Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00163/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Bakari Darnell Mackey, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Conrad Graber, 

 Respondent. 

 CV 12-163-TUC-CKJ (JR) 

 

 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Federal Prisoner Bakari Darnell Mackey’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In 

accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the 

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the 

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Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of 

the record, deny the Petition. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in 

Safford, Arizona (“FCI-Safford”), and at the time of the incident underlying this case 

he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Center (“FCC”) in Yazoo City, 

Mississippi. On April 19, 2011, Special Investigative Agent (“SIA”) Nicholson at 

FCC-Yazoo City received a memorandum from a teacher in the prison’s education 

department, Engret Jenkins, stating that on April 18, 2011, Petitioner entered her 

office and told Jenkins that another inmate, Jerome Harris, wanted Jenkins’ address 

so that Harris could send Jenkins $3,000.00 to bring cigarettes into the prison. 

Response, Ex. 1, Att. 3, p. 3; Att. 2. On July 7, 2011, Acting SIA Debra Dawson 

prepared an Incident Report charging Petitioner with offering a staff member a bribe 

in violation of Prohibited Act Code 216A. The Incident Report describes the facts 

underlying the charge as follows: 

An SIS investigation was completed regarding prohibited acts 

committed by you during your assignment in the general population at 

FCC Yazoo City. Specifically, on April 18, 2011, you Mackey, 

Barracki, Reg. No. 21282-001, entered a staff member’s office and 

stated to her that another inmate asked you to ask her for her address. 

You stated to the staff member that the inmate wanted to send her 

$3,000.00, in an effort to attempt to eventually ask her to bring in 

cigarettes. Although you allege that you were delivering a message for 

another inmate, the inmate denied making this request to you and you 

have not provided any evidence that you were only speaking on 

another’s behalf. You are also the only inmate identified by the staff 

member as attempting to get her to introduce contraband into the 

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institution. Therefore you are being charged with violation of code 

216- Offering a staff member a bribe. 

Response, Ex. 1, Att. 3, p. 4. 

 The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) Report reflects that Petitioner was 

given notice that a hearing on the charges would be held on July 7, 2011, and that he 

was personally advised of his rights before the DHO on July 8, 2011. Id. Ex. 1, Att. 

3, p. 1. Petitioner was informed that he had the right to staff representation and to 

present witnesses and documentary evidence at the hearing. Id., Ex. 1, Att. 3, p. 8. 

Petitioner requested representation by Dr. Cheek, a psychologist, and indicated that 

he wished to call Jenkins as a witness. Id. In an Inmate Request To Staff Member 

form dated July 10, 2011, Petitioner also asked Dr. Cheek to obtain Jenkins’ April 

19, 2011 memorandum and “Mr. Henderson’s SIA report following the April 26, 

2011, interview with myself, inmate Jerome Harris, and telephone conference with 

Mrs. Jenkins.” Petition, Ex. A 

 On July 21, 2011, Acting DHO Truex held a hearing on the charges. Id., Ex. 

1, Att. 3, pp. 1-3. At the hearing, Petitioner denied offering Jenkins a bribe, denied 

making the statements she reported, and stated that any action he took was at the 

direction of staff. Response, Ex. 1, Att. 3, p. 2. In addition to Petitioner’s testimony, 

the DHO received and considered the SIS investigation report of Jenkins’ statements 

and a second memorandum from Jenkins, dated June 29, 2011 and sent to Acting SIA 

Dawson, which again detailed the allegations. Id., Ex. 2, Att. 3, pp. 2, 17. However, 

Jenkins did not appear at the hearing and, after her statement was read, Petitioner 

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asserted that Jenkins would testify that “he did not offer her a bribe, he did not ask 

her for her address and he never mentioned a dollar amount to her.” Id., Ex. 1, Att. 3, 

p. 1. Petitioner also submitted an affidavit explaining his version of events and 

stating that on April 26, 2011, he met with SIA Nicholson and during the meeting 

Nicholson had a telephone conversation with Jenkins after which Nicholson told 

Petitioner that he would be released “back into the general population” after safety 

concerns were addressed. Id., Ex. 1, Att. 3, p. 14. 

 On July 29, 2011, the DHO issued his decision finding Petitioner had 

committed the offense. Id., p. 2. The DHO based his findings on the investigative 

report and specifically relied on Jenkins’ statements and the statement from Jerome 

Harris, the other inmate, denying making any request of Petitioner to deliver a 

message to Jenkins. Id. The DHO concluded that Petitioner was “attempting to 

compromise the staff member,” and was “attempting to discover if she would be 

willing to accept money from another inmate, and if she was willing, then you would 

move forward with your plan to attempt to introduce contraband in exchange for 

paying the staff member money.” Id. The DHO believed the Petitioner was using 

this approach in an attempt to “isolate himself from responsibility,” and found it 

suspicious that, if Petitioner had intended to report the other inmate for suggesting 

such a plan, that he did so to Jenkins, a teacher, and not to an investigator or other 

appropriate personnel. Id. The DHO’s sanction was 27 days of disallowed good 

conduct time, 30 days of disciplinary segregation, 180 days of commissary 

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restriction, 180 days of telephone restriction, and a recommendation that Petitioner 

be transferred. Id. 

 On August 14, 2011, Petitioner filed a Regional Remedy Appeal alleging that 

the DHO failed to comply with the regulations on inmate discipline because 

Petitioner was “unable to appreciate the nature and quality, or wrongfulness of his 

actions,” and was therefore “not responsible for his actions.” Petition, Ex. 1, p. 1. 

He also alleged that the DHO’s decision was not based on facts and that he was not 

timely issued the incident report. Finally, he alleged that his staff representative 

failed to adequately represent him and failed to obtain documents related to the 

investigation and did not question his requested witness at the hearing. Id., pp. 1-2. 

Petitioner describes the document in question as an April 26, 2011 memorialization 

of statements that Jenkins made to SIA Henderson indicating that Jenkins did not 

believe that Petitioner had offered a bribe. Id., p. 2. 

 The Regional Director responded on September 22, 2011, denying Petitioner’s 

appeal. Id., p. 3. The denial noted that the DHO’s decision was based on the 

“greater weight of the evidence.” The Regional Director concluded that Petitioner’s 

staff representative, a psychologist, would have raised Petitioner’s mental health if it 

had been an issue. The Director then noted that the investigation was completed on 

July 6, 2011, at 1:00 p.m., and that Petitioner received a copy the next morning, 

which was within the 24 hour period required. Id. It was then noted that the 

documents Petitioner requested, presumably the SIA Henderson’s April 26, 2011, 

report, was not used against Petitioner and was available under the Freedom of 

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Information Act if he wished to obtain them. Finally, the Director noted that 

Petitioner’s requested witness, Jenkins, had provided a written statement. Id. 

 On October 4, 2011, Petitioner appealed to the Central Office. Petitioner 

repeated his allegations that his rights were violated because Jenkins did not appear 

to testify and the DHO did not ask her questions that Petitioner had submitted. He 

also alleged that he was denied his right to present documentary evidence, which he 

again described as the April 26, 2011, investigative report following the SIA’s 

interview of educational staff at the prison. Response, Ex. 3. After finding that the 

greater weight of the evidence supported the DHO’s decision, the Administrator of 

National Inmate Appeals denied the appeal. Id. 

 In Ground One of the Petition, Petitioner claims that his due process rights 

were violated in his disciplinary proceeding because his staff representative, Dr. 

Cheek, did not obtain and present SIA Henderson’s April 26, 2011, report of an 

interview of Jenkins that led Nicholson to indicate to Petitioner that no bureau 

regulations had been violated. In Ground Two, Petitioner claims that his due process 

right to call witnesses was violated when Jenkins did not appear at the DHO hearing 

and the DHO did not ask her the questions Petitioner proposed. He alleges that these 

violations resulted in the loss of 27 days of good time credits. He seeks to have the 

findings of the DHO expunged from his disciplinary record and his good time credits 

restored. 

 In his response, without addressing the April 26 documents, Respondent 

argued that due process was satisfied because Petitioner was provided a copy of the 

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incident report, had Jenkins’ statement read to him, and was given the decision 

describing what evidence had been used to support a finding of guilt. Response, p. 7. 

However, the Court determined that if the documents memorializing the events of 

April 26 exist and support Petitioner’s allegations, they are potentially exculpatory. 

Thus, without reviewing the documents in question, it would be impossible to fully 

evaluate whether Petitioner was afforded due process. This is because, in certain 

circumstances, a prison disciplinary officer “may not refuse to consider exculpatory 

evidence simply because other evidence in the record suggests guilt.” Piggie v. 

McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002) (regarding surveillance videotape) 

(internal quotation omitted). “[P]risoners are entitled to have exculpatory evidence 

disclosed unless its disclosure would unduly threaten institutional concerns.” Id. 

Because the Respondent did not produce the documents or deny their existence, it 

remained possible that the documents in question, as Petitioner’s contends, were 

exculpatory. As such, the Court ordered supplemental briefing regarding the 

existence and impact of the April 26 documents. Respondent filed his supplemental 

brief on November 5, 2013 (Doc. 20), and Petitioner responded on November 15, 

2013 (Doc. 25). 

 As discussed below, the Court finds that the Court has jurisdiction over 

Petitioner’s claims, that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies, and 

that the process afforded to Petitioner during his disciplinary proceedings satisfied 

the reduced requirements of the Due Process Clause as outlined in Wolff. 

 . . . . 

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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. Jurisdiction 

Habeas corpus relief is available to those who are “in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner claims that he suffered 

violations of his rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution based on the loss of good 

time credit as a result of the outcome of disciplinary proceedings at a federal facility. 

If a constitutional violation has resulted in the loss of good time credits, it affects the 

duration of a sentence and may be challenged in a section 2241 petition. Tucker v. 

Carlson, 925 F.2d330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction. At the time this action was filed, Petitioner was housed in FCI-Safford 

in Arizona. Thus, venue is appropriate in this Court. Francis .v Rison, 894 F.2d 353 

(9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Exhaustion 

 Federal prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing a 

habeas petition pursuant to § 2241. E.g., Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th

Cir. 2004); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). If a petitioner has 

not properly exhausted his claims, the district court, in its discretion, may either 

“excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits, or require the petitioner to 

exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” Brown v. Rison, 

895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). The record here indicates, and the Respondent 

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agrees, that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing his 

claims to the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals. 

 C. Analysis

 1. Petitioner had no right to representation. 

 As part of Ground One, Petitioner contends his due process rights were 

violated because his inmate representative did not obtain all of the documents he 

requested and did not ask certain unspecified questions of Jenkins. There is no right 

to retained or appointed counsel in a prison disciplinary hearing. Baxter v. 

Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1976); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1274 

(9th Cir. 1989). “Therefore, an inmate has no claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel at a disciplinary hearing.” Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1274. In Wolff, the court 

suggested an exception to this rule exists where an illiterate inmate is involved or the 

issues are complex. 418 U.S. at 570. However, as evidenced by his pleadings, 

affidavit, and appeals documents, Petitioner was not entitled to counsel because he is 

fully literate and the issues involved are not complex. 

 2. Petitioner’s procedural due process rights were not violated.

 Federal prisoners have a statutory right to good time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3624. “It is well-settled ‘that an inmate’s liberty interest in his earned good time 

credits cannot be denied without minimal safeguards afforded by the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1444 

(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir. 1991)). 

However, “[d]ue process in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate 

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receives written notice of the charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by 

the prison officials and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Zimmerlee v. Keeny, 

831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1207 (1988) (citing Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-67 (1974)). An inmate also has “a limited right to call 

witnesses and to present documentary evidence when permitting him to do so would 

not unduly threaten institutional safety and goals.” Id. 

 Turning first to Petitioner’s Ground Two, he claims that his right to call 

Jenkins as a witness was violated. The record reflects that, in the Notice of 

Disciplinary Hearing Before DHO, Petitioner indicated he wished to have Jenkins as 

a witness because she could testify that Petitioner “did not offer her a bribe and he 

did not ask her for her address and . . . never mentioned a dollar amount to her.” 

Answer, Ex. 1, Att. 3, p. 8. However, as noted above, Jenkins did not testify at the 

hearing. In his decision, DHO Truex explained that she was not called because her 

written statement was available and was read to Petitioner and his representative. 

Additionally, in an affidavit prepared for this case, DHO Truex explains: 

 I did not call Ms. Jenkins as a witness for the July 21, 2011 

DHO hearing. In my view, she was the reporting officer and she was 

also an adverse witness. Although she was not the staff who wrote the 

incident report in question, she was the staff member who reported this 

incident, which was the cause of the investigation being initiated. It 

was also my view that her knowledge of the incident was adequately 

summarized in the June 29, 2011 memorandum that I read to Mr. 

Mackey and his staff representative at the DHO hearing and that I 

attached to the DHO report. 

 

Response, Ex. 2, p. 2. 

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 Respondent contends that the DHO’s decision comported with Wolff because 

prison officials have the discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and 

because the DHO did not think it was necessary to call Jenkins as a witness because 

her version of events was adequately covered in her memorandum. Response, p. 7. 

The Court agrees. 

 Prison officials are obligated to make individualized determinations to limit 

the calling of witnesses, and must explain their reasons for limiting the prisoner's 

ability to call witnesses. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985); Serrano v. 

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2003); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 

525 (9th Cir. 1996); Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Legitimate justifications for refusing to allow a prison to call a witness include those 

cited by the Respondent here. Petitioner had no right to cross-examine witnesses in 

prison disciplinary hearings. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567–68. Moreover, as 

Respondents contend, prison officials have discretion to restrict witness testimony in 

order keep disciplinary hearings within a reasonable time limit or if the witness's 

testimony would be repetitive or superfluous. Ponte, 471 U.S. at 499 (“[P]rison 

officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable 

limits and refuse to call a witness that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine 

authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or compile 

other documentary evidence.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); Bostic v. 

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1273 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[P]rison disciplinary committees may 

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sometimes deny a defendant the right to call redundant and unnecessary witnesses.”) 

(citation omitted). 

 The Supreme Court has stated that the complete denial of the opportunity to 

present a specifically identifiable witness who possesses exculpatory evidence is “an 

obvious procedural defect” which, when established, invalidates the deprivation of 

good time credits. See Edward v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997). Here, Jenkins 

statements are contained in two unsworn memorandums, the first dated April 19, 

2011, and the second dated June 29, 2011. See Response, Ex. 2, Atts. 2 and 3. Given 

the consistency between the two statements, Jenkins’ testimony at the hearing would 

have been redundant. 

 However, Petitioner alleges that during Jenkins’ April 26, 2011 telephone 

conversation with SIA Henderson, Jenkins stated that Petitioner had never offered 

her a bribe. Petition, p. 4; Traverse, p.2. This allegation, if true, would support 

Petitioner’s contention that Jenkins’ April 26, 2011, statements were entirely 

inconsistent with the two memos she prepared describing what happened. However, 

in the supplemental briefing submitted to the Court, Petitioner’s contentions are 

thoroughly rebutted. 

 According to Henderson and Jenkins, no telephonic conference occurred 

between them and Petitioner on April 26, 2011. Respondent’s Supplemental Brief, 

Ex. A, ¶ 4; Ex. B, ¶ 3. They further state that their discussions about Petitioner and 

the events of April 18, 2011, were held outside the presence of inmates. Id. 

Moreover, Jenkins states that she never made any exculpatory statements about 

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Petitioner and was consistent in her contention that Petitioner approached her 

regarding the introduction of contraband into the prison. Id., Ex. B, ¶ 3. Finally, 

Henderson states that the only documentation of the investigation was the incident 

report generated in July 2011. Id., Ex. A, ¶ 6. Although Petitioner raises a number 

of new issues in his supplemental briefing, none of them rebut the Respondent’s 

claims that no exculpatory documents or testimony existed. As such, there was 

nothing withheld to which Petitioner was entitled. Rasheed–Bey v. Duckworth, 969 

F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding prisoner was not entitled to documentary 

evidence at disciplinary hearing where it “was not patently exculpatory”). Thus, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

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within which to file a response to the objections. No replies shall be filed without the 

approval of the District Court. If any objections are filed, this action should be 

designated case number: CV 12-0163-TUC-CKJ. Failure to timely file objections to 

any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 13th day of December, 2013. 

 

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