Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05265/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05265-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 3, 1997 Decided May 27, 1997

No. 96-5265

MARLENA RAMALLO,

APPELLEE

v.

JANET RENO,

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 

DORIS MEISSNER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF 

THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv01851)

Philip D. Bartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 

Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants, with 

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whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Philemina M. Jones, Assistant Director, Michelle R. Slack, and 

Laura M. Friedman, Attorneys, were on the briefs.

Richard L. Brusca argued the cause for appellee, with 

whom Robert S. Bennett, Katharine S. Sexton, and Catharine 

A. Hartzenbusch were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and TATEL, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellee Marlena Ramallo, a native 

of Bolivia, entered the United States in 1972; she became a 

lawful permanent resident in 1978. In August 1986, Ramallo 

pled guilty to conspiracy to import cocaine and thereafter 

served 51⁄2months in prison.

In November 1986, due to her criminal conviction, the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") initiated deportation proceedings against Ramallo. During the course of 

these proceedings, the Government and Ramallo entered into 

an agreement, the terms of which are disputed. Ramallo 

claims that, in return for her cooperation in prosecuting drug 

traffickers and her waiver of objections to her deportability, 

the Government agreed not to deport her and to restore her 

status as a lawful permanent resident. In compliance with 

her understanding of the agreement, Ramallo withdrew her 

objection to deportability in the deportation proceedings. A 

deportation order was subsequently issued by an Immigration 

Judge. When the Government later attempted to execute the 

deportation order, Ramallo filed suit in the District Court for 

the District of Columbia, seeking enforcement of the agreement to restore her status as a lawful permanent resident. 

The District Court entered judgment in favor of Ramallo.

On appeal, the Government claims that, at the time it ruled 

on this case, the District Court had no jurisdiction to consider 

Ramallo's claims. Due to recent legislative developments, we 

need not decide this issue. Subsequent to the District 

Court's judgment, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration 

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 

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("IIRIRA"), amending section 242 of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act ("INA"). The IIRIRA undisputably deprives 

both district courts and courts of appeals of jurisdiction to 

hear this case.

As it is clear that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over 

the subject matter of this case, a question remains as to the 

continuing validity of the District Court's judgment. In other 

words, because this court has no authority to review a matter 

of the sort here in issue, does the judgment of the District 

Court stand immune to challenge? We think not. We find 

that, in enacting the IIRIRA, Congress intended a pragmatic 

approach, leaving this court with residual jurisdiction to clear 

the decks of pending cases covered by the new statute. 

Accordingly, we find that IIRIRA grants us jurisdiction to 

vacate the District Court's judgment and remand with a 

direction to dismiss appellee's present claim before the court.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellee Marlena Ramallo, a native of Bolivia, came to the 

United States in 1972 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1978. Ramallo was arrested in 1986 and, on August 1, 

1986, she pled guilty to conspiracy to import cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. As part of a plea agreement, 

she agreed to cooperate with officials of the U.S. Attorney's 

Office and the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") in their 

investigations of unlawful drug trafficking. Ramallo served 

51⁄2 months in prison on her drug conviction.

On November 21, 1986, the INS initiated proceedings to 

deport Ramallo, issuing an Order to Show Cause, in which it 

charged that Ramallo was subject to deportation due to her 

criminal conviction. Appellee's initial deportation hearing 

took place on February 25, 1987. After two continuances, 

Ramallo began to present evidence on April 6, 1988. After 

the April 6 hearing was adjourned, proceedings did not 

reconvene until May 10, 1988.

At the May 10 hearing, during a recess, an INS trial 

attorney, a DEA agent, Ramallo's attorney, and Ramallo met. 

At the meeting, the parties formed an agreement, the terms 

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of which are now substantially disputed. The Government 

asserts that it agreed not to deport Ramallo for the period it 

would take for her to cooperate with law enforcement authorities; Ramallo contends that, in return for her cooperation, 

the Government agreed not to deport her at all and to restore 

her status as a lawful permanent resident. It is undisputed 

that, as a result of the meeting, Ramallo agreed (1) to 

cooperate with the DEA and the United States Attorney's 

Office in the investigation and prosecution of drug traffickers, 

(2) to concede that she was subject to deportation, (3) to 

withdraw her application for a waiver of deportation pursuant 

to section 212(c) of the INA, and (4) to waive an appeal of the 

Immigration Judge's decision. That same day, after Ramallo 

withdrew her application for relief pursuant to section 212(c) 

of the INA, the Immigration Judge entered an order of 

deportation.

On February 10, 1992, the INS, on Ramallo's behalf, filed a 

motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. The Immigration Judge granted the motion to reopen and gave Ramallo 

one week to file an application for waiver of deportation 

under section 212(c) of the INA. Ramallo, however, did not 

file the necessary papers; on April 15, 1992, the Immigration 

Judge denied Ramallo's request for relief, citing lack of 

prosecution.

On May 1, 1992, Ramallo filed a notice of appeal with the 

Board of Immigration Appeals, contesting the April 15, 1992 

order denying her request for relief. On March 10, 1994, the 

Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Ramallo's case for 

want of jurisdiction, holding that trips made by Ramallo 

outside the United States after the issuance of the deportation order divested the Board of jurisdiction. Ramallo appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The 

case in the Fourth Circuit has been held in abeyance, pending 

the outcome of the instant action.

On September 25, 1995, Ramallo filed the instant action in 

the District Court, seeking to enforce the May 10 agreement. 

She alleged breach of contract, promissory and equitable 

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estoppel, and violations of the Fifth Amendment. The INS 

moved for dismissal on the grounds that the District Court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review a final deportation order, claiming that, pursuant to section 106(a) of the 

INA, review of such an order is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. Both the INS and Ramallo 

moved for summary judgment. The District Court held that 

it was not reviewing a final deportation order and, thus, that 

it had jurisdiction. The trial court then denied both motions 

for summary judgment, holding that an affidavit of an INS 

attorney created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Government, in the May 10 agreement, promised not 

to deport Ramallo and to restore her lawful permanent 

resident status in return for her cooperation with law enforcement authorities. The District Court later held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rules 43(e) and 52(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve the issue of whether the 

Government promised not to deport Ramallo. After taking 

testimony from the INS attorney, the District Court entered 

judgment in favor of appellee, finding that "[Ramallo] and the 

government, through its agents, servants and/or employees, 

entered into an agreement, in exchange for her testimony 

against numerous drug dealers, that she would not be deported and that she would be restored to her previous status as a 

Lawful Permanent Resident." Ramallo v. Reno, Civ. No. 

95-01851 (July 23, 1996) at 1-2, reprinted in Joint Appendix 

399-400.

II. ANALYSIS

If we accept Ramallo's argument that the action in District 

Court concerned an alleged contract between the Government 

and appelleenot a final deportation orderthen, at the time 

it heard the instant action, the District Court may have had 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Government disputes this view, claiming that the case in District Court 

concerned the validity of a final deportation order and that, at 

the time the case was before the District Court, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1105(a) vested exclusive jurisdiction to review a final deportation order in the courts of appeals.

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We need not determine whether the District Court erred in 

finding that it had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of 

Ramallo's claim. Subsequent to the District Court hearing 

the case, Congress enacted the IIRIRA, amending section 

242 of the INA. IIRIRA now undisputably deprives both 

courts of appeals and district courts of jurisdiction to decide 

the instant action. Section 306(a) amends section 242 of the 

INA by adding the following provision:

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.Except as provided in 

this section and notwithstanding any other provision of 

law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 

claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the 

decision or action by the Attorney General to commence 

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders 

against any alien under [the INA].

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added). The instant action 

arises from "the decision or action" of the Attorney General 

to execute a removal order against Ramallo and, thus, falls 

squarely within the express terms of the newly amended 

Section 242.

As it is clear that we lack jurisdiction over the subject 

matter of the instant action, we are faced with the question of 

whether we must now allow the District Court's decision to 

stand. To hold that we lack jurisdiction to enter any order 

affecting the judgment of the District Court would create an 

anomalous situation: a judgment of the District Court, with 

respect to a matter over which it now has no jurisdiction to 

hear, would escape appellate review, because the newly 

amended section 242 took effect after the issuance of the 

decision in the District Court. We doubt that Congress 

meant to countenance such a result. Rather, given the firm 

command of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), we believe that Congress 

intended to afford this court residual jurisdiction to clear the 

decks of cases in which the District Court has entered 

judgment, but in which there can be no review by the Court 

of Appeals due to its lack of jurisdiction pursuant to IIRIRA.

In the peculiar circumstance of this case, our jurisdiction is 

something akin to an appellate court's jurisdiction when a 

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1 See also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), where the Court 

held:

We emphasized in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), 

that where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of 

constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear. Id., at 

373-74. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), we 

reaffirmed that view. We require this heightened showing in 

part to avoid the "serious constitutional question" that would 

arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial 

forum for a colorable constitutional claim. See Bowen v. 

case becomes moot between the time a district court judgment is entered and the time it arrives at the appellate court 

for review. In United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 

36 (1950), the Supreme Court held,

The established practice of the Court in dealing with a 

civil case from a court in the federal system which has 

become moot while on its way here or pending our 

decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss. 

That was said in Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County,

299 U.S. 259, 267, to be "the duty of the appellate court." 

That procedure clears the path for future relitigation of 

the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance. When that procedure is followed, the rights of 

all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in the statutory scheme was only preliminary.

Id. at 39-40 (footnote omitted); see also U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 391 n.3 

(1994) (holding that "mootness by happenstance provides 

sufficient reason to vacate"). Following this line of analysis, 

we hold that the IIRIRA does not strip us of the authority to 

vacate the District Court's judgment, which was preliminary, 

and to remand with a direction to dismiss.

IIRIRA's deprivation of jurisdiction raises no constitutional 

problem in this case. A statute that removes jurisdiction 

from all courts to vindicate constitutional rights poses serious 

constitutional objections. See Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 

695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("In our view, a statutory provision 

precluding all judicial review of constitutional issues removes 

from the courts an essential judicial function under our 

implied constitutional mandate of separation of powers, and 

deprives an individual of an independent forum for the adjudication of a claim of constitutional right.").1 However, we 

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Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681, 

n.12 (1986).

Id. at 603. 

need not decide whether the IIRIRA has such an effect, or, if 

it does, whether it is constitutional, because, as the Government concedes, habeas review remains available to appellee to 

raise substantial constitutional questions. Cf. Yang v. INS,

109 F.3d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that section 

306(a) of the IIRIRA deprives courts of jurisdiction over 

statutory habeas claims but, of course, leaves constitutional 

habeas intact). Appellee thus retains the right to pursue 

claims of constitutional infirmity on habeas.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we vacate the District 

Court's judgment and remand with a direction to dismiss 

appellee's present claim before the court.

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