Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01675/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01675-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv1675

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR LEE MILLER,

Petitioner,

v.

J.W. SULLIVAN, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 08-CV-1675-JLS (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Arthur Lee Miller (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner who was convicted on

November 18, 2005 of one count of second degree murder (Cal. Penal Code §187(a))

and one count of “attempted voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of the

charged attempted murder” (Cal. Penal Code §§ 192(a)/664). [Lodgment No. 3, Court

of Appeal Slip Opinion (“Cal. Ct. App. slip. op.”) at 1; Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s

Appeal Transcript (“RAT”) Vol. 8, Nov. 16, Nov. 17, & Nov. 18, 2005 at 727-29.] The

jury also found Petitioner “personally used a handgun in the commission of both

crimes.” (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5(a)). [Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip op. at 1.] 

It found he “personally used a handgun in the commission of the attempted voluntary

manslaughter,” within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b). [Id.] Finally, it

found he “intentionally discharged a handgun in the commission of the murder which

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 1 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 08cv1675

proximately caused great bodily injury and death,” within the meaning of Cal. Penal

Code § 12022.53(d).” [Id. at 1-2.] The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a term of

55 years, 6 months to life in prison on May 8, 2006. [Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 9, May 8,

2006 at 754.]

Petitioner appealed his conviction, and on December 21, 2007, the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One affirmed the conviction in an

unpublished opinion. [Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip op. at 1, 28.] The court

amended its opinion on January 10, 2008 and the conviction remained affirmed. 

[Lodgment No. 3, Order Modifying Opinion (“Cal. Ct. App. mod. slip op.”) at 1-3.] 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court

[Lodgment No. 3, Petition for Review] on January 28, 2009, which that court summarily

denied on April 9, 2008. [Lodgment No. 4 at 1.] Petitioner did not pursue collateral

review in the state courts. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition on September 11, 2008. [Doc. No. 1.] 

Respondent filed an answer on April 22, 2009. [Doc No. 15.] Petitioner filed a traverse

on May 11, 2009. [Doc. No. 16.] 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to

be correct. Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-

36 (1992). 

The relevant facts of the case are taken directly from the California Court of

Appeal opinion: 

In the late afternoon of April 16, 2005, Miller (aka Speed and

Speedy), who lived in the Hidden Meadows apartment complex in San

Diego County with his girlfriend and their two children, was working on the

fuel pump in his Nissan 300ZX parked next to his Nissan Maxima in the

apartment complex parking lot with his friend Richard Ashe. While they

worked on the car, three men drove into the parking lot and Miller walked

over to talk to them. As he was talking with them and smoking a cigarette,

Miller saw his girlfriend walk to her car in the parking lot and walked over

to her, giving her some money. Because Miller seemed fine at the time,

his girlfriend left to run errands, leaving their five-year-old son in their

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 2 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 08cv1675

apartment for Miller to watch. 

After about five to 10 minutes of resumed talking with the men,

Miller walked back to his car in which Ashe was then sitting. Miller who

seemed to be different to Ashe as if his mind were somewhere else,

suddenly asked Ashe where his gun that he sometimes carried was. 

When Ashe told him he did not know, they looked in the trunk of the

Maxima where they found the gun and Miller picked it up. Miller then

crossed the parking lot and fired three shots at one of the apartment

buildings in the complex. 

Afterwards, Miller walked up the stairs to the second floor of the

complex, where Alan Jackson, another resident of the complex, was

sitting drinking beer and listening to music on the landing at the top of the

stairs with James Edwards, who did not live in the complex, but visited

friends and family there regularly. Without any discussion, Miller

approached Edwards from behind, pointed the gun about an inch away

from the back of his head and fired two shots in his neck. Edwards fell

face forward onto the ground and Miller shot him three more times, in the

lower back, arm and chest. Edwards died as a result of the multiple

gunshot wounds 

Miller then walked back down the stairs and fired two more shots at

the complex before turning his attention to Ashe, who was still in the

parking lot. When Miller pointed the gun at Ashe, he ran away but Miller

pursued him. As they ran, Miller tried to shoot Ashe, but the gun would

not fire. When Ashe ran up the stairs, he saw Edwards lying in a puddle

of blood. As he ran back down the stairs, Ashe could hear the sound of

the gun clicking as Miller continued to follow him. When Ashe fell down in

the parking lot, Miller again unsuccessfully tried to shoot him. 

As Miller was chasing Ashe, another resident of the complex saw

what was happening and yelled, “Speedy stop. Don’t.” Miller continued

running out to the street where he removed a glove from his right hand

and dropped it in the road. After he dropped the gun in the street, Miller

ran into a nearby complex less than a half mile away where he was later

found sitting on the ground in the parking lot. Miller was arrested without

problems after being positively identified as the shooter. 

A deputy then transported Miller to the Lemon Grove sheriff’s

station for booking and placed paper bags on his hands while he was in a

holding cell to preserve any gunshot residue. As the paperwork was being

processed, the deputy observed Miller without the bags urinating on his

hands and rubbing them on his pants several times. The deputy’s belief

that Miller had urinated on his hands to try to remove gunshot residue was

later confirmed when Miller confessed to a fellow inmate at jail that he had

done so for that purpose. 

Meanwhile back at the scene of the shooting, other deputies found

the gun and glove in the street along with Miller’s cellular phone, which

was opened and “on.” Miller’s fingerprints were found on the phone. The

gun, a semiautomatic Ruger 9 millimeter, was determined to be bent and

defective. Deputies further found a set of five unexpended 9 millimeter

rounds and an empty magazine for a Ruger 9 millimeter in the complex.

Several unexpended rounds were found across from Miller’s apartment. 

Although gunshot residue was found on Miller’s glove, none was found on

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 3 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 08cv1675

his hands. Deputies found two clear vials of PCP in a search of Miller’s

apartment. 

Miller was subsequently interviewed at 1:30 a.m., the morning after

the shooting. He gave deputies his full name, date of birth, address, age

of his sons, girlfriend’s name, relationship status, and job information. 

After waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, he

gave his version of the events the day of the shooting. Sometime after

2:00 p.m. while waiting for his girlfriend to come home from grocery

shopping, he and Ashe worked on the fuel pump in his car in the parking

lot. As they did so, a couple of men Miller did not know drove in the

parking lot in a green Cadillac. Ashe then yelled, “Hey look out, look out”

and Miller heard four or five gunshots and started running. Miller

continued running even though his five-year-old son was playing in the

parking lot because he thought he was being chased. He ran down a hill

and into another apartment complex where he hid under a pool table,

staying there until the police arrived and arrested him. He believed he

hurt his foot when he jumped over a fence running away from his complex. 

Miller told the deputies that he had smoked some “reefer” and a

cigarette containing PCP around 12 or 1 p.m. on the day of the shootings,

which usually calmed him down. He also told them he had oil on his

hands from working on his car and denied he was carrying a gun the day

of the shooting. Miller claimed he had not carried a gun since he was a

child. 

When the deputies suggested that Miller might not remember what

happened because his memory may have been altered by the PCP, Miller

disagreed, saying that could not be the case because he did not have a

gun and he would have remembered if he had shot someone. The

interview lasted until 3:40 a.m. 

In addition to the above evidence being presented in the

prosecution case against Miller at trial for Edwards’s murder and the

attempted murder of Ashe, the deputies involved in arresting and

transporting him to the station all testified that Miller did not exhibit any

outward signs of impairment or intoxication and had been responsive to

their questions. 

One of the residents of the complex testified that Edwards was

known for being loud and often using expletives. Just minutes before

Miller shot him, the resident saw Edwards go downstairs to check on his

son in an apartment. Another resident heard Edwards say “[f***] you” right

before he walked back up to the second floor landing and was shot. 

The day before the shooting, another resident of the complex had

seen Miller who he thought was acting paranoid, pull out a black 9

millimeter gun when a car drove into the complex parking lot. That same

resident saw Miller walking around with his hand on his waistband, like he

had a gun, on the day of the shooting. 

The parties stipulated that Miller’s blood tested positive for

marijuana at a level of 10.2 nanograms per milliliter and positive for PCP

at 32.9 nanograms per milliliter five and a half hours after his arrest. 

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 4 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 08cv1675

Defense case 

Miller’s defense was that because of his PCP ingestion, he did not

have the required mental state necessary to commit murder or attempted

murder and was guilty at most of involuntary manslaughter. In support of

this defense, he called Dr. Alex Stalcup, physician and medical director of

an outpatient drug treatment program, to testify as to the effects of PCP. 

Stalcup testified that PCP causes symptoms of disassociation and

“derealization” causing a person to lose their sense of person and time as

well as altering sensory experiences. He stated that the degree of

impairment from PCP use is equal to the impairment obtained from

smoking strong marijuana or drinking three or four beers and that it was

easy to overdose on PCP. He explained that PCP takes normal

integrated brain functions and separates them so there is no relationship

between memory, drive, reward and reason, completely distorting a

person’s consciousness. Stalcup further noted that a significant number

of people using PCP can develop an extreme psychotic reaction to the

drug, causing them to act abnormally, like a person with schizophrenia,

having delusions, hallucinations, and thought disorders. Such a person is

unable to reason or remember what they are doing or why they are doing

it. The usual PCP high lasts five or six hours and an adverse reaction can

last anywhere from a minute up to several days. 

Stalcup additionally testified that the Drug Enforcement

Administration recognizes PCP as a uniquely dangerous drug that often

causes the user to suffer hallucinations, mood distortion, amnesia, and

paranoia as well as suffer a loss of coordination, including slurred speech. 

Some of the more observable effects of PCP usage are a blank stare,

rapid and involuntary eye movements, and an exaggerated gait. PCP may

also cause acute anxiety and a feeling of impending doom, paranoia,

hostility, or psychosis indistinguishable from schizophrenia. Even

experienced PCP users can have an adverse reaction to the drug if they

take it unwittingly or in a larger dose than they expected. 

Stalcup did not interview Miller in this case because PCP users

often have memory failure and are very suggestible to facts provided by

an interviewer. Nonetheless, Stalcup believed that the amount of PCP in

Miller’s system after the shooting was a sufficient amount to cause an

adverse reaction and opined that Miller’s behavior was consistent with an

individual experiencing such a reaction to PCP. 

On cross-examination, Stalcup conceded that it is impossible to

know whether a person has a good trip or a bad trip based on the amount

of PCP in their system. He also acknowledged that the hiding or

discarding of evidence after doing something wrong was an indication that

the person doing so was aware of what they were doing. Additionally,

Stalcup agreed that the facts a person chose a deadly weapon to shoot a

human being in their vital organs and then made up a story about

someone else being responsible for the crime were indications that the

person was aware of what he was doing. 

Defense counsel’s closing argument focused on Miller’s irrational

behavior after smoking a cigarette with the three men in the complex

parking lot, emphasizing that Ashe and several residents of the complex

had described Miller as confused, zoned out, and looking wild before the

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 5 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Cited page numbers are those assigned by the Clerk of the Court. 

6 08cv1675

shooting and attempted shooting of the victims with whom he had no

disputes. Counsel challenged the testimony of the deputies concerning

Miller not appearing to be under the influence as not credible, arguing that

the only explanation for the shooting event was that Miller had suffered a

psychotic episode, was unaware of his actions and was the poster child

for an intoxication defense. Counsel further argued that Miller was

functionally unconscious and guilty only of involuntary manslaughter. The

jury found otherwise. 

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 2-9.]

III. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS 

The Petition contends: 

1. “The trial court violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury

and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by denying his Batson-Wheeler

motion after the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove the only black

prospective jurors.” [Doc. No. 1 at 61

 (citing Exhibit B at 33-49.)] 

2. “The trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the defense of

unconsciousness as it related to second degree murder under the theory of implied

malice and attempted murder.” [Doc. No. 1 at 7 (citing Exhibit C at 51-63.)]

3. “The trial court violated appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury

and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by denying his Batson-Wheeler

motion after the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove the only black

prospective jurors.” [Doc. No. 1 at 8 (citing Exhibit D at 65-88.)]

4. “The trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the defense of

unconsciousness as it related to second degree murder under the theory of implied

malice and attempted murder.” [Doc. No. 1 at 9 (citing Exhibit E at 90-103.)] 

5. “Evidence was insufficient to support the findings of implied malice as there

was no showing that appellant was subjectively aware that smoking PCP would trigger a

homicidal reaction.” [Doc. No. 1 at 13 (citing Exhibit F at 105-111.)] 

The first and third claims are verbatim except the first count uses the word

“petitioner’s” and the third count uses the word “appellant’s.” The Court has also

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 6 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 08cv1675

reviewed pages 33-49 of Exhibit B and pages 65-88 of Exhibit D and concludes the

claims are the same. Thus, the Court will analyze these claims together. The second

and fourth claims are verbatim, and the court concludes pages 51-63 of Exhibit C and

pages 90-103 of Exhibit E set forth the same claim. Thus, the Court will also analyze

these claims together. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review 

The Court may grant a petition for habeas corpus “only on the ground that [the

petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Mere errors of state law are not cognizable in federal

habeas corpus proceedings. Id.; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). The

provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

govern this petition since it was filed after the statute took effect on April 24, 1996. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The Court cannot grant a habeas petition

asserting claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the Court first

concludes the state court decision 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) 

The Supreme Court has defined “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of”

as follows:

A state-court decision is contrary to this Court's clearly established precedents if

it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it

confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of this

Court but reaches a different result...A state-court decision involves an

unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the

state court applies this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively

unreasonable manner. 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (internal citations omitted) 

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 7 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The Court refers to prospective jurors by their initials to protect their privacy. 

3

 The quoted text contained the following footnote: “The defense excused 15

prospective jurors, passing on its sixteenth challenge. 

4

 The quoted text contained the following footnote: “The court noted that those two

jurors were “lighter-skinned” African-Americans.

8 08cv1675

“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state

court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a

substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). Where

as here, the state’s highest court summarily denied Petitioner’s claims, federal courts

review the “last reasoned decision” of the state court, in this case the unpublished

opinion of the California Court of Appeal affirming Petitioner’s conviction. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806. 

B. First and Third Claims: Trial Court’s denial of the Batson-Wheeler

motion

Petitioner claims the trial court infringed his Sixth Amendment right to an

impartial jury and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws by

denying his Batson-Wheeler motion after the prosecutor removed the only two AfricanAmerican prospective jurors, Ms. AC and Ms. CY2

 via peremptory challenge. 

1. Facts Surrounding the denial of the Batson-Wheeler motion 

The relevant facts are taken from the Court of Appeal opinion: 

During jury selection, the prosecutor excused 17 prospective jurors,

two of whom were Black (Ms. AC and Ms. CY) on peremptory challenges.3

After the jury, which did not include any Black jurors, was sworn in, Miller

made a Batson-Wheeler motion arguing the prosecutor had improperly

exercised his peremptory challenges to remove the only two Blacks from

the entire panel thereby establishing a pattern of racial discrimination. 

Finding that the two jurors were part of a recognizable group and

appeared to be African-American,4

 the trial court asked the prosecutor to

explain his reasons for excusing the jurors. 

When the prosecutor responded, “[a]s for [CY], she had an exboyfriend who is a drug-user, and I felt that put her in a sympathetic

posture for the case” the trial judge stated she was satisfied “because the

court does have a recall of [CY’s] history [and did] not find it was a racially

motivated peremptory challenge.” The prosecutor added that he recalled

that CY’s boyfriend was either a drug dealer or a user and “there were

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 8 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 08cv1675

some issues with that.” 

Turning to AC, the prosecutor explained that he had asked her

questions about her church and did not “feel like she was tracking [his]

questions on the differences between standing in judgment of people

and...the role of sitting as a juror versus...a view fo the situation from a

standpoint of a religion or church. He also had to ask her questions

several times. 

When Miller’s counsel commented his recollection was that AC had

been clear that she had no problem putting her religious beliefs aside to

determine the case and that it was his impression the prosecutor was just

questioning AC on her ability to decide the case in spite of her religious

beliefs “as a lesson for the rest of the jury,” the prosecutor explained that

the problem was not so much in her answers as in “the manner in which

she answered. She didn’t speak up a few times, and I did not feel like she

was connecting with me.” 

The court found, that based on the prosecutor’s remarks, “there

were adequate justifications for his exercise of the peremptory challenges

and certainly neutral explanations for each challenge. The court found

that [AC] did, many times hesitate before responding to the prosecutor’s

questions, and it would have appeared... that she was hesitating, and one

does not know why. I suppose one explanation is hard of hearing, but the

other explanation is to try and couch a response. So based upon that, the

court is going to deny your Batson motion.” 

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 9-11.]

2. The Court of Appeal’s Ruling 

The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim stating: 

Miller specifically argues that the trial court erroneously found the

prosecutor had articulated race-neutral reasons for excusing the two

prospective Black jurors because the prosecutor’s justifications were not

supported in the record and the court did not make a reasoned and

sincere attempt to evaluate those reasons. He also claims that a

comparative analysis under Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241

(Miller-El) will show that the prosecutor’s explanations regarding each juror

were pretextual. We conclude the court properly denied the motion upon

finding the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges of AC and CY were not

based on improper racial bias. 

With regard to AC, she mentioned during voir dire she knew a

corrections officer who went to her church. When the prosecutor later

asked her specifically about whether she would have the courage in spite

of her religious beliefs to find Miller guilty if the case were proven against

him, AC asked him to repeat the question. When he then asked whether

any of the prospective jurors had any particular religious beliefs that would

impact their ability to be fair, no one responded. He then specifically

asked AC to respond saying, “No? You’re sort of smiling and looking at

me, but you’re not answering, What are you thinking?” AC asked the

prosecutor to repeat the question for her. After doing so, AC answered

“no” and that God’s “judgment is different from....” When the prosecutor

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 9 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 08cv1675

then asked “from ours?,” AC responded “Right now, yeah” and said she

was comfortable with that role. 

The prosecutor justified the removal of AC from the jury panel

based on her religious beliefs and in the manner in which she delivered

her answers. The trial judge herself stated she had observed AC

hesitating before answering or commenting on the prosecutor’s inquiries. 

Wheeler does not preclude a peremptory challenge to a juror on the basis

of the juror’s relevant personal values “even though those values may be

founded in the juror’s religious beliefs.” (People v. Martin (1998) 64

Cal.App.4th 378, 385.) Further as already noted, a nondiscriminatory

challenge may be based on “‘the prospective jurors’...manner of

answering questions.’” (Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal. 4th at p. 917.) The

prosecutor is not required to present reasons that rise to the level of a

challenge for cause, and could have reasonably decided on this record to

peremptorily challenge AC whose manner of answering questions made it

difficult to determine whether her statements really reflected her beliefs. 

Thus, the court could have reasonably concluded on its own observations

as well as the prosecutor’s statements that a race-neutral reason was

offered for the excusal of AC, which precluded an inference of a

discriminatory purpose. 

The court could likewise reasonably find that there was a raceneutral reason offered by the prosecutor for the removal of CY, who had

stated that she had an ex-boyfriend who had used crystal

methamphetamine and was in and out of prison for fraud, robbery, and

assault. The prosecutor explained that he had excused CY because her

ex-boyfriend used drugs and such might make her unreasonably

sympathetic towards Miller. Generally a prosecutor’s belief that a potential

juror would be unduly sympathetic to a defendant is a legitimate raceneutral based reason for a peremptory challenge. (see People v. Dunn

(1995) 40 Cal. App.4th 1039, 1054.) 

Additionally, the trial court could consider that the circumstances of

the case were not such that they suggested a clear motive for the

prosecutor to excuse African-Americans. In Johnson, the high court found

there was a prima facie case of racial bias because the defendant was

Black, the victim was White, and the prosecutor had excluded all three

Black persons in the jury venire. (Johnson, supra 545 U.S. at pp. 172-73.)

Here both the defendant and the victims are Black. Thus, the factual

scenario here is not completely comparable to Johnson where the

circumstances facially supported an inference of discrimination. 

Miller also asserts the pretextual nature of the prosecutor’s stated

reasons for excusing AC is shown by the fact that the prosecutor did not

ask any other jurors questions about their religious beliefs. We disagree. 

Although, the failure to question other jurors about the claimed area of

concern may be a valid factor to consider, here the record shows the

prosecutor asked the entire panel of prospective jurors twice, once during

the questioning of AC and later after other prospective jurors replaced

ones that had been removed, whether they had any particular religious

views that would impact their ability to sit in judgment of another human

being or hear this case. When no other jurors responded, the prosecutor

had no reason to further inquire about their religious beliefs and the lack of

further questioning does not require an inference of pretext. (See Lewis

and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1018 & fn. 14.) 

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 10 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 08cv1675

Nonetheless, the record reveals that after several other jurors later

mentioned that they knew various law enforcement or legal officers from

their churches, one of whom further noted she did not drink due to her

religious beliefs, both were removed as jurors by peremptory challenges

(one by the prosecutor and the other for the defense). In addition, the

court on its own motion excused a male juror for cause before either

counsel could question him when he expressed strong concerns as to

whether he could be fair to Miller because of his religious beliefs. These

facts additionally lend support to the trial court’s finding that the

prosecutor’s motive to keep strong religious beliefs out of the jury equation

was not a pretext for excusing AC. 

Contrary to Miller’s additional argument that AC’s answers to her

religious beliefs would not affect her ability to serve as an impartial juror

show the prosecutor’s reason was pretextual, those purported assurances

were not required to be accepted uncritically where as here, her

observable actions created ambiguity in her answers. Under these

circumstances, it appears the court found the prosecutor’s reasons truthful

as consistent with its own observations. We defer to the court’s credibility

assessment and find substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that

Miller did not make a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose with

regard to AC. 

Finally Miller asserts that a comparative analysis under Miller-El, supra 545 U.S. 231, with respect to AC and CY and jurors similarly

situated but not Black who were left on the jury shows the prosecutor’s

discriminatory purpose in excluding AC and CY as jurors. Under a

comparative analysis review, “‘[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for

striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar

nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove

purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.’” (Lewis

and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal. 4th at p. 1017.) In making this comparative 

analysis, the proper inquiry is whether the prosecutor “honestly found

pertinent and legitimate dissimilarities between members of the group he

challenged and members of the group he accepted.” (Huggins, supra, 38

Cal. 4th at p. 233.) 

Here, Miller’s counsel did not ask the trial court to do a comparative

analysis before ruling on his Batson-Wheeler motion. Although our

California Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that a

comparative analysis may be undertaken for the first time on appeal in

light of the United States Supreme Court doing so in Miller-El, supra, 545

U.S. 231, (see Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1017; Huggins,

supra, 38 Cal. 4th at p. 232), even assuming such is proper, it is not very

meaningful in this case. 

As already noted above, no other juror left seated was questioned

about their religious beliefs in a similar manner as AC and those that did

express those beliefs were excused. Because there were no remaining

jurors to compare with AC and the court’s own observations were involved

in assessing the validity of the prosecutor’s reasons for excluding her as a

juror, a comparative analysis on appeal would serve no fruitful purpose

and would essentially be unreliable and inconsistent with the deference we

accord to the trial court in this area. 

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 11 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 The quoted text contained the following footnote: “We find Miller’s appellate

counsel’s snide remarks that the trial judge’s ruling was “covering” for a biased prosecutor

offensive and not supported by the record.” 

12 08cv1675

[Id. at 14-19.]

Moreover, regarding CY, even if a comparison was made under

Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 231 with Juror No. 11, whom Miller claims is the

most similarly situated nonblack seated juror to CY to use to show that the

prosecutor excused CY because of her race, such analysis does not prove

purposeful discrimination on this record. Although both CY and Juror No.

11 had ex-boyfriends with drug problems caused by crystal

methamphetamine and had agreed their boyfriends’ behavior was not

excused by the drugs, unlike CY, Juror No. 11 had two children, had

previously served as a juror in a criminal case that had reached a verdict

and had one relative who worked as a deputy sheriff and another who

worked as a senior volunteer patrol officer with the police department. In

addition, Juror No. 11 had no real awareness at the time of her

relationship about the extent of her ex-boyfriend’s drug addiction, and he

had never done “anything terrible to anybody” while on drugs, whereas CY

stayed with her ex-boyfriend even though she knew he had a drug

problem and was committing crimes, including assault for which he was

arrested and imprisoned. Thus, a side-by-side comparison of CY and

Juror No. 11 reveals that there were pertinent and legitimate dissimilarities

between the two prospective jurors from which the prosecutor could

honestly believe they were really not “similarly situated.” (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 247; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 233.) 

Furthermore, the prosecutor had also peremptorily challenged at

least six other jurors who either had a substance abuse problem or knew

of a family member or friend who did. The prosecutor’s decision to retain

Juror No. 11 and other jurors who had relatives or friends with substance

abuse problems may well have been motivated by countervailing factors in

their background that lessened concerns about their potential bias to

either party. Miller simply has not shown how a comparative juror analysis

reveals any racially motivated striking of jurors in this case. 

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. mod. slip. op. at 1-2.] 

In sum, we conclude the trial court made a sincere and reasonable

effort to evaluate whether the peremptory challenges were exercised for

race-neutral reasons5

 and there is substantial evidence to support the trial

court’s finding of no discriminatory purpose. Accordingly, Miller’s

contention based on the denial of his Batson/Wheeler motion fails. 

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 19.] 

3. Standard of Review for a Batson-Wheeler claim

In Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit held that

challenges to factual findings which are based entirely on the state court record are

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)’s unreasonableness standard, that is, a federal

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 12 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 08cv1675

court may only overturn such findings if they are “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

999-1000. In contrast, challenges to a state court’s factual findings which are based on

evidence presented to a federal court for the first time are governed by 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1)’s requirement that a petitioner must rebut those findings by “clear and

convincing evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. In the

Ninth Circuit, courts have reviewed state court findings that a prosecutor did not engage

in purposeful discrimination under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Ali v. Hickman, 584

F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 358 (9th

Cir. 2006). The United States Supreme Court, however, has not decided which

provision applies to situations, such as this one, where a petitioner challenges the facts

upon which a state court decision rests and all the operable facts were before the state

court. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006) (declining to decide which

section applies to a state court’s credibility finding in a Batson challenge). The Court in

Collins did, however, state unequivocally that “[r]easonable minds reviewing the record

might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, but on habeas review that does not

suffice to supercede the trial court’s credibility determination.” Rather, the state court’s

credibility determination must be unreasonable. Id. at 339.

This Court is bound by Ninth Circuit authority. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s

Batson claim and this Court’s decision is based entirely on the state court record, the

Court will employ § (d)(2)’s standard in its review of Petitioner’s claim, i.e., whether the

state court’s factual findings were objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Taylor, 366 F.3d at

999-1001, Hickman, 584 F.3d at 1180-81.

4. Clearly Established Federal Law 

 The Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause does not allow a prosecutor to

peremptorily strike a prospective juror on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Batson constitutes a clearly established precedent. See, e.g., Ali,

584 F.3d at 1171 (conditional writ of habeas corpus granted for Batson violation). The

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 13 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 08cv1675

Supreme Court has articulated a three-step process for a trial court to determine

whether the use of peremptory challenges infringed Batson: 

“First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory

challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that

showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis

for striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties’

submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has

shown purposeful discrimination.” 

Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted);

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 

In “step one” to make a prima facia showing under Batson, the defendant must

show: 

(1) the prospective juror is a member of a cognizable racial group, (2) the

prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove the juror, and (3) the

totality of the circumstances raises an inference that the strike was

motivated by race." 

U.S. v. Collins, 551 F.3d, 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d

1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, – U.S. –,

127 S. Ct. 2249 (2007)) 

If a defendant does not establish a prima facia case, the defendant’s challenge

fails and the prosecution is not required to provide a “race-neutral” explanation for the

strike. Id. In this case, the Court of Appeal did not consider whether step one of a

Batson claim was satisfied before evaluating the reasons the prosecutor gave for the

peremptory challenges. [See Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 14-15.] 

However, “[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory

challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional

discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facia

showing becomes moot.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality

opinion of Kennedy, J.) Such is the case here because the prosecutor offered

explanations for the challenges, and the trial court determined intentional discrimination

did not occur. [Lodgment No. 2, RAT Vol. 1, Nov. 7 & Nov. 8, 2005 at 236-38.] Thus,

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 14 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 08cv1675

this Court’s review must focus on steps 2 and 3 of the Batson inquiry. 

The Supreme Court has fleshed out step two of the Batson inquiry as follows:

A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an

explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this

step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's

explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's

explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360

The prosecutor justified the removal of Ms. AC based on concerns about her

religious beliefs affecting her ability to judge and her manner in answering questions. 

[Lodgment No. 2, RAT Vol. 1, Nov. 7 & Nov. 8, 2005 at 237]. Concern about religious

beliefs affecting a juror’s ability to judge is a race-neutral explanation. U.S. v. Stafford,

136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998). Hesitation in answering questions is “plainly raceneutral.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). However, to satisfy

Batson’s second step, the prosecutor’s reason must also relate to the case. Kesser v.

Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.) 

A juror’s role is to judge the defendant. Concern regarding an individual’s ability to

judge, and hesitation in giving forthcoming responses, clearly relates to a prospective

juror’s ability to serve on the case.

The prosecutor explained that Ms. CY was removed because her ex-boyfriend

used drugs and, therefore, she might be unreasonably sympathetic towards the

defendant. [Lodgment No. 2, RAT Vol. 1, Nov. 7 & Nov. 8, 2005 at 236]. Concern about

the sympathy of a prospective juror towards the defendant is a race-neutral factor. See

e.g., Kesser, 465 F.3d at 369-70 (en banc) (court performed comparative analysis

regarding sympathy and whether the prosecutor asked questions regarding sympathy.) 

Since Petitioner’s PCP use was one of the major issues in the case, concern about a

prospective juror having sympathy for him because she used to date a drug user relates

to the case. Thus, as articulated by the Court of Appeal, the reasons put forth for the

strike of both prospective jurors were racially neutral. [Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App.

slip. op. at 15-16, citing People v. Martin, 64 Cal. App. 4th 378, 385 (1998), People v.

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 15 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 08cv1675

Reynoso, 31 Cal.4th 903, 917 (2003), and People v. Dunn, 40 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1054

(1995)]. 

Having put forth race neutral reasons for his strikes, the trial court was required

to proceed to the third step of the Batson inquiry and determine “whether the opponent

of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168

(citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767). At this stage, the judge is required to “assess the

plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005). The trial judge must determine whether the reasons

advanced by the prosecutor are “pretextual” and the judge’s conclusion “‘largely will turn

on evaluation of credibility.’” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at

98)). As the Hernandez court noted, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the

decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory

challenge should be believed.” Id. The Court may consider any “relevant

circumstances” which bear on the issue of whether the prosecutor used the peremptory

challenges with racial intent. It is this final step of the Batson inquiry that the Court turns

to next.

In the Ninth Circuit, violations have been found in the final step of the Batson

analysis in cases where the record either did not support or flatly contradicted the

prosecutor’s stated reasons for the strike. In McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir.

2000), the prosecutor stated she struck the first African-American juror, SR, because

she “mistrusted the system” and “believed that she had been treated unfairly” by it. Id.

at 1211. The prosecutor also believed SR had lied when she said she was a stewardess

because she was a heavyset woman. Id. The prosecutor’s third reason for striking SR

was that she lacked any group decision-making experience. Id. The prosecutor stated

she struck the second and only remaining African-American juror, JH, because he was

a drug rehabilitation counselor and would therefore “root for the underdog.” In addition,

he “didn’t speak in ordinary language” and gave “highly intellectual answers” which she

believed would make it difficult for him to get along with other jurors. Id.

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 16 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 08cv1675

Upon review of the voir dire, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the reasons given

by the prosecutor for the strikes were contradicted by the jurors’ own answers. SR

never stated she distrusted the system and gave her occupation as a maintenance

worker at U.S. Airlines, not a stewardess. Id. at 1214-15, 1221-22. In addition, after

conducting a comparative analysis with another white juror who, like SR, also did not

have decision-making experience but who was not struck, the court found the third

reason put forth by the prosecutor for SR’s strike was pretextual. Id. at 1211-22. The

court also concluded the reasons given by the prosecutor for JH’s strike were

pretextual. Id. at 1222- 23. JH worked as a drug research pharmacist at the Veteran’s

Administration, not a drug rehabilitation counselor. Id. The transcript of the voir dire

also contradicted the prosecutor’s assertion that JH did not speak in “ordinary language”

or gave “highly intellectual answers.” Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state

court’s denial of the Batson claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented to the trial court. Id. at 1223.

The Ninth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Kesser, 465 F.3d 351 and,

more recently, Green v. Lamarque, 532 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008), as amended. In

Kesser, the court concluded that the reasons the prosecutor gave for his strike of a

Native American woman from the jury venire were pretextual based on a comparative

analysis with other jurors and because they conflicted with the juror’s own statements

on voir dire. In particular, the court noted that although the prosecutor gave as reasons

for the strike that she was “pretentious” and “self-important” because she believed she

was the only one who could complete certain paperwork for her job, “he did not ask her

further questions about her work or her interpersonal experiences.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at

354, 364. Quoting Miller-El, the court stated that “‘unless he had an ulterior reason for

keeping [the juror] off the jury we think he would have proceeded differently . . . . [W]e

expect the prosecutor would have cleared up any misunderstanding by asking further

questions before getting to the point of exercising a strike.’” Id. at 364 (quoting Miller-El,

545 U.S. at 244).

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 17 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 08cv1675

In Green, the prosecutor struck an African-American juror, Deborah P., because

“she had visited her stepfather in prison” and would therefore “likely assume

imprisonment would be the outcome of [the] case,” she “failed to complete two

questions on the juror questionnaire” and “she had held five jobs, suggesting she must

have ‘problems getting along with others [and] responding to authority.’” Green, 532

F.3d at 1031. The court concluded that the first two reasons set forth by the prosecutor

were shown to be pretextual when compared with other white jurors who were not

struck. Id. at 1032-33. As to the third reason, Deborah P.’s five jobs, the court stated

that the validity of the reason “was undermined by the fact that he did not ask her a

single question about why she changed jobs.” Id. at 1033. The court again quoted

Miller-El, stating that “‘[t]he State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire

examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting

that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.’” Green, 532 F.3d at

1033 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246).

In Ali, the prosecutor struck the only two African-American members. Ali, 584

F.3d at 1176. The Ninth Circuit determined the prosecutor acted with discriminatory

intent when he struck one of the jurors, identified as M.C., because the stated reasons

for striking her were not supported by the record. Id. at 1193. The prosecutor indicated

he struck M.C. because her judgment and objectivity might have been adversely

affected by the fact her daughter had been the victim of an attempted molestation by

M.C.’s stepson, she had past involvement with the criminal justice system, she indicated

that anything less than professional and respectful conduct on the part of the lawyers

might affect her view of the case, and because she commented that she might have

trouble sitting in judgment of others due to her Christian faith. Id. at 1177-78. On

review, the court found the stated reasons were inconsistent with M.C.’s remarks and

that a logical conclusion could not be drawn from her comments that she might be

biased against the prosecution. Id. at 1184-93. The court further concluded a

comparative analysis of other non-African-American jurors revealed that “two (or three)”

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 18 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 During voir dire, Juror No. 11 is initially referred to as Juror No. 14. The first

reference to Juror No. 11 occurs on page 184 of the voir dire transcript where she is referred

to as “Juror No. 14.” [Lodgment No. 2, RAT Vol. 1, Nov. 7 & Nov. 8, 2005.] 

7

 The Court of Appeal also noted that “Juror No. 11 had two children, had previously

served as a juror in a criminal case that had reached a verdict and had one relative who

worked as a deputy sheriff and another who worked as a senior volunteer patrol officer with

the police department,” whereas CY did not. Id. at p. 2

19 08cv1675

of the stated reasons were pretextual. Id. at 1192. (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 522

U.S. 472 (2008) for the proposition that “‘the prosecution’s proffer of [one] pretextual

explanation naturally gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent,’ even where

other, potentially valid explanations are offered.”)

With these authorities in mind, the Court reviews the reasons the prosecutor

provided for removing Ms. AC and Ms. CY.

Ms. CY

Petitioner contends a comparative analysis of Ms. CY to other jurors, most

importantly, Juror No. 11, the juror with whom Petitioner claims Ms. CY is most similarly

situated, reveals that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking Ms. CY were

pretextual. [Doc No. 1, Ex. B & D.] A comparative analysis of Ms. CY and Juror No. 11

was undertaken by the Court of Appeal. [Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op.]6

 As

the Court of Appeal observed, both Ms. CY and Juror No. 11 had ex-boyfriends with

drug problems caused by crystal methamphetamine. [Id. at p. 1.] Both indicated their

boyfriends’ behavior was not excused by their drug use. [ Id.] On these two accounts

the women appear to be similarly situated. The Court of Appeal, however, identified

differences between the two. The Court observed that “Juror No. 11 had no real

awareness at the time of her relationship about the extent of her ex-boyfriend’s drug

addiction, and he had never ‘done anything terrible to anybody’ while on drugs, whereas

[Ms.] CY stayed with her ex-boyfriend even though she knew he had a drug problem

and was committing crimes, including assault, for which he was arrested and

imprisoned.”7

 [Id. at p. 2.]

The trial court record is such that it is impossible to determine whether the factual

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 19 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 08cv1675

differences identified by the Court of Appeal were in fact considered by the trial court. 

As discussed above, the prosecutor stated that Ms. CY was removed because she had

an ex-boyfriend that was a drug-user or dealer and “there were some issues with that.”

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 10.] He felt her experience “put her in a

sympathetic posture for the case.” [Id.] The trial court, which was not asked to

undertake a comparative analysis, found in favor of the prosecution stating she was

“satisfied, because the court does have a recall of [Ms. CY’s] history [and did] not find

that that was a racially motivated peremptory challenge.” [Id.] 

A trial court’s failure to fully articulate its basis for ruling in favor of the

prosecution on a Batson-Wheeler challenge is not an independent basis for habeas

relief. "[A] federal habeas court can only grant [the] petition if it was unreasonable to

credit the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for the Batson challenge." Rice v.

Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006). "[A] state court's finding of the absence of

discriminatory intent is ‘a pure issue of fact' accorded significant deference," which "is

necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire,

is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations." Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). "[A] decision adjudicated on the merits in a state

court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds

unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding." Id. at 340. The cold record here cannot adequately convey the

circumstances which were present in the courtroom which gave rise to the trial judge's

finding that the prosecutor's motive in challenging Ms. CY’s was genuinely race-neutral,

as this Court "is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make" that determination. 

Id. at 339; see also Thaler v. Haynes, – S.Ct. –, 2010 WL 596511 (Feb. 22, 2010) 

(reversed grant of writ of habeas corpus and remanded for application of AEDPA

deference to the state court’s factual findings regarding a demeanor-based explanation

for a peremptory challenge.) As the Supreme Court noted in Hernandez:

Deference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent

makes particular sense in this context because, as we noted in Batson,

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 20 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 08cv1675

the finding"largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." 476 U.S. at 98, n.

21. In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will

be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge

should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that

issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney

who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror,

evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and

credibility lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's province."Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985), citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.1025, 1038

(1984).

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (emphasis added).

The present case is one where the genuineness of the prosecutor's motive with

respect to Ms. CY "lies peculiarly within a trial judge's province," and the "best evidence

[is] the demeanor of the [prosecutor]." Id. Perhaps when the trial court stated she

recalled Ms. CY’s testimony she was referring to the differences noted by the Court of

Appeal or perhaps she was referring to other differences that are not readily identifiable

from the cold record. Regardless of what the unspoken reasons were, deference is

owed to the trial court, which was in the best position to evaluate Ms. CY’s state of mind

and the prosecutor’s demeanor. Furthermore, Ninth Circuit precedent does not support

a finding that the prosecutor’s proffered reasons were pretextual. The Green, Kesser,

McClain and Ali cases are distinguishable from Petitioner’s case because they either

involved instances where the prosecutor offered reasons which did not exist, see

Kesser, 465 F.3d at 363-65; McClain, 217 F.2d at 1221-22, involved overtly race-based

reasons, see Kesser, 465 F.3d at 362, involved internally or logically inconsistent

reasons, Id. at 367; Ali, 584 F.3d at 1184-93, or involved situations where comparative

analysis demonstrated obvious pretext; see Green, 532 F.3d at 1031-33; Kesser, 465

F.3d at 362-71; McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-23; Ali, 584 F.3d at 1192. None of these

factors exists here and the comparative analysis conducted by the Court of Appeal and

the differences it identified between Ms. CY and Juror No. 11 establish that it was not

objectively unreasonable for the trial court to credit the prosecutor’s explanation for

removing Ms. CY in light of the evidence presented.

/ /

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 21 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22 08cv1675

Ms. AC

The Court of Appeal concluded that the stated reasons for Ms. AC’s removal,

based on religion and the manner in which she delivered answers, were not pretextual. 

If a review of the record undermines the prosecutor’s stated reasons, the reasons may

be deemed a pretext for racial discrimination. Kesser, 465 F.3d. at 360. The

prosecutor said he did not believe Ms. AC was tracking his questions regarding the

differences in judging people as a juror with judging people as the member of a church. 

[Lodgment No. 2, RAT Nov. 7 & Nov. 8, 2005 at 237.] He also said, “I know I had to ask

her to answer up a few times.” [Id.] The record indicates Ms. AC twice asked the

prosecutor to repeat his question regarding judgment and religion. [Id. at 82, 83.] 

Moreover, the trial judge herself said Ms. AC “did, many times, hesitate[.]” [Id. at 238.]

The Court of Appeal deferred to the trial judge’s determination regarding credibility

when concluding Petitioner did not satisfy Batson’s third step. [Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct.

App. slip. op. at 17.] Determining the credibility and demeanor of a juror or prosecutor

lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Snyder, 128 S. Ct at 1208 (quoting

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court concludes the Court of Appeal did

not make an unreasonable factual determination regarding the peremptory challenge of

Ms. AC. 

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds habeas relief is not appropriate

on Petitioner’s Batson-Wheeler claims.

C. Second and Fourth Claims: Lack of a sua sponte unconsciousness

instruction 

Petitioner’s second and fourth claims are that the trial court erred by not

instructing the jury sua sponte regarding the unconsciousness defense “as it related to

second degree murder under the theory of implied malice and attempted murder.” [Doc.

No. 1 at 7 (citing Exhibit C at 51-63); Doc No. 1 at 9 (citing Exhibit E at 90-103)]. 

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 22 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

 CALJIC 4.30 reads “A person who while unconscious commits what would otherwise

be a criminal act, is not guilty of a crime. This rule of law applies to persons who are not

conscious of acting but who perform acts while asleep or while suffering from a delirium of

fever, or because of an attack of [psychomotor] epilepsy, a blow on the head, the involuntary

taking of drugs or the involuntary consumption of intoxicating liquor or any similar cause.

Unconsciousness does not require that a person be incapable of movement. Evidence has

been received which may tend to show that the defendant was unconscious at the time and

place of the commission of the alleged crime for which [he] is here on trial. If, after a

consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

conscious at the time the alleged crime was committed, [he] must be found not guilty.” 

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 19-20 (brackets omitted).] 

23 08cv1675

Petitioner claims the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury under CALJIC No. 4.308 that

unconsciousness based on mental illness was a complete defense to the charges

violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and to trial by jury

under the Sixth Amendment, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).

1. Court of Appeal’s Ruling

In rejecting this claim, the Court of Appeal reasoned : 

Here, although the jury instruction discussion was not reported,

Miller’s counsel stated on the record he was satisfied with the proposed

instructions, which included CALJIC Nos. 4.21.1 and 4.22, defining

voluntary intoxication for the jury and informing them that such condition

could be considered on the question of Miller’s mental state for the

specific intent crimes charged, including the lesser offenses to those

crimes. Further, consistent with Miller’s defense at trial, the court

instructed under CALJIC No. 8.47, which provides in part that if the jury

found “that a defendant while unconscious as a result of voluntary

intoxication, killed another human being without an intent to kill and

without malice aforethought, the crime is involuntary manslaughter.” 

Now, relying on his expert’s testimony about the effects of PCP and

his opinion that the amount of PCP in Miller’s system five hours after his

arrest could trigger a psychotic episode causing delusions and

hallucinations, his pretrial statements that he did not remember having a

gun and shooting anyone as well as the testimony of people at the

complex who described Miller as “wild in the eyes” and acting differently

than usual at the time of the shooting, Miller claims that the court was also

required to instruct on unconsciousness as a complete defense based on

the inference he had suffered an involuntary psychotic event stemming

from his voluntary ingestion of PCP. 

Miller’s unconsciousness claim is based on pure speculation, which

does not give rise to a duty to instruct the jury. People v. Berryman (1993)

6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998)

17 Cal.4th 800, 823.) Rather Miller’s own admissions in his pretrial

interview and in his appellate briefing make clear that he was voluntarily

intoxicated at the time of the shootings and did not lack awareness of his

actions during the course of the offenses. At no time during his interview

did he claim to be unconscious, only claiming he could not recall having a

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 23 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24 08cv1675

gun or shooting it. However, the purposeful nature of his conduct,

intentionally smoking a cigarette laced with PCP, putting on a glove before

the shootings, obtaining a loaded gun from the trunk of his car, aiming the

gun at his victims, shooting one victim in vital areas of the body,

discarding the gun and glove before leaving the scene, hiding from the

police, urinating on his hands to erase any traces of gunshot residue, and

making up a story about someone else shooting the murdered victim

suggest Miller was conscious and aware of his actions. 

In addition, Miller’s expert who had not interviewed Miller, and thus

did not testify as to mental state during the shooting or say he was

conscious during that time, agreed that the above facts tended to show

consciousness. The expert also testified that a person suffering from a

PCP induced psychotic episode was insensitive to pain, whereas Miller

complained to police that his foot hurt from injuring it while running away

after the shooting. None of the other witnesses at trial testified that Miller

was unconscious or close to unconsciousness near the time of the crimes. 

His girlfriend said he seemed fine when he was talking with the men in the

parking lot shortly before the shooting and deputies who arrested Miller

and interviewed him after the shooting did not observe him to be under the

influence of any drugs. 

Because a defendant’s professed inability to remember an incident

without more, is insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction

(People v. Froom (1989) 108 Cal. App.3d 820, 829-30; People v.

Heffington (1973) 32 Cal. App.3d 1, 10), Miller’s claims of not recalling

portions of the events in his pretrial interview, standing alone, were

insufficient to trigger the trial court’s duty to sua sponte instruct on the

defense of unconsciousness. Miller’s reliance on People v. Mosher (1969)

1 Cal. 3d 379, People v. Moore (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 486, 492 and People

v. Lisnow (1978) 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 21, to show otherwise is

unfounded. In each of those cases the defense expert examined the

defendant and made personal observations consistent with the

defendant’s claimed memory loss or mental derangement before

committing a crime. As noted above, Miller’s expert had not examined,

tested or evaluated Miller before testifying at trial about the general effects

of PCP on chronic users which could vary from person to person. 

Although the expert testified that some of Miller’s behaviors the day of the

shooting were consistent with someone suffering a psychotic episode, he

also conceded that many of Miller’s behaviors were inconsistent with a

person suffering such an episode. The expert’s testimony provided the

only evidence from which Miller speculates he was suffering from a

psychotic episode. 

On this record we can find no substantial competent evidence that

would support an instruction on unconsciousness based on an involuntary

psychotic episode. Although Miller was clearly voluntarily under the

influence of PCP, there is simply no evidence that he was unconscious as

a result of a “bad trip” or drug induced psychosis as he now claims. We

therefore conclude the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on

unconsciousness as a complete defense in this case or to specifically

relate such defense to second degree murder under the theory of implied

malice and attempted murder as claimed by Miller.

Moreover, even assuming the court should have instructed the jury

on unconsciousness, any error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 24 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25 08cv1675

doubt in light of this record. (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 499.)

As noted above, the jury was instructed under CALJIC No 8.47 on

involuntary manslaughter due to unconsciousness caused by voluntary

intoxication as well as being fully and correctly instructed on murder and

its degrees, the various forms of manslaughter, the effect of voluntary drug

induced intoxication on the various mental states and intents for the

charged crimes and lesser offenses. Because the jury found Miller guilty

of attempted voluntary manslaughter, it necessarily found he had the

“specific intent to kill” and rejected the possibility that we was unconscious

due to drugs. By finding Miller guilty of second degree murder, the jury

also necessarily found the killing resulted from an intentional act

performed by Miller “with knowledge of the danger to and with conscious

disregard for,” human life again rejecting the possibility that he was

unconscious due to drugs when he committed the crime. Accordingly, no

prejudicial jury instruction error can be shown on this record.

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 21-25.]

2. Clearly Established Federal Law 

Under the Due Process Clause, “a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to

any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury

to find in his favor.” Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (citing Stevenson

v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896)); see also Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091,

1098 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to obtain habeas relief on a claim that a trial judge erred

by omitting an instruction the petitioner must show the omission so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72;

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 146, 147. In

determining whether a trial court’s failure to instruct violated due process, a reviewing

court must assess whether the error was harmless or had a "substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999). A “substantial and

injurious effect” means a “reasonable probability” that the jury would have arrived at a

different verdict had the instruction been given. Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 916 (9th

Cir. 2006). The court should consider: (1) the weight of evidence that contradicts the

defense; and (2) whether the defense could have completely absolved the defendant of

the charge. Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Beardslee v.

Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 578 (9th Cir. 2002).

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 25 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26 08cv1675

Here, a finding of unconsciousness under CALJIC 4.30 would have absolved

Petitioner of the charges. However, as the Court of Appeal found, there was insufficient

evidence to support this defense. Petitioner’s own expert testified that concocting a

story blaming someone else after shooting at a person’s vital organs, fleeing the scene,

and disposing of evidence were indicators that he was aware of his actions. [Lodgment

No. 2, RAT Vol. 7, Nov. 8, 2005 at 578-80.] For the jury to accept the unconsciousness

claim, it would have had to conclude that someone who fatally shot a person in the vital

organs, fled the scene after trying to dispose of the gun and a glove he was wearing, hid

from the police, and concocted a story blaming someone else was unconscious. 

[Lodgment No. 2, RAT Vol. 2, Nov. 8, 2005 at 90-91, 100-01; RAT Vol. 3, Nov. 9, 2005

at 258, 262; RAT Vol. 4, Nov. 10, 2005 at 359-63, 388, 390, 404; RAT Vol. 6, Nov. 14,

2005 at 477-78.] 

Moreover, even if the evidence supported the conclusion the trial court erred by

omitting the instruction, the omission did not affect the entire trial process so as to make

it fundamentally unfair. The significance of the omitted instruction should be evaluated

by comparing it to the instructions that were given. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Henderson,

431 U.S. at 156. As the Court of Appeal correctly noted, the jury was instructed with

CALJIC No. 8.47 to the effect that “if you find that a defendant, while unconscious as a

result of voluntary intoxication, killed another human being without an intent to kill and

without malice aforethought, the crime is involuntary manslaughter.” [Lodgment No. 2,

RAT Vol. 8, Nov. 16, Nov. 17, & Nov. 18, 2005 at 647.] The jury was also fully

instructed on murder and its degrees, the various forms of manslaughter, and the effect

of voluntary drug intoxication on the various mental states and the intents for the

charged crimes and lesser offenses. [Lodgment No. 2, RAT Vol. 8 Nov. 16, Nov. 17 &

Nov.18 at 640-52.] The jury declined to convict Petitioner of involuntary manslaughter,

thus rejecting the theory that Petitioner was unconscious from drug use. The jury also

rejected unconsciousness as a defense in reaching guilty verdicts on the charges of

attempted voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder, both of which required

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 26 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27 08cv1675

specific intent findings. These findings support the conclusion an unconsciousness

instruction would not have influenced the jury’s verdict.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes there is no indication the trial court

erred in not sua sponte instructing the jury with CALJIC 4.30. Even it there was an

error, it was harmless and did not substantially and injuriously affect or influence the

jury's verdict. The state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent and,

therefore, the Court recommends this claim be denied.

C. Claim 5: Insufficient Evidence to show Implied Malice

Petitioner also claims there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding

of implied malice to support the second degree murder conviction. He claims the

evidence of implied malice was insufficient because it did not establish Petitioner “was

subjectively aware smoking PCP would result in a homicidal reaction.” [Doc. No. 1 at

13 (citing Ex. F at 68, 73.)]

1. Court of Appeal’s Ruling

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument stating: 

With regard to his second degree murder conviction, [Petitioner’s]

only assertion is that there was insufficient evidence of implied malice to

support such verdict based upon his voluntary ingestion of PCP, which

caused him to suffer a drug-induced psychosis that prevented him from

subjectively appreciating the risks involved in his conduct. However, as

already discussed in the previous section, there was no substantial

evidence to show Miller actually had suffered a drug-induced psychotic

episode. Rather the evidence revealed an intention on Miller’s part to

unlawfully kill his victim. From that facts that Miller obtained a loaded gun

from the truck (sic) of his car before putting on a glove and walking up

some stairs where he pointed the gun at the back of his victim’s head

before shooting him in the back of the neck and again shooting the victim

several more times in his torso and arm after falling forward on the

ground, a jury could reasonably infer an intent to kill the victim sufficient to

support express malice. Miller’s intentional acts after the shooting, of

running away, disposing of the gun and glove, hiding from authorities and

then placing the blame on others, provides additional support for such a

finding. (See Lasko, supra 23 Cal.4th at p. 107; People v. Lashley (1991)

1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945.) 

Contrary to Miller’s premise that the jury had to have relied on

implied malice for his second degree conviction because it had also found

him guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and thus necessarily

rejected an intent to kill theory, a second degree murder conviction based

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 27 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 08cv1675

on a finding of express malice, without premeditation, is fully consistent

with an attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction founded on intent to

kill. Because the jury was not asked to identify on which theory either

conviction was based, the second degree murder conviction may have

been found on either express or implied malice. 

Moreover, even without the intent to kill, the jury had before it

abundant evidence about the manner of the killing, including the use of the

firearm and the lack of provocation by the victim, from which it could

reasonably find implied malice to support its verdict. As already noted, the

trial court properly instructed the jury on the various degrees of murder

and manslaughter, including their various mental states and intents, and

on Miller’s defense of voluntary intoxication. The jury rejected Miller’s

theory that the shooting was committed while he was unconscious due to

voluntary intoxication caused by PCP ingestion. The jury was not required

to believe that such intoxication prevented him from appreciating the risk

posed by his intentional conduct and could have easily rejected such a

theory based on the totality of the evidence. In sum, ample evidence

supported the jury’s finding that Miller acted with express or implied

malice. 

[Lodgment No. 3, Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 25-28.] 

2. Petitioner alleges a federal question

Respondent argues Petitioner cites only state law to support this claim and fails

to allege a violation of due process. [Doc No. 15-1 at 13.] He argues Petitioner’s claim

is merely an error of state law and, therefore, does not constitute a federal question. Id.

Petitioner, however, specifically cites to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979),

the seminal case that sets forth the test federal courts use to determine sufficiency of

the evidence in the context of a petition for habeas corpus. [Doc No. 1, at 13 (citing

Exhibit F at 105)]; See e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see also Ellis v. Armenakis,

222 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979));

Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 

Thus, the Court concludes Petitioner’s last claim states a federal question and analyzes

the claim accordingly. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

3. Clearly Established Federal Law 

 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated “if it is found that

upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 28 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29 08cv1675

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). A

claim of insufficiency of evidence fails if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 639 (quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see also, Ellis, 222 F.3d at 630 (citing

Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274 (quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). A “cour[t] faced with a record of

historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume-even if it does not

affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in

favor of the prosecution and must defer to that resolution.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 639. The

Ninth Circuit has stated that a petitioner arguing insufficiency of the evidence has “a

heavy burden,” and cases “a considerable hurdle.” Davis, 382 F.3d at 639; Juan H.,

408 F.3d at 1274. In deciding whether a due process violation has occurred, this Court

must look to "the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, n. 16. 

In reviewing Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal observed, “[t]he test is not

whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether substantial

evidence, of credible and solid value supports the jury’s conclusion.” [Lodgment No. 3,

Cal. Ct. App. slip. op. at 25] (internal citation omitted). The court considered, “whether

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” [Id.] (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

original.) 

Petitioner’s claim is predicated on the argument the evidence was insufficient to

establish implied malice to support the second degree murder conviction. As the Court

of Appeal noted, the jury may have reached its verdict on either express or implied

malice theories. The Court, therefore, will evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence

under both theories. Under California law, “[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human

being...with malice aforethought.” People v. Ramirez, 39 Cal.4th 398, 464 (2006)

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 29 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30 08cv1675

(quoting Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)). Malice may be express or implied. Id. Express

malice occurs when the defendant “manifest[s] a deliberate intention unlawfully to take

away the life of a fellow creature.” Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 188)). Malice is

implied “when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances

attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” Id. Murder that is

committed with malice but is not premeditated is of the second degree. Id. (citing Cal.

Penal Code § 189.) 

As the Court of Appeal noted, the evidence showed Petitioner obtained a loaded

gun from his car and put on a glove before shooting the victim in the back of the neck

and again three more times in his lower back, arms and chest. [Lodgment No. 3, Cal.

Ct. App. slip. op. at 3.] These facts alone support a finding of express malice. See,

e.g., Ramirez, 39 Cal.4th at 464 (two shots fired at close range without provocation

supported a finding of express malice); People v. Smith, 37 Cal.4th 733 (2005) (firing a

gun at close range in manner that could inflict a mortal wound supports an inference of

intent to kill and express malice); People v. Bolden, 29 Cal.4th 515, 560-561 (2002)

(stabbing a victim in the back when the victim was “apparently unsuspecting and

defenseless” is “evidence of intent to kill” that is so “overwhelming” an error in jury

instructions was harmless.) Evidence indicating the intentional shooting of a victim

“twice at close range without provocation and...with an abandoned and malignant heart”

is “easily sufficient” to establish implied malice for second degree murder. Ramirez, 39

Cal.4th at 464-65. Thus, the evidence in this case, which shows Petitioner shot the

victim multiple times at close range, is sufficient to establish implied malice for second

degree murder. [Lodgment No. 2, RAT Vol., Nov. 10, 2005 at 388, 390, 404.]

 Furthermore, as articulated in the earlier discussion of Petitioner’s jury instruction

claims, evidence of Petitioner’s voluntary ingestion of the PCP and the effects thereof

were considered by the jury. The jury was free to reject this evidence, as it apparently

did.

/ /

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 30 of 31
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31 08cv1675

Based on the foregoing, the Court concurs with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion

a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt proof of malice and

guilt on the charge of second degree murder. The state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S.

Supreme Court precedent and, therefore, the Court recommends this claim be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge finds that Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to habeas relief under the

applicable legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge hereby

recommends the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered

accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L.

Sammartino, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that not later than March 19, 2010, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and

filed no later than April 1, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 148 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 22, 2010

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01675-JLS-JMA Document 18 Filed 02/23/10 Page 31 of 31