Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00605/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00605-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GERALD COHEN,

Plaintiff,

v. NO. CIV. S-06-605 FCD/DAD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RICHARD D. WILLIAMS,

as Trustee of the 

RICHARD D. WILLIAMS

TRUST, 

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Gerald Cohen’s

(“plaintiff”) motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs

against defendant Richard D. Williams, as Trustee of the Richard

D. Williams Trust (“defendant”). The motion is brought pursuant

to the parties’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (“Rule 68")

offer of compromise and judgment, entered November 21, 2006. 

Defendant opposes the motion, arguing the number of hours claimed

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2 Rule 68 states, in relevant part:

At any time more than 10 days before the trial 

begins, a party defending against a claim may 

serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow 

judgment to be taken against the defending party 

for the money or property or to the effect 

specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. 

If within 10 days after the service of the offer 

the adverse party serves written notice that the 

offer is accepted, either party may then file the 

offer and notice of acceptance together with proof 

of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall 

enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be 

deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not 

admissible except in a proceeding to determine 

costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the 

offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the

 offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making 

of the offer. 

2

by plaintiff’s counsel is unreasonable.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant seeking accessible

parking at a shopping center known as the Mason Street Retail

Shopping Center, located in Vacaville, California (the “Center”). 

Plaintiff is a quadriplegic who requires the use of a wheelchair

for ambulation. He alleges that on two occasions he traveled to

the Center and found a lack of accessible parking. Plaintiff

brought suit pursuant to Title III of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the

California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq., and

the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq.

On October 24, 2006, defendant made plaintiff an offer of

compromise pursuant to Rule 68.2 Therein, defendant offered to

provide six van-accessible parking spaces in the Center’s parking

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

lot and to pay plaintiff $4,000 in damages. Defendant also

agreed to pay plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs “as determined

by the court.” (Def.’s Offer of Compromise, filed October 25,

2006, at 1.) Plaintiff accepted the offer, and judgment was

entered in favor of plaintiff on November 21, 2006.

Subsequently, plaintiff offered to settle the amount of

attorneys’ fees and costs owed by offering to accept from

defendant $5,000.00. Defendant did not respond to plaintiff’s

offer. (Stewart Decl., filed December 5, 2006, at 5.) Plaintiff

thus brings the instant motion, requesting attorneys’ fees and

costs in the amount of $8,125.00. (Pl.’s Fees Mot., filed

December 5, 2006, at 7.)

STANDARD

The prevailing party in an ADA action may recover

“reasonable attorney’s fees, including litigation expenses and

costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Additionally, the Unruh Civil Rights

Act provides that any party that discriminates in contravention

of state law is liable for “any attorney’s fees that may be

determined by the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). 

Courts in this circuit have adopted the “lodestar” method

for calculating attorneys’ fees. Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207,

1209 (9th Cir. 1998). To determine the appropriate fee amount

using the lodestar method, the court multiplies the number of

hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable

hourly rate. Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983)). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount

is reasonable, though the court may adjust the lodestar figure if

various factors overcome that presumption of reasonableness. 

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Hernandez v. Martinez, No. Civ. 04-1747 GEB/EFB (E.D.

Cal. Nov. 7, 2006) (awarding fees and costs in the amount of

$10,920.00); Johnson v. Rahbarian, No. Civ. 04-699 LKK/PAN (E.D.

Cal. May 15, 2006) (awarding fees and costs in the amount of

$15,658.00).

4

Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). 

ANALYSIS

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The court must determine a reasonable hourly rate by

considering “the rate prevailing in the community for similar

work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and

reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205,

1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984)). 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Thomas Stewart, seeks an hourly rate of

$250.00. Defendant does not object to this rate. Considering

Mr. Stewart’s twenty-seven years of experience, the last six of

which have been devoted exclusively to disabled-access cases, and

similar cases decided in this district which have awarded Mr.

Stewart fees at $250.00 an hour,3 the court finds that $250.00 is

a reasonable hourly rate in this case. The court thus calculates

the lodestar amount based on this hourly rate.

B. Reasonableness of Hours Billed

In calculating the lodestar amount, the court should exclude

hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Plaintiff seeks

to recover attorneys’ fees of $7,875.00, representing a total of

31.5 hours expended on this litigation. (Pl.’s Fees Mot. at 7.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees fall within three general categories:

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

(1) 11.4 hours expended on serving defendant; (2) 14.8 hours

expended on other litigation matters, including inspections of

the Center; and (3) 5.3 hours expended on this motion. (Id. at

6-7.)

Defendant requests the court award plaintiff attorneys’ fees

of $2,500.00, representing fees for 10 hours of work. (Opp’n,

filed December 22, 2006, at 5.) Specifically, defendant contends

the time spent on service of process issues and conducting

inspections of the Center were unnecessary and unreasonable. (Id.

at 3-5.)

Plaintiff’s counsel submits a detailed invoice of the hours

worked on this case, as well as a declaration explaining the

necessity of the tasks performed. (Stewart Decl., Ex. 1.) After

careful review of counsel’s invoice and declaration, the court

finds that all of the hours billed by plaintiff’s counsel are

reasonable.

1. Service by Publication

Plaintiff’s counsel requests fees for 11.4 hours spent on

serving defendant, including time spent on an application for an

order allowing service by publication. Defendant objects to

these hours, claiming they were incurred due to plaintiff’s

counsel’s error in naming an incorrect defendant.

According to plaintiff’s counsel, county records indicated

that the owner of the Center was the Richard D. Williams Trust. 

(Reply, filed December 28, 2006, at 4.) Accordingly, plaintiff

named the trust entity as the sole defendant in the original

complaint. The only address listed within the county property

records for the trust was that of a property management company,

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

and counsel mailed the original complaint to this address. 

(Stewart Decl. at 3-4.) 

Shortly thereafter, defendant’s counsel contacted

plaintiff’s counsel and discussed possible changes to the

Center’s parking lot. (Id. at 4.) Defendant’s counsel did not

indicate that the trust entity was improperly named or that he

did not represent the trustee. (Reply at 4-6.) After more than

a month without further communication from defendant, plaintiff’s

counsel contacted defendant’s counsel to discuss service of

defendant. (Stewart Decl. at 4.) According to plaintiff’s

counsel, defendant’s counsel informed him that the trustee

resided in another state, that the trustee would be difficult to

locate, and that defendant’s counsel refused to accept service on

defendant’s behalf. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel then filed an application for service by

publication. (Id.) Magistrate Judge Drozd initially denied

plaintiff’s application on the ground that the trust was not an

entity appropriately served with process by publication. (Order,

filed June 26, 2006.) Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently filed a

supplemental application for service by publication on the

trustee of the trust. On August 10, 2006, Magistrate Judge Drozd

granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to name the

trustee, personally, as the sole defendant, and granted

plaintiff’s application to serve the trustee by publication. 

(Order, filed August 10, 2006.) Shortly thereafter, defendant’s

counsel agreed to accept service on behalf of the defendant

trustee. (Stewart Decl. at 4-5.)

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Defendant now claims that plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to

originally name the trustee, personally, as the defendant

resulted in unnecessary work, fees for which should not be

recoverable on this motion. 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s application to serve defendant by

publication, however, appears to have been necessary regardless

of any need to amend the named defendant. In granting

plaintiff’s application for an order allowing service by

publication, the magistrate judge found that the trustee could

not be served by any other means. (Order, filed August 10, 2006,

at 4.) Even if plaintiff’s counsel had named the trustee as the

defendant in the original complaint, service by publication was

the only means available for serving defendant, as defendant’s

counsel would not (initially) accept service and defendant could

not be located. Thus, defendant’s argument that service by

publication was necessitated only because plaintiff’s counsel

named the trust entity instead of the trustee is unavailing.

The court finds that plaintiff’s counsel was warranted in

moving for service by publication and that the 11.4 hours

expended on the motion are reasonable. Plaintiff shall be

awarded fees for those hours.

2. Other Litigation Matters

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks fees for 14.8 hours spent on

general litigation matters, such as the drafting and filing of

the complaint, correspondence with defendant’s counsel, and

inspections of the Center. Defendant specifically challenges the

three inspections plaintiff’s counsel made of the Center, arguing

that the second and third inspections were unnecessary and

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 The court notes the travel time from counsel’s office

to the Center and back is approximately one and a half hours. 

Accordingly, counsel’s time for the inspections does not appear

conflated.

8

excessive. (Opp’n at 4-5.)

Plaintiff’s counsel billed two and a half to three hours for

each inspection. Counsel made the initial inspection immediately

after plaintiff first contacted counsel to discuss violations in

the Center’s parking lot. More than two months later, just prior

to filing plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff’s counsel conducted

the second inspection to confirm that the alleged violations

still existed. Plaintiff’s counsel made the final inspection to

confirm whether changes defendant made to the parking lot

adequately remedied the violations alleged in the complaint. 

(Reply at 2-3.)

The court finds that it was reasonable for plaintiff’s

counsel to conduct each of these inspections for the purposes

stated and that the hours expended on each inspection are also

reasonable.4 The court finds that the 14.8 hours expended on

general litigation matters, including the time spent inspecting

the Center, are reasonable, and the court will award attorneys’

fees for these hours.

3. Motion for Fees

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks fees for 5.3 hours expended on

preparing this motion. Time spent preparing a motion for

attorneys’ fees is generally compensable. See Clark v. City of

Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1986). Defendant makes

a general objection to the number of hours billed by plaintiff’s

counsel, stating that plaintiff’s motion was “unnecessarily

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

verbose.” (Opp’n at 2, 5.) The court does not agree. At seven

pages, plaintiff’s motion is not verbose, and the court notes

that, significantly, plaintiff’s counsel did not claim fees for

the time spent on preparing the reply. 

The court finds that 5.3 hours is a reasonable amount of

time expended on preparing this motion, and accordingly, it will

award attorneys’ fees for this work.

C. Costs

The only cost claimed by plaintiff is the $250.00 filing

fee, to which defendant does not object. The court shall award

plaintiff this amount in costs.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and

costs is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded fees and costs

in the total amount of $8,125.00. Defendant shall pay said

amount to plaintiff within 30 days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2007

Case 2:06-cv-00605-FCD-DAD Document 24 Filed 01/22/07 Page 9 of 9