Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01289/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01289-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANETTA SCONIERS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

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v. )

)

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al., )

)

)

)

Defendants. )

 )

1:08cv1289 OWW DLB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION

Plaintiff Janetta Sconiers (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se and proceeding in forma

pauperis, filed the instant complaint on September 2, 2008. Plaintiff alleges numerous causes of

action based upon a pending state Workers’ Compensation action and names nine state officials

as Defendants.

DISCUSSION

A. Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must conduct an initial review of the

complaint for sufficiency to state a claim. The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof

if the court determines that the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the court determines that the complaint fails to state

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a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be

cured by amendment.

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must accept as true the allegations

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick

v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, 

cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has

jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a

demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of

several different types may be demanded.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev.

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support Plaintiff's claim. Id.

Although a complaint need not outline all elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from

the allegations that all elements exist and that there is entitlement to relief under some viable

legal theory. Walker v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990);

Lewis v. ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1998).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action against Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, California Attorney

General Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Richard Starkeson, the director of the Workers’ Compensation

Division of the California Department of Industrial Relations, John Miller, Chairman of the

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB”), Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Joy L.

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 For purposes of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims, the Court presumes that Defendants are sued in their 1

individual capacities, as well, because she states claims for damages. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir.

2007) (in a section 1983 suit for money damages, it is presumed to be one against defendants in their individual

capacities). 

 It appears that Plaintiff excluded numerous pages because the paragraphs skip from 135 to 219, and the 2

causes of action skip from the Fifth to the Fifteenth. Since this action is one of three Plaintiff filed in this Court on

the same day, it is unclear if this was an unintentional omission or whether Plaintiff combined mixed portions of the

other complaints to create the instant complaint. The Court notes that in at least two instances, Plaintiff refers to a

“Plaintiff Tiyeondrea McGlothin,” who is not a Plaintiff in this action but appears in another of Plaintiff’s actions. 

For ease of reference, the Court will refer to the causes of action as they are numbered in the complaint. 

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Krikorian, and Ronnie G. Caplane, Merle C. Rabine, James C. Cuneo, all members of the

WCAB. All Defendants are sued in their official capacity. Complaint, ¶¶ 28-35. 1

As best the Court can discern, Plaintiff’s allegations arise from a workers’ compensation

action filed as a result of work-related injury in September 2002. Complaint, ¶¶ 41-51. 

According to her complaint, she hired Glass & Seebode on January 2, 2003, to file the workers’

compensation action, which she states is still pending. Complaint, ¶ 53. Plaintiff also filed a

petition to increase her award pursuant to California Labor Code section 132a. Complaint, ¶ 54. 

Plaintiff details the administrative proceedings, as well as related proceedings in Fresno

County Superior Court. Complaint, ¶¶ 51-61. Although not entirely clear, the crux of Plaintiff’s

complaint relates to Glass & Seebode’s petition to withdraw as attorney, which she alleges

Defendant ALJ Krikorian granted without affording her an opportunity to read it or respond. 

Complaint, ¶ 63. Plaintiff makes additional factual allegations that appear to suggest that she

was deprived of notice of hearings or purposefully misinformed as to other aspects of her case. 

She makes general allegations, unsupported by facts, of fraud, perjury, intentional deprivation of

rights, undue influence and actions taken in excess of jurisdiction. 

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges at least 24 claims. Complaint, ¶¶ 82-310. Most of 2

the claims are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and make generalized allegations of retaliation,

deprivation of due process, and numerous violations of state laws and regulations. Plaintiff also

includes a claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Complaint, ¶ 307-308. In addition,

Plaintiff alleges numerous violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the

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Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), as well as violations of the California constitution and state law. 

Complaint, ¶¶ 228-270, 277-306, 309-310. 

Plaintiff requests monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Her

claims for equitable relief appear to request that the Court void the WCAB’s August 15, 2005,

order granting Glass & Seebode’s petition to withdraw. 

C. Claims

1. Abstention

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that abstention is appropriate and therefore

declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action. 

“Younger abstention is a common law equitable doctrine holding that a federal court

generally should refrain from interfering with a pending state court proceeding.” Poulos v.

Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 669 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

Younger abstention is required if (1) state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate

important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise

federal questions. Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir.1994). It is

well-established that the Younger doctrine has been extended to pending state administrative

proceedings if judicial in nature. See Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261, 1272 (9th

Cir.1994).

In her complaint, Plaintiff indicates that the Workers’ Compensation action is still

pending. Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 53. In fact, she specifically requests that this Court interfere with

those proceedings by (1) enjoining Defendants from requiring her to show cause for

reassignment; and (2) enjoining Defendants from applying a prior Fresno County Superior Court

determination that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant to the Workers’ Compensation proceeding. 

Complaint, ¶¶ 15-16. 

Therefore, the underlying Workers’ Compensation action is ongoing and the

administrative proceeding is the proper venue for adjudication of Plaintiff’s state law work-injury

claim and all related issues that Plaintiff raises in this action. Moreover, the state has an

important and substantial interest in overseeing, managing and adjudicating its Workers’

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Compensation system. Although Plaintiff may not be able to raise federal constitutional claims

in the Workers’ Compensation action, “[her] ability to raise the claims via state judicial review of

the administrative proceedings suffices.” Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 332 (9th

Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). California Labor Code section 5952

provides for judicial review of WCAB decision, including a determination as to whether the

WCAB “acted without or in excess of its powers” or issued an order that was “procured by

fraud.” Cal. Labor Code, §§ 5952(a)-(b).

While abstention is inappropriate if the state proceedings are instituted in bad faith or if

harassment is evident, assertions of bad faith or harassment are insufficient if they are conclusory

and unsupported by specific facts. World Famous Drinking Emporium, Ind., 820 F.2d 1079,

1082 (9th Cir. 1987); Roberts v. Carrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Since

Plaintiff’s assertions of bad faith or harassment are conclusory and unsupported, abstention

pursuant to Younger is appropriate.

Even if the Court did not abstain under Younger, Plaintiff’s complaint would fail for the

reasons set forth below.

2. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Claims- One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Fifteen 

and Seventeen

a. Linkage

Under section 1983, Plaintiff is required to show that Defendants (1) acted under color of

state law, and (2) committed conduct which deprived Plaintiff of a federal right. Hydrick v.

Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007). “A person deprives another of a constitutional right,

where that person ‘does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to

perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.’” Id. at 988 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

“[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the

actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” 

Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

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Therefore, in order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of her

federal rights. However, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any facts that link any of the

defendants to the deprivations alleged. Rather than the required “direct, personal participation,”

Plaintiff alleges only conclusory, generalized statements unsupported by anything other than her

perception that she has been wronged by the WCAB. In fact, Plaintiff groups the Defendants

together in almost all of her allegations, so that she essentially alleges that each and every

Defendant was involved in each and every alleged deprivation. 

Plaintiff comes closest to alleging personal involvement against Defendant Krikorian, the

ALJ who allegedly granted the petition to withdraw without notice. Yet even these allegations

are nothing more than generalized statements without factual support and are insufficient to

establish linkage. 

b. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from being

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 556 (1974). Procedural due process claims require (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. Kildare

v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 

While individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in receiving certain state

benefits, there is no protected interest in having counsel at the administrative level. The gist of

Plaintiff’s complaint contends that Defendants violated her due process rights by granting

counsel’s request to withdraw without providing Plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to be

heard. However, as there is no constitutionally protected right to counsel before the WCAB,

Plaintiff cannot state a denial of due process claim. Plaintiff’s Fifteenth Cause of Action and the

related Sixteenth Cause of Action for equitable relief should therefore be dismissed without leave

to amend.

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c. Equal Protection

“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432

(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff

must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff

based upon membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

“Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a

plaintiff’s protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). 

“Where the challenged governmental policy is ‘facially neural,’ proof of its disproportionate

impact on an identifiable group can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show that

some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 687 (citing

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (264-66) (1977) (internal

citations omitted)). “The mere fact that [a] facially neutral polic[y] had a foreseeably

disproportionate impact on an identifiable group does not mean that [it] violated the Equal

Protection Clause.” Id. at 687. 

In her First Cause of Action, Plaintiff makes vague allegations that her right to equal

protection has been denied because she was “retaliated against” for petitioning the WCAB for

ALJ reassignment. Although elsewhere in her complaint she makes reference to a mental

impairment, there is no allegation or indication that she is a member of a protected class. 

Plaintiff also fails to explain how she was denied equal protection, other than a general statement

that Defendants “imped[ed] and hinder[ed] the due course of justice, with intent to deny

[Plaintiff] equal protection of the laws.” Complaint, ¶ 84. 

d. Supervisorial Liability 

In her Second Cause of Action for “Refusing or Neglecting to Prevent” the events she

now complains of, Plaintiff attempts to establish liability against Defendants Schwarzenegger,

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Brown, Miller, Starkeson, Caplane, Rabine and Cuneo for their failure to “instruct, supervise,

control and discipline on a continuing basis” Defendant Krikorian. Complaint, ¶ 86-88. She

further alleges that these failures were consistent with Defendants’ “official policy or custom.” 

“Although there is no pure respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a supervisor [may

be held] liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates ‘if the supervisor participated in

or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.’” Hydrick

v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989)). 

Plaintiff wholly fails to explain the supervisorial role of any of the named Defendants and

fails to make any allegations of direct participation. While it is at least conceivable that perhaps

one or two of the named Defendants act in a supervisorial capacity to ALJ Krikorian, it is

unlikely that they all have the direct involvement necessary to sustain supervisorial liability under

section 1983. 

e. State Based Violations

Plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventeenth Causes of Action allege section 1983

violations based upon violations of California state law or regulations. Section 1983 actions,

however, require deprivation of a federal right. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir.

2007). Accordingly, the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventeenth Causes of Action should be

dismissed without leave to amend. 

f. Immunity of Named Defendants

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct

violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In ruling upon the issue of

qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next

step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. The inquiry “must be undertaken in

light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Saucier v. Katz,

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533 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been

‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of

the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted). In resolving these issues,

the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material

factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

Here, Plaintiff makes generalized allegations against Defendants, all of whom are

government officials. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that their actions violated a

constitutional right for the reasons discussed throughout this order. 

Moreover, Defendant Krikorian is an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and is entitled

to quasi-judicial immunity. The doctrine of judicial immunity applies to ALJ’s performing

functions similar to judges in a court-like setting. Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court of

California, 67 F.3d 708, 714-715 (9th Cir.1995).

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages.

g. Summary of Section 1983 Claims

Based on the above, the Court has determined that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Fifteenth,

Sixteenth and Seventeenth Causes of Action should be dismissed without leave to amend. As to

the First and Second Causes of Action, although leave to amend would normally be granted to

allow Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the deficiencies, leave to amend would be futile given

the application of Younger abstention. 

3. ADA and RA Claims

Plaintiff’s Eighteenth through Twenty Fifth Causes of Action allege various violations of

the ADA and RA. For each claim under the ADA, Plaintiff makes the identical claim under the

RA. 

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

(RA) “both prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d

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1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination

by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the RA provides that “no otherwise qualified

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from

the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 794.

“To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3)

such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

Similarly, “[t]o establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is

handicapped within the meaning of the RA; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or

services sought; (3) [he] was denied the benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap;

and (4) the program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and RA allege that Defendants (1) fail to administer

California State programs in a manner that supports the availability of services and programs in

the most integrated setting for individuals with disabilities; (2) utilize methods of administration

that effectively subject disabled individuals to discrimination and “perpetuate the current eviction

system rather than facilitate the receipt of services in the most integrated setting appropriate” to

Plaintiff’s needs; (3) discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of her mental illness by refusing

to provide notice and redress other due process violations; and (4) are attempting to exclude

Plaintiff from receiving benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Complaint, ¶¶ 233, 239,

244, 247. These allegations are based mainly upon the alleged “inappropriate denial of

representation.” Complaint, ¶¶ 239, 244, 245, 266, 269. 

Despite her allegations, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either the ADA or RA. 

Although she contends that she was otherwise qualified, she does not allege that she was denied

benefits or services solely on the basis of her disability. Moreover, representation before the

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WCAB is not a “service” provided by the WCAB, nor is it the type of “service” that would come

within the protection of the ADA or RA. See eg., Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170

F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges a violation of the ADA or RA on the basis of a denial

of Workers’ Compensation benefits, her claim likewise fails. Plaintiff did not allege facts

showing that she was qualified to receive worker’ compensation benefits, or that her disability

was the reason that she was denied benefits. See McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259,

1265 (9th Cir.2004) (listing requirements to state a claim under the ADA); Wong v. Regents of

Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1055 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005) (RA creates same rights and obligations as

ADA); see also Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir.1998) (ADA and RA do not provide a

cause of action for challenging adequacy of state programs without showing of disparate or

discriminatory treatment).

Plaintiff is therefore unable to state causes of action under the ADA and RA and her

Eighteenth through Twenty Fifth Causes of Action should be dismissed without leave to amend.

4. Conspiracy Claim

In Plaintiff’s Thirty Second Cause of Action, she alleges that the Defendants conspired

against her to deprive her of her constitutional rights and requests monetary damages. 42 U.S.C

§§ 1983, 1985.

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under section 1983 fails for many of the same reasons her

other section 1983 claims failed, as discussed above.

Plaintiff’s claim also fails on a substantive basis. A conspiracy claim brought under

section 1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional

rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of

Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an

actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

“‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but

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each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312

F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court may not apply a heightened

pleading standard to Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of

San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307

F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). However, although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the

grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .” Id. at 1964-65 (internal quotations

and citations omitted). As such, a bare allegation that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's

constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under section 1983. 

Indeed, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is comprised of nothing more than a conclusory sentence,

without explanation or factual support. 

Similarly, her conspiracy claim under section 1985 also fails. To state a cause of action

under section 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a

class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under

the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal

injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 

Gillispie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); Giffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,

102-03 (1971). 

In interpreting these standards, the Ninth Circuit has held that a claim under section 1985

must allege specific facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). A mere allegation of

conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id.;

Sanchez v. City of Santa Anna, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Not only has Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to support a conspiracy, she has failed

to allege a racial or other class-based discriminatory animus behind the alleged actions. As her

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complaint appears to revolve around her alleged mental impairment, Plaintiff cannot state a cause

of action under a civil rights statute. Section 1985 applies only where there is a racial or other

class-based discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,

978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, to state a claim for conspiracy under section

1985, a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim under section 1983. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd.

of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir.2004).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Thirty Second Cause of Action must be dismissed without leave

to amend.

5. State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action (Twenty Eighth, Twenty Ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty

First and Thirty Third) are based upon violations of California law. As the Court has dismissed

the claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over these state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817,

826 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had

original jurisdiction).

Accordingly, the Twenty Eighth, Twenty Ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty First and Thirty Third

Causes of Action should be dismissed without leave to amend. 

D. Malice

The instant complaint, as well as Plaintiff’s litigation history before this Court, suggests

that she brings this action with malice and in the absence of good faith in an attempt to vex the

administrative defendants who ruled against her. The test for malice is a subjective one that

requires the Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good faith. Kinney v.

Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968

n. 1 (11th Cir.1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive suits filed by

plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free filing to file a multiplicity of suits. 

This is Plaintiff’s fifth action brought in pro se and in forma pauperis before this Court. 

One action remains in the pleading stage and as of the date of this order, the other two have yet to

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 In addition to this action, Plaintiff has filed 1:06cv1260 AWI LJO, 1:07cv972 AWI DLB, 1:08cv1288 3

LJO SMS and 1:08cv1290 LJO GSA. The Court first questioned Plaintiff’s intentions in the September 27, 2006,

order dismissing her complaint with leave to amend in 1:06cv1260 AWI LJO. There, the Court stated, “This Court

is concerned that plaintiff has brought this action in absence of good faith and attempts to vex defendants because

they investigated plaintiff for fraud. Such attempt to vex defendants provides further grounds to dismiss plaintiff's

complaint.” 

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be screened. Her complaints share a common thread- they are brought against a multitude of 3

state officials and allege endless causes of action for what she perceives to be fraudulent actions

against her in the denial of state benefits. Moreover, although Plaintiff’s complaints are

voluminous (some are over 100 pages in length), they appear to be supported by little more than

vague, conclusory statements. It is becoming apparent to this Court that Plaintiff is taking

advantage of her in forma pauperis status to file multiple meritless lawsuits. Plaintiff’s lack of

good faith is therefore another reason to recommend dismissal of this action.

 RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the Honorable Oliver W.

Wanger pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections

with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 4, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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