Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02826/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02826-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

BofA argues it has been erroneously sued as Bank of America 1

and Bank of America Home Loans.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

A. MICHAEL AMSTADTER, BONITA )

AMSTADTER, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:09-cv-2826-GEB-EFB

)

v. ) ORDER GRANTING IN PART

) BOFA’s MOTION TO DISMISS

BANK OF AMERICA, BANK OF AMERICA ) AND DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL

HOME LOANS, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC ) JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFFS’

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., ) STATE LAW CLAIMS*

NDEX WEST., and DOES 1-50, ) 

inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On December 29, 2009, Bank of America, N.A. (“BofA”) filed 1

a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in which it

argues Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint should be dismissed. 

(Docket No. 29.) Plaintiffs’ claims relate to a mortgage loan

transaction and foreclosure proceedings involving their property

located at 27600 Cloverleaf Drive in Helendale, California. For the

reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ sole federal claim is dismissed with

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prejudice and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “challenges a complaint’s compliance

with . . . pleading requirements.” Champlaie v. BAC Home Loans

Servicing, LP, No. S-09-1316 LKK/DAD, 2009 WL 3429622, at *1 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 22, 2009). A pleading must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief

. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the [plaintiff’s] claim is and the

grounds upon which relief rests . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Further, “[a] pleading that offers

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 

To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must allege “only enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Plausibility, however, requires

more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Id. “When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quotations and

citation omitted).

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In evaluating a dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court “accept[s] as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Al-Kidd

v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). However, neither

conclusory statements nor legal conclusions are entitled to a

presumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.

BofA requests that judicial notice be taken of four

documents related to Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan which are publically

recorded in the Official Records of San Bernardino County: a May 5,

2005 Deed of Trust, a May 21, 2009 Notice of Default and Election to

Sell Under Deed of Trust, a July 7, 2009 Substitution of Trustee and a

September 23, 2009 Notice of Trustee’s Sale. (Request for Judicial

Notice (“RJN”) Exs. A-D.)

“[A]s a general rule, a district court may not consider

materials not originally included in the pleadings in deciding a Rule

12 motion[,] . . . [however,] it may take judicial notice of matters

of public record and may consider them without converting a Rule 12

motion into one for summary judgment.” United States v. 14.02 Acres

of Land, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations

omitted). The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that is either

“generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

court” or “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b). The documents BofA submits are publically recorded and

are proper for judicial notice. See Champlaie, 2009 WL 3429622, at *4

(finding judicial notice of recorded Notice of Default, Notice of

Trustee’s Sale, and Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale proper). Therefore,

BofA’s request for judicial notice is granted. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action on

October 12, 2009, in which they alleged nine claims under California

law and a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). 

Plaintiffs filed their now operative first amended complaint after

BofA filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ original complaint. 

Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint explicitly identifies

six claims, all alleged under California law. However, in the

“Jurisdiction and Venue Section” of their amended complaint,

Plaintiffs allege that “[t]his is an action asserting violations of

Federal Statutes commonly known as TILA, RESPA, Regulation Z, and

[RICO].” Despite this allegation, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint only

includes a conclusory allegation of a TILA violation. Specifically,

in the “Factual Background” section of their amended complaint,

Plaintiffs allege that their mortgage loan was subject to TILA’s

disclosure requirements, they did not receive the statutorily required

disclosures, and as a result, they are entitled to damages. (First

Amended Compl. 6:3-8.) Plaintiffs, however, do not argue in their

opposition that they are alleging a TILA claim.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ TILA Claim

BofA argues that to the extent Plaintiffs’ amended complaint

alleges a TILA claim, it is barred by the one-year statute of

limitations and should be dismissed. (MTD 3 n.3.) Plaintiffs have

not countered this argument.

TILA provides a one-year statute of limitations for damages

claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (stating that any action against a

creditor who fails to comply with TILA’s disclosure requirements may

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be brought “within one year from the date of the occurrence of the

violation”). “[A]s a general rule[,] [this] limitations period starts

at the consummation of the transaction.” King v. California, 784 F.2d

910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). Although Plaintiffs do not allege the date

on which they “consummated” their mortgage loan, they executed the

Deed of Trust securing their loan on May 4, 2005 and the recorded Deed

of Trust reveals Plaintiffs signed and dated the promissory note on

May 5, 2005. (RJN Ex. A.) Plaintiffs, however, did not file their

original complaint in this action until October 12, 2009. Therefore,

Plaintiffs’ TILA claim was filed after the one-year statute of

limitations period. Since Plaintiffs have already amended their

complaint once, there is no indication that the doctrine of equitable

tolling applies, and Plaintiffs have presented no opposition to

dismissal of this claim, Plaintiffs’ TILA claim is dismissed with

prejudice.

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Since only state law claims remain in Plaintiffs’ amended

complaint, the Court may sua sponte decide whether to continue to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. 

See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state] claim” if “the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction . . . .” “While discretion to decline . . . supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one

of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the . . . values of

economy, convenience, fairness and comity” as delineated by the

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Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

726 (1966). Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001. “Since state courts have the

primary responsibility to develop and apply state law, . . . the Gibbs

values do not favor continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction

over [Plaintiffs’] state claims . . . .” Anderson v. Countrywide

Financial, No. 2:08-cv-01220-GEB-GGH, 2009 WL 3368444, at *5 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 19, 2009); see also Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (stating that “in

the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before

trial, the balance of factors will point towards declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims” (quotations and

citation omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims

are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, BofA’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

TILA claim is granted and Plaintiffs’ TILA claim is dismissed with

prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are dismissed

without prejudice, and this case shall be closed.

Dated: February 25, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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