Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00713/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEUANG LOTAKOON NIRAVANH, et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ADRIANA DURHAM, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-00713-DAD-DMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

(Doc. No. 7)

Plaintiffs Leuang Lotakoon Niravanh and Somsack Niravanh, proceeding pro se, initiated

this civil action on April 18, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) The matter is now before the court on the ex 

parte application for a temporary restraining order filed by plaintiffs on April 20, 2023. (Doc. 

No. 7.) For the reasons explained below, plaintiffs’ ex parte application will be denied.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging that

their property located at 7906 Churn Creek Road, Redding, California (the “property”) was 

wrongly foreclosed upon. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that the 

foreclosure of the property is void because it was initiated by “an agent without standing” and 

because the notice of default letter was not properly signed by “the Trustee.” (Id. at 1, 4–5.) The 

remaining allegations in the complaint are largely quotes of various legal authorities that appear 

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mixed together with some factual allegations that are predominately cast as legal conclusions. 

(See id. at 2–13.) However, there is a general dearth of factual allegations explaining the nature 

of the underlying dispute except that a foreclosure on the subject property appears to have 

occurred.

Plaintiffs also attached two exhibits to their complaint that are each a collection of 

documents related to the foreclosure of the property including a notice of default and election to 

sell dated April 26, 2019, a corporate assignment of deed of trust dated December 16, 2019, a 

notice of trustee’s sale dated January 10, 2023, and a deed of trust dated May 19, 2006, among 

other related correspondence and documents.1 (Id. at 14–44.) According to the notice of trustee 

sale, it appears that the property was to be sold at a public auction on February 6, 2023 at 11:00 

a.m. by one of the named defendants in this action, The Mortgage Law Firm, PLC, the duly 

appointed trustee of the deed of trust for the property. (Id. at 23.) Both notices are signed by 

another named defendant in this action, Adriana Durham of The Mortgage Law Firm, PLC. (Id.

at 17, 23.) However, there are no allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint that the property at issue 

was in fact sold on February 6, 2023 or at any other time. Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation 

appears to have been the mortgage servicer for the property in 2019 while defendant California 

Reconveyance Company is listed as the “Trustee” on the original deed of trust issued in 2006. 

(Id. at 17, 26.) However, aside from these scant references to the named defendants that the court 

has drawn from the attachments to the complaint, plaintiffs do not clearly articulate each 

defendant’s particular role in the underlying (yet unexplained) dispute. 

In their complaint, plaintiffs appear to assert eight claims: (1) violation of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act; (2) violation of the Truth in Lending Act; (3) breach of contract; (4) 

violation of federal trust and lien laws; (5) wrongful foreclosure; (6) slander of title; (7) slander of 

credit; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 13.) On April 20, 2023, 

1

 The documents attached to the complaint concerning the property all state that the borrowers 

for the mortgage are plaintiff Leuang Lotakoon Niravanh and non-party Sommak Niravanh—

plaintiff Somsack Niravanh is not a signatory or borrower to any of the mortgage documents. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 14–44.) In the pending application, plaintiff Somsack Niravanh states in a signed 

declaration that he is “the heir to the Estate of Sommak Niravanh.” (Doc. No. 7 at 14.) 

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plaintiffs filed the pending ex parte application for a temporary restraining order “to force the 

Banks attorneys, the realtors, and/or the Property Management Companies to cease and decease 

[sic] all foreclosure and eviction efforts until the title dispute pending in this court can be 

settled.”

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 (Doc. No. 7 at 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the 

standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 

Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive 

relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see 

also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, 

‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a 

preliminary injunction.”). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is 

appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were 

raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” All. for Wild Rockies v. 

Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 

981, 97 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).3 The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving 

these elements. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009). Finally, an 

injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 

plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

2

 It is unclear if the “title dispute” that plaintiffs refer to in their pending application is the subject 

of this civil action or some other action filed by plaintiffs.

3

 The Ninth Circuit has found that this “serious question” version of the circuit’s sliding scale 

approach survives “when applied as part of the four-element Winter test.” All. for Wild Rockies, 

632 F.3d at 1134. “That is, ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that 

tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the 

plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 

public interest.” Id. at 1135.

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A temporary restraining order may be issued without notice to the adverse party or its 

attorney only if 

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly 

show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in 

opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any 

efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be 

required. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); see also Local Rule 231(a) (“Except in the most extraordinary of 

circumstances, no temporary restraining order shall be granted in the absence of actual notice to 

the affected party and/or counsel, by telephone or other means, or a sufficient showing of efforts 

made to provide notice.”) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has noted, an ex parte

temporary restraining order is justified in very limited circumstances: 

The stringent restrictions imposed . . . by Rule 65 on the availability 

of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our 

entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken 

before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been 

granted both sides of a dispute. Ex parte temporary restraining 

orders are no doubt necessary in certain circumstances, but under 

federal law they should be restricted to serving their underlying 

purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable 

harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974) (internal citation omitted). 

ANALYSIS

Here, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

65(b)(1) and therefore have not established that they are entitled to the extraordinary relief 

requested. In a joint declaration signed by both plaintiffs and dated April 20, 2023, plaintiff 

Somsack Niravanh declares that he “telephoned defendant [The Mortgage Law Firm] at her [sic]

place of business to inform them of this application, but could not personally contact them.” 

(Doc. No. 7 at 15.) Plaintiff Somsack Niravanh also states in the declaration that he “left a 

message with their answering service” and has not received a call from them. (Id.) Plaintiff 

Somsack Niravanh further declares that he has “attempted to locate the defendant’s residence and 

present whereabouts without success”—without any reference to which of the four defendants he 

is referring to—and that he has “no knowledge of any attorney who may presently represent the 

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defendants, and ha[s] attempted to learn this without success.” (Id.) Plaintiffs, however, have not 

indicated whether they have properly served their complaint on any defendant, and this court is 

unable to conclude whether any defendant is aware of this lawsuit at all. See Reno Air Racing 

Ass’n., Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130–32 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[C]ourts have recognized very 

few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO.”); Silas v. Select Portfolio 

Servicing, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00012-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 117889, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017)

(denying an ex parte application to halt a public sale of property scheduled the following day 

because the plaintiff did not meet his burden under Rule 65(b)(1) by merely informing defendant 

of his intent to file an ex parte application and faxing a copy of it to defendant’s ombudsman).

In addition, plaintiffs have not clearly shown in their joint declaration that an immediate 

and irreparable injury will result before defendants can be heard in opposition to the pending 

application. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Although plaintiffs vaguely mention “eviction efforts” in 

the pending application, plaintiffs do not identify any specific imminent and irreparable harm in 

the declaration attached to the pending application. Plaintiff Somsack Niravanh only stated in his 

declaration that “on February 6, 2023 [he] was informed of defendant’s imminent conduct as set 

forth in the complaint” (Doc. No. 7 at 15), but there is no explanation regarding what “imminent 

conduct” was expected to occur or when. Moreover, the pending application was not filed until 

over 10 weeks after plaintiff Somsack Niravanh was, by plaintiffs’ own admission, notified of the 

“imminent conduct” and plaintiffs have not explained the reason for this 10-week delay. That

unexplained delay in seeking immediate injunctive relief also militates against a finding of 

irreparable harm and against the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Moreover, plaintiffs 

have not presented any evidence to this court that denial of an ex parte temporary restraining 

order would result in irreparable injury to them for which legal remedies, such as monetary 

damages, are inadequate. In fact, plaintiffs’ pending application states that they are seeking $4.5 

million in damages. (Doc. No. 7 at 2.) Thus, plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden under 

Rule 65(b)(1). 

Even if the court were to accept that reasonable attempts have been made to provide 

defendants notice of this case and the pending request for injunctive relief, or that there is 

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evidence that an imminent and irreparable injury will occur to plaintiffs, plaintiffs have still failed 

to show that the relief they seek is appropriate at this time. The bulk of plaintiffs’ complaint and 

application are devoted merely to recitations of various legal authorities and conclusory factual 

contentions that do not clearly describe the dispute or the specific conduct by defendants that 

plaintiffs contend is unlawful. (See generally Doc. Nos. 1, 7.) As best the court can tell, one of 

plaintiffs’ main arguments appears to be that the trustee who foreclosed on the property—

defendants The Mortgage Law Firm and Adriana Durham—did not have authority to do so. 

(Doc. No. 7 at 1–2.) However, that argument is contradicted by the documents attached to the 

complaint, such as the notice of default and election to sell date April 24, 2019 and the notice of 

trustee sale dated January 10, 2023, indicating that defendant The Mortgage Law Firm was the 

property’s trustee when the foreclosure occurred. (Doc. No. 1 at 17, 23.) Moreover, although 

plaintiffs purport to assert that the property was wrongly foreclosed upon, plaintiffs have not 

alleged in their complaint that the property has in fact been sold yet, which is a necessary 

predicate to bringing a wrongful foreclosure claim. See Zinnel v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 2:10-

cv-02406-GEB-DAD, 2010 WL 3715079, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) (“Wrongful 

foreclosure is an action in equity, where a plaintiff seeks to set aside a foreclosure sale that has 

already occurred. Because plaintiff’s house has not yet been sold, a claim for wrongful 

foreclosure is not yet ripe.”) (citation omitted). At bottom, plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden 

under Winter because they have not clearly articulated the factual bases for their claims or offered 

evidence in support, let alone argued why they are likely to succeed on the merits of those claims. 

See Tavake v. Chase Bank, No. 1:12-cv-0041 KJM-GGH, 2012 WL 117146, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 

13, 2012) (denying a pro se plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order after reviewing 

plaintiff’s complaint and motion together and concluding that plaintiff “presented no evidence 

that she is likely to succeed on the merits or that there are serious questions going to the merits”). 

Thus, the court concludes that plaintiffs have not shown in their ex parte application that they are 

likely to succeed on the merits of their various claims.

/////

/////

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a temporary 

restraining order (Doc. No. 7) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21, 2023 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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