Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01635/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01635-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1635

LOUIS A. BIANCHI, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THOMAS K. MCQUEEN, et al.

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:12-cv-00364 — Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 16, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 29, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In 2004 Louis Bianchi was elected to 

the office of State’s Attorney in McHenry County, Illinois, 

and immediately embarked on a program of reforms. Along 

the way he acquired a few enemies. In 2006 one of the secretaries in the office resigned and took a treasure trove of sensitive documents with her. Working with a disgruntled Assistant State’s Attorney whom Bianchi had demoted, the secCase: 14-1635 Document: 49 Filed: 03/29/2016 Pages: 23
2 No. 14-1635

retary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s 

opponent in the next election.

When Bianchi learned of the document theft, he asked a 

judge to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate. The 

judge obliged, and the former secretary was charged with 

several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer 

tampering. In the meantime, Bianchi’s opponent—aided by 

the secretary and other unnamed political enemies—sought 

the appointment of another special prosecutor, this time to 

investigate Bianchi for politicking on the public’s dime 

(among other alleged malfeasance). Again a judge obliged; a 

special prosecutor was appointed, a grand jury was convened, and Bianchi and three of his colleagues were indicted 

on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted.

Once vindicated, Bianchi and his colleagues filed this suit

for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Henry Tonigan, 

the court-appointed special prosecutor; Thomas McQueen, 

the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor; and Quest 

Consultants International, Ltd., a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and several of its investigators. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants fabricated

evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of 

their rights under the Due Process Clause and the Fourth 

Amendment. They also allege a claim for political retaliation

in violation of the First Amendment.

Tonigan settled and dropped out of the case. McQueen 

and the Quest investigators moved to dismiss based on the 

combined effect of absolute prosecutorial immunity and

qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion, 

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No. 14-1635 3

concluding that the two immunities foreclose the federal 

constitutional claims. That ruling was sound and we affirm.

I. Background

In 2004 Bianchi was first elected as McHenry County 

State’s Attorney; he has been reelected ever since.1 The 

events underlying this litigation took place between 2006

and 2011. This suit was filed in 2012, and the district judge 

gave the plaintiffs extra pleading opportunities to try to 

overcome the dual barriers of absolute and qualified immunity. We take the following factual account from the second

amended complaint. Because the case comes to us from an 

order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim, see 

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), we accept the plaintiffs’ allegations as 

true but remind the reader that these are only allegations, see

Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 

382, 384 (7th Cir. 2010).

We note for starters—as did the district judge—that the 

second amended complaint differs in significant respects 

from the earlier versions, probably because of the intervening settlement with Tonigan. The earlier versions alleged 

that Tonigan was in cahoots with the other defendants to 

fabricate evidence used to prosecute the plaintiffs. The current theory, in contrast, is that Tonigan was an unwitting 

participant in an unconstitutional prosecution. More specifically, the second amended complaint alleges that McQueen 

 1 Late last year Bianchi announced that he would not run for reelection 

in 2016. See Kevin P. Craver, McHenry County State’s Attorney Lou Bianchi 

dropping re-election bid, NW. HERALD (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nwherald.

com/2015/12/07/mchenry-county-states-attorney-lou-bianchi-droppingre-election-bid/a9b23i5/.

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4 No. 14-1635

and the Quest investigators “duped” Tonigan into prosecuting Bianchi and his colleagues by feeding him fabricated 

witness statements and other false evidence.

We have one more preliminary observation before we 

proceed. Key factual allegations in the second amended 

complaint are pleaded with a conspicuous Rule 11 qualifier. 

To take just one example: “After a reasonable opportunity 

for further investigation or discovery, there likely will be evidentiary support that Defendants McQueen and the Quest Investigators used the false evidence and witness statements 

that they manufactured during the investigation and concealed exculpatory evidence in order to ‘dupe’ Tonigan to 

bring charges ... .” (Emphasis added.)

The defendants urged the judge to disregard all such allegations outright. The plaintiffs’ attorney objected, explaining that this mode of pleading was necessary under the circumstances and is specifically permitted by Rule 11(b)(3).2

The judge accepted this explanation and rejected the defendants’ invitation to disregard these allegations based on the 

qualifier alone. We’ll do the same.

For simplicity, from now on we’ll omit the modifier “second amended” and simply refer to the “complaint.”

* * *

Amy Dalby was a secretary in the McHenry County 

State’s Attorney’s Office from 2004 to 2006. She resigned in 

 2 Rule 11(b)(3) provides that by submitting a pleading to the court, counsel certifies that any factual contentions contained in the pleading “have 

evidentiary support, or if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation 

or discovery.”

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No. 14-1635 5

July 2006, taking some 5,000 sensitive documents with her. 

She was encouraged in this theft by Kristin Foley, an Assistant State’s Attorney whom Bianchi had demoted. In 

October 2007 Dalby and Foley gave the documents to members of the local media and to Daniel Regna, Bianchi’s opponent in the upcoming 2008 Republican primary for State’s 

Attorney.

When the document theft came to light in November 

2007, Bianchi petitioned the McHenry County Circuit Court 

for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate. A

special prosecutor was duly appointed and grand-jury proceedings followed. In March 2009 Dalby was indicted on six 

felony counts. In June 2009 she pleaded guilty to computer 

tampering. Before she did so, however, Regna—Bianchi’s 

political nemesis—petitioned for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate Bianchi on allegations that he 

had ordered Dalby do political work on county time. Dalby

too filed a petition asking for a special prosecutor to investigate Bianchi, echoing the allegations made by Regna. 

In September 2009 Judge Gordon Graham of the McHenry County Circuit Court appointed Tonigan, a former circuit 

court judge, as a “Special State’s Attorney” under the authority of 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-9008 and tasked him with

investigating the allegations made by Regna and Dalby. 

Judge Graham also appointed McQueen, a local attorney, to 

work with Tonigan as an assistant special prosecutor.

Tonigan and McQueen quickly discovered that the statute of limitations had run on Dalby’s allegations, so in 

November 2009 they asked Judge Graham to expand the 

scope of the investigation. The judge agreed and authorized

them to investigate and prosecute “any and all persons relaCase: 14-1635 Document: 49 Filed: 03/29/2016 Pages: 23
6 No. 14-1635

tive to the possible misuse, misappropriation or theft of public funds, public property or public personnel by McHenry 

County State[’]s Attorney Louis Bianchi from 2005 and 

thereafter.”

In December 2009 Tonigan and McQueen retained Quest 

Consultants to assist in the investigation and asked the court

to appoint Quest’s investigators as special investigators. 

Again the court obliged. By April 2010 Judge Graham had 

convened a grand jury. 

As we’ve noted, the current theory of the case is that it 

was actually McQueen—not Tonigan—who controlled the 

investigation. The complaint alleges that McQueen conspired with the Quest investigators “to limit Tonigan’s role 

in and knowledge of” what was actually going on. The

plaintiffs accuse McQueen and the investigators of “manufacturing” and “fabricating” evidence against them—largely 

in the form of false witness statements—both before and after the grand jury was convened. This false evidence was 

then presented to the grand jury, and in September 2010 the 

special prosecutors obtained indictments against Bianchi 

and Joyce Synek, his executive assistant, on 19 counts of official misconduct. Arrest warrants followed. On September 10, 

2010, Bianchi and Synek were arrested and immediately released on bond that same day.

We pause here to note a factual concession that will become important later. The complaint alleges that Bianchi and 

Synek were “held in custody at the McHenry County Jail”

following their arrest. But at oral argument the plaintiffs’ attorney abandoned that allegation, telling us that Bianchi and 

Synek in fact were never held in custody; rather, they were 

immediately released on bond and not detained.

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No. 14-1635 7

Now back to the narrative. At this point the special prosecutors realized they had a problem: A charge of official 

misconduct in Illinois requires an underlying crime. So in 

October McQueen interviewed Peter Austin, the McHenry 

County Administrator, to find out whether public officials

ever had the discretion to use county property for noncounty business. The complaint alleges that McQueen and 

the investigators thereafter “manufactured a false statement 

of Peter Austin for the purpose of creating the appearance 

that there was probable cause to charge Bianchi and Synek 

with conspiracy and official misconduct.” McQueen and the 

investigators then fed this fabricated evidence to Tonigan, 

who (with McQueen pulling the strings) used it to obtain a 

superseding indictment against Bianchi and Synek on 

October 22, 2010.

Meanwhile, shortly after the grand jury issued its first 

indictment, McQueen returned to Judge Graham for broader 

authority to investigate other allegations of misconduct in

the State’s Attorney’s Office. On October 1, 2010, the judge 

signed an order expanding the scope of the investigation.

McQueen and the investigators thereafter fabricated still

more evidence with which to dupe the credulous Tonigan 

into pursuing additional charges. 

On February 24, 2011, the grand jury indicted Bianchi on

three counts of official misconduct for intervening in criminal cases on behalf of his political supporters. The grand jury

also issued misconduct charges against Ronald Salgado and 

Michael McCleary, both investigators in Bianchi’s office—

Salgado for intervening in a case involving his nephew and 

McCleary for improperly using a county vehicle. Arrest warrants were issued, and the three men were arrested and imCase: 14-1635 Document: 49 Filed: 03/29/2016 Pages: 23
8 No. 14-1635

mediately released on bond. (Again, the complaint alleges 

that they were held in custody following their arrest, but 

counsel told us at oral argument that they were not detained.)

With the entire McHenry County judiciary recused,

Judge Joseph McGraw was brought in from Winnebago 

County to preside over the cases. The complaint alleges that 

McQueen and the investigators suppressed exculpatory evidence that would have persuaded Tonigan to drop the prosecution. In March and August 2011, the cases were separately tried to the court. Judge McGraw acquitted the defendants 

of all charges.

This action for damages followed in January 2012. Bianchi, Synek, Salgado, and McCleary sued Tonigan, McQueen, 

Quest, and five individual Quest investigators,3 alleging that 

they committed various federal constitutional torts.

The judge dismissed the first amended complaint based 

on absolute and qualified immunity but allowed the plaintiffs a second opportunity to replead if they thought they 

could overcome the obstacles the judge had identified in his 

dismissal order. As we’ve noted, Tonigan then settled with 

the plaintiffs; the latest iteration of the complaint depicts him 

as an unsuspecting tool of McQueen and the Quest investigators. The plaintiffs allege that the remaining defendants

violated their rights under the Due Process Clause, the 

Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment. The complaint also includes state-law claims for malicious prosecu-

 3 The Quest investigators are Robert Scigalski, Daniel Jerger, James Reilly, Patrick Hanretty, and Richard Stilling. 

Case: 14-1635 Document: 49 Filed: 03/29/2016 Pages: 23
No. 14-1635 9

tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All 

counts contain substantive and conspiracy components.

Ruling on a renewed motion to dismiss, the judge held

that the latest version of the complaint suffered from the 

same defects as the earlier ones and dismissed the federal 

claims with prejudice. The judge relinquished jurisdiction 

over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice

to refiling in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

The plaintiffs’ pursuit of a damages remedy under § 1983 

encountered two immediate obstacles: absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983 for 

conduct that is functionally prosecutorial; this immunity is 

understood to broadly cover all conduct associated with the 

judicial phase of the criminal process. See Van de Kamp v. 

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341–43 (2009); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 

478, 486 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31

(1976). Police, law-enforcement investigators, and prosecutors acting in an investigative capacity may claim only qualified immunity, which covers “conduct that ‘does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.’” Whitlock v. 

Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

This appeal turns entirely on the applicability of these 

two forms of immunity. We review the district court’s decision de novo. Chasensky v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088, 1093 (7th 

Cir. 2014); Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012).

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10 No. 14-1635

A. Absolute Immunity

McQueen is protected by absolute immunity to the extent 

that the claims against him are premised on his conduct as a 

prosecutor. The district judge ruled that absolute immunity 

protects McQueen in part. McQueen argues that he is protected in full. The plaintiffs say absolute immunity doesn’t 

apply at all because McQueen wasn’t really acting as a prosecutor but instead was a private lawyer who was merely assisting a court-appointed special prosecutor. We think the 

district court got it right.

1. Was McQueen a Prosecutor?

The plaintiffs argue that although McQueen “held himself out” as a criminal prosecutor, he wasn’t actually a prosecutor under the relevant state law. In their view the controlling statute—55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-9008—permits only one

special prosecutor, and Judge Graham named Tonigan.

This argument is hard to take seriously. On its face the 

statute contains no numeric limitation. Indeed it refers to 

“[a]ny attorney appointed for any reason under this Section,” 

who by virtue of the court’s appointment shall “possess all 

the powers and discharge all the duties of a regularly elected 

State’s attorney.” Id. § 5/3-9008(b) (emphasis added).

Judge Graham’s September 18, 2009 appointment order

cited this statutory authority and appointed “Attorney 

Thomas K. McQueen” to “assist the specially appointed 

prosecutor, Henry C. Tonigan, III, as directed by him on all 

matters relative to this case.” If there’s any ambiguity here 

(and we don’t see any), Judge Graham’s October 1, 2010 order expanding the investigation specifically refers to both

Tonigan and McQueen as “Special State’s Attorneys.”

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No. 14-1635 11

If more were needed, we note that the Illinois Appellate 

Court didn’t see any relevant distinction between Tonigan 

and McQueen; it recognized both men as special prosecutors. Ruling on a question about their compensation, the appellate court wrote as follows: “Tonigan was appointed as a 

special prosecutor, and McQueen was appointed as an assistant to the special prosecutor. Throughout this order, we refer to them jointly as Special Prosecutors.” In re Appointment 

of a Special Prosecutor, Nos. 2-12-0318, et al., 2012 WL 6969007, 

at *1 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 25, 2012). The court went on to 

affirm the circuit court’s decision to pay McQueen and Tonigan the same hourly rate for their work. 

In the teeth of the statutory language and this evidence, 

the plaintiffs insist that the position of “special assistant 

state’s attorney” simply “does not exist.” For support they 

cite People v. Woodall, 777 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (Ill. App. Ct.

2002), but that case isn’t on point. Woodall concerned the status of special state’s attorneys who were deputized by other 

prosecutors, not appointed by the court under section 9008.

See id. at 1017 (“None of the three Agency attorneys were 

appointed by court order to perform as special prosecutors.”). That case has no bearing on whether section 9008

permits the court to appoint more than one special state’s 

attorney. It plainly does. And Judge Graham plainly appointed two special prosecutors, Tonigan and McQueen.

The plaintiffs also argue that McQueen wasn’t really a 

prosecutor because his appointment was procured by fraud 

and is therefore void. This argument is directed at the October 1, 2010 order, which the plaintiffs claim “was obtained 

solely through the perjured petition of McQueen in which he 

intentionally presented Judge Graham with evidence that he 

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fabricated in order to fraudulently obtain the authority to 

investigate and prosecute Bianchi and Salgado.”

But Judge Graham appointed McQueen by order dated

September 18, 2009. The October 2010 order—the one the 

plaintiffs say was procured by fraud—merely expanded the 

scope of the investigation. 

2. The Scope of Prosecutorial Immunity

So McQueen was a prosecutor. The extent to which he is 

protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity depends on 

the type of work he performed and the factual premises of 

the plaintiffs’ claims. A prosecutor only enjoys absolute immunity insofar as he is “act[ing] within the scope of his 

prosecutorial duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 

(1976). The inquiry requires a “functional approach.” Rehberg 

v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012). That is, we “look[] to the 

nature of the function performed.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 

509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (quotation marks omitted). But absolute prosecutorial immunity is not restricted to what goes on 

in the courtroom: “[T]he duties of the prosecutor in his role 

as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the 

initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.

More particularly, the immunity encompasses quintessentially prosecutorial functions like “an out-of-court ‘effort 

to control the presentation of [a] witness’ testimony,’” 

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272–73 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 

n.32), and “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for 

the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial,” id. at 273. 

These include “the professional evaluation of the evidence 

assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its 

presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek 

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indictment has been made.” Id. (emphasis added).

At the other end of the spectrum, a prosecutor is not absolutely immune for acts that “go beyond the strictly prosecutorial to include investigation.” Fields v. Wharrie 

(“Fields II”), 740 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275–76)). A prosecutor acting in an investigative capacity may claim only the same qualified immunity that protects police officers and other law-enforcement 

investigators. Id.

With this background in mind, it’s clear that absolute 

immunity knocks out a large part of the case against 

McQueen—most notably the claims premised on allegations 

that McQueen presented false statements to the grand jury

and at trial. Still, some of the allegations cover conduct that 

stretches back to the investigative period before McQueen 

was engaged in what could reasonably be called prosecutorial advocacy. The complaint contains allegations of evidence fabrication and other chicanery months before the 

grand jury was empaneled.

The district judge observed that many of these allegations are vague and alleged only very generally and “as to a 

large window of time (October 2009–August 2010).” They 

are indeed vague (e.g., “McQueen personally interviewed 

individuals and also directed [Quest] to conduct certain interviews for the purpose of manufacturing and fabricating 

evidence.”). They’re also general (e.g., “McQueen and 

[Quest] manufactured evidence and fabricated inculpatory 

witness statements against Bianchi and other [State’s Attorney’s Office] employees.”). But these weaknesses do not affect the scope of McQueen’s absolute immunity. We agree 

with the judge that McQueen is not absolutely immune for 

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his investigative conduct in the months before the grand jury 

was convened.

But he—and the Quest defendants—remain protected by 

qualified immunity.

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified-immunity doctrine holds that “government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions when ‘their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 

800, 818 (1982)). “[T]wo central questions must be addressed 

in the course of determining whether qualified immunity is 

available: whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a 

constitutional right at all, and whether the right at issue was 

clearly established at the time and under the circumstances 

presented.” Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.

The complaint alleges claims for violation of (1) due process (evidence fabrication and breach of the Brady duty to 

disclose exculpatory evidence); (2) the First Amendment (for 

political retaliation); and (3) the Fourth Amendment (for 

false arrest). Qualified immunity bars them all.

1. Due Process/Evidence Fabrication

Allegations of evidence fabrication may state a colorable

due-process claim in the wake of our decisions in Whitlock

and Fields II. See id. at 580–82 (holding that a prosecutor’s 

fabrication of evidence while acting as an investigator is not 

covered by qualified immunity); Fields II, 740 F.3d at 1114–

15. But an act of evidence fabrication doesn’t implicate dueprocess rights unless the fabricated evidence “is later used to 

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No. 14-1635 15

deprive the [criminal] defendant of her liberty in some way.” 

Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580. A deprivation of liberty is a necessary element of a due-process claim premised on allegations 

of evidence fabrication. “[I]f an officer (or investigating 

prosecutor) fabricates evidence and puts that fabricated evidence in a drawer, making no further use of it, then the officer has not violated due process; the action did not cause 

an infringement of anyone’s liberty interest.” Id. at 582 (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994)).

Bianchi and his colleagues suffered no deprivation of liberty; they were acquitted at trial. That brings this case 

squarely within the holding of Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 

556 (7th Cir. 2015). Our decision in Saunders-El reiterated 

that “[n]ot every act of evidence fabrication offends one’s 

due process rights.” Id. at 560. To explain, we pointed to the 

recent case of Alexander v. McKinney, 692 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 

2012). Alexander involved an evidence-fabrication claim by a 

plaintiff who was arrested, immediately released on bond, 

and found not guilty at trial. Id. at 555–57. Following his acquittal, he sued the prosecutor and investigators, alleging 

that they conspired “to manufacture false evidence and 

bring trumped-up charges” in violation of his right to due 

process. Id. at 554. We held in Alexander that the plaintiff’s 

acquittal foreclosed any due-process claim. See id. at 557. Indeed, we said “[i]t would be anomalous to hold that attending a trial deprives a criminal defendant of liberty without 

due process of law, when the purpose of trial is to effectuate

due process.” Id. at 557 n.2.

The same result followed in Saunders-El. We held that because “Saunders-El [was] released on bond following his arrest and acquitted at trial, [his case] falls squarely within our 

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holding in Alexander, and ... [he] cannot make out an evidence fabrication-based due process violation.” 778 F.3d at 

561. We explained that “due process is not implicated when, 

as here, the defendant is released on bond following his arrest and acquitted at trial.” Id. at 558.

Saunders-El and Alexander foreclose the evidencefabrication claim alleged in this case. Because the plaintiffs

suffered no liberty deprivation, they suffered no due-process 

violation. When pressed on this point at oral argument, the 

plaintiffs’ attorney conceded the controlling force of

Saunders-El and grudgingly accepted the impossibility of 

prevailing on this claim. So even if acts of evidence fabrication could be proved, qualified immunity applies.

2. Due Process/Brady

The complaint states a separate due-process claim based 

on alleged violations of the Brady duty to disclose material 

exculpatory evidence. This claim too runs into difficulty for 

a similar reason: A violation of Brady requires a showing of 

prejudice, which can’t be made here because the plaintiffs 

were acquitted.

As the Supreme Court has explained,

[T]he term “Brady violation” is sometimes used 

to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to 

disclose exculpatory evidence—that is, to any 

suppression of so-called “Brady material”—

although, strictly speaking, there is never a real 

“Brady violation” unless the nondisclosure was 

so serious that there is a reasonable probability 

that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. 

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Stricker v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). The Court succinctly elaborated the point, saying “[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must 

be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, 

or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been 

suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; 

and prejudice must have ensued.” Id. at 281–82.

Accordingly, we’ve explained that it’s “doubtful ... that 

an acquitted defendant can ever establish the requisite prejudice for a Brady violation.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 

561, 570 (7th Cir. 2008). The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have definitively held that an acquittal extinguishes a 

Brady claim.4 So even assuming the truth of the allegations

about evidence suppression, no Brady violation occurred because the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice. Qualified immunity bars this claim too. (Indeed, absolute immunity bars the 

Brady claim against McQueen.)

3. First Amendment Retaliation

Bianchi alleges that McQueen and the Quest investigators pursued this prosecution in retaliation for his decision 

to seek and hold public office, and this politically motivated

retaliation violated his First Amendment rights. Synek joins 

him in this claim. But they haven’t pleaded plausible allegations that McQueen and the investigators harbored retaliatory animus or that a causal connection between the retaliatory 

motive and the claimed injury exists.

To succeed on a political-retaliation claim, a “plaintiff 

 4 See Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999); Flores v. Satz, 

137 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1998); McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 

842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1988).

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18 No. 14-1635

must show a causal connection between a defendant’s retaliatory animus and subsequent injury in any sort of retaliation 

action.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006). Even if 

retaliatory animus can be shown, the retaliation must be the 

cause-in-fact of the claimed injury. See Thayer v. Chiczewski, 

705 F.3d 237, 252 (7th Cir. 2012) (“If retaliation is not the butfor cause of the arrest, ‘the claim fails for lack of causal connection between unconstitutional motive and resulting 

harm, despite proof of some retaliatory animus in the official’s mind.’” (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260)).

The complaint does not come close to plausibly alleging

that McQueen or the investigators harbored retaliatory animus against Bianchi for seeking and holding office or that 

this animus, if it existed, was the cause-in-fact of the alleged 

false indictment. At most the complaint alleges that 

McQueen and the investigators interviewed Bianchi’s political enemies during the course of the investigation. That’s not 

enough to support a reasonable inference that they harbored 

retaliatory animus or were in cahoots with those who did.

This claim too was properly dismissed. 

4. Fourth Amendment/False Arrest

The final claim is one for false arrest in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. The complaint alleges that McQueen 

and the investigators fabricated evidence during the investigation, which in turn was used to indict and arrest the plaintiffs without probable cause.

The problem with this claim is that it’s not actually one 

for false arrest, at least not on the facts alleged here. As the 

district judge correctly noted, false arrest “is detention without legal process,” and Bianchi and his colleagues were arrested on warrants that were issued after the grand jury inCase: 14-1635 Document: 49 Filed: 03/29/2016 Pages: 23
No. 14-1635 19

dicted. That is, they were arrested after and as a consequence of 

formal legal process. What the complaint calls a claim for

false arrest is really one for malicious prosecution, which 

does not implicate any interests protected by the Fourth 

Amendment. (Or at least it does not under existing law; 

we’ll have more to say about this in a moment.) 

The Supreme Court's decision in Wallace v. Kato is instructive on this point. Wallace addressed a statute-oflimitations question: What is the accrual rule for a Fourth 

Amendment claim for arrest without probable cause? 

549 U.S. 384, 386–87 (2007). The Court held that the limitations period “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes 

detained pursuant to legal process.” Id. at 397. Along the 

way to this holding the Court had a lot to say about how to 

classify and analyze the different constitutional claims that 

might arise from a wrongful arrest and prosecution.

By way of background, the plaintiff in Wallace was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause (or so 

he claimed), and was detained and remained in jail pending 

trial on a murder charge. Id. at 386–89. He was convicted of 

murder and sentenced to 26 years in prison. Id. at 386. When 

his conviction was later overturned, he sued the arresting 

officers for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 387. The question before the Court was 

whether the cause of action accrued “at the time of his arrest ... [or] when his conviction was later set aside.” Id. If the 

former, the suit was untimely; if the latter, it could proceed.

See id. at 387–88.

The Court began by explaining that a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim—that is, a claim arising from a warrantless arrest without probable cause—is most closely analCase: 14-1635 Document: 49 Filed: 03/29/2016 Pages: 23
20 No. 14-1635

ogous to a common-law claim for false imprisonment. Id. at 

389. And “[t]he sort of unlawful detention remediable by the 

tort of false imprisonment is detention without legal process,” 

which “ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such 

[legal] process—when, for example, he is bound over by a 

magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Id.

The Court continued: “Thereafter [i.e., after the initiation 

of formal legal process], unlawful detention forms part of 

the damages for the ‘entirely distinct’ tort of malicious prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal 

process.” Id. at 390 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER 

AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 119, at 885–86 (5th ed. 

1984)). It follows, the Court said, that

[i]f there is a false arrest claim, damages for 

that claim cover the time of detention up until 

issuance of process or arraignment, but not 

more. From that point on, any damages recoverable must be based on a malicious prosecution claim and on the wrongful use of judicial 

process rather than detention itself.

Id. (quoting KEETON, supra, § 119, at 888).

After Wallace we have applied similar boundaries: “Typically, the scope of a Fourth Amendment claim is limited up 

to the point of arraignment, at which point the prosecution is 

underway.” Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 638 (7th 

Cir. 2008).

Applying this reasoning here, it’s clear that the falsearrest claim is really one for abuse of the judicial process

(that is, malicious prosecution). The complaint alleges that 

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No. 14-1635 21

McQueen and the investigators fabricated some of the evidence that was presented to the grand jury to obtain indictments against the plaintiffs, and the indictments in turn led 

to the issuance of arrest warrants. Bianchi and his colleagues 

were thus arrested pursuant to formal legal process (and then

were immediately released on bond). As a factual and legal 

matter, the claim is for malicious prosecution, not false arrest.5

 

5 The plaintiffs cite Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1992), as 

support for their Fourth Amendment claim. Juriss involved a false-arrest 

claim against a police officer who was alleged to have lied to a grand 

jury to obtain an indictment against the plaintiff for harboring a fugitive. 

Id. at 346–48. The grand jury indicted the plaintiff, an arrest warrant followed, and the lying officer arrested her. Id. at 347–48. Two months later 

the charge was dropped. Id. at 348. The plaintiff sued the officer for false 

arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 346. Relying on 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986), we held that qualified immunity 

did not apply because an officer who engages in deceit to persuade a 

judicial officer to issue a warrant is not entitled to rely on either the facial 

validity of the warrant or the Leon good-faith exception. Id. at 350–51.

We see two problems with extending Juriss to this case. First, Juriss

involved an actual false arrest: A police officer fraudulently obtained a 

warrant and then arrested the plaintiff pursuant to that warrant. The 

claim in this case is strictly for abuse of the legal process; the complaint 

does not allege that McQueen or the Quest investigators effectuated the 

arrests of Bianchi and his colleagues. The second problem is that Juriss

predates Wallace, which more clearly demarcated the lines between the 

cognizable constitutional torts in cases alleging wrongful arrest and 

prosecution. As we’ve already explained, the arrests at issue in this case

came after and as a consequence of the formal initiation of criminal proceedings by indictment. Wallace teaches that once formal criminal proceedings have begun, we’re in the domain of malicious prosecution, not

false arrest. And as a factual matter, the gravamen of the allegations 

against McQueen and the investigators is abuse of the formal legal process.

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22 No. 14-1635

Importantly, the Court in Wallace specifically declined to 

address whether a malicious-prosecution claim is ever cognizable as a Fourth Amendment violation remediable under 

§ 1983. 549 U.S. at 390 n.2. The plaintiff in Wallace had expressly abandoned that issue, which was left unresolved in 

the Court’s split decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 

270–71 (1994) (plurality opinion). 549 U.S. at 390 n.2; see generally Albright, 510 U.S. at 276–81 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 

Although some circuits have recognized such a claim, see 

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99 (1st Cir. 2013) (collecting cases), this circuit has not, see, e.g., Welton v. Anderson, 

770 F.3d 670, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2014); Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 638;

Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750–52 (7th Cir. 2001). With 

the law this unsettled, qualified immunity applies.6

Finally, even if this claim were cognizable as a Fourth 

Amendment violation, McQueen and the investigators 

would still be entitled to qualified immunity. Because the 

plaintiffs were immediately released on bond and were neither seized nor detained, they suffered no Fourth Amendment injury. 

So any way you slice it, the district judge was right to 

apply the qualified-immunity bar. The Fourth Amendment 

 

6 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to address whether 

a claim for malicious prosecution is cognizable under the Fourth 

Amendment where the plaintiff alleges that he was held in pretrial detention without probable cause. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 F. App’x 

641 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. granted 136 S. Ct. 890 (Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 14-9496). 

Manuel will be heard next term. The Court’s decision will not affect this 

case; here the plaintiffs were not held in pretrial detention.

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No. 14-1635 23

claim was properly dismissed.7

AFFIRMED.

 

7 With the federal claims gone, it was entirely appropriate for the judge 

to relinquish jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismiss them 

without prejudice. See Sharp Elec. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 

514 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Normally, when all federal claims are dismissed 

before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent 

state-law claims ... .”).

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