Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01541/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01541-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN ANDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 17-cv-1541-AJB (NLS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF. No. 1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Melvin Anderson (“Petitioner,” “Anderson,” or “Melvin”), a state 

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his San Diego Superior Court 

convictions in case number SCS225148. (ECF No. 1 at 2 (“Petition”).)

1

 Respondent 

filed an answer, arguing that Petitioner’s petition fails for one claim on a procedural bar 

and on his other claim on the merits, and lodged the court records. (ECF No. 14 

 

1 Due to discrepancies between original and imprinted page numbers, page numbers for 

docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted by 

the court’s electronic case filing system.

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(“Answer”); ECF No. 15 (“Lodgment”).) Petitioner filed a traverse, and the Court took 

the matter under submission. (ECF No. 16 (“Traverse”).) After reviewing the parties’ 

submissions and the lodgments, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinions:

2

Melvin James Anderson was sentenced to prison in March 2013 for an 

aggregate term of 23 years after a jury found him guilty of residential burglary, 

first degree robbery, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a 

felon, and found true firearm enhancement allegations attached to the 

burglary, robbery, and assault charges, and he admitted he had served three 

prior prison terms and had a prior conviction that constituted a serious felony 

and a strike under the Three Strikes law.

(Lodgment No. 21 at 1; see also Lodgment No. 13 at 2.) 

At the time of the incident giving rise to the charges in this case, 

Anderson lived with his cousin, Kellie Thomas, and her three children. 

Gregory Moore and his girlfriend, Niya Watson, who is a cousin of both 

Anderson and Thomas, had previously lived with Thomas and her children. 

Moore and Watson testified that Thomas abused prescription pills, and that 

Moore occasionally provided Thomas with Vicodin pills that were prescribed 

for him when they lived together. Thomas sometimes paid Moore money for 

the Vicodin pills and sometimes paid him for the pills by letting him use her

electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card to buy food. When Thomas’s mother, 

Diane Sawyer, found out that Moore was giving Thomas Vicodin, she asked 

Moore and Watson to move out of Thomas's apartment, and paid them $200 

to expedite their move.

After Moore and Watson moved out of Thomas’s apartment, Moore 

continued to provide Thomas with Vicodin from his prescriptions, and 

Thomas occasionally paid Moore for the pills by letting him purchase food 

 

2 This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); Slovik v. Yates, 545 F.3d 

1181, 1183 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) 

(holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from those facts, 

are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). Here, Petitioner does not raise a 

challenge to any of these facts.

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with her EBT card. Moore testified that he would “front” Thomas the pills and 

Thomas would pay him with the EBT card “about a week or so later.” On 

March 1, 2012, Thomas met with Moore and Watson at a grocery store across 

the street from her residence to give them the EBT card as payment for

Vicodin that Moore had given her earlier in the week. Thomas agreed to allow 

Moore to spend $200 on the card for food. Thomas also paid Moore $300 in 

cash toward an $800 debt for pills that he had given her and money that he 

and Watson had loaned her. After Thomas bought groceries for her household, 

she gave Watson the EBT card and told her that she could spend “$200 off the 

EBT card.” Moore would normally “go right to the store” when Thomas let 

him use her EBT card, and would return the card to Thomas within a couple 

of hours. However, when Thomas gave Watson the card that day, Moore did 

not have time to shop because he had a “previous engagement” and “other

things to do.” Consequently, he and Watson drove home with the EBT card 

and Thomas walked home.

After Moore and Watson returned to their apartment, Anderson called 

Watson and asked her if she had Thomas’s EBT card. Thomas later sent 

Moore and Watson several text messages telling them that she, Anderson, and 

Sawyer were on their way to Moore and Watson's apartment to retrieve the 

card. Thomas told Moore that they were going to bring him $200 in cash in 

exchange for the card.

Anderson arrived at Moore and Watson's apartment and knocked on the 

door. Moore opened the door with the EBT card in his right hand. Anderson 

said, “Yo, man. I need that card.” Moore replied, “Okay, well, where is the 

$200?” Anderson said that he did not have the money, but would give it to 

Moore later. Moore told Anderson that he needed to buy food before he 

returned the card and turned to close the door. Anderson pushed the door open 

and hit Moore on the head with what appeared to Moore to be a “skull cap,” 

which Moore explained is a “beanie that you put over your skull.” The blow

caused Moore to lose his balance and stumble. As he stumbled, he saw a gun 

clip fall out of the cap onto the floor, and saw Anderson pick up the clip. 

Moore then heard the sound of a clip being inserted into a gun.

Watson testified that she saw the gun clip on the floor and saw 

Anderson pick up the clip and insert it into a black gun. She yelled at Anderson 

and told him to get out of her house. In response, Anderson said, “Get the fuck 

out of my face. Get back. You will get hurt, too.” Before he left the apartment, 

Anderson pushed Watson, pointed the gun at her and said, “I ought to rob you 

right now.”

Medical assistant Shawn Ireland and a doctor were making a house call 

at an apartment located down the hall from Moore and Watson’s apartment 

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when the altercation between Anderson, Moore, and Watson occurred. Ireland 

and the doctor heard yelling and screaming coming from down the hall. The 

doctor told Ireland to “go break that up.” Ireland went into the hallway and

walked toward Moore and Watson’s apartment. As he approached their door, 

he said something to the effect of, “Hey, hey, guys, calm down.” Anderson, 

who was standing in the doorway, turned around and looked at Ireland. Ireland 

saw a pistol in Anderson's right hand. He was familiar with guns and 

recognized the gun in Anderson's hand as a semiautomatic “Glock” type of

pistol. Anderson was holding the gun by the barrel with the handle sticking 

out the backside. When Ireland saw the gun, he backed away from Anderson, 

returned to his patient's apartment, and called 911. A few minutes later, the 

police arrived at Moore and Watson’s apartment. Moore told the police that 

he had received his welfare check that day and that Anderson had probably 

come to his home to rob him.

[] Anderson testified that he lived with his cousin, Thomas, and her 

three children and was employed as an in-home caregiver. He testified that 

Thomas was a “sickly person” and is mentally “slow.” He helped Thomas by 

making sure that she shopped for groceries for the children, got the children 

to school, made it to her medical appointments, and cleaned herself and the 

children. Thomas’s mother, Sawyer, told Anderson in late 2011 that Thomas 

had a drug problem. Anderson tried to talk to Thomas about the problem and 

began to watch her more closely. Watson and Thomas told Anderson that 

Thomas was getting pills from Watson, and Anderson knew that Watson was 

getting the pills from Moore. Anderson spoke with Moore about providing

Thomas with pills. He asked Moore, “Why would you guys do this to your 

family?” Moore responded, “I need my money. I’ve got to live too.”

After Thomas was hospitalized in December 2011 as a result of a drug 

overdose, Anderson began monitoring her money. Thomas gave Anderson her 

bank card and EBT card, but he later returned them to her when he “noticed 

that she was doing better.” However, he continued to monitor her use of the 

EBT card by asking her for receipts.

The day before the March 1 incident, Sawyer and Anderson became 

concerned because Thomas was missing and Sawyer discovered that money 

had been withdrawn from Thomas’s bank account from a 7/11 store across 

the street from Moore and Watson’s apartment. Anderson suspected that 

Moore and Watson were selling drugs to Thomas again. When Thomas came 

home, Anderson searched her and found Vicodin pills in her pocket. Anderson 

was upset. He took the pills and Thomas’s cards from Thomas, but returned 

the cards that night.

The next day, Anderson and Sawyer confronted Thomas and asked her 

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where the money missing from her account and her EBT card were. Thomas 

said that she had paid bills with the money. She pretended to look for her EBT 

card for a few minutes, but eventually admitted that Moore and Watson had 

the card. Anderson “started arguing” with Thomas and expressing disapproval 

that she had allowed Moore and Watson to take the card. Thomas responded, 

“Well, she snatched it. It was two of them and just me. What was I going to 

do?” Sawyer suggested that they go to Moore and Watson's apartment to 

retrieve the EBT card and told Thomas to “tell them we’re coming to get the

card.” Thomas sent a text message to Moore and Watson while Sawyer, 

Anderson and Thomas drove to their apartment. Anderson testified that he did 

not have a gun. He explained that he wore a knife attached to his belt on his 

right hip, and wore a cell phone holder behind the knife.

Anderson arrived at Moore and Watson’s apartment and knocked on 

the door. When Moore opened the door, he was holding Thomas's EBT card 

in his hand. Anderson said, “I’m going to need that.” Moore turned to Watson 

and asked her if he should give Moore the card. Watson said, “No, no. Hell 

no.” Anderson reached for the card and Moore held onto it. They both pulled 

on the card, but Anderson won the “struggle” and left with the card. Anderson 

testified that he did not hit Moore over the head with a gun or with anything 

else, and said that he did not own a gun. When Anderson was asked if Moore

fell during the struggle, he answered, “I’m not sure what happened when I 

left. He was kind of, like, hurling towards the bathroom.” Anderson added 

that Moore was not steady on his feet during the struggle and seemed “kind 

of scared,” “slow,” and “groggy.” When Anderson was shown a photograph 

of Moore with blood on his head after the incident, he testified that he might 

have caused Moore to fall because Moore was unstable, but he denied that he 

had hit Moore on the head.

(Lodgment No. 13 at 3-8.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings

Matthew Williams (“Mr. Williams”) was the deputy district attorney assigned to 

prosecute the case, and Debbie Kirkwood (“Ms. Kirkwood”) served as Petitioner’s public 

defender. (Lodgment No. 1 at 2.)

Petitioner was initially charged by information on March 7, 2012. (Lodgment No. 

9 at 8-12.) On May 9, 2012, Petitioner was charged by an amended information with first 

degree residential burglary (Cal. Penal Code §§ 459-60, 667.5(c)(21)), first degree 

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robbery (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211, 212.5(a), 12022.53(b)), assault with a firearm (Cal. 

Penal Code § 245(a)(2)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 

29800(a)(1)). (Id. at 19-21.) The State also alleged that in the commission or attempted 

commission of the robbery and assault, Petitioner personally used a firearm (a firearm 

enhancement under Cal. Penal Code §§ 12022.5(a), 12022.53(b)). (Id. at 20.) The State

further alleged that Petitioner had served three prison terms (within the meaning of Cal. 

Penal Code §§ 667.5(b), 668), and that he had a prior conviction which constituted a 

serious felony (under Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a)(1), 1192.7(c)) and a strike (under Cal. 

Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 668, 1170.12). (Id. at 22.) 

On May 16, 2012, a jury convicted Anderson of all charges and found true the 

accompanying allegations. (Id. at 84-90.) In a bifurcated proceeding, Anderson admitted 

to the prior convictions. (Id. at 268-69.) 

On March 19, 2013, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 23 years in state prison. 

(Id. at 281-82.) There, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to eight years for robbery (a 

middle term of four years, doubled under the Three Strikes law), ten years for the robbery 

firearm enhancement, and five years for the prior felony conviction enhancement.3 (Id.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

On February 22, 2014, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (See Lodgment No. 10 at 

13.) In his direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court erred by failing to instruct 

the jury on Petitioner’s meritorious claim of right defense, and by allowing Mr. Williams 

to impeach him with a 23-year-old prior robbery conviction. (Id. at 21-30, 45-55.) 

Petitioner also claimed that the trial court erred by not excluding impeachment evidence 

regarding prior gun use, or, in the alternative, that Ms. Kirkwood rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to object to the same. (Id. at 31-45.) Further, Petitioner 

 

3 The additional eight year burglary sentence (four-year middle term, doubled) with four 

year accompanying firearm enhancement was later stayed by the California Court of 

Appeal, in accordance with Cal. Penal Code § 654’s prohibition against multiple 

punishments for crimes arising out of a single act. (Lodgment No. 13 at 30-31.)

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claimed that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of due process. (Id. at 55-

56.) Lastly, Petitioner claimed that his burglary sentence should have been stayed 

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 654. (Id. at 56-59.) On March 13, 2015, the California 

Court of Appeal stayed a portion of Petitioner’s sentence,4 but affirmed the remainder of 

the judgment. (Lodgment No. 13.) 

On April 22, 2015, Petitioner sought review from the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 14.) There, he raised issues regarding the denied claim of right defense, 

the admission of his 1989 robbery conviction, and Ms. Kirkwood’s ineffective assistance 

as to permitting his prior gun use to be introduced. (Id. at 7.) The California Supreme 

Court issued an order denying review on June 24, 2015. (Lodgment No. 15.)

C. State Habeas Proceedings

On January 22, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San 

Diego County Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 16.) Petitioner argued that Ms. Kirkwood

“advised him to reject the plea offer [and] insisted if he lost he would only receive 10 

years.” (Id. at 3.) However, in his habeas petition, he noted that these5claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel were not made during those initial appeals because 

“appellate counsel failed to adequately review the record on appeal in lieu of filing 

above-claims.” (Id. at 5.) Respondent subsequently filed a return to an order to show 

cause, arguing that Petitioner was not entitled to relief, (Lodgment No. 17), to which the 

Petitioner responded with a traverse, (Lodgment No. 18). On December 15, 2016, the 

superior court denied the habeas petition, pointing to Petitioner’s delay in raising the 

claims and also concluding that Petitioner’s claim failed on the merits. (Lodgment No. 

19 at 3-5.) 

 

4 See supra note 3.

5

In contrast, during Petitioner’s direct appeals, he claimed that “(1) the trial court erred 

by failing to instruct the jury on a claim-of-right defense, (2) the court erred by admitting 

impeachment evidence regarding his prior gun use, [and] (3) the court prejudicially erred 

in allowing the prosecution to impeach him with 23yrs.” (Lodgment No. 16 at 5.) 

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On February 14, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 20.) Petitioner argued that he received 

ineffective assistance because counsel advised him to reject prosecution’s eight-year offer 

because of a meritorious claim of right defense and advised him that he would receive no 

more than ten years if convicted. (Id. at 29.) Petitioner further argued that he was denied 

due process at his Alvernaz6 waiver hearing, where he rejected the plea bargain. (Id. at 

15-19.) On February 28, 2017, the state appellate court denied the habeas petition, 

concluding that his claims were untimely, and, even if they were not procedurally barred, 

that they would fail on the merits. (Lodgment No. 21 at 4.) 

On June 9, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court. (Lodgment No. 22.) He argued that there was confusion in the lower courts as to 

what questions may be asked during an Alvernaz waiver hearing, thus entitling him to 

review. (Id. at 8.) He also reasserted his previous ineffective assistance of counsel and 

due process claims. (Id. at 26-30.) On April 26, 2017, the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied the petition for review without comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 

23.) 

D. Federal Habeas Proceedings

On July 20, 2017, Petitioner then filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in this Court. (Petition at 1.) 

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Petitioner’s petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 

(1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

 

6 Referring to In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924 (1992).

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court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring 

only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an 

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court need 

not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 

U.S. at 8. As long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision 

contradicts Supreme Court precedent, the decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). Clearly 

established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or 

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003)

The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state 

court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but 

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Bell, 535 U.S. at 

694. The “unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more 

than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of 

clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer, 538 

U.S. at 75. “[A] habeas court [must] determine what arguments or theories supported, or 

could have supported, the state-court decision and then . . . ask whether it is possible 

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fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with a 

prior decision of [the Supreme Court].” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011). 

This is an extremely deferential review, posing a heavy burden on the Petitioner: to prove 

that the state court’s ruling on the claim was “so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103. 

To determine if a decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented, the state court’s factual findings are presumed correct 

and this presumption will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court finds 

that the factual determinations were objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in state court. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also 

Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds reviewing 

the record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively unreasonable). 

Petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007). A state 

court decision is only considered objectively unreasonable when it is “more than 

incorrect or erroneous.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. If 

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal 

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the 

state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled 

on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two claims in his petition: (1) that he was deprived of effective 

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assistance of counsel, and (2) that he was deprived due process in the Alvernaz waiver 

hearing. (Petition at 12.) Respondent argues that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim was reasonably rejected by the appellate court, and that his due process 

claim is procedurally defaulted. (Answer at 17-26.)

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel7

In Petitioner’s first claim, he argues that he was deprived of effective assistance of 

counsel related to the plea bargain he was offered for the following reasons: (1) Ms. 

Kirkwood incorrectly advised him that if convicted, he would get a maximum of 10 

years; (2) Ms. Kirkwood incorrectly advised him that he had a meritorious claim of right 

defense; (3) Ms. Kirkwood instructed him to reject the plea bargain with an eight-year 

stipulated prison term; and (4) Ms. Kirkwood told him that he would win at trial. 

(Petition at 12-15.) Petitioner contends that he would have accepted the plea bargain but 

for Kirkwood’s erroneous advise. (Id. at 14.) 

Petitioner raised this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his state habeas 

petition to the San Diego County Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 16.) The claim was 

also presented to and ruled upon by the California Court of Appeals. (Lodgment No. 20.) 

Petitioner’s habeas petition to the state supreme court was summarily denied. (See 

 

7

In his petition, Petitioner states that his “imprisonment is unlawful because Melvin was 

deprived of his rights . . . to effective assistance of counsel before and during trial[.]” 

(Petition at 12. Emphasis added.) However, Petitioner wholly failed to substantively 

discuss this argument in his petition or traverse, or support it with any facts or argument. 

Rather, Petitioner focused on the Alvernaz hearing and the events surrounding the plea 

bargain prior to trial. Thus, the Court finds that any arguments as to ineffective 

assistance of counsel during trial have been waived and the Court will not address it. See 

Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a brief 

that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”); FDIC v. Garner, 126 F.3d 

1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Appellants present no case law or argument in support of 

this claim. Accordingly, we deem the argument waived.”); Creech v. Ramirez, No. 1:99-

CV-00224-BLW, 2016 WL 8605324, at *6 (D. Idaho Jan. 29, 2016) (finding that claims 

with “no particular argument or evidentiary support” are “either forfeited or voluntarily 

waived”). 

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Lodgment No. 22.) Therefore, this Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court 

decision to address Petitioner’s claim—i.e., the appellate court decision—and presumes 

that it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim. See Ylst, 501 

U.S. at 805-06.

1. Legal Standard

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective 

assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that 

Strickland “has long been clearly established federal law determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States”). 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in federal court, 

Petitioner must have first established in state court that his trial counsel’s performance

was deficient—that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. 

Second, he must have shown counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, 

such that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s errors. 

Id; see People v. Lucero, 23 Cal. 4th 692, 728 (2000) (“Prejudice occurs only if the 

record demonstrates a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).8 Counsel’s errors must be so serious that the result of the proceeding was 

 

8 The appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the Petitioner’s 

relationship with his lawyer: 

If counsel is a reasonably effective advocate, [s]he meets constitutional 

standards irrespective of h[er] client’s evaluation of h[er] performance. It is 

for this reason that we attach no weight to either respondent’s expression of 

satisfaction with counsel’s performance at the time of his trial, or to his later 

expression of dissatisfaction. 

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984) (internal citations omitted).

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fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). 

In assessing counsel’s performance, the Court employs a strong presumption that counsel 

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

On federal habeas review, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were 

reasonable, [but] whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S.at 105. The Court need not 

address the performance prong if the claim can be resolved on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Effective assistance of counsel also attaches to the decision to accept or reject a 

plea bargain. Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 879 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United 

States v. Fuller, 941 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Our law has long recognized that a 

defendant has the right to assistance of counsel in deciding whether or not to plead 

guilty.”). Strickland’s two-prong test applies to ineffectiveness claims arising from the 

plea process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985). The first prong assesses not 

whether “counsel’s advice was right or wrong but . . . whether that advice was within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Turner, 281 F.3d at 879 

(quotation omitted). To satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, petitioner must show “but 

for counsel’s errors, he would have pleaded guilty and would not have insisted on going 

to trial.” Id. 

2. Timeliness 

As a threshold matter, the Court will briefly address the issue of timeliness because 

it was the first ground upon which the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s 

habeas petition. The state appellate court stated:

As the trial court observed, the unexplained delay of nearly three years 

between sentencing and the filing of the habeas corpus petition in the trial 

court bars the claims as untimely. (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 459; In 

re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 302.)

(Lodgment No. 21 at 4.) 

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A state court finding that a state habeas petition was untimely is generally 

sufficient grounds to bar the federal habeas petition as well. California’s timeliness bar 

has been found to be an “independent and adequate” state procedural ground barring 

subsequent habeas relief in federal court. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 317 (2011); 

Ayala v. Chappell, 829 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Walker holds that California’s 

timeliness rule is an independent and adequate state law ground sufficient to bar federal 

habeas relief on untimely claims.”) (original emphasis omitted). This federal bar applies 

even if the appellate court found the petition untimely but still went on to address the 

merits—as the appellate court did here. Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 

2000) (concluding that federal habeas review was precluded when the state court 

dismissed the “state habeas petition, independently stated that his petition was 

procedurally barred because it was untimely and then separately concluded that his 

claims were without merit”).

However, neither party raised this timeliness ground as a procedural bar to the 

instant claim in the federal habeas petition. Failing to raise a procedural bar as a defense 

to a claim generally waives it. Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 

2005) (stating that, in the habeas context, “a state waives its statute of limitations defense 

by filing a responsive pleading that fails to affirmatively set forth the defense”); Vang v. 

Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that, in the habeas context, 

procedural default is an affirmative defense, which is waived if not asserted by the state); 

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Moreover, the Court retains the discretion to consider a claim on the merits even if 

it may be procedurally barred. Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992); see

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984) (courts have “uniformly acknowledged that federal 

courts are empowered under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to look beyond a state procedural 

forfeiture and entertain a state prisoner’s contention that his constitutional rights have 

been violated.”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ourts are 

empowered to, and in some cases should, reach the merits of habeas petitions if they are, 

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on their face and without regard to any facts that could be developed below, clearly not 

meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar.”).

Thus, the Court will address the merits of Petitioner’s ineffective of counsel claim.9

3. Merits 

After finding the petition untimely, the California Court of Appeal continued to 

also deny Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits:

Even were the petition not procedurally barred, it would be denied on the 

merits. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Anderson 

must show his trial counsel’s advice to reject the prosecutor’s plea offer both 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and also caused him 

prejudice in that, but for her bad advice, there is a reasonable probability he 

would have accepted the offer and the trial court would have approved it. 

(Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156, 162-164; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2

Cal.4th 924, 936-941.) “In this context, a defendant’s self-serving

statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—that with competent advice 

he or she would have accepted a proffered plea bargain, is insufficient in and 

of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to prejudice, and must 

be corroborated independently by objective evidence.” (In re Alvernaz, supra, 

at p. 938.) As the trial court noted, the transcript of the hearing at which

Anderson rejected the prosecutor’s plea offer—the only objective evidence in 

the record—completely undermines his claim that he decided to go to trial 

because counsel had misinformed him he was facing only 10 years in prison 

if convicted. At the hearing, both the prosecutor and the trial court stated the 

maximum exposure was 30 years in prison, and Anderson said he understood 

that when asked by the court. He also said he was aware of the prosecutor’s 

offer of a stipulated eight-year prison sentence in exchange for a guilty plea, 

 

9 Similarly, neither party raises any potential timeliness issue with the federal habeas 

petition. AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitations on petitioners seeking to file a 

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). While this statute of 

limitations is subject to statutory tolling with a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), an untimely filed state 

habeas petition does not toll the statute of limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 412-13 (2005) (a state post-conviction petition that a state court rejects as untimely 

is not considered “properly filed” such that it tolls the federal statute of limitations). 

Regardless, neither party raised this issue so the Court will not rule on it. Day v. 

McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (“[D]istrict courts are permitted, but not obliged, 

to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition.”). 

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had discussed the offer with counsel, and had decided to reject the offer and 

go to trial. Anderson’s related claim that counsel misadvised him about the 

strength of his claim of-right defense also fails. The only evidentiary support 

for this claim is Anderson’s own declaration, which “is insufficiently 

corroborated by independent, objective evidence.” (Id. at p. 945.) The 

declarations of Anderson’s obviously biased family members and friends say 

nothing about this defense. Those witnesses state only in very vague terms 

that counsel advised Anderson not to accept the plea offer because he had a 

good chance of prevailing at trial, and four of them suspiciously state they 

heard counsel give that advice five days after the hearing at which Anderson 

rejected the plea offer. Moreover, Anderson’s claim is contradicted by the 

declaration of his counsel, who stated she advised Anderson the claim-of-right 

defense was not worth taking to trial and he should accept the plea offer. 

Based on “an independent review of the record,” this court concludes 

Anderson has not “established by a preponderance of substantial, credible 

evidence” that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. 

(Id. at pp. 944-945.)

(Lodgment No. 21 at 4.) 

Here, for the reasons below, the Court finds that the state appellate court’s decision 

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law and did not 

reflect an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

Because Petitioner presents several basis for the IAC claim, the Court will address each 

in turn. 

First, Petitioner claims that Ms. Kirkwood mistakenly told him that he only faced a 

maximum of 10 years in prison if convicted. In support of this claim, in his state habeas 

petition, Petitioner submitted a declaration stating that Ms. Kirkwood told him that “even 

if she lost the case [Petitioner] wouldn’t get over 10 years.” (Lodgment No. 16 at 12; see 

also Lodgment No. 18 at 4.) 

The appellate court found that this statement from Petitioner—which was the only 

evidence he submitted in support of this specific claim—was not sufficient to overcome 

the objective evidence to the contrary. Specifically, the appellate court pointed to 

Petitioner’s rejection of the prosecution’s plea offer on the record, where the following 

exchange took place: 

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THE COURT: You have any objection to me inquiring of him along the lines 

of People v. Alvern[a]z? 

MS. KIRKWOOD: No, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, let me talk to you personally about what you 

just heard. I sometimes feel uncomfortable having this conversation because 

I am not in any way trying to pressure you, trying to nudge you in one way or 

the other. It’s your call in consultation with your attorney. So please don’t 

take anything I’m saying now with any indication of what I think you should 

do, any, you know, arm twisting or anything. Understood? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: I want you to have the information that was just given to me 

so you understand that and you can put that in your calculations. The district 

attorney wants me to go forward on a new amended information this morning, 

arraign you on it, and he’s added some prior convictions of yours to it and 

he’s changed one of the allegations to not only simply “uses a firearm” but 

“uses a firearm during a robbery” which is a mandatory 10-year sentence 

enhancement to any sentence. So that is what is happening. According to his 

calculations, if we go forward in trial on that and you’re convicted on all 

counts and all priors are found to be true, at sentencing you’re facing a 

potential sentence of 30 years. Understood? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Before we go forward on that, Mr. Williams has made an offer 

on the original complaint, that’s the only one now in effect until I arraign you 

on the new one, and has offered you a plea bargain if you plead guilty to the 

robbery and admit to the use of a gun and stipulate to an eight-year prison 

sentence. That’s the offer of the district attorney right now. It will expire if 

you don’t accept it, frankly. I presume you’ve had these conversations. I 

don’t want you to tell me about your conversations. I presume you’ve 

discussed these issues with your attorney. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: You’re aware of the district attorney’s offer of eight years?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Is it your intention to refuse the offer and go forward in trial? 

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay, I’ll note that Mr. Anderson has been advised of the 

district attorney’s offer on the original complaint and has consulted with his 

attorney about it and has advised the court that he is turning it down and 

willing to go forward on trial. 

(Lodgment No. 1 at 6-8.) 

After Petitioner rejected the plea and the court moved onto other matters, Ms. 

Kirkwood herself repeated that Petitioner faced a 30-year maximum in open court and in 

the presence of Petitioner. In the hearing for motions in limine with Petitioner present, in 

the context of whether Petitioner’s prior convictions could be used as propensity 

evidence, Ms. Kirkwood stated “Mr. Anderson is facing 30 years in prison for this. We 

have to make sure he receives a fair trial.” (Lodgment No. 1 at 34.) Later on, Ms. 

Kirkwood again repeated “[w]e need to assure that Mr. Anderson receives a fair trial 

acknowledging that he is looking at 30 years on this case.” (Id. at 46.) Petitioner did not

raise an issue with him misunderstanding his maximum sentence at this time either. 

On this factual record, the appellate court was not objectively unreasonable in

rejecting Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective because she misinformed him of 

the sentence he was facing. The appellate court pointed out that the only “objective” 

evidence on the record—the hearing transcript—showed that the prosecutor and the trial 

court stated the maximum exposure was 30 years in prison, and Petitioner said he 

understood that when asked by the court. In his state habeas brief, Petitioner argued that 

his statements on the record that he understood the consequences of going to trial was 

actually based on Ms. Kirkwood’s advice about 10 years, not 30 years. (Lodgment No. 

18 at 9.) However, courts are not required to give weight to self-serving statements made 

years after the fact. See Turner, 281 F.3d at 881 (rejecting petitioner’s “self-serving 

statement, made years later,” that his counsel told him he would not face the death 

penalty when petitioner sat through charging information, which included the possible 

penalty of death, as insufficient to establish he was unaware of the possible punishment). 

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Second, Petitioner contends that Ms. Kirkwood rendered inefficient assistance 

because she assured him that he had a meritorious claim of right defense. Petitioner 

argues that the claim of right defense clearly did not apply to his situation, because it 

“does not apply if the claim arises from an activity known to be illegal or known by the 

defendant to be illegal. . . . [and here,] the EBT card was being used in criminal activity.” 

(Petition at 14-15.)

The appellate court weighed the evidence on both sides. In support of Petitioner’s 

claim, he had his declaration which stated “Ms. Kirkwood told me that my good faith 

believe [sic] that I had legal right to retrieve the card from Gregory Moore whom was 

wrongfully holding the card would be my defense to the crime I was charge [sic].” 

(Lodgment 16 at 12.) In addition, he stated “Still I worry and consultant [sic] with a

family friend. He told me that O.J. Simpson try the same defense and lost his case with 

paid attorneys.” (Id.) In contrast, Ms. Kirkwood’s declaration, submitted to the state 

court, stated: 

After Anderson made clear to me that he was not going to plead guilty, I 

formulated the claim-of-right defense based on the available facts. I believed 

that arguing Anderson had a right to the property taken from the victim was 

Anderson's best defense under the circumstances. As a zealous advocate, I 

also argued Anderson’s theory that his cellular telephone carrier and knife 

looked like a gun. I did not think these defenses were worth the risk of going 

to trial, and I explained my candid assessment of these defense theories to 

Anderson. However, Anderson still wanted to go to trial.

(Lodgment No. 17 at 56.). None of the other declarations submitted by Petitioner 

included any statements specific to this defense. Balancing the two dueling declarations 

from Petitioner and Ms. Kirkwood, the appellate court found that Petitioner’s own selfserving, uncorroborated declaration was insufficient evidence that Ms. Kirkwood assured 

him he had a meritorious claim of right defense. 

The Court does not find this conclusion to be contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of Strickland or an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence. Self-serving 

statements, made after the fact, are often insufficient to overcome the presumption of 

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validity accorded to state convictions. See Turner, 281 F.3d at 881; United States v. 

Allen, 153 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[S]elf-serving statements by a defendant 

that his conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the 

presumption of regularity accorded state convictions.”).

Moreover, even if Ms. Kirkwood did make statements to Petitioner suggesting that 

he had a strong claim of right defense, this would not be sufficient to establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Whether or not the claim of right defense applied to Petitioner’s 

situation was not so clear that his counsel’s pursuit of the defense would have placed her 

“outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Turner, 281 

F.3d at 879. 

During trial, after the defense rested and prosecution declined to introduce rebuttal 

evidence, Ms. Kirkwood requested the claim of right instruction.10 (Lodgment No. 4 at 

62-63.) Ms. Kirkwood argued that Petitioner believed he had a bona fide belief to a 

claim of right to the EBT card. (Id. at 63.) Ms. Kirkwood differentiated Petitioner’s 

factual situation from cases cited by the State, arguing that Petitioner was not engaged in 

“notorious illegal activity” such that the defense would be inapplicable. (Id. at 63-65.) In 

a lengthy debate, the trial court debated whether to give the instruction, questioning Ms. 

Kirkwood regarding how the defense applies when the property was not technically 

Petitioner’s but belonged to another (i.e., Kellie Thomas). (Id. at 65-91.) Eventually, 

 

10 Specifically, she requested California Criminal Jury Instruction 1863, which reads in 

relevant part: 

If the defendant obtained property under a claim of right, (he/she) did not have 

the intent required for the crime of (theft/ [or] robbery). The defendant 

obtained property under a claim of right if (he/she) believed in good faith that 

(he/she) had a right to the specific property or a specific amount of money, 

and (he/she) openly took it. . . . The claim-of-right defense does not apply if 

the claim arose from an activity commonly known to be illegal or known by 

the defendant to be illegal. 

CALCRIM 1863.

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after noting that he “struggled” with the issue, the trial judge denied her request to give 

the instruction. (Id. at 88-91.) 

This record shows that the claim had some merit, as it was not summarily 

dismissed as frivolous. Indeed, Petitioner himself argued that the claim of right defense 

was meritorious, in his motions for new trial and direct appeals. (Lodgment No. 9 at 150-

53 (arguing that trial court should have given claim of right instruction because it was 

supported by the evidence); Lodgment No. 10 at 18-19, 25-27 (arguing same on direct 

appeal).11) Given this record, Petitioner’s claim that Ms. Kirkwood’s pursuit of this 

defense arose to ineffective assistance of counsel does not stand. 

Third, turning to the last two arguments petitioner makes—that Ms. Kirkwood 

erred in telling him that he would prevail at trial and that she instructed him to not accept 

the plea bargain—neither of these are sufficient to grant Petitioner habeas relief for an 

IAC claim either. 

The state appellate court reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties on this 

issue. Petitioner submitted a declaration stating that Ms. Kirkwood told him “not to 

worry we would win the case” and advised him to decline the eight year plea bargain. 

(Lodgment No. 16 at 12.) He submitted a declaration from Gary L. Peavy, who stated 

that he asked Ms. Kirkwood “you don’t believe he should have took the deal” and she 

responded “No, he has a very good chance of success.” (Id. at 14.) He submitted a 

declaration from Da’Lundra Anderson, which stated:

On several occasions while accompanying Melvin Anderson to court 

proceedings [I] spoke with Mrs. Kirkwood in regards of his case. Mrs. 

Kirkwood expressed her desire to take the case to trial and to reject the plea 

 

11 The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument that he was acting as Thomas’s 

agent in retrieving her rightful property, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing 

to give the claim of right instruction because there is a “strong public policy against 

forcible self-help” of Petitioner taking the property for Thomas. (Lodgment No. 13 at 10-

13.) Thus, court of appeal rejected this claim on a different basis than the trial court. 

This again shows that whether or not the defense applied was not a simple matter of black 

letter law and required a nuanced application. 

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deal because she felt there wasn’t enough to convict him and she could win 

the case. Melvin and I went back and forth on making this decision on what 

should he do and Mrs. Kirkwood kept assuring us to not worry and of course 

we believed her since she was his attorney. 

(Id. at 16.) He also submitted declarations from Kenya Dye, Gwendolyn D. White, 

Timmy Anderson, and Jacqueline Anderson, which all identically stated “While in the 

hallway of the court I heard [Petitioner’s] attorney Ms. Kirkwood tell [him] don’t take the 

plea bargain because she believed it was no doubt[] that she would prevail during trial.” 

(Id. at 18, 20, 22, 24.) 

On the other hand, Ms. Kirkwood submitted a declaration, stating that she “never 

guaranteed any outcome at trial” because “jury trials are inherently unpredictable” so it 

was her “standard practice to never guarantee outcomes at trial.” (Lodgment No. 17 at 

56.) She stated further that she was “pessimistic about [Petitioner’s] chances at trial” and 

never stated to Petitioner’s declarants that he had a good chance at trial. (Id.) She also 

stated that she “never counselled [Petitioner] to reject” the plea deal and instead 

“counselled Petitioner to plead guilty.” (Id. at 57.) 

In weighing this evidence, the state appellate court found that Petitioner’s 

declarants were “biased family members” and noted that four of them “suspiciously” 

stated that they overheard Ms. Kirkwood telling Petitioner to reject the plea bargain five 

days after the hearing at which Petitioner already rejected the plea offer. The court 

weighed these declarations against the contradictory statements submitted by Ms. 

Kirkwood, ultimately finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish an IAC 

claim. To obtain habeas relief, Petitioner must show that the state court’s factual 

conclusion was more than “incorrect or erroneous” or that “reasonable minds reviewing 

the record might disagree”—Petitioner must show that the conclusion was “objectively 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Rice, 546 U.S. at 341-42. Under this 

deferential review, the Court cannot say that the state appellate court’s conclusion was 

“objectively unreasonable.” The state appellate court reviewed the evidence and gave 

reasons for discounting certain declarations. 

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The Court also does not find that the state court’s conclusion was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of established Supreme Court law. “[A]n erroneous strategic 

prediction about the outcome of a trial is not necessarily deficient performance.” Lafler 

v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012). A “defense attorney’s simple misjudgment as to 

the strength of the prosecution’s case, the chances of acquittal, or the sentence a 

defendant is likely to receive upon conviction, among other matters involving the 

exercise of counsel’s judgment, will not, without more, give rise to a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 936. In other words, while the 

attorney must give the client accurate information—such as the terms of the plea deal 

offered or the maximum sentence he faces or issues of black letter law—the same does 

not extend to opinions or advice. The attorney must only provide information such that 

the defendant can “make an intelligent decision about an available plea bargain.” Perez 

v. Rosario, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“While counsel is not required 

to accurately predict the outcome of a trial, he is required to provide the defendant with 

the tools needed to make an intelligent decision about an available plea bargain.”). 

As discussed above, the Court finds that Petitioner has not established that he was 

told wrong information regarding the maximum sentence he faced and that Ms. 

Kirkwood acted outside the accepted realm of competence in asserting the claim of right 

defense. Armed with that information, his decision to accept or reject the plea bargain 

was his own to make. Thus, this case is not unlike others where no ineffective assistance 

of counsel was found. For example, in Turner v. Calderon, the court found no legal basis 

for petitioner’s IAC claim where petitioner argued that he had a right to “an accurate 

prediction of the outcome of his case” or that “counsel had an obligation to strongly 

recommend the acceptance or rejection of a plea offer.” 281 F.3d at 881. The court 

noted that “[c]ounsel cannot be required to accurately predict what the jury or court might 

find, but he can be required to give the defendant the tools he needs to make an intelligent 

decision.” Id. Finding that counsel in Turner accurately conveyed to the petitioner the 

terms of the plea offer and that is case could result in a death sentence, the court found 

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that counsel satisfied his obligation. Id. Similarly, in Van Wyk v. Beard, the petitioner 

argued that his counsel “made a prediction about what was likely to happen, and that 

prediction turned out to be wrong.” No. SACV1501257BROKES, 2016 WL 3381283, at 

*9-10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016). The court found the advice from counsel was “based on 

an erroneous strategic prediction, not an incorrect legal rule.” Id. Such advice was not a 

basis for an IAC claim. See also Roberson v. Adams, 170 F. App’x 462, 464 (9th Cir.

2006) (rejecting IAC claim where attorney advised client that “she believed she had a 

triable case and because she also believed that a 13-year sentence was too high”). Errors 

in counsel’s judgment that turn out to be mistaken cannot be faulted after the fact as the 

basis for an IAC claim. See Turner, 281 F.3d at 851 (“That counsel and Turner chose to 

proceed to trial based on counsel’s defense strategy and presumably sincere prediction 

that the jury would not award a sentence of death, does not demonstrate that Turner was 

not fully advised of his options. Trial counsel was not constitutionally defective because 

he lacked a crystal ball.”); Roberson, 170 F. App’x 462, 464 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In 

hindsight, counsel’s advice appears to have been mistaken. Whether an attorney’s advice 

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, however, must be determined on the basis of 

the situation as the attorney saw it when she gave the advice and not on the basis of a 

hindsight analysis of the correctness of that advice.”). 

Finally, Petitioner argues that his case is like Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 

(2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), because Ms. Kirkwood gave him 

advice that turned out to be wrong about his probability of success at trial and to not 

accept the plea bargain. Petitioner’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Lafler, 

counsel told petitioner that he could not be convicted for assault with intent to murder 

because he shot the victim below the waist. 566 U.S. at 174. This amounted to a 

statement of “an incorrect legal rule.” In Frye, counsel wholly failed to communicate the 

plea deal to petitioner before it expired. 566 U.S. at 134. For the reasons discussed 

above, neither of these cases are factually applicable to Petitioner’s situation here. 

Petitioner also fails to provide support for his claim that he would have accepted 

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the plea bargain but for Ms. Kirkwood’s advice. This is a required showing under 

Strickland—to show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, such 

that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s errors. None 

of the third party declarations Petitioner submitted in support of his petition stated that 

Petitioner would have taken the plea bargain but for Ms. Kirkwood’s advice. A 

declaration from Petitioner stating that he was prejudiced is not itself sufficient; it must 

be accompanied by some corroborating evidence. In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 938 (“A 

defendant’s self-serving statement-after trial, conviction, and sentence that with 

competent advice he or she would have accepted a proffered plea bargain, is insufficient 

in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to prejudice, and must be 

corroborated independently by objective evidence.”); see also Belton v. Knipp, No. C 12-

03582 BLF (PR), 2014 WL 3345793, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2014). 

Accordingly, after due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Court 

recommends that Petitioner’s petition as to his IAC claim be DENIED.

B. Due Process

In Petitioner’s second claim, Petitioner states that he was deprived due process in 

his Alvernaz waiver hearing, where he rejected the plea bargain at issue. (Petition at 12.) 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s due process claim is procedurally barred as untimely, 

because the issue was raised three years after sentencing. (Answer at 17.) Petitioner 

contends that he did not know his rights had been violated, nor that there was a legal 

procedure to raise a due process claim, which should toll the statute of limitations. 

(Traverse at 13.)

1. Procedural Bar

The state appellate court, in denying the habeas petition, reiterated that Petitioner’s 

due process claim regarding his Alvernaz hearing was not only untimely, but also “further 

barred because it could have been raised on [direct] appeal, but was not.” (Lodgment No. 

21 at 4.) This is the basis that Respondent challenges Petitioner’s due process claim. 

(Answer at 17-18.) Petitioner contends that his due process claim is not procedurally 

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barred because he did not know the claim was litigable until much later, due to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Traverse at 13.). 

“[H]abeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal.” In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 

2d 756, 759 (1953). In California, “a convicted defendant desiring to bring claims in a 

state habeas petition, must, if possible, have pursued the claims on direct appeal from his 

conviction.” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (calling this 

requirement the “Dixon rule”) (citing In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759); accord Johnson v. 

Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802 (May 31, 2016) (per curiam) (noting that it is a ubiquitous rule 

across the country). However, the California state court would get to the merits of a 

claim if one of four exceptions applied: “(1) fundamental constitutional error, (2) a lack 

of fundamental jurisdiction by the trial court over the petitioner, (3) the trial court’s 

acting in excess of jurisdiction, and (4) an intervening change in the law.” Park, 202 

F.3d at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 

760 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Federal habeas review is barred when a California defendant procedurally defaults 

his claim under Dixon by raising it for the first time on state collateral review if it could 

have been raised on direct review. Johnson, 136 S. Ct. at 1802 (holding that the Dixon

procedural bar is adequate to bar federal habeas review). A district court may, however, 

reach the merits if the Petitioner can “demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice.” Park, 202 F.3d at 1150. 

Here, Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise the issue on direct appeal. (Traverse at 13; see Lodgment No. 16 at 5 (“appellate 

counsel failed to adequately review the record on appeal”).) Petitioner argues that he 

“never knew that there was a legal procedure or basis to raise the claim that he had been 

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denied due process[,]”12 because of his treatment at the Enhanced Outpatient Program

(“EOP”),

13 and thus did not tell his attorney to raise the issue. (Traverse at 13.) The 

Court imputes that Petitioner essentially makes two arguments. First, that the ineffective 

assistance of counsel qualified as the “fundamental constitutional error” exception under 

Dixon and so his claim should not be considered procedurally defaulted. Second, that 

even if his claim was procedurally defaulted, the ineffective assistance of counsel and his 

own lack of legal knowledge and mental status constitute cause under the cause and 

prejudice standard and this Court should review the merits on federal habeas. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel falls within “fundamental constitutional error” to 

constitute an exception to the Dixon bar. See Garner v. Small, No. CV 09-9332 SVW JC, 

2011 WL 1584062, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2011) (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 

814 n.34 (1998)). Similarly, ineffective assistance of counsel can also qualify as

sufficient “cause” to overcome a state’s procedural bar rule. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 

U.S. 446, 451 (2000) (“in certain circumstances counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing 

properly to preserve the claim for review will suffice” to excuse procedural default.); see 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2012); Loveland, 231 F.3d at 644. “Not just any 

deficiency in counsel’s performance will do, however; the assistance must have been so 

ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution.” Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451. Indeed, 

“the mere fact that prior counsel omitted a particular nonfrivolous claim, however, is not 

in itself sufficient to establish prior counsel was incompetent.” In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 

 

12 However, evidence exists to the contrary; the Court notes that Petitioner raised a due 

process claim (unrelated to the one at issue here) in his direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 10 

at 55-56.)

13 There are three levels of mental health services care at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility: Enhanced Outpatient Program is the second level, and is for 

inmates who have difficulty adjusting to living in the prison’s general population, but 

who are not so gravely disabled that they require inpatient care. California Dep’t of 

Corrections & Rehabilitation, Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility Psychology 

Internship Handbook, at 4 (2018-2019), https://cchcs.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/60/2017/12/RJDPsychologyInternshipHandbook.pdf.

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428, 464 (2012). Petitioner has the burden to show that an exception to Dixon applies or 

that he has met the cause and prejudice requirement. See Roevekamp v. Choates, No. CV 

12-3845-CAS CW, 2013 WL 2456615, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2013); Giang Kien 

Huynh v. Walker, No. EDCV 09-1288-R CW, 2013 WL 5934016, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 

1, 2013). 

Here, Petitioner fails to meet his burden. Stating only that appellate counsel failed 

to adequately review the record, without more, is not sufficient to establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Gevock, No. 211CR526JAMEFBP, 2016 

WL 4209516, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016) (“[V]ague allegations” that “his [] counsel 

did not review evidence or discovery with him” are “insufficient to support a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.”); United States v. Park, No. CRS-02-0133 LKK 

DADP, 2009 WL 3806232, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2009) (“[V]ague allegation” that 

counsel “failed to perform effective legal services” are insufficient to excuse tolling.).

Even if counsel should have brought this claim on direct appeal because it had some 

merit—which, as the Court explains below, it does not—failure to bring a particular 

nonfrivolous claim does not alone constitute ineffective assistance, cognizable under the 

Federal Constitution. In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 464. 

The other reason that Petitioner posits—his own ignorance of the law—is 

insufficient to establish cause. See Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Attorney inadvertence or ignorance of the law does not establish cause for a procedural 

default.”) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1986)); Thiessen v. Knipp, 

No. 2:13-CV-0722 JAM GGH, 2016 WL 3512300, at *8 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2016) 

(“ignorance of law” not sufficient reason to excuse procedural default). Furthermore, 

Petitioner’s status as an EOP patient does not present adequate cause either. Schneider v. 

McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1153-1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s mental 

condition cannot serve as cause for a procedural default, at least when the petitioner on 

his own or with assistance remains able to apply for post-conviction relief to a state 

court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th 

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Cir. 1988) (“Petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental condition and that he relied 

upon incompetent ‘jailhouse lawyers’ do not constitute cause.”). 

Accordingly, the Court holds that Petitioner’s due process claim relating to his 

Alvernaz waiver hearing is procedurally barred under Dixon and Petitioner has failed to 

meet his burden to establish cause and prejudice.

14

2. Merits

Regardless, for completeness, the Court will briefly address the merits of 

Petitioner’s due process claim. Even if Petitioner’s due process claim was not 

procedurally barred, it would fail on the merits.

Petitioner argues that he “was denied a sufficient Alvernaz waiver hearing because 

the hearing never determined what his attorney advised him regarding the exposure he 

faced; what he was advised the offer was and what he was advised as to taking the 

prosecution offer.” (Lodgment No. 18 at 9.) Petitioner contends that the trial court did 

not ask Ms. Kirkwood “what she advised Petitioner as to his exposure, the offer, and

whether he should take the offer[,]” thus constituting a violation of Petitioner’s due 

process rights. (Lodgment No. 18 at 9-10.)

This Court liberally construes Petitioner’s contentions15 as arguing that there was a 

procedural due process violation, that he did not have fair notice or opportunity to be 

heard. To obtain relief on a procedural due process claim, Petitioner must have 

established “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a 

 

14 In addition, the Court notes that Petitioner’s due process claim was not only not 

addressed in direct appeal, but also is missing from his state habeas petition; it was not

until his traverse, (Lodgment No. 18 at 9), when he raised the issue for the first time. As 

such, the Superior Court did not address any alleged due process violation in its decision 

to deny the petition. (Lodgment No. 19 at 3 (noting that the record of the Alvernaz

hearing refutes Petitioner’s contention that his attorney advised him that he faced a tenyear maximum, but never mentioning the due process concerns of the hearing itself).)

15 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (reasoning 

that pro se pleadings are liberally construed).

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deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process.” Shanks v. 

Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even 

with this Court’s attempts to liberally construe Petitioner’s argument, he has not 

overcome his burden: the record is clear that Petitioner’s due process rights were not 

violated at his Alvernaz waiver hearing.

The purpose of an Alvernaz waiver hearing is to ensure that the defendant received 

effective assistance of counsel during the pre-trial stages, namely plea-negotiations, by 

correctly and accurately communicating the prosecution’s offer to the defendant. See 

generally In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 928 (holding that if a defendant demonstrates with 

objective evidence that ineffective representation at the pretrial stage of a criminal 

proceeding caused him reject a plea bargain, he has been deprived of the effective 

assistance of counsel). This Alvernaz hearing avoids any later confusion and ensures that 

the record reflects that the defendant knew (1) the terms of the plea bargain offered, (2) 

how to resolve the case via the available plea bargain, and (3) what could happen if he 

proceeded to trial. Here, the Alvernaz waiver hearing fulfilled its purpose; thus Petitioner 

was not denied due process.

During the Alvernaz hearing, the court addressed Petitioner directly, stating: “[I]f 

we go forward in trial on that and you’re convicted on all counts and all the priors found 

to be true, at sentencing you’re facing a potential sentence of 30 years.” (Lodgment No. 

1 at 7.) When the court asked Petitioner if he understood, Petitioner replied, “Yes, sir.” 

(Id.) The court then explained the plea bargain currently on the table: 

Mr. Williams has made an offer on the original complaint, that’s the one now 

in effect until I arraign you on the new one, and has offered you a plea bargain 

if you plead guilty to the robbery and admit to the use of a gun and stipulate 

to an eight-year prison sentence. That’s the offer of the district attorney right 

now. It will expire if you don’t accept it, frankly. 

(Id. at 7-8.) When asked by the court if he was aware of “the district attorney’s offer of 

eight years[,]” Petitioner responded with, “Yes, sir.” (Id. at 8.) 

In the hearing, the court also sought to ensure that Petitioner had discussed the plea 

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bargain with his counsel: “I presume you’ve had these conversations. I don’t want you to 

tell me about your conversations. I presume you’ve discussed these issues with your 

attorney,” to which Petitioner responded, “Yes, sir.” (Id. at 8.) Thus, on this record, 

Petitioner advised the court that he had discussed the plea bargain with his attorney16 and 

that it was his intention to refuse the offer and go forward with trial. (Id. at 8.) 

Petitioner appears to argue that this exchange was insufficient and the court should 

have inquired into what he was advised by his counsel. The Court disagrees that such 

questions are required in an Alvernaz hearing, especially since such questions may invade 

the attorney-client privilege. The trial court in fact recognized this—the judge asked 

Petitioner only whether he discussed the plea bargain with his counsel but specifically 

cautioned him not to divulge the contents of those discussions. Petitioner fails to cite any 

authority suggesting that such questioning is required for a sufficient Alvernaz hearing. 

In alleging violation of his due process rights, Petitioner provides no objective 

evidence to overcome the overwhelming evidence in the record to the contrary. In re 

Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 938. As the trial court noted in responding to Petitioner’s motion 

for new trial:

It was very, very plain. . . . [Petitioner] is not a kid. He and I had a straightup conversation and he told me ‘yes, sir, I want to go to trial.’ So I cannot 

find, here, ineffective assistance of counsel or confusion that resulted in him 

turning down an offer that now, facing the sentence he is facing today, perhaps 

he should have taken.

(Lodgment No. 8 at 20-21.) The court in Alvernaz stated that “a reviewing court can take 

 

16 In his state court habeas traverse, Petitioner alleged that when the trial court cautioned 

him against revealing attorney-client privileged information, “he thought [that meant] he 

could not tell the court what he had been told by his attorney[,]” when asked if they had 

discussed the potential sentence. (Lodgment No. 18 at 8.) Petitioner alleges that though 

he answered affirmatively that he understood the potential consequences of going to trial, 

he actually was basing his choice on Kirkwood’s advice about his maximum exposure of 

10 years. (Lodgment No. 18 at 9.) As discussed below, Petitioner’s assertions are not 

enough to succeed with his claim.

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judicial notice of trial court proceedings, including a defendant's ‘trial stance.’” 

Buenrosto v. Spearman, No. 14-CV-3166-LHK, 2015 WL 2251063, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 

May 13, 2015) (citing In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th at 940). Here, that stance, as expressed 

to the court, was that Petitioner was advised adequately by Ms. Kirkwood regarding the 

plea bargain, and decided on his own volition to reject the plea bargain and go to trial. 

(See Lodgment No. 1 at 8.) Thus, were the Court to reach the merits, this claim would 

still fail. 

Accordingly, the Court also recommends that Petitioner’s petition as to his due 

process claim be DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Anthony J. Battaglia under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. In addition, IT IS 

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting 

this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING

the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than November 16, 

2018. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than December 7, 2018. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: October 30, 2018

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