Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00022/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00022-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HON LAU,

Plaintiff,

v.

DERRAL ADAMS,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09 cv 00022 MJS PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction under

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Plaintiff filed the action on January 26, 2009.

On April 8, 2009, an order was entered granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an

amended complaint. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within the allotted time, and on

June 19, 2008, an order was entered directing Plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be

dismissed for failure to prosecute. On June 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed a response setting forth

allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement and attaching copies of inmate grievances.

In an August 27, 2009, order the court advised Plaintiff that additional allegations had to be set forth,

if at all, in an amended complaint. The court discharged the order to show cause and granted

Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff was advised that if he failed to file an

amended complaint, the court would proceed with and screen the original complaint.

Case 1:09-cv-00022-MJS Document 24 Filed 05/07/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

On August 26, 2009, Plaintiff filed a document styled as a notice of appeal. It did not specify

what order was being appealed. On October 22, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On November 13, 2009, this court received the

mandate from the Ninth Circuit. To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint. The court

therefore addresses the original complaint.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners when the complaint seeks

relief against a governmental entity or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . .

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Except in limited circumstances, none of which applies to a section 1983 action such as this,

Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions . Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,

534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d

1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at the R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego. Plaintiff names as

the sole defendant in this action Derral G. Adams, the Warden at California State Prison (CSP)

Corcoran. In section III B of the complaint, Plaintiff lists as additional defendants “other guards,

Case 1:09-cv-00022-MJS Document 24 Filed 05/07/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

do not know names.” Plaintiff’s statement of claim, in its entirety, follows:

Plaintiff was put in SHU for ten months and CSP suppose release Lau

to RJD Donovan State Prison on Oct 25, 2008, until now the Warden

still keeping me in 24 hours isolated lock up confinement, let me

suffering emotional and physically injury, violating my civil right by

Warden Adams.

(Compl., ¶ IV.) Plaintiff seeks to be released to RJ Donovan Correctional Facility, and

damages for “wrongful confinement” in the Security Housing Unit (SHU). (Compl, ¶ V.) 

A. SHU Placement

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process clause

itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The Due Process Clause

itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population

instead of administrative segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68. With respect to liberty

interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulation is

determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84

(1995). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484.

In order to be entitled under federal law to any procedural due process protections, Plaintiff

must first have a liberty interest at stake. Plaintiff has alleged no facts that establish the existence

of a liberty interest in remaining free from being segregated in security housing or administrative

segregation. Id.; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9 Cir. 1997)(convicted inmate’s due th

process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within

sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9 Cir. th

2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally

expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no

Case 1:09-cv-00022-MJS Document 24 Filed 05/07/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

protected liberty interest in being fee from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff

may not pursue a claim for relief under section 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process unless

he is able to establish the existence of a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative

segregation. He has not done so.

B. Supervisory Liability

The sole defendant in this action is Warden Adams. Plaintiff does not indicate what, if any,

conduct Defendant Adams engaged in that caused him injury. To state a claim under section 1983,

a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant

deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles,

442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9 Cir. 2006). “A person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that th

person ‘does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9 Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 th

9 Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of th

direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by

others which the actors knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743.44). 

Further, liability may be imposed on supervisory defendants under § 1983 only if (1) the

supervisor personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or (2) the supervisor

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th

Cir. 1989); Taylor v. Lst, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff does not allege that facts

indicating that Warden Adams participated in, or knew of and failed to prevent, the alleged wrongs.

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it does not state any claims upon

which relief may be granted under section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the

opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified bythe Court in this order.

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff is cautioned that he may not

Case 1:09-cv-00022-MJS Document 24 Filed 05/07/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George,

507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, but must state what each named defendant did

that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights, Hydrick, 500 F.3d at

987-88. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965

(2007) (citations omitted). 

 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing

to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at

1474.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; 

4. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via his amended

complaint and any attempt to do so will result in an order striking the amended

complaint; and 

5. If Plaintiff failsto file an amended complaint within the time provided, the Court will

recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2010 /s/ Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00022-MJS Document 24 Filed 05/07/10 Page 5 of 5