Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01242/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01242-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GREGORY HANDLOSER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HCL AMERICA, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01242-LHK (VKD)

ORDER RE DISCOVERY DISPUTES 

NOS. 4 AND 5 RE PLAINTIFFS’ 

INTERROGATORIES

Re: Dkt. Nos. 69, 70

The parties ask the Court to resolve two discovery disputes concerning plaintiffs’ 

interrogatories to defendants HCL America, Inc. and HCL Technologies Ltd. (collectively, 

“HCL”). The Court heard oral argument on January 28, 2019.

In view of HCL’s representations during the hearing, the Court orders HCL to serve a 

complete response to plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 1 (Set 2) by January 30, 2020.

The remaining disputes concern plaintiffs’ Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3 (Set 2), which the 

Court addresses separately below.

I. BACKGROUND

In this putative class action, plaintiffs allege that HCL engages in a pattern or practice of 

racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Dkt. No. 40. 

Specifically, plaintiffs allege that at least 70% of HCL’s U.S.-based workforce is South Asian, 

even though only about 12% of the relevant labor pool is South Asian. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiffs contend 

that HCL uses various techniques to achieve a workforce with these disproportionate 

demographics and that these techniques amount to a pattern and practice of intentional 

employment discrimination based on race. Id. ¶¶ 14-20 53, 58.

HCL denies the allegations of discrimination, objects to treatment of the matter as a class 

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action, and raises a number of affirmative defenses. Dkt. No. 45.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Interrogatory No. 2 (Set 2)

Plaintiffs ask the Court to require HCL to answer Interrogatory No. 2, at least as it 

concerns the affirmative action requirements in 41 C.F.R. part 60-2. Interrogatory No. 2 states:

Describe HCL’s federal affirmative action obligations, including but 

not limited to: (1) the years in which HCL was obliged to comply 

with 41 C.F.R. part 60-2’s affirmative action requirements, and (2) 

why the affirmative action requirements of 41 C.F.R. part 60-2 did 

not apply to HCL for any year in which you contend that they did 

not apply.

Dkt. No. 69-2 at 5. Plaintiffs argue that evidence that HCL failed to comply with its federal

affirmative action obligations is relevant to and probative of HCL’s discriminatory intent. Dkt. 

No. 69 at 3. HCL objects that the interrogatory does not seek relevant information, and is so broad 

that HCL would need to undertake “a full-scale audit” of its regulatory obligations in order to 

respond. Id. at 6-8. HCL also argues that any such response would necessarily implicate attorneyclient privilege and attorney work product protections because it would require legal analysis. Id.

at 9.1

The federal regulations at 41 C.F.R. part 60-2 provide that certain “nonconstruction 

(supply and service) contractors” working with the federal government must develop “affirmative 

action programs.” 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1. The purpose of an affirmative action program is as a 

“management tool designed to ensure equal employment opportunity.” 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10(a)(1). 

According to the regulations, “[a] central premise underlying affirmative action is that, absent 

discrimination, over time a contractor’s workforce, generally, will reflect the gender, racial and 

ethnic profile of the labor pools from which the contractor recruits and selects.” Id. The

regulations include requirements governing the contents of these programs and procedures for 

evaluating contractors’ compliance with them. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10.

The Court agrees with plaintiffs that if HCL had an obligation under 41 C.F.R. part 60-2 to 

1 HCL objected on grounds of privilege and relevance, among other bases, in its written response 

to Interrogatory No. 2. Dkt. No. 69-2 at 5-6.

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develop and comply with an affirmative action program, its failure to do so may be relevant to 

plaintiffs’ claim of intentional racial discrimination. See Gonzales v. Police Dept., City of San 

Jose, 901 F.2d 758, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that defendant’s failure to comply with 

affirmative action plan mandated by a consent decree may be relevant to the question of 

discriminatory intent); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1135 n.14 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 

454 U.S. 969 (1981) (observing that evidence of defendant’s failure to comply with an affirmative 

action program or support the program’s director is also “relevant to discerning the Company’s 

attitude regarding race”) (cited with approval in Gonzales). In these circumstances, plaintiffs 

should be permitted to discover the factual basis for any contention by HCL that it did not have an

obligation to develop an affirmative action program under 41 C.F.R. part 60-2 during the relevant 

period of time, particularly if HCL intends to rely on those facts in disputing plaintiffs’ allegations 

of intentional discrimination. While contention interrogatories directed to issues of pure law are 

not permitted, a party may propound such interrogatories to seek the factual basis for the opposing 

party’s position on an issue. See AngioScore, Inc. v TriReme Medical, Inc., Case No. 12-cv03393-YGR (JSC), 2014 WL 7188779 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014) (“If, as a legal matter, 

Defendant contends he was not under a legal duty to disclose the opportunity to Plaintiff, then 

Defendant should say so and explain why.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2) (“An interrogatory is not 

objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the 

application of law to fact . . . .”).

However, the Court agrees with HCL that Interrogatory No. 2 is not limited to discovery of

HCL’s contention that it had no obligation under 41 C.F.R. part 60-2 or to the facts that support 

such a contention. The interrogatory asks for HCL’s description of its “federal affirmative action 

obligations, including but not limited to” other more specific information. HCL is correct that an 

interrogatory seeking a narrative description of all of HCL’s federal legal obligations concerning 

affirmative action is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case, nor a proper subject 

for an interrogatory. For this reason, HCL need not answer Interrogatory No. 2. However, 

plaintiffs may withdraw this interrogatory and serve a different interrogatory that complies with 

Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, consistent with the discussion above.

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B. Interrogatory No. 3 (Set 2)

Plaintiffs ask the Court to require HCL to answer Interrogatory No. 3, which states:

Identify all persons who provided factual information in connection 

with your answers to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories (including this set of 

interrogatories, prior sets of interrogatories, and any subsequent sets 

of interrogatories), including, for each such person, his or her title, 

position, department, employee number, duties and the specific 

Interrogatory(ies) for which the person provided information.

Dkt. No. 69-2 at 6. Plaintiffs say that, with respect to the interrogatories HCL has answered so far, 

HCL’s corporate representative, Kuldeep Rawat, has relied on the following statement when 

verifying HCL’s answers:

I am informed and believe that the facts stated in the foregoing 

responses are within knowledge of Defendants but not entirely 

within my personal knowledge, that there is not one agent or officer 

who has personal knowledge of all such facts, and that the facts 

stated herein have been assembled by authorized agents and counsel 

of Defendants. Subject to this limitation, I am informed and believe 

that the facts stated in the foregoing responses are true and correct.

Dkt. No. 70 at 1; Dkt. No. 70-1 at 12. Plaintiffs want to know who provided the factual 

information on which HCL relied for its interrogatory answers so that they can “determine where 

the information came from, who relevant witnesses may be, and who may possess relevant 

discovery.” Dkt. No. 70 at 2-3. HCL argues that this interrogatory impermissibly seeks discovery 

of information protected by the attorney work product doctrine. Dkt. No. 70 at 5-7. HCL also 

argues that this interrogatory contains as many subparts as there are interrogatories served (or to 

be served) and therefore exceeds Rule 33’s 25-interrogatory limit. Id. at 7-8.

The Court first addresses whether HCL has waived its work product objection by failing to 

assert that objection in its written response to Interrogatory No. 3. See Dkt. No. 70 at 3; Dkt. No. 

69-2 at 6. HCL does not dispute that it did not specifically object to this interrogatory on work 

product grounds in its written response, but argues that it preserved this objection by incorporating 

its “general objections” by reference into its responses to each interrogatory, including 

Interrogatory No. 3, and by raising the objection in subsequent correspondence with plaintiffs’ 

counsel. Dkt. No. 70 at 8. 

Under Rule 33(b)(4), the grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated “with 

specificity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). “General objections” incorporated by reference are 

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insufficient. See, e.g., Shyh-Yih Hao v. Wu-Fu Chen, No. C10-00826 LHK (HRL), 2011 WL 

741225, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011). Generally, any objection that is not timely stated is 

waived, unless the Court, for good cause, excuses the failure to object. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected a per se waiver rule with respect to the assertion of 

privileges, and instead requires courts to engage in a “holistic reasonableness analysis” that 

considers several factors. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 

408 F.3d 1142, 1147-1149 (9th Cir. 2005).

HCL did not timely assert a work product objection in its response to Interrogatory No. 3, 

and it provides no explanation for its failure to comply with Rule 33(b)(4) or for its reliance on 

“general objections.” However, the Court is reluctant to find waiver in these circumstances, where 

the objection appears to have been asserted a few days later in correspondence between counsel 

and where the failure to assert work product protection concerns a single interrogatory. See id. at

1149 (discussing factors to be considered when evaluating waiver of privilege). As nothing in the 

record suggests plaintiffs will be prejudiced if the Court resolves HCL’s work product objection 

on the merits, the Court concludes that it would be inappropriate to find waiver here.

The Court next considers whether Interrogatory No. 3 seeks the disclosure of information 

protected by the work product doctrine. This doctrine protects from discovery materials that are 

prepared by or for a party or its representative in anticipation of litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(3). The doctrine provides qualified protection against discovery of the legal strategies and 

mental impressions of a party’s counsel. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508-10 (1947); 

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1981). It does not protect facts from 

disclosure, unless disclosure of those facts would inherently reveal an attorney’s strategies or 

mental impressions. See, e.g., O’Toole v. City of Antioch, No. 11-cv-01502-PJH (MEJ), 2015 WL 

1848134, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015); Hamilton v. RadioShack Corp., No. C 11-00888 LB, 

2012 WL 2327191, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2012). 

HCL’s work product objection to Interrogatory No. 3 presents a close call. On the one 

hand, HCL’s corporate representative attests that the facts stated in HCL’s interrogatory answers 

“have been assembled by authorized agents and counsel of Defendants,” implying that other 

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individuals besides the representative have knowledge of those facts. On the other hand, 

plaintiffs’ interrogatory is not limited to an identification of those “authorized agents” with 

knowledge of the facts; rather, the interrogatory asks HCL to identify “all persons who provided 

factual information in connection with your answers to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories,” which is broad 

enough to include anyone who assisted counsel in gathering factual information or whom counsel 

identified and sought out for such assistance.

The Court has reviewed the cases cited by the parties and finds the decision in Strauss v. 

Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) the most persuasive. In Strauss, the court 

distinguished between interrogatories seeking the identities of people with knowledge, which is 

clearly permissible, and interrogatories seeking the identities of people contacted or interviewed 

by counsel during an investigation, which is not. Id. at 231 (citing cases). In considering an 

interrogatory similar to plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 3, the court observed that the interrogatory did 

not simply ask for the identities of witnesses with knowledge of the facts, but asked for the 

identities of witnesses who participated in the preparation of the interrogatory responses, 

potentially revealing the witnesses whom counsel considered the most relevant or important to the 

case. Id. at 231-32. The Strauss court denied a motion to compel an answer to that interrogatory

on work product grounds. Id. Here, Interrogatory No. 3 raises similar concerns because it frames 

the question in a way that implicates information about counsel’s efforts to obtain the factual 

information necessary to answer plaintiffs’ interrogatories. Because the Court concludes that 

Interrogatory No. 3 implicates HCL’s work product protection, HCL need not answer this 

interrogatory. However, plaintiffs may withdraw this interrogatory and serve a different 

interrogatory that asks HCL to identify witnesses with knowledge of particular subject matter.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2020

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

2 Because the Court concludes that HCL need not answer Interrogatory No. 3, it does not reach the 

question of whether that interrogatory would have exceeded the 25-interrogatory limit.

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