Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00630/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00630-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

IN RE MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS (MERS) 

LITIGATION 

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 

Robinson v. GE Money Bank et al., 

CV 10-00630-PHX-JAT1

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MDL 09-02119-PHX-JAT

CV 10-630-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

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I. Jurisdiction 

 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra 

Foods, Inc, 136 S.Ct. 1021 (2016) (holding that a trust takes on the citizenship of its 

members), this Court called for supplemental briefing on jurisdiction. (Doc. 2046). Both 

Trustees (U.S. Bank as Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Series 2006-

GEL3 and Bank of New York Mellon As Trustee for SAMI II 2006-AR3) and Plaintiffs 

 

1

 In the original case (CV 09-227-TUC) that was bifurcated and partially transferred to 

the MDL (counts related to the operation and formation of MERS were transferred to the 

MDL court), the amended complaint listed 4 Plaintiffs: Sally Robinson-Burke and 

Jonathan Burke (“the Robinsons”) (re property at 7095 North Tula Lane, Tucson, 

Arizona); Rosa Silvas (“Silvas”) (re property located at 3167 N. Corona Place, Nogales 

Arizona) and Amada Holbert (re property located at 10636 South Varner Drive, Vail, 

Arizona). (Doc. 91 in CV 09-227-TUC). Ms. Holbert was voluntarily dismissed from 

CV 09-227-TUC on May 7, 2010 because she entered into a loan modification 

agreement. The Court has not located a comparable dismissal in the MDL case number 

(MD 09-2119) nor the member case (CV 10-630-PHX); however, because no party has 

treated Ms. Holbert as a Plaintiff in either case before this Court, the Court presumes the 

dismissal in CV 09-227-TUC applied equally in this case. The Tucson case is now 

closed. (CV 09-227 Doc. 282). 

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appear to take the position that the Trustees were not sued to “reach” the assets of the 

trusts (unlike Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980)), but instead argue the 

Trustees are literally the Defendants, and that the status as Trustee is irrelevant. (For 

example, Plaintiffs state “Plaintiffs did not sue any trusts.” (Doc. 2048 at 1)). In other 

words, both briefs imply that any judgment Plaintiffs might obtain against U.S. Bank, as 

Trustee, or Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee, would be paid by U.S. Bank or Bank 

of New York Mellon personally, and not out of the res of the respective trusts. Further, 

they both imply that the banks are paying their own legal fees; not that the either Trust is 

paying the legal fees of its Trustee. If these representations are true, the Court would 

agree that U.S. Bank’s citizenship and Bank of New York Mellon’s citizenship is the 

relevant citizenship for diversity purposes and not the citizenship of the Trust (i.e. all the 

members/certificate holders of the Trust). 

 However, Plaintiffs have made no claims of breach of fiduciary duty against U.S. 

Bank or Bank of New York Mellon, which is the typical claim made against a Trustee 

personally. Instead, Plaintiffs must be alleging that they can make direct claims against 

U.S. Bank or Bank of New York Mellon as the de facto “manager” of Plaintiffs’ loans as 

a Trust asset. Assuming this is true, the Court is unclear why U.S. Bank was named 

“solely in its capacity as Trustee”, because in reality, it is being named solely in its 

capacity as a Bank. The same would be true for Bank of New York Mellon. 

 Because the Court cannot do any fact investigation on its own, the Court is left to 

accept the parties’ representations. Based on these representations, the Court will accept 

that the Trusts, and their respective assets, are not at issue in this case. The Court will 

also accept these representations to establish that the Banks, and not the Trusts or their 

assets, are the real parties in interest. 

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II. Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate when a moving part shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Initially, the movant bears the burden of 

pointing out to the Court the basis for the motion and the elements of the causes of action 

upon which the non-movant will be unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do more 

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. 

III. Count I of the Amended Complaint 

 Following the Court of Appeals reversal (In re Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 

Inc., 754 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014) at Doc. 1820) of this Court’s dismissal of the 

consolidated amended complaint in this case, there is one Count remaining. The 

remaining Count is a cause of action under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). Another Court in this 

district has summarized this cause of action as follows: 

...A.R.S. § 33-420(A) [] penalizes persons claiming an interest or lien in 

real property for knowingly recording a document that is “forged, 

groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or is otherwise 

invalid”: 

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A. A person purporting to claim an interest in, or a lien or 

encumbrance against, real property, who causes a document 

asserting such claim to be recorded in the office of the county 

recorder, knowing or having reason to know that the 

document is forged, groundless, contains a material 

misstatement or false claim or is otherwise invalid is liable to 

the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property for the 

sum of not less than five thousand dollars, or for treble the 

actual damages caused by the recording, whichever is greater, 

and reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action. 

 (Emphasis added.) The broader statutory section, A.R.S. § 33-420, is 

entitled “False documents; liability; special action; damages; violation; 

classification.” 

David A. Kester v. CitiMortgage, CV 15-365, Doc. 37 (D. Ariz. March 31, 2016). 

IV. Robinsons’ and Silva’s Fact Specific Claims 

 A. The Plaintiffs 

The member case at issue in this Order (CV 10-630) involves two properties 

previously owned by the Robinsons and Ms. Silvas (see footnote 1). Beyond having both 

been named as Plaintiffs in this suit, it does not appear that the Robinsons and Ms. Silvas 

have any relation to each other, nor do their respective properties. Thus, even this 

member case is in actuality two completely separate cases. 

B. The Defendants 

 In their first supplement regarding jurisdiction (Doc. 2001-1), Plaintiffs stated that 

there are six defendants in the Robinson/Silvas member case: 1) U.S. Bank, National 

Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Series 2006-GEL3; 2) 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; 3) The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for SAMI II 

2006-AR3; 4) ReconTrust Company, N.A.; 5) MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.; and 6) 

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 

 MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 

(hereinafter “MERS”) moved for summary judgment at Doc. 1979; Plaintiffs responded 

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at Doc. 2011; and MERS replied at Doc. 2040. This Motion seeks summary judgment 

against both the Robinsons and Silvas. 

 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and U.S. Bank, National Association, as Trustee for 

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Series 2006-GEL3 moved for summary 

judgment at Doc. 1923, Plaintiffs responded at Doc. 2009 and these Defendants replied at 

Doc. 2037. This Motion seeks summary judgment against the Robinsons. 

 Bank of America, The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for SAMI II 2006-

AR3, and ReconTrust Company, N.A. moved for summary judgment at Doc. 1921, 

Plaintiff responded at Doc. 2021, and Defendants replied at Doc. 2035. This Motion 

seeks summary judgment against Silvas. With regard to this motion, based on Plaintiffs’ 

jurisdictional statement (which does not list Bank of America), the Court is unclear 

whether Bank of America is actually a Defendant to the Silvas’ complaint. However, 

Plaintiff’s response to this motion for summary judgment includes Bank of America as if 

it is a proper Defendant. 

 In the Consolidated Amended Complaint (Doc. 1424 at 17) Plaintiffs also made a 

claim on behalf of the Robinsons against America’s Servicing Company. However, 

Plaintiffs’ statement of jurisdiction (Doc. 2001-1) does not mention America’s Serving 

Company as a Defendant in this case. America’s Serving Company currently has no 

motion for summary judgment pending. Nonetheless, the Robinson Plaintiffs repeat their 

allegation against America’s Serving Company in their response (Doc. 2009 at 4) to 

Wells Fargo’s and U.S Bank as Trustee’s motion for summary judgment. Further, at 

footnote 5 of Doc. 2009, Plaintiffs state without citation that America’s Servicing 

Company is a dba of Wells Fargo. Thus, perhaps this is not a separate Defendant even 

though the consolidated amended complaint makes specific allegations against it. 

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 C. Scope of the Mandate (Forgery) 

 As to Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court previously recounted, 

[Plaintiffs’] amended complaint was dismissed on October 3, 2011. (Doc. 

1602). Plaintiffs appealed dismissal of Counts I-VI to the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Count I 

and affirmed the dismissal of Counts II-VI. In re Mortgage Elec. 

Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 786 (9th Cir. 2014). Specifically, the 

Court of Appeals held that: (1) A.R.S. § 33-420 applies to Notices of 

Trustee Sale, Notices of Substitution of Trustee, and Assignments of a 

Deed of Trust, documents which Plaintiffs alleged to be fraudulent in the 

CAC; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims are not timebarred; (3) Plaintiffs have standing 

to sue under A.R.S. § 33-420; and (4) Plaintiffs pleaded their robosigning 

claims with sufficient particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a). In re Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d at 

781-784. 

Doc. 2005 at 2. 

 More specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs had stated a claim that 

“the documents at issue are invalid because they are ‘robosigned (forged).’” In re 

Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d at 783.2

 As this Court discussed at 

length in the order denying class certification (Doc. 2005), this claim is the only claim of 

the 18-page Count One that was remanded to this Court. Indeed, the Court of Appeals 

confirmed that all other theories potentially embedded in Count One were waived by 

Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs did not raise them on direct appeal. (Doc. 2047) Thus, 

Plaintiffs must survive summary judgment on this single claim. 

 As indicated above, the statute at issue creates a cause of action when someone 

files a document that is: 1) forged; 2) groundless; 3) contains a material misstatement or 

false claim; or 4) is otherwise invalid. A.R.S. § 33-420(A). However, the Court of 

Appeals’ mandate could be construed as permitting Plaintiffs to prove only “forgery” as 

 

2

 Unlike some of the other member cases, the Court of Appeals did not recount any 

factual allegations specific to the Robinsons or Silvas, whose foreclosures are at issue in 

this member case, in its reversal. (Doc. 1820). 

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the means by which this statute was violated. (Doc. 1820). Indeed in a subsequent 

decision, the Court of Appeals stated 

“This court’s reversal of Count I was limited to petitioners’ claims of 

robosigning and forgery. To the extent petitioners now seek to challenge 

the MDL Court’s dismissal of Count I as to allegations beyond robosigning 

and forgery, that challenge is waived because it was not raised in the appeal 

in MERS I.” 

(Doc. 2047 at 2) (emphasis added). 

 Accordingly, the Court will analyze “forgery”3

 specifically because it is possibly 

the only claim remaining before this Court. The Court will then attempt to determine 

whether Plaintiffs are claiming A.R.S. § 33-420 was violated by Defendants in some 

other way. 

D. MERS’ motion for summary judgment 

 1. MERS Motion as to the Robinsons - Forgery 

MERS has identified Jennifer Hamlin as the person who signed the Robinsons’ 

assignment on behalf of MERS. With respect to the allegations that Ms. Hamlin’s 

signature was “forged”, Plaintiffs have failed to create a disputed issue of fact. 

Specifically, each of the Robinsons’ testified that they had no evidence that Ms. Hamlin’s 

signature was forged. (Doc. 1979 at 11). Ms. Hamlin testified that the signature was in 

fact hers. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs’ own handwriting expert testified that Ms. Hamlin’s 

signature on the document was consistent with other examples of her signature. (Id.; 

Doc. 1980-1 at 116).4

 On this record, Plaintiffs have no evidence of forgery and MERS 

is entitled to summary judgment. 

 

3 Arizona’s Criminal Statutes define forgery (as is relevant here) as follows: “A person 

commits forgery if, with the intent to defraud, the person: 1) Falsely makes, completes or 

alters a written instrument....” A.R.S. § 13-2002. While A.R.S. § 33-420 is not a 

criminal statute, it does include a criminal penalty; thus this Court will use this definition. 

4

 The Court has cited MERS’ motion and accompanying statement of facts for “facts” 

recounted in this paragraph because Plaintiffs did not respond to MERS’s argument that 

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 2. MERS Motion as to Silvas – Forgery 

MERS has identified Christina Balandran as the relevant signer of the Silvas’ 

assignment on behalf of MERS. (Doc. 1979 at 11). Ms. Silvas testified that she had no 

evidence that Ms. Balandran did not actually sign the documents. (Id.) Plaintiff’s expert 

did not examine Ms. Balandran’s signature, and had no opinion on the authenticity of her 

signature. (Id.). On this record, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Ms. Balandran’s 

signature is a forgery. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 (moving party may discharge its 

burden on summary judgment by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case). Accordingly, MERS is entitled to summary judgment. 

 3. Plaintiffs’ allegations against MERS 

The Court having concluded there is no disputed issue of fact on the only issue the 

Court of Appeals reversed, namely forgery, the Court could enter judgment in favor of 

MERS. However, the Court will address “robosigning” because it was specifically 

mentioned by the Court of Appeals and arguably within the scope of the mandate. 

 Reading Plaintiffs response to MERS’ motion for summary judgment, it would 

appear Plaintiffs believe “robosigning” is, by and of itself, a way to violate A.R.S. § 33-

420. It is not. The statute lists four distinct and specific ways it can be violated, and 

Plaintiffs’ “robosigning” allegation must fall within one of these four categories to even 

state a claim.5

 

 Plaintiffs define robosigning as, “the actual process where people either forge 

signatures on high volumes of foreclosure documents, or the actual person signing lacks 

 

the documents are not forged and did not present any facts on this issue. Accordingly 

MERS’ facts are undisputed. 

5

 The Court notes that the Court of Appeals found Plaintiffs stated a claim as to 

“robosigning (forgery)”. This Court is aware that it is bound by that decision. However 

the Court of Appeals never suggested that robosigning standing alone, with no evidence 

of forgery or some other means of violating the actual language of the statute, would state 

a claim. 

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knowledge of the facts being attested to, and/or the documents are pre-notarized 

(notarized in blank) or post-notarized (the notary didn’t actually witness the signature).” 

Doc. 2011 at 7-8.6

 Only one of these means of robosigning, namely forgery, overlaps 

with the ways to violate A.R.S. § 33-420. 

 a. Robinsons’ allegations against MERS 

Plaintiffs’ claims that Ms. Hamlin is a robosigner because she did not have 

“personal knowledge or do any independent investigation of the facts that were set forth 

in the assignment.” Doc. 2011 at 8. Notably, lack of personal knowledge and lack of 

investigation are not ways to violate A.R.S. § 33-420. Further, to the extent Plaintiffs 

seek to imply that such lack of knowledge or lack of investigation might rise to the level 

of being a material misstatement or false claim, or make the document groundless or 

otherwise invalid, (each of which are way to violate A.R.S. § 33-420), this Court has 

previously stated that it has not located any authority in Arizona that requires “an 

attestation of personal knowledge” on documents making up the nonjudicial foreclosure 

process. Hensley v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2013 WL 791294, *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 4, 2013). 

Like the Plaintiff in Hensley, Plaintiffs in this case have failed to direct this Court to any 

such authority. Thus, even if Plaintiffs had facts to support this claim, it fails as a matter 

of Arizona law. 

 Moreover, Plaintiffs have no facts to support this claim. As stated above, 

Plaintiffs’ assert that Ms. Hamlin did not have personal knowledge of the documents she 

signed and did not investigate the documents she signed. Plaintiffs’ citation for this fact 

 

6

 MERS takes issue with Plaintiffs’ definition of “robosigning” arguing that it has no 

basis in Arizona law. (Doc. 2040 at 7-8). This Court has previously bemoaned the 

problems that arise from the use of the word “robosigning”, which does not appear to 

have a uniformly accepted legal definition. (Doc. 2005 at 8, n.3). Plaintiffs’ citation for 

their proposed definition comes from a case in the District of Columbia. (Doc. 2011 at 

8). MERS appears to be correct that this citation would have no relevance to the law of 

Arizona. 

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is: 1) paragraph 10 of their statement of facts, which cites Exhibit 11, p 51:9-54:13, and 

2) all of Exhibit 31 (which is 21 pages). Thus, Plaintiffs cite 24 pages of deposition 

testimony for this Court to review and determine whether it supports Plaintiffs’ factual 

assertion. The Court would note that “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles 

buried in briefs.” Independent Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991)). 

 Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed the deposition testimony and determined that 

Plaintiffs mischaracterize it. Ms. Hamlin testified that she would review the documents 

(Doc. 2023-7 at 42) and that if there were any questions, she would do further 

investigation to verify ownership (Doc. 2023-7 at 42-43). Accordingly, looking to only 

Plaintiffs’ evidence, on this record there is no evidence that Ms. Hamlin did not have 

personal knowledge of the documents or failed to investigate the documents. Therefore, 

even if such a theory could state a claim, on this record, MERS is entitled to summary 

judgment. 

 In the response to the MERS’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs also allege 

that Mr. Duong signed a document relevant to the Robinsons’ case. (Doc. 2011 at 8). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel then states “Hank Duong ... is also believed to be a robosigner.” (Id. 

at 8). MERS argues that Plaintiffs made no allegation in the amended complaint that the 

document Mr. Duong signed is attributable to MERS; therefore, MERS is entitled to 

summary judgment regarding Mr. Duong. Doc. 2040 at 8, n. 4; Doc. 1979 at 2-3 and n. 

2. Although Plaintiffs mention Mr. Duong in their response to MERS’ motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. 2011 at 8), they do not refute MERS’ argument that they have 

no claims against MERS for Mr. Duong’s actions. Accordingly, MERS is entitled to 

summary judgment on this theory.7

 

7

 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ factual assertion regarding Mr. Duong is based on counsel’s 

“belief” that Mr. Duong is a robosigner. Counsel’s belief is inadequate to survive 

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 At pages 6-7 and footnote 3 of their response, Plaintiffs appear to argue that even 

if the documents were not robosigned or forged, they are nonetheless false simply 

because MERS signed them. Doc. 2011 at 6-8. Plaintiffs’ argument in this regard is 

somewhat difficult to follow, so the Court quotes it as follows: 

Defendants’ attempt to characterize Plaintiff’s criticism of the assignment 

as a claim that MERS has no interest in the note is misplaced. The false 

statement is related to the transfer of the note itself together with an interest 

in all monies to become due under the note. This is not the same as saying 

that MERS was transferring an interest in the note itself. 

(Doc. 2011 at 6.) The Court ordered supplemental briefing on this issue. (Doc. 2056). 

 In the supplemental brief, Plaintiffs go on to explain that their argument is that 

MERS recorded a transfer of the “note” and that this recording was a “false claim” under 

A.R.S. § 33-420(A). (Doc. 2059 at 7-8).8

 In their motions, the various lenders argue 

that, factually, MERS has an interest in the note and that MERS transferring that interest 

is not false. (See e.g., Doc. 1923 at 16). On the question of whether MERS had a 

transferrable interest in the note, there is a disputed issue of fact. 

 

summary judgment. Further, the Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ citation to the expert opinion. 

While the expert appears to have some questions regarding signatures of Mr. Duong in 

other cases, the expert offers no opinion that the actual document in this case is not Mr. 

Duong’s authentic signature. Therefore, no disputed issue of fact exists as to whether 

Mr. Duong’s signature is authentic. 

8

 In responding to Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief, all Defendants argue that this new 

version of this claim, in which Plaintiffs state that they are not making any allegation of 

forgery, but instead arguing a completely different section of the statute was violated, is 

beyond the scope of the mandate. Doc. 2065; Doc. 2064. As the Court has discussed 

above, the Court tentatively agrees that the mandate was limited to robosigning by 

forgery. However, robosigning, as discussed above, is not a term that was defined by the 

Court of Appeals in reversing this Court. Further, when this Court denied Plaintiffs’ 

theory of class certification as beyond the scope of the mandate (Doc. 2005 at 3-4), the 

Court did so in part because Plaintiffs expressly disclaimed that they were proceeding on 

any theory of robosigning, including forgery. Thus, the Court is left at this point with 

two ambiguities: 1) did the mandate permit Plaintiffs to proceed on a theory of 

“robosigning” other than forgery; and 2) assuming yes, is a “false claim,” as alleged 

herein, a kind of “robosigning.” As the Court held above, this Court interprets the 

mandate as limiting Plaintiffs’ claim on remand to robosigning by forgery. However, the 

Court is considering this other potential definition of robosigning, alternatively, in case 

this Court has misinterpreted the mandate. 

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 However, even assuming Plaintiffs can prove the facts as they have stated them, 

this theory still fails to establish a “false claim” under A.R.S. § 33-420 as a matter of law. 

The Arizona Courts have already held that MERS can transfer a note. Sitton v. Deutsche 

Bank Nat. Trust Co., 311 P.3d 237, 243 ¶28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“MERS was the 

mortgagee of record and could assign the note and the deed of trust without regard to [the 

originating lender’s] legal status.”). The facts of this case (as claimed by Plaintiff), and 

the facts of Sitton are indistinguishable: that the record of assignments was inconsistent 

with the reality of the assignments. Id. at 243 ¶30. Nonetheless, nothing about MERS’ 

representations changed Plaintiffs’ options in a way that impacted Plaintiffs’ decisions. 

See Sitton, 311 P.3d at 243 ¶32-¶33.9

 Therefore, the “false claims” were not material.10 

Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs could prove their version of the facts at trial, this theory of 

liability fails as a matter of law. 

 

9

 The Court stated: ...these misrepresentations were not material to Sitton because the timing 

and sequence of the assignments could have had no effect on Sitton’s 

choice of actions. 

¶ 33 Sitton borrowed money and incurred liability under the note. The 

lender performed fully at the time of closing; Sitton did not perform. Her 

choices were to repay the money pursuant to the terms of the note, 

renegotiate the terms of the note, or default and cause foreclosure. Her 

liability on the note remained the same no matter who was assigned as 

beneficiary, or when. The misrepresentations in the recorded assignments 

were therefore immaterial to her as a matter of law. 

Sitton, 311 P.3d 237, 243-44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 

10 Plaintiffs mischaracterize this Court’s prior order by stating that the Court held that 

Plaintiffs “do not need to prove materiality related to the documents.” (Doc. 2011 at 9). 

This Court did not hold this, and indeed could not, as the statute itself expressly requires 

that if the theory under which a plaintiff is proceeding is a “misstatement or false claim” 

such misstatement must be “material”. A.R.S. § 33-420. Defendants correctly 

summarize the Court’s prior holding at Doc. 1979, n. 7; specifically, that if a plaintiff is 

proceeding on a theory that a document is “forged”, the plaintiff does not have to prove 

materiality. See Doc. 1912 at 4. This Court’s conclusion that “material” does not modify 

“forgery” is bolstered by the fact that forgery has a specific definition under Arizona 

criminal law that requires a showing of “intent to defraud” which is a higher requirement 

than “materiality”. See footnote 3 above. 

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 b. Silva’s allegations against MERS 

Beyond the allegations discussed above, Plaintiff makes no other allegations about 

the Silvas’ property. Therefore, MERS is entitled to summary judgment against Silvas. 

 4. Conclusion on MERS’ motion for summary judgment 

Because the Court has determined that MERS is entitled to summary judgment on 

all claims advanced by Plaintiffs in this member case, the Court need not reach MERS 

additional arguments for summary judgment in its favor including: 1) that MERS did not 

cause the documents to be recorded; and 2) that Plaintiffs do not have standing under 

Arizona agency law to contest whether MERS’ agents (Ms. Hamlin and Ms. Balandran) 

were acting within the scope of their authority. (Doc. 1979 at 8, 13). MERS will be 

granted summary judgment as to both remaining Plaintiffs in this member case. 

E. Wells Fargo’s and U.S. Bank Trustee11’s motion for summary 

judgment against the Robinson Plaintiffs 

In their motion for summary judgment, Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank Trustee 

(referred to as Defendants for purposes of this section E) argue seven theories for why 

they are entitled to summary judgment. 

 1. Forgery 

Defendants argue that the Robinson Plaintiffs have no evidence that any of the 

signatures on the documents in their chain of title were forged. Defendants identify the 

signatures of Jennifer Hamlin, Mark Bosco, and China Brown as appearing on the 

documents related to the Robinsons’ foreclosure. (Doc. 1923 at 11-14). Defendants 

argue that Plaintiffs have no evidence that any of these signatures were forged. 

 Plaintiffs respond and argue that Jennifer Hamlin is a robosigner and Hank Duong 

is a believed to be robosigner. (Doc. 2009 at 9-10). For the reasons stated above, the 

 

11 As stated above, U.S. Bank is Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corporation 

Series 2006-GEL3. 

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Court finds Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that either Ms. Hamlin or Mr. Duong 

signatures are forgeries; accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to 

these signatures. Because Plaintiffs offered no evidence regarding Mr. Bosco or Ms. 

Brown, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these signatures. 

 Finally, Plaintiffs in their response argue there are “numerous other documents” at 

issue in the Robinsons’ case (Plaintiffs do not specify what these documents are, but 

suggest the Court could read the report of Plaintiffs’ expert, which is 47 pages, and 

determine which “numerous other documents” are at issue in the Robinsons’ case). (Doc. 

2009 at 11). Defendants reply and argue that they have moved for summary judgment on 

all documents identified in the consolidated amended complaint, and that Plaintiffs’ 

attempt to interject new and additional documents would require leave to amend; which 

would be untimely. (Doc. 2037 at 7-8). 

 The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs cannot supplement their 

complaint with new documents that they claim violate A.R.S. § 33-420 via an expert 

report that includes additional documents not included in the amended complaint. 

Moreover, even if Plaintiffs could add documents in this manner, Plaintiffs have failed to 

create a disputed issue of fact as to whether these documents contain a forgery merely by 

citing the Court to the expert report without making any argument as to how these 

document(s) allegedly violate the statute. Accordingly, Defendants are also entitled to 

summary judgment on these documents. 

2. Written notice 

Alternatively Defendants argue that the Robinsons’ Deed of Trust specifically 

required the Robinsons to give written notice of their claims to their lender prior to filing 

suit. (Doc. 1923 at 3). Defendants argue that because the Robinsons’ failed to comply 

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with the required written notice provision before filing suit, Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on the Robinsons’ claims. (Doc. 1923 at 3-4). 

 Plaintiffs do not dispute that they did not give written notice prior to filing suit. 

Instead, Plaintiffs respond and argue that the original Lender on the loan was WMC 

Mortgage Corporation. (Doc. 2009 at 4). Plaintiffs then make the following argument: 

“even if Plaintiffs were [] required to give notice of the false documents claim before 

filing suit (which they weren’t), the notice requirement does not apply to Defendants 

against whom Plaintiffs are asserting the claim, i.e., Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, America’s 

Servicing Company, and MERS.” (Doc. 2009 at 4). 

 Plaintiffs make no argument in support of their “which they weren’t” 

parenthetical. Thus, the Court has no idea why Plaintiffs believe the notice requirement 

of their Deed of Trust does not apply to this claim. Accordingly, there being no disputed 

issue of fact, or argument to the contrary, the Court finds the notice provision is in effect. 

 Plaintiffs cite nothing in support of their argument that “Lender” as used in 

paragraph 20 of their Deed of Trust would not apply to any subsequent lender who 

purchased the loan, and instead would apply to only the original lender. Defendants 

reply and argue that paragraph 13 of the Deed of Trust provides that all provisions of the 

Deed of Trust bind and benefit the successors and assignees of the Lender. (Doc. 2037 at 

1). Accordingly, the Court concludes that by the Deed of Trust’s plain language, the 

written notice provision is not limited to the original lender. 

 Because the Robinsons did not give this required notice, Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on any and all theories of a violation of A.R.S. § 33-420. 

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 3. U.S. Bank Trustee’s argument that it was “not involved” in the 

foreclosure of the Robinsons’ property 

U.S. Bank argues that it owns the note, but delegated all obligations of collecting 

the collateral to someone else. (Doc. 1923 at 4-5). The Court order supplemental 

briefing on this argument and specifically the following question: 

...whether U.S. Bank is arguing [that] it IS the principal of its agent 

(MERS and the loan servicer), but that those agents did nothing wrong; or

if U.S. Bank is factually disavowing any agency relationship; thus, U.S. 

Bank could potentially escape liability if it personally took no action with 

respect to the Robinsons’ loan. 

Doc. 2055 at 3. 

 U.S. Bank timely responded to the request for supplement briefing and stated as 

follows: 

MERS was a party to the Robinsons’ deed of trust, as nominee for the 

lenders and its successors and assigns. [citation omitted] The MERS Rules 

with its members provide that an independent contractor relationship exists 

except “in the case of MERS acting as nominee with respect to a MERS 

loan, as Nominee,” as is the case here. MERS System Rules of 

Membership, Rule 10 § 5. [footnote omitted]. 

Doc. 2057 at 2. 

 Following this briefing, the Court was still unsure what exactly U.S. Bank, as 

Trustee, was arguing. The supplemental brief appeared to argue that, for purposes of this 

case and the Robinsons’ deed of trust, MERS is a “nominee”. MERS’ legal status as a 

“nominee” has resulted in various conclusions regarding its authority to act. See Zachary 

A. Kisber, Reevaluating Mers in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, 42 Real Est. L.J. 

183 (2013) (discussing at length the consequences of MERS: 1) calling itself a 

“nominee”; and 2) never defining “nominee”). In its supplement brief, U.S. Bank, as 

Trustee, still made no attempt to define the legal status of being a “nominee” and whether 

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that is the same as an agent for purposes of the Robinsons’ loan. (Doc. 2057).12 As a 

result, the Court ordered another supplemental brief. 

 In the second supplemental brief, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo concede that MERS 

is their agent. (Doc. 2063). Thus, whatever argument U.S. Bank was making (See Doc. 

1923 at 4-5) that it was not involved in the Robinsons’ foreclosure fails as a matter of 

agency law. 

 U.S. Bank devoted the majority of its supplemental briefs to another argument: 

what mens rea is required under A.R.S. § 33-420, and whether traditional agency laws 

were suspended by the case of Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 166 Ariz. 281, 286 (1991) for 

purposes of an A.R.S. § 33-420 claim. Because the Court has already determined that 

these Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, the Court need not reach this 

alternative argument. 

 4. Conclusion Wells Fargo’s and U.S. Bank Trustee’s motion for 

summary judgment 

Because the Court has determined that these Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on all claims advanced by Plaintiffs in this member case, the Court need not 

reach their additional arguments for summary judgment in their favor including: 1) that 

the filings of record did not show that either of these Defendants claimed to have an 

“interest” in the property; 2) that someone else physically recorded the documents; 3) that 

any alleged misstatements in the documents are not material; and 4) that Defendants did 

not have personal knowledge (as opposed to imputed knowledge) that any statements 

were false. 

 

12 MERS responded to U.S. Banks supplemental brief and stated that they are U.S. 

Banks’ agent under Arizona law. (Doc. 2061). 

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F. Bank of America N.A’s, Bank of New York Mellon’s,13 and 

ReconTrust’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Silvas 

Bank of America N.A’s, Bank of New York Mellon’s, and ReconTrust (referred to 

as Defendants in this section F) move for summary judgment against Plaintiff Rosa 

Silvas arguing 11 reasons why they are entitled to summary judgment. 

 1. Silvas settled and released her claim 

When Plaintiff Silvas settled the bifurcated portion of this case (CV 09-227-TUC) 

she released all 

...claims made or which could have been made by Plaintiff arising from the 

origination or servicing of the Loan (in any way) as well as in any way 

related to the underlying property, Note, Mortgage and/or Deed of Trust, 

any serving act or omission thereon as well as any claim or issue which was 

or could have been brought in the Litigation, except for the Amended 

Complaint’s Eighth Claim for Relief and the portions of the Tenth and 

Eleventh Claims for Relief that were transferred for Mulit-district 

Litigation. 

Doc. 1921 at 4. 

 The undisputed facts are that this release was signed in October of 2013 (Doc. 

1922-1 at 6), and that the consolidated amended complaint (in the Phoenix Multi-district 

case) was filed in June of 2011 (Doc. 1424). As is clear from the above quoted language, 

Count 1 (which had already been filed) was not excepted from the general release. 

However, the Counts referenced in the release are referring to the amended complaint in 

the Tuscon case, not the consolidated amended complaint in the Phoenix Multi-district 

case (by way of example, at the time the release was signed, Count Ten in the Phoenix 

case dealt with alleged violations of South Carolina law). 

 Plaintiff’s counsel filed an affidavit that says it was not her “intent” to release 

Count 1: the A.R.S. § 33-420 claim. Defendants point out that the language of the 

release is clear. The Court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiff released all claims that 

 

13 As Trustee for SAMI II 2006-AR3. 

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“could have been brought” except the very specific ones reserved in the release. The 

A.R.S. § 33-420 claim could have been brought in the CV 09-227-TUC case that was 

settled and accordingly, was released by the settlement agreement. Defendants are 

entitled to summary judgment for this reason. 

 2. Silvas did not comply with the written notice provisions of her 

Deed of Trust 

Alternatively, Defendants argue that the Silvas’ Deed of Trust specifically 

required Silvas to give written notice of her claims to her lender prior to filing suit. (Doc. 

1921 at 4-5). Defendants argue that because Silvas failed to comply with the required 

written notice provision before filing suit, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

on Silvas’ claims. (Id.). 

 Silvas does not dispute that she did not give written notice prior to filing suit. 

Instead, Plaintiff responds and argues that the original Lender on the loan was America’s 

Wholesale Lender. (Doc. 2021 at 4). Plaintiff then makes the following argument “even 

if Mrs. Silvas was required to give notice of the false documents claim before filing suit 

(which she wasn’t), the notice requirement does not apply to Defendants against whom 

Mrs. Silvas is asserting the claim, i.e., Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, and 

Recontrust.” (Doc. 2021 at 4-5). 

 Plaintiff makes no argument in support of her “which she wasn’t” parenthetical. 

Thus, the Court has no idea why Plaintiff believes the notice requirement of her Deed of 

Trust does not apply to this claim. Accordingly, there being no disputed issue of fact, or 

argument, to the contrary, the Court finds the notice provision is in effect. 

 Plaintiff cites nothing in support of her argument that “Lender” as used in 

paragraph 20 of the Deed of Trust would not apply to any subsequent lender who 

purchased the loan, and instead would apply to only the original lender. Defendants 

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reply and argue that paragraph 13 of the Deed of Trust provides that all provisions of the 

Deed of Trust bind and benefit the successors and assignees of the Lender. (Doc. 2035 at 

4). Accordingly, the Court concludes that by the Deed of Trust’s plain language, the 

written notice provision is not limited to the original lender. 

 Because Silvas did not give this required notice, Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on any and all theories of a violation of A.R.S. § 33-420. 

 3. Forgery 

 Defendants argue that, looking at the substance of the document, the assignment 

was valid and accurate; and therefore did not violate A.R.S. § 33-420. Specifically, 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no evidence of forgery, invalid notarization, lack of 

knowledge, or lack of authority for Christina Balandran. Further, Defendants argue that 

all representations regarding MERS were true and that any statement that MERS was 

transferring the note is “surplusage and immaterial.” Doc. 1921 at 16. 

 Plaintiff Silvas responds as follows regarding her “evidence” that Ms. Balandran’s 

signature is a forgery: 

 Finally, whether the assignment or other documents were 

appropriately signed, or signed at all, by Christina Balandran and other 

parties, involves a question of fact. (See e.g., McDonnell report related to 

Silvas loan filed as Consolidated Exhibit 26 related to securitization history 

of loan at pp. 10-14; and see paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement 

of Facts filed in support of Plaintiffs’ opposition to MERS Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment, incorporated herein by this reference.) 

(Doc. 2021 at 11-12). 

 The Court has quoted Plaintiff’s argument in its entirety. Exhibit 26, as cited by 

Plaintiff above (Doc. 2023-6 at 1-75) is a 75 page forensic title examination of Silvas’ 

property. The Court has no indication of why Plaintiff cites only pages 10-14. In the 

Court’s review of pages 10-13, the Court found no mention of Ms. Balandran. At page 

14 of the Report (page 15 in the electronic record), there are two mentions of Ms. 

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Balandran. In both instances, the expert questions the scope of Ms. Balandran’s authority 

to authorize the documents in question. However, in neither instance does the expert in 

any way question the authenticity of Ms. Balandran’s signature. Accordingly, Plaintiff 

has offered no evidence of forgery. 

 At summary judgment, Plaintiff has to actually make an argument and come 

forward with evidence in support of that argument. Plaintiff’s sole “argument” on this 

point is the conclusion that whether the documents were appropriately signed is an issue 

of fact. This is inadequate to establish an issue of fact based on evidence from which the 

jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor. 

 Plaintiff also suggests at two points in her response that many more documents are 

at issue beyond the documents she identified in her complaint. (Doc. 2021 at 8, 12). 

Further, Plaintiff suggests that the complaint should be amended to conform to the 

evidence. (Doc. 2021 at 8). 

 First, this is not evidence that is newly discovered; it is evidence that was filed in 

the public record between 2006 and 2013. The deadline to file motions to amend the 

complaint was January 9, 2015 (CV 10-630, Doc. 26 at 2). Plaintiff cannot show she 

exercised diligence in seeking an amendment by trying to add these documents to the 

complaint at this late date.14 Thus, the request to amend to add 9 additional documents is 

untimely and denied. 

 Second, Plaintiff still has not created a disputed issue of fact as to whether any of 

these documents contain a forgery. In her response at page 8 she simply states that the 

documents exist. In her response at page 12, Plaintiff says she does not want to waive a 

claim related to these documents. However, by failing to argue that any of these 

 

14 “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the 

party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 

16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 

amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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documents contain a forgery, Plaintiff has failed to establish a disputed issue of fact on 

any claim as to any of these documents. Thus, even if the Court considered the 9 

documents not included in the complaint (and not presented to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals), the Defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff has 

failed to present any evidence from which a jury could find in her favor. 

 Accordingly, Defendants motion for summary judgment will be granted as to any 

allegation of forgery. 

 4. Plaintiff’s other claim against Defendants 

Identical to the claim made against the MERS Defendants, Plaintiff argues, 

 Defendants’ attempt to characterize Plaintiff’s criticism of the 

assignment as a claim that MERS has no interest in the note is misplaced. 

The false statement is related to the transfer of the note itself together with 

an interest in all monies to become due under the note. This is not the same 

as saying that MERS was transferring an interest in the note itself. 

(Doc. 2021 at 11 and footnote 11 herein). 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds as to this alternative theory of 

“robosigning” as a means of violating A.R.S. § 33-420, Plaintiff’s theory fails as a matter 

of law, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 

 5. Conclusion on Bank of America N.A’s, Bank of New York 

Mellon’s, and ReconTrust’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Silvas 

Because Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for the three reasons stated 

above, the Court need not reach Defendants other alternative reasons they argue they are 

entitled to summary judgment, including 1) there were no specific allegations against 

Bank of America; 2) Bank of New York Mellon was not the actor who foreclosed the 

property; 3) Silvas makes no claims that ReconTrust violated its duties under Chapter 6.1 

which is required to state a claim under A.R.S. § 33-807(E) against a Trustee; 4) of the 

documents Plaintiff complains of in the amended complaint, five were not recorded, and 

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therefore cannot form the basis of an improper “recording” claim under A.R.S. § 33-420; 

5) neither ReconTrust nor Bank of America claim an “interest” in the property at issue; 6) 

neither Bank of America nor Bank of New York Mellon physically recorded the 

documents; 7) the alleged misstatements in the documents are not material; and 8) no 

Defendant had actual knowledge (as opposed to imputed knowledge) that any statements 

were false. 

V. Result 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.’s and Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment against the Robinsons and 

Silvas (Doc. 1979 & 72) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wells Fargo’s and U.S. Bank’s15 motion for 

summary judgment against the Robinson Plaintiffs (Doc. 1923 & 55) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bank of America N.A’s, Bank of New York 

Mellon’s,16 and ReconTrust’s motion for summary judgment against Silvas (Doc. 1921 & 

53) is granted. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment17 in 

favor of these 7 Defendants and against these 3 Plaintiffs, accordingly. The Clerk of the 

 

15 As Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Series 2006-GEL3. 

16 As Trustee for SAMI II 2006-AR3. 

17 This Court has previously been questioned for not using Rule 54(b) language when 

entering judgment in a case in this multi-district litigation. Rollins v. Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 737 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court has 

diligently undertaken to attempt to determine whether such language was necessary at 

this time. First, the Court has presumed that all Defendants have moved for summary 

judgment relying on Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional statement. (Doc. 2001-1). However, the 

Court notes that Bank of America has moved for summary judgment despite not being 

listed as a party in the jurisdictional statement; so the parties’ representations regarding 

jurisdiction are of questionable reliability. Second, the Court has presumed that Amada 

Holbert was never made a Plaintiff in this MDL, or that she settled (see footnote 1 

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Court shall close CV 10-630-PHX-JAT as a result of this Order. The Clerk of the Court 

shall file a copy of this Order in both the MD case number, and the member case number 

listed above. 

 Dated this 25th day of July, 2016. 

 

herein). Third, the Court has accepted Plaintiffs’ representation that America’s Servicing 

Company is a dba of Wells Fargo. Fourth, the Court has reviewed the docket of the 

original member case filed in Tucson (because neither party has given the Court any 

updates as to the status of that case), and determined that the case is closed. Based on all 

of these assumptions, the Court believes this Order completely resolves this member 

case. However, if either party disagrees, that party shall move for Rule 54(b) language 

within 3 days, and list for the Court what claims and parties remain in this case (either 

before this Court or before another Court). 

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