Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01665/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01665-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

 TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Ellis Eugene Pittman, who is confined in an Arizona State Prison, has 

filed a pro se Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. (Doc. 13.) In 2012, Petitioner was in custody on state charges, and subsequently 

writ (but not released) to federal custody in Kentucky. Petitioner was sentenced in his 

federal case, and returned to Arizona. Petitioner was then sentenced in Arizona, with an 

order that his state sentence be served concurrently with his federal sentence. The trial 

court ordered Petitioner’s transfer to federal custody, but that order was not enforced and 

Petitioner remains in state custody. Petitioner is now essentially serving a consecutive 

sentence. The trial court’s failure to rule on Petitioner’s subsequent motion that he be 

transferred to federal custody is a violation of federal law, which requires that state courts 

enforce their contractual plea obligations. The Court recommends Petitioner’s and 

Respondents’ request on Ground One be granted. 

Ellis Eugene Pittman, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

No. CV-14-1665-PHX-GMS (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 1 of 10
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Trial Court Proceedings 

On November 21, 2012, the State of Arizona indicted Petitioner for two counts of 

aggravated assault. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. B, at 6.) On November 1, 2012, a grand jury in the 

Eastern District of Kentucky indicted Petitioner on two counts of Possession with Intent 

to Distribute Controlled Substances. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. C, at 9.) On January 17, 2013, the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky issued a writ of habeas 

corpus ad prosequendum ordering Petitioner to be brought to Kentucky to face federal 

prosecution. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. D, at 13.) On September 9, 2013, Petitioner pleaded guilty in 

district court to Attempted Possession with Intent to Distribute and Possession of a 

Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Offense. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. E, at 16.) On 

September 10, 2013, the district court sentenced Petitioner, in 12 CR 20-DLB-2, to 215 

days of time served for the attempted distribution count and to a consecutive term of 60 

months’ imprisonment for the firearms count. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. F, at 24.) 

 Petitioner was transferred back to Arizona, and subsequently pleaded guilty on 

January 15, 2014, to one count of Aggravated Assault. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. G, at 31.) The plea 

stipulated that Petitioner’s sentence run concurrently with his Eastern District of 

Kentucky sentence. (Id.) On February 20, 2014, the court sentenced Petitioner to six 

years of imprisonment with 505 days credit for time served. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. I, at 2.) 

Petitioner’s order of confinement required that his state sentence would be “concurrent” 

with his federal sentence and that he was “to be housed in federal custody.” (Doc. 17-1, 

Ex. H, at 35.) 

 Petitioner was not transferred to federal custody and remains in the custody of the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. 

 B. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 Petitioner filed motions in the trial court requesting the court order his transport to 

federal custody. (Doc. 17-1, Exs. J and K, at 43-48.) The court declined to take action on 

the motions due to a problem with service. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. L, at 49.) On August 4, 2014, 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 2 of 10
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner filed a motion in the trial court requesting he be transferred to federal custody. 

(Doc. 17-1, Ex. M, at 51.) That motion was not ruled upon. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. R, at 82.) 

 On April 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a “Petition for Order Shortening Time” in the 

District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. (Doc. 17-2, Ex. N, at 62.) The court 

denied Petitioner’s request because Petitioner had not commenced his federal sentence. 

(Doc. 17-1, Ex. P, at 71-72.) 

 C. Federal Habeas Proceedings 

 Petitioner filed a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) He later received 

leave to amend his petition. (Doc. 3, 5.) On April 30, 2015, Petitioner filed the present 

Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 13.) 

 In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the “Maricopa County Superior Court . . . 

violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights” when it failed to ensure Petitioner’s transfer to 

federal custody. (Doc. 13 at 6.) In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance 

of counsel when his attorney failed to ensure that Petitioner would be immediately 

transferred to federal custody to begin serving his concurrent sentences. (Id.) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

Here, Respondents, to their credit, “waive and will not assert the affirmative 

defense of procedural default.” (Doc. 17 at 4.) Respondents have the right to waive this 

requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“A State shall not be deemed to have waived 

the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 3 of 10
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.”). 

III. Merits Review 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).1

 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is 

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Further, under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas 

relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings 

of the Supreme Court in effect at the time the state court rendered its decision. Greene v. 

Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (“A legal 

principle is ‘clearly established’ within the meaning of this provision only when it is 

embodied in a holding of this Court.”). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly 

established precedent if (1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

 

1

 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date, 

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 4 of 10
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). 

 “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable 

application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but applies that 

rule to the facts of a particular case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a 

federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. 

A. Ground One – Failure of Court to Enforce Petitioner’s Agreement 

 In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the “Maricopa County Superior Court . . . 

violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights” when it failed to ensure Petitioner’s transfer to 

federal custody. (Doc. 13 at 6.) The Court agrees. 

 Petitioner’s state agreement required that his state sentence be served concurrently 

with his federal sentence. The trial court imposed a concurrent sentence and ordered 

Petitioner be transferred to federal custody. Petitioner has not, however, been transported 

to federal custody. Instead, Petitioner remains in state custody and is serving a de facto

consecutive sentence because his federal sentence does not begin until he is transferred to 

federal custody. The production of a defendant in state custody to federal court pursuant 

to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not constitute the commencement of a 

sentence under federal law. Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444–45 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Rather, the state retains primary jurisdiction over the prisoner, and federal custody 

commences only when the state authorities relinquish the prisoner upon satisfaction of 

the state term. Taylor, 164 F.3d at 445. 

 Petitioner is entitled the enforcement of his state plea agreement. “[D]ue process 

rights conferred by the federal constitution allow [a defendant] to enforce the terms of 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 5 of 10
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

[his] plea agreement.” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). When a plea 

agreement rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 

such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 

 The state court failed to enforce Petitioner’s plea when it failed to rule upon his 

motion that he be transported to federal custody. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. R, at 82.) Respondents 

agree Petitioner’s motion has not been ruled upon. (Doc. 17 at 3.) Petitioner is entitled to 

have the state court enforce his sentence. The question before the Court is whether the 

trial court’s refusal to specifically enforce the terms of Petitioner’s plea agreement was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, or was based 

upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in violation of Petitioner’s due process 

rights. 

 The Court determines that the trial court’s failure to enforce its own plea is an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Davis v. Woodford, 446 

F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a denial of petitioner’s Santobello claim 

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent 

“within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)”); Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 699 

(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (ordering specific performance of state plea bargain). 

 The Court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief. 

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, federal 

courts are authorized to dispose of habeas corpus matters “as law and justice require.” 

“Conceptually, any habeas remedy ‘should put the defendant back in the position he 

would have been in if the [constitutional] violation never occurred.’” Nunes v. Mueller, 

350 F.3d 1045, 1056–57 (9thCir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 

1468 (9th Cir. 1994)). An adequate remedy “must ‘neutralize the taint’ of a 

constitutional violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or 

needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal 

prosecution.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388–89 (2012) (quoting United States v. 

Morrison, 409 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)). 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 6 of 10
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim, but only to 

cure the violation. This will place Petitioner back in the position he would have been 

absent the error and abides by the mandate in Lafler not to create a windfall for either 

party and not squander the resources of the State. 

B. Ground Two – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel when his 

attorney failed to ensure that Petitioner would be immediately transferred to federal 

custody to begin serving his concurrent sentences. (Doc. 13 at 6.) Claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency 

prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687–88. Under the mandate of Strickland, Petitioner’s trial 

counsel is subject to a presumption of competency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “A 

court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that 

counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

Petitioner also bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the Court 

can conclude his counsel was ineffective. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 878 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 Here, Petitioner has not established that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. The record is devoid of information regarding 

counsel’s conduct after the sentencing in this matter. Counsel obtained a favorable plea 

for Petitioner. Counsel ensured the trial court order that the state sentence run 

concurrently with Petitioner’s federal sentence. The Court does not know when counsel 

withdrew from the case, and what actions were taken by counsel after sentencing. 

Petitioner has not satisfied his burden regarding Ground Two. 

IV. Remedy 

The Court concurs with Petitioner’s and Respondents’ request that Petitioner’s 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 7 of 10
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

trial court sentence be vacated except for 290 days of credit for time served. The District 

Court has the authority to order such a remedy. See also, Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 

1026, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding with instructions to grant a writ with respect 

to defendant’s sentence). As Respondents correctly state, if the Court vacated Petitioner’s 

entire sentence, then Petitioner would receive all of his time served as credit against his 

federal case. Petitioner would receive a windfall. If the Court vacated the sentence and 

granted Petitioner 505 days of credit for time served, then all of those days would be 

calculated against his state sentence and he would receive no credit for his state custody. 

As Respondents request, the “solution, then, is to give Petitioner the difference between 

his state and federal time-served. That difference is 290 days (505-215=290). This 

ensures that Petitioner will receive the credit for time-served that he deserves under both 

sentences while preventing him from receiving a shorter sentence than he bargained for.” 

(Doc. 17 at 8-9, fn. 1.)2

 Respondents assert that upon transfer to federal custody, the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons should give Petitioner credit for his time served in state custody. (Doc. 17 at 9.) 

Respondents will support this request. (Id.) 

 Based on its review of Petitioner’s claims, as set forth above, the Court finds that 

an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. 

 Respondents request the Court retain jurisdiction over this matter until Petitioner 

has received credit against his federal sentence. (Doc. 17 at 10.) The Court recommends 

that jurisdiction be extended for a period of six months to allow the parties time to 

remedy Petitioner’s prejudice. This is sufficient time to ensure the state sentence is 

amended, and Petitioner is transferred. Any issues regarding Petitioner’s calculation of 

federal credit is matter for the Eastern District of Kentucky. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court recommends that Petitioner’s sentence in 

 

2

 The Court again acknowledges Respondents’ fairness in seeking a just resolution in this matter. 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 8 of 10
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Count One of CR 2012-147441-001 SE (Aggravated Assault, a Class 3 Dangerous 

Felony) be amended to 290 days of imprisonment with 290 days of credit for time served. 

The Court may order this amendment even though that sentence is lower than Arizona 

law provides. See Buckley, 441 F.3d at 699–700 (ordering reduction of a habeas corpus 

petitioner’s prison sentence to 15 years, the term the state agreed to recommend, even 

though California law does not permit such a sentence for the offense). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 13) be GRANTED as to 

Ground One (amending Petitioner’s sentence in CR 2012-147441-001 SE (Aggravated 

Assault, a Class 3 Dangerous Felony) to 290 days of imprisonment with 290 days of 

credit for time served). 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Ground Two of the Second Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 13) be DENIED

and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order the State of Arizona 

to transfer Petitioner to federal custody for Petitioner to begin serving his five-year 

sentence in 12-CR-20-DLB-2 (Eastern District of Kentucky). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court retain jurisdiction over this 

matter for six months, absent further request of the parties. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with regard to Ground 

Two. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 9 of 10
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 28th day of December, 2015. 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-01665-GMS Document 18 Filed 12/28/15 Page 10 of 10