Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01073/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01073-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Jerome Lee Cross is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on July 9, 2014. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

JEROME LEE CROSS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01073-AWI-SAB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE 

A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF

[ECF No. 1]

Case 1:14-cv-01073-AWI-SAB Document 12 Filed 10/23/14 Page 1 of 5
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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

On April 17, 2014, Plaintiff was arraigned on charges of possession of alcohol and/or drugs 

within a county jail, pursuant to California Penal Code section 4573.8. Officer Tolbert investigated 

and forwarded his information with a direct request for the district attorney to file charges against 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends officer Tolbert acted outside the scope of his duties by his 

recommendation. 

In 2013, Plaintiff was involved in a mutual combat without substantial or significant injuries. 

However, Officer Tolbert recommended the district attorney prosecute Plaintiff for assault with great 

bodily injury, and following a jury trial Plaintiff was found not guilty. The district attorney is in the 

“habit” of “going off” of officer’s recommendation when officers only have the duty to pass along the 

information.

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III.

DISCUSSION

A. Malicious Prosecution

Claims by pretrial detainees, such as Plaintiff, are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment 

Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 

2002). In the Ninth Circuit, a claim for malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los 

Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). However, if malicious prosecution is 

“conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended 

to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights,” a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is 

available. Id. at 562 (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985)). To state a claim 

for malicious prosecution in California under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead the “(a) the initiation of 

criminal prosecution, (b) malicious motivation, and (c) lack of probable cause.” Usher, 828 F.2d at 

562. A criminal defendant can maintain a malicious prosecution claim against police officers who 

wrongfully caused his prosecution. Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff claims only that the officer went beyond his scope of duties by recommending that the 

district attorney prosecute him for possession of alcohol/drugs while incarcerated. Plaintiff’s bare 

allegation fails to give rise to claim for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff fails to allege that he was 

prosecuted with malice and without probable cause for the purpose of denying him equal protection or 

another specific constitutional right. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief 

and leave to amend will be granted. 

B. Municipal Immunity

Plaintiff names the Kings County Sheriff’s Department and Kings County District Attorney’s 

Office as Defendants. 

A local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a 

respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163-1164 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, a claim against a local 

government unit for municipal or county liability requires an allegation that “a deliberate policy, 

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custom, or practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation . . . suffered.” 

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Alternatively, and more difficult to prove, municipal liability may be 

imposed where the local government unit’s omission led to the constitutional violation by its 

employee. Gibson at 1186. Under this route to municipal liability, the “plaintiff must show that the 

municipality’s deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the employee to 

commit the constitutional violation.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires a showing “that the 

municipality was on actual or constructive notice that its omissions would likely result in a 

constitutional violation.” Id.

The Kings County Sheriff’s Department and District Attorney’s Office are not proper parties

as they are a department of the County, not a separate municipal agency. See, e.g., United States v. 

Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005) (“municipal police departments and bureaus are generally 

not considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Hall v. Placer County Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, No. CIV S-10-01152 JAM EFB PS, 2011 WL 6002912, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) 

(sheriff’s department is a municipal department of the County). Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim 

fails because he has presented no evidence of constitutional deprivations. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days. Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by 

adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 

2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 

and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). Although accepted as 

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true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . 

. . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. “All 

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are 

waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 

1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff an amended civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed July 9, 2014, is dismissed for failure to state a claim;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this action 

will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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