Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01998/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01998-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN DRAGASITS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-01998-BAS-JLB

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

[ECF No. 30]

v.

J. YU, et al.

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by 

Plaintiff Stephen Dragasits, a California state prisoner incarcerated at the Richard 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff alleges that the 

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent 

to his medical needs when he was given top bunk accommodations, which posed a 

risk of harm to him. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff alleges that he fell off the top bunk on 

three occasions in fall 2015 despite making multiple requests for a lower bunk 

assignment. (Id.) Although Defendants have provided Plaintiff with a permanent 

lower bunk assignment (ECF No. 38), Plaintiff requests that the Court grant 

injunctive relief requiring Defendants to provide him an assignment that is not 

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subject to yearly reevaluation. (Id. at 6.) For the reasons herein, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary relief and drastic remedy and “one 

that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden 

of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). An injunction 

may be granted only where the movant shows that “he is likely to succeed on the 

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 

interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Am. 

Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).

The movant has the burden of proof on each element of the test. Envtl. Council of 

Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements 

on prisoner litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. 

“Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than 

necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the 

least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(2). As the 

Ninth Circuit has previously observed, the PLRA places significant limits upon a 

court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, and “operates 

simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the 

bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve 

relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” 

Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Request for Injunctive Relief is Not Moot

First, the Court addresses Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s request for 

injunctive relief is moot. Defendants provide evidence showing that Plaintiff was 

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provided a lower bunk assignment on December 31, 2015. (ECF No. 38 at 6.) They 

also provide evidence showing that Plaintiff “has a permanent lower bunk chrono 

with an expiration date of December 31, 9999.” (Id. at 5 (citing Decl. of T. Johnson 

¶¶3–4, Exs. A–B).) Defendants do not provide evidence showing that the permanent 

lower bunk chrono is not subject to reevaluation, which is the basis of Plaintiff’s 

request for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 30 at 6.) The absence of this evidence 

prevents the Court from concluding that Plaintiff’s motion is in fact moot. Cf.

Williams v. Chau, No. 3:17-cv-00517-CAB-KSC, 2018 WL 558987, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 

Jan. 24, 2018) (preliminary injunction request for permanent lower bunk chrono 

without reevaluation was moot because plaintiff had received accommodation with 

expiration date of 12/31/9999 not subject to reevaluation). Because Plaintiff’s 

request is not moot, the Court proceeds to assess whether Plaintiff has shown that he 

is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. 

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Show Irreparable Harm Necessary for 

Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction

The Court finds that the issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary 

injunction at this stage of the proceedings begins and ends with his failure to show 

irreparable harm. 

Irreparable harm has been described as “[p]erhaps the single most important 

prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” See 11A Wright & Miller, 

FED. PRAC. & PROC. §2948.1 (3d ed.). When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a 

likelihood of irreparable harm without preliminary relief, the court need not address 

the remaining elements of the preliminary injunction standard. See Center for Food 

Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2011). Because the conduct at issue 

in this case concerns alleged past violations of the law by government actors, Plaintiff

is required to establish the threat of future or repeated injury that is both “real and 

immediate,” not merely “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. 

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). The Plaintiff must show “that a credible threat exists 

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that [he] will again be subject to the specific injury for which [he] seek[s] injunctive 

or declaratory relief.” Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1985). The 

Ninth Circuit has repeatedly admonished that “[s]peculative injury does not 

constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” 

Carribean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988); Goldie’s 

Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is based on 

speculative future injury that is insufficient to constitute irreparable injury. The 

incidents at issue in Plaintiff’s amended complaint occurred on August 3, August 21, 

and December 27, 2015. (ECF No. 30 at 2.) Even if these incidents resulted in 

violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, those past violations which 

occurred nearly two years before the filing of the motion for preliminary injunctive 

relief do not establish that he is subject to ongoing harm or faces an immediate threat 

of irreparable harm. See Midgett v. Tri-Cty. Metro. Transp. Dist., 254 F.3d 846, 850 

(9th Cir. 2001); see also Cohea v. Patzloff, No. 10cv0437 IEG (RBB), 2010 WL 

1200342, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010) (finding no irreparable harm because, inter 

alia, the allegations concerned incidents that occurred several years ago). Plaintiff 

must provide specific facts which clearly show a credible threat of future injury. FED.

R. CIV. P. 65(b); see also, e.g., Wallace v. Sosa, No. 16-cv-01501-BAS-BGS, 2017 

WL 469140, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017). Plaintiff has not done so. 

Plaintiff concedes that he was provided a permanent lower bunk chrono on 

December 28, 2015—a mere one day after his final fall. (ECF No. 27 ¶132.) 

Defendants have also provided evidence of Plaintiff’s permanent lower bunk chrono. 

(ECF No. 38 Ex. B.) Although the Court has found that this evidence does not moot 

Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief for a permanent lower back chrono not subject 

to reevaluation, the evidence does undermine Plaintiff’s speculative assertions about 

future injury simply because the chrono is subject to future review. See, e.g., 

Wallace, No. 2017 WL 469140, at *4 (no showing of irreparable harm to support 

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injunctive request for single cell status pending release date where plaintiff was 

placed in single cell status subject to review at a later point). At this point, Plaintiff 

has a lower bunk assignment with a permanent status. Plaintiff merely asserts that 

there is a future “risk of being placed on the upper bunk again years later” due to 

yearly review of his permanent lower bunk chrono, which in turn leads to a 

“substantial serious risk of falling, and causing serious physical injury again.” (ECF 

No. 30 at 4.) However, the possibility of some remote future injury is insufficient to 

warrant injunctive relief. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. This is particularly true when, 

as here, the threat of injury is contingent on a series of speculative occurrences. The 

Court would need to assume that review of Plaintiff’s permanent lower bunk 

assignment would result its rescission at some indeterminate point, Plaintiff would

be placed on a top bunk, Plaintiff would fall off the top bunk at some indeterminate 

point thereafter, and Plaintiff would sustain physical injuries. The issuance of a 

preliminary injunction is not appropriate to mitigate against these mere possibilities 

and assumptions. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

Because Plaintiff has received a permanent lower bunk assignment and has 

failed to show he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the future simply because the 

assignment is subject to review at a later date, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion 

for a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 30.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 14, 2018

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