Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00597/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00597-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUDRATE BURTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RUMSEY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-CV-0597-OWW-DLB-P

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT OR

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO

PROCEED ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS ONLY 

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Defendants removed this action from the Kings County Superior Court on April 17, 2007.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

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506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)(“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at California State PrisonCorcoran, where plaintiff is incarcerated. Plaintiff names Nurse Rumsey and Chief Medical Officer

McGuinness as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of

false allegations of a rule violation by defendant Rumsey, plaintiff’s housing status was changed,

interrupting his regularly scheduled medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Rumsey

intentionally failed to alert medical staff of plaintiff’s housing change so that he would receive his

dialysis treatment. He alleges that as a result of the false rules violation, he suffered an increase in

custodial status and he was transferred to administrative segregation thereby losing the privileges

given to inmates in general population. Plaintiff alleges that it was the responsibility of defendant

McGuinness to schedule plaintiff’s treatment, which he intentionally failed to do. 

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C. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his placement in administrative segregation and loss of

privileges do not state a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The

Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process of law.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action for deprivation

of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which

the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The state does not create protectable liberty

interests by way of mandatory language in prison regulations. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-

84 (1995). Rather, the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing on the nature of the

deprivation. Id. Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined

in the general prison population instead of segregation, see Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68, and plaintiff

has not alleged any facts which support a finding that plaintiff had a liberty interest in remaining free

from administrative segregation created by state law. Plaintiff’s allegation that he was subject to

more restrictions than general population inmates is insufficient. The complaint is devoid of any

facts supporting a finding that plaintiff was subjected to a situation which constituted atypical and

significant hardship. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s

due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within

sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally

expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no

protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). 

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2. Medical Claims

Plaintiff’s claims involving the alleged denial of medical treatment fall within the purview

of the Eighth Amendment. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does

not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the

prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted

with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official

does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate

indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with

medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in

receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to

make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060

(citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants intentionally denied his dialysis treatment. Plaintiff’s

allegations are sufficient to support a claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

serious medical need. 

3. State Law Negligence

Plaintiff also alleges a claim for negligence under California law. In a medical malpractice

action, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and

diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that

duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and

(4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” Tortorella v. Castro, 140

Cal.App.4th 1, 3 n.2 (2006); Hanson v. Grode, 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606 (1999). “The standard of

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care in a medical malpractice case requires that medical service providers exercise that . . . degree

of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession

under similar circumstances.” Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.4th 101, 108 (Cal. 1999);

Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal.3d.399, 408 (1976). Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a

claim that the named defendants committed malpractice. 

 C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983 against

defendants for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment and a pendent state law claim for negligence. However, plaintiff’s complaint does not

state a claim for violation of his due process rights. The court will provide plaintiff the opportunity

to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only

against defendants for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need and negligence, plaintiff

may so notify the court in writing, and the court will issue a Findings and Recommendations

recommending that this action proceed accordingly, and will forward plaintiff two summonses and

two USM-285 forms for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the court will direct the

United States Marshal to initiate service of process.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is advised that an

amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474

(9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself

without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that

“[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended

complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d

811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

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affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and wishes to proceed only against defendants on his Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference and state law negligence claims; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 22, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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