Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01511/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01511-32/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Anti-trust

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE ABBOTT LABORATORIES NORVIR

ANTI-TRUST LITIGATION

 /

No. C 04-1511 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

ABBOTT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION OF PATENT

INVALIDITY

Defendant Abbott Laboratories moves for summary judgment on

all of the claims against it. Plaintiffs John Doe and Service

Employees International Union Health and Welfare Fund oppose

Abbott’s motion and cross move for summary adjudication that

Abbott’s patents do not provide a defense to antitrust liability. 

The matter was heard on May 1, 2008. Having considered oral

argument and all of the papers submitted by the parties, the Court

grants Abbott’s motion for summary judgment in part and grants

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication.

BACKGROUND

Protease inhibitors (PIs) are considered the most potent class

of drugs to combat the HIV virus. In 1996, Abbott introduced

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Norvir as a stand-alone PI with a daily recommended dose of 1,200

milligrams (twelve 100-mg capsules a day), priced at approximately

eighteen dollars per day. Norvir is the brand name for a patented

compound called ritonavir. 

After Norvir’s release, it was discovered that, when used in

small quantities with another PI, Norvir would “boost” the antiviral properties of that PI. Not only did a small dose of Norvir

-- about 100 to 400 milligrams per day -- make other PIs more

effective and decrease the side effects associated with high doses,

but it also slowed the rate at which HIV developed resistance to

the effects of those PIs. The use of Norvir as a “booster” has

enabled HIV patients to live longer. But the use of Norvir as a

booster, and not a stand-alone PI, has also meant that the average

daily price of Norvir has plummeted since Norvir was first

introduced, because patients need a much smaller daily dose of

Norvir when it is used as a booster compared to when it is used as

a stand-alone PI. By 2003, the average price for a daily dose of

Norvir was $1.71.

In 2000, Abbott introduced Kaletra, a single pill containing

the PI lopinavir as well as ritonavir, which is used to boost the

effects of lopinavir. Although effective and widely used, Kaletra

causes some patients to experience significant side effects.

In 2003, two new PIs, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Reyataz and

GlaxoSmithKline’s Lexiva, were about to be introduced to the

market. Studies showed that, when boosted with Norvir, the new PIs

were as effective as Kaletra, and were more convenient. In July,

2003, Reyataz was successfully introduced to the market. As a

result, Kaletra’s market share fell more than Abbott had

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anticipated. The average daily dose of Norvir also fell. Before

Reyataz’s release, the most common boosting dose of Norvir ranged

from 200 milligrams to 400 milligrams a day. Clinical trials,

however, showed that a Norvir dose of only 100 milligrams a day

effectively boosted Reyataz.

On December 3, 2003, Abbott raised the wholesale price of

Norvir by 400 percent while keeping the price of Kaletra constant. 

Abbott contends that it did this so that the price of Norvir would

be more in line with the drug’s enormous clinical value. 

Plaintiffs contend that the Norvir price increase was an illegal

attempt to achieve an anti-competitive purpose in the “boosted

market,” which Plaintiffs define as the market for those PIs, such

as Reyataz, Lexiva and Kaletra, that are prescribed for use with

Norvir as a booster. Plaintiffs sued for, among other things,

monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or

other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg,

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815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods: 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

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produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id. Once it

has done so, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts

controverting the moving party’s prima facie case. UA Local 343,

48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party’s “burden of contradicting

[the moving party’s] evidence is not negligible.” Id. This

standard does not change merely because resolution of the relevant

issue is “highly fact specific.” Id.

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DISCUSSION

I. Sherman Act Claims

A monopolization claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act

requires a plaintiff to prove “(1) possession of monopoly power in

the relevant market, (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that

power, and (3) causal ‘antitrust injury.’” Rutman Wine Co. v.

E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 736 (9th Cir. 1987). An

attempted monopolization claim requires “(1) specific intent to

control prices or destroy competition in the relevant market,

(2) predatory or anti-competitive conduct directed to accomplishing

the unlawful purpose, and (3) a dangerous probability of success.” 

Id. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the requirements of both

claims are similar, “differing primarily in the requisite intent

and the necessary level of monopoly power.” Image Technical

Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.

1997). Abbott argues that Plaintiffs have failed to make a showing

that there is a triable issue of fact with respect to any of the

elements of a Sherman Act claim.

A. Antitrust Injury

Abbott argues that Plaintiffs have failed to show that they

have suffered an antitrust injury. The Court has rejected this

argument in at least two previous orders. In ruling on Abbott’s

motion to dismiss, the Court found that, because Plaintiffs have

been forced into a “Hobson’s choice” of either “paying more for

competing boosted regimens versus paying less for Defendant’s

Kaletra while accepting the drug’s harmful side effects,”

Plaintiffs have stated an antitrust injury similar to the one

identified by the Supreme Court in Blue Shield of Virginia v.

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McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). Docket No. 63 at 8-9. In the

Court’s order denying Abbott’s previous motion for summary

judgment, it found that Plaintiffs’ expert’s finding that

“Defendant’s price increase harms HIV patients by creating another

barrier to entry that hinders the introduction of new PIs from

Defendant’s competitors” also created a dispute of fact as to

whether Plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust injury. Docket No.

256 at 12.

Abbott argues that, since the Court’s previous rulings on the

matter, Plaintiffs’ expert has admitted that there is no

evidentiary support for his assertion that potential competitors

may have been excluded from the market. Specifically, Plaintiff’s

expert stated in his rebuttal report, “I do not think it is

possible to prove that innovation would actually fall due to the

price increase, and I did not pretend to offer any such proof.” 

Hurst Dec. (Docket No. 440) Ex. I ¶ 103.

Abbott is incorrect in suggesting that Plaintiffs must offer

direct proof that competitors have actually been excluded from the

market. Doing so would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 

A jury could infer from the disparity between the price of

ritonavir when it is sold as a component of Kaletra and when it is

sold independently as Norvir that Abbott has hindered competition

in the boosted market. This would injure consumers in that market.

In addition, there is no basis for revisiting the Court’s

decision that the Hobson’s choice consumers face could itself

constitute an antitrust injury. Abbott is incorrect in suggesting

that Plaintiffs must come forward with a patient who wanted to

purchase a drug that competes with Kaletra but could not afford to

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do so. It is the “penalty” consumers pay, in the form of a

disparately high price for Norvir when they choose to use one of

the competing drugs, that gives rise to the injury. Cf. McCready,

457 U.S. 465 (where health plan reimbursed its members for

psychotherapy treatment administered by psychiatrists but not

psychologists, member who chose to forgo reimbursement and receive

treatment from psychologist had suffered antitrust injury). And

although Abbott maintains that requiring patients to pay a high

price for a patented drug can never be an antitrust injury, the

price of Norvir cannot be considered in a vacuum. It is the

comparatively high price of Norvir in relation to the low price of

Kaletra that is the crux of Abbott’s alleged anticompetitive

conduct.

B. Monopoly Power

Abbott argues that Plaintiffs have not come forward with

evidence showing that it has monopoly power over the boosted

market. Such evidence can be either direct or circumstantial.

1. Direct Evidence

In the Court’s previous order denying Abbott’s motion for

summary judgment, it found that Plaintiffs had presented direct

evidence that Abbott’s price increase had a significant impact on

the boosted market. Specifically, the Court stated:

One of Defendant’s competitors in the boosted market,

GlaxoSmithKline, the maker of Lexiva, believed that

Lexiva’s failure to meet forecasted expectations was due,

in part, to the Norvir price hike. Professor Douglas F.

Greer, Plaintiffs’ expert, notes that, in the absence of

the price hike, Defendant anticipated that Kaletra’s

market share would decline by ten percent in 2004. But,

according to Professor Greer, following the price

increase in December, 2003, sales of Kaletra essentially

remained stable. Furthermore, Defendant’s documents show

that it knew that raising Norvir’s price could result in

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formularies restricting access to Norvir and a potential

increase in Kaletra’s market share. As a result of

increasing the price of Norvir, Defendant believed that

at least one of its competitors in the boosted market

“will need to give away significant rebates to be cost

neutral to Kaletra.”

Docket No. 256 at 7-8.

Abbott argues, as it has argued before, that this is not

direct evidence of market power. It maintains that direct evidence

must take the form of evidence of restricted output and consequent

supracompetitive prices. However, Abbott does not point to any new

facts or law which would support a motion for reconsideration. 

Moreover, Abbott has not cited any case holding that restricted

output and supracompetitive prices are the only form direct

evidence may take. In Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit noted, “One

type of proof [of monopoly power] is direct evidence of the

injurious exercise of market power. If the plaintiff puts forth

evidence of restricted output and supracompetitive prices, that is

direct proof of the injury to competition which a competitor with

market power may inflict, and thus, of the actual exercise of

market power.” While this passage indicates that evidence of

restricted output and supracompetitive prices is sufficient to

demonstrate the injurious exercise of market power, it does not

suggest that such evidence is necessary to make such a showing. 

Rebel Oil involved predatory pricing of a commodity. The concepts

of restricted output and supracompetitive prices (i.e., prices

higher than marginal cost) have little application to the boosted

market, where each PI has only one manufacturer and prices are

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In contrast, if a producer of a single drug for which there

was more than one manufacturer had market power, supracompetitive

prices could be expected to follow the monopolist’s decision to

restrict output.

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Circumstantial evidence, in turn, demonstrates only that a

defendant has the potential to inflict injury to competition.

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expected to be significantly above marginal cost.1

The defining characteristic of direct evidence is that it

demonstrates actual injury to competition.2 While the Court

expresses no opinion as to the strength of the evidence described

above, that evidence could support a jury finding that Abbott

harmed competition in the boosted PI market by manipulating the

price of Norvir. Accordingly, it constitutes direct evidence of

monopoly power.

2. Circumstantial Evidence

To demonstrate monopoly power by circumstantial evidence, a

plaintiff must “(1) define the relevant market, (2) show that the

defendant owns a dominant share of that market, and (3) show that

there are significant barriers to entry.” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at

1434. To establish a prima facie case of market power, courts

generally require a sixty-five percent market share. See, e.g.,

Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1206.

The parties dispute what Abbott’s share of the boosted market

is. Abbott claims that Plaintiffs’ expert’s method of calculating

its market share is flawed. Specifically, it claims that the

expert, Dr. Greer, both improperly counts prescriptions of Norvir

as representing a share of the boosted market and improperly counts

each prescription of Kaletra as representing two prescriptions in

the boosted market.

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In the Court’s previous decision denying Abbott’s motion for

summary judgment, it found that there are triable issues of fact

with respect to which party’s method of calculating market share is

appropriate. Abbott has not pointed to any new facts or law which

would support a motion for reconsideration of that decision.

C. Anticompetitive Conduct

In its decision denying Abbott’s motions to dismiss the

recently filed related cases, Nos. 07-5985, 07-6010, 07-6118, 07-

5470, 07-5702 and 07-6120, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit’s

recently developed test for identifying potentially exclusionary

pricing in the context of bundled discounts, as set out in Cascade

Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008), does

not apply in the context of the particular antitrust theory

asserted against Abbott. As a result, the Court found that the

plaintiffs in the related cases need not demonstrate that the

imputed price of the lopinavir portion of Kaletra is below Abbott’s

average variable cost of producing it. The Court incorporates that

decision by reference and adheres to its conclusions for the

reasons stated therein.

D. Patent Immunity

Abbott argues that its patents give it the right to a monopoly

in the market for boosted PIs, and therefore it cannot be held

liable for violating the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs dispute this

assertion on a number of grounds, arguing generally that the

patents are invalid and do not grant Abbott the exclusionary rights

it asserts over the boosted market.

Although Abbott maintains that its patents contain “dozens of

applicable claims” that “cover the boosted market,” it relies on

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only two representative claims in its papers. The first is Claim 9

of U.S. Patent No. 6,037,157 (the ‘157 patent), which states:

A method for increasing human blood levels of a drug

which is metabolized by cytochrome P450 monooxygenase

comprising administering to a human in need of such

treatment a therapeutically effective amount of a

combination of said drug or a pharmaceutically acceptable

salt thereof and ritonavir or a pharmaceutically

acceptable salt thereof.

Hurst Dec. Ex. M at col. 14.

The second claim on which Abbott relies is Claim 22 of U.S.

Patent No. 6,703,403 (the ‘403 patent), which is dependant on Claim

21 of the same patent. Claim 21 states:

A method for improving the pharmacokinetics of a drug

which is metabolized by cytochrome P450 monooxygenase

comprising administering to a human in need of such

treatment an amount effective to inhibit cytochrome P450

monooxygenase of ritonavir or a pharmaceutically

acceptable salt thereof.

Hurst Dec. Ex. K at col. 12. Claim 22 states, “The method of claim

21 wherein the drug which is metabolized by cytochrome P450

monooxygenase is an HIV protease inhibitor.” Id.

Claim 21 of the ‘403 patent is similar in scope to Claim 9 of

the ‘157 patent. The two primary differences are largely semantic:

The preamble of Claim 9 refers to a method for “increasing human

blood levels” of a drug metabolized by cytochrome P450

monooxygenase, whereas Claim 21 refers to a method for “improving

the pharmacokinetics” of such a drug. But under Abbott’s

undisputed proposed claim construction, improving the

pharmacokinetics of a drug is tantamount to increasing its blood

levels. See Hurst Dec. Ex. T at 5. And while Claim 9 refers to

administering ritonavir in combination with another drug whereas

Claim 21 refers simply to administering ritonavir, it is clear that

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Claim 21’s method of improving the pharmacokinetics of another drug

would be effective only if the individual to whom ritonavir was

administered was also taking the other drug.

Plaintiffs argue that these claims are invalid because they

are anticipated by, among others, U.S. Patent No. 5,674,882 (the

‘882 patent). This patent claims, “A method of inhibiting an HIV

infection comprising administering to a human in need thereof a

therapeutically effective amount of [Norvir] or a pharmaceutically

acceptable salt thereof in combination with a therapeutically

effective amount of another HIV protease inhibiting compound.” 

Wiebe Dec. of 2/10/06 (Docket No. 187) Ex. M at col. 112.

The parties appear to agree that, when written, this claim

contemplated administering Norvir as part of a “cocktail” of PIs,

not specifically as a boosting agent. However, any time Norvir is

administered with another PI that is metabolized by cytochrome P450

monooxygenase, it will necessarily have the effect of boosting that

PI; this is what makes Norvir particularly effective when

administered as part of a PI regimen. “[T]he discovery of a

previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition, or of

a scientific explanation for the prior art’s functioning, does not

render the old composition patentably new to the discoverer.” 

Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir.

1999). The claims of the ‘157 and ‘403 patent attempt to patent a

result -- boosting -- that was an inherent function of the prior

art’s teaching of combining Norvir with other PIs. Because someone

practicing the prior art by taking Norvir with a PI metabolized by

cytochrome P450 monooxygenase would necessarily infringe the new

claims, those claims are invalid as anticipated. Id. at 1346

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(“[I]f granting patent protection on the disputed claim would allow

the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior art,

then that claim is anticipated, regardless of whether it also

covers subject matter not in the prior art.”).

Abbott argues that the asserted claims are not invalid because

they include a limitation not found in the ‘882 patent: they

encompass only the administration of ritonavir with the intent to

improve the pharmacokinetics or increase the blood levels of

another PI. Abbott relies primarily on Jansen v. Rexall Sundown,

Inc., 342 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) in support of this argument. 

In that case, the court addressed a claim stating:

A method of treating or preventing macrocyticmegaloblastic anemia in humans which anemia is caused by

either folic acid deficiency or by vitamin B12 deficiency

which comprises administering a daily oral dosage of a

vitamin preparation to a human in need thereof comprising

at least about 0.5 mg. of vitamin B12 and at least about

0.5 mg. of folic acid.

Id. at 1330 (emphasis in Jansen). The plaintiff in Jansen sued the

producer of an over-the-counter dietary supplement containing both

vitamin B12 and folic acid within the claimed ranges, charging the

defendant with inducement of and contributory infringement of the

above claim.

In construing the claim, the Federal Circuit addressed the

issue of whether “a human must know that he is in need of either

treatment or prevention” of macrocytic-megaloblastic anemia in

order to infringe the claim. Id. at 1333. The court noted that

“the claim preamble sets forth the objective of the method, and the

body of the claim directs that the method be performed on someone

‘in need.’” Id. The court found that

the claim[‘s] recitation of a patient or a human “in

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need” gives life and meaning to the preamble[‘s]

statement of purpose. The preamble is therefore not

merely a statement of effect that may or may not be

desired or appreciated. Rather, it is a statement of the

intentional purpose for which the method must be

performed.”

Id.

The court also looked at the prosecution history of the

plaintiff’s patent. It noted that the plaintiff added the

modifier, “macrocytic-megaloblastic” to the word, “anemia” and

added the phrase, “to a human in need thereof” to render the claims

not obvious in light of prior art, which taught administration of

both folic acid and vitamin B12 alone to treat anemia generally. 

See id. at 1330-31. This bolstered the court’s conclusion that

“administering the claimed vitamins in the claimed doses for some

purpose other than treating or preventing macrocytic-megaloblastic

anemia is not practicing the claimed method, because Jansen limited

his claims to treatment or prevention of that particular condition

in those who need such treatment or prevention.” Id. at 1334. The

court thus rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “those who do not

affirmatively know that they do not need to take steps to prevent

or treat macrocytic-megaloblastic anemia are still ‘in need

thereof.’” Id.

Although there are similarities between the claims in this

case and the claims at issue in Jansen, the court’s construction of

the claims in that case was informed by the specific facts and

history surrounding them. The case did not purport to change the

general rule for assigning meaning to a claim’s preamble:

[A] preamble limits the invention if it recites essential

structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life,

meaning, and vitality to the claim. Conversely, a

preamble is not limiting where a patentee defines a

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structurally complete invention in the claim body and

uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use

for the invention.

Catalina Mktg. Int’l Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801,

808 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

In Jansen, the preamble language was construed as a limitation

because it disclosed a specific theretofore unknown use for taking

a combination of folic acid and vitamin B12 -- namely, the

prevention and treatment of macrocytic-megaloblastic anemia. The

preamble gave “life and meaning” to the claim because without it,

the patent would simply recite a method that was already being

practiced. Here, the preamble does not disclose a new use for the

prior art, i.e., taking Norvir with a PI that is metabolized by

cytochrome P450 monooxygenase. The use in both cases is to treat

HIV. The preamble simply expresses one of the necessary results of

practicing the existing method. Abbott cannot patent the practice

of prior art by framing a necessary result of that practice as a

claim-limiting purpose. “Newly discovered results of known

processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because

such results are inherent.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue

Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he claimed

process here is not directed to a new use,” no matter how it is

styled; “it is the same use” -- here, the inhibition of HIV

infection -- “and it consists of the same steps.” Id.

Accordingly, the claims on which Abbott relies for its patent

immunity defense are anticipated by the ‘882 patent and are

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3Having concluded that the claims are invalid, the Court need

not address the merits of Plaintiffs’ other arguments concerning

Abbott’s patent defense.

4

While Abbott sometimes refers to Plaintiffs’ state law claims

generally, Abbott’s Illinois Brick argument does not specifically

address Plaintiffs’ claim under California’s Business and

Professions Code § 17200 et seq.

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invalid.3

II. Unjust Enrichment Claim

In addition to Sherman Act claims for monopolization and

attempted monopolization, Plaintiffs assert state law claims for

fraudulent, unfair and deceptive business practices in violation of

California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. and for

unjust enrichment.

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), bars

indirect purchasers from recovering damages for violations of

federal antitrust law. Abbott argues that a plaintiff may not

avoid this holding by seeking restitution under the common law of

unjust enrichment where the underlying claim is premised on a

violation of federal antitrust law.4 While there is no controlling

case directly on point, Abbott cites two cases from federal

district courts supporting its view. See In re New Motor Vehicles

Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 211 (D. Me.

2004) (“Certainly no restitutionary remedy can escape the

limitations the United States Supreme Court imposed on federal

antitrust recovery in Illinois Brick, and the plaintiffs do not

argue that it can. Therefore, as indirect purchasers, the

plaintiffs may not use state common law restitution to recover

money from the defendants for violation of the federal antitrust

laws.”); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 160 F.

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Plaintiffs appear to concede this point and have not

articulated an alternate theory of liability.

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Supp. 2d 1365, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (finding that allowing

indirect purchasers to obtain restitution or a constructive trust

under state common law would enable them to do “an end run around

the policies” articulated in Illinois Brick).

The cases Plaintiffs cite in refuting Abbott’s argument do not

address the relevant legal issue. Rather, they address whether the

plaintiffs in those cases had stated unjust enrichment claims

independent of their antitrust claims. See In re Cardizem CD

Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 668-71 (E.D. Mich. 2000); In

re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 2d 517, 543-46 (D.N.J.

2004). And although Plaintiffs maintain that Abbott is attempting

to rehash an argument that was rejected by the Court in granting

class certification, the Court’s order did not address the specific

legal issue Abbott raises. Rather, the Court dealt only with

whether Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims were amenable to

adjudication in a class action. See Docket No. 345 at 16-20.

The Court agrees with the approach taken in In re New Motor

Vehicles and In re Terazosin Hydrochloride and finds that, because

Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim appears to be premised wholly

on Abbott’s alleged violation of federal antitrust law,5

 Illinois

Brick bars them from obtaining restitution based on those claims.

III. Interlocutory Appeal and Continuance

Abbott asks the Court to certify the following question for

interlocutory appeal:

Whether this case warrants an exception from the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Cascade Health Solutions v.

PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008), which held

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If Abbott wishes to move for an interlocutory appeal in the

related cases, it should file a motion in those cases so that those

plaintiffs will have an opportunity to respond.

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that the Supreme “Court’s opinions strongly suggest that,

in the normal case, above-cost pricing will not be

considered exclusionary conduct for antitrust purposes,”

id. at 912, and “the appropriate measure of costs [in

this context] is average variable cost . . .” id. at 920.

Docket No. 491 at 4.

Although the Court will entertain the possibility of Abbott

pursuing an interlocutory appeal in the related cases, which were

filed recently and are still in the preliminary stages of

discovery,6 the present case is scheduled for a relatively short

trial in approximately three months. At this late stage in the

proceedings, even if an interlocutory appeal were ultimately

granted, it would save a relatively small amount of the parties’

resources. In addition, this case has been pending for more than

four years, and waiting for the result of an interlocutory appeal

would unjustifiably delay trial.

Abbott also seeks a continuance to allow it to conduct

supplemental fact and expert discovery in light of the Court’s

decision that Cascade’s below-cost pricing rule does not apply

here. But as explained in an earlier order, see Docket No. 492,

the need for additional discovery is premised on Abbott’s mistaken

view that the Court has established a new test for identifying

exclusionary pricing. The Court’s decision that Cascade does not

apply maintained the status quo. There is no reason to permit

additional discovery on matters that have been relevant all along.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Abbott’s motion

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The Court DENIES Abbott’s request to file supplemental

material in support of its motion for summary judgment (Docket No.

495). The material is not necessary to the Court’s decision.

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for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims (Docket No.

445).7 Those claims will proceed to trial. The Court GRANTS

Abbott’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ unjust

enrichment claim. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

adjudication on Abbott’s defense of patent immunity (Docket No.

460).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/16/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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