Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00197/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00197-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WESLEY C. JONES, :

AIS 205738,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs. CA 07-0197-KD-C

:

JERRY FERRELL,

 :

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Wesley C. Jones, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for the

entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and Local Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant petition be

dismissed as time barred under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act’s one-year limitations provision contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jones was convicted in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,

Alabama on June 9, 1999 of first-degree robbery. (Doc. 13, Case Action

Summary Sheet) On July 9, 1999, petitioner was sentenced to a thirty-year

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 1 of 19
2

term of imprisonment. (Id.) Jones gave oral notice of appeal at his sentencing.

(Id.)

2. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Jones’

conviction and sentence by memorandum opinion entered on January 28,

2000. (Doc. 13, January 28, 2000 MEMORANDUM)

Jones’s appellate counsel has filed a “no merit” brief in

substantial compliance with Anders v. Califronia, 386 U.S. 738,

87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which counsel states

that, upon review of the record, he can find no meritorious

issues upon which to base an appeal. Jones was afforded an

opportunity to raise additional pro se issues to his counsel and

with this court, but has not done so.

We have reviewed the record and can find no basis for

reversing the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, we find that

an appeal of this matter would be wholly frivolous. The trial

court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

(Id.) The certificate of final judgment of affirmance was issued by the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on February 15, 2000 and received by the

trial court on February 18, 2000. (Doc. 13, Case Action Summary Sheet, Entry

for February 18, 2000)

3. On March 27, 2000, Jones filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit

Court of Mobile County, Alabama, collaterally attacking his conviction and

sentence. (Doc. 13, MEMORANDUM Dated May 18, 2001) The Rule 32

petition was summarily denied by the trial court on November 21, 2000;

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 2 of 19
3

petitioner filed written notice of appeal on December 15, 2000. (See id., Case

Action Summary Sheet Entries for November 21, 2000 and December 15,

2000) The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

summary denial of the collateral petition by memorandum opinion dated May

18, 2001. (Doc. 13, May 18, 2001 MEMORANDUM) 

Wesley Cornelius Jones appeals the circuit court’s

summary denial of his Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for

postconviction relief, in which he attacked his 1999 conviction

for robbery in the first degree and his resulting sentence of 30

years’ imprisonment.

...

Jones raises the following three claims on appeal:

Claim 1: That the trial court erred in denying

his petition without making specific

findings of fact relating to each

issue presented.

Claim 2: That his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to preserve

for direct appeal instances of trial

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.

Claim 3: That his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to use a prior

inconsistent statement made by a

witness for the State to impeach

that witness’s testimony at trial.

(R.20.) Jones presented several additional claims in his petition,

but failed to present those claims again on appeal. We note that

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 3 of 19
4

those claims that Jones presented in his petition but does not

pursue on appeal are deemed to be abandoned. See, e.g.,

Brownlee v. State, 666 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.) (holding

that “[w]e will not review issues not listed and argued in brief”).

In addition, with regard to Claim 1, as set out above, because

Jones did not raise this issue in the circuit court, it is deemed to

be waived. See Whitehead v. State, 593 So.2d 126

(Ala.Crim.App. 1991). Moreover, we note that a circuit court is

not required to make specific findings of fact, or even to state its

reasons for denying a petition, when, as here, the petition is

summarily denied under Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P. See

Fincher v. State, 724 So.2d 87 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998); and

Bowers v. State, 709 So.2d 494 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995).

I.

Jones contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing to preserve for review on direct appeal (in a motion

for a new trial) specific claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel (Claim 2 above). However, the record reflects that

Jones’s appellate counsel did not receive a copy of the trial

transcript until after the expiration of the 30-day jurisdictional

time limit for filing a motion for a new trial had lapsed. See Rule

24, Ala.R.Crim.P. Jones was sentenced on July 9, 1999, and his

appellate counsel was appointed that same day. However, the

first portion of the trial transcript was not filed until August 23,

1999, well over 30 days after the pronouncement of his

sentence. Thus, Jones’s appellate counsel could not be

ineffective in this regard.

II.

Jones contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to impeach identification testimony given at the trial by

William B. Sellers, a state’s witness, through the use of the

allegedly inconsistent prior statement made by Sellers to police

officers on the date of the robbery (Claim 3 above).

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 4 of 19
5

In his brief on appeal, Jones argues that had Sellers been

impeached by trial counsel, it could have caused the jury to

discredit the portion of Sellers’s testimony that placed Jones at

the scene of the robbery. Jones argues that had the jury

discredited Sellers’s testimony, the only testimony which

corroborated that given by an accomplice, he would not have

been convicted. We disagree. From the record, it does appear

that trial counsel did not question Sellers about any

inconsistencies existing between the statement he gave to police

and the testimony he gave at the trial. However, it is also clear

from the record that the two statements were not inconsistent. In

his initial statement to the police, Sellers indicated that, while

pursuing the robbers immediately after the robbery, he saw a

black male standing beside a car, which he believed to be a red

Ford Thunderbird. At trial, Sellers identified Jones as the black

male, and testified that he was familiar with the red Thunderbird

because he had seen Jones driving it many times. Therefore,

Jones argues that Sellers’s trial testimony was inconsistent with

his statement, and that Sellers should have impeached on those

grounds. However, Jones fails to acknowledge that, subsequent

to the robbery, Sellers was shown a photo lineup from which he

identified Jones as the man whom he had observed standing by

the red Thunderbird on the night of the robbery. (R. 170.)

Furthermore, we note that it was reasonable for defense

counsel to elect not to impeach Sellers in order to prove that

Jones was not present at the time of the robbery, because that

would have been inconsistent with a police statement and trial

testimony given by Jones. In his statement, Jones admitted that

he was present during the robbery and knew about it beforehand,

but denied any participation. Again at trial, while testifying in

his own behalf, Jones admitted that he had been present during

the robbery, but denied any prior knowledge of his brother’s

intent to perpetrate the robbery, and denied that he received any

of the money that was stolen.

Based on the foregoing, we are convinced that trial

counsel’s failure to impeach Sellers with his prior statement did

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 5 of 19
1 Jones’ motion to dismiss was granted on March 6, 2003, and his habeas corpus

petition was dismissed without prejudice to allow him to exhaust state court remedies. (See id.,

Docs. 14-16)

6

not constitute ineffective assistance because there was no valid

impeachment evidence. Moreover, Sellers’ testimony placing

Jones at the scene of the robbery was merely cumulative to

Jones’s own testimony at trial. Therefore, Jones has not shown

that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his

trial counsel attempted to impeach Sellers’s testimony.

(Id.) The certificate of final judgment of affirmance was issued by the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on June 5, 2001 and received by the trial

court on June 12, 2001. (Doc. 13, Case Action Summary Sheet, Entry for June

12, 2001)

4. Jones filed a petition seeking habeas corpus relief in this Court

on October 22, 2002. Jones v. Culliver, CA 02-0779-CG-M. On February 13,

2003, Jones filed a motion to dismiss his habeas corpus petition without

prejudice. (See id., Doc. 13)1

5. On February 14, 2003, Jones filed his second Rule 32 petition

in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama collaterally attacking his

conviction and sentence. (Doc. 13, Case Action Summary Sheet, Entry for

February 14, 2003) The trial court summarily dismissed the petition on

February 21, 2003. (Doc. 13, ORDER of February 21, 2003)

Petitioner contends that his sentence of 30 years in prison

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 6 of 19
7

for robbery first degree is excessive because the indictment

charges only robbery in the third degree. He claims that the

indictment is void as to robbery first degree for failing to allege

serious physical injury and that the court was without

jurisdiction to render judgment or impose sentence. The claim

is utterly without merit. The indictment properly charges

robbery in the first degree and the sentence is within the lawful

range of punishment for the offense.

Accordingly, this Court is authorized to summarily

dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing or a response

from the State for failure [to] plead a right to relief, Rule 32.3,

failure to plead allegations with specificity, Rule 32.6(b), failure

to state a claim, Rule 32.7(d), and for having raised no material

issue of fact or law. Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P.; Bishop v.

State, 608 So.2d 345, 347-348 (Ala. 1992), adopting Bishop v.

State, 592 So.2d 664, 665-667 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Tatum v.

State, 607 So.2d 383, 384 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992).

(Id.) Jones filed written notice of appeal on March 28, 2003. (Doc. 13,

NOTICE OF APPEAL) On May 9, 2003 petitioner was advised that his case

would “be dismissed for failure to prosecute the appeal” if his brief was not

filed by May 23, 2003. (Doc. 13, ORDER of May 9, 2003) Jones did not file

his appellate brief by the stated deadline; therefore, the appellate court entered

a certified judgment of dismissal on June 5, 2003 (Doc. 13, CERTIFICATE

OF JUDGMENT Dated June 5, 2003)

6. On February 5, 2007, Jones filed a petition seeking habeas

corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama. (See Doc. 6, Attachment, FORM FOR

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 7 of 19
8

USE IN APPLICATIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §

2254, at 7 (application signed by Jones on February 5, 2007)) The Middle

District of Alabama transferred the case to this Court on March 14, 2007. (See

Doc. 6)

7. On June 27, 2007, petitioner filed a cross-answer (Doc. 16) in

response to this Court’s order to show cause dated June 22, 2007 (Doc. 15, at

2 (“[P]etitioner shall SHOW CAUSE not later than July 20, 2007, as to why

this cause of action should not be dismissed based on the [petitioner’s] failure

to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).”)) and amended that cross-answer

on July 3, 2007 (Doc. 17).

Clearly the record in and of itself will reflect that the petitioner

DID FILE THIS PETITION IN COMPLIANCE WITH

THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE TIME TOLLING. The

matter before this court is that the petitioner did not and could

not properly represent his liberty interest as he did not have

knowledge of any alternative thus, indirectly would again raise

another JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT, in that the “witnesses

(sic) confession that he could not identify the petitioner”

violated the color of Constitutional law and again is not

barred by [the] time frame established in Post-conviction

rule 32.

(Id. at 1; see also Doc. 16 (substantially the same argument)) 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 8 of 19
9

1. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) was enacted on April 24, 1996 and, pertinent to this case, added

a new subdivision to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 providing for a one-year period of

limitations within which state prisoners must file their habeas corpus petitions

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 158

F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998) cert. denied sub nom. Wilcox v. Moore, 531

U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 103, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of— 

 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 9 of 19
10

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

2. Subsections (B), (C), and (D) of § 2244(d)(1) clearly do not

apply to petitioner’s case and therefore, the timeliness of Jones’ petition must

be calculated under § 2244(d)(1)(A) based upon the date on which his firstdegree robbery conviction became final. “For prisoners whose convictions

became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the one-year statute

of limitations instituted by the AEDPA began to run on its effective date, i.e.,

April 24, 1996.” Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d

683 (2000). This rule from Guenther is obviously not applicable in this case

since Jones’ conviction became final in 2000.

3. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) specifically provides that the one-year

limitations period will run from “the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such

review[.]” On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

Jones’ conviction and sentence by memorandum opinion on January 28, 2000.

Jones did not file an application for rehearing nor did he request certiorari

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 10 of 19
2 Under Alabama law, “[a]n application for rehearing and the brief in support of the

application must be filed with the clerk of the appropriate appellate court within 14 days (2

weeks) of the date the decision being questioned is issued[.]” Ala.R.App.P. 40(c). The filing of

an application for rehearing is a prerequisite for certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme

Court. Ala.R.App.P. 40(d)(1) (“In all criminal cases except pretrial appeals by the state, the

filing of an application for rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is a prerequisite

to certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court.”). Jones’ failure to file an application for

rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and, thereafter, to seek certiorari review by

the Alabama Supreme Court prevented the court of last resort in Alabama from considering his

direct appeal; therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States clearly would have been unable

to consider Jones’ case on direct review. See Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir.

2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States may grant a writ of certiorari to review the final

judgment of ‘the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.’ . . . A defendant has

90 days from the judgment of the state court of last resort to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

in the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . In the absence of a clear statutory or

constitutional bar to higher state court review . . . the Supreme Court requires petitioners to seek

review in the state’s highest court before filing a petition for writ of certiorari.”). 

11

review of his conviction and sentence in the Alabama Supreme Court.2 The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of judgment on

February 15, 2000; therefore, his conviction became final on that date. Brown

v. Hooks, 176 Fed. Appx. 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2006) (“On March 23, 2001, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. Brown did not

petition for certiorari review in the Alabama Supreme Court, and his

conviction became final on April 10, 2001, when the Certificate of Judgment

issued.”); see also Ala.R.Crim.P. 41(a) (“The certificate of judgment of the

court shall issue 18 days after the entry of judgment” unless a timely

application for rehearing is filed.); see Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201,

1202 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Bridges pled guilty to terroristic threats, aggravated

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 11 of 19
3 This Court recognizes that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations “allows a

prisoner the time to seek direct review in the Supreme Court of the United States.” Pugh, supra,

12

assault and stalking charges, and was sentenced to 26 years’ imprisonment on

November 12, 1996. He did not appeal his convictions and sentences, but he

did request that his sentence be reviewed by a sentence review panel, pursuant

to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6. . . . As provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), his

judgment became final on the date that the time for seeking direct review

expired; this date was not affected by his application for sentence review,

because an application for sentence review is not a part of the direct appeal

process under Georgia law. . . . Accordingly, Bridges’ judgment of conviction

became final on December 21, 1996, the date on which his 30-day right to

appeal the November 21, 1996 judgment expired.”); Tinker v. Moore, 255

F.3d 1331, 1332 & 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Tinker was convicted on the

robbery charge, and on January 29, 1997, the Third District Court of Appeal

affirmed his conviction. . . . The mandate issued on February 14, 1997. . . .

Under Florida law, a judgment against a criminal defendant becomes final

upon issuance of the mandate on his direct appeal. . . . Tinker’s mandate

issued on February 14, 1997, and thus he had until February 13, 1998, to file

his § 2254 petition, absent tolling of the limitations period.”), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 1144, 122 S.Ct. 1101, 151 L.Ed.2d 997 (2002).3

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 12 of 19
465 F.3d at 1299; see also Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 774 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Appellant was

entitled to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court within 90 days

of the entry of the judgment against him by the Florida Supreme Court. Sup.Ct.R. 13.1. The

statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) should not have begun to run until this 90-day

window had expired. Appellant’s state judgment became final on December 13, 1996, when the

Florida Supreme Court denied Appellant’s motion for a rehearing. The statute of limitations

should have begun to run, therefore, on March 17, 1997.”). However, in those instances, as here,

where a petitioner is not entitled to seek review in the Supreme Court of the United States, he is

not entitled to benefit of the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court, Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (“Unless otherwise provided by law, a petition for writ of

certiorari to review a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by a state court of last

resort . . . is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after the entry of

the judgment. A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state

court that is subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is

filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.”); 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which

a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where . . .

any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the

treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.”).

See Pugh, 465 F.3d at 1299-1300. As previously established, Jones did not seek direct review of

his conviction and sentence in the state court of last resort, that is, the Alabama Supreme Court;

therefore, he was not entitled to seek direct review in the United States Supreme Court. See id.

Jones’ conviction became final when the certificate of judgment issued from the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals on February 15, 2000, Brown, supra, and this Court need not add to that

final judgment date the 90 days contemplated in Supreme Court Rule 13.1, compare Pugh, 465

F.3d at 1299-1300 with Tinker, supra, 255 F.3d at 1332 & 1333.

13

4. Jones’ one-year period of limitations under AEDPA began to

run on February 15, 2000. Petitioner filed his first Rule 32 petition

collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence in the Circuit Court of

Mobile County, Alabama on March 27, 2000, some forty (40) days after his

conviction became final. The statute of limitations, therefore, was tolled until

June 5, 2001 (Doc. 13, CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT Dated June 5,

2001), when the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued its certificate of

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 13 of 19
4 That petition was dismissed without prejudice, at Jones’ request, on March 6,

2003, to enable the petitioner to exhaust further state remedies. The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals entered a certified judgment of dismissal on June 5, 2003, dismissing Jones’ appeal of

the summary denial of his second Rule 32 petition due to his failure to file an appellate brief. It

14

final judgment of affirmance, affirming the trial court’s summary denial of

Jones’ Rule 32 petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this section.”); Guenther,

supra, 173 F.3d at 1331 (“‘The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period

of limitation in [subsection (d)].’”) cf. Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227

(11th Cir. 2000) (“We agree with the Tenth and Fifth Circuits that the time

during which a petition for writ of certiorari is pending, or could have been

filed, following the denial of collateral relief in the state courts, is not to be

subtracted from the running of time for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) statute of

limitations purposes.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129, 148

L.Ed.2d 995 (2001). Petitioner did not file his first federal habeas corpus

petition in this Court until October 22, 2002, more than five months after the

one-year limitations period ran.4

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 14 of 19
was not until more than three and one-half years later, on February 7, 2007, that Jones filed the

present habeas corpus attack on his first-degree robbery conviction. 

5 Petitioner appears to be confusing the statute of limitations set forth in AEDPA

with the limitations period set forth in Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. (See

Docs. 16 & 17) 

15

5. Jones summarily contends that the record reflects that he “DID

FILE THIS PETITION IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUETIME TOLLING.” (Doc. 17) As the foregoing

discussion establishes, however, petitioner did not, in fact, timely file his

federal habeas corpus attack in this Court.5

 Nevertheless, the undersigned will

consider whether the doctrine of equitable tolling has any application in this

case.

6. Recent decisions of the Eleventh Circuit have clearly embraced

the doctrine of equitable tolling with regard to the one-year limitations period

at issue: “Equitable tolling is to be applied when ‘”extraordinary

circumstances” have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from

timely filing his petition.’ . . . Thus, the petitioner must show both

extraordinary circumstances and due diligence in order to be entitled to

equitable tolling.” Diaz v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 362 F.3d

698, 700-701 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Section 2244 is a statute of

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable tolling

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 15 of 19
16

‘when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that

are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.’” Steed v.

Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Thus, the oneyear limitations provision need not be equitably tolled unless there is evidence

that “extraordinary circumstances” beyond petitioner’s control made it

impossible for him to file his petition on time. See Miller v. New Jersey State

Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-619 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“[E]quitable

tolling is proper only when the ‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid

application [of a limitation period] unfair.’ . . . Generally, this will occur when

the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way . . . been prevented from

asserting his or her rights.’ . . . The petitioner must show that he or she

‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims.’ .

. . Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient.”); Calderon v. United States

District Court for the Central District of California, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997) (“Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”),

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, 118 S.Ct. 899, 139 L.Ed.2d 884 (1998) and cert.

denied sub nom. Beeler v. Calderon, 523 U.S. 1061, 118 S.Ct. 1389, 140

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 16 of 19
6 Even if he was so inclined, petitioner cannot argue that this Court should have

advised him of the one-year statute of limitations when it granted his motion to voluntarily

17

L.Ed.2d 648 (1998). 

7. As aforesaid, petitioner has failed to establish that the instant

habeas corpus petition was timely filed. Moreover, Jones has not established

that extraordinary circumstances and due diligence counsel equitable tolling

of the limitations period. See Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th

Cir. 2007) (“‘The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary

remedy plainly rests with the petitioner[.]’”). Tellingly, petitioner makes no

argument that he was ignorant of the one-year limitations period or that he

was unaware of the fact that this time period had run by the time he filed his

first habeas corpus petition in this Court on October 22, 2002. It is apparent

to the undersigned that nothing other than petitioner’s own lack of due

diligence is responsible for the untimeliness of the filing of the instant

petition, as well as his first federal petition. This is simply not one of those

rare cases in which principles of equitable tolling can save petitioner from

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. 

 8. Petitioner did not file his first habeas corpus petition until

October 22, 2002, over five months after the one-year limitations period

expired.6

 Needless to say, therefore, his present habeas corpus petition, filed

Case 1:07-cv-00197-KD-C Document 18 Filed 08/16/07 Page 17 of 19
dismiss his first federal petition in March of 2003, see Diaz, supra, 362 F.3d at 701-702, because

the limitations period had already run by the time he filed his first federal petition on October 22,

2002.

18

February 5, 2007, more than four years after the one-year limitations period

expired, is due to be dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d).

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the instant petition be

dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 16th day of August, 2007.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A), by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation’ within ten days after being served with a copy of the

recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The

statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting

party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection,

a brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief

may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support

of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may

be deemed an abandonment of the objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay

the cost of the transcript.

_s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY_______ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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