Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02336/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02336-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carol Rall,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Arizona Department of Public Safety,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 04-2336-PHX-DKD 

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Arizona Department of Public Safety’s ("DPS")

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #35). For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that

there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff Carol Rall's Equal Pay Act ("EPA")

and Title VII claims and DPS is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The parties

have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. #4).

BACKGROUND

Rall began her employment with DPS in 1989 (DSOF ¶ 7). After receiving a number

of promotions at DPS, Rall received a promotion to become the acting manager of DPS’s

Logistics Bureau in November 2000 (DSOF ¶ 17). DPS’s Logistics Bureau is one of four

bureaus that make up DPS’s Support Division (Doc. #35 at 2). The Logistics Bureau is

responsible for the procurement, maintenance, and replacement of supplies for DPS’s vehicle

fleet (DSOF ¶ 19). In 2001, Rall received a salary reclassification upgrade and was classified

as an Administrative Manager (DSOF ¶ 20). DPS employee salaries are based on an

employee’s job classification (DSOF ¶ 1). Both men and women have had the Administrative

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Manager classification and held the position of Logistics Manager (DSOF ¶ 77-78). At the time

of her reclassification as an Administrative Manager, Rall’s yearly salary was $68,493 (DSOF

¶ 20). Rall retired from DPS in May 2004 and her final yearly salary was $69,943 (DSOF ¶ 22).

As the manager of DPS’s Logistics Bureau, Rall was required to manage the logistics

of maintaining DPS’s vehicle fleet (PSOF ¶ 100). Rall supervised 41 employees and had an

annual budget of $5,328,146 (PSOF ¶ 99). Rall did not negotiate contracts for DPS and her

position did not require technical knowledge (DSOF ¶ 37, PSOF ¶ 100). Rall, moreover, was

a civilian employee and was not a sworn peace officer (DSOF ¶ 29).

Rall’s predecessor was Robert Aguilera ("Aguilera"), who was classified as a

Commander under the DPS pay system, and he received a yearly salary of $89,958 (PSOF ¶ 91).

Pursuant to the pay system, Aguilera’s salary was based on his Commander classification (Doc.

#35 at 4). As a Commander, Aguilera was a sworn peace officer, and was required to undergo

law enforcement training and was available to respond to law enforcement duties at any time

(Id. at 5). In addition, Aguilera was assigned to Logistics after serving as DPS deputy director

– the number two position in the agency – under a previous director (DSOF ¶ 73). Aguilera

served as head of Logistics for several months before retiring (DSOF ¶ 74). Rall’s successor,

Mike Fuson (“Fuson”), a male, received a yearly salary of $73,000 (PSOF ¶ 98). Roger

Illingsworth (“Illingsworth”), a male, served as a Grants Manager at DPS and, like Rall, was

classified as an Administrative Manager (DSOF ¶ 80, PSOF ¶ 99). Illingsworth received the

same salary as Rall (DSOF ¶ 80). Illingsworth supervised 3 employees and had an annual

budget of $35,400 (PSOF ¶ 99).

Carl Tornambe ("Tornambe"), a male, served as the manager of DPS’s Facilities Bureau

and was classified as Facilities Manager (DSOF ¶ 41). Tornambe was responsible for

overseeing the design, funding, construction, and improvements of DPS buildings (DSOF ¶ 41-

46). Tornambe was responsible for negotiating contracts and traveled often around Arizona to

manage DPS facilities (DSOF ¶ 42, 45). Further, Tornambe’s position required technical

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knowledge of the mechanical, electrical, and plumbing components of DPS facilities (DSOF

¶ 47). In 2002, Tornambe’s yearly salary was $90,199 (DSOF ¶ 51).

Phillip Case ("Case"), a male, served as Comptroller of DPS and its chief financial

officer (DSOF ¶ 53). Case was responsible for the oversight of the financial accounting

structure of DPS and monitored its expenditures (DSOF ¶ 56). DPS has an annual appropriated

budget of $183.6 million and expends $50 million in non-appropriated funds. (Id.) Case also

served as the liaison between the Legislature and the Governor’s budget office (DSOF ¶ 57).

In 2001, Case’s yearly salary was $87,839 and increased to $89,289 in 2002 (DSOF ¶ 59).

Sam Fragala ("Fragala"), a male, is a sworn peace officer and classified as a Commander

by the DPS classification system (DSOF ¶ 60). Fragala served as DPS Human Resources

Commander (DSOF ¶ 61). Fragala is responsible for the recruitment of law enforcement

officers and the administration of the promotions process for sworn peace officers (DSOF ¶ 62-

63). Fragala carries a weapon, is available to respond to emergencies, and is required to

perform annual law enforcement training to retain his peace officer certification (DSOF ¶ 64-

65). Fragala received a yearly salary of $90,408 from 2002 to 2004 (DSOF ¶ 66).

Gary Hughes ("Hughes"), a male, is a sworn peace officer and classified as a Commander

by the DPS classification system (DSOF ¶ 67-68). Hughes is required to respond to

emergencies at all times and is required to perform annual law enforcement training to retain

his peace officer certification (DSOF ¶ 69-70). As a Commander, Hughes was responsible for

training sworn peace officers, and he oversaw the enforcement and accident records section and

the safety and loss section (DSOF ¶ 72).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For DPS to prevail on its Motion for Summary Judgment, it must show, through the

pleadings and supporting documents, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Substantive

law determines which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

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outcome of the suit under the governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. For a genuine issue of material fact to exist, there must be evidence

that would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Further,

the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255.

The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient

evidence favoring the non-moving party; if the evidence is merely colorable or is not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

Finally, unsupported testimony is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Anheuser-Busch v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 354 (9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s EPA Claim

A. EPA legal standard

The EPA prohibits employers from paying employees “at a rate less than the rate at

which [the employer] pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs

the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are

performed under similar working conditions . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). For purposes of

comparison, "the jobs need not be identical, but they must be 'substantially equal.'" Stanley v.

Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, "[e]ach of these components

[skill, effort, and responsibility] must be substantially equal to state a claim." Id.

The Ninth Circuit has outlined a burden-shifting framework in EPA cases. Initially, "the

plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that

employees of the opposite sex were paid different wages for equal work." Stanley v. Univ. of

S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999). At this stage, "[t]he prima facie case is limited

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to a comparison of the jobs in question, and does not involve a comparison of the individuals

who hold the jobs." Id. at 1074.

The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that her job was "substantially equal" to a job

with a higher pay rate. A plaintiff may do this by showing "the jobs to be compared have a

'common core' of tasks, i.e., [that] a significant portion of the two jobs is identical." Stanley,

178 F.3d at 1074. The court does not compare the individuals who hold the positions. Id. Once

the plaintiff establishes this "common core of tasks," the inquiry shifts and "the court must then

determine whether any additional tasks, incumbent on one job but not the other, make the two

jobs 'substantially different.'" Id. See also Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1209 (7th

Cir. 1989) (outlining "common core" approach).

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "the burden of persuasion shifts to the

employer to show that the [pay] disparity is permitted by one of the four statutory exceptions

to the Equal Pay Act." EEOC v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th

Cir. 1984). The fourth statutory exception, the one at issue in this case, is "differential [in pay]

based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Maricopa County, 736 F.2d

at 513. A salary difference based on a classification system qualifies as a factor other than sex

if the system is neutrally applied to both male and female employees. Maricopa County Cmty.

Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d at 514-15; see Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir.1986).

If the defendant meets the burden of showing that the pay disparity is based on a

statutory exception, "the employee may prevail by showing that the employer's proffered

nondiscriminatory reason is a 'pretext for discrimination.'" Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1076 (quoting

Maxwell, 803 F.2d at 446). At this stage, the plaintiff "bears the burden of demonstrating a

material fact regarding pretext in order to survive summary judgment." Stanley, 178 F.3d at

1076 (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).

B. EPA Analysis

Rall has failed to show that her position as the manager of the Logistics Bureau was

substantially equal to that of her male counterparts, in particular the bureau chief Tornambe, to

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"In the instant case Plaintiff is comparing herself against Carl Tornambe." (Plaintiff's

Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 7).

2

Plaintiff objected to Defendant's affidavits which were not sworn before a notary public.

This objection is without merit as affidavits executed under penalty of perjury are permissible

Rule 56 affidavits. 28 U.S.C. § 1746; U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003).

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whose position she draws the critical comparison1

. Although Rall has shown that she had

significant managerial responsibilities that were similar to her male counterparts that managed

DPS Bureaus, her position required materially different responsibilities and it was not

substantially equal to the positions of her male counterparts. See Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074.

Tornambe was responsible for the funding, design, improvement, and construction of

DPS facilities throughout Arizona (DSOF ¶ 43, 46). His position required him to have technical

knowledge of mechanical, electric, and plumbing components of DPS facilities and he was

responsible for negotiating contracts for DPS (DSOF ¶ 47). Tornambe, moreover, was required

to travel extensively throughout Arizona to carry out his position (DSOF ¶ 42). As Logistics

Manager, Rall was not required to perform the same material responsibilities listed above that

Tornambe was required to perform as Facilities Manager. Defendant submitted unchallenged

evidence2

 that Tornambe's pay differential was substantially due to his request that his position's

compensation be reevaluated in light of his demonstration that facilities managers for other

public entity employers received higher pay (DSOF ¶ 51). Plaintiff argues that her budget of

$5,328,146 dwarfs Tornambe's budget of $2,777,666 and therefore demonstrates the

equivalency of the two positions (PSOF ¶ 86). This argument does not reflect the unchallenged

fact that Tornambe's budget did not include millions of dollars in capital improvement and

building improvement funds for which his position exercised oversight responsibility (DSOF

¶ 43). Nor does it recognize the unchallenged fact that much of the Logistics budget includes

categories which are relatively fixed by external factors such as $1.8 million for fuel

(Schallmann Affidavit, attached as Exhibit 2 to DSOF). 

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The equivalency analysis fails with respect to other possible employees as well. Rall’s

position did not contain the same material responsibilities as Case’s position as Comptroller and

the positions were not substantially equal. Case served as the chief financial officer and was

responsible for overseeing DPS’s accounting structure and expenditures (DSOF ¶ 56). Rall’s

position only required her to manage the finances of a DPS Bureau, not an entire state agency.

Case was also required to serve as a liaison between the Governor’s budget office and the

Arizona Legislature (DSOF ¶ 57).

Rall’s position as a Logistics Manager is also materially different from the positions of

Fragala and Hughes. Fragala and Hughes were sworn peace officers (DSOF ¶ 60, 67). They

both carry firearms, are required to undergo law enforcement training to retain their peace

officer certification, and are required to respond to emergencies (DSOF ¶ 64-65, 69, 70).

Moreover, Fragala’s positions at DPS required him to manage the recruitment and promotions

of peace officers (DSOF ¶ 62-63). Hughes’ position required him to supervise the training of

peace officers and management of departments regarding law enforcement procedure (DSOF

¶ 72). Rall was a civilian employee and she was not required to take on the responsibilities of

a sworn peace officer in her position as Logistics Manager. Furthermore, as Logistics Manager,

Rall did not manage the recruitment, promotions or training of peace officers, nor did she

manage law enforcement procedures.

Aguilera held the same Logistics Manager position as Rall (PSOF ¶ 91). However,

Aguilera, like Fragala and Hughes and unlike Rall, was a sworn peace officer, required to

undergo law enforcement training, and was available to respond to law enforcement duties at

any time (DSOF ¶ 29, 30, 64, 65, 69). Rall’s position as Logistics Manager is not substantially

equal to Aguilera’s position because Aguilera was paid at the Commander level which reflected

the extra responsibilities of a sworn peace officer. Moreover, Aguilera's unique circumstances

as a former deputy director refute an inference of discriminatory pay in violation of the EPA.

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Because Rall has failed to meet the burden of showing that her position with DPS was

substantially equal to that of her male counterparts, in particular Tornambe, the Court grants the

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Rall's EPA claim. 

II. Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim

A. Title VII Legal Standard

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.

Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). Title VII places a

broader prohibition on discriminatory wages than the EPA and, unlike the EPA, permits a

plaintiff to pursue a claim without showing substantial equality of jobs with different pay rates.

County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169-71, 179-80 (1981); Lewis v. Smith, 255

F.Supp.2d 1054, 1060-61 (2003).

To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence

of intentional discrimination by an employer. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217,

1220 (9th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff may circumstantially establish a prima facie case by meeting

the following four requirements: the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2)

performed according to the employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) suffered an adverse

employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than other employees similarly situated.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).

The defendant can rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case by showing that the pay disparity

is permitted by one of the statutory exceptions to an EPA claim. Lewis, 255 F.Supp.2d at 1062.

Title VII incorporates the EPA’s statutory exceptions and a defendant that proves one of the

statutory exceptions “cannot be held liable under the EPA or Title VII.” Maxwell v. City of

Tucson, 803 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir.1986); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). See Gunther, 452 U.S. at

168 (holding that Title VII incorporates EPA’s statutory exceptions).

If the defendant rebuts the plaintiff’s prima facie case by showing a permissible reason

for a pay disparity, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the employer’s stated reason is a

pretext for discrimination. Lewis, 255 F.Supp.2d at 1060 (citing Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220).

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If the plaintiff offered direct evidence of discriminatory motive, “a triable issue as to the actual

motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial.” Godwin, 150 F.3d

at 1221. However, if the plaintiff relies on indirect evidence to show that the defendant’s stated

motive is a pretext, the plaintiff must present “‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ [evidence] in order

to create a triable issue to whether the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of sex.”

Id. at 1222.

B. Title VII Analysis

Rall has not presented evidence that establishes a prima facie case. She does not show

that she was treated less favorably than other employees similarly situated. Although the

motion for summary judgement, the response and the reply discuss a number of different

employees, as indeed does this Order, Plaintiff very plainly limited the relevant comparative

employees to Tornambe. The Response states, "[i]n the instant case Plaintiff is comparing

herself against Carl Tornambe" (Plaintiff's Response, Doc. #42 at p. 7). The same point is made

in her statement of facts:

87. All of the individuals who were Bureau Chiefs were male. All of the

individuals had a greater salary than Plaintiff. In this lawsuit Plaintiff compares

herself against Carl Tornambe, Bureau Chief Facilities Manager (See Rall

Affidavit, ¶1; Exhibit "B").

(PSOF ¶87). Thus the appropriate focus, as framed by Plaintiff, is upon Tornambe. As set forth

in the preceding section, Tornambe does not qualify as a similarly situated employee. There is

no genuine issue of material fact that Tornambe was paid more because his job was materially

different, not because of impermissible gender discrimination. 

Even assuming Plaintiff could demonstrate a prima facie Title VII case, Defendant would

still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As discussed in Section I. B., the Defendant has

initially shown that its salary disparity between employees is based on the factor other than sex

statutory exception. Because DPS has initially proved one of the statutory exceptions under the

EPA, it can not be held liable under Title VII unless Rall can show DPS’s stated reason for its

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salary disparity is a pretext for sexual discrimination. Maxwell, 803 F.2d at 446; Godwin, 150

F.3d at 1220.

The Plaintiff has not presented direct proof of intentional discrimination by DPS. Rall

has attempted to present indirect evidence that DPS’s stated reason for its pay disparity is a

pretext for sexual discrimination. Because Rall has presented indirect evidence, she must

present “substantial” and “specific” evidence that DPS’s pay system is a pretext for sexual

discrimination. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222. Drawing all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the

Court finds that the Plaintiff has not presented “substantial” and “specific” evidence that shows

the Defendant’s stated reasons for a pay disparity were a pretext for sexual discrimination.

The Court will grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

regarding Rall's EPA claim (Doc. #35).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

regarding Rall's Title VII claim (Doc. #35).

The Clerk shall enter Judgment in favor of Defendant and dismiss the case.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2006.

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