Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08064/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08064-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Randolph Wolfson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

J. William Brammer, Jr., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-8064-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff Randolph Wolfson is a lawyer admitted to the State Bar of Arizona. In 2006,

and again in 2008, he was an unsuccessful candidate for judge of the Superior Court of

Arizona in Mohave County. On May 21, 2008, during his second campaign, Wolfson filed

this action against the members of the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct and the

members of the Arizona Disciplinary Commission (collectively, the “Commission

Defendants”), as well as Robert Van Wyck, Chief Bar Counsel for the State Bar of Arizona

(“Bar Counsel”), claiming that six canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 81, Rules

of the Supreme Court of Arizona, (the “Code”), unconstitutionally limit his right to free

speech either as a judicial candidate or as a judge. Wolfson claims that his constitutionally

protected speech is chilled by his compelled adherence to Canons 3(E)(1)(e), 5(A)(1)(b),

5(A)(1)(c), 5(A)(1)(d), 5(B)(1)(d)(i), and 5(B)(2) of the Code in that he will be subjected to

Case 3:08-cv-08064-FJM Document 47 Filed 01/15/09 Page 1 of 6
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He makes this claim even though the Code and the defendants acknowledge that

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002), guarantees

his right to announce his views on disputed legal or political issues. 

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Among other things, we concluded that because Wolfson claimed he did not intend

to make “pledges, promises, or commitments” within the meaning of Canon 5(B)(1)(d)(i) and

Canon 3(E)(1)(e) of the Code, there was no case or controversy with respect to these two

provisions. Wolfson v. Brammer, No. 08-CV-8064, 2008 WL 4372459, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept.

23, 2008).

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professional discipline if he announces his views on controversial legal and political issues,1

endorses other candidates, personally solicits funds for his own campaign, participates in

political campaigns other than his own, supports candidates and state ballot initiatives, or

associates himself with political groups. It is undisputed that no disciplinary proceeding has

ever been initiated or threatened against him. He asks this court to declare these canons

unconstitutional and seeks to enjoin the defendants from enforcing them. 

On September 23, 2008, we entered an order denying Wolfson’s motion for

preliminary injunction, concluding that Wolfson could not show a probability of success on

the merits of any of his First Amendment claims (doc. 34).2

 In November 2008, before the

present motions were fully briefed, Wolfson lost his bid for judicial office. In his

supplemental reply to his motion for summary judgment (filed at our request), Wolfson stated

that he does not intend to be a candidate in the next election (doc. 46). Defendants argue,

among other things, that because this case is moot we lack jurisdiction under Article III to

hear Wolfson’s constitutional challenges. 

We now have before us the Commission Defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 19),

Wolfson’s response (doc. 26), and the Commission Defendants’ reply (doc. 31); Bar

Counsel’s motion to dismiss (doc. 20), Wolfson’s response (doc. 25), Bar Counsel’s reply

(doc. 30); and Wolfson’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 35), Bar Counsel’s response

(doc. 39), the Commission Defendants’ response (doc. 41), Wolfson’s replies (docs. 43, 44),

and supplemental reply (doc. 46).

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Under Article III, a federal court has jurisdiction to hear “only actual, ongoing cases

or controversies.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S. Ct. 1249,

1253 (1990). A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 489

(9th Cir. 2003). An established exception to the mootness doctrine exists, however, if the

underlying dispute between the parties is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” So.

Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S. Ct. 279, 283 (1911). This limited

exception is available only where (1) the challenged conduct is in its duration too short to be

fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that

the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Weinstein v.

Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349 (1975); see also Lewis, 494 U.S. at 481, 110

S. Ct. at 1255. “Election cases often fall within this exception, because the inherently brief

duration of an election is almost invariably too short to enable full litigation on the merits.”

Porter, 319 F.3d at 490. 

As to the first prong of the mootness exception, there is little doubt that the campaign

period before the 2008 general election was too brief to permit full litigation on the merits

of the issues presented, and therefore these claims are likely to evade review. 

The second prong of the “capable of repetition” exception presents a more difficult

question. “Article III denies federal courts the power to decide questions that cannot affect

the rights of litigants in the case before them.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477, 110 S. Ct. at 1253

(quotation omitted). Therefore, the second prong requires a “‘reasonable expectation’ or

‘demonstrated probability’ that the same controversy will recur involving the same

complaining party.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1184 (1982)

(emphasis added). “[A] mere physical or theoretical possibility [is not] sufficient to satisfy

the test . . . . If this were true, virtually any matter of short duration would be reviewable.”

Id. 

In recent election cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that, although the

elections concluded before the issues were decided, the cases were capable of repetition yet

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evading review where the plaintiff “made a public statement expressing his intent to [selffinance another bid for a House seat],” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759,

2770 (2008); the plaintiff “credibly claimed that it planned on running . . . broadcast ads

mentioning a candidate within the blackout period,” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin

Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2007); the plaintiff “represented, as on officer of this

Court, that he plans to run again,” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 n.2, 117 S. Ct. 1295,

1300 n.2 (1997); the plaintiff “remains a candidate for the office . . . in [the new] election,”

Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 498 U.S. 466, 473 n.8, 111 S. Ct. 880, 885

n.8 (1991); and the plaintiffs “insist[ed] they will continue to oppose the constitutional

amendment,” First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (1978).

In every instance, the Court considered significant the fact that there was some evidence,

however slight, of the plaintiff’s intention to engage in the challenged conduct in the future.

In his supplemental reply, Wolfson affirmatively states that he does not intend to be

a candidate in the next election. He also does not express an intention to be a candidate in

any election in the near future. Nevertheless, relying on Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d

1031 (9th Cir. 2000), he argues that this fact is irrelevant to our mootness analysis. 

In Schaefer, the court rejected the proposition that “only when a candidate plans to

seek reelection is the case not moot” under the capable of repetition yet evading review

doctrine. Id. at 1033 (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding that the election was over and

that Schaefer refused to disclose whether he intended to run for office again, the Ninth

Circuit held that the case remained capable of repetition, yet evading review. Schaefer relied

primarily on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972), where Dunn challenged

the constitutionality of a state’s residency requirements that denied his right to vote. The

Court held that the case was not rendered moot by the fact that, before a decision on the

merits was reached, Dunn met the residency requirements and was no longer prohibited from

voting. Dunn, however, is fundamentally distinguishable from the instant case in that it was

a class action in which Dunn represented a class of voters affected by the challenged statute.

Id. at 331, 92 S. Ct. at 997. The Court ruled that the case was not moot because Dunn had

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“standing to challenge [the residency requirements] as a member of the class of people

affected by the presently written statute.” Id. at 333, 92 S. Ct. at 998. The case before us is

not a class action and Wolfson has presented no argument that he has standing to challenge

the Code on behalf of any other individual. 

Despite the fact that Schaefer did not require any showing of a “reasonable

expectation” or “demonstrated probability” that the “same controversy will recur involving

the same complaining party,” Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482, 102 S. Ct. at 1184, other Ninth

Circuit cases have considered such a showing significant in their mootness analysis. See,

e.g., Porter, 319 F.3d at 490 (court found significant fact that plaintiff had “expressed his

intent” to engage in the challenged conduct in a future election); Baldwin v. Redwood City,

540 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the controversy was capable of repetition,

yet evading review because plaintiff testified that he wanted to engage in the challenged

conduct in future elections); Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.

1994) (to meet the second prong “the complaining party ‘need only show that it is reasonable

to expect that [it] will engage in conduct that will once again give rise to the assertedly moot

dispute”). 

At all events, this is not a case where, as in Schaefer, the plaintiff is merely silent on

whether he intends to participate in the next election. This is a case where the plaintiff has

affirmatively stated that he will not. In order to give some meaning to the second prong of

the “capable of repetition” exception, we conclude that under these circumstances there is

no reasonable expectation that the same controversy involving Wolfson will recur.

Therefore, we conclude that Wolfson’s claims are not capable of repetition and that the case

is now moot.

IT IS ORDERED DENYING Wolfson’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 35),

and GRANTING the Commission Defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 19), and

GRANTING Bar Counsel’s motion to dismiss (doc. 20), on the ground of mootness. 

DATED this 14th day of January, 2009.

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