Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00766/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00766-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DIRK REGAN, et al.,

NO. CIV. S-01-0779 WBS JFM

Plaintiffs, S-01-0766 WBS JFM 

 

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER

WILLIAMS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

et al.

Defendants.

------------------------------

DIRK REGAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

QWEST COMMUNICATIONS 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Named plaintiffs Dirk Regan, Carol Regan, and Jacquelyn

Sheldrick have filed two putative class actions in this court. 

In Civ. S-01-766, defendants are Qwest Communications

International, Inc., Qwest Communications Corporation, Qwest

Transmission, Inc., Qwest USLD Communications Corporation, and

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Qwest Network Construction Services (collectively, “Qwest”). In

Civ. S-01-779, defendants are Williams Companies, Inc., Williams

Holdings of Delaware, Inc., Williams Communications Group, Inc.,

Williams Communications LLC and Williams Communications, Inc.

(collectively, “Williams”). These cases arise out of plaintiffs’

allegation that Qwest and Williams wrongfully installed and

operated fiber-optic cables on plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs

now move for reconsideration of the court’s order of May 16, 2003

denying class certification.

I. Factual and Procedural History

The Regans and Ms. Sheldrick are the owners in fee

simple of 2.9 and 2.0 acres of land, respectively, in Placer

County. They each allege that a railroad right-of-way belonging

to the Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”) runs across a

portion of their land. Plaintiffs contend that this right-of-way

is an easement given to the Central Pacific Railway Company

(Union Pacific’s predecessor-in-interest) by a July 1, 1862 Act

of Congress. Plaintiffs further contend that this right-of-way

easement is limited to railroad-related purposes only, and that

the underlying land remains within the ownership of plaintiffs

for all nonrailroad-related purposes.

Beginning in the 1990s, Qwest and Williams began

constructing fiber-optic telecommunications system networks

throughout the country, including California, installing cable

beneath Union Pacific’s right-of-way. Plaintiffs filed the class

action against Qwest on April 20, 2001 and the class action

against Williams on April 24, 2001, alleging that defendants

installed fiber-optic cable on plaintiffs’ land without their

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consent, that such cable installation went beyond the scope of

the railroad’s easement, and that defendants’ operation of fiberoptic cable on plaintiffs’ land therefore constitutes trespass.

Plaintiffs moved to certify the following class: “all

owners of land in California that underlies or is adjacent to a

railroad right-of-way within which defendants operate or use

fiber-optic cable.” In an order dated May 16, 2003, the court

denied plaintiffs’ certification motion. The court determined

that the “typicality” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23(a) (“Rule 23(a)”) was not met. Plaintiffs’ title

history is unique, and “a named plaintiff’s motion for

certification should not be granted if there is a danger that

absent class members will suffer if their representative is

preoccupied with defenses unique to it.” (May 2003 Order at

4)(quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th

Cir. 1992)). Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration on June 2,

2003. 

Meanwhile, a settlement agreement was being negotiated

in the Northern District of Illinois between telecommunications

companies and a putative class consisting of “landowners whose

property is subject to railroad rights of way, along which

defendant telecommunications companies have installed fiber-optic

cables without the landowners’ permission.” See Smith v. Sprint

Communications Co., L.P., 387 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir.

2004)(reviewing settlement agreement). Before this court was

able to hear the motion for reconsideration, the court in the

Northern District of Illinois approved the settlement agreement

and, further, enjoined the present putative class actions, among

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1 Isaacs v. Sprint Corp. was a case involving a

“virtually identical class.” Smith, 387 F.3d at 613; Isaacs, 261

F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit in Isaacs vacated

the certification of that class, labeling the case “a nightmare

of a class action” due to the “intricate legal and factual

issues” involved. 261 F.3d 679, 682. 

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others, from proceeding further. Smith v. Sprint Communications

Co. L.P., No. 99 C 3844, slip op. at 3, 5 (N.D. Ill. July 31,

2003).

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s class

certification and effectively dissolved the injunction on this

court by its decision that issued October 19, 2004. Smith, 387

F.3d 612. Smith noted that the class at issue had been certified

“for settlement only, which the settling parties insist

eliminates the complications that made the class uncertifiable in

Isaacs.” Id. at 613.1 Smith found that the settlement class was

wrongly certified because the settling plaintiffs did not

adequately represent all of the class, thus not meeting the

requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). Id. at 614. The landowners in

Tennessee and Kansas, included in the proposed settlement class,

were on the eve of trial in their own state courts, and the

Tennessee landowners had a chance to recover much more than the

settlement would have permitted. Id.

This court lifted the stay on these cases on March 4,

2005. 

II. Discussion

“An order under Rule 23(c)(1) [certifying or denying

certification of a class] may be altered or amended before final

judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). Motions for

reconsideration of interlocutory orders, like the order in this

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case denying class certification, are governed by Local Rule 78-

230(k). Among other requirements, the party seeking

reconsideration must show “what new or different facts or

circumstances are claimed to exist . . . or what other grounds

exist for the motion.” The moving party must also show “why the

facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior

motion.”

Plaintiffs give two reasons why the court should

reconsider its order denying class certification. First, they

argue that “when a class action defendant supports certification

of a settlement class, it is judicially estopped from later

contesting that the requirements of certification have been met.” 

(Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 6). 

Plaintiffs point out that defendants supported certifying a

plaintiff class in the Northern District of Illinois that would

have included all of the class members in this case. Therefore,

plaintiffs argue, defendants should now be judicially estopped

from arguing against certification of the class for any reason

other than manageability of the class. (Id. at 4). 

Plaintiffs’ second argument for reconsideration is that

plaintiffs’ counsel did not treat the centerline presumption

extensively enough in its earlier briefing, with the result that

the court misunderstood the issue and that therefore the motion

for class certification was wrongly decided. Plaintiffs argue

that this centerline presumption is common among the putative

class members and not unique, and that therefore the named

plaintiffs meet Rule 23(a)’s typicality requirement. (Id. at 5).

///

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A. Judicial Estoppel

The most recent Supreme Court opinion considering

judicial estoppel is New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001). 

The state of New Hampshire in 1977 had argued before the Supreme

Court that the boundary between New Hampshire and Maine was in

the middle of the Piscataqua River’s main channel of navigation. 

In a separate case two decades later, New Hampshire attempted to

argue that the border ran along Maine’s shore. Id. at 745. The

Supreme Court found in its 2001 decision that New Hampshire was

judicially estopped from making that argument. Id. “Where a

party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and

succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter,

simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary

position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who

has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” Id. at

749(citation omitted). Thus, even though the application of

judicial estoppel is discretionary and there is no formula for

determining when the doctrine should apply, “several factors

typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine.” 

Id. at 750. First, the party’s later position must be “clearly

inconsistent” with its earlier position. Second, whether the

prior argument was successful is also a factor. A third factor

is whether the party asserting inconsistent positions thereby

would derive an unfair advantage over the opposing party. Id. at

750-51. Finally, “[a]dditional considerations may inform the

doctrine’s application in specific factual contexts.” Id. at

751.

Plaintiffs rely on the Seventh Circuit case of Carnegie

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2 The Buford court held that individual issues

predominated, and thus that a class action was not the superior

method of adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

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v. Household International, 376 F.3d 656 (2004), for the

proposition that “when a class action defendant supports

certification of a settlement class, it is judicially estopped

from later contesting that the requirements of certification have

been met – both in the original case and in any other related

litigation.” (Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at

6). Because this language is not found in Carnegie, further

analysis is necessary. 

Beginning in 1990, a number of class action suits were

brought against banks and tax preparers on the basis of what the

plaintiffs characterized as a scheme to defraud. Carnegie, 376

F.3d at 659. In 1999, the defendant banks and tax preparers

reached a settlement that purported to be global in nature. The

defendants “urged the district court to accept the giant class as

appropriate for a global settlement.” Id. Defendants argued

that the case of Buford v. H & R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340

(S.D. Ga. 1996), dealing with a similar if not identical class,

had been wrongly decided.2 Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 663. 

Defendants’ arguments succeeded at the district court level: the

court approved the settlement agreement. Id. at 659. However,

the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court because of the

appellate court’s concern that the settlement might have been the

product of collusion. Id.

On remand to the district court, the court “certified

the same class that had been contemplated by the rejected

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settlement.” Id.(emphasis added). The defendants filed an

interlocutory appeal with the appellate court arguing against

this certification. Id. at 658. Defendants attempted to argue

that Buford, which held that the class of bank and tax preparer

customers could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) because

common issues did not predominate, had the effect of collaterally

estopping the certification of a similar class in Carnegie. Id.

at 663. The Seventh Circuit held that defendants could not make

such inconsistent arguments. “They prevailed in the present

litigation, until the settlement was finally rejected, by arguing

that Buford was wrong. They are estopped to argue now that it

was right.” Id.

Carnegie does not control this case. First, this court

is not bound by a Seventh Circuit decision. Second, the posture

of this case is entirely different than it was in Carnegie. In

Carnegie, the burden was on defendant to show the appellate court

why the class was wrongly certified by the district court. 376

F.3d at 658. In this case, by contrast, the defendants need not

make any arguments at all: as it stands, the class is not

certified. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(k)(providing that the

burden of proof on a motion to reconsider is with the moving

party). Third, Carnegie involved defendants’ inconsistent

arguments regarding certification of the exact same class. Id.

at 659. Here, by contrast, the class sought to be certified in

Smith was nationwide and plaintiffs in this case purport to

represent only a class of California land owners. Smith, 387

F.3d at 613; (May 2003 Order at 3). 

The fourth reason Carnegie does not control this case

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is that in the present case the defendants do not make

inconsistent arguments. See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750(“[A]

party’s later position must be ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its

earlier position.”)(citation omitted). Defendants never argued

before the Seventh Circuit that Dirk Regan, Carol Regan, and

Jacquelyn Sheldrick were typical of the class they purport to

represent. Such an argument would have been nonsensical because

the Regans and Ms. Sheldrick were not the named parties in that

case. Yet here defendants make exactly that argument – no matter

how worthy of certification the class may be in theory,

defendants argue that the Regans and Ms. Sheldrick are not

typical class members because the idiosyncracies in the title

history of named plaintiffs’ parcels are unique to them. The

Regans and Ms. Sheldrick may not even have standing to bring the

case on their own behalf, (see May 2003 Order at 5-6), and the

argument about this issue could potentially prejudice other class

members whose title histories are clearer.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, would have the court

hold that, once a defendant agrees that a class is certifiable in

another district, that defendant is estopped from arguing that a

similar class with different named plaintiffs is not certifiable. 

Thus, by plaintiffs’ theory, the named plaintiffs in this case

could be any plaintiffs that would have been included in the

Seventh Circuit nationwide class, no matter how atypical those

named plaintiffs are in comparison to the class of landowners

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3 By contrast, the district court in Carnegie that

certified the class found that the named plaintiffs did meet Rule

23's typicality requirement, a holding which the Seventh Circuit

did not disturb. 376 F.3d at 662. 

4 Another reason the application of judicial estoppel is

inappropriate in this instance is that, if the court were to do

so, the court would technically be estopping defendants but in

reality would be hurting the chances for other class members to

recover on their claims. See Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508(“The purpose

of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of

the named representative aligns with the interests of the

class.”); id.(“[C]lass certification should not be granted if

there is a danger that absent class members will suffer if their

representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to

it”)(quotation marks and citation omitted).

5 An owner of land bounded by a road or street is

presumed to own to the center of the way, but the

contrary may be shown.

Cal. Civ. Code § 831.

6 A transfer of land, bounded by a highway, passes the

title of the person whose estate is transferred to the

soil of the highway in front to the center thereof,

unless a different intent appears from the grant.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1112.

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sought to be certified in this case. That cannot be the law.3

This case is not one where judicial estoppel is appropriate.4

B. The Center Line Presumption

Plaintiffs’ second argument is that the “centerline

presumption” at issue with regard to the named plaintiffs is an

issue common to all members. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for

Reconsideration at 5). The “centerline presumption” is codified

in California Civil Code §§ 8315 and 1112.6 The presumption is

relevant in this case because there exists a 1947 grant deed

conveying to plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest the land

abutting the easement. (See May 2003 Order at 5)(quoting

language of the deed, which purported to except from the grant

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“that portion which lies within the 400 foot easement of the

Central Pacific Railway Company . . .”).

Plaintiffs have not shown what new facts or

circumstances now exist that did not exist when the original

order denying class certification issued in May 2003. See E.D.

Cal. L.R. 78-230(k)(providing that, in an application for

reconsideration, “it shall be the duty of counsel to present to

the Judge . . . what new or different facts or circumstances are

claimed to exist, or what other grounds exist for the motion”). 

The contents of the 1947 grant deed have not changed, nor has the

nature of the class plaintiffs seek to have certified. The court

in its May 2003 Order held that

[w]hether defendant’s construction of the December 4, 1947

grant deed is correct need not be determined at this time. 

The court is persuaded that defendants have set forth a

standing defense against plaintiffs that is at least

arguable, and that this defense, arising out of an

idiosyncracy in the title history of plaintiffs’ parcels, is

unique to plaintiffs. Most likely, there are thousands of

putative class members whose trespass claims are not

similarly encumbered, and the interest of those members

would not be well-served by class representatives

preoccupied with litigating that defense. Plaintiffs, for

their part, have presented no arguments as to why

defendants’ proferred defense is not at least arguable, or

why that defense would not threaten to become a focus of the

litigation to the detriment of absent class members.

(May 2003 Order at 5-6). After considering plaintiffs’ and

defendants’ lengthy dissertations on the history and application

of the centerline presumption, the court is convinced more than

ever that this issue, and its effect on plaintiffs’ standing to

bring this case, will be a significant, if not the primary, issue

in this case. Plaintiffs have produced no new evidence showing

that the majority, or even a significant minority, of the members

of the class they seek to have certified face similar standing

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7 In addition, the “law of the case” doctrine supports

today’s decision to continue not to certify the class. That

doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to

reopen what has been decided.” Christianson v. Colt Indus.

Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)(citation omitted). “A

court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a

coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts

should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary

circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly

erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Id.(quotation

marks and citation omitted).

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problems.

Plaintiffs attempt to argue in the present motion that

the law on the centerline presumption is crystal clear, and that

therefore the named plaintiffs have clear title to the land on

which the easement lies. This is a classic case of litigants

attempting a second bite of the apple. Defendants made clear in

their initial opposition to the motion for class certification

two years ago that they were putting plaintiffs’ standing in

issue. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 28-

37)(discussing title history of plaintiffs). Plaintiffs now

argue that their “previous treatment of these issues obviously

did not adequately address the concerns that led to the Court’s

decision to deny the Motion for Class Certification,” (Pls.’ Mem.

in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 5), and then proceed to

attempt to adequately address those concerns on this motion to

reconsider. The fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys think that they

did not handle this issue adequately in their first attempt does

not provide grounds for reconsideration of the issue.7

C. Plaintiffs’ Case Management Plan

Plaintiffs argue that “the centerline presumption is

relevant to virtually every claimant, and under California law,

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the presumption must be adopted class-wide. This is a simple

summary judgment issue.” (Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for

Reconsideration at 17). Plaintiffs would have the court somehow

dispose of the issue of the differing language of all class

members’ deed histories by ruling that all plaintiffs in the

class own the relevant land. While the plaintiffs are correct in

arguing that the law must be applied consistently to each class

member, it is not individualized differences in the law with

which the court is concerned but individualized differences in

the title histories, and particularly the effect of the named

plaintiffs’ title histories on their ability to represent the

class.

Plaintiffs also argues that its case management plan

calls for the court to certify the class, provide a forum for 

common issues to be litigated, and then have individual trials to

determine whether individual class members actually owned the

land. Plaintiffs cite In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation

for the proposition that the accepted view in the Ninth Circuit

is that trial on all common elements followed by individual

trials on individualized issues is the solution where common

issues do not predominate. (Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for

Reconsideration at 18); see 69 F.R.D. 24 (S.D. Cal. 1975). There

are at least two problems with this argument. First, the court

in its order of May 2003 did not reach the question of whether

common issues predominated over individualized issues. The court

held that named plaintiffs were not typical of the class. 

Second, the individualized issue in U.S. Financial was plaintiff

class members’ reliance on an alleged misrepresentation in a Rule

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10b-5 securities suit. U.S. Financial, 69 F.R.D. at 39-40. By

contrast, standing is a more fundamental requirement for bringing

a suit in the first place. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)(Article III of the Constitution imposes

an “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing on all cases

brought in federal court). Therefore, the court will not permit

standing to be determined after other issues are adjudicated.

D. Leave to Amend

At oral argument, plaintiffs contended that defendants’

strategy is to oppose any named plaintiffs on the basis that

those plaintiffs are not typical, and that therefore defendants

are in reality arguing that common issues do not predominate. 

Plaintiffs will be able to test that theory, as the court today

grants plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to substitute new

named plaintiffs.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the

court’s order denying certification of the class with the current

named plaintiffs be, and the same hereby is, DENIED;

(2) within 30 days from the date of this order,

plaintiffs may amend their complaint to substitute new named

plaintiffs. If new plaintiffs are substituted, plaintiffs may

again move the court for class certification. 

DATED: June 17, 2005

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