Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07135/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07135-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Submitted November 14, 2008 Decided June 26, 2009

No. 08-7135

DOMINIC NOVAK,

APPELLEE

v.

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:01-cv-00039-HHK)

Brian E. Hoffman argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Jeffrey R. Schmieler.

Patrick M. Regan argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellee. 

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: A group of men attacked and

brutally beat appellee Dominic Novak moments after he left a

nightclub in 1998. The club required patrons to leave the

building through a single door that led into an alley, and the

attack occurred in close proximity to that door. Although the

club employed several security officers, they were all inside the

building during the beating. Novak, who sustained permanent

injuries, brought this diversity action against the club, alleging

negligence under District of Columbia law. 

The district court initially granted summary judgment in

favor of the club, holding that the club owed Novak no duty of

care because the attack occurred in a public alley, and that the

criminal assault was not foreseeable. In July 2006, a panel of

this court reversed and remanded, determining that a reasonable

jury could find that the club owed Novak a duty if it put the

alley to a substantial special use, and that evidence of frequent

fights in the alley could establish foreseeability. The case

proceeded to trial and, in May 2007, a jury found in favor of

Novak and awarded him damages. 

The club now appeals, contesting the district court’s

judgment on a number of grounds. We reject those challenges

and affirm the judgment.

I

This court’s 2006 opinion reversing summary judgment in

favor of the club describes the facts surrounding the attack. See

Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902 (D.C. Cir.

2006) (Novak I). We reprise them in somewhat less detail here.

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1

Appellants are Capital Management and Development

Corporation; Menage Limited Partnership; Zei, Inc.; Capital

Restaurant Concepts, Ltd.; and Power Station Limited Partnership.

For ease of reference, we refer to appellants collectively as “the Zei

Club” or “the club.”

Appellants owned and operated the Zei Club, a bar and

dance club located in northwest Washington, D.C.1 The club

was situated next to -- and was only accessible through -- two

alleys that formed an upside-down T shape, “one running eastwest from 14th to 15th Street, named ‘Zei Alley,’ and another

running from Zei Alley north to I Street (the ‘I Street alley’).”

Novak I, 452 F.3d at 904. The club’s front entrance was located

at the southeast corner of the building, which lay at the

intersection of the two alleys; its back door was at the northeast

corner, which abutted the I Street alley. J.A. 3001 (Pl.’s Ex. 1).

At closing time, the club required patrons to depart through the

back door, which locked behind them to prevent re-entry.

Patrons then had to walk south down the I Street alley to return

to Zei Alley.

In the early morning of March 22, 1998, Novak visited the

club with a group of friends. He left the club through the back

door -- the only available exit -- at approximately 2:35 a.m., and

turned south on the I Street alley. At that time, twelve to fifteen

men were standing together next to a wall in the alley. Moments

after Novak left the club, and “within view of the exit,” the men

attacked Novak and other members of his party. Novak I, 452

F.3d at 904. The men struck Novak’s friend John Henderson

first, before attacking Novak. Near the end of the assault, which

lasted for approximately five minutes, the assailants “tripped

Novak, then hit him in the back of the head” with wooden

boards. Id. 

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Although the Zei Club maintained a private security team

of fifteen people and also employed two off-duty Metropolitan

Police Department (MPD) officers, all employees were inside

the club when the assault began. When the MPD officers

working security learned of the attack, they “ran out of the club,

stopped the attack, and apprehended some of the assailants.” Id.

at 905. Novak sustained severe injuries as a result of the

beating. He underwent emergency brain surgery immediately

after the attack and was in a coma for nearly three weeks. He

suffered permanent brain damage, loss of motor functions,

speech disturbance, and loss of strength.

Novak filed suit against the Zei Club in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the court’s

diversity jurisdiction. He alleged that the club was liable for the

common law tort of negligence because it did not protect him

from a foreseeable fight in the alley abutting the club’s only exit.

The district court initially granted summary judgment in the

club’s favor, concluding that its “lack of exclusive control” over

the I Street alley “relieved the Zei Club of any duty of care to

patrons using the alley to leave the club.” Id. The court also

held that the criminal attack on Novak was not foreseeable.

Although the court “acknowledged that fights occurred as often

as twice a month[, it] concluded that these fights were not

sufficiently ‘frequent.’” Id. (quoting Novak v. Capital Mgmt. &

Dev. Corp., No. 01-0039, Mem. Op. at 7 (D.D.C. July 12,

2004)).

A previous panel of this court reversed the grant of

summary judgment on both grounds. The court explained that

the District of Columbia employs a “substantial special use” test,

rather than an exclusive control test, to determine “when a

business invitor’s duty extends to an egress.” Id. at 909.

Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Novak, the

court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that “the Zei

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Club put the I Street alley to a substantial special use.” Id. at

911. The facts relevant to that conclusion were as follows:

The Zei Club was set off from any public street and

surrounded by alleys. Its patrons were invited to use

the alleys as approaches and exits to the club. The

attack occurred within a few steps of the exit in the I

Street alley, which was the chief path of egress from

the club. At the hour of the attack, the only exit from

the club led to the I Street alley. The exact spot of the

attack was on a “calculated” and “necessary” egress.

No other businesses used the alley at that hour, and the

Zei Club routinely used its security guards to clear the

alley of loiterers and maintain order. 

Id. (citation omitted).

The previous panel also held that a reasonable jury could

find that the criminal attack on Novak met the standard of

foreseeability required under District of Columbia case law. Id.

at 913. As the court explained:

Novak . . . proffered testimony from the club’s security

guards and other employees indicating that fights

occurred in the club “once every two weeks at least,”

“twice a month,” or “probably 1 a month or 1 a week.”

One employee testified that he saw fights in the alley

by the exit “twice a month;” another said he saw

“maybe 1 or 2 fights” each month in the alley by the

exit. If believed, this evidence certainly could put a

reasonable club owner on heightened notice that a

serious problem existed outside its door. . . . Indeed, in

the words of the Zei Club’s own incident report from

the night of the attack, just “moments” prior to the

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assault on Novak[,] . . . the club had ejected a group of

patrons for fighting inside the club.

Id. at 913-14 (footnote omitted). In addition, “[t]he club, as

business invitor, shared a special relationship with its business

invitees, [including] . . . Novak.” Id. at 913. Drawing all

inferences in Novak’s favor, the court determined that “the club

cannot now seriously contend that an assault at its exit was not

legally foreseeable.” Id. at 914. 

In summary, the court concluded that:

With notice of repeated fights on its premises and in its

entryways and approaches, having made substantial

special use of those entryways and approaches, with

every reason to expect that fights would continue

absent the exercise of reasonable care, and with the

power to exercise reasonable care over entryways and

approaches, a reasonable jury could believe Novak[’s]

. . . evidence on prior similar conduct and conclude that

the Zei Club failed to take reasonable steps to secure

its alley.

Id. Accordingly, we vacated the district court’s grant of

summary judgment and remanded the case for further

proceedings. Id. at 915.

After our ruling in Novak I, the case proceeded to trial.

During the trial, Novak presented evidence consistent with his

proffer of testimony at the summary judgment stage. Regarding

substantial special use, witnesses at trial testified, inter alia, that:

the Zei Club required people seeking to enter the club to form a

line in the I Street alley, and security personnel maintained order

in the line; the club forced patrons to depart through a single exit

abutting the alley; and Novak’s party was first attacked in the

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alley in close proximity to the exit. Regarding foreseeability,

the evidence was as follows: one former Zei Club security

officer testified that he observed an altercation in the club or in

the alley “at least on a weekly basis” and that he was aware of

gang members taking materials from the Zei Club’s dumpsters

to use in assaults on others; another employee stated that patrons

in the club were ejected from the premises “twice a month” and

that he witnessed altercations in the alley with the same

frequency; the club’s former head of security stated that the club

ejected patrons who were fighting “every two or three weeks”;

and one of the off-duty MPD officers who worked security

testified that he became involved in customer altercations at the

club “once or twice a month.” J.A. 2055-56, 2229, 2723, 2830.

In addition, Novak introduced into evidence the club’s incident

report, which stated that patrons fighting inside were “ejected

from the club” just “[m]oments” before the attack on Novak.

J.A. 3021 (Pl.’s Ex. 6). 

Novak also presented evidence at trial indicating that the

absence of security personnel guarding the club’s exit was a

substantial factor contributing to his injuries. Witnesses testified

that the attack lasted for nearly five minutes, that the assailants

did not strike Novak’s head with boards until the end of this

time period, and that the attack ceased immediately once the offduty MPD officers rushed outside and intervened. Reviewing

this testimony, Novak’s security expert stated that, in his

opinion, the lack of security in the alley proximately caused

Novak’s injuries. The expert also testified that the Zei Club had

violated a national standard of care by not posting security

guards outside its exit at closing time until all patrons had

dispersed. He described this security measure as the “standard

practice,” id. at 2114, and he named other nightclubs in the

District of Columbia that employed it. 

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2

We initially dismissed an appeal by the club for lack of

jurisdiction because its cross-claims against four individuals alleged

to have assaulted Novak remained pending, and the district court’s

judgment on the verdict was therefore not final. See Novak v. Capital

Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 298 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We advised

the parties, however, that “in the interest of sparing [them] further

expenditure of resources,” if they obtained a final judgment as to all

of the claims and parties and filed a notice of appeal within thirty

days, we would permit them “to proceed on the new appeal on the

basis of the briefs and record previously submitted and on the oral

argument previously heard.” Id. at *2; see Chvala v. D.C. Transit

Sys., Inc., 293 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Pons v. Republic of

Cuba, 288 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see also 10 CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2660, at 152-53 & n.19 (3d ed. 1998).

Following our ruling, the district court dismissed the cross-claims and

the parties obtained a final judgment. Because the club filed its notice

of appeal within thirty days of the date of our dismissal, we now

consider its appeal on the basis of the previously submitted briefs and

record and on the previous oral argument.

3

The Zei Club also contends that the district court improperly

instructed the jury regarding proximate cause and vicarious liability,

The jury returned a verdict for Novak and awarded him

damages of $4,111,772. After the verdict, the Zei Club filed

motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 50(b) and for a new trial under Rule 59. The

district court denied both motions. Novak v. Capital Mgmt. &

Dev. Corp., No. 01-0039, Order (D.D.C. July 28, 2007). The

club now appeals.2

 In Part II, we consider the club’s contention

that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the

insufficiency of Novak’s evidence and on his assumption of the

risk of injury. In Part III, we address its argument that the

district court failed to instruct the jury regarding Novak’s

obligation to prove the club’s substantial special use of the

alley.3

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erroneously used a general verdict form rather than one posing

specific interrogatories, and improperly admitted certain evidence.

We have considered and rejected these arguments, which are either too

insubstantial for extended discussion or are waived because the club

omitted them from its opening brief and raised them only in its reply

brief. See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan,

296 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

II

The Zei Club contends that the district court erred in

denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review

such a denial de novo, but “[w]e do not . . . lightly disturb a jury

verdict. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the

evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women

could not have reached a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.’” Muldrow

v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting

McGill v. Muñoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). We first

discuss the club’s contention that there was insufficient evidence

to support the jury’s verdict; we then consider its argument that

Novak assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law.

A

The Zei Club’s arguments relating to the sufficiency of the

evidence merit only brief discussion. The club contends that

there was insufficient evidence of substantial special use,

foreseeability, proximate cause, and a national standard of care.

Novak I forecloses the club’s challenge regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence of substantial special use. As

explained in Part I above, the evidence Novak introduced at trial

relating to this issue was nearly identical to that which he

presented at the summary judgment stage. Indeed, at oral

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argument we asked the Zei Club’s counsel whether there was

any fact relating to substantial special use that was listed in

Novak I but that did not come into evidence at trial. He could

not cite a single one. Oral Arg. Recording at 9:24-10:22. In

Novak I, we reversed the grant of summary judgment in the

club’s favor because, based on the evidence then before the

district court, a reasonable jury could find that “the Zei Club put

the I Street alley to a substantial special use.” 452 F.3d at 911.

Based on the same evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury

could -- and did -- find that the club made substantial special use

of the alley. See generally Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251, 254

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that neither summary judgment nor

judgment as a matter of law may be granted if “a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))). 

Novak I also precludes the club’s argument regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence of foreseeability. Again, Novak’s

evidence at trial relating to foreseeability mirrored the testimony

he proffered at the summary judgment stage. Based on that

evidence, we concluded in Novak I that “the club cannot now

seriously contend that an assault at its exit was not legally

foreseeable.” 452 F.3d at 914. There is no ground to reach a

different conclusion after trial.

Nor does the club fare any better with its contention that

there was insufficient evidence of proximate cause. The club

argues that its failure to provide security in the I Street alley

could not qualify as the proximate cause of Novak’s injuries

because no evidence established that “the presence of one or

both of the off-duty officers on the outside of the exit door rather

than the inside of the exit door would have deterred or prevented

the attack.” Appellants’ Br. 30. But Novak did present

evidence that the absence of security personnel guarding the exit

was a substantial factor contributing to his injuries. See Lacy v.

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Dist. of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319-22 (D.C. 1980) (applying

a “substantial factor test” to determine whether a defendant’s

negligence was the proximate cause of an injury involving the

criminal acts of a third party). Several witnesses testified that

the attack lasted for nearly five minutes, that the assailants did

not strike Novak’s head with boards until the end of that time

period, and that the attack ceased immediately once the off-duty

MPD officers rushed outside and intervened. In light of this

evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that security

officers standing outside the exit would have deterred Novak’s

assailants from attacking him in the first place, or would have

broken up the fight before it escalated and caused him such

serious harm. 

We are also unpersuaded by the club’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence of a national standard of care. Under

District of Columbia law, an expert testifying about a national

standard of care must describe a specific standard rather than

refer generally to safety, see Pannell v. Dist. of Columbia, 829

A.2d 474, 479-80 (D.C. 2003), and must show that the standard

is accepted in the industry, see Clark v. Dist. of Columbia, 708

A.2d 632, 635 (D.C. 1997); see also Briggs v. Wash. Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

(explaining that “an expert may support a purported standard by

showing that it has been accepted as controlling in facilities and

enterprises that are similar to defendants’ facilities or

enterprises”). 

In this case, Novak presented the opinion of a security

expert, Norman Bates, who testified that the Zei Club violated

a national standard of nightclub security by failing to post

security personnel outside its exit at closing time until patrons

dispersed. J.A. 2114 (stating that it was the “standard practice,”

“widespread practice,” and “normal practice” to station security

guards outside “with a special focus . . . at the end of the night

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4

We also reject the club’s argument that Bates’ testimony did not

meet the standard of admissibility announced in Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Kumho Tire

Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 152 (1999) (holding that

in some cases “the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon

personal knowledge or experience,” and that “the trial judge must have

considerable leeway in deciding . . . how to go about determining

whether particular expert testimony is reliable”). 

when people are leaving . . . to be outside to monitor the

crowd”); see id. at 2128, 2145-46. This testimony satisfied the

requirement of D.C. law that an expert testify about a specific

standard of care, rather than merely about the generalized

objective of safety. Bates also testified that other nightclubs

place security guards at their exits. See, e.g., id. at 2115, 2118.

He specifically named four D.C. nightclubs that follow the

practice, id. at 2146, and he relied on testimony by the Zei

Club’s former general manager, who was unable to name a

single professionally run nightclub in the District that does not

position security personnel outside, id. at 2146, 2177. This

factual basis for the expert’s asserted standard of care was

comparatively thin, see Butera v. Dist. of Columbia, 235 F.3d

637, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (cataloguing D.C. cases in this

area of the law), but it was sufficient to establish that the

standard Bates articulated was in effect at comparable facilities,

see Dist. of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1273 (D.C.

1987) (holding that an expert established a national standard of

care for police officer training by testifying that police

departments throughout the country commonly trained officers

to deal with mentally disturbed persons and by naming several

departments that offered such training).4

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B

The club further contends that the district court should have

granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law, as well as its

earlier motion for summary judgment, based on Novak’s alleged

assumption of the risk by “voluntarily . . . join[ing] the fight . . .

to assist his friend” John Henderson, whom the group of men

attacked first. Appellants’ Br. 20. Under District of Columbia

law, assumption of the risk “is an affirmative defense in all

negligence actions and if properly invoked, it may operate as a

complete bar to liability.” Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d

555, 566 (D.C. 1979). “[T]he princip[al] elements of the

defense are an actual knowledge and comprehension of a danger

caused by the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s

voluntary exposure to that known danger.” Id. at 567. Because

this inquiry generally requires analysis of complex and casespecific factors, “the determination as to whether or not a

plaintiff assumed the risk is a question of fact usually to be

determined by the jury.” Id. at 568.

According to the Zei Club, Novak assumed the risk of

injury because he knowingly and voluntarily became part of an

ongoing fight after the assailants attacked Henderson. Although

the club claims that Novak did not dispute at the summary

judgment stage that he “rushed back up the alley and joined the

fight to aid [Henderson],” J.A. 225 (Defs.’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts), in fact Novak vigorously contested this

characterization of the events. In his opposition to the club’s

summary judgment motion, Novak stated that he “became part

of the melee involuntarily, as it developed around [him],” id. at

410, and he proffered Henderson’s deposition testimony that

Novak was only seven feet away when the attack began, id. at

449. In light of this genuine issue of material fact, the district

court properly denied the club summary judgment on the issue

of assumption of the risk.

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Nor was the club entitled to judgment as a matter of law

after the jury rendered its verdict in favor of Novak. Viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to Novak, a reasonable

jury could have found that Novak did not voluntarily enter the

fray, but rather was swept up in the attack. One of Novak’s

friends testified that Novak left the club first, with Henderson

“just behind him.” Id. at 1913. The group “hadn’t gone four or

five feet” when Henderson was attacked, id. at 1915, suggesting

that Novak was just a few steps ahead and could easily have

been caught up in the fight against his will. Indeed, Novak’s

sister, who was present in the I Street alley and witnessed the

attack, testified at trial that “there was nowhere to really go, so

[the assailants] just all came towards us.” Id. at 1949. 

The jury could also have reasonably believed that Novak

did not voluntarily assume the risk of injury because the

negligence of the Zei Club “left him no reasonable alternative

course of conduct in order to avert harm to himself or another.”

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E(2)(a) (1965). The

club misstates D.C. law when it asserts that “the reasonableness

of defending a friend has no impact on the defense of

assumption of the risk, and in fact proves it.” Appellants’ Br. 21

n.8. To the contrary, “[o]ne who endeavors to safeguard others

against a threat of injury posed by a defendant’s negligence does

not voluntarily assume the incidental risks where the alternative

is to suffer a continuation of the danger.” Aylor v. Intercounty

Constr. Corp., 381 F.2d 930, 934 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E(2)(a)); see also

Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“The

rescuer who extricates another from harm threatened by a third

person does not assume the risk as against the latter where the

only remaining choice is acquiescence in continuance of the

peril.”).

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Finally, even if the jury believed that Novak voluntarily

entered the fight, it could still have reasonably found that he did

not fully appreciate the danger of the situation. See Morrison,

407 A.2d at 566-67 (“[T]he evidence must show that the

plaintiff possessed full comprehension and appreciation of the

danger.”). When Novak initially became involved in the fight,

his assailants were only using their fists. Near the end of the

five-minute attack, however, they picked up wooden boards and

used them to beat Novak over the head. Facing an analogous

situation in Sinai v. Pollinger Co., the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff had not assumed

the risk of injury. 498 A.2d 520, 524-25 (D.C. 1985). In that

case, the plaintiff was accosted by a man at the front entrance of

an apartment building. When the plaintiff voluntarily followed

his assailant out to the parking lot, the assailant pulled a gun

from his car and shot him. The court held that the plaintiff had

not assumed the risk of injury by following the assailant to the

parking lot because “the gun . . . introduced a ‘new element’ into

the situation,” which “escalated the conflict, transforming it

from one whose risks were more or less known into one whose

potentialities [the plaintiff] could in no way have anticipated.”

Id. In this case, the attackers’ use of the boards as weapons

qualifies as a “new element” that transformed the risks Novak

confronted. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly

rejected the club’s motions for summary judgment and judgment

as a matter of law.

III

The Zei Club also maintains that the district court failed to

instruct the jury regarding the doctrine of substantial special use.

“An alleged failure to submit a proper jury instruction is a

question of law subject to de novo review; the choice of the

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language to be used in a particular instruction, however, is

reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” Joy v. Bell Helicopter

Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The club contends that “the trial court . . . deleted the issue

of ‘substantial special use’ entirely from the instructions given

to the jury.” Appellants’ Br. 13. That contention is factually

incorrect. As part of the jury instructions, the district court

stated:

In this case the plaintiff, Dominic Novak, claims that

the defendants are liable to him for the damages he

sustained on March 22nd, 1998, because they were

negligent. Specifically, Mr. Novak claims that

defendants did not properly monitor the exit of the Zei

Club and the alley beyond the exit, which is property

not owned by the Zei Club, because the Zei Club put

that area to a substantial special use.

The plaintiff must prove that the defendants were

negligent, and that such negligence proximately caused

the plaintiff’s injuries and damages. The plaintiff must

prove both negligence and damages by a

preponderance of the evidence.

J.A. 2963-64 (emphasis added). In context, the court listed

substantial special use as an element of Novak’s “[s]pecific[]”

claim of negligence, and the court’s subsequent references to

“negligence” are reasonably construed as using the term as

shorthand that incorporated that element. Thus, when the judge

immediately followed the reference to substantial special use

with the instruction that “[t]he plaintiff must prove that the

defendants were negligent,” he effectively stated that Novak

bore the burden of proving that the Zei Club did not properly

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monitor its exit and the alley, and that the club put that area to

a substantial special use. 

Indeed, both parties recognized that the jury instructions

made proof of substantial special use a part of Novak’s

negligence claim. In his summation, Novak’s counsel read the

instruction defining the negligence claim and then stated:

Okay. What does that mean? How did the Zei Club

put that alley, the I Street alley where this assault

occurred, how did they put that to a substantial special

use? They locked the front entrance, they forced

patrons to go out into that alley. . . . They lined up

patrons from the Zei street alley. . . . Two thousand

five hundred patrons on a Saturday night would be

forced out that exit down that alley or up to the left.

That’s what we mean by substantial special use.

Id. at 2905. Similarly, the Zei Club’s own counsel told the jury

in his closing argument that Novak had not met his burden of

proving substantial special use, as the jury instructions required:

Plaintiff’s burden in this case, and you’ll see it on page

six of the jury instructions[,] . . . is to demonstrate that

the Zei Club put the I Street alley to a substantial

special use. What evidence has been presented in this

case? The I Street and Zei alleys were both public

alleys open to pedestrians and motorists. The Zei Club

had no right to control either alley. They couldn’t clear

them, fence them, block them, close them or patrol

them. . . . [Novak’s counsel] has completely failed in

this case to present any evidence of special use for

control of those alleys.

USCA Case #08-7135 Document #1193406 Filed: 06/26/2009 Page 17 of 18
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5

In its reply brief, the Zei Club changed tack and objected that the

district court failed to define the term “substantial special use” for the

jury. The club has waived this argument by waiting until its reply

brief to make it. See World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1160; see

also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash. v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214,

1221(D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that, “[t]o prevent . . . sandbagging

of appellees and respondents,” the court treats an argument as waived

when the petitioners “were obscure on th[e] issue in their opening

brief” and only “warmed to the . . . issue” in their reply brief).

Moreover, we note that the Zei Club’s own proposed jury instruction

on substantial special use did not contain a definition of the term. See

J.A. 1191. 

Id. at 2935-36 (emphasis added). Although the district court

could certainly have expanded its discussion of substantial

special use, the charge that it entirely “deleted” the issue from

the jury instructions is simply untrue.5

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the

arguments that the Zei Club has raised on this appeal. The

judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

USCA Case #08-7135 Document #1193406 Filed: 06/26/2009 Page 18 of 18