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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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l 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

.I Jl 241991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED Clerk 

v. 

JAMES 

STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) 

) 

w. HERSHBERGER, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-3237 

(D.C. No. 89-40046-01) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist _the_cie.te.rmination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion 

under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. After six and one-half weeks of trial, a 

jury convicted defendant of twenty-five counts of mail fraud, bank 

fraud, and transportation of stolen goods, securities, and money. 

The jury acquitted defendant of six counts of mail fraud and 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3237 Document: 010110129473 Date Filed: 07/24/1991 Page: 1 
failed to reach a unanimous verdict on six other counts, which 

the court then dismissed. After sentencing, defendant retained 

new counsel and then filed a "petition for release pending 

adjudication pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2241" and brief in support 

with affidavits. 

Defendant asserted that he was denied his right to testify 

and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The 

district court construed the petition as a motion pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 2255 and reassigned it to the original trial judge. At 

the court's direction, the government filed a response to the 

motion, with attached affidavits that directly refuted defendant's 

contentions. Defendant then filed a reply brief with further 

affidavits and exhibits. The district court denied the motion, 

and this appeal followed. 

Following Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1987), 

the district court concluded that no evidentiary hearing was 

necessary because defendant's allegations were "not highly 

specific and lack[ed] independent corroboration." R. Vol. I, Doc. 

140, at 1 n.1. After finding that the affidavits submitted on 

defendant's behalf were "subject to substantial impeachment apart 

from the refuting affidavits," the district court held that 

defendant was aware of his right to testify, that he waived the 

right, and that his complaints about "his counsel's manner of 

trying the case and decisions about what witnesses to call 

completely lack merit." Id. at 4. 

2 

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On appeal, defendant contends that the district court erred 

in denying his motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. 

Section 2255 provides that 

[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the 

case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to 

no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be 

served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt 

hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings 

of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. 

28 u.s.c. § 2255 (emphasis added). We must first determine 

whether defendant would be entitled to relief if he proved his 

allegations. If he would be entitled to relief, then we must 

determine whether the district court abused its discretion in 

failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing. 

Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1305 (10th Cir. 1988). 

I. 

United States v. 

Defendant's first claim is that he was denied the right to 

testify. "[A] defendant in a criminal case has the right to take 

the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense." Rock 

v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). This right arises from 

several provisions in the Constitution. It is a "necessary 

corollary to the Fifth .Amendment's guarantee against compelled 

testimony," id. at 52; it is part of a criminal defendant's sixth 

amendment right to present a personal defense and call witnesses 

in his favor, id.; and "[i]t is one of the rights that 'are 

essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process,'" id. 

at 51 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 

(1975)). 

3 

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The right of the accused to testify is a personal right that 

only the accused can waive; defense counsel cannot waive the right 

as a matter of trial strategy without the defendant's consent. 

United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1987); 

United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986). Any waiver by the defendant 

must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 

See Johnson v. 

The district court found that the defense rested at trial 

without calling defendant as a witness and that "defendant made no 

objection by word or conduct to this decision." R. Vol. I, Doc. 

140 at 2. Defendant does not refute this finding on appeal. 

Instead, he contends that he made no objection because counsel 

never informed him that he had the sole authority to decide 

whether he would testify; defendant was under the impression that 

whether he testified was a decision, like that regarding other 

witnesses, that was ultimately counsel's. 

Defendant alleged in his motion and supporting affidavits 

that he told his counsel he wanted to testify on several 

occasions; that counsel said he would decide whether defendant 

would testify when the time came; and that counsel later 

reiterated to both defendant and his wife that counsel had made 

the decision not to have defendant testify. 

When a defendant asserts that he desires to 

exercise his constitutional right to testify truthfully, 

counsel's duty is to inform the defendant why he 

believes this course will be unwise or dangerous. If a 

defendant insists on testifying, however irrational that 

insistence might be from a tactical viewpoint, counsel 

must accede. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-3237 Document: 010110129473 Date Filed: 07/24/1991 Page: 4 
United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1076. If defendant can prove 

that his counsel prevented him from testifying by asserting that 

counsel, rather than defendant, would make the decision whether 

defendant would testify, defendant would be entitled to relief. 1 

We must therefore decide whether the district court abused 

its discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing on 

defendant's claim. The district court declined to hold a hearing 

because it found defendant's allegations too conclusory and 

because it apparently did not believe the affidavits submitted on 

defendant's behalf. Although "[c]onclusory allegations 

unsupported by specifics are insufficient to require a court to 

grant an evidentiary hearing," Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 

1185, 1211 (10th Cir. 1989), defendant's allegations were not so 

"vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible," Machibroda v. United 

States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962), as to justify denying a hearing. 

Furthermore, a district court cannot simply credit the 

government's affidavits and discredit the defendant's. Lindhorst 

1 The district court found that "even assuming defense counsel 

overrode defendant's desire to testify, the error was harmless ... [because] [t]he evidence against the defendant was 

overwhelming." R. Vol. I, Doc. 140 at 4. Even if a harmless 

error analysis were appropriate here, compare Ortega v. O'Leary, 

843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir.)(applying harmless error analysis to 

violation of defendant's right to testify), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 

841 (1988) and Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 

1977)(same), aff'd on reh'g en bane, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978) with United States v. Bentvena, 

319 F.2d 916, 944 (2d Cir.)(reversing defendant's conviction due 

to violation of right to testify without discussing harmless 

error), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) and Wright v. Estelle, 

572 F.2d at 1081-82 (Godbold, J., with whom Goldberg, J., and 

Tjoflat, J., join, dissenting)(arguing that harmless error does 

not apply to violation of defendant's right to testify), the 

district court's finding was premature because the record did not 

reflect to what the defendant would have testified had he been 

called to the stand. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-3237 Document: 010110129473 Date Filed: 07/24/1991 Page: 5 
v. United States, 585 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1978); see also 

Friedman v. United States, 588 F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 

1979)("contested fact issues in§ 2255 cases cannot be resolved on 

the basis of affidavits"). 

Like that in Machibroda v. United States, this is a case in 

which 

[t]he factual allegations contained in the petitioner's 

motion and affidavit[s], and put in issue by the 

affidavit[s] filed with the Government's response, 

related primarily to purported occurrences outside the 

courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, 

cast no real light. Nor were the circumstances alleged 

of a kind that the District Judge could completely 

resolve by drawing upon his own personal knowledge or 

recollection. 

368 U.S. at 494-95. 

Under the circumstances, we conclude the district court 

abused its discretion in failing to afford defendant an 

opportunity to prove his allegations at an evidentiary hearing. 

II. 

Defendant's second claim is that he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel. Specifically, he asserts that his counsel 

failed to advise him he had the right to decide whether he would 

testify, waived defendant's right to testify without his consent, 

failed to call certain witnesses and present certain evidence, and 

instructed defendant and his wife not to look members of the jury 

in the eye during trial. As with defendant's first claim, we must 

determine initially whether defendant would be entitled to relief 

if he could prove his allegations. 

6 

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"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must 

be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning 

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 

having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prove that his counsel's assistance was 

so ineffective as to require reversal of his conviction, defendant 

"must show both that his attorney's performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for the 

counsel's inadequacies, the result of the proceedings would have 

been different." Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1564 (10th Cir. 

1991), petition for cert. filed, (May 28, 1991). To meet the 

first requirement, defendant must overcome "a strong presumption 

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance; ... that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. 

Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 

Although advising the defendant not to testify can be 

appropriate trial strategy, see Rogers-Bey v. Lane, 896 F.2d 279, 

283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 93 (1990); Hollenbeck v. 

Estelle, 672 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019 

(1982), failing to advise the defendant of his right to testify or 

refusing to call the defendant to testify despite his desire to do 

so cannot be, cf. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1076 

(counsel cannot waive defendant's right to testify as a matter of 

trial strategy). Therefore, defendant's allegations that defense 

counsel failed to inform him that he alone controlled the decision 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-3237 Document: 010110129473 Date Filed: 07/24/1991 Page: 7 
to testify and that defense counsel failed to let him testify 

despite his expressed desire to do so, if proved, would be 

sufficient to meet the first requirement of the Strickland test. 

Defendant, however, must also meet the second requirement of 

the Strickland test to be entitled to relief. The materials 

defendant filed with the district court state only that 

"[p]etitioner vehemently contends the outcome of his trial would 

have been different if trial counsel's conduct would have been 

effective," R. Vol. I, Doc. 125, Petitioner's Brief in Support of 

His Petition for Release Pending Adjudication Pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 2241, at 18, and that had defendant testified he would 

have "adequately explained and rebutted in detail every allegation 

made by the government in each and every count," id., Ex. A, 

Affidavit of James w. Hershberger, at 8. These allegations are 

too conclusory to entitle defendant to relief. 

Likewise, defendant's allegations that his counsel did not 

present certain testimonial and documentary evidence that 

defendant wanted him to, and that counsel instructed defendant and 

his wife not to look the jury in the eye during trial, even if 

proved, would not entitle him to relief. Defendant has not 

overcome the strong presumption that these acts and omissions of 

counsel were trial strategy. 

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

failing to grant defendant a hearing on his claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel. In the evidentiary hearing on remand, the 

district court need only consider whether defendant's right to 

testify was violated. 

8 

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.. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and 

judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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