silent ls not a necessary 

prerequisite to the admission of that defendant's confession as 

voluntary. To the contrary: 

"Strong and unmistakeable circumstances may upon occasion 

establish an efective equivalent to an express waiver. To 

constitute such a waiver, the attendant facts must show clearly 

and convincingly that the _accused did relinquish his 

constitutional rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 11 

Roybal b. People, 178 Colo. 259, 496 P.2d 1019 (1972). 

The record here shows strong and unmistakable circumstances 

from which it can clearly and convincingly be said that defendant 

knowlngly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional 

rtght to remain silent. 

The record shows that, even before his first contact with Laredo 

police, defend.ant was intent upon confessing to authorities the 

murder which he had committed. Upon his initial contact with 

police, defendant was extremely cooperative and volunteered 

a great deal o{ information before he was even questioned. 

Defendant was twice or thrice advised of hls constitutional rights 

and, on two occasions, defendant specifically stated that he 

understood those rights. The fact that the defendant continued 

to make statements in response to questions immediately after 

he voiced his understanding of his right to remain silent 

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) 

demonstrates that defendant's confession was a result of the 

activity of his own conscience, rather than the result of torture 

or treacherous interrogation against which our Flfth Amendment 

was designed to protect us. 

We perceive no error in the trial court's admission of defendant's 

confession. Defendant cites extensively from Miranda v. Arizona, 

supra. However, the United States Supreme Court, in that 

landmark opinion, cautioned against the hyperextension of the 

holding therein. Specifically, it emphasized that: 

''There is no requirements that police stop a person who enters 

a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a 

crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession 

or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered 

&tatements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment 

and their admissib111ty is not affected by our holding today." 

Therefore, the trial court did not, by denying defendant's 

suppress_ion motion, deprive him of his constitutional rights. 

Ji,, at 872-73. 

In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), the 

Supreme Court stated that ''(f]ederal courts hold no supervisory authority over state 

judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional 

dimenston. 11 .!£_., at 221, 102 S.Ct. 948; ~ also Gaines v. Hess, 662 F .2d 1364, 1368 (10th 

Cir. 1981). Further, an alleged violation of state law or procedure alone does not state 

a cogni:table claim for violation of a federal right. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119, 

102 S.Ct. 1558, 1567, 71 L.Ed.2d 783i ~ also, Brinlee v. CrisE, 608 F .2d 8.39, 843 (10th 

Ctr. 1979), .£!!!· denied, 444 U.S. 1047, 100 S.Ct. 737 (1980). Therefore, any perceived 

irregularity under Colorado state l~w with respect to petitioner's instant conviction 

does not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas corpus relief. 

In Brinlee v. Crisp, supra, the Tenth Circuit stated that 11 [s]tate court rulings 

on the admissibility of evidence may not be questioned in federal habeas corpus 

proceedings unless they render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a dental 

ot federal constitutional rights." .!£_,. 608 F' .2d at 850. ~ also, Valdez v. Wlnas, 7.38 

F .2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1984). In order for this Magistrate to determine whether or 

not petitioner's state trial was rendered fundamentally unfair through the admission 

of evidence concerning petitioner's inculpatory statements, it first must be determined 

whether or not the tnculpatory statements were voluntarily made by petitioner. 

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In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), the 

Supreme Court held that "the ultimate question whether, under the totality of 

circumstances, the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with 

the requirements of the Constitution is a matter for independent federal determination." 

Id., at 112, 106 S.Ct. at 451. See also, United States v. Chalan, 812 P .2d 1302, 1.307 (10th - -- Cir. 1987); see c.f., Phtllips v. Murphy, 796 F.2d 1303, 1306 (10th Ctr. 1986). On a related 

issue, at least one federal circuit court recently has applied the 28 U .S.C. §2254(d) 

presumption of correctness to a state trial court's finding that a defendant had waived 

) his due process rights described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 

L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ~' Perri v. Dlrector 1 Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, 

817 F.Zd 448, 451 (7th Ctr. 1987), ~- denied, 108 S.Ct, 135 (1987). However, in Fernandez 

v. Rodriguez, 761 P.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1985), the Tenth Circuit has held that the question 

o! 11whether there was an intelligent waiver of [a defendant's] constitutional rights against 

self-incrimination •: .. ls a question of law and fact which requires a full examination a 

of all the circumstances involved. When such mixed questions of fact and law are 

presented to federal habeas corpus coTJrts, the federal judge need not defer to the legal 

determinations of a state trial judge," Id., at 561-62. A9cord, Ahman v. Redm.!,n, 782 

F.Zd 409, 413 (3rd Cir. 1986), ~- denied, 107 S.Ct. 119 (1986). ''To be sure, subsidiary 

factual questions, such as •.. whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation 

) tactics alleged by the defendant, are entitled to the §2254(d) presumption, And the 

federal habeas court, should, of course, give great weight to the considered conclusions 

of a coequal state judiciary." .Mtller v. Penton, supra, at 112, 106 S.Ct. at 451 (citations -

omitted), See !!!,£, United States v. Chalan, suera, at 1307. This Magistrate, therefore, 

has refrained from applying the 28 U .S.C. §2254(d) presumption of correctness to the 

ultimate question• of: l) whether petitioner's inculpatory statements were voluntarlly 

glven1 and 2) whether petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional 

rights provided under Miranda v. Arizona, supr!,, 

Review. ot the Trial Court's Transcript of the October 29 and 30, 1981 hearing 

concerning petitioner's motion to suppress admission of evidence, reveals that the 

following subsidiary factual findings were made by the trial court: 

... The Court finds from the facts that, as a part of the booking 

procedures with the police department at Laredo, Texas, that 

Officer Holguin again gave the defendant a full and complete 

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Appellate Case: 89-1043 Document: 01019974296 Date Filed: 10/06/1989 Page: 13 
Miranda advisement, that the defendant understood that 

advisement, that the officer did not in any way give any promises. 

threats or inducements to the defendant at that time and that 

the officer was satisfied that this defendant did, in fact. 

understand the English language and the conversations that were 

going on between the officer and the defendant at the time that 

he was taking the basic information necessary to complete the 

booking process. Again, the defendant acknowledged that he 

understood his rights under Miranda and when asked if he wanted 

to waive those rights, there was no response given to the officer. 

The officer had a wanted flyer that had been distributed to police 

agencies 'by the Lakewood Department of Public Safety and that 

flyer contained not ony the defendant but also his brother, who 

was also a wanted fugitive in this particular charge. The officer, 

at that juncture and in the immediate time frame of having, 

for the· second time. advised him of his Miranda rights. asked 

him the whereabout of his brother or if his brother was in the 

Laredo area, to which the defendant responded to that question 

and, subsequent thereto in that 'brief period of tlme, proceeded 

to give (urther information to the officer which is the statement 

that is be"tng questioned at this time, . . • 

(Trial Court Transcript, Volume .3e, p. 41). 'l'he state trial court's !actual !lndings, as 

set forth above, properly are subject to the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. 

§2254(d) as subsidiary facts. Petitioner has failed to allege or otherwise indicate the 

existence of any reason under 28 U .S.C. §2254(d)(l) thru (8} why those findings should 

) not be presumed correct. This Magistrate, therefore, adopts the presumption of 

correctness with respect to those factual findings. 

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court's ruling in Colorado v. 

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. S15, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), provides a proper basis for 

denial of Ground One of the instant Petition. The facts in Colorado v. Connelly involved 

a man who travelled from Boston to Denver to confess to murder. A defense psychiatrist 

ultimately testified that Connelly was following the "voice of God". The Colorado state 

trial and Supreme Court• determined that such circumstances were inconsistent with 

a requirement of voluntariness for an admissible confession which, they held, had to 

be the product of a defendant's rational intellect and "free will". In reversing the 

Colorado state courts rulings. the Supreme Court of the United States, in Colorado 

v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 163-64, stated that each of the confession cases considered by 

that Court in the last 50 years has focused on the crucial element of police overreaching 

and that 

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) 

) 

• . . Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, 

there is simply no basis for concluding any state actor has deprived 

a criminal defendant of due process of law. 

Id. at 479 U.S. 164. 

In Connelly, su:era 1 the Supreme Court further stated as follows: 

We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate 

to the finding that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning 

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We 

also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements and 

their admission into evidence, constitute no violation of that 

Clause. · 

... 

. . • There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of 

a volunta-riness inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in 

the Fourteenth Amendment confession context. The sole concern 

of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is 

governmental coercion. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege 

is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess 

ernanating from sources other than official coercion. 'fhe 

voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended 

on the absence of police overreaching, not on free choice in 

any broader sense of the word. 

M,,, at 167, 169·70, 107 S,Ct. at 522-23. 

As in Connelly, supra, petitioner here apparently surrendered himself to 

police officials with reference to a crime that he had allegedly perpetrated. Petitioner 

has falled (both here and in the Colorado state courts) to allege any unconstitutional 

overreaching or coercive activity on the part of the arresting L&redo, Texas police, 

and the Colorado state trial court similarly found an absence of pollce misconduct. 

Consequently, it appears that petitioner simply volunteered the lnculpatory information 

with full knowledge that he was under no requirement to do so. 

Based upon the state trial court's factual findings and absent any evidence 

of unconstitutional police activity, this Magistrate concludes that petitioner knowingly 

and intelligently waived his constitutional rights described ln Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 

with respect to the inculpatory statements evidenced at his trial and here at issue. 

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This Magistrate similarly concludes that petitioner's inculpatory statements were . 

voluntarily made, Accordingly, petitioner"s state trial was lli?l rendered fundamentally 

unfair by virtue of the trial court's admission of that evidence, and Ground One of the 

Petition fails to provide an adequate basis for habeas corpus relief, 

JURY INSTRUCTION/CLOSING ARGUMENT 

In Ground Two of the instant Petition, petitioner alleges. '

1

[d)enial of jury 

) instruction informing jury of motive element in Petitioners [sic] charge and illegal jury 

instruction by court .atateing [sic] that the jury will not consider motive in reaching 

verdict.'' (Petition, p. 8). As supporting facts, petitioner alleges the following! 

\ 

I 

Petitioner was forbidden by Court to argue [that] prosecution 

failed tq establish robbery which was prosecutions [sic] theory 

to Jury. ·-Insted [sic], the Court entered Instruction No. 15 which 

basically informed the Jury that it was not necessary that jury 

consider motive and that motlve was not an element to petitioners 

[sic) charge. Petitioner claims that this was prejudicial error. 

(Petition, p. 6). 

In People v. Garcia, 690 P.2d 869 {Colo. App. 1984), the Colorado Court 

of Appeals discussed end ruled on petitioner's Ground Two allegations as follows: 

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred not only 

in instructing the Jury that "motive is not an element of the 

charge of murder in the firat degree," but also in preventing 

defense counsel from arguing to the jury the fact that the 

prosecution dld not prove its theory in its opening statement 

that robbery was defendant's motive for the murder. We find 

no error in either the instruction or the ruling. 

Defendant argues that instructing the jury that motive is not 

an element of first degree murder was improper because it 

highlighed particular evidence in a negative fashion. Defendant 

reasons that since a defendant ls not entitled to an instruction 

highlighting the fact that the People failed to prove motive, 

Armijo v. Peo:Qle, 134 Colo, 344, 304 P,2d 633 (1956), that, . 

therefore, the converse must also be true. However, the converse 

ls not the law. 

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) 

"It ls the duty of the ttial courts to instruct the jury so 

plainly and accurately on the law of the case that they 

may comprehend the principles involved. . . . The 

instructions to the Jury should relate and be confined 

to issues concerning which evidence has been presented 

. • • . Accordingly, the sufficiency of instructions must 

be determined always by the facts of each case .... " 

Rumley v. People, 149 Colo. 132, 368 P.2d 197 (1962). 

Here, defendant was tried on a charge of felony murder, as 

well as a charge of murder by deliberation. In opening argument, 

the district attorney advised the jury that his theory of the case 

as to the felony murder charge was that the defendant killed 

the victim during the course of robbing him. However, once 

the court granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal 

as to the felony murder count, the prosectuion no longer bore 

the burden to prove that the murder was committed in the course 

of or in furtherance of another crime such as robbery. Therefore, 

the instruction given here was not only a correct statement of 

the law _as contained in §18-.3-102, C.R.S. (1978 Repl, Vol. Sh 

but aleo,·-under the facts in this case, it was reasonable in light 

of the Jury's understandable confusion between felony murder 

and murder by deliberation. Therefore, the instruction was 

necessary to the jury's accurate comprehension of the applicable 

law. 

Defendant further asserts that the trial court's ruling prohibiting 

defense counsel from arguing in closing that the prosecution 

had failed to prove the motive of robbery was unconstitutionally 

reatritive. We do not agree. 

"It is fundamental tn Colorado that the scope of final argument 

rests in the sound · discretion of -the trial court • . • which 

[discretion] will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless 

it ls clearly apparent that in so ruling the trial court grossly 

abused it discretion, which abuse resulted in prejudice and a 

denial of justice," People v. Motley, 179 Colo. 77, 498 P.2d 339 

(1972). Here, inasmuch as the felony murder charge was dismissed 

at the close of the evidence, argument on the issue of whether 

robbery had been proven would only have served to divert the 

Jury from the lHues pertinent to first degree murder. See I ABA 

Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard 4-7 .S(d) 

(2d ed. 1982). Hence, the trial court d.id not abuse its discretion 

in precluding argument on this extraneous issue. 

I note that in hls Opening Brief to the Colorado Court of Appeals, petitioner 

acknowledged that "Mr. Garcia would not have been entitled to a Jury instruction pointing 

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out the possible effects of a finding of no motive •. ," (Petitioner's Opening Brlef, 

p. 22, · Attached to Respondents' Answer as Appendix I). Furthermore, review of the 

pertinent portions of the state trial court transcript reveals that defense counsel (ailed 

to tender any jury instruction concerning motive after the trial court rendered its 

Judgment of acquittal on the felony-murder count involving robbery. (~, Trial Court 

Transcript, Volume 6, p, 470-533). Since a prisoner's 11 pro se petition must be held to 

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys\ Brinlee v. Crisp, 

supra, at 855, ~ !!!9_, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 

) 652 (1972), I wUl generally construe Ground Two of the Petition as challenging: 1) the 

trial court's Jury Instruction No. 15 which "tells the jury that motive ls not an element 

of the charge of first· degree murder" (Trial Court Transcript, Volume 6, p. 487)1 and 

2) the trial court's apparent disallowance of 1etense counsel's intended closing argument 

directed at the prosecution's failure to prove the elements of robbery (see, Trial Court 

Transcript, Volume \ ~, p. 505-509). Petitioner appears to have sufficiently exhausted 

his state court remedies with respect to those two issues. See, 28 U.S.C, §2254(b) 

and (c); ~ also, Qureshi v. Diesslin, 654 F. Supp. 555, 557 (0. Colo. 1987). The interest 

of justice would here be best served by simply addressing the merits of . petitioner's 

Ground Two allegations as construed above. ~. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 107 

S.Ct. 1671, 1674M75, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). 

) 

The trial court's Jury lrlstruction No. 15 provides as follows: 

You are further instructed that motive is . not an element of 

the charge of murder in the first degree. The prosecution need 

only show that the defendant after dellberation and with the 

Intent to cause the death of a person other than hirnsel( then 

causes the death of that person. 

(Trial Court Transcript, Volume 1, p. 119). 1 note that the above jury instruction ts not 

inconsistent with the Colorado state first-degree murder statute. See, Colo.Rev.Stat. 

§18-3-102. Due to the trial court's summary acquittal of petitioner on the felonyMmurder 

charge (involving the underlying and alleged speeiftc intent crlme of robbery), the above 

instruction properly would serve to eliminate any jury confusion with respect to the 

dismissed felony•murder charge. "The adequacy ot Jury instructions is determined by 

examining the instructions as a whole." United States v. Skinner, 667 F .2d 1306, 1310 

(9th Cir. 1982), ~- denied, 103 S.Ct. 3569 (1982). Review of the subject jury instructions 

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(particularly Jury Instruction No. 14 which explains first•degree murder) indicates that 

the jur·y was adequately instructed on the charge of first-degree murder (~; Trial 

Court Transcript, Volume 6, p. 101-153). This Magistrate. therefore, agrees with the 

Colorado Court of Appeals decision ln People v. Garcia, 690 P.2d 869, 874-75 (Colo. 

App. 1984) 1 that the trial court's giving of Jury Instruction No. 15 did not constitute 

error. Accordingly, petitioner's trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair by virtue 

of Jury Instruction No. 15. 

With respect to petitioner's allegation that the trial court erred in disallowing 

closing argument directed at the prosecution's failure to prove that petitioner committed 

robbery (see. Petition, p. 8; ~ !!!Q., Trial Court Transcript, Volume 6, p. 505-509), 

I must consider the probable effect of such disallowance on the Jury's ability to judge 

the evidence against petitioner fairly. ~ c.f., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 

12, 105 S.Ct, 1038; :}_044, 84 L.Ed.2d l (1984) (alleged prosecutorial misconduct during 

closing argument at issue); ~ !!!Q., Daniels v. Wood, 819 P .2d 195, 197 (8th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 108 S.Ct, 177 (1987). Further, any perceived irregularity with respect to 

closing argument 11 may not support habeas relief unless it fatally infected the entire 

trial bnd deprived the petitioner of fundamental fairness." Davis v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 

1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1985), ~- denied. 106 S.Ct. 1209 (1986), 

As noted previously in connection with petitioner's Jury instruction challenge. 

after the trial court granted petitioner's _n:iotion for summary acquittal on the 

felony~murder charge (involving the underlying crime of robbery), the issue of whether 

or not petitioner committed a robbery no longer was an issue for the jury to decide. 

Con,equently, any belated argument that defense counsel may have intended on that 

subject would have had no apparent ettect on the jury's ab1Uty to judge the evidence 

presented on the remaining charge of first-degree murder, I therefore conclude that 

the trial court's disallowance of such argument did not fatally Infect petitioner's trial 

or otherwise deprive petitioner of a fundamentally falr trial, 

m. FAILURE to GRANT CONTINUANCE 

In Ground Three or the Petition, petitioner alleges "(d]enlal of petitioners 

[sic] due process [rights], right to counsel, and state stai:ute by t'alllng to grant a 

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) 

continuance after newly established evidence was introduced 13 days before trial.'' 

(Petition, p. 10). I note that the new evidence referred to here consists of the inculpatory 

statements made by petitioner to the arresting Laredo, Texas poltce officer as previously 

discussed in connection with Ground One of the Petition. 

ln People v. Garcia, 690 P.2d 869 (Colo. App. 1984). the Colorado Court 

of Appeals describes the circumstances surrounding petitioner's Ground Three allegations 

as follows: 

On July 29, 1981, defendant ftted a number of pretrial motions, 

including a second motion for discovery. On September 11, 1981, 

the court modified its order of June 19 and required discovery 

to be completed by October 1, 1981. 

On October 1, 1981, the prosecution was informed for the first 

time b)! Laredo authorities that the defendant had made oral 

lnculpatcrry statements at the time of his arrest. The next day, 

the prosecution advised both the court and defense counsel of 

this new development, whereupon defendant moved to suppress 

the statements. 

The unavailability of the Laredo oftlcere caused hearings on 

the suppression motion to be continued untlt October 20, when 

a conference phone call was scheduled between the Laredo officers 

and counsel for both de!ense and proeecution to discover the 

substance of the statements. Prior to that time, both prosecution 

and defense made a number of unsuccessful attempts to discover 

the content of defendant's statements. 

On October 20, 1981, the telephone conference between the 

arresting Laredo police officer, prosecution, and defense counsel 

took place. On the following day, defendant moved to suppress 

the May 18 stater:1ents and continue the trial, both of which 

motions were dented. 

Defendant's jury trial commenced on November 2, 1981. 

ld., at 872. The Colorado Court o! Appeals proceeded to conclude as follows: 

Defendant's second contention is that the trial court deprived 

hirn of his rights to discovery, due process of law, and the effective 

assistance of counsel by denying his motion for a continuance 

after defense counsel was advised 13 days prior to trial, of the 

contents of defendant's May 18, 1981 inculpatory statements. 

Vie disagree. 

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) 

The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance ls 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will 

be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of a clear . abuse of 

discretion resulting in manifest injustice. U.S. v. Gonzales-Palrna, 

645 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981). cert. denied, Gonzales-Garcia v. 

U.S., 454 U.S. 861, 102 S.Ct. 316, 70 L.Ed.2d 159 (1981) and 454 

U.S. 8691 102 S.Ct. 335, 70 L.Ed.2d 172 (1981h see People v. Mann. 

646 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1982). 

Here, we find neither an abuse of discretion. nor any manifest 

injustice to defendant for two reasons. First, we find no violation 

of Crim.P, 16 and, consequently no denial of due process. 

Seeond, the trial court's denial of a continuance did not deprive 

defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel. As 

a starting point, we emphasize our agreement with defendant 

that the effective assistance of counsel encompasses a guarantee 

that defense counsel shall have sufficient time to prepare 

adequately for trial. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. 53 S.Ct. 

55. 77 f.Ed. 158 (1932)1 People v. O'Neill, 185 Colo. 202. 523 

P.2d 123 (1974), 

However. in U.S. v. Gay, 623 P.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1980). .£m• 

denied, 449 U.S. 957. 101 S.Ct. 3661 66 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), the 

court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a 

continuance sought by defense counsel in order to study the impact 

of testimony contained in a transcript, where defense counsel 

had three to four days to study the transcript before trial 

commenced. In the case before us, defense counsel had one 

month from the date when he first learned of the existence of 

defendant's incriminating st_ateme_nts. and 13 days from when 

he learned of the substance of those statements, until trial 

commenced. We hold that this amount of tlme was sufficient 

for defense counsel to prepare adequately for trial. 

Id., at 873-74, 

In People v. Garcia, su12r~. the Colorado Court of Appeals correctly decided 

petitioner's instant Ground Three allegations under established principles of federal 

law. After review of the trial court transcripts. this Magistrate similarly concludes 

that petitioner's due process and Sixth Amendment rights were lli violated by the trial 

court's dental of petitioner's motion for continuance. See Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 1 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L,Ed.2d 674 (1984)i United States v. Wright, 

826 F.2d 938. 942 {10th Ctr. 1987); United States v. Pearson, 798 F.2d 385. 388 {10th 

Cir. 1986). 

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) 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the instant habeas corpus petltlon 

broug}\t under 28 U.S.C. §2254 be DENIED. 

FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that under Rule 605 of the Local Rules of 

Practice o! the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the parties 

shall have ten (10) days after service hereof to serve and file any written objections 

in order to obtain reconsideration by the Honorable Richard · P. Matsch, the District 

Court Judge to whom this case is assigned. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the United States District 

Court shall attach to · a copy of this recommendation for the plaintiff a copy of Rule 

605 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District 

of Colorado. 

',z.);/, DATED AND ENTERED this ___ day of October, 1988. 

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RIC ARD B. HARVEY 

Un ed States Magistrate 

Appellate Case: 89-1043 Document: 01019974296 Date Filed: 10/06/1989 Page: 22 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

Ol'l'IClt 01' THIil CL.IRK 

CISTRICT OF COLORAC>O 

JAMES R, MAN&P£AKIUI, c:1.auc ROOM 1;-1•• 

UNITiiD ITATE8 COURTHOUtlll 

t t&• •TOUT •Tllltll:llT 

DltNVER, Cc:>L0111AD0 80&11.& 

l"HONI (ao,, 8S7-S4S. 

n• a&7·a•aa 

) 

) 

C'ER.TIFICATB OF MAILING 

DATE: October lz_ , 1988 

CASE NO: 88-M~618 

NAME: JESUS BARRIBNTOS GAR.CIA VS, BENNY JOHNSON, et al. 

I, the undersigned, certify that a copy of the foregoing RECOMMENDATION 

BY UNITED STATES.MAGISTRATE and Local Rule 605 

was mailed to the fbllowlng on thls date: 

Jesus Barrlento8 Garcia 

Reg, No. 48237 

Centennial Correctional Factllty 

Box 600 G-3 

Canon City, CO 81212 

Paul H, Chan 

AHi&tant Attorney General 

Appellate Section 

1525 Sherman, 3rd Floor 

Denver, co 80203 

JAMES R. MANSPEAKER, Clerk 

By: 

Deputy Clerk 

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