Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00708/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00708-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK MANN et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Case No. 3:11-cv-0708-GPC-BGS

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF

COURT’S SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ORDER 

REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’

MONELL CLAIM REGARDING

PARENTAL EXCLUSION FROM

POLINSKY EXAMINATIONS

[ECF Nos. 226, 227, 247]

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ March 18, 2016 motion for clarification, or, in

the alternative, trial brief regarding Plaintiffs’ Monell claim arising out of the

Polinsky Children’s Center Examinations. ECF No. 227. On March 28, 2016,

following the pretrial conference, the Court invited additional briefing in response

to Plaintiffs’ motion, specifically on the issues of (1) whether Defendants are

judicially estopped from claiming that County of San Diego (“County”) did not

have a policy of excluding parents from Polinsky Children’s Center (“Polinsky”)

examinations; and (2) whether Plaintiffs must prove deliberate indifference. Jury

Trial Preparation and Scheduling Order (“Trial Preparation Order”) 1–2, ECF No.

235. Having reviewed the additional briefing, see Pl. Brief, ECF No. 239; Def.

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Opp., ECF No. 240; Pl. Reply, ECF No. 241; Def. Request for Judicial Notice, ECF

No. 242; Pl. Objection to Def. Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 243, and the

applicable law, the Court now finds that (1) Defendants are judicially estopped from

claiming that the County did not have a policy of excluding parents from Polinsky

Children’s Center examinations; and (2) Plaintiffs are not required to prove

deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the Court now finds that Plaintiffs have

satisfied all required steps of the Monell analysis, and therefore that, as a matter of

law, the County violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights through its policy of

excluding parents from Polinsky examinations.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts in this case having been described in the Court’s previous

orders, the Court will not reiterate them in depth here. See 1st Summ. J. Order 2–12,

ECF No. 102. In short, this is an action brought by Plaintiffs Mark and Melissa Mann

and their four minor children N.E.H.M., M.C.G.M., N.G.P.M., and M.N.A.M

(“Plaintiffs”) challenging actionstaken by the County, the County’s Health and Human

Services Agency (“HHSA”), and the County’s Polinsky Children’s Center, a temporary

emergency shelter for children who are separated from their families (collectively

“Defendants”), during the course of a child abuse investigation that led to the removal

of the minor children from the family’s home. Id.

Plaintiffs initially filed a complaint against the County, HHSA, Andrea E.

Hernandez (née Cisneros), Lisa J. Quadros, Gilbert Fierro, Kelly Monge, Susan Solis,

and six other now dismissed defendants. Compl.; see also Orders Dismissing Defs.,

ECF Nos. 93, 142. Plaintiffs asserted eight causes of action for: (1) assault; (2) battery;

(3) false imprisonment; (4) violation of federal civil rights guaranteed by the First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) Monell claims related

to the County’s policies; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (7)

violation of state civil rights under Cal. Civ. Code § 43; and (8) violation of state civil

rights under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. Compl. 30–33. Every cause of action was pled

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against all the Defendants, with the exceptions of the fourth cause of action for the §

1983 claims, which was pled solely against the individual defendants, and the fifth

cause of action for the Monell claims, which was pled solely against the County,

HHSA, and Polinsky. Id. 

Following parties’ initial cross-motionsfor partialsummary judgment, the Court

found that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’

fourth cause of action for the § 1983 claims to the extent that such claims were based

on Defendants’: (1) interview with N.G.P.M. atschool; (2) examination of the children

at Polinsky; and (3) listing of Mr. Mann on California’s Child Abuse Central Index

(“CACI”), but not with respect to their actions in obtaining and executing the

protective custody warrant. 1st Summ. J. Order 16–29. Defendants were granted

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell cause of action with regards to the charge of

inadequate training. Id. at 30–31; Scheduling Order 8, ECF No. 190. 

Subsequently, the Court found good cause to direct additional briefing in order

to determine whether the following issues can be decided on summary judgment: (1)

Plaintiffs’ Monell cause of action based on the Polinsky exams; (2) Defendants’

qualified immunity defense to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim; (3)

all claims against Defendants Fierro, Monge, and Solis; and (4) Plaintiffs’ state law

causes of action of assault, battery, false imprisonment, IIED, and violations of Cal.

Civ. Code § 43 and § 52.1. Scheduling Order 9–10. 

On November 23, 2015, the Court issued a second summary judgment order. See

2nd Summ. J. Order, ECF No. 211. Therein, the Court found that for Plaintiffs’ Monell

claims based on the County’s alleged policies of (1) allowing medical examinations to

be performed at Polinsky in the absence of exigency, valid parental consent, or court

order specific to the child being examined; and (2) preventing parents or guardians

from being present during medical procedures, including examinations performed at

Polinsky, only the latter policy constituted a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights. Id. at 11. The Court then found that Plaintiffs had also established that the latter

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policy wasthe moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutionalrights, but

had not conclusively established that the County in fact had such a policy, nor that the

policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to a constitutional right. Id. at 22–24. 

In the second summary judgment order, the Court also granted Defendants’

motions for summary judgment: (1) based on qualified immunity with respect to

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim; (2) on all claims against

Defendants Fierro, Monge and Solis; and (3) on Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims against

Defendants Hernandez and Quadros to the extent that they relied on the Polinsky

medical examinations, and dismissed Defendants Fierro, Monge, and Solis. Id. at 36.

Finally, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ §

52.1 claims as to Defendants Hernandez and Quadros. Id.

On March 18, 2016, Plaintiffs moved to clarify the Court’s summary judgment

ruling on the Monell issue, arguing that at the hearing on the motion for summary

judgment held on October 16, 2015, County Counsel openly acknowledged that it was

the County’s policy to exclude parents from examinations conducted at Polinsky, and

that deliberate indifference was not a required prong of the Monell inquiry in the

instant case. ECF No. 227 at 3–4. On March 25, 2016, the Court conducted a pretrial

conference. ECF No. 234. Following the pretrial conference, the Court directed the

parties to provide additional briefing on the Monell issues of (1) whether Defendants

are judicially estopped from claiming that County did not have a policy of excluding

parents from Polinsky examinations; and (2) whether Plaintiffs must prove deliberate

indifference. Trial Preparation Order 1–2. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary

judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just,

speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue asto any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact

is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any

genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23. If the moving party fails to bear the

initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the

nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–60

(1970).

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannotrest

on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient

showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Id. at 325. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this

determination, the court must “view[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court

does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, or drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are for the trier of fact. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. 

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II. Reconsideration

District courts retain inherent authority to revise interim or interlocutory orders

any time before entry of judgment. Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., 127 F. Supp. 2d

1101, 1102 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir.

1996) (“[T]he interlocutory orders and rulings made pre-trial by a district judge are

subject to modification by the district judge at any time prior to final judgment.”); Balla

v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(b) (noting that unlessfinal judgment has been entered, “any order or other decision,

however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and

liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims

or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating

all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities”)). A district court may

reconsider and reverse a previous interlocutory decision for any reason it deems

sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or

clarification of controlling law. Id. (citing Sport Squeeze, Inc. v. Pro–Innovative

Concepts, Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1764, 1771, 1999 WL 696009 (S.D. Cal. 1999);

Washington v. Garcia, 977 F.Supp. 1067, 1068 (S.D. Cal. 1997)). But a court should

generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either

represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice. Id. (citing Christianson v.

Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Defendants are Judicially Estopped from Claiming That

County Did Not Have a Policy of Excluding Parents from Polinsky

Examinations

In the Court’s second summary judgment order, the Court found that whether

the County actually had the contested policy of excluding parents from the

examination room at Polinsky was a disputed issue of material fact that must be

decided by the jury. 2nd Summ. J. Order 23. The Court observed that,

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Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Graff testified that the medical examinations

were conducted according to the policies and procedures of the County

of San Diego. Pls. SSUF in Support of Mot. Summ. J. 6 (citing Graff

Dep., 51:12–14), ECF No. 197-4. Dr. Graff testified that she believed

that it was Polinsky policy that parents were not allowed to attend

medical examinations at Polinsky from 1994 to 2011. Graff. Dep.

110:17–22. However, when asked whether it was County policy to

notify the parents before the examination occurs, she stated that while

Polinsky did not notify the parent, she did not know “if the removing

social worker or other agent informs the parent.” Thus, there is some

dispute over whether it was the overall policy of the County not to

notify the parents before the examination occurred. Moreover,

Defendants argue that “Dr. Graff was not a County employee and did

not testify she was competent or knowledgeable about all County

policies at Polinsky.” Defs. Resp. to Pls. SSUF 6. 

However, at the October 16, 2015 hearing on the second motions for summary

judgment, County Counsel acknowledged that at the time the medical examinations

were conducted in this case, County policy excluded parents from their children’s

medical examinations:

THE COURT: In Swartwood, the Court found there was no

dispute that the county’s policy excludes parents from their children's

medical exams at the Polinsky Children’s Center.

Do you likewise agree that the county policy excludes parents --

excluded the parents in this case from their children's medical exams?

MR. BRODIE: It excluded them from the room. But as we

presented testimony, or evidence, I believe, in a declaration, parents are

allowed to be at Polinsky in the visiting room, and they can talk to

medical staff there about their child’s medical issues. But as far as at

the time of this exam, 2010, parents were not allowed in the exam room

at the time. Yes.

Transcript of October 16, 2015 Hearing 15, ECF No. 225. 

Plaintiffs thus argue that the admissions of County counsel, combined with

the admission by the County in other cases concerning Polinsky’s practices such as

Swartwood v. County of San Diego, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1093 (S.D. Cal. 2014) and

Parkes v. County of San Diego, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (S.D. Cal. 2004) that this was

County policy, judicially estop the County from now claiming that the County did

not have such a policy during the relevant time period of this case. Pl. Brief 5–7.

“[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and

succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his

interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the

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prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.”

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting

Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court observes that

This rule, known as judicial estoppel, “generally prevents a party from

prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a

contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” Pegram v.

Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227, n. 8, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164

(2000); see 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.30, p. 134-62 (3d ed.

2000) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from

asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim

taken by that party in a previous proceeding”); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller,

& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4477, p. 782 (1981)

(hereinafter Wright) (“[A]bsent any good explanation, a party should

not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one theory, and

then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible

theory[.]”).

Id. “[C]ourts have uniformly recognized that [the] purpose [of this rule] is ‘to

protect the integrity of the judicial process’ by ‘prohibiting parties from deliberately

changing their positions according to the exigencies of the moment.’” Id. at

749–750 (citations omitted). “Because the rule is intended to prevent ‘improper use

of judicial machinery,’ judicial estoppel ‘is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court

at its discretion.’” Id. at 750 (citations omitted). “[S]everal factors [that] typically

inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case” include (1)

whether a party’s later position is “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier position; (2)

whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier

position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding

would create “the perception that either the first or the second court was misled”;

and (3) whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an

unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not

estopped. Id. at 750–51 (citations omitted). 

The County now provides a number of declarations from County employees

purporting to demonstrate that at the time the examination of the Mann children

occurred, Polinsky did not have a policy or practice of excluding parents from

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medical examinations. The County claims that these declarations demonstrate that it

was not the case that parents were not “allowed” to be present in the exam room

during the exams, but simply that “parents did not attend the exams because they

were not informed about the exams.” Def. Opp. 12. But the declarations reveal that

the parents were not informed about the exams precisely because the County

believed that they did not have a right to attend. See,e.g., Brodie Decl. 2–3, ECF No.

240-4 (“[U]pon further analysis and reflection, I realize my statements concerning

parental presence at the exams were not entirely accurate. Polinsky is a confidential

placement for children, and at the time of the exams in this case and in Swartwood,

parents and guardians did not attend the exams. The reason they did not attend is

that they were not informed by social workers at the time of the removal that the

child would have a medical examination at Polinsky, and there were no steps taken

to make provisions for them to attend. They were not informed by the County about

the exams because the County did not believe they had a right to be present . . . .”).1

Monell liability attaches whether the constitutional deprivation is attributable

to an “overall policy,” a “persistent and widespread practice,” or the direction of a

policymaking official. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1144–45 (9th

Cir. 2012) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1359 (2011)). Here, the County

is effectively admitting that even if they did not have a written policy of excluding

parents from these examinations, they had a persistent and widespread practice of

See also McCarthy Decl. 2–3, ECF No. 240-3 (“Based on my office’s 1

evaluation of the Wallis case, we did not believe the holding of the case meant parents

had a right to be present at the Polinsky exams . . . . My understanding is that before

the changes in 2015, parents and guardians whose children were removed by County

social workers were not informed about the Polinsky medical exams because they were

just part of the routine admission process . . . .”); Rincon Decl. 2, ECF No. 240-1

(“[T]he medical examinations for children entering Polinsky are conducted in an area

not accessible to the public . . . . In 2015, the County moved the medical exam room

location at the Polinsky facility, changed its forms so that parents and guardians would

be notified about their child having a medical exam in Polinsky, and provided for

parents and guardians to attend the exam if they wished. . . . [B]efore 2015, when

children were removed from their parents’ or guardians’ care by County of San Diego

social workers, the social workers did not inform the parent or guardian that their child

was going to have a medical exam at Polinsky.”). 

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doing so. See also Def. Opp. 13 (admitting that “the County is not currently saying

parents were allowed into the Polinsky exams”).

Moreover, as Plaintiffs point out, the County consistently adopted the

position not only that they had a policy of excluding parents from Polinsky

examinations, but that doing so did not amount to a Monell violation, in multiple

cases before courts in this district. See Swartwood, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 1116 (noting

that Defendant’s opposition brief stated that “‘there is no factual dispute about

parental presence at the Polinsky exams. Parents are not allowed in the exam room

when the Polinsky exams are conducted, though they are allowed to visit their

children in the visitation area and speak to the doctors about their children’s

medical issues.’”); Parkes, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (“It is undisputed that the nonoffending parent is not permitted to be present at physical examinations conducted

by the agency.”).

Thus, it is plain both that the County’s current position is “clearly

inconsistent” with its earlier position, and that the County has previously succeeded

in persuading a court to accept the County’s earlier position. In addition, the Court

observes that to allow the County to adopt its current position would allow the

County to derive an unfair advantage, since the County appears to have adopted its

current position only because three courts in this district have now found that the

parental exclusion policy constitutes a constitutional deprivation under Monell.

Thus, the Court finds that the County is judicially estopped from claiming that the

County did not have a policy of barring parents from attending their children’s

medical examinations at Polinsky.

II. Whether Plaintiffs Must Prove Deliberate Indifference

Previously, the parties did not dispute whether deliberate indifference is a

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required prong for Monell liability at the summary judgment stage. However, 2

Plaintiffs now argue that deliberate indifference is not a required prong, Pl. Brief

10, while Defendants maintain that it is, Def. Opp. 8. Upon review of the applicable

law, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that deliberate indifference is not a required

element for Monell liability in the instant case. 

In the Court’s previous summary judgment order, the Court stated that “[t]o

establish municipal liability where a municipality’s inaction in failing to protect the

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is the source of the deprivation, the plaintiffs must

show that (1) they were deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the County had a

policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to the constitutional

right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.”

2nd Summ J. Order 10 (citing Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc.

Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This Court observed that deliberate indifference is generally considered a jury

question, and found that whether County acted with deliberate indifference was a

disputed issue of material fact that must be decided by the jury. Id. at 23–24 (citing

Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1195 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

However, a closer review of the caselaw discloses two types of Monell

liability: the “direct” and “indirect” paths to municipal liability. Monell itself did not

include a deliberate indifference prong. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Analyzing the legislative history of the

Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended for

municipalities and other local government units to be included among those

“persons” subject to § 1983 liability. Where a local government’s “policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, decision” or “custom or usage” “so permanent and well

Indeed, at the hearing for the second summary judgment motions, the Court

2

asked Plaintiffs’ counsel whether deliberate indifference is a required showing, and

Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that “deliberate indifference is an element always in a

Monell cause of action.” Transcript of October 16, 2015 Hearing 25, ECF No. 225. 

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settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law” is “responsible for

a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution,” that local government may be

sued under § 1983. Id. at 690–91 (citations omitted). Monell also imposed a

causation requirement: the policy must have been what the Court termed “the

moving force of the constitutional violation,” id. at 694, and a municipality cannot

be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, id. at 691.

Following Monell, the Supreme Court struggled in a series of cases with what

to do in instances where the direct causal link between an averred policy and

constitutional deprivation was less clear than in Monell itself (where an official

policy compelling pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such

leaves were required for medical reasons was the straightforward cause of the

constitutional deprivation). See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–

86 (1989) (citing cases). On the one hand, the Court was reluctant to find that

municipalities can only be found liable under § 1983 where “the policy in question

[is] itself unconstitutional.” See, e.g., id. at 386 (alteration in original). On the other

hand, the Court feared that “[t]o adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would

open municipalities to unprecedented liability under § 1983,” because “[i]n virtually

every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a

city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city ‘could

have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.” See id. at 391–92 (quoting

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)).

In City of Canton, the Supreme Court decided that the “deliberate

indifference” test struck the best balance between these competing values in cases

where the plaintiff alleges that the municipality’s inaction in failing to protect

plaintiff’s constitutional rights is the cause of the constitutional deprivation. Id. at

388. In Canton, the plaintiff argued that the municipality was liable under § 1983

for a failure to train its police officers where, after the plaintiff was arrested and

brought to the police station, police officers did not summon medical attention for

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the plaintiff after she became incoherent and slumped on the floor on several

occasions over the course of about an hour. Id. at 381. The Court found that “[o]nly

where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences

a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be

properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Id.

at 388. Cases that followed Canton further developed the meaning of the “deliberate

indifference” test, but predominantly in the failure-to-train context, or analogous

theories like negligent supervision or hiring. See, e.g., Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1359; Bd.

of Cnty. Com’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994) (holding that, to prove deliberate indifference,

the plaintiff must show that the municipality was on actual or constructive notice

that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation); Van Ort v. Estate

of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Thus, the Ninth Circuit has characterized existing Monell doctrine as creating

“[t]wo [p]aths” to municipal liability. See Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185; see also Tsao,

698 F.3d at 1142; Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

2006). First, under the “direct” route to Monell liability, “a plaintiff can show that a

municipality itself violated someone’s rights or that it directed its employee to do

so.” See Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185 (citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 404). 

Examples of this direct path to municipal liability include: a city’s

policy of discriminating against pregnant women in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment, Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56

L.Ed.2d 611; a policy-maker’s order to its employees to serve capiases

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); and a county

policy that policymakers know will place aggressive and passive

homosexuals in the same jail cell in violation of the passive

homosexual’s Fourteenth Amendment right to personal security.

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991) (en

banc).

Id. at 1185–86.

Second, under the indirect route, “a plaintiff can allege that through its

omissions the municipality is responsible for a constitutional violation committed

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by one of its employees, even though the municipality's policies were facially

constitutional, the municipality did not direct the employee to take the

unconstitutional action, and the municipality did not have the state of mind required

to prove the underlying violation.” Id. at 1186 (emphasis added) (citing Canton, 489

U.S. at 387–89). In the latter case, plaintiffs must then show that “the municipality’s

deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the

employee to commit the constitutional violation.” Id. at 1186 (citing Canton, 489

U.S. at 387). 

In Van Ort, plaintiffs brought suit against the County of San Diego, the San

Diego Sheriff’s Department, and others, seeking damages for mental and physical

injuries incurred when a Sheriff’s Deputy, while off-duty, “attacked and tortured”

plaintiffs during the course of a home invasion conducted by the Deputy. Id. at

833–34. The court found that any negligent hiring or supervision of the Deputy was

not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered, since the Deputy’s actions as a

private individual were an intervening cause of the attack on plaintiffs. Id. at 837. 

Similarly, in Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470 (9th

Cir. 1992), the jury found that a county was “deliberately indifferent” to the right of

detainees not to be incarcerated without prompt pretrial procedures where its

policymaker knew that “some inmates could not communicate their plight or were

out of touch with their families or lawyers[,] some inmates remain[ed] incarcerated

for a period of time because they missed their arraignments[, and in] at least 19

incidents between 1981 and 1989[,] individuals sat in jail for periods of

undetermined length after they missed arraignment,” but did not develop any

procedures to alleviate this problem. Id. at 1477–78.

As the Ninth Circuit observes, the salient inquiry is thus whether the

constitutional violation is the result of an “overall policy,” a “persistent and

widespread practice,” or the direction of a policymaking official. See Tsao, 698 F.3d

at 1144–45 (citing Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359). Defendants argue that the indirect

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path to Monell liability ought to apply because the County did not have either a

formal policy regarding parental presence at the Polinsky exams, or a practice or

custom of barring parents from the exam. Def. Opp. 9. However, as discussed supra

in Part I, the Court now finds that the County did indeed have such a policy or

practice. As such, the Court also finds that the direct path to Monell liability applies,

and Plaintiffs do not need to show deliberate indifference.

CONCLUSION

Since the Court found in the Second Summary Judgment Order, ECF No.

211, that a municipal policy or practice of preventing parents or guardians from

being present during the Polinsky examinations constituted a deprivation of

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and that Plaintiffs had also established that such a

policy would be the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights, and now finds that the County had such a policy or practice, and that

Plaintiffs are not required to show deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs have satisfied

all the elements to establish Monell liability as to the County’s exclusion of

Plaintiffs from their children’s medical examinations at Polinsky.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as to their

Monell claim relating to the County’s exclusion of Plaintiffs from their

children’s medical examinations at Polinsky.

2. The Court DENIES Defendants’ request for additional briefing and ruling on

an issue of law regarding Monell claim for failure to provide exculpatory

evidence. ECF No. 226. Parties may address this issue using one of their

allotted motions in limine if they so choose. 

3. The Court DENIES Defendants’ ex parte motion for permission to file

additional motions in limine. ECF No. 247. The instant Order reduces the

number of triable issues, such that the Court questions whether even eight

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motions in limine are necessary. That said, the Court will continue to permit

each side to file a maximum of eight motions in limine.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 17, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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