Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00442/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00442-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cvp Civil Rights (Personal Property)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN L. ERVIN, an individual, Pro Se,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, XAVIER 

BECERRA, in his official capacity as 

attorney general of the state of California, 

and DOES 1-10 inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00442-GPC-RBB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

[DKT. NO. 11]

Before the Court is Defendants State of California and Attorney General Xavier 

Becerra’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint.1 Dkt. No. 11. Plaintiff filed 

his opposition on May 25, 2018. Dkt. No. 13. Defendants filed a reply on June 8, 2018. 

Dkt. No. 15. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the matter suitable 

for adjudication without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend. 

 

1 Defendants previously moved to dismiss the complaint on March 23, 2018. Dkt. No. 7. In response, 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 13, 2018. Dkt. No. 9. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a resident of the County of San Diego in the State of California. FAC ¶ 

2. According to the FAC, Plaintiff was romantically involved with Carolina Altafulla 

Tarraga (“Altafulla”) between March 2012 until February 2014. FAC ¶ 10. They 

purchased a home together as joint tenants in San Diego, CA in December 2013 and lived 

there together. Id. Altafulla allegedly began to cheat on Ervin with another man. Id. ¶ 11. 

On February 14, 2014, Ervin was allegedly sent in the mail a report made by a private 

investigator showing pictures of Altafulla performing felatio on another man in an airport 

parking lot. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff and Altafulla decided to end the relationship and Plaintiff 

agreed to buy her out of the house for $20,000. Afterwards, Altafulla began to repeatedly 

call the police on Ervin; the police negotiated a new living arrangement; and Altafulla and 

Plaintiff rearranged furniture pursuant to that arrangement. Id. ¶ 16. 

On March 2, 2014, Ervin was served with a restraining order issued against him 

removing him from the home and requiring him not to have any weapons. Id. ¶ 17. On 

March 17, 2014, the family court extended the restraining order for five years, removed his 

right to bear arms, and removed his right to live in the common house. Id. ¶ 18. Several 

acts of abuse were identified including inter alia: Ervin’s distribution of information about 

Altafulla’s affair, statements regarding felatio made to Altafulla’s children, and prior death 

threats. See Altafulla v. Ervin, 238 Cal. App. 4th 571, 580 (2015). The California Court 

of Appeal affirmed the rulings of the trial court finding (1) Ervin’s conduct constituted 

harassment under the DVPA and was sufficient to support the issuance of a restraining 

order; (2) the DVPA withstood Ervin’s challenges to the statute under the First and Second 

Amendments; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant his 

application for a restraining order against Altafulla; and (4) rejected Altafulla’s request for 

sanctions. Ervin, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 577-582. 

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Plaintiff filed suit against Altafulla for partition and various causes of action in Civil 

Court in April 2014. FAC ¶ 19. In June 2016, Ervin obtained an injunction against 

Altafulla which assigned a referee to sell the house and evict Altafulla. Id. ¶ 22. In 

December 2016, Altafulla indicated to Ervin that she was nearly bankrupt and no judgment 

against her could be enforced, and thus Ervin settled for 100% of house proceeds. Id. 

On February 27, 2018, Plaintiff filed this instant suit against the State of California 

and later amended his complaint to add the California Attorney General in his official 

capacity. See Dkt. No. 1, 9. Plaintiff raises four causes of action: (1) Deprivation of 

freedom of expression under the first amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Defendant Becerra; (2) Deprivation of the Right to Bear Arms under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendant Becerra; (3) a violation of equal protection against Defendant Becerra

because the protective order prevents Ervin from publicly discussing his former girlfriend’s 

activities while others can do so; and (4) a common law claim for inverse condemnation 

alleging that the protective order denied plaintiff all economically viable use of his property

against Defendants State of California and Becerra. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may seek 

to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The federal court is 

one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York, 790 F.2d 769, 

774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its 

own subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 

83, 95 (1998). Plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction, has the burden of 

establishing that jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

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sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal 

is proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 

allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Id. at 545. “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the 

non–conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be 

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 

2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal 

conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); W. 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, a court “will 

dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails 

to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Mktg. 

Ass’n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

In addition, courts “liberally construe[]” documents filed pro se, Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), affording pro se plaintiffs benefit of the doubt. Thompson, 295 

F.3d at 895; see also Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Court 

has held pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than briefs by counsel and reads pro 

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se pleadings generously, ‘however inartfully pleaded.’”). However, the Ninth Circuit has 

declined to ensure that district courts advise pro se litigants of rule requirements. See 

Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Pro se litigants in the ordinary 

civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record . . . it 

is not for the trial court to inject itself into the adversary process on behalf of one class of 

litigant”). 

III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision in Altafulla v. Ervin, 238 Cal. App. 4th 571 (2015). The Court will take 

judicial notice of this document as it is a matter of public record. See Intri-Plex 

Technologies, Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) a request to vacate a 

temporary restraining order from Ervin’s ex-wife in In re Marriage of Ervin and Ben-Nun, 

San Diego Family Court Number DV033786, dated September 9, 2011; (2) a second 

request to vacate a temporary restraining order from Ervin’s ex-wife in In re Marriage of 

Ervin and Ben-Nun, San Diego Family Court Number DV033786, dated January 13, 2012; 

(3) transcript excerpts from a restraining order hearing in In re Marriage of Ervin and BenNun, San Diego Family Court Number DV033786, dated June 6, 2013; (4) minute order in 

Ervin v. County of San Diego, San Diego Superior Court Case No. 2014-00207, dated 

September 12, 2014. Plaintiff seeks to discount the assertion that he previously threatened 

his ex-wife and their three children by allegedly stating “One day I will take a gun and 

shoot all four of you.” RJN, Dkt. No. 13-1 at 2. The Court need not consider the veracity 

of this fact in assessing the issues below. While these documents are properly subject to 

judicial notice as matters within the public record, the Court concludes that these 

documents are not relevant to the issues in the instant motion. Accordingly, the Court will 

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decline to take judicial notice of these documents. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

As courts of original jurisdiction, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review 

the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings. Doe & Assocs. Law 

Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). However, federal district 

courts do have jurisdiction over a “general constitutional challenge,” i.e. one that does not 

require review of a final state court decision in a particular case. Id. (citing Dubinka v. 

Judges of the Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994). This distinction between 

a permissible general constitutional challenge and an impermissible appeal of a state 

court determination may be subtle and difficult to make. Id. (citing Worldwide Church of 

God v. Mcnair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986)). To draw this distinction, the court 

must ask whether it is “in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.”

Id. A de facto appeal exists “when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal 

error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court 

judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2004). Once the 

court has found a de facto appeal, it must identify and decline to exercise jurisdiction 

over any issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with that appeal. Doe, 415 F.3d at 

1043 (9th Cir. 2005). If the federal constitutional claims presented to the district court 

are ‘inextricably interwined’ with the state court’s judgement, then [plaintiff] is 

essentially asking the district court to review the state court’s decision, which the district 

court may not do.”Id. If “consideration and decision have been accomplished, action in 

federal court is an impermissible appeal from the state court decision.” Id. (citing 

Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 892). “Where the district court must hold that the 

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state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues presented to both 

courts are inextricably intertwined.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff first seeks an “injunction vacating the state restraining order and/or 

gun prohibition against Ervin.” FAC ¶ 63. Essentially, plaintiff is asking this court to 

overturn the state court’s order issuing the protective order and the gun prohibition, 

making this a de facto appeal of the state court order that is prohibited under the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Gimbel v. California, No. C 07-05816 CRB, 2008 WL 590504, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2008), aff'd, 308 F. App'x 124 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing claim 

under Rooker-Feldman doctrine where complaint challenged the restraining order issued 

against him in state court and requested invalidation and enjoinment of the state court’s 

order). Next, Plaintiff requests in his FAC “[a] declaration declaring that a California 

domestic violence restraining order cannot be based on disturbing the peace when that 

disturbance is protected speech.” FAC ¶ 63. Evaluating this claim would require this 

Court to, in effect, conduct an appellate review of the state court judgment which 

specifically denied Plaintiff’s first amendment and second amendment claims. See 

Gimbel, 2008 WL 590504, at *2 (“[T]he Court cannot evaluate Plaintiff’s federal claim 

without, in effect, conducting an appellate review of the state court judgment.”); Lefcourt 

v. Superior Court, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“the district court does 

not have jurisdiction if it cannot evaluate the constitutional claims without conducting a 

review of the state court’s legal determinations in a particular case.”). Accordingly, the 

Court concludes that Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action are an impermissible 

de facto appeal of a state court decision under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See 

Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 892 (“If consideration and decision have been 

accomplished, action in federal court is an impermissible appeal from the state court 

decision.”). 

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Moreover, Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleging an equal protection claim is an 

issue that is “inextricably intertwined” with the issues resolved by the state court in its 

judicial decision. In order to find in favor of plaintiff on this issue, the Court would 

necessarily need to find the state court was wrong, a strong indicator that this issue is 

inextricably intertwined with issues decided by the state court including the issuance of 

the protective order and his constitutional claims. See Doe, 252 F.3d at 1029. 

Furthermore, another indication that this cause of action involves an inextricably 

intertwined issue with a de facto appeal is that Ervin directly asks this Court to address a 

“privilege argument” that Ervin asserts was left unaddressed by the appeals court. FAC ¶ 

47. Accordingly, the Court will also dismiss the Third Cause of Action based on the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Nadolski v. Winchester, No. 13-CV-2370-LAB-DHB, 

2014 WL 3962473, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014) (“At their core, Plaintiff's various 

claims against all Defendants hinge on his allegations that these state court decisions 

deprived him of various constitutional rights. In other words, Plaintiff seeks to challenge, 

here in federal court, adverse rulings in state court. This is precisely the type of 

case Rooker-Feldman bars.”). 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Third Causes of 

Action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine finding that the first and second causes of 

action are an impermissible de facto appeal2and the third cause of action is “inexplicably 

 

2 Ninth Circuit law holds that “even if a plaintiff seeks relief from a state court judgment, such a suit is a 

forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also alleges a legal error by the state court.” See Bell v. 

City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 

(9th Cir. 2004)). While no party has raised this issue, the Court finds that the First Amended Complaint 

alleges legal error by the state courts. See FAC ¶ 28-29 (asserting there is no cognizable exception to 

freedom of expression preventing boyfriends from telling people their girlfriend was cheating on them); 

Id. ¶ 35-36 (attempting to distinguish cases cited by the California Court of Appeal regarding his second 

amendment claim); Id. ¶ 47 (arguing that the appellate court erred by refusing to address his privilege 

argument). 

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interwined” with the decisions of the California courts that they constitute a de facto 

appeal that deprives this Court of jurisdiction. 

Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action––a 

common law federal takings claim for inverse condemnation––is not barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This issue was never considered by the California Court of 

Appeal and is not inextricably intertwined with that decision. The hypothetical remedy 

obtainable would be “just compensation,” and the federal court’s decision on this issue 

would not require the Court to overrule the state court’s judgment. Consequently the 

Court will decline to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action based on the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine. 

B. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

“The Eleventh Amendment has been authoritatively construed to deprive federal 

courts over suits by private parties against unconsenting States.” Seven Up Pete Venture 

v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). “Generally speaking, a suit brought 

against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but 

rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against 

the State itself.” Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) 

(internal citations omitted)). If, however, the plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief 

against the state official for a violation of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment does not 

bar the action. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 

1. Sovereign Immunity and Inverse3 Condemnation Claims

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit states from taking private property 

 

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“The term ‘inverse or reverse condemnation’ contemplates the situation in which property has been 

taken by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but without any payment of compensation 

therefor having been made. The theory upon which such an action is brought is that since a taking, 

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for “public use” without “just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V; Macri v. King 

County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that “the Fifth Amendment's Takings 

Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment”). “[A] claim for damages 

for the unconstitutional denial of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment cannot 

qualify as available prospective relief under Ex parte Young, and is therefore barred by 

the Eleventh Amendment.” Suever v. Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Numerous Courts of Appeal, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that the Eleventh 

Amendment bars Fifth Amendment reverse condemnation claims brought in federal district 

court. See Seven Up Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2008); DLX, 

Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 526-528 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[The State] enjoys sovereign 

immunity in the federal courts from [a] federal takings claim . . . .”); John G. v. Marie 

Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. V. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[A] Fifth 

Amendment inverse condemnation claim brought directly against the State . . . is . . . barred 

by the Eleventh Amendment.”). In Seven Up, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) did not allow for the selfexecuting dominance of the Takings Clause over State immunity to apply equally in state 

and federal court. 523 F.3d at 955. Accordingly, the Seven Up court held that the Eleventh 

Amendment bars reverse condemnation actions brought in federal court against state 

officials in their official capacities, joining the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DLX, Inc. Id.

Here, Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is brought against Attorney General Becerra 

in his official capacity and against the State of California. Based on Seven Up, California 

is immune from a federal takings claim in this court. See Seven Up, 523 F.3d at 955 

(collecting cases holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars Fifth Amendment reverse 

 

which is otherwise lawful, would be a violation of due process of law if done without compensation, it 

must be presumed that the taker intends to pay for the property condemned.” State of Cal v. U.S. Dist 

Court In & For S. Dist of Cal, 213 F.2d 818, 821 n.10 (9th Cir. 1954). 

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condemnation claims brought in federal district court); DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 526-528 

(“[The State] enjoys sovereign immunity in the federal courts from [a] federal takings claim 

. . .”). Similarly, Plaintiff’s cause of action in this court against Attorney General Becerra 

is barred under the express holding of Seven Up. See Seven Up, 523 F.3d at 956 (“We 

therefore conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars reverse condemnation actions 

brought in federal court against state officials in their official capacities.”). Accordingly, 

the Court concludes that Plaintiff may not proceed on his takings claim in this federal court

and that the proper forum for such a claim would be the state court. See Hahn v. California 

Dep't of Parks & Recreation, No. 2:09-CV-01479-JAM-GG, 2009 WL 3048716, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009); G. v. Hawaii, 676 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1070 (D. Haw. 2009). 

2. Ex Parte Young Exception

Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a suit brought against a state official in his or 

her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief challenging a violation of federal 

law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984). However, a plaintiff may not seek retroactive 

monetary relief against a state official for past allegedly unconstitutional behavior. 

Edelman v. Jordan, 416 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1984). Consequently, as a threshold matter, 

Plaintiff’s first three causes of action against Attorney General Becerra are also barred 

insofar as he is sued in his official capacity for monetary damages. See Mulvaney v. 

California Highway Patrol, 2017 WL 6271283, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) 

(“Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment Bars Plaintiffs’ claims against defendants insofar 

as they are sued in their official capacities for money damages.”) 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff attempts to invoke the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign 

immunity based on his claim for prospective relief. Under Ex Parte Young, the state 

official must “have some connection with the enforcement of the [allegedly 

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unconstitutional] act.” 209 U.S. at 157. This connection must be “fairly direct; a 

generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons 

responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” Los 

Angeles Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.3d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992). This exception applies 

only where “it is plain that such officer [has] some connection with the enforcement of the 

act, or else it is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby 

attempting to make the State a party.” Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. 

Here, Plaintiff’s primary contention linking Attorney General Becerra to the 

enforcement of the alleged unconstitutional act is that Attorney General Becerra has 

received federal aid such that it would constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. FAC ¶ 

6. A state may waive its immunity by accepting federal funds where the funding statute 

“manifest[s] a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act 

on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity.” Clark v. State of Cal., 123 F.3d 

1267, 1271 (citing as an example the amended Rehabilitation Act providing that “(1) A 

State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment . . . from any suit in Federal 

court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . of the provisions 

of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial 

assistance.”). Here, Plaintiff has not identified any statute or case law establishing that the 

State waived Eleventh Amendment Immunity by the acceptance of federal funds. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the state and Attorney General Becerra have not 

waived Eleventh Amendment Immunity through the acceptance of federal funds. See 

Hunger v. Univ. of Hawaii, No. CIV. 12-00549 LEK, 2013 WL 6147673, at *2 (D. Haw. 

Nov. 22, 2013) (“Plaintiff does not identify, nor has this Court found, any statute or 

controlling case law establishing that the State of Hawai‘i waived its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity from § 1983 claims by accepting federal funds of any nature.”). 

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The Court must also consider whether there is a sufficient connection between 

Attorney General Becerra and the challenged statute––the protective order provisions of 

California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act. As currently plead, the First Amended 

Complaint lacks any factual allegations that Attorney General Becerra has a specific duty 

to enforce the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Plaintiff has not identified in his 

complaint an adequate connection between Attorney General Becerra and the challenged 

statute. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the First Amended Complaint should be 

dismissed as the Eleventh Amendment bars the claim as plead under sovereign 

immunity.4 See Bolbol v. Brown, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Eleventh 

Amendment bars plaintiffs’ claims against Attorney General because general duty to 

enforce California law was insufficient to invoke Ex Parte Young); Pickup v. Brown, 

2016 WL 4192406, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016) (same). 

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the First, Second, and Third Causes 

of Action against Attorney General Becerra because he is immune from suit. 

C. State is a Not a “Person” Subject to Section 1983 Liability

Third, Defendants argue that the State of California is not a “person” who may be 

liable under section 1983. However, as previously stated, the Court finds that the First 

Amended Complaint’s Fourth Cause of Action pleads a federal takings claim based on a 

theory of reverse condemnation. This cause of action is the only cause of action brought 

 

4 The Court would normally have provided Plaintiff leave to amend this claim as it is possible that the 

First Amended Complaint could be amended to adequately plead a connection between the Attorney 

General and the enforcement of the DVPA. See, e.g., Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du 

Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying Eleventh Amendment immunity to 

California Attorney General where challenged statute expressly authorized enforcement by district 

attorneys and city attorneys). However, in Section E, below, the Court concludes for other reasons that 

amendment of the first, second, and third causes of action would remain futile because they would 

remain barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

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against the State of California. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument regarding California 

not being a “person” is not relevant and the Court will decline to dismiss on this basis.5

D. Res Judicata

California’s preclusion rules govern this action. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 

1166 (9th Cir. 2003) (28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires that federal courts give “full faith and 

credit” to state courts and “commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State 

from which the judgment is taken.”) (internal citations omitted). 

Claim preclusion bars relitigation of the same “cause of action in a subsequent suit” 

where (1) the second lawsuit involves the same “cause of action” as the first one, (2) there 

must have been a final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit; and (3) the party to be 

precluded must itself have been a party, or in privity with a party to that first lawsuit. San 

Diego Police Officers' Ass'n v. San Diego City Employees' Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 

(9th Cir. 2009). California law defines a “cause of action” for purposes of res judicata by 

analyzing the primary right at stake. See id. (citing Le Parc Cmty. Ass’n v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeals Bd., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1161 (2003)). This concept is “indivisible: the violation of 

a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action.” Id. (citing Crowley v. 

Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666 (1994)). Consequently, “if two actions involve the same injury 

to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake 

even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different 

forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 

Cal. App. 3d 1170 (1983). What is critical to the analysis is the “harm suffered; that the 

same facts are involved in both suits is not conclusive.” San Diego Police Officers' Ass'n 

v. San Diego City Employees' Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, a final judgment issued in the state court Altafulla v. Ervin lawsuit. Ervin was 

 

5 Defendants’ Reply recognized that this argument was moot. See Dkt. No. 15 at 8. 

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a party to that suit. See Altafulla, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 571. Therefore, the remaining 

question is whether that the state court action involved the same “causes of action” as those 

in the instant case. In Altafulla v. Ervin, the Court of Appeal and state court previously 

considered Plaintiff’s arguments that the DVPA intruded on his free speech and Second 

Amendment rights. The Court of Appeal rejected his First Amendment claim finding that 

the “protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse, or annoyance” constituted a 

compelling governmental interest. Id. at 581. Next, the Court of Appeal rejected his 

second amendment claim holding that the firearm prohibitions in the DVPA were 

analogous to a prohibitions on felon weapon possession that were expressly deemed 

permissible in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Id. In the current 

action, Plaintiff’s first cause of action argues that the DVPA limits his freedom of 

expression and his second cause of action argues that the automatic nature of the gun 

restriction violates District of Columbia v. Heller. FAC ¶¶ 26-42. These causes of action 

raise the same constitutional harms––deprivation of freedom of expression and 

constitutional rights––as those raised in the previous suit. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that the first and second causes of action are also barred under res judicata. See 

However, Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Causes are not barred by res judicata because these 

issues have not been finally decided by the state courts.6

E. Leave to Amend

Even though leave to amend is generally granted freely, it is not granted 

automatically. See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Leave to amend may be denied if the amendment would be futile or where the amended 

complaint would be subject to dismissal. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 

 

6 While Defendants’ motion to dismiss initially requested dismissal on this ground as to all causes of 

action, on reply Defendants argue only that Plaintiffs’ First and Second causes of actions are barred by 

res judicata. 

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1991). A proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the 

amendment that would constitute a valid claim. Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 

214 (9th Cir. 1988).

Because this Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Eleventh 

Amendment, and Res Judicata bar each of Plaintiff’s causes of action, the Court finds that 

any amendment of Plaintiff’s complaint would be futile. See Chaudry v. California Court 

of Appeal, No. 311CV508JAHNLS, 2011 WL 13121679, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2011)

(“Because this Court finds both the Eleventh Amendment and the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine bar Plaintiff’s suit, this Court also finds any amendment of Plaintiff’s complaint 

would be futile.”) (underline in original); Hahn v. California Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 

No. 2:09-CV-01479-JAM-GG, 2009 WL 3048716, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) 

(dismissing claims with prejudice under Eleventh Amendment immunity). Accordingly, 

the Court will deny leave to amend as to all four causes of action. 

CONCLUSION

Having considered the briefing and the arguments of the parties, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and finds that: 

1. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is dismissed without leave to amend under 

the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, sovereign immunity, and res judicata. 

2. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action is dismissed without leave to amend 

under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, sovereign immunity, and res judicata. 

3. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is dismissed without leave to amend under 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and sovereign immunity. 

4. Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is dismissed without leave to amend

under sovereign immunity.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 11, 2018

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