Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-03881/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-03881-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM LEROY CARIS, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 03-3881 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his

conviction for conspiracy to commit murder and first degree murder (see Cal. Penal Code § §

182(a)(1), 187). On March 6, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-two years to life in state

prison. Petitioner appealed his conviction. The state appellate court affirmed the judgment on

May 31, 2002. The state supreme court denied a petition for review on August 21, 2002. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on August 21, 2003. 

Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: (1) the trial court erred in prohibiting his

counsel from commenting during closing argument on the timing of his co-defendant’s election

to testify only on sur-rebuttal; (2) the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony by a

witness violated Petitioner’s rights to a fair trial and due process; (3) the trial court’s denial of

**Original filed 5/12/06**

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 Respondent’s Ex. 3 (Unpublished Opinion of California Court of Appeal, Sixth

Appellate District, People v. Adam Leroy Caris, Case No. H018246, May 31, 2002) at 2-4.

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Petitioner’s severance motion violated his right to a fair trial and deprived him of due process;

(4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s failure to preserve issues

for appeal, failure to request certain jury instructions, failure to object to the court’s and the

prosecutor’s use of “the People” during trial; and (5) the trial court’s denial of his motion for

new trial violated his rights to a fair trial and due process. 

This Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition, and Petitioner filed a traverse. 

After reviewing the papers and the relevant portions of the record, the Court concludes that

Petitioner’s claims are without merit and will deny the petition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent facts are taken from the unpublished opinion of the California Court of

Appeal.1 On September 27, 1993, at 2:21 a.m., San Jose Police Officer Bridgette Blahut found

the body of Paul Farfan in Watson Park. Farfan had been shot five times. Farfan was a drug

dealer and member of the Northern Structure, a prison and street gang subsidiary of the Nuestra

Familia prison gang. Farfan’s parole officer told police officers that Farfan’s girlfriend was

Jessica Salazar. Officers traced Salazar to the Arena Hotel where Oliverez, Jeannette Alarcon

(Oliverez’s wife), and another person were also staying. Officers found Farfan’s pouch inside

Alarcon’s purse. Inside the pouch were two guns, ammunition, and a small amount of

methamphetamine. Officers found a large amount of dust on Alarcon’s Geo Prizm automobile

that was consistent with the dirt in Watson Park. They also found Petitioner’s fingerprints in

three places on the car. The car’s tire tread pattern was consistent with patterns near the crime

scene. A bloodstain on the seat of the car was consistent with Farfan’s blood. A dent in the door

frame was consistent with a bullet strike. In the trunk, officers found two pairs of bloodstained

athletic socks that were similar to socks belonging to Oliverez, a pair of Reebok shoes with

bloodstained shoelaces, and a pair of Nike shoes. The blood on the socks and Reebok shoes was

consistent with Farfan’s blood. The sizes of the shoes were different and consistent with the

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different sizes worn by Oliverez (the Reebok shoes) and Petitioner (the Nike shoes). Police

found a paper in the car that had Farfan’s telephone number written on it and another paper that

had Petitioner’s address written on it.

Oliverez told the police that, between 11:00 p.m. and midnight on the night of the murder,

he had borrowed Alarcon’s car, driven to Farfan’s brother’s home, picked up Farfan, and drove to

Watson Park to drink and talk. He added that he and Farfan stayed in the park for twenty minutes

and, afterward, he drove to an apartment, dropped off Farfan, and returned to the Arena Hotel.

Robert Romero told the police that Petitioner had told him that he, Petitioner, had shot Farfan

five times after Petitioner and Oliverez had set up Farfan to be killed. Jesus Avila testified that

Petitioner had told him in jail that he, Petitioner, had killed Farfan because Farfan was

“disrespecting” Jerry Salazar by “messing with” Salazar’s wife.

Petitioner was a member of the Northern Structure. Oliverez was either a member or

sympathizer of the gang. The prosecution’s theory was that Farfan’s murder was a “gang hit” that

was ordered by Chente Arroyo because Farfan and Manuel Nanez had spent drug profits instead of

sending the profits to incarcerated gang members. Arroyo was under a murder indictment with

other members of the Northern Structure and was the highest ranking Nuestra Familia and Northern

Structure member in custody. The Grand Jury accepted the prosecution’s theory, and the indictment

alleged that Oliverez and Petitioner had committed the murder in association with a criminal street

gang an allegation that subjected the defendants to a ten-year sentence enhancement. At trial, the

prosecution introduced general evidence about the organization and activities of Nuestra Familia

and Northern Structure and specific evidence about the involvement and activities in gang business

of Farfan, Oliverez, Petitioner, and others. The jury, however, found the gang enhancement

allegations not true. 

Petitioner testified in his own defense and related the following: Petitioner joined the

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Northern Structure in 1986 while he was in prison. On the evening of the murder, Oliverez called

him and asked whether he wanted to party with Salazar’s wife and Farfan. Petitioner agreed.

Oliverez picked him up in the Geo Prizm. Farfan was in the car. The three drove to Milpitas.

Oliverez and Farfan argued in the front seat. The three encountered police near their destination

and, because Farfan indicated that he possessed a gun, drove back to San Jose and Watson Park.

Oliverez and Farfan escalated their argument. The three got out of the car. Petitioner walked 30 feet

away to urinate. When he turned to walk back to the car, he saw Oliverez and Farfan struggling.

He then heard a gunshot and saw a flash. He heard more shots and saw Oliverez holding a gun.

Oliverez was pulling Farfan out of the car. Farfan called to Petitioner to help get Oliverez away.

Farfan jumped out of the car and ran around to the front. Oliverez followed. Petitioner saw the two

on the ground, heard shots, and saw a flash. Oliverez broke free, stepped away, and shot Farfan. 

Petitioner started to run away, but Oliverez exclaimed that there had been a green light

(murder contract) on Farfan because of Farfan’s relationship with Salazar’s wife. Petitioner got into

the car on the driver’s side and crawled to the passenger side. Oliverez drove Petitioner to

Petitioner’s girlfriend’s home. Petitioner cried and told his girlfriend that Oliverez had shot Farfan.

Oliverez did not testify in his own defense. After the prosecution’s rebuttal case, however,

Oliverez testified in surrebuttal. He related the following: Oliverez and Farfan decided to party on

the evening of the murder. Oliverez picked up Farfan in the Geo Prizm. Farfan was carrying a black

duffel bag. They drove to Milpitas. They encountered police near their destination and, because

Farfan indicated that he possessed a gun, drove back to San Jose and picked up Petitioner. The three

drove to Watson Park. Oliverez exited the car to go urinate. As he walked back to the car, he heard

a gunshot. He saw Petitioner jumping from the driver’s side of the car. He heard another shot and

saw Farfan run away. Petitioner chased after Farfan and shot him again. He came back to the car

with a gun in his hand. He ordered him to drive out of the park. In the car, Petitioner exclaimed that

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Farfan “had it coming, fuck with my old lady.” Oliverez dropped Petitioner off at Petitioner’s home

and drove to the Arena Hotel. He took Farfan’s black pouch into the hotel and left Petitioner’s shoes

in the trunk. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

court may not grant a petition with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable

application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the

writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

A federal court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry in a habeas case should

ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

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unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The “objectively unreasonable” standard does not equate to “clear

error” because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of clear error fails to give

proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (citation omitted). This standard of review,

however, does not relieve a federal court of review from its duty to examine and analyze the

state court’s application of federal law.

A federal habeas court may grant the writ it if concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made

by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

(1) Prohibiting Petitioner’s Counsel from Commenting During Closing Argument

At trial, Petitioner and Oliverez each testified that the other shot and killed Paul Farfan. 

Petitioner testified at trial after Oliverez rested his case. Oliverez then testified on sur-rebuttal

and blamed Petitioner for the crime. Before final arguments to the jury, Oliverez’s counsel

asked the trial court to preclude Petitioner’s counsel from commenting on Oliverez’s failure to

testify during the presentation of his defense. Counsel argued that Oliverez had the right to

remain silent until he exercised his right to testify on his own behalf. Petitioner’s counsel

countered that he had the right to defend his client and to raise all reasonable inferences on

credibility and on the reliability of the witnesses. The trial court balanced Oliverez’s

constitutional right to remain silent against Petitioner’s right to comment on that silence, and

ruled that Petitioner’s counsel could not comment on the fact that Oliverez waited until surCase 5:03-cv-03881-JF Document 12 Filed 05/12/06 Page 6 of 19
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rebuttal to present his version of events.

Petitioner contends he was denied his rights to counsel and to due process when the trial

court erroneously ruled that his counsel could not comment on the fact that Oliverez waited until

sur-rebuttal to present his version of events. Petition at A-3–A-6. He argues that he was

deprived of a meaningful opportunity to argue adverse inferences as to Oliverez’s credibility,

which, according to Petitioner, was critical given the jury’s rejection of the gang-motive theory. 

See id. Petitioner contends that the trial court’s error was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. See id. The prosecution conceded that the ruling was erroneous. Ex. 3 at 14. 

The Supreme Court has determined that comments made during summation that call the

jury’s attention to the fact that the defendant had an opportunity to hear other witnesses testify

and to tailor his testimony do not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights and are a proper way

to impeach the defendant’s testimony. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65-74 (2000). The

Court reasoned that “it is natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating the relative credibility

of a defendant who testifies last, to have in mind and weigh in the balance the fact that he heard

the testimony of all those who preceded him.” Id. at 67-68. Accordingly, it held that “[a]llowing

comment upon the fact that a defendant’s presence in the courtroom provides him a unique

opportunity to tailor his testimony is appropriate – and indeed, given the inability to sequester

the defendant, sometimes essential – to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the

truth.” Id. at 73.

The state appellate court found that “even though [Petitioner] was prohibited from

commenting on Oliverez’s opportunity to tailor his testimony, it was ‘inevitable’ that the jury

would infer that Oliverez had the opportunity to tailor his testimony.” Ex. 3 at 15. Moreover,

the court noted that Petitioner misstated the nature of the case. Id. It reasoned that even if

Petitioner had been allowed to comment on Oliverez’s opportunity to tailor his testimony and to

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suggest that Oliverez was lying, the jury would have found that Oliverez was the aider and

abettor rather than Petitioner. See id. at 15-16. In any event, the jury at least would have

convicted Petitioner as an aider and abettor, given that it convicted Petitioner as a conspirator

and Petitioner was present at the murder scene without having withdrawn from the conspiracy. 

See id. 

The state appellate court’s determination was not unreasonable. Although the trial court

should have allowed Petitioner’s counsel to comment on Oliverez’s failure to testify during the

presentation of his defense, the denial of such comment did not have a substantial or injurious

effect on the jury’s verdict. The jury inevitably could infer that Oliverez had the opportunity to

tailor his testimony. Furthermore, given the facts presented at trial, Petitioner would have been

convicted as an aider and abettor. Based upon the record, the appellate court’s rejection of

Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

(2) Prosecutor’s Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony

Petitioner contends that his rights to a fair trial and due process were violated by the

prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony, which resulted in highly inflammatory but

irrelevant criminal street gang evidence being admitted at trial. Petition at A-6. Petitioner

claims that the prosecution’s witness, Jerry Salazar, committed perjury and that the police knew

or reasonably should have known that a “green light” order had never been issued from the jail

for Paul Farfan. Petition at A-7. The state appellate court held that Petitioner failed to show

affirmatively that any error occurred. Ex. 3 at 13. The court acknowledged that Salazar’s June

1993 interview with the grand jury lasted three hours and the transcript of that testimony is at

least seventy pages in length. Id. The portion of the tape recording played to the jury was only

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28 2

 Once constitutional error has been found under this test, it cannot subsequently be found

harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 & n.9.

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three pages in length, and Salazar testified that the excerpted portion was taken out of context. 

Salazar also testified that he talked to the District Attorney’s office three or four times, for an

hour to an hour and a half each time, in December 1993 and January 1994. Salazar testified

specifically that in an interview on December 7, 1993, he told the District Attorney’s office that

Chente Arroyo had directed the “green light” on Farfan and Nanez. However, according to the

appellate court, “the record establish[ed] no more than that Salazar made inconsistent

statements’ before he testified, a fact that Oliverez and [Petitioner] fully exposed in crossexamination.” Id. at 14.

 Mere inconsistencies in testimony do not violate due process unless the evidence is “of

such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th

Cir. 1998); Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.3d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986). Ultimately, the

appropriateness of habeas relief depends on whether even with the perjured testimony or false

evidence petitioner received a fair trial. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (using

test in context of suppression of evidence); Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 367-38 (9th Cir.

1997) (using test in context of perjured testimony). A violation will be found, and relief will be

granted, if it is shown that the perjured testimony or false evidence reasonably could be viewed

as putting the entire case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. See

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.2 

Here the inconsistencies in Salazar’s testimony did not necessarily prevent Petitioner

from receiving a fair trial. Salazar’s testimony was subject to vigorous cross-examination, and

Petitioner’s counsel highlighted the inconsistencies. 

Further, as the appellate court noted, Salazar’s statements were not the only evidence

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related to gang-motive. Ex. 3 at 14. There was evidence indicating that Petitioner boasted to

Avila that he had killed Farfan because Farfan was disrespecting Salazar by “messing with”

Salazar’s wife. Id. Such evidence indicating membership in a gang is appropriate if it relates to

motive or bias. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984). It is clear that Petitioner’s

involvement in the Northen Structure gang established a motive for the murder. The evidence at

issue was not so prejudicial as to render the trial unfair, because the jury did not find the gang

enhancements to be true. Thus, the appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not

contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor was it based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

(3) Denial of Severance Motion

Next, Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial

from that of his co-defendant Oliverez. Petition A-8–A-9. He maintains that he and Oliverez

presented irreconcilable, antagonistic defenses. Id. He elaborates that the complex layers of

proof in the case presented a substantial probability of jury confusion as to the prosecution’s

burden of proof. Id. 

A joinder, or denial of severance, of co-defendants or counts may prejudice a defendant

sufficiently to render his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Grisby v.

Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997); Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir.

1986). It also may result in the deprivation of the specific constitutional guarantee of the right of

confrontation. Id.

A federal court reviewing a state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not concern

itself with state law governing severance or joinder in state trials. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. Nor

is it concerned with the procedural right to severance afforded in federal trials. Id. Its inquiry is

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limited to a petitioner’s right to a fair trial under the United States Constitution. In order to

prevail, the petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s joinder or denial of his severance

motion resulted in prejudice great enough to render his trial fundamentally unfair. Id. In

addition, the impermissible joinder must have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000).

There is a “high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . . joinder of counts allows evidence

of other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would

otherwise be inadmissible.” United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Severance also may be in order when a defendant “shows that the core of the co-defendant’s

defense is so irreconcilable with the core of his own defense that the acceptance of the codefendant’s theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant.” United States v.

Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996). However, conflicting and antagonistic

defenses at trial do not necessarily require a severance, even if hostility surfaces or defendants

seek to blame one another. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978). 

The state appellate court found that “because defendants were charged with having

committed common crimes involving common events and victims this was a ‘classic case’ for a

joint trial.” Ex. 3 at 11. Although the trial court could have accepted Petitioner’s arguments and

granted a severance, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he received an unfair trial because of the

joinder. The jury was instructed on the prosecution’s burden of proof and the obligation to give

separate consideration to each defendant and to each charge. The jury could have accepted

Petitioner’s assertion that his co-defendant shot Farfan, but it chose not to do so. The defenses

raised by Oliverez were not so irreconcilable with Petitioner’s theory of the case as to prejudice

Petitioner’s own defense. The appellate court’s determination was not contrary to, nor did it

involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it

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based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

(4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner next contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial based

upon counsel’s failure to preserve issues for appeal, failure to require certain jury instructions,

and failure to object to the trial court’s and prosecutor’s use of “the People” during trial. Petition

at A-9–A-11. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any

claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a

just result. Id. The right to effective assistance counsel applies to the performance of both

retained and appointed counsel without distinction. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-

45 (1980).

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner

must make two separate showings. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was

deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. Id.

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The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

considered to be “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). A defendant can make out a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel only by pointing to specific errors made by trial counsel. See United States v. Cronic,

466 U.S. 648, 666 (1984).

(a) Failure to Preserve Issues for Appeal

Petitioner contends that his counsel failed to preserve significant issues for appeal on

several occasions during trial. Petition at A-10. However, as set forth below, these issues lack

merit and did not result in any prejudice. Accordingly, counsel’s failure to preserve the issues

for appeal did not meet the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(b) Failure to Request a Modified CALJIC No. 3.18 Instruction

The trial court instructed the jury with the modified language of CALJIC No. 3.18 as

follows: “You should view the testimony of an accomplice called as a witness by the prosecution

which tends to incriminate a defendant with distrust. This does not mean that you may

arbitrarily disregard that testimony. [¶] You should give that testimony the weight you think it

deserves after examining it with care and caution and in light of all the evidence in the case.” 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this instruction

because it limits the caution in viewing accomplice testimony with distrust to testimony of

accomplices called as witnesses by the prosecution. Petition at A-10. Thus, Petitioner claims

that he was denied the advantage of an instruction to the jury to regard Oliverez’s testimony with

distrust, since neither Petitioner nor Oliverez testified as a prosecution witness. See id.

The state appellate court found that “the instruction given by the trial court was not a

misstatement of the law.” Ex. 3 at 7. The instruction “plainly and correctly stated that

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prosecution accomplice testimony that incriminates should be viewed with distrust.” Id. The

appellate court interpreted Petitioner’s argument as “essentially that the word ‘prosecution’

should have been deleted from the given instruction so that all accomplice testimony would be

covered by the instruction.” Id. Moreover, the appellate court recognized a rational tactical

purpose for not requesting a modification of CALJIC No. 3.18: “[a] modification of the

instruction would have further emphasized Oliverez’s testimony, as the jury would have been

told to determine which parts tended to incriminate [Petitioner] and which parts did not.” Id. at

8. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that defense counsel’s failure to object to this instruction

constituted deficient performance, nor establish any prejudice to him from counsel’s omission. 

As the appellate court noted, there was a rational purpose for not requesting a modification to the

instruction. Id. 

(c) Failure to Instruct the Jury to Related Third-Party Defense to the Prosecution’s

 Burden of Proof

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel should have requested a pinpoint instruction

on third-party culpability that related to his theory on the burden of proof. Petition at A-10. The

trial court instructed the jury pursuant to the language of CALJIC No. 2.90, that the prosecution

had the burden of proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that Petitioner was

entitled to a not guilty verdict if the jury had a reasonable doubt whether his guilt was

“satisfactorily shown.” The trial court later instructed the jury that it had to convict Petitioner of

a lesser charge if it was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty of first

degree murder, provided that it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was

guilty of the lesser crime. Ex. 3 at 17.

CALJIC No. 2.90 is the standard instruction set forth in California Penal Code section

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3

 California Penal Code section 1096(a) states “[i]n charging a jury, the court may read to

the jury Section 1096, and no further instruction on the subject of the presumption of innocence

or defining reasonable double need be given.”

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1096.3

 The appellate court noted that “[i]f [Petitioner] wished a pinpoint instruction relating the

reasonable doubt standard to the crux of his case, he had a right to such instruction, but only

upon request.” Ex. 3 at 18. Petitioner now contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to

request a pinpoint instruction. Petition at A-10. Nevertheless, Petitioner fails to demonstrate

that defense counsel’s failure fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687-88. Moreover, Petitioner fails to demonstrate how counsel’s failure resulted in

prejudice. As the appellate court noted, “[t]he jury certainly knew [Petitioner’s] theory –

[Petitioner] testified and accused Oliverez of independently shooting Farfan. And other

instructions correctly informed the jury as to the allocation of proof.” Ex. 3 at 17. 

A court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a

component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988). Under the circumstances, the absence of a pinpoint

instruction did not affect the outcome of the trial because a reasonable juror would not have

believed that it was Petitioner’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Oliverez shot

Farfan.

(d) Failure to Object to the Court’s and Prosecutor’s Use of “the People” During 

 Trial

Petitioner contends that “[i]t is fundamentally incorrect and unfair to refer to the

prosecuting bodies of the State of California as ‘The People’ in criminal cases.” Petition at A10. He maintains that the prosecution is part of the executive branch of the state, not part of the

people. Id. The appellate court rejected this claim because Petitioner waived the argument by

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4

 California has a long history of designating the prosecution as “the People.” People v.

McLaughlin, 44 Cal. 435, 437 (1872).

5

 Respondent also addressed a claim that Petitioner’s counsel failed to request a pinpoint

instruction on intoxication. Resp. Mem. of P. & A. at 16-18. However, Petitioner does not

specifically reference this claim in the instant petition. Petition at A-10. Rather, it appears that

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Court of Appeal. Therefore, this Court declines

to address the merits of the claim since the issue is not raised in the petition. 

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not objecting or raising the issue in the trial court below. Ex. 3 at 18. Here, upon review of this

claim on the merits, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel’s failure resulted in deficient

performance, nor establish any prejudice by the prosecution’s use of the term “the People.”4 

In sum, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails on the merits.5

 The

appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not

contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor was it based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

(5) Denial of Petitioner’s Motion for a New Trial

Finally, Petitioner contends that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial

violated his rights to a fair trial and due process. Petition at A-11. The motion for new trial was

based on newly discovered evidence of co-defendant Oliverez’s post-trial confession. Id. 

After the jury convicted Petitioner and Oliverez, Oliverez arranged to be interviewed by

Petitioner’s counsel. Ex. 3 at 22. In the interview, Oliverez related that he had shot Farfan with

Farfan’s gun in self-defense after Farfan became belligerent about Oliverez’s supposed intimate

relationship with Jessica Salazar, after which Farfan reached for the gun and the two wrestled

over the gun. Id. Oliverez then testified at a joint evidentiary hearing, in support of his own

motions for a new trial (one of which was grounded upon ineffective assistance of counsel

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6

 The trial court denied Oliverez’s motions before ruling on Petitioner’s motion.

7

 Under California law, a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered

evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Monroe, 162 Cal. App.

2d 248, 254-55 (1958) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion for new trial when trial court

disbelieved co-defendant who testified at trial but waited until after the verdict to exculpate the

defendant).

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because counsel failed to defend on a self-defense theory) and in support of Petitioner’s motion.6

Id. At the hearing, Oliverez essentially repeated what he said in the interview. Id. He also

admitted that he lied under oath at the trial at least twenty-eight times. Id. In denying

Petitioner’s motion, the trial court stated: “I simply do not believe this new evidence is worthy.” 

Id. 

A new trial is not automatically required when false evidence is discovered, and the mere

existence of newly discovered evidence relevant to guilt is not grounds for federal habeas relief. 

Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir.1990). Petitioner must show that the newly

discovered evidence probably would have resulted in his acquittal. Gordon, 895 F.2d at 614-15;

Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980); Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1993). 

After Oliverez testified at the post-trial evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that

nothing Oliverez said was worthy of belief.7 As the appellate court noted, “[t]here is nothing

manifestly irrational about such a conclusion. If one credits Oliverez’s new trial testimony,

Oliverez is a liar (for denying his involvement to the police) and perjurer [twenty-eight] times

over; if one credits his jury testimony, he is a liar (for denying his involvement to the police) and

a perjurer based on his new trial testimony.” Ex. 3 at 23. Given Oliverez’s history of lying,

Petitioner fails to establish the probability that this new evidence of Oliverez’s confession would

result in his acquittal.

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Regardless, the appellate court recognized that Petitioner was convicted of both firstdegree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. As the trial court noted, given the conspiracy

conviction, it was immaterial who actually killed Farfan. Even if a new trial were granted, and

Petitioner was found not guilty of first-degree murder, the charge of conspiracy would remain. 

Because Oliverez’s post-trial testimony would not result in Petitioner’s acquittal, the appellate

court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), (2). 

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the petition is

denied. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: ________________ 

 JEREMY FOGEL

 United States District Judge

5/12/06

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A copy of this order was mailed to the following:

Adam LeRoy Caris

K-87833 

CSATF - Corcoran

P.O. Box 5242

Corcoran, CA 93212

Sharon R. Wooden

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue 

Suite 11000 

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Case 5:03-cv-03881-JF Document 12 Filed 05/12/06 Page 19 of 19