Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02218/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02218-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

DONNIE R. JORDAN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-2218

RUBEN COLE, Jailer;

BOB ROSS, Sheriff;

ALLEN KAYLOR; and 

TERRY REA, Jail Administrator DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Donnie R. Jordan brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

contends that his constitutional rights were violated while he was detained in the Crawford

County Detention Center. 

On April 29, 2005, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 9). By

order entered on May 17, 2005, Jordan was directed to complete, sign, date, and return an

attached questionnaire that would serve as his response to the summary judgment motion. On

June 17, 2005, the plaintiff's response (Doc. 13) to the summary judgment motion was filed. The

summary judgment motion is currently before the undersigned for issuance of this memorandum

opinion. 

I. Background

Jordan arrested on November 11, 2003 and was then released on bond. (Doc. 13 at ¶ 2.)

He was again arrested two days later, on November 13, 2003. (Doc. 13 at ¶ 3.) He remained in

the Crawford County Detention Center (CCDC) until he was released on bond on December 23,

2003. (Doc. 13 at ¶ 13.) Jordan claims that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

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confinement while detained at CCDC and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs. 

On December 9, 2003, Jordan filed a grievance form. He alleged in this form that at

11:00 p.m. the previous night he began smelling strong chemicals, which adversely affected his

lung recovery from emphysema. He claims that he informed defendant Ruben Cole about the

smell. Cole told Jordan that the smell was coming from paint fumes. On the morning of

December 9, Jordan reported in the grievance that he was experiencing wheezing and shortness

of breath. (Doc. 13 Attach.) 

In response to the December 9 grievance, defendant Terry Rea instructed Jordan to file

a medical request to see the nurse and remarked that he was advising the trustees about Jordan's

condition and that they should not paint near Jordan or his cell. Rea's response was made on

December 10. (Doc. 13 Attach.)

On December 10, Jordan contends that he was experiencing high fever and was "delirious

most of the time." He further states that Cole saw him in this condition and did nothing about

it. (Doc. 13 at ¶ 7.) Jordan admits that the paint was no longer applied near his cell, but he

contends that he still had to breathe some of the fumes. He also states that although painting was

not done near him, silicone caulk was applied "adjacent to my head in the shower as I slept on

the floor with my feet soaked of rain water from a leaky sky light and experiencing fever." (Doc.

13 at ¶ 7.) 

On December 13, Jordan filed another grievance. In this grievance, he states that he

awoke to "overwhelming fumes of silicone" and that "by sunrise I was coughing up blood." He

stated that he showed the blood on his shirt to Cole. (Doc. 13 Attach.) In response to this

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grievance, jailers contacted a Nurse Charles Wall (who is not a defendant) who directed that

Jordan could have Benadryl that night and Tylenol for five days. Jordan began receiving this

medication on December 15, not on December 14, as the grievance response indicated he would

receive the medications. (Doc. 13 at ¶¶ 8-9.) 

On December 16, Jordan was examined by Nurse Wall who noted that Jordan was

suffering from scattered wheezes, but no dyspnea (shortness of breath) and that the lungs were

clear. Nurse Wall ordered that Jordan continue the Advair diskus and receive cold pills as

needed for his "sniffles." (Doc. 9 at Ex. 4.) Jordan contends that Nurse Wall told him that he

needed the prescribed medications to clear his lungs. (Doc. 13 at ¶ 11.) Jordan also states that

his lungs "started natural recovery after six (6) days" and this was before he received

medications. (Doc. 13 at pg. 9.) 

Jordan does not describe any actions or decisions made by defendant Alan Kaylor. His

claims against Sheriff Bob Ross concern Ross's actions relating to Jordan's arrests. Jordan now

says in his summary judgment response that he wishes to pursue claims concerning his arrest in

this action, however those claims are not raised in the complaint. (Doc. 1 & Doc. 13 at ¶ 2, 5.)

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summaryjudgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary judgment has

made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts,

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by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Nat’l Bank

of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.1999). 

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d 607 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). "A case

founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment."

Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

III. Discussion

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law,

of a citizen's "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the

United States. "To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must show [1] a

deprivation [under color of law] of [2] a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States." Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.

1999). "[T]o establish a violation of constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove

that the defendant’s unconstitutional action was the 'cause in fact' of the plaintiff’s injury."

Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1992).

Official Capacity Claims

Under section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his

official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his individual and his

official capacities. In Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit

discussed the distinction between individual and official capacity suits. As explained by the

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Gorman case:

Claims against government actors in their individual capacities differ from those

in their official capacities as to the type of conduct that is actionable and as to the

type of defense that is available. Claims against individuals in their official

capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work; they

require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights,

and the only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.

Personal capacity claims, on the other hand, are those which allege personal

liability for individual actions by officials in the course of their duties; these

claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may be raised

as a defense. 

Gorman, 152 F.3d at 914 (citations omitted). 

The Eighth Circuit has consistently advised plaintiffs to specifically plead whether

government agents are being sued in their official or individual capacities to ensure prompt

notice of potential personal liability. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989); see also

Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1999) (in actions against officers specific pleading

of individual capacity is required to put public officials on notice they will be exposed to

personal liability). When the plaintiff fails to state whether he is suing an official in his

individual capacity, the Eighth Circuit has construed the claim to be against the official in his

official capacity only. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.

1999) ("in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must

expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the

defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity."). 

The plaintiff now states in his summary judgment response that he was intending to name

the defendants in both their official and individual capacities (Doc. 13 at ¶ 1), and the factual

allegations alleged in the complaint appear to support that claim, in that the factual allegations

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are claims that the defendants, as individuals, were depriving him of his constitutional rights.

The court will review both official and individual capacity claims against these defendants. 

Under section 1983, a governmental entity may not be held vicariously liable for the

unconstitutional acts of employees. A governmental entity, however, may be held liable for the

unconstitutional acts of its officials or employees when those acts implement or execute an

unconstitutional custom or policy. See Doe v. Washington Co., 150 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir.

1998). 

Thus, Crawford County would be held liable for defendants’ conduct only if it had a

policy or custom that caused plaintiff’s injury. See Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997). In the absence of a written policy, plaintiff

must identify a pattern of widespread unconstitutional conduct that was so pervasive and wellsettled that it had the effect of law. See Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 901

F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must show that Crawford County "through its deliberate

conduct . . . was the 'moving force' behind the injury alleged." Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388. 

"[I]naction or laxness can constitute government custom if it is permanent and well

settled." Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dept., 28 F.3d 802, 807 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

"Such a government custom of laxness or inaction must be the moving force behind the

constitutional violation." Id. 

Any suggestion of the existence of a basis the hold Crawford County liable is wholly

lacking. There is simply nothing from which to conclude a genuine issue of fact exists to the

County's liability. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Jordan's official

capacity claims. 

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Conditions-of-Confinement Claim

"As a general matter, a prison official commits an Eighth Amendment violation only

when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be objectively, sufficiently

serious, and (2) a prison official must be, as a subjective state of mind, deliberately indifferent

to the prisoner's health or safety." See Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995)

(internal quotations omitted). 

In a similar factual situation, the Eighth Circuit held in Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229

(8th Cir. 1990), that prison officials did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon an inmate

by allowing remodeling and renovations to continue in the area where the inmate was housed

after that inmate notified the jail officials that the noise and fumes were giving him migraine

headaches. The Eighth Circuit noted that "[d]isturbing prison conditions that came about by

inadvertence or error in good faith, however, do not constitute constitutional violations, even

though the conditions may involve the infliction of discomfort and pain." Givens, 900 F.2d at

1234. The court concluded that without proof that the alleged conduct was "the result of

malicious intent or even reckless disregard for his well being," the plaintiff had failed to show

a constitutional violation. Id.

When Jordan complained about the paint fumes, defendant Rea instructed Jordan to

submit a medical request and directed the trustees to not paint near Jordan's cell. These actions

indicate that the defendant was not deliberately indifferent towards Jordan's conditions, rather

the defendant took affirmative steps to minimize the effect of the fumes on the plaintiff. As

pointed out by the Eighth Circuit, "[r]emodeling and upkeep of institutions and buildings, in and

out of prison, is a fact of life that must be faced by most individuals." Id. The mere fact that

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later silicone was applied in an adjacent shower area at most states a claim of negligence, which

is not actionable under section 1983. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S. Ct. 2321,

115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991). 

The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims that the conditions

of his confinement violated his constitutional rights. 

Medical Claim

The deliberate indifference standard is also applied to medical claims and includes "both

an objective and a subjective component: 'The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered

[from] objectively serious medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but

deliberately disregarded those needs.'" Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)). Additionally, "'[t]he

prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere

disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.'"

Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995)).

See also Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) ("To establish a constitutional

violation, it is not enough that a reasonable official should have known of the risk, a plaintiff

must establish that the official in question did in fact know of the risk.").

"Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health

care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only

if those needs are 'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.

Ed. 2d 156 (1992). "A medical need is serious if it is obvious to the layperson or supported by

medical evidence." Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

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(internal quotation and citation omitted).

"[T]he failure to treat a medical condition does not constitute punishment within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment unless prison officials knew that the condition created an

excessive risk to the inmate's health and then failed to act on that knowledge." Long v. Nix, 86

F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996). In Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1997), the

Eighth Circuit said:

As long as this threshold is not crossed, inmates have no constitutional right to

receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain

free to exercise their independent medical judgment. Deliberate indifference may

be demonstrated by prison guards who intentionally deny or delay access to

medical care or intentionally interfere with prescribed treatment, or by prison

doctors who fail to respond to prisoner's serious medical needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Mere

negligence or medical malpractice, however, are insufficient to rise to a

constitutional violation. Id. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292.

Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239. See also Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2001). 

When Jordan first complained about the fumes and that those fumes were causing

difficulty with breathing, defendant Rea instructed Jordan to submit a medical request. Jordan

states that he did not do so immediately because he was delirious and had a fever, and that

defendant Cole saw him in this condition. Jordan submits no proof to establish that Cole actually

knew that Jordan was suffering from delusions and fever. After Jordan submitted a grievance

(but not a medical request) that he was coughing blood, defendants immediately contacted the

jail nurse by phone and within one to two days, Jordan was receiving medications. Three days

after that submitting that grievance, Jordan was seen by the jail nurse who prescribed further

medications to treat "sniffles." The defendants jailers acted upon Jordan's complaints about the

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fumes and the resulting medical complications, and thus were not deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs. 

Kaylor and Ross

Jordan names Allan Kaylor as a defendant in this action, however there is nothing in his

complaint about Kaylor nor are any of the factual events attributed to Kaylor. Therefore, it is

proper that Kaylor be dismissed as a defendant in this suit as Jordan has failed to state a claim

against Kaylor. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir.1974) (per curiam) (court

properly dismissed pro se complaint that was silent as to defendant except for his name

appearing in caption); see also Krych v. Hvass, 83 Fed. Appx. 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003)

(unpublished per curiam) (plaintiff failed to state claim against named defendants where he listed

defendants in complaint and did not allege defendants were personally involved in constitutional

violations). 

In his summary judgment response, Jordan states that at jury trial he would show how

illegal child pornography was placed on his home computer and how Sheriff Bob Ross was

personal friends of those who sought to have him put in jail. (Doc. 13 at pp. 7-8.) He also states

that "this case is not about why I was arrested." Rather, he claims that it is "about how I was

treated while in the total custody and control of the defendants in this case." (Doc. 13 at ¶ 2.)

To the extent that Jordan might be trying to bring any claims concerning his arrest and detention

on charges of child pornography, those claims are not alleged in the complaint, and thus are not

presently before the court for review. Second, it appears that the plaintiff is attempting to hold

Sheriff Ross liable on the basis that Ross was the supervisor of the other defendants who

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supposedly violated Jordan's constitutional rights. Jordan has presented no evidence to suggest

that Ross actually knew about his claims while they were occurring, and respondeat superior

liability is not permitted under section 1983. See Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.

1995) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; supervisor is liable where he is personally

involved in violation, i.e., where he knows about conduct and facilitates it, condones it, or turns

blind eye). Thus, Jordan has not stated a claim against Ross. 

IV. Conclusion

Therefore, defendants'motion (Doc. 9) for summary judgment is hereby granted, and this

case is dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of January 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones

_________________________________________

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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