Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00380/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00380-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEVEN KLEIN, 

Petitioner,

v. 

NEIL MCDOWELL, warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 17cv00380 JAH-PCL 

ORDER ADOPTING THE 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION AND 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

INTRODUCTION

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Steven Klein’s First Amended Petition for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254. Respondent filed an answer 

and Petitioner filed a traverse. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1), the Honorable 

Peter C. Lewis, United States Magistrate Judge, submitted a Report and Recommendation 

(“Report”) to this Court recommending denial of the petition. Petitioner filed objections 

to the Report, and filed a supplemental petition with additional grounds for relief. After 

careful consideration of the pleadings and relevant exhibits submitted by the parties, and 

for the reasons set forth below, this Court OVERRULES the objections, ADOPTS Judge 

Lewis’s report, DENIES the petition in its entirety and DENIES a certificate of 

appealability. 

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BACKGROUND5

 On March 4, 2016, a jury convicted Petitioner of driving under the influence of 

alcohol in violation of California Vehicle Code section 23152(a) and driving while having 

a measurable blood alcohol of 0.08 or more, in violation California Vehicle Code section 

23152(a) and (b). Lodg. 2 at 168 (Doc. No. 21-1). Petitioner was sentenced to 6 years 

imprisonment. Id. at 142. 

 Petitioner appealed his conviction through a brief submitted pursuant to People v. 

Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979) and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), requesting 

the Court of Appeal to independently review the record and determine whether errors 

occurred requiring reversal. See Lodg. 8 (Doc. No. 21-11). While the appeal was pending, 

Petitioner, appearing pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the California 

Court of Appeal. See Lodg. 9 (Doc. No. 21-12). The California Court of Appeal affirmed 

the judgment, and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Lodgs. 10, 11 (Doc. 

Nos. 21-13, 21-14). Petitioner filed a petition for review which the California Supreme 

Court denied without opinion. See Lodgs. 12, 13 (Doc. Nos. 21-15, 21-16). 

 Petitioner original filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 23, 2017, 

and filed a First Amended Petition on March 23, 2017. He also filed a supplement to his 

amended petition provided transcripts and a brief filed pursuant to Wende and a copy of a 

case in support of his petition. Defendant filed an answer and Petitioner filed a traverse. 

 Judge Lewis filed a report recommending the Court deny the petition. Petitioner 

filed objections to the Report on December 1, 2017. On June 22, 2018, Petitioner filed a 

motion to amend his petition and a request for stay and abeyance. He filed a second request 

for stay and abeyance on January 30, 2018. On March 12, 2018, he filed a request for 

ruling on structural error, requested the Court mandate the authentication of the MVARS, 

                                               

5 The underlying facts set forth in the report are adopted in toto, and referenced as if fully 

set forth herein. This Court provides only a brief procedural background. 

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a request for leave to amend his petition and request for counsel. He later filed a motion 

for leave to file electronically, a motion for ruling on his motions and a motion to substitute 

the respondent. 

DISCUSSION

I. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

A. Legal Standard

 The district court’s role in reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district 

court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which 

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” Id. When no objections are filed, the 

Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and the district 

court is not required to conduct a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating 

that “de novo review of a R & R is only required when an objection is made”); United 

States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that 28 

U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(c) “makes it clear that the district judge must review the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not 

otherwise”). 

B. Analysis

 Petitioner asserts the following grounds for relief: (1) denial of due process caused 

by the prosecutor’s use of perjured testimony; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 

(3) denial of right to testify; (4) presentation of false testimony; (5) ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel; and (6) structural error. In his supplemental petition, he attaches 

transcripts which he believes demonstrates structural error, in support of ground six. 

Petitioner also asserts additional grounds for relief, (7) failure to preserve evidence and (8) 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

// 

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1. Ground 1 

 In ground 1, Petitioner contends the prosecutor allowed Officer Vidana to offer 

perjured testimony at the preliminary hearing, motion to suppress and at trial. He maintains 

the Mobile Video Audio Recording System (“MVARS”) proves Officer Vidana’s 

testimony was false. He further contends the prosecutor colluded with trial counsel to 

conceal the audio evidence of the MVARS when only the video portion was played at trial. 

Respondent argues the MVARS does not prove Officer Vidana’s testimony was false and 

provides a CD copy of both the video and audio of the MVARS. 

 The last reasoned decision, the state appellate court, determined Petitioner’s 

assertion that the officer testified falsely was unsupported by evidence and was insufficient 

to state a claim for habeas relief. 

 Judge Lewis reviewed both the audio and video of the MVARS showing the pursuit, 

stop and arrest of Petitioner provided by Respondent. Citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 

264 (1959), Judge Lewis determined the MVARS does not establish Vidana’s testimony 

was false. Additionally, Judge Lewis found there was no evidence to demonstrate trial 

counsel’s decision to present only the video portion of the videotape was anything other 

than a tactical decision, and the audio portions could only hurt Petitioner at trial. Judge 

Lewis determined the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s perjury and collusion claims was 

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court 

law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 Petitioner objects. He contends the MVARS was not authenticated, and it was 

actually a “Digitally Remastered Remix.” Objections at 3. He contends the file format 

reduced the size and quality of the MVARS, and thereby compromised evidence. Noting 

Respondent submitted the video without any information to authenticate it, this Court 

directed Respondent to respond to Petitioner’s objection or submit a declaration attesting 

to its authenticity. In response, Respondent explains current counsel did not lodge the 

video for the Court’s review, has no personal knowledge about how the video was obtained 

and cannot authenticate it. However, Respondent obtained a copy of the video admitted 

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during the trial which includes audio, although defense counsel chose not to play the audio 

during his cross-examination. Respondent attests to its authenticity and lodges a copy with 

the Court. The Court finds Petitioner’s allegations of the video being remixed are 

unsubstantiated and overrules his objection to the authenticity of the video. Additionally, 

Petitioner’s groundless allegation that the video was altered is insufficient to support the 

claims for knowingly offering perjured testimony or colluding to offer false testimony. 

The Court agrees that the video does not demonstrate the officer’s testimony was false, 

and, therefore, the Court adopts Judge Lewis’s findings and recommendation to deny this 

claim. 

2. Ground 2

 Petitioner asserts trial counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights by colluding to 

conceal evidence of the audio of the MVARS, failing to present expert witness testimony 

at trial and failing to renew a motion to suppress. Respondent contends counsel’s tactical 

decisions were reasonable. 

 The California Court of Appeal denied the claim upon determining Petitioner failed 

to submit evidence that the officer testified falsely, failed to present a declaration from an 

expert or any other evidence explaining what the expert testimony would have been or how 

it would have helped his case, and failed to show a renewed motion to suppress would be 

meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 

different absent the excludable evidence. 

 Relying on Strickland v. Washington, 4666 U.S. 668 (1984), Judge Lewis found 

counsel’s decision to not present audio does not constitute deficient performance or that 

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Judge Lewis similarly found counsel’s failure to call a defense expert did not constitute 

deficient performance and Petitioner failed to establish how the expert would have changed 

the outcome of the case. With regard to counsel’s failure to renew his motion to suppress, 

Judge Lewis found Petitioner did not establish he was prejudiced by the failure. Judge 

Lewis determined the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

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unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law nor based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 Petitioner objects and points to different portions of the record in support of his claim 

that counsel colluded to conceal evidence. However, upon review of the record, this Court 

finds these discussions between the trial court and the parties about the MVARS during the 

trial process do not demonstrate any attempt or agreement to conceal evidence or otherwise 

show counsel’s decision not to play the audio at trial was anything other than a tactical 

decision. As such, the Court agrees with Judge Lewis’s determination that the decision to 

not present audio does not constitute deficient performance. The Court also agrees with 

Judge Lewis’s determination that counsel’s failure to call a defense expert and failure to 

renew a motion to suppress did not constitute deficient performance, and Petitioner failed 

to establish the trial outcome would have been different had counsel done so. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s objections are overruled and the Court adopts Judge Lewis’s findings and 

denies this ground for relief. 

3. Ground 3

 In ground 3, Petitioner maintains he was denied his constitutional right to testify. 

He contends his attorney knew he wanted to testify but when he asked his attorney, the 

attorney responded it was too late. Respondent argues Petitioner made a conscious 

decision to not testify and, thereby, waived the right. 

 The California Court of Appeal determined Petitioner failed to state a prima facie 

case for denial of his right to testify because he does not allege he informed his counsel or 

the trial court of his desire to testify at any time before he was found guilty. 

 Judge Lewis found the record contained no evidence that Petitioner insisted on 

testifying, spoke to the court about his wish to testify or that he discharged his lawyer for 

refusing to permit him to testify and the record supported a conclusion Petitioner waived 

his right to testify. This Court agrees with Judge Lewis that the record supports the 

conclusion that Petitioner waived his right to testify and, therefore, the state court’s denial 

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of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

4. Ground 4

 In ground 4, Petitioner contends the prosecutor made a false statement in his closing 

argument about the expert’s testimony regarding the margin of error for the breathalyzer 

and trial counsel did not object. Respondent argues the prosecutor did not misquote the 

expert and his argument was grounded on the evidence. 

 The California Court of Appeal determined Petitioner failed to state a prima facie 

case for habeas relief because his unsupported assertion that numerous cases acknowledge 

the margin of error was insufficient to establish prejudicial error warranting vacating 

judgment. 

 Judge Lewis determined the record establishes the prosecutor’s statements correctly 

characterized the expert’s opinion. This Court agrees. Therefore, the state court’s denial 

of the claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

5. Ground 5

 Petitioner asserts, in ground 5, that appellate counsel was ineffective when he failed 

to secure and review audio and video evidence. Respondent contends Petitioner cannot 

overcome the presumption of correctness and demonstrate prejudice. 

 The California Court of Appeal determined Petitioner failed to state a prima facie 

claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because the claims he 

argues appellate counsel should have raised on appeal have no merit and the right to 

effective assistance of appellate counsel does not include the right to have counsel press 

frivolous or meritless arguments. 

 Relying on Strickland, Judge Lewis found Petitioner does not establish he was 

prejudiced by appellate counsel’s actions because he fails to demonstrate he would have 

prevailed on appeal had counsel obtained and reviewed the MVARS videotape. This Court 

agrees that Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim because he cannot establish 

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prejudice. Therefore, the states court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

6. Supplemental Grounds 

 Petitioner asserts three additional grounds not included in his amended petition: (a) 

structural error; (b) failure to preserve evidence, and (c) ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel for failing to challenge the structural error. 

 In a supplemental document entitled “Motion(s)” Petitioner provides the copy of a 

docket indicating he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme 

Court on November 30, 2017, which was denied on February 14, 2018. His petition 

includes the following claims: (1) for structural error based upon the trial court overruling 

defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the burden of proof, (2) 

collusion, evidence tampering, due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial 

misconduct, conspiracy and fraud based upon a failure to preserve evidence, and (3) 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failure to address structural error. 

Petitioner also attaches a copy of the California Supreme Court decision denying his 

petition on February 14, 2018, which reads: 

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 

750, 767-769 [courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that are successive].) 

Individual claims are denied, as applicable. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 

464, 474 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably 

available documentary evidence]; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [courts will 

not entertain habeas corpus claims that could have been, but were not, raised on 

appeal]; In re Miller (1941) 17 Cal.2d 734, 735 [courts will not entertain habeas 

corpus claims that are repetitive].). 

Doc. No. 31 at 22. 

a. Ground 6

 In ground 6, Petitioner requests the Court review the record and determine whether 

the state court proceedings offended Petitioner’s constitutional rights. In his supplemental 

petition, he contends “structural error” occurred which requires reversal of his conviction. 

He refers to appellant counsel’s Wende brief which asserts’ the trial court’s act of 

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overruling the defense objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument which misstated the 

law was error. Respondent argues Petitioner’s request for the Court to review the 

proceedings for error is without precedent. Respondent further argues Petitioner’s specific 

complaints are unexhausted and should be denied as meritless. In his traverse, Petitioner 

contends appellate counsel’s Wende brief identified structural error when the prosecution 

lowered its burden of proof. 

 Judge Lewis held the court cannot conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine this ground for relief. Judge Lewis also determined the new specific claims 

raised in ground 6 are unexhausted and meritless. Petitioner objects. He maintains neither 

Respondent nor Judge Lewis address the structural error claim. 

 Petitioner’s supplemental and subsequent filings clarify what he is asserting in this 

ground for relief and provide additional argument in support. He argues the trial court 

erred when it overruled trial counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument 

which, he maintains, improperly lowered the burden of proof. Specifically, he contends 

the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof when he stated the jury must consider all of 

the evidence together in deciding whether there was a reasonable doubt as to Petitioner’s 

guilt. 

 A defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct 

renders a trial fundamentally unfair. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 (1986). 

“[U]nder Darden, the first issue is whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and, if 

so, whether they infected the trial with unfairness.” Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

 Petitioner challenges the following statement made by the prosecutor during the 

rebuttal closing argument: 

You have to consider all of the evidence together, and then consider whether all of 

that evidence together points to a reasonable doubt, and if all of the evidence together 

does not point to a reasonable doubt, and only points to guilt, then you must reject 

the ones -- 

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RT 314:3 – 6, Lodg. 5 (Doc. No. 21-7). Petitioner argues the prosecutor’s statement 

lessened the burden of proof by suggesting the defendant must raise reasonable doubt as to 

all the evidence together. Immediately following the statement, defense counsel objected. 

After the court overruled defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor continued and 

explained: 

Again, the standard is you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any 

that are unreasonable. If a conclusion is unreasonable, you have to reject it. It’s not 

a standard of scientific certainty. It’s a standard of reasonable doubt. And it’s not a 

standard of beyond all possible doubt. You have to decide this case based on the 

evidence in this case, evidence, not speculation about what might have occurred or 

what’s possible. And the evidence in this case establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he’s guilty of both counts. 

RT 314:23 - 315:6. 

 The prosecutor was addressing an instruction explaining circumstantial evidence. 

Immediately prior to the challenged statement, the prosecutor read a portion of the 

instruction and stated: 

How it works is you take all of the evidence in this case, and then when you consider 

all of the evidence in this case, is there one reasonable conclusion or is there two 

reasonable conclusions? 

RT 314:3 – 6. 

 Defense counsel objected, which the court overruled and explained: 

Ladies and gentlemen, it is your interpretation of the instructions and your 

interpretation of the evidence that is of paramount importance.

RT 314:10-12. 

 This Court finds, in context, the statement did not mislead the jury as to the burden 

of proof. The court’s instruction on circumstantial evidence permits either party to draw 

reasonable inferences from the evidence, and reasonable inferences from the totality of the 

evidence may support any or all elements of a criminal act. The trial court instructed the 

jury on the standard of reasonable doubt, and what is evidence. The court also explained 

that the closing arguments were not evidence and if either attorney’s comments conflicted 

with the instructions, they were to follow the written instructions. The trial court’s 

instructions and both counsels’ closing arguments conveyed to the jury that they were 

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required to find the prosecutor proved each element of the charges beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

 Even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, in light of the instructions given 

by the trial court, there is nothing to indicate the jury followed the statements by the 

prosecutor rather than the instructions provided by the court. Accordingly, Petitioner is 

not entitled to relief as to this claim. 

b. Failure to Preserve Evidence

 In his seventh ground for relief, Petitioner asserts the prosecution and his trial 

counsel conspired to deprive him due process by concealing evidence material to his 

defense, namely the audio portion of the MVARS. He, again, claims the MVARS was 

altered. 

 Petitioner claims that the MVARs was somehow altered are unsubstantiated and 

unsupported by the evidence, including the recent authentication provided by Respondent. 

Additionally, the record does not support Petitioner’s allegations of a conspiracy to conceal 

evidence. As explained above, the discussions between the trial court and the parties about 

the MVARS during the trial process do not demonstrate any attempt or agreement to 

conceal evidence or otherwise show counsel’s decision not to play the audio at trial was 

anything other than a tactical decision. As such, this claim is without merit. 

c. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel 

 Petitioner contends trial and appellate counsel failed to challenge structural error that 

resulted in a deficient standard of proof. Specifically, he contends trial counsel failed to 

seek a writ of mandate prior to sentencing based upon the deficient standard of proof used 

to obtain his conviction. He further contends appellate counsel failed to file a merits brief 

on appeal and, instead, “buried” a structural error argument within a Wende brief which 

declared no arguable issue could be found. This Court has determined in section I.B.6.b. 

Petitioner’s claims of structural error are without merit. As such, counsels’ purported 

failure to challenge the conviction based upon structural error was not deficient. 

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 Petitioner also argues both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to 

preserve the MVARS evidence and moving for sanctions. This claim is supported by 

Petitioner’s assertion that the MVARS is altered which are unsubstantiated and groundless. 

 As such, Petitioner fails to establish counsels’ failure to challenge his conviction 

based upon structural error and failure to preserve evidence constitutes deficient 

performance. He also fails to show there is a reasonable probability the results would have 

been different. Therefore, his claim is denied. 

7. Evidentiary Hearing

 The Court agrees with Judge Lewis’ determination that Petitioner is not entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing based upon the fact he is not entitled to habeas relief. 

II. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. section 2254, which was 

amended effective December 1, 2009, a district court now “must issue or deny a certificate 

of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A state prisoner may 

not appeal the denial of a section 2254 habeas petition unless he obtains a certificate of 

appealability from a district or circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see also United 

States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts retain 

authority to issue certificates of appealability under AEDPA). A certificate of appealability 

is authorized “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold showing, petitioner 

must show: (1) the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, (2) a court could resolve 

the issues in a different manner, or (3) the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). 

The Court finds no issues are debatable among jurists of reason. This Court further 

finds no issues could be resolved in a different manner. Lastly, this Court finds no 

questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, this 

Court DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Petitioner’s motion to substitute respondent is GRANTED IN PART. 

 Neil McDowell is substituted in as respondent. 

 2. Petitioner’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

 recommendations are OVERRULED.

 3. The Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is ADOPTED.

 4. The petition is DENIED in its entirety. 

 5. Petitioner’s remaining motions are DENIED as moot. 

6. Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability.

DATED: November 16, 2018 

 

 _________________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

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