Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-03078/USCOURTS-ca2-14-03078-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

1

2 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

4

5 August Term, 2015

6

7 (Argued: September 10, 2015 Decided: January 20, 2016)

8

9 Docket No. 14-3078-cv

10 _____________________________________

11

12 T.K. and S.K., individually and on behalf of L.K.,

13

14 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

15

16 v.

17

18 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

19

20 Defendant-Appellant.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 Before:

24

25 LYNCH, LOHIER, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

26

27 The New York City Department of Education (the “Department”) 

28 appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

29 District of New York (Weinstein, J.) awarding Plaintiffs T.K. and S.K. 

30 reimbursement for one year of private school education for their daughter, 

31 L.K. The District Court held that that the Department denied L.K. the free 

32 appropriate public education required by the Individuals with Disabilities 

33 Education Act because the Department refused to address Plaintiffs’ 

34 reasonable concerns about the severe bullying that L.K. endured in public 

35 school. Because we agree that the Department denied L.K. a free appropriate 

36 public education, that L.K.’s private school placement was appropriate, and 

37 that the equities favor Plaintiffs, we AFFIRM.

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page1 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

2

1

2 GARY S. MAYERSON (Jean Marie 

3 Brescia, on the brief), Mayerson & 

4 Associates, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs5 Appellees.

6

7 RONALD E. STERNBERG (Richard P. 

8 Dearing, on the brief), for Zachary W. 

9 Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City 

10 of New York, New York, NY, for

11 Defendant-Appellant.

12

13 James Cole, Jr., General Counsel, 

14 Francisco Lopez, Vanessa Santos, 

15 Michelle Tucker, Attorneys, U.S. 

16 Department of Education, Office of 

17 General Counsel, Washington, DC; 

18 Vanita Gupta, Acting Assistant 

19 Attorney General, Mark L. Gross, 

20 Jennifer Levin Eichhorn, Attorneys, U.S. 

21 Department of Justice, Civil Rights 

22 Division, Appellate Section, 

23 Washington, DC, for United States as 

24 Amicus Curiae supporting Plaintiffs25 Appellees.

26

27 LOHIER, Circuit Judge:

28 The New York City Department of Education (the “Department”) 

29 appeals from a judgment awarding Plaintiffs T.K. and S.K. reimbursement 

30 under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA” or the “Act”) 

31 for one year of private school education for their daughter, L.K, who was the 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page2 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

3

1 subject of severe bullying. On appeal we consider whether the Department

2 violated the IDEA by denying Plaintiffs’ requests to discuss L.K.’s bullying 

3 despite their reasonable concern that the bullying interfered with L.K.’s 

4 ability to receive a free appropriate public education, also known as a 

5 “FAPE.” We conclude that the Department’s refusal to discuss the bullying of 

6 L.K. with her parents during the process of developing L.K.’s “individualized 

7 education program,” or “IEP,” violated the IDEA. Because Plaintiffs have 

8 also met their burden to show that their choice of a private placement for L.K. 

9 was appropriate and that the equities favored reimbursing them, we affirm 

10 the judgment of the District Court.

11 BACKGROUND

12 I. L.K.’s Public School Experience and Private School Placement

13 The following undisputed facts are drawn from the record on appeal. 

14 L.K. is a child with a disability under the IDEA. She spent her third-grade 

15 year (2007-2008) in a public school operated by the Department. At the 

16 school, she was placed in a “Collaborative Team Teaching” class, which 

17 included general and special education students and which was taught by 

18 both a general and a special education teacher. The Department also 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page3 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

4

1 provided L.K. with one-on-one “Special Education Itinerant Teachers” 

2 (“SEITs”). 

3 Academically, L.K. made “progress throughout the school year” and 

4 performed at or approaching grade level in all subjects. But at a certain point

5 L.K.’s schoolmates bullied her so severely that she came home crying and 

6 complained to her parents about the bullying on a near daily basis. L.K.’s 

7 three SEITs testified that her classmates constantly bullied her. One SEIT 

8 even described the classroom as a “hostile environment” for L.K. A neuro9 developmental pediatrician found that the “minimal interactions” L.K. had 

10 with her classmates “were mostly negative.”

11 The witnesses supported these generalized assessments by describing 

12 specific instances of bullying. In May and November 2007 one student 

13 pinched L.K. hard enough to cause a bruise and stomped on her toes. Her 

14 classmates ostracized her, backing away from her to avoid touching her. In 

15 one instance, they refused to touch a pencil, treating it as contaminated 

16 merely because L.K. had touched it. At other times they pushed L.K. away;

17 tripped her; laughed at her; and called her “ugly,” “stupid,” and “fat.” One 

18 student drew a demeaning picture of her and another made a prank phone 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page4 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

5

1 call to her home.

2 L.K.’s teachers appear to have done little to stop the bullying. For 

3 example, when L.K.’s classmates refused to touch the pencil that she had 

4 touched, one of her classroom teachers foolishly reinforced their behavior by 

5 labeling the pencil with L.K.’s name, purportedly because of L.K.’s poor 

6 hygiene. When L.K. was tripped, a teacher berated L.K. for “making a scene.” 

7 Two of L.K.’s SEITs explained that the classroom teachers ignored their 

8 concerns about L.K.’s bullying. The neuro-developmental pediatrician 

9 observed that L.K.’s teachers neither intervened nor punished the students 

10 who bullied her. 

11 It appears from the record that the bullying affected L.K.’s academic 

12 and non-academic development. Her father described her as “emotionally 

13 unavailable to learn” as a result of the bullying, and his assessment was 

14 supported by other facts in the record. L.K. was late to school sixteen times in 

15 the spring semester due, the Plaintiffs claim, to her fear of interacting with her 

16 classmates. She brought dolls to school for support. One of her SEITs 

17 reported that bullying negatively affected L.K.’s “ability to initiate, 

18 concentrate, attend and stay on task with her homework assignments and 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page5 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

6

1 activities after school.” She volunteered less in class. And she counted the 

2 days until the end of the school year, when she might temporarily escape her 

3 tormentors. 

4 Plaintiffs’ several attempts to raise the issue of bullying with L.K.’s 

5 school were consistently rebuffed. Without avail, they requested copies of 

6 any incident reports involving harassment of L.K. They wrote to teachers and 

7 administrators about L.K.’s bullying, but received no response. The school’s

8 stonewalling continued even during the process of developing L.K.’s IEP, 

9 which is the central mechanism by which the IDEA ensures that States

10 comply with its provisions. At a meeting on March 26, 2008, to develop L.K.’s 

11 behavior intervention plan (a plan to be used in developing the IEP), L.K.’s 

12 parents “attempted to raise the bullying issue,” but the school principal, 

13 without explanation, flatly refused to discuss the issue with them. Joint 

14 App’x 6799. And at the IEP team meeting on June 4, 2008, L.K.’s parents tried 

15 to revisit the bullying issue, but school officials again refused to discuss 

16 bullying, contending that it was an inappropriate topic to consider when 

17 developing L.K.’s IEP. 

18 Plaintiffs decided to place L.K. in a private school rather than risk 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page6 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

7

1 another year of bullying. On March 21, 2008, prior to the development of 

2 L.K.’s behavior intervention plan or IEP, Plaintiffs signed an enrollment 

3 contract with The Summit School (“Summit”), a private school for students 

classified as learning disabled.1 4 They also made a non-refundable one-month 

5 tuition payment to Summit to reserve L.K.’s seat for the following school 

6 year. On June 6, 2008, two days after the development of L.K.’s IEP, Plaintiffs 

7 notified the Department that they were rejecting L.K.’s IEP in favor of a 

8 private placement. 

9 II. Procedural History

10 Later in June 2008 Plaintiffs started a New York State administrative 

11 action seeking reimbursement for L.K.’s 2008-2009 tuition for Summit,

12 arguing, among other things, that the Department violated the IDEA by

13 refusing to discuss their concerns about L.K.’s bullying. They lost at both 

14 levels of administrative review: first before the Initial Hearing Officer (IHO) 

15 and then before the State Review Officer (SRO). 

16 Plaintiffs next appealed to the United States District Court for the 

17 Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, J.). Concluding that students have 

 

1 L.K. was initially diagnosed with Autism Spectrum disorder but, at 

Plaintiffs’ request, was reclassified as “learning disabled”.

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page7 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

8

1 the “right to be secure” in school and that significant, unremedied bullying 

2 could constitute the denial of a FAPE, the District Court developed a four3 part test to determine whether bullying resulted in the denial of a FAPE: (1) 

4 was the student a victim of bullying; (2) did the school have notice of 

5 substantial bullying of the student; (3) was the school “deliberately 

6 indifferent” to the bullying, or did it fail to take reasonable steps to prevent 

7 the bullying; and (4) did the bullying “substantially restrict” the student’s 

8 “educational opportunities”? 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 316, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 

9 The court remanded the case to the IHO to consider Plaintiffs’ claims under 

10 that test. Plaintiffs again lost before the IHO and the SRO and again appealed 

to the District Court, which granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor.2 11 

12 Among other things, the District Court held that the Department’s refusal to 

13 permit Plaintiffs to discuss bullying in the development of L.K.’s IEP violated 

14 the IDEA. 32 F. Supp. 3d 405, 426-27 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Because the District 

15 Court also held that Summit was an appropriate placement and that the 

16 equities favored reimbursement, it entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.

 

2 Although the parties style the procedure to dispose of IDEA actions as a 

motion for “summary judgment,” the “procedure is in substance an appeal 

from an administrative determination.” M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 

F.3d 217, 226 (2d Cir. 2012).

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page8 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

9

1 The Department timely appealed. 

2 DISCUSSION

3 In this appeal, we consider principally whether the Department denied 

4 L.K. a FAPE by refusing to discuss bullying with her parents despite their 

5 reasonable concern that the severe bullying that L.K. endured could prevent 

6 her from receiving a FAPE. We hold that the Department denied L.K. a FAPE 

7 by refusing to discuss an issue that, as we note below, it acknowledges may 

8 substantially interfere with a child’s learning opportunities. Because 

9 Plaintiffs have also met their burden to show that their choice of private 

10 placement for L.K. was appropriate and because the equities favor

11 reimbursement of their private school tuition, we affirm the judgment of the 

12 District Court.

13 I. Standard of Review

14 We review de novo a district court’s award of summary judgment in an 

15 IDEA case. C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 

16 2014). With respect to state administrative decisions, we engage in an 

17 independent, but circumscribed, review, “more critical . . . than clear-error 

18 review but . . . well short of complete de novo review.” Id. (quotation marks 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page9 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

10

1 omitted). We give “due weight” to the state proceedings, affording particular 

2 deference where “the state hearing officers’ review has been thorough and 

3 careful.” M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2012)

4 (quotation marks omitted). We are also mindful that federal courts lack “the 

5 specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and 

6 difficult questions of educational policy.” Id. at 240 (quotation marks 

7 omitted).

8 II. Legal Background

9 The IDEA’s purpose is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have 

10 available to them a free appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. 

11 § 1400(d)(1)(A). In practice, this means that States have an affirmative 

12 obligation to provide a basic floor of opportunity for all children with 

13 disabilities or, as we recently described it, an education “likely to produce 

14 progress, not regression,” and one that “afford[s] the student with an 

15 opportunity greater than mere trivial advancement.” M.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 

16 Educ., 793 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2015). The “centerpiece” of the IDEA and its 

17 principal mechanism for achieving this goal is the IEP. Murphy v. Arlington 

18 Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Honig 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page10 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

11

1 v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). The IEP is a written document that must 

2 include the child’s present level of performance, goals for her improvement, 

3 and a plan about how to achieve that improvement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); 

4 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2012). Where the IEP 

5 is substantively deficient, parents may unilaterally reject it in favor of sending 

6 their child to private school and seek tuition reimbursement from the State. 

7 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 

8 F.3d 356, 363 (2d Cir. 2006).

9 Even when an IEP itself is not deficient, parents may seek 

10 reimbursement for a unilateral placement if the State fails to afford them 

11 certain procedural safeguards. Of particular importance here, the IDEA

12 requires States to provide parents with the “opportunity to participate in the 

13 decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents’ 

14 child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Not every violation of these procedural 

15 safeguards rises to the level of the denial of a FAPE. Rather, the violations 

16 must “significantly impede[]” the parents’ participation rights, “impede[] the 

17 child’s right to a [FAPE],” or “cause[] a deprivation of educational benefits.” 

18 Id. Nor will every denial of a FAPE based on the violation of procedural 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page11 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

12

1 safeguards or the substantive inadequacy of the IEP necessarily support a 

2 claim for tuition reimbursement. In each case, after determining that a FAPE 

3 has been denied, we look to “whether the parents’ private placement is 

4 appropriate to the child’s needs[] and . . . [to] the equities.” C.F., 746 F.3d at 

5 73; see also Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-

6 16 (1993); Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of 

7 Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). Under New York law, “the Department 

8 bears the burden of establishing the validity of the IEP, while the parents bear 

9 the burden of establishing the appropriateness of the private placement.” 

10 C.F., 746 F.3d at 76 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(c)).

11 III. The Department’s Denial of a FAPE

12 We have not previously addressed whether the bullying of a student 

13 with a disability is an appropriate consideration in the development of an IEP 

14 and can result in the denial of a FAPE under the IDEA. Because the 

15 Department concedes that it can be an appropriate consideration when it 

16 “reaches a level where a student is substantially restricted in learning 

17 opportunities,” Department Br. 37 (quotation marks omitted), we assume as 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page12 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

13

much without deciding the issue here.

3 1 We note, though, that the 

2 Department’s concession recognizes that a child with a disability who is 

3 severely bullied by her peers may not be able to pay attention to her academic 

4 tasks or develop the social and behavioral skills that are an essential part of 

any education.

4 5 It also accords with the position of the United States as 

6 amicus curiae in this appeal and with guidance from the United States

7 Department of Education that bullying can interfere with a disabled student’s 

ability to receive a FAPE.5 8 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special 

9 Education and Rehabilitative Services, Dear Colleague: Bullying of Students 

 

3 Because we hold that the Department denied L.K. a FAPE as a result of its 

procedural violations, we also need not and do not reach the question 

whether the bullying at issue here was so severe that the failure to address it 

in L.K.’s IEP resulted in a substantive denial of a FAPE. For the same reason, 

we express no opinion as to whether the District Court’s four-part test for 

determining when bullying results in the substantive denial of a FAPE 

correctly states the law. 

4 Even assuming that the IEP need be concerned only with “how the child’s 

disability affects” her academic and functional performance, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa), we see no reason to doubt that bullying may be 

sufficiently related to a child’s disability to meet any nexus requirement that 

can reasonably be inferred from the IDEA.

5 In view of the Department’s concession in this case, we need not decide the 

precise level of deference owed to the position outlined in the United States’ 

amicus brief or to the other agency guidance supporting that position.

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page13 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

14

1 with Disabilities 1 (Aug. 20, 2013), available at 

2 http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/bullyingdcl-8-20-

3 13.pdf.

4 We conclude that the Department denied L.K. a FAPE by violating her 

5 parents’ procedural right to participate in the development of her IEP. At two 

6 separate meetings, both of which were integral to the development of L.K.’s 

7 IEP, Plaintiffs sought to discuss L.K.’s bullying, but school officials refused to 

8 do so. The undisputed record evidence confirms that, in asking to speak with 

9 the officials about the bullying, L.K.’s parents had reason to believe that the 

10 bullying would interfere with L.K.’s ability to receive meaningful educational 

11 benefits and could prevent L.K.’s public education from producing “progress, 

12 not regression.” M.O., 793 F.3d at 239. For example, one of L.K.’s SEITs 

13 reported that bullying negatively affected L.K.’s “ability to initiate, 

14 concentrate, attend and stay on task with her homework assignments and 

15 activities after school.” Joint App’x 6331. There was also undisputed 

16 evidence that L.K. dreaded going to school, counted the days until the end of 

17 school, and was frequently tardy, arguably due to her fear of being bullied. 

18 Indeed, her father described L.K. as “emotionally unavailable to learn” and 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page14 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

15

1 testified that she came home crying and complained about bullying on a near 

2 daily basis. Three of L.K.’s SEITs confirmed that she was constantly teased, 

3 excluded from groups, and subjected to a hostile environment. A doctor 

4 familiar with L.K. testified that her classroom behavior and demeanor had 

5 regressed from the prior year. And given the school’s lack of cooperation 

6 about the bullying, Plaintiffs could not reasonably be confident that they had 

been informed about the full scope of the bullying or its effects on L.K.

6 7 The 

8 Department’s persistent refusal to discuss L.K.’s bullying at important 

9 junctures in the development of her IEP “significantly impede[d]” Plaintiffs’ 

10 right to participate in the development of L.K.’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. 

11 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). This constituted a procedural denial of a FAPE similar to

12 other procedural violations that our sister circuits have held to constitute 

13 denials of a FAPE, such as the predetermination of an issue prior to an IEP 

14 meeting, see Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 855-59 (6th Cir. 

15 2004), or the failure to inform parents about a fact significant to the 

16 development of the IEP, see Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cty. Sch. 

 

6 Certain children covered by the IDEA have disabilities that impair their 

ability to communicate. For parents of children with such disabilities, the 

responsiveness of school officials could be especially important.

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page15 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

16

1 Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2001).

2 The Department argues that the Plaintiffs suffered no harm, insofar as 

3 L.K.’s IEP already addressed bullying by including goals for improving L.K.’s 

4 behavior in a manner that might reduce future bullying. It also argues that 

5 some anti-bullying strategies are better addressed through channels other 

6 than the IEP. We are not persuaded. Denying L.K.’s parents the opportunity 

7 to discuss bullying during the creation of L.K.’s IEP not only potentially

8 impaired the substance of the IEP but also prevented them from assessing the 

9 adequacy of their child’s IEP. 

10 We have recognized in other contexts the procedural importance of the 

11 parents’ ability meaningfully to evaluate the sufficiency of the IEP before it is 

12 finalized. For example, we have explained that school districts defending the 

13 adequacy of an IEP must do so with evidence that was available to parents at 

14 the time of the IEP’s creation. See R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 

15 186 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A school district cannot rehabilitate a deficient IEP after 

16 the fact.”). Here, Plaintiffs were reasonably concerned that bullying severely 

17 restricted L.K.’s educational opportunities, and that concern powerfully

18 informed their decisions about her education. By refusing to discuss that 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page16 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

17

1 bullying during the development of the IEP, the Department significantly 

2 impeded Plaintiffs’ ability to assess the adequacy of the IEP and denied L.K. a 

3 FAPE. 

4 IV. Summit Was An Appropriate Placement

5 Having determined that L.K. was denied a FAPE, we now address 

6 whether reimbursement was appropriate — that is, whether Plaintiffs also 

7 demonstrated that (1) their private placement of L.K. was appropriate and (2) 

8 the equities favored reimbursement. Both elements are satisfied here.

9 A private placement is appropriate if it is “reasonably calculated to 

10 enable the child to receive educational benefits,” C.F., 746 F.3d at 82

11 (quotation marks omitted), “such that the placement is likely to produce 

12 progress, not regression,” C.L., 744 F.3d at 836 (quotation marks omitted). In 

13 determining whether a placement reasonably serves the educational needs of 

14 a child with a disability and is likely to produce progress, we consider the 

15 totality of the evidence, including “grades, test scores, regular advancement, 

16 or other objective evidence.” Id.; see also Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. 

17 Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007). The test for the private placement “is 

18 that it is appropriate, and not that it is perfect.” C.L., 744 F.3d at 837 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page17 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

18

1 (quotation marks omitted). Parents bear a lower burden to demonstrate the 

2 appropriateness of a private placement than school districts do to 

3 demonstrate the provision of a FAPE because “parents are not barred from 

4 reimbursement where a private school they choose does not meet the IDEA 

5 definition of a [FAPE].” Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364. 

6 We conclude that Summit was an appropriate placement. Plaintiffs 

7 sent L.K., who was classified as “learning disabled,” to a State-approved 

school devoted to educating students with learning disabilities.

7 8 Plaintiffs

9 were advised by a private psychologist that L.K. needed “a more supportive 

10 academic environment” in “a small, special education class and school for 

11 children with solid cognitive potential who need a supportive and specialized 

12 approach for learning.” Summit proved to be a successful match for L.K. 

13 Indeed, the IHO and the SRO found that L.K. made progress “across the 

14 board” there, both academically and behaviorally. 

15 However, believing that the failure to include multiple services that 

 

7 New York State lists The Summit School as among the schools to which it 

has approved private placements for students with disabilities. See Joint 

App’x 6141; N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 853 Programs Serving Students with 

Disabilities, http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/privateschools/853-

statewide.htm (last updated April 17, 2015).

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page18 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

19

1 were properly recommended in an IEP necessarily renders a private 

2 placement inappropriate, both the SRO and the IHO ultimately concluded 

3 that Summit was not an appropriate placement because it offered L.K.

4 inadequate physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and 

5 counseling services. This was error. “[P]arents need not show that a private 

6 placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child’s 

7 potential.” Frank G., 459 F.3d at 365. “They need only demonstrate that the 

8 placement” is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 

9 educational benefits.” Id. at 364-65. As verified by the totality of the record 

10 evidence and the findings of the IHO and SRO themselves, L.K’s progress at 

11 Summit amply satisfies Plaintiffs’ burden to prove that Summit was 

12 “reasonably calculated to enable [L.K.] to receive educational benefits.” C.F., 

13 746 F.3d at 82 (quotation marks omitted).

14 V. The Equities Favor Reimbursement

15 Echoing the conclusions of the IHO and the SRO, the Department also 

16 contends that the equities in this case do not favor Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs 

17 “appeared intent on sending [L.K.] to the private school prior to and at the . . . 

18 meeting” where they developed the IEP. In support of this contention, the

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page19 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

20

1 Department points out that Plaintiffs (1) paid Summit a deposit of one

2 month’s tuition prior to the IEP meeting, (2) “rejected the IEP’s recommended 

3 . . . placement prior to the start of the 2008-09 school year,” and (3) refused to 

4 allow the Department to conduct evaluations of L.K. prior to the June 2008 

5 meeting.

6 We reject these arguments and conclude, as did the District Court, that 

7 the balance of equities favors Plaintiffs. As an initial matter, our review of the 

8 record confirms the District Court’s view that Plaintiffs consistently made 

9 good-faith efforts to resolve L.K.’s bullying problem at her public school, and 

10 generally cooperated with the Department in the development of L.K.’s IEP. 

11 Cf. C.L., 744 F.3d at 840 (“Important to the equitable consideration is whether 

12 the parents obstructed or were uncooperative in the school district’s efforts to 

13 meet its obligations under the IDEA.”). The record gives no sense that prior 

14 to the Department’s refusal to resolve the bullying the parents were anything 

15 less than fully committed to a public school education for L.K. Moreover, 

16 Plaintiffs promptly notified the Department of their intention to place L.K. at 

17 Summit after they received the IEP. Ultimately, their decision to place L.K. at 

18 Summit, rather than in public school, reflects a good-faith effort to find an 

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page20 of 21
14-3078-cv

T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

21

1 appropriate placement for their daughter, not just a mere preference for a 

2 private school environment. 

3 Nor are we persuaded that Plaintiffs engaged in any form of 

4 misconduct merely by making a precautionary private school deposit prior to 

5 the meeting with public school officials during which the IEP was developed. 

6 Summit required Plaintiffs to put down a deposit long before that meeting,

7 and waiting would have imperiled their ability to secure a spot for L.K in the 

8 event that their concerns about bullying remained unaddressed. Moreover, 

9 we agree with the District Court that, to the extent that Plaintiffs had an 

10 adversarial relationship with school officials, the IHO and SRO overlooked 

11 the fact that the same officials shared responsibility for that relationship by 

12 ignoring or rebuffing the parents’ repeated attempts “to raise their concerns 

13 about bullying with teachers and administrators.” 

14 CONCLUSION

15 To summarize, we hold that the Department denied L.K. a FAPE, that 

16 Summit was an appropriate placement, and that the balance of equities favors 

17 reimbursement. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

18 District Court.

Case 14-3078, Document 108-1, 01/20/2016, 1687175, Page21 of 21