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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 7, 2025*

Decided January 8, 2025 

Before

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1479 

EDDRELL D. SCOTT,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ARYANA M. MOSS and AKILAH 

LAMAR, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:22-cv-01324-RLY-TAB

Richard L. Young, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Eddrell Scott, a former Indiana prisoner, sued two mental-health professionals 

who treated him while he was incarcerated. He alleged that they violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights by failing to place him on suicide watch before he attempted 

suicide. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the 

defendants, concluding that no evidence shows that the mental-health professionals 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record 

adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the 

court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1479 Page 2 

acted with deliberate indifference by deciding not to place Scott on suicide watch. We 

agree with the district court and affirm. 

Because the case was resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment, we 

recount the facts in the light most favorable to Scott, the losing party. See Holcomb v. 

Freedman Anselmo Lindberg, LLC, 900 F.3d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 2018). Scott was charged 

with armed robbery and adjudicated guilty but mentally ill. He was placed in

Pendleton Correctional Facility’s intensive residential treatment unit, but officials later 

moved him to the restrictive housing unit for using drugs, selling drugs to other 

prisoners, and being aggressive. 

While in the restrictive housing unit, Scott repeatedly threatened suicide in 

response to circumstances that upset him. In May 2017, for instance, Scott threatened

suicide after he received a write-up for inappropriate conduct. At this time, he was 

placed on suicide watch. In July 2020, he threatened to harm himself unless he was 

permitted to speak with Pendleton’s lead psychologist. Scott repeated this behavior in 

October, November, and December, threatening to hang himself during the latter two 

occasions. After a mental-health evaluation in December 2020, a psychologist noted that 

Scott’s “suicide attempts do not appear to be serious attempts as they appear to be 

staged when officers are around and the cuts are not deep and usually are just washed 

off and not bandaged.” Nevertheless, Scott’s reports of suicidal ideation continued. For 

example, in August 2021, Scott submitted a healthcare request, stating that he was 

hearing voices urging him to commit suicide. But during his monthly visit with 

Dr. Akilah Lamar, a psychologist, Scott denied thoughts of self-harm and suicidal 

ideation. So, Dr. Lamar ordered that mental-health staff continue to monitor Scott to 

“determine necessary treatment and level of care.” 

On January 11, 2022, Scott demanded to be removed from the restrictive housing 

unit and placed in general population (a transfer that had been scheduled but then 

delayed), stating that he felt suicidal and that he would commit suicide if he returned to 

his cell. When notified of Scott’s suicidal ideation, Dr. Lamar stated that Scott “has [a] 

history of making statements of suicidality as a means of secondary gain [and] his 

current behavior displays an attempt to threaten self-harm as a means of being moved 

out of [the restrictive housing unit] when he demands.” A few hours later, Aryana 

Moss, a mental-health professional, observed Scott and decided not to place him on 

suicide watch because his threat appeared to be “driven by not being placed in general 

population in the time frame [Scott] would like.” Later that night, Scott attempted to 

hang himself in his cell and was taken to the hospital. (Scott says that he had to be “cut 

down,” but nothing in the record substantiates this assertion.) Scott received an x-ray, 

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No. 24-1479 Page 3 

which did not show an injury, but he was prescribed a muscle relaxer and physical 

therapy to treat his reported neck pain.

Believing that the mental-health staff ignored his risk of suicide, Scott sued 

Dr. Lamar and Moss for deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that they should have placed him 

on suicide watch to prevent him from attempting to hang himself.

Multiple times during discovery, Scott asked the district court to order the 

defendants to produce discovery about the January 11 incident, including video footage 

and incident reports. Ultimately, the magistrate judge overseeing discovery denied 

Scott’s motions, explaining that only the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) had 

custody and control of the requested evidence, and the defendants were not employees 

of IDOC, a non-party; therefore, the magistrate judge could not order IDOC to produce 

anything. And although Scott had been informed that he could request a subpoena to 

obtain evidence, he never did. 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court 

denied Scott’s motion while granting the defendants’ motion. It ruled that the 

undisputed evidence showed that Dr. Lamar and Moss reasonably responded to Scott’s 

behavior and used their medical judgment when they decided not to place him on 

suicide watch. In the same decision, the district court overruled Scott’s objections to the 

magistrate judge’s discovery decisions and concluded that Scott should have requested

a subpoena to obtain materials from IDOC that the defendants (who were employed by 

Centurion Health) did not have. 

On appeal, Scott primarily challenges the summary judgment ruling, which we 

review de novo. See Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021). To establish a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference, Scott must show 

that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition and that the defendants

knew of and consciously disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. See Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(en banc). We assume that Scott had an objectively serious mental-health condition, and 

so Scott needed to submit evidence that the defendants acted with conscious disregard 

to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This can be shown with 

evidence that their treatment decisions departed so substantially from accepted 

professional standards as to demonstrate that they did not exercise medical judgment at 

all. See Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2022). 

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Scott’s Eighth Amendment claim falls short because he failed to present evidence 

that Dr. Lamar or Moss were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Dr. Lamar’s 

and Moss’s professional judgment is entitled to deference unless no minimally 

competent professional would have responded similarly under those circumstances. 

Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 

18 F.4th 214, 241 (7th Cir. 2021). Scott points to no evidence that calls into question the 

defendants’ decision not to place him on suicide watch because of his history of 

threatening suicide to protest circumstances that upset him. Dr. Lamar and Moss did 

not have to take Scott’s statements at face value given his history—which included no 

serious acts of self-harm (just superficial scratches) despite frequent threats—if his 

threats were inconsistent with their professional assessments of the risk level. See Lord v. 

Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2020) (distinguishing “an inmate’s insincere 

suicide threat”). Scott’s disagreement with Dr. Larmar’s and Moss’s decisions is not 

evidence of deliberate indifference. See Johnson, 5 F.4th at 826. 

Similarly, Scott’s argument that the simple fact that, in this instance, he nearly 

hanged himself created a jury question about the defendants’ deliberate indifference is 

unavailing. A defendant is not liable under the Eighth Amendment if she responds 

reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately avoided. See id. at 825. And 

as previously explained, Dr. Lamar and Moss reasonably responded to Scott’s threats of 

self-harm. Their decisions not to place Scott on suicide watch did not come out of 

nowhere, given the undisputed evidence that Scott had a history of threatening 

self-harm for secondary gain. Simply put, no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Lamar 

and Moss ignored a substantial risk of death by suicide. See Quinn v. Wexford Health 

Sources, Inc., 8 F.4th 557, 566 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Finally, Scott challenges the district court’s decision denying his request for 

discovery. But the district court reasonably ruled that Scott showed no reason to doubt

the medical defendants’ representations that the video footage and other requested 

evidence was in the custody and control of IDOC. Scott’s disbelief that the defendants 

lacked access to these materials was not a ground for ordering the defendants to 

produce them. Scott needed to serve a subpoena because he sought materials from a 

non-party. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a), (c), 45; see Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 

580 F.3d 664, 665 (7th Cir. 2009). 

AFFIRMED

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