Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00900/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00900-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CITY OF WEST SACRAMENTO, 

CALIFORNIA; and PEOPLE OF THE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

R AND L BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, a

California corporation, f/k/a 

STOCKTON PLATING, INC., d/b/a 

CAPITOL PLATING, INC., a/k/a 

CAPITOL PLATING, a/k/a CAPITAL 

PLATING; CAPITOL PLATING, INC., 

a dissolved California 

corporation,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-CV-00900 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO DISMISS R&L 

BUSINESS MANAGEMENT’S THIRDPARTY COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

The City of West Sacramento, California (“the City”)

and the People of the State of California filed suit

to address toxic levels of soil and groundwater contamination in

the environment within the City. Defendants R&L Business 

Management and John Clark (collectively referred to as “R&L”) 

subsequently brought the County of Yolo and Eco Green into the 

Case 2:18-cv-00900-WBS-JDP Document 136 Filed 02/19/20 Page 1 of 9
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action as a third parties to the City’s lawsuit. R&L seeks 

contribution after R&L was found liable in the City’s lawsuit on 

summary judgment. (See Docket No. 125.) Before the court is the 

County of Yolo’s (“the County”) Motion to Dismiss Defendant R&L’s 

First Amended Third-Party Complaint. (Docket No. 116.)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The City’s lawsuit against R&L involves the 

contamination at the property located at 319 3rd Street in West 

Sacramento, California. This court described much of the factual 

and procedural background to this lawsuit in its prior orders. 

(See Docket Nos. 18, 33, 44, 63, 115, & 125). Recently, this 

court granted the City’s motion for partial summary judgment and 

found defendants liable under the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 

9613(f)(1). (Docket No. 125.) 

R&L’s claim against the County and Eco Green involves 

the alleged contamination at 305 3rd Street, previously owned by 

the County, and 317 3rd Street, currently owned by Eco Green. 

(Am. Third Party Compl. ¶¶ 10, 20, 44 (Docket No. 116).) The 

court previously dismissed, and gave leave to amend, R&L’s claims 

for (1) contribution under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); (2) 

equitable indemnity; (3) equitable contribution; and (4) 

declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2201. (Docket No. 115.) R&L subsequently filed the First 

Amended Third-Party Complaint (“ATPC”) alleging only a claim for 

contribution under CERCLA. (Docket No. 116.) The County now 

moves to dismiss the ATPC, and Eco Green joins in the County’s 

motion. (Docket Nos. 126, 130.)

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II. Discussion

A. California’s Government Claims Act

Pursuant to California’s Government Claims Act (“CGA”), 

“a party seeking to recover money damages from a public entity or 

its employees must present a claim to the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board before filing suit in 

court.” Tran v. Young, No. 2:17-CV-1260 DB P, 2018 WL 603814, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2018) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 

910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2). “The filing of a proper claim 

pursuant to Gov. Code, § 910, describing the contents of such a 

claim, is a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action 

against the state for damages caused by tort.” Donohue v. State, 

178 Cal. App. 3d 795, 797 (2d Dist. 1986). The County argues 

that R&L did not sufficiently present the claim, and therefore 

the ATPC must be dismissed. See id.

To sufficiently present a claim, complainant must 

include “[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the 

occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted,” 

and “[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, 

injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the 

time of the presentation of the claim.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 910. 

The factual basis for recovery in the complaint must be “fairly 

reflected in the written claim.” Watson v. State, 21 Cal. App. 

4th 836, 838 (2d Dist. 1993) (sustaining demurrer where legal 

theory for recovery in written claim differed from that in the 

complaint); Donohue, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 797 (same).

Here, R&L has sufficiently presented its CERCLA claim. 

R&L specified that the claim concerns “toxic chemicals,” 

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including “substantial amounts of lead,” and “fill materials” 

“discharged” “from at least 1938 until at least 1997” on the 

“Yolo County owned portions of [the Eastern 300 block of Third 

Street, West Sacramento],” which the County does not dispute 

includes the 305 property. (Claim for Damages at 1 (Docket No. 

110-2).) The written claim also states that the discharge 

occurred “during the County’s ownership” of the property and that 

“these discharged chemicals and fill materials contributed to the 

contamination of the soil and groundwater.”1 (Id.) The written 

claim thus states the date, place, and circumstances that give 

rise to the claim. Further, given that the ATPC alleges that 

fill materials, hazardous chemicals, and lead were disposed of at 

the 305 property and subsequently contaminated nearby properties, 

the soil, and groundwater, the written claim “fairly reflect[s]” 

these allegations. (See Watson, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 838; ATPC ¶¶ 

31, 32.) Accordingly, R&L has sufficiently presented its CERCLA 

claim.

B. CERCLA

A party must be subject to suit under CERCLA Section 

106 or 107(a) to be able to bring a contribution claim for the 

contamination that is the subject of the suit. Cooper Indus., 

Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168 (2004). In its 

previous order, the court dismissed R&L’s CERCLA contribution 

claim because R&L sought “contribution for contamination for 

which it is not being sued.” (Mem. & Order at 6 (Docket No. 

 

1 Because “at the time of the presentation of the claim” 

R&L had not reimbursed the city for clean-up costs and did not 

know the extent of its liability, R&L did not need to include any 

monetary figures. See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 910.

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115).) Specifically, the court found that R&L did not plausibly 

allege that either the City’s complaint sought to hold R&L 

responsible for the contamination at the 305 property or that the 

County’s contamination was the same contamination present at the 

319 property, for which the City is suing R&L. (Id. at 4-5, 5-

6.) 

The ATPC cures those defects. It alleges that “the 

site history for the County Property and 317 Third Street 

indicates that lead and other toxic chemicals”, including “zinc, 

cadmium, chromium,” “were discharged onto and into the soil at 

those locations.” (ATPC ¶ 31, 32.) That contamination of the 

soil “continue[s] to spread.” (ATPC ¶ 31.) The ATPC further 

alleges that “historic fill material” containing “heavy metals . 

. . including but not limited to zinc, cadmium, chromium, and 

lead” was “imported, disposed, dumped, released at and/or spread 

from the County Property [and] 317 Third Street.” (ATPC ¶ 18.) 

That material was spread “potentially onto others, including 319 

Third Street.” (ATPC ¶ 44). Indeed, “the releases of fill 

material that occurred at the County Property, 317 Third Street, 

and 319 Third Street contain some of the same contaminants which 

are commingled.” (ATPC ¶ 38.) 

Therefore, the ATPC alleges, “R&L has incurred and will 

continue to incur response costs as a result of the release(s) of 

heavy metal contaminants . . . disposed of at the County Property 

and 317 Third Street.” (ATPC ¶ 45.) The allegations in the 

ATPC, if taken as true, establish that the County has contributed 

to the release of the hazardous substances that emanate from the 

319 Property. Because the City has sued R&L for that release of 

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hazardous substances, R&L no longer “seeks contribution for 

contamination for which it is not being sued.” (See Mem. & Order 

at 6 (Docket No. 115)). R&L has therefore stated a claim for 

contribution against the County. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); 

Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138.

The County contends that R&L is not subject to an 

action for the contamination emanating from the County’s property 

because the City in its complaint alleges only contamination 

“originating at 319 Third Street.” (See City’s Third Amended 

Complaint ¶ 4 (Docket No. 45).) Because the contamination 

allegedly moving from the 305 property to the 319 property by 

definition did not originate at the 319 property, the County 

argues that R&L is not subject to suit for the County’s 

contamination, and thus has no Section 113(f)(1) claim for 

contribution. 

The court disagrees with the County’s overreliance on 

the language in the City’s complaint. First, on a purely 

practical level, the court cannot infer that the City will clean 

only the contamination that “originated at 319 Third Street.” 

This is especially true where it is alleged that the contaminants 

are “commingled” at the 319 property. (ATPC ¶ 38.) If the City 

is successful, R&L will undoubtedly have to reimburse the City 

for the cost of cleaning whatever hazardous contamination is 

currently at the 319 property, not just that which originated 

there. 

Second, the City’s complaint does not necessarily state 

the extent of contamination for which the city seeks recovery. A 

complaint need only allege enough facts to plausibly state a 

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claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Under 

CERCLA, plaintiffs must allege there was a release of a hazardous 

substance from a facility, which caused them to incur response 

costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). A complaint may therefore state a

CERCLA claim without referencing all hazardous substances on 

site. Accordingly, “[t]he complaint[] cannot be fairly read as 

needlessly narrowing this suit to recovery for harm caused solely 

by . . . pollutants” originating at the 319 property. See

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 590 (9th 

Cir. 2018).

The Ninth Circuit considered a similar argument in 

Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 590–91, and concluded that a plaintiff’s

complaint does not serve the limiting function the County seeks. 

In Pakootas, defendants appealed the district court’s finding 

that the defendant was not entitled to a divisibility defense to 

CERCLA liability. There, the defendant argued that, as to the 

divisibility defense, “its burden of production extended only to 

addressing the harm from the specific pollutants that [defendant]

is alleged to have contributed to the Site.” Id. at 590. The 

Pakootas defendant thus contended that it could “disregard all 

other types of pollution found with its wastes at the Site.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit disagreed and found that the “environmental 

harm in this case is not so limited.” Id. Because “Section 

107(a) imposes strict liability on all [potentially responsible 

parties], even if those persons are in fact not responsible for 

any pollution at all,” and because the complaint merely complied 

with “CERCLA’s pleading requirements” –- as opposed to 

intentionally narrowing recovery to certain pollutants --

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defendant “was required to produce evidence showing divisibility 

of the entire harm –- not just the harm from sources” alleged in 

the complaint. Id. at 590-91. 

Here, as in Pakootas, the complaint identifies sources

of contamination in order to comply with pleading requirements, 

not to limit recovery. Accordingly, the court will not read the 

complaint to limit the harm to just the contamination originating 

at the 319 property.

The County also contends, in reliance on Cooper 

Industries, 543 U.S. at 166, that incurring response costs is a 

precondition to alleging a contribution claim under § 113(f). 

Because R&L has not yet reimbursed the City, the County argues 

that defendant cannot allege a contribution claim. The court 

disagrees with the County’s interpretation of the statute. The

County is correct that contribution “is available for parties 

that have reimbursed those response costs to others.” Niagara 

Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 122 (2d 

Cir. 2010) (citing U.S. v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 

139). But whether R&L must reimburse the City prior to the court 

ordering the County to contribute is different from whether R&L 

must reimburse the City prior to bringing a third party complaint

for contribution. The statute states that “[a]ny person may seek 

contribution” under § 113(f) “during or following” any civil 

action under sections 106 or 107(a). 42 U.S.C. § 113(f)(1). The 

Supreme Court in Cooper found that “[t]he natural meaning of this 

sentence is that contribution may only be sought subject to the 

specified conditions, namely, ‘during or following’ a specified 

civil action.” 543 U.S. at 166. “Thus, § 113(f)(1) permits suit 

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before or after the establishment of common liability.” Atl. 

Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 138–39 (emphasis added). To sue for 

contribution, R&L need only be “subject to [a Section 106 or 

107(a)] action.” Cooper, 543 U.S. at 168; see also Hobart Corp. 

v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(“[A]ny party sued under §§ 106 or 107 . . . may seek 

contribution from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1).”) (citing Cooper, 

543 U.S. at 165-66). The statute does not list any other 

conditions and plainly allows R&L to ask for contribution before 

the City’s suit is resolved and any reimbursement has taken 

place.

The County’s other objections to the sufficiency of the 

allegations in the ATPC challenge the veracity of the allegations 

and are premature at the motion to dismiss stage. The court must 

accept R&L’s well-pled allegations as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. Here, R&L has alleged the necessary elements of a 

contribution claim, “supported by factual allegations” of the 

contents of the WKA Report and Dr. Anne Farr’s testimony. (See

id. at 679; ATPC ¶¶ 14, 35, 36.) Taking the allegations as true, 

the court finds that there is “more than a sheer possibility that 

[the County] acted unlawfully.” Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t, Ltd. 

v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Those allegations suffice at this stage. Accordingly, the court 

will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Docket No. 126) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: February 19, 2020

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