Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_06-cv-00019/USCOURTS-ared-2_06-cv-00019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

HAROLD BENNETT PLAINTIFF

VS. NO.2:06CV00019-WRW

DENNIS JACKSON, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 21). Harold Bennett, an inmate

presently confined at East Arkansas Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction

(“ADC”), filed a pro se complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

According to Plaintiff’s complaint, on May 19, 2005, he was going before the parole board

for consideration of whether he would receive in-state parole. When he got to the hearing, he was

shown a copy of a letter containing threats toward a lawyer and court clerk in Jonesboro, Arkansas.

Plaintiff denied writing the letter, and it was investigated by Defendant Jackson. On May 23, 2005,

Plaintiff was served with notice of a disciplinary violation, accusing him of writing the letter. On

may 24, 2005, Plaintiff went before Defendant Mathis for his disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff

requested a handwriting analysis test, but one was not done. Plaintiff was found guilty, and his

appeals were denied. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process during his disciplinary proceedings because

a handwriting expert was not provided. Plaintiff’s request for a handwriting analysis test has once

been denied (Doc. No. 18). Despite that finding, Plaintiff now alleges that he has since been able

to provide the Arkansas State Police with a handwriting sample and asks that I reconsider the

previous ruling. 

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Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).

2

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-26 (1976). 

3

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-73 (1974).

4

Id. at 556.

2

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part:

“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ..”

 The Supreme Court has mandated a two-part analysis of a procedural due process claim: first,

“whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the ... protection of ‘life, liberty

or property[,]’” and second, “if protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what

procedures constitute ‘due process of law.’”1 If there is no protected liberty or property interest, it

is obviously unnecessary to analyze what procedures were followed. Liberty interests protected by

the Fourteenth Amendment may arise either from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law.2

Plaintiff claims that as a result of his conviction on a disciplinary charge, he received a class

reduction from level 1-C to level 3, which effectively made him illegible for parole, thereby

extending his stay in the penitentiary. In Wolff v. McDonnell,

3

 where the plaintiffs were deprived

of good time credits as a severe sanction for serious misconduct, the Supreme Court held that such

inmates have various procedural due process protections in a prison disciplinary proceeding. If

changes in good time credits warrants procedural due process, then surely a reduction in class

warrants the same due process considerations. 

In Wolff, the Supreme Court recognized that “prison disciplinary proceedings are not part

of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does

not apply.”4

 Nonetheless, the Court held that a prisoner facing serious institutional sanctions such

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Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71.

6

Id. at 563-73.

7

Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

453-56 (1985). 

8

Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir.1992).

9

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480-84 (1995).

10See also Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir.1991) (a federal prisoner has a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in good time credit); Von Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F.Supp.

1413, 1417 (M.D.Pa. 1994). 

3

as a loss of good time credits is entitled to some procedural protection before penalties can be

imposed.5 It set forth five requirements of due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding: (1) the

right to appear before an impartial decision-making body; (2) twenty-four hour advance written

notice of the charges; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence,

provided the presentation of such does not threaten institutional safety or correctional goals; (4)

assistance from an inmate representative, if the charged inmate is illiterate or if complex issues are

involved; (5) a written decision by the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the rationale

behind their disciplinary action.6 An additional procedural requirement was set forth in

Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. at Walpole v. Hill,

7

 where the Court held that there

must be some evidence which supports the conclusion of the disciplinary tribunal. The Third

Circuit in Griffin v. Spratt,

8

 later recognized that the above due process requirements must be

satisfied in a prison disciplinary hearing.

In Sandin v. Conner,

9

 the United States Supreme Court confirmed that the Wolff due process

safeguards must be provided when, as in the instant case, the challenged disciplinary proceeding

results in a loss of good time credits.10 In conclusion, since Bennett was sanctioned to a reduction

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11Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1988).

12Id. at 278.

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in class, his allegations relating to those disciplinary proceedings will be reviewed under the Wolff

and Hill standards.

Under Wolff, it is required that an inmate accused of a disciplinary infraction be provided

with twenty four (24) hour advance written notice of the charges against him. The petition in

question contains no allegation that the advance notice mandate of Wolff was violated. Furthermore,

the undisputed record confirms that Plaintiff received proper advance written notice of the charges

against him. There is also no contention that the fact finder failed to issue a written decision.

Consequently, both of those Wolff procedural safeguards were satisfied.

There is also no claim that Petitioner requested and was denied assistance from an inmate

representative. Consequently, this prong of Wolff was also satisfied. Wolff also includes a procedural

safeguard which requires that an inmate facing institutional disciplinary charges be granted an

opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. However, this privilege is not

absolute. Specifically, a prisoner’s request to present evidence may be denied if it would threaten

institutional security or correctional goals.

A court has no duty to independently assess the witnesses’ credibility or otherwise weigh the

evidence, but it must determine that there was some evidence or basis in fact to support the finding

of guilt.11 The court in Hensley added that a disciplinary tribunal’s failure to explain why alibi

testimony was not found credible did not constitute a due process violation.12 Accordingly,

Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights by accepting Defendant Jackson’s testimony

that the threatening note was comparable to a sample of Plaintiff’s handwriting. Defendants’ failure

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to submit the document for analysis by a handwriting expert did not violate Wolff.

The disciplinary proceeding afforded Bennett satisfied the his federal due process rights.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of March, 2006.

 /s/ Wm. R.Wilson,Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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