Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02225/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02225-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY LOVEC, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

)

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ERIC HOLDER, et al., )

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Respondents. )

____________________________________)

1:09-CV-02225 GSA HC 

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE CASE

Petitioner, currently in the custody of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) and proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner has returned his consent/decline form indicating consent

to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. The petition alleges that the continued, indefinite detention of

the petitioner violates his Constitutional rights. 

FACTUAL SUMMARY1

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Germany. Petitioner is currently being detained at the

Kern County Jail in Bakersfield, California. On August 8, 2009, an Immigration Judge ordered

This information is derived from Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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Petitioner deported, excluded or removed from the United States. Petitioner did not appeal the

order and he claims he is now subject to a final order of removal. He entered ICE custody on

August 8, 2009, and has been detained continuously by ICE since that date.

DISCUSSION

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can

show that “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A

habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or duration”

of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9 Cir.1991), quoting, Preiser v. th

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases. However, the petition must “allege facts concerning the

applicant’s commitment or detention,” 28 U.S.C. § 2242, and the Petitioner must make specific

factual allegations that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief if they are true. O’Bremski v.

Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir.1990); United States v. Poopola, 881 F.2d 811, 812 (9 th th

Cir.1989). 

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court is required to

make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. “If it plainly appears from 2

the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief,” the Court must dismiss the

petition. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also, Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d

490 (9th Cir.1990).

In the instant case, Petitioner states that he is being indefinitely detained by ICE in

violation of his Constitutional rights. This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 

In Zadvydas, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the habeas corpus statute grants federal

courts the authority to determine whether post-removal-period detention is pursuant to statutory

authority. Id. at 678. In addition, the Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act’s

(INA) post-removal-period detention statute does not permit indefinite detention but “implicitly

The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases can be applied to petitions other than those brought under § 2254 at the

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Court’s discretion. See, Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

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limits an alien’s detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States.” Id at 689. When faced with making such a determination, the Court

must consider “the basic purpose of the statute, namely assuring the alien’s presence at the

moment of removal.” Id. at 699. In addition, the Court must take appropriate account of the

Executive Branch’s “greater immigration related expertise,” the Bureau’s “administrative needs

and concerns,” and the “Nation’s need to speak with one voice on immigration.” Id. at 700. The

Supreme Court attempted to limit those occasions when the federal court would need to make

such “difficult judgments” by setting a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six

months. Id. at 701 (italics added). The burden is on the alien to show that there is no reasonable

likelihood of repatriation. Id. ("This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every

alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in

confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future."). After six months and once an alien makes a showing that there

is no “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government

must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. However, where an alien

seeks release prior to the expiration of the presumptive six-month period, his claims are unripe

for federal review. See, Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148- 49, 87 S.Ct.

1507 (1967) ("[The ripeness doctrine's] basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through

avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an

administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.").

In this case, Petitioner has remained in the custody of ICE since August 8, 2009. 

Petitioner’s current detention is still within the six month “presumptively reasonable period of

detention.” Id. Moreover, the court notes that with respect to German nationals, efforts at

repatriation are generally successful. Petitioner's allegation alone is, therefore, insufficient to

overcome the presumption of reasonableness of the six month period and his claims of

constitutional violations are not ripe for review. Should Petitioner’s detention continue past the

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six month presumptive period, he may re-file the instant federal action and obtain review. At

that time, however, Petitioner must provide "good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED as the claims raised are not

ripe for federal review; 

2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and terminate the case; and

3) As Petitioner’s detention does not arise out of a process issued by a state court, a

certificate of appealability is not required. Forde v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 114 F.3d 878, 879 (9th

Cir.1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 12, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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