Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_98-cv-02444/USCOURTS-cand-3_98-cv-02444-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID J. CARPENTER,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT L. AYERS, Jr., Acting Warden

of California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

NO. C 98-2444 MMC 

 C-00-3706 MMC

 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

 MOTION TO TERMINATE SUA SPONTE

 INQUIRY INTO PETITIONER’S

 CURRENT COMPETENCY; GRANTING

 IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 

 

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Introduction

Petitioner is a California prisoner who was sentenced to death in two separate proceedings.

Carpenter I (C 98-2444) arises from petitioner’s conviction and death sentence for the first degree

murders of Ellen Hansen and Heather Scaggs, the attempted murder of Steven Haertle, the attempted

rape of Hansen, and the rape of Scaggs. See People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th 312 (1997). In

Carpenter II (C00-3706), petitioner was separately convicted and sentenced to death for murdering

five people in Marin County and raping or attempting to rape three of them. See People v.

Carpenter, 21 Cal.4th 1016 (1999). In both capital habeas petitions, petitioner includes a claim that

he is currently incompetent. 

Case 3:98-cv-02444-MMC Document 176 Filed 06/19/08 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The March 31 Order was issued by United States District Judge Martin J. Jenkins.

2

The Ninth Circuit has held that capital habeas petitioners have a statutory right to

competence during their federal habeas proceedings. Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d

803, 817, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1069 (2003). In addition, under certain circumstances, incompetent

habeas petitioners are entitled to a stay of habeas proceedings. Id. at 819. Because petitioner’s

claim of incompetency potentially impacts the Court’s ability to proceed with his capital habeas

cases, the Court issued an order on March 31, 2008 that petitioner’s competency be determined in a

timely matter (hereafter, “March 31 Order”).1

 On April 28, 2008, petitioner filed a “Motion to

Terminate Sua Sponte Inquiry into Petitioner’s Current Competency” (hereafter, “Motion to

Terminate”). Petitioner also requests therein that, should the competency inquiry go forward, a

protective order be issued. Respondent has opposed petitioner’s motion and his request for a

protective order. 

For the following reasons, petitioner’s motion to terminate the competency inquiry is

DENIED, and petitioner’s motion for a protective order is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Legal Standard

A prisoner “has a statutory right to competence in his federal habeas proceedings. . . .” 

Rohan, id. at 817. For purposes of determining competence in the federal habeas context, the

“relevant question” is “whether [the petitioner] now has the capacity to understand his position and

to communicate rationally with counsel.” Id. at 819. “[W]here an incompetent capital habeas

petitioner raises claims that could benefit from his ability to communicate rationally, refusing to stay

proceedings pending restoration of competence denies him his statutory right to assistance of

counsel, whether or not counsel can identify with precision the information sought.” Id. 

Accordingly, in such a situation, federal habeas proceedings “must be stayed until [the petitioner] is

competent.” Id.

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United States District Court

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3

Analysis

I. Petitioner’s Motion

At the outset, the Court must address the specific relief sought by petitioner’s motion. As

noted, petitioner characterizes the instant filing as a “Motion to Terminate” the competency inquiry. 

As respondent correctly points out, however, petitioner does not cite to the authority under which he

seeks such relief. The Court’s March 31 Order regarding competency proceedings was not a final

judgment or order, and thus may not be challenged under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60. 

See, e.g., Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (N.D.Cal. 2003). 

Consequently, petitioner is, in essence, moving the Court to reconsider its earlier order. 

Pursuant to the Civil Local Rules of this District, “[n]o party may notice a motion for

reconsideration without first obtaining leave of Court to file the motion.” See Civil L.R. 7-9(a). 

Petitioner, however, did not file for leave of Court before noticing his motion.

Moreover, in bringing a motion for leave, the movant is required to show:

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists

from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for

which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of

reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or

law at the time of the interlocutory order; or

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time

of such order; or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. 

See Civil L.R. 7-9(b).

As discussed below, petitioner, in his Motion to Terminate, has not demonstrated any of the

above circumstances exist. Nevertheless, despite petitioner’s non-compliance with the applicable

Local Rules, the Court, rather than denying the motion on procedural grounds, will consider the

motion on its merits.

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2 In his moving papers, petitioner suggests that Judge Jenkins did not have jurisdiction to

enter the above-referenced March 31 Order. As respondent correctly points out, however,

jurisdiction over this matter is proper in the Northern District of California, and Judge Jenkins, the

judge assigned to both of the cases prior to their reassignment to the undersigned, was a judge of the

Northern District at the time the order in question was issued. Petitioner has conceded in his reply

that Judge Jenkins had jurisdiction to issue the March 31 Order. 

3

 Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner, while objecting to a competency evaluation

at this time, has not withdrawn from his petitions any of his allegations that he is currently

incompetent. 

4

II. Sua Sponte Inquiry Into Petitioner’s Competency

Petitioner objects to the Court’s sua sponte decision to conduct an inquiry into petitioner’s

competence.2 He argues both that there is no basis for the Court’s conclusion that a competency 

evaluation is presently appropriate, and that the Court did not have authority to order a competency

evaluation.

A. Basis for Examination

Petitioner argues that no legal basis for a competency evaluation exists at this time. The

Court disagrees. To begin with, petitioner alleges in both of his cases that he is currently

incompetent. Such allegations standing alone, however, did not precipitate the Court's decision to

conduct a competency evaluation at this time. Rather, the Court considered other factors as well. In

that regard, the Court first notes that both of the instant petitions contain claims of petitioner’s

incompetency at the time of trial and ineffective assistance of counsel, claims that the Ninth Circuit

has indicated cannot be litigated if a habeas petitioner is incompetent. See Rohan, 334 F.3d at 818. 

Additionally, petitioner’s counsel have reiterated that petitioner has long-standing mental health

issues; such issues, in conjunction with petitioner’s claims,3 trigger a competency evaluation. In

particular, petitioner’s counsel have continuously maintained that he is mentally ill and that his

mental illness causes him to behave erratically and irrationally. See, e.g., C-00-3706, First Amended

Petition, at ¶¶ 337-71, 386-416, 847-911. Furthermore, they point out that petitioner has a long

history of psychiatric illness, having first been committed to a mental institution sixty years ago. Id.

at 770-75.

Finally, the only expert opinion presently before the Court suggests that petitioner currently

is incompetent. David V. Foster, M.D., a psychiatrist, was asked by petitioner’s counsel to

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4 Dr. Foster’s declaration was submitted prior to the Rohan decision, and thus the Court did

not order a competency evaluation at that time.

5

determine petitioner’s mental status, and offered, inter alia, the following opinion: “[Petitioner’s]

delusional 

thinking, coupled with his manic behavior and memory impairments and other organic mental

deficits, strongly contributed to his inability to cooperate with counsel during trial, and makes it

difficult for [petitioner] to work with his current counsel now.” Foster Decl. at ¶ 20. While Dr.

Foster’s examination of petitioner was conducted six years ago, it is the most recent expert opinion

before the Court, and has not been countered by any other or more recent expert opinion.4

 

B. Sua Sponte Inquiry

As petitioner repeatedly points out, the Court did not order a competency evaluation at the

request of petitioner; petitioner suggests that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district

court would be permitted to order a competency evaluation only upon noticed motion by the

petitioner. Petitioner cites no case in support of this position, however, and, perhaps recognizing the

Court’s plenary power on habeas corpus and under the All Writs Act, see 28 U.S.C. section 1651,

appears to have withdrawn this argument in his reply. See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,

292 (1969) (observing that “the language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this

Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary”) (citations

omitted). As discussed below, the totality of the circumstances in the particular petitions before the

Court compels a competency inquiry at this time, irrespective of petitioner’s objection thereto.

At the outset, the Court recognizes that the views of petitioner’s counsel are relevant to a

competency inquiry; they are not, however, conclusive. “It is true that defense counsel will often

have the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense. But counsel is

not a trained mental health professional, and his failure to raise petitioner’s competence does not

establish that petitioner [is] competent.” See Odle v. Woodford, 228 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations and citations omitted) (holding state trial judge erred by not conducting sua

sponte inquiry into petitioner’s competency). While Odle was decided before Rohan and does not

directly address competence in the habeas context, it makes clear that competency inquiries are not

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5

 Petitioner points out that the Court had stated earlier that briefing of record-based claims

was likely to be the next step in the litigation. As petitioner is aware, however, the Court is

permitted to manage cases in the manner that it deems to be most fair and efficient. Given all of the

factors described above, the Court has determined that an examination of petitioner’s competency at

this juncture of the litigation is appropriate. 

6

exclusively triggered by defense counsel. 

In addition, at least one district court case, indeed one upon which petitioner relies, has

involved an inquiry into the petitioner’s competency over the objection of counsel for the petitioner. 

In Ruiz v. Woodford, CV 89-4126 FMC (C.D.Cal.), the district court found that, based on the

evidence before it, it had a “sua sponte duty . . . to inquire into [the] petitioner’s current

competency.” Ruiz v. Woodford, No. CV 89-4126 FMC (C.D. Cal), Order Denying Motion For A

Stay Of Federal Habeas Proceedings As To Claim A at 2, n.2, citing Order re Motion to Stay, dated

August 10, 2006, Docket No. 245. 

To the extent petitioner is contending the instant sua sponte competency evaluation sets a

precedent that all petitioners raising competency claims in their habeas petitions will be subject to

sua sponte evaluations, the Court is unpersuaded. As the Court’s March 31 Order and this order

make clear, the competency inquiry herein was not triggered solely by the allegations in the petition

but by the totality of the circumstances before the Court. In short, and as petitioner aptly notes,

“[n]o two cases will be the same.” (See Pet.’s Reply at 5:8.)5

In sum, because Rohan has suggested that the error of conducting an entire habeas

proceeding while the petitioner is incompetent could be “structural and thus fatal even if the

government could prove absence of prejudice post hoc,” Rohan, 334 F.3d at 818, and has confirmed

that 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(b) “incorporate[s] a statutory right to competence,” id. at 814, and given

petitioner’s allegations of current incompetence, his extensive history of mental health issues, and

the opinion of his most recent mental health examiner, the Court will require a competency

evaluation at this time. The Court further observes that petitioner will not be prejudiced by such

evaluation and that the Court intends petitioner receive “a legitimate competency inquiry in which

protection of [petitioner’s] rights and interests is the sole focus of the proceeding.” See Pet.’s

Motion at 10. 

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7

III. Timing of Competency Inquiry

Petitioner maintains that a competency evaluation at this time would be premature for an

additional reason. Specifically, petitioner argues that the inquiry under Rohan is “claim-specific,”

and that examining petitioner’s competency now, without focusing on specific claims, would not be

productive.

In Rohan, as noted, the Ninth Circuit stated that “where an incompetent capital habeas

petitioner raises claims that could benefit from his ability to communicate rationally, refusing to stay

proceedings pending restoration of competence denies him his statutory right to assistance of

counsel, whether or not counsel can identify with precision the information sought.” Rohan, 334

F.3d at 819. Nowhere in Rohan does the Ninth Circuit suggest it is preferable that a particular claim

be the subject of active litigation before the issue of a petitioner’s competency should be addressed. 

The Rohan court also confirmed that claims alleging the petitioner was incompetent to stand

trial or that trial counsel was ineffective could not be properly litigated if the petitioner was

presently incompetent. Id. at 818. Here, as noted, Carpenter raises both such claims in each of his

pending capital habeas cases. When coupled with his claim that he is currently incompetent, the

inclusion in the petition of claims of petitioner’s incompetency at trial and ineffective assistance of

trial counsel compel an inquiry into his competence. 

Moreover, it is not clear that the inquiry contemplated by Rohan is as claim-specific or

otherwise related to the sequencing of claims as petitioner suggests. In particular, the Rohan court

did not state, as petitioner seems to imply, that litigation of certain claims ought to be concluded

prior to a competency evaluation, if those claims do not depend on information counsel receives

from the client. Moreover, the Rohan court did not hold that it would be appropriate for a district

court to address such claims despite the petitioner’s incompetence. Rather, the Ninth Circuit

explicitly left the question open, stating:

Rohan does not seek to proceed with some claims while staying others, so we need

not address the appropriate procedure in such situations. Although some state

decisions have held that purely record-based or non-factual claims should proceed

notwithstanding the petitioner’s incompetence, see Carter, 706 So.2d at 879; Debra

A.E., 523 N.W.2d at 735, we see little point in compelling Rohan to pursue them. 

The State’s interests are prejudiced as much by a stay of all claims as by a stay of

some, as the execution cannot proceed until all claims are resolved. 

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6 In Ruiz, the district court stated: “The Court did not determine whether Respondent has

standing to raise the issue of Petitioner’s current competency. The Court concluded that, regardless

of whether Respondent has standing, the Court has a sua sponte duty based on the evidence to

inquire into Petitioner’s current competency.” Ruiz v. Woodford, No. CV 89-4126 FMC, Order

Denying Motion For A Stay Of Federal Habeas Proceedings As To Claim A at 2, n.2, citing Order

re Motion to Stay, dated August 10, 2006, Docket No. 245. 

8

334 F.3d at 819, n.11. 

Petitioner’s reliance on Ruiz v. Woodford, No. CV 89-4126 FMC (C.D. Cal) likewise is

misplaced. In Ruiz, the respondent moved, over the petitioner’s objection, for a stay pending a

competency examination.6

 After concluding that the petitioner was incompetent, the district court

entered a stay. Subsequently, the district court lifted the stay as to one claim, allowing it to go

forward, but continued the stay as to the petitioner’s other outstanding claims. See Ruiz v.

Woodford, No. CV 89-4126 FMC, Order Denying Motion For A Stay Of Federal Habeas

Proceedings As To Claim A at 12. 

Ruiz does not assist petitioner in his claim that a competency evaluation is not appropriate at

this juncture. Rather, Ruiz is consistent with this Court’s determination that a competency

evaluation is required before a claim-specific evaluation. In Ruiz, petitioner’s competency was

examined and a stay entered prior to the district court’s engaging in a claim-by-claim analysis. 

Furthermore, before deciding to lift the stay as to the one claim, the district court found such claim

was fully developed and required no further information from petitioner. Id. at 12. 

In sum, the Court finds that even if petitioner is correct that a claim-by-claim inquiry is

appropriate, such inquiry is appropriate at the time a district court determines whether, in the case of

an incompetent petitioner, it should stay a particular claim or allow it to proceed. In other words,

conducting such inquiry does not imply that a court must defer any competency evaluation until a

particular claim is being actively litigated. Rather, as Rohan and Ruiz suggest, once specific

allegations of current incompetence, when combined with certain claims such as, but not limited to,

ineffective assistance of counsel or competency during trial, trigger a competency inquiry, the

Court’s next step is to determine the petitioner’s competency, and once the competency evaluation is

concluded, the Court will be in a position to determine how best to proceed with the claims. 

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IV. Protective Order

The Court agrees with petitioner that he is entitled to a protective order in connection with

the competency inquiry. See, e.g. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465, 468 (1981) (finding Fifth

Amendment violated where statements made to psychiatrist during competency evaluation used

against defendant at capital sentencing proceeding); Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 726-28 (9th

Cir. 2003) (providing examples of protective orders issued in various types of cases). The Court

declines, however, to enter a specific protective order at this time. 

The Court will address this issue further in conjunction with its future order detailing the

procedures for the competency evaluation. Once an order regarding the competency evaluation is

issued, the Court anticipates petitioner’s counsel will be directed to draft, serve and submit a

proposed protective order, after which respondent will be afforded an opportunity to submit

objections.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s motion to terminate the competency inquiry is

DENIED, and petitioner’s motion for a protective order is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part

as set forth herein. 

In his Statement Re Procedures for Competency Litigation, petitioner states that in the event

his motion to terminate is denied, he will promptly recommend an expert or experts to conduct the

competency inquiry. Respondent has submitted his recommendation as to two experts to be

appointed as well as for the timing of the expert evaluation. Petitioner is hereby DIRECTED to

submit, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order, petitioner’s recommendation as to

qualified experts, along with any additional recommendations he may have for the competency

evaluation procedures. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 19, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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