Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01116/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

SCOTT BRIDGE COMPANY, ) 

INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:11-cv-1116-WKW-PWG

)

GRESHAM SMITH AND )

PARTNERS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the following Daubert motions: a motion to 1

strike, exclude or limit the testimony of Dr. Richard Hartman filed by Defendant

GreshamSmith and Partners(hereinafter “Defendant”) (Doc. 65),Defendant’s motion

to strike, exclude or limit the testimony of Dane Floyd (Doc. 66), a motion to strike

or exclude the testimony of Ben D. Nolan, III, filed by Plaintiff Scott Bridge

Company, Inc. (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) (Doc. 70), and Plaintiff’s motion to strike or

exclude the testimony of Dr. Ted Thomson (Doc. 71). The motions have been briefed

by the parties and are ripe for consideration. They are taken under submission on the

 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also Fed. 1

R. Evid. 702. 

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record and without a hearing.

2

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff filed this action in tort against Defendant alleging professional

negligence, gross negligence, and/or wantonness. Plaintiff’s claims relate to designs

that Defendant prepared for use by Plaintiff in constructing “deep water” piers 7, 8,

and 9 of the B.B. Comer Bridge in the Tennessee River. 

Defendant describes the relationship between it and the Plaintiff and the B.B.

Comer Bridge in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, which it

incorporated by reference into its Daubert motions, as follows: 

“In March of 2001, Defendant ... contracted with the Alabama

Department of Transportation (ALDOT) to serve asthe design engineer

for the B. B. Comer Bridge Replacement Project ... which involved the

replacement of the B. B. Comer Bridge on State Route 35 crossing the

Tennessee river in Scottsboro, Alabama. The bridge project was divided

into three phases. Phase II included the section of the bridge crossing

the main channel of the Tennessee River and involved Piers 7, 8 and 9

of the bridge. ALDOT contracted separately with Plaintiff ... as the

contractor for Phase II of the bridge project.” 

 Upon review of the record, a Daubert hearing is unnecessary to resolve the motions at 2

bar.

 The following is offered to supply context. Nothing herein should be construed as an 3

express or implied finding of fact, and the parties should not attempt to extract clues as to the

court’s deliberations on matters associated with the pending motion for summary judgment or, if

necessary, the trial. 

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Case 2:11-cv-01116-WKW-PWG Document 107 Filed 10/14/15 Page 2 of 23
(Doc. 68 at pp. 1-2). Plaintiff asserts that while preparing its cofferdam design for 4

the construction of the piers, its engineers noticed a potentially inadequate concrete

seal designed by Defendant and notified ALDOT of the problem in early October

2009. (Doc. 87 at pp. 1-2). 

Plaintiff further describes the dispute that arose between it and Defendant as

follows: 

“ALDOT directed [Defendant] to evaluate its defective design

and then develop a re-design to solve the problem. In its first

evaluation, [Defendant] concluded its original design was “not good’ 

and so informed the ALDOT. Several weeks of re-designs and

uncertainty over the ultimate solution ensued until Scott Bridge 

was finally able to implement the re-designed work at the end of

November 2009.” 

(Doc. 87 at pp.1-2). ALDOT is not a party to these proceedings. Separate and apart

from this case, ALDOT and Plaintiff reached an agreement whereby ALDOT paid

According to Plaintiff: 4

“Cofferdams are temporary structures that are built around the drilled shafts

for bridge foundations to allow people and equipment to safely work below ground

or water level to construct a permanent structure. The water inside the cofferdam is

pumped out so the bridge pier footing and columns can be built in dry conditions. 

In order to safely pump the water out of the cofferdam, a concrete seal is poured

inside the bottom of the cofferdam and serves to resist buoyancy of the structure

when the water is pumped out. The seal concrete must be of sufficient mass and

depth to offset the buoyant forces created by the pumping and removal of water from

inside the cofferdam and the upward pressures created by water outside the

cofferdams. If the seal concrete thickness is not of sufficient mass or depth, pumping

out the water will result in flotation and catastrophic collapse of the cofferdam.” 

(Doc. 95 at p. 1, fn. 1.)

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Plaintiff a sum of money to compensate Plaintiff for losses associated with the redesigns on the B.B. Comer Bridge project. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s redesigns “caused considerable construction damages and costs to Plaintiff, the balance

of which Plaintiff now seeks recovery in this action.” (Doc. 70 at p. 2). 

In support of its allegations, claims, and petition for damages, Plaintiff relies

on the testimony of two proffered expert witnesses: Dr. Richard Hartman, P.E., and

Dane Floyd, C.P.A. Defendantrelies on the proffered expert testimony ofBen Nolan,

III, P.E., and Dr. Ted Thomson, P.E. Each proffered expert is the subject of a

Daubert motion.

II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND DISCUSSION

Recently, this court set out the standard ofreview for motionsto exclude expert

testimony as follows:

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed byFederalRule

of Evidence 702 and Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)] and its progeny.

Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the

form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

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(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data

(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods; and

(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and

methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court emphasized that Rule 702 assigns

the trial court a gatekeeping role to “ensure that any and all scientific

testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” 509

U.S. at 589 & 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see also Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)

(“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence ‘assign to the trial judge the task of

ensuring that an expert’s testimony rests both on a reliable foundation

and is relevant to the task at hand.’” (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596,

113 S.Ct. 2786)). This gatekeeping responsibility is the same when the

trial court is considering the admissibility of testimony based upon

“‘technical’ and ‘other specialized knowledge.’” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S.

at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).

In light of Daubert’s “gatekeeping requirement,” the Eleventh

Circuit requires district courts to engage in a “rigorous three-part

inquiry” for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule

702:

Trial courts must consider whether: “(1) [T]he expert is

qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he

intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the

expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as

determined by the sort ofinquiry mandated in Daubert; and

(3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the

application ofscientific,technical, orspecialized expertise,

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”

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United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting

City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th

Cir. 1999)). These requirements are known as the “qualifications,”

“reliability,” and “helpfulness” prongs. See id. “The burden of

establishing qualification, reliability, and helpfulness rests on the

proponent of the expert opinion,” id., and the proponent must meet its

burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp.,

Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 582 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2009);

see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir.

1999) (In addition, we note that “[t]he burden of laying the proper

foundation for the admission of expert testimony is on the party offering

the expert, and the admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of

the evidence.” (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, n. 10, 113 S.Ct. 2786)).

As to qualifications, “experts may be qualified in various ways,”

including by scientific training, education, and experience. Frazier, 387

F.3d at 1260. When evaluating the reliability of scientific expert

testimony, the [district court] must assess “whether the reasoning or

methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ...

whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the

facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Factors

that may bear on the reliability of expert testimony include (1) whether

the expert’s theory can be and has been tested, (2) whether the theory

has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) whether the

known or potential rate of error of the methodology is acceptable, and

(4) whether the theory is generally accepted in the proper scientific

community. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786). These factors are

not definitive, however. Other potentially relevant factors, depending

upon the facts, include “whether the proposed expert ruled out other

alternative explanations” and “whether the proposed expert sufficiently

connected the proposed testimony with the facts of the case.” Lauzon v.

Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).

In short, trial courts retain “considerable leeway in deciding in a

particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert

testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. At

the same time, trial courts must remain mindful that “Daubert does not

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require certainty; it requires only reliability.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v.

Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1198 n. 10 (11th Cir. 2010). The focus of

reliability “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the

conclusions they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

Finally, whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact

in understanding the evidence or a fact in issue “goes primarily to

relevance.” Id. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786. “Expert testimony which does

not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” 

Id.(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The ‘basic standard

of relevance ... is a liberal one,’ but if an expert opinion does not have

a ‘valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry[,]’ it should be

excluded because there is no ‘fit.’” Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., 582 F.3d

at 1232 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92, 113 S.Ct. 2786). Hence,

under this third inquiry, “even if an expert’s testimony [is] admissible

under the first two prongs of the Daubert analysis, it may still be

insufficient to create an issue of fact to overcome summary judgment.”

Gulf States Reorganization Group, Inc. v. Nucor Corp., 822 F.Supp.2d

1201, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2011); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.

136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (District courts may

reject expert testimony that is based on sound methodology when “there

is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion

proffered.”).

Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1201-03 (M.D. Ala.

2014) (Watkins, J.). The rulings on the motions at bar isinformed by those principles

and the authority relied upon in Seamon.

Upon consideration of the motions, extensive briefs, and the evidentiary

submissions, and “consistent with the ‘liberal thrust of the Federal Rules [of

Evidence] and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion

testimony[,]’” the court concludes that the concerns each party raises with regard to

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the other’s proffered expert testimony go to the weight of the testimony, not to its

admissibility. See United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. at 2794). “Questions about the weight

given to testimony, as distinguished from the issue of its admissibility, are for the

factfinder.” Brown, 415 F.3d at 1270 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d

1042, 1052 (11th Cir. 1998)). That is especially true considering that there has been

no jury demand by either party in this case, and the trial judge will be the ultimate

trier of fact. See id. at 1268-69 (the rules regarding the admissibility of expert

testimony “are even more relaxed in a bench trialsituation, where the judge isserving

as factfinder.”). “There is less need for the gatekeeper to keep the gate when the

5

 As explained by another district court within Alabama:

5

“While [the Daubert] concerns are of lesser import in a bench trial, where no

screening [for] the factfinder can take place, the Daubert standards of relevance

and reliability for scientific evidence must nevertheless be met.” Seaboard

Lumber Co. v. United States, 308 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Federal

district courts are still “required to rely only on admissible and reliable expert

testimony, even while conducting a bench trial.” Gonzales v. National Bd. of

Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir. 2000) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (listing

cases). However, “district courts conducting bench trials have substantial

flexibility in admitting proffered expert testimony at the front end, and then

deciding for themselves during the course of trial whether the evidence meets the

requirements” of Rule 702. Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 635. Alternatively, in a bench

trial, it has been an acceptable method “to admit evidence of borderline

admissibility and give it the (slight) weight to which it is entitled.” See

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1042 (N.D. Ill.

2003).

United States v. Brown, 279 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1243-44 (S.D. Ala. 2003) aff'd, 415 F.3d 1257

(11th Cir. 2005). The “weight” to be given to the experts’ testimony will be determined by the

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gatekeeper is keeping the gate for himself.” Id. at 1269. 

A. Dane Floyd, C.P.A.

Mr. Floyd, a certified public accountant, was retained by Plaintiff to provide

expert testimony regarding damages suffered by Plaintiff in connection with the

bridge construction project for which Defendant performed design work. Mr. Floyd

reached the conclusion that, because of extra work performed and delays encountered

as a result of the alleged design issue, the money ALDOT paid to Plaintiff was

inadequate to compensate it for additional costs and reasonable profits related to the

work on the B.B. Comer Bridge. Mr. Floyd also concluded that the unreimbursed

damages incurred by Plaintiff total approximately $2.5 million.

6

Defendant does not contest Mr. Floyd’s qualifications, but argues that the

methodology he used is unreliable because he did not conduct an independent

analysis of the data Plaintiff provided to him in order to verify its accuracy.

Defendant specifically argues that Mr. Floyd: (1) only verified eleven of thousands

of entries on a job cost report; (2) did not independently verify the data he used in his

calculations; (3) took no steps to verify the accuracy of Plaintiff’s reported equipment

usage on the project; (4) used the amount Plaintiff claimed for labor in the job cost

trial judge.

 In addition to compensatory damages, Plaintiff demands $7.5 million in punitive 6

damages. (Doc. 43 at p. 3).

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report without independent verification of the same; (5) did not look beyond the job

cost report to determine if Plaintiff had properly characterized the work being

claimed; (6) and simply relied on conversations with Plaintiff in formulating his

opinion that the profit was reasonable. 

Defendant’s challenges to Mr. Floyd’s methodology are rejected. Defendant

concedes that Mr. Floyd testified that he did not conduct the “independent analysis”

because the data “had been subject to an audit process and reconciled with

[Plaintiff’s] financial statements.” (Doc. 66 at p. 5 (citing Floyd Depo. at p. 119). 

Defendant does not indicate that the data Floyd relied upon was flawed, nor does

Defendant explain why Floyd’s failure to conduct an “independent analysis” causes

his methodology to be inherently unreliable. There is sufficient evidence of record,

particularly through Floyd’s deposition and his curriculum vitae, to satisfy the court

that Floyd is qualified to employ accounting methods that are standard in the

profession and that his testimony is reliable such that it is admissible. 

On consideration of the record, the court finds that Mr. Floyd, who is an

accountant offering testimony in the area of accounting, is qualified to testify to the

matters for which he is offered as an expert witness. Moreover, his testimony is

relevant to the damages sought by Plaintiff and is likely to assist the trier of fact.

Accordingly, the motion to exclude Floyd’s testimony is due to be denied.

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B. Richard Hartman, Ph.D., P.E. and Ted Thomson, P.E., Ph.D. 

1. Dr. Hartman

Plaintiff retained Dr. Hartman, “an engineer, to offer various opinions

regarding [Defendant’s] designs of Piers 7, 8, and 9, along with opinions regarding

Plaintiff’s construction practices.” (Doc. 65 and p. 2). Dr. Hartman “graduated with

a degree in Civil Engineering in 1965 and a Master of Science degree in 1966 with

a focus on structural engineering. He obtained a doctorate in 1972, with a focus on

structural engineering and minors in material science (metallurgy) and elasticity.”

(Doc. 87 at p. 6). He has been in the construction industry for over forty years, and

he is a licensed professional engineer in 38 states. (Id.). He has experience with

cofferdams, bridges, foundations, and foundations and designed cofferdams for a

deepwater bridge in Georgia. (Doc. 87 at pp. 6-7). 

Dr. Hartman reached the following conclusions in his expert report:

1. The means and methods used by [Plaintiff] to install the

drilled shafts and the cofferdam were consistent with

accepted construction practices.

2. The foundation designs for Piers 7, 8, and 9 as shown in

the original Contract Drawings were unstable relative to

uplift.

3. All foundation redesigns for Piers 7, 8 and 9 were stable

relative to uplift.

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4. The first redesign of the Pier 7 foundation was not feasible

to construct. 

5. [Defendant] did not meet [the] generally accepted standard

of care and was negligent when preparing the original

designs of Piers 7, 8 and 9. 

(Doc. 69-1 at p. 9).

Defendant challenges both Dr. Hartman’s qualifications to offer testimony in

this case as well as his methodology. Defendant argues that Dr. Hartman is

unqualified on the following bases: (1) Dr. Hartman is not a geo-technical or

structural engineer;(2) while he is qualified to testify regarding cofferdamdesign and

construction, his expertise in cofferdams and retaining walls does not qualify him to

testify regarding the standard of care for the design of a marine bridge foundation

involving concrete; (3) Dr. Hartman has no experience designing a marine bridge

with a concrete foundation and cannot testify as to the standard of care for designing

the same; (4) Dr. Hartman has never testified in a case regarding the standard of care

engineers should use in designing a bridge; (5) Dr. Hartman has never been involved

in the construction or oversight of a bridge with drilled shafts like the subject bridge;

and (6) Dr. Hartman did not conduct any specific research regarding the proper

methodology for drilled shaft installation before formulating his opinionsin this case.

Defendant also argues that Dr. Hartman’s methodology is unreliable.

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Defendant first argues that Dr. Hartman’s understanding of methodology is derived

from his discussions with contractors and past review of reference materials as

opposed to specific research regarding the proper methodology for drilled shaft

installation. This argument is not supported by testimony and other evidence of

record as to the source of Dr. Hartman’s methodology. 

Defendant further argues that Dr. Hartman failed to use sufficiently reliable

methodology in evaluating whether the foundation designs met the standard of care

because the value he used in his calculations regarding resisting forces was unreliable

for the following reasons: (1) the value of the friction force between the steel and

surrounding soil was pulled “off the shelf” from a Minnesota Department of

Transportation manual and was neither site- nor region-specific; (2) Dr. Hartman

failed to consider friction between the drilled shaft and the rock socket because the

Minnesota manual did not assume friction in that area; (3) Dr. Hartman used a value

for the friction between the seal concrete and the steel casing/cofferdamsteel that was

more conservative than the standard of care; and (4) Dr. Hartman did not use an

accurate value for the weight of the cofferdam steel because he ignored a resistive

force that would have increased the total weight. In support of those arguments,

Defendant refers the court to the methods and conclusions of its proffered experts. 

Defendant also argues that Dr. Hartman used unreliable methodology in

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evaluating whether the first redesign for Pier 7 was constructable because he offers

only his opinion that the revised design was impossible to construct. 

Finally, Defendant argues that Dr. Hartman’s opinions regarding whether the

foundation designs met the standard of care and whether the first redesign of Pier 7

was constructable are irrelevant and will not assist the trier of fact because the uplift

calculations he used were not sufficiently related to the site-specific conditionsin this

case. 

2. Dr. Thomson

Defendantretained Dr. Thomson, a licensed professional engineer, to “analyze

whether Defendant’s designs for Piers 7, 8, and 9 sufficiently resisted the buoyancy

force that would have been created when the cofferdams were dewatered, and to

render and opinion regarding whether or not GSP’s foundation designs ultimatelymet

the standard of care.” (Doc. 85 at p. 2). Dr. Thomson “obtained a Bachelor’s degree

in Civil Engineering from the University of Delaware in 1993.” (Doc. 85 at p. 4). He

“subsequently obtained his Master of Civil Engineering degree (concentrating in

structural engineering) from the University of Delaware followed by a Ph.D.

(concentrating in geotechnical engineering) from the University of Massachusetts in

1998.” (Id.). He is a licensed professional engineer in six states. (Id.). Dr. Thomson

is a member of several professional organizations and “specialized in geotechnical

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and structural design and instrumentation, and insitu geotechnical testing.” (Id.). He

has “worked on several projects in the past involving drilled shaft foundations for a

bridge,” and “performed analysis of the drilled shaft foundations for a marine bridge

that was being designed for the Pennsylvania [Department of Transportation]” that

involved “drilled shafts, seal concrete and cofferdams.” (Doc. 85 at pp. 7). He has

also worked on projects involving cofferdams in water, and was engineer of record

on a marine project in Wilmington, Delaware that involved “a jetty with a cellular

cofferdam that ‘behaves a similar way (to the case at bar) when it[’]s subjected to the

forces.” (Doc. 85 at p. 7). 

Plaintiff contests the sufficiency of Dr. Thomson’s qualifications to testify as

to the same. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that: (1) Dr. Thompson’s experience is

primarily in geo-technical projects, construction, and observation testing projects and

that his reliance on a staff engineer to perform critical calculations is evidence of his

lack of experience and expertise; and (2) Dr. Thomson has no experience in

performing engineering analysis involving a marine bridge with drilled shafts, seal

concrete, and cofferdams.

3. Dr. Hartman and Dr. Thomson are qualified

Based upon Dr. Hartman’s and Dr. Thomson’s respective qualifications

described supra, each is qualified to so testify. A review of their curriculum vitae

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reveals that Dr. Hartman and Dr. Thomson possess the necessary “knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education” to testify in this matter. Fed. R. Evid. 702. The

arguments made against their qualifications are properly characterized as being

related to the weight and credibility of their testimony, but do not belie their

qualifications to testify on the subjects the parties identified in their Fed. R. Civ. P.

26 disclosures.

4. Dr. Hartman’s and Dr. Thomson’s testimony is reliable and

relevant. 

Defendant’s challenges to Dr. Hartman’s methodology, as articulated in the

briefing, are predominately supported by a single theme: Dr. Hartman’s methodology

and conclusions are different from those reached by Defendant’s proffered experts. 

There is an acceptable range of differing methodologies and conclusions within

which different expert witnesses may operate, and this case presents that range. 

Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 153, 119 S.Ct. at 1177 (citation omitted). Asserting that

an opposing party’s expert uses methodsthat do not conformwith one’s own expert’s

method does not demonstrate the unreliability of the opposing expert’s methods. See

id. The Supreme Court recognizes that experts may reasonably differ on issues of

methodology and conclusions,butthat those differencesshould be admitted assuming

they each meet the reliability and relevance requirements to assist the trier of fact in

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deciding often complex issues. See id.

One of the material calculations in this case has to do with “uplift,” and the

value for the “factor of safety” (i.e., the ratio of the resisting forces to the driving

forces, or uplift) differs between Dr. Hartman’s and Dr. Thomson’s testimony. Dr.

Hartman utilized the Minnesota Department of Transportation manual in his analysis,

Dr. Thomson used values contained in the Florida Department of Transportation

manual, and the parties concede that the Alabama Department of Transportation

manual does not contain the necessary standards for the issues at hand. While the

parties argue over soil and ground compositions in Minnesota, Florida, and north

Alabama, the geographic proximity of those two states to Alabama, skin friction

between the drilled shaft and the rock socket, and the friction value between the seal

concrete and the steel casing / cofferdam steel, the evidence of record taken as a

whole, and especially the deposition testimony by Dr. Hartman and Dr. Thomson,

convincesthe court that, for purposes of a reliability and methodology determination,

the Minnesota and Florida manuals’ friction force values are appropriate, and that Dr.

Hartman’s and Dr. Thomson’s overall analyses, including the factors of safety used

by each individual, meet the baseline requirements of admissibility. 

As discussed above, Defendant also challenges themethodology and reliability

supporting Dr. Hartman’s testimony regarding constructability and standard of

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professional care, specifically with designs as to aspects of Pier 7. Again, the record

as a whole, which has been subjected to careful and close scrutiny, and Dr. Hartman’s

qualifications and areas of specialization are sufficient to satisfy the admissibility

requirement of Rule 702 asto Dr. Hartman’s testimony on these points. Defendant’s 7

assertions speak to the weight Dr. Hartman’s testimony arguably should be given by

the trier of fact, but are not persuasive that his testimony is inadmissible. 

The opinions and findings of Dr. Hartman and Dr. Thomson are precisely the

sort of testimony that should be weighed and decided by the trier of fact, in this case

the trial judge at a bench trial, but does not cause the testimony to be inadmissible. 

See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[i]ssues

concerning the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence are questions of

fact which require resolution by the trier of fact.”). After reviewing the parties’ briefs

[The Eleventh Circuit has] held that “an expert may be qualified ... 7

[but that] does not mean that experience, standing alone, is a

sufficient foundation rendering reliable any conceivable opinion

the expert may express.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244,

1261 (11th Cir. 2004). When a witness relies “solely ... on

experience, then [he] must explain how that experience leads to the

conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the

opinion, and how that experience reliably applied to the facts.” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

U.S. S.E.C. v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 783 F.3d 786, 810 (11th Cir. 2015). To be clear,

the court is not holding that Dr. Hartman or Dr. Thomson are reliable based solely on their

qualifications, but based on the record as a whole. Nevertheless, the expert’s respective

qualifications are strong support under the particular circumstances in this case that their

methodology and conclusions are of the reliable sort required by Rule 702 and Daubert.

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and the evidentiary submissions, Dr. Hartman and Dr. Thomson base their testimony

on sufficiently reliable methods. Inasmuch as the parties argue that they disagree

with their opponent’s expert’s opinions, the parties are free at trial, within the

boundaries established by the trial judge, to argue against any opinions reached by

an opposing party’s expert as well as present evidence of their own theories, which

is in keeping with the notion that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of

contrary evidence and careful [attention] to the burden of proof are the traditional and

appropriate means of attacking ... admissible evidence[,]” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596,

116 S.Ct. at 2798, and “the weakness in the underpinnings of the expert’s opinions

go to its weight rather than its admissibility.” Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d

655, 663 (11th Cir. 1988). The parties will have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr.

Hartman and Dr. Thomson at trial to test their credibility and differing opinions

before the trier of fact.

The testimony these expert witnesses offer is relevant to issues raised by

Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, and they are likely to assist the trier of

fact in reaching the ultimate issues. The motions to exclude Dr. Hartman and Dr.

Thomson are due to be denied. 

C. Ben Nolan, III, P.E.

Defendant hired Mr. Nolan, a professional engineer who is also offered as a

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Planning and Scheduling Professional, to “analyze the construction schedules and

events forming the basis of the lawsuit to formulate opinions regarding the number,

cause of, and responsibility for the delay days that occurred during Phase II of the

bridge project.” (Doc. 84 at p. 2). He was also asked to formulate an opinion

regarding the constructability of one of the revisions to Defendant’s foundation

design for Pier 7. (Id.). Mr. Nolan “has a Bachelor’s of Science in Applied Sciences

and Engineering from West Point that he obtained in 1979.” (Doc. 84 at p. 4). “He

subsequently obtained a Master’s degree in Engineering Management from the

University of Missouri in 1981.” (Id.). “He is a licensed professional engineer in

Alabama, among other states, and specializes in civil engineering.” (Id.). During his

professional career, he has worked as a project engineer for the U.S. Army Corp of

Engineers, as a project manager, asa marine contractor and mechanical/utility

contractor, and as the president of a general contracting company. (Id.). Mr. Nolan

has “worked in the construction industry for 34 years” and has experience in “marine

construction work includ[ing] the use of cofferdams, although no work in over 10 feet

of water.” (Id.). 

Plaintiff conteststhe adequacy of Mr. Nolan’s qualificationsto testify asto the

constructability of the revisions, arguing that Mr. Nolan (1) does not have the

necessary experience or expertise in deep water projects, specifically that he has no

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personal experience with the use of drilled shafts and cofferdams; and (2) when

forming his conclusions, Nolan merely relied on the opinions of colleagues outside

of his firm who had actual experience with the constructability of drilled shafts and

cofferdams in deep water. 

Plaintiff spends the bulk of the pages in its motion to exclude Nolan’s

testimony highlighting Nolan’s lack of deep water construction experience, but

Plaintiff misses a critical element: explaining why deep water experience is necessary

to offer an opinion on constructability in this case. Plaintiff assumes the link is

axiomatic; it is not. Defendant concedes that Nolan has no marine construction

experience using cofferdams in greater than ten feet of water, but argues that his

extensive experience in the construction industry, prior testimony in three cases

involving shafts or cofferdams on land, and his education and training as a

professional engineer qualify him to testify on constructability of the instant deep

water bridge project. The court agreesthat Defendantsatisfies its burden to show that

Mr. Nolan’s experience and professional training qualify him to offer testimony on

constructability in this case. Plaintiff is certainly free, within the confines set by the

trial judge, to cross examine Mr. Nolan regarding his lack of deep water experience;

however, that examination properly targets weight and credibility, not the

admissibility of Nolan’s testimony under Rule 702. 

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Insofar as Plaintiff argues that Mr. Nolan is not qualified because of his

reliance on the opinions of his colleagues — i.e., people who arguably have deep

water experience — when formulating his opinions on constructability such that his

reliance reduces Nolan to a mere conduit for information from other engineers, that

argument is not convincingly supported by the record. Mr. Nolan’s deposition

testimony indicates that he took his colleagues’ opinions into consideration when

reaching his own conclusions as to this case, not that he parroted others’ opinions as

his own without any independent consideration on his part. The balance of the record

weighs in favor of a finding that Mr. Nolan is qualified.

While not challenged by Plaintiff, the court has fulfilled its gatekeeper

responsibility and undertaken a review of the record to satisfy itself of the reliability

and relevance prongs of analysis. Mr. Nolan’s testimony is, although a close call

primarily because of his reliance on the advice of engineering colleagues who have

not been disclosed and are not expert witnesses in this action, sufficiently reliable, 8

relevant, and likely to assist the trier of fact in this matter. Any “shaky” areas in Mr.

 Plaintiff makes a passing hearsay objection in the motion to exclude Mr. Nolan’s 8

testimony. That objection is not addressed by this order and is left to the trial judge should

Plaintiff reassert a hearsay objection. No opinion is expressed or implied herein on such a

hearsay objection except to note that the objection does not impact the resolution of the motion to

exclude Mr. Nolan as an expert witness. In other words, Plaintiff is not being granted license to

revisit the court’s ruling on the Daubert motion by way of a hearsay objection at trial, but is not

prohibited by this order from asserting a stand-alone hearsay objections as a challenge to Mr.

Nolan’s testimony that is separate from a Rule 702 challenge. 

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Nolan’s testimony or questions regarding the foundations of his testimony, as those

questions relate to weight and credibility, can be explored at trial through the

“vigorous” cross-examination countenanced by the Supreme Court. Daubert, 509

U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. The motion to exclude Mr. Nolan’s expert testimony

is due to be denied.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly and for the reasons discussed herein, it is ORDERED asfollows:

Defendant’s motion to strike, exclude or limit the testimony of Dr. Richard Hartman

(Doc. 65), Defendant’s motion to strike, exclude or limit the testimony of Dane Floyd

(Doc. 66), Plaintiff’s motion to strike or exclude the testimony of Ben D. Nolan, III

(Doc. 70), and Plaintiff’s motion to strike or exclude the testimony of Dr. Ted

Thomson (Doc. 71) are DENIED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 28 U.S.C. § 636, Order of

Reference (Doc. 76; Entered Feb. 23, 2015). All other pending motions will be

addressed in separate orders or recommendations, as appropriate.

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of October, 2015.

 /s/ Paul W. Greene 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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