Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03932/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03932-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

GABRIEL RALPH REYES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOE McGRATH, Warden; RICHARD

RIMMER, Director of Corrections; J.S.

WOODFORD; Director of Corrections;

B.J. O’NEAL, Associate Warden;

RICHARD KIRKLAND, Warden; N.

GRANNIS, Chief of Inmate Appeals; T.

SURGES, Appeals Examiner; SWIFT,

Correctional Lieutenant; NAVARRO,

Sergeant; and HAWKINS, Correctional

Officer, 

Defendants. /

No. C 07-3932 PJH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis was granted and an initial partial filing fee of $51.54 imposed. Plaintiff’s

motion for service was denied, the court stating that it would “screen the complaint and, if

appropriate, order service, after plaintiff indicates his intention to proceed with the case by

paying the initial partial filing fee.” The initial partial filing fee was received on March 9,

2009, but was not docketed, so did not come to the court’s attention. The court regrets the

delay.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

Case 4:07-cv-03932-PJH Document 9 Filed 01/28/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations

omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65

(2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. The United States Supreme Court has recently

explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “[w]hile legal conclusions can

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff was in his cell on February 24, 2004, when there were two incidents of staff

using chemical agents, apparently pepper spray, against inmates in other cells. He

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contends that the amount used was excessive, that no measures were taken to minimize

the effect on other prisoners such as himself, and that decontamination measures were

inadequate. As a consequence, he alleges, he suffered choking, burning eyes, and inching

and burning of his skin. The inmates were instructed to use water from their cells to wipe

off the spray, and to apply cold compresses. They were not given showers until two days

later. 

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). "After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

. . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and

citation omitted). What is required to establish an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 320 (1986). Where an inmate alleges use of excessive force, the core judicial

inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992);

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2001)

(applying “malicious and sadistic” standard to claim that prison guards used excessive

force when attempting to quell a prison riot). 

The “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” standard, the

Whitley standard, applies when prison authorities use force against one inmate and thereby

injure another, as plaintiff alleges happened here. See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898,

903 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (pepper spray affecting non-target inmate). Putting together the

Whitley/Hudson standard for excessive force claims and the Iqbal standard for pleading a

claim, for plaintiff to state a claim here he must provide sufficient factual allegations to

make it plausible that defendants used the pepper gas maliciously and sadistically with the

very purpose of causing harm. 

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1 Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions issued on or after January 1, 2007, may be cited

to courts of this circuit. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(b). They are not, however, precedential. Id. at 36-

3(a). Allen v. Bosley was issued on November 2, 2007. 

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Plaintiff alleges that the first pepper spray incident occurred when two inmates of the

Security Housing Unit refused to move to a new cell, and that he does not know the cause

of the second. These allegations obviously are not sufficient to state a plausible claim that

the gas was used “maliciously and sadistically with the purpose of causing harm.” Plaintiff

thus has failed to state a claim for excessive use of force. 

 Plaintiff’s other claim is that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs when he was not allowed to adequately decontaminate. Plaintiff contends

that he suffered choking, burning eyes, and inching and burning of his skin. When shortlived, these do not constitute a serious medical need, though unpleasant. The Ninth Circuit

has agreed, rejecting a similar claim and saying that coughing, choking, gaging, and

burning in one’s eyes, when transitory, do not add up to a serious medical need. See Allen

v. Bosley, 253 Fed. Appx. 658, 2007 WL 3244002 (9th Cir. 2007).1

 

Because it is clear from plaintiff’s allegations that he cannot rectify the deficiencies of

these claims, they will be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000).

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff’s motion to screen the complaint (document number 7 on the docket) is

GRANTED. The screening has been performed above.

2. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/28/10 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

P:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.07\REYES3932.DISMISS.wpd 

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