Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00375/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00375-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LATESHA L. ROBINSON, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00375-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Social Security Claimant/Plaintiff Latesha Robinson (“Robinson”) has 

brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review 

of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“the 

Commissioner”) denying her protective applications for disability insurance benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and

supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. By the consent of the parties (see Doc. 16), the Court has 

designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order 

the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (See Doc. 18).

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 12, 13) and the administrative 

record (Doc. 11) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s)])”),1 the Court finds that 

the Commissioner’s decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

 1 With the Court’s consent, the parties jointly waived the opportunity for oral 

argument. (Docs. 15, 17).

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I. Procedural Background

On March 11, 2011, Robinson protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI

with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”),2 alleging disability beginning April 

28, 2010.3 After her applications were initially denied, Robinson requested a 

hearing on her applications, which was held in Mobile, Alabama, before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on January 15, 2013. (R. 22).

On March 14, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Robinson’s 

applications, finding her “not disabled” under the Social Security Act. (See R. 19-

29). Robinson requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council for the 

SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (R. 17), which denied Robinson’s 

request on July 2, 2014. (R. 8-12).

On August 11, 2014, Robinson filed this action under §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) 

for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1). See Ingram v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law 

 2 “The Social Security Act's general disability insurance benefits program (‘DIB’) 

provides income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature 

retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence. 

See 42 U.S.C. 423(a). The Social Security Act's Supplemental Security Income (‘SSI’) 

is a separate and distinct program. SSI is a general public assistance measure 

providing an additional resource to the aged, blind, and disabled to assure that 

their income does not fall below the poverty line. Eligibility for SSI is based upon 

proof of indigence and disability. See 42 U.S.C. 1382(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(C).” 

Sanders v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11-0491-N, 2012 WL 4497733, at *3 (S.D. Ala. 

Sept. 28, 2012).

3 “For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both 

disabled and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202–03 (2005). For 

DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on 

or before the last date for which she were insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) (2005).” 

Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

Case 1:14-cv-00375-N Document 19 Filed 07/24/15 Page 2 of 15
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of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a 

denial of review by the Appeals Council.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (“The final 

determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI 

benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title 

to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of 

this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, 

irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a 

civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such 

decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may 

allow.”).4

II. Standard of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on 

proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” ’ ” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 

2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d

1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, 

 4 The record reflects that Robinson resides in this judicial district. Thus, venue is 

proper in this Court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Such action shall be brought in the 

district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff 

resides, or has his principal place of business...”).

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reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” 

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8

(11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 

1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the 

[Commissioner]'s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is 

supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. 

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

 “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as 

automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the 

decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). “In determining 

whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must...tak[e] into account evidence 

favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, “[t]here is no 

presumption...that the Commissioner followed the appropriate legal standards in 

deciding a claim for benefits or that the legal conclusions reached were valid. 

Instead, [the court] conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. 

Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 

894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (internal citation omitted). In sum, courts 

“review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s 

legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 

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5

curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon 

which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 

(11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine 

whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”). “ ‘The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply 

the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for 

determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.’ ” 

Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46

(11th Cir. 1991)).

Eligibility for...SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. 

§...1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§...1382c(a)(3)(A).

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 

2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).5

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or 

equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of 

Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past 

relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are 

 5 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but 

they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (effective Dec. 1, 2014). 

See also Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only 

insofar as their legal analysis warrants.”).

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significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work 

experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-

(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).6

“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate 

both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 

405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

“In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the 

examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; 

(2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the 

claimant's age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 

(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in 

combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a plaintiff proves 

that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant 

work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the 

plaintiff is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging 

in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 

economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 

 6 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing 

individual steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.

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764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, but importantly, although “the 

[plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her 

past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to 

develop a full and fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(citations omitted).

“When no new evidence is presented to the Appeals Council and it denies 

review, then the administrative law judge's decision is necessarily reviewed as the 

final decision of the Commissioner, but when a claimant properly presents new 

evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new 

evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262.

III. Claim on Judicial Review

The ALJ “reversibly erred in failing to articulate specific reasons for rejecting 

the opinion of Plaintiff treating physician.” (Doc. 12 at 1).

IV. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Robinson had “not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since April 28, 2010, the alleged onset date.” (R. 24). At 

Step Two, the ALJ determined that Robinson had the following severe impairment: 

calcaneal fracture with ORIF (“open reduction, internal fixation”) of the right foot, 

stemming from an automobile accident on April 28, 2010. (R. 24-25). At Step 

Three, the ALJ found that Robinson did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the 

Listing of Impairments. (R. 25). Robinson does not challenge any of the ALJ’s 

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determinations at Steps One through Three, or at Step Five. Her claim of error 

concerns the ALJ’s analysis in Step Four.

At Step Four,

the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the 

regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do 

despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about 

[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant 

medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine 

whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under 

the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth 

step...20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will 

conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past 

relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.

In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant 

work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant 

medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That 

is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular 

work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the 

claimant's RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her 

prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Robinson had the RFC “to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).”7 (R. 25-28). 

 7 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment 

in the national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, 

medium, heavy, and very heavy. These terms are all defined in the 

regulations...Each classification...has its own set of criteria.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 

1239 n.4. “Light work is defined as work that ‘involves lifting no more than 20 

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Robinson’s sole claim on judicial review is that, in determining her RFC, the 

ALJ erred by failing to articulate specific reasons for rejecting the medical opinions 

of Robinson’s treating physician, Dr. Mark Perry, M.D. “ ‘Medical opinions are 

statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources 

that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] 

impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what 

[the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or 

mental restrictions.’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). “In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must 

consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each 

medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) 

the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the 

claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's 

opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and 

(5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both examining and nonexamining physicians.” Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 

(11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)). 

“[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical 

 

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 

pounds.’...The regulations further state that ‘[e]ven though the weight lifted may be 

very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or 

standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and 

pulling of arm or leg controls.’ ” Id. n.5 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), which is 

identical to § 416.967(b)).

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opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (citing Sharfarz v. 

Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). However, the ALJ “may 

reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary 

conclusion.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240. Accord, e.g., Anderson v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., 427 F. App'x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished).

“A ‘treating source’ (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant's ‘own physician, 

psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides[], or has provided[],[ 

the claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an 

ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant].’ ” Nyberg v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 179 F. App'x 589, 591 (11th Cir. May 2, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). “Absent ‘good cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical 

opinions of treating physicians ‘substantial or considerable weight.’ ” Winschel, 631 

F.3d at 1179 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). “Good cause exists ‘when the: (1) 

treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence 

supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or 

inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.’ With good cause, an ALJ may 

disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he ‘must clearly articulate [the] 

reasons’ for doing so.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation 

omitted). See also, e.g., Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (“[T]he opinion of a treating 

physician may be rejected when it is so brief and conclusory that it lacks persuasive 

weight or where it is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings. 

Further, the Secretary may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence 

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supports a contrary conclusion.” (citation omitted)).

The ALJ summarized Dr. Perry’s medical findings and opinions as follows:

In a report dated June 9, 2011, Mark Perry, M.D., a treating physician, 

noted it had been approximately one year since the claimant’s 

operative treatment. He also referenced that the claimant had been 

denied for disability twice. Dr. Perry referenced the claimant’s report 

that she still had significant pain when walking or ambulating. The 

physical examination findings revealed tenderness to palpation of the 

peroneal tendons, and pain with motion of the subtalar joint. 

However, x-rays showed good consolidation of the fracture but with 

decreased posterior heel height. Dr. Perry opined that the claimant 

was a good candidate for some form of disability (Exhibit 8F). The 

following year, on May 15, 2012, the claimant presented for follow-up 

of what Dr. Perry referenced as a “yearly surveillance.” Examination 

findings revealed the right ankle was approximately three-fourths 

normal. X-rays showed nice consolidation of the fracture, although it 

was noted the claimant had lost some calcaneal height as well as 

subsequent dorsiflexion of her talus. Dr. Perry recommended a shoe 

heel lift to compensate for lost height. He opined that, given the 

claimant’s injury, she would be a good candidate for disability (Exhibit 

12F).

On June 12, 2012, Dr. Perry completed a Physical Capacities 

Evaluation, in which he estimated the claimant was able to sit for a 

total of 8 hours in an 8-hour workday, and could stand/walk for a total 

of one hour each in an 8-hour workday. He added the claimant was 

able to lift and/or carry up to five pounds for one hour. She was unable 

to use her right leg or foot for repetitive actions. The claimant could 

reach for two hours, and bend for one hour in an 8-hour workday, but 

could not squat, crawl, or climb. She was precluded from activities 

that involved unprotected heights and had moderate restrictions in 

terms of driving automotive equipment. Dr. Perry opined that the 

claimant had been impaired for two years, and was unable to work for 

8 hours per day, 40 hours per week on a sustained basis within the 

limitations noted without missing more than two days of work per 

month (Exhibit 10F). Dr. Perry also completed a Clinical Assessment 

of Pain form, indicating he had treated the claimant since April 28, 

2010 for a right calcaneal fracture. He indicated that pain would 

distract the claimant from adequately performing daily activities or 

work. He also indicated that physical activity would greatly increase 

the claimant’s pain and cause distraction from task or total 

abandonment of task. It was noted that the impact from pain would 

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cause limitations, but not to such degree as to cause serious problems 

at work. Dr. Perry indicated the claimant needed a heel lift for her 

shoe, and noted that her pain had been at the level indicated for one 

year. He reiterated that the claimant had been impaired for two years, 

and was unable to work for 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week on a 

sustained basis within the limitations noted without missing more 

than two days of work per month (Exhibit 11F).

...

Of note, Dr. Perry, the claimant’s treating physician, has provided 

several medical source statements, including a physical capacity 

assessment regarding the claimant’s pain, in which he noted she has 

tried several times for disability based on her right foot condition 

(Exhibits 10F-12F). Interestingly, after a follow-up examination on 

July 11, 2011, and following a brief, 15-minute evaluation a year later, 

on May 15, 2012, Dr. Perry determined that the claimant would be a 

good candidate for disability (Exhibits 8F, 12F)...

(R. 36-37).

Robinson asserts that “[t]he ALJ rejected Dr. Perry’s opinion without fully 

articulating why. Further, she does not explain exactly how much weight is given 

to Dr. Perry’s opinions.” (Doc. 12 at 3). Robinson’s assertions are without merit. 

The ALJ expressly assigned “very little weight” to Dr. Perry’s opinions, explaining: 

“[T]he opinion evidence from Dr. Perry, particularly with regard to the Physical 

Capacity Assessment (Exhibit 10F) and the Clinical Assessment of Pain (Exhibit 

11F), are internally inconsistent, as the treating physician does not state what 

objective findings he relied upon; and his treatment records do not support his 

assessments.” (R. 27-28). The ALJ further noted that his determined RFC was 

supported by “the claimant’s conservative treatment history and reports of her 

activities of daily living.” (R. 28). The ALJ found more credible the objective 

medical evidence of examining physician Dr. William Crotwell, III, M.D., and 

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assigned his opinions “great weight.” (R. 27-28).

The ALJ articulated “good cause” for assigning less than controlling weight to 

Dr. Perry’s opinions, finding that they were not bolstered by the evidence (e.g. 

Robinson’s “conservative treatment history[8] and reports of her daily living”9), that

evidence supported a contrary finding, and that they were inconsistent with Dr. 

Perry’s own medical records. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.10 Robinson, in her 

 8 Cf. Petteway v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 353 F. App'x 287, 290 (11th Cir. Nov. 18, 

2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[G]ood cause existed to reject the opinion 

because Dr. Leber's conclusion was inconsistent with Petteway's medical records, 

which showed infrequent medical visits at intervals of two or more months.”); 

Harrison v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 569 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir. June 24, 2014) 

(per curiam) (unpublished) (“Dr. Davina–Brown's physical examinations of Harrison 

were consistently unremarkable, and she never found that Harrison suffered from 

any of the paradigmatic symptoms frequently associated with the most severe cases 

of fibromyalgia, such as joint swelling, synovitis, or tender trigger points. For 

example, Dr. Davina–Brown prescribed medications for Harrison's chronic pain but 

never recommended more aggressive treatment, such as visits to the emergency 

room for pain or trigger point injections. The conservative and routine nature of Dr. 

Davina–Brown's treatment plan suggests that Harrison's impairments—while 

significant—were not so severe that Harrison could not perform any job duties.”).

9 An “ALJ is not required to give a treating physician's opinion considerable weight 

if the claimant's own testimony regarding her daily activities contradicts that 

opinion. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241 (finding that an ALJ's decision to give a 

treating physician's opinion little weight was supported by substantial evidence 

because the claimant's admissions concerning her activities were at odds with the 

treating physician's assessment).” Leiter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 377 F. 

App'x 944, 949 (11th Cir. May 6, 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished). See also Crow v. 

Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 571 F. App'x 802, 806-07 (11th Cir. July 7, 2014) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (“[E]vidence of Crow's daily activities also provided good 

cause to discount his treating physician's opinion. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.”).

10 The ALJ was also not required to accept Dr. Perry’s opinions that Robinson was 

“a good candidate for disability” because “the resolution of that issue is reserved for 

the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). ‘A statement by a 

medical source that [a claimant is] “disabled” or “unable to work” does not mean 

that [the Commissioner] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.’ Id. §§ 

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brief substantive discussion regarding the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Perry’s opinions 

(Doc. 12 at 2-3), has not attempted to demonstrate why the ALJ’s decision to reject 

those opinions is not supported by substantial evidence, instead asking the Court to

simply accept her bare assertion that the ALJ articulated no reasons for doing so.11

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Robinson’s lone assignment of error and 

finds that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

 

404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1).” Forsyth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 503 F. App'x 892, 894

(11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished).

11 Robinson notes that Dr. Perry “also completed a disabled parking permit 

application for the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 12 at 3). The placement of this observation 

(between the statements “On behalf of the Plaintiff, Dr. Perry completed a clinical 

assessment of pain and a physical capacities evaluation” and “The ALJ rejected Dr. 

Perry’s opinion without fully articulating why” (Doc. 12 at 3)) appears to suggest 

that Robinson considers the parking permit application to be additional opinion 

evidence that the ALJ was required to consider. This suggestion is misleading.

Robinson does not cite where the form may be found in the record, and the 

Commissioner does not address it in her brief. It appears the parking permit 

application (R. 16) in question was not submitted to the ALJ for consideration. 

Rather, the parking permit application appears to have been completed after the 

AJL issued his opinion denying Robinson’s applications and was presented as 

additional evidence to the Appeals Council on review. Unlike an ALJ’s decision, 

“[t]he Appeals Council ... [i]s not required to provide a detailed rationale for 

denying review.” Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 784-85 (11th 

Cir. 2014).

By arguing only that the ALJ did not properly consider the parking permit 

application, Robinson has forfeited any claim of error that the Appeals Council 

failed to review the new evidence. But cf. id. at 784 (“In Ingram, the claimant 

argued the Appeals Council failed to consider her new evidence of mental disability. 

[496 F.3d] at 1262. We held the record contradicted the claimant's argument, 

explaining that the Appeals Council accepted the new evidence but denied review 

because, even in light of the new evidence, there was no error in the ALJ's decision. 

Id. We are confronted with the same situation in this case. Mitchell contends the 

Appeals Council failed to evaluate his new evidence, but the record demonstrates 

otherwise. As in Ingram, the Appeals Council accepted Mitchell's new evidence but 

denied review because the additional evidence failed to establish error in the ALJ's 

decision. See id. On this record, we are confident the Appeals Council adequately 

evaluated Mitchell's new evidence.”).

Case 1:14-cv-00375-N Document 19 Filed 07/24/15 Page 14 of 15
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V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the 

Commissioner’s final decision issued July 2, 2014, denying Robinson’s applications 

for DIB and SSI benefits is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 24th day of July 2015.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00375-N Document 19 Filed 07/24/15 Page 15 of 15