Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00059/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00059-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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3:15-CV-00059-BEN-MDD 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TORRY BUCHANAN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DR. A. GARIKAPARTHI and DR. S. 

ROBERTS, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:15-CV-00059-BEN-MDD 

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; and 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[Docket Nos. 48, 61] 

 Plaintiff Torry Buchanan (“Plaintiff”) is incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego. He is proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, with a civil Complaint and First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket Nos. 1, 4.) Presently before the Court is Defendants Dr. A. 

Garikaparthi and Dr. S. Roberts’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 48.) 

 On October 16, 2017, the Honorable Mitchell D. Dembin issued a thoughtful and 

thorough Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Defendants’ Motion be 

granted. (Docket No. 61.) Objections to the Report and Recommendation were due by 

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October 30, 2017. (Id.) On November 1, 2017, the Court received a self-styled 

document dated October 29, 2017 from Plaintiff captioned ‘Opposition to Court’s 

Judgment for Summary Judgment’. (Docket No. 67.) A Notice of Document 

Discrepancy was generated regarding the filing and the Court ordered the document filed 

nunc pro tunc to October 31, 2017.1 (Docket No. 66.) Defendant did not file any 

specific objections. For the reasons that follow, the Report and Recommendation is 

ADOPTED. 

BACKGROUND 

 The Report and Recommendation carefully details the relevant factual background 

of this case, which the Court incorporates by reference. 

DISCUSSION 

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition” of a 

magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the [report and 

recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

However, “[t]he statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate 

judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also 

Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). “Neither the Constitution nor 

the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations 

that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. 

Plaintiff generally objects to the Report’s conclusion that he failed to state a claim 

against Defendants Dr. A. Garikaparthi and Dr. S. Roberts (“Defendants”) for deliberate 

 

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 Upon the submission of the document, the following discrepancies were noted: (1) 

missing proof of service as required by Civ. L. Rule 5.2, and (2) Objections are not 

timely per Order dated 8/29/2017 (ECF No. 57), requiring objections to be filed by 

9/19/2017. 

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indifference to his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Docket 

No. 4 at 2-4.) Both of Plaintiff’s claims are related to Defendants’ alleged failure to 

provide adequate medical treatment that led to the amputation of three of Plaintiff’s toes. 

(Id. at 3-4.) Having conducted a de novo review, the Court adopts the Report and 

Recommendation in full. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint and FAC allege two claims. (Id.) Claim 1 alleges that 

Defendant Dr. Garikaparthi violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical 

treatment. (Id. at 3.) Claim 2 alleges that Defendant Dr. Roberts similarly violated 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right by not fulfilling his obligation in his supervisory 

capacity to ensure that Plaintiff’s medical needs were being adequately met. (Id. at 4.) In 

essence, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants were aware of the serious medical condition in 

his right foot big toe, and did not take reasonable steps to minimize the risk caused by the 

infection or protect him from injury, in this case, amputation of three toes. (Id.) 

“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons[.]’” Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). 

“[B]ut neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that ‘the treatment a 

prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to 

scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment[.]’” (Id. at 832 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 

U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Among other protections, the Eighth Amendment “imposes duties 

on [prison] officials, who must . . . ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, 

shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of 

the inmates[.]’” (Id. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527 (1984)). 

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical care, a 

plaintiff must allege facts to indicate that a defendant was “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]” to 

his “serious medical needs.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This includes allegations under 

“both an objective standard – that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel 

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and unusual punishment – and a subjective standard – deliberate indifference.” (Id. at 

1066 (quoting Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012)). 

Plaintiff’s Objection states in pertinent part “...relys on all of the points and 

authorities cited within his Complaint.” (Docket No. 67.) Pro se pleadings and briefs are 

to be construed liberally. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 

1990). When a pro se plaintiff technically violates a rule, the Court should act with 

leniency toward the pro se litigant. Motoyama v. Haw. Dep’t of Transp., 864 F. Supp. 2d 

965, 975 (D. Haw. 2012); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Granting Plaintiff great latitude in interpreting his Objection, the Court believes he is 

objecting to the Report on two grounds: 1) that he sufficiently alleged a serious medical 

need, and 2) that he sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference. Aside from the 

aforementioned, the Plaintiff does not raise any specific objections to the Motion for 

Summary Judgment or Magistrate Judge Dembin’s Report. Plaintiff’s objections are 

unfounded. 

First, the Report provides a thorough analysis of the facts of the case and 

ultimately determines that under the circumstances, it would be likely that a trier of fact 

would determine that Plaintiff’s complaints amounted to a serious medical condition. 

(Docket No. 61 at 12-13.) The Court, having reviewed the Plaintiff’s objection, agrees 

with Magistrate Judge Dembin’s conclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection on this 

ground is moot. 

Second, as to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding deliberate 

indifference, the Court agrees that Plaintiff did not allege specific facts from which it 

may infer any of the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. “A prison official is 

deliberately indifferent under the subjective element of the test only if the official ‘knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 

1066 (quoting Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 

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1066 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (internal quotations marks omitted). “Deliberate 

indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with 

medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide 

medical care.’” (Id.) at 1066 (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 

(9th Cir. 1988)). However, a plaintiff must allege that one or more defendants acted with 

more than lack of ordinary due care. (Id. at 1066 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835)). 

In his objection, Plaintiff merely directs the Court to “...the points and authorities 

cited within his complaint.” (Docket No. 67.) Even doing so, the Court notes Plaintiff 

only provides his own general assumptions and legal conclusions that: 1) both 

Defendants were aware he had a serious infection in his foot that was rapidly progressing; 

2) both Defendants failed to take reasonable measures to eliminate the infection and 

prevent future recurrence by providing appropriate medical care, therapy and 

accommodation; and 3) both Defendants were therefore deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs. Each of these grounds is refuted by the analysis provided in the 

Report. (Docket No. 61.) Likewise, he argues without providing any factual basis that 

“Defendants course of treatment was medically unacceptable [sic][.]” (Docket Nos. 1 

and 4.) Again, unfounded and refuted by the Report. 

The Court finds Magistrate Judge Dembin’s analysis sound. In particular, the 

Report provides thorough analysis tailored to each of the Individual Defendants that 

explains in detail the insufficiency of the Complaint and FAC’s deliberate indifference 

allegations, both in their individual and supervisory capacities as alleged in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint and FAC. In short, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Complaint and FAC fail to 

set forth facts to suggest either of the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, and 

incorporates by reference Magistrate Judge Dembin’s analysis on this issue. 

CONCLUSION 

 The Court has considered and agrees with Magistrate Judge Dembin’s Report and 

Recommendation, and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. 

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(Docket No. 61.) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (Docket 

No. 48.) 

 The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on all 

claims and close the case.2 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2017 

 

2

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, the Court finds there is no just reason to 

delay the entry of judgment on the claims between Plaintiff and Defendants. 

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