Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04383/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04383-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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Case No. 14-CV-04383-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DISTRIBUTOR DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD, FOURTH, AND 

SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

EVGENY EPIKHIN and DMITRI 

REDLIKH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GAME INSIGHT NORTH AMERICA, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-04383-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DISTRIBUTOR 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

THIRD, FOURTH, AND SEVENTH 

CAUSES OF ACTION

Plaintiffs Evgeny Epikhin (“Epikhin”) and Dmitri Redlikh (“Redlikh”) (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) bring suit against defendants Game Insight North America, Game Insight, and GIGL 

(collectively, “Game Insight”) and Game Garden, LLC (“Game Garden”) (together, with Game 

Insight, “Distributor Defendants”), as well as against Fly High Games (“Fly High”) and Yury 

Pomortsev (“Pomortsev”). Before the Court is Distributor Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and seventh causes of action. ECF No. 16.

The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument under Civil Local 

Rule 7-1(b) and hereby VACATES the motion hearing set for June 11, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. The 

case management conference scheduled for that date and time remains as set. Having considered 

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ORDER GRANTING DISTRIBUTOR DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD, FOURTH, AND 

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the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby 

GRANTS Distributor Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and seventh causes 

of action.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The crux of this lawsuit is who owns the rights to Cat Story, a free mobile application 

(“app”) in which players build a virtual village for cats shipwrecked on an island and send the cats 

on various quests and adventures. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 21-23, 50-60. The app is distributed 

by Game Garden and Game Insight, pursuant to a license from Fly High. Id. ¶¶ 29, 54-57. From 

November 2011 to September 2013, Game Garden, a California Corporation, was owned by 

Pomortsev, Maxim Bakanovich (“Bakanovich”), and Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 34; ECF No. 26-1 (“Redlikh 

Decl.”) ¶ 3.

1

 Game Garden was managed by Taras Titarenko (“Titarenko”), Redlikh’s lifelong 

friend. Redlikh Decl. ¶ 13; ECF No. 26-2 (“Titarenko Decl.”) ¶ 1.

Plaintiffs allege that the app which became Cat Story was first conceived in early 2012 at 

South Port Studios, LLC (“South Port”), a Russian corporation owned solely by Redlikh but 

managed by Pomortsev. Compl. ¶¶ 20-23; Redlikh Decl. ¶¶ 2, 9. At the time, Plaintiffs say, the 

app was called PussyVille. Compl. ¶ 24. According to Plaintiffs, South Port employees 

participated in various tasks related to PussyVille, including development of the game concept;

creation of art, code and graphics; deployment of game mechanics; and development of a 

marketing strategy for the app. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs claim that PussyVille contained computer code 

based on and derived from code created by South Port in connection with earlier app projects such 

as Fairy Farm. Id. ¶ 27.

 

1 As indicated above, the Court uses “Game Garden” herein to refer to Game Garden, LLC, 

the California corporation, not the informal Russian partnership, apparently comprised of the same 

owners, that is not a party to this litigation. See, e.g., ECF No. 42 at 4-5 (joint case management 

statement explaining the difference between “Game Garden Partnership” and “Game Garden, 

LLC”); Redlikh Decl. ¶¶ 10-12 (describing “the informal group Game Garden”).

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Starting in late 2012, things started to go awry. Plaintiffs allege that Pomortsev informed 

Redlikh that the owner of Fly High was interested in helping develop PussyVille in exchange for a 

share in the app’s profits. Compl. ¶ 37. Plaintiffs allege further that Pomortsev, without authority 

or Plaintiffs’ prior consent, began to share with Fly High information regarding PussyVille. Id.

¶ 38. While this sharing was happening, Plaintiffs claim that Pomortsev was representing to them 

that South Port employees were no longer working to develop PussyVille. Id. ¶ 40. In an e-mail 

to Plaintiffs dated January 18, 2013, Pomortsev allegedly wrote, “PussyVille is not being 

developed.” Id. ¶ 41. Despite these representations, Plaintiffs claim that Pomortsev and 

Bakanovich had started a new gaming company, Fair Play Studios, which was secretly working 

with Fly High to develop the app that would become Cat Story. Id. ¶¶ 36, 42.

Startek Invest Limited (“Startek”), a corporation organized under the laws of Cyprus, was 

another company owned solely by Redlikh. Redlikh Decl. ¶ 1. Though Startek is mentioned 

nowhere in Plaintiffs’ complaint, Redlikh says that Startek “was the owner of rights to certain 

gaming applications that were developed by South Port.” Id. ¶ 6. Startek and Game Garden 

entered into a series of service contract agreements whereby Game Garden would distribute games 

created by South Port but owned by Startek. Id. ¶¶ 13-14; Titarenko Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. The last such 

agreement, dated March 21, 2013, did not include PussyVille in either the list of games then in 

development or the list of games then being distributed by Game Garden. Titarenko Decl. Ex. A. 

To be clear, though, Plaintiffs allege that South Port, not Startek, owned the rights to PussyVille. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 38, 49-50, 58.

Due to various difficulties, the relationship between Game Garden’s four owners began to 

deteriorate beyond repair. By May 2013, the owners had decided to part ways. Compl. ¶ 45. 

Over the next several months, Plaintiffs negotiated with Pomortsev and Bakanovich to sell 

Plaintiffs’ ownership interests in Game Garden. Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiffs eventually sold their 

ownership interests in Game Garden to friends of Pomortsev and Bakanovich on September 9, 

2013. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. Plaintiffs allege that the sale agreement listed certain games, apps, and 

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projects that were part of the transaction. Id. ¶ 49. The agreement, Plaintiffs say, made no 

mention of PussyVille, whose rights and title were allegedly transferred from South Port to 

Plaintiffs on September 13, 2013. Id. ¶¶ 49, 58.

On August 2, 2013—more than a month before Plaintiffs sold their interest in Game 

Garden—the domain name www.catstorygame.com was registered by Fly High’s owner. Compl. 

¶ 53. According to Plaintiffs, Distributor Defendants have since distributed Cat Story through 

various platforms: Game Insight began distributing Cat Story through Apple’s App Store on 

September 19, 2013, id. ¶ 54; Game Insight began distributing Cat Story through Google Play on 

January 24, 2014, id. ¶ 55; Game Garden began distributing Cat Story through Amazon on 

February 1, 2014, id. ¶ 56; and Game Garden began distributing Cat Story through Windows 

Mobile on April 1, 2014, id. ¶ 57.

Plaintiffs claim to have filed for copyright protection on both PussyVille and Cat Story. 

Compl. ¶¶ 59-60. The record indicates that Plaintiffs have registered Cat Story with the U.S. 

Copyright Office. See ECF No. 23-1 Ex. A (screenshot of record of registration for Cat Story, 

Copyright Registration Number TXu 001912978). The effective date of Cat Story’s registration is 

September 24, 2014. Id.

B. Procedural History

On September 29, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action. In the complaint, 

Plaintiffs allege that Cat Story contains significant art, graphics, and other copyrightable material 

created by South Port during its development of PussyVille; that the rights in this copyrightable 

material were properly assigned to Plaintiffs; and that these rights are infringed by Distributor

Defendants’ distribution of Cat Story. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 25-27, 58. On that basis, Plaintiffs bring 

causes of action for direct copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501 (first cause of action), 

contributory copyright infringement (third cause of action), and vicarious copyright infringement 

(fourth cause of action) against Distributor Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 61-73, 100-09. Plaintiffs seek 

damages arising from the alleged infringement as well as injunctive relief to prevent future 

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infringement. Id. ¶ 1.

Plaintiffs bring additional causes of action against Pomortsev and Fly High. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs allege a cause of action for fraud (second cause of action) and breach of contract (sixth 

cause of action)2against Pomortsev. Compl. ¶¶ 74-99, 118-23. Plaintiffs also allege a cause of 

action for declaration of copyright ownership against Fly High (fifth cause of action). Id. ¶¶ 110-

17. Lastly, Plaintiffs bring a cause of action against all defendants for deceptive business practices 

under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.

(seventh cause of action). Id. ¶¶ 124-30.

Following several stipulations to extend time to answer Plaintiffs’ complaint, Distributor 

Defendants3filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and seventh causes of 

action on January 20, 2015. ECF No. 16 (“Mot.”). Distributor Defendants do not seek to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for direct copyright infringement. Id. at 1. Plaintiffs opposed the 

motion on February 3, 2015. ECF No. 23 (“Opp.”). Distributor Defendants replied on February 

10, 2015. ECF No. 24.

Also on February 10, 2015, Game Garden filed a motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel, 

ECF No. 25, which the Court granted on May 12, 2015, ECF No. 45. Plaintiffs were given 

twenty-one days to find replacement counsel.

In a joint case management statement filed on May 7, 2015, the parties agreed that the 

 

2

The sixth cause of action for breach of contract purports to be asserted against 

Bakanovich as well. Compl. ¶¶ 118-23. Bakanovich, however, is not named as a defendant in 

Plaintiffs’ complaint. See id. ¶¶ 1-14. In addition, the Court notes that Pomortsev is not included 

in the complaint’s list of parties. See id. ¶¶ 2-14.

3 At the initial case management conference held on March 18, 2015, the Court was 

informed that Pomortsev and Fly High, both of whom reside in the Russian Federation, had not 

been served with process in this action. See ECF No. 29 at 2. However, on May 6, 2015, waivers 

of service were filed with the Court on behalf of Pomortsev and Fly High. ECF Nos. 40, 41. On 

May 11, 2015, Pomortsev and Fly High separately answered Plaintiffs’ complaint. ECF Nos. 43, 

44. At the same time, Fly High filed counterclaims against Plaintiffs for declaration of copyright 

ownership and for misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), see ECF No. 43 at 18-19, while 

Pomortsev filed counterclaims against Plaintiffs for declaration of copyright invalidity and for 

breach of contract, see ECF No. 44 at 18-19.

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Court should proceed to rule on Distributor Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss even if the 

Court were to grant Game Garden’s motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel. ECF No. 42 at 10. 

Accordingly, the Court proceeds to address Distributor Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss: Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a) requires a 

plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling 

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and 

construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially 

noticeable facts, see Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look 

beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 

the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2004).

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B. Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide 

whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave 

to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose 

of Rule 15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should 

grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that 

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing 

amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 

moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 

(9th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Distributor Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and seventh causes of 

action for contributory copyright infringement, vicarious copyright infringement, and deceptive 

business practices under the UCL, respectively. Mot. at 1. For the reasons stated below, the Court 

grants Distributor Defendants’ motion.

A. Contributory Copyright Infringement Claim (Third Cause of Action)

The parties agree that to state a claim for contributory copyright infringement, a plaintiff 

must allege that a defendant “(1) has knowledge of a third party’s infringing activity, and (2) 

induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l 

Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Mot. at 3; 

Opp. at 9. “To establish liability,” the Ninth Circuit has said, “the first prong requires more than a 

generalized knowledge by [a defendant] of the possibility of infringement” by a third party. 

Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013). Rather, “actual 

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knowledge of specific acts of [third party] infringement is required for contributory infringement 

liability.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs’ complaint here fails to state a claim for contributory copyright infringement. As 

Plaintiffs concede, see Opp. at 2-3, the only allegation of wrongdoing against Distributor 

Defendants is that they distributed an app Plaintiffs claim to own, Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 28-29, 54-

57. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts in support of the threadbare assertion that Distributor 

Defendants “had knowledge of the infringing acts relating to Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.” 

Compl. ¶ 103. Nor do Plaintiffs allege any facts to suggest that Distributor Defendants “induced, 

caused, and materially contributed to the infringing acts of others.” Id. ¶ 102. In fact, Plaintiffs 

do not even identify the alleged third party infringers. See id. ¶ 101 (including only a vague 

reference to “[n]umerous entities and individuals”). Plaintiffs’ attempt to do so in their opposition 

brief via an unpled theory of “end user[] infringement” is unavailing. Opp. at 11. Simply put, 

Plaintiffs cannot avoid dismissal by alleging new facts in an opposition to a motion to dismiss. 

See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the 

propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s 

moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Distributor Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

third cause of action for contributory copyright infringement. The Court does so with leave to 

amend because the Court concludes that amendment would not necessarily be futile. See Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “a district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). To survive a second round motion to dismiss, however, Plaintiffs must 

allege facts to support the conclusion that Distributor Defendants had “actual knowledge of 

specific acts of [third party] infringement.” Luvdarts, 710 F.3d at 1072. Mere “conclusory 

allegations that [Distributor Defendants] had the required knowledge of infringement are plainly 

insufficient.” Id.

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B. Vicarious Copyright Infringement Claim (Fourth Cause of Action)

The parties also agree that to state a claim for vicarious copyright infringement, a plaintiff 

must allege that a defendant has “both the (1) right and ability to supervise the infringing activity

and (2) a direct financial interest in the activity.” Luvdarts, 710 F.3d at 1071; see Mot. at 4; Opp. 

at 6. Plaintiffs here have plainly failed to do so. Not even reciting the elements of vicarious 

copyright infringement, Plaintiffs’ complaint simply repeats verbatim the allegations asserted for 

contributory copyright infringement. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 100-04 (contributory copyright 

infringement allegations), with id. ¶¶ 105-09 (virtually identical allegations for vicarious copyright 

infringement). Without any allegations of a claim for vicarious copyright infringement, let alone 

any facts in support of those allegations, Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action must be dismissed. See 

Luvdarts, 710 F.3d at 1071-72 (explaining the difference between contributory and vicarious 

copyright infringement). As stated above, Plaintiffs’ attempt to use their opposition to cure the 

patent deficiencies in their complaint will not be countenanced. See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 

n.1.

Consequently, the Court GRANTS Distributor Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

fourth cause of action for vicarious copyright infringement. The Court does so with leave to 

amend because the Court concludes that amendment would not necessarily be futile. See Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1127.

C. UCL Claim (Seventh Cause of Action)

Distributor Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ UCL claim for deceptive business practices 

must be dismissed because it is preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Mot. at 5-7. In their 

opposition brief, Plaintiffs make no attempt to refute this argument. Indeed, all Plaintiffs say is 

the following: “In the event, however, that the Court agrees to dismiss the copyright-related claims 

as to the Distributor Defendants, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their 17200 claim.” Opp. at 12. In 

the Court’s view, Plaintiffs have effectively failed to oppose dismissal of their UCL claim.

In any event, the Court agrees with Distributor Defendants. As the Ninth Circuit has 

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explained: “The Copyright Act explicitly preempts state laws that regulate in the area of copyright, 

stating that ‘all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the 

general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . are governed exclusively by this title.’” 

Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008) (ellipsis in original) 

(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)). In general, “two conditions must be satisfied for a law to be 

preempted under the federal Copyright Act”: “First, the content of the protected right must fall 

within the subject matter of copyright as described in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Second, the right 

asserted under state law must be equivalent to the exclusive rights contained in section 106 of the 

Copyright Act.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

California’s UCL broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts. Kor.

Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1143 (2003). “Unlawful acts are anything 

that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law . . . be 

it civil, criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made, where courtmade law is, for example a violation of a prior court order.” Sybersound, 517 F.3d at 1151 

(ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Unfair acts among competitors means 

‘conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the spirit or policy of 

those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 

significantly threatens or harms competition.’” Id. at 1152 (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. 

L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999)). “Finally, fraudulent acts are ones where 

members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id.

In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the first condition for preemption is 

satisfied because their causes of action against Distributor Defendants fall within the subject 

matter of the Copyright Act. To wit, Plaintiffs allege that Distributor Defendants, by distributing 

Cat Story through various platforms, are liable for direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright 

infringement. Compl. ¶¶ 61-73, 100-09. Nor do Plaintiffs dispute that the second condition is met 

because the only allegation of wrongdoing against Distributor Defendants is that they distributed 

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an app over which Plaintiffs claim to own the rights, id. ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 28-29, 54-57, and the right “to 

distribute” a protected work is one of the exclusive rights granted under section 106, 17 U.S.C 

§ 106(3). Where, as here, “the improper business act complained of is based on copyright 

infringement,” a UCL claim is “properly dismissed because it is preempted.” Sybersound, 517 

F.3d at 1152; see also Dos Santos v. Telemundo Commc’ns Grp., LLC, No. SACV 12-1373 JVS, 

2012 WL 9503003, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (finding the plaintiffs’ UCL claims 

“preempted to the extent they are premised on a violation of the Copyright Act”); Bissoon-Dath v. 

Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (dismissing UCL 

claim where the plaintiffs’ “complaint makes allegations pertaining only to copyright 

infringement”), aff’d sub nom. Dath v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 653 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 

2011).

As a result, the Court GRANTS Distributor Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

seventh cause of action under the UCL. The Court does so without leave to amend because 

Plaintiffs’ UCL claim against Distributor Defendants is preempted by federal law and amendment 

would therefore be futile. See Hayes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 13CV1707 L BLM, 2014 

WL 3014906, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) (dismissing UCL claim with prejudice because it was 

preempted by federal law). Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose dismissal of their UCL claim also weighs 

in favor of dismissing that claim with prejudice. See Smith v. Harrington, No. C 12-03533 LB, 

2013 WL 132465, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013) (“In instances where a plaintiff simply fails to 

address a particular claim in its opposition to a motion to dismiss that claim, courts generally 

dismiss it with prejudice.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Distributor Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and seventh causes of action. The Court grants leave to amend as 

to Plaintiffs’ third and fourth causes of action only. Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action is 

dismissed with prejudice as to Distributor Defendants.

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Case No. 14-CV-04383-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DISTRIBUTOR DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD, FOURTH, AND 

SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Should Plaintiffs elect to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

herein, Plaintiffs shall do so within thirty (30) days of the date when Plaintiffs’ new counsel files a 

notice of appearance in this case. See ECF No. 45 at 13 (ordering Plaintiffs “to obtain successor 

counsel who shall file a notice of appearance within twenty-one (21) days from” May 12, 2015). 

Failure to meet the thirty-day deadline to file an amended complaint or failure to cure the 

deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs’ third and 

fourth causes of action. Plaintiffs may not add new causes of action or parties without leave of the 

Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 20, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-04383-LHK Document 46 Filed 05/20/15 Page 12 of 12