Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00019/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ODILON ALBARRAN, Civil No. 11-cv-0019-BTM(BGS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

L. S. McEWAN, Warden, 

Respondent.

State prisoner Odilon Albarran ("Albarran"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas relief from his December 8, 2006 conviction and sentence for a 1991 murder

in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD187650. A jury found him guilty of first degree

murder with personal use of a deadly weapon and found true a special circumstance allegation he

committed the murder in the course of a robbery. (Lodg. 1, CT 0262-0263; Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 4,

1353-1355.) As summarized by the Court of Appeal in its May 4, 2010 denial of his habeas petition:

Odilon Albarran came to the attention of law enforcement cold

case investigators in 2004 when DNA from a ski mask used in a 1991

robbery-murder matched DNA Albarran had provided to a data bank.

In 2006 a jury convicted Albarran of first degree murder and found he

personally used a deadly weapon. The court sentenced him to life

without the possibility of parole plus one year. We affirmed the

judgment on January 13, 2009.

(Lodg. 11, p. 1.)

 Albarran's federal Petition alleges fifteen grounds for relief. Respondent filed an Answer,

conceding the Petition was timely filed and the claims are exhausted, but opposing any habeas relief.

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 Carolina Chavez testified she was Tony Ayala's common law wife. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 8, 690:28-

691:1.) The record also refers to her as Tony's "girlfriend." (See, e.g., Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 4, p. 243.) 

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(Dkt No. 13.) Albarran filed a Traverse. (Dkt No. 23.) The Court has reviewed the pertinent portions

of the trial transcript and case record in consideration of controlling legal authority and, for the reasons

discussed below, it is recommended the Petition be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

 In its January 13, 2009 decision affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeal summarized the

prosecution's case before rejecting all twelve claims Albarran had raised. (Lodgs. 2, 5.) 

 In 1991 Antonio Ayala (Tony) was running a drug business out

of an apartment he shared with his wife Carolina Chavez[1

] and his

brother Miguel Ayala (Miguel). Tony sold cocaine, rock cocaine and

marijuana. Until the middle of 1991, Carolina's then-13-year-old

daughter Veronica Chavez (Veronica) and another adult male, Oscar

Aguirre, also lived in the apartment. Veronica and Aguirre were forced

to leave the apartment after they became romantically involved. When

they left the Ayala apartment, Veronica and Aguirre moved into an

apartment with appellant [Albarran].

After he left the Ayala apartment, Aguirre continued to have

contact with Tony, and in the middle of September he bought a gun

from Tony. While Tony was selling the gun to Aguirre, Tony was also

counting his drug money. Caroline did not like Aguirre and told Tony

that Aguirre could not be trusted.

About 10 p.m. on September 16, 1991, Aguirre's cousin stopped

at the Ayala apartment and asked Miguel if he could obtain drugs on

credit. Miguel, who usually slept by the front door so he could provide

service to Tony's clientele, told the cousin he would "front" the cousin

the drugs. Rather than taking the drugs, the cousin said he would come

back for them and left. Thirty minutes later, someone knocked on the

door. When Miguel opened it, he was confronted by two masked men,

one of whom had a gun. As the two men forced their way into the

apartment, one of the men told Miguel, "This is a holdup."

The shorter of the two robbers began trying to choke Miguel

with a shoe lace. As this was occurring, Tony came out of the bedroom

and began fighting with the other taller robber. Miguel was able to flip

the shorter robber over his shoulder. The robber hit Miguel with his

gun and then went into the kitchen, where he grabbed a knife. The

shorter robber then began slashing Miguel, who was able to take the

ski-mask off the shorter robber.

Eventually, because of the knife wounds he suffered, Miguel

was no longer able to fight. The robber without the mask then turned

his attention to Tony. He knifed Tony 14 times.

Carolina came into the living room and saw the unmasked

shorter robber with something in his hand, hitting Tony; according to

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Carolina, at that point only the unmasked robber was fighting with

Tony, who was bleeding profusely. The robbers fled the apartment,

and Miguel saw them get into a white TransAm or sports car.

According to Miguel, only the shorter robber knifed Tony, and,

according to Carolina, only the shorter robber was fighting with Tony

at the time she came into the room.

Carolina called police from a neighbor's apartment; while

waiting for police and paramedics to arrive, Carolina instructed Miguel

to gather up evidence of Tony's drug business and hide it. Miguel did

so. Tony died at the scene. Miguel recovered from his wounds.

The forensic team that processed the apartment found blood

everywhere in the apartment: "all over the walls, and window sills and

carpet – everywhere." The forensic team was able to recover two guns,

two knives and a black ski mask from underneath a mattress in Tony

and Carolina's bedroom. Only one of the knives had any human blood

on it.

According to Veronica, on the evening of the killing, appellant

and Aguirre were talking about the fact they needed to go out and "do

something." Veronica believed appellant and Aguirre were going to do

something unusual because, unlike most times the men went out, on

this occasion Veronica was not invited to go with them. Before they

left, Veronica gave them a knife. After appellant and Aguirre left in

Aguirre's white Camero, Veronica watched a movie and fell asleep.

Veronica woke up when Aguirre returned to the apartment.

Appellant was not with Aguirre, and in fact, even though appellant's

belongings remained in the apartment, appellant never returned to the

apartment. The following morning, Veronica went with Aguirre to

have his car detailed, and at trial Veronica recalled the detailers did a

very thorough job of cleaning the car. Veronica did not see appellant

again until the time of trial.

Elizabeth Escogido was 13 years old in 1991 and was a friend

of Veronica. She was also a friend of appellant. After Tony's murder,

Escogido never saw appellant again in San Diego. However, three or

four days after the murder, appellant called Escogido and told her that

he was in Los Angeles. Appellant asked Escogido if she heard about

Tony's murder and told Escogido that he had some problems about

money with Veronica's father and Veronica's father was "trying to get

overly smart with him." 

. . . . Notwithstanding the evidence the forensic team was able to

recover from the scene of the murder, the case went cold. In 2004 a

cold case detective revisited the case. In 2004 a crime lab analyst was

able to recover a DNA sample from the mouth area of the ski mask

Miguel pulled off the robber who initially attacked him and eventually

stabbed Tony to death. The DNA matched a sample appellant provided

to a DNA data bank.

Appellant was charged with first degree murder, use of a deadly

weapon in the commission of a murder and the special circumstance he

murdered his victim in the commission of a felony. The jury found

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 The defense case in chief consisted of one testifying witnesses, an experimental psychologist

specializing in human memory perception and identification. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 12, pp. 1148-1182.)

3

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this R&R refer to those electronically imprinted.

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appellant guilty of those crimes and further found the special

circumstance allegation was true.

(Lodg. 5, pp. 3-6.)

Albarran describes his defense at trial, without challenging that aspect of his representation:

Petitioner's defense to the charge against him was that he had been

misidentified as one of the two perpetrators of the murder and that he,

in fact, did not participate in the incident at all. To this end, Petitioner's

defense was proffered essentially through cross-examination of the

various witnesses, many of whom, the defense was able to show, had

serious credibility problems.[2

]

(Dkt No. 23, 25:24-26:2; see Dkt No. 1-1, p. 26.)3

As summarized by the San Diego County Superior Court deciding Albarran's habeas petition

following direct review:

Petitioner timely appealed his conviction to the California Court

of Appeal. . . . Petitioner argued on appeal: the trial court erred in two

respects with regard to the felony murder special circumstance jury

instruction; the trial court erred in instructing the jury about the specific

intent required for the commission of murder and robbery; the

prosecution committed misconduct by vouching for the credibility of

witnesses, allowing a witness to offer inadmissible evidence,

improperly eliciting testimony, and failing to provide crucial discovery;

the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction; the court erred

when it admitted evidence of Petitioner's statements elicited in

violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436; and, the court

erred when it refused to find jury misconduct. The judgment was

affirmed.

(Lodg. 9.)

Albarran petitioned the California Supreme Court for review after the judgment was affirmed,

alleging: (1) trial court error in failing to give CALCRIM No. 703, the instruction defining the

requisite intent for aiding-and-abetting accomplice liability; (2) the trial court's modified CALCRIM

252 instruction inaccurately stated the law; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in purportedly vouching for

its detective witnesses and coaching an eye-witness; and (4) he received a confusing preamble to the

Miranda warnings which should have resulted in the suppression of statements he made to police.

(Lodg. 6, pp. ii-iii.) Review was summarily denied on April 15, 2009. (Lodg. 7.) 

\\

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Albarran filed his January 21, 2010 habeas petition in San Diego County Superior Court

alleging: "there was insufficient evidence to support bind over on the charges against Petitioner, the

government committed misconduct in Petitioner's case, his counsel was ineffective because counsel

failed to file a motion to dismiss the information, the trial court committed instructional error, there

was insufficient evidence of guilt and the trial court erred by not suppressing Petitioner's statements

to police elicited in violation of Miranda, supra." (Lodg. 9.) The Superior Court denied the petition

on March 10, 2010, observing "habeas corpus cannot serve as a second appeal" and finding he had

"tested all his claims on appeal," with the exception of "the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

and the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing," warranting summary denial of all but

those two claims. (Id.) In denying his preliminary hearing challenges, the court concluded he should

have raised any claim concerning the Information in the trial court and, under California law, his

failure to do so resulted in a waiver of "any invalidity in the proceedings prior to the commitment,"

foreclosing his claim "that the bind over was fraught with error." (Id.) The court also rejected his IAC

claim because he did not demonstrate prejudice, applying the standards from Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S 668, 687 (1984) and People v. Ledesma 43 Cal.3d 171, 216 (1987). (Id.)

The Court of Appeal also denied Albarran habeas relief. The court rejected his claim "the trial

court should have set aside the indictment or information after the preliminary hearing because the

witnesses were untruthful and had been coached by the prosecution" and his IAC claim that his

representation was ineffective, concluding on the latter claim, as had the Superior Court, that

"Albarran has not shown that had counsel moved to set aside the indictment or information, counsel

would have obtained a favorable result." (Lodg. 11, p. 1.) The court rejected his challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence because it had been "rejected on appeal." (Id.) The court also denied his

additional claim that the taking of a saliva sample constituted an unreasonable search and seizure

because his DNA was already available in a law enforcement data base, applying, inter alia, Terry v.

Ohio, 392U.S. 1, 21 (1968) and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). (Id.)

Albarran's habeas petition to the California Supreme Court alleged: two grounds of

instructional error associated with CALCRIM No. 703; prosecutorial misconduct in "vouching" for

its witnesses; prosecutorial misconduct "when one of his witnesses referenced appellant's past criminal

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conviction and imprisonment" in violation of a pre-trial ruling; prosecutorial misconduct in eliciting

testimony from a witness that he "was afraid to testify;" prosecutorial misconduct, "however

inadvertent, when its agent . . . destroyed key piece of evidence;" cumulative error from "the various

incidents of prosecutional misconduct;" trial court error in "giving a modified version of CALCRIM

No. 252;" insufficient evidence that he had committed or attempted to commit a robbery to support

the robbery-first degree murder conviction; insufficient evidence to support findings of premeditation

and deliberation; trial court error in failing to suppress his statements made after allegedly misleading

Miranda advisements; and juror misconduct. (Lodg. 12.) That petition was summarily denied on

December 15, 2010, with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998). (Lodg. 13.) 

Albarran filed his federal Petition on January 5, 2011. Ground One alleges his "preliminary

hearing judge on its own motion failed to set aside case." (Dkt No. 1, p. 11.) Ground Two alleges

various examples of purportedly "outrageous governmental misconduct" associated with the

preparation and presentation of the prosecution's case and the gathering of DNA evidence. (Id., p. 15.)

Ground Three alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to set aside the

information and for purportedly assisting the District Attorney regarding an alleged promise to

"supply[] citizenship to Miguel Angel Guzman Ayala [in exchange] for his testimony." (Id., p. 16.)

 Albarran presents Grounds Four through Fifteen by referencing Petition "Appendix A," stating

it "adequately summarizes the procedural history and facts of the case." (Dkt No. 1, p. 17.) The

docketed Attachment is Albarran's entire 108-page Opening Brief on direct appeal elaborating the

twelve claims he pursued there. (Dkt Nos. 1-1, 1-2; see Lodg. 2.) The Court accordingly construes

those twelve claims as Petition grounds Four through Fifteen and refers to appeal ground one as

Petition Ground Four, appeal ground two as Petition Ground Five, and so forth, up to and including

appeal ground twelve as Petition Ground Fifteen. Respondent's Answer addresses each of those

claims using the same approach (Dkt No. 13), and the Traverse adopts that convention (Dkt No. 23,

pp. 7-10).

Respondent contends Albarran is entitled to no federal habeas relief on any of his claims. (Dkt

No. 13.) Respondent also argues Grounds One, Two, and Three are procedurally defaulted. Albarran

concedes in his Traverse that Grounds One and Eight do not present issues cognizable in this Court

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(Dkt No. 23, 1:24-27, 3:15-18, 55:25-56:3), but reasserts his claims in all other respects. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Federal Habeas Relief

A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") controls review of Albarran's habeas petition.

See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). AEDPA imposes a " 'highly deferential standard

for evaluating state-court rulings,' " requiring "that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002), quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7; see MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ("Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary"), citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

A petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief only if the result of a claim adjudicated on the

merits by a state court "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), or

"was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding" (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). To be found unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), application of the precedent "must have been more than incorrect or erroneous;" it "must

have been 'objectively unreasonable.' " Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citations

omitted). A decision is "contrary to" federal law if (1) it applies a rule that contradicts governing

Supreme Court authority, or (2) it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from"

a Supreme Court decision but reaches a different result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)

(citations omitted); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-06 (2000) (distinguishing the "contrary

to" standard from the "unreasonable application" standard); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694

(2002). 

When the state court denies a federal claim on procedural grounds clearly without reaching

the merits, there is no state court decision to which deference is owed. A federal habeas court will

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review "a properly raised issue" de novo in such circumstances. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167-68 (9th Cir. 2002) ("the AEDPA deference scheme outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)" does not

apply when the state denied post-conviction relief on procedural grounds rather than on the merits)

(citation omitted). If the dispositive state court decision reaches the merits "but provides no reasoning

to support its conclusion," federal habeas courts independently review the record "to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law," although "we still

defer to the state court's ultimate decision." Id. at1167; see Harrington v. Richter, -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct.

770, 784-85 (2011) (where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas

petitioner's burden must still be met by showing there was no reasonable [legal or factual] basis for

the state court to deny relief"). "We construe 'postcard' denials . . . to be decisions on the merits."

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) ( "[a] decision on the merits necessarily implies

that an application was 'properly filed.' "), revised in part by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2006). Federal

courts apply AEDPA standards to the "last reasoned decision" by a state court addressing the claim.

Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803

(1991) ("Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground").

2. Procedural Default

Respondent contends Albarran's Petition Grounds One, Two, and Three are procedurally

defaulted. "A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state court 'if the decision . . .

rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate do support the

judgment.' " Walker v. Martin, -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011), quoting Beard v. Kindler, 588

U.S. --, 130 S.Ct. 612, 615 (2009). "The state-law ground may be a substantive rule dispositive of the

case, or a procedural barrier to adjudication of the claim on the merits." Id. at 1127-28 (citation

omitted). The state's rule may be mandatory or discretionary, as long as it is "firmly established and

regularly followed." Beard, 130 S.Ct. at 618.

"In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant

to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred

unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

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violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Cooper v. Neven,

641 F.3d 322, 328 (2011). The "good cause" showing must involve an "objective factor outside of a

prisoner's control." Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1127. The "prejudice" showing requires the petitioner to

establish "the errors . . . worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire

[proceeding] with errors of constitutional dimension." Id. (citations omitted).

In California, habeas petitioners may have their claims denied as untimely without a merits

review if they "substantially delay" presenting them without justification. In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750,

765, n.5 (1993). "A summary denial citing Clark and Robbins means that the petition is rejected as

untimely." Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1126, 1130-31 (holding California's untimeliness rule is "adequate"

for procedural default purposes when the petitioner subsequently presents for federal habeas relief the

same claims that were rejected on untimeliness grounds in state court, reversing a Ninth Circuit

determination that the California untimeliness bar of Clark and Robbins was not "adequate" because

not firmly defined or consistently applied). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that California's

untimeliness rule became unequivocally "independent" of federal law in 1998 with the California

Supreme Court decision In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998), a case holding that California courts

would no longer consider the federal constitutional merits of a state habeas petition when enforcing

the state's untimeliness bar. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 581-83 (9th Cir. 2003). 

State courts may decide a claim on the merits notwithstanding the applicability of an

untimeliness rule, without application of the rule being found arbitrary. Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1126;

see also Bennett, 322 F.3d at 580 ("A state court's application of a procedural rule is not undermined

where, as here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim"). Thus, a state

procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal claim even if

the state court exercised its discretion "to by-pass a timeliness issue and, instead, summarily reject the

petition for want of merit." Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1126, citing Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 778, n.1.

 It is recommended the Court find, as Respondent contends, that the state courts denied

Petition Grounds One, Two, and Three on adequate and independent state law grounds, as reflected

in the Superior Court's and Court of Appeal's reasoned decisions and in the California Supreme Court's

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summary denial of habeas review with a citation to Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. See Walker. 131 S.Ct.

at 1124 ("California courts signal that a habeas petition is denied as untimely by citing the controlling

decisions, i.e., Clark and Robbins"). Albarran has thus procedurally defaulted those claims for

purposes of federal habeas review, and he has not attempted to demonstrate excusable cause for the

delay in presenting those claims in state court nor the prejudice required to overcome the default.

Those claims should be DENIED on that basis. Even were the Court to decide the procedural default

issue differently, it is recommended that federal habeas relief be DENIED on the merits of those

claims, for the reasons discussed below.

B. Ground One: Failure To Set Aside The Information At Preliminary Hearing

Albarran asserts federal habeas relief is warranted due to allegedly coached and untruthful

witness testimony at his preliminary hearing. (Dkt No. 1, p. 11.) The Superior Court and the Court

of Appeal rejected this claim on habeas review as waived, and the California Supreme Court

summarily denied his habeas petition containing the claim as untimely. Respondent contends not only

is this issue procedurally defaulted, but also it presents no federal question for which relief may be

granted. In his Traverse, Albarran disputes that Ground One is procedurally defaulted (Dkt No. 23,

1:24-27), but "[a]fter consideration, Petitioner concedes that, whether the trial court erred or not when

it failed to set aside the case at the preliminary hearing, is not a federal question" for which relief may

be granted (Id., 30:2-6). It is recommended the Court construe his concession as an abandonment of

the claim and DENY relief on Ground One on that basis.

C. Ground Two: Governmental Misconduct

Albarran alleges the state courts unreasonably rejected his claims of "outrageous governmental

misconduct" in the form of "over zealous San Diego Police Department, the District Attorney's Office

presented the case poorly in the preparations thereof," including allegedly "mak[ing] . . . promises and

threats to all witnesses in this case," use of their "authority to incite, provoke and to intimidate

witnesses into testifying to what the Government felt was suitable to obtain a conviction," and their

"conduct had caused Petitioner to be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure" in the form of a

saliva swab to collect a DNA sample. (Dkt No. 1, p. 15.) He raised on direct appeal all but the Fourth

Amendment DNA issue. (See Lodg. Nos. 2, 5.) 

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In the context of federal habeas review of unconstitutional state trial errors, Albarran

mistakenly represents: "The test for prejudice in an instance of prosecutorial misconduct, where a

federal constitutional error is involved, is the burden is on the state to prove the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt." (Dkt No. 23, 60:21-24, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967).) Rather, the harmless error standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)

applies "uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under § 2254" to a review of unconstitutional

trial errors regardless of which of those standards, if any, the state courts applied in deciding the claim.

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir.2000) (that is, whether the error had a "substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"). 

The Court of Appeal reached and denied relief on the merits of Albarran's allegations: (1) the

prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a police detective and an investigator who were

present during an interview with Miguel; (2) a trial witness improperly and prejudicially referenced

a government criminal DNA database during testimony; (3) a police detective lost a videotaped

interview of Elizabeth Escogido; and (4) cumulatively, that misconduct requires reversal. (Lodg. 5,

pp. 16-28.) The Court addresses those discrete claims individually below in connection with Petition

Grounds Six, Seven, Nine, and Ten, respectively, and recommends each be DENIED.

In deciding Albarran's habeas petition, the Superior Court denied relief on all but his

preliminary hearing irregularities and IAC claims on grounds matters previously raised and rejected

on appeal are not cognizable on collateral review, and he demonstrated no special circumstances to

avoid that rule. (Lodg. 9, pp. 2-3.) With respect to the preliminary hearing issues, the court found:

Further, Petitioner's challenge to the bind over should have been

raised in the trial court. Failure to so challenge the information renders

any invalidity in the proceedings prior to the commitment waived. (In

re Hannie (1970) 3 Cal.3d 520, 528); In re Razutis (1950) 35 Cal.2d

532, 534.) Thus, the claim that the bind over was fraught with error is

denied.

(Lodg. 9, 2:14-28.)

As recommended above, applying procedural default legal standards, relief on Ground Two

should be DENIED for Albarran's failure to make the required cause and prejudice showing to

overcome the state's adequate and independent state law untimeliness bar to reaching the merits of this

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claim on federal habeas review. See Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1124. In addition, Albarran relies on no

controlling United States Supreme Court authority that suggests alleged pre-trial error of this nature

can provide a cognizable basis to disturb a conviction after a subsequent full and fair trial, foreclosing

relief on this theory. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

1. DNA Collection Issue

 Even were the Court to reach the merits of Albarran's unreasonable search and seizure

argument, AEDPA standards foreclose relief. The Court of Appeal rejected his Fourth Amendment

claim that the collection of a saliva sample for DNA testing was unreasonable because "Petitioner's

D.N.A. was already" available in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation data

bank. (Dkt No.1, p. 15.) The Court of Appeal explained:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits all "unreasonable" searches,

whether conducted with or without a warrant. (United States v.

Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U.S. 452, 464.) Reasonableness is determined by

balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search

entails. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21.) Appropriate procedures

to retrieve evidence from the human body are neither "unreasonable"

per se under the Fourth Amendment, nor violations of "due process"

procedures guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

(People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 293.) "[W]here a warrant [or

court order] authorizing a bodily intrusion is sought, the issuing

authority after finding probable clause to believe the intrusion will

reveal evidence of crime, must apply an additional balancing test to

determine whether the character of the requested search is appropriate.

Factors which must be considered include the reliability of the method

to be employed, the seriousness of the underlying criminal offense and

society's consequent interest in obtaining a conviction [citations], the

strength of law enforcement suspicions that evidence of crime will be

revealed, the importance of the evidence sought, and the possibility that

the evidence may be recovered by alternative means less violative of

Fourth Amendment freedoms. [Citations.] [¶] These considerations

must, in turn, be balanced against the severity of the proposed

intrusion." (Ibid.)

Albarran has not provided documentation of the postarrest DNA

evidence gathering to support his claim of unlawful search [e.g.,

discovery requests, motions, opposition, court order for testing]. The

minimally invasive swab for saliva to compare a defendant's DNA in

a prosecution for murder with DNA the defendant has previously

provided is not per se an unreasonable search.

(Lodg. 11, p. 2.) 

It is recommended the Court find the state court identified the proper legal standard controlling

this issue and applied it in an objectively reasonable manner to conclude Albarran demonstrated no

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Fourth Amendment violation occurred. He cites no United States Supreme Court authority contrary

to the state court's determination, and his conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant disturbing

the state court result. Moreover, Albarran does not contend there was any discrepancy in the DNA

matches among the CODIS data base sample, the ski mask sample, and his saliva swab sample, so any

unconstitutional error associated with the DNA collection cannot be construed as having caused him

any prejudice. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Relief on this ground should be DENIED.

2. Prosecutorial Misconduct Through False Evidence Or Unrevealed

Promises

 "[I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such

by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment," and that "[t]he same

result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when

it appears." Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Prosecutorial misconduct amounting to a

due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150 (1972) can also be found where the prosecution fails to disclose a secret deal with a witness.

See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (government failed to disclose an alleged promise to its key witness that

if he testified for the government at trial, he would not be prosecuted). "When the reliability of a

given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting

credibility falls within this general rule" that nondisclosure of a secret deal with a witness constitutes

prosecutorial misconduct amounting to a due process violation. Id.

However, "there is never a real 'Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that

there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different

verdict." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). The decisive question under Brady and

Giglio is whether the evidence withheld from the jury is material, that is, whether there is a

"reasonable probability" of a different result had the evidence been presented. See Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) ("The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have

received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,

understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence"); see also United States v. Kohring,

637 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 

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The Court should reject Albarran's arguments that the witnesses against him at his preliminary

hearing gave false or coerced testimony at the instigation of the prosecution, with the allegedly

unconstitutional consequence that he was wrongfully bound over for trial. (Dkt No. 1, pp. 11-14.)

First, under California law, he defaulted any challenges to the pre-trial bind over. (See Lodg. 9, 2:25-

28); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-261 (1989) (a federal habeas claimant's procedural default

under state law precludes federal habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice). Second,

the preliminary hearing witnesses were also trial witnesses. Defense counsel thoroughly cross

examined them in front of the jury with questions expressly exploring the possibility of improper

prosecutorial coaching on the identification and inducement issues, followed by rebuttal testimony.

The record reflects, for example, defense counsel sought to have Miguel testify at trial that the

prosecutor told him what answers to give at the preliminary hearing. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 9, 777:8-

22.) 

Q. "Question: Did Mr. Myers, the prosecutor, tell you what you

needed to say?" Your answer: "He told me how to answer the

questions that were going go be made to me." Do you remember that

question and answer now?

A. Yes.

Q. When you said that he told you how to answer the questions, do you

mean he told you what answers to give?

A. No.

Q. Isn't it true that your answer to that same question on that day was

yes?

A. Well, I was confused.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 9, 778:2-14.)

Counsel also asked Miguel whether, in a December 2004 meeting, then-sergeant Duran or

Robert Baker, a district attorney investigator assigned to the cold case homicide division (Lodg. 14,

RT Vol. 10, 907:1-3), told him they "were having trouble finding a witness that was able to identify

the defendant" and "indicated it was important for [Miguel] to be able to identify the defendant;"

Miguel clarified they conveyed to him: "That they were not being able to find the person who was

guilty of committing the crime." (Id., RT Vol. 9, 778:26-779:10.) Counsel also had Miguel confirm

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 Veronica Chavez testified at trial the police showed her a "six pack" photo lineup of possible suspects

in 2004 and she recognized "Ody" (Albarran) at that time, the same person she identified in court. (Lodg. 14,

RT Vol. 9, 797:28-798:11.) On cross-examination, she authenticated Exhibit 40 as a copy of that photo lineup.

(Id., 814:13-815:2.) She also testified she was shown that photo lineup at Albarran's preliminary hearing and

testified then, as she did at trial, that she "immediately recognized" him, and that he was also known as

"Shorty." (Id., 815:5-817:7.) She also testified she recognized Exhibit 38, the photo lineup with Carolina's

signature on it. (Id., 813:25-814:11.) Veronica admitted she lied to police in 1991when she told them about

a friend of Albarran's, Chikiz, in order to protect her boyfriend, Oscar, from being implicated in the crime. (Id.,

796:4-797:27; see also Id., 831:7-27; Id., 832:18-24.) 

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that he had never been presented with a live lineup, but only with a photo lineup containing six images

"similar to court's Exhibit 38," and he had stated before the May 10, 2005 preliminary hearing he was

"sure" the person who committed the crime was "none of those," whereas after being prepared for that

hearing, he identified Albarran while testifying there. (Id., 779:19-780:24.) 

In response to those defense suggestions, Lieutenant Duran testified that Miguel was not told

by any of the investigating officers or the prosecutor, in those meetings when he was translating the

conversations, that he should identify as the murderer whoever was produced in court as the defendant

at the preliminary hearing, as suggested by defense counsel, or that he should do anything other than

tell the truth. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 10, pp. 879-880.) He confirmed Miguel said he did not recognize

anyone in the photo lineup shown to him, but testified Miguel also told him "if he saw the person –

the individuals in person, that he may be able to identify them." (Id., 876:24-877:8.) Duran also

confirmed that both Carolina Chavez and Veronica Chavez both identified Albarran from photo

lineups shown to them.4

 (Id., pp. 871-874.)

 Investigator Baker testified he observed no instance where anyone preparing Miguel or any

other witnesses to testify at the preliminary hearing urged them to identify the defendant produced at

the hearing as the person who committed the crime. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 10, 919:24-920:9, 923:12-18.)

He confirmed Miguel stated during an interview translated by Duran that he could not identify anyone

out of the photo lineup, but "could possibly identify the person -- the subject in person." (Id., 916:17-

25.) Baker, like Duran, refuted the coaching accusations and testified that at the time he, too, "had

no idea" in advance of his testimony whether Miguel was going to identify Albarran at the

preliminary hearing, but that "when he looked at Mr. Albarran that morning in the preliminary hearing

and he was asked if he saw anybody in court . . . . he identified Mr. Albarran . . . in short order." (Id.,

924:10-24; see Id., 882:2-11.) He also testified that during an interview with Miguel the week before

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trial began, an investigator certified in Spanish who stepped in to assist in trial preparations after

Lieutenant Duran was promoted, translated that Miguel was "very certain" about his identification of

Albarran at the preliminary hearing. (Id., 925:13-926:5.) This aspect of Albarran's prosecutorial

misconduct claims thus became an issue solely entrusted to the factfinder, outside the scope of federal

habeas review. 

 None of the state court decisions separately discusses Albarran's particular allegation that

Miguel was promised immigration assistance in exchange for his allegedly false testimony. Like the

other prosecutorial misconduct allegations, this claim must fail because that accusation was fully

explored on the record at trial. Miguel testified on direct that he was originally from Honduras.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 9, 744:26-28.) He admitted he was in the United States illegally. (Id., 774:24-

26.) On cross, defense counsel asked Miguel questions aimed at eliciting evidence of prosecutorial

promises that could undermine his credibility and impeaching him with prior inconsistent statements.

Q. Isn't it true that at some point, members from the prosecution team

discussed with you your citizenship and your ability to stay in the

United States legally?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall your testifying in this courthouse at an earlier hearing

in this case?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. During that hearing, when I asked you, "Did either of them at any

point discuss with you your citizenship or ability to stay in the United

States legally?" You answered Yes, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And when I asked you who you spoke to about that, you said, "The

detective or Jorge Duran and his partner," right?

A. Yes.

Q. Isn't it true that you and the prosecutor describe some sort of visa

that would be given to you to stay in the United States legally?

A. No.

Q. Isn't it true that at that same hearing, in which you testified under

oath, in answer to that same question, you said, "He hasn't yet

processed anything, but he told me he would do everything possible"?

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A. I was confused.

. . .

THE COURT: . . . [Reading from the preliminary hearing transcript],

The question was, "And did the prosecutor ever describe to you some

sort of visa that would be given to stay in the United States legally?

Answer: He hasn't yet processed anything, but he told me he would do

everything possible." Do you remember that question and remember

that answer?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 9, 775:2-777:5.)

The prosecutor rebutted the defense suggestions that Miguel had been pressured to identify

Albarran as the killer and that he may have been promised immigration consideration. For example,

Lieutenant Duran testified in pertinent part:

Q. Did you ever arrange a meeting between me and Miguel Ayala

before the morning of the prelim?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Before the morning of the prelim or any time you had any contact

with him, was there any mention of any government agency helping

Miguel Ayala with is visa or with his I.N.S. paperwork or anything like

that?

A. No.

Q. Well, you heard statements to that effect during the preliminary

hearing; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you attribute those to?

. . .

THE WITNESS: Mr. Ayala was concerned for his immigration status

in this country and was concerned that he, at some point, may be

deported. I reassured him he was a victim and a witness to a crime, that

we did not have the authority to deport him or arrest him for any

immigration violation.

Q. And that's what you told Miguel Ayala?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any promises of help from federal agencies or anything

like that?

A. No.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 10, 877:23-878:20.)

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 After Miguel was excused as a witness, with the jury absent, the prosecutor, Mr. Myers, objected to

the "accusations against me during the course of this trial," suggesting "probably I would feel that it would be

relevant for counsel to bring up Mr. Ayala and whether he's deluded that he's getting help with his immigration

status." (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 9, 782:10-14.) He told the court: "At one point during a recess at the preliminary

hearing, [defendant's co-counsel] said, 'I believe that none of those things happened, Mr. Myers.' It was during

a time when Ayala was saying yes to everything, every single thing being asked." (Id., 782:15-19.) The

prosecutor identified defense questioning that required a response, in particular the line of questioning inquiring

whether the prosecutor told Miguel, " 'Whoever is in court, just identify that person,' " a statement that the

prosecutor intended to "clear up" through the detective witnesses, reminding defense counsel "[i]t is misconduct

to accuse counsel of something without proof." (Id., 782:15-783:5.) He expressed his discomfort "with regard

to constant accusations in this case, both at the prelim and here." (Id., 783:7-14.) The court noted the

previously-asked question and answer were in the record and pre-approved anticipated arguments regarding

Miguel's lack of sophistication. (Id., 783:23-28.)

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Investigator Baker's testimony also rebutted defense suggestions the prosecutor or his agents

allegedly made promises in exchange for testimony or sought to influence witnesses:5

Q. Was there ever a time where you conveyed through Sergeant Duran

any type of promises or any type of favoritism or any type of favor with

regard to I.N.S. or visas or anything like that to Miguel Ayala?

A. No.

. . .

Q. And were you present when Miguel Ayala was prepared to testify

in court [at the preliminary hearing]?

A. Yes, I was.

. . .

Q. Was Sergeant Duran interpreting for me [as the prosecutor prepared

Miguel to testify the morning of the preliminary hearing]?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Was there ever a point where I said to Miguel Ayala that I was

going to fill out his paperwork for I.N.S. or get a visa for him or

anything like that?

A. No.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 10, 917:21-918:27.) 

 Unlike the circumstances contemplated in the Brady/Giglio context, this record reflects the

purported promises or coaching were not concealed. The factfinders were able to consider whether

such conduct occurred and retained their prerogatives to weigh the evidence and to make credibility

determinations in reaching their verdict. It is recommended the Court reject Albarran's attempt to

undermine confidence in the fairness of his trial or the verdict on this theory and DENY habeas relief.

D. Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel ("IAC")

Albarran alleges as Ground Three IAC for counsel's failure to file a "motion under §995. (A),

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(B), (1), 2; and § 999 when the evidence surfaced of perjured testimony from each and every witness

who had testified" at his preliminary hearing. Those code identify the means to challenge nonjurisdictional irregularities under California law, including motions to set aside an information when

the defendant has allegedly been indicted without reasonable or probable cause. Albarran contends

that instead of moving to set aside the information, counsel "sat on his hands" and "assist[ed] the

District Attorney and vouched when 'evidence' surfaced about promise[] of supplying citizenship to

Miguel Angel Guzman Ayala for his testimony." (Dkt No. 1, p. 16.) He argues that the resulting

determination to bind him over for trial and the "results in determining Petitioner guilty in this case

prior to trial would have decreased dramatically" had his attorney done so. (Id.)

Respondent contends this claim is procedurally defaulted, as signaled by the California

Supreme Court's citation to Robins in summarily denying Albarran's habeas petition. (Dkt No. 13,

p. 48; see Lodg. 13; see Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1124.) Both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal

denied him habeas relief on this claim both for failure to overcome the state law procedural default

and for failure to satisfy the prejudice prong of an IAC claim. (Lodg. 9, Lodg. 11.) Albarran disputes

that the claim is procedurally defaulted, summarily arguing he "established good cause for the delay

and, the California Supreme Court's finding to the contrary was the result of an unreasonable

application of clearly established [federal] law . . . and was the product of an unreasonable

determination of the facts." (Dkt No. 23, 35:10-14.) However, his conclusory characterizations are

unsupported by any factual underpinning, and he relies on no apposite United States Supreme Court

authority. It is recommended the Court DENY habeas relief on Ground Three for those reasons. 

Even if the Court were to reach the merits of his IAC claim, judicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance is "highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Reviewing courts approach an IAC

claim with the "strong presumption" that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Cullen v. Pinholster, --

U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (citation omitted). To prevail, the claimant must demonstrate that

counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment and resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690, 694. To prove constitutional error on the objectively unreasonable performance element,

"[t]he challenger's burden is to show 'that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

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functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.' " Harrington, 131

S.Ct. at 787, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 688. To prove prejudice, "[t]he defendant must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694; see Harrington, 131

S.Ct. at 792 ("The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable"). "[E]ven

a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable."

Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 791-92 (reversing a Ninth Circuit en banc grant of habeas relief on an IAC

claim for lack of sufficient deference to a state court result).

Albarran argues that "when it [allegedly] became clear that the testimony offered by the

prosecution was the product of perjury and was obviously scripted" at his preliminary hearing, his trial

attorney should have moved to set aside the charges against him. (Dkt No. 23, 34:25-27.) He

contends "there is a reasonable probability that, had counsel made that motion, the court would of

agreed and granted the motion." (Id., 35:27-36:1.) The Superior Court correctly identified and

reasonably applied the Strickland standards to conclude he failed to make the showing required

showing to warrant relief: 

Finally, Petitioner has not shown that counsel's failure to file the

motion to dismiss the information was an unreasonable decision and

resulted in prejudice to Petitioner. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)

466 U.S 668, 687; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216.) In

other words, Petitioner has not shown that the motion, if it had been

made by counsel, would have resulted in the dismissal of the charges

and termination of the prosecution against Petitioner and that counsel's

decision to forgo the motion was not [a] tactical decision.

(Lodg. 9, 3:1-7; see Lodg. 11, p. 1 (the Court of Appeal reached the same result).) 

In order to prevail as a federal habeas petitioner, Albarran "must show that the [state court]

applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner." Bell, 535 U.S. at

698-99. "The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,' and when

the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788, 791-92 (citations

omitted). Accordingly, even if Albarran's IAC claim were not procedurally defaulted, applying the

"double deference" required on federal habeas review of IAC claims, it is recommended the claim be

DENIED, as the state court result comports with controlling federal authority, and it is not based on

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an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidentiary record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

E. Instructional Error

1. Legal Standards

"What the factfinder must determine to return a verdict of guilty is prescribed by the Due

Process Clause." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993). "The prosecution bears "the

burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the factfinder 'beyond a

reasonable doubt' of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements. . . ." Id. at 277-78

(citations omitted). A state court’s construction of state law binds this court. See Bradshaw v. Richey,

546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991) (the fact that a

jury instruction "was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief"). Federal

habeas relief based on instructional error is warranted only if there is "reasonable likelihood" the jury

was actually led to an unconstitutional result as a consequence of that error. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 73,

n.4, quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 379-80, 381-83 (finding it improbable that the jury actually interpreted

erroneously an arguably ambiguous penalty phase instruction in a capital case, after examining the

challenged instruction in the context of the entire proceedings and jury charge). 

On federal habeas review of alleged instructional error, "[t]he only question for us is whether

the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73, quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). "A single

instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but rather must be viewed in the context

of the overall charge." Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47; see also Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th

Cir. 2008). The instructions Albarran's jury received are provided in Lodgement 1, CT 0210-0257.

For the reasons discussed below in connection with his three discrete instructional challenges, it is

recommended the Court find Albarran's conviction was not the result of any unconstitutional

instructional error. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12, 18 (1999) (instructional error is

harmless where it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the

defendant guilty absent the error"). The Court should find, even if there was instructional error in any

of the alleged particulars, none "so infect[] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violate[d] due

process." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977), quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.

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2. Ground Four

Albarran alleges as Ground Four the trial court committed reversible error by "failing to

instruct with CALCRIM No. 703" addressing the required intent for accomplice liability, which he

contends must be "given sua sponte when a robbery special circumstance is alleged and the accused

may not have been the actual killer." (Dkt No. 1-1, pp. 32-40.)

Under California law, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct when there is substantial

evidence to support a theory the defense is relying on or when there is evidence to support a theory

that is not inconsistent with the defense theory. See People v. Abilez, 41 Cal.4th 472, 517 (2007); see

also People v. Salas, 37 Cal.4th 967, 982 (2006) (the determination whether substantial evidence

supports a theory addresses "only whether there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was

sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt") (citation omitted). The court must instruct only on those

principles of law "commonly or closely and openly" connected with the facts of the case. People v.

Davis, 36 Cal.4th 510, 570 (2005) (no duty to instruct on the court's own initiative unless "some

significant evidence could have supported a finding" addressed by the instruction).) The Court of

Appeal explained:

Although the trial court provided the jury with a version of

CALCRIM 730 "Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of

Felony, Pen. Code § 190.2(A)(17)," the trial court was not asked and

did not give the jury CALCRIM No. 703 "Special Circu[m]stances:

Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990-Felony Murder,

Pen. Code § 190.2(d)." In pertinent part, CALCRIM No. 703 states:

"If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the People have the

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with

either the intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life and

was a major participant in the crime for the special circumstance[s] of

[section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A)] to be true. If the People have

not met this burden, you must find (this/these) special circumstance[s]

(has/have) not been proved true [for that defendant]." The Bench Note

to CALCRIM No. 703 states: "The court has a sua sponte duty to

instruct the jury on the mental state required for accomplice liability

when a special circumstance is charged and there is sufficient evidence

to support the finding that the defendant was not the actual killer.

[Citation.]"

(Lodg. 5, pp. 6-7.)

The Court of Appeal acknowledged and reconciled a discrepancy in the testimonial evidence

before finding "there was no factual basis upon which the jury could have concluded appellant was

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a mere accomplice who did not actually kill Tony." (Lodg. 5, pp. 7-8.) Accordingly, "there was no

basis upon which the trial court was required to give CALCRIM No. 703." (Id.)

[T]here was no evidence which suggested the taller robber, who

remained masked, knifed Tony. According to Miguel, he unmasked the

shorter robber, the shorter robber knifed Miguel until Miguel could no

longer fight and the shorter robber then began knifing Tony.

According to Miguel, only the shorter robber knifed Tony. According

to Carolina, when she walked into the living room of the apartment, she

saw Tony fighting with the shorter unmasked robber while the taller

masked robber was fighting with Miguel.

Admittedly, Miguel and Carolina's recollection of the murder

differ in that, according to Miguel, when the shorter robber stopped

fighting with Miguel, he joined the other robber in attacking Tony, and,

according to Carolina, she saw only the shorter robber fighting with the

bloodied Tony. This variation in recollection does not assist appellant.

Under neither version of events did the taller masked robber knife

Tony. Moreover, contrary to appellant's suggestion the strong

inference appellant was the actual killer, which was raised by the DNA

found on the ski mask, was not undermined by the fact that the forensic

team found the mask beneath a mattress in the bedroom. In light of

Miguel's apparent frantic effort to hide drug-related items before the

police arrived, discovery of the mask in the bedroom beneath the

mattress was not surprising.

(Lodg. 5, pp. 7-8.)

The Court of Appeal continued:

[E]ven if the trial court erred in failing to give CALCRIM No. 703, the

error was harmless. Significantly, as we have noted, the jury found

appellant personally used a weapon in the commission of a crime.

Because only one knife with blood on it was found in the apartment and

only the shorter robber was identified as the robber who knifed Tony,

the personal use finding is convincing proof the jury believed appellant

was the actual killer. Thus, we have no doubt that even if the jury was

given CALCRIM No. 703, the jury would have found appellant guilty

of murder because plainly the jury did not believe appellant was merely

an accomplice in Tony's murder. (See People v. Jones (2003) 30

Cal.4th 1084, 1120.)

(Lodg. 5, p. 8.)

It is recommended the Court find the state court reasonably found the facts in concluding no

sua sponte duty arose for the trial court to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 703. The evidentiary

record does not support a finding Albarran was not the actual killer. Moreover, his defense theory was

essentially mistaken identity because he purportedly was not present. Even if the Court reaches a

different conclusion on the propriety of giving that instruction, it is recommended the Court find any

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 In his Traverse, Albarran does not dispute the evidentiary record as summarized by Respondent and

by the state courts. Rather, he proffers different inferences he contends are the correct ones, insisting he was

deprived of due process and a fair trial by the omission of an accomplice liability instruction in the special

circumstance context. (Dkt No. 23, pp. 36-39.) His jury did receive "aiding and abetting" instructions

associated with the murder theories. (See Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 12, 1239:19-1240:18, pp. 1243-1244.) He also

contends the Court "should hold an evidentiary hearing because Petitioner has established a 'colorable claim

for relief and has never been afforded a state or federal hearing.' " (Id., 39:12-17.) However, not only is he

mistaken regarding his opportunities to present this claim on a fully-developed factual record in state court, but

also AEDPA substantially restricts a federal habeas court's authority to hold an evidentiary hearing. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e); Cullen v. Pinholster, -- U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (Apr. 4, 2011); see also Baja v. Ducharme, 187

F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1085, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover,

"an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court record," as

is the case here. Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998). It is recommended under none of his

theories does Albarran satisfy the showing required to warrant an evidentiary hearing here, and that request

should be DENIED.

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such error was harmless. The state court demonstrated there is no reasonable likelihood of a different

outcome had that instruction been given, based on factual determinations from the evidentiary record

to which this Court must defer.6

 See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 73, n.4 (federal habeas relief is warranted

only if there is a "reasonable likelihood" the jury was actually led to an unconstitutional result based

on instructional error). Accordingly, relief should be DENIED on Ground Four.

3. Ground Five

Ground Five alleges the trial court gave a defective CALCRIM No. 730 felony-murder special

circumstance instruction. In particular, Albarran contends the trial court "misread CALCRIM

No. 730" and that purportedly reversible error "was exacerbated by the fact the written instruction was

likewise defectively written." (Dkt No. 1-1, pp. 41-48.) He argues the defect created an ambiguity

the Court should find resulted in his unconstitutional conviction. 

When a petitioner challenges an ambiguous instruction, "we inquire 'whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violates the

Constitution." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73, quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see

Mejia, 534 F.3d at 1045. The Court of Appeal rejected this claim on the merits, finding the trial

court's version of CALCRIM No. 730 was not defective. (Lodg. 5, pp. 8-14.)

The trial court gave the jury the following special circumstance instruction:

The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of

murder committed while engaged in the commission of a Robbery. To

prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed or attempted to commit or aided and

abetted a Robbery; 2. The defendant did an act that caused the death

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of another person; AND 3. The act causing the death and the Robbery

were part of one continuous transaction; AND 4. There was a logical

connection between the act causing the death and the Robbery

must involve more than just their occurrence at the same time and

place. 

To decide whether the defendant and perpetrator committed or

attempted to commit robbery, please refer to the separate instruction

that I will give you on that crime. To decide whether the defendant

aided and abetted a crime, please refer to the separate instructions that

I will give [y]ou on aiding and abetting. You must apply those

instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this

special circumstance.

The defendant must have intended to commit or aided and

abetted in Robbery before or at the time of the act causing the death.

In addition, in order for this special circumstance to be true, the People

must prove that the defendant intended to commit Robbery independent

of the killing. If you find that the defendant only intended to commit

murder and the commission of Robbery was merely part of or

incidental to the commission of that murder, then the special

circumstance has not been proved.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 12, 1247:15-1248:17 (internal capitalization and enumerations added to reflect

the appearance in the written version of this instruction as provided to the jury (Lodg. 1, CT 0252-

0253) (bolding added)); see also Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 12, 1213:7-1213:18.)

 The Court of Appeal acknowledged, "[a]s appellant points out, 'the felony-murder rule

requires both a causal relationship and a temporal relationship between the underlying felony and the

act resulting in death.' " (Lodg. 5, p. 8, quoting People v. Cavitt, 33 Cal.4th 187, 193 (2004).) The

court noted that the trial court, in both the oral recitation and the written version of CALCRIM 730

provided to Albarran's jury, omitted a phrase normally part of the standard version. (Id., p. 9.) In its

intended entirety, the language after the number "4" as reproduce above would normally include the

following italicized phrase (omitted in Albarran's case): "There was a logical connection between the

act causing the death and the Robbery. The connection between the fatal act and the [robbery] must

involve more than just their occurrence at the same time and place." (Id.)

In giving CALCRIM No. 730, the trial court omitted the

italicized phrase . . ., so that as read by the trial court the instruction

required proof "there was a logical connection between the act causing

the death and the robbery must involve more than just their occurrence

at the same time and place." The written instruction given to the jury

contained the same omission. Appellant contends the instruction, as

given, was a "discombobulated sentence" and "[a]s a result of the

defective instruction given in the instant case, the requirement for the

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 The Court of Appeal continued: "Although neither the prosecution nor the defense objected to the

shortened version of CALCRIM No. 730 which the court gave both orally and in writing, appellant contends

the trial court was required sua sponte to more fully instruct the jury about the connection that must exist

between the robbery and the killing. As Cavitt illustrates, appellant is mistaken. Because there was no factual

dispute as to whether Tony was killed during the commission of the robbery, the trial court was not required

to give any instruction on the issue and hence its provision of an instruction which appellant contends was

unintelligible did not materially affect the trial." (Lodg. 5, p. 11.)

8

 "[T]he verdict form returned by the jury stated: 'And we further find the FIRST SPECIAL

CIRCUMSTANCE that the murder of [Tony] was committed by defendant ODILON ALBARRAN, while the

said defendant was engaged in the commission and attempted commission of the crime of Robbery, in violation

of Penal Code section 211, within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17), to be: TRUE.' (Italics

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causal relationship was set out, but the requirement for the temporal

relationship was not."

The trial court's omission does not warrant reversal. First, there

was no factual dispute at trial with respect to whether there was both a

logical and temporal connection between the robbery and Tony's death.

The unrebutted testimony showed Tony's death occurred after masked

robbers forced their way into his apartment and he and his brother

attempted to defend themselves. This is not an instance where there

was or could have been a claim Tony's death was unrelated to the

robbery or occurred at a different time or place. . . .

Where, as here, there is no dispute the victim's death occurred

during the course of and as a result of the robbery, there is no

requirement an instruction explicitly setting forth the requirement of a

logical and temporal nexus be given. . . .[7

]

(Lodg. 5, pp. 9-10, quoting Cavitt, 33 Cal. 4th at 203 (citations omitted) for the propositions: "The

existence of a logical nexus between the felony and the murder in the felony-murder context, like the

relationship between the robbery and the murder in the context of the felony murder special

circumstance, is not a separate element of the charged crime but, rather, a clarification of the scope

of an element;" and " '[t]he mere act of "clarifying" the scope of an element of a crime or special

circumstance does not create a new and separate element of that crime or special circumstance.' ")

The Court of Appeal found no material error occurred in the context of the entire instructional

charge. (Lodg. 5, p. 11.) The court highlighted three other CALCRIM instructions Albarran's jury

received that bear on the showings necessary "under the felony-murder theory of murder and as a

special circumstance that the killing and the robbery were part of one continuous transaction." (Id.,

p. 12.) "In light of the other instructions," and from the verdict form returned by the jury, "it is simply

not reasonable to conclude the jury was left with any erroneous impression as to what was required

to find the felony murder special circumstance true."8

 (Id., p. 13.) The state court reached its result

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by applying the appropriate legal standard and making objectively reasonable factual findings

supported by the record, foreclosing federal habeas relief on this issue. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73; 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). It is recommended relief on Ground Five be DENIED.

4. Ground Eleven

Albarran alleges as Ground Eleven the trial court's giving of a modified version of the

CALCRIM No. 252 instruction on the specific intent required for the commission of murder and

robbery was reversible error. (Dkt No. 1-2, pp. 23-29.) The Court of Appeal addressed and rejected

this claim on the merits, reproducing in its opinion the pertinent portions of the instruction, italicizing

the added sentence Albarran contends is prejudicially erroneous: 

Without objection the trial court gave a version of CALCRIM No. 252

which stated, in pertinent part: "Every crime or other allegation

charged in this case requires proof of the union, or joint operation, of

act and wrongful intent. [¶] "The following crimes and allegations

require a specific intent or mental state: Premeditated Murder, Second

Degree Murder & Robbery for Felony Murder, 1st degree. To be guilty

of these offenses, a person must not only commit the prohibited act, but

must do so intentionally or on purpose. It is not required, however,

that the person intend to break the law. The act and the intent or

mental state required are explained in the instruction for each crime or

special circumstance." (Italics added.) The italicized sentence is not

in the official version of the CALCRIM No. 252.

(Lodg. 5, p. 14.)

"The trial court then went on to instruct the jury fully on the mental states required for

commission of premeditated murder, second degree murder, robbery and felony murder." (Lodg. 5,

p. 14.) In addition, the record reveals the trial court also addressed the jury before closing arguments,

to "correct" and clarify that instruction.

The D.A. has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the

person they have charged. Then, when you get to the substantive

charges, two things you will be considering: murder, set [out] as first

or second degree, and then the additional allegations. And you may

recall that I stated that each of the things must be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.

And then the instruction about the order in which you consider

things and how the verdicts are returned. When we discussed the topic

yesterday of specific intent, I did omit one thing. Let me reread part of

Instruction Number 252.

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Every crime or other allegation in this case requires proof of

union or joint operation of act and wrongful intent. The following

crimes and allegation require a specific intent or mental state.

Yesterday, I told you premeditated murder, first degree, or second

degree murder. I forgot to mention the alternative theory.

The District Attorney is proposing as a theory willful

premeditated murder as first degree or felony murder, which would be

in the first degree. In order to have the felony murder, you must be

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of

robbery, and we gave you that instruction for robbery.

So the correction is the following crime and allegations require

a specific independent or mental state. Premeditated murder in the first

degree, felony murder, which is murder during the commission of

robbery, or second degree murder. To be guilty of those offenses, the

person must not only commit the prohibited act, but must do so

intentionally or on purpose.

It is not required, however, that a person intend to break the

law. The act and the intent or mental state required or explained in the

instruction elsewhere for each of the crimes or for the special

circumstance, which is murder during the commission of a robbery

[sic].

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 13, pp. 1257-1259.)

The Court of Appeal found "the trial court's instruction was an accurate statement of the

law. . . ." (Lodg.5, p. 15.) That conclusion is binding on federal habeas courts. Bradshaw, 546 U.S.

at 76. The court also found "appellant neither objected nor suggested any amplifying or clarifying

instruction," and thereby waived any objection. (Id.) Even if Albarran had preserved an objection,

the court determined "it would have been without merit" because, in consideration of the entire jury

charge, the specific intent instructions "fully and unambiguously advised the jury as to the mental

state required to find appellant guilty of murder and robbery, and thus instructing the jury that it need

not find defendant intended to break the law would not have misled or confused the jury." (Id., p. 16.)

It is recommended the Court find the state court result was not contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of United States Supreme Court precedent, nor does it reflect an objectively unreasonable

determination of the facts from the evidentiary record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court should

DENY habeas relief on Ground Eleven.

F. Ground Six: Prosecutorial Misconduct Through Vouching

Ground Six alleges prosecutorial misconduct through improper vouching for witnesses. (Dkt

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No. 1-1, pp. 49-59.) "Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness

through personal assurances of the witness's veracity, or suggesting that information not presented to

the jury supports the witness's testimony." United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.

1993). Albarran alleges that during questioning and closing argument, the prosecutor "impliedly –

if not expressly – suggest[ed] these witnesses were truthful because of their positions as law

enforcement officers." (Dkt No. 1-1, p. 49 (typography altered); see Dkt No. 23, pp. 43-51.) In

affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeal characterized Albarran's contention "that in his

questioning of the investigator and in his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor improperly vouched for

the credibility of the members of law enforcement who testified at trial" as a "misper[ception] of

improper vouching." (Lodg. 5, p. 18.) From the trial record, the court found no coaching or vouching

misconduct.

In cross-examining Miguel, appellant's counsel strongly

suggested the prosecutor, while interviewing Miguel before his

preliminary hearing testimony, told Miguel to identify appellant as the

robber who stabbed Tony to death after Miguel tore his mask off. In

response to the suggestion Miguel was coached to identify appellant,

the prosecution presented testimony from a police detective and an

investigator from the district attorney's office who were present during

the interview. The detective and the investigator stated Miguel was

never told to identify appellant but instead was repeatedly told to tell

the truth. At one point the prosecutor asked the investigator if the

investigator would ever permit such coaching of a witness to take

place. The investigator stated he would not permit a witness to be

coached.

During closing argument, appellant's attorney asserted appellant

was innocent, the investigation started on a false premise which the

investigator and the prosecutor were unwilling to abandon and the

investigator told Miguel, " 'You gotta come and identify Mr.

Albarran.' " Appellant's counsel also attacked Miguel's credibility and

the credibility of the other prosecution witnesses. In particular, counsel

stated: "[W]hat Detective Duran and Detective Baker have done in this

case is wrong."

In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor made the following

statement: "Sometimes we hear bad things about our society.

Sometimes, especially lately in the news, there are slams against our

culture or the way we are. From the time this country was founded,

people who worked in law enforcement didn't care who was murdered.

To them, a murder was a murder. Sheriffs and marshals in this part of

the country, when it was still being settled, they would go to the ends

of the earth to find a murderer. They didn't care who the person was,

who was murdered, or who the witnesses were. Well, these detectives

and cops they have slammed so much did exactly that. [¶] . . . [¶]

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 "They didn't care that Tony Ayala was a drug dealer. They

didn't care that the witnesses in this case would cause the accusations

you have heard in this courtroom. They didn't care that these witnesses

would put you through more than anybody ever should have to go

through. They only cared -- these good people they insulted, they only

cared about bringing a murderer to justice."

(Lodg. 5, pp. 16-18.)

The Court of Appeal concluded: "In essentially asserting the investigators were dedicated

public servants attempting to achieve justice, the prosecutor did nothing improper: he did not refer

to anything that was outside the record or the common knowledge of the jurors, and he did not attempt

to relieve the jurors of their duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Lodg. 5, p. 20.) The

limitations on what a prosecutor may argue "do not preclude all comments regarding a witness's

credibility," and vigorous argument is permitted "as long as it amounts to fair comment on the

evidence," including "reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom" based on the facts

of record "rather than any personal knowledge or belief.'' (Id., pp. 18-19, quoting People v. Bonilla,

41 Cal.4th 313, 336-37 (2007).) "Where, as here a prosecutor has not suggested to the jury that he is

aware of evidence outside the record which bolsters a witness's credibility, no misconduct has

occurred." (Id, p. 18.) 

Contextual factors are material to a determination whether a prosecutor's comments rendered

a trial constitutionally unfair. Courts consider: "whether the comment misstated the evidence,

whether the judge admonished the jury to disregard the comment, whether the comment was invited

by defense counsel in its summation, whether defense counsel had an adequate opportunity to rebut

the comment, the prominence of the comment in the context of the entire trial and the weight of the

evidence." Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In addition, a

"reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into

account defense counsel's opening salvo" in assessing a vouching challenge. United States v. Young,

470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). "[I]f the prosecutor's remarks were 'invited,' and did no more than respond

substantially in order to 'right the scale,' such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction."

Id. at 12-13 (1985). As summarized by the Court of Appeal in this case:

[T]here is no dispute appellant's counsel forcefully impugned the

integrity of the investigators and the prosecution's witnesses and in his

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 Defense counsel immediately objected to that testimony. At sidebar, counsel requested a mistrial.

The trial court heard argument, criticized the witness, discussed the significance of that error, but was unwilling

to go so far as to say he intentionally lost the tape, resolving to simply instruct the jury to disregard the question

and the witness' answer. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 9, pp. 838-844.) Further discussion on the record among the court

and counsel regarding the CODIS database source, that testimony, prior stipulations, and the mistrial motion

continued the next day, including the defense request that the court sua sponte declare a mistrial both on that

ground and on grounds of cumulative error purportedly resulting in a denial of due process predicated, among

other things, on Miguel's "fear testimony" and the contention Carolina Chavez was not a credible witness.

(Lodg. 14, Vol. 10, pp. 845-851.)

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questioning of the investigators the prosecutor did nothing more than

give them a chance to directly refute the implication of defense

counsel's questions. In doing so the prosecutor in no sense went

outside the record or suggested the jury not determine the credibility of

the investigators. When defense counsel again impugned the integrity

of the investigators in his closing argument, in his rebuttal the

prosecutor reminded the jurors that in fact the integrity of the

prosecutors had been impugned. In addition to pointing out the

insulting nature of counsel's argument, in the major thrust of his

argument the prosecutor defended the officers by alluding to another

undisputed fact: neither the victim nor the percipient witnesses led

exemplary lives. From this fact the prosecutor asked the jury to

conclude that rather than engaging in an unfair prosecution of

appellant, the prosecutors were instead simply attempting to obtain

justice for Miguel, notwithstanding Miguel's criminal lifestyle and the

criminal lifestyle of his brother and wife.

(Lodg. 5, p. 20; see Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 13, 1340:7-1341:5.)

Albarran's jury received the instruction that arguments of counsel are not evidence that may

be consider in reaching a verdict. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 12, 1227:6-14.) He fails to demonstrate that

the state court's factual determinations on this issue are objectively unreasonable. It is recommended

habeas relief on Ground Six be DENIED. 

G. Ground Seven: Improper Reference To Past Crime

Albarran alleges as Ground Seven prosecutorial misconduct when a prosecution witness

"referenced appellant's past criminal conviction and imprisonment" and seeks relief from the trial

court's failure to grant a mistrial on that basis. (Dkt No. 1-1, pp. 60-65, Dkt No. 1-2, pp. 1-7.) The

claim arises from Lieutenant Duran's testimony describing the CODIS system DNA database as

"profiles of convicted felons" (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 9, 838:9-12), an excluded remark Albarran contends

was so prejudicial that it could not be mitigated by jury instructions.9 

The Court of Appeal addressed the merits of this claim on direct review (Lodg. 5, pp. 21-26),

stating the question presented as "whether the investigator's reference to felons in the CODIS system

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was so prejudicial that we must reverse [his] conviction" (Id., p. 22). The court acknowledged "the

detective's reference to the DNA of convicted felons in the CODIS data base was improper." (Id.)

There had been a pre-trial agreement that prosecution witnesses would not make any reference to the

origins of that data base, and "the trial court advised the parties their agreement would be treated as

an in limine ruling excluding such references." (Id.; see Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 1, 1:18-2:7.) The court

acknowledged the seriousness of the witness's forbidden description, but it deemed the impropriety

to have been cured by the trial court's multiple admonitions to the jury. (Id., pp. 21-22.) 

In support of its case, the prosecution called a police detective

to testify about, among other matters, CODIS, a DNA data base

operated by the California Department of Justice. On direct

examination, the detective said: "Basically, it's a large database of

D.N.A. profiles of convicted felons." Appellant's counsel objected and

asked for a sidebar. Before excusing the jury and conducting the

sidebar, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the detective's

remark. At the sidebar, appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial.

Before ruling on the mistrial, the trial court excused the jury for the day

and gave the jury an additional instruction with respect to the

detective's description of the CODIS data base: "Folks, look, I

mentioned that you have to disregard the previous comment. I will

order that you do disregard the previous comment. Additionally, I have

to state, as I had in the instruction and so forth, the jury decides the

case only on the evidence presented. And the only evidence presented

in this case is that there is one person who has a criminal background,

and that's [Carolina], okay?"

After listening to further argument from counsel, the trial court

denied the motion for a mistrial and counsel's alternative suggestion the

court declare a mistrial on its own motion. When the trial resumed, the

trial court gave the jury another curative instruction.

(Lodg. 5, p. 21.)

 The Court of Appeal acknowledged prosecutors' duty to instruct witnesses not to make

statements that have been ruled inadmissible, and agreed with Albarran "that by indirectly suggesting

appellant was a felon, the investigator's explanation of the CODIS system was a serious mistake" that

in some factual contexts "might require a new trial." (Lodg. 5, pp. 22, 23.) However in his case, the

court found that "two sets of circumstances substantially mitigate the nature of any harm" and that the

prejudicial effect of the impropriety was insufficient to require reversal. (Id. p. 23.)

First, the record is quite clear that at the time of the murder appellant

was associating with criminals. Indeed, at the time of the murder

appellant was living with Aguirre and his 13-year-old girlfriend. As we

noted, Aguirre and his girlfriend moved in to appellant's apartment

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after leaving Tony's apartment and the drug business Tony was

operating there. Given this evidence about appellant's lifestyle, the jury

would not have been shocked or surprised to learn appellant himself

had a criminal record. Second, the evidence of appellant's guilt was

quite powerful. Although the eyewitnesses were confronted at trial

with inconsistent statements they made shortly after the killing, the

DNA evidence the prosecution presented, along with the undisputed

fact that appellant never returned to his apartment after the killing, were

convincing evidence of his guilt. In short, given appellant's lifestyle at

the time of the killing and the other evidence of his guilt, this is not the

sort of unusual situation in which we would question the jury's ability

to follow the trial court's direction and consider only the properly

admitted evidence. Thus the detective's inadvertent statement did not

require a mistrial.

(Lodg. 5, p. 23.)

\\

Even assuming that testimony amounted to an unconstitutional trial error, to warrant federal

habeas relief the error must have had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. In consideration of the considerable unobjectionable

evidence against Albarran summarized by the state courts and reproduced above, the Court should

defer to the state court's objectively reasonable finding the effect of the witness' improper reference

to the source of the DNA data base was not sufficiently "substantial and injurious" to warrant

disturbing the result, particularly in light of the trial court's curative intervention. Accordingly, it is

recommended habeas relief on Ground Seven be DENIED.

H. Ground Eight: Improper Eliciting Of Testimony

Albarran alleges prosecutorial misconduct by "eliciting testimony from the prosecutor's star

witness that he was afraid to testify." (Dkt No. 1-2, pp. 8-12.) This claim was rejected by the

California courts (see Lodg. 5, pp. 24-26), and he "concedes" in his Traverse this "is not a federal

claim for which relief may be granted" (Dkt No. 23, 3:15-18). It is recommended the Court construe

his concession as an abandonment of the claim and DENY relief on Ground Eight.

I. Ground Nine: Destruction Of Evidence

Ground Nine alleges prosecutorial misconduct based on Lieutenant Duran's apparently

inadvertent destruction of "a key piece of evidence" in the form of a videotaped Spanish language

interview with Elizabeth Escogido conducted in 2004 and "fail[ure] to provide a transcribed

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translation of that interview to the defense." (Dkt No. 1-2, pp. 13-18; Dkt No. 23, 60:12-14.) The

record reflects investigator Baker conducted the Escogido interview with sergeant Duran, then head

of the cold case homicide unit, acting as interpreter, and wrote a two and one-half page summary of

the interview, a report that had been turned over to the defense during discovery. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol.

6, p. 519.). Escogido's evidence could be construed as Albarran having confessed to the crime when

he called her just a day or two after the 1991 murder.

During the jury selection process, when the parties thought the tape had only been misplaced

rather than permanently lost, the trial court and counsel discussed the on-going efforts to locate the

original recording of the Escogido interview. Apparently several taped interviews had been forwarded

from the police to the prosecution in January 2005, with the Escogido tape returned to police for a

translation. That tape had not resurfaced. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 6, pp. 425-432, 517-520.) Defense

counsel requested a sanction in the form of precluding Escogido from testifying at trial, arguing the

prosecution had a duty both to preserve the tape and to produce it to defense counsel. (Id., p. 520.)

The prosecutor pointed out Escogido had testified at the preliminary hearing, where both sides had

the opportunity to question her, and argued the requested sanction was improper in cases of loss or

destruction of evidence through negligence. The court discussed the state of the evidence and the

Escogido testimony after hearing argument from both sides. (Id., pp. 522-535.) The court confirmed

the Baker report was available to everyone at the preliminary hearing, no one currently had the tape,

neither the District Attorney nor anyone from his office had ever viewed the tape, investigator Baker

did not look at the tape after it was recorded, Sargent Duran took the tape back to do a transcription

into English, and it had not been seen since. (Id., pp. 538-539.) The court observed, "Everybody

knows what this woman will testify to and how she is vulnerable to cross-examination," and counsel

would be permitted to ask about her previous testimony. (Id., 535:22-28, p. 537.) 

The trial court held a formal evidentiary hearing on November 29, 2006, on the limited issues

of how the tape came to be missing and the appropriate remedy, before denying the motion to exclude

the Escogido testimony. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 7, 553:14-16.) As summarized by the Court of Appeal:

Prior to trial, a police detective interviewed Elizabeth Escogido.

The interview was conducted in Spanish and recorded on a videotape.

At a pre-trial hearing the prosecutor disclosed the tape was lost.

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Appellant moved that testimony from Escogido be excluded. The trial

court conducted an evidentiary hearing in which a paralegal from the

district attorney's office and the police detective who conducted the

interview testified. The paralegal testified that during the investigation

he was given custody of the tape, along with five other tapes, and that

he copied the five tapes. The paralegal testified he did not copy the

Escogido tape but instead returned it to the police detective so the

detective could provide an English translation. According to the police

detective, he could not locate the Escogido tape in his desk and

believed he may have destroyed the tape when he left the homicide unit

in 2005. The detective explained that when moving he would have

destroyed any tapes he found in his desk because he erroneously

believed they had all been copied. Following the evidentiary hearing,

the trial court found the loss of the tape was inadvertent and denied the

motion to exclude testimony from Escogido. As we noted previously,

Escogido testified at trial that shortly after Tony was killed appellant

called her, asked her if she had heard about Tony's murder and told her

Tony got smart with him over some money.

(Lodg. 5, p. 26; see Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 6, pp. 518, 535-537, Vol. 7, pp. 552-570.)

The issue and implications of the lost Escogido interview tape were also explored at trial

during the examination of Lieutenant Duran. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 10, pp. 882- 885.) The Court of

Appeal, applying federal due process standards, rejected Albarran's claim he was deprived of a fair

trial associated with the loss of the tape. "A due process violation occurs when, acting in bad faith,

the government fails to preserve evidence which possesses apparent exculpatory value and is of such

a nature that the defendant is not likely to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available

means." (Lodg. 5, p. 27, citing, inter alia, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), California

v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). "[A] trial court's inquiry whether evidence was destroyed

in good faith or bad faith is essentially factual: therefore, the proper standard of review is substantial

evidence." (Id., quoting People v. Memro, 11 Cal.4th 786, 831 (1995).) The Court of Appeal found

the record fully supports "the trial court's conclusion the government acted in good faith and no due

process violation occurred." (Id..)

To obtain federal habeas relief on this ground, Albarran had to do more than disagree with the

state courts' findings. Escogido testified at his trial and was fully cross-examined, at which time her

recollections, veracity, and credibility were tested by the defense and observed by the factfinders.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 11, pp. 1090-1100.) Albarran does not suggest any factual basis for a reasonable

inference the lost recording had exculpatory or even impeachment value. "[U]nless a criminal

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defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence

does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. He has made no

such showing. Accordingly, federal habeas relief on Ground Nine should be DENIED.

J. Ground Ten: Cumulative Effect Of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Ground Ten alleges "the cumulative effect" of the "various incidents of prosecutorial

misconduct" requires reversal, "even if individually they do not." (Dkt No. 1-2, pp. 19-22.) "In some

cases, although no single trial error examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal,

the cumulative effect of multiple errors may still prejudice a defendant." United States v. Frederick,

78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court of Appeal rejected this claim:

Finally, appellant contends that even if no single instance of

what he believes was prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal, the

cumulative impact of prosecutorial mistakes warrants reversal. (See

People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844-848.) The central problem

we have with appellant's argument is, contrary to his contention on

appeal, the prosecutor was not guilty of numerous instances of

misconduct. The only intrusion on appellant's rights which occurred

was the detective's inadvertent reference to felons in the CODIS

database, which we have determined did not cause undue prejudice.

Thus, we reject appellant's contention the judgment should be reversed

because of cumulative prejudice.

(Lodg. 5, pp. 27-28.) 

As it is recommended this Court reach the same results as did the state courts on each of

Albarran's discrete prosecutorial misconduct claims, relief on Petition Ground Ten should be DENIED

on the same basis.

K. Grounds Twelve And Thirteen: Insufficient Evidence

Albarran alleges as Ground Twelve insufficient evidence supports a robbery felony-first degree

murder special circumstance finding (Dkt No. 1-2, pp. 30-36), and as Ground Thirteen insufficient

evidence of premeditation and deliberation supports the first degree murder conviction (Id., pp. 37-40).

"As a matter of federal constitutional law, 'the Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he is charged.' " Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting In

re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

is evaluated under the clearly established principles enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

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318-19 (1979): "After Winship, the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly

instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt." "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (citation omitted); see

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990) (a state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas relief for

insufficiency of the evidence only "if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"), quoting Jackson,

443 U.S. at 324; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995) (the Jackson standard "looks to whether

there is sufficient evidence which, if credited, could support the conviction"; see Walters v. Maass,

45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). California courts apply the federal standard in this context.

People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 (1980), citing Jackson, 433 U.S. 307. Federal habeas courts

apply the standard "with an additional layer of deference" after AEDPA. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274.

As recently emphasized by the United States Supreme Court, in reversing a Ninth Circuit

panel's conclusion that a state jury's verdict was irrational:

The opinion of the Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979), makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury -- not the

court -- to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence

admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on

the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could

have agreed with the jury. What is more, a federal court may not

overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state

court. The federal court instead may only do so if the state court

decision was "objectively unreasonable." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. --,

[130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)] (internal quotation marks omitted).

Cavazos v. Smith, 2011 WL5118826 at *1 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011), per curiam.

A reviewing court "must respect the province of the jury to determine the credibility of

witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by

assuming the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict." Maass, 45 F.3d at

1358; see Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1023 (2000) ("[A] reviewing court 'faced with a record of

historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume -- even if it does not affirmatively

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appear in the record -- that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and

must defer to that resolution' "), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

In denying the defense motion for acquittal at the end of the state's case in chief, the trial court

determined there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Albarran.

Ultimately, it will come down to a credibility call by the jury. A lot of

it is that, do they believe the mother and daughter and Miguel when

they say they now remember? And, ultimately, it's a decision for the

jury to make.

(Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 11, 1117:16-20.) 

The Court of Appeal decision demonstrates sufficient evidence in the record supports the true

finding on the felony-murder allegation, contrary to Albarran's Ground Twelve contentions:

Tony was a drug dealer who kept money and drugs at his apartment.

According to Miguel, on the evening of the murder, two men barged

into his brother's apartment, both men were wearing ski masks, one was

brandishing a gun and one said, "This is a hold up." Contrary to

appellant's argument, in order to establish a robbery the prosecution

was not required to establish any more specific request for money on

the part of the robbers. Moreover, this is not an instance . . . where the

perpetrator plainly entered the victims' residence with an intent to kill

rather than rob the victims. Instead, given the drugs and money Tony

was known to keep in his apartment and the conduct of the invaders,

the jury could reasonably conclude the overall purpose of the invasion

was robbery.

(Lodg. 5, pp. 28-29, distinguishing state caselaw Albarran relied on.)

That decision also demonstrates sufficient evidence in the record supports Albarran's first

degree murder conviction, contrary to his Ground Thirteen contentions. After discussing categories

of evidence sufficient under state law to sustain a premeditated and deliberate murder conviction, the

court determined: 

Here, the record shows that appellant appeared at a drug dealer's

apartment with an accomplice armed and masked. The record further

shows that during the struggle with Miguel, appellant went into the

kitchen and found a knife, with which he then inflicted disabling

wounds on Miguel and deadly wounds on Tony. Given these

circumstances, the jury could reasonably have concluded appellant

went to the apartment fully prepared to kill Miguel and Tony and upon

meeting resistance from the Ayala brothers, appellant quickly

determined that he would in fact kill the brothers to avoid detection or

retaliation. Although not a great deal of time elapsed, in light of the

evidence appellant was prepared for violence even before he entered

the apartment, these circumstances were sufficient to support a finding

that during the course of the robbery appellant made a cold and

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calculated judgment that he had to kill both Miguel and Tony.

(Lodg. 5, pp. 29-30.)

 A federal habeas court's role is solely to ensure that the state court's factual findings are

objectively reasonable and that the state court result comports with the clearly established

constitutional standards controlling the issue as articulated by the United States Supreme Court.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A rational jury could easily reject the defense theory Albarran did not attack and

kill Tony Ayala because he was not in the apartment on September 16, 1991 if they credited and drew

reasonable inferences from the DNA evidence, the eyewitness testimony, the Escogido testimony

regarding what Albarran told her by phone within a day or two of the 1991 murder, Albarran's failure

ever to return to retrieve his possessions, and his untruthful statements regarding his connections to

San Diego and to persons involved in this incident when police first interviewed him, among other

evidence supporting the verdict. It is recommended habeas relief on Grounds Twelve and Thirteen

be DENIED because the evidence was substantial and sufficient to support his conviction, and the

result comports with controlling United States Supreme Court authority. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

L. Ground Fourteen: Failure To Suppress Statements To Investigating Officers

Ground Fourteen alleges Albarran's interview statements to investigating officers in December

2004, after he received allegedly defective Miranda warnings, should have been suppressed because

"the interpreter (Lieutenant Duran) was seriously inept in his communication" of those constitutional

rights, "resulting in a confusing, if not misleading advisement." (Dkt No. 1-2, pp. 41-49; Dkt No. 23,

69:26-70:2.) In seeking to suppress the statements, "[d]efense counsel argued that the supplemental

comments by Lieutenant Duran were discombobulated to the point of rendering the reading of

Petitioner's Miranda rights confusing, and, he further argued, Petitioner never voluntarily waived his

rights." (Dkt No. 23, 71:9-12, citing Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 11, 1020, 1045-1046.)

The trial court heard argument outside the presence of the jury on the defense motion to strike

those statements. A native Spanish-speaker certified interpreter testified to confirm the accuracy of

what officer Duran said to Albarran at the time, including both his preamble and the actual warning

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10 The English translation of Lieutenant Duran's preamble reads: "SD: Ody, Ody, what we are -- right

now -- what we're going to do, we're going to explain to you what's going on, and also we are going to -- we

want to ask you some questions. OA: Sure. SD: But since you have constitutional rights, we're going to read

you your rights. OA: Okay. SD: After I read you your rights, if -- ah -- you have the right that if I don't want

to talk, I don't want to talk. If we give you -- give you a questions that you don't want to answer, that's your

right, you don't have to answer. If there's something that yes -- that you want to tell me, you can say it. Is that

all (sic) right? OA: That's fine." (Lodg. 1, CT pp. 11-12; Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 11, pp. 1031, 1035-1036.) 

11 Albarran contends he was prejudiced by the denial of his suppression motion because he "made a

number of statements which the prosecution used at trial to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt, i.e., the fact

Petitioner gave a number of false answers in this interview suggested he was covering up his role in the killing,"

such as: "he wasn't in San Diego in September of 1991; he passed through San Diego only a couple of times;

he stayed one time at the mission and another time at an elderly couple's house; he never loaned anybody

clothing in San Diego, he did not know Oscar Aguirre, Elizabeth Escogido, or Oscar Duarte; he was at the

Ocean View apartment; he never rode in a car in San Diego; he never lived in logan heights area of San Diego;

and he never used force in San Diego." (Dkt No. 23, 74:8-15, citing 11 RT 1022, 1052-1054.) This Court notes

that before deliberations, the jury was presented with the parties' stipulation "that in September of 1991, Ody

Albarran was living in San Diego. During that time period, Mr. Albarran was staying in the apartment of Oscar

Aguirre." (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 12, 1222:4-7.) The court instructed the jury: "The parties have entered into a

stipulation, which is basically an agreed-to fact. You take this as a fact. It's something that doesn't need to be

proved through witnesses or other evidence." (Id., RT Vol. 12, 1221:27-1222:2.) 

40 11cv0019

as read from a card provided by the police department.10 The transcript of that proceeding and the trial

court's rationale for denying the motion appear at Lodgment 14, RT Vol. 11, pp. 1027-1049. The

court denied the motion on grounds the challenged comments were only the preamble to the reading

of the actual Miranda rights, the rights themselves had been accurately conveyed and therefore no

Miranda violation occurred, and by continuing to speak with the investigators, Albarran waived those

rights. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 11, p. 1049.) The statements he made after receiving the Miranda warning

were introduced at trial through Lieutenant Duran's testimony. (Id., pp. 1051-1057.) The prosecution

proved the statements Albarran made were false. The Court of Appeal rejected Albarran's arguments

he "was given a confusing Miranda warning in Spanish and the trial court should have excluded

statements he made to a police detective denying that he knew Tony, Escogido, any person named

Oscar, or that he ever lived in San Diego."11 (Lodg. 5, p. 30.) 

The trial court found the detective read the Miranda warning in

Spanish from the form provided to the detective by the police

department. That warning fully satisfies the requirements of Miranda

v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Admittedly, before the detective

actually gave the Miranda warning, the detective gave appellant a

somewhat confusing explanation of what he was about to do. The

detective told appellant: "After I read you your rights, if – you have a

right that if I don't want to talk, I don't want to talk." Like the trial

court, we find this less than clear preamble to the Miranda warning

which the detective gave did not render the actual warning appellant

received ineffective in any respect. As given, the warnings appellant

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received fully conveyed to appellant his rights as required by Miranda

[and thus] the trial court did not err in admitting the statements

appellant thereafter made to the detective.

(Lodg. 5, pp. 30-31 (citation omitted).) 

Albarran concedes: "From all appearances, Lieutenant Duran accurately read the form

presenting the Miranda rights." (Dkt No. 23, 70:21-22.) Nor does not dispute "Lieutenant Duran

simply read the Spanish translation of the Miranda rights, asked Petitioner if he understood those

rights, and then proceeded to question him," and he "acknowledges that under normal circumstances

the fact Petitioner proceeded to answer questions put to him might indicate an implied waiver of his

rights." (Id., 72:7-12.) "While it is true the actual Miranda rights that were ultimately read in

[S]panish were correctly conveyed," Albarran summarily argues "it certainly cannot be said Petitioner

would adequately (for constitutional purposes) have understood those rights, given how Lieutenant

Duran introduced those rights by way of a spontaneous preamble." (Id., 72:27-73:3.) He contends

the trial court should have ruled the entire interview inadmissible and argues the "improper

introduction of Petitioner's admissions" at trial "contribut[ed] strongly to the verdict against him."

(Id., 74:2-3.) 

Albarran does not represent that he in fact did not understand his Miranda rights or that he

actually intended not to waive them. He urges the Court to believe he placed more stock in a short,

ambiguous, conversational preamble than in the concededly accurate recitation thereafter of his

specific rights. Duran's unscripted introduction did not conflict with any of the recited rights, and the

record reflects Albarran manifested no confusion at the time nor hesitation in subsequently answering

the officers' questions. It is recommended the Court find that the state courts' result on this issue was

objectively reasonable and, according the required AEDPA deference to those findings, habeas relief

on Ground Fourteen should be DENIED. 

M. Ground Fifteen: Juror Misconduct

Albarran alleges as Ground Fifteen "the judgment must be reversed due to misconduct by some

of the jurors" based on the discovery, after the December 8, 2006 verdict and dismissal of the jury,

that "three pieces of evidence that went into the jury room did not come out again." (Dkt No. 1-2, p.

50.) He identifies those as: "the court's exhibits No. 28 (a sixpack photographic lineup card shown

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to Carolina Chavez), No. 39 (the transcript of the videotaped recording of prosecution witness

Veronica Chavez), and No. 40 (a photographic line-up shown to Veronica Chavez.)" (Id.) All three

items were introduced at trial, and each was referenced when the court and counsel reviewed all the

admitted exhibits prior to jury deliberations. (See Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 11, pp. 1111-1113.)

When it was discovered on December 14, 2006 that the three exhibits were missing, defense

counsel orally moved for an evidentiary hearing "to examine each of the jurors to see who took those

exhibits and why." (Lodg. 1, CT 0258-0261.) The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue

of jury misconduct concerning the missing exhibits. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 15, pp. 1363-1368.) The

court heard argument after formal briefing, then reserved a ruling until the time of Albarran's April

20, 2007 sentencing. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 16, pp. 1369-1377.) The court heard additional argument

at that time on the various grounds defense counsel raised, including the juror misconduct issue, before

denying a new trial all for the reasons stated on the record. (Lodg. 14, RT Vol. 17, pp. 1378-1396;

Lodg. 1, CT 0354.) In affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeal summarized:

After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court discovered

three trial exhibits were missing. The exhibits, Nos. 38, 39 and 40,

consisted of two photo lineups and a transcript of an interview of

Tony's wife Veronica.[12] The trial court's bailiff was prepared to

testify the exhibits went into the deliberation room with the jury. The

bailiff was also prepared to testify that after the jury left, the

deliberation room was a mess, "a lot of papers all over the place; a lot

of papers in the trash." In response to this information, appellant asked

the trial court to question each juror with respect to the whereabouts of

the missing exhibits or in the alternative release information with

respect to the identity for the jurors so they might be questioned. The

trial court denied both requests and in addition treated the requests as

a motion for a new trial, which it also denied.

(Lodg. 5, p. 31.)

Applying state law and an abuse of discretion standard of review, the Court of Appeal

concluded "nothing in the record suggests the jury was guilty of any misconduct." (Lodg. 5, p. 31.)

Given the circumstances which the bailiff discovered after the jury left

the deliberation room, the trial court could reasonably conclude court

personnel inadvertently disposed of the entirely documentary exhibits

after the jury finished its deliberations. This conclusion is buttressed

by the fact that during the trial the jurors did not ask for the exhibits or

otherwise indicate the exhibits were missing before the jury's

deliberations were concluded. As appellant concedes, if, as the record

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13 Albarran's speculation that CAL. PENAL CODE § 1119 could have been violated not only raises a

purely state law issue not cognizable on federal habeas review, but also by its own terms, it applies only to

procedures for jurors to view a place or personal property which cannot be brought into the courtroom. 

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suggests, the exhibits were not lost until after the verdict was returned,

appellant was not prejudiced in any manner by the loss of the exhibits.

Because the record fully supports the conclusion no jury misconduct

occurred, the trial [court] did not abuse its discretion in denying the

appellant's motion for an evidentiary hearing, for jury information or

for a new trial.

(Lodg. 5, pp. 31-32.)

Albarran identifies here the "determinative question" as whether the "misconduct . . . in direct

violation of the court's instructions" not to remove evidence from the jury room purportedly

attributable to some of the jurors "tainted" the deliberation process to his prejudice, warranting a new

trial. (Dkt No. 23, 76:4-12.) He "concede[s] that if the evidence was removed at the end of jury

deliberations, no prejudice would have occurred to Petitioner's case." (Id., 76:28-77:2.)

If, however, the evidence was removed at the beginning of

deliberations, then considerable prejudice could well have accrued. If,

for example, a juror took the evidence home, it is quite likely that juror

might also have had some discussion with third parties concerning that

particular evidence. In addition, where a juror takes evidence with him

or her for private inspection, he or she violates Penal Code section

1119 (the section pertaining to viewing evidence outside the

courtroom).[13] In such an instance, the juror is not viewing the

evidence as a body under careful court supervision.

(Dkt No. 23, 77:2-10.)

 The Sixth Amendment requires that a criminal defendant be tried by an impartial jury that

reaches a verdict based on the evidence produced at trial. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72

(1965); see Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008). The introduction of extraneous

influences into jury deliberations constitutes misconduct which may result in the reversal of a

conviction, if that trial error had a " 'substantial and injurious' effect or influence in determining the

jury's verdict." Estrada, 512 F.3d at 1235 (citation omitted). Albarran's attempted showing of

misconduct amounts to no more than speculation positing imagined scenarios. He asks this Court to

credit his musings as fact and to substitute them for the state courts' objectively reasonable findings.

He offers no evidence that any juror actually removed an exhibit during deliberations, sought any

outside information, or inserted any extraneous consideration into the deliberations. See Brecht, 507

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U.S. at 638. Relief on this purely hypothetical theory should be DENIED. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Barry Ted

Moskowitz under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED this habeas Petition be DENIED in its entirety on grounds the Petitioner is not

in custody in violation of any federal right. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) entering an order

DISMISSING the petition without leave to amend; and (3) the court DECLINE to issue a certificate

of appealability.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than February 23, 2012, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than March 8, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2012

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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