Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05875/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05875-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1961 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS ALBIZU, ) 

 )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

CLYDE A. STROHL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1: 02-CV-05875-AWI-SMS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF HENRY D.

NUNEZ TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR

DEFENDANTS WESLEY A. AMUNDSON AND

AMUNDSON & ASSOCIATES (DOCS. 120-

122)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

UPDATE THE DOCKET TO REFLECT

DEFENDANT WESLEY E. AMUNDSON’S

AND AMUNDSON & ASSOCIATE’S PRO SE

STATUS, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE

NUMBER

ORDER NOTIFYING THE PARTIES OF

SETTING HEARING ON PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Doc.

87) AGAINST DEFENDANTS AMUNDSON

FOR OCTOBER 14, 2005, AT 9:30

A.M., COURTROOM 4

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief:

Due September 9, 2005;

Defendants’ Brief: September 23,

2005;

Plaintiff’s Reply Brief: October

7, 2005

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

Case 1:02-cv-05875-AWI -SMS Document 130 Filed 08/24/05 Page 1 of 6
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The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302(c)(1) and 72-303.

The motion of Henry D. Nunez to withdraw as attorney of

record for Defendants Wesley A. Amundson and Amundson &

Associates (Defendants Amundson) came on regularly for hearing on

August 22, 2005, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 4 before the Honorable

Sandra M. Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Stephen Paul

Drobny appeared on behalf of Plaintiff; Henry D. Nunez appeared

telephonically on behalf of Defendants. Mr. Nunez represented

that he would file with the Court a substitution of attorneys

form that had been signed by Mr. Amundson. After argument the

matter was submitted to the Court.

I. Background

Plaintiff is proceeding with an action for damages against

Defendants Amundson. Henry D. Nunez, counsel for Defendants

Amundson, filed his motion and notice of motion to withdraw as

attorney of record, including a supporting memorandum and

declaration, on July 27, 2005; a proof of service recites that

the motion was served on Plaintiff and Defendant Amundson;

Defendant Amundson was served at an address that Mr. Nunez stated

in a declaration made under penalty of perjury was Defendants’

last known address; further, Nunez contacted Defendants by

telephone.

The grounds of the motion are a conflict of interest. (Decl.

at 2.)

II. Analysis

Local Rule 83-182(d) provides that an attorney who has

appeared may not withdraw leaving the client in propria persona

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 The motion is granted without regard to Defendant Amundson’s having executed a form consenting to the

substitution of himself for Mr. Nunez. 

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without leave of Court upon noticed motion and notice to the

client and all other parties who have appeared. Further, it

requires that the attorney provide an affidavit stating the

current or last known address or addresses of the client and the

efforts made to notify the client of the motion to withdraw.

Here, the required notification has been established. It further

appears from the representations of counsel at the hearing that

there was no opposition to the motion.

Local Rule 83-182 further states that withdrawal of the

attorney is governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct of the

State Bar of California, and that the attorney shall conform to

the requirements of those Rules. Rule 3-700(C)(2) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct permits withdrawal if the continued

employment is likely to result in a violation of the rules or of

the State Bar Act. Rule 3-700(B) requires withdrawal if the

member knows or should know that continued employment will result

in violation of the rules or of the State Bar Act. Rule 3-310

prohibits representation except under stated circumstances of

more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the

clients potentially or actually conflict.

Good cause having been shown, and in view of the lack of

opposition to the motion, the motion of Henry D. Nunez to

withdraw as counsel for Defendants Wesley A. Amundson and

Amundson & Associates IS GRANTED.1

II. Updating the Docket

Because the withdrawal of counsel results in Defendants

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Amundson’s proceeding pro se in this action, the Clerk of Court

IS DIRECTED TO UPDATE the docket to reflect the pro se status of

Defendants Wesley A. Amundson and Amundson & Associates; the last

known address is 7030 Monza Place, Alta Loma, California 91701;

the telephone is (909) 941-1000.

The Clerk SHALL NOTE that Mr. Nunez continues to serve as

counsel for Defendants Clyde A. Strohl and Strohl’s Financial

Services.

III. Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, filed on January 7,

2005, IS SET FOR HEARING on Friday, October 14, 2005, at 9:30

a.m. in the Courtroom of the undersigned Magistrate Judge,

Courtroom number 4.

IV. Briefing Schedule

Plaintiffs SHALL FILE no later than September 9, 2005, a

supplemental brief, containing points and authorities and

analysis, addressing whether or not it is appropriate to enter

default judgment against one defendant in a fraud action under

the circumstances present in the instant case when the action

remains pending against another defendant who is subject to a

stipulated stay by virtue of the pendency of criminal

proceedings, or whether the possibility of inconsistent judgments

or other considerations of fairness render the entry of default

judgment inappropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Frow v. La

Vega, 15 Wall. 552, 554-55 (1872); In re First T.D. & Investment,

Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2001); Shanghai Automation

Instrument Co. Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005-10 (N.D.Cal.

2001).

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 Although liability is not established merely by the default, if the Court does desire to hold a hearing to

establish facts concerning liability, notice must be given to Plaintiff in advance to that Plaintiff has an opportunity to

present evidence. Pacheco v. Rolon Morales, 953 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1992)

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The Court acknowledges that the scope of a defaulting

defendant’s participation in a motion for default judgment is

quite limited. A default judgment generally bars the defaulting

party from disputing the facts alleged in the complaint because

averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is

required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are

admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (authorizing a hearing to

determine the amount of damages, to establish the truth of any

averment by evidence, or to investigate any other matter); Alan

Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th

Cir. 1988). A party’s default does not admit the legal

sufficiency of the allegations of the pleadings, however; the

sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint, read as a whole

with a view towards the liberal system of notice pleading

provided for by Rule 8, must be considered. Black v. Lane, 22

F.3d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1994); Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386,

1388-89 (9th Cir. 1978).2 The Court is bound to consider whether

the plaintiff’s well pleaded allegations of fact are sufficient

to state a claim for relief. See Weft, Inc. v. G.C. Investment

Associates, 630 F.Supp. 1138, 1143 (D.C.N.C. 1986). Further,

notice is required, and a hearing on the amount of unliquidated

or certain damages may be required. See Davis v. Fendler, 650

F.2d 1154, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding the right to hearing

waived where after notice the defendant expressed no objection to

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the evidence of damages).

The Court by way of this order gives notice to Defendants

Amundson of the hearing on the motion for default judgment and

the setting of damages as well as the opportunity to brief any

matters within the scope of appropriate participation by

Defendants. The Court notes that it has already received the

input of Defendants Amundson submitted by former counsel Henry

Nunez on March 18 and 21, 2005 (Docs. 92, 95, 96), constituting

opposition to the motion for default judgment. The remainder of

the documents submitted by Mr. Nunez on behalf of Defendants

Amundson related to the motion to set aside the default, which

has been denied. In view of the resetting of the motion for

default judgment and the withdrawal of Defendants’ counsel, an

opportunity for further submissions is appropriate. Accordingly,

any input by Defendants MAY BE FILED no later than September 23,

2005. 

Plaintiff may file any reply no later than October 7, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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