Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01451/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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1 Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of the

California Labor Code § 201 et seq. for: (1) misclassification as

exempt from overtime pay and failure to pay overtime; (2) willful

failure to pay wages due within the time specified by the Code;

(3) violation of California Wage Order No. 4 for knowingly and

intentionally failing to provide timely, accurate, itemized wage

statements including request for an injunction and damages; 

(4) failure to give proper rest and meal breaks; and (5)

violation of California’s Business & Professions Code § 17200 et

seq.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CATHERINE WILKIE, individually

and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

CIV. NO. 10-1451 FCD/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GENTIVA HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Gentiva Health

Services’ (“defendant” or “Gentiva”) motion to transfer plaintiff

Catherine Wilkie’s (“plaintiff” or “Wilkie”) Federal Labor and

Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim and various state law claims1 to the

same federal district court in which the “first-filed action” is

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2 On May 10, 2010, five individual plaintiffs commenced a

FLSA collective action and New York and North Carolina state law

class action against Gentiva in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York, entitled Rindfleisch, et

al. v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc., No. CV10-2111 (E.D.

N.Y.)(“Rindfleisch”). 

There, a status conference was held on July 8, 2010. 

Gentiva filed its Answer on July 9, 2010, and subsequently moved

to transfer the case to the Northern District of Georgia. The

court set the motion for hearing on November 5, 2010. Briefing

on the motion will be completed by September 23, 2010.

3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

2

pending.2 Plaintiff asserts her claims for relief in this action

as a putative nation- and California-wide class action against

Gentiva, plaintiff’s former employer. 

By its motion, defendant moves to transfer plaintiff’s

complaint under the “first-to-file rule,” on the ground

plaintiff’s claims are the subject of the Rindfleisch action. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing the parties and claims are

not substantially similar in the two actions and other equitable

factors militate against transfer under the first-to-file rule.

For the reasons set forth below,3

 the court DENIES 

Gentiva’s motion; plaintiff’s complaint is not properly

transferred under the first-to-file rule.

BACKGROUND

Gentiva is a corporation which provides home health services

in various parts of the United States. (Def.’s Answer, ¶ 29).

1. Rindfleisch Action

On May 10, 2010, plaintiffs Lisa Rindfleisch, Tiffany

Melendez, Michelle Gentile, Laurie Baker and Christina Nelmes

filed a complaint against Gentiva in the United States District

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Court, Eastern District of New York, on behalf of all “visiting

health care providers” who were, are, or will be employed by

Gentiva nationwide, during the period of three years prior to the

date of commencement of the action through the date of judgment

in the action. (Gentiva’s Request for Judicial Notice [Docket

#13], filed July 23, 2010 [“RJN”], Ex. A, ¶ 6). The Rindfleisch

plaintiffs’ definition of “visiting health care providers”

includes registered nurses, physical therapists, and occupational

therapists. (Id. at Ex. A, ¶ 3). They assert a nationwide class

action under FLSA based on Gentiva’s alleged policy of paying its

visiting health care providers pursuant to an unlawful hybrid

compensation plan, which includes “per visit” payments for some

work and hourly pay for other work. (Id.)

The Rindfleisch plaintiffs also seek certification of two

state law, sub-classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,

one on behalf of North Carolina visiting health care providers

and one on behalf of New York visiting health care providers. 

(Id. at Ex. A, ¶¶ 9-13). Both sub-classes seek respective state

law overtime remedies for misclassification of employees. (Id.)

2. Wilkie Action

On June 11, 2010, plaintiff filed the instant action against

Gentiva. (Id. at Ex. B.) Like in Rindfleisch, plaintiff also

alleges a FLSA claim, on behalf of a nation-wide class of

similarly situated persons, asserting that Gentiva maintains a

policy of paying employees pursuant to an unlawful “mixed per

visit and hourly compensation scheme.” (Id. at Ex. B, ¶ 1).

Plaintiff contends that by compensating employees in such a

manner defendant fails to pay plaintiff and the class for all

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4 Defendant requests either transfer to New York or

Georgia, depending on the status of the Rindfleisch motion. The

motion to transfer in that case is not set to be heard until

November 2010; as such, any transfer at this point would be to

New York. However, for the reasons set forth below, the court

finds that transfer of this case is not warranted.

4

hours worked, as well as overtime pay. Plaintiff’s class

definition for her FLSA claim is as follows:

[A]ll persons who are or were formerly

employed by Defendant in the United

States at any time since June 11, 2007

to the entry of judgment in this case,

as clinical associates, including but

not limited to registered nurse case

managers, and similarly situated

employees holding comparable positions

with different titles. (Id. at Ex. B,

¶¶ 1,18).

Plaintiff also alleges state law claims for failure to (1)

pay overtime, (2) pay for all hours worked, (3) provide timely and

accurate itemized statements, and (4) provide meal and rest breaks

in violation of the California Labor Code (“Labor Code”) § 201, et

seq., and (5) for violation of California Business and Professions

Code § 17200, et seq. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following

California class:

[A]ll persons who were, are, or will be

employed by Defendant in California, as

clinical associates, including but not

limited to registered nurse case

managers and similarly situated

employees holding comparable positions

with different titles (the ‘California

Class’), at any time within four years

prior to the date of the filing of this

complaint through the date of the final

disposition of the action. (Id. at Ex.

B, ¶¶ 4, 53-79). 

Defendant moves to transfer this case to the district court

in which the Rindfleisch action is pending.4

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ANALYSIS

The first-to-file rule is a recognized legal doctrine

regarding duplicative lawsuits in which “[t]he principles of

comity allow a district court to decline jurisdiction over an

action where a complaint involving the same parties and issues has

already been filed in another district.” Barapind v. Reno, 225

F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000). Its purpose is to “to avoid

placing an unnecessary burden on the federal judiciary, and to

avoid the embarrassment of conflicting judgments.” Church of

Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750

(9th Cir. 1979). 

 However, the first-to-file rule is not a “rigid or

inflexible rule to be mechanically applied, but rather is to be

applied with a view to the dictates of sound judicial

administration.” Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678

F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1992). The United States Supreme Court has

explicitly noted that “[w]ise judicial administration, giving

regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive

disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical

solutions” to the problems of duplicative litigation and the

relevant factors are equitable in nature. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. CO-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952). 

In applying the first-to-file rule, a court looks to three

threshold factors: “(1) the chronology of the two actions; (2) the

similarity of the parties, and (3) the similarity of the issues.” 

Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 625-626

(9th Cir. 1991). If this action meets the requirements of the

first-to-file rule, the court has the discretion to transfer,

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5 Multi-plaintiff actions under the FLSA are governed by

29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) and are termed collective or representative

actions rather than class actions. Despite the difference in

terminology, collective actions are similar to class actions, in

that they address a similar alleged wrong suffered by multiple,

similarly situated plaintiffs. 

6

stay, or dismiss the action. Id. at 622. The Rindfleisch and

Wilkie plaintiffs’ various claims present distinct factual and

legal issues, which are addressed below, meriting the denial of

Gentiva’s motion.

1. Chronology of the Actions

The parties do not dispute that the New York action was filed

first; that action was filed on May 10, 2010, and this action was

filed on June 11, 2010.

2. Similarity of the Parties

Defendant contends that the parties are substantially similar

because both the Rindfleisch and Wilkie lawsuits set out

collective actions under FLSA5 on behalf of a nation-wide class

consisting of similar employees. Further, defendant maintains

that the ancillary state law classes do not affect the similarity

requirement because despite the California sub-class which exists

only in Wilkie, there is still “substantial overlap” between all

the parties in both actions. Plaintiff asserts, to the contrary, 

that at this point in the litigation it is uncertain whether the

two nation-wide classes are substantially similar. Additionally,

plaintiff contends Wilkie’s California plaintiffs and

Rindfleisch’s New York and North Carolina plaintiffs are distinct

from each other, making the parties as a whole dissimilar. 

The first-to-file rule does not require strict identity of

the parties, but rather substantial similarity. Inherent.com v.

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Martindale-Hubbell, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 

Substantial similarity of the parties is determined by comparing

the proposed classes as they currently stand. Gardner v. GC

Services, LP, No. 10-CV-997-IEG (CAB), 2010 WL 2721271, *5 (S.D.

Cal. July 6, 2010) (“the focus is on the composition of the two

classes at this point.”); accord Dubee v. P.F. Chang’s China

Bistro, Inc., No. C 10-01937 WHA, 2010 WL 3323808, *2 (N.D. Cal.

August 23, 2010). 

While Gentiva is a defendant in both actions, plaintiff

correctly points out that at this stage in the litigation, it is

not apparent whether the nation-wide classes are substantially

similar. On the surface, and as conceded by plaintiff, the two

classes appear similar. The Rindfleisch nation-wide class

consists of “Registered Nurses (“RNs”), Physical Therapists, and

Occupational Therapists (collectively, ‘visiting health care

providers’).” (Def.’s RJN at Ex. A, ¶ 3.) The instant action’s

class includes all persons who are, or were, formerly employed by

defendant as “clinical associates,” including but not limited to

registered nurse case managers and similarly situated employees

holding comparable positions with different titles. (Id. at Ex.

B, ¶ 2.) 

Plaintiff’s definition of “clinical associates” is similar to

the Rindfleisch plaintiffs’ “healthcare providers;” but

significantly, plaintiff’s definition, here, may be broader. 

However, with no discovery conducted in either case, it is yet to

be seen whether the two actions substantially overlap. As

plaintiff argues, some employees included in the instant action

may not ultimately be included in the Rindfleisch action. For

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example, it is unclear whether licensed vocational nurses,

physicians assistants, and monitor technicians which likely fit

under plaintiff’s class definition, also fit within the

Rindfleisch class. As such, the court cannot find at this

juncture that substantial similarity exists between the nationwide classes in the two actions.

Additionally, plaintiff’s California class is separate and

distinct from any and all Rindfleisch sub-classes. See, e.g.,

Gardner v. GC Services, LP, No. 10-CV-997-IEG (CAB), 2010 WL

2721271, *5 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (finding “no overlap at all,

much less ‘substantial overlap’” where a later-filed action

represented a California putative class, while the earlier-filed

action excluded all California employees from the putative class). 

Indeed, no subclass of California litigants, alleging California

state law claims, currently exists in the Rindfleisch action so

there can be no similarity of the parties as to the state classes. 

Thus, considering all of the classes at issue, the court cannot

find a similarity of the parties in the two actions.

3. Similarity of the Issues

Defendant contends that the FLSA claims in both actions are

substantially similar. Additionally, defendant asserts while the

particulars of California law differ from the provisions of FLSA,

still both claims concern the same core alleged violation, and

thus, the claims are substantially similar. Finally, defendant

argues the state law claims in both actions need not be compared

because, if transferred, any federal district court is capable of

interpreting and applying California law. On the other hand,

plaintiff argues that while the FLSA claims in both actions appear

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similar, Wilkie’s California state law claims are distinct from

the Rindfleisch action’s FLSA claim. Further, plaintiff contends

that there is no overlap between the two action’s state law

claims.

With respect to the issues, courts also routinely recognize

that they need not be identical in the two actions. Substantial

similarity is sufficient. Adoma v. University of Phoenix,

_F.Supp.2d_, 2010 WL 1797263, *5 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2010). Here,

it is likely that the FLSA issues in this action will be similar

to those of the Rindfleisch action. Both plaintiffs allege that

Gentiva maintained a policy of paying its employees pursuant to an

unlawful hybrid compensation plan. (Compare Def.’s RJN at Ex. A,

¶ 3 with Ex. B, ¶ 1.)

On the other hand, plaintiff’s California law claims are

dissimilar from both the Rindfleisch action’s FSLA claim and the

North Carolina and New York state law claims. First, California

law is significantly different than FLSA. See e.g., Gardner v. GC

Services, LP, No. 10-CV-997-IEG (CAB), 2010 WL 2721271, *6 (S.D.

Cal. July 6, 2010) (comparing class certification and the

calculation of overtime remedies under FLSA and the Cal. Labor

Code; ultimately finding “significant differences”); Nordquist v.

McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 32 Cal. App. 4th 555, 562 (1995)

(“California’s professional employee exemption is narrower than

that in the FLSA and the administrative employee exemption is

somewhat different”). 

Moreover, while the Rindfleisch FLSA claim only seeks relief 

for defendant’s misclassification and failure to pay overtime

wages, (Def.’s RJN, Ex. A, ¶¶ 3, 13), the instant action’s

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California law claims also seek relief for defendant’s failure to

(1) pay compensation due within the time specified by California

law (Count III), (2) provide timely and accurate wage statements

(Count IV), (3) provide required rest and meal breaks (Count V),

and (4) for violation of California Business and Professions Code

§ 17200 et seq. (Count VI), (id. at Ex. B, ¶¶ 53-79.) 

The Wilkie state law claims also do not overlap the

Rindfleisch New York and North Carolina state law claims. 

Defendant contends that the instant action’s state law claims do

not preclude application of the first-to-file rule because

whichever federal court ultimately hears the case may exercise

supplemental jurisdiction to determine any state law claims. 

However, this is irrelevant to the court’s inquiry. The court

must consider the pleadings and the cases as they currently exist. 

See, Gardner v. GC Services, LP, No. 10-CV-997-IEG (CAB), 2010 WL

2721271, *5 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2010). Whether amendments to the

pleadings could later add a California class action to the

Rindfleisch action is not pertinent. What is relevant is that the 

Rindfleisch action alleges no California state law claims, so no

overlap can exist; this makes the issues dissimilar. 

 On balance, there are more dissimilarities in the issues

than similarities, and thus, this requirement for application of

the rule is also not met.

4. Equities 

Finally, even if the requirements of the first-to-file rule

were met, the court has broad discretion to not apply the rule in

the interests of equity. Adoma v. University of Phoenix,

_F.Supp.2d_, 2010 WL 1797263 at * 6 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2010).

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Plaintiff contends that the prejudice she and the class may suffer

due to the unsettled procedural posture of the Rindfleisch action

is a persuasive equitable reason not to apply the first-to-file

rule. The court agrees. 

The statute of limitations for a FLSA claim runs until the

party opts in, i.e., it is unlike a class action where the statute

of limitations is tolled while plaintiff seeks class

certification. See, 29 U.S.C. § 256. A plaintiff has a two year

window to commence an action unless there is a willful violation

which affords her three years. Id. at § 255(a). Defendant has

moved for transfer of the Rindfleisch action to the Northern

District of Georgia, which will be heard November 5, 2010. It is

unclear when discovery will commence, and thereafter,

certification of the proposed collective action. 

Rindfleisch’s unsettled posture raises several issues. 

First, delay in certification of the class may cause some nationwide collective members to lose their claims. Second, at this

stage in the litigation, it is not clear that the Rindfleisch

nation-wide class will be certified. As such, and as plaintiff

contends, class members nation-wide may be harmed by not allowing

this case to at least move forward to the collective action

certification. Finally, as set forth above, it seems possible

that transferring this action before it is determined whether each

nation-wide class includes the same employees might seriously

infringe the rights of potential collective members of plaintiff’s

proposed nation-wide class. 

///

///

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Accordingly, the court is persuaded that the equities in this

case further militate against applying the first-to-file rule. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to transfer is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 16, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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