Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02025/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS KOHLER,

 Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-CV-2025-W-BLM

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART

AND DENYING-IN-PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE

DEFENSES [DOC. 69].

v.

STAPLES THE OFFICE

SUPERSTORE, LLC, et al, 

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s affirmative

defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. 69].) 

Defendants oppose. (Defs.’ Opp’n [Doc. 10].) The Court decides the matter on the

papers submitted and without oral argument. See CIV. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons

discussed below, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiff’s

motion to strike, and GRANTS Defendants leave to amend selected affirmative

defenses.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 1, 2011, Plaintiff Chris Kohler initiated this action against Staples

the Office Superstore, LLC and other defendants. (Compl. [Doc. 1].) Kohler, who is

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paraplegic and uses a wheelchair, alleges that he encountered several “physical and

intangible” barriers to his use and enjoyment of the restroom at a Staples store in San

Diego, California. (Compl. at 7-9.) 

1

In his complaint, Kohler asserts five causes of action under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.: (1) denial of full and

equal enjoyment and use of the restaurant, § 12182(a); (2) failure to remove

architectural barriers in an existing facility, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); (3) failure to design

and construct an accessible facility, § 12183(a)(1); (4) failure to make an altered facility

accessible, § 12183(a)(2); and (5) failure to modify existing policies and procedures,

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). (Id. at 27-29.) Kohler seeks all relief available under the ADA,

including injunctive relief and attorney’s fees and costs. (Compl. at 29.) In addition,

he also asserts derivative state claims under California’s Disabled Persons Act,

California Civil Code §§ 54, et seq., the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code

§§ 51, et seq., and relevant sections of California’s Health & Safety Code. (Id. at 29-

32.) 

Staples answered Kohler’s complaint, denying all factual allegations and raising

twenty affirmative defenses. (Answer [Doc. 33].) Kohler then filed the present motion

to strike all of Staples’ affirmative defenses or, in the alternative, to require Staples to

re-plead any insufficient affirmative defenses under the Twombly standard. (See Pl’s 2

Mot.) Staples opposed Kohler’s motion, arguing that the Twombly standard does not

apply to affirmative defenses and, in the alternative, requesting leave to amend any

insufficient affirmative defenses. (Defs. Opp’n [Doc. 70].)

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 All references in this document are to page numbers.

1

 Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 2

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court“may strike from a pleading

an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time

and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues

prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 

At the same time, 12(f) motions are “generally regarded with disfavor because of the

limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as

a delaying tactic.” Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152

(C.D. Cal. 2003). Unless it would prejudice the opposing party, courts freely grant

leave to amend stricken pleadings. Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th

Cir. 1979); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

An affirmative defense may be insufficient as a matter of pleading or as a matter

of law. Sec. People, Inc. v. Classic Woodworking, LLC, 2005 WL 645592, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. 2005). “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense

is whether it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshack, 607 F.2d at 827

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)) (emphasis added); Simmons v. Navajo,

609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010); Schutte & Koerting, Inc. v. Swett & Crawford,

298 Fed. Appx. 613, 615 (9th Cir. 2008). Fair notice generally requires that the

defendant state the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense. See Conley, 355

U.S. at 47. It does not, however, require a detailed statement of facts. Id. at 47-48. 

On the other hand, an affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it clearly lacks

merit“under any set of facts the defendant might allege.” McArdle v. AT&T Mobility,

LLC, 657 F. Supp. 1140, 1149-50 (N.D. Cal. 2009).

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B. Pleading for Affirmative Defenses

Before addressing the merits of Kohler’s motion against each of Staples’

affirmative defenses, the Court must resolve a preliminary issue raised by the parties. 

The question is whetherthe Court should extend the Supreme Court’s holdings in Bell

Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal to evaluate the pleading

sufficiency of Staples’ affirmative defenses. See 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009);

550 U.S. 544 (2007).

As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit has directed courts to evaluate the

pleading sufficiency of affirmative defenses under the “fair notice” standard. Wyshack,

607 F.2d at 827. In his motion, Kohler contends that all twenty-one of Staples’

affirmative defenses are pled insufficiently. (Pl.’s Mot. 2.) In addition to arguing that

Staples’ defenses fail to provide fair notice, Kohler also suggests that the pleading

standards established by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal apply. (See Id. at 3.) 

Although the Ninth Circuit has not yet adopted the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard

for affirmative defenses, Kohler cites to several district courts that have done so. (Id. 3

at 3.) In response, Staples relies on several other district courts, including one within

this district, that has declined to extend Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses.

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(Defs.’ Opp’n 9.) Based on the cases both parties cited, it is clear that this point of law

is unresolved. See Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (“[N]either the Ninth Circuit or

See Dion v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace LLP, 2012 WL 160221, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal.

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2012) (explaining that a majority of district courts have extended Twombly and Iqbal to

affirmative defense pleading);Barnes v. AT&TPension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718

F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1171-73 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Anticancer Inc. v. Xenogen Corp, 248 F.R.D.

278, 282 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

See J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, 2011 WL 2132723, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2011); see

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also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Estradda, 2011 WL 2413257, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011);

Holdbrook v. SAIA Motor Freight Line, LLC, 2010 WL 865380, at *2 (D. Colo. 2010);

Bartronics, Inc. v. Power-One, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 532, 537 n.5 (S.D. Ala. 2007). Additionally,

this Court recently declined to extend the Twombly/Iqbalstandard to affirmative defenses. See 

Kohler v. Islands Restaurants, LP, 280 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Cal. 2012).

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any other Circuit Courts of Appeals have extended Twombly’s heightened pleading

standard to affirmative defenses.”).5

Absent further direction, this Court declines to extend the Twombly/Iqbal

pleading standards to affirmative defenses. Several considerations inform this

conclusion. Most significantly, the Ninth Circuit has continued to recognize the “fair

notice” standard of affirmative defense pleading even after Twombly and Iqbal. See

Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1023; Schutte & Koerting, 298 Fed. Appx. at 615.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Twombly and Iqbal is itself limited to

pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 129 U.S. at 1950; 550 U.S.

at 555. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the party stating a claim for relief provide “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 8(c), on the other hand, only requires a

responding party to “affirmatively state” its affirmative defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)

(emphasis added). The Supreme Court’s discussion in Iqbal suggests that this

distinction is important. See 129 S. Ct. At 1950. Factual plausibility—which is the key

difference between Twombly/Iqbal pleading and “fair notice” pleading—is particularly

suited to claim pleading because Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the party “show[ ]” that it

is entitled to relief. Id. (“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to

infer more than mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has

not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). Stating an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c), however, does not require the

Kohler contends that the Tenth Circuit has decided this issue in favor of applying 5

Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses. (Pl.’s Mot. 3.) Kohler’s reliance on Robbins v.

Oklahoma, however, is misplaced. (See id.) (citing 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).) In

Robbins, the Tenth Circuit applied Twombly and Iqbal to qualified immunity pleadings. 519

F.3d at 1246-48. But, the same court also identified the qualified immunity pleadings as part

of the complaint, not as an affirmative defense. Id. at 1249 (“[P]laintiffs must allege facts

sufficient to show (assuming they are true) that the defendants plausibly violated their

constitutional rights, and that those rights were clearly established.”).

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pleader to “show” entitlement to its defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Applying the

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same standard of pleading to claims and affirmative defenses, despite this clear

distinction in the rules’ language, would run counter to the Supreme Court’s warning

in Twombly that legislative action, not “judicial interpretation,” is necessary to

“broaden the scope” of specific federal pleading standards. See 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14.

Finally, the Court is persuaded by the District of Colorado’s recognized

distinction between the time plaintiff has to compose a complaint versus the time a

defendant has to answer it. See Holdbrook, 2010 WL 865380, at *2. As the court

explained, “it is reasonable to impose stricter pleading requirements on a plaintiff who

has significantly more time to develop factual support for his claims than a defendant

who is only given [21] days to respond to a complaint and assert its affirmative

defenses.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).

For these reasons, the Court will review the sufficiency of Staples’ affirmative

defenses under the “fair notice” pleading standard.

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Affirmative Defense - Failure to State a Claim

In its first affirmative defense, Staples alleges that Kohler “fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted,” and “lacks standing to pursue his alleged claims.”

(Answer 13-14.) The Court agrees with Kohler that these simple identifications of 

Staples’ defenses are insufficient to provide “fair notice.” See Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827. 

Although Staples’ pleading need not be supported by detailed factual allegations, it

must at least give notice of the “grounds upon which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 

Therefore, the Court STRIKES Staples’ first affirmative defense WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

Nor does pleading of non-affirmative defenses under Rule 8(b)(1) require any type of 6

“showing.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). Rule 8(b)(1) only requires the responding party to

“state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it.” Id. 

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B. Second Affirmative Defense - Failure to Mitigate

In its second affirmative defense, Staples contends that Kohler is precluded from

recovery “to the extent that he failed to mitigate his alleged damages.” (Answer 14.)

Kohler contends that this defense is “legally irrelevant” because he seeks only statutory

minimum damages, which cannot be mitigated. (Pl.’s Mot. 6.) However, Kohler’s

complaint can be read to seek more than just minimum statutory damages. “For each

offense of the Disabled Persons Act, Kohler seeks actual damages (both general and

special damages, statutory minimum damages of one thousand dollars ($1,000),

declaratory relief, and any other remedy available under California Civil Code § 54.3.” 

(Compl. 30) (emphasis added.) Section 54.3 permits an aggrieved party to seek “up to

a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages but in no case less than one

thousand dollars.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3(a). Kohler’s request for actual damages and

statutory minimum damages could be read to mean that he seeks actual damages to the

extent that they exceed statutory minimum damages. Without some affirmative

admission on Kohler’s part that his actual damages do not exceed the statutory

minimum, the Court cannot say that Staples’ failure-to-mitigate defense is impertinent

or legally irrelevant. 

On the other hand, Staples’ answer gives no notice to Kohler of the basis of

his alleged failure to mitigate. For that reason, the Court STRIKES Staples’ second

affirmative defense WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Third Affirmative Defense - Statute of Limitations

In its third affirmative defense, Staples contends that Kohler’s claims are

“barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” (Answer 14.) Again, the Court

agrees with Kohler that this statement alone is insufficient to provide fair notice. In

Wyshak, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a nearly identical pleading. 607

F.2d at 827 (“[P]laintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”). 

In Wyshack, however, the court held that fair notice was provided because an

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attached memorandum identified the actual statute upon which the defense rested. 

Id. Here, Staples makes no mention of the applicable statute in its answer, and has

attached no supplemental briefing on that point. (See Answer 14.) Accordingly, the

Court STRIKES Staples’ third affirmative defense WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

D. Fourth and Eighteenth Affirmative Defense - Comparative

Negligence & Third-Party Responsibility

In its fourth and eighteenth affirmative defenses, Staples contends that the

plaintiff or a third party is responsible for any violations and damages. (Answer 14,

16). The Court finds that these affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law, because

“[t]he ADA is clear that a public accommodation is responsible for its own

violations of the ADA, and that such violations cannot be contracted away.” 

Kohler v. Bed Bath & Beyond, 2012 WL 424377 at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting

United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1118, rev'd on other

grounds by 549 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2008)); Kohler v. Big 5 Corp., 2012 WL 1511748

at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (striking affirmative defense of contributory negligence as

legally insufficient). Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Staples’ fourth and

eighteenth affirmative defenses WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

E. Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Affirmative Defenses - Doctrines of

Waiver, Estoppel, & Laches

In its fifth, seventh, and eighth affirmative defenses, Staples argues that

Kohler’s claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches. Though

these doctrines may be legally plausible, the Court agrees with Kohler that these

statements are insufficient to provide fair notice. Staples provides no basis for these

claims in his answer, and “a reference to a doctrine . . . is insufficient notice.” 

Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

Staples does not dispute this contention in its opposition. Accordingly, the Court

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STRIKES Staples’ fifth, seventh, and eighth affirmative defenses WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND. 

F. Sixth Affirmative Defense - Unclean Hands

In its sixth affirmative defense, Staples alleges that “Plaintiff’s claims are

barred to the extent he had unclean hands.” (Answer 18.) Kohler argues that, in

addition to being an improper defense against ADA claims, Staples also fails to plead

its defense with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b). (Pl.’s

Mot. at 8-9.) Kohler relies on McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S.

352, 360 (1995), and Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324,

338 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), to support his assertion that “unclean hands” is not a defense

to ADA claims. (Id. at 17.) Reliance on these cases is, however, misplaced. 

The Supreme Court in McKennon proffered no opinion about whether

unclean hands survives as a defense against ADA claims. See 513 U.S. at 360-61. 

The Court merely recognized that the defense of unclean hands—or after-acquired

evidence in the employment context—is inappropriate to consider against the

equitable relief provided by Congress “to serve important national policies.” Id. at

360. In fact, the Court recognized that unclean hands may still be applicable to

non-equitable forms of relief, which Kohler also seeks in this matter. Id. at 361;

(Compl. 8-9, 11.) 

Moreover, in Deer Mountain, the district court noted that “there is some

doubt as to the applicability of unclean hands to ADA actions.” 682 F. Supp. 2d at

338 n.31 (citing McKennon). But the court did not conclude that unclean hands is

per se barred from ADA actions; rather, it held that the facts of the record before it

did not support the defense. Id. Without more explicit guidance from the Ninth

Circuit or Supreme Court, this Court will not conclude that unclean hands is

inapplicable to all ADA claims. Furthermore, even if this Court did come to that

conclusion, it would not bar the defense to Kohler’s California claims. 

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Nor must Staples plead unclean hands with particularity under Rule 9(b). 

Rule 9(b) only requires particularity when pleading fraud or mistake. Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(b). While allegations of fraud may provide the factual underpinning for certain

unclean hands defenses, there is no apparent allegation of fraud in this matter.

On the other hand, Staples unclean-hands defense, like all others, must still

provide fair notice to Kohler of the grounds upon which it rests. Here, Staples’

answer provides no basis for an assertion of unclean hands, and therefore the Court

STRIKES Staples’ sixth affirmative defense WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

G. Ninth Affirmative Defense - Failure to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies or Satisfy Other Prerequisites for Cause of Action

In its ninth affirmative defense, Staples argues that Kohler’s claims are barred

“to the extent he has failed to satisfy jurisdictional and/or statutory prerequisites for

his causes of action, and/or exhaust the appropriate administrative remedies.” 

(Answer 14.) Kohler argues that this defense is “legally irrelevant” because there is

no ADA administrative notice requirement for private entities. (Pl.’s Mot. 11.) 

However, Staples seems to be alleging more than a failure to exhaust the appropriate

administrative remedies because it alludes to other unmet prerequisites. In either

event, Staples fails to provide fair notice of its defense because its answer provides

no indication what the allegedly unmet prerequisites might be. Consequently, the

Court STRIKES Staples’ ninth affirmative defense WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

H. Eleventh & Twelfth Affirmative Defenses - Defendant in

Compliance with Law, Property is Readily Accessible, & Plaintiff

Encountered No Barrier

In its eleventh and twelfth affirmative defenses, Staples contends that it is

compliant with the law, its property is readily accessible to disabled customers, and

Kohler encountered no barriers to access within its store. (Answer 15.) Kohler

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argues that this is not an affirmative defense but rather a denial of Kohler’s

complaint. (Pl.’s Mot. 11.) Technically, Kohler is correct. Affirmative defenses are

allegations unrelated to the plaintiff’s prima facie case that deny the plaintiff’s right

to relief, even if all allegations in the complaint are true. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.

Main Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Cal. 1987). But simple mislabeling on

Staples’ part is not grounds for striking or granting partial summary judgment on its

defenses. Negative defenses may also be raised in Staples’ answer. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(b). In fact, Rule 12(b) permits Staples to assert these exact defenses by motion

or in the responsive pleading. The Court fails to see how identifying a defense as

“affirmative,” when in actuality it is not, makes that defense legally insufficient. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Consequently, the Court DENIES Kohler’s motions to strike

affirmative defenses eleven and twelve.

I. Thirteenth and Seventeenth Affirmative Defenses - Access not

Intentionally Impeded, Good Faith

In its thirteenth and seventeenth affirmative defenses, Staples argues that it

“did not intentionally impede or impair access or service to plaintiff” and it made

good faith efforts to render its facility accessible. (Answer 15, 16.) Kohler contends

that intent is irrelevant to ADA claims, so this defense is legally insufficient. (Pl.’s

Mot. 12.) Staples made no specific rebuttal to Kohler’s argument. (See Answer.)

A plaintiff bringing a claim under the ADA need not show “intentional

discrimination . . . to establish a violation of the ADA’s access requirements.”

Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 628 (Cal. 2009); Lentini v. California Ctr.

for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, a plaintiff alleging an

Unruh Act violation premised on an ADA violation need not show intentional

discrimination. Lentini, 370 F.3d at 847. Consequently, the Court STRIKES

Staples’ thirteenth and seventeenth affirmative defenses WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

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J. Fourteenth Affirmative Defense - Insufficient Notice

In its fourteenth affirmative defense, Staples argues that Kohler did not give it

sufficient notice of the need for equal accommodations or the opportunity to provide

equal accommodations. (Answer 15.) Kohler disagrees, citing a Ninth Circuit

holding that “[a] plaintiff in a private Title III action is not required to provide

notice to any state or local agency as a prerequisite to filing suit.” (Pl.’s Mot. 13,

(quoting Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000)).) To

be clear, Staples claims it was not personally notified prior to the lawsuit, but

Kohler’s motion addresses the lack of a requirement to notify a government agency

prior to filing a private ADA claim. (See Answer 15; Pl.’s Mot. 13.) However, the

Ninth Circuit held that it will not recognize a “pre-filing notice requirement” in

ADA cases until Congress chooses to amend the ADA to add such a requirement. 

Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Because there is no pre-filing notice requirement in private ADA lawsuits, the Court

STRIKES Staples’ fourteenth affirmative defense WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND.

K. Fifteenth Affirmative Defense - Liability under both the Unruh Act

and the Public Accommodations Act

In its fifteenth affirmative defense, Staples argues that it cannot be held liable

for damages under both the Unruh Act and the “Public Accommodations Act.” 

(Answer 15.) Plaintiff does not mention the “Public Accommodations Act” in his

Complaint. (See Compl.) Staples’ assertion provides inadequate notice to Kohler

because Staples simply provides no further explanation of its grounds for this defense

nor offers insight into its relevance. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Staples’

fifteenth affirmative defense WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

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L. Sixteenth Defense - Defendant Began to Remedy Any Deficiencies

Prior to Lawsuit’s Filing

In its sixteenth affirmative defense, Staples argues that Kohler is not entitled

to collect attorney’s fees because Staples was already “taking measures to remedy the

sought after relief prior to the lawsuit.” (Answer 15-16). Kohler argues that Staples

seems to be rebutting a “catalyst theory of recovery.” (Pl.’s Mot. 14.) It is not clear

that Staples is addressing the catalyst theory of recovery. Staples fails to mention

the legal or factual grounds for this defense and thus the Court holds that this

defense does not provide fair notice to Kohler. Consequently, the Court STRIKES

Staples’ sixteenth affirmative defense WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

M. Nineteenth Separate Defense - Facility Specifications Approved by

Government Officials

In its nineteenth affirmative defense, Staples argues that its conduct was

privileged because government officials approved the facility’s compliance with

ADA standards. (Answer 16.) Kohler contends that Staples’ is erroneously relying

on local government officials though the ADA preempts local regulations. (Pl.’s

Mot. 15). The Court finds that Staples’ statement provides fair notice of its

affirmative defense. While not explicitly identifying the authorities or documents

relied on, Staples nevertheless provides sufficient direction for Kohler to investigate

the defense in discovery. If Staples is relying on local authorities, this affirmative

defense is still applicable to Kohler’s state-law causes of action. There may be

instances where a facility is not compliant with the California Disabled Persons Act

but still compliant with ADA, because the Disabled Persons Act may demand

higher standards than the ADA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a)(3) (“[I]f the laws of

this state prescribe higher standards, it shall mean access that meets those higher

standards.”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Kohler’s motion to strike. 

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N. Twentieth Affirmative Defense - Premises Within Industry

Standards

In its twentieth affirmative defense, Staples argues that the “construction of

the premises is within industry standard dimensions.” (Answer 16.) Kohler asserts

that “allusions to ‘industry standards’ are not a defense to an ADA claim” and cites

authority regarding the dimensional-tolerances defense. (Pl.’s Mot. 17.) There is a

split of authority in the Ninth Circuit about the technical nature of the dimensionaltolerances defense. Compare Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 1 F.Supp 2d

1124, 1135 (D. Or. 1998), with Cherry v. City Coll. of San Francisco, 2006 WL

6602454, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Until this disparity in the law is resolved, the

Court finds that Staples is entitled to state its defense in its answer. Moreover,

Staples’ present statement of its twentieth defense provides fair notice to Kohler. 

Kohler clearly understands what the defense entails, and Staples’ statement of its

defense is effectively just a response to Kohler’s complaint. (See Pl.’s Mot. 16-17). 

Therefore, the Court DENIES Kohler’s motion to strike Staples’ twentieth

affirmative defense.

O. Reservation of Right to Assert Additional Defenses

In addition to Staples’ twenty affirmative defenses, Staples also seeks to

reserve the right to assert other affirmative defenses should the need arise during

discovery. (Answer 16.) Kohler argues that this is inappropriate under the Federal

Rules. (Pl.’s Mot. 17.) The Court agrees. The mere “‘reservation of affirmative

defenses’ is not an affirmative defense.” E.E.O.C. v. Timeless Investments, Inc.,

734 F.Supp. 2d 1035, 1055 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Defendants may assert additional

affirmative defenses later by amending their pleadings in compliance with Rule 15. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; U.S. v. Global Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2008 WL 5264986 at *5

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[I]f a Defendant seeks to add affirmative defenses, it must

comply with the procedure set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.”); Timeless

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Investments, Inc., 734 F.Supp. 2d at 1055 (“Rule 15 does not require a defendant to

“expressly reserve” unnamed affirmative defenses in its answer.”). In short, Staples

“is either entitled to raise additional defenses at a later time or he is not; his right to

reserve his rights to do so is a legal nullity.” Global Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2008 WL

5264986 at *5. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Staples’ reservation of rights to

assert additional defenses WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

IV. Conclusion

For the previously stated reasons, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and

DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiff’s motion to strike [Doc. 69] and ORDERS as follows:

1. The Court STRIKES Staples’ fourth, thirteenth, fourteenth,

seventeenth, and eighteenth affirmative defenses, as well as Staples’s

reservation of future affirmative defenses WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

2. The Court STRIKES Staples’ first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh,

eighth, ninth, fifteenth, and sixteenth affirmative defenses WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND. 

3. The Court DENIES the motion as to Staples’ eleventh, twelfth,

nineteenth, and twentieth affirmative defenses. 

4. Staples must file its amended answer, if any, on or before February 26,

2013.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 12, 2013

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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