Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01361/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01361-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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17-cv-1361-JM (RNB) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RICHARD DON RUTHERFORD, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 17-cv-1361-JM (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 12, 15) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On July 5, 2017, plaintiff Richard Don Rutherford filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. 

(ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that the Commissioner’s crossCase 3:17-cv-01361-JM-RNB Document 19 Filed 07/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
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motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and that Judgment be entered affirming the 

decision of the Commissioner and dismissing the action with prejudice. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2011, plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of disability 

and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability 

beginning January 25, 2010. (Certified Administrative Record [“AR”] 292-98.) After his 

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration (AR 161-65, 167-71), plaintiff 

requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 172-

73.) An administrative hearing was held on June 6, 2013. Plaintiff appeared with a nonattorney representative, and testimony was taken from him and a vocational expert (“VE”). 

(AR 36-68.) 

As reflected in her August 29, 2013 hearing decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from his alleged onset 

date through the date of the decision. (AR 133-50.) In an Order issued April 16, 2015, the 

Appeals Council granted plaintiff’s request for review. It vacated the hearing decision and 

remanded the case to the ALJ with instructions. (AR 155-59.) 

A second administrative hearing was held on October 20, 2016 before a different 

ALJ. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with the same non-attorney representative, and 

testimony was taken from him and a different VE. (AR 69-101.) As reflected in his 

December 16, 2016 hearing decision, the second ALJ found that plaintiff’s date last insured 

was June 30, 2014, and that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, from his alleged onset date through his date last insured. (AR 20-30.) The 

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on May 4, 2017, when the 

Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-5.) This timely civil action 

followed. 

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SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date 

of January 25, 2010 through his date last insured of June 30, 2014. (AR 22.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: type 

I diabetes mellitus; hypertension; status post-surgery for repair of left shoulder rotator cuff 

tear with residual left should pain; alcohol dependence; and an anxiety disorder. (AR 22.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 23.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, plaintiff had the 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work “with a limit to occasionally 

lift or carry 20 pounds and frequently lift or carry 10 pounds; sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour 

workday; stand or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasionally climb, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; occasionally reach overhead with the left upper extremity; 

mentally limited to simple and routine tasks performed in a non-public setting and 

involving work with items rather than with people.” (AR 25.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile would be unable to 

perform the exertional demands of plaintiff’s past relevant work as an operating engineer. 

Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(AR 29.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile would have 

been able to perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers 

in the national economy (i.e., garment bagger, folder, and inspector/hand-packager), the 

ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled through his date last insured. (AR 29-30.) 

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PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF ERROR

Plaintiff is claiming that, in determining his mental RFC, the ALJ impermissibly 

rejected the opinion of examining physician, Jaga Nath Glassman. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

 On September 24, 2011, plaintiff presented to Dr. Glassman for a comprehensive 

psychiatric evaluation. After performing a mental status examination, Dr. Glassman 

opined as follows: 

“He has moderate impairment in his capacity to function in a workplace 

setting, due to his panic attacks and phobic avoidance. He has impairments in 

his capacity to behave in a socially appropriate manner, given his anxious and 

depressed moods. He is capable of getting along adequately with others. He 

is capable of understanding and following at least simple instructions. He has 

moderate impairments in his capacity to maintain concentration, persistence, 

and pace, and to adapt to changes and stresses in a workplace setting.” (AR 

425.) 

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 In his decision, the ALJ stated that he was giving “significant weight” to Dr. 

Glassman’s opinion. (AR 27.) However, plaintiff contends that, in limiting plaintiff to 

“simple and routine tasks performed in a non-public setting and involving work with items 

rather than people,” the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment did not adequately account for Dr. 

Glassman’s opinion that plaintiff suffers from moderate impairments in his capacity to 

maintain concentration, persistence, and pace and to adapt to changes and stresses in a 

workplace setting. (See ECF No. 12-1 at 7.) 

 The Commissioner contends that this case is controlled by the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Stubbs–Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008). There, the Ninth 

Circuit held that an ALJ’s limitation to “simple, routine, repetitive” work sufficiently 

accommodated medical-opinion evidence that the claimant had a “moderate” limitation in 

pace and “other mental limitations regarding attention, concentration, and adaption.” See 

id. at 1173-74. 

 In his Reply, plaintiff maintains that Stubbs-Danielson is distinguishable because 

“[h]ere, by way of contrast, the nonexertional limitations set out in the ALJ’s RFC 

determination were not the only concrete restrictions identified in Dr. Glassman’s opinion, 

and no medical source ultimately concluded that such limitations adequately captured a 

moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace or a moderate limitation [in] 

the ability to adapt to changes and stresses in a workplace setting.” (See ECF No. 16 at 3-

4, citing Brink v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 Fed. Appx. 211, 212 (9th Cir. 2009), for 

the proposition that the phrase “simple, repetitive work” fails to encompass difficulties 

with concentration, persistence or pace.) As discussed hereafter, the Court disagrees with 

plaintiff that Stubbs-Danielson is distinguishable and declines to apply Brink. 

 In Stubbs-Daniels, two doctors assessed the claimant with moderate limitations in 

mental functioning. See 539 F.3d at 1173. An examining physician (Dr. McCollum) found

that the claimant was “moderately limited” in her ability “to perform at a consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods” but did not assess whether she 

could perform unskilled work on a sustained basis. Id. A state-agency reviewing 

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psychologist (Dr. Eather) identified the claimant’s limitation in pace, as well as moderate 

limitations in several other areas of mental functioning but also found the claimant capable 

of carrying out “simple tasks.” Id. Based on this medical opinion evidence, the ALJ 

assessed the claimant as having the RFC for simple, routine, repetitive work and he did not 

include any moderate limitations in pace or other mental areas of functioning in his 

hypothetical to the VE. See id. at 1171, 1173-74. In doing so, the ALJ did not reject the 

two doctors’ findings of moderate limitations in pace and other areas of mental functioning. 

Id. at 1174. Rather, the ALJ “translated” the claimant's condition, “including the pace and 

mental limitations, into the only concrete restrictions available to him — [the state-agency 

reviewing psychologist’s] recommended restriction to ‘simple tasks.’” Id. (citing Howard 

v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 582 (8th Cir. 2001) (when state psychologist both identified 

claimant as having deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace and pronounced that 

claimant possessed ability to “sustain sufficient concentration and attention to perform at 

least simple, repetitive, and routine cognitive activity without severe restriction of 

function,” ALJ’s hypothetical including ability to perform “simple, routine, repetitive 

tasks” adequately captured claimant’s deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace), 

and Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001) (when ALJ’s hypothetical 

incorporated concrete restrictions identified by examining psychiatrist regarding quotas, 

complexity, and stress, ALJ did not err in failing to include that claimant suffered from 

deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace)). 

 In Brink, the ALJ accepted medical evidence that the claimant had moderate 

difficulty maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, but did not include those 

limitations in the hypothetical he presented to the VE. See 343 Fed. Appx. At 212. Instead, 

the ALJ mentioned only a limitation for simple, repetitive work. Id. The panel there held 

that the hypothetical was incomplete because it did not specifically include the limitations 

for concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. The court rejected the Commissioner’s 

contention that the limitation to simple, repetitive work encompassed the claimant’s 

difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace. Id. Although Stubbs-Danielson had 

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reached the opposite conclusion, the Brinks court attempted to distinguish it. The court 

explained that in the case before it, there was medical evidence that the claimant had 

difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, whereas in Stubbs-Danielson, the 

medical testimony did not establish any limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. 

Id.

 The Court has concluded that Brink does not establish error in the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment here. First, Brink is not controlling authority, whereas Stubbs-Danielson is. 

See 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a) (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of the Court are not 

precedent.”). Second, under that law, the ALJ was not required to explicitly include in his 

RFC determination the moderate limitations assessed by Dr. Glassman. The restriction to 

simple and routine tasks adequately captured those moderate limitations. See StubbsDanielson, 539 F.3d at 1174. Third, Brink’s conclusion that there was no medical testimony 

of limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace in Stubbs-Danielson, see Brink, 343 

Fed. Appx. at 212, overlooks express language in Stubbs-Danielson to the contrary. See

Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1171 (“Dr. Bryce A. McCollum evaluated StubbsDanielson and ... said she showed ... a slow pace in thought and action”), 1173 

(recounting similar findings by Dr. McCollum and Dr. Eather’s finding that she had “a 

slow pace, both in thinking & actions”), 1174 (summarizing both doctors' findings 

“related to pace and the other mental limitations regarding attention, concentration, 

and adaption”). See also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The 

‘failure to complete tasks in a timely manner’ is not a functional limitation but the end 

result of ‘deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace.’”). The Court therefore 

concurs with the district court in Calisti v. Colvin, 2015 WL 7428724, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 23, 2015) that the reasoning offered in Brink to distinguish Stubbs-Danielson is not 

persuasive. 

 Here, as in Stubbs–Danielson, the ALJ’s limitation to “simple and routine tasks” in 

the RFC was consistent with the other restrictions identified in the medical evidence. 

Although Dr. Glassman opined that plaintiff had moderate impairments in the capacity to 

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maintain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace and to adapt to changes and stress 

in a workplace setting, she nonetheless concluded that plaintiff was “capable of 

understanding and following at least simple instructions.” (See AR 425.) Further, contrary 

to plaintiff’s contention in his Reply, as in Stubbs-Danielson, a State agency reviewing 

psychologist did opine after considering the entire medical record, including Dr. 

Glassman’s limitations, that plaintiff “demonstrates the capacity to understand, remember 

and sustain concentration to carry out and complete simple, routine tasks in work settings 

where there is infrequent and casual contact with the general public and coworkers.” (See

AR 125.) Given this opinion evidence,1

 the Court finds that the ALJ reasonably translated 

the moderate deficiencies assessed by Dr. Glassman into the RFC assessment for “simple 

and routine tasks.” See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174. 

 Accordingly, the Court rejects plaintiff’s contention that, in determining plaintiff’s 

mental RFC, the ALJ impermissibly rejected Dr. Glassman’s opinion. See also Hughes v. 

Colvin, 599 Fed. Appx. 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ’s RFC assessment accounted for 

moderate difficulties in social functioning, concentration, and persistence by restricting the 

claimant to simple, routine, repetitive tasks in job where she could work independently, 

with no more than occasional public interaction); Sabin v. Astrue, 337 Fed. Appx. 617, 

620-21 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ properly assessed medical evidence in determining that 

despite moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, claimant could perform 

simple and repetitive tasks on a consistent basis). 

RECOMMENDATION 

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment be 

                                               

1

 As the ALJ also noted in explaining his rationale for limiting plaintiff to simple 

routine work and no public contact, plaintiff told Dr. Glassman himself that he “could 

probably work in a job if he did not have to be around people [much].” (See AR 28-29, 

citing AR 424.)

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GRANTED, and that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner 

and dismissing this action with prejudice. 

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). See id. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 31, 2018 _________________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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