Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06060/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06060-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION 

LARRY GLEGHORN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-6060

DON MELTON, in his individual capacity;

THOMAS MARS, in his individual capacity;

STEVE DOZIER, in his official capacity as 

Director of the Arkansas State Police 

Department; JERRY DAVIS, in his capacity 

as Chairman of the Arkansas State Police 

Commission; and the ARKANSAS STATE POLICE DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the Court for consideration of the

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and supporting documents

(Docs. #39-41), Plaintiff’s response and supporting documents

(Docs. #44-47) and Defendants’ Reply (Doc. #49). 

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 alleging violations of his due process and

equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff contends Defendants

effectively terminated his employment in violation of his

substantive and procedural due process rights, as well as his equal

protection rights. Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of

intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation and

wrongful discharge. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment,

compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly,

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Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 and for

declaratory relief are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The remaining

causes of action based upon state law are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

Jurisdiction is proper under the general federal question

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) to hear the claims based upon state

law.

Background

 The facts are related in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as required. Plaintiff began his employment with the

Arkansas State Police (ASP) as a recruit on February 14, 1971. He

subsequently completed his training and was certified as a Trooper.

In 1997, Plaintiff was laterally transferred from Troop F to Hot

Springs, Arkansas as the Commander of Troop K. In his four years

as Commander of Troop K, Plaintiff received favorable evaluations.

In July, 1999, Thomas Mars, who was Director of ASP at the

time, conducted an investigation of alleged misconduct involving

two ASP employees, Lieutenant James Hale and Julie Hefner,

resulting in Ms. Hefner’s termination. Ms. Hefner filed a

harassment suit against the ASP, Plaintiff and Lt. Hale that was

concluded by settlement as to all defendants in 2001.

Plaintiff contends on September 14, 2001, he and Lt. Hale were

advised via a telephone conference with Colonel Don Melton (then

Director), Major Houston Tally and Steve Dozier that they were

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“immediately relieved of their command” and would be transferred to

the administrative office in Little Rock due to the Hefner lawsuit.

According to Plaintiff, Melton told him he had lost confidence in

Plaintiff’s ability to manage a troop. Plaintiff states he

appealed this decision to Frank Gwen, then Chairman of the ASP

Commission, and requested a hearing before the full Commission but

the request was denied.

After the transfer, Plaintiff retained the same pay and title

as Captain. Plaintiff reported to work in Little Rock on September

24, 2001. According to Plaintiff, his job duties were limited to

reviewing files for mistakes and filing. Five days later,

Plaintiff took sick leave and remained on either sick or annual

leave until his leave was exhausted. He then contacted Major J.R.

Howard to advise he was ready to return to work. Major Howard

consulted Melton who stated that Plaintiff could come back to work

but could not tell him what his specific job duties would be.

According to Plaintiff, “that [was] not good enough”, and he

submitted his retirement effective May 21, 2002, just short of his

mandatory retirement date of August 1, 2002.

Summary Judgment Standard

The Court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). In

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reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts

and inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, and the burden is placed on the moving party, to

establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Nat'l.

Bank of Commerce of El Dorado, Arkansas v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d

602 (8th Cir. 1999). Once the moving party has met this burden,

the non-moving party may no longer rest on the allegations in its

pleadings, but must set forth specific facts by affidavit and other

evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.

See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). In order to withstand Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, Plaintiff must substantiate his allegations

with "sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy."

Gregory v. Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.1992).

Entry of summary judgment resting on qualified immunity is

appropriate if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party and affording him all reasonable inferences,

no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the

officials’ actions, even if unlawful, were objectively reasonable

“in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the

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time [the actions were] taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635 (1987)(internal citation omitted).

Discussion

Sovereign Immunity - ASP and official capacity claims

Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against the ASP and the official capacity claims against Steve

Dozier and Jerry Davis as they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment

to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff contends that these

defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity as there are

disputed facts at issue in this case. 

Sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction

over lawsuits brought by private citizens against states unless the

state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the state’s

immunity under a valid exercise of Congressional power. Here, the

State of Arkansas has not consented to be sued in the federal

courts and Congress did not abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity

when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Jacobsen v. Dep’t of

Transp., 450 F.3d 778 (8 Cir. 2006)(citing cases). Thus, th

sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 and 1985 claims against

Steve Dozier, in his official capacity as Director of the Arkansas

State Police Department; Jerry Davis, in his capacity as Chairman

of the Arkansas State Police Commission; and the Arkansas State

Police, as well as Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.

Accordingly, these Defendants are DISMISSED.

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Qualified Immunity - individual capacity claims

Qualified immunity protects public officials from personal

liability under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800 (1982). We first address whether the facts alleged show

that the state actor’s conduct violated a constitutional right.

See Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703 (8 Cir. 2004). If that threshold th

question is answered in the negative, we need not proceed further,

as the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. If a

constitutional right may have been violated, we proceed to the

second step and determine whether the right was clearly

established. Id. 

Plaintiff contends he was constructively discharged resulting

in violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights

as well as his right to equal protection of the laws. All of

Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations hinge on whether

Separate Defendants Don Melton and Thomas Mars’ actions resulted in

a constructive discharge. If not, then Plaintiff has failed to

show Separate Defendants violated any constitutional right, and

Separate Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against

Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff was scheduled for mandatory retirement on August 1,

2002. However, in September 2001, Don Melton, former Director of

the ASP, transferred Plaintiff to the administrative office in

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Little Rock advising Plaintiff there were reports about

mismanagement at Troop K that were being investigated.

Plaintiff contends the transfer amounted to an illegal

constructive discharge. “Constructive discharge occurs when an

employer deliberately renders the employee’s working conditions

intolerable, thereby forcing him to quit.” Baker v. John Morrell

& Co., 382 F.3d 816 (8 Cir. 2004). To prove a case of th

constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a

reasonable person in his situation would find the working

conditions intolerable and (2) that the employer...intended to

force the employee to quit. Garman v. Gencorp, Inc., 120 F.3d 127

(8 Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff cannot show the employer th

consciously intended him to quit, he can still prevail on a

constructive discharge claim if the employer could have reasonably

foreseen that the employee would quit as a result of its actions.

Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707 (8th

Cir. 2003)(quoting Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011

(8 Cir. 1999). th

Plaintiff testified that after the transfer he maintained the

same pay and the same title of Captain. (Doc. 41, Ex. 1, p. 1).

Plaintiff stated that he was told that the reason for the transfer

was that Melton lost “confidence in [his] ability to manage a

troop”. (Doc. 41, Ex. 1, p. 2). According to Plaintiff he had ten

months left before his mandatory retirement date of August 1, 2002.

(Doc. 41, Ex. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff took his sick and vacation leave

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“due to the advice of [his] doctor”, and asked to return to work

when it was exhausted two months prior to his retirement date.

(Doc. 41, Ex. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff testified that Melton told him

to return to work. Id. According to Plaintiff he chose to retire

at that point because they would not be specific about what his job

duties would be and he didn’t want to be embarrassed or humiliated

by being an assistant file clerk. (P. 8). 

Plaintiff contends that the transfer was done “with an intent

to force resignation”, yet he provides no evidence to support this

statement other than his own assessment. (Doc. 45, p. 13). In

fact, the only evidence submitted by Plaintiff in support of his

summary judgment response is his own affidavit. In the affidavit,

Plaintiff avers: (1) he worked for the ASP for 31 years receiving

only the highest evaluation marks; (2) he felt he was “stripped of

[his] command and given a job as a file clerk”; (3) he was treated

for depression and a heart condition due to these events; (4) the

transfer was to “punish” him for Tom Mars’ negligent handling of a

complaint involving other ASP employees. (Doc. 45, Ex. A).

Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff was

constructively discharged from his employment. Nothing in the

record indicates that the working conditions were intolerable or

that Separate Defendants had an intent or reason to believe

Plaintiff would quit as a result of being transferred to the

administrative office. Further, Melton was within his statutory

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of stating a claim against Mars 1

in his individual capacity, but, even so, Mars is entitled to qualified immunity.

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authority to transfer employees for the efficient administration of

the ASP. Section 12-8-104(h) of the Arkansas Code provides, in

pertinent part:

Whenever in the Director of the Department of Arkansas

State Police’s discretion the action is necessary for the

efficient operation of the Department..., the Director...

may:

(1) Transfer, assign, and reassign from one division to

another division any member of the Department... or other

employee of the Department....

While Plaintiff was undoubtedly unhappy with the transfer, the

Court finds that he voluntarily resigned from his position. There

was no termination, thus no state action resulting in any

constitutional violation. Given the totality of the circumstances

surrounding Plaintiff’s resignation and the state of the law

regarding constructive discharge, we conclude that it was not

“apparent” that Separate Defendants’ conduct violated a clearly

established federal right. Separate Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity.1

42 U.S.C. § 1985 

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants conspired in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3) fails for the reasons set forth above,

specifically because Plaintiff failed to allege the deprivation of

a constitutional right.

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State Law Claims

Having granted the summary judgment motion on the federal law

claims, we decline to retain jurisdiction on the state law claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, Defendants' motion for summary

judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 and for declaratory

relief are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The remaining causes of

action based upon state law are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The

parties are to bear their own fees and costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 4th DAY OF MAY 2007.

/s Robert T. Dawson 

 Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge 

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