Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00002/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00002-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE KAPPES, III,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security1,

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-0002 JAM DB PS

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On June 24, 2019, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations finding that 

plaintiff had failed to file a motion for summary judgment and recommending that this action be 

dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 16.) However, on July 22, 2019 

plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 19.) Defendant filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment on August 21, 2019. (ECF No. 20.) Accordingly, the June 24, 2019 findings 

and recommendations will be vacated. 

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1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on June 17, 2019. 

See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on July 30, 2019). 

Accordingly, Andrew Saul is substituted in as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding 

the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).

Case 2:18-cv-00002-JAM-DB Document 22 Filed 02/21/20 Page 1 of 7
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Moreover, the motions for summary judgment have been submitted to the undersigned 

without oral argument for ruling on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(15). For the reasons 

explained below, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s motion be denied, the decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) be affirmed, and this matter be closed. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 13, 2014, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on 

September 2, 2008. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 20, 145.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, 

(id. at 90-94), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 96-101.) Plaintiff requested an administrative 

hearing and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 24, 

2015. (Id. at 32-60.) Plaintiff was not represented by an attorney and testified at the 

administrative hearing. (Id. at 35-37.) 

In a decision issued on February 11, 2016, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. 

(Id. at 29.) The ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act on December 31, 2013. 

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity 

during the period from his alleged onset date of September 2, 2008 

through his date last insured of December 31, 2013 (20 CFR 

404.1571 et seq.).

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following 

severe impairment: seizure disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 

404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the 

residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 

20 CFR 404.1567(c) except he was able to frequently climb ramps, 

stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl 

and was to avoid even moderate exposure to hazardous heights and 

machinery. 

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6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of 

performing past relevant work as an insurance agent. This work did 

not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by 

the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, at any time from September 2, 2008, the alleged onset 

date, through December 31, 2013, the date last insured (20 CFR 

404.1520(f)). 

(Id. at 22-29.)

On July 19, 2017, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s 

February 11, 2016 decision. (Id. at 4-6.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on January 2, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If 

so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

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Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 

disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 

the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

APPLICATION

Plaintiff’s July 22, 2019 motion for summary judgment asserts that the ALJ’s “decision is 

wrong in not allowing SSI benefits[.]” (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 19) at 1.) Specifically, plaintiff 

argues that plaintiff’s “seizures first occurred in 1979,” but plaintiff “was able to work for

[plaintiff’s] Father’s business and associates of his who were aware of my condition and hired me 

knowing of my condition.” (Id.) Nonetheless, the seizures “subsided from about 1998 until” 

August 25, 2011, “after being seizure-free for about 13 years.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that since that time plaintiff has “suffered from many additional seizures 

and severe loss of memory.” (Id.) That plaintiff’s “seizures are still not under control.” (Id.) 

That plaintiff is “unable to drive” and does not “feel comfortable in public places due to the risk 

of having a seizure[.]” (Id.) And that the ALJ’s assertion that plaintiff’s first neurological 

appointment occurred on February 7, 2014, was incorrect as “Dr. Wong” has treated plaintiff for 

seizures “since the first week in February of 2011 following [plaintiff’s] seizure onset.” (Id. at 1-

2.)

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The undersigned is cognizant of the difficulties faced by pro se litigants. Nonetheless, 

plaintiff fails to cite to any evidence establishing that the ALJ’s decision is not based on

substantial evidence or is based on a legal error. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)) (“[T]he burden of showing 

that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.”).

Moreover, a review of the ALJ’s decision finds that it is based on substantial evidence and 

free of legal error. In this regard, the ALJ’s decision acknowledges that plaintiff “reported a 

history of seizures since 1978 . . . which have been well controlled over the years with 

medication” until 2011, when plaintiff suffered two seizures after being “weaned off 

medication[.]” (Tr. at 25.) Plaintiff “was then restarted on his previous medication” and “was 

noted to be stable as of October 2013.” (Id.) 

The ALJ’s findings are supported by the evidence of record. Specifically, an August 25, 

2011 Emergency Department Record notes that plaintiff was treated for a “grand mal seizure”

after being “weaned of off Tegretol 3 months ago,” and “has not had a seizure in 10 years[.]” (Id.

at 524.) Plaintiff was found to have “no neurological deficit and his exam [was] normal.” (Id. at 

527.) Plaintiff was started back on Tegretol. (Id.) On December 6, 2011, plaintiff was seen in 

Pulmonary and Critical Care by a doctor who found that “no tests of symptoms indicate that he 

needs to be on disability.” (Id. at 570.) An October 18, 2013 progress note reflects that 

plaintiff’s epilepsy was “stable.” (Id. at 595.) 

Moreover, plaintiff testified that although plaintiff experienced a “reoccurrence of the 

seizure condition” in 2011, plaintiff stopped working in 2008 after being “laid off . . . at the onset 

of the economic downturn[.]” (Id. at 46.) An ALJ may consider evidence that the plaintiff’s 

employment ceased for reasons other than impairment when evaluating credibility. See Bruton v. 

Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001)). The ALJ’s decision also relied on the fact that 

“the record is lacking treatment evidence as to seizures from 2011-2013 except for one note 

where medication was prescribed.” (Id. at 26.) And that plaintiff offered “no opinion 

evidence[.]” (Id.) 

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As noted above, “[t]he claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, 

consistent with the general rule that ‘[a]t all times, the burden is on the claimant to establish [his] 

entitlement to disability insurance benefits.’” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, plaintiff has failed to satisfy 

this burden and review of the ALJ’s decision finds that it is based on substantial evidence and free 

of legal error. 

CONCLUSION

The undersigned finds that plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment with respect to 

any claim of error. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the June 24, 2019 findings and 

recommendations (ECF No. 16) are vacated.

Also, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s July 22, 2019 motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) be denied

2. Defendant’s August 21, 2019 cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) be 

granted;

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security be affirmed; and

4. This case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

Dated: February 20, 2020

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.soc sec\kappes0002.f&rs

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