Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00147/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pi Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHAVONDA HAWKINS, on behalf of 

herself and all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

KELLOGG COMPANY, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 16-cv-0147-JAH (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. # 8) 

INTRODUCTION 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Kellogg Company’s (“Defendant”) motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff Shavonda Hawkins’ (“Plaintiff”) complaint. (See Doc. # 8). The motion 

has been fully briefed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint WITH PREJUDICE. 

BACKGROUND 

Defendant manufactures, distributes, and sells various types of cookies under the 

brand name Mother’s Cookies. (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 3, 10). Plaintiff is a consumer who has 

repeatedly purchased Mother’s Cookies since January 1, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 64, 95. On 

January 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit challenging Defendant’s use 

of partially hydrogenated oil (“PHO”) in its cookies. (See Doc. # 1). Plaintiff asserts that 

PHO is a source of artificial trans fat and that “there is ‘no safe level’ of PHO or artificial 

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trans fat intake” because PHO and artificial trans fat cause inflammation, heart disease, 

diabetes, cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and cognitive damage. Id. ¶¶ 4, 16, 17, 54. Plaintiff 

further asserts that there are safe, economical alternatives to PHO, which Defendant 

“unfairly” declines to use in its cookies. Id. ¶ 7. As a result of purchasing and consuming 

Defendant’s cookies, Plaintiff contends that she suffered both pecuniary and physical 

injuries, and thus brought suit against Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 86, 87. 

In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) unlawful business practices in 

violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code 

§§ 17200, et seq. (“UCL”), (2) unfair business practices in violation of the UCL, (3) 

nuisance in violation of California Civil Code §§ 3479–93, and (4) breach of the implied 

warranty of merchantability. Id. at 23–28.1 Plaintiff asserts these claims individually and 

on behalf of a class of all individuals “who purchased in the United States, on or after 

January 1, 2008 . . . for household or personal use, Mother’s Cookies products 

manufactured or distributed by Defendant containing partially hydrogenated oil.” Id. ¶ 95. 

Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on Defendant’s use of PHO; Plaintiff does not assert that 

the cookies were mislabeled. Id. ¶ 90. 

On March 17, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, 

arguing that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing, failed to properly allege any of her claims, 

and that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal law. (See Doc. # 8). Alternatively, 

Defendant requested the Court dismiss or stay the instant action under the doctrine of 

primary jurisdiction. Id. at 23–24. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss on April 25, 2016, and Defendant filed a reply in support of its motion 

to dismiss on May 2, 2016. (See Docs. # 9, 10). The Court then took Defendant’s motion 

to dismiss under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d.1). (See Doc. # 11). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

 1 Page numbers cited refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s Electronic 

Court Filing system.

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LEGAL STANDARD 

A. 12(b)(1) 

The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New 

York, 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute 

until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, a defendant may seek to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the district court is “free 

to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior to trial, resolving 

factual disputes where necessary.” Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th 

Cir. 1983). In such circumstances, “[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court 

from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Id. (citing Thornhill Publ’g 

Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). Plaintiff, as the party 

seeking to invoke jurisdiction, has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

B. 12(b)(6) 

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 

12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts 

to support a cognizable legal theory. Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 

claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. In other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable 

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff 

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to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . 

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are “cast in the 

form of factual allegations.” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The court may 

consider facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents 

relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and 

matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, the 

court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts. Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 

1995). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing, 

failure to state any claims, and because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal law. The 

Court will first discuss the federal regulations on the use of PHO in human food. Next, the 

Court will address whether Plaintiff has Article III standing. Then, the Court will address 

whether federal law provides a basis for Plaintiff’s UCL claims and whether Plaintiff’s state 

law claims are preempted by federal law. 

A. The Federal Regulatory Scheme on PHO 

In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act, “which was the first 

comprehensive federal legislation designed to protect consumers from fraud or 

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misrepresentation in the sale of food and drugs.” Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 

10–00927 MMM (AJWx), 2011 WL 1045555, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) (citing 

JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 3:1–13 (3d ed. 2009)). Then, in 

1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) as successor 

legislation. See Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 

(1938). The FDCA established the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) within the 

Department of Health and Human Services and empowered the FDA to protect public 

health by regulating food safety and labeling. 21 U.S.C. § 393. Specifically, the FDCA 

requires the FDA to (i) ensure that “foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly 

labeled,” (ii) promulgate regulations to enforce the provisions of the FDCA, and (iii) enforce 

its regulations through administrative proceedings. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371, 393(b)(2)(A); 21 

C.F.R. § 7.1 et seq. 

The FDCA also prohibits “[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into 

interstate commerce of any food . . . that is adulterated.” 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). A food is 

adulterated “if it . . . contains . . . any food additive that is unsafe within the meaning of” 

21 U.S.C. § 348.2 Id. § 342(a)(2)(C)(i). In relevant part, a food additive is deemed unsafe 

unless there is “a regulation issued . . . prescribing the conditions under which such additive 

may be safely used,” and the additive is used in conformity with the regulation. Id. § 

348(a)(2). In addition, the FDCA explicitly exempts from the definition of “food additive” 

foods that are “generally recognized . . . as having been adequately shown through scientific 

procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through 

either scientific procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe . . . .” 

Id. § 321(s). This status is referred to as “Generally Recognized as Safe” or “GRAS.” 21 

C.F.R. § 170.30. Substances that are GRAS may be used in food without FDA approval or 

review. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348(b).The FDA maintains a non-exhaustive list of foods that 

 

2

 A food additive is “any substance the intended use of which results . . . in its becoming a 

component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food . . . if such substance is not 

generally recognized, among experts qualified . . . to evaluate its safety . . . to be safe under 

the conditions of its intended use.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(s). 

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have been deemed GRAS. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(d). PHOs are not on this list. See 21 C.F.R. 

Part 184.4. 

On June 17, 2015, the FDA issued a final determination on the use of PHO in food 

(“Final Determination”). See Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 

80 Fed. Reg. 34650 (June 17, 2015). In the Final Determination, the FDA recognized that 

common PHOs “have been considered GRAS by the food industry based on a history of 

use prior to 1958,” while other PHOs have been deemed GRAS. Id. at 34651. However, 

the FDA announced that based on current scientific evidence “there is no longer a consensus 

that PHOs . . . are [GRAS] for use in human food. . . .” Id. at 34669. The FDA set June 18, 

2018, as a compliance date by which time food producers must have removed PHO from 

their food products or petitioned for and received approval to use PHO in their products. 

Id. at 34668. By selecting a compliance date three years in the future, the FDA expressed 

an intention to “minimiz[e] market disruptions by providing industry sufficient time to 

identify suitable replacement ingredients for PHOs, to exhaust existing product inventories, 

and to reformulate . . . affected products.” Id. at 34669. 

Several months later, on December 18, 2015, the President signed into law the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (“2016 CAA”). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 754, 129 Stat. 2242, 2284 (2015). Section 754 of the 2016 

CAA, which discusses the use of PHO in food and the FDA’s Final Determination, states 

as follows: 

No partially hydrogenated oils as defined in the [Final 

Determination] shall be deemed unsafe . . . and no food that is 

introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate 

commerce that bears or contains a partially hydrogenated oil 

shall be deemed adulterated . . . by virtue of bearing or 

containing a partially hydrogenated oil until the compliance date 

as specified in such order (June 18, 2018). 

Id. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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B. Plaintiff Alleges a Physical Injury Sufficient to Confer Article III Standing 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert this action because her 

allegations do not establish that she suffered physical or economic injuries. (Doc. # 8, pg. 

14–18). First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “claim that she may somehow in the future 

face a . . . higher risk of disease” as a result of eating Defendant’s food products is too 

speculative and conclusory to establish a physical injury. Id. at 16. Second, Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff did not plausibly allege an economic injury because Plaintiff received 

“the benefit of the bargain” when she consumed Defendant’s cookies, which were not 

alleged to be mislabeled. Id. at 17–18. 

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that she has standing to bring this action because 

she sufficiently alleged that, as a result of eating Defendant’s cookies, she suffered an 

increased risk of future injury, an actual injury, and an economic injury. (Doc. # 9, pg. 13–

21). In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she “suffered physical injury when she 

repeatedly consumed Defendant’s . . . Cookies, because consuming artificial trans fat in any 

quantity, including the quantity she actually consumed, inflames and damages vital organs 

and substantially increases the risk of heart disease, diabetes, cancer, and death.” (Doc. # 

1, ¶ 87). Plaintiff argues that this allegation establishes that she was actually injured because 

she was exposed to trans fat and exposure at any level causes physical harm. (Doc. # 9, pg. 

14). Plaintiff also contends that this allegation demonstrates that she faces a credible threat 

to her physical well-being, which is an injury sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 13–14. 

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that she suffered an economic injury as a result of purchasing 

Defendant’s cookies because she intended to buy a safe product, but received a dangerous 

product “not fit for human consumption.” Id. at 17–21. 

In reply, Defendant again contends that Plaintiff lacks standing because she did not 

sufficiently allege a physical or economic injury as a result of eating Defendant’s cookies. 

(Doc. # 10, pg. 6–8). Defendant points to cases in which courts have determined that 

allegations that trans fat increases the future risk of developing diseases are too speculative 

to establish standing. Id. at 6–7 (citing McGee v. Diamond Foods Inc., No. 14-cv-2446, 

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2016 WL 816003, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016); Simpson v. California Pizza Kitchen, 

Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (S.D. Cal. 2013); Hawkins v. Kroger Co., No. 15-cv2320, Doc. # 19, pg. 7–8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2016)). Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff 

does not sufficiently allege economic injury because food products are purchased with the 

goal of consumption, therefore Plaintiff received the benefit of the bargain when she 

consumed Defendant’s cookies. (Doc. # 10, pg. 7–8). 

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal court may only 

adjudicate an action if it constitutes a justiciable “case” or a “controversy” that has real 

consequences for the parties. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders 

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). One of the baseline requirements for 

justiciability in federal court is that the plaintiff have standing to assert the claims brought. 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiff has the burden of showing that Article III standing exists 

here. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2011). To do so, Plaintiff 

must establish the following three elements. 

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be 

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and 

not . . . the result of the independent action of some third party 

not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to 

merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 

favorable decision. 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (quotations and citations omitted). Here, the inquiry centers on 

the first element of standing—whether Plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact.” This is not an 

exceptionally high threshold. An injury may be minimal. See Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 

757, 763 (9th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out 

a question of principle.” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 

Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14 (1973) (citation omitted). 

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1. Potential Future Injury 

Plaintiff’s main contention is that PHO causes long-term harm. Plaintiff alleges that 

she is at an increased risk of developing numerous, serious diseases as a result of eating 

Defendant’s cookies due to their PHO content. An allegation of future injury may suffice 

to establish an injury in fact “if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a 

‘substantial risk that the harm will occur.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 

2334, 2341 (2014) (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n. 5 

(2013)). Plaintiff does not contend that the threatened injuries are certainly impending. 

(See Doc. # 9, pg. 15 (stating that she is not required “to demonstrate that it is literally 

certain” that the harms identified will occur)). Plaintiff must then establish an increased 

risk of harm. To do so, Plaintiff must show “(i) a substantially increased risk of harm and 

(ii) a substantial probability of harm with that increase taken into account.” Herrington v. 

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., No. C 09–1597 CW, 2010 WL 3448531, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 1, 2010) (citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she has “repeatedly” consumed Defendant’s cookies since 

January 1, 2008. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 11). Plaintiff fails to offer additional details on how many 

times she ate Defendant’s cookies. Plaintiff also fails to allege that this mystery level of 

consumption substantially increased her risk of developing diseases associated with trans 

fat. Therefore, Plaintiff does not have standing to assert claims based on future harm. 

2. Actual Physical Injury 

Plaintiff also alleges that she suffered an actual injury after consuming Defendant’s 

cookies because consuming PHO “in any quantity, including the quantity she actually 

consumed, inflames and damages vital organs . . . .” (Doc. # 1, ¶ 87). Defendant focuses 

on future risk rather than addressing whether Plaintiff’s allegations of inflammation and 

organ damage are sufficient to confer standing. (Doc. # 8, pg. 14–16). However, Defendant 

asserts that various courts, including this Court, have found similar allegations of physical 

harm too speculative to confer standing. Id. 

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Physical injuries traditionally give rise to an injury in fact. See Covington v. Jefferson 

Cnty., 358 F.3d 626, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding allegations of physical injuries, including 

“watering eyes and burning noses” sufficient to establish an injury in fact); Backus v. Gen. 

Mills, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 909, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (stating that “[a] physical injury is 

a traditionally recognized injury giving rise to Article III standing”). Construing the factual 

allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must do, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff’s allegations of inflammation and organ damage are “trifles” sufficient to 

establish an injury in fact for the purposes of Article III standing. 

The Court notes that this finding appears inconsistent with an opinion previously 

issued by this Court. See McGee v. Diamond Foods, No. 14-cv-2446, 2016 WL 816003 

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016). However, in McGee, the plaintiff-consumer argued that she had 

standing based on a physical injury of an “increased risk of disease from consuming trans 

fat” and an economic injury of purchasing an unhealthy product. McGee v. Diamond Foods, 

No. 14-cv-2446, Doc. # 8, pg. 13–19 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2014). The plaintiff-consumer in 

McGee stated that she had suffered an actual injury of inflammation, but this statement 

was buried in argument discussing increased risk of future disease as a basis for standing. 

Id. at 14–15. Therefore, the argument that the plaintiff-consumer suffered an actual injury 

was not properly raised and vetted in McGee as was done here. Further, the other cases to 

which Defendant cites are similarly distinguishable because they involved allegations of 

increased risk of future harm as an injury in fact, rather than actual harm. See Simpson v. 

California Pizza Kitchen, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that 

the plaintiff-consumer failed to establish “increased risk of harm”); Hawkins v. Kroger Co., 

No. 15-cv-2320, Doc. # 19, pg. 7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2016) (relying on Simpson to find 

allegations of physical harm from consuming trans fat too hypothetical to confer standing). 

3. Economic Injury 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she suffered an economic injury because she purchased 

Defendant’s cookies, which were less healthy than expected. “[A]n economic injury 

typically requires a loss of the plaintiff’s benefit of the bargain, such as by overpayment, 

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loss in value, or loss of usefulness.” Simpson, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1022. As this Court has 

previously stated, “consumption is the purpose for which consumers purchase food 

products.” McGee, 2016 WL 816003, at *6. This Court explained that where a consumer 

purchases a food product with no misleading or false information advertised on the product 

and then consumes the food product, the consumer has received the benefit of the bargain 

and suffered no economic injury. Id. 

Here, too, Plaintiff alleges that she purchased and consumed Defendant’s cookies. 

(Doc. # 1, ¶ 8). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant’s cookies were mislabeled; instead, 

she claims she was too busy to read the product’s nutrition label. Id. ¶ 90. Therefore, 

Plaintiff has not alleged an economic injury sufficient to confer Article III standing. 

C. Federal Law Does Not Provide a Basis for Plaintiff’s Claim under the Unlawful 

Prong of Section 17200 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the unlawful prong of section 17200 of the 

UCL, in part, by using PHO in its cookies. (See Doc. # 1, pg. 23–25). Section 17200 

prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” CAL. BUS. & PROF.

CODE § 17200. Under the unlawful prong of section 17200, violations of other laws are 

treated as unlawful practices that are independently actionable under the UCL. See 

Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff argues that 

Defendant has violated numerous sections of the FDCA by using PHO in its cookies, and 

has thus violated the unlawful prong of section 17200. (See Doc. # 1, pg. 24–25). However, 

as explained below, the Court finds that the current use of PHO in food products does not 

violate federal law. Therefore, federal law cannot serve as a basis for Plaintiff’s claim for 

violation of the unlawful prong of section 17200. 

By choosing June 18, 2018, as the compliance date, the FDA makes evident in the 

Final Determination that it is not currently unlawful to use PHO in food products. Final 

Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650, 34668 (June 

17, 2015). If the FDA intended to make illegal the current use of PHO in food, it is 

reasonable to expect that the Final Determination would have contained language to that 

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effect. Instead, the Final Determination states that, by offering three years’ advanced notice 

of the compliance date, the FDA intended, in part, to allow affected parties to “exhaust 

existing product inventories.” Id. at 34669. Thus, the Final Determination specifically 

contemplates and allows for the continued sale of food products that may contain PHO 

until June 18, 2018. 

Further, the 2016 CAA explicitly says that foods shall not be considered adulterated 

based on their PHO content and PHOs shall not be deemed unsafe under the FDCA until 

June 18, 2018. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 754, 

129 Stat. 2242, 2284 (2015). This is a clear step by Congress to preclude parties, like 

Plaintiff, from bringing suit against food manufacturers based on use of PHO before the 

compliance date, or, as another court explained it, section 754 is “essentially [Congress’s] 

ratif[ication] [of] the FDA’s Final Determination.” See Backus v. Nestle USA, Inc., 167 F. 

Supp. 3d 1068, 1073–74 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 

Finally, other courts have held that the current use of PHO in food products neither 

violates federal law nor provides a basis for a claim of unlawful business practices under 

section 17200. See Backus v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 909, 926–28 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (finding that the use of PHO in food products is not currently unlawful under federal 

law such that federal law “cannot serve as the basis for [the plaintiff’s] ‘unlawful’ UCL 

claim”); Backus v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 16–0454 WHA, 2016 WL 3844331, at *2–

3 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (examining federal regulations on the use of PHO and holding 

that the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the sale of food products containing PHO 

violates federal law, so federal law could not serve as the basis for his “unlawful” section 

17200 claim). 

In similar fashion, the Court finds that, even if Plaintiff had established Article III 

standing, she failed to plausibly allege that Defendant violated federal law by manufacturing 

and selling cookies that contain PHO. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the 

unlawful prong of section 17200 of the UCL fails to the extent it is premised on alleged 

violations of federal law. 

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D. Plaintiff’s State Claims Are Preempted 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the 2016 CAA federal 

law. (Doc. # 8, pg. 18–19). Defendant asserts that section 754 of the 2016 CAA states that 

foods containing PHO cannot be found unsafe or adulterated under the FDCA until June 

18, 2018, and thus allows for the use of PHO in food until that time. Id. Defendant 

explains that Congress’s objective in drafting and passing section 754 was to prevent 

unnecessary litigation and a disruption in the market in light of the FDA’s concerns on use 

of PHO in food as stated in the Final Determination. Id. Because Plaintiff’s claims attempt 

to “make it immediately unlawful for manufacturers to produce or sell products containing 

PHOs,” Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims directly conflict with the language and 

objective of section 754. Id. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s claims contravene the 

FDA’s Final Determination, which purposefully provides three years’ notice of the 

compliance period to minimize market disruptions by allowing affected parties time to use 

existing product inventory and formulate a new product. Id. 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that her claims are not preempted by federal law. 

Plaintiff first contends that her claims are not preempted by the FDA’s regulatory scheme 

on PHO because the FDA’s Final Determination states that PHOs are not GRAS, so the 

state regulation of PHO in food does not conflict with the FDA’s position. (Doc. # 9, pg. 

22). Plaintiff states that the Final Determination says that the FDCA does not preempt 

state laws prohibiting or limiting PHO use, which Plaintiff asserts demonstrates that her 

claims are not preempted by the FDA. Id. at 21–22. Next, Plaintiff argues that her claims 

are not preempted by the 2016 CAA. Id. at 23–25. Plaintiff contends that states have 

“plenary control” over the regulation of food, and the 2016 CAA does not alter that right. 

Id. at 23–24. Plaintiff also appears to argue that the 2016 CAA is not retroactive and that, 

between the time the Final Determination was issued until the 2016 CAA was passed, all 

but two varieties of PHO were deemed unsafe. Id. at 25. Finally, Plaintiff contends that the 

2016 CAA does not create a safe harbor because it does not expressly permit the use of 

PHO. Id. 

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In reply, Defendant reasserts that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the 2016 CAA 

and the Final Determination, both of which allow for the use of PHOs in food until at least 

June, 18, 2018. (Doc. # 10, pg. 12). Defendant cites to case law in which claims nearly 

identical to those asserted by Plaintiff were dismissed as preempted by the 2016 CAA and 

the Final Determination. Id. at 12–13 (citing Backus v. Nestle USA, Inc.,167 F. Supp. 3d 

1068, 1071–74, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2016)). Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s 

assertion that the Final Determination says that state and local laws prohibiting or limiting 

PHO use in food do not conflict with federal law is inapplicable as that particular statement 

is “not a finding, only a comment, and an ambiguous one at best.” (Doc. # 10, pg. 13 (citing 

Nestle USA, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1073)). 

Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law can 

preempt and displace state law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 

1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). There are three types of preemption: (1) express preemption,3

(2) field preemption,4 and (3) conflict preemption. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1135 (citations 

omitted); see also Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 

558 (9th Cir. 2002). The latter two types of preemption are often referred to as implied 

preemption. See Bank of America, 309 F.3d at 558; Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 

918 (9th Cir. 2011); Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2008). This case 

presents a question of conflict preemption, specifically whether Plaintiff’s state claims are 

barred under that doctrine. 

“Conflict preemption is found where ‘compliance with both federal and state 

regulations is a physical impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Ting, 319 

F.3d at 1136 (citations omitted). When considering whether a state claim is barred by 

 

3

 A state law is expressly preempted when “Congress enacts an explicit statutory command 

that state law be displaced.” Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). 

4

 “Field preemption exists ‘where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 

comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for 

supplementary state regulation.’” Id. at 1136 (citations omitted). 

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conflict preemption, the Court focuses on Congress’s purpose and the goals and policies of 

the federal law. Id. Additionally, there is a presumption against preemption when the 

inquiry involves a field that “has been traditionally occupied by the States.” De Buono v. 

NYSA–ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997) (quotations and 

citations omitted); see also Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 

546 F.3d 639, 647 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Because the regulation of health and safety is a field traditionally occupied by states, 

the presumption against preemption applies. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 

475 (1996) (regulation of health and safety matters is a field traditionally occupied by 

states); accord Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Nonetheless, the Court finds the presumption overcome and Plaintiff’s state law claims 

barred under the doctrine of conflict preemption. 

All of Plaintiff’s state claims are premised on Defendant’s use of PHO in its cookies. 

As Defendant aptly explains, Plaintiff’s claims are an attempt to make it “immediately 

unlawful” under California law to market or sell any food product that contains PHO. (Doc. 

# 8, pg. 19). However, the FDA considered and rejected recommendations that the Final 

Determination should be effective immediately. Final Determination Regarding Partially 

Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650, 34668 (June 17, 2015). Instead, the FDA selected 

a compliance date three years in the future so affected parties could petition for and receive 

approval from the FDA to use PHO in their products, or exhaust current inventory of food 

products that may contain PHO and create new products sans PHO. Id. at 34668–69. By 

providing advance notice of the compliance date, the FDA hoped to minimize market 

disruptions. Id. Here, allowing Plaintiff’s remaining state claims to go forward would 

contravene the FDA’s regulatory scheme on the current use of PHO in food products and 

directly impede the goals and objectives of that scheme. It would seriously disrupt the 

market by causing food manufacturers to immediately throw out all existing products 

containing PHO without affording manufacturers time to reformulate the products, find 

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alternative ingredients to PHO, and manufacture the revamped products. These are 

consequences that the FDA explicitly sought to avoid. 

Additionally, allowing Plaintiff to proceed on her state claims would contravene 

Congress’s purpose in passing section 754 of the 2016 CAA, which was to prevent economic 

disruption and preclude lawsuits against food producers based on PHO content until the 

compliance date set forth in the Final Determination. This purpose is demonstrated in 

legislative overviews of the 2016 CAA, which state that section 754 was drafted in response 

to concerns of market interference and is meant to prevent “frivolous lawsuits.”5 The Court 

finds that Plaintiff’s current action is one of the frivolous suits that Congress meant to 

preclude until 2018. 

The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s arguments that the 2016 CAA has no bearing 

on her claims because it “does not purport to be retroactive.” (See Doc. # 9, pg. 25). First, 

Plaintiff filed her complaint after the 2016 CAA was signed into law. Second, Plaintiff 

misrepresents that the FDA had “deemed all but two varieties of PHO to be unsafe” when 

it issued the Final Determination on June 17, 2015. Id. Instead, the FDA stated that there 

was no longer a consensus among experts that PHOs are GRAS for use in food and invited 

parties to submit food additive petitions proposing safe conditions of use of PHO in foods. 

Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650, 34657, 

34669 (June 17, 2015). Also problematic is the fact that Plaintiff contends that two types 

 

5

 See H.R. REP. NO. 114–205, at 71 (2015) (stating concerns of “economic disruption in 

the marketplace and . . . unnecessary litigation” surrounding the use of PHO in food in light 

of the Final Determination); FY 2016 Omnibus Summary – Agriculture Appropriations, 

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, available at

http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/12.15.15_fy_2016_omnibus_-_agriculture_-

_summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (stating that “[t]he legislation includes several 

policy provisions, including . . . [a] provision to amend FDA policy relating to the regulatory 

treatment of partially hydrogenated oils so that the baking industries and small businesses 

are not subject to frivolous lawsuits”); see also Legislative Digest, Dec. 18, 2015, 

REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, available at https://policy.house.gov/legislative/legislativedigest/friday-december-18-2015 (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (stating that “the omnibus . . . 

amends an FDA policy relating to the regulatory treatment of partially hydrogenated oils 

to prevent frivolous lawsuits”). 

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of PHO were safe while others were not, but fails to identify which PHOs are safe and which 

PHOs are in Defendant’s cookies. 

For several reasons, the Court also finds unpersuasive Plaintiff’s argument that her 

claims do not conflict with the FDA’s regulatory scheme on PHO use because the Final 

Determination states that the FDCA does not preempt local and state laws limiting or 

banning the use of PHOs in food and state and local laws limiting PHO use in food are not 

likely to conflict with federal law. (See Doc. # 9, pg. 22). First, in making this argument, 

Plaintiff offered a misleading and doctored quote from the Final Determination. The FDA 

actually “decline[d] to take a position regarding the potential for implied preemptive effect 

of this order on any specific state or local law; as such matters must be analyzed with respect 

to the specific relationship between the state or local law and the federal law.” Final 

Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650, 34655 (June 

17, 2015). While the FDA noted its belief that local and state laws on use of PHO in food 

would not conflict with federal law, the FDA nonetheless stated that any state or local law 

conflicting with a federal law or frustrating federal objectives would be preempted. See id. 

Therefore, the Final Determination does not state what Plaintiff would have this Court 

believe it states. Second, the FDA’s comment was “not a finding;” rather, it was “only a 

comment, and an ambiguous one at best.” Backus v. Nestle USA, Inc.,167 F. Supp. 3d 

1068, 1073, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2016). The FDA did not specify what types of local or state 

laws it was referencing and ultimately declined to take a position on the preemptive effect 

of the Final Determination. Finally, Plaintiff offers no state or local statutes prohibiting the 

use of PHO in food to which this comment may refer. 

Because Plaintiff’s claims stand as a direct obstacle to the FDA’s objective to 

minimize market disruptions by providing three years’ notice of the compliance date on use 

of PHO in food and Congress’s objective to bolster the FDA’s Final Determination through 

the passage of section 754 of the 2016 CAA, Plaintiff’s remaining state claims are barred 

by conflict preemption. In making this determination, the Court joins with other courts 

which have dismissed nearly identical claims based on preemption. See Nestle USA, 

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Inc.,167 F. Supp. 3d at 1071–74, 1077 (finding that the plaintiff’s state law claims, 

premised on defendant’s use of PHO in its food product, were preempted by the Final 

Determination and the 2016 CAA, and dismissing the claims without leave to amend); 

accord Backus v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 16–0454 WHA, 2016 WL 3844331, at *3–

4 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016). 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

The Court finds that Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be granted because 

Plaintiff’s claims fail to the extent they are premised on federal law and Plaintiff’s state 

claims are preempted. As such, the Court need not address Defendant’s additional 

arguments. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 8) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Dated: December 13, 2016 

______________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

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