Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02090/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02090-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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In California, CSK Auto, Inc. operates under the name 1

“Kragen Auto Parts.” 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MELISSA WHEELER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CSK AUTO, INC., and DOES 1-

100, Inclusive,

Defendants.

No. CIV. S 03-2090 MCE GGH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Melissa Wheeler, a former employee of Defendant

CSK Auto, Inc. (“CSK”), challenges the events surrounding her 1

termination by CSK through the present lawsuit. Plaintiff raises

five causes of action in her complaint: (1) sex discrimination

under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), (2)

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

In 1998, when requesting a transfer, Wheeler signed a 3

second at-will employment provision that was part of the

application for employment. (Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 8).

2

wrongful termination (breach of contract), (3) wrongful

termination in violation of public policy, (4) defamation, and

(5) failure to compensate all hours worked.

Wheeler originally filed her complaint in state court. CSK

removed to the case to this Court based on diversity of

citizenship under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b). Presently before

the Court is CSK’s motion for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, for summary adjudication. For the reasons stated

below, CSK’s motion for summary judgment is granted.2

BACKGROUND

1. At-will Employment

On July 27, 1997, CSK hired Wheeler as a cashier at its

Fairfield, California store. Wheeler’s application for employment

included a provision, which she signed, acknowledging that she

would be an at-will employee and that either she or CSK could

terminate her employment at any time and with or without cause.3

(Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 9). The application’s at-will provision

also stated that employment terms could only be changed by a

written agreement with CSK’s president. (Wheeler Dep. Exhibits

7,9). 

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Conduct of Associates is a brief description of CSK’s 4

polices and procedures. 

3

Once hired, Wheeler attended an orientation meeting where

she received a copy of CSK’s Conduct of Associates along with 4

the Associate Handbook. The Conduct of Associates included a

brief description of CSK’s at-will employment policy. The

Associate Handbook also included the at-will employment policy as

well as a form that employees are required to sign acknowledging

that their employment with CSK is at-will. Wheeler signed this

form and a checklist acknowledging that she had received a copy

of the Conduct of Associates and the Associate Handbook and that

a supervisor had thoroughly discussed the policies contained

therein. (Wheeler Dep. 121:16-122:3; Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 10). 

In April of 2001, CSK promoted Wheeler to store manager at

its Antioch, California store. In March 2003, Wheeler was

transferred to CSK’s Fulton/Cottage store in Sacramento,

California. As store manager, Wheeler was responsible for

supervising, training, hiring, and firing clerks. In particular,

Wheeler was responsible for training each new hire on the

materials contained in CSK’s new hire packet. This packet

included CSK’s Associate Handbook and the Conduct of Associates,

which, as enumerated above, set forth CSK’s policy of at-will

employment. Wheeler was also responsible for obtaining the signed

acknowledgment form of CSK’s at-will policy from each new

employee.

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2. CSK’s Sick Leave Policy

CSK provides sick leave, vacation time, and personal days

for its employees. Sick leave and personal days are

distinguishable from vacation time in that they are not vested

benefits and are not paid out to employees upon termination.

CSK’s sick leave policy states that sick leave is only to be used

“when an injury of the associate prevents the associate from

coming to work.” (Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 4; Adam Decl. ¶15; Roscoe

Decl. ¶5). The sick leave policy is included in CSK Operations

Manual and is made available to employees online. (Wheeler Dep.

34:5-15, 35: 13-16; Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 4).

While employed as store manager at CSK’s Fulton/Cottage

store in Sacramento, it is undisputed that Wheeler used sick

leave to supplement employees’ hours for non-illness related

absences. On Sunday June 8, 2003, Wheeler called Leonard (“Skip”)

Shields, her First Assistant Manager, and asked if he could

assist her boyfriend, Francisco Mejia, in repairing her car.

Shields agreed to help Mejia repair Wheeler’s car that day but

they were unable to finish the repair. Shields offered to

complete the repair on his next scheduled day off but Mejia could

not secure that day off from work. Wheeler then offered Shields

Monday, June 9, 2003, off work so Shields could help Mejia finish

repairing her car.

Wheeler used sick leave to pay Shields for the eight hours

of work on Monday, June 9, 2003 that Shields missed while he was

assisting Mejia in repairing her car. Later that week, on June

12, 2003, Wheeler again used sick leave to supplement Shields’

hours after Shields attended a training meeting. Wheeler asked

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Shields if he wanted to go home early because another employee

had requested additional hours. Wheeler then gave Shields the

night off and paid him five hours of sick leave.

Wheeler admits that when an employee took time off for a

non-illness related reason she would exhaust the employee’s

personal days and sick leave before using vacation time. (Wheeler

Dep. 152:15-153:2). Wheeler also admits that she knew that

employees would lose their personal days and sick leave if they

did not use them. (Wheeler Dep. 152:17-23).

3. CSK Investigation on Wheeler’s Use of Sick Leave

Wheeler’s practice of using sick leave to pay employees for

non-illness related time off was brought to CSK’s attention after

an employee requested and was denied a sick day. Steve McCall,

the Fulton/Cottage store’s Assistant Manager, called Wheeler on

June 10, 2003 to request the day off because he had injured his

arm over the weekend. Wheeler denied McCall’s request.

On June 12, 2003, McCall overheard a conversation between

two employees who stated that Wheeler had given Shields Monday,

June 9, 2003 off so that Shields could assist Mejia in repairing

her car and that she had used sick leave to compensate Shields

for his time off. McCall made a complaint against Wheeler to

CSK’s Regional Human Resource Manager Bret Adam based on his

belief that he had been denied the day off because Shields had

received June 9 off.

Adam and CSK loss prevention agent, Dave Fullerton,

conducted an investigation into Wheeler’s use of sick leave. Adam

and Fullerton interviewed Wheeler as well as McCall and Shields.

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In addition to confirming his earlier allegations, McCall

informed Adam and Fuller that Wheeler had been supplementing his

regular work hours with sick leave when his hours were cut back

due to slow business.

In her interview, Wheeler admitted that she had used sick

leave to supplement employees’ hours for non-illness related time

off. (Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 14; Adam Decl. ¶13). Wheeler also

admitted to paying Shields eight hours of sick leave for the day

he missed work to help Mejia fix her car and for the day he left

early after a training meeting (Wheeler Dep. 148:21-149:13;

Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 14; Adam Decl. ¶¶11-13). 

In his interview, Shields confirmed that Wheeler gave him

Monday June 9, 2003 off work so that he could help Mejia repair

Wheeler’s car and that Wheeler had paid him eight hours of sick

leave for that day. (Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 14; Adam Decl. ¶¶10,

12). Shields also confirmed that Wheeler had paid him five hours

of sick leave for the evening of June 12, 2003 that she had given

him off work. (Wheeler Dep. Exhibit 14; Adam Decl. ¶¶10, 12).

On July 3, 2003, Adam and Fullerton, along with District

Manager Phillip Kuhn, Divisional Asset Protection Manager Jay

Plassmeyer, Regional Vice President Ken Roscoe, Senior Human

Resources Manager Sonya Granillo-Cathey, and Assistant General

Counsel James Wigle reviewed the investigation report and

discussed the appropriate level of discipline for Wheeler. After

receiving input and recommendations from the Legal, Human

Resources, and Loss Prevention Departments, Roscoe and Kuhn

decided to terminate Wheeler’s employment for misuse of CSK’s

sick leave policy and for falsifying documents. CSK also

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Unless otherwise stated, all references to “Rule” or 5

“Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

7

terminated Shields and McCall for misuse of CSK’s sick leave

policy and for falsifying documents.

STANDARD

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962). According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),5

summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material

fact exists. The moving party may demonstrate that no genuine

issue of material fact exists by showing “an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. V. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies these

requirements of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the party resisting

the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). In evaluating evidence at the summary

judgment stage, the court does not weigh conflicting evidence.

See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

626, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The standard

that applies to a motion for summary adjudication is the same as

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that which applies to a motion for summary judgment. Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

ANALYSIS

1. Failure to Timely Oppose Motion for Summary Judgment

Local Rule 78-230(c) requires that the opposition to a

motion be filed “not less than fourteen (14) days preceding the

noticed . . . hearing date.” The Court has discretion to

disregard papers filed after a filing deadline. See Pfeil v.

Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

1107 (1986)(“The filing deadline . . . assures the court . . .

that its decisions will be accurate because the issues will have

been fully briefed”), cited with approval by Ashton-Tate Corp. v.

Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, Rule 56(e)

requires the party opposing summary judgment to present evidence

showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See also E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 56-260 (requiring the party opposing a motion for

summary judgment to file “all evidentiary documents cited in the

opposing papers.”).

The hearing for CSK’s motion for summary judgment was

originally set for June 6, 2005. On May 17, 2005, Wheeler

requested a continuance and on May 23, 2005 the hearing date was

reset for June 20, 2005. On June 16, 2005, four days before the

hearing date and ten days after opposition was due, Wheeler filed

an opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to

her claim that she was not compensated for all hours worked. On

June 17, 2005, Wheeler filed her response to Defendant’s

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undisputed facts in support of the motion for summary judgment.

On June 20, 2005, the date set for the hearing on the motion for

summary judgment, Wheeler filed an additional opposition

addressing the sex discrimination and wrongful termination based

on violation of public policy claims. In addition to her untimely

filings, Wheeler failed to file any of the evidentiary documents

cited in her opposition papers.

Because Wheeler neglected to adequately and timely oppose

CSK’s motion for summary judgment, the Court strikes the

oppositions filed June 16 and 20, and the response to the

statement of undisputed material facts filed June 17, 2005. 

On June 9, 2005, citing the Court’s December 10, 2003

Scheduling Order, CSK requested that the Court treat Wheeler’s

failure to oppose as consent to the motion. (CSK’s Reply at 2).

Irrespective of Plaintiff’s failure to submit a timely

opposition, however, the Court nonetheless cannot grant summary

judgment in favor of the defense unless it deems it appropriate

to do so following examination of the evidence and arguments

submitted. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir.

2003). The Scheduling Order provides that failure to timely

oppose a summary judgment motion “may result in the granting of

that motion if the movant shifts the burden to the nonmovant to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact remains for

trial.” (Scheduling Order, Dec. 10, 2003 at 5) (emphasis added).

Thus, even if the nonmoving party has failed to timely oppose,

the Court must nevertheless determine whether the moving party

has met its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of

material fact for trial. Martinez, 323 F.3d at 1182-83. 

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 California has adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden- 6

shifting test for discrimination claims. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l,

Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (2000).

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2. Plaintiff’s Individual Claims

a. Sex Discrimination

When analyzing a discrimination claim under FEHA, the

allocation of burdens of proof and order of analysis follow the

three step pattern established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiff must first 6

establish a prima facie case by showing that 1) she belongs to a

protected class; 2) that she was performing her job

satisfactorily; 3) that she was terminated, rejected for

employment, or otherwise subjected to a tangible employment

action; and 4) that this took place under circumstances giving

rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Id. at 802;

see also Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). 

If the Plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case

as outlined above, the burden shifts to the Defendant to

articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

adverse action taken. McDonnnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the

Defendant satisfies that burden, the Plaintiff must then show

that the reason proffered by the Defendant was merely a pretext

for discrimination. Id. at 804. 

Wheeler claims she was terminated because of her sex. Her

claim is based on allegations that male store managers used sick

leave in the same manner she did but were not terminated, that

only three out of nineteen store managers in the district where

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she was employed were female, that CSK paid higher salaries to

male employees than it did for similarly situated female

employees, that CSK did not hire females for certain job

positions, and that CSK used a higher standard and additional

criteria in its promotion of female store managers. (Wheeler

Compl. ¶51). 

CSK asserts that Wheeler cannot meet her burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. It claims that

Wheeler cannot show that she was performing her job

satisfactorily or that she was treated differently than other

male store managers. However, the burden of establishing a prima

facie case is not an onerous one. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. CSK

has not shown that, prior to its investigation into her use of

sick leave, Wheeler was not performing her job satisfactorily. In

addition, Wheeler’s declaration that she believed male store

managers were treated differently is sufficient to satisfy the

low prima facie burden. 

We next turn to whether CSK has met its burden of showing

that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

terminating Plaintiff. CSK has shown that it had an established

sick leave policy. Sick leave was to be used to compensate

employees for illness related absences. Wheeler violated this

policy by using sick leave to compensate employees for leaving

work early and taking days off for non-illness related reasons.

Wheeler admitted she used sick leave in this manner in both her

deposition and throughout CSK’s investigation into the matter.

CSK terminated Wheeler after a thorough investigation determined

that she had violated CSK’s sick leave policy. As a result of

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 In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant addresses 7

Plaintiff’s disparate pay claim in the context of gender bias.

However, the Court need not address this issue since Plaintiff’s

complaint of sex discrimination is solely based on her

termination. (Complaint ¶¶47, 51, 53, 54). 

12

that same investigation, CSK also terminated two male employees,

Shields and McCall, for violating the sick leave policy and for

falsifying time records.

CSK provided enough evidence to meet its burden by showing

that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

terminating Wheeler. There is no evidence that Wheeler was

terminated for anything other than misusing CSK’s sick leave

policy and falsifying documents. Thus, the burden shifted to

Wheeler to show that CSK’s reason for terminating her employment

was pretextual. Because Wheeler failed to raise pretext in

opposition, she did not meet her burden. Accordingly, grant of

summary judgment on Wheeler’s claim for gender discrimination is

appropriate.7

b. Wrongful Termination (Breach of Contract)

Most California cases have held that an express at-will

employment provision cannot be contradicted by proof of an

implied contrary understanding. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24

Cal. 4th 317, 340 n.10 (2000). Thus, an at-will provision in an

express written agreement stating that the employer can terminate

the employee at any time with or without cause cannot normally be

overcome by proof of an implied agreement to terminate for good

cause. Starzynski v. Capital Public Radio, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 4th

33, 37 (2001).

On two separate occasions Wheeler signed an express at-will

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employment provision that was part of CSK’s employment

application. California courts disagree as to whether an at-will

provision in an application for employment constitutes a valid

express contract. Compare Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp., 230

Cal. App. 3d 1550, 1555 (1991), with Wallis v. Farmers Group,

Inc., 220 Cal. App. 3d 718, 730 (1990). However, Wheeler also

signed the at-will acknowledgment form contained in CSK’s

Associate Handbook given to her after she was hired. Moreover, as

store manager, she was responsible for ensuring that new hires

signed the at-will acknowledgment form. 

Wheeler claims that she had an implied contract of

employment with CSK that the termination of her employment could

only be for “good cause.” Wheeler bases her contention on the

fact that she received several promotions during the time she was

employed by CSK. In addition, she claims that policies in the CSK

operations manual created self-imposed limitations for

discharging employees, thereby implying termination only for

“good cause.” (Wheeler’s Complaint ¶11). 

CSK established that it had an express at-will employment

agreement with Wheeler. CSK has provided the Court with three

documents signed by Wheeler acknowledging that her employment was

at-will and could be terminated at any time with or without

cause. Thus, Wheeler cannot contradict this express agreement

with proof of an implied agreement to terminate for good cause.

However, even if there had been implied contract to terminate for

good cause, good cause was present. Wheeler has not established

that her termination was arbitrary or pretextual. Accordingly,

summary judgment on Wheeler’s claim for breach of contract is

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also appropriate. 

c. Wrongful Termination (Violation of Public Policy)

An employer’s right to terminate an at-will employee is

subject to limits imposed by public policy. Foley v. Interactive

Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 665 (1988). Wheeler’s wrongful

termination claim in violation of public policy is based on her

sex discrimination claim. Because Wheeler failed to meet her

burden on her sex discrimination claim, there is no basis for her

public policy violation claim and grant of summary judgment is

appropriate. 

d. Defamation

To establish a defamation claim, Wheeler must show that the

communication complained of was published, false, and

unprivileged. Cal. Civ. Code § 46. Truth and privilege are both

defenses to a defamation claim. Campanelli v. Regents of Univ. of

California, 44 Cal. App. 4th 572, 582-83 (1996); Cal. Civ. Code §

47(c). 

Wheeler’s defamation complaint stems from a statement Don, a

human resources manager for CSK, made to Chuck Amalong, a CSK

district manager, who then relayed the statement to Wheeler’s

sister, also a CSK employee. Wheeler claims Don told Amalong, who

then told her sister, that she was terminated for violating

company policy and for having an associate work on her

car.(Wheeler Dep. 295:16-296:3). 

CSK claims that Wheeler’s defamation claim must fail because

the statements regarding her termination were true. CSK further

contends that the statements are privileged under California

Civil Code § 47(c). (A communication made by an employee to

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another employee is subject to a qualified privilege if it is

made, without malice, to a person interested in the

communication. See Deaile v. General Tel. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d

841, 846-47 (1974). However, the conditional privilege can be

defeated if the plaintiff specifically alleges malice. Williams

v. Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 3d 745, 752 (1982).

CSK provided sufficient evidence to show that the

communication was true: Wheeler was terminated for violating

CSK’s sick leave policy. In addition, because the communication

was between two CSK employees who had an interest in the

circumstances of Wheeler’s termination, the communication also

falls within a qualified privilege. Moreover, Wheeler cannot

defeat the qualified privilege because she did not specifically

allege malice in her complaint and failed to allege it in

opposition. Accordingly, summary judgment on Wheeler’s claim for

defamation is also appropriate. 

f. Failure to Compensate All Hours Worked

Wheeler claims that CSK did not fully compensate her for the

hours she worked on her last pay period. CSK contends that it did

not receive an accurate account of Wheeler’s hours when it issued

her last pay check but that, once it became aware of the

inaccuracy, it promptly paid Wheeler the amount she was owed.

(Adam Decl. ¶16). Because there is no opposition as to whether

Wheeler was fully compensated, summary adjudication on her claim

for failure to compensate all hours worked is appropriate. 

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, CSK’s motion is GRANTED in all

respects. Judgment shall accordingly be entered in favor of CSK

and the Clerk is directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 10, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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