Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06247/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06247-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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As used in this order, “Defendants” refers only to these two

Defendants; it does not refer to Dempsey Investigations, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONSTANCE FINLEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE

CO.; THE BOSTON FINANCIAL GROUP LONGTERM DISABILITY PLAN; and DEMPSEY

INVESTIGATIONS, INC.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-6247 CW

ORDER DENYING THE

PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR

JUDGMENT, GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

REMANDING PLAINTIFF’S

DISABILITY CLAIM TO

HARTFORD

Plaintiff Constance Finley moves for judgment on her claim for

disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act (ERISA). Defendants Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.

(Hartford) and The Boston Financial Group Long-Term Disability Plan

cross-move for judgment on this claim and move for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s claims for trespass and invasion of privacy.1

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion with respect to her

trespass claim, but she does oppose Defendants’ motion with respect

to her invasion of privacy claims. The matter was heard on

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November 29, 2007. Having considered oral argument and all of the

papers submitted by the parties, the Court denies the parties’

motions for judgment on Plaintiff’s ERISA claim and grants

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s privacy

claims. Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits is remanded to

Hartford for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

I. Findings of Fact on Plaintiff’s ERISA Claim

Having considered the evidence in the record, the Court finds

the following facts with respect to Plaintiff’s ERISA claim.

A. Plaintiff’s Employment and Injury

In early 1996, when she was self-employed, Plaintiff began to

experience pain in her right shoulder and stopped working for a

time while she underwent a course of physical therapy. By June of

that year, she considered herself sufficiently recovered to resume

work and, on June 24, she began working for The Boston Financial

Group (Boston) as a vice president and senior banker. In her

position, she negotiated contracts, marketed projects to developers

and spoke at conferences. The job involved frequent travel, and

Plaintiff was away from home a majority of the time. She worked an

average of sixty-five to seventy-five hours a week.

On October 8, 1996, Plaintiff injured her shoulder while

carrying a box of documents at work. She underwent surgery to

remove portions of bone, bone spurs and scar tissue from her

shoulder, but continued to experience pain even after the surgery. 

She took a brief amount of time off work, but soon resumed working

full-time. In February, 1997, Plaintiff began to experience spasms

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in her left arm, rendering it unusable. The pain in her arms

prevented her from doing ordinary activities of daily life, such as

opening a door, lifting a pot, driving a car and sleeping. Because

the pain prevented her from performing the duties expected of her

at work, she stopped working for Boston on May 15, 1997.

Boston maintains a long-term disability plan (the Plan) that

covers eligible employees in the event they become totally

disabled. The Plan is administered and insured by Hartford. The

Plan document defines “total disability” as a condition where,

during the first thirty-six months, the insured is “prevented by

Disability from doing all the material and substantial duties of

[his or her] own occupation on a full time basis.” Roberts Dec.

Ex. 2 at P00154. After the first thirty-six months, the definition

includes only individuals who are “prevented by Disability from

doing any occupation or work for which [they] are qualified by

training, education, or experience.” Id.

Plaintiff filed a claim for disability benefits as a result of

her diagnosis of bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome, left cubital

tunnel syndrome and right shoulder impingement syndrome. On

August 16, 1997, Hartford approved this claim and began paying

Plaintiff benefits.

B. The June, 2005 Surveillance of Plaintiff

In June, 2005, at Hartford’s request, an investigative firm,

HUB Enterprises, performed surveillance on Plaintiff. On June 17,

2005, Plaintiff was videotaped outside her home during several

periods of time, all falling between approximately 9:40 a.m. and

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2

The video was submitted to the Court as Exhibit 11 to the

Roberts Declaration.

4

2:15 p.m.2

 The video depicts her in her yard, conversing with her

gardeners and assisting them with various aspects of their work. 

Between approximately 10:08 a.m. and 10:21 a.m., Plaintiff is seen

bending over to remove weeds and pick flowers from areas of heavy

growth. She is also depicted continuing this type of activity at

various times between approximately 10:51 a.m. and 11:48 a.m., when

she enters her house. Throughout these periods, Plaintiff can

clearly be seen grasping at the stems of tall plants and pulling

them out forcefully. However, during the latter period, the video

does not run continuously and Plaintiff is frequently obscured or

out of sight, making it difficult to determine the exact nature of

her activities.

Plaintiff next appears at approximately 1:05 p.m., when she

begins to remove smaller weeds from around the edge of her

driveway. Nothing obscures the camera’s view of her activities at

this time. Kneeling on a pad, bending forward while supporting her

weight with her arm, she uses a trowel to dig into the soil and pry

the weeds out. She also uses a hook-type instrument to scrape

forcefully around the edge. She pulls strenuously at the weeds

with her fingers and grips them with her fist to rip them out. The

ground appears to be dry and the weeds do not come out easily.

Plaintiff continues along the driveway until 1:31 p.m., then

moves to another part of her garden, where she resumes pulling

larger weeds until about 2:08 p.m. In addition to the previously

described activities, during this period she is seen carrying a

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basket of weeds and throwing weeds several feet with both arms,

using both underhanded and overhanded motions. She also signals to

her gardeners by raising her right arm above her head until it is

vertical and maintaining it there for several seconds.

Throughout the video, Plaintiff moves at a normal speed and

displays no clear outward signs of pain. She can, however, be seen

shaking her hands, particularly near the end of the video, between

2:08 p.m. and 2:15 p.m., just after she has finished the yard work

and before she returns inside the house. 

The next day, June 18, 2005, HUB Enterprises again performed

surveillance on Plaintiff. In the video from this surveillance,

Plaintiff is seen driving her two dogs to the San Francisco Bay

trail. She departs on the trail at 11:31 a.m., walking in an

unrestricted manner. The HUB investigator accompanies Plaintiff on

the trail until 11:40 a.m., then returns to the parking lot. 

Plaintiff is seen returning to her car with her dogs at 12:57 p.m. 

At this time, a long-sleeved shirt that she had been wearing when

she started is tied around her waist. She then brushes her dogs

using apparently unrestricted arm movements.

C. Plaintiff’s Statements on July 29, 2005

On July 29, 2005, a Hartford investigator visited Plaintiff at

her home. Prior to showing her the surveillance video, he

interviewed her about her condition and prepared a statement for

her to sign. The document contained, among others, the following

statements:

I am able to walk about twenty or thirty minutes and

other days is [sic] painful after five minutes.

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I am able to lift and carry items that weigh as little as

possible I limit it to less than five pounds.

I am not able to push and pull because of the pain in my

upper body.

I am not able to reach overhead because it is very

painful in the area of my shoulders.

I do not have full use of my hands and fingers, using my

thumbs aggravate[s] the pain in my hands. . . . My grip

strength is not enough to open a jar or a bottle; but I

have a tool to open jars and bottles. [It] is not because

of lack of strength [it] is because of the pain it causes

me.

On my best day I can walk my dogs for a mile, I may go to

the beach with a friend or go out to eat or go to a

movie. That is the most activity I can do on a best day.

In the last 6 months, my condition has improved for about

three weeks and there was [a] period that it got worse

but mostly it has remained the same. During the past 6

months, I have not experienced a time when I could exceed

the level of functionality or be more active than I have

described above.

Welch Dec. Ex. D at SIU100-106. Before signing the statement,

Plaintiff made several edits by crossing out certain words and

writing in others. Id.

The statement does not disclose an improvement -- even a

temporary one -- of the type depicted in the surveillance video. 

At her deposition, Plaintiff explained this by saying:

When the special investigator came, he asked me, “Has

[sic] there been any times in the last” blah, blah, blah

“where you felt better than other times?” And I said,

“Yes. In June, I actually had a two-week period in which

I thought I might be getting better, and maybe even like

[sic] that I was going to recover.” I said, “I felt

amazingly better.” And he said, “Well, what did that

mean?” I said, “I gardened with my gardeners, which is

something I never am able to do.” I described the whole

thing to him. And so he said, “Well, do you still feel

better?” I said, “No. I immediately got much, much

worse and spent most of July in bed.” So then later he

placed the -- he didn’t put that in my statement. He

said it was irrelevant because I had gotten better.

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Roberts Dec. Ex. 10 at 35. The record is silent as to whether the

investigator would corroborate Plaintiff’s account of her exchange

with him.

After Plaintiff signed her statement, the investigator showed

her the surveillance video. He then prepared a second statement,

which Plaintiff revised and then signed. In this statement,

Plaintiff acknowledged that:

“[S]ome of the activities seen on the video exceeded the

restrictions and limitations outlined by my doctor, and

what I have reported to The Hartford Life Company, but I

was able to do those activities on those days because I

had to put the pains aside out of frustration and not

having the funds to hire someone to do it for me. . . .

It was bizarre that the only day in the last nine years

that I did landscaping I was videotaped. It took me two

weeks to recover by resting and bring [sic] the pain down

to my usual level of pain. My gardener repeatedly urged

me to stop knowing that I was vastly exceeding my

physical limitations.

Welch Dec. Ex. D at SIU098-099. She also stated that the weeds

were in mud and came out easily, and that her gardeners did all of

the lifting.

D. Hartford’s Denial of Plaintiff’s Disability Claim

Following Plaintiff’s interview, Hartford requested a medical

review from University Disability Consortium (UDC). Dr. Brian

Mercer, board-certified in neurology, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical

records and the surveillance videos described above. He did not

examine Plaintiff; UDC physicians do not examine patients. Dr.

Mercer also called Plaintiff’s physician, Dr. Steven Blackman, who

stated that he had not seen Plaintiff in over six months. Dr.

Mercer found that Plaintiff’s records revealed no objective

abnormalities that would preclude her from functioning at a fullCase 4:06-cv-06247-CW Document 112 Filed 12/14/07 Page 7 of 22
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time light-level job. He also found that Plaintiff’s subjective

symptoms and limitations, as reported to Hartford and her

physicians, were inconsistent with the activities depicted on the

videos. 

Plaintiff notes that Dr. Mercer is a part-time employee of UDC

and participates in the company’s profit-sharing plan. 

Approximately seventy-five percent of UDC’s revenue is from its

business with Defendant Hartford.

On September 21, 2005, Hartford terminated Plaintiff’s

benefits on the grounds that she was no longer totally disabled as

defined under the policy. In reaching this conclusion, Hartford

relied largely upon Dr. Mercer’s findings and the discrepancy

between Plaintiff’s self-reported condition and her activities in

the June, 2005 surveillance videos. Hartford concluded that

Plaintiff was capable of performing full-time work imposing light

physical demands. Based on her education and transferable skills,

it identified two sedentary occupations that closely matched

Plaintiff’s background: a manager in the credit or collection

industry, and a vice president at a financial institution.

E. Plaintiff’s Appeal

On March 22, 2006, Plaintiff appealed the termination of her

benefits. In support of her appeal, Plaintiff submitted a letter

from Dr. Blackman, who treated Plaintiff from April, 1986 until

December, 2004. He supported Plaintiff’s account of her

disability, stating, “Over the years, she has demonstrated

objective findings to confirm her diagnosis, including muscle

weakness, joint inflammation, swelling, heat and muscle wasting,

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peripheral entrapment neuropathy, and furthermore, palpatory

findings such as altered muscle tone, tissue irritability,

segmental facilitation, etc.” Welch Dec. Ex. 2 at AR0134. Dr.

Blackman concluded that the chronic nature of Plaintiff’s

disability prevented her “from being involved in her previous

occupation on any regular basis” because her condition “limit[ed]

her ability to lift, carry or type and write for long periods of

time.” Id. He added that chronic connective tissue disorders

often cycle through episodes of improvement and worsening. 

However, Dr. Blackman acknowledged that he had not reviewed the

June, 2005 video surveillance of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also submitted a letter from Dr. Daniel Shadoan,

whom she first saw in July, 2005, after the surveillance video had

been taken. Dr. Shadoan echoed Dr. Blackman’s statements, stating

that Plaintiff suffers from a condition marked by pain that does

not limit her anatomic range of motion. He noted that Plaintiff’s

“prognosis is chronic with intermittent periods of amelioration

common in a chronic systemic connective tissue disorder, which may

have an autoimmune basis.” Welch Dec. Ex. B at AR0136. 

“Objectively,” he said, “I find a neurologically intact female in

no acute distress with chronic muscle spasm of the upper back,

shoulders and neck along with segmental facilitation, which support

the symptoms she describes.” Id. Noting that more than ten

minutes of working on the computer exacerbates Plaintiff’s pain, he

concluded that she would not be able to return to her former job.

Plaintiff also submitted a letter from Dr. Aimee Chagnon, whom

Plaintiff began seeing on March 14, 2006, after the denial of her

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disability benefits. This letter repeated much of the information

in the letters from Plaintiff’s other two doctors. Dr. Chagnon

attached some of Plaintiff’s medical records as well.

In addition to the letters from her treating physicians,

Plaintiff submitted a declaration in which she addressed the

activities she was performing while under surveillance. She stated

that in June, 2005, she had a two-week period in which she was

“elated” because she thought she “might possibly be having a major

breakthrough and getting ‘well,’ relatively speaking.” Welch Dec.

Ex. B at AR0167. It was during this time period that she was

videotaped working in her garden. As someone who enjoyed gardening

before her disability, on June 17, 2005, Plaintiff “told [her]

gardeners with excitement that [she] was going to try to work in

the garden with them.” Id. As she explained in her declaration,

“I knew the pain level would go up immediately but I needed to know

for me if I could do gardening and how many days it would take me

to recover.” Id. Despite her gardeners’ exhortations, she began

pulling weeds from what she described as a marshy area in her yard. 

When she went inside the house, her pain level was elevated, but

she nonetheless decided to press on that afternoon because of the

feeling of accomplishment. Plaintiff stated in her declaration

that the gardening was “the most physical activity” she had done

since she stopped working. Id. at AR0168.

Plaintiff supplemented her account with a declaration from her

gardener. The gardener stated that, prior to June 17, 2005,

Plaintiff had helped them with gardening, but only by performing

minor work such as weeding the stairs, where the weeds are easy to

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remove. Still, on these occasions, Plaintiff would complain about

pain in her wrists and arms and go inside to rest after a short

period of time. The gardener reported that on the morning of June

17, 2005, Plaintiff “appeared to be feeling better and tried to do

substantially more than she was ever able to do in the past.” 

Welch Dec. Ex. B at AR0172. During the gardening, Plaintiff

“complained about her arms and indicated that she knew she needed

to take a rest.” Id. at AR0173.

According to Plaintiff’s declaration, on the night of June 17,

2005, her pain became very severe. She “tried walking the next day

with [her] dogs to see if walking would help.” Welch Dec. Ex. B at

AR0168. It did not, and she experienced a two-week period of

intense pain. Afterwards, her condition returned to its usual

state of alternating periods of feeling better and feeling worse.

In considering Plaintiff’s appeal, Hartford requested that two

additional physicians, one board-certified in neurology and

clinical neurophysiology, the other board-certified in physical

medicine, rehabilitation and pain medicine, review Plaintiff’s

medical records and the July, 2005 surveillance video. These

doctors -- Bruce LeForce and Phillip Marion -- are employed by Reed

Review Services (RRS), not UDC. In a joint report, each doctor

concluded individually, as did Dr. Mercer, that Plaintiff was

capable of full-time work. They both relied heavily on the

surveillance video in support of their conclusion. However, they

mischaracterized the content of the video somewhat, stating that

Plaintiff was depicted gardening for “several hours.”

On April 24, 2006, Hartford upheld its original decision to

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terminate Plaintiff’s benefits and closed its file of Plaintiff’s

case. In doing so, it relied in part on the report by provided by

RRS. Although Plaintiff requested that she be permitted to respond

to any new evidence Hartford considered in reviewing her appeal,

Hartford did not provide Plaintiff with the RRS report, and thus

she had no opportunity to rebut the doctors’ conclusions. Hartford

did not provide Plaintiff with the report until June 28, 2006.

On September 1, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter to Hartford,

attempting to supplement her request for review by submitting a

letter from a new doctor. This doctor, Michael Neuwelt, stated

that he first examined Plaintiff on May 4, 2006. He diagnosed her

with ankylosing spondylitis, an autoimmune disease. He disagreed

with the RRS report’s conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of

full-time work without restrictions or limitations, because the

reviewing doctors “did not have before them the examination and

test results showing ankylosing spondylitis and did not consider

this diagnosis.” Roberts Dec. Ex. 4 at P00946. Five days later,

Hartford returned the additional materials Plaintiff had submitted. 

The letter explained, "Because we closed our administrative record

for this claim on 4/26/06, we have not reviewed and are returning

the documents you included with your 9/1/06 letter." Id. at

P00941.

Plaintiff now sues Hartford and the Plan under ERISA to obtain

a reinstatement of her disability benefits.

II. Factual Background on Plaintiff’s Invasion of Privacy Claims

In January, 2001, Hartford’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU)

asked Defendant Dempsey Investigations, Inc. (Dempsey) to perform

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surveillance on Plaintiff. This investigation was independent from

the one described above. Pursuant to Hartford’s instruction, a

Dempsey investigator conducted surveillance of Plaintiff on

February 2, 3 and 4, 2001. As part of this surveillance, the

investigator videotaped Plaintiff when she was in her kitchen.

The relevant portion of the video was shot by zooming in on

Plaintiff’s kitchen window shortly before 6:00 p.m. on February 2. 

It was dark outside when the video was taken, and Plaintiff’s

kitchen light was on. There were no blinds or curtains obstructing

the view through the window. Given the camera angle, it appears

that the investigator was not positioned on Plaintiff’s property,

but rather across the street from her house.

In the video, Plaintiff can be seen from mid-chest up standing

at a counter preparing food, placing an item in the microwave,

moving around the kitchen, and drinking from a glass of wine. The

video lasts approximately twenty minutes; Plaintiff is not in the

field of view throughout this entire period.

Based on the Dempsey investigator’s filming her while she was

in her home, Plaintiff asserts claims against Hartford and Dempsey

for invasion of privacy under the common law, Article I, § I of the

California Constitution, and California Civil Code § 1708.8.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Plaintiff’s ERISA Claim

Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

each of the parties moves for judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s

ERISA claims. Under Rule 52, the court conducts what is

essentially a bench trial on the record, evaluating the

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persuasiveness of conflicting testimony and deciding which is more

likely true. Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1094-95

(9th Cir. 1999).

In an earlier order, the Court determined that it would review

Hartford’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s disability claim under an

abuse of discretion standard. However, because of conflicts of

interest inherent in the structure of the Plan, the Court also

found that it would apply this standard with a moderate degree of

skepticism.

Taking the Rule 52 procedure together with the standard of

review, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence in

the administrative record that Hartford’s decision to terminate her

benefits, when considered with a moderate degree of skepticism,

constituted an abuse of discretion. If Hartford’s decision,

considered with a moderate degree of skepticism, was reasonable and

supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record as a

whole, it was not an abuse of discretion. See McKenzie v. General

Tel. Co. of Cal., 41 F.3d 1310, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1994).

II. Plaintiff’s Invasion of Privacy Claims

Defendants move under Rule 56 for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claims. Summary judgment is

properly granted when no genuine and disputed issues of material

fact remain, and when, viewing the evidence most favorably to the

non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d

1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987).

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The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods:

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

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produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s ERISA Claim

Defendants argue that Hartford’s decision to terminate

Plaintiff’s benefits must be upheld because the decision does not

represent an abuse of their discretion, considering the

administrative record as a whole. Plaintiff argues, to the

contrary, that the record clearly demonstrates that she is totally

disabled, and that Hartford’s decision was not supported by

substantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s benefits were denied as a direct result of the

June, 2005 surveillance video. Thus, a central question is whether

it was reasonable for Hartford to conclude that Plaintiff was

capable of returning to full-time work based on the videotape and

the relationship between Plaintiff’s activities on the videotape

and her self-reported physical limitations.

Weighing the conflicting evidence, the Court finds that during

the July 29, 2005 interview, Plaintiff was not forthcoming about

the extent of her improvement in June, 2005. The video shows

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Plaintiff performing activities that clearly and dramatically

contradict her statements to Hartford’s investigator. Although

Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she told the

investigator about the gardening session, this testimony is not

supported by the statement she reviewed, edited, and signed

immediately before being shown the surveillance video. In that

statement, Plaintiff claimed to suffer from severe physical

restrictions on an ongoing basis. She also stated unambiguously

that, during the prior six months, she had not experienced a time

when she could exceed the minimal level of functionality described

in detail above.

The video shows Plaintiff performing vigorous yard work

requiring the use of her arms in a way that far exceeded her

reported abilities. Additionally, parts of her second written

statement on July 29, 2005 -- made immediately after being

confronted with the video -- are inconsistent with either the

depictions in the video itself or with the declarations she later

submitted in support of her appeal. For instance, in her

statement, Plaintiff said that the weeds were in mud and came out

easily, but this does not accord with the footage in the video. 

She also stated that it took her two weeks to recover from the

gardening and bring her pain down to its usual level, but this

claim is dubious given the footage of her walking her dogs for an

hour and a half, then brushing them, the next day. She further

stated that the videotaped gardening session was the first time she

had gardened in nine years, but her gardener’s later declaration

said that Plaintiff had attempted to help the gardeners in the

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past, albeit by performing easier tasks. Plaintiff’s own

declaration, submitted with her appeal, referred to a two-week

period in June, 2005 during which she was elated and thought she

might be getting better, but mention of such a period is absent

from both of the statements she signed on July 29, 2005. It also

contradicts the second statement’s claim that she was in extreme

pain while gardening, but did it anyway out of frustration with not

having funds to pay for the work to be done.

The video does more than simply depict activities that are

arguably incompatible with Plaintiff’s claim of disability; when

considered together with Plaintiff’s self-reported limitations, the

video severely damages her credibility. Because the record before

Hartford contained no evidence of objective abnormalities that

would conclusively establish the level of pain Plaintiff claimed to

experience, her credibility was a key factor in evaluating her

eligibility for benefits.

Nonetheless, it does not inexorably follow from the video

footage that Plaintiff is capable of enduring the physical demands

of full-time work, even in a sedentary position. The video depicts

only a few scattered bursts of activity. It also shows Plaintiff

repeatedly shaking her hands, supporting her claim that the

gardening caused her to suffer pain and that she would not be able

to maintain the depicted activity level for an extended period of

time. Additionally, Plaintiff’s treating physician stated that

individuals who suffer from chronic pain disorders frequently

experience cycles of improvement and worsening. Thus, it is

possible that the video depicted a temporary improvement during

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which Plaintiff was able to work in her garden and walk her dogs,

but not a recovery sufficient to enable her to return to work.

Although Hartford sought the opinions of three physicians

prior to issuing its final decision on appeal, none of them

addressed these points. They simply concluded that, because

Plaintiff’s medical records revealed no objective abnormalities

that would prevent her from light-duty full-time work, and because

the video depicts Plaintiff exceeding her self-reported

limitations, she is capable of returning to work. None of the

reviewing physicians examined Plaintiff, nor did they explain how

they could extrapolate from the activity seen on the video, which

was limited in duration, to conclude that Plaintiff could meet the

physical demands of full-time work. In addition, Drs. LeForce and

Marion, who relied heavily on the video in reaching their

conclusions, were not completely accurate in describing the events

depicted in the video; they appear to have overstated the length of

time that Plaintiff was seen gardening. Moreover, as noted

previously, the reports of Hartford’s reviewing doctors warrant

skepticism because the doctors stood to benefit financially from

their continued business with Hartford.

Hartford also failed to consider Dr. Neuwelt’s diagnosis of

ankylosing spondylitis. Plaintiff claims that, to a greater degree

than the reports provided by her earlier doctors, Dr. Neuwelt’s

report is based on objective medical findings that confirm her

reported limitations. It is true that Plaintiff did not submit

this material until after Hartford had already decided her appeal

and closed her file. However, Plaintiff requested an opportunity

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to review and respond to any evidence Hartford considered prior to

issuing its final decision on appeal. Hartford did not provide

Plaintiff with the RRS report until after it had already made its

final decision. Plaintiff contends that she would have responded

to this report with Dr. Neuwelt’s findings. Because the authors of

the RRS report based their conclusions on a lack of objective

abnormalities, Dr. Neuwelt’s diagnosis could have materially

affected Hartford’s decision.

It appears that Hartford and its reviewing physicians gave

overwhelming weight to the video surveillance, and did not

adequately consider the rest of the evidence of Plaintiff’s

disability when making their decision to deny Plaintiff’s benefits. 

Accordingly, the Court remands Plaintiff’s claim to Hartford for

further proceedings. See Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287

F.3d 1276, 1288 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The remedy when an ERISA

administrator fails to make adequate findings or to explain

adequately the grounds of her decision is to remand the case to the

administrator for further findings or explanation.”) It would be

helpful to the Court if, on remand, Hartford considers Dr.

Neuwelt’s diagnosis of ankylosing spondylitis and addresses the

other points raised above. It would also be helpful to the Court,

and presumably to Hartford, if Plaintiff’s treating physicians

would watch and address the surveillance video and indicate whether

they believe it is consistent with their diagnoses.

II. Plaintiff’s Invasion of Privacy Claims

Plaintiff asserts claims against Hartford and Dempsey based on

the video surveillance of her inside her home on February 2, 2001. 

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3Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment in their favor on her trespass claim. Accordingly, the

Court grants Defendants’ motion and dismisses this claim against

all Defendants, including Dempsey.

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She claims that these Defendants committed the common law tort of

invasion of privacy and violated § 1708.8 of the California Civil

Code and Article I, § I of the California Constitution.3 All of

these causes of action require that a plaintiff have a reasonable

expectation of privacy under the circumstances.

Under California law, an individual has no reasonable

expectation of privacy with respect to activities observable in

plain view from a public place where the observer has the right to

be. See Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626 (1973); People

v. Stanley, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1547 (1999). While the majority of

the cases addressing the concept of a reasonable expectation of

privacy involve the Fourth Amendment’s protection against

unreasonable searches, Plaintiff provides no authority indicating

that the standard should be any different when it comes to her

asserted causes of action.

Plaintiff was videotaped standing in front of her kitchen

window at night with the lights on, and with no blinds or curtains

obstructing the view. Even though a person has a reasonable

expectation of privacy inside his or her home as a general

proposition, the investigator videotaped only activities that were

plainly observable by someone standing on the street across from

Plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff thus had no reasonable expectation of

privacy under the circumstances. That the investigator used a

camera lens to zoom in on her does not change the analysis. At

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most, the lens allowed the investigator to observe Plaintiff in

more detail; it did not alter how much of her he could see, and

there is no dispute that Plaintiff was visible with the naked eye. 

Cf. People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302 (1986) (no reasonable

expectation of privacy where marijuana crop was photographed with a

telephoto lens from an airplane flying at one thousand feet). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claims against

Hartford and Dempsey cannot succeed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment

(Docket No. 53) is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for judgment on

Plaintiff’s ERISA claim (Docket No. 61) is also DENIED. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s trespass and

invasion of privacy claims (Docket No. 61) is GRANTED, and these

claims are dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claim for benefits is remanded to Hartford for

further proceedings consistent with this order. The case will be

administratively closed pending Hartford’s decision. It will be

re-opened at Plaintiff’s request.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/14/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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