Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-14-02030/USCOURTS-ca4-14-02030-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2030

HUMPHREYS & PARTNERS ARCHITECTS, L.P.,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

LESSARD DESIGN, INCORPORATED; LESSARD GROUP INCORPORATED;

CHRISTIAN J. LESSARD; CLARK BUILDERS GROUP, LLC; PDT

BUILDERS, LLC; THE PENROSE GROUP; SIXTH PENROSE INVESTING

COMPANY LLC; NORTHWESTERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY,

LLC; NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

PENROSE PARTNERS; PARK CREST SPE PHASE I, LLC;

PENROSE/DONOHOE TYSONS, LLC,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior

District Judge. (1:13-cv-00433-TSE-TCB)

Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: June 23, 2015

Amended: June 24, 2015

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Shedd and Judge Harris joined.

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ARGUED: Patrick Andrew Zummo, LAW OFFICES OF PATRICK ZUMMO,

Houston, Texas, for Appellant. Patrick Joseph Coyne, FINNEGAN,

HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, Washington, D.C.;

Antigone Gabriella Peyton, CLOUDIGY LAW PLLC, McLean, Virginia,

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Walter D. Kelley, Jr., HAUSFELD, LLP,

Washington, D.C.; Jennifer L. Swize, JONES DAY, Washington,

D.C., for Appellant. Kandis M. Koustenis, CLOUDIGY LAW PLLC,

McLean, Virginia, for Appellees The Penrose Group, PDT Builders,

LLC, Sixth Penrose Investing Company LLC, and Clark Builders

Group, LLC; Christopher P. Foley, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,

GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees Lessard

Design, Incorporated, Lessard Group Incorporated, and Christian

J. Lessard; Christopher P. Mead, LONDON & MEAD, LLP, Washington,

D.C., for Appellees Northwestern Investment Management Company,

LLC and Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

In this architectural copyright infringement action,

Plaintiff-Appellant Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P.

(“HPA”) appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment

in favor of Defendants-Appellees Lessard Design, Inc., Lessard

Group, Inc., and Christian J. Lessard (collectively, “Lessard”);

Clark Builders Group, LLC (“Clark”); PDT Builders, LLC, The

Penrose Group, and Sixth Penrose Investing Co., LLC

(collectively, “Penrose”); and Northwestern Investment

Management Co., LLC, and Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.

(collectively, “Northwestern”). HPA claims that the design,

development, ownership, and construction of Two Park Crest, an

apartment building in McLean, Virginia, infringed HPA’s

architectural copyright embodied in Grant Park, a condominium

building in Minneapolis, Minnesota.1 The district court awarded

summary judgment to Appellees, primarily because no reasonable

jury could find that the Grant Park and Two Park Crest designs

are substantially similar. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

 1 The Appendix to this opinion includes a comparison

prepared by HPA’s founder and CEO of the two designs’ floorplans

and exteriors. See infra Appendix; see also J.A. 5220, 5222.

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I.

A.

HPA is an architecture firm based in Dallas, Texas, that

designs multi-family residential buildings. In 2000 and 2001,

HPA designed a high-rise residential tower known as Grant Park. 

In 2003, HPA registered the Grant Park design as an

architectural work with the United States Copyright Office and

received a certificate of copyright registration. The Grant

Park building was constructed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in

2004.

Grant Park is a 27-story condominium building with 11 units

per floor. It has two separate elevator cores, such that each

floor has two elevator lobbies. The units on a typical floor

open directly into these lobbies, five units into one and six

into the other. The lobbies also each provide access to a

stairwell and to either a trash chute or a mechanical/electrical

room. Residents can travel between the lobbies through an

unfinished service corridor, which allows all residents to

access both utility rooms and both stairwells. This dual-core

layout is desirable because it eliminates the need for a

finished central hallway and fosters a sense of community among

the units sharing a lobby.

In 2008, Penrose began developing a high-rise apartment

building called Two Park Crest for construction in McLean,

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Virginia. In 2010, it solicited design proposals from three

architecture firms, including HPA and Lessard, a firm based in

Vienna, Virginia. HPA submitted illustrations of its Grant Park

design in September 2010 and met with Penrose in October 2010. 

On November 3, 2010, Penrose informed Lessard that it

wanted the Two Park Crest design to feature dual elevator cores

connected by a service corridor, and emailed Lessard the Grant

Park floorplan to illustrate the concept. Later that month, on

November 15, Lessard emailed Penrose a preliminary sketch of a

design with two elevator cores; Penrose responded that the

design was “looking good.” J.A. 9033. Lessard ultimately

submitted a design for a 19-story building with 17 apartments

per floor. The design incorporated three elevator cores: two

passenger elevator cores connected by an unfinished hallway, and

a service elevator core accessible from that hallway. Of the 17

apartments per floor, 8 would open directly into one passenger

elevator lobby and 9 would open directly into the other.

On November 17, 2010, Penrose told HPA that it had hired

Lessard to design the Two Park Crest project. Penrose

subsequently sold the project to Northwestern. In November

2011, Northwestern hired Clark to construct Two Park Crest. 

Clark began constructing the building in January 2012.

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B.

In April 2013, HPA filed this action against Appellees 2

under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., alleging one count of copyright

infringement against each Appellee. Following discovery, the

parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Appellees argued that

they were not liable to HPA because, among other reasons, they

did not copy the Grant Park design and the two designs are not

substantially similar. Appellees supported their motions with

expert reports filed by three architects--Stephen Gresham,

Robert Greenstreet, and Douglas Carter--who concluded in their

reports that the two designs are not substantially similar.

HPA argued in its motion and responses to Appellees’

motions that Lessard copied the Grant Park design after

receiving that design from Penrose. It claimed that the speed

with which Lessard created the Two Park Crest design is direct

evidence of copying, and that the similarities between the two

designs is circumstantial evidence of copying. HPA supported

its claim that the two designs are substantially similar with a

declaration from architect and HPA expert Daniel Figert, who

identified nine characteristics shared by both designs--for

example, both designs are for multi-family buildings that are

 2 HPA also brought a claim against Penrose Partners, Park

Crest SPE Phase I, LLC, and Penrose/Donohoe Tysons, LLC, none of

which is a party to this appeal.

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approximately twenty stories tall, that have two elevator

lobbies connected by a service corridor, and that provide direct

access to units from the elevator lobbies.3 HPA argued that the

presence and arrangement of these nine features in Two Park

Crest infringed its copyright in the Grant Park design.

HPA also moved to strike Gresham’s, Greenstreet’s, and

Carter’s expert reports on the ground that those reports were

inadmissible hearsay. In response, Appellees provided

declarations from the experts verifying the contents of their

reports and stating that they would testify at trial to the

substance thereof. The district court then denied HPA’s motions

to strike, reasoning that the declarations, although belated,

cured HPA’s objection.

On September 2, 2014, the district court granted Appellees’

motions for summary judgment. The court determined that summary

judgment was appropriate because, among other reasons, (1) there

was no direct evidence of copying, and (2) no reasonable jury

 3 Figert also stated that both buildings have a “barbell”-

shaped footprint, have “similar top story and fenestration

[(i.e., window)] elements” that are constructed of “the same

materials,” and have a roof with a “cantilevered overhang” (i.e,

a roof extending beyond the exterior wall that is supported by a

beam anchored only inside the exterior wall). J.A. 5559–60

(Figert Declaration). And, with respect to the typical

floorplans in each design, Figert stated that each building has

“mechanical / electrical rooms located at one end of the fire

corridor and the trash chutes located at the opposite end,” and

that the corner units in each design have “diagonal access

corridors.” Id. at 5559.

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could find that the Grant Park and Two Park Crest designs are

extrinsically (i.e., objectively) similar.

The court held that the two designs are not extrinsically

similar for two independently sufficient reasons. First,

neither the nine features that Figert identified nor their

arrangement in Grant Park is eligible for copyright protection. 

And second, those features are presented and arranged

differently in the Two Park Crest design. With respect to the

arrangement of the nine features in the two designs, the court

noted that Appellees’ experts had provided detailed explanations

as to how the two designs differ with respect to their size,

footprints, floorplans, and exterior appearances. HPA’s expert,

in contrast, “offer[ed] no evidence as to what makes the two

arrangements extrinsically similar.” Humphreys & Partners

Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 644,

677 (E.D. Va. 2014). The court concluded that Appellees were

“entitled to summary judgment . . . based on the results of the

extrinsic similarity analysis.” Id. HPA timely appealed.

II.

Before turning to HPA’s arguments on appeal, we set forth

the law governing architectural copyright infringement claims. 

“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of

authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from

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which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise

communicated . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). In 1990, Congress

expanded the scope of “works of authorship” to include

“architectural works,” id. § 102(a)(8), by enacting the

Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (the “AWCPA”), Pub.

L. No. 101–650, §§ 701–706, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified in

various sections of 17 U.S.C.). The AWCPA defines an

architectural work as “the design of a building as embodied in

any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “The work

includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and

composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not

include individual standard features.” Id. The AWCPA’s

legislative history explains that the arrangement and

composition of spaces and elements is protectable because

“creativity in architecture frequently takes the form of a

selection, coordination, or arrangement of unprotectible

elements into an original, protectible whole.” H.R. Rep. No.

101–735, at 18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,

6949.

“To establish a claim for copyright infringement, a

plaintiff must prove that it owned a valid copyright and that

the defendant copied the original elements of that copyright.” 

Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801

(4th Cir. 2001). “Copying can be proven through direct or

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circumstantial evidence.” Bldg. Graphics, Inc. v. Lennar Corp.,

708 F.3d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 2013). 

“Direct evidence of copying . . . includes evidence such as

party admissions, witness accounts of the physical act of

copying, and common errors in the works of plaintiffs and the

defendants.” Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 732

(8th Cir. 2006). In M. Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews, 783

F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986), for example, we found direct evidence

of copying where “[t]he computer programs in the record [were]

virtually identical” and the defendants’ program, like

plaintiff’s, included “a hidden legend that would appear only

when the [program’s] buttons were pressed in an abnormal

sequence,” id. at 446. Similarly, our sister circuits have

found direct evidence of copying where a defendant “gave . . .

explicit instruction that [a] work be copied,” Rogers v. Koons,

960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992), and where the defendant

admitted to copying the plaintiff’s work, see, e.g., Enter.

Mgmt. Ltd. v. Warrick, 717 F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013);

Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689

F.3d 29, 49 (1st Cir. 2012).

“Where direct evidence of copying is lacking, [the]

plaintiff may prove copying by circumstantial evidence in the

form of proof that the alleged infringer had access to the work

and that the supposed copy is substantially similar to the

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author’s original work.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 241

F.3d 350, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2001). To show substantial

similarity, the plaintiff must establish that the two works are

both “extrinsically” and “intrinsically” similar. Universal

Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d

417, 435 (4th Cir. 2010). “The extrinsic inquiry is an

objective one” that “looks to ‘external criteria’” of

substantial similarity between the alleged copy and the

protected elements of the copyrighted work. Id. at 435–36

(quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435,

1442 (9th Cir. 1994)). “The intrinsic inquiry, in contrast,

implicates the perspective of the [works’] intended observer

. . . [and] looks to the ‘total concept and feel of the works

. . . .’” Id. at 436 (quoting Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 801).

While we have applied this two-part substantial similarity

test in a variety of copyright contexts, we have not expressly

held in a published opinion that this test governs claims of

architectural copyright infringement. The parties both argue,

and the district court determined, that the extrinsic/intrinsic

test governs. We agree, and therefore hold that “the two-part

test for determining substantial similarity . . . is applicable

to a copyright infringement claim involving architectural

works.” Charles W. Ross Builder, Inc. v. Olsen Fine Home Bldg.,

LLC, 496 F. App’x 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Bldg.

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Graphics, 708 F.3d at 580 n.3 (stating in dicta that the court

would apply the extrinsic/intrinsic test to a claim of

architectural copyright infringement).

III.

We turn now to HPA’s arguments on appeal. HPA claims that

the district court erred in three respects: by considering

Appellees’ expert reports when resolving the motions for summary

judgment; by failing to credit HPA’s direct and circumstantial

evidence of copying; and by making various errors of copyright

law. We consider each argument in turn.

A.

We begin with HPA’s argument that the district court erred

by considering Appellees’ expert reports, a claim we review for

abuse of discretion. See Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 963 (4th

Cir. 2008) (reviewing admissibility of affidavits at summary

judgment stage for abuse of discretion); cf. EEOC v. Freeman,

778 F.3d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We review a district court’s

decision to admit or to exclude expert evidence for an abuse of

discretion.”).

HPA maintains that, because these reports were

“inadmissible hearsay,” they were “not evidence upon which the

court could grant summary judgment.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. 

Appellees respond that the district court acted within its

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discretion when considering the expert reports because those

“reports were both sworn to in declarations filed in response to

HPA’s objection and the content of the reports would be

admissible through the expert’s testimony at trial.” Appellees’

Br. at 28. We agree with Appellees that the district court did

not err by considering the reports.

“The court and the parties have great flexibility with

regard to the evidence that may be used on a [summary judgment]

proceeding.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary

Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2721 (3d ed. 1998). 

The court may consider materials that would themselves be

admissible at trial, and the content or substance of otherwise

inadmissible materials where the “the party submitting the

evidence show[s] that it will be possible to put the information

. . . into an admissible form.” 11 James Wm. Moore et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.91[2] (3d ed. 2015). If the

nonmovant objects to the court’s consideration of “material

cited to support or dispute a fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2),

the movant has the burden “to show that the material is

admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that

is anticipated,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note.

Here, the admissibility of the reports themselves is

immaterial because Appellees “explain[ed] the admissible form

that is anticipated.” Id. Appellees submitted declarations

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made “under penalty of perjury” from the experts attesting that

they “would testify to the matters set forth in [their

respective] report[s].” J.A. 6367 (Greenstreet), 6392–93

(Carter); accord J.A. 6426 (Gresham). And “[s]ubsequent

verification or reaffirmation of an unsworn expert’s report,

either by affidavit or deposition, allows the court to consider

the unsworn expert’s report on a motion for summary judgment.” 

DG & G, Inc. v. FlexSol Packaging Corp. of Pompano Beach, 576

F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Maytag Corp. v.

Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1064 (N.D.

Iowa 2006)). HPA does not claim that the experts’ declarations

are deficient or that the experts’ testimony would be

inadmissible at trial. We therefore find no error in the

district court’s consideration of the experts’ reports.4 

B.

We turn now to HPA’s argument that the district court

failed to credit HPA’s direct and circumstantial evidence of

copying when granting summary judgment to Appellees. As the

 4 Our holding today does not establish any requirement for

the consideration of expert reports at summary judgment. We

hold only that the district court acted within its discretion by

considering Appellees’ reports; we express no opinion as to

whether the experts’ declarations were necessary. Cf. Deakins

v. Pack, 957 F. Supp. 2d 703, 752 (S.D.W. Va. 2013) (“The 2010

amendments to Rule 56(c)(2) ‘eliminated the unequivocal

requirement that documents submitted in support of a summary

judgement motion must be authenticated.’” (quoting Akers v. Beal

Bank, 845 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (D.D.C. 2012))).

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district court noted, summary judgment is appropriate “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We review de novo a district court’s

award of summary judgment, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Boyer-Liberto v.

Fontainebleau Corp., No. 13-1473, 2015 WL 2116849, at *8 (4th

Cir. May 7, 2015) (en banc).

1.

HPA first argues that the district court “ignored HPA’s

evidence” when it “stated that there was no direct evidence of

copying.” Appellant’s Br. at 52. HPA submits that “the

development of Lessard’s sketches establishes direct evidence of

copying,” id. at 53, particularly when viewed in concert with

Figert’s deposition testimony. Figert stated in relevant part:

“It appears that rather than going through the normal iterative

design process, that Lessard had a preconceived solution to the

design.” Id. (quoting J.A. 5195). 

This evidence is not direct evidence of copying. That

Lessard may have created its design with more speed and less

revision than is typical in the industry is consistent with

HPA’s theory that Lessard copied its design, but it does not

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itself establish copying. 5 And Figert did not claim to have

personal knowledge that Lessard copied the Grant Park design. 

In fact, Figert made clear in his deposition that he was not

prepared to state that Lessard copied the design. Asked whether

it was his “opinion that Lessard copied the Grant Park design,”

Figert responded, “I was not asked to give an opinion about

whether or not there was a copy made. . . . I’ll pass on giving

a conclusion as to whether or not I think they copied it or

not.” J.A. 1532. Because HPA presented no direct evidence of

copying, the district court did not err by stating that “direct

evidence of copying does not exist” here. Humphreys & Partners

Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 644,

659 (E.D. Va. 2014).

2.

HPA next argues that the district court resolved disputed

issues of fact in Appellees’ favor and failed to credit HPA’s

evidence when considering whether the two designs are

 5 HPA states that the district court in Brocade

Communications Systems, Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., 873 F. Supp.

2d 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2012), considered “almost identical facts” to

be “direct evidence of copying,” Appellant’s Br. at 53. But the

Brocade court found “the unusually fast pace of development of

[computer] code” to be “circumstantial evidence” supporting an

expert’s conclusion about copying. Brocade Commc’ns Sys., 873

F. Supp. 2d at 1219–20 (emphasis added).

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extrinsically similar. 6 Specifically, HPA claims that the

district court failed to credit its “evidence showing that the

overall form and composition of the works was similar.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 27. This argument presents a closer question

than does HPA’s direct-evidence claim. We address it by

outlining the parties’ respective burdens at summary judgment,

and then considering whether Appellees and HPA met those

burdens.

The party moving for summary judgment “discharges its

burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case.” Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286

F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 2002). If the movant discharges this

burden, the nonmoving party must present “specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Blair v. Defender

Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 625 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting White

v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 101 (4th Cir.

1987)). To create a genuine issue for trial, “the nonmoving

party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere

speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather,

731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013). In other words, a factual

 6 We assume for the purposes of this argument that HPA has

met its burden of showing that it owns a valid copyright in the

Grant Park design, and that Appellees had access to that design.

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dispute is genuine only where “the non-movant’s version is

supported by sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to

find” in its favor. Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855

F.2d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 1988).

Here, Appellees carried their initial burden of “‘showing’-

-that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an

absence of evidence to support [HPA’s] case.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). They explained in their

motions that no evidence suggests that Two Park Crest and Grant

Park have a substantially similar overall form, or that the two

designs arrange spaces and elements in a substantially similar

manner. And Appellees submitted expert reports explaining why

the two designs are dissimilar. Cf. Universal Furniture Int’l,

Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 435 (4th Cir.

2010) (“The extrinsic inquiry is an objective one on which

expert testimony may be relevant.”). For example, Gresham

explained in his report that, while both designs offer direct

access to units from elevator lobbies, the “relation of the

elevators to the apartment doors” is different in the two

designs. J.A. 2326. “At Grant Park,” Gresham wrote, “the

elevators open into a discernible vestibule,” such that a person

standing in the lobby “can view six of the individual resident

doors (out of eleven, total, per floor[]).” Id. “At Two Park

Crest, however, the elevators open directly into a cross

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corridor,” and “[u]nit entries are tucked away in the legs of an

H-shaped resident corridor[.]” Id. In the Two Park Crest

design, “[o]nly two of seventeen resident doors are visible form

the elevator lobby.”7 Id.

The burden then shifted to HPA to document a substantial

similarity between the protected elements of its design--i.e.,

Grant Park’s overall form and arrangement of the nine individual

features--and the Two Park Crest design. HPA claims on appeal

that it carried this burden with the following evidence.

First, HPA relies on two declarations submitted by Mark E.

Humphreys, HPA’s founder and CEO. The only statements in these

declarations relevant to substantial similarity are Humphreys’s

assertions that “[t]he Court can see that the two floor plans

are very similar,” and that “the Court can see that [the two

buildings] have a very similar appearance.” J.A. 5216. These

statements are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of

material fact because they are conclusory. See Dash, 731 F.3d

at 311. Humphreys identifies no specific, objective similarity

 7 Appellees also presented evidence that, as compared to

Grant Park, Two Park Crest is eight stories shorter; has six

more units per floor; has one more elevator core, for service;

has a less rectangular footprint; has mechanical/electrical

rooms and trash chutes on the back (rather than front) side of

the building; has exit stairwells located opposite the elevator

lobbies and encased in separate enclosures; has an exterior with

wider and more widely spaced vertical indentations; has a façade

that is majority glass; and has fewer window elements and

walkable balconies.

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between the two designs to support his conclusion that the

buildings’ floorplans and appearances are similar.

Second, HPA identifies three declarations--from Robert Lux

and David A. Hunt, both of whom worked with HPA on the Grant

Park project, and Walter Hughes, HPA’s Director of Design--

describing the creation, originality, and benefits of the Grant

Park design. These declarations do not create a genuine dispute

for trial because none contains an assertion about the

similarity between the Grant Park and Two Park Crest designs. 

Finally, HPA relies on Figert’s declaration and deposition

testimony. Figert stated in his declaration that “[t]he two

designs have an extrinsic similarity in that the ideas and

expression of the ideas used in the projects have substantial

similarities[,] . . . includ[ing] such things as building floor

plan layout, exit circulation, building size, and composition of

the major elements that make up the exterior expression of the

designs.” J.A. 5558. He also listed nine features shared by

both designs--for example, the stairwells in both designs are

located adjacent to elevator lobbies--and stated that these

characteristics are “examples of the arrangement and composition

of spaces and elements that represent substantially similar

features of Humphreys’ Grant Park design.” J.A. 5560. And

Figert stated in his deposition that the “the overall expression

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of the idea of those [nine] elements is very similar in the two

projects.” J.A. 5197.

Figert’s declaration and deposition testimony are

insufficient to show that the designs are extrinsically similar. 

Like Humphreys, Figert offered no specific similarity between

the designs’ overall form or arrangement of individual elements. 

He identified nine shared features and stated that these

characteristics show that the two designs arrange and compose

both spaces and elements in a substantially similar manner. But

the mere presence of these nine features in both buildings does

not create an issue for trial because, as HPA’s counsel

confirmed at oral argument, HPA does not claim “any protectable

interest in any individual component” of the Grant Park design.8 

Oral Arg. 7:56–8:16; see also Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh

Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 143 (4th Cir. 2000) (“To prove

copyright infringement, the plaintiff must establish that it

owned copyrighted material and that the infringer copied

protected elements of it.”). And Figert did not explain how

specifically the two designs are similar in their floorplans,

exits, sizes, or arrangement of individual elements. Figert’s

 8 We do not imply that the outcome of this appeal would be

different if HPA had pressed this claim. To the contrary, we

agree with the district court that the nine features, when

viewed in isolation, are not extrinsically similar in the two

designs. See Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard

Design, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 644, 669-75 (E.D. Va. 2014).

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conclusory assertions are, as a matter of law, insufficient to

show that any aspect of Two Park Crest is substantially similar

to a protected element of the Grant Park design. See Dash, 731

F.3d at 311.

At bottom, HPA failed to carry its burden of identifying a

specific similarity between the Two Park Crest design and the

protected elements of its Grant Park design. The evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to HPA, shows that the Two

Park Crest and Grant Park designs incorporate nine of the same

concepts. But it does not establish that the two designs have a

similar overall form, or that the designs arrange or compose

elements and spaces in a similar manner. Accordingly, because

HPA failed to present nonconclusory evidence that the designs

are extrinsically similar, we reject HPA’s claim that the

district court failed to credit its extrinsic-similarity

evidence.

C.

We conclude by addressing HPA’s claim that the district

court misapplied relevant copyright law in three respects.

First, HPA argues that the district court erroneously

declined to consider whether the Two Park Crest design arranges

unprotected elements in a substantially similar manner to the

arrangement of those elements in the Grant Park design. This

argument mischaracterizes the district court’s reasoning. The

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district court began its analysis by considering whether any of

the nine features Figert identified were themselves protectable. 

But the court did not stop there; it also considered whether,

“notwithstanding the fact that the nine features [HPA] relies on

do not warrant protection under the AWCPA, . . . the arrangement

of those features is substantially similar in the Grant Park and

Two Park Crest designs.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P.

v. Lessard Design, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 644, 676 (E.D. Va.

2014). And, contrary to HPA’s assertion here, the district

court did not exclude any feature from this analysis. Rather,

the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find the two

arrangements similar because, among other reasons, “the overall

footprints of the two designs are highly different,” and the two

designs “have a different shape, size, and exterior appearance.” 

Id. at 677.

Second, HPA claims that the district court erred in various

respects by finding that the allegedly copied aspects of the

Grant Park design are not eligible for copyright protection. We

need not reach this argument because the district court also

held that, even if those aspects were protected, Appellees are

not liable to HPA because they did not copy them. This holding,

which we affirm today, is sufficient to support the judgment.

Finally, HPA argues that the district court conflated

intrinsic (i.e., subjective) and extrinsic (i.e., objective)

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similarity when considering the two designs as a whole. Cf.

Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.,

618 F.3d 417, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing between the

intrinsic- and extrinsic-similarity analyses). HPA claims that

the district court engaged in a subjective analysis when

discussing whether the overall arrangement of elements in the

two designs is extrinsically similar. But the district court

correctly stated that “examining an ordinary person’s subjective

impressions of similarities between two works . . . is typically

the province of the jury,” and it declined to make any

subjective finding about the two designs. Humphreys, 43 F.

Supp. 3d at 679. HPA’s final argument fails because it

identifies no subjective finding by the district court in its

extrinsic-similarity analysis, and our review reveals no such

finding.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

AFFIRMED.

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APPENDIX

Typical Grant Park Floorplan:

Typical Two Park Crest Floorplan:

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Grant Park Exterior:

Two Park Crest Exterior:

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