Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00507/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00507-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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28 * This motion was determined to be suitable for decision

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HEIDI M. FITZER, )

) 2:05-cv-507-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CHEVRON CORPORATION, and )

ARLENE GAONA, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move for summary judgment or summary adjudication

of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff does not oppose granting summary

judgment on her retaliation claim, and indicates she does not oppose

granting summary judgment on her discrimination claim. (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1; Pl.’s Proposed Order at

1-2.) Plaintiff otherwise opposes the motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Heidi Fitzer, a Caucasian female, is a former

employee of Defendant Chevron Corporation (“Chevron”). In March 2004,

Defendant Chevron hired Plaintiff to work as a customer service

representative at a gas station on Nut Tree Parkway in Vacaville,

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California (“Nut Tree gas station”). (Pl’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement

of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 8; Fitzer Depo. 50:1-51:5.) During her

first week on the job, Plaintiff received off-site training in

Sacramento, California. (SUF ¶ 10; Fitzer Depo. 52:2-9.) The

following week, Plaintiff worked at the Nut Tree gas station under the

supervision of manager Buck Buchanan (“Buchanan”), a Caucasian male,

and assistant manager Defendant Arlene Gaona (“Gaona”), a Hispanic

female. (SUF ¶¶ 8, 11; Fitzer Depo. 55:2-8.) During that week,

Defendant Gaona criticized Plaintiff’s work performance, “slam[med]

things around,” and hurt her feelings. (SUF ¶¶ 12; Fitzer Depo. 58:1-

59:12.) At the end of the week, Plaintiff quit her job. (SUF ¶ 14;

Fitzer Depo. 59:16-61:12.) 

In late September 2004, Plaintiff approached Buchanan and

asked if she could return to work at the Nut Tree gas station. (SUF

¶ 15; Fitzer Depo. 85:3-87:17.) Buchanan agreed, and Plaintiff

resumed work at the gas station under the supervision of Defendant

Gaona. (SUF ¶ 15; Fitzer Depo. 334:22-24.) Plaintiff and Defendant

Gaona usually worked at different times: Defendant Gaona worked the

morning shift, while Plaintiff worked the afternoon shift. (SUF ¶ 16;

Brooks Depo. 23:12-17.) During shift overlaps, Plaintiff asserts

Defendant Gaona spoke to her in a rude tone, yelled at her about her

work performance, “slamm[ed] stuff around,” asked her to perform

certain job tasks, requested she re-do tasks she had already

completed, or “picked” on her about the manner in which she counted

money and cigarettes. (Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“SDF”) ¶ 1;

Fitzer Depo. 81-83, 91:1-14, 90:4-10, 145:1-146:25, 188:18-189:19.)

Plaintiff states that when this conduct occurred, she “blew it off and

just continued working.” (SUF ¶ 16; Fitzer Depo. 81:1-10.) On

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December 16, 2004, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Gaona called her a

“white witch,” and “white and stupid.” (SUF ¶ 21; SDF ¶ 1; Fitzer

Depo. 194:2-24, 209:1-5, 258:8-20.) On December 19, 2004, Plaintiff

asserts Defendant Gaona called her a “bitch,” “white bitch,” and

“blonde bitch.” (SUF ¶ 23; SDF ¶¶ 1, 4; Fitzer Depo. 107:23-108:2,

115:16, 233:19-22.) 

Plaintiff asserts other co-workers “picked on her,” caused

fights, used profanity towards her, and assigned her job tasks. (SDF

¶ 1; Fitzer Depo. 91:13-107:18.) Plaintiff asserts she complained to

Buchanan about the conduct of Defendant Gaona and her co-workers, but

nothing was done in response to her complaints. (SDF ¶ 3; Fitzer

Depo. 83:2-84:10, 100:1-20.) In December 2004 or January 2005,

Plaintiff asserts Buchanan told her that he would take care of her

problems only “if she spread her legs.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2; Fitzer

Depo. 502:17-505:23.) Plaintiff also asserts “there was additional

sexual harassment by . . . Buchanan.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, n. 2.) 

In the beginning of January 2005, Plaintiff missed several

days of work, and by January 24, 2005, her absence from work was

continuous. (SUF ¶ 44; Alm Depo. 98:6-23.) Plaintiff submitted

doctor notes for her absences, but did not advise Chevron when she

would return to work. (SUF ¶ 47; SDF ¶ 2; Fitzer Depo. 127:1-128:16,

525:7-10.) After two months passed, Defendant Chevron notified

Plaintiff in a letter that her employment was terminated effective

March 21, 2005, because of her continued absence. (SUF ¶¶ 46, 48-49;

Alm Depo. 99:10-100:11; Defs.’ Ex. O.) Plaintiff believes her

employment was terminated for the reasons stated in the letter. (SUF

¶ 50; Fitzer Depo. 541:13-17.) 

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1 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim

is based on events that occurred during March 2004. (Defs.’ Mot.

at 31-33.) However, Plaintiff indicates her constructive discharge

claim is based on the events that occurred from September 2004

through March 2005. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1, 4.)

2 Although Defendants contend Plaintiff asserts claims for

discrimination and harassment based on her Native American national

origin, no such claims appear in Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint. In her Opposition, Plaintiff states she asserts claims

only for discrimination and harassment because of race and gender.

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2.) Accordingly, the discussion section only

addresses race and gender discrimination and harassment claims. 

3 The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment

are well known and need not be repeated here. 

4

Plaintiff has brought this action against Defendant Chevron

and Defendant Gaona as a result of the events that occurred from

September 2004 through March 2005.1 (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.) Plaintiff

asserts claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for

harassment and discrimination based on her gender and race,

constructive discharge, and retaliation.2 In addition, Plaintiff

asserts state law claims for harassment, failure to prevent

harassment, discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. 

DISCUSSION3

I. Title VII Claims

A. Administrative Charge Requirement

Defendants argue Plaintiff should not be able to offer

evidence that she was harassed or discriminated against by Buchanan or

co-workers in support of her Title VII claims because she did not

include these allegations in her charge of discrimination

(“administrative charge”) presented to the Equal Employment

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Opportunity Commission. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8, 11.) Plaintiff

acknowledges she cannot assert new harassment claims, and then asserts

an argument that pertains to one of her state claims. (Pl.’s Opp’n

at 5.) 

A plaintiff must file an administrative charge before

commencing a civil suit alleging Title VII claims. Brown v. Puget

Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th

Cir. 1984). New incidents of discrimination under Title VII that were

not included in the administrative charge are not actionable unless

the incidents “are like or reasonably related to the allegations

contained in the [administrative] charge.” Lyons v. Edwards, 307 F.3d

at 1104; Oubichon v. Northern Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571

(9th Cir. 1973). This standard is satisfied if the incidents “fell

within the scope of the actual [administrative] investigation or an

[administrative] investigation which can reasonably be expected to

grow out of a charge of discrimination,” or when the incidents “are

consistent with the plaintiff’s original theory of the case.” Lyons,

307 F.3d at 1104. However, new incidents of discrimination “are not

alike or reasonably related” to allegations in the administrative

charge if they do not “describe the same conduct and implicate the

same individuals.” Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31

F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994); see Freedman v. Oakland Unified School

Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (“it is appropriate to

consider such factors as . . . [the] perpetrators of discrimination

named in the charge”). 

When examining an administrative charge, the court must

construe the allegations “with utmost liberality since they are made

by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” Lyons,

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4 The relevant portion of Plaintiff’s administrative charge

states: 

[O]n March 10, 2004, I was rehired [by Defendant Chevron]

as a Cashier. A new Assistant Manager, Arlene (Hispanic

female) was working there. I went to training for a

week. Then for the next two weeks she harassed me by

yelling at me, and by being mean to me. The work

atmosphere was so hostile, that I was constructively

discharged on about March 17, 2004. Then on September

30, 2004, Station Manager, Buck Buchanan, rehired me and

promised that I would not be harassed again.

Nevertheless, Arlene was still there, and she began to

harass me again. For instance, on December 16, 2004, she

subjected me to a racial epithet. On December 19, 2004,

she called me a “bitch” and a “blonde bitch” in front of

a customer. She has again made my work atmosphere

extremely hostile. I complained to Buck on December 19,

2004, and to Human Resources on December 22, 2004, but

nothing has been done to stop the discriminatory hostile

work environment.

(Pl.’s First Am. Compl. Ex. 1.) 

6

307 F.3d at 1104; B.B.K. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1100

(9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff alleges in her administrative charge that

she was harassed by Defendant Gaona, but does not indicate she was

harassed by any other individual.4 (See Pl.’s First Am. Compl.

Ex. 1.) Consequently, nothing in Plaintiff’s administrative charge

indicated an administrative investigation should focus on harassment

by anyone other than Defendant Gaona. See Freedman, 291 F.3d at 637

(stating “nothing in [the plaintiff’s] charge would have indicated

that an investigation should focus on anything more than the

allegations of discrimination by . . . particular individuals”). 

Therefore, the allegations of harassment against Gaona are not like or

reasonably related to allegations of harassment against Buchanan and

co-workers because they do not “describe the same conduct and

implicate the same individuals,” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501, or set forth

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the same “theory of the case,” Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1104. Therefore,

the court cannot consider evidence of harassment by Buchanan or coworkers in connection with Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. 

B. Harassment Claims

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sexual and

racial harassment claims brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a). (Defs.’ Mot. at 11.) To establish a harassment claim under

Title VII, a plaintiff must show she was harassed “because of” her

gender or race. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S.

75, 80-81 (1998). In addition, a plaintiff must demonstrate the

harassment was “so severe or pervasive as to ‘alter the conditions of

[her] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Clark

County, 532 U.S. at 270 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d

634, 642 (9th Cir. 2004). 

i. “Because of” Gender or Race

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot establish she was harassed

“because of” gender or race. (Defs.’ Mot. at 16.) Plaintiff argues 

she was harassed based on her gender and race because she was

“assigned duties not given to non-Caucasian females.” (SUF ¶ 4;

Fitzer Depo. 193:7-23; Defs.’ Ex. C.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts

she was harassed based on her gender because Defendant Gaona called

her a “bitch,” and she was harassed based on her race because

Defendant Gaona called her a “white witch,” “white bitch,” “blonde

bitch,” and “white and stupid.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2.) 

A female plaintiff can establish she was harassed “because

of” her gender by offering “direct comparative evidence” as to how the

alleged harasser treated male employees. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81;

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EEOC v. Nat’l Education Assoc. Ala., 422 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir.

2005). Plaintiff does not assert that she was treated differently

than male employees at the Nut Tree gas station, but only that she was

treated differently than other female employees. (SUF ¶ 4; Fitzer

Depo. 193:7-23; Defs.’ Ex. C.) Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish

she was harassed “because of” her gender through the use of

comparative evidence. 

A female plaintiff can also establish she was harassed

“because of” her gender if she was “harassed in such sex-specific and

derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the

harasser [was] motivated by general hostility to the presence of women

in the workplace.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Although the word “bitch”

has a sexual connotation, it is not such a sex-specific and derogatory

term as to make it automatically clear Defendant Gaona harassed

Plaintiff “because of” her gender. Galloway v. General Motors Service

Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled in

part on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101 (2002)(stating the use of the word “bitch” does not make it

“automatically clear” that the harassment “was motivated by gender

rather than by a personal dislike unrelated to gender”); Kriss v.

Sprint Communications Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1281 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating

the word “bitch” is not “an indication of a general misogynist

attitude,” and is not “particularly probative of gender

discrimination”). 

Plaintiff has not presented any other evidence demonstrating

she was harassed “because of” her gender. Therefore, Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII gender harassment

claim is granted. Compare Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d

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721, 737 (8th Cir. 2000) (no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the plaintiff was harassed because of her gender where the

plaintiff only presented evidence she was called a “bitch”), with

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 862 (9th Cir. 2002)

(genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was

harassed because of her gender where the plaintiff was called a

“bitch” and she presented evidence of other differential treatment). 

Plaintiff could establish she was harassed “because of” her

race by presenting “direct comparative evidence” as to how the alleged

harsser treated members of a different race. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at

80-81. Although Plaintiff alleges she was “assigned duties not given

to non-Caucasian[s],” she does not dispute that with the exception of

her supervisor, Defendant Gaona, all of the employees at the Nut Tree

gas station were Caucasian. (SUF ¶ 4; Alm Depo. 35:12-36:4.) 

Consequently, Plaintiff could not have been treated differently than

similarly-situated employees of a different race because no such

employees worked at the Nut Tree gas station. Therefore, Plaintiff

cannot establish she was harassed “because of” her race through the

use of comparative evidence. 

Plaintiff could also establish she was harassed “because of”

her Caucasian race if she was harassed in such race-specific and

derogatory terms as to make it clear that the harasser was motivated

by general hostility to the presence of Caucasian persons in the

workplace. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The phrases “white and

stupid,” “white witch,” and “white bitch” are “explicitly racial” and

“carr[y] clear racial overtones.” See Bowen v. Missouri Department of

Social Services, 311 F.3d 878, 884 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding “two

‘white bitch’ epithets” were “explicitly racial” and “carried clear

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5 Accordingly, the Court need not determine whether “blonde

bitch” constitutes a racial slur. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 15-16; Pl.’s

Opp’n at 2-3; Defs.’ Reply at 8-9.) 

10

racial overtones”). Consequently, the use of these phrases permit an

inference “that racial animus motivated not only [Defendant Gaona’s]

overtly discriminatory conduct, but all of her offensive conduct

towards [Plaintiff].”5 Id. Therefore, a genuine issue of material

fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was harassed “because of” her

race. 

ii. Hostile or Abusive Work Environment

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot establish she was

subjected to a sufficiently hostile or abusive work environment

because Defendant Gaona’s conduct was not objectionable or frequent,

and did not interfere with Plaintiff’s employment. (Defs.’ Mot.

at 13.) Plaintiff argues she was subjected to a hostile or abusive

work environment because Defendant Gaona yelled at her, nitpicked,

assigned her certain work duties, applied different rules and

standards to her, and subjected her to racial slurs. (Pl.’s Opp’n at

3.) Plaintiff also cites to deposition testimony in which she states

Defendant Gaona spoke to her in a rude tone of voice, “slammed stuff,”

and requested she re-do work that had already been completed. (See

SDF ¶ 1.) 

“[W]hether [the work] environment is sufficiently hostile or

abusive must be judged ‘by looking at all the circumstances,’

including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.’” Clark County, 532 U.S. at 270 (quoting

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Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 777-78 (1998)). In addition,

the working environment must have been “both objectively and

subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find

hostile or abusive, and one that [Plaintiff] in fact did perceive to

be so.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777. 

Plaintiff argues the conduct at issue was frequent because

it occurred “on a daily basis, during shift overlaps.” (Pl.’s Opp’n

at 3; SDF ¶ 1.) However, Plaintiff does not provide any specific

facts regarding the frequency of the conduct in support of her

allegations. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986)

(“The party opposing summary judgment may not rest on conclusory

allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.”); F.T.C. v. Publishing Clearing House, 104

F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“conclusory, self-serving statements

. . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact”). 

Consequently, although “the alleged number of . . . incidents is

greater than one, . . . [the conduct] cannot be said to constitute a

pervasive pattern.” Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins., 12 F.3d

668, 674 (7th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff argues the conduct at issue was severe because

Defendant Gaona used racial slurs on two separate occasions. (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 3.) However, the “mere utterance of an epithet which

engenders offensive feelings in an employee” does not create an

objectively hostile or abusive work environment. Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Vasquez, 349 F.3d 634 (no

hostile or abusive work environment created when supervisor used two

“racially-related epithets”). Plaintiff also argues the other conduct

at issue, which primarily includes complaints of rude behavior, unfair

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treatment, and criticisms of her work performance, was severe enough

to create a hostile work environment. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) However,

“conduct must be extreme” to create an objectively hostile work

environment because “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace” are

not proscribed. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (stating that “the

standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure

Title VII does not become a general civility code”). 

Plaintiff argues the conduct at issue unreasonably

interfered with her work performance because she “developed severe

gastritis as a result of the harassment.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) 

However, Plaintiff’s treating physician testified he never diagnosed

Plaintiff with gastritis. (Dr. Sidhu Depo. 20:10-12.) Therefore,

Plaintiff’s self-diagnosis is “supported solely by [her] own

self-serving testimony . . . and [is] undermined . . . by other

credible evidence.” Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1999); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th

Cir. 2002) (no genuine issue of material fact exists where the only

evidence presented is “uncorroborated and self-serving” testimony). 

Furthermore, other undisputed evidence suggests Defendant Gaona’s

conduct did not interfere with Plaintiff’s work performance: Plaintiff

and Defendant Gaona rarely worked together, only interacted during

shift overlaps, and when Plaintiff had a problem with Defendant Gaona,

she “blew it off and just continued working.” (See SUF ¶¶ 16-17.) 

Therefore, the conduct at issue did not create an

objectively hostile or abusive work environment because it was not

frequent or severe, and did not unreasonably interfere with

Plaintiff’s work performance. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 638, 643-44

(no hostile or abusive work environment where the supervisor yelled at

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the plaintiff, made negative comments about him in front of other

people, wrote false complaints about his work, treated him unfairly,

and subjected him to two “racially related epithets”). Accordingly,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII

racial harassment claim is granted because no genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was subjected to a

racially hostile or abusive work environment. 

C. Constructive Discharge

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for

constructive discharge brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 29-30.) To establish a prima facie case of

constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show (1) she was subjected to

a hostile work environment, and (2) her working conditions were so

intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to

resign. Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146-147 (2004)

(emphasizing that a constructive discharge claim requires more than a

showing of a hostile work environment). Plaintiff cannot establish a

prima facie case of constructive discharge because, as discussed

supra, Plaintiff has not established she was subjected to a hostile

work environment. (See Discussion Part II, B.) Therefore,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s constructive

discharge claim is granted.

D. Discrimination Claim

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s race and

gender discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

(Defs.’ Mot. at 16-21.) It appears Plaintiff concedes her

discrimination claims because Plaintiff states she “limits her

discrimination allegations to the harassment claim,” and proposes her

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“discrimination claim [be] limited to evidentiary support of her

harassment claim.” (Pl.’s Proposed Order at 1-2.) Nevertheless, her

discrimination claims are addressed in the event Plaintiff did not

intend to concede these claims. 

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against

an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail on a

Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must first establish a

prima facie case of discrimination. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640. A

plaintiff may establish a prima facie case either with direct or

circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, or by showing (1)

she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was performing according to

her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse

employment action, and (4) other employees with qualifications similar

to her own were treated more favorably. Id. at 640, n.5. Once the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

allegedly discriminatory conduct.” Id. at 640. “If the defendant

provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to

show that the . . . reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Id.

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie

case of discrimination because Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse

employment action. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 17.) Plaintiff indicates she

suffered an adverse employment action because she “was not protected

from harassment.” (Defs.’ Ex. C; Fitzer Depo. 193:7-23.) However, a

failure to be protected from harassment cannot serve as the basis for

an adverse employment action because, as discussed supra, Plaintiff

cannot establish a prima facie case of harassment. Trujillo v. North

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County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 289 (1998) (a plaintiff

cannot show she was not protected from harassment unless she first

establishes the “essential foundational predicate” that she was

harassed); see Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th

2004) (“a finding of discrimination is required before a failure to

investigate a discrimination complaint would become actionable”).

Plaintiff also indicates she suffered an adverse employment action

because she was “made to do other females’ jobs,” and was “assigned

job duties not given to non-Caucasian females.” (SUF ¶¶ 3-4.) 

Disadvantageous work assignments can constitute an adverse employment

action. Wyatt v. Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994). 

Therefore, Plaintiff has established she suffered an adverse

employment action.

Assuming arguendo Plaintiff can establish the other

requisite elements of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

Defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

the allegedly discriminatory conduct. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. 

Defendants assert Plaintiff was not given disadvantageous assignments,

but rather was given only those assignments that were part of her

regular duties as a customer service representative. (Defs.’ Mot.

at 18; see SUF ¶ 9.) Defendants further aver Plaintiff was never

asked to do any work that was not part of her position. (Defs.’ Mot.

at 18; see SUF ¶ 9.) Therefore, Defendants have satisfied their

burden of articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason why

Plaintiff received certain assignments. See Board of Trustees of

Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (the employer’s

burden is satisfied if [it] simply “explains what [it] has done”). 

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Since Defendants have provided a non-discriminatory reason

for the assignments, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show that

the reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at

641. Plaintiff does not counter Defendant’s evidentiary showing with

any specific facts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn

that Defendants’ proffered explanation is a pretext for

discrimination. See Berg, 794 F.2d at 459 (“The party opposing

summary judgment . . . must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.”). Therefore, Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII race and gender

discrimination claims is granted. 

C. Retaliation Claims

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. (Defs.’ Mot. at

27-29.) Plaintiff concedes she cannot prove the damage element of her

retaliation claim, and states she does not oppose summary judgment

being entered against her on this claim. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1; Pl.’s

Proposed Order at 1-2.) Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim is granted. 

II. State Law Claims

Since Defendants’ motion for summary judgment has been

granted on all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the issue is reached

whether supplemental jurisdiction should continued being exercised

over Plaintiff’s state claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), when all

federal claims are eliminated before trial, the court has a measure of

discretion when deciding whether to continue exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over state claims. Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. National

Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989). “[W]hen deciding

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whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court should

consider and weigh in each case, . . . the values of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’l College

of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). “In the usual case in which

all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Wade v. Regional Credit Assoc.,

87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where a district court dismisses

a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution, it should

decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without

prejudice.”). 

Plaintiff argues she asserts common law racial and sexual

harassment claims, and that these claims “are appropriate under

California law.” (Id. at 4.) Defendants rejoin Plaintiff has not

asserted common law harassment claims, and that no California court

has recognized common law claims for harassment. (Defs.’ Reply at

11.) “Because the California Supreme Court has not addressed this

question, . . . [this Court would have to] ‘predict how the highest

state court would decide the issue . . .’” Walker v. City of

Lakewood, 272 F. 3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nat’l Labor

Relations Bd. v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

However, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as

a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by

procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” United

Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Therefore,

“as a matter of comity” and to provide the parties with “a

surer-footed reading of applicable law,” the Court declines to

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continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims. Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims are dismissed

without prejudice as of the date on which this order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 27, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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