Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01174/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01174-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAYBEL JAYME, IRINA WALLER, and )

CRYSTAL CASANOVA, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:10-cv-01174-GEB-KJN

v. ) 

) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

CHECKSMART FINANCIAL, LLC., ) MOTION TO REMAND*

and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, ) 

)

Defendants. )

___________________________________)

Plaintiffs move to remand this case to Sacramento County

Superior Court in California from which Defendant removed it. Removal

was under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). CAFA “vests

district courts with ‘original jurisdiction of any civil action in

which, inter alia, the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs,’ and in which the

aggregate number of proposed plaintiffs is 100 or greater, and any

member of the plaintiff class is a citizen of a state different from

any defendant.” Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994,

997 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)). Defendant

“bears the burden of establishing . . . jurisdiction” under CAFA. 

Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Case 2:10-cv-01174-GEB-KJN Document 10 Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiffs argue Defendant has not satisfied its burden of showing

that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.

Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that “the maximum

potential recovery as a result of this action is less than

$5,000,000.” (Compl. ¶ 1.) “[W]here the plaintiff has pled an amount

in controversy less than $5,000,000,” the removing party “must prove

with legal certainty that CAFA’s jurisdictional amount is met.” 

Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 1000. The parties agree the legal certainty

standard applies. (Notice of Removal ¶ 11; Mot. to Remand 1:10-13.) 

Under this standard, Defendants “‘must not only contradict the

[P]laintiff[s’] own assessment of damages, but must overcome the

presumption against federal jurisdiction’ by showing [P]laintiff[s]

[are] legally certain to recover at least five million dollars,

assuming proof of liability.” Hollinghurst v. Lacoste USA, 2010 WL

2630365, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at

999).

Plaintiffs allege seven claims in their complaint under the

California Labor Code and one claim under the California Business and

Professions Code. Defendant argues the amount in controversy is

$5,225,658 based on Plaintiffs’ fifth, sixth, and seventh claims, the

civil penalties recoverable under the Private Attorney General’s Act

of 2004 (“PAGA”) for all seven Labor Code claims, and recoverable

attorneys’ fees. Defendant provides the declaration of Pagle

Helterbrand, Vice President of Human Resources for Defendant

(“Helterbrand”) in support of its calculation. Helterbrand declares

Defendant’s records “indicate that [there are] approximately 210

individuals whose employment [with Defendant] has ended” during the

period from April 2007 to April 5, 2009. (Id. ¶ 4.). Helterbrand

Case 2:10-cv-01174-GEB-KJN Document 10 Filed 07/22/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

also declares that from April 5, 2009 to April 5, 2010, Defendant

“employed approximately 138” store managers, shift managers, and

customer services representatives. (Id. ¶ 5.) Helterbrand declares

these 138 employees “worked a total of 2,560 pay periods during that

time period.” (Id.) However, after “[t]aking a close look at

Defendant’s . . . figures . . . there is a conspicuous lack of

evidentiary support for these numbers.” Green v. Staples Contract &

Commercial, Inc., 2008 WL 5246051, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 

First, Defendant fails to show how it calculated the amount

in controversy in Plaintiffs’ fifth claim in which Plaintiffs seek

waiting time penalties under California Labor Code section 203. 

Defendant states: “[t]he total waiting time penalties Plaintiffs seek

on behalf of the former employees is $549,215, which represents 30

days of wages for each of the 210 employees, calculated at the rate of

8 hours per day at the employee’s last rate of pay.” (Notice of

Removal 8:9-11.) However, Defendant has failed to explain how it

calculated the wage of each employee. “[A]bsent . . . evidence”

showing the wage of each employee, “it is nearly impossible to

estimate with any certainty the actual amount in controversy” under

Plaintiffs’ fifth claim. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 1001.

Further, Helterbrand has not explained how she calculated

that 2,560 pay periods were worked during the April 5, 2009 to April

5, 2010 time period. Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the

three named Plaintiffs’ respective employment ended on different

dates. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19.) This variation in employment end dates

indicates that not all 138 class members worked the same amount of pay

periods; Defendant has not explained how its pay period calculation

accounts for this variation. Defendant uses the 2,560 pay period

Case 2:10-cv-01174-GEB-KJN Document 10 Filed 07/22/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

figure in calculating that $249,100 is the amount in controversy under

Plaintiffs’ sixth claim and that $3,487,400 is the amount of PAGA

penalties Plaintiffs’ seek. Without more detailed information as to

how Helterbrand approximated the number of pay periods, Defendant’s

calculations based on that figure appears to be speculative. 

Therefore, Defendant has not provided evidence sufficient to permit

using these figures in calculating the total amount in controversy.

Defendant has also failed to provide sufficient evidence in

support of the class sizes. See id. at 1001 (stating the problem with

Defendant’s figures are “only compounded if Defendant is wrong about 

. . . the class size”). Here, Helterbrand declares there are two

relevant subclasses: (1) the 210 employees whose employment ended

during the time period April 2007 to April 5, 2009, and (2) the 138

employees who worked for Defendant during the time period April 5,

2009 to April 5, 2010. These figures are supported only by

Helterbrand’s conclusory averment that she “reviewed [Defendant’s]

records.” However, this evidence is insufficient to “contradict the

[P]laintiff[s’] own assessment of damages” under the legal certainty

standard. Id. at 999. 

Moreover, Defendant uses the 138 employee figure to

calculate $484,000 in PAGA civil penalties for Plaintiffs’ waiting

time penalties claim without explaining why Defendant concludes that

138 employees quit or were discharged during the one-year time period

from April 5, 2009 to April 5, 2010. Although Helterbrand declares

that 210 employees quit or were discharged within the three-year

statute of limitations period for the waiting time penalties claim,

Defendant has not provided evidence showing that 138 employees quit or

were discharged within the one-year statute of limitations for PAGA

Case 2:10-cv-01174-GEB-KJN Document 10 Filed 07/22/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

civil penalties. Therefore, Defendant has not provided evidence

sufficient to permit using this portion of the PAGA civil penalties in

calculating the total amount in controversy.

Lastly, Defendant estimates it will recover twenty percent

of the “total penalties” in attorneys’ fees, which Defendant estimates

will be $870,943. Defendant provides the declaration of its counsel,

Cary G. Palmer, to establish that twenty percent of total penalties is

an appropriate and reasonable attorney fee award in this case. 

(Palmer Decl. ¶ 8.) However, Defendant’s attorneys’ fees calculation

is problematic because the total penalty figure used to calculate it

has not been shown to be based on evidence sufficient to satisfy the

legal certainty standard. (Notice of Removal 7:8-12.) Since

Defendant has not met its burden of “prov[ing] with legal certainty

that CAFA’s jurisdictional amount is met,” Plaintiffs’ remand motion

is granted. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 1000. Therefore, this case is

remanded to Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento from

which it was removed.

Dated: July 21, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:10-cv-01174-GEB-KJN Document 10 Filed 07/22/10 Page 5 of 5