Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01166/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01166-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHILD EVANGELISM FELLOWSHIP OF

GREATER SAN DIEGO,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALAN D. BERSIN, in his individual and official

capacity as Superintendent of San Diego City

Schools; LUIS ACLE in his individual and official

capacity as President of the Board of Education of

San Diego City Schools; MITZ LEE, in her

individual and official capacity as Vice President

of the Board of Education of San Diego City

Schools; JOHN DE BECK, in his individual and

official capacity as Member of the Board of

Education of San Diego City Schools; SHEILA

JACKSON, in her individual and official capacity

as Member of the Board of Education of San

Diego City Schools; KATHERINE NAKAMURA,

in her individual and official capacity as Member

of the Board of Education of San Diego City

Schools,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 05cv1166-IEG(WMc)

Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment 

 [Doc. No. 62] 

Plaintiff Child Evangelical Fellowship of Greater San Diego (“CEF”) moves the Court for

summary judgment awarding it $864.30 in actual damages, plus interest at the full legal rate. CEF also

seeks an award of nominal damages and a declaration that it is the prevailing party pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1988. Defendants (or “District”) have filed an opposition and CEF has filed a reply. This

Case 3:05-cv-01166-IEG-WMC Document 67 Filed 12/01/08 Page 1 of 7
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motion is appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule

7.1(d)(1), and the November 21, 2008 hearing is VACATED. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The underlying facts and procedural history of this case were set forth in the Court’s August 24,

2005 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and also in the Court’s January 10,

2006 Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys fees and costs. Plaintiff CEF is the local chapter of

an international non-profit organization, Child Evangelism Fellowship, Inc., that operates after school

clubs for elementary-age children which are called “Good News Clubs” (“GNCs”). GNCs teach many

of the same values that are taught by organizations like the Boy Scouts and Campfire Girls, but from a

religious perspective. The Supreme Court has determined that GNCs must be granted the same access

to public school sites as other youth groups engaged in moral and character development such as the

Boy Scouts. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 111-112 (2001). The District

has not, in this litigation, disputed this legal point.

In 1999, CEF applied for use of the auditorium at Ericson Elementary School in the San Diego

School District for the purposes of conducting GNC meetings after school hours. The District approved

CEF’s application for facilities use, but required CEF to pay a fee for use under the district’s policy, AP

9205. That policy provides for “civic center use” of District facilities by “[o]rganizations, clubs, and

associations formed for recreational, educational, political, economic, artistic, or moral purposes.” AP

9205(B)(2). Such use of school facilities “may be on either a free, direct cost recovery, fair rental value,

or commercial basis.” At the time this action was filed, AP 9205(C)(3)(a) provided that “[f]ree use

applies to activities directly supporting the district’s adopted goals and educational programs;

districtwide events designed to serve the youth and citizens of the district and planned and directed by

school-related groups; and activities of community organizations whose primary purpose is service to

district youth or the general welfare of the community and whose meetings are nonprofit.” To further

define the category of groups entitled to free use of facilities, AP 9205(c)(3)(a)(5) explicitly permitted

free use by “Camp Fire, Inc., Boy Scouts, and similar youth groups.” AP 9205(C)(3) further provides

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the following standards to be applied to determine the cost to be charged those groups not entitled to

free usage:

b. Direct cost recovery use applies to groups that are not authorized “free use” and

whose purposes are not in conflict with the educational programs or goals of the

district. . . .

c. Fair rental value use applies to groups that use school facilities or grounds for

entertainment, meetings, or classes for which admission is charged or contributions are solicited and the net receipts are not expended for charitable purposes or

for the welfare of district students. Facilities requested by churches for conduct

of services are included in the “fair rental value” use category. . . .

d. Commercial use applies to users who do not qualify for free use, direct cost

recovery, or fair rental rates. . . .

Prior to the filing of this suit, the District required CEF to pay a fair rental value fee to use District

facilities. The District, however, historically allowed other youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts,

Girl Scouts, and 4-H Clubs to use its facilities free of charge.

Because CEF could not afford to pay the fair rental value fee to use District facilities, several

volunteer teachers paid the District-required fees so that the GNC could meet at Ericson Elementary

School. The GNC met at Ericson Elementary School for several years, with these volunteers paying the

usage fee required by the District. During the 2004-05 school year, however, increasing fees resulted in

the GNC being unable to meet at Ericson or any other elementary school in the San Diego School

District. 

CEF filed its complaint against the District on June 3, 2005. CEF alleged that the District’s

policy, requiring CEF to pay a fee for use of District facilities but allowing similar groups engaged in

moral and character development to use the facilities free of charge, violated the First Amendment. 

After the action was filed, the District revised AP 9205 to eliminate free use by all similarly situated

groups. 

By Order filed August 24, 2005, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. 

Plaintiff immediately appealed the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. During the pendency

of the appeal, because of strenuous objection by the Boy Scouts and similar youth organizations who

were then also required to pay a fee to use District facilities under the revised version of AP 9205, the

District again modified AP 9205. This subsequent modification provided free use of District facilities to

the concerned youth organizations, including CEF. The parties thereafter entered into a Partial

Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Dismissal. The parties agreed that the Court would retain

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jurisdiction to determine Plaintiff’s claim for damages, as well as Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

Plaintiff at that time did not pursue damages. Instead, Plaintiff moved the Court for an award of

fees and costs as the prevailing party in this litigation. By order filed January 10, 2006, the Court

denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding the Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Dismissal did not materially

alter the legal relationship between the parties or create any judicially-enforceable rights. Plaintiff

appealed. 

On October 23, 2007, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the appeal in order to prosecute the issue of

damages before this Court. With jurisdiction now restored to this Court, Plaintiff now moves the Court

for summary judgment regarding actual and nominal damages. Plaintiff also asks the Court to declare it

is the prevailing party.

Discussion

As indicated above, the Supreme Court has determined that GNCs must be granted the same

access to public school sites as other youth groups engaged in moral and character development such as

the Boy Scouts. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 111-112 (2001). Plaintiff,

in its motion, devotes a good deal of discussion to establishing that the District’s policy AP 9205, prior

to the filing of this lawsuit, constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Plaintiff also details

the reasons why the District’s actions, in denying CEF’s request for a fee waiver, constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 

Defendant does not make any substantive argument in opposition to the motion. As the Court

stated in its Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, “[w]ithout a doubt, the

District’s application of AP9205 to require CEF to pay a fee for use of the District facilities prior to the

filing of this case constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.” The only question posed by

the present motion, therefore, is whether Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, nominal damages, and/or

prevailing party status. 

1. Actual Damages

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration establishing the amount of damages due and owing to CEF

to be $864.30, which represents the fees paid to the District under the prior version of AP 9205. 

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[Declaration of Mary McAlister, ¶ 11.] Defendants do not dispute the amount of those damages. 

Instead, Defendants argue Plaintiff's claim for damages is moot because the District, on December 7,

2007, mailed a check to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,064.64, representing the amount of fees Plaintiff

paid to the District, plus interest. [Declaration of Catherine Morrison, ¶ 5.] 

In reply, Plaintiff argues the Defendants’ unsolicited and unilateral tender of even the full

amount of damages claimed does not moot its claim for damages. Plaintiff argues the unsolicited check

the District mailed on December 7, 2007 contained a notation "final and full settlement of all claims." 

Because the parties had not reached an agreement regarding the outstanding issue of attorneys fees,

Plaintiff did not negotiate the unsolicited check but instead notified Defendants that the tender would

not be accepted. [McAlister Declaration, Exhibit B.] 

In support of its mootness argument, Defendants cite only one case, Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a nominal

damages claim asserted only after the plaintiff lost standing to assert her remaining claims could not

revive her case. The Court held it is appropriate to vacate a judgment as moot when the mootness occurs

through circumstances not attributable to the parties or by the unilateral action of the prevailing party.

Id. As Plaintiff points out, neither of these circumstances is present in this case. 

As noted by the Ninth Circuit when it dismissed Plaintiff's appeal of the attorneys fees ruling in

this case, there remains a live controversy between the parties regarding actual damages. Although the

amount is undisputed, those damages remains due and owing. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff is

entitled to summary judgment on its claim for actual damages in the amount of $864.30, plus interest. 

2. Nominal Damages

Plaintiff also seeks nominal damages on its claims. Defendants’ opposition does not even

address Plaintiff’s request for nominal damages. Typically, nominal damages are available in a § 1983

action where the violation of a constitutional right produced no actual damages. Bernhardt v. County of

Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th

Cir. 1999)). The purpose of nominal damages is purely symbolic, to vindicate the violation of a

constitutional right. Schneider v. County of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784, 795 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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The Ninth Circuit has permitted a § 1983 plaintiff to recover nominal damages where the

plaintiff also recovered compensatory damages under a separate cause of action. Schneider, 285 F.3d

at 795. However, Plaintiff has cited no authority, and the Court is unaware of any, permitting the Court

to award nominal damages in a case such as this where the only alleged constitutional violation resulted

in an award of actual damages. Because the Court has found Plaintiff is entitled to $864.30, plus

interest, in actual damages flowing from the constitutional violation, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion

to enter judgment in its favor for nominal damages.

3. Prevailing Party Status

Lastly, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare it to be a prevailing party entitled to fees under 42

U.SC. § 1988. Defendants do not offer any substantive opposition to Plaintiff’s request. Instead,

Defendants argue the Plaintiff should make any argument regarding prevailing party status in a motion

for attorneys fees.

The case cited by Defendants, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), involved a motion for

attorneys fees. However, nothing in that case requires the issue of “prevailing party” status be resolved

by way of a motion for attorneys fees. In Farrar, the Supreme Court found “the prevailing party inquiry

does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained.” 506 U.S. at 114. The Court held that even an

award of nominal damages, where there are no actual damages flowing from a constitutional violation,

confers upon the plaintiff the status of “prevailing party” under § 1988. Id. at 112. 

Defendants can certainly argue in opposition to an any motion for attorneys fees brought by

Plaintiff, that Plaintiff achieved minimal success not warranting any actual award of fees. Farrar, 506

U.S. at 114 (noting that reasonableness of a fee award under § 1988 is related to the degree of plaintiff’s

overall success). However, based upon the Court’s finding that Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages in

the amount of $864.30, plus interest, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this case. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of

///

///

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$864.30, plus interest. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may bring a motion for attorneys fees in due

course.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 1, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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