Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00315/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00315-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Hemmerle, )

)

Petitioner, ) No. CV-04-0315-PHX-PGR

)

vs. )

) ORDER ISSUING CERTIFICATE

Dora Schriro, et al., ) OF APPEALABILITY

)

Respondents. ) )

On May 12, 2006, the Court issued an order (doc. #37) and judgment (doc.

#38) in which it dismissed as time-barred the petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner, through

counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal (doc. #40) from the judgment on June 12, 2006. 

Pending before the Court is the petitioner's Amended Motion for Certificate of

Appealability (doc. #46), to which the respondents have not filed any response in

opposition.

In order to be entitled to a certificate of appealability, the petitioner must

make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). This "substantial showing" standard is a "relatively low" one,

Case 2:04-cv-00315-PGR Document 47 Filed 08/22/06 Page 1 of 5
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1

 The specific issues that the Petitioner wants certified in this regard are the following:

Did the one-year statute of limitations under the AEDPA begin running as of the

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Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S.

958 (2003), as the petitioner is not required at this stage to prove that some

jurists would grant his habeas petition. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338,

123 S.Ct. 1029, 1040 (2003); accord, Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025

(9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he issuance of a COA is not precluded where the petitioner

cannot meet the standard to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.") Where, as here,

the petitioner's § 2254 petition was dismissed on procedural grounds, all the

petitioner is required to establish is (1) "that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling", and 

(2) "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). The Court must resolve in the petitioner's

favor any doubt about whether he has met his burden. Lambright v. Stewart, 220

F.3d at 1025.

With regard to the first prong of the Slack test, the petitioner seeks to have

the Court certify two procedural issues which the Court resolved against him in its

determination that his § 2254 petition should be dismissed because it was filed 24

days after the expiration of the limitations period of the AEDPA. The first issue,

which the petitioner has set forth in two parts, concerns the Court's conclusion

that the state court rulings at issue became final for purposes of the commencement of the AEDPA's limitations period when the state court rulings at issue were

entered, and not when the state court mandates were issued.1

 The second issue

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issuance of an opinion affirming Petitioner's conviction by the Arizona Court of

Appeals on October 29, 1998, rather than the issuance of that Court's mandate

on December 4, 1998, as determined by the district court? Further, did the

statute of limitations recommence running on February 20, 2003 upon the

issuance of the Arizona Supreme Court's Order denying review of Petitioner's

second state petition for post-conviction relief or on March 19, 2003, when the

Court of Appeals finalized the action by returning the files and a copy of the

Order to the trial court?

2

 The second specific issue that the petitioner wants certified is the following:

Should the two State Petitions for Post Conviction relief filed by Petitioner, one

filed pro-per on November 21, 1997, and dismissed without prejudice on

December 1, 1998, and the other filed January 4, 1999, and resolved on the

merits, count as a single round of state post-conviction litigation such that the

entire period of time from November 21, 1997, to the Arizona Supreme Court's

order denying review on February 20, 2003, (or the date the Court of Appeals

finalized that order on March 19, 2003) should be tolled pursuant to 28 USC 

§ 2244(d)(2)?

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concerns the Court's conclusion that the time period between the denial of the

petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief and the filing of his second such

petition was not tolled because the petitioner failed to establish that the two

petitions constituted a single round of collateral review pursuant to the test of

King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003).2

The petitioner argues that these issues are reasonably debatable among

jurists because, as to the first issue, it can be argued that Ninth Circuit law has

"irreconcilable strands" in that the case of Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th

Cir. 2001), looks to state procedural law to determine the finality of a state court

proceeding which triggers the commencement (or recommencement) of the

running of the AEDPA's statute of limitations, whereas the case of Wixom v.

Washington, 264 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1143 (2002),

holds that federal law, not state procedural provisions, determines the starting

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and recommencement dates of the statute, and, as to the second issue, because

the petitioner raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in both of his

post-conviction relief petitions even though it wasn't exhaustively briefed in the

first petition, and the state court treated the two post-conviction relief petitions as

part of a single round of relief in denying the state's motion to dismiss for

preclusion.

Although the Court continues to believe the petitioner's positions are

incorrect as a matter of law, the Court, construing any doubts in the petitioner's

favor, concludes that the petitioner has sufficiently shown that "reasonable jurists

could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate

to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123

S.Ct. at 1039.

With regard to the second prong of the Slack test, the petitioner argues that

his § 2254 petition validly raised two constitutional claims: that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel because his attorney advised him to testify falsely

at trial, and that he was denied due process when the trial court prohibited him

from contesting the existence of a culpable mens rea with evidence of his bi-polar

affective disorder. 

Where, as here, the habeas petition is dismissed without the merits of the

petitioner's constitutional claims being reached, a COA should be issued if the

Court concludes that its procedural ruling is debatable, which it has, and, after

taking a "quick look" at the face of the petition, determines that the petitioner has

facially alleged the denial of a constitutional right. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d

at 1026-27. The Court concludes that reasonable jurists could conclude that the 

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§ 2254 petition sufficiently alleged the denial of a constitutional right.

The Court thus concludes that the petitioner has met his burden under both

prongs of the Slack test and is entitled to the issuance of a certificate of

appealability on the issues set forth in footnotes one and two of this Order.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the petitioner's Amended Motion for Certificate of

Appealability (doc. #46) is granted.

DATED this 21st day of August, 2006.

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