Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02850/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KELU NDUNGE MAUNDU,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CORBRITT, SHAW & ASSOCIATES,

INC., et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

NO. C 05-02850 JW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Kelu Ndunge Maundu's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Default

Judgment against Defendant Corbritt, Shaw & Associates, Inc. and Defendant Todd Christopher Shaw

(hereinafter "Defendants") pursuant to Rule 55, Fed. R. Civ. P. The motion is noticed for hearing on

November 28, 2005. Neither of the defendants has submitted an opposition to Plaintiff's motion. The

Court finds it appropriate to take the motion under submission for decision based on the papers filed by

Plaintiff, without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Based upon all papers filed to date, the

Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment against Defendants.

II. BACKGROUND

On July 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants for violations of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (hereinafter “Federal FDCPA”) and California’s

Case 5:05-cv-02850-JW Document 14 Filed 11/16/05 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

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Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Civil Code 1788, et seq. (hereinafter, “California FDCPA”). 

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the Federal FDCPA because Defendants: (1) falsely

represented the amount of the alleged debt; (2) falsely represented or implied that a lawsuit could or would

be filed against Plaintiff when Defendants did not intend to do so; (3) drafted and sent Plaintiff a collection

letter to instill in Plaintiff a false sense of urgency; (4) threatened to sue Plaintiff for the debt; (5) attempted

to collect interest, fees, and/or other charges that were not expressly authorized by the agreement creating

the debt; (6) falsely represented the name of the creditor to whom the alleged debt was owed; (7) provided

Plaintiff with less than thirty days to send a written request to Defendants requesting verification of the

alleged debt; (8) provided Plaintiff with less than thirty days to send a written request to Defendants

requesting the name and address of the original creditor; (9) continued its collection efforts after Plaintiff

sent a written notification to Defendants requesting Defendants not to contact Plaintiff; (10) used obscene

or profane language against Plaintiff to collect the debt; and (11) falsely represented themselves as

representatives of U.S. Bank.

Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants violated the California FDCPA by: (1) failing to comply with

the Federal FDCPA; and (2) communicating with Plaintiff by telephone with such frequency as to be

unreasonable and to constitute a harassment to the Plaintiff under the circumstances. Defendants were

personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint on August 9, 2005. Defendants failed to

answer the complaint or otherwise defend the action. On September 16, 2005, the Clerk of this Court

entered default against Defendants. On October 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Default Judgment. 

III. STANDARDS

Upon entry of default, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of

damages, will be taken as true. Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)

(citing Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)). Necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and

claims which are legally insufficient, however, are not established by default. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of

North America, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). In exercising its discretion to grant default

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judgment, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the

merits of plaintiff's substantive claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; ( 4) the sum of money at stake in

the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to

excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring

decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Damages

Plaintiff contends that statutory damages is warranted under the Federal FDCPA. The Federal

FDCPA precludes the use of false representations, threats, and deceptive practices to collect debt from an

individual. See Bracken v. Harris & Zide, L.L.P., 219 F.R.D. 481, 484 (N.D.Cal., 2004). Plaintiff

alleged that Defendants sent Plaintiff a demand letter that violated the Federal FDCPA in several respects. 

For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants provided Plaintiff with less than thirty days to send a written

request to Defendants requesting verification of the alleged debt. Construing the allegation as true for

purposes of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, the Court finds that Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for

relief under the Federal FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) (Consumer has the option of notifying the debt

collector in writing within the thirty-day period.). The maximum recovery for a plaintiff in an action under

the Federal FDCPA, who did not allege any actual damages and requested only statutory damages, is

$1,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Therefore, the Court awards Plaintiff statutory damages in the amount

of $1,000 under the Federal FDCPA.

 Plaintiff also contends that statutory damages is warranted under the California FDCPA. Under

the California FDCPA, "any debt collector who willfully and knowingly violates [Title 1.6C "Fair Debt

Collection Practices"] with respect to any debtor shall, in addition to actual damages sustained by the

debtor as a result of the violation, also be liable to the debtor . . . not be less than one hundred dollars

($100) nor greater than one thousand dollars ($1,000)." Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(b). Plaintiff alleged

that Defendants sent a collection letter to Plaintiff, and that the letter falsely represented that a legal

proceeding has been, is about to be, or will be instituted unless Plaintiff paid her credit card debt to U.S.

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Bank. Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes of the motion for default judgment, Defendants

violated Title 1.6C. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.13(j). Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to award

Plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of $1,000 under the California FDCPA. 

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that under Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17, she is entitled to an additional

$1,000 in statutory damages under the California FDCPA, even though the maximum recovery for a

plaintiff in an action under the California FDCPA is $1,000. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(b). California Civil

Code § 1788.17 provides that "notwithstanding any other provision of [Title 1.6C], every debt

collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the [Federal FDCPA] . . .,

and shall be subject to the remedies in [Section 1692k of the Federal FDCPA]." Cal. Civ. Code §

1788.17. Because Defendants are already subject to the remedies in Section 1692k for violating the

Federal FDCPA, and because Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(b) clearly provides that the maximum recovery

under the California FDCPA is $1,000, Plaintiff is not entitled to additional statutory damages under the

California FDCPA.

B. Attorney's Fees and Costs

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this action against

Defendants in the amount of $4,140 and $443.64 perspectively. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(3),

Plaintiff is entitled to recover full costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. A reasonable attorney fee is

the number of hours and the hourly rate that would be billed by "reasonably competent counsel." See

Yahoo! Inc. v. Net Games, Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1183 (N.D.Cal., 2004) (Attorney fee applicants

are entitled to an award sufficient to enable them to secure reasonably competent counsel, but are not

entitled to an award necessary to secure counsel of their choice.). 

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's attorney's fees in this action and finds the rate of compensation,

$300/hr for the attorney, to be excessive. In Yahoo! Inc. v. Net Games, Inc., the court found that $266

per hour for the attorneys was excessive. See Id. The court reasoned that although the plaintiff argued that

the factual analysis was detailed and the legal analysis was complex, the plaintiff's description was plainly an

exaggeration because the case "simply was not unusually complex." Id. at 1189. Likewise, the instant case

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simply was not unusually complex. All Plaintiff did here was formulate the complaint, obtain an entry of

default, and immediately thereafter, file an unopposed motion for default judgment. 

The Court finds it appropriate to adopt the formulae as set forth in Yahoo!. The Yahoo! court

calculated the reasonable rate by dividing the mean hourly wage of attorneys in the San Francisco area by

the ratio of net receipts to gross receipts. See Id. This Court will calculate the reasonable rate based on

the mean hourly wage of attorneys in the San Jose area, and divide that number by the ratio of net to gross

receipts using the most recent 2001 year data from the 2004-2005 Statistical Abstract. See United States

Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005, tbl 718, available at

http://www.census.gov/statab/www/. Gross receipts totaled $91 billion and net receipts totaled $32 billion. 

This yields a ratio of net receipts to gross receipts of 0.352. The most recent data available from the

Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") describing hourly wages in the San Jose area are available at

http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_7400.htm. Dividing the most recent mean hourly wage for lawyers,

$74.10/hr, by the most recent ratio of net to gross receipts, 0.352, yields an estimate of $210.51/hr as the

average market rate for lawyers in the San Jose area. The Court awards Plaintiff $2,905 for the 13.8 hours

that counsel spent on the case at a rate of $210.51 per hour. The Court also awards Plaintiff $444 in

costs.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff is

awarded statutory damages against Defendants in the amount of $2,000, and $3,349 in attorney's fees and

costs for a total award of $5,349.

Dated: November 16, 2005

05cv2850dj

/s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Frederick William Schwinn cand_cmecf@sjconsumerlaw.com

Dated: November 16, 2005 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:__/s/JW chambers________

Ronald L. Davis

Courtroom Deputy

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