Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02417/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02417-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

---

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

)luitdt ;States (lfourt nf j\ppeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

TELEPHONE 

CLERK 

March 4, 1988 

< 303 > 844·31S7 

<FTS> 564•3157 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 85-2417 - Vernon Rambo and Bonnie Rambo vs. American · Southern Insurance Company, et al 

Filed February 26, 1988 by Judge Stephen H. Anderson 

Attached are new pages 5 and 6 to be substituted for pages 

5 and 6 in the original opinion which was sent to you on February 

26, 1988. 

RLH:afw 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

L. Clerk 

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 1 
inquiries under the state statute and due process principles can 

be conducted as one analysis.") (citation omitted). 

We have outlined the general test for personal jurisdiction 

under the federal Constitution many times. 

"A federal court sitting in diversity 'may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only 

so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the 

defendant and the forum state.' World-Wide Volkswagen 

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting 

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 

(1945)). 'The defendant's contacts with the forum State 

musf be such that maintenance of the suit "does not 

offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.'"' World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 

292 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 

(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). 

The sufficiency of a defendant's contacts must be 

evaluated by examining the defendant's conduct and 

connections with the forum state to assess whether the 

defendant has 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum 

State.' Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)." 

_F_i_r_s_t __ C_i_t_y~_B_a_n_k, 820 F.2d at 1130-31; _s_e_e _a_l_s_o Jones v. 3M Co., 

107 F.R.D. 202, 205-06 (D.N.M. 1984). 

Appellate review of district court decisions on questions of 

jurisdiction was explained in Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n 

of the United States, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 471 U.S. 1010 (1985): 

"The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Prior to 

trial, however, when a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction is decided on the basis of affidavits and 

other written materials, the plaintiff need only make a 

prima facie showing. The allegations in the complaint 

must be taken as true to the extent they are 

uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the 

parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual 

disputes are resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the 

plaintiff's prima facie showing is sufficient 

notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving 

party." 

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Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 2 
(citations omitted); see also Ten Mile Indus. Park v. Western 

Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987), We 

review a district court's ruling on a jurisdictional question de 

novo. Ten Mile Indus. Park, 810 F.2d at 1524. Thus, our task is 

to determine whether the plaintiffs' allegations, as supported by 

affidavits, make a prima facie showing of the minimum contacts 

necessary to establish jurisdiction over each defendant. 3 

Jurisdiction over corporations may be either general or 

specific. Jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of 

or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state is 

"specific jurisdiction." In contrast, when the suit does not 

arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum 

and jurisdiction is based on the defendant's presence or 

accumulated contacts with the forum, the court exercises "general 

jurisdiction." See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

473 n.15 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft 

Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987). Here, there are no 

allegations that any of the three defendants have the continuous 

or systematic contacts with Oklahoma that would permit the 

exercise of general jurisdiction. Each of the alleged contacts is 

related to the insurance policy and the Rambos' claim. We review 

the contacts between each of the defendants and Oklahoma to 

3 We reject the Rambos' argument that the contacts of any of 

the three defendants can somehow be aggregated to support jurisdiction over all. It is clear that "due process requirements for 

personal jurisdiction must be met as to each individual 

Defendant." Jones v. 3M Co., 107 F.R.D. 202, 204 (D.N.M. 1984) 

(citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 334 (1980)). 

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Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 3 
PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 61988 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

VERNON and BONNIE RAMBO, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) No. 85-2417 

AMERICAN SOUTHERN INSURANCE 

COMPANY, MID SOUTH CLAIM 

SERVICES, INC., and W.T.R., 

I:NC. , 

Defendants/Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-85-1077-A) 

Robert T. Keel, Keel and Kulmacz, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiffs/Appellants. 

Cary E. Hiltgen, Law Offices of B.J. Cooper, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees. 

Before LOGAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,* District 

Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* Hon. John E. Conway, U.S. District Court, District of ~ew 

Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 4 
Vernon and Bonnie Rambo, plaintiffs below, appeal the 

dismissal of their action against American Southern Insurance 

Company, Mid South Claim Services, Inc., a_nd W.T.R. Inc., for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. we affirm. 

I• 

In November 1984, the Rambos insured their 197p International 

tractor-trailer truck with defendant American Southern Insurance 

Company ("American"). American is a Georgia corporation. The 

Rambos were residents of Alabama at the time the. insurance 

contract was executed. The truck was leased to an Alabama freight 

company for cross-country hauling. Shortly thereafter, the Rambos 

moved to Texas. In December 1984, while the Rambos were living in 

Texas, the truck was stolen in California. The Rambos reported 

the theft to American. American employed defendant Mid South 

Claim Services, Inc. ("Mid South") to investigate and settle the 

claim. Mid South is also a Georgia corporation. After the truck 

was .stolen and the claim filed, the Rambos moved to Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma. Subsequently, the truck was recovered, but it was 

damaged. According to the Rambos, Mid South agreed to deliver the 

truck to Oklahoma City for repairs. However, Mid South hired 

defendant W.T.R., Inc. ("WTR"), a Texas corporation, to make the 

repairs and had the truck taken to Texas for the repair work. 

During this period, Mid South wrote several letters to the Rambos 

and also discussed the claim with the Rambos over the telephone. 

The Rambos were ~nhappy that the truck was repaired in Texas, and 

when they picked it up, the repairs were neither satisfactory nor 

-2-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 5 
complete. 

The Rambos filed this action against American, Mid South and 

WTR in the federal district court for the Western District ~f 

Oklahoma alleging breach of contract and failure to deal in good 

faith. All three defendants appeared specially, objecting to the 

court's jurisdiction over them and filing motions to quash and 

dismiss. Each defendant filed an affidavit asserting that it had 

no business relationship with the state of Oklahoma: no office, 

no employees, no property, in short, nothing constituting a 

presence or contact in the forum state. In response, the Rambos 

offered the letters written to them in Oklahoma City by Mid South 

and an affidavit alleging "eight or ten telephone conversations 

with American Southern and/or Mid South after we moved to 

Oklahoma." R. Supp. Vol. I. 1 The district court granted the 

defendants' motions and dismissed the actions. This appeal 

followed. 

II. 

This appeal presents only one issue: could the district 

court in Oklahoma exercise personal jurisdiction over the 

nonresident corporate defendants? 

"Whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant in a diversity action is determined by the 

law of the forum state." Yarbrough v. Elmer Bunker & Assocs., 669 

F.2d 614, 616 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). 

1 By affidavit, American denies having made any contacts in 

Oklahoma regarding the Rambo policy. Brief of Appellees, Exhibit 

"C," at 2. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 6 
"The test for exercising long-arm jurisdiction in Oklahoma is to 

determine first whether the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized 

by statute and, if so, wh~ther such exercise of jurisdiction is 

consistent with the constitutional requirements of due process." 

Yarbrough, 669 F.2d at 616 (quoting Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel 

Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1385-86 (10th Cir. 1980)). In Oklahoma, 

this two-part inquiry collapses into a single due process 

analysis, as the current Oklahoma long-arm statute provides that 

"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis 

consistent with the Constitution of this state and the 

Constitution of the United States." Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004 

F. 2 See First City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, 

Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 1987); cf. FDIC v. 

British-American Ins~ Co., Ltd., 828 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 

1987) ("Because the California statute extends jurisdiction to the 

maximum extent permitted by due process, the jurisdictional 

2 Oklahoma also has a long-arm statute specifically related to 

insurance companies. Okla. Stat. t~t. 36, § 1103 A provides: 

"Delivery, effectuation, or solicitation of any 

insurance contract, by mail or otherwise, within 

Oklahoma by an unauthorized insurer, or the performance 

within Oklahoma of any other service or transaction connected with such insurance by or on behalf of such 

insurer, shall be deemed to constitute an appointment by 

such insurer of the Insurance Commissioner and his successors in office as its attorney, upon whom may be 

served all lawful process issued within Oklahoma in any 

action or proceeding against such insurer arising out of 

any such contract or transaction." 

Because Okla. Stat. tit. 12, S 2004 Fis all-encompassing, extending jurisdiction in Oklahoma to the limits of due process, there 

is no need for a separate analysis under the insurance statute. 

Any contacts sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the broader 

provision would also be sufficient under this provision. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 7 
inquiries under the state statute and due process principles can 

be conducted as one analysis.") (citation omitted). 

We have outlined the general test for personal jurisdiction 

under the federal Constitution many times. 

"A federal court sitting in diversity 'may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only 

so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the 

defendant and the forum state.' World-Wide Volkswagen 

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (quoting. 

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 

(1945)). 'The defendant's contacts with the forum State 

must be such that m~intenance of the suit "does not 

offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.'"' World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 

292 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 

(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). 

The sufficiency of a defendant's contacts must be 

evaluated by examining the defendant's conduct and 

connections with the forum state to assess whether the 

defendant has 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum 

State.' Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)." 

First City Bank, 820 F.2d at 1130-31; see also Jones v. 3M Co., 

107 F.R.D. 202, 205-06 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Appellate review of district court decisions on questions of 

jurisdiction was explained in Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n 

of the United States, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 471 U.S. 1010 (1985): 

"The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Prior to 

trial, however, when a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction is decided on the basis of affidavits and 

other written materials, the plaintiff need only make a 

prima facie showing. The allegations in the complaint 

must be taken as true to the extent they are 

uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the 

parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual 

disputes are resolved in the piaintiff's favor, and the 

plaintiff's prima facie showing is sufficient 

notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving 

party." · 

-5-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 8 
(citations omitted); see also Ten Mile Indus. Park v. Western 

Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987). We 

review a district court's ruling on a jurisdictional question de 

novo. Ten Mile Indus. Park, 810 F.2d at 1524. Thus, our task is 

to determine whether the plaintiffs' allegations, as supported by 

affidavits, make a prima facie showing of the minimum contacts 

necessary to establish jurisdiction over each defendant. 3 

Jurisdiction over corporations may be either general or 

specific. Jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of 

or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state is 

"specific jurisdiction." In contrast, when the suit does not 

arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum 

and jurisdiction is based on the defendant's presence or 

accumulated contacts with the forum, the court exercises "general 

jurisdiction." See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

473 n.15 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 

Hall, 466 U.S. _408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft 

Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987). Here, there are no 

allegations that any of the three defendants have the continuous 

or systematic contacts with Oklahoma that would permit the 

exercise of general jurisdiction. Each of the alleged contacts is 

related to the insurance policy and the Rambos' claim. We review 

the contacts between each of the defendants and Oklahoma to 

3 We reject the Rambos' argument that the contacts of any of 

the three defendants can somehow be aggregated to support jurisdiction over all. It is clear that "due process requirements for 

personal jurisdiction must be met as to each individual 

Defendant." Jones v. 3M Co., 107 F.R.D. 202, 204 (10th Cir. 1984) 

(citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 334 (1980)). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 9 
determine whether jursidiction may be exercised consistent with 

due process standards. 

The district court's decision to dismiss the claim against 

WTR may be summarily affirmed. WTR had no contact with Oklahoma 

relating to the Rambos' cause of action. According to the 

complaint and allegations of the plaintiffs, there was no contact 

with WTR until the Rambos went to Texas to reclaim the truck. The 

mere fact th~t WTR was employed by an insurance company to repair 

the property of Oklahoma residents will not support jurisdiction. 

The decision to dismiss American and Mid South requires more 

scrutiny. Rambo argues that the telephone and written contacts 

with Mid South can be used to exercise jurisdiction over both Mid 

South and American because Mid South was acting as American's 

agent to settle the claim. We note initially that the record does 

not establish the relationship between American and Mid South. 

However, because American does not deny the allegation, we will 

assume, without deciding, that the actions of Mid South may be 

considered in analyzing jurisdiction over American as well. 4 

Certainly, telephone calls and letters may provide sufficient 

contacts for the exercise of personal jursidiction. See 

Continental Am. Corp. v. Camera Controls Corp., 692 F.2d 1309, 

1313-14 (10th Cir. 1982). In proper circumstances, even a single 

4 The United States Supreme Court has noted "that when commercial activities are 'carried on in behalf of' an out-of-state 

party those activities may sometimes be ascribed to the party, at 

least where he is a 'primary participan[t]' in the enterprise and 

has acted purposefully in directing those activities." Burger 

King, 471 U.S. 462 n.22 (citations omitted). Thus, in this case 

it may be appropriate to ascribe the activities of Mid South to 

American,· but not to ascribe the activities of Mid South and 

American to WTR. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 10 
letter or telephone call to the forum state may meet due process 

standards. See Burger King, .471 U.S. at 475 n.18 {"So long as it 

creates a 'substantial connection' with the forum, even a single 

act can support jurisdiction."}; see also Anselmi v. Denver Post, 

Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 323 {10th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 

(1977}; Berrett v. Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest, 623 F. Supp. 

946, 950-51 {D. Utah 1985). However, the exercise of jurisdiction 

depends on the nature of those contacts. The existence of letters 

or telephone calls to the forum state related to the plaintiff's 

action will not necessarily meet due process standards. See 

Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806 F.2d 305, 307 {1st Cir. 1986) 

{plaintiff's "generalized reference to inter-state contacts 'via 

telephone communications' and 'via U.S. mail,' without more," did 

not satisfy due process requirements}, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 

2466 (1987); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 {9th Cir. 

1985) {"ordinarily 'use of the mails, telephone, or other 

. international communications simply do not qualify as purposeful 

activity invoking the benefits and protection of the (forum] 

state'") {citation omitted), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986); 

Scullin Steel Co. v. Nat'l Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 

314 {8th Cir. 1982) {"use of interstate facilities {telephone, the 

mail), . are secondary or ancillary factors and cannot alone 

provide the 'minimum contacts' required by due process"). 

The proper focus for analyzing these contacts is whether they 

represent an effort by the defendant to "purposefully avail( ] 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 

-8-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 11 
State. 115 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1~58). The 

Supreme Court has recently reemphasized this element of due 

process analysis: 

"[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the 

defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in 

the forum State •••• In determining when it is that a 

potential defendant should 'reasonably anticipate' outof-state litigation, the Court frequently has drawn from 

the reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 

(1958): 

'The unilateral activity of those who claim 

some relationship with a nonresident defendant 

cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with 

the forum State. The application of that rule 

will vary with the quality and nature of the 

defendant's activity, but it is essential in 

each case that there be some act by which the 

defendant purposefully avails itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.' 

"This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures 

that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction 

solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 

'attenuated' contacts, [citations omitted] or of the 

'unilateral activity of another party or a third 

person.' Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the 

contacts proximately result from actions by the 

defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' 

with the forum State." 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75 (emphasis in original); 6 see also 

5 Moreover, this is generally the distinguishing feature 

between those cases finding telephone and mail contacts with the 

forum state sufficient and those that do not. 

6 Due process analysis does not end with minimum contacts and 

purposeful availment. "Once it has been decided that a defendant 

purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, 

these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to 

determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would 

comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.'" Burger King, 

471 U.S. at 476 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). In other words, the exercise of 

jurisdiction by the forum state must be reasonable. 

(cont'd on next page) 

-9-

Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 12 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, 107 s.ct. 

1026, 1031 · ( 1987). We have frequently emphasized the same 

requirement. Fidelity· and Casualty Co. of New York v. 

Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440, 445-46 (10th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); Helitzer v. Helitzer, 761 F.2d 

582, 585-86 (10th Cir. 1985); Jones, 107 F.R.D. at 207; see also 

Taylor v. Taylor, 709 P.2d 707, 709 (Okla. App. 1985). 

"Purposeful availment analysis turns upon whether the 

defendant's contacts are attributable to his own actions or solely 

to the actions of the plaintiff. • [and generally] requires 

affirmative conduct by the defendant which allows or 

promotes the transaction of business within the forum state." 

Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 840 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Here, we find no acts by either Mid South or American 

that can be construed as purposeful contacts with the state of 

(cont'd from previous page) 

The Ninth Circuit has set forth these requirements in a 

three-part test for specific jurisdiction: 

"(l) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby 

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (2) 

The claim must be one which arises out of or results 

from the defendant's forum-related activities. (3) 

Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable." 

Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 

1287 (9th Cir. 1977); see Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Marina Salina 

Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270(9th Cir. 1981) (jurisdiction over 

Mexican shipyard held unreasonable). 

We need not reach the question of reasonableness here, but 

note that it would not be unreasonable to require a domestic 

insurance company that has insured a truck leased for interstate 

travel to defend itself in an Oklahoma forum. It would certainly 

be as reasonable, we suppose, as defending itself in Texas. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 13 
Oklahoma. The Oklahoma contacts were. fortuitous, resulting from 

the Rambos change of residence after the insurance policy was 

issued and the claim was filed. Thus, this case is 

distinguishable from the common case where an insurance company 

has solicited the defendant's business in the forum state, or 

where the accident leading to the litigation occurred in the forum 

state. See,~ Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832 

F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1987); August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 

168 (4th Cir. 1984); 7 Teleco Oilfield Servs., Inc., v. Skandia 

Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 753, 758-59 (D. Conn. 1987). Here, the 

Rambos do not allege that any premiums were mailed from Oklahoma 

or that any modifications or renewals of the policy were 

negotiated in the forum state. 

In similar circumstances, where the insurance company's 

contacts with the forum were driven by the plaintiff's choice of 

7 August represents the most expansive reach of the minimum 

contacts test in an insurance context that we can find. August, 

the insured, brought a claim against his health insurer in 

Virginia. The policy was issued when August was an Arizona resident, but he subsequently moved to Virginia. The court noted the 

following contacts. "The owner of the policy, issued to him in 

Arizona when an Arizona resident, came to reside in Virginia. The 

members of his family covered by the policy came with him ..•• 

Premiums [were] remitted by mail from Virginia to HBA in Arizona. 

A loss has allegedly occurred in Virginia, and a claim has been 

asserted by mail from Virginia. In a letter of denial mailed from 

Arizona to Virginia, HBA solicited an agreement which would have 

reduced the coverage afforded by the policy." August, 734 F.2d at 

172. The Fourth Circuit found the rider, proposed by the insurance company from Arizona, to be the constitutionally sufficient 

contact. Id. at 173. In August, the Fourth Circuit may have 

stretched the minimum contacts test too far. See Id. at 173-74, 

(Hall, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, to find jurisdiction over 

Mid South and American would require that we stretch it even 

further, for the Rambos filed their claim with American before 

they moved to Oklahoma and American neither solicited nor accepted 

any change in the policy. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 14 
residence after the claim arose, the Ninth Circuit failed to find 

the requisite minimum contacts. In Hunt v. Erie Ins. Group, 728 

F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff, a resident of Virginia, 

was severely injured in an automobile accident in Colorado while 

en route to visit her mother in California. She was hospitalized 

in Colorado and a dispute arose with the other party's insurance 

company (Erie) which was licensed to do business in. several 

eastern states but had no offices or contacts in the west. Before 

the claim was settled, Hunt's mother moved her to California for 

treatment and rehabilitation. Subsequently, Hunt brought suit in 

California for breach of contract and various torts. The 

appellate court found that Erie's contacts with California were 

insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 

The parallel with the Rambos' claim here is striking, as the court 

found that: 

"The mere fact that Erie communicated with Hunt in the 

state, and may have committed a tort in the exchange of 

correspondence, does not show that Erie purposefully 

availed itself of the privilege of conducting business 

in California. Hunt's move to California forced Erie to 

send mail to that State concerning her claim." 

Id. at 1248. We find the Ninth Circuit's reasoning persuasive and 

agree that minimum contacts are not necessarily established simply 

because a plaintiff's move into a state requires the defendant to 

send communications into that forum. Id. 

Even more illuminating is a comparison with McGee v. Int'l 

Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, the Supreme Court 

found due process requirements satisfied where a Texas insurance 

company's single contact with California was the solicitation of a 

reinsurance agreement in California and the acceptance of premiums 

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Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 15 
mailed from Califorpia. "The contract was delivered in 

California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured 

was a resident of that State when he died." Id. at 223. In 

contrast, the Rambos' contract was delivered in Alabama, the claim 

was filed from Texas and no premiums were mailed from Oklahoma. 

McGee is frequently characterized as the Court's most expansive 

application of the "minimum contacts" test. See,~, Dollar 

Savings Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, 746 F.2d 208, 212 (3d 

Cir. 1984) ("In McGee the Court applied its most relaxed standard 

of contacts--one which it has steadfastly declined to extend."). 

Even the Rambos concede that the Court extended minimum contacts 

"to its farthest limits in McGee." Brief of Appellant at 6. We 

decline to find due process requirements satisfied on contacts 

which are even less significant than those in McGee, particularly 

where the missing element is the "purposeful availment" by the 

defendant recently emphasized by the Court in Burger King. If 

Mrs. McGee had moved to Oklahoma after the claim was filed and 

denied, we do not believe the Supreme Court would have approved 

the exercise of jurisdiction by the Oklahoma courts. 8 

The Rambos also argue that when Mid South agreed to return 

the truck to Oklahoma for repairs, an oral contract to be 

performed in Oklahoma was created. We can find no contract in 

8 In McGee, the Court found that "[i]t is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which 

had substantial connections with that State." McGee, 355 U.S. at 

223. The presence of the plaintiff was not the substantial connection, rather it was the insurance company's purposeful acts 

soliciting business in the forum state. In contrast, there is no 

substantial connection between the insurance contract at issue 

here and the state of Oklahoma. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 16 
these allegations. Any statement by Mid South in these 

circumstances was a mere accommodation and did not represent a 

modification of the insurance contract. The insurance contract 

provided: "At our [insurance company's] option we may: a. Pay 

for, repair or replace damaged or stolen property; or b. Return 

the stolen property, at our expense." Brief of Appellant at 14. 

We find no jurisdictional significance in discussions as to where 

the repairs might be made and the mere assertion that a contract 

was formed or modified will not support jurisdiction. See 

American Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, 

N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1983). In addition, even if 

we were to recognize an oral contract between Mid South and the 

Rambos to repair the truck in Oklahoma, the absence of "purposeful 

availment" still remains a jurisdictional barrier,·for ''an 

individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can[not] 

automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other 

party's home forum." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (emphasis in 

original). 

Finally, the Rambos assert that jurisdiction is proper 

because Oklahoma is the most convenient place to litigate this 

case. While the convenience of the forum is relevant to due 

process analysis, it is not a controlling factor. "(E]ven if the 

forum State is the most convenient location for the litigation, 

the Due Process Clause, .•• may sometimes act to divest the 

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Appellate Case: 85-2417 Document: 010110018335 Date Filed: 02/26/1988 Page: 17 
State of its power to render a valid judgment.'' World-Wide 

Volkswagen, 9 444 U.S. at 294. 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

9 The Rambos also note that the order of the district court 

dismissed their action with prejudice and ask us to correct that 

error. The record discloses that, in response to a motion by the 

defendants, the district court corrected the order to read "dismissed without prejudice" by order of April 11, 1986. We affirm 

the district court order as amended and the Rambos are free to 

pursue their claims in another forum. 

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