Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01966/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01966-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROE, a minor, by and through her 

Guardian ad Litem, JUSTIN SLAGLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

GROSSMONT UNION HIGH SCHOOL 

DISTRICT et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-1966-CAB-BGS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 15]

This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss and strike Plaintiff’s 

complaint filed by Defendants Grossmont Union High School District, April Baker, Josh 

Reiderer, Robin Ballarin, and Michael Falcomer (collectively “Defendants”). [Doc. No. 

15.] The motion has been fully briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for determination 

on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For 

the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Roe, a minor and freshman at West Hills High School in Santee, California, 

by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Justin Slagle, alleges that on January 30, 2018, she 

was the victim of a gender-based sexual assault and battery committed by Defendant John 

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Doe, also a minor at the same high school. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 17.] As alleged in the 

complaint, at the time of the incident, Defendant Grossmont Union High School District 

(“GUHSD”) and its school administrators Defendants Baker, Reiderer, and Ballarin, 

exercised substantial control over the high school campus and provided a lack of adequate 

and appropriate supervision. [Id. at ¶ 18–19.] Among other things, Plaintiff alleges 

Defendants failed to comply with its own policies and applicable law governing sexual 

harassment, failed to perform an unbiased investigation of the allegations against 

Defendant John Doe, failed to interview key witnesses, failed to investigate claims of 

Defendant John Doe’s prior dissemination of nude photos and videos to Plaintiff, and failed

to appropriately train its staff and administrators. [Id. at ¶ 20.] Further, Plaintiff alleges 

Defendants’ investigation report concluded the sexual assault allegations were unfounded 

when the investigation process was incomplete, one-sided, gender-biased and 

discriminatory on its face. [Id. at ¶ 39.] While no restrictions were placed on Defendant 

John Doe, Plaintiff had to transfer to Santana High School where she was subjected to a 

continuing pattern of retaliation, discrimination, and harassment by students and Defendant 

Falconer, a school administrator there. [Id. at ¶ 44.]

Plaintiff filed her complaint on October 10, 2019, against Defendants Grossmont 

Union High School District, April Baker, Josh Reiderer, Robin Ballarin, Michael 

Falcomer, John Doe, and Heidi and Garret Grosch, alleging: (1) Violation of Title IX, 20 

U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; (2) Violation of California Education Code § 200, et seq.; (3) 

Negligent Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties, California Government Code §§ 815.6, 

820; (4) Violation of Constitutional Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) Violation of Unruh Civil 

Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51, et seq.; (6) Sexual Battery; and (7) Vicarious 

Liability, California Civil Code § 1714.1.

On January 24, 2020, Defendants GUHSD, April Baker, Josh Reiderer, Robin 

Ballarin, and Michael Falcomer moved to dismiss and partially strike Plaintiff’s complaint. 

[Doc. No. 15.]

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(f), the Court “may strike from a pleading

. . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

A 12(f) motion to strike functions “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must 

arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” 

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Such motions, however, “are generally disfavored because 

they are often used as delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings 

in federal practice.” Gottesman v. Santana, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1307 (S.D. Cal. 2017). 

In ruling on a motion to strike, the Court “must view the pleading under attack in the light 

most favorable to the pleader.” Id. Matter is “immaterial” if it “has no essential or 

important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being plead.” Fantasy, Inc. v.

Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. 

Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the 

sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For purposes 

of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint 

as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only that a 

party make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

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inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 

1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a 

cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to partially strike Plaintiff’s third cause of action for negligent 

failure to perform mandatory duties, move to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for 

violation of constitutional rights, and move to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for 

violation of California’s Unruh Act. [Doc. No. 15.]

A. Negligent Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties in the Supervision 

and Training of Students

Defendants seek to strike a portion of Plaintiff’s third cause of action, specifically 

identifying paragraphs 94–95 of the complaint. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 11–12.] Plaintiff’s third 

cause of action consists of three separate theories of negligence: 1) failure to supervise 

students; 2) failure to train staff; and 3) failure to train students. Defendants seek to strike 

the third theory of failure to train students contending that no such duty exists under Title 

IX or the California Education Code. Plaintiff argues that California Education Code

Sections 200 and 201 when read together creates this mandatory duty.

Plaintiff’s third cause of action for negligence is brought under California 

Government Code Sections 815.6 and 820. Section 815.6 has three distinct requirements 

which “must be met before governmental entity liability may be imposed . . . : (1) an 

enactment must impose a mandatory duty; (2) the enactment must be meant to protect 

against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the party asserting section 815.6 as a basis for 

liability; and (3) breach of the mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury 

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suffered.” San Mateo Union High Sch. Dist. v. Cty. of San Mateo, 213 Cal. App. 4th 418, 

428 (2013). “The first requirement, which is ultimately dispositive here, is that the 

enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its 

directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that 

a particular action be taken or not taken.” Id. at 428. “Whether a particular statute is 

intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a 

discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts.” Id. at 428–

29.

While the dividing line between a discretionary and mandatory duty is not always 

definitive, the California Supreme Court has articulated “rigid requirements for imposition 

of governmental liability under Government Code section 815.6.” Ellerbee v. County of 

Los Angeles, 187 Cal. App. 4th 1206, 1215 (2010). “An enactment creates a mandatory 

duty if it requires a public agency to take a particular action. An enactment does not create 

a mandatory duty if it merely recites legislative goals and policies that must be 

implemented through a public agency’s exercise of discretion.” Lockhart v. County of Los 

Angeles, 155 Cal. App. 4th 289, 308 (2007) (internal citation omitted). “Courts have 

construed this first prong rather strictly, finding a mandatory duty only if the enactment 

‘affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.’” Guzman v. 

County of Monterey, 46 Cal. 4th 887, 898 (2009) (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that her third cause of action incorporates by reference California 

Education Code Section 200 et seq., which creates a mandatory affirmative duty for 

California public schools to address all aspects of discrimination, bias, and retaliation. 

California Education Code Section 200 states that it is “the policy of the State of California 

to afford all persons in public schools, regardless of their disability, gender, gender identity, 

gender expression, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation . . . equal rights 

and opportunities in the education institutions of the state.” Cal. Educ. Code § 200. In the 

same chapter, the Legislature declares that “all pupils have the right to participate fully in 

the educational process, free from discrimination and harassment.” Cal. Educ. Code § 

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201(a). Further, it states, “It is the intent of the Legislature that each public school 

undertake educational activities to counter discriminatory incidents on school grounds and, 

within constitutional bounds, to minimize and eliminate a hostile environment on school 

grounds that impairs the access of pupils to equal educational opportunity.” Cal. Educ. 

Code § 201(f). It also states, “There is an urgent need to teach and inform pupils in the 

public schools about their rights, as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, in 

order to increase pupils’ awareness and understanding of their rights and the rights of 

others, with the intention of promoting tolerance and sensitivity in public schools and in 

society as a means of responding to potential harassment and hate violence.”

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s interpretation of a mandatory duty to train students

attenuated by the statutory language. While the California Education Code recites 

legislative intent and highlights an urgent need to prevent and respond to the growing acts

of hate violence and bias-related incidents at public schools, and to teach and inform pupils 

about their rights, there is no obligation created. The statutory language does not 

affirmatively impose a mandatory duty, nor does it provide any implementing guidelines,

with respect to the training of students which is at issue here. Plaintiff therefore has failed 

to demonstrate an enactment imposes a mandatory duty to train students for a claim of 

negligence under Government Code Section 815.6. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to 

partially strike Plaintiff’s third cause of action for negligence under a theory of failure to 

train students is GRANTED.

B. Violation of Constitutional Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action fails because Plaintiff failed to 

allege the violation of any rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution or statutes. [Doc. 

No. 15-1 at 8–11.] Plaintiff contends that while she does not affirmatively state she is 

seeking Section 1983 relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, her complaint includes substantive allegations that she is a member of an 

identifiable class for purposes of equal protection based on her sex and perceived sexual 

orientation.

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The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person 

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The 

Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should 

be treated alike.” Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 

citation omitted). “To establish a § 1983 equal protection violation, the plaintiff[ ] must 

show that the defendants, acting under color of state law, discriminated against [her] as [a] 

member[ ] of an identifiable class and that the discrimination was intentional.” Flores v. 

Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003). Sexual orientation 

is an identifiable class for equal protection purposes. See Flores, 324 F.3d at 1137 (sexual 

orientation is an identifiable class for equal protection purposes). School officials are 

prohibited from intentionally treating students disparately on the basis of their protected 

status. See Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000). The 

Ninth Circuit has “held that § 1983 claims based on Equal Protection violations must plead 

intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an 

inference of discriminatory intent.” Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 

1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, Plaintiff alleges acts of discrimination based on her sexual orientation and 

gender identity after a sexual assault incident on campus and alleges that each individual 

Defendant administrators’ actions were taken under color of state law in the course of their 

employment. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7–10, 12.] The crux of Plaintiff’s allegations is that 

Defendants failed to perform an unbiased investigation of the sexual assault allegations 

against Defendant John Doe. [Id. at ¶ 20.] Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that she 

discussed the prior events leading up to the incident with the Defendants, Defendants failed 

to follow their own policy of implementing interim measures for victims of sexual assault, 

placed no restrictions on Defendant John Doe, the investigation was one-sided and genderbiased, several witnesses were never questioned prior to the report, and Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent by making biased, sexually-oriented, gender-biased statements in 

their report. [Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34, 35, 38, 39, 41, 65.]

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Defendants’ citation to cases discussing adequate evidence on the record for similar 

claims to survive at the motion for summary judgment stage is inapposite. Plaintiff 

incorporated the above allegations and others into her fourth cause of action for violation 

of constitutional rights and at this stage the allegations are enough to plead a cognizable 

equal protection claim as they are “at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory 

intent.” Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1026; see also Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 

F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“To plead a cognizable equal protection claim, 

[Plaintiff] must simply allege facts that plausibly show that [Plaintiff] was discriminated 

against as a member of an identifiable class”) (citing Flores, 324 F.3d at 1135). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for violation 

of constitutional rights is DENIED.

C. Violation of California’s Unruh Act

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that the District is a business establishment under the Unruh Act. [Doc. No. 

15-1 at 12–17.] Plaintiff contends that every California district court to reach this question 

has answered that public schools constitute business establishments within the meaning of 

the Unruh Act.

The Unruh Act guarantees all persons in California, regardless of sex or disability, 

“the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 

business establishment of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). While the 

California Supreme Court has not definitively said whether the Unruh Act applies to public 

schools, it has explained that the term “business establishment” should be construed “in 

the broadest sense reasonably possible.” Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 

3d 72, 78 (1985) (quotation and citation omitted). The Unruh Act applies to an 

organization that is “classically ‘public’ in its operation,” namely one that “opens its . . . 

doors to the entire youthful population” of a city, or a “broad segment of the population,” 

with “no attempt to select or restrict membership or access on the basis of personal, 

cultural, or religious affinity, as private clubs might do.” Id. at 81, 84 (emphasis omitted).

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California courts have applied the Unruh Act not just to for-profit commercial 

establishments but also to nonprofit institutions. See, e.g., Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & 

Country Club, 10 Cal. 4th 594, 619-20 (1995); O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., 

33 Cal. 3d 790, 796 (1983) (“Nothing in the language or history of its enactment calls for 

excluding an organization from its scope simply because it is a nonprofit.”). But the Unruh 

Act generally does not apply to a private social club, such as a private, religious school that 

is “an expressive social organization whose primary function is the inculcation of values 

in its youth members,” and whose admission policies are “effectively selective and based 

on these values.” Doe v. California Lutheran High School Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 

838 (2009) (quoting Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 17 Cal. 4th 670, 699 

(1998)). Like the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Unruh Act is concerned with equal 

access to places of public accommodation. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las 

Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 872 (9th Cir. 2004); Warfield, 10 Cal. 4th at 598. 

Defendants contend the Unruh Act requires a stricter reading of “business 

establishment” and GUHSD was not operating here as a “commercial establishment” for 

the Unruh Act to apply. The Court finds the reasoning in the overwhelming authority 

holding that public schools can constitute business establishments persuasive. There is no 

dispute that GUHSD is classically public in nature, open to a broad segment of the 

population, and does not attempt to restrict membership in the way private institutions do, 

if at all. Consequently, in keeping with the California Supreme Court’s instruction that 

“business establishment” should be construed in the broadest sense reasonably possible, 

GUHSD can be held liable under the Unruh Act. See Z. T. by & through Hunter v. Santa 

Rosa City Sch., No. 17-CV-01452-WHA, 2017 WL 4418864, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2017) 

(and cases cited therein). This conclusion also squares with the ADA, which 

unquestionably applies to public schools. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 

749 (2017); see also K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1094 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] violation of the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act.”) 

(quotation omitted). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of 

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action for violation of California’s Unruh Act is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and strike the 

complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED as follows:

1) Defendants’ motion to partially strike Plaintiff’s third cause of action is 

GRANTED;

2) Plaintiff’s third cause of action for negligence under a theory of failure to train 

students is STRICKEN at paragraphs 94–95;

3) Defendants’ motion to dismiss on all other grounds is DENIED;

4) Defendants must answer Plaintiff’s complaint on or before March 20, 2020.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 6, 2020

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