Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00335/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

In conjunction with his motion to compel Defendant Floer's second deposition, Plaintiff

simultaneously filed a "Request for Expedited Hearing" on August 18, 2005. Plaintiffs sought to

expedite the matter because the discovery deadline was August 24, 2005. The Court did not grant

Plaintiffs' request. Plaintiff's request would have only allowed Defendants three full business days

to respond to Plaintiff's motion to compel. Defendants had the right to file their response by

September 6, 2005. See Local Civil Rule 7.2(c); FED.R.CIV.P. 6(a) Further, besides citing the

pending discovery deadline, Plaintiff gave no other justification to support their request. A review

of the record shows that the parties have been aware of the August 24, 2005 discovery deadline since

at least February of 2005. See Doc. #80 (Scheduling Order). As their was no adequate basis for

Plaintiffs' request, and it is nonetheless moot, it is denied.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ivan Tomkins, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Schmid Systems, Inc., et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 03-335-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court are four motions: (1) Defendants' Motion to Strike Deposition

Based on Plaintiffs' Fraudulent Subpoena; (2) Defendants' Motion to Hold Plaintiff in

Contempt of Court's Order ;(3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant Floer's Deposition

and Request for Attorney's Fees and Sanctions;1

 and (4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Court-Ordered

Settlement Conference.

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

I. Background

This case arises out of an alleged wrongful termination of Ivan Tomkins ("Plaintiff").

Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated by Schmid Systems, Inc. (USA)

("Schmid") through its former president, Gottfried Floer. Plaintiff also named the parent

corporation, Gerb Schmid GMBH & Co ("Schmid Germany") as a Defendant, which was

subsequently dismissed from the case as Plaintiff failed to timely serve Schmid Germany.

Accordingly, the only remaining Defendants in this case are: (1) Schmid; and (2) Gottfried

Floer who are represented by Alan Ariav. Plaintiff is represented by Adam Watters.

In an Order filed on April 27, 2005, the Court ruled on numerous motions to compel

discovery and for sanctions. The Court noted in the previous Order: "Unfortunately, the four

motions for sanctions reflect the ongoing, contentious, uncooperative litigation between these

parties. For the most part, the motions for sanctions arise out of various discovery disputes

between the parties . . ." See Doc. #96. Since that time, it appears that nothing has changed,

and now the Court must rule on more motions to compel, to strike, to hold in contempt, and

for sanctions.

II. Discussion

A. Sanctions 

As discussed in the Court's previous Order ruling on the various requests for

sanctions, FED.R.CIV.P. 37 ("Rule 37") substantially covers disputes arising from discovery.

Here, the disputes at issue arise from discovery disputes, and related previous Orders

regarding these disputes. The party seeking discovery may file a motion to compel the

discovery in question; if the motion is granted, that party may be awarded costs and

attorneys' fees. See Rule 37(a)(4). However, if the motion to compel is denied, the other side

may be awarded costs and attorneys' fees. Id. If the court finds that the party filing the

motion to compel failed to make a "good faith effort" to obtain the discovery without court

intervention, costs and attorneys' fees may be denied. Id. In addition, costs and attorneys'

fees may be denied if the court finds that the "opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses

unjust." Id.

The purpose of sanctions "is the prevention of delay and costs to other litigants caused

by the filing of groundless motions . . . [it] designed to protect courts and opposing parties

from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process." Cunningham v. Hamilton

County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 208-209 (1999). "When a party's conduct during discovery

necessitates its opponent's bringing motions which otherwise would have been unnecessary,

the court may properly order it to pay the moving party's expenses unless its conduct was

'substantially justified' or other circumstances make the award 'unjust.'" Marquis v. Chrysler

Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 1978). If a party's actions in the discovery dispute were

"substantially justified," sanctions need not be imposed; an action is "substantially justified

. . . if reasonable people could differ as to whether the party" acted appropriately under the

pertinent rules of procedure. Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649

(9th Cir. 1982)(internal quotes and citations omitted.) Trial courts are "afforded great latitude

in imposing sanctions," and such decisions to impose sanctions are reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Reygo Pacific Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Further, 28 U.S.C. §1927 provides that: "Any attorney or other person admitted to

conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such

conduct." Trial courts also have the "well-acknowledged inherent power ... to levy sanctions

in response to abusive litigation practices." Fjelstad v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 762

F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, the "decision whether to penalize a party for dilatory

conduct during discovery proceedings is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."

Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1981); see

also Marquis, 577 F.2d at 641 ("Imposition of discovery sanctions is committed to the trial

court's discretion."); Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 367 (9th Cir. 1996)("The

district court has great latitude in imposing sanctions for discovery abuse, and this court

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion."); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,

43-44 (1991)(holding that it is firmly established that federal courts have inherent power to

sanction individuals for contempt of court, that this power extends to both conduct before a

court and that beyond the court's confines, and that a court has discretion to fashion sanctions

as it deems appropriate under the circumstances of the case.) 

1. Defendants' Motion to Strike Deposition Based on Plaintiff's Fraudulent 

 Subpoena

On July 20, 2005, Plaintiff served a subpoena on a non-party witness, Greg Michel,

for a July 22, 2005 deposition in Olympia, Washington; Olympia falls within the bounds of

the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Defendants previously told

Plaintiff that they were available on July 22, 2005 for the deposition, and Plaintiff thereafter

scheduled the deposition for that date based on Defendants input. Michel appeared for the

deposition on July 22, 2005, and Defendants also appeared telephonically for the July 22,

2005 deposition as scheduled. Nonetheless, Defendants found it necessary to file the motion

to strike at issue. First, it appears that the "motion to strike" is simply a veiled attempt to

retroactively quash a subpoena; as Defendants admit, they have no such standing to obtain

relief on such a motion. Second, Defendants have suffered no prejudice by Plaintiff's

actions; Defendants were consulted as to the deposition date, the deponent appeared for the

deposition at the correct location and time, and Defendants appeared telephonically for the

deposition. Third, contrary to the one argument made for the invalidity of the subpoena in

Defendants' motion (as opposed to the new arguments for invalidity made in the reply brief

to which Plaintiff had no chance to address), Plaintiff's counsel had the authority to issue

deposition subpoenas on behalf of any district court in the country as he is an attorney that

has a case pending before an Arizona federal district court and he is admitted to practice

before the Arizona federal district court. See FED.R.CIV.P. 45(a)(3); Kupritz v. Savanah

College of Art & Design, 155 F.R.D. 84, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1994); William W. Schwarzer, et al.,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial §11:2268 (2005). Lastly, while it is true that Plaintiff

failed to comply with some of the subpoena requirements in FED.R.CIV.P. 45, the deponent

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

appeared for the deposition and testified that he would have appeared for the deposition even

without a subpoena. If the deponent failed to appear for the deposition and Plaintiff failed

to serve a valid subpoena, then Defendants would actually have grounds for a sanction.

However, under the circumstances at issue, Defendants are not entitled to relief. In addition,

at the hearing on the pending motions, Defendants withdrew the motion in question. As

Plaintiff did in fact fail to comply with various requirements in FED.R.CIV.P. 45, it appears

that Defendants had at least some basis for their motion; as such, Plaintiff's request for

sanctions in having to respond to the motion is denied.

2. Defendants' Motion to Hold Plaintiff in Contempt of Court's Order

In an Order filed on July 5, 2005, the Court stated:

Defendants have . . . filed a motion to compel Plaintiffs to produce the entire

inadvertently sent email received by Ivan Tomkins regarding the schedule for

the Schmid conference in California. At the previous hearing on the last four

motions for sanctions, Defendants' counsel requested the entire email in

question; Plaintiffs' counsel responded that he produced everything Tomkins

gave to him, which was the attachment to the email. However, as Defendants

correctly argue, the email page itself which has information as to who sent and

received the email was not produced, and was not specifically addressed by the

Court. As Tomkins must have received the initial email containing sender and

receiver information to have received the attachment already disclosed,

Tomkins is ordered to produce that page. To the extent Tomkins may claim

he no longer has that page, he shall file an affidavit with the Court attesting to

the fact that he no longer has the printed out email page in question, that this

email is no longer easily accessible via Tomkin's computer, and explaining

what he did with the initial email page. Tomkins shall disclose or file an

affidavit within 14 days of the filing date of this Order. 

See Doc. #111.

Pursuant to that Order, Plaintiff had to produce the email or file an affidavit within 14

days. There is no dispute that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court's Order. Rather,

Plaintiff never produced the email and still has not filed an affidavit to make it a part of

official the record in this case; rather, Plaintiff faxed an affidavit to the Court on August 5,

2005. Plaintiff's counsel argues that it was impossible to meet the Court's deadline because

Tomkins, unbeknownst to counsel, went on a business trip to New York. Further, counsel

states that he left several messages for Tomkins, but Tomkins failed to return his calls until

after the Court's deadline had expired. After the deadline expired, while on a cross country

car trip, Tomkins stopped at roadside faxes to send the affidavit; both attempts to fax,

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

however, failed. Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel contacted Defendants explaining the

situation, but to Plaintiff's chagrin, Defendant's filed the motion in question.

Defendants' suggested sanction of dismissing the entire case is obviously too harsh

considering the infraction, but some form of sanction is appropriate. Plaintiff has previously

been warned and sanctioned for failing to comply with numerous rules of procedure, and

should know to make every reasonable effort possible to comply with an actual Order from

the Court. In its April 25, 2005 Order, the Court stated that the "sanction against Plaintiff

should encourage him to fully comply with the rules of procedure and relevant case law prior

to acting or submitting a motion; Plaintiff's failure to do this has resulted in the Court having

to expend additional time resolving unnecessary disputes such as the one at bar." See Doc.

#96. Again, in a June 29, 2005 Order denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of

sanctions, the Court stated that "Plaintiffs were previously sanctioned for failing to comply

with numerous rules of procedure which forced the Defendants to unnecessarily incur costs

and unnecessarily required the Court's intervention; both of these unnecessary events could

have been avoided if Plaintiffs complied with the rules of procedure as discussed in the

Court's previous Order.." See Doc. #111. 

Here, Plaintiff had a full two weeks to comply with a simple Order of the Court to

either turn over a one page email, or file an affidavit consisting of a few sentences explaining

why Plaintiff no longer had the email. While Plaintiff's counsel argues that it "proved

impossible" to comply with the Court's Order, the Court finds this difficult to accept. While

Tomkins was apparently in New York during the time at issue and Tomkins' counsel

apparently left messages for him in Tucson because he did not know Tomkins was in New

York, compliance would not have "proved impossible" if one of the following occurred: (1)

Tomkins picked up a phone in New York and called into his relevant answering

machine/voicemail to check his messages during the two week period in question; (2)

Tomkins picked up a phone in New York and called someone to check and relay any

messages left for him during the two week period in question; (3) Tomkins informed counsel

of his whereabouts, and left contact information (cell phone, hotel numbers, email, the

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

number of anyone who would know how to contact him, etc.). As Plaintiff chose to file this

lawsuit, it is more than reasonable to expect that he would have done one or more of the

above in order to comply with the obligations that may arise throughout hislawsuit. Further,

the Court notes that counsel was aware of the deadline for two weeks and must have been

cognizant of Tomkins' failure to respond to his messages. As such, Plaintiff could have and

should have filed a motion for an extension of time prior to the expiration of the deadline;

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 6(b), the Court may grant an extension of time for "cause shown"

if the request is made prior to the deadline. However, where the request for an extension of

time is made after the deadline (or not at all, as in this case), the extension can only be

granted for "excusable neglect." None of these undemanding steps were taken by Tomkins

or counsel. Nevertheless, as Defendants withdrew their motion for contempt at the hearing

on the pending motions, Defendants motion is denied as moot.

3. Plaintiff's Motion to Re-Depose Defendant Floer

The discovery deadline in this case was August 24, 2005; this deadline has been in

place since February 28, 2005. See Doc. #80. Nonetheless, Plaintiff waited until August 18,

2005 to file his motion to compel a second deposition of Defendant Floer. Plaintiff initially

deposed Floer on February 28, 2004 for approximately two hours. Because Plaintiff had not

yet obtained various financial documents relating to Defendants prior to the deposition,

Plaintiff's counsel stated at the deposition that he thought it would be necessary to take a

second deposition of Floer once more documents were obtained. Nearly 16 months after

taking Floer's initial deposition, and many months after obtaining documents pertaining to

Defendants' financial condition, Plaintiff requested a second deposition from Floer in a letter

dated August 10, 2005. Due to the long passage of time, Defendants reasonably objected to

Plaintiff's request which was only 14 days prior to the discovery deadline. Generally, where

a litigant seeks to depose a party for a second time, he must obtain leave of court. See

FED.R.CIV.P. 30(a)(2)(B). However, where the other side has already stipulated to a second

deposition of the deponent in question, then leave of court is not required to re-depose the

opposing party. See FED.R.CIV.P. 30(a)(1) & (2); Adv. Comm. Notes to 1993 Amendments

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

See Defendants' Response to Motion to Compel at 2 (". . . Defendants' counsel did

agree to allow resumption of Floer's deposition . . .").

3

Besides this one telephonic deposition, no other discovery will be permitted.

4

The Court notes that Defendants could have simply allowed Floer's second deposition

to proceed in the spirit of cooperation and pursuant to their previous agreement to do so.

However, Defendants refused to do this which once again has contributed to the continued

waste of time and resources in this case as Plaintiff was forced to file the motion at issue to

which Defendants had to respond.

- 8 -

to FED.R.CIV.P. 30(a)(2). As Defendants admit2

 that they agreed to allow Floer's second

deposition, Plaintiff's motion to compel such deposition is granted. The parties previously

agreed that this second deposition would take place telephonically. Accordingly, despite the

expiration of the discovery deadline,3

 Plaintiff shall depose Defendant Floer (and he shall

make himself available) via telephone within 14 days of the filing date of this Order. As

Defendants arguably acted reasonably4

 (as discussed above) in opposing the second

deposition, Plaintiff's request for sanctions and attorney's fees is denied. In light of the delay

related to Floer's deposition, Plaintiff shall have an additional 30 days to file his response to

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

4. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Settlement Conference 

Lastly, Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the Court to compel the parties to attend a

settlement conference. While the Court certainly has the discretion to order such a

conference, the Court declines to given that a dispositive motion has been filed by

Defendants. As such, Plaintiff's request is denied without prejudice at this time.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

(1) As Defendants' Motion to Strike Deposition Based on Plaintiffs' Fraudulent Subpoena

was withdrawn, it is denied as moot; 

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

(2) As Defendants' Motion to Hold Plaintiff in Contempt of Court's Order was withdrawn,

it is denied as moot;

(3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant Floer's Deposition and Request for Attorney's

Fees and Sanctions is granted in part and denied in part; 

(4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Court-Ordered Settlement Conference is denied without prejudice;

and

(5) As discussed at the hearing, due to the continuing lack of professionalism demonstrated

by the attorneys for both parties throughout this case, they are ordered to jointly contact Kip

Micuda who is the Director of the Attorney/Consumer Assistance Program for the State Bar

of Arizona. Mr. Micuda's phone number is 602-340-7270. The attorneys shall contact Mr.

Micuda no later than 4:00 p.m. on 10/18/05, and Mr. Micuda will set up a meeting at a time

and place that he deems appropriate; the purpose of the meeting is to conduct an informal

mediation regarding various problematic issues that have arisen in this litigation. The Court

has forwarded this Order, the docket report, two previous Orders (Doc. #96, #111), and an

excerpt of a deposition (attached to Defendants reply brief, Doc. #119) to Mr. Micuda for his

review. After contacting Mr. Micuda, the parties shall inform the Court of the date, time, and

location of their meeting, and the issues that will be discussed at the meeting as directed by

Mr. Micuda. Lastly, within 5 days after meeting with Mr. Micuda, the parties shall file a

joint report with the Court detailing what occurred at the meeting. Failure to comply with

this Order and failure to cooperate with Mr. Micuda will result in sanctions.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2005.

Case 4:03-cv-00335-CKJ Document 129 Filed 10/13/05 Page 9 of 9