Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01028/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARINA BOURKOV, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:10-cv-01028-GEB-KJM

)

v. ) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

) MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION; BAC ) AND DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL

HOME LOAN SERVICING, L.P. AKA ) JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S

COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION; ) STATE LAW CLAIMS*

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION )

SYSTEMS, INC.; GUILD MORTGAGE )

COMPANY; RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.; )

FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY; )

AND DOES 1-50, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendant Fidelity National Title Company filed a motion

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint on May 6, 2010. (Docket No. 6.) However, on May 13, 2010,

Plaintiff timely filed a first amended complaint, which is now the

operative pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B) (stating that “[a]

party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within . . .

21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)”); see also Hal

Case 2:10-cv-01028-GEB -KJM Document 12 Filed 05/19/10 Page 1 of 3
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Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542,

1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that an amended complaint supercedes the

prior complaint). Since the pending dismissal motion does not address

the operative pleading, it is denied as moot.

However, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges three

claims under California law and has eliminated the federal Truth in

Lending Act (“TILA”) and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

(“RESPA”) claims which provided the sole basis for removal of this

action to federal court. Since Plaintiff is no longer pursuing any

federal claims, the court may sua sponte decide whether to continue

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state

law claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (suggesting that a district court may, but

need not, sua sponte decide whether to continue exercising

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) once all

federal law claims have been dismissed). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim” when

“all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have been

dismissed. This decision should be informed by the values of economy,

convenience, fairness and comity as delineated by the Supreme Court in

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1996). Acri,

114 F.3d at 1001. Comity weighs in favor of declining supplemental

jurisdiction since state courts have the primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law. See Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001

(stating that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point towards

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

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claims” (quotations and citation omitted)); Curiel v. Barclays Capital

Real Estate Inc., No. S-09-3074 FCD/KJM, 2010 WL 729499, at *1 (E.D.

Cal. Mar. 2, 2010) (stating “primary responsibility for developing and

applying state law rests with the state courts” and declining to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of the federal

claims). Further, none of the other Gibbs factors favor retaining

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims in this

case. Therefore, the court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, and this

case is remanded to the El Dorado County Superior Court in the State

of California from which it was removed.

Dated: May 18, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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