Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00970/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00970-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

DANNY LAWRENCE DUPREE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACT. NO. 3:10cv970-WKW

) (WO)

CITY OF PHENIX CITY, ALABAMA, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE and ORDER

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the pro se plaintiff, Danny Lawrence Dupree

(“Dupree”), complains that defendants Phenix CityPolice officer SherryLashley(“Lashley”)

and the City of Phenix Cityviolated his constitutional rights by unlawfully arresting him, and

improperly seizing his shotgun. The plaintiff filed two amended complaints setting forth his

allegations in more detail. In his second amended complaint, Dupree specifically complains

that defendant Lashley arrested him without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, and defendant City of Phenix City has a practice and

custom of permitting improper arrests. See Doc. # 31. The court has jurisdiction of the 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

This case is now pending before the court on the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (doc. # 72) filed on April 30, 2012. The plaintiff has filed a response in opposition

to the defendants’ motion. After careful consideration and review, the court concludes that

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the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 1

as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for

summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,

discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

[dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant

may meet this burden by presenting evidence which would be admissible at trial indicating

there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to

present evidence in support ofsome element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden

of proof. Id. at 322-324. 

Once the movant meets his evidentiary burden and demonstrates the absence of a

Effective December 1, 2010, the language of Rule 56(a) was amended. The word “dispute”

1

replaced the word “issue” to “betterreflect[]the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” FED.R.CIV.P.

56(a), Advisory Committee Notes, 2010 Amendments.

2

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genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; th

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must be

support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not

establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”). A genuine dispute of material fact exists

when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to

return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

To survive the movant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment, a party

is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” “that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49

(1986). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is

not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250. “A mere

‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must

be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party.” Walker

v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990) quoting Anderson, supra. Conclusory th

3

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allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute

of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001). Hence, th

when a nonmoving party fails to set forth specific facts supported by appropriate evidence

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which the

nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in

favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.”).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74 Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 th

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law th

applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children &

Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are material th

under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment.”). 

“The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that

factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City

of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate th

a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the

4

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record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, Ltd., v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is

admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no

genuine dispute of material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled

to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324

(summaryjudgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiarymaterials and affidavits before

the court show there is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d

at 1279 (to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor). However,

if there is a conflict in the evidence, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Ruiz de

Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11 Cir. 2000). th

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906

F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this th

court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. With these

principles of law in mind, the court will determine now whether summary judgment is

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appropriate and should be granted.

III. FACTS2

On November 13, 2008, defendant Sherry Lashley was employed as a patrol officer

by the City of Phenix City Police Department. (Doc. # 72, Ex. B, Aff. Lashley at 1). At

approximately 6:30 a.m. on that day, Lashley was dispatched to North Railroad Street and

6 Avenue in response to a report of a “male subject near a dark truck displaying an th

unknown type weapon.” (Doc. # 72, Ex. A, at 3). 

When she arrived, Lashley encountered Dupree. When Dupree saw Lashley’s patrol

car, he grabbed grocery bags and began to exit his truck. (Doc. # 82, Aff. Dupree at 3). 

What happened next is hotly disputed. According to Dupree, Lashley instructed him to put

his groceries back in his truck which he did. (Id.) She then instructed him to turn around,

and he complied. He tried to explain that his truck was stuck but Lashley “had no interest

in what [he] wanted to say.” (Id.) Lashley then requested permission to search Dupree’s

truck which he refused. Dupree asserts that he “complied in every way with said officer’s

instruction.” (Id.) He did not raise his voice, curse, yell, use racial epithets, use obscene

language or disobey any orders by the officer. (Id. at 3-4). Dupree also asserts that at no

At this stage of the proceedings, this court takes the facts alleged by Dupree as true and construes

2

them in the light most favorable to him. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11 Cir.

th

2000) (citations omitted) (“In assessing whether there is any ‘genuine issue’ for trial, the court ‘must view

all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party,” ... and ‘resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.’

... Moreover, the court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations....”). 

The court makes no factual findings, and the actual facts may be different than those stated here.

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time did he remove his shotgun from his truck. (Id. at 4). He contends that he was “polite,

cooperative, [and] not argumentative,” but he did not give officer Lashley permission to

search his truck. (Id.) Finally, Dupree contends that he made no statement at any time to

Lashley about the shotgun in his truck. (Id.)

Lashley describes a completely different scene. According to Lashley’s affidavit,3

Dupree was standing outside the truck when she arrived. (Doc. # 72, Ex. B, at 1). Very

quickly a witness told Lashley that Dupree had pointed a shotgun at him earlier. (Id.). 

Lashley approached Dupree who “appeared agitated in [her] presence.” (Id. at 2). Lashley

then noticed the shotgun on the front seat of Dupree’s truck. (Id.) Dupree denied having any

weapons. (Id). Lashley asserts that during the duration of her encounter with Dupree, he was

yelling answers, screaming, cursing, and refusing to “lower his voice and calm down after

being instructed to do so.” (Id.) At some point, Lashley spoke with a couple who advised

her that Dupree had been yelling racial epithets while standing in the street with a shotgun

in his hand. (Id.) Lashley arrested Dupree for disorderly conduct, and seized his Mossberg

12 gauge shotgun. 

On November 14, 2008, a criminal complaint was filed charging Dupree with

disorderly conduct. (Doc. # 72, Ex. F). At a court hearing on January 6, 2009, the charge

was nolle prossed on the motion to the prosecutor because the criminal complaint named a

 The defendants filed Lashley’s police report narrative created on November 14, 2008 as well as

3

her affidavit, signed on April 25, 2012. Although there are inconsistencies between Lashley’s narrative and

her affidavit, regardless of which document the court considers, her chronicles of the encounter with Dupree

varies vastly from Dupree’s description of the event.

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“Mr. Price,” instead of Danny Dupree. (Doc. # 72, Ex. E & I). 

Despite numerous requests, Dupree was unable to secure the return of his shotgun. 

This lawsuit followed. Shortly after the complaint was filed in this case, the shotgun was

returned to Dupree’s friend, Thomas Worthy. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Motions to Strike

Before addressing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as an initial matter,

the court disposes of the parties’ motions to strike (docs. # 80, 81, & 83). The plaintiff and

the defendants seek to strike certain information relied on by the opposing party either in

support of or in opposition to the pending motion for summary judgment. The defendants

argue that the plaintiff’s responses are untimely and should be stricken because they were

filed one day after the deadline set by the court. The defendants have not asserted that they

have been prejudiced by the late filing of the plaintiff’s responses, and thus, the defendants’

motion to strike will be denied.

The plaintiff argues that the affidavits filed in support of the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment do not meet the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 56, and should be 4

stricken. The court is capable ofsifting through the defendants’ affidavits and accompanying

documentation and considering only those portions which are either based on the declarant’s

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) requires that “an affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a

4

motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show

that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated.” 

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personal knowledge or are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. To the

extent that the declarations contain information not based on personal knowledge, the court

has not considered that material in resolving the motion for summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motions to strike will also be denied. 

To the extent that the plaintiff seeks to have certain documents deemed authentic, see

doc. # 79, the defendants have not objected. Accordingly, this motion shall be granted to the

extent that the court will deem the documents to be authentic for the purpose of considering

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

B. City of Phenix City

The plaintiff has sued the City of Phenix City alleging that it has a custom of

permitting arrests without probable cause, and allowing unfounded criminal complaints to

be routinely filed. “The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability

under §1983.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11 Cir. 1998). Municipalities th

are usually not liable for the acts of their agents; however, a municipality may incur liability

for the actions of a police officer when it promulgates an “official policy” that causes a

constitutional violation. Monnell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978).

To be successful on a claim against a municipality under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show: (1)

that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy

that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or

custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11 Cir. 2004). th

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Dupree asserts in his complaint that the City of Phenix City failure to “take corrective action

as concerns the carte blanche issuance of arrest warrants without regard to their legal

correctness is a product of the City of Phenix City’s failure to properly supervise and/or train

the warrant clerk, policemen and others involved in the wholesale issuance of arrest

warrants.” (Doc. # 31 at 4). Asserting that something is a “unofficial” custom, without

more, is simply insufficient to hold the municipality liable. (Id.). Courts in this district have

repeatedly required more than a bare bones, passing reference to a policy or custom to state

a claim against a municipality. See, e.g., Johnson v. Andalusia Police Dep’t, 633 F. Supp.

2d 1289, 1301–02 (M.D. Ala. 2009); Manning v. Mason, 2011 WL 1832539, at *4 (M.D.

Ala. May 13, 2011) (dismissing claim where plaintiffs failed to identify a specific policy or

custom)’ Lowe v. Montgomery City, Ala., 2007 WL 1186596 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (vague and

conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim under § 1983); Walters v. City of

Andalusia, 89 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (single incident insufficient to

demonstrate “longstanding and widespread practice”). Dupree points the court to no

evidence other than his arrest to support his claim of a custom or policy of the City of Phenix

City. Consequently, the court concludes that Dupree has failed to demonstrate that there

exists a genuine dispute regarding any policy or custom related to the City of Phenix City’s

training and supervising of its officers, and thus, the City of Phenix City is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on his claims against it.

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C. Illegal Arrest and Seizure Claim against defendant Lashley. 

Dupree also sues defendant Lashley alleging that she arrested him and seized his

shotgun without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States. Defendant Lashley denies that her actions were improper under the

circumstances and she asserts the defense of qualified immunity. See Doc. # 73.

1. Official Capacity Claims. To the extent that Dupree sues this defendant in her

official capacity, he is entitled to no relief. A suit against a party in her official capacity is

the same as a suit against the governmental entity that the individual employee represents.

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As previously noted, governmental entities

may be liable when the alleged constitutional violations resulted from the execution of the

policy or custom of the governmental entity, see Monell, supra, but Dupree has not come

forward with any evidence that the City of Phenix City had a custom or policywhich resulted

in the wrongs asserted in the complaint. Thus, Lashley is entitled to summary judgment in

her official capacity with regard to the plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and seizure claims. 

2. Individual Capacity Claims. Defendant Lashley asserts that she is entitled to

summary judgment on the plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and seizure claims against her because

Dupree has failed to demonstrate that she violated his Fourth Amendment rights. She also

alleges that she is entitled to qualified immunity.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees that persons will be secure in their persons against

unreasonable searches and seizures. “The Fourth Amendment is implicated when a police

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officer either briefly detains a citizen for investigatory purposes or holds a citizen pursuant

to an arrest. United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11 Cir.1989).” Bryan v. th

Spillman, 217 Fed. Appx. 882, 884, (11 Cir. 2007) (No. 06-13970). “Personal encounters th

between law enforcement officers and citizens are ‘seizures’ on occasions “when the officer,

by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a

citizen.”” Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1488 (11 Cir. 1991) quoting Terry v. Ohio,

th

392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). Individuals have a constitutional right not to be arrested without

probable cause, and a violation of this right may give rise to a claim for damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572 (11 Cir. 1990). However, “[a]n arrest th

does not violate the Fourth Amendment if a police officer has probable cause for the arrest.” 

Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11 Cir. 2003). th

Lashley arrested Dupree for disorderly conduct. Under Alabama law, an officer may

arrest an individual for disorderly conduct when the person:

(1) Engages in fighting or in violent tumultuous or threatening behavior;

(2) Makes unreasonable noise; or 

(3) In a public place uses abusive or obscene language or makes an

obscene gesture; or

(4) Without lawful authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of

persons; or

(5) Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or a transportation facility; or

(6) Congregates with other person (sic) in a public place and refuses to

comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse.

ALA. CODE § 13A-11-7 (1977).

“The “abusive or obscene language” provision of the disorderly conduct statute “is

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very narrow and applies only to ‘fighting words.’” R.I.T. v. State, 675 So. 2d 97, 98 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1995). See also Robinson v. State, 615 So. 2d 112, 113 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).

Unfortunately, epithets ... directed at a police officer in the performance of

[her] duties are not uncommon in today’s law enforcement environment. The

fact that an officer encounters such vulgarities with some frequency, and the

fact that [her] training enables [her] to diffuse a potentially volatile situation

without physical retaliation, however, means that words that might provoke a

violent response from the average person do not, when addressed to a police

officer, amount to ‘fighting words.’

Id. at 114 quoting Shinault v. City of Huntsville, 579 So. 2d 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)

(Bown, J., dissenting).

Moreover, “[d]isorderly conduct is a Class C misdemeanor.” ALA.CODE § 13A-11-7

(1977). Alabama law prohibits a police officer from arresting a person for a misdemeanor

without a warrant unlessthe offense has been committed in the officer’s presence. See ALA.

5

CODE § 15-10-3 (emphasis added). 

Dupree asserts that he did not curse, yell, utter racial epithets, or obscene language at

any time during the encounter with Lashley. Lashley contends that Dupree yelled, screamed,

cursed and refused to lower his voice or calm down. Lashley also reported that two

witnesses told her that Dupree had been waving the shotgun and yelling racial epithets. 

Plainly, there are factual disputes concerning the incident between Dupree and Lashley,

including whether Alabama law permitted Lashley to arrest Dupree for disorderly conduct

There are certain exceptions to the general rule that misdemeanor arrests without a warrant require 5

that the offense occur in the officer’s presence. See ALA. CODE 15-10-3. None of the exceptions apply in

this case.

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under the circumstances. Taking the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, as the court is

required to do at this juncture, a reasonable jury could conclude that Lashley’s arrest of

Dupree was not permissible under Alabama law because his conduct did not rise to the level

of disorderly conduct. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Alabama law did not

permit Lashley to arrest Dupree for the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct without

a warrant because Dupree did not commit the offense in Lashley’s presence. A reasonable

jury could conclude, therefore, that Lashley’s arrest of Dupree was invalid and thereby

violative of the Fourth Amendment. Under the facts presented by the plaintiff, the court

concludes that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether Lashley had

probable cause to arrest Dupree for disorderly conduct. Thus, summary judgment is due to

be denied. 

Lashley further argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity for Dupree’s claims

against her. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials sued in their

individual capacities as long as their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “[Q]ualified immunity is a privilege that provides

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‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’” Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d

1233, 1242 (11 Cir. 2008) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)). For this th

reason, the Supreme Court instructs courts to resolve“immunity questions at the earliest

possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); GJR Invs., Inc. v.

County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11 Cir. 1998) (Noting it is “important for a court th

to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit as possible.”). 

District courts are no longer bound to follow the“inflexible” two-part inquiry for qualified

immunity that had been required by Saucier, supra. Pearson, 555 U.S. 227. “The judges of

the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 236. Under

Saucier, the court first asked a“threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right?” 533 U.S. at 201. If the answer to that question was affirmative, the

next question was “whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific

context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. The court may still apply the

two-part inquiry fromSaucier when that “order of decision making will best facilitate the fair

and efficient disposition of [the] case.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. However, lower courts

have the discretion to decide in which order to ask those questions.

Dupree clearly claims that he was unreasonably arrested, and his property seized, in

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violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, he has alleged a deprivation of his constitutional

rights. It is clearly established that seizing and detaining an individual without reasonable

suspicion or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635 (1987); Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 579. However, because factual disputes preclude

summary judgment on the merits of the case, the nature of the factual disputes also preclude

summary judgment on the question of qualified immunity. If the facts are as Dupree alleges,

Lashley would not be entitled to immunity because any police officer would know that the

law was clearly established that arresting Dupree for disorderly conduct under the facts of

this case would violate his constitutional rights and any officer would know or conclude that

his or her actions were therefore unlawful. See Duncan v. State, 686 So. 2d 1279. 1282 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1996) (“Regarding the cursing, the appellant’s saying “fuck you” to the officer

were not fighting words so as to constitute disorderly conduct in this case.”); R.I.T., 675 So.

2d at 99-100 (use of profanity or vulgarity directed at police officer does not constitute

“fighting words” to support arrest for disorderly conduct); Robinson, 615 So. 2d at 113-14

(language used by defendant did not constitute “fighting words” and arrest was unlawful). 

Based on the forgoing, the court concludes that the motion for summary judgment with

respect to the Fourth Amendment claims against defendant Lashley is due to be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that defendant

City of Phenix City’s motion for summary judgment (doc. # 72) be GRANTED, and that this

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defendant be DISMISSED as defendant in this action. It is also the RECOMMENDATION

of the Magistrate Judge that defendant Lashley’s motion for summary judgment regarding

Dupree’s Fourth Amendment claims against her in her individual capacity (doc. # 72) be

DENIED, and that this case be set for a non-jury trial. Finally, it is 

ORDERED as follows:

1. That the motions to strike (docs. # 80, 81 & 83) be and are hereby DENIED;

2. That the plaintiff’s motion for order (doc. # 79) be and is hereby GRANTED

to the extent that the documents are authenticated for the purpose of the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. The motion be and is hereby DENIED in all other respects; and

3. That the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on or

before July 16, 2012. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein th

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 2 day of July, 2012. nd

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18

Case 3:10-cv-00970-WKW-CSC Document 84 Filed 07/02/12 Page 18 of 18