Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00713/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00713-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

BEASLEY SINGLETON, )

) 

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-cv-713-WHA

 ) (WO)

AUBURN UNIVERSITY ) 

MONTGOMERY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 18) filed by

Defendant Auburn University Montgomery (“AUM”) on February 9, 2012.

Following this court’s granting of the Defendant’s Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #

6), the Plaintiff’s, Beasley Singleton (“Singleton”), case was to proceed on Count I – racially

hostile working environment in violation of Title VII; Count II –race and gender discrimination

in violation of Title VII and § 1981; and Count IV – age discrimination in violation of the

ADEA. AUM filed the present Motion to Dismiss alleging that Count IV is due to be dismissed

because of AUM’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. On March 2, 2012, Singleton filed a

Response to the Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 20), and on March 9, 2012, the

Defendants filed a Reply to the Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. # 21). 

For reasons to be discussed, the Second Motion to Dismiss is due to be GRANTED. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS 

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The court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, Duke v. Cleland, 5

F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). In analyzing the sufficiency of pleading, the court is guided

by a two-prong approach: one, the court is not bound to accept conclusory statements of the

elements of a cause of action and, two, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to entitlement

to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). “[A] plaintiff's

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Id. (citation omitted). To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but instead the

complaint must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id. at 570. The factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. at 555. 

III. FACTS1

Singleton’s Complaint alleges that he is an African-American citizen of the United States

and a resident of Alabama. On August 26, 2010, the day he received notification that his

position was to be abolished on September 30, 2010, he was over forty years of age. His

position was being abolished so that AUM could outsource their Housing and Maintenance

Department to a third-party company.

1

 This statement of the facts is identical to this court’s statement from its Order partially granting

the Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. #11).

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Singleton contends that his position was not abolished but given to two other individuals,

Wanda Blake, a white female, and Darryl Morris, a white male under forty years of age. 

Singleton alleges that neither is capable of performing his job, and that Wanda Blake instructed

the third-party company to not hire him for a position. Furthermore, Singleton alleges that he

was not even interviewed by the new company.

 Singleton’s Complaint alleges two specific instances of racially discriminative conduct. 

First, “Wanda Blake has a history of making racially derogatory comments, such as ‘black

people should not make so much money’ or something to that effect.” (Doc. #3 at ¶ 11). Second,

“Singleton has been referred to as the ‘Do Boy’ while employed at AUM. These references were

offensive to Plaintiff Singleton.” Id. at ¶ 12.

IV. DISCUSSION

AUM raises two main arguments in its Second Motion to Dismiss. AUM argues that it

should be considered an arm of the State of Alabama for Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity purposes. AUM also argues that the ADEA does not properly abrogate Alabama’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity, and, therefore, this court must dismiss Count IV.

The text of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution explains that

“[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” 

Alabama courts have consistently held that state run institutions of higher education are arms of

the state. See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc., Case No. 1100557,

1100560 and 1100561, ___ So. 3d ___, 2011 WL 4507358, *3 (Ala. September 30, 2011). 

Accordingly, AUM is privileged to the same immunity granted to Alabama per the Eleventh

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Amendment. See LaFluer v. Wallace State Community College, 955 F.Supp. 1406, 1422 (M.D.

Ala. 1996) (De Ment, J.) (“Accordingly, because Wallace College is an agency of the State of

Alabama, the Eleventh Amendment precludes the plaintiff from maintaining a § 1983 lawsuit

against this entity.”).

“Absent a valid waiver or abrogation, Alabama may not be sued in federal court for

either money damages or injunctive relief.” Cobb v. Alabama, No. 2:10cv502–MHT, 2011 WL

3666696, *2 (M.D. Ala. August 22, 2011) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). The

Plaintiff raises claims under the ADEA. The Supreme Court has directly addressed whether this

statute properly abrogated Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity and answered in the

negative. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (“Because the ADEA does

not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, however, the present suits must be

dismissed.”). Accordingly, a private citizen, like Singleton, is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment from bringing claims for monetary damages or injunctive relief against AUM under

the ADEA. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (“There can be no doubt, however,

that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit.”). 

Singleton attempts to circumvent relevant Supreme Court precedent by relying on the

language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 along with two cases CSX Transportation, Inc. v. The City of

Garden City, 355 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) and Huffstutler v. Bergland, 607 F.2d 1090 (5th

Cir. 1979). 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 governs actions to enforce § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, and

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The statute also contains a residual clause. Singleton

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did not bring any claim under any of the enumerated statutes and have cited no cases for the

proposition that the ADEA would be governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. 

Singleton’s reliance on the CSX case is misplaced. Singleton argues that the CSX case

stands for a broad principal that a state waives its sovereign immunity by purchasing liability

insurance; however, CSX actually dealt with whether a Georgia municipality waives its

sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(a) by purchasing an insurance policy for an

occurrence in which sovereign immunity would be available. Because that case necessarily

relied on Georgia law, it is inapplicable to the case at bar.

Lastly, Singleton cites the Huffstutler case for the proposition that reinstatement is

exempted from Eleventh Amendment immunity. In actuality, the Huffstutler case did not

address Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity nor did it address the reinstatement remedies

at issue in this case. The reinstatement remedy at issue in this case is governed by 29 U.S.C. §

626(b). This enforcement provision is part of the same ADEA statute which the Supreme Court

found failed to properly abrogate state sovereign immunity. Accordingly, this enforcement

provision cannot be properly brought against the State of Alabama or its agency AUM.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The Second Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

2. Count IV is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

3. This matter will proceed on Counts I and II.

 

Done this 12th day of March, 2012.

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/s/ W. Harold Albritton 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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