Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01810/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luis Acosta, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, a municipal corporation,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-1810-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Pending before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 34).

I. Background

This case is the latest in a long and diverse line of actions brought by Plaintiff Luis

Acosta (“Acosta”) against Defendant City of Phoenix (“City”). In December 1994, Acosta,

a Mexican American, began employment as a “trades helper” at the Skunk Creek Landfill,

a facility maintained by the City’s Department of Public Works. Acosta’s job required him

to handle plumbing repairs at the landfill and assist carpenters, mechanics, and other skilled

trades workers in the performance of their duties. 

 Between May and July 2001, Acosta submitted to the United States Environmental

Protection Agency and the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality several notices of

alleged City violations of federal environmental laws. Acosta sought the support of his coworkers in filing these actions. 

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For a variety of reasons, Acosta’s behavior created an atmosphere of hostility between

himself and other landfill employees. On July 12, 2001, sixteen of Acosta’s co-workers

submitted a signed statement to the Department of Public Works calling for disciplinary

action against him. The statement read: 

We, employees of the City of Phoenix Skunk Creek Landfill,

feel that Luis Acosta is creating a non-conducive work

environment. His behavior toward his fellow co-workers is not

only making us feel like we are walking on eggshells, but is also

making us feel we have to continually look over our shoulders

due to his constant distractions and accusations. We find this

demeaning toward all the employees at the landfill. 

His attitude toward his fellow co-workers does not demonstrate

a team environment or a healthy work atmosphere. Not only is

this annoying, it has created morale, production and work ethic

problems. 

We are respectfully requesting that the City of Phoenix take

appropriate action toward Mr. Acosta’s behavior to correct the

hostile environment he has created at the landfill. 

Doc. # 35, Exhibit 1. On July 25, 2001, four additional co-workers signed a joint statement

which read: 

We the undersigned have requested the Foremen at Skunk Creek

Landfill not to assign us to work with Mr. Luis Acosta for the

following reasons: 

1. Mr. Acosta treats us with lack of mutual respect when we

are assigned to work with him. 

2. Mr. Acosta has requested personal information from us

on numerous occasions for a purpose unknown to us. 

3. Mr. Acosta continues to tell us to participate in actions

with the landfill and management in which we do not

agree with or wish to partake in. Despite our requests for

him to stop he continues to tell us to participate in these

actions. 

Doc. # 35, Exhibit 1. All of the employees who signed these statements were male; several

were also Hispanic. 

Problems persisted after the submission of these complaints. On July 26, 2001,

Acosta filed notice of an alleged safety hazard with the Industrial Commission of Arizona’s

Division of Occupational Safety & Health. The notice alleged that safety rails on a machine

used for trash extraction at Skunk Creek were missing, causing the machine to be unsafe.

Acosta requested that his identity as the filer of the notice not be revealed to the City because

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he “want[ed] protection,” and because “disparate treatment already exist[ed] in [his] work

place.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit 3. 

In August 2001, Acosta was transferred to the Salt River Service Center and informed

that he was being investigated for creating a hostile work environment at Skunk Creek.

Acosta performed tasks at Salt River not typically assigned to trades helpers and considered

his new position a demotion. City Public Works Director Mark Leonard, who was involved

in the decision to transfer Acosta, explains that the action was taken because of “safety

concerns” and a “petition/complaint . . . received from numerous co-workers of Mr. Acosta.”

Doc. # 35, Exhibit 3 at 2. No City employee ever stated that Acosta was transferred to Salt

River because of the claims he had filed against the City or because he is Hispanic. 

Upon completion of its investigation, the City filed a disciplinary notice on October

5 that suspended Acosta from his employment for October 8-9, 2001. The notice articulated

several justifications for the suspension. First, it explained that Acosta had violated City

personnel rules against insubordination and the “incompetent or inefficient” performance of

job duties by failing to repair broken toilets at Skunk Creek facilities. Doc. # 40, Exhibit 4.

The notice also stated that Acosta had committed a “gross violation of established

procedures” by neglecting to notify management of hazardous materials suspected of being

dumped at the landfill. Id. The notice further stated that Acosta had shown “continuing

negative behavior” by raising unfounded complaints of safety violations against the City and

“creating a hostile work environment” for his co-workers. Id. In support of the latter

conclusion, the notice cited the memorandum filed with Skunk Creek’s management by

Acosta’s co-workers on July 25, 2001. It was found that Acosta’s behavior violated a City

personnel rule against “abusive or threatening” conduct toward fellow employees. Id.

Acosta signed the statement describing these violations, but below his signature added, “I

don’t agree with above statement and sign under protest.” Id. 

The City’s Civil Service Board upheld the disciplinary action on February 25, 2002.

The Board found that Acosta had been “suspended for several incidents of inappropriate and

disruptive conduct contributing to creating a hostile work environment for some of his

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coworkers; negligence in carrying out his job duties; reporting false safety and hazardous

dumping violations without first notifying his supervisor; and inappropriately soliciting

coworkers and contractors to take action to discredit the City.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit 5. 

In April 2002, Acosta filed a grievance with the City’s Equal Opportunity

Department, complaining that his transfer to the Salt River Service Center manifested

discrimination on the basis of national origin. The Department’s investigative summary

found otherwise, explaining that, based on the preliminary information and documentation

it had received, “there [was] no identifiable basis for conducting an investigation into

Acosta’s allegation.” Doc. # 35, Exhibit 2. The summary concluded as follows: 

A preliminary review of the evidence supports a reasonable

inference that Mr. Acosta’s relocation was due to his coworker’s

[sic] complaints. The nineteen [sic] coworkers whose signatures

are found on the grievance against Acosta represent a diverse

group in several protected categories. In fact, three of the

coworkers who lodged a complaint against Acosta are members

of the same protected groups. . . . There is no evidence to

suggest that Acosta’s gender (male), age (42), or national origin

(Hispanic) are related to his transfer.

Doc. # 35, Exhibit 2. 

Acosta was suspended a second time on January 2, 2003. The basis for this action

was that Acosta had violated a directive of the Public Works Director by attending a City

Council meeting to voice discontent with his transfer and prior suspension. The Civil Service

Board rescinded the second suspension after finding it unwarranted. Doc. # 40, Exhibit 6.

In July 2004, Acosta appeared at a City Council meeting to complain that the

Department of Public Works had misused funds by failing to recover an unspecified form of

“warranty money” in the “best interest of the taxpayers.” Doc. # 35, Exhibit 6 at 21. From

the submissions of the parties, it is unclear how the City Council responded to the allegation.

Also in July 2004, a building maintenance worker at the Metro Facilities Division of

the City’s Public Works Department took an extended leave of absence due to disability.

The City assigned Acosta to fill the worker’s position in early August, which put Acosta in

charge of changing filters on air conditioners in all City-owned buildings. The letter of

assignment stated that the job would likely last six to twelve months, and that Acosta’s

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“salary and benefits [would] not be affected as a result of [the] transfer.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit

7. Acosta retained his title of trades helper in carrying out the new assignment. Public

Works Director Mark Leonard chose Acosta to fill the vacancy because Acosta had

previously expressed an interest in working closer with skilled tradespeople, and the job

would allow him to gain that experience. Doc. # 35, Exhibit 3 at 2-3. Acosta accepted the

assignment because he felt it “would be a great opportunity to learn new skills, meet new

individuals and assist [the] department in an area of need.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit 8 at 2. No

City employee ever told Acosta that he was transferred to the Metro Facilities Division

because of the various claims he had filed against the City or because he is Hispanic. Doc.

# 35, Exhibit 6 at 25. 

Acosta began working at the Metro Facilities Division on August 2, 2004. At the

time, space in the Division’s building was partly apportioned to administrative offices; partly

apportioned to a heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning shop; and partly apportioned to a

building maintenance shop. The building also contained a warehouse. Some parts of the

building were air conditioned, while others relied on swamp coolers for temperature control.

Facilities Maintenance Superintendent Loren Pike assigned Acosta to a desk located in the

warehouse, a portion of the building that used a swamp cooler and contained the air filters

Acosta would need to complete his job. Other employees were also assigned to the

warehouse area, although none of them were employed in Acosta’s line of work. 

Pike explained that he assigned Acosta to the warehouse because Acosta’s position

required him “to be out in the field almost 100% of the time,” and he “only needed a ‘work

station’ as a place to report in the mornings and a place to complete paperwork that would

be necessary at the close of the day.” Doc. # 35, Exhibit 4 at 2. He also explained that the

assignment was motivated by the practical advantage of locating Acosta in close proximity

to his supplies. Pike had no prior contact with Acosta, but was aware of co-worker

complaints in connection with Acosta’s prior work at Skunk Creek. No City employee ever

stated that Acosta was assigned to the warehouse because of his ethnicity or because he had

previously filed claims against the City. 

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On August 4, shortly before starting time, Pike noticed that Acosta was not sitting at

his assigned location, so he repeated the instruction that Acosta was to report to his assigned

desk in the warehouse. Acosta believes that, after this encounter, Pike “began . . . placing

judgment” upon him without allowing any time “to get to know [him] as an employee or

individual.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit 11. Several weeks later, Acosta advised his supervisor that

he felt “ostracized and segregated against” because of the location of his desk and that he

would contact Mark Leonard to discuss the issue that night. Id. In response to Acosta’s

complaint, the Division moved Acosta out of the warehouse and into an air-conditioned

cubicle located in close proximity to front-office personnel. Acosta then complained that the

new location segregated him from employees engaged in his line of work.

Acosta then filed two grievances against the City in connection with his work at the

Metro Facilities Division. In the first, filed with the Public Works Department on November

29, 2004, he alleged that because building maintenance workers are paid at higher rates than

are trades helpers, the City was underpaying him by retaining his previous pay while tasking

him with the responsibilities of a building maintenance worker. He requested a pay increase

to match his new responsibilities. Doc. # 40, Exhibit 8. The Public Works Department

initially denied Acosta’s request on December 6, 2004, on the ground that his job did not

include the “higher-level duties of a Building Maintenance Worker.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit 9.

However, the grievance was subsequently upheld, and the requested compensation was

granted in full on December 15, 2004. Doc. # 40, Exhibit 10. 

Acosta filed a second grievance in connection with his job at Metro Facilities Division

on February 3, 2005. The basis for this action was that Pike had required him to work in the

warehouse, an area that was allegedly isolated and that used a swamp cooler rather than an

air conditioner. Observing that other personnel worked in close proximity to others and in

air-conditioned environments, Acosta stated that he felt “segregated, intimidated as well as

stressed about being ostracized.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit 11. As a remedy, he requested to be

located with the “building maintenance employee group.” Id. 

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Acosta’s second grievance was denied by the City’s Public Works Department as

untimely because it concerned events that occurred in August 2004. Doc. # 40, Exhibit 12.

The grievance was also denied because Acosta had already been moved out of the warehouse

and into an air-conditioned cubicle alongside the Metro Facilities Division’s office staff.

Acosta expressed dissatisfaction with the denial on the ground that the alleged violation was

ongoing. Id.

On March 11, 2005, Acosta filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), claiming retaliation and discrimination

on the basis of national origin. The basis for the charge was that he was being “supervised

by a non-traditional supervisor who oversees . . . City planners only.” Doc. # 35, Exhibit 7.

Acosta further stated that he believed he was being retaliated against for “reporting a half

million dollars of mishandled product not in the best interest of the public good,” and that

“because of my national origin (Mexican-American) [the City] is discriminating against me

because of my intelligence in the work place.” Doc. # 40, Exhibit 2. The charge indicated

that the latest date of the cited discrimination was March 11, 2005, and that the

discrimination was not ongoing. Id. The EEOC denied the charge because it could not

conclude that a violation had occurred. A right-to-sue letter was issued on March 31, 2005.

Acosta now argues that the City has discriminated against him on the basis of national

origin by “reassigning him to new work areas and keeping him apart and separate from his

co-workers,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Count I). Doc. # 1 at 5. He contends

that the same conduct also constitutes retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

(Count II). Defendant moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56. 

II. Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is

proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly

supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1985). 

The Court must evaluate a party’s motion for summary judgment construing the

alleged facts with all reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party. See Baldwin v.

Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001). The evidence presented by the

parties must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory and speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and to defeat

summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.

1979).

III. Analysis

A. Timeliness of the EEOC Charge

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)

Generally, a plaintiff asserting claims under Title VII must file an administrative

charge with the EEOC “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). However, where the plaintiff

first “instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek

relief,” the Title VII claim must be filed with the EEOC “within three hundred days after the

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Id. To trigger the application of the 300-

day limitations period, the state or local agency with which the plaintiff’s grievance was

initially filed must satisfy the following qualifications: 

(1) That the State or political subdivision has a fair

employment practice law which makes unlawful

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employment practices based upon race, color, religion,

sex, national origin or disability; and 

(2) That the State or political subdivision has either

established a State or local authority or authorized an

existing State or local authority that is empowered with

respect to employment practices found to be unlawful, to

do one of three things: To grant relief from the practice;

to seek relief from the practice; or to institute criminal

proceedings with respect to the practice. 

29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a). An agency that satisfies these requirements may be formally

designated a “Fair Employment Practices” (“FEP”) agency if it “submits a written request

to the Chairman of the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission.” 29 C.F.R. §

1601.70(b). Alternatively, if the Commission is “aware that an agency or authority meets the

. . . criteria for FEP agency designation [in § 1601.70(a)], the Commission shall defer charges

to such agency or authority even though no request for FEP agency designation has been

made.” Id.

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1). In the action filed with the EEOC on March 11, 2005, Acosta stated that the Metro

Facilities Division forced him to work in an isolated warehouse that used a swamp cooler.

This alleged segregation began on the first day of his employment with the Division: August

2, 2004. The time between August 2, 2004, and March 11, 2005, is 221 days. Thus, if the

300-day limitations period governs, Plaintiff’s claims were timely filed with the EEOC. If

the 180-day period governs, Plaintiff’s claims were untimely in the absence of some other

justifying circumstance. 

Applying 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), Acosta had only 180 days to file his charge with

the EEOC. The 300-day limitations period only governs if a plaintiff first instituted an

action with a “State or local agency with authority grant or seek relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1). Plaintiff’s employee grievance was filed with the City’s Department of Public

Works on February 3, 2005. While the Phoenix Department of Public Works may appear

to fall under the statutory terms that trigger the 300-day period, the regulations that

implement 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) indicate otherwise. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) lists all

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agencies that have received the “FEP agency” designation. The only such agency from the

state of Arizona is the Arizona Civil Rights Division. Id. Additionally, there is no record

evidence that the City’s Department of Public Works actually petitioned the EEOC for FEP

designation, or that the EEOC was otherwise aware that the Department met the criteria for

that designation. As a result, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(b) precludes the Department of Public

Works from operating as a “state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief” under

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), and the 180-day period applies. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 180-day limitations period has been held applicable in

closely analogous circumstances. In Branco v. Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2000

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16249 (D. Mass. Nov. 2, 2000), the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging

employment discrimination with the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission. Two hundred

and sixty days after the last act of alleged discrimination, the plaintiff grew impatient with

the lack of progress in his claim before the Civil Service Commission, so he filed a charge

with the EEOC. It was found, however, that the claims filed with the Civil Service

Commission did not toll the limitations period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). While the

Commission appeared to satisfy the facial requirements of the statute, it was not listed as an

FEP agency in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a), and there was no indication in the record that the

Commission had actually petitioned the EEOC for FEP designation or that the EEOC was

aware that the Commission met the criteria for FEP designation in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a).

Id. at *6-7. 

2. The Continuing Violation Doctrine

Acosta attempts to salvage his claims by arguing that even if the 180-day limitations

period applies, his March 11 complaint of harassment was timely because it concerned an

“ongoing condition” that persisted within the 180-day period. He identifies this condition

as the “denial of the privilege to be able to work with co-employees who performed the same

or similar job duties.” Doc. # 39 at 6. 

The argument is unpersuasive. Discrete acts of discrimination that occur outside the

statutory time period may not be considered in evaluating a Title VII claim. Nat’l R.R.

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Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113-14 (2002). An employer’s rejection of a

proposed accommodation is not an ongoing condition, but rather a discrete act. Cherosky v.

Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2003). Even though the effect of the denial

“continues to be felt by the employee for as long as he remains employed,” the denial is

deemed to occur exclusively on the date on which the employee’s proposal is rejected. Id.

at 1248 (quoting Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2nd Cir. 2003)).

The record indicates that Acosta requested to be located with building maintenance workers

during the week of August 31, 2004, and that his request was tacitly denied. Doc. # 40,

Exhibit 11. From this evidence, it is apparent that the proposed accommodation was rejected

at least 190 days before Acosta filed a charge before the EEOC. 

For these reasons, and because there is no dispute of material fact concerning the dates

at issue, Acosta’s claims are time-barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Summary judgment

will be granted. 

B. The Merits

Even if Acosta hypothetically filed his charge of discrimination with the EEOC in a

timely fashion, his claims cannot survive the Motion for Summary Judgment. Lawsuits

arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are subject to a three-stage burdenshifting analysis. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir.

2001). First, the plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving a prima facie case of

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the plaintiff has created a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the burden of

production, but not persuasion, shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

802. If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that the reasons advanced by the defendant constitute mere pretext for

unlawful discrimination. Id. 

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“As a general matter, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action need

produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary

judgment.” Chuang v. Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

the plaintiff must still raise a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant’s legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for her termination was pretextual. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1094. The

plaintiff may demonstrate pretext either directly, by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 1093-94.

1. Count I: Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “limit, segregate, or classify his

employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive

any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an

employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under this

statute, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was

qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly

situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other

circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of

discrimination.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Defendant contends that Acosta has failed to demonstrate an adverse employment

action. “An adverse employment action is a discriminatory act which ‘adversely affects the

terms, conditions, or benefits’ of the plaintiff’s employment.” James v. Booz-Allen &

Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2004). “Conduct short of ‘ultimate employment

decisions’ can” satisfy this standard. Id. However, the “mere fact that a new job assignment

is less appealing to the employee . . . does not constitute adverse employment action.” Id.

at 376. 

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a. The Transfer to the Salt River Service Center

In light of the cited authority, Plaintiff has made a prima facie case that his transfer

to the Salt River Service Center was an adverse employment action. In connection with that

transfer, Acosta was demoted from his status as a trades helper. Although he apparently

continued to receive the same salary, the transfer adversely affected the “terms” and

“conditions” of his employment. James, 368 F.3d at 375. 

Nevertheless, Defendant has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for this

adverse employment action. Acosta’s transfer to Salt River occurred after the City had

received twenty written complaints from his co-workers. These complaints stated that

Acosta’s behavior toward other employees was “demeaning” and “created morale,

production and work ethic problems.” Doc. # 35, Exhibit 1. The statements also explained

that Acosta caused “constant distractions” and made others feel “like [they were] walking

on eggshells.” Id. Several of the co-workers who signed these complaints were Hispanic

males. Id. The City’s Public Work Director explained that he transferred Acosta to Salt

River because of these complaints. Doc. # 35, Exhibit 3 at 2. 

Plaintiff has not even attempted to establish that the articulated reason for his transfer

to Salt River was a mere pretext for discrimination. Count I therefore cannot survive the

Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of Acosta’s transfer to the Salt River Service

Center. 

b. The Transfer to the Metro Facilities Division

Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in connection with

his transfer to the Metro Facilities Division and subsequent isolation from building

maintenance workers. These actions were not adverse employment actions. Acosta heartily

accepted the transfer to the Division because he felt it “would be a great opportunity to learn

new skills, meet new individuals and assist [the] department in an area of need.” Doc. # 40,

Exhibit 8 at 2. The transfer did not change Acosta’s job title or affect his benefits. Doc. #

40, Exhibit 7. Acosta even received a higher salary at the Division than he had received from

either of his prior positions with the City. Doc. # 40, Exhibit 10. When Acosta began to feel

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isolated from co-workers at the Division and dissatisfied because his new workspace used

a swamp cooler rather than centralized air conditioning, Division management responded by

promptly moving him to an air-conditioned cubicle located in close proximity to other

employees. Doc. # 40, Exhibit 11. Although Acosta remained dissatisfied even after

receiving these accommodations, Title VII does not support an action simply because the

employer provides employment conditions that are less than utopian. 

Even if Acosta hypothetically demonstrated that his transfer to the Metro Facilities

Division was an adverse employment action, Defendant has also articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for that action. The building maintenance worker who preceded

Acosta at the Division took an extended leave of absence due to disability, and the Division

needed someone to fill his position. The Public Works Director chose Acosta because

Acosta had previously expressed an interest in working closer with tradespeople, and the job

would allow him to gain that experience. Doc. # 35, Exhibit 3 at 2-3. It is apparent from the

record that the transfer was simply an attempt to fulfill Acosta’s expressed career interests,

rather than a hostile act of discrimination. 

Defendant has also articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the

location and condition of Acosta’s workspace at the Division. The superintendent explained

that he assigned Acosta to the warehouse because Acosta’s position required him “to be out

in the field almost 100% of the time,” and Acosta “only needed a ‘work station’ as a place

to report in the mornings and a place to complete paperwork that would be necessary at the

close of the day.” Doc. # 35, Exhibit 4 at 2. From these statements, it appears that Acosta

was assigned to the warehouse for practical reasons rather than because of discrimination.

In an attempt to show pretext, Acosta baldly asserts that he was transferred because

of his national origin. However, other than his subjective belief, there is zero support for that

assertion. Count I thus cannot survive the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to

Plaintiff’s transfer to the Metro Facilities Division. 

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2. Count II: Retaliation

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision forbids employer actions that “discriminate

against” an employee because he has “opposed” a practice that Title VII forbids or has “made

a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title VII “investigation, proceeding, or

hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas, as

modified for retaliation cases, requires that the plaintiff “demonstrate that (1) []he had

engaged in protected activity; (2) []he was thereafter subjected by [his] employer to an

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action.” Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir.

2005) (citations omitted). On summary judgment, “the existence of a discriminatory motive

for the employment decision will generally be the principal question.” Lam v. Univ. of Haw.,

40 F.3d 1551, 1559 (9th Cir. 1994). 

a. The Transfer to the Salt River Service Center

Acosta first argues that he was transferred to the Salt River Service Center in

retaliation for filing safety and environmental complaints against the City in the summer of

2001. In support of this position, he points out that the transfer was made only a few weeks

after the complaints were filed. 

Plaintiff fails to make a prima facie case. A retaliation claim under Title VII must be

based on an adverse employment action taken because the employee “opposed a practice

made an unlawful employment practice by” Title VII, or because the employee “made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Acosta’s claims against the City in the

summer of 2001, however, concerned violations of federal environmental laws and state

safety regulations. Title VII does not make unlawful the conduct on which those claims were

founded. Thus, even assuming that Acosta was transferred to Salt River in retaliation for the

safety and environmental claims he filed against the City, Title VII provides no cause of

action. 

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b. The Transfer to the Metro Facilities Division

Plaintiff also argues that he was transferred to the Metro Facilities Division in

retaliation for the various complaints he filed against the City between 2001 and 2004.

Insofar as the claim is based on complaints filed against the City for activities not governed

by Title VII, Acosta has failed to make a prima facie case for the reasons articulated above.

To the extent that the claim concerns retaliation for actions actually governed by Title VII,

the claim fails because the transfer to the Division was not adverse. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

“protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury

or harm.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006).

The plaintiff “must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action

materially adverse, which . . . means that it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker

from making or supporting” charges against the City. Id. at 2415 (internal quotations

omitted). “An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that

employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that

all employees experience.” Id. 

The record does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that his second transfer was adverse.

As explained above, Acosta had previously requested a job like the one he received at the

Division, and he looked forward to carrying out the assignment. Moreover, the transfer did

not result in any change in Acosta’s title or benefits. He even received a higher salary at the

Division than he had received at Skunk Creek or Salt River. The fact that Acosta’s

workplace used a swamp cooler rather than centralized air conditioning was, at best, no more

than a “minor annoyance” that cannot support a claim under Title VII, particularly in light

of the fact that Acosta was promptly moved to an air-conditioned cubicle after he

complained. Although Acosta’s original workspace isolated him from building maintenance

workers, other employees were present in the warehouse, and Acosta worked nearby the

Division’s office personnel after he received a cubicle. 

Fancifully assuming that Acosta has in fact made a prima facie case of retaliation

under Title VII, the City has, as explained earlier, articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory

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reasons for transferring Acosta to the Metro Facilities Division and locating him in its

warehouse, and Acosta has failed to establish that those reasons were pretextual. He argues

that retaliation can be inferred from the fact that the City relocated him to a cubicle

approximately one month after he complained about conditions at the warehouse. In some

situations, temporal proximity between a plaintiff’s action and the employer’s response may

support an inference of retaliation. Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 855 (9th Cir.

2003). However, the City relocated Acosta in order to accommodate him. The fact that the

accommodation failed to satisfy Acosta’s precise expectations does not demonstrate that the

accommodation was made in retaliation. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 34) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter judgment in favor of Defendant and

that Plaintiff take nothing. The clerk shall terminate this case.

DATED this 4th day of December 2006.

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