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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 23, 2006 Decided March 31, 2006

No. 04-5343

ROBERT LUIZ MARTINEZ A/K/A BERK,

APPELLANT

v.

BUREAU OF PRISONS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv00735)

Crystal R. Brown, Student Counsel, argued the cause as

amicus curiae in support of appellant. With her on the briefs

were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, and Lucas R.

Moskowitz, Student Counsel.

Robert L. Martinez, pro se, was on the brief for appellant.

W. Mark Nebeker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

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Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS, Circuit

Judge, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Appellant Robert Luiz Martinez, a federal

prisoner assisted by amicus, seeks the correction of three

presentence reports (“PSRs”) that were prepared by the United

States Probation Office (“USPO”) and remain in his files

maintained by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and the

United States Parole Commission (“USPC”). Appellant alleges

that during his criminal prosecution in 1983, a federal district

court in New York ordered certain information struck from his

PSR, and he attaches a relevant excerpt of a court transcript. He

also seeks a copy of a PSR in the BOP files, which amicus states

appellant would keep in his cell. Appellant further alleges that

the PSRs have been used to his detriment by the BOP in making

prisoner security and programmatic decisions and by the USPC

in determinating his eligibility for parole. In addition, appellant

seeks other corrections to his BOP records that refer to events he

alleges did not occur as well as copies of certain documents in

his New York case and recalculation of drug amounts in the

New York case. Appellant seeks relief, including money

damages, under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5

U.S.C. § 552, the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 

The district court dismissed certain defendants named in

appellant’s pro se complaint and construed the complaint to

raise claims only under the Privacy Act and FOIA. See Order of

June 17, 2004. Subsequently, the district court granted the

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Government’s motion to dismiss the complaint. See Order of

August 25, 2004. Appellant appeals.

I.

The Government challenges this court’s jurisdiction on two

grounds. Neither ground has merit. 

First, the pro se notice of appeal does not identify this court

as the court in which the appeal is to be filed. See Federal Rule

of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(C). However, appellant’s

intention to appeal to this court can be inferred. See Anderson

v. District of Columbia, 72 F.3d 166, 167-69 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

The notice of appeal was filed in the district court for the

District of Columbia, whose final orders can be appealed to this

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In fact, appellant’s appeal from

the dismissal of his complaint can only be filed in this court.

Contrary to the Government’s position, the Tucker Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1491 (2005), is inapplicable to appellant’s claims.

Claims brought under statutes, such as the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(g)(5), that independently confer jurisdiction upon the

district court and waive sovereign immunity for money claims

against the United States are not deemed to be “based on” the

Tucker Act for the purposes of determining appellate

jurisdiction. See Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 1070-

71 (D.C. Cir. 1985); cf. Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, 959 F.2d

307, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694,

699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). Neither FOIA nor the Due

Process Clause provides a substantive right to compensation

from the United States, which would be necessary to support a

claim under the Tucker Act. See United States v. Mitchell, 463

U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983); see also Van Drasek, 762 F.2d at 1070.

Because the Tucker Act does not apply, appellant could not file

his appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2). 

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Second, the pro se notice of appeal mentioned only the

August 25, 2005 Order dismissing the complaint. Nonetheless,

under either of two approaches, this court has jurisdiction to

review the interlocutory June 17, 2003 Order dismissing all

defendants except the BOP and construing the complaint to raise

claims under the Privacy Act and FOIA. By appealing from the

final appealable order of August 25, 2005 dismissing the

complaint, appellant has brought before this court the

interlocutory June 17, 2003 Order. See, e.g., Ciralsky v. CIA,

355 F.3d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Alternatively, appellant’s

intention to appeal from both rulings of the district court can be

fairly inferred from his notice of appeal and no appellee is

prejudiced. See 16A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE,JURISDICTION § 3949.4 (3d ed. 1999). The notice

of appeal stated it was “a NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR CIVIL

ACTION NO. 03-0735,” i.e., a notice of an appeal of the entire

case. Although the notice listed only the dismissal order dated

August 25, 2004, appellant was proceeding pro se and that was

the only order designated by the district court as a final

appealable order. See Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286

F.3d 576, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002); cf. Warren v. District of

Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Kalka v. Hawk,

215 F.3d 90, 94 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On appeal, the dismissed

parties and the USPC are represented by the United States

Attorney, who has presented their arguments and shown no

evidence that the dismissed parties would be prejudiced if

appellant’s challenges to the June 17, 2004 order were addressed

by this court. Cf. Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d

366, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Brookens v. White, 795 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per

curiam), on which the Government relies to argue that only the

Order of August 25, 2005 is properly before the court, is

inapposite. In Brookens, the district court had granted summary

judgment in two instances, against different parties. See id. at

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179. Although this court had jurisdiction over both final

judgments, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over one

of the final judgments on the prudential ground that parties to

that order would be prejudiced. See id. at 180 (citing J. MOORE

& B. WARD, MOORES’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 203.18 (2d ed.

1985) (footnotes omitted)); see also Appeal of District of

Columbia Nurses’ Ass’n, 854 F.2d 1448, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

No such prejudice threatens here. The district court dismissed

the individuals who were named as defendants in the complaint

before the service of process. See Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321 (2005); 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b), (e)(2). The USPC was not named in the

complaint as a defendant. Hence, the individuals and the USPC

were never parties in the district court. 

The Government also maintains that the individual

defendants and the Government itself suffered prejudice by

virtue of the fact that they were not afforded the opportunity to

argue before the district court that an appeal would not have

been taken in good faith. The Government speculates that the

district court could have concluded that appellant’s appeal, to

the extent it included the June 17, 2003 Order, was not taken in

good faith and thus would have denied appellant leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). The

only statutory requirement to proceed in forma pauperis is good

faith and does not require that the underlying claim be

meritorious. See Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 674

(1958) (per curiam). The district court did not rule that the

complaint was frivolous, and on appeal the Government fails to

point to any basis for concluding that the district court lacked an

adequate opportunity to consider whether the appeal was taken

in good faith. Cf. United States v. Godines, 433 F.3d 68, 71

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 

II.

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Appellant contends that the district court erred in dismissing

all named defendants except the BOP, in construing the

complaint to raise claims only under the Privacy Act and FOIA,

and in denying relief. For the following reasons, we disagree.

First, the district court properly dismissed the named

individual defendants because no cause of action exists that

would entitle appellant to relief from them under the Privacy Act

or FOIA. See Deters v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 85 F.3d 655, 657

(D.C. Cir. 1996); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (authorizing suit

against an “agency”) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (same); see also

Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 1987). Both

statutes concern the obligations of agencies as distinct from

individual employees in those agencies. 

Second, the district court properly dismissed USPC as a

defendant because the allegations in the complaint could not

sustain the finding of willfulness necessary to prevail under the

Privacy Act. See Deters, 85 F.3d at 657. Contrary to

appellant’s implicit assumption, the excerpt from the transcript

attached to his complaint does not show that a court had ordered

the USPC to delete data from its records. Hence, he cannot

show a violation of a court order, which could establish

willfulness. See id.

Third, the district court properly dismissed appellant’s

claims against the BOP. The BOP has exempted its Inmate

Central Record System from the accuracy provisions of the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). See 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j).

Appellant does not challenge the BOP’s authority to exempt its

records, and the BOP did not expressly waive the exemption.

Even if it had waived the exemption, the record shows that the

BOP provided a reasonable explanation for its refusal to correct

its records as appellant requested. The BOP contacted the USPC

and the USPO and was advised that the BOP’s records regarding

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appellant were accurate. The excerpt from the transcript

attached to his complaint does not show that a court had ordered

the BOP to delete certain data from its records. 

Fourth, the district court properly dismissed appellant’s

claims under FOIA. In Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920

F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court held that the National

Archives and Records Administration had fulfilled its FOIA

obligation when it provided records for Oglesby’s review in its

public reading room. See id. at 70. The court reasoned that an

agency “‘need not respond to a FOIA request for copies of

documents where the agency itself has provided an alternative

form of access,’” Id. at 70 (quoting Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t

of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1988), affirmed, 492

U.S. 136 (1989)). The record shows that appellant was afforded

a meaningful opportunity to review his PSRs and to take notes

on them. Indeed, he does not dispute this. Hence, FOIA does

not entitle him to have copies of his PSRs. Moreover, the BOP

Program Statement 1351.05 p.15, available at

http://www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsPolicyLoc, which

sets forth reasons, based on concerns about inmate safety, for

prohibiting inmates from keeping copies of their PSRs in their

cells and reflects a judgment regarding prison administration

that a court would be loath to second-guess. See Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,

405 (1974). 

Finally, the district court did not err in construing the

complaint as raising claims only under the Privacy Act and

FOIA because the complaint alleges no viable Due Process

claims. See Alicke v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 111 F.3d 909, 912

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Although appellant mentions “due process”

three times in his complaint, claiming that due process affords

him the right to a hearing, he does not allege that any defendant

violated his due process rights by failing to correct the three

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PSRs in the manner he requests or by relying on them when

making status, programmatic, and penal determinations. 

Amicus concedes that appellant’s due process claims do not

allege violation of a court order but nonetheless maintains that

the BOP and the USPC “should be under an obligation to note

the nature of [appellant’s] challenges to the inaccuracies

contained [in his records], similar to the process he would have

been entitled to under the Privacy Act.” Amicus Br. at 56.

Amicus cites no authority for the proposition that the failure to

correct the alleged record inaccuracies rises to the level of a due

process violation where the BOP has made reasonable inquiries

and received confirmation of the accuracy of its records; hence,

amicus’s reliance on Doe, 821 F.2d at 701, is misplaced. The

complaint does not show that USPC or its officers had been

ordered by a federal district court to correct their records and,

thus, appellant cannot rely on violation of a court order as the

basis for a due process claim. For similar reasons, amicus’s

reliance on Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651

(D.C. Cir. 2001), is misplaced as appellant alleges no facts that

would constitute a substantive due process violation but at most

only negligence in record keeping. Additionally, the allegations

in the complaint and the attached excerpt from a transcript

provide no basis for the award of injunctive relief under Bell v.

Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment dismissing the

complaint.

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