Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01300/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01300-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLENE ELIZABETH MASTERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE’S REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION;

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT;

(3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND

(4) REMANDING THE MATTER 

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

[ECF Nos. 13, 15, 17.]

On May 31, 2016, Plaintiff Arlene Elizabeth Masterson (“Plaintiff” or 

“Masterson”) filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of a final decision by Carolyn W. 

Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Defendant” or 

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
2

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Commissioner”),1 denying Plaintiff’s applications for a period of disability, disability 

insurance benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental security income (“SSI”) on the basis that 

Plaintiff was not disabled. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 15.) On 

July 11, 2017, Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo issued a report and recommendation 

(“Report”) recommending that the undersigned judge grant Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, deny Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remand 

the matter for further proceedings by the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Dkt. No. 

17.) Defendant filed objections to the Report on July 25, 2017, (Dkt. No. 18), and 

Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s objections, (Dkt. No. 19-1). Having reviewed 

the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, the Court ADOPTS the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The district court’s duties in connection with a Report from a magistrate judge are 

set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district 

court “may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court need 

not review de novo those portions of a Report to which neither party objects. See Wang 

v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). When no objections to a Report are made, 

the Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and 

decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of 

California, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 

1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

 

1 Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
3

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Standard of Review of Commissioner’s Final Decision

Section 205(g) of the Act permits unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may 

enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision, and

may also remand the matter to the Social Security Administrator for further proceedings. 

Id. 

The scope of the reviewing court is limited; it may only “set aside the ALJ’s denial 

of benefits . . . when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Robbins v. SSA, 466 F.3d 880, 882 

(9th Cir. 2006). However, “[e]ven if the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by 

inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2012).

III. Determination of Disability

For purposes of the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if she is unable “to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to determine whether a claimant meets this definition, 

the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a); Molina, 674 

F.3d at 1110. If the ALJ determines that a claimant is either disabled or not disabled at a 

step in the process, the ALJ does not continue on to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(a)(4); Bray v. Comm’r of SSA, 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). In brief, 

the ALJ considers whether the claimant is disabled by determining: (1) whether the 

claimant is “doing substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a “severe, 

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
4

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments 

that has lasted for more than 12 months; (3) whether the impairment “meets or equals”

one of the listings in the regulations; (4) whether, given the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”), the claimant can still do his or her “past relevant work”; and (5) 

whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 

Between steps three and four, the ALJ must, as an intermediate step, assess the claimant’s 

RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222–23; Garrison v. Colvin, 759 

F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014). The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one 

through four but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report on three grounds.2 (Dkt. No. 

18.) Each is discussed in turn below.

I. Waiver of the Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) Issue

Plaintiff argued to the Appeals Council that the ALJ erred in finding that her past 

work was performed at the level of substantial gainful activity, as her past work did not 

meet the minimum monthly earnings thresholds to qualify as such. (Dkt. No. 17 at 15–

16.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that although Plaintiff failed to raise the SGA issue 

before the ALJ, Plaintiff ultimately did not waive the issue, because she presented it to 

the Appeals Council when she sought review of the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 17–18.)

Defendant relies upon Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1999), to argue that 

Plaintiff waived the SGA issue by failing to raise it in front of the ALJ in the first 

instance. (Dkt. No. 18 at 2–4.) In Meanel, the claimant “relie[d] on new statistics that 

she admittedly failed to raise at both her hearing before the ALJ and the Appeals 

Council.” 172 F.3d at 1115 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he 

 

2 No objections were made to the remainder of the Magistrate Judge’s Report. Accordingly, the Court

limits its discussion to Defendant’s three objections. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121–22. The 

Magistrate Judge’s description of the proceedings below are incorporated by reference. (See Dkt. No. 

17 at 6–12.)

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
5

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ALJ, rather than this Court, was in the optimal position to resolve the conflict between 

Meanel’s new evidence and the statistical evidence provided by the VE.” Id.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that, “at least when claimants are represented by 

counsel, they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order 

to preserve them on appeal.” Id.

Meanel is distinguishable. First, the claimant in Meanel failed to raise the new 

statistical evidence at her hearing before either the ALJ or the Appeals Council. See 172 

F.3d at 1115. Meanel’s holding requires represented claimants to “raise all issues and 

evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal.” Id. The 

holding does not, however, specify which level of the administrative process is the 

terminus for purposes of waiver. See id. Second, recent Ninth Circuit authority disfavors 

Defendant’s position. See Lamear v. Berryhill, No. 15-35088, 2017 WL 3254930, at *4 

(9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) (publication forthcoming). In Lamear, the Ninth Circuit rejected 

the Commissioner’s argument that claimant’s counsel waived an issue by failing to raise 

it during the hearing in front of the ALJ. See id. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Meanel, 

noting that “[u]nlike the claimant in Meanel, Lamear raised this issue to the Appeals 

Council.” Id. 

The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s first objection.

II. Apparent Conflict Between the Vocational Expert’s (“VE’s”) Testimony 

and Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)

“In determining whether an applicant is entitled to disability benefits, an ALJ may 

consult a series of sources, including a [vocational expert (“VE”)] and the [Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”)].” Lamear, 2017 WL 3254930, at *2. “If the expert’s 

opinion that the applicant is able to work conflicts with, or seems to conflict with, the 

requirements listed in the Dictionary, then the ALJ must ask the expert to reconcile the 

conflict before relying on the expert to decide if the claimant is disabled.” Gutierrez v. 

Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2016). The conflict must be “obvious or apparent.”

Id. at 808.

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
6

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ erred at step five by failing to ask the 

VE to reconcile the apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the overhead 

reaching requirements detailed in the DOT. (Dkt. No. 17 at 21–25.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff’s RFC limited her to reaching overheard with her right arm on only an 

occasional basis, or up to one-third of the day. (See id. at 23.) Despite this limitation, the 

VE identified three jobs—mail clerk, small parts assembler, and garment folder—that 

required frequent or constant reaching under the DOT. (See id. (DOT notes that mail 

clerks and small parts assemblers perform frequent reaching between one-third to twothirds of the time, and that garment folders perform constant reaching two-thirds of the 

time or more).) Problematically, the definition of reaching entails extending the hands 

and arms in any direction, which Plaintiff cannot do with her right arm. (See id.) The 

VE’s testimony exceeded Plaintiff’s RFC and created an apparent conflict with the 

requirements listed in the DOT.

Relying on Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2016), Defendant argues 

that there was no apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. (Dkt. No. 

18 at 4–7.) At issue in Gutierrez was “whether overhead reaching is such a common and 

obvious part of cashiering that the ALJ should have recognized a conflict and questioned 

the expert more closely before concluding that Ms. Gutierrez could work as a cashier.” 

Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 807. Specifically, 

the applicant could not reach above shoulder level with her right arm. The VE 

opined that she could work as a cashier, and the ALJ did not specifically question 

the VE about how the applicant could do this in light of her inability to reach 

overhead with her right arm. The applicant in Gutierrez . . . argued that the ALJ 

should have recognized a conflict between the DOT and the VE’s testimony, and 

questioned the VE more closely.

Lamear, 2017 WL 3254930, at *3 (citing Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 807). Notwithstanding 

the above, the Ninth Circuit “held there was no error because, based on common 

experience, it is ‘unlikely and unforeseeable’ that a cashier would need to reach 

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
7

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

overhead, and even more rare for one to need to reach overhead with both arms.” Id. 

(citing Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808–09 & 809 n.2).

Lamear is again instructive. In Lamear, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “‘[t]he 

requirement for an ALJ to ask follow up questions is fact-dependent,’ and the more 

obscure the job, the less likely common experience will dictate the result.” Id. at *3 

(quoting Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808). Further, “[t]o avoid unnecessary appeals, an ALJ 

should ordinarily ask the VE to explain in some detail why there is no conflict between 

the DOT and the applicant’s RFC.” Id. In Lamear,

The VE opined that an individual with Lamear’s limitations, which included being 

able only “occasionally” to handle, finger, and reach overhead with his left, nondominant hand and arm, but with no limitations on his right side, . . . could still 

work as an office helper, mail clerk, or parking lot cashier, even though the DOT 

states that these jobs require “frequent” handling, fingering, and reaching. 

Id. 

The Ninth Circuit distinguished Gutierrez: 

Contrary to the facts in Gutierrez, we cannot say that, based on common 

experience, it is likely and foreseeable that an office helper, mail clerk, or parking 

lot cashier with limitations on his ability to “handle, finger and feel with the left 

hand” could perform his duties. The DOT’s lengthy descriptions for these jobs 

strongly suggest that it is likely and foreseeable that using both hands would be 

necessary to perform “essential, integral, or expected” tasks in an acceptable and 

efficient manner. . . . Moreover, all three jobs require workers to “frequently”

engage in handling, fingering, and reaching, which means that these types of 

activities could be necessary for as much as two-thirds of the workday. Absent 

anything in the record to explain this apparent discrepancy, we must reverse and 

remand so the ALJ can ask the VE to reconcile these jobs with Lamear’s left hand 

limitations.

Id.

Here, the positions of mail clerk, small parts assembler, and garment folder, while 

not obscure, are not so commonplace that “common experience” can easily resolve the 

conflict. As in Lamear, common experience does not dictate that it is likely and 

foreseeable that a mail clerk, small parts assembler, or garment folder with limitations on 

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
8

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

her ability to reach overhead with her right arm could perform her duties. This is 

particularly true where all three jobs require workers to frequently or constantly engage 

in reaching—indeed, reaching may be necessary for up to two-thirds of the workday for 

mail clerks and small parts assemblers, and for up to the entire workday for garment

folders.

Moreover, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s left arm was not similarly limited 

as her right arm does not answer the question of whether the DOT’s reaching 

requirements are unilateral or bilateral, “an issue that has divided many courts.” Lamear, 

2017 WL 3254930, at *3. Here, as in Lamear, the Court “cannot determine from this 

record, the DOT, or . . . . common experience whether the jobs in question require both 

[arms], so we cannot say the ALJ’s failure to inquire was harmless.” Id.; see also 

Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 211 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Although we could guess what 

these occupations require in reality, it is the purview of the ALJ to elicit an explanation 

from the expert as to whether these occupations do, in fact, require frequent bilateral 

overhead reaching.”).

The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s second objection. 

III. Dr. Kotha’s Report and Basis for Remand

Defendant objects that the Magistrate Judge erroneously recommended remanding 

the matter based on Dr. Kotha’s assessment. (Dkt. No. 18 at 7–9.) It is plain, however,

that the Magistrate Judge did not base his recommendation on Dr. Kotha’s report.3 (See 

Dkt. No. 17 at 25–30.) Rather, remand was recommended on account of the ALJ’s 

failure to develop the record in two areas—the SGA factors and the apparent conflict 

 

3

It is undisputed that “the administrative record includes evidence submitted to and considered by the 

Appeals Council,” as “[t]he Commissioner’s regulations permit claimants to submit new and material 

evidence to the Appeals Council and require the Council to consider that evidence in determining 

whether to review the ALJ’s decision, so long as the evidence relates to the period on or before the 

ALJ’s decision.” Brewes v. Comm’r of SSA, 682 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.970(b)). 

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
9

3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. (See id.) The Report explicitly recommends 

that the ALJ should also consider Dr. Kotha’s assessment on remand. (See id. at 27.) 

Further, the Report does not conclude that Dr. Kotha’s assessment disturbs the 

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. (See id. at 29.) Rather, the Report 

notes that while questions of reliability or credibility may affect Dr. Kotha’s report, the 

ALJ, not the Court, is ultimately in the best position to resolve these evidentiary concerns 

and determine the full significance—if any—of Dr. Kotha’s report on the ALJ’s own 

RFC findings. (See id.) 

The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s third objection.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections and 

ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 17.) The 

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 13), DENIES 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 15), and REMANDS the 

matter for further proceedings by the ALJ.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-01300-GPC-WVG Document 21 Filed 08/18/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9