Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00688/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYKAL S. RYAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11 CV 0688 MMA (BLM)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 4]

vs.

LEE M. QUICK, individually and as attorney

representing the John and Christy Ryan

Family Trust, and DOES 1 through 20,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Lee M. Quick’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff Mykal S. Ryan’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) for lack of

personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 4.] Plaintiff did not

file an opposition to Defendant’s motion. On May 11, 2011, the Court in its discretion under Civil

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) found the motion suitable for decision on the papers and without oral

argument. [Doc. No. 6.] For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to

dismiss. 

DISCUSSION

On March 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed an action in the Superior Court for the State of California,

San Diego County, alleging that Defendant Quick made defamatory statements about him during a

deposition in March 2010, taken in connection with an earlier civil action initiated by Plaintiff in

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 Plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate how he is disabled. However, the Court notes Plaintiff

has filed several other actions in the Southern District of California in which he asserts he suffers from

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). See, e.g., Ryan v. Hyden, case no. 10cv1206; Ryan v. Quick, case no. 10cv1326, Ryan v. Hyden, case no. 10cv1092.

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the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. [Doc. No. 1, Exh. A.] Plaintiff also

summarily alleges Quick “and his agents contacted my federal government employer and my

Army Reserve employers and declared that I committed a crime (stole property and money) which

was a false allegation that resulted in the suspension of my TS/SCI security clearance and loss of

my position.” [Id. at ¶22.] Plaintiff seeks $1.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. 

[Id. at p.7.]

Plaintiff acknowledges Defendant Quick is a Virginia resident, and that the offending

conduct occurred in Virginia. [Id. at ¶¶1, 14.] Yet Plaintiff deems California an appropriate venue

for two reasons. First, Plaintiff asserts he has lived in San Diego, California since 2007, and

therefore he has suffered personal injury in San Diego as a result of the defamatory comments

Quick allegedly made in Virginia. [Id. at ¶9.] Second, Plaintiff asserts he is “100% disabled” and

unable to travel, making San Diego the “legal, logical and reasonable place of venue.”1

 [Id. at

¶¶10-12.] In support, Plaintiff cites California Code of Civil Procedure, section 395(a), which

states in part, that in personal injury actions venue may be proper where the injury occurs. [Id. at

¶¶8-9.] On April 5, 2011, however, Defendant Quick removed the state action to this Court based

on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. [Doc. No. 1.] 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) governs the

proper venue in actions based on diversity. Under section 1391(a), generally, actions based on

diversity may only be brought in:

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants

reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated,

or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal

jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district

in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Here, the face of Plaintiff’s complaint indicates Defendant resides in

Virginia, the allegedly wrongful actions occurred in Virginia, and Defendant has had no contact

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with California upon which personal jurisdiction could be based. The complaint therefore

provides no indication venue is proper in the Southern District of California under section 1391(a).

The Ninth Circuit has held a district court may properly grant an unopposed motion to

dismiss pursuant to a local rule where the local rule permits, but does not require, the granting of a

motion for failure to respond. See generally, Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Local Civil Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) provides that “[i]f an opposing party fails to file papers in the manner

required by Local Rule 7.1(e)(2), that failure may constitute a consent to the granting of that

motion or other ruling by the court.” As such, the Court has the option of granting Defendant’s

motion on the basis of Plaintiff’s failure to respond, and it chooses to do so. 

Generally, public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits. See, e.g., Hernandez v.

City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). However, a case cannot move forward

toward resolution on the merits when the plaintiff fails to defend his case against a Rule 12(b)

motion. Thus, this policy lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case

toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes or completely prevents progress in

that direction. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, management of

this Court’s docket is of vital significance to the proper and timely resolution of matters before it.

Consequently, the Court finds dismissal pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) serves to

facilitate the management of its docket in light of the fact that the complaint, on its face,

demonstrates no plausible ground for jurisdiction over this out-of-state Defendant, nor venue in the

Southern District of California. 

Lastly, the Court notes that although Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, on May 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed a request for “Judicial Notice to Defamation in Filing and

Objection to Transferring Cases to One Court.” [Doc. No. 7.] Because Plaintiff’s filing does not

request the Court take judicial notice of any identifiable material, Plaintiff’s request for judicial

notice is DENIED. Instead, Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s notice of related cases [Doc. No. 5],

including Defendant’s characterization and summary of nine cases Plaintiff has filed in the

Southern District of California from July 2009 to present. Plaintiff further objects to Defendant’s

request that six open matters be transferred to a single court pursuant to Civil Local Rule 40.1(h). 

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Plaintiff asserts “[t]he Defendants are co-conspirators and consolidating the cases to one Court

would deny me the opportunity to unravel the conspiracy and would allow the Defendants an

opportunity to work together and to cover-up their wrongdoing.” [Doc. No. 7, ¶25.] Under Local

Rule 40.1(h), related cases can be transferred to a single district judge and single magistrate judge

“to avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial effort.” Plaintiff does not, however, address whether

judicial economy will be served by transferring Plaintiff’s related cases to one court. Rather,

Plaintiff summarily asserts transfer will facilitate an alleged conspiracy against him. Upon

consideration of the existing record before the Court, and the fatal jurisdictional deficiencies of

Plaintiff’s current complaint before the undersigned, the Court overrules without prejudice

Plaintiff’s conclusory objections to Defendant’s request to transfer related cases in accordance

with Local Rule 40.1(h). The Court expresses no opinion, however, regarding the propriety of any

transfers in the remaining open cases.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and

Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is not, however, granted leave to

amend because venue for this action is not proper in the Southern District of California, and the

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant Quick. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is

instructed to terminate this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 17, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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