Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05185/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05185-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT VERNON WOODS,

Petitioner,

 v.

FRANK X. CHAVEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

_________________________________

ROBERT VERNON WOODS,

Petitioner,

v.

FRANK X. CHAVEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. 07-05144 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

No. 07-5185 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Robert Vernon Woods, an inmate at Sierra

Conservation Center State Prison, has filed two petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that

two sentences under California's Three Strikes law, California

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1

In accordance with Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254

Proceedings and Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

the Court substitutes Frank X. Chavez as Respondent because he is now

Petitioner's custodian.

2

Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12, violate state law and

constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Respondent Frank X.

Chavez1

 opposes the petitions. Petitioner has not filed a

traverse. Having considered all the papers filed by the parties,

the Court denies the petitions.

BACKGROUND

I. Petition in C 07-5144 CW

In a complaint filed on December 29, 2004, Petitioner was

charged with three counts of robbery. The complaint also alleged

that Petitioner had five prior strike convictions and three prior

serious felony convictions. On April 26, 2005, Petitioner waived

his right to a preliminary hearing, plead guilty to all charges and

admitted the enhancement allegations. On October 27, 2005, the

court sentenced Petitioner to seventy-five years to life in prison

and to forty-five years consecutive. On October 31, 2006, the

California court of appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished

opinion. On January 3, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s petition for review. 

The California court of appeal summarized the facts as

follows:

Appellant was 44 years old when the trial court sentenced

him to a total term of 120 years to life, representing a

three strikes term of 25 years to life plus 15 years for

a serious felony enhancement for each of three bank

robberies committed during December, 2004. All three

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robberies were at Bank of America branches in San Jose. 

Resp.’s Ex. 6, People v Woods, H029514 (October 31, 2006) at 1.

Petitioner carried out two of the robberies by handing a bank

teller a note indicating he wanted money in fifty and one hundred

dollar bills. Petitioner carried out the third robbery by telling

the manager that he wanted one hundred thousand dollars in hundred

dollar bills. He also told the manager that he had a bomb in his

briefcase. At each robbery, Petitioner left the bank with a few

thousand dollars. Id. at 2.

According to the probation report, appellant said that he

had been directed to rob the banks by voices that he had

been hearing since April, 2001. In a letter to the court,

Appellant said, “I am very remorseful for what I have

done. The crimes I committed were not done for profit or

personal gain, but the spirit voices can be quite

overwhelming.” The probation report states that

appellant said that he “gave most of the money away to

family, friends, and to the homeless. He also purchased

$3,000.00 in flowers for a friend’s funeral.”

Id. at 2.

The court summarized the facts about Petitioner’s

sentencing as follows:

At the time of the imposition of the sentence challenged

here appellant was also sentenced on a separate case for

theft from an elder and contracting without a license. 

. . . In that case, appellant did some yard work for a

woman in her 90's and did not have a valid license to

perform this work. Appellant collected one check for

$3,500 from the victim at the start of the work and

another $3,500 check after working for an hour and a

half. Appellant admitted to the probation officer that

he had knowingly overcharged the victim for the work but

said that he “did a competent and complete job.”

Before sentencing, appellant filed a motion asking the

court to reduce the theft from an elder charge to a

misdemeanor and to dismiss appellant’s strike priors. 

The motion described appellant’s childhood. Appellant’s

father left him, appellant’s mother, and appellant’s

three brothers. Appellant was sexually molested by his

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uncle. Appellant’s mother married a man who was

physically abusive to appellant and his brothers. 

Appellant began running away, drinking alcohol, and

smoking marijuana. When he was 15, he was sent to the

California Youth Authority for armed robbery, burglary

and forgery.

Appellant’s first three strike priors were incurred in

1980 when appellant was residing in a drug treatment

program. . . . Appellant was sentenced to four years in

state prison for three counts of robbery.

In 1984, appellant and a friend “after days of binging on

alcohol and cocaine” committed a residential burglary in

which a handgun, ammunition, and other property were

taken. . . . Appellant was sentenced to seven years in

state prison. In 1992, appellant was convicted of making

criminal threats to a woman he had been seeing socially

and sentenced to 16 months in state prison.

In 2001, appellant got divorced, started smoking

methamphetamine and crack cocaine, and began hearing

voices. He attempted suicide by hanging himself in his

mother’s backyard and was hospitalized. In 2002,

appellant began receiving treatment including medication

from a mental health facility. Personnel there diagnosed

appellant as “schizo effective, paranoid type.” . . . In

2004, appellant was living in a facility for dualdiagnosed men. In August, 2004, he left this program

“fearful the rampant drug use occurring at the facility

by other residents would cause him to relapse.” 

Appellant committed the bank robberies four months later. 

After a 15 to 20 minute discussion of this sentencing in

chambers, and hearing argument from counsel, the trial

court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the prior

strike convictions. The trial court reviewed appellant’s

criminal history noting, “he has performed poorly on

probation. He has 6 felonies and 18 misdemeanor prior

convictions and he was on probation at the time of the

present offense.” The court considered appellant’s

“background, character, and prospects” noting that

appellant was divorced and had no dependent children. As

to the charges of theft from an elder and contracting

without a license, the court said that because those

cases were not serious or violent, because of appellant’s

mental illness and drug and alcohol addiction, and

because the codefendant had received a sentence of

probation and 30 days on the weekend work program, the

court would exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior

strike allegations. As to the bank robbery charges,

however, the court said, “I realize that Mr. Woods

suffers from schizophrenia. The question in the Court’s

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mind is whether or not the public in passing the Three

Strikes Law and . . . the legislature had in mind people

such as Mr. Woods coming within the meaning of the Three

Strikes Law. [¶] I believe that Mr. Woods is a person who

should be taken from . . . the potential of doing harm to

those he comes in contact with. I believe that the best

place to do that is a prison facility which provides

mental health services to a person such as those in Mr.

Woods’ situation.” The court declined to strike the

prior strike allegations and sentenced appellant as

described above to a state prison term of 120 years to

life with the recommendation that appellant “be housed in

a State psychiatric medical facility.”

Id. at 3-5.

II. Petition in C 07-5185 CW

On April 23, 2003, Petitioner plead guilty to possession of

cocaine base, being under the influence of cocaine, and possession

of drug paraphernalia, and admitted the truth of five prior strike

convictions. On May 9, 2003, the court suspended imposition of

sentence and granted probation for one year. On February 19, 2004,

the court summarily revoked probation and issued a bench warrant

for Petitioner. On April 8, 2004, the court found a violation of

probation and ordered a mental health evaluation. On July 14,

2004, the court reinstated probation and extended the term to

October 30, 2004. On September 10, 2004, the court again revoked

probation and issued a bench warrant. On June 14, 2006, the court

sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years to life. 

On June 25, 2007, the California court of appeal affirmed the

judgment in an unpublished opinion. On August 29, 2007, the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

The court of appeal summarized the facts of the case as follows:

In December, 2002, appellant flagged down a police

officer to complain about a fare dispute with a cab

driver. The officer noticed that appellant appeared to

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be under the influence and that he kept putting his hands

in his pockets. A search of appellant’s person revealed

a crack pipe and three baggies of a substance resembling

crack cocaine. A urine test was presumptively positive

for cocaine.

Resp.’s Ex. 6, People v. Woods, H030320 (June 25, 2007) at 1.

The court noted that, before his sentencing, Petitioner had

filed a motion to dismiss his strike priors which included the same

facts about his childhood, divorce and mental health problems that

were stated in his motion to dismiss prior convictions in the bank

robberies case. Id. at 3-4. The court quoted the trial court’s

consideration of the motion to dismiss:

The [trial] court said, “. . . I’ve noted a very

extensive criminal history that has continued to the

present date including while . . . being supervised by me

and was reviewed on a regular [basis]. He has continued

to violate the law [and] his most recent conviction is of

a serious felony that does pose in my view a threat to

the community. [¶] I feel that based on my supervision of

the defendant and all the reports I have received over

these many, many months from probation and in the fact

that he has continued [to] violate the law while on

probation and pose a threat to the community that this

motion should be denied.”

Id. at 5.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim

that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

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was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal

law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if

it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). If the state court only

considered state law, the federal court must ask whether state law,

as explained by the state court, is "contrary to" clearly

established governing federal law. Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d

1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001).

To determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state

court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). In the present case, the highest court to address the

merits of Petitioner's claims is the California appellate court on

direct review.

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DISCUSSION

I. Abuse of Discretion

In both petitions, Petitioner’s first claim is that the state

courts’ refusals to dismiss his prior strike convictions were

arbitrary and deprived him “of fundamental fairness in state

sentencing, his liberty interest in non-arbitrary exercise of

discretion, and, thus of due process.”

Federal habeas relief is unavailable for violations of state

law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of

state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). A

petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one

merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Longford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996); see also, Ely v. Terhune, 125

F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding claim that state

court erred by refusing to strike prior conviction not cognizable

on habeas review). 

In People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 508

(1996), the California Supreme Court held that a trial court may,

on its own motion, strike prior felony conviction allegations in a

case brought under the Three Strikes Law. In so holding, the court

interpreted the language of California Penal Code § 1385(a). Thus,

Petitioner’s abuse of discretion claim arises under state law and 

he cannot transform it into a federal claim merely by asserting

that the trial courts violated his right to due process. Because

this is a state law claim, it is not cognizable on habeas review. 

Therefore, relief on this claim is denied.

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II. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner’s second claim in both petitions is that his

sentences are cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. 

A. Established Supreme Court Authority

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for

which the defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Solem v. Helm,

463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (sentence of life imprisonment without

possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent felony violates Eighth

Amendment). But "outside the context of capital punishment,

successful challenges to the proportionality of particular

sentences will be exceedingly rare." Id. at 289-90. For the

purposes of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), it is clearly

established that a “gross proportionality principle is applicable

to sentences for terms of years.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

72, 73 (2003). 

In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Chief Justice

Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined in a two-justice plurality to

conclude that Solem should be overruled and that no proportionality

review is required under the Eighth Amendment except with respect

to death sentences. Id. at 961-985. A three-justice concurrence

made up of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter concluded that

Solem should not be rejected and that the Eighth Amendment contains

a narrow proportionality principle that is not confined to death

penalty cases, but that forbids only extreme sentences which are

grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 997-1001. Because

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no majority opinion emerged in Harmelin on the question of

proportionality, Justice Kennedy's view-–that the Eighth Amendment

forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to

the crime--is considered the holding of the Court. United States

v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In judging the appropriateness of a sentence under a

recidivist statute, a court may take into account the government's

interest not only in punishing the offense of conviction, but also

its interest "'in dealing in a harsher manner with those who [are]

repeat[] criminal[s].'" Bland, 961 F.2d at 129 (quoting Rummel v.

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)). The Eighth Amendment does not

preclude a state from making a judgment that protecting the public

safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been

convicted of at least one serious or violent crime, as may occur in

a sentencing scheme that imposes longer terms on recidivists. 

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 (2003) (upholding twentyfive-to-life sentence for recidivist convicted of grand theft);

Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85 (upholding life sentence with

possibility of parole for recidivist convicted of fraudulent use of

credit card for $80, passing forged check for $28.36 and obtaining

$120.75 under false pretenses). Substantial deference is granted

to state legislature’s determination of the types and limits of

punishments for crimes. United States v. Gomez, 472 F.3d 671, 673-

74 (9th Cir. 2006). 

B. Analysis

1. Case No. C 07-5144 CW

In addressing this claim, the court of appeal properly relied

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upon the Supreme Court jurisprudence discussed above and

corresponding California law as explicated in In re Lynch, 8 Cal.

410 (1972). Resp.’s Ex. 6 in case no. C 07-5144 CW at 7-10. The

court properly found that Petitioner’s current offenses, three bank

robberies, were more serious than those offenses at issue in Rummel

and Ewing. Id. at 9. The court properly relied upon the fact that

Petitioner’s sentence was not punishment merely for the instant

offenses, but for committing the robberies as a recidivist offender

and that recidivism justifies the imposition of longer sentences

for subsequent offenses. Id. at 10. The court found that

Petitioner had repeatedly re-offended, performed poorly on parole,

and was on probation when he committed the current offenses. Id.

The court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s sentence was not cruel and

unusual because he was sentenced not only for the three serious

robbery convictions, but also due to his five strike convictions,

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States

Supreme Court authority. Id. Therefore, this claim for habeas

relief is denied.

2. Case No. C 07-5185 CW

In addressing this claim, the court of appeal primarily

considered California law governing cruel and unusual punishment. 

Resp.’s Ex. 6 in case number C 07-5185 CW at 8-9. On habeas

review, this is acceptable because California’s jurisprudence

regarding cruel and unusual punishment is in accord with that of

the United States Supreme Court.

The court properly found that Petitioner’s sentence was not

punishment merely for the instant drug offense; rather, it was

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punishment for committing the instant offense as a recidivist

offender. Id. at 9. The appellate court recognized that the trial

court had frequent contacts with Petitioner during the probationary

period, received reports on his progress, and was aware of his

mental health and drug abuse issues. Thus, the trial court was in

an unusually well-informed position to make a determination about

Petitioner’s sentence. Id. at 9-10. The court of appeal noted

that Petitioner had “repeatedly re-offended, performed poorly on

parole, and failed on closely-monitored probation.” Id. at 9. 

Given these findings, the court properly found that Petitioner’s

mental illness and drug problems did not compel the conclusion that

his sentence was cruel or unusual. Id. The court’s conclusion

that Petitioner’s sentence was not unconstitutional, because he was

sentenced not only for the felony drug offense but also due to his

five strike convictions, was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of United States Supreme Court authority. Id.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner’s two petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus are denied. No certificate of appealability

is warranted in this case. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing

§ 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring district court to

rule on certificate of appealability in same order that denies

petition). Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing

that any of his claims amounted to a denial of his constitutional

rights or to demonstrate that a reasonable jurist would find this

Court's denial of his claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The clerk of the court shall

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enter judgment and close the files. Each party shall bear his own

costs.

Dated Feburary 16, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT VERNON WOODS,

Petitioner,

 v.

FRANK X. CHAVEZ, Warden,

Respondent. /

ROBERT VERNON WOODS,

Petitioner,

v.

FRANK X. CHAVEZ, Warden.

Respondent.

__________________________________/

Case Number: CV07-05144 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Number CV07-5185 CW

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 16, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Robert Vernon Woods F-32883

T3-135-U

Sierra Conservation Center State Prison

5150 O’Byrnes Ferry Rd

Jamestown, CA 95327-0500

Dated: February 16, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Ronnie Hersler, Administrative Law Clerk

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