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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13455

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cv-80137-KAM

JEAN MESIDOR, 

PAUL DELVA, 

JEAN EDY PIERRE,

PASTEL ST. DUC, 

FEKEL EXANTUS, 

FRANTZ LAURENT, 

PIERRE DENEUS,

DUCOEUR DUMERLUS,

ANTOINE PIERVIL, 

LUCMAN ST. LOUIS,

HAROLD COURAGEAUX, 

JOSEPH HENRY, 

RONES ST. JULIEN, 

BERTHO JEANTY,

MICHELET ALZIME, 

WANES MILDOR, 

JEAN BAPTISTE MONDESTIN,

ALEX MESIDORT, 

ANIVAN CENELIAN, 

PAUL FERTIL,

SAINGIL BENOIT, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

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VIARD SIMON, etc.,

 Plaintiff,

versus

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. OF FLORIDA, 

a Florida corporation, 

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. OF FLORIDA, 

1001 Fannin Sute 4000 Houston, TX 77002, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States district court

for the Southern district of Florida

________________________

(March 26, 2015)

Before MARTIN, JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Jean Mesidor and twenty other Appellants appeal the dismissal of their 

employment-discrimination suits as time-barred. Their appeal presents one 

question: are they entitled to equitable tolling of Title VII’s ninety-day statute of 

limitations? Because we conclude they are not, we affirm.

Believing that their employer, Waste Management, Inc. of Florida, 

discriminated against them in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

the Appellants made charges of discrimination and received right-to-sue letters 

from the EEOC. Within ninety days—that is, within Title VII’s ninety-day statute 

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of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)—the Appellants (along with seventyseven other plaintiffs) brought a joint action against Waste Management. Nearly 

two years later, the district court severed these ninety-eight claims into individual 

actions and ordered each plaintiff to file a separate complaint within thirty days. 

Instead of following that instruction, the Appellants appealed the severance order. 

We dismissed because a severance order is reviewable only after final judgment. 

See Hofmann v. De Marchena Kaluche & Asociados, 642 F.3d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 

2011) (per curiam).

After we dismissed their appeal, the Appellants each filed separate

complaints. But by then they were well beyond the thirty-day deadline imposed by 

the district court. The court dismissed their complaints because Title VII’s ninetyday statute of limitations had expired. The court explained that while the earlier 

severance order allowed refiling within thirty days despite the expiration of the 

statute of limitations, the Appellants failed to take action within those thirty days. 

The Appellants now appeal this dismissal, arguing they are entitled to equitable 

tolling. We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to satisfy the 

statute of limitations. Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007).1

 1 The Appellants insist that the district court should have converted Waste Management’s 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because it relied on materials outside the 

pleadings—specifically, the severance order from the earlier joint action. But a district court 

may consider extrinsic materials on a motion to dismiss if “[1] a plaintiff refers to a document in 

[his] complaint, [2] the document is central to [his] claim, [3] its contents are not in dispute, and 

[4] the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss.” Fuller v. SunTrust Banks, 

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The district court did not err in dismissing the Appellants’ individual actions 

as time-barred. The Appellants received their right-to-sue letters by April 4, 2011, 

but they did not file their actions until February 2014. Although the district court

gave them a thirty-day reprieve following severance on September 20, 2013, the 

Appellants failed to file their complaints within this period.

The only argument the Appellants raise on appeal is that the statute of 

limitations should be equitably tolled.2

 Title VII’s ninety-day filing requirement is 

subject to equitable tolling. Irvin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96, 

111 S. Ct. 453, 457 (1990). The Appellants bear the burden of proving equitable 

tolling, which “is an extraordinary remedy which should be extended only 

sparingly.” Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). We review de novo the district court’s ruling on equitable 

tolling, but we review its factual determinations only for clear error. Cabello v. 

Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

 

Inc., 744 F.3d 685, 696 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). A court may also consider 

public documents, such as court orders, without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment. See Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2 of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace 

Workers, 452 F.2d 794, 797–98 (5th Cir. 1971) (prior circuit opinions). The Appellants referred 

to the order in their complaints; its contents were undisputed; Waste Management attached the 

order to its motion; and it is a public document. It was proper to dismiss on statute of limitations 

grounds because it was “apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim [was] timebarred.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 846 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation 

marks omitted). 2 The Appellants argued to the district court that their complaints should have related 

back to the earlier, joint action. But they do not press this argument on appeal, so it is 

abandoned. See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11th Cir. 2012).

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The Appellants have not met their burden. To show they are entitled to 

equitable tolling, the Appellants must show extraordinary circumstances such as 

fraud, misinformation, or deliberate concealment. See Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1355. 

Equitable tolling of Title VII’s statute of limitations may be appropriate if (1) a 

state court action is pending; (2) the defendant concealed acts giving rise to a Title 

VII claim; or (3) the defendant misled the employee about the nature of his rights 

under Title VII. Manning v. Carlin, 786 F.2d 1108, 1109 (11th Cir. 1986).

None of these circumstances is present here. Beyond that, the Appellants 

did not act with due diligence. See Bost, 372 F.3d at 1242 (“Equitable tolling is 

inappropriate when a plaintiff did not file an action promptly or failed to act with 

due diligence.”). The Appellants say that by appealing the severance order they 

acted with diligence. But our precedent is clear, and was at the time of their 

appeal, that a severance order is not immediately appealable. See Hofmann, 642 

F.3d at 997–99. Their mistaken belief to the contrary is not an extraordinary 

circumstance entitling the Appellants to equitable tolling. See Jackson, 506 F.3d at 

1356 (explaining that “[i]gnorance of the law does not, on its own,” warrant 

equitable tolling). The Appellants could have asked the district court to extend the 

thirty-day period for filing their individual complaints until after their appeal, or 

they could have filed their complaints while pursuing the appeal. They did neither. 

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They simply ignored the thirty-day period and appealed a clearly nonappealable 

order. That is not diligence.

AFFIRMED.

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