Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00430/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00430-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1244(d).

1 07cv0430

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY WILLIAMSON MORRIS, Civil No. 07cv0430-IEG (CAB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR

STAY AND ABEYANCE; and TO DISMISS

PETITION WITH PREJUDICE

[Doc. No. 9]

v.

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Larry Williamson Morris is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On March 15, 2007, the Court issued a Notice

Regarding Possible Dismissal of Petition for Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies. [Doc. No. 3.] 

The Court informed Petitioner that he had not alleged exhaustion of claim 1, claim 2, parts of claim 4

and claim 5. On March 28, 2007, Petitioner sought leave to file a motion for stay and abeyance of the

Petition so he can return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. [Doc. No. 6.] On April 5,

2007, the Court issued an Order granting Petitioner leave to file his motion and explaining the

requirements for showing that a stay and abeyance procedure is appropriate. [Doc. No. 7.]

Petitioner filed his motion on May 2, 2007. [Doc. No. 9.] Respondent filed an opposition on

June 4, 2007. [Doc. No. 10.] In the opposition, Respondent argued that the stay and abeyance procedure

is not appropriate in this case, and that the entire Petition is untimely under AEDPA.1 Because

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Respondent’s untimeliness argument may result in a dismissal of the entire Petition, and Petitioner had

not had an opportunity to respond on this issue, the Court allowed Petitioner until October 26, 2007, to

file a reply to Respondent’s opposition. [Doc. No. 11.] On October 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a

document entitled, “Order setting date for Petitioner’s reply to Respondent’s opposition to Petitioner’s

motion for stay and abeyance.” [Doc. No. 13.] Because the document was filed when Petitioner’s reply

was due, and because the document appears to be addressing the timeliness issue, the Court construed

this document as Petitioner’s reply. [Doc. No. 14.]

For the reasons that follow, this Court recommends that Petitioner’s motion for stay and

abeyance be DENIED, and the entire Petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred.

II. DISCUSSION

Petitioner has not shown that a stay and abeyance procedure is appropriate in this case. Habeas

petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in

state prison must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481

U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the

California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her

federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. District courts have

limited discretion to hold in abeyance a mixed habeas petition, containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, in order to permit a petitioner to return to state court to exhaust additional claims

while the federal proceedings are stayed. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).

In Rhines, the Supreme Court recognized that “petitioners who come to federal court with

‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their

unexhausted claims.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that federal courts

may now issue “stay and abey” orders under appropriate circumstances to permit petitioners to exhaust

unexhausted claims before proceeding with their federal petitions. Id. at 275-76. In so holding, the

Supreme Court noted that, while the procedure should be “available only in limited circumstances,” it

“likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition

if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially

meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation

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tactics.” Id. at 270. When a petitioner has met these requirements, his interest in obtaining federal

review of his claims outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of federal

petitions. Id.

Petitioner has not met the above standard. He has not shown any good cause for the failure to

exhaust his claims timely. There is also no indication of Petitioner’s diligence in pursuing his claims. 

Petitioner provides no explanation whatsoever for why he did not present his claims to the state courts

before. His motion simply lists the claims. Petitioner’s claims arise from a trial held in 2003. He does

not argue that he has not had access to the relevant facts or law until now. The record before this Court

contains no reason why Petitioner would not have had access to the information he needed to raise his

claims in the original Petition. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish good cause. Similarly, he has

made no showing that his claims are potentially meritorious and should be considered.

Further, as Respondent argues in his opposition, the entire Petition is barred by AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations. Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by AEDPA. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a one-year period of

limitation applies to an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed “by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court.” The limitation period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The “conclusion of direct review” is not the denial of review by the California Supreme Court,

but 90 days thereafter, upon the expiration of the time in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in

the United States Supreme Court. Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

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petition for review on April 13, 2005. (Lodgment 1.) Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of

certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, the statute of limitations period started to run on July

13, 2005, and expired on July 13, 2006. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (excluding the day from which the period

begins to run from the calculation of the time). The Petition was filed on March 7, 2007, well after the

statutory period expired.

Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling. Nothing indicates that Petitioner was prevented

from filing his claims by state action. None of the asserted rights are newly recognized. Petitioner has

provided no evidence showing that the factual predicates of his claims could not have been discovered

timely through the exercise of due diligence. Finally, Petitioner has not stated that he filed any state

habeas petitions, which would have tolled the limitations period. At best, the exhibits to Petitioner’s

reply brief reveal that he requested an extension of time to file his federal habeas corpus petition, which

was due by July 13, 2006 (Pet’r Reply Ex. A), but it is not clear where he filed this request nor does

Petitioner cite any authority to support the implied assertion that this request would have tolled the

statute of limitations.

In addition, there is no showing that Petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling. Equitable

tolling is available when the petitioner can establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408 (2005); Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). “Equitable tolling is

justified in few cases.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). “Equitable tolling is

the exception, not the rule.” Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

292 F.3d at 1066.

Petitioner has been given an opportunity to demonstrate good cause for his failure to exhaust his

claims timely. This Court specifically directed Petitioner to respond to the timeliness issue in his reply

brief. Petitioner filed a reply brief, but he has not described any extraordinary circumstances that stood

in the way of his filing a timely federal petition. Nor does the record reveal that there were any

extraordinary circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. Further, there is no indication that

Petitioner has been diligent in pursuing his claims. As stated above, Petitioner has offered no facts

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showing his efforts to protect his rights.

Because the Petition was filed after the expiration of the limitations period and no tolling is

warranted, the entire Petition is untimely. Therefore, staying the case to allow Petitioner time for the

exhaustion of his claims would be futile. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the motion for stay

and abeyance be DENIED, and the entire Petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred

under AEDPA.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the above discussion, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED, and the Petition be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 6, 2007, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 6, 2007

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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