Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01780/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01780-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN ALAN KING,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1780 MCE DAD P

vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction

entered against him on May 24, 2001, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of

committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of fourteen years, in violation of

California Penal Code § 288(a). He seeks relief on the grounds that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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 The following summary is drawn from the August 7, 2002 opinion by the California 1

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-5, filed on

December 8, 2003, as exhibit D to respondent’s answer.

2

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A jury convicted defendant Brian King of five counts of

committing lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age

of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). In connection with one

count, the jury found that he engaged in substantial sexual conduct

within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8).

After defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied, the court

sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of 14

years. . .

In June 1999, the 11-year-old victim was in the fifth grade at an

elementary school in Rancho Cordova. On the last day of the

school year, the 33-year-old defendant, the boyfriend of the

victim’s mother, was supposed to take the victim to school. 

Instead, defendant and the victim stayed in Rancho Cordova and

spent the night at a Motel 6. In bed, they touched each other “all

over.” Defendant touched the victim’s “lower part” with his penis;

they did not have sexual intercourse. The victim “believe[d]” that

the very next day defendant drove her to Santa Cruz in a rental car

where defendant could do some work for his business of “price

comparisons.” That night, they went to a motel in Santa Cruz

where they did “[a]bout the same thing” as the previous night. The

victim did not recall the name of the motel but described it as

located “right by the boardwalk” on a street “around” the beach. 

The room had television, a telephone and “messed up” curtains. 

The next day, the victim thought they stayed in Santa Cruz and

spent the night in the same motel. They touched each other again

but did not have sexual intercourse.

The day following, the two returned to Rancho Cordova and spent

the night in a motel. The victim thought it might have been called

the “Extended Stay[america].” This time, besides mutual touching,

they had intercourse and “[g]ooey stuff” came out of defendant’s

penis, which the victim had to wipe off. The next day, defendant

drove the victim to a store near her home and dropped her off. The

victim did not go home. Instead, she went to a friend’s house so

that she would not have to face her mother, who was upset because

she had been gone for several days. The day after spending the

night at her friend’s house, the victim walked toward home but was

picked up by the police and taken to a receiving center.

Previously, around Christmas, just before the victim turned 11

years of age, defendant had touched the victim’s “lower part” over

and under her clothes. On another occasion, he had taken her to a

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Days Inn motel near a Target store in Rancho Cordova to spend the

night. They spent time touching each other but did not have sexual

intercourse.

The victim did not want to testify against defendant, because she

felt sorry for him and she was embarrassed. He took her to fun

places and he never “forced” her to do any of the acts.

A sexual assault examination revealed findings consistent with the

victim’s claims. She had a healed “cleft or a notch” on her

posterior hymenal rim which indicated “a penetrating injury

sometime in the past.”

Records from a Motel 6 in Rancho Cordova reflected that

defendant checked into the motel on June 11, 1999, gave a Carson

City, Nevada, address and claimed that another adult was with him. 

The motel did not charge extra for children under 17 years of age

but did charge extra for each additional adult.

Defendant testified and admitted prior felony convictions for

burglary and receiving stolen property. He denied ever molesting

children. Defendant and the victim’s mother began a relationship

in 1995. For three months, defendant, defendant’s parents and

brother, the victim and her mother and brother lived together in a

one-bedroom apartment belonging to defendant’s mother.

Defendant admitted checking into the Rancho Cordova Motel 6 on

June 11, 1999, with the victim’s mother for privacy reasons; he had

checked into the same motel on other occasions with the [sic] her

and also for business purposes. He provided documentation

showing that he had also stayed at the same Motel 6 four nights in

November 2000, one night in August 1999 and two nights in May

1999.

Defendant stayed overnight in Santa Cruz in 1999 four times, twice

on business and twice for pleasure, once in February and once in

July with the victim’s mother and the victim. One of the Santa

Cruz Motels was located on Seaside Avenue across from the Best

Western and the other motel was directly across from the roller

coaster on the boardwalk. He denied ever checking into the

Extended Stay motel.

Defendant said the victim constantly refused to go to school and

the victim’s mother condoned her refusal. Defendant denied that

he was supposed to have taken the victim to school and denied

taking her to a motel. He denied having sexual contact with the

victim, although he admitted she had sat on his lap a couple of

times. He suggested that she may have had a fantasy about him.

Defendant claimed that, between the alleged events and his arrest a

year later, the victim’s mother asked him for money.

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4

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his conviction in the California Court of Appeal

for the Third Appellate District. (Answer, Ex. A.) The Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s

conviction in its entirety in a reasoned decision dated August 7, 2002. On August 27, 2002,

petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) That

petition was summarily denied by order dated October 23, 2002. (Answer, Ex. F.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether relief is available

under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not reached the

merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the AEDPA’s

deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. 

Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th

Cir. 2002).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner’s sole claim is that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel improperly failed to: (1) investigate petitioner’s alibi that

he was in Nevada from June 12, 1999 through June 15, 1999; (2) present evidence at trial that on

two occasions prior to her police interview the victim denied that petitioner had molested her; (3)

present evidence at trial that petitioner and the victim did not stay at the Extended Stay Motel in

Rancho Cordova after they returned from Santa Cruz; (4) investigate hotel records in Santa Cruz

to determine whether petitioner and the victim had stayed at the hotels and on the dates described

by the victim; and (5) investigate evidence that the victim and her mother plotted to falsely

accuse petitioner of molesting the victim. Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel “never

spent adequate time with me to go over the facts and determine who the appropriate witnesses

were and which supporting documents were necessary.” (Pet. at consecutive p. 8). Petitioner

informs the court that all of these arguments and the documentary evidence in support thereof

were presented to the trial court in connection with his motion for new trial. (Id.)

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 In order to be colorable, a claim must have both legal and factual support, Beaudry 2

Motor Co. v. Abko Properties, Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1986), and must not be “wholly

insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous.” Rolen v. Barnhart, 273 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citations omitted). 

6

Respondent argues that petitioner’s claims 2 and 5, described above, are

unexhausted because they were raised for the first and only time in petitioner’s motion for new

trial. Generally, a state prisoner must exhaust all available state court remedies either on direct

appeal or through collateral proceedings before a federal court may consider granting habeas

corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). However, a federal court considering a habeas petition

may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the claim is not

“colorable.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir.2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) 2

(“[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State”). For the

reasons discussed below, assuming arguendo that petitioner exhausted claims 2 and 5 in state

court, he is not entitled to relief pursuant to § 2254(b)(2). 

A. State Court Opinion

On appeal, petitioner claimed that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

as a result of “the cumulative effect of various acts and omissions.” (Answer, Ex. A at 6.) 

Specifically, petitioner claimed that his trial counsel improperly failed to investigate evidence

that petitioner had an alibi from June 12 through June 15, 1999; failed to request jury instruction

CALJIC No. 17.01, which would have informed the jury that each count charged a separate and

distinct offense; and failed to investigate the Extended Stay Motel to determine whether

petitioner ever stayed there. (Id. at 14-18.) The California Court of Appeal addressed each of

these arguments at length and rejected them, reasoning as follows:

After trial, and with retained new counsel, defendant moved for a

new trial asserting, among other things, ineffective assistance of

court-appointed counsel, Laurence Smith. He argued Smith (1)

failed to present alibi evidence for the period from June 12, 1999,

through June 14, 1999, when defendant was in Boomtown,

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Nevada, and the Tahoe area with several people, including the

victim and her mother; (2) failed to attack the victim’s credibility

with her prior statements wherein she denied any inappropriate

contact with defendant; (3) failed to present evidence that, although

defendant made a reservation in the Extended Stay motel (where

the victim claimed they stayed after returning from Santa Cruz) he

did not stay there the day of the reservation; (4) failed to present

evidence that defendant was not a registered guest at two Santa

Cruz motels, which could possibly match the victim’s description,

on June 12 and 13, 1999; and (5) failed to show that the victim’s

mother attempted to extort money from defendant and his mother

in exchange for influencing the victim’s testimony.

A. Evidence and ruling on the motion in the trial court.

At the hearing on defendant’s motion, he presented the following

evidence.

Sohail Aziz ran a car rental business. From June 12 through June

15, 1999, he believed that he rented a van to defendant and

defendant’s mother who claimed they were traveling to Tahoe, or

Reno. Aziz was unable to find a contract for a vehicle he believed

he rented to one of them from June 7 through June 12, although he

did find contracts for cars rented to defendant, or his mother, from

May 28 to June 4, from June 4 to June 7, and from June 15 through

June 23, 1999.

At the direction of defendant’s new attorney, a defense investigator

visited two Santa Cruz motels, which fit the description given by

the victim, the Seaside Lodge on Beach Street and the Carousel

Motel on Riverside Avenue. On June 12 and 13, 1999, the dates

listed in the subpoenas, defendant was not a registered guest at

either motel. The investigator was not aware of defendant’s

description of a Santa Cruz motel on Seaside Avenue.

Defendant’s mother, Cheryl Berchtold, claimed that attorney Smith

avoided discussing defendant’s case with her. Although Smith

never asked Berchtold to document defendant’s whereabouts

beginning on June 11, his new attorney did.

Berchtold claimed that, during that time period, she and others

including defendant, the victim and the victim’s mother, went to

Reno, Boomtown and the Lake Tahoe area in a vehicle rented from

Aziz. Berchtold had documents showing that she had gambling

cards and used them on the June 13, 1999, weekend. Defendant

and the victim’s mother also had a card that one of them used on

June 13, 1999. While in Reno on June 13, 1999, the group took a

person named Louis Stein to the airport.

Further, Berchtold said one of defendant’s receipts for his business

shows a return at an Office Depot in Reno on June 13, 1999. 

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Smith initially told Berchtold that she would be a witness but later

decided not to call her. In addition, Berchtold claimed she had

overheard the victim tell a social worker that defendant had not

inappropriately touched her, but Smith did not ask her about the

victim’s statement.

When Berchtold told Smith that the victim’s mother attempted to

extort money from her, Smith did not ask for details. Berchtold

claimed that she had overheard the victim and the victim’s mother

“plotting to get money and property” from Berchtold and that the

victim’s mother had given Berchtold an ultimatum after the

charges were filed.

On cross-examination, Berchtold admitted telling a probation

officer that the victim had acted in a sexually inappropriate manner

with defendant. Initially, Berchtold claimed the victim’s mother

had told her that the victim had done so but later admitted she

witnessed the victim jumping on top of defendant and rubbing

against him. Berchtold also claimed she told the probation officer

about the victim’s conduct in an attempt to “bait” the victim so she

would tell the truth. Berchtold admitted telling defendant to avoid

being around the victim.

Berchtold provided two “chronologies” of events to Smith. In one

chronology, she stated that defendant was going to go to Santa

Cruz after dropping off the victim at school, but the victim begged

him to take her with him.

Berchtold had reviewed Aziz’s car rental records, was unhappy

that he was unable to locate the missing contract and told him he

“better find it.” Berchtold and her family gave Aziz a lot of

business.

Berchtold acknowledged that defendant had never lived in Nevada

and that he had obtained a Nevada license using a friend’s address. 

She explained defendant’s business involved competitive price

shopping.

The assistant general manager of “Extended Stay America” on

White Rock Road found no record of defendant registering at the

motel, although a person with defendant’s name made a reservation

at some unknown time. The motel changed computer systems in

1999. The assistant general manager was not employed at the

motel in 1999 and did not know how records were kept at that

time. He claimed, however, that manual records of the motel were

now stored “very similar[ly]” to the way they always had been.

Defendant also testified at the hearing. He said he may have made

a reservation at Extended Stayamerica but did not recall staying

there. He thought he stayed at the Courtyard by Marriott next door. 

As Berchtold had testified, defendant said he went to Boomtown

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and Reno with Berchtold, the victim, the victim’s mother, and

others, including Louis Stein, in a car rented from Aziz.

Defendant testified that Smith discussed the case in detail with him

during the trial only after the victim testified. Smith never asked

about defendant’s whereabouts from June 11 to June 14, 1999. 

When they went over the police report, it appeared that Smith had

not read it and he never asked for defendant’s input as to

inaccuracies. Smith did not take notes of their brief conversations.

Defendant testified he provided alibi witnesses to Smith for June

19, 1999. Based on his review of the police reports, or collected

motel receipts, June 19 was the date defendant was focusing on at

the time of trial. Defendant claimed he had an alibi for June 19,

because he stayed at a Motel 6 with the victim’s mother and

another adult female on that date. 

Defendant explained his business. He and others purchased office

equipment, found an advertisement for a lower price elsewhere,

took the advertisement to the purchase location, and obtained the

difference. They then sold, returned, or exchanged the equipment. 

There was a receipt attached to defendant’s mother’s declaration

showing such a transaction in Reno on June 13, 1999.

Defendant admitted traveling to Santa Cruz on occasion for

business. Defendant claimed Smith never asked where defendant

spent the night in Santa Cruz.

Defendant asserted that Berchtold unsuccessfully attempted to talk

to Smith several times about the case. Defendant claimed he was

present when Berchtold told Smith that the victim and the victim’s

mother were attempting to extort money from him and Berchtold.

The court verified that no motel receipts for June 19, 1999, were

presented at trial.

Defendant admitted he knew before trial that there was a June 11,

1999, Motel 6 receipt, but he claimed he had no idea that he

needed an alibi for that night.

Smith also testified at the hearing. He said he met with defendant

on numerous occasions and spoke with Berchtold several times. 

He never refused to discuss the case with her. Although Berchtold

provided the chronologies, she never raised a potential alibi and

never mentioned Boomtown nor did defendant. Smith

acknowledged that Berchtold claimed the victim’s accusations

were made after the victim’s mother failed to extort money from

Berchtold. Smith testified Berchtold never said the victim actively

participated in the attempted extortion, even though Berchtold’s

chronology said that the victim was acting as her mother’s “pawn.”

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10

Smith noted that Berchtold had reported seeing the victim touching

defendant in a sexually inappropriate manner, but Berchtold never

claimed she had reported the touching in an attempt to “bait” the

victim. Smith knew that Berchtold had reported overhearing the

victim deny that defendant ever touched her in a sexually

inappropriate manner. Smith also knew that a dependency petition

had been filed, that the victim never deemed defendant’s conduct

inappropriate and that the victim claimed to have enjoyed it.

Smith knew that, on August 2, 1999, the victim stated to Child

Protective Services (CPS) that no one had “hurt her or made her

feel afraid.” According to CPS records, Berchtold reported she

saw the victim rub up against defendant, that he had admitted to

Berchtold the victim had given him a hickey, pinched him on the

butt, which gave him a “hard-on,” and tied his arms to a bed frame

and poured hot wax on his chest.

Smith and defendant discussed alibis for June 1999. Although

defendant believed he could provide alibi witnesses such as

business associates, he never provided any to Smith. In any event,

Smith opined that an alibi would be difficult, because the charges

were alleged to have occurred over a long period of time rather

than on any specific date. Further, Smith was suspicious of

defendant’s business, because Smith had heard of similar

operations that dealt in stolen goods. Smith believed defendant’s

business associates would not be good alibi witnesses. Defendant

did not offer any receipts associated with his work and never

offered a fictitious name statement.

Because the victim’s description of the Santa Cruz motel was

nonspecific, Smith did not investigate motels in Santa Cruz. In any

event, defendant admitted going to Santa Cruz with the victim. He

claimed that the victim’s mother was with them, and denied that

anything inappropriate occurred. Smith believed it was not

necessary to identify the motel.

Smith did not investigate the Extended Stayamerica motel either. 

Based on his experience, motel records were unreliable and the

lack of a registration record did not necessarily mean defendant did

not spend the night. Smith noted that defendant, in fact, had made

a reservation, and the victim’s mother found a receipt from

Extended Stayamerica that included a handwritten note, “The best

time I ever had,” apparently written by defendant. Smith decided

to show that defendant, who was essentially homeless, stayed at

motels on a regular basis to “defus[e] the significance of the [June

11, 1999 Motel 6] receipt . . . .”

Smith had defendant obtain motel records, because defendant was

out of custody and would have an easier time than an investigator

obtaining the records. Defendant gathered records from Motel 6

but not Extended Stayamerica.

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Smith decided not to call Berchtold to testify, because she knew

about sexually inappropriate conduct between defendant and the

victim.

Prior to trial, Smith moved to admit evidence that the victim’s

mother had attempted to extort money from Berchtold and that the

attempt influenced the victim’s testimony. The court had then

conducted a hearing at which the victim testified that her mother

had not attempted to influence her testimony. The court excluded

any evidence of an attempted extortion by the victim’s mother.

Smith took no notes of his interviews with defendant and

Berchtold, explaining that he never received any information from

them other than defendant’s denial of the charges and Berchtold’s

chronologies. Smith met one time with each of them in his office,

and he met with defendant before and after every court appearance.

Smith knew prior to trial that the June 11 Motel 6 date was

important and asked defendant about it. Defendant thought he

stayed there either with the victim’s mother, or with some other

adult female whose name he did not reveal. Because the motel

receipt listed two adults, Smith thought defendant’s claim was

corroborated. When asked about staying in a Santa Cruz motel on

June 12 and 13, defendant thought he may have, but if he did the

victim’s mother was present.

Smith decided the case was one of credibility, not alibi. He

unsuccessfully attempted to contact the victim’s mother. Smith did

not have an investigator because he knew of no “loose end[s].” 

Smith never had any idea that Berchtold could vouch for

defendant’s whereabouts from June 11 through June 14, so he

never asked her about the time period. Nor was Smith told about

any car rental, or any trip to Boomtown, Reno or Tahoe, or that

Louis Stein might be an alibi witness.

In denying defendant’s new trial motion, the trial court found:

(1) Smith knew nothing about the Boomtown alibi, because neither

defendant nor Berchtold had told Smith about it;

(2) Smith could not be faulted for failing to pursue alibis by

defendant’s business associates, which had been only vaguely

mentioned by defendant, based on the suspect nature of

defendant’s business and defendant’s prior theft-related

convictions;

(3) Smith knew nothing about either Aziz or Stein, the other

alleged alibi witnesses;

(4) The jury could have concluded that the offenses occurred some

time other than June 11 through 14, 1999, because the charges

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alleged the offenses occurred between January 1, 1999, through

June 30, 1999;

(5) Smith made a valid tactical decision not to call Berchtold to

testify based on the CPS report, and because there was no proof

that the victim was involved in the victim’s mother’s alleged plot

to extort money;

(6) Smith made a valid tactical choice not to impeach the victim

with her statements to CPS that defendant had done nothing wrong,

because her prior statements were not inconsistent with her trial

testimony. In addition, the victim’s prior statements were in the

same CPS report that contained Berchtold’s statements about the

victim’s inappropriate conduct and Berchtold’s warning to

defendant to stay away from the victim;

(7) Smith knew defendant had made at least one reservation at the

Extended Stayamerica in Rancho Cordova, that the motel had

changed computer systems in 1999, that records showing defendant

had stayed there could have been lost, that the victim’s mother had

seen a receipt from the Extended Stayamerica motel with

defendant’s handwritten note to the effect it was the best time he

ever had, and that defendant’s confusion about where he stayed

could have been used by the prosecutor to argue that a child would

have been even more confused; and

(8) the defense’s offer that the motel in Santa Cruz could have

been only one of two amounted to “sheer speculation,” and in any

event, defendant had admitted staying in a Santa Cruz motel with

the victim and the victim’s mother. The trial court also noted,

based on its observations, that Smith was prepared and

knowledgeable about the facts of the case.

* * *

Defendant asserts that there are numerous instances of deficient

performance by trial counsel, in particular, counsel’s failure to

investigate the facts. But defendant’s complaints on appeal focus

on the prosecutor’s arguments at the hearing on the new trial

motion, which he claims were inaccurate and were adopted by the

trial court. Specifically, defendant points to:

(1) the prosecutor’s argument at the hearing that it had not been the

prosecutor’s theory at trial that the lewd conduct occurred on or

about June 11, and the prosecutor’s argument that the Motel 6

evidence was intended only to show defendant’s connection to that

motel.

In response to that argument, although acknowledging that the

charging document alleged that the lewd conduct occurred between

January 1, 1999, and June 30, 1999, defendant asserts that the

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prosecution adduced evidence at trial that the first instance

occurred on the last day of school and presented evidence that

defendant stayed at the motel on that date. Defendant therefore

argues the prosecution did rely on a theory that part of the

misconduct occurred on June 11 and that a failure to investigate

into defendant’s whereabouts on that day amounted to ineffective

assistance.

In closing argument, defendant’s attorney pointed out there was no

evidence as to when the last day of school was, thus lessening the

importance of the June 11 date. At most, the prosecutor argued

that the June 11, 1999, Motel 6 receipt “appear[ed] to correspond

to the last day of school” but that the victim did not remember

what day it was. The prosecutor also claimed that the receipt

“appear[ed] to correlate.”

Defendant replies this was not the full extent of the prosecutor’s

closing argument on the subject, noting that the prosecutor referred

to the registration itself to argue that it would make sense to have it

show two adults to deflect attention from the fact defendant was

with a minor. The prosecutor also pointed out that defendant used

a Nevada address.

These arguments were, of course, legitimate based on the evidence

adduced at trial, that is defendant was familiar with the motel that

the victim mentioned and stayed there with someone on June 11,

1999. The offenses were alleged to have occurred between January

1, 1999, and June 30, 1999, so the June 11, 1999, motel receipt

was simply some evidence to corroborate the victim’s claim that

defendant took her to a Motel 6. Contrary to defendant’s posttrial

position, which was made to elevate the importance of an

investigation into the June 11 date, the arguments did not target

that date alone as the one on which one of the incidents took place;

it could have occurred on another day. An alibi for that date would

have been of minimal importance.

Defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor’s argument that

defendant had presented no evidence at the new trial hearing with

respect to the lewd conduct alleged and proved to have occurred

around Christmas. Defendant complains that this all-or-nothing

approach is contrary to the law, that is each count charges a

separate and distinct offense. While we have difficulty following

his argument, we suppose he is suggesting that, to the extent the

trial court accepted that argument, the trial court was in error.

“As an aspect of the presumption that judicial duty is properly

performed, we presume . . . that the court knows and applied the

correct statutory and case law (People v. Mack (1986) 178

Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032 [224 Cal.Rptr. 208]) and is able to

distinguish admissible from inadmissible evidence, relevant from

irrelevant facts, and to recognize those facts which properly may be

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considered in the judicial decisionmaking process. (citations

omitted.)

We are confident the trial court did not rely on any misstatement of

the law in ruling on the motion.

As an aside, because the jury was not instructed that each charge

stated a different and distinct offense, defendant claims the failure

of counsel to request CALJIC No. 17.02 constitutes ineffective

assistance of counsel. Defendant did not assert counsel was

ineffective for failure to request CALJIC No. 17.02 in his new trial

motion nor does he raise a separate contention of ineffective

assistance of counsel in this regard on appeal. In any event, the

court did instruct the jury in the language of the information, which

stated that each count was a further and separate cause of action

and a different offense than the other counts.

Defendant further complains that the prosecutor argued that

evidence relating to the absence of a record concerning a stay at the

Extended Stayamerica motel was not an issue, because defendant

testified he may have stayed there. Citing Evidence Code section

1272, defendant asserts that the lack of a business record of an

event may be admitted when offered to prove the nonoccurrence of

the event. Thus, he argues the absence of a record of defendant’s

registration at the Extended Stayamerica motel was proof that he

did not stay there.

Also on the subject of the Extended Stayamerica motel, he claims

the court erroneously stated that there was evidence the records had

been lost. Defendant notes that, although the clerk was not aware

of the computer change in 1999, he testified he was also not aware

of any records being lost in the change. Defendant notes there is a

difference between a reservation, which defendant admitted, and

registration documents showing that he actually stayed at the motel

as the victim claimed. Defendant overlooks the fact that, according

to this report, employees of the motel stated to an investigating

detective on April 13, 2000, that records, in fact, had been lost in

the transition that occurred when the record-keeping practices were

changed in 1999.

On this point, that is the failure to present evidence of a lack of

registration documents, defendant also challenges the court’s

conclusion that the main allegation raised in his motion for new

trial was that Smith failed to present an alibi defense. Defendant

argues this conclusion “overlook[s] the fact’ that the evidence with

respect to the Extended Stayamerica motel directly contradicted the

victim’s testimony.

On the subject of the Extended Stayamerica motel, Smith was

entitled to rely on his own experience concerning motel records to

judge this point minor, and further Smith, in fact, argued to the jury

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that the lack of a record meant there was no corroboration of the

victim’s claim that defendant had contact with the motel. We note

also that the discovery Smith received prior to trial on defendant’s

behalf prior to trial [sic] included information from an

investigating detective that records of the motel had, indeed, been

lost. The assistant general manager did not testify that records had

not been lost, he said only that manual records were kept “very

similar[ly]” to the way they always had been. Finally, we agree

with the trial court that introducing the lack of a registration record

ran the risk of allowing the prosecution to introduce the Extended

Stayamerica motel receipt found by the victim’s mother with

defendant’s handwritten note, “the best time I ever had.” The latter

evidence could have been particularly damaging, and in all Smith

cannot be justly accused of ineffective assistance of counsel for

handling the matter of the Extended Stayamerica motel as he did.

Defendant also complains that the court concluded that, because

defendant heard the victim’s testimony at trial and did not testify

about the Boomtown trip, no ineffective assistance can be shown

by failure to produce documentation of the trip. Defendant

suggests that he can answer only questions put to him. The point is

that defendant heard the victim’s testimony but failed to mention

the trip, or the evidence that defendant presented to prove the trip,

to Smith before testifying. We note that Berchtold never listed the

event in her chronology.

Smith cannot be faulted for not knowing about any alibis and alibi

witnesses of which he was never told. Smith made legitimate

tactical decisions throughout the course of his defense of this case.

We conclude the trial court properly found that defendant failed to

demonstrate that, under an objective standard of professional

reasonableness, counsel’s performance was in any manner

deficient. Under the circumstances, we need not consider the

question of prejudice.

(Opinion at 6-24.)

B. Relevant Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a petitioner

identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

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professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 

Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a petitioner must establish that

he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice

is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S.

at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance

of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound

judgments.” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691. “This includes a duty to . . . investigate and introduce into evidence records that

demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine

confidence in the verdict.” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hart v.

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Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)). In this regard, it has been recognized that “the

adversarial process will not function normally unless the defense team has done a proper

investigation.” Siripongs v. Calderon (Siripongs II), 133 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384). Therefore, counsel must, “at a minimum, conduct a reasonable

investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent his client.” 

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d

1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation and quotations omitted). On the other hand, where

an attorney has consciously decided not to conduct further investigation because of reasonable

tactical evaluations, his or her performance is not constitutionally deficient. See Siripongs II,

133 F.3d at 734; Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998); Hensley v. Crist, 67

F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). “A decision not to investigate thus ‘must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 691). See also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 385 (counsel “neither investigated, nor made a

reasonable decision not to investigate”); Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173-74. A reviewing court must

“examine the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct ‘as of the time of counsel’s conduct.’” United

States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

Furthermore, “‘ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate must be considered in

light of the strength of the government’s case.’” Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Eggleston v.

United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054,

1070 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. Analysis

The decision of the California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner’s arguments in

support of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Strickland and should not be set aside. The state appellate court carefully analyzed

all of petitioner’s claims and determined that trial counsel’s performance was not “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Under the

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circumstances of this case, and for the reasons explained below, that determination was

reasonable.

1. Alibi

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he

failed to investigate petitioner’s alibi that he was on a trip to Boomtown, Nevada from June 12,

1999 through June 14, 1999. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, petitioner’s trial counsel

testified that he did not present evidence that petitioner was in Nevada on those dates because he

was never informed about the trip by either petitioner or his mother. Trial counsel testified that

he had “no reason to guess that [petitioner] would have gone to Boomtown that weekend.” 

(Reporter’s Transcript (RT) at 385.) Counsel further testified that “at no time” did petitioner’s

mother mention a trip to Boomtown and that petitioner never informed counsel that he had a

“being out-of-town type of alibi.” (Id. at 372.) Instead, petitioner told his trial counsel that he

“thought” he had an alibi involving “business associates or employees of his in some capacity

that were going to establish this alibi.” (Id. at 386.) However, petitioner never gave counsel

“any specific name of somebody that could be a potential alibi witness,” nor did he explain

“precisely what [the alibi] was.” (Id.) Trial counsel explained that petitioner simply told him he

had not committed the acts alleged in the information. (Id. at 379.) Trial counsel therefore

concluded that the case did not involve a plausible alibi defense but was a “credibility case.” (Id.

at 399.) 

Trial counsel was entitled to rely on the facts as reported by his client and could

not be expected to investigate a factual scenario of which he was completely unaware. Indeed,

the “reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the

defendant's own statements or actions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. See Langford v. Day, 110

F.3d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir. 1996) (no ineffective assistance for failure to investigate where client

failed to tell attorney about relevant facts). Here, where petitioner did not tell his trial counsel 

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 Trial counsel also testified that he did not believe specific dates were important to this 3

case because the time frames alleged in the information covered a period of six months and, in

any event, there was some confusion about the date of the victim’s last day of school in 1999,

thereby creating uncertainty as to the specific date that some of the acts were alleged to have

taken place. A review of the record confirms that the information charging petitioner alleged that

the offenses took place within an extended period of time covering six months. (Clerk’s

Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 16-18.) For this reason, an alibi for a date certain in the middle of

June would have been of limited relevance. 

19

that he had a specific alibi for June 12, 1999 through June 14, 1999, counsel did not render

ineffective assistance because of his failure to investigate any such alibi. 

3

2. Failure to Present Evidence of Victim’s Prior Statements

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because

he failed to present evidence that on two occasions prior to her police interview the victim denied

that petitioner had engaged in inappropriate conduct with her. However, as discussed in detail by

the state appellate court, the victim’s statements in this regard were not inconsistent with her trial

testimony and were contained in a report which included information damaging to the defense

case. (Opinion at 14; see also RT at 419-21.) In addition, trial counsel testified at the motion for

new trial that he did not want to pursue this area because the victim’s statements implied that she

“enjoyed the sexual activity” and counsel was aware that a violation of California Penal Code §

288 “can take place to satisfy the sexual passions of the child as well as the adult.” (RT at 391.) 

For all of these reasons, petitioner’s trial counsel believed that the victim’s statements in this

regard did not “help [him] very much as far as constructing a defense.” (Id.) Under the

circumstances, trial counsel’s decision not to impeach the victim with her prior statements was

not outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 

3. Extended Stay Motel

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present

evidence that petitioner and the victim did not stay at the Extended Stay Motel in Rancho

Cordova, as the victim testified. He notes that an investigator hired by his post-trial counsel

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ascertained that while the motel in question had records indicating that petitioner made a

reservation in June, 1999, there were no records indicating that petitioner had “checked in or

rented a room.” (Pet. at consecutive p. 7.) However, as described at length above, there was also

evidence in the record that: (1) the motel may have lost some of its records during the change to a

new computer system; (2) the victim’s mother found a damaging receipt from the motel in

question with petitioner’s handwritten notation that it was “the best time [he] ever had;” and (3)

petitioner did, in fact, contact the hotel in June, 1999. At the hearing on the motion for new trial,

petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he “thought about” investigating the records of the

Extended Stay Motel but decided against it because he knew about the damaging receipt from

that motel; the date and time of the offense were not specifically alleged in the charging

information, making any records for a specific date largely beside the point; and it was his

experience that motels “rarely keep adequate business records.” (RT at 374, 395.) Under these

circumstances, petitioner’s trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to simply argue that

the prosecutor had failed to establish petitioner ever stayed at the Extended Stay Motel.

4. Motels in Santa Cruz

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because

of his failure to investigate hotel records in Santa Cruz to locate evidence indicating whether

petitioner and the victim stayed at the hotels mentioned by the victim on the days she described. 

Petitioner notes that the investigator hired by his post-trial counsel investigated two hotels and

determined that petitioner had not stayed in those hotels. 

The trial court found petitioner’s argument in this regard to be “completely

without merit.” (RT at 422.) As noted by that court, the twelve-year-old victim’s general

description during trial of the motel she thought she stayed in with petitioner “does not support

the investigator’s sheer speculation as to the motel he thought she might have been referring to.”

(Id.) Further, petitioner’s trial counsel testified during the motion for new trial that he did not

attempt to identify the Santa Cruz motel described by the victim because petitioner “was not

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making the claim that he never stayed in a motel in Santa Cruz with [the victim],” but rather

admitted he had stayed in a motel in Santa Cruz with the victim and her mother. (Id. at 374, 396-

97, 399-400.) Trial counsel also testified that he did not think it was important to pin down

whether petitioner had stayed in any particular hotel on any particular date because the Santa

Cruz offenses were alleged to have occurred anytime between January 1, 1999 and June 30,

1999. (Id. at 395, 399.) In light of these factors, trial counsel’s decision not to investigate

whether petitioner and the victim stayed in Santa Cruz on a date certain at a particular hotel

(which may or may not have been the relevant hotel) was not unreasonable. 

5. False Accusations

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to investigate evidence given by petitioner’s mother that the victim and her mother plotted

to falsely accuse petitioner of molesting the victim. However, as noted by the California Court of

Appeal, petitioner’s mother had no information that the victim was induced by her mother to lie

about petitioner’s actions, whether to obtain money or for any other reason. At the motion for

new trial, petitioner’s trial counsel agreed that “nothing in the discovery indicated that [the

victim] herself was involved” in any extortion scheme. (RT at 378.) Accordingly, the testimony

of petitioner’s mother to that effect, even if it was believed by the jury, would have had only

limited relevance to the issues at petitioner’s trial. 

In addition, as discussed by both the state trial and appellate courts, counsel’s

decision not to call petitioner’s mother as a trial witness was a reasonable tactical decision. 

Petitioner’s mother had made damaging statements to investigators about petitioner’s behavior

with the victim which would certainly have been revealed to the jury on cross-examination. 

Further, "[a]s a matter of trial strategy, counsel could well decide not to call family members as

witnesses because family members can be easily impeached for bias." Bergmann v. McCaughtry,

65 F.3d 1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1995). 

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6. Failure to Communicate

Petitioner also complains that his trial counsel did not have sufficient contact with

him or his mother prior to trial to be able to prepare and present an effective defense. However,

the trial court noted in its ruling on petitioner’s motion for new trial that petitioner’s trial counsel

appeared to have a complete grasp of the facts of the case, that complaints by petitioner’s mother

to the contrary were not credible, and that trial counsel’s records and testimony indicated that he

had met with petitioner and his mother several times prior to and during trial to discuss the case. 

(Id. at 423-24.) At the hearing on the motion for new trial, petitioner’s trial counsel testified that

he met with petitioner’s mother at his office in order to go over certain documents she wanted

counsel to see, that he never refused to see or talk to petitioner’s mother about the case, and that

he met with petitioner prior to trial and after each court appearance. (Id. at 370-71, 386-87, 394.)

Under these circumstances, the decision of the state appellate court that trial counsel kept in

adequate contact with petitioner and was adequately prepared is not unreasonable.

For all of the reasons described by the California Court of Appeal, petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s representation in this matter fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 8, 2007.

DAD:8:king1780.hc

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