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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1939

THOMAS WILSON and RANDY BROWN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

WARREN COUNTY, ILLINOIS, MARTIN EDWARDS, THOMAS

CARITHERS, ALBERT ALGREN, RONALD HANSON, MARK

JOHNSON, and DOUGLAS REINERS,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 11-CV-04078 — Sara Darrow, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 11, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 18, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN,

District Judge.*

 * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

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ADELMAN, District Judge. Plaintiffs Thomas Wilson and 

Randy Brown bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against private citizen defendants, Ronald Hanson, Mark Johnson, and 

Douglas Reiners, as well as against Warren County, Illinois 

and several of its officials including Sheriff Martin Edwards, 

Deputy Thomas Carithers, and State Attorney Albert Algren, 

referred to as the public defendants. Wilson also brings a Fair 

Housing Act (“FHA”) claim against the private defendants, 

and plaintiffs assert supplemental state law claims. The 

claims arise out of an incident in which the private defendants 

seized items of plaintiffs’ personal property. The district court 

dismissed Wilson’s FHA claim for failure to state a claim, 

granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, and 

chose not to address the state law claims. Plaintiffs appeal, 

and we affirm.

I. Background

Wilson and Hanson were business partners who got into 

a dispute about the ownership of property. On September 14, 

2009, Warren County issued a letter relating to real property 

occupied by Wilson stating that it had to be cleaned up within 

30 days. The County, however, sent the letter to Hanson. 

When he received the letter, Hanson, Hanson’s lawyer Johnson, and Reiners, photographed the items on Wilson’s property. This activity upset Wilson, who suffers from various 

psychological disorders, causing him to be hospitalized. 

Subsequently, a friend of Wilson called Algren and expressed concern that Hansen, Johnson, and Reiners would return and take personal property belonging to Wilson. Algren 

assured him that they could not do this without a court order 

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No. 15-1939 3

and that, if they returned, Wilson should call the sheriff. Hanson, represented by Johnson, sought an order in state court 

authorizing him to remove material from Wilson’s property 

but was unsuccessful because the judge was unavailable. 

Johnson told Algren about the suit but did not disclose his 

failure to get a court order or when he, Hanson, and Reiners 

planned to remove material from Wilson’s property. On September 26, the private defendants began removing items from 

Wilson’s property. Wilson called the sheriff’s department, 

which dispatched Carithers to the property. Carithers, however, believed that Hanson owned the property and thought 

that his job was to stand by and observe. 

When Carithers arrived, Johnson told him that the private 

defendants had a legal right to remove property and handed 

him a stack of what he called court papers. Wilson objected 

and encouraged Carithers to call Algren. Carithers did not understand the court papers and called Algren, who advised 

him that if Johnson had the proper papers the private defendants were within their rights. It is unclear whether Algren 

mistakenly understood Carithers to say that Johnson had a 

valid court order or whether Carithers misunderstood Algren 

on that point. In any case, Carithers believed that the private 

defendants could legally remove items from the property and 

he stood by as they did so. At this point, Wilson suffered another anxiety attack. In addition to removing Wilson’s property, the private defendants removed an item belonging to 

Brown.

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II. Discussion

A. FHA claim 

Wilson’s FHA claim alleges that the private defendants 

committed disability discrimination by intentionally attempting to trigger his disability to prevent him from objecting to 

the removal of property. We review the district court’s dismissal of the claim de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as 

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. 

Roberts v. City of Chi., 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). Dismissal is appropriate where the complaint fails to set forth facts 

which amount to a plausible claim. 

The FHA makes it unlawful to make unavailable or deny 

a dwelling to anyone because of a handicap, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3604(f)(1), and to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere 

with a person’s exercise or enjoyment of the rights granted by 

the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3617. To adequately plead a disability 

discrimination claim under § 3617 and § 3604, Wilson must 

allege facts suggesting that the private defendants entered his 

real estate and removed personal property because of his disability. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 784 (7th Cir. 2009).1

Wilson’s complaint fails because it does not plausibly allege that the private defendants acted because of his disability. It alleges that Hanson blamed Wilson for the failure of 

their business, that Wilson sold a piece of Hanson’s machinery for less than they had agreed, and that Hanson believed 

that Wilson refused to return items that he had taken from 

 1 A § 3604 plaintiff may also proceed on a disparate impact theory, but 

Wilson does not do so.

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him. R. at 286–87. These allegations suggest that the private 

defendants were motivated by Wilson’s dealings with Hanson rather than by his disability, and that they would have 

behaved the same regardless of the disability. Wilson argues 

that the private defendants exploited his disability to prevent 

him from protesting their removal of his property. But this is 

not enough to survive a motion to dismiss because it does not 

raise the inference that the private defendants would not have 

removed his property if he wasn’t disabled. 

B. Section 1983 claims 

The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on plaintiffs’ § 1983 Fourth Amendment and due 

process claims based on the alleged unconstitutional removal 

of property. We review grants of summary judgment de novo, 

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and taking all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. 

Carman v. Tinkes, 762 F.3d 565, 566 (7th Cir. 2014). Summary 

judgment is appropriate where no reasonable jury could find 

for plaintiffs based on the evidence in the record. Id. 

1. Private defendants

To succeed on their § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must prove (1) 

the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law and (2) that defendants were acting under color of 

state law. Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719–20 (7th Cir. 

2014) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). For a 

private actor to act under color of state law he must have “had 

a ‘meeting of the minds’ and thus reached an understanding” 

with a state actor to deny plaintiffs a constitutional right. 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970); see also 

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Hanania v. Loren-Maltese, 212 F.3d 353, 356 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring a showing of “a concerted effort between” a private 

actor and state actor and that a state actor and private actor 

“reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights”); Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental 

Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A requirement 

of the joint action charge . . . is that both public and private 

actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.”). Because § 

1983 allows a private actor to be sued as if it were the state 

and makes state actors potentially liable as well, the state actor must share the private actor’s unconstitutional goal in order for a state actor to be acting under color of state law. In 

other words, “[a] private actor . . . cannot unilaterally convert 

a state actor’s legitimate activity into an illegal act, conferring 

both constitutional accountability on itself and liability on the 

state.” Cunningham, 924 F.2d at 108.

In the present case, plaintiffs fail to present evidence supporting an inference of a meeting of minds between the private and public defendants. No evidence suggests that any of 

the public defendants knew that the repossession was unlawful or that they shared an unconstitutional goal with the private plaintiffs. Rather, the record indicates that the private defendants, particularly Johnson, misrepresented that a court 

order authorized them to remove plaintiffs’ property. Lying 

to a state actor in order to induce him to participate in unlawful conduct, however, is the type of unilateral action that does 

not create private actor liability. See, e.g., Betts v. Shearman, 751 

F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that a claim that plaintiff 

was arrested based on a false accusation made against him by 

the private defendant was insufficient to indicate that the private defendant and the arresting officers shared a common 

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goal of violating plaintiff’s rights); Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 

335 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying private actor liability 

where there was no evidence that the arresting officer knew 

that the private actor’s allegations were false and that plaintiff 

was innocent of the charges for which he was arrested). Thus, 

plaintiffs cannot establish that the private defendants acted 

under color of state law.

2. Public defendants

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the public defendants fail 

for similar reasons. Plaintiffs must show that the defendants 

were personally responsible for the deprivation of their 

rights. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). A 

defendant is personally responsible “if the conduct causing 

the constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or with 

his knowledge and consent.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th 

Cir. 1988). This is a mental state requirement and requires 

plaintiffs to prove more than mere negligence. Pepper v. Vill. 

of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Jones, 856 

F.2d at 992–93 (requiring a showing of knowledge or deliberate, reckless indifference). As noted, the evidence doesn’t support an inference that the public defendants knew that the private defendants did not have a court order to remove the 

property. Rather, Johnson misrepresented this matter to 

Carithers, and some sort of miscommunication between Algren and Carithers during their phone call led to the mistaken 

belief that the stack of papers Johnson presented included a 

court order. While Carithers and Algren could have done 

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more to confirm the existence of a court order, their behavior 

appears to be no more than negligent.2

Plaintiffs also argue that Algren violated substantive due 

process because under the state-created danger doctrine, he 

was obliged to protect Wilson from the private defendants’ 

seizure of his property. Due Process does not require a state 

to protect citizens from private acts unless the state itself creates the danger. King ex rel. King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 

496 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago 

Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). Under the statecreated danger doctrine, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the 

state created or increased a danger to him, (2) the state’s failure to protect plaintiff was a proximate cause of his injuries, 

and (3) the state’s failure to protect the individual shocks the 

conscience. Id. at 817–18. Plaintiffs allege that Algren created 

the danger by advising Wilson’s friend that the removal of 

property required a court order. Plaintiffs contend that this 

statement amounted to an assurance that Algren would protect Wilson from the private defendants and made Wilson feel 

sufficiently protected that he left the gate to his property unlocked. Plaintiffs also assert that Algren then failed to protect 

 

2 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment and substantive and procedural due 

process claims against the public defendants also fail for other reasons. 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim fails because plaintiffs do not present 

sufficient evidence to support the inference that any of the public defendants actively participated in seizing Wilson’s property, see Pepper v. Vill. of 

Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2005), and plaintiffs’ due process claims 

fail because plaintiffs have adequate post-deprivation remedies at state 

law, Gable v. City of Chi., 296 F.3d 531, 540–41 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring 

plaintiff to show inadequacy of state law remedies to succeed on due process claims). 

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their property, citing Carithers’ phone call regarding the legality of the property removal. But this behavior falls short of 

shocking the conscience. Only “the most egregious official 

conduct” shocks the conscience, Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. 

Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations 

and citation omitted), and Algren’s act of informing Wilson of 

a general legal principle—that one needs a court order in order to legally take another’s property – does not fall into that 

category.

Plaintiffs also bring Monell3 claims against Algren and Edwards in their official capacities and against Warren County. 

But these claims fail because of the absence of an underlying 

constitutional violation. Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 

499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010). 

C. Motion to disqualify counsel

Finally, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s denial of its 

motion to disqualify Johnson, himself a defendant, from representing the other two private defendants. For a lawyer to 

represent parties in a lawsuit in which he is a defendant is 

surely a conflict of interest See IL RPC 1.7(a) (prohibiting a 

lawyer from representing a client if the representation involves “a concurrent conflict of interest,” including where 

“the representation of one client will be directly adverse to 

another client”); IL RPC 1.7 cmt. 10 (stating that “if the probity 

of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a 

client detached advice”). At this point, however, the issue is 

 3 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

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moot. Johnson has apparently been disbarred as a result of his 

conduct and thus can no longer represent the private defendants. Moreover, the district court’s failure to disqualify Johnson was harmless because the issue had no bearing on the 

merits of plaintiffs’ claims. 

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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