Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02165/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02165-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL CARILLO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv2165-LAB (POR)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION; AND

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

On November 21, 2008, Petitioner, a prisoner in state custody, filed his petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, his

petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Louisa Porter for report and recommendation. On

June 16, 2009, Judge Porter issued her report and recommendation (the "R&R"), to which

Petitioner filed objections (the “Objections”).

Petitioner was convicted on January 13, 1982 of first degree murder with the use of

a firearm, robbery, and unlawfully taking a vehicle. At the time of his conviction, California

Code of Regulations § 2817 provided that certain prisoners sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole were nevertheless entitled to periodic review hearings to determine

whether they should be considered for commutation and pardon. The first hearing was to

be held 12 years after the prisoner began serving his sentence, and hearings were to be

held every three years thereafter. This provision was, however, repealed effective January

19, 1994 by the Briggs Initiative, which Petitioner argues was an ex post facto law. Had the

Case 3:08-cv-02165-LAB-POR Document 11 Filed 08/17/09 Page 1 of 4
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provision not been repealed, Petitioner would have been given his first hearing in February,

1994. Petitioner was aware that he had a right to a commutation review, but did nothing to

pursue it until August 22, 2007 when he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state

court. The R&R concluded his petition was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The district court has jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge's report and

recommendation concerning a dispositive pretrial motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). "The district

judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record,

or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which

specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule." Id.; see also 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). "A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C). Thus, the district court judge reviews those parts of the report and

recommendation to which a party has filed a written objection. United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally

and affords him any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, "[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules

of procedure that govern other litigants." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

Petitioner’s Objections are divided into paragraphs. The objections in paragraphs 1,

4, 5, and 8 are generalized objections to the R&R’s conclusions, which require no review.

See, e.g., United States v. Burkey, 2009 WL 1616564, slip op. at 2–3 (D.Nev., June 8, 2009)

(reviewing case law and statutory authority, and concluding that no review of generalized or

conclusive objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is required).

In paragraph 2, Petitioner objects that his claim is not time-barred under the

“continuing violation” doctrine, because each failure to hold a hearing counts as a new ex

post facto violation. The latest failure, he argued, was in February, 2006. (Obj. to Mot. to

Dismiss, 14:5–9.) Petitioner’s claim, however, accrued as soon as he discovered, or with

due diligence could have discovered, the factual predicate for it. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

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1077, 1082–83 (9 Cir. 2003). Where a prisoner alleges a change in policy constitutes an th

ex post facto law, each continued application of the same policy does not involve separate

factual predicates. Brown v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261–62

(11 Cir. 2003); McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 217–19 (3d Cir. 2007) . The limitations th

period therefore began to run on February 25, 1994, when Petitioner did not receive a

commutation hearing. See Allen v. Cate, 2009 WL 426194 (S.D.Cal., Feb. 19, 2009) (finding

petitioner’s challenge to repeal of section 2817 was time-barred because he should have

raised it when parole board first failed to give him a commutation hearing).

In paragraph 3, Petitioner asserts the limitations period is “wholly inapplicable” to his

claims, although he does not explain why. Petitioner is in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a state court, so the limitation period in § 2244(d)(1) applies to him. Shelby v. Bartlett,

391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9 Cir. 2004); Redd, 343 F.3d at 1081–82. The limitations period th

applies even to the failure of an administrative body to take action. Hill v. Kane, 264

Fed.Appx. 603 (9 Cir. 2008) (citing Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084–85). th

In paragraph 6, Petitioner argues he was unable to locate the statutory language of

the repealed section 2817 and therefore could not file a claim. He therefore argues he is

entitled to equitable tolling. In paragraph 7, Petitioner argues the Magistrate Judge erred by

failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling. The pleadings,

however, make clear Petitioner first began to look into the provisions of section 2817 years

after the limitations period had run. Petitioner argues that because the prison library did not

maintain copies of the long-repealed section 2817 during the period from February, 2006 to

July, 2007, he is entitled to equitable tolling. (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, 14:22–24, 15:6–9.)

These arguments fail because it is clear Petitioner did not pursue his rights diligently, and

allowed the limitations period to expire long before beginning to conduct research. See Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (requiring a petitioner seeking equitable tolling to

show he has been pursuing his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way). He is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under these circumstances. See

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9 Cir. 2000). 

th

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Petitioner’s Objections are therefore OVERRULED. The R&R is ADOPTED and the

Petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 16, 2009

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-02165-LAB-POR Document 11 Filed 08/17/09 Page 4 of 4