Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00740/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00740-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DWAYNE A. HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-0740 DMS (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

PARTIALLY DISMISS

[Docket No. 26]

vs.

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et. al.,

Defendants.

On August 17, 2009, this Court entered an order granting in part and denying in part

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint, and granting Plaintiff leave to file a First

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on August 27, 2009. Defendants

now move for partial dismissal of the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the

motion, and Defendants filed a reply. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and

denies in part Defendants’ motion.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dwayne A. Harvey, an African-American man, began his employment with the City

of San Diego over twenty years ago. Plaintiff works as a Public Work Supervisor in the City’s

Environmental Services Department. He alleges that at various times during his employment, he was

subjected to differential and discriminatory treatment due to his race. Plaintiff filed a charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and received a

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Notification of Right to Sue on January 29, 2009. Plaintiff now sues the City and three of his

supervisors, alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not comply with the Court’s

previous order on individual capacity claims and punitive damages, and those portions that are

noncompliant should be dismissed. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim should be

dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to identify the constitutional right at issue, and the claim is

based on respondeat superior liability. Plaintiff concedes that some portions of his First Amended

Complaint are inconsistent with the Court’s order, and he requests leave to amend his Complaint to

bring it into compliance. He disputes that his § 1983 claim should be dismissed. 

A. Standard of Review

In two recent opinions, the Supreme Court established a more stringent standard of review for

12(b)(6) motions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under this new standard, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Id. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)). In Iqbal, the Court began this

task “by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”

Id. at 1951. It then considered “the factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they

plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951.

B. The Court’s Previous Order

Before turning to whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief under § 1983, the

Court addresses Defendants’ argument that the First Amended Complaint does not comply with the

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Court’s previous Order. In the previous Order, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s Title

VII claims against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities. The Court also dismissed

with prejudice Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their

official capacities. Defendants argue the First Amended Complaint does not reflect these rulings.

Plaintiff agrees that the First Amended Complaint does not accurately reflect the Court’s ruling on

punitive damages, but disagrees about the individual capacity claims. 

Plaintiff asserts that his first and second claims for discrimination and harassment,

respectively, accurately reflect that Plaintiff is suing the individual Defendants in their official

capacity only. This is consistent with the Court’s previous Order. However, the Court notes that

Plaintiff’s first claim is against the City only. There is no claim for discrimination against the

individual Defendants. To the extent Plaintiff contests that in his opposition brief, it is not contained

in his First Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff also argues he is suing the individual Defendants in their official and individual

capacities for retaliation, and that is not inconsistent with the Court’s previous Order because that

claim is not based on Title VII, but Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. As

Defendants point out, however, Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is Title

VII. As currently pleaded, therefore, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim does not conform to the Court’s

previous Order. Consistent therewith, this claim may be brought against the individual Defendants

in their official capacities only. 

C. Section 1983 Claim

Turning to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to identify the

specific constitutional right at issue, and Plaintiff improperly seeks to holds Defendants liable under

a respondeat superior theory. Plaintiff responds that he does not intend to pursue a respondeat

superior theory against Defendants. Therefore, the only issue is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently

identified the constitutional right at issue. 

Plaintiff relies on § 1983 as one of the legal bases for his harassment claim. This claim clearly

alleges that Plaintiff was the victim of harassment at work based on his race, but it does not specify

the constitutional right at issue. Although a claim of racial harassment implicates the equal protection

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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amended Complaint does not make that clear.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim, but with leave to file a

Second Amended Complaint. 

III.

CONCLUSION

In light of the above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

Specifically, the Court grants the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim against the

individual Defendants in their official capacities. The Court also grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s racial harassment claim under § 1983 for failure to identify the specific constitutional right

at issue. The motion is denied in all other respects. 

Because this is the first time the Court has considered Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, Plaintiff is

granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint that cures the pleading deficiencies set out above.

Plaintiff shall file his Second Amended Complaint on or before November 20, 2009. If Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint fails to address the pleading deficiencies outlined above, it will be

dismissed with prejudice and without any further leave to amend. Furthermore, to the extent any

portion of the Second Amended Complaint is inconsistent with this Order, it will be stricken. 

With this ruling, the parties shall attend an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference with Judge

Brooks on December 10, 2009, at 2:00 p.m., at which time a trial date will be set. Judge Brooks will

be issuing a separate order outlining the practices and procedures for ENE conferences in his

chambers. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 9, 2009

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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