Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01207/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01207-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL ROYBAL and VIDA ROYBAL,

2:05-cv-1207-MCE-KLM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EQUIFAX, TRANSUNION, EXPERIAN,

RICKENBACKER, MEDAMERICA, CITY

TOWING BODY SHOP, INC., SEARS,

and DOES 1 through 50,

Defendants.

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Plaintiffs Daniel and Vida Roybal (“Plaintiffs”) allege that

Equifax, Transunion, Experian, Rickenbacker, Medamerica, City

Towing Body Shop, Inc. and Sears violated various federal and

state consumer protection laws including the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Fair Credit Billing Act (“FCBA”) and

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by furnishing

and reporting erroneous credit information on Plaintiffs’ credit

report.

Case 2:05-cv-01207-MCE -KJM Document 96 Filed 05/19/06 Page 1 of 6
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Defendant furnisher of credit Medamerica, Inc.

(“Medamerica”) moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative

Rule 12(c), on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court dismissed

Plaintiffs’ FCRA claim with leave to amend and dismissed their

FCBA claim and state claims without leave to amend. The Court

reserved its judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ FDCPA and called for

additional oral argument. Having heard the Parties’ respective

positions, the Court grants Medamerica’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

The Court has previously set forth a detailed factual

background for this action in its Order of October 19, 2005,

which is incorporated by reference and need not be reproduced

herein. Mem. & Order 2-3, October 19, 2005. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

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A complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

“‘unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of [his or] her claim that would entitle [him

or] her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109

F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Tel. Employees

Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996)).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Court should

"freely give[]" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt

collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those

debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection

practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to protect

consumers against debt collection issues.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 

Under the FDCPA, a claim must be brought within one year of the

violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Plaintiffs claim Medamerica

violated the FDCPA by furnishing inaccurate information to the

credit reporting agencies in 1997 and 2001. Plf.’s Compl., ¶ 11.

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Assuming the alleged violations occurred at the time the

information first appeared on Plaintiffs’ credit report,

Plaintiffs’ action would have accrued at the earliest in 1997 and

at the latest in 2001. Consequently, the one year statute of

limitations to bring an action for violation of the FDCPA would

have run no later than the end of 2002. The present action was

commenced on May 10, 2005, well beyond the applicable one year

statute of limitations. As a defense to the statutory bar of

this claim, Plaintiffs aver that the continuing violations

doctrine applies to claims under the FDCPA and that Medamerica’s

pattern of conduct has restarted the limitations period. 

Conversely, Medamerica claims the continuing violations doctrine

does not apply to FDCPA claims. The Court adopts neither

position.

While the Ninth Circuit has not squarely spoken to the

propriety of applying a continuing violation theory to FDCPA

claims, various district courts have addressed the issue. 

Generally, those courts have held that only when the complained

of conduct constitutes a continuing pattern can the continuing

violations doctrine apply. See Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos.,

L.L.C., 281 F.Supp.2d 1156 (N.D.Ca. 2003)(noting the doctrine

applicable only when the conduct complained of constitutes a

continuing pattern and course of conduct as opposed to unrelated

discrete acts); Sierra v. Foster & Garbus, 48 F. Supp. 2d 393,

395 (D.N.Y. 1999)(noting possibility of continuing violation

theory where defendants sent a series of threatening letters,

each of which violated the FDCPA and only some of which were

time-barred); Calka v. Kucker, Kraus & Bruh, LLP, 1998 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 11868 (D.N.Y. 1998)(rejecting continuing violation theory

based on actions undertaken in prosecution of lawsuit).

The Court concurs with the judgment of the foregoing courts that

the key to assessing whether the continuing violations doctrine

saves Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is whether Medamerica persisted in

a course of conduct violative of the FDCPA.

 The Court finds that the facts of the instant case do not

support application of the continuing violation doctrine to toll

the FDCPA one-year bar. Unlike the pervasive pattern of 200

harassing phone calls over a long period of time in Joseph,

Plaintiffs only allegation of wrongdoing on the part of

Medamerica are adverse reports in 1997 and 2001. These singular

acts certainly do not constitute a “continuing course of conduct”

for purposes of the continuing violations doctrine. In addition,

to the extent Plaintiffs are alleging that the republishing of

their credit report containing the adverse entries constitutes a

continuing violation on the part of Medamerica, that argument is

without merit. A furnisher of credit does not engage in a

pattern of conduct violative of the FDCPA merely by submitting an

adverse entry that is then republished in the report itself. 

Such a result would effectively nullify the one year statutory

bar Congress elected to include in the FDCPA. Accordingly,

Medamerica’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is granted

without leave to amend.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Medamerica’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is granted without leave to

amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 18, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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