Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02270/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRYL TYRONE FOSTER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11-cv-2270-LAB

(WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION ON

RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation,

 

 Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Derryl Tyrone Foster (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a state inmate proceeding pro

se, petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus. [ECF No. 1.] Petitioner filed a first

amended petition (“FAP”), adding new claims. [ECF No. 22.] Respondent moves to

dismiss Petitioner’s FAP as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) statute of limitations. [ECF No. 30.] Petitioner filed an

opposition to Respondent’s motion. [ECF No. 34.] Respondent filed a reply. [ECF

No. 35.] 

The Court submits this report and recommendation to United States District

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Judge Larry A. Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule

H.C.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Jury Trial

In 2005, Petitioner and two others robbed the Blarney Stone Pub. (Lodg. No. 1

at 1-2.) The jury convicted Petitioner of armed robbery plus three counts of false

imprisonment. (Lodg. No. 1 at 1-2.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner, a “Three

Strikes” recidivist, to an indeterminate term of thirty-six years to life imprisonment. 

(Lodg. No. 1 at 2.) 

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

District. (Lodg. No. 1.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and

denied the appeal. (Lodg. No. 1.) Petitioner petitioned the California Supreme Court

to review his appeal.1

 (Lodg. No. 2.) On August 27, 2008, the California Supreme

Court denied review. (Lodg. No. 3.) 

C. First State Habeas Corpus Petition

1. San Diego Superior Court

On December 22, 2008, Petitioner filed his first habeas corpus petition in the

San Diego County Superior Court. (Lodg. No. 4.) The petition included the

following five claims: (1) the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment

right to a fair and impartial jury trial because the trial court judge patronized the bar

that Petitioner was charged with robbing (“claim A”)2

; (2) Petitioner was denied his

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to

raise jury and judge bias issues, object to prosecutorial misconduct, subpoena

witnesses and audio-video cameras, disclose a conflict of interest with the judge, file

1 Petitioner’s claims before the California Supreme Court on direct review mirror the claims he filed in instant federal habeas corpus petition. 

2 In order to identify and track Petitioner’s claims, the Court designates each claim with a letter, i.e., “claim A, claim B, claim C, etc.” 

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motions, and allowed Petitioner to take the stand which caused Petitioner harm

(“claim B”); (3) the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a

fair and impartial trial because the trial court failed to inform the jury that aiding and

abetting is a lesser included offense (“claim C”); (4) the trial court violated

Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial because the trial

court judge instructed the jury with an improper consciousness of guilt instruction

based on California Criminal Jury Instruction 362 (“claim D”); and, (5) the trial court

violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights because the judge improperly

instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard (“claim E”). (Lodg No. 4.) The

superior court denied the petition on March 27, 2009. (Lodg. No. 5) The superior

court held that Petitioner: (1) did not set forth a prima facie statement of facts which

would entitle Petitioner to habeas corpus relief under the law; (2) did not plead

sufficient grounds for relief; and (3) improperly attempted to use the habeas corpus

petition as a second appeal on matters that were already raised and rejected on appeal. 

(Lodg. No. 5 at 2-4.) 

2. California Appellate Court

On May 4, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition at the California

Court of Appeal. (Lodg. No. 6.) Petitioner raised the exact same claims (claims A-E

above) from his December 22, 2008 habeas corpus petition to the San Diego County

Superior Court. (Lodg. No. 6.) On May 8, 2009, the court of appeal denied the

petition. (Lodg. No. 7.) The appellate court denied without prejudice Petitioner’s

claims because they were not filed in a proper lower court.3

 (Lodg. No. 7 at 1.)

3. California Supreme Court

On July 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition at the California

Supreme Court. (Lodg. No. 8.) Petitioner raised essentially the same ineffective

assistance of counsel claim (claim B above) from his superior and appellate court

3 Petitioner indicated in his petition to the appellate court that he had yet to file a petition in any other state court regarding his claims. (Lodg. No. 6 at 1.) It appears

the appellate court was unaware of Petitioner’s superior court filing. (Lodg. No. 7 at 4.) 

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petitions.4 (Lodg. No. 8.) On December 17, 2009, the California Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. (Lodg. No. 9.) The California Supreme

Court issued a one-page denial citing In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949). (Lodg.

No. 9 at 1.)

D. Second State Habeas Corpus Petition

1. San Diego Superior Court

On June 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a second habeas corpus petition in the San

Diego County Superior Court. (Lodg. No. 10.) Petitioner included the following

three claims: (1) the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights

because the judge improperly instructed the jury that Petitioner robbed the Blarney

Stone Pub (“claim F”); and (2) the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights because the judge created a conflict of interest when he drank with

Petitioner’s counsel at the Blarney Stone Pub while the judge and Petitioner’s counsel

conducted their own investigation and discussed Petitioner’s case (claim A); and (3)

ineffective assistance of counsel5

 because the court-appointed counsel acted as an

investigator for the trial court judge when counsel failed to object to, or file motions

regarding, prejudicial information that the judge disclosed to the jury during voir dire,

failed to timely file bifurcation and suppression motions, and failed to subpeona

audio-video surveillance (claim B). (Lodg. No. 10.) 

The superior court denied the petition on August 13, 2010. (Lodg. No. 11.) 

The superior court denied the first claim because: (a) the same claim was raised and

denied in Petitioner’s first habeas corpus petition, and Petitioner did not demonstrate a

4Petitioner also asserts a second ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his appellate counsel’s failure to investigate. (Lodg. No. 8). Petitioner supports this

claim by asserting the trial judge prejudiced him by leading the jury to believe he was guilty before the trial. Id. The extent to which this allegation constitutes a “claim” which was “fairly presented” to the state courts was not raised in the briefs and remains

unclear. 

5 The superior court’s opinion did not address the ineffective assistance of

counsel aspect of Petitioner’s amalgamated claim number two. However, this Court

distinguishes the two claims for purposes of this report and recommendation. 

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change in existing law or facts; and (b) Petitioner did not set forth a prima facie

statement of facts that entitled him to relief under the law. (Lodg. No. 11 at 2, 4.) The

superior court denied claim two because: (a) Petitioner did not set forth a prima facie

statement of facts that entitled him to relief under the law; and (b) Petitioner must

raise judicial bias claims on direct appeal. (Lodg. No. 11 at 3-4.) 

E. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition6

On September 28, 2011, Petitioner filed his original federal habeas corpus

petition. [ECF No. 1.] The petition contains five claims. [ECF No. 1.] Three of the

five claims - grounds 2, 3, and 4 - mirror those filed on December 22, 2008 in superior

court and on May 4, 2009 in the appellate court (claims C, D, and E above). (Lodg.

Nos. 4 & 6.) 

Petitioner also includes two additional claims: (1) the trial court violated

Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights because insufficient evidence existed to

support Petitioner’s convictions for second degree robbery and false imprisonment

(“claim G”) and (2) the trial court violated Petitioner’s Eight Amendment rights

because his thirty-six year sentence is cruel and unusual (“claim H”). [ECF No. 1.] 

Claims C, D, E, G, and H mirror the claims presented to the California Supreme

Court on direct review. (Lodg. No. 2). 

F. Court’s Denial of Petitioner’s Request for Stay and Abeyance

On September 28, 2011, Petitioner filed a request for stay and abeyance. [ECF

No. 4.] In the request, Petitioner stated that the five claims from his federal habeas

corpus petition are exhausted. [ECF No. 12 at 1.] However, Petitioner also indicated

6 Petitioner attempted but failed to initiate federal habeas corpus proceedings on September 15, 2010 in case number 3:10-cv-01952 BTM(BLM). Petitioner filed a motion to stay on September 15, 2010 but did not include an petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court denied the motion to stay and instructed Petitioner on the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations. Petitioner then filed an “amended” petition with claims regarding trial court error (failure to instruct and failure to sever), ineffective assistance of counsel, and insufficient evidence. The Court dismissed the petition because Petitioner failed to submit the filing fee or adequate proof of his inability to pay and a second amended petition to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in the first amended petition. (The Court takes judicial notice of the docket for Case No. 3:10-cv01952-BTM (BLM)). 

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he intended to add other, unexhausted claims. [ECF No. 4 at 1.] Respondent opposed

Petitioner’s request for a stay. [ECF No. 11.]

On January 6, 2012, Petitioner replied to Respondent’s opposition. [ECF No.

12.] In his reply, Petitioner identified three purportedly unexhausted claims. [ECF

No. 12.] These claims include: (1) the trial-court-appointed counsel violated

Petitioner’s due process right under the Sixth Amendment when counsel failed to

properly cross-examine witnesses, including police officers, that testified inconsistent

with previous statements (claim B); (2) the prosecution violated Petitioner’s due

process right under the Fourteenth Amendment because the prosecution introduced

false information to the jurors at the voir dire proceeding (claim F); and (3) the trial

court and court-appointed counsel violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth and Sixth

Amendment rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, respectively,

because they committed prejudicial error when they failed to conduct a full

investigation of jurors that spread biased information and counsel failed to file for

mistrial when at least one juror learned about Petitioner’s extrinsic prior conviction

during the trial (“claim I”). [ECF No. 12.] Petitioner also claimed he raised the three

unexhausted claims in a separate habeas corpus petition that he filed in the California

Supreme Court on October 3, 2011. [ECF No. 4 at 1.] 

While Petitioner and Respondent briefed this issue, the California Supreme

Court denied Petitioner’s three purportedly unexhausted claims. (Lodg. No. 15.) The

record confirms that on October 3, 2011 Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition at the

California Supreme Court. (Lodg. No. 12.) Petitioner filed the same three claims at

the California Supreme Court that he filed in his reply to Respondent’s opposition in

federal court.7

 (Lodg. Nos. 12-14.) On February 15, 2012, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition, citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) and In re

7Claims B, F, and I at the California Supreme Court include–almost verbatim–the same legal theory and facts Petitioner presented in his Request for Stay and Abeyance. However, Petitioner split claim I from his federal petition into two claims at the California Supreme Court; thus his California Supreme Court petition includes four

claims.

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Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-769 (1993). (Lodg. No. 15 at 1.)

 Respondent then filed an “Application for Leave to File Supplemental

Response in Opposition to Motion to Stay.” [ECF No. 14 and 15.] Respondent

argued the stay and abey issue is moot because Petitioner’s previously unexhausted

claims are now exhausted. [ECF No. 15 at 3.] Furthermore, Respondent reiterated

Petitioner’s AEDPA statute of limitation time has run. [ECF No. 15 at 3-5.] 

However, Respondent recognized that neither Petitioner nor Respondent had fully

briefed the statutory and equitable tolling issues. [ECF No. 15 at 5-6.] Therefore,

Respondent requested the Court deny Petitioner’s request for a stay, and to set a

briefing schedule to permit both sides to argue the statutory and equitable tolling

issues. [ECF No. 15 at 6.] 

The Court concluded Petitioner exhausted claims B, C, D, E, F, H, I and G and

denied Petitioner’s motion to stay as moot. [ECF No. 19.] Additionally, the Court

ordered Petitioner shall file an amended petition [Id.], and set a briefing schedule for

the parties to brief the timeliness issue following Petitioner’s FAP. [ECF No. 23.] The

Court will now address the arguments raised in the briefing on the timeliness issue.

IV. ARGUMENTS

A. Summary of Respondent’s Arguments

Overview

Respondent contends Petitioner’s original petition and the FAP are untimely. 

Respondent contends Petitioner is entitled to limited statutory tolling but not equitable

tolling. 

Statutory Tolling

Respondent contends the statute of limitations began on November 26, 2008.

The limitations period ran for 27 days until statutorily tolled by Petitioner’s first round

of state habeas corpus proceedings. The first round of state habeas proceedings ended

on December 17, 2009 when the California Supreme Court denied relief. The

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limitations period ran again–for 193 days–from December 17, 2009 until June 28,

2010, when Petitioner began his second round of state habeas proceedings.

Respondent argues Petitioner is not entitled to statutory gap-tolling between his first

and second state habeas proceedings. Respondent further argues Petitioner is not

entitled to statutory gap-tolling during his second state habeas petition which began

June 28, 2010 and ended February 15, 2012. Respondent marks the denial of the

second state habeas corpus petition by the superior court as the restart of the

limitations period, and contends 411 days elapsed between the restart date and

September 28, 2011, the date Petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition.

Respondent acknowledges Petitioner’s September 15, 2010 federal habeas corpus

petition but contends that filing did not toll the limitations period in the instant case. 

Accordingly, Respondent concludes Petitioner had until January 5, 2011 to

timely file his federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner, however, waited until

September 28, 2011 to file, thus exceeding the statute of limitations by nine months,

unless equitable tolling applies.

Equitable Tolling

Respondent contends Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and

that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing. Specifically,

Respondent contends Petitioner’s excuses for timely filing – including his appellate

counsel’s failure to present issues on direct review or instruct Petitioner on habeas

filings, his lack of legal sophistication, his mental health issues, prison lockdowns and

cell searches, and his limited library access – do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances that prevented Petitioner from timely filing. Respondent concludes

Petitioner’s failure to timely file is due to Petitioner’s own lack of diligence.

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

///

///

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B. Summary of Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner does not address statutory tolling or provide any analysis or argument

on gap tolling. Rather, Petitioner contends the Court should find his federal petition

timely based on equitable factors. Specifically, Petitioner contends the Court should

apply equitable tolling and find his petition timely because the following factors made

it impossible for Petitioner to timely file his federal petition: (1) Petitioner’s appellate

counsel failed to raise “very important issues” on direct review and failed to explain to

Petitioner how Petitioner could raise the issues on collateral review; (2) Petitioner is a

layman; (3) Petitioner has mental health issues for which he takes medication –

Petitioner has confused thinking, memory loss, panic attacks, and hears voices in his

head; (4) Petitioner was subjected to lockdowns and cell searches during which

Petitioner’s legal materials were mishandled and mixed up; (5) Petitioner was placed

in Administrative Segregation for harming another inmate and had limited access to

the law library.

V. LEGAL STANDARD

A. AEDPA Time Limit

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies

to this action and all others filed after April 26, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA

imposed a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas petitions. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides as follows:

(d) (1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

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United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

The AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled during the time a properly filed

application for post-conviction relief is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

The statute of limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on which a

decision becomes final and the date on which the petitioner files his first state

collateral challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once state

collateral proceedings are commenced, a state habeas petition is “pending” during a

full round of review in the state courts, including the time between a lower court

decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher court, as long as the intervals

between petitions are “reasonable.” See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192 (2006);

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222–24 (2002).

In reviewing habeas petitions from California, the Ninth Circuit formerly

employed the following rule: where California courts did not explicitly dismiss a

habeas petition for lack of timeliness, the petition is presumed timely. The United

States Supreme Court has rejected this approach and requires the lower federal courts

to determine whether a state habeas petition was filed within what California would

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consider a reasonable period of time. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189. Section 2244(d)(2) is

satisfied when a state post-conviction petition is determined to be untimely by a state

court. Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. However,

in the absence of a clear indication that petitioner's state habeas petitions were denied

as untimely, this court is charged with the duty to independently determine whether

petitioner filed his state habeas petitions within what California would consider a

reasonable time. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 198. 

In addition, a petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling if he can show 

“‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 130

S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct.

1807 (2005)).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitation period begins to run on “the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review.” See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897

(9th Cir. 2001). The statute commences under § 2244(d)(1)(A) upon either: (1) the

conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state court system, followed by either

the completion or denial of certiorari proceedings before the United States Supreme

Court; or (2) if certiorari was not sought, then by the conclusion of all direct criminal

appeals in the state court system followed by the expiration of the time permitted for

filing a petition for writ of certiorari. Wixom, 264 F.3d at 897 (quoting Smith v.

Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1187 (1999)).

///

///

///

///

///

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VI. DISCUSSION

A. Time-line of Relevant Events 

Date: Event:

August 27, 2008 California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on August 27, 2008. (Lodg. 3).

November 25,

2008 Judgment became final 90 days after the supreme court’s denialbecause Petitioner did not seek certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999).

November 26,

2008 Statute of limitations begins to run.

27 days elapsed until 

December 22,

2008 Petitioner signed his first state habeas corpus petition. SeeStillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (deeming petition filed on date Petitioner signs petition).

December 17,

2009 California Supreme Court denied relief on Petitioner’s first statehabeas corpus petition. (Lodg. 9). 

193 days elapsed until

June 28, 2010 Petitioner files second state habeas corpus petition in superior court. (Lodg. 10). (Petitioner did not date this petition with his signature).

August 13, 2010 Superior court denied habeas relief. (Lodg. 11). 

Statute of limitations runs

September 15,

2010 Petitioner attempted habeas corpus proceedings but failed tofollow through and the petition was dismissed on April 4, 2011.

(Docket for Case No. 3:10-cv-01952-BTM (BLM)). This

federal petition did not toll the statute of limitations. See

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).

402 days elapsed since August 13, 2010 until

September 19,

2011 Petitioner signed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. [ECF No. 1.] 

September 22,

2011 Petitioner signed and filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodg. 12).

February 15,

2012 California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s second habeaspetition citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) and In

re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-69 (1993).

July 5, 2012 Petitioner filed the first amended petition (“FAP”). [ECF No. 22.]

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B. Analysis

Statutory Tolling

 As demonstrated in the time-line above, Petitioner allowed 622 days (27 + 193 +

402) to elapse before filing his federal habeas corpus petition. The 622-day tally does

not include Petitioner’s first round of state habeas corpus proceedings or Petitioner’s

second-round state habeas petition to the superior court. Rather, the Court finds

statutory tolling applies to these periods because the “time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year

limitation period.8

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (italics added). 

 The 622-day tally includes three periods of elapsed time: 27 days, 193 days, and

402 days. The application of statutory tolling to the first two periods (the 27-day and

193-day non-tolled periods) is fairly straightforward because the statute began to run

90 days after the supreme court’s denial, Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1158-59, tolled during

Petitioner’s full-round of state habeas proceedings, then ran again until Petitioner

began his second round of state habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Further, the Court finds the time between the first and second rounds (193 days)

should not be statutorily tolled because (1) Petitioner introduced new and distinct

claims, as well as old claims, in his second state habeas petition, See Welch v. Carey,

350 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003), and (2) Petitioner waited an unreasonable

amount of time (193 days) to begin the second round. See Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d

964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting Supreme Court presumes as reasonable 30-60 or 30-

45 day intervals and concluding 146-day interval unreasonable); but see Smith v.

Small, No. 11-57167, 2013 WL 1150906 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing district court and

holding 85–day delay reasonable because it was close to a 30-60 day interval,

8Arguably, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for his incomplete second round because tolling applies to “full rounds” in which the prisoner is “moving up”

through the state appellate courts. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). Regardless of whether or not this brief period is tolled, Petitioner still failed to

timely file his federal petition. 

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California Supreme Court did not indicate petition was untimely, petitioner proceeded

pro se and had limited access to legal files while in protective custody). 

In addition, even if the Court concluded that statutory tolling applied to the 193-

day gap between Petitioner’s first and second rounds in state court, the 402-day gap

between the end of Petitioner’s second round of state habeas corpus proceedings and

his filing in federal court renders his original petition and his FAP untimely. Based on

the record before the Court, it appears Petitioner started his second round of state

habeas proceedings in superior court, skipped review at the appellate level, and then

petitioned the California Supreme Court 405 days after the superior court’s denial.

Petitioner’s failure to complete his second round of state habeas proceedings in a

timely manner – Petitioner’s second round began on June 28, 2010 and ended

February 15, 2012 – does not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Banjo, 614

F.3d at 970; see also Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)

(concluding that a prisoner only receives tolling for “full rounds” in which the

prisoner is “moving up” through the state appellate courts). Moreover, the California

Supreme Court’s February 15, 2012 silent denial cited to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th

770, 780 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-69 (1993), thus indicating the

California Supreme Court found Petitioner’s second state habeas petition untimely

and procedurally barred as repetitious, piecemeal, and successive. See Thomas v.

Hubbard, No. C 12-1019, 2013 WL 144904, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013) (analyzing

import of California Supreme Court’s citations to both Robbins and Clark in regards

to a motion to dismiss a habeas corpus petition as procedurally defaulted). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is only entitled to limited statutory tolling for his first

round of state habeas corpus proceedings (December 22, 2008 through December 17,

2009) and the timely filed portion of his incomplete second round of state habeas

corpus proceedings (June 28, 2010 through August 13, 2010). Petitioner had 365 days

in which to timely file his federal petition under the AEDPA standard but allowed 622

un-tolled days to elapse before filing. Therefore, if Petitioner cannot demonstrate

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sufficient equitable reasons for the Court to excuse the 259-day discrepancy,

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely.

Equitable Tolling

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has not pursued his

rights diligently and has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances prevented him

from timely filing. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

Indeed, the table of relevant events, supra, demonstrates Petitioner’s lack of diligence.

Although Petitioner’s state collateral review started promptly after the conclusion of

his direct review, Petitioner inexplicably waited 193 days after his first round of

collateral review to begin a second round of collateral review. Then, following the

superior court denial of his second state habeas petition, Petitioner inexplicably waited

another 405 days to file the petition in the California Supreme Court. Furthermore,

even though Petitioner filed a federal petition on September 15, 2010, the case was

dismissed because Petitioner failed to submit the filing fee or adequate proof of his

inability to pay and a second amended petition to cure the deficiencies identified by

the Court in the first amended petition. (Docket for Case No. 3:10-cv-01952-BTM

(BLM)). In short, Petitioner’s failure to follow through with his first federal habeas

corpus petition, coupled with the inexplicable and lengthy delays in filing his state

habeas corpus petitions, demonstrate a general lack of diligence in pursing his claims. 

Petitioner’s explanation for his delay in filing the instant petition is insufficient

to justify equitable tolling because Petitioner’s reasons are neither extraordinary nor

do they demonstrate an impediment to filing beyond Petitioner’s control. For

example, Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel failed to raise “very important

issues” on direct review and failed to explain to Petitioner how Petitioner could raise

the issues on collateral review, as well as Petitioner’s status as a layman, do not

constitute extraordinary impediments to filing because Petitioner began his state

collateral review after only 27 days had elapsed. Therefore, Petitioner had ample time

to take the claims he exhausted on state collateral review and present them in a federal

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habeas corpus petition. Moreover, with full knowledge of the factual predicate for all

claims in the instant petition, Petitioner reached the federal court with (an attempted)

petition for federal habeas corpus relief on September 15, 2010, but Petitioner allowed

the petition to languish and the petition was dismissed. Moreover, Petitioner managed

to present certain claims to the federal court in an amended petition before the petition

was dismissed. Thus, the Court finds Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s alleged failure

did not impede Petitioner from filing the instant petition. 

Similarly, Petitioner’s general allegations of being subject to lockdowns,

administrative segregation and cell searches also fails. Lockdowns warrant equitable

tolling only where a substantial lockdown period denies the prisoner access to

materials necessary to file a petition despite the prisoner’s diligent efforts to obtain the

materials. See Espinoza–Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“For nearly 11 months, despite his diligence, [petitioner] could not obtain his legal

papers.”). The petitioner “bears the burden of showing his own diligence and that the

hardship caused by lack of access to his materials was an extraordinary circumstance

that caused him to file his petition . . . late.” Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d

1008, 1013 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Pace, 544 U.S. at 418)). Petitioner has not met his

burden because he has failed to provide the Court with any information regarding the

length of time he was allegedly deprived access to his materials, the specific materials

he needed in order to file, or the efforts he undertook to retrieve the materials he

needed. See Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013. Without specific information

regarding the duration of the alleged deprivation, Petitioner’s diligent efforts to

counter that alleged deprivation, or the necessity of the withheld documents, this

Court can only conclude it was Petitioner’s lack of diligence, and not external factors,

that caused Petitioner’s delay. 

Finally, Petitioner has failed to show his mental health issues were “so severe

that either “(a) [he] was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the

need to timely file, or (b) [his] mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare

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a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.” Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-10 (9th

Cir. 2010). Petitioner did not allege, nor did Petitioner attach documents to show, he

was unable to understand the need to timely file or that his mental disorder rendered

him unable to prepare and file his habeas petition. See Nelson v. Clark, No. SA CV

09-761, 2009 WL 6640990, *4 (C.D. Cal Nov. 13, 2009) (noting the petitioner “has

not presented any proof that he was unable to understand or manage his legal affairs

or file his Petition in a timely manner due to his dyslexia”). Further, the Court notified

Petitioner of the AEDPA statute of limitations on October 1, 2010, following

Petitioner’s request for a stay. (Docket of Case No. 3:10-cv-01952-BTM (BLM)).

Furthermore, Petitioner’s request for a stay demonstrates he understood the need to

file a federal petition within a certain amount of time. Petitioner further demonstrated

his understanding of the need to timely file under the AEDPA (albeit after the

limitations period expired) when he specifically cited the AEDPA one-year statute of

limitations in the motion to stay and abey the instant federal petition while he

exhausted his claims in state court. [ECF No. 4.] Similarly, Petitioner’s numerous

filings in state and federal court demonstrate his ability to personally prepare and file a

habeas petition. 

Petitioner’s numerous, scattershot filings also demonstrate the reason for his

failure to timely file: his own lack of diligence. Petitioner’s first omission, which he

does not contend was caused by his mental health issues, was his failure to file a

federal petition immediately after completing his first round of collateral review in

state court. Petitioner’s second omission was his inexplicable failure to follow through

with his September 15, 2010 federal habeas corpus petition. (Case No. 3:10-cv-01952-

BTM (BLM)). Because Petitioner knew how and when to file a federal petition for

writ of habeas corpus, the Court finds Petitioner’s failure to timely file his federal

petition stems from his own lack of diligence, and not his alleged mental health issues.

VII. CONCLUSION

 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United State District

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Judge Larry A. Burns under 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of

the United States District court for the Southern District of California. For all the

foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED this habeas Petition be

DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1)

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2) directing that

judgment be entered dismissing the FAP with prejudice. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than May 31, 2013 any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than June 7, 2013. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 10, 2013

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge, 

U.S. District Court

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