Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01553/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01553-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TMI PRODUCTS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS, L.P.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1553

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California in No. 5:12-cv-02263-RGKSP, Judge R. Gary Klausner.

______________________ 

Decided: April 2, 2015

______________________ 

REYNALDO C. BARCELO, Barcelo, Harrison & Walker, 

LLP, Newport Beach, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

Also represented by DAVID BRYANT WALKER, JOSHUA 

CHARLES HARRISON, GUADALUPE M. GARCIA. 

DAVID PAUL COOPER, Kolisch Hartwell, P.C., Portland, 

OR, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

OWEN W. DUKELOW, DESMOND JOHN KIDNEY, II. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

TMI Products, Inc. (“TMI”) appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Central 

District of California granting summary judgment that 

Rosen Entertainment Systems, L.P. (“Rosen”) does not 

infringe claim 1 of U.S. Patent 7,597,393 (the “’393 patent”). See TMI Prods., Inc. v. Rosen Elecs., L.P., No. 12-

02263-RGK (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2014) (“Decision”). Because we conclude that the district court did not err in 

construing claim 1, we affirm the grant of summary 

judgment of noninfringement. 

BACKGROUND

TMI owns the ’393 patent relating to automotive 

headrest entertainment systems. The claimed invention 

is directed to a head restraint for vehicle seats having an 

integrated entertainment system that includes a video 

screen and a media player. ’393 patent col. 2 ll. 17–29. 

Independent claim 1 of the ’393 patent reads as follows:

1. A media assembly adapted to be installed into a 

seat back of a vehicle, the assembly comprising:

a mounting structure that is coupled to 

the seat back of the vehicle wherein the 

seat back defines a first outer surface visible to a viewer sitting in a back seat of the 

vehicle; 

a display that displays media to a viewer 

sitting within the vehicle;

a media player having an input opening 

into which a user can position a media 

storage device wherein the media player 

provides signals to the display to thereby 

induce the display to visually display the 

contents of the media storage device;

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TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3

a housing defining a recess having a first 

opening that receives both the display and 

the media player such that the display is 

positioned proximate the first opening of 

the recess with the media player positioned inward in the recess from the first 

opening such that the media player does 

not impede visual access to the display 

wherein the housing is structured to permit selective access to the input opening of 

the media player to permit user positioning 

of the media storage device within the 

player and 

wherein the housing is adapted to be coupled to the mounting structure within the 

seat back of the vehicle to thereby retain 

the housing within the seat back such that 

the display is positioned adjacent the outer surface of the seat back;

wherein the housing defines a second 

opening and the media player is positioned within the recess such that the input opening of the media player is 

accessible through the second opening of 

the housing.

Id. col. 17 l. 59–col. 18 l. 21 (emphasis added).

The patent discloses two exemplary families of embodiments of a media assembly adapted to be installed into 

the seat back of a vehicle. Figure 9A discloses one embodiment: “a video system 300 for a vehicle seat or seat back

302 having a head restraint 304 with an integrated video 

display or monitor 306 and a side-loading media player

308 . . . .” Id. col. 10 ll. 61–64; see also id. col 12 l. 60–

col. 13 l. 9 (Figure 10 disclosing a head restraint with a 

top-loading media player.).

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4 TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS

Figures 11A–12B disclose an alternative embodiment: 

“a video system 370 for the vehicle seat 302 having the 

head restraint 304 with the panel display 306 and media 

player 308 pivotally attached thereto.” Id. col. 13 ll. 22–25

(emphasis added). Exemplary figures of both families of 

embodiments are depicted below:

Id. figs. 9A, 11B. 

According to TMI, in the patent application that 

would later issue as the ’393 patent as originally filed at 

the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), thenpending dependent claims 3–5 were directed to the embodiments disclosed in figures 9A–10. Dependent claims 

6–10 were directed to the “pivotally-mounted” embodiments disclosed in figures 11A–12B.

During prosecution, the Examiner issued a restriction 

requirement, distinguishing between product claims 

directed to “a media assembly for a headrest” and method 

claims for “mounting an entertainment system to a head 

restraint.” J.A. 689. The Examiner also identified three 

patentably distinct species subgroups: figure 9A, figure 

9B, and figures 11A–C. J.A. 690. The Examiner required 

that the applicant elect a subgroup “to which the claims 

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TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS 5

shall be restricted if no generic claim is finally held to be 

allowable.” J.A. 690. In response, the applicant elected 

the product claims directed to “a media assembly for a 

headrest” and the subgroup containing figures 11A–12B. 

J.A. 695. The Examiner then withdrew claims 3–5 “from 

further consideration . . . as being drawn to a nonelected 

species, there being no allowable generic or linking 

claim.” J.A. 705.

The Examiner also rejected claim 1 as being anticipated by the prior art. J.A. 707–08. The Examiner found, 

“[w]ith respect to claim 1, [that the prior art] discloses a 

media assembly (10) adapted to be installed into a seat 

back (50) of a vehicle . . . wherein the housing is structured to permit selective access, because it pivots in and 

out of carrier member (17).” J.A. 708 (emphasis added). 

The applicant eventually overcame that rejection by 

establishing prior invention, and the application issued as 

the ’393 patent containing claim 1. 

TMI subsequently brought suit against Rosen, a 

competitor of TMI, alleging that the Rosen AV7900 and 

the Rosen CS9000 products directly infringe claim 1 of the 

’393 patent. TMI and Rosen filed cross-motions for summary judgment of infringement and noninfringement, 

respectively.

The district court construed claim 1 of the ’393 patent 

and, based on that construction, granted Rosen’s motion 

for summary judgment of noninfringement. The court 

construed the phrase “the housing is structured to permit 

selective access to the input opening” to require that “the 

housing is structured to be capable of moving between an 

accessible and an inaccessible orientation.” Decision at 7. 

The court found that TMI’s proposed construction of “to 

permit selective access” as “to allow choice for entry” 

created at least two redundancies in the claim language. 

Id. at 5–6. First, according to the court, if “to permit 

selective access” referenced a user’s choice to either access 

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6 TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS

the device or not, “the word ‘selective’ could be omitted 

entirely without doing any violence to the limitation’s 

meaning.” Id. at 5. Second, the court found that TMI’s 

construction would render the term “the housing is structured to permit selective access to the input opening of the 

media player” unnecessary in light of the final limitation 

of claim 1, which requires that “the media player is positioned within the recess such that the input opening of 

the media player is accessible through the second opening 

of the housing.” Id. 

The court found that any evidence of a disclaimer in 

the prosecution history was inconclusive; however, the 

court noted that the Examiner’s interpretation of the 

claim language was consistent with Rosen’s proposed 

construction. Id. at 6. The court found, with respect to 

the prior art, that the Examiner “understood ‘structured 

to permit selective access’ to mean capable of being made 

accessible or inaccessible by, for instance, pivoting in the 

recess.” Id.

Having construed claim 1, the court examined Rosen’s 

products in camera and concluded that “[t]he accused 

products’ housing sits within the recess of the headrest, 

and cannot be manipulated to expose the input opening, 

which is always accessible from the top of the headrest.” 

Id. at 8. Thus, based on the court’s construction of the 

claim and its findings regarding the accused products, the 

court granted Rosen’s motion for summary judgment of 

noninfringement. Id.

TMI timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

We review the grant of summary judgment under the 

law of the regional circuit in which the district court sits, 

here, the Ninth Circuit. Lexion Med., LLC v. Northgate 

Techs., Inc., 641 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011). ApplyCase: 14-1553 Document: 76-2 Page: 6 Filed: 04/02/2015
TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS 7

ing the law of the Ninth Circuit, we review the grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. 

Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when, drawing all justifiable 

inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

In this case, we review the district court’s claim construction de novo because the intrinsic record fully determines the proper construction, and the district court’s 

construction was not based on extrinsic evidence. See 

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. __, 135 S. 

Ct. 831, 841 (2015). A patent is a fully integrated written 

instrument and the claims must be read in view of the 

specification of which they are a part. Phillips v. AWH 

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). A 

court should also consult the patent’s prosecution history, 

which, like the specification, provides evidence of how the 

PTO and the inventor understood the claimed invention. 

Id.

TMI argues that the district court erred in construing 

“to permit selective access,” and that, when using the 

plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language, the 

phrase should be construed as “to allow choice for entry.” 

Appellant’s Br. 28. According to TMI, dependent claims

3–5, as originally filed, were drawn to figures 9A–10. 

TMI contends that claim 1 must have been at least as 

broad or broader in scope than then-pending claims 3–5, 

and the withdrawal of claims 3–5 did not alter the scope 

of claim 1. Thus, TMI asserts that the meaning of “to 

permit selective access” must not exclude the embodiment 

shown in figures 9A–10. 

Rosen responds that the court correctly construed “to 

permit selective access.” According to Rosen, the plain 

and ordinary meaning of “to permit selective access” is 

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8 TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS

switching between having and not having access. Rosen 

further argues that TMI disavowed coverage of figures 

9A–10 by electing the embodiments of figures 11A–12B in 

response to the restriction requirement.

We agree with Rosen that the district court correctly 

construed “the housing is structured to permit selective 

access to the input opening” to require that “the housing 

is structured to be capable of moving between an accessible and inaccessible orientation.” That construction gives 

meaning to the word “selective.” When considering multiple possible claim constructions, “[a] claim construction 

that gives meaning to all the terms of the claims is preferred over one that does not do so.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. 

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). Read in the context of the specification, the district 

court’s construction of “to permit selective access” gives 

meaning to all of the terms of the claim. In the description of figures 11A–12B, the housing limits access to the

input opening of the media player using a pivot member: 

[T]he pivot member 386 allows for the video system 370 to be pivoted outward from the recess 384 

so that a user can readily access the media player 

308, and, in addition, the pivot member 386 also 

allows for the video system 370 to be pivoted towards the recess 384 so as to engage the recess 

384 in the retracted orientation 382 . . . .

’393 patent col. 14 ll. 11–16 (emphases added). Thus, the 

housing permits access to the input opening of the media 

player, and that access is selective because the housing is 

structured to be capable of moving between an accessible

orientation and a retracted, inaccessible orientation. The 

court correctly stated that the scope of claim 1 is not 

necessarily limited to the pivotally attached embodiment. 

In contrast, TMI’s proposed construction creates redundancies in the claim language. Under TMI’s construction of “to permit selective access” as “to allow choice for 

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TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS 9

entry,” the term “selective” becomes unnecessary. As the 

district court found, by definition, one with access to the 

input opening may choose whether to make use of it, and

as a result, TMI’s proposed construction renders the term 

“selective” unnecessary. TMI argues that “selective” is 

necessary because it distinguishes “selective access” from

“visual access,” as recited earlier in claim 1, but we find 

that distinction unavailing. But there is no need to 

distinguish “visual access,” as it applies in the context of a 

display, from “access,” as it applies in the context of the 

input opening of the media player.

TMI’s proposed construction also creates a redundancy between the “selective access” limitation and the final 

limitation of claim 1, which provides: “wherein the housing defines a second opening and the media player is 

positioned within the recess such that the input opening 

of the media player is accessible through the second 

opening of the housing.” Id. col. 18 ll. 18–21. As so construed, the narrower final limitation would render the 

“selective access” limitation redundant because the final 

limitation would require that the housing permit access to 

the input opening of the media player as well as further 

define the structure of the housing. Thus, the broader 

“selective access” limitation would be unnecessary.

TMI’s additional argument that dependent claims 3–

5, as originally filed, were drawn to figures 9A–10, and 

thus that independent claim 1 must not exclude the 

embodiment shown in figures 9A–10, is also unavailing. 

TMI’s argument focuses on the drafter’s intent with 

respect to the drafting of the original claims, but intent

alone, without further evidence, does not inform the 

construction of claim 1. See Howmedica Osteonics Corp. 

v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 

2008) (“We hold that inventor testimony as to the inventor’s subjective intent is irrelevant to the issue of claim 

construction.”). Although originally-filed dependent 

claims 3–5 may have been intended to cover figures 9A–

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10 TMI PRODUCTS, INC. v. ROSEN ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS

10, and claim 1 may have initially been intended as a 

generic independent claim, it does not follow from the 

“selective access” language that claim 1 covers the embodiments in figures 9A–10. As drafted and issued, claim 1 

never did cover those embodiments.

Finally, both parties argue that the prosecution history affects the construction of claim 1. “Absent a clear 

disavowal or contrary definition in the specification or the 

prosecution history, the patentee is entitled to the full 

scope of its claim language.” Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. 

LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We 

conclude that none of the statements in the prosecution 

history rise to the level of a clear disavowal or otherwise 

support a departure from the claim language and the 

written description. Thus, the district court correctly 

construed “the housing is structured to permit selective 

access to the input opening” to require that “the housing 

is structured to be capable of moving between an accessible and inaccessible orientation.” We have considered the 

parties’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are 

without merit.

CONCLUSION

TMI does not contend that Rosen infringes under the 

district court’s construction. Thus, because the district 

court correctly construed the language of claim 1 of the 

’393 patent, the decision of the court granting Rosen’s 

motion for summary judgment of noninfringement is 

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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