Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00114/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00114-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darlene Laws, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dennis Harkins, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-0114-PHX-EHC (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Darlene Laws has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which she challenges the judgment of conviction and

sentence imposed against her in the Maricopa County Superior Court on March 20, 2003.

Doc. #1.

BACKGROUND

 Following a jury trial in February 2003, Petitioner was found guilty of three felony

counts of obtaining a credit card by fraudulent means. Doc. #9, Exh. D. On March 20, 2003,

the court entered judgments of guilt for each of the three offenses and sentenced Petitioner

to concurrent terms of five years in prison on each count. Id. The court further ordered the

overall sentence to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in an unrelated case. Id.

On direct appeal, Petitioner's counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he stated that after searching the record he could

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find no issues to raise. Doc. #9, Exh. E. Counsel also filed a motion for leave to allow

Petitioner to file a pro per supplemental brief. Id. On September 22, 2003, Petitioner filed

a "Supplemental Brief." Doc. #9, Exh. F. On January 13, 2004, the Arizona Court of

Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision rejecting Petitioner's claims and affirming her

convictions and sentence. Doc. #9, Exh. G. Petitioner did not file a motion for

reconsideration or a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. Doc. #9, Exh. H.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the state trial court on March 1,

2004. Doc. #9, Exh. I. The court then appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in the postconviction proceedings. Doc. #9, Exh. J, K. Through counsel, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief on July 20, 2004. Doc. #9, Exh. L. The trial court denied the petition

on October 20, 2004. Doc. #9, Exh. O. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals on November 16, 2004, which was denied on August 16, 2005. Doc. #9,

Exh. P, R. Petitioner claims that she sought review in the state supreme court. Doc. #1 at

2. However, Respondents provide a copy of the Court of Appeals docket which shows that

no petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court was filed. Doc. #9, Exh. T.

Respondents also attach to their answer a copy of a "Petition for Review" to the United States

Supreme Court prepared by Petitioner, but no record has been provided showing whether it

was filed or if a decision was issued. Doc. #9, Exh. S. 

On January 9, 2006, Petitioner filed her habeas petition in this court. Petitioner

alleges eight grounds for relief: (1) the conviction and sentence were unconstitutional

because they were based on racial discrimination; (2) the police unlawfully searched her car

and took money from her purse which was never returned; (3) Petitioner's arrest was

unlawful because the police knew nothing about the status of the credit cards at the time of

the arrest; (4) the prosecution introduced statements Petitioner made to police in violation

of her Miranda rights; (5) Petitioner received an unfair trial because the trial judge was

biased; (6) Petitioner's right to due process was violated when police arrested and searched

her before they contacted the victim to determine if the credit cards were stolen; (7)

Petitioner's attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the

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unlawful search of her car, object to the Miranda violation, and explain the possibility of a

consecutive sentence; and (8) the court and the prosecution abused its authority by failing to

apply Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), to this case, failing to admit evidence of

the unlawfully seized money, punishing Petitioner with a harsher sentence for exercising her

right to trial, and failing to produce all the relevant evidence at trial. Respondents filed an

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 13, 2006. Doc. #9. Petitioner filed

a Reply to Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 20, 2006. Doc. #10.

This case involved the Petitioner trying to buy merchandise from a J.C. Penney's store

using someone else's credit card. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the

case in its Memorandum Decision:

The owner of the credit card, Amy, testified she had discovered her

wallet was missing. She called her credit card companies and found that

several charges had been made on her cards without her knowledge or consent.

The next day, she received a call from a police officer telling her to come to

the Arizona Mills Mall where her wallet had been found.

David, a loss prevention officer at J.C. Penney Co. ("Penney's"),

testified that while he was watching a store surveillance camera he saw two

gentlemen in the shoe department quickly putting many pairs of shoes into a

cart without trying them on. Laws joined the men and the three of them

continued to put clothes and other items from throughout the store into the

cart. David became suspicious of this activity and called the police. David

had videotaped his surveillance and excerpts of the video were played for the

jury.

At the checkout line, Laws and her companions presented the Penney's

cashier with Amy's credit card. Laws signed the receipt for the merchandise,

but her signature did not match the one on the credit card. When the cashier

asked for identification, Laws told him she would get it from her car and "be

right back." She then left the store.

Officer Quill of the Phoenix Police Department testified that he stopped

Laws in the Penney's parking lot. Laws had a wallet in her hand, which he

asked her to drop. The wallet and its contents belonged to Amy. Officer

Mowery of the Phoenix Police Department interviewed Laws once she was

taken into custody and she told him she obtained the credit cards from "a

friend who got [them] from a . . . girl." Doc. #9, Exh. G.

DISCUSSION

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Respondents contend in their answer that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on her

claims by failing to exhaust state court remedies. They first argue that Petitioner's failure to

seek review of her direct appeal and state post-conviction petition in the Arizona Supreme

Court constitutes a failure to exhaust state court remedies. Alternatively, Respondents argue

that with the exception of one ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner failed to

properly present her claims in the state court. With respect to the ineffective assistance claim

that was exhausted, Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to show deficient

performance or prejudice. 

A. Procedural Default 

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

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88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). The "mere mention of the federal Constitution as a whole,

without specifying an applicable provision, or an underlying federal legal theory, does not

suffice to exhaust the federal legal claim. Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th

Cir. 2005).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

A procedural default may also occur when a petitioner raises a federal claim in state

court but the state court declines to address the claim because the petitioner failed to meet

a state procedural requirement. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. In such cases, federal habeas

review is precluded if the state court opinion contains a plain statement clearly relying on a

state procedural bar that presents an independent and adequate basis for the court's decision.

See Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. Moreover, even if after rejecting a federal claim on procedural

grounds, the state court goes on to discuss the merits, the procedural bar is not eliminated.

See id. at 264 n.10; Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998). As with

defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, a federal court may still review the merits of

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a defaulted claim based on a state procedural bar if the petitioner can establish cause and

prejudice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

1. Failure to File Petition for Review in Arizona Supreme Court

Respondents contend that Petitioner was required to seek review of the denial of her

direct appeal and petition for post-conviction relief in the Arizona Supreme Court.

Respondents argue at length that Swoopes, supra, was wrongly decided by the Ninth Circuit.

This court has repeatedly rejected Respondents' arguments regarding the viability of

Swoopes and will do so again. Respondents' argument that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and

conclusion in Swoopes were flawed should be made to the Ninth Circuit. This court has no

authority to overturn or refuse to follow a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.

Accordingly, the court finds Respondents' first argument regarding Petitioner's failure to seek

review in the Arizona Supreme Court to be without merit.

2. Failure to Properly Present to the State Court

Respondents alternatively argue that all but one of Petitioner's claims are procedurally

defaulted because Petitioner failed to properly present them in the state court, thus depriving

the state court of the opportunity to address them. 

a. Discrimination

Petitioner's claim in ground one, that her conviction and sentence were

unconstitutional because they were the result of racial discrimination, was not presented to

the state court as a federal claim. A review of Petitioner's supplemental brief on direct appeal

shows that Petitioner failed to identify a federal legal theory or otherwise indicate that the

claim was based on federal law. Doc. #9, Exh. F. Petitioner simply alleged that the police

targeted her and her companions while they were shopping in the store because they were

black. Id. She failed to allege a federal constitutional violation and failed to cite a specific

provision in the Constitution. Id. Additionally, Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief

contains only a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and does not allege a discrimination

claim. Doc. #9, Exh. L. 

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1

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to her.

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By failing to fairly present her first claim in the state court, Petitioner has failed to

exhaust her state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if she

returned to the state court.1

 As a result, this claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has

neither argued nor otherwise shown cause for the default and actual prejudice, or a

miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claim in ground one

be denied. 

b. Unlawful Search

Petitioner's claim in ground two, that the police unlawfully searched her car and seized

her purse, was also not properly presented in the state court. In her supplemental brief on

direct appeal, Petitioner alleged that the police searched her car without her permission or

a warrant and took her purse which contained $130.00. Doc. #9, Exh. F. Petitioner did not

allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution or any other federal law. Id.

Moreover, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined that Petitioner had waived any unlawful

search claim in her direct appeal because she failed to raise the claim at trial. Doc. #9, Exh.

G at 6-7. In addition, Petitioner's state petition for post-conviction relief contained no claim

related to the unlawful search of her car. Doc. #9, Exh. L. 

For these reasons, Petitioner has failed to fairly present her claim in ground two to the

state court. Consequently, Petitioner has failed to exhaust her state court remedies.

Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if she returned to the state court. As

a result, this claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has neither argued nor otherwise

shown cause for the default and actual prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly,

the court will recommend that the claim in ground two be denied.

c. Unlawful Arrest

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Petitioner's third claim, that the police unlawfully arrested her, was not presented in

the state court as a federal claim. In her supplemental brief on direct appeal, Petitioner

argued that the police arrested her before knowing whether the wallet and credit cards were

stolen or missing. Doc. #9, Exh. F. Petitioner failed to allege a violation of the Fourth

Amendment or any other federal law. Id. In her petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner

raised no unlawful arrest claim.

Petitioner has failed to fairly present her unlawful arrest claim in ground three to the

state court, and therefore has failed to exhaust her state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner

would no longer have a remedy if she returned to the state court. As a result, this claim is

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has neither argued nor otherwise shown cause for the

default and actual prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court will

recommend that the claim in ground three be denied.

d. Miranda Violation

Petitioner contends in ground four that the prosecution used statements she made to

the police against her even though the police failed to read her Miranda rights. Petitioner

properly raised this federal claim in the state court in her supplemental brief on direct appeal.

However, the state court declined to address the claim because Petitioner failed to meet a

state procedural requirement. The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that Petitioner

waived the Miranda claim because she failed to raise it at trial. Doc. #9, Exh. G at 6-7.

The Court of Appeals opinion contains a plain statement clearly relying on a state

procedural bar that presents an independent and adequate basis for the court's decision. As

a result, the claim is procedurally defaulted and federal habeas review is precluded.

Petitioner has failed to show cause for the default and actual prejudice, or a miscarriage of

justice. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claim be denied.

e. Fair Trial

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Petitioner alleges in ground five that she was denied her right to a fair trial because

the judge "already had an agenda in mind" and because Petitioner was not allowed to testify

about the unlawful search and the money that was seized. Petitioner failed to allege in her

supplemental brief on direct appeal that the trial judge was biased or that she was not allowed

to testify about the money that was seized during the alleged unlawful search. Doc. #9, Exh.

F. Nor were these claims raised in Petitioner's state petition for post-conviction relief. Doc.

#9, Exh. L. 

Petitioner's only allegation in her supplemental brief on direct appeal regarding a fair

trial is that "the courts abused their authority by not following the rules and procedure for a

fair trial." Doc. #9, Exh. F. To the extent that can be construed to allege a general claim of

an unfair trial, Petitioner failed to identify a federal constitutional provision or otherwise

describe the federal legal theory on which the claim is based.

Having failed to fairly present her claims in ground five to the state court, Petitioner

has failed to exhaust her state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have

a remedy if she returned to the state court. As a result, the claims are procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has neither argued nor otherwise shown cause for the default and actual prejudice,

or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claims in ground

five be denied.

f. Due Process

In ground six of her petition, Petitioner alleges a claim nearly identical to that alleged

in ground three. Petitioner contends that she was arrested and searched before police had

contacted the victim to determine if the wallet and credit cards were stolen or missing. In

ground six, however, Petitioner alleges that arresting her under these circumstances violated

her constitutional right to due process.

Petitioner failed to present this claim to the state court. Petitioner stated in her

supplemental brief on direct appeal that the police arrested her before knowing if the wallet

was even stolen or missing. Doc. #9, Exh. F. However, Petitioner failed to allege a violation

of the Due Process Clause and therefore the state court was not given the opportunity to

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address it as a federal claim. Petitioner also did not raise a due process claim in her state

petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. #9, Exh. L. 

Having failed to fairly present her claim in ground six to the state court, Petitioner has

failed to exhaust her state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a

remedy if she returned to the state court. As a result, the claim is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has neither argued nor otherwise shown cause for the default and actual prejudice,

or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claim in ground

six be denied.

g. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges in ground seven that her attorney provided ineffective assistance of

counsel by failing to object to the unlawful search of her car, object to the Miranda violation,

and explain the possibility of a consecutive sentence. In her supplemental brief on direct

appeal, Petitioner made a general claim of ineffective assistance but failed to specify what

conduct fell below the standard for ineffective assistance. Doc. #9, Exh. F. The Arizona

Court of Appeals explained in its Memorandum Decision that it would not consider

ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal and that they must first be presented

to the trial court in a petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. #9, Exh. G at 4. Petitioner then

filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which she raised only one ineffective assistance

of counsel claim: that her lawyer failed to challenge the alleged violation of her Miranda

rights. Doc. #9, Exh. L. After the trial court denied the petition, Petitioner raised the same

claim in her petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. #9, Exh. P at 2.

Because this claim was properly exhausted in the state court, the court will address it on the

merits below.

 Petitioner's other ineffective assistance claims, however, were not fairly presented

in the state court. Petitioner's claims that her lawyer failed to object to the unlawful search

of her car and failed to explain the possibility of a consecutive sentence were not included

in the petition for post-conviction relief, and therefore have not been exhausted. See

Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (a petitioner who presented any

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ineffective assistance claim in the state court cannot later add unrelated ineffective assistance

claims on habeas review that were not presented in the state court). Petitioner would no

longer have a remedy if she returned to the state court to raise these additional ineffective

assistance claims. As a result, the claims are procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has neither

argued nor otherwise shown cause for the default and actual prejudice, or a miscarriage of

justice. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the unexhausted ineffective assistance

of counsel claims in ground seven be denied.

h. Abuse of Authority 

Petitioner alleges in ground eight the court and the prosecution abused its authority

by failing to admit evidence of the unlawfully seized money, punishing Petitioner with a

harsher sentence for exercising her right to trial, and failing to produce all the relevant

evidence at trial. Petitioner failed to fairly present these claims in the state court. In her

supplemental brief on direct appeal, none of Petitioner's "abuse of authority" claims involve

the admission of evidence or an unduly harsh sentence. Doc. #9, Exh. F. Moreover,

Petitioner's brief fails to identify any federal constitutional provision or federal legal theory

on which her abuse of authority claims are based. Id. In her petition for post-conviction

relief, Petitioner raised no abuse of authority claims.

Having failed to fairly present these claims to the state court, Petitioner has failed to

exhaust her state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if she

returned to the state court. As a result, the claims are procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has

neither argued nor otherwise shown cause for the default and actual prejudice, or a

miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court will recommend that these claims in ground

eight be denied. 

Also in ground eight, Petitioner claims that her sentence violates Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). However, in Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th

Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that Blakely does not apply retroactively to convictions that

were already final when it was decided. 

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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Here, the Order and Mandate was issued at the conclusion of direct review, on

February 27, 2004. Doc. #9, Exh. H. Thus, Petitioner's conviction was final before Blakely

was decided on June 24, 2004. Because Blakely does not apply to convictions that were final

before it was decided, it does not apply here. Accordingly, the court will recommend that

Petitioner's Blakely claim in ground eight be denied.

B. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA2

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

"When applying these standards, the federal court should review the 'last reasoned decision'

by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,"

or (2) "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent." Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an

'unreasonable application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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As stated above, Petitioner claims in ground seven that her attorney provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the use of Petitioner's statements

obtained in violation of Miranda. Respondents argue that the only statement obtained and

used by the state was consistent with Petitioner's own testimony at trial, and therefore her

lawyer had no reason to object to the use of the statement.

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.

One of the officers testified at trial that he asked Petitioner to stop and drop the wallet

she was holding when she left the store. Doc. #9, Exh. B at 127. He then placed Petitioner

under arrest. Id. at 129. The officer asked Petitioner her name and date of birth which she

told him. Id. at 134. The only other question this officer asked her was whether she had any

identification for the wallet and she said no. Id. at 135. 

A second officer testified that he spoke with Petitioner at the police substation. Doc.

#9, Exh. B at 139. He asked her how she obtained the credit cards and she responded that

she got them from a friend who got them from a white girl. Id. at 140. No other statements

made by Petitioner to the police were presented at trial. There was no evidence presented

to show that either officer informed Petitioner of her Miranda rights. 

In its order denying the petition for post-conviction relief, the state trial court directly

addressed Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim: 

Even if the Court assumes no tactical reason justified trial counsel's failure to

attempt to suppress the statements made by Laws to the police officers, it is

hard to see how Laws was prejudiced by the testimony in question given she

testified herself about the same issues. In addition, the other evidence of guilt

was overwhelming. Nothing more than the petition's conclusory assertion

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supports her claim of prejudice. That is not enough. The Court finds no

contested issue of law or fact that would entitle Laws to relief.

Doc. #9, Exh. O at 2. The Arizona Court of Appeals then denied Petitioner's request for

review. Doc. #9, Exh. R. 

 The court finds that the state trial court's decision regarding Petitioner's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law or based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner failed to establish a key element of an

ineffective assistance claim and therefore the state court properly rejected the claim.

Moreover, like the petition in state court, Petitioner's habeas petition fails to establish how

she was prejudiced by her attorney's failure to try to suppress her statements. For these

reasons, the court will recommend that Petitioner's remaining ineffective assistance of

counsel claim in ground seven be denied.

C. Conclusion

Having determined that all but one of Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted

and that the remaining one should be denied on the merits, the court will recommend that the

petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 5th day of December, 2006.

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