Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02460/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02460-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY J. BUSH,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL, INC., et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02460-RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anthony Bush avers that food manufacturer Mondelez International Inc. 

(“Mondelez”) under-fills certain travel-size snack products. In his original and first amended 

complaints, Bush did not dispute that the snack product labels accurately disclose the number of 

cookies included in each container. Rather, he averred that the containers include empty space at 

the top, such that the container size misrepresents the volume of included snack. In his second 

amended complaint (“SAC”), Bush newly alleges that the product labels actually fail accurately to

disclose the amount of snack within. The SAC’s new allegations, however, still do not support a 

plausible claim for consumer deception, and Bush has not adequately pleaded any other violation 

of California’s Unfair Competition Law. Mondelez’s motion is thus granted. 

II. BACKGROUND

The allegations of the first amended complaint (“FAC”) are described in detail in the 

October 7, 2016 order dismissing the FAC (“prior order” or “Order”) and, to the extent they are 

essentially repeated in the SAC, they are not repeated here. This section focuses on the SAC’s 

new allegations.

While Bush previously alleged he purchased six different varieties of travel-size snack 

Case 3:16-cv-02460-RS Document 48 Filed 12/16/16 Page 1 of 8
ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS

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products within the last three years, he now alleges only making a one-time purchase of four 

products: Mini Oreo, Mini Chips Ahoy!, Golden Oreo Mini, and Nutter Butter Bites (“Go-Pak 

products”). He also newly alleges that Go-Pak products actually contain fewer cookies than listed 

on the product labels. In addition, he now clarifies that he brings claims under all three prongs of 

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, which prohibits 

“unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s].” He also brings claims for consumer deception 

under California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500, and Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750. Mondelez moves to dismiss the SAC on the grounds that: 

(i) Bush’s consumer deception claims are implausible; (iii) his claims under the UCL “unlawful” 

prong are inadequately pleaded and preempted; (iii) his claims under the UCL “unfair” prong are 

inadequately pleaded; and (iv) all claims are pleaded without requisite particularity.

1

 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While “detailed factual allegations” are not 

required, a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the pleaded factual content allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. This standard asks for “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. 

The determination is a context-specific task requiring the court “to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 679. In alleging fraud, a plaintiff “must state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “To satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must 

identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false 

or misleading about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.” Cafasso, U.S. ex 

 

1 Mondelez also argues that Bush lacks standing to challenge products he did not purchase, but the 

SAC seeks relief on behalf of consumers who purchased the same four products that Bush 

allegedly purchased. See SAC ¶¶ 1, 70. 

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ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS

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rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of 

Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may 

be based either on the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

(9th Cir. 1990). When evaluating such a motion, the court must accept all material allegations in 

the complaint as true, even if doubtful, and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences,” however, “are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” 

Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996).

IV. DISCUSSION

1. Consumer Deception

The prior order explained in detail the deficiencies of Bush’s consumer deception claim. 

In short, his claim that reasonable consumers are likely to be deceived by Go-Pak product 

packaging is implausible because Go-Pak product labels disclose the net weight and number of 

cookies per container and consumers expect there to be some slack-fill in opaque snack containers.

See Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., No. 13-56644, 2016 WL 5389307, at *6 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2016) 

(deception claim based on oversized packaging was implausible where net weight label was 

affixed to every tube); Hawkins v. UGI Corp., No. 14-08461, 2016 WL2595990 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 

2016) (“regardless of consumers’ inability to visually observe the level of product remaining in a 

cylinder . . . Plaintiffs here cannot plausibly allege that Defendants’ admittedly accurate net weight 

labels [] are fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading”); Fermin v. Pfizer, No. 15-2133, 2016 WL 

620891 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016) (“as a matter of law, it is not probable or ever possible that 

Pfizer’s packaging could have misled a reasonable consumer” because “each of the packages in 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint clearly display the total pill-count on the label”). 

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Bush’s new allegations do not alter this conclusion. He attempts to show that Go-Pak 

products “provided less food than the amount actually stated on the [label],” but his averments fall 

short. For example, he claims that “Golden Oreo Mini containers contain fewer than 32 cookies.” 

SAC ¶ 36. This is not less than the amount stated on the label. The label lists a serving size of 9 

cookies and about 3.5 servings per container, so consumers can expect to find approximately 31.5 

cookies per container. The same is true for Oreo Minis. For Nutter Butter Bites, the labels

represent that containers include “about” 35 cookies (with a net weight of 99 grams) and Bush 

alleges that they contain “fewer than 35 cookies.” Id. ¶ 38. He does not allege the number of

cookies actually included or the actual net weight of the included product. Nor does he allege

when, where, and how he weighed or counted the cookies. Id. ¶ 7. For Mini Chips Ahoy! 

products, the labels represent that the containers include about 49 cookies (with a net weight of 99 

grams) and Bush alleges that the containers include “fewer than 32 cookies.” SAC ¶ 39. At the

hearing, Bush conceded that this allegation is an error and that he intended to allege that Mini 

Chips Ahoy! products contain “fewer than 49 cookies.” As with Nutter Butter Bites, Bush does 

not allege the actual number of included Mini Chips Ahoy! cookies, the actual net weight of the 

included product, or the manner in which he counted or weighed the cookies. He also does not 

explain why he implicitly acknowledged the accuracy of Go Pak Product labels in his prior 

complaints and briefing, see, e.g., FAC ¶ 8, or why he failed to assert these new facts in his prior 

two complaints. At bottom, Bush’s new factual allegations are either entirely immaterial or 

insufficiently particular under Rule 9(b), which is the applicable pleading standard for claims 

alleging consumer deception. See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir.

2009). 

In his opposition brief, Bush newly argues that the prior order conflicts with FDA guidance 

on 21 C.F.R. §100.100, the federal regulation prohibiting nonfunctional slack-fill in food products. 

See Misleading Containers; Nonfunctional Slack-Fill, 58 F.R. 64123, 1993 WL 498605 (Dec. 6, 

1993). Before finalizing that regulation, he argues, the FDA considered and rejected comments 

“that stated that net weight statements protect against misleading fill.” Id. at 64128. It found “that 

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the presence of an accurate net weight statement does not eliminate the misbranding that occurs 

when a container is made, formed, or filled so as to be misleading.” Id. Bush admits this is a new 

argument that he could have made earlier in support of his FAC. See Opp. at 9 (“the prior order 

does not take cognizance of [Bush’s new argument] because it was not provided in Plaintiff’s prior 

briefing”). This argument could thus be rejected as waived. 

In any event, the FDA guidance document is not binding authority for purposes of Bush’s 

consumer deception claims. Those claims are brought under California consumer protection laws.

Courts, not the FDA, determine whether a product is misleading under those laws. In Ebner, the 

Ninth Circuit decided that a manufacturer’s alleged oversized packaging for a lip balm product 

was not deceptive under the reasonable consumer test and, thus, did not violate the same consumer 

protection laws at issue here. There, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

noting that “Plaintiff points to no cases in which such packaging, when paired with an accurate net 

quantity label, . . . constituted deceptive marketing practices.” No. 13-00477, 2013 WL 9760035, 

at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2013). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 2016 WL 5389307, at *6.2 Though 

Ebner involved a cosmetic product and 21 C.F.R. §100.100 governs food products, nothing in the 

decision suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s application of the reasonable consumer test under state 

consumer protection laws would have been different in the context of food, or that the court was 

influenced by, or even considered, the existence of any FDA regulations (or the lack thereof).

2. Unlawful Packaging

In the SAC, Bush again asserts a claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. He avers 

his claim is based on violations of California’s Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

 

2

The prior order distinguished Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008), 

which “stands for the proposition that, if the defendant commits an act of deception, the presence 

of fine print revealing the truth is insufficient to dispel that deception.” Ebner, 2016 WL 5389307

at *5. It found that here, like in Ebner and unlike in Williams, there is no deceptive act to be 

dispelled. Order at 6. Bush argues for the first time in his opposition brief that the size of the 

packing itself is a deceptive act. Yet, in Ebner, the plaintiff similarly alleged that oversized 

packaging was deceptive and the Ninth Circuit nevertheless found “the weight label does not 

contradict other representations or inferences on [defendant’s] packaging.” Id. at *6.

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(“Sherman Law”), Cal. Health & Safety Code § 109875 et seq., and cites the provisions of the 

Sherman Law that incorporate by reference the nutrition labeling requirements of the federal Food, 

Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q). See SAC ¶ 88 (citing Cal. Health & 

Safety Code § 110665). Bush does not, however, aver with specificity any particular FDCA 

requirement which he claims Mondelez violated. His claim is thus inadequately pleaded.3

To the extent Bush intended to allege a violation of the Sherman Law based on 21 C.F.R. 

§ 100.100, his allegations continue to be insufficient. That regulation provides that a food is 

misbranded if it contains “nonfunctional slack-fill,” which is defined as “empty space in a package 

that is filled to less than its capacity” for reasons other than: (1) protection of contents; (2) the 

requirements of the machines used for enclosing the package; (3) unavoidable product settling; (4) 

the need for the package to perform a specific function; (5) the fact that the product consists of a 

food packaged in a reusable container where the container is part of the presentation and has 

value; or (6) inability to increase level of fill or to further reduce the size of the package. 21 

C.F.R. § 100.100(a)(1)-(6). Bush alleges that Go-Pak slack-fill serves none of these

functionalities. SAC ¶¶ 12-32. Yet, his allegations continue to be entirely conclusory; he has not 

amended them in any meaningful way. See Order at 7 (citing Victor v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., No. 13-

02976, 2014 WL 1028881, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014)); see also Bautista v. Cytosport Inc., 

15-CV-9081-CS (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) (“a plaintiff must possess some factual basis before 

bringing a [nonfunctional slack fill claim]”). Moreover, some of his allegations are illogical and 

implausible. For example, Bush alleges that “any slack-fill present in the Products’ container is 

not a result of the cookies settling during shipping and handling,” SAC ¶ 21, but the “settling” of 

contents “is a normal, unavoidable process for many types of food (e.g., cereal and potato chips).” 

 

3 Mondelez also argues that Bush’s claims are preempted by the FDCA. Federal law prohibits 

state food labeling requirements that are not identical to federal requirements, but the FDCA and 

Sherman law contain identical prohibitions on false or misleading labeling. See Cal. Health & 

Safety Code § 110100(a). Because Bush’s claim is inadequately pleaded, it is difficult to assess 

whether Bush seeks to impose a slack-fill requirement separate and apart from 21 C.F.R. 

§ 100.100. Assuming his claim is based merely on a violation of that regulation, his claim is not

preempted. See, e.g., Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 

2010) (“plaintiffs’ claims need not fail on preemption grounds if the requirements they seek to 

impose are . . . identical to those imposed by the FDCA”). 

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58 Fed. Reg. 2957-01, 2961, 1993 WL 1564 (Jan. 6, 1993). In the SAC, Bush adds no factual 

allegation about how Go-Pak packaging is unlawful aside from conclusory statements that do not 

suffice for either Rule 8’s “plausibility” standard or Rule 9’s “particularity” standard for pleading.

4

 

3. “Unfair” Conduct

Bush now asserts that Mondelez violated the UCL’s “unfair” prong. The proper definition 

of “unfair” conduct against consumers “is currently in flux” among California courts. In re Adobe 

Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1224 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Some courts apply 

a balancing approach, which requires courts to “weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct 

against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 

F.3d 1152, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012). Others have held that “unfairness must be tethered to some 

legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition.” Lozano 

v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 2007).5 Bush’s claim fails under both 

tests. First, his claim fails under the balancing test because, as discussed above, he alleges no

plausible claim of consumer deception. Second, his claim fails under the public policy test

because, as discussed above, Bush fails adequately to plead any specific statutory violation. He 

also does not otherwise connect Mondelez’s conduct with a violation of a legislatively declared 

policy. Moreover, to the extent he intended to tether his claim to the policy of protecting against 

consumer deception, his claim fails for the same reasons it fails the balancing test. In sum, his 

allegations do not comply with Rule 8 or 9.

 

4 Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to each of the three prongs of the UCL where, as 

here, the claims are based on a “unified course of fraudulent conduct.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126–

27. Bush’s “unlawful” and “unfair” claims appear to relate to 21 C.F.R. 100.100, which protects 

consumers against “misbranding,” specifically “misleading containers.” Other courts in this 

district have “rejected the notion that ‘misbranding’ under the ‘unlawful’ prong of the UCL 

excuses a plaintiff’s obligation to plead fraud with particularity.” Romero v. Flowers Bakeries, 

LLC, 2015 WL 2125004 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2015) (citing cases).

5

There is a third test, which borrows from section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, finding 

“unfair” business practices where (1) the consumer injury is substantial, (2) any countervailing 

benefits to consumers or competition do not outweigh the injury, and (3) the consumers could not 

reasonably avoid the injury. See Camacho v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 142 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403, 

48 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 (2006). This test does not apply in consumer cases, and therefore is 

inapplicable here. Lozano, 504 F.3d at 736 (“Though the California Supreme Court did reference 

FTC’s section 5 as a source of ‘guidance,’ that discussion clearly revolves around anti-competitive 

conduct, rather than anti-consumer conduct.” (internal alteration omitted)).

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ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS

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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mondelez’s motion is granted and Bush’s claims are dismissed

without leave to amend. Given that Bush failed to cure the previously identified pleading 

deficiencies on his third attempt to state a claim, leave to amend appears futile and thus is not 

granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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