Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00198/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00198-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Netscape Communications Corporation et

al.,

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

Federal Insurance Company et al.,

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 06-00198 JW 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS; GRANTING

PLAINTIFFS LEAVE TO AMEND;

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Netscape Communications Corporation and America Online, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) bring suit

against Federal Insurance Company, St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company, Executive Risk

Specialty Insurance Company (“Defendants”) alleging common law breach of contract, common law

tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair business practices under

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Presently before this court are (1) Defendant St. Paul Mercury

Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action, namely unfair business

practices, motion to strike prayer, or alternatively, motion for a more definite statement; (2)

Defendants Federal Insurance Company’s and Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Company’s

motion to dismiss; and Defendants Federal Insurance Company’s and Executive Risk Specialty

Insurance Company’s joinder in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff, in turn, moves for leave to amend if the Court grants Defendants’ motions. The motions

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were noticed for hearing on February 27, 2006. The Court finds it appropriate to take the motions

under submission for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the

reasons set forth below, this court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss, DENIES Defendants’

motion for a more definite statement, and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.

II. BACKGROUND

In 2000, four civil actions were filed against Plaintiffs for alleged interceptions of

consumers’ private electronic communications (hereinafter, “underlying actions”). (Complaint at ¶

15.) The plaintiffs in those suits argued that two of Plaintiffs’ products acted in concert to

surreptitiously collect personal and private information in violation of the Electronic

Communications and Privacy Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. (Complaint at ¶ 16.) 

Plaintiffs allege they promptly notified their respective insurers, Defendants in the instant action, of

the claims in order to trigger defense and indemnity obligations. (Complaint at ¶ 18.) As to

Defendant Federal Insurance, Plaintiffs believe their first-party and third-party liability insurance

provided them with coverage from liability for “personal injuries” such as those alleged in the

underlying actions. (Complaint at ¶ 22.) Issued under the “Electronics Insurance Program,” the

policy ran from April 1998 to April 30, 1999. As to Defendant St. Paul Mercury, Plaintiffs believe

their policy covered them from liability for “personal injuries” such as those alleged in the

underlying actions. Issued as a technology commercial general liability policy, it ran from April 1,

1999 to April 1, 2000. As to Defendant Executive Risk, Plaintiffs believe their policy covered the

underlying actions because it covered “Media Activities,” defined as “all matter ... on the World

Wide Web ... accessible via “www.aol.com.” (Complaint at ¶ 28.) This policy ran from April 1,

1999 to April 1, 2000.

Defendants denied coverage and did not pay any benefits. Plaintiffs allege they were forced

to defend and resolve the suits with their own resources, at the cost of $ 4,273,064 in attorneys’ fees. 

The four underlying actions eventually settled at the cost of $100,000. (Complaint at ¶ 33.) 

Plaintiffs also anticipate an additional $1,340,113,86 to resolve an appeal. Id. Based on the

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forgoing, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, costs of suit, and prejudgment and

post-judgment interest. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from committing the

alleged unfair business practice of “automatically denying all claims that implicate their ‘personal

injury’ and/or ‘Media Activities’ coverages when privacy allegations are asserted against insureds.” 

(Complaint at ¶ 78.) Lastly, Plaintiffs seek an “order directing Defendants to disgorge to the public

all funds and profits acquired by means of any act or practice described herein which is found by the

Court to be unlawful, unfair or fraudulent within the meaning of that statute.” (Complaint at ¶80.)

Defendants make three arguments and one argument in the alternative. First, Defendants

contend that Plaintiffs have improperly labeled their claim under the unfair competition act,

California Business & Professions Code § 17200, instead of under the Uniform Insurance Practices

Act § 790.03 (“UIPA”), which bars certain types of private actions against insurers. Second,

Defendants contend that the § 17200 claim is legally deficient because Plaintiffs have failed to

allege that they have no other adequate remedies. Third, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs

improperly seek non-restitutionary disgorgement. In the alternative, Defendants request that the

Court require Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement of the facts supporting the claim.

III. STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's claims or entire complaint may be dismissed by the court

for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See, e.g.,

Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, 407 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005)

(affirming district court's partial Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. The court must decide whether the facts alleged, if

true, would entitle plaintiff to some form of legal remedy. Unless the answer is unequivocally in the

negative, the motion must be denied. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); De La Cruz v.

Tormey (9th Cir. 1978). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must (1) construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations

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as true, and (3) determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would

merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Because of the

liberal federal pleading rules, a 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in "extraordinary" cases. U.S. v.

Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). 

B. Motion for More Definite Statement

A motion for more definite statement, like a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, is

viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Cellars v. Pacific Coast Packaging. Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575,

578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). "[T]he proper test in evaluating a motion under Rule 12(e) is whether the

complaint provides the defendant with a sufficient basis to frame his responsive pleadings." Federal

Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Musacchio, 695 F.Supp. 1053, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing Famolare

Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Section 17200 defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act

or practice ...” and establishes three types of unfair competition– unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent acts

or practices. Schnall v. Hertz Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1153 (2000). “Unlawful” practices are

those practices that are prohibited by law, whether “civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal,

statutory, regulatory, or court-made.” Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 839 (citing

People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 632 (1979)). “Unfair” practices are those practices “whose harm

to the victim outweighs its benefits.” Id. (citing Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 102 Cal. App. 3d

735, 740 (1980)); Progressive West Ins. Co., v. Yolo County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434,

453 (2005). “Fraudulent” practices are those practices that are likely to deceive the public and do

not refer to the tort of fraud. Id; Heighley v. J.C.Penney Life Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1259

(C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal.

3d 197, 211 (1983). 

A. Re-casting UIPA claims under Section 17200

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs improperly characterize their claim as a section 17200 claim. 

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The California Supreme Court modified the State Farm test for unfairness, but limited its

holding to business competitors in an antitrust action. Cel-Tech, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565.

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They contend that Plaintiffs’ claim circumvents the UIPA, which bars certain types of private

actions against insurers. (St. Paul Mot. to Dis., at 7.) The court disagrees. 

The scope of Section 17200 was left intentionally broad to enable judicial tribunals to “deal

with the innumerable new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive.” Cel-Tech

Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 561 (1999)

(citing American Philatelic Soc. v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (1935)). Here, the focus is on

whether Plaintiffs’ allegations independently meet any of the three types of unfair competition

proscribed by section 17200. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d

229, 237 (1996).1

 In State Farm, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant insurance company

changed its earthquake coverage policies without giving proper notice and without consent. The

Plaintiff argued that they were misled into paying the same premiums for diminished coverage. The

Plaintiff’s claims included a breach of contract, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and a

violation of the Unfair Competition Act. The Defendant argued that these claims were an improper

attempt to plead around the UIPA’s bar of private actions against insurers. The court disagreed,

reasoning that whether the UIPA was violated was irrelevant; the focus was on whether the common

law claims were independently actionable under the Unfair Competition Act Id. Here, the court

finds Plaintiffs’ common law claims sufficient to meet the requirements of section 17200. Other

courts, too, have held that a pattern of conduct which disregarded common law doctrine and misled

consumers constituted “unfair business practices,” as “immoral, unethical ... or substantially

injurious to consumers.” Progressive, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 453. 

B. No Adequate Remedy

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs fail to meet the requirements for bringing a claim under

section 17200. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs are required, but have failed, to allege the

inadequacy of the legal remedies available to them.

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To plead a claim for violation of the UCA, a party must allege the following: (1) plaintiff's

status as an insured or intended beneficiary of the insurance policy, (2) the existence of the policy,

(3) the insurer's conduct and that such conduct was an unfair, unlawful or fraudulent business

practice in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, (4) plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, (5) a

request for injunctive relief and or restitution (monetary damages are not recoverable under the

UCA), and (6) a request for attorney's fees. Heighley v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d

1241, 1259-60 (C.D. Cal., 2003) (emphasis added); Crosky et al., California. Practice Guide:

Insurance Litigation § 15:112. See Stewart v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1138,

1144 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Cel-Tech, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548). 

In Stewart, the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant insurance company misled its customers

by failing to give notice of delinquent payments. The Plaintiff sought to recover benefits on an

insurance policy that had expired due to lack of payment. The Defendant brought a motion for

summary judgment against the section 17200 claim. The court granted the motion because the

Plaintiff failed to allege that she had no adequate remedy at law. The court noted that the Plaintiff’s

breach of contract claim would provide any benefits owed and that the Plaintiff did not seek

injunctive relief. 

In this case, Plaintiffs similarly claim a breach of contract, and therefore have an adequate

remedy to recover the money owed to them under the insurance policies. Plaintiffs, however,

contend that they are entitled to bring a section 17200 claim to recover two additional types of

remedies: injunctive relief and disgorgement. Plaintiffs’ position is untenable for the following

reasons.

First, as Defendants point out, the complaint fails to establish any ongoing need for

injunctive relief. Rather, the complaint contains allegations that each of the policies at issue were in

effect for a finite period, ending no later than April of 2000. If indeed the parties are no longer in

contractual privity, which the complaint clearly suggests, Plaintiffs have no basis for seeking

injunctive relief.

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2

 Because the Court is dismissing the section 17200 claim, the Court finds it unnecessary to

address Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for relief associated with the section 17200 claim.

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Second, Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek disgorgement on behalf of the public. Section

17203 of the California Business & Professions Code, which was amended in 2004, provides in

pertinent part that a party seeking relief on behalf of the public must satisfy class action pleading

requirements. Plaintiffs’ complaint lacks the requisite class allegations.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss the section 17200 claim.2

 

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs request leave to amend their complaint if the Court grants Defendants’ motions to

dismiss. Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any

time before a responsive pleading is served. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading within

the meaning of Rule 15(a). FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a); Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1530 (9th

Cir. 1995). Federal policy strongly favors determination of cases on their merits and amendments to

pleadings should be allowed with “extreme liberality.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979

(9th Cir. 1981). Here, Defendants have not filed a responsive pleading. Therefore, Plaintiffs’

request for leave to amend the complaint is granted.

D. Motion for More Definite Statement

Because the Court is granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss and granting Plaintiffs leave to

amend, it is largely unnecessary to address Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement.

Nevertheless, the Court notes that Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “have a policy or practice of

automatically denying all claims that implicate their ‘personal injury’ and /or ‘Media Activities’

coverages when privacy allegations are asserted against insureds.” (Complaint at ¶ 78-79.) These

allegations are sufficiently definite to enable Defendants to frame a responsive pleading. Claims

alleging violations of section 17200 do not require pleading with particularity. Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 720 (1998). Generalized allegations of a violation

can be sufficient. Id. Therefore, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss, GRANTS

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend, and DENIES Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement, and DENIES as moot Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for relief. Plaintiffs shall

file and serve an amended complaint no later than March 20, 2006.

Dated: February 22, 2006

06cv198dismiss

 /s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Daniel J. Bergeson dbergeson@be-law.com

Gordon I. Endow gendow@gordonrees.com

Jeffrey M. Ratinoff jratinoff@gordonrees.com

Leslie Ann Pereira lpereira@abelsonherron.com

Marc G. Van Niekerk mvanniekerk@be-law.com

Michael Bruce Abelson mabelson@abelsonherron.com

Monique M. Fuentes courtir@rdblaw.com

Sara M. Thorpe sthorpe@gordonrees.com

Terrence R. McInnis courtir@rdblaw.com

Dated: February 22, 2006 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:_/s/JW Chambers________

Melissa Peralta

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:06-cv-00198-JW Document 21 Filed 02/22/06 Page 9 of 9