Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01635/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01635-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 08cv1635

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

S.D. STEINMETZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08 CV 1635 JM (AJB)

ORDER GRANTING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Doc. No. 79

vs.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY;

GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL

CORPORATION; EXXONMOBIL OIL

CORPORATION; CITIGROUP, INC.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff S.D. Steinmetz (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit in California small claims court,

alleging that Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s,

the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code

§1785.25(a), and state defamation law. (See Doc. No. 1). Defendants removed the lawsuit to

this court. (Doc. No. 1). After Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (Doc. No. 63), the

court dismissed all claims against GE Money Bank, FSB (“GEMB”), erroneously sued as

“General Electric Company” and “General Electric Capital Corporation,” and Defendant

Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (“Citibank”), erroneously sued as “Citigroup, Inc.” (Doc. No.

74). In the same order, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Defendant

ExxonMobil Corporation (“ExxonMobil”), erroneously sued as “ExxonMobil Oil

Corporation.” (Doc. No. 74). Plaintiff’s FCRA and CCRAA claims against ExxonMobil

Case 3:08-cv-01635-JM-AJB Document 86 Filed 03/09/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 08cv1635

survived the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 74). 

ExxonMobil, supported by a declaration, now moves for summary judgment on the

FCRA and CCRAA claims. (Doc. No. 79). Plaintiff filed an opposition, but has not filed any

supporting evidence. (Doc. No. 83). ExxonMobil filed a reply. (Doc. No. 84). 

The court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See

CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the court hereby GRANTS ExxonMobil’s motion

for summary judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

According to the allegations set forth in the third amended complaint, an “ExxonMobil

Credit Card account” (the “Account”) credit card was issued to Plaintiff by GEMB in January

2006. (Doc. No. 63, Third Amended Complaint, hereinafter “TAC,” ¶¶ 11-12). Plaintiff

petitioned for bankruptcy in April 2006 but neither included the Account in the proceedings

nor informed GEMB about the bankruptcy. (TAC ¶ 20). On or about October 10, 2006, after

the bankruptcy had been discharged, Plaintiff allegedly was informed by a “customer service

representative” the Account had been closed because Plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy. (TAC

¶¶ 27, 29). Plaintiff subsequently learned that, sometime prior to March 2007, the Account

status was reported by major credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”) (i.e. TransUnion and Equifax)

as having been included in Plaintiff’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy. (TAC ¶ 36). In reviewing his

credit reports between March 30, 2007 and late 2007, Plaintiff noticed additional minor

changes to the reporting of the Account. (TAC ¶¶ 38, 40). Between November 2007 and

January 2008, Plaintiff disputed the allegedly inaccurate reporting on various occasions

through the CRAs. (TAC ¶¶ 39-42). Responses from TransUnion and Equifax indicated their

investigations warranted no changes to the reporting status of Plaintiff’s ExxonMobil account.

(TAC ¶¶ 43-44).

Despite Plaintiff’s allegations, ExxonMobil played a minor role regarding the Account.

ExxonMobil did not issue, service, or own the Account. (Doc. No. 81, Declaration of Robert

Haase, hereinafter “Decl.,” ¶ 4). ExxonMobil merely partnered with GEMB, and later

CitiBank, who issued Plaintiff’s credit card and serviced the Account. (Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 7). Most

Case 3:08-cv-01635-JM-AJB Document 86 Filed 03/09/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 08cv1635

importantly to the claims in this case, ExxonMobil does not—and did not here—furnish

information about ExxonMobil credit card account holders to the CRAs. (Decl. ¶ 8). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue of material fact and

. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court

must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States

v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). If the moving party, however, “meets its initial

burden of identifying for the court the portions of the materials on file that it believes

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party may not

rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment.” Nilsson,

Robbins, Dalgarn, Berlines, Carson & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1542 (9th Cir.

1988) (citing T.W. Elec. Servs. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987)). 

“If a party opposing [a motion for summary judgment] shows by affidavit that, for

specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may . . .

order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other

discovery to be undertaken.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). To receive relief under Rule 56(f),

Plaintiffs “must show (1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they

hope to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these soughtafter facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary judgment motion.” State of Cal. ex rel. Cal.

Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) Motion

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that he “had no opportunity whatsoever to gather

admissible evidence that could prove his points.” (Doc. No. 83). As Plaintiff is proceeding

pro se, the court liberally construes Plaintiff’s argument as a motion under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(f) for discovery. 

Plaintiff’s statement in his opposition, however, does not meet the standard for

Case 3:08-cv-01635-JM-AJB Document 86 Filed 03/09/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 08cv1635

obtaining relief under Rule 56(f). First, Plaintiff has not filed an affidavit as required by Rule

56(f). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Second, even if Plaintiff had filed an affidavit, Plaintiff’s

conclusory statements do not identify any “specific facts” that discovery would elicit. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(f). Merely asking for “pertinent records of the CRAs, of the banking agents GE

Money Bank, F.S.B., and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., and of Exxon,” (Doc. No. 83),

merely indicates where Plaintiff would look for the “specific facts” he needs. Third,

ExxonMobil provides persuasive evidence that any facts that Plaintiff would seek—that

ExxonMobil reported false information to the CRAs—simply does not exist. ExxonMobil

does not furnish information to CRAs, therefore there is no reason to believe that ExxonMobil

furnished any false information to a CRA. Cf. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir.

1991) (“Denial of a Rule 56(f) application is proper where it is clear that the evidence sought

is almost certainly nonexistent or is the object of pure speculation.”).

As Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden for relief under Rule 56(f), the court denies

his request for further discovery and will rule on ExxonMobil’s motion for summary judgment.

See Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Failure

to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) is a proper ground for denying discovery and

proceeding to summary judgment.”). 

B. ExxonMobil’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Both federal and state law regulate those who furnish information to CRAs. “[T]o

ensure that credit reports are accurate, the FCRA imposes some duties on the sources that

provide credit information to CRAs, called ‘furnishers’ in the statutue.” Gorman v. Wolpoff

& Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009). California law provides that “[a]

person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer

credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or

inaccurate. Cal. Civ. Code §1785.25(a). In general, only “furnishers”—those who provide

credit information to CRAs—are liable to consumers under the FCRA or the CCRAA. Id. at

1154, 1171; see also Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

Case 3:08-cv-01635-JM-AJB Document 86 Filed 03/09/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 08cv1635

The undisputed evidence provided by ExxonMobil demonstrates that ExxonMobil is

not a “furnisher” of credit information as required for liability under the FCRA or CCRAA.

ExxonMobil did not provide credit information about Plaintiff to the CRAs. Therefore,

ExxonMobil cannot be liable under either the FCRA or the CCRAA. See Gorman, 584 F.3d

at 1154, 1171. ExxonMobil’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby GRANTS Defendant ExxonMobil’s motion

for summary judgment. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 9, 2010

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01635-JM-AJB Document 86 Filed 03/09/10 Page 5 of 5