Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00092/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00092-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

 J.C., A Minor, By and Through 

 J.C., His guardian Ad Litem, 

NO. CIV. S-05-0092 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 VACAVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL 

 DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through this action, plaintiff J.C. seeks judicial review of

an administrative decision made by a special education hearing

officer pursuant to a due process hearing. Plaintiff also seeks

attorney’s fees and costs from defendant Vacaville Unified School

District (“VUSD” or the “District”). The court has reviewed the

administrative record, the evidence submitted by the parties, and

heard oral argument on the matter on August 18, 2006.

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1 The parties agree that the operable version of the IDEA

is the 1997 Reauthorization. Congress reauthorized and amended

th IDEA in 2004. However, the dispute in this case arose under

the 1997 Reauthorization. Therefore, all references to the IDEA

herein are to the 1997 Reauthorization.

2

BACKGROUND

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)1

requires state education agencies, which receive federal funds 

for providing education to children with special needs, to comply

with the provisions of the Act in administering a free and

appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to all children with

disabilities through individualized education programs (“IEPs”). 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2006). An IEP is a “written statement for

each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and

revised in accordance with . . . [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)]” of the

IDEA, and is designed to meet each child’s unique needs. 20

U.S.C. § 1401(14). 

Specifically, these federally-funded agencies must

“establish and maintain procedures in accordance with [§ 1415] 

. . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents

are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the

provision of a [FAPE] . . . by such agencies.” 20 U.S.C. §

1415(a). A child eligible for a FAPE and his or her parent(s)

are afforded two procedural avenues to guarantee relief for an

agency’s failure to provide a FAPE - an opportunity to present a

complaint to the state agency through a complaint procedure and,

subsequently, an opportunity to participate in a due process

hearing. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f). Where a complaint is

filed against a local educational agency but remains unresolved

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3

“to the satisfaction of the parents within 30 days of the receipt

of the complaint, the due process hearing may occur . . . .” 20

U.S.C. § 1415(f)(B)(ii). California’s hearings are operated

through the Special Education Hearing Office (“SEHO”), Institute

for Administrative Justice, McGeorge School of Law, in

Sacramento, California. An aggrieved party may appeal the

hearing decision issued by the SEHO to federal court within 90

days of the decision. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512. California has also

passed its own statutory scheme pertaining to the provision of

special education, which generally parallels the IDEA. Cal.

Educ. Code § 56000 et seq. 

At all relevant times, plaintiff J.C. was a student within

the educational jurisdiction of defendant Vacaville Unified

School District (the “District”). Plaintiff is, and had been at

all relevant time, eligible for special education services

pursuant to the IDEA and the special education provisions of the

California Education Code, due to a diagnosis of Autism. The

case arises out of a dispute between plaintiff’s parents and

defendant District regarding the program and related services

necessary to provide plaintiff with a FAPE during the relevant

school years. Specifically plaintiff’s parents challenged the

education programs provided to J.C. (1) from February 9, 2001

through the end of the 2000-2001 school year, including the 2001

extended school year; (2) the 2001-2002 school year, including

the 2002 extended school year; (3) the 2002-2003 school year,

including the 2003 extended school year; (4) the 2003-2004 school

year, including the 2004 extended school year; and (5) the 2004-

2005 school year, including the 2005 extended school year. 

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4

Plaintiff’s parents assert that J.C. was entitled to compensatory

education services as a result of procedural and substantive

violations that occurred in the IEP process.

On or about February 9, 2004, plaintiff filed a request for

an administrative due process hearing. The hearing commenced on

July 13, 2004, and continued over seven days. On the first day

of the hearing, prior to the introduction of evidence on disputed

issues, defendant conceded a denial of FAPE “from February 9,

2001 to the end of the school year, and through the following

school year, including the 2002 extended school year.” 

(Administrative Record (“AR”), filed Aug. 15, 1006, 0203). The

concession was made at the end of the day after extensive

clarification of the issues. (AR at 0201). Based upon the

concession, defendant offered the proposed remedy of 420 hours of

direct instruction to be provided during the 40 weeks of the

regular school year by a trained Instructional Assistant under

the supervision of a behavior analyst from a non-public agency. 

(AR 0204-05). The behavior analyst would provide 5-10 hours of

consultation per month, solely for the compensatory hours. (AR

0205). The proposed remedy also included team meetings every six

weeks, case management by a resource specialist, and 5-10 hours

of training for any new Instructional Assistant who would join

the team. (AR 0205-06). On the second day of the hearing,

plaintiff’s parents agreed to defendant’s proposed resolution in

most aspects. However, defendant District made it abundantly

clear on the record that this concession was not to be considered

a settlement agreement. (AR at 0249-50). The hearing officer

then stated that his hearing decision would include an order that

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2 On the second day of the hearing, the hearing officer

stated the following on the record:

I want to make that clear – and my Order will say, you

know, the District shall provide as indicated at the

commencement of the hearing the following, you know,

ten and a half hours a week for a period of 40 weeks,

or, you know, if it’s exactly as the District proposed

yesterday. That’s what it’s going to say. . . . [A]t

this point in time my Order will include an award of

Comp Ed because the proposed resolution of the District

lines up somewhat with the parent’s proposed resolution

as it relates to that period. That’s what my Order’s

going to say.

(AR 0257).

5

the District shall provide the remedy “exactly as the District

proposed” on the first day of the hearing, except for the issues

about which plaintiff sought to present testimony.2 (AR 0257-

58). Specifically, plaintiff sought to present testimony

regarding the implementation of the compensatory remedy

exclusively within a 40 week time frame and during J.C.’s normal

school day; plaintiff sought an order that the compensatory

remedy could extend beyond the 40 weeks if J.C. could not

tolerate 10.5 hours of services per week and that the

compensatory remedy would not be applied during the regular

school day.

On October 19, 2004, the hearing officer issued his

decision. The hearing decision ordered that the District

“provide [J.C.] a total of 420 hours of direct instruction, and

this instructions shall be provided outside the regular school

day.” (Hearing Decision (“HD”) at 19). The hearing decision

also provided that “in the event [J.C.] cannot tolerate 10.5

hours each week, the services must extend beyond the 40 regular

school-week period, until exhausted.” (HD at 18). However, the

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hearing decision made no mention of the other aspects of the

compensatory remedy that were proposed by the District, agreed to

by plaintiff, and that the hearing officer orally confirmed would

be included in the written decision. All of plaintiff’s other

claims for relief were denied by the decision. The hearing

decision also denied plaintiff prevailing party status, stating

that the parties “settled the issue of whether the District

denied a FAPE from February 9, 2001, through the end of the 2001-

2002 school year, included the extended school year [] of 2002,”

and as such, no issues relating to this matter were “heard and

decided.” (HD at 3) (emphasis added). 

On November 10, 2004, plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration and clarification, requesting that the hearing

decision be amended to include the other compensatory remedies

that were proposed and accepted at the hearing and that the

hearing officer stated on the record would be included in the

hearing decision, but that were ultimately omitted from the

hearing officer’s written decision. Plaintiff also sought

identification as a prevailing party on the issue of whether the

District provided a FAPE from February 9, 2001 through the 2002

extended school year. The District opposed plaintiff’s motion

for reconsideration and clarification on all issues. 

Subsequently, by way of a minute order, the SEHO denied

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, stating:

Petitioner’s motion for clarification and

reconsideration is denied as Petitioner has not

provided new facts or law warranting clarification or

reconsideration. The elements of the compensatory

education remedy offered by the District is part of the

record of the hearing and set forth in the decision on

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7

pages 17 and 18. The prevailing party status is

addressed in the decision on page 3.

Subsequent to the conclusion of the administrative hearing,

J.C. moved with his family to Elk Grove, California, where they

continue to reside. (Decl. of Geralyn M. Clancy in Supp. of

Pl.’s Opening Trial Br. (“Clancy Decl.”), filed May 22, 2006, ¶

2).

On January 14, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint in this

court, seeking, in relevant part, (1) an order that the District

provide to plaintiff the compensatory education services not

included in the hearing decision; (2) that plaintiff be

identified as a prevailing party on the issue of whether

plaintiff was denied a FAPE from February 9, 2001 through the

2002 extended school year; and (3) reasonable attorneys fees

under the IDEA. Plaintiff also asks this court to declare that

he is entitled to an award of the cash value of the compensatory

education services to be paid directly into a special needs trust

as an equitable remedy because he no longer resides within the

educational jurisdiction of defendant District. 

STANDARD

The IDEA provides that “any party aggrieved by the findings

and decisions” made after a due process hearing shall have the

right to bring an action with respect to the complaint in federal

court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). In any action brought in federal

court, the court “(i) shall receive the records of the

administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence

at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the

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8

preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the

court determines is appropriate.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has characterized the court’s review under

the IDEA as de novo. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d

1493, 1499 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has

also cautioned that “the IDEA does not empower courts to

substitute their own notions of sound education policies for

those of the school authorities which they review.” Ojai Unified

Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993)

(internal quotations omitted). The court is “to consider the

findings ‘carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing

officer’s resolution of each material issue.” Capistrano Unified

Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311

(9th Cir. 1987)). Ultimately, the amount of deference given to

the administrative findings is within the discretion of the

court. Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 980 F.3d 585, 588 (9th

Cir. 1992); Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1311. However, “the amount

of deference accorded the hearing officer’s findings increases

where they are ‘thorough and careful.’” Capistrano, 59 F.3d at

391 (citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th

Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the

hearing officer’s decision was incorrect, and unless the record

imparts “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed,” there is no basis for reversal. Ash, 980 F.2d at

589.

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9

ANALYSIS

A. Compensatory Education Package

1. The Hearing Decision

Plaintiff argues that the hearing officer erred when he

failed to include in the written hearing decision all of the

compensatory education services that were proposed by defendant 

and agreed to by plaintiff and that the hearing officer stated

would be included in the written decision on the record at the

hearing. Defendant District asserts that these compensatory

education services were not “heard and decided” because no

evidence was taken on the issue. As such, defendant argues that

these services were properly omitted from the written hearing

decision, which should only address those issues “heard and

decided” by the hearing officer. 

Section 56507 of the California Education Code provides that

“[t]he hearing decision shall indicate the extent to which each

party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided.” Cal Educ.

Code § 56507. At issue in this case is whether matters that are

heard on the record, but are stipulated to by defendant, such

that no evidence is introduced, are “heard and decided” under

California law. The Northern District of California addressed

this issue in Omid A. v. Dublin Unified Sch. Dist., 104 LRP 43027

(N.D. Cal. 2003). In Omid A., at the underlying due process

hearing, the defendant District admitted to and stipulated on the

record to certain factual issues, including the past denial of a

FAPE to the plaintiff. Id. at *3. Despite several occasions

during the hearing where the parties temporarily suspended formal

proceedings to discuss settlement, the parties were unable to

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10

reach agreement. Id. Subsequently, the hearing officer issued

his decision, ordering relief based upon the admissions and

stipulations made by the defendant District on the record. Id.

at *5. However, the hearing decision also found that because the

defendant admitted to the denial of a FAPE, and, thus, no issues

were in dispute, no issue was actually “heard and decided” by the

hearing officer. Id. The plaintiff appealed the SEHO decision

to the United States District Court for the Northern District of

California. Id. The court reversed the hearing officer’s

conclusion that plaintiff was not a prevailing party. Id. at 10. 

The court held that the issues admitted and stipulated to on the

record were “heard and decided” because the hearing officer

“heard” the District’s admissions made on the record and that all

the issues were “decided” through the hearing officer’s

statements on the record as well as through her written decision. 

Id. at 6. 

The court agrees with the reasoning of Omid A. and holds

that the issues relating to the denial of FAPE from February 9,

2001 through the 2002 extended school year and the compensatory

education services proposed as a remedy for this denial were

“heard and decided.” While the parties did not present evidence

on these issues in the form of testimony, defendant District did

not concede to the denial of FAPE until after a full day of

“clarification” of the issues at the due process hearing. 

Further, the hearing officer “heard” the District’s admissions

that it denied J.C. a FAPE for the relevant period. See Omid A.

v. Dublin Unified Sch. Dist., 104 LRP 43027, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan

21, 2003). The hearing officer stated on the record that he

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3 Defendant District disputes that the hearing decision

ordered any part of the proposed remedy. As set forth infra, the

court finds defendant’s interpretation of the hearing decision

illogical.

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would include in his order the proposed remedy as stated by the

defendant on the first day of the hearing. Subsequently, the

hearing officer issued his decision, which ordered part of the

compensatory education services proposed by defendant at the

hearing.3 As such, the issues relating to the District’s

concession of the denial of FAPE and the proposed remedy were

“heard” at the due process hearing and should have been

incorporated in full in the written hearing decision. 

If the court were to accept defendant’s position, plaintiff

would be left without any enforceable order on an issue (1) that

defendant did not concede to prior to the due process hearing;

(2) that defendant was explicit in not categorizing as a

settlement agreement at the hearing; and (3) that was agreed to

by the parties only after issues were clarified over the entirety

of a day in front of the hearing examiner and on the record. 

Defendant made clear on the record that it did not consider its

proposed remedy to be a settlement agreement. However, in

support of its argument that the agreed upon proposed remedy

should not have been included in the hearing decision, the

District now cites the hearing decision which states that “[t]he

parties settled the issue before any evidence was taken by the

hearing officer.” See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Opening Br.

(“Opp’n”), filed June 23, 2006, at 12. Defendant seeks to have

the agreement interpreted in any way which best suits its

interests in the given context: At the hearing, it made clear

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4 The District relies primarily on a SEHO decision issued

in Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 103 LRP 20212, at *4 (SEHO,

Mar. 28, 2002). In that case, the hearing officer found that an

issue was not “heard and decided” for purposes of fees where the

parties had reached an informal agreement regarding the issue at

an IEP meeting prior to the hearing. Id. That case is clearly

distinguishable from this case where the concession was not made

until the first day of the due process hearing, after a full day

of “clarification” of the issues by the parties, and where the

proposed remedy and subsequent agreement were made on the record. 

12

that it was not a settlement agreement and as such, there was no

written agreement between the parties; now, it seeks to define

the stipulation on the record as a settlement agreement and, as

such, beyond the scope of what should have been included in the

hearing officer’s written enforceable order. This is at best

confusing and at worst disingenuous.4

In order to support its position, the District also asks the

court to accept an unreasonable reading of the hearing decision. 

Defendant contends that the hearing decision did not order any of

the proposed remedy. Defendant is forced to argue this position

because if the hearing officer ordered part of the proposed

remedy, but not all of it, it would defeat the District’s

position that the hearing officer properly did not include the

remedy in its decision because it was not “heard and decided”;

rather, if the hearing decision only ordered part of the agreed

upon compensatory remedy, it would lend support to plaintiff’s

contention that it was error to omit the other aspects of the

remedy from the decision. The hearing decision states under the

section entitled “ORDER,” that “[t]he District shall provide

[J.C.] a total of 420 hours of direct instruction.” (HD at 19). 

The court finds that the only reasonable way of interpreting this

provision in the hearing decision is that the hearing officer

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ordered part of the agreed upon compensatory education services,

specifically the 420 hours of direct instruction. 

Therefore, the court finds that the hearing officer erred in

failing to incorporate and order all of the compensatory

education services proposed by defendant and agreed to by

plaintiff on the record in front of the hearing officer. 

2. Cash Value

Because plaintiff and his family no longer reside within the

educational jurisdiction of the District, plaintiff seeks the

cash value of the compensatory education package to be placed in

a special education trust. Plaintiff argues that the cash value

should be market value for the services, i.e. that which

plaintiff would have to pay a private service provider. 

Defendant argues that this court does not have jurisdiction to

decide the appropriate value of the compensatory education

package. Alternatively, defendant District argues that the value

of the remedy should be the amount of money that the District

would have paid for such services at the time the remedy was

agreed upon by the parties.

a. Exhaustion

Defendant District argues that the court does not have

jurisdiction to decide the appropriate cash value of the

compensatory education package because this issue has not been

exhausted through the applicable administrative procedures. The

Ninth Circuit has recognized the need for a party to exhaust his

or her administrative remedies under the IDEA, because exhaustion

. . . allows for the exercise of discretion and

educational expertise by state and local agencies,

affords full exploration of technical educational

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issues, furthers development of a complete factual

record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving

these agencies the first opportunity to correct

shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled

children.

Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 

(9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In the context of the IDEA, 

the exhaustion doctrine requires that, “before the filing of a

civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also

available under this part [20 U.S.C. § 1411 et seq.], the

procedures under subsections (f) [due process hearing] and (g)

[appeal] of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as

would be required had the action been brought under this part 

[20 U.S.C. § 1411 et seq.].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Pursuant to

section 56505 of the California Education Code, a state-level due

process hearing “shall be the final administrative determination

and binding on all parties.” Cal. Ed. Code § 56505(h). 

It is within the court’s authority to order compensatory

education services as equitable relief. See Park v. Anaheim

Union High Sch. Dist., 444 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff exhausted his claims relating to the factual issue of

defendant District’s denial of a FAPE from February 9, 2001

through the 2002 extended school year. Defendant proposed the

compensatory education package on the record, and it was

included, in part, in the hearing decision. While the entirety

of the proposed relief should have been included in the hearing

decision, the hearing officer heard all aspects of the proposed

remedy and stated that he would incorporate it into his order. 

Therefore, the issue before this court is not whether defendant

failed to provide a FAPE or what the compensatory education

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package is, but merely how it should be evaluated for purposes of

implementation now that plaintiff has moved out of the

educational jurisdiction of defendant District. As such,

plaintiff has exhausted the issues relating to both liability and

remedy at the administrative level. Therefore, plaintiff’s

claims have been properly exhausted. 

Nevertheless, to the extent that plaintiff failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies regarding cash value of the

compensatory education package, he is excused from exhaustion

under the doctrine’s inadequate relief and futility exceptions. 

A party is freed from the exhaustion requirement set forth in §

1415(l) where her use of due process procedures would be futile,

or where she would not obtain adequate relief by pursuing

administrative remedies. Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303-04; see Kerr

Ctr. Parents Ass’n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.

1990); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the SEHO does not have

jurisdiction to hear claims relating to the failure to implement

a due process hearing order. Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified

School District, 223 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2000); see Porter v. Bd.

of Trs. of Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 307 F.3d 1064,

1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002). In Wyner, the plaintiff requested a due

process hearing in accordance with the IDEA and reached a

settlement agreement with the defendant school district during

the course of the hearing. 223 F.3d at 1027. The hearing

officer issued an order requiring both parties to comply with the

settlement agreement. Id. The plaintiff subsequently initiated

another due process proceeding to address the school district’s

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5 For example, defendant District submitted an average

hourly rate for a behavior analyst, determined using the

District’s Non-Public Agency Listing 2006-07 Negotiated Rates. 

(Decl. of Lorraine Barker in Supp. of Def.’s Supplemental

(continued...)

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failure to comply with the settlement agreement, at which the

hearing officer determined that SEHO did not have jurisdiction to

hear any issue related to directing compliance. Id. at 1028. 

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the hearing officer’s

determination, holding that a subsequent due process hearing is

not available to address alleged noncompliance with a prior SEHO

Order. Id.

In this case, if plaintiff sought a due process hearing to

determine the cash value of the compensatory education package,

he would be asking SEHO to exercise jurisdiction to hear issues

relating to implementation and compliance with its prior order. 

As set forth in Wyner, the SEHO does not have jurisdiction over

such claims. Therefore, even if plaintiff’s claims relating to

the cash value of the compensatory education services was not

exhausted, he is excused from exhaustion.

b. Valuation

The appropriate value of the compensatory education services

must be analyzed in light of the purpose of this equitable

remedy. “Compensatory education services are services which

replace or remedy something that [J.C.] did not receive in the

past.” (HD at 18). 

Defendants argue that the court should value the

compensatory education services at the cost to the District at

the time the services were agreed upon.5 However, if the court

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Briefing (“Barker Decl.”), filed Sept. 5, 2006; Ex. 1 to Barker

Decl.). However, there is no indication that plaintiff could

receive these service at the negotiated rate. 

17

accepts this valuation, the money paid to plaintiff would not

actually provide him with the amount necessary to obtain these

services in the market. Therefore, plaintiff would not receive

the replacement or remedy for the things that defendant admitted

that it denied him when it conceded that it denied him a FAPE

from February 9, 2001 through the 2002 extended school year.

The court finds that the appropriate cash value of the

compensatory education services is the present market value of

such services. This valuation would allow plaintiff to receive

an amount whereby he could actually purchase and receive the

services that were proposed by defendant District. Plaintiff has

presented evidence of the regional fair market value of the

services. (Ex. 1 to Clancy Decl.). Plaintiff has also presented

evidence of the rates of his proposed service provider, Learning

Solutions. (Supp. Decl. of Erin Chargin, M.A. (“Chargin Decl.”),

filed Aug. 28, 2006). Learning Solutions’ rates are within and

towards the low end of the regional fair market value for these

services. Learning Solution is also on contract with the Elk

Grove Unified School District to provide J.C. with educational

and functional programming. (Chargin Decl. ¶ 1). Learning

Solutions is also available to provide J.C. with compensatory

education program and services. (Id. ¶ 11). Therefore, the

court will value the compensatory education remedy using the

rates of Learning Solutions.

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Plaintiff argues that the court should value the services

over an 84 week period, based upon a schedule contemplating 5

hours of 1:1 instruction per week. Plaintiff contends that a 5

hour per week schedule is appropriate because the hearing

decision found that services must extend beyond 40 weeks (a 10.5

hour per week schedule) if J.C. could not tolerate the schedule.

While the court is mindful of the hearing officer’s

conclusion that services should not arbitrarily end at a date

certain, in the calculation of monetary value of services, the

court must set a definitive time period. The court is also

mindful that the value of the compensatory services increases

with the amount of time over which it is implemented and that the

time period should remain close to what the district envisioned

and expected when proposing the remedy. Therefore, the court

holds that the appropriate time period for the implementation of

services is 42 weeks, based upon a schedule contemplating 10

hours per week of 1:1 instruction. The 42 week time period also

contemplates team meetings to be held every six weeks. 

Plaintiff presents evidence of the total cost of the

compensatory education services if implemented by Learning

Solutions. (Chargin Decl.). The court will award the value as

follows:

Service Rate Total

1. 420 hours of 1:1 instruction $ 32 $ 13,440

by a trained Instructional 

Assistant

2. Supervision and consultation $ 105 $ 11,025

by a Behavior Analyst 

(10 hrs. per month)

/////

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6 The court notes that while the value of the services is

calculated using a 42 week period, plaintiff need not necessarily

implement the remedy in 10 hours per week or exhaust the funds or

the services within 42 weeks.

7 While plaintiff also argues that he is a prevailing

party under California law, he only seeks attorneys fees pursuant

to the IDEA. (See Compl., Prayer for Relief, filed Jan. 14,

2005, ¶¶ 6-7). As such, the court will only analyze prevailing

party status pursuant to federal law. 

However, even if state law prevailing party status was at

issue, plaintiff satisfies that standard as well. Under

California law, “[t]he hearing decision shall indicate the extent

to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and

decided.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(d). As set forth above, the

issues plaintiff prevailed upon were “heard and decided.” 

Further, as a result of the litigation, defendant District is

(continued...)

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3. Team Meetings every 6 weeks

with a Behavior Analyst $ 105 $ 1,470

and Instructional Assistants $ 32 $ 896

(2 hrs. per meeting)

4. Case Management $ 105 $ 8,820

(8 hrs. per month)

5. 5-10 hours of training for

new Instructional Assistants $ 32 $ 480

by Behavior Analyst $ 105 $ 1,575

(3 IAs with 5 hours training)

TOTAL VALUE: $ 37,706

Therefore, the court finds that the cash value of the

compensatory education services proposed by defendant at the

hearing is $ 37,706.6 

B. Prevailing Party Status

The IDEA provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding

brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may

award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the

parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing

party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).7 The Ninth Circuit has held

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7(...continued)

required to provide compensatory education services. See Omid

A., 104 LRP 43027, at *6-7 (finding that the plaintiff was a

prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees under California law

where the issues prevailed upon were stipulated to at the hearing

because the issues were “heard and decided,” and, as a result of

the litigation, plaintiff achieved his objectives).

8 Defendant also urges the court to give deference to the

hearing officer’s determination that plaintiff is not a

prevailing party. The deference owed to this determination is

related to whether it evinces the hearing officer’s careful

consideration of all the evidence and demonstrates his

sensitivity to the complexity of the issues presented. Ojai, 4

F.3d at 1476. The hearing officer’s decision here does not

demonstrate that a careful analysis of the issue of prevailing

party status was undertaken. (See HD at 3). Thus, little

deference is due.

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that in order to be considered a prevailing party under the IDEA,

“a plaintiff must not only achieve some material alteration of

the legal relationship of the parties, but that change must also

be judicially sanctioned.” Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified

Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted);

see also P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist, --- F.3d ---, No. 04-36141,

2006 WL 2347715 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff was

not a prevailing party because the settlement agreement lacked

any judicial imprimatur). 

Defendant District argues that plaintiff is not a prevailing

party under federal law because any change in the legal

relationship between the parties has not received the requisite

judicial imprimatur.8 Defendant District is incorrect.

As set forth above, the hearing officer erred in failing to

include the entirety of the proposed remedy in his hearing

decision. Plaintiff was entitled to an enforceable order

incorporating the admissions of defendant and compensatory

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education services offered by defendant. However, because the

hearing decision failed to incorporate the full compensatory

education package as proposed by the District on the record, this

court orders such relief as a result of defendant District’s

concession that it denied plaintiff a FAPE from February 9, 2001

through the 2002 extended school year. Therefore, plaintiff has

achieved a change in the legal relationship between himself and

the District, requiring defendant to provide compensatory

education services (or the monetary equivalent thereof), and such

a change should have been sanctioned by the hearing officer and

the hearing decision, but has subsequently been judicially

sanctioned by this court. Thus, plaintiff is a prevailing party

under federal law.

However, even if this court’s order did not provide the

requisite judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing party status

upon plaintiff, the findings and orders set forth in the hearing

decision also changed the parties’ legal relationship. The

hearing decision ordered that “[t]he District shall provide

[J.C.] a total of 420 hours of direct instruction, and this

instruction shall be delivered outside of the regular school

day.” (HD at 19). The hearing decision also stated that, in the

event that J.C. could not tolerate 10.5 hours of direct

instruction per week, the services must extend beyond the 40 week

period until exhausted. (HD at 18). As such, the hearing

decision set forth orders that required the District to provide

J.C. with services in a specified manner. Thus, even considering

the hearing decision by itself, plaintiff is a prevailing party

under federal law. 

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 CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court makes the following

findings and orders:

(1) Plaintiff J.C. is entitled to the full compensatory

education package as the result of defendant District’s

concession on the record at the hearing. These

compensatory education services include:

(a) 420 hours of 1:1 direct instruction to be provided

by a trained Instructional Assistant, under the

supervision of a behavior analyst from a certified

non-public agency;

(b) 5-10 hours per month of consultation by the

behavior analyst;

(c) team meetings every six weeks, to include the

parent, behavior analyst, and Instructional

Assistants;

(d) case management to ensure that the program is

implemented; and

(e) 5-10 hours of training of any new Instructional

Assistant to be provided by the behavior analyst. 

(2) Plaintiff J.C. is entitled to an award of $ 37,706.00,

that will be paid directly into a special needs trust

for J.C. due to plaintiff’s relocation from the

educational jurisdiction of defendant District.;

(3) Plaintiff J.C. is the prevailing party on the issue of

a denial of a free, appropriate public education and

the compensatory education entitlement under federal

law; and 

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(4) The court retains jurisdiction over the issue of

attorneys fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 14, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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