Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01867/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01867-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVARE GRANT,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 14-cv-1867 MCE KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before court is defendants’ summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 

69.) Defendants move for summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff’s claims and on the 

grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons stated herein, the 

undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion be granted. 

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears 

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)). 

“Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 

committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

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1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 

1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By contemporaneous notice provided on August 16, 2013(ECF No. 22), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

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III. Plaintiff’s Claims

This action is proceeding on the amended complaint filed October 31, 2014 as to 

defendants Moss, Jason, Brown and Huser.1 (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff alleges that on November 

17, 2011, he was transferred to the North Fork Correctional Facility (“NFCF”), located in 

Oklahoma.

2

 At the time of plaintiff’s transfer, African American inmates at NFCF were on an 

emergency lockdown following a riot between Hispanic and African American inmates. (Id.) 

Plaintiff is African American. (Id. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff alleges that upon his arrival at NFCF, he was labeled as a threat because he is 

African American, even though he was not involved in the riot. (Id.) Plaintiff was told that he 

would be placed on lockdown. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that other inmates who arrived at 

NFCF after the riot who were not African American were not placed on the lockdown. (Id.) As a 

result of being placed on lockdown, plaintiff was denied access to work, school and recreation 

activities. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was on lockdown for 11 months. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that on January 25, 2012, defendants Jason, Brown and Huber denied his 

request for a transfer back to California following a classification hearing at NFCF. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that during the classification hearing, plaintiff argued that he should not be on 

lockdown because he was not involved in the riot. (Id.)

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1

 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 34.) The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to 

defendant Cate. (ECF No. 43.) The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss as to defendants 

Moss, Jason, Brown and Huser. (Id.)

2

 NFCF is a California Out-of-State Correctional Facility (“COCF”) under California’s COCF 

program to relieve overcrowding in California state prisons. The COCF program is one in which 

male California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) inmates are transferred 

to out-of-state correctional facilities that have contracted with CDCR to provide housing, 

security, health care and rehabilitative programming services to CDCR inmates. Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 15, § 3000. COCF is a unit within the CDCR-Division of Adult Institutions whose mission is 

to transfer inmates out of state for the purpose of alleviating overcrowding within existing 

institutions. James v. Sweeney, 2013 WL 129393, at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013). “Inmates 

transferred to a COCF program facility ‘remain under the legal custody of the CDCR and shall be 

subject to the rules, rights and privileges of the CDCR in accordance with [Title 15] of the 

California Code of Regulations.’” Id. at 4, n. 7 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3379(a)(9)(I)).

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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Moss, the Chief Deputy Warden at the CDCR Contract 

Beds Unit in Rancho Cordova, California, denied plaintiff’s administrative appeal at the second 

level. (Id.) Defendant Moss stated that plaintiff was a threat to the security of the facility, i.e., 

NFCF. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Moss ordered that plaintiff remain on lockdown. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that his placement and retention on lockdown following his arrival at 

NFCF violated his right to Equal Protection and his rights under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 

3.) 

IV. Administrative Remedies

A. Legal Standard for Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Proper exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,

741 (2001), and “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The Supreme Court has 

also cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory exhaustion 

requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6. Moreover, because proper exhaustion is necessary, 

a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise 

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93. 

“[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners ‘must complete the administrative 

review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ -- rules that are defined not by 

the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) 

(quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). See also Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 

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2009) (“The California prison system’s requirements ‘define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.’”) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218). 

In California, prisoners may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission 

by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

On January 28, 2011, California prison regulations governing inmate grievances were revised. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Now inmates in California proceed through three levels of 

appeal to exhaust the appeal process: (1) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal 

form; (2) second level appeal to the institution head or designee; and (3) third level appeal to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Under specific circumstances, the first level review may be bypassed. Id. 

The third level of review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR and exhausts a 

prisoner’s administrative remedies. See id. § 3084.7(d)(3). Since 2008, medical appeals have 

been processed at the third level by the Office of Third Level Appeals for the California 

Correctional Health Care Services. A California prisoner is required to submit an inmate appeal 

at the appropriate level and proceed to the highest level of review available to him. Butler v. 

Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 

2002). Since the 2011 revision, in submitting a grievance, an inmate is required to “list all staff 

members involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.2(3). Further, the inmate must “state all facts known and available to him/her regarding 

the issue being appealed at the time,” and he or she must “describe the specific issue under appeal 

and the relief requested.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2(a)(4). An inmate now has thirty 

calendar days to submit his or her appeal from the occurrence of the event or decision being 

appealed, or “upon first having knowledge of the action or decision being appealed.” Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b). 

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Bock, 

549 U.S. at 204, 216. In Albino, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the underlying panel’s decision 

“that the burdens outlined in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996), 

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should provide the template for the burdens here.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc). A defendant need only show “that there was an available administrative remedy, 

and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Once the 

defense meets its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the administrative 

remedies were unavailable. See Albino, 697 F.3d at 1030-31. 

A prisoner may be excused from complying with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement if 

he establishes that the existing administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172-73. When an inmate’s administrative grievance is improperly rejected 

on procedural grounds, exhaustion may be excused as effectively unavailable. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 

623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 

2010) (warden’s mistake rendered prisoner’s administrative remedies “effectively unavailable”); 

Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion excused where futile); Brown 

v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff not required to proceed to third level where 

appeal granted at second level and no further relief was available).

Where a prison system’s grievance procedures do not specify the requisite level of detail 

for inmate appeals, Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824, a grievance satisfies the administrative exhaustion 

requirement if it “alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin 

v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). “A grievance need not include legal terminology 

or legal theories unless they are in some way needed to provide notice of the harm being grieved. 

A grievance also need not contain every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal 

claim. The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem and facilitate its 

resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120.

If under the Rule 56 summary judgment standard, the court concludes that plaintiff has 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 

747 F.3d 1162. 

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B. Discussion

Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he 

failed to name them in a grievance and because he submitted a grievance after their alleged 

involvement in the case. In support of these arguments, defendants cite the administrative 

grievances attached to the original complaint. Plaintiff does not dispute that these are the 

grievances which allegedly exhausted his claims.

The undersigned begins by summarizing the relevant administrative grievances. The 

undersigned observes that these grievances were prepared on CDCR forms. NFCF officials 

appear to have responded to the first level grievance. CDCR officials responded to the second 

and third level grievances.

Plaintiff filed his first level grievance regarding the lockdown on January 30, 2012. (ECF 

No. 13.) In this grievance, plaintiff complained that he was wrongly placed on lockdown because 

he did not participate in the riot that led to the lockdown. (Id.) As relief, plaintiff requested that 

his privileges be restored and that he be allowed to work. (Id.) This grievance was denied at the 

First Level of Review. (Id. at 19.) The memorandum denying the first level grievance stated that 

plaintiff requested that he be allowed to attend his job and receive the same privileges as other 

inmates not currently on modified programming. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a second level grievance requesting that he be released from lockdown and 

given access to dayroom, yard and education. (Id. at 14.) Defendant Moss denied this grievance 

at the second level of review. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff then appealed to the Director’s Level. This 

grievance was also denied. (Id. at 11-12.) The memorandum denying the third level grievance 

stated that plaintiff requested that he be provided with privileges and be allowed to participate in 

a work assignment. (Id. at 11.) 

In the grievances summarized above, it is clear that plaintiff requested that he be released 

from the lockdown and to have his “privileges” restored. Plaintiff did not request that he be 

transferred back to California. 

For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies with respect to his claims against defendants Jason, Brown and Huber. 

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The gravamen of plaintiff’s claim against these defendants is that they denied his request to be 

transferred to a prison in California.

As discussed above, plaintiff alleges that these defendants denied his request to be 

transferred back to California during a classification committee hearing. While plaintiff alleges 

that the hearing occurred on January 25, 2012, the memorandum prepared following the hearing 

states that it occurred on January 31, 2012. (ECF No. 17 at 6.) The memorandum also states, in

relevant part, “Grant requested a transfer back to California. Grant was informed that COCF was 

not performing any convenience moves at this time.” (Id.) 

The level of detail in an administrative grievance necessary to exhaust a claim is 

determined by the prison’s grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). 

“[W]hen a prison's grievance procedures are silent or incomplete as to factual specificity, 'a 

grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’” 

Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 

650 (7th Cir. 2002)).

As discussed above, plaintiff’s grievances were filed on CDCR grievance forms. The 

California regulations require an inmate to describe the specific issue under appeal and the relief 

requested. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2. And under CDCR regulations, “[a]dministrative 

remedies shall not be considered exhausted relative to any new issue, information, or person later 

named by the appellant that was not included in the originally submitted [appeal] and addressed 

through all required levels of administrative review up to and including the third level.” Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). Accordingly, in California, a prisoner must describe the specific 

issue of which he complains in his grievance, and does not exhaust administrative remedies when 

he includes entirely new issues from one level of review to another. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 

F.3d 813, 825 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that it was proper for prison officials to “decline[ ] to 

consider a complaint about [prisoner's] eye condition that he raised for the first time in a secondlevel appeal about medical care for a skin condition.”). 

Nevertheless, because California's regulations are “'incomplete as to the factual specificity 

[required in an inmate's grievance], a grievance [in California] suffices if it alerts the prison to the 

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nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’” Id. at 824 (quoting Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120) 

(first alteration in original). In other words, a California prisoner's “grievance...need not contain 

every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal claim,” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120, 

so long as it “puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner seeks 

redress.” Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824.

Plaintiff’s grievances did not exhaust his claims against defendants Jason, Brown and 

Huber because they did not challenge defendants’ decision to deny his request for a transfer back 

to California or mention the at-issue classification committee hearing. In the grievances, as relief, 

plaintiff did not request that he be transferred back to California. This is most likely because the 

at-issue classification committee hearing occurred after plaintiff filed his first level grievance. 

For these reasons, plaintiff’s grievances did not put defendants on notice that he challenged their 

decision to deny his request for a transfer. Accordingly, defendants Jason, Brown and Huber 

should be granted summary judgment based on these grounds. 

Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Moss is based on defendant Moss’s denial of his 

second level grievance. In this grievance, plaintiff challenged his placement and retention on 

lockdown and requested that his privileges be restored. Defendants suggest that plaintiff did not 

exhaust his administrative remedies against defendant Moss because plaintiff filed his first level 

grievance before defendant Moss denied his second level grievance. In essence, defendants 

suggest that plaintiff was required to file another round of grievances challenging defendant 

Moss’s denial of the second level grievance. The undersigned disagrees. Plaintiff was not 

required to file another round of administrative grievances challenging defendant Moss’s denial 

of his grievance. Moreover, it is unlikely that such duplicative grievances would even be 

permitted. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that plaintiff exhausted his administrative 

remedies as to defendant Moss. 

V. Statute of Limitations

Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff’s claims are barred by 

the statute of limitations. Defendants argue that the court should apply the Oklahoma statute of 

limitations, under which plaintiff’s claims would be time barred.

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Citing Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 973 (9th Cir. 

2013), defendants argue that the federal court in which the case is litigated should apply the 

forum state’s choice of law. Defendants argue that, under California law, Oklahoma is the choice 

of law for the statute of limitations. 

Federal courts apply the forum state’s choice of law in cases based on diversity 

jurisdiction. See id. at 973; Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983) 

(“In diversity cases, the district court normally applies the substantive law of the forum state, 

including its choice of law rules.”) However, the instant case is not brought based on diversity 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (diversity of citizenship exists only where there is complete diversity, that is, “where 

the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from that of each defendant.”). Instead, this action 

arises under federal question jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal civil rights actions are 

subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. Wallace v. 

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Therefore, the California statute of limitations is applicable. 

Defendants do not appear to argue that this action is untimely under California law. As 

discussed herein, plaintiff’s claims are timely under the California statute of limitations.

Plaintiff’s claims accrued on the date he transferred to Oklahoma, i.e., November 17, 

2011. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (“the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question 

of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law”); Bradford v. Scherschiglt, 803 F.3d 

382, 387-88 (9th Cir. 2015) (claim accrued on the day that plaintiff knew or had reason to know 

of the injury). Under California law, plaintiff had four years from that date to file a timely federal 

action. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Civ. Code § 335.1 (two 

year statute of limitations); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 352.1, 357 (incarceration tolls the statute of 

limitations for two years for inmates serving less than life).3 

Plaintiff filed this action on July 24, 2014. Because this action was filed within four years 

of the date the injury accrued, this action is not barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants 

 

3

 The parties do not dispute that plaintiff is serving a term less than life.

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are not entitled to summary judgment on this ground. 

VI. Clarification of Claims

Because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to defendants Jason, 

Brown and Huber, the undersigned need not address the defendants’ summary judgment motion 

addressing the merits of plaintiff’s claims against these defendants. Before analyzing defendants’ 

summary judgment addressing the merits of plaintiff’s claims against defendants Moss, the 

undersigned herein clarifies plaintiff’s claims against this defendant. 

First, plaintiff alleges that his placement and retention on the lockdown violated his Equal 

Protection rights because he did not participate in the incident that led to the lockdown. In other 

words, plaintiff does not raise an Equal Protection claim challenging the validity or duration of 

the lockdown per se. Second, plaintiff alleges that the denial of access to work, educational and 

recreation activities, i.e., access to outdoor exercise, during the lockdown violated the Eighth 

Amendment.

The undersigned also clarifies that plaintiff is basing the liability of defendant Moss on 

defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s second level administrative grievance challenging his placement 

and retention on the lockdown. (ECF No. 17 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Moss 

improperly found that plaintiff posed a threat to the security of NFCF and denied his request to be 

released from the lockdown. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Moss ignored his claim that he 

was not involved in any riot. (Id.) Defendant Moss’s June 20, 2012 response to plaintiff’s 

second level grievance states, in relevant part, 

Issue: The appellant is submitting this appeal relative to modified 

programing at North Fork Correctional Facility (NCFC) claiming 

that it is race based, punitive and in bad faith. Furthermore, it does 

not allow for out of cell privileges and attending job assignments. 

The appellant requests on appeal that he be allowed to participate in 

out of cell privileges and attend his job assignment.

****

The appellant’s submitted appeal (NF-03—12-010) was denied at 

the FLR on March 28, 2012. The FLR denied the appeal based on 

the fact that the appellant was identified as a member of a security 

threat group with a significant participation in the October 11, 2011 

incident at NFCF.

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NFCF has utilized modified programs during situations where a 

disruption of orderly operations is caused by inmate initiated 

disturbance(s). The modified programs are prudent actions by staff 

to ensure the safety of others and the security of the institution. The 

appellant’s allegation that the modified program is race based, 

punitive and in bad faith is groundless. In instances where the 

inmate population has engaged in an inmate initiated disturbance 

with another inmate faction, records support all involved 

populations are placed on modified programs. The appellant has 

been identified as a member of a security threat group with a 

significant level of participation in the October 11, 2011 incident. 

Non-affiliates are often not subject to the full extent of a modified 

program. At various intervals of modified programs, changes are 

made to allow for showering, dayroom activities, phone, yard, and 

other privileges for impacted inmates, commensurate with the 

security needs of the institution. All modified programs are 

monitored weekly to ensure progression is made to return the 

impacted inmate population to normal program as quickly as 

possible, yet ensuring the safety and security of the facility. The 

placement of an inmate population on modified program is not 

discriminatory and is based on the safety and security needs of the 

institution. Due to the above, the appellant has not supported his 

appeal issues.

DECISION: The appeal is denied.

(ECF No. 1 at 17-18.) 

VII. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim/ Vicarious Liability 

A. Legal Standard for Equal Protection Claim

Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) 

(citation omitted). Invidious racial discrimination such as racial segregation, which is 

unconstitutional outside prisons, also is unconstitutional within prisons. Johnson v. California, 

543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005). A prison classification based on race is immediately suspect and is 

subject to the same strict scrutiny as a racial classification outside prison. Id. at 508–10. Prison 

officials must therefore demonstrate that the race-based policy or action is narrowly tailored to 

serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 510–11; Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 671 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (applying Johnson to racial lockdowns in response to prison disturbances). Johnson

did not rule out race-based classifications and did not eliminate prison security as a reason for 

such classifications, but instead determined that prison officials must demonstrate that race-based 

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policies are narrowly tailored to address a compelling government interest such as prison security. 

See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511–13, 515 (remanding case for determination of whether Department 

of Corrections' policy of temporarily segregating inmates by race when they arrive in the prison 

system initially or are transferred to a new prison is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 

interest).

Plaintiff alleges that he put defendant Moss on notice through the appeals process that he 

was being subjected to allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Because prison 

administrators cannot willfully turn a blind eye to constitutional violations being committed by 

subordinates, an individual who denies an inmate appeal and who had the authority and 

opportunity to prevent an ongoing constitutional violation could potentially be subject to liability 

if the individual knew about an existing or impending violation and failed to prevent it. Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006).

However, in the context of a claim for unconstitutional discrimination, mere knowledge of 

the alleged discrimination is insufficient to impose liability on a prison, which requires purpose. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009). Therefore, to succeed on his racial 

discrimination claim against defendant Moss, plaintiff must show that defendant Moss denied his 

grievance with the purpose of discriminating against him. Oregon State University Student 

Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012). 

B. Discussion

To the extent plaintiff argues that he should not have been transferred to NFCF in October 

2011 because it was on lockdown, there is no evidence that defendant Moss participated in the 

decision to transfer plaintiff to NFCF. Accordingly, defendant Moss should be granted summary 

judgment as to this claim. 

Citing defendant Moss’s declaration submitted in support of the summary judgment 

motion, defendants argue that defendant Moss cannot be liable for any violation of plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights caused by the lockdown because defendant Moss had no authority to issue 

programming orders to NFCF. The undersigned quotes herein, in relevant part, from defendant 

Moss’s declaration: 

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2. ...In 2012, I became the Chief Deputy Warden at the CDCR 

Contracts Bed Unit (“CBU”), then the Chief in 2014. I am still the 

CBU Chief as of the date of this declaration.

 

3. Around August 2009, the United States District Court ordered 

the CDCR to reduce its inmate population to 137.5% of the design 

capacities for the prison facilities. To that end, the CBU is a unit 

within the CDCR Division of Adult Institutions whose mission is to 

transfer inmates out of state for the purpose of temporarily 

alleviating overcrowding within existing institutions, and to oversee 

the coordination and support of a Modified Community 

Correctional Facility program. In addition, CBU also manages and 

provides oversight to other various contracts, including the 

Alternative Custody Program, Medical Paroles, Contract Back 

Beds, and the Sacramento Control Office/Western Interstate 

Corrections Compact.

4. There was an agreement in writing between the CDCR and 

Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) with a term of 

January 7, 2008 to June 30, 2013 (“Agreement). The stated 

purpose in the Agreement’s recitals is “the STATE requires 

correctional bed space and services for STATE offenders due to 

continuing in-state crowding issues...” The CCA has suitable 

facilities in Arizona, Mississippi and Oklahoma.

** **

8. The Agreement required the CDCR to designate a person to 

monitor the CCA’s performance of the agreement, including their 

maintenance of at least four correctional institutions.

9. The Agreement required the CCA to maintain, among other 

things, educational, recreational, self-help, vocational, recreational 

[sic], religious and visitation programs.

10. Also per the Agreement, the CCA was obligated to report any 

lockdowns or modification of programs for CDCR inmate 

populations. Additionally, the CCA was prohibited from unduly 

delaying return to normal program. In the agreement, the CDCR 

did not retain the right to veto or otherwise override the CCA’s 

programing decisions.

11. In the Agreement, the CCA was an independent contractor and 

had the “sole right to manage the operations of the facility.”

12. During the October 2011 to October 2012 lockdown and 

modified program at-issue in this lawsuit, I was never physically 

present at the North Fork Correctional Facility (“NFCF”) in Sayre, 

Oklahoma. I did not have the authority to issue programming 

orders to the NFCF because they were not CDCR employees and 

because the Agreement afforded them the “sole right to manage the 

operations of the facility.” I did not participate in the NFCF’s 

investigation related to the riot or ongoing threats of racial violence. 

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As an autonomous contractor facility, they were in charge of those 

functions.

(ECF No. 69-7 at 1-4.) 

If defendant Moss had no authority to issue programming orders to NFCF, as defendants 

allege, then it is unclear why defendant Moss would have the authority to review plaintiff’s 

grievance requesting that he be released from the NFCF lockdown. Accordingly, the undersigned 

finds that whether defendant Moss had the authority to order NFCF officials to release plaintiff 

from the lockdown is a materially disputed fact.

Relying on the declaration of NFCF Warden Figueroa submitted in support of the 

summary judgment motion, defendants next argue that the NFCF race-based lockdown was 

narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of institutional security. The undersigned 

quotes herein, in relevant part, from Warden Figueroa’s declaration:

3. 

a. There was a major disturbance at NFCF on October 11, 

2011, at 11:42 a.m., when approximately 120 Southern Hispanic 

and White inmates in the dining hall were battering AfricanAmerican inmates in the Main Dining Hall. A Code Response 

Team was assembled and staff were evacuated from the area. 

Pepper spray was deployed. Then, approximately 50 African

American inmates were evacuated from the area. The rioting 

inmates then began to destroy property in the Main Dining Hall and 

broke multiple metal objects to create weapons and stabbing tools. 

There were multiple inmate injuries in the Main Dining Hall,

including a head injury, broken nose, loss of consciousness, 

lacerations to the back of an inmate’s head, missing teeth, a broken 

jaw, bruising to the head, lacerations to the face, lacerations to the 

hands and arms, a partially amputated finger and a fractured finger.

b. On the West Yard, around 11:42 a.m., approximately 30 

African American and Southern Hispanic inmates began rioting and 

fighting. Pepper spray was deployed. Some of the inmates on the 

West Yard fled into Gym A. Injuries on the West Yard included a 

head injury and a large laceration to the head. In Gym A, 

approximately 75 inmates were rioting and fighting, again with 

Southern Hispanics attacking African American inmates. 

Additional pepper spray was deployed via grenades. The inmates 

in Gym A began destroying property and setting fires in the 

clothing exchange room. Additional metal objects were broken and 

fashioned into weapons. In Gym A, inmates were attacked with fan 

vents and another inmate was observed to be making a stabbing 

motion toward another inmate’s neck.

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c. A containment fence was broken and inmates accessed 

the East Yard. Another containment fence was broken and inmates 

accessed the Big Recreation yard.

d. On the Big Recreation Yard, around 11;44 a.m., 

approximately 200 inmates massed and were rioting and fighting. 

Additional CCA property was destroyed, including fences, fan 

vents, desks, office equipment, refrigerators, tables, brooms, mops, 

cleaning supplies and recreation equipment (baseball bats, gloves, 

weight stack equipment). The inmates barricaded themselves and 

started to create weapons. Injuries included a head injury and other 

trauma. 

e. In the Bravo North unit, around 11:45 a.m., inmates were 

rioting, destroying property, barricading themselves and attempted 

to break into the Officer’s Office. They also attempted to access 

locked cells, but the access panel had been disabled by Master 

Control. A roof team was deployed and they regained control of 

this unit by using pepper spray grenades around 12:27 p.m. Injuries 

in this area included a puncture wound to an inmate’s left thigh. 

Another inmate had multiple lacerations to his head, back, lip, and 

check along with a fractured finger.

f. In the Hotel Alpha unit, around 11:54 a.m., 

approximately 80 African American and Southern Hispanic inmates 

were rioting, destroying property and fighting. Control of this unit 

was not obtained until about 1:35 p.m. An inmate in Hotel Alpha 

had cuts and lacerations to his head, above his right eye, and 

swelling.

g. In the Golf Charlie unit, around 12:20 p.m., inmates were 

rioting and used clinched fists, feet, microwaves, property boxes, 

trash cans, ice chest lids, property box lids, radios and inmate 

manufactures weapons to attack two inmates. Another roof team 

was deployed and they regained control of the unit by 2:09 p.m. 

The injuries included an inmate who lost consciousness. Another 

inmate had an abrasion, scratch, active bleeding and deformity to 

the head area. Yet another inmate had three amputated fingers. A 

fourth inmate was found unresponsive with head trauma and active 

bleeding. Multiple attempted murder investigations were 

commenced based on incidents that occurred in Golf Charlie.

h. In Gym B, around 11:53 a.m., approximately 60 inmates 

began to riot. Southern Hispanic and White inmates again attacked 

African American inmates. The African American inmates escaped 

to the Expansion Dining Hall and barricaded the door. Additional 

property was destroyed. At 2:24 p.m., pepper spray grenades were 

deployed and control was regained around 2:29 p.m. In the kitchen, 

three inmates grabbed a non-inmate Canteen Supervisor and 

dragged her by the legs. Other inmates came to her aid and 

escorted her to the Expansion Dining Hall. Control of the 

Expansion Dining Hall was regained around 3:08 p.m. An inmate 

in this area had a laceration to the scalp and a head injury.

i. After the disturbance was contained, 120 weapons were 

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discovered.

j. A true and correct, redacted copy of the facility’s 5-1 A 

Incident Report is attached as Exhibit 1. 

4. The central theme of the disturbance was a coordinated, widescale attack by Southern Hispanic inmates on African American 

inmates. It was subsequently theorized that the racial motivation of 

the disturbance was based on (1) Southern Hispanics perceived that 

African Americans were disrespecting them, (2) African Americans 

had previously failed to support Southern Hispanics while the latter 

engaged in a hunger strike, and (3) Northern Hispanics had been 

transferred away from the NFCF, leaving a power vacuum that 

African American inmates sought to fill. After the disturbance, it 

would be expected that the African American inmates would be 

motivated to avenge the attack and launch one of their own, 

targeting Southern Hispanics.

5. After a disturbance of this magnitude, the appropriate 

correctional response is to place the institution on lockdown 

pending an investigation into the causes of the disturbance, 

including investigation into racial tension that might indicate future 

violence; investigation related to whether the correctional officers’ 

response and uses of force were reasonable and consistent with 

policy; gather evidence for referral to the local prosecuting agency 

for criminal charges; gather evidence for disciplinary proceedings 

against inmates; repair the facility and search for any new inmatemanufactured weapons. The facility would also start reviewing 

inmate mail for indicia of continued racial tensions and would 

interview inmates periodically to gather information on ongoing 

threats. I ordered that all off these things commence as soon as 

feasible.

6. On October 14, 2011, an NFCF employee took a statement from 

an inmate. The inmate reported that “the Mexicans are going to 

target staff next and it is not safe to open cell doors.” The inmate 

also stated he “won’t feel better till revenge was had.” Attached as 

Exhibit 2 is a true and correct, redacted copy of this 5-1C Incident 

Statement.

7. On October 15, 2011, an NFCF employee reported overhearing 

inmates who were discussing the riot say that “this situational is not 

over yet. When the Black and the Hispanics come up off lockdown 

the Blacks are going to retaliate and make the incident from 

Tuesday look small.” The inmates “wanted to get even” and “it 

will happen to the Hispanics and the staff if they get in the way.” 

Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and redacted copy of this 5-1C 

Incident Statement.

8. On January 10, 2012, I generated a memorandum to CDCR 

Associate Warden Mike Williams titled “Threat Assessment of Riot 

Involving Black and Southern Hispanic Inmates at North Fork 

Correctional Facility.” In that memorandum, I documented that on 

October 17, 2011, eight inmate manufactured weapons had been 

found and that review of the videotapes of the incident had not yet 

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been completed, as there were approximately 140 cameras at the 

facility, running 24 hours per day. In addition, 262 inmates had 

been placed in administrative segregation due to the incident, which 

itself generates a host of institutional procedures that must be 

followed. The hearings on all of the inmate rules violation reports 

and disciplinary proceedings had not been completed. NFCF had 

also conducted an unclothed body search of every inmate for 

injuries or marks consistent with being involved in the disturbance. 

Inmate interviews commenced on October 12, 2011 and as of 

January 10, 2012, 980 had been completed. We conducted an 

additional 1,084 inmate interviews between December 20-27, 2011. 

The feedback we got from the inmates was that there was still a 

racial issue between Southern Hispanics and African Americans 

and “the situation is not finished and will continue once let up from 

lockdown.” I further documented that NFCF staff “continued to 

observe tension amongst the Blacks and the other races in the 

housing units.” Following the disturbance, inmate representatives 

from the Men’s Advisory Committee also toured the housing units 

to discuss issues pertinent to the disturbance with the inmates. They 

discovered that African Americans “are not going to ‘let it go’” 

while referring to the actions taken by the Hispanic participants of 

the disturbance. I recommended that 180 inmates who were active 

participants in the incident be removed from NFCF and that the 

inmate population once again be interviewed.

9. After a racially motivated disturbance occurs, prison officials 

usually restore programs by “phase unlock.” Under this gradual 

method, programs are restored to inmate populations and subgroups 

only when it is safe to do so and on a smaller, test population basis. 

Once a particular group is allowed to resume a program, staff will 

monitor that group’s progress and ability to program before 

allowing another group to also resume that program. Programs are 

restored in small, incremental steps so that any potentially recurring 

violent behavior will be smaller in scale and more easily controlled. 

Typically, the phase unlock will grant programs to the older inmate 

populations first, since the majority of the institutional violence is 

attributed to the younger inmates.

10. Depending on the population, inmates in prison are frequently 

known to self-segregate by race and then form management ranks 

within each race. In my experience, this was true of the CDCR 

inmate population at NFCF. Consequently, inmates in a particular 

racial group may be required to attack other inmates on the basis of 

their race or use violence to protect members of their own race. If 

inmates do not comply with their internal race management, they 

may themselves be targets for violence. For this reason, it was 

impossible to distinguish between members of a race who were 

present participants in the disturbance as opposed to those who 

arrived shortly after, like plaintiff.

11. I am aware that plaintiff, who is African American, arrived at 

NFCF after the disturbance. He had to be included in the 

restrictions on African Americans and Southern Hispanics, despite 

not being present for the incident, for several reasons. First, 

overwhelming intelligence indicated that Southern Hispanics were 

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being ordered to attack African Americans without discriminating 

on the basis of who was present for the October 11, 2011 incident. 

Plaintiff was therefore a target on the basis of his race alone. 

Second, African Americans had been ordered to attack Southern 

Hispanics, on pain of retaliation, without regard to whether the 

African American was present on October 11, 2011 and regardless 

of their gang affiliation. These are unfortunate aspects of prison 

life, but plaintiff’s program restrictions were necessary for his 

personal safety and not over-inclusive.

12. NFCF was contractually required to create Form CDCR 3022-

B Program Status Reports (“PSRs”) to convey to the California Out 

of State Correctional Facility (“COCF”) arm of CDCR what was 

being conveyed to staff and inmates regarding which programs 

were being offered and to which groups. These PSRs were 

assigned number 11-10-0043. The programs that might be affected 

included inmate movement, feeding, ducats, visiting, work, 

showers, medical, dayroom, recreation, canteen, packages, 

telephone calls, legal library and religious services. All of the Form 

CDCR 3022-B PSR Plan B Plan of Operation/Staff & Inmate 

Notifications are attached to this declaration as Exhibit 4, bates 

stamped PSR Plan B 1-162. The PSRs were made at or near the 

time of the program decision, by a person with knowledge, kept in 

the regular course of correctional business and the PSRs were a 

regular practice of our correctional activity.

13. According to PSR Plan B 001, dated October 11, 2011, with an 

effective date of October 12, 2011, the entire inmate population at 

NFCF was placed on lockdown as a result of the disturbance and 

subsequent declaration of a state of emergency. Once programs 

were restored, the NFCF went from a state of “lockdown” to a 

“modified program” status.

14. According to PSR Plan B 003, as of April 2, 2012, we had 

restored normal programming to all inmates, except inmates 

classified African American or Southern Hispanic. The African 

American and Southern Hispanic inmates were still under the 

modified program and had the following restrictions: all movement 

out of cell had to be by escort, with unclothed body search prior, 

segregated by race and at a maximum ratio of five inmates per one 

correctional officer; all meals were served in the cell only, as 

opposed to larger dining halls; visitation was segregated so that 

Southern Hispanics and African Americans alternated days from 

Monday to Friday, with no visitation on Wednesdays; neither race 

was offered vocational opportunities; showers were segregated by 

race; dayroom access and out of cell recreation were prohibited; the 

inmates were allowed telephone calls, canteen and law library 

access, however religious services were limited to cell side by 

chaplains who made rounds.

15. I delayed the phase unlock for Southern Hispanic and African 

American inmates due to ongoing concerns that those inmate 

populations were determined to riot again and attack one another. 

These concerns were based on my training and experience as a 

correctional employee, our investigation and the history of racial 

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politics at NFCF and intelligence we obtained from the inmates 

themselves. For example, on May 21, 2012, we received a note 

from an inmate that read, “There are many blacks who are very mad 

at what happened and we plan on getting even. This is no joke and 

you better be ready. Anyone envolved [sic] needs to be moved out 

or this will never be over. We ain’t rolling over.” On May 29, 

2012, we received another inmate note, directed to the “unet [sic] 

manger [sic].” This note read “word came from Califoria [sic] to 

do eny ]sic] thing possible to take out the Blacks when The South 

Side comes out and The Surenos are told not to take mercy or pay 

the consacuens [sic] them selfs [sic] so I thik [sic] you should let 

both rases [sic] cool down for a little more or git [sic] ready for 

wore [sic]...” True and correct copies of the inmate notes are 

attached to this declaration as Exhibits 5 and 6.

16. The mainstay of the phase unlock began for the Southern 

Hispanic and African American inmates around June 2012. While I 

was not present during the phase unlock, the pertinent records of 

the unlock document the following timeline.

17. According to PSR Plan B 078-79, Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans over age 40 were given day room access 

starting June 29, 2012.

18. According to PSR Plan B 092-93, Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans over age 40 were given out of cell recreation on 

August 24, 2012. In addition, day room access was broadened to 

include Southern Hispanics and African Americans over age 34.

19. According to PSR Plan B 104-105, on September 4, 2012, day 

room access was broadened to include Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans over age 31.

20. According to PSR Plan B 112-113, on September 11, 2012, day 

room access was broadened to include Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans over age 28.

21. According to PSR Plan B 120-121, Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans over age 35 were given out of cell recreation on 

September 17, 2012. In addition, day room access was broadened 

to include Southern Hispanics and African Americans over age 25.

22. According to PSR Plan B 140-141, Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans over age 30 were given out of cell recreation on 

October 1, 2012. In addition, day room access was broadened to 

include Southern Hispanics and African Americans over age 22.

23. According to PSR Plan B 150-151, Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans over age 25 were given out of cell recreation on 

October 8, 2012.

24. According to PSR Plan B 160-161, Southern Hispanics and 

African Americans received normal programming on October 15, 

2012.

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25. While I was Warden of NFCF, the PSRs were signed by me as 

Warden of NFCF or by my designee, in accordance with CCA’s 

contractual obligation to CDCR and I had plenary authority to 

manage the facility’s programs and was responsible for the safety 

and security of the inmate population. No one at the CDCR caused 

any delay in our ability to restore NFCF programming.

26. My programming decisions at NFCF were necessary and based 

on intelligence backed security concerns, the safety of our staff and 

the safety of our Southern Hispanic and African American inmate 

populations. At no time did I intentionally discriminate against 

either population and I was never deliberately indifferent to either 

inmate population’s programming needs. 

27. In my opinion, based on NFCF records, my training and 

experience in corrections and my personal experience at NFCF, I 

believe that the duration of this lockdown and modified program 

were reasonable, necessary, and they were narrowly tailored to 

further a compelling interest of institutional security and safety.

(ECF No. 69-2 at 2-10.

The undersigned again observes that plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim does not challenge 

the imposition or duration of the lockdown per se. Instead, plaintiff claims that he should not 

have been put on lockdown because he was not present at NFCF when the incident occurred.

Based on Warden Figueroa’s declaration quoted above, the undersigned finds that the 

decision to put plaintiff on lockdown, although he was not present at NFCF on October 11, 2011, 

was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of prison security. While plaintiff did 

not participate in the October 11, 2011 incident, prison officials put plaintiff on lockdown 

because they reasonably concluded that plaintiff faced significant security risks from both 

Southern Hispanics and other African American inmates.

To the extent plaintiff suggests that he should have been the only African American 

inmate not on lockdown, plaintiff offers no evidence as to whether this was a plausible alternative 

to putting him on lockdown. Plaintiff offers no evidence as to whether his safety needs would 

have been protected were he not placed on lockdown. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that the decision to retain plaintiff 

on lockdown did not violate his Equal Protection rights. Therefore, defendant Moss did not 

purposefully discriminate against plaintiff when he denied plaintiff’s second level grievance. 

Accordingly, defendant Moss should be granted summary judgment as to this claim. 

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C. Qualified Immunity

Although defendant Moss should be granted summary judgment as to the merits of 

plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim, the undersigned briefly addresses defendants’ argument that 

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim.

Legal Standard

“[Q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense and ... the burden of pleading it rests with 

the defendant.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998). Deciding qualified immunity 

entails a two-step analysis. Once a court determines that a constitutional violation occurred the 

court must then inquire whether the right violated was “clearly established” by asking whether a 

reasonable officer could believe that his actions were lawful. Oxborro v. City of Coalinga, 559 

F.Supp.2d 1072, 1080 (E.D. 2008) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).) “In the 

second step, the court must ask whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation confronted. Although this inquiry is primarily a legal one, where 

the reasonableness of the officer's belief that his conduct was lawful ‘depends on the resolution of 

disputed issues of fact ... summary judgment is not appropriate.’” Id. (citing Wilkins v. City of 

Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2003).) 

Discussion

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they are not aware 

of any Ninth Circuit equal protection cases in the context of a lockdown or modified program 

which would place defendants on notice that their conduct in California was unconstitutional, 

given that the alleged discrimination occurred at a Sayre, Oklahoma, privatized, contractor prison 

which had contractually reserved the sole right to manage the operations of its facility. (ECF No. 

69 at 27.) In support of this argument, defendants cite several published and unpublished Ninth 

Circuit cases addressing prison lockdowns. Defendants argue that none of these cases explore or 

address the situation that is presented in the instant action. Defendants argue that these cases all 

involve challenges by California state prisoners to race based lockdowns in California prisons.

Defendants’ argument for qualified immunity presupposes that defendant Moss had no 

authority over programming orders at NFCF, such as whether to retain plaintiff in lockdown. 

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However, as discussed above, whether defendant Moss had the authority to issue programming 

orders is a disputed material fact. Accordingly, defendant Moss is not entitled to qualified 

immunity. See Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007) (summary 

judgment is appropriate only if defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the facts as 

alleged by the non-moving party). 

VIII. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that the denial of access to work, educational and recreation activities 

during the lockdown violated his Eighth Amendment rights.4 Defendants first move for 

summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on grounds that defendant Moss 

had no involvement or oversight over the lockdown program. As discussed above, whether 

defendant Moss had the authority to order plaintiff’s release from the lockdown, and grant his 

request for exercise, is a materially disputed fact. 

Defendants next argue that defendant Moss should be granted summary judgment as to the 

merits of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

To establish that a lockdown created conditions of confinement that violated the Eighth 

Amendment, the prisoner must establish first, that he was deprived of the “minimal civilized 

measure of life's necessities,” and second, that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his 

health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1994). 

Prisoners have no constitutional right to work or to education. See Baumann v. Arizona 

Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1985) (no constitutional right to work); Rhodes 

v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (no constitutional right to education). Therefore, the 

denial of access to work and educational activities during the lockdown did not violate plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, defendant Moss should be granted summary judgment 

 

4

 In the summary judgment motion, defendants argue that plaintiff does not clearly raise an 

Eighth Amendment claim, but they address the Eighth Amendment in their motion out of an 

abundance of caution. In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment claim. 

(ECF No. 17 at 3, 5: 20.) In their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 32), defendants did not argue that plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim was not adequately pled or otherwise address plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claim. 

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as to these claims.

For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned finds that defendant Moss is entitled to 

qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim challenging the denial of outdoor 

exercise. The parties do not dispute that plaintiff was denied outdoor exercise for the 

approximately 11 months plaintiff was on lockdown/modified program.

“Although exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth 

Amendment, a temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial 

deprivation.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). A finding that the purpose of 

the lockdown was to “prevent further attacks, injuries, and homicides” will generally defeat an 

argument that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. See Norwood v. Woodford, 661 

F.Supp.2d 1148, 1157 (S.D.Cal. 2007). 

In Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011), first issued on March 17, 2011, and 

amended on August 2, 2011, the Ninth Circuit determined that prison officials were entitled to 

qualified immunity with respect to a seven-month lockdown following a prison riot, as

it was not clearly established in 2002—nor is it established yet—

precisely how, according to the Constitution, or when a prison 

facility housing problem inmates must return to normal operations, 

including outside exercise, during and after a state of emergency 

called in response to a major riot, here one in which inmates 

attempted to murder staff.

Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d at 1143 (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit reiterated in Noble that prison officials are entitled to “wide-ranging 

deference” and courts must defer to prison officials' judgment as long as it does not manifest 

deliberate indifference or an intent to inflict harm. Id. The court also noted that after the attack 

on the exercise yard against correctional staff, prison officials were justified in declaring an 

emergency and imposing a lockdown, which by definition precluded typical outdoor exercise, 

until prison officials could gradually restore it. Id. at 1144. The court observed that responsible 

officials were constantly reviewing the lockdown to determine how and when to safely lift it. Id.

at 1147. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit found that prison officials were not deliberately 

indifferent, and the lockdown was not in excess of what was necessary to restore order. Id. at 

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1148.

Pursuant to Noble, defendant Moss is entitled to qualified immunity. The incident in the 

instant case occurred approximately two months after Noble was decided. As of October 2011, it 

was still not clearly established how long a prison could remain on lockdown before violating the 

inmates’ constitutional rights.

As in Noble, the “incident” in the instant action involved a major riot. Defendants have 

presented sufficient evidence showing that security concerns justified imposing the lockdown in 

October 2011, and maintaining the lockdown and modified programs through October 2012, 

when all inmates received normal programming. In his declaration, Warden Figueroa discusses 

the interviews and investigations into January 2012 that revealed ongoing racial tensions. 

Warden Figueroa also cites the inmate notes found in May 2012, which demonstrated ongoing 

racial tensions. While defendants have not provided specific evidence regarding investigations or 

other evidence of ongoing racial tension from January 2012 to when the inmate notes were 

discovered in May 2012, the court cannot conclude from this evidentiary gap that the 

lockdown/modified program was no longer warranted. This court is not in the position to lightly 

second guess the expert judgment to make the decisions regarding when to ease restrictions, 

Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2009), or otherwise micromanage prisons. 

Noble, 646 F.3d at 1143.5 

 

5

 In Noble, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred in finding that the lack of 

evidence of new disruptive events did not support the ongoing lockdown:

The district court erred in viewing the end on January 30, 2002 of 

the formal investigation of the immediate precipitating causes of the 

riot, which in any event was not conclusive, as a point from which 

the officials must demonstrate additional “specific facts” or new 

disruptive events supporting their judgment that the emergency had 

not dissipated and that the lockdown must continue. The absence of 

any additional disruptive events was a good sign, but hardly one 

that signaled the evaporation of the tension that sparked this riot 

and clearly continued in its aftermath. The district court's approach 

manifestly trespassed against our warnings not to micro-manage 

prisons. Moreover, the absence of any new attacks demonstrates, if 

anything, appropriate prudence and the success of the lockdown, 

not that it might lack a “penological purpose.”

Noble, 646 F.3d at 1147.

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In any event, plaintiff does not seriously dispute that the purpose of the lockdown was to

maintain prison security. Plaintiff also does not seriously dispute that ongoing security concerns 

warranted maintaining the lockdown and modified program until October 2012. Plaintiff’s main 

claim is that he should not have been placed on lockdown because he was not at NFCF when the 

riot occurred. However, as discussed above, defendants have demonstrated, by way of Warden 

Figueroa’s declaration, that placing plaintiff on the lockdown was legitimately for his own 

protection. 

As mentioned above, in Noble, the Ninth Circuit found that prison officials were entitled 

to qualified immunity because they regularly reviewed the lockdown to determine whether 

restrictions could be eased. In the instant case, defendants have provided “Program Status 

Report” forms signed by Warden Figueroa and Warden Perez, reflecting their regular reviews of 

the lockdown following implementation of the modified programs in April 2012 through the 

conclusion of the phased unlock in October 2012. (ECF No. 69-4 at 4-78; ECF No. 69-5.) 

Defendants do not specifically address the type and frequency of reviews of the lockdown 

occurring prior to April 2012. However, in his June 2012 response to plaintiff’s grievance, 

defendant Moss states that the lockdown/modified program was reviewed weekly to determine 

whether restrictions could be eased. Therefore, by the time defendant Moss reviewed plaintiff’s 

grievance, it is clear that NFCF officials regularly reviewed the status of the lockdown. 

There is no evidence raising a genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the need 

for the lockdown/modified program, or the need to lift the lockdown in measured phases. Noble, 

646 F.3d at 1144. There is no evidence that defendant Moss acted with deliberate indifference in 

denying plaintiff’s grievance requesting that he be released from the modified program and 

allowed outdoor exercise. Accordingly, defendant Moss should be granted summary judgment on 

grounds that he is entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to Noble, supra. 

IX. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Settlement Conference

On June 1, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for a settlement conference and for the court to 

rule in “favor of plaintiff in summary” (docketed as a motion for summary judgment). (ECF No. 

65). Because the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be 

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granted, plaintiff’s motion for a settlement conference and for a ruling in his favor is denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a settlement 

conference and for a ruling in his favor (docketed as a summary judgment motion) (ECF No. 65) 

is denied;

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 

No. 69) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right 

to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: December 6, 2016

Gr1867.sj

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