Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01904/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01904-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVIN GOLDSTON, JR.,

CDCR #T-07388

Civil No. 11cv1904 BTM (MDD)

Plaintiffs, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS [ECF No. 3]; AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT AS FRIVOLOUS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A

vs.

RANDALL TOREZZ; UNKNOWN

PSYCHIATRIST,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Marvin Goldston, currently incarcerated at California State Prison located in

Represa, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) [ECF No. 3].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

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Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however,

remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is

ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 3] and assesses no

initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the

filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the

installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A.

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a

claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and

(2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint contains a number of rambling statements and it is difficult to

discern the nature of his claims. While far from clear, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking to sue

a psychiatrist based on his role in a study during which Plaintiff was taken off psychiatric

medication. (See Compl. at 3-4.) Plaintiff indicates that after he was taken off medication he

began to hear voices that told him to commit a robbery. (Id. at 4-5.) 

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff has already brought identical claims in a previous

action. A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United

States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.

1992). A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it

“merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,

1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal

quotations omitted). 

Second, while Plaintiff has attempted to bring this action pursuant to § 1983, there are no

federal law claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal

question jurisdiction exists over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not comply with

§ 1331, there is no subject matter jurisdiction. The Court could exercise diversity jurisdiction

with regard to Plaintiff’s malpractice claim only if Defendant Torrezz resides in a different State

than Plaintiff and the amount in controversy exceeds “the sum or value of $75,000.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332. Plaintiff pleads no facts to support a finding of diversity jurisdiction in this matter. 

For all these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint and will provide him with

an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. 

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 3] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction

and as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. 

See S.D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79

(9th Cir. 1996).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 29, 2011 _________________________________________

 HON. BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

 United States District Judge 

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