Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02142/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02142-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF OAKLAND,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM ABEND, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-2142 EMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART CITY OF

OAKLAND’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(Docket Nos. 4, 7)

This action consists of two cases that were originally filed in state court. 

The first case, filed on September 19, 2006, was initiated by the City of Oakland against

William Abend. In its amended complaint, the City alleged that Mr. Abend was the owner of certain

real property and that he was using or permitting the use of the property for both the unlawful sale,

storage, or manufacture of controlled substances and for lewdness and prostitution. The City

asserted claims for drug abatement, red light abatement, and public nuisance. In response, Mr.

Abend filed a cross-complaint against the City.

The second case, filed on October 31, 2006, was initiated by Mr. Abend and his wife Marcia

against the City, the Office of the City Administrator, Deborah Edgerly (the City Administrator),

Barbara Killey (an employee in the Office of the City Administrator), and Arturo Sanchez (an

employee in the Office of the City Administrator) (collectively “City Defendants”).

On April 6, 2007, the state court consolidated the two cases upon motion by the Abends and

designated the first case the lead case. Shortly thereafter, on April 17, 2007, the City removed the

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consolidated cases to this Court. The City is now moving to dismiss Mr. Abend’s cross-complaint

and the City Defendants are moving to dismiss the Abends’ separate petition/complaint.

Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, and all other evidence of

record, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the two motions to dismiss.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Abends’ Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus and Complaint

In their petition/complaint, the Abends allege as follows.

The Abends are individuals residing in the City and County of San Francisco and are owners

of certain real property in Oakland. See Pet. ¶ 3. From May 1994 to May 2006, the City did not

provide any notice to the Abends that the property was a nuisance or that nuisance activities were

occurring on the property. See id. ¶ 11.

On May 4, 2006, the City demanded a meeting with Mr. Abend. See id. ¶ 12. The purpose

of the meeting -- scheduled for May 23, 2006 -- was for Mr. Abend to sign an agreement with the

City regarding the property. See id. 

On May 17, 2006, approximately a week before the meeting, the City wrote a letter to the

Abends complaining of alleged drug- and prostitution-related arrests at or directly in front of the

property. See id. ¶ 13.

The very next day, on May 18, 2006, the City issued a “30 Day Notice to Abate Letter” to

the Abends. See id. ¶ 14 & Ex. A (letter, dated 5/18/06). The letter was authored by Mr. Sanchez,

an employee in the Office of the Administrator. See id., Ex. A. According to the letter, the City

Attorney’s Office and the Oakland Police Department had provided the Office of the City

Administrator with evidence of nuisance activity at the property and were requesting that the

property be declared a public nuisance. See id. The City concluded that the nuisance activity

documented in the police reports “constitutes a public nuisance . . . in violation of Oakland

Municipal Code section 1.08 et seq.” Id. The Abends were therefore assessed a $3,000 nuisance

case fee. The Abends were also advised that, “thirty (30) days from the date of this letter, the City

may impose penalties of $1,000.00 a day up to $365,000 a year (pursuant to OMC Chapter 1,

Section), unless the nuisance conditions are abated. . . . Failure to do so may result in the City doing

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so and billing you for the costs.” Id. The City further noted: “Fees, costs, payments, assessment,

and penalties associated with [the City’s] enforcement actions . . . shall be a charge against the

property and the owners and, if not reimbursed immediately, shall become a special

assessment/priority lien recorded against the property title and are recoverable through the property

tax general levy and court action . . . .” Id.

The Abends had the right to appeal the determination of the City. As explained by the May

18, 2006, letter: “You have the right to appeal this determination to an independent administrative

hearing examiner. In order to request an appeal you must . . . submit in writing the details upon

which you base your claim that the City has erred or abused its discretion in these actions.” Id. The

form for filing an appeal was enclosed. See id. According to the letter, the Abends had until June 1,

2006, to appeal -- i.e., two weeks -- or they would “waive [their] right for further administrative

adjudication of the matter.” Id. The form for filing an appeal provided similar information, stating,

inter alia, that, “IF THE APPEAL AND FEE ARE NOT RECEIVED BY OUR OFFICE WITHIN

14 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE MAILING DATE OF THE NOTIFICATION OF THE

ENFORCEMENT ACTION, OR IF THE APPELLANT FAILS TO IDENTIFY FACTS WHICH

SUPPORT A CONTENTION THAT THE CITY HAS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,

THE APPEAL WILL BE DENIED WITHOUT AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.” Id. The

form instructed the appellant to “BRIEFLY IDENTIFY HOW THE CITY HAS ERRED OR

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN BRINGING THIS ACTION.” Id.

On May 23, 2006, the Abends, along with their attorney and property managers, met with

City representatives. See id. ¶ 16. At the meeting, the Abends were told that “they were required to

sign a Compliance Agreement . . . regarding the PROPERTY . . . without an opportunity to confront

those who had allegedly complained about the PROPERTY, or to view any of the evidence against

them.” Id. The City refused to discuss amendments to the Compliance Agreement and to listen to

information about the Abends’ efforts to address the activity at the property. See id.

On June 1, 2006, the Abends filed an appeal of the City’s May 18, 2006, determination that

the activity on their property constituted a nuisance. See id. ¶ 18; see also Defs.’ RJN, Ex. A

(appeal, dated 6/1/06).

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Under the City’s policies and procedures for administrative appeals, as soon as practicable

after receiving a written appeal, the case manager will forward the appeal to the administrative

hearing officer (AHO) for a determination of whether the appellant has, inter alia, briefly identified

how the City erred or abused its discretion. See Pet., Ex. B (Administrative Appeals, Hearing

Procedures II.B.11.A). “The AHO will have up to 30 days from the date the appeal is received by

the City to recommend a hearing or deny the request.” Id. If the AHO finds that the appellant has

sufficient grounds for an appeal, then an appeal hearing is scheduled. See id. The hearing examiner

“shall be appointed from a panel of persons qualified to conduct administrative hearings by virtue of

[his or her] education, experience, or profession, including City staff not associated with applicable

enforcement actions.” Id. (Administrative Appeals, Hearing Procedures II.C.2). A hearing

examiner “shall be disqualified . . . for bias, conflict of interest, or prejudice or any other reason for

which a judge may be disqualified in a court of law.” Id. (Administrative Appeals, Hearing

Procedures II.C.3). At the hearing, the parties “have the opportunity to present evidence by oral or

written testimony of witnesses and by submission of original or true copies of documents, records,

photographs, or other written material.” Id. (Administrative Appeals, Hearing Procedures III.E.1).

On June 29, 2006, the City informed the Abends by letter that the appeal was denied without

a hearing. See id. ¶ 22 & Ex. C (letter, dated 6/29/06). The letter was authored by Barbara Killey,

an employee in the City Administrator’s Office. See id., Ex. C. According to the letter, the Abends’

appeal was denied for failure to state adequate grounds or facts showing that the City erred or

abused its discretion in bringing the action. See id. A subsequent letter from Ms. Killey clarified

that the denial of the appeal was final as of August 3, 2006. See id. ¶ 24 & Ex. D (letter, dated

8/3/06).

On July 6, 2006, the City wrote to the Abends, stating that they owed the City a total of

$54,739 in civil penalties from May 18 through July 6, 2006. See id. ¶ 23.

On September 11, 2006, the City wrote to the Abends, stating that they owed the City

$120,739 in civil penalties from May 18 through September 11, 2006. See id. ¶ 25.

Based on the above, the Abends asserted the following claims in their complaint (separate

from their petition for a writ of mandamus): (1) violation of federal due process because the City’s

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administrative appeal procedures do not require a hearing; (2) violation of federal due process

because the administrative appeal examiner, Ms. Killey, was not impartial; (3) violation of federal

due process because, in initiating the nuisance enforcement action, the City Defendants acted in an

arbitrary and capricious manner, without any factual findings or rational basis; and (4) violation of

federal equal protection because the City Defendants selectively enforced City and local ordinances

against the Abends that were not enforced against similarly situated persons and property owners.

B. Mr. Abend’s Cross-Complaint

Mr. Abend’s cross-complaint contains many of the same allegations as detailed above in the

Abends’ separate petition/complaint. In the cross-complaint, the following causes of action are

asserted: (1) violation of federal and state equal protection by selectively enforcing state nuisance

abatement laws against Mr. Abend that were not enforced against similarly situated persons and

property owners; (2) violation of both the federal and state constitutions by taking property without

just compensation; and (3) a violation of federal and state due process by filing the complaint and

amended complaint without any factual findings or rational basis.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Although not an issue raised by either party, the Court, as a preliminary matter, must

examine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the two consolidated cases. 

If the cases were never consolidated, then the Court would not have jurisdiction over the

City’s lawsuit because no federal question was presented on the face of the City’s complaint or

amended complaint. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (noting that, under

the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint”). However, in the instant case,

the two cases were consolidated, and there is case law that, “under certain circumstances, where two

actions are consolidated into a single action, state-ordered consolidation may affect jurisdiction and

removal.” In re MTBE Prods. Liability Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 340, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). For

example, where a state consolidation order destroys the identity of each suit and merges them into

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one, then the consolidated case may potentially be removed if the consolidated case contains a claim

over which removal is proper. See id. at 353-54.

In California, there are “two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial

only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or

consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one

case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” Hamilton v.

Asbestos Corp., 22 Cal. 4th 1127, 1147 (2000). In the instant case, the state court’s consolidation

order did not explicitly specify which type of consolidation was being established. However,

implicitly, the order established a complete consolidation. Although the state court did not specify

that only one judgment would be rendered, it consolidated the two cases for all purposes (the

Abends asked in essence for consolidation for all purposes by asking that discovery, pretrial

motions, and trial be consolidated), and the cases proceeded under only one case number. See id. at

1148 (concluding that two cases were completely consolidated in large part because “the court’s

order granting the motion was not limited to a consolidation for trial: rather the court declared that

‘It Is Ordered that Action[s] Nos. 955576 and 975884 are consolidated as Action No. 955576’” and

because a subsequent order from the court stated that there was consolidation for all purposes). 

Because there was a complete consolidation, the two consolidated cases were properly

subject to removal, in spite of the lack of a federal question on the face of the City’s complaint and

amended complaint, because the Abends’ independent complaint asserts federal claims against the

City. The Abends have not made any claim that there were procedural defects with the removal by

the City justifying remand. See Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346

F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (“hold[ing] that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for

defects in removal procedure”). The Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over this

litigation and proceeds to address the merits of the motions to dismiss.

B. City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Abends’ Petition/Complaint

As noted above, the Abends assert four causes of action in their complaint (separate from

their petition for a writ of mandamus). The City Defendants argue that each of the four claims

should be dismissed.

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1. First Cause of Action -- Procedural Due Process

In the first cause of action, the Abends assert that their right to procedural due process was

violated by the City Defendants. “A procedural due process claim has two distinct elements: (1) a

deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate

procedural protections.” Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

quotation marks omitted). According to the City Defendants, the Abends’ claim for violation of

procedural due process should be dismissed for two reasons: (1) because the Abends lack a

cognizable property interest and (2) because the Abends were, as a matter of law, given adequate

notice and opportunity to be heard with respect to the City Defendants’ actions. 

a. Property Interest

Although a violation of procedural due process must involve a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected property interest (or liberty interest), property for purposes of the Due

Process Clause can be different from property for purposes of the Takings Clause. In fact, “[t]he

Due Process Clause . . . recognizes a wider range of interests as property than does the Takings

Clause.” Pro-Eco v. Board of Comm’rs, 57 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Federal Lands

Legal Consortium v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he fact that a grazing

permit is not ‘property’ under the Takings Clause does not prevent the same permit (or its terms and

conditions) from constituting ‘property’ under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.”); Puerto

Rico Tel. Co. v. Telecommunications Regulatory Bd., 189 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 1999) (“An

expectation that is not property for purposes of the Takings Clause may yet sometimes entitle the

citizen to procedural protection, and substantive protection against arbitrariness, before the

expectation is cut off by government action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Corn v. City of

Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir.1996) (“‘Property’ as used in the Just

Compensation Clause is defined much more narrowly than in the due process clauses.”).

For purposes of due process, “[p]roperty interests are not created by the Constitution but by

existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law -- rules or

understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” 

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

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omitted). “Although the underlying substantive interest is created by ‘an independent source such as

state law,’ federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a

‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” Memphis Light, Gas &

Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). “[T]he identification of property interests under

constitutional law turns on the substance of the interest recognized, not the name given that interest

by the state.” Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Ninth Circuit has “recognized a constitutionally protected property interest in a

landowner’s right to devote [his or her] land to any legitimate use.” Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v.

Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering the due process claim asserted by the

plaintiff because it had alleged that “the alleged overzealous and selective regulation of Squaw

Valley [by the defendants] interfere[d] with its use of its real property”); see also Harris v. County

of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that county’s rezoning deprived plaintiff of

the commercial use of his land until he paid a substantial nonrefundable fee to apply to have his

previous zoning designation reinstated; concluding that this “[l]oss of the use and enjoyment of his

land deprived [plaintiff] of . . . a property interest.”); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d

592, 601 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that, “in the context of land use regulation, that is, in situations

where the governmental decision in question impinges upon a landowner’s use and enjoyment of

property, a land-owning plaintiff states a substantive due process claim where he or she alleges that

the decision limiting the intended land use was arbitrarily or irrationally reached.”), overruled on

other grounds by UA Theatre Circuit v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003);

Mohilef v. Janovici, 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 285 (1996) (noting that city had, via a public nuisance

abatement proceeding, barred plaintiffs from keeping ostriches and emus on their ranch; concluding

that, “[i]n light of the [plaintiffs’] ownership interest in the ranch and the fact that [one plaintiff]

partially owns the [birds] through his commercial ventures, the City’s nuisance abatement

proceeding sufficiently implicates a protected property interest”). 

Courts have also recognized a constitutionally protected property interest in avoiding fines

and liens. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991) (stating that “even the temporary

or partial impairments to property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are

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 It is possible to distinguish Beck Dev. Co. and Paul on the grounds that they did not involve

slander of title to land.

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sufficient to merit due process protection”; adding that “the property interests that attachment affects

are significant” because “attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise

alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or

additional mortgage; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an

insecurity clause”); Cook v. City of Buena Park, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1, 6 (2005) (stating that a

landlord “undoubtedly” had a property interest in avoiding the lien provision and fines imposed by

an ordinance).

Finally, a slander on title can also effect a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property

interest. See Beck Dev. Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 4th 1160, 1189 (1996)

(noting that land was “disparaged” by the recommendation of the Department of Toxic Substances

Control that there be a moratorium on proposed development of the property; adding that “the

landowner’s ability to sell or make use of the land would be inhibited” as a result and the landowner

“has a sufficient, legally recognized and protected interest in its property and business to warrant

similar due process protection [i.e., similar to a person’s interest in good name, reputation, honor, or

integrity]”); cf. WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that

“damage to the reputation of a business, without more, does not rise to the level of a constitutionally

protected property interest”; distinguishing an earlier case where there was clearly “much more than

an injury to the reputation of a business” -- i.e., there was “actual, direct interference with business

goodwill”); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (rejecting “the proposition that

reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either ‘liberty’ or

‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause”).1

Guided by the above, the Court concludes that the Abends have sufficiently alleged a

constitutionally protected property interest which suffered a deprivation when the City issued the

“30 Day Notice to Abate Letter” on May 18, 2006. Under the terms of the letter, the Abends were

assessed a $3,000 nuisance case fee, which could be recovered through the property tax general

levy, and additional substantial fines were threatened. See Pet., Ex. A (letter, dated 5/18/06). 

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Furthermore, the Abends’ property was declared a public nuisance, and, drawing all inferences in

the Abends’ favor, this declaration could impair the ability of the Abends to sell, finance, or lease

the property. 

The denial of the Abends’ administrative appeal also effected a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected property interest. After denial of the appeal, the Abends were informed

that they owed the City penalties of more than $100,000. See id. ¶ 25. Per the “30 Day Notice to

Abate Letter,” these penalties, if not reimbursed immediately, would become a special

assessment/priority lien recorded against the property title. See id., Ex. A (letter, dated 5/18/06). 

Furthermore, under the terms of the letter, the Abends could be subject to additional penalties unless

they abated the alleged nuisance and, if they failed to do so and the City did the abatement, the

Abends could be billed for the costs. See id. 

Furthermore, the deprivation of property is underscored by the fact that the denial of the

Abends’ administrative appeal effected a significant change in the relative legal positions of the

parties and the legal rights possessed by the Abends as owners of the property. If, as the City

Defendants contend, no fundamental vested right is at stake, then the scope of judicial review via

administrative mandamus under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 is narrow. The Court’s

“inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether or not the findings are supported by

substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.” Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees

Retirement Ass’n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32 (1974). In addition, on judicial review, evidence is generally

limited to that in the administrative record, i.e., the Abends would not be able to introduce new

evidence in the mandamus proceedings. See Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 55

Cal. App. 4th 93, 101 (1997) (noting that augmentation of an administrative record is permitted

“only within the strict limits set forth in section 1094.5, subdivision (e)”). In short, losing the

administrative appeal may well have had an adverse material effect on the Abends’ legal ability to

protect their property interest.

b. Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard

In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he essence of

due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case

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against him and opportunity to meet it.’” Id. at 348. To determine what procedural protections are

required in a particular case, a court considers several factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.

Id. at 335; cf. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 269 (1979) (considering the same factors above as

well as one additional factor, namely, “the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature,

grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before

a responsible governmental official”). 

The Supreme Court has indicated that these three factors are applied in light of the specific

facts of each case -- and not, e.g., to categories of administrative proceedings. See Gilbert v. Homar,

520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“It is by now well established that due process, unlike some legal rules, is

not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (“Due process, as

this Court often has said, is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.”); Joint

Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)

(explaining that due process is a general requirement that legal processes follow the forms of law, be

appropriate to the case, and be just to the parties involved); see also McGuinness v. Dubois, 75 F.3d

794, 800 (1st Cir. 1996) (recognizing that “some particular case in the future may present

compelling evidence that MCI-CJ’s [across-the-board] policy of denying live testimony from inmate

witnesses at a disciplinary hearing held in the West Wing violates due process,” but “leav[ing]

consideration of such a case where it appears presently to reside -- in the future”; “on the facts of

this case,” there was no due process violation); Mohilef, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 302, 304-05 (noting

that, “[i]n this case, the denial of prehearing discovery did not result in an unfair hearing, nor did it

prejudice the [plaintiffs’] case”; also noting that, while “[d]ue process may require an agency to

subpoena witnesses where, absent their testimony, the agency’s ultimate decision would be based

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solely on their written reports,” in this case, the plaintiffs did not provide the court with any

information about who they wished to subpoena or what those witnesses might have said).

Although the City Defendants argue that, based on the allegations in the complaint, adequate

process was given to the Abends, the cases cited by the City Defendants do not demonstrate that, as

a matter of law, the Abends were given adequate process. Friends of the Old Trees v. Department of

Forestry & Fire Protection, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1383 (1997), for example, does not even address the

issue of procedural due process. See id. at 1391 (noting that “courts and commentators have found

that purely documentary proceedings can satisfy the hearing requirement of Code of Civil Procedure

section 1094.5, so long as the agency is required by law to accept and consider evidence from

interested parties before making its decision”) (emphasis added). Nor does Del Mar Terrance

Conservancy, Inc. v. City Council, 10 Cal. App. 4th 712, 729 (1992) (simply discussing

admissibility of evidence not contained in the administrative record).

Moreover, it is telling that the City Defendants have made no attempt to explain why process

was adequate as a matter of law based on the three Eldridge factors above. The three factors require

factual analysis and is not susceptible to a 12(b)(6) motion. See Pavelich v. Natural Gas Pipeline

Co. of Am., No. 02 C 3374, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23946, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2002)

(“Whether post-deprivation remedies are adequate is principally a question of fact, not appropriate

for determination on a motion to dismiss.”); see also Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir.

2002) (“[M]inimum procedural due process requirements ultimately turn on a highly fact-specific

inquiry.”). For example, the second factor requires an assessment of the risk of erroneous

deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. In their administrative

appeal, the Abends argued, inter alia, that the majority of nuisance activity occurred on public

property and not their own property. In view of this fact-based issue, whether additional procedural

safeguards such as a live hearing, discovery, subpoenaing of witnesses, cross-examination of

witnesses, etc., would materially advance the reliability of the City’s determination cannot be

assessed in the abstract or in a vacuum. See, e.g., Robledo v. City of Chicago, 444 F. Supp. 2d 895,

902 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“[T]his matter is not appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss. For

example, defendants argue that an additional hearing on these issues would be unnecessary because

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these issues ‘can be brought to City’s attention without requiring a hearing.’ The record before the

court does not however, explain what informal procedures currently exist, why these procedures

would be adequate to avoid erroneous deprivations, or that these procedures were made available to

plaintiffs in this case. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to decide plaintiffs’ claims on facts

that go well beyond the allegations of the complaint.”). Likewise, the third factor -- i.e., the burdens

imposed by the additional procedural safeguards -- requires factual analysis.

Accordingly, the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss the procedural due process claim is

denied.

2. Second Cause of Action -- Due Process

In the second cause of action, the Abends assert that their due process rights were violated

because Ms. Killey, the administrative appeal examiner, was not impartial.2

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contend that this due process claim should be dismissed because (1) the Abends do not allege a

cognizable property interest and (2) the Abends do not adequately allege hearing officer bias. For

the reasons stated above, the Abends have alleged a cognizable property interest, and therefore the

Court turns to the issue of whether they have adequately alleged bias on the part of Ms. Killey. 

The Court concludes that the claim of bias is not adequately supported, particularly under the

pleading standard recently articulated by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S. Ct. 1955 (2007). In Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court held that an allegation of parallel conduct

by major telecommunications providers was insufficient to establish a claim for relief for conspiracy

under § 1 of the Sherman Act because parallel conduct was consistent not just with conspiracy, but

also with “a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by

common perceptions of the market.” Id. at 1964. In so holding, the Supreme Court emphasized that

the allegation of the complaint must state more than a possible claim; it must state a plausible one. 

See id. at 1965-66 (noting that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level” and that there must be “plausible grounds” for a claim for relief). 

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According to the Abends, Ms. Killey was not impartial for two reasons: (1) because she was

reviewing the work of an employee in the same office (i.e., the Office of the City Administrator) and

(2) because she used to work as an attorney in the Neighborhood Law Corps (“NLC”), a division in

the City Attorney’s Office which is predisposed against property owners, and Mr. Sanchez as well as

Laura Blair (of the City Attorney’s Office) were also previously or currently affiliated with the

NLC. Both of these allegations are insufficient to support a claim of bias.

First, the fact that the Office of the City Administrator was in effect both the investigator and

the adjudicator is not enough to establish bias. As the City Defendants point out, in Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), the Supreme Court rejected “[t]he contention that the combination of

investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in

administrative adjudication.” Id. at 47; see also id. at 54-55 (same). If, in the instant case, Ms.

Killey specifically was both the investigator and the adjudicator, then the Abends would have a

stronger case, see id. at 52 (noting that, under the APA, “no employee engaged in investigating or

prosecuting may also participate or advise in the adjudicating function” but that there is an

“express[] exempt[ioin] from this prohibition for ‘the agency or a member or members of the body

comprising the agency’”), but there is no dispute that the investigator and adjudicator were different

persons, though employed by the same City agency.

Second, the fact that Ms. Killey was formerly affiliated with the NLC is not enough to

establish bias. Even if the Abends are right that the NLC is predisposed against property owners,

that bias cannot be automatically imputed to Ms. Killey simply because she was once employed

there. As the City Defendants note, judges are often former prosecutors but are not as a result

automatically barred from adjudicating criminal matters. See Soden v. Murphy, No. 4:05 CV 1399

CAS DDN, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32731, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 2007) (citing cases in which

“federal courts have held that, when a former prosecutor later acts as a judge, an appearance of bias

or prejudice against the defendant or grounds to require disqualification of the judge do not

automatically appear”). The Abends try to distinguish their case on the basis that the NLC targets

landlords specifically whereas prosecutors act only “generally against crime,” Opp’n at 13, but this

distinction is not persuasive. For instance, the fact that a former prosecutor specialized in drug cases

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would not disqualify her from later serving as a judge in trials involving drug charges. The bottom

line is that, while a due process violation may be established without a showing of actual bias, there

must be “special facts and circumstances present in the case before [the court demonstrating] that the

risk of unfairness is intolerably high.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58. The Abends, alleging nothing other

than general circumstances from which they speculate bias, have not demonstrated that the situation

as alleged presents a risk of unfairness that is intolerably high.

The Court therefore dismisses without prejudice the Abends’ due process claim based on the

alleged bias of Ms. Killey. To state a viable due process claim they will have to allege facts that are

more specific and more suggestive of actual bias.

3. Third Cause of Action -- Substantive Due Process

In the third cause of action, the Abends claim that their right to substantive due process was

violated as a result of the City Defendants’ actions. The City Defendants contend that this cause of

action is preempted by the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1324

(9th Cir. 1996) (“Because the conduct that the plaintiffs allege is the type of government action that

the Fourth and Fifth Amendments regulate, Graham [v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)] precludes

their substantive due process claim.”). In turn, the Abends argue that the cause of action is not

preempted based on Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).

The Court agrees with the Abends that the substantive due process claim is not preempted. 

Chevron makes clear that a substantive due process claim and a takings claim address two different

matters. Substantive due process concerns the legitimacy of the government’s actions; takings, on

the other hand, concerns the severity of the burden that government imposes upon property rights. 

See id. at 539, 542 (noting that the “common touchstone” in the regulatory takings jurisprudence is

the focus on the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights and

that the issue of whether government action substantially advances a legitimate public purpose

“reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes

upon private property rights” or “provide any information about how any regulatory burden is

distributed among property owners”) (emphasis in original); see also Consolidated Waste Sys., LLC

v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, No. M2002-02582-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 382, at *81

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(June 30, 2005) (“As a general theory, the primary purpose of a takings claim is to enforce the

constitutional protection against government deprivation of private property without just

compensation. It is not an attack on the validity of the governmental action itself.”).

In the instant case, the Abends have alleged facts challenging the legitimacy of the City

Defendants’ actions and therefore have sufficiently stated a claim for a substantive due process

violation. See id. at *80-81 (June 30, 2005) (stating that a court should look at a plaintiff’s “actual

claims to determine if the substantive due process claims are in reality only recast takings claims” --

“[i]f not, they are separately reviewed according to applicable principles”); see also John Corp. v.

City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that a careful analysis must be

undertaken in each case to assess the extent to which a plaintiff’s substantive due process claim rests

on protections that are also afforded by Takings Clause). They have alleged that the City

Defendants’ nuisance enforcement action lacks a factual or rational basis and is just a pretext to

avoid the payment of just compensation for the taking of their property. See Pet. ¶ 60. The fact that

the Abends refer to a taking does complicate matters somewhat; it raises the question of whether the

Abends are trying to recast a takings claim as a substantive due process claim. However, Chevron

suggests that there will often be a predicate substantive due process claim before a takings claim.

Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on

private property, the “substantially advances” inquiry probes the

regulation’s underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically prior

to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking,

for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in

pursuit of a valid public purpose. The Clause expressly requires

compensation where government takes private property “for public

use.” It does not bar government from interfering with property rights,

but rather requires compensation “ in the event of otherwise proper

interference amounting to a taking.” Conversely, if a government

action is found to be impermissible -- for instance because it fails to

meet the “public use” requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due

process -- that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation

can authorize such action.

Chevron, 544 U.S. at 543 (emphasis in original). 

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4. Fourth Cause of Action -- Equal Protection

In the fourth cause of action, the Abends allege that the City Defendants violated the Equal

Protection Clause because they selectively enforced City and local ordinances against the Abends

that were not enforced against similarly situated persons and property owners. The City Defendants

argue that the equal protection claim should be dismissed because “selective enforcement of valid

laws, without more, does not make [their] actions irrational.” Mot. at 15.

Plaintiffs have alleged disparate treatment. While the City Defendants are correct that

selective enforcement of a valid law by itself is not enough to give rise to an equal protection claim,

the Ninth Circuit has explained that

[a] plaintiff can establish a “class of one” equal protection claim by

demonstrating that it “has been intentionally treated differently from

others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Where an equal protection claim is based on

“selective enforcement of valid laws,” a plaintiff can show that the

defendants’ rational basis for selectively enforcing the law is a pretext

for “an impermissible motive.”

Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 944. “[A] plaintiff may show pretext by [demonstrating] that either: (1)

the proffered rational basis was objectively false; or (2) the defendant actually acted based on an

improper motive.” Id. at 946. 

Here, the Abends have alleged that there was no factual (and hence no rational) basis for the

City’s declaration that the Abends’ property was a nuisance. Moreover, they have alleged an

improper motive on the part of the City Defendants -- namely, to avoid just compensation for the

taking of the Abends’ property. They have also alleged facts supporting an inference of improper

motive -- e.g., the “30 Day Notice to Abate Letter” was issued only one day after the City wrote a

letter to the Abends complaining of alleged drug- and prostitution-related arrests at or directly in

front of the property, and subsequently the City refused to discuss amendments to the Compliance

Agreement and to listen to information about the Abends’ efforts to address the activity at the

property. See Pet. ¶¶ 13-14, 16. In effect, the Abends imply the City had no real interest in

obtaining the Abends’ cooperation. Whether this claim is credible is not at issue at this stage.

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the equal protection claim.

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5. Preclusion

With respect to all four causes of action alleged in the complaint, i.e., both due process and

equal protection claims, the City Defendants argue in favor of dismissal on the basis that the claims

could have been raised at the administrative level but were not and that the Abends should be

therefore precluded from raising them now. In support of this argument, the City Defendants cite

Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1985). In Reid, the plaintiff was appealing from a decision

of the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) affirming the suspension of her pilot

certificate for 120 days. See id. at 1460. On appeal, the plaintiff raised several issues challenging

the FAA Administrator’s authority on statutory and constitutional grounds, none of which had been

raised in the NTSB proceeding. See id.

As the Abends argue, Reid does not govern their case. In Reid, the Ninth Circuit was

presented with the issue of whether the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in

appealing a decision of a federal agency. See id. at 1460. However, the Abends have brought a

claim under § 1983 against the City. In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, (1982), the

Supreme Court held that “exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a

prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” Id. at 2568. The City Defendants did not

make any argument in their reply brief negating the applicability of Patsy. 

6. Injunctive Relief

The City Defendants apparently seek dismissal of the Abends’ claim for injunctive relief on

the theory that the Abends have failed to allege irreparable injury. While the scope of the injunction

sought is not clear and may be subject to future motions, it appears that the Abends assert, inter alia,

that the nuisance abatement laws have been selectively and vindictively enforced against them. See

Pet. (Fourth Cause of Action); Cross-Compl. (First Cause of Action). If proven, the Abends may be

entitled to an injunction against any further such discriminatory prosecution. Cf. Murgia v.

Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 290 (1975). Standing might be established if unlawful motive

were demonstrated, particularly in view of the prior abatement proceedings brought by the City

which the Abends contend was also meritless. At this stage, since all the allegations must be taken

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as true and reasonable inferences drawn in the Abends’ favor, dismissal of their claim for injunctive

relief is not appropriate.

7. Individual Liability

Based on the complaint, it is not entirely clear whether the Abends are suing the individual

defendants in their official capacities only, in their individual capacities only, or in both capacities. 

The City Defendants argue, in effect, that they need clarity as to how the individual defendants are

being sued. In their opposition, the Abends do not clarify the matter. The Abends should specify

how the individual defendants are being sued. The parties should meet and confer to determine the

most convenient way to address this problem (e.g., the Abends could file an amended complaint or

the City Defendants could serve an interrogatory on the Abends, with the Abends providing a

response on an expedited basis).

8. Municipal Liability

In Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a

municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation by its employees or

officials but only if it can be said that the violation results from the municipality’s official policies or

customs. See id. at 694 (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made

by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,

inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). According to the

City Defendants, the Abends have not made sufficient allegations regarding municipal liability in

accordance with Monell.

The City Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. First, as the Abends point out, “[t]he

Monell Court set forth an ‘official policy or custom’ requirement to limit § 1983 damage awards

against municipalities.” Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 250 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in

original). In the instant case, the Abends have alleged only claims for prospective relief. The City

Defendants did not contest this point in their reply brief.

Second, regardless of Chaloux, the Abends have alleged enough for municipal liability

pursuant to Monell to survive a motion to dismiss. The Abends have alleged that the City

Defendants’ actions were in accordance with a custom, policy, or practice of the City. See, e.g., Pet.

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¶¶ 42, 52, 62, 74. While the City Defendants contend that the Abends have failed to identify the

exact official policy, this argument is not persuasive at this juncture. First, there is no heightened

pleading requirement of specificity regarding Monell allegations. Second, a single constitutional

deprivation can be an official policy. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). An

isolated constitutional violation is an official policy for which a municipality can be held liable

when: (1) the person causing the violation has “final policymaking authority,” see id. at 1235-36; (2)

the person causing the violation is a subordinate but his or her action is “ratified” by one with final

policymaking authority, see id. at 1238; or (3) the person causing the violation is a subordinate but

one with final policymaking authority is “deliberately indifferent” to the subordinate’s action. See

id. at 1240. That the Abends have not identified who the final policymaker of the City is or which

City employee actually caused the constitutional violation is not a bar at this stage. That is

something that discovery will inform. See, e.g., Kase v. Wiseman, No. 93-3076, 1993 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 14414, at *8 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1993) (rejecting argument that “§ 1983 claim against the

City should be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to identify an official with final policymaking

authority who violated Sandra Kase’s constitutional rights”; noting that a heightened pleading

standard does not apply in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under § 1983). But see

Pivonka v. Collins, No. 3:02-CV-0742-G, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12211, at *9 (N.D. Tex. July 5,

2002) (agreeing with the city’s argument “that the plaintiffs’ claims must fail because they have not

alleged any specific policymaker responsible for promulgating the policy or custom which led to the

alleged constitutional violations”). Here, the allegations of the complaint imply that the

administrative actions taken have been approved or ratified by a final policymaker as the City has

not only formally acted on the administrative appeal but also sought to enforce its actions by

bringing an abatement/nuisance lawsuit. 

C. City’s Motion to Dismiss Mr. Abend’s Cross-Complaint

In the cross-complaint, Mr. Abend asserts claims for equal protection, a taking, and

substantive due process. For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the City’s motion to dismiss

with respect to the equal protection and substantive due process claims. The only remaining issue is

whether Mr. Abend has properly stated a claim for a taking.

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The Court grants the motion to dismiss the takings claim because the claim is premature. 

Whether there has been a taking cannot be determined until the abatement/nuisance lawsuit filed by

the City is resolved. As noted above, the crux of any takings claim is that the deprivation of

property be sufficiently severe so as to rise to the level of a takings. Here, the burden on Mr.

Abend’s property cannot be assessed until the Court is able to determine what abatement, if any, is

required or what use, if any, is enjoined. In this case, the “30 Day Notice to Abate” generally

requires the Abends to abate the nuisance but does not specify the specific scope of the nuisance or

the particular steps they must take. The “30 Day Notice to Abate” thus did not represent a “final,

definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in

question.” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson, 473 U.S.

172, 191-95 (1985). Even if the City could be deemed to have taken a definitive position, it relies

on its lawsuit to enforce the notice, and thus the severity of the burden on Abends’ property cannot

yet be measured. Cf. City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159, 166-72, 101 Wash. App. 815, 827-39

(Wash Ct. App. 2000) (holding that court order of closure constitutes the taking); see also

Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1274 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that

“[t]he ripeness doctrine requires not only that the [City] arrive at a final, definitive position, but also

that its decision inflicts an actual, concrete injury”). The current inability to define the severity of

the burden precludes the finding of a “takings” whether the claim is for a public or private taking.

///

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Abends’ complaint is

granted in part and denied in part. The Court dismisses without prejudice only the due process claim

based on the alleged bias of Ms. Killey. The remainder of the motion is denied.

Likewise, the Court grants in part and denies in part the City’s motion to dismiss Mr.

Abend’s cross-complaint. The Court dismisses without prejudice the takings claim. The remainder

of the motion is denied.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 4 and 7.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2007

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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