Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01468/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01468-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Injunction

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

05cv1468

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNE WHITLOCK, Individually and

On Behalf of All Others Similarly

Situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P., d/b/a

SPRINT PCS, SPRINT SPECTRUM

HOLDING COMPANY, L.P., and

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 05CV1468 JAH(WMc)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS [DOC. # 14]; AND

DENYING AS MOOT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE [DOC. # 11] AND 

PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER

STRIKING PORTIONS OF

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

[DOC. # 24] 

INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court are the motions to dismiss and to strike filed by defendants Sprint

Spectrum L.P. and Sprint Spectrum Holding Company, L.P. (collectively “defendants” or

“Sprint”) along with the ex parte application for an order striking portions of defendants’ reply

brief filed by plaintiff Anne Whitlock (“plaintiff”). The motions and application have been

fully briefed by the parties. After a careful consideration of the pleadings and relevant exhibits

submitted by the parties, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES IN PART defendants’ motion to dismiss, DENIES defendants’ motion to strike

plaintiffs’ ex parte application as moot.

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 These facts are taken directly from plaintiff’s amended complaint and are presumed true for purposes

of this motion. See Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005); Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d

358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).

2 05cv1468

BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background1

Sprint markets and sells mobile telephone services. Plaintiff signed a mobile telephone

service agreement with Sprint in May 2005. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff received unsolicited

text messages on her phone containing advertisements sent by Sprint for which plaintiff was

billed $.10 for each of the text messages. Plaintiff alleges she contacted Sprint to complain and

was informed Sprint can charge for any message sent to its customers even if it is sent by Sprint.

Plaintiff further alleges that she later received a credit on her bill for the unwanted text

messages.

2. Procedural History

Plaintiff initially filed her complaint on July 22, 2005. Plaintiff’s amended complaint,

the operative pleading here, was filed on February 2, 2006, and seeks monetary and injunctive

relief based on violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal.Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq.,

(“the CLRA”) and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 and

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (“the TCPA”). Defendants filed their motions to dismiss and to strike

portions of plaintiff’s amended complaint on March 29, 2006. Plaintiff’s oppositions to the

motions and defendants’ reply briefs were filed on May 11, 2006 and May 18, 2006,

respectively. On May 22, 2006, plaintiff filed her ex parte application for an order striking

portions of defendants’ reply brief to their motion to dismiss. Defendants filed an opposition

to that ex parte application on May 24, 2006. This Court subsequently took all motions under

submission without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1(d.1).

//

//

//

//

/

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint on the grounds that the

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). In addition, defendants separately move to strike all class allegations from plaintiff’s first

amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). However, because this Court ultimately

finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to plaintiff’s lack of standing, this Court DENIES defendants’

additional motions as moot.

3 05cv1468

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), on the grounds that plaintiff lacks standing.2

1. Legal Standard 

A federal court’s judicial power is limited to “cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const.,

Art. III § 2. A necessary element of Article III’s “case” or “controversy” requirement is that a

litigant must have “‘standing’ to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.”

Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.

464, 471 (1982); LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000). The “irreducible

constitutional minimum” of Article III standing has three elements. LSO, 205 F.3d at 1152

(internal quotations omitted). First, plaintiff must have suffered “an injury in fact — an

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual

and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Second, plaintiff must show a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; i.e., “the injury has to be fairly

. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the

independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern

Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)) (alterations in original). Third,

it must be “likely,” and not merely “speculative,” that the plaintiff’s injury will be redressed by

a favorable decision. Id. at 561. In order to have standing to sue for injunctive relief, plaintiff

must demonstrate there exists a “a real or immediate threat of an irreparable injury.”

Hangartner v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021-22 (9th Cir.

2004)(citing Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001))(emphasis

omitted). 

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 05cv1468

The court’s standing analysis, however, does not end here. The court can also impose

“prudential limitations” on the class of persons seeking federal jurisdiction, including requiring

that a litigant can only assert his own legal rights, and not the rights of a third party. See, e.g.,

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1960); Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of

Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 1996). “This rule flows from a concern that third parties

will not adequately represent the individuals whose rights they seek to vindicate.” Retired

Chicago Police Ass’n, 76 F.3d at 862. Thus, in determining whether a party can assert a cause

of action on behalf of others, a reviewing court must ask two questions: 1) whether the litigants

have suffered an injury in fact sufficient to rise to an Article III controversy; and 2) whether,

as a prudential matter, the plaintiff properly represents the interest of any other individual in

the complaint. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 n.3

(1989); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976).

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that she has standing. United States v. Hays, 515

U.S. 737, 743 (1995). In determining standing, the Court “must accept as true all material

allegations of the complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining

party,” Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal citations omitted),

unless the challenging party presents a factual attack. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 363

(9th Cir. 2004). In Wolfe, the Ninth Circuit explained that:

[i]n a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast,

in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction. 

Id. (citing Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004)). Thus, when faced

with a factual attack, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence without converting the motion

into a motion for summary judgment. Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

//

//

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 05cv1468

2. Analysis

As a threshold matter, this Court notes that defendants seek to introduce extrinsic

evidence in support of their Rule 12(b)(2) motion, claiming that the Court may consider that

evidence because defendants factually attack plaintiff’s allegations. See Doc. # 14 at 5.

However, a review of the pleadings presented reveals that defendants do not dispute any of the

facts presented by plaintiff in her first amended complaint but, instead, argue that the

allegations presented are insufficient to support standing. Therefore, this Court finds that

defendants present only a facial challenge on standing grounds. Accordingly, this Court

assumes the facts presented in the first amended complaint are true and construes all factual

allegations in plaintiff’s favor. Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362.

Defendants contend plaintiff lacks standing because she fails to establish an injury in

fact. Specifically, defendants contend (1) plaintiff fails to allege an economic injury as required

to pursue damages; and (2) plaintiff fails to demonstrate a real or immediate threat of an

irreparable injury, which is required to seek injunctive relief. Defendants further contend that,

because plaintiff fails to establish an injury in fact, plaintiff has no standing to pursue a class

action. 

Defendants first argue that plaintiff fails to allege an injury in fact because she does not

allege an economic injury, i.e., “that she paid Sprint for any of the alleged improper charges,”

Doc. # 14 at 2, and that her complaint alleges she “‘received a credit for Sprint’s own

advertising charges.’” Id. at 5 (quoting Am.Compl. ¶ 56). In opposition, plaintiff points out

that, under Article III, plaintiff does not need to allege economic harm but, instead, need only

allege she suffered an injury through the violation of a statute that creates legal rights.

Doc. # 18 at 6 (citing Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Baldridge, 827 F.3d

1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff argues she alleges an injury in fact by stating that

defendants violated the TCPA and the CLRA, which are statutes that were created to protect

consumers from deceptive business practices and invasion of privacy. Id. 

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiff moves, ex parte, to strike portions of defendants’ reply brief on the grounds that defendants

present arguments not raised in their moving papers. See Doc. # 25 at 2. Because this Court does not consider

the arguments by defendants for the first time in reply in its determination of standing, this Court DENIES

plaintiff’s ex parte application to strike as moot.

6 05cv1468

Defendants, in reply,3 concede that economic injury is not required to demonstrate an

injury in fact but claim plaintiff must still allege an injury that is “‘distinct and palpable’ as

opposed to merely abstract.” Doc. # 20 at 2 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,

155-56 (1990)). Defendants point out that the sole authority cited by plaintiff to support her

position is a California Supreme Court case that is not only inapposite to the instant case but

is not binding on this federal court. Id. at 3-4. The case cited by plaintiff held that a plaintiff

need not suffer any damage, pecuniary or otherwise, as long as a legal right, such as the right

to be free from deceptive business practices, was alleged to be violated. See Doc. # 18 at 10

(citing Kagan v. Gibralter Savings & Loan Ass’n, 35 Cal.3d 582 (1984). Defendants note that,

under federal law, plaintiff must allege she suffered more than just an “‘[a]bstract injury’” to

establish an injury in fact and not just present allegations of a violation of a statute that creates

a legal right. Doc. # 20 at 3 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)).

According to defendants, plaintiff fails to allege such a “distinct and palpable” injury. Id.

Defendants contend that, because plaintiff does not allege she suffered any harm, economic or

otherwise, by Sprint’s erroneous billing of text messages that were later corrected, plaintiff’s

allegations are merely abstract and, therefore, fail to demonstrate an injury in fact under federal

law. Id. at 2-3. 

This Court agrees with defendants. Federal law clearly requires plaintiff to allege more

than an abstract injury and not just an allegation of a violation of the legally created right to

establish an injury in fact. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101. Here, plaintiff contends defendants’

alleged violations of the CLRA and TCPA are enough to establish an injury in fact, admitting

she did not suffer any economic or other harm. Although plaintiff alleges her right to privacy

was violated and infers a violation of her right to be free from deceptive business practices, there

are no allegations of any harm caused by these alleged violations. Because there are no

allegations of any concrete injury to plaintiff, this Court finds plaintiff fails to establish she

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Plaintiff suggests, in a footnote, that, if this Court deems plaintiff lacks standing to pursue this case as

a class action, the Court should permit the substitution of another class member as named plaintiff in order to

allow the suit to proceed. Doc. # 18 at 9 n.13 (citing Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d

1018, 1023 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003)). This Court finds it inappropriate to address this issue because it is

improperly presented in footnote in opposition to a motion to dismiss. 

7 05cv1468

suffered an injury in fact and, therefore, finds plaintiff lacks standing to sue for damages.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 

In addition, although plaintiff contends that there is no impediment forestalling

defendants from charging plaintiff again for unsolicited text messages, plaintiff presents no

allegation that could reasonably be inferred to indicate such an action will occur again. Plaintiff

points out she alleges that “defendants continue to engage in their unlawful practices,” Doc. #

18 at 7 (citing Am.Compl. ¶ 19), and that “[i]t is not clear ... whether ... the text messages are

actually blocked for plaintiff,” id. (citing Am.Compl. ¶ 37), which facts plaintiff claims support

her contention of a real and immediate threat of future harm. However, this Court is

unconvinced it can be inferred from these facts that the unsolicited text messages will be sent

by defendants again and, if sent, that defendants’ acts will cause plaintiff harm in the future.

Thus, plaintiff also fails to establish “a real or immediate threat of an irreparable injury” as

required to seek injunctive relief. Hangartner, 373 F.3d at 1021-22. Because plaintiff lacks

standing to sue for damages or injunctive relief on her own behalf, plaintiff cannot pursue those

claims on behalf of a class. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624 n.3; Singleton, 428 U.S.

at 112. Accordingly, defendants motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) based on lack of

standing is GRANTED.4

 Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and motion

to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are, therefore, DENIED as moot.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART

as follows:

a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is GRANTED; and

//

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 05cv1468

b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is DENIED as moot;

2. Defendants’ motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) is DENIED as moot;

3. Plaintiff’s motion to strike portions of defendants’ reply brief is DENIED as

moot; and

4. The instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

DATED: September 5, 2006

Hon. John A. Houston, U.S. District Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:05-cv-01468-JAH-WMC Document 29 Filed 09/05/06 Page 8 of 8