Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-03131/USCOURTS-ca3-23-03131-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 23-3131

__________

QUENTIN SALMOND,

Appellant

v.

NATHAN WILLIAMS; THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT;

THE PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-03806)

District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 1, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 2, 2025)

___________

OPINION*

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM

Quentin Salmond, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the 

District Court dismissing his complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

In 2014, Quentin Salmond was convicted of third-degree murder and conspiracy in 

Pennsylvania state court. Last year, he filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against the Philadelphia Police Department, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, 

and former police officer Nathan Williams. Salmond claimed that the defendants failed 

to disclose exculpatory cell phone records obtained during the criminal investigation. He 

averred that phone records received by Williams would prove that he was not in the area 

of the homicide when it occurred and that he did not communicate with anyone involved. 

Salmond also alleged that an informant told Williams that Salmond confessed to the 

murder at a location in Philadelphia, but the records would show that he was not in 

Philadelphia at that time. 

Salmond claimed that Williams, among other things, maliciously prosecuted him, 

falsely testified at trial that he did not know the results of an investigation into the phone 

records, and violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He also claimed violations 

of his rights by the District Attorney’s Office and the Police Department for failing to 

provide the phone records and/or information about deals with the informant. Salmond 

further claimed that the District Attorney’s Office and the Police Department continued

to violate his rights post-conviction by denying his requests for this information, and 

information regarding misconduct by Williams, under Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know 

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Law. Salmond sought money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, including an 

order compelling the defendants to furnish the alleged Brady material. 

The District Court screened Salmond’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it for failure to state a claim for relief. The District Court 

ruled that Salmond’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487

(1994), and its progeny, which prohibit actions under § 1983 where success would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, unless the conviction or 

sentence has been invalidated. The District Court dismissed the complaint without 

prejudice to re-filing in the event Salmond’s sentence was invalidated. This appeal 

followed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of 

the dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2). Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 

(3d Cir. 2020).

Salmond appears to concede on appeal that his monetary claims are barred by 

Heck. He argues that his action to compel the defendants to produce evidence is not

barred because a favorable ruling would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction. Salmond states that his conviction may be overturned later, but only after 

further proceedings in state court. This argument lacks merit. As the District Court 

stated, Salmond’s constitutional claims stem from an alleged failure to disclose evidence

in violation of Brady. Because “Brady evidence is, by definition, always favorable to the 

defendant and material to his guilt or punishment,” a successful Brady claim “necessarily 

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yields evidence undermining a conviction.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536

(2011). The Heck bar applies “no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief).” 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).

Salmond’s other arguments on appeal are unavailing. Salmond likens his request 

for evidence to a request for DNA testing, which may be pursued in a § 1983 action. 

However, unlike a Brady violation, DNA testing may not yield favorable evidence. See 

Skinner, 562 F.3d at 525. Salmond also asserts that the District Court erred in dismissing 

his malicious prosecution claim based on false testimony at trial, but a claim for 

malicious prosecution is barred under Heck. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-86. In addition,

Salmond’s contention that the District Court showed bias when it commented in its 

opinion on the facts related to his claims is meritless.

Salmond also appears to argue that the responses to his requests for records under 

Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law by the District Attorney’s Office and the Police 

Department violated his right to procedural due process, and that the statute is 

constitutionally infirm. The Right-to-Know Law, however, provides for judicial review 

in state court. See 65 Pa. Stat. § 67.1302.(a). Where a state has provided seemingly 

adequate procedural protections, a plaintiff cannot skip that process and seek relief in 

federal court. Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). Finally, Salmond 

contends that the District Court should have afforded him leave to amend his complaint, 

but he has not called into question the District Court’s conclusion that amendment would 

be futile.

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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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