Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01182/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01182-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY DAVID URBANO,

Petitioner,

J. MACDONALD,

Respondent.

No. 2:13-cv-1182 TLN GGH P

ORDER

On August 22, 2013, respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust five

out of six claims. Petitioner filed an opposition, arguing that exhaustion is excused for various 

reasons. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may not entertain a 

petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies with respect to each 

of the claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). The exhaustion of state court 

remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1). 

A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with 

a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). A state court has had an opportunity to rule on the merits of a 

claim when the petitioner has fairly presented that claim to that court. The fair presentation 

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requirement is met where the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theory on 

which his claim is based. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78. Generally, it is “not enough that all the 

facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts . . . or that a somewhat 

similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Instead, 

[i]f state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged 

violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to 

the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United 

States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an 

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of 

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not 

only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). 

Petitioner first argues that the five claims were unexhausted due to the state court’s failure 

to provide counsel on direct appeal, and therefore an exhaustion requirement would be unjust.1 

He then concedes that he was permitted a supplemental brief but the state court erred in failing to 

appoint counsel to argue his points because it should have found his grounds arguable on their 

merits. Therefore, in the interests of justice, petitioner argues that claims two through six should 

be adjudicated now. He further claims that respondent failed “to raise a meritorious nonexhaustion defense,” in response to petitioner’s argument in the petition that claim one, denial of 

counsel on direct appeal, which was exhausted, was the cause for failing to exhaust claims two 

through six. Finally, petitioner claims that claims two through six arguably have been exhausted 

by virtue of exhausting claim one.2 Petitioner concedes that claims two through six of his petition 

are unexhausted.

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1

 Petitioner had counsel on direct appeal who filed a Wende brief. (Resp.’s Lod. Doc. No. 1.)

2

 In his petition, petitioner claims that he tried to exhaust claims two through six by requesting 

an extension of time to file his pro per Wende brief on October 7, 2011, but that the state court of 

appeal did not respond to the request. (Petn., Ex. L2; ECF No. 1 at 129.) The docket from the 

direct appeal indicates that an October 14, 2011 request for extension of time was granted on 

October 19, 2011. 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=3&doc_id=1973000&doc_no

=C067579. 

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Because this is a mixed petition, petitioner may proceed in one of two ways. He may

eliminate claims two through six as unexhausted and proceed on the exhausted claim one only. 

Or, petitioner may file a motion to stay this action pending exhaustion of the unexhausted five

claims.

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In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005) the United States Supreme 

Court found that a stay and abeyance of a mixed federal petition should be available only in the 

limited circumstance that good cause is shown for a failure to have first exhausted the claims in 

state court, that the claim or claims at issue potentially have merit and that there has been no 

indication that petitioner has been intentionally dilatory in pursuing the litigation. Rhines, supra, 

at 277-78, 125 S. Ct at 1535. 

Petitioner is informed that counsel’s failure to include claims on direct appeal does not 

constitute “good cause” to grant a stay of a mixed federal petition under Rhines. Wooten v. 

Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2008). 

If petitioner wishes to stay this action, he shall file a motion addressing the Rhines factors. 

In the alternative, petitioner may proceed with a stay request as outlined in King v. Ryan, 564 

F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) citing Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). In King, the 

Ninth Circuit held that in addition to the stay procedure authorized in Rhines, district courts also 

have discretion to permit petitioners to follow the three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure 

approved in Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1998) and Kelly v. 

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Pursuant to the King procedure, (1) a petitioner amends his 

petition to delete any unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, 

fully exhausted petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to 

exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and re-attaches the 

newly-exhausted claims to the original petition. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71. The King stay-and-

 

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Petitioner is cautioned that the habeas corpus statute imposes a one-year statute of limitations 

for filing non-capital habeas corpus petitions in federal court. In most cases, the one year period 

will start to run on the date on which the state court judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of time for seeking direct review, although the statute of 

limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral 

review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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abeyance procedure has no requirement of a good cause showing or that the claims are potentially 

meritorious. However, no statute of limitations protection is imparted by such a stay, nor are 

exhausted claims adjudicated during the pendency of such a stay.

In this regard, petitioner is informed that he must not only comply with the statute of 

limitations, but he must show that the amendment of any newly exhausted claims relates back to 

the original exhausted claim in the petition by sharing a common core of operative facts. See

Thomas v. Kramer, 2011 WL 2633470, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 5, 2011) (describing claims which do 

not relate back to previously timely filed claims).

In the alternative, petitioner may file an amended petition in this court raising only the 

exhausted claim. If petitioner chooses the second method, however, the court cautions that he 

will risk forfeiting consideration of the unexhausted claims in this or any other federal court. See

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); see also Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21; Rule 9(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Within twenty-one (21) days of this order, petitioner shall file either a motion to stay 

under either Rhines or Kelly, or file an amended petition containing only the exhausted claim.

Petitioner is cautioned that failure to respond to the instant order may result in a recommendation 

that the unexhausted claims be dismissed.

2. Within seven (7) days of the filing of any motion to stay, respondent may file a 

response.

Dated: October 15, 2013

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076/Urba1182.mixed

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