Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00956/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-00956-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS POPE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SONATYPE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:15-cv-00956-RMW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

COMPEL ARBITRATION WITH 

SEVERANCE OF UNCONSCIONABLE

PROVISIONS; DISMISSING CASE

Re: Dkt. No. 11

Defendant Sonatype, Inc. (“Sonatype”) moves to compel arbitration of the 14 claims raised 

in plaintiff Thomas Pope’s (“Pope”) complaint. Dkt. No. 11 (“Mot.”). The court grants the motion 

with severance of certain provisions.

I. BACKGROUND

Pope is a former employee of Sonatype. Pope filed a complaint on March 2, 2015 alleging 

14 claims related to his employment with, and separation from, Sonatype. 

Sonatype recruited Pope to work as a salesperson. Over the course of a few weeks, Pope 

and Sonatype engaged in negotiations over his salary. On February 7, 2013 Pope orally accepted 

a job offer from Sonatype. To confirm the offer, Sonatype extended a written offer of 

employment to Pope. Dkt. No. 11-1 (“Offer”). The Offer included an Arbitration Agreement. Id. 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 1 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

at page 4. The Arbitration Agreement provides:

You [Pope] and the Company [Sonatype] agree to submit to 

mandatory binding arbitration of any and all claims arising out of or 

related to your employment with the Company and the termination 

thereof, including, but by no means limited to, claims of 

discrimination, harassment, unpaid wages, breach of contract, 

wrongful termination, torts, claims for stock or stock options or 

other ownership interest in the Company, as well as claims based 

upon any federal, state or local ordinance, statute, regulation or 

constitutional provision . . . . All arbitration hearings shall be 

conducted in Washington, D.C. Arbitration shall be the exclusive 

method by which to resolve Arbitrable Claims, except that each 

party may at its, his or her option, seek injunctive relief in a 

court of competent jurisdiction related to the improper use, 

disclosure or misappropriation of a party’s proprietary, 

confidential or trade secret information (or any related right) . . 

. . THE PARTIES HEREBY WAIVE ANY RIGHTS THEY MAY 

HAVE TO TRIAL BY JURY IN REGARD TO SUCH CLAIMS. 

This letter does not restrict your right to file administrative claims 

you may bring before any government agency where, as a matter of 

law, the parties may not restrict the employee’s ability to file such 

claims (including, but not limited to, the National Labor Relations 

Board, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the 

Department of Labor). However, the parties agree that, to the fullest 

extent permitted by law, arbitration shall be the exclusive remedy 

for the subject matter of such administrative claims. The 

arbitration shall be conducted through JAMS before a single 

neutral arbitrator, in accordance with the JAMS employment 

arbitration rules then in effect. The arbitrator shall issue a written 

decision that contains the essential findings and conclusions on 

which the decision is based. If any legal action, including, without 

limitation, an action for arbitration or injunctive relief, is brought 

relating to this letter or the breach or alleged breach thereof, the 

prevailing party in any final judgment or arbitration award, 

shall be entitled to the full amount of all reasonable expenses, 

including all court costs, arbitration fees and actual attorneys’

fees paid or incurred in good faith.

Id. (“Arbitration Agreement”) (bold emphases added). Pope signed the Offer the same day it was 

extended, and began working for Sonatype on March 4, 2013. Pope left Sonatype on October 17, 

2014. 

Pope’s complaint is primarily based on claims that Sonatype misrepresented his potential 

compensation as a salesperson when recruiting him to join the company. Prior to Pope filing the 

instant complaint, Sonatype opened arbitration proceedings against Pope pursuant to the 

Arbitration Agreement relating to commissions and a severance package paid when Pope left 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 2 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Sonatype. 

Sonatype now moves to compel arbitration of Pope’s 14 claims pursuant to the Arbitration 

Agreement. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements 

regarding transactions involving commerce, including employment agreements such as Pope’s 

agreement with Sonatype. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA provides that any contract to settle a 

dispute by arbitration shall be valid and enforceable, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 

equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This provision reflects both that (a) 

arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract, and (b) Congress expressed a “liberal federal 

policy favoring arbitration.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Under § 4 of the FAA, a district court must issue an order compelling arbitration if the 

following two-pronged test is satisfied: (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; and (2) that 

agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” United Computer Systems, Inc. v. AT & T Corp.,

298 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2002). “Under California law, a contract must be both procedurally 

and substantively unconscionable to be rendered invalid. California law utilizes a sliding scale to 

determine unconscionability.” Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.

2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less 

evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is 

unenforceable, and vice versa.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 

83, 114 (2000).

III.DISCUSSION

A. Unconscionability

The court first examines whether the Arbitration Agreement as a whole is unconscionable. 

Pope, as the party opposing arbitration, has the burden of proving the agreement is 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 3 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

unconscionable. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1099 (2002).

The California Supreme Court in Armendariz provides the definitive pronouncement of 

California law on unconscionability as applied to mandatory arbitration agreements. See 

Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F .3d 778,782-83 (9th Cir. 2002). “In order to 

render a contract unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability, there must be both a 

procedural and substantive element of unconscionability.” Id. at 783 (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal.

4th at 114). These two elements must both be present, but not necessarily in the same degree. Id. 

“The more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural 

unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice 

versa.” Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.

1. Procedural Unconscionability

“Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated 

and the circumstances of the parties at the time.” Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs. Inc., 70 Cal.

App. 4th 1322 (1999). The analysis focuses on two factors: oppression and surprise. Oppression

arises from the inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence 

of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of 

the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the 

disputed terms. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519 (1997).

Here, the first notice of the Arbitration Agreement was in the Offer presented to Pope after 

he had accepted a verbal offer of employment. The Offer concluded with a statement that “This 

offer will remain open until February 9, 2013. . . Should you have anything else that you wish to 

discuss, please do not hesitate to call me.” Dkt. No. 11-1. However, the Offer did not otherwise 

indicate that the terms of the Offer were negotiable nor did the parties discuss the Arbitration 

Agreement. Pope was not provided with the actual JAMS rules which were referred to in the 

Arbitration Agreement.

Sonatype argues that the negotiations with Pope over his salary show that Sonatype was 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 4 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

willing to negotiate the Arbitration Agreement. This argument is not persuasive because Pope did 

not know about the Arbitration Agreement until after he had orally accepted the job. Furthermore, 

job applicants, especially at Pope’s level, typically negotiate salary and other employment 

benefits, such as vacation leave, title, stock options, etc. Arbitration is not a commonly negotiated 

employment “perk.” Beyond the statement that Pope could contact Sonatype “to discuss” the 

offer, nothing in Sonatype’s written employment Offer suggested that the unilaterally drafted 

Arbitration Agreement was negotiable or that Pope even knew about any arbitration provision 

until after he had accepted a verbal offer of employment. Although a close case, the court finds 

that the Arbitration Agreement does contain some degree of procedural unconscionability because 

of the manner in which it was presented to Pope. See Trompeter v. Ally Fin., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 

1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Trompeter has established a minimal degree of procedural 

unconscionability based on the adhesive nature of the form arbitration agreement and the lack of 

opportunity for him to negotiate its terms.”). 

2. Substantive Unconscionability

“Substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those 

terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.” Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 784. The primary 

consideration is whether the agreement contains a “modicum of bilaterality.” Armendariz, 24 Cal.

4th at 117. In Armendariz the California Supreme Court set forth five requirements that are 

applicable to arbitration agreements in an employment context. Id. at 100. At a minimum, an 

arbitration agreement must: (1) provide for neutral arbitrators, (2) provide for more than minimal 

discovery, (3) require a written award, (4) provide for all types of relief that would otherwise be 

available in court, and (5) not require the employee to pay either unreasonable costs or any 

arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum. Id. at 102-03. Pope 

argues that the Sonatype Arbitration Agreement does not meet two of the Armendariz 

requirements, because it (1) imposes unreasonable costs and (2) does not provide for more than 

minimal discovery. Pope also argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 5 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

unconscionable because it is unilateral. 

a. Unreasonable Costs

Pope argues that the Sonatype Arbitration Agreement requires him to pay unreasonable 

fees, including travel to Washington, D.C., costs of arbitration, and attorney’s fees. Opp. at 4-5. 

Sonatype responds that the JAMS employment arbitration rules eliminate the risk that Pope will 

have to pay costs in violation of California law and that a venue selection clause is permissible in 

an arbitration agreement unless it has no justification other than maximizing an advantage over the 

opposing party. See Arreguin v. Global Equity Lending, Inc., 2008 WL 4104340*8 (N.D. Cal. 

2008); Bolter v. Superior Court, 87 Cal.App.4th 900, 910 (2001).

The Arbitration Agreement states that “the prevailing party in any final judgment or 

arbitration award, shall be entitled to the full amount of all reasonable expenses, including all 

court costs, arbitration fees and actual attorneys’ fees paid or incurred in good faith.” Sonatype 

concedes that this provision is inconsistent with California law but argues that the JAMS rules 

which are incorporated in the Arbitration Agreement negate this provision. The Arbitration 

Agreement provides that “[t]he arbitration shall be conducted through JAMS before a single 

neutral arbitrator, in accordance with the JAMS employment arbitration rules then in effect.” The 

JAMS “Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards” currently in effect provide:

An employee’s access to arbitration must not be precluded by 

the employee’s inability to pay any costs or by the location of the 

arbitration. The only fee that an employee may be required to pay 

is JAMS’ Initial Case Management fee. All other costs must be 

borne by the company, including any additional JAMS Case 

Management Fee and all professional fees for the arbitrator’s 

services. In California, the arbitration provision may not 

require an employee who does not prevail to pay the fees and 

costs incurred by the opposing party.

Dkt. No. 11-2 (emphases added). Thus, submits Sonatype, it is apparent from the Arbitration 

Agreement that Pope will not be subject to any unreasonable costs of arbitration or attorney’s fees, 

even if he does not prevail in the arbitration. Although Sonatype currently agrees that the JAMS 

Minimum Standards apply, no evidence has been offered that at the time the Offer was presented 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 6 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

to Pope, Sonatype would have agreed that the JAMS Minimum Standard trump the express 

conflicting language in the Arbitration Agreement. However, the most logical interpretation of the 

Arbitration Agreement is that the JAMS provisions were intended to apply if a provision in the 

Arbitration Agreement conflicted with a JAMS requirement.

The most oppressive aspect of the Arbitration Agreement is its requirement that arbitration 

take place in Washington D.C. Pope, a California resident, was hired by Sonatype for a job in 

California and which he performed in California. To make such an employee who has a falling 

out with his employer go to his employer’s choice of venue seems oppressive. 

Sonatype suggests that Pope, and his witnesses, could present his case by either 

videoconference or through recorded depositions. The court is not convinced that appearing by 

videoconference is a cure-all. Even if Pope appeared by video or phone, Sonatype could appear in 

person, potentially giving Sonatype an advantage in the arbitration proceeding. 

Sonatype indicated at the hearing on the motion that it would be willing to arbitrate the 

dispute in California if it could retain its right to arbitrate. Some courts have expressed reluctance 

to relieve a party of the effect of an unlawful provision it inserted in its arbitration policy despite 

the incorporation of, for example, the AAA rules that do not have the same infirmity. See Fitz v. 

NCR Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th 702, 721 (2004) (“NCR should not be relieved of the effect of an 

unlawful provision it inserted in the ACT policy due to the serendipity that the AAA rules provide 

otherwise”). However, as discussed below, the court finds this venue provision severable.

b. Discovery

Pope also argues that the Sonatype Arbitration Agreement, which incorporates JAMS 

rules, provides for only one deposition, which is insufficient to present his case. Opp. at 5. The 

Arbitration Agreement itself does not include any discovery limits, thus the JAMS rules apply. 

The JAMS rules provide as follows:

Each Party may take at least one deposition of an opposing Party or 

an individual under the control of the opposing Party. The Parties 

shall attempt to agree on the number, time, location and duration of 

the deposition(s). Absent agreement, the Arbitrator shall determine 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 7 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

these issues, including whether to grant a request for additional 

depositions, based upon the reasonable need for the requested 

information, the availability of other discovery and the 

burdensomeness of the request on the opposing Parties and witness. 

Dkt. No. 11-3 (JAMS Rule 17(b)). Pope’s characterization of the rules as limited to one 

deposition is not accurate. The JAMS discovery limits are “more than minimal” and sufficient to 

meet Armendariz. See also Chau v EMC Corp., 2014 WL 842579 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014). 

c. The Arbitration Agreement is Minimally Unilateral 

Pope also argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because

employment disputes must be arbitrated but parties may seek injunctive relief “related to the 

improper use, disclosure or misappropriation of a party’s proprietary, confidential or trade secret 

information (or any related right)” (hereinafter, “trade secret misappropriation”). Pope is correct 

that some California courts have found substantive unconscionability in arbitration provisions that 

require employment claims (which are more likely to be brought by an employee) to be arbitrated, 

but provide that trade secret misappropriation claims (which are more likely to be brought by an 

employer) can be litigated in court. See, e.g., Fitz, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 702. Here, the limited 

injunctive relief provision is mutual in that it allows either party to assert an injunctive relief claim

based upon trade secret misappropriation against the other. It is unilateral, however, in the sense 

that the employer is more likely to assert such a claim than is the employee. Because there are no 

trade secret misappropriation claims in this case, the court finds that this provision should not bar 

enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement. See Lara v. Onsite Health, 896 F.Supp. 2d 831, 837 

(N.D. Cal. 2012).

B. Plaintiff’s Tort Claims

Pope argues that the Arbitration Agreement does not apply to his “tort claims based on 

misrepresentations made to Plaintiff by Sonatype during the time that the company recruited him.” 

Opp. at 13. This is not persuasive. The Arbitration Agreement expressly states that Pope agreed 

to arbitrate “any and all claims arising out of or related to your employment with the Company 

and the termination thereof, including, but by no means limited to . . . torts.” Pre-employment 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 8 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

representations “relate to” Pope’s employment with Sonatype. Pope’s arguments do not address 

the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, but instead relate to the legal distinctions between 

different types of claims. Pope may be correct that he could have brought misrepresentation 

claims based on statements made before entering into an employment agreement with Sonatype 

even if he had not never actually worked for Sonatype, but by signing the employment agreement 

he agreed to arbitrate those claims. Accordingly, plaintiff’s tort claims are covered by the 

Arbitration Agreement. 

C. Severance 

Sonatype submits that any unconscionable provisions in the Arbitration Agreement can be 

severed to preserve the intent of the parties. Pope argues that this is inappropriate, citing 

Armendariz. 

California Civil Code § 1670.5(a) provides that “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the 

contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the 

court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without 

the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 

avoid any unconscionable result.” Comment 2 of the Legislative Committee comment on section 

1670.5, incorporating the comments from the Uniform Commercial Code, states: “Under this 

section the court, in its discretion, may refuse to enforce the contract as a whole if it is permeated 

by the unconscionability, or it may strike any single clause or group of clauses which are so 

tainted or which are contrary to the essential purpose of the agreement, or it may simply limit 

unconscionable clauses so as to avoid unconscionable results.” (Legis. Com. com., at 9 West’s 

Ann. Civ. Code (1985 ed.) p. 494 (Legislative Committee comment) (emphasis added)).

As identified above, there are three provisions1in the Arbitration Agreement that contain 

some degree of unconscionability. “[A] court should sever an unconscionable provision unless the 

agreement is so ‘permeated’ by unconscionability that it cannot be cured by severance.” Serafin v. 

 

1

The venue provision, the fee provision, and the trade secret misappropriation provision. 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 9 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Balco Properties Ltd., LLC, 235 Cal. App. 4th 165, 183-84 (2015). Although some cases have 

found that including more than one unconscionable term suggests that the terms cannot be 

severed, that is not the case here. See, e.g, Trivedi v. Curexo Tech. Corp., 189 Cal. App. 4th 387, 

398 (2010) (“At least two provisions were properly found to be substantively unconscionable, a 

circumstance considered by our Supreme Court to “permeate” the agreement with 

unconscionability.” (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 122) (footnote omitted)).2 

Here, it is clear that the primary intent of the the Arbitration Agreement was to arbitrate 

“any and all claims arising out of or related to your employment with the Company and the 

termination thereof” in accordance with JAMS rules. The Arbitration Agreement itself provides 

that “The arbitration shall be conducted through JAMS before a single neutral arbitrator, in 

accordance with the JAMS employment arbitration rules then in effect.” Dkt. No. 11-1. Although 

Sonatype inserted two clauses that appear to conflict with JAMS rules, simply severing those 

provisions or interpreting them as not applicable in California and proceeding under the 

incorporated JAMS rules cures the unconscionability as to those terms and preserves the intent of 

the Agreement. Specifically, the JAMS rules provide that “[a]n employee’s access to arbitration 

must not be precluded . . . by the location of the arbitration. . . In California, the arbitration 

provision may not require an employee who does not prevail to pay the fees and costs incurred by 

the opposing party.” Dkt. No. 11-2. The injunctive relief clause does not have a JAMS 

counterpart, but it is also easily capable of severance. See, e.g., Arreguin v. Global Equity 

Lending, Inc., No. C07-06026 MHP, 2008 WL 4104340, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2008) (severing 

forum selection and non-mutual arbitration of claims provisions).

Accordingly, the (1) trade secret misappropriation injunctive relief carve-out, (2) the 

requirement that arbitration take place in Washington, D.C., and (3) the requirement that Pope pay 

attorney’s fees unless he is a prevailing party are severed, and the motion to compel arbitration is 

 

2

The court in Trivedi nonetheless noted that “the trial court was free to sever the offending 

provisions.” 189 Cal. App. 4th at 399. 

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 10 of 11
5:15-cv-00956-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND DISMISSING CASE

11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

GRANTED. Because defendants have established the existence of a valid arbitration agreement 

which encompasses the dispute in this case, the court dismisses the case without prejudice to 

proceed with the arbitration and without prejudice to an action confirming the arbitration award.

IV.ORDER

For the reasons explained above, the court GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration. 

The applicable JAMS rules on venue and fees shall apply. The court dismisses the case without 

prejudice to proceed with the arbitration and without prejudice to an action confirming the 

arbitration award.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

Case 5:15-cv-00956-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/08/15 Page 11 of 11