Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00449/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00449-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Some 54 other defendants were named in the Complaint. Of that number,

plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal with respect to 52 defendants, and the undersigned granted

summary judgment in favor of defendants Mobile County and Jack Tillman via Order (doc. 115)

dated July 7, 2006. James Bonding is the sole remaining defendant.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LOUIS G. WEAVER, )

 ) PUBLISH

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0449-WS-B

 )

JAMES BONDING COMPANY, INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

 

ORDER

At the final pretrial conference held on July 17, 2006, the undersigned sua sponte raised

the question of whether plaintiff’s federal claims against the lone remaining defendant are

cognizable as a matter of law. The Court ordered supplemental briefing on that narrow issue,

and has now received and reviewed the parties’ memoranda of law on that threshold question. 

As such, the viability of the federal cause of action, and the jurisdictional status of the state law

claims, are now squarely presented for ruling.

I. Background.

A. Procedural Posture.

Plaintiff Louis G. Weaver brought this action in this District Court on his own behalf and

as administrator of the estate of James Ellis Weaver (“Weaver”). The Complaint filed on August

2, 2005 purported to assert claims against defendant James Bonding Company (“James

Bonding”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive force, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, as well as state law claims for assault and battery and wrongful death. (Complaint,

¶ 29.)1

 Plaintiff maintained that agents of James Bonding “did excessively beat and maim”

Weaver on the evening of August 4, 2003 during the course of arresting him. (Id., ¶ 5.) 

According to plaintiff, Weaver “was beaten senseless” by James Bonding and was “continually

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beaten after he was senseless.” (Id.) After spending five days in jail, Weaver was transferred to

the USA Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with septic endocarditis and a staph infection

in his bloodstream. Weaver received antiobiotic therapy for six days, underwent open-heart

surgery for mitral valve replacement on August 15, and died the next day of complications from

that surgery. Plaintiff’s medical expert, Dr. Dimitris K. Kyriazis, who was one of Weaver’s

attending physicians, opined that Weaver was septic, meaning that his entire body was infected,

and that this condition predated his arrival at Mobile Metro Jail on August 4, 2003. Despite Dr.

Kyriazis’s stated opinion, plaintiff has alleged in the parties’ proposed Pretrial Order (the

“Pretrial Order”) that the beating of Weaver by James Bonding “was a legal contributing cause

[to] his death.” (Doc. 117, at 1.)

James Bonding failed to move for summary judgment on the § 1983 or the state law

claims, most probably because it sought to represent its own interests in this action by

proceeding pro se. When this Court learned of James Bonding’s pro se status, an Order (doc.

107) was entered on June 13, 2006 explaining that business entities cannot represent themselves

in federal court. In response, counsel of record appeared for James Bonding on June 22, 2006. 

(See doc. 206.) By that time, however, it was far too late in the day for James Bonding to file a

Rule 56 motion. After all federal claims against defendants Mobile County and Jack Tillman

were dismissed on summary judgment, the Court became concerned that plaintiff’s § 1983

theory might not be cognizable against James Bonding because the latter may not have been

acting under color of state law. If that were true, then the only remaining causes of action would

be state law claims involving non-diverse parties, which would call into question the propriety of

federal subject matter jurisdiction. For that reason, the Court directed the parties to submit

supplemental briefing on the narrow issue of the viability of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

B. Relevant Facts.

The parties’ supplemental submissions concerning James Bonding’s involvement in this

matter rely on facts to which the parties agreed in their Pretrial Order; accordingly, the legal

validity of the § 1983 claim will be evaluated by reference to those facts. James Bonding is a

bonding company that is duly licensed by the State of Alabama. On or about May 24, 2003,

James Bonding bonded Weaver out of jail on charges of felony obstruction of justice and

possession of a controlled substance. When Weaver failed to appear for a May 27 court date on

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2 The source of that authority is Ala. Code § 15-13-117, which provides that a bail

bondsman may exonerate himself “by surrendering the defendant to the jail” and that to achieve

that objective he “may arrest the defendant on a bondsman’s warrant at any place in the state.” 

Id. The Court’s understanding is that the clerk of the Mobile County Circuit Court issued a

bondsman’s process to James Bonding upon request pursuant to Ala. Code §§ 15-13-124 through

15-13-128, following Weaver’s failure to make a required court appearance. James Bonding’s

subsequent actions in arresting Weaver on August 4, 2003 were undertaken pursuant to that state

court-issued bondsman’s process.

3 This statement is partially corroborated by the Report of Parties’ Planning

Meeting (doc. 53), wherein James Bonding offered a pro se account of Weaver’s arrest by James

Bonding agents Bobby Varner and Mike Casper. According to this narrative, Weaver attempted

to drive away from Varner and Casper with an open car door, prompting a struggle in which

Varner and Casper entered and attempted to forcibly stop Weaver’s car. (Doc. 53, at 6.) James

Bonding asserted that Varner was thrown from the car after the gear shift broke off in his hand,

while Casper was dragged down the street trying to handcuff Weaver, and ultimately gained

control of the vehicle and drove it into a ditch, at which time Weaver was taken into custody. 

(Id.)

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those charges, the Mobile County Circuit Court issued a writ for his arrest. At James Bonding’s

request, that court issued a certified copy of the bond and conferred upon James Bonding the

authority under Alabama law to arrest Weaver and to return him to jail.2

 The parties agree that

James Bonding searched for Weaver for more than two months until August 4, 2003, when he

was finally located at the Cimarron Club with the help of a tipster. It is undisputed that James

Bonding arrested Weaver on August 4 pursuant to the bondsman’s process and transported him

to Mobile Metro Jail, where he was booked and taken into custody.

There are no agreed facts concerning the method and manner in which that arrest was

carried out. For purposes of this Order, however, the undersigned will accept plaintiff’s

description of that event, as set forth in the Complaint and the Pretrial Order. In particular, the

Court assumes (without finding) that James Bonding representatives “jumped into [Weaver’s]

vehicle while he was trying to evade arrest, crashed the vehicle into a wall and then beat him.” 

(Pretrial Order, at 1.)3 The Court also accepts plaintiff’s characterization that agents of James

Bonding used their “fists and a mag light and or other instruments” to beat Weaver “senseless”

when they arrested him. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) There is no evidence or allegation that law

enforcement officers participated in or in any way assisted or joined James Bonding in effecting

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4 Plaintiff does not dispute this portion of the James Bonding narrative, and in fact

relies on it in his supplemental brief; therefore, it is accepted as true for purposes of this Order.

5 Varner’s narrative states, in pertinent part, as follows: “[Weaver] was placed in

the back seat of my vehicle and I called the police to come out and pick up Mr. Weaver’s

girlfriend, Sherrie Sellers, as she also had active warrants. Ms. Sellers showed up at the scene

approximately five minutes after Mr. Weaver was placed in my vehicle. As we waited for the

police to show up, the fire department came ... and spoke with everyone at the scene, including

Mr. Weaver.” (Doc. 53, at 6.) Thus, the uncontroverted evidence is that (1) James Bonding

contacted police only after Weaver had been arrested; (2) the purpose of the call to police was

not to effect Weaver’s arrest, but rather to apprehend Weaver’s girlfriend for unrelated reasons;

and (3) police did not arrive on the scene until after Weaver had been arrested and the fire

department had checked on the medical condition of all participants in the altercation.

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Weaver’s arrest. At most, James Bonding’s narrative4 in the Report of Parties’ Planning Meeting

reflects that after Weaver had been arrested, handcuffed, and secured in the bail bondsman’s

vehicle, James Bonding contacted the police, who arrived at the scene a short time later to arrest

Weaver’s girlfriend, who was also present. (See doc. 53, at 6.)5

 James Bonding then transported

Weaver to Mobile Metro Jail and placed him in the custody of jailers there.

II. Analysis.

A. James Bonding Cannot Be Liable under Section 1983.

1. Section 1983 Liability Requires State Action.

Plaintiff’s sole federal claim alleges that James Bonding utilized excessive force to arrest

Weaver, violating his Fourth Amendment rights and giving rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. To prevail on a § 1983 cause of action, a plaintiff must show that a wrongful act “(1) was

committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) deprived the complainant of rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Harvey v.

Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). The law is clear that “the under-color-of-statelaw element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how

discriminatory or wrongful.” Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344

F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). For a defendant’s actions to be under color

of state law, such conduct must be “fairly attributable to the State,” which in turn requires that

“the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state

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6 In addition to the “state actor” requirement, the “fairly attributable” test also

requires a showing that the constitutional wrong is “caused by the exercise of some right or

privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for

whom the State is responsible.” Patrick v. Floyd Medical Center, 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir.

2000) (citation omitted). This prong of the test is plainly satisfied here. After all, James

Bonding arrested Weaver pursuant to a bondsman’s process issued by an Alabama state court in

accordance with an Alabama statute. That bondsman’s process specifically conferred upon

James Bonding the right, under Alabama law, to arrest Weaver. It was in the course of that

arrest that the alleged deprivation occurred; therefore, the alleged deprivation was plainly caused

by the exercise of an Alabama-created right or privilege. See Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75

F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2000) (alleged deprivation was caused by exercise of privilege created by

state where “Louisiana law allows bail bondsmen to arrest their principals for purposes of

returning them to detention facility officers”); Green v. Abony Bail Bond, 316 F. Supp.2d 1254,

1259 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (state right or privilege prong satisfied where bail bondsmen’s authority

to arrest plaintiff was derived from Florida statute). Therefore, the analysis in this case turns on

the “state actor” requirement, not the “state right or privilege” element.

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actor.” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130 (citation omitted).6

 “Only in rare circumstances can a private

party be viewed as a ‘State actor’ for section 1983 purposes.” Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v.

Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130). Indeed, a

private entity such as James Bonding can qualify as a “state actor” under § 1983 only if one of

the following three tests is satisfied: (a) a “state compulsion test,” wherein the state has coerced

or significantly encouraged the violative conduct; (b) a “public function test,” wherein private

parties perform a public function that is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; and

(c) a “nexus/joint action test,” wherein the state has insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with the private party, such that the state and private party are essentially joint

participants in an enterprise. Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1347; see also Green v. Abony Bail Bond,

316 F. Supp.2d 1254, 1259-60 (M.D. Fla. 2004). The “state actor” determination must be made

on a case-by-case basis. See Focus, 344 F.3d at 1277.

2. Tests for State Action Are Not Satisfied Here.

Plaintiff’s supplemental brief (doc. 118) addresses none of the three tests for satisfying

the “state actor” requirement. Nonetheless, application of these alternative frameworks to

Weaver’s circumstances makes it clear that James Bonding was not a state actor.

As for the state compulsion test, there is absolutely no evidence that the State of Alabama

has coerced or encouraged bail bondsmen to use excessive force in carrying out arrests, or even

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7 In his supplemental brief, plaintiff suggests that the fact that bail bondsmen are

heavily regulated by the State of Alabama is, in and of itself, sufficient to render their actions

“fairly attributable to the State” and to transform them into state actors. (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief

(doc. 118), at 2.) Rayburn and White underscore the legal flaw in that contention; therefore, the

Court will not adopt plaintiff’s reasoning on this point. See also Green, 316 F. Supp.2d at 1261-

62 (facts that State of Florida qualifies, licenses and appoints bail bondsmen are unavailing for

state actor analysis, where such reasoning would otherwise turn lawyers, doctors, private

investigators, and others in heavily regulated professions into state actors, as well).

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that Alabama has coerced or encouraged bail bondsmen to carry out arrests in any manner. That

omission is sufficient to reject state compulsion as a ground for satisfying the “state action”

requirement here. See McCoy v. Johnson, 176 F.R.D. 676, 680 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (rejecting state

compulsion theory out of hand where plaintiff made no allegations of any state compulsion on

defendant). At most, the record confirms that an Alabama statute authorizes bail bondsmen to

arrest fugitives under certain circumstances, and that James Bonding availed itself of those

provisions in obtaining permission from an Alabama court to arrest Weaver for bail jumping. 

Mere regulation of a private actor does not and cannot amount to state compulsion of that private

actor. See Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1348 (“[T]he mere fact that a State regulates a private party is

not sufficient to make that party a State actor.”); White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 143 (5th

Cir. 1979) (mere existence of state statute permitting merchants to detain shoplifters does not

compel them to do so or otherwise constitute overt state involvement that might transform

merchant’s detention of shoplifter into state action).7

The public function analysis is a stringent test requiring a showing that private actors

have been given powers or are performing functions that are “traditionally the exclusive

prerogative of the State.” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1131. That a private party’s powers may be

coextensive with those of the state on a particular matter is irrelevant to that inquiry. Id.

Moreover, very few activities are “exclusively reserved to the states.” Id. (parenthetically citing

as examples that functions of arrest, detention and search are not exclusively reserved to states). 

The authority to arrest, and more specifically the authority to arrest bail jumpers, historically has

not been exclusively reserved to the states. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert,

49 F.3d 1442, 1457 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing authority for proposition that private citizens making

arrests are not state actors when they do not act in concert with government officials); McCoy,

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8 For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the nexus / joint action test is

satisfied where the state contractually requires a private actor to take certain actions, such that

the private actor is acting in accordance with the governmental directive and is effectively the

surrogate for the state, particularly where the state unmistakably directs the private actor to take

those particular actions. See Focus, 344 F.3d at 1278-79. Absent such clear evidence of the

requisite nexus, it is a daunting task for a plaintiff to show that the state and a private actor were

engaged in joint action sufficient to trigger state actor liability under § 1983 for the private

entity’s conduct.

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176 F.R.D. at 680 (“the authority to arrest does not appear to be a power that is traditionally the

exclusive prerogative of the State”); Green, 316 F. Supp.2d at 1260 (“history indicates that bail

bonding has never been an exclusive privilege of the sovereign. Rather, since the inception of

the American legal system, bail was administered by private citizens and businessmen.”). 

Plaintiff offers no argument or authority to rebut these principles. Accordingly, the undersigned

finds that James Bonding is not a state actor under the public function test, either.

To satisfy the nexus/joint action test, “the governmental body and private party must be

intertwined in a ‘symbiotic relationship.’” Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1348 (citation omitted). 

Moreover, “the symbiotic relationship must involve the specific conduct of which the plaintiff

complains.” Id. (explaining that even though state regulates foster parents, the symbiotic

relationship thereby created does not encourage or sanction child abuse by foster parents, such

that foster parent was not state actor because state was not joint venturer in child abuse that

underlay the complaint); see also Patrick v. Floyd Medical Center, 201 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th

Cir. 2000) (“We hold that, to sustain a § 1983 claim under the nexus/ joint action test, the

symbiotic relationship between the public and private entities must involve the alleged

constitutional violation.”). Again, a state’s mere regulation of a private enterprise is not

sufficient to satisfy this test. See Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1132 (state imposition of licensing and

regulation on private entities is not enough to transform such entities into state actors for § 1983

purposes). “[E]ach case must be analyzed on its own facts to determine whether the

interdependence between the private and state entities reflects sufficient state involvement to

sustain a § 1983 claim.” Patrick, 201 F.3d at 1315.8

Under these authorities, then, plaintiff must show that the State of Alabama and James

Bonding were intertwined in a symbiotic relationship as to James Bonding’s arrest of bail

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9 Even then, the evidence before the Court does not support an inference that police

officers were called by James Bonding to assist in Weaver’s arrest. Instead, the only reasonable

inferences supported by the one extant narrative account of that arrest is that the police were

called to arrest Weaver’s girlfriend and to examine the scene, which had involved an automobile

crash, a person being dragged down the street in a fugitive automobile, and the like. Simply put,

the police’s role was to clean up the mess created by the completed arrest, not to assist, advise or

collaborate with James Bonding in carrying out the arrest. The arrest was a fait accompli before

law enforcement agents ever became involved.

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jumpers pursuant to a bondsman’s process. Moreover, in order for this test to be satisfied, that

symbiotic relationship must extend to the alleged use of excessive force in the arrest of Weaver

that lies at the heart of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against James Bonding. No such evidence exists

here. After James Bonding obtained bondsman’s process from the state court, there was no state

involvement or participation of any kind in James Bonding’s ongoing efforts to arrest Weaver. 

There is no evidence that James Bonding coordinated its two-month search for Weaver with law

enforcement agencies. Furthermore, in actually carrying out the arrest, James Bonding was

unaccompanied by police officers. It appears that no law enforcement agency was even aware

that James Bonding was attempting to arrest Weaver at the Cimmaron Club on the evening of

August 4 until after that arrest had been consummated and Weaver was in James Bonding’s

custody. Only then were police apprised of the situation and summoned to the scene.9

 These

facts unambiguously establish that James Bonding was performing a private function arising out

of its contract with Weaver, and that it acted completely independently and in its own financial

self-interest to carry out that function.

Numerous courts in analogous circumstances have held that bail bondsmen are not state

actors. See, e.g., Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (8th Cir. 1997); Landry v. A-Able

Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1996); Ouzts v. Maryland Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d

547, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1974); Green, 316 F. Supp.2d at 1261-62; McCoy, 176 F.R.D. at 681-82. 

The most critical factor underlying these decisions has typically been “whether the bondsmen

enlisted the assistance of law enforcement officers in arresting their principals.” Landry, 75 F.3d

at 204; see also Brady v. Maasikas, 2006 WL 1288608, *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2006) (“when

bondsmen unilaterally apprehend their principals without any assistance from law enforcement

officials, courts have consistently found them not to be state actors”); McCoy, 176 F.R.D. at 682

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(same). This case unquestionably flunks that litmus test. James Bonding did not request or

receive any assistance from law enforcement officers in carrying out the arrest of Weaver. 

Rather, James Bonding located and arrested Weaver on its own, bringing law enforcement

officers into the mix only after the arrest had been concluded and Weaver had been handcuffed

and deposited in the back of a James Bonding vehicle. In that regard, this case is factually

indistinguishable from Landry, in which the Fifth Circuit denied state actor status to a bail

bondsman who obtained a warrant from state court for the principal’s arrest, arrested the

principal without assistance from local law enforcement officials, and did not display the arrest

warrant to the principal or anyone else. 75 F.3d at 204-05; see also Green, 316 F. Supp.2d at

1261 (bail bondsman is not a state actor where, although his authority to arrest principal derived

from the state, he received no instructions, directions, aid, comfort, succor, or anything else from

the state in pursuing and capturing principal); McCoy, 176 F.R.D. at 681-82 (bondsman is not

state actor where he did not enlist aid of law enforcement officers in attempted arrest, but instead

acted unilaterally).

To combat these well-reasoned authorities, plaintiff proffers five arguments. First, he

characterizes Landry and Green as holding “that although the bondsmen were in fact ‘state

actors’ they acted for purely personal reasons, and thus, went beyond the authority given to

them.” (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at 2.) This is a misreading of the cases, both of which

specifically found that the bail bondsmen at issue were not state actors. See Landry, 75 F.3d at

205 (“[w]e find that Burrow and his two employees did not act under color of state law when

they seized Landry in Texas and returned him to Louisiana”); Green, 316 F. Supp.2d at 1262

(“Since bail bondsmen are not state actors, the Plaintiffs have no cause of action against the

Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Moreover, there is no suggestion in those cases that

the bail bondsmen were stripped of state actor status because they exceeded the authority

bestowed upon them by the state. Rather, both Landry and Green explain that the bail bondsmen

were not state actors because in executing their state-conferred authority, they acted

independently of law enforcement officers, did not purport to be state agents, and did not

announce that they were executing arrest warrants on behalf of the state. These facts do not

imply that the Landry and Green plaintiffs exceeded their authority. Therefore, plaintiff’s cause

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10 Plaintiff is correct, however, that the decisions deeming bail bondsmen not to be

state actors rest in part on the self-interested motivations for their actions. The Ninth Circuit said

it best in pointing out that “the bail bondsman is in the business in order to make money and is

not acting out of a high-minded sense of devotion to the administration of justice. ... [T]he

bondsman was acting to protect his own private financial interest and not to vindicate the interest

of the state.” Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 555 (citation omitted). This is different from saying that a bail

bondsman went beyond his statutory authority.

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is not furthered by his construction of Landry and Green.

10

Second, plaintiff likens this case to Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir.

2001), wherein the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that a city

manager was acting under color of state law when he sexually assaulted a city employee in her

apartment. Id. at 1303. In reaching this determination, Griffin emphasized the city manager’s

“persistent abuse of authority leading up to the assault,” finding that “the entire pattern of abuse

and harassment against Griffin that eventually culminated in her rape is relevant to our color of

law analysis.” Id. at 1305. The Griffin court was also swayed by the fact that the city manager

had directly used his official authority to create the opportunity to sexually assault his victim. 

Id. at 1305-07 & n.12. Plaintiff reasons that “[i]f Griffin can be held liable, then so should the

bondsmen.” (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at 3.) The Court fails to see any similarity between the fact

pattern in Griffin and that alleged by plaintiff here. In Griffin, the city manager performed his

official duties in a manner that facilitated and created opportunities for sexual harassment and

sexual assault of his subordinate. But in this case, James Bonding had no official duties or

responsibilities to the State of Alabama or the Mobile County Circuit Court. The state court did

not order or command James Bonding to apprehend Weaver, but instead simply gave him

permission to do so. While the Griffin manager was a state actor because he exercised his

official state duties in a discriminatory and abusive manner, James Bonding had no official

duties, but was acting privately, albeit with the state’s permission. Thus, Griffin sheds no light

on the proper resolution of the state actor query in this case, nor does it in any way suggest that

the Eleventh Circuit would construe the “state actor” requirement more expansively in the bail

bondsman context than did Green and Landry.

Third, plaintiff suggests that bail bondsmen can and should be held liable “merely on the

grounds that they had to get a [bondsman’s process] before arresting the decedent.” (Plaintiff’s

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Supp. Brief, at 3.) But this is not an accurate summation of the law. There do not appear to be

any cases holding that simply getting a state’s permission to act transforms a private party into a

state actor for § 1983 liability. Rather, the undersigned believes that the correct approach on this

point is that articulated by the Fifth Circuit, which opined in Landry that “mere possession of an

arrest warrant does not render a bail bondsman a state actor under § 1983” without more direct

involvement of the state in the arrest. 75 F.3d at 205.

Fourth, plaintiff attempts to distinguish Green and Landry by arguing that James Bonding

actually did request the assistance and intervention of local law enforcement officers during the

arrest process. (Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, at 3.) This distinction is unavailing because, as already

discussed supra, the evidence is that James Bonding neither requested nor received any

assistance from law enforcement until after the arrest of Weaver was concluded. The post-arrest

activities of local law enforcement officers in examining the scene or accepting Weaver into

custody at Mobile Metro Jail in no way transform the private character of James Bonding’s

arrest activities into some official state function in which James Bonding and the State of

Alabama were intertwined. Simply put, the post-arrest events cited by plaintiff have no bearing

on the “under color of state law” analysis for § 1983 liability purposes.

Fifth and finally, plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the prevailing approach in the Fourth

Circuit, as announced in Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1987). In Jackson, a bail

bondsman and a police officer appeared at the home of the bondsman’s principal’s mother,

inquiring as to the principal’s whereabouts. The plaintiff’s evidence was that the bondsman

forced his way into the home and kicked down interior doors, all as the law enforcement officer

physically restrained the mother. In deeming the bail bondsman a state actor for § 1983

purposes, the Jackson court opined that “the symbiotic relationship between bail bondsmen and

the Maryland criminal court system suffices to render Pantazes’ conduct state action” because

bondsmen depend for their livelihood on the state’s bail bond system, while the state depends on

bondsmen to monitor the whereabouts of released criminal defendants and to retrieve them for

trial. Id. at 430. The Court declines to adopt this portion of Jackson for several reasons. As an

initial matter, Jackson is a distinctly minority view. The Fourth Circuit appears to stand alone

among appellate courts in finding a symbiotic relationship between a bail bondsman and the

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11 See Landry, 75 F.3d at 205 n.5 (“We are not persuaded by the Fourth Circuit’s

finding that the relationship between bail bondsmen and the state criminal court system is such

that the actions of the bondsmen may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.”); Dean v.

Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1006 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997) (unequivocally rejecting Fourth Circuit

approach, explaining that “bondsmen are private citizens who interact with the state in the course

of pursuing their private interests. Their conduct is therefore not attributable to the state.”);

Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 554-55 (refusing to find that bail bondsman acts as unofficial agent, partner or

arm of the State court in bringing fugitives to justice, where state courts have their own official

arms for capturing fugitives and bondsman’s private reclamation interests and procedures are

completely separate from those of the state); see also Green, 316 F. Supp.2d at 1260-61

(embracing Landry and Ouzts rationales, and declining to follow Jackson); McCoy, 176 F.R.D.

at 681 (similar).

12 On this point, the Court believes the Eleventh Circuit is likely to agree. Although

the Eleventh Circuit has not considered this precise issue, at least one decision suggests that it

would be disinclined to cleave to arguments premised on the notion of a symbiotic relationship

between bail bondsmen and the state criminal systems with which they work. See Jaffe v. Smith,

825 F.2d 304m 307-08 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding no governmental action, as necessary to trigger

treaty violation, where bail bondsmen forcibly seized plaintiff in Canada and transported him to

Florida, on grounds that there was no evidence that bondsmen received instructions, directions,

aid, comfort, succor or anything else from federal, state or local governmental agencies).

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state.11 Furthermore, the “symbiotic relationship” aspect of Jackson is mere dicta because the

Fourth Circuit had already concluded in that same opinion that the bail bondsman was rendered a

state actor by virtue of the fact that he received significant aid from a police officer in gaining

entrance to the home, subduing the owner, and advising the owner that the bail bondsman could

do whatever he wanted. See Jackson, 810 F.2d at 429 (“This participation by a state official

suffices to render Pantazes a state actor for purposes of § 1983.”). The Jackson court having

already concluded that the bondsman was a state actor because of the active participation of a

law enforcement officer in the challenged incident, it was unnecessary for it to make sweeping

pronouncements about the relationship between bail bondsmen and state criminal court systems

for § 1983 purposes. This Court will not embrace the Fourth Circuit’s needless dicta at the

expense of the well-reasoned, persuasive analyses of the Fifth, Ninth and Eighth Circuits.12 

For all of the foregoing reasons, James Bonding’s actions on the evening of August 4,

2003 with respect to Weaver cannot properly be classified as “state action” and cannot expose it

to § 1983 liability. The uncontroverted factual allegations confirm that James Bonding’s

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13 Judges in this District have routinely declined supplemental jurisdiction in such

circumstances. See, e.g., Hosea v. Langley, 2006 WL 314454, *34-35 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2006)

(Steele, J.) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for conversion and theft

after dismissal of all federal claims on the merits); Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 188 F. Supp.2d

857, 869 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (Vollmer, J.) (remanding supplemental state law claims after

dismissing federal claims on summary judgment); Bowens v. City of Atmore, 171 F. Supp.2d

1244, 1260 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (Butler, J.) (“Because all federal claims have been dismissed prior

to trial, because state court should be the final arbiter of plaintiffs’ tort claims, and because no

countervailing considerations outweigh these circumstances, the plaintiffs’ state law claims ...

will be dismissed without prejudice.”); Brewer v. City of Daphne, 111 F. Supp.2d 1299, 1320

(S.D. Ala. 1999) (Steele, M.J.) (upon dismissing federal claim on summary judgment, “[t]he

Court declines supplemental jurisdiction of the remaining claim for wrongful death under state

law in light of the insubstantial nature of the federal claims”); see also Reynolds v. Golden

Corral Corp., 106 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (declining supplemental jurisdiction

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conduct in arresting Weaver was not fairly attributable to the state and was not performed under

color of state law. Simply put, James Bonding is a private actor which cannot be held liable

under § 1983 for bail bonding functions performed unilaterally, without assistance or

cooperation from law enforcement agents, and in furtherance of its own private financial and

contractual interests. For these reasons, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against James Bonding is not

cognizable as a matter of law, and that cause of action is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

B. State Law Claims for Wrongful Death and Assault and Battery.

In light of the dismissal of the § 1983 claim, there are no federal causes of action in this

lawsuit. Rather, all that remains are state law claims of wrongful death and assault and battery

against James Bonding. The dismissal of all federal claims has important jurisdictional

ramifications for this case, where subject matter jurisdiction was predicated exclusively on

federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and where diversity of citizenship is

plainly absent.

Once all triable claims within a federal court’s original jurisdiction have been dismissed,

the decision of whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims rests in the court’s discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2); Shotz v. City of Plantation,

Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003) (in deciding how to exercise § 1367(c) discretion,

court should consider principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity); Palmer v.

Hospital Authority of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994) (similar).13 The

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 121 Filed 08/01/06 Page 13 of 15
over state law claims after granting summary judgment on federal claims).

14 In so doing, the Court recognizes that the applicable Alabama statute of

limitations on these claims appears to have expired. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38 (generally

providing two-year limitations period for actions sounding in wrongful death or personal injury). 

Any unfairness to plaintiff from this result is drastically mitigated by the following

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Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as

here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d

1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004).

This approach is buttressed by the bedrock notion that state courts should generally be

the final arbiters of state law claims, particularly when federal claims are dismissed before trial. 

Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared that: 

“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and

to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed

reading of applicable law. Certainly if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims

should be dismissed as well.”

United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d

218 (1966); see also Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “if

the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires

dismissal of state claims”) (citation omitted); Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d

1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (indicating that state courts should be final arbiters of state law and

that when federal law claims are dismissed prior to trial, remaining state law claims are best

resolved by state courts under considerations of judicial economy, fairness, convenience and

comity); Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that because

federal claims were dismissed at summary judgment stage, district court should consider whether

interests of comity warrant dismissing state law claim without prejudice).

In light of these authorities and considerations, and in the absence of any argument to the

contrary by plaintiff why § 1367 jurisdiction should be exercised, the undersigned will not

exercise supplemental jurisdiction here. Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law claims against James

Bonding for wrongful death and assault and battery are due to be, and the same hereby are,

dismissed without prejudice for want of federal jurisdiction.14

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considerations: (i) plaintiff chose to pursue these state law claims in federal court and to initiate

that lawsuit just two days before the statute of limitations expired, thereby eliminating his

margin for error if the federal court were to decide that § 1367 jurisdiction over the state law

claims was inappropriate; (ii) plaintiff’s own medical evidence presented in litigating other

defendants’ motions for summary judgment exposes the profound weakness of his wrongful

death claims against James Bonding by establishing that the septic condition that killed Weaver

predated and was unrelated to his alleged physical mistreatment by James Bonding on the

evening of his arrest; and (iii) plaintiff’s assault and battery claims appear destined to fail,

inasmuch as Alabama law provides that tort claims for personal injury abate upon a party’s death

unless such claims were brought before death, see Price v. Southern Ry. Co., 470 So.2d 1125,

1127-28 (Ala. 1985) (tort claim for personal injury abates on death if not filed before death);

Missildine v. City of Montgomery, 907 F. Supp. 1501, 1504 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (under Alabama

law, claim sounding in tort for which no action has been filed dies with the person, and does not

survive death in favor of personal representative); Ala. Code § 6-5-462 (providing only that “all

personal claims upon which an action has been filed” survive in favor of personal

representative). Given these circumstances, declining supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

state law claims can work no injustice.

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III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s federal claims against James Bonding

Company are dismissed with prejudice on the grounds that defendant is not a “state actor” and

cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional deprivations relating to

the arrest of plaintiff’s decedent. Plaintiff’s state law claims against James Bonding Company

are dismissed without prejudice for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. A separate

judgment will enter.

This ruling disposes of all remaining claims in this action; therefore, the Clerk’s Office is

directed to close this file.

DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of August, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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