Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02730/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02730-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

December 6, 1990 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 88-2730; Clemmons v. Bohanon 

(D.C. 87-3219) 

Attached are corrected pages 18 and 19 to the opinion 

authored by Judge Seymour, filed on October 9, 1990. 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

by: ~~fuL Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 88-2730 Document: 01019297861 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 1 
The cases cited above applying and enforcing this principle in 

manifold factual contexts speak for themselves. 

The dissent interprets the Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes 

to proscribe as unconstitutional only those health hazards which 

already have resulted in injury or adverse symptoms, apparently 

regardless of how severe the potential harm may be or how imminent 

the danger from exposure to the risk. See Dissent at 3-4. The 

dissent points to nothing in Rhodes to support its narrow, rigid, 

and somewhat draconian interpretation of that case. The majority 

opinion in Rhodes does not even intimate that an Eighth Amendment 

plaintiff is required to allege that the unreasonable risk to 

health complained of has actually come to fruition before a court 

may intervene. If anything, the Court's analysis points in the 

opposite direction. The facts in Rhodes disclosed that the 

prisoners had air conditioning and radios in their cells, and had 

open access from 5:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. to dayrooms with 

television and card tables which the district court had described 

as "'in a sense part of the cells and ... designed to furnish 

that type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen 

would seek in his living room or den.'" 452 U.S. at 341. Those 

prisoners not on restriction, or about 75% of the total, could 

choose to spend most of the day outside their cells in school, the 

workshop, the library, at meals, or in the dayroom. Id. It was 

on these facts that the Court held double-celling to be 

constitutional. The majority emphasized that "[t]he double 

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celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison 

population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical 

care, or sanitation." Id. at 348. Had the majority adopted the 

approach suggested by the dissent, it more appropriately would 

have stated that double celling did not result in inmate 

starvation, death or severe injury from lack of medical care, or 

infection and illness from unsanitary conditions. The Court 

purposely left the applicable standard broadly worded, see supra 

at 7-8, precisely because the types of punishments potentially 

violative of the Eighth Amendment admit no definitive 

categorization. We do not believe Rhodes requires prisoners to be 

diagnosed with cancer before their rights become ripe under the 

Eighth Amendment. 

In addition to the scientific evidence that tends to 

establish the significant health threat of ETS exposure, there has 

been increasing recognition outside the scientific community of 

the hazards of tobacco smoke. For example, as of 1987, forty-six 

states and the District of Columbia had passed legislation 

restricting smoking to protect nonsmokers from even voluntary 

exposure to ETS. See Note, An Overview of Current Tobacco 

Litigation and Legislation, 8 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 133, 172 & 

175-82 (Appendix A) (1987). An example of such legislation is a 

Kansas statute that forbids smoking in public places or in public 

meetings, except in designated smoking areas. Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 

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.. 

PUBLISH 

Fl LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

'fenth Circuit 

OCT .. 9 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

EDWARD LEE CLEMMONS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DALE BOHANNON, ROBERT TANSY, 

HERB MASCHNER, and ROBERT MILLS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 88-2730 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 87-3219) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Edward Lee Clemmons, pro se. 

Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General (Carol R. Bonebrake, Assistant 

Attorney General, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2730 Document: 01019297861 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 4 
Pro se plaintiff Edward Lee Clemmons, an inmate at the Kansas 

State Penitentiary, sued officials of the Kansas Department of 

Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), alleging violations of 

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments arising out of his 

involuntary subjection to environmental tobacco smoke. He also 

contends that defendants imposed disciplinary segregation in 

retaliation for asserting his alleged rights. The district court 

granted summary judgment for defendants, and Clemmons appeals. We 

reverse, concluding that defendants' policy of permitting the 

indefinite double-celling of smokers with nonsmokers against their 

expressed will can amount to deliberate indifference to the health 

of nonsmoking inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 We remand these 

claims for further consideration. We otherwise affirm the 

district court's grant of summary judgment. 2 

I. 

Clemmons is a Muslim inmate at the Kansas State Penitentiary 

in Lansing, Kansas. He has been double-celled with another inmate 

1 After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 Clemmons raised a First Amendment claim below which he does 

not reassert on appeal. Consequently, we will not consider it 

here. See United States v. Spector, 343 u.s. 169, 172 (1952). 

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• 

in a cell originally designed for one prisoner, apparently since 

his admission to the penitentiary, due to overcrowding in existing 

prison facilities. Although Clemmons is a nonsmoker for both 

religious and health reasons, he has been forced to share a cell 

with smoking inmates at the discretion of the Department of 

Corrections. Clemmons contends that his subjection to smoking 

cellmates in a sixty-three square foot cell has led to significant 

involuntary exposure to "passive," "secondary," or "environmental 

tobacco smoke" (ETS), amounting to deliberate indifference to his 

health in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and of his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to substantive due process. 

In response to Clemmons' complaint, the district court 

ordered defendants to prepare a Martinez report. See Martinez v. 

Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (lOth Cir. 1978)(en banc)(per curiam). 

Defendants did so, attaching doctors' examination reports showing 

no symptoms of shortness of breath or pneumonia after Clemmons' 

complaints of irritation due to cigarette smoke. Defendants then 

filed a motion for summary judgment. Clemmons' response to the 

motion included affidavits from smoking and nonsmoking prisoners, 

as well as exhibits showing his various requests for nonsmoking 

cellmates, defendants' responses to his requests, and 

documentation of the health hazards of ETS. The district court 

granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that 

Clemmons had failed to raise a cognizable claim. The court held 

that Clemmons' involuntary exposure to ETS resulting from 

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double-celling a nonsmoker with a smoker was a mere "inconvenience" with no constitutional significance. The court also 

granted Eleventh Amendment immunity from Clemmons' requests for 

compensatory and punitive damages to all defendants in their 

official capacities, and granted them qualified immunity in their 

individual capacities. Finally, the court dismissed Clemmons' 

claim of retaliation as frivolous. On appeal, Clemmons contends 

that the district court erred in dismissing his Eighth Amendment, 

Fourteenth Amendment, and retaliation claims, but he does not urge 

as error the district court's conclusion that defendants are 

immune from liability for damages. 

II. 

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must determine 

whether any genuine issue of material fact pertinent to the ruling 

remains and, if not, whether the substantive law was correctly 

applied. See Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (lOth Cir. 

1986). In deciding the constitutional claims in this case, the 

district court appears to have accepted the facts as shown in 

Clemmons' exhibits and affidavits, concluding that Clemmons raised 

no fact issues pertinent to a constitutional claim. In reviewing 

this decision, we must construe all pleadings and documentary 

evidence liberally in favor of the party opposing the motion. Id. 

This standard is particularly apt when the nonmoving party is a 

prose prisoner. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) 

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• 

(pro se complaint "can only be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim if it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 

relief'") (citations omitted); see also Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 

1512, 1526 (lOth Cir. 1988). We then review de novo the questions 

of law presented by the facts so construed. 

When viewed in this light, the record shows that Clemmons 

alleged that ETS is "harmful" and "hazardous to health." 

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion, rec., vol. I, doc. 

22, at 4; id. at ex. 4 (letter from Clemmons to Herb Maschner 

dated May 7, 1987). Clemmons also somewhat awkwardly attempted to 

produce evidence that ETS is a positive health hazard. See id. at 

ex. 6 (flyer from American Lung Association of Kansas and 

newspaper article concerning danger of cancer from secondhand 

smoke); see also id. ex. 5 at 3 (letters from prison physician and 

his assistant recommending that Clemmons "should reside in a cell 

with a nonsmoker, if possible"). 

Despite Clemmons' repeated complaints about his confinement 

in a small cell with a smoker, defendants have made no sustained 

effort to find him a nonsmoking cellmate. Although Clemmons has 

sometimes been celled with nonsmokers, these arrangements appear 

to have been of short duration. Defendants do not dispute that 

the vast majority of Clemmons' cellmates have been regular 

smokers. Further, it is undisputed that Clemmons could be forced 

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• 

to cell with a smoker indefinitely, in the discretion of the 

Department of Corrections, for no stated reason. 

Clemmons, in a multitude of written requests and letters to 

corrections officials, has repeatedly requested either a single 

cell or a nonsmoking cellmate. His single-cell requests were 

denied because of lack of space. The responses to his requests 

for a nonsmoking cellmate were more varied. On one occasion, his 

request was approved but he was thereafter assigned with a smoker. 

On other occasions, he was told his request would "be considered." 

See rec., val. I, doc. 22, ex. 4, at 1. In response to yet other 

requests, he was told that since prison officials had "no way of 

knowing who smokes or doesn't," id. at 7, he should "find a 

nonsmoker and let [them] know," see id. at 4. On some occasions, 

Clemmons would reply that he was unable to find such a person, 

while at other times he would submit a list of nonsmoking inmates. 

Neither reply appears to have made a difference. 

When Clemmons asked at one point to remain cellmates with a 

nonsmoker because they "desire[d] to protect [their] health from 

exposure to tobacco smoke in [their] cell breathing space where 

[they] live," id. at 9, his request was denied for unexplained 

reasons. Id. Clemmons attached the letters cited above from the 

prison physician and from his assistant to yet another written 

request for a nonsmoking cellmate. He was told that if he found 

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an "appropriate" nonsmoker, they could be moved together. The 

upshot of this exchange is not evident in the record. 

Defendants' position below and on appeal is that the prison's 

treatment of Clemmons did not constitute deliberate indifference 

within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, nor a violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants continue to maintain that 

Clemmons' retaliation claim is frivolous. 

III. 

A. The Eighth Amendment Claim 

The applicable modern Eighth Amendment principles are now 

familiar. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause proscribes 

punishments "which, although not physically barbarous, 'involve 

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'; or are grossly 

disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Among 'unnecessary 

and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are 'totally 

without penological justification.'" Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 

337, 346 (1981)(citations omitted). A prisoner's conditions of 

confinement may constitute punishment prohibited by the Eighth 

Amendment unless such conditions are "'part of the penalty that 

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 u.s. 312, 319 (1986) (quoting Rhodes, 452 

u.s. at 347). Any Eighth Amendment analysis of whether prison 

conditions are cruel and unusual punishment "must draw its meaning 

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from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 

maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86, 101 (1958) 

(plurality opinion); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 

2687, 2691 (1988) (plurality opinion); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. 

Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989). To avoid the imposition of a judge's 

subjective views, these evolving standards of decency must be 

informed by "objective factors to the maximum possible extent." 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted). We are also mindful 

that judicial responses to conditions of confinement claims must 

spring from constitutional requirements "'rather than a court's 

idea of how best to operate a detention facility.'" Id. at 351 

(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 539 (1979)). 

Applying these principles to particular cases involves 

self-restraint. This reticence to interfere in prison 

administration is tempered by the recognition that "judicial 

intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates -- not to 

mention considerations of basic humanity -- are to be observed in 

the prisons." Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also 

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 405 (1974) ("a policy of 

judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance 

of valid constitutional claims"); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 

388, 392 (lOth Cir. 1977) (same). In attempting to maintain this 

balance in particular cases, we first look to the principles 

already well established in the Supreme Court and lower court 

cases in the conditions-of-confinement area. 

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In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court 

first held that prison officials' deliberate indifference to an 

inmate's serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678, 687 (1978), the 

Court affirmed a district court's holding that denial of an 

inmate's basic human needs is "cruel and unusual." These 

decisions arise from an essential fact of prison life: the 

prisoner depends totally on the state to secure those necessities 

fundamental to his or her very existence. An incarcerated person 

loses more than freedom. The prisoner must depend on the state to 

make the most basic decisions vital to his or her health and 

safety. The Eighth Amendment, as now construed, requires that the 

state act humanely in making these decisions on its wards' behalf. 

See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 ("'[i]t is but just that the public 

be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the 

deprivation of his liberty, care for himself'") (quoting Spicer v. 

Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490 (1926)). See also Battle, 564 F.2d 

at 395 ("Persons are sent to prison as punishment, not for 

punishment" ) . 

Courts have applied this general principle in a variety of 

situations relating to the maintenance of an inmate's physical 

well being. See, ~' Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 600 (7th 

Cir. 1986) (prolonged restriction on exercise that threatens an 

inmate's physical health); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 

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783-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (lack of adequate ventilation and air flow, 

inadequate cell-cleaning supplies, vermin infestation, poor 

lighting); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir.)(en 

bane) (gross overcrowding, filthy mattresses, extreme heat, poor 

diet, lack of exercise), cert. dismissed, 453 u.s. 950 (1981), 

overruled in part on other grounds, International Woodworkers v. 

Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1175 (5th Cir. 1986); Ruiz v. 

Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1152 (5th Cir. 1982)(inadequate regular 

exercise), vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266, cert. 

denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 

199-200 (9th Cir. 1979) (denial of regular outdoor exercise for 

period of years); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 751 n.12 (5th 

Cir. 1977)(deprivation of exercise). These decisions all reflect 

the same well-settled principle: the state is under a 

constitutional mandate to take reasonable steps to provide a safe 

and sanitary environment for those incarcerated. See generally 

J. Gobert & N. Cohen, Rights of Prisoners §§ 11.10, 11.14-.15, 

11.17 (1981 & 1989 Cum. Supp); cf. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 

568 (lOth Cir. 1980) (state must provide inmate with a "'healthy 

habilitative environment'")(quoting Battle, 564 F.2d at 395), 

cert. denied, 450 u.s. 1041 (1981). 

Although an issue of first impression in this circuit, courts 

elsewhere have been divided on whether involuntary exposure to ETS 

in one's cell implicates this same principle. In Avery v. Powell, 

695 F. Supp. 632, 639-40 (D.N.H. 1988), the district court held 

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that it was possible for a prisoner to state an Eighth Amendment 

claim by showing that constant involuntary exposure to ETS 

endangered his physical health. The court cited the 1986 Surgeon 

General's Report and echoed that report's conclusion that 

"involuntary smoking is a cause of disease, including lung cancer, 

in healthy nonsmokers," and that "the simple separation of smokers 

and nonsmokers within the same air space may reduce, but does not 

eliminate, the exposure of nonsmokers to environmental tobacco 

smoke." Id. at 637-38; see also 1986 Surgeon General Report, "The 

Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking," U.S. Dep't of Health 

and Human Services, Public Health Service (1986)(hereinafter "1986 

Report"). The court also referred to federal regulations and laws 

in forty-five states and the District of Columbia, a significant 

portion of which regulated tobacco use to restrict exposure to 

ETS. Avery, 695 F. Supp. at 640. The court went on to 

"extrapolat[e] from legislative enactments a finding that the 

exposure to ETS violates society's standards of decency," and 

concluded that "those objective factors, buttressed by significant 

scientific authority, indicate that tobacco smoke may be a harmful 

and possibly lethal indoor pollutant." Id. 

In Gorman v. Moody, 710 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1989), 

another district court held that exposure to ETS does not 

implicate the Eighth Amendment because "society cannot yet 

completely agree on the propriety of nonsmoking areas." Id. at 

1262 (emphasis added). Significantly, the plaintiff there had 

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been released from prison in early 1985, and was thus limited to 

damages occurring prior to that time. We do not disagree with the 

outcome in Gorman because the Surgeon General did not issue his 

report on the hazards of ETS until 1986. The court took care to 

note that "the effects of second-hand smoke have just recently 

become known. • • • [T]here may come a time when the 'evolving 

standards of decency that mark the progress of society' demand a 

smoke-free environment in a prison setting." Id. 

The Fifth Circuit in Wilson v. Lynauqh, 878 F.2d 846 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 417 (1989), affirmed a district 

court's denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a prisoner 

suit alleging that exposure to ETS violates the Eighth Amendment. 

See 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d) (1982). The prisoner in Wilson had filed 

a similar suit in 1980, and the district court had ruled against 

him on a summary judgment motion. In holding that the application 

of res judicata rendered the prisoner's suit duplicative, the 

court concluded that the recent discoveries of the harmful effects 

of ETS in the 1986 Surgeon General's report were not "'significant 

facts creating new legal conditions'" which would allow 

relitigation of the claim. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 851 (citation 

omitted). The court emphasized that its decision affirming the 

section 1915(d) dismissal was not on the merits and that it 

"should not be construed as foreclosing in perpetuity the ability 

of prisoners ... to litigate their ETS claims." Id. at 851-52. 

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Finally, the court in Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F. Supp. 4, 6 

(D.D.C. 1990), stated that "contemporary society has yet to view 

exposure to secondhand smoke as transgressing its 'broad and 

idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and 

decency.'" 729 F. Supp. at 6 (quoting Estelle, 429 u.s. at 102). 

However, in that case the prison had established a nonsmoking/ 

smoking policy in an effort to accommodate both smoking and 

nonsmoking prisoners. Certain common areas were designated 

nonsmoking, the dining hall had a nonsmoking area, prisoners 

determined whether offices and other work areas would be smoking 

or nonsmoking, and two of the prison's housing units were 

designated as nonsmoking. The plaintiff complained that smoke was 

drifting over to his cell from nearby smoking cells, and that he 

was being exposed to passive smoke while he was transported among 

various prison facilities. It was in that context that the court 

said it could "not find that the Director's failure to constantly 

segregate smokers from nonsmokers constitutes 'cruel and unusual 

punishment' and it certainly cannot find that plaintiff's 

occasional exposure to smoke drifting over from designated 

'smoking' areas violates the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 6-7 

(emphasis added). 

The dispute among these courts has centered on the necessary 

extent of public recognition that long-term exposure to ETS in 

close quarters is potentially damaging to one's health, and how 

much this recognition must percolate throughout our social 

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institutions and become manifest in legislative enactments before 

a court may invoke the "evolving standards of decency that mark 

the progress of a maturing society." Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. We 

believe this type of inquiry is unnecessary. The extensive line 

of cases recognizing a prisoner's constitutional right to a 

"healthy habilitative environment," Ramos, 639 F.2d at 570, 

reflects a longstanding judicial recognition that exposing a 

prisoner to an unreasonable risk of a debilitating or terminal 

disease does indeed offend these "evolving standards of decency." 

It is the precise circumstance creating the unreasonable risk 

which resists definition, as borne out by the variety of factual 

circumstances which courts have concluded can amount to an 

unreasonable risk to a prisoner's health. See cases cited supra, 

at 9-10; see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 

1985) (inadequate diet, unsanitary physical conditions, denial of 

personal hygiene items and lack of opportunity to exercise); 

Ramos, 639 F.2d at 567-72 (extremely small cell size, inadequate 

ventilation, unsanitary kitchen conditions); Campbell v. Cauthron, 

623 F.2d 503, 507-09 (8th Cir. 1980) (lack of exercise and 

inadequate diet); Riddick v. Bass, 586 F. Supp. 881, 883 (E.D. Va. 

1984) (denial of low sodium diet); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. 

Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977) (unsanitary kitchen facilities); 3 

3 Significantly, none of the cases cited above concerning 

unreasonable risks to health embarked on an analysis of the extent 

to which the specific risk at issue had been recognized as such by 

the public. Why the specific risk presented by exposure to ETS 

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see generally Gobert & Cohen, Rights of Prisoners §§ 11.10, 

11.14-.15, 11.17 (and cases cited therein). Moreover, as 

scientific awareness of potential harms evolves, some risks 

previously thought innocuous may rise to constitutional 

significance, while other risks, previously thought unacceptable, 

may no longer require judicial intervention. The constitutional 

standard--unreasonable risks to health--remains relatively 

constant, while the types of risks implicating the standard may 

change as our medical and scientific knowledge evolves. 

The relevant question in this case, therefore, is whether 

long-term exposure to ETS poses an unreasonable risk of harm to an 

inmate's health. It is not our task on appeal to answer what is 

in large part a factual question. Rather, we are asked only to 

review the correctness of the district court's conclusion that it 

is beyond doubt that Clemmons can prove no set of facts in support 

of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See rec., vol. I, 

doc. 23, at 5; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The district 

court concluded, in spite of evidence of the Surgeon General's 

1986 Report, 4 that such exposure was a mere "inconvenience." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 23, at 4. We cannot agree that the record 

below, as supplemented by evidence of which we have taken judicial 

should be treated differently escapes us. 

4 See rec., vol. I, doc. 22, pl. ex. 6, at 2, where references 

were made to the Surgeon General's studies concerning exposure to 

ETS. 

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' . notice, 5 justified this factual conclusion under the Estelle 

standard and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To the contrary, the mounting 

scientific evidence of the potentially lethal effects of long-term 

exposure to tobacco smoke, 6 raises a genuine fact issue whether 

the type of exposure potentially faced by a nonsmoking prisoner 

double-celled with a smoker constitutes a health hazard at least 

as significant as denial of exercise. See, ~, Spain v. 

Procunier, 600 F.2d at 199-200. As the Surgeon General has 

5 See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court may take judicial notice of 

adjudicative facts in absence of request of party at any stage of 

the proceeding). In this case, for purposes of determining 

whether Clemmons raises fact issues sufficient to survive summary 

judgment, we have taken judicial notice of federal statutes and 

regulations, state statutes, government reports, municipal 

ordinances, and the Surgeon General's reports referred to or 

incorporated into the Congressional Record. Although much of this 

information was not noticed by the district court, appellate 

courts may notice facts not noticed below. See Advisory 

Committee's Notes to Fed. R. Evid. 20l(f); Melton v. Oklahoma 

City, 879 F.2d 706, 724 (lOth Cir. 1989) (judicial notice taken by 

appellate court of city charter) reh'g granted on other grounds, 

888 F.2d 724 (1989); Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 F.2d 808, 

812 (lOth Cir. 1946) (appellate court has discretion to take 

judicial notice of facts not called to the attention of the trial 

court); E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence§ 333 (3d ed. 1984). We 

may take notice of declarations in federal statutes, see United 

States v. Van Buren, 513 F.2d 1327, 1328 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 421 u.s. 1002 (1975); state statutes, see United States v. 

One (1) 1975 Thunderbird, 576 F.2d 834, 836 (lOth Cir. 1978); 

municipal ordinances, see Melton, 879 F.2d at 724 n.25; official 

government publications, see Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 535 

(lOth Cir. 1979); and agency rules and regulations,~ Ray v. 

Aztec Well Serv. Co., 748 F.2d 888, 889 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

6 The most comprehensive source of scientific evidence 

concerning the harmful effects of ETS is the 1986 Report. A later 

Surgeon General's report in 1988 determined that nicotine, the 

principal pharmacological agent in tobacco smoke, is a powerfully 

addicting drug. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Human Servs., 

The Health Consequences of Smoking Nicotine Addiction, A Report of 

the Surgeon General at iv (1988). 

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emphasized: 

"[T]he time for delay is past; measures to protect the 

public health are required now. The scientific case 

against involuntary smoking as a health risk is more 

than sufficient to justify appropriate remedial action, 

and the goal of any remedial action must be to protect 

the nonsmoker from environmental tobacco smoke." 

1986 Report at xii (emphasis added). 

Hesitation in recognizing the health hazards of ETS would not 

comport with the Eighth Amendment standard set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Trop, or with our decisions in Ramos and Battle 

mandating judicial action when an inmate's right to a "healthy 

habilitative environment" is violated. 7 No one can seriously 

dispute that our society as a whole ceased decades ago to tolerate 

prison conditions threatening the health and safety of inmates. 

7 If the Eighth Amendment demands that courts not hesitate to 

recognize health hazards, it also requires that we not hesitate to 

recognize situations in which severe latent harm is a likely 

result of an ignored prison condition. The court in Gorman v. 

Moody, 710 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (N.D. Ind. 1989), for example, 

distinguished Franklin v. Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 

1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981), where the court held that a prisoner 

plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of exposure 

to ETS. In Franklin, the plaintiff alleged that the smoke 

exacerbated his throat tumor. The Gorman court emphasized that 

the existence of a "previously diagnosed serious medical 

condition" set the Franklin case apart. Gorman, 710 F. Supp. at 

1262. 

While we agree with Gorman that the plaintiff in Franklin had 

a more urgent need for safe air, we nevertheless believe the 

Constitution does not require waiting until the prisioner actually 

develops a serious medical condition -- be it lung cancer or 

another disease -- before affording relief from exposure to a 

known carcinogen. 

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. . The cases cited above applying and enforcing this principle in 

manifold factual contexts speak for themselves. 

The dissent interprets the Supreme Court's decision in 

Rhoades to proscribe as unconstitutional only those health hazards 

which already have resulted in injury or adverse symptoms, 

apparently regardless of how severe the potential harm may be or 

how imminent the danger from exposure to the risk. See Dissent at 

3-4. The dissent points to nothing in Rhoades to support its 

narrow, rigid, and somewhat draconian interpretation of that case. 

The majority opinion in Rhoades does not even intimate that an 

Eighth Amendment plaintiff is required to allege that the 

unreasonable risk to health complained of has actually come to 

fruition before a court may intervene. If anything, the Court's 

analysis points in the opposite direction. The facts in Rhoades 

disclosed that the prisoners had air conditioning and radios in 

their cells, and had open access from 5:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. to 

dayrooms with television and card tables which the district court 

had described as "'in a sense part of the cells and •.• designed 

to furnish that type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary 

citizen would seek in his living room or den.'" 452 U.S. at 341. 

Those prisoners not on restriction, or about 75% of the total, 

could choose to spend most of the day outside their cells in 

school, the workshop, the library, at meals, or in the dayroom. 

Id. It was on these facts that the Court held double-celling to 

be constitutional. The majority emphasized that "[t]he double 

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. . celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison 

population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical 

care, or sanitation." Id. at 348. Had the majority adopted the 

approach suggested by the dissent, it more appropriately would 

have stated that double celling did not result in inmate 

starvation, death or severe injury from lack of medical care, or 

infection and illness from unsanitary conditions. The Court 

purposely left the applicable standard broadly worded, see supra 

at 7-8, precisely because the types of punishments potentially 

violative of the Eighth Amendment admit no definitive 

categorization. We do not believe Rhoades requires prisoners to 

be diagnosed with cancer before their rights become ripe under the 

Eighth Amendment. 

In addition to the scientific evidence that tends to 

establish the significant health threat of ETS exposure, there has 

been increasing recognition outside the scientific community of 

the hazards of tobacco smoke. For example, as of 1987, forty-six 

states and the District of Columbia had passed legislation 

restricting smoking to protect nonsmokers from even voluntary 

exposure to ETS. See Note, An Overview of Current Tobacco 

Litigation and Legislation, 8 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 133, 172 & 

175-82 (Appendix A) (1987). An example of such legislation is a 

Kansas statute that forbids smoking in public places or in public 

meetings, except in designated smoking areas. Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 

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.. ' 

21-4009 to 21-4010 (1988). The statute explicitly recognizes the 

interest of nonsmokers in avoiding the toxic effects of ETS: 

"Where smoking areas are designated, existing physical 

barriers and ventilation systems should be used to 

minimize the toxic effect of smoke in adjacent 

nonsmoking areas." 

Id. § 21-4010(c) (emphasis added). 

The New Mexico State Legislature similarly acknowledged the 

health hazards of ETS in enacting the Clean Indoor Air Act: 

"The Legislature finds and decrees that the smoking of 

tobacco . . . is a positive danger to health and a 

health hazard to those who are present in enclosed 

places . . " 

N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 24-16-2 (1985) (emphasis added). Many other 

states have made explicit their awareness and concern for the 

health of nonsmokers subjected to ETS. 8 

8 State legislation enacted in response to the health hazards 

of ETS is widespread. California, for example, eliminated smoking 

on public transportation vehicles, see Cal. Health & Safety Code § 

25948 (West Supp. 1990), in direct response to the 1986 Surgeon 

General's report. After concluding that exposure to ETS is a 

positive health hazard, the legislature declared that 

"[n]onsmokers have no adequate means to protect themselves from 

the damage inflicted upon them when they involuntarily inhale 

tobacco smoke." Id. at§ 25948(b)(1) See also Cal. Health & 

Safety Code§ 25940.5 (West 1984) ("The Legislature finds and 

declares that tobacco smoke is a hazard to the health of the 

general public."). 

Maine limits smoking in shopping centers to designated areas 

"[i]n order to protect the public from detrimental effects of 

smoking by others" Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1672-A(1) (1989 

Supp.). Arizona has declared that "[s]moking tobacco in any form 

is . . . dangerous to public health if done in any . . . 

[e]levator, indoor theater, [or other enclosed places]. Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 36-601.01 (1986). New Jersey prohibits smoking 

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. , 

Congress and federal agencies 9 also have responded to the 

recent scientific recognition that ETS exposure may pose a 

in various enclosed areas in recognition of the fact that tobacco 

smoke is "at least an annoyance and a nuisance to a substantial 

percentage of the nonsmoking public, and ... a substantial 

health hazard to a smaller segment of the nonsmoking public." 

N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 26:30-38 (West 1987). Oregon law states: "the 

people of Oregon find that . . . the smoking of tobacco creates a 

health hazard to those present in confined places." Or. Rev. 

Stat. § 433.840 (1989) (emphasis added). Rhode Island recognizes 

the "toxic effect" of tobacco smoke to those who are present in 

confined places in requiring an employer to accommodate nonsmokers 

in the workplace. See R.I. Gen. Laws§ 23-20.7-3(a) (1989). Utah 

also recognizes that exposure to tobacco smoke is toxic and a 

potential health hazard. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-106 (1989). 

The State of Washington has declared: 

"The legislature recognizes the increasing evidence that 

tobacco smoke in closely confined places may create a 

danger to the health of some citizens of this state. In 

order to protect the health and welfare of those 

citizens, it is necessary to prohibit smoking in public 

places except in areas designated as smoking areas." 

Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 70.160.010 (1989 Supp.) (emphasis added). 

The above sampling of state laws is by no means exhaustive. 

For similar legislative pronouncements, see Alaska Stat. 

§ 18.35.300 (1986); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 20-27-701 (1987); Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 25-14-101 (1989); Fla. Stat. §§ 386.201-386.209 (1986); 

Idaho Code§ 39-5501 (1985); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 144.411-144.417 

(West 1982); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-40-101-09 (1987); Neb. Rev. 

Stat. §§ 71-5701-13 (1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 155:50 (1989 

Supp.). For a description of legislation in numerous other states 

at least partially aimed at protecting nonsmokers from the hazards 

of ETS, see Note, Smoking In Public: Nonsmokers' Rights and the 

Proposed Iowa Clean Indoor Air Act, 37 Drake L. Rev. 483 (1987-

88); Note, An Overview of Current Tobacco Litigation and 

Legislation, 8 u. Bridgeport L. Rev. 133 (1987). 

9 See 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.105-3(a) (1989) (regulating smoking in 

Government Services Administration controlled buildings). The 

regulation states: "In recognition of the increased health 

hazards of passive smoke on the non-smoker, smoking is to be held 

to an absolute minimum in areas where there are non-smokers." Id. 

at§ 101-20.105-3(a)(1). See also 14 C.F.R. § 252.1-.7 (1989) --

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. . 

• 

substantial health hazard. For example, Congress recently amended 

a statute temporarily banning smoking on airline flights of two 

hours or less to impose a permanent prohibition against smoking on 

all domestic airline flights in the contiguous United States 

regardless of duration, and a ban on all flights of six hours or 

less when to or from Alaska or Hawaii. See Department of 

Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. 

L. No. 101-164, Tit. III, § 335, 103 Stat. 1069, 1098-99 (1989) 

(codified as amended at 49 u.s.c.A. § 1374(d)(1)(A) (1990 

Supp.)). 1° Finally, municipal ordinances have been enacted to 

fill voids left by federal and state legislation. See, ~, 

McCarthy v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 759 P.2d 351, 

355 (Wash. 1988)(en bane) (discussing local ordinances in State of 

Washington). 

(regulating smoking aboard aircraft and requiring proper 

ventilation). 

10 Senate statements upon introduction of the bill to ban 

smoking on airline flights referred to new studies reaffirming the 

health hazards of exposure to ETS in enclosed places. Incorporated into the Congressional Record was a National Cancer 

Institute Statement, u.s. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Feb. 8, 

1989, reprinted at 135 Cong. Rec. S2258 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1989) 

(statement of Sen. Lautenberg) which showed: "Some passengers in 

the nonsmoking section were exposed to nicotine levels comparable 

to levels experienced by passengers in the smoking section of the 

aircraft." See also 135 Cong. Rec. S10862 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 

1989) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (referring to February 10, 

1989, study published in Journal of the American Medical 

Association alluding to Surgeon General's conclusion that "as many 

as 5,000 nonsmokers die each year from [i]nhaling the smoke of 

others"). 

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• . . 

• 

In the face of the health risks of ETS, confirmed by the 

widespread recognition of the hazards, we conclude that Clemmons' 

involuntary exposure to ETS in an eight-foot cell raises a triable 

issue of fact as to whether such exposure creates an unreasonable 

risk to health. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and 

hold that Clemmons has raised a genuine fact issue on whether 

arbitrary exposure to ETS constitutes deliberate indifference to 

his long-term health and physical well being. On remand, the 

court must permit Clemmons to present evidence relevant to whether 

his exposure to ETS in his cell and elsewhere constitutes an 

bl . k f . d' 1 . . 11 unreasona e r~s o ser~ous me ~ca ~nJury. Because this case 

raises substantial and complex factual and legal issues of broad 

significance which may be beyond the capacity of a pro se prisoner 

to develop, on remand the trial court should consider whether to 

appoint counsel for Clemmons. See 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d) (1982); 

Blankenship v. Meachum, 840 F.2d 741, 743 (lOth Cir. 1988)(per 

curiam) (district court has discretion to appoint counsel in civil 

cases); Abdul-Wadood v. Duckworth, 860 F.2d 280, 288 (7th Cir. 

1988) (discussing factors trial court should consider in 

11 Notwithstanding the ever-increasing amount of current 

evidence of the effects of ETS, coupled with the rapidly evolving 

changes in state and federal law to protect citizens from ETS, the 

dissent states that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

regarding whether defendants' failure to provide Clemmons a 

non-smoking cellmate constitutes deliberate indifference to a 

serious health and safety risk. We believe sufficient evidence 

exists of a serious and unreasonable risk to health from ETS to 

raise a fact issue. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2730 Document: 01019297861 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 26 
' ' appointment of counsel determination); Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 

885, 887-89 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 

B. The Due Process Claim 

Clemmons also argues that his involuntary exposure to ETS 

violates his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Although the exact nature of his due process claim is not 

altogether clear, the district court apparently perceived 

Clemmons' due process argument as foreclosed by his failure to 

state an Eighth Amendment claim. 

We have recognized that the Eighth Amendment and the Due 

Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments operate in 

tandem to protect the physical well-being of prisoners. In Harris 

ex rel. Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (lOth Cir. 1988), we 

stated: 

"Where one's very right to life is at stake, and where 

prison officials control the conditions of confinement, 

thereby reducing the prisoner's ability to protect 

himself, it takes no great acumen to determine that, 

constitutionally, prison officials may not exercise 

their responsibility with wanton or obdurate disregard 

for or deliberate indifference to the preservation of 

the life in their care. . . . The same is true under 

the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. • • . We 

conclude that wanton or obdurate disregard of or 

deliberate indifference to the prisoner's right to life 

as a condition of confinement is a substantive 

constitutional deprivation whether it falls under the 

due process clause or the Eighth Amendment." 

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' . The question remains whether the substantive due process 

clause affords prisoners protection distinct from the Eighth 

Amendment. The Supreme Court has noted that the protections 

overlap, at least where the claim is one of excessive force: 

"We think the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically 

concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source 

of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in 

cases such as this one, where the deliberate use of 

force is challenged as excessive and unjustified. It 

would indeed be surprising if, in the context of 

forceful prison security measures, 'conduct that shocks 

the conscience' ... and so violates the Fourteenth 

Amendment, Rochin v. California, 342 u.s. 165, 172, 72 

S. Ct. 205, 210, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), were not also 

punishment 'inconsistent with contemporary standards of 

decency' and 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind,' 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. at 103, 105 (1976), in 

violation of the Eighth. . . . [We hold] that in these 

circumstances the Due Process Clause affords respondent 

no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause." 

Whitley, 475 u.s. at 327; see also Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 

1865, 1871 n. 10 (1989) ("Any protection that 'substantive due 

process' affords convicted prisoners against excessive force 

is • . . at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth 

Amendment."). 

The present case alleges that prison authorities forced 

Clemmons to be subjected to a known carcinogen, potentially 

resulting in debilitating disease or death. We do not perceive 

any meaningful distinction for our purposes here between claims of 

excessive force and coerced exposure to health hazards. We 

therefore conclude that because the Eighth Amendment is the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2730 Document: 01019297861 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 28 
' . "'primary source of substantive protection to convicted 

prisoners,'" Clemmons' due process claim is effectively subsumed 

within his Eighth Amendment claim. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 

F.2d ___ , ___ , Nos. 86-1934, 86-2003, slip op. at 7 (lOth 

Cir. filed April 10, 1990) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). 

We are aware, of course, of our decision in Kensell v. 

Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350, 1351 (lOth Cir. 1983), where we held that 

a state's refusal to provide a smoke-free environment in a 

government workplace does not implicate an employee's 

constitutional due process rights. We reasoned that 

"the plaintiff has voluntarily accepted employment in an 

office in which he knew or should have known other 

employees smoke. Upon discovering that he is allergic 

to smoke or that it exacerbates his health problems, 

instead of quitting or transferring he seeks to force 

his employer to install a no-smoking rule in the office 

or to segregate smokers from nonsmokers." 

Id. Kensell is distinguishable, however. Here, Clemmons faces 

exposure to ETS in extremely close quarters in his prison setting. 

Unlike the plaintiff in Kensell, Clemmons has no option to quit or 

transfer. Significantly, moreover, Kensell was decided well 

before the Surgeon General published his 1986 findings concerning 

the hazards of ETS, and predates other significant government 

action taken in response to the discoveries of the harmful effects 

of ETS. Our decision in that case, therefore, is not controlling 

in the wholly different prison setting involved here. To the 

contrary, the analysis in Kensell serves to underscore Clemmons' 

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. . total dependence on the state's constitutional obligation to 

minimize exposure to serious health risks. 

C. The Retaliation Claim 

Clemmons also argues that a false and frivolous disciplinary 

report, resulting in his disciplinary segregation, was submitted 

in retaliation for filing his lawsuit and for submitting 

grievances. After reviewing the record, we agree with the 

district court that "plaintiff's claim rests on nothing more than 

unsupported speculation and should, therefore, be dismissed as 

frivolous." Rec., vol. I, doc. 23, at 9. 

IV. 

We reverse the district court's dismissal of Clemmons' Eighth 

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising from involuntary 

exposure to ETS, and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. We affirm the district court's dismissal of 

Clemmons' retaliation claim. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2730 Document: 01019297861 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 30 
' . No. 88-2730, Clemmons v. Bohannon 

TACHA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I share the majority's concern that exposure to environmental 

tobacco smoke ("ETS") is a potential health hazard. I cannot 

agree, however, that such exposure rises to the level of an eighth 

amendment violation. There is no evidence that Clemmons's health 

has been adversely affected by cigarette smoke from his cellmate. 

Moreover, society itself is struggling to balance the rights of 

smokers and nonsmokers at the present time. 

I find no basis in eighth amendment jurisprudence for forcing 

on prison officials, or conversely favoring nonsmoking prisoners 

with, a constitutionally-mandated health standard that is as yet 

not enjoyed by those persons living and working outside the prison 

walls. I find that the majority's effort to engraft a 

constitutional dimension onto this controversial societal issue 

constitutes a challenge to the basic purpose of the eighth 

amendment and the proper role of the federal judiciary. In the 

immortal words of Chief Justice Marshall, "we must never forget 

that it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch Y....!.. 

Maryland, 17 u.s. 316, 407 (1819). The majority has forgotten 

this cornerstone commandment of constitutional jurisprudence. 

I. 

The Supreme Court in Rhodes~ Chapman, 452 u.s. 337 (1981), 

clearly laid out the eighth amendment analysis governing this 

case: 

[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, 

although not physically barbarous, involve the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or are grossly 

disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Among 

Appellate Case: 88-2730 Document: 01019297861 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 31 
' . unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those 

that are totally without penological justification. 

No static test can exist by which courts determine 

whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, 

for the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the 

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 

a maturing society. . . . Eighth Amendment judgments 

should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective 

views of judges . . . [b]ut . . . should be informed by 

objective factors to the maximum possible extent . . . 

[o]bjective indicia [may be] derived from history, the 

action of state legislatures, and the sentencing by 

juries. 

452 U.S. at 346-47 (quotations, citations, and footnote omitted). 

Contrary to the majority's position, see maj. op. at note 7, 

the eighth amendment does not sweep so broadly as to include 

possible latent harm to Clemmons's health. This court has 

previously held that the "core areas" of any eighth amendment 

claim are shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, medical 

care, and adequate clothing. Ramos ~ Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 & 

n.8 (lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 u.s. 1041 (1981); see 

Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 347 (conditions of confinement in Hutto ~ 

Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), and Estelle~ Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 

(1976), violated eighth amendment because of serious deprivations 

of basic necessities of life); Inmates of Occoquan~ Barry, 844 

F.2d 828, 836-839 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("deprivations" that trigger 

eighth amendment scrutiny are deprivations of essential human 

needs-- food, shelter, health care, and personal safety). 

Clemmons's complaint that he is forced to share a cell with a 

smoker does not implicate any of these core eighth amendment 

areas, see Ramos, 639 F.2d at 566 & n.8, nor does exposure to ETS 

"deprive [Clemmons] of the minimal civilized measure of life's 

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Appellate Case: 88-2730 Document: 01019297861 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 32 
. . necessities," Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 347; Inmates of Occoquan, 844 

F.2d at 836-39. 

If Clemmons's claim colorably touches the most peripheral 

edge of a core eighth amendment area, it would be the area of 

adequate medical/health care. Clemmons's complaint of exposure to 

ETS, however, simply does not rise to the level of "deliberate 

indifference" to an inmate's serious illness or injury, ~' 

Estelle~ Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (severe back pain and high 

blood pressure), nor is it comparable to the situation where 

prison conditions are so horrible that there is an immediate and 

substantial danger to the health and safety of the inmates, ~' 

Ramos, 639 F.2d 559 (substandard conditions of shelter, 

sanitation, food, personal safety, and medical care); Battle~ 

Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (lOth Cir. 1977) (191% overcrowding 

resulting in substandard living conditions). The deliberate 

indifference standard for medical care requires that the inmate's 

illness or injury be a serious one, Estelle, 429 u.s. at 104-05; 

Brown~ Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied, ---u.s. ---, 110 S. Ct. 2624 (1990), for example: four 

knife stab wounds, Reed~ Dunham, 893 F.2d 285 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

broken bones rendering .limbs useless or the plaintiff unconscious; 

Mandel ~ Doe, 888 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1989) (cracked hipball 

joint); Brown, 894 F.2d 1533 (broken foot); Simpson~ Hines, 903 

F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1990) (neck trauma), symptoms of a heart 

attack, Miltier ~ Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990) (chest 

pains, shortness of breath, dizziness), or chronic illness, White 

~Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (epilepsy); Greason~ 

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• 

Kemp, 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (schizophrenic with suicidal 

tendencies). Clemmons does not have a serious medical need; he 

has alleged no adverse physical symptoms from cigarette smoke. 

Clemmons's complaint regarding ETS is simply of a different order 

of magnitude from those cases which have found an eighth amendment 

violation due to deliberate indifference to a serious medical 

need. 

The majority's conclusion that Clemmons has introduced a 

genuine issue of material fact supporting a claim under the eighth 

amendment due to the "unreasonable risk of debilitating" effects 

from ETS is nothing short of surprising. In Rhodes, the Supreme 

Court solidly rejected the argument of Justice Marshall, who would 

have found an eighth amendment violation whenever prison 

conditions "if left unchecked, [would] cause deterioration in [the 

prisoners'] mental and physical health." Id. at 375 (Marshall, 

J., dissenting). Eight justices found that although 38 percent 

overcrowding and double-celling in fifty-five square foot cells 

were not desirable, these conditions did not "inflict unnecessary 

or wanton pain," id. at 348, were not "grossly disproportionate to 

the severity of the crimes," id., and did not rise to the level of 

an eighth amendment violation. See id. at 348-50 & n.15; id. at 

366-68 (Brennan, J., with Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring). 

In light of Rhodes, the majority's reliance on a broad reading of 

Ramos's and Battle's "healthy habilitative environment" language 

is misplaced. Accordingly, I would find that requiring Clemmons 

to share a cell with a smoker does not create a genuine issue of 

material fact implicating a core area protected by the eighth 

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• 

,• 

amendment. See Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 837-39 ("If the 

necessities are provided, then the Eighth Amendment has been 

satisfied . . . II ) 

Furthermore, the majority has not identified a genuine issue 

of material fact supporting an eighth amendment violation under 

Rhodes because it cannot point to proper objective factors 

supporting its conclusions regarding society's evolving standards 

of decency. The 1986 Surgeon General's report, u.s. Dep't of 

Health & Human Servs., The Health Consequences of Involuntary 

Smoking (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Surgeon General's report], 

heavily relied upon by the majority, does not establish a minimum 

constitutional standard; rather, it recommends a public health 

goal that society should strive to achieve, and calls for more 

research. Public health recommendations by medical experts 

even the Surgeon General -- do not constitute "contemporary 

standards of decency." When determining contemporary standards of 

decency, "of greatest importance under the Constitution is the 

public's attitude toward _g,_ given sanction or condition," Inmates 

of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 836-37 (emphasis in original). See 

Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 348 n.13 (recommendations of professional 

groups do not constitute constitutional minima; rather, they 

establish goals recommended by the organization in question); Bell 

~Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 n.27 (1979) (same); Inmates of 

Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 837 (professional standards do not serve as 

constitutional benchmarks). 

Looking to objective indicia of the general public's 

attitude, as we must, see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346-47, a review of 

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• 

,• 

the state legislation cited by the majority as forbidding or 

restricting smoking reveals that the vast majority of these laws 

are limited to public places, which are statutorily defined so as 

to exclude prisons. 1 Thus, although society's attitude as 

indicated by the objective factor of state legislation shows a 

trend toward protecting the rights of nonsmokers in public places, 

1 In roughly the order cited by the majority, see Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 21-4009 (1988) ("public place" defined as enclosed indoor 

areas open to the public or used by the general public); Cal. 

Health & Safety Code § 25949 (1990) (eliminating smoking on public 

transportation vehicles); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1672-A(1) (1989) 

(smoking in shopping centers restricted); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§ 36-601.01 (1986) (restricting smoking in certain public areas); 

id. § 36-601.02(C) (specifically exempting inmate use areas within 

state prisons from smoking restrictions); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:30-

39 (1985) ("indoor public place" defined as a structurally closed 

area generally accessible to the public which is not owned or 

leased by a governmental entity); Or. Rev. Stat. § 433.835 (1989) 

("public place" means any enclosed indoor area open to and 

frequented by the public); R.I. Gen. Laws§ 23-20.7-3 to .7-4 

(1989) (restricting smoking in the workplace); Utah Code Ann. 

§ 76-10-106 (1989) (restricting smoking in public places, schools, 

and child care centers); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.160.010 (1989) 

(restricting smoking in public places); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 20-27-

703 (1987) (restricting smoking in patient areas of medical 

facilities and on school buses); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-14-102, 

25-14-103 (1989) ("public place" defined as an enclosed indoor 

area used by the general public or serving as a place of work); 

Fla. Stat. § 386.203(1) (1986) (areas accessible to general 

public); Idaho Code§ 39-5502 (1985) ("public place" defined as 

any enclosed indoor area used by the general public); Minn. Stat. 

Ann. § 144.413 (1987) ("public place" defined as any enclosed 

indoor area used by the general public or serving as a place of 

work); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-40-103 (1987) ("enclosed public place" 

defined as any indoor area, room, or vehicle used by the general 

public or serving as a place of work); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-5704 

(1986) ("public place" defined as any enclosed area used by the 

general public or serving as a place of work); see also Richmond 

Newspapers, Inc. ~Virginia, 448 u.s. 555, 576 n.11 (1980) 

(prisons by definition are not public places). But see N.M. Stat. 

Ann. § 24-16-3(0) (1985) ("public place means any enclosed indoor 

area in a building owned or leased by the state or any of its 

political subdivisions."); Alaska Stat. § 18.35.300(3) (1986) 

(buildings owned or leased by state or political subdivision); 

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 155:45(II) (1989) ("'enclosed public 

places' means any enclosed, indoor area which is publicly owned or 

supported by tax revenues."). 

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• 

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society has expressly rejected extending these protections to 

prisons and nonsmoking prisoners. The majority paves the way for 

the constitutionalization of a public health goal for prisoners 

that the vast majority of state legislatures has expressly 

rejected. 

The fundamental error of the majority's approach lies in the 

presumption that it is the duty of the courts to spearhead 

society's evolving standard of decency. Rather, the Supreme Court 

has emphasized that it is our duty to apply society's standard 

even though the standard may be "restrictive and even harsh," 

Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 347, lest we violate the injunction that 

"Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be 

merely the subjective view" of judges, Rummel ~ Estelle, 445 u.s. 

263, 275 (1980). The Court in Rhodes specifically cautioned 

against what the majority is doing here -- that is, using the 

Constitution to reform prisons according to "a court's idea of how 

best to operate a prison facility." Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 351. 

Although it may be unpleasant for Clemmons to share a cell with a 

smoker, "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons." 

Id. at 349. Clemmons's discomfort does not violate the evolving 

minimum standards of decency that mark our society today. 

A constitutional right to a smoke-free cell would have no 

limits and it would open a Pandora's box of constitutional 

challenges for prison administrators. ETS is not contained by 

bars or even walls. The 1986 Surgeon General's report states that 

"[t]he data contained in this Report on the rapid diffusion of 

tobacco smoke throughout an enclosed environment suggests that 

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., • 

separation of smokers and nonsmokers in the same room or in 

different rooms that share the same ventilation system may reduce 

ETS exposure but will not eliminate exposure." Id. at xii. 2 If 

Clemmons is successful on remand, prison adminstrators eventually 

may be forced to house smokers and nonsmokers in separate 

facilities to eliminate the nonsmokers' exposure to ETS. I find 

no justification whatsoever for making the rights of nonsmoking 

prisoners paramount over the myriad of health and security 

concerns that prison officials must confront and balance daily. 

At worst, the majority opinion lays the groundwork for a 

constitutional burden that will be impossible for prison 

authorities to carry, given the well-documented state of our 

underfinanced and overcrowded prison systems. At best, the 

majority imposes an unwarranted and unprecedented constraint on 

the discretion of prison administrators to balance potential 

versus immediate health and safety concerns. As Judge Leon 

Higginbotham has stated, "[t]he eighth amendment does not confer 

upon this Court the authority to impose upon [prison 

2 This diffusion charactistic merely underscores the reality 

that with regard to ETS, "you can run, but you cannot hide," at 

least not unless and until all of society foregoes smoking. Thus, 

even though a nonsmoker may attempt to avoid ETS by "voluntarily" 

leaving a smoking environment, he or she cannot escape some level 

of exposure. See Kensell ~ Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (lOth Cir. 

1983). To contend that the involuntary nature of Clemmons' 

confinement distinguishes this case from the dilemma of the 

employee in Kensell ignores the fact all nonsmokers in society 

today are to some extent "involuntarily" exposed to ETS. What 

gives nonsmoking prisoners the privilege to be more insulated from 

ETS than the rest of society? Certainly not the Constitution. 

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administration] our notions of enlightened policy." Hassine ~ 

Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 1988). 

II. 

Finally, I also am troubled by the majority opinion because 

it sets up a tension between the state's reserved powers over 

public health, safety, and welfare and the concern of the federal 

courts with the constitutionally humane treatment of those 

imprisoned. We do not need to create such a tension; we need only 

decide if it is cruel and unusual punishment for a nonsmoking 

prisoner to be celled with a smoking one. I would find that it is 

not. 

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