Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_24-cv-00255/USCOURTS-alnd-5_24-cv-00255-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JASON EVERETT MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARK MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 5:24-cv-255-ACA-GMB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Jason Everett Moore has filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 alleging violations of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. Doc. 1. Moore names the following defendants in the complaint: Lieutenant 

Mark Martin, Lieutenant Edward Lewter, Sheriff Kevin Turner, Madison County 

Commission Chairman Mac McCutcheon, Mayor Tommy Battle, the Madison 

County Detention Facility, the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, and Governor Kay 

Ivey. Doc. 1 at 2–6. Moore requests injunctive relief in the form of access to the 

jail’s law library for himself and all other inmates, along with $50 million in 

monetary damages. Doc. 1 at 10. The complaint is before a Magistrate Judge for a 

preliminary report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); McCarthy v. 

Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991). For the reasons to follow, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a 

FILED

 2024 Nov-15 AM 11:36

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires this court to screen prisoners’ 

complaints against government officers or employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The 

court must dismiss these complaints, in whole or in part, if they are frivolous or

malicious, seek monetary damages from a defendant immune from monetary relief, 

or do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The 

court has the discretion under § 1915A(a) to dismiss a prisoner’s complaint sua 

sponte and prior to service. 

Under § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim is “frivolous where it 

lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

For example, a claim is frivolous as a matter of law if the defendants are immune 

from suit or the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a legal right that does not exist. Id. at 

327. 

The legal standard for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) also determines whether a complaint states a valid claim under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). Therefore, 

in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks

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omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level” and a complaint should be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] 

enough heft to ‘show that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & 557 (2007). On the other hand, “[t]hreadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Similarly, the court should dismiss a claim 

when a successful affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations, appears on 

the face of a complaint. Jones, 549 U.S. at 215.

A pro se pleading “is held to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted 

by an attorney” and should be liberally construed, Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 

F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015), but still must include factual allegations that “raise 

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 

(11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Moore claims that he requested access to the law library at the Madison 

County Detention Facility through a kiosk system on April 25, 2023. Doc. 1 at 10. 

On April 27, Lieutenant Martin responded, telling Moore to “contact [his] attorney 

for all legal based matters.” Doc. 1 at 9. Moore therefore contends that Martin “used 

[his] position and authority to deny my right to access [the] law library.” Doc. 1 at 

8. At some later date, Moore claims that Lieutenant Lewter “reaf[f]irmed the denial

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of [his] access.” Doc. 1 at 8. Moore requests for “all inmates to have access to the 

law library whenever requested” and “feel[s] that [he] ha[s] been illegally detained, 

and [his] access to the law library would have helped [him] [ob]tain [his] freedom.” 

Doc. 1 at 10. Moore also complains that he “cannot get in touch with [his] attorney.” 

Doc. 1 at 10. 

Moore also claims that (1) Sheriff Turner gave Martin and Lewter the right 

use their positions and authority to deny his access to the law library; (2) Chairman 

McCutcheon allowed Martin, Lewter, and Sheriff Turner to use their positions and 

authority to deny access to the library; (3) Mayor Battle allowed Martin, Lewter, 

Sheriff Turner to deny access to the library; (4) the Madison County Detention 

Facility gave Martin and Lewter the right to deny access to the library “by 

employment”; (5) the Madison County Sheriff’s Office gave Turner the right to deny 

law-library access because Turner has “all control” over the Madison County 

Detention Facility, Martin, and Lewter; and (6) Governor Ivey allowed Martin, 

Lewter, Sheriff Turner, Chairman McCutcheon, Mayor Battle, the Madison County 

Detention Facility, and the Madison County Sheriff’s Office to use their power, 

authority, and positions to deny access to the law library and violate his

constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 7. 

III. ANALYSIS

Moore sues the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional 

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violations on his own behalf and on behalf of other inmates. But Moore cannot sue 

for other inmates. The question of standing asks whether the litigant is entitled to 

have the court decide the merits of a dispute or of particular issues. Warth v. Seldin, 

422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Among other things, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal 

injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 

redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984), 

abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Comp., Inc., 

572 U.S. 118 (2014). Consistent with the “general prohibition on a litigant’s raising 

another person’s legal rights,” id. at 751, Moore has no standing to sue on behalf of

other inmates. For this reason, any claim purportedly brought on another inmate’s 

behalf must be dismissed.

A. Madison County Sheriff’s Office and Madison County Detention Center

The Madison County Sheriff’s Office is not subject to suit or liability. 

“Sheriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered legal 

entities subject to suit” under § 1983. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (“Sheriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered 

legal entities subject to suit[.]”). “Under Alabama law, a county sheriff’s department 

lacks the capacity to be sued.” Id. at 1215. Accordingly, the Madison County 

Sheriff’s Office is not a proper defendant in this action and should be dismissed. 

Moore also names the Madison County Detention Center as a defendant, but 

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the jail, as a division of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, is not a legal entity 

subject to suit. See Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214. Accordingly, Moore’s claims against 

the Madison County Sheriff’s Department and the Madison County Detention 

Center are due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.

B. Official Capacity Claims

The Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 claims against the state or an agency

of the state. See Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity “has also been extended to state officials, acting in 

their official capacity, where an agency or individual may ‘be treated as an arm of

the State partaking of the Eleventh Amendment Immunity.’” Melton v. Abston, 841

F.3d 1207, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 

280 (1977)). “A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state 

has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has abrogated the state’s 

immunity.” Id. Congress has not waived, and Alabama has not abrogated, the state’s 

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1234. “Consequently, Alabama state 

officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.” 

Id. For this reason, the individual defendants are immune from suit in their official 

capacities for Moore’s claims seeking monetary damages.

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C. Individual Capacity Claims

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1. Lieutenants Martin and Lewter

In an access-to-courts claim, like Moore’s, he must show prejudice—that “his 

efforts to pursue a legal claim” were “hindered.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351

(1996). In particular, a plaintiff “first must show actual injury before seeking relief.”

Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Bass v. 

Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1444 (11th Cir. 1998)). This “essential standing

requirement means that prison officials’ actions that allegedly violate an inmate’s

right of access to the courts must have impeded the inmate’s pursuit of a

nonfrivolous, post-conviction claim or civil rights action.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The “plaintiff must provide evidence of such deterrence, such as a denial or dismissal

of a direct appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights case that results from actions of

prison officials,” id. (citation omitted), or as to prospective or existing litigation, he 

must present evidence of “miss[ed] filing deadlines or being prevented from 

presenting claims.” Id. at 1290 n.10. Conclusory statements will not suffice, and 

Moore has not explained how his lack of access to a law library caused him to be 

“illegally detained” or hindered his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.

Doc. 1 at 10. 

1 Although Moore checked the box on his form complaint for only official capacity claims, the 

court liberally construes his allegations to include claims against the defendants in their individual 

capacities. See Doc. 1 at 3–6. 

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Additionally, Moore acknowledges that he has an attorney. Doc. 1 at 10. The 

fact that Moore is represented by counsel underscores his inability to demonstrate 

an actual injury. See Arwine v. Rigney, 2023 WL 6475425, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 

12, 2023) (finding that a pretrial detainee could not show actual injury since he was 

represented by counsel in his criminal proceedings) (citing Wilson, 163 F.3d at 

1291). Because Moore cannot show prejudice or an actual injury, his claims against 

Lieutenants Martin and Lewter for a right of access to the courts are due to be 

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. Sheriff Turner, Chairman McCutcheon, Mayor Battle, and 

Governor Ivey

Moore’s claims against Turner, McCutcheon, Battle, and Ivey depend on a 

theory of respondeat superior. Because Moore’s underlying claims are without 

merit, however, his claims against these supervisory defendants necessarily fail. 

Ross v. Corizon Med. Servs., 700 F. App’x 914, 917 (11th Cir. 2017); see also 

Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1264 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We need not 

address the Appellant’s claims of municipal or supervisory liability since we 

conclude no constitutional violation occurred.”); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 

1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that a claim for supervisory liability fails where there 

is no underlying constitutional violation). 

Even if Moore’s access-to-courts claim had merit, there is no respondeat 

superior or vicarious liability for the unconstitutional acts of subordinates. Gonzalez 

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v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003). Instead, a supervisor can be liable 

only if he or she participated directly in the unconstitutional conduct or if there is a 

causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the constitutional violation. 

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff can establish 

this causal connection by showing a history of widespread abuse that puts the 

supervisor on notice of the need to correct an alleged violation, a supervisor’s 

improper custom or policy that results in deliberate indifference to constitutional 

rights, or that a supervisor ordered his subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that 

they would act unlawfully and did not stop them. Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234–35. 

Moore has not alleged any facts showing a causal connection between the

supervisory defendants’ actions and the alleged constitutional violation. Therefore, 

Moore’s claims against Turner, McCutcheon, Battle, and Ivey are due to be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Moore’s claims 

be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

V. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

The plaintiff may file specific written objections to this report and 

recommendation. Any objections must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 14 

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days. The plaintiff must identify every objectionable finding of fact or 

recommendation and state the specific basis for every objection. The plaintiff also 

must identify every claim in the complaint that the report and recommendation has 

not addressed. Objections should not contain new allegations, present additional 

evidence, or repeat legal arguments.

A plaintiff who fails to object to factual or legal conclusions in the Magistrate 

Judge’s report and recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal those 

same conclusions adopted in the District Judge’s order. Without a proper objection, 

however, the court on appeal may review the unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

After receiving the plaintiff’s objections, a District Judge will conduct a de 

novo review of the relevant portions of the report and recommendation and may 

accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact 

and recommendations. The District Judge also may refer this action back to the 

Magistrate Judge with instructions for further proceedings.

The plaintiff may not appeal the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 

Circuit. The plaintiff may appeal only from a final judgment entered by a District 

Judge.

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DONE and ORDERED on November 15, 2024.

 _________________________________

 GRAY M. BORDEN

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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