Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02403-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARY C. ENGEL,

2:03-CV-2403 MCE KJM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER ON REQUEST FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

MICHAEL BARRY et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

In bringing the present request for reconsideration,

Defendants Michael Barry, Deputy Sowles, Deputy Brian Hammer,

Deputy William Sowles, and Officer Scott Sparks (collectively,

"Defendants") ask this Court to reverse, in part, a November 21,

2005, Order issued by Magistrate Judge Kimberly J. Mueller

(hereinafter “Magistrate Judge”), requiring Defendants to provide

to Plaintiff, for copying and inspection, various documents

submitted to the Magistrate Judge for in camera review. The

documents in question purportedly respond to several

interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff as well a Request for

Production of Documents related to defendant Sowles’s dismissal

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) directs the district 1

court judge to “modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate

judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 

Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the district judge may

reconsider any pretrial order “where it is shown that the

magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”

2

from the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. Prior to the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling, the Defendants, in their opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, asked the Magistrate Judge to deny

Plaintiff’s motion outright or, in the alternative, to undertake

an in camera review of the requested documents prior to ordering

their disclosure. The Magistrate Judge ordered disclosure of the

documents after reviewing them in chambers. Defendants now

challenge that ruling. 

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s determination, the

district judge shall apply the “clearly erroneous or contrary to

law” standard of review set forth in Local Rule 72-303(f), as

specifically authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a)

and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Under this standard, the Court 1

must accept the Magistrate Judge’s decision unless it has a

“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 

Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Calif., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers

Pension Trust for So. Calif., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). If the

Court believes the conclusions reached by the Magistrate Judge

were at least plausible, after considering the record in its

entirety, the Court will not reverse her decision even if

convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently. 

Phoenix Eng. & Supply Inc. v. Universal Elec. Co., Inc., 104 F.3d

1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1997).

After reviewing the evidence, this Court cannot say that the

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Defendants have chosen not to address their failure to 2

respond within the thirty (30) days allowed in their brief to the

Court. 

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Magistrate Judge’s decision was clearly erroneous as that

standard has been defined. To the contrary, the Court finds

multiple grounds under which the Magistrate Judge could plausibly

have found the documents in question discoverable. In

submissions to the Magistrate Judge, Defendants objected to the

production of said documents on the bases of privilege and

relevancy. Defendants waived these objections, however, when

they failed to respond to Plaintiff’s interrogatories or Request

for Production in a timely manner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33; Fed. R. 2

Civ. P. 34; See also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants

959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992)(noting that failure to

respond to a Rule 33 or Rule 34 request “within the time required

constitutes a waiver of any objection”)(emphasis added). 

The Court further notes that even if Defendants had made

timely objections, there would still be insufficient grounds to

reverse the Magistrate Judge. With respect to the official

information privilege asserted by Defendants, that privilege is

not absolute. Miller v. Pancucci, 141 FRD 292, 299-300 (C.D.

Cal. 1992). Rather, the court must engage in a balancing test to

determine whether the privilege even applies. See id. (stating

that courts are to balance the potential benefits of disclosure

against the potential disadvantages). Here, the Magistrate Judge

could have plausibly concluded that the potential benefits of

production outweighed the potential disadvantages, thereby

negating the claimed privilege. 

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4

With respect to Defendant’s relevancy objection, the

controlling rule states that, ordinarily, discovery is limited to

matters relevant to the claim or defense of a party. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(b)(1); But see Adv. Comm. Notes to 2000 Amendment to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that “[a] variety of types of

information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit could

be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action”). 

The rule, however, allows for more expansive discovery in certain

situations. For example, upon a showing of good cause, a court

may order the discovery of any matter that is relevant to the

subject matter involved in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

This broader standard is meant to be flexible and could properly

include information that could be used to impeach a likely

witness, such as Deputy Sowles. Adv. Comm. Notes to 2000

Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Although the Magistrate

Judge did not specify the grounds upon which she based her

ruling, the Court concludes that under either of the applicable

relevancy standards, the Magistrate Judge’s decision is not

clearly erroneous.

Finally, Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge erred

by ordering disclosure of information that goes beyond what was

actually requested by Plaintiff. (Req. Recons. of Magist.

Judge’s Ruling on Pl.’s Mot. to Compel Produc. Docs. at 1-2, 3-

4.) According to Defendants, by requiring such broad disclosure,

the Magistrate Judge is effectively “conducting discovery on

Plaintiff’s behalf.” (Id. at 1-2.) This marks the first time

that Defendants have objected to production of the documents

based on the ground that they exceed the scope of Plaintiff’s

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As stated previously, in submissions to the Magistrate 3

Judge, Defendants’ objections to production rested solely on the

bases of privilege and relevancy. 

5

request. Unfortunately, Defendants provide no authority to 3

support their position and the Court finds none. In addition, as

noted above, Defendants have waived this objection because they

failed to timely respond to Plaintiff's interrogatories or

Request for Production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 34. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ request for reconsideration is denied. 

Defendants shall make the documents identified in the Magistrate

Judge’s Order available to Plaintiff for copying and inspection.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 7, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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