Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01108/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01108-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 At the time defendants Houston, Barreto, Clark, Cordova, Mendez and Rodriguez

filed their motion to dismiss, defendant Martinez had not been served. Once he was served,

Martinez filed his motion to dismiss. 

07cv1108

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMIE LEE JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

R.M. HOUSTON, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 07cv1108 L (POR)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT;

OVERRULING OBJECTIONS; AND

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS [doc. nos. 14,

15]

Pro se plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending that various prison

officials deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights by suspending his outdoor recreational

privileges for 42 days, and violated his due process rights by failing to schedule an Institutional

Classification Committee hearing within ten days. Defendants1

 moved to dismiss the complaint

in its entirety contending that plaintiff failed to allege the objective and/or subjective elements of

his Eighth Amendment claim, and failed to allege a violation of procedural due process.

Defendants also seek qualified immunity for both of plaintiff’s claims.

The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter for a Report and

Recommendation (“Report”) in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule

Case 3:07-cv-01108-L-POR Document 31 Filed 04/11/11 Page 1 of 7
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2 The Background is taken directly from the Report and Recommendation.

3 Plaintiff does not state in his complaint whether or not he refused to accept a cell

mate.

2 07cv1108

72.3. The magistrate judge recommended that defendants’ motions to dismiss the due process

claim be granted and the Eighth Amendment claim be denied. Although plaintiff did not file

objections to the Report, defendants have done so. 

The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district court "shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made," and "may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge." Id. Under this statute, "the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise." United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) ( en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 238 (2003).

1. Factual Background2

On September 15, 2004, Defendant Houston allegedly loudly chastised the

Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”) supervisor and demanded that extra bed-space be

provided for incoming Administrative Segregation inmates. Compl. at 3-4. Defendant Houston

then advised the inmates, including Plaintiff, who was an inmate in ASU at the time, that failure

to accept a cell mate would result in a Rule Violation Report and immediate yard suspension. Id.

at 4. Upon Defendant Houston’s departure, Defendants Cook, Mendez, Cordova, and Reyes

ordered the prisoners to accept cell mates. Id. At this point, Defendant Mendez placed a sign

above Plaintiff’s cell door that read “Yard Suspended Pending ICC.”3

 Id.

On September 20, 2004, Plaintiff received a Rule Violation Report (“Report”) dated

September 15, 2004. Id. In the Report, it is noted that, upon a direct order by Defendant Mendez

to accept a cell mate, Plaintiff replied, “I am not taking a cellie.” See Doc. No. 14, Decl. Of D.

Hanlon. On September 23, 2004, Plaintiff attended a hearing concerning the rule violation. Id.

At the hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of the rule violation and given a thirty-day forfeiture of

behavior credits. Id.

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3 07cv1108

Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff summoned Defendant Mendez to his cell door

and asked why Plaintiff had not gone to ICC. Compl. at 4. Defendant Mendez replied, “Call me

when you’re ready to accept a cellie” and purportedly walked away. Id. On October 9, 2004,

Plaintiff contacted Defendants Rodriguez and Barretto requesting that they review his file to

determine whether Defendant Mendez had scheduled Plaintiff for ICC. Id. During the

subsequent weeks, Plaintiff attempted to speak to Defendant Mendez by calling his name aloud

as he passed Plaintiff’s cell, whereupon Defendant Mendez would say, “Call me when you’re

ready to accept a cellie.” Id. at 5. 

On October 28, 2004, Plaintiff was summoned before ICC. Compl. at 5. There, Plaintiff

notified Defendant Houston that he had been denied his outdoor recreation privileges for fortytwo days. Id. Defendant Houston subsequently ordered Defendant Martinez to remove the yard

suspension sign from Plaintiff’s cell door. Id.

On November 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed an Administrative Appeal regarding the

aforementioned incidents. See Compl. at 5. On December 1, 2004, Defendant Houston denied

the complaint at the First level. Id. On January 2, 2005, Plaintiff processed the complaint at the

Second level. Id. On February 9, 2005, the complaint was denied at the Second level. Id. On

February 22, 2005, Plaintiff processed the complaint at the Third level. Id. On May 25, 2005, the

complaint was granted in part at the Director’s level. Id. CEN was ordered to conduct and

document further investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations and to report the disposition to

Plaintiff. Id.

2. Discussion 

Defendants object to the magistrate’s finding that plaintiff adequately alleged the

subjective component of the Eighth Amendment claim and further object to the finding that they

are not entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim.

a. Eighth Amendment Claim

Prison officials may violate the Eight Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishments if they deprive the inmate of “a single, identifiable human need such as food,

warmth or exercise.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (emphasis added). To

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sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment violation, however, the inmate must “objectively show

that he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently serious,’” and “make a subjective showing that

the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety.” Foster v.

Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994)).

The Ninth Circuit recently repeated that “exercise is one of the most basic human

necessities protected by the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151–52

(9th Cir. 2010); see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993)(“[O]rdinarily the

lack of outside exercise for extended periods is a sufficiently serious deprivation” for Eighth

Amendment purposes.). A prohibition on outdoor exercise of six weeks is a “sufficiently

serious” deprivation to support an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1086 (1994). Defendants

do not challenge the magistrate judge’s finding that plaintiff has met the objective element of an

Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that he had been deprived of outdoor exercise privileges

for six weeks, that the deprivation was long-term and thus constitutes a substantial deprivation.

In other words, plaintiff has objectively shown that he was deprived of something sufficiently

serious.

Once an individual has first shown objectively that he was deprived of something

sufficiently serious, the court must consider whether the risk to the inmate was sufficiently

obvious to the prison officials that they must have been aware of the severity of the deprivation.

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). This second step in showing deliberate

indifference involves a two-part inquiry: first, the inmate must show that the prison officials

were aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to an inmate's health or safety. Id. (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In other words, plaintiff must show that the risk posed by the

deprivation is obvious. Id. Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no

“reasonable” justification for the deprivation, in spite of that risk. Id.

Defendants contend that plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating the subjective

element of the claim, specifically that “the deprivation was not wanton or malicious or sadistic

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for the very purpose of causing harm” because “the deprivation would only last until Plaintiff

agreed to accept a cellmate (i.e. that Plaintiff, himself, could have ended the deprivation at any

time)” . . . . Obj. at 2.

As the Thomas court noted, “[f]or over thirty years, we have emphasized that ‘some form

of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical well-being

of inmates.’” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1152 (citing Sprain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir.

1979). As a result, the Thomas court found, as a matter of law, that the risk to plaintiff's health

was sufficiently obvious such that any prison official who was aware that plaintiff was deprived

of outdoor exercise for a significant amount of time would have known of the obvious risk to

plaintiff's health. Id. Defendants do not address this first prong of the subjective component for

deliberate indifference. The Court finds plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that defendants were

aware of the length of time plaintiff was deprived of his outdoor exercise privileges and that this

deprivation would be an obvious risk to his health. 

Appearing to acknowledge that they were aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to

plaintiff based on the deprivation of exercise privileges, defendants focus their argument by

contending that the purpose of the deprivation was reasonable because it was intended to cause

plaintiff to accept a cell mate and plaintiff could end the deprivation at his choosing. 

Prison officials may act reasonably in depriving inmates of exercise when they respond to

a “genuine emergency.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1154. Such an emergency may occur following

outbreaks of extraordinary levels of violence in a prison. Norwood v. Vance, 572 F.3d 626, 631

(9th Cir. 2009) (“When violence rises to unusually high levels, prison officials can reasonably

believe it is lawful to temporarily restrict outdoor exercise to help bring the violence under

control.”). 

In the present case, defendants do not assert that a violent emergency situation occurred

or that the deprivation was necessary to maintaining prison order. Defendants do not even

contend that defendant was dangerous. Instead, because plaintiff failed to comply with an order

to accept a cell mate, his exercise privileges were curtailed. Upon plaintiff’s compliance, his

exercise privileges would be restored. As the Thomas court noted: 

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The prison officials’ repeated assertion that the deprivation of exercise was

“reasonable” because Thomas could have signed the pledge form at any time and

thereafter would been permitted to exercise misses the point completely and is

entirely inconsistent with out previous holdings. . . . Under the circumstances

present here, however, in which the punishment of deprivation of exercise appears

clearly not to have been necessary to maintain order in the prison, it is difficult to

conceive how a deprivation of a “basic human necessity” may be deemed

reasonable.

Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1155-56.

And so it is here. At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiff has adequately alleged that the

deprivation of his exercise rights was not reasonable. Accordingly, the Court overrules

defendants’ objections to the Report and denies the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim on the grounds defendants argue.

b. Qualified Immunity

As noted above, defendants object to the Report’s recommendation that they be denied

qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

"Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct

violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.'" Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982)). In determining whether qualified immunity is applicable,

Courts consider (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

demonstrate that the defendant's conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2)

whether the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time it is alleged to have been violated.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

In Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010). the Ninth Circuit addressed

when a correctional officer is entitled to immunity from an Eighth Amendment claim for denial

of outdoor exercise based on “qualified immunity.” First, the court acknowledged that, pursuant

to their decision in Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1995), there is a Constitutional

right to outdoor exercise which may not be denied for inconsequential logistical concerns or

punitive reasons. Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1069, 1070. But the Norwood court found that there is

no clearly established right to outdoor exercise in “in the midst of severe ongoing prison

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violence” and temporary restrictions on outdoor exercise are lawful to help bring violence under

control. Id.

The present case, however, is not about whether defendants had a duty to balance

plaintiff’s right to outdoor exercise against their responsibility to keep all in the prison safe. The

denial of plaintiff’s outdoor exercise was premised on and executed as a means of coercing

plaintiff to take a cell mate and punishing him until he complied. Thus, because outdoor exercise

for prisoners was clearly established as a Constitutional right in 1995, and plaintiff’s rights were

deprived in 2004, defendants are not entitled to qualified. immunity and their objection to the

Report is overruled. 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ objections to the Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED;

2. The Report and Recommendation in ADOPTED in its entirety;

3. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED as to plaintiff’s due process claim

and DENIED as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim; and

4. Defendants shall answer plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with the Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 11, 2011

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. LOUISA S. PORTER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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