Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05082/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05082-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United Stares Couft of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 11991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

HARRY ROBINSON and KAY ROBINSON, ) 

EVA MAY McCARTHY and GEORGE SAMUEL ) 

ROBINSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) No. 90-5082 

vs. ) 

) 

VOLKSWAGENWERK AG, ) 

) 

Defendant, ) 

) 

GREER & GREER, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee, ) 

) 

and HERZFELD & RUBIN, P.C., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. Nos. 88-C-367-E & 88-C-1435-E) 

Herbert Rubin (and Daniel v. Gsovski, Herzfeld & Rub-in, New York, 

New York, Richard M. Eldridge & John F. Tucker, Rhodes, 

Hieronymous, Jones, Tucker & Gable, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on 

the brief) for Defendant-Appellant. 

Thomas Elke, Palo Alto, California (Ronald D. Mercaldo & Lucille 

D. Sherman, Law Offices of Ronald D. Mercaldo, Ltd., Tucson, 

Arizona, Winton D. Woods, Tucson, Arizona, Maynard I. Ungerman, 

Ungerman & Iola, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for 

Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Jack Redhair (and Nancy Coomer, Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Redhair, 

Tucson, Arizona, with him on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 1 
Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and KANE, 

District Judge.** 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C. (H&R) appeals from 

an interlocutory order of ,the district court denying a motion to 

dismiss and a motion for summary judgment filed by itself and 

defendant Volkswagenwerk AG (VWAG). See V R. doc. 199 (Amended 

Order filed Apr. 25, 1990). Normally, our jurisdiction under 28 

u.s.c. § 1291 extends only to final orders. Appellant H&R 

correctly maintains that we have jurisdiction based on the 

collateral order doctrine as applied to a denial of absolute 

immunity. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982); 

Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979); Abney v. United 

States, 431 U.S. 651, 657-63 (1977); Cohen v. Beneficial Loan 

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-547 (1949). Appellant also urges us to 

exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over several interlocutory 

rulings of the district court pertaining to the merits of the 

controversy. See Snell v. Tunnellr 920 F.2d 673, 676 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1622 (1991). 

This case has a protracted history which we need not detail 

other than to say that the plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in 

obtaining relief for injuries suffered in a tragic automobile 

accident. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 

** The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge, sitting by designation. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 2 
286 (1980); Robinson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 803 F.2d 572 

(10th Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union 

Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1984). In its 

present incarnation, plaintiffs include claims for negligence, 

strict products liability, and breach of warranty. See I R. doc. 

142 at~~ 97-100 (count I). The district court has ruled that 

these claims will not be relitigated given the previous adverse 

final judgment. See I R. doc. 64 at 3; V R. doc. 199 at 3. Also 

included is a malpractice claim against plaintiffs' previous trial 

counsel, defendant Greer & Greer (G&G). IR. doc. 142 at 

11~ 103-07 (count III) . Plaintiffs also claim that defendant VWAG 

is liable for fraud in connection with H&R's answers to 

interrogatories and representations at trial. I R. doc. 142 at 

1111 108-09 (count IV). In this same regard, plaintiffs also claim 

that H&R is independently liable for fraud in its litigation 

conduct. Id. at ~11 101-02 (count II), 108-09 (count IV) . 

According to plaintiffs, H&R fraudulently concealed the true 

relationship among VWAG and Audi NSU and Auto Union from the 

plaintiffs, thereby precluding the plaintiffs from using critical 

liability evidence against VWAG and collecting damages. G&G has 

crossclaimed against defendants H&R and VWAG based on the same 

theories. 

H&R claims that it is absolutely immune from civil liability 

for damages based upon its discovery and courtroom conduct in the 

previous trial. The district court rejected this theory, stating 

that "any immunity that might attach to a private attorney's 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 3 
conduct does not attach to the conduct alleged in this case to be 

fraudulent." V R. doc. 199 at 4. Our review of the district 

court's legal determination on absolute immunity is de novo. See 

Snell, 920 F.2d at 694. Given the sparing recognition of absolute 

immunity by both the Supreme Court and this court, one claiming 

such immunity must demonstrate clear entitlement. See Burns v. 

Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1944-45 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 

U.S. 219, 230 (1988); Snell, 920 F.2d at 692-93; Rex v. Teeples, 

753 F.2d 840, 843-44 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 

(1985); Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 440 (10th Cir. 1983). 

In resolving absolute immunity claims, the Supreme Court has 

taken a functional approach after considering the history of 

common law immunity. See, -~, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 

334-35, 345 (1983) (absolute immunity for witnesses). Relevant 

factors include the recognition of immunity at common law, the 

risk of vexatious litigation given the function involved, and the 

availability of checks other than civil litigation if absolute 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 4 
. 't . d 1 unmuni y was recognize • Burns, 111 s. Ct. at 1941-44; Mitchell 

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1985). In this case, however, 

the absolute immunity precedent indicates that H&R's claim of 

absolute immunity would not be recognized at common law; we need 

proceed no further. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922-23 

(1984); Burns, 111 s. Ct. at 1945 (Scalia, J., concurring in 

judgment in part and dissenting in part) (common law tradition of 

immunity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 

absolute immunity in§ 1983 actions). 

Concerning suits by litigants other than an attorney's own 

client, the general rule is that: 

[i]f an attorney is actuated by malicious motives 

or shares the illegal motives of his client, he may be 

personally liable with the client for damage suffered by 

a third person as a result of the attorney's actions. 

7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law§ 235 at 275 (1980 & 1991 Supp.). 

1 Employing this approach, the Supreme Court has held that a 

judge is absolutely immune from civil damages, unless he or she 

acts without a colorable claim of jurisdiction. Stump v. 

SparJanan, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 

547, 553-55 (1967). Acting in an administrative capacity, 

however, a judge does not enjoy the protection of absolute 

immunity. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230. Likewise, a prosecutor is 

absolutely immune from civil liability for activities which are 

"intimately associated with the judicial process" such as 

initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, but is not 

absolutely immune for activities which are administrative or 

investigative. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 n.16 (1982). Thus, a 

prosecutor has absolute immunity for controlling the presentation 

of evidence at trial and participating in a probable cause 

hearing, but not for providing legal advice to the police. Burns, 

111 S. Ct. at 1944-45; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 5 
Accord Anderson v. Canaday, 131 P. 697, 699-700 (Okla. 1913). 2 

Our research suggests that only in a narrow class of cases 

involving defamation claims has the Supreme Court acknowledged a 

common law tradition of absolute immunity for private lawyers. 

The Supreme Court recently discussed the concept in further 

defining the scope of absolute immunity for prosecutors. 

Like witnesses, prosecutors and other lawyers were 

absolutely immune from damages liability at common law 

for making false or defamatory statements in judicial 

proceedings (at least so long as the statements were 

related to the proceeding), and also for eliciting false 

and defamatory testimony from witnesses. See, ~, 

Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 401-402 (CA2 1926), 

summarily aff 'd, 275 U.S. 503, 48 s. Ct. 155, 72 L. Ed. 

395 (1927); Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 219-220, 47 

N.E. 265 (1897); Griffith v. Slinkard, 46 Ind. 117, 122, 

44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (1896); Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N.Y. 

309, 312-313 (1872); Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358 

(1855); Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193, 197-198 (1841). See 

also King v. Skinner, Lofft 55, 56, 98 Eng. Rep. 529, 

530 (K.B. 1772), where Lord Mansfield observed that 

"neither party, witness, counsel, Jury, or Judge can be 

put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken 

in office." 

Burns, 111 s. Ct. at 1941. See also Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 

(citing King v. Skinner); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 

(1978); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421-24 (discussing Yaselli and 

Griffith). 

2 In Oklahoma, 

[a]n attorney is not oridinarily liable for the 

acts of his client. The fact that through 

ignorance he gives his client bad advice, on which 

he acts to the hurt of another, will not make the 

attorney liable to that other. But where the 

attorney is actuated by malicious motives or shares 

the illegal objectives of his client he becomes 

responsible. 

Anderson, 131 P. at 699-700. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 6 
We have reviewed the cases cited by the Supreme Court and 

must conclude that while absolute immunity might be afforded 

government lawyers on these claims, such immunity is not available 

for a private law firm. The cases relied upon by the Supreme 

Court support absolute immunity (1) for prosecutors on malicious 

prosecution and defamation claims and (2) for private lawyers on 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 7 
defamation claims. 3 

All lawyers are protected by an absolute privilege against 

defamation actions based upon litigation conduct in judicial 

proceedings. See 2 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of 

3 Yaselli v. Goff held that a prosecutor was entitled to 

absolute immunity on a malicious prosecution claim by an acquitted 

defendant. 12 F.2d at 397-398, 402-03. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 

177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, C.J.) (following Yaselli 

on a false arrest claim against prosecutors and concluding that 

"it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the 

wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who do try 

to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation), cert. 

denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). Youmans v. Smith was a libel action 

in which the court recognized a common law privilege associated 

with a list of pertinent questions prepared by a private lawyer 

for use in a disbarment proceeding. 153 N.Y. at 215-16, 222. 

Griffith v. Slinkard held that no action will lie against a 

prosecutor on claims of malicious prosecution and libel by a 

defendant indicted by a grqnd jury. 44 N.E. at 1001-02. Marsh v. 

Ellsworth was a libel action against a lawyer who filed an 

objection to discharge in a bankruptcy action; held, the writing 

containing the objection is privileged. 50 N.Y. at 309, 313. 

Marsh contains a cogent statement of the rule. 

The law is well settled that a counsel for a party 

conducting judicial proceedings is privileged in 

respect to words or writings used in the course of such 

proceedings reflecting injuriously upon others, when 

such words and writings are mate~ial and pertinent to 

the questions involved; and that, within such limit, the 

protection. is complete, irrespective of the motive with 

which they are used; but that such privilege does not 

extend to matter, having no materiality or pertinency to 

such questions. 

Id. at 311-12. Jennings v. Paine held that a lawyer commenting 

upon the testimony of a witness while defending his client is not 

answerable in damages for slander. 4 Wis. at 375. Hoar v. Wood 

was a slander action by a witness in which the court held that 

words spoken in judicial proceedings by a party or counsel are not 

actionable if they are pertinent to the subject matter of inquiry. 

44 Mass. at 193, 194-95. Finally, King v. Skinner involved an 

indictment against a justice of the peace for allegedly scandalous 

words spoken to a grand jury; held, the justice of the peace could 

not be held to answer either civilly or criminally "for words 

spoken in office." 98 Eng. Rep. at 529-30. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 8 
Torts§ 5.22 at 191 (1986); 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 586 

at 247-48 (1977); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (1980 & 1991 

Cum. Supp.); Kirschstein v. Hayes, 788 P.2d 941, 947-48, 954 

(Okla. 1990) (privilege extends to claims for defamation and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress). The same rule does 

not apply to claims for malicious prosecution. While prosecuting 

attorneys are subject to an absolute privilege, Yaselli, 12 F.2d 

at 402-03, 

attorneys employed by private persons usually appear to 

come under the general principle and they are liable 

under the same conditions that would subject a layman to 

liability for encouraging, without probable cause and 

for an improper purpose, a third person to instigate 

criminal proceedings against another. 

1 F. Harper, F. James & o. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 4.3 at 414 

(1986); Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts§ 653, comment f 

& illus. 6. Likewise, in prosecuting civil proceedings, if "an 

attorney acts without probable cause for belief in the possibility 

that the claim will succeed, and for an improper purpose, • . • he 

is subject to the same liability as any other person." 

Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 674, comment d; Reeves 

v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745, 755 (Okla. 1989) ("We know of no rule which 

gives lawyers absolute immunity for malicious prosecution.") 

(footnote omitted). 

We think that a similar rule applies in this case. While we 

recognize that prosecutors and government lawyers defending civil 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 9 
actions have been granted absolute immunity on similar claims, 4 

the cases do not support an analogous common law tradition for 

private lawyers. Two "client versus counsel" cases suggest that 

4 Of particular interest in this case is the type of immunity 

afforded government lawyers in connection with the false or 

misleading production and presentation of evidence. In Imbler the 

prosecution had absolute immunity on claims that it "had knowingly 

used false testimony and suppressed material evidence." 424 U.S. 

at 428-29. The Court strongly rejected the idea that absolute 

immunity is not available for claims of "willful suppression by a 

prosecutor of exculpatory information," Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 

n.34, and it is "now [a] well-settled rule that a prosecutor 

cannot be held personally liable for the knowing suppression of 

exculpatory information." Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 

279 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989). Whether 

the claim involves withholding evidence, failing to correct a 

misconception or instructing a witness to testify evasively, 

absolute immunity from civil damages is the rule for prosecutors. 

See, ~' Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 

1978); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir. 1976). 

Likewise, absolute immunity also extends to allegations that 

government lawyers misapplied the law in civil and criminal tax 

matters heard by a tribunal. Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 

1474-75 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 559 (1990). In this 

circuit, absolute immunity has been upheld even given allegations 

that a prosecutor allegedly lied and filed a false affidavit in 

the course of a criminal proceedings. Martinez v. Winner, 771 

F.2d 424, 438-39, on reh'g, 778 F.2d 553, 555-56 (10th Cir. 1985), 

vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 1066 (1986). 

Absolute immunity also has been extended to government 

lawyers involved in civil proceedings. Analogizing to the 

functions of a prosecutor, the Court in Butz, 438 U.S. at 517 held 

that "an agency attorney who arranges for the presentation of 

evidence on the record in the course of an adjudication is 

absolutely immune from suits based on the introduction of such 

evidence." In Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 

1986), the Second Circuit determined that an assistant attorney 

general defending a wrongful death action was entitled to absolute 

immunity concerning claims that he concealed facts concerning 

federal involvement in the death by way of an experimental drug 

program. Id. at 569-70, 573. The federal attorneys, who did not 

represent the State and attempted to minimize the exposure of the 

federal government through concealment, were not entitled to 

absolute immunity because their activities were too far removed 

from the judicial process. Id. at 573. Similarly, in Murphy v. 

Morris, 849 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1988), an assistant attorney 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-10-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 10 
the Supreme Court will not extend absolute immunity without such a 

tradition. In Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979), the Court 

ruled that an appointed defense counsel in a federal criminal 

proceeding, like a private lawyer, does not enjoy absolute 

immunity from a malpractice action by his former client. Id. at 

204-05. The Court reasoned that those traditionally afforded 

immunity are charged with representing the public trust and should 

not be deterred by civil damage suits. Id. at 203-04. In 

contrast, the appointed defense attorney does not have a duty to 

the public at large; rather, "[h]is principal responsibility is to 

serve the undivided interest of his client." Given the rationale 

of Ferri v. Ackerman, the Ninth Circuit overruled its precedent 

that public defenders are absolutely immune from suit under 

§ 1983, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Glover v. Tower, 700 F.2d 

556, 559 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 467 U.S. 914 (1984). 

In Tower, the Court determined that a public defender did not 

have absolute immunity against a § 1983 claim alleging a 

conspiracy to convict a defendant whom the public defender 

represented. 467 U.S. at 92~. Because a public defender was 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

general defending a prisoner civil rights action was entitled to 

absolute immunity on claims that he introduced improperly obtained 

impeachment evidence at trial. Id. at 1105 ("The introduction of 

evidence in a judicial proceeding constitutes a normal and regular 

advocacy function .... "). Absolute immunity did not attach to 

the act of obtaining the evidence from the prison mail system, an 

investigative activity. Id. In Snell v. Tunnell, we held that 

preparing and presenting an emergency custody application before a 

judge constitutes advocacy, notwithstanding the incomplete or 

false allegations contained therein. 920 F.2d at 694. But the 

state attorney in Snell was denied absolute immunity because she 

acted beyond colorable authority. Id. at 696. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 11 
unknown to the common law, the Supreme Court analogized to 

retained defense counsel. Id. at 921. In denying absolute 

immunity, the Court stated: "It is true that at common law 

defense counsel would have benefited from immunity for defamatory 

statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, . . . but 

this immunity would not have covered a conspiracy by defense 

counsel and other state officials to secure the defendant's 

conviction." Id. at 922. Although the case before us is of the 

"nonclient versus counsel" variety, Ferri and Tower suggest that 

the scope of absolute immunity accorded a private lawyer can be no 

broader than that originating from common law. 

Plaintiffs and G&G seek to hold H&R liable based upon 

allegedly fraudulent statements in the course of discovery and at 

trial, but we cannot identify a common law precedent for absolute 

immunity on such claims. 5 The claims asserted are not for 

defamation and H&R cannot avail itself of the immunity afforded 

government lawyers responsible for vindicating the public 

interest. We must conclude that H&R is not entitled to absolute 

immunity for the discovery and litigation statements contained in 

the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. 

Next we consider whether we should exercise pendent appellate 

5 H&R urges reliance upon the suggestion in Auriemma v. 

Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, that absolute immunity should extend to 

"advocates within the broad confines of the civil discovery 

procedures available in both federal and state courts." Id. at 

278. We note that the actual holding in Auriemma denies absolute 

immunity to two government defense lawyers based on an 

extra-judicial investigation. Id. Moreover, before policy 

concerns may be weighed, a common law predicate for absolute 

immunity must exist. Tower, 467 U.S. at 922. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 12 
jurisdiction over otherwise nonappealable issues. H&R urges us to 

consider whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides the exclusive 

remedial framework for plaintiffs, and if so, whether plaintiffs' 

action is barred under Rule 60(b)(3). See generally 7 J. Moore & 

J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 11 60.24[5] (1987 & 1990-91 Cum. 

Supp.); In re M/V Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1987); McCarty 

v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1983); Villareal 

v. Brown Express, Inc., 529 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1976). H&R also 

urges us to consider whether Oklahoma would allow plaintiffs' 

action given the prior and adverse federal court judgment. We 

recently indicated that three factors inform a decision about 

pendent appellate jurisdiction: 

(1) whether the otherwise nonappealable issue is 

sufficiently developed, both factually and legally, for 

our review, ..• 

(2) whether review of the appealable issue involves 

consideration of factors closely related or relevant to 

the otherwise nonappealable issue, • • . and 

(3) whether judicial economy will be better served by 

resolving the otherwise nonappealable issue, 

notwithstanding the federal policy against piecemeal 

appeals • • . . 

Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 1491 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584. Our analysis of these 

factors, if not the layout of H&R's brief-in-chief, 6 convinces us 

that this is a case of the pendent appellate jurisdiction tail 

wagging the jurisdictional dog. 

The three nonappealable issues raised by H&R simply are not 

6 The first 90% of the brief is devoted to otherwise 

nonappealable issues. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 13 
integral to the district court's decision to deny absolute 

immunity. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission v. Shoshone 

River Power, 874 F.2d 1346, 1353 (10th Cir. 1989). Our resolution 

of the absolute immunity issue without mention of these issues is 

telling. Moreover, in light of the pending claims and 

crossclaims, we think that the Rule 60(b) issues may become 

clearer once the operative facts are determined. This will 

require the district court to carefully assess and characterize 

the evidence concerning the alleged fraudulent scheme to deprive 

the plaintiffs of discovery information and damages. Judicial 

economy will be better served by evaluating these claims on a more 

complete record, thus avoiding the potential for revisiting the 

claims in a subsequent appeal. Pendent appellate jurisdiction is 

a doctrine of discretion, not of right, and in our discretion we 

decline to consider the nonappealable claims. 

The denial of absolute immunity is AFFIRMED. The remainder 

of the appeal is DISMISSED. All pending motions are DENIED. 7 

7 This denial extends to H&R's request that we award it costs, 

expenses and attorney's fees if we decline to sanction plaintiffs' 

counsel for filing a belated 10th Cir. R. 27.2 motion. See 

Appellant's Motion for Costs and Expenses under 28 u.s.c. § 1927 

and the Inherent Powers of the Court at 2. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 90-5082 Document: 01019630339 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 14