Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08147/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08147-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sharif Devon McPhatter, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CV-11-8147-PCT-RCB(JFM)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., )

 )

Defendants. ) )

Pending before the court is a motion styled as one to

“reconsider” filed by plaintiff pro se Sharif Devon McPhatter,

seeking to have this court “reopen this case[.]” Mot. (Doc.

14) at 1:6 and 15. More specifically, plaintiff is seeking to

have this court vacate the order dismissing this action for

failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and the

judgment entered thereon. Because this motion was not timely

filed, as discussed herein, the court denies plaintiff’s

motion. 

. . . 

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Background

On September 20, 2011, plaintiff McPhatter, who was then

confined in the Arizona State Prison, Cerbat Unit, in

Kingman, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Co. (Doc. 1). The court

dismissed that complaint for failure to state a claim, but

allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint. Thereafter,

plaintiff was released and he timely filed a FAC (Doc. 6). 

The FAC asserts a claim for failure to train as against

the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”) and ADC

Director Charles L. Ryan, and a second claim alleging various

constitutional violations against all defendants, i.e., the

State of Arizona; Mr. Ryan and his wife, Jane Doe Ryan;

Deputy Warden Pollard; and various Doe Defendants. 

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges the following facts: On May 31,

2010, he was one of 25 African-American inmates in the North

Yard of the Cerbat Unit outside of Dorm 1. Plaintiff and the

other African-American inmates were attacked by approximately

100 Caucasian inmates using fists, stones, sticks, and other

weapons. After the attack began, an unspecified number of ADC

officers in full riot gear appeared. Despite the ongoing

attack, these officers did not attempt to intervene until

much later. 

The FAC further alleges: Subsequently, plaintiff was

informed by prison officers that Deputy Warden Pollard had

ordered the officers to stand down and not to intervene. 

Plaintiff also was told that to avoid putting themselves at

risk, the officers were ordered not to intervene. Plaintiff

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was severely beaten resulting in head and back injuries, and

emotional harm, including post-traumatic stress, for which he

sought psychiatric treatment. Plaintiff’s request for a copy

of the ADC’s incident report was denied. Plaintiff contends

that based upon his race, defendants failed to intervene

promptly to stop the attack.

After screening the FAC, on February 21, 2012, this court

dismissed without prejudice the claims against the State of

Arizona, Ryan, Jane Doe Ryan and the Doe Defendants. Ord.

(Doc. 8) at 7:9-10, ¶ (1). However, finding that “[p]laintiff

sufficiently state[d] a claim for failure to protect and

violation of equal protection against [Deputy Warden]

Pollard[,]” the court required Pollard to answer those claims. 

Id. at 6:11-13. The court required Pollard to answer based

upon the following allegations:

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pollard 

prevented prison officers in riot 

gear from intervening to stop attacks 

by a large number of Caucasian inmates 

against a much smaller number of African 

American inmates during which Plaintiff 

was beaten and injured. Plaintiff also 

alleges that Pollard ordered officers in 

riot gear not to intervene in the race 

riot based on the race of the African 

American inmates, including Plaintiff.

Id. at 6:7-11. Among other things, that order required

plaintiff to “complete and return the service packet to the

Clerk of Court within 21 days of the date of filing of this

Order.” Id. at 7:16-17, ¶ (4) (footnote omitted). 

On March 19, 2012, because the plaintiff did not comply

with that order by completing and returning defendant

Pollard’s service packet, United States Magistrate Judge James

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F. Metcalf ordered “that within fourteen days of the filing of

this Order, Plaintiff shall either: (1) return completed

service packets as previously ordered; or (2) show cause why

this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.” 

Ord. (Doc. 9) at 1:15-17. When plaintiff did not so comply,

on April 11, 2012, this court ordered, inter alia, dismissal

of the complaint and action for failure to prosecute pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Ord. (Doc. 12) at 1:19-21. Also on

April 11, 2012, a final judgment was entered in defendants’

favor and against plaintiff (Doc. 13). More than four months

later, on August 16, 2012, plaintiff sought to “reopen this

case[.]” Mot. (Doc. 14) at 1:15. Plaintiff claims “great

injustice” as a result of the dismissal and entry of judgment

against him for failure to prosecute. Id. at 1:20. 

Defendant Ryan’s response readily can be construed as

arguing, in the first instance, that plaintiff’s motion is not

timely. Even if timely, the defendant further argues that

plaintiff McPhatter is not entitled to relief from judgment

under Rule 60(b)(1) because he has not shown excusable neglect

within the meaning of that Rule. 

Discussion

I. Nature of Motion

Plaintiff does not specify the Rule under which he is

seeking to have this court “reopen” and “reconsider” this

case. See Mot. (Doc. 14) at 1:15; and 1:6. Nevertheless,

defendant Ryan construes it as one for relief from final

judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). So, too, will

this court. Despite its nomenclature, this court will treat

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plaintiff’s motion as a Rule 60(b) motion because it was not

filed within 28 days of entry of judgment, as Rule 59(e),

permitting altering or amending of judgments, requires. See

Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 2008) (treating

“Application to Amend Order Nunc Pro Tunc” as a Rule 60(b)

motion) (citing, inter alia, Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v.

N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (“a

motion for reconsideration . . . is treated as a Rule 60(b)

motion” if it is filed more than ten days after entry of

judgment)). 

For nearly identical reasons, the court also will not

treat plaintiff’s motion as one for reconsideration under

LRCiv 7.2(g). Assuming arguendo that Rule applies to final

judgments, plaintiff’s motion was not timely thereunder

because that Local Rule requires that the same be filed “no

later than . . . 14 . . . days after the date of the filing of

the Order that is the subject of the motion.” LRCiv

7.2(g)(2). Here, the order and judgment were entered on April

11, 2012. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion, filed on August 16,

2012, also would not have been timely under that Local Rule. 

Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part that “[o]n motion

and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a

final judgment, . . . for . . . mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). 

Plaintiff’s stated basis for this motion is “Due to failure to

supply summons [he] thought was attached to the [FAC] that was

prepared for [him].” Mot. (Doc. 14) at 17-18. Plaintiff adds

that “[a]fter realizing [the summons] wasn’t present, the

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court [had] already dismissed the case.” Id. at 1:17-19.

Defendant Ryan strongly implies that that failure was due to

plaintiff’s “ignorance or carelessness[,]” which are not among

the listed bases for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Resp. (Doc.

15) at 1:26-2:1 (citations omitted). 

Regardless, the parties are misconceiving the basis for

dismissal. This dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule

41(b) was predicated upon plaintiff’s failure to timely

complete and return to the Clerk’s Office Deputy Warden

Pollard’s service packet. Nothing in the record shows, as

plaintiff suggests, that this action was dismissed because he

returned an incomplete service packet, i.e., the FAC without

the summons. Therefore, the focus here is not on the

purportedly missing summons. Instead, the issue is whether

plaintiff is entitled to have the judgment vacated, despite

the fact that he did not timely complete and return Pollard’s

service packet in accordance with this court’s orders, and

even though he filed this motion more than four months after

entry of the judgment. 

II. Timeliness

Before turning to the merits, it is necessary to address

the timeliness of plaintiff’s motion. A Rule 60(b)(1) motion

“must be made within a reasonable time,” and in any event “no

more than a year after entry of the judgment or order[.]”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1). Plaintiff McPhatter filed the pending

motion less than one year after entry of judgment, but more

than four months after entry of the judgment and more than

three months after the filing date for a notice of appeal. 

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Although plaintiff was within the Rule 60(c)(1)’s outside

limitation for filing this motion, that is not dispositive of

the timeliness issue. “[A] court may deny a Rule 60(b)(1)

motion, even if it was filed within the one-year period, if

the moving party ‘was guilty of laches or unreasonable

delay.’” Hidais v. Porter, 2010 WL 760561, at *1 (N.D.Cal.

March 4, 2010) (quoting Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817

F.2d 517, 520–21 (9th Cir. 1987)). “‘What constitutes

‘reasonable time’ within the meaning of Rule 60(c)(1), depends

upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the

interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical

ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied

upon, and prejudice to the other parties.’” Lemoge v. U.S.,

587 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashford v.

Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). 

The court will address the Ashford factors seriatim. 

A. Interest in Finality

A Rule 60(b)(1) “motion guides the balance between ‘the

overriding judicial goal of deciding cases correctly, on the

basis of their legal and factual merits, with the interest of

both litigants and the courts in the finality of judgments.’” 

In re Williams, 287 B.R. 787, 793 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (quoting

TCI Group Life Ins. v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir.

2001)). Although Rule 60(b) motions “are liberally construed,

‘there is a compelling interest in the finality of judgments

which should not lightly be disregarded.’” Id. (quoting Pena

v. Sequros La Comercial, 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has determined that where “the

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time for filing an appeal to the underlying judgment has

expired, the interest in the finality of judgments is to be

given great weight in determining whether a FRCP 60(b)(1)

motion is filed within a ‘reasonable time.’” Id. (citing

Ashford, 657 F.2d at 1055) (emphasis added).

In the present case, the order of dismissal and judgment

were entered on April 11, 2012. Docs. 12 and 13. As the

docket sheet reflects, the order together with the judgment

were mailed to plaintiff on that same date. Presumably he

received both, because he is not claiming lack of notice of

the order or judgment as a basis for this motion. And further,

those documents were not returned as undeliverable, as

happened earlier in this case when a court order was returned

as undeliverable because plaintiff had been released from

custody and had not, at that time, given notice of his change

of address. See Doc. 5. 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) provides

that in a case such as this, the notice of appeal “must be

filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order

appealed from.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff

McPhatter did not file a notice of appeal, timely or

otherwise, in accordance with that Rule. Nor did he file a

motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59,

which would have extended his time for filing a notice of

appeal. See Fed. R.App. P.4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Instead, he

waited more than four months (127 days to be precise) after

entry of the judgment, and more than three months after the

time to appeal had expired, to file the pending motion to

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1 The court stresses that it is not holding that a Rule 60(b)(1)

motion must always be filed prior to the time allowed for filing a notice

of appeal or a Rule 59 motion. “Rule 60(c)(1) clearly contemplates Rule

60(b)(1) motions may be filed ‘no more than a year after the entry of the

judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.’” Woodfin Suite Hotels,

LLC v. City of Emeryville, 2008 WL 724105, at *11 n. 20 (N.D.Cal. March 14,

2008) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1)). “And, Ashford clearly holds the

determination of whether a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is filed within a

reasonable time, is dependent on facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing

Ashford, 657 F.2d at 1053).

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vacate. Accordingly, in assessing the timeliness of this

motion, the court, as it must, gives “great weight” to the

interest in finality of this judgment. See Williams, 287 B.R.

at 793 (same, where creditor did not timely file a notice of

appeal or “immediately move for reconsideration and

effectively stay[] the appeal period[,]” but instead waited 85

days before filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion); see also Coronado

v. Chavez, 2010 WL 892192, at * 2 (D.Ariz. March 10, 2010)

(citing Ashford, 657 F.2d at 1055) (“[S]ince the plaintiff

filed his pending motion long [almost ten months after entry

of the judgment] after the time for appealing the judgment had

passed, the Court must give ‘great weight’ to the interest in

finality.”)1 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has “agree[d]” that a

Rule 60(b) motion “was not timely because it was filed after

the expiration of the time to appeal[,]” where the plaintiff

filed his motion within a much shorter time frame than

plaintiff McPhatter. See Plotkin v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,

688 F.2d 1291, 1293 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff filed his

Rule 60(b) motion only “48 days after entry of the order and

18 days after the expiration of the time for appeal of that

order[]”). 

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2 There are certain exceptions to a Rule 41(b) dismissal

“operat[ing] as an adjudication on the merits[,]” but none applies here.

See Fed.R.Civ.P.41(b). 

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The interest in finality is bolstered in this case because

the Rule 41(b) dismissal order did not state that it was

without prejudice. Consequently, it “operates as an

adjudication on the merits.”2 Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). As such, it

is distinguishable from a party seeking to set aside a default

judgment, where the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “where

there has been no merits decision, appropriate exercise of

district court discretion under Rule 60(b) requires that the

finality interest should give way fairly readily, to further

the competing interest in reaching the merits of a dispute[]”

does not come into play in this case. See Knoebber, 244 F.3d

at 696 (emphasis in original). For both of these reasons, the

court has little difficulty finding that the first Ashford

factor –- interest in finality of judgments -– weighs against

finding that this motion was brought within a “reasonable

time.”

B. Reason for Delay 

As in Ashford, plaintiff McPhatter offers no reason

whatsoever for his “failure to timely challenge the [order of

dismissal and judgment thereon] by direct appeal or 60(b)

motion[,]” and the court declines to speculate. See Ashford,

657 F.2d at 1055. Consequently, the reason for delay factor

also militates against a finding that this motion was filed

within a “reasonable time.” See Regan v. Frank, 2008 WL

508067, at *4 (D.Hawai’i Feb. 26, 2008), aff’d without pub’d

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opinion on other grounds, 334 Fed.Appx. 848 (9th Cir. 2009)

(denying plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) motion as untimely

where he waited over four months to file it, and “provided no

reasonable justification for []his continued delay[]”). 

C. The Practical Ability of the Litigant to Learn

Earlier of the Grounds Relied Upon

In his motion, plaintiff states, as earlier mentioned,

that “[a]fter [he] realiz[ed] [the summons] wasn’t present,

the court had already dismissed the case.” Mot. (Doc. 14) at

1:18-19. This is not responsive to when plaintiff learned that

the court had dismissed this action and entered judgment

against him for failure to prosecute, however. Further,

plaintiff is not claiming that anything “impeded [his]

awareness of the court’s ruling and all of the relevant facts

and law.” See Ashford, 657 F.2d at 1055. Thus, again, this

factor points to a finding that plaintiff McPhatter did not

file his motion within a “reasonable time[,]” as Rule 60(c)(1)

requires. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).

D. Prejudice to Other Parties

 In an action such as this, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, “federal courts apply the statute of limitations

governing personal injury claims in the forum state.” Cuen v.

Granville, 2012 WL 6674420, at *6 (D.Ariz. Dec. 20, 2012)

(citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938,

85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991

(9th Cir. 1999)). “In Arizona, the limitations period for

personal injury claims is two years.” Id. (citing, inter

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alia, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12–542 (providing that actions for

personal injury must be commenced within two years after the

cause of action accrues). Given that the incident at issue

took place on May 31, 2010 -– “well over two years ago” --

defendant Ryan argues that that two year statute of

limitations has “expired” as to plaintiff’s claims. Resp.

(Doc. 15) at 3:5 (citing TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991). 

Additionally, defendant Ryan asserts that during that time

frame, “[t]here is no indication . . . that [plaintiff] has

sought to serve Defendant Pollard or that [he] ever received

notice of this action.” Id. at 3:7-8. Even though

defendant’s response does not explicitly mention prejudice,

that is the obvious implication of this statute of limitations

argument. 

Under the particular circumstances of this case, the court

agrees that prejudice would arise if the court were to vacate

the judgment. That is because “[s]tatutes of limitation have

as one purpose allowing a defendant relief from being forced to

litigate stale claims.” Sayago v. Jiminez, 2011 WL 5914279, at

*5 (D.Or. Nov. 3, 2011), adopted by Sayago v. Jiminez, 2011 WL

5914266 (D.Or. Nov. 23, 2011). “Setting aside a judgment

dismissing a claim that is past the statute of limitations for

failure to prosecute the claim takes this protection from the

defendant. This can be prejudice to the defendant.” Id.;

accord Murray v. Walgreen Co., 2011 WL 4089588, at *2 (D.N.J.

Aug. 24, 2011) (“[i]n light of the Supreme Court’s directive

[in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S.

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3 The court is fully aware that in Sayago, Laurino and Murray, the

prejudice discussion was in the context of the four factors which inform

the excusable neglect analysis, as opposed to determining the timeliness of

a Rule 60(b)(1) motion in the first place. That distinction does not

render those cases any less instructive, however, on the issue of prejudice

herein. 

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618, 630, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (internal

quotations and citations omitted), superseded by statute on

other grounds in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)] to heed the policy

determinations implicit in statutes of limitations,” finding

“as a result, . . . that Defendant would suffer prejudice by

being forced to defend stale claims”) , aff’d without pub’d

opinion, 470 Fed. Appx. 97 (3rd Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff McPhatter has never claimed that he was

unaware of any of the court’s orders, directing him to timely

complete and return defendant Pollard’s service packet. 

Similarly, he has never claimed that he was unaware of the

order of dismissal and entry of judgment against him. 

Indeed, he must have been aware of it at some point, as he

filed this motion to vacate. Thus, “[a]ny loss of [his] 

ability to vindicate [his] claims is thus due to [his]

failure to proceed in a timely manner[,]” and his failure to

comply with this court’s orders. See Sayago, 2011 5914279,

at *5. Therefore, “a presumption of prejudice arises where,

as here, the party seeking relief has not explained [its]

failure to prosecute.” Id. (citing Laurino v. Syringa Gen.

Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002)).3 “Plaintiff still

has not offered an explanation regarding [his] delay in

prosecution[;]” nor, as just discussed has he offered any

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4 Having found that plaintiff’s motion is untimely, the court need

not address defendant Ryan’s motion that plaintiff failed to establish

excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). Cf. Williams, 287 B.R. at 794 n. 14

(not reaching the issue of excusable neglect “[b]ecause the bankruptcy

court did not abuse its discretion” in denying creditor’s Rule 60(b)(1)

motion as untimely). 

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explanation for his delay in filing the present motion. See

id. Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that the

prejudice factor also weighs in favor of a finding that

plaintiff’s motion is untimely. 

In sum, based upon the totality of the circumstances, as

gleaned from plaintiff’s motion, defendant Ryan’s response,

and the entire record, and after applying the Ashford

factors, the court finds that plaintiff’s motion to vacate

was not made within a “reasonable time,” as Rule 60(c)(1)

requires, and so denies it.4

Conclusion

For the above discussed reasons, the court hereby ORDERS

that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Reconsider” (Doc. 14) is DENIED.

DATED this 4th day of February, 2013.

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Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

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