Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01619/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01619-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FABRIENNE ENGLISH,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE INC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:14-cv-01619-WHO 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION UNDER FRCP 56(d) 

AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 288

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Apple Inc., AppleCare Service Company Inc., and Apple CSC Inc. 

(collectively, “Apple”) move for summary judgment of Plaintiff Fabrienne English’s claims 

related to Apple’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions in connection with AppleCare+ 

(“AC+”), an extended service plan Apple offers to purchasers of iPhones. English’s core 

complaint is that Apple misrepresents to consumers that replacement iPhones under AC+ will be 

new when in fact many of the replacement devices in Apple’s service stock are “refurbished” or 

otherwise not new. She asserts claims under California law for violations of the Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act (“CLRA”), the False Advertising Law (“FAL”), the Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”), and the Secondhand Merchandize Labeling Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17531, and 

for fraud. 

English urges me to deny Apple’s motion for summary judgment, or to stay the matter 

pending additional discovery to give her the opportunity to present facts essential to justify her 

opposition under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(d). She insists that, through additional 

discovery and/or testing of the phone, she can prove that her replacement phones under AC+ were 

not new when Apple gave them to her. I have already found that the phones she received were 

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new, and she has not convinced me that any proposed testing would demonstrate otherwise. She 

also fails to justify her delay in pursuing additional discovery, and since it is disproportional to her 

claims anyway, she is not entitled to it. Her 56(d) application is DENIED.

Because English does not offer sufficient evidence to establish that she relied on any 

alleged misrepresentation by Apple, she fails to make the requisite showing for Article III standing 

that her injury was caused by Apple. Her Secondhand Merchandize Labeling Law claim fails 

because she fails to show a genuine issue as to whether the phones she received were anything 

other than new. Although there may be a genuine issue whether English was denied a second 

incident under AC+, that fact is not material to any of her claims. Apple’s motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. AC+ and APP 

AC+ is a service plan offered by Apple for, among other products, the iPhone. Healy 

Decl. ¶¶ 3–4 (Dkt. No. 209-32). APP is a predecessor to AC+.1 Id. ¶ 3.

Apple offered APP until October 2011. Id. APP cost $99 and provided consumers with 

hardware repair coverage and telephone technical support for two years from the date of purchase 

of the iPhone.2 Id. 

Apple launched AC+ in October 2011. Id. ¶ 4. For $99, purchasers receive coverage for 

two accidental damage incidents. Id. The service fee for each incident was initially $49. Id. On 

September 10, 2013, the service fee was increased to $79. Id. ¶ 5. There is no service fee under 

AC+ for repairs not resulting from accidental damage. Id. ¶ 6. 

From AC+’s first launch until September 2013, Apple allowed customers to purchase AC+ 

at the time of accidental damage. Id. ¶ 8. During that time period, if a customer’s iPhone suffered 

 

1

In her TAC and briefing, English describes AC+ and APP as “essentially extended warranties.” 

TAC ¶ 11 (Dkt. No. 139). I use “service plans” instead of “extended warranties” in this Order 

unless quoting from materials submitted by English. 

2

Every new iPhone comes with a one year limited warranty and 90 days of telephone technical 

support. See Patel Decl. Ex. R (Dkt. No. 209-19).

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accidental damage, rather than having to pay $149 for an out-of-warranty service event or 

approximately $449 for a new iPhone, the customer could purchase AC+ for $99 and receive a 

$50 discount on the $149 out-of-warranty service event, plus the two accidental damage incidents 

provided under AC+. Id. As discussed in more detail below, English purchased her AC+ plan in 

this way. TAC ¶ 34. 

A customer who brings in her iPhone for service under AC+ or APP may have the iPhone 

repaired or replaced, depending on the circumstances (e.g., whether a repair is feasible) and the 

customer’s preference. When a customer decides to replace her iPhone, she receives a 

replacement device out of Apple’s “service stock.” Apple describes its service stock as consisting 

of three types of iPhones: (1) new iPhones; (2) remanufactured iPhones; and (3) reclaimed 

iPhones. Lanigan Decl. ¶ 3 [sealed](Dkt. No. 208-17); Lanigan Decl. ¶ 3 [redacted](Dkt. No. 209-

34) . 

New iPhones are made of all new parts and are “exactly the same” as the iPhones Apple 

sells in its stores. Lanigan Decl. ¶ 4. New iPhones 

 Id. As discussed 

below in more detail, the evidence in this case shows that English received only new iPhones as 

replacement devices, not remanufactured or reclaimed iPhones. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 

Remanufactured iPhones are manufactured using the same process as new iPhones, but 

“could contain both new parts and recovered parts that have been extensively tested.” Id. ¶ 5. 

Apple states that “each and every remanufactured iPhone is inspected and tested to ensure that it is 

equivalent to a new iPhone in performance and reliability.” Id. 

Reclaimed iPhones are iPhones that have either 

. Id. ¶ 6. Apple states that “[t]hese (essentially new) 

iPhones undergo a testing and screening process to ensure that they are equivalent to new in 

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performance and reliability.”3Id.

All iPhones in Apple’s service stock are shipped and stored in plain, white, unbranded 

boxes. See Williams Dep. at 210–11 (Patel Decl. Ex. T, Dkt. No. 209-21). Because all iPhones in 

the service stock are shipped and stored in this manner, Apple store employees do not know 

whether any particular replacement device is new, remanufactured, or reclaimed. Id. at 152–53, 

231–32. Customers who receive a replacement device do not keep the plain, white, unbranded 

box in which it is carried out from the service stock to the floor. Morrison Dep. 202:5–9 (Dkt. No. 

288-2).

The current AC+ terms and conditions state in relevant part:

If during the plan term you submit a valid claim . . . , Apple will 

either (a) repair the defect at no charge, using new parts or parts that 

are equivalent to new in performance and reliability, or (b) exchange 

the [iPhone], with a replacement product that is new or equivalent to 

new in performance and reliability. All replacement products 

provided under this plan will at a minimum be functionally 

equivalent to the original product.

TAC Ex. B (Dkt. No. 139-2); Patel Decl. Ex. O (Dkt. No. 209-16).

The AC+ and APP terms and conditions in effect until September 2013 similarly stated:

If during the coverage period you submit a valid claim. . . , Apple 

will either (a) repair the defect at no charge, using new or 

refurbished parts that are equivalent to new in performance and 

reliability, or (b) exchange the [iPhone] with a replacement product 

that is new or equivalent to new in performance and reliability, and 

is at least functionally equivalent to the original product.

TAC Ex. C (Dkt. No. 139-3).

B. English’s Purchase and Use of AC+

In September 2012, English obtained an iPhone 4 from Sprint in connection with signing 

up for Sprint wireless telephone service. English Decl. ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 180-43); Patel MSJ Decl. Ex. 

2, English Dep. at 71:9–23 (Dkt. No. 288-3). She gave the iPhone to her minor son. Id.

On February 15, 2013, English and her son went to an Apple store in NorthPark Center, 

Texas because the screen on the iPhone had cracked. English Decl. ¶ 4; English Dep. at 61:23–25. 

 

3

In her TAC and briefing, English refers to all replacement iPhones other than new replacement 

iPhones as “refurbished.” See, e.g., TAC ¶ 11. For ease of reference, I do the same in this Order 

unless otherwise indicated.

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English states that in discussing AC+ with an Apple employee at the store, she was told that she 

“would have two ‘incidents’ available for occurrences such as a cracked screen or water damage, 

and that the replacement devices would be new.” English Decl. ¶ 6. She paid $99 for AC+ and 

another $99 to receive what the Apple employee allegedly described as a new iPhone 4. Id. ¶ 4; 

see also TAC Ex. E (Dkt. No. 139-5). 

The replacement iPhone was presented to English in the plain, white, unbranded box in 

which Apple packages its replacement devices. Patel MSJ Decl. Ex. 2 at 104:9–106:16, 140:4–

141:8. The box did not include “any label or other writing indicating that the [iPhone] was 

refurbished, reconditioned, used, or contained parts that were refurbished, reconditioned, or used.” 

TAC ¶ 40. English states that the Apple employee “took great care to unseal and open [the box] in 

front of [her],” and that “[w]hen he took the iPhone out of the packaging he did so in a way that 

made [her] think that the device was new.” English Decl. ¶ 7. English was not given the box, nor 

was she given a charger or earbuds. English Dep. at 105:1, 106.

At the time English purchased AC+, the plan’s terms and conditions were available in hard 

copy, available at apple.com, and provided via URL on “Smart Signs” (i.e., interactive iPads) 

throughout the store. Healy Decl. ¶¶ 9–11 (Dkt. No. 209-32). The Smart Signs state that 

“replacement equipment that Apple provides as part of the repair or replacement service may be 

new or equivalent to new in both performance and reliability.” Healy Decl. Ex. A (Dkt. No. 209-

33) at APL000029437. English also received a pdf of the AC+ terms and conditions via email. 

English Dep. at 108:11. English admits that she never read the AC+ terms and conditions.4 

English Dep. at 107:18–108:17, 124:6–128:13.

English contends that the replacement iPhone she received on February 15, 2013 was not 

new and was in fact a “refurbished device.” English Decl. ¶ 9. She states that “[h]ad [she] known 

that [the] iPhone was not new, [she] would not have made the purchase, and would have 

 

4

English claims to have read and relied on the Repair Terms and Conditions prior to purchasing 

AC+. English 2nd Decl. ¶ 14 (Dkt. No. 304-15). It provides, “When the product is covered by 

warranty or an extended service contract, such as the AppleCare Protection Plan, Apple will 

perform repairs under the terms of the warranty or the extended service contract, provided that you 

have presented satisfactory proof of the products’ eligibility for such repairs.” TAC Ex. D 

(“Apple Inc. Repair Terms and Conditions”)(Dkt. No. 38-4).

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considered other options such as getting an upgraded phone from Sprint.” Id. ¶ 5.

Apple contends that the replacement iPhone was new. See Lanigan Decl. ¶ 9. It submits a 

declaration from Michael Lanigan, Director of AppleCare Supplier Quality Engineering and MailIn Operations, who 

 Id. ¶ 1. He states that based on his research and 

analysis of Apple’s records, the iPhone English received on February 15, 2013 was a new device. 

Id. ¶ 9. 

English alleges that she “immediately started experiencing problems” with the replacement 

iPhone. English Decl. ¶ 11. The device “would freeze, stop working, and close without warning.” 

Id. On July 22, 2013, she and her son went to an Apple store in Plano, Texas after the device 

completely stopped working and would no longer turn on. Id. An Apple employee there told her 

that the device had water damage and that she could use one of the accidental damage incidents 

under her AC+ plan to get a replacement. Id. English paid the $49.00 AC+ service fee and 

received another replacement iPhone 4. Id.; see also Patel Decl. Ex. E (Dkt. No. 209-6). This 

replacement device was again presented in a plain, white, unbranded box. English Decl. ¶ 11. 

According to English, the second replacement device, like her first one, was “refurbished.” Id. 

According to Apple, it was in fact new. Lanigan Decl. ¶ 10. English states that within a week of 

receiving the second replacement device, it began suffering from “freezing issues” like those 

exhibited by the first one. English Decl. ¶ 12. 

On February 28, 2014, English went back to the Apple store in North Park Center, Texas 

because the screen on her second replacement iPhone had cracked. English Decl. ¶ 13. English 

alleges that she was told by an Apple employee there that she had already used up both incidents 

allowed under her AC+ plan, and that as a result she was not entitled to another replacement 

device. English Dep. at 160:15–21. She states that the employee “cited [her] initial purchase from 

Apple in February 2013 and the July 2013 replacement as the incidents of accidental damage 

replacement that [she] was entitled to under [her AC+ plan].” English Decl. ¶ 13. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 English initially brought her claims as one of three plaintiffs in a class action complaint 

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filed by attorney Renee Kennedy. See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1). With the filing of the second 

amended complaint on January 17, 2015, the other two named plaintiffs dropped out, while a new 

named plaintiff joined in. See Dkt. No. 116. They filed the TAC on March 6, 2015, alleging four 

causes of action against Apple based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions in connection 

with AC+ and APP: (1) violations of the CLRA, TAC ¶¶ 73–94; (2) violations of the FAL, TAC 

¶¶ 103–111; (3) violations of the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent prongs of the UCL, TAC ¶¶ 

121–127; (4) violations of the Secondhand Merchandise Labeling Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 

17531, TAC ¶¶ 112–120; and (5) fraud, TAC ¶¶ 95–102. Shortly after the TAC was filed, on 

March 19, 2015, the other named plaintiff dropped out of the case, leaving English as the only 

named plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 144.5

On January 5, 2016, I denied English’s motion for class certification because none of her 

theories of liability supported class certification, and also because she could not establish 

adequacy of counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) in light of the deficiencies 

shown by her lead counsel, Ms. Kennedy. Class Certification Order (Dkt. No. 225). On 

September 23, 2016, Apple filed its motion for summary judgment on English’s individual claims 

related to her purchase of AC+ and alleged denial of coverage for a second incident. See Mot. 1–2 

(Dkt. No. 288). 

On October 15, 2016, one of plaintiff’s former co-counsels, who apparently had gained 

possession of the July 2013 replacement phone that English had received under AC+ and 

misplaced it, notified Kennedy that he had located it. Kennedy Decl. ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 293-1). 

Plaintiff filed several motions seeking leave for permission to test the phone, and an extension of 

time to file her opposition. Dkt. Nos. 290, 293, 295, 296, 299. On October 24, 2016, I extended 

her deadline by four days (Dkt. No. 300), and she filed her opposition on October 28, 2016. 

Opp’n (Dkt. No. 305[redacted], Dkt. No. 304-3[under seal]). On October 31, 2016, I denied her 

request to test the phone, in part because plaintiff had not: 

 

5

Since English does not allege that she ever purchased the APP service plan, it is no longer at 

issue in this case.

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specifically respond[ed] to defendants’ arguments that testing the 

iPhone now will not prove that it was new or refurbished when 

plaintiff received it from Apple in 2013, that the testing is not 

proportionate to the needs of the case, that plaintiff has not provided 

sufficient detail regarding the tests she proposes to run, and that she 

has not provided a written description of the proposed testing 

protocol.

Dkt. No. 307. But I also left open the possibility that briefing and evidence concerning the motion 

for summary judgment might establish the need for such testing. I heard argument from the 

parties on December 14, 2016.

III. BACKGROUND OF 56(D) MOTION

Relevant to English’s request for additional discovery, she proffered two affidavits that

identify three categories of discovery: additional information to determine whether or not her 

replacement unit was new; “testing” of the recently found 2013 replacement unit; and an 

additional deposition of Apple employee “Ryan.” English Decl. 56(d) ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 304-15); 

English 2nd Decl. ¶¶ 10–13, 16. She submits that (1) “fingerprints, scratches and stickers on the 

internal parts are evidence that the phone is refurbished;” (2) “[e]xperts can tell if the phone has 

been opened before;” and (3) “[t]here are diagnostic, software and application tests that can be 

run.” English Decl. ¶ 5 (citing Dixon Decl., Ex. M; and Huynh Decl., Ex. R).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of 

persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has 

made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to identify 

“specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The party opposing summary 

judgment must then present affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a verdict in that 

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). 

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On summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the 

non-movant. Id. at 255. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the 

facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Id. However, conclusory and speculative testimony 

does not raise genuine issues of fact and is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill

Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d),

If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified 

reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the 

court may:

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take 

discovery; or

(3) issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

“[A] district court should continue a summary judgment motion upon a good faith showing 

by affidavit that the continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to preclude summary 

judgment.” State of Cal., on Behalf of California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 

138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998). The party seeking to continue the motion “must show (1) that 

they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further 

discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to 

resist the summary judgment motion.” Id.

DISCUSSION

All five of English’s claims stem from her allegation that Apple misrepresented or omitted 

the fact that she might not obtain a new replacement unit when receiving service under AC+. See

TAC ¶¶ 73–127. Apple argues that, since she did in fact receive new phones on both occasions, 

all of her claims must fail. Mot. at 1. First, Apple states that English has suffered no injury since 

she received new phones, and so Apple is entitled to summary judgment because English lacks 

Article III standing for all five claims. Mot. at 9. Next, Apple contends that it did not 

“misrepresent” that English would receive a new phone, because she did in fact receive a new 

phone. Id. at 11. In the absence of any misrepresentation, her claims under the UCL, FAL, CLRA 

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and for fraud must fail. Id. And, since she received a new phone, her Secondhand Merchandising 

Labeling Law claim must fail. Id. at 12.

In the alternative, Apple argues for partial summary judgment to the extent her claims 

under the UCL, FAL, CLRA and for fraud depend on English’s reliance on the AC+ terms and 

conditions, because the undisputed evidence establishes that she never viewed the terms and 

conditions prior to purchasing the plan. Id. at 13. Additionally, Apple argues for partial summary 

judgment to the extent her claims depend on a theory that Apple’s use of a plain white box 

misrepresents that replacement phones are new because using a plain white box is not an 

affirmative representation at all and plaintiff cannot meet the reasonable consumer standard. Id. at 

15. Lastly, Apple argues for summary judgment on English’s claim that she was denied a second 

incident because the undisputed facts prove that she was not denied a second incident. Id. at 17.

English asserts the following genuine issues of material fact: whether the service units 

were in fact new; whether she was denied a second incident under AC+; and whether Apple 

properly discloses the plan’s length of time. Opp’n 8–15. English contends that she still suffered 

an injury, even if the iPhones she received as replacement units were new, but she admits that 

“[t]he main fact in contention is whether Plaintiff’s replacement iPhones [“service units”] are new 

rather than used or refurbished.” Id. at 6. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S 56(D) APPLICATION IS DENIED

A. English’s Delay in Conducting Discovery

On September 9, 2015, Apple filed a declaration with its opposition to class certification 

from Michael Lanigan, who “reviewed Apple’s database containing information regarding the 

source of iPhones used as replacement devices under AC+[,]” and discovered “the two 

replacement iPhones that Plaintiff received were ‘new’—meaning they were ‘made of entirely 

new parts, and therefore are exactly the same as the iPhones Apples sells as new in Apple-branded 

boxes in its retail stores.’” Id. at 10:1–6 (quoting Lanigan Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4). As discussed during the 

hearing on class certification, English had three weeks to pursue discovery on the issue prior to 

filing her reply to Apple’s opposition to class certification. Class Certification Hr’g Tr. at 6:14–

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19. She did none. One of her former co-counsels, Mr. Cutter,

6 who ably argued her motion for 

class certification, accepted the evidence that English received a new rather than refurbished 

phone: “[y]ou know, I have no reason not to take Ms. Preovolos, who’s distinguished counsel, lot 

of experience, that she—likely it’s true... .” Hr’g Tr. at 9:6–9. I understood that representation as

a waiver of English’s claim to additional discovery on Lanigan’s testimony.7 Apple correctly 

states that the undisputed evidence at class certification established, and I concluded, that the 

replacement iPhones were new. Mot. for Summ. J. at 1:7–8; id. at 8–11 (Dkt. No. 288). 

I denied class certification in January, 2016, denied English’s motion for reconsideration in 

March, and the Ninth Circuit denied her petition for review in June. Nonetheless, English waited 

until the last day of August to seek any discovery related to her individual claims, even though she 

knew since a Case Management Conference on July 9, 2016 that her opposition to summary 

judgment would be due on October 24, 2016. Dkt. No. 289 at 3–4; Minute Entry (Dkt. No. 275). 

All in all, she waited nearly an entire year to seek discovery on the Lanigan testimony that she 

now seeks to question. See Reply at 3 (Dkt. No. 320); Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Administrative Mot. 

to Extend Time at 1–3 (Dkt. No. 292); Patel Decl. (Dkt. No. 292-2). 

There have been many requests for extensions in this case. English apparently feels 

aggrieved—in her administrative motion for an extension of time (Dkt. No. 290), she states, 

“please note that this Court has granted at least seven of Defendants’ motions for extension of 

time if not more, but has never granted one of Plaintiff’s motions as to extension of time.” 

10/10/16 Admin. Mot. at 6:7–10. Reality is much different, as shown below: 

DATE ECF 

NO.

REQUESTED 

BY

FOR FILING RESOLUTION REASON

4/29/15 67 Apple Declaration ISO 

Sealing

Granted Unopposed

2/9/15 134 Apple Response to 

Second 

Amended 

Complaint

Granted Stayed until after 

Court rules on 

Plaintiffs’ pending 

motion for leave to 

 

6

Two California law firms and four solo practioners at different times have represented English in 

addition to her lead lawyer, Renee Kennedy.

7

I noted in the Order Denying Class Certification that “English withdrew her request for further 

discovery on this issue.” Dkt. No. 225 at 14:1–2.

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file Third Amended 

Complaint

4/1/15 149 Apple, with 

contingent 

request by 

plaintiffs

30(b)(6) 

depositions

Granted as to 

both

Due to the number 

and variety of 

disputes over the 

appropriate scope

Extended plaintiffs’ 

deadline to file 

motion for class 

certification given 

the extended 

deposition deadline

7/6/15 185 Apple Declaration ISO 

Sealing

Granted Unopposed

7/16/15 194 Apple Opposition to 

Class 

Certification

Granted, 

including an 

extension for 

English to file her 

Reply

In support of class 

certification, English 

filed a substantially 

revised memorandum 

of points and 

authorities more than 

one week after the 

filing deadline, 

including 

declarations from 

seven previously 

undisclosed fact and 

expert witnesses

10/2/15 216 Apple Declaration ISO 

Sealing

Granted Unopposed

2/17/16 243 English Reply to Motion 

for 

Reconsideration

Granted in Part Stipulation for 7 day 

extension granted, 

but request for 14 

day extension denied

3/18/16 260 Apple Declaration ISO 

Sealing

Granted Unopposed

10/24/16 300 English Opposition to SJ Granted in part No reason

As evidenced by this chart, the only instances of extensions for substantive motions or 

responses granted to Apple were prompted by English’s own actions. Moreover, when Apple was

granted an extension, a corresponding extension was given to English. The docket is rife with the 

Court’s leniency in overlooking English’s failure to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

the Civil Local Rules and my Standing Orders during the pendency of this action. There is no 

good cause for English’s delay in conducting discovery. 

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B. Evidence Regarding the Phone

The bulk of English’s claims stem from her belief that the replacement phones she received 

from Apple through AC+ were not new. See Opp’n at 6:5–6 (Dkt. No. 304-3). While that may be 

her belief, I have already concluded in the Order Denying Class Certification that the phones she 

received were new, and she has offered no evidence to shake my determination of that fact. 

English now challenges the evidence that the phones were new by pointing to (1) her 

phone’s malfunctions, (2) the presumed proportion of remanufactured phones versus new phones 

in the supply channel for service units, and (3) the fact that it took Apple two years to uncover the 

evidence that her iPhones were in fact new at the time she received them as service units. Opp’n 

at 8–9. In the absence of actual evidence concerning the phones she received, none of these 

suppositions holds water.

Apple counters the first point by arguing that “brand new devices can on occasion 

malfunction,” and “[p]laintiff’s allegations and speculation ‘do not create a factual dispute for 

purposes of summary judgment.’” Reply at 8 (citing Nelson v. Pima Cmty. College Dist., 83 F.3d 

1075, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1996))(Dkt. No. 320). Apple points out that English “never sought 

repairs or any other assistance from Apple regarding the issues, nor did she research how to 

address the freezing issue... .” Id. (citing TAC ¶ 40 and English Dep.). I agree that English’s 

“conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data are insufficient... .” Arpin v. Santa Clara 

Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), especially considering the variability 

with which electronic devices malfunction. See, e.g., Pecht Report ¶ 23–26 (Dkt. No. 189-

1[sealed]; Lall Report ¶16c (Dkt. No. 208-25[sealed], 209-39[redacted]).

As to the second point, Apple highlights a previous order in which I found “evidence 

regarding the theoretical likelihood that English’s replacement iPhones would be refurbished does 

little to counter evidence that the replacement devices she actually received were in fact new.” 

Class Certification Order at 13:13–15 (emphasis in original) (Dkt. No. 225). The final point is

immaterial—the issue is whether there is a genuine dispute about its accuracy. None has been 

raised. 

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1. Additional Discovery Related to the Phone

English claims that summary judgment is improper because “necessary facts in existence 

are pending discovery.” Opp’n at 1. The parties submitted two Joint Letters regarding discovery 

disputes—one on October 6 and one on October 20, 2016. Dkt. Nos. 289, 297. In the former, 

plaintiff mentioned “discovery that Apple refuses to answer although served on 09.02.16,” as well 

as an outstanding RFA and RFPs served on 10.04.16. Dkt. No. 289 at 1. In the latter letter, Apple 

clarifies that it made its “last document production over a year ago, on July 1, 2015[,]” and that 

“Plaintiff waited until Sept. 28 [2016] (less than a month before her opposition brief [was] due) to 

raise any issues with respect to ‘updating’ the RFPs... .” Dkt. No. 297 at 3–4. Apple stated that 

“[t]here is nothing for the Court to compel” because “Defendants have produced all responsive, 

non-privileged documents for several of the RFPs[,]” and “[t]he remainder do not seek 

information that is relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and are 

disproportional to the nature of Plaintiff’s individual claims.” Id. at 4:11–14.

“Plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated that the request to postpone summary judgment 

and extend discovery is not due to a lack of diligence, nor what specific facts would be shown by 

additional discovery.” Thommeny v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80291, at 

*6 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2011). Given plaintiff’s own delay, the waiver by her prior counsel, and the 

likelihood that additional discovery will fail to prove anything—let alone a fact “essential” to 

resist summary judgment—English’s request for additional discovery is denied. See Volk v. D.A. 

Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987)(“The burden is on the party seeking to 

conduct additional discovery to put forth sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought exists.”) 

2. Testing the Phone

English states that “if the Court were to force us to pick [between additional discovery and 

testing the phone], we would rather be allowed to test, inspect, and open the iPhone.” Pl.’s 

Opposed Admin. Mot. for Leave to File Pl.’s Supp. Mot. to Extend Time to File an Opp’n Brief to 

Defs.’Mot. for Summ. J. at 2:25–27 (Dkt. No. 295). Apple opposed plaintiff’s initial motion to 

test the phone because “such ‘testing’ would prove nothing regarding whether [the phone] was 

new or ‘refurbished’ at the time Plaintiff received it from Apple[,]” and “would be especially futile 

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given that the iPhone (i) has been subjected to normal wear and tear since Plaintiff received it on 

July 22, 2013, (ii) has been damaged (cracked screen) by Plaintiff, (iii) may have been subject to 

unknown third-party repairs, and (iv) has been stored in unknown conditions by Plaintiff’s former 

counsel.” Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Second Admin. Mot. Re Extension of Time to Oppose MSJ at 1–2 

(Dkt. No. 294).

English owns the phone, so the “testing” I am asked to authorize is in actuality a command 

that Apple and its experts monitor whatever English wants to do with her phone. I will not order 

that because I do not see how any “testing” now will show whether the phone was new in 2013. 

She has had the phone for almost four years, although it was apparently misplaced by her lawyers 

for one of those years. There is no chain of custody for the phone. It is not at all clear how the 

“testing” that English discusses would prove that her phone was not new when she received it in 

2013.

8

 

The only “testing” that English proposes is akin to a visual examination, which I address 

below.9 Dkt. No. 298 at 2:7. In addition, she claims that “Thang Huynh also told Kennedy that 

there is a way to tell if the phone has been opened previously.” Id. Whether the device has been 

opened before is one thing, but whether the phone was new three years ago is something entirely 

different. 

English beseeches the Court to allow her to open up the phone, “take the parts out, test the 

phone, and run standard industry tests on it.” Pl.’s Statement Regarding Testing Pl.’s iPhone at 

1:15–16 (Dkt. No. 298). She states that “the parts are coded and numbers and letters can help 

identify whether the phones are refurbished or used.” Id. at 2:5–6. English submits a declaration 

 

8

Plaintiff’s own expert report submitted in support of class certification confirms this conclusion: 

“Electronic parts and products (devices, equipment) are known to wear-out with time, usage 

conditions and environmental conditions.” Kennedy Decl. in support of Class Certification, Ex. 1 

(Pecht Report) (Dkt. No. 189-1) ¶ 23.

9

She also mentions “diagnostic, software and application tests that can be run,” English Decl. ¶ 5 

(Dkt. No. 305-15), but never elaborates on this testing. See Dkt. No. 299 at 4:20–22. She 

references “step-by-step testing instructions.” Id. at 3: 7–8 (citing Dkt. No. 213-13). I do not see, 

and English does not explain, how the referenced procedures, entitled “iPhone Finished Goods 

Reclamation Process,” Dkt. No. 213-13, would be used to identify whether the phones English 

received as replacement units in 2013 were new at the time she received them.

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from her telecommunications expert, Dr. Nettleton, describing the various identifying numbers on 

which she sought discovery: IMEI, MEID, IMSI, ICCID, HEX, DEC, and serial numbers. 

Nettleton Decl. ¶¶ 3–15 (Dkt. No. 304-12). But nowhere does she explain how she will use these 

numbers to prove whether or not her phone was new.10 Apple has stated that “the replacement 

iPhones and their component parts have no ‘service history’ because they are brand new.” Dkt. 

No. 289 at 5:7–8. Apple argues that “neither Plaintiff nor her telecommunications expert ... 

provides any basis as to why these numbers are relevant to whether Plaintiff’s replacement iPhones 

were new.” Reply at 2 n.5 (emphasis in original). In the absence of an explanation of how she 

would use the numbers to determine whether the phones were new or used, she has not met her 

burden to show that this information is “essential.” 

Plaintiff proffers “expert” declarations stating that phones can be disassembled and 

visually inspected for fingerprints, scratches and other marks. Dixon Decl. ¶¶ 9–10 (Dkt. No. 304-

16);11 Tapia Decl. ¶ 25 (Dkt. No. 304-17); Huynh Decl. ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 304-21);12 see also

Dalrymple Decl. (Dkt. No. 310-6).13 Apple contends that an iPhone 4 cannot be taken apart 

 

10 As an aside, Lanigan testified that “most IMEI numbers are produced later in the process. The 

serial number is produced in the beginning of the process.” Lanigan Depo. 226:6–9. In light of 

this information, I do not see, and English does not explain, how an IMEI number would provide a 

different or more thorough history than a serial number. 

11 Apple moves to strike the Dixon Decl. (Dkt. No. 304-16) and corrected Dixon Decl. (Dkt. No. 

310-3) because she is not an expert and has no basis for her testimony. Reply at 4–6 (Dkt. No. 

320 [redacted]; 319-3 [under seal]. According to Apple, the Elk Grove facility where Dixon 

, and the “sole basis for her 

purported ‘expert’ opinion is the five hours of training she claims she received from Apple and her 

‘experience’ during her time at Apple.” Reply at 5; see Lanigan Decl. ¶ 7 (Dkt. No. 208-17[under 

seal])(noting the type of work done at the Elk Grove facility). Apple also notes that workers at the 

Elk Grove facility do not open or take apart iPhones. Garbutt Decl. ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 319-8). Since 

the evidence indicates that English’s replacement units were new, I find the Dixon declaration 

minimally relevant and hardly probative, and give it little weight. She is not an expert. I do not, 

however, find it necessary to strike the declaration. Apple’s motion is DENIED. 

12 Apple moves to strike the Huynh Declaration because he is not an expert and his opinion lacks 

foundation. Reply at 6. As discussed, I agree that Huynh does not provide sufficient details 

regarding the “testing” or visual examinations he proposes. His declaration need not be stricken, 

but I consider its deficiencies in deciding whether testing is warranted. 

13 English filed a declaration from a “fingerprint expert” expounding on the process of 

“fingerprinting.” Dalrymple Decl. (Dkt. No. 310-6). Apple moves to strike the Dalrymple 

declaration as untimely because plaintiff filed it five days after her deadline to oppose summary 

judgment. See Order at Dkt. No. 300. Plaintiff does not dispute that the declaration was untimely. 

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completely and put back together without compromising the iPhone. Schaeffer Decl. ¶ 3 (Dkt. 

No. 320-9). I will address each declaration in turn. 

The Dixon declaration is of little to no value since she , and 

there is no evidence or argument relating her work to a disposition of whether English’s phone 

was new when she received it in 2013. Huynh himself states that he “may be able to tell if Ms. 

English’s phone contains refurbished or used parts.” Huynh Decl. ¶ 4. But an unsupported 

declaration that he may be able to tell if the phone contains refurbished or used parts is not enough 

to show “that the facts sought exist.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 779. And the Tapia declaration, 

discussed in greater detail in Section III, below, confuses the matter even further, as he states that 

“Apple also frequently put used or refurbished parts in even their brand new devices.” Tapia Decl. 

¶ 25. If that is true, and the phone—whether new, used, or remanufactured/refurbished—might 

contain used or refurbished parts, there would be no purpose in “testing” it. 

There are several problems with the reliability of any evidence ascertained as a result of a 

visual inspection. First, the presence of fingerprints (or any other marks) would not mean that the 

phone was not new when English received it in 2013. Counsel for English avers that she “does 

not believe that Ms. English’s phone has even been opened.” Id. (emphasis added). Counsel’s 

“belief” does not establish a foundation. And even if Huynh can determine that the phone has 

been opened previously, there is not enough evidence to even begin to posit when it may have 

been opened or by whom. Because a chain of custody has not been established, the origin of any 

fingerprints (or any other markings) cannot be determined. 

English’s declaration stating that she, her family members, and third parties have never 

opened the phone is hardly sufficient to establish a reliable chain of custody either. English 2nd 

Decl. ¶ 6 (Dkt. No. 304-15). She cannot speak for others, nor does she indicate that the phone was 

always in her possession (as opposed, for example, to being in her son’s possession). She states 

that on September 24, 2015, she placed the phone in a plastic bag, handed it to Ms. Kennedy (her 

lead lawyer) and the next day viewed a photograph emailed by Mr. Parker (one of her other 

 

See Mot. for Leave to File a Supplemental Mot. ¶ 8 (Dkt. No. 310). Because the declaration was 

untimely (and is of no value), it is STRICKEN. 

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lawyers) to Ms. Kennedy and confirmed that the photograph appeared to be of the same phone that 

she had handed over to Ms. Kennedy the previous day. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. Then she says that the phone 

photographed by Mr. Parker on October 15, 2016, more than a year later, appears to be the same 

phone that she handed to Ms. Kennedy on September 24, 2015. Id. ¶ 6. This is not persuasive. 

But even if I accept that the phone is the same phone and that the phone has never been opened or 

tampered with, English still has not demonstrated that there is a way to test the phone to determine 

whether or not it was new when she received it in 2013.

While English submits declarations proposing her “fingerprint” theory, she offers no 

corroborating evidence, such as a refurbished phone containing fingerprints, to bolster its 

reliability. According to Lanigan, the service units that are remanufactured (as opposed to new 

buy units) come from service factories with few differences from those factories that ship only the 

latest device. Lanigan Dep. 95–97 (Dkt. No. 304-5); see also Lanigan Decl. ¶ 5

(“Remanufactured iPhones are assembled using the same manufacturing process as new iPhones, 

and could contain both new parts and recovered parts that have been extensively tested. ... These 

iPhones are manufactured by the same contract manufacturers that manufacture the new iPhones 

Apple sells in its stores, and the production lines on which these iPhones are manufactured are 

identical to those for new iPhones Apple sells in its stores, and the production lines on which these 

iPhones are manufactured are identical to those for new iPhones.”) There is no reason to believe 

that a phone processed in a service factory would contain fingerprints, while a phone processed in 

another factory would not.

Plaintiff insists that “the device may contain the very answers and evidence Plaintiff needs 

to prove her case.” Id. at 4:16–17. But she never explains how such “answers and evidence” will 

prove that her phone was refurbished in 2013. Apple has repeatedly opposed plaintiff’s requests 

for additional time and discovery on the basis that the amount of discovery is grossly 

disproportionate to plaintiff’s claim, since out of pocket expenses relating to her claim are less 

than $300. See, e.g., Defs.’s Opp’n to Plaintiff’s Mot. to Extend Time at 1:5-10 (Dkt. No. 292). 

Because of the implausibility of her theory, the burden on Apple, and the lack of good cause as a 

result of her delay in seeking this discovery, English is not entitled to additional discovery or an 

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opportunity to test the phone under the Court’s auspices. See Garrett v. San Francisco, 818 F.2d 

1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987)(In seeking additional discovery under Rule 56, “an opposing party 

must make clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment.”)

C. Additional Discovery Related to English’s Claim that she was Denied a Second Incident

Apple moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether English was denied a second 

incident under AC+. See Mot. at 17. English visited the Apple store on February 28, 2014 

because her iPhone had a cracked screen. TAC ¶ 38. She asserts that when she attempted to use 

her second incident under AC+, an employee named Ryan told her she had used up both 

accidental damage incidents under her plan. English 2nd Decl. ¶¶ 10–11. Apple maintains that its

business records demonstrate that an employee named Morrison assisted English, and that the 

records indicate that she was not denied an incident, but rather elected to wait for an upgrade 

opportunity. Mot. at 17.

The parties have twice briefed the issue of the employee named “Ryan.” Dkt. Nos. 118, 

297. Although Morrison admits that there was a male employee by the name of Ryan matching 

the description provided by English, Morrison Dep. at 196:20 (Dkt. No. 310-10), Apple insists that 

this employee has no recollection of assisting English. Dkt. No. 118 at 3:18-4:4; Dkt. No. 297 at 

5:15-22. This does not justify Apple’s withholding Ryan’s identity given that Morrison did not 

remember assisting English. See Morrison Dep. at 155:25 (Dkt. No. 288-2). But the question is 

whether Ryan’s deposition is important or necessary to oppose Apple’s motion for summary 

judgment. Because I find that English fails to state a claim for relief, even assuming she was 

denied a second incident under AC+, a deposition of Apple employee “Ryan” is unnecessary. See

III, below.

II. UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES APPLE’S MOTION

A. Standing 

1. Injury

Apple argues that since English received two new phones under AC+ she has not suffered 

an injury in fact necessary to satisfy Article III standing for her claims under the CLRA, FAL, 

UCL, Secondhand Merchandizing Labeling law, and for fraud. Mot. at 9. To have standing, a 

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plaintiff must show: (1) an injury-in-fact, i.e., an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) 

concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) 

causation, which means her injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant; 

and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).

English claims that her replacement phones were not new, but rather were refurbished, and 

that she suffered injury by overpaying for AC+ and the replacement iPhones, and losing the 

iPhone she owned and turned in at the time she purchased AC+. TAC ¶ 30, 57. She contends 

that, even if the phones she received were new, she suffered an injury because she would not have 

bought AC+, a replacement device, or turned in her original phone if she knew that there was a 

chance she would receive a used or refurbished phone as a replacement unit. Opp’n 16 (Dkt. No. 

304-3). She claims the following damages: “the improper denial of an incident under AC+, the 

loss of a new replacement phone with new parts due to the denied incident, the loss of an extended 

warranty contract that afforded for only new replacements, the loss of new phones with new parts, 

the value of her original phone ..., her original replacement cost for the first device purchased, the 

cost of AC+, the cost of the replacement devices (“service fees”), the phones that she had to turn 

in each time, and attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.” Id. at 17. 

Apple disputes English’s alleged injury because (1) she could not have purchased the Best 

Buy plan she claims she would have purchased; (2) the Best Buy plan was more expensive; and 

(3) the Best Buy plan called for refurbished replacement devices. Reply at 14–15.

While it may be true that “[a] service that can provide either new or used replacement 

phones is worth less than a service that provides only new replacement phones[,]” Opp’n at 16, 

the fact remains that plaintiff received only new replacement phones. She therefore was not 

“deprived of an agreed-upon benefit ... .” Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 

2009). But English maintains that she “would not have purchased the AC+ plan had she been 

made aware of its policies, including the nature of replacement devices, the loss of an incident at 

enrollment, and the fact that she would not receive a full 2-years on her plan.” Id. at 16–17. 

While issues remain regarding causation, see below, it is at least disputed whether English’s

injury-in-fact is the price she paid for AC+ and her replacement units, and whether she would not 

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have purchased AC+ if she knew she could receive used or refurbished phones. Mazza v. Am. 

Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 595 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding an injury-in-fact where consumers 

purchased a product or paid more for it than they otherwise would have paid).

2. Causation/Actual Reliance

Even if English suffered an injury-in-fact, she must allege causation and redressability for 

Article III standing. To establish causation, she contends that her injury is “traceable to 

Defendants’ conduct (i.e., misrepresentations and omissions)... .” Opp’n at 17. Plaintiff faces 

three problems here. First, she fails to proffer specific evidence of an oral misrepresentation. 

Second, the undisputed facts prove that she did not read the AC+ terms and conditions, and 

therefore, could not have relied on them in making her purchase decisions.14 If she did not view or 

rely on the AC+ terms and conditions, then Apple’s alleged written misrepresentations could not 

have caused her injury. And third, as discussed later, I do not find that Apple’s written 

representations would be misleading to a reasonable consumer. 

a. Oral Misrepresentation

English contends that the Apple employee who helped her told her that replacement 

devices would be new. TAC ¶ 36. In her opposition to summary judgment, English fails to 

directly raise her oral misrepresentation theory and does not offer evidence in support of it. She 

merely mentions it in passing. Opp’n at 3 (“Apple associates also use the word ‘new’ to describe 

the devices... .). Although evidence supporting this theory was submitted during the class 

certification briefing, it hardly helps English here. See Kennedy Decl. in support of Pl.’s Mot. for 

Class Certification, Ex. 9 (Pozderac Depo.)(Dkt. No. 180-14[sealed]). Nicholas Pozderac, the 

employee who sold English AC+ in February 2013, testified that—prior to 2012—when customers 

asked if their replacement devices were refurbished, he told them “[i]t would have been a new 

device.” Pozderac Dep. at 103:22–104:2. But sometime in early 2012, an interaction with a 

customer prompted him to look up the AC+ terms and conditions, where he discovered the “new 

 

14 Plaintiff’s argument that she read the Repair terms and conditions, which reference the AC+ 

terms and conditions, is not helpful. Reading a reference to the AC+ terms and conditions is not 

equivalent to reading the AC+ terms and conditions. See II.A.1, below.

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and functionally equivalent to new” language. Id. at 101:4–23. English does not submit evidence 

of the precise language Pozderac used in his interaction with her in February 2013, but one can 

infer that he may have revised his wording in 2012, after reading Apple’s “official” terminology as 

documented in the AC+ terms and conditions. Id. at 104:10. Even without giving weight to this 

reasonable inference that contravenes English’s theory, she fails to meet her burden to proffer the 

evidence to support her allegations of an oral misrepresentation. In re iPhone Application Litig., 6 

F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2013)(“[A]t summary judgment, a plaintiff may no longer rely 

on ‘mere allegations,’ but rather must set forth ‘specific facts’ supporting standing.”) 

Accordingly, her allegations of misrepresentation must depend on either the AC+ terms 

and conditions, which she did not read, or her “unbranded white box” theory. With either theory, 

she must proffer evidence of actual reliance to satisfy standing requirements under the CLRA and 

UCL, In re iPhone Application Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1012 – 13, and the FAL, Pfizer Inc. v. 

Superior Court, 182 Cal. App. 4th 622, 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 795, 804 (2010), and to state a 

claim for common law fraud, Lazar v. Super. Ct, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996). 

b. Never Viewed or Relied on AC+ Terms and Conditions

In the order denying class certification, I found “it is undisputed that English did not view 

or rely on the AC+ terms and conditions in making her purchase,” and so she “cannot bring claims 

under the CLRA, FAL, or UCL, or for fraud, based on misrepresentations she was not exposed to 

and did not rely on in making her purchase.” Class Certification Order at 20:10–13 (Dkt. No. 

225)(citing Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 966, 980 (2009); Pfizer Inc. v. Superior 

Court, 182 Cal. App. 4th 622, 634 (2010)). Plaintiff admits she never read the AC+ terms and 

conditions. Opp’n at 19; English 2nd Decl. ¶ 14. But she argues that she did not have to view the 

AC+ terms and conditions because the Repair terms and conditions reference the AC+ terms and

conditions, and this is not the only basis of misrepresentation.15 Opp’n at 19. Lastly, she argues

misrepresentation in “Apple’s overall sales strategy and its failure to adequately disclose its 

 

15 She also asserts oral misrepresentations, which I addressed above, and misrepresentations in the 

“plain white box” theory, which I address below.

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replacement policy.” Id. “To survive a standing challenge at summary judgment, Plaintiffs must 

be able to provide some evidence that they saw one or more of Apple's alleged misrepresentations, 

that they actually relied on those misrepresentations, and that they were harmed thereby.” In re 

iPhone Application Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1027. 

The Repair terms and conditions state:

When the product is covered by warranty or an extended service 

contract, such as AppleCare Protection Plan, Apple will perform 

repairs under the terms of the warranty or the extended service 

contract, provided that you have presented satisfactory proof of the 

product’s eligibility for such repairs.

English 2nd Decl. ¶ 14 (Dkt. No. 304-15). I do not see how reading the above cited language 

establishes that the AC+ terms and conditions included a representation that consumers would 

only receive new phones under the terms of the extended service contract. Since English is unable 

to meet this “far from unreasonable” burden, In re iPhone Application Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d at 

1027, to demonstrate that she saw and relied on an alleged misrepresentation in the AC+ terms and 

conditions, she lacks standing under this theory, and Apple is entitled to summary judgment of 

those claims that depend on an affirmative misrepresentation. See id. at 1013 (“California courts 

have held that when the ‘unfair competition’ underlying a plaintiff's UCL claim consists of a 

defendant's misrepresentation, a plaintiff must have actually relied on the misrepresentation, and 

suffered economic injury as a result of that reliance, in order to have standing to sue.”)

To the extent English claims that her injury was caused by an omission on Apple’s part, 

she fares no better. I previously rejected her omission theory in part because she “did not view or 

rely on the terms and conditions in making her purchase... .” Class Certification Order at 22. 

Moreover, “to be actionable the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by 

the defendant... .” Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 835 (2006). The 

AC+ terms and conditions state that the phones would be “new or equivalent to new in 

performance and reliability.” TAC Ex. B (Dkt. No. 139-2); TAC Ex. C (Dkt. No. 139-3). English 

cannot show any omission that is contrary to this representation.16 

 

16 English’s argument that “Apple’s misrepresentations and omissions ... fail[] to make consumers 

aware of the [AC+] plan’s true length calculated by the personal device brought in by the consmer 

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c. Plain White Box Theory

Plaintiff also asserts a theory of misrepresentation that depends on the context of Apple’s 

entire sales strategy.17 She points to the presentation of the replacement unit in a sealed plain 

white box and a plastic film on the device as creating “an overall impression on a consumer that 

the device is new.” Opp’n at 20. Apple argues that a plain white box is not a representation 

because “[w]hen a customer purchases a new iPhone, it comes in an Apple-branded box that 

contains the iPhone itself, along with accessories including an iPhone charger and headphones.” 

Mot. 15; Healy Decl. 13 (Dkt. No. 209-32). In an AC+ transaction, the iPhone does not come in 

an Apple-branded box, the consumer does not receive any accessories, and the consumer does not 

keep the box. Mot. at 15–16. 

English acknowledges these differences, although she claims they are minor. Opp’n at 21; 

Dkt. No. 213-14 at 14-15; 233-43 at 3. She even points out additional differences—there is more 

color on new boxes and one is slightly larger. Opp’n at 21. Given the numerous differences, 

which she acknowledges, plaintiff’s plain white box theory is unconvincing. Even if the plain 

white box was a representation, English still presents no evidence that she relied on it.18

 

[sic] at the initial purchase of AC+” suffers from the same deficiency. Opp’n at iii; see also id. at 

15. The AppleCare+ Certificate emailed to her son at the time she purchased AC+ explicitly states 

“AppleCare+ extends service coverage to 24 months from the purchase date of your Apple 

product... .” Patel Decl. ISO Defs.’ Opp’n to Class Certification Ex. C (Dkt. Nos. 209-4, 208-

8[redacted]; Dkt. No. 208-7[under seal]). And further, “[i]f you purchased AppleCare+ in 

conjunction with a service transaction, your coverage end date remains 24 months from the date 

you purchased your Apple product.” Id. Moreover, the certificate clearly discloses the “Coverage 

Period End Date” as September 25, 2014—two years from the date she purchased the original 

phone, not the AC+ service plan. Id. I find these disclosures adequate to put a reasonable 

consumer on notice of the coverage period end date. Therefore, Apple’s training materials stating 

“two replacements are available for up to 2 years,” Kennedy Decl. Ex. 14 (Dkt. No. 180-

19)(emphasis added), would not be misleading to a reasonable consumer given Apple’s 

affirmative representations. Further, the same training materials explicitly state, “[b]ecause [AC+] 

protects the device for two years from the original purchase date, customers get the most out of 

[AC+] when they buy it with their device.” Id. at 5. All of the evidence demonstrates that this 

theory of misrepresentation is baseless.

17 It is worth noting that her arguments surrounding the plain white box theory have been 

inconsistent. See Reply at 10. 

18 In this vein, English identifies the Smart Signs and claims that “[t]he box that represents what 

an iPhone 4s a [sic] service unit (“replacement device”) looks like on a Smart Sign depicts a 

service unit box as a branded box with a logo.” Opp’n at 21. She then states, “[w]hen Ms. 

English purchased she would have seen a logo branded box.” Id. This allegation comes closer to 

an actual misrepresentation. But, even still, English has not demonstrated that she actually relied 

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Moreover, the fact remains that her replacement phones were new. As I stated in denying class 

certification, “English does not explain how she can establish standing with respect to a theory 

based on Apple’s allegedly improper packaging of refurbished replacement iPhones if she 

received only new replacement iPhones.” Order Denying Motion for Class Certification at 14 

(Dkt. No. 226).

B. Even if Plaintiff Adequately Alleged Reliance, She Can Not Meet the Reasonable 

Consumer Standard

For plaintiff to assert claims under the CLRA, FAL, UCL and for common law fraud, she 

must meet the “reasonable consumer standard,” which requires a “show[ing] that members of the 

public are likely to be deceived.” Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir. 1995)(internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “The California Supreme Court has recognized that these 

laws prohibit not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which [,] although true, is 

either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse 

the public.” Williams v. Gerber Prod. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). “Surveys and 

expert testimony regarding consumer assumptions and expectations may be offered but are not 

required; anecdotal evidence may suffice, although ‘a few isolated examples’ of actual deception 

are insufficient.” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

English points to “[a] plethora of call logs” that “show that many reasonable consumers 

were deceived.” Opp’n at 22; see Kennedy Decl. Ex. B (Dkt. No. 180). She also recites Apple’s 

terminology to refer to this “ceremonious presentation of the service units,” as “polishing the 

Apple.” Opp’n at 22 (citing Williams Dep. 215:22-216:1 (Dkt. No. 180-16)). At least some of the 

call logs provide proof that some consumers believed that they would receive new iPhones under 

AC+. See Call Logs (Dkt. Nos. 304-6–304-8). But there is no evidence that these consumers’ 

expectations under AC+ was in any way connected to receiving their replacement units in a plain 

white box. Even if I simply accepted English’s theory, she still has not alleged that she—nor any 

 

on the Smart Sign images. Moreover, Apple explains that the photos English identifies as 

misleading are actually of Apple-branded boxes for new iPhones. Reply at 11 (citing Dkt. No. 

233-43 at 3, 18).

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of the customers in the call logs—relied on the plain white box as an affirmative 

misrepresentation. Her claims still fail on this ground.

In the absence of any evidence that English relied on any misrepresentations by Apple, she 

has not shown that her injury of purchasing AC+ was caused by Apple. She received a new 

phone. And her omission theory fails because Apple adequately discloses the terms of AC+, she 

just failed to read them. “AC+ terms and conditions clearly state that replacement iPhones will be 

‘new or equivalent to new in performance and reliability,’ and therefore not necessarily new.” 

Mot. at 12 n.4. A plaintiff asserting claims for fraudulent misrepresentation must show a specific 

misrepresentation that she actually relied on. Baltazar v. Apple, Inc., No. CV-10-3231-JF, 2011 

WL 588209, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011). Under any theory supported by evidence, English’s

injury was not caused by Apple, and she therefore lacks standing to pursue her misrepresentation 

claims. 

C. Secondhand Merchandise Labeling Law Claim

The Secondhand Merchandise Labeling Law states: 

It is unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation ... to advertise, 

call attention to or give publicity to the sale of any merchandise, 

which merchandise is secondhand or used merchandise, or which 

merchandise is defective in any manner, or which merchandise 

consists of articles or units or parts known as “seconds,” ... unless 

there is conspicuously displayed directly in connection with the 

name and description of that merchandise and each specified article, 

unit, or part thereof, a direct and unequivocal statement, phrase, or 

word which will clearly indicate that the merchandise or each 

article, unit, or part thereof so advertised is secondhand, used, 

defective[.]

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17531. There is no genuine issue whether the phones English received 

were new. The Secondhand Merchandise Labeling Law does not apply. Apple’s motion for 

summary judgment of this claim is GRANTED.

III. THE DENIAL OF A SECOND INCIDENT, IF IT OCCURRED, FAILS TO CREATE 

A MATERIAL DISPUTE BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT 

INTENT

Let’s assume, as English hopes, that the Apple employee named Ryan would remember 

her, their conversation nearly three years ago, and that when he looked up her information, it 

showed that she didn’t have any incidents left, despite the note to the contrary written by 

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Morrison.19 That might establish a breach of contract claim if Apple failed to provide English 

with two incidents, in addition to the “incident” at the time she purchased AC+. But English does 

not assert that claim. Instead, she alleges claims based on fraud under the UCL, CLRA, FAL and 

common law, none of which reference the purported denial of a second incident. See TAC ¶¶ 73–

127. Both parties dedicated significant portions of their briefing to the issue of whether plaintiff 

was denied a second incident, and yet neither party has identified to which claims the issue relates. 

See Mot. at 17–19; Opp’n at 10–15; Reply at 12–13. Rather than supporting an element of her 

fraud-based claims, the denial of a second incident seems to go towards English’s purported 

damages. See Opp’n at 17. Although this case has been pending since 2014, English has 

proffered no evidence of fraud. 

Apple’s records, prepared by employee Morrison, state that English: “decided to wait for 

an upgrade in may [sic]20 before getting a new phone[.] Resolution: Ownership Opportunity[.] 

Reason: Future Purchase[.]” O’Neil Decl., Dkt. No. 208-23 at APL00000597 [sealed]; Dkt. No. 

209-37 at APL00000597 [redacted]. Morrison testified that his notes from the transaction meant 

English “ha[d] the option of purchasing another product as opposed to doing a service transaction 

through the Genius Bar,” and she “chose not to use the Genius Bar to get another phone, but, 

instead, to wait for her upgrade, which, to me, I would describe as an ownership opportunity.” 

Patel MSJ Decl. Ex. 1 (Morrison Dep.) at 166:5–9, 14–17. 

English counters with a declaration from former Apple employee Gabriel Tapia, who has 

no personal knowledge about the way Apple responded to her second incident. But he interprets 

Apple’s records to conclude that they “validate that Ms. English indeed lost an incident.” I do not 

 

19 This is the evidence Ms. Kennedy suggested Ryan might provide when I asked for an offer of 

proof at the hearing on this motion. It seems unlikely that Ryan would testify in this way.

20 Both parties accept that “may” does not accurately reflect when English would be eligible for an 

upgrade, as she was not eligible for an upgrade until around September 26, 2014 (two years 

following the purchase of her “original” device). But neither party discusses whether the 

employee who took the notes (whether it was Morrison or Ryan) mistakenly wrote “may” or was 

told by English that she would be eligible in May. If it was a mistake, that’s one thing, but if 

English represented and believed that she would be eligible for an upgrade in May, then the theory 

of her waiting eight weeks and foregoing the $49 service fee is more plausible than her deciding to 

wait eight months for an upgrade.

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think that the records require “expert” interpretation—the author of the note has explained what he 

meant. See id. Tapia, who worked at Apple for seven years and helped work on the 

MobileGenius, an application used by Apple employees on the floor to assist customers, said that 

the loss of an incident happened at all the New York stores where he worked. Opp’n at 10 

(quoting Tapia Decl. at Dkt. No. 304-17[under seal]);21 Tapia Decl. ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 304-17). He 

states, “[w]hen processing a repair in MobileGenius or iRepair, an icon would appear if the phone 

was purchased with AppleCare+. When all AppleCare incidents were consumed, the plus sign 

would turn to a red logo.” Id. ¶ 10. Tapia reviewed the records from English’s February 28, 2014 

interaction and reported that “ ” meant that the phone 

did not have AppleCare+ coverage available. Id. ¶ 14. 

English highlights the record notes to bolster her position: 

” Opp’n at 10 (quoting Dkt. No. 232-12)22. Apple counters that this 

description “mean[t] that there [was] accidental damage, and does not provide any information 

regarding whether the iPhone is covered under AC+.” Reply at 13. Apple contends that “

could fall under AC+, or it could fall outside AC+[,]” and that English’s 

“interpretation of [the] records ... does not create a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. at 12–

13. English claims that the interpretation that she elected to forego an incident under AC+ to wait 

for her upcoming upgrade does not make sense since she did not upgrade until eight months later 

on October 18, 2014 and had to operate with a cracked screen until then.

23

 Id. at 11. She also 

highlights Apple’s own evidence that “this AC+ program [allowing enrollment ‘at time of 

 

21 Numerous Tapia declarations have been filed in this case. See Dkt. Nos. 233-29[redacted], 265-

4[sealed] (mistakenly labeled as 265-5), 180-7[sealed], 214-26[sealed]. A version of this 

declaration was previously sealed by the court. Dkt. No. 285. Defendants filed a redacted version 

at Dkt. No. 286. In the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, I found that the declaration 

labeled as exhibit 13N was “too conclusory and speculative to materially impact the analysis in the 

Class Certification Order.” Dkt. No. 263 at 7 n.7. In this Order, I consider his declaration only as 

it relates to English and Apple’s records of English’s transaction. 

22 This exhibit was previously sealed by the court. Dkt. No. 285. 

23 See supra note 9. 

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incident’] had the highest number of incidents utilized compared with any other AC+ program.” 

Id. at 12 (citing Healy Decl. (Dkt. No. 209-32 at 22:27)). And lastly, she points to Apple’s own 

training material in an unsuccessful attempt to bolster her position. See Opp’n at 10. The training 

material states that sometimes an “ownership opportunity,” i.e., an opportunity to buy a new 

phone, is a better option for a customer than receiving a replacement unit through AC+. Opp’n at 

10 (citing Dkt. No. 180-19 at 9[under seal]). None of this is relevant to whether English was 

denied a second incident.

If there is a genuine dispute whether English was denied a second incident, it does not 

create a dispute regarding any fraud or misrepresentation, both of which require intent. According 

to Apple, its policy, training materials, and customer records “establish that customers who, like 

Plaintiff, purchased AC+ at the time of an out-of-warranty repair did in fact receive coverage for 

two incidents of accidental damage in addition to the initial out-of-date warranty repair.” Mot. at 

18. To counter Apple’s contentions, English points to the name of the program (“AppleCare+ 

Enroll at Time of Incident”), the same training materials, and the statistics behind the number of 

customers who purchased AC+ at the time of incident and allegedly used both incidents. She does 

not suggest how Ryan’s alleged failure to provide a second incident was fraudulent, and she 

therefore has not shown how the issue of whether she was denied a second incident is material to 

any of her claims in this case.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MOTIONS24

On January 27, 2015, this court signed a stipulated Protective Order in this case. Dkt. No. 

127. To abide by this protective order, plaintiff filed an administrative motion to file certain 

documents under seal, Dkt. No. 304, and “corrected” exhibits, Dkt. No. 306. Plaintiff also 

introduces some exhibits via declaration at Dkt. No. 310. “Plaintiff takes no position ... but 

wishes to give defendants every opportunity to request that the documents be sealed.” Admin. 

Mot. ¶ 3, see also Kennedy Decl. ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 304-1). Given that plaintiff seeks only to abide by 

the protective order, I will focus on defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s motions.

 

24 Plaintiff’s motions at 304 and 310 are addressed in the table. Plaintiff’s motion at 314 is 

TERMINATED AS MOOT. Defendants’ motion at 319 is addressed in the table.

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Some documents filed by plaintiff were previously sealed, which is indicated in the table 

below. For ease of reference, documents are ordered by ECF number. Apple submitted the 

declaration of Pami Vyas in support of sealing, which states that plaintiff’s opposition and 

supporting exhibits contains: “(i) confidential information regarding Apple’s testing processes, (ii) 

confidential information regarding Apple’s sales and service numbers, and (iii) confidential 

information regarding Apple’s databases and data capabilities.” Vyas Decl. ¶ 2 (Dkt. No. 315-1). 

Apple filed a motion to seal portions of its reply, Dkt. No. 319, supported by the Vyas 

declaration at Dkt. No. 319-1. For the most part, I find Apple’s requests specific and narrowly 

tailored to cover only highly confidential information. Apple’s specific and narrowly tailored 

requests to seal information pertaining to its testing processes and procedures, sales and services 

numbers, and databases are GRANTED as indicated in the table below. 

However, I am unsealing a portion of Apple’s business records pertaining to English that I 

previously sealed because I do not find that Apple has established compelling reasons to seal the 

text entry. The request to seal all references 

.” is DENIED. In addition, I plan to unredact this Order in its entirety and to unseal all 

general information related to the type of devices used as replacement units. There is no 

compelling reason to redact any of it. But because I previously granted requests to seal this 

information, if Apple disagrees it should respond within seven days with compelling reasons why 

any reference in this Order should remain under seal. 

I otherwise rule on the motions as follows: 

Dkt. No. 315

Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Administrative Mot. to File Certain Documents Under Seal

ECF No. Ex. No. ECF No. of 

Previously 

Sealed Ex.

Document Court’s Ruling

304-3 N/A N/A Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ 

Mot. for Summ. J.

Portions to be sealed:

9:11–13; 10:23.5; 

GRANTED IN 

PART

DENIED AS 

TO 10:23.5

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11:24; 22:16–17 

304-4 N/A N/A Renee Kennedy 

Decl.

DENIED

304-5 Ex. A 256-7 Michael Lanigan 

Dep. excerpts

GRANTED 

(previously 

sealed)

304-6 Ex. B-1 N/A GCRM records DENIED

304-7 Ex. B-2 N/A GCRM records DENIED

304-8 Ex. B-3 N/A GCRM records DENIED

304-9

306-1

Ex. C 256-28 Training – Enrolling 

in AC+ at the Time 

of Incident on an 

iPad

GRANTED 

(previously 

sealed)

304-10

306-2

Ex. D 256-30 Training – Enrolling 

in AC+ at the Time 

of Incident on an 

iPod

GRANTED 

(previously 

sealed)

304-13 Ex. G N/A Apple’s Highly

Confidential 

Responses to ROG 

Nos. 3, 5, 10-12, 18-

24, 29(a), 30-34, 39 

in Pl.’s First Am. 

Interrogatories, Set 

Six

Portions to be sealed:

5:4–7; 6:8–11; 14:21; 

18:13–16; 19:14–19, 

21–25, 27–28; 20:1–

4 

GRANTED

304-15 Ex. J N/A Fabrienne English 

Decls.

DENIED

304-16 Ex. M N/A Bathena Dixon Decl. DENIED

304-17 Ex. N Same 

information 

sealed in 

previous versions 

of Tapia 

Declarations 

(Dkt. Nos. 223-

21, 225, 253-3, 

285).

Gabriel Tapia Decl.

Portions to be sealed:

5:11, 15.5; 7:9.5–12

GRANTED IN 

PART; 

DENIED IN 

PART (5:11, 

15.5)

304-18 Ex. ) N/A Salvador Toledo 

Depo. Excerpts

DENIED

304-19 Ex. P 256-32 Training – AC+ 

within 30 days

GRANTED 

(previously 

sealed)

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304-20 Ex. Q 256-36 Training – AC+ 

Processing an 

AppleCare+ Repair

GRANTED 

(previously 

sealed)

304-21 Ex. R N/A Thang Huynh Decl. DENIED

310-2 “Ex. A”25 N/A Bathena Dixon 

“Corrected” Decl.

DENIED

310-9 Ex. L N/A Kenneth Morrison 

Depo. Excerpts

DENIED

Dkt. No. 319

Defs.’ Mot. to Seal Portions of Their Reply Filings in support of Summ. J.

320 N/A N/A Apple’s Reply

Portions to be sealed:

4:16; 5:3–6, 8, 23–

24; 13:4–6, 8

DENIED

320-8 N/A N/A Mitch Garbutt Decl.

Portions to be sealed:

1:10

GRANTED

320-5 Ex. D Kenneth Morrison 

Dep. excerpts

167:11, 18, 21, 23; 

168:8, 16–21 

GRANTED IN 

PART

DENIED AS 

TO 167:11, 18, 

21, 23

CONCLUSION

I GRANT Apple’s motion for summary judgment in full and will enter judgment 

accordingly. English has failed to raise a disputed issue whether she relied on an affirmative 

misrepresentation made by defendants, dooming her CLRA, FAL, UCL, and common law fraud 

claims. Her claim under Secondhand Merchandise Labeling Law claim fails because there is no 

dispute that she received new phones. Her request for further discovery lacks good cause and is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2017

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

 

25 This declaration is labeled as Exhibit A to a different Kennedy declaration entitled, “Declaration 

in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Motion to Seal and Also Leave 

to File Bathena Dixon’s Corrected Declaration, Brian Dalrymple’s Declaration, and Ex. L ISO 

Opposition to Summary Judgment.” Dkt. No. 310-1.

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