Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00580/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00580-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICIA A. MCCOLM,

Plaintiff,

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00580-RRB

DISMISSAL ORDER

Patricia A. McColm, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis,

1

filed

a civil rights complaint in this Court.2

 The complaint arises out of Plaintiff’s incarceration

at the California Correctional Facility for Women, Chowchilla, California.3 Although it is

unclear from the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff brings her action under the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, et seq.), the Americans with Disabilities Act

(42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as

amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, et seq.), as well as several state-law claims.4

1

 Docket 9.

2 Plaintiff, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed two other actions in this

district: McColm v. Trinity County, 2:12-cv-01984-MCE-CMK (unscreened); and McColm

v. Trinity County, 2:14-cv-00773-KJM-CKD (dismissed, February 9, 2015).

3

It appears from the record that Plaintiff has since been released from custody. 

Docket 10.

4

In addition to the State of California, Plaintiff names as Defendants: California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; California Correctional Women’s Facility;

(continued...)

DISMISSAL ORDER

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Case 1:14-cv-00580-LJO-JDP Document 13 Filed 03/04/15 Page 1 of 10
I. SCREENING STANDARD

This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

5 This Court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that

“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”6Likewise,

a prisoner must exhaust all administrative remedies as may be available,7irrespective of

whether those administrative remedies provide for monetary relief.

8

In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading

standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.”9

“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

4

 (...continued)

California Correctional Health Care Services; 65 named individuals; and 250 Does.

5

 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1126 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

7

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–95 (2006) (“proper

exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires proper adherence to

administrative procedural rules); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (exhaustion

of administrative remedies must be completed before filing suit).

8 See Booth, 532 U.S. at 734.

9

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

DISMISSAL ORDER

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accusation.”10 Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard

applied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed

by pro se prisoners are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the benefit of any

doubt, and dismissal should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can plead no facts in support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.

11

This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief.

12

“[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.’”13 Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations

contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.14

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.”15

 

10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).

11 Wilhelm v. Rotham, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

12

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–69; see Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting and applying Iqbal and Twombly). 

13

Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

14

Id.

15

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISMISSAL ORDER

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II. DISCUSSION

Prisoner pro se pleadings are given the benefit of liberal construction.16 While this

Court must liberally construe papers filed by pro se parties, pro se parties must none-theless follow the applicable rules of practice and procedure.17 The Complaint before the

Court reads in narrative form. Under the simplified standard of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8, “a plaintiff need only plead sufficient allegations of underlying facts to to give

fair notice and enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. . ..”

18 As presently

drafted it is extremely difficult, if at all possible, to determine from the Complaint which act

or acts of each Defendant violated which of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff alleges a multitude

of different acts without clearly specifying which Defendant(s) committed which act.19 The

major deficiencies in the Complaint are summarized as follows.

Medical Malpractice

16 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Porter v. Ollison, 620

F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010).

17 King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the

same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”) (overruled in part on other grounds

in Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).

18 Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)

19 The Complaint consists of numerous unnumbered paragraphs, undivided into

causes of action. In amending her Complaint Plaintiff should: (1) number the paragraphs

sequentially; and (2) divide her Complaint into separate claims/causes of action to the

extent that the claim is directed towards different defendants, arising out of different acts

or on different dates. The Complaint must be drafted in a manner that permits each

defendant to ascertain which act or acts he or she is being called upon to respond.

DISMISSAL ORDER

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Plaintiff’s Complaint is directed at several medical care providers. The Supreme

Court, holding that the infliction of unnecessary suffering on prisoners violated the Eighth

Amendment, stated:

[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth

Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison

doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in

intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally

interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how

evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury

states a cause of action under § 1983.20

In Estelle the Supreme Court distinguished “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs of prisoners,” from “negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,”

holding that only the former violates the Constitution.21In short, Eighth Amendment liability

requires “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.”22

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. A showing of medical malpractice or

negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth

Amendment.”23 A mere difference of medical opinion regarding the course of medical

20 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976) (footnotes, internal quotation

marks, and citations omitted).

21

Id. at 106. 

22 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

23 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F. 3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); see Hallett v. Morgan,

296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334

(9th Cir. 1990) (stating that even gross negligence is insufficient to establish a

constitutional violation).

DISMISSAL ORDER

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treatment is “insufficient as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.”24 To the

extent that Plaintiff complains about the level of her medical care, her allegations, even

accepted on their face as true, fall far short of this standard.

Conspiracy

Plaintiff makes a general, omnibus allegation that the Defendants in doing the

myriad of acts alleged were doing so in the furtherance of some grand conspiracy. 

Plaintiffs must plead the basic elements of a civil conspiracy: an agreement and concerted

action amongst the defendants in the furtherance of that agreement.25 As presently

drafted, the Complaint falls far short of meeting this standard.

Supervisor Liability

Section 1983 suits do not support vicarious liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his or her rights.26 As presently

constituted the Complaint appears to name some of the Defendants solely in their

24 Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1059–60 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th

Cir. 1996)); Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981) (noting, also, that a disagreement between a prisoner and a medical professional

over the most appropriate course of treatment cannot give rise to a viable claim of

deliberate indifference).

25 See Wasco Products, Inc. v. Southwall Technologies, Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 990–91

(9th Cir. 2006); see also Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008)

(noting that a bare allegation of a conspiracy is almost impossible to defend against where

numerous individuals are concerned).

26

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2012); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); see Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior in

the context of § 1983, instead requiring individual liability for the violation).

DISMISSAL ORDER

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supervisory capacity without alleging that they participated in, directed, or knowingly failed

to prevent the deprivation of Plaintiff’s right(s).27

 

State/Official Capacity Individuals

Plaintiff’s complaint to the extent it seeks compensatory damages as against the

State of California and its agencies is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.28 The same

result holds for the individual defendants sued in their official capacities.29 To the extent

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, because she is no longer in custody, this Court cannot grant

her effective relief, thereby rendering that claim moot. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against

California, its agencies and the individuals in their official capacity must be dismissed.

Validity of the Conviction

Although it is unclear from the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff may be challenging

her conviction.30 To the extent Plaintiff is challenging the fact of her custody, not the

conditions, it must be brought in a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.31 Consequently, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning her conviction are surplusage.

27 See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under [§] 1983

arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only

liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in

or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”)

(citations omitted)).

28

 Brown v. Oregon Dept. of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2014).

29

 Id.; Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1997).

30

 Complaint, pp. 4–5.

31 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Suits challenging the

validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within the heart of habeas corpus,

(continued...)

DISMISSAL ORDER

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Doe Defendants

To the extent that Plaintiff names Doe defendants in her Complaint: “As a general

rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.”32 However, where the

identity of the unknown defendants is not known prior to the filing of the complaint, a

plaintiff should be given an opportunity to discover the true identity of the of the unknown

defendants unless it is clear that discovery would not reveal their identities.33 In its present

state, it is unclear whether the Complaint meets this standard.

State Law Claims

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the actions of Defendants violated state law,

§ 1983 does not provide a cause of action for those claims.34 Except to the extent Plaintiff

pleads a viable federal claim against the Defendant(s) this Court declines to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

35 Accordingly, this Court will

31

 (...continued)

whereas a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a

constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of

his custody.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

32 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980); see Wiltsie v. California

Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir.1968) (“The action was also properly

dismissed as to the fictitious defendants identified only as ‘Does', in the complaint as

amended.”). 

33 Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie).

34

 Loftis v. Almagar, 704 F.3d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

67).

35

“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

under subsection (a) if— . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction . . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

DISMISSAL ORDER

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exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims solely to the extent that the

same act also gives rise to a cognizable federal claim.

Filing Fee

As noted above, the record reflects that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. Plaintiff

was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis based upon her status as prisoner under

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).36 Once she was released from custody, Plaintiff

ceased being a prisoner.37 Consequently, at that point, there was no longer a prisoner trust

account from which payment could be made.38 The PLRA by its express terms does not

waive the filing fee.39 Therefore, as a condition of proceeding in this Court, Plaintiff must

pay the filing fee.

III. ORDER

Accordingly, the Complaint on file herein is DISMISSED without leave to amend as

to the State of California, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

California CorrectionalWomen’sFacility, California Correctional Health Care Services, and

all individual Defendants in their official capacity. As to all Defendants sued in their

individual capacities the Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend.40

36

 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

37 See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1129–40 (9th Cir. 2000).

38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

39

Id.

40 See Hartman v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1141, 1130 (9th

Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”);

(continued...)

DISMISSAL ORDER

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Not later than April 3, 2015, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint consistent with

this Order that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of the

Eastern District of California, accompanied by the full amount of the unpaid filing fee.

If Plaintiff fails to comply with the terms of this Order by April 3, 2015, or such

other date as the Court may order, the Court may, without further notice, enter a

judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice.41

IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 2015.

S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

40

 (...continued)

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that leave

to amend should be given unless amendment would be futile).

41 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

DISMISSAL ORDER

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