Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08074/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Todd Tracy,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 19-08074-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On March 14, 2019, Petitioner Todd Tracy, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison, Aspen Mental Health Unit, Phoenix, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (hereinafter “habeas

petition”). (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed an Answer on October 17, 2019. (Doc. 13.) Petitioner

has filed a Reply. (Doc. 16.)

BACKGROUND

On October 11, 2012, Petitioner was indicted by a State of Arizona, Mohave County

Grand Jury on two felony counts of aggravated assault, and three felony counts of hindering

prosecution (hindering the prosecution of murder). (Doc. 13, Exh. A.) Petitioner went to

trial, and the evidence presented that resulted in his conviction was summarized by the

Arizona Court of Appeals on direct appeal:

Tracy was indicted on two counts of aggravated assault and three counts

of hindering prosecution of a murder. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light

most favorable to sustaining the convictions, demonstrated that Tracy, his son

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Jade, and a friend of Jade’s [Eric] beat up M.C., who had been staying in

Tracy’s back bedroom, after Tracy’s girlfriend complained that M.C. was

being rude and making suggestive remarks to her. Tracy and Jade then loaded

M.C. into the bed of Tracy’s pickup. Jade drove a few blocks and then braked

sharply, ejecting M.C. from the back of the truck, along with a tool box, which

Jade retrieved. When Jade returned home, he said that he had run over M.C.

After M.C. was discovered lying in the road, he was flown to a hospital

in Las Vegas, where he died shortly afterward. The cause of death was blunt

force trauma; the medical examiner testified M.C. likely would have died from

the beating, even if he had not been ejected from the truck.

The day after Jade left M.C. in the road, Tracy told his son to clean up

the back bedroom and throw away M.C.’s belongings. The next day, Tracy

drove the truck to a friend’s house in Golden Valley and left it there. Tracy

then drove Jade to another friend’s house in Kingman so he could hide out and

avoid arrest.

Tracy testified that he did not participate in the beating. Tracy admitted

that he had told Cole to clean up the back bedroom, but testified he did so to

protect his eight-year-old daughter, who was not at home during the fight. He

testified he drove the truck to Golden Valley in part because he had received

notice that he would be fined $500 if he did not move the unlicensed truck

from his property. He testified he helped Jane hide from police after finding

out M.C. had died.

(Doc. 13, Exh. V.)

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of lesser-included misdemeanor assault, and

all three charged counts of hindering prosecution. (Doc. 13, Exh. P.) The trial court

subsequently sentenced Petitioner to concurrent 150-day sentences on the misdemeanor

assault convictions, and 2.5 years-imprisonment on the hindering prosecution convictions,

to be served consecutively. (Id., Exh. P.) 

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences, raising the following issues: (1)

the trial court abused its discretion in its determination that Petitioner’s statements to police

were voluntary; (2) Petitioner’s right to due process was infringed by the trial court’s faulty

jury instructions; and (3) Petitioner’s right to due process was infringed by virtue of jury

irregularities. (Doc. 13, Exh. S.) The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims

on the merits, and issued its mandate on February 23, 2017. (Id., Exhs. V, W.) 

While Petitioner’s appeal was pending, he initiated post-conviction proceedings

(“PCR”) in state court by filing a Notice of PCR. (Doc. 13, Exh. X.) The trial court

appointed counsel who, on February 22, 2017, filed a PCR petition claiming that Petitioner’s

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trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the trial court’s decision, during jury

deliberations, to reduce the number of jurors from 12 to 8. (Id., Exh. CC.) Petitioner

asserted that trial counsel should have argued that the actions of the trial court could have had

a coercive affect on the jury, and should have asked for an instruction that the newly

constituted jury begin their deliberations anew. (Id.) 

The trial court denied relief, reasoning that the Arizona Court of Appeals conducted

a fundamental error review on the same issues, and found that not only was there no

fundamental error, but that there was “no error at all.” (Doc. 13, Exh. GG.) Thus, there

could not be ineffective assistance of trial counsel on issues “decided against Defendant” on

appeal. (Id.) On May 16, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review of the trial

court’s decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. JJ.) In his petition he asserted that

(1) his confession was coerced, (2) a faulty jury instruction, (3) jury irregularities, and (4)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object to jury irregularities. (Id.)

On January 25, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals accepted review, but summarily

denied relief, finding that “petitioner has not established an abuse of discretion.” (Doc. 13,

Exh. KK.) The appellate court issued its Mandate on March 12, 2018. (Id., Exh. LL.)

Petitioner initiated successive PCR proceedings on June 18, 2018, raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and asserting that the trial court erred in

imposing consecutive sentences. (Id., Exhs. NN, OO.) The trial court dismissed the PCR

petition July 17, 2018, as untimely, as Petitioner had “missed the deadline” to file a

supplemental PCR notice “pursuant to Rule 32.4(a)(2)(D) by 453 days.” (Id., Exh. QQ.)

On March 9, 2019, Petitioner placed his habeas petition in the U.S. mail for mailing

to the Court. (Doc. 1-1.) The petition was received and filed with the Court on March 14,

2019. (Id.) In his petition, Petitioner advances four grounds for relief: (1) the trial court

abused its discretion in finding that his statements to police were voluntary in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, (2) the trial court denied Petitioner’s right

to due process by failing to give a lesser-included instruction in violation of his Sixth

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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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Amendment rights, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in regards to the jury

irregularities in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1.)

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Timeliness under the AEDPA1

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 The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

“[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state

petition that is not filed, however, within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed”

and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is]

the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

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2

 Respondents filed a copy of the Mandate with their Response, but do not address its

effect on the timeliness calculation, and assert that PCR proceedings were no longer pending

when the Court of Appeals denied relief. This Court includes the time between the appellate

court’s denial of relief and the mandate in the statutory tolling period. See, Wells v. Ryan,

No. CV-14-02048-PHX-JJT (BSB); 2015 WL 9918159 *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2015) (listing

numerous cases that have held that when appellate court grants review, then denies relief,

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A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state court, but

before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th

Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds sub nom; Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). In

Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed

even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“Petitioners are not entitled to statutory tolling between rounds of state [post-conviction]

petitions.”).

A post-conviction proceeding initiated after the statute of limitations has already run

does not re-start the limitations period. See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.

2003); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

A. Statutory Tolling.

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely and should be

dismissed. (Doc. 13.) Petitioner’s conviction became final 30 days after the Arizona Court

of Appeals decided his direct appeal on January 5, 2017. Because Petitioner initiated his PCR

proceedings prior to this date, all of the time period during which his properly-filed PCR

petition was pending is tolled under the AEDPA. Petitioner’s PCR proceedings were no

longer pending when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate on March 12, 2018.2

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AEDPA tolling period expires on issuance of the mandate). 

3

“Because [Petitioner] failed to file his habeas petition until March 14, 2019, it is

untimely by 48 days.” (Doc. 13 at 8.)

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Thus, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on March 13, 2018, and expired one year

later on March 12, 2019. Petitioner’s successive PCR proceedings did not toll the running of

the statute of limitations period as the trial court dismissed the proceedings on procedural

grounds. 

Respondents assert that the limitations period ran until the date Petitioner’s habeas

petition was filed with the court on March 14, 2019,3

 but Petitioner placed his habeas petition

in the mail for filing on March 9, 2019. (Doc. 1-1). See, Huizar v. Cary, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223

(9th Cir. 2001) (applying “prison mailbox rule” in construing filing date). Thus, contrary to

Respondents’ assertion, Petitioner’s habeas petition is timely by three days. As it is

undisputed that Petitioner’s habeas claims were properly presented in state court proceedings,

this Court will conduct a merits review.

AEDPA MERITS REVIEW

Pursuant to the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to

“any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102

(2011). It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which

demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When

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applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a

state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or

(2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends

or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is

objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

A state court’s factual determination “will not be overturned [] unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state-court proceedings.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing § 2254(d)(2)). Even if “[r]easonable minds

reviewing the record might disagree” about the credibility findings, “on habeas review that

does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s credibility determination.” Rice v. Collins, 546

U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006). To find a factual determination is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2),

the court must be “convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of

appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.”

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The reviewing court “must be

satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect was pointed out would be unreasonable

in holding that the state court’s fact-finding was adequate.” Id.

If the last reasoned decision by the state court adopts or substantially incorporates the

reasoning from a previous state court decision, a habeas court may consider both decisions

to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1136

(9th Cir. 2007). 

A claim that a petitioner’s confession was coerced involves mixed questions of law and

fact under the AEDPA standard of review. The ultimate conclusion of a state court that a

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confession was voluntary constitutes a legal issue that requires an independent federal

determination. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985). The factual findings underlying

the state court’s conclusion on the mixed issue are accorded a presumption of correctness.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Voluntariness of Confession.

The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee

that “no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”

requires that a confession must be voluntary to be admissible. Bram v. United States, 168

U.S. 532 (1897). The Supreme Court subsequently incorporated the 5th Amendment’s

protections into the 14th Amendment’s Due Process guarantee, making Bram’s voluntariness

requirement directly applicable to the States. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

Evaluation of the voluntariness of a confession requires consideration of the “‘totality

of all the circumstances – both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the

interrogation.’” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (citation omitted). The

question to be asked is “‘whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he

confessed.’” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (citation omitted). “‘In short,

the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without

compulsion or inducement of any sort.’” Id. The court must examine “the factual

circumstances surrounding the confession, assess [] the psychological impact on the accused,

and evaluate [] the legal significance of how the accused reacted.” Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (citation omitted). Although the federal court normally

gives deference to state court factual findings, the “ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal

question requiring an independent factual determination.” Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S.

279, 287 (1991) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

Confessions have been held involuntary by the Supreme Court when it appeared they

were the direct result of violence or simply the implied threat of physical harm. See Brown

v. Mississippi, 197 U.S. 278 (1936); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Fulminate,

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499 U.S. 279. In Spano, a confession was found to be coerced where police instructed a friend

of the accused to falsely state that Petitioner’s telephone call had gotten him into trouble, that

his job was in jeopardy and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his

wife and his unborn child. Spano, 350 U.S. at 323.

Petitioner presented this issue on direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

affirmed the trial court’s finding that Petitioner’s statements to law enforcement were

voluntary, reasoning as follows:

Tracy argues that the court abused its discretion in finding that his

statements to police were voluntary, because his statements were induced by

threats and promises. At a voluntariness hearing conducted the second day of

trial, Detective Brandon Grasse testified that Tracy waived his Miranda[] rights

and spoke to him during three separate recorded interviews. Detective Grasse

testified that he did not make any threats or promises, and that Tracy was

deceptive in all three interviews. After the third interview, Tracy called

Detective Grasse and told him he had taken a lot of narcotics on the night in

question and did not remember anything, and that M.C. had been beaten up

before coming to Tracy’s residence; that interview was not recorded. The court

found the statements voluntary.

The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

that a statement was voluntary. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 164, 800

P.2d 1260, 1272 (1990). In evaluating voluntariness, the court must “look to

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and decide whether

the will of the defendant has been overborne.” State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131,

137, 847 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1992). We will not find a statement involuntary

unless there exists “both coercive police behavior and a causal relation between

the coercive behavior and the defendant’s overborne will.” State v. Boggs, 218

Ariz. 325, 336, ¶ 44, 185 P.3d 111, 122 (2008). We review the trial court’s

ruling admitting defendant’s statements for abuse of discretion, based on the

evidence presented at the voluntariness hearing, viewed in the light most

favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116,

126 ¶ 25, 140 P.3d 899, 909 (2006).

The record fails to reflect that any of the statements made by the

interrogating officers resulted in Tracy’s will being overborne. Although one

of the officers warned Tracy during the first interview that if he wanted to see

his daughter again, he needed to start telling the truth, and that she hoped he

had kissed his daughter goodbye that day, these remarks had no discernible

effect on Tracy or his responses to the officers’ questions. And it was Tracy

who offered midway through the second interview to tell the officers where

Jade was, and then asked if they would drop the charges against him or reduce

them “at least down to where I can be with my daughter tonight?” It was only

after Tracy told the officers that he was going to tell them where Jade was that

one of the officers told Tracy that he could be saving Jade’s life by preventing

Jade from doing “something dumb” and getting shot. The officer then

explained that he was going to charge Tracy with destruction of evidence, but

would allow him to return home that night if the information he provided

enabled them to locate Jane. Finally, it was only after Tracy told them where

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Jade was staying that one of the officers warned him that he would be going to

jail if he sent them on a “wild goose chase.” The record, in short, supports the

trial court’s conclusion that neither threats nor promises caused Tracy’s will to

be overborne, see Boggs, 218 Ariz. At 336, ¶ 44, 185 P.3d at 122, and the court

did not abuse its discretion in finding the statements voluntary.

(Doc. 13, Exh. V.)

The appellate court applied the correct Supreme Court test for evaluating the

voluntariness of a confession, even though it only cited Arizona cases. See Early v. Parker,

537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (under the AEDPA, state courts are not required to cite Supreme Court

precedent; “it does not even require awareness of [such cases], so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts them.”); Garcia v. Carey, 395

F.3d 1099, 1104 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). The appellate court applied clearly established Supreme

Court precedent in evaluating Petitioner’s claim, in finding that the test for voluntariness is

whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s “will was overborne.”

 See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513.

Additionally, the appellate court’s determination of the facts in light of the record

before the court was not unreasonable. As the appellate court noted, the remarks to Petitioner

concerning his daughter had “no discernible effect on Petitioner or his responses.” And, the

comments were made in relation to Petitioner remaining under arrest if he gave the officer’s

inaccurate information regarding the location of a fugitive. The appellate court also noted that

“it was [Petitioner] who offered midway through the second interview to tell the officers

where Jade was,” and then asked if they would drop the charges against him or reduce them

so that he could “be with [his] daughter tonight.” The appellate court concluded that neither

threats nor promises caused Petitioner’s will to be overborne. Based upon a review of the

record, (doc. 13, Exhs. C, D, E), this conclusion was not an unreasonable determination of the

facts presented.

B. Jury Instruction.

Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his due process and Sixth Amendment

rights by refusing to instruct the jury on a purported lesser-included instruction of hindering

the prosecution of a simple assault, as opposed to the prosecution of the crime of murder. As

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a starting point, instruction errors of state law generally do not form the basis for habeas relief.

See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 334 (1993); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)

(failure to provide jury instruction under state law not cognizable in habeas). The habeas

court may only analyze whether an errant instruction “by itself so infected the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991).

In making this determination, “the court must be mindful that a ‘single instruction to a jury

may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall

charge.’” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378 (1990) (citation omitted).

Petitioner argued on appeal that the trial court erred by giving faulty jury instructions,

but the Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning as follows:

Tracy argues that he was denied due process by the Court’s instructions

on hindering prosecution, specifically the court’s failure to provide an

instruction on hindering prosecution in connection with something less than

murder, and its failure to define “extreme indifference” as it related to murder.

A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory which is reasonably supported

by the evidence. State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 487, 733 P.2d 1066, 1070

(1987) (citation omitted). We review the adequacy of jury instructions in their

entirety to determine if they accurately reflect the law. , 199 Ariz. 127, 145 ¶

75, 14 P.3d 997 1015 (2000). We review a trial court’s decision on whether or

not to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. State v. Dann, 220 Ariz.

351, 363-64, ¶ 51, 207 P.3d 604, 616-17 (2009). We review de novo, however,

whether the jury was properly instructed. Id. At 364, ¶ 51, 207 P.3d at 617

(citations omitted).

¶ 11 Section 13-2512 (2010) provides in pertinent part:

A. A person commits hindering prosecution in the first

degree if, with the intent to hinder the apprehension,

prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for any

felony, the person renders assistance to the other person.

B. Hindering prosecution in the first degree is a class 5

felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if ...

1. The person knows or has reason to know that

the offense involves ... murder.

Section 13-2511 (2010) defines the offense of hindering prosecution in

the second degree as hindering prosecution of “any misdemeanor or petty

offense.”

¶ 12 The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tracy’s request for

an instruction on hindering prosecution of a misdemeanor or petty offense

under A.R.S. § 13-2511, and instead instructing that in order to find Tracy

guilty of the charged crimes under A.R.S. § 13-2512, the jury must find that he

intentionally hindered the prosecution of a felony. The evidence demonstrated

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that Tracy intentionally took steps to hinder prosecution of Jade for severely

beating M.C. and then ejecting him from the bed of his pickup truck, causing

his death. An instruction on the lesser-included offense of hindering the

prosecution of a misdemeanor assault accordingly was not supported by the

evidence, and the court did not err in refusing to give it.

¶ 13 Nor did the court abuse its discretion in instructing the jurors for

purposes of determining the class of felony under A.R.S. § 13-2512(B) that if

they found Tracy guilty of hindering prosecution, they were to determine

whether the defendant knew or had reason to know that the offense involved

murder. The evidence, again, supported such instruction. The evidence

demonstrated that Tracy knew that night that M.C. had been severely beaten,

ejected from the truck, and run over. Tracy acknowledged that by the following

day, when he hid the truck and ordered clean-up of the back bedroom, he knew

that M.C. had been hospitalized, and by the day after that, when he drove Jade

to a friend for hiding, that M.C. had died. This evidence demonstrated that at

a minimum, Tracy should have known the night of the beating that M.C. might

die, and thus, that Jade might be charged with murder. The statutory offense

of hindering the prosecution of a felony either involved murder, in which case

it was a class 3 felony, or it did not involve murder, in which case it was a class

5 felony. See A.R.S. § 13-2512(B)(1). The court’s instruction was supported

by the evidence, accurately reflected the law, and was not erroneous.

(Doc. 13, Exh. V.)

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the instructions to the jury were erroneous, much

less that the trial was so infected by an erroneous instruction that his due process rights were

violated. As the appellate court noted, the jury was given the option of finding, and then

found, that Petitioner knew or had reason to know that the offense involved murder. And,

Petitioner’s conviction of a misdemeanor assault, as opposed to the charged aggravated

assaults, bears no relationship to the object of the hindering charge. Evidence was presented,

and was undisputed that the object of the hindering charge was Petitioner’s son Jade, who was

accused of participating in the assault and dumping the body, resulting in the victim’s death.

In the context of the overall charge, the court’s instruction was not erroneous and no due

process violation has been shown. 

C. Jury Irregularities.

Petitioner asserts that his due process and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by

jury irregularities. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees than

in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by

an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” A

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defendant in a criminal case “is entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for which he is

charged carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months.” Blanton v.

Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989). Twelve person juries are not required, and the states

are free to set the number of jurors in criminal proceedings. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,

86, 102-02 (1970). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals, in addressing the issue of jury irregularities raised by

Petitioner, engaged in a lengthy analysis in reaching its conclusion that the trial court had not

erred:

Tracy also argues that he was denied due process because of “jury

irregularities,” specifically the court’s decision to excuse a juror who had

reported she did not understand what was going on, and to reduce the jury to

eight members after the prosecutor stipulated to withdraw allegations that might

result in punishment of thirty years or more.

Tracy’s claim fails, first, because he was not entitled to be tried by any

particular jury, only a fair and impartial jury, and he has made no claim that the

final eight jurors who ultimately convicted him were not fair and impartial. See

State v. Goldston, 133 Ariz. 520, 521, 652 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1982) (citation

omitted). Nor did the court commit constitutional error in reducing the twelvemember jury to an eight-member jury after the state stipulated to withdraw

allegations that might result in punishment of thirty years or more. See State

v. Soliz, 223 Ariz. 116, 119 ¶ 12, 219 P.3d 1045, 1048 (2009).

Tracy suggests that the juror might have been feigning her lack of

understanding because she was a hold-out juror, and the court’s handling of this

issue may have coerced or influenced a verdict. Because defense counsel failed

to raise either of these objections below, we review these issues for

fundamental error only. Henderson, 210 Ariz. At 568 ¶ 22, 115 P.3d at 608.

Tracy has failed to meet his burden to show that the court erred, much less

fundamentally erred to his prejudice in its manner of questioning this juror, and

in determining it was necessary to excuse her. The juror told the court:

Well, first I thought it was because everybody was talking at

once, you know; and of course, the – the air conditioner over

the top of me doesn’t help. I can’t hear it; but then, because I

kept trying – and I told them not everybody can talk at once;

and so, they stopped. I mean, they were nice about that, but

then I realized what it was is that I’m not really understanding

any of it.

The court followed up with a question: “All right. So, you’re – you’re

telling me that you just don’t feel that you understand the testimony or the law,

or what?” The juror responded: “All of it. It’s like a different language.” After

confirming that it was only after starting deliberations that she realized she did

not understand what was going on, the court asked, “But you’re telling me now

that you just – you don’t understand what’s going on enough to even participate

in the deliberations?” The juror responded, “yeah. I wouldn’t be fair because

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I wouldn’t even know how to answer anything.” Neither counsel had any

further questions for the juror[] before the court told her to return to the jury

room while the parties discussed how to proceed. Defense counsel agreed that

it was necessary for the court to excuse the juror. Under these circumstances,

the court did not err in excusing the juror. See State v. Kolmann, 239 Ariz. 157,

163 ¶ 26, 357 P.3d 61, 67 (2016) (juror’s statements that she “was incapable of

making a decision ... would have warranted excusing her from the jury

irrespective of her tentative inclination to vote not guilty or the other juror’s

advice to her.”).

Nor were the court’s questions of this juror of the nature that might have

coerced or influenced her to reach a verdict. Tracy misplaces his reliance on

State v. McCrimmon, 187 Ariz. 169, 927 P.2d 1298 (1996), in which our

supreme court feared that the trial court had “inadvertently created an

atmosphere of coercion when it repeatedly communicated the implicit message

to the lone hold-out juror that being undecided about a guilty verdict was

unacceptable.” Id. at 173, 927 P.2d at 1302. In this case, the court posed

neutral questions to the juror, and elicit responses that defense counsel agreed

required her dismissal. The court’s handling of the circumstances in this case

were not of the nature that would have coerced or influenced the verdict.

Tracy also argues that it was ultimately not necessary to reconstitute the

jury because after the jurors returned to the courtroom and the court had

excused the one juror, but before selecting the three more alternates, the

foreman notified the court that the twelve-member jury had reached a verdict.

Under those circumstances, Tracy argues, the juror who had reported she did

not understand enough of what was going on to participate in deliberations

“was either actually capable of doing so or she was coerced into reaching guilty

verdicts.” The court, however, had already determined that it was required to

excuse the twelfth juror. Its decision not to accept the verdict and instead to

order a reconstituted jury to deliberate accordingly was not error. See State v.

Martinez. 198 Ariz. 5, 8, ¶ 11, 6 P.3d 310, 313 (App. 2000) (holding that the

court did not err in refusing to accept verdicts from original jury, in light of its

decision to discharge two jurors, and in instead ordering the reconstituted jury

to begin deliberations anew).

Finally, Tracy argues that the court erred when it failed to expressly

instruct the eight-member jury to begin deliberations anew and not to consider

the reasons why the juror was excused, and instead implied the excused juror

was “incompetent” by asking if anyone else wanted to be excused because they

“didn’t get it.” Tracy did not raise these issues in the trial court, and

accordingly has the burden to show error, that the error was fundamental, and

that he was prejudiced thereby. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. At 567 ¶ 20, 115

P.3d at 607. Tracy has failed to meet his burden. No new person was

introduced to the jury; rather, the number of jurors was reduced by four. Under

those circumstances, it was not fundamental error to fail to direct the jurors to

begin deliberations anew. Nor has Tracy shown how it was fundamental error,

or that he was prejudiced, by the court asking, “Is there any one of you who

feels that you need to be excused from serving on this jury because it’s too

hard, or because you don’t understand what’s going on, or you just don’t get it?

I mean, is there any of you who feel incapable of finishing out your jury service

in this case?” Under these circumstances, the court did not err, much less

fundamentally err, to Tracy’s prejudice.

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4

 Defense counsel had objected to an 11-person jury, so the court drew the names of

three jurors to excuse, and ordered the newly constituted jury to resume deliberations. (Doc.

13, Exh. N at 125-30.) After the jury retired, the trial court shared a note passed to the court

from a juror indicating that the jury “ha[s] a vote from all 12 of us and are done,” but the

court noted that a verdict could not have been reached with the excused juror. (Id., at 129.)

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(Doc. 13, Exh. V.)

The appellate court’s determination that the trial court did not err in excusing the juror

who could not deliberate was not unreasonable. The court noted that the juror made clear that

she was not capable of dispensing her duty to deliberate, and that the trial court colloquy with

the juror was not coercive. A trial court has the authority to excuse a juror for cause, so long

as the discharge is not based upon the juror’s view of the evidence. United States v.

Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing cases upholding the dismissal

of jurors). The juror in Petitioner’s case clearly stated that she didn’t understand anything,

and that she wouldn’t be fair, justifying her dismissal.

The fact that Petitioner was convicted by an 8-person jury did not violate his Sixth

Amendment rights, and was in accordance with state law, as he was not facing 30 years or

more in prison. See State v. Soliz, 219 P.3d 1045, 1048-49 (Ariz. 2009) (an 8-person jury

operates to preclude the State’s ability to obtain a 30-plus year sentence). The reduction of

Petitioner’s jury from 12 to 8 was in fact advantageous to him as it eliminated any risk that

he could receive a sentence of more than 30 years, which he in fact faced had he been

convicted as charged. Additionally, Petitioner cites no authority to establish that his rights

were infringed when the trial court instructed the newly-constituted jury to continue

deliberations rather than begin anew. The reconstituted jury did not include any member who

had not been part of the original jury that had heard the evidence and began deliberations.

Furthermore, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice. As is clear from the record, the 8-

person jury returned its unanimous guilty verdict just 14 minutes after the 11-person jury had

indicated it had reached a verdict.4

 The appellate court did not unreasonably apply Supreme

Court precedent to the facts before it in denying Petitioner’s claim.

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CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is timely, but that Petitioner’s

claims lack merit, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to

the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely

to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment

entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of May, 2020.

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