Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02073/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02073-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD L. LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 12cv02073 AJB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 10],

DENYING DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NO. 11], AND REMANDING

FUR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

On January 19, 2010, Plaintiff Richard L. Lewis filed an

application for supplemental security income benefits alleging a

disability onset of February 26, 2009. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 13,

ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #5, 119.) The Social Security

Administration ("SSA") denied his claim on March 18, 2010, and

again upon reconsideration on July 7, 2010. (Id. Attach. #2, 13;

id. Attach. #3, 44-45; id. Attach. #4, 55-59.) Lewis then filed a

written request for a hearing, which is dated July 26, 2010. (Id.

Attach. #2, 13; id. Attach. #4, 62.)

A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")

Larry B. Parker on May 18, 2011. (Id. Attach. #2, 25.) He issued

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a written decision on June 22, 2011, finding that Plaintiff was not

disabled. (See id. at 20.) The Appeals Council declined to review

the decision on July 10, 2012. (Id. at 1.)

On August 22, 2012, Lewis filed a Complaint in this Court

against Defendant Michael J. Astrue, then-Commissioner of Social

Security [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff challenges the denial of his claim

for disability insurance benefits. (Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 1.) 

Defendant filed an Answer to Complaint on November 2, 2012, along

with the Administrative Record [ECF Nos. 7, 8]. On January 30,

2013, Lewis's Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand was filed [ECF

No. 10]. Astrue filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on

February 12, 2013, with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF

No. 11]. The Cross-Motion is essentially the same document as

Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,

which was filed the same day [ECF No. 12]. Lewis did not file an

opposition to the Cross-Motion.

Since the initiation of this lawsuit, Carolyn W. Colvin has

replaced Astrue as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. 

Colvin is therefore substituted for her predecessor pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 

The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral

argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set

forth below, the Court recommends that the district court GRANT IN

PART AND DENY IN PART Lewis's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.

10], DENY Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.

11], and remand the case for further proceedings.

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I. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiff if a sixty-one-year old male who graduated from high

school and attended three years of college. (Admin. R. Attach. #2,

29, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #4, 81.) He previously worked at an

auto dealership as a sales manager and as a finance manager. (Id.)

Lewis began seeking treatment for back pain in September of

2003. (Id. Attach. #7, 297.) An MRI completed on October 7, 2003,

showed that Lewis had degenerative disk disease at L4-5 and L5-S1. 

(Id. at 293-94.) In April and May of 2004, he received epidural

steroid injections. (Id. at 338-42.) On October 4, 2004, Dr.

Virgil Hilliard, M.D., performed a provocative discography on

Plaintiff that "revealed a severely degenerated disk with a right

posterolateral leak." (Id. at 318.) Plaintiff was evaluated on

November 3, 2004, by Dr. Sanjay Khurana, M.D., who opined that

based on Lewis's MRI, he had a "significantly collapsed disk at L5-

S1 as well as a blackened disk at L4-5 . . . ." (Id. at 320.) Dr.

Khurana subsequently performed an interbody and posterolateral

fusion procedure. (Id. at 330.) 

On May 2, 2006, Lewis underwent another MRI, which revealed

"no clear impingement upon the neural elements." (Id. at 257.) 

His back pain persisted, and he later had the interbody and

posterolateral fusion surgery reversed and the hardware removed. 

(Id. at 330-31, 334.) Seven weeks after surgery, on December 11,

2006, the claimant reported that his back pain had improved but his

leg pain continued. (Id.)

Plaintiff sought treatment for pain in his back and legs from

Dr. Janith Seidel, a family practitioner, on September 6, 2007. 

(Id. at 277.) The physician diagnosed Lewis with diabetes,

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ventricular tachycardia, lumbar disk disorder, lumbar spondylosis,

hypermlipidemia, and hypertension. (Id. at 278.)

Almost eighteen months later, on February 27, 2009, Plaintiff

returned to Dr. Seidel and complained that his back pain was

getting worse. (Id. Attach. #8, 717.) The doctor determined that

Lewis had failed back syndrome and she recommended acupuncture. 

(Id. at 718.) Dr. Seidel again diagnosed the claimant with

diabetes, ventricular tachycardia, lumbar disk disorder, lumbar

spondylosis, hypertension, a nonruptured cerebral aneurysm, and

migraines. (Id. Attach. #7, 289-90.) In a letter addressed "To

Whom It May Concern" and dated March 8, 2011, Dr. Seidel described

Lewis's physical limitations.

As a result of Mr. Lewis's conditions he cannot sit,

stand, or walk for more than one hour total in an eight

hour work day on a sustained basis, he can only

occasionally lift and carry up to ten pounds, and he has

significant limitations in doing repetitive reaching,

handling, fingering, and lifting. As a result, he is

markedly limited, essentially precluded in his bilateral

upper extremities for grasping, turning and twisting

objects, using fingers/hands for fine manipulations, and

using arms for reaching (including overhead). 

Additionally, he is precluded from pushing, pulling,

kneeling, bending, and stooping. His condition also

interferes with his ability to keep his neck in a

constant position (e.g. looking at a computer screen,

looking down at a desk) so he could not do a full time

job that requires this activity on a sustained basis.

(Id. Attach. #9, 878.) The treating physician ultimately opined

that Lewis's recovery potential was poor, he was only capable of

working at a low-stress job, and his symptoms would become worse in

a competitive work environment. (Id.)

 On May 21, 2009, Plaintiff consulted with Dr. Lisa Anne

Phillip, M.D., about his back pain. (Id. Attach. #7, 255-56.) Dr.

Phillip diagnosed Lewis with postlaminectomy syndrome of the lumbar

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region, arthropathy of lumbar facet, degeneration of lumbosacral

intervertebral disk, and myofascial pain syndrome. (Id. at 258.) 

Two weeks later, an MRI was performed which revealed fusion at the

L4 to S1, persistent left L5-S1 spondylotic foraminal stenosis, and

minor multi-level spondylosis. (Id. at 281-82.) On the same day,

an x-ray was taken which showed that Lewis had "postoperative and

mild degenerative changes with mild scoliosis and

spondylolisthesis." (Id. at 280.) Plaintiff also sought

acupuncture treatment again, to which he responded favorably. (Id.

at 373.)

Dr. Louis Rosen, an osteopathic specialist in physical

medicine and rehabilitation, evaluated Lewis on February 19, 2010. 

(Id. Attach. #8, 557.) Dr. Rosen observed that Plaintiff moved

cautiously, used a walking stick, and suffered from atrophy of his

gluteal muscles. (Id. at 559.) The doctor diagnosed Lewis with

postlaminectomy syndrome, diabetes, and "deconditioning/chronic

pain syndrome." (Id. at 560.)

On March 2, 2010, Dr. S. Brodsky, D.O., completed a residual

functional capacity ("RFC") questionnaire. (Id. Attach. #7, 464-

68.) Dr. Brodsky opined that Plaintiff could frequently lift or

carry ten pounds and could stand or walk at least two hours in an

eight-hour day. (Id. at 465.) According to Dr. Brodsky, Lewis

could sit six hours in an eight-hour day and had unlimited ability

to push and pull. (Id.) Plaintiff could also occasionally climb,

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but never balance. (Id. at 466.) 

The doctor concluded that Lewis had the RFC to perform sedentary

work. (Id. at 470.)

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Dr. Gregory Nicholson, M.D., completed a comprehensive

psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff on March 4, 2010. (Id. at 472-

77.) The physician noted that Lewis took prescription medications

Xanax and nortriptyline. (Id. at 473.) Dr. Nicholson stated that

Plaintiff did not have symptoms consistent with any psychiatric

conditions and determined that "[f]rom the psychiatric standpoint,

the claimant's condition is expected to remain stable without

treatment." (Id. at 476.) Based on the examination, Dr. Nicholson

drew the following conclusions:

1. The claimant is able to understand, remember, and

carry out simple one or two-step job instructions.

2. The claimant is able to do detailed and complex

instructions. 

3. The claimant's ability to relate and interact with

coworkers and the public is not limited.

4. The claimant's ability to maintain concentration and

attention, persistence and pace is not limited. 

5. The claimant's ability to associate with day-to-day

work activity, including attendance and safety is

not limited.

6. The claimant's ability to accept instructions from

supervisors is not limited.

7. The claimant's ability to maintain regular

attendance in the work place and perform work

activities on a consistent basis is not limited.

8. The claimant's ability to perform work activities

without special or additional supervision is not

limited.

(Id. at 476-77.)

On April 12, 2010, Lewis sought treatment for his lower back

and leg pain from Dr. Michael Scott Jaffe, a specialist in physical

medicine and rehabilitation. (Id. at 515-16.) Dr. Jaffe opined

that Plaintiff suffered from limited lumbar flexion, questionable

stocking-glove loss of sensation in both feet and toes, poor

vibratory sensation in both metatarsal joints, poor

proprioreception in both feet, and mild atrophy of the left foot

muscle. (Id. at 518.) He also stated that Lewis had moderate

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bilateral lumbar paraspinal spasms, moderate bilateral lumbar facet

tenderness, a wide-based gait with less knee flexion than normal,

and two and a half centimeters less circumference in the left thigh

compared to the right. (Id. at 518-19.) As a result, the

physician diagnosed Plaintiff with postlaminectomy syndrome of the

lumbar region. (Id. at 519.)

Dr. Jaffe completed a lumbar spine impairment questionnaire

two weeks later. (Id. Attach. #9, 806-12.) There, he noted that

Plaintiff had poor recovery potential and walked with a limp. (Id.

at 806-07.) In an eight-hour work day, Dr. Jaffe estimated that

Lewis could only sit, stand, or walk for less than one hour each

and that Plaintiff's symptoms would frequently interfere with his

ability to concentrate. (Id. at 808, 810.) Dr. Jaffe opined that

Lewis would need to get up and move around every half hour for ten

to fifteen minutes. (Id. at 809.) He also stated that Plaintiff

could lift or carry five to ten pounds occasionally and up to five

pounds frequently. (Id.) The doctor ultimately concluded that

Lewis was unable to work. (Id. at 811.)

When Plaintiff was evaluated by a neurologist, Dr. Sumati

Rawat, M.D., on April 27, 2010, the doctor noted that Lewis was

"unable to give good effort" during the strength testing because of

his pain. (Id. Attach. #8, 501.) Dr. Rawat determined that Lewis

had decreased sensation to pin pricks and touch in a stocking

distribution and "differential decreased pin prick in the left

medial foot and calf in the L5 distribution." (Id.) Additionally,

Plaintiff had decreased reflexes, a very cautious, wide-based,

antalgic gait, and an inability to perform a heel-to-shin maneuver

due to back pain. (Id.)

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On May 4, 2010, Dr. Rawat noted that the claimant was still

suffering from back pain and taking Norco, morphine, nortriptyline,

and gabapentin. (Id. Attach. #9, 814.) She opined that Plaintiff

had a flat affect, decreased sensation in a stocking distribution

below the knee, and differentially decreased pin prick sensation in

the left foot and calf in an L5 distribution. (Id. at 815.) The

doctor again stated that Lewis exhibited decreased reflexes and

walked with a very cautious, antalgic, and wide-based gait. (Id.) 

A nerve conduction velocity/electromyograph (NCV/EMG) study was

also completed by Dr. Rawat which showed left L5 radiculopathy with

past axonal loss and active denervation. (Id. at 816-17.) Dr.

Rawat diagnosed Plaintiff with post-laminectomy syndrome. (Id. at

817.) Two months later, Dr. R. Masters, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff's

medical history; he affirmed the finding that Lewis had the RFC to

perform sedentary work and was able to return to work as a

financial manager. (Id. Attach. #9, 793.)

On October 25, 2011, four months after the ALJ issued his

decision, Plaintiff sought an independent medical evaluation from

an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Alanson Mason. (Id. at 896-905.) Dr.

Mason examined Lewis and diagnosed him with lumbar spondylosis at

L4-5 and L5-S1; dextroscoliosis of the lumbar spine; facet joint

arthrosis at L5-S1; status post-lumbar laminectomy; discectomy and

fusion with instrumentation L4-5 and L5-S1; narcotic drug

dependency; diabetes; and diabetic polyneuropathy. (Id. at 904.) 

He concluded that "[t]he cumulative effect of multiple comobidities preclude [Plaintiff's] return to substantial gainful

employment . . . ." (Id.) 

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Two and a half weeks later, Dr. Mason completed a cervical

spine impairment questionnaire where he opined that during the

course of an eight-hour day, Lewis could sit for three hours and

stand or walk for one hour. (Id. at 908, 911.) Every hour,

however, Plaintiff would need to get up and move around for ten

minutes. (Id. at 911.) The doctor also determined that Lewis

could frequently lift five pounds, occasionally lift five to twenty

pounds, and never lift over twenty pounds. (Id.) He noted that

Plaintiff frequently experienced pain, fatigue, or other symptoms

that interfered with his ability to concentrate. (Id. at 912.) 

According to Dr. Mason, Lewis was capable of performing a job with

low stress, but would likely miss work two to three times a month

because of his impairments. (Id. at 912, 914.) 

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

On May 18, 2011, an administrative hearing was held. (Id.

Attach. #2, 25.) Lewis, his former attorney Michael Rickard, a

vocational expert, and a medical expert were present at the

hearing. (Id.) Judge Parker heard testimony from Plaintiff, the

vocational expert, and the medical expert. (Id. at 28-43.) 

A. Lewis's Testimony

Plaintiff testified that he was not working due to his

multiple impairments. (Id. at 29-30.) To manage his pain when he

previously worked at an auto dealership, Lewis would ice his back

two to four times a day, prop his feet up on his desk, and move

around when not consulting with customers. (Id. at 33.) He later

began to take pain medication, but the medicine made him confused

and unable to "think straight." (Id.) As a result, he was

terminated from his job. (Id.) 

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Lewis testified that he took 120 milligrams of morphine a day

along with Norco, Lorazepam, and "all kinds of other medicines." 

(Id. at 34.) He claimed that the medications caused him to nap up

to three hours during the day. (Id. at 34-35.) Plaintiff also

maintained that he was unable to read books because the medications

impaired his ability to "keep the storyline[s] straight." (Id. 35-

36.) Rather, he stated that his days were spent icing his back,

watching television, and helping his wife with minor household

chores such as dusting, making spaghetti, and some light grocery

shopping. (Id. at 35-38.) Lewis represented that he was unable to

return to work as a finance manager because he suffered from leg

and back pain, along with numbness in his feet. (Id. at 38.) 

Additionally, he was unable to "think straight" or walk. (Id.)

B. The Medical Expert's Testimony

Dr. Arthur Brovender, the medical expert, testified that while

the claimant did suffer from severe limitations, he did not meet or

equal any of the listed impairments. (Id. at 30.) To support this

conclusion, the expert cited two MRI's of Plaintiff's lumbosacral

spine. (Id.) Both showed post-operative changes, degenerative

disk disease, osteoarthritis, and a solid fusion of the L4 to S1. 

(Id.) According to the expert, the medical evidence also showed

that Lewis suffered from weakness in his big toe, decreased

sensation in both legs, and lower back pain at the L5-S1 space. 

(Id. at 30-31.) Plaintiff received acupuncture and epidural

injections to help treat these ailments. (Id.)

The expert noted that the records indicated that Plaintiff had

a normal gait, a negative straight leg raise, mild decreased range

of motion at the lumbosacral spine, and decreased motor strength

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and sensation. (Id. at 31.) The electromyogram (EMG) performed on

August 5, 2004, was negative, and a subsequent discogram completed

in October of that year showed fifty percent concordance. (Id.) 

Five years later, however, Lewis's gait and neurological and

sensory examinations were normal. (Id.) 

Dr. Brovender then discussed a report prepared on April 27,

2010, which showed that Plaintiff had been complaining of chronic

lower back pain and cramping in his lower extremities. (Id.) 

Lewis had stocking anesthesia in his legs that was possibly due to

his diabetes. (Id.) According to the report, Plaintiff exhibited

a cautious gait, but his deep tendon reflexes were present and

symmetrical and he had a negative straight leg raise. (Id.) The

expert stated that the fusion in Lewis's back was solid, and an EMC

showed L5 radiculitis and "spinal cord stimulator." (Id.) 

The medical expert then described the evidence contained in

Exhibits 13F, 18F, and 21F. (Id.) Plaintiff's bilateral

radiculitis was again noted. (Id.) Exhibit 18F showed that Lewis

used a cane; his straight leg raise test was negative; and his

neurological sensory examinations were normal. (Id.) The medical

expert noted that in Exhibit 20F, one of Lewis's treating

physicians stated that Plaintiff could perform a low-stress job. 

(Id.) 

Based on this evidence, the medical expert opined that Lewis

could sit six to eight hours in a work day and stand or walk for

four. (Id. at 32.) According to Dr. Brovender, Plaintiff could

lift ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally, as well

as bend, stoop, squat, and kneel occasionally. (Id.) Lewis could

use stairs and ramps occasionally, but should avoid ropes,

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scaffolds, and ladders. (Id.) Lastly, the expert testified that

Plaintiff had no limitations in reaching overhead or with fine or

gross manipulation. (Id.)

C. The Vocational Expert's Testimony

Finally, vocational expert John Kilcher also testified at the

hearing. (Id. at 40.) He stated that Lewis's previous jobs as a

financial manager and sales manager are both classified as

sedentary and skilled work. (Id.) 

The ALJ asked the vocational expert whether a person of

advanced age with a post-high school education and the limitations

that Dr. Brovender provided would be able to perform Plaintiff's

past relevant work. (Id. at 41.) The expert opined that a person

with that background and those limitations would be able to perform

both of Lewis's previous jobs. (Id.) The ALJ then asked if that

same person could carry out Plaintiff's past relevant work activity

if that claimant was unable to use ladders, ropes, and scaffolds;

limited to lifting ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds

frequently; able to sit six out of eight hours; and able to stand

or walk two out of eight hours. (Id.) The vocational expert

responded, "Yes." (Id.) 

Michael Rickard, Lewis's attorney, then proposed hypotheticals

to the vocational expert. (Id.) Rickard asked whether a person of

the same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff could

perform his past relevant work experience if the hypothetical

claimant was unable to (1) sit, stand, or walk for more than one

hour in a work day; (2) lift or carry ten pounds more than

occasionally; and (3) push, pull, kneel, bend, and stoop; and (4)

keep his neck in a constant position. (Id. at 41-42.) Kilcher

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said, "No" and that there were no jobs available for a person with

such a profile. (Id. at 42.) 

Next, the attorney asked whether a person with the same

education and work experience as Lewis could perform his past

relevant work if the hypothetical claimant was off task twenty

percent of the time due to pain or side effects from the use of

medication. (Id.) The vocational expert said that a person with

the limitations described could not perform Plaintiff's past

relevant work and that no jobs existed for that person. (Id.

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Generally

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show two things: (1) He or she suffers from

a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to last

for a continuous period of twelve months or more, or would result

in death; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of

performing the work that he or she previously performed or any

other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national

economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2011). An

applicant must meet both requirements to be classified as

"disabled." Id.

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

allow applicants whose claims have been denied by the Social

Security Administration to seek judicial review of the

Commissioner's final agency decision. Id. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). 

The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the

Commissioner's decision. Id. § 405(g). The court should affirm

the decision unless "it is based upon legal error or is not

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supported by substantial evidence." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d

1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d

599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). The district court may also remand the

matter to the Social Security Administration for further

proceedings. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (2011).

B. Remand for Further Proceedings

A district court may remand a Social Security disability

decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Hoa Hong Van

v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2007). That provision

states, "The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings

and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with

or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C.A. §

405(g). "A sentence-four remand is essentially a determination

that the Commissioner erred in denying benefits." Havrylovich v.

Astrue, No. 09-1113-HA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, at *19 (D. Or.

Jan. 25, 2011) (citing Hoa Hong Van, 483 F.3d at 605). If a case

is remanded and an additional hearing is held, the Commissioner may

modify or affirm the original findings of fact or the decision. 42

U.S.C.A. § 405(g).

A remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings or to

award benefits is within the court's discretion. McAllister v.

Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). "'If additional

proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative

proceedings, a social security case should be remanded. Where,

however, a rehearing would simply delay receipt of benefits,

reversal [and an award of benefits] is appropriate.'" Id. (quoting

Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). "[T]he

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proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to an

administrative agency for additional investigation or explanation." 

INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the

opinions of his treating physicians, Drs. Jaffe and Seidel. (See

generally Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Remand Attach. #1, 11-16, ECF No.

10.) Lewis also alleges that it was error for the Appeals Council

not to remand the case in light of the new opinion of Dr. Alanson

Mason, an examining orthopedist. (Id. at 16-17.) Finally,

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ's conclusion that Lewis lacked

credibility was not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 17-

18.) 

In her Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Colvin maintains

that the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion evidence in

the record and gave valid reasons for discounting the assessments

of Drs. Jaffe and Seidel. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 3-5, ECF No. 11.) Defendant additionally argues that the most

recent opinion provided by the examining orthopedist is not a

ground for remand because it is not material. (Id. at 5-7.) 

Lastly, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ properly determined

that Plaintiff was not fully credible. (Id. at 7-10.) 

"Administrative law judges are responsible for reviewing the

evidence and making findings of fact and conclusions of law." 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2) (2012). Generally, conflicts in the

evidence should be resolved by the Commissioner, not the courts. 

See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987); Laffoon

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v. Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1977). The ALJ is the

final arbiter of ambiguities in the medical evidence. Tommasetti

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2008). The

Commissioner's decision must be upheld when the evidence would

support more than one rational interpretation. Havrylovich, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, at *4 (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)).

The Ninth Circuit has articulated the standard district courts

must apply when deciding whether to remand a matter for further

proceedings:

Remand for further administrative proceedings is

appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful. 

Conversely, where the record has been developed fully and

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

purpose, the district court should remand for an

immediate award of benefits. More specifically, the

district court should credit evidence that was rejected

during the administrative process and remand for an

immediate award of benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the

evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must

be resolved before a determination of disability can be

made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ

would be required to find the claimant disabled were such

evidence credited.

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted); see Strauss v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d

1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the standard outlined in

Benecke). "A claimant is not entitled to benefits under the

statute unless the claimant is, in fact, disabled, no matter how

egregious the ALJ's errors may be." Strauss, 635 F.3d at 1138. 

A. The ALJ's Adverse Credibility Determination

The Court will address the assessment of Plaintiff's

credibility first because it informs the analysis of another of

Lewis's claims. Plaintiff argues that ALJ Parker failed to provide

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substantial evidence to support his finding that Lewis's statements

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his

symptoms were not credible. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Remand Attach.

#1, 17-18, ECF No. 10.) The claimant contends that the ALJ relied

on written statements provided by Plaintiff and his wife, Juanita,

which indicated that he was able to function at a higher level than

what was alleged by his treating sources. (Id. at 18 (citing

Admin. R. Attach. #2, 18, ECF No. 8).) Lewis claims that the ALJ

failed to elaborate on his credibility findings, constituting a

"clear violation of well-entrenched case law that demands a strict

accounting for so severe a finding." (Id.)

Colvin maintains that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff

was not fully credible was supported by proper reasoning and

substantial evidence. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

7, ECF No. 11.) Moreover, Defendant asserts that Lewis fails to

challenge any of the credibility factors that the ALJ considered. 

(Id.) "As such, Plaintiff has conceded the factors are valid and

supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ's credibility

finding should be upheld on this basis alone." (Id.) 

The ALJ properly concluded that Lewis was not credible, the

Commissioner insists, because Plaintiff's daily activities were

inconsistent with his claims of disability. (Id. at 8 (citing

Admin. R. Attach. #2, 18-19, ECF No. 8).) Colvin claims that

according to Richard and Juanita Lewis, Plaintiff was able to make

meals, watch television, play games, shave, shower, run errands,

cook, dress himself, style his hair, use the toilet, wash dishes,

do laundry, pick up the house, walk, drive a car, shop, e-mail,

take photos, go out to dinner, and visit family and friends. (Id.

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(citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 18, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #6, 184-

91).) 

Next, Defendant contends that the ALJ also properly considered

the February 27, 2009 progress notes, which showed that Lewis was

within normal limits and was not suffering from pulmonary distress

or neurological deficits. (Id. at 9 (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2,

16, ECF No. 8; id. Attach #7, 391-92).) Colvin additionally urges

that the ALJ considered a September 2009 physical examination

report that described Lewis as alert and cooperative, with an

appropriate affect, and a full range of movement; Plaintiff had a

negative cerebellar examination and an ataxic gait. (Id. (citing

Admin. R. Attach. #2, 16, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #7, 289-90).) 

Finally, the Commissioner alleges that the ALJ properly discounted

Plaintiff's credibility because the record showed that Lewis's pain

had been effectively treated with medication. (Id. (citing Admin.

R. Attach. #2, 16, ECF No. 8).) 

"In order for the ALJ to find [claimant's] testimony

unreliable, the ALJ must make 'a credibility determination with

findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that

the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant's testimony.'"

Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958). In deciding whether

a plaintiff's testimony regarding subjective pain is credible, the

adjudicator must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue,

572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue,

504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)); see Batson v. Comm'r of

the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 

"'First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented

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objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms

alleged.'" Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591 (quoting Lingenfelter, 504

F.3d at 1036). Second, if the claimant satisfies the first step

and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the

claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms if he gives

"'specific, clear and convincing reasons'" for doing so. Id.

(quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Judge Parker determined that Lewis's impairments "could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms . . . ." 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 18, ECF No. 8.) No one challenges this

conclusion. The first prong of the ALJ's inquiry regarding Lewis's

credibility is satisfied. See Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. Next, the

Court determines whether Judge Parker provided clear reasons for

the adverse credibility finding that are supported by the evidence

in the record. 

The Commissioner's reasons for rejecting a claimant's

testimony must be "clear and convincing." Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). To support a finding that the plaintiff

was not credible, the ALJ must "'point to specific facts in the

record which demonstrate that [the plaintiff] is in less pain than

she claims.'" Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 592 (quoting Dodrill v.

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993)). The ALJ must make

specific findings "stat[ing] which pain testimony is not credible

and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible." 

Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918. A reviewing court should not be forced to

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speculate as to the grounds for an administrative law judge's

rejection of a plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain. Bunnell

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Murray v.

Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Steele v.

Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the

ALJ must build an accurate and logical connection between the

evidence and the decision).

In general, questions of credibility are for the ALJ to

resolve. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Courts should not "second-guess" an ALJ's credibility

determinations. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 580 (9th Cir.

1984). If the evidence is conflicting and could be rationally

interpreted more than one way, the court must uphold the ALJ's

decision. Id. at 579. 

Social Security Ruling 96-7p provides the relevant standard: 

4. In determining the credibility of the individual's

statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case

record, including the objective medical evidence, the

individual's own statements about symptoms, statements

and other information provided by treating or examining

physicians or psychologists and other persons about the

symptoms and how they affect the individual, and any

other relevant evidence in the case record. An

individual's statements about the intensity and

persistence of pain or other symptoms or about the effect

the symptoms have on his or her ability to work may not

be disregarded solely because they are not substantiated

by objective medical evidence.

5. It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a

single, conclusory statement that "the individual's

allegations have been considered" or that "the

allegations are (or are not) credible." It is also not

enough for the adjudicator simply to recite the factors

that are described in the regulations for evaluating

symptoms. The determination or decision must contain

specific reasons for the finding on credibility,

supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be

sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and

to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator

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gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for

that weight.

SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, at *2-4 (July 2, 1996). 

The Ninth Circuit has articulated the grounds on which an ALJ

may properly decide to discredit a claimant's testimony: 

In weighing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may

consider [claimant's] reputation for truthfulness,

inconsistencies either in his testimony or between his

testimony and his conduct, his daily activities, his work

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties

concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the

symptoms of which he complains.

Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). Where the ALJ's credibility assessment is

supported by substantial evidence, it will not be disturbed even

where some of the reasons for discrediting a claimant's testimony

were improper. Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d

1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Judge Parker determined that Plaintiff's statements were

not fully credible "to the extent they are inconsistent with the

above [discussed] residual functional capacity assessment." 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 18, ECF No. 18.) He continued: 

In terms of the claimant's alleged impairments, the

consultative examiner indicated that the claimant has no

difficulty with dressing, bathing or attending to his own

personal hygiene needs unassisted. The claimant can

appropriately handle bills as well as cash, and he is

able to go out on his own (Exhibit 6F). The claimant's

wife, Juanita Lewis, completed a third party function

report on February 17, 2010, indicating that she is with

the claimant on a daily basis, and that they make a home

together spending time together every day making meals,

watching television and playing games. The claimant

shaves and showers independently. The claimant reads email on the computer every day and is able to go to the

post office, bank, and grocery store unassisted. Mrs.

Lewis stated that the claimant can independently run 

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errands, and retains the ability to cook and prepare

meals for the family, including sandwiches, oatmeal, and

meats such as roast or spaghetti. Mrs. Lewis indicated

that the claimant's daily personal care includes

independently dressing, showering, keeping his hair clean

and neat, shaving, feeding, and using the toilet. Mrs.

Lewis stated that the claimant washes dishes on a daily

basis, does laundry a couple of times a week, and "picks

up" on a daily basis. Mrs. Lewis encourages the claimant

to "go outside" every day. The claimant can walk and

drive a car on daily outings, and he shops for groceries,

paper products, cards, and medications. The claimant's

daily hobbies include e-mail/computer news, photography,

and watching television. Mrs. Lewis stated that the

claimant remains social going out to dinner, visiting

friends and family, holding his grandchildren and he

engages in these activities once or twice a month. Mrs.

Lewis stated that every day when she gets home from work,

they share a meal, sometimes [sic] call relatives, plays

[sic] computer games, and fall asleep watching television

(Exhibit 4E). In the function report dated February 28,

2010, completed by the claimant, he stated that everyday

he takes a shower and gets dressed independently. He

retains the ability to take a walk, make the bed, wash

the laundry, and wash dishes. He sometimes drives down

to the beach for the sunset. The claimant stated that

every day he prepares food or meals that require

preparation time from 5 minutes to a few hours and he

cooks more because he has more time. He also engages in

light housekeeping and goes outside every day, stating

that he tries "to get out and walk as much as possible." 

He travels by foot, walking, goes out alone, and is able

to drive a car without assistance. The claimant shops

for groceries a few times a week for an hour or more each

time, and he stated his hobbies include watching

television every day and photography. The claimant uses

a cane/walking stick to ambulate, but admitted that it

was not medically necessary and not prescribed by his

physician (Exhibit 5E). The claimant's daily level of

functioning, as corroborated by his spouse, is indicative

of a higher level of functioning than that of his

treating sources.

(Id.)

In assessing Lewis's credibility, ALJ Parker did not

explicitly rely on the progress notes, the September 2009 exam

notes, or on the fact that Plaintiff's pain was being treated

effectively with medication, as argued by Colvin. (Compare id.,

with Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9, ECF No. 11.) 

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These grounds were not specifically invoked by the ALJ when he made

his credibility determination, thus, the Court will not speculate

whether they were a basis to reject Lewis's credibility. See

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346. 

"'[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain

daily activities . . . does not in any way detract from her

credibility as to her overall disability.'" Orn v. Astrue, 495

F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d

1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Fair v. Brown, 885 F.2d 597,

603 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted) ("The Social Security Act

does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be

eligible for benefits, and many home activities are not easily

transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the

workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or

take medication.").

The Ninth Circuit has identified a two-part test for using a

claimant's daily activities as the basis for an adverse credibility

determination. Orn, 495 F.3d at 639. First, the court considers

whether a claimant's daily activities contradict the claimant's

other testimony. Id. Second, it determines whether the daily

activities meet the threshold for transferable work skills. Id.

"The ALJ must make specific findings relating to [the daily]

activities and their transferability to conclude that a claimant's

daily activities warrant an adverse credibility determination." 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart,

400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005)).

The ALJ relied on Plaintiff's "daily level of functioning" to

make an adverse credibility determination. (See Admin. R. Attach.

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#2, 18, ECF No. 8.) Judge Parker made no mention of whether the

claimant's daily activities contradicted his other testimony. (See

id.) Accordingly, the administrative law judge did not satisfy the

first ground for using a claimant's daily activities to make an

adverse credibility determination. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 639. 

Futhermore, to rely on a Plaintiff's daily activities to

support an adverse credibility determination, the claimant's daily

activities must correspond to transferable work skills. See id.

The inquiry is whether the claimant "is able to spend a substantial

part of her day performing household chores or other activities

that are transferable to a work setting." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284

n.7; see Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. Many home activities, however,

may not be easily transferable to a work environment where it might

be impossible to rest periodically or take medication. Smolen, 80

F.3d at 1284 n.7 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 603). In Vertigan, 260

F.3d 1044, the plaintiff shopped for groceries, socialized, walked

at the mall, and swam; the court still found her complaints

credible because some of these activities were not transferable to

a work setting, and she did not engage in them for a substantial

part of the day. Id. at 1049-50.

Here, Judge Parker did not attempt to correlate Lewis's daily

activities to a particular type of job. (See Admin. R. Attach. #2,

18, ECF No. 8); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; Vertigan, 260 F.3d

at 1050 ("[A]ctivities such as walking in the mall and swimming are

not necessarily transferable to the work setting with regard to the

impact of pain."). Moreover, the ALJ did not discuss whether

Plaintiff engaged in these physical activities for a substantial

part of the day. See Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050 ("A patient may do

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these activities despite pain for therapeutic reasons, but that

does not mean she could concentrate on work despite the pain or

could engage in similar activity for a longer period given the pain

involved."); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (holding that sporadic

activities followed by periods of rest are not inconsistent with

subjective complaints of severe pain).

The ALJ's conclusory reliance on Lewis's daily activities was

not a proper reason to discredit Plaintiff's subjective pain

testimony. See Richards v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-6011-JRC, 2012 WL

3279523, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2012) ("[T]he ALJ failed to

find explicitly that plaintiff's activities of daily living were

transferable to a work setting and he failed to identify

specifically which testimony was credible and what evidence

undermined Plaintiff's complaints. Therefore, this reliance on

activities of daily living was not supported by 'specific, cogent

reasons.'"). Similarly, the reasons articulated by the ALJ do not

constitute clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Lewis's

testimony.

There may be evidence in the record that the ALJ can rely on

as "specific, clear and convincing reasons" for rejecting the

claimant's testimony. Indeed, the Defendant discusses multiple

bases that could have been relied upon to discount Plaintiff's

credibility. (See Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8-9,

ECF No. 11.) The Commissioner made a similar argument in Vasquez

v. Colvin, No. ED CV 12-1302-E, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86554, at *7-

8 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2013), which the court rejected.

The ALJ's decision does not specifically identify any of

these considerations as the reason or reasons for the

ALJ's credibility determination. The ALJ's decision 

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mentions some of these considerations, but does not

expressly base the credibility determination on any of

them. Consequently, the Court cannot affirm the

credibility determination on the basis of any of these

considerations.

Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter for further

administrative review. Id. at *8.

The ALJ is in a better position to evaluate credibility than

this Court. See Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); see also Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d

1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) ("We are wary of speculating about the

basis of the ALJ's conclusion . . . ."). The Commissioner should

address the outstanding issues before making a decision as to

Lewis's disability. See Swims Under v. Astrue, 473 F. App'x 552,

553 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding for further proceedings where the

ALJ failed to cite sufficient reasons for his adverse credibility

determination). 

In considering Lewis's credibility, the ALJ failed to assess

the transferability of Plaintiff's daily activities to a work

setting. This assessment and its effect on the weight given to

Plaintiff's subjective testimony are unknown. The error cannot be

overlooked. The ALJ did not give other legitimate reasons for

discounting Lewis's credibility. See, e.g., Batson, 359 F.3d at

1197. There are outstanding issues to resolve, and it is not clear

from the record that ALJ Parker would be required to find Plaintiff

disabled if his testimony was credited. See Strauss v. Comm'r of

the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d at 1138. On this basis, a remand

for further proceedings rather than an award of benefits is

appropriate. 

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B. The Opinions of Drs. Jaffe and Seidel

Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the

opinions of Lewis's treating doctors and instead relied on the

assessments of nonexamining physicians. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

Remand Attach. #1, 13, ECF No. 10.) According to 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d), a treating physician's opinion must be accorded

controlling weight if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and . . . not

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case

record . . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (1012). If the

treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, the

following factors are applied to determine what weight to give the

opinion: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the

frequency of examination, (2) the nature and extent of the

treatment relationship, (3) the supportability of the opinion, (4)

the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the

specialization of the treating physicican, and (6) any other

factors brought to the attention of the ALJ which tend to support

or contradict the opinion. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii), (c)(3)-

(6).

Opinions of treating physicians may be rejected under certain

circumstances. See Batson v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359

F.3d at 1195. "Cases in [the Ninth Circuit] distinguish among the

opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the

claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not

treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who

neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians)." 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830 (footnote omitted).

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The standard for determining whether an ALJ properly rejected

the opinion of a treating physician varies. If the treating

doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another physician, the ALJ

must give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting it. Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d at 957; see also Spelatz v. Astrue, 321 F. App'x

689, 692 (9th Cir. 2009); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

On the other hand, if the treating physician's opinion is

contradicted, "[t]he ALJ must give specific, legitimate reasons for

disregarding the opinion of the treating physician.'" Batson, 359

F.3d at 1195 (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th

Cir. 1992)); see also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d at 1042. An

ALJ may discredit opinions "that are conclusory, brief, and

unsupported by . . . objective medical findings." Batson, 359 F.3d

at 1195.

Similarly, the opinion of an examining doctor is entitled to

greater weight than that of a nonexamining doctor. Lester, 81 F.3d

at 830 (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir.

1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1984)). "In

addition, the regulations give more weight to opinions that are

explained than to those that are not, and to the opinions of

specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over

that of nonspecialists." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), (5)).

"The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the

opinion of either an examining or a treating physician." Lester,

81 F.3d at 831 (citing Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506 n.4; Gallant, 753

F.2d at 1456). "[T]he report of [a] non-treating, non-examining

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physician, combined with the ALJ's own observance of [the]

claimant's demeanor at the hearing d[oes] not constitute

substantial evidence" and does not support an ALJ's "decision to

reject the examining physician's opinion that the claimant [is]

disabled." Id. (quoting Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

This does not mean that an ALJ may never reject a treating or

examining physician's opinion in favor of a nonexamining medical

expert's testimony. "[T]he findings of a nontreating, nonexamining

physician can amount to substantial evidence, so long as other

evidence in the record supports those findings." Saelee v. Chater,

94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonexamining physician's

opinion must be "supported by other evidence in the record and

consistent with it." Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169

F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

"When a nontreating physician's opinion contradicts that of

the treating physician - but is not based on independent clinical

findings, or rests on clinical findings also considered by the

treating physician - the opinion of the treating physician may be

rejected only if the ALJ gives 'specific, legitimate reasons for

doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.'"

Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.

1995); see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir.

1989)). 

The ALJ must set out a "detailed and thorough summary of the

facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation

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thereof, and making findings." Id. at 600-01 (quoting Magallanes,

881 F.2d at 750). The ALJ is not required to discuss each item of

evidence, but the record should indicate that all evidence

presented was considered. Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th

Cir. 2000); Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir.

1996). "[A]n ALJ may not make 'speculative inferences from medical

reports' and may reject 'a treating physician's opinion outright

only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence' and not due to

his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion."

Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)) (citing

Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1988); Kent v.

Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1983)). "Further, an ALJ may

discredit treating physicians' opinions that are conclusory, brief,

and unsupported by the record as a whole, or by objective medical

findings . . . ." Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (citing Matney, 981

F.2d at 1019; Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d at 1149). The

reviewing court must "'consider the record as a whole, weighing

both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the

Secretary's conclusion.'" Tacket v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th

Cir. 1993)).

Plaintiff alleges that the only physicians to examine Lewis

and evaluate his residual physical function were Drs. Jaffe and

Seidel. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Remand Attach. #1, 12, ECF No. 10.) 

Lewis contends that Dr. Jaffe's clinical findings were that

Plaintiff suffered from the following:

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limited lumbar flexion, stocking glove loss of sensation

in both feet and toes, poor vibratory sensation in both

metatarsal joints, poor proprioception in both feet, mild

atrophy of the left foot muscle, moderate bilateral

paralumbar spasm, moderate lumbar facet tenderness

bilaterally, a wide-based gait with less knee flexion

than normal, and 2.5 centimeters less circumference in

the left thigh compared to the right[.] Dr. Jaffe

diagnosed postlaminectomy syndrome of the lumbar region,

also suspecting that his left lower extremity

radiculopathy could be due to his diabetic peripheral

neuropathy.

(Id. (citing Admin. R. Attach. #8, 519, ECF No. 8).) Plaintiff

also argues that the record shows that he tried various remedies to

control his pain, including fusion and instrumentation insertion;

subsequent removal of that instrumentation; epidural injections;

acupuncture; and prescriptions for hydrocodone and morphine. (Id.

at 13.) Despite this evidence, the ALJ still rejected both of the

treating physicians' opinions. (Id.) 

According to Lewis, the ALJ provided three reasons for

discounting the opinions of Drs. Jaffe and Seidel, none of which

were clear and convincing. (Id.) First, Plaintiff states that the

ALJ rejected the opinions because they were not supported by the

evidence of record. (Id. (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19, ECF No.

8).) Lewis alleges that this type of general statement is a

legally insufficient reason to reject the opinion of a treating

physician. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this assertion is

factually inaccurate in light of the diagnostic and clinical

evidence, which included two unsuccessful lumbar surgeries, MRI's

that showed "the continued presence of persistent left L5-S1

spondylotic foraminal stenosis [Admin. R. Attach. #7, 281-82, ECF

No. 8]," and an EMG/NCV study that showed "an L5 radiculopathy with

active denervation [Id. Attach. #9, 816-17]."

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Second, Lewis contends that the ALJ rejected the opinions of

Drs. Jaffe and Seidel because they conflicted with Juanita and

Richard Lewis's assertions regarding his daily activities. (Id. at

14.) The ALJ found that the statements were "'indicative of a

higher level of functioning than that alleged by [Plaintiff's]

treating sources.'" (Id. (quoting Admin. R. Attach. #2, 18, ECF

No. 8).) Yet, maintains Lewis, the only activities that he was

able to perform "are of such minimal physical exertion and are

performed so sporadically or for such short periods that they do

not logically bear upon his ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, or

carry for the duration, regularity, or intensity that even

full-time sedentary work would entail." (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiff urges that ALJ Parker rejected the opinions

of Drs. Jaffe and Seidel because they appeared to be based

primarily on Lewis's subjective complaints that his pain was

moderately severe, constant, and diffuse. (Id. at 14-15 (citing

Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #9, 876, 878-79).) 

Plaintiff responds that in addition to relying on his statements,

the treating physicians also provided their assessments of how long

the claimant was able to sit, stand, and walk, as well the extent

to which he could lift and carry objects. (Id. at 15.)

Plaintiff asserts that ALJ Parker based his decision on the

opinions of nonexamining review physician Brodsky and medical

advisor Brovender rather than on the opinions of the treating

physicians. (Id. (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 31-32, ECF No. 8;

id. Attach. #7, 464-68).) Yet, "[n]either source offered any

explanation whatsoever for their significant departure from the

opinions of the treating sources as to the functional impact of

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their patient's spinal impairments." (Id.) Absent specific and

legitimate or clear and convincing reasons justifying the rejection

of the opinions of these opinions, Plaintiff insists that the ALJ

committed "harmful error." (Id. at 16.)

On the other hand, the Defendant argues that ALJ Parker gave

valid reasons for discounting the opinions of the treating

physicians and determining that Lewis could work a full week at a

limited, sedentary job. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 3, ECF No. 11 (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 17-19, ECF No. 8).) 

Colvin contends that the ALJ properly relied on the assessments of

state agency medical consultants, Drs. Brodsky and Masters, and

medical expert, Dr. Brovender, because these opinions were the most

consistent with the record. (Id. (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 17-

19, 30-33, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #8, 464-71; id. Attach. #9, 791-

93).)

The Commissioner also maintains that the ALJ found that the

opinions of Drs. Jaffe and Seidel were contrary to the great weight

of the evidence, which showed that Plaintiff suffered from mild

degenerative disk disease and scoliosis. (Id. at 4 (citing Admin.

R. Attach. #2, 16-17, 19, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #7, 250-305; id.

Attach. #9, 791-93).) Evidence of Lewis's mild condition included

(1) a May 2009 orthopedic evaluation which showed that Plaintiff

was a "relatively healthy-appearing individual with no apparent

distress[;]" (2) an MRI that showed no impingement; and (3) an MRI

from June 2009 which showed no evidence of osteolysis or fracture

deformity. (Id. (citing Admin R. Attach. #7, 379-90, 382-83,

386).)

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Colvin insists that Drs. Jaffe and Seidel based their opinions

on Lewis's subjective complaints. (Id.) "Since the ALJ properly

found Plaintiff's complaints not fully credible, it was appropriate

for the ALJ to not fully credit Drs. Jaffe and Seidel's opinions,

which was based upon those exaggerated claims." (Id. (citations

omitted).) Moreover, Defendant alleges that the ALJ properly

discounted the opinions of the treating physicians because their

conclusions were inconsistent with Lewis's activities of daily

living, which showed that he had a higher level of functioning. 

(Id. at 5 (citing Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19, ECF No. 8).) The

Commissioner contends that in light of these specific and valid

reasons, ALJ Parker did not err. (Id.) 

In his decision, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was

impaired with spondylotic foraminal stenosis with back pain, disk

disease/mild scoliosis, cerebral aneurysm, and diabetes mellitus. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 15, ECF No. 8.) Lewis did not have an

impairment that met one of the listed impairments. (Id.) Judge

Parker further stated that after considering the entire record,

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of sedentary work,

including his past relevant work as a financial manager and sales

manager. (Id. at 15-16, 19.) 

The administrative law judge found fault with the opinions of

Drs. Jaffe and Seidel:

As for the opinion evidence, Michael Jaffe, M.D.,

the claimant's treating physician completed a lumbar

spine questionnaire dated April 30, 2010, and provided

opinion evidence regarding the claimant's ability to work

(Exhibits 14F and 19F). The undersigned gives little

weight to Dr. Jaffe's findings as they are not supported

by the evidence of record and these findings are

excessively restrictive. Dr. Jaffe states that the

claimant's back pain is constant and that the claimant's 

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bilateral lower extremity weakness and fatigue limit

functionality. Dr. Jaffe's opinions are inconsistent

with the evidence that establishes that [t]he claimant's

spouse provided information indicative of a much higher

level of functioning than that assessed by the claimant's

medical sources, and the claimant continues to engage in

routine daily activities independently, including the

many duties listed herein above, which is inconsistent

with the excessively restrictive functional assessment

indicated by Dr. Jaffe. Additionally, Janith Seidel,

M.D., provided a narrative report dated March 8, 2011,

mirroring almost verbatim Dr. Jaffe's findings, all of

which appear to be primarily based on the claimant's

subjective complaints, i.e., the claimant "estimates his

level of pain to be moderately severe" and the claimant

"describes his pain to be constant and diffuse." Dr.

Seidel's opinions regarding the claimant's functional

capacity are excessively restrictive based on the

objective evidence of record, and the undersigned gives

these opinions little weight (Exhibits 17F and 20F). 

Pertinent Kaiser Permanente treatment notes do not

support the excessively restrictive functional capacity

found by Drs. Jaffe and Seidel (Exhibits 1F, 2F, 3F, 9F,

10F, 13F, 18F, 21F). The undersigned finds that the

opinions of the medical expert, who opined that the

claimant retains the functional capacity for sedentary

level work activity, and who is familiar with the

Commissioner's regulations for evaluating disability is

entitled to great weight. The undersigned has considered

the opinions of Dr. Seidel who is a family practitioner,

and Dr. Jaffe, the claimant's treating physicians, and

finds that these opinions are not entitled to controlling

weight as they are not supported by medically acceptable

clinical signs and laboratory diagnostic findings. 

Additionally, the opinions of Drs. Seidel and Jaffe are

inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record,

including the testimony of the medical expert at the

hearing in this matter as well as the claimant's own

statements regarding his functional capacity (SSR 96-2,

97-7 and 96-8).

 

(Id. at 19.) 

Lewis complains that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions

of two treating physicians. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Remand Attach.

#1, 11, ECF No. 10.) The ALJ is not obligated to accept or reject

the opinion of a treating physician in full. Adorno v. Shalala, 40

F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994). The ALJ "may properly accept some

parts of the medical evidence and reject other parts, but [the ALJ]

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must consider all the evidence and give some reason for discounting

the evidence [he] rejects." Id.

The opinions of Drs. Jaffe and Seidel were contradicted by Dr.

Brovender. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19, ECF No. 8.) Thus, although

clear and convincing reasons for disregarding the contradicted

opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians were not required, the

ALJ was obligated to give specific, legitimate reasons that were

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Batson, 359

F.3d at 1195; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1148; Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d at 830.

1. Dr. Jaffe

The ALJ gave less weight to Dr. Jaffe's opinion because it was

contrary to the evidence in the record. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19,

ECF No. 8.) Specifically, ALJ Parker rejected Dr. Jaffe's opinion

because it (1) conflicted with the Lewises' assertions about

Plaintiff's functionality; (2) was inconsistent with the opinion of

the medical expert, Dr. Brovender; and (3) was premised primarily

on Plaintiff's subjective complaints. (Id.) Based on the entire

record, the ALJ determined that the treating physician's findings

were excessively restrictive. (Id.)

a. Conflict with Richard and Juanita Lewis's statements

First, the ALJ discredited Dr. Jaffe's finding that the

claimant's back pain was constant and that his lower extremity

weakness and fatigue limited his functionality because these

assertions conflicted with the Lewises' statements about

Plaintiff's functionality. (Id.; compare id. Attach. #6, 184-91,

with id. Attach. #9, 805-12, 876.) As noted above, the ALJ

discussed in depth the activities that the claimant and his wife

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represented that he could perform. (Id. Attach #2, 19.) Conflicts

in the medical evidence are resolved by the Commissioner. Sprague,

812 F.2d at 1230. Here, the contradiction between Dr. Jaffe's

opinion and the Lewises' statements is a specific and legitimate

reason, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Dr.

Jaffe's opinion. See Fisher v. Astrue, 429 F. App'x 649, 652 (9th

Cir. 2011) (holding that conflict between doctor's opinion and

claimant's daily activities was a specific and legitimate reason to

discount opinion); see also Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856

(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a treating physician's opinion may be

discounted where it is inconsistent with a claimant's level of

functioning). 

b. Conflict with medical expert testimony

Next, the ALJ discounted Dr. Jaffe's opinion because it was

inconsistent with Dr. Brovender's assessment. (Admin. R. Attach.

#2, 19, ECF No. 8 (citing id. Attach. #9, 805-12).) The ALJ noted

that the medical expert testified that Lewis had the ability to

perform sedentary work. (Id.) This contrasted with Dr. Jaffe's

statement that Plaintiff was "unable to work." (See id. Attach.

#9, 811.)

In addition to Dr. Brovender's conclusions, two other

nonexamining physicians, Drs. Brodsky and Masters, opined that

Lewis could perform sedentary work. (Admin. R. Attach. #7, 470,

ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #9, 792-93.) As discussed above, "The

opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute

substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of

either an examining or a treating physician." Lester, 81 F.3d at

831 (citations omitted). Thus, by themselves, these opinions do

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not constitute substantial evidence. See Vasquez v. Astrue, No.

CV11–2406–PHX–GMS, 2013 WL 491977, at *6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2013)

(citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 831) ("[B]ecause neither Dr. Stevenson

nor Dr. Downs examined the claimant, their assessments, either

separately or in concert, cannot by themselves constitute

substantial evidence sufficient to justify the rejection of Dr.

Geary's opinion by the ALJ.").

Yet, ALJ Parker's determination may stand if other evidence in

the record supports Dr. Brovender's findings. Morgan v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d at 600; Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d at

522. The ALJ pointed to additional medical evidence that

conflicted with Dr. Jaffe's "excessively restrictive" functional

capacity assessment. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19, ECF No. 8.) 

Specifically, ALJ Parker relied on Exhibits 1F, 2F, 3F, 9F, 10F,

13F, 18F, and 21F. (Id.) Independent clinical findings supported

the ALJ's conclusion that Lewis's condition was relatively mild. 

(See id. Attach. #7, 257, 382-83 (Exhibits 1F and 3F) (finding no

clear impingement on the neural elements based on MRI results and

diagnosing Plaintiff with mild dextroscoliosis); id. at 259, 385

(diagnosing Lewis with mild scoliosis and spondylolisthesis); id.

at 260-61, 386-87 (stating that Plaintiff suffered from spondylotic

foraminal stenosis and "minor-degree" spondylosis, based on an MRI

results); id. at 280 (diagnosing Lewis, based on an x-ray of his

lumbar spine, with "mild degenerative changes with mild scoliosis

and spondylolisthesis").) Accordingly, the testimony of Dr.

Brovender was a specific and legitimate reason, supported by

substantial evidence, for rejecting Dr. Jaffe's medical opinion. 

See Zeidman v. Astrue, No. CV 11–9368–JPR, 2012 WL 4868118, at *7

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(C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012) (citing Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149)

("The ALJ was entitled to rely on [the medical expert, consultive

examiner, and state agency consultant's] opinions in formulating

his RFC assessment because they were largely consistent with each

other and with other independent evidence in the record, including

the above-noted EMG study, MRI, and x-ray results.").

c. Primarily based on Plaintiff's subjective complaints

Finally, the ALJ determined that Dr. Jaffe's opinion was

primarily based on Lewis's subjective complaints. (Admin. R.

Attach. #2, 19, ECF No. 8.) It is well established that "[a]n ALJ

may reject a treating physician's opinion if it is based 'to a

large extent' on a claimant's self-reports that have been properly

discounted as incredible." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d at 1041;

see Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d at 1217; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1149; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 602; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043. Yet, as

discussed above, the ALJ failed to properly discount Plaintiff's

credibility. To the extent the ALJ rejected Dr. Jaffe's opinion

because it was based on subjective claims, this was in error. See

Valenzuela v. Colvin, No. CV 11–812–TUC–HCE, 2013 WL 1092886, at *8

(D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 2013) (holding that it was error to reject

treating physicians' opinions because they were based on a

claimant's subjective complaints, adding that the ALJ did not

properly analyze the claimant's credibility) (citing Sousa v.

Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1998)).

It is not clear from Judge Parker's decision, however, that he

rejected Dr. Jaffe's opinion because it was based on properly

discounted self-reports by Lewis. The ALJ stated that "Janith

Seidel, M.D., provided a narrative report dated March 8, 2011,

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mirroring almost verbatim Dr. Jaffe's findings, all of which appear

to be primarily based on the claimant's subjective complaints

. . . ." (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19, ECF No. 8.) He also found

that Dr. Jaffe's opinions are "not supported by the evidence of

record and [his] findings are excessively restrictive." (Id.)

Courts may not engage in "post hoc rationalizations that

attempt to intuit what the [ALJ] might have been thinking." Bray

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Court may not conjecture as to whether reservations about

Lewis's subject complaints was a basis for the ALJ rejecting Dr.

Jaffe's opinion.

An ALJ may discredit a physician's opinion that is

"conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole . . .

or by objective medical findings." Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195. But

Dr. Jaffe's opinions are neither conclusory nor brief. (See Admin.

R. Attach. #8, 515-19, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #9, 806-12, 876.) 

Moreover, on April 12, 2010, Dr. Jaffe interviewed Plaintiff and

conducted a physical examination and tested Lewis's lumbar flexion,

sensory loss, deep tendon reflexes, lumbar paraspinal spasms, and

lumbar facet tenderness. (Id. Attach #8, 517-18.) Dr. Jaffe also

conducted a straight leg raise test, SI compression test, a femoral

stress test, and a motor examination. (Id. at 518.) The doctor

reported that "Mr. Lewis's clinical findings include limited range

of motion in the lower back, tenderness and swelling in the lumbarsacral area, muscle spasms, sensory loss, and muscle weakness in

the bilateral lower extremities, and reflex changes and muscle

atrophy in the lower left leg." (Id. Attach. #9, 876.) 

Additionally, Dr. Jaffe opined on how long Lewis could sit, stand,

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and walk during the work day, as well his ability to lift and carry

objects. (Id.)

Based on the evidence in the record, the Court finds that Dr.

Jaffe, at least in part, relied on objective medical tests to

inform his opinion. See Garza v. Astrue, 380 F. App'x 672, 673

(9th Cir. 2010) (noting that sensory and motor examinations may

yield objective evidence); Wooten v. Astrue, No. CV 10–8264 JC,

2011 WL 3320065, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2011) (declining to

second guess objective findings regarding reduced range of motion,

sensory loss, tenderness, muscle spasms, and weakness); Scott v.

Astrue, No. 1:08–cv–1194 GSA, 2009 WL 2379981, at *7 (E.D. Cal.

July 30, 2009) (remarking that testing range of motion and tendon

reflexes are objective tests); Lemus v. Astrue, No.

07–cv–01773–TAG, 2009 WL 817546, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2009)

(stating that a straight leg raise test yields objective evidence);

Wilson v. Astrue, No. CV 07-7532 AN, 2008 WL 4382704, *2 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 26, 2008) (noting that muscle spasms, reflex changes, sensory

loss, muscle weakness, abnormal gait, tenderness, muscle atrophy,

and loss of range of motion are objective findings).

It is not clear whether the ALJ considered the objective

findings that supported Dr. Jaffe's opinion, and if so, how they

were insufficient to support the doctor's conclusions. See Arevalo

v. Colvin, No. SA CV 12–895–PLA, 2013 WL 1314008, at *6 (C.D. Cal.

Mar. 29, 2013) (finding that ALJ erred by rejecting treating

physician's opinion, which was based both on plaintiff's subjective

complaints and on a medical examination); Trevino v. Colvin, No. SA

CV 12–0185 JCG, 2013 WL 645455, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013)

("Plaintiff's subjective complaints have no bearing on Dr. Pan's

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medical opinion, which, as established above, was based on

objective medical techniques. This reason, therefore, also fails

to satisfy the specific and legitimate standard."); Jones v.

Astrue, No. 11–35660, 2012 WL 6760094, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 31,

2012) (finding that ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate

reasons for discounting medical opinion based on purportedly

insufficient objective evidence when it was unclear whether the ALJ

considered relevant treatment notes and did not articulate what

made them insufficient to support the opinion). Cf. Ryan v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding

error, under the clear and convincing standard, where the ALJ

asserted that the examining physician relied too heavily on the

plaintiff's subjective complaints, when there was nothing in the

record to suggest that the examining physician relied more heavily

on the plaintiff's subjective complaints than on his own clinical

observations). Accordingly, insofar as ALJ Parker discounted Dr.

Jaffe's opinion because it was primarily based on Lewis's

subjective complaints, this was not a specific and legitimate

reason for rejecting the treating physician's assessment.

Yet, on the whole, the ALJ provided other specific, legitimate

reasons supported by the record for the limiting the weight given

to Dr. Jaffe’s opinion. See Black v. Astrue, No. 3:10–cv–06409–MO,

2011 WL 6130534, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2011) (upholding ALJ's

rejection of treating physician's opinion in favor of nonexamining

physicians' opinions whose assessments were the most consistent

with the medical record and plaintiff's reported daily activities);

Jones v. Astrue, No. 1:06-cv-01585 LJO GSA, 2008 WL 1970645, at *14

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(E.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (same). On this basis, reversal or remand

is not warranted. 

2. Dr. Seidel

The ALJ also rejected Dr. Seidel's opinion because it

conflicted with Lewis's statements regarding his functionality and

the opinion of medical expert Brovender. (Admin. R. Attach. #2,

19, ECF No. 8.) Additionally, the ALJ noted that the family

practitioner's opinion was primarily based on Dr. Jaffe's

assessment and, in turn, on Plaintiff's subjective complaints. 

(Id.)1 Nevertheless, the ALJ properly relied on Plaintiff's daily

activities, objective medical evidence, and Dr. Brovender's

assessment. Accordingly, ALJ Parker provided specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Seidel. 

C. Failure of Appeals Council to Remand in Light of New Evidence

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Appeals Council

improperly chose not to disturb the ALJ's decision when presented

with additional evidence that was contrary to Judge Parker's

findings. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Remand Attach. #1, 16, ECF No. 10.) 

This new evidence was the opinion of Dr. Alanson Mason, an

orthopedic surgeon who conducted a clinical examination of

Plaintiff. (Id.) Lewis maintains that Dr. Mason's assessment was

consistent with Drs. Jaffe and Seidel's findings that Lewis's spine

1

 The ALJ remarked that Dr. Seidel is a family practitioner. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 19, ECF No. 8.) The courts "generally give

more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues

related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a

source who is not a specialist." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(5) (2012);

see also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d at 1202. Yet, it appears

that the ALJ was merely stating Dr. Seidel's title, rather than

using her lack of specialization as a basis to reject her opinion. 

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condition prevented him from working full time. (Id.) "The entire

record before the Council then consisted of two treating sources

and now one examining source who found that Mr. Lewis' spinal

impairments are totally disabling, with no more than outdated

and/or unreasoned opinions by non-examining sources providing the

sole support for the ALJ's decision." (Id.) On this basis,

Plaintiff argues that the Council's refusal to set aside the ALJ's

decision constituted legal error. (Id. at 16-17.)

Defendant counters that Dr. Mason's evaluation is not material

and does not merit a remand of the case. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 11.) The Commissioner maintains

that considering the record as a whole, the ALJ's decision was

still supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 6.) "Because Dr.

Mason's opinion mirrors other opinion evidence in the record that

the ALJ discussed and properly discounted, it was not material to

the ALJ['s] determination that Plaintiff was not disabled." (Id.) 

Colvin insists that the ALJ need not discuss every piece of

evidence. (Id. at 7.) Thus, remand is not required. (Id.)

District courts "do not have jurisdiction to review a decision

of the Appeals Council denying a request for review of an ALJ's

decision, because the Appeals Council's decision is a non-final

agency action." Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d

1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011)). "When the Appeals

Council declines review, 'the ALJ's decision becomes the final

decision of the Commissioner,' and the district court reviews that

decision for substantial evidence, based on the record as a whole." 

Id. at 1161-62 (citations omitted). 

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In Brewes, the Ninth Circuit held that when a claimant submits

evidence for the first time to the Appeals Council, and that

information is then considered by the Council in denying review of

the ALJ's decision, the new evidence is considered to be part of

the administrative record. Id. at 1162. District courts must

consider that new evidence in determining whether an ALJ's decision

was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1163. When the

Appeals Council accepts a claimant's new evidence and makes it part

of the record, the Council essentially concludes that the evidence

is material within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). Id. at

1164. New evidence must only be considered if it relates to the

time period "on or before" the date of the ALJ's decision. Id. at

1162 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)).

Here, ALJ Parker rendered his decision on June 22, 2011. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 10, ECF No. 8.) Dr. Mason's only evaluation

of the Plaintiff was on October 25, 2011; the doctor completed a

cervical spine impairment questionnaire on November 6, 2011. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #9, 896, 908, 914, ECF No. 8.)2 This additional

evidence does not warrant reversal because it postdates the ALJ's

decision. See Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1162; Cervantes v. Astrue, No.

CV 12-3794 JC, 2012 WL 5964526, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012)

(holding that new evidence from a treating physician did not

warrant reversal of the ALJ's nondisability determination because

the physician treated the plaintiff two months after the ALJ issued

his decision); Fry v. Astrue, No. CV–11–199–JPH, 2012 WL 5906689,

at *6 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2012) (rejecting argument that Appeals

2

 Plaintiff incorrectly states that the questionnaire was

completed on April 6, 2011. (See Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Remand

Attach. #1, 10, ECF No. 10.)

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Council erred when it did not consider new evidence that was dated

sixteen months after the ALJ's decision).

Moreover, nothing in Dr. Mason's evaluation indicates that it

was intended to provide a retrospective assessment of Plaintiff's

medical condition. The October 25, 2011 assessment contains a

record of Lewis's medical history, medication, and complaints. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #9, 896-900, ECF No. 8.) The orthopedist also

conducted a physical examination. (Id. 901-04.) He diagnosed

Plaintiff with lumbar spondylosis; dextroscoliosis; facet joint

arthrosis; status post-lumbar laminectomy; discectomy and fusion

with instrumentation at L4-5 and L5-S1; narcotic drug dependency;

diabetes; and diabetic polyneuropathy. (Id. at 904.) 

Dr. Mason's assessments make no reference to the relevant time

period in this case. Rather, his comments are in the present tense

and note that Lewis "has a severe impairment" and that his

"multiple co-mobidities preclude his return to substantial gainful

employment." (Id.) Accordingly, this evidence does not provide a

basis for reversing the ALJ's decision or remanding the case. See

Calvey v. Astrue, No. CV 12–0472–JPR, 2013 WL 180033, at *4 (C.D.

Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) (holding that evidence from the time period

after the ALJ rendered his decision is not material and thus must

be given little weight when reviewing the ALJ's decision); Marin v.

Astrue, No. CV 11–09331 AJW, 2012 WL 5381374, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct.

31, 2012) (stating that case should not be remanded where the new

evidence did not contain a retrospective assessment of the

claimant's condition); see also Hudson v. Astrue, No.

CV-11-0025-CI, 2012 WL 5328786, at *6 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2012)

("[B]ecause the opinions expressed are not relevant to the

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Plaintiff's condition during period at issue, they could not change

the outcome of the proceedings below. Therefore, remand for review

by the ALJ is not required.").

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

"The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if it is

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standards." Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart,

341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Pagter v. Massanari,

250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001)). If the AlJ's decision is not

supported by substantial evidence, remand or reversal is

appropriate. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d at 1457. 

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 10] should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART,

and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 11]

should be DENIED. The Court recommends a limited remand. On

remand to the Social Security Administration, the administrative

law judge should explain his reasons for determining the extent to

which Lewis was credible and the effect of this determination of

Lewis's claim for benefits.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 19, 2013. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before August 26, 2013. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 5, 2013 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Battaglia

 All Parties Record

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