Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02183/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02183-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 07cv2183

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES H. CUNNINGHAM, Civil No. 07-2183 DMS (BLM)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

James H. Cunningham, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in

case number SCE243538. The Court has considered the Petition

and Exhibits, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse and all

the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon

the documents, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the

California Court of Appeal opinion, People v. Cunningham, No.

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D046320, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2006). This Court

gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes

them to be correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of

correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36

(1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to

statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

A. The People’s evidence

Jose Castro testified that on September 12, 2004,

he was helping Rebecca Knox (Rebecca) and Christopher

Knox (Christopher) pack because they were moving.

Castro had been living with the Knoxes in their

apartment. Cunningham lived in an apartment below the

Knoxes’ apartment. At some point during the evening,

Cunningham came to the Knoxes’ apartment and asked

Castro for a vacuum that Rebecca had borrowed. Castro

replied that Rebecca was not home. Some time later,

from downstairs in the parking lot of the apartment

complex, Cunningham shouted to Castro, “Where’s my cell

phone?” Cunningham then said, “I’ll be right back.”

Moments later, Cunningham “busted in the door” of

the Knoxes’ apartment, holding a short rifle. Castro

and Rebecca were in the apartment and saw Cunningham

come through the front door. Cunningham placed his

hand on the trigger and, addressing Castro, said:

“Where’s my cell phone goddamn it? I want my cell

phone back. You took my cell phone.” Cunningham held

the gun against Castro’s throat. Castro grabbed a

cordless telephone. Cunningham took the telephone from

Castro and pushed him up against the wall with the gun.

Cunningham then threw the telephone back to Castro and

said, “Go ahead and call the cops. I’ll come back and

kill you all.”

Castro testified that at this point, Christopher

came out of a bedroom holding a baseball bat.

Christopher took the telephone from Castro and told

Cunningham to get out of the apartment. Cunningham

began to leave the apartment. As Cunningham was

leaving the apartment, heading to the parking lot of

the complex, he continued yelling at and threatening

Castro and Christopher.

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Rebecca Knox testified that when she returned home

on the evening in question, Christopher and Castro told

her that Cunningham had asked them about his missing

cellular telephone. Later, while Rebecca was in the

living room of the Knoxes’ apartment with Castro,

Cunningham walked into the apartment through the open

front door. Rebecca could see that Cunningham was

holding a gun at his side. Cunningham began yelling at

Castro, accusing him of taking Cunningham’s cellular

telephone and threatening to kill him. Castro denied

having taken the phone. Cunningham put the gun to

Castro’s neck and pushed him backward. Castro grabbed

a cordless telephone. Cunningham took the telephone

from Castro and threw it into the hallway. At this

point, Christopher came out of the bedroom holding a

baseball bat and told Cunningham to leave. Cunningham

then left the apartment.

While Cunningham was in the parking lot of the

apartment complex, Christopher telephoned 911.

[Footnote 2: Christopher Knox did not testify.] The

tape of the 911 call was played for the jury. On the

tape, Christopher can be heard yelling, “Yep. You

gonna let me have it tonight. I’m gonna shoot you in

your face, you come up here again.” Rebecca took the

telephone from Christopher and said to the 911

operator, “He just pulled a fuckin’ gun on me and my

husband and my roommate.” Later during the 911 call,

the operator asked Rebecca whether Cunningham had shot

anyone. Rebecca responded, “No. He fuckin’ held it to

my roommate’s head. He slammed him to the ground with

it.”

At around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. that night, Officer

Stephen Paz of the El Cajon Police Department heard a

radio dispatch regarding a disturbance at the apartment

complex. The dispatcher provided a description of

Cunningham and his truck. As Officer Paz was

responding to the scene, he stopped at a traffic light.

While stopped at the light, Paz saw a person driving a

truck. The person and the truck matched the

description he had heard over the radio. The driver of

the truck was headed in the opposite direction from

Paz. Paz made a U-turn and began to follow the truck.

The driver of the truck ran a red light as he

approached the entrance to a freeway. A second police

officer in another police car was also following the

truck. Both officers turned on their overhead lights.

As the driver of the truck began to merge onto the

freeway, Paz saw the driver throw something out of the

passenger window. Shortly thereafter, the officers

were able to stop the truck, and took Cunningham into

custody. Officer Paz retrieved the item he had seen

Cunningham throw from the window. It was a shotgun.

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After the incident, Cunningham was evicted from

his apartment. A property manager found two guns in a

closet while she was cleaning out Cunningham’s

apartment, and called police.

B. The Defense

Cunningham testified at trial. Cunningham lived

in the same apartment complex as the Knoxes, and

considered Rebecca to be a friend. Cunningham had

initially been friendly with Christopher as well, but,

over time, he and Christopher had grown hostile toward

each other. Cunningham claimed that a couple of months

prior to the events underlying the charged offenses, he

had confronted Rebecca and Christopher about a bogus

check Rebecca had deposited to his checking account.

According to Cunningham, Christopher “flew off the

handle” and threatened Cunningham with a baseball bat.

Castro and Rebecca also both testified that

Cunningham and Christopher had gotten into several

arguments with each other prior to the incident in

question. Castro testified that he had heard

Christopher threaten to kill Cunningham during these

arguments.

On September 12, 2004, between 10:00 and 10:30

p.m., Cunningham returned to his apartment after work.

He noticed that a screen to one of his windows had been

pried open and that his daughter’s bicycle, some

clothes, his cellular telephone, and checks were

missing from the apartment. Cunningham noticed that

Rebecca, Castro and other people were outside on the

Knoxes’ balcony. Cunningham asked the people on the

balcony whether they had seen anyone around his

apartment. Cunningham believed that someone who was

staying in the Knoxes’ apartment might have taken his

property. Cunningham said that the people on the

Knoxes’ balcony “got smart” with him and he went inside

his apartment to “cool down.”

Cunningham later went upstairs to the Knoxes’

apartment and asked to speak to Rebecca. Castro told

him she was not home, but that she would return in 10

or 15 minutes. Cunningham told Castro to tell Rebecca

that he would be back. Cunningham then left the

apartment complex and went to the laundry. When he

returned, several people were on the Knoxes’ balcony.

Cunningham said he wanted to see Rebecca. Several

people on the balcony yelled at him. Cunningham went

inside his apartment and armed himself with a shotgun.

Cunningham claimed he armed himself because, six months

earlier, he had been assaulted by people who had been

hanging around the apartment complex, and also because

he was afraid of Christopher due to Christopher’s prior

threats.

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Cunningham said he went upstairs to the Knoxes’

apartment, with his shotgun, to attempt to retrieve his

property. As Cunningham was standing in the doorway to

the Knoxes’ apartment, Christopher came toward him with

a baseball bat. The door to the apartment began to

close. Cunningham told the people inside the Knoxes’

apartment that he would get back with them and that he

was going to call the police. Christopher asked

Cunningham what he was holding in his hand, and

Cunningham told him it was a gun. Cunningham turned

and began to walk down the stairs. He denied ever

having pointed the gun at anyone.

Cunningham said that after this confrontation, he

decided to leave the apartment complex. As he was

leaving, Christopher yelled at him and threatened him.

Cunningham got into his truck and drove onto the

freeway. Cunningham noticed that the police were

following him. He decided to throw the gun out of the

car window because he feared being shot. Cunningham

admitted he had two additional guns that he kept locked

in a closet in his apartment.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 5 at 2-7.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 15, 2004, the District Attorney for the County

of San Diego filed an Information charging James Cunningham with

one count of burglary of an inhabited dwelling (Cal. Penal Code

§§ 459, 460) (Count 1); one count of assault with a firearm

(Cal. Penal Code §§ 245, 12022.5(a)) (Count 2); one count of

possession of a firearm by a felon (Cal. Penal Code

§ 12021(a)(1)) (Count 3); and one count of possession of a

deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 12020(a)(1)) (Count 4). (See

Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 001-003.) In the Information it was

also alleged that Cunningham had been convicted of one serious

prior felony (Cal. Penal Code §§ 337(a)(1), 668, 1192.7(c)) and

had one prior “strike” conviction (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-

(i), 1170.12, 668). (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 003.) 

/ / /

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 The jury found Cunningham “not guilty” of residential burglary

(Count 1). (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 064.)

-6- 07cv2183

On January 6, 2005, after a jury trial, Cunningham was

convicted of Counts 2, 3 and 4.1 (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 065-

67.) The jury also found that Cunningham had personally used a

firearm as to Count 2 (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5(a)). (See

Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 065, 093.) Cunningham admitted having

a prior conviction, including a serous felony prior and a strike

prior under California’s Three Strikes law (Cal. Penal Code §§

667.5(a)(1), (b)-(i); 668; 1170.12; and 1192.7). On March 10,

2005, the court sentenced Cunningham to 12 years in prison.

(See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 093.)

Cunningham appealed to the California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (See Resp’t Lodgment

No. 3.) On March 9, 2006, the appellate court affirmed

Cunningham’s conviction in an unpublished decision. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 5.) Cunningham filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 6.) The court

denied the petition without comment on May 17, 2006. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 7.)

On April 9, 2007, Cunningham filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court which was denied

on August 22, 2007 with citation to In re Waltreus, 61 Cal. 2d

218 (1965); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953); In re Swain, 34

Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1940); People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 464, 474

(1995); and In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947). (Resp’t

Lodgment Nos. 8, 9.) 

/ / /

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On November 13, 2007, Cunningham filed a federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus along with a motion for stay and

abeyance in this Court [doc. nos. 1, 3]. On March 7, 2008,

Cunningham filed a First Amended Petition followed by a motion

for stay and abeyance [doc. no. 16]. At about the same time,

Cunningham filed a petition for habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 10.) On October 28, 2008,

the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s state

habeas petition. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 11.)

This Court denied Cunningham’s motion for stay as moot on

December 19, 2008 [doc. no. 48]. Respondent filed an Answer to

the First Amended Petition on April 21, 2009 [doc. no. 62].

Cunningham filed a Traverse on July 30, 2009 [doc. no. 70]. In

response to an Order from this Court, Respondent filed

Supplemental Lodgments on February 17, 2010 [doc. no. 75]. On

March 2, 2010, Cunningham filed a “Motion for Procedural

Default” [doc. no. 77].

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

28 U.S.C § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

/ / /

/ / /

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The current petition is governed by the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Cunningham must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets

§ 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 73-74 (2003). 

In order for a petitioner to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), he or she

must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state

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2

 Cunningham’s First Amended Petition is lengthy and without

page numbers. Therefore, this Court has paginated the document

consecutively.

-9- 07cv2183

court’s adjudication rests, assuming it rests on a factual

determination, is objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish

a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct

an independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled

on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a

habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

“[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the

state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly

established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

In his First Amended Petition (“FAP”), Cunningham claims:

his Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses against him and

to present a defense were violated when the trial court excluded

potential impeachment evidence Cunningham wanted to use against

a prosecution witness (see FAP, Ground Four at 49-55)2; his due

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process rights were violated when the trial court improperly

instructed the jury (see FAP, Grounds Five and Six at 124-128,

130-135); his Sixth Amendment right was violated based on

several instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

(see FAP, Ground 3 at 69-115); and, his Sixth Amendment rights

were violated as a result of several instances of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel (see FAP, Grounds 1 and 2 at 7-

67). 

1. Cross-Examination of Rebecca Knox

Cunningham alleges that his Sixth Amendment rights to

confront witnesses against him and to present a defense were

violated when the trial court limited the admission of

impeachment evidence during the cross-examination of a

prosecution witness, Rebecca Knox (“Rebecca”). (See FAP at

Ground 4, 49-55.) Respondent argues that the state appellate

court’s denial of these claims was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. (See

generally, Answer at 19-20.)

Cunningham raised these claims in his petition for review

to the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 6.) The

petition was denied without comment or citation. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 7.) Because there is no reasoned decision from

the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to the last

reasoned state court decision which addressed the claims, the

California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In

rejecting these claims, the court of appeal stated: 

1. Procedural Background

During a pretrial conference, defense counsel

requested permission from the court to impeach Rebecca

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at trial with evidence that she had previously accused

Christopher of perpetrating domestic violence against

her and later recanted the accusations. Counsel

stated:

Rebecca Knox will be testifying. Ms.

Knox previously filed a report accusing her

husband of a domestic violence situation.

She then recanted the statements after her

husband was arrested. Charges were dropped

against him. I think this goes toward her

credibility. Unfortunately, I left the file

in my office, but I think it was from 2001.

Of course, I would like to use that to

impeach her in terms of her credibility today

and what she said to the police at the time.

After argument from the People and defense counsel, the

court ruled that the evidence would not be admitted:

That will be excluded. It has relevance,

no doubt about it. But in weighing it’s [sic]

relevance, versus the other factors, such as

the time it will take to bring it in, the

trial within a trial that it will most

certainly require, its relevance is

outweighed by those other factors under

[Evidence Code section] 352, and therefore,

it will be excluded and not referred to.

. . . .

3. The exclusion of the proffered evidence did not

violate Cunningham’s constitutional rights

Cunningham claims the trial court’s exclusion of

the proffered evidence violated his federal

constitutional rights to confront adverse witnesses and

to present a defense.

a. The exclusion of the evidence did not

violate Cunningham’s right to confront

adverse witnesses

“The confrontation clauses of both the federal and

state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the

right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses. (U.S.

Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const. art. I, § 15.) That

right is not absolute, however.” (People v. Cromer

(2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892.)

In People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600,

623-624, the court explained the scope of the right of

confrontation in the context of examining an adverse

witness on issues related to the witness’s credibility:

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Although the right of confrontation

includes the right to cross-examine adverse

witnesses on matters reflecting on their

credibility, “trial judges retain wide

latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause

is concerned to impose reasonable limits on

such cross-examination.” [Citation.] In

particular, notwithstanding the confrontation

clause, a trial court may restrict

cross-examination of an adverse witness on

the grounds stated in Evidence Code section

352. [Citation.] A trial court’s limitation

on cross-examination pertaining to the

credibility of a witness does not violate the

confrontation clause unless a reasonable jury

might have received a significantly different

impression of the witness’s credibility had

the excluded cross-examination been

permitted. [Citations.]

Quartermain also makes clear that a defendant’s

right of confrontation is not necessarily violated even

where a trial court abuses its discretion in excluding

impeachment evidence bearing on a witness’s

credibility. In Quartermain, the Supreme Court

concluded that the trial court had abused its

discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in excluding

evidence that a prosecution witness had bribed judges

in criminal proceedings unrelated to defendant’s case.

(Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 624.) However,

the Quartermain court concluded that the court’s

exclusion of the evidence would not have caused a

reasonable jury to reach a significantly different

impression of the witness’s credibility because his

credibility had been extensively impeached by his

admissions that he had perjured himself numerous times

in other proceedings, committed other acts of bribery,

and was extensively involved in the trafficking of

drugs. (Ibid.) The Quartermain court concluded that

the defendant’s confrontation rights had not been

violated by the erroneous exclusion of the impeachment

evidence. (Ibid.)

In this case. . . a reasonable jury would not have

received a significantly different impression of

Rebecca’s credibility regarding the incident in

question if the court had permitted defense counsel to

cross-examine her regarding her prior recantation of

domestic violence allegations against Christopher.

(See Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 290 [concluding

trial court did not violate defendant’s right of

confrontation by precluding cross-examination of

People’s witness on collateral credibility issue].)

Thus, the trial court did not violate Cunningham’s

right to confrontation by excluding the proffered

evidence.

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b. The exclusion of the proffered evidence

did not violate Cunningham’s right to

present a defense

In People v. Reeder (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 543, the

court outlined the interplay between a trial court’s

authority to exclude evidence pursuant to Evidence Code

section 352 and a defendant’s constitutional right to

present a defense.

“Evidence Code section 352 must bow to the due

process right of a defendant to a fair trial and to his

right to present all relevant evidence of significant

probative value to his defense. In Chambers v.

Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, it was held that the

exclusion of evidence, vital to a defendant’s defense,

constituted a denial of a fair trial in violation of

constitutional due-process requirements.

“We do not mean to imply, however, that a

defendant has a constitutional right to present all

relevant evidence in his favor, no matter how limited

in probative value such evidence will be so as to

preclude the trial court from using Evidence Code

section 352.” (People v. Reeder, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d

at p. 553.)

In Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pages 427-428,

the Supreme Court explained that errors in excluding

defense evidence on a minor point does not constitute

a deprivation of a defendant’s constitutional right to

present a defense:

“‘As a general matter, the “[a]pplication of the

ordinary rules of evidence ... does not impermissibly

infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.”

[Citations.] Although completely excluding evidence of

an accused’s defense theoretically could rise to this

level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or

subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due

process right to present a defense. [Citation.] If the

trial court misstepped, “[t]he trial court’s ruling was

an error of law merely; there was no refusal to allow

[defendant] to present a defense, but only a rejection

of some evidence concerning the defense.” [Citation.]’

[Citations.]”

In this case, evidence of Rebecca’s recantation of

domestic violence allegations against Christopher was

neither of significant probative value nor vital to

Cunningham’s defense, for the reasons discussed in part

II.A.2, ante. The evidence was, at best, tangentially

relevant to one witness’s credibility. Cunningham was

allowed to present a defense and did so, both through

his own testimony and through extensive

cross-examination of the People’s witnesses, including

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Rebecca. The trial court did not “completely exclud[e]

evidence of [his] defense.” (Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th

at p. 428.)

We conclude the trial court did not violate

Cunningham’s constitutional right to present a defense

by excluding the proffered evidence.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 5 at 8-17.)

The state court’s rejection of Cunningham’s Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established law. The Sixth

Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be

confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend.

VI. The Supreme Court has stated that the right of

confrontation “means more than being allowed to confront the

witness physically,” but rather “[t]he main and essential

purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the

opportunity of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.

308, 315-16 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The Sixth Amendment, however, does not prevent a trial

judge from setting “reasonable limits on such cross-examination

based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 

Here, the trial court excluded evidence that Rebecca had

filed a report in an unrelated action accusing her husband,

Christopher Knox (“Christopher”), of domestic violence, which

she later recanted. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 12, 13.) This

evidence potentially was relevant because it could be used to

challenge Rebecca’s credibility. However, there are many

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reasons why Rebecca may have chosen not to pursue domestic

violence charges against her husband. Accordingly, the evidence

had minimal probative value on whether Rebecca was testifying

truthfully in this case. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679

(Sixth Amendment does not prevent a trial judge from placing

reasonable limits on cross-examination where the evidence is

“only marginally relevant”). And as state court noted,

permitting evidence of Rebecca’s recantation may have lead to a

mini-trial on whether Christopher had, or had not, actually

assaulted Rebecca. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 5 at 10.) 

Moreover, the defense was permitted to extensively crossexamine Rebecca regarding her credibility and possible biases

against Cunningham. Rebecca admitted she and her husband had

disagreements with Cunningham in the past. (Resp’t Lodgment No.

2 at 82-83, 90-91.) Rebecca testified that she and Cunningham

had, at one time, been friendly but that her husband did not

approve of the friendship. In addition, Cunningham had loaned

Rebecca money and then she and Cunningham had argued over the

money she owed him. (Id. at 83.) Rebecca also testified that

Knox and Cunningham had had several “loud” arguments in the past

year. (Id. at 83-84.) Rebecca admitted that she believed

Cunningham had complained about the number of visitors coming

and going from her and Knox’s apartment and thus may have been

partly responsible for their eviction. (Id. at 90-91.) 

The defense also questioned Rebecca about inconsistencies

between her testimony and her statements to the 9-1-1 operator

and law enforcement. (Id. at 88-90.) For instance, the defense

pointed out that Rebecca testified at trial that Cunningham

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pushed Castro to the floor. However, she did not include this

fact when giving her statement to police. (Id. at 92-93.) 

In sum, the defense was able to elicit testimony from

Rebecca that she did not have a good relationship with

Cunningham at the time of the incident, that she blamed

Cunningham for certain unpleasant events, and that her trial

testimony was not entirely consistent with her previous

statements. As such, the jury had sufficient information to

appraise Rebecca’s truthfulness. See Skinner v. Cardwell, 564

F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding no error when excluded

evidence was only marginally relevant and the jury was able to

adequately appraise the witness’s motivation and bias based on

other evidence). Thus, the trial court’s exclusion of the

impeachment evidence did not violate the Sixth Amendment. See

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.

Further, even if the evidence of Rebecca’s recantation

should have been admitted, the state court’s conclusion that

there was no prejudice was reasonable. Violations of the

Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless-error analysis set

forth in Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. A court must determine whether the

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the

following factors: the importance of the witnesses’ testimony;

whether the testimony was cumulative; the presence or absence of

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the

witness; the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted;

and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Id. at 684.

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Here, the prosecution had a strong case against Cunningham.

Rebecca’s testimony generally was consistent with the statements

she and Christopher made during the call to 9-1-1. Only minutes

after the incident, Rebecca told the operator that Cunningham

had hit Castro with a gun. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 010-011.)

Her testimony also was corroborated by Castro, who unequivocally

stated that Cunningham had struck him with a gun and knocked him

down. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 32-33, 51.) The only

contradictory evidence was the testimony of Cunningham.

Accordingly, because the evidence against Cunningham was strong,

the state court’s conclusion that the exclusion of the unrelated

domestic violence evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, Chapman. See id; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 403. 

Cunningham’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to present

a defense was violated fails for the same reasons. Clearly

established federal law holds that the right to present evidence

and witnesses is essential to due process; it is also guaranteed

by the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment. Taylor

v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988); Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d

1501, 1503 (9th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has cautioned,

however, that “[a] defendant’s right to present relevant

evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable

restrictions.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308

(1983); see also Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir.

1983). “Moreover, we have found the exclusion of evidence to be

unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it

has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.”

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Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. 

 As discussed above, the excluded impeachment evidence was

only marginally relevant to Rebecca’s credibility. That she

recanted a previous report of domestic violence committed

against her by her husband does not strongly suggest that her

testimony regarding the assault of Castro would not be credible.

Thus, the evidence was not highly probative. Evidence which is

merely cumulative or of little probative value “will almost

never outweigh the state interest in efficient judicial

process.” Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453. In addition, because the

defense was able to cross-examine Rebecca about the accuracy of

her testimony and biases she may have had against Cunningham

(see Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 82, 89, 90-93), the restriction of

impeachment testimony was not unreasonable. See Scheffer, 523

U.S. at 308. Accordingly, the exclusion of the evidence did not

amount to a due process violation. See id. 

Finally, even if the exclusion of evidence was deemed a

constitutional error, Cunningham would not be entitled to habeas

relief because, as discussed above, the evidence against

Cunningham was reliable and strong. Cunningham cannot show that

with the impeaching evidence or, even without Rebecca’s

testimony, the verdict would have been different. See Brecht

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding that in order

to obtain habeas relief a petitioner must show that any

constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence” on the verdict).

In sum, Cunningham’s Sixth Amendment right to confront

witnesses against him and his right to present a defense were

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not violated. The state court’s denial of the claims was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 403; 28 U.S.C.

2254(d). Cunningham is not entitled to relief as to the claims

raised in Ground Four.

2. Instructional Errors

In Grounds Five and Six, Cunningham alleges his due process

rights were violated when the trial court erroneously instructed

the jury. First, he claims the jury should have been instructed

under California Jury Instruction – Criminal (“CALJIC”) No.

12.50. (See FAP at Ground 6, 130-35.) Second, he asserts the

trial court erred when it instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC

No. 2.52. (See FAP at Ground 5, 124-28.) Respondent argues

that neither claim is cognizable on federal habeas corpus.

Further, Respondent contends the state court’s rejection of the

claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. (See Answer at 220-22.) 

a. CALJIC No. 12.50

Cunningham claims his due process rights were violated when

the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding a felon’s

right to use a firearm in self-defense, pursuant to CALJIC NO.

12.50. (See FAP, Ground 6 at 130-35.) Respondent argues that

the state appellate court’s denial of these claims was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law. (See generally, Answer at 20-22.) 

Cunningham raised this claim in his petition for review to

the California Supreme Court. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 6.) The

petition was denied without comment or citation. (See Resp’t

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Lodgment No. 7.) Because there is no reasoned decision from the

state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to the last

reasoned state court decision which addressed the claims, the

California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In denying Cunningham’s claim, the appellate court stated:

Cunningham claims the trial court erred in denying

his request to instruct the jury on count 3 pursuant to

CALJIC No. 12.50 regarding a felon’s right to use a

firearm in self-defense. “‘A trial court has no duty

to instruct the jury on a defense-even at the

defendant’s request-unless the defense is supported by

substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hill

(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1101.) A trial court’s

refusal to instruct on a defense “will be upheld on

appeal where the record contains no substantial

evidence to support the instructions.” (Ibid.)

In count 3 of the information, the People charged

Cunningham with possessing a firearm as a felon

(§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). During the jury instruction

conference, defense counsel requested that the trial

court instruct the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 12.50.

CALJIC No. 12.50 provides:

A person previously convicted of a felony

does not violate § 12021 of the Penal Code by

being in possession of a firearm if:

1. [He][She] as a reasonable person had

grounds for believing and did believe that

[he][she] was [or] [others were] in imminent

peril of great bodily harm; and

2. Without preconceived design on [his][her]

part, a firearm was made available to

[him][her];

3. [His][Her] possession of such firearm was

temporary and for a period of time no longer

than that in which the necessity or apparent

necessity to use it in self-defense

continued; and

4. The use of the firearm was reasonable

under the circumstances and was resorted to

only if no alternative means of avoiding the

danger were available.”

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The trial court rejected the request, stating:

12.50 entitled ‘Use of a Firearm by a

Convicted Felon Self-Defense’ is in the

court’s view designed and restricted to those

situations in which a person finds himself in

a situation without any pre-planning, and a

firearm is either close at hand or

immediately given to him for purposes of

self-defense, and he therefore possess [sic]

it under those spontaneous circumstances.

In the instant case, the evidence was

that the defendant had possessed the firearms

for, I think he said, two to three months

that they’ve been in his house, and that’s

simply-and that he had to unlock a box to get

them, this does not appear to the court to be

a situation with 12.50 would be applicable

because it was not a spontaneous quick moving

situation where he [was] tossed a gun to

defend himself by somebody, which I think is

what is required here.

So, [defense counsel], I will decline to read

12.50 as requested by the defense. . . .

Cunningham acknowledges that CALJIC No. 12.50 is

premised on “a narrow exception,” to section 12021's

prohibition of possession of a firearm by a felon,

established in People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12

(King). The defendant in King was a guest at a party

in an apartment. (Ibid.) A fight broke out at the

party. (Id. at p. 16.) A group of people who had not

been invited to the party and who were friends of one

of the men involved in the fight, pounded on the front

door of the apartment and threatened to break it down.

(Id. at pp. 17-18.) One of the members of this

uninvited group threw a barbeque grill into the

apartment through a window. (Id. at p. 18.) The grill

and the glass from the window hit the defendant. A

woman who was frightened by the intruders gave

defendant a pistol from her purse. Defendant fired the

gun in an attempt to frighten the intruders. (Ibid.)

Among other crimes, defendant was charged with

possession of a firearm as a felon. (Id. at p. 19.)

Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the

jury that if the jury found he had used the firearm in

self-defense, it could find him guilty on the

possession charge only if it found that he had

possessed the weapon prior to such use. (Id. at pp.

19-20.) Defendant also requested that the court

instruct the jury that if the weapon was used in a

manner that reasonably appeared necessary to prevent

imminent injury, he was not guilty of possessing a

firearm as a felon. (Id. at p. 20.) The trial court

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denied the requests (id. at p. 19), and the jury found

defendant guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon.

(Id. at p. 15.)

On appeal, defendant renewed his claim that he was

entitled to the requested self-defense instructions on

the charge of possessing a firearm as a felon. (King, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 15.) The King court agreed,

stating, “Inasmuch as defendant’s brief use of a

concealable firearm, without predesign or prior

possession of the weapon, in the exercise of the right

to self-defense, defense of others, or defense of

habitation would not constitute the possession,

custody, or control of the firearm which the

Legislature has prohibited in section 12021, it was

error for the court to fail to instruct the jury

regarding the relevance of these defenses to the 12021

charge.” (Id. at pp. 26-27.)

In People v. McClindon (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 336,

339-340 (McClindon), the court of appeal rejected the

defendant’s claim that he was entitled to a

self-defense instruction pertaining to his possession

of a firearm. The defendant, who was a felon, kept a

firearm near his bed for protection. One night, he and

his wife were awakened by a noise near their bedroom

window. (Id. at p. 339.) Defendant’s wife became

hysterical, and defendant yelled, “What in the devil is

going on out there?” (Ibid.) Defendant then fired three

gunshots out the window. (Ibid.) Upon his conviction

for possessing a firearm as a felon, defendant claimed

that the trial court erred by failing to give an

instruction on self-defense pursuant to King.

(McClindon, supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at p. 339.) In

rejecting this claim, the McClindon court reasoned:

King clearly is not applicable here.

Appellant’s possession of the pistol was

admittedly not brief and further it was not

without design or prior possession.

Appellant admitted that he had possession of

the firearm for approximately five months and

that he kept it by his bed for protection

because he did not want to shoot anybody with

his rifle.” (Id. at p. 340.)

In this case, Cunningham admitted at trial that he

had possessed three firearms for a couple of months

prior to the incident leading to the charged offenses.

He further testified that he kept the firearms locked

away in a closet. When asked whether the guns were easy

to get to in case he needed them for “protection,”

Cunningham conceded that they were not. When the

People asked Cunningham if he needed three guns for

protection, he admitted, “I really don’t need them,

no.” With respect to the charged offenses, it was

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undisputed that Cunningham armed himself with a firearm

prior to being physically threatened by Christopher,

and that Cunningham left the scene of the incident

armed with a firearm.

As in McClindon, supra, 114 Cal.App.3rd at page

340, the evidence in this case clearly establishes that

Cunningham’s possession of the firearms was neither

temporary nor without predesign. We reject

Cunningham’s argument that because he had been

subjected to threats and assaults prior to the incident

in question, he was entitled to maintain a cache of

firearms for his own protection. King establishes a

narrow exception to section 12021's prohibition for the

immediate use of a firearm by a felon due to an

imminent threat without prior possession. (King, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 26-27.) Cunningham’s possession of

the firearms in this case falls far outside this

exception.

The trial court did not err in refusing

Cunningham’s request to instruct the jury, as to count

3, pursuant to CALJIC No. 12.50 regarding a felon’s

right to use a firearm in self-defense.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 5 at 22-26.)

To the extent Cunningham claims the trial court’s refusal

to instruct the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 12.50 was erroneous

as a matter of state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal

habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991).

To merit relief, clearly established law requires a petitioner

to show that the instructional error so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. Id.

at 72; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977); Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). Where failure to give an

instruction is an issue, the burden on the petitioner is

“especially heavy.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. 154. 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, that “a criminal

defendant is also entitled to adequate instruction on his or her

theory of defense.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1128, 1240 (9th

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Cir. 1984); Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-1101 (9th

Cir. 2002). In the context of a trial court’s failure to give

an instruction on a theory of the defense, the Ninth Circuit has

noted that “[u]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing

notions of fundamental fairness . . . [which] require that

criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense." Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091,

1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mathews v. United States, 485

U.S. 58, 63 (1988) and California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479,

485 (1984)). 

Thus, a “‘[f]ailure to instruct on the defense theory of the

case is reversible error if the theory is legally sound and

evidence in the case makes it applicable.’" Clark v. Brown, 450

F.3d 898, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beardslee v. Woodford,

358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004)); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d

922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240

(9th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[a] criminal defendant is

entitled to adequate instructions on his or her theory of

defense") (quoting James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir.

1976).) 

Although Cunningham’s defense was based, at least in part,

on self-defense, he was not entitled to CALJIC No. 12.50. As the

appellate court noted, CALJIC 12.50 is based on a “narrow

exception” to the proscription against possession of a firearm

by a felon. It is appropriate only in cases in which evidence

shows a defendant had temporary possession of a firearm and used

it in self-defense without pre-planning and disposes of the

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firearm as soon as possible. See People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12,

24 (1978); see also People v. Mijares, 6 Cal. 3d 415, 418-23

(1971) (“To “possess” means to have actual control, care and

management of, and not a passing control, fleeting and shadowy

in its nature”); see also People v. Sullivan, 215 Cal.App.3d

1446, 1453 (1989) (holding instruction on momentary possession

of narcotics not warranted where defendant took narcotics from

a shed to his car and drove a quarter mile where he was stopped

by the police, which showed his possession was extended rather

than momentary). 

Cunningham testified to possessing three guns for “a couple

months” prior to the September 12, 2004 incident, with knowledge

that the law prohibited his possession. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2,

vol. 3 at 231-33.) He also acknowledged that he intentionally

retrieved the gun from his apartment before confronting the

victim in Knox’s apartment. (Id. at 222-223.) Cunningham

claimed he needed the gun to defend himself because he had been

jumped six months prior by people hanging around Knox’s

apartment and because Christopher Knox previously had threatened

him with a baseball bat. (Id.) 

Even under Cunningham’s version of events, he was not

entitled to CALJIC No. 12.50 because he could not meet the

necessary elements for this defense. First, his possession was

with “preconceived design” because he deliberately went to his

apartment to retrieve the firearm. Second, Cunningham’s

possession was not “temporary” because he kept the gun with him

until he threw it out the window of his truck as the police were

chasing him. Thus, evidence presented at trial clearly

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demonstrated that the instruction did not apply to Cunningham.

See Mijares, 6 Cal. 3d at 418-23.

Accordingly, failure to instruct the jury as to CALJIC No.

12.50 did not deprive Cunningham of an opportunity to present a

meaningful defense. See Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d at 904-05.

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to carry his “especially heavy”

burden of showing that the instructional error “so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154. The state court’s denial of

the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established law. See Williams, 529 U.S.

at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court therefore recommends

Claim Six be DENIED. 

b. CALJIC No. 2.52

Cunningham alleges his due process rights were violated when

the trial court erroneously instructed the jury under CALJIC No.

2.52. (See FAP Ground 5 at 124-28.) Respondent argues that the

state appellate court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law. (See generally, Answer at 22-23.) As with his

previous claims, this Court looks through the California Supreme

Court’s silent denial of the claim to the decision of the

California Court of appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The

appellate court rejected the claim, stating:

During a conference on jury instructions, the

People requested that the court instruct the jury

regarding the inference a jury may draw based on a

defendant’s flight after the commission of a crime.

The court indicated that it intended to instruct the

jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52. Defense counsel

objected, stating “I don’t think what happened was

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sufficient with flight.” The court overruled the

objection, reasoning:

I think it directly applies. I mean,

the – certain events occurred, and he jumped

in his car and took off, and those events

have been alleged to be crimes. So 2.52 will

be read over the objection of the defense.

And in the instruction there are various

alternatives in this, such as flight,

attempted flight, escape, etc. And in this

case, I’m simply going to read flight, ‘The

flight of a person immediately after the

commission of a crime, or after accused [sic]

of a crime, is not sufficient in itself.’

Otherwise, that will be read in it’s [sic]

entirety verbatim.”

The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to

CALJIC No. 2.52. as follows:

The flight of a person immediately after

the commission of a crime, or after he is

accused of a crime, is not sufficient in

itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact

which, if proved, may be considered by you in

the light of all other proved facts in

deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not

guilty. The weight to which this circumstance

is entitled is a matter for you to decide.

There is substantial evidence from which the jury could

reasonably infer that Cunningham’s flight reflected

consciousness of guilt

Cunningham contends that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52

regarding flight from the scene of the crime because

there is no substantial evidence that his departure

from the scene of the incident supported the

consciousness of guilt inference permitted by the

instruction. In reviewing this claim, we determine

whether there is substantial evidence in the record to

support the trial court’s giving of the instruction.

(People v. Crandell 1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 869

(Crandell), overruled on another ground in People v.

Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-365.)

Section 1127c provides:

In any criminal trial or proceeding

where evidence of flight of a defendant is

relied upon as tending to show guilt, the

court shall instruct the jury substantially

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as follows:

The flight of a person immediately after

the commission of a crime, or after he is

accused of a crime that has been committed,

is not sufficient in itself to establish his

guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the

jury may consider in deciding his guilt or

innocence. The weight to which such

circumstance is entitled is a matter for the

jury to determine. 

No further instruction on the subject of

flight need be given.

An instruction on flight is properly given if the

jury could reasonably infer that the defendant’s flight

reflected consciousness of guilt, and flight requires

neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of

a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does

require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or

arrested.” (Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 869.)

Cunningham admitted at trial that he left the

apartment because he “didn’t want to get arrested.” It

was also undisputed that Cunningham left the scene of

the incident – his own apartment building – immediately

after the incident. A police officer testified that

Cunningham ran a red light as he was driving away from

the scene. Cunningham admitted that while he was being

pursued by the police, he threw his shotgun out the

window of his car. Thus, there was clearly evidence

from which the jury could reasonably infer that

Cunningham’s flight reflected consciousness of guilt.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 5 at 17-19.)

As discussed above, Cunningham must show the instructional

error rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72. The allegedly erroneous instruction must be

considered in the context of the trial record and the

instructions as a whole. Id.; Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 156; Cupp, 414

U.S. at 146-47. The instructions must be more than just

erroneous, Cunningham must show that there was a reasonable

likelihood that in light of the instructions as a whole, the

jury applied the challenged instruction in such a way that his

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constitutional right to due process was violated. See Carriger

v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

This Court is bound by state court’s determination that

CALJIC No. 2.52 was properly given as a matter of California

law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). Further,

the Court has no basis for finding that the instruction violated

the Constitution. The instruction merely advised the jury that

the flight of a person after the commission of a crime may be

considered, in light of all the other facts proved, in deciding

whether the defendant is guilty. The instruction made clear

that evidence of flight is not by itself sufficient to support

a guilty finding. CALJIC No. 2.52 in no way relieved the

prosecution of its burden of proving each element of each crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The prosecution presented uncontroverted evidence that

Cunningham fled the scene of the crime. See McMillian v. Gomez,

19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (flight instruction not

erroneous where prosecution made strong showing it was defendant

who left the scene of the crime). Cunningham claims that he

left the scene out of fear for his own safety and therefore the

instruction was improper. However, the Ninth Circuit has held

that there is no due process violation where jury was instructed

on flight even though trial court refused to advise jury of

possible reasons for flight other than consciousness of guilt.

Karis v. Calderon, 83 F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 1999).

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this instructional

error claim neither was contrary to nor involved an unreasonable

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application of clearly established Supreme Court law. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court

therefore recommends this claim be DENIED. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In Claim Three, Cunningham argues his Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel was violated when his

attorney failed to object to several erroneous jury instructions

(See FAP, Ground 3, Arguments 1, 2 and 4) and failed to file a

motion to suppress. (Id., Ground 3, Argument 3.) Cunningham

raised these issues for the first and only time in the

California Supreme Court and they were denied without comment or

citation. (Resp’t Lodgment Nos. 10, 11.) Because there is no

reasoned decision, this Court must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

The clearly established Supreme Court law regarding

ineffective assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Strickland requires a

two-part showing. First, an attorney’s representation must have

fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at

688. Second, a defendant must have been prejudiced by counsel’s

errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see

also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

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3

 The “Use Note” for CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 states:

CALJIC 2.01 and CALJIC 2.02 should never be given

together. This is because CALJIC 2.01 is inclusive of all

issues, including mental state and/or specific intent,

whereas CALJIC 2.02 is limited to just mental state and/or

specific intent. Therefore, they are alternative

instructions. If the only circumstantial evidence relates

to specific intent or mental state, CALJIC 2.02 should be

given. If the circumstantial evidence relates to other

matters, or relates to other matters as well as specific

intent or mental state, CALJIC 2.01 should be given and not

CALJIC 2.02. (See People v. Honig, 48 Cal. App. 4th 289,

340–341, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 555 (3d Dist.1996); People v.

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Further, Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance . . . be highly deferential.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689. There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Id. at 686-87. The Court need not address both

the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant

fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697.

a. Failure to Object to CALJIC Number 2.02 and

Failure to Request 2.01

Cunningham argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to object to instructions given the jury regarding

circumstantial evidence. Specifically, he alleges defense

counsel should have objected when the trial court instructed the

jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.02 (Sufficiency of Circumstantial

Evidence to Prove Specific Intent or Mental State) and should

have requested CALJIC No. 2.01 (Sufficiency of Circumstantial

Evidence – Generally) be read in its place. (See FAP, Ground 3,

Argument 1 at 69-79.) 

Under California law, only one of the above instructions may

be given.3 After some consideration, the trial court determined

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Marshall, 13 Cal. 4th 799, 849, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 347, 919

P.2d 1280 (1996).) When the prosecution does not

“substantially rely” on circumstantial evidence to prove

guilt, neither instruction is required. (See People v.

Wright, 52 Cal.3d 367, 406, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d

221 (1990).)

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that CALJIC No. 2.02 was the appropriate instruction. (See

Resp’t Lodgment No. 2, vol. 3 at 267-68.) The jury was

instructed as follows:

The specific intent with which an act is done may

be shown by the circumstances surrounding the

commission of the act. However, you may not find the

defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 1 to be

true, unless the proved circumstances are not only (1)

consistent with the theory that the defendant had the

required specific intent but (2) cannot be reconciled

with any other rational conclusion.

Also, if the evidence as to any specific intent

permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which

points to the existence of the specific intent and the

other to its absence, you must adopt that

interpretation which points to its absence. If, on the

other hand, one interpretation of the evidence as to

the specific intent appears to you to be reasonable and

the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must

accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the

unreasonable.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 024.) Further, the trial court

provided the following instruction on “Flight After Crime,”

pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52:

The flight of a person immediately after the

commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a

crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his

guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be

considered by you in the light of all other proved

facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not

guilty. The weight to which this circumstance is

entitled is a matter for you to decide.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 035.)

Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to

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CALJIC No. 2.02. An attorney’s failure to make a meritless

objection or motion does not constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel. Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n. 8 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.

1985)); see also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.

1996) (holding that “the failure to take a futile action can

never be deficient performance”). The trial court properly

declined to instruct the jury under CALJIC No. 2.01 because the

instruction is only appropriate when “circumstantial evidence is

‘substantially relied on for proof of guilt.’” People v.

Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 406 (1990). 

Here, the only circumstantial evidence that did not go

toward state of mind was evidence that Cunningham had fled the

scene and threw the gun out the window. As such, the trial

court properly elected to give CALJIC No. 2.02 along with a

specific instruction on “flight after crime.” (See Resp’t

Lodgment No. 2, vol. 3 at 267-68.) Any objection by defense

counsel would have therefore been futile. See Wright, 52 Cal.

3d at 406. Thus, Cunningham has failed to satisfy both the

deficiency prong and the prejudice prong set forth in

Strickland. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.

1989) (noting that if a petitioner challenges the failure to

make a futile objection, he fails both Strickland prongs).

Based on an independent review of the record, the state

court’s silent denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Williams, 529

U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court therefore

recommends this claim be DENIED. 

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4

 Respondent does, however, address a very similar claim based

on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (See Answer at 15-

16.)

5

 The jury was instructed, in part:

In order to prove an assault, each of the following

elements must be proved: 1. A person willfully committed an

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b. Failure to Object to CALJIC No. 9.00

Cunningham asserts trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to request that the trial court sufficiently instruct the jury

as to the definition of “Assault” under CALJIC No. 9.00. (See

FAP, Ground 3, Argument 1 at 80-83.) Cunningham acknowledges

that the trial court did instruct the jury as to CALJIC No.

9.00. He claims, however, that the trial court erred in failing

to re-iterate or explain to the jury that the definition of

assault provided in CALJIC No. 9.00 applied to the lesserincluded offense of “simple assault.” (See id.) Respondent

fails to address this claim in the Answer.4 (See generally,

Answer.)

Petitioner’s claim fails because the trial court adequately

instructed the jury on the definition of assault – with regard

to the charged offense of assault with a deadly weapon (Cal.

Penal Code § 245) and the lesser-included offense of simple

assault (Cal. Penal Code § 240). Under California law, a trial

court must sua sponte instruct the jury on lesser included

offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all

of the elements of the charged offense were present. See People

v. Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th 142, 154 (1998). Here, the jury was

instructed on the general definition of assault pursuant to

CALJIC No. 9.00.5 This instruction provides the elements for

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act which by its nature would probably and directly result

in the application of physical force on another person; [¶]

2. The person committing the act was aware of facts that

would lead a reasonable person to realize that as a direct,

natural and probable result of this act that [sic] physical

force would be applied to another person; and [¶] 3. At the

time the act was committed, the person committing the act

had the present ability to apply physical force to the

person of another.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 045; see also Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 295-

96.)

6

 The jury was instructed under to CALJIC No. 17.12, as follows:

If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt

that a defendant is guilty of the crime of which he is

accused in Count 2, and you unanimously so find, you may

convict him of any lesser crime provided you are satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] is guilty of that

crime.

You will be provided with guilty and not guilty

verdict forms for the crime charged in Count 2, and lesser

crimes thereto. The crime of assault is a lesser crime to

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“simple assault” under Cal. Penal Code section 240 – the lesserincluded offense for Count 2. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 45,

CALJIC No. 9.00, “Assault – Defined.”) The jury was further

instructed that an “assault” committed with a “firearm”

constituted “assault with a deadly weapon” under California

Penal Code section 245. (Id. at 44; CALJIC No. 9.02.) 

The trial court informed the jury that it could convict

Cunningham of the lesser-included offense of assault. (See

Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 68; see also Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

300.) Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury

pursuant to CALJIC Number 17.12, that it could reach a guilty

verdict on the lesser-included offense of simple assault if the

jury was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Cunningham

was guilty of assault with a firearm.6 (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2

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that of assault with a firearm.

Thus, you are to determine whether the defendant is

guilty or not guilty of the crime charged in Count 2, or

any lesser crimes. In doing so, you have discretion to

choose the order in which you evaluate each crime and

consider the evidence pertaining to it. You may find it to

be productive to consider and reach tentative conclusions

on all charges and lesser crimes before reaching any final

verdict[s].

Disregard the instruction previously given which

requires that you return but one verdict form as to Count

2.

Before you return any final or formal verdict, you

must be guided by the following:

1. If you unanimously find a defendant guilty of the crime

of which [he] [she] is accused in Count 2, your foreperson

should sign and date the corresponding verdict form. All

other verdict forms as to Count 2 must be left unsigned.

2. If you are unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to the

crime of which the defendant is accused in Count 2, do not

sign any verdict forms as to Count 2 and report your

disagreement to the court.

3. The court cannot accept a guilty verdict on a lesser

crime, unless the jury also unanimously finds and returns

a signed verdict form of not guilty as to the charged

greater crime.

4. If you unanimously agree and find a defendant not

guilty of the crime with which he is charged in Count 2,

but cannot reach a unanimous agreement as to a lesser crime

charged in Count 2, your foreperson should sign and date

the not guilty verdict form as to the charged greater

crime, and report your disagreement as to the lesser crime

to the court.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 51-51.)

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at 300-01; see also Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 51.) The court

even reiterated the instructions regarding the lesser-included

offense in Count 2, just before sending the jury to begin

deliberations, stating:

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Now, I told you I’d give you a quick primer on

that lesser included offense issue again. . . The

simplest way for me to think about it is that there are

three possible things that can happen on count 2, and,

frankly with any other count. You can find the

defendant guilty, you can find him not guilty, or you

can fail to come up with a unanimous verdict. [¶] Only

if you find him not guilty on the charged offense of

assault with a firearm. . . . can I then accept a

verdict of either guilty or not guilty on the lesser

offense of simple assault.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 327-28.) 

Viewing all of the instructions as a whole, the trial court

properly and thoroughly instructed the jury as to the lesserincluded offense of simple assault. See Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th

at 154. Because there was no error by the trial court, any

objection by defense counsel would have been futile. Thus,

Cunningham has failed to satisfy both the deficiency prong and

the prejudice prong of Strickland. See Miller, 882 F.2d at

1434. As such, the state court’s denial of the claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Court recommends this claim be DENIED. 

c. Failure to Object to CALJIC No. 17.19 and

“General Intent” Instructions

Next, Cunningham argues defense counsel was ineffective, in

violation of Cunningham’s Sixth Amendment rights, because

counsel failed to object when the trial court improperly

instructed the jury that the “personal use of a firearm”

enhancement was a “general intent” crime. (See FAP, Argument 1

at 84-87.) Cunningham argues CALJIC No. 17.19 was insufficient

because it “makes no mention of the mental state which must

accompany the menacing display” of a firearm. (Id. at 85.)

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 Respondent does, however, address a very similar claim based on

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (See Answer at 16.)

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Respondent does not address this specific ground for relief in

his Answer.7 (See generally, Answer.)

As discussed above, the jury convicted Cunningham of assault

with a firearm and further found that Cunningham personally used

a firearm during the commission of the assault, in violation of

Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5(a). (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 0065.)

The mental state required under section 12022.5(a) is “general

intent.” See People v. Wardell, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 1496

(2008). “A crime is characterized as a ‘general intent’ crime

when the required mental state entails only an intent to do the

act that causes the harm; a crime is characterized as a

‘specific intent’ crime when the required mental state entails

an intent to cause the resulting harm.” People v. Davis, 10

Cal.4th 463, 518-19, fn. 15 (1995). 

The jury was instructed on the elements of section 12022.5

pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.19. Specifically, the trial court

stated:

It is alleged in Counts 1 and 2 that the defendant

personally used a firearm during the commission of the

crime charged. If you find the defendant guilty of one

or more of the crimes charged, you must determine

whether the defendant personally used a firearm in the

commission of those felonies.

The word “firearm” includes a shotgun. The

“firearm” need not be operable. The term “personally

used a firearm” as used in this instruction, means that

the defendant must have intentionally displayed a

firearm in a menacing manner, intentionally fired it or

intentionally struck or hit a human being with it. 

The People have the burden of proving the truth of

this allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that

[it] is true, you must find it to be not true.

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8

 The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No.

3.30 as follows:

In the crimes charged in Counts 2, 3, 4. . . , there must

exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and

general criminal intent. General intent does not require

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(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 050.) 

CALJIC 17.19 accurately describes a “general intent” crime

in that a defendant must “intentionally” do the act which causes

harm -- in this case “display the firearm in a menacing manner,”

“fire it,” or “strike or hit a human being with it.” See People

v. Atkins, 1 25 Cal. 4th 76, 82 (2001) (stating that “when the

definition of a crime [or enhancement] consists of only the

description of a particular act, without reference to intent to

do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether

the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention

is deemed to be a general criminal intent”). 

Further, contrary to Cunningham’s assertion, California

courts have held that the phrase “displays a firearm in a

menacing manner” is one commonly understood and thus does not

require further definition. See Wardell, 162 Cal. App. 4th at

1496. Thus, defense counsel had no reason to object because the

jury was properly instructed under CALJIC No. 17.16. See United

States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding

competent counsel could reasonably forgo requesting the jury be

instructed on a concept that “an average juror would understand

. . . without specific definition”).

Cunningham argues that, even if CALJIC No. 17.16 was proper,

defense counsel should have requested clarification because the

jury may have been confused by CALJIC No. 3.30,8 which defined

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an intent to violate the law. When a person intentionally

does that which the law declares to be a crime, he is

acting with general intent, even though he may not know

that his act or conduct is unlawful.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 039.) 

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“general intent,” because it did not specify the definition

applied to Penal Code 12022.5(a). Cunningham’s argument is

without merit because, as discussed above, CALJIC No. 17.16

alone adequately set forth the intent required to find

Cunningham guilty of the firearm-use enhancement. 

Because competent counsel could have concluded the

instructions given by the court were adequate, counsel was not

ineffective for failing to request clarification or further

instruction. See Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th

Cir. 2000). Moreover, because the jury was properly instructed,

any such request would have been denied. Thus, Cunningham has

failed to satisfy both the deficiency prong and the prejudice

prong of Strickland. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. As such,

the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court recommends this

claim be DENIED. 

d. Failure to Request Instruction on “Personally

Armed with a Firearm”

Cunningham asserts defense counsel was ineffective in

failing to request an instruction on California Penal Code

sections 12022(a) (armed with a firearm) or 12022.3 (use or

possession [of a firearm] in commission or attempted commission

of certain sex offenses) as “lesser included enhancements” of

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9

 Respondent does, however, address a very similar claim based on

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (See Answer at 16.)

10 Cal. Penal Code § 12022.3 reads: 

For each violation of Section 220 involving a specified

sexual offense, or for each violation or attempted

violation of Section 261, 262, 264.1, 286, 288, 288a, or

289, and in addition to the sentence provided, any person

shall receive the following:

(a) A 3-, 4-, or 10-year enhancement if the

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Penal Code section 12022.5(a) (personally using a firearm).

(See FAP, Ground 3, Argument 1 at 86-93.) Respondent does not

address this specific issue in the Answer.9 (See generally,

Answer.)

As discussed above, a trial court must instruct on lesser

included offenses when there is substantial evidence that

defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense. People v. Cook,

91 Cal.App.4th 910, 917 (2001) (emphasis added). The California

Supreme Court, however, has expressly held that a trial court

has no duty to instruct on "so-called lesser included

enhancements." People v. Majors, 18 Cal. 4th 385, 410-11 (1998)

(emphasis added). Specifically, a trial court has no duty to

instruct on the enhancement of being armed with a firearm

(§ 12022(a)) as a lesser included enhancement of personally

using a firearm (§ 12022.5(a)). Id. 

Defense counsel was not ineffective in declining to request

an instruction under sections 12022(a) or 12022.3. First, any

request by defense counsel that the jury be instructed as to

section 12022.3 would have been denied because that enhancement

applies specifically to use of a firearm during the commission

of certain sex offenses. See Cal. Penal Code § 12022.3.10 Thus,

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person uses a firearm or a deadly weapon in the

commission of the violation.

(b) A one-, two-, or five-year enhancement if the

person is armed with a firearm or a deadly

weapon.

11 California Penal Code section 12022(a) states, in relevant

part:

(a)(1) Except as provided in subdivisions (c) and (d), any

person who is armed with a firearm in the commission of a

felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an

additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the

state prison for one year, unless the arming is an element

of that offense. 

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defense counsel’s failure to request such an instruction was not

unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Likewise,

Cunningham has not shown he was prejudiced by failure to request

an instruction under section 12022.3, an inapplicable

enhancement, because the trial court would have overruled any

such request. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Second, Cunningham has not overcome the presumption that his

attorney exercised sound trial strategy in declining to request

the jury be instructed on section 12022(a).11 See Morris v.

California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991). Review of

counsel’s performance is "highly deferential" and there is a

"strong presumption" that counsel rendered adequate assistance

and exercised reasonable professional judgment. United States

v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987); see

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87. Here, there was no dispute

that Cunningham was “armed” when the incident took place –

Cunningham admitted it. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 245,

248.) The question was whether Cunningham had used the firearm

in a “menacing manner” or had actually hit Castro with the gun.

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(See Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 30, 32, 73-74, 224-25.) If the

jury had been instructed on section 12022(a) it would surely

have found the enhancement to be true, based on Cunningham’s own

admissions. By only instructing the jury as to “use” of a

firearm, there was a possibility that Cunningham would be spared

an enhancement altogether. Thus defense counsel’s decision not

to request an instruction under section 12022(a) was not

unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

Nor was Cunningham prejudiced by defense counsel’s decision

not to request the jury be instructed on “armed with a firearm”

enhancement under section 12022(a). That the jury found the

“personal use” enhancement under section 12022.5 to be true

shows it credited the testimony of Knox and Castro –

specifically that Cunningham had threatened Castro with the gun,

put the gun to Castro’s neck and pushed him to the ground. (See

Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 30, 32, 73-74.) Given the jury’s

verdict, even if it had been instructed under section 12022(a),

there is no reasonable possibility the outcome would have been

any different. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372; see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Thus, Cunningham has failed to satisfy both the deficiency

prong and the prejudice prong of Strickland. See Miller, 882

F.2d at 1434. As such, the state court’s denial of the claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Court recommends this claim be DENIED. 

/ / /

/ / /

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e. Failure to Request Modification of CALJIC No.

2.52

Cunningham contends defense counsel was ineffective because

he failed to request the trial court modify CALJIC No. 2.52, the

“flight instruction.” (FAP, Ground 3, Argument 2 at 94-97.)

Respondent argues that Cunningham has failed to show prejudice

under Strickland and therefore the state court’s denial of the

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of clearly established law. (See Answer at 19.)

As Cunningham acknowledges, defense counsel objected to

CALJIC No. 2.52, arguing there was insufficient evidence of

flight to warrant the instruction. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

273.) The trial court disagreed and instructed the jury

pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52, as follows:

The flight of a person immediately after the

commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a

crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his

guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be

considered by you in the light of all other proved

facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not

guilty. The weight to which this circumstance is

entitled is a matter for you to decide. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 035; see also Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

292.) 

Cunningham claims that when the trial court overruled the

objection, defense counsel should have asked the court to modify

the instruction to require the jury to make a preliminary

finding as to whether Cunningham left the scene to avoid arrest.

He suggests counsel should have requested the court instruct the

jury that “whether or not evidence of flight show[ed] a

consciousness of guilt, and the significance to be attached to

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such circumstance, are matters for your determination.” (FAP,

Ground 3, Argument 2 at 99.) 

The California Supreme Court has held that the CALJIC No.

2.52 flight instruction adequately conveys the “concept that if

flight was found, the jury was permitted to consider alternative

explanations for that flight other than defendant’s

consciousness of guilt.” People v. Barnett, 17 Cal. 4th 1044,

1152-53 (1998) (citing People v. Bradford, 14 Cal. 4th 105,

1054-55 (1997)); see also People v. Lucas, 12 Cal. 4th 415, 471

(1995). Defense counsel’s failure to request the modification

to CALJIC No. 2.52 was not unreasonable because it did not alter

the instruction in any meaningful way. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688. For the same reason, Cunningham has failed to show

prejudice. Id. at 694. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of the claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Court recommends this claim be DENIED. 

f. Failure to File a Motion to Suppress

Cunningham argues defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion to suppress evidence of the guns. (See

FAP, Ground 3, Argument 3 at 100-104.) Cunningham claims the

guns were seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

(Id.) 

It is undisputed that the two guns in question were found

in Cunningham’s apartment by the property manager, Deborah

Teich, who then turned the firearms over to police. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 2 at 183-84.) Teich entered the apartment after

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Cunningham had been evicted – approximately 3 weeks after he had

vacated it – in order to remove his belongings so that a new

tenant could move in. (Id.) While cleaning out the apartment

she found two shotguns in a closet and called police. (Id.)

Both guns were admitted into evidence at trial. (Id. at 184.)

Defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress was

neither unreasonable nor prejudicial. The Fourth Amendment

proscribes only governmental action; and indeed, the amendment

“is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an

unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as

an agent of the Government or with the participation or

knowledge of any governmental official.’” United States v.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United

States, 447 U.S. 649, 662, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2404, 65 L.Ed.2d 410

(1980) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)). The burden of proving that

a private search is governmental action lies on the movant. See

United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir.1994) (“The

defendant has the burden of showing government action.”)

In light of the facts, defense had no reasonable grounds for

moving to suppress the evidence. There is no evidence of

government action and therefore any motion would have been

futile. Accordingly, counsel’s failure to file a motion to

suppress was neither deficient or nor prejudicial. See Tomlin

v. Meyers, 30 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United

States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating

it is not unreasonable for counsel to decline to file a

meritless motion).) 

The state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary

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to, nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court

recommends this claim be DENIED. 

g. Failure to Object to CALJIC No. 17.01

Cunningham argues defense counsel was ineffective in failing

to object to CALJIC No. 17.01. He contends defense counsel

should have argued that he was deprived of due process because

he was charged with only one count of assault with a firearm

(Count 2) and nonetheless, the trial court instructed the jury

under CALJIC Number 17.01 that there were two incidents which

could form the basis of that conviction. (See FAP, Ground 3,

Argument 4 at 105-14.)

Pursuant to the People’s and defense counsel’s requests, the

jury was instructed as follows:

The defendant is accused of having committed the

crime of assault with a firearm in Count 2. The

prosecution has introduced evidence for the purpose of

showing that there is more than one act upon which a

conviction on Count 2 may be based. Defendant may be

found guilty if the proof shows beyond a reasonable

doubt that he committed any one or more of the acts.

However, in order to return a verdict of guilty on

Count 2, all jurors must agree that he committed the

same act. It is not necessary that the particular act

agreed up on [sic] be stated in your verdict.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 053; see also Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at

322-23.) After reading the instruction to the jury, the trial

judge stated: 

Now let me explain what that means. You’ve heard

evidence of certain events that occurred inside the

apartment. You’ve also heard evidence, I believe, of

the defendant holding the gun in a certain manner while

he was downstairs, I think, in the parking lot. The

prosecution has argued that either one of those events

could support a conviction for Count 2. What this

instruction means is that all 12 of you must agree on

which event or act occurred before you can find the

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defendant guilty. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 323.)

The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

Defense counsel’s decision not to object to CALJIC No. 17.01 was

not unreasonable. First, there is nothing in the record to

suggest Cunningham failed to receive adequate notice as required

by the Due Process Clause. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a

criminal defendant a fundamental right to be clearly informed of

the nature and cause of the charges in order to adequately

prepare a defense. Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 812 (9th Cir.

1987). A court looks first to the information to determine

whether a defendant has received adequate notice. James v.

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir. 1994); Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 812.

The principal purpose of the information is to provide the

defendant with a description of the charges against him in

sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense. Borg,

24 F.3d at 24; United States v. Lane, 765 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th

Cir. 1985). An information is not constitutionally defective if

it “states elements of an offense charged with sufficient

clarity to apprise a defendant of what to defend against.”

Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985).

Here, it was adequately alleged in the Information that

Cunningham was charged with assaulting Jose Castro with a

firearm on September 12, 2004. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 002.)

This alone is sufficient to provide Cunningham with a sufficient

description of the charge to allow him to prepare his defense.

See Borg, 24 F.3d at 24. Evidence was presented during the

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trial that Cunningham hit Castro with the shotgun inside the

apartment and later, while in the parking lot, pointed the

shotgun up at Castro who was standing on the stairs. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 1 at 170, 173, 174.) Either of these acts could

amount to assault on Castro with a firearm under Penal Code 245.

Thus, the jury was properly instructed that it must be unanimous

as to which act formed the basis for its guilty verdict. See

People v. Diedrich, 31 Cal. 3d 263, 280 (1982). Accordingly,

defense counsel’s failure to object on the basis of insufficient

notice was neither unreasonable nor prejudicial. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. 

Cunningham seems to argue that the instruction permitted the

jury to find him guilty of assaulting Knox when the charging

documents specified that Castro was the victim. This is not the

case. The trial court made it clear to the parties that Castro

was the only victim charged in the case. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2

at 179) (stating “the victim in this case is Castro, not Knox.

. . the People aren’t going to be allowed to argue he’s a victim

of any of these crimes.”) Likewise, the prosecutor never argued

that Cunningham had assaulted Knox. Indeed, the prosecutor went

out of his way to stress that Castro, not Knox, was the victim

in this case. (Id. at 309-10.) Thus, as discussed above,

Cunningham had adequate notice of the charges. 

Any objection to CALJIC No. 17.01 would have been denied.

Thus, Cunningham has failed to satisfy both the deficiency prong

and the prejudice prong of Strickland. See Boag, 769 F.2d at

1344. As such, the state court’s denial of the claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of Strickland. See

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Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court

recommends this claim be DENIED. 

4. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In his first two claims, Cunningham argues his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel was

violated when appellate counsel failed to raise seven issues on

appeal. (See FAP, Grounds 1 and 2 at 7-67.) Five of

Cunningham’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel arise from the same alleged errors raised in his claims

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Cunningham raises

two additional claims. 

Cunningham raised these claims for the first and only time

in a petition for habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court.

(See Resp’t Lodgment No. 10.) The petition was denied without

comment or citation. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 11.) This Court

must therefore conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Himes 336 F.3d at 853.

It is clearly established that “[t]he proper standard for

evaluating [a] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective . .

. is that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 528

U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,

535-36 (1986)). A petitioner must first show that his appellate

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He must then

establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694.

To establish prejudice, Cunningham must demonstrate that he

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would have prevailed on appeal absent counsel’s errors. Smith,

528 U.S. at 285. 

The Ninth Circuit has observed that:

[Strickland’s] two prongs partially overlap when

evaluating the performance of appellate counsel. In

many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an

issue because she foresees little or no likelihood of

success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of

weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. . . .

Appellate counsel will therefore frequently remain

above an objective standard of competence (prong one)

and have caused her client no prejudice (prong two) for

the same reason-because she declined to raise a weak

issue.

Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434.

a. CALJIC Number 17.01

Cunningham argues appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing argue on appeal that the trial court erred when it

instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.01. (See FAP,

Ground 1, Argument 1 at 8-18.) As discussed in section

(IV)(B)(3)(g) of this Report and Recommendation, the trial court

did not err when it instructed the jury pursuant to 17.01. The

Information filed by the District Attorney provided Cunningham

with adequate notice of the charges against him. See Borg, 24

F.3d at 24. Because evidence was presented at trial showed

there may have been more than one assault committed against

Castro, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.01

that, in order to find Cunningham guilty, it had to agree on the

specific act which constituted the assault. Contrary to

Cunningham’s claims, the jury was not permitted to find that

Cunningham had assaulted Christopher Knox. (See Resp’t Lodgment

No. 1 at 002; Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 179, 309-10.) 

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Because the state court did not err, appellate counsel’s

decision not to raise the claim on appeal was neither deficient

nor prejudicial. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. The state

court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S.

at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court recommends this claim be

DENIED.

b. CALJIC No. 9.00 and “Simple Assault”

Cunningham argues his right to effective assistance of

counsel was violated because appellate counsel did not argue on

appeal that the trial court erred when it failed to properly

instruct the jury regarding a lesser-included offense and as to

the definition of “simple assault.” (FAP, Ground 1, Argument

2 at 19-23.)

Petitioner’s claim fails for the same reasons discussed in

section IV(B)(3)(b). The trial court properly instructed the

jury on the definition of “simple” assault (see Resp’t Lodgment

No. 1 at 45, CALJIC No. 9.00, “Assault – Defined”) as well as

“assault with a deadly weapon” (Id. at 44). The jury was

informed that it could convict Cunningham of the lesser-included

offense of assault. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 68.) 

Finally, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC

Number 17.12, that it could reach a guilty verdict on the

lesser-included offense of simple assault if the jury was not

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Cunningham was guilty

of assault with a firearm. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 300-01;

Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 51.)

The state court did not err when instructing the jury as to

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the lesser included offense of assault. As such, appellate

counsel’s decision not to raise the claim on appeal was neither

deficient nor prejudicial. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. The

state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of clearly established law. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court

therefore recommends this claim be DENIED.

c. CALJIC No. 17.19 and General Intent

Cunningham asserts appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to claim that the trial court erred in not properly

instructing the jury on “general intent.” He asserts the court

should have specifically instructed the jury that “general

intent” applied to the personal use of a firearm allegations

attached to Counts 1 and 2. (FAP, Ground 1, Argument 3 at 24-

26.) 

As discussed in section IV(B)(3)(c), the trial court

properly instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.19,that

in order to find the allegation of personal use of a firearm, it

must find that Cunningham “intentionally displayed a firearm in

a menacing manner, intentionally fired it or intentionally

struck or hit a human being with it.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at

50.) As such, the trial court adequately instructed the jury on

the intent required under Penal Code §12022.5(a). See Atkins,

1 25 Cal. 4th at 82. Appellate counsel’s decision not to raise

the issue on appeal was neither unreasonable nor prejudicial

because there was no error. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434.

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly

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established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. The Court therefore recommends this claim be DENIED.

d. Personally Armed with a Firearm Instruction

Cunningham next argues that appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to argue on appeal that the trial court

erred when it did not instruct the jury regarding lesser

included sentencing enhancements. He claims the court should

have instructed the jury on “personal use of a firearm” pursuant

to Penal Code sections 12022(a) or 12022.3(b), as a lesser

included enhancement “personal use of a firearm” under Penal

Code section 12022.5(a)(FAP, Ground 1, Argument 4 at 28-35.) 

As discussed in section IV(B)(3)(c) of this Report and

Recommendation, under California law, a trial court has no duty

to instruct on "so-called lesser included enhancements."

Majors, 18 Cal. 4th at 410-11. Specifically, a trial court has

no duty to instruct on being armed with a firearm (§ 12022(a))

as a lesser included enhancement of personally using a firearm

(§ 12022.5(a)). Id. Because there was no error, appellate

counsel’s decision not to raise the issue on appeal was neither

unreasonable nor prejudicial under Strickland. See Miller, 882

F.2d at 1434. 

The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The

Court therefore recommends this claim be DENIED. 

e. Circumstantial Evidence Instructions

Next, Petitioner alleges appellate counsel was ineffective

in failing to argue that the trial court improperly instructed

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the jury regarding circumstantial evidence. He alleges the

trial court should have instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC

No. 2.01 (Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence – Generally)

instead of CALJIC No. 2.02 (Sufficiency of Circumstantial

Evidence to Prove Specific Intent or Mental State). (FAP,

Ground 1, Argument 6 at 45-56.) 

As discussed in section IV(B)(3), the trial court noted that

it was not permitted to give both instructions and it properly

elected to give CALJIC No. 2.02 because the only circumstantial

evidence that did not go toward state of mind was evidence that

Cunningham had fled the scene and threw the gun out the window.

See Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 406. The trial court properly elected

to give CALJIC No. 2.02 along with a specific instruction on

“flight after crime.” (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 2, vol. 3 at

267-68.) Any objection by defense counsel would therefore have

been futile. See Wright, 52 Cal. 3d at 406 (holding that CALJIC

No. 2.01 is only appropriate when “circumstantial evidence is

‘substantially relied on for proof of guilt’”). Thus, there was

no error by the trial court and as such, appellate counsel’s

failure to raise the issue on appeal did not constitute

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Smith, 528

U.S. at 285. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. The Court recommends this claim be DENIED. 

f. Brandishing a Firearm Instruction

Cunningham argues appellate counsel was ineffective in

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12 It is undisputed that appellate counsel did not obtain a

transcript of the jury voir dire. Indeed, the jury voir dire was not

part of the state court record. After reviewing Petitioner’s claims,

this Court ordered Respondent to have the jury voir dire transcribed

and lodged with the Court. 

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failing to argue on appeal that the trial court should have

instructed the jury that “brandishing a firearm” is a lesserincluded offense of “assault with a firearm.” (FAP, Ground 1,

Argument 5 at at 35-45.) California appellate courts have held

that brandishing a firearm is not a lesser included offense of

assault with a firearm. See People v. Steele, 82 Cal. App. 4th

212, 221 (2000) (stating that “the conclusion is inescapable

that an assault with a firearm may be committed without the

defendant brandishing such weapon. Ergo, under the Supreme

Court’s own rule of analysis, . . . brandishing cannot be a

lesser included offense to assault with a firearm.”) 

Because brandishing a firearm is not a lesser included

offense of assault with a firearm, appellate counsel had no

reason to raise the issue on appeal and if she had, it would

have be rejected. Cunningham has thus failed to satisfy either

prong of Strickland. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. The

state court’s denial of this claim, therefore, was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. The Court recommends the claim be DENIED.

g. Failure to Request Voir Dire Transcripts and Raise

Batson Claim on Appeal

Cunningham contends appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to obtain a transcript of the jury voir dire.12

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Cunningham alleges that competent counsel would have reviewed

the voir dire transcript and, as a result, successfully raised

the issue on appeal. Failure to do so, he argues, constituted

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (FAP, Ground 2,

Argument 1 at 58-61.) 

A standard record on appeal includes the reporter’s

transcript of the oral proceedings at trial, but does not

necessarily include “the voir dire examination of jurors and any

opening statements.” Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.320(c)(3). A

party, however, may move to augment the record to include

matters outside the normal record. Id. at Rule 8.155. To

justify augmentation, the party must signify with some certainty

“how materials not included in the normal transcript may be

useful to him on appeal.” People v. Hill, 67 Cal. 2d 105, 124

(1967). 

Here, there is evidence in the state court record that trial

counsel objected to the dismissal of jurors pursuant to People

v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978) – the California version of

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1

at 107.) There is nothing in the record to indicate whether

appellate counsel considered the issue and determined it was not

necessary to obtain the transcript or whether her failure to

request the transcript was due to oversight or incompetence.

Regardless, this Court need not decide whether appellate

counsel’s failure to obtain the voir dire transcript was

deficient performance under Strickland because Cunningham cannot

show that a Batson claim would have been successful had it been

raised on appeal. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. 

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution prevents a prosecutor from

systematically eliminating potential jurors on the basis of

racial identity. Batson, 476 U.S. 79. In Purkett v. Elem, 514

U.S. 765 (1995), the United States Supreme Court outlined the

steps a court must follow in conducting a Batson analysis:

Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent

of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie

case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of

production shifts to the proponent of the strike to

come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step

two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the

trial court must then decide (step three) whether the

opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial

discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,

358-359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d 395

(1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 375, 111 S.Ct. at

1874 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Batson, supra, at 96-98, 106 S.Ct., at 1722-1723.

Id. at 1170-71; see also Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1047

(9th Cir. 2004). A state court’s determination as to whether a

prima facie case has been made is a factual determination

entitled to a presumption of correctness. Tolbert v. Page, 182

F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The Supreme Court has fleshed out step two of the Batson

inquiry as follows:

A neutral explanation in the context of our

analysis here means an explanation based on something

other than the race of the juror. At this step of the

inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the

prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory

intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the

reason offered will be deemed race neutral.

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).

Finally, once the prosecutor has put forth race neutral

reasons for his strikes, the trial court must proceed to the

third step of the Batson inquiry and determine “whether the

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opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial

discrimination.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168

(2005)(citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767). At this stage, the

judge is required to "assess the plausibility of that reason in

light of all evidence with a bearing on it." Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005). The trial judge must

determine whether the reasons advanced by the prosecutor are

“pretextual" and the judge’s conclusion “‘largely will turn on

evaluation of credibility.’" Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365

(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98)). As the Hernandez court

noted, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the

decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral

explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed." Id.

Here, defense counsel objected to the dismissal of two

African American jurors, noting that he and the defendant were

African American and the prosecutor had used peremptory

challenges to excuse the only two African American males on the

panel of approximately 42 potential jurors. (Resp’t Supp.

Lodgment No. 1 at 118.). Defense counsel further observed that

both excused jurors exhibited no bias when questioned and had

given “solid answers” during voir dire. (Id.) 

In response, the trial judge found that defense counsel had

stated a prima facie case, stating: 

The record should reflect that Juror Number 2 is an

African American female at this point, at least she’s

not been excused by anyone. Mr. [C.] was the original

juror number 18. He was an African-American male and

was excused by the prosecution, and then now Mr. [M.]

has been excused as well. It is a close case, but I’m

prepared at this time to find a prima facia [sic] case

of possible racial selection by the people. . . and

therefore put the burden on the people to explain their

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choices both as to Mr. [C.] and Mr. [M.] 

(Id. at 118-19.)

The prosecutor then explained that he had struck Mr. C.

based on his statements that people who were incarcerated were

predominantly African-Americans, and therefore he thought that

“there was no way [Mr. C.] could be fair and impartial because

of race.” (Id. at 119.) As for Mr. M., the prosecutor stated

that he had struck him because he was very young and when asked

specific questions he had given unresponsive answers like “I

guess.” The prosecutor also explained that Mr. M. slouched in

his chair and appeared inattentive. (Id. at 120.)

Defense counsel responded that Mr. M.’s answers were similar

to Juror Number 5's, who was not struck. As to Mr. C., defense

counsel stated that his responses indicated that, if anything,

he would be biased against the defendant. (Id. at 120-21.) 

The trial court then made its ruling, stating:

You know, I was a little surprised when Mr. C. was

excused. But in thinking about it and hearing Mr.

Link’s explanation of it, I think there were solid

reasons for it. Mr. C. did in fact step to the plate,

and respond and gave some kind of hard to follow

explanation about African American men who are in jails

more so than anybody else, and the thought that if this

defendant had been incarcerated before that would mean

one thing, and if he hadn’t been incarcerated before

that would mean something else. But then when the

court kind of asked him some follow-up questions, what

it really came down to was well he would try to assess

the evidence and the law without regard to whether this

particular African-American male, Mr. Cunningham, had

ever been in custody. I, frankly was left with really

not knowing where Mr. C. was coming from. He seemed

like an intelligent man, but he popped up about African

American males and incarceration, and really I’m not

sure what his point was. And I think the People were

free to excuse him for the reason that he may well have

had some prejudice in favor of African-American males

or against them. I’m still not sure what it was. But

his comments in that regard were sufficient reason for

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either counsel to excuse Mr. C.

Now, we get into a more dicey situation with Mr.

M. The record should reflect that Mr. M. appears to be

somewhere around 18 and 20 years old to me. He’s

African-American. He is a student at Cuyamaca College.

He gave appropriate answers under the biographical part

of the rendition that everybody had to give. His

father, I think he said, is in the fire department.

His mother is with an insurance company.

Body language is one thing that does not come

across very well on the record, and it appears the one

thing that Mr. Link is hanging his hat on. And I must

say that Mr. M.’s body language was not something that

if I were a prosecutor I would be particularly

comfortable with. I observed Mr. M. when he answered

Mr. Link’s questions. He did not give eye contact, he

looked downward, he had his hand up toward his mouth

the entire time, he appeared defensive, he appeared

uncommunicative, and like many very young people, he

gave one syllable, one word answers to most of the

questions without looking at you. I would say that his

body language was negative.

It appeared somewhat negative to me about even

being here, and I feel that people picked up on it.

And I don’t know if our appellate courts have indicated

that body language is something that can be taken into

account but in Mr. M.’s case it was clearly negative.

I can’t say it was negative necessarily toward the

prosecution as opposed to towards the entire process,

but he was not engaged. And for that reason, I’m going

to deny the Batson/Wheeler motion. And I take into

account the fact that there is at least one other

African-American that remains on the jury that has not

been excused, that being juror number 2. So for those

reasons, the motion is denied. 

(Id. at 121-23.)

The trial court properly denied Cunningham’s Batson claim.

In response to the court’s finding of a prima facie case, the

prosecutor set forth race neutral explanations for striking both

jurors. First, the prosecutor explained that he excused Mr. M.

because his one word answers and body language suggested he was

inattentive and disinterested in the proceedings. (Resp’t Supp.

Lodgment at 118.) The trial court then concluded that the

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prosecutor’s explanation was reasonable and not pretextual. The

court commented that it too noticed that Mr. M. failed to make

eye contact when answering questions and displayed defensive and

negative body language. (Id. at 121-23.) 

California courts have held that body language can be an

acceptable race neutral reason for exercising a peremptory

challenge. See People v. Dunn, 40 Cal. App. 1039, 1047 (1995)

(finding no error when the prosecutor struck an African-American

because she was frowning and appeared to lack interest in the

proceedings); People v. Turner, 8 Cal. 4th 137, 170 (1994)

(finding no error where the prosecutor used a peremptory

challenge to excuse an African-American because she had a

defensive body position, would not make eye contact with the

prosecutor and appeared hostile). Like Dunn and Turner, the

prosecutor’s explanation here was based on the impression the

prospective juror’s body language gave, in conjunction with

other factors.

This case is distinguishable from McClain v. Prunty, 217

F.3d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000). In McClain, one of the reasons

the prosecutor gave for excusing a juror was that her “body

language was unacceptable because she had her elbow on her

chair.” Id. The court held this explanation was insufficient

because “the prosecutor did not explain the significance of [the

juror’s] body language.” Here, the prosecutor explained that

Mr. M.’s body language, coupled with his answers, suggested that

he might not be sufficiently attentive during the proceedings.

The trial court clearly found the prosecutor’s explanations

credible, having made the same observations regarding Mr. M.’s

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body language and disposition. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.

Accordingly, the court did not err in concluding that defense

counsel had not met his burden of proving intentional

discrimination with respect to Mr. M. 

With regard to Mr. C., the prosecutor explained that he had

excused Mr. C. based on his views regarding the high rate of

incarcerated African-Americans. (Resp’t Supp. Lodgment at 118.)

The prosecutor stated that he believed “there was no way [Mr.

C.] could be fair and impartial because of race.” (Id.) During

initial questioning of the jurors, the trial judge asked whether

“race is going to be an issue with any of you potentially.”

(Id. at 48.) Mr. C. raised his hand and the following exchange

took place:

MR. C.: Well, it’s not so much the race issue. But

I feel that the incarceration of AfricanAmerican males in our system in most of the

prisons today – and I don’t know if this

gentleman has had any experience – but I

would think if he has been incarcerated

before or hasn’t been I would probably want

to weigh that in any decisions that I make

concerning this case.

COURT: Well, let’s do two assumptions. I’m going to

give you two assumptions. I’m going to assume

– first of all let’s assume that Mr.

Cunningham has never been incarcerated

before. Assume that to be true and tell me

how that would affect you as a deliberating

juror.

MR. C.: I would probably tend to look at the evidence

a lot closer to determine if in fact he is

guilty of the charges against him. And

conversely if in fact he has had problems

before, I would probably be more reluctant to

not weigh it as heavily if there’s been other

incidents with criminal activity.

COURT: I’m sorry. You’d be not as reluctant to

weigh what as heavily?

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MR. C.: The evidence.

COURT: Let’s assume – well, let’s go to the second

point. Let’s assume that he has been

incarcerated at some point in his life. How

would that affect your job as a juror? Are

you saying that you would be – you would

follow the evidence less closely in that

regard.

MR. C.: Well, not so much less closely. But I would

probably weigh the circumstances in which the

evidence came about a lot more closer?

COURT: Okay. A lot more closely?

MR. C.: Yes, sir. 

COURT: But if you assume that he’s never been

incarcerated, then you would look at the

circumstances less closely. I’m not trying

to play word games. I’m trying to see– 

MR. C.: I understand what you’re saying. And I guess

the first time – you know, the first time

conviction of anything should be scrutinized

for a lot of things. I would look at it a

lot more closely in those cases.

COURT: You’re not going to hear any evidence as to

whether or not Mr. Cunningham has ever been

incarcerated before, and the reason you’re

not is because it’s not relevant under the

law of [sic] whether or not he’s guilty or

not guilty of the crimes charged in this

case. It is improper and, frankly illegal

for any juror, for example, to assume that a

person who maybe had been in trouble before

is probably guilty again.

(Resp’t Supp. Lodgment at 48-50.) 

The court went on to explain that the jurors would hear

evidence that Mr. Cunningham had previously been convicted of a

felony but that Mr. C. was not to assume that he had or had not

been to jail. (Id. at 50-51.) The exchange concluded as

follows: 

COURT: [Y]ou’re not allowed to [consider the fact

that Mr. Cunningham has been previously

convicted of a felony] and allow it into your

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decision-making process on whether he

committed the crimes charged today. . . It

may be counter-intuitive to not consider it,

but you’re going to be instructed not to

consider it. Is it something that you can

do, or do you think it’s going to be too hard

for you to disregard that?

MR. C.: I’m a fair man. I don’t think I would.

(Id. at 51.)

Mr. C.’s comments, while not entirely clear, suggested that

he might weigh the evidence differently depending on whether or

not the defendant previously had been incarcerated. (Id. at 49-

50.) Thus, the prosecutor’s “explanation for excusing Mr. C.

was based on something other than the race of the juror.” See

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. 

Having found the prosecutor’s explanation was not based on

Mr. C.’s race, the trial judge was left to determine “whether

the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial

discrimination.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 1170-71. Here, the trial

court observed that Mr. C.’s comments suggested he might have a

bias based on his views about incarcerated African-Americans.

Having made the same observations regarding Mr. C.’s comments,

the trial court found the prosecutor’s explanation credible.

See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. Based on a through review of

the record, this Court finds the trial court properly concluded

that defense counsel had not met his burden of proving

intentional discrimination with respect to Mr. C. As such,

there was no Batson violation as to Mr. C. 

In sum, the state trial court correctly followed the three

prong Batson test, and its conclusions are amply supported by

the record. As such, Cunnningham cannot show he was prejudiced

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by appellate counsel’s failure to pursue a Batson claim on

appeal. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. Accordingly, the state

court’s silent denial of this claim is neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The Court

recommends this claim be DENIED.

h. Cumulative Errors

Finally, Cunningham claims appellate counsel was ineffective

based on the cumulative effect of all the alleged errors

discussed above. (See, FAP Ground 2, Argument 2 at 62-67.)

While any single error may not have deprived a defendant of due

process when considered alone, a series of errors may have the

cumulative effect of denying a defendant due process when

considered together. See Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197,

1212 (9th Cir. 2000). In the context of ineffective assistance

of counsel, the Ninth Circuit has held that “prejudice may

result from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies.”

Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir.

1995) (quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th

Cir. 1978)).

Cunningham is not entitled to relief under the cumulative

error doctrine. Even assuming appellate counsel’s failure to

obtain the voir dire transcript was deficient performance, this

single misstep did not render Cunningham’s trial fundamentally

unfair. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 654 (9th Cir.

2004). As discussed above, Cunningham has not demonstrated

prejudice as to his Batson claim or any of his other individual

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Thus,

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there is no “cumulative prejudice.” See id. Accordingly,

Cunningham has not shown he was denied due process under the

cumulative error doctrine. Thus, the Court recommends the

claims be DENIED.

5. Motion for Procedural Default

On March 2, 2010, Cunningham filed a document entitled

“Motion: Procedural Default” [doc. no. 77]. The basis for the

motion is not entirely clear to this Court. In the motion,

Cunningham notes that the Court ordered Respondent to lodge the

transcript of the jury voir dire and any related documents. He

claims that Respondent failed to submit a copy of a relevant

minute order, which was referenced in the Answer. Cunningham is

incorrect. A copy of the minute order cited by Respondent is

part of the trial court record originally lodged with this

Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 106-07.) Accordingly,

Respondent was not required to re-submit a copy of the order.

Therefore, Cunningham’s “motion” is DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the

United States District Judge Dana M. Sabraw, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. For the

reasons outlined above, IT HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered

denying the Petition with prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 16, 2010, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and

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serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

July 7, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 25, 2010

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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