Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00579/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00579-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Grigory Sorokin, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections; and Terry

Goddard, Attorney General of the State

of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-07-579-PHX-DGC (BPV)

ORDER

Petitioner Grigory Sorokin is a state prisoner confined by the Arizona Department of

Corrections. Petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. #1. United States Magistrate Judge Bernardo Velasco

has filed a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the petition be dismissed

as untimely. Dkt. #15. Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. Dkt. #16. A response

and reply have been filed. Dkt. ##19-20. For reasons stated below, the Court will accept the

R&R and dismiss the petition.

I. Background.

On January 27, 2004, Petitioner pled guilty in state court to charges of attempted

sexual assault, sexual abuse, and attempted child molestation. Dkt. #14, Exs. D-E. Petitioner

was sentenced one month later to an aggravated term of seven years’ imprisonment and

lifetime probation. Id., Ex. F.

Case 2:07-cv-00579-DGC Document 21 Filed 09/10/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Petitioner filed a notice of petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) on March 8,

2004. Id., Ex. G. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the petition,

which was granted on September 1, 2004. Id., Exs. I-J.

On February 28, 2005, Petitioner filed a successive petition for PCR on the ground

that the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296 (2004), was a

significant change in the law that applied to his case. Id., Ex. K. The trial court denied the

successive petition on the ground that Petitioner was precluded from relief because he should

have raised his Blakely claim in his first PCR petition. Id., Ex. L. The trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Id., Exs. M-N.

On May 27, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to reinstate petition for PCR alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel and reasserting his Blakely claim. Id., Ex. O. The trial court

denied the motion as untimely. Id., Ex. P. Appellate review was denied. Id., Exs. R-T.

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on March 19, 2007. Dkt. #1. Petitioner

alleges that his PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance and his aggravated sentence

violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 8-11.

II. Discussion.

The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

“imposes a one-year statute of limitation on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners

in federal court.” Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). The limitation period generally begins to run when the state conviction

becomes final “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.

2002) (“Under the AEDPA . . . a state prisoner must file his federal habeas corpus petition

within one year of the date his state conviction became final.”).

The R&R concludes that the AEDPA’s limitation period began to run on October 1,

2004 – 30 days after the dismissal of Petitioner’s first PCR petition (see Dkt. #14, Ex. J), that

the limitation period is not subject to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2), that the instant

habeas petition is therefore untimely because it was filed more than 500 days late on

Case 2:07-cv-00579-DGC Document 21 Filed 09/10/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

March 19, 2007 (see Dkt. #1), and that Petitioner has established no grounds for equitable

tolling. Dkt. #15 at 7-10.

Petitioner does not dispute that his habeas petition is untimely. He instead contends

that his PCR counsel’s failure to advise him of the Blakely decision constitutes “good cause”

for his untimely filing in state court and he therefore should not be barred from proceeding

with his habeas petition in this Court. Dkt. #16 at 4-9.

As Respondents correctly note, the AEDPA’s limitation period may not be equitably

tolled merely upon a showing of “good cause.” Dkt. #19 at 8. The “‘threshold necessary to

trigger equitable tolling under [the] AEDPA is very high[.]” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of showing

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The

petitioner also “‘must show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his

untimeliness.’” Bryant v. Ariz. Attorney Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799).

In his reply, Petitioner cites Spitsyn for the proposition that attorney misconduct can

justify equitable tolling under the AEDPA. Dkt. #20 at 4-5. Petitioner’s reliance on Spitsyn

is misplaced. The attorney in Spitsyn completely failed to file a federal habeas petition

despite the fact that he was hired to do so nearly a year before the filing deadline. He also

refused to communicate with the petitioner and his mother regarding the status of the petition

and he retained the petitioner’s file for the duration of the limitation period. 345 F.3d at 801.

Petitioner has not shown that the alleged ineffectiveness of his state PCR counsel caused him

to delay filing his federal habeas petition. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35

(9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling not justified where petitioner failed to show that his “selfrepresentation on appeal caused him to delay filing his federal habeas application”). In short,

Petitioner “has failed to establish the requisite causal connection.” Bryant, 499 F.3d at 1061.

Moreover, even if a causal connection existed, Petitioner has not shown that the

alleged negligence on the part of his PCR counsel was “sufficiently egregious” to constitute

Case 2:07-cv-00579-DGC Document 21 Filed 09/10/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 800-01

(stating that “ordinary attorney negligence will not justify equitable tolling”); see Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002) (attorney’s miscalculation of limitation

period did not warrant equitable tolling).

Finally, Petitioner has not shown that he acted diligently in raising his Blakely and

ineffective assistance claims. Petitioner learned of the Blakely case in September 2004

(Dkt. #14, Ex. P at 1 n.1), but did not raise a Blakely claim in state court until February 2005

(id., Ex. K) and did not file the instant habeas petition until March 2007 (Dkt. #1). This

Circuit has made clear that equitable tolling is justified “only where ‘external forces, rather

than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim.” Guillory

v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999)); see Bryant, 499 F.3d at 1061 (“A petitioner must show that his untimeliness

was caused by an external impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.”).

In summary, the Court finds that Petitioner’s objections to the R&R are without merit.

The Court will accept the R&R and dismiss the habeas petition as untimely. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) (the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (same). Given this

ruling, the Court need not address Respondents’ argument that equitable tolling is no longer

available under the AEDPA. See Dkt. #19 at 3-7.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation (Dkt. #15) is accepted.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is dismissed.

3. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 9th day of September, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-00579-DGC Document 21 Filed 09/10/08 Page 4 of 4