Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01359/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MDR 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gregory Nides Valencia, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-1359-PHX-DGC (MEA) 

ORDER 

On June 18, 2014, Plaintiff Gregory Nides Valencia, Jr., who is confined in the 

Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights 

Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and invoked the Court’s supplemental 

jurisdiction over his state law claims. He also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis. On July 24, 2014, he filed a second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(Doc. 5). On August 4, 2014, he filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 6) and a 

Memorandum and a Declaration in support of the Motion. 

The Court will grant the second Application to Proceed, order Defendant Martin to 

answer the Eighth Amendment claim regarding Defendant Martin’s denial of a no-nitrate 

diet for Plaintiff, dismiss without prejudice the remaining claims and Defendants, and 

deny without prejudice the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. 

I. Second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $4.63. The remainder 

of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income 

credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate 

government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

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 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. Complaint 

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff sues nineteen Defendants in their individual and official 

capacities: Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) Director Charles L. Ryan; 

Wexford Health Services, Inc. (Wexford); Corizon Health Services, Inc. (Corizon); 

Trinity Food Services, Inc. (Trinity); ADOC/Corizon Doctors Anderson and Thomas A. 

Bell; ADOC/Corizon Nurse Practitioner Laurence Ende; ADOC/Corizon Nurses Martin 

and Connor; ADOC/Corizon Psychiatrists Jawad Riaz, Rawa, and Charles; Health Site 

Managers Linda Hammer, Brenda Rojas, and Cameron Lewis; “Regional Operation” Jim 

Reinhart; Assistant Deputy Warden Aguilar; Correctional Officer IV Frisbee; and 

ADOC/Trinity Dietician April Dishman.

 Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment regarding his medical care. Plaintiff asserts that in June 2012, he 

developed “an apparent sensitivity to chemical substances,” including a sensitivity to 

sodium nitrates, which are found in processed meats served by the ADOC.1

 Plaintiff 

contends that he must consume protein to maintain his proper nutrition and the processed 

meats provided by ADOC are his main source of protein.2

 Plaintiff asserts that ingesting 

sodium nitrates causes him to suffer from vertigo, chills, fatigue, weakness, migraine 

 

1

 Plaintiff also asserts that he also developed sensitivities to caffeine, nicotine, artificial sweeteners, and medications. Plaintiff has, however, limited his claim to 

sodium nitrates, conceding that nicotine and caffeine are not provided by ADOC and that, although artificial sweeteners are provided by ADOC, he can avoid them and they are not necessary for maintaining proper nutrition. 

2

 Plaintiff asserts that he has voluntarily abstained from eating lunch meats because they are the main source of his “aggravation,” but alleges that he must eat the chicken and ground chicken, both of which make him “ill.” 

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headaches, arrhythmia, muscle spasms/cramping, and “parasthesia,” which Plaintiff 

contends is “temporary partial paralysis” that can lead to strokes and can be fatal.3

 Plaintiff asserts that on October 19, 2012, he suffered “parasthesia” after eating 

graham crackers, the medical department was notified, the medical department did not 

respond, and Plaintiff laid on the recreation yard for 20 minutes until officers were able to 

locate a wheelchair and take Plaintiff to the medical department. Plaintiff contends that 

the medical staff took Plaintiff’s vitals and had him provide a urine sample. Plaintiff 

states that his vitals were normal, his urine did not show that he had taken drugs, and his 

urine showed that he was properly hydrated. Plaintiff states that he was ordered to stay in 

bed for 3 days, but no further treatment was provided. 

 Plaintiff claims that he suffered “parasthesia” again on October 30, 2012, after 

eating two bologna sandwiches the day before. He claims he was lying on his back and 

officers moved him to the floor, where he laid for fifteen minutes until medical staff 

arrived. A nurse took his vitals and assessed his sugar levels, all of which were normal, 

and concluded that Plaintiff was fine, even though Plaintiff was unable to sit, stand, or 

move his hands or feet. Plaintiff states that he argued for fifteen minutes that he was not 

fine, at which point the nurse left. Plaintiff states that he was unable to move his hands or 

feet for another ten minutes. Plaintiff claims no further treatment was provided. 

 Plaintiff asserts that he suffered “parasthesia” again on June 5, 2013. He claims he 

was placed in a wheelchair and taken to the medical department, where Defendant 

Anderson, based on Plaintiff’s statement that his chest was tight and he was having 

difficulty breathing, stated that Plaintiff may have had a heart attack and ordered Plaintiff 

transported to the hospital. At the hospital, Plaintiff’s blood was tested and a doctor 

stated that Plaintiff’s potassium and magnesium levels were low and provided Plaintiff 

 

3

 “Paresthesia” is a “burning or prickling sensation that is usually felt in the hands, arms, legs, or feet, but can also occur in other parts of the body. The sensation, which happens without warning, is usually painless and described as tingling or numbness, skin crawling, or itching.” National Institute of Health, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Paresthesia Information, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/ paresthesia/paresthesia.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 

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with mineral supplements. Plaintiff was returned to the prison, where he received the 

supplements and his blood was tested. Plaintiff claims he received no further treatment 

after his potassium and magnesium levels returned to normal. 

 Plaintiff contends that on June 18, 2013, a doctor told Plaintiff that he may be 

experiencing sensitivity to sodium nitrates and submitted a “no nitrates” diet card for 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that a nurse told him on June 21, 2013, that his “no nitrate diet” 

was denied. Plaintiff states that Defendant Martin denied the diet, despite the diet card 

having been submitted by the doctor. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Martin acted with 

deliberate indifference by denying a diet prescribed by the doctor and that doing so 

subjected Plaintiff to a substantial risk of harm. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants 

Trinity and Corizon “per policy do not have an authorized ‘no nitrate diet’ and are not 

authorized to provide the aforesaid diet.” Plaintiff contends that Defendants Trinity and 

Corizon acted with deliberate indifference by failing to fulfill the doctor’s prescription for 

a no-nitrate diet, and that this subjected Plaintiff to a substantial risk of harm. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “parasthesia” again on June 30, 2013, after eating 

a hamburger the day before. Plaintiff states that he was in the dining hall, a sergeant 

called the medical department, but the medical department did not respond for 20 

minutes. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Connor arrived and “was very rude and 

callous,” threatened Plaintiff with disciplinary sanctions if he was “faking” his 

symptoms, accused Plaintiff of faking his symptoms, rudely stated that “it is written in 

your medical file that you fake your symptoms,” and stated that he was “only taking 

Plaintiff to [the medical department] because he had to.” At the medical department, 

Defendant Connor took Plaintiff’s vitals, which were normal. When Plaintiff asked 

Defendant Connor if he could explain why Plaintiff’s hands were cramped, Defendant 

Connor was unable to do so. Defendant Connor kept Plaintiff in a holding cell for 30 

minutes, after which Plaintiff walked back to his cell. No further treatment was provided. 

 Plaintiff contends that on January 9, 2014, “after already exhausting his damage 

claim,” he met with Defendants Frisbee and Aguilar. After discussing Plaintiff’s medical 

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needs, Defendant Aguilar had Plaintiff sign “I accept the informal resolution” on his 

grievance and explained to Plaintiff that he could submit a grievance if he was unsatisfied 

with the informal resolution. According to Plaintiff, the resolution was that an e-mail 

would be sent to Defendant Dishman requesting clarification regarding the approval of a 

no-nitrate diet. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Frisbee and Aguilar were attempting to 

intentionally delay and prevent Plaintiff from exercising his rights of access to the courts 

and his Eighth Amendment rights and that this also constituted deliberate indifference. 

 Plaintiff admits that “Defendants” have provided some treatment to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff states that he was tested for Hepatitis C (he tested negative); his blood was tested 

in August 2012 to check his sugar and sodium levels (his results were within normal 

levels); and he was tested in August 2013 to determine if he was allergic to peanuts, 

sugar, beef, chicken or turkey (he was not). Plaintiff also claims Defendant Ende 

prescribed a medication for seizures on December 22, 2012, but the medication caused 

Plaintiff to have dizziness; and Defendant Ende prescribed another seizure medication 

that caused Plaintiff to have dizziness, nausea, and vomiting. Plaintiff claims Defendant 

Rawa evaluated Plaintiff for anxiety on July 17, 2013, diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety, 

and prescribed a medication that caused Plaintiff to have dizziness; Defendant Riaz 

prescribed another medication for anxiety, but it caused Plaintiff to have dizziness, 

fatigue, nausea, and migraines; and Defendant Charles prescribed another anxiety 

medication on March 28, 2014, but that medication caused Plaintiff to have dizziness, 

nausea, and migraines. Plaintiff states that at every psychiatric evaluation he claimed he 

was not suffering from anxiety, but rather from a sensitivity to chemicals, as diagnosed 

by the doctor in July 2013. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Ende gave Plaintiff a 

“migraine speech” on July 10, 2013, in which he suggested that Plaintiff’s body may be 

experiencing a physiological change that may have occurred with age after a 

methamphetamine addiction. In addition, Plaintiff contends that on July 12, 2013, a 

neurologist evaluated Plaintiff, concluded that Plaintiff was suffering from carpal-pedal 

spasms, and advised Plaintiff to stop ingesting whatever was causing the spasms. 

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 Plaintiff asserts that he has complained to Defendants Ryan, Aguilar, Frisbee, 

Wexford, Corizon, Bell, Ende, Connor, Riaz, Anderson, Rawa, Charles, Hammer, Rojas, 

Reinhart, Dishman, and Lewis about his serious medical needs “to no avail”; that 

Defendants Ryan, Wexford, and Corizon have not provided “confirmation nor treatment” 

regarding Plaintiff’s injuries; and that Defendants Ryan, Wexford, Corizon, Anderson, 

Connor, Ende, Rawa, Charles, and Riaz acted with “deliberate indifference and 

negligence” when they knowingly failed to adhere to the doctor’s diagnosis regarding 

nitrate-sensitivity. Plaintiff asserts that he has suffered pain, damage to his equilibrium, 

vertigo, fatigue, weakness, difficulty concentrating and retrieving information from his 

short-term memory, and “jolts – [his] hands, feet, and legs thrust out in an outward 

direction.” 

 Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 

He asserts that once his sensitivity to sodium nitrates has been diagnosed he will qualify 

as an American with a disability. He contends that ADOC has “A.D.A. cells for 

prisoners with a disability” and that he needs to be assigned to one of these cells, on a 

lower tier/lower bunk, and without a cellmate. 

 Finally, Plaintiff contends that he is actually innocent of burglary and murder and 

was wrongfully convicted in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

 In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, 

monetary damages, a jury trial, and his costs of suit. 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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 A. Official Capacity Claims

 Any official capacity claims Plaintiff may be asserting against employees of 

Defendants Wexford, Corizon, and Trinity are duplicative because Plaintiff has also sued 

Defendants Wexford, Corizon, and Trinity. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978) (“official-capacity suits general represent only 

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). 

Thus, the Court will dismiss as duplicative any official capacity claims against employees 

of Defendants Wexford, Corizon, and Trinity. 

 As to any official capacity claims Plaintiff may be asserting against ADOC 

employees, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit 

against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no 

different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 

U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff cannot maintain a lawsuit for 

damages against ADOC employees in their official capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 

U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (“State officials sued for damages in their official capacity are not 

‘persons’ for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that 

employs them.”); see also Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (“[A] state is not a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1983. Likewise ‘arms of 

the State’ such as the Arizona Department of Corrections are not ‘persons’ under section 

1983.”) (citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff may maintain a lawsuit against ADOC employees in their official 

capacity for prospective injunctive relief. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10 (“[A] state 

official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person 

under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as 

actions against the State.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, n.14 

(1985))); see also Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d. 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] suit for 

prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow, but well-established, exception to 

Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). However, “in an official-capacity suit the entity’s 

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‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Graham, 473 

U.S. at 166; see also Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 131 S. Ct. 447, 453-

54 (2010) (the “‘policy or custom’ requirement [in Monell] applies in § 1983 cases 

irrespective of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective.”). A plaintiff must 

allege, as a matter of law, that the policy or custom caused him to suffer constitutional 

injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff does not allege 

that any ADOC employee was acting pursuant to a specific State of Arizona or ADOC 

policy or custom or that such a policy or custom caused Plaintiff to suffer a constitutional 

injury. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice any official capacity claims 

against ADOC employees. 

B. Individual Capacity Eighth Amendment Claims 

 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and 

therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; 

Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 

suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was 

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of 

Defendants has violated a constitutional right are insufficient. 

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

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medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

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1. Defendants Ryan, Wexford, Bell, Hammer, Rojas, Lewis, 

Reinhart, and Dishman

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Ryan, Wexford, Bell, Hammer, Rojas, 

Lewis, Reinhart, and Dishman are nothing more than vague and conclusory allegations 

against a group of Defendants, without any factual specificity, as to what any particular 

Defendant did or failed to do. Although Plaintiff alleges that he complained to these 

Defendants “to no avail,” he does not identify when he complained to each Defendant, 

the substance of his complaint, what each Defendant did or failed to do, and how that 

particular Defendant’s conduct constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical 

need. The Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants 

Ryan, Wexford, Bell, Hammer, Rojas, Lewis, Reinhart, and Dishman. 

 2. Defendants Corizon and Trinity

 To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional 

public function, such as providing meals or medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must 

allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, 

decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. See Tsao v. Desert 

Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2012); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 

(11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff must allege the specific policy or custom and how it violated 

his constitutional rights. A private entity is not liable simply because it employed 

individuals who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Tsao, 698 F.3d 

at 1139. 

 Plaintiff’s only specific factual allegation against Defendants Corizon and Trinity 

is that these Defendants “per policy do not have an authorized ‘no nitrate diet’ and are not 

authorized to provide the aforesaid diet” and that they “act with deliberate indifference in 

failing to fulfill a doctor’s prescription for a no nitrate diet.” These allegations are still 

nothing more than conclusory allegations against a group of defendants, without any 

factual specificity as to each Defendant’s policy or custom. Plaintiff has failed to allege 

facts to support that Defendant Corizon promulgated or endorsed a specific policy or 

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custom of rejecting a doctor’s recommendation for a no-nitrate diet or a specific policy or 

custom of refusing to authorize a no-nitrate diet and has failed to allege facts to support 

that Defendant Trinity promulgated or endorsed a specific policy or custom of rejecting a 

doctor’s recommendation for a no-nitrate diet or a specific policy or custom of refusing to 

authorize a no-nitrate diet. Moreover, even if such a policy existed, Plaintiff’s has failed 

to identify how such a policy violated his constitutional rights Although Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendant Martin denied Plaintiff’s no-nitrate diet, he does not allege that she denied 

the diet pursuant to a policy or custom of either Defendant Corizon or Defendant Trinity. 

Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendants Corizon and Trinity. 

 3. Defendant Anderson

 Plaintiff’s only specific allegation against Defendant Anderson is that after 

Plaintiff suffered “parasthesia” on June 5, 2013, and Defendant Anderson stated that 

Plaintiff may have had a heart attack and ordered him to be transported to the hospital. 

This does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Thus, 

the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Anderson. 

 4. Defendants Ende, Rawa, Riaz, and Charles

 Plaintiff’s only specific factual allegations against Defendant Ende are that he 

prescribed medications to treat anxiety, even though Plaintiff claimed he did not have 

anxiety, and gave Plaintiff a “migraine speech.” Plaintiff’s only specific factual 

allegations against Defendant Rawa are that Defendant Rawa evaluated Plaintiff, 

diagnosed him as having anxiety, and prescribed medication. Plaintiff’s only allegations 

against Defendants Riaz and Charles are they prescribed medication for anxiety. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Ende, Rawa, Riaz, and Charles do not rise to 

the level of deliberate indifference. See Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242 (“A difference of 

opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference”). The Court will dismiss without 

prejudice Defendants Ende, Rawa, Riaz, and Charles. 

 5. Defendant Connor

 Plaintiff’s only specific factual allegations against Defendant Connor are that 

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Defendant Connor was rude, callous, and accused Plaintiff of faking his illness, but 

nevertheless transported him to the medical department, assessed his vital signs, and 

stated that he could not explain Plaintiff’s hand cramping. These allegations do not rise 

to the level of deliberate indifference. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice 

Defendant Connor. 

 6. Defendants Aguilar and Frisbee

 Plaintiff’s only specific factual allegations against Defendants Aguilar and Frisbee 

are that they met with Plaintiff regarding his medical needs and attempted to resolve his 

grievance. This does not constitute deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

 In addition, regarding Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants Frisbee and Aguilar 

were trying to delay and prevent Plaintiff from exercising his rights of access to the 

courts by attempting to informally resolve Plaintiff’s grievance, Plaintiff has failed to 

state a claim. “[P]risoners have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 

litigate claims challenging their sentences or the conditions of their confinement to 

conclusion without active interference by prison officials.” Silva v. DiVittorio, 658 F.3d 

1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). The right of meaningful access to the 

courts prohibits officials from actively interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or 

file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). As a matter of standing, 

for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he suffered an “actual injury”—

i.e., “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any actual injury as a result of Defendants 

Aguilar and Frisbee’s conduct. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s 

access to the courts claim. 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a deliberate indifference claim or an access to 

the courts claim against Defendant Aguilar and Frisbee, the Court will dismiss without 

prejudice Defendants Aguilar and Frisbee. 

. . . . 

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 C. Americans with Disabilities Act

 Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, “no qualified individual 

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 

be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state an ADA 

claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he: 

(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise 

qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some 

public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) he was 

either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of 

the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was 

otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and 

(4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was 

by reason of [his] disability. 

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting McGary 

v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim appears to be nothing more than an assertion that he would 

like to be placed in an ADA cell, on a lower tier/lower bunk, without a cellmate. He does 

not allege that he requested these accommodations, to whom he directed his request, or 

that his request was denied. Thus, even if he would be classified as an individual with a 

disability, he has failed to allege that any Defendant refused to accommodate his needs or 

discriminated against him by reason of his disability. Thus, the Court will dismiss 

without prejudice Plaintiff’s ADA claim. 

 D. Claim of Actual Innocence

 “Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to 

imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). “Challenges to the 

validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of 

habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be 

presented in a § 1983 action.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 

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573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s claim of actual innocence is a challenge to the 

validity of his convictions and is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, the Court will 

dismiss his actual innocence claim. 

E. Negligence

 Plaintiff’s sole claim of “negligence” is that a group of Defendants acted with 

“deliberate indifference and negligence” when they knowingly failed to follow the 

doctor’s diagnosis of nitrate sensitivity. This vague and conclusory allegation against a 

group of defendants is insufficient to state a negligence claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Therefore, the Court will dismiss without prejudice 

Plaintiff’s negligence claim. 

V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference claim against Defendant Martin regarding Defendant Martin’s denial of 

Plaintiff’s no-nitrate diet even though that diet had been prescribed by a doctor. The 

Court will require Defendant Martin to answer this claim. 

VI. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

 Whether to grant or deny a motion for a preliminary injunction is within the 

Court’s discretion. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 

1979). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show “that he is likely 

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 

(2008). The moving party has the burden of proof on each element of the test. 

Environmental Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 

2000). 

 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy and will not be 

granted absent a clear showing of likely success in the underlying claim and possible 

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irreparable injury. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam). 

An injunction or temporary restraining order is appropriate to grant intermediate relief of 

the same character as which may be granted finally, and relief is not proper when 

requested on matters lying wholly outside the issues in suit. See DeBeers Consol. Mines 

v. United States., 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945); Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 

(11th Cir.), amended, 131 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1997). To obtain injunctive relief, the 

party “must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s 

motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 

471 (8th Cir. 1994). 

 Much of the relief Plaintiff seeks in his Motion appears to relate to issues and 

Defendants who have been dismissed in this Order. Thus, the Court, in its discretion, 

will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction without prejudice to Plaintiff 

filing a new motion for a preliminary injunction seeking relief only against Defendant 

Martin regarding the no-nitrate diet. 

VII. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Because Plaintiff is currently confined in an Arizona Department of Corrections 

unit subject to General Order 14-17, Plaintiff is not required to serve Defendants with a 

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copy of every document he files or to submit an additional copy of every filing for use by 

the Court, as would ordinarily be required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 and 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.4. If Plaintiff is transferred to a unit other than one 

subject to General Order 14-17, he will be notified of the requirements for service and 

copies for the Court that are required for inmates whose cases are not subject to General 

Order 14-17. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 5) is 

granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $4.63. 

(3) Plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act, actual innocence, and 

negligence claims are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (4) Defendants Ryan; Wexford Health Services, Inc.; Corizon Health Services, 

Inc.; Trinity Food Services, Inc.; Anderson; Bell; Ende; Riaz; Rawa; Charles; Connor; 

Hammer; Rojas; Lewis; Reinhart; Aguilar; Frisbee; and Dishman are dismissed without 

prejudice. 

 (5) Defendant Martin must answer Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim 

regarding the denial of a no-nitrate diet. 

 (6) Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 6) is denied without 

prejudice. 

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 (7) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff this Order, and a copy of the 

Marshal’s Process Receipt & Return form (USM-285) and Notice of Lawsuit & Request 

for Waiver of Service of Summons form for Defendant Martin. 

 (8) Plaintiff must complete4

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (9) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant within 120 days of the 

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

the action may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (10) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (11) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of 

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent 

by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

 

4

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upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

 (12) If Defendant Martin agrees to waive service of the Summons and 

Complaint, Defendant Martin must return the signed waiver forms to the United 

States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (13) Defendant Martin must answer the relevant portion of the Complaint or 

otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable 

provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (14) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 12th day of September, 2014. 

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