Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00249/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JERMAINE MITCHELL, #205893, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-249-WHA

) [WO]

)

WILLIAM WYNNE, JR., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an amended complaint

filed by Jermaine Mitchell (“Mitchell”), an indigent state inmate confined at the Hamilton

Aged and Infirmed Facility (“Hamilton”). Doc. No. 5. Mitchell subsequently filed an

amendment to the complaint on November 29, 2012. Doc. No. 35. In these pleadings,

Mitchell alleges, inter alia, that the defendants violated various state statutes during the

parole consideration process which resulted in the decision to deny him parole on January

25, 2012. Mitchell also challengesthe constitutionality of the parole consideration process

and the decision to deny him parole. The defendants in this cause of action are William

Wynne, Jr., Robert Longshore and Cliff Walker, members of the Alabama Board of

Pardons and Paroles; Robert Bentley, Governor of the State of Alabama; and Kim Thomas,

Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections. Mitchell seeks declaratory

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relief, production of various parole documents and a new parole consideration hearing

conducted in a fair manner.

The defendants filed specialreports and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing

the plaintiff’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems

it appropriate to treat each of these reports as a motion for summary judgment. Order of

June 11, 2012 - Doc. No. 27; see also Order of June 27, 2012 - Doc. No. 29. Thus, this

case is now pending on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Upon

consideration of these motions, the evidentiarymaterialsfiled in support thereof, the sworn

complaint, the plaintiff’s responses to the reports, including relevant affidavits and

documents, the court concludesthat the defendants’ motionsforsummaryjudgment are due

to be granted.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

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of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initialresponsibility

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [-- now dispute --] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593 (11 Cir. 1995) (moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine

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dispute of material fact for trial). The movant maymeet this burden by presenting evidence

indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has

failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it

bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiff.

Based on the foregoing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate

evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v.

Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 1

summary-judgment motions.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 56AdvisoryCommittee Notes. Under thisrevision, “[s]ubdivision (a) carries

forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine ‘issue’

becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is

also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Despite these stylistic changes, the substance

of Rule 56 remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the

current rule. 

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properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record

including affidavits,relevant documents or othermaterials]the courtmay... grantsummary

judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meetsits burden, “the non-moving party

must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” demonstrate that there is

a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in

a plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment.

Mitchell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11 Cir. 2014). A genuine

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dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would

allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in itsfavor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263;

Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11 Cir. 2007).

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In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison [and parole] authorities. Unless a prisoner

can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow

him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment

stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motionsfor

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summaryjudgment, Mitchell is required to produce “sufficient[favorable] evidence” which

would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ...

or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position

will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably

find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91

L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990).

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Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a

genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (A

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plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence,

are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916

(11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing

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beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman

v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party’s own

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conclusoryallegationsis notsufficient to oppose summaryjudgment....”); Evers v. General

Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11 Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without

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specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set

forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case

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the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d

1012, 1023 (11 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary judgment appropriate where no genuine

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dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must “consider

all evidence in the record .... [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits,

etc. -- and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that

no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,

692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11 Cir. 2012).

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Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

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the Department ofChildren and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthere is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,

1279 (11 Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party

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must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his

favor.).

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Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se

litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute

of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d

667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this

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court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. The

court has undertaken a thorough review of all the evidence contained in the record. After

such review, the court finds that Mitchell has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment. Matsushita, supra.

III. MATERIAL FACTS

Mitchell is currently confined in the custody of the Alabama Department of

Corrections on convictions for first degree robbery and first degree kidnapping imposed

upon him by the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. Exhibit A to the Special

Report of Defendant Thomas - Doc. No. 16-1 at 2. On December 19, 2012, the Alabama

Board of Pardons and Paroles requested a warden’s report on Mitchell from the warden of

Hamilton for use in Mithchell’s upcoming parole hearing. Id. at 4. Warden Freddie Butler

compiled the requested report and provided it to the parole board. Id. The report detailed

Mitchell’s criminal convictions and disciplinaryhistory, and also advised that Mitchell was

confined to a wheelchair due to a medical condition. Id. at 2-4. Prior to conducting the

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parole hearing, parole board members also had possession of the Pre-Sentence Report

prepared at the time of Mitchell’s current convictions and an Institutional Parole Officer

Report compiled on January 4, 2012. Exhibit 1 to the Supplemental Special Report of the

Parole Defendants (Aff. of Ken Fetzer, Parole Manager of Board Operations) - Doc. No.

30-1 at 2. The Pre-Sentence Report contains details of Mitchell’s robbery and kidnapping

convictions, and the report of the parole officer “includes information about Mitchell’s

personal history,social history, criminal historyand information about Mitchell’s disability

(his being paralyzed).” Id.

The board conducted a parole hearing and, on January 25, 2012, defendants Walker

and Wynne voted to deny Mitchell parole. Exhibit 1 to the Special Report of the Parole

Defendants (Report of Action by the Board) - Doc. No. 26-1 at 4. The record demonstrates

that the denial of parole occurred because the voting members of the parole board did not

believe that Mitchell was an acceptable risk for release on parole. Exhibit 2 to the

Supplemental Special Report of the Parole Defendants(Aff. of Cliff Walker) - Doc. No. 30-

2 at 2 (“I personally studied Mr. Mitchell’s parole file, which included information about

his personal history, social history, criminal history, the details of the offenses for each

sentence under consideration, an assessment of Mr. Mitchell’s adjustment during his

sentence, Mr. Mitchell’s proposed home [plan] and job programand information about and

circumstances surrounding Mr. Mitchell’s being paralyzed. In addition to considering the

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information in Mr. Mitchell’s parole file, I also took testimony from witnesses in

attendance at Mr. Mitchell’s parole hearing.... When considering Mr. Mitchell for parole,

I had all the required investigative reports required by law before me for review and

consideration. Regardless of the fact that Mr. Mitchell is presently paralyzed, I was not

of the opinion that Mr. Mitchell’s release would be compatible with the welfare of society

and that he could live and remain at liberty without violating the law at this time....”);

Exhibit 3 to the Supplemental Special Report of the Parole Defendants (Aff. of William

Wynne, Jr.) - Doc. No. 30-3 at 2 (same). The board members scheduled Mitchell’s next

parole consideration for December of 2016. Exhibit 1 to the Special Report of the Parole

Defendants (Report of Action by the Board) - Doc. No. 26-1 at 4

IV. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

Mitchell asserts that the defendants deprived him of fair consideration for parole in

violation of his due process right, as the decision to deny parole allegedly arose from

arbitrary and capricious actions. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 5 at 5. In support of this

assertion, Mitchell alleges that the defendants deprived him of due process in the parole

consideration process by (1) failing to provide him copies of the information contained in

his parole file, the statutes governing parole, and the rules and regulations of the parole

board; (2) failing to explain the factors on which the parole board members relied in

determining that he was not suited for release on parole; (3) failing to provide him specific

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reasons for the denial of parole; (5) denying him the opportunity to review the information

contained in his parole file; (6) denying him the opportunity to present arguments in favor

of parole personally; (7) failing to investigate community reaction to his potential release,

the nature and extent of his disability, and community programs which might be available

to him under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.,

if he was released on parole ; (8) basing the decision to deny parole on mere opinions; and

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(9) depriving him of his liberty interest in parole. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 5 at 5-

15. Mitchell also asserts that defendants Walker and Wynne relied on false information --

i.e., two disciplinaries issued against him in July of 2011 -- to deny him parole.

Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 35 at 2; Affidavit in Support of Response - Doc.

No. 28-1 at 3. Mitchell further challenges the scheduling of his next parole consideration,

which was set off for five years, Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 5 at 2-3; asserts that the

parole process deprived him of free speech because only documents compiled by state

officials were reviewed, id. at 8-9; and argues that denial of parole constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment, id. at 12. Finally, Mitchell allegesthat the defendants violated several

state laws during the parole consideration process and in denying him parole. Under

applicable federal law, these claims entitle Mitchell to no relief from this court.

To the extent that Mitchell asserts a right to release on parole due to his disability, this claim is 2

without merit. The mere fact that an inmate suffersfroma disability, even a disability qualified for protection

under the Americans with Disablities Act, does not establish a liberty interest in parole. 

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A. Respondeat Superior

Defendants Wynne and Walker are the only defendants who in any manner

participated in the decision to denyMitchell parole. Thus, the claims against the remaining

defendants entitle Mitchell to no relief as these claims are based on theories of respondeat

superior and/or vicarious liability.

The law is well settled “that Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or

vicarious liability].... Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed.

203 (1888) (‘A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position

wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or

servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his

official duties’). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1948 (2009); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11 Cir. 2003) (“[S]upervisory

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officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on

the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d

1014, 1035 (11 Cir. 2001) (A supervisory official “can have no respondeat superior

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liability for a section 1983 claim.”); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11 Cir.2003)

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(concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or

vicariousliability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11 Cir. 1999), citing Belcher

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v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11 Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a

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plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under

either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). “Absent vicarious liability,

each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1949. Thus, liability for actions of

defendants Wynne and Walker could attach to the other named defendants only if these

other defendants “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if]

there is a causal connection between [their] actions ... and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.

Mitchell, however, has presented no evidence which would create a genuine issue

of disputed fact with respect to the claims lodged against defendants Bentley, Thomas and

Longshore. The only evidentiary materials filed in this case demonstrate that these

defendants did not personally participate in or have any involvement with the claims on

which Mitchell seeks relief. In light of the foregoing, defendants Bentely, Thomas and

Longshore can be held liable for actions of defendants Wynne and Walker only if their

actions bear a causal relationship to the purported violations of Mitchell’s constitutional

rights and federal law.

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 To establish the requisite causal connection and therefore avoid entry of summary

judgment in favor of defendants Bentley, Thomas and Longshore, Mitchell must present

sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either “a history of widespread

abuse [that] put[] [these defendants] on notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation, and [they] fail[ed] to do so ...” or “a ... custom or policy [that] result[ed] in

deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or ... facts [that] support an inference that

[these defendants] directed [defendants Wynne and Walker] to act unlawfully, or knew that

[they] would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at

1360 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and

evidentiary materials submitted in this case demonstrates that Mitchell has failed to meet

this burden.

The record before the court contains no evidence to support an inference that

Bentley, Thomas or Longshore directed Wynne and Walker to act unlawfully or knew that

they would act unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Mitchell has

presented no evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration in the

face of which these defendants failed to take corrective action. Finally, it is clear that the

challenged actions did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by Bentley, Thomas or

Longshore. Thus, the requisite causal connection has not been established between the

actions challenged by Mitchell and the conduct of the aforementioned defendants, and

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liability under the custom or policy standard is not warranted. Summary judgment is

therefore due to be granted in favor of defendants Bentley, Thomas and Longshore.

B. False Information

Mitchell complains that defendants Wynne and Walker relied on false information

to deny him parole. Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 35 at 2. Specifically,

Mitchell allegesthat two disciplinariesimposed upon him in July of 2011 are false because

they are based on the purported retaliatory actions of correctional officers. Affidavit in

Support of Response - Doc. No. 28-1 at 3. The defendants do not admit the information

used in the parole decision-making process was false, and categorically deny any knowing

reliance on false information. Exhibit 2 to the Supplemental Special Report of the Parole

Defendants (Aff. of Cliff Walker) - Doc. No. 30-2 at 2 (“As far as I know, the disciplinary

reports in Mr. Mitchell’s parole file are accurate and truthful. I have no reason to question

the veracity of factssurrounding the two disciplinary actions[challenged by] Mr. Mitchell.

I deny knowingly relying on false information to deny Mr. Mitchell parole.”); Exhibit 3 to

the Supplemental Special Report of the Parole Defendants (Aff. of William Wynne, Jr.) -

Doc. No. 30-3 at 2 (Wynne avers that during the parole consideration process he had no

knowledge of any false information in Mitchell’s file and denies “knowingly relying on

false information to deny [him] parole.”).

In Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437 (11 Cir. 1991), the Court held that reliance

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on admittedly false information to deny a prisoner consideration for parole was arbitrary

and capricious treatment which violated the Constitution. The appellate court, however,

carefully distinguished its holding in Monroe from its prior decision in Slocum v. Georgia

State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043

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(1982).

Our holding today does not conflict with our earlier holding in Slocum,

supra. In Slocum, the plaintiff, who had been denied parole, made the

conclusory allegation that the Board must have relied upon erroneous

information because otherwise the Board would surely have granted him

parole. Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941. The plaintiff then sought to assert a due

process right to examine his prison file for the alleged errors. Unlike the

instant case, in Slocum the state did not admit that it had relied upon false

information in denying parole nor did the plaintiff present any evidence that

his prison file even contained any false information. We held in Slocum that

prisoners do not state a due process claim by merely asserting that erroneous

information may have been used during their parole consideration. Id. at

942. We also determined that prisoners do not have a due process right to

examine their prison files as part of a general fishing expedition in search of

false information that could possibly exist in their files. Id. In the case at

bar, we are confronted with prison authorities who admit that information

contained in Monroe’s files is false and that they relied upon such

information, at least in part, to deny Monroe parole and to classify him as a

sex offender. As we stated, the parole statute does not authorize state

officials to rely on knowingly false information in their determinations.

Thomas [v. Sellers], 691 F.2d [487] at 489 [(11 Cir. 1982)].

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Monroe, 932 F.3d at 1442. Slocum controlsthe disposition of the instant false information

claim.

The defendants maintain that, to their knowledge, the information on which they

relied to deny Mitchell parole is correct, and reliance on this information therefore did not

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violate Mitchell’s constitutional rights. There is no admission by the defendants that the

information used in denying Mitchell parole is false, incorrect or erroneous. Mitchell has

failed to come forward with any evidence which indicates that the defendants knowingly

used false information during the parole consideration process. Moreover, Mitchell’s

conclusory assertion regarding possible false information does nothing more than raise the

possibility that information in his records may be false, and this mere possibility fails to

provide a basis for relief. Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1142; Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944 (11 Cir.

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2001) (“[P]risoners cannot make a conclusory allegation regarding the use of [false]

information as the basis of a due process claim.”).

The record in this case establishes that the defendants did not rely on admittedly

false information in their decision to deny Mitchell parole. Consequently, the plaintiff is

entitled to no relief as a matter of law and entry of summary judgment in favor of

defendants Wynne and Walker is appropriate.

C. Due Process

Mitchell’s claims arising from an alleged lack of due process with respect to the

parole consideration process and resulting denial of parole entitle him to no relief.

“The Alabama [parole]statute ... callsfor discretionaryratherthan mandatory action

on the part of the board. The law directs the board to consider a number of factors in

making their determination, which is a subjective rather than objective determination. It

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does not contain any language that mandates parole... . When the statute is framed in

discretionary terms there is not a liberty interest created... . Alabama parole statutes do not

create a liberty interest [in parole]... .” Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489 (11 Cir.

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1982). This court’s exhaustive review of the history of the Alabama statute governing

release on parole establishes that from its inception the statute has been framed in

discretionary terms. The law is well settled that “the mere possibility of parole provides

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simply ‘a hope that is not protected by due process....’ ... [In addition], the Alabama parole

statute framesthe Parole Board’s authority in discretionary terms, and thus does not create

for Alabama prisoners a protected liberty interest in the expectation of parole. See Thomas

v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487 (11 Cir. 1983).” Ellard v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles,

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824 F.2d 937, 942 (11 Cir. 1987). 

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To the extent that Mitchell contends that applicable statutes and regulations create

a protected liberty interest in the procedures related to parole consideration, he is likewise

entitled to no relief, as this claim is foreclosed by Slocum. In Slocum, the Eleventh Circuit

Section 15-22-26 of the Alabama Code governs the authority of the Alabama Board of Pardons and 3

Paroles to grant parole to inmates. The pertinent portion of this statute reads as follows:

No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient

performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the Board of Pardons and Paroles is

of the opinion that there isreasonable probability that, ifsuch prisoner isreleased, he will

live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not

incompatible with the welfare of society. If the board shall so determine, such prisoner

shall be allowed to go upon parole outside of prison walls and enclosure upon such terms

and conditions as the board shall prescribe.... 

Ala. Code § 15-22-26 (emphasis added). The statute is clear that the decision to grant parole is within the

sole discretion of members of the parole board, and that parole is permitted only when board members, in

their opinion, deem an inmate suitable for release on parole. 

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deemed such a “unique theory ... without merit.” 678 F.2d at 942. The relevant portion

of the Court’s opinion reads as follows:

Petitioner argues that even if there is no statutorily created liberty

interest in parole, particular [statutory parole] provisions ... create a

protectable entitlement to parole consideration. Specifically, petitioner cites

the requirement ... that parole consideration “shall be automatic” upon the

expiration of a set period of confinement and language ... that the board

include in the parole file “as complete information as may be practically

available....” If these provisions create a protectable expectancy in parole

consideration, petitioner arguesthat the consideration must comport with due

process standards. Petitioner’s unique theory is without merit. Unless there

is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in making the parole

determination are not required to comport with standards of fundamental

fairness. See Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 429

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U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 308, 50 L.Ed.2d 283 (1976). In Staton v. Wainwright, 665

F.2d 686 (5 Cir. 1982) (former Fifth Circuit decision), the court concluded

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that no liberty interest in parole was created by the Florida statutes. The

court, therefore, rejected appellant’s claim that his due process rights were

violated when he did not receive an initial parole interview within the time

required under the parole laws. The analysis in Staton was adopted by the

Eleventh Circuit in Hunter v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission,

674 F.2d 847 (11 Cir. 1982), where the court held that no due process

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violation could be shown through an allegation that the Florida Parole and

Probation Commission improperly calculated a prisoner’s “presumptive

parole release date.” Accordingly, in the instant case petitioner[’s] ...

allegation that the ... parole board has not accorded him adequate parole

consideration does not entitle him to [relief].

Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941-942.

Mitchell does not possess a liberty interest in being granted parole that is protected

by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Heard v. Georgia State Board of Pardons

and Paroles, 222 Fed. Appx. 838, 840 (11 Cir. 2007); Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437,

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1441 (11 Cir. 1991); Ellard, 824 F.2d at 941-942; Thomas, 691 F.2d at 488-489. Absent

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the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, “the procedures

followed in making the parole determination are notrequired to comport with the standards

of fundamental fairness.” O’Kelley v. Snow, 53 F.3d 319, 321 (11 Cir. 1995); Slocum,

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678 F.2d at 942; Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5 Cir. 1995) (because applicable Texas

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parole statutes confer “no liberty interest in obtaining parole” Texas inmate could not

“complain of the constitutionality of procedural devices attendant to parole decisions.”).

Thus, the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply

to either the parole decision making process, Thomas, 691 F.2d at 488-489, or the parole

consideration process. Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942 (failure to provide parole review within

time required under parole rules or properly calculate presumptive date of release on parole

does not constitute a violation of due process).

Nevertheless, even though there is no liberty interest involved, a parole board may

not engage in “flagrant or unauthorized action.” Thomas, 691 F.2d at 489. Defendants

Wynne and Walker maintain that they acted in accordance with state law and applicable

administrative regulations when they denied parole to Mitchell. They also indicate that the

decision to deny parole was based on their determination that Mitchell did not present an

acceptable risk for release on parole. The decision of the parole board members

demonstrates a reasonable and appropriate action, Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850, 853

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(11 Cir. 1986), rationally related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring that only those

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inmates bestsuited for parole are actuallygranted this privilege.Cf.Conlogue v. Shinbaum,

949 F.2d 378 (11 Cir. 1991); see also Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526 (11 Cir. 1988).

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Mitchell hasfailed to present any evidence indicating arbitrary or capricious actions on the

part of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles or its members. Consequently,summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of defendants Wynne and Walker with respect to

each of Mitchell’s due process claims.

D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Mitchell contendsthat the decision to deny himparole constituted cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 5 at

12. The denial of parole does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation as

it is “merely a disappointment rather than a punishment of cruel and unusual proportions.”

Damiano v. Florida Parole and ProbationCommission, 785 F.2d 929, 933 (11 Cir. 1986).

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Summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of the defendants on this claim.

E. Retroactive Application of Increase in Parole Set-Off Dates

Mitchell challenges the use of administrative rules adopted after he began service

of his current term of incarceration which altered the frequency of parole consideration

dates from every three years to every five years, and resulted in his next parole

consideration date being set for December of 2016. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 5 at

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12. This allegation implicates the protections guaranteed by the Ex Post Facto Clause and

the court therefore construes the claim as one arising under this provision of the

Constitution.

The Ex Post FactoClause bars “enactments which, byretroactive operation, increase

the punishment for a crime after its commission.” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249

(2000). An amended law or regulation must create a significant risk of increasing the

punishment imposed upon an inmate in order for the amendment to run afoul of this

constitutional provision. Garner, 529 U.S. at 255. Decisions with respect to whether a

parole regulation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to inmates entitled to

more frequent parole consideration at the time they committed their crimes must be made

on a case-by-case basis. Harris v. Hammonds, 217 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11 Cir. 2000). In

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making these decisions, a court is required to consider evidence of the general operation

of the parole system and any other evidence produced by a prisoner in support of his

assertion that the regulation “‘as applied to his sentence,’ created a significant risk of

increasing his punishment.” Harris, 217 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S.

244, 255, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000)); Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946 -947

(11 Cir. 2001).

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In Garner, the Court addressed whether an amended Georgia rule increasing parole

consideration hearings from every three years to every eight years violated the Ex Post

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Facto Clause. The Court determined that extending the time for a scheduled parole

consideration hearing did not prevent the exercise of discretion by the Georgia Board of

Pardons and Paroles during the period between parole reviews, because the agency’s

policies permit the Board, in its discretion, to schedule expedited reviews in the event of

a change in circumstances or new information. Garner, 529 U.S. at 256.

A determination of whether retroactive application of a particular change in a law

or regulation governing parole respects the prohibition of ex post facto legislation is often

a question of particular difficulty when the discretion vested in the parole board is taken

into account. Id. at 249. In deciding whether a parole regulation prevents a parole board’s

exercise of discretion, the court may consider the implementing regulations, the statutory

structure and the board’s representations regarding its operations. Id. at 254. “The idea

of discretion is that it has the capacity, and the obligation, to change and adapt based on

experience.” Id. at 253.

Alabama law gives the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles broad discretion in

determining whether an inmate should be granted parole, § 15-22-26, Ala.Code 1975, “and

when and under what conditions” parole will be granted, § 15-22-24(a), Ala. Code.

Applicable state law also requiresthat the parole board consider the public interest in every

case. Ala. Code § 15-22-26. This unconditional discretion, however, does not displace

the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. The proper inquiry

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in cases challenging retroactive application of new parole policies or statutes is whether

the retroactive change creates “a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment

attached to the covered crimes.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The rules and regulations governing the frequency of parole consideration dates are

found in the operating proceduresfor the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. In 2001,

the parole board adopted the rules and regulations relevant to the claims presented in this

case. The board amended these rules and regulations in 2004 and 2012. Article 6, § 11,

Rules, Regulations and Procedures of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, vests the Board

with discretion to “determine whether and when the case shall next be docketed for

consideration, not to exceed five (5) years.” Exhibit 4 to the Special Report of the Parole

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Defendants - Doc. No. 26-4 at 12. Article 2, § 7 of these rules provides that, after a denial

of parole, “the [Review] Committee may consider earlierscheduling, butsuch review shall

not begin earlier than eighteen months after the Board has denied or revoked parole.” Id.

5

at 6. In addition, the opportunity for an expedited parole review is likewise available to

inmates who have served at least five years in prison as Article 2, § 1 of the rules and

The initial operating procedure governing the scheduling of parole consideration dates, Ala. Adm. 4

Code § 640-X-2.02(8)(1982, revised 1986), provided that upon denial of parole to an inmate “the Board will

determine when [the inmate’s] case is to be reset but in no event shall it be reset for more than three years

from the date of denial.” The increase in the reset date from no “more than three years” from denial of parole

to the current five-year maximum originally occurred in adoption of the 2001 rules and regulations at Article

6, § 11. The parole board retained the five-year set off in its 2004 and 2012 amendments. 

The 2001 amendment to the regulation in Article 2, § 8 allowed the “earlier scheduling” of parole 5

consideration twenty-four months, rather than eighteen months after the denial of parole as permitted by the

2004 and 2012 amendments. 

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regulations directs that an inmate in this situation “may file a written request once per

calendar year [with parole officials] ... to determine whether it may be appropriate to

schedule earlier parole consideration. Such a rescheduling may be granted only for good

cause shown and circumstances bearing on [the inmate’s] probability to succeed on parole,

not merely because the prisoner is following the rules in prison.” Thus, the rule changes

are designed to facilitate better exercise of the Board’s discretion. Garner, 529 U.S. at

254-255.

It is clear that the law changing the frequency of parole consideration from three

years to five years does not extend the term of imprisonment imposed upon Mitchell, or

increase the level of risk that he will serve a longer term of imprisonment. Specifically,

prior to this change, the parole board never guaranteed Mitchell that he would be

unconditionally released before completion of his twenty-year sentence. Additionally,

eighteen months after the denial of parole Mitchellretainsthe opportunityunderthe current

regulation to submit information about changed circumstances bearing on his suitability

for release on parole and, therefore, he could be scheduled for consideration at an earlier

date. Hence, even if risk of an increased term of incarceration develops in Mitchell’s case,

he may, upon a showing of “good cause ... and circumstances bearing on his probability to

succeed on parole,” seek an earlier review before the 5-year reconsideration interval

expires. Article 2, § 1, Rules, Regulations and Procedures of the Board of Pardons and

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Paroles; Exhibit 4 to the Special Report of the Parole Defendants - Doc. No. 26-4 at 5.

Mitchell has presented no evidence which demonstratesthat the regulations at issue

create a significant risk of increased punishment. Moreover, Mitchell possessesthe ability

to petition the parole board for an earlier parole consideration date.Based on the foregoing,

the court concludes that the change about which Mitchell complains did not lengthen his

actual term of imprisonment. Thus, Mitchell’s challenge to the potential increase in time

between parole consideration dates does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation

and provides no basis for relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Garner, 529 U.S. at 253-

256; Olstad v. Collier, 326 Fed.Appx. 261 (5 Cir. 2009) (retroactive imposition by parole

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board of changes in Texas parole policy allowing a potential five year set-off until

prisoner’s “next parole review presents no ex post facto violation because its effect on

increasing [plaintiff’s] punishment is merely conjectural.... The Board is vested with

discretion as to how often to set [plaintiff’s] date for reconsideration, with five years for

the maximum; the Board is also permitted to adjust subsequent review dates and conduct

a special review if [plaintiff’s] status changes.”); Creel v. Kyle, 42 F.3d 955, 957 (5 Cir.),

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cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1070, 115 S.Ct. 1706 (1995) (change in rules that lengthen period

of time between parole reconsideration hearings applied retroactively by the parole board

not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause). Defendants Wynne and Walker are therefore

entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

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F. Free Speech

Mitchell makes the conclusory allegation that the parole consideration process

deprived him of free speech “where under the policy and regulation [of the Alabama Board

of Pardons and Paroles] the reports, investigations, examinations, and determinations done

are spoken by and through [correctional and parole officials].” Amended Complaint - Doc.

No. 5 at 9. This claim provides no basis for relief, as Mitchell has no right protected by the

First Amendment to appear at his parole hearing, review the information in his parole file

or submit written documentation in support of parole. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,

822 (1974) (Attendant to incarceration is “the [inescapable] withdrawal or limitation of

many [inmate] privileges and rights.”); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (“In the

First Amendment context, ... some rights are simply inconsistent with the status of a

prisoner....”).

G. The Americans with Disabilities Act

6

Mitchell references the Americans with Disabilities Act Disabilities Act in his

amended complaint. “Under Title II of the ADA, a ‘qualified individual with a disability’

cannot be excluded from participating in, or be denied the benefits of, services, programs,

or activities of a public entity ‘by reason of such disability’ or ‘be subjected to

discrimination by’ the public entity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.” Flournoy v. Culver, 534

For purposes of this Recommendation, the court assumes arguendo that Mitchell is a qualified 6

individual with a disability and that parole is a program within the purview of the ADA. 

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Fed. Appx. 848, 851 (11 Cir. 2013). Title II of the ADA applies to inmates confined in

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state correctional facilities. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) (citing

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade

County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11 Cir. 2007) (It is well settled law “that a disabled

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prisoner can state a Title II ADA claim if he is denied participation in an activity provided

in state prison by reason of his disability.”).

7

“In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the

ADA, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate that [he] (1) is disabled, (2) is a

qualified individual, and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination

because of [his] disability.” Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11 Cir.

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2000) (citation omitted). This standard derives from the ADA’s language,

stating that “no [employer] shall discriminate against a qualified individual

with a disability because of the disability of such an individual.” 42 USC

12112(a)....

Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263-1264 (11 Cir.

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2007).

 In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 152-154 (2006), the Court advised: 7

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” § 12132 (2000 ed.). 

A “‘qualified individual with a disability’” is defined as “an individual with

a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,

policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or

transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,

meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the

participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 

§12131(2). The Act defines “‘public entity’” to include “any State or local

government” and “any department, agency, ... or other instrumentality of

a State,” §12131(1). 

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Defendants Wynne and Walker deny violating any rights afforded Mitchell

regarding the parole consideration process or their decision to deny parole. It is undisputed

that the defendants considered Mitchell for parole and, after reviewing records regarding

his criminal, correctional, personal and social history, denied him parole based on their

opinion that his release would not be compatible with society’s welfare. Exhibit 2 to the

Supplemental Special Report of the Parole Defendants(Aff. of Cliff Walker) - Doc. No. 30-

2 at 2; Exhibit 3 to the Supplemental Special Report of the Parole Defendants (Aff. of

William Wynne, Jr.) - Doc. No. 30-3 at 2. Mitchell concedes that the defendants’ opinions

regarding his incompatibility for release into society constituted the basis for the decision

to deny him parole. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence that the denial of parole

was due to Mitchell’s disability. Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1332,

1334 (11 Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must present evidence the disability constituted a

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determinative factor in the decision-making process); see also McNely v. Ocala-Star

Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11 Cir. 1996) (the ADA liability standard requires

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proof that the decision at issue occurred because of the alleged disability). Instead, the

only evidence before the court demonstrates that the denial of parole was based solely on

the defendants’ determination that Mitchell was not deemed suitable for release on parole

for reasons other than the fact that he was disabled. Id. In light of the foregoing, Mitchell’s

ADA claim provides no basis for relief.

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H. State Law Claims

Throughout the amended complaint, Mitchell contends that the parole defendants

have acted or failed to act in accordance with state laws governing parole with respect to

the parole consideration process and the determination that he is notsuitable for release on

parole. Mitchell further asserts that denying parole to eligible inmates violates provisions

of the Alabama Criminal Code regarding the need for inmate rehabilitation and the

prevention of arbitrary treatment of inmates. To the extent that Mitchell asserts that the

actions of the defendants violated state law, review of these claimsis appropriate only upon

exertion of this court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Here, however, the exercise of such

jurisdiction is inappropriate.

8

For a federal court “[t]o exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction over state law claims

not otherwise cognizable in federal court, ‘the court must have jurisdiction over a

substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from a “common

nucleus of operative fact.”’” L.A. Draper and Son v. Wheelabrator Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d

414, 427 (11 Cir. 1984). The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is completely

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discretionary. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). “If the federal claims

are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of the

state claims.” L.A. Draper and Son, 735 F.2d at 428. In view of this court’s resolution of

The court also notes that its review of the complaint and evidentiary materials filed herein does not 8

indicate any violation of state law. 

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the federal claims presented in the complaint, Mitchell’s pendent state claims are due to

be dismissed. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the

state claims should be dismissed as well); see also Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677

F.2d 818 (11 Cir. 1982).

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V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before March 16, 2015, the parties may file objections to this

Alabama law vests complete discretion in the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles “of 9

determining what prisoners may be released on parole and when and under what conditions” parole will be

granted. Ala. Code § 15-22-24(a). The law further gives the parole board total discretion in determining

whether an inmate should be granted parole. § 15-22-26, Ala.Code (A prisoner shall not be released on

parole unless “the Board of Pardons and Paroles is of the opinion that there is reasonable probability that,

if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release

is not incompatible with the welfare of society....”). The Alabama parole statutes governing standards for

parole of inmates are typical parole statutes which vest absolute discretion in the Alabama Board of Pardons

and Paroles. Ellard, 824 F.2d at 942; Thomas, 691 F.2d at 489. The Alabama parole scheme has been

reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on numerous occasions with that court acknowledging

the constitutionality of the discretion accorded the Board and continuously stressing “that absent flagrant or

unauthorized action by a parole board the discretionary power vested in a parole board will not be interfered

with by the Federal courts.” Thomas, 691 F.2d at 489. As the findings set forth herein make clear, there has

been no flagrant or unauthorized action by the parole board or its members warranting interference by this

court. 

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Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled must clearly identify the findingsin the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en

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banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 2nd day of March, 2015.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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