Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05373/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 12, 2002 Decided April 1, 2003

No. 01-5373

RANCHO VIEJO, LLC,

APPELLANT

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02798)

John C. Eastman argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Hugh Hewitt, Steven B. Imhoof, John

W. Wilmer, Jr., and Gregory D. Russell.

M. Reed Hopper and Anne M. Hayes were on the brief for

amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation in support of reversal.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-5373 Document #741450 Filed: 04/01/2003 Page 1 of 30
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Katherine J. Barton, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

Ellen J. Durkee and Seth M. Barsky, Attorneys. David C.

Shilton, Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and GARLAND,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

Concurring opinion filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Rancho Viejo is a real estate

development company that wishes to construct a 202-acre

housing development in San Diego County, California. The

United States Fish and Wildlife Service determined that

Rancho Viejo’s construction plan was likely to jeopardize the

continued existence of the arroyo southwestern toad, which

the Secretary of the Interior has listed as an endangered

species since 1994. Rather than accept an alternative plan

proposed by the Service, Rancho Viejo filed suit challenging

the application of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1531 et seq., to its project as an unconstitutional exercise

of federal authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court dismissed the suit. We conclude that this case is

governed by our prior decision in National Association of

Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and

therefore affirm.

I

The Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et

seq., is ‘‘the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.’’

Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).

Finding that ‘‘various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in

the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by

adequate concern and conservation,’’ 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1),

Congress passed the ESA ‘‘to provide a means whereby the

ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened

species depend may be conserved,’’ id. § 1531(b).

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The ESA directs the Secretary of the Interior to list fish,

wildlife, or plant species that she determines are endangered

or threatened. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a). Section 9 of the Act

makes it unlawful to ‘‘take’’ any such listed species without a

permit. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). ‘‘The term ‘take’ means to

harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,

or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.’’ Id.

§ 1532(19). The Secretary has promulgated, and the Supreme Court has upheld, a regulation that defines ‘‘harm’’ as

including ‘‘significant habitat modification or degradation

where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly

impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding.’’

50 C.F.R. § 17.3; see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of

Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995)

(sustaining 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 as a reasonable interpretation of

16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)).

Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to ensure

that none of their activities, including the granting of licenses

and permits, will ‘‘jeopardize the continued existence of any

endangered species TTT or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary TTT to be critical.’’ Id. § 1536(a)(2).

When an agency concludes that its activities may adversely

affect a listed species, it must engage in a formal consultation

with the Interior Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service

(FWS). 50 C.F.R. § 402.14; see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

Where applicable, such consultations result in the issuance of

a Biological Opinion that includes a ‘‘jeopardy’’ or ‘‘no jeopardy’’ determination. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3); see 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(b)(4). If the FWS decides that the proposed action is

likely to ‘‘jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of

critical habitat,’’ the opinion must set forth ‘‘reasonable and

prudent alternatives,’’ if any, that will avoid such consequences. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3); see 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(b)(3)(A).

The Secretary listed the arroyo toad as an endangered

species on December 16, 1994. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered StaUSCA Case #01-5373 Document #741450 Filed: 04/01/2003 Page 3 of 30
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tus for the Arroyo Southwestern Toad, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,859

(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The toads live in scattered

populations from California’s Monterey County in the north

to Mexico’s Baja California in the south. Id.; Endangered

and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Designation of

Critical Habitat for the Arroyo Toad, 66 Fed. Reg. 9414 (Feb.

7, 2001) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). They breed in shallow,

sandy, or gravelly pools along streams, and spend most of

their adult lives in upland habitats. 66 Fed. Reg. at 9415.

The toads range no farther than 1.2 miles from the streams

where they breed, and none in the area at issue in this case

travel outside the state of California. Id. Habitat destruction has driven the toad from approximately 76% of its former

California range. Id. at 9414.

Plaintiff Rancho Viejo plans to build a 280-home residential

development on a 202-acre site in San Diego County. The

property is bordered on the south by Keys Creek, a major

tributary of the San Luis Rey River, and is just east of

Interstate 15. FWS, Biological/Conference Opinion on the

Rancho Viejo Residential Development at 8, 26 (Aug. 24,

2000). The company’s construction plan is to build homes in

an upland area of approximately 52 acres, and to use an

additional 77 acres of its upland property and portions of the

Keys Creek streambed as a ‘‘borrow area’’ to provide fill for

the project. Rancho Viejo wants to remove six feet or more

of soil from the surface of the borrow area, amounting to

approximately 750,000 cubic yards of material, and to transport that soil to the 52-acre housing site to the north. Joint

Stip. ¶ 2. Surveys of Keys Creek have confirmed the presence of arroyo toads on and adjacent to the project site. Id.

¶ 7.

Because Rancho Viejo’s plan would involve the discharge of

‘‘fill into waters of the United States, including wetlands,’’

Biological/Conference Opinion at 8, the company was required

by section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, to

obtain a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the

‘‘Corps’’). See id. § 1344(a). The Corps determined that the

project ‘‘may affect’’ the arroyo toad population in the area,

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and sought a formal consultation with the FWS pursuant to

ESA § 7.

In May 2000, Rancho Viejo excavated a trench and erected

a fence, each running parallel to the bank of Keys Creek.

Arroyo toads were observed on the upland side of the fence.

Joint Stip. ¶ 8. In the FWS’s view, the fence has prevented

and may continue to impede movement of the toads between

their upland habitat and their breeding habitat in the creek.

Id. ¶ 9. On May 22, the FWS informed Rancho Viejo that

construction of the fence ‘‘has resulted in the illegal take and

will result in the future illegal take of federally endangered’’

arroyo toads ‘‘in violation of the Endangered Species Act.’’

May 22, 2000 Letter at 1; Joint Stip. ¶ 10.

In August 2000, the FWS issued a Biological Opinion that

determined that excavation of the 77-acre borrow area would

result in the taking of arroyo toads and was ‘‘likely to

jeopardize the continued existence’’ of the species. Biological/Conference Opinion at 35; see Joint Stip. ¶ 14. Pursuant

to ESA § 7(b)(3)(A) and 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, the FWS proposed an alternative that would, without jeopardizing the

continued existence of the toad, allow Rancho Viejo to complete its development by obtaining fill dirt from off-site

sources instead of from the proposed borrow area. Joint

Stip. ¶ 14; Biological/Conference Opinion at 37.

Rancho Viejo neither removed the fence nor adopted the

FWS’s proposed alternative. Instead, it filed a complaint in

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

against the Secretary of the Interior and other federal defendants, alleging that the listing of the arroyo toad as an

endangered species under the ESA, and the application of the

ESA to Rancho Viejo’s construction plans, exceeded the

federal government’s power under the Commerce Clause.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (‘‘The Congress shall have

Power TTT [t]o regulate Commerce TTT among the several

StatesTTTT’’).

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In

ruling on those motions, the district court noted that this

circuit had only recently sustained, against a Commerce

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Clause challenge, a determination by the FWS that hospital

construction in San Bernardino County, California would

likely lead to the take of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly

in violation of the ESA. See National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (‘‘NAHB’’), 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Holding that Rancho Viejo’s case was indistinguishable from

NAHB, and finding nothing in subsequent Supreme Court

opinions to cast doubt on that decision, the court granted the

government’s motion.1

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, United Seniors Ass’n v. Shalala, 182 F.3d 965, 969

(D.C. Cir. 1999), and in so doing accord the ESA a ‘‘presumption of constitutionality,’’ United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.

598, 607 (2000). In this Part, we first discuss the NAHB

decision, focusing particularly on the Supreme Court opinion

that provided that case’s analytic framework, United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). We then consider the application

of NAHB and Lopez to the complaint filed by Rancho Viejo.

In Part III, we examine Rancho Viejo’s argument that Supreme Court opinions issued after this court decided NAHB

have deprived that decision of its precedential force.

A

In Lopez, the Supreme Court considered whether a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V), which made it a federal

offense to possess a firearm near a school, exceeded Con1 In the district court, the government contended that the case

was not ripe for review. The court rejected that contention, and we

agree that plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of ripeness. See

Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998).

On appeal, the government does not reassert its ripeness contention, but does argue that the suit should be dismissed because there

has been no final agency action. It is clear, however, that the

FWS’s Biological Opinion relating to plaintiff’s proposed development project constitutes final agency action. See Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).

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gress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. 514 U.S. at

551. The Court held that the clause authorizes Congress to

regulate ‘‘three broad categories of activity’’:

First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of

interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to

regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate

commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,

even though the threat may come only from intrastate

activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a

substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those

activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.

Id. at 558–59 (citations omitted). With respect to the third

category, the Court discussed four factors that led it to

conclude that the activities regulated by the Gun-Free School

Zones Act did not substantially affect interstate commerce.

First, the Court said, ‘‘the possession of a gun in a school

zone TTT has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of

economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those

terms.’’ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560–61. Second, the Court

observed that the Act ‘‘has no express jurisdictional element

which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm

possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with

or effect on interstate commerce.’’ Id. at 562. Third, Lopez

noted that, ‘‘[a]lthough as part of our independent evaluation

of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course

consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional

committee findings, TTT neither the statute nor its legislative

history contains express congressional findings regarding the

effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a

school zone.’’ Id. (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). Finally, the Court determined that the relationship between gun possession and interstate commerce

was simply too ‘‘tenuous[ ]’’ to be regarded as substantial, and

that if the government’s arguments were accepted, the Court

would be ‘‘hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual

that Congress is without power to regulate.’’ Id. at 564.

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In NAHB, this circuit applied Lopez in a case challenging

the application of the ESA to a construction project in an

area that contained the habitat of the Delhi Sands FlowerLoving Fly. 130 F.3d at 1043 (Wald, J.). The fly, an

endangered species, is found in only two counties, both in

California. Id. One of those counties reported to the FWS

that it planned to construct a hospital and power plant on a

site occupied by the fly, and to expand a highway intersection

in connection with that work. Id. at 1044–45. The FWS

informed the county that the expansion of the intersection

would likely lead to a take of the fly in violation of section 9 of

the ESA. Id. at 1045. Thereafter, the county filed suit

against the Secretary of the Interior, contending that application of the ESA in those circumstances exceeded the authority of the federal government under the Commerce Clause.

A majority of the NAHB court held that the take provision

of ESA § 9, and its application to the facts of that case,

constituted a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power.

130 F.3d at 1042, 1057 (Wald, J.); id. at 1057 (Henderson, J.,

concurring). The court found that application of the ESA fell

within the third Lopez category, concluding that the regulated

activity ‘‘substantially affects’’ interstate commerce. In so

holding, the majority agreed upon two rationales: (1) ‘‘the

loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our

ecosystem and likewise on interstate commerce’’; and (2) ‘‘the

Department’s protection of the flies regulates and substantially affects commercial development activity which is plainly

interstate.’’ Id. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring); see id.

at 1046 n.3, 1056 (Wald, J.). Examining those two rationales

within the context of Lopez’s four factors, the NAHB court

concluded that application of the ESA to the county’s proposed construction project was constitutional. Id. at 1042,

1057 (Wald, J.); id. at 1057 (Henderson, J., concurring).

Because the second NAHB rationale readily resolves this

case, it is the focus of the balance of our discussion.2

2 In focusing on the second NAHB rationale, we do not mean to

discredit the first. Nor do we mean to discredit rationales that

other circuits have relied upon in upholding endangered species

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B

Secretary Norton argues, and the district court concluded,

that application of the four Lopez factors leads to the same

result here as it did in NAHB. We agree.

The first Lopez factor is whether the regulated activity has

anything ‘‘to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic

enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.’’

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.

The regulated activity at issue in NAHB — the construction

of a hospital, power plant, and supporting infrastructure —

was plainly an economic enterprise. As Judge Henderson

observed, ‘‘the Department’s protection of the flies regulates

and substantially affects commercial development activity.’’

NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058; see id. at 1056 (Wald, J.) (‘‘[T]he

case at hand involves a regulation of the conditions under

which commercial activity takes place.’’). The same is true

here, where the regulated activity is the construction of a 202-

acre commercial housing development.

Second, the court must consider whether the statute in

question contains an ‘‘express jurisdictional element.’’ Lopez,

514 U.S. at 561–62; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611–12.

Section 9 of the ESA has no express jurisdictional hook that

limits its application, for example, to takes ‘‘in or affecting

commerce.’’ Lopez did not indicate that such a hook is

required, however, and its absence did not dissuade the

legislation. We simply have no need to consider those other

rationales to dispose of the case before us. See, e.g., Gibbs v.

Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 497 (4th Cir. 2000) (‘‘The protection of the

red wolf on both federal and private land substantially affects

interstate commerce through tourism, trade, scientific research, and

other potential economic activities.’’); United States v. Bramble, 103

F.3d 1475, 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Bald and

Golden Eagle Protection Act’s prohibition on the possession of eagle

feathers, see 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), because ‘‘[e]xtinction of the eagle

would substantially affect interstate commerce by foreclosing any

possibility of several types of commercial activity,’’ including ‘‘future

commerce in eagles,’’ ‘‘future interstate travel for the purpose of

TTT studying eagles,’’ ‘‘or future commerce in beneficial products

derived TTT from analysis of their genetic material’’).

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NAHB court from finding application of the ESA constitutional.3

 Nor did it dissuade the Fourth Circuit from finding a

similar application of the ESA constitutional in Gibbs v.

Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000). Indeed, all of the

circuits that have addressed the question since Lopez (as well

as those that have considered the matter since Morrison)

have concluded that the absence of an express jurisdictional

element is not fatal to a statute’s constitutionality under the

Commerce Clause.4

 Rather, in a case like this, ‘‘[t]he absence

of such a jurisdictional element simply means that courts

must determine independently whether the statute regulates

activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial

transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[ ] interstate commerce.’’ United States v. Moghadam,

175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The third Lopez factor looks to whether there are ‘‘express

congressional findings’’ or legislative history ‘‘regarding the

effects upon interstate commerce’’ of the regulated activity.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–62. There are no such findings or

history with respect to the specific rationale that we rely upon

here, the effect of commercial housing construction on interstate commerce.5

 But neither findings nor legislative history

3 Nor did Morrison, discussed below, make an express jurisdictional element necessary. See 529 U.S. at 612 (stating only that

such an element ‘‘may establish that the enactment is in pursuance

of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce’’).

4 See, e.g., Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2002);

Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 211 (5th Cir.

2000); United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275–76 (11th

Cir. 1999); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 675 (5th Cir. 1997);

see also Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8 (acknowledging that ‘‘the lack of

a jurisdictional element may not be dispositive’’).

5 There is ESA legislative history that supports the other primary

rationale relied upon in NAHB — the effect of the loss of biodiversity on interstate commerce. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1050 (Wald,

J.). There are also express findings and legislative history indicating that Congress enacted the ESA out of concern that land

development and habitat modification were leading to species exUSCA Case #01-5373 Document #741450 Filed: 04/01/2003 Page 10 of 30
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is necessary.6

 As Lopez acknowledged, ‘‘Congress normally

is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial

burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.’’ Id. at

562; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. Rather, such evidence merely ‘‘enable[s] [the court] to evaluate the legislative

judgment that the activity in question substantially affected

interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect

was visible to the naked eye.’’ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563; accord

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. As we discuss in the remainder of

this section, the naked eye requires no assistance here.

The fourth Lopez factor is whether the relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce is too

attenuated to be regarded as substantial. See Lopez, 514

U.S. at 563–67; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. Although

Rancho Viejo avers that the effect on interstate commerce of

preserving endangered species is too tenuous to satisfy this

test, it does not argue that the effect of commercial construction projects is similarly attenuated. Because the rationale

upon which we rely focuses on the activity that the federal

government seeks to regulate in this case (the construction of

Rancho Viejo’s housing development), and because we are

required to accord congressional legislation a ‘‘presumption of

constitutionality,’’ Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607, plaintiff’s failure

to demonstrate (or even to argue) that its project and those

like it are without substantial interstate effect is fatal to its

cause.

This conclusion is not diminished by the fact that the

arroyo toad, like the Flower-Loving Fly, does not travel

outside of California, or that Rancho Viejo’s development, like

the San Bernardino hospital, is located wholly within the

state. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1043–44 (Wald, J.) (noting

that the fly has an eight-mile radius, limited to California

alone). As Judge Henderson said in NAHB, the regulation of

commercial land development, quite ‘‘apart from the charactinction and had to be controlled by federal legislation. See infra

Part III.B.

6 See, e.g., Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493 n.3; Moghadam, 175 F.3d at

1275.

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teristics or range of the specific endangered species involved,

has a plain and substantial effect on interstate commerce.’’

Id. at 1059. There, ‘‘the regulation relate[d] to both the

proposed redesigned traffic intersection and the hospital it

[was] intended to serve, each of which ha[d] an obvious

connection with interstate commerce.’’ Id. (Henderson, J.,

concurring); accord id. at 1048, 1056 (Wald, J.). Here,

Rancho Viejo’s 202-acre project, located near a major interstate highway, is likewise one that ‘‘is presumably being

constructed using materials and people from outside the state

and which will attract’’ construction workers and purchasers

‘‘from both inside and outside the state.’’ Id. at 1048 (Wald,

J.).7

This analysis is perfectly consistent with Lopez. In that

case, the Court noted that it had ‘‘upheld a wide variety of

congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity

where we have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce.’’ 514 U.S. at 559. Such conclusions were often based upon viewing ‘‘regulations of activities

that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction TTT in the aggregate.’’ Id. at 561.8

 To survive Commerce Clause review, all the government must establish is

7 Application of the ESA to habitat degradation has a further

impact on interstate commerce by removing the incentives for

states ‘‘to adopt lower standards of endangered species protection

in order to attract development,’’ thereby preventing a destructive

‘‘race to the bottom.’’ NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1054–56 (Wald, J.); see

infra Part III.D.

8 The cases cited by the Court include: Hodel v. Virginia Surface

Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), which Lopez

described as involving ‘‘the regulation of intrastate coal mining’’;

Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), which addressed

congressional regulation of ‘‘intrastate extortionate credit transactions’’; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241

(1964), which reviewed the application of Title II of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 to ‘‘inns and hotels catering to interstate guests’’; and

Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), a case involving

application of the same statute to ‘‘the regulation of TTT restaurants

utilizing substantial interstate supplies.’’ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60.

USCA Case #01-5373 Document #741450 Filed: 04/01/2003 Page 12 of 30
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that ‘‘a rational basis exist[s] for concluding that a regulated

activity sufficiently affect[s] interstate commerce.’’ Id. at

557. And there can be no doubt that such a relationship

exists for costly commercial developments like Rancho Viejo’s.9

 As Judge Henderson made clear in NAHB, ‘‘[i]nsofar

as application of section 9(a)(1) of [the] ESA TTT acts to

regulate commercial development of the land inhabited by the

endangered species, ‘it may TTT be reached by Congress’

because ‘it asserts a substantial economic effect on interstate

commerce.’ ’’ 130 F.3d at 1059–60 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at

556 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942))).

III

Rancho Viejo does not seriously dispute that NAHB is

indistinguishable from this case. Rather, plaintiff argues

that, as a result of subsequent Supreme Court decisions in

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Solid

Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers (‘‘SWANCC’’), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), NAHB is no

longer ‘‘good law.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 9. Before considering

plaintiff’s argument in detail, we explain why the nature of

9 For example, in McClung, cited with approval in Lopez, 514 U.S.

at 559, the Court upheld application of Title II of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq., to a local restaurant. 379

U.S. at 303–05. The Court found the application of the statute to

be within Congress’ commerce power because the restaurant

bought 46% of its food, costing approximately $70,000, from a local

supplier who obtained it from outside of the state. Id. at 296, 298.

In part, the McClung Court relied on the fact that the amount of

food the restaurant procured from out of state, ‘‘ ‘taken together

with that of many others similarly situated,’ ’’ was ‘‘ ‘far from

trivial.’ ’’ Id. at 301 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,

127–28 (1942)). Cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425

U.S. 738, 744 (1976) (holding that a conspiracy against a North

Carolina hospital had ‘‘a substantial effect on interstate commerce,’’

and hence was covered by the Sherman Act, because it could, inter

alia, reduce the hospital’s purchases of out-of-state medicines and

supplies).

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the Supreme Court’s analysis in those decisions makes it

highly unlikely that they undermine our circuit precedent.

In Morrison, the Court considered a challenge to a section

of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which

provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence. Concluding that the case was ‘‘controlled

by our decision[ ] in United States v. Lopez,’’ the Court held

that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under

the Commerce Clause. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. Lopez, of

course, is the case that controlled this court’s decision in

NAHB. Accordingly, because NAHB was based upon Lopez,

and because Morrison made clear that ‘‘Lopez TTT provides

the proper framework for conducting the required analysis,’’

id. at 609, it would be quite surprising if Morrison undermined our decision in NAHB. See Norton v. Ashcroft, 298

F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2002) (‘‘Rather than breaking new

Commerce Clause ground, Morrison derived its four-factor

framework directly from Lopez.’’).

Rancho Viejo’s reliance on SWANCC is even further from

the mark. In that case, the Supreme Court held, as a matter

of statutory construction, that an abandoned gravel pit that

provided habitat for migratory birds did not constitute ‘‘navigable waters’’ within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1344(a), and hence was beyond the regulatory authority of the Army Corps of Engineers. 531 U.S. at 167,

171–72. Although the petitioner in SWANCC also asked the

Court to decide whether Congress could exercise such authority under the Commerce Clause if it chose to do so, the

Court expressly declined to reach that question. Id. at 162.

As Rancho Viejo notes, the Court did indicate that if it were

to consider the constitutionality of such an exercise, it ‘‘would

have to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the

aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.’’ Id. at

173 (quoted in Appellant’s Br. at 17). But as we discuss

below, identifying the ‘‘precise activity’’ at issue in Rancho

Viejo’s case only strengthens the conclusion that the take

provision of the ESA can constitutionally be applied to plaintiff’s construction project.

USCA Case #01-5373 Document #741450 Filed: 04/01/2003 Page 14 of 30
15

A

Plaintiff’s principal argument is that, although Lopez made

clear that the first of its four factors was whether the object

of regulation was ‘‘economic activity,’’ 514 U.S. at 559, Morrison ‘‘reaffirmed and elaborated upon’’ that factor in a way

that undercuts this circuit’s opinion in NAHB. Appellant’s

Br. at 14. We agree that Morrison reaffirmed and elaborated upon the first factor, but we see nothing in Morrison’s

discussion to suggest any dissatisfaction with the way the

Court treated the factor in Lopez, and hence nothing to

undercut our prior reliance on that case. To the contrary,

Morrison largely proceeded by quoting and paraphrasing

Lopez’s analysis. See, e.g., 529 U.S. at 610 (noting that in

Lopez, the Court ‘‘observed that § 922(q) was ‘a criminal

statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘‘commerce’’

or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one

might define those terms’ ’’ (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561)).

Rancho Viejo contends that Morrison stands for the proposition that whether the regulated activity is economic is not

simply a factor in the analysis, but instead is outcomedeterminative: that noneconomic activity, whatever its effect

on interstate commerce, cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause.10 Although plaintiff acknowledges that Morrison expressly ‘‘declined to ‘adopt a categorical rule against

aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity’ because a

categorical rule was unnecessary to the outcome of that case,’’

it argues that the Court ‘‘came pretty close’’ to adopting such

a rule. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4 (quoting Morrison, 529

U.S. at 613). Because the arroyo toad is not itself ‘‘the

subject of commercial activity,’’ id. at 15, Rancho Viejo argues

that regulation of the toad fails Morrison’s (and Lopez’s) first

factor.

10 But see Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(holding, post-Lopez but pre-Morrison, that ‘‘[t]he regulated activity

TTT need not be commercial, so long as its effect on interstate

commerce is substantial’’).

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16

But how close the Court came to embracing plaintiff’s view

is irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal, because the

ESA regulates takings, not toads.

11 Morrison instructs that

‘‘the proper inquiry’’ is whether the challenge is to ‘‘a regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.’’ 529 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added). Similarly,

SWANCC declares that what is required is an evaluation of

‘‘the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.’’ 531 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added). When, as directed, we turn our attention to the

precise activity that is regulated in this case, there is no

question but that it is economic in nature.

That regulated activity is Rancho Viejo’s planned commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it threatens. The

ESA does not purport to tell toads what they may or may not

do. Rather, section 9 limits the taking of listed species, and

its prohibitions and corresponding penalties apply to the

persons who do the taking, not to the species that are taken.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), (a)(1)(B) (making it ‘‘unlawful for

any person TTT to take any such species’’) (emphasis added);

id. § 1540 (providing civil and criminal penalties for ‘‘[a]ny

person who knowingly violates’’ the ESA). In this case, the

prohibited taking is accomplished by commercial construction,

and the unlawful taker is Rancho Viejo.

Nothing in the facts of Morrison or Lopez suggests that

focusing on plaintiff’s construction project is inappropriate or

insufficient as a basis for sustaining this application of the

ESA. Both of those cases involved the regulation of purely

noneconomic activity: the statute in Morrison regulated gender-motivated violence; the one in Lopez regulated gun possession. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (noting that ‘‘the

noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was

central to our decision in’’ Lopez). Although Rancho Viejo

argues that, in fact, the Lopez defendant had brought the gun

to school in order to sell it, one can examine the Supreme

Court’s opinion with a microscope without learning that fact.

11 See Oral Arg. Tr. at 5 (acknowledgment by plaintiff’s counsel

that ‘‘the regulated activity here [is] the taking of an Arroyo Toad’’).

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17

It appears only in the lower court’s opinion, see United States

v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), and the Supreme

Court attached no significance to it. To the contrary, Morrison describes Lopez as a case in which ‘‘neither the actors nor

their conduct ha[d] a commercial character, and neither the

purposes nor the design of the statute ha[d] an evident

commercial nexus.’’ 529 U.S. at 611 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.

at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

Here, by contrast, both the ‘‘actor,’’ a real estate company,

and its ‘‘conduct,’’ the construction of a housing development,

have a plainly commercial character. So too does the ‘‘design’’ of the statute: the ESA seeks in part to regulate

‘‘economic growth and development untempered by adequate

concern and conservation,’’ which, Congress found, had the

consequence of rendering ‘‘various species TTT extinct.’’ 16

U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1). As Judge Henderson wrote in NAHB:

‘‘It is plain, then, that TTT the Congress contemplated protecting endangered species through regulation of land and its

development, which is precisely what the Department has

attempted to do here. Such regulation, apart from the

characteristics or range of the specific endangered species

involved, has a plain and substantial effect on interstate

commerce.’’ 130 F.3d at 1059.12

B

Rancho Viejo suggests that even if the regulated activity

here is the taking of the toads through economic activity, that

fact still does not end the matter. Although the ESA may

regulate economic activity, plaintiff insists that the statute has

12 In United States v. Ho, the Fifth Circuit applied a similar

analysis in affirming, against a Commerce Clause challenge, the

conviction of a contractor who violated asbestos work practice

standards promulgated under the Clean Air Act. 311 F.3d 589,

601–04 (5th Cir. 2002). Focusing on ‘‘the regulated intrastate

activity, asbestos removal,’’ id. at 602, rather than on ‘‘the effects of

interstate pollution,’’ id. at 602 n.12, the court concluded that

asbestos removal ‘‘is very much a commercial activity in today’s

economy,’’ id. at 602.

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a noneconomic purpose: the preservation of biodiversity, and,

in this case, the preservation of toads that Rancho Viejo

maintains are without commercial value. Asserting that to

survive Commerce Clause scrutiny a statute must be aimed at

economic activity and not simply regulate it for some other

purpose, Rancho Viejo concludes that the ESA (at least as

applied to its project) must fall. This argument suffers from

a number of serious defects.

First, the ESA, like many statutes, has multiple purposes.

Whether or not economic considerations were the primary

motivation for the Act, there is no question that the commercial value of preserving species diversity played an important

role in Congress’ deliberations. As Judge Wald described in

NAHB, ‘‘[t]he Committee Reports on the ESA reveal that

one of the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect

endangered species from ‘takings’ was the importance of the

continuing availability of a wide variety of species to interstate commerce.’’ 130 F.3d at 1050. Likewise, the Fourth

Circuit has noted that ‘‘[c]ommittee reports and legislative

debates have emphasized the importance of endangered species to interstate commerce.’’ Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494 n.3.

Thus, to use a ‘‘noneconomic purpose’’ test to overturn a

multi-purpose statute like the ESA, we would have to do so

on the ground that economic concerns were not the Act’s

‘‘true’’ or ‘‘primary’’ motivation. Such an enterprise is

fraught with both difficulty and danger, see Michael M. v.

Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 469–70 (1981) (plurality opinion of

Rehnquist, J.); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–

86 (1968), and the Supreme Court has therefore permitted

inquiry into legislative purpose in only a narrow class of

cases, see City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,

Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377–78 & n.6 (1991).13 The enterprise is

13 In City of Columbia, Justice Scalia noted that the Court has

probed governmental motivation ‘‘only in the ‘very limited and welldefined class of cases where the very nature of the constitutional

question requires [this] inquiry.’ ’’ 499 U.S. at 378 n.6 (quoting

O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 n.30). As an example of a case in that

limited class, he cited Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan

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19

difficult because distilling the true or primary legislative

purpose out of the motivations of 435 representatives and 100

senators is inherently problematic. And it is that difficulty

that makes the project a dangerous one — dangerous because

the indeterminacy of outcome leaves courts open to the

charge that they have manipulated the determination of

purpose in order to achieve their own policy preferences, and

because rejecting a stated congressional purpose as ‘‘untrue’’

reflects considerable disrespect for the pronouncements of a

democratically elected branch of government. Is the ESA’s

true purpose to preserve the economic potential of species

whose commercial value we cannot now foresee, or did Congress regard species protection as a moral imperative? Was

the Occupational Safety and Health Act enacted to spare the

country the loss of productivity occasioned by workplace

injury, or to protect the lives of American workers for their

own sake? Did Congress pass the Clean Air and Clean

Water Acts out of concern that pollution hurts the economy,

or out of a fundamental concern for the health of the citizenry? For courts to insist on making these kinds of determinations a prerequisite for upholding the validity of congressional

legislation is a recipe for judicial intervention in the political

process.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has long held that Congress

may act under the Commerce Clause to achieve noneconomic

ends through the regulation of commercial activity. The first

case in this line is Champion v. Ames, in which the Court

upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, notwithstanding that

Congress passed the statute ‘‘for the protection of public

morals.’’ 188 U.S. 321, 355–57 (1903). ‘‘We should hesitate

long,’’ the Court said, ‘‘before adjudging that an evil of such

appalling character, carried on through interstate commerce,

cannot be met and crushed by the only power competent to

that end.’’ Id. at 357–58. Ten years later, citing Champion,

the Court rejected a Commerce Clause attack on the Mann

Act, which prohibited the transportation of women in interHousing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 & n.18 (1977), a case

involving ‘‘race-based motivation.’’ 499 U.S. at 378 n.6.

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state commerce ‘‘for immoral purposes.’’ Hoke v. United

States, 227 U.S. 308, 317, 320 (1913). The Court rejected the

defendant’s claims that the act was ‘‘a subterfuge and an

attempt to interfere with the police power of the states to

regulate the morals of their citizens.’’ Id. at 321. ‘‘[T]he

powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the

nation,’’ the Court said, ‘‘are adapted to be exercised, whether

independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral.’’ Id. at 322 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court briefly departed from this line in

Hammer v. Dagenhart, enjoining, on Commerce Clause

grounds, the enforcement of a 1916 federal statute excluding

the products of child labor from interstate commerce. 247

U.S. 251, 277 (1918). Over Justice Holmes’ dissent, the Court

held the statute unconstitutional because ‘‘[t]he thing intended’’ was not regulation of ‘‘transportation among the states,’’

but rather ‘‘standardiz[ation] [of] the ages at which children

may be employed in mining and manufacturing.’’ Id. at 271–

72. But Hammer was expressly overruled in United States

v. Darby, in which the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act’s prohibition on the shipment in interstate commerce of products produced by employees whose wages or

hours did not conform to the Act’s requirements. 312 U.S.

100, 116–17 (1941). ‘‘The motive and purpose of a regulation

of interstate commerce,’’ the Court declared, ‘‘are matters for

the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the

Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts

are given no control.’’ Id. at 115.

Since then, the Supreme Court has never held an exercise

of Congress’ commerce power unconstitutional on the ground

that the legislature had a noneconomic purpose. Perhaps the

most important of the subsequent cases is Heart of Atlanta

Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964), in

which the Court rebuffed a Commerce Clause attack on Title

II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq.

The Court acknowledged that ‘‘[t]he Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the fundamental object of Title

II was to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that

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21

surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.’’ Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). But

the fact that Congress passed the statute to attack the moral

outrage of racial discrimination did not lead the Supreme

Court to find it unconstitutional. To the contrary, citing

several of the cases discussed above, the Court held that the

fact ‘‘[t]hat Congress was legislating against moral wrongs

TTT render[s] its enactments no less valid.’’ Id. at 257; see

id. at 256–57.

The position urged by Rancho Viejo puts the constitutionality of many of the above-described statutes at risk. And they

are hardly the only ones. Congress’ primary object in passing product safety legislation, for example, was not to improve the productivity of industry but rather to protect the

well-being of the public.14 Much the same can be said of

federal environmental legislation.15 And plaintiff’s position

would make federal criminal law an area of particular vulnerability. Surely statutes proscribing the use or possession of

explosives, of weapons of mass destruction, and of firearms by

convicted felons, were not passed merely (or even primarily)

to protect commercial property — but to protect lives.16 Nor

did Congress bar the murder of public safety officers because

14 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1)

(declaring that the first purpose of the Act is ‘‘to protect the public

against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products’’); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 49

U.S.C. § 30101 (stating that ‘‘the purpose of this chapter is to

reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from

traffic accidents’’).

15 See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 (1981) (noting that

‘‘Congress adopted the Surface Mining Act in order to ensure that

production of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the

expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety’’).

16 See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,

§ 1123, 116 Stat. 2135, 2283–85 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 842(i), which

had prohibited certain categories of persons from receiving or

possessing any explosive that has been shipped ‘‘in interstate commerce,’’ by inserting ‘‘or affecting’’ before ‘‘interstate’’); 18 U.S.C.

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22

it was concerned about the economic impact of their deaths,17

or the shipment of child pornography because it thought that

the market for such materials was suboptimal.18

It is true that Congress has tied the application of many of

these statutes to jurisdictional hooks. But there are many

other criminal statutes that are not so tied. See, e.g., 21

U.S.C. § 841(a) & (b)(1)(A)(iv) (making it unlawful to possess

with intent to distribute 100 grams of PCP). Moreover, as

we have noted above, a jurisdictional element is not critical to

a statute’s constitutionality as long as there is other evidence

that interstate commerce is substantially affected. See supra

Part II.B. Rancho Viejo offers no reason to regard a noneconomic purpose as acceptable if tied to a jurisdictional hook,

but unacceptable if effectuated — as it is here — through the

direct regulation of commercial activity.19

§ 2332a (making it unlawful to use a weapon of mass destruction

against any person within the United States where the results of

such use ‘‘affect interstate TTT commerce’’); id. § 844(o) (barring

the transfer of explosive materials with knowledge that they will be

used to commit a crime of violence); id. § 922(g) (making it

unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a firearm ‘‘in or affecting

commerce’’).

17 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (setting penalties for receiving an

explosive in interstate commerce with intent to kill or injure, where

injury or death results to any person, including a public safety

officer).

18 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (criminalizing the transportation of

child pornography in interstate commerce); see also United States

v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding a federal

statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography on the

ground of substantial effect on interstate commerce).

19 Similarly, it is also true that the cases in the Champion/Hoke/Darby/Heart of Atlanta line can be described as falling

within the first Lopez category — the regulation of the use of the

channels of interstate commerce. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609

(citing Darby and Heart of Atlanta as examples of that category of

cases). But the demarcation between the Lopez categories is far

from clear. For example, the Court has repeatedly referred to

Heart of Atlanta (and its companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung)

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There is nothing in Morrison or Lopez to put the Champion/Hoke/Darby/Heart of Atlanta line of precedent in doubt.

Indeed, both decisions repeatedly cite Darby and Heart of

Atlanta. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609, 610, 614;

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 558, 559. Morrison did

overturn a statute that was passed with a moral purpose:

protecting women against violent crime. But unlike the ESA,

the Violence Against Women Act sought to achieve its objective by regulating an activity — gender-motivated violence —

that the Court found was not ‘‘in any sense of the phrase,

economic activity.’’ Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. Similarly,

the Gun-Free School Zones Act sought to achieve its noneconomic purpose — the preemption of potential gun violence

near schools — by regulating conduct, ‘‘[t]he possession of a

gun in a local school zone,’’ that was ‘‘in no sense an economic

activity.’’ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573–74 (quoted in Morrison, 529

U.S. at 610). Thus, neither case precludes the conclusion that

it is constitutional to apply the ESA to a commercial construction project like Rancho Viejo’s. And a court must hesitate

before extending those two cases, neither of which involved

economic regulation of any kind, to require the unraveling of

a vast fabric of Supreme Court precedent and congressional

legislation.

C

Rancho Viejo next argues that even if the taking regulated

in this case is commercial in character, the ESA bans other

takings that are not. Because the ESA’s prohibition on

takings applies as much to a hiker’s ‘‘casual walk in the

woods’’ as to the commercial activities of a real estate company, Rancho Viejo contends that the statute cannot constituas also falling within the third category — the regulation of

activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. See

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. Moreover,

Rancho Viejo again proffers no reason why it would be permissible

for Congress to have a noneconomic purpose when regulating the

use of the channels of interstate commerce but impermissible when

regulating activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.

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24

tionally be applied to its taking of arroyo toads. Appellant’s

Reply Br. at 5. Plaintiff’s ‘‘overbreadth’’ argument is unavailing.

In Lopez, the Supreme Court noted that ‘‘where a general

regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce,

the de minimis character of individual instances arising under

that statute is of no consequence.’’ 514 U.S. at 558 (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27

(1968)). Hence, because much activity regulated by the ESA

does bear a substantial relation to commerce, it may well be

that the hiker hypothetical proffered by the plaintiff is ‘‘of no

consequence’’ to the statute’s constitutionality. See Hodel v.

Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981) (‘‘A complex regulatory

program TTT can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is

independently and directly related to a valid congressional

goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions are an

integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies [the Commerce Clause] test.’’).20

But we need not decide that question here because there is

a more basic answer to Rancho Viejo’s hiker hypothetical: it

is not this case. Plaintiff characterizes its complaint as

‘‘fundamentally TTT an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the Defendants’ regulation of the ‘taking’ of

Arroyo toads under the ESA.’’ Complaint ¶ 2. And as we

have already discussed, the particular application before us

involves the regulation of Rancho Viejo’s commercial real

estate development, which falls well within the powers granted Congress under the Commerce Clause.

At oral argument, Rancho Viejo asserted that it has a

different kind of ‘‘as-applied’’ challenge in mind. Plaintiff’s

20 It may also be that application of the ESA to hikers or toad

hunters can be sustained on the other rationale relied on in NAHB,

‘‘that the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our

ecosystem and likewise on interstate commerce.’’ 130 F.3d at 1058

(Henderson, J., concurring); see Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497 (citing

NAHB).

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objection, it said, is not confined to the application of the ESA

to its development project, but ‘‘to the listing of this particular endangered species,’’ the arroyo toad. Oral Arg. Tr. at 5.

In effect, plaintiff explained, ‘‘[w]e are facially challenging the

listing of the arroyo toad.’’ Id. at 20. But this curious

characterization is simply the plaintiff’s attempt to have its

cake and eat it too. The company would like us to consider

its challenge to the ESA only as applied to the arroyo toad,

which it says has no ‘‘known commercial value’’ — unlike, for

example, Mark Twain’s celebrated jumping frogs of Calaveras

County. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9; see Appellant’s Br. at

20–21. Yet it would also like us to regard that narrow

challenge as a facial one, unconstrained by the fact that

plaintiff is a commercial developer.

This artificially constructed ‘‘facial’’ challenge must fail. As

the Supreme Court held in United States v. Salerno, to

mount a successful facial challenge, ‘‘the challenger must

establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the

Act would be valid. The fact that the TTT Act might operate

unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we

have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the

limited context of the First Amendment.’’ 481 U.S. 739, 745

(1987).21 Because Rancho Viejo’s own case represents a ‘‘set

of circumstances’’ under which the ESA may constitutionally

be applied — even to the lowly arroyo toad — plaintiff cannot

shoulder the ‘‘heavy burden’’ required to prevail in a facial

challenge. Id. In effect, Rancho Viejo seeks to trade the

21 See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253

F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Salerno to a Commerce

Clause challenge and holding that the plaintiff ‘‘must establish that

no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged ordinance] would be valid’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); United

States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); see also

AMFAC Resorts v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 282 F.3d 818, 826 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (noting that this circuit has repeatedly ‘‘invoked Salerno’s

no-set-of-circumstances test to reject facial constitutional challenges’’), cert. granted on other grounds sub nom. Nat’l Park

Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 123 S.Ct. 549 (2002).

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shoes of a commercial developer for those of a weekend hiker.

But permitting plaintiff to stand in the hiker’s shoes would

mean recognizing the kind of overbreadth challenge the Supreme Court has expressly forsworn.

Before leaving this point, we further note that the constitutional circumstances we rely on here — takings by commercial developers — are neither an unintended nor an insignificant portion of the activities regulated by the ESA. In that

statute, ‘‘Congress expressly found that ‘economic growth and

development untempered by adequate concern and conservation’ was the cause for ‘various species of fish, wildlife, and

plants in the United States hav[ing] been rendered extinct.’ ’’

NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (quoting

16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1)). Moreover, as Secretary Norton

points out, ‘‘the activities that cause the loss of endangered

species and that are regulated by the take prohibition are

themselves generally commercial and economic activities.’’

Appellees’ Br. at 34. Finally, in listing the arroyo toad as an

endangered species, the FWS specifically found that ‘‘[d]evelopment projects in riparian wetlands have caused permanent

losses of riparian habitats and are the most conspicuous

factor in the decline of the arroyo toad.’’ 59 Fed. Reg. at

64,863. Because Congress has constitutional authority to

regulate such development projects, Rancho Viejo’s complaint

fails regardless of whether it is characterized as an as-applied

or facial challenge.

D

Finally, Rancho Viejo draws our attention to Morrison’s

declaration that ‘‘[t]he Constitution requires a distinction

between what is truly national and what is truly local.’’ 529

U.S. at 617–18. Plaintiff argues that the ESA represents an

unlawful assertion of congressional power over local land use

decisions, which it describes as an area of traditional state

regulation. The ESA, however, does not constitute a general

regulation of land use.22 Far from encroaching upon territo22 Cf. California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S.

572, 587 (1987) (stating that ‘‘the core activity described by’’ land

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27

ry that has traditionally been the domain of state and local

government, the ESA represents a national response to a

specific problem of ‘‘truly national’’ concern.

In making these points, we can do little to improve upon

the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Gibbs, which upheld, as a valid

exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause, an

FWS regulation that limited the taking of red wolves. 214

F.3d at 487. As Chief Judge Wilkinson explained, regulation

of the taking of endangered species ‘‘does not involve an ‘area

of traditional state concern,’ one to which ‘States lay claim by

right of history and expertise.’ ’’ Id. at 499 (quoting Lopez,

514 U.S. at 580, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Rather, as

the Supreme Court acknowledged in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs

Band of Chippewa Indians, ‘‘[a]lthough States have important interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources

within their borders, this authority is shared with the Federal

Government when the Federal Government exercises one of

its enumerated constitutional powers.’’ 526 U.S. 172, 204

(1999). Moreover, while ‘‘states and localities possess broad

regulatory and zoning authority over land within their jurisdictions, TTT [i]t is well established TTT that Congress can

regulate even private land use for environmental and wildlife

conservation.’’ Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 500. Tracing a hundredyear history of congressional involvement in natural resource

conservation, Chief Judge Wilkinson concluded that ‘‘it is

clear from our laws and precedent that federal regulation of

endangered wildlife does not trench impermissibly upon state

powers.’’ Id. at 500–01.

The Fourth Circuit also recognized the national scope of

the problem posed by species conservation. Citing the ESA’s

legislative history, the court noted Congress’ concern that

‘‘ ‘protection of endangered species is not a matter that can be

handled in the absence of coherent national and international

use planning and environmental regulation ‘‘is undoubtedly different,’’ because ‘‘environmental regulation TTT does not mandate

particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land

is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed

limits’’).

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policies: the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized policies and programs by various states might well be

confusion compounded.’ ’’ Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502 (quoting

H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 7 (1973)). As the Gibbs court

explained: ‘‘States may decide to forego or limit conservation

efforts in order to lower these costs, and other states may be

forced to follow suit in order to compete.’’ Id. at 501. Our

court has recognized this problem as well. See NAHB, 130

F.3d at 1055 (Wald, J.) (noting that states may be ‘‘motivated

to adopt lower standards of endangered species protection in

order to attract development’’). And the Supreme Court, as

the Fourth Circuit observed, ‘‘has held that Congress may

take cognizance of this dynamic and arrest the ‘race to the

bottom’ in order to prevent interstate competition whose

overall effect would damage the quality of the national environment.’’ Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501 (citing Hodel v. Virginia

Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)).23

For these reasons, the protection of endangered species

cannot fairly be described as a power ‘‘which the Founders

denied the National Government and reposed in the States.’’

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. Rather, ‘‘the preservation of

endangered species is historically a federal function,’’ Gibbs,

214 F.3d at 505, and invalidating this application of the ESA

‘‘would call into question the historic power of the federal

government to preserve scarce resources in one locality for

the future benefit of all Americans,’’ id. at 492. We therefore

agree with Chief Judge Wilkinson that to sustain challenges

of this nature ‘‘would require courts to move abruptly from

23 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 268, 281–82

(rejecting a claim that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation

Act exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause power because it regulates local land use, noting that the Act responds to congressional

concern that ‘‘nationwide ‘surface mining and reclamation standards

are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate

commerce TTT will not be used to undermine the ability of the

several States to improve and maintain adequate standards,’ ’’ and

holding that ‘‘[t]he prevention of this sort of destructive interstate

competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the

Commerce Clause’’ (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g))).

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preserving traditional state roles to dismantling historic federal ones.’’ Id. at 504.

IV

‘‘Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of

Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.’’ Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607

(citations omitted). Rancho Viejo has not made that ‘‘plain

showing’’ here. Rather, its attack on the constitutionality of

the application of the ESA to its commercial housing development is indistinguishable from the attack we turned back in

NAHB, and nothing in subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has undermined the precedential authority of that

decision. Accordingly, NAHB controls our decision in this

case, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Secretary Norton is therefore

Affirmed.

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GINSBURG, Chief Judge, concurring: Although I do not

disagree with anything in the opinion of the court, I write

separately because I do not believe our opinion makes clear,

as the Supreme Court requires, that there is a logical stopping point to our rationale for upholding the constitutionality

of the exercise of the Congress’s power under the Commerce

Clause here challenged. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (‘‘if we

were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard

pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is

without power to regulate’’); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16;

see also United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1455-56 (6th Cir.

1996) (Boggs, J., dissenting in part) (‘‘the rationale offered to

support the constitutionality of the statute TTT has a logical

stopping point, so that the rationale is not so broad as to

regulate on a similar basis all human endeavors, especially

those traditionally regulated by the states’’).

In this case I think it clear that our rationale for concluding

the take of the arroyo toad affects interstate commerce does

indeed have a logical stopping point, though it goes unremarked in the opinion of the court. Our rationale is that,

with respect to a species that is not an article in interstate

commerce and does not affect interstate commerce, a take

can be regulated if – but only if – the take itself substantially

affects interstate commerce. The large-scale residential development that is the take in this case clearly does affect

interstate commerce. Just as important, however, the lone

hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in

order to landscape his property, though he takes the toad,

does not affect interstate commerce.

Without this limitation, the Government could regulate as a

take any kind of activity, regardless whether that activity had

any connection with interstate commerce. With this understanding of the rationale of the case, I concur in the opinion

of the court.

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