Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-05477/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-05477-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 Plaintiff is now on parole. 1

 **Original filed 2/27/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE RUFFIN,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J. REYNOSO, Et Al., 

Defendants.

 

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No. C 02-5477 JF (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff Terrence Ruffin filed this pro se civil rights action when he was

incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed

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in forma pauperis and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff has filed

an amended complaint, which the Court now reviews under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on June 7, 2002 at Pelican Bay State Prison, Correctional

Officer J. Reynoso and Sgt. R.K. Bell used unnecessary and excessive force against

him after separating him from his cellmate and while escorting him from the cell. He

also claims that after assaulting him Defendants strapped him to a "Stokes litter" and

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denied him medical attention for his injuries. He further alleges that Reynoso then

placed him in a cell which was not his assigned cell, and into which chemicals had

been sprayed. Plaintiff states that he was forced to stay overnight in the chemicalsaturated cell while suffering from his injuries, without clothing, a mattress or blanket,

and that he spent all night coughing and choking. Plaintiff alleges that the cell removal

and use of force occurred because Plaintiff is black and his cellmate is white, as

evidenced by racially derogatory statements Defendants made before they assaulted

him.

Plaintiff alleges causes of action under the First and Eighth Amendments, and

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks monetary

damages.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any

cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally

construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person

acting under the color of state law committed a violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used excessive force against him, denied him

medical care for his injuries, and acted with deliberate indifference to his safety by

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placing him in a cell saturated with chemicals. Liberally construed, these allegations

present cognizable claims for relief under the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (whenever prison officials stand accused of using

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is

whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976) (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment); Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (a prison official can be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement if the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety). 

C. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges that he was separated from his cellmate and assaulted because

he is black and his cellmate is white, in violation of his First Amendment right to

freedom of association.

The First Amendment prohibits government officials from "abridging the

freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. Const.

amend. I. Prisoners retain those First Amendment rights not inconsistent with their

status as prisoners or with legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. 

See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). While the Supreme Court has held

that the First Amendment right to freedom of association is among the rights least

compatible with incarceration, Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U. S. 126, 131 (2003), it has

not determined the scope of associational rights that prisoners might retain, id. at 132;

see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1977)

(The "inmate's 'status as a prisoner' and the operational realities of a prison dictate

restrictions on the associational rights among inmates.") . Nevertheless, prison

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regulations that infringe on a prisoner's First Amendment rights are valid only so long

as they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley,

482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegation that he was removed from his cell and

assaulted because he chose to be cellmates with an inmate of a difference race states a

cognizable First Amendment claim. 

C. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff claims that Defendants' actions violated his right to equal protection. 

In order to present an equal protection claim, a prisoner must allege that his treatment

is invidiously dissimilar to that received by other inmates. More v. Farrier, 

984 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1993) (absent evidence of invidious discrimination,

federal courts should defer to judgment of prison officials). Plaintiff alleges that

because he celled with an inmate of another race he was forcibly removed from his cell

and beaten. The inference to be drawn is that inmates who cell with inmates of the

same race are not treated in this manner. Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations

state a cognizable claim for relief. 

CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, a copy of the amended complaint in this matter (docket no.

9), all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order on Defendants Correctional Officer

J. Reynoso and Sgt. R.K. Bell at Pelican Bay State Prison. The Clerk shall also serve a

copy of this order on Plaintiff. 

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date they are served with the

amended complaint, Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other

dispositive motion, or shall notify the Court that they are of the opinion that this case

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cannot be resolved by such a motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate

factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If Defendants are of the opinion that

this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior

to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendants’ counsel no later than thirty (30) days from the date

Defendants’ motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice

should be given to pro se plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which

they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment

under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted,

end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted

when there is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, if there is no real

dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party

who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a

motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations

(or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as

provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant's

declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in

opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants, your case

will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)

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(holding party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing

triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is

cautioned that failure to file an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and

granting of judgment against Plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d

52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir.

1994). 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

3. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16-1 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

For Plaintiff’s information, the proper manner of promulgating discovery is to

send demands for documents or interrogatories (questions asking for specific, factual

responses) directly to Defendants' counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33-34. The scope of

discovery is limited to matters “relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . .” See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery may be further limited by court order if “(i) the

discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some

other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party

seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the

information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs

its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). In order to comply with the requirements

of Rule 26, before deciding to promulgate discovery Plaintiff may find it to his benefit

to wait until Defendants have filed a dispositive motion which could include some or

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all of the discovery Plaintiff might seek. In addition, no motion to compel will be

considered by the Court unless the meet-and-confer requirement of Rule 37(a)(2)(B)

and N.D. Cal. Local Rule 37-1 has been satisfied. Because Plaintiff is incarcerated he

is not required to meet and confer with Defendants in person. Rather, if his discovery

requests are denied and he intends to seek a motion to compel he must send a letter to

Defendants to that effect, offering them one last opportunity to provide him with the

sought-after information.

4. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on

Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the

document to Defendants’ counsel.

5. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court and the parties informed of any change of address and must comply with the

Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

6. Extensions of time are not favored, although reasonable extensions will be

granted. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than ten (10) days

prior to the deadline sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2/27/07 

 JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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