Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01325/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01325-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUSTAFFA A. MANSOUR,

Booking No. #16137475,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CDCR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01325-AJB-LL

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED 

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO 

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

[ECF No. 21]

Mustaffa A. Mansour (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently serving his sentence in 

local custody pursuant to California’s Proposition 57, while incarcerated at the San Diego 

County Sheriff Department’s East Mesa Detention Facility (“EMDF”) in San Diego, 

California, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eastern 

District of California on May 24, 2019. (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 1.)

I. Procedural Background

On July 17, 2019, the Honorable Edmund F. Brennan transferred the case to the 

Southern District of California in the interests of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

(See ECF No. 8.) Judge Brennan did not rule on Plaintiff’s pending Motion to Proceed In 

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Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 5), or conduct the 

mandatory initial screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and/or § 1915A before the transfer.

Therefore, on September 18, 2019, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, 

screened his Complaint, and dismissed it sua sponte for failing to state a claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 15.) The Court granted Plaintiff

45 days leave in which to file an amended complaint that addressed all the deficiencies of 

pleading it identified. (Id. at 6-11); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to 

amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be 

cured.”) (citations omitted)).

On November 5, 2019, just as his amended complaint was due, Plaintiff filed a letter 

addressed to the Court, repeating some of the same allegations included in his original 

pleading, and requesting an extension of time in which to amend. (See ECF No. 17 at 1-3.)

On November 12, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request, reminding him of the need 

to cure his previous pleading’s deficiencies, and directing him to “simply allege the facts 

that entitle him to relief” and identify a legal cause of action that might plausibly entitle

him to relief. (Id. at 3.)

In response, Plaintiff filed another letter addressed to the Court, see ECF No. 20, 

followed by another adding “a little more about my complaint.” (See ECF No. 21). The 

Court will now liberally construe these two documents together as Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint. See Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A pro se 

complaint must be liberally construed, since a pro se complaint, however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)

As Plaintiff knows, the Court is obligated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

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Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, 

or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of 

parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” at the time of filing “as soon 

as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under the 

PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are 

immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27 (citing 

§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

A. Standard of Review

“The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits 

need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 

2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). 

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are well-pleaded 

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 

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court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of 

misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an 

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in 

civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Allegations in Plaintiff’s Letters / Amended Complaint

Plaintiff continues to claim, as he did in his original Complaint, that he is serving a 

state local prison term for a “non-violent offense under AB 109 PC 1170(h)” and that San 

Diego County Sheriff William D. Gore, “State of California law makers,” the former 

Governor, and CDCR are denying him equal protection because the county jails are 

overcrowded, and do not offer the same rehabilitative programs, contact visits, or “33%” 

custody credits available to prisoners who were not sentenced under “Prop. 57.”1 (See ECF 

No. 20 at 1-5; ECF No. 21 at 1-3.)

 

1 Proposition 57, otherwise known as the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011, 

“significantly change[d] the punishment for some felony convictions” in California. People 

v. Scott, 58 Cal. 4th 1415, 1418 (2014); see also Mainez v. Gore, 2017 WL 6453595, at *1 

(S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2017). As relevant here, the Act shifted responsibility for housing and 

supervising certain felons from the state to the individual counties. See Cal. Penal Code 

§ 1170(h). Thus, “once probation has been denied, [California] felons who are eligible to 

be sentenced under realignment ... serve their terms of imprisonment in local custody 

rather than state prison.” People v. Cruz, 207 Cal. App. 4th 664, 671 (2012).

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt 

v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 

442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

D. Equal Protection

Plaintiff’s amended pleadings continue to suffer from the same deficiencies as his 

original Complaint. Specifically, his suit still appears to challenge the application of 

Proposition 57 to the circumstances of his confinement and his commitment to local 

custody as a non-violent offender, and he continues to object to the denial of the “33%”

custody credits and to the lack of “early release” opportunities available to “offenders in 

CDCR” as a violation of equal protection. (See Compl. at 3, 6.)2

 

2 After Proposition 57 was passed in November 2016, “the CDCR issued new regulations 

that governed the ability of inmates to earn custody credits to advance their parole dates.” 

Rodriguez v. Kernan, 2019 WL 3425335, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2019) (citing People v. 

Contreras, 4 Cal.5th 349, 374 (2018), as modified (Apr. 11, 2018)). Newly implemented 

section 3043.2, entitled Rehabilitative Achievement Credit, provides that “‘[o]ne day of 

credit for every two days of incarceration (33.3%) shall be awarded to an inmate sentenced 

under the Three Strikes Law, under subdivision (c) of section 1170.12 of the Penal Code, 

or under subdivision (c) or (e) of section 667 of the Penal Code, who is not serving a term 

for a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of section 667.5 of the Penal Code.’” 

Mustafaa v. Davis, No. 19-CV-04105-EMC, 2019 WL 6771794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 

2019) (quoting 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3043.2(b)(3)) (emphasis original). The award of such 

good conduct time credits “shall advance an inmate’s release date if sentenced to a 

determinate term or advance an inmate’s initial parole hearing date pursuant to subdivision 

(a)(2) of section 3041 of the Penal Code if sentenced to an indeterminate term with the 

possibility of parole.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3043.2(b). Thus, while Plaintiff does not 

specify whether his prison sentence is determinate or indeterminate, and does not expressly

seek either his early release or to advance his parole date, he does appear to claim that the 

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The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires only that persons 

who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 

Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 

1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008).

As the Court noted in its previous screening Order, the Constitution does not require 

individuals who are, in fact, differently situated, to be treated equally under the law. 

Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (citations 

omitted); Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) 

(“Dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection). 

Thus, absent threshold allegations that Plaintiff is similarly situated to others who allegedly 

receive what he perceives as more favorable treatment, he fails to state a plausible equal 

protection claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Michael M., 450 

U.S. at 469 (citations omitted). “The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid 

classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently 

persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); 

Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1005-06 (C.D. Cal. 2013).

 

Fourteenth Amendment entitles him to the same § 3043.2 custody credit earning 

opportunities as a “CDCR offender.” (See ECF No. 21 at 3.) Most courts have concluded 

that this type of claim, while it could potentially affect the timing of a parole release 

consideration hearing, still falls outside of the “core of habeas corpus” and must be pursued 

(if at all) in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than in a habeas action. See 

Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 645 

(2017); Blanco v. Asuncion, No. 18CV2005-JLS(KSC), 2019 WL 2144452, at *3 (S.D. 

Cal. May 16, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Blanco v. Diaz, No. 

18-CV-2005 JLS (KSC), 2019 WL 3562215 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2019), reconsideration 

denied, No. 18-CV-2005 JLS (KSC), 2020 WL 619241 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020); Bisel v. 

Kernan, No. 1:18-CV-00090-DAD-JLT PC, 2019 WL 1508062, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 

2019).

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Thus, to state an Equal Protection claim, the Court advised Plaintiff that he must 

allege that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his membership in 

a protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Serrano v. 

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). But Plaintiff still fails to make any such 

allegation, and “neither prisoners nor ‘persons convicted of crimes’ constitute a suspect 

class for equal protection purposes.” United States v. Whitlock, 639 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 

2011); Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[P]risoners are not a 

suspect class....”); United States v. Smith, 818 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[P]ersons 

convicted of crimes are not a suspect class.”).

The Court further advised Plaintiff that if no suspect class or fundamental right is 

implicated, equal protection claims like his are subject to a rational basis review. See 

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); United States v. Juvenile Male, 

670 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012); Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 

1998) (“Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or implicates a 

suspect classification, to meet constitutional challenge the law in question needs only some 

rational relation to a legitimate state interest.”). In the prison context, the right to equal 

protection is viewed through a standard of reasonableness; that is, whether the actions of 

prison officials are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Walker v. 

Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

In his amended pleadings, Plaintiff continues to claim he is being denied “equal 

treatment” because he is not provided the same opportunities to participate in substance

abuse, behavior modification, and rehabilitative job training programs as “CDCR inmates,”

and unlike them, is ineligible for contact visitation privileges. See ECF No. 20 at 3-4, ECF 

No. 21 at 2-3. But these purported differences nevertheless fail to state an equal protection 

claim because Plaintiff still does not explain how he is similarly situated to CDCR inmates

and does not allege there is no rational basis for treating prisoners who have been sentenced 

pursuant to Proposition 57 differently. “The Constitution permits qualitative differences in 

meting out punishments and there is no requirement that two persons convicted of the same 

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offense receive identical sentences.” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).

“Inmates are not entitled to identical treatment as other inmates merely because they are 

all inmates.” McQuery v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834–35 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Norvell v. 

Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963)). 

Therefore, mere allegations of inequality are insufficient to establish a violation of 

the equal protection clause. Id.; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1973) 

(applying rational basis review to state statutory scheme that treated inmates held in county 

facilities differently than those held in state facilities); see also Sigur v. California Dep’t 

of Corr. & Rehab., 2018 WL 2734918, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2018) (dismissing claims 

that defendants treated non-violent sex offenders differently under Proposition 57 pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A on equal protection grounds); Mason v. Holt, 2016 WL 6136076, at 

*7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2016) (dismissing finding Proposition 57 prisoner’s equal protection 

challenge with regard to eligibility for work credits because the distinctions made between 

county and prison custody credits as a result of realignment are “not arbitrary and bear a 

rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.”); People v. Lara, 54 Cal. 4th 896, 

906 (2012) (“[P]risoners who serve their pretrial detention before ... [Proposition 57’s] 

effective date, and those who serve their detention thereafter, are not similarly situated.”);

Cruz, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 680 (holding that “[t]he distinction drawn by section 1170, 

subdivision (h)(6), between felony offenders sentenced before, and those sentenced on or 

after, October 1, 2011, does not violate equal protection.”).

For these reasons, and based on this precedent, the Court finds Plaintiff’s amended 

pleadings continue to fail to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and must 

be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004; see also Stephens v. Kunz, No. CV 19-

1008-AB (KS), 2019 WL 6649021, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2019), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. CV 19-1008-AB (KS), 2019 WL 6700938 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 

6, 2019) (dismissing prisoner’s Proposition 57 equal protection claims pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) without leave to amend because he “presented no factual allegations 

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indicating that Defendant treated similarly situated inmates differently from [him], much 

less any factual allegations to support a plausible inference that any difference in treatment 

had no rational basis.”).

E. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his pleading 

deficiencies, and while given both the opportunity and an extension of time in order to 

address them in an amended pleading, has nevertheless failed to do so. Therefore, the Court 

concludes further attempts to amend would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 

759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the 

denial of ... leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 

1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently 

failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny 

leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration 

in original)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without further 

leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be 

taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court 

to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2020

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