Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00185/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Andrea Middleton, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

The City of Tucson; the Tucson Police 

Department; and Frank Greene, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-00185-TUC-JGZ (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Greene’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to State a Claim Against Defendant Greene (Doc. 9). Plaintiff filed her Response 

to Defendant Greene’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) and Defendant Greene replied (Doc. 

18). Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

motion is fully briefed, and oral argument was held on April 19, 2016. Minute Entry 

4/19/2016 (Doc. 23). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court grant 

Plaintiff’s motion. 

 . . . 

 . . . 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 In September 2005, Plaintiff Andrea Middleton began work as a Tucson Police 

Department (“TPD”) patrol officer. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 10. In early 2009, during the 

course of her employment, Plaintiff met Defendant Frank Greene, a TPD lieutenant. Id.

at ¶ 13. Plaintiff and Defendant Greene began a consensual, romantic, dating 

relationship. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that over time Defendant Greene became 

physically abusive of her. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) describes more than 

one incident in which Defendant Greene was abusive toward Plaintiff. See id. ¶¶ 16–27. 

Ultimately, Plaintiff reported Defendant Greene’s conduct to TPD’s Office of Internal 

Affairs (“OIA”). Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 28. Plaintiff further alleges misconduct by Officer 

Greene throughout the internal affairs process, as well as on the job mistreatment by him. 

See id. ¶¶ 29–124.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A complaint is to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. While Rule 8 does not 

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; Pareto v. Fed. 

Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (“conclusory allegations of law and 

unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”). 

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 Dismissal is appropriate where a plaintiff has failed to "state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted." Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 

929 (2007)). Further, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 “When ruling on a motion to dismiss, [the Court must] accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party.” Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los 

Angeles, 648 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 

1072 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff.” Id. (citing Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2008)). This Court is not required, however, to accept conclusory 

statements as a factual basis. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 

S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790, 793 

(9th Cir. 1986) (“Although we must, in general, accept the facts alleged in the complaint 

as true, wholly vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to withstand a motion 

to dismiss.”); See also Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 

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2007) (“Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient 

to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment”). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Defendant Greene seeks dismissal of this cause of action, because “there is no 

individual liability under Title VII[.]” Def. Greene’s Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 9). In 

opposition to Defendant Greene’s motion, Plaintiff relies on Jendusa v. Cancer 

Treatment Centers of Am., Inc., a district court case from the Northern District of Illinois. 

868 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Plaintiff argues that Miller was wrongly decided and 

urges this Court to adopt the reasoning cited in Jendusa to find Defendant Greene can be 

held individually liable under Title VII. Pl.’s Response (Doc. 17). 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly recognized that “[t]here is no 

reason to stretch the liability of individual employees beyond the respondeat superior 

principle intended by Congress.” Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th 

Cir. 1993). In Miller, the plaintiff alleged sex and age discrimination under Title VII, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 269, et seq. against her employer and six individual defendants. 

Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. The Miller court held, “[u]nder our interpretation of Padway and 

the Title VII and ADEA statutory schemes, Miller’s claims against the defendants in their 

individual capacities properly were dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Id. As such, 

in this circuit, supervisory employees are protected from liability in their individual 

capacities. Id. at 587. 

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 “A district judge may not respectfully (or disrespectfully) disagree with his 

learned colleagues on his own court of appeals who have ruled on a controlling legal 

issue, or with Supreme Court Justices writing for a majority of the Court.” Hart v. 

Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001). “Binding authority within this regime 

cannot be considered and cast aside; it is not merely evidence of what the law is . . . 

caselaw on point is the law.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Zuniga v. United Can 

Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 1987) (“District courts are . . . bound by the law of their 

own circuit”). To his credit, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument that Miller is 

binding authority upon this Court, but indicated Plaintiff’s desire to preserve the record. 

In light of binding Ninth Circuit precedent, Defendant Greene’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 9) is granted. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Judge enter an order GRANTING to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 

9). 

 . . . 

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 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-15-0185-

TUC-JGZ. 

 Dated this 19th day of April, 2016. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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