Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00567/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00567-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES LOUIS PETERSON, )

AIS #193772, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

v. )CIVIL ACT ION NO. 2:05-CV-567-WKW

) [WO]

)

GWENDOLYN C. MOSLEY, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause of action is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas

corpus relief filed by Charles Louis Peterson [“Peterson”], a state inmate, on June 13, 2005.

In this petition, Peterson challenges a 1997 conviction and sentence imposed upon him for

felony- murder by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. The trial court

sentenced Peterson to thirty years imprisonment for this conviction.

This case entails a protracted post-conviction history in the state courts which is best

summarized by the Alabama Supreme Court as follows:

For the factual background of this case, see Peterson v. State, 842

So.2d 734 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (“Peterson I”), and Ex parte Peterson, 884

So.2d 924 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003 (“Peterson II”). This case arises out of the

murder, in which Peterson and other individuals participated, of “Eddie

Allen, the manager of a Burger King fast-food restaurant.” Peterson II, 884

So.2d at 925. In 1995, a grand jury returned a one-count, capital-murder

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 1 of 13
2

indictment against Peterson for the intentional murder of Allen during the

course of a robbery. Id. at 925. In May 1997, pursuant to a blind plea

agreement, Peterson’s indictment was amended to charge, and he pleaded

guilty to, (1) felony murder and (2) first-degree robbery. He was sentenced

to 30 years’ imprisonment and 20 years’ imprisonment, respectively; the

sentences were to be served consecutively.

In July 2000, Peterson filed a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition

challenging his robbery conviction. Specifically, he contended that he was

indicted for murder made capital because he committed it during the course

of a robbery. See § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. He further asserted that

he was convicted of first-degree robbery and felony murder, for which the

underlying offense was robbery. Peterson I, 842 So.2d at 736. Therefore,

he argued, his conviction for both felony murder and the underlying offense

of robbery violated the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. Id.

The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for further factual

findings, stating that “if [Peterson’s] convictions for both felony-murder and

first-degree robbery were based on the same robbery, his convictions for both

offenses violate double jeopardy principles.” Id.

On remand, the State conceded “that the felony-murder conviction and

the robbery conviction were both based upon the same robbery and ... that,

based on [the remand instructions], the circuit court must set aside the

robbery conviction and sentence.” Id. at 739 (opinion on return to third

remand). The State also convened a grand jury, which, on March 8, 2002,

returned a three-count indictment against Peterson, charging (1) capital

murder during the course of a robbery, (2) capital murder during the course

of a burglary, and (3) conspiracy to commit robbery. The State then moved

to set aside both the felony-murder conviction and the robbery conviction and

to nol-pros the original one-count capital-murder indictment.

Peterson objected to the dismissal of the felony-murder conviction,

and moved to dismiss the March 2002 indictment. The trial court granted the

State’s motions and denied Peterson’s motion. Peterson petitioned the Court

of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to

dismiss the March 2002 capital-murder indictment and to reinstate his

felony-murder conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the

petition. Peterson II. Peterson now seeks the same relief from this Court.

Peterson contends that there was no basis on which to set aside his

felony-murder conviction and that any prosecution under the March 2002

indictment violates the principle of double jeopardy.... We agree with

Peterson.

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 2 of 13
3

***

Here, ... the amended indictment was not void, because felony murder

in which robbery is the underlying felony is, indeed, a lesser-included offense

of intentional murder during the course of a robbery. The trial court had

jurisdiction, therefore, to accept the guilty plea to felony murder on the

amended indictment, but it had no authority to accept the March 2002

reindictment.

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted, and

the trial court is directed to dismiss the March 2002 indictment against

Peterson and to reinstate his conviction for felony murder.

Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990, 991-994 (Ala. 2004) (emphasis in original) (footnote

omitted).

Pursuant to the instructions of the Alabama Supreme Court in granting the writ of

mandamus requested by Peterson, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County dismissed the

March 2002 indictment and reinstated Peterson’s conviction and sentence for felonymurder arising from the amended two-count indictment. On November 3, 2004, Peterson

filed a Rule 32 petition in which he argued that the trial court “violat[ed] double jeopardy

by reinstating a sentence [for felony-murder] after [the indictment for such offense had

been] nolle prossed for reindictment.” Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief - Court Doc. No.

1 at 3. In the instant habeas petition, Peterson continues this challenge to reinstatement of

the sentence for felony-murder. In support of this argument, Peterson asserts that the

sentence violated double jeopardy because “the Alabama Supreme Court only instructed

that the conviction be reinstated, after the record is clear that the indictment was nol pros,

and the sentence execution was stopped.... To reinstate the petitioner’s sentence, clearly

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 3 of 13
 Although Peterson alleges that his sentence for felony-murder is based on a conviction arising from an

1

indictment the trial court nol prossed, this assertion is patently incorrect and refuted by the record before this

court. Instead, the felony-murder conviction arose from the 1997 amended indictment, not the original onecount indictment issued in 1995 for capital murder which indictment the trial court ordered nol prossed upon

motion of the State. Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d 990, 991 (Ala. 2004) (“In 1995, a grand jury returned a

one-count, capital-murder indictment against Peterson for the intentional murder of Allen during the course

of a robbery.... In May 1997, pursuant to a blind plea agreement, Peterson’s indictment was amended to

charge ... (1) felony murder and (2) first degree robbery.”). Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court, acting

on a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Peterson seeking dismissal of the March 2002 indictment and

reinstatement of his felony-murder conviction, vacated the order of the trial court setting aside Peterson’s

felony-murder conviction and mandated dismissal of the March 2002 reindictment. Id. at 994. The court

therefore specifically directed the trial court “to reinstate [Peterson’s] conviction for felony murder.” Id. In

so doing, the Alabama Supreme Court determined “[t]he trial court had jurisdiction ... to accept the guilty

plea to felony murder on the amended indictment, but it had no authority to accept the March 2002

reindictment.” Id. In light of this action by the Alabama Supreme Court, it is as though the dismissal of

Peterson’s felony murder conviction and subsequent reindictment never occurred. 

4

after his sentence had been nol pros, and Peterson re-indicted, violates the principles of

double jeopardy.” Amendment to Petition for Habeas Corpus Reilef at 3-4. 

1

The trial court summarily dismissed Peterson’s November 3, 2004 Rule 32 petition.

Peterson appealed the denial of this Rule 32 petition and the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals issued a memorandum opinion on March 4, 2005 affirming the trial court’s

decision to deny post-conviction relief. Respondents Exhibit D - Peterson v. State, 925

So.2d 1019 (Ala.Crim.App.) (table decision), cert. denied, Ex parte Peterson, 926 So.2d

385 (Ala. 2005). This memorandum opinion, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

[Peterson] argues that the trial court improperly reinstated his sentence

for the felony-murder conviction. In its order dismissing the petition, the

circuit court found as follows: 

“Petitioner’s conviction for felony murder was reinstated by

the Court at the direction of the Alabama Supreme Court. The

petitioner makes a bare accusation that this court erred in

reinstating the original sentence for the conviction when the

Alabama Supreme Court did not order the sentence to be

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 4 of 13
5

reinstated.

“... This court had the authority to sentence the

petitioner in accordance with [the] statutory range for the

convicted offense. When the Alabama Supreme Court ordered

that this court reinstate the original conviction, this court also

had the responsibility to reinstate the sentence the petitioner

received for the offense. The sentence imposed on the

petitioner was within the statutory authority, so this court had

the proper jurisdiction to impose the sentence on the

petitioner.”

We adopt the circuit court’s findings as part of this memorandum.

Obviously, the trial court was authorized to reinstate [Peterson’s] sentence

when it reinstated his conviction. Therefore, [Peterson’s] argument is

without merit, and the circuit court properly summarily dismissed his

petition..... Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Respondents’ Exhibit D at 2-3 (citation to record omitted). The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals denied Peterson’s application for rehearing on March 25, 2005 and the Alabama

Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari on May 13, 2005. Respondents’

Exhibit E - Ex parte Peterson, 926 So.2d 385 (Ala. 2005) (table decision).

 In their answer to the petition, the respondents argue that Peterson’s challenge to

reinstatement of his sentence for felony-murder does not entitle Peterson to federal habeas

relief because the state courts properly adjudicated this claim on the merits. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-405, 120 S.Ct. 495, 1518-1523 (2000). In support of this

assertion, the respondents maintain that the decisions of the Montgomery County Circuit

Court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in denying Peterson’s 2004 Rule 32

petition are not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law nor an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 5 of 13
6

Upon review of the § 2254 petition, the answer of the respondents, Peterson’s

response to the answer and the opinions issued by the state courts, this court concludes that

no evidentiary hearing is required and that the petition is due to be denied in accordance

with the provisions of Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States

District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

 Peterson’s request for federal habeas relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as

amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Price v. Vincent, 538

U.S. 634, 638, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (2003) (“A habeas petitioner whose claim was

adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he

meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402,

120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518 (2000). Under the requisite provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with

respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal habeas relief from a state

court judgment may not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

In Williams, the Supreme Court held that:

Under the “contrary to” clause a federal court may grant the

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 6 of 13
7

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

529 U.S. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. 1523. The Court explained federal habeas relief is

appropriate when a petitioner demonstrates “that a decision by a state court is ‘contrary to’

... clearly established [Supreme Court] law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless

arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.’ Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed. 2d 389 (2000).” Price, 538 U.S. at 640, 123 S.Ct.

at 1853 (2003). Additionally, federal review in a habeas action “is limited to whether the

state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable in the light of clearly established

federal law. Williams, [529 U.S. at 409],120 S.Ct. at 1521.” Hawkins v. Alabama, 318

F.3d 1302, 1310 (11 Cir. 2003); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11 Cir. 2001), citing th th

Williams, supra (“[F]ederal habeas relief [is] available under the ‘unreasonable application’

standard only if the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

‘objectively unreasonable.’”). A federal district court is not to decide “the correctness per

se ... of the state court decision” but only the “objective reasonableness” of the court’s

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 7 of 13
8

decision. Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11 Cir. 2001). Moreover, “an

th

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of

federal law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (emphasis in original).

“Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 529 U.S. at 411, 120

S.Ct. at 1522.

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court

based its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

determinations of fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a

question of law, this court is not authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo

rather than through the lens of § 2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852. The

Supreme Court admonishes that such evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on federal

habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)....” 538 U.S. at 636, 123 S.Ct. at 1851. 

With respect to Peterson’s claim before this court, the record establishes that the

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 8 of 13
9

state courts addressed the merits of his challenge to reinstatement of the sentence for

felony-murder. During proceedings related to his 2004 Rule 32 petition, both the Circuit

Court of Montgomery County and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals adjudicated this

claim adversely to Peterson on the merits. Specifically, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals, in adopting the decision of the circuit court, determined that “the trial court was

authorized to reinstate [Peterson’s] sentence when it reinstated his conviction. Therefore,

[Peterson’s] argument is without merit....” Respondents’ Exhibit D at 3. The Alabama

Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals. Ex parte Peterson, 926 So.2d 385 (Ala. 2005) (table decision). This court must

therefore review the instant claim in accordance with the directives contained in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

Peterson asserts that reinstatement of his sentence for felony murder is violative of

double jeopardy because the trial court, at one point in the post-conviction proceedings,

“nolle prossed petitioner’s conviction and sentence [for felony-murder] for reindictment

purposes.” Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief - Court Doc. No. 1 at 8. Initially, the court

finds that this claim is based on an erroneous factual predicate. As previously noted, the

Alabama Supreme Court, upon Peterson’s petition for writ of mandamus, reversed the trial

court’s decision to dismiss Peterson’s felony murder conviction and ordered that the

reindictment be dismissed. Ex parte Peterson, 890 So.2d at 993-994. This decision

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 9 of 13
10

nullified the trial court’s order setting aside the felony-murder conviction and voided the

March 2002 reindictment thereby effectively rendering these actions of the trial nonexistent. Thus, Peterson stands convicted of felony-murder in accordance with his guilty

plea to the 1997 amended indictment and his sentence relates only to this conviction.

Contrary to his allegation, no conviction or sentence occurred due to or based on the March

2002 reindictment. 

Additionally, it is clear that the sentence imposed by the state court for felonymurder did not subject Peterson to double jeopardy. “The Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution guarantees that no person ‘shall be subject for the same offence to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,’ U.S. Const. amend. V, and applies to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787, 89 S.Ct.

2056, 2058, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). ‘That guarantee ... consist[s] of three separate

constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense

after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after

conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.’ North

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)

(footnotes omitted), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109

S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).” Williams v. Singletary, 78 F.3d 1510, 1512 (11 Cir. th

1996). Under the present facts of this case, Peterson has been subjected to only one

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 10 of 13
11

conviction, i.e., felony-murder, and one sentence for such conviction. The felony-murder

conviction did not occur after acquittal for this same offense nor did it result from

prosecution for felony-murder after conviction of this same offense or subsequent to

conviction for an offense to which felony-murder is considered a lesser included offense.

Multiple punishments have not been imposed for this conviction. Consequently, imposition

of a single sentence for the felony-murder conviction did not run afoul of the Double

Jeopardy Clause. 

In denying Peterson relief on his double jeopardy challenge to imposition of

sentence after reinstatement of the conviction for felony murder, the state courts did not

“arrive[] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law” nor did the state courts “confront[] a set of facts ... materially indistinguishable from

a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrive[] at a result different from

[Supreme Court] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-406, 120 S.Ct. at 1519-

1520. Consequently, rejection of this claim by the state trial and appellate courts did not

constitute a decision contrary to clearly established federal law. Moreover, a thorough

review of the evidentiary materials submitted in this case establishes that the denial of

Peterson’s challenge to his sentence was objectively reasonable. The decisions issued by

the Circuit Court of Pike County and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals likewise

constituted reasonable determinations of the facts in light of the evidence presented by the

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 11 of 13
12

parties. Peterson is therefore due no relief from this court. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Charles Louis Peterson be DENIED.

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before September 20, 2007 the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 12 of 13
13

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed 

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 10th day of September, 2007.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

Case 2:05-cv-00567-WKW-TFM Document 16 Filed 09/10/07 Page 13 of 13