Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02136/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02136-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

ROBERT JOHNSON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-2136

CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS;

THE FORT SMITH AIRPORT COMMISSION;

WILLIAM STRANDELL, individually;

JOHN R. DALLAS, individually;

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

WILLIAM HARDING, individually;

JOHN POLINSKY, JR., individually;

R. MARK HORN, individually;

KENNETH PYLE, individually;

GARY W. CAMPBELL, individually;

COLE GOODMAN, individually;

JERRY R. STEWART, individually;

JOSEPH HERMANN, individually;

RICK DERAMUS, individually, DEFENDANTS

O R D E R

NOW on this 6th day of March, 2007, the above referenced

matter comes on for this Court’s consideration of Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Filed on

August 16, 2006 (document # 93) and the Supplemental Motion to

Substitute the United States for Individually Named Defendants

William Strandell and John R. Dallas and Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint as to the United States (document # 120), and the

various responses and replies thereto. Having reviewed the

pleadings of the parties, and all other matters of relevance

before it, the Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds

and orders as follows with respect thereto:

1. Plaintiff, Robert A. Johnson, (hereinafter “Johnson” or

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“plaintiff”) filed this action on September 12, 2005 against the

following named defendants:

* the City of Fort Smith, Arkansas (Fort Smith);

* the Fort Smith Airport Commission (Airport Commission);

* William Strandell (Strandell);

* John R. Dallas (Dallas);

* the United States of America (United States);

* William Harding (Harding);

* John Polinsky, Jr. (Polinsky);

* R. Mark Horn (Horn);

* Kenneth Pyle (Pyle);

* Gary W. Campbell (Campbell);

* Cole Goodman (Goodman);

* Jerry R. Stewart (Stewart);

* Joseph Herrmann (Herrmann); and

* Rick Deramus (Demarus). 

This matter was originally filed on September 12, 2005; a

First Amended Complaint (document #82) was filed on August 16,

2006; and, a First Amended and Substituted Complaint (document

#109) was filed on September 12, 2006. 

Plaintiff’s complaint contains seven (7) separate counts:

* breach of contract;

* intentional interference with contract or business

expectancy;

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* denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

* denial of due process under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105;

* defamation;

* civil conspiracy;, and 

* age discrimination under Ark. Code Ann. § 21-3-203. 

Initially, separate defendants the United States, Strandell

and Dallas moved to dismiss (document # 93) the plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint filed herein on August 16, 2006. They argued

that the First Amended Complaint failed to state any allegations

against them upon which relief can be granted. They then filed

their Supplemental Motion to Substitute the United States for

Individually Named Defendants William Strandell and John R. Dallas

and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as to the United States

(document #120). 

2. The Court observes that its Order dated September 12,

2006 noted that the defendants had filed various motions to

dismiss plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (document #82).

Further, the Order ruled that, to the extent any such motions were

based upon plaintiff’s non-compliance with Local Rule 5.5(e), the

motions were denied as moot. Defendants were then allowed time

within which to supplement their pending motions to dismiss to

assert other bases for dismissal. They did so with the filing of

their Supplemental Motion to Substitute the United States for

Individually Named Defendants William Strandell and John R. Dallas

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and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as to the United States

(document #120). 

3. The Court will initially address the separate

defendants’ argument that the United States should be substituted

for the individually named defendants, Strandell and Dallas; and

will then discuss their argument that the complaint should be

dismissed as to the United States.

4. As background for these discussions, it is useful to note

the following “facts” as alleged in plaintiff’s complaint -- which

“facts” will, for purposes of ruling on the motions under

discussion, be taken as true:

* that Johnson was hired by the Airport Commission and Fort

Smith as Airport Manager of the Fort Smith Airport on August 22,

1988. Complaint, ¶ 19;

* that the Airport Commission, Fort Smith, and Johnson

entered into a written Employment Agreement, which was

subsequently amended on August 31, 2000 and January 28, 2003.

Complaint, ¶ 20;

* that, under the Employment Agreement, Johnson’s employment

could only be terminated for cause. Complaint, ¶ 21;

* that on December 1, 1995, the Airport Commission and Fort

Smith established a Salary Reduction Plan for Johnson under 26

U.S.C. § 457(f), under which Johnson would be fully vested in his

benefits under the Plan at the age of 60. Complaint, ¶ 23-24.

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Further, Johnson was named as the “Named Fiduciary and Plan

Administrator” under the Salary Reduction Plan. Complaint, ¶ 25;

* that on November 6, 2003, the Airport Commission and Fort

Smith terminated Johnson’s employment, without sufficient cause.

Complaint, ¶ 26-27;

* that Johnson’s 60 birthday occurred on December 8, 2003. th

Complaint, ¶ 28; and

* that Dallas and Strandell were employed by the United

States Department of Defense at all times pertinent to the

Complaint. Complaint, ¶ 39, 40. 

5. Motion To Substitute -- In their motion, the separate

defendants argue that the United States should be substituted as

a defendant for both Strandell and Dallas under 28 U.S.C. §

2679(b). Plaintiff resists that notion.

According to 28 U.S.C. § 2679, the remedy of an injured party

for an injury resulting from the negligent or wrongful act of any

employee of the government while acting within the scope of

his/her office is exclusively against the United States of

America. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b). Specifically, 

[u]pon certification by the Attorney General that the

defendant employee was acting within the scope of his

office or employment at the time of the incident out of

which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding

commenced upon such claim in a United States district

court shall be deemed an action against the United

States . . . and the United States shall be substituted

as the party defendant. 

28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). 

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Such a certification has been previously filed with this

Court as an exhibit to the separate defendants’ Motion to

Substitute the United States for Individually Named Defendants

William Strandell and John R. Dallas and Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint (document #30) filed on November 10, 2005. 

However, although an Attorney General’s certification that an

employee was acting within the scope of his employment is prima

facie evidence that the employee’s challenged conduct was within

the scope of employ, the certification is subject to limited

judicial review. Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1012 (8 Cir. th

1991). According to Brown, 

‘the burden of altering that status quo’ is on the

plaintiff, who must come forward with specific facts

rebutting the government’s scope-of-employment

certification. If the issue is contested, plaintiff

bears the burden of proving that the employee was not

acting within the scope of employ, consistent with the

purpose of § 2679(d) and with the general scheme of the

FTCA, in which plaintiff bears the burden of proof on

this issue.

949 F.2d at 1012 (citations omitted). Further, it is clear that

the scope of employment analysis is governed by the state law of

respondeat superior. See Piper v. U.S., 887 F.2d 861, 863 (8th

Cir. 1989). 

Under Arkansas law, “[w]hether the employee’s action is

within the scope of employment . . . [depends] on whether the

individual is carrying out the ‘object and purpose of the

enterprise,’ as opposed to acting exclusively in his own

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interest.” Gordon v. Planters & Merchants Bancshares, Inc., 935

S.W.2d 544, 550-551 (Ark. 1996)(citing J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. V.

Doss, 899 S.W.2d 464 (Ark. 1995)). 

Plaintiff argues that the alleged acts by Strandell and

Dallas went beyond furthering their employer’s interest -- and,

therefore, the United States should not be substituted as a

defendant, and Strandell and Dallas should not receive the

protections of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Specifically,

plaintiff -- quoting the separate defendants’ pleadings -- notes

that the duties of Strandell’s employment included: 

* “to initiate, negotiate, process, and approve real

property leases, airport joint use agreements, master

cooperative construction agreements, contracts, funding

agreements, memorandums of agreement, and memorandums of

understanding between the United States Air Force and state

and local governments”;

* “to negotiate with The Fort Smith Airport Commission

on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force to obtain an

Airport Joint Use Agreement and other agreements affecting

the basing rights of the 188 Fighter Wing”; and, th

* “to negotiate Airport Joint Use Agreements . . .

[and] to communicate on numerous occasions with the Commander

of the 188 Fighter Wing, and with officials of the City of th

Fort Smith Airport Commission . . . concern[ing] the 188th’s

tenancy and occupancy . . . on the Fort Smith Municipal

Airport”. 

Again quoting the separate defendants’ pleadings, plaintiff

notes that the employment duties of Dallas included:

* “to command the 188 Fighter Wing (188 ) and execute th th

the training and operational missions in the defense of the

nation”;

* to “[represent] the 188 and to [act] as the local th

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Air Force Liaison Officer in the negotiation and approval of

real property leases, airport joint use agreements, master

cooperative construction agreements, contracts, funding

agreements, memorandums of agreement, and memorandums of

understanding between the United States Air Force and the

Fort Smith Airport Commission”; and

* “the management and expenditure of federal funds in

compliance with federal law in order to provide for the

military needs of the Air Force and this assigned unit”. 

Plaintiff further argues that the following allegations of 

his Complaint “go far beyond the duties recited above”: 

* publishing statements about the plaintiff that were

known to be untrue or were made with a reckless disregard for

their truthfulness (Complaint, ¶ 52(b));

* conspiring to terminate the plaintiff’s employment

with the Airport Commission with or without cause, at any

cost and on any grounds possible (Complaint, ¶ 60); 

* conspiring to manufacture or dredge up any facts

possible to justify terminating the plaintiff’s employment in

order to satisfy their personal and corporate political

ambitions of making the plaintiff appear responsible for

difficulties surrounding the renegotiation of the Airport

Commission’s “Airport Joint Use Agreement” and “Lease” with

the United States (Complaint, ¶ 61); and, 

* committing such other and further improper acts as

shall be proven at trial (Complaint, ¶ 52(d)). 

With respect to the plaintiff’s argument concerning the

allegations of the complaint, controlling case law makes clear

that the determination of whether the United States should be

substituted in place of the separate defendants is not controlled

by the asserted allegations. Osborn v. Haley, 127 S.Ct. 881

(2007). Rather, the Attorney General’s “certification must be

respected unless and until the District Court determines that 

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. . . [the separate defendants] in fact, engaged in conduct beyond

the scope of [their] employment.” Osborn v. Haley, 127 S.Ct. at

900. 

In furtherance of his argument against substitution,

plaintiff submits documentary evidence apparently intended to

rebut the U.S. Attorney’s certification. He says that “[w]hile

these documents may not show direct evidence of all of the acts

complained of, they do show that the motivation of Strandell

and/or Dallas was motivated by personal animosity toward the

Plaintiff and went far beyond their respective scopes of

employment.” Plaintiff further argues that the submitted

documentary evidence shows “that the acts complained of were

unforeseeable, not of the kind [the separate defendants] were

hired to perform, did not further the United States’ interest of

negotiating and obtaining contractual rights to use the Fort Smith

Airport facilities, and were motivated exclusively by personal

animosity toward the Plaintiff – not any interest to advance the

interest of the United States . . . .” 

After having thoroughly reviewed plaintiff’s submissions on

the point, the Court concludes that he has failed to submit

sufficient evidence to support his contention that the separate

defendants’ actions went beyond their scope of employment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that he has failed to rebut the

presumption established by the U.S. Attorney’s certification of

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The Court further rejects plaintiff’s argument that to be covered under the Federal 1

Tort Claims Act the employee’s acts must have been undertaken without malice toward the

victim. The plaintiff cites Rainey v. Hartness, 5 S.W.3d 410 (Ark. 1999) in support of

his position. Rainey is distinguishable in that it addresses when immunity is

applicable for state employees. Further, both 28 U.S.C. § 2679 and case law establishes

that intentional torts may be covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Duffy v.

United States, 966 F.3d 307, 331 (7 Cir. 1992). th

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employment. Both Strandell and Dallas were solely affiliated with

the plaintiff as a result of their employment duties. And,

despite the plaintiff’s allegations that both Strandell and Dallas

eventually took their relationship with the plaintiff personally,

the Court finds no evidence that the actions of either separate

defendant were carried out exclusively for their own interests.

See Lawson v. United States, 103 F.3d 59 (8 Cir. 1996). th 1

6. Motion To Dismiss -- In support of their motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, the separate defendants assert

several theories. First, they argue that this Court does not have

subject matter jurisdiction over this matter -- since, they say,

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

required by the Federal Tort Claims Act. 

In response, plaintiff simply says that any dismissal for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be without

prejudice. 

Accordingly, the Court must determine whether exhaustion is

required and, if so, whether such has occurred. 

“[T]here can be no question but that the filing of an

administrative claim is an absolute prerequisite to maintaining a

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civil action against the Government for damages arising from a

tortious occurrence . . .” Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d

1219, 1220 (8 Cir. 1970). According to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a): th

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against

the United States for money damages for injury or loss

of property or personal injury or death caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of

the Government while acting within the scope of his

office or employment, unless the claimant shall have

first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal

agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by

the agency in writing and sent by certified or

registered mail. . . .

28 U.S.C.A. § 2675(a). 

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that exhaustion is

required. Thus, the final question is whether such has occurred.

Plaintiff has made no allegation that he has filed an

administrative claim; and, therefore, the Court must conclude that

plaintiff’s complaint against the United States should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

7. Since the Court is ruling that the complaint should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies, the Court deems it

unnecessary to examine or discuss separate defendants’ other

theories for dismissal. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Filed on August 16, 2006

(document # 93) and the Supplemental Motion to Substitute the

United States for Individually Named Defendants William Strandell

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and John R. Dallas and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as to the

United States (document # 120) should be, and they hereby are,

granted as follows:

* the United States is substituted for individually named

defendants William Strandell and John R. Dallas; and, 

* the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies as against the United States. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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