Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00264/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00264-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN MCCLINTOCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

COLOSIMO et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-0264 TLN DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are several motions filed by plaintiff. For the 

reasons discussed below, the court will deny those motions. In addition, the court will at this time 

order the parties to participate in a mandatory settlement conference.

First, plaintiff has filed a motion to modify the court‟s discovery and scheduling order. 

Under that order, the parties were allowed to conduct discovery until October 17, 2014, and file 

any pretrial motions on or before January 9, 2015. Plaintiff now seeks additional time to conduct 

discovery. Plaintiff notes that he had requested a stay of this action, which this court ultimately 

denied as moot, while he pursued an interlocutory appeal of this court‟s order denying him the 

appointment of counsel. The Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiff‟s interlocutory appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction and subsequently denied plaintiff‟s request for reconsideration. 

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Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may modify the 

scheduling order for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The “good cause” standard 

“primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” See Johnson v. 

Mammoth Re-creations, 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). In this regard, the court may modify 

a scheduling order deadline “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party 

seeking the extension.” Id. See also Zivkovich v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 

1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If the party seeking the modification „was not diligent, the inquiry 

should end‟ and the motion to modify should not be granted.”).

Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause to modify the court‟s discovery and 

scheduling order. Specifically, plaintiff has not described what efforts he undertook to meet the 

discovery deadline previously set by the court in this action. Moreover, as to plaintiff‟s filing of 

an interlocutory appeal of this court‟s order denying his request for appointment of counsel, his 

appeal to the Ninth Circuit did not relieve him of the duty to prosecute this action. See Plotkin v. 

Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982) (“We hold that an appeal from an 

interlocutory order does not stay the proceedings, as it is firmly established than an appeal from 

an interlocutory order does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to continue with other phases 

of the case.”). Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff‟s motion to modify the court‟s discovery 

and scheduling order which was filed long after the time for conducting discovery in this action 

had closed.

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to compel discovery. As discussed above, under the 

court‟s discovery and scheduling order, the parties were allowed to conduct discovery until 

October 17, 2014. Plaintiff‟s motion to compel, filed on February 24, 2015, is untimely. 

Accordingly, the court will deny the motion.1

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Plaintiff has also filed a motion styled “motion to federal judge discovery of witnesses.” In the 

motion, plaintiff asserts “In the interest of justice in finding discovery of witnesses . . . plaintiff 

should have first rights of their findings and locations of all person(s).” Insofar as this is a 

discovery motion by plaintiff, it too is untimely under the court‟s discovery and scheduling order. 

In any event, the court is unable to decipher what relief plaintiff seeks from the court. 

Accordingly, the court will deny this motion as well.

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Finally, plaintiff has filed a request for the undersigned Magistrate Judge to recuse himself 

from issuing further rulings in this civil action. “Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district 

court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is 

pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such 

judge shall proceed no further therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. “Any justice, judge, or magistrate 

judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Under both recusal statutes, the 

substantive standard is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would 

conclude that the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Studley,

783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(internal quotations omitted)).

In this case, plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail to establish a reasonable question as to 

the undersigned‟s impartiality or that a bias or prejudice exists. Insofar as plaintiff disagrees with 

the undersigned‟s rulings to date, he is advised that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute 

a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

Rather, judicial rulings are a basis for appeal after a final judgment, not recusal. Id. Accordingly, 

the court will deny plaintiff‟s request for recusal.

The court will now instruct the parties on how the rest of this matter will proceed. As 

noted above, under the court‟s discovery and scheduling order, the parties were required to file 

any pretrial motions on or before January 9, 2015. Defense counsel had filed a motion for 

summary judgment on behalf of defendants Casillas and Merriweather. On March 5, 2015, the 

undersigned issued findings and recommendations, recommending that the motion for summary 

judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required be 

granted. On April 20, 2015, the assigned District Judge adopted those findings and 

recommendations in full, granted defendants‟ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed 

defendants Casillas and Merriweather from this action. Plaintiff‟s claims against defendants 

Colosimo and Beshears remain pending before the court. 

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In the court‟s discovery and scheduling order, the court advised the parties that it would 

set pretrial conference and trial dates, as appropriate, after adjudication of any dispositive motion 

or upon expiration of the time for filing such a motion. The time for filing any additional

dispositive motions has now passed. In due course, the court will issue a further scheduling order 

setting dates for pretrial statements, pretrial conference, and jury trial. However, before issuing 

that order, the court will set a mandatory settlement conference in this case. If available at his 

institution of confinement, the court may order that plaintiff participate in the settlement 

conference by way of video-conferencing. Pursuant to Local Rule 270(b), the parties will be 

directed to inform the court in writing as to whether they wish to proceed with the settlement

conference before the undersigned magistrate judge or if they wish to be referred to the court‟s 

mediation program for assignment of another magistrate judge to preside over that settlement 

conference. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s motion to modify the court‟s discovery and scheduling order (Doc. No. 55) 

is denied;

2. Plaintiff‟s motion to compel (Doc. No. 56) is denied;

3. Plaintiff‟s “motion to federal judge discovery of witnesses” (Doc. No. 62) is denied;

4. Plaintiff‟s request for recusal (Doc. No. 63) is denied;

5. Within twenty-one days of the date of this order, each party shall inform the court in 

writing as to whether they wish to proceed with the settlement conference before the undersigned 

magistrate judge or if they wish to be referred to the court‟s mediation program. If the parties 

wish to proceed before the undersigned magistrate judge, each party shall return to the court the 

consent form for settlement conferences provided with this order. If the parties do not wish the 

undersigned magistrate judge to preside at the settlement conference, each party shall file a 

declaration stating he wishes to be referred to the court‟s mediation program; and

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6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send each party the consent form for settlement 

conferences.

Dated: May 1, 2015

DAD:9

mccl0264.sc

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