Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01773/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01773-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

 Defendant Monika Beitbadal removed this case from the Superior Court of Stanislaus 

County on November 24, 2015. Doc. 1. The Complaint contains a single cause of action for 

unlawful detainer under state law. Doc. 1, Ex. A. Defendant asserts that the basis for removal is 

federal question jurisdiction because “Plaintiff’s claim is based upon a notice which expressly 

references and incorporates the ‘Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009,’ 12 U.S.C. § 5201. 

Further, this statute is drawn in controversy in this action because the federal statute provides for a 

ninety (90) day notice period prior to the filing of any state eviction proceeding; Defendant asserts 

and alleges that Plaintiff did not allow the ninety day period to lapse before filing his claim.” Doc. 

1, 3:1-6. 

A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 

sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 

& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441) is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 

599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 

F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 

CHRISTIANA TRUST,

Plaintiff

v.

MONIKA BEITBADAL,

Defendant

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-01773-AWI-EPG 

ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

MATTER DUE TO LACK OF 

JURISDICTION

Case 1:15-cv-01773-AWI-EPG Document 2 Filed 11/25/15 Page 1 of 3
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the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 

1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means that 

“the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a 

removed case “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th 

Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson 

v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is 

mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); California 

ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, the court “must 

dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not a party 

has filed a motion.” Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995). 

“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 

215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. Under 

the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s 

statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation of 

avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at 

1014. Thus, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense...even if the defense is 

anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense is the only 

question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Wayne v. DHL 

Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Defendant has not shown that removal was appropriate. Plaintiff’s Complaint is for 

an unlawful detainer action that is based entirely on state law. Plaintiff’s reference to Section 

5201 in the notice to vacate premises was simply included to inform Defendant of her rights under 

Case 1:15-cv-01773-AWI-EPG Document 2 Filed 11/25/15 Page 2 of 3
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the law. While Defendant asserts that Section 5201 may provide her with a defense, the federal 

statute does not form part of Plaintiff’s claim. There is no federal question in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint. Because there is no federal question appearing in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant has 

failed to successfully invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Remand to the Stanislaus County Superior 

Court is appropriate and mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 

1107; Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257; Page, 45 F.3d at 133. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, per 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), due to this Court’s 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of Stanislaus 

County. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 25, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:15-cv-01773-AWI-EPG Document 2 Filed 11/25/15 Page 3 of 3