Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-15243/USCOURTS-ca11-15-15243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-15243

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00218-MP-CAS

VICTORIA L. WILLIAMS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 versus

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(September 23, 2016)

Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Claimant Victoria Williams appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the 

Commissioner”). Williams argues that the district court erred by finding that her 

appeal from the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of her application for 

disability insurance benefits was untimely. After careful review, we affirm. 

DISCUSSION

In September 2011, Williams filed an application for disability insurance 

benefits based on hypertension, diabetes, mellitus, and peripheral vascular disease. 

The ALJ denied Williams’s application, concluding that she was not disabled 

because she was capable of performing her past relevant work. The Appeals 

Council thereafter denied Williams’s request for review in a notice dated 

September 15, 2014. 

Williams did not file a complaint in the district court requesting review of

the Appeals Council’s decision until November 21, 2014. The Commissioner 

moved to dismiss Williams’s complaint as untimely because it was filed more than 

sixty days after she received the notice from the Appeals Council. 

Construing the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss as one for summary 

judgment, a magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), 

recommending that summary judgment be granted in favor of the Commissioner 

because the complaint was untimely filed. Because the regulations presume that 

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the claimant receives the notice within five days of the date of the notice, it was 

presumed that Williams received the Appeals Council’s notice by or on September 

20, 2014. Given that Williams did not provide any evidence to rebut this 

presumption, her complaint filed more than 60 days later—on November 21, 

2014—was untimely. After considering Williams’s objections to the R&R, the 

district court adopted the R&R and dismissed Williams’s complaint. This appeal 

followed. 

We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. 

Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006); Jackson v. 

Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007) (reviewing de novo the district 

court’s dismissal of a claimant’s complaint as untimely). 

Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is entitled to disability insurance 

benefits if she is “disabled” due to a physical or mental impairment. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1). A claimant such as Williams may dispute the Commissioner’s 

adverse determination of her entitlement to benefits first through review by an 

administrative law judge. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(3). If the decision remains 

adverse to the claimant, she may seek further review from the Appeals Council. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(4). After the claimant has exhausted the administrative 

process, she may seek judicial review by filing a complaint in the appropriate 

federal district court. See id. § 404.900(a)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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A claimant may only proceed in the district court if her civil action is

“commenced within sixty days after the mailing to [her] of notice” of “any final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which 

[she] was a party” or “within such further time as the Commissioner of Social 

Security may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 

U.S. 467, 478–79 (1986) (concluding that the 60-day time period is not 

jurisdictional but is instead a statute of limitations that operates as a waiver of 

sovereign immunity). 

The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner further provide that a 

civil action must be “instituted within 60 days after the Appeals Council’s notice of 

denial. . . or notice of the decision by the Appeals counsel is received . . . except 

that this time may be extended by the Appeals Council upon a showing of good 

cause.” 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c). “[T]he date of receipt of . . . notice of the 

decision by the Appeals Council shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of 

such notice, unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 422.210(c); accord 20 C.F.R. § 404.901 (“Date you receive notice means 5 days 

after the date on the notice, unless you show us that you did not receive it within 

the 5-day period). 

Here, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of 

the Commissioner. The Appeals Council’s notice of decision denying Williams’s 

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request for review was dated September 15, 2014. Unless there is a reasonable 

showing to the contrary, Williams is presumed to have received that notice five

days later on September 20, 2014. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901, 422.210(c); see also

Hatchell v. Heckler, 708 F.2d 578, 579 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that “[t]he date 

of receipt is presumed to be five days after mailing unless there is a reasonable 

showing to the contrary”). Williams therefore had 60 days from September 20, 

2014, to file her complaint in federal district court. Stated another way, she had 

until November 19, 2014, to file her complaint. Williams did not file her 

complaint in the district court until November 21, 2014, however. As such, her 

complaint was untimely filed. 

Williams contends that in determining whether she timely filed her 

complaint, we should not look at the date of the Appeals Council’s notice of 

denial. Instead, she asserts that we should look at the date the envelope was 

postmarked, September 17, 2014, and presume that she received the Appeals

Council’s notice five days later on September 22, 2014. Using September 22 as a 

starting point, Williams contends that her complaint filed on November 21, 2014,

was timely. 

We are not persuaded by Williams’s argument. The regulations clearly state 

that the date of receipt should be presumed to be five days after the date of the 

actual notice. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.210(c), 404.901. The regulations do not 

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saying anything about interpreting the date of receipt as five days after the 

postmark date. See Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432, 436–37 (6th Cir. 

2007) (rejecting the claimant’s attempt to calculate the five-day period from the 

postmark date, rather than from the date of the notice of denial). Moreover, the 

envelope Williams submitted that shows a postmark date of September 17, 2014, is 

not sufficient to rebut the presumption that she received the Appeals Council’s 

notice of denial by September 20, 2014. And notably, Williams has not argued or 

produced any evidence showing that she did not receive the Appeals Council’s 

notice by that date.

1

 Nor did she request an extension of time from the Appeals 

Council to initiate a civil action. Accordingly, the district court did not err by 

dismissing her complaint as untimely.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

2

 

 1 We further conclude that Williams’s passing reference to the phrase “equal protection” without 

any elaboration or citation to legal authority was not sufficient to preserve this argument on 

appeal. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 682 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding 

that a passing reference in an appellate brief is not sufficient to preserve an argument on appeal); 

see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (stating that an Appellant’s brief must contain the 

Appellant’s “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of 

the record on which the [A]ppellant relies”). 

2 We recognize that the 60-day statute of limitations period is subject to equitable tolling. See 

Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1353. However, Williams does not argue that she is entitled to equitable 

tolling of the limitations period. 

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