Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08193/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08193-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Douglas E Fuqua,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-08193-PCT-DWL

ORDER 

On October 12, 2018, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (“the Petition”). (Doc. 6.) On September 3, 2019, Magistrate Judge Boyle 

issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) concluding the Petition should be denied

and dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 18.) Afterward, Petitioner filed objections to the 

R&R. (Doc. 25.) For the following reasons, the Court will overrule Petitioner’s objections

to the R&R, deny the Petition, and terminate this action.

I. Background

The relevant factual and procedural background is set forth in the R&R. In a 

nutshell, in 2011, Petitioner was convicted at trial of two counts of misdemeanor assault, 

two counts of aggravated assault, one count of kidnapping, and one count of felony 

criminal damage. (Doc. 18 at 3.) All of the charges arose “from a domestic violence

incident that occurred on April 22 and 23, 2011, between [Petitioner] and his then wife.” 

(Id. at 1, citation omitted.) In January 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total 

of 35 years’ imprisonment, with 34.5 years of the sentences being flat-time sentences, and 

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awarded Petitioner 277 days of presentence credit. (Id. at 3.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed in 

part, holding that the imposition of flat-time sentences was improper and that Petitioner 

should serve no less than 85% of his sentences. (Id.)

In August 2014, Petitioner filed an appeal challenging his resentencing. (Id.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. (Id.)

In September 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Id. at 4.) In February 2016, the trial court granted relief in part, as to “the illegal sentence 

pursuant to Rule 32.1(H),” and ordered resentencing. (Id.) In April 2016, the trial court 

resentenced Petitioner to 21 years’ imprisonment on the four felony counts. (Id.)

In May 2016,

1 Petitioner filed a petition for review regarding the trial court’s partial 

denial of PCR relief. (Id.) 

In September 2016, Petitioner filed an appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals in 

which he challenged his resentencing, requested presentence credit for time served, and 

requested that his sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively. (Id.)

In August 2017, after consolidating the PCR denial and the sentencing appeal, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s sentences and denied relief on the petition 

for review. (Id.) 

In October 2018, Petitioner filed the petition. (Doc. 1.) It asserts four grounds for 

relief, which the Court previously summarized as follows: “In Ground One, Petitioner 

alleges the state court violated the Fourteenth Amendment by affirming the Superior 

Court’s vacatur of presentence credit as to certain counts where the State had not 

challenged Petitioner receiving the credit. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges his Fifth 

Amendment right not to be subjected to double jeopardy was violated. In Ground Three, 

Petitioner alleges his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial were 

violated based upon the admission of expert testimony over his objections. In Ground Four, 

1 The R&R states this petition was filed in May 2015. (Doc. 18 at 4.) Although the 

underlying petition is dated May 5, 2015 (Doc. 16-3 at 21), this appears to be a typo—

other portions of the petition refer to events in April 2016 (Doc. 16-3 at 2 n.1).

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Petitioner alleges his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of appellate

counsel was violated.” (Doc. 9 at 2.)

II. The R&R

The R&R was issued on November 6, 2019. (Doc. 18.) 

As an initial matter, the R&R declines to resolve whether the petition was filed 

within AEPDA’s one-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 5-7.)

As for Ground One (challenge to state court’s vacatur of pretrial incarceration 

credit), the R&R concludes it fails “because it challenges Arizona law regarding the finality 

of its judgments. Whether the Arizona courts violated Rules 26.16 and 24.3 of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure does not present a federal question. . . . Petitioner’s assertion 

of a Fourteenth Amendment violation does not make this claim cognizable.” (Id. at 8-9, 

citations omitted.)

As for Ground Two (challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences arising

from a single incident), the R&R concludes it fails for two independent reasons. First, the 

R&R concludes that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust this claim during the state-court 

proceedings—when Petitioner presented this challenge during his direct appeal from his 

third sentencing, he characterized it as a state-law sentencing error and didn’t, aside from 

a fleeting reference to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the caption, 

cite or rely upon federal law. (Id. at 9-11.) Second, the R&R concludes this claim “is not 

cognizable” regardless of whether it was exhausted and identifies several Ninth Circuit 

decisions refusing to consider habeas challenges to consecutive sentences. (Id. at 11 & 

n.5.) Finally, in a footnote, the R&R notes that “Petitioner did not argue before, and does 

not argue now, that his underlying convictions fail the [Blockburger] same-elements test. 

Certainly, Aggravated Assault, Kidnapping, and Criminal Damage contain distinct 

elements.” (Id. at 11 n.5.)

As for Ground Three (challenge to trial court’s decision to allow the state to elicit 

domestic violence “profile” testimony from an expert), the R&R concludes it is 

“unexhausted and procedurally defaulted” because Petitioner “cited only state law [State 

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v. Ketchner, 339 P.3d 645 (Ariz. 2014)] and presented no federal argument” in his PCR 

petition, reply, and petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 11-12.) 

As for Ground Four (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, premised on 

counsel’s failure to present a Ketchner claim), the R&R begins by summarizing the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ rationale for rejecting this claim. After observing that, “[a]s a 

general rule, appellate counsel is not ineffective for selecting some issues and rejecting 

others” and noting that the state presented very little profile evidence at trial (“the trial 

court . . . limited the prosecutor to four questions seeking the expert’s opinion, only one of 

which addressed the behaviors that abusers use to control the victim”), the Arizona Court 

of Appeals concluded that Petitioner’s appellate counsel was not ineffective. (Id. at 13-

14.) The R&R concludes that, “[g]iven the limited scope and quantity of the testimony, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals was not objectively unreasonable when it decided counsel 

was not ineffective for deciding to bypass a weaker appellate issue.” (Id. at 15.)

III. Legal Standard

A party may file written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of being served 

with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 Rules”). Those 

objections must be “specific.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after being 

served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis added).

District courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no specific 

objection has been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (“It does 

not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual 

or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to 

those findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations 

de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). 

...

...

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IV. The Objections To The R&R

Petitioner objects to the R&R’s analysis concerning all four of his grounds for relief. 

(Doc. 25.)

As for Ground One, Petitioner argues that he did “not present Ground One ‘only’

on the basis of a state law violation” because the Arizona Constitution “encompasses the 

provisions of the ‘Due Process’ Clause of the very 14th Amendment of the U.S. ‘same’

Constitutional guarantee and safeg[u]ard.” (Id. at 3-5.) Petitioner further contends that 

Ground One raises a “fundamental unfairness” claim that justifies not only federal habeas 

review, but also federal habeas relief. (Id. at 4.)

These objections will be overruled. First, Petitioner is incorrect that his assertion of 

a state-law claim during the state-court proceedings may be construed, for exhaustion 

purposes, as the implicit assertion of a federal constitutional claim. As the Ninth Circuit 

has explained:

Fair presentation requires that the petitioner describe in the state proceedings 

both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is 

based so that the state courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal 

principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. Thus, for 

purposes of exhausting state remedies, a claim for relief in habeas corpus 

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well 

as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.

Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Second, putting aside the question of exhaustion, Petitioner doesn’t address (and 

thus has waived any objection to) the R&R’s citation of cases holding that the specific type 

of challenge Petitioner seeks to raise here—a challenge to a state court’s failure to confer 

presentence incarceration credit—simply isn’t cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

As for Ground Two, Petitioner offers various reasons why all of the crimes in his 

case should have been considered “one act” under Arizona law. (Doc. 25 at 5-6, 8.) 

Petitioner then contends that because “the State of Arizona’s ‘State Constitution’ itself 

holds provisions adopting and embracing the Constitution of the United States as well as 

its ‘Bill of Rights’ . . . [t]he Arizona State Constitution ‘by its own language’ . . . subjects 

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itself to the provisions of the United States Constitution.” (Id. at 6-7.) Finally, as for 

footnote five of the R&R, Petitioner acknowledges that he never specifically raised a 

Blockburger claim but argues this should be overlooked because (1) pro se pleadings 

should be construed liberally and (2) the Arizona Department of Corrections didn’t provide 

him with access to the legal books that were needed to discover this claim. (Id. at 8-9.)

These objections will be overruled. First, and as with Ground One, Petitioner

misunderstands the legal standards governing exhaustion and fair presentation—a 

reference to state law or the state constitution is insufficient, even if Petitioner believes 

these authorities implicitly incorporate federal law. Second, Petitioner doesn’t address 

(and thus has waived any objection to) the R&R’s citation of cases refusing to consider 

habeas challenges to consecutive sentences. (Doc. 18 at 11 & n.5.)

As for Ground Three, Petitioner disagrees with the R&R’s conclusion that he failed 

to exhaust his federal constitutional challenge to the trial judge’s decision to admit profile 

testimony and points to Tart v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 

1991), as a case recognizing the propriety of “reliance on state law to exhaust federal 

claim.” (Doc. 25 at 9-10.) Additionally, Petitioner asks the Court to review Ground Three 

pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).

These objections will be overruled. As noted, the rule in the Ninth Circuit is that 

“[f]air presentation requires that the petitioner . . . include reference to a specific federal 

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to 

relief.” Davis, 511 F.3d at 1009 (citation omitted). Thus, to the extent the First Circuit 

may have followed a different fair-presentation rule in 1991, it does not help Petitioner 

here. Finally, Petitioner’s invocation on Martinez is misplaced because Ground Three is 

not a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

As for Ground Four, Petitioner argues his appellate counsel was ineffective in 

failing to present his Ketchner claim because the claim was “a dead-bang winner” and the 

underlying evidence was clearly “inadmissible.” (Doc. 25 at 12-13.) 

These objections will be overruled. Petitioner’s narrow focus on whether the trial 

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court’s decision to admit the profile evidence was erroneous under Ketchner, and whether

his counsel therefore could have raised a meritorious challenge to that evidentiary ruling 

on appeal, asks the wrong question. Petitioner doesn’t challenge (and has therefore waived

any objection to) the R&R’s observation that very little profile evidence was admitted at 

trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the admission of this limited evidence was 

improper, Petitioner hasn’t argued—much less established—that its admission was also 

harmful. Indeed, even in Ketchner, where the state presented a significant quantity of 

profile evidence and emphasized that evidence during closing argument, the Arizona 

Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he error . . . is harmless as to the convictions and 

sentences for aggravated assault and attempted first-degree murder.” Ketchner, 339 P.3d 

at 650. It was thus logical (or, at least, not an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law) for the Arizona state courts to conclude that Petitioner’s appellate 

counsel’s tactical decision to focus on other issues didn’t constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellate counsel’s

failure to raise issues on direct appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance when 

appeal would not have provided grounds for reversal.”).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Petitioner’s objections to the R&R (Doc. 25) are overruled.

(2) The R&R’s recommended disposition (Doc. 18) is accepted.

(3) The Petition (Doc. 6) is denied.

(4) A Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied because denial of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and 

reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(5) The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 3rd day of February, 2020.

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