Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05150/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 23, 2004 Decided January 21, 2005

Reissued February 16, 2005

No. 02-5227

THE CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

APPELLEE

Consolidated with

04-5150

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00443)

(No. 02cv02414)

Stephanie E. Sawyer argued the cause for appellants. With

her on the briefs were David B. Bergman and Ida L. Bostian.

Catherine Y. Hancock, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief

were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney.

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 1 of 31
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Before: EDWARDS, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Opinion concurring in the judgment in part filed by Circuit

Judge EDWARDS.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellants appeal from

judgments of the District Court dismissing their claims on the

grounds that (1) plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the

membership of a rulemaking committee convened pursuant to

the No Child Left Behind Act, and (2) the Act barred judicial

review of the committee’s membership. Appellants contend that

they have standing to pursue their challenges, and that the Act

does not bar judicial review of the Secretary of Education’s

choice of committee members. Because we agree with the

District Court’s holding that Appellants lack standing to pursue

their claims, we affirm the judgments of the court. Moreover,

because this Court concludes that it lacks Article III jurisdiction

over this case, it does not consider the alternate issue of whether

judicial review is barred by the Act.

I. Background

A. The No Child Left Behind Act

On January 8, 2002, the President signed into law the “No

Child Left Behind Act” (“NCLBA” or “the Act”). Pub. L. No.

107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.

The Act requires each State to implement statewide

accountability systems for all public schools and their students,

to define education standards, and to establish a system of

assessments for measuring whether students have met those

standards. 20 U.S.C. § 6311. Under the Act, a school’s

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continued failure to make adequate yearly progress toward

meeting proficiency goals will give rise to assistance and

intervention, with parents of students in failing schools allowed

to transfer their children to better schools. Id. at § 6316(b).

The Act authorizes the Department of Education (“DOE”)

to adopt regulations for the oversight of States’ design of

standards and assessments. 20 U.S.C. § 6571. In order to

“ensure that final regulations are issued by the Secretary not

later than” January 8, 2003, id. at § 6571(b)(4)(A), Congress

directed the Secretary to utilize a “negotiated rulemaking

process.” Id. at § 6571(b)(3)(A).

The framework for promulgating and adopting regulations

under the Act is laid out with specificity. First, the Secretary of

Education is to “obtain the advice and recommendations” of

various interest groups. Id. at § 6571(b)(1). Second, the

Secretary shall “establish a negotiated rulemaking process” for

the purpose of drafting regulations, id. at § 6571(b)(3)(A), and

select individuals to participate in such process “from among

individuals or groups that provided advice and recommendations

. . . in such numbers as will provide an equitable balance

between representatives of parents and students and

representatives of educators and education officials . . . .” Id. at

§ 6571(b)(3)(B). Finally, “[s]uch process” shall be conducted

before January 8, 2003. Id. at § 6571(b)(4)(A). The Secretary

provides draft regulations to committee members prior to their

first meeting. Id. at § 6571(b)(3)(C). The process “shall not be

subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, but shall

otherwise follow the provisions of the Negotiated Rulemaking

Act of 1990 (5 U.S.C. 561 et seq.).” Id. at § 6571(b)(4).

This incorporation of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act

(“NRA”) implicates jurisdictional concerns, as the NRA bars

judicial review of “[a]ny agency action relating to establishing,

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assisting, or terminating a negotiated rulemaking committee

under this subchapter,” unless such review is otherwise provided

by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 570. Section 6571(b)(4) does not

explicitly describe selection of committee members as being

included in the “process” subject to the provisions of the NRA,

but it does not explicitly exclude member selection from the

“process” subject to the NRA.

B. Implementation of the Act’s Framework;

Contemporaneous Lawsuits

On January 18, 2002, DOE published a request for advice

and recommendations in the Federal Register. 67 Fed. Reg.

2770. On February 12, 2002, DOE issued an invitation for the

submission of possible participants in the negotiated rulemaking.

See Email from Susan B. Neuman, Ed.D., Assistant Secretary of

Elementary and Secondary Education (Feb. 12, 2002), reprinted

in Joint Appendix at 380-81. While the notice did stress that

“[t]he nominees should be practitioners . . . [i.e.], they should be

significantly involved with implementing and operating Title I

programs,” id., it also noted that the negotiated rulemaking was

to include “representatives of Federal, State and local

administrators; parents; teachers and paraprofessionals;

members of local school boards; and other organizations . . . .”

Id.

The committee convened by the Secretary consisted of 24

members. According to the DOE, this body consisted of six

representatives of “State Administrators and State Boards of

Education,” four representatives of “Local Administrators and

Local School Boards,” four representatives of “Principals and

Teachers,” seven representatives of “Students” (including one

teacher, a few administrators, and a representative of a Diocese),

one representative of “Business Interests,” and two

representatives of the DOE. 67 Fed. Reg. 9223, 9224 (Feb. 28,

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2002), corrected at 67 Fed. Reg. 9935 (Mar. 5, 2002). The

parties do not specify whether any of the non-“parent”/

“teacher” representatives are, themselves, parents or teachers.

Appellants dispute the nominal makeup of this body. They

claim that “only one” member represented “the interests of all

public school parents and students,” because some

representatives actually stood in for “multiple perspectives.”

Brief for Appellants at 11.

The February 28 notice gave individuals and groups who

“felt that his or her interests [we]re not adequately represented

by this . . . group” the opportunity to petition at the March 11

meeting, in person, to be seated as a negotiator. 67 Fed. Reg.

9224. Plaintiff organization Designs For Change attempted to

petition by phone to be seated (claiming that travel was

economically infeasible). The DOE declined to hear the

phoned-in petition. Decl. of Weckstein, Joint Appendix at 121.

Appellants assert that Center for Law and Education also

petitioned to be seated, Brief for Appellant at 13, although no

such petition is apparent from the record. Likewise, it is not

apparent that plaintiff Lindsey petitioned to be seated.

Appellants filed suit in District Court on March 8, 2002.

They alleged that the committee did not achieve “an equitable

balance between representatives of parents and students and

representatives of educators and education officials,” and sought

a preliminary injunction. While the suit was pending, the

committee convened, reviewed the Secretary’s draft regulations,

and reached consensus on every issue of academic standards and

assessments before it. See 67 Fed. Reg. 30,452 (May 6, 2002).

The Secretary received the committee’s proposed rules, and

published them for public notice and comment. Id. During the

comment period, the DOE convened five regional meetings for

further comment. Id. 

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In May 2002, the District Court held that it lacked

jurisdiction over Appellants’ challenge on two grounds. First,

it held that the NRA § 570 judicial-review bar precluded judicial

review of a challenge to the committee’s composition prior to

promulgation of final rules. Ctr. for Law and Educ. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Educ., 209 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2002).

The court noted the plaintiffs’ argument that § 570 only applies

to the “process” of committee deliberation, as 20 U.S.C. § 6571

provides that committee members would “participate in such

process . . . .” 209 F. Supp. 2d. at 107. But the court ultimately

rejected this interpretation of “process” because of “the

implications of plaintiffs’ theory.” Id. Specifically, such

interpretation would require DOE to segregate the NCLBA into

“process” and “non-process” provisions, and apply the NRA

accordingly; the Court saw such segregation and selective

application to be implausible. Id. at 107-08. Moreover, to allow

for lawsuits over selection of committee members would make

compliance with the NCLBA’s strict time limits infeasible.

Id. at 108.

Second, the court held that review was unavailable under

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), because selection of

the committee was not “final agency action.” Id. at 111.

Appellants filed an appeal, which later was stayed at Appellants’

request.

In July 2002, the DOE published its final rules on state

standards and assessments. 67 Fed. Reg. 45,038 (July 5, 2002)

(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 200). The final rules took effect

on August 5, 2002. Id.

In December 2002, Appellants filed a new complaint. They

did not challenge the substance of the rules on traditional APA

grounds. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Instead, they again focused on the

composition of the committee, calling for the rules to be set

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aside and a new committee formed. On March 26, 2004, the

District Court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding

that Appellants lacked standing. Ctr. for Law and Educ. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2004). The court

held that DFC and CLE (“the organizational plaintiffs”) failed

to demonstrate a procedural injury because the Act “contains no

requirement that advocacy groups be represented on the

negotiated rulemaking committee.” Id. at 23. The court also

rejected the organizations’ standing on other grounds regarding

lack of actual injury (i.e., the rules “do[] no more than arguably

offend their policy goals,” id. at 24) and lack of causation (i.e.,

the alleged injury was not caused by the formation of the

committee, but rather, by subsequent choices made by State

agencies. Id. at 25). As to the individual plaintiff, Rachelle

Lindsey, the court held that because the Act created no

enforceable right to have an equitably balanced committee,

Lindsey suffered no actual injury. The “risk” that her children

would not receive a high-quality education was too

“hypothetical” and was dependant on the actions of the States,

not the DOE. Id. at 26-29. Finally, the court also held that

incorporation of the NRA included incorporation of its bar on

judicial review of the establishment of the negotiated

rulemaking committee. Id. at 29-33.

II. Analysis

This Court reviews de novo a dismissal for lack of standing.

Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d

930, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2004). A dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is also reviewed de novo. Flynt v. Rumsfeld,

355 F.3d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In reviewing a ruling on a

motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all facts alleged

by the nonmoving party and must draw all inferences in favor of

the nonmoving party.

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A. The Judicial Review Bar

As noted above, DOE raises two jurisdictional arguments:

first, that Appellants lack Article III standing; and second, that

Congress deprived this Court of jurisdiction to review the

composition of the committee. Supra pages 3-4, 5-6. Because,

as we discuss below, we hold that Appellants lack Article III

standing, we do not consider the question, never before raised in

this Court, of whether judicial review is barred in this matter.

We “need not identify every ground for holding that a claim is

not justiciable.” Fourth Branch Assocs. (Mechanicville) v.

FERC, 253 F.3d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Indep.

Petroleum Ass’n of America v. Babbitt, 235 F.3d 588, 594 (D.C.

Cir. 2001)). “[W]e have no trouble dismissing a claim ‘based on

one jurisdictional bar rather than another.’” Id. (quoting

Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379,

1384 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). See also New Jersey Television Corp.

v. FCC, No. 03-1444, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2004).

Any statements by this Court on the question of the judicial

review bar would be “unnecessary dicta,” which “precedent and

prudence counsel us to avoid . . . .” Louisiana Envtl. Action

Network, 87 F.3d at 1385. 

B. Standing

This Court, like all Article III courts, is one of limited

jurisdiction; we cannot decide cases that we lack constitutional

authority to decide. Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest

Service, 165 F.3d 43, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We are empowered

to hear only “cases or controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

We ascertain whether or not the matter before us is a “case” or

“controversy” by looking to whether, inter alia, the litigants

have “standing.” Wyoming Outdoor Council, 165 F.3d at 48.

The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains

three elements”: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered injury in

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fact, an actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected,

concrete and particularized interest; (2) there must be a causal

connection between the alleged injury and the defendant’s

conduct at issue; and (3) it must be “likely,” not “speculative,”

that the court can redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Where plaintiffs allege

injury resulting from violation of a procedural right afforded to

them by statute and designed to protect their threatened concrete

interest, the courts relax–while not wholly eliminating–the

issues of imminence and redressability, but not the issues of

injury in fact or causation. See Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen,

94 F.3d 658, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Lujan,

504 U.S. at 572-73 & nn. 8-9). Taken together, the plaintiffs

have standing only if, inter alia, (1) the government violated

their procedural rights designed to protect their threatened

concrete interest, and (2) the violation resulted in injury to their

concrete, particularized interest. Plaintiffs fail to satisfy either

of the requirements at issue.

1. Violation of a procedural right designed to protect

plaintiffs’ interests

Appellants fail to show that a procedural right sufficient for

standing has been violated. Not all procedural-rights violations

are sufficient for standing; a plaintiff must show that “the

procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened

concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.”

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8 (emphases added). 

With respect to the organizational plaintiffs, the procedural

rights at issue are clearly insufficient for standing, as the

procedures at issue were not designed to protect “some

threatened concrete interest of” the organizations. The No Child

Left Behind Act required the Secretary to “select individuals to

participate in such process from among individuals or groups

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that provided advice and recommendations, including

representation from all geographic regions of the United States,

in such numbers as will provide an equitable balance between

representatives of parents and students and representatives of

educators and educational officials.” 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(3)(B).

Nowhere does the Act make mention of advocacy organizations’

interests. The only interests arguably enjoying implicit

protection here are those of parents, students, educators and

education officials; although the advocacy groups may be

“representatives” of parents and students, the interests to be

protected are those of the parents and students, not of the

organizations.

Even in the case of the individual plaintiff, Lindsey, it is not

at all clear that the Act’s procedures regarding the negotiated

rulemaking process were “designed to protect” the interests of

parents and students. The structure of § 6571 as a whole shows

that Congress manifestly did not endorse “protective” litigation

regarding the formation of the committee amidst the timelimited rulemaking process. The Act specifically mandated that

“[s]uch [rulemaking] process shall be conducted in a timely

manner to ensure that final regulations are issued by the

Secretary not later than 1 year after January 8, 2002[.]” 20

U.S.C. § 6571(b)(4)(A). And, as noted above, the Act created

a complex process for crafting federal and state regulations that

would affect parents’ and students’ interests, including the Act’s

provision for the selection of an “equitable balance” of

committee members. These provisions do not offer any promise

of purposeful protection of the concrete interests of students and

parents. Appellants cite the Conference Report for evidence that

“Congress sought to ‘ensu[re] that the views of both program

beneficiaries and program providers are fairly heard and

considered.’” Brief for Appellants at 9 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP.

107-334, at 809, reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1230, 1352).

This is not persuasive evidence of protective design. To the

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extent that the legislative history is relevant to the question

before us, we note that the language of the report does not

support Appellants’ position; if anything, it weighs against it:

“The Conferees do not intend this language to require strict

numerical equality or comparability among these

representatives. Rather, the Conferees intend the Secretary to

have flexibility in selecting the [committee members.]” H.R.

CONF. REP. 107-334 at 809.

With respect to the organizational plaintiffs, the NCLBA

clearly did not create procedural rights designed to protect their

concrete interests. With respect to Lindsey, the NCLBA did not

clearly create such a right; but as the next section of this

standing analysis makes clear, even if NCLBA did create such

a right, she has not suffered injury sufficient to establish

standing.

2. Injury to a concrete, particularized interest

Appellants present a variety of alleged “injuries” as a result

of the Secretary’s selection of committee members. Appellants

argue that the individual plaintiff, parent Rachelle Lindsey, has

suffered three injuries as a result of the Secretary’s selection of

committee members: First, she was deprived of her procedural

right to help shape the final rules. Brief for Appellants at 16.

Second, the final rules increased the “risk” that her children will

be denied the benefit of the best-possible education and those

rules were caused by the committee selection. Id. at 17. Third,

the final rules fail to require States to provide for public

participation in the creation of standards and measures under the

Act, and those final rules were caused by the committee

selection. Id.

Appellants also argue that the organizational plaintiffs have

suffered four injuries as a result of the Secretary’s selection of

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committee members: First, the Secretary’s apportionment of

committee seats among representatives of various interests

reduced their chances of serving on the committee. Id. at 16.

Second, the selection excluded parent and student advocacy

organizations from consideration. Id. Third, the final rules

forced them to address advocacy issues on an expensive Stateby-State basis. Id. at 17. Fourth, the final rules failed to require

States to provide for public participation. Id.

Taken together, Appellants allege four basic categories of

injuries:

(1) Injuries to Plaintiff Lindsey caused by the

final rules, following selection of the

committee members;

(2) Injuries to Plaintiff Lindsey caused by the

Secretary’s abridgment of her procedural

rights in the selection of committee members;

(3) Injuries to Plaintiff Organizations caused by

the final rules, following selection of the

committee members; and

(4) Injuries to Plaintiff Organizations caused by

the Secretary’s abridgment of their procedural

rights in the selection of committee members.

To organize Appellants’ alleged injuries in this fashion reveals

what Appellants’ muddled brief obfuscates: Appellants allege

two classes of injury under a Procedural Rights theory of

standing. Appellants allege injuries to Appellants’ procedural

rights per se, and they allege injuries to their particularized

interests caused by the final rules. We consider these classes of

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1

 Appellants do not argue that the organizational plaintiffs retain

“representational standing” to press claims on behalf of individual

members of the organization. Nonetheless, this Court notes in its own

jurisdictional inquiry that these organizational plaintiffs would not

satisfy the test for representational standing, because such plaintiffs

would need to show actual or imminent injury to their members

caused by the challenged action. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511

(1975). As we discuss below, Appellants fail to show any such

causation here.

injuries in turn.1

a. Injury to their procedural interests

Appellants first allege that they suffered injury, as a result

of the Secretary’s failure to abide by the procedures prescribed

by the Act, to their interest in the government’s protection of

their procedural rights. 

As this Court sitting en banc described at length in Florida

Audubon Society, a procedural-rights plaintiff must demonstrate

standing by “show[ing] not only that the defendant’s acts

omitted some procedural requirement, but also that it is

substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the

essential injury to the plaintiff’s own interest.” 94 F.3d at 664-

65. In other words, while we relax the imminence and

redressability requirements, the procedural-rights plaintiff must

still satisfy the general requirements of the constitutional

standards of particularized injury and causation. See id. at 664.

Although Appellants rely heavily on footnote 7 of Lujan in

arguing procedural standing in this case, even in that case the

Court required a showing that “concrete interests” had been

invaded. 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.

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Assuming arguendo that a procedural right designed to

protect a concrete interest of the Appellants has been violated

here, Appellants fail to demonstrate how they suffer actual

injury to a concrete, particularized interest, caused by the

challenged conduct. The chain of causation between the alleged

procedural violation and the concrete interest is speculative at

best. See infra pages 16-17. “Unadorned speculation will not

suffice to invoke the judicial power.” Physicians Ed. Network

v. Dep’t of H.E.W., 653 F.2d 621, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (district

court’s opinion expressly adopted en toto by Court) (quoting

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare RightsOrganization, 426 U.S. 26,

44 (1976)).

But even more importantly, Appellants appear to

misunderstand the difference between the “procedural right” and

the “concrete interest” in a procedural-rights case. See, e.g.,

Brief of Appellants at 23 (“The Department’s denial of this right

constitutes sufficient injury to support standing.”). The two

things are not one and the same. Appellants must show both (1)

that their procedural right has been violated, and (2) that the

violation of that right has resulted in an invasion of their

concrete and particularized interest. “[A] prospective plaintiff

must demonstrate that the defendant caused the particularized

injury, and not just the alleged procedural violation.” Fla.

Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 664 (emphasis added). In Lujan the

Supreme Court disclaimed Appellants’ conflation of concrete

interest and procedural right in unambiguous language:

If we understand this [argument] correctly, it means that the

Government’s violation of a certain . . . class of procedural

duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself,

without any showing that the procedural violation

endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his

interest in having the procedure observed). We cannot

agree.

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504 U.S. at 573 n.8. Appellants must allege injury beyond mere

procedural misstep per se to satisfy standing in a proceduralrights case, and they fail to do so here.

In sum, we hold that Appellants have failed to show that the

alleged procedural violation caused actual injury to Appellants’

concrete interests such that they satisfy Article III’s requirement

of standing. Fla. Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 664.

b. Injuries to other interests, caused by the final

rules

Appellants allege injury not only to their procedural

interest, but also to their interests in education, lobbying, and

other interests apart from procedural rights per se. Even

assuming arguendo that their purported interests do constitute

particularized, concrete interests sufficient to satisfy Lujan, see

504 U.S. at 560, Appellants fail to demonstrate the necessary

causal connection between the challenged agency action–here,

the promulgation of final rules–and the alleged injury.

To demonstrate standing, Appellants must show “a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained

of–the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged

action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the

independent action of some third party not before the court.’”

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42).

To show causation and redressability in their proceduralrights case, Appellants need not demonstrate that, but for the

procedural defect, the final outcome of the rulemaking process

would have been different, and that this Court’s ordering the

action to remedy the procedural defect will alter the final effect

on Appellants’ interests. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. In

short, this Court assumes the causal relationship between the

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2

 We note that where, as here, the purported cause of injury (i.e.,

promulgation of final rules) and the injury itself is separated by

intervening actors and events, the causation and redressability

inquiries may appear to merge.

In such cases, both prongs of standing analysis can be said to

focus on principles of causation: fair traceability turns on the

causal nexus between the agency action and the asserted

injury, while redressability centers on the causal connection

between the asserted injury and judicial relief. Despite these

similarities, however, each inquiry has its own emphasis.

Causation remains inherently historical; redressability

quintessentially predictive.

Freedom Republicans v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

procedural defect and the final agency action. Nonetheless,

Appellants must still demonstrate a causal relationship between

the final agency action and the alleged injuries.2

In the case of Lindsey, the agency action and the alleged

injury stand at opposite ends of a long chain: (1) DOE

promulgated final rules giving discretion to the States to

implement their own rules for the education of children in the

State; (2) the State of Illinois, in its discretion, implemented

rules that were permitted but not required by DOE; (3) those

rules increased the risk of improper evaluation of students and

schools; (4) Lindsey’s daughter’s school might be improperly

classified as a result (though it presently receives federal

funding under the NCLBA); (5) Lindsey’s daughter might

thereby be harmed by improper classification. 

Having outlined the alleged causal chain, we conclude that

the connection between the beginning and end of the purported

chain remains so attenuated that we cannot hold the alleged

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3We do not read Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 03-

1182, 2004 WL 2828047 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2004), to extend the

“enhanced risk” analysis. That case dealt with standing to challenge

a federal agency’s arguably ultra vires publications of regulations

purporting to authorize ex parte communications in violation of the

Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). While in a

sense a violation of rights protected by that statute could be called

procedural, in the final analysis, the violation supporting standing goes

to substantive rights created under the Act. Electric Power Supply

Association’s analysis of standing to assert those rights is not authority

for the general proposition of applicability of “enhanced risk” analysis

to procedural violations in the determination of standing.

injury to be “fairly traceable to” the final agency rules “and not

the result of the independent action” of the State of Illinois.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Where “the necessary elements of

causation and redressability . . . hinge on the independent

choices of the regulated third party,” i.e. the States, “it becomes

the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those

choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce

causation and permit redressability of injury.” Nat’l Wrestling

Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 938 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants fall far short of

carrying their burden. 

Moreover, the Court is not convinced that the alleged injury

to Lindsey is “concrete and particularized.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560. Appellants allege direct injury styled as “increased risk,”

in the form of giving the States the opportunity to injure

Appellants’ interests. This so-called “injury” is insufficient for

standing.

 

Outside of increased exposure to environmental harms,

hypothesized “increased risk” has never been deemed sufficient

“injury.”3 And even if “risk” were sufficient injury for standing

in the non-environmental context, Lindsey would have to show

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 17 of 31
18

that the challenged conduct has created a “demonstrably

increased risk” that “actually threatens the plaintiff’s particular

interests.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 667 (emphasis

added). Here, Lindsey has hypothesized that the final agency

rules have increased the risk to her interests, but she has offered

this Court no actual demonstration of increased risk.

Indeed, were all purely speculative “increased risks”

deemed injurious, the entire requirement of “actual or imminent

injury” would be rendered moot, because all hypothesized, nonimminent “injuries” could be dressed up as “increased risk of

future injury.”

 

With respect to the organizational plaintiffs, the causal

chain between the challenged rules and the alleged injury is not

so attenuated: The organizations allege that the Federal rules

force them to change their lobbying strategies, a more costly

form of lobbying. But while their causal chain may be more

traceable than Lindsey’s, it fails to bind the challenged conduct

to actual injury. This Court has not found standing when the

only “injury” arises from the effect of the regulations on the

organizations’ lobbying activities (as opposed to the effect on

non-lobbying activities): “[C]onflict between a defendant’s

conduct and an organization’s mission is alone insufficient to

establish Article III standing. Frustration of an organization’s

objectives is the type of abstract concern that does not impart

standing.” Nat’l Treas. Employees Union v. United States, 101

F.3d 1423, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

 

The case before us is easily distinguished from Havens

RealtyCorp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). There, the Court

held that an organization dedicated to promoting equal-access to

housing had standing to challenge defendants’ practice of

steering prospective tenants away, because defendants’ practice

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 18 of 31
19

4

 In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court recognized that to hold that

a lobbyist/advocacy group had standing to challenge government

policy with no injury other than injury to its advocacy would

eviscerate standing doctrine’s actual injury requirement: 

It is clear that an organization whose members are injured

may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial

review. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428

[1963]. But a mere “interest in a problem,” no matter how

longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the

organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by

itself to render the organization “adversely affected” or

“aggrieved” within the meaning of the APA. The Sierra Club

is a large and long-established organization, with a historic

commitment to the cause of protecting our Nation’s natural

heritage from man’s depredations. But if a “special interest”

in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to

commence this litigation, there would appear to be no

objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any other

bona fide “special interest” organization, however small or

short-lived. And if any group with a bona fide “special

interest” could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive

why any individual citizen with the same bona fide special

interest would not also be entitled to do so.

405 U.S. at 739-40.

“perceptibly impaired HOME’s ability to provide counseling

and referral services for low- and moderate-income

home-seekers . . . .” Id. at 379. Here, the only “service”

impaired is pure issue-advocacy–the very type of activity

distinguished by Havens. See id. at 379 (distinguishing Sierra

Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).4

In sum, Appellants fail to demonstrate standing arising from

the effect of the final rules, with respect to either the individual

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 19 of 31
20

or organizational plaintiffs.

III. Conclusion

Because we hold that Appellants lack standing to challenge

the Secretary’s selection of committee members, this Court and

the District Court lack jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ claims.

And because we have already recognized our lack of

jurisdiction, we will not consider whether the No Child Left

Behind Act incorporates the Negotiated Rulemaking Act’s § 570

bar on judicial review of committee formation. “Without

jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.

Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to

exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of

announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte

McCardle, 74 (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868), quoted in Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).

We affirm the District Court’s judgments of dismissal.

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 20 of 31
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment in

part: The No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLBA” or “Act”), Pub.

L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (relevant sections

codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (Supp. I 2001)), was enacted

to enhance the educational opportunities of all children and

ensure their ability to meet challenging academic standards. The

Act permits schools to exercise “greater decisionmaking

authority . . . in exchange for greater responsibility for student

performance,” 20 U.S.C. § 6301(7), as monitored through state

testing and accountability systems that comply with specific

standards set out in 20 U.S.C. § 6311. Students in schools that

consistently fail to meet target performance levels are entitled to

supplemental educational services and the option to transfer to

other public schools. Id. § 6316. 

The Act envisions parents as an integral part of achieving

high-quality results and provides for parental participation from

the inception of the implementing regulations through the

development of state plans regarding assessments and

accountability systems. See id. §§ 6571, 6311. To implement

the NCLBA, the Secretary of Education (“Secretary”) is

required to “establish a negotiated rulemaking process on, at a

minimum, standards and assessments,” id. § 6571(b)(3)(A), and

“select individuals to participate in such process . . . in such

numbers as will provide an equitable balance between

representatives of parents and students and representatives of

educators and education officials,” id. § 6571(b)(3)(B). 

Rachelle Lindsey is a parent of two children who attend a

school that has been identified as a “school in need of

improvement” under the NCLBA. She alleges that the

Department of Education (“Department”) failed to observe the

“equitable balance” requirement of § 1901 of the NCLBA, 20

U.S.C. § 6571, in selecting the members to participate in the

negotiated rulemaking process. In particular, she contends that

this Committee did not include an adequate number of

representatives of parents and students. She also contends that

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2

the implementing regulations, which originated with the

Committee, have placed at risk her children’s capacity to obtain

the full benefits of the Act.

Two questions are presented on this appeal. The first

question is whether any challenge to the composition of the

Committee is subject to judicial review. The second question is

whether any of the appellants in this case have standing to

pursue such a challenge. I believe that the District Court erred

in holding that judicial review of the Committee’s composition

is barred; however, on the record at hand, I find that appellants

lack standing to bring this case.

I. THE SECRETARY’S SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS FOR THE

NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING PROCESS PRESCRIBED BY THE

NCLBA IS CLEARLY SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Department asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction

over appellants’ claims, because judicial review is barred. In

advancing this contention, the Department argues that the

NCLBA incorporates § 570 of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act,

which provides in part: 

Any agency action relating to establishing, assisting, or

terminating a negotiated rulemaking committee under this

subchapter shall not be subject to judicial review. Nothing

in this section shall bar judicial review of a rule if such

judicial review is otherwise provided by law. 

5 U.S.C. § 570 (2000). The Department’s argument is entirely

without merit. The NCLBA does not incorporate § 570 of the

Negotiated Rulemaking Act. And, even if it did, § 570 does not

bar review of the present suit.

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 22 of 31
3

The NCLBA plainly does not incorporate the Negotiated

Rulemaking Act in its totality. Indeed, the NCLBA mandates a

negotiated rulemaking process, see 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(3),

while the Negotiated Rulemaking Act leaves the decision

whether to engage in such process to the discretion of the

agency, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 563, 565 (2000). The NCLBA also

prescribes particular steps for selecting participants in the

negotiated rulemaking process, see 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(3),

whereas the Negotiated Rulemaking Act has no such

prescriptions. The NCLBA only looks to the Negotiated

Rulemaking Act to guide the “process” of negotiated

rulemaking. This is apparent from the language and structure of

the relevant provisions of the two acts. 

The NCLBA directs the Secretary to establish a negotiated

rulemaking process, 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(3)(A), and to “select

individuals to participate in such process . . . in such numbers

as will provide an equitable balance between representatives of

parents and students and representatives of educators and

education officials,” 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(3)(B) (emphasis

added). The next paragraph of § 6571, titled “Process,” explains

that “[s]uch process – . . . shall not be subject to the Federal

Advisory Committee Act, but shall otherwise follow the

provisions of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.” 20

U.S.C. § 6571(b)(4)(B). Thus, § 6571 first prescribes that the

Secretary establish a negotiated rulemaking process and

provides instructions for the selection of persons to participate

in that process. It then directs that the process of negotiated

rulemaking shall follow the prescriptions of the Negotiated

Rulemaking Act, such as the consensus requirement contained

in 5 U.S.C. § 566 (2000). It is therefore clear that, under the

NCLBA, questions concerning the selection of the Committee

are completely distinct from how the Committee members

participate in the negotiated rulemaking process. Judicial

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 23 of 31
4

review is foreclosed only with respect to the process of

negotiated rulemaking. 

Furthermore, nothing in the language, structure, or

legislative history of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act purports to

bar judicial review of procedural requirements imposed by other

statutes. In fact, it expressly states the opposite. First, § 570 of

the Negotiated Rulemaking Act is explicit that “[a]ny agency

action relating to establishing . . . a negotiated rulemaking

committee under this subchapter shall not be subject to judicial

review.” 5 U.S.C. § 570 (emphasis added). The NCLBA

Committee is not established “under [the] subchapter” in which

the Negotiated Rulemaking Act is located. Indeed, establishing

a negotiated rulemaking committee “under [that] subchapter” is

a discretionary act, 5 U.S.C. § 565, which follows consideration

of multiple factors enumerated at 5 U.S.C. § 563(a). In contrast,

establishing the Committee under the NCLBA is mandatory, and

must follow specific steps contained in 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(3).

Clearly, then, the Committee established under 20 U.S.C. §

6571(b)(3) is not a committee established under the Negotiated

Rulemaking Act.

Second, where, as here, review of an alleged procedural

violation in the context of final rule review is permitted by the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the savings clause of §

570 explicitly permits such review: “Nothing in this section

shall bar judicial review of a rule if such judicial review is

otherwise provided by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 570. The legislative

history of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act is explicit that the

savings clause of § 570 was intended to preserve rights available

under the APA. The Senate Report states:

Persons wishing to challenge a rule derived from the work

of a negotiated rulemaking committee would retain all

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 24 of 31
5

rights they presently possess under the APA to obtain

judicial review of that rule. 

[The bill] recognizes and maintains the long tradition

in federal administrative law which authorizes judicial

review of agency rules at the time those rules are

promulgated. The bill merely precludes judicial

intervention in the earlier stages of the regulatory process,

when a negotiated rulemaking is underway. 

S. REP. NO. 101-97, at 28 (1989). Contrary to the District

Court’s analysis, the House Report is also consistent with this

interpretation. It explains that “[a]gency decisions to establish

a negotiated rulemaking committee or regarding the makeup of

this [sic] membership are not subject to judicial review.” H.R.

REP.NO.101-461, at 15 (1990),reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

6697, 6706. It makes perfect sense that discretionary decisions

whether to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee under

the Negotiated Rulemaking Act are nonreviewable. This says

nothing about the reviewability of binding directives to establish

such committees under other statutes.

The District Court’s misunderstanding of the relationship

between the NCLBA and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act stems

in part from its peculiar phrasing of the question presented. The

court considered whether § 570’s bar on judicial review lapses

when final rules are promulgated, and identified tension between

the plain language of § 570 and a temporal limitation on the

prohibition of judicial review; it also expressed concern that

reading the prohibition contained in the first sentence of § 570

as lapsing when final rules are promulgated renders § 570

superfluous because the APA already bars review prior to final

agency action. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. United States Dep’t

of Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2004). The

properly framed question, however, is whether the savings

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 25 of 31
6

clause of § 570 permits review under the APA, which grants

jurisdiction to review a final agency action, and allows for

review of procedural violations at that time. See 5 U.S.C. §§

704, 706(2)(D). 

Approaching the issue in this way alleviates the District

Court’s concerns. First, the plain language of the savings clause

is consistent with permitting review under the APA. Second,

triggering the savings clause does not render the first part of §

570 superfluous. Indeed, intermediate agency action pursuant

to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act remains unreviewable under

the APA because of the first part of § 570, which provides a

clear statement barring judicial review of alleged violations of

the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, thereby overcoming the APA’s

presumption of reviewability. There also is no basis for

attacking regulations produced under the Negotiated

Rulemaking Act unless another statute expressly creates such a

basis. 

In sum, nothing in § 570 of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act

proscribes review of procedures mandated by the NCLBA for

establishing the Committee. Even if § 570 were improbably

construed to have such meaning, it is evident from the language

and structure of § 1901 of the NCLBA that the Act incorporates

provisions of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act only to the extent

that those provisions determine the process of an already

established Committee. Such a construction clearly prevents §

570 from determining reviewability in this case.

II. APPELLANTS HAVE NO STANDING

Although there is no statutory bar to judicial review of this

case, we nonetheless lack jurisdiction over this matter because

appellants have no standing.

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7

In order to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) she has suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) which

is fairly traceable to the defendant’s purported unlawful conduct,

and is not the result of an independent action of a third party not

before the court, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable

decision of the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992). In Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme

Court fortified standing doctrine. It provided for precise notions

of injury-in-fact grounded in concrete and imminent harm and

of redressability rooted in an uninterrupted causal chain. See id.

at 562-71. It is especially significant, therefore, that Defenders

of Wildlife simultaneously embraced an expansive view of

standing in the context of procedural rights: “[S]o long as the

procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened

concrete interest of [the plaintiff’s],” id. at 573 n.8, “[t]he person

who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete

interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal

standards for redressability and immediacy,” id. at 572 n.7. In

other words, “‘procedural rights’ are special.” Id. This is

because they are prophylactic in nature. Such requirements

reflect Congress’s reasonable judgment that a government

decision will better protect particular interests with the specified

procedures in place. 

Consistent with the unique role of procedural rights in

contemporary statutory schemes, a procedural rights plaintiff

must establish that (1) the procedural requirement was designed

to guard her concrete interests; and (2) the government conduct,

performed in the absence of that procedure, will cause a distinct

risk to her particularized interests. 

In applying these principles to the instant case, I concur in

the judgment that the organizational plaintiffs lack standing to

pursue their claims. The majority opinion needs no

amplification on this point.

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 27 of 31
8

The question whether Lindsey has standing to seek judicial

enforcement of her alleged procedural right to a properly

constituted Committee raises a much harder issue. There is not

the slightest doubt in the record that this procedural requirement

was intended to protect parents’ voices on the Committee; and

Lindsey contends that the disputed regulations, which allegedly

originated in the absence of adequate parental representation,

have placed at risk her interest in ensuring that her children are

properly assessed so as to receive the full benefits of the

NCLBA. 

The District Court concluded that Lindsey failed to

establish an injury-in-fact because the language of § 1901 does

not “expressly bestow upon any person an individual right to

enforce his or her construction of an ‘equitably balanced’

negotiated rulemaking committee.” Ctr. for Law & Educ., 315

F. Supp. 2d at 27. This holding is clearly wrong. Because

Lindsey brings this suit under the APA, not the NCLBA, the

standing inquiry does not turn on rights enforceable

independently from the APA, but rather on an independent

source of procedural protection – here, § 1901 of the NCLBA –

and a risk to concrete interests protected by the procedural

requirement. 

I also disagree with the statement in the majority opinion

suggesting that, in procedural rights cases, “[o]utside of

increased exposure to environmental harms, hypothesized

‘increased risk’ has never been deemed sufficient ‘injury’” to

satisfy standing requirements. In my view, this statement is not

consistent with the applicable case law. Most recently, in

Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 03-1182, 2004 WL

2828047 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2004), we held that the Electric

Power Supply Association (“EPSA”) had standing “to enforce

procedural requirements designed to protect [its] concrete

interest in the outcome of hearings to which [it was] a party.”

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 28 of 31
9

Id. at *5. Specifically, EPSA had standing to challenge FERC’s

new exemptions regarding ex parte communications even

though there was no guarantee that impermissible ex parte

contacts would in fact materialize: 

In complaining that the market monitor exemption violates

the Sunshine Act, EPSA is seeking to enforce procedural

requirements designed to protect EPSA’s concrete interest

in the outcome of hearings to which EPSA is a party. That

being the case, EPSA’s standing is not defeated by the fact

that it cannot show, with any certainty, that its or its

members’ financial interests will be damaged by the

operation of the [rule limiting the proscription against ex

parte communications in agency hearings]. 

Id. The holding of Electric Power follows the well-established

law of this circuit. See id. at *6.

As noted above, there is no doubt that a “person who has

been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests

can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for

redressability and immediacy.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

at 572 n.7. However, “in cases involving alleged procedural

errors, the plaintiff must show that the government act

performed without the procedure in question will cause a

distinct risk to a particularized interest of the plaintiff.” Wyo.

Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 51

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Lindsey has failed to do this. The injury that she alleges is so

attenuated that she fails to demonstrate that “the procedural

violation endangers a concrete interest . . . (apart from [her]

interest in having the procedure observed).” Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8. 

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 29 of 31
10

This court looks to a two-part nexus to establish the

requisite relationship between the alleged procedural

irregularity, the substantive government decision, and the

concrete interests of the procedural rights plaintiff. Consistent

with the prophylactic nature of procedural rights, a litigant

seeking to enforce such rights must, first, show that the omitted

procedure is linked to a substantive government decision or act,

see City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir.

2003) (per curiam), and, second, “that the government act

performed without the procedure in question will cause a

distinct risk to [her] paricularized interest,” Wyo. Outdoor

Council, 165 F.3d at 51 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Procedural requirements serve their prophylactic

function irrespective of whether the ultimate Government

decision is consistent with views that emerge through the

requisite process. Thus, under the first part of the causal nexus

requirement, “[a] plaintiff who alleges a deprivation of a

procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to prove

that if he had received the procedure the substantive result

would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that

the procedural step was connected to the substantive result.”

Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94-95

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Lindsey’s problem lies not with this first

prong, but the second. She has failed to establish any causal

relationship between the substantive Government decision that

she desires and a concrete, personal interest. 

Lindsey is a parent of two children who attend John Foster

Dulles Elementary School, a public school in Chicago that has

been identified as a “school in need of improvement” under the

NCLBA. She contends that the Department violated her

procedural right to equitable representation on the Committee,

and that the Department’s implementing regulations, which

originated in the allegedly improperly constituted Committee,

increase the risk that her children will be incorrectly assessed

USCA Case #04-5150 Document #871677 Filed: 01/21/2005 Page 30 of 31
11

and therefore denied the full benefits of the NCLBA. See Ctr.

for Law & Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 26, 29 (citing Pls.’ Opp’n).

Lindsey, however, does not contend that the disputed regulations

violate the NCLBA. Indeed, at oral argument, Lindsey’s

counsel conceded that the regulations do not violate the statute.

See Recording of Oral Argument at 7:30-:40. Lindsey’s claim,

then, is that the regulations might have been qualitatively better

if the Committee had been properly constituted and this might

have resulted in the state adopting qualitatively better

educational assessment programs which, in turn, might have

benefitted her children. 

Lindsey’s argument cannot succeed. First, it is far from

clear that she has demonstrated a cognizable concrete interest

sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. Second, even assuming

that her interest in her children’s education has some content

that makes it sufficiently concrete to be cognizable, she has

failed to demonstrate that there is any causal relationship

between the disputed regulations and her asserted interest. In

short, Lindsey has failed to show that the alleged procedural

violation endangers a concrete interest apart from her interest in

having the procedure observed. I therefore agree with the

majority that she lacks standing.

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