Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01504/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01504-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Geoffrey Gagnon, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-01504 PHX ROS(MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 12,

2012. Respondents filed a response to the petition on November

21, 2012. See Doc. 10. As of January 11, 2012, Petitioner had

not filed a reply to the response to his petition. The

Magistrate Judge notes that Petitioner’s prison sentence

expires, and Petitioner will presumably be released from

custody, on or about February 18, 2013.

I Procedural History

An information filed in the Maricopa County Superior

Court on March 15, 2007, charged Petitioner in CR 2007-114875

with one count of sale or transportation of methamphetamine, a

class two felony. Petitioner testified at his first trial on

this charge. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence

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at Petitioner’s first trial, the jury was instructed on the

elements of the crime of transfer of dangerous drugs.

Additionally, at Petitioner’s counsel’s request, the jury was

instructed on a lesser offense of possession of dangerous drugs.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of

transfer of dangerous drugs, but found Petitioner guilty of the

offense of possession of dangerous drugs. The trial court

entered Petitioner’s conviction on one count of possession of

dangerous drugs and declared a mistrial regarding the charge of

transfer of dangerous drugs. 

The state trial court set a date for sentencing

Petitioner pursuant to his conviction for possession of

dangerous drugs. On November 23, 2007, the state and Petitioner

negotiated a plea agreement wherein the state agreed not to retry Petitioner on the greater offense on which the mistrial was

declared. A change of plea hearing was set for and conducted on

December 12, 2007. Doc. 10 (“Answer”), Exh. F. At that time

Petitioner rejected the plea agreement. Eventually a trial was

set for January 14, 2008, on the charge on which a mistrial was

declared. Id., Exh. G. Sentencing with regard to the count of

conviction was postponed. Id., Exh. G.

On November 30, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals

issued an opinion in Arizona v. Cheramie, 217 Ariz. 212, 171

P.3d 1253 (“Cheramie I”). The appellate court held that

possession of dangerous drugs was not a lesser-included offense

of transportation of dangerous drugs. In Cheramie, the state

trial court had directed a verdict of acquittal on a

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transportation charge and then allowed the jury to find the

defendant guilty on a possession charge. The state appellate

court determined that allowing the finding of guilt on the

possession charge after a directed acquittal on the

transportation charge violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right to notice of the charges against him.

Consequently, Petitioner successfully moved the state

trial court to set aside the guilty verdict in his case on the

lesser-included offense of possession of dangerous drugs,

notwithstanding that his argument of notice was belied by the

fact that he had requested the jury instruction on the lesser

offense. See Answer, Exh. H & Exh. I. The state trial court

also granted Petitioner’s request to require the state to retry

him solely on the original charge of transportation of dangerous

drugs. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner argued that his re-trial on the

charge of transportation of dangerous drugs would not implicate

double jeopardy because the jury had hung and a mistrial

declared on that charge. Id., Exh. K at 4-5.

[T]he trial court concluded that Cheramie I

controlled, and the court vacated Gagnon’s

possession conviction. The court also found

“that inasmuch as the judgment of guilt on

possession is invalid, jeopardy did not

attach to the greater charge and the matter

will be retried.”

Answer (Doc. 10) at 10 & Exh. X (Exhibit X is the Arizona Court

of Appeals’ decision denying relief in Petitioner’s direct

appeal after his second trial).

Petitioner’s second trial occurred on February 13,

2008. On February 21, 2008, the jury found Petitioner guilty of

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the charge of transportation of dangerous drugs. Id., Exh. R.

The jury was not instructed on a lesser charge. On March 28,

2008, Petitioner was sentenced to a mitigated term of five years

imprisonment. Id., Exh. S.

On July 23, 2008, the en banc Arizona Supreme Court

issued a decision in Arizona v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 189

P.3d 374 (2008) (“Cheramie II”), reversing the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision in Cheramie I. The state Supreme Court

reaffirmed that possession of dangerous drugs is a

lesser-included offense of the crime of transportation of

dangerous drugs. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his second

conviction. Petitioner asserted that his retrial on the charge

of transportation of dangerous drugs violated his right to be

free of double jeopardy. Petitioner argued that the doctrine of

“invited error” did not apply to his case. 

In a memorandum decision issued June 25, 2009, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. The

Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of invited error

precluded the relief sought by Petitioner. See Gagnon v.

Arizona, 2009 WL 1819521; Answer, Exh. X. 

In denying relief, the Court of Appeals stated: 

Gagnon now argues that the second trial

violated his constitutional right not to be

placed in jeopardy of the same offense twice

and, therefore, we should apply Cheramie II

retroactively to vacate his conviction on the

greater offense of transportation,

reinstating his conviction on the lesser

offense of possession from his first trial.

We decline to do so.

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 Rather, we find the doctrine of invited

error bars the relief Gagnon seeks on appeal.

See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565–66, ¶¶

8–9, 30 P.3d 631, 632–33 (2001). Here, Gagnon

invited error by requesting that the trial

court vacate his conviction on the lesser

offense and retry him solely on the greater

offense. In making this request, he

affirmatively argued that retrial would not

violate his right against double jeopardy.

And he did so over the State’s repeated

objections that a retrial would violate

double jeopardy and that our supreme court

would likely overturn Cheramie I as wrongly

decided. Thus, Gagnon received precisely what

he asked for.

 As such, this case calls for the

application of the invited error doctrine,

which is designed “to prevent a party from

injecting error in the record and then

profiting from it on appeal.” Logan, 200

Ariz. at 566, ¶ 11, 30 P.3d at 633 (citation

and internal punctuation omitted). ...

 Recognizing that invited error poses an

obstacle to his appeal, Gagnon argues that

the doctrine does not apply when, as in his

case, the error was based on a change in law

that arose after the defendant’s trial. For

example, in State v. Miranda, 200 Ariz. 67,

22 P.3d 506 (2001).... While we acknowledge

that Miranda recognizes a limited exception

to the invited error doctrine, we are not

persuaded that Cheramie II necessarily

constituted a change in law that otherwise

obviates application of the doctrine in this

case. Rather, we interpret Cheramie I as an

unwarranted departure from Chabolla-Hinojosa, which was immediately corrected in Cheramie

II.

2009 WL 1819521.

Petitioner sought review of the appellate court’s

decision denying relief in his direct appeal by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which denied review.

Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

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Procedure, on December 7, 2009. See Answer, Exh. AA.

Petitioner was represented by counsel in this action. In his

Rule 32 action Petitioner asserted that his constitutional

rights were violated because the police did not record their

interrogation of Petitioner. Relief was denied in this action

by the trial court on July 18, 2011. Id., Exh. CC. The state

appellate court denied relief on June 27, 2012. Id., Exh. EE &

Exh. FF.

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because: (1) at the conclusion of his second

trial, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the

lesser-included offense of possession of dangerous drugs,

despite the fact that Petitioner had obtained a new trial by

persuading the trial court that possession of dangerous drugs

was not a valid lesser-included offense of transportation of

dangerous drugs; (2) Petitioner’s retrial on the charge of

transportation of dangerous drugs violated the Fifth Amendment’s

prohibition against double jeopardy; and (3) Petitioner’s right

to due process of law was violated because the police did not

tape-record his post-arrest interview.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his first and third federal habeas claims in the state

courts by failing to present them to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in a procedurally correct manner.

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

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on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

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(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2011). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

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Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

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his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

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from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

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convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

C. Petitioner’s claims for relief

A. Petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief

because the his federal constitutional rights were violated

during his second trial when the court failed to give the jury

an instruction regarding the lesser-included offense of

possession of dangerous drugs. 

Respondent argues:

Ground One does not warrant habeas relief

because Petitioner never presented the

Arizona judiciary with the claim that the

trial court violated the United States

Constitution during his retrial by not

charging the jury during his retrial with an

instruction on the lesser- included offense

of possession of dangerous drugs.

Answer at 3.

In Petitioner’s direct appeal he argued that he was

entitled to the benefit of Cheramie II, i.e., that on retrial

the jury should have been instructed on a lesser-included

possession offense. Petitioner’s appellate brief did mention

that Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were violated,

but Petitioner did not assert the violation of any specific

federal constitutional right and did not discuss the Sixth

Amendment or Petitioner’s right to due process. Petitioner’s

counsel cited to numerous state-law opinions and a single

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opinion of the United States Supreme Court, i.e., Griffith v.

Kentucky, 479 U.S. 323 (1987), when arguing that Petitioner’s

“fundamental right” to a “fair trial” was violated.

In order to exhaust a claim, the petitioner must fully

and fairly “present both the factual and legal basis for the

claim to the state court.” Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1101. “Full

and fair presentation ... requires a petitioner to present the

substance of his claim to the state courts, including a

reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement

of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.” Scott v.

Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009). “[G]eneral appeals

to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to

establish exhaustion.” Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106

(9th Cir. 1999), citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152,

162–63, 116 S. Ct. 2074, (1996).

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this federal habeas

claim in the state courts as asserting the violation of a

federal constitutional right. Compare Gentry v. Sinclair, 693

F.3d 867, 880 (9th Cir. 2012), and Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d

898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011).

 B. Petitioner contends that his conviction on the

charge of transportation of dangerous drugs at the conclusion of

his second trial violates his right to be free of double

jeopardy. 

Petitioner raised this issue in his direct appeal after

his second trial. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected

Petitioner’s double-jeopardy claim, concluding Petitioner had

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invited any error by moving to vacate his original guilty

verdict on the lesser charge and requesting that he be retried

on the original transportation charge. The Arizona Court of

Appeals noted that Petitioner himself had averred to the state

trial court when requesting a new trial that granting a new

trial on the greater charge would not violate his right to be

free of double jeopardy.

Federal courts have recognized that “[t]he invited

error doctrine qualifies as a state procedural bar” to federal

habeas relief. Druery v. Thaler, 647 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir.

2011) (collecting cases). See also Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d

809, 832 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the invited-error

rule can serve as a state procedural bar but declining to apply

the doctrine to the instant case because the state court did not

actually hold that the petitioner had invited the error);

Coleman v. O’Leary, 845 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1988).

Because the Arizona Court of Appeals explicitly invoked

the invited-error doctrine when denying Petitioner’s doublejeopardy claim, and because Petitioner does not assert that the

doctrine is not “firmly established” and “regularly followed” in

Arizona, the Court may deny this claim for relief. 

C. Petitioner argues that his right to due process of

law was violated by the failure of law enforcement to record his

post-arrest interview.

Respondents contend Petitioner procedurally defaulted

this claim in the state courts by failing to raise it in his

direct appeal and because Petitioner did not raise the claim in

state court as a violation of Petitioner’s federal

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constitutional rights. 

Petitioner asserted in his state action for postconviction relief that his rights were violated by the failure

to record his post-arrest interview. In Petitioner’s state Rule

32 action the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on this

claim, citing Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3).

The appellate court concluded that relief on the claim was

precluded because Petitioner failed to raise it on direct

appeal.

Petitioner procedurally defaulted this claim in the

state courts because he did not assert this claim in the state

courts as a violation of his federal constitutional rights;

Petitioner asserted that his state right to due process of law

and the state power of the judiciary. Petitioner cited only to

state law when raising this claim in his Rule 32 action.

Accordingly, the federal habeas claim was not exhausted in the

state courts.

Additionally, the state appellate court concluded that

the claim was precluded as waived by Petitioner’s failure to

raise the claim in his direct appeal. Accordingly, the state

relied on an adequate and independent state law basis for

denying the claim, resulting in Petitioner’s procedural default

of the claim in his federal habeas proceeding.

Petitioner has not responded to the answer to his

petition asserting any basis for finding cause and prejudice

with regard to his procedural default of two of his federal

habeas claims. Petitioner has not established cause for his

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failure to fairly present his claims to the Arizona state

courts. Additionally, Petitioner has not established prejudice

arising from the procedural default of his claims. Therefore,

the Court need not consider the merits of the claims absent a

showing that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will otherwise

occur. Petitioner has not provided a basis for finding that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent a

consideration of the merits of his habeas claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his first and third

claims for federal habeas relief in the state courts by not

fairly presenting them to the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner as asserting the violation of a federal

constitutional right. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor

prejudice arising from his procedural default of his claims.

Petitioner has not established that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice will occur absent consideration of the merits of his

federal habeas claims. The Arizona Court of Appeals found that

the doctrine of invited error precluded relief on Petitioner’s

claim that his right to be free of double jeopardy was violated.

The Court of Appeals’ decision is an adequate and independent

state-law basis for denying Petitioner relief on the merits of

this claim.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Gagnon’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

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recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 14th day of January, 2013.

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