Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00283/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNA JOHNSON et. al, CASE NO. CV-F-07-0283 LJO DLB

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS/

MOTION TO STRIKE

vs.

GMRI, INC. et. al,

Defendants.

 /

By notice filed on February 26, 2007, defendants GMRI, Inc. and Darden Restaurants, Inc. move

to dismiss the first and second causes of action of plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds of Fed.R.Civ. P.

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) that no private right of action exists. Defendants also seek to strike portions of

the complaint. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on March 15, 2007 and defendants filed a reply on March

22, 2007. Pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h), this matter is submitted on the pleadings without oral

argument and the hearing set for March 29, 2007 was vacated. Having considered the moving,

opposition, and reply papers, as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action is a purported class action against Defendant GMRI, Inc. and Darden Restaurant, Inc.

dba as Olive Garden Restaurants. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and others

employed by defendants as food servers and bartenders. (Complaint ¶8.) Plaintiffs contend that

common questions exist as to whether:

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

- Defendants paid plaintiffs and class members a bonus hour as

mandated by California Code of Regulations (“CCR”), Title 8,

§11050.4( C) when theywere required to work a split shift during

a work day.

- Defendants caused plaintiffs and class members to pay for cash shortages and

walkouts as is proscribed by CCR, Title 8, §11050.8. (Complaint ¶10.)

Plaintiffs allege three causes of action:

1. Failure to pay split shift premiums, in violation of 8 CCR §11050.4 ( C),

2. Requiring plaintiffs to pay for cash shortages in violation of 8 CCR §11050.8, and

3. Unfair competition in violation of Bus. And Prof. Code §17200 et seq. (“Unfair

Competition Law”).

Defendants challenge the first and second causes of action in this motion. The case was removed

on February 21, 2007 based upon diversity jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1332.

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

A. Motion To Dismiss and Strike Standards

1. Motion to Dismiss on Rule 12(b)(1) Grounds

A party may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint as a whole, it appears

to lack jurisdiction either “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec.

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979) th

Fundamentally, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). The presumption is that federal courts are “without

jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of

America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9 Cir. 1970). Limits on federal jurisdiction must neither be disregarded

th

nor evaded. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). 

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen,

511 U.S. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396. This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient

allegations to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over an action.

McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936); F.R.Civ.P.

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 A defendant may also attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction apart from the pleadings. Mortensen, 549 1

F.2d at 891. In such a case, a court may rely on evidence extrinsic to the pleadings and resolve factual disputes relating to

jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 541 (1989); Roberts th

v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 Cir. 1987) ( 'The existence of disputed material facts will not prevent the trial court th

from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.'); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. th

1983). In this case, the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a facial challenge to the

complaint and the Court did not review or rely on extrinsic evidence.

3

8(a)(1). When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially,” all material allegations in the complaint

are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from

the face of the pleading. Thornhill Publishing Co., 594 F.2d at 733; Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3 Cir. 1977); Cervantez v. Sullivan, 719 F.Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Cal. rd

1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9 Cir. 1992). A motion to dismiss for want of subject

th 1

matter jurisdiction may be granted only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conely v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,

78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957); Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287 (9 Cir. 1977). th

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229 (1984)(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,

78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. th

1981). A Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal

theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). th

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must (1) construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996).

/////

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

3. Rule 12(f)

A Rule 12(f) motion to strike may be made to have stricken from a pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter, rather than to test the legal

sufficiency of the claim. “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time

and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to

trial····” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9 Cir.1993), rev'd on other grounds in Fogerty th

v. Fantasy, Inc. 510 US 517, 534-535, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 1033 (1994); ‘Immaterial’ matter is that which

has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.”

‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in

question.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527. Granting a motion to strike may be proper if it

will make the trial less complicated or if allegations being challenged are so unrelated to plaintiff's

claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as a defense and that their presence in the pleading will

be prejudicial to the moving party. Id. Allegations supplying background or historical material or other

matter of an evidentiary nature will not be stricken unless unduly prejudicial to defendant. Fuchs Sugars

& Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 402 F.Supp. 636, 637-638 (SD NY 1975). 

B. Private Right of Action

Defendants challenge the first and second claims on the grounds that no private right of action

exists for violations of a California Wage Order.

Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state in

which they are located except on matters governed by the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.

Procedural issues, however, are governed by federal law. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,

78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822 (1938). Erie states that federal courts are to follow state substantive law as

derived from state statutes and decisions of the state's highest court. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. at 78.

Where the issues involved are ones upon which the state supreme court has not yet ruled, federal

courts must attempt to predict how the state supreme court would decide. In doing so, federal courts may

properly consider the state Supreme Court's dicta, the opinions oflower state courts (intermediate courts

of appeal or trial courts), or even opinions from courts of other states. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994).

In this case, the parties agree that there is no controlling state authority as to whether a private

right of action exists for violation of the Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“IWC”) Wage Orders. The

Court’s research has not found any controlling authority.

The IWC “is the state agency empowered to formulate regulations (known as wage orders)

governing employment in the State of California.” Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw,14

Cal.4th 557, 561, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997). IWC has promulgated

15 industry and occupation wage orders--12 orders cover specific industries and 3 orders cover

occupations--and 1 general minimum wage order which applies to all California employers and

employees (excluding public employees and outside salesmen). Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22

Cal.4th 575, 581, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 7 (2000); Ralph’s Grocery Co. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.4th

1090, 1097, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 687, 692 (2003). The applicable Wage Order is found in the California Code

of Regulations, Title 8, §11050(4)( C) and (8).

Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief, based upon 8 CCR §11050(4)( C), states: 

“( c) When an employee works a split shift, one (1) hour's pay at the

minimum wage shall be paid in addition to the minimum wage for that

workday, except when the employee resides at the place of employment.”

Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief is based upon 8 CCR §11050(8), which states:

“8. Cash Shortage and Breakage

No employer shall make any deduction from the wage or require any

reimbursement from an employee for any cash shortage, breakage, or loss

of equipment, unless it can be shown that the shortage, breakage, or loss

is caused by a dishonest or willful act, or by the gross negligence of the

employee.”

The parties have not cited any state authority that either permits or denies a private right of action for

alleged violations of Wage Orders. Indeed, the parties agree that there is no controlling state authority.

Defendants cite Vikco Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Ohio Indemnity Co., 70 Cal.App.4th 55, 62, 82

Cal.Rptr.2d 442 (1999) for the proposition that no private right of action exists. Under California law,

"[a]doption of a regulatory statute does not automatically create a private right to sue for damages

resulting from violations of the statute. Such a private right of action exists only if the language of the

statute or its legislative history clearly indicates the Legislature intended to create such a right to sue for

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

damages." Vikco Ins. Servs., 70 Cal.App.4th at 62. When the Legislature intends to create a private right

of action, it will do so "directly" and "in clear, understandable, unmistakable terms." Id. at 62-63

(quoting Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 46 Cal.3d 287, 294-295, 250 Cal.Rptr. 116,

758 P.2d 58 (1988)). Indeed, “[w]hen a regulatory statute provides for enforcement by an administrative

agency, California courts generally conclude the Legislature intended the administrative remedy to be

exclusive, unless the statutorylanguage or legislative history clearly indicates otherwise.” SeeVikco Ins.

Servs., 70 Cal.App.4th at 66.

Here, the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) is “empowered to

enforce California’s labor law, including IWC’s wage orders.” Tidewater, 14 Cal.4th at 561-62. Thus,

the existence of an administrative remedy precludes a private right of action.

Plaintiff seeks to distinguish Vikco on the grounds that it is an insurance case. However, the

basis for the finding of no private right of action - legislative intent and administrative enforcement - has

been upheld in various other cases, including labor related cases. Matoff v. Brinker Restaurant Corp.,

439 F.Supp.2d 1035 (C.D.Cal. 2006) (Plaintiff's claim under California Labor Code § 351 was dismissed

because the statute does not create a private cause of action - Employee brought action against employer

alleging unlawful tip pooling distribution.); See also Ruiz v. Paladin Group, Inc., 2003 WL 22992077,

at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting motion to dismiss claim on the ground that there is no private right of

action under California Labor Code section 558, which provided only for enforcement by the Labor

Commissioner; “[T]he Legislature did not clearly and unmistakably give employees the right to sue

under section 558.”); Goehring v. Chapman University, 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 380, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 39

(2004) (absence of assigned administrative agency and no administrative procedure or remedy by

provided by the statute is determinative); See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 46

Cal.3d 287, 304-305, 250 Cal.Rptr. 116 (1988) (no private right of action for bad faith insurance claim

because statute gives insurance commissioner power to enforce statute administratively).

C. Wage Orders and Common Law Torts

Plaintiff argues that California has a long line of employment-related cases which protect

individual’s rights of action in fundamental public policy violations. See e.g., Foley v. Interactive Date

Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 666, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167,

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

164 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980). Plaintiff argues that the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of pubic policy

is analogous to the first and second claims for violation of the wage orders.

In each of these cases, theCourt created a tort action for wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy. None of the cases was based upon wage orders, and therefore, the cases are distinguishable. 

Along the same reasoning, plaintiffs argue that it is more “egregious demonstration of an

employer taking advantage of its position of dominance [in] causing the employee to pay for its

monetary losses.” (Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p.5:line 10-11.) Plaintiffs argue that Kerr’s Catering Serv.

v. Dept. Of Ind. Relations, 57 Cal.2d 319 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962) supports the

proposition that individuals may enforce their rights against employers who make deductions from their

wages. 

Kerr’s Catering Serv. v. Dept. of Ind. Relations is distinguishable. The case involved injunctive

and declaratory relief by the employer against the Department of Industrial Relations to void the wage

order as unconstitutional. Kerr’s did not involve a claim for a private cause of action by the employee

against the employer. Thus, this case does not support the proposition that plaintiffs have a private right

of action for violation of Wage Orders or for the tort of fundamental public policy violation.

Plaintiff also cites Ralph’s Grocery Co. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1094 (2003)

Former grocery store manager filed a lawsuit individually and as a putative class representative, alleging,

among other things, that the grocery company was violating the Labor Code and an Industrial Welfare

Commission wage order for non-exempt employees, and committing unlawful business practices, by

improperly factoring cash and merchandise shortages in its employee bonus calculation. Ralph’s is

distinguishable because, at the demurrer stage, the court held that allegations that an employer's bonus

program based in part on each store's workers's compensation expenses and cash shortages stated a claim

for violation of specific prohibitions on deductions in Labor Code §3751. Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus

Group, Inc., 34 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1115 (1995) (Hudgins filed his complaint in September 1987,

alleging that Neiman Marcus unidentified returns policy violated section 221 and Business and

Professions Code section 17200). Thus, the cases relied upon by plaintiff are distinguishable because

they did not decide the issue of the private right of action under a Wage Order or for the tort of

fundamental public policy violation.

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Nonetheless, plaintiffs have argued that they have a fundamental public policy to protect their

wages. In its reply, defendants argue that a public policy claim cannot be based upon violation of a

Wage Order. This argument was presented in reply and plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to brief

the issue. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action

with leave to amend to permit plaintiffs to allege a claim(s) for violation of a fundamental public policy.

Fed.R.Civ.P 15(a) expressly states leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’

Accordingly, leave to amend will be granted.

D. Defendants’ Motion to Strike

1. Split Shift “Penalty” Limited to a One year Statute of Limitation

Defendants argue that the first cause of action, the Wage Order’s Extra Pay penalty, for working

a split shift is limited to a one year statute of limitations.

This argument is moot because the first cause of action is dismissed.

2. Labor Code § 203 penalties

Defendant argues that Section 203 - failure to pay wages due at the time of termination -

penalties are not available in connection with any of plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants argue that there are

no “wages” which were failed to be paid. Plaintiff argues that the “server banking” system used by

defendants was in reality a wage scale reduction device, for which penalties are appropriate.

However, plaintiffs concede that Labor Code §203 penalties are not available to them under

California’s Unfair Competition law. (Plaintiffs’ Opposition p.7: lines 22-26.) Since the Wage Order

claims are dismissed, and plaintiffs agree the UCL claim does not support a section 203 penalty, the

motion to strike this allegation in the prayer will be granted.

3. Labor Code §558

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are not entitled to Labor Code §558 penalties. Therefore, the

motion to strike this allegation in the prayer is granted.

4. Penalties under the UCL

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are not entitled to penalties under California’s UCL - that they

are entitled to restitution. Therefore, the motion to strike the allegation of penalties in the UCL claim

is granted.

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

5. Attorneys’ fees

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are not entitled to penalties under California’s UCL. Since the

Wage Order claims are dismissed, and the UCL claim does not support attorneys’ fees, the motion to

strike this allegation in the prayer will be granted.

6. Punitive Damages under the UCL

Punitive damages are not recoverable under the UCL. The UCL remedies are limited to

restitution and injunctive relief. Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code §17203 (“The court may make such orders or

judgments, . . . to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may

have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.”)

Where a statute creates new rights and obligations not previously existing in the common law,

the express statutory remedy is deemed to be the exclusive remedy available for statutory violations,

unless it is inadequate. Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transportation, Inc., 219 Cal.App.3d 811, 268

Cal.Rptr. 856, disapproved on another ground in Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130,

801 P.2d 373; Czechowski v. Tandy Corp., 731 F.Supp. 406, 410 (N.D.Cal. 1990) (plaintiffs' claim under

section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code will not support an award of punitive damages.)

The motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages will be granted.

7. Disgorgement of Profits

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are not entitled to disgorgement of profits under California’s

UCL, and are limited to restitution. Since the Wage Order claims are dismissed, and the UCL claim

does not support penalties, the motion to strike this allegation in the prayer will be granted.

8. Allegations of the Class Action

Defendants seek to strike the allegations ofthe class definition. Plaintiffs’ complaint define their

representative capacity as: “Plaintiffs were . . . employed at the Bakersfield Olive Garden at the time

they sustained the injuries. . . Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly

situated.” (Complaint ¶3.) Johnson identifies herself as a “food server” and Brinkman as a “server.”

(Complaint ¶8.) Plaintiffs allege the common question of law and fact giving rise to this action are:

- Defendants paid plaintiffs and class members a bonus hour as

mandated by California Code of Regulations (“CCR”), Title 8,

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

§11050.4( C) when theywere required to work a split shift during

a work day.

- Defendants caused plaintiffs and class members to pay for cash shortages and

walkouts as is proscribed by CCR, Title 8, §11050.8. (Complaint ¶10.)

The federal rules provide for notice pleading (Fed.R.Civ.P. 8), and the courts will liberally construe the

pleadings to avoid creating an injustice based on giving undue weight to form over substance. Class

allegations should put the defendant on notice that relief is sought on behalf of a class and, basically,

what the nature of that class is. 6 Alba Conte & Herberg B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 6:13

(2006).

Here, the allegations in the complaint notify defendant that a class action is pursued, who the

potential class members are - food servers and servers from the Bakersfield Olive Garden - who worked

a split shift or paid cash shortages. On its face, the complaint provides adequate notice at the pleading

stage. 

The distinction from the cases relied upon by defendants is that most, if not all, of the cases

involved class certification and not motions to strike. See e.g., Whiteway v. FedEx Kinko's Office and

Print Services, Inc., 2006 WL 2642528 (N.D.Cal. 2006), but compare, DeBremaecker v. Short (5th Cir.

1970) 433 F.2d 733, 734 (pleading was addressed but in addition, evidence had been submitted in a

motion for preliminary injunction.) 

All class actions under Rule 23 must meet four prerequisites:

1. Numerosity,

2. Commonality,

3. Typicality,

4. Adequacy of representation.

Numerosity: The class must be so numerous that joinder of all members individually is

“impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). No specific numerical threshold is required; each case must

be examined. General Tel.C. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698 (1980). Generally, 40 or

more members will satisfy the numerosity requirement. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park,

47 F.3d 473, 483 (2 Cir. 1995). nd

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

A factor to consider for “numerosity”, and the element challenged by defendant, is whether the

class is “ascertainable.” The class members need not be known at the time of certification, class

membership must be objectively ascertainable; i.e., it must be possible for the members to identify

themselves as a member of the class. DeBremaecker v. Short (5th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 733, 734 (class

made up of ‘residents of this State active in the ‘peace movement’‘ does not constitute an adequately

defined or clearly ascertainable.)

Commonality: There must be questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(a)(2). A “common nucleus of operative facts” is usually enough to satisfy the commonality

requirement. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (7 Cir. 1992). th

Typicality: The claims or defenses of the class representative must be typical of the claims or

defenses of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). The named plaintiff must be a member of the class. Bailey

v. Patterson, 362 U.S. 31. 32 -33, 82 S.Ct. 549 (1962).

Adequacy of Representation: The person representing the class must be able “fairly and

adequately to protect the interests” of all members in the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). The

representation is “adequate” if the attorney representing the class is qualified and competent and the

class representatives are not disqualified by interests antagonistic to the remainder of the class. Lerwill

v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc. 582 F.2d 597, 512 (9 Cir. 1978). th

The Court does not rule whether the class(es) identified would be subject to certification upon

a motion to certify. See e.g., Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 205 (D.N.J. 2003) (defendant

may move to strike class action allegations prior to discovery in those rare cases where the complaint

itself demonstrates that the requirements for maintaining a class action cannot be met.) Here, the class

allegations are sufficient to put defendants on notice that relief is sought on behalf of a class and,

basically, what the nature of that class is. 

/////

/////

/////

////

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court:

1. GRANTS defendant’s F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) motion to dismiss with LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

2. ORDERS plaintiffs, no later than 15 days from date of service of the order, to file an

amended complaint in compliance with this order.

3. GRANTS the Motion to Strike the allegations of:

A. Labor Code § 203 penalties, 

B. Labor Code §558 penalties, 

C. Unfair Competition Law penalties,

D. Attorneys’ fees,

E. Punitive Damages under the UCL, and

F. Disgorgement of Profits.

4. DENIES the Motion to Strike the class action allegations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00283-LJO-DLB Document 20 Filed 03/29/07 Page 12 of 12