Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03069/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03069-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMCHAL AZODI; IGNACIO

BARRAGAN; NADINE DAHDAH;

KENT GLINTZ; HANINA

HOFFMAN; EMILY JOHNSON;

SAMUEL SANTOS; BRIAN SOASH;

and KIP WILLIAMS,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 12cv3069 - IEG (BGS)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 9]

v.

TEPL, INC., doing business as MC

ADMINISTRATORS,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is the motion of Defendant TEPL, Inc. doing

business as MC Administrators (“Defendant”) to dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiffs

Pamchal Azodi, Ignacio Barragan, Nadine Dahdah, Kent Glintz, Hanina Hoffman,

Emily Johnson, Samuel Santos, Brian Soash, and Kip Williams (collectively

“Plaintiffs”). [Doc. No. 9.] For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that they incurred a financial obligation to an original

creditor, Kaiser Permanente, in 2010. [Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 20.] Without taking

any position as to whether any debt was actually owed, Plaintiffs further assert that

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this obligation was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant subsequently,

after Plaintiffs fell behind on payments allegedly owed. [Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.] Plaintiffs

further allege that on or about January 3, 2012, Defendant disclosed Plaintiffs’

personal information to an unauthorized third party, along with the information of

hundreds of other consumers who purportedly owe debts to Defendant. [Id. ¶¶ 23-

26.] Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant violated the

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788

et seq., and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et

seq. [Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 31-33.]

Plaintiffs filed the instant action in this Court on December 28, 2012

asserting two causes of action against Defendant. Count I claims violation of the

RFDCPA, and Count II claims violation of the FDCPA. [Id.] Plaintiffs assert

federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the basis of

the FDCPA claim. [Id. ¶ 8.]

Defendant subsequently filed the present motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

Complaint arguing failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for both

the FDCPA and RFDCPA claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). [Doc. No. 9, Def’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 2.] In their

opposition brief, Plaintiffs conceded to the dismissal of the FDCPA claim and

requested the Court remand the remaining RFDCPA state claim to State Court. 

[Doc. No. 10, Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 6.] 

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s FDCPA Claim

Because Plaintiffs concede to Defendant’s motion to dismiss with regard to

the FDCPA claim, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim

without prejudice.

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Supplemental Jurisdiction over Remaining State Law Claim

Having dismissed the single federal claim, the Court now evaluates any

remaining basis for subject matter jurisdiction over Count I, the state claim for

violation of the RFDCPA. Plaintiffs, in their opposition brief, concede that “this

Court may no longer have jurisdiction” over the remaining claim. [Doc. No. 10,

Pl.’s Opp. at 6.]

Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and as such

“possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be

expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Lack of subject matter

jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any party or sua sponte by the court. Csibi

v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982). 

With Plaintiffs’ sole claim supplying original federal jurisdiction dismissed,

only a state law claim remains. A court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over

a state law claim “after dismissing every claim over which it had original

jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S.

635, 639 (2009); accord Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 649 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir.

2011). Per 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Supreme Court precedent “makes

clear that whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is distinct

from whether a court chooses to exercise that jurisdiction.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc.,

556 U.S. at 639 (citations omitted). 

In exercising its discretion, the court may look to a host of factors, “including

the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the

character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and

federal claims.” City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173

(1997); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

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In the usual case, where federal claims are dismissed before trial, “the balance of

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims.” Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation omitted); accord Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim,

971 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d

264, 268 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992).

In this case, the sole claim over which the Court had original jurisdiction, the

FDCPA claim, has been dismissed. Looking at the balance of factors—including

the fact that this case is still in its infancy and that the present motion is the only

motion that has been filed to date—the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim for violation of the RFDCPA.

III. Disposition of Remaining State Law Claim

Plaintiffs request that the Court remand the RFDCPA claim to state court. 

[Doc. No. 10, Pl.’s Opp. at 6.] Defendant argues for dismissal of the remaining

state law claim either by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction or,

alternately, based on failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 11, Def.’s Reply Mem. at 2.]

The procedural process of remanding an action from federal district court to

state court is codified by 28 U.S.C. § 1447, entitled “[p]rocedure after removal

generally.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (emphasis added). Removal, per 28 U.S.C. § 1446, is

the process by which a case is transferred from state court to federal court. Based

on this statutory framework, “[f]ederal district courts do not have the authority to

remand an action originally commenced in federal court . . . to a state tribunal . . . .” 

E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Estate of Kirk, 821 F. Supp. 2d 543, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)

(quoting Schiffman v. Epstein, 2009 WL 1787760, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009)). 

“Thus, a case originally commenced by a plaintiff in federal court cannot then be

removed . . . from federal to state court.” E. Sav. Bank, FSB at 545-46 (quoting

Hatheril v. Michael, 1993 WL 385754, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1993).

As Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in federal court [Doc. No. 1,

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Compl.], it is procedurally improper for the Court to remand the remaining

RFDCPA claim to state court. Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiffs’ request to

remand, and instead GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the RFDCPA claim

without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to file this

action in state court if they choose to do so. The Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2013 _______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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