Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02772/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02772-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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28 This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBI COUGHLIN, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:08-cv-02772-GEB-JFM

)

v. ) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

) DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT*

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION ) 

and TOM MAUGERI, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On February 4, 2010, Defendant California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) filed a motion for summary

judgment or in the alternative for summary adjudication on Plaintiff

Bobbi Coughlin’s five claims: (1) sexual harassment under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et

seq. (“Title VII”); (2) sexual harassment under the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code §§ 12940 et

seq. (“FEHA”); (3) retaliatory harassment under Title VII; (4)

retaliatory harassment under FEHA; and (5) failure to prevent

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Coughlin filed her opposition to CDCR’s motion four days late 1

without providing an explanation for the late filing. CDCR urges the

Court not to consider Coughlin’s opposition or in the alternative

requests leave to file a response to Coughlin’s Separate Statement. In

deciding CDCR’s motion, the Court considers Coughlin’s opposition and

CDCR’s Supplemental Reply filed in response to the late opposition. 

Since CDCR’s Supplemental Reply is deemed a sufficient response to

Coughlin’s Separate Statement, CDCR’s request to file an additional

response to Coughlin’s Separate Statement is denied.

2

harassment under FEHA. For the following reasons, CDCR’s summary

judgment motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1

I. Background

A. October 10, 2006 – October 13, 2007

Bobbi Coughlin (“Coughlin”) began working for CDCR as a 

“Cook II” at the Pine Grove Youth Conservation Camp (“Pine Grove”) on

October 10, 2006. (Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 1.) Karen

Wheeler (“Wheeler”) was Coughlin’s official supervisor from October

10, 2006 to October 13, 2007, at which time Wheeler transferred to a

different CDCR facility. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4; Coughlin Dep. 29:11-14.) 

Defendant Tom Maugeri (“Maugeri”) worked as a cook at Pine Grove from

“before October 2006” until December 4, 2007, when he was placed on

“Administrative Time Off.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 60.)

“Between October 2006 and October 2007, Maugeri and Coughlin 

were friends.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Maugeri commented on Coughlin’s hair and

eyes three or four times between October 2006 and October 13, 2007. 

(Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Coughlin offers testimony that at one point during

this time period she noticed Maugeri “leering” at her while she took

off her sweatshirt. (Coughlin Dep. 76:23-77:5.) Coughlin testified

that on another occasion, Maugeri commented on her tan skin as she

removed her sweatshirt, making her “uncomfortable.” (Id. 77:10-

78:9.)

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Some time before Coughlin’s son’s wedding on September 29, 

2007, “Coughlin described a pedicure she received in anticipation of

her son’s wedding . . . . Maugeri told Couglin he . . . was aroused

by the conversation, asked Coughlin to touch his hands, and told

Coughlin she was his sexual fantasy.” (SUF ¶ 19.) Coughlin testified

that when Maugeri asked her to feel his hands, she touched them with

her two index fingers and stated “You are out of control, that’s just

bizarre. And you just ruined for me a great moment, you know, and

being excited about my son’s wedding and taking all the girls and all

the moms, you know.” (Coughlin Dep. 81:19-23.) Coughlin testified

that Maugeri responded “Well, I have a foot fetish, and, you know, I

am turned on.” (Id. 81:24-25.) Coughlin testified “that was the end

of the conversation, I just left the room.” (Id. 82:22-23.) 

“Coughlin was not offended by Maugeri’s actions between October 2006

and October 13, 2007.” (SUF ¶ 21.)

B. October 13, 2007 – October 23, 2007

Wheeler transferred to another facility on or about October 

13, 2007. (SUF ¶ 4; Coughlin Dep. 66:1-3.) “Between October 14, 2007

and October 23, 2007, Coughlin and Maugeri worked together on [four]

occasions, for approximately [two and a half] hours each time.” (SUF

¶ 25.) The parties dispute whether Pine Grove Assistant

Superintendent Harry Linden (“Linden”) “was responsible for

supervising the kitchen staff” at Pine Grove during this time period,

or whether “the actual supervision and decisions were being made by

Maugeri.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Linden testified that as Assistant

Superintendent, he was “directly in charge of the kitchen . . .[; he]

supervise[d] the kitchen.” (Linden Dep. 15:10-12.) Coughlin

testified that “we all knew that [Maugeri] was going to get [the

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Supervisor position.] . . . [H]e had been acting in that capacity

already.” (Coughlin Dep. 39:12-15.) Wheeler testified that before

she was hired, Maugeri “was the cook there who did everything.” 

(Wheeler Dep. 14:16-17.) Wheeler testified that “[b]efore [Wheeler]

was hired, . . . [Maugeri] kind of ran the whole show.” (Wheeler Dep.

14:18-21.) Coughlin testified that “when [Wheeler] left[, Maugeri]

became the acting supervisor and he said he had to go through the

formal interview, which he laughed about and said it was a joke 

. . . . Because he knew he already had the job.” (Coughlin Dep. 67:1-

6.) Coughlin testified that during the week of Wheeler’s last day,

Maugeri stated “I am the acting supervisor.” (Id. 67:10-17.) 

Coughlin testified that Maugeri told her prior to Wheeler leaving that

“he was finally going to get to be the supervisor, not just in doing

the work, but get the job.” (Id. 66:11-13.)

Coughlin testified that during the time period of October 14 

to October 23, 2007, Maugeri “got bold. And I don’t know how to tell

you that in words other than that he just felt like he was on top of

the world, I think.” (Coughlin Dep. 86:1-3.) Coughlin testified that

Maugeri “made comments like, I thought about you over the weekend. 

And I think he meant it in a sexual way.” (Id. 87:16-18.) She

further testified that on one occasion “he told me a story about some

gal he had made out with and he had her panties in his locker. And I

am like, [t]hat’s out of control. He told me the story twice, and I

don’t know why he told it to me.” (Id. 87:7-12.) Additionally,

“Between October 14, 2007 and October 23, 2007, Maugeri told Coughlin

that he tried to have oral sex with his wife.” (SUF ¶ 33.)

Coughlin testified that her reaction to Maugeri during this 

time period was “to play it off, or tell him, You are out of control 

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or, you know, You know I am married. Or I would just leave the area

that he was in.” (Coughlin Dep. 88:4-8.)

“Maugeri told Coughlin that he had watched pornography on 

the [Pine Grove] computer.” (SUF ¶ 34.) “Sometime prior to October

23, 2007,” Maugeri showed Coughlin a pornographic image on his

computer and stated that the woman in the image was his sister-in-law

and that she was a “porn-star.” (SUF ¶ 26.) Coughlin testified that

Maugeri convinced Coughlin to look at the image by stating his wife

“looks just like her sister. Oh, her sister has a website. You want

to look at it?” (Coughlin Dep. 113:7-14.)

“On October 23, 2007, Maugeri exposed his genitals to 

Coughlin in the [Pine Grove] kitchen office.” (SUF ¶ 37.) Coughlin

testified “that on October 23, 2007, Maugeri asked Coughlin if she

wanted to touch his exposed penis.” (Id. ¶ 38; Coughlin Dep. 150:9-

17.) Coughlin testified that Maugeri then stated “I will jack off for

you.” (Coughlin Dep. 166:13-14; SUF ¶ 39.) “He said it a couple

times.” (Coughlin Dep. 166:17.) Coughlin testified that she

responded “No thanks, I’m not interested” and she left the office. 

(Id. 166:24-167:3.)

Coughlin testified Maugeri also asked her on October 23, 

“Can I kiss you?” (Id. 94:24-25.) Coughlin responded “No, I’m

married, you are married . . . my husband wouldn’t appreciate it, your

wife wouldn’t appreciate it. That’s not ok.” (Id. 95:16-18.) She

testified that he “kept persisting,” and asked “in a perfect world

would you?” (Id. 95:21-22.) Coughlin “sarcastic[ally]” responded,

“Maybe in a perfect world, Tom.” (Id. 96:2-3.)

Coughlin testified Maugeri acted “inappropriately” with the 

male wards. She testified that “[the wards] would sit on [Maugeri’s] 

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lap and rub his head, and they would . . . say like, I did your mama

last night.” (Coughlin Dep. 101:13-15.) Coughlin testified Maugeri

said to the male wards “You are my girl. Is my girl going to come

back and see me later?” (Id. 107:17-18.) Coughlin told Maugeri and

the wards, “Guys, this is really not ok. And . . . the response [she]

always got is, This is jailhouse love, this is how we do it here.” 

(Id. 101:18-21.) Coughlin testified that this behavior was “constant”

and “to be conservative, [occurred] once a week.” (Id. 102:1-2.)

Coughlin testified that between October 13 and October 24, 

2007, she and Maugeri met with Linden and Pine Grove Superintendent

Mike Roots (“Roots”) and were asked whether they wanted Linden and

Roots to hire another person or whether they wanted the overtime. 

(Id. 138:13-14.) Coughlin testified that as she and Maugeri walked

away from that meeting, Maugeri stated “[Roots] is going to hire

someone else with big [tits] like yours.” (Id. 138:18-139:10.) 

Coughlin testified that Maugeri and Roots “were buddies.” (Id.

140:11-13.) 

C. October 24, 2007 – November 8, 2007

“Maugeri was officially promoted to the Supervising Cook 

position at [Pine Grove] on October 24, 2007.” (SUF ¶ 31.) Coughlin 

testified that “on or about October 30, 2007” Maugeri stated to her,

“I’m so glad I showed you my genitals. I really will jack off for

you” and “asked if Coughlin would kiss him.” (Coughlin Dep. 90:13-15,

91:1-3; SUF ¶ 42.) Coughlin testified that she responded “No thanks

dude.” (Id. 91:17.) At that point Coughlin felt she was “in the

presence of a predator.” (Id. 92:10-11.) 

Coughlin testified “that on or about November 6, 2007

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Maugeri was ‘abrupt’ with her in discussing a graduation ceremony.” 

(Coughlin Dep. 219:20-220:9; SUF ¶ 43.) “Coughlin reports no other

misconduct by Maugeri . . . between October 24 and November 6, 2007.” 

(SUF ¶ 44.) “Coughlin has not spoken with Maugeri since November 7,

2007.” (SUF ¶ 45.)

D. November 8, 2007 – June 2008

“On or about November 8, 2007, Coughlin reported Maugeri’s 

alleged misconduct to the [Pine Grove] Superintendent Mike Roots and

to [Pine Grove] Assistant Superintendent Harry Linden.” (SUF ¶ 46.) 

“CDCR has a policy against sexual harassment.” (Id. ¶ 88.) 

“CDCR’s policy against sexual harassment is available to all CDCR

employees, including Coughlin.” (Id. ¶ 89.) “Coughlin was provided a

copy of the CDCR policy when she first started working at CDCR.” (Id.

¶ 90.) “Coughlin acknowledged receipt of CDCR’s policy against sexual

harassment.” (Id. ¶ 91.) “Coughlin attended training that reviewed

CDCR’s policy against sexual harassment.” (Id. ¶ 92.)

“On or about November 9, 2007, Roots took the following 

action[s]:

• Altered the kitchen schedule to ensure that Coughlin did not work

at the same time as Maugeri;

• Reported Coughlin’s complaint to his supervisor, the Division of

Juvenile Justice Administrator Steve Krause;

• Relieved Maugeri of all supervisory duties;

• Contacted the Amador County Sheriff’s Department to report

Maugeri’s alleged misconduct;

• Advised Coughlin to immediately report any contact with Maugeri;

• Advised Maugeri that retaliation was prohibited;

• Advised Maugeri to not have any contact with Coughlin, and if

contact were to occur, to immediately report the contact;

• Advised Coughlin of the Employee Assistance Program.”

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(SUF ¶ 48 (citations omitted).)

“On or about November 9, [2007], Linden took the following 

action[s]:

• Reported Coughlin’s complaint to the CDCR’s Office of Civil

Rights;

• Commenced the Local Intervention Process;

• Advised Coughlin of the Employee Assistance Program;

• Advised Coughlin of the CDCR’s policy against retaliation;

• Advised Coughlin of her right to complain directly to the Office

of Civil Rights, the DFEH, or the EEOC.”

(Id. ¶ 49 (citations omitted).)

“Coughlin’s internal complaint of sexual harassment was 

referred to the Office of Internal Affairs.” (Id. ¶ 51.) “On or

about November 13, 2007, Coughlin made a report to the Amador County

Sheriff’s Department regarding Maugeri’s conduct.” (Id. ¶ 52.) “On

December 4, 2007, the Amador County Sheriff’s Department interviewed

Maugeri regarding Coughlin’s complaint that Maugeri had exposed

himself on October 23, 2007.” (Id. ¶ 57.) “On or about December 4,

2007, CDCR learned that Maugeri had admitted exposing himself to

Coughlin on October 23, 2007.” (Id. ¶ 58.) “On or about December 4,

2007, CDCR placed Maugeri on Administrative Time Off while CDCR

continued its investigation into Coughlin’s complaints.” (Id. ¶ 59.) 

“On or about December 4, 2007, Linden collected Maugeri’s keys from

him.” (Id. ¶ 60.) “[On] April 7, 2008, [Maugeri] was involuntarily

transferred as a Cook II to the Preston Youth Correctional Facility.” 

(Id. ¶ 61.) “Maugeri resigned his employment with CDCR in or about

late June 2008.” (Id. ¶ 62.)

//

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E. Coughlin’s Employment After Reporting Maugeri’s Conduct

“In 2007, Maugeri lived [in] a house located on [Pine Grove] 

grounds” and “remained [there] until his resignation in June 2008.” 

(SUF ¶¶ 9, 10.) “On five occasions between November 16 and November

23, 2007, Coughlin observed Maugeri either in or near his rented home

as she drove onto or away from [Pine Grove]. According to Coughlin,

Maugeri ‘stared’ at her during these [five] occasions.” (Id. ¶ 53.) 

“Coughlin reported these [five] sightings to Roots and/or Linden on

November 26, 2007.” (Id. ¶ 54.) “On or about November 26, 2007,

Roots warned Maugeri to avoid contact with Coughlin, including being

outside his house and/or staring when Coughlin was arriving or

departing from [Pine Grove].” (Id. ¶ 55.)

“On February 20, 2008, Coughlin signed a Charge of 

Discrimination with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”)] and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

[(“DFEH”)].” (Id. ¶ 70.) “The Charge of Discrimination was filed by

the EEOC on February 27, 2008.” (Id. ¶ 71.) “According to the Charge

of Discrimination, Coughlin claimed she had been harass[ed] by

Maugeri[] and retaliated against for being assigned additional shifts

[beginning] December 4, 2007[,] when Maugeri was placed on

[Administrative Time Off].” (SUF ¶ 72; Rechhio Decl. Ex. A, Coughlin

Dep. Ex. 10.) The Charge also states that Coughlin was “in constant

fear” of Maugeri due to his “menacing” stares as Coughlin arrived at

work. (Recchio Decl. Ex. A, Coughlin Dep. Ex. 10.)

II. Legal Standard

In a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(c), the moving party bears the initial burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for

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trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If the

moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must set

forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir. 1987) (quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). “All

reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” 

Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. Analysis

A. Sexual Harassment under Title VII

CDCR seeks summary judgment of Coughlin’s first claim in 

which Coughlin alleges Maugeri sexually harassed her in violation of

Title VII. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-15.) CDCR argues: (1) Maugeri was not

Coughlin’s supervisor until October 24, 2007, and therefore CDCR is

not vicariously liable for Maugeri’s actions before October 24, 2007;

(2) Maugeri’s actions were not sufficiently “severe or pervasive”

under Title VII; and (3) CDCR is entitled to the “reasonable care”

affirmative defense under Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).

The United States Supreme Court “outlined the principles 

governing employer liability for sexual harassment in [Ellerth] and

[Faragher], both of which involved the harassment of an employee by

her direct supervisor.” Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047,

1054 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court divided cases in which a supervisor

harassed a subordinate into two categories:

The first category involves situations where a

supervisor exercising his authority to make

critical employment decisions on behalf of his

employer takes a sufficiently concrete action with

respect to an employee. In these situations,

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termed ‘tangible employment action’ or ‘quid-proquo’ harassment, the employer may be held

vicariously liable under traditional agency law.

In the second category, which are known as ‘hostile

environment’ claims, the Court tempered the agency

principles by allowing the employer to assert an

affirmative defense if the employer is able to

establish that it acted reasonably and that its

employee acted unreasonably.

Id. (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). Coughlin alleges a

hostile work environment claim. 

To make a prima facie case of a hostile work

environment, a person must show ‘that: (1) she was

subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual

nature, (2) this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and

create an abusive working environment.’ 

Id. at 1055 (quoting Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527

(9th Cir. 1995)).

1. Maugeri as Supervisor

CDCR argues that Maugeri and Coughlin remained co-workers 

until October 24, 2007, when Maugeri was promoted to supervisor, and

therefore CDCR is not vicariously liable for Maugeri’s actions

occurring before October 24, 2007. Coughlin rejoins, arguing “at all

relevant time periods[,] Maugeri had supervisory responsibilities over

her.” (Opp’n 3:2-3.) 

A plaintiff may state a case for harassment against

the employer under one of two theories: vicarious

liability or negligence. Which route leads to

employer liability depends on the identity of the

actual harasser, specifically whether he is a

supervisor of the employee, or merely a co-worker.

If the harasser is a supervisor, the employer may

be held vicariously liable. If, however, the

harasser is merely a co-worker, the plaintiff must

prove that the employer was negligent, i.e. that

the employer knew or should have known of the

harassment but did not take adequate steps to

address it.

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Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted). Coughlin premises CDCR’s liability on her argument that

Maugeri was Coughlin’s supervisor. 

The issue is whether Coughlin could have reasonably

concluded that Maugeri was her supervisor before he received his

promotion. In situations where “there is a false impression that the

actor was a supervisor, when he in fact was not, [the employer is

exposed to vicarious liability if] the victim’s mistaken conclusion

[is] a reasonable one.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. The Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) guidelines on vicarious

liability for supervisor harassment explains circumstances in which an

actor could expose an employer to vicarious liability for the actor’s

sexual harassment of a victim. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.

424, 434 (1971) (stating EEOC’s interpretation of the guidelines are

entitled to great deference).

The EEOC Guidelines state:

An individual who is authorized to direct another

employee’s day-to-day work activities qualifies as

his or her supervisor even if that individual does

not have the authority to undertake or recommend

tangible job decisions. Such an individual’s

ability to commit harassment is enhanced by his or

her authority to increase the employee’s workload

or assign undesirable tasks, and hence it is

appropriate to consider such a person a

‘supervisor’ when determining whether the employer

is vicariously liable. 

In Faragher, one of the harassers was authorized to

hire, supervise, counsel, and discipline

lifeguards, while the other harasser was

responsible for making the lifeguards’ daily work

assignments and supervising their work and fitness

training. There was no question that the Court

viewed them both as ‘supervisors,’ even though one

of them apparently lacked authority regarding

tangible job decisions.

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An individual who is temporarily authorized to

direct another employee’s daily work activities

qualifies as his or her ‘supervisor’ during that

time period. Accordingly, the employer would be

subject to vicarious liability if that individual

commits unlawful harassment of a subordinate while

serving as his or her supervisor.

On the other hand, someone who merely relays other

officials’ instructions regarding work assignments

and reports back to those officials does not have

true supervisory authority. Furthermore, someone

who directs only a limited number of tasks or

assignments would not qualify as a ‘supervisor.’

For example, an individual whose delegated

authority is confined to coordinating a work

project of limited scope is not a ‘supervisor.’

EEOC Guidelines ¶ II(A)(2). The EEOC Guidelines also discuss apparent

supervisory authority and vicarious liability for harassment by a

supervisor as follows:

In some circumstances, an employer may be subject

to vicarious liability for harassment by a

supervisor who does not have actual authority over

the employee. Such a result is appropriate if the

employee reasonably believed that the harasser had

such power. The employee might have such a belief

because, for example, the chains of command are

unclear. Alternatively, the employee might

reasonably believe that a harasser with broad

delegated powers has the ability to significantly

influence employment decisions affecting him or her

even if the harasser is outside the employee’s

chain of command.

EEOC Guidelines ¶ III(B). 

Coughlin’s evidence is insufficient to controvert the

portion of CDCR’s motion in which CDCR presents evidence showing it is

not vicariously liable for Maugeri’s alleged sexual harassment of her 

occurring before October 13, 2007. Wheeler testified that she

“generally supervised” both Maugeri and Coughlin until her departure

on October 13, 2007. (Wheeler Dep. 14:3-4.) Coughlin “didn’t even

know [Wheeler] was leaving until like two days before she left

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 . . . .” (Coughlin Dep. 66:4-17.) This evidence shows Coughlin had

no reason to believe Maugeri would be replacing Wheeler as supervisor

before Wheeler departed on October 13, 2007. Further, Coughlin

testified that during this time period she would describe Maugeri as

her “co-worker” (Coughlin Dep. 65:9) and Wheeler as her “supervisor”

(Coughlin Dep. 29:13-14). Coughlin testified that during this time

period Wheeler “let” Maugeri continue the ordering, menu planning, and

scheduling since “he had been at the camp for a long time and had

already been doing that.” (Coughlin Dep. 29:16-20.) However,

Coughlin testifies that other than those three additional duties,

during this time “[Maugeri’s] job duties were the same as mine, he was

a Cook II . . . .” (Coughlin Dep. 37:19-21.) Finally, Coughlin’s

Complaint alleges “on or about October 13, 2007 . . . Maugeri became

the acting supervisor and eventually permanent supervisor of the

kitchen staff . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 9.) 

However, Coughlin evidence raises a genuine issue of

material fact on the question whether she reasonably believed Maugeri

was her supervisor from October 13 to October 23, 2007. Coughlin

testified:

I just felt like he got like bold about approaching

me – after Ms. Wheeler left. I think he felt like

I’m on top of the world now, I got my supervisor

job, I get to pick who works with me. And I just

felt like he was – he started telling me stories 

. . . – it just changed.

(Coughlin Dep. 65:18-25.) Coughlin testified that Maugeri acted out

on this knowledge, discussing how he “already had the job” and stating

“I am the acting supervisor.” (Coughlin Dep. 66:11-67:17.) Following 

Wheeler’s departure, Coughlin could have reasonably believed that

Maugeri was “authorized to direct [Coughlin’s] day-to-day work

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activities” by scheduling, ordering, and creating the menu. EEOC

Guidelines ¶ III(A)(2). After Wheeler’s departure, “the chains of

command were unclear.” EEOC Guidelines ¶ III(B). Therefore, this

portion of the motion is denied.

2. Severe or Pervasive

CDCR also seeks summary judgment of Coughlin’s sexual 

harassment claim under Title VII, arguing that although “Maugeri’s

conduct was boorish and inappropriate . . . Coughlin cannot establish

that [it] was severe or pervasive.” (Mot. 13:9-14.) Coughlin

responds, arguing, “there is much evidence from which a trier of fact

[could] reasonably conclude that the conduct was severe or pervasive.” 

(Opp’n 10:16-17.)

To prevail on a hostile work environment sexual

harassment claim, the plaintiff must show that her

work environment was both subjectively and

objectively hostile; that is, she must show she

perceived her work environment to be hostile and

that a reasonable person in her position would

perceive it to be so.

Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir.

2005). “The plaintiff must also prove that ‘any harassment took place

because of sex.’” Id. (quoting Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc.,

256 F.3d 864, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2001)). CDCR does not dispute that the

harassment here “took place because of sex.” Id.

In determining whether the alleged conduct created an 

objectively hostile work environment under the first prong, the court

accesses:

all the circumstances, including the frequency of

the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether

it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a

mere offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance. Simple teasing, offhand comments, and

isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will

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not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms

and conditions of employment.

Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

Here, Coughlin has presented evidence that Maugeri’s 

sexually harassing conduct was frequent and persistent. Coughlin

presents evidence that from October 13 to November 8, 2007: Maugeri

commented that he thought about Coughlin over the weekend; Maugeri

twice told Coughlin a story about a woman he “made out” with and that

he kept that woman’s “panties” in his work locker; Maugeri told

Coughlin about his sexual relationship with his wife; Maugeri told

Coughlin he watched pornography on his computer and showed Coughlin a

pornographic image of a woman he claimed was his sister-in-law;

Maugeri exposed his penis to Coughlin and asked Coughlin “if she

wanted to touch his exposed penis”; Maugeri stated “a couple times” “I

will jack off for you”; Maugeri persistently asked Coughlin if he

could kiss her; Maugeri acted inappropriately with the male wards;

Maugeri stated “[Roots] is going to hire someone with big [tits] like

you”; Maugeri stated “I’m so glad I showed you my genitals,” again

offered “to jack off” for Coughlin, and again asked Coughlin if she

would kiss him. Coughlin has also presented evidence that she

objected to Maugeri’s behavior multiple times by reminding Maugeri

that they were both married, by leaving the room, by telling Maugeri

he was “out of control,” or by saying “no thanks, I’m not interested.”

Coughlin’s evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue

of material fact on the “objective hostility” prong of her sexual

harassment work environment claim, since a reasonable woman could have

viewed Maugeri’s behavior as humiliating and offensive to the point

that it altered conditions of her employment and interfered with her

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work performance. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir.

1991) (applying “reasonable woman” standard when victim of sexual

harassment is a woman); see also Brooks, 229 F.3d at 927 n.9 (“a

sexual assault by a supervisor, even on a single occasion, may well be

sufficiently severe so as to alter the conditions of employment and

give rise to a hostile work environment claim.”). 

Coughlin has also presented sufficient evidence to raise a 

genuine issue of material fact on the “subjective hostility” prong of

her hostile work environment claim. Coughlin testified she felt she

was “in the presence of a predator” and that she repeatedly objected

to Maugeri’s behavior. Further, Coughlin eventually complained to her

superiors and to the EEOC, demonstrating that she viewed the

environment as hostile. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d

1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Subjective hostility is clearly

established in the instant case through [Plaintiff’s] unrebutted

testimony and his complaints to supervisors and to the EEOC.”);

Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1036 n.4 (finding that a woman stating

she “finally” decided she “didn’t appreciate the rude jokes” and her

complaint to the EEOC were sufficient to satisfy “subjective hostility

prong in order to survive summary judgment”). Therefore, Coughlin has

presented evidence “sufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether [Maugeri’s] conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to create a hostile work environment,” and CDCR’s motion is

denied on this ground. Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1035. 

3. The Reasonable Care Defense

CDCR also argues it prevails on its “reasonable care”

affirmative defense to vicarious liability, articulated in Ellerth and

Faragher. Coughlin responds, CDCR “cannot establish as a matter of

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law that [Coughlin] ‘unreasonably’ failed to take advantage of any

preventive or collective opportunities provided by the employer or to

avoid harm otherwise.” (Opp’n 11:4-6.)

To prevail on the affirmative defense of

‘reasonable care,’ an employer must prove ‘(a) that

it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct

promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)

that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to

take advantage of any preventive or corrective

opportunities provided by it or to avoid harm

otherwise.’

Holly D. v. California Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1177 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at

765) (emphasis added). Further, under the second prong of the

defense, “an employer who exercised reasonable care . . . is not

liable for unlawful harassment if the aggrieved employee could have

avoided all of the actionable harm. If some but not all of the harm

could have been avoided, then an award of damages will be mitigated

accordingly.” EEOC Guidelines ¶ V(D) (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at

807) (emphasis added).

The undisputed facts show that CDCR “exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly” Maugeri’s harassing behavior

after Coughlin complained about the behavior. Holly D., 339 F.3d at

1177. It is undisputed that Coughlin was provided a copy of and knew

of the CDCR policy against sexual harassment and that she attended

training that included the sexual harassment policy. (SUF ¶¶ 88-92.) 

It is further undisputed that Roots and Linden promptly responded to

Coughlin’s complaint by altering the kitchen schedule to ensure

Coughlin and Maugeri did not work together, relieving Maugeri of all

supervisory duties, contacting the Amador County Sheriff’s Department

to report Mauger’s conduct, reporting Coughlin’s complaint to the CDCR

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Office of Civil Rights, commencing the “local intervention process,”

advising Coughlin of her right to complain directly to the Office of

Civil Rights, the DFEH, or the EEOC, and eventually placing Maugeri on

Administrative Time Off. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.) Therefore, CDCR has

satisfied the first prong of the “reasonable care” defense.

However, CDCR has not sustained its summary judgment burden

of showing as a matter of law that Coughlin “unreasonably failed to

take advantage of [the] preventive or corrective opportunities

provided by [CDCR] or to avoid harm otherwise.” Holly D., 339 F.3d at

1177. The following comprises CDCR’s showing on these issues:

In waiting until November 8, 2007, Ms. Coughlin

unreasonably failed to take advantage of the

corrective and preventative opportunities afforded

to her. Had Ms. Coughlin promptly reported

Maugeri’s conduct when it first occurred, she could

have prevented further misconduct from occurring.

For instance, Ms. Coughlin claims that shortly

after she began working at [Pine Grove] Maugeri

became “fliratious” with her, and commented four

times on her hair and eyes between October 2006 and

October 13, 2007. She also alleges that in late

September 2007 Maugeri told her he was aroused when

she talked about pedicures, and asked her to touch

his hands. Ms. Coughlin could and should have

reported this conduct when it occurred, and she

chose not to. She unreasonably failed to [] report

this conduct when it occurred. Further, she knew

that Maugeri was interviewing for the supervisor

position, and believed he would likely receive the

promotion. She failed to alert [Pine Grove] or

anyone at CDCR of Maugeri’s conduct at any point

prior to his promotion.

(Mot. 19:13-24.) CDCR essentially makes two arguments: first, that

Coughlin acted unreasonably by not reporting Maugeri’s earlier conduct

between October 2006 and October 13, 2007; and second, that Coughlin 

knew Maugeri was interviewing for the supervisor position, and

believed he would likely receive the promotion, yet she failed to

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alert Pine Grove or anyone at CDCR of Maugeri’s behavior at any point

prior to his promotion. 

However, the parties’ agree it is undisputed that even

though Maugeri’s actions between October 2006 and October 13, 2007 

made Coughlin “uncomfortable,” she “was not offended” during this time

period. (SUF ¶ 21.) Further, CDCR has not provided evidence

supporting its factual assertions in its second argument. Therefore,

CDCR’s motion based on its Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense is

denied.

B. Sexual Harassment Under FEHA

CDCR next seeks summary judgment of Coughlin’s sexual 

harassment claim under FEHA, arguing (1) Maugeri and Coughlin were coworkers until October 24, 2007, and (2) Maugeri’s conduct was not

severe or pervasive. (Mot. 20:15-21:16.) Coughlin rejoins, arguing

“both . . . Title VII and . . . FEHA cases consider similar factors.” 

(Opp’n 9:3-4.)

“The elements of a hostile work environment claim under the 

FEHA track the elements of such a claim under Title VII.” Reiter v.

City of Sacramento, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1041 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2000).

FEHA follows the same analysis as Title VII for purposes of what

conduct is “severe and pervasive” enough to constitute a hostile work

environment. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 923 (stating that “[w]hile

[plaintiff] argues that she was subjected to sexual discrimination

under Title VII as well as FEHA, we need only assess her claim under

federal law because Title VII and FEHA operate under the same guiding

principles” and going on to discuss whether the work environment was

sufficiently “severe and pervasive” under both statutes). “Only when

FEHA provisions are similar to those in Title VII do [courts] look to

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the . . . interpretation of Title VII as an aid in construing the

FEHA.” Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 74 (2000).

Since what constitutes a hostile work environment under FEHA is

similar to how this issue is determined under Title VII, CDCR’s motion

on this ground is denied based on the reasons discussed above in the

decision on CDCR’s motion challenging this issue in Coughlin’s Title

VII claim.

Coughlin argues Maugeri is a supervisor under FEHA and

therefore CDCR is liable for Maugeri’s sexually harassing actions. 

“Under the FEHA, an employer is strictly liable for the harassing

actions of its supervisors and agents.” Chapman v. Enos, 116 Cal.

App. 4th 920, 928 (2004). 

FEHA defines a supervisor as follows:

[A]ny individual having the authority, in the

interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,

suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,

assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or

the responsibility to direct them, or to adjust

their grievances, or effectively to recommend that

action, if, in connection with the foregoing, the

exercise of that authority is not of merely routine

or clerical nature, but requires the use of

independent judgment.

Cal. Gov. Code. § 12926(r). “We must construe the provisions of the

FEHA broadly, to protect employees’ rights to seek and hold employment

without discrimination.” Chapman 116 Cal. App. 4th at 931. 

[W]hile full accountability and responsibility are

certainly indicia of supervisory power, they are

not required elements of . . . the FEHA definition

of supervisor. Indeed, many supervisors with

responsibility to direct others using their

independent judgment, and whose supervision of

employees is not merely routine or clerical, would

not meet these additional criteria though they

otherwise be within the ambit of the FEHA

supervisor definition.

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Id. at 930 (emphasis in original). Further, the California appellate

court in Chapman cited as “useful, although not controlling” the same

EEOC Guidelines discussed above in the decision on Coughlin’s Title

VII claim. Id. at 930 n.10 (quoting EEOC Guidelines ¶ III(B)). 

“[C]onstru[ing] the provisions of the FEHA broadly,” and considering

Coughlin’s evidence controverting CDCR’s position on whether it is

exposed to liability under the FEHA based on Maugeri’s sexual

harassment, requires denial of this portion of CDCR’s motion because a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Coughlin

reasonably believed Maugeri was her supervisor on and after October

13, 2007. Chapman, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 931; see e.g., Almanza v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-0553-WBS-GGH, 2007 WL 2274927, **3-4

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) (finding there was evidence suggesting

plaintiff could have reasonably believed another employee was her

supervisor under FEHA, among other factual disputes, and holding,

“Sufficient significant disputes over material facts exist so that the

court cannot say at this time that [the employee] was not plaintiff’s

supervisor as a matter of law.”); Beagle v. Rite Aid Corp., No. C 08-

1517 PJH, 2009 WL 3112098, at **14-16 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2009)

(finding triable issue of fact as to whether individual constituted a

supervisor under FEHA where “he did not direct [plaintiff’s] work on a

daily basis, but only when [other supervisors] were not on the store

premises . . . and [he] could not approve or set vacation days or

schedules”). However, for the reasons discussed above in the decision

on Coughlin’s Title VII claim, Coughlin has failed to raise a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether she reasonably believed Maugeri

was her supervisor before October 13, 2007. Therefore, CDCR’s summary

judgment motion on Coughlin’s sexual harassment claim under FEHA is

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granted concerning Maugeri’s behavior before October 13, 2007 and is

denied concerning his behavior on and after October 13, 2007.

C. Retaliation under Title VII and FEHA

CDCR also seeks summary judgment of Coughlin’s third and 

fourth claims in which Coughlin alleges retaliatory harassment under

Title VII and FEHA, arguing Coughlin cannot “establish she suffered an

adverse employment action or a causal connection.” (Mot. 28:1-2.) 

Coughlin rejoins, arguing she can establish an adverse employment

action and its causal connection to her protected activity. (Opp’n

16:4-18:6.) Coughlin further argues that her retaliation claim is

“reasonably related” to the allegations in her EEOC complaint, and

therefore she has not failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 

(Opp’n 13:19-21.)

Title VII and FEHA retaliation “claims are examined 

together under the same burden-shifting structure.” Brooks, 229 F.3d

at 928.

To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII, a

plaintiff must show (1) involvement in a protected

activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3)

a causal link between the two. Thereafter, the

burden of production shifts to the employer to

present legitimate reasons for the adverse

employment action. Once the employer carries this

burden, plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the reason advanced

by the employer was a pretext. Only then does the

case proceed beyond the summary judgment stage.

Id. (citations omitted). Coughlin engaged in a protected activity

under both Title VII and FEHA when she reported Maugeri’s conduct.

Coughlin argues she suffered the following adverse 

employment actions in retaliation for reporting Maugeri’s conduct:

Maugeri “being allowed” to live at Pine Grove and “staring” at

Coughlin from his house as she entered Pine Grove each morning; having

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to work “excessive shifts and hours”; and being ostracized and labeled

a “trouble-maker” by other employees. (Opp’n 16:4-18:6; Compl. ¶¶ 19-

26.)

“An action is cognizable as an adverse employment action 

[under Title VII] if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from

engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234,

1243 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Among those employment decisions that can

constitute an adverse employment action are

termination, dissemination of a negative employment

reference, issuance of an undeserved negative

performance review and refusal to consider for

promotion. By contrast, we have held that

declining to hold a job open for an employee and

badmouthing an employee outside the job reference

context do not constitute adverse employment

actions.

Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928-29. Under FEHA, an adverse employment action

must “materially affect the terms and conditions of employment.” 

Yankowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1036 (2005).

Coughlin’s bare assertion that she was ostracized by her coworkers and labeled a “trouble-maker” is insufficient to constitute an

adverse employment action under either Title VII or FEHA. See Brooks,

229 F.3d at 929 (“Because an employer cannot force employees to

socialize with one another, ostracism suffered at the hands of

coworkers cannot constitute an adverse employment action.”); Strother

v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir.

1996) (“[M]ere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to show an

adverse employment decision.”); Yankowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1036 (an

adverse employment action must “materially affect the terms and

conditions of employment”).

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Additionally, Coughlin’s assertion that Maugeri “stared” at

her is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. 

Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing and quoting Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d

1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) for the proposition that “the supervisor’s

hostile stares . . . were insufficient to preclude summary judgment

dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim”). Nor has Coughlin showed

that the hostile stares about which she argues “materially affect[ed]

the terms and conditions of her employment.” Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at

1036. Further, it is undisputed that Coughlin reported these “stares”

to Roots and that Roots warned Maugeri to avoid contact with and to

stop staring at Coughlin. (SUF ¶¶ 53-55.) 

Coughlin also fails to show that her assertion that she was

required to work excessive shifts and hours constitutes an adverse

employment action. Coughlin testified that after Maugeri was placed

on Administrative Time Off, Roots asked her “How are you doing[?]”

(Coughlin Dep. 223:15-17.) Coughlin avers she responded:

I said, I’m doing okay, but I need some help. And

he said, Well, you know, we are just waiting on

Livescan. And I said, I’m probably good for 30

days. You can do almost anything for 30 days as

long as there is a light at the end of the tunnel.

And that’s the only conversation that Mike and I

had about it.

(Coughlin Dep. 223:18-24.) It is undisputed that CDCR paid other CDCR

employees overtime to work in the kitchen as relief for Coughlin until

Sharon Bauer and Cynthia Wilson began work in March. (SUF ¶ 76.) 

Coughlin testified that correctional officers covered “several”

weekends during this period of time. (Coughlin Dep. 226:7-16.) 

Moreover, CDCR has provided “monthly attendance reports” which show

that in December 2007, Coughlin worked 15.75 hours of overtime and had

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twelve days off; in January 2008, Coughlin worked 43.75 hours of

overtime and had eleven days off; and in February 2008, Coughlin

worked 29.25 hours of overtime and had thirteen days off. (Brizzi

Decl. ¶¶ 8-10, Ex. 3.) Coughlin disputes these figures, but has not

provided evidence controverting them.

Further, even if Coughlin could establish that her extra 

shifts were adverse employment actions, CDCR has presented evidence

that it obtained part-time staff to assist Coughlin in the kitchen and

that there was an administrative delay in hiring additional permanent

kitchen staff. Coughlin has not presented evidence demonstrating that

these legitimate reasons for the shortage of kitchen staff are

pretextual.

Coughlin also complains about the schedule she had after 

Wilson began as kitchen supervisor in March 2008. Coughlin argues

that Roots somehow participated in assigning Coughlin unpleasant

duties and shifts. However, Coughlin provides no evidence supporting

her argument that Roots participated in assigning duties to the cooks

or was involved with creating the schedule for the cooks. 

Therefore, CDCR’s summary judgment motion on Coughlin’s

retaliatory harassment claims under Title VII and FEHA is granted. D.

Failure to Prevent Harassment Under FEHA

Finally, CDCR seeks summary judgment of Coughlin’s fifth 

claim for failure to prevent harassment under FEHA, arguing “Coughlin

cannot establish that CDCR failed to take reasonable steps to prevent

sexual harassment.” (Mot. 34:11-12.) Coughlin counters that this

claim is based on the following: “Maugeri was permitted to live in

state housing and Roots had the authority to prevent that. [Coughlin]

came to work at odd hours and Maugeri would stare at her and make her

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uncomfortable. She was told by administration that they could not

guarantee her safety.” (Opp’n 18:10-15.) Coughlin further argues

that “the scheduling and assignment of kitchen duties were

inequitable.” (Opp’n 18:16-18.) 

Coughlin’s fifth claim is alleged under 12940(k) of the

FEHA. To maintain this claim, Coughlin must establish the usual tort

elements: duty of care, breach of duty, causation and damages.

Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 286-287

(1998). However, Coughlin’s conclusory assertions do not establish a

duty concerning the matters on which she relies, and even assuming the

existence of a duty, she has not shown breach of that duty. 

Further, CDCR argues that “the mere fact that sexual

harassment occurred is insufficient to establish a defendant’s

negligent failure to prevent harassment.” (Supplemental Reply 16:8-

9.) “Employers are required to ‘take all reasonable steps necessary

to prevent discrimination’ in the workplace. One such reasonable

step, and one that is required in order to ensure a

discrimination-free work environment, is a prompt investigation of the

discrimination claim.” California Fair Employment and Housing Com'n

v. Gemini Aluminum, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1024 (2004) (citation

omitted). Coughlin does not dispute the reasonable steps CDCR

established to prevent the sexual harassment to which Maugeri

allegedly subjected Coughlin. (SUF ¶¶ 88-92.) It is undisputed that

CDCR had a no-harassment policy and that all CDCR employees, including

Coughlin, received training on that policy, and Coughlin could have

reported the harassment to CDCR under that policy but waited until

after Maugeri was promoted to report the sexual harassment. (SUF ¶¶

46, 88-92.) 

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Therefore, CDCR’s summary judgment motion on Coughlin’s

“failure to prevent harassment” claim is granted.

IV. Conclusion

For the stated reasons, CDCR’s summary judgment motion is 

GRANTED on Coughlin’s first and second claims for vicarious liability

for sexual harassment under Title VII and FEHA based on Maugeri’s

actions occurring before October 13, 2007; DENIED as to Coughlin’s

first and second claims for vicarious liability for sexual harassment

under Title VII and FEHA based on Maugeri’s actions on and after

October 13, 2007; GRANTED on Coughlin’s third and fourth claims for

retaliation under Title VII and FEHA; and GRANTED on Coughlin’s fifth

claim for failure to prevent harassment under FEHA.

Dated: April 23, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:08-cv-02772-GEB -JFM Document 38 Filed 04/26/10 Page 28 of 28