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Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 2, 2020 Decided April 21, 2020

No. 18-5370

NICHOLAS S. STEWART, CAPTAIN, UNITED STATES MARINE

CORPS,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES E. MCPHERSON, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, IN 

HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-00479)

Charles W. Gittins argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Dana Kaersvang, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jessie 

K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Abby C. Wright, Attorney. R. Craig 

Lawrence and Marsha W. Yee, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 

entered appearances.

Before: TATEL and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

In this case, Marine Corps Officer Nicholas Stewart 

challenges the Navy Secretary’s refusal to grant him a waiver 

of statutory requirements that govern his eligibility for 

incentive pay as “arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Aviation career 

incentive pay (ACIP) is a monthly cash benefit given to certain 

armed servicemembers who regularly fly aircraft as part of 

their official duties. See 37 U.S.C. § 301a. As relevant here, to 

be entitled to ACIP, servicemembers must be assigned flight 

duties for eight of the first twelve years of their careers, a 

requirement the parties refer to as a “flight gate.” By statute, 

the Secretary may waive the flight gate “[f]or the needs of the 

Service” “so long as the officer has performed” flight duties 

“for not less than 6 years.” Id. § 301a(a)(5). A Navy regulation, 

SECNAV Instruction 7220.87, further provides that the 

Secretary is “authorized . . . to waive ACIP flight gate

requirements for aviators who are unable to meet their gates 

due to reasons beyond their control.” SECNAV Instruction 

7220.87(4) (July 13, 2009), Joint Appendix (J.A.) 74. That 

regulation also sets forth a waiver-request process: officers 

“submit their requests via their chain of command,” and if the 

chain of command “endorse[s]” the request, it forwards the 

officer’s waiver “package” to the Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy, who in turn “review[s]” the package “for content, 

validity, and rationale,” and “forward[s]” it to the Secretary 

“with a recommendation to approve, disapprove, or . . . return[] 

to [the] . . . Marine Corps for further action.” Id. at

7220.87(5)(b)–(e), J.A. 75–76.

Stewart, who had accrued six years and fifteen days of 

flight-duty time when he reached his twelve-year service mark, 

sought a flight-gate waiver from the Secretary pursuant to 

Instruction 7220.87. His chain of command supported the 

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request, noting that, during Stewart’s twelve years of service, 

he had been incarcerated or on appellate leave for 

approximately thirty-one months due to a court-martial 

conviction that was later set aside. It forwarded Stewart’s 

package to the Assistant Secretary, who, finding the request 

“within norms and appropriate,” forwarded it to the Secretary.

Action Memo from Juan M. Garcia, Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to Secretary of the Navy 

(Sept. 1, 2014), J.A. 45. The Secretary denied Stewart’s 

request, offering no reason for his decision. See Letter from

Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, to Deputy Commandant for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Feb. 13, 2015), J.A. 42.

Stewart challenged the unexplained denial in the district 

court, which agreed that the Secretary’s failure to explain was 

arbitrary and capricious and remanded the denial to the 

Secretary “for further consideration and clarification.” 

Stewart v. Stackley, 251 F. Supp. 3d 138, 141 (D.D.C. 2017). 

In response, the Secretary adhered to the initial decision, 

finding that “a waiver does not meet the needs of the service” 

because (1) Stewart “barely meets the statutory 6-year 

minimum for eligibility,” (2) he “has been consistently ranked 

in the bottom two-thirds of his peer group,” and (3) his 

“reviewing officers have evaluated him as performing better 

than only about 18% of his peers.” Letter from Richard V. 

Spencer, Secretary of the Navy, to Deputy Commandant for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Dec. 19, 2017), J.A. 31–32. 

The Secretary rejected the notion that Stewart would have met 

the flight gate if not for his criminal case, noting that Stewart 

was out of “flight status” before his unlawful conviction and 

again after its reversal. Id., J.A. 32.

Returning to the district court, Stewart argued that the 

Secretary’s denial violated Instruction 7220.87 and that it was 

substantively arbitrary and capricious. See Stewart v. Spencer, 

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344 F. Supp. 3d 147, 154–58 (D.D.C. 2018). The district court 

rejected Stewart’s claims and entered summary judgment in the 

Secretary’s favor. As to Stewart’s procedural claim, the district 

court concluded that none of the Secretary’s actions violated 

Instruction 7220.87 and, in the alternative, that Stewart failed 

to demonstrate prejudice from any alleged procedural 

violation. Id. at 155. As to his substantive claims, the district 

court found that the Secretary’s decision “was accompanied by 

a ‘reasoned evaluation of the relevant information,’” id. at 156

(quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 

U.S. 360, 385 (1989)), and, further, that “it [was] reasonable 

for the Secretary to have relied on [Stewart’s personnel 

records]” in denying the waiver, id. at 158. 

Stewart now appeals. “We review the district court’s 

decision to grant summary judgment de novo.” Aera Energy 

LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2011). As Stewart 

acknowledges, our review of the Secretary’s actions is 

“‘unusually deferential.’” Appellant’s Br. 9–10 (quoting 

Kreis v. Secretary of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989)). 

As an initial matter, the government argues that Stewart’s 

challenge to the waiver denial is unreviewable. See Kreis, 866 

F.2d at 1515 (finding Air Force servicemember’s retroactivepromotion claim “nonjusticiable”). We need not address this 

argument insofar as it applies to the substance of the denial, 

however, because Stewart has made clear he has abandoned his 

substantive challenge. Specifically, in his appellate briefs, 

Stewart consistently characterizes his claim as procedural, 

including in response to the government’s argument that the 

waiver denial was “‘committed to agency discretion by law.’”

Appellee’s Br. 19 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). At oral 

argument, moreover, Stewart’s counsel confirmed that the sole 

relief he seeks is to have the waiver-request process “done 

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right . . . in compliance with the regulation,” not for the court 

to find that the denial was inconsistent with the service’s needs. 

Oral Arg. Rec. 23:25–30.

Stewart’s sole remaining claim on appeal, then, is 

procedural. At oral argument, the government conceded that 

the question whether the Secretary complied with the process 

outlined in the applicable regulation is judicially reviewable. 

See id. 21:29–32 (“[C]ompliance with the regulation is 

reviewable.”). We may accept the concession because, contrary 

to the government’s brief, see Appellee’s Br. 19 (referring to 

“these barriers to jurisdiction”), this question of reviewability 

is not jurisdictional, see Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 

854 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A] complaint seeking review of agency 

action ‘committed to agency discretion by law,’ 5 U.S.C. 

§ 701(a)(2), has failed to state a claim under the 

[Administrative Procedure Act], and therefore should be 

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), not under the jurisdictional 

provision of Rule 12(b)(1).”).

We therefore proceed to the merits of Stewart’s procedural 

claim. Stewart argues that, on remand, Instruction 7220.87 

required the Secretary to obtain fresh endorsements from 

Stewart’s chain of command. We disagree. Nothing in the 

regulation obligates the Secretary to seek updated 

endorsements, and Stewart concedes that the Secretary “full[y] 

compli[ed]” with the regulation when Stewart’s waiver 

package was initially compiled, Reply Br. 7. In the “absence of 

any specific [judicial] command,” moreover, agencies are 

“generally free to determine in [their] discretion whether to 

accept additional evidence” on remand. Butte County v. 

Chaudhuri, 887 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see id. 505–06

(affirming Secretary of Interior’s decision to reopen informal 

adjudication record). In this case, the district court’s remand 

order contained no requirement that the Secretary obtain new 

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endorsements, and Stewart gives us no reason to conclude that 

the Secretary abused his discretion by relying on the old 

endorsements or by considering Stewart’s performance data. 

To be sure, as Stewart points out, by the time of the 

remand, the signatory to the initial waiver denial, thenSecretary Ray Mabus, “had moved on from his Government 

service.” Reply Br. 12. But, contrary to Stewart’s argument, the 

remand order directed “the Secretary,” not Mabus personally, 

to provide “further consideration and clarification.” Stewart, 

251 F. Supp. 3d at 141. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to the Secretary.

So ordered.

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