Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01165/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01165-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Upon screening, the Court dismissed Count III for failure to state a claim (Doc. 4).

Subsequently, Count II was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc.

(Doc. 13). 

WO JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Sam Parisi, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-1165-PHX-MHM (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Joseph Sam Parisi brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (Doc. 1). Before the Court is Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29). The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 38, 40).

The Court will grant the motion and terminate the action. 

I. Complaint

Plaintiff’s claim arose during his confinement at various Maricopa County Jails in

Phoenix, Arizona (Doc. 1 at 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that his constitutional

rights were violated by Defendant’s policies governing food service (id. at 1). Plaintiff

claimed that he was provided just two small, spoiled, and nutritionally inadequate meals a

day (id. at 3 (Count I)).1

 Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant instructs his staff to seize

inmates’ stored food to ensure inmates experience hunger pains (id.). Plaintiff sued for

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monetary damages (id. at 6). 

II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Defendant’s Contentions

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to

demonstrate a constitutional deprivation and that the policy governing food was

unconstitutional (Doc. 29). In support, Defendant submits his separate Statement of Facts

(DSOF) (Doc. 30). Defendant also proffers the declaration of Lieutenant Kimberly

Thompson, an officer in the Institutional Services division of Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office (MCSO), which includes Food Services (id., Ex. A, Thompson Decl. ¶ 1), with

attachments: Plaintiff’s Inmate Housing Report (id., Ex. A, Attach. A); a copy of the MCSO

pickup roster for April 24, 2009 (id., Attach. B); a copy of the MCSO Policy DG-1, entitled

“Menu Planning and Nutritional Adequacy for Inmates” (id., Attach. C); a copy of the

MCSO Policy DG-2, entitled “Inmate Meal Distribution” (id., Attach. D); a copy of the 2005

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Guidelines for Americans (id., Attach. E);

copies of menus and nutritional information for meals served to inmates (id., Attachs. F-G);

a copy of the MCSO Policy DG-3, entitled “Food Services Section Safety and Sanitation”

(id., Attach. H); a copy of the MCSO Policy DG-6, entitled “Budgeting, Purchasing, and

Storing of Food” (id.); and copies of Plaintiff’s medical records (id.).

 In his motion, Defendant argues that any policy claim against Defendant fails because

the MCSO’s food policy requires that meals meet or exceed the daily calories required for

a sedentary adult (Doc. 29 at 5-6). In addition, the policy requires that the jail’s dietician

periodically review the menus and the meals actually served to ensure that the nutritional

needs of inmates were met (id. at 6). As a result, Defendant contends that he has introduced

indisputable evidence that the meals served during Plaintiff’s incarceration met the USDA

guidelines and that Plaintiff has filed to provide any evidence that any food he received was

spoiled.

Alternatively, Defendant maintains that there is no evidence that Defendant knew of

any risk to Plaintiff or that Plaintiff actually suffered any harm (id. at 7-8). Finally,

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The Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to

Defendant’s motion (Doc. 53). See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages (id. at 9).

B. Plaintiff’s Response2

 

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion and maintains that there are sufficient facts

showing a genuine issue for trial (Doc. 38). Plaintiff submits his own Statement of Facts

(Doc. 39, Pl.’s Statement of Facts (PSOF)); his declaration (id., Ex. A, Pl. Decl.); and the

declarations of inmates Roy Lee Jarrett, Chad Edward Lander, and Richard A. Breitling (id.,

Exs. B-D). 

Plaintiff argues that it is well-known that Defendant is “America’s Toughest Sheriff”

and that Defendant has intentionally created policies—written and unwritten—that are

deliberately indifferent to the health of Plaintiff and other inmates (Doc. 38 at 4-5). Plaintiff

contends that contrary to Defendant’s contentions, Plaintiff consistently received food that

was moldy, undercooked, or otherwise inedible (Doc. 39, Ex. A, Pl. Decl. ¶ 3). Plaintiff

asserts that it was common to receive food with foreign objects and that MCSO staff would

not replace inedible food (id. ¶¶ 6-7). Plaintiff claims that food that is inedible cannot count

toward the USDA minimum calorie requirement (Doc. 38 at 5). Plaintiff also challenges the

meal reports Defendant submitted in support of his summary judgment motion. Plaintiff

argues that any report generated by any MCSO employee is suspect and should not be

considered (id.).

As a result of inadequate and spoiled meals, Plaintiff alleges he suffered vomiting,

severe abdominal pain, cramping, headaches, dizziness, and physical weakness (Pl. Decl.

¶ 9). Plaintiff also claims he was placed on a vegetarian diet (id. ¶ 10). Finally, Plaintiff

alleges that on days he went to court, he was served meals more than 14 hours apart (id. ¶ 4).

C. Defendant’s Reply

In reply, Defendant maintains that MCSO policies pertaining to food service are

constitutional and that Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence to the contrary (Doc. 40 at

2). Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence to show

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that Defendant was aware of any deficiencies with respect to meals and failed to act.

Defendant also challenges the statements from three other MCSO inmates, arguing that the

inmates’ contentions are irrelevant with respect to whether MCSO’s food policies are

unconstitutional. And finally, Defendant reiterates that there is no evidence Plaintiff suffered

anything more than de minimis harm or that Defendant had an intent to punish inmates (id.

at 5-6). 

IV. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under summary judgment

practice, the movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 

If the movant meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then

shifts to the nonmovant to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995); see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The nonmovant need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968). By affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, the nonmovant must designate

specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249;

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. 

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477

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3 Defendant disputes that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during his MCSO

incarceration, arguing that Plaintiff was transferred to the Lower Buckeye Jail from the

Arizona Department of Corrections. Plaintiff, however, maintains that he was transferred

from the Pinal County Jail to MCSO custody. Defendant’s evidence about Plaintiff’s transfer

to MCSO custody reflects only that Plaintiff was picked up from “S. O. Florence” on April

24, 2009 (Doc. 30, Ex. A, Attach. B). This evidence does not establish that Plaintiff was

transferred from the Arizona Department of Corrections. And Defendant fails to introduce

any other evidence that Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner during his MCSO incarceration.

Consequently, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claim as arising under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1205.

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U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence, and draw all

inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment3

Pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,

which providesthat “detainees have a right against jail conditions or restrictions that ‘amount

to punishment.’” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979)). The Fourteenth Amendment standard is more

protective than the Eighth Amendment; “[t]his standard differs significantly from the

standard relevant to convicted prisoners, who may be subject to punishment so long as it does

not violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment.” Pierce, 526

F.3d at 1205.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, to determine if government action

constitutes punishment, courts must determine (1) whether the action caused the detainee to

suffer some harm or “disability,” and (2) whether the purpose of the action was to punish the

detainee. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at

538). The test for identifying unconstitutional punishment of pretrial detainees is whether

there was an express intent to punish or whether there was an alternative purpose for the

restriction and whether the restriction appears excessive in relation to this alternative

purpose. Demery, 378 F.3d at 1028.

Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention constitutes “punishment” in the

constitutional sense. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. To constitute punishment, the harm caused by

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the action or condition “must either significantly exceed, or be independent of, the inherent

discomforts of confinement.” Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030. A court should look at the nature

of the condition and whether it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.

Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1205. If the condition or restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, a court

may infer that the purpose of the action is punishment that may not be inflicted on pretrial

detainees. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 539).

C. Food

Food served to inmates does not have to be tasty or aesthetically pleasing, and if meals

occasionally contain foreign objects or are served cold, it does not amount to a constitutional

deprivation. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). But inmates must be

provided food that is nutritionally adequate to maintain health and that is prepared and served

in a manner that does not present a danger to their well being. Id.; see also Johnson v. Lewis,

217 F.3d 726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (identifying a cognizable constitutional violation where

inmates alleged they were, inter alia, deprived of adequate food). 

V. Analysis

A supervisory official may be liable if he implements a policy “so deficient that the

policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is the ‘moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.

1991) (citation omitted). To premise a supervisor’s alleged liability on a custom or policy,

the plaintiff must identify a specific policy and establish a “direct causal link” between that

policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

Under state law, Defendant has final policy-making authority with respect to the

operation of the county jails. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5); Flanders v. Maricopa

County, 54 P.3d 837, 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). Further, it has been established that pretrial

detainees at the Maricopa County Jails must be provided food that meets or exceeds the

USDA Dietary Guidelines. Graves v. Arpaio, 2008 WL 4699770, at *46 (D. Ariz. Oct. 22,

2008); Graves, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 3987721, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2010)

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4 Plaintiff’s date of birth is November 14, 1965 (Doc. 30, Ex. 1, Attach. A). 

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(addressing, among other issues, adequacy of food); see U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 2002) (courts may take judicial

notice of proceedings in other courts “if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters

at issue”).

Defendant introduces the relevant food policies in effect during Plaintiff’s

incarceration, which establish that inmates were served two meals a day, with an average of

just over 2500 calories per day (Doc. 30, Ex. 1, Thompson Aff. ¶¶ 12-13). Defendant further

submits the USDA guidelines for recommended caloric intake for sedentary males between

the ages of 31 and 50, which is 2200 calories per day (id. ¶ 10).4

 Additionally, Defendant

avers that although there might be fluctuation in the actual calories served on a day-to-day

basis, the jail’s policy is to serve a minimum of 2400 calories per day (id. ¶ 16). 

The Court finds that Defendant has introduced specific evidence that his policy

required inmates to be served a minimum of 2400 calories per day, which exceeds the USDA

caloric guidelines for sedentary males. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to present specific

facts that a genuine issue exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Plaintiff alleges that in practice, it was the custom at the jail to serve meals more than

14 hours apart and provide meals with inadequate calories and spoiled food. Plaintiff also

alleges that he suffered vomiting, headaches, and dizziness as a result of the spoiled and

insufficient meals provided at the jail. But Plaintiff’s response is devoid of any specific

allegations regarding any spoiled or inedible meals he received. Even crediting Plaintiff’s

claim that he did sometimes receive spoiled food, a claim that a policy or custom is

unconstitutional “may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents.” Trevino v. Gates,

99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s conclusory and vague allegations are simply

insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989).

Nor does Plaintiff introduce any probative evidence that Defendant directed or was

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aware of any deviations from his established meal policies. See Redman, 942 F.2d at 1447

(culpability where a supervisor “knows or reasonably should know” that acts by others would

lead to a constitutional injury) (citation omitted). As such, Plaintiff makes no evidentiary

showing concerning Defendant’s liability. See Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 671-72

(9th Cir. 2010) (movant must make some evidentiary showing to support claim for summary

judgment). 

For these reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 29).

(2) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29) is granted.

(3) This action is dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court must enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 22nd day of November, 2010.

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