Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05037/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 22, 2015 Decided December 22, 2015

No. 15-5037

FOOD & WATER WATCH, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

THOMAS J. VILSACK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE U.S.

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-01547)

Zachary B. Corrigan argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellants. 

Daniel Tenny, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Vincent H. Cohen Jr., Acting U.S. Attorney, and 

Mark B. Stern, Attorney. Adam C. Jed, Attorney, entered an 

appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, MILLETT and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit 

Judge HENDERSON.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Margaret Sowerwine and Jane 

Foran, individual consumers of poultry, and Food & Water 

Watch, Inc. (“FWW”), their organizational advocate, fear that 

new regulations promulgated by the United States Department 

of Agriculture (“USDA”) may result in an increase in 

foodborne illness from contaminated poultry. To prevent the 

regulations from going into effect, Plaintiffs sought 

declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court 

concluded that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in 

fact and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing.

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court applied 

an incorrect standard in finding that they lacked standing. 

According to Plaintiffs, once the appropriate standard is 

applied, their complaint and evidence show: (1) the Individual 

Plaintiffs, Margaret Sowerwine and Jane Foran, and FWW 

members have shown an increase in the risk of harm 

sufficient to establish an injury in fact; (2) FWW has shown 

an injury to its interest and expenditures made in response to 

that injury sufficient to establish an injury in fact; and (3) 

Plaintiffs have suffered a procedural injury sufficient to 

establish an injury in fact for purposes of standing. Although 

the District Court applied the incorrect standard to evaluate 

Plaintiffs’ standing, the District Court nonetheless correctly 

ruled that Plaintiffs have not alleged a sufficient injury to 

establish standing under the appropriate standard. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

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I.

The Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”), 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 451-472, was born out of a Congressional interest in 

protecting consumer health and welfare by enabling the 

Secretary of Agriculture (“Secretary”) to ensure that poultry 

products were “wholesome, not adulterated, and properly 

marked, labeled, and packaged.” 21 U.S.C. § 451. The PPIA 

accomplishes this goal, in part, by requiring the Secretary to 

ensure that inspectors1 conduct a post-mortem inspection of 

all poultry processed for human consumption. Id. § 455(b). 

The PPIA also requires condemnation and destruction for 

human food purposes of all poultry that is found to be 

adulterated, unless the poultry can be reprocessed under an 

inspector’s supervision so that it is found to be not 

adulterated. Id. § 455(c). The PPIA defines “adulterated” to 

include various conditions, including containing, among other 

things, “any poisonous or deleterious substance which may 

render it injurious to health”; various additives that are unfit 

for human consumption; consisting in whole or in part of any 

“filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance or is for any other 

reason unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, or otherwise unfit 

for human food”; or packaging in conditions where it “may 

have been rendered injurious to health.” Id. § 453(g). 

Carcasses that pass inspection receive an official legend 

indicating that it was inspected by the USDA. Id.

§ 453(h)(12); 9 C.F.R. § 381.96. 

 1 The PPIA defines an inspector as “(1) an employee or official of 

the United States Government authorized by the Secretary to 

inspect poultry and poultry products under the authority of this 

chapter, or (2) any employee or official of the government of any

State or territory or the District of Columbia authorized by the 

Secretary to inspect poultry and poultry products under authority of 

this chapter.” 21 U.S.C. § 453(k).

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The Food Safety and Inspection Service (“FSIS”) 

administers the PPIA. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.18(a)(1)(ii)(A), 

2.53(a)(2)(i). Historically, FSIS has permitted chicken and 

turkey – the poultry products of concern to Plaintiffs – to be 

inspected under one of four inspection systems: the 

Streamlined Inspection System, the New Line Speed 

Inspection System, the New Turkey Inspection System, and 

traditional inspection (collectively, “the existing inspection 

systems”). Modernization of Poultry Slaughter Inspection, 77 

Fed. Reg. 4408, 4410 (proposed Jan. 27, 2012). Under the 

existing inspection systems, FSIS inspectors perform either an 

online or offline role. See id. Offline inspectors ensure

compliance with food safety regulations, verify sanitation 

procedures, and collect samples for pathogen testing. See id. 

One or more online FSIS inspectors inspect each poultry 

carcass with its viscera2 immediately following the separation 

of the viscera from the carcass. See id. Under the existing 

inspection systems, the inspectors conduct an “organoleptic” 

inspection, using sight, touch, and smell to evaluate the 

carcasses. See Brief for Appellees, Food & Water Watch, Inc. 

v. Vilsack, No. 15-5037 (D.C. Cir.), Doc. No. 1553589, at 3; 

see also 77 Fed. Reg. at 4410 (noting that inspectors 

“examine each eviscerated carcass for visual defects”). 

Poultry establishment personnel do not conduct any sorting or 

evaluation of carcasses; the poultry establishments provide a 

“helper” who takes action only upon an FSIS inspector’s 

direction. 77 Fed. Reg. at 4410.

 2 Viscera are “[t]he soft contents of the principal cavities of the 

body” which includes “the entrails or bowels together with the 

heart, liver, lungs, etc.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 

2007). 

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The inspection method at issue in this case, the New 

Poultry Inspection System (“NPIS”), alters the responsibilities 

of the FSIS inspectors and the establishment personnel. The 

NPIS rules institutionalize the shift from inspector-based 

sorting and evaluation to establishment-based sorting and 

evaluation. Under the NPIS, poultry establishment personnel 

sort the poultry carcasses and take corrective action prior to 

an FSIS inspection. See id. at 4421. 

The NPIS grew out of FSIS’s concern that agency 

resources were not being used in the most effective way to 

ensure food safety. See id. at 4410. In an effort to develop 

new methods to more effectively inspect poultry, in 1996 

FSIS promulgated the “Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis 

and Critical Control Points” (“HACCP”) rule. Id. at 4413; 

Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 

Points, 61 Fed. Reg. 38806 (July 25, 1996). HACCP required 

poultry establishments to develop controls to ensure product 

safety and empowered the establishments to make their own 

determinations about how to meet the FSIS regulatory 

requirements. 77 Fed. Reg. at 4413. FSIS subsequently 

announced an HACCP-based inspection models project 

(“HIMP”) that would allow FSIS to test and develop new 

inspection models. HACCP-Based Meat and Poultry 

Inspection Concepts, 62 Fed. Reg. 31553 (June 10, 1997). 

The pilot HIMP method made poultry establishment 

personnel “responsible for identifying and removing normal 

from abnormal carcasses and parts.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 4413. 

The HIMP pilot was challenged as a violation of the 

PPIA because FSIS inspectors did not inspect poultry 

carcasses themselves, leaving all inspection to establishment 

personnel with FSIS oversight. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Empls., 

AFL-CIO v. Glickman (AFGE I), 215 F.3d 7, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 

2000). This Court held that such delegation violated the 

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PPIA. Id. at 11. In response to AFGE I, “FSIS modified 

HIMP to position one inspector at a fixed location near the 

end of the slaughter line in each poultry slaughter 

establishment” who was responsible for evaluating each 

carcass after establishment personnel had sorted and 

processed it. 77 Fed. Reg. at 4413. The modified HIMP 

program was also challenged, and this Court held that the 

program did not violate the PPIA. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t 

Empls., AFL-CIO v. Veneman, 284 F.3d 125, 130-31 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002). However, we cautioned that “[i]f the USDA 

undertakes a rulemaking to adopt as a permanent change 

something along the lines of the modified program, 

experience with the program’s operation and its effectiveness 

will doubtless play a significant role” and warned that our 

opinion “may not necessarily foreshadow the outcome of 

judicial review of such future regulations.” Id. at 130-31.

Twenty young chicken and five turkey establishments 

participated in HIMP, and FSIS collected and analyzed the 

data from these establishments. 77 Fed. Reg. at 4414. Using 

this data, FSIS concluded that the HIMP procedures 

“improved performance related to food safety and non-foodsafety standards . . . especially in reducing pathogen levels” 

and proposed the NPIS to replace the existing inspection 

systems, excluding the traditional inspection system. Id. at 

4421. Under the proposed NPIS rule, “establishments 

[would] be required to sort carcasses, to dispose of carcasses 

that must be condemned, and to conduct any necessary 

trimming or reprocessing activities before carcasses are 

presented to the online FSIS carcass inspector.” Id. The 

carcasses would pass along a production line for the online 

inspector at a speed of 175 birds per minute for young 

chickens, and 55 birds per minute for turkeys. Id. at 4423. 

While establishment personnel sort carcasses, FSIS inspectors 

would reallocate their time by increasing offline inspection 

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activities. Id. at 4420, 4422. FSIS projected that 99.9% of 

young chickens and poultry would be produced under the 

NPIS. Id. at 4436. After a notice and comment period, FSIS 

adopted a final NPIS rule with a number of modifications, 

which included making adoption of the NPIS optional, and 

lowering the birds per minute speed of young chickens to 140 

birds per minute. Modernization of Poultry Slaughter 

Inspection, 79 Fed. Reg. 49566, 49570 (Aug. 21, 2014). 

On September 11, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in 

this case, claiming that the NPIS constitutes “an 

unprecedented elimination of inspection resources for a secret 

set of young chicken and turkey slaughterhouses.” Compl. 

¶ 1, J.A. 9. In this spirit, Plaintiffs alleged eight claims 

against Defendants: (1) violation of 21 U.S.C. § 455(c) by 

allowing condemnation of young chicken and turkey 

carcasses by NPIS establishment personnel; (2) violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 455(c) by allowing reprocessing of young 

chickens and turkeys by NPIS establishment personnel 

without inspector supervision; (3) violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 455(b) because each young chicken and turkey carcass will 

not receive a post-mortem inspection in NPIS establishments; 

(4) violation of the PPIA’s branding requirements; (5) 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 455(b) and 9 C.F.R. § 381.1 because 

each chicken and turkey viscera will not be federally 

inspected; (6) violation of 21 U.S.C. § 463(c) for failure to 

provide an opportunity for oral presentation of views; (7) 

violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by 

failing to provide adequate opportunity for notice and 

comment; and (8) violation of the APA because the final 

NPIS rules are arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiffs sought

declaratory and injunctive relief. On the same day they filed 

the complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction 

on Claims 1, 2, 6, and 7. The District Court heard the motion 

on October 17, 2014.

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On February 9, 2015, the District Court dismissed the 

case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs

lacked standing, and denied the motion for preliminary 

injunction and all other pending motions as moot. Food & 

Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 79 F. Supp. 3d 174, 206 (D.D.C. 

2015). With respect to the Individual Plaintiffs, the District 

Court found that they did not suffer an injury in fact in order 

to establish standing. Id. at 190-95. The District Court also 

found that FWW lacked standing as an organization, and that 

Plaintiffs did not suffer a procedural injury sufficient to 

establish standing.3 Id. at 199-206. Plaintiffs appeal the 

dismissal on these grounds.

II.

Before considering the merits of Plaintiffs’ standing 

arguments, we must first determine the appropriate standard 

under which we should evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims. Because 

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, the District 

Court evaluated Plaintiffs’ standing to bring their claims 

under the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for 

summary judgment. See Food & Water Watch, 79 F. Supp. 

3d at 186 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 

907 n.8 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). This approach 

was correct for determining whether or not to grant the 

motion for preliminary injunction, but it was incorrect for 

determining whether to dismiss the case in its entirety.

 3 The District Court also held that the Individual Plaintiffs and 

FWW lacked informational standing, but Plaintiffs do not appeal 

those rulings. See Food & Water Watch, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 196-99, 

203-04.

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It is well-established that “each element of Article III 

standing ‘must be supported in the same way as any other 

matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., 

with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 

successive stages of the litigation.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 

U.S. 154, 167-68 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). In order to obtain a preliminary 

injunction, a party must show, among other things, “a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Mills v. 

District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “In this context, the 

‘merits’ on which plaintiff must show a likelihood of success 

encompass not only substantive theories but also 

establishment of jurisdiction.” Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 

559, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Williams, J.). In order to establish 

jurisdiction, a plaintiff must establish standing. See, e.g., 

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 

(2014) (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 

burden of establishing standing.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, a party who seeks a 

preliminary injunction “must show a ‘substantial likelihood’ 

of standing.” Klayman, 800 F.3d at 568 (Williams, J.). A 

party who fails to show a “substantial likelihood” of standing 

is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. Id.

However, an inability to establish a substantial likelihood 

of standing requires denial of the motion for preliminary 

injunction, not dismissal of the case. See id. at 562 (Brown, 

J.); id. at 568 (Williams, J.). Whether a party’s claim requires 

dismissal because of an inability to establish standing depends 

on the stage of the litigation. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167-68. 

Here, Plaintiffs filed their complaint and moved for a 

preliminary injunction contemporaneously. When the District 

Court dismissed the case, Defendants had not yet filed an 

answer, and no discovery had occurred. Accordingly, the 

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litigation had not proceeded past the pleadings stage, and 

standing – for evaluating the propriety of proceeding with the 

case at all – should have been evaluated under the motion to 

dismiss standard. Id. Because what we have before us is the 

dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint, we must evaluate whether 

they have established standing under the standard applicable 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

To establish standing, Plaintiffs “must state a plausible 

claim that [they have] suffered an injury in fact fairly 

traceable to the actions of the defendant that is likely to be 

redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Humane 

Soc’y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

“[G]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the 

defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss 

we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific 

facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Bennett, 520 

U.S. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 

“we do not assume the truth of legal conclusions, nor do we 

accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in 

the complaint.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, “‘[w]hen considering any chain of allegations 

for standing purposes, we may reject as overly speculative 

those links which are predictions of future events (especially 

future actions to be taken by third parties).’” Id. at 21

(quoting United Transp. Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 913

(D.C. Cir. 1989)). In determining standing, we may consider 

materials outside of the complaint. See Coal. for 

Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003).

Applying this standard, we review standing de novo. 

Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136, 1138 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). 

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III.

Plaintiffs first contend that the Individual Plaintiffs, 

Sowerwine and Foran, have alleged an injury in fact. 

Plaintiffs also submit that FWW would have associational 

standing on behalf of its members. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. 

EPA, 754 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining that 

associational standing requires an organization to show, 

among other things, that “at least one of [the organization’s] 

members would have standing to sue”). Because the analyses 

for both the Individual Plaintiffs and FWW’s members are 

identical, see id., we address them jointly here.

For the Individual Plaintiffs or FWW’s individual 

members to establish standing, they must show (i) they have 

“suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (ii) that 

was caused by or is fairly traceable to the actions of the 

defendant, and (iii) is capable of resolution and likely to be 

redressed by judicial decision.” Osborn v. Visa, 797 F.3d 

1057, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, because Plaintiffs are not directly subjected 

to the regulation they challenge, “standing is ‘substantially 

more difficult to establish.’” Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l 

Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Public Citizen I), 489 F.3d 

1279, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

at 562). In order to have suffered an injury in fact, Plaintiffs 

must have suffered an injury that is “(1) concrete, (2) 

particularized, and (3) actual or imminent.” Id. at 1292. A 

concrete injury is “direct, real, and palpable—not abstract.” 

Id. A particularized injury is “personal, individual, distinct, 

and differentiated—not generalized or undifferentiated.” Id. 

An actual or imminent injury is “certainly impending and 

immediate—not remote, speculative, conjectural, or 

hypothetical.” Id. at 1293. 

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Here, Plaintiffs claim their injury in fact is an increased 

risk of foodborne illness from unwholesome, adulterated 

poultry resulting from the Defendants’ regulation.4

 

Increased-risk-of-harm cases implicate the requirement that 

an injury be actual or imminent because “[w]ere all purely 

speculative increased risks deemed injurious, the entire 

requirement of actual or imminent injury would be rendered 

moot, because all hypothesized, nonimminent injuries could 

be dressed up as increased risk of future injury.” Id. at 1294 

(quoting NRDC v. EPA (NRDC II), 464 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 

2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, 

“[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disputes about 

future events where the possibility of harm to any given 

individual is remote and speculative are properly left to the 

policymaking Branches, not the Article III courts.” Id. at 

1295. As a result, this Court has limited its jurisdiction over 

cases alleging the possibility of increased-risk-of-harm to 

those where the plaintiff can show “both (i) a substantially

increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial probability of 

harm with that increase taken into account.” Id. at 1295

(emphasis in original); accord Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. 

Ct. at 2341 (“An allegation of future injury may suffice if the 

threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a 

‘“substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’” (quoting 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 n.5, 

1150 (2013))). “The word ‘substantial’ of course poses 

questions of degree, questions far from fully resolved.” Va. 

State Corp. Comm’n v. FERC, 468 F.3d 845, 848 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). 

 4 Because Plaintiffs argue that their increased risk of harm, or 

alternatively, that the costs associated with avoiding that risk 

constitute injuries sufficient for standing, we address those injuries 

separately.

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Although Plaintiffs may establish standing by 

demonstrating an increased risk of harm, “[i]n applying the 

‘substantial’ standard, we are mindful . . . that the 

constitutional requirement of imminence . . . necessarily 

compels a very strict understanding of what increases in risk 

and overall risk levels can count as ‘substantial.’” Public 

Citizen I, 489 F.3d at 1296. Accordingly, “the proper way to 

analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the 

ultimate alleged harm – such as death, physical injury, or 

property damage . . . – as the concrete and particularized 

injury and then to determine whether the increased risk of 

such harm makes injury to an individual citizen sufficiently 

‘imminent’ for standing purposes.” Id. at 1298. 

The Individual Plaintiffs’ and FWW members’ alleged 

harm is the foodborne illness that would result from 

consuming adulterated, unwholesome chicken produced under

the NPIS. In order to have standing, therefore, Plaintiffs at 

least need to plausibly allege that the NPIS substantially 

increases the risk of foodborne illness when compared to the 

existing inspection methods. Accordingly, in order to satisfy 

this Court’s two-part analysis, the Plaintiffs must 

demonstrate, under the relevant standard, (1) that the NPIS 

substantially increases the risk of contracting foodborne 

illness compared to the existing inspection methods, and (2) a 

substantial probability that the Individual Plaintiffs and FWW 

members will contract a foodborne illness given that increase 

of risk. A failure to satisfy either of these prongs would 

deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ case. See

Public Citizen I, 489 F.3d at 1295.

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A.

Plaintiffs argue that their complaint and submissions in 

support of their motion for preliminary injunction sufficiently 

establish that the NPIS substantially increases the risk of harm 

that will arise from consuming unwholesome, adulterated 

poultry. Defendants submit that Plaintiffs have failed to 

demonstrate a substantially increased risk of harm. 

We find that Plaintiffs’ complaint, as well as their various 

submissions in support of their motion for preliminary 

injunction, fails to plausibly allege that the NPIS taken as a 

whole substantially increases the risk of foodborne illness as a 

result of unwholesome, adulterated poultry. First, a careful 

examination of Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrates that they 

have not plausibly alleged that the NPIS substantially 

increases the risk of foodborne illness compared to the 

existing inspection systems. To be sure, Plaintiffs’ 

submissions contained detailed allegations about how HIMP, 

and by extension, the NPIS, differs from the existing poultry 

inspection systems. See Compl. ¶¶ 31-77, J.A. 16-25. The 

complaint is replete with what Plaintiffs argue are the NPIS’s 

inadequacies. See Compl. ¶¶ 78-126, J.A. 25-29. The 

complaint also outlines what Plaintiffs perceive are the flaws 

with the HIMP studies and analyses. See Compl. ¶¶ 148-61, 

J.A. 33-35. However, these differences and perceived flaws 

do not demonstrate a substantial increase in the risk of 

foodborne illness under the NPIS compared to the existing 

inspection systems. 

To the extent that the presence of adulterated, 

unwholesome poultry could give rise to an inference of

resulting foodborne illness, these allegations still fall short 

because they fail to allege that the NPIS as a whole will 

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produce significantly more adulterated, unwholesome chicken 

compared to the existing inspection systems. Plaintiffs’ 

allegations focus on certain discrete aspects of the NPIS: the 

reduced number of online federal inspectors, the speed at 

which the online federal inspectors must evaluate carcasses, 

and the substitution of establishment personnel for federal 

inspectors. See Compl. ¶¶ 78-121, J.A. 25-29. However, 

Plaintiffs’ complaint contains only a single allegation that 

references another key aspect the NPIS: the reallocation of 

resources for offline inspection. Compl. ¶ 183, J.A. 39. 

Under the NPIS, additional offline verification inspectors will 

check to see to that inspection protocols are being followed 

and conduct pathogen testing. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 4422. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint makes no allegation regarding the 

impact of increased offline verification inspectors on the 

presence of adulterated, unwholesome poultry. Although 

Plaintiffs fault Defendants for failing to account for a 

reduction in online inspectors in Defendants’ risk assessment, 

Plaintiffs’ failure to account for the increase in offline 

inspections and their attendant impact on poultry production 

prevents us from inferring that the NPIS as a whole 

substantially increases the risk of foodborne illness.

Other allegations in the complaint reveal the same 

problem. For example, the complaint outlines HIMP 

personnel’s alleged failure to catch disease-related conditions 

on poultry. See Compl. ¶ 177, J.A. 38 (“An FWW analysis of 

the data for 14 HIMP plants found that out of 229 

[Noncompliance Reports] filed from March to August 2011, 

208 (90 percent) were for visible fecal contamination that was 

missed by company employees.”). Although these 

allegations, at best, give rise to the inference that 

establishment personnel will not be as effective in identifying 

adulterated poultry, they do not allege how NPIS inspection 

as a whole will impact the amount of adulterated poultry. 

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Notably, these allegations do not allege that these results are 

worse than what plants do under existing inspection systems. 

Thus, they fail to plausibly allege that the regulations 

substantially increase the risk of foodborne illness.

Plaintiffs’ submissions in support of their motion for 

preliminary injunction suffer from the same defect. The 

sworn affidavits from existing USDA inspectors go into great 

detail about the differences between the NPIS and existing 

poultry inspection systems. One inspector explained that 

under the existing inspection systems, they “would have 3 

inspectors on each line, with 90 birds per minute split among 

them, so that each inspector was looking at 30 birds per 

minute” but under HIMP, one inspector looks “at up to 200 

birds, or more, per minute.”5

 J.A. 298. Another inspector 

claimed, “I know I cannot detect all of the carcasses with 

Food Safety defects, and it is reasonable to assume that some 

are going out to the public.” J.A. 306. A third inspector said, 

“I know the kinds of unwholesome, mutilated, and diseased 

chickens that are processed and shipped out for sale and I feel 

it is important to share this information with consumers and 

taxpayers” because the HIMP system “is tantamount to 

having the wolves watch the proverbial henhouse, but these 

chickens are real and they could very likely hurt or kill 

someone.” J.A. 317. Another inspector who worked 

previously for a chicken production company and serves 

currently as a USDA inspector outlined the various pressures 

that poultry production personnel are under to increase the 

number of birds that are shipped out to consumers. J.A. 321-

24. Although these statements may be alarming, even taken 

 5 This number is higher than the final rule, which limits the speed 

for young chickens to 140 birds per minute. 79 Fed. Reg. at 49570, 

Plaintiffs claim this number remains too high. Compl. ¶¶ 92-99, 

J.A. 27.

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as true, they do not allege that there is a substantially

increased risk of foodborne illness because they do not allege 

that the risk of unwholesome, adulterated poultry is higher

under the NPIS as a whole than the existing inspection 

systems.

Plaintiffs could perhaps overcome this deficiency by 

providing the Court with an alternative basis from which to 

infer that NPIS inspection results in a substantially increased 

risk of unwholesome, adulterated poultry. Here, if Plaintiffs 

could plausibly allege through their use of statistics that NPIS 

poultry creates a substantial increase in the risk of foodborne 

illness, they would allege a sufficient injury for standing. We 

have, in the past, refused to require a quantitative analysis in 

order to establish standing in increased-risk-of-harm cases, 

see NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 7, and we likewise refuse to hold 

that statistics are required for such cases. However, we 

remain mindful that “[d]etermining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim [of injury] is context-specific, 

requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and 

common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 

(2009). Accordingly, where a plaintiff’s allegations 

incorporate statistics and the plaintiff contends that the 

statistics demonstrate a substantial increase in the risk of 

harm, the plaintiff must allege something from which the 

Court can infer that risk. Using our experience and common 

sense, we cannot make this inference from Plaintiffs’ 

statistics.

 A review of Plaintiffs’ statistics demonstrates their 

failure to plausibly allege a substantial increase in the risk of 

harm. Plaintiffs point to isolated statistics where Defendants 

found Salmonella rates to be “higher” in chicken processed in 

HIMP establishments than in non-HIMP establishments, but 

the complaint does not specify how much higher the rates 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 17 of 36
18

were. See Compl. ¶¶ 162-164, J.A. 35-36. Plaintiffs also 

submitted selections from an FSIS report that found under 

some scenarios, “a 0.2% increase in the proportion of samples 

testing Campylobacter positive,” but the same page of this 

report concluded that under most projected scenarios, the 

samples testing positive for Salmonella or Campylobacter 

would decrease. J.A. 430. Plaintiffs also alleged that 0.1% of 

Campylobacter illnesses would be attributable to the NPIS 

“under some scenarios.” Compl. ¶ 180, J.A. 39. Plaintiffs 

likewise relied on Defendants’ risk assessment assumption

that annual Salmonella and Campylobacter illness 

“attribut[able] to poultry are about 174,686 and 169,005, 

respectively.” J.A. 430. Plaintiffs plucked these statistics 

from Defendants’ studies but provide no allegations from 

which we can infer that the statistics reflect a substantial 

increase in the risk of harm. Indeed, Defendants’ risk 

assessment concluded under most scenarios that annual 

illnesses from Salmonella and Campylobacter would remain 

unchanged or would decrease under the NPIS. J.A. 430-31. 

Even Plaintiffs’ complaint acknowledges that the risk of

Campylobacter increase is “ambiguous.” Compl. ¶ 180, J.A. 

39. An ambiguous increase in risk is hardly a substantial 

increase in risk.

Plaintiffs’ statistics suffer from additional problems. 

First, these studies predate the final rule’s amendments. 

Although not necessarily a problem by itself, the rule’s 

amendments specifically lowered the line speeds (one of 

Plaintiffs’ chief criticisms) and made the transition to NPIS 

inspection voluntary. Plaintiffs make no allegations about the 

impact of these changes on their statistical claims. 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to account for how increased 

allocations in offline inspections would impact the risk. In 

this context, Plaintiffs’ statistics do not plausibly allege that 

NPIS inspection as a whole substantially increases the risk 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 18 of 36
19

that poultry will be contaminated with Salmonella or 

Campylobacter compared to the existing inspection systems.6

 

Because Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that the 

NPIS substantially increases the risk of producing 

unwholesome, adulterated poultry compared to the existing 

inspection systems, they do not have standing.7

 6 Our conclusion that Plaintiffs’ statistics do not plausibly allege a 

substantial increase in the risk of harm here does not mean that a 

plaintiff could never plausibly allege such an increase through the 

use of statistics culled from government-conducted studies that 

reach conclusions contrary to the plaintiff’s allegations. Rather, it 

means that, to the extent a plaintiff relies on statistics to show a 

substantial increase in the risk of harm, a plaintiff cannot allege a 

bare statistic without plausibly alleging how the statistic reflects a 

substantial increase in the risk of harm.

7 Plaintiffs ask us to follow the Second Circuit’s approach to 

increased-risk-of-foodborne illness outlined in Baur v. Veneman, 

352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2003). In Baur, the Second Circuit held “that 

exposure to an enhanced risk of disease transmission may qualify as 

injury-in-fact in consumer food . . . suits.” Id. at 628. Baur’s 

approach to increased-risk-of-harm cases is not without 

controversy. See Va. State Corp., 468 F.3d at 848 (noting the 

conflict among the circuits about what increase in risk must be 

shown to support standing); NRDC v. EPA (NRDC I), 440 F.3d 

476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated by rh’g en banc, NRDC II, 464

F.3d 1 (noting the potential “expansiveness” of Baur’s reasoning). 

However, we need not resolve any controversy here. Although 

Baur makes passing reference to “a moderate increase in the risk of 

disease,” id. at 637, the Second Circuit’s reasoning focused on the 

probability of the plaintiff suffering harm, see id.; see also NRDC I, 

440 F.3d at 483 (describing Baur in the context of increased 

probability of harm). Because we resolve Plaintiffs’ standing on 

the first prong of the Public Citizen I analysis, Baur does not 

impact our analysis here.

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 19 of 36
20

B.

Plaintiffs also contend that their avoidance of NPIS

poultry, or alternatively the increased cost of seeking out 

poultry from other sources, constitutes an injury in fact to 

establish standing. Plaintiffs argue that they have taken these 

steps to avoid potential injury from NPIS-produced poultry. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that FWW “[m]embers who wish 

to continue to eat chicken will have to spend additional 

resources to seek out and purchase poultry from plants that 

have not adopted NPIS, if this is even possible. FWW 

members that have lost all confidence in USDA’s inspection 

legend will simply avoid eating chicken altogether.” Compl. 

¶ 6, J.A. 11-12. Plaintiffs’ declarations in support of their 

motion for a preliminary injunction contain more detailed 

allegations of avoidance and increased cost, making clear that 

such costs would be incurred due to their fear of illness from 

contaminated poultry produced under the NPIS. Jane Foran

expressed concern that NPIS poultry may “cause harm to 

[her] family and [her] health,” leading her to “stop eating 

chicken in restaurants” and to “look for farmers’ markets or 

co-ops.” Foran Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13, J.A. 49. Margaret 

Sowerwine explained that she was “concerned that there will 

be more contaminated and lower-quality poultry” and that she 

may “purchas[e] product that could make [her] sick.” 

Sowerwine Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9, J.A. 53-54. As a result, she planned

to “find a local farmer” for her poultry purchases, resulting in 

increased costs or avoiding poultry completely if she cannot 

afford it. Id. ¶ 10, J.A. 54. Wendy Davis feared that she “will 

be purchasing product that could make [her] or [her] husband 

sick or even die.” Davis Decl. ¶ 8, J.A. 59. Alina Pittman 

was “concerned that the USDA’s NPIS rules will allow for 

more chicken and turkey that is not safe and unwholesome,” 

which will cause her to “look for farmers’ markets” where her 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 20 of 36
21

“costs will go up considerably.” Davis Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14, J.A. 

64, 65. Plaintiffs argue that these avoidance costs are not 

self-inflicted injuries and are sufficient to establish standing. 

In Clapper, the Supreme Court explained that plaintiffs 

“cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on 

themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm 

that is not certainly impending” because such injuries “are not 

fairly traceable” to the conduct creating that fear. 133 S. Ct. 

at 1151. “[O]therwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able 

to secure a lower standard for Article III standing by making 

an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.” Id. As 

explained in Section III.A, Plaintiffs have not plausibly 

alleged that they face a substantial increase in the risk of harm 

from NPIS-produced poultry. Just as the respondents in 

Clapper could not repackage their “first failed theory of 

standing” as a theory of costs, id., Plaintiffs here cannot 

establish standing by incurring costs that “are simply the 

product of their fear of” NPIS poultry, id. at 1152. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ “self-inflicted injuries are not fairly 

traceable” to the NPIS, “and their subjective fear . . . does not 

give rise to standing.” Id. at 1152-53.

IV.

FWW argues that it has standing to pursue its claims on 

its own behalf. FWW may assert standing on its own behalf, 

but organizational standing requires FWW, “like an individual 

plaintiff, to show actual or threatened injury in fact that is 

fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be 

redressed by a favorable court decision.” Equal Rights Ctr., 

633 F.3d at 1138 (internal quotation marks omitted). An 

organization must allege more than a frustration of its purpose 

because frustration of an organization’s objectives “is the type 

of abstract concern that does not impart standing.” Nat’l 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 21 of 36
22

Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433

(D.C. Cir. 1995). “The court has distinguished between 

organizations that allege that their activities have been 

impeded from those that merely allege that their mission has 

been compromised.” Abigail All. for Better Access to 

Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 133 

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, for FWW to establish 

standing in its own right, it must have “suffered a concrete 

and demonstrable injury to [its] activities.” PETA v. USDA, 

797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Making this determination is a two-part 

inquiry – “we ask, first, whether the agency’s action or 

omission to act injured the [organization’s] interest and, 

second, whether the organization used its resources to 

counteract that harm.” Id. at 1094 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We need not address the second prong of this 

inquiry because it is clear that FWW has not sufficiently 

alleged an injury to its interest.

To allege an injury to its interest, “an organization must 

allege that the defendant’s conduct perceptibly impaired the 

organization’s ability to provide services in order to establish 

injury in fact.” Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC, 786 F.3d 

18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

An organization’s ability to provide services has been 

perceptibly impaired when the defendant’s conduct causes an 

“inhibition of [the organization’s] daily operations.” PETA, 

797 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Action All. of Senior Citizens of 

Greater Phila. v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 938 (D.C. Cir. 

1986)). Our precedent makes clear that an organization’s use 

of resources for litigation, investigation in anticipation of 

litigation, or advocacy is not sufficient to give rise to an 

Article III injury. Id. at 1093-94; Turlock Irrigation Dist., 

786 F.3d at 24. Furthermore, an organization does not suffer 

an injury in fact where it “expend[s] resources to educate its 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 22 of 36
23

members and others” unless doing so subjects the 

organization to “operational costs beyond those normally 

expended.” Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc., 68 F.3d at 1434; see 

also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 12 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (organization’s expenditures must be for 

“‘operational costs beyond those normally expended’ to carry 

out its advocacy mission” (quoting Nat’l Taxpayers Union, 68 

F.3d at 1434)).

According to Patricia Lovera, the Assistant Director of 

FWW, one of FWW’s “primary purposes is to educate the 

public about food systems that guarantee safe, wholesome 

food produced in a sustainable manner.” Lovera Decl. ¶ 4,8

J.A. 68. As a result, FWW is concerned that NPIS will allow 

inadequately trained staff to inspect food and that food safety 

will suffer because inspection will be turned over to poultry 

establishment personnel. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 21, J.A. 69-70, 72-73. 

Lovera contends that allowing the NPIS to go into effect will 

cause “all of the organization’s time and resources spent 

advocating against NPIS [to have been] wasted.” Id. ¶ 10, 

J.A. 70. Lovera also claims that “FWW would have to 

increase the resources that it spends on educating the general 

public and its members that the NPIS rules do not allow for 

the inspection of poultry product prescribed by the PPIA.” Id.

¶ 11, J.A. 70. Additionally, “FWW will spend time and 

money on increasing its efforts to educate members of the 

public that just because a poultry product has a USDA 

inspection legend does not mean that it is not adulterated and 

is wholesome.” Id. ¶ 12, J.A. 70-71. Finally, Lovera states 

that “FWW will increase the amount of resources that it 

spends encouraging its members who wish to continue to eat 

chicken to avoid poultry from such companies” and “to 

 8 The declaration erroneously contains two paragraphs numbered as 

“4.” This citation refers to the second of those paragraphs.

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 23 of 36
24

purchase poultry at farmers’ markets or direct from 

producers.” Id. ¶ 13, J.A. 71.

Lovera’s statements make clear that FWW has alleged no 

more than an abstract injury to its interests. Our recent 

decision in PETA is instructive. In PETA, an animal-welfare 

organization challenged the USDA’s failure to apply statutory 

general animal welfare requirements to birds. 797 F.3d at 

1089-91. Ordinarily, when the USDA applied the animal 

welfare requirements, an outside organization like PETA

could seek redress for mistreatment by filing a complaint with 

the USDA. Because the USDA refused to apply those 

requirements to birds, PETA could not seek redress for 

mistreatment of birds through the USDA’s complaint 

procedures. Id. at 1091. Additionally, because the USDA 

was not applying the requirements to birds, the USDA was 

not generating inspection reports that the organization used to 

educate its members. Id. The agency inaction injured the 

organization because the organization suffered a “denial of 

access to bird-related . . . information including, in particular, 

investigatory information, and a means by which to seek 

redress for bird abuse” Id. at 1095. We found these injuries to 

be “concrete and specific to the work” in which the 

organization was engaged. Id. (quoting Action All., 789 F.2d 

at 938). The denial of access to an avenue for redress and 

denial of information “perceptibly impaired [the 

organization’s] ability to both bring [statutory] violations to 

the attention of the agency charged with preventing avian 

cruelty and continue to educate the public.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In the present case, taking all of FWW’s allegations and 

Lovera’s statements as true, FWW has alleged nothing more 

than an abstract injury to its interests that is insufficient to 

support standing. FWW does not allege that the NPIS limits 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 24 of 36
25

its ability to seek redress for a violation of law. Nor does 

FWW allege that the USDA’s action restricts the flow of 

information that FWW uses to educate its members. 

Although Lovera alleges that FWW will spend resources 

educating its members and the public about the NPIS and 

USDA inspection legend, nothing in Lovera’s declaration 

indicates that FWW’s organizational activities have been 

perceptibly impaired in any way.9 Accordingly, FWW has 

not alleged an injury to its interest to give rise to 

organizational standing.

V.

Plaintiffs’ final standing argument on the basis of 

procedural injury is easily resolved. Plaintiffs claim that they 

have suffered a procedural injury sufficient to establish 

standing because Defendants violated their procedural rights. 

 9 The concurrence contends that FWW has met the first prong of 

the organizational standing analysis because, taking FWW’s 

allegations as true, the complaint has alleged a “direct conflict” 

between the NPIS and FWW’s mission. Conc. Op. at 6 n.5

(Henderson, J.). However, even if FWW were to allege a “direct 

conflict,” an issue on which we express no opinion, FWW would 

still need to allege an injury to its interest. “[I]n those cases where 

an organization alleges that a defendant’s conduct has made the 

organization’s activities more difficult, the presence of a direct 

conflict between the defendant’s conduct and the organization’s 

mission is necessary – though not alone sufficient – to establish 

standing.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 

1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Am. Soc’y for Prevention of 

Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 25 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (“If the challenged conduct affects an organization’s 

activities, but is neutral with respect to its substantive mission, we 

have found it ‘entirely speculative’ whether the challenged practice 

will actually impair the organization’s activities.” (quoting Nat’l 

Treasury Emps. Union, 101 F.3d at 1430)).

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 25 of 36
26

However, “the omission of a procedural requirement does not, 

by itself, give a party standing to sue.” Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 479 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). “[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some 

concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation – a 

procedural right in vacuo – is insufficient to create Article III 

standing.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 

(2009). As explained in the foregoing, Plaintiffs have failed 

to establish that they will suffer any cognizable injury. 

Because Plaintiffs “have failed to establish that they will 

likely suffer a substantive injury, their claimed procedural 

injury . . . necessarily fails.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 754 F.3d 

995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs have 

failed to show any cognizable injury sufficient to establish 

standing. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court.

So ordered.

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 26 of 36
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring 

in the judgment: Although I agree with my colleagues that 

the individual and organizational plaintiffs do not have 

standing, I so conclude for a different reason. Regarding the

two individual plaintiffs, I believe we need not assess whether 

they face a “substantially increased risk of harm 

and . . . substantial probability of harm” from consuming 

NPIS-inspected poultry (NPIS poultry), see Public Citizen v. 

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphases in original), because, as their

declarations make clear, they have the alternative of 

consuming non-NPIS poultry—e.g., by purchasing poultry 

from a farmers’ market—and they have failed to allege that 

the alternative is “not readily available at a reasonable 

price.” See Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 

F.3d 1275, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). For 

this reason, any injury they suffer from consuming NPIS 

poultry is a self-inflicted injury that would not establish 

Article III standing. Regarding plaintiff Food & Water Watch 

(FWW), I would reject its organizational standing argument

because its only expenditures are made for “pure issueadvocacy,” an insufficient injury to support standing under 

our precedent. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 

396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

The individual plaintiffs allege that they cannot

determine whether the poultry they buy at grocery stores is 

NPIS-inspected and, at the same time, that NPIS poultry

accounts for 99.9% of available poultry. See Compl. ¶ 34. If 

the plaintiffs were in fact limited to purchasing poultry at 

grocery stores, I too would most likely conduct the 

“substantial increase and substantial probability” inquiry my 

colleagues undertake. See Maj. Op. 13–18. But that is not the 

case. Under our precedent, if a plaintiff has access to an

alternative of the product he claims causes his injury, he must 

show that the alternative is either (1) “not readily available” 

or (2) not “reasonabl[y] price[d]” to establish standing. 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 27 of 36
2

Public Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969, 974 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 

1980). And because the plaintiffs assert only that they “seek 

out chicken from [both] local farmers’ market[s] [and] 

grocer[s],” Foran Decl. ¶ 3, J.A. 47 (emphasis added), they 

have failed to do so.1To rule out access to an alternative 

under the first prong, the alternative must be “difficult to 

obtain.” See Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs, 671 F.3d at 1281

(emphasis omitted). It is not enough, for example, to allege 

that some, or even many, suppliers do not provide it. See id. 

at 1282. Under the second prong, the plaintiffs must allege

more than “the mere existence of a price differential,” id.;

instead, they must claim that the product is not reasonably 

priced. See id. at 1282–83. Notwithstanding neither assertion

is “overly burdensome,” Foreman, 631 F.2d at 974 n.12; see 

Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs, 671 F.3d at 1281, 1283 (price 

differential must have more than “little effect” on alternative’s

“affordability for the average person”), the plaintiffs’ failure 

to affirmatively allege unavailability or unreasonable cost 

should end our inquiry. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[t]he party invoking federal 

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” standing). 

Granted, the two individual plaintiffs’ declarations are 

vague about the cost and accessibility of farmers’ markets but 

they are plainly insufficient to sustain their standing in my 

view. See Foran Decl. ¶ 6, J.A. 48 (plaintiff unable to find

farmers’ market near family residences); see also Sowerwine 

Decl, supra n.1; cf. FWW member Pittman Decl. ¶ 10, J.A. 64 

 

1

See also Sowerwine Decl. ¶ 10, J.A. 54 (“If the USDA’s 

rules go into effect . . . I will have to find a local farmer from whom 

I trust to purchase chicken and turkey.”); cf. FWW Member Pittman 

Decl. ¶ 10, J.A. 64 (“If the USDA’s rules go into effect . . . . I 

would have to look for farmers’ markets”). Critically, the plaintiffs 

allege that poultry sold at farmers’ markets is “slaughtered in 

sanitary conditions.” See e.g., Foran Decl. ¶ 3, J.A. 48. 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 28 of 36
3

(“turkey is not always available year –round” [sic] at 

preferred farmers’ market). But the plaintiffs allege no facts 

supporting the notion that poultry from farmers’ markets is 

either unavailable or unreasonably priced.2 At best, their 

allegations are agnostic about the proximity, inventory and 

pricing of nearby markets, which is, to me, insufficient to 

conclude that non-NPIS poultry is either “difficult to obtain” 

or that the price differential is sufficient to affect 

“affordability for the average person.” Coal. for MercuryFree Drugs, 671 F.3d at 1281, 1283 (emphasis omitted).

The individual plaintiffs have two options. They can 

either purchase/consume the source of their alleged injury 

(i.e., NPIS poultry) or they can avoid it. Avoidance then

presents two possibilities. They can stay away from poultry 

altogether or they can purchase/consume non-NPIS poultry. 

In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), the 

Supreme Court concluded that the respondents’ alleged 

injury—likelihood that their telephone and email 

communications would be intercepted by domestic 

surveillance—was, for many reasons, too speculative to 

support standing, id. at 1147–50. It then rejected the 

respondents’ argument that the costs they incurred to avoid

 

2

FWW member Pittman alleges that “costs will go up 

considerably” at farmers’ markets, where “ground turkey alone is 

$12 per pound.” Pittman Decl. ¶ 10, J.A. 64. I find her assertion 

inadequate for two reasons. First, she does not mention the price of 

ground turkey at her grocery store (presumably selling NPIS 

turkey). Second, assuming that her reference to “turkey bacon and 

deli meat” costing “$9 per pound” at her grocery store, id. ¶ 3, J.A. 

62, results in a $3 per pound price increase in ground turkey at 

farmers’ markets, I cannot conclude that this threadbare price 

differential recital suffices to establish that “affordability for the 

average person” is affected. Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs, 671 

F.3d at 1283. 

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 29 of 36
4

surveillance were themselves a cognizable injury, concluding 

that “allowing respondents to bring this action based on costs 

they incurred in response to a speculative threat would be 

tantamount to accepting a repackaged version of respondents' 

first failed theory of standing.” Id. at 1151. Clapper 

subsequently dubbed the respondents’ “avoidance” injury 

“self-inflicted.” Id. at 1152. I take from this holding that 

injury attendant on the avoidance of an uncognizable injury is 

itself insufficient for standing because, for one thing, it is selfimposed. Here, the individual plaintiffs’ professed injury 

from eschewing poultry altogether is similarly self-imposed—

and therefore insufficient for standing—because they are free 

to purchase/consume poultry that is neither “difficult to 

obtain” nor “unreasonably priced.” Coal. for Mercury-Free 

Drugs, 671 F.3d at 1281, 1283 (emphasis omitted).3

I believe this case is on all fours with Coalition for 

Mercury-Free Drugs. There, the plaintiffs challenged the 

Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of the use of 

thimerosal, a mercury-based preservative, in certain vaccines. 

Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs, 671 F.3d at 1276–77. The 

plaintiffs alleged a “fear of future exposure to mercury,” 

claiming that it could cause “miscarriages, autism, and other 

developmental disorders.” Id. at 1278, 1280 (emphasis in 

 

3 Granted, Clapper was decided at the summary judgment 

stage, 133 S. Ct. at 1146, and here we review dismissal. Food & 

Water Watch v. Vilsack, 79 F.Supp.3d 174, 179 (D.D.C. 2015); 

Maj. Op. 8–10. Although the showing necessary to establish 

standing varies at each stage of the litigation, see Abigail Alliance 

for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 

129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006), nonetheless we can plainly uphold 

dismissal of claims for lack of standing, including lack of standing 

based on self-inflicted injury. See e.g., Fair Emp’t Council of 

Greater Washington, Inc., v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 

1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 30 of 36
5

original). But the plaintiffs did not allege that thimerosal-free

vaccines were not readily available at a reasonable price. Id. 

at 1282. “On the contrary,” we recognized, “they sa[id] that

they w[ould] refuse thimerosal-preserved vaccines.” Id. at 

1280. Given the existence of a readily available and 

reasonably priced thimerosal-free alternative—the plaintiffs’ 

“declarations [having] claim[ed] only that there was some 

price differential at a few individual outlets,” id. at 1283 

(emphasis added)—any injury from exposure to thimerosalbased vaccines would be self-inflicted. And, accordingly, we 

concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing. See id.4

Regarding plaintiff FWW, our organizational standing 

jurisprudence applies a two-part test to determine whether an 

organization has alleged a cognizable injury. See Equal 

 

4 Foreman, on the other hand, is inapposite. There, the 

plaintiffs challenged the FDA’s approval of the use of nitrites, 

whose probable carcinogenic effect was undisputed, as a bacon 

preservative. 631 F.2d. at 973–74. Because the plaintiffs alleged 

that bacon preserved without nitrites was “not readily available at a 

reasonable price,” id. at 974 n.12 (emphasis added), we concluded 

the plaintiffs had standing.

Baur v. Veneman is similarly distinguishable. 352 F.3d 625 

(2d Cir. 2003). There the plaintiffs challenged the United States 

Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) failure to “ban the use of 

downed livestock as food for human consumption.” Id. at 628. 

The court did not discuss whether the plaintiffs had any way to 

obtain meat that did not come from downed livestock. Here, 

however, the plaintiffs posit that poultry from farmers’ markets 

does not expose them to the injury allegedly resulting from NPIS 

poultry. See Foran Decl. ¶ 3, J.A. 48. Although Baur did not 

discuss the absence of alternative, and allegedly safe, meat 

suppliers, the Second Circuit approvingly cited Foreman for the 

proposition that, if an alternative is available, a plaintiff must allege 

that it is “not readily available at a reasonable price.” Id. at 634.

USCA Case #15-5037 Document #1589972 Filed: 12/22/2015 Page 31 of 36
6

Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). Litigation brought by an organization against a 

government entity requires that we ask, first, whether the 

agency’s action or omission to act “injured the 

[organization’s] interest and, second, whether the 

[organization] used its resources to counteract that harm.”5 

 

5

In my view, the first prong requires only a “direct conflict” 

with the plaintiff organization’s mission. Am. Soc’y. for Prevention 

of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, 659 F.3d 13, 25 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (“First, an organization seeking to establish [organizational] 

standing must show a direct conflict between the defendant’s 

conduct and the organization’s mission.” (quotations omitted)); See 

also PETA v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 

have emphasized the need for a direct conflict between the 

defendant’s conduct and the organization’s mission.” (quotations 

omitted)); Abigail Alliance, 469 F.3d at 133 (“[T]here must . . . be a 

direct conflict between the defendant’s conduct and the 

organization’s mission.”). Unlike my colleagues, I believe FWW 

satisfies this prong. Its mission includes “maintaining strong 

federal inspection of poultry” and “work[ing] to promote the 

practices and policies that will result in sustainable and secure food 

systems.” Lovera Decl. ¶ 4, J.A. 68 (reference to paragraph 4 is to 

second of paragraphs numbered “4”). And FWW alleges that the 

NPIS “threaten[s] public health and introduc[es] unwholesome 

poultry into interstate commerce.” Compl. ¶ 1, J.A. 9. Of course, 

“[f]or purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of 

standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all 

material allegations of the complaint.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 

490, 501 (1975). It is only because FWW’s resources are spent on 

“pure issue-advocacy,” as explained infra, that its standing is 

lacking. My colleagues, I believe, have erroneously injected a 

prong-two consideration—i.e., what FWW has spent its money to 

combat—into the prong-one inquiry whether the NPIS “directly 

conflicts” with FWW’s mission. They distinguish PETA under 

prong one by simply highlighting the agency’s omissions. Maj. Op.

24. In stopping at that point, they do not complete the prong-one 

analysis, that is, whether or not what the agency does—or, as in

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7

Id. at 1140 (quotation marks omitted). Under the second 

prong, we have held that expenditures for “pure issueadvocacy” are insufficient for standing. See Ctr. for Law & 

Educ., 396 F.3d at 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Here, the only 

‘service’ impaired is pure issue-advocacy . . . . In sum, 

Appellants fail to demonstrate standing . . . . ”); cf. Sierra 

Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“[A] mere 

‘interest in a problem’ . . . is not sufficient by itself to render 

the organization ‘adversely affected’ . . . . [I]f a ‘special 

interest’ in [a] subject were enough to entitle the [plaintiff] to 

commence this litigation, there would appear to be no 

objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any other 

bona fide ‘special interest’ organization . . . .”). In other 

words, an organization’s “expend[iture of] resources to 

educate its members and others regarding” government action 

or inaction “does not present an injury in fact.” See e.g., Nat’l 

Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (non-profit taxpayer organization qua

organization had no standing where its only expenditures to 

contest federal estate and gift tax rates were made to educate 

public and challenge legislation); Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 

F.3d at 1161–62 (organization lacked standing where alleged 

unlawful government action increased lobbying costs only). 

Instead, an organizational plaintiff must “allege impairment of 

its ability to provide services, [not] only impairment of its 

advocacy.” Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC, 786 F.3d 18, 24 

(D.C. Cir. 2015). FWW’s sole allegation that it has made

expenditures based on the challenged NPIS regime is tied to 

 

PETA, fails to do—is in direct conflict with the organization’s 

mission. 

On the other hand, an organization can—and here, does—

show the necessary direct conflict but nonetheless expend resources 

on matters we have said do not support standing, e.g., issue 

advocacy. Otherwise, our two-pronged inquiry merges into one 

prong. 

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8

educating its members and the public.6 In essence, FWW 

seeks to sound an alarm regarding the dangers of NPIS 

poultry. This is “pure issue-advocacy.” Ctr. for Law & 

Educ., 396 F.3d at 1162.

Moreover, I believe our decision in PETA is 

distinguishable. There, PETA made expenditures to fill a 

void left by the USDA when, according to PETA, the USDA

unlawfully failed to apply the protections of the Animal 

Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq., to birds. Id. at 1091. 

Its failure “meant, ipso facto, that the USDA was not creating 

bird-related inspection reports that PETA could use to raise 

public awareness.” Id. Thus, PETA was “required to expend 

resources to obtain information about the conditions of 

birds . . . , including through investigations, research and state 

and local public records requests.” Id. at 1096. PETA 

suffered a cognizable injury-in-fact because it spent resources 

to remedy alleged governmental nonfeasance, which deprived 

PETA of information to which it was allegedly entitled. But

for the USDA’s failure to act, “PETA would not need to 

undertake” those efforts, id., and, on that basis, we concluded 

that PETA’s expenditures constituted a cognizable injury. Id. 

at 1097. 

Granted, we have found organizational standing in 

private-party litigation on the basis of expenditures made to 

 

6

See Lovera Decl. ¶ 11–13, J.A. 70–71 (explaining that FWW 

plans to “educat[e] the general public and its members that the 

NPIS rules do not allow for the inspection of poultry product 

prescribed by the [Poultry Products Inspection Act],” “educate 

members of the public that just because a poultry product has a 

USDA inspection legend does not mean that it is not adulterated”

and “increase the amount of resources that it spends encouraging its 

members who wish to continue to eat chicken to avoid poultry from 

such companies”). 

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9

educate the public. For example, in Spann v. Colonial 

Village, Inc., the Fair Housing Council of Greater Washington 

and the Metropolitan Washington Planning & Housing 

Association challenged allegedly racially-motivated real 

estate advertisements placed by realtors and advertisers,

claiming the ads violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 899 

F.2d 24, 25–26 (D.C. Cir. 1990). We held that the 

organizations had standing because they spent funds on 

“endeavors designed to educate . . . black home buyers and 

renters [and] the D.C. area real estate industry and the public 

that racial preference in housing is indeed illegal.” Id. at 27. 

But Spann also made clear that our circuit has drawn a brightline between private-party suits and “suits against the 

government to compel the state to take, or desist from taking,

certain action.” Id. at 30. The latter “implicate most acutely 

the separation of powers, which, the Supreme Court instructs, 

is the ‘single basic idea’ on which the Article III standing 

requirement is built.” Id. The former, by contrast, are 

“traditional grist for the judicial mill.” Id. Thus, if an 

organization’s standing to pursue litigation against the 

government is premised only on injury flowing from 

expenditures to educate the public, the suit amounts to no 

more than an “assert[ion] [of] generalized grievances about 

the conduct of Government,” id. at 27 (quotation marks

omitted), and organizational standing is lacking. 

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment. 

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MILLETT, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join Judge 

Wilkins’ opinion for the Court in full. I write separately only 

to reiterate my continuing concerns about this Court’s 

organizational-standing doctrine and the unwarranted 

disparity it seems to have spawned between individuals’ and 

organizations’ ability to bring suit. See People for the Ethical 

Treatment of Animals v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 

797 F.3d 1087, 1099–1106 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Millett, J., 

dubitante). Because the majority opinion properly applies our 

precedent to keep a bad jurisprudential situation from getting 

worse, I concur. But I continue to believe that our 

organizational standing doctrine should be revisited in an

appropriate case.

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