Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02188/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02188-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JON LLOYD HOUSTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

GREGORY SOKOLOV et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-2188 CKD P (TEMP)

ORDER

Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These 

Case 2:15-cv-02188-CKD Document 6 Filed 11/18/15 Page 1 of 7
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payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2).

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Case 2:15-cv-02188-CKD Document 6 Filed 11/18/15 Page 2 of 7
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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

In the present case, plaintiff has identified as defendants Medical Director Gregory 

Sokolov and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department Jail Psychiatric Services. In his 

complaint, plaintiff alleges that he requested medication for his schizophrenia, but Psychiatric 

Services at Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center (“RCCC”) denied his request. According to 

plaintiff, he had previously received the medication for two years at RCCC, so either Psychiatric 

Services prescribed him the wrong medication back then, or it is denying him proper medication 

now. Plaintiff claims that the defendants have violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. 

In terms of relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Compl. at 3-4.)

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DISCUSSION

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 

complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to 

the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his 

claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended 

complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must allege facts demonstrating how 

the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal constitutional or statutory 

rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The amended complaint must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362; May 

v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 

268.

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of additional deficiencies. As an initial 

matter, it is not clear whether and to what extent defendant Sokolov was involved in any alleged 

deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Insofar as plaintiff has sued defendant Sokolov 

because he supervises the medical department at RCCC, as noted above, supervisory personnel 

are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of 

respondeat superior. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that a supervisory defendant may be held 

liable under § 1983 only “‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

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conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)). In this case, it does not appear 

from plaintiff’s allegations that defendant Sokolov was personally involved in the alleged

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Thus, if plaintiff wishes to proceed against this 

supervisory defendant, he will need to allege facts in his amended complaint clarifying the causal 

connection between the defendant and his alleged constitutional deprivations.

Also, the court notes that the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department Jail Psychiatric 

Services is not a proper defendant in this action. In determining who to name as defendant(s) in 

this action, plaintiff should consider who he believes has denied him adequate mental health care

for his schizophrenia. For example, if a specific doctor at RCCC has refused to provide him with

the medication he believes is necessary to treat his mental health condition, plaintiff should 

consider naming him or her as the defendant or one of the defendants.

Turning now to plaintiff’s substantive claims, if plaintiff elects to proceed in this action by 

filing an amended complaint, he is advised that to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on 

inadequate mental health care, he must allege facts showing defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference to serious mental health needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Doty v. 

County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (“deliberate indifference” standard also 

applies in cases involving the adequacy of mental health care in prisons). In the Ninth Circuit, a 

deliberate indifference claim has two components: 

First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by 

demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This 

second prong – defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent – is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) 

harm caused by the indifference. Indifference “may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.” (internal citations omitted)

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 

1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to an 

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inmate’s serious mental health needs, the prisoner must show that ‘the official [knew] of and 

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health.”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 

(1994). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that, in applying the deliberate indifference standard, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the 

indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or 

‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). In addition, mere differences of 

opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff as to the proper course of treatment for a 

medical condition do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 988 

(9th Cir. 2012); Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. 

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Finally, delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. See 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. To establish a deliberate indifference claim arising from a delay in 

providing medical care, however, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the delay was harmful. 

See Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 

200 (9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985). In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 

provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 

plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim 

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Sheriff of Sacramento 

County filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number 

assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an amended 

complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be 

dismissed without prejudice.

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil 

rights action.

Dated: November 17, 2015

ec

hous2188.14a

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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