Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00494/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00494-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Amy Patterson,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Two Fingers LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00494-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the court is Plaintiff Amy Patterson’s Motion to Decline Supplemental 

Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Doc. 46). In “any civil action of which the 

district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental 

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III 

of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). District courts have 

supplemental jurisdiction even over state law counterclaims brought by defendants. See 

Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing district court’s decision to 

dismiss state law counterclaim for abuse of discretion); Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 

515, 522 (9th Cir. 1988). “A state law claim is part of the same case or controversy when 

it shares a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal claims and the state and 

federal claims would normally be tried together.” Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 

978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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 In this case, Patterson sued Defendants for Title VII sexual harassment, intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, battery, assault, and defamation. Defendants 

counterclaimed for business disparagement, wrongful interference with business 

relationships, libel per se, trade libel, public disclosure of private facts, false light, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 

civil conspiracy. The essence of Defendants’ allegations is that, in retaliation for her 

forced resignation from Defendants’ restaurants, Patterson and her former attorney, Peter 

K. Strojnik, distributed leaflets and posted websites that suggested Defendant Joseph 

Popo had sexually harassed numerous women, including Patterson. In addition, Patterson 

and Strojnik allegedly reported these and other allegations to Defendants’ landlord and 

“conspired . . . to extort money from Popo by threatening the disclosure of work related 

communications, potential criminal activity, and alleged affairs to the public at large.” 

(Doc. 45 at 5.) 

 Determining the parties’ liability on both sets of claims will require understanding 

the nature of Patterson’s employment with Defendants and her reasons for leaving, 

whether severe sexual harassment or unsatisfactory performance. Trying Defendants’ 

counterclaims will involve much of the same evidence that Patterson might use to prove 

her Title VII, battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 

Indeed, if Patterson’s allegations are true, Defendants’ claims for defamation, and 

perhaps some of their other claims, must fail as a matter of law. Defendants’ 

counterclaims will also necessitate other evidence that, strictly speaking, is irrelevant to 

Patterson’s claims. But § 1367(a) does not require a perfect fit between those claims over 

which a federal court has original jurisdiction and those claims over which it exercises 

supplemental jurisdiction. Rather, as long as the two sets of claims share a “common 

nucleus of operative facts,” supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate. That common 

nucleus is present in this case. 

 Patterson argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 

counterclaims because the “nucleus of Plaintiff’s allegations relates to Plaintiff’s 

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mistreatment prior to the commencement of litigation,” whereas Defendants’ 

counterclaims “relate to events occurring after Plaintiff made her claims against 

Defendants.” (Doc. 46 at 2 (emphasis in original).) This characterization appears to 

misstate the record: Defendants allege Patterson and Strojnik began making threats no 

later than January 12, 2015 (Doc. 45 at 5-6), but Patterson did not “commence” this 

litigation until March 18, 2015 (Doc. 1). Regardless, Patterson offers no citation to 

support her theory that the “common nucleus” test for § 1367(a) is governed by such 

artificial cutoffs. The court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defendants’ 

counterclaims. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Amy Patterson’s Motion to Decline 

Supplemental Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Doc. 46) is denied. 

 Dated this 22nd day of May, 2015. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00494-NVW Document 53 Filed 05/22/15 Page 3 of 3