Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00757/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00757-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

MICHAEL D. FRAZIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF GADSDEN,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 4:13-CV-757-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The trial of thisfailure-to hire case arising under Title VII began on August 24,

2015, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Michael D. Frazier (“Mr.

Frazier”) on August 28, 2015. (Doc. 66); (see also Docs. 81-85 (5 volumes of trial

transcript proceedings)). The jury awarded Mr. Frazier $20,000 in compensatory

damages (Doc. 66-1 at 2 ¶ 3) on his race discrimination claim against Defendant City

of Gadsden (the “COG”). On August 28, 2015, the court entered a final judgment in

Mr. Frazier’s favor. (Doc. 67).

On May 13, 2016, the court addressed the parties’ seven post-judgment

motions in a memorandum opinion (Doc. 130) and, based upon those rulings, set a

deadline for Mr. Frazier “to submit to chambers email a proposed amended final

FILED

 2016 Sep-23 PM 12:11

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:13-cv-00757-VEH Document 145 Filed 09/23/16 Page 1 of 13
judgment order . . . no later than 10 days from the entry date of this order.” (Id. at 51).

Mr. Frazier complied with this submission deadline, never brought to the court’s

attention that he disagreed with any of those rulings, and the court entered an

amended final judgment order on May 24, 2016. (Doc. 132). 

Oddly enough and over 10 dayslater,1on June 8, 2016, Mr. Frazier filed a Rule

59 Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc.

133) (the “Rule 59(e) Motion”). Claiming that the court “need[s]to correct clear error

or manifest injustice” (Id. at 2 ¶ 2),2 Mr. Frazier seeks reconsideration of two

issues–the court’s job reinstatement/front pay ruling (id. at 2-4 ¶¶ 2-4) and its hourly

rate determination for Mr. Frazier’s lead counsel. (Id. at 4-7 ¶¶ 6-7). The parties have

briefed the Rule 59(e) Motion. (Docs. 139, 142). 

Also pending before the court is Mr. Frazier’s Motion for Leave To Further

Supplement Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 143) (the

“Supplemental Fee Motion”). The COG has not opposed the Supplemental Fee

Motion. The COG has, however, already filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. 134). 

1 Under the court’s uniform initial order, “[m]otions for reconsideration must be filed within

ten days of the date of the court’s ruling which the movant seeks to have reconsidered or the court

may, in its discretion, deny the motion as untimely.” (Doc. 5 at 26) (emphasis in original).

2 Mr. Frazier’s Rule 59(e) Motion has two paragraphs that are numbered “2”. This language

appears in the first of those redundantly-numbered paragraphs.

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After carefully considering all of the parties’ contentions, Mr. Frazier’s Rule

59(e) Motion is DENIED as to the hourly rate ruling. The job instatement/front pay

issue is HEREBY SET for an evidentiary hearing on October 19, 2016, from 10:00

a.m. to noon in Courtroom 6A of the Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse,

located at 1729 Fifth Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203. Finally, the

Supplemental Fee Motion is DENIED with leave to refile no later than 5:00 p.m. on

September 30, 2016. 

II. STANDARD

“The decision to alter or amend judgment is committed to the sound discretion

of the district judge and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of

discretion.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237,

1238-39 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Commodities

Group, 753 F.2d 862, 866 (11th Cir. 1984)). “While, as a rule, parties are not entitled

to ‘two bites at the apple’, there are occasions in which reconsideration should be

entertained.” Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 667 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Am.

Home, 763 F.2d at 1239). 

As the Eleventh Circuit has summarized the limited scope of relief that is

available to a litigant under Rule 59(e):

“The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59]motion are newly-discovered

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evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d

1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used]

to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could

have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v.

Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).

Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Jacobs v.

Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Reconsidering the

merits of a judgment, absent a manifest error of law or fact, is not the purpose of Rule

59.”); Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1442 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of a Rule

59(e) motion is not to raise an argument that was previously available, but not

pressed.”). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Rule 59(e) Motion

1. The Hourly Rate Ruling Will Not Be Modified.

Mr. Frazier’s counsel, A. Brett Adair (“Mr. Adair”), requested that the court

award him an hourly rate of $425.00 in the initial fee motion. The court, instead,

determined that the appropriate rate for Mr. Adair was $350.00. (Doc. 130 at 48). On

reconsideration, Mr. Adair requests that the court adjust the award to somewhere

between $400.00 to $425.00. (Doc. 133 at 5). 

As grounds for his relief, Mr. Adair generally relies upon “the affidavits of

employment counsel submitted as exhibits as to the current rates for similar services

4

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by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience and reputation.” (Id. at 132-

33). Mr. Adair also specifically points to the fact that in 2010 another judge on this

court found his reasonable rate to be $350.00 in an employment case and contends

that a higher rate for him is appropriate now given that six years has elapsed since

that determination, “the novel legal issues in this case[,] and the vigorous defense

asserted by the [COG] . . . .” (Doc. 133 at 5).

The flaws in Mr. Adair’s Rule 59(e) efforts to increase his hourly rate are

numerous. The court has already fully considered Mr. Adair’s fee evidence and

rejected these recycled arguments when deciding the initial post-judgment fee

request. (See Doc. 130 at 40-50 (arriving at $350.00 rate for Mr. Adair and rejecting

requestfor a lodestar enhancement under the circumstances of this uncomplicated and

not-so-novel case));see also Lazo v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 10 F. App’x 553, 553 (9th Cir.

2001) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Lazos’ motion

to reconsider because the Lazos merely reiterated meritless arguments.”).

Moreover, nowhere within the current motion has Mr. Adair shown with case

authority that awarding him a rate of $350.00 or anything below $400.00 constitutes

clear error or is manifestly unjust. Likewise, Mr. Adair does not refer to an

intervening change in controlling law that would impact the court’s prior formulation

of his reasonable rate and the rejection of any lodestar enhancement for his legal

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work. See Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (M.D.

Ala. 2003) (identifying intervening change in controlling law as an appropriate basis

for reconsideration). 

Instead, he ineffectively asserts that the court has committed clear error by not

using his previously awarded $350.00 rate as a baseline from which to build his fee

award in this case. Mr. Adair’s myopic view of this issue disregards the considerable

latitude afforded to a district court under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g.,

Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he abuse of

discretion standard allows ‘a range of choice for the district court, so long as that

choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.’” (quoting United States v. Kelly,

888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir.1989))); see also Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d

968, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone of

choice within which the trial courts may go either way.”) (Kern cited with approval

in Kelly). Therefore, this section of the Rule 59(e) Motion falls short of even

triggering a reconsideration of the amended final judgment. 

Additionally, when determining Mr. Adair’s rate, the court thoroughly

explained its reasoning, including its reliance upon the rate of $385.00 set by the

undersigned and affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in 2015 for a more seasoned

employment lawyer–John Saxon (“Mr. Saxon”),who has been practicing law since

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1977 versus Mr. Adair, who obtained hislaw license 18 yearslater in 1995. (Doc. 130

at 43-44). Mr. Saxon had requested that this court award him a $450.00 hourly rate

in 2014. 

The court also factored in the $375.00 rate awarded to another significantly

more experienced lawyer, Alicia Haynes (“Ms. Haynes”), in 2013, and pointed out

how that race discrimination case–Hithon v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

4:96-CV-03257-JHE–was very close to Mr. Frazier’s failure-to-hire Title VII suit in

terms of legal theory and scope. (Doc. 130 at 42). 

Mr. Frazier attempts to discredit the import of the foregoing rates for Mr.

Saxon and Ms. Haynes because associate attorneys were involved in those cases.

(Doc. 142 at 6; id. at 6 n.1). Mr. Frazier cites no authority for this strange proposition

and this court fails to see how the involvement of junior lawyers translates into an

artificially lower reasonable rate for the senior lawyer. Additionally, Mr. Adair, at

times, relied on an associate lawyer, Matthew Hill (Doc. 130 at 35), in litigating this

lawsuit.

The $350.00 rate is also well within the general prevailing market range for

employment discrimination matters as testified to by Kenny Haynes ($250.00-

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$600.00)

3

 (Doc. 78-2 at 4 ¶ 5)

4

and Mr. Saxon ($250.00-$650.00) (Doc. 78-5 at 5 ¶

11)

5

in their capacities as expert witnessesfor Mr. Adair. Mr. Saxon expressly opined

that “the prevailing market rate in Birmingham for plaintiffs’ attorneys in cases such

as the Frazier case, involving race discrimination, ranges from $250.00 to $650.00

per hours.” (Doc. 78-5 at 5 ¶ 11). Further, it is just outside the general range

($375.00-$650.00) that Ms. Haynes provided in her affidavit. (Doc. 78-3 at 4 ¶ 5).6

For whatever reason, Mr. Adair continues to be unwilling to share with the

court what rate he charges to his defense clients in employment cases. (Doc. 130 at

48 n.34). As determined in Maner v. Linkan, LLC, 602 F. App’x 489 (11th Cir. 2015),

in using Mr. Saxon’s reasonable rate charged to his non-contingent clients, “the

district court did not clearly err in setting lead counsel’srate at his normal billing rate

of $385 and in the middle of the expert’s range.” Id. at 494. Mr. Adair suggests in the

reply brief that this court should not be persuaded by Maner because of the

distinguishing evidence of Mr. Saxon’s non-contingency fee rate. (Doc. 142 at 6). 

This argument is unpersuasive in light of Mr. Adair’s continuing failure to provide

3 The court acknowledges but disagrees with the additional opinion provided by Mr. Haynes

that a reasonable range for someone with Mr. Adair’s level of experience is $400.00- $475.00. (Doc.

78-2 at 5 ¶ 11).

4 All page references to Doc. 78-2 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

5 All page references to Doc. 78-5 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

6 All page references to Doc. 78-3 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

8

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comparable information for Mr. Adair.7

Further, Mr. Adair misses the court’s point entirely–Mr. Saxon has

considerablymore experience than Mr. Adair and Mr. Saxon’s reasonable hourly rate

as determined by the undersigned in 2014 and upheld on appeal was $385.00.

8

Therefore, setting Mr. Adair’s rate for legal work performed for the period of 2013

to 2015 at $350.00, with the tested reasonable benchmark of $385.00 and the general

range evidence in mind, is a discretionary determination that is entirely reasonable.

Thus, Mr. Adair has not substantively supported the fee relief sought, and the hourly

rate portion of the Rule 59(e) Motion is DENIED.

2. The Court Will Hold an Evidentiary Hearing on

the Job Instatement/Front Pay Issue.

Title VII presumesthat a successful failure-to-hire plaintiff should be awarded

either a job or front pay. See Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1528

(11th Cir. 1991) (“In addition to back pay, prevailing Title VII plaintiffs are

7 Mr. Adair’s misplaced argument seems to assume that a lawyer’s rate for non-contingent

employment cases will always be lower than the rate applicable in contingencyfee cases. This theory

is undermined by Mr. Saxon’s expert opinion that “rates charged to clients for non-contingent,

employment litigation-related work range[] between $250 and $600 per hour” (Doc. 78-2 at 4 ¶ 4),

the same exact range he provided for attorneys representing plaintiffs in race discrimination cases

such as this one.

8

In contrast, Mr. Adair’s previously approved rate of $350.00 did not undergo any appellate

review. According to CM/ECF in 2:08-CV-0459-KOB, one defendant’s notice of appeal was

dismissed due to settlement. (Doc. 365). The other defendant’s appeal was dismissed for want of

prosecution. (Doc. 366).

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presumptively entitled to either reinstatement or front pay.”), superseded by statute

on other grounds as indicated by Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340

(11th Cir. 2000). “Front pay may be particularly appropriate in lieu of reinstatement

[or instatement] where discord and antagonism between the parties would render

reinstatement ineffective as a make-whole remedy.” Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus.,

Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1449 (11th Cir. 1985). If a district court awards a plaintiff front

pay, it must “make factual findings as to whether reinstatement [or instatement] is

feasible.” EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 606 (11th Cir. 2000). Further, those

factual findings must be explicit. See W&O, 213 F.3d at 619 n.12 (“While it may be

implicit in the district court’s award of front pay that the court credited the EEOC’s

claims of antagonism toward Nuesse and discounted W&O’s claims that

reinstatement was a viable option, we must require the district court to make explicit

findings on this issue.”). 

The job instatement/front pay issue is highly contested by the parties,

especially in light of an unusual post-trial filing by Mr. Frazier–a Notice of Material

Development (Doc. 128) (the “Notice”) filed on April 28, 2016, that pertains

specifically to this equitable claim. Mr. Frazier contendsthat the court misunderstood

the meaning of the Notice, urges that he has not abandoned his request for

instatement, and alternatively asserts that April 28, 2016, should not be the cut-off

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date for his front pay claim. (Doc. 133 at 4). Noticeably absent from this section of

the Rule 59(e) Motion is any supporting declaration or affidavit from Mr. Frazier. 

The COG countersthat the court correctly interpreted the Notice asspecifically

rejecting his claim for instatement and that no adjustment to Mr. Frazier’s front pay

award is warranted. (Doc. 139 at 3-5); (see id. at 4 (“In light of the Plaintiff’s specific

request for front pay in lieu of reinstatement after describing the futility of

instatement, the Court chose a reasonable date, April 28, 2016, to cut off front pay –

the date of the Plaintiff’s clear-cutrequest.”)). Because the determination of thisissue

falls squarely within the court’s equitable powers under Title VII, it has decided that

the best way to deal with this post-judgment dispute is to hold an evidentiary hearing

where Mr. Frazier’s claim for instatement/front pay, including the meaning and

impact of the Notice and the COG’s grounds for opposition, can be more fully

developed through live testimony and the introduction of documentary evidence.

Therefore, as indicated above, an evidentiary hearing is SET for October 19,

2016, from 10:00 a.m. to noon in Birmingham. Each side will have 1 hour to present

his or its position. Mr. Frazier will call his witnesses first, followed by the COG’s

witnesses. Any time spent cross-examining a witness will be counted against that

cross-examining party’s one-hour allotment. The deadline for the parties to file their

witness and exhibit lists for the purposes of this hearing is no later than 5:00 p.m. on

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October 5, 2016. The deadline for filing objections to those lists is no later than 5:00

p.m. on October 12, 2016. Finally, post-hearing, the parties will be required to submit

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to chambers email no later than 5:00

p.m. on October 31, 2016.

B. Supplemental Fee Motion

In the Supplemental Fee Motion, Mr. Adair seeks an additional 63.9 hours of

attorney time for addressing various post-trial motions and participating in courtordered mediation. (Doc. 143 at 2). When reviewing his initial petition, the court

expressly found that work performed “outside of Mr. Frazier’s case in chief, including

time spent on equitable relief and fee petition issues” was not compensable. (Doc.

130 at 39). The court then reduced the hours claimed by Mr. Adair consistent with

that principle and also attached annotated copies of Mr. Adair’s billing records

reflecting those as well as other time reductions that were found to be appropriate.

(Doc. 130-1, Doc. 130-2). 

The Supplement Fee Motion indicatesthat “Plaintiff’sCounsel hasmade every

effort to include only those allowable and compensable time entries.” (Doc. 143 at 2).

To the contrary, the court has reviewed the time entries attached as Exhibit 2 to the

Supplemental Fee Motion (Doc. 143-3) and has found numerous instances in which

Mr. Adair again seeks to recover for work performed outside of Mr. Frazier’s case in

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chief, including time spent on equitable relief, mediation/settlement, and fee petition

issues. Further, Mr. Adair has in no way contested the court’s prior

ruling–reasonableness means the claimed hours must relate to Mr. Frazier’s case in

chief. Accordingly, the Supplemental Fee Motion is DENIED with leave to file a new

one that fully comports with the unchallenged reasonableness-of-hours framework

previously set forth by the court on May 13, 2016. (Doc. 130 at 37-40).

IV. CONCLUSION

Mr. Frazier’s Rule 59(e) Motion is DENIED as to the hourly rate ruling. The

instatement/front pay issue is SET for an evidentiary hearing on October 19, 2016,

beginning at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 6A of the Hugo L. Black United States

Courthouse and subject to the additional requirements set out above. Finally, the

Supplemental Fee Motion is DENIED with leave to refile in an acceptable format no

later than 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2016.

DONE and ORDERED this the 23rd day of September, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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