Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01337/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory Clarence Mason, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-01337 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, Arizona Attorney)

General, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 6, 2011. Respondents filed

an answer to the petition on September 12, 2011. See Doc. 7.

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment issued June 29,

2006, charged Petitioner with six counts of furnishing obscene

or harmful items to minors (alleging Petitioner showed pictures

of a naked man to six different victims at the same time); one

count of public display of explicit sexual materials; one count

of possession or use of marijuana; and nine counts of sexual

exploitation of a minor (relating to pornographic images found

on Petitioner’s personal computer). See Answer, Exh. A.

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel during

his pretrial proceedings. During a pre-trial settlement

conference conducted December 15, 2006, before a Superior Court

Commissioner, the Commissioner engaged Petitioner in a colloquy

regarding the charges against him and a plea agreement offered

by the state. The Commissioner explained that, if Petitioner

proceeded to trial and was convicted of all of the charges he

faced a presumptive sentence of 170 years imprisonment, because

Arizona’s laws required consecutive mandatory sentences on each

count of conviction. Id., Exh. B at 5-6. At the hearing the

Commissioner explained to Petitioner the state’s plea offer,

which required Petitioner to plead guilty to one count of sexual

exploitation of a minor, the existence of aggravating factors,

and two counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. The

Commissioner explained the plea agreement provided Petitioner

would receive an aggravated term of 24 years imprisonment and

lifetime probation. Id., Exh. B at 7.

Petitioner stated he understood that if he went to

trial and was convicted, he would be effectively sentenced to a

term of life in prison because he was then 45 years old.

Petitioner stated he understood the plea agreement provided for

a sentence of 24 years imprisonment. 

At the hearing Petitioner admitted he had told a

detective investigating the case that he would probably continue

to “do this until he got caught” and that Petitioner “wanted to

get caught.” Id., Exh. B at 13. At the hearing the prosecutor

noted that Petitioner had previously served a 15-year sentence

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -3-

for conviction on a charge of attempted child molestation and

that Petitioner was released from incarceration in 2000 or 2001.

Id., Exh. B at 13-14.

The Commissioner explained that, even if Petitioner

were not found guilty on the child pornography charges,

Petitioner faced a lengthy sentence if found guilty of the

charges of providing obscene material to minors. Id., Exh. B at

15-16. Petitioner stated that he believed he was an

exhibitionist and not a pedophile and that he was ashamed of his

behavior. Id., Exh. B at 17-18. Petitioner admitted that he

had at least one picture of child pornography on his home

computer, but claimed that he did not know how a the other

images of child pornography described in the charges had been

downloaded to his computer. Id., Exh. B at 18.

The Commissioner explained to Petitioner that, before

the court could accept a guilty plea, Petitioner was required to

make a truthful admission regarding the underlying factual basis

for the plea and, if he could not, the court would not accept a

guilty plea. Id., Exh. B at 19. The prosecutor noted that

Petitioner’s counsel had thoroughly interviewed a forensic

computer expert with regard to the likelihood Petitioner could,

if he went to trial, establish that someone other than

Petitioner had downloaded the pornographic images to

Petitioner’s computer. Id., Exh. B at 19-20.

The hearing then adjourned so that Petitioner could

confer with his counsel and determine whether he was prepared to

accept the plea agreement or go to trial. Id., Exh. B at 20-21.

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 This opinion was issued by Superior Court Judge Sanders,

reviewing the plea colloquy conducted by Commissioner Peterson.

-4-

After conferring privately with his counsel, Petitioner then

accepted the plea agreement and pled guilty to one count of

sexual exploitation of a minor and entered a no contest plea

regarding two counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a

minor. Id., Exh. B at 22. At that time Petitioner averred in

open court that: (1) he understood the plea agreement; (2) the

plea agreement had been fully explained to him; (3) his guilty

plea was not coerced, nor was it the result of a threat of force

or harm; and (4) he understood the sentencing terms provided in

the plea agreement. Id., Exh. B at 22-24. The state court

thereafter found that Petitioner’s plea was knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made and that Petitioner had

provided a sufficient factual basis for the pleas. Id., Exh. B

at 31.

At some time after entering his guilty plea on December

6, 2006, Petitioner moved to withdraw from the plea agreement.

On February 9, 2007, the state trial court denied the request to

withdraw, stating that: “[N]o undue influence was used and

[Petitioner’s] plea was knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily made. The plea was accepted and the Court does not

find any manifest injustice that would allow [Petitioner] to

withdraw from the plea.” Id., Exh. E.1

On February 13, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to a

term of 24 years imprisonment pursuant to his guilty plea to

Count 13 (sexual exploitation of a minor) of the indictment. At

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -5-

that time the state court suspended the imposition of sentence

as to Counts 10 and 11 (attempted sexual exploitation of a

minor), and placed Petitioner on lifetime probation on those

counts. Id., Exh. C.

On April 11, 2007, Petitioner initiated an action for

state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. F1. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him and in his Rule 32 action. Counsel

informed the Court he could find no meritorious claims to raise

on Petitioner’s behalf on January 29, 2008. Id., Exh. F2. 

In his pro se Rule 32 petition, Petitioner alleged: (1)

his employment time records constituted newly discovered

evidence of innocence; (2) defense counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to: (i) obtain Petitioner’s work time

sheets; and (ii) secure a computer exert to examine “backdoor

Trojans” on Petitioner’s computer; (3) his plea was involuntary

as a result of coercion from jail conditions and the statements

of the judge; and (4) the factual basis he provided was

insufficient to sustain his guilty and no contest pleas. Id.,

Exh. E. Petitioner asserted that the evidence that he could not

have downloaded “some images” would “cause most reasonable

people to doubt my guilt regarding the rest of the listed

images.” Id., Exh. E.

On November 21, 2008, the state trial court summarily

dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief finding that

Petitioner “failed to show any colorable claim for relief.”

Id., Exh. G. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on August 25,

2010. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because: 

1. He has obtained newly discovered evidence warranting

relief (Ground One); 

2. He was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel during plea proceedings (Ground Two);

3. The factual basis Petitioner provided for his guilty

plea was insufficient to sustain his guilty and no contest pleas

(Ground Three); 

4. Petitioner’s pleas were coerced, in violation of his

right to due process of law (Ground Four).

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2010).

-7-

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).2

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 A petitioner must present to the state courts the

“substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair

presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his

claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal

constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th

Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007).

Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the

federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts,

Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more

than present the facts necessary to support the federal claim. See

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

-8-

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.3 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2010). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595

(1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16

(9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -12-

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner presented the same issues raised in his

habeas petition in his state Rule 32 action; however, with the

exception of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

Petitioner did not clearly present any claim as a violation of

his federal constitutional rights. In his state Rule 32 brief

Petitioner did not use the term “due process,” cite to any

federal case or state case applying federal law, or otherwise

discuss his federal constitutional rights. Petitioner makes

reference to the “Sixth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments” once

in his entire 31-page brief in his state action for postconviction relief. See Answer, Exh. F1 at 6. Petitioner

asserts that his guilty plea was coerced and that his plea

proceedings were fundamentally unfair but never discusses his

federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial in

these discussions. Accordingly, with the exception of his Sixth

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Petitioner

has technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted any

assertion that any of his other federal constitutional rights

were violated in his state criminal proceedings. Neither has

Petitioner shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his

procedural default of his claims. Therefore, habeas relief may

not be granted on those claims.

D. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel

Petitioner arguably exhausted in the state courts a

claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel. The state court summarily

denied Petitioner’s claim that he was denied this right.

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -14-

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”);

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325

(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1041 (2003); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th

Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006).

A state court decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law if it arrives at a

conclusion of law opposite to that of the

Supreme Court or reaches a result different

from the Supreme Court on materially

indistinguishable facts. Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). A

state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal

law if it correctly identifies a governing

rule but applies it to a new set of facts in

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if

it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly

established legal principle to a new set of

facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable. Id. An unreasonable

application of federal law is different from

an incorrect application of federal law. Id.

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 3066 (2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608

F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2010).

For example, a state court’s decision is considered

contrary to federal law if the state court erroneously applied

the wrong standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim.

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright

v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47

(2008); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010),

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court

to grant relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly

applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v.

Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2011).

-15-

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011). See also Frantz v. Hazey,

533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d

1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009). 

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2008). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See

Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077,

1080 (9th Cir. 2005).4

A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as “fairminded jurists could

disagree” on the correctness of the state

court’s decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, []

(2004). And as this Court has explained,

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -16-

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, [] 129 S.Ct.

1411, 1413–14, [] (2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recently

held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in

the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise

requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127

S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790,

805 (9th Cir. 2011); Norris, 622 F.3d at 1286; Howard, 608 F.3d

at 568.

The “clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” at issue in this case is the test for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, [] (1984), and in Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, []

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -17-

(1985). Under Strickland, to establish a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the petitioner must show (1) grossly

deficient performance by his counsel, and (2)

resultant prejudice. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.

Ct. 2052. In Hill, the Supreme Court adapted

the two-part Strickland standard to

challenges to guilty pleas based on

ineffective assistance of counsel, holding

that a defendant seeking to challenge the

validity of his guilty plea on the ground of

ineffective assistance of counsel must show

that (1) his “counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for [his]

counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S. Ct. 366.

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. A court

considering a claim of ineffective assistance

must apply a strong presumption that

counsel’s representation was within the wide

range’ of reasonable professional assistance.

The challenger’s burden is to show that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.

Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citations

and quotations omitted), citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788

(“The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted

to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not

whether it deviated from best practices or most common

custom.”). Counsel’s performance is not deficient nor

prejudicial when counsel “fails” to raise an argument that

counsel reasonably believes would be futile. See Premo, 131 S.

Ct. at 741; Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -18-

Furthermore, to succeed on a claim that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985). Although the Court

may proceed directly to the prejudice prong when undertaking the

Strickland analysis, the Court may not assume prejudice solely

from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. See Jackson v.

Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner has not established that his counsel’s

performance was deficient, or that any alleged deficiency

prejudiced Petitioner. The plea agreement was beneficial to

Petitioner and Petitioner indicated both in the written plea

agreement and at the plea colloquy that he understood the terms

of the plea agreement and was pleading guilty voluntarily and

knowingly. Petitioner has not demonstrated that, but for

counsel’s advice with regard to the plea agreement, Petitioner

would have chosen to go forward to trial on all of the counts

charged in the indictment. Nowhere in his pleadings does

Petitioner contend that he could not be found guilty of the

other charges stated in the indictment and Petitioner fully

understood that, if convicted of the other charges in the

indictment and not the pornography charges, Petitioner faced a

lengthy sentence.

Petitioner’s bald assertion that he may have received

a more favorable plea offer had his counsel more adequately

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -19-

articulated a defense strategy and performed a more thorough

pre-trial investigation is insufficient to carry his burden of

establishing deficient performance. Petitioner’s conjecture

that hypothetical expert testimony or time records may have

“forced the State to re-examine its own case” and would result

in a more favorable plea offer is simply insufficient to

establish deficient performance.

III Conclusion

With the exception of his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal habeas

claims in the Arizona state courts as claims asserting the

denial of a federal constitutional right. Petitioner has not

shown cause for nor prejudice arising from his default of his

claims, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur

absent consideration of the merits of the claims. Additionally,

the state court’s decision that Petitioner was not denied the

effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of federal law.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Mason’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -20-

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -21-

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 25th day of October, 2011.

Case 2:11-cv-01337-JAT Document 8 Filed 10/26/11 Page 21 of 21