Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01818/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01818-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEDA GRAGOSSIAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07-CV-1818-H (LSP)

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO AMEND THE

COMPLAINT

vs.

CARDINAL HEALTH INC., a

Delaware corporation; CARDINAL

HEALTH 303 INC., a Delaware

corporation; CARDINAL HEALTH

RESOURCES, LLC, a Delaware

limited liability company; and Does 3

through 50

Defendants.

On April 28, 2008, plaintiff Seda Gragossian (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion to

amend the complaint. (Doc. No. 31.) Defendants Cardinal Health, Inc., Cardinal

Health 303, Inc., and Cardinal Health Resources LLC (“Defendants”) filed an

opposition on May 13, 2008. (Doc. No. 32.) Plaintiff filed her reply brief on May 19,

2008 (Doc. No. 33.) The Court exercises its discretion to submit this motion without

oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below,

the Court grants the motion for leave to amend.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-01818-H-LSP Document 34 Filed 05/21/08 Page 1 of 6
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Background

Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint in San Diego Superior Court on July 17,

2007, and the case was removed to federal court on September 17, 2007. (See Doc. No.

1.) Plaintiff now seeks to bring a Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in this matter.

The Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) was filed on December 10, 2007, pursuant to

a joint motion by the parties. (Doc. No. 20.) It asserts eleven employment-related

claims such as failure pay overtime wages, discrimination, sexual harassment, and

fraud. (See id.) On March 13, 2008, the magistrate judge entered a case management

order setting various deadlines including: (1) a May 2, 2008 deadline for any motion

to amend the pleadings; (2) a January 16, 2009 discovery cut-off; and (3) an April 27,

2009, final pretrial conference date. (See Doc. No. 29.) Plaintiff now seeks to add two

additional claims: (1) failure to pay wages due upon discharge; and (2) constructive

discharge in violation of public policy. (See Proposed FAC ¶¶ 83-98.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standard

Under Rule 15(a)(2), when a party is no longer able to amend as a matter of

course, they must obtain either the court’s leave or the opposing party’s written consent.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”

Id. This rule ordinarily favors leave to amend, though it has limits. For example, a

court may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend where the amendment is

duplicative of existing claims. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th Cir. 1995)

(holding that it would be futile to amend habeas petition to include proposed

amendments that were “either duplicative of existing claims or patently frivolous, or

both”). A court may also look to the sufficiency of allegations in a proposed amended

complaint to determine if they would be futile. See Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 650-51 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming denial of leave to amend

where the proposed complaint contained only conclusory allegations without supporting

Case 3:07-cv-01818-H-LSP Document 34 Filed 05/21/08 Page 2 of 6
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1

 Defendants argue that the test for futility in this context should be coextensive with Rule

12(b)(6) standards, citing authority outside this circuit. It does not appear that the Ninth Circuit has

required this approach on a motion to amend, though the Court considers the ability of the proposed

complaint to survive a motion to dismiss in the interests of judicial economy.

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facts).1

II. Adding Claim for Constructive Discharge

Defendants argue that the Court should deny leave to amend because the new

constructive discharge claim will not survive a motion to dismiss. Rule 12(b)(6)

permits dismissal of a claim either where that claim lacks a cognizable legal theory, or

where insufficient facts are alleged to support the claim’s theory. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). While a claim does not need

detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a party’s obligation to

provide the grounds of its entitlement to relief requires “more than labels and

conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” See Bell

Atlantic Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6), factual allegations must be sufficient, when taken as true, to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 1965. A complaint may proceed even

though proof seems improbable or recovery is very remote and unlikely. Id.

“Constructive discharge occurs when the employer’s conduct effectively forces

an employee to resign.” Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1239, 1244 (1994),

abrogated on other grounds by Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479 (1996).

Courts apply an objective standard to determine whether the conditions were sufficient

for constructive discharge. Id. at 1248. The conditions prompting resignation must be

“sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a

competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job.” Id. at 1246. The

resignation must be coerced, not merely a rational option chosen by the employee. Id.

at 1247; Mullins v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 15 Cal. 4th 731, 737 (1997) (“Constructive

discharge occurs only when the employer coerces the employee's resignation, either by

creating working conditions that are intolerable under an objective standard, or by

failing to remedy objectively intolerable working conditions that actually are known to

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the employer.”) Single, isolated acts are usually insufficient to establish constructive

discharge. Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1247. Furthermore, the employee must prove that the

employer either created the intolerable conditions or knowingly permitted them to exist.

See id. at 1248-50. Finally, to recover for a constructive discharge, an employee must

show that the termination was a breach of contract or a tort committed in violation of

public policy. Id. at 1251-52.

Defendants focus their challenge on the alleged conditions, arguing that they

would not establish a constructive discharge, even if proved. Plaintiff alleges that the

workplace was a demeaning environment for women in which sexual favoritism

exhibited toward other employees created an environment that implicitly conveyed the

message that intimate contact with management was necessary to success.

(See Proposed FAC ¶¶ 91-93.) California has permitted constructive discharge claims

to proceed based on a pattern of discriminatory behavior, and the Court concludes that

the alleged environment might constitute a sufficiently intolerable situation.

See Kovatch v. Cal. Cas. Mgmt. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1275 (1998) (reversing

summary judgment of no constructive discharge where evidence showed triable issue

of constructive discharge due to “harassment in violation of the fundamental public

policy against sexual orientation discrimination in employment”), disapproved on other

grounds by Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal. 4th 826 (2001); cf. Cloud v.

Casey, 76 Cal. App. 4th 895, 902-05 (1999) (affirming summary judgment of no

constructive discharge resulting from failure to promote due to alleged gender

discrimination, where employee stayed at company for months receiving high

compensation). To show constructive discharge based on gender discrimination, the

plaintiff must show extreme conditions beyond those of a general claim of gender

discrimination. See Cloud, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 902-05. Applying the favorable view

of the alleged facts appropriate to a motion to dismiss, the Court concludes that the

allegations of harassment are sufficient in combination with all the facts alleged.

Plaintiff also asserts that failure to pay overtime wages and failure to promote her

also contributed to this environment. (Proposed FAC ¶¶ 89-90.) Failure to promote,

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or even a demotion and reduction in pay, is not enough to find constructive discharge,

without more. Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1247. Plaintiff’s has gone further, however, by

alleging a pattern of sexual favoritism. The Court looks to all the circumstances

alleged, as a whole.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law because she

does not allege ever complaining to her employer about the purported conditions. The

test is whether the employer “created or knowingly permitted the intolerable conditions

to exist.” Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1250. While a complaint to the employer may be one

method by which the employer learns of the conditions, the California Supreme Court’s

constructive discharge standard does not expressly require an employee complaint in

all instances. See id. at 1248-51. Plaintiff alleges that the intolerable conditions were

actually created by Defendants’ managers. (See, e.g., Proposed FAC ¶ 92.) The Court

concludes that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants either created the

conditions or knowingly permitted them to exist.

Furthermore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation

of public policy. At least for now, Defendants have not challenged that element. Since

the Court would allow the claim, under the favorable view of the allegations appropriate

to a motion to dismiss, the Court concludes that an amendment to add this claim is not

futile.

III. Adding Claim for Failure to Pay Wages Upon Discharge

Defendants argue that the new claim for failure to pay wages upon discharge is

duplicative and adds nothing to the claim. Plaintiff previously brought claims for

general damages, waiting time penalties, and other statutory penalties. (See TAC

¶¶ 29-32.) The new claim seeks similar relief. (See Proposed FAC ¶ 86.) The new

claim, however, asserts a different theory of recovery. Furthermore, Defendants

concerns over double recovery would be better addressed at a later stage of the

proceedings. Therefore, the Court will grant leave to bring this claim.

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. Other Considerations

The Court has considered Defendants other arguments and concludes that it

should grant leave to amend. As to Plaintiff’s delay in raising these issues, Plaintiff

brought her motion to amend before the deadline set by the Court’s order. Discovery

is in the early stages, and the parties have nearly a year until their final pretrial

conference date. Any prejudice to Defendant will be limited. Should the parties believe

that the amendment requires the Court’s leave to conduct additional discovery, they

may bring an appropriate motion to the magistrate judge. The Court notes that, because

the deadline to bring motions to amend the pleadings has now passed, it may exercise

its discretion to deny any further motion to amend as a consequence of delay.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the motion to amend.

Plaintiff shall file her amended complaint within 10 days of the date this order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 21, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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