Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02263/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02263-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH LAWTON WATKINS, 

 

Plaintiff, 

 

vs. 

 

S. OJEDA, et al., 

 

Defendants. 

 /

Case No. 1:10-cv-02263 JLT (PC) 

 

ORDER DISMISSING THE ACTION FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

(Doc. 1)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint filed December 6, 2010.

I. SCREENING

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen a case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental

entity or officer. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must review the complaint and dismiss any portion

thereof that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). If the Court

determines the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49

(9th Cir. 1987) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is

absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) 

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B. Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

To plead a § 1983 violation, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it may be inferred that (1)

plaintiff was deprived of a federal right, and (2) the person who deprived plaintiff of that right acted

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145,

1147 (9th Cir. 1989). To warrant relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and show that the

defendants’ acts or omissions caused the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights. 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). “A person deprives another of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

[the plaintiff complains].” Id. There must be an actual causal link between the actions of each defendant

and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71(1976)).

C. Rule 8(a)

Section 1983 complaints are governed by the notice pleading standard in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), which provides in relevant part that:

A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court

already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;

and

(3) a demand for the reliefsought, which may include reliefin the alternative or different

types of relief.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy. Nevertheless, a complaint

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to reliefrequires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotations omitted). Rather, the complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 883 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). Vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

II. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff identifies Correctional Officers Ojeda, Murrells, Vendenoffs, and Rivas as defendants

to this action. Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Dealing with my grievance to the court as well as my writ to proceed with just cause, I

have a complaint that sustained my opening arguement [sic] as to the close costody [sic]

survelience [sic] not being able to intercept my conversations with other inmates and due

to animosity as far as issue’s [sic] dealingwith the surroundings at this reception [center]. 

I don’t have to tollerate [sic] any type of harrassment [sic] due to race, creed, or religion

and [once] again I stipulate that I was assessed maximum penity [sic] in court due to the

foregoing that I’m a youth black and not up under a submissive organization where I can

be venus fly trapped! The law wasn’t able to do it with in my walk of life so the state of

corrections choose to act out color of law within the grounds of Delano State Prison! I’m

stressed for freedom of choice and choose to exercise my constitutional amendment by

addressing my constitutional rights to [personal] happiness.

(Compl. at 1-3.)

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, to plead a cognizable § 1983 violation, a plaintiff must allege facts from which

it may be inferred that (1) plaintiff was deprived of a federal or constitutional right, and (2) the person

who deprived plaintiff of that right acted under color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 48. In this case, the

complaint is utterly incoherent. As such, the Court is unable to glean any facts that affirmatively link the

actions of Defendants to any violation of Plaintiff’s federal or constitutional rights. The complaint

therefore fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. 

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The complaint also appears to be duplicative. In a separate case also pending before this Court, Watkins v.

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Murrells, Case No. 1:10-cv-02290-JLT, Plaintiff initiated a § 1983 action against the same defendants and, as far as the Court

can discern, makes similar allegations. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986) (a court may

take judicial notice of its records). Therefore, the complaint in this case should also be dismissed due to its duplicative nature.

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The Court declines to provide Plaintiff with leave to amend. “Under Ninth Circuit case law,

district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are

not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, the complaint wholly lacks merit. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss this action at this time for Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim;

2. This dismissal shall count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2011 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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