Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00501/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00501-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard Shupe et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-00501-TUC-RCC (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs Richard and Maria Shupe’s (the Shupes) 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 88) pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., and 

Motion for Default Judgment as to JP Morgan Chase Bank NA (Doc. 96). Defendant 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) has filed responses in opposition (Doc. 112) and 

(Doc. 99), respectively. Plaintiffs have filed replies accordingly (Docs. 116, 111). 

Also pending before the Court is Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 115), Plaintiffs’ response (Doc. 116) and Defendant’s reply (Doc. 128). 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 10.) 

For reasons stated herein, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiffs’ 

Motion for Default Judgment be denied; that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

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Judgment be denied, and that Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be 

granted in part and denied in part. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 31, 2011 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint with the Superior Court, 

County of Pima, State of Arizona. On August 12, 2011 Defendant removed the case from 

the Pima County Superior Court to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On March 

29, 2013, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 52), 

and, on May 7, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint (Amended 

Complaint) with the Court. (Doc. 94.) 

 The Shupes allege that their residential phone numbers were placed on the 

National “Do-Not-Call Registry” (DNCR) prior to numerous calls made by Chase to the 

Shupe’s residential telephone using an auto/predictive dialing system. (Doc. 94, ¶¶ 3-4, 

20.) The Shupes further allege that the calls were made by Chase for the purpose of 

soliciting additional mortgage products that Chase had to offer, that the Shupes had 

terminated all business relationships with Chase, and that Chase failed to cease 

communications with the Shupes despite being told do so. (Id., ¶¶ 10, 12, and Count I.) 

The Shupes assert claims against Chase as follows: (1) violation of the TCPA; (2) 

violation of A.R.S. § 44-1282; (3) invasion of privacy; (4) harassment; and (5) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. (Id., at 7-9.) The Shupes request relief in the form of 

compensatory damages, statutory damages, punitive damages and attorney’s fees. (Id., at 

9-12.) 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Default Judgment 

 The Shupes moved for default judgment on May 9, 2013 (Doc. 96), alleging that 

Defendant had failed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint they had filed with the 

Court on January 2, 2013 (Doc. 52) and served on Defendant by certified mail on April 8, 

2013. 

 Defendant opposes the motion (Doc. 99), noting that Plaintiffs had served a copy 

of the motion to amend with redline/strikeout version of the amended complaint, but that 

Defendant had not been served with the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a)(3), 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 The Shupes respond that “immediately upon the court granting the Plaintiffs 

motion to amend their complaint, the Plaintiffs filed such, and then mailed copy of such 

to the defense attorney” (Doc. 111). 

 As correctly pointed out by Defendant, there is no basis for default because 

Defendant was never properly served with the Amended Complaint. A review of the 

record in this case demonstrates that the Shupes’ motion to amend was granted on March 

29, 2013. (Doc. 71.) Plaintiffs were directed to “file” and “serve the Amended Complaint 

on Defendant” within 14 days from the date of the Order. Id. Plaintiffs failed to comply 

with the Court’s order to file the Amended Complaint. See Order April 29, 2013 (Doc. 

86). When Plaintiffs finally attempted to comply with the Court’s Order by filing a 

“Compliance to Court’s Order: Amended Complaint Served” (Doc. 94), the attachment 

still contained a redline/strikeout version, and not a fully amended version of the 

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Complaint. See also Order (Doc. 136)(acknowledging Plaintiffs’ error and directing 

Defendant to accept bracketed portions of the Amended Complaint as the new portions of 

the complaint.) 

 Accordingly, because it is evident that Defendant was never served with the 

Amended Complaint prior to the Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, the Magistrate 

Judge recommends that the District Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. 

B. Motions for Summary Judgment 

 The Shupes move for partial summary judgment as to Counts I, II and III of the 

Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56(c), arguing that there 

is no genuine issue of material fact and the Shupes are entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law because: 1) Chase used a prerecorded message to “knowingly” or “willfully” call the 

Shupes’ residential telephone number, which was on the DNCR, using a prerecorded 

message, without authorization, 108 times, thereby establishing a violation of the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., and A.R.S. § 

44-1282; and 2) without an established business relationship with the Shupes these calls 

form the basis for a claim of invasion of privacy under the Restatement (Second) of 

Torts. 

Chase moves for Summary Judgment as to all counts in the Amended Complaint 

arguing: 1) that the calls did not violate the TCPA because they were not telemarketing 

calls and, additionally, the calls were exempt as they were made in an effort to collect a 

debt; 2) since the calls are not proscribed by the TCPA, they are not unlawful under 

A.R.S. § 44-1282, and, additionally, the Arizona law applies only to intrastate calls; 3) 

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the Shupes have failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy under the relevant law; and 

4) the claims of harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress should be 

dismissed as the Shupes have acknowledged in their own recitations to the Court. 

C. Summary Judgment Standard 

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek summary 

judgment where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate 

only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 23 (1986). Under summary 

judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis 

for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which 

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact 

in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the 

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the non-moving party. Id. at 250; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 

1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(c) provides that "[a] party asserting that a fact cannot 

be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of 

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materials in the record . . . or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the 

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact." An issue of fact must be genuine. Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 87 (1986). The opposing 

party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient 

that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' 

differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 

U.S. 253, 288 89 (1968). If the factual context makes the non-movant’s claim 

implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support its 

claim than would otherwise be necessary. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-movant’s position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence from which a fair minded jury could reasonably find 

for the non movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits or declarations, if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, the "trial court can 

only consider admissible evidence...." Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 

2002). The court should view the facts and draw reasonable inferences “in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.” Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (citation omitted). The ultimate question is whether the evidence 

"presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one 

sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 52. A 

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party cannot defeat summary judgment by producing a “mere scintilla of evidence to 

support its case.” City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th

Cir. 1992). 

D. Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

 The Shupes contend that Chase willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA and are 

entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Chase responds that the calls did not violate 

the TCPA because they were not telemarketing calls. In addition the calls were made in 

an effort to collect a debt, so they are exempt. Furthermore, Plaintiffs still had a credit 

card account with Chase, thus establishing an additional exception for contacting them 

based on the separate existing business relationship, which Plaintiffs did not terminate. 

 The TCPA prohibits callers from initiating “any telephone call to any residential 

telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the 

prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency 

purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the [Federal Communications] Commission 

under paragraph (2)(B).” The FCC has created two regulatory exemptions that Defendant 

argues are applicable to the calls in this case. First, the FCC exempts from the TCPA's 

statutory prohibition against prerecorded calls any call “made to any person with whom 

the caller has an established business relationship at the time the call is made[.]” 47 

C.F.R. 64.1200(a)(2)(iv). Second, the FCC exempts any call “made for a commercial 

purpose but does not include or introduce an unsolicited advertisement or constitute a 

telephone solicitation[.]” 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(a)(2)(iii). 

 The FCC has made clear that these two exemptions “apply where a third party 

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places a debt collection call on behalf of the company holding the debt.” In the Matter of 

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 

FCC Rcd. 8752, 8773, ¶ 39 (July 26, 1995). The FCC has also clarified that “all debt 

collection circumstances involve a prior or existing business relationship.” Id. at 8771–

72, ¶ 36. The FCC has explicitly stated that debt collection calls will be “covered by 

exemptions ... for commercial calls which do not transmit an unsolicited advertisement” 

In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 

7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8772, ¶ 39 (1992). In 2008, the FCC again confirmed that “calls solely 

for the purpose of debt collection are not telephone solicitations ...' and ‘calls regarding 

debt collection ... are not subject to the TCPA's separate restrictions on ‘telephone 

solicitations.’ ” See Meadows v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., 414 Fed. App'x 230, 236 

(11th Cir. 2011) (citing In Re Rules and Regulations Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 23 

F.C.C.R. 559, 565, ¶ 11 (Jan. 4, 2008)). 

 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant began calling their residential home on or about 

September 20, 2010, seeking to solicit alternative mortgage products and services from 

the Plaintiffs in addition to trying to collect an “alleged debt from the Plaintiffs.” (Doc. 

88, at 3-4.) Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on fifty calls presented in a call log 

submitted as Exhibit 6 to Plaintiffs’ statement of facts (Doc. 88, Attachment 1, Plaintiffs’ 

Separate Statement of Facts (PSOF) to support Plaintiffs’ claim.)1

 Chase objects to the 

 

1

 Plaintiffs also affirmed that they kept a handwritten call log of phone calls from Chase (see Affidavit of Richard Shupe (Doc. 117), ¶¶ 29-30; and Maria Shupe, ¶¶ 25-26) but did not attach these call logs as exhibits to their motion for partial summary judgment, and these are not the calls at issue in Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 

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phone records submitted by the Shupes to support the claim arguing that the records are 

inadmissible because they are unauthenticated, and lacking in explanation. See Reply in 

Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 128), at 2. The undersigned 

agrees with Defendant and will not consider the call logs. See Canada v. Blain's 

Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987)(A court may not consider 

unauthenticated documents on a motion for summary judgment.). 

 Because Plaintiffs’ motion seeks summary judgment on these fifty calls, and the 

Magistrate Judge finds Plaintiffs’ evidence inadmissible, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Judge deny Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 

judgment. 

 Defendant argues that summary judgment in favor of Chase is appropriate on 

Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims because the calls were not telemarketing calls, and, even if they 

were made outside of the context of mortgage servicing, Plaintiffs had a credit card 

account with chase which would have provided an additional exception for contacting 

them based on that separate existing business relationship. See Defendant’s Cross Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 115), at 5. 

 For purposes of the TCPA, the FCC has defined a “telephone solicitation” as “the 

initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or 

rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any 

person.” 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(f)(12). Chase has submitted evidence that the only calls made 

during the period in question (August 2010 – January 2011) were made in connection 

 judgment. See Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. 88), at 11, ¶ 5. 

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with servicing the mortgage loan for collection purposes, and not for marketing purposes. 

See Defendant’s Statement of Facts (DSOF) (Doc. 113) at ¶¶ 8-9, 15. 

 Plaintiff contends that these statements are not supported by call logs or 

transcripts, and that these calls were made for the purpose of selling optional mortgage 

products, and that the word “record” in Defendant’s factual statement is ambiguous as the 

records themselves are not presented for review. See Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants 

Controverted Facts & Separate Facts (PRDSOF) (Doc. 121) at ¶¶8-9, 15. 

 Defendant’s motion is properly supported by the affidavit of Assistant Vice 

President Jessica Garibay, and her examination of records that are kept in the usual 

course of Chase’s business. With regard to summary judgment, a party does not 

necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long 

as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). With respect to evidence submitted by 

affidavit, Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., requires that the affidavits “shall be made on personal 

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” 

 Ms. Garibay's affidavit testimony is based on her experience and knowledge as 

Assistant Vice President of Chase. Ms. Garibay personally examined system notes of 

calls made to the Shupes during the time period in questions, and researched Chase’s 

business records related to the Shupes’ mortgage and can properly testify that she 

confirmed that all calls made by Chase to the Shupes were for the purpose of attempting 

to collect the debt owed by the Shupes with respect to the promissory note secured by the 

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deed of trust, and that there was no record of any calls made for the purposes of 

marketing new products or services during the relevant time period. See In re Kaypro, 

218 F.3d 1070, 1075 (“Personal knowledge may be inferred from a declarant's 

position.”). 

 The FCC has unequivocally stated that “calls solely for the purpose of debt 

collection are not telephone solicitations and do not constitute telemarketing” and “calls 

regarding debt collection ... are not subject to the TCPA's separate restrictions on 

‘telephone solicitations.’ ” In The Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 565, ¶ 11 (Jan. 4, 2008); 

See also Meadows v. Franklin Collection Serv., 414 Fed. Appx. 230, 236 (11th Cir. 

2011)(“debt-collection circumstances are excluded from the TCPA’s coverage”). 

 Plaintiffs do not dispute that they borrowed $180,775.00 from Chase in 2006, and 

secured that loan with a deed of trust on real property (“the Property”). (DSOF ¶ 1). 

Plaintiffs take the position that under Arizona’s Anti-Deficiency Statutes, they no longer 

owed a debt after September, 2010, because they sent a letter to Defendants stating that 

they were abandoning the house and sent the keys to the bank. Plaintiffs assert that they 

owed no debt to the Defendant due to their “walk-away notice of default.” (Doc. 116, at 

8). After Plaintiff’s defaulted on the loan, a trustee’s sale of the Property was conducted 

in March 2011. (DSOF ¶¶ 2, 30) 

 “[I]n Arizona, non-judicial foreclosure sales, or trustees' sales,” are governed by 

A.R.S. §§ 33–801 to 33–821. Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz. 584 (2012). If a 

deed of trust which secures a purchase-money mortgage conforms to the requirements of 

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the state’s anti-deficiency protections, the holder of the note may not elect to waive the 

security and bring an action on the note; the holder must proceed with a non-judicial 

foreclosure through a trustee’s sale. See A.R.S. § 33-814(G); Baker v. Gardner, 160 

Ariz. 98, 103m 770 P.2d 766 (1989). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion that their debt to 

Chase was satisfied when they acknowledged default, their debt was not satisfied until 

completion of the trustee’s sale because Plaintiffs had the legal right, prior to the trustee’s 

sale, to cure the default and reinstate their contract and trust deed. See A.R.S. § 33-813. 

 Thus, calls made to service the debt owed to Defendant up until the time of the 

trustee’s sale are exempted from the TCPA. The affidavit submitted by Ms. Garibay 

establishes that no calls made during the period from August 2010 through January 2011 

were made for purposes other than to collect the debt owed by the Shupes with respect to 

the promissory note secured by the deed of trust. (Doc. 114, ¶¶ 6,7,8.) 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that Chase’s calls were not telephone 

solicitations, and recommends that the District Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion for partial 

summary judgment on the TCPA claim and grant summary judgment in favor of Chase 

on the TCPA claim. 

E. A.R.S. § 44-1282 

 Plaintiffs seek summary judgment as to claims under Arizona law, based on 

violations on the TCPA, arguing that “in establishing the elements for the TCPA, 

[Plaintiffs] have also established the same for A.R.S. [§] 44-1282.” Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 88) at 16. For the same reasons the Magistrate Judge 

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recommends denying Plaintiffs’ motion as to the TCPA claim, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends denying Plaintiffs’ motion as to the claim under A.R.S. § 42-1282. 

 Defendant argues that motion for summary judgment in favor of Chase should be 

granted because the calls made by Chase are permitted under the Arizona law, and, 

additionally, the Arizona law applies only to intrastate calls, and there is no evidence that 

Chase made any intrastate calls. 

 Arizona’s law, which prohibits solicitors to initiate telephone calls to numbers 

entered in the national do-not-call registry, expressly allows calls “that would be 

permitted by federal law or regulation relating to interstate telephone solicitation.” A.R.S. 

§44-1282 (A) & (B). As Defendant correctly asserts, since the calls are not proscribed by 

the TCPA, they are not unlawful under the Arizona statute. Because the calls are not 

unlawful, there is no need to determine if a factual dispute exists as to the origin of the 

calls. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny 

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim under A.R.S. § 44-

1282, and grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim under 

A.R.S. § 44-1282. 

F. Invasion of Privacy 

 The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized the invasion of privacy torts laid out 

in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A et seq., which include the tort of intrusion 

upon seclusion, see Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 338 (1989), 

and at least one Arizona Court of Appeals decision has applied the tort of intrusion upon 

seclusion. See Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 190 Ariz. 272, 279 (Ct.App.1997). The Arizona 

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courts generally follow the Restatement in the absence of Arizona authority on an issue. 

Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g. Co., 63 Ariz. 294 (1945); Campbell v. Westdahl, 148 Ariz. 

432 (Ct.App.1985). Consequently, we look to the Restatement for guidance regarding 

how the Arizona Supreme Court would resolve the Shupes’ claim. 

 The Restatement describes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as follows: “One 

who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 

another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 

his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Hart, 190 

Ariz. at 279 (citing Rest. (2d)Torts § 652B (1977)). The comments to the Restatement 

further define the contours of the tort; there is no liability unless the interference with a 

plaintiff’s seclusion is “a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the 

ordinary reasonable man.” Rest.(2d) Torts § 652B (1977), cmt d. Thus, contrary to 

Defendant’s assertion that the tort is not likely to include telephone calls by a lender as in 

the circumstances here, or telephone calls in any context, while there is “no liability for 

knocking at the plaintiff’s door” or calling on the telephone on one, or “even two or 

three” occasions, to demand payment of a debt, the Restatement counsels that “when the 

telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course 

of hounding the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial burden to his existence” then a 

plaintiff’s privacy may be invaded. Id. 

 For example, the District Court for the Southern District of California applied the 

standard enunciated in the Restatement (2d), and found plaintiffs’ allegation that 

defendant had contacted them, in an attempt to collect a debt, 380 times over a seven 

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month period, at a rate of five to ten times per day, despite notifications that Plaintiffs 

were represented by counsel, adequately stated a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. 

Chaconas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 713 F.Sup.2d 1180 (S.D. Cal. 2010); See also 

Hurrey–Mayer v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2009 WL 3647632, at *2–3, 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 103039, at *6–7 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 4, 2009) (denying defendant's motion to 

dismiss because allegations of continuous and numerous phone calls to collect a debt 

through an automated dialing system after defendant was aware the plaintiff was 

represented by counsel was sufficient to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion). 

 Plaintiffs’ affidavits and supporting exhibits demonstrate that prior to their default, 

they first requested mortgage products and services from Chase but received no response 

(Affidavit of Richard Shupe (Doc. 117) at ¶ 8). Thereafter, on September 13, 2013, 

Plaintiffs sent Chase a letter informing them that they would not be making any further 

payments and enclosed the keys to the house, and offered a “Deed in Lieu of 

Foreclosure” as an alternative to foreclosure. (Affidavit of Richard Shupe (Doc. 117), ¶ 

12 , Ex. 4C.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs requested that Defendant cease calling their personal 

phone number by letter dated October 15, 2010 (Affidavit of Richard Shupe (Doc. 117) ¶ 

23, Ex. 4F) and through verbal requests to the telephone representatives who were 

making the telephone calls (Affidavit of Maria Shupe (Doc. 118) ¶ 19-20). Despite these 

requests, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant called their residence 108 times. (Doc. 118, Ex. 

9). Although Plaintiffs’ call logs that they submitted to support their allegation of 50 of 

those calls is inadmissible, Defendants do not dispute that some calls were made, and 

were made for the purpose of debt collection. The number is calls alleged is not 

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insubstantial. The evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact regarding how 

many telephone calls Defendant made to Plaintiffs, over what length of time the 

telephone calls were made, whether they were repeated with such persistence and 

frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the Plaintiffs such that they would be 

considered highly offensive to a reasonable person. 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny 

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and deny Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim for invasion of privacy. 

G. Harassment and Intentional Infliction of Emotional (and/or Physical) 

Distress 

 Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ harassment claim based on 

Plaintiffs’ concessions that their harassment claim is not actionable and that intentional 

infliction of emotional distress requires burdens of proof that are too high for Plaintiffs to 

meet; alternatively Defendant requests summary judgment. Defendants Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 115) at 12 (citing Doc. 85, at 6:17-23).) Plaintiffs do not 

oppose Defendant’s request to dismiss these claim. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court dismiss these claims. 

H. Remand 

 A district court has “the power to hear claims that would not be independently 

removable even after the basis for removal jurisdiction is dropped from the proceedings.” 

Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991). “It is generally within 

a district court’s discretion either to retain jurisdiction to adjudicate the pendant state 

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claims or to remand them to state court.” Id. In Harrell, the Ninth Circuit recognized that 

“it is generally preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendent claims to state 

court,” but concluded in that case the district court’s retention of jurisdiction over the 

state-law claims was within its discretion. Id. 

 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 

balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 

U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). The lawsuit here is “the usual case” in which all federal-law 

claims are eliminated early in the litigation, and the principles of judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity are not promoted by federal retention of the state-law 

claims. Further, if federal-law issues are raised as defenses, the state courts are competent 

to decide them. See, e.g., Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 

n.5 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends that if the District Court 

accepts the recommendations of the undersigned, the District Count, in its discretion 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim because it has dismissed all claims over which it had 

original jurisdiction.2

 A district court may relinquish jurisdiction over remaining 

supplemental claims either by dismissing the case without prejudice or by remanding it to 

 

2

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the state court. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 351. The district court has discretion to 

remand to state court, rather than dismiss, supplemental claims upon a determination that 

remand best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Id. at 

357. Here, remand avoids the delay, cost, inconvenience, and potential unfairness that 

may be imposed on Plaintiffs by requiring them to file and serve their claims again in 

state court following dismissal without prejudice. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim, and remand this action to the state court. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that : 

(1) The Shupes’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 88) be DENIED; 

(2) The Shupes’ Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 96) be DENIED; 

(3) The Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 115) be 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 

 a. GRANTED as to the Shupes’ claims pursuant to the TCPA; A.R.S. § 

44-1281; and harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress; 

 b. DENIED as to the Shupes’ claims for invasion of privacy; 

(4) This action be REMANDED to state court. 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. If 

objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the District 

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 11-

0501-TUC-RCC. 

 Dated this 5th day of November, 2013. 

 

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