Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01345/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01345-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brian Weymouth, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

County of Maricopa, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-18-01345-PHX-SMB 

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Maricopa County’s Partial Motion To 

Dismiss For Failure to State A Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted (Doc. 42). Oral 

argument was held on February 1, 2019. The Court has now considered the Motion (Doc. 

42, Mot.), Response (Doc. 45, Resp.), and Reply (Doc. 50, Reply) along with arguments 

of counsel and relevant case law. 

BACKGROUND 

 This case arises from Plaintiffs Brian and Andrea Weymouth’s Complaint, 

originally filed on January 25, 2018, in the Maricopa County Superior Court, and removed 

to this Court by Defendants on May 1, 2018. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 38, “FAC”) on July 25, 2018. In the FAC, Plaintiffs bring claims against 

Maricopa County, Brian Mackiewicz, Brian and Shawn O’Connor, and multiple unnamed 

defendants. The claims stem from Plaintiffs’ allegations that Plaintiffs’ property was 

seized and impounded by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and then retrieved by 

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Defendant Brian O’Connor, without permission from the Plaintiffs and without a court 

order. (FAC ¶¶ 27–28, 34–37). In regard to Defendant Maricopa County (“Defendant 

County”), Plaintiffs bring Count Sixteen for “Unconstitutional Policies, Practices and 

Customs/42 U.S.C. § 1983” and Count Seventeen for “Failure to Train/42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 

(FAC ¶¶ 194–215). Defendant County now moves to dismiss Count Seventeen of 

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 

the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice 

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence 

of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a cognizable legal 

theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, which, if 

accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists if 

the pleader sets forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pled factual allegations are 

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. 

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Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 

factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 

of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 

v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

II. ANALYSIS 

a. Municipal Liability 

“Neither state officials nor municipalities are vicariously liable for the deprivation 

of constitutional rights by employees.” Flores v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 

1158–59 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 

A municipality may, however, be liable under § 1983 if a plaintiff shows “that a policy or 

custom led to the plaintiff’s injury,” and “that the policy or custom . . . reflects deliberate 

indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 

833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A 

municipality may only be held liable for the inadequacy of police training if Plaintiff shows 

“(1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the [municipality] had a training policy 

that amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the persons with whom 

its police officers are likely to come into contact; and (3) his constitutional injury would 

have been avoided had the [municipality] properly trained those officers.” Blankenhorn v. 

City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations 

omitted); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (municipality may 

only be held liable for the inadequacy of police training “where the failure to train amounts 

to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact,” 

and the policy was “the moving force [behind] the constitutional violation”) (quotation 

marks omitted). However, a “municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its 

most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 

51, 61 (2011). 

“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a 

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. (quoting 

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Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). “[T]he need 

for more or different training [must be] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result 

in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be 

said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1076 (9th Cir. 

2016) (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations 

by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for 

purposes of failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 

409). “After all, ‘[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular 

respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program 

that will cause violations of constitutional rights.’” Hein v. City of Chandler, No. CV-15-

01162-PHX-DJH, 2016 WL 11530432, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2016) (quoting Connick, 

563 U.S. at 62). Although a pattern is ordinarily necessary, “there exists a ‘narrow range 

of circumstances [in which] a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to show 

deliberate indifference.’” Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63) 

(alterations in original). 

Here, Defendant County first argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged a “pattern” of 

similar constitutional violations. In response, Plaintiffs contend that they have “specified 

two distinct events, one occurring in 2011 and the other in 2015, where the Property Clerks 

permitted Plaintiffs’ personal property to be distributed to Defendant O’Connor without 

Plaintiffs’ permission or authority from the Maricopa County Superior Court,” and that 

“the Property Clerks demonstrated consistency in their denial of Plaintiffs’ constitutional 

rights having distribut[ed] Plaintiff’s property to a stranger on two occasions.” (Resp. at 

5) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs further assert that the Defendant County may be liable 

even with “one” isolated event. (Resp. at 8). 

This Court has continuously recognized that complaints lacked allegations of a 

“pattern” when plaintiffs alleged only a single incident. See, e.g., Ericson v. City of 

Phoenix, No. CV-14-01942-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 6522805, at *21 and n.13 (D. Ariz. Nov. 

3, 2016) (noting that plaintiff must proceed on a single incident theory because plaintiff 

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cited “to no incident besides the one in this case”); Hein, 2016 WL 11530432, at *7 (“[T]he 

FAC does not allege a pattern of similar violations, namely, of other officers citing and 

arresting people to discourage them from filing lawsuits against the City.”). But alleging 

more than one incident does not automatically create a “pattern.” The Ninth Circuit has 

affirmed a district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss a claim for failure to train when 

plaintiff alleged that the defendants were on notice of the lack of proper training following 

another officer’s conviction approximately five years earlier. Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159 

(“The isolated incidents of criminal wrongdoing by one deputy other than [the Deputy 

involved in the case at hand] do not suffice to put the [defendants] on ‘notice that a course 

of training is deficient in a particular respect,’ nor that the absence of such a course ‘will 

cause violations of constitutional rights.’”) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). 

The Court finds the facts as alleged do not create a pattern to put Defendant County 

on notice of Defendant’s inadequacy of training. Additionally, there are no facts alleged 

to support a finding that this is a case fitting in the narrow set of circumstances when a 

pattern is not necessary. See Ericson, 2016 WL 6522805, at *20 (“In explaining this 

‘narrow range of circumstances,’ the Supreme Court hypothesized that where a 

municipality ‘arms its police force with firearms and deploys the armed officers into the 

public to capture fleeing felons without training the officers in the constitutional limitation 

on the use of deadly force,’ a pattern of similar violations would not be necessary to show 

deliberate indifference.”) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63). 

Defendant County also contends that Plaintiffs make “conclusory allegations of the 

existence of a ‘training program’ without context, description, or factual support,” and that 

“there is no allegation that the County deliberately chose a training program that would 

cause constitutional violations of this alleged nature.” (Resp. at 4). Under Count 

Seventeen, Plaintiffs allege that “Maricopa County has a training policy for its employees 

and agents responsible for the Evidence and Property Division that is deliberately 

indifferent to the constitutional rights of the persons whose property is likely to be seized 

and impounded in the Maricopa County Evidence and Property Division” and that 

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“Plaintiff’s damages would have been avoided had Maricopa County properly trained its 

employees and agents responsible for the Evidence and Property Division.” (FAC at 

¶¶ 213–214). These allegations appear to be no more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a [failure to train] cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” 

which do not meet the pleading standard articulated in Iqbal. 

Plaintiffs respond to Defendant County’s Motion, pointing to ¶¶ 31, 36–40 of the 

FAC asserting that from these paragraphs, it can be “reasonably . . . infer[ed] that the 

Property Clerks were not trained to recognized Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” (Resp. at 

6). The paragraphs referenced by Plaintiffs read as follows: 

31. However, when Mr. Weymouth contacted the Maricopa 

County Sheriff’s Office Property and Evidence Division to 

arrange the return of his personal property he learned that all

of his personal property had been released, without Mr. 

Weymouth’s permission or the Court’s Order, to Defendant 

Brian O’Connor. Mr. Weymouth was told that Detective 

Mackiewicz used the County’s computer system to authorize 

the release of Mr. Weymouth’s personal property to Defendant 

Brian O’Connor. 

36. The Weymouths never gave anyone permission to retrieve 

their property. 

37. The Court never ordered the release of the property to 

anyone other than the Weymouths. 

38. The Court never made an order or any other determination 

that anyone other than Weymouth was the owner of the 

property. 

39. The records provided by the Property and Evidence 

Division indicate that Defendant Brian O’Connor retrieved 

some of Mr. Weymouth’s personal property in 2011. He did so 

either using his rank and privilege with the Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Posse, with Brian Mackiewicz’ rank and status as 

lead investigator in the criminal case, or both. He also did so

without Mr. Weymouth’s permission and without the authority 

of the Superior Court. 

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40. Astonishingly, on September 23, 2015 Defendant Brian 

O’Connor returned to the Property and Evidence Division to 

take the remainder of Mr. Weymouth’s personal property. 

Again, he did so either using his rank and privilege with the 

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Posse, with Brian Mackiewicz’ 

rank and status as lead investigator in the criminal case, or 

both. He also did so without Mr. Weymouth’s permission and 

without the authority of the Superior Court. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that from the aforementioned paragraphs, it can reasonably 

be inferred that (1) “there is a computer system that would provide the Property Clerk with 

the ability to track the property and its owner,” and that “the Property Clerks did not do so 

because they were not trained to do so”; (2) “Property Clerks were not trained to ask about 

the ownership of the property or verify with the computer or Superior Court orders”; and 

(3) “Property Clerks were not trained to ask for a court order or any other documentation 

related to the ownership of the property.” (Resp. at 7). 

However, merely describing a course of events that allegedly violates constitutional 

rights does not necessarily lead to an inference that such events occurred because of a 

failure in training. Such an assumption would appear to violate the standard set out in 

Iqbal. Furthermore, the FAC “does not identify what the training . . . practices were [or] 

how the training . . . practices were deficient[.]” Hein, 2016 WL 11530432, at *7 (citing 

Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149–50 (E.D. Cal. 2009)). 

Even taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is a far stretch to infer from the 

aforementioned paragraphs that the alleged violation occurred because the Property Clerks 

were not properly trained. Plaintiffs have provided no more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief in regard to 

Failure to Train, and Count Seventeen is therefore dismissed. 

III. Leave To Amend 

In the final sentence of its Reply to Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss, 

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Plaintiffs request leave to amend the Complaint if the Court finds Plaintiffs failed to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Resp. at 10). Defendant County makes no 

mention of Plaintiffs’ request to amend in its Reply. 

“After a party has amended a pleading once as a matter of course, it may only amend 

further after obtaining leave of the court, or by consent of the adverse party.” Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)). “Generally, Rule 15 advises the court that leave shall be freely given when justice 

so requires.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The power to grant leave to amend . . . is 

entrusted to the discretion of the district court, which determines the propriety of a motion 

to amend by ascertaining the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, 

prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.” Weber v. Allergan Inc., No. CV-12-

02388-PHX-SRB, 2016 WL 8114210, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 17, 2016) (quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Jackson v. 

Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A trial court may deny [a motion 

for leave to amend] if permitting an amendment would prejudice the opposing party, 

produce an undue delay in the litigation, or result in futility for lack of merit.”). “[L]eave 

to amend should be denied as futile ‘only if no set of facts can be proved under the 

amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.’” 

Barahona v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sweaney 

v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Local Rule 15.1 requires that the party seeking leave to amend “must attach a copy 

of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion[.]” Plaintiffs have failed to 

attach a copy of the proposed pleading, as is required by Local Rule 15.1. The Court 

therefore cannot make a determination on whether such amendment would be futile. See 

also Aguirre v. Amchem Prod. Inc., No. CV 11-01907-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 760627, at *2 

(D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2012) (noting that the Court could not “evaluate whether amendment 

would be futile” when plaintiff did not attach a copy of the proposed pleading in accordance 

with Local Rule 15.1). The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request to amend the Complaint. 

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Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss Count Seventeen is 

GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend the 

Complaint with respect to Count Seventeen is DENIED. Should Plaintiffs choose to renew 

their motion for leave to amend Count Seventeen, such motion must be in compliance with 

Local Rule 15.1 and be filed no later than February 15, 2019. 

 

Dated this 4th day of February, 2019. 

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