Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02901/USCOURTS-ca7-13-02901-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-2901

CELIA GREENGRASS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEMS LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:12-cv-00212—Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 12, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Celia Greengrass sued her former employer, International Monetary Systems Ltd. (“IMS”), 

alleging that IMS retaliated against her for filing a complaint 

with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) against the company by naming her in its annual 

SEC filings and casting her complaint as “meritless.” The 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of IMS on 

the ground that Greengrass lacked evidence showing a 

Case: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
2 No. 13-2901

causal link between her EEOC filing and the alleged retaliatory act. We reverse. Greengrass made out a prima facie case 

of retaliation by demonstrating that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity when she filed her EEOC charge, 

that IMS engaged in an adverse employment action when it 

listed her name in its SEC filings, and that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that IMS 

listed her name because Greengrass filed the EEOC charge. 

I. BACKGROUND

Celia Greengrass began working as an account executive 

at IMS in January 2007. On September 10, 2007, Greengrass 

made a written complaint to IMS alleging harassment by 

Kevin Anderson, IMS’s Las Vegas General Manager. Two 

days later, John Strabley, IMS’s CEO, forwarded a copy of 

the complaint to Anderson, the alleged harasser, along with 

the message, “Call me before you explode.” Greengrass quit 

her job at IMS on November 25, 2007. On January 20, 2008, 

Greengrass filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC, 

alleging sex discrimination, national origin discrimination, 

and retaliation. 

As a publicly traded company, IMS is subject to the 

SEC’s annual filing requirements. In particular, item 103 of 

SEC Regulation S-K requires companies to describe any material legal proceedings, including the principal parties, facts 

giving rise to the proceeding, and the relief sought. See 17 

C.F.R. § 229.103 (1982). In March 2008, IMS’s Treasurer and 

CFO, Danny Weibling, consulted with an outside accountant, Derek Webb, regarding whether Greengrass’s EEOC 

complaint needed to be mentioned in the company’s SEC 

filings. Following this consultation, IMS did not refer to 

Greengrass’s complaint in its 2008 disclosures. It did, howCase: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
No. 13-2901 3

ever, without naming the complainant, refer to a different 

EEOC complaint brought against the company. IMS’s 10-Q 

forms for the periods ending March 31, 2008, June 30, 2008, 

and September 30, 2008 (all of which were prepared and 

filed after Weibling’s discussion with Webb) reported that 

IMS was engaged in litigation, but did not mention the 

names of parties, instead referring to the litigants as “former 

employees.”

At some point in July 2008, IMS received correspondence 

from the EEOC regarding Greengrass’s complaint. Apparently, the agency sought information regarding other sexual 

harassment claims leveled against the company. On July 29, 

2008, IMS’s general counsel, Martin Sklapsky, sent an email 

to the company’s management team (including Weibling, 

Strabley, and President/CEO Donald Mardak) regarding 

how forthcoming IMS should be with the EEOC. It stated, 

[T]he EEOC has finally responded to the ... 

Greengrass complaint. At this point, they're 

just looking for some additional information. 

One of the items they’re asking about is any 

other sexual harassment claims made by any 

employee between Nov 2005 and June 2008. 

Obviously, the John Lounsbury complaint will 

have to be included but what about the two issues raised by Carol Cannedy?

I don’t think the issue with Stan is a problem. 

She brought it to our attention, we addressed it 

with Stan and it was done. The problem is the 

issue with Paul. There was a complaint made 

to Paul G, the situation was discussed with 

Paul W and then the behavior she was comCase: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
4 No. 13-2901

plaining about occurred at least one other time 

after the discussion. The question is, do we include this in our response to the EEOC? 

They’re asking about other complaints because 

they’re looking for a pattern of conduct by 

IMS. Their logic would be that if we have multiple complaints, obviously we’re doing something wrong. 

Our problem is that we don’t know if Celia 

was aware of that issue and told the EEOC of 

other complaints made. The letter from the 

EEOC appears to just be a form letter and the 

request for that information is likely a standard 

question. I’m asking for your opinions on this 

because no matter how we respond, IMS has 

some potential liability.

If we do not mention it and Celia already reported it to them, it makes it appear IMS is trying to hide something. If we do report it, that 

means we’ve had three sexual harassment 

complaints in about eight months. That’s the 

sort of pattern they’re looking for and since all 

the complaints are from different offices, it 

would give them the impression that it’s a 

company-wide problem, not just an issue with 

one or two employees. That’s the sort of situation where the EEOC could step in and file suit 

themselves. If Celia has to litigate this herself, 

IMS is probably not going to get a large damages award because she likely doesn’t have the 

resources for a lengthy court fight. However, if 

Case: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
No. 13-2901 5

the EEOC files suit, that is no longer an issue 

and they’ll be looking to punish IMS for a pattern of behavior, not necessarily just this one 

incident.

This all may not matter anyway. One of the 

things they asked for was a list of IMS employees. I've asked for clarification on whether they 

want a list of all employees or for just the Las 

Vegas office. If they want a list of every employee, it would seem they intend to conduct 

an investigation of the entire company, not just 

the Las Vegas office. If that’s the case, we may 

have no choice but to disclose the incidents 

with both Paul and Stan.

Around January 12, 2009, IMS received notice that the 

EEOC wanted to conduct interviews regarding Greengrass’s 

complaint. This signaled a major ramping up of the agency’s 

involvement in Greengrass’s case. 

For its next SEC filing, dated April 6, 2009, IMS chose to 

include Greengrass’s complaint and to specifically name her. 

The “Legal Proceedings” section of its annual 10-K filing 

stated: “On January 20, 2008, Celia Greengrass filed a sexual 

harassment complaint with the [EEOC]. The claim is still 

under investigation by the EEOC but IMS believes the claims 

to be meritless and will vigorously defend itself.” (In reality, 

Greengrass’s EEOC claim did not allege sexual harassment, 

but rather sex discrimination, national origin discrimination, 

and retaliation against IMS.) These disclosures were repeated in the “Legal Proceedings” portion of IMS’s Form 10-K/A 

Amendment No. 1 Annual Report and in a quarterly disclosure dated May 14, 2009. Other former employees with 

Case: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
6 No. 13-2901

pending claims against IMS were also specifically named in 

these filings.

On September 3, 2009, the EEOC found reasonable cause 

to believe that Greengrass and other females as a class were 

subject to harassment because of their sex and national 

origin, and that Greengrass and females, as a class, were 

constructively discharged because of their sex, national 

origin, and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. 

Around December 24, 2009, the parties resolved Greengrass’s original EEOC complaint through conciliation, which 

did not include IMS’s rehiring of Greengrass. 

IMS reported the resolution of its dispute with Greengrass in the company’s Form 10-K Annual Report for 2009, 

stating, “During 2009, the company was defendant in two 

cases of note.... Settlement was reached in the EEOC matter 

in November 2009.” It did not refer to any other parties by 

name. In later filed quarterly and annual reports, IMS continued to refer generically to plaintiffs and defendants in ongoing litigation, not identifying them by name.

After leaving IMS, Greengrass struggled to find and 

maintain regular employment. Greengrass attributes her 

post-IMS difficulties to the SEC filings that identified her by 

name. She claims that a Google search of her name draws 

multiple results regarding IMS’s SEC filings that include her 

name. She also claims that a recruiter informed her she was 

“unemployable” due to this information.

On September 28, 2010, Greengrass filed a second EEOC 

complaint against IMS, alleging it retaliated against her because of her previous complaint based on its SEC filings. On 

March 25, 2011, the EEOC found “reasonable cause” to beCase: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
No. 13-2901 7

lieve IMS had violated Title VII’s retaliation provision by 

“providing information regarding her previous Charge of 

Discrimination on a public record to preclude her from obtaining new employment.” The parties were unable to resolve the dispute through conciliation and the EEOC issued 

Greengrass a right-to-sue letter.

Greengrass sued IMS alleging retaliation under Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e, et seq. After discovery closed, both Greengrass and 

IMS moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to IMS on all claims, finding Greengrass had “no evidence” of causation, and she appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Greengrass challenges the district court’s conclusion that 

she did not provide enough evidence that IMS retaliated 

against her for asserting her rights under Title VII to survive 

summary judgment. We review the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo, “constru[ing] all facts and reasonable inferences from the record in a light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party.” Magin v. Monsanto Co., 420 F.3d 

679, 686 (7th Cir. 2005). “Summary judgment is appropriate 

when there are no genuine issues of material fact and judgment as a matter of law is warranted for the moving party.” 

Gross v. PPG Indus., Inc., 636 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

A Title VII plaintiff can prove retaliation using either the 

direct or indirect method. Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 

527, 537 (7th Cir. 2013). Under the direct method, which 

Greengrass relies upon, a plaintiff must prove (1) that she 

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that she was 

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8 No. 13-2901

subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) that 

there was a causal connection between the two. O'Leary v. 

Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011). 

There is no dispute that Greengrass satisfied the first element, as her formal EEOC charges were “the most obvious 

form of statutorily protected activity.” Silverman v. Board of 

Educ. of City of Chicago, 637 F.3d 729, 740 (7th Cir. 2011). We 

also find (and IMS does not dispute) that listing Greengrass’s name in publicly available SEC filings (and referring 

to her complaint as “meritless”) constituted a materially adverse employment action. As Greengrass’s allegations regarding the recruiter who called her “unemployable” make 

clear, an employee’s decision to file an EEOC complaint 

might be negatively viewed by future employers. So, naming EEOC claimants in publicly available SEC filings could 

”dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting 

a charge of discrimination”—the essence of a materially adverse employment action. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 

Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); see also Veprinsky v. Fluor 

Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888-91 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 

“post-termination acts of retaliation that have a nexus to 

employment,” e.g., by “imping[ing] on [an employee’s] future employment prospects” are actionable under Title VII).

We now turn to the causation requirement, which the 

district court found Greengrass failed to satisfy. To demonstrate a “causal link” between the protected activity and the 

adverse employment action, a plaintiff must show the defendant “would not have taken the adverse ... action but for 

[her] protected activity.” King v. Preferred Technical Grp., 166 

F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 1999). Direct evidence typically requires an admission by the employer of discriminatory aniCase: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
No. 13-2901 9

mus, which is “rare.” Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 

757, 764 (7th Cir. 2008). But a plaintiff may also supply the 

causal link through circumstantial evidence from which a 

jury may infer intentional discrimination. Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 787 (7th Cir. 2009). Such circumstantial evidence may include suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of animus, evidence other employees were treated differently, or evidence the employer’s proffered reason for the 

adverse action was pretextual. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 

835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012). When the plaintiff has “assemble[d] 

from various scraps of circumstantial evidence enough to 

allow the trier of fact to conclude that it is more likely than 

not that discrimination lay behind the adverse action, then 

summary judgment for the defendant is not appropriate.” 

Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2013).

Greengrass has assembled a convincing array of circumstantial evidence. We begin with her evidence of suspicious 

timing. Suspicious timing is generally found when “an adverse employment action follows close on the heels of protected expression.” Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 

(7th Cir. 2012). IMS argues that it did not begin listing names 

in its SEC filing until 14 months after Greengrass filed her 

first EEOC complaint, undercutting any suggestion of suspicious timing. However, this is not the only relevant 

timeframe. IMS did not become aware of the EEOC’s intention to seriously pursue Greengrass’s claim until January 

2009, when the agency informed IMS it would be taking interviews. Before this point—as Sklapsy’s July 29, 2008 email 

to IMS management makes clear—the company was confident it could avoid a “large damages award” because, without the EEOC’s involvement, Greengrass “likely [would not] 

have the resources for a lengthy court fight.” Thus, a reasonCase: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
10 No. 13-2901

able jury could find that IMS decided to retaliate against her 

not when she filed her charge, but when IMS saw that the 

EEOC was taking the charge seriously, and that the retaliation occurred in its next scheduled SEC filing on April 6, 

2009. See Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (noting whether amount of time lapsed is suspicious “depends on context”). 

Greengrass presented evidence of animus as well. A reasonable jury could, for example, interpret Sklapsky’s July 

2008 email as evincing disdain for the EEOC process and animus against Greengrass for filing her complaint. Animus 

might also be inferred from Strabley’s decision to forward 

Greengrass’s complaint to her alleged harasser with the 

message, “Call me before you explode.” The fact that IMS 

employees do not mention how IMS might retaliate is irrelevant since they raise the reasonable inference that IMS held 

animus about the process and Greengrass’s decision to engage it. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 

703 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting whether ambiguous 

statements are discriminatory, retaliatory, or benign “is an 

appropriate question for a jury”).

Greengrass also provided evidence of pretext. Pretext can 

be shown by “identif[ying] ... weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, or contradictions” in an employer’s asserted 

reason for taking an adverse employment action such “that a 

reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence.” 

Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852-53 (citations omitted). IMS maintains that it changed its policy to include names on its SEC 

filings based on advice from “auditors and others” regarding compliance with SEC Regulation S-K item 103. The district court agreed, finding that “[u]ltimately, it was uncerCase: 13-2901 Document: 32 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 11
No. 13-2901 11

tainty over the filing requirements, not discriminatory animus, which led to the inclusion of Greengrass’s name on 

IMS’s SEC filings.” However, IMS’s multiple shifts in policy—from not including litigants’ names, to listing them, and 

then not including them again—could lead a reasonable juror to find that IMS is “dissembling” when it contends that it 

listed Greengrass’s name in response to advice regarding 

compliance with SEC regulations. See id. (noting pretext can 

be shown by evidence of “dissembling”). As Greengrass 

points out, IMS had also consulted with an outside accountant, Derek Webb, before filing its 2008 disclosures, which 

did not identify litigants by name. And IMS offers no evidence of when it received the alleged advice to change policy. Where, as here, “there is a question of fact as to the believability of an employer’s purported reasons for an employment decision then, ‘even if the evidence presented by 

[the plaintiff] does not compel the conclusion that [her employer] discriminated against [her] when making its ... decision, at a bare minimum it suffices to defeat [the employer’s] 

summary judgment motion.’” Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712, 726 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 423 (7th Cir. 1994)). In light 

of this evidence, summary judgment for the defendant was 

inappropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the 

case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

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