Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06067/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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* This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1. After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 20, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHNNY MALONE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RANDALL WORKMAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-6067

(D.C. No. CIV-06-1356-C)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HENRY, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

 Petitioner-Appellant Johnny Malone, an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing

pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(1) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas

petition. However, because Mr. Malone has previously filed a § 2254 petition, we

treat this as an implied request for authorization to file a second § 2254 petition. 

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1 Because Mr. Malone is proceeding pro se, we review his pleadings and

filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Howard v.

U. S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 815 (10th Cir. 2007).

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Reviewing Mr. Malone’s filings liberally,1

 we hold that Mr. Malone has not

made the requisite showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to obtain such

authorization. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s order, DENY Mr.

Malone’s implied application for authorization to file another § 2254 petition, and

DISMISS this matter.

I. BACKGROUND

In March of 1998, Mr. Malone was convicted of Murder in the First Degree

in the District Court of Garvin County, Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Court of

Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed his conviction on March 30, 1999. In

February of 2003, Mr. Malone filed a habeas petition under § 2254 in the Western

District of Oklahoma, which was dismissed as untimely. See Malone v.

Oklahoma, 100 F. App’x 795, 796-97 (10th Cir. 2004). After granting Mr.

Malone a COA, we affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 796.

On December 11, 2006, Mr. Malone filed this federal habeas action before

the district court in the Western District of Oklahoma. Question 14 of the

standard court form that Mr. Malone used in filing this action asked the

following: “Have you previously filed any type of petition, application, or

motion in a federal court regarding the conviction that you challenge in this

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2 In order to confirm that the same Mr. Malone brought the instant

habeas action and the 2003 habeas action, we carefully studied the factual and

procedural history set out in our opinion in Malone v. Oklahoma, 100 F. App’x at

796-97. More importantly, in an exercise of our discretion, see United States v.

Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 424 (2007),

we took judicial notice of the case file in the 2003 habeas action filed by “Johnny

Malone.” Case No. CIV-03-96-C (W.D. Okla.). Our study and case file review

leave no room for doubt that the Mr. Malone before us in this case is the same

Mr. Malone who filed the 2003 habeas action. Compare R., Doc. 1, at 1-4 (Mr.

Malone’s reporting that his Oklahoma prisoner number is 83634, and providing a

recitation of the procedural history of his state conviction, including his charge of

murder and the OCCA’s affirmance of the conviction on March 30, 1999), with

Case No. CIV-03-96-C, Doc. 1, at 1-3 (petitioner “Johnny Malone” reporting

same Oklahoma prisoner number and offering materially indistinguishable

recitation of procedural history of his state conviction) (Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside

or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sect. 2254, dated Feb. 13, 2003). 

Therefore, Mr. Malone’s response to Question 14 was false. Mr. Malone has

repeatedly noted that he has very significant problems reading and writing. See,

e.g., Malone, 100 F. App’x at 797 (noting Mr. Malone’s assertion that “he is

illiterate”). Principally for that reason, we take a very generous view of this

situation and operate on the assumption that Mr. Malone’s negative response to

Question 14 was made through inadvertence.

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petition?” R., Doc. 1, at 9. By checking a box, Mr. Malone responded “No.” Id.

Whether Mr. Malone acted through inadvertence, or with the intention of

misleading the district court (which would be very troubling indeed), Mr.

Malone’s response was false.2

 Not surprisingly, the district court thereafter

mistakenly treated Mr. Malone’s petition as an initial habeas action under § 2254.

The district court assigned the case to a magistrate judge for consideration. 

On January 11, 2007, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

concluding that Mr. Malone’s § 2254 habeas petition was untimely and therefore

should be dismissed. Mr. Malone filed no objections to the magistrate judge’s

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3 Because we dispose of this case under the second-or-successive

analytic rubric of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), we need not decide whether Mr. Malone

waived his right to appeal the magistrate judge’s recommendation by not filing

objections with the district court. See, e.g., Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d

1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the “firm waiver rule”). 

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report,3

 and the district court entered an order of dismissal. Mr. Malone then filed

a notice of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

“Before a petitioner may file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition in the district court, he must successfully apply to this court for an order

authorizing the district court to consider the petition.” Spitznas v. Boone, 464

F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). Without prior authorization from this court,

the district court is without jurisdiction to decide a second or successive § 2254

petition. See, e.g., Pease v. Klinger, 115 F.3d 763, 764 (10th Cir. 1997) (per

curiam). Accordingly, when a petitioner fails to seek authorization from this

court before filing a second or successive § 2254 petition, the district court should

transfer the petition to this court. Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341

(10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The only other action a district court can take in

such a situation is to dismiss the petition. See Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1227.

Mr. Malone previously filed a § 2254 petition in 2003, challenging the

same conviction at issue here, which was dismissed as untimely. See Malone, 100

F. App’x at 796-97. Such a dismissal is on the merits. See Murphy v. Klein

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Tools, Inc., 935 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“[A] dismissal

on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits.”). See also Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(b) (“Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this

subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of

jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as

an adjudication on the merits.”).

Although we are not required to, we may construe a petitioner’s request for

a COA as an application to file a second or successive § 2254 petition. Spitznas,

464 F.3d at 1219 n.8; see also Pease, 115 F.3d at 764 (“[W]e construe Mr.

Pease’s notice of appeal and appellate brief as an implied application for leave to

file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition . . . .”). We will so construe Mr.

Malone’s COA request. 

Any of Mr. Malone’s claims that were previously raised must be dismissed. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas

corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application

shall be dismissed.”). In his current § 2254 petition, Mr. Malone asserts that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel “for not demanding a competency

hearing, telling the jury that petitioner was guilty of shooting his wife, violation

of petitioners [sic] constitutional rights,” and he also claims actual innocence. 

Pet’r Op. Br. & Application for COA, at 5. Although the matter is not entirely

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4 In Mr. Malone’s previous habeas petition, he “asserted that he was

convicted due to the use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest, that

he was denied effective assistance of counsel, that hearsay evidence was

improperly admitted at trial, and that his sentence is excessive.” Malone, 100 F.

App’x at 797 n.1; see also Case No. CIV-03-96-C, Doc. 1, at 5-6. Mr. Malone

raised (unsuccessfully) his alleged actual innocence in connection with his

argument for equitable tolling. Malone, 100 F. App’x at 798; Case No. CIV-03-

96-C, Doc. 14, at 5 (magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, dated Apr. 30,

2003). Mr. Malone’s 2003 claims appear to be different from those at issue in his

current petition. In particular, we note that, although Mr. Malone asserted

ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief in both the 2003 petition

and the instant petition, the 2003 claim seems to have been predicated upon

different alleged failings of counsel than advanced in the current habeas action. 

In 2003, Mr. Malone complained: “Counsel did not bring up the fact that all

evidence used to arrest Mr. Malone was unlawful, because it came from his

brother whom [sic] should have been taken into custody as well.” Case No. CIV03-96-C, Doc. 1, at 5. Therefore, Mr. Malone’s current ineffective assistance

claim—involving inter alia counsel’s alleged failure to demand a competency

hearing and purported improper concession that Mr. Malone shot his wife—would

appear to be a new claim. See Allen v. Massie, 236 F.3d 1243, 1245 & n.2 (10th

Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that § 2244(b)(2) “is not implicated” because

petitioner is “not asserting a new factual predicate in support of her claim of

ineffective assistance,” and concluding that § 2241(b)(1) would prevent petitioner

from “relitigating her claims of ineffective assistance”). Cf. Felder v. McVicar,

113 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 1997) (alluding to categorical dismissal under §

2244(b)(1) and noting that petitioner cannot “squeeze through the narrow gateway

. . . created for successive petitions” where his “claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel in failing to interview the two eyewitnesses is the same in this petition as

in the previous one”). Construing Mr. Malone’s filings liberally, we are

comfortable operating on the view that his current petition does not reassert

claims raised in 2003 (i.e., only contains new claims). 

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free of doubt, Mr. Malone’s claims all appear to be new.4

To succeed on new claims, Mr. Malone must make a prima facie showing

that satisfies § 2244(b)(2)’s criteria for filing another § 2254 petition. See Pease,

115 F.3d at 765. That section requires that:

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A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was not presented in a

prior application shall be dismissed unless—

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have

been discovered previously through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed

in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

Based on our review of Mr. Malone’s implied application for authorization,

we conclude that he has failed to make a prima facie showing that would satisfy

the above requirements. Mr. Malone invokes no new rule of constitutional law

that was made retroactive to cases on collateral review. Nor does he rely on any

newly discovered evidence. Indeed, the factual basis for all of his claims would

have been readily apparent to Mr. Malone at the time of his trial.

Mr. Malone also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). To succeed on this motion, Mr. Malone “must show a financial inability

to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous

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5 See Parker v. Dinwiddie, 258 F. App’x 200, 202 (10th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam) (disposing of a similar case in a like manner: “The district court

order is VACATED, and the implied application for authorization to file another

§ 2254 petition is DENIED. We also DENY the motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. This matter is DISMISSED.”).

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argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” 

DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). 

We deny Mr. Malone’s IFP motion; his attempted appeal is frivolous. Mr.

Malone has received crystal-clear notice that his § 2254 action is time-barred. 

The district court reached that conclusion on two separate occasions and so did

we in Malone v. Oklahoma, 100 F. App’x at 796-97. Nevertheless, Mr. Malone

has sought a COA to challenge the district court’s statute of limitations dismissal. 

Unquestionably, Mr. Malone has failed to raise a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument

to support his appeal. Accordingly, his IFP motion is denied.

For the reasons stated above, the district court order is VACATED, and

Mr. Malone’s implied application for authorization to file another § 2254 petition

is DENIED. We also DENY Mr. Malone’s request to proceed IFP. This matter

is DISMISSED.

5

 This denial of authorization “shall not be the subject of a

petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Jerome A. Holmes

Circuit Judge

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