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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS , p I L E D 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Umred Stat.c1 Coutt of Appeals 

RONALD CHURCH, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant and ) 

Cross-Appellee, ) 

v. 

CITY OF FRUITA, 

Defendant-Appellee and 

Cross-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FRUITA DEPARTMENT OF POLICE; ) 

FRUITA CITY COUNCIL; CLARA ) 

INEZ SPENCE WALKER, as ) 

personal representative of the) 

estate of Richards. Walker, ) 

formerly Fruita Chief of ) 

Police; and ERROL SNIDER, ) 

FRUITA CITY MANAGER, both in ) 

their individual and official) 

capacities, ) 

Cross-Appellees. 

) 

) 

Tenth Circuit 

SE 17 ft O 

R.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 89-1295 & 89-1369 

(D. C. No. 85-C-2405) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. ~0th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1295 Document: 010110042164 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This appeal arises from the district court's ruling granting 

defendant-appellee's (City of Fruita) motion to dismiss plaintiffappellant's (Ronald w. Church) claim brought pursuant to 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983. The motion was made and granted at the close of 

plaintiff's case in chief. In his appeal, Mr. Church contends 

that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting 

defendant's motion to dismiss. Subsequent to the entry of the 

directed verdict, defendant-appellee filed a motion for recovery 

of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This motion was 

denied by the district court in a minute order dated November 14, 

1989. Defendant-appellee filed a cross-appeal from this order 

claiming the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 

award counsel fees to the City. 

Mr. Church initially filed an action for damages against the 

City of Fruita pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a 

deprivation of his liberty interest in employment as protected by 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Mr. Church was 

employed as a police officer by the City of Fruita at the time of 

the alleged violation. During this time, a Fruita City Council 

meeting was held where public citizens appeared and openly and 

falsely accused Mr. Church of using excessive force to effectuate 

two arrests. An investigation by the district attorney's office 

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followed, during which time Mr. Church was suspended with full pay 

and benefits. Mr. Church was ultimately cleared of the charges 

alleged against him but was terminated from his employment on 

February 9, 1983, for reasons unrelated to such charges. 

We review the district court's ruling on directed verdict de 

novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Guilfoyle 

v. Missouri, K. & T. R.R. Co., 812 F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 

1987). Under the applicable standard, a directed verdict is 

proper when ''there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the 

verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 

(1986). 

To establish his claim of deprivation of a liberty interest 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show: that he was deprived 

of a right guaranteed him under the United States Constitution, 

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 716 (1976), such as the right to 

liberty in employment, Lentsch v. Marshall, 741 F.2d 301, 303 

(10th Cir. 1984); that such deprivation was proximately caused by 

the defendant or the employees, agents or officers of the 

defendant, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, , 109 S. Ct. 

1197, 1203 (1989), acting under the color of state law, Polk 

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); that plaintiff was 

stigmatized by false information generated or published by the 

defendant, Asbill v. Housing Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 

1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1984); and that due to the stigma imposed on 

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him, plaintiff was foreclosed from some tangible interest such as 

employment, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972). 

A review of the district court's conclusions shows the 

following: (1) "Plaintiff has not proved that the defendants' 

agents, employees or officials made any false statements regarding 

his alleged use of excessive force''; (2) "[t]he false statements 

were made by members of the public at a public City Council 

meeting"; (3) plaintiff's testimony that City is responsible 

because it held the Council meeting and allowed the false 

statements to be published "is insufficient [evidence] to hold the 

city liable for what other noncity persons said about the 

plaintiff"; (4) ''plaintiff did not lose his job as a result of the 

false accusations"; (5) "[p]laintiff testified that he did not ask 

for a hearing to attempt to clear his name"; and (6) ''there has 

been no testimony or other specific evidence of causation, that 

is, that the plaintiff was not hired by other employe[r]s because 

of or as a result of his suspension from employment by the City of 

Fruita in December 1982." We agree with the above conclusions of 

the district court. 

On appeal to this court, Mr. Church contends that "when an 

employee's dismissal is accompanied, as in the instant case, by 

dissemination of charges that stigmatized the employee's 

reputation or foreclosed future employment opportunities, due 

process requires that that employee be given a hearing in which he 

may clear his good name and reputation and refute the charges." 

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Mr. Church also contends "that Defendant-Appellee City 

participated in [the defamatory conduct] by giving members of the 

public the forum to publicly state their position," and that by 

not conducting "an independent investigation prior to allowing 

members of the public to publish slanderous and untrue statements 

about one of its employees in a public forum or prohibiting such 

statements" the City is liable for "failing to protect its 

employee." In his final contention, Mr. Church complains that 

since his termination on February 9, 1983, he has been unable to 

find comparable employment, and that 

specific evidence of causation is not an element as 

erroneously stated by the Court wherein the Court held 

there was no testimony of specific evidence or 

causation, that is, that Plaintiff-Appellant was not 

hired by other employers because of or as a result of 

his suspension by the City of Fruita in December, 1982. 

First, plaintiff-appellant's claims regarding the City's 

holding a public council meeting, allowing public citizens to 

speak at the meeting, and not conducting an independent 

investigation prior to allowing the citizens to make statements at 

such meeting, all fail due to the First Amendment protections of 

such activity. 

In regard to plaintiff-appellant's contention that causation 

need not be proven, the Supreme Court has previously acknowledged 

that in § 1983 actions the plaintiff must prove "both the 

requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal 

connection" between the municipality's conduct and the alleged 

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constitutional deprivation. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 

U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (footnote omitted). 

We also find no merit in plaintiff-appellant's contention 

that he was denied due process by not being afforded a hearing to 

clear his name when his "dismissal [wa]s accompanied ... by 

charges that stigmatized [his] reputation or foreclosed future 

employment opportunities." In Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 

(1977), the Supreme Court indicated that a hearing would be 

required in such cases "[o]nly if the employer creates and 

disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee 

in connection with his termination " As indicated in the 

district court's conclusions and order dated August 15, 1989: 

"Plaintiff has not proved that the defendants' agents, employees 

or officials made any false statements regarding his alleged use 

of excessive force''; "the plaintiff did not lose his job as a 

result of the false accusations,'' and "[p]laintiff testified that 

he did not ask for a hearing to attempt to clear his name." 

Considering the established principles, and in the absence of 

additional evidence, we AFFIRM the district court's action 

granting the directed verdict in favor of defendant-appellee as we 

find there to be only one reasonable conclusion in light of the 

evidence presented. 

We now turn to the City's cross-appeal 

court's order denying its motion for attorney 

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of the district 

fees. Award of 

Appellate Case: 89-1295 Document: 010110042164 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 6 
attorney fees to the successful party is not mandatory. 

Determining whether to award attorney fees rests in the district 

court's discretion and is not deemed an absolute right. Goichman 

v. City of Aspen, 859 F.2d 1466, 1471 (10th Cir. 1988). We review 

such determinations under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 

1471 (citing Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 

1986)). The Supreme Court has indicated that "[a] prevailing 

defendant may recover an attorney's fee only where the suit was 

vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the 

defendant." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983), 

quoted in Goichman, 859 F.2d at 1471. The trial court gave us no 

reasons for its denial of attorney fees; hence, we are unable to 

review this decision. Given the absence in the record as to what 

standard the trial court applied, we REMAND to the district court 

for reconsideration of this motion. Goichman, 859 F.2d at 1471. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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