Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02646/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02646-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYLER EDWARDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MODOC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In his Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff Tyler Edwards (“Plaintiff”) alleges several 

causes of action against Defendants County of Modoc, Modoc County Sherriff’s 

Department, Mike Poindexter, and Billy Holshouser (collectively, “Defendants”). Each of 

Plaintiff’s claims stems from Defendant Holshouser’s alleged use of excessive force 

against Plaintiff on October 15, 2013. 

Defendants have filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 11). Pending 

before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 12), which requests that the 

Court strike all nineteen of the affirmative defenses that Defendants assert in their 

Answer. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED 

in part. 

///

///

Case 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN Document 23 Filed 07/20/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

STANDARD

An affirmative defense is an “assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will 

defeat the plaintiff’s [ ] claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A court may strike an insufficiently pled affirmative 

defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).1

District courts in this circuit were previously split on whether the heightened 

pleading standard that the United States Supreme Court announced in Twombly and 

Iqbal2 applied to affirmative defenses. Some courts, including this Court, concluded that 

affirmative defenses were subject to the heightened pleading standard. See, e.g., Wine 

Group LLC, v. L. and R. Wine Co., No. 2:10-cv-022040-MCE-KJN, 2011 WL 130236, at 

*2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2011); Dodson v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 

289 F.R.D. 595 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Other courts, however, declined to apply the 

heightened pleading standard to affirmative defenses, citing Wyshak v. City National

Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that the pleadings need only 

provide the plaintiff “fair notice” of the defense. See, e.g., Kohler v. Staples the Office 

Superstore, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 464, 468 (S.D. Cal. 2013). 

The Ninth Circuit, however, has resolved the split in the district courts. In Kohler 

v. Flava Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit explained that “the ‘fair notice’ required by the 

pleading standards only require[s] describing [an affirmative] defense in ‘general terms.’”

779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1274 (3d ed. 1998)).3 Accordingly, this Court now 

///

 1

 All subsequent references to “Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

2

 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

3

 The specific sentence that the Ninth Circuit quoted in Kohler provides: “As numerous federal 

courts have held, an affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to be sufficient, 

and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long as it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of 

the defense.” Wright & Miller, § 1274 (footnotes omitted).

Case 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN Document 23 Filed 07/20/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

applies the “fair notice” standard, and not the heightened pleading standard announced 

in Twombly and Iqbal, when evaluating motions to strike affirmative defenses. 

“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the 

pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 

by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Motion requests that the Court strike all nineteen of the affirmative 

defenses that Defendants assert in their Answer. The Court will examine each 

affirmative defense in turn. 

In the first and second affirmative defenses, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s 

Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. These assertions, however, are 

not affirmative defenses. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra; see also Zivkovic v. 

S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defense which demonstrates 

that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED with respect to the first and second affirmative defenses, 

and those defenses are STRICKEN from Defendants’ Answer. 

In the third affirmative defense, Defendants assert that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense,” Crawford-El v. 

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998), and Defendants’ Answer gives Plaintiff fair notice of 

that defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED with respect to the third 

affirmative defense. 

In the fourth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that several of Plaintiff’s 

causes of action fail because his filing of the Complaint “was not preceded by a timely 

and proper claim made pursuant to” the claims statute, California Government Code 

sections 910 et seq. “Since compliance with the claims statute is an element of plaintiff’s 

Case 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN Document 23 Filed 07/20/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

cause of action, failure to comply is not an affirmative defense.” Wood v. Riverside Gen. 

Hosp., 25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED 

with respect to the fourth affirmative defense, and that defense is STRICKEN from 

Defendants’ Answer.

Defendants’ fifth and sixth affirmative defenses are simply additional assertions of 

qualified immunity. Again, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and Defendants’ 

Answer gives Plaintiff fair notice of the defense. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“A 

party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or 

hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate ones.”). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to the fifth and sixth affirmative defenses.

Defendants’ seventh affirmative defense is that Plaintiff’s alleged damages were 

proximately caused or contributed by other parties. Third-party liability is an affirmative 

defense, and Defendants’ Answer gives Plaintiff fair notice of the defense. See

Geurin v. Winston Indus., Inc., 316 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that the

district court erred in dismissing the “affirmative defense of third-party liability”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to the seventh affirmative defense.

In the eighth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that the United States 

Constitution, the California Constitution, and the California Government Code bar 

punitive damages. Defendants’ argument is not an affirmative defense, as it will not 

defeat Plaintiff’s claim. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

Motion is GRANTED as to the eighth affirmative defense, and that defense is 

STRICKEN from Defendants’ Answer. 

In the ninth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to 

allege facts sufficient to state a claim against a governmental entity. This assertion is 

not an affirmative defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to the ninth 

affirmative defense, and that defense is STRICKEN from Defendants’ Answer.

///

///

Case 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN Document 23 Filed 07/20/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

In the tenth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to prevent 

and mitigate his damages. “[T]he duty to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense

. . . .” Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 2012). Because Defendants’ Answer 

gives Plaintiff fair notice of the defense, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to the tenth 

affirmative defense.

In the eleventh affirmative defense, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to 

allege facts sufficient to state a negligence claim. Again, such an assertion is not an 

affirmative defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to the eleventh 

affirmative defense, and that defense is STRICKEN from Defendants’ Answer.

In the twelfth affirmative defense, Defendants assert that they will seek attorneys’ 

fees and costs if they prevail in this action. This is not an affirmative defense, as it will 

not defeat Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to the twelfth 

affirmative defense, and that defense is STRICKEN from Defendants’ Answer. 

In the thirteenth and fourteenth affirmative defenses, Defendants “claim and plead 

all rights, defenses, privileges and immunities” granted to them under the United States 

Code and California statutes. Answer at 14 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the fifteenth 

affirmative defense, Defendants “claim and assert all defenses available to them 

pursuant to” Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (emphasis added). These affirmative defenses, however, 

do not give Plaintiff fair notice of any specific defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is 

GRANTED as to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth affirmative defenses, and those 

defenses are STRICKEN from Defendants’ Answer. 

In the sixteenth affirmative defense, Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s contributory 

negligence caused and contributed to his damages. “Contributory negligence” is 

included in the non-exhaustive list of affirmative defenses in Rule 8(c)(1), and 

Defendants’ Answer sufficiently puts Plaintiff on fair notice of the defense. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to the sixteenth affirmative defense. 

///

///

Case 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN Document 23 Filed 07/20/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

In the seventeenth affirmative defense, Defendants appear to again assert 

qualified immunity. See Answer at 14 (“the actions and conduct of [D]efendants were 

made in good faith without malice . . . .”). Again, qualified immunity is an affirmative 

defense, and Defendants have provided Plaintiff with fair notice of the defense. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to the seventeenth affirmative defense.

In the eighteenth affirmative defense, Defendants argue that any cause of action 

against Defendant Poindexter or any other governmental official acting in his or her 

official capacity, is barred under Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). In Graham, 

the United States Supreme Court held that an official capacity suit could not have been 

maintained against a defendant state police commissioner because of Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. 473 U.S. at 169. To the extent that Defendants are asserting 

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Answer sufficiently puts Defendants on 

notice of that defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to the eighteenth 

affirmative defense.

In the nineteenth affirmative defense, Defendants “reserve the right to amend this 

answer and allege further defenses . . . .” Answer at 15. Defendants need not “reserve” 

that right, see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), and their attempt to reserve it is 

not a valid affirmative defense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to the 

nineteenth affirmative defense, and that defense is STRICKEN from Defendants’ 

Answer. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses (ECF No. 12) is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to the first, 

second, fourth, eighth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, and 

nineteenth affirmative defenses. Accordingly, those affirmative defenses are STRICKEN 

from Defendants’ Answer without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to the third,

Case 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN Document 23 Filed 07/20/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

fifth, sixth, seventh, tenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth affirmative defenses in 

Defendants’ Answer (ECF No. 11). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-02646-MCE-KJN Document 23 Filed 07/20/15 Page 7 of 7