Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05124/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC HACKETT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

SCHWARZENEGGER, et al, ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

CV F 04-5124 OWW SMS 

ORDER AMENDING THE COURT’S ORDER

OF MARCH 30, 2004, DISMISSING

COMPLAINT (DOC. 9)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF THIRTY

DAYS WITHIN WHICH TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH RESPECT TO

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §

1983

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

FORWARD A BLANK PRISONER CIVIL

RIGHTS COMPLAINT FORM TO

PLAINTIFF WITH THIS ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The complaint was filed on January 20, 2004. The matter has been

referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)

and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304.

Amendment of the Court’s First Order of Dismissal

On March 30, 2004, the Court ordered Plaintiff’s complaint

to be dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff failed to respond

to the order. Due to clerical error, the Court failed

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subsequently to recommend dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to

file an amended complaint or otherwise to prosecute the case. In

the interim, as is detailed below, the law governing the

classification of § 1983 claims such as Plaintiff’s underwent a

change. In view of these circumstances, the Court is issuing this

amendment of its order of March 30, 2004. This amendment

addresses only the screening of Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and is intended to provide a further explanation of

the Court’s screening and a renewed opportunity to file an

amended complaint only with respect to a claim brought pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Screening the Complaint

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

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claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id.

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11th Cir.

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costCase 1:04-cv-05124-OWW -SMS Document 11 Filed 05/27/05 Page 3 of 12
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 The reference is to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

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free filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1984). 

Here, Plaintiff complains that after he was arrested and

placed in custody at a jail on August 9, 2003, he arrived at

Wasco State Prison on October 9, 2003, and he did not have a

full-blown Morrissey1 hearing on his parole revocation until

December 16, 2003. He claims that he was not afforded counsel

until on or about December 8, 2003, and could not meet with

counsel before the hearing. He seeks “freedom and monitary (sic)

damages” for each day of delay beyond a reasonable time, which

Plaintiff asserts is twenty-three days for a screening process

and forty-five days for the Morrissey hearing. He claims that he

suffered mental stress, abuse, anxiety and loss of freedom and

suffering. Plaintiff does not detail what the result of the

Morrissey hearing was, but it may be inferred that Plaintiff was

found to have violated parole because he remained in Wasco state

prison, where according to his complaint he arrived on October 9,

2003, as a parole violator. The Court thus infers on the basis of

the complaint that Plaintiff was found to have violated parole. 

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On March 30, 2004, the Court issued an order dismissing

Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. The Court’s order

noted that to the extent that Plaintiff sought freedom, or to

have his time in custody shortened because of the delay in his

parole revocation, Plaintiff was challenging the duration of the

term of confinement imposed for the parole violation. Plaintiff

was informed that in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the fact or duration

of a prisoner’s confinement; rather, plaintiff’s remedy was to

file for habeas corpus after exhaustion of his state and

administrative remedies. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-482

(1994), citing Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

The Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with

leave to amend further informed Plaintiff that to the extent that

Plaintiff attempted to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus

of violation of due process of law from the delay in his parole

violation hearing, he had failed to allege that he suffered

prejudice as a result of the delay. Cf. Camacho v. White, 918

F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff had also failed to demonstrate

exhaustion of state remedies. 

The Court’s order further informed Plaintiff that to the

extent that he sought damages for the delay in parole

proceedings, as distinct from time credit or time reduction,

Plaintiff was necessarily claiming that the procedure leading to

his parole revocation was invalid and thus that the revocation

itself was invalid. The validity of the revocation of parole and

thus the continuing confinement of the prisoner was implicated by

Plaintiff’s challenge. Plaintiff’s civil claim for damages thus

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amounted to a collateral attack on his denial of parole and

subsequent incarceration. Such an attack was not permitted by

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, and Edwards v. Balisok,

520 U.S. 641, 644-48 (1997). Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023,

1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court concluded that Plaintiff’s

civil rights claim did not accrue unless and until the parole

revocation was reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by

the grant of a writ of habeas corpus; it was properly dismissed

because it failed to state a claim.

The Court’s order directed that Plaintiff be given a form

for a habeas corpus petition and for a civil rights claim. The

Court’s order and the forms were served by mail on Plaintiff on

March 31, 2004. Plaintiff did not file in this action any further

pleadings in the nature of a complaint or petition in response to

the Court’s order.

In the interim between the Court’s order dismissing

Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend and the present, the

case of Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005) was decided.

In that case it was held that constitutional challenges to the

constitutionality of parole procedures (there the standards used

to govern parole eligibility and suitability as well as the makeup of the tribunal and extent of an inmate’s opportunity to

speak) may be brought in actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

where the remedy sought is declaratory relief or correction of

procedures as distinct from a release from custody.

Here, the only remedies sought by Plaintiff are 1) freedom

for each day beyond the Morrissey process, and 2) monetary

damages. As previously set forth, this Court does not have the

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jurisdiction in a § 1983 suit to award freedom for delay because

in effect it would respond to a request for adjudication of

either the lawfulness or duration of Plaintiff’s confinement.

As to damages, Plaintiff has not alleged that the delay was

unreasonable or that he suffered any prejudice from the delay.

Plaintiff appears to rely on regulations or state law authority

providing time limits on the parole revocation process. He

asserts that he suffered mental stress, unspecified abuse,

hardship, anxiety, loss of freedom and suffering, and unlawful

imprisonment. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from

being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process

of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to

state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due

process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. In Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court abandoned earlier

case law which had held that states created protectable liberty

interests by way of mandatory language in prison regulations. 

Id. at 481-84. Instead, the Court adopted an approach in which

the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing on

the nature of the deprivation. Id. In doing so, the Court held

that liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited

to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Here, even if it is assumed that Plaintiff had some interest

in the timeliness of a Morrissey hearing separate and apart from

the validity of the result of the hearing, Plaintiff’s suit for

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damages does not address such an interest in a way compatible

with the holdings of Heck v. Humphrey 512, U.S. 477, 486-87

(1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644-48 (1987). In

view of the fact that it appears that Plaintiff’s parole was

revoked as a result of the parole revocation proceedings, it does

not appear that the restraint involved in any delay imposed

atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.

Further, as Plaintiff was informed in the Court’s order

dismissing his complaint without leave to amend, the Civil Rights

Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.

1986).

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section

1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of

respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds

a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the

claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. 

See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher

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v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442

U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983

for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts

indicating that supervisory defendants either personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights;

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the

moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black,

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted);

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although

federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged

to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant

County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that

Defendant Schwarzenegger personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a

policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant

Chris Johnson, a parole agent, and Defendant Lopez, a parole

hearing officer, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking

compensation for their participation in the parole revocation

process, and specifically, the length of time between the arrest

and the actual revocation hearing. Plaintiff mentions no other

conduct in connection with these defendants. It is established

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that parole officers engaging in such processes are entitled to

absolute immunity from suits by prisoners for actions taken when

processing parole applications. Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d

1295, 1302 (9th Cir. 1981) (parole board officials); Anderson v.

Boyd 714 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983)(imposition of parole

conditions). 

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant

Doyle Anderson, who was Plaintiff’s attorney during the

revocation hearing process, Plaintiff is informed that to state a

claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the

defendant acted under color of state law and (2) that the

defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or

federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338

(9th Cir. 1986). Generally, private parties are not acting under

color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08

(9th Cir. 1991). It appears that Defendant Anderson was an

attorney appointed by the government. However, it is likewise

established that a public defender does not act under color of

state law when performing a lawyer’s analogous traditional

functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317, 325 (1981); Rivera v.

Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985). The only mention of

Anderson is in connection with Plaintiff’s allegation that

Plaintiff did not see his counsel until the day of the hearing,

and counsel did not argue Plaintiff’s points about the delay or

his having been categorized as a parole violator when he was

initially returned to Wasco.

Finally, Plaintiff asserted that no branch of the government

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has the authority to impose a special or separate sentence of

parole after the sentence has been served. However, Plaintiff

does not state dates or other facts that would indicate that his

sentence was completed at the time of his being taken into

custody or at the time his parole was revoked. 

Amendment of the Complaint

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s original complaint does not

state a claim cognizable in a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Court previously gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended

complaint within thirty days of service of its order dismissing

the complaint. For good cause, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff

a further thirty-day period within which to file an amended

complaint stating a claim pursuant to § 1983. Failure to cure the

deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without

leave to amend.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules

adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that

support Plaintiff's claim. Id.

In addition, Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot

refer to a prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended

complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended

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complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay,

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once Plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must

be sufficiently alleged. 

The Clerk will be directed to forward to Plaintiff a form

for a prisoner civil rights action 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) The Court’s HEREBY AMENDS its order of March 30,

2004, dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend; and

2) Plaintiff IS GRANTED thirty days from the date of

service of this order to file an amended complaint stating a

claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that complies with the

requirements of the pertinent substantive law, the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended

complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case; failure

to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will

be considered to be a failure to comply with an order of the

Court pursuant to Local Rule 11-110 and will result in dismissal

of this action; and

3) The Clerk of the Court IS DIRECTED to send to Plaintiff

with this order a blank prisoner civil rights (§ 1983) complaint

form with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 26, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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