Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00990/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00990-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Securities Violation

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pamela Thompson, individually and as

guardian of Gabriella Thompson, Matthew

Thompson, Marcus Thompson, Michael

Thompson; and the Thompson Group,

P.C., an Arizona professional corporation,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

George Paul and Karen Paul, husband and

wife; Tom Morgan; Scott Dewald and

Deborah Jamieson, husband and wife;

Lewis and Roca, LLP, An Arizona limited

liability partnership; and Capitol Detective

Agency, Inc., an Arizona corporation, 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV-05-0990-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendants Lewis and Roca, LLP’s Motion for Award

of Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses (Dkt#60,66) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave

to File a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (Dkt.#72). After

reviewing the papers, and finding oral argument to be unnecessary, the Court issues the

following Order.

I. Factual Background

On April 1, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging claims for: (1) violation of

section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act; (2) Abuse of Process; (3) Wrongful

Institution of Civil Proceedings; (4) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; (5) Negligent

Misrepresentation; (6) Third Party Professional Negligence; (7) Tortious Interference with

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Contractual Relations; (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (9) Negligent

Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff's claims were asserted against Lewis and Roca

LLP, George Paul, Karen Paul, Tom Morgan, Scott Dewald and Deborah Jamieson (the

"L&R Defendants") (Complaint "Compl." ¶¶6-10) as well as Capitol Detective Agency.

(Id. at ¶11). Plaintiff's allegations arose out of the resignation by Plaintiff Pamela

Thompson ("Ms. Thompson" or "Plaintiff Thompson"), as Chief Financial Officer, Secretary,

and Treasurer of YP.net in May, 2002. (Id. ¶17). Plaintiff Thompson’s resignation was

allegedly motivated by ethical and professional concerns regarding accounting and disclosure

practices of YP.net and Angelo Tullo, Chief Executive Officer of YP.net. Id. Upon

receiving Ms. Thompson’s resignation, YP.net, represented by the L&R Defendants, sued

Ms. Thompson and Ms. Thompson countersued. (Id. ¶26). Plaintiffs asserted that the L&R

Defendants instituted the baseless litigation to harass Ms. Thompson and to prevent her from

disclosing information to law enforcement regarding the criminal investigation of Mr. Tullo.

(Id. ¶¶26-32). On April 22, 2004, the parties entered settlement negotiations. (Id. ¶37).

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Ms. Thompson relied on certain false statements made by

the L&R Defendants when accepting YP.net’s settlement offer, comprising of YP.net’s

Common Stock. (Id. ¶38). For instance, an alleged false statement made by the L&R

Defendants was that there was no criminal investigation targeted at Mr Tullo. (Id. ¶37).

Plaintiffs asserted that due to the L&R Defendants' conduct and false misrepresentation, Ms.

Thompson was unable to sell her YP.net stock before the government indicted Mr. Tullo,

and consequently, the value of Ms. Thompson’s stock plummeted. (Id. ¶¶44,45). 

On December 5, 2005, the Court issued its order granting in part and denying in part

the L&R Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims. Specifically, the Court ordered

that dismissal with prejudice was proper regarding Plaintiff's claims of: (1) violation of

Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act; (2) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; (3)

Negligent Misrepresentation; (4) Third Party Professional Negligence; and (5) Tortious

Interference with Contractual Relations. Further, the Court dismissed without prejudice

Plaintiff's claims of: (6) Abuse of Process; (7) Wrongful Institution of Legal Proceedings;

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and (8) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. The Court denied the motion to dismiss

regarding Plaintiffs' Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. Lastly, the Court

held that "in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, on balance,

favor declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims

pursuant to this Court's discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)." (Dkt.#33). The Court

subsequently denied Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on February 6, 2006, finding that

it had previously addressed the arguments raised by Plaintiff and that the arguments were

again without merit. (Dkt.#48). On March 13, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal

to the Ninth Circuit of this Court's rulings. (Dkt.#51). On March 20, 2006, final judgment

was entered in this case. (Dkt.#54). On April 3, 2006, the L&R Defendants filed their instant

Motion for attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs. The L&R Defendants seek $98,052.75 in

attorneys' fees and $4,605.09 in non-taxable costs. On December 5, 2006, Plaintiffs filed

their instant Motion for leave to file a motion to set aside the judgment. Both motions are

fully briefed and ripe for the Court's consideration. 

II. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Motion to Set Aside the Judgment

Plaintiffs raise three arguments in support of their request for leave to file their

proposed Motion to set aside the Court's Judgment in this matter. First, Plaintiffs contend

that they have obtained newly discovered evidence that establishes that Defendant Paul made

a material misrepresentation to Plaintiff Thompson during settlement discussions on April

22, 2004. Second, Plaintiffs assert that they recently discovered that during a period of

eighteen (18) months, this Court presided over three different cases all involving Lewis and

Roca, Angelo Tullo and Plaintiff Thompson. Plaintiffs assert that they "do not know" if the

prior cases "affected this Court's judgment in this case." (Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt.#72, Exhibit

A, p.1). Third, Plaintiffs assert that the Court's judgment was procured by fraud and/or

should be set aside based upon "any other reason justifying relief" under Rule 60(b)(6),

Fed.R.Civ.P. 

As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that this Court's jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs' Motion is limited in light of Plaintiffs' appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit

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Court of Appeals. As stated by the Ninth Circuit "[t]o seek Rule 60(b) relief during the

pendency of an appeal, 'the proper procedure is to ask the district court whether it wishes to

entertain the motion, or to grant it, and then move [the appellate court], if appropriate, for

remand of the case.'" Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 586 (9th Cir. 2004). As such, the

only issue before the Court is whether, based upon the arguments presented by Plaintiffs, the

Court is inclined to entertain or grant Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. The Court is not so

inclined for several reasons. 

First, with respect to Plaintiffs' reliance on fraud or newly discovered evidence it does

not appear that the Plaintiffs have presented these issues within a "reasonable time" based

upon the papers presented. Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981)(motion

filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (2) & (3) "must be brought within a 'reasonable time' and in

any event not longer than one year afer the judgment was entered." ); see also Butz v.

Mendoza-Powers, 474 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. Feb.1, 2007). Plaintiffs' papers indicate that

they became aware of the alleged new evidence regarding the settlement agreement between

Angelo Tullo and New Horizon Capital occurring in December of 2003, at the latest, June

6, 2006. (Plaintiffs' Reply, Dkt.#74, p.4). However, Plaintiffs did not file the instant Motion

to set aside the judgment until December 5, 2006, the one-year anniversary of the Court's

signed order dismissing Plaintiffs' claims upon Defendants' motion to dismiss. As such,

approximately six months expired prior to any action before this Court with respect to this

newly discovered evidence or evidence suggesting fraud. Plaintiffs offer no persuasive

argument justifying the delay; rather Plaintiffs assert only that they complied with the one

year deadline. However, Plaintiffs ignore that a Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) motion must be filed

within a "reasonable time" period, not simply filed within one year of the Court's judgment.

 See Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 1996) ("the one year period

represents an extreme limit, and the motion will be rejected as untimely if not made within

a 'reasonable time,' even though the one year period has not expired.") (citing Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2866). Plaintiffs failure to articulate any

reason for the near six-month delay based upon this newly discovered evidence or evidence

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supporting the existence of fraud is detrimental to Plaintiffs' request to set aside the Court's

judgment now. 

Second, it is not apparent that the new evidence cited by Plaintiff is in fact "newly

discovered evidence" contemplated by Rule 60(b)(2). Notably, Plaintiffs asserted in their

Complaint the existence of the settlement between Angelo Tullo and New Horizon Capital

("NHC") (Compl.¶39(e)). As such, it is apparent that Plaintiffs were aware of the settlement

agreement between Mr. Tullo and NHC prior to this lawsuit being filed. The fact that

Plaintiffs rely on the NHC settlement agreement now to further support their argument

opposing the Court's order does not somehow make the agreement newly discovered

evidence. Moreover, even if the NHC settlement agreement demonstrates that the

representation made to Plaintiff Thompson by the L&R Defendants during settlement

negotiations was false, the Court does not see the significance suggesting a different result,

as the Court presumed such to be true in the context of the L&R Defendants' original motion

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rather, it appears to the Court that Plaintiffs again seek

another bite at the apple in support of their argument regarding the L&R Defendants alleged

false statements made during settlement discussions with Plaintiff Thompson, an adverse

party and unintended beneficiary. See Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 943 P.2d 758, 766

(Ariz.App. 1997). The Court addressed this argument in its December 5, 2005, and February

13, 2006, orders. (Dkt.#33,48). 

Third, to the extent Plaintiffs rely on their "discovery" that this Court presided over

previous litigation involving the Parties involved in this litigation, the Court finds this

argument provides no basis to set aside the judgment. For instance, Plaintiffs cite that the

Court presided over the Stocklemon.com litigation, CV04-0035-PHX-MHM, filed on

January 8, 2004, which involved Lewis and Roca representing Plaintiff YP.net and an

allegedly defamatory reference in the complaint to Plaintiff Thompson. In addition, this

Court presides over the criminal proceedings against Mr. Tullo; CR04-0539-PHX-MHM.

Plaintiffs assert that "it is questionable if this Court should have even accepted the

assignment of th[e] case" in light of these other cases. (Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt.#72, p.4). 

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This broad reference provides nothing to suggest that the Court should consider setting aside

the Judgment based upon the Court's handling of the other litigation involving some the

Parties, nor does the Court find any issue as to the propriety of the Court's handling of such

matters.

Fourth, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not advance any persuasive argument

suggesting the existence of fraud tainting the Court's judgment. In re M/V Peacock on

Complaint of Edwards, 809 F.2d 1403, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1987)("moving party [under Rule

60(b)(3)] must establish that a judgment was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or

misconduct, and that the conduct complained of prevented the moving party from fully and

fairly presenting the case." ). No such circumstances have been suggested here, especially

in light of the fact that the Court previously deemed as true Plaintiffs' allegation regarding

the false representations by the L&R Defendants during settlement discussions, which

Plaintiffs claim the newly discovered or concealed evidence supports. 

Lastly, to the extent Plaintiffs rely on Rule 60(b)(6) in support of setting aside the

judgment, the Court finds no basis to do so. Notably, other than citing this Rule, the

Plaintiffs offer no argument in support of such a determination. Ackerman v. United States,

340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950) (noting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to be available only in

"extraordinary circumstances."). 

As such, because Plaintiffs offer no persuasive argument suggesting it is appropriate

to grant leave to file its Motion to set aside the Court's judgment under Rules 60(b)(2), (3)

or (6), the Court will deny Plaintiffs' request for leave. 

III. L&R Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Costs

The L&R Defendants offer two arguments in support of their request to recover their

attorneys' fees totaling $98,052.75 and non-taxable costs of $4,605.09 against Plaintiffs.

First, they assert that the settlement agreement entered into between Plaintiff Thompson and

YP.net provides for such a recovery. Second, they contend that A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-

341.01 authorize such a recovery. 

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A. Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiff Thompson and non-Party

YP.Net.

As noted in the factual background discussion, above, Plaintiffs' claims are based, in

part, upon false statements of fact made by the L&R Defendants, as counsel for YP.net, to

Plaintiff Thompson during settlement negotiations. Plaintiffs asserted several claims based

upon these false statements including securities violation, fraudulent misrepresentation,

negligent misrepresentation and third-party professional negligence. As previously

addressed, the Court dismissed those claims, upon Rule 12(b)(6) review finding that the L&R

Defendants had no duty to Plaintiffs as unintended beneficiaries. (Dkt.#33). In light of the

Court's ruling, the L&R Defendants assert that they are entitled to their attorneys' fees in this

matter because of specific language agreed to in the underlying settlement agreement

between YP.Net and Plaintiff Thompson finalized on May 21, 2004. Specifically, the

agreement provides in pertinent part:

Attorney's Fees. If either party brings an action to enforce the terms of this

Agreement or to declare rights hereunder, the prevailing party, as determined

by the court, in any such action, on trial or appeal, shall be entitled to its

reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to be paid by the losing party, as

determined by the court. 

(Lewis and Roca Motion, Dkt.#66, Exhibit F, p.6). 

The L&R Defendants assert that the attorney fee provision of this settlement

agreement applies because Plaintiffs' claims are based upon Plaintiff Thompson's rights under

the agreement. They contend this argument is supported by Plaintiffs' allegations regarding

an inflated value of the stock she received under the terms of the settlement agreement

because of Defendants' false and misleading statements. (Compl. ¶¶37-45). On the other

hand, Plaintiffs oppose any notion that their action constitutes an action to enforce the terms

of the settlement agreement with YP.net or to declare their rights thereunder. Rather,

Plaintiffs contend that their claims are solely tortious in nature and are independent of the

settlement agreement with YP.net.

In reviewing the L&R Defendants' reliance on this provision of the settlement

agreement between Plaintiff Thompson and YP.net, the Court finds this provision does not

contractually obligate Plaintiffs to bear the L&R Defendants' attorneys' fees. First, there is

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no basis to suggest that Plaintiffs' lawsuit against the L&R Defendants constitutes "an action

to enforce the terms of [the] [a]greement." Nor do the L&R Defendants even attempt to

make this argument as Plaintiffs' lawsuit against the L&R Defendants does not bear on any

type of enforcement of the terms of settlement agreement Plaintiff Thompson and non-party

YP.net. Second, contrary to the L&R Defendants' argument, Plaintiffs' lawsuit against them

does not consist or constitute an action to "declare [Plaintiffs] rights" under the settlement

agreement. Notably, Plaintiffs' lawsuit does not seek any type of declaratory ruling from the

Court suggesting that the settlement agreement is valid or invalid. Rather, Plaintiffs assert

multiple tort claims against the L&R Defendants regarding their conduct during the course

of settlement proceedings and outside the scope of such as well, such as tortious interference

with Plaintiff Thompson's contracts with third-parties (Compl.¶¶87-94) and harassment of

Plaintiff Thompson and her children. (Compl. ¶¶95-122). As such, the Court finds that the

provision of the settlement agreement between Plaintiff Thompson and YP.net, upon which

the L&R Defendants rely does not contractually obligate Plaintiffs to bear the L&R

Defendants' attorneys' fees. 

B. Arizona Statutory Attorneys' Fees: A.R.S. § 12-341.01

The L&R Defendants also assert that they are statutorily entitled to their attorneys'

fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341 and 12-341.01. A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) provides that "[i]n

any contested action arising out of a contract, expressed or implied, the court may award the

successful party reasonable attorney fees." As such, the L&R Defendants assert, as the

"successful party" that because Plaintiffs' claims "aris[e] out of" the settlement agreement

between Plaintiff Thompson and YP.net, that they are entitled to their reasonable attorneys'

fees. In support of this argument, the L&R Defendants argue that although Plaintiffs'

asserted claims sound in tort, these claims clearly arise out of the settlement agreement and

are therefore recoverable. The L&R Defendants cite certain allegations of Plaintiffs'

Complaint asserting that the Plaintiff Thompson was fraudulently induced into entering into

the settlement agreement. For example, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged multiple times that the

L&R Defendants made false representations as to: (1) the lack of existence of any criminal

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investigation targeted at the CEO of YP.net, Angelo Tullo; and (2) that the final settlement

documents would be executed on April 26, 2004. (Compl. ¶¶37, 67, 75). Moreover,

Plaintiffs' Complaint asserted that Plaintiff Thompson "was induced into accepting a

settlement agreement in the YP litigation comprised of nothing more than YP.NET's

Common Stock." (Id. ¶38; see also ¶¶51, 69, 76). In reviewing these allegations and the

nature of Plaintiffs' claims, the L&R Defendants assert that they are entitled to their fees

because "[b]ut for th[e] Agreement, there would be no lawsuit, as plaintiffs' claims are based

on the alleged denial of Ms. Thompson's rights, benefits and underlying assumptions of that

Agreement and the alleged fraudulent inducement of the settlement." (Dkt.#66, p.5).

Conversely, Plaintiffs firmly dispute the application of A.R.S. § 12.341.01 to this

lawsuit. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that this action "is based upon a series of separate and

independent torts..." (Plaintiff's Response, Dkt.#67, p.6). In support, Plaintiffs offer an

analogy of an unwarranted request for attorney's fees by a successful consumer plaintiff who

purchases a movie ticket and because of the negligence of the movie theater owner suffers

injury when the building burns to the ground. As with this case, Plaintiffs argue that

statutory attorney's fees would not be available to plaintiff's counsel simply based upon the

existence of a contract, i.e., the movie ticket. (Id.).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to their reasonable attorneys' fees under

the statutory authority of A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), as the claims at issue do not "aris[e] out of"

a contract, but rather sound exclusively in tort. A brief review of Arizona law distinguishing

between contract and tort claims is helpful to the Court's inquiry. For instance, in Sparks

v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982), the Arizona Supreme

Court concluded that a prevailing party could recover attorneys' fees for both breach of

contract and bad faith claims "based upon facts which show a breach of contract, the breach

of which may also constitute a tort." Id. at 543-44. The Arizona Supreme Court went to

explain that "[t]he fact that the two legal theories are intertwined does not preclude recovery

of attorney's fees under § 12-341.01(A) as long as the cause of action in tort could not exist

but for the breach of contract." Id. Notably, in Sparks, the Arizona Supreme Court, while

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finding an award of attorney's fees based upon the intertwined tort claim of bad faith claim

to be appropriate, held that the prevailing plaintiff could not recover attorney's fees based

upon the misrepresentation claim as it "sound[ed] mainly in tort and its existence d[id] not

depend upon a breach of the contract of insurance." Id. at 544. In Marcus v. Fox, 150 Ariz.

333, 723 P.2d 682 (1986) the Arizona Supreme Court further noted that in determining

whether a claim arises out of a contract, an "actual" breach of the relevant contract may not

be required, rather attorneys' fees may also be recoverable in situations where "a contract is

entered into and later found void due to a claim of fraudulent inducement." Id. at 335. The

Arizona Supreme Court further clarified its position, in Morris v. Achen Const. Co., Inc., 155

Ariz. 512, 747 P.2d 1211 (in banc) by noting that "the mere existence of a contract

somewhere in the transaction" does not make an award of attorney's fees appropriate. Id. at

514. The court went on to hold that a claim for attorney's fees based upon the plaintiff's

claim of fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract with a third-party did not arise out of

a contract because the "duty not to commit fraud ... exists ... even when there is no

contractual relationship between the parties at all." Id. Thus, as stated by the court in

Ramsey Air Meds, LLC v. Cutter Aviation, Inc., 198 Ariz. 10, 6 P.3d 315 (Ariz. App. 2000),

in light of the above Arizona Supreme Court authority, "a tort claim 'will arise out of a

contract' only when the tort could not exist 'but for' the breach or avoidance of contract." Id.

at 15. As such, "[w]hen the duty breached is one implied by law based on the relationship

of the parties, that claim sounds fundamentally in tort, not contract." Id.

In light of this authority, the Court finds that the L&R Defendants are not entitled to

their attorneys' fees because the Plaintiffs' claims arise not of the breach or avoidance of a

contract, but rather arise out of the alleged relationship between the Parties implied by law.

This determination is bolstered by a plain review of the fraud and misrepresentation claims

asserted by Plaintiffs, such as: (1) violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange

Act; (2) Fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) Negligent misrepresentation; and (4) Third-party

professional negligence. These claims arise out of the L&R Defendants' conduct in allegedly

failing to disclose certain information, such as the ongoing criminal investigation against

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YP.net's CEO, Mr. Tullo, to Plaintiff Thompson, in violation of their legal obligation to do

so. This alleged obligation did not arise out of the a contract, but was based upon the

relationship of the parties. The Court, in its order granting the L&R Defendants' motion to

dismiss, rejected any such legal duty to Plaintiff Thompson as she stood as only a non-client

unintended beneficiary in relation to the L&R Defendants. (Dkt#33, pp.3-4). Notably, the

Court's determination did not turn on the existence of a contract. Moreover, Plaintiffs did

not seek to invalidate or enforce any provision of the settlement agreement at issue. Thus,

Plaintiffs' claims turned on the existence or lack of a relationship between Plaintiffs and the

L&R Defendants and not on the "breach or avoidance of a contract." Ramsey, 198 Ariz at

15.

The L&R Defendants' theory in support of attorneys' fees is somewhat similar to that

advanced by the successful defendant in Morris 155 Ariz. 512. Specifically, in Morris, the

defendant, as the successful party, sought to recover its attorneys' fees in an action brought

by a party claiming that it was fraudulently induced by the defendant into entering a contract

with a third party. As noted above, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the defendant's

request for attorneys' fees on the basis that the defendant's obligation not to commit fraud

existed apart from any contractual relationship and held that the action amounted only to "an

action for damages for fraud where the alleged fraud is claimed to have resulted in one party

entering into a contract with a third party." Id. at 514. The same can be said here as the L&R

Defendants contend they are entitled to their fees because of Plaintiffs' general allegations

suggesting that Plaintiffs were fraudulently induced into entering the settlement agreement

with YP.net, a non-party to this litigation, by the false statements and actions of the L&R

Defendants. This argument fails as the alleged obligation to provide such information arises

not out of any contract, but out of a legal obligation, which the Court has found does not

exist. (Dkt.#33). Therefore, because Plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation claims do not

"aris[e] out of" contract, but sound exclusively in tort, the L&R Defendants are not statutorily

entitled to their attorneys' fees on such claims. Moreover, it is clear that the L&R Defendants

are not entitled to their attorneys' fees on any of the remaining unsuccessful claims asserted

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by Plaintiffs of: (1) Abuse of process; (2) Wrongful institution of legal proceedings; (3)

Tortious interference with contractual relations; and (4) Negligent infliction of emotional

distress. These claims relate to the L&R Defendants alleged tortious conduct based on their

actions and omissions in the use of the judicial process, tortious interference with Plaintiff

Thompson's other contractual relationships and harassment of Plaintiff Thompson and her

children. These claims do not depend on the "breach or avoidance of a contract." Ramsey,

198 Ariz at 15. As such, the Court finds that the L&R Defendants are not entitled to their

attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs. 

IV. Summary

Plaintiffs offer no compelling or persuasive argument suggesting it is appropriate to

grant them leave to file a motion to set aside the Court's judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)

Fed.R.Civ.P. As such, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' request. Moreover, because Plaintiffs'

claims do not "aris[e] out of" a contract, the Court will deny the L&R Defendants' Motion

for attorneys' fees amounting to $98,052.75 and non-taxable costs of $4,605.09. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Lewis and Roca, LLP’s Motion for Award of

Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses (Dkt#60,66).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Motion

to Set Aside the Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (Dkt.#72).

DATED this 29th day of March, 2007.

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