Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00143/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00143-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

---

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MISTRELL ALVIN, )

 )

 )

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:14-cv-143-WKW-TFM

 ) 

 ) [WO]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

JUSTICE, et. al., )

 )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:14-cv-153-WKW-TFM

)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED )

STATES ATTORNEYS, et. al., )

 )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:14-cv-964-WKW-TFM

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT )

OF JUSTICE, et. al., )

 )

 Defendants. )

) 

 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act against the United 

States Department of Justice, Criminal Division “(DOJ)”; the Office of Enforcement Operations 

“(OEO)”; and the Electronic Surveillance Unit “(ESU)”; DOJ’s Office of Information Policy 

“(OIP)”; and DOJ’s Executive Office for the United States Attorneys “(EOUSA)”. Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) this case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge 

for review and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

(Doc. 2) Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, 

Case 2:14-cv-00143-WKW-TFM Document 33 Filed 03/02/15 Page 1 of 15
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Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 17, filed July 7, 2014). The Court has carefully reviewed 

the Motion and brief in support and Plaintiff’s response in opposition. (Docs. 17, 18, and 22). 

For good cause, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Defendants’ 

Motion be GRANTED. 

I. Introduction

Plaintiff has filed suit, pro se, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5521asking this Court, in essence, 

“to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any 

agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B). Plaintiff 

asserts that DOJ and its agencies withheld documents and information to which he was entitled 

and that OIP wrongly denied his appeal of these actions as untimely. Complaint, Case No. 2:14-

cv-143-WKW-TFM, ¶3 and ¶10. Plaintiff also alleges that EOUSA never responded to a FOIA 

request allegedly filed on or about December 18, 2012. Case No. 2:14-cv-153-WKW-TFM, 

Complaint, p. 4.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims against DOJ and its agencies, EOUSA, OEO, 

ESU and OIP are due to be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to timely exhaust his administrative 

remedies when he failed to timely appeal the December 4, 2012 decision. Defendants also assert 

that EOUSA never received the second request allegedly filed on or about December 18, 2012

and that the claim based upon that alleged request is due to be dismissed because a legally 

sufficient search of its records following the initiation of this litigation failed to locate the alleged 

FOIA request or any documents responsive to it. 

 

1

 Plaintiff filed two separate FOIA lawsuits in this Court on March 23, 2014. See Case Nos. 2:14-cv-143-

WKW-TFM and 2:14-cv-153-MHT-CSC. By Order entered July 2, 2014, the two cases were consolidated 

under Case No. 2:14-cv-143-WKW-TFM. See Case No. 2:14-cv-143-WKW-TFM (Doc. 14) and 2:14-cv153-MHT-CSC (Doc. 19). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed another FOIA action in this court on September 12, 

2014. See Case No. 2:14-cv-964-WKW-TFM. By Order entered September 24, 2014, this case was 

consolidated with the previously filed cases, and Case No. 2:14-cv-143 was designated as lead case. 

(Doc. 30).

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II. Standard of Review

This matter is before the court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative 

Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting evidentiary submissions (Doc. 17), Brief in 

Support (Doc.18), and Plaintiff’s responsive brief (Doc. 22). Because the court is considering 

evidence outside the pleadings this matter is appropriately before the court on a motion for 

summary judgment. A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before 

trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (b). AThe court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.@ FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-

24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 

F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). 

A[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.@ Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). At the summary 

judgment juncture, the court does not Aweigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,@

but solely Adetermine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.@ Id. at 249. Only disputes 

about the material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment and Adisputes that are 

irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.@ Id. at 248. A material fact is one Athat might 

affect the outcome of the suit under governing law,@ and a dispute about a material fact is 

Agenuine@ Aif the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.@ Id.; accord Greenberg v. Bell-South Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 

2007); see also Slomcenski v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2003)) (AIn determining 

whether an issue of fact is >genuine= for the purpose of defeating summary judgment, we ask 

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whether the evidence is >such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.=@). 

Thus, the initial burden of proof rests on the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S. Ct. 

at 2554; Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1294. This burden is satisfied when the movant shows that if the 

evidentiary record were reduced to admissible evidence at trial, it would be insufficient to permit 

the non-movant from carrying its burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; 106 S. Ct. at 

2552-53. The admissibility of evidence is subject to the same standards and rules that govern 

admissibility of evidence at trial. Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 

n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 556 (5th Cir. 

1980)).

Once the movant meets its burden under Rule 56, the non-movant must designate specific 

facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Conclusory 

assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for 

summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. 

Lejaun v. Nat=l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 

(1990); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (conclusory 

assertions in absence of supporting evidence are insufficient to withstand summary judgment). 

ASpeculation does not create a genuine issue of fact.@ Cordoba v. Dillard=s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 

1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).2

 

2All litigants, pro se or not, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although 

the court is required to liberally construe a pro se litigant=s pleadings, the court does not have Alicense to 

serve as de facto counsel for a party. . .or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an 

action.@ GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). 

(Citations omitted). 

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The party opposing summary judgment must respond by setting forth specific evidence in 

the record and articulating the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim, 

and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); 

Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001). If 

the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be 

granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S. Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted). Thus, to 

avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party Amust do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.@ Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586 106 

S. Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted). A plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating that he can 

establish the basic elements of his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548. 

In determining whether a genuine dispute for trial exists, the court must view all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 

333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003); Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1242-43. Further, Aall justifiable 

inferences are to be drawn in [that party=s] favor.@ Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; 106 S. Ct. at 

2513; see also McCormick, 333 F.3d at 1243 (the evidence and all reasonable inferences from 

the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant). If the non-moving 

party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its 

case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53. In other words, summary judgment is proper 

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party=s case. Id. at 322, 106 S.

Ct. at 2552.

III. The Facts

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On June 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a written FOIA request with the DOJ seeking records 

concerning the interception of wire and oral communications in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 

2510, et seq. The request is identified as No. CRM-201200529P. See Doc. 17-2 at p. 2; (Def. 

Ex. 1; letter received July 5, 2012 from Plaintiff addressed to Rena Y. Kim, Chief FOIA, Privacy 

Act Unit.) On December 4, 2012, OEO issued its decision in response to request No. CRM201200529P and withheld one page of information, but produced several pages of documents 

with redactions pursuant to the exemptions provided under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). See Doc. 17-3 at 

pp. 2-19; (Def. Ex. 2; attachments to letter dated December 4, 2012, from DOJ Criminal 

Division, OEO to Plaintiff; Complaint, Case No. 2:14-cv-143-MEF-TFM, Exs. B, C, and D).

3

In 

this decision, Plaintiff was given notice of his right to file an administrative appeal and instructed 

that such an appeal must be received by OIP, “no later than sixty days (60) from the date of this 

letter.” See Doc. 17-3 at pp. 2-4; (Def. Ex. 2; letter dated December 4, 2012, from DOJ Criminal 

Division, OEO to Plaintiff.) Plaintiff’s administrative appeal to OIP was received on February 8, 

2013, 64 days beyond the December 4, 2012, date of the OEO’s decision. See Doc. 17-4 at p.2;

(Def. Ex. 3; Alvin Appeal letter and Doc. 17-5 at p.2; Def, Ex. 4 at p.2 Letter from OIP to 

Plaintiff.) By letter dated August 6, 2013, OIP denied Plaintiff’s appeal as untimely. See Doc. 

17-5 at p.2; (Def. Ex. 4 at p.2.)

Subsequent to the filing of this action, the United States Attorney’s office for the Middle 

District of Alabama, requested a response from officials at EOUSA regarding Plaintiff’s 

allegation that he filed a FOIA request with EOUSA to which no response had been received. 

See (Doc. 17-1; Declaration of Courtney Griffith, ¶ 5). Thereafter, an extensive search was 

 

3 All exhibits attached to a complaint “are part of the pleading ‘for all purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

10(c).” Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205 (11th Cir. 2007)(citations 

omitted)(“Under Rule 10(c) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such attachments are considered 

part of the pleadings for all purposes, including a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion.”).

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conducted by the responsible official at EOUSA. This person was unable to locate any FOIA 

request submitted by Plaintiff and also was unable to locate any documents responsive to 

Plaintiff’s request. See id., Griffith Declaration, ¶¶ 6, 7 and 8). 

IV. Discussion

A. June 20, 2012 FOIA Request

“The FOIA clearly requires a party to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking 

redress in the federal courts.” Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations 

omitted). While not a jurisdictional requirement, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a 

condition precedent to filing a suit in federal court, “’perform[ing] a function similar to the 

judicial doctrine of ripeness by postponing judicial review.’” Id. at 1367-68. Regarding 

administrative appeals, DOJ’s regulations state, “[i]f you are dissatisfied with a component’s 

response to your request, you may appeal an adverse determination denying your request, in any 

respect, to the Office of Information and Privacy, . . . , in writing and it must be received by the 

Office of Information and Privacy within 60 days of the date of the letter denying your 

request.” 28 C.F.R. § 16.9(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the regulations state, “[i]f you 

wish to seek review by a court of any adverse determination, you must first appeal it under this 

section.” 28 C.F.R § 16.9 (c).

In the instant action, Plaintiff filed a FOIA request on June 20, 2012. See Doc. 17-2 at 

p.2. The OEO issued a decision on December 4, 2012. See Doc. 17-3 at pp. 2-4. In its decision 

OEO advised Plaintiff that any appeal must be received by the OIP not later than 60 days from 

December 4, 2012, the date of the decision. See Doc. 17-3 at p.3. Plaintiff claims the December 

4, 2012 decision was misdirected and not received by Plaintiff until January 4, 2013. See 

Complaint, Case No. 2:14-cv-143-WKW-TFM, p. 4. The 60-day appeal time ran on February 4, 

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2013 and Plaintiff’s appeal was not received by the OIP until February 8, 2013. See Doc. 17-5 at 

p.2. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s appeal is time-barred for failure to exhaust his 

administrative remedies because it was received four days after expiration of the appeal deadline. 

Plaintiff, however, argues that due to the Defendant’s misdirection via mail of the OEO opinion,

the 60-day appeal time did not begin to run until his receipt of the letter on January 4, 2013. 

Defendants argue that regardless of any misdirection of the OEO decision, it is undisputed that 

Plaintiff had the opinion by January 4, 2013, 30 days before the appeal deadline ran, and that he 

had notice the appeal must be received by February 4, 2013.

Plaintiff points the court to no case law or statutory law in the FOIA context that suggests 

the 60-day appeal deadline maybe tolled for the reasons which Plaintiff claims. Specifically, the 

court has found no law indicating that the failure of the DOJ to appropriately direct an opinion 

and appeal rights letter via U.S. mail to a pro se and incarcerated plaintiff is a basis for tolling 

the 60-day time period, especially when as here, the letter and opinion is received by Plaintiff 

with 30 days before the appeal deadline. Nor has the court’s own independent research indicated 

that in the FOIA context the appeal deadline is anything other than a bright line rule. See Bonilla 

v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 535 Fed. App’x 891, 893-94 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming a grant of 

summary judgment to the DOJ and holding that the requester failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies under FOIA, where appeal was eight days late); Lakin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 917 F. 

Supp. 2d 142, 145-145 (D.D.C 2013) (dismissing prisoner’s FOIA suit for failure to exhaust, 

where appeal was 10 days late).

Plaintiff further argues that since he placed his appeal letter in the U.S. Mail on January 

18, 2013, prior to the February 4, 2013 deadline, his appeal is timely. In essence the Plaintiff 

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argues that the prison mailbox rule should be extended to FOIA context. This is not the law. 

Rather the court notes generally that while pleadings filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally 

construed, pro se litigants must conform to procedural rules including deadlines. Albra v. Advan, 

Inc. 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F. 3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1999) 

(“Liberal construction does not mean liberal deadlines.”), overruled in part Manders v. Lee, 338 

F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003). Indeed, it appears that the Eleventh Circuit continues to view the 

FOIA appeal deadline as a strict deadline, which if not followed, is a basis for awarding 

summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff. See Bonilla, 535 Fed. 

App’x at 893 (affirming a grant of summary judgment to the DOJ in the FOIA context where 

appeal letter was eight days late).

The court recognizes that the United States Supreme Court has created the “prison 

mailbox rule” which recognizes, for purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), a 

pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal is “filed” on the date that the prisoner delivers the notice to 

prison authorities, rather than on the date when the court clerk receives the notice. Houston v. 

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-73, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988). Furthermore, the 

Eleventh Circuit has extended this mail box rule from habeas corpus appeals to complaints filed 

by pro se prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Garvey v. 

Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 782-83 (11th Cir. 1993). However, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to 

extend the mailbox rule to administrative appeals under FOIA because the court found no 

published decisions of the Supreme Court or other circuit courts of appeals extending the prison 

mailbox rule to the administrative appeal context. Bonilla. 535 Fed. App’x. at 893; see also, 

Lakin, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 145 (D.D.C. 2013)(noting that the Fifth, Ninth and Third circuits have

refused to apply the mailbox rule to administrative appeals, such as FOIA). Accordingly, the 

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court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in the Defendants’ favor with 

respect to Plaintiff’s appeal of the OEO’s December 4, 2012 decision because Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies under FOIA.

B. December 18, 2012 FOIA Request

Next, the Court will address Plaintiff’s claim concerning his second alleged FOIA request 

which he claims was filed on or about December 18, 2012, and which Plaintiff claims the 

EOUSA failed to adequately process. In response, Defendants assert that EOUSA never 

received the second request allegedly filed on or about December 18, 2012 and that the claim 

based upon that alleged request is due to be dismissed because a legally sufficient search of its 

records following the initiation of this litigation failed to locate the alleged FOIA request or any 

documents responsive to it. See Doc. 17-1; Declaration of Courtney Griffith, ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, and 8. 

The Eleventh Circuit has clearly articulated the summary judgment standard as applied to 

FOIA cases. 

“’Generally FOIA cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment, once the 

documents in issue are properly identified.’ Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. A factual dispute between the parties will not defeat summary 

judgment unless it is both genuine and material. A factual dispute is ‘material’ if it 

would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and ‘genuine’ if a 

reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party.”

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008). 

The agency initially bears the burden of showing “’beyond a material doubt . . . that it has 

conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” [emphasis 

added]. Delvecchio v. Internal Revenue Service, 360 Fed. Appx. 104, 107 (11th Cir. 2010) citing 

Id. at 1248 (quoting Ray v. U.S. Dep’t Justice, 908 F. 2d 1549, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990), rev’d on 

other grounds sub nom U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 112 S. Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 

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526 (1991)). The agency “need not show that its search was exhaustive.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Rather, it may meet its burden “by producing relatively detailed and nonconclusory affidavits 

submitted in good faith by responsible officials. “ Id. [emphasis added]. “After the agency 

meets the burden of demonstrating that the search was reasonable, the burden then shifts to the 

requester to demonstrate that the search was not reasonable or was not conducted in good faith.” 

Id.

In support of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Defendants 

offer the Declaration of Courtney Griffith, who is a Paralegal Specialist with the EOUSA, which 

is a component of the DOJ, and she is a liaison to all 93 United States Attorney’s Offices

(“USAO”), which are also components of the DOJ. (Doc. 17-1; Griffith Affid.). She explains 

that her duties include responding on the EOUSA’s behalf to FOIA and Privacy Act (“PA”) 

requests. Specifically, she states that she is responsible for the following:

1) processing FOIA/PA requests for records located in the EOUSA office and in

all of the USAO’s offices;

2) reviewing correspondence related to FOIA/PA requests; 

3) reviewing searches conducted by the USAOs in response to requests;

4) locating responsive records, and 

5) preparing EOUSA responses to ensure that determinations to withhold or 

release such responsive records are in accordance with FOIA, PA< and DOJ 

regulations.

(Doc. 17-1 pp. 1-2; Griffith Affid.). She further explains that she is

familiar with the procedures followed by EOUSA in conducting searches for records 

responsive to FOIA/PA requests and the processing of FOIA/PA requests. There are two 

Computer database systems used by our office to track all FOIA files, litigation, and 

appeals, as well as any mail and/or correspondence related to these files. Information can 

be retrieved from both database systems by names, court case numbers, dates of requests, 

and subjects of requests. The two systems we use are ORACLE and our newer system, 

ACCESSPRO. When any correspondence comes in, it is date stamped, entered in a mail 

log book, and entered in both of our computer database systems by our intake staff.

(Doc. 17-1 p. 2; Griffith Affid.).

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With respect to the December 18, 2012 FOIA request which was allegedly made by 

Plaintiff Mistrell Alvin, she explains that the USAO for the Middle District of Alabama 

requested her office to review the complaint filed in this court in Alvin v. DOJ, 2:14-cv-153-

MHT-CSC in which Alvin claims he made a FOIA request on December 18, 2012. Alvin’s 

FOIA request states, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) The Date and Time the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 

Georgia (Savannah Division) received the fax from the Office of Enforcement 

Operations (OEO) Electronic Surveillance Unit (ESU), approving the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Georgia (Savannah Division) to seek 

Judicial Authority for a Wiretap for the Target Telephone (912)536-8815. (b) A 

copy of the Original Memorandum of Authorization in which includes the fax date 

and time on the “Top” of the document. (c) The application and affidavit presented 

to the Department of Justice including any and all revisions made and resubmitted to 

the OEO, ESU. (d) The date and time that Verizon Wireless responded to the 

“DEA” request for the toll records to the target telephone number (912)536-8815. 

(e) Any and all applications and affidavits presented to the OEO, ESU seeking 

wiretaps for the previous target telephone (912)678-61511; (912)541-2893; 

(912)678-6043; pursuant to Julius Pinkston, et al, Case No. CR. 606-26. (f) The 

arrest Warrant and Affidavit in support of the arrest warrant for plaintiff Mistrel 

Alvin. (g) A certified copy of the grand jury transcript/proceeding and a certified 

oral transcribed c.d., in light of the fact the AUSA allowed the Foreman to sign the 

Indictment and then amended the indictment without going back in front of the 

Grand Jury.

(Doc. 17-1 pp. 2-3;Griffith Affid.).

Griffith explains that on June 5, 2014, using ORACLE and ACCESSPRO, she searched 

the system’s name and subject fields using Mistrell Alvin, Julius Pinkston and Homer Holloway, 

in first and last name combinations. The systems contained no information on Mistrell Alvin or

the other two men. Furthermore, she explains that she spoke with intake staff, the paralegal 

supervisor, who also conducted a search, and Senior Litigation Counsel, who oversees litigation 

cases, and none of them had any information indicating Alvin had filed a FOIA request. She 

stated “[f]rom this I conclude that he has never filed a FOIA request with EOUSA/FOIA.” 

Finally, she stated that “[t]here is no other location or file in the FOIA Office where any other 

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records related to Mr. Alvin would be located . . . nor am I aware of any other method or means 

by which a further search could be conducted which would be likely to locate any other 

responsive records.” (Doc. 17-1 p. 3; Griffith Affid.). 

The Court has carefully reviewed the Affidavit of Courtney Griffith, an employee of 

EOUSA who is responsible for processing FOIA/PA requests. (Doc. 17-1 pp. 1-2; Griffith 

Affid.). The court finds that this affidavit meets the criteria for including sufficient detail in a 

nonconclusory manner and finds no reason to conclude that this affidavit has not been submitted 

in good faith. Delvecchio, 360 Fed. App’x. at 107. Based upon a review of Griffith’s Affidavit, 

and other record evidence, the court concludes that the defendants have met their burden of 

demonstrating that they have “conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant 

documents.” Id. Accordingly, because the court has concluded that the defendants have met 

their burden of demonstrating that the search was reasonable, the burden now shifts to Alvin to 

demonstrate that the search was not reasonable or was not conducted in good faith. Id.

Alvin argues that defendants’ search was not reasonable because the “LEGAL 

INFORMATION OFFICE NETWORK SYSTEM (LIONS) nor the COMPUTER TRACKING 

FROM THE USAO” and archive files were never searched. (Doc. 22 p.6; Plaintiff’s responsive 

brief). Other than his own unsupported statement, Plaintiff offers no proof that these two 

database systems exist or are currently in use by the EOUSA. In contrast the unopposed 

affidavit of Courtney Griffith, the EOUSA employee charged with the duty of processing 

FOIA/PA requests, states that the two systems used by the EOUSA are ORACLE and 

ACCESSPRO and that both of these were searched. (Doc. 17-1 p. 2; Griffith Affid.). Plaintiff 

also complains that the declaration “never stated what type of search was conducted”. (Doc. 22 

p. 6; Plaintiff’s responsive brief). However, the declaration clearly states that Griffith “searched 

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under the first name and last name and also searched the subject field and reversed the last name 

as the first name as last.” ( Doc. 17-1 p. 3, Griffith Affid.). Furthermore Griffith states that she 

“spoke with the intake staff, the paralegal supervisor, who also conducted a search, and Senior 

Litigation Counsel, who oversees litigation cases” and that none of these people had any 

information of Alvin’s alleged FOIA request. Id. Alvin offers no proof to contradict these 

statements. Thus, the court concludes that Alvin has failed to demonstrate that the search was 

not reasonable or was not conducted in good faith, and therefore has not met his burden to refute 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Delvecchio, 360 Fed. App’x. at 107. Accordingly, 

the court concludes that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 17) is due to be granted.

V. Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge 

that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17) be 

GRANTED and that all other pending Motions be DENIED as Moot. It is further 

ORDERED that the Plaintiff file any objections to this Recommendation on or before

March 16, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate 

Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general 

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this 

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court 

of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in 

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the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or 

manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds 

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 

(11th Cir. 1981, en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth 

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

DONE this 2nd day of March, 2015.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00143-WKW-TFM Document 33 Filed 03/02/15 Page 15 of 15