Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01935/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01935-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1935

JENNY RUBIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,

Defendant-Appellee,

 and

FIELD MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, et al.,

Respondents-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 03 C 9370 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 23, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and REAGAN,

Chief District Judge.*

 * Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
2 No. 14-1935

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In September 1997 three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up on a crowded pedestrian 

mall in Jerusalem. Among those grievously injured were 

eight U.S. citizens who later joined with a handful of their 

close relatives to file a civil action against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the 

attackers. Iran was subject to suit as a state sponsor of terrorism under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act (“FSIA”), then codified at 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(7). A district judge in the District of Columbia 

entered a $71.5 million default judgment. Iran did not pay.

So began more than a decade of unsuccessful litigation 

across the country to attach and execute on Iranian assets in 

order to satisfy the judgment. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of 

Iran, No. Civ. A. 01-1655 (RMU), 2005 WL 670770, at *1 

(D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005), vacated, 563 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 

2008) (granting and then vacating writs of execution against 

two domestic bank accounts used by Iranian consulates); 

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 810 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D. Mass. 

2011), aff'd, 709 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting an effort to 

attach Iranian antiquities in the possession of various museums); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1003

(N.D. Ill. 2014) (same). This appeal concerns the last decision

on this list.

The plaintiffs sought to execute on four collections of ancient Persian artifacts located within the territorial jurisdiction of the Northern District of Illinois: the Persepolis Collection, the Chogha Mish Collection, and the Oriental Institute 

Collection, all in the possession of the University of Chicago; 

and the Herzfeld Collection, split between the University 

and Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History. The case

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No. 14-1935 3

was last here on some procedural issues early in the attachment proceeding. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

637 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012). It

now returns on the merits.

A foreign state’s property in the United States is immune 

from attachment and execution, see 28 U.S.C. § 1609, but 

there are a few narrow exceptions. The plaintiffs identified

three possible paths to reach the artifacts: subsections (a) and 

(g) of 28 U.S.C. § 1610, both part of the FSIA; and section 201 

of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), Pub. L. 

No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note), 

which permits holders of terrorism-related judgments to 

execute on assets that are “blocked” by executive order 

under certain international sanctions provisions. The district 

court entered judgment against the plaintiffs, finding no 

statutory basis to execute on the artifacts.

We affirm. The assets are not blocked by existing executive order, so execution under TRIA is not available. Nor 

does § 1610(a) apply. That provision permits execution on a

foreign state’s property “used for a commercial activity in 

the United States.” We read this exception to require commercial use by the foreign state itself, not a third party. Iran 

did not put the artifacts to any commercial use.

Lastly, § 1610(g) is not itself an exception to execution

immunity. Instead, it partially abrogates the so-called Bancec 

doctrine, which holds that a judgment against a foreign state

cannot be executed on property owned by its juridically 

separate instrumentality. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El 

Comercio Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”), 462 U.S. 611, 626–29 

(1983). The Bancec rule can be overcome in two ways: The 

holder of a judgment against a foreign state may execute on

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the property of its instrumentality if the sovereign and its 

instrumentality are alter egos or if adherence to the rule of 

separateness would work an injustice. Id.

Section 1610(g) lifts the Bancec rule for holders of terrorism-related judgments, allowing attachment in aid of execution “as provided in this section” without regard to the 

presumption of separateness—that is, without the requirement of establishing alter-ego status or showing an injustice. 

The phrase “as provided in this section” refers to the immunity exceptions found elsewhere in § 1610, one of which 

must apply to overcome execution immunity. So although 

subsection (g) substantially eases the enforcement process 

for terrorism victims by removing the Bancec barrier, it is not

a freestanding terrorism exception to execution immunity.

I. Background

The artifacts at issue here arrived in the United States 

over a 60-year timespan beginning in the 1930s. In 1937 Iran 

loaned the Persepolis Collection—roughly 30,000 clay tablets 

and fragments containing some of the oldest writings in the 

world—to the University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute for 

research, translation, and cataloguing. In 1945 the Field 

Museum purchased a collection of approximately 1,200 

prehistoric artifacts from Dr. Ernst Herzfeld, a German 

archaeologist active in Persia in the early 20th century (the 

Herzfeld Collection). In the 1960s Iran excavated clay seal 

impressions from the ancient Chogha Mish settlement and 

loaned them to the University’s Oriental Institute for academic study (the Chogha Mish Collection). Most items in 

this collection were returned to Iran in 1970, but the University has since located some objects previously missing from 

the collection. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Oriental Institute 

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No. 14-1935 5

received several small donations of Persian artifacts from 

Iran and other donors. These artifacts are not really a discrete collection, but the parties refer to them as the “Oriental 

Institute Collection,” so we’ll do the same.

The plaintiffs are American victims of a suicide-bomb attack carried out by Hamas in Jerusalem on September 4, 

1997, with material support from Iran. In 2003 the survivors 

and their close family members filed suit against Iran in 

federal court in the District of Columbia, proceeding under

the terrorism exception to jurisdictional sovereign immunity, 

then codified at § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA. (In January 2008 

Congress repealed § 1605(a)(7) and enacted a new terrorism 

exception to jurisdictional sovereign immunity codified at 

28 U.S.C. § 1605A. See National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 

338–44.)

The plaintiffs won a $71.5 million default judgment, see 

Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 

(D.D.C. 2003), and quickly commenced enforcement actions

around the country in an effort to collect. As relevant here, 

the plaintiffs registered the judgment in the Northern District of Illinois, initiating attachment proceedings for the 

purpose of executing on the four collections then in the 

possession of the University and the Field Museum.1 (We’ll 

refer to the University and the Field Museum collectively as 

“the Museums” unless the context requires otherwise.)

 1 The plaintiffs later converted their § 1605(a)(7) judgment to one under 

§ 1605A. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 270 F.R.D. 7, 9 & n.3 (D.D.C. 

2010).

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Significant procedural battles ensued. We resolved these 

disputes in our earlier opinion and need not repeat that

litigation history. See Rubin, 637 F.3d at 786–89. For present 

purposes it’s enough to note that the plaintiffs initially 

proposed two possible ways to overcome Iran’s execution 

immunity. First, they invoked § 1610(a), the “commercial 

activity” exception to execution immunity. Second, they 

pointed to TRIA, which permits execution on the blocked

assets of a state sponsor of terrorism (or its agency or instrumentality) to satisfy a judgment obtained under the 

terrorism exception to jurisdictional sovereign immunity.

After we sent the case back to the district court, the parties engaged in discovery on the four collections, and Iran

and the Museums moved for summary judgment. The 

district judge granted the motion. First, he rejected the 

plaintiffs’ claim that the artifacts are subject to execution 

under § 1610(a). The judge read this exception as limited to 

property used for a commercial activity by the foreign state

itself. Because Iran hadn’t used the artifacts for commercial 

activity, the judge held that § 1610(a) does not apply.

The judge also held that because the assets in question 

are not blocked—i.e., frozen—by any current executive 

order, execution under TRIA is likewise unavailable.

Finally, in their response to the summary-judgment motion, the plaintiffs identified a third possible path to reach 

the artifacts: § 1610(g), which they argued is an independent 

exception to execution immunity available to victims of 

state-sponsored terrorism. The judge rejected this argument

too, concluding that subsection (g) abrogates the Bancec rule 

for terrorism-related judgments but is not a freestanding 

terrorism exception to execution immunity.

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No. 14-1935 7

Finding no statutory basis to execute on the artifacts, the 

judge entered judgment for Iran and the Museums. The 

plaintiffs appealed, reprising all three arguments.

II. Discussion

A. Which Artifacts Remain at Issue?

Our first task is to identify which of the four collections is

even potentially subject to attachment and execution at this 

juncture. Two basic criteria apply: (1) the artifacts must be

owned by Iran, and (2) the artifacts must be within the 

territorial jurisdiction of the district court. See Republic of 

Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014) 

(“Our courts generally lack authority in the first place to 

execute against property in other countries ... .”) (citation 

omitted); see also Autotech Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. 

Corp., 499 F.3d 737, 750 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The FSIA did not 

purport to authorize execution against a foreign sovereign’s 

property, or that of its instrumentality, wherever that property is located around the world. We would need some hint 

from Congress before we felt justified in adopting such a 

breathtaking assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.”).

There’s no dispute that the Persepolis Collection is 

owned by Iran and is in the physical possession of the 

University. The three other collections, however, are outside 

the reach of this proceeding for reasons relating to their

present location or the absence of Iranian ownership.

As we’ve just explained, when the district court entered 

judgment, the University had possession of remnants of the 

Chogha Mish Collection. But intervening developments 

have placed these artifacts beyond the grasp of the federal 

courts. After filing their notice of appeal, the plaintiffs asked 

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8 No. 14-1935

us to stay the district court’s judgment pending appeal. We 

denied the motion. The State Department then informed the 

University that the United States was obligated to return the 

Chogha Mish artifacts to Iran. The University, in turn,

notified us that it would return the Chogha Mish artifacts to 

Iran within 45 days unless the court ordered otherwise. We 

did not order otherwise. So the University delivered the 

artifacts to Iran’s National Museum in Tehran and filed 

notice with the court that Iran received and accepted them. 

Accordingly, the Chogha Mish Collection is no longer within 

the territorial jurisdiction of the district court.

The Herzfeld and the Oriental Institute Collections remain within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, but they are 

not Iranian property. The plaintiffs have tried to cast doubt 

on the legitimacy of their removal from Iran, arguing that 

Dr. Herzfeld is regarded by some in the academic community as a plunderer and that the artifacts in these collections 

are covered by Iran’s National Heritage Protection Act of

1930, which gives the government of Iran an option to 

exercise control over certain antiquities unearthed in the

country. The Museums, on the other hand, maintain that 

they were bona fide purchasers or recipients of these collections; the plaintiffs have not meaningfully contested this

point.

We don’t need to resolve any questions about the provenance of the Herzfeld and Oriental Institute Collections or 

explore the circumstances under which the Museums acquired them. As the plaintiffs concede, Iran has expressly 

disclaimed any legal interest in the two collections, and the 

district judge found that no evidence supports Iranian 

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No. 14-1935 9

ownership of these artifacts. The plaintiffs have not given us

any reason to disturb this ruling, and we see none ourselves.

Because the Chogha Mish Collection is no longer within 

the territorial jurisdiction of the district court and Iran has 

disclaimed ownership of the Herzfeld and Oriental Institute 

Collections, we confine our merits review to the Persepolis 

Collection.

B. Statutory Framework

We traced the history of the foreign sovereign immunity 

doctrine and the enactment of the FSIA in our earlier opinion. See Rubin, 637 F.3d at 792–94. A brief repetition is helpful to a proper understanding of the statutory-interpretation 

questions presented here.

Foreign sovereign immunity “is a matter of grace and 

comity on the part of the United States,” and for much of our 

nation’s history was left to the discretion of the Executive 

Branch. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 

486 (1983). As such, federal courts “consistently ... deferred 

to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those 

of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction 

over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” Id. Under the common-law doctrine, a diplomatic 

representative of the foreign state would request a “suggestion of immunity” from the State Department, and if the 

State Department obliged, the court would surrender jurisdiction without further inquiry; absent a suggestion of 

immunity, the court would decide the immunity question 

itself based on policies established by the State Department. 

Rubin, 637 F.3d at 793. Either way, “[t]he process ... entailed 

substantial judicial deference to the Executive Branch.” Id.

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Even if a court acquired jurisdiction and awarded judgment against a foreign state, “the United States gave absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns from the execution of 

judgments.” Autotech, 499 F.3d at 749. Successful plaintiffs

had to rely on voluntary payment by the foreign state. Id.

In 1952 the State Department adopted a “restrictive” theory of foreign sovereign immunity, conferring jurisdictional 

immunity in cases arising out of a foreign state’s “public 

acts” but withholding it in “cases arising out of a foreign 

state’s strictly commercial acts.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. 

“Under the restrictive, as opposed to the ‘absolute,’ theory of 

foreign sovereign immunity, a state is immune from the 

jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its sovereign or public acts 

(jure imperii), but not as to those that are private or commercial in character (jure gestionis).” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 

507 U.S. 349, 359–60 (1993). Even under this theory, however, foreign sovereign property remained absolutely immune 

from execution. Autotech, 499 F.3d at 749.

The State Department’s shift to the restrictive theory of 

jurisdictional immunity “‘thr[ew] immunity determinations 

into some disarray,’ since ‘political considerations sometimes led the Department to file suggestions of immunity in 

cases where immunity would not have been available.’” 

NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2255 (brackets in original) (quoting 

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004)).

Essentially, “sovereign immunity determinations were 

[being] made in two different branches, subject to a variety 

of factors, sometimes including diplomatic considerations. 

Not surprisingly, the governing standards were neither clear 

nor uniformly applied.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.

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No. 14-1935 11

In 1976 Congress stepped in and enacted the FSIA, which 

“largely codifies the so-called ‘restrictive’ theory of foreign 

sovereign immunity first endorsed by the State Department 

in 1952.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 

612 (1992). The Act establishes a “comprehensive set of legal 

standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action 

against a foreign state.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. “The key 

word ... is comprehensive.” NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2255. 

“[A]ny sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the Act’s text. Or it 

must fall.” Id. at 2256.

The Act codifies the two common-law immunities we’ve 

just discussed—jurisdictional immunity (28 U.S.C. § 1604)

and execution immunity (id. § 1609). Only the latter is at 

issue here. Section 1609 states that “the property in the 

United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment[,] arrest[,] and execution except as provided in 

sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.” Accordingly, the

Persepolis Collection is immune from attachment and 

execution unless an exception listed in § 1610 applies. (Section 1611 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code lists exceptions to the 

exceptions and is not implicated here.)

The most prominent are the so-called commercialactivity exceptions found in subsections (a) and (b) of § 1610. 

Under § 1610(a) a person who holds a judgment against a 

foreign state may execute it on the foreign state’s property 

“used for a commercial activity in the United States” if one 

of seven listed conditions is met. Similarly, under § 1610(b) a 

person who holds a judgment against a foreign state’s 

instrumentality may execute it on “any property in the 

United States of [the] ... instrumentality ... engaged in 

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commercial activity in the United States” if one of three

listed conditions is met.

So to summarize, at common law execution immunity 

was absolute, Autotech, 499 F.3d at 749, but subsections (a) 

and (b) of § 1610 together codify a narrower version of the 

restrictive theory of jurisdictional immunity for the execution of judgments, allowing successful claimants to attach 

and execute on foreign sovereign property “used for a 

commercial activity” in this country, at least in some circumstances.2

The plaintiffs point to § 1610(a) and § 1610(g) as possible

paths to reach the artifacts. They also rely on section 201(a) 

of TRIA. We turn to these arguments now.

C. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)

As we’ve just explained, § 1610(a) establishes rules for 

executing a judgment against a foreign state on the foreign 

state’s property; § 1610(b) establishes rules for executing a 

judgment against a foreign state’s instrumentality on the 

instrumentality’s property. The judgment here is against 

Iran, and Iran owns the Persepolis Collection, so subsection (a) is the relevant subsection.

Generally speaking, § 1610(a) permits the holder of a 

judgment against a foreign state to execute on property of 

the foreign state “used for a commercial activity in the 

United States” but only if one of seven enumerated condi-

 2 Section 1610 also permits in rem execution of certain foreclosure 

judgments against a foreign state’s vessels. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(e). Other 

parts of § 1610 address, for example, certain procedural requirements for 

execution, see, e.g., id. § 1610(c), and the sensitive matter of prejudgment 

attachment of foreign sovereign property, id. § 1610(d).

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tions is satisfied. For example, a judgment creditor may 

proceed against a foreign state’s property “used for a commercial activity in the United States” if the foreign state has 

expressly or impliedly waived execution immunity, 

§ 1610(a)(1); or if the property in question “was used for the 

commercial activity upon which the claim is based,” 

§ 1610(a)(2); or if “the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award,” § 1610(a)(6).

At issue here is subsection (a)(7), which permits attachment and execution if the following terms are met:

(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, ... used for a commercial activity in the 

United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, 

upon a judgment entered by a court of the 

United States or of a State after the effective 

date of this Act, if—

...

(7) the judgment relates to a claim for which 

the foreign state is not immune under section 

1605A or section 1605(a)(7) [the present and 

former terrorism exceptions to jurisdictional immunity] ... regardless of whether the 

property is or was involved with the act 

upon which the claim is based.

§ 1610(a)(7) (emphases added).

The plaintiffs obtained their judgment against Iran in 

2003 under § 1605(a)(7), the terrorism exception to jurisdictional immunity then in effect. In 2008 Congress replaced

§ 1605(a)(7) with § 1605A, and the plaintiffs converted their 

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judgment to one under the new statute. So there’s no question that the special condition in subsection (a)(7) is satisfied.

That leaves the basic “commercial activity” requirement 

of § 1610(a). The dispute here centers on the key statutory 

phrase identifying the property that may be subject to 

execution under this exception: “property in the United 

States of a foreign state ... used for a commercial activity in 

the United States.” § 1610(a). The passive-voice phrasing of 

this sentence raises an interpretive question: Used by whom?

The plaintiffs contend that a third party’s commercial use 

of the property triggers § 1610(a) and that the University’s 

academic study of the Persepolis Collection counts as a

commercial use. Iran and the University counter that the 

foreign state itself must use its property for a commercial 

activity, and regardless, academic study isn’t a commercial

use. The United States has weighed in as an amicus curiae 

on the side of the interpretation urged by Iran and the 

University—namely, that the exception in § 1610(a) applies 

only when the foreign sovereign itself (not a third party) uses

the property for a commercial activity.

We’re skeptical that academic study qualifies as a commercial use, but we’ll put that question aside and focus on 

the antecedent one: Whose commercial use counts?

The Fifth Circuit has held that § 1610(a) is triggered only 

when the foreign state itself uses its property in the United 

States for a commercial activity. See Conn. Bank of Commerce v. 

Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 256 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002)

(“[W]hat matters under the statute is how the foreign state 

uses the property, not how private parties may have used the 

property.”).

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The Second and Ninth Circuits agree. See Aurelius Capital 

Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir. 

2009) (“The commercial activities of the private corporations 

who managed these assets are irrelevant to this inquiry. ... 

[B]efore the retirement and pension funds at issue could be 

subject to attachment, the funds in the hands of the Republic 

must have been ‘used for a commercial activity.’”); Af-Cap, 

Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1090–91 

(9th Cir. 2007) (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation).

We think these circuits have understood § 1610(a) correctly. It’s true that a legislature’s use of the passive voice

sometimes reflects indifference to the actor. See Dean v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (“The passive voice 

focuses on an event that occurs without respect to a specific 

actor ... .”). But attributing indifference to Congress in this 

instance would be inconsistent with the FSIA’s statutory 

declaration of purpose, which explicitly invokes the international law understanding of foreign sovereign immunity: 

“Under international law, states are not immune from the 

jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial 

activities are concerned, and their commercial property may 

be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered 

against them in connection with their commercial activities.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphases added).

Section 1602 thus instructs courts to interpret the immunities and exceptions in the FSIA against the backdrop of the 

international law norm that foreign sovereigns do not have 

immunity for “their commercial activities” or immunity from 

execution on “their commercial property.” This suggests that 

a foreign sovereign’s property is subject to execution under 

§ 1610(a) only when the sovereign itself uses the property for 

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a commercial activity. While the passive-voice phrasing in 

§ 1610(a) introduces some ambiguity about whose commercial use matters, § 1602’s declaration of purpose clarifies that

foreign states may lose execution immunity only by virtue of

their own commercial use of their property in the United 

States, not a third party’s.

The plaintiffs object that the declaration of purpose isn’t 

relevant because resort to legislative history is not necessary 

when the statutory language is unambiguous. We disagree 

for two reasons. First, § 1602 is legislation, not legislative

history. It was written, debated, and enacted by Congress 

and signed into law by the President—in the same manner 

and at the same time as § 1610. None of the standard objections to judicial reliance on legislative history inhibit our 

resort to a statutory declaration of purpose for help in interpreting a part of the statute to which it applies.3

Second, as we’ve just noted, the passive-voice phrasing of 

§ 1610(a) creates uncertainty about whose commercial use of 

the property suffices to forfeit a foreign state’s execution 

immunity. The text itself raises the question, and the uncertainty is all the more apparent when subsection (a) is considered in its broader statutory context. See King v. Burwell, 

135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“[O]ftentimes the ‘meaning—or 

ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become 

evident when placed in context.’ So when deciding whether 

the language is plain, we must read the words ‘in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 

scheme.’” (citation omitted) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Wil-

 3 We’re not suggesting, however, that a legislative statement of purpose 

provides statutory meaning independent of the operative statutory text.

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No. 14-1935 17

liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 438, 450 (2002))). The FSIA 

starts with a baseline rule of execution immunity; the exceptions are few and “narrowly drawn.” Autotech, 499 F.3d at 

749.

Given the broad protective stance of the statutory scheme 

in general, we cannot say with confidence that § 1610(a) 

unambiguously abrogates a foreign sovereign’s execution 

immunity when a third party uses its property for a commercial activity. Rather, the statutory declaration of purpose 

suggests that a narrower interpretation is correct: A foreign 

state may lose its execution immunity only by its own commercial use of its property in the United States.

Trying another tack, the plaintiffs direct our attention to

the language of § 1605(a), the commercial-activity exception 

to jurisdictional immunity, which specifically states that the 

commercial activity must be “carried on in the United States 

by the foreign state” before immunity is lost. (Emphasis 

added.) The absence of similar language in § 1610(a), they 

argue, means that the commercial-activity exception to 

execution immunity is broader than its parallel in § 1605(a)

and applies whenever a third party uses a foreign state’s 

property for a commercial activity.

This argument contradicts the settled principle that the 

exceptions to execution immunity are narrower than, and 

independent from, the exceptions to jurisdictional immunity. 

NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2256; Rubin, 637 F.3d at 796; 

DeLetelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.3d 790, 798–99 (2d Cir. 

1984). This principle is both well established and based on a

critical diplomatic reality: Seizing a foreign state’s property 

is a serious affront to its sovereignty—much more so than 

taking jurisdiction in a lawsuit. Correspondingly, judicial 

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seizure of a foreign state’s property carries potentially farreaching implications for American property abroad.

The plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 1610(a) turns this important principle on its head. A third party’s commercial use 

of a foreign state’s property, which cannot establish jurisdiction over the foreign state, would suffice to strip the foreign 

state’s property of its execution immunity. That cannot be 

right.

Accordingly, we join the emerging consensus of our sister 

circuits and hold that a third party’s commercial use of a 

foreign state’s property does not trigger the § 1610(a) exception to execution immunity. Rather, § 1610(a) applies only 

when the foreign state itself has used its property for a commercial activity in the United States; the actions of third 

parties are irrelevant.

Nothing in the record suggests that Iran itself used the 

Persepolis Collection for a commercial activity in the United 

States. Indeed, the plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. The 

district court reached the correct conclusion: Section 1610(a) 

does not apply.4

D. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)

Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that § 1610(g) provides 

an independent basis to execute on the artifacts. A bit of 

background is necessary before we take up this argument.

Congress enacted § 1610(g) as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, which ushered in several 

changes to the FSIA as applied in cases of state-sponsored 

 4 Our holding makes it unnecessary to decide whether the University’s 

academic study of the Persepolis Collection is a commercial use.

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terrorism. We’ve already mentioned one: Section 1605A 

replaced § 1605(a)(7), the previous terrorism exception to 

jurisdictional immunity. Section 1605A includes an identical 

exception to jurisdictional immunity but “is more comprehensive and more favorable to plaintiffs because it adds a 

broad array of substantive rights and remedies that simply 

were not available in actions under” the previous law. In re 

Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 58 

(D.D.C. 2009). 

The other major change was the creation of § 1610(g), 

which applies to execution proceedings to enforce judgments obtained under § 1605A and eases the collection 

process for victims of state-sponsored terrorism by eliminating the Bancec rule that foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are treated separately for execution purposes.

The 2008 legislation also provided that certain judgments

obtained under the old § 1605(a)(7) could be converted to 

judgments under § 1605A so that judgment creditors could 

access the benefits of § 1610(g). The plaintiffs successfully 

converted their judgment, and they now contend that 

§ 1610(g) makes all Iranian assets available for execution

without proof of a nexus to commercial activity—that is, 

without having to satisfy § 1610(a). They argue, in other 

words, that subsection (g) is a freestanding exception to 

execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments.

Iran and the University dispute that interpretation. They 

agree that subsection (g) was intended to—and does—make 

it easier for terrorism victims to enforce their judgments. But 

they maintain that it does so only by abrogating the Bancec 

doctrine for § 1605A judgments; subsection (g) is not itself an 

exception to execution immunity. The United States supports

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
20 No. 14-1935

this interpretation and joins Iran and the University in 

urging us to adopt it.

We begin with the Bancec doctrine, which derives from 

the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision known by that name. 

Bancec established a general presumption that a judgment 

against a foreign state may not be executed on property 

owned by a juridically separate agency or instrumentality. 

462 U.S. at 626–27 (“Due respect for the actions taken by 

foreign sovereigns and for principles of comity between 

nations leads us to conclude ... that government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as 

such.”) (citation omitted). That’s the general rule in the law 

of private corporations, and the Court applied it to the 

juridically separate instrumentalities of foreign governments. Id. The Court recognized two exceptions: The holder 

of a judgment against a foreign state may execute on the 

property of its instrumentality if the sovereign and its instrumentality are alter egos or if adherence to the rule of 

separateness would work a fraud or injustice. Id. at 628–33.

The Court expressly declined to elaborate on these exceptions, however. Id. at 633 (“Our decision today announces no 

mechanical formula for determining the circumstances 

under which the normally separate juridical status of a 

government instrumentality is to be disregarded.”). So the 

lower courts had to fill the gap. Soon after Bancec was decided, the federal courts began to coalesce around a set of five 

factors for determining when the exceptions applied. See, 

e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1071 n.9

(9th Cir. 2002); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of 

Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1380–82, 1380–81 n.7 (5th Cir. 

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 21

1992). The following formula from the Fifth Circuit is typical; 

courts should consider:

(1) The level of economic control by the government; (2) whether the entity’s profits go to 

the government; (3) the degree to which government officials manage the entity or otherwise have a hand in its daily affairs; (4) whether the government is the real beneficiary of the 

entity’s conduct; and (5) whether adherence to 

separate identities would entitle the foreign 

state to benefits in United States courts while 

avoiding its obligations.

Walter Fuller Aircraft, 965 F.2d at 1380 n.7.

Fast forward to 2008 and the enactment of the National 

Defense Authorization Act, which created § 1605A and

§ 1610(g). In relevant part, § 1610(g) states:

[T]he property of a foreign state against which 

a judgment is entered under section 1605A, and

the property of an agency or instrumentality of 

such a state, ... is subject to attachment ... and 

execution ... as provided in this section, regardless of—

(A) the level of economic control over 

the property by the government of the foreign state;

(B) whether the profits of the property 

go to that government;

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22 No. 14-1935

(C) the degree to which officials of that 

government manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs;

(D) whether that government is the sole 

beneficiary in interest of the property; or

(E) whether establishing the property as 

a separate entity would entitle the foreign 

state to benefits in United States courts 

while avoiding its obligations.

(Emphases added.)

Put more succinctly, subsection (g) permits a terrorism 

victim who wins a § 1605A judgment to execute on the 

property of the foreign state and the property of its agency or

instrumentality “as provided in this section” but “regardless of”

the five factors listed in subsections (A)–(E).

As the careful reader no doubt has grasped, the five factors made irrelevant by subsection (g) mirror almost exactly 

the factors developed by the lower courts under the Bancec

doctrine. For ease of comparison, we’ve prepared this chart:

Bancec Doctrine Factors Factors Made Irrelevant by 

Subsection (g)

(1) the level of economic 

control by the government; 

(A) the level of economic 

control over the property by 

the government of the foreign state;

(2) whether the entity’s 

profits go to the government;

(B) whether the profits of the 

property go to that governCase: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 23

ment;

(3) the degree to which 

government officials manage 

the entity or otherwise have 

a hand in its daily affairs;

(C) the degree to which 

officials of that government 

manage the property or 

otherwise control its daily 

affairs;

(4) whether the government 

is the real beneficiary of the 

entity’s conduct; and

(D) whether that government 

is the sole beneficiary in 

interest of the property; or

(5) whether adherence to 

separate identities would 

entitle the foreign state to 

benefits in United States 

courts while avoiding its 

obligations.

(E) whether establishing the 

property as a separate entity 

would entitle the foreign 

state to benefits in United 

States courts while avoiding 

its obligations.

The nearly identical language is either a stunning coincidence or Congress drafted subsection (g) to abrogate the

Bancec doctrine for terrorism-related judgments. It’s impossible to ignore the clear textual parallels between subsection (g), the Bancec rule, and the preexisting caselaw. Indeed, 

we’ve already noted that subsection (g) overrides the Bancec 

doctrine for terrorism-related judgments. See Gates v. Syrian 

Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014).

The key question here—a question not expressly decided 

in Gates—is whether, as the plaintiffs contend, subsection (g)

goes further and establishes a freestanding “terrorism” 

exception to execution immunity.

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
24 No. 14-1935

Iran and the University—with support from the United 

States—caution against reading a corrective measure so 

plainly aimed at eliminating the Bancec barrier as creating a 

new and independent exception to execution immunity for 

all terrorism-related judgments. They direct our attention to 

language in subsection (g) specifically limiting its scope: The 

text says that for § 1605A judgments, the property of a 

foreign state and the property of its agency or instrumentality are “subject to attachment ... and execution ... as provided 

in this section.” The highlighted phrase makes very little 

sense—indeed, is entirely superfluous—if subsection (g) is 

itself a freestanding exception to execution immunity. The 

plaintiffs’ reading of subsection (g) thus violates the “cardinal principle” that a statute should be interpreted to avoid 

superfluity. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).

The plaintiffs suggest that the phrase “as provided in this 

section” refers to only the “non-substantive rules” set forth 

in § 1610. But they offer no basis for limiting the phrase in 

that manner, nor have they identified which non-substantive 

rules they think Congress meant to include in subsection (g).

Moreover, it would be very odd to read “as provided in this 

section” as referring only to certain unidentified subsections 

of § 1610. The word “section” must mean what it says:

Subsection (g) modifies all of § 1610.

Treating § 1610(g) as an independent basis for execution 

also creates superfluities in other parts of the statute. For 

example, subsections (a)(7) and (b)(3) of § 1610 relate specifically to judgments obtained under § 1605A, the current 

terrorism exception to jurisdictional immunity, and its 

predecessor, § 1605(a)(7). If subsection (g) paves a dedicated 

lane for all execution actions by victims of state-sponsored 

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 25

terrorism, then § 1610(a)(7) and (b)(3) serve no purpose at 

all.5

In their reply brief, the plaintiffs seek refuge in our decision in Gates, which they say has already resolved this

interpretive question in their favor. We disagree, though we 

can see how Gates might be read in that way. Gates involved 

a lien-priority contest between two sets of terrorism victims 

holding § 1605A judgments against Syria. 755 F.3d at 572–73. 

Both sets of victims—the “Gates plaintiffs” and the “Baker 

plaintiffs”—sought to execute on the same assets owned by 

Syrian instrumentalities but held by an American bank and a 

telecommunications company and located within the territorial jurisdiction of the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 573–

74. The dispute concerned compliance with the procedural 

requirements of § 1610(c). That subsection provides that

[n]o attachment or execution referred to in 

subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be 

permitted until the court has ordered such attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable period of time has 

elapsed following the entry of judgment and 

the giving of any notice required under section 

1608(e) of this chapter.

 5 Moreover, as we’ve noted, subsection (g) was enacted at the same time 

as § 1605A. In the same 2008 legislation, subsections (a)(7) and (b)(3) of 

§ 1610 were amended to make the commercial-activity exceptions 

applicable to judgments obtained under § 1605A, the new exception to 

jurisdictional immunity for terrorism-related cases. If, as the plaintiffs 

claim, subsection (g) were a freestanding exception to execution immunity for § 1605A judgments, then these amendments—enacted at the same 

time—were completely unnecessary.

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26 No. 14-1935

§ 1610(c). The cross-referenced provision establishes rules 

for obtaining a default judgment against a foreign state or its 

agency or instrumentality. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).

The Gates plaintiffs obtained a § 1610(c) order from the 

district court in the District of Columbia, where their judgment was entered, then registered the judgment in the 

Northern District of Illinois, where the assets of the Syrian 

instrumentality were located. A few days later, the Baker 

plaintiffs also registered their judgment in the Northern 

District of Illinois, but “[u]nlike the Gates plaintiffs, ... [they] 

sought and obtained a new § 1610(c) order from the Northern District of Illinois.” Gates, 755 F.3d at 574. The Baker 

plaintiffs then argued that their lien had priority because the 

Gates plaintiffs hadn’t obtained a new § 1610(c) order in the 

Northern District of Illinois. The Gates plaintiffs responded

with two arguments: First, “§ 1610(c) does not apply at all,” 

and second, “even if it does, one order per judgment suffices 

for attachment and execution anywhere in the United 

States.” Id. at 575.

The panel sided with the Gates plaintiffs, ruling in their 

favor on both grounds, either of which was independently 

sufficient to support the judgment. Id. at 578 (“For two 

independent reasons, then, § 1610(c) does not bar the priority of the Gates plaintiffs’ liens ... .”). Addressing the first 

argument, the panel noted that the Gates plaintiffs “are not 

seeking attachment under § 1610(a) or (b). They seek attachment under § 1610(g), which authorizes attachment of 

property of foreign state sponsors of terrorism and their 

agencies or instrumentalities to execute judgments under 

§ 1605A for state-sponsored terrorism.” Id. at 575. The panel 

continued: “Section 1610(g) is not mentioned in § 1610(c). By 

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 27

its terms, then, § 1610(c) simply does not apply to execution 

or attachment under § 1610(g).” Id.

Alternatively, the panel held that “[e]ven if § 1610(c) applie[s] to attachment efforts under § 1610(g),” one order 

“suffices for attachment efforts throughout the United 

States.” Id. at 577. The § 1610(c) order issued by the D.C. 

district court was thus sufficient; the Gates plaintiffs “were 

not required to seek a duplicative determination of the same 

question by the Northern District of Illinois before attaching 

the Syrian assets.” Id. at 578.

Notably, Gates assumes rather than decides the crucial 

antecedent question—that is, whether § 1610(g) is itself a 

freestanding exception to execution immunity. Instead, it 

simply describes subsection (g) in a way that implies an 

affirmative answer. Perhaps that’s not surprising; the issue 

was not developed by the parties. To be sure, the Gates

opinion touches on the Bancec doctrine, observing that 

§ 1610(g) “was intended to avoid limits the Supreme Court 

had imposed on the ability of litigants to attach the assets of 

foreign state agencies and instrumentalities.” Id. at 576. And 

there’s no doubt that the opinion treats § 1610(g) as if it were

an independent exception to execution immunity, albeit 

without actually deciding the question. Indeed, that’s the 

premise of the panel’s holding that § 1610(c) does not apply.

But nowhere does the Gates opinion grapple with the 

fundamental interpretive question presented here. Instead, 

the parties and the court appear to have assumed without 

further inquiry that subsection (g) is an independent basis 

for attachment and execution for all terrorism-related judgments. Tellingly, there’s no mention in Gates of the limiting 

phrase in subsection (g) “as provided in this section,” nor 

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28 No. 14-1935

any reference to the statutory superfluities created by the 

broader interpretation advanced by the Rubin plaintiffs here.

A second appeal from the same attachment proceeding—

this time involving a dispute between the Gates plaintiffs 

and the “Wyatt plaintiffs”—again found for the Gates 

plaintiffs but likewise neither raised nor decided the antecedent interpretive question. See Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2015). The Wyatt plaintiffs 

mounted a collateral challenge to the § 1610(c) order that the 

Gates plaintiffs had obtained from the D.C. district court. Id. 

at 334–35, 342. The panel did not directly address this argument, relying instead on the holding of Gates that “‘§ 1610(c)

simply does not apply to the attachment of assets to execute 

judgments under § 1610(g) for state-sponsored terrorism.’”

Id. at 343 (quoting Gates, 755 F.3d at 575). As in Gates, the 

opinion in Wyatt does not mention the fundamental interpretive question about the scope of § 1610(g). Wyatt thus left

the unexamined premise of Gates unexamined.

In the meantime, the Ninth Circuit has been wrestling 

with the precise question presented here in a case involving 

assets of Bank Melli, an instrumentality of Iran. A panel of 

that court initially adopted the interpretation urged by the 

Rubin plaintiffs here—that § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments. 

Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 799 F.3d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 

2015). Bank Melli petitioned for rehearing, and three weeks 

later the panel invited the views of the United States on the 

proper interpretation of § 1610(g). The United States responded, taking the same position it advances in this case. 

On February 22, 2016, the panel withdrew its earlier opinion 

and issued an amended one again holding that subsecCase: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 29

tion (g) contains a freestanding exception to execution 

immunity. Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 817 F.3d 1131, 

1141 (9th Cir. 2016). Judge Benson disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of subsection (g) and filed a partial dissent

on that issue. Id. at 1149–51. The panel expressly invited 

Bank Melli to file another petition for panel and en banc 

rehearing. Id. at 1136. 

Bank Melli did so, and on June 14, 2016, the panel issued 

a second amended opinion. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of 

Iran, Nos. 13-15442 & 13-16100, 2016 WL 3257780 (9th Cir., 

June 14, 2016). The majority reaffirmed its earlier conclusion

that “subsection (g) contains a freestanding provision for 

attaching and executing against assets of a foreign state or its 

agencies or instrumentalities.” Id. at *6. Judge Benson again 

dissented. Id. at *11–14. With this latest decision, the Ninth 

Circuit appears to be done with the case; the panel’s order

indicates that no judge requested a vote on Bank Melli’s

petition for en banc rehearing. Id. at *2.

The Bennett majority purported to explain away the “as 

provided in this section” language in subsection (g) by 

interpreting it to apply only to § 1610(f). Id. at *6 (“When 

subsection (g) refers to attachment and execution of the 

judgment ‘as provided in this section,’ it is referring to 

procedures contained in § 1610(f).”). That strikes us as a 

highly strained interpretation. First, as we’ve already noted, 

it implausibly reads the word “section” as “subsection,” so 

the phrase “as provided in this section” actually means “as 

provided in subsection (f).” 

Second, and importantly, § 1610(f) never became operative. 

It was adopted as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 

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30 No. 14-1935

No. 105-277, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491 (1998), and 

pertains to execution on property associated with certain 

regulated and prohibited financial transactions. Congress 

originally authorized the President to waive subsection (f)’s 

provisions “in the interest of national security.” Id. § 117(d), 

112 Stat. at 2681-492. President Clinton immediately issued a 

blanket waiver. Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. 

Reg. 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998). Congress briefly repealed the 

President’s waiver authority in the Victims of Trafficking 

and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 

§ 2002(f)(2), 114 Stat. 1464, 1541, 1543, but quickly restored it, 

id. § 2002(f)(1)(B), 114 Stat. at 1543, codifying the Executive’s 

waiver authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3): “The President 

may waive any provision of paragraph (1) in the interest of 

national security.” President Clinton issued another blanket 

waiver that same day. Presidential Determination No. 2001-

03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000).

So subsection (f), being inoperative from the start, does 

not allow any form of execution. Congress enacted subsection (g) just eight years later. If the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning

is correct, subsection (g) was effectively a nullity upon 

passage. That cannot be the correct interpretation. See Voisine 

v. United States, No. 14-10154, 2016 WL 3461559, at *6 (U.S., 

June 27, 2016) (explaining that Congress is presumed to 

legislate against the backdrop of the “known state of the 

laws” (quoting United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238, 256 

(1835))). It therefore makes no sense to say, as the Bennett

majority does, that the phrase “as provided in this section”

in subsection (g) refers only to subsection (f), an inoperative 

part of the statute. If that were the case, then execution “as 

provided in this section” would mean no execution at all.

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No. 14-1935 31

For these reasons, we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s 

interpretation of subsection (g). We note that the Bennett 

majority drew support for its conclusion from our decisions 

in Gates and Wyatt, apparently reading them as the plaintiffs 

do here. See Bennett, 2016 WL 3257780, at *7. That’s understandable for the reasons we’ve already explained. To the 

extent that Gates and Wyatt can be read as holding that 

§ 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to execution immunity 

for terrorism-related judgments, they are overruled.6

To summarize: Section 1610(g) is not itself an exception 

to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments; 

rather, it abrogates the Bancec rule for terrorism-related 

judgments. Accordingly, terrorism victims with unsatisfied 

§ 1605A judgments against foreign states may execute on the 

foreign state’s property and the property of its agency or 

instrumentality—without regard to the Bancec presumption 

of separateness—but they must do so “as provided in this

section.” § 1610(g). That is, they must satisfy an exception to 

execution immunity found elsewhere in § 1610—namely, 

subsections (a) or (b).

 

6 Because this opinion overrules circuit precedent and creates a conflict 

with the Ninth Circuit, it has been circulated to all judges in active 

service in accordance with Circuit Rule 40(e). Chief Judge Wood and 

Circuit Judges Posner, Flaum, Easterbrook, and Rovner did not participate, so a majority did not vote to rehear this case en banc. Circuit Judge 

Hamilton has filed a dissent from the denial of en banc review, which is 

attached to this opinion.

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32 No. 14-1935

E. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act

Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the Persepolis Collection 

is subject to attachment and execution under section 201(a)

of TRIA, which permits a person who holds a judgment 

against a state sponsor of terrorism to execute on the foreign 

state’s assets (and those of certain agencies and instrumentalities) if the assets have been blocked by executive order 

under certain international sanctions provisions. Pub. L. 

No. 107-297, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2322, 2337 (2002). An asset is 

deemed to be blocked when it has been “seized or frozen”

by the United States under section 5(b) of the Trading with 

the Enemy Act or under sections 202 or 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Id. § 201(d)(2)(A), 

116 Stat. at 2339.

In response to the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, President 

Carter invoked his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and issued Executive Order 

12170, which froze all Iranian assets in the United States. 

Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979).

The hostage crisis was resolved in 1981 with the Algiers 

Accords, and in accordance with commitments made in that 

agreement, President Carter issued Executive Order 12281, 

which unblocked all uncontested property interests of the 

Iranian government. Exec. Order No. 12281, 46 Fed. Reg. 

7923 (Jan. 19, 1981). The order gave implementing authority 

to the Treasury Department. Id. at 7924. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued regulations broadly defining unblocked property as “all uncontested and non-contingent liabilities and property interests of 

the Government of Iran, its agencies, instrumentalities, or 

controlled entities.” 31 C.F.R. § 535.333(a). A property interCase: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 33

est is considered “contested only if the holder thereof reasonably believes that Iran does not have title or has only

partial title to the asset,” and a belief is considered reasonable “only if it is based on a bona fide opinion, in writing, of 

an attorney licensed to practice within the United States 

stating that Iran does not have title or has only partial title to 

the asset.” Id. § 535.333(c).

There’s no evidence that the University contests Iran’s 

title to the Persepolis Collection. To the contrary, the University has reaffirmed the terms of the long-term academic loan, 

which unambiguously requires it to return the artifacts to 

Iran when study is complete. Nor has the University sought 

or obtained an attorney’s opinion that Iran lacks title or has 

only partial title to the artifacts.

The plaintiffs argue that the Persepolis Collection remains a blocked asset subject to execution because the 

University asserted in a June 2004 district-court filing that it 

maintained a “superseding possessory right.” But no one 

disputes that the University has a present possessory interest

in the Persepolis Collection. Iran nonetheless retains full 

ownership. The plaintiffs place great emphasis on the fact that 

Iran has periodically inquired about the progress of the 

study and has occasionally requested the return of the 

artifacts. That simply reinforces the University’s present 

possessory interest; it’s not evidence of contested title.

Alternatively, the plaintiffs claim that the artifacts have 

been “reblocked” by President Obama’s Executive Order 

13599. 77 Fed. Reg. 6659, 6659 (Feb. 8, 2012). But section 4(b) 

of this order expressly exempts all “property and interests in 

property of the Government of Iran that were blocked 

pursuant to Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, 

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
34 No. 14-1935

and thereafter made subject to the transfer directives set 

forth in Executive Order 12281 of January 19, 1981.” Id. at 

6660.

The plaintiffs argue that “transfer directives” means a 

directive from Iran, and because Iran has never directed that 

these particular artifacts be transferred to it, the exception in 

section 4(b) doesn’t apply to the Persepolis Collection. This 

argument misreads the 2012 order, which refers to “transfer 

directives set forth in” President Carter’s 1981 Executive 

Order that all property meeting certain specified criteria be 

returned to Iran. That is, the directive is categorical rather 

than contingent on a particularized demand by Iran.

Accordingly, the district judge was right to conclude that 

attachment and execution under section 201 of TRIA is 

unavailable.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 35

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting from denial of en banc 

review. The panel opinion in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

No. 14-1935, both creates a circuit split and overrules, in part,

two recent decisions of this court. Either step by itself would 

ordinarily trigger our Circuit Rule 40(e), which requires circulation within the court before publication to see if a majority of active judges wish to rehear the case en banc.

In this case, a majority of active judges do not even have 

the opportunity to vote. A majority are disqualified, so it is 

impossible to hear this case en banc. In this rare situation, the 

panel apparently has the power to overrule circuit precedent 

and to create a circuit split without meaningful Rule 40(e) review. Yet that step is a mistake that should not go without 

comment. Also, most Rule 40(e) decisions settle the legal issue 

in the circuit. In this rare situation, one panel’s decision to 

overrule another’s decisions should not be treated as settling 

the legal issue in this circuit. I respectfully dissent.

The issue is whether a provision of the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g), offers a freestanding basis for executing judgments against state sponsors of

terrorism, independent of § 1610(a) and (b). As dry and technical as that sounds, the issue has important practical consequences for victims of state-sponsored terrorism. Most important, the Rubin panel’s view restricts execution to foreign 

sovereign assets that are used: (a) by the foreign sovereign itself, (b) for a commercial activity, and (c) in the United States. 

That reading shelters from execution a wide range of assets of 

state sponsors of terrorism, such as the museum collection

here.

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36 No. 14-1935

If, on the other hand, § 1610(g) offers a freestanding basis 

for execution, then victims are not limited to property the sovereign uses commercially in the United States. Victims of 

state-sponsored terrorism may execute judgments against a 

broader range of foreign sovereign assets. That’s the view of 

the Ninth Circuit in Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, — F.3d 

—, — & nn. 4–7, 2016 WL 3257780, at *6–7 & nn. 4–7 (9th Cir. 

2016), which held that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding basis 

for executing judgments for state-sponsored terrorism. That 

reading should enable the plaintiffs in Bennett to execute on 

assets that were not used commercially in the United States. 

See id. at *4 (cash in United States that was owed to Iranian 

state bank for use of credit cards in Iran). That same reasoning 

would extend to the museum collection at issue here.

Whether § 1610(g) provides a freestanding basis also affects the procedures that victims of state-sponsored terrorism 

must follow to execute their judgments. We dealt with procedural issues in both Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 

342–43 (7th Cir. 2015), and Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 

F.3d 568, 575–77 (7th Cir. 2014) (alternative holding). In both 

cases, we adopted the view that § 1610(g) is freestanding, 

which broadens the rights of victims v. state sponsors of terrorism, while still assuring due process of law.

The details of the textual arguments are laid out well in 

Bennett and Rubin, and I will not repeat them. Both readings

of the text, I believe, are reasonable, meaning that the text is 

ambiguous. The courts must choose between two statutory 

readings: one that favors state sponsors of terrorism, and another that favors the victims of that terrorism.

The FSIA contains detailed protections for foreign governments in most civil litigation. But over the years, Congress has 

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37
No. 14-1935 37

added special provisions for cases of state-sponsored terrorism, including the addition of § 1610(g) as part of § 1083 of 

Public Law 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008. Those special provisions, including 

§ 1610(g), work together to make it easier for victims of statesponsored terrorism to pursue foreign sovereign assets in the 

United States. In 2008, Congress even took the unusual step 

of applying the new provisions to pending cases. P.L. 110-181, 

§ 1083(c). See also Bennett, 2016 WL 3257780, at *8 (legislative 

history of 2008 amendments shows broad intent to facilitate 

execution of judgments against any property owned by state 

sponsors of terrorism). 

I recognize that “no legislation pursues its purposes at all 

costs,” and that it “frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the 

statute’s primary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v. 

United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987). But in interpreting 

an ambiguous statutory text, we can and should draw on statutory purpose and legislative history. We must choose one 

side or the other. The balance here should weigh in favor of

the reading that favors the victims. We should not attribute to 

Congress an intent to be so solicitous of state sponsors of terrorism, who are also undeserving beneficiaries of the unusual 

steps taken by the Rubin panel.

We should continue to follow Gates and Wyatt, and we 

should avoid creating a conflict with Bennett, especially in a 

case where the en banc court cannot act. We should allow the 

Rubin plaintiffs to pursue broader categories of Iranian property, including the Persepolis Collection at the University of 

Chicago.

Case: 14-1935 Document: 95 Filed: 07/19/2016 Pages: 37