Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05779/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05779-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAYLEY MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-05779-RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Hayley Moore contends she was a victim of sexual assault while enrolled as a 

student at the University of California, Santa Barbara (“UCSB”). She alleges that the university 

responded with deliberate indifference when she reported her assault to school officials. She 

brings suit against The Regents of the University of California (“Regents” or “university”) seeking 

to hold the university liable for gender discrimination in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.

(“Title IX”). The university moved to dismiss Moore’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) on the 

basis that Moore failed to plead adequately deliberate indifference based on the university’s preor post-assault conduct. On May 23, 2016, the Court granted that motion with leave to amend and

Moore subsequently filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”). The Regents move to dismiss on 

the ground that Moore still fails to plead adequately deliberate indifference. For the reasons 

explained below, the motion to dismiss based on the university’s post-assault conduct is granted 

with leave to amend. The motion to dismiss based on the university’s pre-assault conduct is

granted without leave to amend. This matter was submitted without oral argument, pursuant to 

Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).

Case 3:15-cv-05779-RS Document 45 Filed 09/15/16 Page 1 of 12
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

The allegations of the FAC are described in great detail in the May 23, 2016 order 

dismissing the FAC (“prior order” or “Order”) and, to the extent they are essentially repeated in 

the SAC, they are not repeated here. This section focuses on the SAC’s new allegations.

In the SAC, Moore expands upon her interaction with University of California Police 

Department (“UCPD”) detective Mitch Molitor on the day after the assault. She previously 

alleged that soon after her cousin contacted the police, Molitor arrived at her dorm and took her to 

the police station where he proceeded to take her statement. Now, she adds that Molitor 

specifically discouraged her from going to the hospital to get a rape kit test, and that she followed 

his advice. She avers that when she told Molitor she was especially upset because, prior to the 

assault, she was a virgin, he expressed skepticism because she was not experiencing much more 

severe pain. 

Additionally, Moore expands upon her conversation with Joe O’Brien, UCSB’s Assistant 

Dean and Director of Advising. Previously, Moore alleged O’Brien confirmed that if she reduced 

her course load she would be ineligible for financial aid and on-campus housing, but he informed 

her of the availability of an appeal process that would allow her to stay in the dorms and maintain 

her financial aid despite dropping to part-time student status. Moore now alleges O’Brien told her 

that, in order to appeal for continued student housing and financial aid as a part-time student, she 

would have to “personally go to” the student housing board and the financial aid office and 

discuss her assault with administrators. SAC ¶ 62. Moore asked if O’Brien or some other school 

official could make the appeals on her behalf, given her discomfort with discussing the details of 

her assault. O’Brien said no. Moore’s father subsequently called O’Brien to express his outrage 

that Moore would need to discuss her assault with additional administrators in order to receive the 

 

1

The factual background is based on the averments in the complaint, which must be taken as true 

for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Additionally, the parties request judicial notice of three of the 

same documents that were noticed in the prior order. See Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice 

(“RJN”) Exs. 1-2; Pl.’s RJN Ex. A. The requests are denied as redundant. 

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requested accommodations. He requested a call back, but O’Brien did not return the call. Moore 

also discussed her inability to complete the appeal process in her second meeting with Olson, but 

Olson just reiterated her suggestion that Moore withdraw from classes.

Moore also newly alleges that, at some unspecified point in time, she met with Santa 

Barbara Police Department (“SBPD”) Detective Minter and Crutcher to express her desire to have 

both SBPD and UCSB independently investigate her case. They responded that “it would be a 

long, drawn-out process that would ultimately likely not resolve in her favor because it was a ‘hesaid she-said’ situation” and that the process would likely negatively impact her grades. SAC ¶ 

50. They also stated that pursuing a UCSB investigation “would negatively affect any criminal 

investigation and may even sabotage it altogether.” Id. In the SAC, Moore newly avers she never 

rescinded her request to move forward with both investigations. In fact, she avers she reiterated 

the request in her second meeting with Olson. Moore previously alleged, however, that she 

eventually “indicated that she did not want an [UCSB] investigation, after she was heavily 

discouraged by UCSB administrators from pursuing one.” FAC ¶ 72; Complaint ¶ 44. 

Further, while Moore had previously alleged seeing Doe on campus one time after the 

assault, she now alleges reporting that encounter to Crutcher. She reported to Crutcher that the 

encounter induced a panic attack and that she feared running into Doe again. In response, 

Crutcher offered counseling.

Finally, Moore now avers UCSB engaged in a practice of discouraging victims of sexual 

assault from pursuing Title IX investigations and delaying those investigations that victims did 

choose to pursue. In March 2014, Jane Roe 1 reported that she had been sexually assaulted by 

another UCSB student. She met with UCSB’s Judicial Affairs office to request that UCSB 

investigate her report. In response, Jane Roe 1 was told that investigations take a long time, that 

her story was not credible, that it was a “he-said, she-said” situation and that the investigation was 

unlikely to produce results. Jane Roe 1 persisted in her desire to have UCSB investigate and 

UCSB commenced an investigation in November 2014—eight months after receiving her report. 

Similarly, in June 2014, Jane Roe 2 was sexually assaulted by another UCSB student. She 

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requested immediate action, but UCSB did not commence an investigation until February 2015—

approximately eight months after receiving her report. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While “detailed factual allegations” are not 

required, a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the pleaded factual 

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard asks for “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully.” Id. The determination is a context-specific task requiring the court “to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of 

Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may 

be based either on the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

(9th Cir. 1990). When evaluating such a motion, the court must accept all material allegations in 

the complaint as true, even if doubtful, and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences,” however, “are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” 

Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(“threadbare recitals of the elements of the claim for relief, supported by mere conclusory 

statements,” are not taken as true).

IV. DISCUSSION

Moore continues to assert a single claim for a violation of Title IX based on the 

university’s actions both prior to and following her alleged sexual assault. As explained in the 

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prior order, a university can be held liable for violating Title IX in connection with peer-on-peer 

harassment only in “limited circumstances,” where five requirements are met. Davis Next Friend 

LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999). First, a school is liable 

“only for its own misconduct,” id. at 640, so the institution must “exercise[] substantial control 

over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.” Id. at 645. 

Second, the survivor must have suffered harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively 

offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim[] of access to the educational opportunities or 

benefits provided by the school.” Id. at 650. Third, the institution must have had “actual 

knowledge” of the harassment. Id. at 650. Fourth, the institution must have acted with “deliberate 

indifference” to the known harassment. Id. at 651. Fifth, this deliberate indifference must “cause 

students to undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to it.” Id. at 645. The Regents 

assert that Moore has still not pleaded adequately “deliberate indifference.” 

A. Preliminary Issue

As a preliminary matter, the Regents take issue with Plaintiff’s heavy reliance on guidance 

documents from the Department of Education (“DOE”). The prior order noted that there is no 

private right of action to recover damages under Title IX for violations of DOE administrative 

requirements, much less provisions of DOE guidance documents, like the DOE’s April 4, 2011 

Dear Colleague Letter (“DCL”) or its Questions and Answers (“Q&As”) documents. Moore asks 

for reconsideration and suggests reliance on these documents “as a frame of reference.” Opp. at 9. 

The SAC, however, continues to rely on these documents to establish Title IX liability. See, e.g., 

SAC ¶ 84 (“Defendant violated the standards set forth by the DCL, Questions and Answers, and 

Defendant’s own policies.”); id. ¶ 94 (“Defendant Trustees acted with deliberate indifference in 

deviating significantly from the standard of care outlined by the DOE in the DCL of 2011.”). As 

previously explained, an institution’s “alleged failure to comply with the regulations . . . does not 

establish [] deliberate indifference” and “does not itself constitute discrimination in violation of 

Title IX.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291-92 (1998); see also DCL at 

1 n.1 (significant guidance documents—like the DCL—“do[] not add requirements to applicable 

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law”). There is no reason to depart from the prior ruling on this issue. Accordingly, in deciding if 

Moore adequately has pleaded deliberate indifference, Davis and its progeny—not the DCL or 

Q&As—must govern. See Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2015 

WL 8527338, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015). Adherence to the DCL might be good policy, 

but failure to adhere, standing alone, does not constitute deliberate indifference.

B. Deliberate Indifference

Institutions “are deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ to acts of student-on-student harassment 

only where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in 

light of the known circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Institutions are not required to 

“purg[e] their school[] of actionable peer harassment,” nor do “victims of peer harassment . . .

have a Title IX right to make particular remedial demands.” Id. Instead, the standard is akin to “an 

official decision by the [institution] not to remedy the violation.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. This is 

an “exacting standard,” Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of California, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1122 (N.D. 

Cal. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), that requires a showing of a response that was more 

deficient than merely “negligent, lazy, or careless.” Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 440 F.3d 1085, 

1089 (9th Cir. 2006).

1. Post-Assault Conduct

Moore contends Defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” to her report of sexual 

assault because the university failed to investigate her report, discouraged her from pursuing a 

school investigation, failed to offer reasonable accommodations, and failed to take remedial action 

in response to Plaintiff’s encounter with Doe. 

a. UCSB Investigation

Principally, Moore argues the university deliberately was indifferent because it failed to 

investigate her reported assault. Moore alleges she “expressed her desire to Minter and Crutcher 

to have both SBPD and UCSB each independently investigate” her report and she “again 

expressed her desire to Olson that UCSB conduct an investigation.” SAC ¶ 50, 66. She now avers

she never rescinded her request to move forward with the UCSB investigation. Id. In the FAC 

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and the original complaint, however, Moore alleged that she eventually “indicated that she did not 

want an [UCSB] investigation.” FAC ¶ 72; Complaint ¶ 44. This statement “serve[s] as a judicial 

admission.” Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the party making

an ostensible judicial admission explains the error in a subsequent pleading or by amendment, the 

court must accord the explanation “due weight.” Id. at 859–60. Moore, however, has failed to 

provide a clear explanation for this error. Instead, Moore argues the term “rescind” is irrelevant, 

emphasizing instead the reason that she rescinded the request. Opp. 19 n. 7.2 

Even if Moore had not previously alleged that she rescinded her request for a school 

investigation, the mere allegation that Moore “expressed her desire” for a school investigation is 

vague. In the cases on which Moore relies, the plaintiffs made formal requests for school action. 

See, e.g., Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 WL 1563424, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 

2003) (plaintiff “filed a formal written complaint” with the Yale Divinity School Sexual 

Harassment Committee); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1289 

(11th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff “fil[ed] her complaint” with university police). Moore does not allege 

whether Crutcher or Olson or any other school administrator ever discussed with her the process 

for formally initiating a school investigation or any grievance procedure, or whether she ever took 

any affirmative steps to file a formal request and, if so, when or how. Moreover, Moore does not 

allege whether she requested that the school continue its investigation after withdrawing, or 

whether she ever communicated with school officials about the progress of the investigation after 

she withdrew. These are not facts for which discovery is needed to shed light; Moore is fully in 

control of this information. These allegations matter because Moore withdrew from the university

three months after her assault and even a nine-month investigative delay has been found to be no 

 

2 Because of the lack of clarity surrounding Moore’s request for an investigation and 

subsequent retraction thereof, the question of whether any such request—if not rescinded—might 

have been privileged need not be reached. (Mot. 22-24.) Accordingly, the Regents’ related 

request for judicial notice of the privacy policies in effect during the relevant time period is 

denied. See Def.’s RJN, Ex. 3.

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more than “negligent, lazy, or careless” in certain circumstances. See Oden, 440 F.3d at 1089.3 

At bottom, given the ambiguity that surrounds Moore’s request for an investigation, she has not 

pleaded delay or inaction that is “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” 

Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. 

Relatedly, Moore avers that Minter and Crutcher discouraged her from requesting a school 

investigation.4 As an initial matter, Minter is not a university employee; he is a detective 

employed by the Santa Barbara Police Department or the Santa Barbara County Sherriff’s Office. 

The SAC does not distinguish between statements made by Minter and those made by Crutcher. 

Minter’s statements cannot be attributed to the university. A school is liable “only for its own 

misconduct.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. Moreover, as explained in the prior order, even if a school 

official instructed that a school investigation “would likely interfere with” the criminal 

investigation and even if that statement was wrong, such a mistake does not rise above negligence. 

b. Accommodation

Moore argues the university deliberately was indifferent because it failed to provide her 

with accommodations related to her course load and housing following the assault. Moore avers 

she expressed to several administrators her concern that dropping units could jeopardize her

financial aid and campus housing. In the SAC, Moore clarifies that O’Brien told her she could 

appeal to keep her financial aid and campus housing, but she would have had to “personally go to”

each office and discuss her situation with relevant administrators. SAC ¶ 62. In response, Moore 

expressed her reluctance to discuss the assault and asked if O’Brien or some other administrator 

could conduct the appeals on her behalf. He said no. 

Moore again relies on Kelly v. Yale University, No. 3:01-cv-1591, 2003 WL 1563424 (D. 

 

3 Moore argues that the university was obligated to proceed with an investigation “even if 

she did rescind her request.” Opp. 19-20. She cites no case law in support. She points only to the 

DCL. As discussed above, the DCL is not controlling. See Section IV.A, supra.

4 Moore also alleges in a conclusory fashion that Molitor “specifically discouraged” her 

from going to the hospital to get a rape kit (SAC ¶ 48), but does not allege how Molitor did so. 

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Conn. Mar. 26, 2003). There, the plaintiff was assaulted by a student with whom she shared a 

class and a dormitory. She filed a formal written complaint with the Yale Divinity School Sexual 

Harassment Committee and requested that the assailant be removed from their shared class. 

Throughout the grievance process, she also repeatedly requested alternative housing because she 

did not feel safe living in the same dormitory as her assailant. The court found a reasonable jury 

could find the school’s failure to provide accommodations, either academic or residential, 

immediately following the assault, was clearly unreasonable. Id. at *4.

Unlike Kelly, Moore’s requests for accommodations were separate from her concerns 

about a hostile environment. Moore does not allege she sought academic or residential 

accommodations to avoid encounters with Doe. Moreover, as noted in the prior order, unlike

Kelly, Moore’s requests were not simply ignored. Within days of the incident, Moore met with the 

university police, her CARE advocate, the Assistance Coordinator of Student Mental Health 

Services at UCSB, the Assistant Clinical Director and Crisis and Administrative Services 

Coordinator, and the Assistant Dean and Director of Advising at UCSB. Moore received 

counseling from UCSB and the university informed her of a process through which she could keep 

her financial aid and housing if she dropped units. O’Brien’s refusal to conduct Moore’s appeals 

on her behalf appears “negligent, lazy, or careless” but, as presently pleaded, does not evince 

conduct plainly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. 

c. Remediation

Moore contends Doe’s unrestricted presence on campus created a hostile environment, 

which the university failed to remediate. She encountered Doe on campus one time and reported 

the encounter to Crutcher. She further reported suffering a panic attack and feeling fearful of 

encountering Doe in the future. Crutcher offered counseling, but did not offer other remedial 

measures. Moore, for her part, did not make any remedial demands. 

Moore relies on Doe ex rel. Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438 (D. Conn. 

2006), where the plaintiff was a middle-school student who had been sexually assaulted by a highschool student during summer break. Id. at 444. The plaintiff and her assailant attended school in 

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the same building “leaving open the constant potential for interactions between them.” Id. at 444. 

The plaintiff, in fact, frequently did see her assailant during the school year and the assailant’s 

friends harassed her on several occasions. Id. The court found a triable issue of deliberate 

indifference where the school made no efforts to reduce plaintiff’s “vulnerability to traumatic

interactions with her attacker” because of the plaintiff’s “youth, and her proximity to [the 

assailant] at school.” Id. at 448.

Unlike Derby or Kelly, Moore does not aver that any encounter with her assailant was 

likely or imminent. Nor does Moore aver that the school ignored or rebuffed any request for 

remedial action to eliminate a hostile environment. She did not demand, for example, a no-contact 

order or the assailant’s removal from campus. Further, Moore fails to allege when she 

encountered Doe or reported the encounter to Crutcher. It is thus unclear whether the encounter 

occurred proximately to her decision to withdraw from school or her decision, if any, to rescind 

her request for a school investigation. Again, the university’s alleged failure to offer remedial 

measures may have been negligent, but it does not rise to the standard of “clearly unreasonable” as 

the pleadings now stand.

2. Pre-Assault Conduct

In the FAC, Moore failed to state a claim against the university based on its pre-assault 

response to the general problem of sexual violence on campus. Order at 13-15. Moore’s general 

allegations regarding the university’s inadequate response to sexual violence, and the complaints 

and protests allegedly responsible for the adoption of new sexual assault policies, were insufficient

in the FAC to support a finding of deliberate indifference to known harassment. In the FAC, 

Moore did not allege the university had any specific knowledge of a heightened risk of sexual 

assault either by John Doe or in the particular context in which Moore’s assault occurred, 

differentiating her case from Williams v. Board of Regents of the Univ. System of Georgia, 477 

F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) and Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 

1181–85 (10th Cir. 2007). 

In the SAC, Moore avers UCSB maintained a pattern and practice of discouraging victims 

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of sexual assault from pursuing formal investigations by the university. She alleges the university 

waited eight months to investigate the peer-to-peer sexual assaults reported by Jane Roe 1 and 2 in 

2014, and that it discouraged both victims from pursuing school investigations. Moore does not 

allege, however, that the university had any specific knowledge of a heightened risk of sexual 

assault by the assailants or in the particular contexts in which the assaults occurred in the cases of 

Jane Roe 1 and 2. 

Moore argues that she is not required to allege such knowledge because her allegation is 

based on a school policy. She relies on Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of California, 602 F.3d 

957, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2010). There, female wrestlers sued their university because it eliminated 

all women from the wrestling team and then, in response to student protests, instituted an official

policy permitting women to participate on the team if they could beat male wrestlers in their 

weight class using men’s collegiate wrestling rules. As a result of the new requirement, female 

students were unable to participate on the team. The Ninth Circuit found the plaintiffs were not 

required to give the university notice of the alleged Title IX violation before filing suit. The court 

held that actual knowledge of discrimination is required when the alleged Title IX violation 

consists of an institution’s deliberate indifference only in cases that “do not involve official 

policy.” Id. at 967 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290). In other words, no notice requirement is 

applicable to Title IX claims that rest on “an affirmative institutional decision.” Id. at 967. The 

Ninth Circuit reasoned that a university’s decision with respect to athletics is easily attributable to 

the university and “always—by definition—intentional.” Id. at 968 (citing Jackson v. Birmingham 

Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, 183 (2005)). 

Here, Moore does not allege an affirmative institutional decision or official school policy 

of UCSB. Rather, she points to two incidents that she asserts show a “pattern or practice” of 

discouraging victims of sexual assault from pursuing formal investigations by the university. 

Moore does not allege that Jane Roe 1 and 2 even interacted with the same UCSB administrator or 

office as she did. In fact, Jane Roe 1 spoke with someone in the UCSB Judicial Affairs office, 

while Moore and Jane Roe 2 did not. Even crediting Moore’s allegation of a “pattern and 

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practice” of discouraging victims from pursuing formal school investigations, Moore has not 

alleged any official policy, which can be “easily attributable to the university” and “always—by 

definition—intentional.” 

To the extent Moore’s claim is based on the school’s pre-assault conduct, the motion to 

dismiss will be granted without leave to amend. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 

F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend 

and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, the district court’s 

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

V. CONCLUSION

Moore has still not pleaded adequately deliberate indifference based on the university’s 

pre- or post-assault conduct. To the extent Moore’s claim is based on the school’s pre-assault 

conduct, the motion to dismiss will be granted without leave to amend. To the extent Moore’s 

claim is based on the school’s post-assault conduct, she will be given one final opportunity to 

amend if she can do so in good faith, consistent with the principles set forth above. It Moore

elects to amend her pleading, she must lodge an amended complaint within twenty (20) days from 

the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-05779-RS Document 45 Filed 09/15/16 Page 12 of 12