Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00765/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00765-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRIANT WATER AUTHORITY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SALLY JEWELL, as Secretary of the UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 

INTERIOR, et al.,

Defendants. 

Case No. 1:14-CV-000765-LJO-BAM

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE SAN LUIS & DELTA 

MENDOTA WATER 

AUTHORITY’S AND 

WESTLANDS’ MOTION TO 

INTERVENE (DOC. 31)

I. INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND

This suit concerns the United States Bureau of Reclamation’s (“Reclamation”) release of water 

from Millerton Lake/Friant Dam, features of the Friant Unit of the Central Valley Project (“CVP”), to 

supply water to the San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors Authority and its member districts 

(“Exchange Contractors”). The Friant Water Authority and its member agencies (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”), which also contact for and depend upon water deliveries from the Friant Unit, 

acknowledge the priority of the Exchange Contractors’ contracts with Reclamation, but allege that 

Reclamation’s actions are unlawful because the Exchange Contractors’ demands should be satisfied first 

from sources other than Millerton. Doc. 1. Plaintiffs further allege that Reclamation’s actions are 

causing them harm because water released from Millerton will not be available to satisfy Plaintiffs’ own 

needs. 

Plaintiffs name as defendants in this action Reclamation and related federal entities and officers, 

as well as two water districts that manage wildlife refuges in the San Joaquin Valley, Grassland Water 

Case 1:14-cv-00765-LJO-BAM Document 43 Filed 05/27/14 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

District (“GWD”), and Grassland Resource Conservation District (“GRCD”) (collectively, 

“Grasslands”), which districts Plaintiffs maintain are receiving water from sources other than Millerton, 

water that Plaintiffs allege should be delivered to the Exchange Contractors to prevent the need for 

releases from Millerton. 

On May 20, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order that would, among 

other things, require the Bureau to provide water to the Exchange Contractors from sources other than 

Millerton. On May 22, 2014, San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority (“SLDMWA”) and Westlands 

Water District (“Westlands) (collectively, “Applicants”) moved to intervene in this matter as of right or 

in the alternative for permissive intervention. Doc. 32.

II. INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT.

A. Applicants. 

SLDMWA was formed in 1992 as a joint powers authority, and has its principal office in Los 

Banos, California. Declaration of Daniel Nelson, Doc. 35, at ¶ 2. SLDMWA is comprised of 28 member 

water agencies that contract with the United States for water supply stored, pumped and conveyed by the 

CVP. Id. SLDMWA also operates and maintains certain CVP facilities under a contract with 

Reclamation. Id. at ¶ 4. One such facility is the Jones Pumping Plant, located in the southern portion of 

the Delta, near the City of Tracy. Id. SLDMWA also operates and maintains the Delta-Mendota Canal, 

which delivers water to member agencies. Id. The SLDMWA member agencies serve areas on the west 

side of the San Joaquin Valley south of the Delta. The water supplied to SLDMWA’s member agencies 

is pumped from the Delta through the Jones Pumping Plant and has been used to meet the water supply 

needs of over 2.8 million acres of agricultural lands within areas of San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Merced, 

Fresno, Kings, San Benito and Santa Clara Counties. Id. at ¶ 6. Member agencies also provide 

approximately 350,000 acre-feet of water to wildlife refuges for habitat enhancement and restoration 

activities. Id. Finally, these water supplies support municipal and industrial uses, including within the 

City of Tracy and urban areas within Santa Clara County. Id. 

Westlands is a member agency of SLDMWA. Declaration of Russell Freeman, Doc. 33, at ¶ 1. 

Case 1:14-cv-00765-LJO-BAM Document 43 Filed 05/27/14 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Westlands contracts with Reclamation to receive water through the San Luis Unit of the CVP, for 

distribution and consumption within areas of Fresno and Kings Counties. Id. at ¶ 2. Westlands’ total 

contractual entitlement from the CVP under this contract is 1.15 million acre feet per year. Id. In 

addition, Westlands holds 43,500 acre-feet of water entitlement in the form of contract assignments from 

other districts including Broadview Water District, Centinella Water District, Widren Water District, 

and Oro Loma Water District. Id. Most of this CVP water supply is used for irrigation. Id. Westlands 

encompasses approximately 600,000 acres. Id.

Applicants move to intervene as of right or, in the alternative, to permissively intervene. 

B. Intervention as of Right.

1. Legal Standard.

Intervention is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. To intervene as a matter of right 

under Rule 24(a)(2), an applicant must claim an interest, the protection of which may, as a practical 

matter, be impaired or impeded if the lawsuit proceeds without the applicant. Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. 

Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit applies Rule 24(a) liberally, in 

favor of intervention, and requires a district court to “take all well-pleaded, non-conclusory allegations 

in the motion as true absent sham, frivolity or other objections.” S.W. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 

Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001). A four-part test is used to evaluate a motion for intervention of 

right:

(1) the motion must be timely; 

(2) the applicant must claim a “significantly protectable” interest 

relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; 

(3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action 

may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that 

interest; and 

(4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the 

parties to the action. 

Wilderness Soc., 630 F.3d at 1177.

2. Timeliness.

Case 1:14-cv-00765-LJO-BAM Document 43 Filed 05/27/14 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

In assessing timeliness, courts in the Ninth Circuit must consider: (1) the current stage of the 

proceedings; (2) whether the existing parties would be prejudiced; and (3) the reason for any delay in 

moving to intervene. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 

1997). Applicants moved to intervene two days after this action was initiated. There can be no debate 

that the motion is timely. 

3. Significant Protectable Interests/Impairment of Interests.

Here, it is practical to treat the third and fourth factors together. To demonstrate a “significantly 

protectable interest,” “a prospective intervenor must establish that (1) the interest asserted is protectable 

under some law, and (2) there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at 

issue.” Wilderness Soc., 630 F.3d at 1181. Finally, intervention of right is only appropriate where

disposition of this action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede Applicants’ abilities to protect 

their interests. This requirement demands only a showing that the applicant “would be substantially 

affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action.” S.W. Ctr., 268 F.3d at 822. 

Here, the relief Plaintiffs seek would further limit Reclamation’s already limited discretion and 

ability to allocate CVP shortages among CVP contractors. Such a ruling would likely reduce the water 

supplies available to the areas served by Applicants, by providing Plaintiffs a priority to water (at least 

vis-à-vis CVP contractors such as Applicants). Applicants possess contractually protected interests in 

deliveries from the CVP. In light of the potential adverse consequences to Applicants’ interests if 

Plaintiffs obtain the relief they seek, the Court concludes that Applicants have satisfied the third and 

fourth prongs of the intervention as of right test. 

4. Existing Parties’ Ability to Represent Applicants’ Interests.

The remaining issue is whether Applicants’ interests are adequately protected by other parties. In 

assessing the adequacy of representation, the Ninth Circuit looks at three factors: 

(1) whether the existing parties will undoubtedly make all of the applicant’s arguments;

(2) whether the existing parties are capable of and willing to make the applicant’s arguments; 

and

Case 1:14-cv-00765-LJO-BAM Document 43 Filed 05/27/14 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

(3) whether the applicant offers a necessary element to the proceedings that otherwise would 

be neglected.

Id. at 823. “[T]he requirement of inadequacy of representation is satisfied if the applicant shows that 

representation of its interests may be inadequate.... [T]he burden of making this showing is minimal.” 

Sagebrush Rebellion Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983).

It is “well-settled precedent in this circuit” that “[w]here an applicant for intervention and an 

existing party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises.” 

League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1305; see also Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 

1086 (9th Cir. 2003). This presumption is triggered here because Applicants and Federal Defendants 

share a similar objective of upholding Reclamation’s releases from Millerton. However, the presumption 

is rebuttable upon a showing that the applicant and the existing parties “do not have sufficiently 

congruent interests.” S.W. Ctr., 268 F.3d at 823.

Applicants’ interests diverge from existing Federal Defendants, who, as operators of the entire 

CVP, have responsibilities to protect multiple interests. See Georgia v. United States Army Corps of 

Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding federal defendant with interest in management of 

a resource did not have interests identical to an entity with economic interests in the use of that 

resource). Moreover, Applicants are particularly concerned that imposing additional constraints upon 

Reclamation’s discretion would increase the likelihood that Reclamation would impose shortages upon 

Applicants, a concern that, while assuredly shared by Reclamation, is not of equal import to or impact 

upon Reclamation itself.

Applicants satisfy all of the requirements for intervention as a matter of right. It is not necessary 

to address Applicants’ alternative request for permissive intervention. 

III. CONCLUSION

Applicants’ motion to intervene as a defendant as a matter of right is GRANTED, conditioned 

upon strictly limiting their participation solely to issues about which they can provide non-repetitive, 

unique information and/or arguments. The Court notes that Applicants’ brief in opposition to the 

Case 1:14-cv-00765-LJO-BAM Document 43 Filed 05/27/14 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

pending request for a temporary restraining order substantially overlaps with those filed by other parties. 

In the future, the parties shall meet and confer in an effort to avoid such duplication.

SO ORDERED

Dated: May 27, 2014

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

United States District Judge

Case 1:14-cv-00765-LJO-BAM Document 43 Filed 05/27/14 Page 6 of 6