Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02056/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02056-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORIAN ANGUIANO, 

Petitioner,

Case No. 18-cv-02056-BAS-RBM

ORDER: 

(1)OVERRULING 

OBJECTIONS

[ECF No. 22, 23];

(2)APPROVING AND 

ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

[ECF No. 20];

(3)DENYING PETITION 

[ECF No. 1];

AND

(4)DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

v.

CHARLES CALLAHAN,

Respondent.

Pro se Petitioner Dorian Anguiano filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

(the “Petition”) in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking federal habeas 

relief from his conviction for corporal injury to a spouse or roommate in violation of 

California Penal Code § 273.5(a) and his sentence to a stipulated seven-year term

pursuant to his October 13, 2016 plea agreement in San Diego County Superior 

Court. (ECF No. 1.) In the Petition, Anguiano claims that his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his retained trial counsel 

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miscalculated his true sentence exposure when counsel presented the plea offer to 

Anguiano. Anguiano also claims that his Sixth Amendment right was violated 

because, after Anguiano terminated his retained trial counsel, Anguiano’s courtappointed counsel failed to identify and raise the miscalculation issue in Anguiano’s 

subsequent motion to withdraw the plea, a motion which concerned a different 

alleged misrepresentation by his trial counsel. Anguiano pursued these claims in a 

California state habeas petition. In his presently pending federal Petition, Anguiano 

contends that the California appellate court erred in denying him relief in connection 

with his state habeas petition.

On March 15, 2019, Magistrate Judge Ruth Montenegro issued an extensive 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that recommends denial of the Petition. (ECF 

No. 20.) Anguiano filed a “request to stay” the Petition on March 29, 2019, based on 

his misunderstanding that he has yet to exhaust in state court any ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim regarding the conduct of his court-appointed counsel 

during the motion to withdraw phase. (ECF No. 22.) The filing otherwise disputes 

the R&R’s recommendation to deny the Petition and thus the Court has construed the 

filing as a timely objection to the R&R. (ECF No. 21.) Petitioner filed a second 

timely objection to the R&R. (ECF No. 23.) Respondent has timely replied to 

Anguiano’s filings, and urges the Court to approve and adopt the R&R in its entirety. 

(ECF No. 24.) For the reasons herein, the Court: (1) overrules Petitioner’s objections, 

(2) approves and adopts the R&R, (3) denies the Petition, and (4) declines to issue 

Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND1

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence pursuant to a plea agreement stem from

 

1 No party objects to the R&R’s factual and procedural background. (ECF No. 

20 at 3–8.) The Court approves and adopts the background. For the purposes of the 

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events that took place on August 6, 2016. According to the statement of facts from 

the state appellate court opinion on direct appeal, surveillance video showed 

Anguiano and the victim drive into the parking lot of motel where Anguiano had 

rented a room. Anguiano struck the victim in the face and the victim slumped against 

the passenger side window for several seconds. After the victim got out of the car, 

Anguiano kicked the left side of the victim’s head causing her head to snap back and 

the victim lay motionless on the ground as Anguiano locked the car and walked away. 

The motel manager and his wife called the police after they witnessed the incident 

through a closed-circuit television feed. When the motel manager’s wife confronted 

Anguiano, and told him they were calling the police, Anguiano returned to the car.

He lifted the victim’s limp body from the ground, falling backwards with the victim 

at one point. He put the victim in the car and drove away quickly. See People v. 

Anguiano, No. D071738, 2018 WL 1023867, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

2

 

On August 18, 2016, the state filed a three-count felony complaint charging 

Petitioner with kidnapping in violation of California Penal Code § 207(a) (count 1), 

corporal injury to a spouse or roommate in violation of California Penal Code § 

273.5(a) (count 2), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury in 

violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(4) (count 3). With the assistance of trial 

counsel, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to count 2 on October 13, 2016, in which he 

admitted to the great bodily injury allegations associated with count 2 and agreed to 

a stipulated sentence of seven years of prison, followed by four years of parole, and 

a $10,000 fine. Petitioner subsequently relieved his retained trial counsel. His new

 

present order, the Court highlights certain aspects of the R&R’s background section

and incorporates other background material that appears in the R&R’s analysis, 

material to which no party has objected as well.

2 These facts were taken from the preliminary hearing transcript and the change 

of plea form. Anguiano, 2018 WL 1023867, at *1 n.2.

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court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea on December 27, 2016

in the same trial court that had accepted the plea. Court-appointed counsel contended 

that Petitioner had “mistakenly relied on [a] representation by his attorney that he 

would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea at any time prior to sentencing.” The 

trial court denied the motion after a hearing on February 3, 2017 in which Petitioner’s 

prior trial counsel provided testimony that the trial court found credible. The trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to seven years, as stipulated. On direct appeal, a California 

appellate court affirmed on February 3, 2018, over appointed appellate counsel’s 

contention that the denial of the motion to withdraw was an abuse of discretion. 

Thereafter, Anguiano’s appointed appellate counsel filed a state habeas 

petition on March 20, 2018 in California state appellate court, seeking relief on the 

ground that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

was violated. The state appellate court denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition on 

March 28, 2018. The Court reasoned that Petitioner had forfeited the claim regarding 

his trial counsel because he could have but did not raise the miscalculation issue in 

his motion to withdraw the plea and, in the alternative, the claim failed on the merits. 

(Lodgment No. 12, In re Anguiano, No. D073694, slip op. at 2–3.) The court also 

determined that Anguiano’s claim regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of his 

court-appointed counsel during the motion to withdraw phase failed because 

Anguiano could not “avoid procedural bars to habeas corpus relief” and “Anguiano 

has not shown counsel on the plea withdrawal motion performed deficiently and 

thereby prejudiced Anguiano.” (Id.) The California Supreme Court summarily 

denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the appellate court’s denial of state habeas 

relief. 

Anguiano now seeks federal habeas relief, raising the same substantive 

arguments and grounds for relief that the California appellate court considered and 

rejected. (ECF No. 1.) Magistrate Judge Ruth Montenegro recommends denial of 

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federal habeas relief on all claims raised in the Petition. (ECF No. 20.) The Court 

turns to the recommendations to which Petitioner objects.

LEGAL STANDARD

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition”

of a magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions 

of the report. . . to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The statute 

makes it clear,” however, “that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s 

findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 

(emphasis in original). 

DISCUSSION

Magistrate Judge Montenegro distilled the Petition into three claims3: (1) 

Anguiano contends that his retained trial counsel miscalculated his true exposure as 

fourteen years, instead of ten years and eight months (Claim One); (2) Anguiano 

contends that his court-appointed counsel failed to discover his retained trial 

counsel’s error and thus did not raise it in the motion to withdraw the plea agreement 

Anguiano pursued (Claim Two); and (3) Anguiano contends that the California 

appellate court erred in its review of the record when it denied Anguiano’s state 

habeas petition, at least insofar as it concerns his claim for habeas relief concerning 

his trial counsel’s conduct (Claim Three). (ECF No. 20 at 8.) 

 

3

Judge Montenegro noted that Petitioner contended that these issues presented 

“one cohesive claim” all concerning his fundamental contention that he did not 

receive effective assistance of counsel in connection with his plea agreement and 

attempt to withdraw his plea, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (ECF No. 20 at 

8.) In an abundance of caution and based on the Petition’s identification of each as a 

separate claim, Judge Montenegro addressed the issues as separate claims. 

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As Judge Montenegro correctly acknowledged, Petitioner’s claims are subject 

to two interlocking standards of review in this Court because a state court has already 

adjudicated Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the merits. (Id. 

at 9–10.) First, when a state court has already addressed the merits of a claim later

raised again in a federal habeas petition, the petitioner must demonstrate that the state 

court adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). Second, even if 

Section 2254(d) is satisfied, the petitioner must show that a federal constitutional 

violation occurred to obtain relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–22 (2007); Frantz 

v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

Here, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are subject to the 

clearly established law set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 

which (1) “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and 

(2) requires Petitioner to also show prejudice, which means that “counsel’s errors 

were so serious as to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Id. at 687. The California state court applied the Strickland standard in its review of 

Petitioner’s state habeas petition and this standard necessarily undergirds Judge 

Montenegro’s analysis of Petitioner’s federal Petition as well. Together, Section 

2254(d) and the Strickland standard establish a “doubly” and “highly deferential” 

standard of review in this Court for Petitioner’s claims. Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 105 (2011).

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Pursuant to the applicable standards of review, Judge Montenegro concluded 

that Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits. The crux of Petitioner’s claim for federal 

habeas relief, Judge Montenegro’s analysis, and Petitioner’s objections concern

Claim One.4 Petitioner also objects to Judge Montenegro’s analysis for Claim Two 

on that ground that the claim is unexhausted and “directs” the Court to his request to 

stay the entire Petition. (ECF No. 23 at 20.) The Court addresses these issues in turn

and agrees with Judge Montenegro’s analysis and recommendation to deny the 

Petition.

A. Claim One and Petitioner’s Objections

Judge Montenegro determined that Claim One should fail on its merits 

regardless of whether Petitioner procedurally defaulted on the claim in state court.

5

 

(ECF No. 20 at 13–17 (observing that the procedural default analysis effectively 

collapsed into the merits inquiry for Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim.) As Judge Montenegro observed, the state appellate court denied Petitioner 

state habeas relief on the basis of Petitioner’s inability to establish Strickland 

prejudice, which requires Petitioner to “show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

 

4

Judge Montenegro concluded that Claim Three “is a restatement of 

[Petitioner’s] argument why he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to 

properly advise him regarding his maximum sentence exposure” and thus 

recommended denial of the claim for the reasons set forth in Claim One. (ECF No. 

20 at 33.) Petitioner does not object to this conclusion. The Court agrees with Judge 

Montenegro’s conclusion and will not separately address Claim Three apart from 

Claim One.

5 Petitioner contends that the California appellate court was “wrong in the law 

and in the facts” when it determined that Petitioner had forfeited Claim One. (ECF 

No. 22 at 11–12.) To the extent this is an objection, the Court overrules it because 

Judge Montenegro expressly proceeded to the merits of Claim one irrespective of any 

forfeiture. 

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on going to trial.” (Id. at 22 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).) Based 

on its review of the record, the California appellate court concluded that there is no 

“objective evidence” to corroborate Petitioner’s claim that he would not have entered 

into the plea agreement and would have instead gone to trial if he had known his 

maximum exposure was only ten years and eight months rather than fourteen years. 

Reviewing the conduct underlying the three charges against the Petitioner in 

the state court criminal complaint, the evidence regarding the plea agreement, and

statements by the trial court at the sentencing hearing, Judge Montenegro agreed. 

Judge Montenegro reasoned that (1) Petitioner “has not shown he had a viable 

defense to any of the charges regarding [the] videotaped encounter at the motel” that 

resulted in the criminal charges and (2) the record does not show a “plausible basis” 

that Petitioner’s reluctance to accept the seven-year offer based on his concern over 

separation from his daughters and his “obdurate belief he was the victim” “would 

have led him to insist on going to trial had he known he was agreeing to serve twothirds of his maximum sentence exposure rather than one-half[.]” (Id. at 24–26.) 

Judge Montenegro underscored that if he had gone to trial, Petitioner “faced certain 

conviction” that most likely would have resulted in “an additional 44 months in 

prison” compared to his stipulated sentence. (Id. at 25.) Judge Montenegro

concluded that, “[i]n light of the high level of deference this Court gives to the state 

court application of Strickland,” “the state court adjudication is not contrary to, nor 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts.” (ECF No. 20 at 27.) 

Petitioner essentially raises two objections. First, Petitioner objects to a 

portion of the R&R in which Judge Montenegro quoted from a California state court 

decision, People v. Johnson, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Petitioner 

contends that the R&R “incorrectly identifies that Johnson’s trial counsel 

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miscalculated defendant’s maximum potential sentence by 11 years” and then 

Petitioner objects that his case is like Johnson. (ECF No. 23 at 12–13.) The Court 

overrules this objection. Setting aside that Judge Montenegro merely quoted from 

the California appellate decision on Petitioner’s state habeas petition, Petitioner finds 

error where none exists. The Johnson defendant “claim[ed] ineffective assistance of 

counsel” on the ground that “his original attorney miscalculated his maximum 

potential sentence by 11 years[.]” Johnson, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1355. The Johnson

defendant claimed an 11-year miscalculation because he contended “his maximum 

sentence was 27 years, not, [as his trial counsel] stated, 38 years[.]” Id. This 

miscalculation error—which computes to an 11-year difference—was expressly 

conceded by the state. Id. In denying Petitioner’s state habeas petition, the California 

appellate court accurately cited and discussed Johnson in its review of Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Consequently, the R&R does not err in its 

inclusion of this discussion. 

More substantively, Petitioner’s second objection is that he has established a 

fair probability that he would not have entered into the plea agreement if he had been 

properly informed of his true maximum exposure and, consequently, the California 

appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts of his case. (ECF No. 23 

at 14–20.) Petitioner contends that he was not “fully aware of the actual value he was 

receiving by accepting the prosecution’s 7-year offer.” (ECF No. 23 at 15.)

Petitioner further contends that Judge Montenegro failed to account for certain facts

that appeared in his trial counsel’s testimony at the plea withdrawal hearing, which 

Petitioner contends support his contentions. (ECF No. 22 at 7–9.) The Court 

overrules this objection.

To begin, Petitioner’s objection that Judge Montenegro failed to account for 

the facts he identifies is incorrect because the R&R expressly identifies the statements 

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by his trial counsel at the plea withdrawal hearing on which Anguiano relies in his 

objection. (Compare ECF No. 20 at 19–20 with ECF No. 22 at 7–9.) Having

otherwise conducted a de novo review of the Petition, Traverse, Lodgments, the 

R&R, Petitioner’s objections, and Respondent’s reply, the Court agrees with Judge 

Montenegro’s conclusion that Petitioner has failed to establish that the California 

appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts of his case when it 

concluded that the record lacked objective evidence to substantiate Petitioner’s claim. 

First, as the California appellate court concluded, the absence of objective 

evidence to substantiate Petitioner’s claim that he would not have entered into the 

plea agreement if he had received competent advice renders Petitioner’s 

circumstances different from those of the Johnson defendant. (Lodgment No. 12, In 

re Anguiano, No. D073694, slip op. at 2-3.) In Johnson, the “defendant believed he 

may have cut his sentence almost by half, from a potential 38 years to 20, which 

under any circumstances would be a powerful inducement to plead.” Johnson, 36 

Cal. App. 4th at 1358. The fact that Petitioner believed he was saving seven years 

when in reality he was “only” saving three years and eight months is not akin to the 

“powerful inducement” to plead that was present in Johnson. The record otherwise 

does not show a plausible connection between the identified concerns he had and the 

length of time that the state offered as part of the plea.

Second, and more critically, Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim otherwise 

fails because, as Judge Montenegro properly concluded, there is no reasonable 

probability that Petitioner’s knowledge of the true exposure would have made a 

difference in the outcome of the proceedings. (ECF No. 20 at 24–25.) “[C]ounsel’s 

ineffectiveness is only a basis for vacating a conviction if there is a reasonable 

probability it would have made a difference to the outcome of the proceeding.” 

Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

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694). In the context of a guilty plea, this requires a case-by-case examination of the 

totality of the evidence. Id. at 285–86 (citing Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 

1966 (2017)). “Overwhelming evidence” on the charged offenses and lack of a viable 

defense other the defendant’s own testimony “weighs against a finding of prejudice.” 

United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 726–27 (5th Cir. 2014). After a review of the 

elements of the criminal charges against Petitioner and cases similar to the evidence 

in the record, Judge Montenegro properly concluded that if Petitioner had gone to 

trial, he “faced certain conviction” that would have likely resulted in “an additional 

44 months in prison” compared to his stipulated sentence. (ECF No. 20 at 25.) 

Having reviewed the record, the Court agrees with Judge Montenegro’s conclusion.

In short, Petitioner has not overcome the “doubly deferential” standards of 

Section 2254(d) and Strickland to show that he is entitled to federal habeas relief on 

Claim One. Accordingly, the Court approves and adopts Judge Montenegro’s 

recommendation to deny the Petition as to this claim.6

B. Claim Two and Petitioner’s Request to Stay

Judge Montenegro determined that Claim Two fails for the same reasons as 

Claim One, specifically that the state court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s claim 

regarding the conduct of his court-appointed counsel during the motion to withdraw 

phase was consistent with Strickland and Petitioner has failed to show that the state 

court finding was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (ECF No. 20 

at 31–32.) 

 

6

Judge Montenegro recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s request for 

an evidentiary hearing on Claim One on the ground that the claim can be resolved on 

the state court record. (ECF No. 20 at 27.) Petitioner does not object to this 

recommendation. Having reviewed the record and R&R, the Court agrees with Judge 

Montenegro’s recommendation. 

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Petitioner objects to the R&R’s analysis for Claim Two on the ground that the 

claim is not exhausted and requires a stay of the Petition so he can return to state 

court. (ECF No. 22 at 6–7; ECF No. 23 at 20.) The Court overrules this objection 

and denies Petitioner’s request. Based on a review of the state habeas petition filed 

by Petitioner’s state appellate counsel and a review of the California appellate court’s 

decision on Petitioner’s state habeas petition, Judge Montenegro expressly 

determined that Petitioner exhausted Claim Two in state court and thus assessed the 

merits of Petitioner’s claim. (ECF No. 20 at 28–30.) After a de novo review of the 

record, the Court agrees with Judge Montenegro’s conclusion. Petitioner’s request

to stay is therefore denied as moot. Although the Court has no obligation to otherwise 

review Judge Montenegro’s conclusions and recommendations regarding Claim 

Two, see Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121, the Court has conducted a de novo review 

and agrees with Judge Montenegro’s conclusions. Accordingly, the Court approves 

and adopts Judge Montenegro’s recommendation to deny the Petition as to this claim. 

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

Objections (ECF Nos. 22, 23), (2) APPROVES AND ADOPTS the R&R (ECF No. 

20), and (3) DENIES the Petition, (ECF No. 1). The Court DECLINES to issue 

Petitioner a certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made the requisite 

showing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 

2013) (observing that in order for a court to exercise its discretion to issue a certificate

of appealability, the petitioner must make a threshold showing that: (1) the issues are 

debatable among jurists of reason, (2) that a court could resolve the issues in a 

different manner, or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 13, 2019

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