Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02436/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02436-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANTON REID, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-02436 PHX JWS (MEA)

)

PHILLIP CRAWFORD, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 ) 

Respondent. )

_______________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK:

Mr. Anton Reid(“Petitioner”), who is detained in the

custody of the Department of Homeland Security at the Eloy

Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October

13, 2006. Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Response”) (Docket No. 6) on

December 6, 2006. Additionally, on January 8, 2007, Petitioner

filed a “Response Reconsideration for Writ of Habeas Corpus”

(“Reply”) (Docket No. 9).

I. Procedural History

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Jamaica. See

Response, Exh. 1. Petitioner was admitted to the United States

as an immigrant on or about November 23, 1990, as a minor child

with his family. See id., Exh. 2. In 2003, Petitioner was

convicted by the State of California of committing lewd and

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1 The charges were predicated on one act of consensual sex with

a 13-year-old-girl when Petitioner was 22 years of age. Response,

Exh. 1. The girl initially mis-represented her age to Petitioner, who

also mis-represented his age to the girl. Id., Exh. 1. Petitioner

was later, prior to the act involved, informed of the girl’s true age

by the girl’s parents. Id., Exh. 1. Petitioner had no prior adult

or juvenile criminal record. Id., Exh. 1.

2 Previous decisions of this Court indicate Petitioner was

sentenced to one year in prison and five years of supervised release.

Response, Exh. 10 (order transferring Arizona District Court docket

number 05-1191 pursuant to the REAL ID Act). Petitioner, who is pro

se, believes he is eligible for relief from removal based on the

length of the prison sentence imposed by the State of California. See

Petition. However, the matter before the court, i.e., the length of

Petitioner’s criminal sentence is not relevant to Petitioner’s claims

for relief from his continued immigration detention. Response, Exh.

1. As noted by the Immigration Judge during Petitioner’s removal

proceedings, “the Government didn’t list” the sentence imposed by the

State of California in the record because the nature of the crime of

conviction, rather than the length of the sentence imposed, provided

the basis for finding Petitioner removable pursuant to federal

immigration statutes. Id., Exh. 1.

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lascivious acts with a child under 14. Id., Exh. 2.1 Petitioner

asserts he was sentenced to a term of one year, “but was given

time served and release[d] on July 18, 2003.” Reply at 1-2.2

Petitioner contends he came to the attention of the

Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) when he

applied for a replacement of his identification as a lawful

permanent resident, after he lost his wallet. Id. at 2.

Petitioner was taken into federal custody on June 8, 2004. See

Response, Exh. 13.

 On or about June 7, 2004, the Department of Homeland

Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner by

serving Petitioner with a Notice to Appear. Id., Exh. 3. The

Notice to Appear charged Petitioner with being removable

pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”), i.e., that Petitioner was an immigrant

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3 At the July 19, 2004, hearing, the Immigration Judge explained

to Petitioner that some non-permanent residents (illegal aliens) who

had been in the United States for a period of ten years and who had

not been convicted of an aggravated felony are eligible for

cancellation of an order of removal predicated on their unlawful

status in the United States. Response, Exh. 1. The IJ further

explained that some lawful permanent residents who had been convicted

of a crime not classified as an aggravated felony are eligible for a

cancellation of an order of removal. Id., Exh. 1. The IJ explained

to Petitioner why Petitioner did not fall under either of these two

categories of individuals eligible for cancellation of removal. Id., Exh. 1.

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who had been convicted of an aggravated felony as that term is

defined by federal immigration statutes, i.e., sexual abuse of

a minor. Id., Exh. 3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2005 &

Supp. 2006) (defining the term “aggravated felony” to include

the crime “sexual abuse of a minor”).

Petitioner appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

and asked for a postponement of his proceedings in order to

obtain counsel. Response, Exh. 1. Petitioner was granted a

postponement, but Petitioner did not obtain counsel. Id., Exh.

1. Another hearing was held before the IJ on July 19, 2004, at

which hearing Petitioner voluntarily proceeded pro se. Id.,

Exh. 1. Petitioner asserted he was eligible for cancellation of

any order of removal because he had been lawfully in the United

States for a period of ten years and he had not been sentenced

to a term of imprisonment exceeding one year pursuant to his

criminal conviction. Id., Exh. 1.3

Petitioner admitted the factual allegation charged in

the Notice to Appear, i.e., his conviction for sexual abuse of

a minor. Id., Exh. 1. Accordingly, the IJ found Petitioner

removable from the United States. Id., Exh. 1. Petitioner

designated Jamaica as his homeland and averred to the IJ he had

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4 The Court notes a document regarding entry of Petitioner’s

guilty plea and ordering preparation of a presentence report summarily

(a checkmark in a box) indicates Petitioner was informed of potential

consequences of his guilty plea on his immigration status at the time

the state trial court accepted his guilty plea. Response, Exh. 1.

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no fear of returning to Jamaica. Id., Exh. 1. The IJ

determined Petitioner was not eligible for relief from removal

because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony and

ordered Petitioner be removed from the United States to Jamaica.

Id., Exh. 1.

Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision to the Bureau of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), seeking a waiver of removability

and cancellation of the order of removal. Id., Exh. 5.

Petitioner asserted, inter alia, that he had not been informed

of the consequences of his guilty plea on his immigration status

prior to entering his plea in the State of California

prosecution. Id., Exh. 5.4 The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s

decision and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on November 5, 2004.

Id., Exh. 6. Petitioner sought review of the order of removal

by the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id., Exh.

7. The Ninth Circuit ordered a stay of the order of removal

pending the outcome of the proceeding. See Reid v. Ashcroft,

No. 04-72699 (available via PACER). The Ninth Circuit declined

substantive review of the order of removal in a decision issued

April 12, 2005. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’

mandate dismissing the appeal, which mandate also resulted in

removing the stay of the execution of the order of removal, was

issued May 4, 2005. Id.; Response, Exh. 8.

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5 The relevant section of the REAL ID Act, Public Law No. 109-13

§ 105(b), enacted May 11, 2005, states:

EXCLUSIVE MEANS OF REVIEW.--Notwithstanding any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including

section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other

habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such

title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate

court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be

the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an

order of removal entered or issued under any provision of

this Act, except as provided in subsection (e). For

purposes of this Act, in every provision that limits or

eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to review, the

terms ‘judicial review’ and ‘jurisdiction to review’

include habeas corpus review pursuant to section 2241 of

title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus

provision, sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and review

pursuant to any other provision of law (statutory or

nonstatutory).

119 Stat. 231, 310-11, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

6 As of January 29, 2007, Petitioner had not filed an opening

brief with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which brief was due

September 18, 2006. See Reid v. Gonzales, 05-77345, docket entry of

April 27, 2006. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ docket in 05-

77345 does not reflect the order of removal has again been stayed by

Petitioner’s filing of that action or automatically by its pendency

before the Ninth Circuit.

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Petitioner filed an action pursuant to section 2241 in

the United States District Court for the District of Arizona on

April 15, 2005. See Reid v. Gonzales, 2:05 CV 1191. The

petition for relief in that matter was transferred to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals on December 21, 2005, pursuant to the

Real ID Act.5 Id., Docket No. 4; Response, Exh. 10.6 There is

no stay of Petitioner’s order of removal indicated in either the

United States District Court docket of that matter or in the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals docket, which indicates the case

is still pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as of

January 29, 2007. See Reid v. Gonzalez, No. 05-77345 (available

via PACER). 

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Petitioner has now been detained in the custody of

Respondent at the detention center in Eloy, Arizona, since June

of 2004, a period of approximately 30 months. On December 3,

2004, Petitioner was served with a notice of File Custody

Review. Response, Exh. 11. Petitioner’s continued detention in

Respondent’s custody was reviewed by the Department of Homeland

Security on April 14, 2005, two days after the Ninth Circuit

dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of the order of removal but before

the mandate was issued. Id., Exh. 12. 

Based on the information in Petitioner’s file and after

consideration of the information submitted by Petitioner, the

Department of Homeland Security determined Petitioner should

continue to be detained. Id., Exh. 12. 

This decision states:

On March 25, 2005, your case was reviewed to

consider you for release under an Order of

Supervision. For this review you provided

several letters of support from your parents,

your brother, your sister, your sister-inlaw, and 3 other letters of support from

close friends. You told Deportation Officer

Miller that you previously worked at Hartsill

Trucking in Redding, California and that you

would try to work there again if you were

released. However, you did not provide a

letter offering you employment, there, or

anywhere.

It appears you have a place to live. You

failed to provide a letter offering you a

job. You did not provide any evidence of

rehabilitation. You have been recently

convicted of a serious crime. You are

removable to Jamaica, pending a decision from

the U.S. Court of Appeals. Travel documents

are routinely obtained for removals to

Jaimaca (sic).

All relevant factors must be considered in

making a determination that you warrant

release from custody. You appear to be a

flight risk, and could be a danger to the

community.

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7 The officer considering Petitioner’s release pending his

removal was required to consider the nature and seriousness of

Petitioner’s conviction, other criminal history, the sentence imposed

and the time actually served, any history of escape or failure to

appear for judicial proceedings, Petitioner’s probation history, any

disciplinary problems while incarcerated or detained, evidence of

rehabilitation or recidivism, equities in the United States, prior

immigration history or violations, and Petitioner’s cooperation in

obtaining travel documents. See Response, Exh. 13; 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(f)

(2006).

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Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 241.4(d)(1), the alien

must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the

Attorney General that his release would not

pose a danger to the community or a

significant flight risk. After having

considered all available information in your

case, I am unable to conclude that you would

not be a danger to the community or that you

would not be a flight risk, and that you

would be able to comply with the requirements

of an Order of Supervision. Therefore, your

release from custody is denied.

Id., Exh. 12.7

On March 14, 2006, Petitioner was again served with a

notice of File Custody Review. Id., Exh. 13. Petitioner’s

continued detention in Respondent’s custody was again reviewed

by the Department of Homeland Security. Id., Exh. 14. The

Department of Homeland Security again determined Petitioner

should continue to be detained. Id., Exh. 14. The decision to

continue detention, issued April 4, 2006, mirrored the decision

issued in April of 2005, regarding the reasons for continuing

Petitioner’s detention. Id., Exh. 14. 

The habeas petition, filed October 13, 2006, asserts

Respondent’s continued detention of Petitioner violates his

constitutional right to substantive and procedural due process

of law. Petitioner contends he is a lawful permanent resident

of the United States and that he is not a danger to the

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8

 In Zabadi, a section 2241 action, the United States District

Court for the Northern District of California concluded the Department

of Homeland Security was not authorized, under the statute in

question, to arrest the petitioner pursuant to a Notice to Appear

predicated on a state criminal conviction. The District Court reached

this conclusion based on the fact the government did not take the

petitioner into federal custody until two years after the petitioner

had been released from state incarceration. See Zabadi v. Chertoff, 2005 WL 3157377, at *1 (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252 as it applied to

a petitioner who was in removal proceedings prior to 1997, noting the

language of the statute required the Attorney General to “take into

custody any alien convicted of any criminal offense covered in section

241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section

241(a)(2)(A)(ii)..., upon release of the alien from incarceration, [and] shall deport the alien as expeditiously as possible...”).

Petitioner contends this conclusion provides relief because,

Petitioner alleges, he was not taken into custody until a year after

his release from state custody.

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community nor a flight risk and, therefore, that he should be

released on bond pending his removal. Petitioner argues the

nature of his conviction does not support the conclusion he is

either a flight risk or a danger to the community. Petitioner

maintains his 2003 California conviction resulted in a sentence

of probation and time served, that he did not violate the terms

of his probation, that he has not been convicted of any other

offense during his years in the United States, and that he has

cooperated in acquiring travel documents enabling his removal.

Reply at 2. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief

pursuant to the conclusion in Zabadi v. Chertoff, a decision

issued by the United States District Court for the Northern

District of California in 2005.8 Id. Petitioner seeks his

release from detention on bond because he has been detained for

a longer period than is reasonable or constitutional, arguing

there is no compelling need for Respondent to continue his

detention. Id. at 3.

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9 In Tijani, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals held an alien was entitled to release on bail after being

detained for two years and eight months during his removal

proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held the alien’s right to due process

was violated because the alien’s detention for this period did not

conform to the INA’s mandatory detention provision, or, alternatively,

because detention for this time period violated the alien’s right to

substantive due process. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242

(2005).

10 Respondent also avers Tijani is distinguishable because the

petitioner in that case sought a bond-determination hearing, and

Petitioner “does not allege that he ever requested, or was denied, a

bond hearing.” Response at 6.

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The Court ordered Respondent to answer the petition,

citing Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005).9

Respondent contends Tijani is distinguishable from Petitioner’s

claims. Response at 3. In Tijani, the petitioner had been

detained for a period exceeding two years during his removal

proceedings. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the

detention of a lawful permanent resident for two years and eight

months, while removal proceedings were ongoing, violated the

petitioner’s constitutional rights. Respondent argues that,

because the entirety of the detention involved in Tijani was

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), governing an alien’s detention

during removal proceedings, and Petitioner has not always been

detained pursuant to section 1226(c), Tijani does not provide a

basis for granting Petitioner relief. Id. at 3-4.10

Acknowledging the order of removal is administratively

final, Respondent also asserts Petitioner’s current action

before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stayed the order

of removal. Respondent maintains that, because the order of

removal is stayed, the ninety-day “removal period” has not begun

to accrue and Petitioner has not been detained beyond the

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11 Presumably writing in December of 2006, Respondent also

asserts:

Petitioner has been detained for less than two years total

and his detention during proceedings to date lasted only

nine months. The remainder of his detention has been

because (1) he had a final order of removal and the

government was required by statute to detain him and (2)

Petitioner’s own continued litigation. 

Response at 2. The Court notes that, if Petitioner has been detained

since June of 2004, in December of 2006 Petitioner had been detained

for well over two years.

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presumptively unconstitutional six-month time period following

the “removal period.”11 In support of this argument, Respondent

cites the decision in Kothandaraghipathy v. Department of

Homeland Sec., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (D. Ariz. 2005).

II. Jurisdiction

Because Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of

his detention, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits

of this claim in his federal habeas petition. See

Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 964-65 (9th Cir.

2004). 

III. Analysis

This Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a

Department of Homeland Security detainee who is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). Petitioner asserts

that his continued detention violates federal law and the United

States Constitution. Furthermore, pro se pleadings are held to

less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.

Ct. 285, 292 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.

Ct. 594, 595 (1972). A pro se habeas petition and any

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12 However, an alien could be entitled to a waiver of this basis

for exclusion, because the section further provides an alien convicted

of a crime of moral turpitude may be entitled to such a waiver if

the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the

alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having

committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having

committed constituted the essential elements) did not

exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was

convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a

term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of

the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) (II) (2005 & Supp. 2006).

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supporting submissions must be construed liberally and with

tolerance by the reviewing court. See, e.g., Brown v. Roe, 279

F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2002); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118

(3d Cir. 1998).

Federal law provides for the detention of removable

aliens in two separate circumstances. Section 236(c) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1226, governs the detention of aliens who are not under an

administratively final order of removal. Section 231 of the

INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs the detention of aliens

whose order of removal is administratively final.

Section 236(c)(1) of the INA requires the Attorney

General to “take into custody any alien” who is deportable as an

aggravated felon, pending the outcome of removal proceedings.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2005 & Supp. 2006). Additionally, the

Attorney General and his designees may not release an alien

pending the finality of their removal proceedings if the alien

has been convicted of a crime of “moral turpitude,” which

includes crimes defined as sexual abuse of a minor. See id. §§

1231(a)(2), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(1).12 Compare United States v.

Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding an

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alien’s conviction under the California Annoy/Molest a Child

statute did not equate to the conviction of the “aggravated

felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor”). Therefore, Petitioner’s

detention by the Attorney General pending the finality of his

removal proceedings was required by federal statutes and did not

violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights. 

Section 241 of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231,

applies to the detention of aliens who are being held pursuant

to an administratively final order of removal. This statute

states: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an

alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the

alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” Id. §

1231(a)(1)(A). Additionally, for particular categories of

removable aliens, this section requires the Attorney General to

detain the alien during the “removal period.” See id. §

1231(a)(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General

shall detain the alien. Under no circumstances during the

removal period shall the Attorney General release an alien who

has been found inadmissible ... or deportable [on certain

specified grounds].”).

This section also explicitly allows, but does not

require, the detention of an alien beyond the ninety-day removal

period in certain circumstances, for example, if the alien does

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13 Section 1231(a)(6) provides:

An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section

1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C),

1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been

determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the

community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,

may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released,

shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph

(3).

Additionally, if an alien’s release “pose[s] a danger to the

community or to the safety of other persons or to property or a

significant risk of flight pending such alien’s removal from the

United States,” the alien may be detained. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(d)(1)

& 241.4(e)-(f) (2006).

14

An order of removal made by the immigration judge at the

conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the Act

shall become final:

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not make a good faith effort to obtain the travel documents

necessary to effectuate the order of removal. See id. §

1231(a)(6).13 However, if an alien subject to an

administratively final order of removal is not removed within

the ninety-day removal period, the alien is entitled to a bond

hearing. See id. § 1231(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (2006); Small

v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (D. Conn. 2000).

The ninety-day limit on an alien’s detention without a

bond hearing pending his removal is not applicable until the

“removal period” begins. See, e.g., Kothandaraghipathy, 396 F.

Supp. 2d at 1107. Ordinarily, the removal period begins when

the order of removal becomes administratively final, i.e., upon

conclusion of the BIA’s review of the order of removal pursuant

to an appeal by either party of the IJ’s decision. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) (2005 & Supp. 2006).14 However, if the alien

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(a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration

Appeals;

(b) Upon waiver of appeal by the respondent;

(c) Upon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if

the respondent does not file an appeal within that time;

(d) If certified to the Board or Attorney General, upon the

date of the subsequent decision ordering removal;

(e) If an immigration judge orders an alien removed in the

alien’s absence, immediately upon entry of such order; or

(f) If an immigration judge issues an alternate order of

removal in connection with a grant of voluntary departure,

upon overstay of the voluntary departure period except

where the respondent has filed a timely appeal with the

Board. In such a case, the order shall become final upon an

order of removal by the Board or the Attorney General, or

upon overstay of any voluntary departure period granted or

reinstated by the Board or the Attorney General.

8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (2006).

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appeals the order of removal and the reviewing court stays the

removal order pending the resolution of the appeal, the “removal

period” does not begin until the reviewing court issues its

final order regarding the appeal. See id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii);

Kothandaraghipathy, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. See also Balogun

v. INS, 9 F.3d 347, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1993); Riley v. Greene, 149

F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1261 (D. Colo. 2001) (“At least two federal

circuit courts and several district courts have found that if an

alien contributes to the delay of his departure he is not

allowed the benefit of a release pending his actual removal, and

the six-month period to effect an alien’s departure is

tolled.”); Hinojosa-Perez v. Eddy, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1006-07

(D. Alaska 1999) (“Federal courts having considered analogous

circumstances are in agreement that aliens who insist on

postponing their own deportation have ‘no constitutional right

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15 Federal statutes provide that an alien subject to a final

order of removal who refuses to make a timely, good faith application

for documents necessary to effect his removal, faces criminal fines

and/or imprisonment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B) (2005 & Supp.

2006).

16 Respondent also argues “Petitioner’s detention during his

proceedings,” presumably governed by section 1226, “ended on November

5, 2004 when the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and petitioner’s Order

of Removal became final. The total time of petitioner’s detention,

during proceedings, was just slightly short of five months.” Response

at 5.

17 The Inmate Locator function of the United States Bureau of

Prisons website, which includes immigrant detainees, indicates Mr.

Reid was released from detention on March 21, 2006. The Court

contacted the detention center on or about January 19, 2007, and was

informed Mr. Reid is still in detention, although the detention

center’s own computer system indicated otherwise.

-15-

to remain at large during the ensuing delay, and the United

States has a powerful interest in maintaining the detention in

order to ensure that removal actually occurs.’”).15

Respondent maintains the current action in the Ninth

Circuit has stayed Petitioner’s removal period. Response at 4.16

The Court can find no record that the Ninth Circuit has stayed

Petitioner’s order of removal pending resolution of the current

action before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.17 Although

Petitioner has an action pending before the Ninth Circuit, the

Ninth Circuit has not explicitly stayed the order of removal

again pending the resolution of that action (No. 05-77345), as

it did during the initial appeal of the order of removal (No.

04-72699). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes the ninety-day removal

period began on May 4, 2005, when the Ninth Circuit issued its

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mandate in No. 04-726996 and lifted the stay of the order of

removal. This conclusion is supported by Respondent’s

initiation of reviews of Petitioner’s detention or release on

bond pending his removal, which would not be allowable were

Petitioner still being detained pursuant to section 1226, which

governed his detention and required his detention prior to the

finality of his removal proceedings. Compare Kothandaraghipathy,

396 F. Supp. 2d at 1107; Hinojosa-Perez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at

1006-07. See also Del Pilar v. United States Att’y Gen., 326

F.3d 1154, 1156 (11th Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)

(2005 & Supp. 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (2006).

Since May 4, 2005, Petitioner has been detained pending

his removal to Jamaica pursuant to an administratively final

order of removal. As of February 4, 2007, this is a period of

approximately 21 months, far exceeding the ninety-day removal

period. 

The United States Supreme Court has concluded section

1231 does not authorize the indefinite detention of an alien

under an administratively final order of removal pending their

ultimate removal from the United States. See Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 701-02, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2504-05 (2001). Pursuant

to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas, this statute

imposes an implied six-month limit on post-removal-period

detention, provided the alien’s actual removal from the United

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18 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001),

the Supreme Court examined section 1231 to determine whether aliens

may be detained indefinitely beyond the removal period, pending their

deportation. The Supreme Court concluded that “[a] statute permitting

indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional

problem.” Id., 533 U.S. at 688-89, 121 S. Ct. at 2498. To avoid the

constitutional difficulty, the Court decided to read an implicit time

limitation into section 1231(a)(6), and determined that the statute

“limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period

reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the

United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” Id. The

Court concluded that if removal of an alien is not reasonably

foreseeable, a court should hold that his continued detention is

unreasonable and order his release. Id., 533 U.S. at 699-700, 121

S. Ct. at 2504. The Court determined that six months was the

presumptive limit on the “reasonably necessary” period of time to

detain an alien beyond the removal period. See id. 533 U.S. at 700,

121 S. Ct. at 2505.

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States is not reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Arango-Marquez

v. INS, 346 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2003); Lin Guo Xi v.

United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 298 F.3d 832,

835 (2002).18 

Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded in Zadvydas

that, except for certain statutorily defined categories of

criminal aliens, protecting the public does not justify the

indefinite detention of an alien pending the execution of an

order of removal. See 533 U.S. at 691, 121 S. Ct. at 2499 (“In

cases in which preventive detention is of potentially indefinite

duration, we have also demanded that the dangerousness rationale

be accompanied by some other special circumstance, such as

mental illness, that helps to create the danger.”).

Subsequent to Zadvydas, the Attorney General enacted

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new regulations establishing a custody review procedure for

removable aliens. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2006). The Department

of Homeland Security must engage in “special review procedures”

for those aliens subject to a final order of removal after the

expiration of the removal period. Id. § 241.13(a). 

The federal regulations further provide:

Showing by the alien. The district director,

Director of the Detention and Removal Field

Office, or Executive Associate Commissioner

may release an alien if the alien

demonstrates to the satisfaction of the

Attorney General or her designee that his or

her release will not pose a danger to the

community or to the safety of other persons

or to property or a significant risk of

flight pending such alien’s removal from the

United States. The district director,

Director of the Detention and Removal Field

Office, or Executive Associate Commissioner

may also, in accordance with the procedures

and consideration of the factors set forth in

this section, continue in custody any alien

described in paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) of

this section.

Id. § 241.4.

The applicable regulations require the alien to provide

good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of

removal to the country to which he was ordered removed in the

reasonably foreseeable future. See id. § 241.13(a). The alien

must commence the custody review process by submitting a

request, after which ICE will conduct a review to determine

whether there is no significant likelihood the alien will be

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19 The petitioner in Doherty was convicted of murder in Great

Britain and had been held in INS detention for a period of eight years

during the pendency of his removal proceedings. The Second Circuit

Court of Appeals’ pre-Zadvydas opinion, issued by a divided panel,

concluded the petitioner’s detention did not violate his right to due

process. This conclusion was premised at least in part on the fact

the petitioner was responsible for the great majority of the delay in

his removal proceedings. See 943 F.2d at 212.

20 The Court further notes that, pursuant to a recent decision of

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Petitioner’s underlying order of

removal may not withstand scrutiny. Petitioner may be entitled to

-19-

removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. § 241.13(c).

Respondent does not contend Petitioner’s removal is

foreseeable. Respondent contends: “The only reason petitioner

is detained while his case is pending before the Ninth Circuit

is because of his own continued litigation. An alien’s own

lawful, self-initiated litigation which has the collateral

consequence of prolonging his detention, extends the removal

period.” Response at 6, citing Doherty v. Thornburg, 943 F.2d

204, 211 (2d Cir. 1991).19 However, Respondent does not indicate

where in the record the Petitioner’s current action before the

Ninth Circuit has stayed the execution of the order of removal.

Furthermore, at least one federal court has concluded an alien

should not be effectively punished by pursuing legitimate

remedies for his situation. See Hoang Minh Ly v. Hansen, 351

F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding an alien who would not

normally be subject to indefinite detention cannot be so

detained merely because he seeks to explore avenues of relief

that the law makes available to him).20

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withholding of removal pursuant to the decision in Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1220 n.4 (2006). See also Morales v. Gonzales, 472

F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2007).

21 Another federal District Court within the jurisdiction of the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected arguments by the Attorney

General similar to the ones offered in this matter. See Singh v.

Gonzales, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1219-20 (W.D. Wash. 2006). In that

matter the District Court considered the continued detention of an

alien ordered removed to India. Id. Noting the statement in Zadvydas

that the choice before the Attorney General is not between detention

and “living at large,” the District Court concluded the Department of

Homeland Security had unconstitutionally and improperly held the alien

without affording him due process of law. Id.

 Alternatively, respondents contend that petitioner’s

continued detention is lawful because petitioner’s

repatriation to India will occur in the reasonably

foreseeable future. [] Respondents assert that ICE has been

successful in repatriating Indian citizens and that ICE has

done all it can to obtain travel documents from India. []

Petitioner challenges respondents’ claim that he will be

-20-

Although the burden is presumably on Petitioner to

establish he is entitled to a bond hearing by showing his

removal is not foreseeable in the near future, see Lin Guo Xi,

298 F.3d at 839-40, Respondent’s glib statement that aliens are

frequently removed to Jamaica begs the question of why the

Attorney General has not effectuated Petitioner’s removal to

Jamaica. Respondent notably does not aver Petitioner has not

cooperated in acquiring travel documents, but instead points to

Petitioner’s initiation of an action, which has not had the

collateral effect of staying his removal, as being the obstacle

to his removal. The Court concludes there is evidence from

which to conclude Petitioner’s removal is not likely in the

foreseeable future. See Singh v. Gonzales, 448 F. Supp. 2d

1214, 1219-20 (W.D. Wash. 2006).21

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removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, contending

that two travel document requests have been sent to the

Indian Embassy, and the only feedback ICE has received

regarding the travel documents is a May 8, 2006, statement

that it “[c]ould be another 90 days before [ICE] get[s] any

information.” (Dkt. # 15 at R256).

 The Court finds that petitioner has met the Zadvydas

standard of showing that there is no significant likelihood

he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Petitioner has fully cooperated with ICE’s efforts to

obtain a travel document for him since November 2005. ICE,

however, has provided no substantive indication regarding

how or when it expects to obtain the necessary travel

document from the Indian government. Rather, ICE merely

asserts that it has followed up on its request for travel

documents from India and done all it can. [] This is not

sufficient evidence to rebut petitioner’s showing that he

is unlikely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable

future.

 Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has shown

that there is no significant likelihood of his removal to

India in the reasonably foreseeable future. The six-month

period established by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas expired

on November 29, 2003, and petitioner should be released.

-21-

The true issue before the Court is whether the

continuation of Petitioner’s detention pending his ultimate

removal violates his substantive due process right to liberty or

his right to procedural due process of law. Petitioner was

granted a bond hearing subsequent to his order of removal

becoming administratively final, in April of 2006. The

Department of Homeland Security determined Petitioner had not

established he was not a flight risk or a danger to the

community, primarily because Petitioner had not presented

evidence he had a solid offer of employment if released from

detention. 

In a concurring opinion in Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim,

538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003), regarding the mandatory

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22 “Such detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing

deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their

removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered

removed, the aliens will be successfully removed...” Demore v. Hyung

Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1720 (2003).

-22-

detention of an alien during removal proceedings without an

individualized determination of their risk of flight,22 Justice

Kennedy stated:

[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits

arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful

permanent resident alien such as respondent

could be entitled to an individualized

determination as to his risk of flight and

dangerousness if the continued detention

became unreasonable or unjustified.

Zadvydas, 533 U.S., at 684-686, 121 S. Ct.

2491; id., at 721, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (Kennedy,

J., dissenting) (“[A]liens are entitled to be

free from detention that is arbitrary or

capricious”). Were there to be an

unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and

completing deportation proceedings, it could

become necessary then to inquire whether the

detention is not to facilitate deportation,

or to protect against risk of flight or

dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other

reasons.

538 U.S. at 531-32, 123 S. Ct. at 1722 (emphasis added). 

Petitioner does not assert he has not been given an

bond hearing. However, the Court notes Petitioner’s last bond

hearing was approximately one year ago, and that neither of

Petitioner’s “individualized” bond hearings gave proper weight

to all of the equities weighing in favor of Petitioner’s release

on bond pending his removal. Petitioner’s case is clearly

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23

(f) Factors for consideration. The following factors should

be weighed in considering whether to recommend further

detention or release of a detainee:

(1) The nature and number of disciplinary infractions or

incident reports received when incarcerated or while in

Service custody;

(2) The detainee’s criminal conduct and criminal

convictions, including consideration of the nature and

severity of the alien’s convictions, sentences imposed and

time actually served, probation and criminal parole

history, evidence of recidivism, and other criminal

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distinguishable from a published federal court opinion

concluding there was “ample evidence” to support the Attorney’s

General to continue detention of an alien beyond the removal

period. See Dennis v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs

Enforcement Interim Field Office Dir. for Det. & Removal for

Middle Dist. of Pa., 426 F. Supp. 2d 252, 258-59 (M.D. Pa.

2006). The Court concludes Petitioner’s situation is the exact

situation imagined by Justice Kennedy in his concurring decision

in Demore.

As noted supra, the officer considering Petitioner’s

release pending his removal was required to consider the nature

and seriousness of Petitioner’s conviction, other criminal

history, the sentence imposed and the time actually served, any

history of escape or failure to appear for judicial proceedings,

Petitioner’s probation history, any disciplinary problems while

incarcerated, evidence of rehabilitation or recidivism, equities

in the United States, prior immigration history or violations,

and Petitioner’s cooperation in obtaining travel documents.23

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history;

(3) Any available psychiatric and psychological reports

pertaining to the detainee’s mental health;

(4) Evidence of rehabilitation including institutional

progress relating to participation in work, educational,

and vocational programs, where available;

(5) Favorable factors, including ties to the United States

such as the number of close relatives residing here

lawfully;

(6) Prior immigration violations and history.

8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2006).

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The officer determined Petitioner should not be released because

he was a flight risk. 

The Court concludes the officer ignored the fact the

State of California imposed a lenient penalty on Petitioner’s

offense, i.e., a year in prison (or time served) and supervised

release, presumably after reaching the conclusion Petitioner was

not a danger to the community. Additionally, Petitioner had no

other criminal history, did not have a record of offenses

committed while incarcerated or in detention, and Petitioner did

not have a record of failing to appear for court hearings or

meetings or while on supervised release. There was no evidence

of recidivism, Petitioner’s entire family resided in the United

States and vouched for his good character and their support, and

Petitioner had no prior immigration offenses. Petitioner had

cooperated in obtaining travel documents. The officer’s

decision that Petitioner was a flight risk and a danger rested

solely on the fact Petitioner had not established he had an

offer of employment waiting for him upon his release.

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24

The government in Zadvydas offered another justification

for the continued detention--“protecting the community.”

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691, 121 S. Ct. 2491. The Court

squarely rejected this as a justification for continued

detention, finding that “preventative detention based on

dangerousness” is only permissible “when limited to

specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong

procedural protections.” Id. at 691-92, 121 S. Ct. 2491.

If the justification of “protecting the community” was

offered in Demore, the Court did not discuss it. The

detention in that case was justified solely on the basis of

preventing flight.

Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1249 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005)(Tashima, J.,

concurring). The Court notes that, in Tijani, the majority opinion

of a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated “the

government [must establish] that [the petitioner] is a flight risk or

will be a danger to the community.” 430 F.3d at 1242. 

25 In an unpublished opinion which is persuasive but not

precedential, the Eastern District of Louisiana reasoned:

Regulation 241.14 authorizes the continued detention of a

removable alien, despite a finding that removal will not

take place within the reasonably foreseeable future, where

the alien poses a special risk, which is limited to: aliens

carrying contagious diseases that pose a public safety

risk; aliens detained who pose serious adverse foreign

policy consequences; aliens detained because of

antiterrorism concerns; and aliens determined to be

especially dangerous by virtue of the severity of their

crimes, or by virtue of mental illness. This regulation

does not allow the government to consider risk of flight as

a continued detention factor.

Jabir v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 60318, at *5.

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Arguably the only valid reason for continuing an

alien’s detention without bond pending their removal, as

established by the federal courts, is to ensure a petitioner’s

ultimate removal from the United States.24 There is no evidence

before this Court that Petitioner will fail to appear for his

removal when the Attorney General eventually effectuates the

IJ’s order.25 

Petitioner has a constitutionally-protected fundamental

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26 In a pre-Zadvydas decision, the United States District Court

for the District of Oklahoma held an alien was entitled to relief

where the panel reviewing his detention “focused on the acts that led

to petitioner’s conviction, which occurred more than four years

ago...,” “[r]ather than analyzing petitioner’s current status”. Tin

Trong Nguyen v. INS, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1265-66 (W.D. Okla. 1999).

The court found the Attorney General’s decision to detain the alien

invalid because, inter alia, “there was no discussion of whether

petitioner currently represents a danger to the community...” Id.

That court noted an internal agency memorandum “specifically provides

that ‘[t]he fact that the alien has a criminal history does not create

a presumption in favor of continued detention.’” Id.

This opinion was predicated on the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals’ decision in Chi Thon Ngo v. Immigration & Naturalization

Serv., 192 F.3d 390, 399 (1999). The court in Ngo stressed that

“[d]ue process is not satisfied, however, by rubberstamp denials based

on temporally distant offenses. The process due even to deportable

and excludable aliens requires an opportunity for an evaluation of the

individual’s current threat to the community and his risk of flight.”

Id. In Ngo, the Third Circuit concurred that such a review does not

comport with due process. See id.

Additionally, the Western District of Washington has criticized

post-removal proceedings because “Directors simply relied on the

aliens’ past criminal history and the fact that they were facing

removal from the United States, summarily concluding that the aliens

posed such risks and denying them release.” Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F.

Supp. 2d 1149, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 

-26-

liberty interest in avoiding potentially indefinite detention.

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696, 121 S. Ct. at 2502 (“an alien’s

liberty interest is, at the least, strong enough to raise a

serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures

used,[], the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite

and potentially permanent”). This Court believes, and at least

one other federal court agrees, that Petitioner is entitled to

a meaningful review of his detention pending his removal. See

Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2001); Dennis, 426

F. Supp. 2d at 260.26

The Court concludes neither of Petitioner’s custody

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interviews was meaningful. The factors weigh in favor of a

finding Petitioner is not a flight risk, i.e., his appearances

and acceptance of responsibility in his state criminal

proceedings, including successfully completing and complying

with the terms of his probation, his lack of any other criminal

activity, and his ties to the community. Petitioner has not

expressed a fear of being removed to Jamaica. Petitioner was

not, apparently, a danger to the community; although his

conviction was for a categorically serious crime, i.e., sex with

a thirteen-year-old girl, the act involved was consensual.

Additionally, in the commission of his crime or otherwise

Petitioner has not shown any propensity to violence or any other

criminal behavior. Prior to his immigration detention,

Petitioner had not re-offended or violated his probation nor had

Petitioner any record of disciplinary problems while

incarcerated by the state or while in immigration detention.

IV. Conclusion

Petitioner’s order of removal is final and, therefore,

his continued detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

Petitioner has been held beyond the ninety-day removal period

and has been held beyond the presumptively constitutional sixmonth period exceeding the removal period. The very fact

Petitioner has been detained over one year beyond the lifting of

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the stay of the order of removal indicates Petitioner’s removal

is not likely in the foreseeable future and, therefore, that

Petitioner is being held in violation of his right to

substantive due process. Although Petitioner has been given a

bond hearing, the substance of the hearing has been meaningless

and the Attorney General has abused his authority in ordering

Petitioner’s continued detention based on the fact of his

conviction and the fact Petitioner does not have assured

employment on his release, thereby violating Petitioner’s right

to procedural due process. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Reid’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court order Petitioner’s

immediate removal from the United States or his release from

federal detention under an order of supervision on conditions

that the government believes are appropriate under the

circumstances within a period of thirty days from the date the

Court issues its order in this matter.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

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Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 31st day of January, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-02436-JWS Document 10 Filed 02/01/07 Page 29 of 29