Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01293/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01293-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE HINSON,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES D. HARTLEY,

Respondent.

 /

1:09-cv-01293-AWI-SMS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation following his 1989 conviction for second degree murder. Petitioner was

sentenced to fifteen years to life, plus three concurrent years for using a weapon and having

served two prior prison terms. (Exhibit 1, to Answer.) 

In the instant petition, Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his conviction; rather,

he challenges Governor Schwarzenneger’s 2007 decision finding him unsuitability for release on

parole. 

Petitioner appeared for a parole hearing on October 3, 2006, and the Board of Parole

Hearings’ (BPH) found him to be suitable for release. On February 22, 2007, the Governor

reversed the BPH’s decision and found Petitioner to be unsuitable for parole. 

1

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior

Court challenging the Governor’s decision. (Exhibit 2, to Answer.) The superior court denied

the petition finding the Governor’s decision was supported by some evidence citing (In re Tripp,

150 Cal.4th 306, 315 (2007) and In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 626 (2002)). (Exhibit 3, to

Answer.) 

Petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal, which

was summarily denied. (Exhibits 4 & 5, to Answer.)

In December 2008, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court. (Exhibit 6,

to Answer.) The petition was summarily denied. (Exhibit 7, to Answer.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 24, 2009. 

(Court Doc. 1.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on October 27, 2009, and Petitioner

filed a traverse on November 19, 2009. (Court Docs. 10, 11.) 

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

On the evening of July 26, 1989, Petitioner stabbed and killed Mike McKnight after

engaging in a physical altercation with him over money. The initial altercation began in the

parking lot of an apartment complex. Witnesses saw Petitioner get out of the passenger side of a

car and run toward Mike. The men punched each other. George then stabbed Mike several times

and fled to a nearby residence. The occupants of the residence allowed Petitioner to use their

telephone to make several calls, and he subsequently called a taxicab. The couple noticed that

Petitioner had blood on him, but he did not appear to have any wounds. Petitioner told them that

he had been robbed, and he hid in a closet located in the complex before knocking on their door. 

After Petitioner left, the couple reported the incident to the police. They also found a knife in the

closet that Petitioner hid in. When police arrived, Mike was suffering from multiple stab

wounds, and he eventually died as a result of a fatal stab wound to the chest area. 

(Exhibit 2, to Answer, Attachment 1.) 

This information is taken from the Governor’s February 22, 2007, decision. (Exhibit 2, to Answer,

1

Attachment 1.)

2

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions. 

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

pursuant to a state court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state

court conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because

he meets the threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass

v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. th

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a th

habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the

petition is not challenging [her] underlying state court conviction.’”). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

3

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this

Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other 

words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's 

4

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

In reversing the Board’s finding that Petitioner was suitable for release on parole, the

Governor found that the circumstances of the commitment offense, institutional misconduct and

prior criminal history rendered him unsuitable. (Exhibit 2 to Answer, Attachment 1.)

 In this instance, the last reasoned state court decision of the Kern County Superior Court

cited to (In re Tripp, 150 Cal.4th 306, 315 (2007) and In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 626

(2002), and found some evidence supported the Governor’s decision finding Petitioner unsuitable

for release on parole. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-805 (1991); see also Exhibit 3, to

Answer.) 

II. Review of Petition

A parole release determination is not subject to all the due process protections of an

adversary proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9 Cir. 1987); see th

also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural

protections that particular situations demand). "[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part

of a criminal prosecution, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not

constitutionally mandated, even when a protected liberty interest exists." Pedro, 825 F.2d at

1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). At a state parole

board proceeding, the only process to which an inmate is entitled is: 1) the inmate must receive

advance written notice of a hearing, Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; 2) the inmate must be afforded an

"opportunity to be heard," Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the

inmate must be told why "he falls short of qualifying for parole,” Id.; and 4) the decision of the

Board must be supported by "some evidence" having an indicia of reliability. Superintendent,

Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th

Cir.1987).

“In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that ‘revocation of good time does not

comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the

prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454

5

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. In

determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, the Court need not examine the entire

record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. Rather,

the Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion of the disciplinary board. Id., citing Superintendent v. Hill, at 455-56. Although Hill

involved the accumulation of good time credits, the same standard applies to parole, as both

situations “directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Id., citing Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

In making a determination whether an inmate is suitable for parole, the Board is guided

by the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to

the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such

information shall include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past

and present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other

criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past

and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control,

including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be

released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a

finding of unsuitability.

15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2402(a) and (b).

In this case, with regard to the procedural protections outlined in Greenholtz, Petitioner

was provided all that is required. Petitioner was given advance notice of the hearing, he was

offered representation by counsel at the hearing, he was granted an opportunity to submit

materials for the Board’s consideration and an opportunity to be heard during the hearing, and he

was provided a written decision explaining the reasons why parole was denied. 

Article 5, section 8(b) of the California Constitution, allows the Governor to review the

decision of the Board and enables him to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision on the basis of

6

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the same factors that the Board is required to consider. See Cal. Const. art. 5, § 8(b); In re

Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 210 (Cal. 2002). Accordingly, the Governor’s decision to reverse a

parole grant is reviewed under the same due process principles utilized to review the Board’s

denial of parole. 

The California Supreme Court clarified the standard of the review applicable to parole

decisions by the Board or Governor in In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (2008). The applicable

standard “is whether some evidence supports the decision of the Board or the Governor that the

inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence

confirms the existence of certain factual findings.” Id. at 1212 (emphasis in original and citations

omitted). As to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the Court concluded that 

although the Board and the Governor may rely upon the aggravated circumstances

of the commitment offense as a basis for a decision denying parole, the aggravated

nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current

dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes that something in

the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor

and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s

dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense

remain probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public

safety. 

Id. at 1214. 

2

With regard to the commitment offense, Governor Schwarzenegger found it was carried

out in a manner that demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering and

life. The Governor quoted from the probation report which stated that Petitioner was observed 3

To this end, the Court recognized that its prior determination of “a focus upon the egregiousness of the

2

commitment offense to the exclusion of other relevant evidence has proved in practice to obscure the core statutory

emphasis upon current dangerousness, the manner in which courts apply the some evidence standard in evaluating

the evidentiary value of the gravity of the commitment offense requires some clarification.” In re Shaputis, 44

Cal.4th 1241, 1254 (citing Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1213-1214.)

Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations, Section 2402(c) sets forth circumstances tending to

3

demonstrate unsuitability for parole when the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or

cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering.

7

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“rushing” the victim to engage in a physical altercation with him. He then stabbed the victim

several times and fled the scene. Petitioner had the victim’s blood on his body, and when he

called a taxicab, he was overheard stating, “I got him. I got him.” Petitioner also lied after the

stabbing by claiming he was the victim of a robbery. Meanwhile, the victim was left to die from

multiple stab wounds. In light of these circumstances, there is some evidence to support the

Governor’s finding that the murder demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering and life, and as explained infra, it remained indicative of his present dangerousness

given his prior criminal history and institutional misconduct. 

The Governor also pointed out that Petitioner had a long criminal history which began

when he was a juvenile in 1975. Petitioner was initially adjudicated for grand larceny in Florida. 

In 1975, Petitioner was sentenced to the California Youth Authority for robbery. Thereafter,

Petitioner committed forgery, firearm offenses, numerous drug offenses, and repeatedly violated

parole. In addition, he was on parole at the time of the commitment offense. Given that

Petitioner’s criminal history continued over a span of almost twenty years and included prior

prison terms, some evidence supports the Governor’s finding that the murder remains indicative

of Petitioner’s present dangerousness. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

Pursuant to section 2402(c)(6), the Governor also considered Petitioner’s institutional

behavior, which includes rules violations for gambling, bookkeeping, manufacturing alcohol,

refusing to submit to a urinalysis test, and receiving a tattoo. Although Petitioner had not been

disciplined for several years, the Governor found his prior misconduct remained predicative of

his present danger with some evidence supporting this finding. Prior to entering prison,

Petitioner’s failure to abide by the law spanned a period of almost twenty years and continued

well into his incarceration. Therefore, it was reasonable for the Governor to find that a longer

period of remaining discipline-free is needed before his prior institutional misconduct can be

deemed of little to no predicative value of his present dangerousness to the public.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.

15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E).

8

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Governor also considered the factors in support of a finding of suitability and

commended Petitioner for his credible gains. The Governor acknowledged that Petitioner earned

his GED in 2004, and in January 2006, he completed adult education courses. In addition, he

participated in vocational training and earned certificates as a skilled wood machinist and graphic

arts. Petitioner also engaged in self-help therapy, including participation in My Change Plan,

Self Worth, Thinking Errors, Coping Skills, Relationships/Communication, Anger, Life

Management, Values of Responsible Living, and Christian-faith-based programs. Petitioner also

participated in Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. Petitioner engaged in extracurricular activities such as Bible study and work in the prison chapel. The Governor also

pointed out that Petitioner received numerous laudatory chronos for his strong work ethic as a

wood machinist, and for being an exemplary inmate. (Exhibit 2, to Answer, Attachment 1.) In

addition, Petitioner maintained solid relationships with his family and friends and had solid

parole plans. (Id.) 

Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, the Governor did not rely solely on the immutable

circumstances of the commitment offense and prior criminal history; he also cited Petitioner’s 

institutional behavior. There is some evidence to support the Governor’s finding that Petitioner

would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety based on the callous nature of the commitment

offense, his lengthy criminal history, and institutional misconduct. Moreover, at the time of the

2006 hearing, Petitioner had been incarcerated for 16 years on his 18-years-to-life sentence. In

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit stated that "[a]

continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and

conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison

system and could result in a due process violation." Although a denial of parole initially can be

justified by relying on the gravity of the offense, over time, "should [the prisoner] continue to

demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply

because of the nature of [his] offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving

his liberty interest in parole." Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Biggs, 334

F.3d at 916. Nevertheless, in both Irons and Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the denials of parole

9

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because in each of these cases the prisoner had not yet served the minimum term of his sentence. 

In sum, this Court cannot conclude that the Governor’s denial of parole has resulted in a

due process violation when considering, in combination, the circumstances of the commitment

offense, prior criminal history, and institutional misconduct. Accordingly, the state courts’

determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

Case 1:09-cv-01293-AWI -SMS Document 12 Filed 03/24/10 Page 10 of 10