Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00469/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00469-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN BOYLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-0469-BAS-PCL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 2, 2017, Petitioner Stephen Boyle (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se and 

in forma pauperis, filed a First Amended Petition (“FAP”) seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner claims a violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (“Brady”), various instances of prosecutorial misconduct, 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and an 

error by the trial court denying Petitioner’s motion to sever the charges according to the 

victims denied Petitioner his right to a fair trial. (Id.; Doc. 32.)

The Honorable Cynthia A. Bashant referred the matter to the undersigned Judge 

for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil 

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Rule 72.1(c)(1)(d). After a thorough review of the petition, supplement, answer, exhibits, 

state court records, and state court decisions, the Court recommends DENYING RELIEF.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); see also Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 

550 (1981) (holding in part that findings of historical fact, including inferences properly 

drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

A. The People’s evidence

1. Boyle’s rape of Ashley (count 6)

In October 2008, Ashley lived next door to Greg Hall, the former 

president of a motorcycle club called the Gun Fighters. Ashley was friends 

with Hall and attended a Gun Fighters’ Halloween party at his residence. 

Boyle, who had met Ashley on several previous occasions, attended the 

party as well. At that time, Boyle was a prospective member of the Gun 

Fighters. Boyle and Ashley flirted with each other during the party, and, at 

one point, Boyle kissed Ashley. Shortly thereafter, someone at the party told 

Ashley that Boyle was married. After learning Boyle’s marital status, Ashley 

was no longer interested in him and stayed away from Boyle throughout the 

remainder of the party.

After leaving the party, Ashley went next door to her residence, went 

into her bedroom, locked her bedroom door, put on some pajamas, and went 

to sleep. [FN4. Ashley explained that she locked her bedroom door because 

she and her roommates had an “‘open door policy’” and many people were 

going back and forth between the party at Hall’s residence and her 

residence.] After falling asleep, Ashley heard a knock on her bedroom door. 

She then heard Boyle asking her to open the door. Ashley ignored the knock, 

thinking that he would go away. About 20 minutes later, Boyle knocked 

again, and this time asked her in a louder voice to open her door. Ashley 

opened the door and Boyle walked into her bedroom. Ashley told Boyle that 

she was going to bed, but Boyle took another step inside the room, forcefully

pushed Ashley against the wall, closed the door and locked it.

Boyle picked up Ashley by her armpits and threw her onto the bed. 

Boyle then pulled off Ashley’s pajama pants, put his arm across her chest, 

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and held her shoulder down. Boyle proceeded to rape Ashley for 

approximately two to five minutes. After the rape, Boyle told Ashley not to 

tell anyone, and added that he was “not somebody to be reckoned with,” and 

that “his brothers would have his back.” These threats frightened Ashley, 

particularly because she knew that Boyle had a criminal history.

2. Boyle’s rape of Luz P. (propensity evidence)

On the evening of May 22, 2010, Luz P. (Luz) and some friends went

to a bar in Tombstone, Arizona. Boyle, who was also at the bar, met Luz, 

and the two danced. At approximately 9:00 p.m., Luz and her friends left 

and went to a second bar. Boyle met up with Luz at the second bar and again

began talking with Luz and one of her friends. At approximately 1:00 a.m., 

Luz and her friends decided to leave the second bar.

While Luz’s friends were paying their bill, Boyle asked Luz to come 

outside with him to look at his motorcycle. Luz agreed. As soon as Boyle 

and Luz were outside the bar, Boyle forcefully grabbed Luz’s hand and led 

her away from the bar. Boyle forced Luz to walk with him to a dark and 

solitary area, telling her, “Shut up bitch. Keep walking.” [FN5. Boyle 

weighed about 240 to 260 pounds. Luz was four feet nine inches, weighed 

100 pounds, and had a prosthetic leg.]

Boyle eventually stopped walking and yelled, “Bitch, pull your pants 

down.” Boyle then forced Luz to take her pants down. Boyle got on top of 

Luz and held her down. While Boyle was on top of Luz her cellular phone 

fell. Boyle grabbed the phone and threw it into a nearby trash can. As Boyle 

attacked Luz, she begged him to stop and told him “no” several times. Luz 

thought that Boyle might kill her. Boyle forced Luz to orally copulate him 

and raped her.

3. Boyle’s sexual assault of Rachel (counts 1-5)

Rachel, her husband, Kevin, and another couple that they were 

friendly with, attended an overnight camping party held by the Grifters 

Motorcycle Club [FN6. The Grifters were formerly known as the Gun 

Fighters.] in a remote area of Warner Springs on Saturday, September 24, 

2011. Rachel and Kevin had been socializing with the Grifters for a couple 

of months before the party because Kevin was considering joining the club. 

Rachel had met Boyle on approximately two occasions prior to the party. At 

the time of the party, Boyle was president of the South County chapter of the 

Grifters.

During the party, Boyle told Rachel that he needed to talk with her 

about something. Rachel thought that Boyle wanted to talk about Kevin. 

Boyle led Rachel away from the main party to an area where a number of 

motorcycles were parked. Boyle began showing Rachel his motorcycle. 

Boyle told Rachel that the seat on his motorcycle was comfortable, tapped 

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the seat, and told her to “test it out.” Rachel got on the seat. Boyle then got 

on the motorcycle and drove off with Rachel on the back of the motorcycle. 

They had never discussed leaving the party and Rachel did not want to go 

anywhere with Boyle.

As Boyle rode off, Rachel yelled at him to take her back to the party 

and hit him in the back with both of her hands. At one point during the ride, 

Boyle reached around and tried to put his hand down Rachel’s tights. Boyle 

pulled off onto a remote gravel road and angrily told Rachel to get off the 

motorcycle. Boyle put his hand around Rachel’s neck and shoulder and 

forcefully pushed her over the motorcycle so that her stomach was on the 

seat. Boyle orally copulated Rachel despite her pleas to stop. Boyle tried to 

penetrate Rachel’s vagina with his penis while she was bent over the 

motorcycle, but he was unable to do so because he was not sufficiently erect.

Boyle pushed Rachel to the ground hard and told her to “start 

sucking,” which she refused to do. Boyle became angry and pulled out a 

knife that was approximately six inches long. Boyle told Rachel, “[I]f [you] 

[don’t] start sucking . . . [this will] be the last dick [you] ever sucked” and 

started to rub the knife around Rachel’s throat, face and hair. Rachel 

complied and orally copulated Boyle.

At one point during the encounter, an eyewitness, Kenneth Russell, 

drove by Rachel and Boyle. Russell saw Rachel orally copulating Boyle, but 

did not see a knife in Boyle’s hands. Russell estimated that he saw Rachel 

and Boyle for approximately five seconds before driving off quickly when 

Boyle gave him a dirty look.

At some point during the oral copulation, Rachel stopped, but Boyle 

forced her to continue. At another point, Boyle forced Rachel to the ground

and stuck his finger in her rectum. Rachel started to scream, which made 

Boyle angry. Boyle told Rachel to get up and “finish it.” Rachel orally 

copulated Boyle again and he ejaculated in her mouth. Semen got on 

Rachel’s face, tights, and hands.

After the assaults, Boyle told Rachel to get back on the motorcycle. 

Boyle told her that if anyone asked where they had gone, she should say that 

they just went for a ride to the lake. Boyle then drove the two back to the 

party. Immediately upon their return, Rachel disclosed the assaults to a 

friend, who drove her to the hospital and called 911. On the drive to the 

hospital, Rachel vomited and had a seizure. [FN7. Rachel suffers from 

epilepsy.] At the hospital, Rachel learned that she had vaginal bleeding and 

that there was gravel embedded in her arms.

In an office next to the hospital, Rachel underwent a sexual assault 

response team (SART) examination. Rachel had dirt on her hands and face, 

scratches on her arm, and redness around her cervix and anal opening. In 

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addition, Boyle’s sperm was found in an oral swab taken from Rachel. 

Boyle’s DNA was also found in an external genital swab taken from Rachel. 

Boyle’s semen was found on Rachel’s hands, face, and on her tights. In the 

hours after the assaults, law enforcement officers attempted to locate Boyle, 

but were unable to find him. Two days later, Boyle was arrested near the 

border between the United States and Mexico.

B. The defense

Angela Miller used to date one of the Gun Fighters and attended their 

2008 Halloween party. Miller stated that she saw Ashley after Boyle had left 

the Halloween party and that Ashley did not seem upset nor did she appear 

to have been crying. Miller also saw Ashely hug Boyle at social gatherings 

that occurred after the Halloween party. Ronald Hayes was one of Ashley’s 

roommates in October 2008. Hayes remembered parts of the evening of the 

Halloween party, but he was drunk that night and was also on drugs. Hayes 

did not hear Ashley call out for help, and would have assisted if he had 

heard her calling for help.

Andrew Ritz saw Boyle and Luz walking together after the alleged 

rape in May 2010. Boyle and Luz were holding hands and laughing.

(Lodgment 1, 4-9.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The San Diego District Attorney (“Prosecution”) filed the first complaint against 

Petitioner on September 29, 2011, which included five felony charges. (Lodgment 16 at 

1.) This complaint charged: (1) forcible rape (Cal. Pen. Code § 261(a)(2)), (2) forcible 

oral copulation (Cal. Pen Code § 288a(c)(2)(A)), a second count of (3) forcible oral 

copulation (id.), (4) rape by foreign object – use of force (Cal. Pen. Code § 289(a)(1)(A)), 

and another count of (5) forcible oral copulation (Cal. Pen Code § 288a(c)(2)(A)). (Id. at 

2.) 

On June 18, 2012, Petitioner was arraigned for the charge filed regarding the 

Ashley H. incident. (Id. at 162.) The Ashley H. charge was consolidated with the Rachel 

O. charges pursuant to the Prosecution’s motion to consolidate filed on July 26, 2012. 

(Lodgment 1 at 63-70.) Accordingly, a consolidated amended information filed by the 

Prosecution on July 26, 2012 included the allegations with factual support. (Id. at 23.) 

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The consolidated amended information included six charges: (1) forcible oral copulation, 

including a kidnapping enhancement and a multiple victim enhancement (Cal. Pen Code 

§ 288a(c)(2)(A), § 667(d)(2), § 667.61 (b)(c)(e)); (2) forcible oral copulation, including 

kidnapping, use of a deadly weapon, and multiple victim enhancements (Cal. Pen Code § 

288a(c)(2)(A), § 12022.3(a), § 667.61(d)(2), § 667.61(b)(c)(e)); (3) assault with intent to 

commit a specific felony (Cal. Pen. Code § 220 (a)(1)); (4) rape by foreign object – use 

of force, including kidnapping and multiple victim enhancements (Cal. Pen. Code § 289 

(a)(1)(A), § 667(d)(2), § 667.61 (b)(c)(e)); (5) forcible oral copulation, including 

kidnapping and multiple victim enhancements (Cal. Pen Code § 288a(c)(2)(A), § 

667(d)(2), § 667.61 (b)(c)(e)); and (6) forcible rape, including burglary and multiple 

victim enhancements (Cal. Pen. Code § 261(a)(2), § 667(a)(c)(d), § 667.61 (b)(c)(e)).

Charges one through five relate to the 2011 incident involving Rachel O. whereas charge 

six relates to the 2008 incident involving Ashley H.

Petitioner’s trial began on October 23, 2012 and the matter was submitted to the 

jury on November 1, 2012. (Id. at 429.) After less than 90 minutes, the jurors informed 

the court they had reached a unanimous verdict. (Id.) Petitioner was found guilty by the 

jury on all charges and sentenced to 263 years in prison. (Id. at 430, Lodgment 20 at 

1920-21.)

After being sentenced, Petitioner filed his first appeal as of right in the California 

Court of Appeal. (See Lodgments 2, 13-14.) Therein, Petitioner argued the trial court 

erred “in refusing to grant a mistrial and denying [Petitioner]’s new trial motion based on 

the [P]rosecution’s Brady violation, and compound[ing] that error by failing to correctly 

instruct the jury” and “in refusing to sever the cases.” (Lodgment 3 at 53.) Respondent 

denied the existence of a Brady violation during the trial, and contended the trial court 

properly denied the motion to sever the Ashley H. count from the Rachel O. counts. 

(Lodgment 13 at 13, 26.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 

(Lodgment 1 at 3.)

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On October 27, 2014,

1 Petitioner filed his petition for review in the Supreme Court 

of California. (Lodgment 3.) Petitioner there raised the same two issues: the Brady issue 

and the denial of the motion to sever the Ashley H. count from the Rachel O. counts. (Id. 

at 6, 19.) The Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s request for review on 

December 3, 2014. (Lodgment 4.)

After Petitioner’s direct appeal became final, Petitioner filed a motion for DNA 

testing of the scrapings taken from Rachel O.’s fingernails. (Lodgment 9 at 24.) On July 

8, 2015, his motion was filed in the Superior Court of Vista. (Id. at 22.) The Superior 

Court granted the motion and granted Petitioner’s request for appointed counsel to assist 

in the proceeding. (Id.) There is no indication in the record whether this testing was 

actually completed, or what the results revealed.

On January 26, 2016,

2 Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

Superior Court. (Lodgment 5.) Petitioner advanced four arguments therein. First, 

Petitioner argued there was a Brady violation in connection with a toxicology report. 

(Lodgment 5 at 15.) Second, Petitioner argued there was a pattern of prosecutorial 

misconduct throughout the trial, comprised of the Brady violation enumerated above and 

alleged perjured testimony. (Id. at 33.) Third, Petitioner continued forward with the 

argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the Ashley H. charge 

from the Rachel O. charges. (Id. at 54.) Fourth and finally, Petitioner argues he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to investigate and test 

evidence that was available. (Id. at 69.) The Superior Court found Petitioner “failed to 

make a prima facie showing of specific facts which would entitle him to habeas corpus 

relief under existing law.” (Lodgment 6 at 3.)

 

1 Lodgment 3 does not have a file stamp from the Supreme Court of California. Instead, this date reflects 

the date the petition for review was signed by counsel.

2 Petitioner notes in his petition for writ of habeas corpus submitted to the Supreme Court of California 

(Lodgment 9) that his writ submitted to the Superior Court was received by that court on November 30, 

2015. Petitioner, however, does not provide any documentation to show where this information was 

derived from. Thus, this Court defers to the docketing date of the writ.

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After Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior 

Court, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on February 16, 

2016. (Doc. 1.) Accompanying his petition was a motion to stay. (Id.) This Court adopted 

the report and recommendation filed recommending a denial of Petitioner’s motion to 

stay based on the lack of “good cause” for the delay the filing of Petitioner’s writ of 

habeas corpus in the Superior Court. (Doc. 16 at 5.) Petitioner gave notice of appeal to 

the Ninth Circuit regarding this order on October 19, 2016. (Doc. 22.) However, on

October 11, 2017, the Ninth Circuit ruled Petitioner was unable to appeal this order 

because the collateral order doctrine does not apply. (Doc. 54 at 1.) Petitioner attempted 

to obtain a Certificate of Appealability from the District Court on this matter (Doc. 23), 

but this Court denied Petitioner’s motion for such. (Doc. 25.)

On May 17, 2016, about two months after the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s 

writ, Petitioner filed a rebuttal to the Superior Court’s decision. (Lodgment 11.) In his 

rebuttal, Petitioner amended his argument of prosecutorial misconduct to a claim for 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising the issue of prosecutorial 

misconduct. (Id. at 39) Other than this amended argument, however, the rebuttal was 

almost identical to the original writ. (Lodgment 12 at 1-2.) The Superior Court again 

denied Petitioner’s request for habeas relief. (Id. at 2.)

Following this second denial at the Superior Court level, Petitioner filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal on August 5, 2016. (Lodgment 7.) 

Therein, Petitioner advanced similar arguments as those he previously raised in his 

Superior Court writ. First, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial 

after a Brady violation occurred. (Id.) Second, Petitioner argued he received ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel for not raising prosecutorial misconduct during his direct 

appeal. (Id.) Third, Petitioner raised the issue of his motion to sever, and argued the trial 

court erred in denying the motion thereby allowing the cases to be consolidated and the 

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Luz P. case also be included.

3

(Id.) There, Petitioner presented new evidence, including 

Luz P.’s police interview which included discrepancies from her trial testimony and the 

S.A.R.T. report indicating Luz P. had no neck injuries from the incident nor any semen 

inside of her, which contradicts her testimony. (Id.) Fourth and finally, Petitioner argued 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial counsel. (Id.) Petitioner points 

to his trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and test available evidence, his failure 

to present alibi witnesses at trial, and his failure to effectively prepare for trial as specific 

deficiencies. (Id.) Petitioner also sought an evidentiary hearing regarding the DNA 

evidence procured from the scrapings of Rachel O.’s fingernails. 

The Court of Appeal first denied Petitioner’s writ as untimely. (Lodgment 8 at 2.) 

In the same opinion, though, the Court of Appeal continued to briefly discuss the merits 

of the new claims raised in Petitioner’s writ. (Id.) The Court of Appeal held that “even if 

the new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not time-barred, they would be 

denied on the merits.” (Id.) Additionally, the Court of Appeal found that a writ for habeas 

corpus was not the appropriate way for Petitioner to seek an evidentiary hearing given the 

statutory procedure available for postconviction DNA testing. (Id. at 3, (citing Cal. Pen. 

Code § 1405).)

Following the Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s petition, Petitioner filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California on December 19, 

2016. (Lodgment 9.) Petitioner raised four arguments in this petition. First, Petitioner 

raised the Brady violation argued in previous appeals and writs. Second, Petitioner 

argued he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure 

to raise prosecutorial misconduct claims. In support of this claim, Petitioner submitted a 

 

3 The Court notes this is not necessarily a legitimate argument, and was likely based on a 

misunderstanding of the law by Petitioner. Here Petitioner was likely trying to add the introduction of 

the Luz P. case into his overall argument that severance was necessary. The Luz P. case was never 

subject to severance because it was not a charge in Petitioner’s case, but rather used as propensity 

evidence only. However, the Court notes this argument because Petitioner uses the expansion of the 

argument to submit the additional evidence to rebut the Luz P. evidence. (Lodgment 7 at 68.)

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letter from appellate counsel regarding the decision to not raise prosecutorial misconduct. 

Third, Petitioner raises the severance issue raised in previous appeals and writs. Lastly, 

Petitioner argued he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 

failure to test evidence, failure to subpoena two alibi witnesses, and failure to consult 

with Petitioner in preparation for trial. On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of 

California summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Lodgment 

10.)

On March 2, 2017, Petitioner filed his FAP in this Court. (Doc. 29.) Petitioner’s 

FAP included arguments for: (1) the previously described Brady violation, (2) 

prosecutorial misconduct, and (3) the severance issue previously described. (Id. at 37, 60, 

70.) Two weeks later, on March 16, 2017, Petitioner filed a supplement to his petition, 

adding: (4) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise prosecutorial 

misconduct claim and (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 32 at 6, 24.) As in 

his petition for writ of habeas corpus submitted to the Supreme Court of California, 

Petitioner attached the letter from appellate counsel as new evidence in support of his 

fourth argument. (Id. at 47.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on June 5, 2017. (Doc. 39.) Petitioner 

then retained counsel, (Doc. 45), and filed his traverse on October 16, 2017, (Doc. 57), 

and his points and authorities in support thereof on October 27, 2017 through such 

counsel (Doc. 60). This petition is now before this Court.

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of state court only on the ground he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. §2254(a). Federal habeas courts may not “reexamine state-court determinations on 

state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). “[A] state court’s 

interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged 

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 

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74, 76 (2005); see Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a 

violation of state law standing alone is not cognizable in federal court on habeas”).

This FAP is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under 

AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on 

the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d); Early v. 

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal 

court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; 

rather, the court applies an extraordinary deferential review, inquiring only whether the 

state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 

1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877(9th Cir. 2004). Because Petitioner’s 

arguments involve only questions of law, this Court reviews the petition under the 

“contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003).

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Hines v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of §2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

Where the state court did not reach the merits of a claim because of the imposition 

of a state procedural bar, “there is no state court decision. . . . to which to accord 

deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Thus, this court must review those claims de novo. 

Id. However, AEDPA “does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision 

can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S 

86, 100 (2011). “Rather, [as the Supreme Court has] explained, ‘[w]hen a federal claim 

has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any 

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.’” Johnson v. Williams, 133 

S. Ct. 1088, 1094 (2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 99).

V. DISCUSSION

In bringing this petition, Petitioner argues five claims warrant this Court granting 

habeas relief. (Doc. 29 at 6-8.) First, Petitioner argues a Brady violation occurred at his 

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trial. Second, several instances of prosecutorial misconduct are alleged by Petitioner. 

Third, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his appellate 

counsel for not arguing the previously mentioned prosecutorial misconduct. Fourth, 

Petitioner argues he also received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial counsel 

for various reasons. Fifth and finally, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in denying his 

request to sever the Ashley H. count from the Rachel O. counts at the same trial. 

Petitioner contends all of these things resulted in a “deni[al of] his right to a fair trial, 

deni[al of his r]ight to [d]ue [p]rocess, . . . [and] a violat[ion of] Constitutional

Amendments V, VI, [and] XIV. . . .” (Doc. 29 at 91.) 

Respondent succinctly responds that none of Petitioner’s arguments meet the high 

burden imposed upon petitioners for writs of habeas corpus. (Doc. 39-1 at 16.) According 

to Respondent, Petitioner’s claims do not show a deficiency giving rise to habeas corpus 

relief because Petitioner’s claims do not show the “‘state court’s ruling on the claim 

being presented . . . was so lacking in justification that there as an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded agreement.” (Id. 

(citing Harrington v. Richer, 562 U.S. 86, 100-02 (2011).)

A. Brady violation

Petitioner’s first argument is based on an alleged Brady violation which he argues 

deprived him of a fair trial. (Doc. 29 at 37.) On October 30, 2017, one week into 

Petitioner’s trial, the Prosecution called criminalist Javier Peña to testify. Peña’s 

testimony focuses solely on testing done to determine Rachel O.’s blood alcohol level on

the night of the incident.4(Lodgment 15 at 806-817.) After being excused, Peña informed 

the Prosecution that further testing had been conducted on Rachel O.’s blood as well as 

her urine samples, neither of which had not been mentioned during Peña’s testimony. (Id. 

at 870.) Once the Prosecution was informed of these toxicology results, the Prosecution 

 

4 Rachel O.’s blood alcohol concentration the night of the incident was 0.00%. (Lodgment 15 at 816-

817.)

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produced the urine test results to Petitioner, which showed the presence of hydrocodone 

in Rachel O.’s urine the night of the incident. (Id. at 867-8, 827. Lodgment 16 at 355-56.)

While the timeline of these toxicology test results is not presented completely by 

either Petitioner or Respondent in their respective briefs, the Clerk’s Transcript provides 

the Court with a helpful recap of the various toxicology reports and the timeline of their 

discovery. 

As a result of the incident with Rachel O., three toxicology tests were done by BioTox Laboratories: one urine test and two blood tests. The urine test and one of the blood 

tests were done on April 27, 2012, months before Petitioner’s trial commenced. 

(Lodgment 16 at 362, 366.) After the verdict was reached and Petitioner was convicted 

on November 1, 2012, and pursuant to Petitioner’s defense counsel’s request, the second 

blood test was performed and reported on December 5, 2012. (Id. at 289-294, 364.) 

Before the trial commenced, the Prosecution had only produced toxicology 

regarding the test performed to determine the presence of alcohol in Rachel O.’s urine. 

(Lodgment 16 at 355.) At the time of the trial, however, there were also toxicology 

results for the blood test reported on April 27, 2012, which reported the presence of 

hydrocodone in Rachel O.’s blood. (Id. at 366.) This initial blood testing was not 

produced to Petitioner and his defense counsel until after the verdicts had been reached. 

(Id. at 356.) Ultimately, after Petitioner made an unsuccessful motion for mistrial based 

on Peña’s notification to the Prosecution, Petitioner’s defense counsel requested broader 

testing be conducted on Rachel O.’s blood sample. (Id. at 371.) Accordingly, such testing 

was conducted and showed the presence of carisprodol and meprobamate in Rachel O.’s 

blood. (Id. at 364.) The testing which had been completed at the time the trial began and 

the reports showing the results thereof are the basis for Petitioner’s claim herein. (Id. at 

362, 366.) The third report produced, in this Court’s view, shows what Petitioner would 

have discovered and likely used in presenting his defense had the two other reports been 

properly produced, but does not fall within Petitioner’s Brady claim. (Id. at 366.)

//

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Defense counsel promptly motioned for a mistrial based on the late production of 

this evidence. (Id.) Defense counsel specifically argued the evidence had been clearly 

available to the Prosecution as it was procured by criminologists engaged by the 

Prosecution, but the Prosecution had not produced the reports to Petitioner prior to trial. 

Had Petitioner been apprised of these toxicology reports before trial, defense counsel 

argued he would have conducted his cross examination of Rachel O. and other witnesses 

differently because “[h]er credibility is the entirety of her case.” (Id. at 868.) 

The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for mistrial based on the alleged Brady

violation finding there were no facts supporting the claim that the Prosecution withheld 

the reports. (Id. at 869.) The trial court based this finding on both parties’ failure to 

follow up on the results of the toxicology tests. (Id. at 871.) After arriving at the hospital 

the night of the incident, Rachel O. underwent a S.A.R.T. exam, which included a 

S.A.R.T. nurse taking both blood and urine samples. The Prosecution informed the trial

court that the District Attorney’s Office generally requests both of these samples be 

tested in order to determine “whether there are any substances in the victim[’s] . . . 

system.” (Id.) Given both parties’ awareness of the S.A.R.T. exam being conducted and 

the routine nature of these samples being taken, the trial court found both parties were 

equally at fault in failing to request the results in advance of trial. (Id. at 869.) In making 

such a finding of equal fault, the trial court denied Petitioner’s claim there had been a 

Brady violation.

Instead of granting the mistrial, the trial court allowed both Rachel O. and Ola 

Bawardi, the toxicologist who analyzed the urine sample, to be recalled to testify 

regarding the newly discovered test results. (Lodgment 15 at 1437.) Rachel O. testified as 

to her prescriptions for various medications, including Vicodin5for pain, Keppra for 

seizures, Naproxen as a muscle relaxer, and Thorazpan for anxiety. (Lodgment 15 at 876, 

 

5 The trial court determined Vicodin and hydrocodone are the same drug. (Lodgment 15 at 1433.) When 

Vicodin is present in a blood or urine test, the test indicates the presence of hydrocodone. (Id. and 1455.)

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1439-1442.) She also testified she believed she had taken all of the medications on day of 

the incident. (Id. at 1444-45.) During cross examination, Rachel O. testified she and her 

doctor had discussed the effects of mixing alcohol with her medications, and Rachel O. 

testified her doctor had advised against drinking heavily while on the drugs. (Id. at 1448.)

Bawardi testified as to the testing procedure at Bio-Tox Laboratories, where 

Rachel O.’s blood and urine samples were sent for toxicology tests. (Id. at 1450.) The 

testimony continued to discuss the hydrocodone found in the urine sample, but Bawardi 

testified that urine samples are “not really emphasized” because they can be easily 

skewed by hydration levels. (Id. at 1455.) Bawardi also testified about the effects 

Hydrocodone would have on a person.

6

(Id. at 1457.) During cross-examination, Bawardi 

testified that she did not test the urine in a way that any of Rachel O.’s other medications 

would have presented themselves. (Id. at 1462.) Additionally, Bawardi testified a blood 

test would be more useful in analyzing the level of hydrocodone and any other drugs in 

Rachel O.’s system. (Id.) However, Bawardi testified if Bio-Tox Laboratories had 

received a blood sample from Rachel O., it would have performed tests on the sample, 

but since no tests were conducted, Bawardi testified no blood sample had been received.

7

(Id. at 1467.)

In addition to recalling Rachel O. and Bawardi, the trial court took one additional 

step in an attempt to remedy the late production of the toxicology report. At the close of 

//

//

 

6 Bawardi explained “Hydrocodone is a prescription medication that is used for pain.” The drug has 

similar effects on a person as alcohol because both Hydrocodone and alcohol are central nervous system 

depressants. Specifically, “[hydrocodone] is designed to slow a person’s mental abilities, their physical 

abilities . . . they may have slow thought processes, they may appear drowsy or fatigued. They may have 

some balance and coordination problems. But it is a depressant, so it can slow a person down mentally 

and physically.” (Lodgment 15 at 1457.)

7 This testimony led Petitioner, the jury, and the trial court to believe no blood tests had been performed. 

Contrarily, a blood test had been performed to determine the presence of amphetamines, cocaine, and 

opiates. (Lodgment 16 at 366.) This testing showed Rachel O. did in fact have hydrocodone in her 

blood. Bawardi had conducted this test. (Id.)

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evidence, the trial court issued an additional jury instruction directly addressing this 

issue. This instruction was given over Petitioner’s objection,

8

and read as follows: 

Both the Prosecution and the Defense did not learn about the results of the 

urine test that showed a positive test for hydrocodone until after Rachel O.’s 

original testimony in this trial. In your evaluation of the significance of this 

evidence, if any, you may consider the effect of the late discovery of the 

information.

(Lodgment 15 at 1592.)

Petitioner argues by assessing equal blame based on Petitioner’s apparent 

opportunity to also discover the reports, the trial court engaged in a “misadventure.”

(Doc. 29 at 43.) In support of this, Petitioner cites numerous cases holding the 

prosecution has an affirmative duty to produce exculpatory or favorable evidence.

Further, Petitioner argues the trial court’s attempts to remedy the late production of the 

toxicology results were inadequate because Rachel O. and Bawardi’s testimonies, 

combined with the jury instruction, were deficient in providing Petitioner a meaningful 

chance to understand the reports and present any alternative interpretations of the 

evidence. (Doc. 29 at 46-49.) 

Respondent rebuts Petitioner’s argument stating the Court of Appeal was correct in 

finding there was no Brady violation because the toxicology reports were not material. 

(Doc. 39-1 at 21.) The Court of Appeal found “[Petitioner]’s guilt did not depend on the 

jury’s evaluation of whether Rachel [O.] was accurately perceiving and recalling subtle 

details of the night in question,” because there was a substantial amount of evidence also 

supporting Rachel O.’s testimony. (Lodgment 1 at 24.) Thus, Respondent argues because 

the reports are not material, there could not have been a Brady violation in the late 

disclosure thereof.

//

 

8 Defense counsel argued the instruction incorrectly assigned blame to both the Prosecution and defense 

and thus allowed the jury to improperly use the late production against Petitioner.

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The Court of Appeal held both blood tests were immaterial under Brady because 

there was not a reasonable probability of a different result had the reports not been 

suppressed. (Lodgment 1 at 23.) The Court of Appeal further elaborated, “there is nothing 

in the record to suggest [the reports] rendered [Rachel O.’s] testimony that she was 

subjected to a series of forcible sexual offenses at knifepoint unreliable.” (Id.) Petitioner’s 

arguments were not found persuasive because although the prescriptions had not been 

discovered through the toxicology reports, the Court of Appeal found Rachel O.’s 

interview during the S.A.R.T. exam, wherein she discloses the prescriptions she is on, 

was sufficient to notify Petitioner of the drugs. (Id. at 24.) Additionally, Rachel O. 

testified upon being recalled about these prescription drugs. (Id.) For all of these reasons, 

the Court of Appeal found Petitioner’s argument meritless. (Id. at 25-26.)

1. Governing law 

The United States Supreme Court held in Brady “the suppression by the 

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 

bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87. To show a Brady violation, a party must 

show the three prong test has been satisfied: the evidence must be favorable to the 

accused, suppressed by the State, and prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 

527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999). Exculpatory or impeaching evidence is considered 

favorable under the Brady test. Id. The state may suppress evidence either wilfully or 

inadvertently. Id. If this evidence is “material to the outcome such that the defendant was 

prejudiced by the suppression,” the third prong is satisfied. Id.

Here, Respondent does not contest the first prong of Brady has been fulfilled. 

(Doc. 39-1 at 22.) Respondent notes the Court of Appeal also assumed the second prong

was fulfilled for purposes of its analysis, and accordingly submits. (Id.) The third prong

of the Brady claim requiring prejudice is where Respondent argues Petitioner’s claim 

falls short. (Id. at 16.)

//

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Evidence is deemed material for Brady purposes “if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 

(1985). A “reasonable probability,” in turn, “is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Id. “A ‘reasonable probability’ does not require showing by 

a preponderance that the outcome would have been different.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 

F.3d 463, 479 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-35 

(1995)). In other words, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely 

than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he 

received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[i]mpeachment evidence is especially likely to be 

material when it impugns the testimony of a witness who is critical to the prosecution’s 

case.” Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). “In cases in which the witness 

is central to the prosecution’s case, the defendant’s conviction indicates that in all 

likelihood the impeachment evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to persuade a 

jury that the witness lacked credibility.” Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2002) (holding that Brady material is especially likely to be prejudicial if it “would have 

provided the defense with a new and different ground of impeachment”). 

In Price, appellee was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The 

conviction, however, was mainly won because of a prosecution witness who testified she 

had seen Price in possession of the firearm shortly before being apprehended by police. 

During trial, Price’s counsel impeached the witness as best as possible by attacking her 

memory and perception; however, this impeachment fell short and Price was convicted. 

After trial, Price discovered the witness had a criminal history including crimes involving 

deceit. This information had not been turned over to Price by the prosecution. The court 

there found that “had Price been able to discredit [the witness]’s testimony, there is a 

reasonable probability that he could have persuaded a jury that there was reasonable 

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doubt” as to whether the gun was actually his, which was his defense. (Id. at 914.) 

Because the impeachment evidence was so strong and gave rise to a reasonable 

probability the jury would have found differently than it did at trial, the court reversed the 

decision on Price’s motion for a new trial and remanded. (Id.)

When a jury seemingly has relied on a witness’s testimony to reach its verdict, 

notwithstanding any impeachment evidence introduced at trial, and there is a reasonable 

probability the combination of presented and suppressed impeachment evidence would 

have altered the jury’s perception of the witness’s credibility, “the suppressed 

impeachment evidence is prejudicial.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1055. However “[t]he mere 

possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or 

might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the 

constitutional sense.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976).

“The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped 

the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 

'materiality' in the constitutional sense.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 

2005) (quoting United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1997)). “For 

purposes of determining prejudice,” therefore, “the withheld evidence must be analyzed 

‘in the context of the entire record.’” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 

112).

2. Application

Here, Petitioner argues the toxicology report was invaluable impeachment 

evidence defense counsel would have used to impeach Rachel O., the prosecution’s star 

witness. As such, the toxicology report was undoubtedly material. The parties do not 

dispute that while the jury did hear testimony about the blood test done to determine 

Rachel O.’s blood alcohol levels the night of the incident, the jury did not hear any 

evidence about the blood test done to determine the presence of narcotics. (Lodgment 1 at 

13 fn.10.) Instead, the jury heard Bawardi’s testimony that no such tests on Rachel O.’s 

blood sample had been performed. (Lodgment 15 at 1467.)

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As Petitioner points out, following the jury’s not hearing the evidence of the blood 

test results for narcotics, the jury was also unable to hear any subsequent expert 

testimony on the alleged additive effects of these narcotic drugs. This combination of 

evidence, according to Petitioner, would have been significantly impactful and persuasive 

in impeaching Rachel O.’s testimony. Petitioner argues had he been aware of this 

suppressed blood test, he would have been able to run his own tests on the blood, test for 

a broader array of narcotics, and present expert testimony regarding the blood test results 

and the additive effects thereof.

While Petitioner claims if he had been in possession of the toxicology report and 

been able to impeach Rachel O.’s testimony through cross-examination and the 

presentation of expert witnesses to testify as to the additive effects of her prescriptions, 

this does not show a reasonable probability the jury would not have still found Petitioner 

guilty of all charges. Most telling is the jury returning the verdict less than 90 minutes 

after being sworn in and beginning deliberations. See Tri Dung Nguyen v. Felker, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45034 (“The quick deliberations in this case show that it was not a 

close case”); United States v. Lopez, 500 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 

S. Ct. 950 (2008) (finding the same “because lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult 

case”).

As the Court of Appeal noted, “For there to have been a more favorable result for 

[Petitioner], the jury would have had to find that Rachel [O.] was lying when she testified 

that [Petitioner] committed a series of forcible sex offenses against her at knifepoint.” 

(Lodgment 1 at 13.) This was unlikely to occur because there was a considerable amount 

of strong evidence showing Petitioner’s guilt. Such evidence includes testimony 

concerning Petitioner’s aggressive behavior and his angry display of a knife during the 

Saturday afternoon of the overnighter, physical and eyewitness evidence demonstrating 

sexual contact between Petitioner and Rachel O., Rachel O.’s injuries, Rachel O.’s 

immediate disclosure of the offenses, propensity evidence of Petitioner’s commission of 

other sexual offenses, and Petitioner’s flight and arrest at the international border. 

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Frankly, no aspect of the suppressed toxicology tests “undermine[] confidence in the 

outcome of the trial.” Dyson v. Dormire, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90211, *31.

Furthermore, even if Rachel O.’s testimony was successfully impeached by 

defense counsel’s use of the suppressed toxicology report, there is not a reasonable 

probability the jury would have found Petitioner did not commit the crimes against 

Rachel O. Contrarily, the remaining evidence would likely be enough for the jury to still

reach the same guilty verdict. Thus, this Court remains confident the outcome would 

remain the same, and therefore habeas relief is DENIED. Id.

B. Prosecutorial misconduct

Petitioner next argues the Prosecution committed multiple instances of 

prosecutorial misconduct, which denied him a fair trial. (Doc. 29 at 60. Doc. 32 at 6.) 

Petitioner first raises the issue in his FAP, alleging prosecutorial misconduct occurred 

when the Prosecution did not halt Bawardi’s testimony. (Doc. 29 at 61.) Bawardi testified 

Bio-Tox Laboratories had never received Rachel O.’s blood sample, which resulted in the 

lack of testing completed on the sample. (Lodgment 15 at 1467.) This was incorrect. In 

reality, Bio-Tox Laboratories had received the sample and Bawardi was in fact one of 

two toxicologists who ran the testing on the blood sample completed before trial. (Doc. 

29 at 107-08.) In light of this glaring discrepancy, Petitioner argues the Prosecution 

incorrectly allowed Bawardi to perjure herself and did not take steps to cure this alleged 

perjury. This violated Petitioner’s right to a fair trial because Bawardi’s testimony misled 

the court and the jury. (Id. at 61.)

In Petitioner’s supplement to his FAP, (Doc. 32), Petitioner again advances the 

issue of prosecutorial misconduct; however, Petitioner does so in the context of an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.9(Id. at 6.) In his supplement, Petitioner argues in 

 

9 Petitioner argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising prosecutorial misconduct on 

direct appeal. This Court addresses the foundation of the ineffective assistance claim here because if 

Petitioner cannot show prosecutorial misconduct is a valid claim, his ineffective assistance claim against 

appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue will similarly fail.

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addition to allowing Bawardi to perjure herself, the Prosecution also committed 

misconduct by allowing Rachel O.’s husband, Kevin O., to perjure himself; by making 

false statements to the trial court regarding the status of the Luz P. case; and by making 

“disparaging” remarks about defense counsel during closing arguments. (Id. at 12, 16, 

18.)

Petitioner claims Kevin O. committed perjury at two points during his testimony. 

First, Petitioner contends Kevin O. gave false testimony when Kevin O. stated once he 

arrived at the hospital the night of the Rachel O. incident, he observed Rachel O.’s 

clothes were torn. (Doc. 32 at 12.) At trial, defense counsel pointed out that none of 

Rachel O.’s clothes were in fact torn or otherwise manipulated, except for the area taken 

for testing by the criminologist. (Id.) Other than this cut square, Rachel O.’s clothes were 

intact. Second, Petitioner contends Kevin O. perjured himself by testifying he turned left 

when departing the overnighter to look for Rachel O. and Petitioner. (Id.) Topography 

maps authenticated by subsequent witnesses showed there was no left turn Kevin O. 

could have taken when leaving the overnighter. (Id.) Petitioner argues the Prosecution 

was aware both of Kevin O.’s statements were untrue when they were made; however, 

the Prosecution neither stopped nor corrected the false testimony at that time or later. (Id. 

at 14.) Petitioner also claims the Prosecution, by allowing Kevin O.’s testimony to stand, 

despite knowing of its false nature, denied Petitioner the right to a fair trial.

Third, Petitioner argues the Prosecution committed misconduct during the pretrial 

motion in limine hearings when the Prosecution was arguing its motion in limine to 

exclude the status of the Luz P. case. Defense counsel argued to inform the jury that the 

Luz P. case had never been pursued or prosecuted. (Lodgment 15 at 59.) Instead, the

charges filed against Petitioner in that case were dropped three days after Petitioner was 

arrested without ever being filed with the court. (Id. at 16.) During this argument,

however, the Prosecution represented to the trial court that the Luz P. case was 

“pending.” (Id. at 16.) Petitioner argues this representation to the trial court led the trial 

//

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court to allow the propensity evidence because the Prosecution “stating the case ‘is 

pending’ gave credibility to a case that would not proceed to trial.”10 (Id.)

Finally, Petitioner argues the Prosecution made “disparaging” remarks towards 

defense counsel during closing arguments. In the Prosecution’s closing argument, the 

Prosecution addressed the defense position that the scratches on Rachel O.’s arms were 

self-inflicted. (Lodgment 15 at 1735, “You’ve got to be kidding me, you’ve got to be 

kidding me.”) Petitioner claims these remarks are evidence of the Prosecution taking 

advantage of her stature as “a pillar of truth” in order to affirm the notion of the defense 

counsel as a “manipulator[] of truth.” (Doc. 32 at 18.)

In sum, because the trial was “riddled with multiple instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct,” the Petitioner argues there was a pattern of misconduct throughout the trial 

depriving Petitioner of his right to a fair trial. (Id. at 22-23.) Petitioner contends this 

deprivation warrants habeas relief.

Respondent counters these arguments in its answer to Petitioner’s FAP and 

supplement. (Doc. 39.) The responses to these arguments are all couched in an ineffective 

assistance of counsel context.11 Respondent argues Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct through allowing perjured testimony must satisfy the test set out in Napue v. 

People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Under this test, Respondent argues

Bawardi’s false testimony was not material and Petitioner did not establish that the 

Prosecution knew this testimony was false and therefore needed to be corrected. (Doc. 

39-1 at 41.) Stated another way, Respondent argues Petitioner’s claim falls short of the 

Napue test.

 

10 Petitioner does not seem to be arguing the trial court’s denial of the Prosecution’s motion in limine

was incorrect, but rather that this statement by the Prosecution is another example of the prosecutorial 

misconduct evident throughout Petitioner’s trial.

11 As noted above in footnote 6, the prosecutorial misconduct allegations and the parties’ respective 

arguments are all discussed in this section, despite the parties overlapping presentation of the issues as 

prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise prosecutorial 

misconduct on direct appeal.

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Responding to the allegation of prosecutorial misconduct resulting from the 

Prosecution’s statement that the Luz P. case was pending, Respondent argues the 

Prosecution did not misrepresent the status of the Luz P. case to the trial court. (Doc. 39-

1 at 44.) Further, Respondent contends even if the Prosecution was mistaken about the 

status, the statement that the case was pending did not cause the trial court to change its 

position on the motion in limine being argued. (Id. See Lodgment 15 at 59-60.)

Finally, Respondent refutes Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct 

regarding the “disparaging” statements made during closing arguments on three grounds. 

First, defense counsel did not object to the statements at the time they were made, thus 

failing to preserve a prosecutorial misconduct claim on appeal. (Doc. 39-1 at 45.) Second, 

the Prosecution merely used “colorful language” to criticize the defense position about 

how the scratches on Rachel O.’s arms came to be. (Id.) Third and finally, regardless of 

the Prosecution’s remarks, the evidence against Petitioner for the crimes committed 

against Rachel O. could not have been outweighed by any prejudice caused by these 

statements. (Id.)

1. Governing Law

The appropriate standard of review in federal habeas corpus for prosecutorial 

misconduct is the narrow one of due process and not the broad exercise of supervisory 

power. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). A defendant's due process 

rights are violated only when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial “fundamentally 

unfair.” Id.; see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (stating that “the 

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor”). Claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct where a proper objection was lodged at trial are reviewed “‘on the merits, 

examining the entire proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.’” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 

516 U.S. 1017 (1995). 

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On the other hand, under California law, claims of prosecutorial misconduct must 

be objected to at trial in order to be preserved on appeal. See People v. Fosselman, 33 

Cal. 3d 572, 580-81 (1983). A petitioner who fails to observe a state's “contemporaneous 

objection” rules may not challenge the constitutionality of the conviction in federal court. 

See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). See also Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 

1241 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that California enforces the contemporaneous objection rule 

during trial argument), amended, No. 97-99007, slip op. 9143, 9147-49 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 

1999). The one exception to this rule occurs when a petitioner can show there was 

“cause” for the failure to raise the objection at trial and the failure to object caused 

“prejudice.” See Engle, 456 U.S. at 129 (“When a procedural default bars state litigation 

of a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief absent a 

showing of cause and actual prejudice”).

Under the procedural bar doctrine, “a federal court ordinarily will not review a 

state court ruling if the state court would find that the claim was barred pursuant to an 

independent and adequate state procedural rule.” Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 

1100 (9th Cir. 2010). A procedural rule is adequate if the rule is “clear, consistently 

applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner's purported default.” Lee v. 

Jacquez, 788 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotations and citations omitted); see 

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (describing adequacy prong as requiring the 

rule be “firmly established and regularly followed”).

This rule of forfeiture is an independent and adequate basis for dismissing a claim, 

and it is well settled that California “consistently applies its contemporaneous objection 

rule[.]” Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Garrison v. 

McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Zapien v. Martel, 805 F.3d 862, 

868 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015) (California court's finding that claim was procedurally barred, 

because petitioner did not contemporaneously object at trial, is a “an independent and 

adequate basis for dismissing the claim, which we are barred from reviewing”); Sands v. 

Lewis, 511 Fed. Appx. 608, 610 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding “claim of prosecutorial 

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misconduct is . . . procedurally defaulted under California's contemporaneous objection 

rule,” because “counsel failed to register a timely objection to the offensive remarks”). 

Accordingly, the procedural default bar applies to Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct unless Petitioner has established that he qualifies for an exception. 

Courts must excuse a procedural default if the petitioner can show “cause for the 

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,” see 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, a fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986), or if the government waived the procedural default, see 

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to constitute 

cause, a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to 

counsel, or some interference by officials made compliance impracticable will suffice. Id. 

at 488 (citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 

(1953)). Generally, though, if “the prisoner can show that some objective factor external 

to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule[,]” 

cause will be shown. Id. 

2. Application

Petitioner clearly believes his case falls within one of the three categories requiring 

the Court to excuse the procedural default. However, Petitioner did not explicitly argue 

he could show cause and prejudice nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Respondent 

likewise did not waive the procedural default. In fact, the Respondent relies upon the 

procedural default as one reason to deny the Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct. Nonetheless, because Petitioner filed his FAP and the supplement thereto 

pro se, this Court may interpret Petitioner’s arguments less stringently. Zichko v. Idaho, 

247 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).

In support of his position the procedural default should be excused, Petitioner 

admits defense counsel did not object to any of the alleged instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct. But, Petitioner contends the more important fact is that defense counsel “did 

object to the most visible and serious instances of misconduct,” referring to the alleged

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Brady violation and defense counsel’s consequent motion for mistrial based thereon. 

(Doc. 32 at 22.) Petitioner argues this Court can and should overlook the preservation 

issue because where the trial court did not find the Prosecution had committed a Brady

violation by suppressing the toxicology reports, other objections to less flagrant 

misconduct would have been “futile.” (Id.)

Similarly, before Petitioner’s trial began, during the hearing on the motions in 

limine, the trial court heard defense counsel’s argument on the motion to sever the newly 

consolidated cases involving charges for the incident with Rachel O. and one charge for 

the incident with Ashley H. (Lodgment 15 at 52-53.) The trial court denied defense 

counsel’s motion to sever. 

Neither the trial court’s denial of the motion for mistrial based on the Brady 

violation nor the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever evidence defense counsel’s 

reluctance to object to other perceived instances of misconduct. Despite these adverse 

rulings made by the trial court, the trial court was not a sufficient “factor external to the 

defense” causing defense counsel to not lodge the proper objections. Reed, 468 U.S. at 

16; Brown, 344 U.S. at 486. Thus, Petitioner has not presented adequate facts to show 

defense counsel had cause to not lodge objections to the various allegations of 

prosecutorial misconduct. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel may also provide sufficient cause to overcome a 

procedural default, so long as the assistance was constitutionally ineffective. Price v. 

Ryan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175481 (citing Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 

1998)). While Petitioner does argue he received ineffective assistance of defense counsel, 

Petitioner does not argue his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to lodge the 

necessary objections to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, Petitioner’s 

prosecutorial misconduct claims are procedurally barred, and habeas relief is DENIED on 

this ground.

//

//

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C. Ineffective assistance of counsel

1. Governing Law

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1512 (U.S. 2000) (stating it is beyond 

question that Strickland is the “clearly established” law governing ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Jones v. 

Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). There, the United States Supreme 

Court establish a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To 

establish that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, a challenger must show: 

(1) his trial counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) trial counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense. Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, 694).

To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors 

so serious . . . that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The 

relevant inquiry is not, however, what counsel could have done, but rather whether the 

decisions made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 

(9th Cir. 1998). In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered 

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained 

that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there is a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 

representation.’” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th 

Cir. 1995)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from 

counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, 

and the standard of review of highly deferential.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,

//

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381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

It is well settled that “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective assistance of counsel] 

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (a 

petitioner “making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of 

counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 

judgment”); Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 933 (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

where petitioner failed “to indicate how he was prejudiced by counsel's failure . . .” to 

conduct cross-examination on a specific issue); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 

(9th Cir. 1987) (defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel for failure to 

call out-of-state witnesses absent indication of what witnesses would have testified to or 

how their testimony would have changed the outcome of proceeding.); Cranford v. 

Sumner, 672 F.Supp. 453, 457 (D. Nev. 1987) (“Aside from the bald allegation that his 

attorney should have raised this claim but did not, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

how his attorney's performance fell below the reasonable level of professional 

competence required by Strickland”).

It is well-established that a defendant has the ultimate authority to make 

fundamental decisions regarding whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in his 

or her own behalf, or take an appeal. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n. 1 (1977)

(Burger, C.J. concurring). However:

[no decision of the Supreme Court] suggests, . . . the indigent defendant has 

a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous 

points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 

judgment, decides not to present those points.

//

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Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). To require otherwise would “seriously 

undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client's case in accord with counsel's 

professional evaluation.” Id. The professional judgment and evaluation every defendant is 

entitled to is an examination of the record, research of the law, and the marshaling of 

arguments on behalf of the defendant. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court's review of the state court's 

decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell, 535 U.S. at 689-699. In order to 

merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that the state 

court's ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); West v. Schriro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90802

(D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007).

The Ninth Circuit has held that a convicted defendant has no Sixth Amendment 

rights on appeal because appellate review is not required of states. “If, however, the State 

elects to furnish an avenue for appeal, its procedures must comport with the Due Process 

and Equal Protections Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001).

2. Appellate Counsel

Petitioner argues he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel from 

his appellate counsel, who declined to raise prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. (Doc. 32 

at 6-23.) The Court of Appeal rejected this because Petitioner did not provide a 

declaration from appellate counsel to support the claim. (Doc. 39-1 at 40.) Subsequently, 

Petitioner obtained a sworn letter from appellate counsel wherein appellate counsel stated 

he had not raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct because he “simply did not 

identify prosecutorial misconduct as a potential separate issue.” (Doc. 32 at 47.)

Respondent maintains this issue is not sufficient to grant habeas relief because 

“[a]ppellate counsel’s letter does not establish that he provided ineffective assistance.” 

(Doc. 39-1 at 40.) Ultimately, Respondent raises the arguments rebutting Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims as discussed in the preceding section.

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While Petitioner goes to great lengths to show his appellate counsel was ineffective 

for not arguing prosecutorial misconduct during Petitioner’s direct appeal, (see Doc. 32 at 

6-23), as discussed above, the claim was not meritorious because defense counsel failed 

to lodge the appropriate objections at trial.12 Thus, even if Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s 

actions fell short of the highly deferential standard of deficient performance, in this case, 

appellate counsel’s actions did not prejudice Petitioner’s appeal because the claim was 

procedurally defaulted before appellate counsel could have raised it. “The failure to raise 

a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). Therefore, habeas relief is 

DENIED on this ground.

3. Trial counsel

Although Petitioner does not argue he received ineffective assistance of defense

counsel in regard to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner claims defense

counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and test available evidence, failing to 

subpoena an alibi witness and an exculpatory witness, and failing to effectively prepare 

for trial. (Doc. 32 at 24-33.) 

Respondent counters by citing the Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s claim 

for ineffective assistance of trial counsel as untimely. (Doc. 39-1 at 31.) The Court of 

Appeal expressly noted Petitioner’s claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel were

filed more than three and a half years after Petitioner was sentenced and nearly two years 

after the judgment was affirmed on appeal “without any explanation for the delay.”

(Lodgment 8 at 2.) The Court of Appeal accordingly denied the claims as untimely. The 

Court of Appeal continued in its ruling to also discuss the merits of both Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance claims, and held even if Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims were not procedurally barred, they would be substantively denied on other 

 

12 While Petitioner’s appellate counsel may not have raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for

defense counsel’s failure to lodge these objections, Petitioner does not make this argument.

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grounds. (Id. at 2-3.) Petitioner did not submit any supporting evidence regarding his 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; no declarations, trial transcripts; or other 

evidence establishing any of Petitioner’s claims are valid were submitted to the Court of 

Appeal. (Id. at 2.) Instead, the Court of Appeal holds even if Petitioner’s claims were not 

procedurally barred, Petitioner’s conclusory allegations are “insufficient to sustain 

[Petitioner’s] heavy pleading burden.” (Id. at 3.)

a. Failure to investigate and test available evidence

Petitioner first contends defense counsel performed deficiently in failing to 

discover and test available evidence. (Doc. 32 at 24.) During trial, defense counsel 

presented a theory that Rachel O.’s only injury, the scratches on her arms, were selfinflicted instead of caused by Petitioner dragging Rachel O. through gravel, as the 

Prosecution argued. (See Lodgment 15 at 221-222, 1688-89.) Defense counsel pursued a 

line of questioning regarding these injuries and the accompanying theory while cross 

examining Rachel O. Petitioner argues that while defense counsel had this thought 

process and embarked upon this line of questioning during the trial, defense counsel 

failed to test the scrapings taken from Rachel O.’s fingernails during the S.A.R.T. exam. 

These scrapings, Petitioner contends, would have been able to either prove or disprove 

the defense theory because they would either show Rachel O.’s own DNA or dirt from 

the scene under her fingernails. By failing to acquire and test these scrapings, Petitioner 

argues defense counsel performed deficiently. 

Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691. This includes a duty to investigate the defendant's “most important defense,”

Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1457, and a duty to adequately investigate and introduce into 

evidence records that demonstrate factual innocence or raise sufficient doubt on that 

question to undermine confidence in the verdict. Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 

(9th Cir. 1999). When the record clearly shows that the lawyer was well-informed, and 

the petitioner fails to state what additional information would be gained by the discovery 

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he now claims was necessary, an ineffective assistance claim fails. Id. Furthermore, 

"ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate must be considered in light 

of the strength of the government's case." Id.

Failure to investigate a possible defense may form the basis of a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel; however, “a particular decision not to investigate must 

be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 

measure of deference to counsel's judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. Trial 

counsel's decision not to pursue an unproductive or unfruitful defense may be a 

reasonable strategic decision. Bonin, 59 F.3d at 833-35.

To determine whether prejudice resulted from the failure to investigate and present 

evidence, the evidence that was actually presented to the jury must be compared to the 

evidence that might have been presented had counsel pursued the investigation. Id. at 

834. Only if there is a reasonable probability that the presentation of such evidence would 

have resulted in a different verdict will the failure to investigate warrant relief under the 

Strickland standards. Id. at 836.

Here, defense counsel presented the defense theory that Rachel O.’s injuries were 

self-inflicted instead of caused by Petitioner. However, defense counsel’s presentation of 

this theory was merely through cross-examination of Rachel O., and the theory was 

presented with only one remark. (Lodgment 15 at 272-73, “There are some scratches or 

red marks on your forearms that to me could also be consistent with somebody, like, 

scratching themselves nervously or something of that nature.”) Beyond this mere 

statement and question whether self-inflicted scratching could have been the cause of 

Rachel O.’s injuries, defense counsel did not provide any other evidence of the theory 

and only briefly raised it in his closing argument. (Id. at 1724.)

Further, during Devlin’s cross-examination, defense counsel confirmed the 

existence of the scrapings taken from Rachel O.’s fingernails. (Lodgment 15 at 567.) 

These scrapings, according to Petitioner, should have been further investigated and tested 

to either prove or disprove defense counsel’s theory about the cause of Rachel O.’s 

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scratches. (Doc. 32 at 25.) Petitioner argues again that Rachel O.’s credibility was of 

paramount importance to the Prosecution’s case, and so if “this evidence can show 

Rachel O. injured herself to manufacture the appearance of a crime,” defense counsel’s 

failure to investigate this evidence amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 32 

at 25.)

Petitioner must then establish this failure to investigate prejudiced his defense. In 

doing so, Petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability the presentation of this 

alternative evidence that may have been discovered would have changed the verdict. The 

evidence Petitioner argues may have been discovered through the investigation defense 

counsel omitted is the scrapings proving Rachel O.’s scratches, which are her only injury, 

were self-inflicted. Specifically, if the scrapings could prove Rachel O.’s only injuries 

were in fact not caused by Petitioner, Rachel O.’s credibility would have been 

diminished. (Doc. 32 at 25.)

Although Rachel O.’s case did depend heavily upon her credibility, merely 

presenting these scrapings and the potential that Rachel O.’s scratches were self-inflicted 

would not likely have changed the verdict. Despite Petitioner’s contention that the 

scrapings would show Rachel O.’s own DNA under her fingernails, Petitioner neglects to 

address the equally likely possibility the testing would show gravel from the scene. Based 

on the very real possibility the evidence could be unfavorable to Petitioner, defense 

counsel was not outside the scope of professional norms in not testing the evidence. 

Additionally, Petitioner filed a post-appeal motion to test the evidence, but did not 

present any results of such testing. Without these results showing the evidence was 

favorable, Petitioner has not shown defense counsel’s failure to test the evidence 

prejudiced Petitioner’s defense. Thus, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

accordingly fails in this respect and habeas relief is DENIED.

b. Failure to subpoena alibi witnesses

Petitioner next argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense 

counsel failed to subpoena suggested witnesses Shannon Lemoureux and Geoffrey Perry. 

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(Doc. 32 at 27.) Attached to Petitioner’s FAP are notes from the Public Defender 

Investigator’s separate interviews with these two witnesses. (Id. at 45-46.) Lemoureux 

stated in her interview that she was with Petitioner the night of the Ashley H. incident in 

2008. (Id. at 45.) Contrary to Ashley H.’s testimony that the assault by Petitioner 

occurred after midnight, Lemoureux stated she, Petitioner, and another Grifters member 

who she was dating at the time, left the party together around midnight and rode back to 

the San Diego area. Petitioner contends Lamoureaux would have presented credible 

evidence of Petitioner’s alibi for the Ashley H. charge.

Perry was interviewed as a witness to the 2010 Luz P. incident in Arizona. Perry 

was present the night of the incident and saw Petitioner and Luz P. walking and holding 

hands before Luz P.’s friends arrived. During the interview, Perry stated when he and 

another Laughing Devils prospect came upon Petitioner and Luz P., “[Luz P.] was clearly 

holding on to [sic] [Petitioner]’s hand and was very close to him. . . . She did not appear 

concerned for her safety and did not say or express that anything was abnormal in regards 

[sic] to her friendship with [Petitioner].” (Id. at 46.) Additionally, Perry noted Luz P. was 

“giggling and laughing with [Petitioner] and seemed pretty happy to be with him.” (Id.)

The failure to call a witness cannot establish ineffective assistance when defense 

counsel is well-informed of the facts and circumstances of the witness's account. 

Eggleston v. U.S., 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986). Trial counsel's tactical decisions 

deserve deference when counsel makes an informed decision based on strategic trial 

considerations, and the decision appears reasonable under the circumstances. Sanders v. 

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). The ultimate decision not to call witnesses at 

trial is well within counsel's “full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Taylor v. 

Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988) (“Putting to one side the exceptional cases in which 

counsel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer's decision . . 

. to decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand . . . .”).

To establish prejudice caused by the failure to call a witness, Petitioner must show 

the witness was likely to have testified if called; the witness would have given the 

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proffered testimony; and the witness's testimony would have created a reasonable 

probability that the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to Petitioner. See 

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Berry, 814 

F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim 

was not satisfied because no indication of what potential witnesses would have testified 

to or how their testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing was offered).

While Petitioner has not necessarily shown the uncalled alibi witnesses would have 

testified had they been subpoenaed, Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel regarding these witnesses fails for other reasons. See United States v. Harden, 

846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (claim of ineffective assistance based on failure 

to call witnesses requires, at minimum, evidence that those uncalled witnesses in fact 

have testified). Ultimately, there are valid reasons defense counsel may have chosen to 

not subpoena either Lamoureux or Perry.

For example, Lamoureux, according to her witness interview summary, had trouble 

recalling the exact events of the night in question, but did state she, the other Grifter, and 

Petitioner left the party around midnight. Most importantly, though, Lamoureux 

thoroughly discussed her disdain for Petitioner during her interview. Lamoureux 

described Petitioner as “shady,” “sneaky,” and a liar. She further described her 

discomfort when she was around Petitioner and stated “some of the other women who 

hang out with the motorcycle club avoid [Petitioner] because of his demeanor.” Finally, 

Lamoureux stated Petitioner gave her “the creeps.” The combination of Lamoureux’s 

inability to remember details of the night and her negative feelings towards Petitioner 

may have led defense counsel to conclude Lamoureux would be a more detrimental 

witness than beneficial. This decision therefore was not arbitrary but instead was 

strategic.

Regarding Perry, Petitioner argues Perry’s testimony would have been valuable at 

trial to corroborate Andrew Ritz’s testimony about seeing Luz P. and Petitioner together 

the night of that incident. (Doc. 32 at 28. See also Lodgment 15 at 1530.) Perry’s witness 

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statement and proffered testimony taken therefrom is virtually identical to Ritz’s in that 

they both describe Luz P. and the Petitioner walking hand in hand, laughing, and 

presenting nothing leading the men to believe Luz P. was averse to her situation. (Doc. 32 

at 46, Lodgment 15 at 1538-39.) Given the similarities in the testimony of Ritz and the 

interview of Perry, defense counsel could have decided presenting two witnesses giving 

identical testimony to dispute propensity evidence only may be found cumulative and 

burdensome by the jury. This decision therefore was also sufficiently strategic so as to 

avoid being rendered outside professional norms.

Ultimately, because defense counsel’s omission of Lamoureux and Perry’s 

testimony was not outside the bounds of professional representation, Petitioner’s claim 

for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in this regard must also fail. Accordingly, 

habeas relief on this ground is DENIED.

c. Failure to prepare effectively for trial

Lastly, Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because 

defense counsel failed to effectively prepare for trial. (Doc. 32 at 29.) Petitioner argues 

defense counsel was ineffective because he met with Petitioner only three times before 

Petitioner’s trial. (Id.) These meetings were reportedly regarding the Rachel O. charges, 

the possible sentence if trial was lost, and the newly added kidnapping charges, 

respectively. (Id.) From the time of the last meeting to Petitioner’s trial, the Ashley H. 

charge was consolidated with the Rachel O. charges. (Id.) During these meetings, 

Petitioner states no strategy or witnesses were discussed. (Id.) Instead, defense counsel 

waited until trial to speak with Petitioner about this. (Id. at 29-30.) Each day of trial, 

Petitioner would speak with defense counsel for about 15 minutes before entering the 

courtroom. (Id. at 30.) Petitioner argues these communications were insufficient, and 

forced Petitioner to “attempt[] to inform defense counsel of witnesses as they walked to 

the witness stand.” (Id. at 30.) 

Adequate consultation between attorney and client is an essential element of 

competent representation of a criminal defendant. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 225-26 

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(4th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); see also Adams v. Balkcom, 688 F.2d 

734, 738 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d at 124. While the amount 

of consultation required will depend on the facts of each case, the consultation should be 

sufficient to determine all legally relevant information known to the defendant.

In arguing this, Petitioner does not state how defense counsel’s representation of 

Petitioner would have differed had defense counsel met with Petitioner more often. 

Instead, Petitioner generally argues defense counsel was “lackadaisical” in preparing 

Petitioner’s case, neglecting to conduct a separate investigation and relying solely on 

evidence produced by the Prosecution. (Doc. 32 at 30.) Thus, even if defense counsel’s 

preparations of Petitioner’s trial were deficient under Strickland, Petitioner has not shown 

his defense was prejudiced by such inactions. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel and habeas relief based thereon is DENIED.

4. Motion to sever the Ashley H. count from the Rachel O. counts

Petitioner makes a final argument that he was denied the right to a fair trial because 

the trial court denied his motion to sever the Ashley H. count from the Rachel O. counts. 

(Doc. 29 at 70.) Petitioner argues the trial court erred because there was no cross 

admissibility between the charges, Ashley H. had significantly weaker evidence, and 

Petitioner probably would have testified had he been tried for the Ashley H. charge

separately. (Id. at 70-71.) In summarizing his argument, Petitioner notes “[d]espite the 

dramatically favorable court findings in petitioner’s favor on crucial facts,” in addition to 

the other reasons laid out in the preceding sentence, the trial court erroneously denied

Petitioner’s severance motion and subsequent motion for new trial based on this denial. 

(Id. at 71.)

Respondent counters this argument by noting the United States Supreme Court has 

never held the denial of a motion to sever charges violates due process rights. (Doc. 39-1 

at 24.) Because of this, Respondent argues the Court of Appeal was correct in finding 

Petitioner has no habeas relief for this claim because the trial court’s decision “could not 

//

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have been contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.” 

(Id.) See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

California Penal Code section 954 states "[a]n accusatory pleading may charge two 

or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or . . . two or more 

different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts . . . ." 

Joinder of counts is favored because it promotes efficiency. People v. Myles, 274 P.3d 

413 (Cal. 2012). Here, Petitioner was charged and convicted of those charges resulting 

from two separate instances of sexual offenses. 

"The Supreme Court has never held that a trial court's failure to provide separate 

trials on different charges implicates a defendant's right to due process." Collins v. Uribe, 

No. 11-56297, 564 Fed. Appx. 343 (9th Cir. 2014) citing Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 

1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Martinez v. Yates, 585 Fed. Appx. 460, 2014 WL 

5293673 (9th Cir. 2014); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question, the Ninth Circuit 

has stated “[f]ederal habeas is available for improper consolidation only if the 

simultaneous trial ‘actually render[ed the] state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, 

violative of due process.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir.1991)). This Court must 

consider each count separately, asking whether “the trial on a particular count was 

fundamentally unfair in light of that count’s joinder with one or more other charges.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has held the failure of the jury to convict on all counts is “‘the best 

evidence of the jury’s ability to compartmentalize the evidence.’” United States v. Baker, 

10 F.3d 1374, 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1374 

(9th Cir. 1987)).

At trial, defense counsel’s main argument against the consolidation of the charges 

regarding the two separate victims was that the Ashley H. count was “bootstrapped” to 

the Rachel O. counts. (Lodgment 15 at 53, “But as to the [Ashley H.] case it makes the 

case [that] probably isn’t provable at all to where now because [the jury] is going to hear 

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[the Rachel O.] case it is.”) Defense counsel essentially argued the Ashley H. case was so 

weak that on its own, the charge would not stand; but, by consolidating the charge with 

the Rachel O. charges, which were highly inflammatory, the jury would likely return a 

guilty verdict on the Ashley H. charge. (Id. “One case being so much more inflammatory 

in its nature of the evidence and being stronger in the nature of the proof point [than] the 

other case.”) 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized potential due process concerns when a poorlysupported charge is combined with one that is well supported. Bean, 163 F.3d at 1084; 

Lewis, 787 F.2d at 1322. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has previously acknowledged 

that there is “a high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . . joinder of counts allows 

evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the 

evidence would otherwise be inadmissible.” Id. In Lewis, the Court explained this risk by 

observing that “it is much more difficult for jurors to compartmentalize damaging 

information about one defendant derived from joined counts, than it is to 

compartmentalize evidence against separate defendants joined for trial,” and by 

recognizing studies establishing “that joinder of counts tends to prejudice jurors’

perceptions of the defendant and of the strength of the evidence on both sides of the 

case.” Id. at 1322.

Here, Petitioner was accused of two separate sex offenses resulting in various 

charges, with evidence of one significantly outweighing evidence of the other. Despite 

cross-admissibility concerns raised by defense counsel, the charges were consolidated by 

the trial court at the Prosecution’s request. The absence of cross-admissibility does not, 

by itself, demonstrate prejudice. People v. Mendoza, 6 P.3d 150 (2000); see also Cal. 

Pen. Code § 954.1.

Furthermore, both the Prosecution and trial court ensured Petitioner was not 

unfairly prejudiced by the consolidation of the Ashley H. and Rachel O. charges. The

Prosecution in Petitioner’s case did not blatantly link the charges regarding Ashley H. 

and Rachel O. in statements in such a way that prejudiced Petitioner to the extent 

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severance was necessary. See Bean, 163 F.3d at 1083 (where the prosecution asserted 

Bean was guilty of a second murder in a consolidated case which had very little evidence 

because “‘the theft of [the second victim’s] car and the manner in which [the murder] was 

perpetration suits [Bean’]s style and his M.O., as you are well aware. . . ,’” this statement 

among other statements led the Ninth Circuit to find severance was required to ensure a 

fair trial). Instead, the Prosecution presented the evidence of the Ashley H. charge, 

consisting of testimony from Ashley H. herself, and the jury was allowed to find the 

evidence credible or not. (See Lodgment 15 at 735-792.)

The Prosecution made reference to Ashley H.’s credibility with evidence presented 

regarding the Rachel O. charges during Petitioner’s trial. (Id. at 1675, “Can you believe 

Ashley H. more because you know that it happened to these other women? In other 

words, is her testimony corroborated then by what these other women said when they 

came in?”; Id. at 1734, “Doesn’t Ashley H.’s testimony make sense in light of the women 

that you’ve heard from?”) But there it ended. Suggesting a victim’s testimony may be 

more credible based on corroborating statements made by other victims is not in itself 

proof severance was required.

In addition to the Prosecution acting appropriately during trial with respect to the 

boundaries between the consolidated cases, the trial court similarly acted appropriately so 

as to not prejudice Petitioner unfairly. No suggestions were made by the trial court to try 

the cases in concert, nor was there any encouragement to use evidence of one case to 

satisfy the other. See Bean, 163 F.3d at 1084 (where the trial court did not give 

instructions to the jury that emphasized the distinction between the consolidated cases, 

the Ninth Circuit found this was one factor making severance necessary). Although there 

was no jury instruction telling the jury to keep the evidence separated according to 

victim, this Court is confident that following the Prosecution’s presentation, the jury was 

able to compartmentalize the evidence, and did not use the evidence from the Rachel O. 

counts to bolster the Ashley H. count. The Prosecution and trial court maintained the 

differentiation between the Rachel O. and Ashley H. charges throughout the trial, so that

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the interplay that was present between the cases was not so substantial to be rise to the 

level of Bean and require a similar outcome.

Thus, because Petitioner did not suffer any undue prejudice as a result of this 

consolidation of charges and the trial court’s denial of severance, Petitioner’s trial on the 

Ashley H. count was not fundamentally unfair. Given the trial was not fundamentally 

unfair, habeas relief is DENIED on this ground.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Cynthia Bashant, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c)(1)(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) 

directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties 

on or before December 21, 2017. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be served and filed on 

or before December 30, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

within the specific time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Ylst, 951 

F.2d at 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2017

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