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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 16, 2014

Decided January 28, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 14-1581

ELIJAH MANUEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF JOLIET, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 3022

Milton I. Shadur,

Judge.

O R D E R

Elijah Manuel appeals the dismissal of his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleging that the City of Joliet and several of its police officers maliciously prosecuted 

him when they falsified the results of drug tests and then arrested him for possession 

with intent to distribute ecstasy. The district court dismissed his claim as foreclosed by 

Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750–52 (7th Cir. 2001), because Illinois law already 

provided an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution. Manuel asks this court to 

reconsider Newsome but offers no compelling reason to do so. We affirm. 

Manuel alleged the following in connection with his arrest on March 18, 2011 for 

possession with intent to distribute ecstasy. On that day he was a passenger in his car 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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being driven by his brother when they were stopped for failing to signal. A police 

officer detected an odor of burnt cannabis from inside the car. Without warning, the 

officer flung open the passenger’s door and dragged Manuel out. The officer pushed 

Manuel to the ground, handcuffed him, and then punched and kicked him. The officer

then patted down Manuel, and in one pocket found a bottle of pills. The pills were then 

tested by officers who had arrived at the scene, and these officers falsified the results to 

show that the pills were ecstasy. Based on these results, Manuel was arrested. In grand 

jury proceedings on March 31, the police continued to lie about the test results. 

But according to a lab report of April 1, 2011, that Manuel submitted with his 

complaint, the pills were not ecstasy. Yet Manuel was arraigned on April 8, 2011, and 

not for more than a month-–until May 4, 2011—did the Assistant State’s Attorney seek 

dismissal of the charges. Manuel was released the next day. Because of his 

incarceration, Manuel missed work and his college classes, forcing him to drop courses 

he already paid for. 

On April 10, 2013, Manuel sued the City of Joliet and various City of Joliet police 

officers alleging malicious prosecution because of the falsified drug tests and other civil 

rights claims that stemmed from his arrest (unreasonable search and seizure, excessive 

force, violation of due process rights, conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights, 

unreasonable detention, failure to intervene, and denial of equal protection of laws). 

The court dismissed most of the § 1983 claims as time-barred because they fell 

outside the two-year statute of limitations. As for the malicious-prosecution claim—

which was not time-barred because the statute of limitations did not begin tolling until 

May 4, 2011, when the underlying proceedings were terminated in Manuel’s favor—the 

court treated it as barred under Newsome because Illinois law provided an adequate 

remedy.

On appeal Manuel challenges only the dismissal of his malicious-prosecution 

claim and argues that the claim, as one in which the police misrepresented evidence, fits 

into an area of law that Newsome did not foreclose. He invokes Johnson v. Saville, 576 

F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2009), in which we stated that “Newsome left open the possibility 

of a Fourth Amendment claim against officers who misrepresent evidence to 

prosecutors.” 

Newsome held that federal claims of malicious prosecution are founded on the 

right to due process, not the Fourth Amendment, and thus there is no malicious 

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prosecution claim under federal law if, as here, state law provides a similar cause of 

action. Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750–51; see Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 845–46 (7th Cir. 

2013). Newsome did not preclude Fourth Amendment claims generally, but we have 

cautioned that “there is nothing but confusion gained by calling [a] legal theory

[brought under the Fourth or any other amendment] ‘malicious prosecution.’” Parish v. 

City of Chicago, 594 F.3d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Newsome, 256 F.3d at 751) 

(internal quotation omitted); see also McCullach v. Gadert, 344 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 

2003) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment wrongful-arrest claim against an officer who 

allegedly gave false information in an incident report and at a preliminary hearing). As 

the district court noted, any Fourth Amendment claim that Manuel might bring is

time-barred. Fourth Amendment claims are typically “limited up to the point of 

arraignment,” after which it becomes a malicious prosecution claim. Bielanski v. County 

of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus if Manuel has a Fourth Amendment claim 

not barred by Newsome, it would have stemmed from his arrest on March 18, 2011, 

which he would have had to challenge within two years, see 735 ILCS 5/13-202, but he 

did not sue until April 10, 2013. And in any event, Manuel has no Fourth Amendment 

right to be free from groundless prosecution. Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 638; Ray v. City of 

Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2011).

 

Next Manuel argues that we should reconsider our holding in Newsome and 

recognize a federal claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment 

regardless of the available state remedy. By his count, ten other circuits have recognized 

federal malicious-prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment—assuming that the 

plaintiff has been seized in the course of the malicious prosecution. See Julian v. Hanna, 

732 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases); Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 

91, 98–99 (1st Cir. 2013) (“there is now broad consensus among the circuits that the 

Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure but upon probable cause extends 

through the pretrial period.”)

Manuel does not provide a compelling reason to overrule our precedent. See 

United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard 

for overturning circuit precedent); United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 

2010). As we stated in our most recent endorsement of Newsome’s rationale: “When, 

after the arrest or seizure, a person is not let go when he should be, the Fourth 

Amendment gives way to the due process clause as a basis for challenging his 

detention.” Llovet, 761 F.3d at 764. While Manuel’s counsel advanced a strong 

argument, given the position we have consistently taken in upholding Newsome, see 

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Llovet v. City of Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 760 (7th Cir. 2014); Ray, 629 F.3d at 664; Parish, 594 

F.3d at 554, Manuel’s argument is better left for the Supreme Court. 

Manuel tries to distinguish Llovet on grounds that he was arrested without 

probable cause and incarcerated for seven weeks. Although Llovet is largely about the 

theory of “continuing seizures” and thus distinguishable from Manuel’s facts, we said 

in that case that “once detention by reason of arrest turns into detention by reason of 

arraignment...the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture and the detainee’s claim 

that the detention is improper becomes a claim of malicious prosecution violative of 

due process.” 761 F.3d at 763. Only if state law fails to provide an adequate remedy can 

a plaintiff pursue a federal due process claim for malicious prosecution, id. at 764; cf. 

Julian, 732 F.3d at 846 (Indiana did not have an adequate remedy for 

malicious-prosecution claim), and Illinois has an adequate remedy. Ray, 629 F.3d at 664.

 

AFFIRMED.

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