Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01650/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01650-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Heidi Abrahamson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-1650-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Plaintiff Heidi Abrahamson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to

seek judicial review of Defendant Michael J. Astrue’s (“Defendant”) denial of her request

for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Dkt. #1).

Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #28) and

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #30). After reviewing the pleadings

and hearing oral arguments on March 23, 2009, the Court issues the following Order.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 27, 1997, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits,

alleging an onset date of September 1, 1995. (Dkt. #10A, Administrative Record “AR” 98-

101.) Defendant denied her application initially and on reconsideration. (Id. at 72-76, 80-

83.) Plaintiff timely requested and received an administrative hearing before Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Anne Blair on May 2, 2000. (Id. at 84, 27-68.) Plaintiff testified at the

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hearing (AR 32-53); Ryan Abrahamson, Plaintiff’s husband, and Louise Chastain, Plaintiff’s

neighbor, testified as lay witnesses (AR 57-62, 53-56.); and Edward Jasinski, Ph.D., a

clinical psychologist, testified as a medical expert. (AR 62-66.)

On March 29, 2001, ALJ Blair denied Plaintiff’s application, finding, inter alia, that

(1) Plaintiff’s insured status expired on June 30, 1997 and (2) Plaintiff had participated in

substantial gainful activity ( “SGA”), and was therefore not disabled at any time before her

insured status expired. (Id. at 17-26.) On September 9, 2003, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review, and adopted the decision of ALJ Blair as the final decision of

the Social Security Administration. (Id. at 8-10.)

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on November 10, 2003 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

seeking judicial review of ALJ Blair’s decision. See Abrahamson v. Barnhart, CV 03-2199-

PHX-EHC, Dkt. #1. On September 29, 2006, this Court remanded Plaintiff’s application for

further proceedings holding, inter alia, that “[t]he record reflects that Plaintiff worked under

special conditions.” Abrahamson v. Barnhart, CV 03-2199-PHX-EHC, Dkt. #58, pp. 4-5.

Further, this Court held that ALJ Blair’s failure to discuss whether those special conditions

precluded a finding that Plaintiff engaged in SGA constituted reversible error. Id. at 5.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application was remanded to consider whether the special conditions

under which Plaintiff worked precluded a finding that Plaintiff engaged in SGA. Id.

On remand, the Appeals Council vacated ALJ Blair’s decision, and remanded the

application to an ALJ for further proceedings. (AR 660.) On March 13, 2007, a

supplemental hearing was conducted before ALJ Ronald Dickinson. (AR 666-696.) Plaintiff

testified (AR 673-691), as did George Bluth, Ph.D., a vocational expert. (AR 691-694.) On

April 25, 2007, ALJ Dickinson denied Plaintiff’s application, finding that (1) Plaintiff’s

insured status expired on June 30, 2007 and (2) Plaintiff had not worked under special

conditions while she was engaged in SGA. (AR 629-637.) ALJ Dickinson’s decision

constitutes the final decision of the Social Security Administration. (AR 630.) Plaintiff filed

this Complaint on August 28, 2007 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review

of ALJ Dickinson’s decision. (Dkt. #1.)

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 The Court notes that there are five circumstances where a court may have discretion

to depart from the law of the case: (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an

intervening change in the law; (3) the evidence on remand is substantially different; (4) other

changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result. See Ischay,

383 F.Supp.2d at 1219-20, citing United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.

1997). However, in reviewing the record, there is no evidence to indicate that any of these

exceptions are applicable in the instant case.

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II. LAW OF THE CASE

“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, ‘a court is generally precluded from

reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in

the identical case.”1

 Ischay v. Barnhart, 383 F.Supp.2d 1199 (C.D.Cal. 2005). In Ischay, the

court further held that “[t]he [law of the case] doctrine does not require that any issue

actually have been adjudicated; rather, it applies to this Court’s ‘explicit decisions as well

as those issues decided by necessary implication.’” Ischay, 383 F.Supp.2d at 1217, quoting

United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original).

Here, this Court found as a matter of law and fact that “the record reflects that Plaintiff

worked under special conditions.” Abrahamson v. Barnhart, CV 03-2199-PHX-EHC, Dkt.

#58, p. 5. Accordingly, this Court’s finding that Plaintiff worked under special conditions

is the law of the case, and thus could not be altered by ALJ Dickinson. As such, ALJ

Dickinson’s renewed “special conditions” analysis constitutes legal error.

 Plaintiff also argues that if her work is SGA, she should have received additional

quarters of credit and extended insured status. Plaintiff argued this proposition in her

previous appeal of the Social Security Administration’s decision, and this Court found that

ALJ Blair did not err with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for an extension of her insured status.

See Abrahamson v. Barnhart, CV 03-2199-PHX-EHC, Dkt. #58, p. 3, n. 1. Nonetheless,

Plaintiff contends that because ALJ Dickinson issued findings of law and fact with regard

to Plaintiff’s insured status, this Court is not precluded from considering the legal and factual

validity of those findings. However, this Court’s findings in reference to an extension of

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Plaintiff’s insured status became the law of the case, and could not be disturbed by ALJ

Dickinson.

III. REMAND

According to the Ninth Circuit, evidence should be credited and an action remanded

for the immediate award of benefits when the following three factors are satisfied: (1) the

ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence; (2) there are no

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made;

and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant

disabled were such evidence credited. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.

2000).

Here, there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of

disability can be made. The mere fact that she engaged in SGA under special conditions is

not dispositive of whether Plaintiff is in fact disabled. In fact, “work done under special

conditions may show that you have the necessary skills and ability to work at the substantial

gainful activity level.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c). Therefore, the Court cannot say that the

ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled as a matter of law. As such, this case is

remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that ALJ Dickinson committed legal error in issuing findings of law

and fact contrary to the law of the case. Because ALJ Dickinson failed to consider the effect

of the special conditions on whether Plaintiff has the necessary skills and ability to work at

the substantial gainful activity level, the case is remanded for further development of the

record.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. (Dkt. #28.) Plaintiff’s Motion is

GRANTED regarding Plaintiff’s request to remand.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. (Dkt. #30.) Defendant’s

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Cross-Motion is GRANTED regarding Defendant’s request to deny an immediate award of

benefits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall serve as the mandate of the Court.

DATED this 26th day of March, 2009.

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