Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01475/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01475-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CASEY L. ROWLAND,

Plaintiff,

 v.

F. VASQUEZ, et al.,

 Defendants.

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1:15-cv-01475-BAM (PC)

SCREENING ORDER REQUIRING 

PLAINTIFF TO EITHER FILE SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY 

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED 

ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS 

(ECF No. 10)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Casey L. Rowland (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action on 

September 14, 2015, and the matter was transferred to this Court on September 29, 2015. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on July 5, 2016, is currently before the Court for 

screening. (ECF No. 10). 

Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); 

Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility 

that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 

of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at High Desert State Prison. The events in the complaint are 

alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”). Plaintiff 

names the following defendants: (1) F. Vasquez, Chief Deputy Warden; (2) P. Llamas, Captain; 

(3) Sarah Leon, Sergeant; (4) Ric Pavich, Maintenance Engineer; (5) Melo, Correctional Officer; 

and (6) Dave Davy, Warden. Plaintiff brings suit against defendants in their individual and 

official capacities. 

Plaintiff alleges: On May 18, 2015, the hot water was shut off inside the cell Plaintiff 

occupied. Many times, the cold water also was turned off. Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived 

of drinkable water until May 20, 2015, and many other days periodically for over two months. 

Plaintiff also alleges that the hot water was shut off many more days and was an ongoing issue. 

Plaintiff further alleges that the plumbing was in such disrepair that many times when other 

inmates flushed their toilets, bodily waste (feces and urine) would back up into Plaintiff’s toilet, 

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causing it to overflow and cover the floor in his cell and the tier in front of his cell. Plaintiff 

contends that he repeatedly was forced to eat, sleep and live-in human bodily waste and saturated 

fumes for over two months, which harmed him physically by causing sores and rashes. Plaintiff 

also contends that he was deprived of cleaning supplies that would prevent the spread of germs, 

bacteria and disease.

On June 3, 2015, during an appearance at committee, Plaintiff informed Defendant 

Vasquez of the water issue he was experiencing in his cell for over two weeks. Plaintiff 

requested to be moved to a fully functioning housing unit. In response, Plaintiff allegedly was 

laughed at by Defendant Vasquez and others present during committee. Plaintiff was told, “I 

don’t know when the water in your cell will be working!” (ECF No. 10, p. 10). Plaintiff 

informed Defendant Vasquez that he had no hot/warm and, at times, even cold water, and never 

received any cleaning supplies or soaps to contain the spread of germs, diseases and bacteria. 

Plaintiff also told him that the plumbing was in such disrepair that when others flushed their 

toilets it caused fecal matter and urine to come through Plaintiff’s pipes and overflow. Although 

Plaintiff apprised defendants of this situation, he was denied an opportunity to move to a 

functioning cell and deprived of any cleaning supplies. Plaintiff was told by Defendants 

Vasquez and Leon that the water would be working and back to normal in a few days or week 

and to quit crying and complaining. Plaintiff alleges that the problem went on for over two 

months and was still ongoing as recently as February 16, 2016. 

Plaintiff further alleges that his request for interviews went unanswered. Plaintiff 

contends that Defendant Leon defamed his good name and reputation by stating in front of 

correctional officers and other inmates that Plaintiff was a snitch and was snitching. Plaintiff 

alleges that this put his life and health further at risk because Plaintiff asked about the status of a 

complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Leon’s comments were made for the sole purpose of 

having Plaintiff harmed. 

On June 6, 2015, Plaintiff sent a CDCR 22 request to Defendant Llamas for interview. 

Plaintiff apprised Defendant Llamas of the above-identified events. On June 29, 2015, 

Defendant Llamas responded that “the issue regarding not having hot water is a maintenance 

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issue” and to “forward [his] concerns to that department.” Defendant Llamas indicated that he 

was being told that it might be another week or two before the water is restored. Plaintiff 

contends that Defendant Llamas disregarded Plaintiff’s issue regarding his living conditions. 

On June 28, 2015, Plaintiff sent a 22 Form Request for interview to Defendant Warden 

Davy concerning the above-identified facts. Plaintiff alleges that once he had presented the 

Warden with these problems in writing, then the Warden had knowledge and failed to respond to 

cure the issue. 

Plaintiff alleges that due to the water crisis and related problems, including no cleaning 

supplies, he began to break out in sores, puss bumps and rashes caused by the unsanitary living 

conditions. Plaintiff was scheduled to see the doctor on July 23, 2015, because his medical 

condition had worsened. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Melo refused to escort Plaintiff for 

treatment by the doctor. Defendant Melo reportedly lied to the medical staff by stating that 

Plaintiff refused. Plaintiff alleges that this false statement caused a delay in Plaintiff’s treatment, 

causing his condition to worsen on his back, buttocks, scalp, arms, legs, neck and chest. 

On July 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed a request for interview to the maintenance department as 

directed by Defendant Llamas. On July 15, 2015, Defendant Ric Pavich of the maintenance 

department told Plaintiff that it was going to take two more weeks, by July 30, 2015. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Davy, Vasquez, Llamas, Melo, Pavich and Leon had the 

authority to “red line” the cell, i.e., declare it unsafe for occupancy, until the water was drinkable 

or otherwise fully functioning and the contaminated sewage was no longer overflowing into the 

cell from other toilets. Plaintiff contends that defendants were deliberately indifferent, negligent 

and engaged in slander and defamation. As relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, along 

with compensatory and punitive damages. 

Discussion

A. Official Capacity – Eleventh Amendment

Plaintiff attempts to bring suit against defendants in both their individual and official 

capacities. 

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The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits for monetary damages against a State, its 

agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 

488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). A suit against a state official in his official capacity 

equates to a suit against the state employing that official, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 

S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), effectively barring a plaintiff from bringing suit on these 

grounds. However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit for monetary damages against a 

state official sued in his individual capacity. Id.

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their official capacities are tantamount to bringing 

suit against the State. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their official capacities 

cannot stand and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, Plaintiff is not precluded 

from bringing a suit for monetary damages against defendants in their individual capacities.

B. Supervisory Liability

Insofar as Plaintiff brings suit against Defendant Warden Davy based on his supervisory 

role, he may not do so. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the 

actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Crowley v. 

Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915–

16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally 

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between 

the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074–75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 

915–16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal 

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional 

violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Davy either was personally involved in the 

alleged constitutional violations or instituted a deficient policy. That Plaintiff may have sent a 

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CDCR 22 Form Request for interview to Defendant Davy is not sufficient to demonstrate that (1) 

Defendant Davy received the request, (2) knew of the issues related Plaintiff’s cell and refused to 

correct them, or (3) there is any causal connection between Defendant Davy and the alleged 

constitutional violations. 

C. Deliberate Indifference - Eighth Amendment

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Prison officials 

therefore have a “duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

2000) (citations omitted). A prisoner claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must show (1) 

that the deprivation he suffered was “objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) that prison 

officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety in allowing the deprivation to take place. 

Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045, quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 

L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). 

Cell Conditions

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the lack of hot water, and sometimes cold water, fails to 

state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. First, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts 

demonstrating that any named defendant was responsible for the brief periods during which 

Plaintiff lacked hot water and sometimes cold water. Plaintiff also fails to set forth sufficient 

facts demonstrating that the alleged lack of hot water, and brief periods without cold water, were 

sufficiently serious. Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate how he was harmed by this alleged 

violation. 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding sewage overflowing in his cell and lack of cleaning of 

supplies are sufficiently serious to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against 

Defendants Vasquez, Leon, Llamas and Pavich. However, there is no indication that Defendants 

Davy and Melo knew of the sewage and were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of 

Plaintiff’s cell. 

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Inmate Safety

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Leon labeled him a snitch in front of other inmates, 

thereby putting his life in danger, are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. 

Allegations that a prison official called a prisoner a “snitch” in the presence of other inmates may 

state a claim of deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety. See Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 

866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) (after prison officers labeled prisoner a snitch, he was 

threatened with harm by fellow prisoners). 

Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Melo was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical 

needs. “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 

(1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious 

medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and 

fails to adequately respond. Simmons v. Navajo County, Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 

2010). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi 

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). The prison official must be aware of facts from 

which he could make an inference that “a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he must 

make the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Melo arising from the failure to 

escort Plaintiff to treatment and lying about the reasons, resulting in further harm. 

D. Retaliation – First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Leon retaliated against Plaintiff for asking about the 

status of his complaint/request form regarding his living conditions. 

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Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation consists of five 

elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); accord 

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 

(9th Cir. 2009).

A plaintiff suing for retaliation under section 1983 must allege that “he was retaliated 

against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance 

legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.” Barnett v. 

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff does not need to show actual inhibited 

or suppressed speech, but that there was a chilling effect upon his speech. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 

569. The burden is on the plaintiff to plead and prove the absence of any legitimate correctional 

goals for the alleged conduct. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995).

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff has stated a cognizable retaliation claim against Defendant 

Leon. 

E. State Law Claims

Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to pursue state law claims for negligence, slander or 

defamation, he has failed to allege necessary compliance with the Government Claims Act.

The Government Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its 

employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board 

no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 

945.4, 950–950.2. Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are 

conditions precedent to suit. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 208–09, 64 

Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 164 P.3d 630 (Cal. 2007); State v. Superior Court of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 

Cal.4th 1234, 1239, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2004); Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty. 

Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001); Mangold v. California Pub. 

Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public 

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employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Shirk, 42 Cal.4th 

at 209, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 164 P.3d 630; Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1239, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 

P.3d 116; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 

627 (9th Cir. 1988).

F. Declaratory Relief

In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his rights were 

violated. “A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as 

a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of 

Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will 

neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate 

the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” 

United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). In the event that this action 

reaches trial and the jury returns a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, that verdict will be a finding that 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, a declaration that any defendant 

violated Plaintiff’s rights is unnecessary.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint states the following cognizable claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment 

claim against Defendants Vasquez, Leon, Llamas and Pavich in their individual capacities 

arising out of allegations of sewage overflowing into Plaintiff’s cell and lack of cleaning of 

supplies; (2) an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Leon in her individual capacity 

arising out of allegations that Defendant Leon labelled Plaintiff a snitch; (3) an Eighth 

Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendant Melo

in his individual capacity; and (4) a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Leon

in her individual capacity. Plaintiff fails to state any other cognizable section 1983 or state law 

claims. 

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing 

the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 

Cir. 2000). If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to 

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proceeding only on his cognizable claims, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing. Plaintiff 

will then be provided with the necessary summonses and USM-285 forms for completion and 

return. Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate 

service of process on the defendants against whom Plaintiff chooses to proceed against in this 

action.

Alternatively, if Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, then his amended complaint 

should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what the named defendants did that led to 

the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted 

as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Plaintiff also may not 

change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; 

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either: 

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court 

in this order; or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is willing to proceed only on the cognizable claims identified in this order. 

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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