Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02244/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Erin K Murphy, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-02244-PHX-BSB

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Erin K. Murphy seeks judicial review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying her applications for 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under the Social 

Security Act (the Act). The parties have consented to proceed before a United States 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and have filed briefs in accordance with 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1. For the following reasons, the Court affirms the 

Commissioner’s decision. 

I. Procedural History 

 In July 2009, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 401-

34, and supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. § 1381-83c, under Titles II and XVI of 

the Act. (Tr. 209-23.)1

 Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled on October 31, 2005 

due to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), fibromyalgia, and chronic fatigue. (Tr. 260-

 

1

 Citations to “Tr.” are to the certified administrative transcript of record located at docket 20. 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 1 of 21
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

61.) After the Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claims at the initial and reconsideration 

levels, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 108-09, 

144-47, 110-43, 162-64.) The ALJ conducted a hearing and issued a decision on October 

7, 2011 denying Plaintiff’s claims. (Tr. 25-47.) 

 The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the 

Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 

(Tr. 5-11.); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (explaining the effect of a disposition by the Appeals 

Council). Plaintiff exhausted the administrative review process and timely appealed the 

Commissioner’s final determination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing a Complaint 

with this Court. 

II. Medical Record 

The record includes the following evidence regarding Plaintiff’s physical and 

mental impairments. 

A. Physical Impairments 

 1. Michael J. Fairfax, D.O. 

 Michael J. Fairfax, D.O., a rheumatologist, treated Plaintiff between September 

20, 2006 and November 27, 2006. (Tr. 337-55.) During his initial assessment of 

Plaintiff, Dr. Fairfax obtained a history of Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal pain and conducted 

a physical examination. (Tr. 345-46.) Dr. Fairfax diagnosed fibromyalgia. (Tr. 346.) 

He found tender points “over multiple major muscle bursal and tendon groups.” 

(Tr. 347.) On November 27, 2006, Dr. Fairfax again assessed fibromyalgia. (Tr. 349.) 

 2. Joe K. Gregory, D.O. 

 In July 19, 2007, Plaintiff began treating with Joe Gregory, D.O. (Tr. 440-42.) Dr. 

Gregory diagnosed chronic fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome. (Tr. 442.) On 

August 30, 2007, Dr. Gregory noted that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia had gotten worse. (Tr. 

439.) On October 16, 2007, Dr. Gregory treated Plaintiff for “moderately severe” 

headaches that were aggravated by sitting, walking, and standing. (Tr. 436.) He assessed 

Plaintiff with chronic fibromyalgia and tension headaches. (Tr. 437.) On November 12, 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 2 of 21
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2007, Dr. Gregory described the intensity of Plaintiff’s headaches and muscle pain as 

“moderate-severe.” (Tr. 434.) On December 18, 2007, Dr. Gregory saw Plaintiff for a 

follow-up regarding her muscle pain related to fibromyalgia. He noted that Lyrica 

relieved some of Plaintiff’s pain. (Tr. 432.) Dr. Gregory reported that Plaintiff was also 

taking Oxycodone, MS Contin, Baclofen, Phenergan, Doxepin, Cymbalta, and Voltaren. 

(Id.) 

 3. Karen Acevedo-Mogharbel, D.O. 

 Karen Acevedo-Mogharbel, D.O., a primary care physician, treated Plaintiff for 

fibromyalgia, asthma, chronic pain, kidney disease, chronic fatigue, hypothyroidism, 

cervicalgia, and a history of deep vein thrombosis from November 20, 2008 through 

2011. (Tr. 513-25, 695-701, 1121-57.) In August 2010, she completed a “residual 

functional capacity form” indicating that Plaintiff could: (1) frequently lift and carry up 

to five pounds, and occasionally lift and carry up to twenty pounds; (2) sit for two hours 

total in an eight-hour workday; (3) stand for two hours total in an eight-hour workday; 

(4) walk for three hours total in an eight-hour workday; (5) occasionally climb 

stairs; (6) never bend, stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl; and (7) never use her hands for 

grasping, pushing/pulling, or fine manipulations. (Tr. 808-09.) She found that Plaintiff 

could not be exposed to unprotected heights, moving machinery, and temperature 

extremes. (Tr. 809.) She also found that Plaintiff had “severe” pain, fatigue, inability to 

deal with stress, and cognitive problems. (Tr. 809.)

 In October 2010, Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel found that Plaintiff’s severe pain and 

fatigue limited her to sitting, standing, and walking for no more than two to three hours in 

an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 1121.) Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel sent a letter, dated 

September 2, 2011, to Plaintiff’s attorney, Scott Davis, and opined that Plaintiff was 

unable “to sustain any kind of gainful employment presently or in the future.” (Tr. 1117.) 

 4. Mesa Pain Management Center 

 On referral from Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel, between January 8, 2009 and July 7, 

2010, Plaintiff received treatment at the Mesa Pain Management Center (MPMC) for 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 3 of 21
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

chronic fibromyalgia pain. (Tr. 541-634; 702-709.) As the ALJ noted, the records from 

MPMC indicate that Plaintiff received pain management, including epidural injections, to 

treat her pain. (Tr. 35.) The treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff had a decreased range 

of motion in her lumbar spine. (Tr. 543, 550, 557, 571, 578. 585, 705.) The majority of 

the MPMC treatment records indicate that Plaintiff had “adequate” pain control, could 

function “adequately” or “well,” and could perform all activities of daily living (ADL) 

and function independently.2

 (Tr. 544, 551, 562, 572, 579.) Plaintiff also reported that 

yoga, muscles relaxers, and pain medication reduced her pain. (Tr. 553, 574.) 

 On March 4, 2009, MPMC records indicate that Plaintiff’s pain control was 

“barely adequate” and she was functioning “barely adequately.” (Tr. 600.) However, she 

was able to perform ADLs and function independently. (Id.) On August 9, 2009, 

Plaintiff reported that her pain control was adequate, and that she was functioning “barely 

adequately” on her current regimen. (Tr. 558.) Plaintiff, however, could perform ADLs 

and function independently on that date. (Id.) 

 5. Daniel Ryklin, M.D. 

 On referral from Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel, Plaintiff also received treatment from 

Dr. Ryklin at the Arizona Pain and Spine Institute from July 2010 through 2011. 

(Tr. 795-96.) In July 2010, Dr. Ryklin found eleven out of eighteen fibromyalgia tender 

points. (Tr. 798.) He noted that Plaintiff could heel walk, toe walk, perform a full squat, 

and climb onto the examination table without difficulty. (Id.) In an August 2011 

treatment note, nurse practitioner Linda Milam found myofascial trigger points. 

(Tr. 986.) 

 On September 8, 2011, Dr. Ryklin and Nurse Milam jointly completed a “residual 

functional capacity form” indicating that Plaintiff could: (1) occasionally lift and carry up 

to five pounds; (2) sit for two hours total in an eight-hour workday; (3) stand for one hour 

total in an eight hour workday; (4) walk for twenty minutes total in an eight-hour 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s “pain control” was assessed on a scale of “good” “adequate” “barely adequate” or “poor.” (Tr. 544.) Her ability to function was assessed on a scale of “well” 

“adequately” “barely adequately” or “poorly.” (Id.) 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 4 of 21
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

workday; (5) very seldom climb stairs; (6) occasionally bend; and (7) never to very 

seldom stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl. (Tr. 1118.) They found that Plaintiff should avoid 

exposure to unprotected heights, moving machinery, and temperature extremes. 

(Tr. 1119.) They also noted that Plaintiff had “severe” pain, fatigue, and inability to deal 

with stress. (Id.) In the “remarks” section of the form, Dr. Ryklin and Nurse Milam 

noted that Plaintiff had recently been discharged from the hospital in August 2011 after 

“extensive blood clot treatment, which had further limited her functional activity 

tolerance.” (Tr. 1120.) 

 On September 15, 2011, Nurse Milam wrote a letter to Plaintiff’s attorney 

confirming the presence of generalized trigger points and opining that Plaintiff “could not 

tolerate activity to sustain full time work of any kind.” (Tr. 1160.) 

 6. Manuel Abrante, M.D. 

 In late December 2010 and continuing to 2011, Manuel Abrante, M.D., treated 

Plaintiff for chronic kidney disease, stage III with related deep vein thrombosis and 

history of hospitalization for acute renal failure. (Tr. 1100-16.) In December 2010, 

Dr. Abrante noted Plaintiff’s diagnoses of chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia. 

(Tr. 1100.) He noted that Plaintiff was “doing pretty well.” (Tr. 1104.) In August 2011, 

Dr. Abrante noted that Plaintiff felt tired but was otherwise “well.” (Tr. 1101-1102.) 

 7. Stephen Dickstein, M.D. 

 In February 2010, Stephen Dickstein, M.D., a State agency physician, reviewed 

the medical record and completed a physical residual functional capacity assessment. 

(Tr. 742-49.) Dr. Dickstein concluded that Plaintiff could: (1) occasionally lift and/or 

carry twenty pounds; (2) frequently lift and/or carry ten pounds; (3) sit for about six 

hours in an eight-hour workday, (4) stand and/or walk for about six hours in an eighthour workday (Tr. 743); (5) Plaintiff could frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, 

and stoop; and (6) occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, kneel, crouch, and 

crawl. (Tr. 744.) Dr. Dickstein found that Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual, or 

communicative limitations. (Tr. 745-46.) He further found that Plaintiff should avoid 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 5 of 21
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

concentrated exposure to temperature extremes and environmental pollutants, and should 

be exposed to heights only occasionally. (Tr. 746.) 

B. Mental Impairments 

 1. Jonna Krabbenhoft, Psy.D. 

 In January 2010, licensed psychologist Jonna Krabbenhoft, Psy.D., evaluated 

Plaintiff. (Tr. 710-18.) Dr. Krabbenhoft diagnosed Plaintiff with depression not 

otherwise specified (NOS), and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 717). 

 Dr. Krabbenhoft completed a “psychological/psychiatric medical source 

statement,” indicating that Plaintiff had: (1) no impairment in the ability to remember 

locations and work-like procedures or understand and remember very short and simple 

instructions; (2) mild impairment in the ability to understand and remember detailed 

instructions; (3) no impairment in the ability to carry out very short and simple 

instructions; (4) mild to moderate impairment in the ability to carry out detailed 

instructions; (5) mild impairment in the ability to maintain attention and concentration for 

extended periods, and in the ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain 

regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; (6) no impairment in 

the ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, the ability to work 

in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them, or the 

ability to make simple work-related decisions; (7) mild to moderate impairment in the 

ability to complete a normal workday and work week without interruptions from 

psychologically-based symptoms, and to perform at a consistent pace without an 

unreasonable number and length of rest periods; (8) no impairment in the ability to 

interact appropriately with the general public, or the ability to ask simple questions or 

request assistance; (9) moderate impairment in the ability to accept instructions and 

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, and the ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and (10) no 

impairment in the ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior, and to adhere to basic 

standards of neatness and cleanliness. (Tr. 719.) 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 6 of 21
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 2. Randall Garland, Ph.D. 

 In February 2010, State agency psychologist Randall Garland, Ph.D., reviewed the 

medical record and completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form. (Tr. 728-41.) 

Dr. Garland found that Plaintiff had: (1) “mild” restriction of activities of daily living; 

(2) “moderate” difficulties in maintaining social functioning; ( 3) “moderate” difficulties 

in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and (4) no episodes of 

decompensation. (Tr. 738.) 

 Dr. Garland also completed an assessment of Plaintiff’s mental functional capacity 

and concluded that she was able to meet the basic demands of competitive, remunerative, 

unskilled work on a sustained basis, including the ability to: “(1) understand, carry out, 

and remember simple instructions; (2) make judgments commensurate with the functions 

of unskilled work, i.e., simple work-related decisions; (3) respond appropriately to 

supervision, co-workers, and work situations; and (4) deal with changes in a routine work 

setting.” (Tr. 723-25.) 

 3. Phoenix Interfaith Counseling 

 Plaintiff obtained treatment from Phoenix Interfaith Counseling (PIC) from 2009 

through 2011. (Tr. 635-94, Tr. 756-71, Tr. 936-82.) The PIC treatment notes include 

diagnoses of mood disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 650, 662, 668, 941, 

982.) The PIC records mainly consist of therapy notes. However, psychiatric progress 

notes indicate that Plaintiff’s global assessment of functioning (GAF) scores ranged from 

52, indicating “moderate symptoms,” to 70, indicating “mild symptoms.” (Tr. 651, 665, 

757, 766-67, 946, 955, 963, 974, 979.) 

 On October 19, 2010, Plaintiff reported that she was trying to work and socialize. 

(Tr. 969.) On March 9, 2011, Plaintiff reported that her sleep and appetite were good, her 

anxiety was low, and she was trying to start an online retail business. (Tr. 946.) On 

March 25, 2011, Plaintiff reported that she was busy getting her business together, 

scheduling appointments, and completing projects. (Tr. 944.) She indicated that she had 

more energy and felt less pain. (Id.) 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 7 of 21
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

III. Administrative Hearing Testimony 

 Plaintiff was in her mid-thirties at the time of the September 2011 administrative 

hearing. (Tr. 39.) She had a high school education. (Id.) Her last relevant work 

included sales representative, vocational training instructor, and “tavern manager.” 

(Tr. 39.) Plaintiff testified that she could not work due to fibromyalgia pain, kidney pain, 

chronic fatigue, depression, lower disc problems, concentration and memory difficulties, 

dizziness, nausea, and vomiting. (Tr. 55.) Plaintiff also testified that she had chronic 

fatigue, an eight on a scale of one to ten, and that she fell asleep unexpectedly several 

times a week. (Tr. 59-60, 83, 85.) She stated that she usually napped once in morning 

and once in the afternoon. (Id. at 60.) Plaintiff also testified that she spent ninety percent 

of every week in her bedroom. (Tr. 90.) 

 Plaintiff testified that her medications made her dizzy and required her to sit with 

her head between her knees for approximately thirty minutes. (Id. at 63.) She stated that 

she experienced nausea daily and vomited three times a week. (Id.) Plaintiff also 

testified that, although she had been in counseling for two years, it had not helped. (Id. at 

61.) Plaintiff testified that she could sit for ten to fifteen minutes at a time and for two 

hours total during the day, and stand and walk for five minutes each at a time and for one 

hour total in an eight hour day. (Tr. 88-89.) Plaintiff testified that she could not lift or 

carry a gallon of milk. (Tr. 89.) 

 Vocational expert (VE) Kathryn A. Atha also testified at the hearing. (Tr. 28.) 

The ALJ asked the VE to consider a hypothetical individual who was Plaintiff’s age, with 

the same education, and work experience. The hypothetical individual had the following 

limitations: (1) occasionally lift or carry up to twenty pounds; (2) frequently lift or carry 

ten pounds; (3) frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, or stoop; (4) occasionally 

climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, kneel, crouch, or crawl; (5) avoid concentrated 

exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation; 

(6) avoid even moderate exposure to hazards, such as moving machinery and unprotected 

heights; and (7) limited to unskilled, rote, routine work. (Tr. 97.) 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 8 of 21
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The ALJ asked whether there were occupations that the hypothetical person could 

perform. (Tr. 97.) The VE responded that the individual could perform unskilled, light 

jobs, including garment sorter (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 222.687-014) 

(2,138 jobs in Arizona and 217,783 jobs in the United States); cafeteria attendant (DOT 

311.677-010) (2,224 jobs in Arizona and 73,703 jobs in the United States); and restaurant 

cashier (DOT 311.472-010) (22,974 jobs in Arizona and 1,126,369 jobs in the United 

States). (Tr. 98.) 

IV. The ALJ’s Decision 

 A claimant is considered disabled under the Act if he is unable “to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (stating nearly identical standard for 

supplemental security income disability insurance benefits). To determine whether a 

claimant is disabled, the ALJ uses a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920. 

 In the first two steps, a claimant seeking disability benefits must initially 

demonstrate (1) that he is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity, and (2) 

that his disability is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (c). If a claimant meets steps one 

and two, he may be found disabled in two ways at steps three or four. At step three, he 

may prove that his impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an 

impairment in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 

pt. 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is presumptively disabled. If 

not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ determines a claimant’s residual 

functional capacity. A claimant’s RFC is what he can still do despite existing physical, 

mental, nonexertional, and other limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 

n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). A claimant must prove that his RFC precludes him from performing 

his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Once the claimant has established this 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 9 of 21
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the government at step five to establish that the 

claimant can perform other jobs that exist in significant number in the national economy, 

considering the claimant’s RFC, age, work experience, and education. If the government 

does not meet this burden, then the claimant is considered disabled within the meaning of 

the Act. Bray v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec. Admin, 554 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ first found that 

Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity since the October 31, 2005 alleged 

onset date. (Tr. 30.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: “fibromyalgia, chronic kidney disease, lumbar degenerative disease, 

hypertension, asthma, obesity, mood disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder.” (Id.) 

At the third step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. 

pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. (Tr. 31.) 

 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b) and § 416.967(b). (Id. at 34.) The ALJ explained that 

Plaintiff could “frequently balance, stoop, and climb ramps and stairs, and occasionally 

kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.” (Id. at 34-35.) The ALJ 

further found that Plaintiff should “avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme 

heat, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation, and even moderate exposure to 

hazards, such as moving machinery and unprotected heights.” (Id. at 35.) The ALJ also 

found that Plaintiff was limited to “unskilled, rote, routine work.” (Id.) 

 At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant 

work (Tr. 40), but that she could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the 

national economy. (Id.) Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the 

meaning of the Act. (Id.) 

V. Standard of Review 

 The district court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of 

record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 10 of 21
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision under the 

substantial evidence standard. Under this standard the court must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and it is free from 

legal error. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); Ryan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Even if the ALJ erred, however, “[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for 

errors that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it 

is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted); see 

also Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). To determine whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court considers the record as a whole and 

“may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 The court also may not “affirm the ALJ’s . . . decision based on evidence that the 

ALJ did not discuss.” Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (a reviewing court “must judge the 

propriety of [administrative] action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency” and 

stating that if “those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm 

the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or 

proper basis”). 

 The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, [the court] must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041) 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 11 of 21
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

VI. Discussion 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of Dr. AcevedoMogharbel and Dr. Ryklin without providing specific and legitimate reasons and by 

failing to give clear and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not credible. 

(Doc. 23 at 2.) The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and is free from legal error. (Doc. 26.) 

A. Weight Assigned Medical Source Opinions 

 In weighing medical source evidence, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between 

three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who treat the claimant; (2) examining 

physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining physicians, 

who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Generally, more weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion. Id. The ALJ 

must provide clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for 

rejecting a treating or an examining physician’s uncontradicted opinion. Id; Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). An ALJ may reject the controverted opinion 

of a treating or an examining physician by providing specific and legitimate reasons that 

are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 

1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

 Opinions from non-examining medical sources are entitled to less weight than 

treating or examining physicians. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Although an ALJ generally 

gives more weight to an examining physician’s opinion than to a non-examining 

physician’s opinion, a non-examining physician’s opinion may nonetheless constitute 

substantial evidence if it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record. 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). When evaluating medical 

opinion evidence, the ALJ may consider “the amount of relevant evidence that supports 

the opinion and the quality of the explanation provided; the consistency of the medical 

opinion with the record as a whole; [and] the specialty of the physician providing the 

opinion . . . .” Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 12 of 21
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Weight Assigned Medical Opinions in this Case 

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not err in weighing the medical 

opinions presented in this case. Based on the record evidence, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to frequently climb ramps and stairs, 

balance, or stoop, occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, kneel, crouch, or 

crawl. (Tr. 34-35.) She also found that Plaintiff should “avoid concentrated exposure to 

extreme cold, extreme heat, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation,” and that she 

should avoid “even moderate exposure to hazards, such as moving machinery and 

unprotected heights.” (Tr. 34.) 

 In making this assessment, the ALJ gave little weight to the Dr. AcevedoMogharbel’s and Dr. Ryklin’s functional capacity assessments. (Tr. 33-36.) The ALJ 

concluded that those opinions were unsupported by the doctors’ treatment notes and by 

the medical record. (Id.) As discussed below, these are specific and legitimate reasons 

for giving little weight to Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel’s and Dr. Ryklin’s functional capacity 

assessments, which were inconsistent with the functional capacity assessment completed 

by non-examining agency physician Dickstein and with other record evidence. (Tr. 742-

47; Tr. 38 (citing exhibit 16F).)3

 

 1. Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel 

 Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel completed two medical source statements opining that, as 

result of Plaintiff’s severe pain and fatigue, Plaintiff was capable of less than a full range 

of sedentary work. (Tr. 808-10, Aug. 16, 2010 RFC form; Tr. 1121, Oct. 8, 2010 form.)4

 

On September 2, 2011, Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel provided a letter to Plaintiff’s attorney, 

Scott Davis, and opined that Plaintiff could not perform any type of gainful employment. 

(Tr. 1117.) The ALJ did “not give great weight to those opinions” because they were not 

 

3

 Administrative hearing exhibit 16F is Dr. Dickstein’s physical residual capacity assessment. (Tr. 742-49.) 

4

 Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel’s October 8, 2010 opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional capacity was completed in relation to Plaintiff’s “application for a discharge of a federal student loan and/or a teaching serve obligation for a federal grant on the basis that he or she has a total and permanent disability.” (Tr. 1121.) 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 13 of 21
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

supported by the overall record evidence, including Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel’s own 

treatment notes. (Tr. 35-36.) This finding is free from legal error and is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

 When Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel initially examined Plaintiff in November 2008, 

Plaintiff had a normal gait, full range of motion, normal strength and tone of extremities, 

and an appropriate mood and affect. (Tr. 523-25.) As the ALJ noted, Dr. AcevedoMogharbel’s later treatment notes through August 2011, indicate that Plaintiff had a 

decreased range of motion with tenderness in the cervical spine, intermittent lower 

extremity edema, and some abdominal tenderness. However, the majority of 

Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel’s treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff’s neurologic, respiratory, 

cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, and psychiatric findings were normal. (Tr. 36, 513-24, 

696-99, 1123-49.) For example, in May 2010, she noted that Plaintiff had full range of 

motion in her spine, a stable gait, full joint range of motion, and “5/5” muscle strength 

and tone. (Tr. 1142.) 

 Plaintiff argues that in rejecting Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel’s assessments, the ALJ 

“ignored the nature of fibromyalgia, the methodology for diagnosing fibromyalgia and 

the manner of assessing is severity.” (Tr. 23 at 15.) Plaintiff further argues that based on 

the manner in which fibromyalgia is diagnosed; the ALJ erred in requiring objective 

evidence of fibromyalgia. (Doc. 23 at 15.) As Plaintiff states, however, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was a severe impairment. (Doc. 23 at 15, Tr. 30.) Contrary 

to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not require objective medical evidence of Plaintiff’s 

fibromyalgia and considered it a severe impairment. The ALJ did not err in considering 

the medical records of Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia. 

 2. Dr. Ryklin 

 Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ erred by not giving “substantial weight” to 

Dr. Ryklin’s September 8, 2011 opinion that Plaintiff “is unable to perform even 

sedentary work activity, and has severe pain and fatigue.” (Tr. 36.) In assigning less 

than substantial weight to Dr. Ryklin’s assessment, the ALJ noted that Dr. Ryklin’s 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 14 of 21
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

September 8, 2011 assessment appeared to be based, at least in part, on Plaintiff’s 

hospitalization during the previous month for deep vein thrombosis. (Tr. 36 (citing 

Tr. 1120 Dr. Ryklin’s notation that plaintiff “was discharged from the hospital 8/11/11 

after extensive blood clot treatment that has further limited her function and activity 

tolerance.”).) The record indicates that, although Plaintiff’s deep vein thrombosis 

“further” limited her ability to function, that impairment was not expected to remain 

severe for the requisite twelve continuous months. (Tr. 30-31, 36.) Accordingly, the 

ALJ did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Ryklin’s assessment to the extent that it was 

based on Plaintiff’s deep vein thrombosis because, although it “further” limited Plaintiff’s 

functional abilities, it was expected to be of limited duration. 

 The ALJ further noted that Dr. Ryklin’s opinion was not supported by his own 

treatment notes. (Tr. 36.) As the ALJ noted, during the initial July 2, 2010 examination, 

Dr. Ryklin noted that Plaintiff had eleven of eighteen fibromyalgia tender points. 

(Tr. 798.) He also noted that Plaintiff could heel walk, toe walk, perform a full squat, and 

climb onto the examination table without difficulty. (Id.) Dr. Ryklin’s notes also 

indicated that Plaintiff had “5/5” strength bilaterally in her lower extremities, no “focal 

motor weakness,” intact sensation to light touch and pinprick, and her reflexes were equal 

and symmetric at the knees and ankles. (Tr. 798.) The record reflects that during 2010 

follow-up appointments with Nurse Linda Milam, Plaintiff reported decreased range of 

motion, muscle spasms, and tenderness or pain, but she also consistently reported that her 

medications controlled her pain “reasonably well” without side effects and that they 

helped her maintain her functional status and quality of life. (Tr. 1019, 1022, 1024, 1027, 

1030.) Although Plaintiff reported experiencing “burning pain,” in a final treatment note 

dated August 1, 2011, she indicated that she had “good relief” from a trigger point 

injection from the week before. (Tr. 986-87.) 

 3. The ALJ’s Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence 

 The ALJ did not err in giving less than substantial weight to the opinions of 

Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel and Dr. Ryklin and that determination is supported by 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 15 of 21
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

substantial evidence in the record, which the ALJ discussed in her opinion. The 

treatment notes of Michael J. Fairfax, D.O., and Joe K. Gregory, D.O., support the ALJ’s 

determination. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Fairfax examined Plaintiff in September 2006 and 

diagnosed fibromyalgia. (Tr. 35.) Plaintiff reported that she could carry on normal 

activities and her physical examination was within normal limits. (Id.) Dr. Fairfax 

examined Plaintiff again in November 2006 and, although Plaintiff reported worsening of 

her condition, the examination remained the same. (Id., Tr. 337-55.) Additionally, Joe 

K. Gregory, D.O., a treating physician, examined Plaintiff in July 2007 and noted that 

Plaintiff had a normal range of motion without signs of edema or cyanosis. (Tr. 35, 432-

42.) In August 2007, Dr. Gregory again noted that Plaintiff had no signs of edema or 

cyanosis. (Tr. 432-42.) 

 The treatment notes from the Mesa Pain Management Center from 2009 to 2010 

also support the ALJ’s determination. As the ALJ noted, these records indicated that, 

although Plaintiff had a decreased range of motion in her lumbar spine, her medications 

provided “adequate” pain relief, she could function “adequately,” and that she could 

perform ADLs and function independently. (See Section II.A.4, supra.) Additionally, 

Dr. Abrante noted that Plaintiff was fatigued, but otherwise doing well (Tr. 1104, 1100-

02), and noted that she had a normal gait and station, and no edema or cyanosis of the 

extremities. (Tr. 1100-1102.) 

 The opinion of non-examining physician Dickstein, which the ALJ gave 

“persuasive weight,” is consistent with the overall record, including the treatment notes 

of Dr. Fairfax, Dr. Gregory, Dr. Ryklin, Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel, and the Mesa Pain 

Management Center. (Tr. 38.) The ALJ properly gave Dr. Dickstein’s assessment 

persuasive weight because it is consistent with other evidence in the record. See Thomas, 

278 F.3d at 957 (stating that “[t]he opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians 

may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent 

clinical findings or other evidence in the record”); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 

1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 16 of 21
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 In summary, the ALJ did not err in assigning less than substantial weight to the 

opinions of Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel and Dr. Ryklin and the ALJ’s determination is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 

(substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.”). 

C. Plaintiff’s Credibility 

 1. The Two-Step Analysis 

Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ erred in finding her testimony less than credible. 

An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s testimony 

regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Id. at 1036 

(quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). 

 The claimant is not required to show objective medical evidence of the pain itself 

or of a causal relationship between the impairment and the symptom. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1282. Instead, the claimant must only show that an objectively verifiable impairment 

“could reasonably be expected@ to produce his pain.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 

(quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282); see also Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 

at 1160B61 (9th Cir. 2008) (“requiring that the medical impairment ‘could reasonably be 

expected to produce’ pain or another symptom . . . requires only that the causal 

relationship be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon”). 

 Second, if a claimant shows that he suffers from an underlying medical 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce his pain or other symptoms, the 

ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the] symptoms” to determine how 

the symptoms, including pain, limit the claimant=s ability to work. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In making this evaluation, the ALJ may consider the objective 

medical evidence, the claimant’s daily activities, the location, duration, frequency, and 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 17 of 21
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, precipitating and aggravating factors, 

medication taken, and treatments for relief of pain or other symptoms. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346. 

At this second evaluative step, the ALJ may reject a claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of his symptoms only if the ALJ “makes a finding of malingering 

based on affirmative evidence,” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Robbins v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006)), or if the ALJ offers “clear and 

convincing reasons” for finding the claimant not credible. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1160 

(quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). 

 2. ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a 

limited range of light work. (Tr. 33-34.) In making this determination, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff’s allegations were “not fully credible with regard to the severity and extent 

of her limitations.” (Tr. 38.) Because there was no finding of malingering, the ALJ was 

required to give clear and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff not credible. 

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1160. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to give clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony. (Doc. 23 at 14.) 

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s 

credibility, and the ALJ supported her findings that Plaintiff’s limitations were less 

serious than alleged with clear and convincing reasons. See Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 

528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the reviewing court gives great weight to the ALJ’s 

credibility determination.) 

 The ALJ noted that in March 2011, Plaintiff was attempting to start an online 

retail business. (Tr. 38.) Additionally, as the ALJ noted, client progress notes from 

Phoenix Interfaith Counseling indicate that Plaintiff was busy “getting her business 

together, scheduling appointments, and finishing projects.” (Tr. 38, Tr. 936, 937, 942, 

944-46, 948, 950, 954, 959, 967, 969.) In January and April 2011, Plaintiff house sat for 

a friend. (Tr. 38, Tr. 942, 954.) A client progress note from March 25, 2011, indicates 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 18 of 21
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that Plaintiff reported “the injections work and that she was not in as much pain” and had 

“more energy.” (Tr. 38, Tr. 944.) The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s activity level, 

including evidence that she was attempting to work, in assessing her credibility. See

Bray v. Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (the fact that a claimant has sought 

out employment weighs against a finding of disability); Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 

1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that claimant’s activity level is relevant to assessing 

subjective complaints); Decker v. Chater., 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996) (the fact that 

claimant regularly exceeded work restrictions imposed by his doctors was relevant to 

assessing the credibility of his testimony of disabling pain). 

 As the ALJ noted, the record includes inconsistent statements that discredit 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. First, Plaintiff testified during the administrative 

hearing that she had the Epstein-Barr virus. (Tr. 38, 83-84.) However, as the ALJ noted, 

the record does not contain such a diagnosis. Additionally, Plaintiff testified that she has 

to elevate her legs above heart level for two hours daily, and has to wear compression 

stockings for two years. (Tr. 85-86.) However, this testimony is inconsistent with the 

recommendations of her treating vascular surgeon. (Tr. 38, Tr. 1097-99 (recommending 

that Plaintiff wear compression stockings for two years, but not specifying how long 

Plaintiff should elevate her leg during the day).) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff 

testified that her mental health had not improved with counseling, (Tr. 38, Tr. 61), but the 

record evidence indicated that Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms had improved. 

(Tr. 936-82.) 

 Additionally, the ALJ noted that although Plaintiff testified that she experienced 

side effects from her medication, including dizziness, nausea, vomiting, and “sleepiness,” 

(Tr. 63), the record evidence reflected that those side effects were not as severe as 

Plaintiff indicated. (Tr. 38, 511-40, 635-94, 695-701, 756-71, 793-805, 936-85, 986-

1047, 1122-57.)5

 In August, September, October, November, and December 2010, 

 

5

 For example, several treatment notes from Dr. Acevedo-Mogharbel do not indicate that Plaintiff was experiencing any side effects, but that she should “call if any problems with medications and side effects.” (Tr. 1123, 1126, 1128, 1132, 1140, 1143.) 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 19 of 21
- 20 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff denied experiencing any side effects from her medication, “such as constipation, 

nausea, vomiting, or excessive sedation.” (Tr. 1019, 1022, 1024, 1027, 1030.) 

 As part of the overall disability analysis, the ALJ must consider whether there are 

any inconsistencies in the evidence, such as Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (stating that an ALJ must consider “whether there are any 

inconsistencies in the evidence.”); Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5 

(stating that a strong indicator of the credibility an individual’s statements is their 

consistency, both internally and with other information in the record); Webb v. Barnhart, 

433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Credibility determinations do bear on evaluations of 

medical evidence when an ALJ is presented with conflicting medical opinions or an 

inconsistency between a claimant’s subjective complaints and his diagnosed condition.”). 

Thus, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements and inconsistencies 

between her statements and the medical record when assessing her credibility. The ALJ 

provided clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. 

VII. Conclusion 

The ALJ did not commit legal error in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding 

the severity of her symptoms or in giving little weight to the assessments of Dr. AcevedoMogharbel and Dr. Ryklin, and the record contains substantial evidence in support of the 

ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits 

in this case is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 20 of 21
- 21 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Inquiry Regarding Status 

(Doc. 29) is DENIED as moot. 

 Dated this 6th day of November, 2013. 

Case 2:12-cv-02244-BSB Document 30 Filed 11/07/13 Page 21 of 21