Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00990/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00990-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Patrick LaCross, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Knight Transportation Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00990-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify This Court’s September 22, 2016 

(Doc. 148) and October 18, 2016 (Doc. 150) Orders Granting Knight’s Motion to Compel 

Arbitration for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). (Doc. 151, Mot.) 

Defendants filed a Response in opposition (Doc. 152, Resp.), and Plaintiffs filed a Reply 

(Doc. 153, Reply). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), if a district judge in making an order is “of the opinion 

that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 

ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing 

such an order.” Here, the Court included no such statement in either of the Orders 

Plaintiffs challenge (Docs. 148, 150). Plaintiffs now move for the Court to make such a 

statement pertaining to those Orders as a step toward giving the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal of those Orders. (Mot. at 1-2.) 

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 Whether or not the Court’s Orders (Docs. 148, 150) involve “a controlling 

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”—the 

Court would find that they do not—the Court cannot conclude that an immediate appeal 

from its Orders will “materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation” under 

§ 1292(b). In the appeal scenario, if the Court of Appeals affirms the Court’s Orders, the 

parties will be left in the same position as they were prior to the appeal and the arbitral 

process will have suffered a significant delay. If the Court of Appeals reverses this 

Court’s Orders, the litigation will continue in this Court in a manner consistent with the 

Court of Appeals’ decision. In either instance, the time for the Court of Appeals to 

resolve Plaintiffs’ appeal—which is likely to be substantial—will have passed, and 

Plaintiffs will be no closer to the ultimate resolution of their claims in this lawsuit. As 

Defendants point out, “In the two years it could take Plaintiffs to appeal the decision, 

they could more quickly arbitrate their claims to a final judgment.” (Resp. at 11.) Of 

course, the Court recognizes that if the Court of Appeals were to reverse its Orders in an 

interlocutory appeal, the parties would avoid litigating Plaintiffs’ claims in arbitration. 

See Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1996) (in the context of 

addressing whether a district court’s order involves a controlling question of law under 

§ 1292(b), finding that the order may do so “if it could cause the needless expense and 

delay of litigating an entire case in a forum that has no power to decide the matter”). But, 

in this case, the Court cannot find that an immediate appeal of its Orders is sufficiently 

likely to materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation, such that this 

Court’s certification of the appeal is appropriate under § 1292(b). 

 The Court notes that Plaintiffs filed this case on March 3, 2014 (Doc. 1-3 at 5-39), 

nearly three years ago, and Plaintiffs’ present characterization of the case as “in its 

infancy” thus appears disingenuous, particularly after arguing to the Court that they have 

been prejudiced by the amount of time and resources spent litigating this case to date. 

(See Doc. 115 at 20.) Disingenuous too is Plaintiffs’ argument that their proposed appeal 

will materially advance the litigation by bringing them closer to settlement with 

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Defendants. Nothing precludes Plaintiffs from negotiating a settlement with Defendants 

now. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify This 

Court’s September 22, 2016 and October 18, 2016 Orders Granting Knight’s Motion to 

Compel Arbitration for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Doc. 151). 

 Dated this 26th day of January, 2017. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge 

Case 2:15-cv-00990-JJT Document 155 Filed 01/26/17 Page 3 of 3