Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-06-04162/USCOURTS-ca6-06-04162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0160p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

GREATER HEIGHTS ACADEMY, et al.,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DR. SUSAN TAVE ZELMAN, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 06-4162

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.

No. 06-00498—Algenon L. Marbley, District Judge.

Argued: March 12, 2008

Decided and Filed: April 18, 2008 

Before: KEITH, CLAY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Albin Bauer II, EASTMAN & SMITH, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellants. Reid T. Caryer,

OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

Albin Bauer II, EASTMAN & SMITH, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellants. Reid T. Caryer, OFFICE OF

THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. 

_________________

OPINION _________________

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourteenth

Amendment claim filed by two Ohio community schools, Greater Heights Academy and W.C. Cupe

Community School (“Appellants”), against three Ohio public officials, Dr. Susan Tave Zelman,

Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction, Dr. Paulo A. DeMaria, Associate Superintendent for the

Center for School Finance of the Ohio Department of Education (ODE), and Todd L. Hanes,

Director of ODE’s Office of Community Schools (collectively, “Appellees”). Appellants sought

injunctive relief consisting of a prayer for the receipt of state educational funds pursuant to Ohio

Rev. Code § 3314.08 and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the denial of funding. Concluding

that community schools are political subdivisions and barred from asserting Fourteenth Amendment

claims against state officials, the district court dismissed Appellants’ suit under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The sole issue on appeal is

whether Appellants are political subdivisions that therefore cannot invoke the protection of the

Fourteenth Amendment against the state of Ohio.

1

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No. 06-4162 Greater Heights Academy, et al. v. Zelman, et al. Page 2

I.

Ohio community schools, also known as “charter schools,” provide non-traditional public

education to students from kindergarten through grade twelve. Chapter 3314 of the Ohio Revised

Code sets forth the operation and funding of community schools. All community schools contract

with an authorized “sponsor” that provides oversight and support to the school, ensuring that they

comply with state requirements. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3314.02(C)(1), (D); Ohio Admin. Code § 3301-

102-05. The sponsor may be either a public educational entity or a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entity.

Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3314.02(C)(1)(a)-(f). Additionally, the sponsorship contract must comply with

the criteria of Ohio Revised Code § 3314.03. Sponsors decide whether to place a community school

on probation, suspension, or permanently terminate the community school’s contract because of

non-compliance with state and federal educational requirements. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3314.07,

3314.072, 3314.073. In turn, sponsors must seek ODE approval for preliminary agreements,

according to criteria, procedures, and deadlines established by the ODE. Ohio Rev. Code

§ 3314.015(B). The ODE, in addition, may revoke approval of a sponsor and assume direct

sponsorship of a community school in the event that a sponsor becomes unwilling or unable to

complete its duties. Ohio Rev. Code § 3314.015(C).

Ohio community schools are financed solely by state educational funds that are diverted from

Ohio school districts and awarded on a per pupil basis. Ohio Rev. Code § 3314.08. Under ODE

funding procedures, after community schools submit their enrollment data, traditional school

districts are permitted to “flag” certain students who they believe do not actually attend the

community school. Traditional public schools and state officials may later remove the error flag.

Where error flags remain, the state automatically denies payment for flagged students. Disputes

about flagged students may be resolved during the ODE’s “reconciliation” period. In this case, the

Cleveland Municipal School District and Columbus City School District flagged a number of

students on Appellants’ lists. As a result, Appellants did not receive payment for those students.

They were not provided the opportunity for a hearing prior to the denial of payment.

II.

Appellants contend that the district court erred in finding that Appellees are ‘political

subdivisions’ and therefore unable to invoke the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. This

Court reviews a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997); Allard v. Weitzman (In re

DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (6th Cir. 1993).

It is well established that political subdivisions cannot sue the state of which they are part

under the United States Constitution. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 186-87, 43 S.

Ct. 534, 67 L. Ed. 937 (1923) (With respect to political subdivisions, “the state is supreme and its

legislative body . . . may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United

States.”); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196, 43 S. Ct. 539, 67 L. Ed. 943 (1923)

(“The regulation of municipalities is a matter peculiarly within the domain of the state.”); South

Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Washington Twp., 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The relationship

between [political subdivisions] is a matter of state concern; the Fourteenth Amendment protections

and limitations do not apply.”). An entity is a political subdivision of a state if it is a creation of the

state, if its power to act rests entirely within the discretion of the state, and if it can be destroyed at

the mere whim of the state, “unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.”

See City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 187; see also South Macomb Disposal Auth., 790 F.2d at 504

(“Being a subdivision of the state, the ‘State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges

[from a municipality] as it sees fit.’” (quoting id. at 187) (alteration in original)). In determining

whether a particular entity is a political subdivision, courts look to statutory and case law. South

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Macomb Disposal Auth., 790 F.2d at 506; Delta Special Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Educ. for

Ark., 745 F.2d 532, 533 (8th Cir. 1984).

After considering Ohio’s statutory and case law, as well as the substantive control that Ohio

exerts on its community schools, it is apparent that community schools are political subdivisions of

the state. First, Ohio’s statutory law establishes community schools as political subdivisions.

Section 2744.01(F) of the Ohio Revised Code defines “‘[p]olitical subdivision’ or ‘subdivision’ [as]

a municipal corporation, township, county, school district, or other body corporate and politic

responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the state. ‘Political

subdivision’ includes, but is not limited to, a . . . community school established under Chapter 3314.”

(emphasis added). As a political subdivision, community schools are immune from liability in civil

actions. Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(A)(1). 

Ohio’s collective bargaining statute similarly enumerates community schools as one of

Ohio’s political subdivisions, stating that “public employer” “means the state or any political

subdivision of the state . . . including . . . [the] governing authority of a community school

established under Chapter 3314. [sic] of the Revised Code.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.01(B). In

addition to Ohio statutory law, the Ohio Supreme Court has expressly found that community schools

are political subdivisions for which the state may assume debt. State ex rel. Ohio Congress of

Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 3d 568, 586, 857 N.E.2d 1148 (2006).

Community schools, moreover, bear many of the characteristics of a political subdivision

under the control of the State. Like other political subdivisions, “the State may withhold, grant or

withdraw powers and privileges [from a community school] as it sees fit. However great or small

its sphere of action, it remains the creature of the State exercising and holding powers and privileges

subject to sovereign will.” South Macomb Disposal Auth., 790 F.2d at 504 (quoting City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 187) (quotation marks omitted). For instance, community schools were created by state

legislation. See Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 3314. Section 3314.01(B) of the Ohio Revised Code

expressly characterizes community schools as “public school[s], independent of any school district,

and part of the state’s program of education.” Moreover, both community school students and

traditional public school students must pass the same proficiency, achievement, and diagnostic tests.

Ohio Rev. Code § 3314.03(A). They are also subject to the same facility requirements and health

and safety standards. Ohio Rev. Code § 3314.05. Although sponsors are responsible for overseeing

compliance with state regulations, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3314.07, 3314.072, 3314.073, sponsors are

under the command of the ODE. The ODE approves and monitors sponsors, and “[i]f a sponsor

becomes unwilling or unable to complete its duties, the ODE may revoke approval to act as a

sponsor and assume direct sponsorship of the community school in question for up to two years.”

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers, 111 Ohio St. 3d at 570; Ohio Rev. Code

§ 3314.015. 

Furthermore, community schools must conform to a variety of general state regulations.

They are required to comply with public records laws and the same bookkeeping standards as

traditional public schools. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 149.43, 3314.03(A)(8). They must also abide by

open meeting laws governing political subdivisions. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 121.22, 3314.03(A)(11).

Moreover, community school teachers receive the benefits of the Ohio public retirement system.

Ohio Rev. Code § 3307.01. Ohio also raises taxes for the purpose of funding community schools,

Ohio Rev. Code § 3314.08, and funds remaining upon a community school’s closing are returned

to the state’s general fund. Ohio Rev. Code § 3314.074(A). Additionally, community schools must

be open to all residents with narrow exceptions and must be nonsectarian and non-discriminatory.

Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3314.06(A), 3314.03(D)(1). 

Given the statutory and case law expressly naming community schools as political

subdivisions, as well as the many institutional characteristics of community schools that establish

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No. 06-4162 Greater Heights Academy, et al. v. Zelman, et al. Page 4

their position as part and parcel of Ohio’s system of public education, the district court did not err

in finding that community schools, as political subdivisions, are barred from invoking the

protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ohio has created community schools “to give parents

a choice and give educators ‘the opportunity to establish limited experimental educational programs

in a deregulated setting.’” State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers, 111 Ohio St. 3d at

576 (quoting 1997 Am. Sub. H.B. No. 215, § 50.52, Subsection 2(B), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2043).

In conducting this experiment, however, Ohio has not relinquished its power to create, govern or

even destroy community schools. Accordingly, we hold that the relationship between Ohio

community schools and traditional public schools “is a matter of state concern; the Fourteenth

Amendment protections and limitations do not apply.” South Macomb Disposal Auth., 790 F.2d at

505.

III.

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

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