Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00460/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00460-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Roy Warden, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Kathleen Robinson, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-00460-TUC-BPV (DCB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Kathleen Robinson’s motion for summary 

judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. 68). Plaintiff, Roy Warden, filed a 

response (Doc. 80) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 83). 

Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Continue Hearing on 

Summary Judgment until Completion of Discovery.” (Doc. 85). The motion is fully 

briefed. (Docs. 87, 90.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the 

undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 25.) 

Plaintiff’s requests for oral argument are denied because the parties submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support of their positions and 

oral argument would not have aided the court's decisional process. 

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For reasons stated herein, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendant 

Robinson’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 68) be granted; and Defendant’s motion 

to continue and for further discovery (Doc. 85) be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The two claims that remain following the Court’s order dismissing several counts 

and defendants from the Amended Complaint (see Docs. 49, 62) arise from events 

alleged by Plaintiff to have occurred at or near the May 1st Coalition community wide 

march held on May 1, 2010 to bring attention to immigration issues and culminating in a 

rally at Armory Park in Tucson, Arizona. See generally Count One, Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 118 A and C; Defendant’s Reply, Special Operations Plan May 1st

Coalition March & Rally (“SOP”) Ex. 1 to Sayre Affidavit, Ex. 2. 

Plaintiff alleges his rights to freedom of speech under the First Amendment were 

violated on May 01, 2010 when Defendant Kathleen Robinson, a police officer with the 

Tucson Police Department, “prevented Plaintiff from entering Armory Park, Tucson 

Arizona to exercise his First Amendment rights;” (Amended Complaint, Doc. 6, ¶¶ 85, 

118 (A); Amended Answer, ¶ 4) and when an “unidentified Defendant TPD officer . . . 

threatened Plaintiff with arrest if Plaintiff did not move more than 1,000 feet away from 

Armory Park . . .” after he had moved across the street and began speaking to onlookers 

gathered there (id. at ¶¶ 86,118(C)). 

The Special Response Division of the Support Services Bureau was the 

specialized unit that coordinated the SOP for the May 1st Coalition March and Rally. 

Defendant’s Statement of Facts (“DSOF”)(Doc. 69) ¶¶ 2. In May, 2010 Assistant Chief 

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Kathleen Robinson was responsible for the Investigative Services Bureau and did not 

supervise the Special Response Division. DSOF ¶ 2. On the day of the rally, there would 

have been no reason for Asst. Chief Robinson to have any contact with Plaintiff because 

she was not in charge of the Support Services Bureau and because she did not have any 

uniform or special response function to assist with the May 1, 2010 SOP. DSOF ¶ 4; see

DSOF, Ex. A, Affidavit of Assistant Chief Kathleen Robinson, ¶ 7. Asst. Chief Robinson 

affirmatively states that she did not work on May 1, 2010, as demonstrated by the TPD 

Roster for May 1, 2010, and did not have any contact with Warden that day. DSOF ¶ 1; 

see Robinson Affidavit, Ex. 1, TPD Roster for May 1, 2010. 

Contrary to Defendant Robinson’s statement that she did not have any contact 

with Plaintiff on May 1, 2010, Plaintiff asserts in his affidavit that Asst. Chief Robinson 

is “personally known” to him, and that she denied Plaintiff entry into Armory Park on 

May 1, 2010. Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) (Doc. 81), 6. Plaintiff also 

challenges the legitimacy of the TPD Roster of May 1, 2010. Id. 10. 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant Robinson moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 1) Defendant Robinson 

did not work on May 1, 2010 and had no contact with Warden at Armory Park that day; 

and 2) Defendant Robinson does not know the name of the unidentified police officer 

who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights on May 1, 2010. 

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A. Summary Judgment Standard 

A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate against a 

party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact 

in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the 

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the non-moving party. Id. at 250; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 

1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(c) provides that "[a] party asserting that a fact cannot 

be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record . . . or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the 

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact." An issue of fact must be genuine. Matsushita 

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Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing 

party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient 

that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' 

differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 

U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). If the factual context makes the non-movant's claim 

implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support its 

claim than would otherwise be necessary. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-movant's position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence from which a fair-minded jury could reasonably find 

for the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

B. Rules Governing Pro se Litigation 

Pro se litigants “must be ensured meaningful access to the courts.” Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.1998)(en banc). This Court is cognizant of the 

special latitude given to pro se litigants. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 

1987). The Ninth Circuit, however, has made clear that a pro se litigant must “abide by 

the rules of the court in which he litigates.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Carter v. Comm’r, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986)). A pro se

litigant is held to the same standard in responding to a motion for summary judgment as a 

represented party. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-66 (9th Cir.1986); United 

States v. Bell, 27 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1197 n. 4 (E.D.Cal. 1998). The Court will therefore 

apply the general summary judgment standard to Defendant's motion, construing 

Plaintiff's pleadings liberally in his favor. See Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1137 (“The Supreme 

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Court has instructed federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se

litigants.”) (citations omitted); see also Semper v. JBC Legal Group, 2005 WL 2172377, 

at *1 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 6, 2005) (“Although the rule requires that the allegations of a pro 

se complaint be liberally construed when determining whether a viable claim has been 

asserted and that strict compliance with procedural/technical rules will not be expected of 

pro se litigants, it does not alter the summary judgment standard or otherwise give pro se

non-prisoner litigants multiple opportunities to present their evidence.”). 

C. Discussion 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting 

that (1) the conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or 

statutory right. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989)(citations omitted). 

In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the 

conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the 

injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 

(1976). 

 Defendant Robinson has submitted admissible evidence demonstrating that she did 

not supervise the Special Response Division of the Support Services Bureau which was 

assigned to coordinate the SOP for the May 1st Coalition March and Rally; that she did 

not work on May 1, 2010; that she was not at Armory Park on May 1, 2010; that she did 

not have any contact with Plaintiff Roy Warden on May 1, 2010; and that she does not 

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know the identity of the officer who allegedly threatened Plaintiff with arrest if he did not 

move more than 1000 feet away from the park. 

 Although Plaintiff Warden states that he was in the company of members of 

“protect the border groups” and “secured the services of a photographer to document the 

events for several rallies”, Warden’s only evidence that Asst. Chief Robinson was present 

at Armory Park on May 1, 2010 is his own affidavit. PSOF 4, 6. Warden has not 

presented controverting evidence in the form of affidavits from the members of the 

“protect the border groups” he was with, or any photographs from the photographer he 

may or may not have engaged on that particular date, that creates a genuine issue of 

material fact as to the whether or not Asst. Chief Robinson prevented Plaintiff from 

entering Armory Park on May 1, 2010. Warden’s affidavit fails to contain any detailed 

information about his encounter with Asst. Chief Robinson, such as who was present, 

where he encountered Asst. Chief Robinson, whether she was in uniform, whether she 

acted alone, or was aided by other TPD officers. Rather, Warden’s affidavit contains only 

the same general allegation that he described in his complaint, and is lacking in any 

specificity. Defendant Robinson argues that the nonmoving party may not rely on the 

mere allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment. See Reply 

(Doc. 83) at p. 2 (citing First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289 & n. 19). Instead, he must 

produce at least some “significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” 

Id. at 290. 

 Warden claims that he has “...not yet been afforded discovery ...” and has not yet 

deposed Asst. Chief Robinson to determine her official capacity and responsibilities on 

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May 1, 2010. The undersigned agrees with Defendant Robinson’s assessment that 

Plaintiff does not need to depose Asst. Chief Robinson to “discover” this information 

because the information is contained in her affidavit, the SOP, and the TPD Roster for 

May 1, 2010, which verifies that Saturday May 1, 2010 was her day off, she did not 

supervise the Support Services Bureau that day, did not serve any uniform or special 

response functions that day, and she was not at Armory Park on that day. If Plaintiff 

deposed Asst. Chief Robinson in the future, Warden does not explain how that deposition 

would reveal any more information relevant to his Amended Complaint than that which 

is already presented in her affidavit, in the TPD duty Roster for May 1, 2010, or in the 

SOP, all of which he already has. 

 Finally, Warden claims that he is presenting additional facts which cast doubt on 

the veracity of Defendant Robinson’s denial that she was in Armory Park on May 1, 

2010, and challenges the legitimacy of the documents she presents. See Response (Doc. 

80) at p. 4.This claim is based upon his affidavit asserting that he read through a trial 

transcript, in an unrelated case filed in this Court over ten years ago, that he alleges 

revealed that Defendant Miranda, then Chief of Police at the Tucson Police Department, 

retaliated against the plaintiff in that case by falsifying TPD records and providing false 

testimony. Aside from the numerous admissibility issues of this evidence, which 

Defendant highlights in her Reply (Doc. 83 at p. 4), the actions of Defendant Miranda in 

a completely unrelated case has no probative value to the factual dispute at issue in this 

motion. 

 Defendant Robinson has presented evidence establishing a factual context that 

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makes Plaintiff’s claim, which rests solely on Plaintiff’s allegation in his Amended 

Complaint and supporting affidavit, implausible. Accordingly, Plaintiff was required to 

come forward with more persuasive evidence to support his claim than would otherwise 

be necessary. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Defendant has failed to support his claim 

with more persuasive evidence. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] conclusory, selfserving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to 

create a genuine issue of material fact. Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 

1993). Thus, Plaintiff’s testimony-lacking any supporting documentation or detailed 

information regarding the incident which occurred on May 1, 20101

—does not create a 

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge grant 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to his claim against Defendant Robinson. 

D. Motion to Continue Hearing and for Further Discovery 

 Finally, Plaintiff requests a motion to continue the hearing on the motion for 

summary judgment until the completion of discovery.2

 (Doc. 85.) Rule 56(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to resist a summary judgment motion by 

“show[ing] by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s recitation of facts is so lacking in detailed information as to be 

virtually identical to the claims he has brought in this Amended Complaint, and in another action filed in this Court (see CV 13-283-TUC-DCB), regarding similar incidents that allegedly occurred in three other years: May 1, 2008; May 1, 2009; and May 1, 2011. 

2

 Plaintiff opposes the motion for summary judgment and requests further discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f), the predecessor to Rule 56(d). For purposes of this motion, the Court will construe this motion as a motion pursuant to Rule 56(d). 

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essential to justify its opposition” to the motion. A party may invoke Rule 56(d) to ask 

the court to deny the summary judgment motion outright or delay consideration while the 

party completes necessary discovery. 

 A party relying on Rule 56(d) must offer specific reasons that it needs additional 

discovery to oppose a summary judgment motion. The affidavit must set out “the specific 

facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery” and show that “the sought-after facts are 

essential to oppose summary judgment.” Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home 

Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008); see State of Cal., on Behalf of 

California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 

1998) (explaining that for a continuance under Rule 56(f), predecessor to 56(d), parties 

must show “(1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope 

to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these soughtafter facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary judgment motion”). 

 Rule 56(d) only applies “where the non-moving party has not had the opportunity 

to discover information that is essential to its opposition.” Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 

F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 

846 (9th Cir. 2001)). However, courts should grant Rule 56(d) motions “fairly freely” 

when a party has not “had any realistic opportunity to pursue discovery relating to its 

theory of the case.” Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co. v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes 

of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003); see Metabolife Int’l, 264 

F.3d at 846. 

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 Plaintiff’s affidavit states that he attempted to obtain records from the Public 

Records Clerk at TPD pertaining to duty assignments and incidents which might have 

occurred within Armory Park or the surrounding area on May 1, 2010, but was informed 

that these were not public records, and could be obtained only through formal discovery. 

See Affidavit of Roy Warden (Doc. 86) ¶¶ 11-15. Plaintiff states because he has not been 

afforded formal discovery, he has not been able to obtain the evidence he needs to learn 

the name of the “unidentified police officer” who violated his rights on May 1, 2010, and 

“other facts” he needs to resist this motion for summary Judgment. Id at ¶ 16. 

Specifically, discovery conducted upon the TPD officers named in the SOP will 1) reveal 

the names of the other TPD officers who participated in the May 1, 2010 rally; and 2) 

reveal the presence of Kathleen Robinson at Armory Park on May 1, 2010, despite the 

fact she was not assigned to be there; and 3) the name of the “unidentified police officer” 

who violated his rights as alleged in Count One. Id. at ¶ 20. 

 Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s motion as it relates to further discovery in an 

attempt to identify the “unidentified police officer” but maintain that Defendant Robinson 

should still be dismissed from this case. (Doc. 87.) The undersigned agrees. Plaintiff 

provides no basis or factual support, through his own affidavit or the affidavit of any 

witness, to suggest that discovery conducted upon the TPD officers who participated in 

the May 1, 2010 rally would reveal the presence of Kathleen Robinson at Armory Park. 

Speculation cannot support a Rule 56(d) request. Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 854 

(9th Cir.1998) (“wild speculation” will not support 56(d) request); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 

F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991) (denial of 56(d) request proper when “the evidence 

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sought ... is the object of pure speculation”). The Magistrate Judge recommends that 

Plaintiffs' request to continue the motion for summary judgment and conduct additional 

discovery as it relates to Defendant Robinson be denied. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that: 

(1) Defendant Robinson’s Motion Summary Judgment (Doc. 68) be GRANTED; 

(2) Plaintiff’s “Motion to Continue Hearing on Summary Judgment until the 

Completion of Discovery” (Doc. 85) be GRANTED IN PART as to continued discovery 

regarding the “unidentified officer” and DENIED IN PART as to Defendant Robinson’s 

motion for summary judgment. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. If 

objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the District 

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 11-

0460-TUC-DCB. 

 Dated this 3rd day of December, 2013. 

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