Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00803/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00803-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND OSCAR WALKER, No. CIV S-07-0803-RRB-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

M.C. KRAMER,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to

dismiss (Doc. 10), filed on July 11, 2007. Also pending is petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary

hearing (Doc. 11), filed on July 31, 2007.

In his motion to dismiss, respondent argues that the sole parole challenge claim

raised in the instant petition is not exhausted. Specifically, he argues that petitioner failed to

fairly present his claim to the California Supreme Court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), the

exhaustion of available state remedies is required before the federal court can grant a claim

presented in a habeas corpus case. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); see also Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); Hunt v. Pliler, 336 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2003). “A

Case 2:07-cv-00803-JKS Document 14 Filed 08/28/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

This situation of procedural deficiency is distinguishable from a case presented to 1

the state court using proper procedures but where relief on the merits is precluded for some

procedural reason, such as untimeliness or failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. The former

represents an exhaustion problem; the latter represents a procedural default problem. 

2

petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement in two ways: (1) by providing the highest state

court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of the claim . . .; or (2) by showing that at the time

the petitioner filed the habeas petition in federal court no state remedies are available to the

petitioner and the petitioner has not deliberately by-passed the state remedies.” Batchelor v.

Cupp , 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The exhaustion doctrine is based

on a policy of federal and state comity, designed to give state courts the initial opportunity to

correct alleged constitutional deprivations. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); see

also Rose, 455 U.S. at 518. 

Regardless of whether the claim was raised on direct appeal or in post-conviction

proceedings, the exhaustion doctrine requires that each claim be fairly presented to the state’s

highest court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). Although the exhaustion doctrine

requires only the presentation of each federal claim to the highest state court, the claims must be

presented in a posture that is acceptable under state procedural rules. See Sweet v. Cupp, 640

F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, an appeal or petition for post-conviction relief that is denied by

the state courts on procedural grounds, where other state remedies are still available, does not

exhaust the petitioner’s state remedies. See Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 488 (1979); Sweet,

640 F.2d at 237-89.1

In addition to presenting the claim to the state court in a procedurally acceptable

manner, exhaustion requires that the petitioner make the federal basis of the claim explicit to the

state court by including reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); see also Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 998 (9th

Cir. 2000). It is not sufficient for the petitioner to argue that the federal nature of the claim is

self-evident. See Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 247 F.3d

Case 2:07-cv-00803-JKS Document 14 Filed 08/28/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

He also cited the district court’s decision to grant habeas relief in a parole 2

challenge case, which was later reversed by the Ninth Circuit in an opinion considering the same

issue raised by petitioner. See Irons v. Carey, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2027359 (9th Cir. July 14,

2007).

3

904 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In this case, petitioner stated the following “ground” for relief to the California

Supreme Court: “There was no evidence for the reversal of parole by the Governor, in violation

of the United States Constitution’s 14th Amendment, due process.” Petitioner framed the issue

as follows: 

That the Governor presented no evidence to support his

determination and failed to consider all relevant and reliable information. 

The Governor also failed to give petitioner individualized consideration by

not considering petitioner’s evidence that he was abused as a child.” 

He then offered 10 typed pages of facts and arguments to the California Supreme Court in

support of his claim. In particular, petitioner argued that the Governor’s decision to reverse a

parole grant was not supported by “some evidence,” as required by due process. Petitioner

argued that continued reliance on unchanging factors to deny parole violated the “some

evidence” standard where there is evidence of rehabilitation while in prison. Petitioner cited the

Ninth Circuit case of Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), in support of his

argument. Petitioner also cited to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent 2

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), which sets forth the “some evidence” standard. He further

cited to the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071

(2005), which addresses the standard for parole under California law. 

Respondent argues that the claim was not fairly presented to the California

Supreme Court due to at least one of three possible procedural deficiencies which could have

been cured in state court but was not. Respondent points to the California Supreme Court’s

March 21, 2007, denial of petitioner’s claim with citations to In re Miller, 17 Cal.2d 734 (1941),

In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300 (1949), and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464 (1995). Respondent

Case 2:07-cv-00803-JKS Document 14 Filed 08/28/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

concludes that, because these procedural defects could have been cured, but were not, petitioner

failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Pitchess, 421 U.S. at 488; Sweet, 640 F.2d at

237-89.

The court will address the California Supreme Court’s citation to In re Swain first. 

The Swain citation indicates that petitioner did not “allege with particularity the facts upon which

he would have a final judgment overturned.” 34 Cal.2d at 304. Under California law, a denial of

relief under Swain is without prejudice to the filing of a new state court petition which meets the

requirements described in the case. See id. Because citation to In re Swain as the basis for

denying a state habeas petition generally indicates that the petitioner has not alleged with

particularity sufficient facts in support of his petition, and is without prejudice to the filing of a

subsequent petition meeting the pleading requirements, such denials do not establish the

exhaustion of available state remedies. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.

1986). However, a Swain denial does not per se establish that the claim is unexhausted if the

federal court independently determines that the claim could not have been alleged with any

greater particularity. See id. at 1320. In this case, the court makes the independent determination

that petitioner could not have alleged his claim with any greater particularity. Therefore, the

court does not find the Swain citation to be a valid basis for concluding that petitioner’s claim

was not fairly presented to the California Supreme Court. 

The court next addresses the state court’s citation to In re Miller. Under Miller, a

state habeas petitioner may not present claims which were raised in a prior petition. See id. at

735. As to this procedural defect, the California Supreme Court observed that “. . . no change in

the facts or the law substantially affecting the rights of the petitioner has been disclosed.” Id. 

Thus, this defect could have been cured if petitioner were able to present new facts or law. 

Petitioner did not do so. For this reason, the Miller citation is a valid basis upon which to

conclude that petitioner did not exhaust his claim due to a procedural deficiency which could

have, at least in theory, been cured but was not. 

Case 2:07-cv-00803-JKS Document 14 Filed 08/28/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

As to the state court’s citation to Duvall, that case outlines the various procedural

requirements for a state habeas petition. See 9 Cal.4th at 474. Among other things, the petition

must “include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim,

including pertinent portions of the trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations.” Id. A failure

to comply with this requirement is a pleading defect subject to cure by amendment. Here, the

court has reviewed the petition filed in the California Supreme Court and notes that no

documentary evidence was attached. Specifically, petitioner did not attach copies of the original

decision granting parole or the Governor’s denial. Nor is there evidence that petitioner ever filed

an amended petition in the California Supreme Court attempting to cure this defect. For this

reason, the court also finds that the Duvall citation is a valid basis upon which to conclude that

the claim was not exhausted in the California Supreme Court. 

In his opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, petitioner addresses the

Swain defect, discussed above. The court agrees with petitioner’s assertion that his claim could

not have been presented with any more particularity. Petitioner, however, does not address either

the Duvall or Miller deficiencies. Specifically, petitioner does not allege that he in fact attached

documentary evidence to his California Supreme Court petition nor does he allege that his claim

had not been presented in a prior state petition. 

As to petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, petitioner’s argument, in its

entirety, is as follows:

Petitioner Edmond Oscar Walker, move upon the United States

Court for the United States Eastern District Court, requesting this court

conduct an evidentiary hearing on the said matter that has not been

contested by the opposing party/defendants/respondents as was ordered to

do so on June 7, 2007. 

The court specifically order the defendants/respondents to file an

opposition motion to the writ of habeas corpus petition within 30 days

from the date of service of the said order filed on petitioner on June 7,

2007. 

Therefore the petitioner requests that this court issue an order for

evidence hearing to be schedule, and deem the defendants/respondents has

defaulted the right to filed a response to the established constitutional right

denial under the 14th Amendment and all facts should be deem true. 

Case 2:07-cv-00803-JKS Document 14 Filed 08/28/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

It appears that petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is based on the conclusion that

respondent has defaulted. That is not true. Respondent was directed to file a response to the

petition within 30 days of the date of service of the court’s June 11, 2007, order. Respondent

timely filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 11, 2007. Plaintiff has not otherwise

demonstrated that an evidentiary hearing would be required or appropriate in this case. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted;

2. Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing be denied; and

3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 24, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00803-JKS Document 14 Filed 08/28/07 Page 6 of 6