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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 2011 Decided May 17, 2011 

No. 10-5078 

MARY BROOKE OBERWETTER, 

APPELLANT

v. 

KENNETH HILLIARD, U.S. PARK POLICE, AND KENNETH LEE 

SALAZAR, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:09-cv-00588) 

Alan Gura argued the cause for appellant. With him on 

the briefs was Candice N. Hance. 

Harry B. Roback, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney. 

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Late on the eve of the 265th 

birthday of Thomas Jefferson—Author of the Declaration of 

American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for 

Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of 

Virginia—Officer Kenneth Hilliard of the United States Park 

Police arrested plaintiff Mary Brooke Oberwetter when she 

refused to stop what she describes as “silent expressive 

dancing” inside the Jefferson Memorial. She filed suit against 

Hilliard and the government alleging violations of her First 

and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed 

her complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I 

 

At quarter to midnight on April 12, 2008, Oberwetter and 

seventeen friends entered the Jefferson Memorial to 

“celebrate and honor the former President . . . by ushering in 

his birthday with silent dance.”1

 Appellant’s Br. 4. According 

to Oberwetter, the dancing expressed admiration for Mr. 

Jefferson’s political legacy. “In the individualist spirit for 

which Jefferson is known, the dancers danced for the most 

part by themselves, in place, each listening to his or her music 

on headphones.” Compl. ¶ 13. The dancing took place inside 

the Memorial, a circular structure with a domed roof and 

colonnaded perimeter. “Apart from [Oberwetter] and her 

associates, and employees of the National Park Service, there 

 

1

 For his part, Mr. Jefferson is on record discouraging celebration of 

his birthday. “On Mr. Jefferson’s accession to the Presidency 

[visitors] had waited on him, requesting to be informed, which was 

his birthday, as they wished to celebrate it with proper respect. ‘The 

only birthday I ever commemorate,’ replied he, ‘is that of our 

Independence, the Fourth of July.’” THE FIRST FORTY YEARS OF 

WASHINGTON SOCIETY 398 (Gaillard Hunt ed., Scribner’s Sons 

1906). 

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were very few visitors to the Jefferson Memorial at the time 

of the dancing.” Id. ¶ 15. 

A group of United States Park Police officers ordered the 

dancers to disperse. Oberwetter states that she did not 

immediately comply but removed a headphone from one ear 

and asked Officer Hilliard “why he was ordering her to leave, 

and what law she was violating.” Id. ¶ 18. Hilliard offered no 

explanation, but continued to insist that she stop dancing and 

leave immediately. Rather than complying, Oberwetter again 

asked Hilliard to “provide a lawful reason why she needed to 

do so,” but he “refused to offer any reason whatsoever for his 

demands, and instead arrested [her].” Id. ¶ 19. Oberwetter 

further alleges that Hilliard “used more force than was 

necessary . . . , ripping apart her earbud, shoving her against a 

pillar, and violently twisting her arm.” Id. ¶ 21. The Park 

Police took her into custody for some five hours of 

processing, after which they cited her for “[i]nterfering with 

an agency function” in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32 

(prohibiting “[t]hreatening, resisting, intimidating, or 

intentionally interfering with a government employee or agent 

engaged in an official duty, or on account of the performance 

of an official duty”). 

Three days later, Park Police officers visited 

Oberwetter’s home and gave her two superseding citations—

one for “interfering with an agency function,” and another for 

“[d]emonstrating without a permit” in violation of the 

National Park Service Regulations. See 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(3)(ii)(C). On May 21, 2008, Oberwetter appeared 

before the district court to defend the charges. According to 

her complaint, the court found that “the prosecution . . . was 

not properly before the Court and advised . . . Hilliard that if 

he wished to proceed, he would have to properly prepare the 

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matter for hearing.” Compl. ¶ 25. The Park Police have not 

pressed the matter since. 

Oberwetter subsequently filed this suit, arguing that 

Hilliard’s enforcement of the Park Service Regulations to 

prohibit her expressive dancing violated her First Amendment 

rights to free speech and assembly. She sought injunctive and 

declaratory relief, stating that she “would again silently dance 

at the Jefferson Memorial to commemorate Thomas 

Jefferson’s birthday, by herself, and with other like-minded 

people, but refrains from doing so because she reasonably 

fears arrest, prosecution, fine, and/or incarceration if she were 

to do so again.” Id. ¶ 26. She also brought three Bivens claims 

for money damages against Hilliard in his personal capacity, 

alleging violations of her First and Fourth Amendment rights. 

The district court dismissed Oberwetter’s complaint for 

failure to state a claim, holding that she was lawfully arrested 

for violating the reasonable regulations that govern the 

Jefferson Memorial, a nonpublic forum reserved for the 

tranquil commemoration of Mr. Jefferson’s legacy. 

Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 680 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2010). 

The court further held that Hilliard had probable cause to 

make the arrest, and that he used reasonable force to subdue 

Oberwetter without injury after she twice refused his lawful 

orders. We take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo. See Muir v. 

Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, 

“we must treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true, 

must grant [the] plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences from the facts alleged, and may uphold the 

dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 

prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would 

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entitle [her] to relief.” Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 450 n.2 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

II 

 As a threshold matter, Oberwetter contends that the 

National Park Service misread its own regulations in treating 

her expressive dancing as unlawful. Ordinarily, we “accord an 

agency’s interpretation of its own regulations a high level of 

deference, accepting it unless it is plainly wrong.” Howmet 

Corp. v. EPA, 614 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, however, because the Park 

Service’s interpretation of its regulations could lead to 

criminal sanctions against Oberwetter, our deference is 

constrained by the need to ensure that she had fair warning. 

See United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 

1987) (“In the criminal context, courts have traditionally 

required greater clarity in draftsmanship than in civil contexts, 

commensurate with the bedrock principle that in a free 

country citizens who are potentially subject to criminal 

sanctions should have clear notice of the behavior that may 

cause sanctions to be visited upon them.”); see also Rollins

Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

We are satisfied that the Regulations give fair notice that 

expressive dancing is prohibited inside the Jefferson 

Memorial. 

 The Regulations provide that, within the park areas of the 

National Capital Region, “[d]emonstrations and special events 

may be held only pursuant to a permit . . . .” 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(2). “Demonstrations” include: 

picketing, speechmaking, marching, holding vigils or 

religious services and all other like forms of conduct 

which involve the communication or expression of views 

or grievances, engaged in by one or more persons, the 

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conduct of which has the effect, intent or propensity to 

draw a crowd or onlookers. [The] term does not include 

casual park use by visitors or tourists which does not 

have an intent or propensity to attract a crowd or 

onlookers. 

Id.§ 7.96(g)(1)(i).2

 Oberwetter argues that her silent expressive dancing was 

not a demonstration because it was not “like” the enumerated 

activities of “picketing, speechmaking, marching, [or] holding 

vigils or religious services.” Id. § 7.96(g)(1)(i). Unlike those 

examples, she argues, her expressive dancing was not an 

“organized group activity in which a uniform message is 

passionately conveyed.” Appellant’s Br. 15. She further 

claims that her conduct falls within the exception for “casual 

park use.” Id. Dancing silently in place while listening to 

headphones, she says, is something that people do in the 

course of ordinary activity—waiting for the bus, standing on 

the sidewalk, etc.—and does not have the “effect, intent or 

propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers.” 36 C.F.R. 

§ 7.96(g)(1)(i). 

 The district court properly rejected Oberwetter’s 

arguments. Under the Park Service Regulations, a 

demonstration need not be an “organized group activity,” but 

may consist of “one or more persons.” Id. Oberwetter’s 

expressive dancing falls within the spectrum of examples of 

prohibited activities, which range from “the boisterousness of 

picketing or speechmaking to the quiet solicitude of a vigil.” 

 

2

 On January 3, 2011, the Park Service issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking that “would revise the definition of demonstration at 36 

C.F.R. 7.96(g)(1)(i) by eliminating the term ‘intent or propensity’ 

where it appears in the definition and replace it with ‘reasonably 

likely.’” 76 Fed. Reg. 57, 57. 

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Oberwetter, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 161. Although silent, 

Oberwetter’s dancing was a conspicuous expressive act with a 

propensity to draw onlookers. True, it occurred close to 

midnight on a weekend, making it less likely that a crowd 

would gather. But the question is not whether her dancing was 

likely to attract attention at that particular time. As with the 

other prohibited activities of “picketing, speechmaking, 

marching, [and] holding vigils or religious services,” 

expressive dancing might not draw an audience when nobody 

is around. But the conduct is nonetheless prohibited because it 

stands out as a type of performance, creating its own center of 

attention and distracting from the atmosphere of solemn 

commemoration that the Regulations are designed to preserve. 

 Taking another tack, Oberwetter argues that even if she 

engaged in a demonstration inside the Memorial, she was free 

to do so because her group of silent dancers was never larger 

than 18 people. The Regulations allow for groups of 25 or 

fewer to demonstrate without a permit “provided that the 

other conditions required for the issuance of a permit are 

met.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2)(i) (emphasis omitted). She 

admits, as she must, that the Regulations state that “[n]o 

permits may be issued authorizing demonstrations or special 

events in . . . [t]he Jefferson Memorial, which means the 

circular portion of the Jefferson Memorial enclosed by the 

outermost series of columns, and all portions on the same 

levels or above the base of these columns, except for the 

official annual commemorative Jefferson birthday ceremony.” 

Id. § 7.96(g)(3)(ii). But, she argues, this is not a “condition” 

required for the issuance of a permit. In her view, there are no 

conditions at all for the issuance of a permit for 

demonstrations inside the Memorial, and so groups of 25 or 

fewer must be allowed to demonstrate there. 

 This argument can be readily rejected. As the district 

court rightly observed, the much more natural reading of the 

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Regulations is that being outside of the Memorial is a required 

condition for any demonstration, meaning that, aside from the 

official birthday ceremony, no demonstrations of any size are 

allowed inside the Memorial. 

III 

 The heart of Oberwetter’s complaint is her claim that the 

First Amendment protects her right to engage in silent 

expressive dancing inside the Jefferson Memorial.3

 Because 

the First Amendment “affords protection to symbolic or 

expressive conduct as well as to actual speech,” Virginia v. 

Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003), there is no question that she 

had the right to dance in order to express her admiration for 

Mr. Jefferson. Of course she did. But the question this case 

presents is whether she had the right to perform her dance 

inside the Jefferson Memorial. 

We analyze Oberwetter’s claim under the familiar 

“public forum” doctrine, which divides government property 

into three categories for purposes of First Amendment 

analysis. The “traditional public forum” includes public areas 

that have “by long tradition or by government fiat . . . been 

devoted to assembly and debate.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 

Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The 

government must respect the open character of these forums, 

and can only impose speech restrictions that are “narrowly 

tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Ward v. 

Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Next is the 

“limited public forum” or “designated public forum,” which 

comprises “public property which the State has opened for 

 

3

 Because Oberwetter brings an as-applied rather than a facial 

challenge, we do not address whether the Regulations could survive 

a challenge on grounds of substantial overbreadth. See Wash. State 

Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 

(2008).

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use by the public as a place for expressive activity.” Perry, 

460 U.S. at 45. Expressive activity in these forums may be 

restricted to particular speakers or purposes. Third is the 

“nonpublic forum,” which encompasses government property 

that is “not by tradition or designation a forum for public 

communication.” Id. at 46. Here the government “may reserve 

the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or 

otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable 

and not an effort to suppress expression merely because 

public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Id. This rule 

recognizes that “[t]he State, no less than a private owner of 

property, has power to preserve the property under its control 

for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Greer v. Spock, 

424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Fla., 385 U.S. 

39, 47 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The dispositive question is not what the forum is called, 

but what purpose it serves, either by tradition or specific 

designation.” Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 

508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2010). We begin by analyzing the 

property in this case “at a very high level of generality,” 

adopting “a working presumption that sidewalks, streets and 

parks are normally to be considered public forums.” 

Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

We then examine the history and characteristics of the 

particular property at issue, mindful “that when government 

has dedicated property to a use inconsistent with conventional 

public assembly and debate . . . then the inconsistency 

precludes classification as a public forum.” Id.

The district court properly concluded that the area inside 

the Jefferson Memorial is a nonpublic forum. As a general 

matter, the interior space of national memorials has not 

traditionally “been used for purposes of assembly, 

communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 

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public questions.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. 

Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). National memorials are places of 

public commemoration, not freewheeling forums for open 

expression, and thus the government may reserve them for 

purposes that preclude expressive activity. Oberwetter points 

out that the Jefferson Memorial is located within the National 

Park system, and that public parks are quintessential examples 

of traditional public forums. See id. Even so, we have 

recognized that our country’s many national parks are too vast 

and variegated to be painted with a single brush for purposes 

of forum analysis. “Presumably, many national parks include 

areas—even large areas, such as a vast wilderness preserve—

which never have been dedicated to free expression and 

public assembly, would be clearly incompatible with such 

use, and would therefore be classified as nonpublic forums.” 

Boardley, 615 F.3d at 515; see also Lederman v. United 

States, 291 F.3d 36, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that “some 

areas within a large public forum may be nonpublic if their 

use is specialized”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cmty. 

for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 599 n.35 

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (observing that 

the Park Service “need not treat the [National Mall] as a 

monolithic whole”), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Clark 

v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 

In creating and maintaining the Jefferson Memorial in 

particular, the government has dedicated a space with a 

solemn commemorative purpose that is incompatible with the 

full range of free expression that is permitted in public 

forums.4

 Oberwetter alleges that visitors to the Memorial 

 

4

 We are mindful that forum determinations are typically fact 

intensive, and that we lack a factual record here because the district 

court dismissed this case on the pleadings. We press ahead 

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regularly “talk loudly, make noise, [and] take and pose for 

photographs,” Compl. ¶ 10, but none of this conduct rises to 

the level of a conspicuous “demonstration.” For three-and-ahalf decades, the Park Service Regulations have sought to 

“protect[] legitimate security and park value interests, 

including the maintenance of an atmosphere of calm, 

tranquility, and reverence in the vicinity of major memorials.” 

41 Fed. Reg. 12,879, 12,880 (Mar. 29, 1976). The 

Regulations specifically identify the interior of the Jefferson 

Memorial as a place where visitors may not engage in 

expressive activity that “has the effect, intent or propensity to 

draw a crowd or onlookers.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(1)(i). 

Visitors to the Memorial interior must ascend a stairway, 

traverse a portico, and pass a sign that says “Quiet / Respect 

Please” before entering. The Park Police patrol the area, and 

Oberwetter has pled no facts suggesting that they allow 

visitors to engage in disruptive demonstrations. Having thus 

created and maintained the Memorial as a commemorative 

site, the government is under no obligation to open it up as a 

stage for the roving dance troupes of the world—even those 

celebrating Mr. Jefferson. 

That the Memorial is open to the public does not alter its 

status as a nonpublic forum. Visitors are not invited for 

expressive purposes, but are free to enter only if they abide by 

the rules that preserve the Memorial’s solemn atmosphere. As 

the Supreme Court has observed, an area “is not transformed 

into ‘public forum’ property merely because the public is 

permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically 

all times.” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178 (1983). 

The government conducts an official ceremony for Jefferson’s 

 

nonetheless because the salient features of the Memorial are 

“generally known within [our] territorial jurisdiction” and “not 

subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

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birthday inside the Memorial each year, but this is an instance 

of government speech rather than an open invitation for 

private speakers. It is of no moment that the Memorial was 

built in 1943 but not regulated by the Park Service until 1976. 

Oberwetter has made no allegation that the Memorial was 

either a traditional public forum or designated public forum 

before the Park Service’s regulation, see Oberwetter, 680 F. 

Supp. 2d at 163, and we have made clear that a piece of 

government property is not automatically a public forum 

“merely because the government has for a time stayed its 

hand” in imposing restrictions. Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1183. 

Nor is this case like Grace, where the Supreme Court 

held that the grounds surrounding the Supreme Court building 

could not be deemed a nonpublic forum because there was 

“no separation, no fence, and no indication whatever to 

persons stepping from the street . . . that they [had] entered 

some special type of enclave.” 461 U.S. at 179. The physical 

characteristics of the Jefferson Memorial clearly delineate the 

nonpublic forum. The ceiling dome sits atop a circular 

colonnade, marking out a distinct memorial space. The clear 

boundaries of the Memorial also distinguish it from the 

restricted-speech zone in Henderson, which we struck down 

in part because it extended far beyond the Vietnam Veterans 

Memorial and encompassed public lawns and sidewalks that 

appeared “indistinguishable from ordinary sidewalks used for 

the full gamut of urban walking.” 964 F.2d at 1182. 

Having determined that the Jefferson Memorial is a 

nonpublic forum, we have little trouble concluding that the 

Park Service Regulations are “viewpoint neutral and 

reasonable in light of the purpose [of] the forum.” Marlin v. 

D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 236 F.3d 716, 719 (D.C. 

Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The 

Regulations plainly do not discriminate on the basis of 

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viewpoint, but rather prohibit disruptive speech regardless of 

its message. Oberwetter argues that the government engages 

in viewpoint discrimination by hosting its own official 

birthday ceremony in the Memorial while excluding her 

celebratory dance. This argument fails because the 

government is free to establish venues for the exclusive 

expression of its own viewpoint. See Pleasant Grove v. 

Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (holding that when the 

government erects a monument on public property, it is not 

obligated to allow other monuments expressing alternative 

viewpoints); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 

553 (2005) (“[T]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt 

from First Amendment scrutiny.”). It would be strange indeed 

to hold that the government may not favor its own expression 

inside the Jefferson Memorial, which was built by the 

government for the precise purpose of promoting a particular 

viewpoint about Jefferson. 

We have noted previously that the Park Service has a 

substantial interest in promoting a tranquil environment at our 

national memorials. See Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1184 (“Th[e] 

interest in maintaining a tranquil mood at the [Vietnam] 

Memorial wall is similar to ones that the Supreme Court and 

this court have recognized as substantial.”). Here the 

government has reasonably advanced its interest in tranquility 

because, unlike in Henderson, the restriction on expressive 

activity does not sweep beyond the actual Memorial space. 

Outside the Jefferson Memorial, of course, Oberwetter and 

her friends have always been free to dance to their hearts’ 

content. 

IV 

Finally, we turn to Oberwetter’s claims against Officer 

Hilliard under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 

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U.S. 388 (1971). Oberwetter alleges that Hilliard personally 

violated her First and Fourth Amendment rights by infringing 

her right to free expression, arresting her without probable 

cause, and subjecting her to excessive force. “Although 

government officials may be sued in their individual 

capacities for damages under Bivens, qualified immunity 

protects officials from liability ‘insofar as their conduct does 

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Atherton 

v. District of Columbia, 567 F.3d 672, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In 

evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, we first “determine 

whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual 

constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine 

whether that right was clearly established at the time of 

violation.” Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 

2003) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)). 

Hilliard’s alleged conduct did not violate Oberwetter’s 

clearly established constitutional rights. She had no First 

Amendment right to stage an unlawful performance inside the 

Jefferson Memorial, and in doing so created the cause for her 

own arrest. She alleges that Hilliard acted out of malice, 

arresting her for no good reason after she questioned his 

authority. But in fact her arrest was prompted not merely by 

her questioning Hilliard, but rather by her failure to comply 

with his lawful order during the course of her unlawful 

conduct. In any event, Hilliard’s motive would not affect the 

existence of probable cause, which depends “on an objective 

assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting him at the time . . . and not on the 

officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action 

was taken.” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 

(1985). Hilliard was objectively justified in arresting 

Oberwetter because he observed her breaking the law. 

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Oberwetter’s remaining Bivens claim is that Hilliard 

violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force 

when he pulled her arm behind her back and pushed her up 

against a stone column during her arrest. In general, police 

officers have authority to use “some degree of physical 

coercion” when subduing a suspect, Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 396 (1989), as long as the amount of force used is 

reasonable. In Judge Friendly’s famous formulation, “Not 

every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in 

the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s 

constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 

(2d Cir. 1973). We determine the reasonableness of force 

based on “the facts and circumstances of [the] particular case, 

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 

suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others, and whether [s]he [wa]s actively resisting 

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396. “The calculus of reasonableness must embody 

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to 

make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of 

force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. 

Thus, for Oberwetter’s claim to prevail, “the excessiveness of 

the force [must be] so apparent that no reasonable officer 

could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions.” 

Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

Although Oberwetter’s alleged violation was far from 

“sever[e],” her complaint nonetheless makes clear that Officer 

Hilliard’s use of force was not excessive. Most instructive on 

this point is Wasserman v. Rodacker, 557 F.3d 635 (D.C. Cir. 

2009), where a man was forcibly arrested after refusing a 

police officer’s request to stop and answer some questions 

while walking his dog in violation of a leash law. Although 

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the man eventually stopped and “was not moving or offering 

any resistance,” the officer “forcefully pressed upwards on 

[his] arm before handcuffing him, causing him pain.” Id. at 

641. The court held that the use of force was reasonable 

because the man’s “refusal to obey [the officer’s] order prior 

to his arrest suggested that he might try to resist or escape.” 

Id. The court also found it significant that the man “suffered 

no bruise or injury, which tends to confirm that [the officer] 

did not use more force than reasonably appeared necessary to 

secure [his] compliance.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The same factors are dispositive in the present case. 

Oberwetter admits in her complaint that before she was 

arrested she twice refused Hilliard’s order to stop dancing and 

leave the Memorial. She also admits that she was 

accompanied by a group of 17 other people at the time, which 

in our view could have caused Hilliard to be reasonably 

worried that events might get out of hand. This is especially 

true given the lateness of the hour and the unusual activity of 

the crowd, whose intentions he did not know. Under such 

circumstances it was not clearly unreasonable for Hilliard to 

take decisive action to subdue Oberwetter quickly and 

forcefully, thereby reducing the risk of interference or escape. 

Given that some force may have appeared reasonably 

necessary, Hilliard’s alleged actions were not markedly 

different from what we would expect in the course of a 

routine arrest. As in Wasserman, the fact that Hilliard did not 

cause Oberwetter any serious bodily injury tends to confirm 

that the use of force was not excessive. See also Wardlaw, 1 

F.3d at 1304 & n.7 (noting that while the absence of a severe 

injury “is not by itself the basis for deciding whether the force 

used was excessive, it does provide some indication” that the 

degree of force was reasonable). 

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In light of these considerations, we agree with the district 

court that Oberwetter’s complaint has failed to state a 

sufficient claim that Hilliard’s actions were beyond the pale 

of reasonableness as established by our case law. 

V 

The judgment of the district court is 

Affirmed.

USCA Case #10-5078 Document #1308285 Filed: 05/17/2011 Page 17 of 17