Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00760/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00760-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

TAMMY SHERRILL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv760-T

) (WO)

CITY OF PRATTVILLE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

AQUIA AVERHART, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv761-T

)

CITY OF PRATTVILLE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MARIA MCELYA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv762-T

)

CITY OF PRATTVILLE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 1 of 18
1. Because he has been called up for military duty,

Stephens has been granted a stay in these proceedings.

2

 OPINION

Plaintiff Aquia Averhart brought this lawsuit against

the following defendants: the City of Prattville,

Alabama, Police Chief Alfred Wadsworth, Jail

Administrator Debra Deramus, and Jailor Jeffrey Stephens.

She claims that Stephens sexually assaulted her in

violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution (as enforced

by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983) and Alabama state law.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (civil

rights), § 1331 (federal claims), and § 1367 (state-law

claims). 

This case is currently before the court on Wadsworth,

Deramus, and Prattville’s motion for summary judgment.1

For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that

they are entitled to full summary judgment. 

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 2 of 18
3

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City

of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 3 of 18
2. Motion for summary judgment of the City of

Prattville, Police Chief Alfred Wadsworth, and Debra

Deramus (Doc. No. 23), Exhibit 12, Statement of Aquia

(continued...)

4

The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the 

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 What follows is Averhart’s version of the facts in

this case. Averhart was incarcerated in the Prattville

City Jail beginning on June 18, 2003. Officer Stephens

often engaged in sexual jokes and made sexual remarks to

her and other female inmates. Averhart returned Stephens

sexual banter.2

 

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 4 of 18
2. (...continued)

Averhart to the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, p. 1. 

3. Id. 

4. Id. at p. 2.

5

On July 12, 2003, Stephens asked if any of the female

inmates wanted to use the phone. Averhart replied

affirmatively, and Stephens escorted her to Deramus’s

office to use it. Following the call, Stephens asked her

to have sex with him. She said not without a condom.

Stephens then took her back to her cell.3

 L a t e r t h a t

evening, Stephens showed Averhart a condom. 

The following day, Stephens again let her use the

phone, and again asked her to have sex. He told her

that, because there were no cameras in this area, she

would not get in trouble and that it would make her time

in jail a lot easier if she slept with him. She agreed

and they had sex in the restroom in Deramus’s office.4

 

 

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 5 of 18
5. Averhart does not specifically mention the City

of Prattville in her § 1983 claims, but her claims

against Stephens, Wadsworth, and Deramus in their

official capacities under § 1983 are simply another way

of bringing the claims directly against Prattville

itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)

(quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978). 

6

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Averhart asserts that Wadsworth, Deramus, and

Prattville are liable for the constitutional violations

perpetrated by Stephens because they failed to train and

supervise him adequately.5

 Before finding Wadsworth and

Deramus liable, in their individual capacities, on a

theory of supervisory liability, the court must first

find that a predicate constitutional violation occurred.

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).

Similarly, the City of Prattville and Wadsworth and

Deramus in their official capacities cannot be liable on

a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise theory unless

the court first finds a constitutional violation.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115,

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 6 of 18
7

120 (1992). However, because these proceedings have been

stayed against Stephens, the court will not analyze

whether Stephens’s actions amounted to a predicate

constitutional violation and, instead, will proceed

directly to determining whether the supervisors and

Prattville can be held liable if the violations in fact

occurred. 

1. Wadsworth and Deramus in 

their individual capacities

Supervisors are liable in their individual capacities

under § 1983 “either when the supervisor personally

participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or

when there is a causal connection between the actions of

a supervising official and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. The standard

for supervisory liability in situations such as this,

when the defendant supervisor was not present during the

constitutional violation, is “extremely rigorous.”

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 7 of 18
8

Braddy v. Florida Dep’t. of Labor & Empl. Sec., 133 F.3d

797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998).

Averhart can establish “a causal connection” in one

of three ways: first, “when a history of widespread abuse

puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to

correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so,”

Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990);

second, when the supervisor’s improper “custom or policy

... resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional

rights,” Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.

1991); or, third, when the facts “support an inference

that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act

unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act

unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.”

Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003).

Averhart cannot meet this rigorous standard. First,

Wadsworth and Deramus stated that they were not aware of

any prior incidents of sexual misconduct during or

preceding their employment at the jail, and Averhart has

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 8 of 18
9

not presented any evidence to dispute these statements or

to demonstrate a history of widespread abuse. Second,

she has failed to reference a specific policy, or lack of

policy, capable of avoiding the harm incurred. And,

third, she has offered no evidence supporting an

inference that Wadsworth or Deramus directed Stephens to

engage in the prohibited conduct or, as detailed above,

that they had any indication that Stephens was likely to

do so. 

Therefore, Wadsworth and Deramus, in their individual

capacities, are entitled to summary judgment on

Averhart’s § 1983 claims.

2. City of Prattville and Wadsworth and 

Deramus in their official capacities

Municipalities are not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of others. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). A municipality can only be held

liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes the

constitutional violation. Id. at 694-5. Cities can be

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 9 of 18
10

held liable on a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise

theory in the rare circumstances when this failure

reflects a deliberate or conscious policy choice; when it

amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of

third parties; and when it causes the employees to

violate a citizen’s constitutional rights. City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-91 (1989); Gold v.

City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Averhart can establish deliberate indifference to the

need for increased training or supervision by showing:

first, a “pattern of constitutional violations...such

that the municipality knows or should have known that

corrective measures [were] needed,” Young v. City of

Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1172 (11th Cir. 1995), or, second,

that the “violation of federal rights...[was a] highly

predictable consequence of a failure to equip law

enforcement officers with the specific tools to handle

recurring situations.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 409 (1997). 

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 10 of 18
11

Averhart cannot satisfy either of these tests. As

detailed above, because the record is devoid of any

evidence of prior instances of sexual misconduct in the

jail, Averhart has not met her burden of demonstrating

the “widespread prior abuse” generally required to put a

municipality on notice that greater or different

supervision was necessary. Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d

665, 674 (11th Cir. 1990). 

Additionally, the record reflects that Stephens

received training specifically detailing that rape,

sexual assault, and sexual abuse were illegal. Averhart

has presented no evidence that the training was faulty on

this point or that Stephens somehow misunderstood the

training presented. More importantly, she has not shown

that the municipality caused her assault; in situations

such as this one, when an employee intentionally violated

an obvious right, no kind or amount of training could

have prevented the violation. Cf. Sewell v. Town of Lake

Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 11 of 18
6. See supra note 5.

12

that when “the proper response ... is obvious to all

without training or supervision, the failure to train or

supervise” fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference)

(quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299-

300 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993);

Thomas v. City of Clanton, 285 F. Supp. 2d, 1275, 1284

(M.D. Ala. 2003). Consequently, the City of Prattville

is entitled to summary judgment on Averhart’s § 1983

claims. Wadsworth and Deramus are also entitled to

summary judgment in their official capacities because a

suit against them in that capacity is the same as a suit

against Prattville.6

 

 B. State-Law Claims

Averhart asserts: (1) negligent guard monitoring; (2)

negligent security, safety, and privacy measures; (3)

inadequate training and supervision; and (4) the tort-ofCase 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 12 of 18
7. Averhart’s assault and battery claim against

Stephens is not currently before the court.

13

outrage.7

 The court will first address the three

negligence claims and then proceed to the intentional

tort-of-outrage claim.

1. Wadsworth and Deramus

i. Negligence claims

For the reasons given above, the record is simply

absent any evidence of such negligence or wantonness that

would support any of the state-law negligence claims

against Wadsworth and Deramus.

In any event, Wadsworth and Deramus are entitled to

discretionary-function immunity under 1975 Ala. Code § 6-

5-338(a) on these claims. This provision provides in

pertinent part that:

"Every peace officer ... who is employed

or appointed pursuant to the

Constitution or statutes of this state

... and whose duties prescribed by law

... include the enforcement of, or the

investigation and reporting of

violations of, the criminal laws of this

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 13 of 18
14

state, and who is empowered by the laws

of this state to execute warrants, to

arrest and to take into custody persons

who violate, or who are lawfully charged

by warrant, indictment, or other lawful

process, with violations of, the

criminal laws of this state, shall at

all times be deemed to be officers of

this state, and as such shall have

immunity from tort liability arising out

of his or her conduct in performance of

any discretionary function within the

line and scope of his or her law

enforcement duties."

1975 Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a). It is settled that the

operation of jails by jailers and municipal police

departments is covered by this statute. Howard v. City

of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 204 (Ala. 2003). 

Therefore, the court must determine whether the

negligence actions Averhart complains of are

discretionary acts. Discretionary acts are defined as

“those acts to which there is no hard and fast rule as to

the course of conduct that one must or must not take and

those acts requiring exercise in judgment and choice and

involving what is just and proper under the

circumstances.” Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1239

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 14 of 18
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(11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wright v. Wynn, 682 So.2d 1, 2

(Ala. 1996). Negligent training and supervision are

considered discretionary acts. McClure v. Houston

County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 (M.D. Ala. 2003);

Phillips v. Thomas, 55 So.2d 81, 85 (Ala. 1989).

Similarly, determinations regarding proper security,

safety, and privacy measures are of the type that require

the exercise of judgment typical in a discretionary act.

Accordingly, discretionary immunity should be extended to

Wadsworth and Deramus “unless the officer[s’] conduct is

so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct

or conduct engaged in bad faith." Couch v. City of

Sheffield, 708 So.2d 144, 153 (Ala. 1998) (citing Wynn,

682 So.2d at 2). As there is no evidence indicating

willfulness, maliciousness, or bad faith, summary

judgment is due to be granted on the state-law negligence

claims asserted against Wadsworth and Deramus. 

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 15 of 18
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ii. Tort-of-outrage claim

The tort of outrage has the following elements: (1)

the defendant must have intended to inflict emotional

distress, or should have known that his or her acts would

result in emotional distress; (2) the act must be extreme

and outrageous; (3) the act must have caused plaintiffs

distress; and (4) plaintiffs emotional distress must have

been so severe that no reasonable person could be

expected to endure it. Harrelson v. R.J., 882 So.2d 317,

322 (Ala. 2003). Because Averhart has presented no

evidence indicating that Wadsworth and Deramus acted

negligently or wantonly, it is clear that their actions

were also not extreme or outrageous. As such, they are

entitled to summary judgment on Averhart’s tort-ofoutrage claim. 

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 16 of 18
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2. City of Prattville

i. Negligence claims

Not only is the record absent of any evidence of such

negligence or wantonness that would support any of the

state-law negligence claims against Prattville, but the

city is also entitled to discretionary-function immunity

on these claims. It is firmly rooted law that when a

municipal officer is immune to liability pursuant to § 6-

5-338(a), the municipality is also immune pursuant to §

6-5-338(b), which extends immunity to “governmental units

or agencies authorized to appoint peace officers.” Howard

v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 211 (Ala. 2003);

Hardy v. Town of Hayneville, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1202

(M.D. Ala. 1999). Therefore, because this court has

previously determined that Wadsworth and Deramus are

immune from suit on these claims, that immunity must be

extended to the city itself.

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 17 of 18
ii. Tort-of-outrage claim

The City of Prattville is entitled to summary

judgment on the tort-of-outrage claim because the record

fails to demonstrate that the city acted in an extreme or

outrageous manner and because the city is immune from

suit for intentional torts under 1975 Ala. Code § 11-47-

190. Todd v. Kelley, 783 So.2d 31, 43 (Ala. 2000). 

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that

summary judgment should be granted on Averhart’s federal

and state-law claims against Wadsworth, Deramus, and the

City of Prattville.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 2nd day of December, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-00760-MHT-DRB Document 41 Filed 12/02/05 Page 18 of 18