Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04098/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04098-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CATHY BURGESS, ELUM BURGESS, and

SHELA BURGESS, by and through her guardian

ad litem, CATHY BURGESS,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ALAMEDA

COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C01-04098 MJJ

ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL

BRIEFING

Pending before the Court is Defendants County of Alameda, Housing Authority of Alameda

County (“ACHA”), Ophelia Basgal, Navdeep Barn, and Donna Payne’s (collectively, “Defendants”)

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #169). On June 13, 2006, the Court held oral argument on the

Motion. After considering the parties’ arguments raised in their briefs and at the hearing, the Court

finds that additional briefing is necessary to assist the Court in resolving the pending Motion. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs have asserted claims for failure to accommodate under both the Fair

Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

reasonable accommodation claims fail because Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendants refused to

make a necessary accommodation of Ms. Burgess’s disability. Defendants’ argument rests primarily

on the fact that ACHA granted Ms. Burgess a voucher that allowed her 120 days to find an apartment

in Contra Costa County, and then granted her a 60-day extension after that initial period expired. 

Plaintiffs counter that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether an accommodation was

Case 3:01-cv-04098-MJJ Document 191 Filed 06/19/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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necessary to afford Ms. Burgess an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing and that Defendants

refused to provide such accommodation. Specifically, Plaintiffs frame their argument as follows:

There is little question, in this case, than an accommodation was

necessary - Ms. Barn repeatedly acknowledged that [Ms. Burgess] did

not understand the information that was being presented to her, which

meant that she needed guidance from the Defendants. [] In other words,

in this case, minimal effort was simply not good enough. Further, an

accommodation was necessary for Plaintiff s to use and enjoy a dwelling

- the break down of the portability process prevented [Ms. Burgess] from

using Section 8 in Concord, and prevented her from obtaining an

apartment to use and enjoy. 

Plaintiffs further assert that, “Specifically, [Ms. Burgess] needed the Defendants to act with sufficient

assiduousness to ensure that she understood the process generally, that portability was proceeding

smoothly, and that [Ms. Burgess] understood how and when to act.” Although not raised anywhere in

their Opposition, at the hearing, Plaintiffs for the first time articulated other specific accommodations

they claim were necessary for Ms. Burgess to use and enjoy housing under the Section 8 program. The

Court has considered the parties’ competing arguments, legal authority, and evidence that they have

cited in support. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the parties have failed to address Plaintiffs’

reasonable accommodations claims in sufficient detail to allow the Court rule on the pending Motion

for Summary Judgment with respect to those claims. The Court therefore presents the following issues

to the parties to focus their discussion. 

The core of Plaintiffs’ case is that Defendants’ failure to process her Section 8 portability

paperwork caused a breakdown in the portability process, preventing her from moving to the Driftwood

apartment in Concord, and ultimately causing her and her children to become homeless. Particularly,

the thrust of Plaintiffs’ case is that Defendants’ failure to send Plaintiff’s portability packet to HACCC

stymied the portability process. Thus, as the Court understands Plaintiffs’ argument, it was Defendants’

alleged failure to adhere to the regulations and policies requiring them to process and transmit certain

paperwork necessary for Ms. Burgess to “port out” from Alameda County to Contra Costa County that

prevented her from securing Section 8 housing. Assuming the Court has correctly characterized

Plaintiffs’ argument, the issue becomes whether there is a connection between the accommodations

identified in Plaintiffs’ opposition - namely, additional assistance and explanations from ACHA about

the portability process - and the alleged reason Plaintiffs could not obtain housing, namely, Defendants’

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failure to transmit the portability packet to HACCC. Stated another way, because Plaintiffs have not

argued that Ms. Burgess’s disabilities prevented her from completing the portability process, the Court

cannot determine how the stated accommodations aid or allow Ms. Burgess to avail herself of housing

through the Section 8 portability process. 

Overall, the Court is unclear as to the exact accommodations Plaintiffs claim were unlawfully

denied and how those accommodation were necessary to enable Ms. Burgess to obtain and/or maintain

her Section 8 housing benefits in light of the fact that Plaintiffs are claiming that it was Defendants’

failure to act that resulted in the loss of Ms. Burgess’s Section 8 voucher. Without a nexus between the

proposed accommodations and the reason why Plaintiffs’ were unable to port out, the Court queries how

Plaintiffs can maintain a reasonable accommodations claim under either the FHA or the ADA. 

To assist the Court in resolving these issues and to clarify Plaintiffs’ reasonable accommodation

claims, the Court now ORDERS as follows:

Plaintiffs shall file a Supplemental Brief, not exceeding 10 pages in length, clarifying their

reasonable accommodation claims in light of the issues raised in this Order. In particular, Plaintiffs shall

articulate exactly what accommodations were necessary for Ms. Burgess to obtain housing, in light of

the fact that Plaintiffs’ position is that it was Defendants’ failure to act that prevented Plaintiffs from

completing the Section 8 portability process. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief shall be due by June 27,

2006. 

Defendants shall file a Responsive Supplemental Brief, not exceeding 10 pages, by July 5, 2006.

Both parties shall limit their discussion to Plaintiffs’ reasonable accommodation claims and

the issues raised in this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 19, 2006. 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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