Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04890/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04890-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

GUSTAVO MCKENZIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

D.MILLER, et al.,

Defendants.

/

Case No. 14-04890 WHA (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN

FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS;

VACATING ORDER; DIRECTING

PLAINTIFF TO PAY FILING FEE

(Dkt. No. 18) 

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

Section 1983. He alleges that defendants D. Miller, C. Nguyen, Yamileth Simmons, N. Adam, L.

Bree, D. LaFever, S. Penkian, S. Risenhoover, C. Russell, J. Torrance, and J. Clark Kelso, were

deliberately indifferent to his need for medical treatment and retaliated against him for exercising his

First Amendment rights. Following a review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), service was

ordered and dispositive motions were scheduled. Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”) was granted. Defendants Nguyen, Simmons, Adam, Bree, LaFever,

Penkian, Risenhoover, Russel, and Torrance filed a motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status under 28

U.S.C. 1915(g). Plaintiff has filed an opposition and defendants have filed a reply brief. For the

reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion is GRANTED and plaintiff is ordered to pay the filing

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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fee. Ruling on the other pending motions will follow plaintiff’s payment of the filing fee. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915, plaintiffs pursuing a civil action may do so without the full

prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

amended Section 1915 to bar the privilege of proceeding under IFP status: 

if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in

any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the ground that it is or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A defendant moving to revoke IFP status under Section 1915 has the burden

of producing court records or other documentation that will allow the district court to make a

determination that the prior cases were dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a

claim. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). A prisoner barred from proceeding in

forma pauperis pursuant to Section 1915(g) may proceed under the fee provisions of 28 U.S.C.

Sections 1911-14 applicable to everyone else. Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.

1996).

For a case dismissal to constitute a “strike” within the meaning of Section 1915(g), it must be

a prior case or appeal brought by a plaintiff who was a prisoner, and it must be dismissed on the

ground that the claim was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1116. The initial burden of production rests with the defendants when challenging a prisonerplaintiff’s IFP status. Id. at 1120. Once defendants have met this initial burden, the burden then

shifts to the prisoner, who must attempt to rebut the defendant’s showing by explaining why a prior

dismissal should not count as a strike. Id. at 1120.

When a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) from

pursuing any other claim under IFP status in federal court unless he or she alleges imminent danger

of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The plain language of the imminent danger

clause in Section 1915(g) indicates that “imminent danger” is to be assessed at the time of filing of

the complaint. Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1053.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

Defendants assert that plaintiff has at least three “strikes” under Section 1915(g). 

Defendants seek judicial notice of court records from four prior cases that plaintiff brought in federal

court: (1) McKenzie v. Casillas, No. 12-CV-1602-BEN (S.D. Cal.); (2) McKenzie v. Woodford, No.

04-CV-05903-AWI-WMW (E.D. Cal.); (3) McKenzie v. Alameda, No. 02-CV-07551-UA-PJW

(C.D. Cal.); and (4) McKenzie v. Alameda, No. 03-55221 (9th Cir.). A court “may take notice of

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings

have a direct relationship to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir.

2002). The request for judicial notice of these court records is GRANTED.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently found that plaintiff has had

at least three dismissals of cases or appeals that qualify as “strikes” under Section 1915(g), and thus

that he is barred from proceedings IFP absent a showing of imminent danger. McKenzie v. Casillas,

No. 13-56742, slip. op. at 1-2 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (unpublished memorandum) (see Defs.’ Req.

Jud. Not. (“RJN”) Exh. G). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, which had

also found that plaintiff was barred by Section 1915(g) from proceeding IFP because of three

qualifying dismissals of past cases or appeals. See McKenzie v. Casillas, No. 12-CV-1602-BEN

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) (see RJN Exh. F). The Ninth Circuit concluded in Casillas that each of

the cases discussed below constituted a strike within the meaning of Section 1915(g). Filing suit in

a different federal court will not circumvent the disqualification of IFP status under Section 1915(g)

because “an effort to bamboozle the court by seeking permission to proceed in forma pauperis after

a federal judge has held that § 1915(g) applies to a particular litigant will lead to immediate

termination of the suit.” Sloan v. Lesla, 181 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1999). As petitioner has

already been determined to be barred from proceeding IFP under Section 1915(g) by both the Ninth

Circuit and another district court, he may not proceed IFP here. 

The dismissal in McKenzie v. Woodford, No. 1:01-CV-05903-AWI-WMW (E.D. Cal., Dec.

20, 2007), constitutes a strike because it was dismissed for failure to state a claim (see RJN Exhs. A,

B). In Woodford, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim because plaintiff only alleged that his lack of law library access

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caused him to miss a filing deadline was missed does not state a cognizable claim for relief (ibid.).

Plaintiff admits and stipulates that the dismissal in Woodford is a strike within the meaning of

Section 1915(g) (Opp. 5).

The dismissal in McKenzie v. Alameda, No. CV-02-07551-UA-PJW (C.D. Cal., Jan. 9,

2002), also constitutes a strike (see RJN Exh. C). Plaintiff attempted to file an action against his

parole officer, his parole officer’s supervisor, and the state director of the Department of Corrections

for violating his due process rights when they gave him a check that bounced (ibid.). Plaintiff was

denied leave to file the case without prepayment of the full filing fee because the action was

“frivolous because it involves a check for $43.00 and does not implicate the federal Constitution”

(ibid.). The denial of leave to file the case IFP on the grounds that the claims were frivolous and fail

to state a claim counts as a strike under Section 1915(g). See O’Neil v. Price, 521 F.3d 146, 1152

(9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff argues that the dismissal should not count as a strike because he did not

consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge who found the claims to be frivolous and not

cognizable. However, because the order denying leave to file the case IFP was signed by a district

court judge, consent was not required. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(3). 

The dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal in McKenzie v. Alameda, Case No. 03-55221 (9th Cir.

June 20, 2003) (RJN Exh. E), constitutes his third strike. The district court determined that

plaintiff’s appeal was not taken in good faith (id. Exh. D). The Ninth Circuit agreed that the appeal

was not taken in good faith, determined that he was not entitled to proceed IFP for the appeal, and

directed him to pay the full filing fee (ibid.). When he did not pay the filing fee, the Ninth Circuit

ruled that “this appeal is dismissed for failure to pay the docketing/filing fees in this case” (id. Exh.

E). Whether the dismissal of this appeal counts as a separate strike from the dismissal of the

underlying action by the district court has been explicitly decided by the Ninth Circuit in Casillas.

In Casillas, the Ninth Circuit held that its “denial of McKenzie’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis in [Alameda] counts as a separate strike from the district court’s order denying his

application to proceed in forma pauperis in the underlying action.” McKenzie v. Casillas, No. 13-

56742, slip. op. at 2 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (see RJN Exh. G); see also McKenzie v. Casillas, No. 12-

CV-1602-BEN, slip op. 5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) (see RJN Exh. F). Because the Ninth Circuit

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(in addition to another district court) has already resolution of this question against plaintiff, the

doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the issue from being decided differently here. See Gospel

Missions v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553-54 (9th Cir. 2003) (collateral estoppel bars

relitigation of identical issues actually litigated and necessary to the judgment in a prior case). 

Accordingly, the dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal in Alameda must be counted as a strike in this case. 

Plaintiff contends Alameda is not a strike because it not final insofar as he filed a petition for

a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. This argument is now moot because the

United States Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition for certiorari on March 23, 2015 (Defs.’

Second Req. Jud. Not. 2).

Plaintiff was not in any imminent danger of physical injury when he initiated this lawsuit.

The only exception to the three strikes rule in proceeding IFP is a showing of “imminent danger of

serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff was incarcerated at Pelican Bay State

Prison (“PBSP”) when he allegedly suffered from inadequate medical treatment for his glaucoma

and was subject to retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. He has since been

transferred to another prison. He seeks only monetary damages for the allegedly inadequate care

that took place there. He does not seek injunctive relief or claim that inadequate care has continued

at his new prison. As a result, he does not allege the requisite imminent or ongoing danger of

physical injury to allow him to proceed IFP under Section 1915(g). See Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1056-

57 (a prisoner must allege an “on going” danger in order for the “imminent-danger” exception to

apply).

Accordingly, plaintiff cannot pursue this action under IFP status because he has accumulated

three or more strikes within the meaning of Section 1915(g), and he is not in imminent danger of

physical harm. Plaintiff must pay the filing fee in order to avoid dismissal of his complaint. 

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s permission to proceed in

forma pauperis (dkt. 18) is GRANTED, and the order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(dkt. 9) is VACATED. Within 28 days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff shall pay the full filing

fee of $400.00. If he does not, this case will be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2015 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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