Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00443/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00443-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

UC ACQUISITION CORP., doing )

business as UNICARE, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 3:11-cv-443-MEF

) (WO—Do not publish)

)

v. )

)

SALEM NURSING & REHAB )

CENTER OF TUSKEGEE, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff Unicare’s Motion for Default

Judgment (Doc. # 8). The Clerk of Court has already entered default against the

defendant, Salem Nursing & Rehab Center of Tuskegee (Doc. # 10), meaning that all

well-pled factual allegations against Salem Nursing have been deemed admitted. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(a); Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987). The Court

must therefore accept these facts as true and determine whether they state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266

(11th Cir. 2003). After thoroughly reviewing the pleadings and the contract between the

parties, the Court finds that Unicare has stated valid claims against Salem Nursing.

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 The Court should note its concern about the timing of the lawsuit. The contract between the

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parties went into effect sometime around 1998 or 1999 and, by its terms, ended in 2001. Yet Unicare

waited until 2011 to file suit for breach. This delay by Unicare triggers statute of limitations concerns,

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Accordingly, Unicare is entitled to have default judgment entered in its favor.

Once a court determines that it should enter a default judgment on liability, it then

turns to damages. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1364 n.27 (11th

Cir. 1997). “If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment . . . it is necessary to take an

account or to determine the amount of damages . . . the court may conduct such hearings

or order such references as it deems necessary and proper . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

But a hearing is not always required. The Court can award damages without one where

the “amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation,” or

if there is “a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.”

Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th

Cir. 1985).

Here, the contract at issue, which Unicare has attached as an exhibit, does not

contain a liquidated damages clause. Instead, the contract required Unicare to submit

invoices to Salem for the amounts owed as they came due. Although Unicare has

especially considering how Alabama has a six-year limitations period for contract claims. See Ala. Code

§ 6-2-34(9). But these concerns are not for the Court’s consideration. In fact, because the statute of

limitations is an affirmative defense (and a waivable one at that), the Court cannot properly raise the

issue on its own motion. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412–13 (2000) (stating courts should

raise statute of limitations defense on own motion only in narrow circumstances); Erline Co. S.A. v.

Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654–56 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding district court erred by considering statute of

limitations defense on its own motion after plaintiff moved for default judgment); Haskell v. Wash. Twp.,

864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Since it is a waivable defense, it ordinarily is error for a district

court to raise the [statute of limitations] sua sponte.”); Davis v. Bryan, 810 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1987)

(concluding sua sponte consideration of statute of limitations an “error of law”); Wagner v. Fawcett

Publ’ns, 307 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1962) (observing that statute of limitations is “a personal privilege

of the defendant,” and that district court erred in raising it sua sponte). Consequently, the Court has

ignored Unicare’s delay for the purposes of deciding its motion for default judgment.

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submitted an affidavit claiming that Salem owes $181,918.61, the document lacks the

detail necessary for the Court, without further proof, to award damages in the claimed

amount. See, e.g., Adolf Coors, 777 F.2d at 1543 (requiring documentary evidence or

detailed affidavits before district court can dispense with evidentiary hearing); United

Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (“ . . . a judgment by default

may not be entered without a hearing unless the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or

one capable of mathematical calculation.”). As a result, the Court will have a hearing on

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the matter at a later date, and Unicare will have the opportunity to prove its damages then.

Unicare also seems to request attorneys’ fees, accrued interest, and costs of

collection in its motion for default judgment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

however, only allow a court to order the payment of “costs other than attorney’s

fees . . . to the prevailing party . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). To get

attorneys’ fees after winning a default judgment, a federal statute—like Title VII, for

example—has to expressly provide for their recovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Because

Unicare has failed to show that federal law allows it to recover attorneys’ fees, its motion

is denied to the extent that it asks for them. Similarly, the motion is denied insofar as it

seeks to recover costs outside the purview of either the contract or the relevant federal

statute expressly allowing for the recovery of certain specified costs. See 28 U.S.C. §

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh 2

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down before the close of business

on September 30, 1981.

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1920 (allowing party to recover costs listed); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,

482 U.S. 437, 441–42 (1987) (holding that party prevailing on Rule 54 motion can

recover “costs” listed in 28 U.S.C. §1920).

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Unicare’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 8) is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART. It is granted to the extent that it seeks a default

judgment; it is denied to the extent that it requests attorneys’ fees and extracontractual damages.

2. Default judgment is ENTERED against Salem Nursing & Rehab Center of

Tuskegee, Inc. on liability for breach of contract.

3. A hearing is set for February 22, 2012 at 9:00 A.M. in the United States

Courthouse, One Church Street, Courtroom 2A, Montgomery, Alabama, to

determine Unicare’s damages stemming from Salem’s breach of contract

and what costs, if any, Unicare can recover.

DONE this the 12 day of January, 2012.

th

/s/ Mark E. Fuller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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