Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00207/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QIONGLIN FU and RONG XIAO,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General of

the United States; EMILIO GONZALEZ,

Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services; MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,

CHRISTINA POULOS, Acting Director of the

California Service Center, U.S. Immigration and

Naturalization Services; and ROBERT S.

MUELLER, Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 07-0207 EDL

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for Mandamus and Injunctive Relief for lack of

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on May

1, 2007, at which Plaintiffs appeared pro se and Defendants appeared through counsel. Having

considered the papers and the argument presented at the hearing, the Court denies Defendants’

motion to dismiss for the reasons stated below.

I. Factual Background

On December 22, 2003, Plaintiff Qionglin Fu and his wife, Plaintiff Rong Xiao, submitted ICase 3:07-cv-00207-EDL Document 23 Filed 05/17/07 Page 1 of 10
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485 Adjustment of Status (“AOS”) applications to become permanent residents of the United States

with the California Service Center (“CSC”) of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”). Compl., ¶ 11 and Ex. A. In response to Fingerprint Notifications dated March 24, 2004

and September 22, 2005, Plaintiffs provided fingerprints for security checks. Id., ¶ 12 and Ex. B. At

various times from December 16, 2004 to November 14, 2006, Plaintiffs’ attorney inquired by email

with the CSC about the AOS applications after waiting more than thirty days past the processing

times posted on the CIS website. Id., ¶ 14 and Exs. D-1 through D-4. Plaintiffs themselves emailed

CSC with a status inquiry on January 19, 2006, to which the CSC Adjudications Officer responded

that the AOS applications were “still pending” because “USCIS is awaiting NAME CHECK results

from the FBI. It may have been a long time since we sent the name, but USCIS has no control of the

time it takes.” Id., ¶ 15 and Ex. E. 

Plaintiffs allege that according to the USCIS website, as of December 18, 2006, the CSC was

processing AOS applications filed September 14, 2006. Id., ¶ 13 and Ex. C. Defendants explain

that before rendering a decision on an AOS application, the USCIS, in conjunction with the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), conducts several forms of security and background checks to

ensure that the alien is eligible for the benefit sought and that he or she is not a risk to national

security or public safety. Mot. at 4; Herring Decl., ¶ 3; Cannon Decl., ¶ 4. Those security checks

include: (1) an FBI name check, which is run against FBI investigative databases compiled by law

enforcement agencies; (2) an FBI fingerprint check, which provides information relating to criminal

background within the United States; and (3) a check against the Interagency Border Inspection

System (IBIS), which contains records and information from more that twenty federal law

enforcement and intelligence agencies. Mot. at 4; Herring Decl., ¶ 4; Cannon Decl., ¶¶ 5-15.

Prior to filing suit, Plaintiffs pursued various avenues for obtaining information about their

AOS applications and/or pressuring the USCIS to adjudicate them. Plaintiffs have written to their

representatives in Congress, see Compl., Exs. F, G and J (correspondence with Rep. Eschoo and

Sen. Feinstein); contacted the FBI about the status of their name checks, id., Ex. H; and filed

requests under the Freedom of Information - Privacy Acts (“FOIPA”) with the FBI, id., Ex. I. 

Case 3:07-cv-00207-EDL Document 23 Filed 05/17/07 Page 2 of 10
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Plaintiffs filed this action on January 11, 2007, seeking mandamus relief in the form of “compelling

Defendants and their agents to make a determination of Plaintiffs Qionglin FU and Rong XIAO’s

application for adjustment of status.” Compl. at 8. Plaintiffs simply ask the Court to order the

agency to make a decision on their applications within a reasonable time, whether positive or

negative, not to order that their applications be granted.

II. Legal Standard

A. Mandamus Jurisdiction

“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is available to compel a federal official to

perform a duty only if: (1) the individual's claim is clear and certain; (2) the official's duty is

nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no other

adequate remedy is available.” Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1361

(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to

compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to

the plaintiff.”) 

B. APA Jurisdiction

To invoke jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), “a petitioner must

show that (1) an agency had a nondiscretionary duty to act and (2) the agency unreasonably delayed

in acting on that duty.” Gelfer v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 902382 at *1 (N.D. Cal., March 22, 2007)

(citing Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-65 (2004)). “Once a

petitioner has proven a right to relief under the circumstances, it is the reviewing court’s duty to

‘compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.’” Id., quoting 5 U.S.C. §

706(1). The APA provides:

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the

reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret

constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning

or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing

court shall–

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed; 

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1 For the view that courts do not have such jurisdiction, see Li v. Chertoff, __ F.Supp. 2d

__, 2007 WL 1098705 (S.D.Cal., April 2, 2007) (granting motion to dismiss upon finding sufficient

evidence to demonstrate that delay in adjudicating AOS application was not due to agency inaction, but

"to the time required to resolve all concerns of a law enforcement or national security nature;" and

holding that the USCIS is not required to act within a specified time period, but has wide discretion to

resolve matters within a reasonable time); Zheng v. Reno, 166 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879-880 (S.D.N.Y.,

2001) (granting summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to require the INS to schedule

an interview re: AOS application where court held that scheduling remains within the discretion of the

INS and delay of nine months was insufficient to support a colorable claim of abuse of discretion);

Mustafa v. Pasquerell, 2006 WL 488399 (W.D.Tex., January 10, 2006) (adopting view that mandamus

relief is unavailable for delay in adjustment application for immediate relative status). 

For the view that courts have jurisdiction to review the timing or pace of adjudicating

applications, see Elmalky v. Upchurch, 2007 WL 944330 (N.D.Tex., Mar 28, 2007) (1252(a)(2)(B) does

not preclude judicial review over non-discretionary actions); Duan v. Zamberry, 2007 WL 626116 at

*3 (W.D.Pa., Feb.23, 2007) (Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips the court of jurisdiction to review only

those decisions within the Attorney’s General discretion as specified in the statute, namely the decision

to adjust status, not the pace of application processing); Haidari v. Frazier, 2006 WL 3544922, at *4

(D.Minn., Dec.8, 2006) (distinguishing the discretionary decision of whether to grant or deny an

adjustment application from the mandatory duty to make any decision). 

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. . . 

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the

whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account

shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (emphasis added). The APA further provides that “[w]ith due regard for the

convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each

agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (emphasis added). 

“Section 706(1) empowers a court only to compel an agency ‘to perform a ministerial or

non-discretionary act,’ or ‘to take action upon a matter, without directing how it shall act.’” 

Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

III. Analysis

Plaintiffs assert that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1361, and under the APA. Defendants contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction to compel

a decision whether to grant or deny Plaintiff’s AOS applications, because that decision is

committed to the discretion of the Attorney General. Mot. at 7-8. There is a split of authority on

the issue of whether courts have jurisdiction to compel the Attorney General to adjudicate

immigration applications without unreasonable delay, compare Yu v. Brown, 36 F.Supp.2d 922

(D.N.M. 1999) with Safadi v. Howard, 466 F.Supp.2d 696 (E.D.Va. 2006).1

 This Court concludes

that the better reasoned view is that courts have jurisdiction at a minimum under the APA because

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Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to process the AOS applications within a reasonable

time, as distinct from its discretionary authority of whether to grant or deny the applications. See

Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *2. In Gelfer, the court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction

under the APA to review the USCIS’ delay in adjudicating the petitioner’s AOS application. Like

Plaintiffs here, prior to filing suit some 16 months after submitting her AOS application, Gelfer

made numerous inquiries about her I-485 AOS application, and was told that the USCIS was

waiting for a name check from the FBI. Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *1. There, as here, the USCIS

conceded that it had a nondiscretionary duty to process the AOS application, but argued that it had

discretion over when to decide whether to approve or deny the application. Id. at *2. See Reply at

4 (“although the governing statute for adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, provides a right to

adjudication of the adjustment application, it does not prescribe a time certain for such

adjudication”). The statute governing adjustment to permanent residence status provides as

follows:

The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into

the United States or the status of any other alien having an approved

petition for classification as a VAWA [Violence Against Women Act]

self-petitioner may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his

discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an

alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes

an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an

immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent

residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at

the time his application is filed.

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 

Gelfer held that the USCIS has “a statutorily prescribed duty to adjudicate petitioner’s

application ‘within a reasonable time’ under 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), while giving wide berth to an

agency’s determination as to what time period is reasonable.” Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *2

(citing Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 932 (D.N.M. 1999). In Yu, the court held that the

predecessor agency has a non-discretionary duty to process immigration applications, and that the

APA imposes a duty to adjudicate those applications within a reasonable time. 36 F. Supp. 2d at

931-932. The court concluded that the delay of two and a half years in processing the named

plaintiff’s application for “Special Immigrant Juvenile Status” and for adjustment to lawful

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The immigration regulations governing adjustment of status to permanent residence

provide that “[t]he applicant shall be notified of the decision of the director and, if the

application is denied, the reasons for the denial. . . . If the application is approved, the

applicant's permanent residence shall be recorded as of the date of the order approving the

adjustment of status.” 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(5).

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permanent resident was unreasonable on its face, and denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds

that the court had subject matter jurisdiction under the APA and that the plaintiffs had established a

prima facie case for mandatory injunctive relief. Id. at 932-933. 

This Court agrees with the court in Gelfer that to allow the USCIS “a limitless amount of

time to adjudicate petitioner’s application would be contrary to the ‘reasonable time’ frame

mandated under 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) and, ultimately, could negate the USCIS’s duty under 8 C.F.R.

245.2(a)(5).2” Id. This Court also concurs that simply asserting a need to await results of an FBI

name check does not suffice to show the delay was reasonable as a matter of law. Id. Like the

court in Gelfer, the court need not reach the question of whether mandamus jurisdiction existed

because the APA suffices. Id. at *3 (citing Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507

(9th Cir. 1997) (electing analysis of mandamus relief on claims of agency delay under the APA

rather than Section 1361 and affirming denial of mandamus relief on summary judgment)). See

also Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 2007); Razaq v. Poulos, 2007 WL

61884 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 2007) (denying summary judgment on reasonableness of delay in

processing the petitioner’s application for “immediate relative” status); Aboushaban v. Mueller,

2006 WL 3041086 (N.D.Cal., Oct. 24, 2006) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

and ordering USCIS to complete its adjudication of his AOS application after eight-year delay). 

Thus, this Court concludes that Defendants have a ministerial duty to act on Plaintiffs’ AOS

applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, within a reasonable time under 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). 

Whether the delay alleged here of over three years was reasonable cannot be determined on a

motion to dismiss. “What constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of immigration

applications depends to a great extent on the facts of the particular case.” Yu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at

934. Here, the government argues generally that the USCIS has been working on Plaintiffs’

applications, and implies that the delay is out of their hands to the extent that they rely on the FBI

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to conduct the name check for background clearance. Reply at 2. However, the Defendant

Attorney General oversees both USCIS and the FBI, so shifting the onus to the FBI does not show

timeliness. See Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *2 (the USCIS had not pointed “to a single action

taken during that period of time [of two years] to further the processing of petitioner’s application

or a reason why petitioner’s application is particularly troublesome”). While Defendants point to a

backlog, that does not by itself show, as a matter of law, that the delay in processing Plaintiffs’

applications is reasonable to prevail on a motion to dismiss.

Defendants argue further that a provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes

relief:

(B) Denials of discretionary relief

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or

nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other

habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title,

and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of

whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal

proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review--

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief

under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or

1255 [adjustment of status] of this title, or

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney

General or the Secretary of Homeland Security

the authority for which is specified under this

subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney

General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,

other than the granting of relief under section

1158(a) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). In Safadi, the court construed this language broadly to

preclude judicial review of any discretionary decision or action of the USCIS, holding that this

statute encompassed “the entire process of reviewing an adjustment application, including the

completion of background and security check and the pace at which the process proceeds.” 466

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3 The Safadi court noted that it was not presented with a case where the USCIS “refused

altogether to process an adjustment application or where the delay [4 years] was so unreasonable as to

be tantamount to a refusal to process the application.” Id. at 700. Thus, although Safadi read the statute

broadly, even that court did not foreclose the possibility of judicial review of outright refusal or its

equivalent due to patently unreasonable delay.

8

F.Supp. 2d at 699.3 Accord Grinberg v. Swacina, 478 F.Supp.2d 1350 (S.D.Fla., March 20, 2007)

(presumption in favor of judicial review overcome by express provisions of Section 1252(a)(2)(B),

precluding review of five-year delay in processing I-485 adjustment applications); Serrano v.

Quarantillo, 2007 WL 1101434 (D.N.J., April 9, 2007) (no jurisdiction to review delay on

adjustment of status, which is within Attorney General’s discretion under Section 1255 and

precluded from judicial review under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)). 

This Court is not persuaded by the reasoning of Safadi. The plain language of the provision

on which it relied addresses “decision or action” on immigration matters, not inaction, which is the

subject of the Complaint. Iddir v. I.N.S., 301 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2002). This Court agrees with

Duan v. Zamberry that adopting Safadi’s reading of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would render

“toothless all timing restraints, including those imposed by the APA,” which would “amount to a

grant of permission for inaction.” 2007 WL 626116 at *3 (W.D.Pa., Feb.23, 2007). Further, the

Safadi court’s reliance on the fact that the statute had been amended in 2005 to suggest that the

statute should be construed to reflect the heightened security concerns in the post 9/11 world, 466

F.Supp. 2d at 700-01, overlooks the fact that the “any other decision or action” provision on which

it relied was not added to Section 1252(a)(2)(B) by the 2005 amendment, but predated September

11, 2001. Rather, the 2005 amendment added the following language: “(statutory or nonstatutory),

including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and

1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252, Historical and

Statutory Notes, Amendments. 

In Iddir, the Seventh Circuit considered this statute as it existed before it was amended in

2005: 

Section 1252(a)(2)(B) provides: “Notwithstanding any other

provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review - (i) any

judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1255 of

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4 Section § 1252(g) provides as follows:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall

have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the

decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or

execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter. 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

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this title, or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney

General the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to

be in the discretion of the Attorney General ....” 

302 F.3d at 496 (emphasis added). Faced with statutory language identical to the current version

considered in Safadi, the Seventh Circuit held that “section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), by its use of the terms

‘judgment’ and ‘decision or action,’ only bars review of actual discretionary decisions to grant or

deny relief under the enumerated sections, including section 1255.” At issue in Iddir were

applications for permanent resident visas through the lottery program, which the INS failed to

process before the statutory time period expired. The Seventh Circuit held that the court had

jurisdiction to review denial of the application on grounds of expiration because that denial did not

constitute either a “judgment” or a discretionary “decision or action,” unlike an award or denial of

relief on the merits, which would likely be covered by section 1252(a)(2)(B). 302 F.3d at 498. 

This Court finds the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning persuasive and more faithful to the statutory

language.

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the specific issue of subject matter jurisdiction over

delays in processing adjustment applications, but has ruled that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “applies

only to acts over which a statute gives the Attorney General pure discretion unguided by legal

standards or statutory guidelines,” and does not bar review of the denial of a motion to reopen

removal proceedings. Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 528 (9th Cir.2004). The Ninth

Circuit reasoned that “[b]ecause 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) neither grants nor limits the Attorney

General's discretion to deny motions to reopen, [it] can perhaps be said to have left such authority

to the Attorney General by default. But default authority does not constitute the specification

required by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Id. In Yu, on which Gelfer, Singh, and Razaq rely, the court

considered the jurisdictional limits in Section 1252(g),4

 but not Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). In view

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of the principle that “exceptions to judicial review of agency action under the APA are narrowly

construed,” the court held that by limiting judicial review of “removal orders,” the statute

specifically left intact judicial review of all other matters properly before the Court. Yu, 36

F.Supp.2d at 933-34. Though not specifically addressing the limitations on judicial review in

Section 1252(a)(2)(B), Yu reflects the principle that “‘the discretion giving rise to the jurisdictional

bar must be “specified” by statute. In other words, “the language of the statute in question must

provide the discretionary authority” before the bar can have any effect.’” Khan v. United States,

448 F.3d 226, 232-33 (3rd Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). As the court in Duan observed, “[t]he

weight of authority ... supports a finding that Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to process

or adjudicate an adjustment application.” 2007 WL 626116 at *3.

Applying the test articulated in Gelfer for relief under the APA, (1) Defendants have a

nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ AOS applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, and

to do so within a reasonable time pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 555(b); and (2) Plaintiffs have made a

prima facie showing that the USCIS unreasonably delayed in acting on that duty for the past 3 years

and 4 months. Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at * 1. The Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction

to determine whether Defendants have unreasonably delayed action on Plaintiffs’ AOS

applications. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 

As the mandamus relief sought under the APA is essentially the same as mandamus under

Section 1361, it is unnecessary to apply the test for traditional mandamus relief. See Independence

Mining, 105 F.3d at 507, n.6 (“we question the applicability of the traditional mandamus remedy

under the MVA [28 U.S.C. § 1361] where there is an adequate remedy under the APA”). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. As the parties

stipulated at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties shall file simultaneous cross-motions

for summary judgment by May 15, 2007, to be heard on June 26, 2007.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2007 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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