Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00369/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00369-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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1 Under the E-Government Act of 2002, this is a written opinion and therefore is

available electronically. However, it has been entered only to decide the motion or matter

addressed herein and is not intended for official publication or to serve as precedent.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LAURA MATTHEWS, )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

BROOKSTONE STORES, INC., et al., )

Defendants. )

 ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0369-WS-C

 )

BROOKSTONE STORES, INC., )

Third-Party Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

D&M SALES, INC., )

Third-Party Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendant D&M Sales, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Class Action Complaint (doc. 100). The Motion has been briefed

and is ripe for disposition.1

I. Background.

In her Second Amended Class Action Complaint (doc. 94), plaintiff Laura Matthews

brings claims arising from her purchase of a “Pure-Ion” air purifier from a Brookstone retail

store in Georgia in December 2004. Plaintiff maintains that she purchased her air purifier from

defendants Brookstone, Inc. (“Brookstone, Inc.”), Brookstone Company, Inc. (“Brookstone

Company”) and Brookstone Stores, Inc. (“Brookstone Stores”) (collectively, “Brookstone”), and

that the unit was designed, manufactured, distributed and sold by Brookstone and defendant

D&M Sales, Inc. (“D&M”). According to plaintiff, this device does not perform the functions

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 1 of 15
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that it was marketed and warranted to perform, inasmuch as it fails to remove dust, pollen and

other impurities from the air, and instead exposes consumers to hazardous levels of ozone. On

behalf of herself and purportedly on behalf of all consumers in the United States who have

purchased air purifier units from Brookstone within the last six years, Matthews advances claims

against all three Brookstone entities and D&M for fraud, negligent/reckless misrepresentation,

breach of implied warranty, money had and received, unjust enrichment, conspiracy and

permanent injunction, plus separate claims against the Brookstone entities for breach of contract

and breach of express warranty. A hearing on plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification was

conducted before Magistrate Judge Cassady on April 27, 2006, and that motion has been taken

under submission.

This Court is now called upon to assess D&M’s jurisdictional status. Defendant D&M

was not named in the Complaint, but was initially brought into the case by defendant Brookstone

Stores as a third-party defendant on September 20, 2005. (See doc. 23.) Plaintiff followed by

submitting a First Amended Complaint (doc. 52) in November 2005, naming D&M as an

additional party defendant. Almost five months later, D&M moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims

against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as various claim-specific defects. On May 24,

2006, the undersigned entered an Order (doc. 175) determining that D&M’s personal jurisdiction

defense was not waived or abandoned by virtue of the delay in asserting it, and authorizing a

deposition of D&M to afford plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to investigate the jurisdictional

allegations. Following that deposition, Matthews and D&M supplemented the record as to the

Rule 12(b)(2) issue with some 43 pages of supplemental briefing and 26 additional exhibits.

II. Legal Standard for Personal Jurisdiction Defense.

Where a district court in its discretion decides a personal jurisdiction issue without an

evidentiary hearing, it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie case of personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d

1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002); S.E.C. v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997). Such a

showing requires the presentation of evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for directed

verdict. Id. In considering the adequacy of a plaintiff’s proffer, district courts accept as true all

facts alleged in the complaint, to the extent they are uncontroverted by a defendant’s affidavits.

Id. Where a plaintiff pleads sufficient material facts to show a basis for personal jurisdiction

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 2 of 15
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and where a defendant submits affidavits controverting those allegations, “the burden

traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction[,] unless

those affidavits contain only conclusory assertions that the defendant is not subject to

jurisdiction.” Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269. If the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting evidence

conflict with the defendant’s affidavits, then all reasonable inferences must be construed in the

plaintiff’s favor. See id.

“When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the twin burdens of

establishing that personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with (1) the forum state’s

long-arm provision and (2) the requirements of the due-process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Lasalle Bank N.A. v. Mobile Hotel Properties,

LLC, 274 F. Supp.2d 1293, 1296 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Horizon

Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005) (similar). 

In Alabama, this two-pronged inquiry collapses into a single question because Alabama’s longarm provision permits its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mutual Service Ins. Co. v. Frit

Industries, Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Alabama’s long-arm statute authorizes

Alabama courts to assert jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible,” such that

the sole issue is whether exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process); Ruiz de Molina v.

Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000); Lasalle Bank, 274 F.

Supp.2d at 1296; Reliance Nat’l Indemnity Co. v. Pinnacle Cas. Assur. Corp., 160 F. Supp.2d

1327, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2001). Accordingly, the critical question here is whether the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over D&M conforms to constitutional safeguards.

Due process authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction when “(1) the nonresident

defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum;” and “(2) the exercise

of jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Carrillo,

115 F.3d at 1542 (quoting Francosteel Corp., Unimetal-Normandy v. M/V Charm, Tiki,

Mortensen & Lange, 19 F.3d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also Horizon, 421 F.3d at 1166;

Molina, 207 F.3d at 1356.

The minimum contacts analysis varies depending on whether the type of jurisdiction

asserted is general or specific. Indeed, facts supporting “[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be general,

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 3 of 15
2 The personal jurisdiction issue must be tackled first because this Court cannot

rule on D&M’s other arguments if personal jurisdiction is lacking. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co.,

178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.6 (11th Cir. 1999) (federal court confronting both Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule

12(b)(6) motions should consider personal jurisdiction issue first because court without personal

jurisdiction is powerless to take further action). Additionally, the Court notes that D&M’s

Motion to Dismiss alleges as an alternative ground for relief that venue is improper, pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., but fails to mention it in its original or supplemental memoranda of

law. (See docs. 101, 130.) This omission is striking, given D&M’s insistence that plaintiff has

engaged in forum-shopping by filing suit in this forum, rather than in Georgia where the

transaction actually occurred. (D&M Supp. Brief (doc. 197), at 1, 2, 15.) In any event, the

venue issue cannot be addressed by this Court because D&M has failed to articulate or identify

any grounds for it, in derogation of Local Rule 7.1(a).

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which arise from the party’s contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the claim, or

specific, which arise from the party’s contacts with the forum state that are related to the claim.” 

Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d 738, 747 (11th Cir. 2002). Under general

jurisdiction, there must be a showing of “continuous and systematic” contacts between the

defendant and the forum state even if those contacts are unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims. Id.

By contrast, specific jurisdiction is proper where (i) the defendant’s contacts with the forum state

are related or give rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action, (ii) the contacts involve some act by

which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum, and (iii) the defendant’s contacts with the forum are such that the defendant should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. See, e.g., McGow v. McCurry, 412 F.3d 1207,

1214 (11th Cir. 2005); Carrillo, 115 F.3d at 1542; Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d

1534, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993).

III. Analysis of D&M Motion.

Defendant D&M seeks dismissal of this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, in

addition to asserting various grounds for dismissal of particular claims for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.2 D&M maintains that

specific jurisdiction is improper because there are no allegations tending to show a relationship

among Matthews, D&M, the Complaint, and the State of Alabama. Furthermore, D&M asserts

that general jurisdiction cannot properly be wielded against it because its connections with the

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 4 of 15
3 D&M’s Supplemental Brief (doc. 197) includes numerous footnotes in a tiny font

size that runs afoul of the requirements of Local Rule 5.1(a)(2), which prescribes a minimum of

12-point type and creates no exceptions for footnotes. The formatting requirements should be

heeded in future submissions to this Court.

4 Plaintiff argues that the undersigned should decline to give any weight to the

Affidavit of Christopher Lozzio submitted by D&M as Exhibit 2 to its supplemental brief. 

Matthews contends that the Lozzio Affidavit should be rejected under the well-recognized

principle that mere conclusory legal statements in an affidavit “are in substance legal

conclusions that do not trigger a duty for Plaintiffs to respond with evidence of their own

supporting jurisdiction.” Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999). But

this argument mischaracterizes the Lozzio Affidavit. Far from sounding in cursory legal

conclusions that simply parrot a long-arm statute and declare that it does not apply, the Lozzio

Affidavit proffers specific facts about the geographic scope of D&M’s corporate activities. 

Compare Posner, 178 F.3d at 1215 (affidavit that “contends, by reciting the long-arm statute

essentially verbatim, that the jurisdictional statute does not apply” offers conclusory assertions of

ultimate facts and will not be considered). Plaintiff overlooks the fact that the Posner court did

consider those portions of the affidavit “that set forth specific factual declarations within the

affiant’s personal knowledge.” Id. That is precisely what the Lozzio Affidavit does. As such,

the undersigned finds that the Lozzio Affidavit is distinguishable from that at issue in Posner, as

it is not limited to the conclusory denials that motivated the Posner ruling. The Court also

cannot agree with plaintiff’s critique that the affidavit “coyly attempts to blur the distinction”

between Lozzio and D&M. (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at 13.) The distinction between the two is

actually quite clear. The Lozzio Affidavit may be of limited utility, because of its emphasis on

Lozzio’s personal circumstances, rather than those of D&M, but it certainly is not devoid of

utility. Notwithstanding plaintiff’s objection, the Court will give this affidavit such weight as is

appropriate.

5 Lozzio has a somewhat tempestuous history in this litigation. Although not

originally named as a defendant, he became enmeshed in this action as a third-party defendant

when Brookstone Stores filed a Third-Party Complaint (doc. 23) alleging indemnity and breach

of warranty. Plaintiff followed by filing a First Amended Class Action Complaint (doc. 52)

naming Lozzio as an additional party defendant with respect to her claims, as well. In December

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forum state are too isolated and remote to satisfy the “continuous and systematic” threshold.3

Based on information secured during jurisdictional discovery, Matthews disagrees.

A. Relevant Facts.4

During the course of jurisdictional discovery, plaintiff has uncovered and submitted the

following relevant facts: D&M was formed in March 2003 as a Massachusetts corporation by

Christopher Lozzio, its president and sole officer. (Lozzio Dep., at 9; Lozzio Aff., ¶ 2;

Plaintiff’s Exh. E.)5 The uncontroverted evidence is that D&M never received any purchase

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 5 of 15
2005, however, Brookstone Stores took a voluntary dismissal of its third-party claims against

Lozzio after the latter filed a Rule 12(b) motion challenging personal jurisdiction. (See doc. 57.) 

Undeterred, Matthews continued to press her claims against Lozzio until, after a period of

jurisdictional discovery, she consented to dismissal without prejudice of all claims against him,

apparently because she conceded that his jurisdictional objections had merit. (See doc. 79.) 

Thus, Lozzio is no longer a party to this dispute.

6 D&M applied for the trademark for the “LumiPure” name. (Id. at 55.) D&M also

created a passive website (www.lumipure.com) to provide product information or “sell sheets”

for LumiPure air purifiers; however, it was not possible for consumers to order the product from

that website, and D&M did not sell the product directly to end users. (Id. at 59-60, 95.)

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orders or conducted any business within the State of Alabama. (Lozzio Dep., at 91-92, 153.) 

D&M has never owned any property in Alabama and has never contracted to supply any goods

or services in Alabama. (Id. at 153.)

 According to its articles of incorporation, D&M’s purpose was to act as a sales

representative for companies in the United States and abroad. (Id. at 10-11.) In that regard,

D&M representatives traveled across the country to meet with various national big-box retailers

(in states other than Alabama) in marketing LumiPure ionizing air purifiers produced by a

Chinese company called VisionTac. (Id. at 101-03.)6

 D&M’s arrangement with VisionTac was

that D&M would sell products designed, manufactured and shipped by VisionTac in China to

retailers in the United States. (Id. at 35, 54, 56.) D&M succeeded in selling VisionTacmanufactured air purifiers to Sam’s Club (“Sam’s”); Bed, Bath & Beyond (“BB&B”); and

Brookstone. (Id. at 35, 57, 114.) D&M never sold air purifiers to any other entity or person. 

(Id. at 72.) D&M never sold or marketed any products directly to consumers or end users,

instead serving exclusively as a middleman between the manufacturer (VisionTac) and the

retailer. (Id. at 56, 59, 94.) D&M did not maintain an inventory of these products for any

substantial length of time. (Id. at 58-59, 152.) D&M outsourced a toll-free customer service

telephone number to vendors in New England, so that consumers who purchased LumiPure air

purifiers (but not the Brookstone variety) could obtain customer service and product support. 

(Id. at 19.) D&M prepared the packaging and instruction manuals, and shipped the LumiPure air

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 6 of 15
7 D&M would ship products to Sam’s at one of their 19 distribution centers, none

of which were located in Alabama. (Id. at 83.) Sam’s would actually take possession of the

goods at D&M’s warehouse in Illinois. (Id. at 84; Plaintiff’s Exh. R.) Lozzio estimated that

D&M sold as many as 140,000 units to Sam’s during their dealings. (Lozzio Dep., at 72.) 

Meanwhile, with respect to BB&B, D&M would ship ordered units directly to individual stores;

however, there is no evidence that any of the small test run of products ordered by BB&B from

D&M were shipped to Alabama retail locations. (Id. at 101.)

8 With respect to BB&B, such an inference may not be appropriate as to LumiPure

air purifiers, given that D&M’s relationship with that entity consisted of simply a test batch of

less than 100 air purifiers. (Id. at 69-70.) However, Lozzio testified that D&M sold

approximately 1,500 humidifiers to BB&B, making it reasonable to infer that at least some of

those items ultimately reached Alabama consumers. (Id. at 76.)

9 There is some evidence that another Chinese company (Hong Hwa Electric

Appliance Co. Ltd.) actually manufactured the air purifiers, although VisionTac designed them

and was responsible for their manufacture. (D&M Exh. 6, at #1, 5; Burout Dep., at 36.) This

discrepancy is not material to the issues presented in the instant Motion to Dismiss.

10 Although D&M was in the business of marketing LumiPure air purifiers, those

sold to Brookstone were not packaged and sold as LumiPure products, but were instead labeled

as Brookstone “Pure-Ion” products. (Id. at 53, 57.) The first version of the “Pure-Ion” air

purifier sold by Brookstone was substantially similar to the LumiPure. (Id. at 53, 97.) 

Eventually, though, Brookstone designed a version two of this air purifier, modifying the outside

shell to change the appearance and altering the functionality of the control panel, but retaining

the internal components from the original VisionTac design. (Id. at 48-49.)

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purifiers to Sam’s and BB&B. (Id. at 57-58, 60, 94.)7

 D&M also sold humidifiers to both Sam’s

and BB&B. (Id. at 73, 75.) A reasonable inference is that Sam’s and BB&B have sold products

purchased from D&M to consumers in the State of Alabama.8

As for D&M’s dealings with Brookstone, the parties’ manner and course of dealing was

as follows: (a) Brookstone would place an order with D&M for the VisionTac-designed air

purifiers; (b) D&M would relay the order to VisionTac in China; (c) VisionTac would

manufacture the product in China, and Brookstone would inspect and take possession of it at the

factory in China;9 and (d) Brookstone would send payment for the air purifiers to D&M, who in

turn would settle up with VisionTac. (Id. at 36, 42-43, 91.)10 At no time did D&M ever transfer

possession of air purifiers to Brookstone at a location in Alabama. (Lozzio Aff., ¶ 8.) Upon

receipt of the products, Brookstone sold them through their distribution channels as they saw fit,

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 7 of 15
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including catalog, Internet and retail stores. (Lozzio Dep., at 51-52.) A reasonable inference is

that Brookstone Stores sold some quantity of these air purifiers in Alabama. Written agreements

between D&M and Brookstone characterized the former’s role as “designer, manufacturer and

distributor” of the products. (Id. at 34-35; Plaintiff’s Exh. L, at 1; Plaintiff’s Exh. P.) Lozzio’s

testimony unequivocally refutes that description of what D&M did, and jurisdictional discovery

apparently did not disclose any other evidence (at least, none set forth in plaintiff’s 18

supplemental exhibits) that D&M’s function was anything other than acting as an intermediary

between VisionTac and Brookstone. Although the evidence is taken in the light most favorable

to Matthews at this stage of the proceedings, this discrepancy is not material to the legal issues

presented in D&M’s Rule 12(b) motion.

Other than humidifiers and air purifiers, D&M did not sell any products. (Lozzio Dep.,

at 100.) D&M no longer sells LumiPure air purifiers, and no longer has any business

relationship with Brookstone. (Id. at 72; D&M Exh. 6, at #2.)

B. Plaintiff’s Jurisdictional Arguments.

Matthews contends that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over D&M is

constitutionally permissible under both general and specific jurisdiction theories. Each will be

considered in turn.

1. General Jurisdiction.

Although Matthews points to no evidence that D&M representatives ever set foot in

Alabama, attempted to make business contacts in Alabama, or transacted any business directly

with anyone in Alabama, she nonetheless maintains that D&M is subject to general jurisdiction

because of its sale of LumiPure air purifiers and humidifiers. In particular, she contends that

D&M “formed an undeniable link in placing the product ... into the stream of commerce by

selling them to Brookstone, Sam’s Club and Bed, Bath & Beyond.” (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at

17.) “The stream of commerce test for jurisdiction is met if the nonresident’s product is

purchased by or delivered to a consumer in the forum state, so long as the nonresident’s conduct

and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled

into court there for claims arising out of that conduct.” Molina, 207 F.3d at 1357. Here,

Matthews misapplies the stream-of-commerce theory by attempting to utilize it as a springboard

for general jurisdiction. Stream-of-commerce theory is a basis for asserting specific jurisdiction,

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 8 of 15
11 See Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 788 (7th

Cir. 2003) (stream-of-commerce theory “is relevant only to the exercise of specific jurisdiction;

it provides no basis for exercising general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant”); Alpine

View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 216 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We have specifically rejected a

party’s reliance on the stream of commerce theory to support asserting general jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant.”); Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610,

612 (8th Cir. 1994) (characterizing stream-of-commerce theory as a type of specific jurisdiction);

Simeone ex rel. Estate of Albert Francis Simeone, Jr. v. Bombardier-Rotax GmbH, 360 F.

Supp.2d 665, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (similar).

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not general jurisdiction.11 In other words, if Matthews were suing D&M in Alabama because of

an air purifier that she had purchased in Alabama and that D&M had placed in the stream of

commerce, then this stream-of-commerce nexus might well support exercise of specific

jurisdiction over D&M in this forum. But Matthews purchased her air purifier in Georgia, not

Alabama, so a stream-of-commerce theory would, at most, support the exercise of specific

jurisdiction over D&M in Georgia. Thus, stream-of-commerce theory cannot establish the

requisite jurisdiction over D&M in this forum.

Undeterred by the problems with her stream-of-commerce argument, plaintiff next seeks

to impose general jurisdiction over D&M in Alabama based on the following facts: (a) D&M

operated a passive website to provide information for the LumiPure products it sold to Sam’s and

BB&B; (b) D&M contracted with a third party to operate a toll-free customer service line for

Sam’s and BB&B customers who purchased LumiPure products; and (c) D&M trained the

representatives of that customer-service vendor. (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at 17.) None of these

facts support jurisdiction. A purely passive informational website such as that operated by D&M

lacks jurisdictional significance. See GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199

F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cautioning that “personal jurisdiction surely cannot be

based solely on the ability of District residents to access the defendants' websites, for this does

not by itself show any persistent course of conduct by the defendants in the District,” and

comparing access to a website to being “nothing more than a telephone call by a District resident

to the defendants' computer servers”); Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th

Cir. 1999) (in “situations where a defendant merely establishes a passive website that does

nothing more than advertise on the Internet ... personal jurisdiction is not appropriate”);

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12 To hold otherwise would be to declare that operation of a website and a 1-800

number automatically subjects a company to general personal jurisdiction in every state of the

Union. In the undersigned’s opinion, such a ruling would expand the notion of jurisdiction well

beyond applicable constitutional parameters. See, e.g., GTE New Media, 199 F.3d at 1350

(theory that mere accessibility of websites in forum state constitutes minimum contacts “cannot

hold water” because “under this view, personal jurisdiction in Internet-related cases would

almost always be found in any forum in the country. We do not believe that the advent of

advanced technology ... should vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of federal court

jurisdiction.”); Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420 (commenting that such a ruling would create a result

in which every complaint arising from trademark infringement on Internet would give rise to

personal jurisdiction wherever plaintiff’s principal place of business was located, in

contravention of traditional notions of what constitutes purposeful activity invoking benefits and

protections of forum state); Snyder v. Dolphin Encounters Ltd., 235 F. Supp.2d 433, 441 (E.D.

Pa. 2002) (“If the contacts at issue here establish general personal jurisdiction, then any

corporation with websites ... would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state.”).

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Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (decrying efforts to

predicate personal jurisdiction on operation of an essentially passive web page advertisement).12

Nor does plaintiff provide any law to counter the authority holding that maintaining a nationwide

toll-free telephone number, in connection with a passive Internet site, does not create general

jurisdiction. See Mink, 190 F.3d at 337 (expressly finding that operation of passive website and

toll-free telephone number is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Jeffers v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 152 F. Supp.2d 913, 923 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) (where defendant operated a passive

website, “use of a nationwide toll-free number and the occasional advertising in national trade

journals do not add enough to Defendant's conduct to raise it above the constitutional bar”);

O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 2005 WL 994617, *4 (E.D. Pa. April 28, 2005) (“there can

be no dispute that the maintenance of a toll-free number is not a forum contact significant or

continuous enough to ground general jurisdiction”). And plaintiff’s suggestion that D&M’s

alleged training of third-party representatives in Maine and Massachusetts to staff the toll-free

customer service line somehow creates general jurisdiction over D&M in Alabama fails because

the cited deposition page makes no reference to any such training and, even if it did, the Court

perceives no link between such conduct and a general jurisdiction analysis.

In summary, then, Matthews would predicate general jurisdiction over D&M on the facts

that it had sales arrangements with several nationwide retailers, that some of the products it sold

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13 Count VIII characterizes the conspiracy as follows: “Defendants jointly

endeavored to design, manufacture, distribute, market, advertise and sell to Plaintiff and the

Class Members ‘air purifiers’ that failed to remove and could not remove impurities from the air

as marketed and advertised, and charged Plaintiff and the Class Members hundreds of dollars

based on said representations.” (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 85.)

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to such nationwide retailers were ultimately resold to Alabama consumers, that D&M had a

passive informational website and a toll-free customer service line, and that D&M reasonably

must have understood that some of the air purifiers and humidifiers it was selling would be

resold to end users in Alabama. But these connections are too attenuated to satisfy the rigorous

“continuous and systematic” threshold for general jurisdiction. And the stream-of-commerce

notion that represents Matthews’ best hope for personal jurisdiction fails because case law

confines that theory to specific jurisdiction and none of the units placed in the stream of

commerce by D&M are alleged in the Complaint to have harmed Matthews in Alabama.

2. Specific Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff also makes two arguments in favor of invoking specific jurisdiction over D&M. 

First, Matthews asserts that personal jurisdiction is proper because D&M is charged in this case

with “causing injury or damage in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or

impliedly made in the sale of goods in this state.” (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at 13.) This assertion

is not correct. The Second Amended Complaint charges D&M with causing injury to Matthews

(a Georgia citizen and resident) in the State of Georgia by breaching warranties in connection

with the sale of goods in Georgia. Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint alleges that

D&M wronged Matthews in any way in Alabama, so this theory of specific jurisdiction cannot

provide the requisite analytical hook for haling D&M into court in this forum.

Second, Matthews argues that the requisite specific jurisdiction is created by Count VIII

of the Complaint, which alleges a state law conspiracy cause of action against all defendants.13

Under the so-called “conspiracy theory of jurisdiction,” personal jurisdiction can be exercised

over a defendant who lacks minimum contacts to the forum state in the traditional sense if a

substantial connection exists between that forum and a conspiracy entered into by that defendant. 

See, e.g., Remmes v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 435 F. Supp.2d 936, 941 (N.D.

Iowa 2006) (collecting cases in which courts have recognized civil conspiracy as a basis to

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14 “Whether personal jurisdiction can be obtained under a state long-arm statute on

a conspiracy rationale at all is a question of state law.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384

F.3d 93, 102 n.8 (3rd Cir. 2004); see also Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.

1992) (same); Posner, 178 F.3d at 1217-18 (examining Florida law to determine whether

plaintiff could predicate personal jurisdiction on conspiracy claim).

15 The “overt act” requirement is not unique to Alabama, but is ubiquitous in the

case law. Indeed, numerous courts have required pleading of an overt act in the forum state as a

prerequisite to establishing personal jurisdiction on a conspiracy basis. See, e.g., Jungquist v.

Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that

the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires plaintiff to plead with particularity “the

conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy”);

Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 711 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (7th Cir.

1983) (“To plead successfully facts supporting application of the conspiracy theory of

jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege both an actionable conspiracy and a substantial act in

furtherance of the conspiracy performed in the forum state.”); In re Terrorist Attacks on

September 11, 2001, --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2006 WL 2008624 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2006) (“To

establish personal jurisdiction on a conspiracy theory, [p]laintiffs must make a prima facie

showing of conspiracy, allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a

member of the conspiracy, and show that the defendant's co-conspirator committed a tort in New

York.”) (citation omitted); Remmes, 435 F. Supp.2d at 942 (“In order to plead successfully facts

supporting application of the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege ... an overt

act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy within the forum's boundaries.”).

16 For reasons that are unclear, the Second Amended Complaint does not identify

the state in which plaintiff purchased or exchanged her Brookstone air purifiers, nor does it offer

any allegations to justify plaintiff’s selection of an Alabama venue for this litigation, rather than

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support in personam jurisdiction).

Alabama courts have recognized and adopted the conspiracy theory of personal

jurisdiction. See Ex parte United Ins. Companies, Inc., --- So.2d ----, 2006 WL 307830 (Ala.

Feb. 10, 2006); Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795, 806-07 (Ala. 2001).14 However, it is well

established in Alabama that a plaintiff cannot establish personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy

theory unless the plaintiff “plead[s] with particularity the conspiracy as well as the overt acts

within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.” McInnis, 820 So.2d at 806-07 (citation

omitted).15 This “overt act” requirement creates an insuperable difficulty for Matthews. After

all, it is undisputed that she is a Georgia citizen who purchased her air purifier from a

Brookstone retail store in Georgia, and later exchanged that air purifier for another unit at a

Brookstone retail store in Georgia. (Matthews Dep., at 9-10.)16 Plaintiff does not allege that her

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 12 of 15
a Georgia venue. By all appearances, plaintiff does not contend that she has incurred damage by

anything that defendants did or failed to do in Alabama; rather, her alleged injuries arise from an

isolated retail transaction in Georgia, and plaintiff’s injuries were allegedly caused by

defendants, none of whom are based in Alabama. Under the circumstances, the Court is hardpressed to understand why no defendant sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P.,

given the lack of any apparent nexus between the forum state and this dispute.

17 The law is clear that a plaintiff cannot rely on acts allegedly perpetrated against

other putative class members to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants for her claims. 

See Jung v. Association of American Medical Colleges, 300 F. Supp.2d 119, 136 n.8 (D.D.C.

2004) (“plaintiffs cannot rely on alleged injury to putative plaintiffs in order to meet the inDistrict injury requirement”); Williams v. FirstPlus Home Loan Trust 1996-2, 209 F.R.D. 404,

413 (W.D. Tenn. 2002) (personal jurisdiction is determined by reference to named plaintiff, not

putative class members); Barry v. Mortgage Servicing Acquisition Corp., 909 F. Supp. 65, 74-75

(D.R.I. 1995) (claims of named class representative are all that may be considered for personal

jurisdiction analysis, not those of other putative class members).

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conspiracy claims against defendants rest on any overt acts in the State of Alabama. Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim does not hinge on anything that any defendant did or may have done in

Alabama. To be sure, other putative class members’ conspiracy claims might involve overt acts

in Alabama (e.g., if they purchased the allegedly offending product in Alabama or if a

conspirator delivered that product to Alabama). But Matthews cannot satisfy jurisdictional

prerequisites for her claims based on the jurisdictional status of others, even if they are putative

class members, because (1) the Second Amended Complaint makes no such allegation, and (2)

even if it did, defendants’ activities towards others have no bearing on the wrong of which

plaintiff complains.17

In response to D&M’s argument that the “overt act” requirement is not satisfied here,

plaintiff does not identify an overt act that might enable conspiracy-based jurisdiction to attach. 

Instead, Matthews argues that she need not satisfy the overt act requirement as to D&M because

defendant Brookstone Stores has not contested personal jurisdiction, such that conspiracy

jurisdiction may be exercised over all co-conspirators because of Brookstone Stores’ overt acts. 

(Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at 22 n.8.) This bewildering contention fails on several levels. Plaintiff

misapprehends the nature of D&M’s overt act objection. The point is not that plaintiff has failed

to allege that D&M engaged in an overt act in Alabama, but is instead that plaintiff has failed to

show that any alleged conspirator committed such an overt act in Alabama that harmed her. The

Case 1:05-cv-00369-WS-C Document 220 Filed 12/11/06 Page 13 of 15
18 In light of this ruling, the Court cannot and will not reach D&M’s other bases for

seeking dismissal, including its Rule 12(b)(6) arguments that the Second Amended Complaint

fails to state a cause of action against D&M for fraud or misrepresentation, that lack of privity

between D&M and Matthews bars her breach of warranty claims, that plaintiff’s unjust

enrichment and money had and received claims are legally deficient because D&M never

received money from her, that Matthews’ conspiracy allegations are inadequate, and that her

injunction claim should be dismissed because D&M no longer markets the air purifier at issue. 

(See doc. 101, at pp. 2-6.)

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wrong of which Matthews complains did not rest to any extent on any acts committed by any

conspirators in Alabama. Furthermore, Matthews improperly conflates Brookstone Stores’

failure to file a Rule 12(b)(2) motion into evidence that Brookstone Stores committed an overt

act in furtherance of the conspiracy in Alabama. Brookstone Stores could not possibly have

prevailed on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, not because there is evidence that it committed overt acts as

to Matthews in Alabama (there is none) but because it operates three retail stores in Alabama,

which is exactly the kind of continuous and systematic contact that establishes general

jurisdiction. Thus, plaintiff’s contention that the propriety of general jurisdiction over

Brookstone Stores somehow dispenses with the need for any “overt act” in Alabama by any

alleged conspirator is misguided.

Simply put, then, conspiracy jurisdiction requires an overt act in the forum state. For

purposes of Matthews’ claims, no overt acts are alleged to have been committed in furtherance

of the conspiracy in Alabama. Because the Second Amended Complaint fails to plead with

particularity any overt acts within Alabama taken in furtherance of defendants’ alleged

conspiracy to mislead plaintiff (a Georgia citizen) into purchasing an allegedly worthless air

purifier from Brookstone in Georgia, plaintiff cannot secure specific personal jurisdiction against

D&M on a conspiracy theory.

For all of these reasons, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over D&M is improper and

unwarranted in this action.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (doc. 100) filed by defendant

D&M Sales, Inc. is granted for lack of personal jurisdiction.18 Plaintiff’s claims against D&M

are dismissed without prejudice for lack of minimum contacts with Alabama. See Posner, 178

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F.3d at 1221 (instructing that dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction must be without

prejudice, so as not to preclude other litigation on the merits in other jurisdictions).

The Court’s finding that Alabama courts lack personal jurisdiction over D&M would

appear fatal to Brookstone Stores’ third-party claims against D&M. Brookstone Stores was

silent in the briefing on D&M’s Motion to Dismiss, which was nominally directed solely at

plaintiff’s claims. To tie this loose end expeditiously, Brookstone Stores is hereby ordered, on

or before December 20, 2006, to show cause, if any exists, why its third-party claims against

D&M ought not be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under the reasoning set forth

above.

DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of December, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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