Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00549/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00549-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COMPANA, LLC, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-00549 MJJ

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT

COMPANA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

AND MOTION TO TRANSFER

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

filed by Defendant Compana, LLC. Alternatively, Defendant seeks to transfer the instant action to

the Northern District of Texas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). For the

following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss and 12(b)(3) Motion

to Transfer.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is engaged in the business of providing domain name registration services to its

customers. Defendant is a Wyoming limited liability company and its principal place of business is

in Carrollton, Texas. Defendant’s president and only employee is Jeffrey Baron. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s business uses tracking and registration software that roams

the Internet and automatically registers newly expired domain names. The object of this enterprise

is to acquire so-called “generic” domain names for resale. While such activity is not generally
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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According to registration records maintained by Top Level Domain Registry, the Internet

domain name “TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM” is registered to “Manilla Industries, Inc.” with a

address in Bangkok, Thailand. Plaintiff alleges that there is no evidence of any real or existing business

presence of any company named “Manilla Industries, Inc.” in Thailand.

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Plaintiff alleges that it sent an email to “manilaindustries@excite.com,” which was identified

in the records of the domain name registry of “TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM” as the correct email

address for “Manilla Industries, Inc.” The email was allegedly opened at a location in Mission Viejo,

California.

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unlawful, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s tracking and registration software fails to distinguish

between domain names that are truly generic and those that constitute an infringement of a third

party’s trademark rights. 

On or about December 27, 2004, Manilla Industries (“Manilla”) registered the Internet

domain name TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM. Manilla accomplished this registration through

Defendant, a licensed domain name registrar. Plaintiff alleges that Manilla is merely a fictitious

entity that exists for the purpose of concealing Defendant’s true ownership of Internet domain names

including TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM.1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “‘Manilla Industries,

Inc.’ act[s] as the proxy and alter ego of Compana.” (Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Manilla is physically located and does business in Mission Viejo, California.2 

Plaintiff alleges that the internet domain name TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM is identical

and/or confusingly similar to the “TRANSAMERICA” trademarks and service marks held by it. 

Thus, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is in violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); federal service mark infringement under Section 32(1) of the Lanham

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); federal unfair competition and false designation of origin under Section

43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982); and related

causes of action under California law.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move to dismiss

a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the Court

has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Compagne

Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). If the Court rules without holding an
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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evidentiary hearing, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is appropriate only if the plaintiff has

not made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Id. In determining whether the plaintiff

has met this burden, the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and

conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s

favor. Id. at 588-89.

There are two limitations on the Court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant: the applicable state or federal personal jurisdiction statute and constitutional

principles of due process. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990). Where, as here,

there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the law of the state in which the

district sits applies. See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir.

1993). As California’s long-arm statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent

permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, the Court need only

determine whether personal jurisdiction in this case would meet the requirements of due process. 

Id.; see Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10.

Federal due process requires that a nonresident defendant have minimum contacts with the

forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice. Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 838 (9th

Cir. 1986) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum must be such that the defendant should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361 (citing World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).

The constitutional test may be satisfied in either of two ways: through general jurisdiction or

specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists if the nonresident’s contacts with the forum are

continuous and systematic and the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice. Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1995)). If general jurisdiction exists,

the Court has jurisdiction over the defendant even if the cause of action is unrelated to the

defendant’s forum activities. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1995).

If general jurisdiction does not exist, the Court still may be able to assert specific jurisdiction

over the defendant for a cause of action that arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. 

Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court applies a three-part test in

determining whether it may assert specific jurisdiction over the defendant: (1) the defendant must

perform an act or consummate a transaction within the forum, purposefully availing himself of the

privilege of conducting activities in the forum and invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the

exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Id.

ANALYSIS

Defendant seeks to dismiss the instant action because it did not have the required “minimum

contacts” with the state of California. Defendant asserts that is has no officers, employees, place of

business, bank accounts, or any other corporate presence in California. Defendant further contends

that it is not registered to conduct business in California, has no license from the State of California,

and has no agent for service of process in California.

Plaintiff responds that the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint constitute prima facie

evidence that Manilla is a “sham” entity used by Defendant to disguise its true ownership interest in

“TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM.” Under this “alter ego” theory, Plaintiff asserts the Court should

treat Defendant and Manilla identically for jurisdictional purposes. Plaintiff contends that because

the Court has general jurisdiction over Manilla, given that it is a California corporation with a

physical address in California, the Court also has general jurisdiction over Defendant.

“[F]ederal courts have consistently acknowledged that it is compatible with due process for a

court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual or a corporation that would not ordinarily

be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court when the individual or corporation is an alter ego or

successor of a corporation that would be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court.” Patin v.

Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 (5th Cir. 2002). In Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc.,

228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000), the court noted as follows:

Although jurisdiction over a subsidiary does not automatically provide

jurisdiction over a parent, where the parent totally controls the actions of
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For the Northern District of California

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Defendant argues that all of its alleged actions in this case occurred outside of California, and

therefore venue is not proper in this district. The Court disagrees. Because Plaintiff has adequately

alleged that Defendant and Manilla are the same entity, Manilla’s actions (in California) in registering

TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM must be imputed to Defendant. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Defendant’s motion to transfer venue. 

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the subsidiary so that the subsidiary is the mere alter ego of the parent,

jurisdiction is appropriate over the parent as well[.] Because it appears, at

the pleading stage, that [defendant] is merely a shell entirely controlled by

[a parent corporation], we disregard [defendant’s] separate identity for

personal jurisdiction purposes.

Id. at 1069 n. 17 (internal citations omitted). “The theory underlying these cases is that, because the

two corporations (or the corporation and its individual alter ego) are the same entity, the

jurisdictional contacts of one are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the

International Shoe due process analysis.” Patin, 294 F.3d at 653 (emphasis in the original). 

Here, the Court is satisfied that it has general jurisdiction over Manilla. Plaintiff has

adequately plead facts that demonstrate that Manilla is a California corporation with a physical

address in California. Furthermore, there is no dispute that Manilla registered the domain name at

issue here, TRANSAMERICAFUND.COM. Moreover, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that

Manilla is merely the “alter ego” of Defendant, and that for all essential purposes, the two

companies are the same entity. Therefore, under Howard, the Court finds that it also has general

jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.3

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss and 12(b)(3) Motion to

Transfer are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August _22__, 2005

 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE