Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01946/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01946-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL O’NEIL CLOYD,

Petitioner,

v.

BURTON,

Respondent.

No. 2:19-cv-1946 DB P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action was transferred in from the Northern District. 

(ECF No. 5.) Petitioner claims his Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated because the 

Board of Parole Hearings has not set a determinate term of imprisonment. Presently before the 

court is petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) and his petition for 

screening (ECF No. 1). For the reasons set forth below, the court will recommend that the 

petition be dismissed. 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford 

the costs of suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

I. Legal Standards – Screening 

The court is required to screen all actions brought by prisoners who seek any form of 

relief, including habeas relief, from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a habeas petition or portion 

thereof if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious” or fail to state a basis 

on which habeas relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). This means the court must 

dismiss a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that 

the petitioner is not entitled to relief[.]” Rule 4 Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that “[t]he Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these 

rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.” Drawing on the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, when considering whether a petition presents a claim upon which habeas relief can be 

granted, the court must accept the allegations of the petition as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007), and construe the petition in the light most favorable to the petitioner, see Scheuer 

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than 

those drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but “[i]t is well-settled that 

‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant 

habeas relief.’” Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). See also Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Pro 

se habeas petitioners may not be held to the same technical standards as litigants represented by 

counsel.”); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he petitioner is not entitled 

to the benefit of every conceivable doubt; the court is obligated to draw only reasonable factual 

inferences in the petitioner’s favor.”).

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II. The Petition

Petitioner alleges that his due process rights have been violated because the California 

Board of Prison Terms1refuses to set a determinate term in accordance with his second-degree 

murder conviction. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner was sentenced to 15-years-to-life for second 

degree murder and with an additional 3-year enhancement for using a gun during the crime. 

(ECF No. 1 at 1.) 

Petitioner claims that under California’s Determinate Sentencing Law, once an individual 

serves 10 years in prison the individual is eligible for parole. However, once an individual serves 

20 years, the Board of Parole Hearings (“the Board”) loses jurisdiction and a determinate prison 

term must be set. Petitioner states that he is in his 28th year of his prison sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 

5.) He argues that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has 

violated his due process rights by failing to set a determinate prison term.

III. Analysis

A. Petitioner’s Claim is Based on his Misunderstanding of State Law

Petitioner claims that his due process rights have been violated because the Board has not 

given him a release date even though he has served more than twenty years in prison. (ECF No. 1 

at 5.) In order to address petitioner’s argument, the court must briefly discuss the background of 

California’s sentencing laws.

Prior to 1977, California used an indeterminate sentencing system (the “ISL”) for felonies. 

In re Dannengberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1077 (2005). In 1977, California instituted a determinate 

sentencing system (the “DSL”). Id. at 1078. The DSL prescribed sentences of a set duration for 

most crimes, e.g., 2, 4, or 6 years in prison for first degree burglary. Cal. Penal Code § 461. 

However, sentences for most murders (and some kidnappings) remained indeterminate.

2

 

 

1

In 2005, California’s Board of Prison Terms was abolished and replaced with the Board of 

Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a) (“As of July 1, 2005, any reference to the Board of 

Prison Terms . . . refers to the Board of Parole Hearings.”).

2 An indeterminate sentence “means the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment but the 

[Board of Parole Hearings] can in its discretion release the defendant on parole.” People v. 

Jefferson, 21 Cal.4th 86, 92 (1999).

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Inmates with indeterminate sentences, like petitioner, “may serve up to life in prison, but 

they become eligible for parole consideration after serving minimum terms of confinement.” 

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1078. The Board determines the actual confinement period of an 

inmate with an indeterminate sentence. Id. Once the Board determines that an inmate is suitable 

to have a parole release date set, the Board will calculate a “base term” for that inmate. Id. at 

1079. The California Supreme Court made clear that an inmate with an indeterminate sentence 

would not have a base term calculated until the Board has determined that the inmate is suitable 

for the fixing of a parole date. Id. at 1079-80.

The allegation that the Board should have set a determinate term appears to be based on 

petitioner’s misunderstanding of the law. Petitioner argues that the Board is obligated to set his 

release date. However, “[u]nder California law, the duty to set (or fix) a term of years for a life 

prisoner does not arise until after he is found suitable for parole. Where, as here, the life prisoner 

has not been found suitable for parole, there is no obligation to set a term or a parole release 

date.” Palomar v. Board of Parole Hearings, No. C-13-3214 EMC (pr), 2013 WL 4482508 at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013) (citations omitted). The court takes judicial notice of records from the 

Board of Parole Hearings located at https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/Details.aspx?ID=J13973

indicating that petitioner has not yet been found suitable for parole.3 Accordingly, the Board is 

not obligated to set petitioner’s release date at this time. 

B. Habeas Relief does not Lie for Errors of State Law

Petitioner’s sole ground for relief challenges the application of California’s sentencing 

laws to his situation. However, “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). 

This court is bound by California’s interpretation of its own laws. See McSherry v. Block, 880 

F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

3 The Court may take judicial notice of public information stored on the CDCR website. See

Louis v. McCormick & Schmick Restaurant Corp., 460 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1155 fn.4 (C.D. Cal. 

2006) (court may take judicial notice of state agency records); Pacheco v. Diaz, No. 1:19-cv-0774 

SAB (PC), 2019 WL 5073594 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2019) (court may take judicial notice of 

CDCR’s Inmate Locator system).

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The supreme Court has “long recognized” that mere errors of state law do not deny due 

process. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 221-22 (2011) (per curiam); Carr, 2017 WL 

1353804, at *4 (under Swarthout, “federal due process protections do not include adherence ot 

California [parole] procedures”). Petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue” into a federal 

one merely by labeling it a constitutional violation. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (as amended Apr. 14, 1997). Because petitioner’s sole ground for relief alleges an 

error of state law, it is not cognizable in a federal habeas action and the petition should be 

dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 4) is granted; and

2. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a district judge to this action.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed because petitioner’s sole 

claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 

objections with the court. The documents should be captions “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 31, 2020

DB:12

DB:1/Orders/Prisoner/Habeas/cloy1946.scrn

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