Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_20-cv-00911/USCOURTS-cand-4_20-cv-00911-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA CANTU SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

FCA US LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 20-cv-00911-PJH 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Before the court is plaintiff Maria Cantu Smith’s motion to remand. The matter is 

fully briefed1 and suitable for decision without oral argument. Having read the parties’ 

papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and 

good cause appearing, the court hereby rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On January 2, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint (“Compl.”) in Alameda County 

Superior Court alleging warranty claims for a defective vehicle. Dkt. 1-1. Plaintiff seeks a

refund for the purchase price of a motor vehicle pursuant to the California Song-Beverly 

Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1794. Id. Defendant FCA US LLC 

(“defendant”) was served on January 7, 2020. Id. Defendant then filed a notice of 

removal and removed the case to federal court on February 6, 2020. Dkt. 1. According 

to the complaint, plaintiff also brings suit against fictitious Doe defendants. Compl. ¶ 3. 

Defendant has submitted evidence that it is a Delaware limited liability company

1 Plaintiff has not filed a reply brief, which was due March 26, 2020. See Civil Local Rule 

7-3(c).

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with its principal place of business in Michigan. Dkt. 17-1, Ex. B. Though the complaint 

does not clearly state, defendant assumes that plaintiff is a citizen of California, which 

plaintiff has not refuted. Plaintiff alleges that she paid $47,792.68 for the vehicle, a 2018 

Alfa Romero Giula. Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 4. Defendant is alleged to have manufactured the vehicle

in question. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the vehicle contained or developed various 

defects in violation of the manufacturer’s warranty. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Plaintiff requests 

restitution in the form of the original $47,792.68 that she paid for the vehicle as well as 

civil penalties amounting to two times the original price or $95,585.36. Id., Prayer for 

Relief. She also requests attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Removal jurisdiction is based entirely on federal statutory authority. See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1441–55. A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of 

which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A federal 

district court has original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

“The amount in controversy includes claims for general and special damages (excluding 

costs and interests), including attorneys fees, if recoverable by statute or contract, and 

punitive damages, if recoverable as a matter of law.” Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Acc. & 

Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 1998).

To remove a case from a state court to a federal court, a 

defendant must file in the federal forum a notice of removal 

“containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for 

removal.” When removal is based on diversity of citizenship, 

an amount-in-controversy requirement must be met. . . . If the 

plaintiff’s complaint, filed in state court, demands monetary 

relief of a stated sum, that sum, if asserted in good faith, is 

“deemed to be the amount in controversy.” When the 

plaintiff’s complaint does not state the amount in controversy, 

the defendant’s notice of removal may do so.

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 83–84 (2014) (quoting 

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) & (c)(2); and citing § 1446(c)(2)(A)). “[W]hen a defendant seeks 

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federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation should be 

accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” Id. at 87. 

Once confronted with a motion to remand, the defendant bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Ibarra v. Manheim 

Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 

846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is 

upon the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against 

removal jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted). Both “parties may submit evidence outside the 

complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence 

relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 

980 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendant cannot rely simply upon “conclusory allegations.” Singer 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). “As with other 

important areas of our law, evidence may be direct or circumstantial.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 

1199. If a defendant has improperly removed a case over which the federal court lacks 

diversity jurisdiction, the federal court must remand the case to state court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded because at the time the 

complaint was filed plaintiff did not know the true name of certain California-based 

automotive dealerships that serviced the vehicle in question and these dealerships were 

the named fictitious defendants. Mtn. at 4. Plaintiff states that she intended to amend 

the complaint once she learned the true legal identities of the fictitious defendants. Id. 

She also seeks attorney’s fees because defendant improperly removed the case to 

federal court. Id. at 6. Defendant responds that this case satisfies the requirements of 

the diversity jurisdiction statute and further that the existence of diversity for removal 

purposes is determined at the instant of removal and any aspirational amendments are 

irrelevant for determining diversity jurisdiction. Opp. at 2.

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The basis for plaintiff’s motion is her contention that unnamed Doe defendants 

somehow destroy this diversity. This argument is misplaced. “In determining whether a 

civil action is removable on the basis of jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of [title 28], the 

citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(b)(1). Further, plaintiff’s stated intent to name California defendants at some 

point in the future does not alter the diversity analysis. “It has long been the case that 

‘the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action 

brought.’” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting 

Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539, 6 L.Ed. 154 (1824)); see also Strotek Corp. v. Air 

Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “the core 

principle of federal removal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity—namely, that it is 

determined (and must exist) as of the time the complaint is filed and removal is effected”

(citations omitted)). Thus, plaintiff’s stated future intentions are irrelevant for determining 

diversity of citizenship at the time defendant removed the case.

The citizenship inquiry does not end there, however. In both its notice of removal 

and opposition brief, defendant states that it is a Delaware corporation. Dkt. 1 at 3; Opp. 

at 7–8. Yet, as is obvious from the abbreviation “LLC” in FCA US LLC and as evidenced 

by the SEC Form 10-K that defendant submitted as evidence, FCA US LLC is a 

Delaware limited liability company and not a corporation. See Dkt. 17-1, Ex. B. The 

distinction between corporation and LLC matters when assessing citizenship for subject 

matter jurisdiction purposes. Unlike a corporation, an LLC “is a citizen of every state of 

which its owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, 

LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendant has not disclosed its members.2 The 

2 The court notes that several other district courts in this circuit have recognized that FCA 

US LLC’s sole member is FCA North America Holding LLC and that entity’s sole member 

is Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., a Dutch N.V. Lee v. FCA US, LLC, No. CV 16-5190 

PSG (MRWX), 2016 WL 11516754, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016); see Petropolous v. 

FCA US, LLC, No. 17-cv-0398 W (KSC), 2017 WL 2889303, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 7, 

2017) (collecting cases). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with 

defendant in this case. While these other opinions indicate the likely outcome of the 

citizenship question, defendant must make its own showing in this case.

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court does not have sufficient information based on the parties’ filings to determine FCA 

US LLC’s owners and members and thus, cannot determine defendant’s citizenship. 

The final question is the appropriate remedy. Generally, a defendant’s notice of 

removal may be amended freely prior to the expiration of the initial thirty-day removal 

period established by title 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Barrow Dev. Co. v. Fulton Ins. Co., 418 

F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969). That period has lapsed. After the thirty-day removal 

period, courts permit an amended notice “only to set out more specifically the grounds for 

removal that already have been stated, albeit imperfectly, in the original notice.” Navarro 

v. Servisair, LLC, No. C 08-02716 MHP, 2008 WL 3842984, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 

2008) (quoting C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3733, at 

358 (3d ed.1998)). Permitting amendment in this case would adhere to the principle that

defendant stated, but imperfectly, the grounds for removal in the original notice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiff’s 

motion. Defendant shall file an amended notice of removal within 14 days that more 

specifically sets out the grounds for removal. Plaintiff may then file any responsive 

motion that addresses defendant’s short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2020

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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