Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02155/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02155-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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14-cv-02155-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D. V., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JACOB THOMPSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02155-RMW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 56

Defendants Cory Morgan and Tyler Fernandes move to dismiss the second amended 

complaint (“SAC”). Dkt. No. 56. Specifically, defendants Morgan and Fernandes move for an 

order substituting the United States of America as the defendant for plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and 

fifth claims (plaintiffs’ three state law claims), and an order dismissing those claims for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative 

remedies as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). For the reasons explained below, 

the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to substitute and motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

This civil rights case arises out of the September 4, 2013 shooting death of Juan Carlos 

Ruelas during a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) sting operation in Sunnyvale, 

California. SAC ¶ 17. The police officers involved in the sting were from Sunnyvale, the City of 

Santa Clara, and the County of Santa Clara, but each was working under the auspices of the DEA 

during the operation. Id. ¶¶ 6–11. Defendants Morgan and Fernandes were acting as federally 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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deputized DEA Task Force Officers. See Dkt. No. 56, Ex. A.1 The Attorney General, acting 

through his designee, the United States Attorney’s Office, see 28 C.F.R. § 15.4, has certified that 

defendants Morgan and Fernandes were acting within the scope of their office or employment at 

the time of the incident at issue in this case, and therefore that they are federal employees for the 

purposes of plaintiffs’ state law claims. Id.

The SAC alleges the following timeline of events. Santa Clara Police Department 

Detective Travis Niesen arranged to meet Ruelas in the parking lot of a Sunnyvale restaurant on 

September 4, 2013 to make an undercover purchase of one pound of methamphetamine. Id. ¶ 19. 

Detective Niesen had previously made several undercover methamphetamine purchases from 

Ruelas, and the DEA task force of which Niesen was a part planned to use the September 4, 2013 

meeting to arrest Ruelas. Id. Detective Niesen approached Ruelas’s truck, and Ruelas handed him 

a pound of methamphetamine through the open passenger door. Id. ¶ 20. Detective Niesen was 

wearing a wire, and the other officers involved in the sting, including defendants Morgan and 

Fernandes, listened in on the transaction. Id. The transmission was intermittent due to poor 

reception, and was not recorded. Id. The officers listening over the wire could hear only Detective 

Niesen, and not Ruelas. Id.

After Ruelas handed over the drugs, Detective Niesen gave the coded arrest signal over the 

wire, and delayed Ruelas. Id. ¶¶ 1, 20. Ruelas warned Detective Niesen that he had a gun, and told 

him to hurry up and not “do anything stupid.” Id. ¶¶ 20–21. However, despite his threats, Ruelas 

was unarmed. Id. ¶ 23. After Detective Niesen asked Ruelas why he had brought a gun, Ruelas 

“move[d] a hand,” and Detective Niesen began to shoot at Ruelas. Id. ¶ 21. When Detective 

Niesen began shooting, he was still undercover, and the sting had not been announced to Ruelas. 

 1 Defendants attach the certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) to their motion to dismiss, 

see Dkt. No. 56, Ex. A, as well as two deputization request/authorization forms for Morgan and 

Fernandes that deputized them to act as DEA task force officers pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 878, see

Dkt. Nos. 56-1, 56-2. Although a court generally may not look beyond the four corners of a 

complaint in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider matters subject to judicial 

notice. U.S. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, neither party objects 

to the documents submitted in support of the motion to dismiss and opposition, and the court finds 

the documents properly subject to judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

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Id. After Detective Niesen began shooting, several undercover police officers from Sunnyvale, the 

City of Santa Clara, and the County of Santa Clara, including defendants Morgan and Fernandes,

rushed toward the vehicle and also began shooting. Id. ¶ 22. Ruelas was incapacitated by the initial 

barrage, but the officers began firing again after Officer Justin Mead said the word “gun.” Id. 

Ruelas was unarmed, and no facts are alleged in the SAC to explain why Officer Mead said “gun.” 

Id. Ruelas was thereafter transported to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center in San Jose, California, 

and pronounced dead from multiple gunshot wounds. Id. ¶ 24. Ruelas’s minor son and successorin-interest D.V., and his father and mother, Jose Luis Ruelas and Rebeca Ruelas, filed the instant 

suit on May 9, 2014. See Dkt. No. 1. 

The original complaint named as defendants the City of Sunnyvale, the City of Santa 

Clara, the County of Santa Clara, and John Does 1-50, who represented the police officers present 

at the incident and who were at that time unidentified. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 6-9. The complaint alleged 

the following claims against all defendants: (1) two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) 

negligence, labelled as a wrongful death claim; (3) assault and battery; and (4) a claim under the 

Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 52.1. Id. ¶¶ 23–40. On June 24, 2014,

Sunnyvale moved to dismiss the complaint, Dkt. No. 11, which the court granted-in-part and 

denied-in-part on August 14, 2014, Dkt. No. 18. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ Section 1983 

claims against Sunnyvale, finding that the complaint alleged no basis for municipal liability under 

Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and dismissed 

plaintiffs’ negligence and assault and battery claims for failure to plead that plaintiffs had 

complied with the FTCA. Dkt. No. 18, at 3–4. The court granted plaintiffs leave to amend both 

claims. Id. at 9. The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the claim under California Civil Code 

§ 52.1. Id. at 5–9.

Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on September 4, 2014. Dkt. No. 19. 

After defendants produced the investigation report identifying the individual officers involved in 

the shooting, plaintiffs filed the SAC, which names only the officers involved in the shooting as 

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individual defendants, and no municipalities.

2 See Dkt. No. 34. The SAC alleges five claims: (1) a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment through the use of excessive 

force; (2) a Section 1983 claim based on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the “Right 

to Familial Relationship”; (3) a negligence claim; (4) a claim for violation of the Tom Bane Civil 

Rights Act, California Civil Code § 52.1; and (5) an assault and battery claim. SAC ¶¶ 30–46. 

Each claim is brought by D.V. against all defendants except for the Fourteenth Amendment 

Section 1983 claim, which is brought by all plaintiffs against all defendants. 

Defendants Jacob Thompson, Justin Mead, Travis Niesen, and Greg Hill, all officers with 

the City of Santa Clara police department, filed an answer on March 30, 2015. Dkt. No. 43. On 

July 24, 2015 defendants Cory Morgan and Tyler Fernandes moved to substitute the United States 

as the defendant for plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and fifth claims (all of plaintiffs’ non-Section 1983 

claims), and to dismiss those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed 

to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Dkt. No. 

56. Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss on August 7, 2015. Dkt. No. 58. Plaintiffs’ 

response states that plaintiffs have no objection to the substitution of the United States in place of 

defendants Morgan and Fernandes as to the third, fourth, and fifth claims. Id. at 2. However, 

plaintiffs attach a claim filed with the DEA on August 6, 2015, based on the incident at issue in 

this case, in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss based on 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Id. 

Defendants Morgan and Fernandes filed a reply on August 14, 2015. Dkt. No. 59.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants first move for an order substituting the United States as the defendant for 

plaintiffs’ three state law claims. Defendants Morgan and Fernandes have been deemed federal 

employees for the purposes of plaintiffs’ state law claims. See Dkt. No. 56 at Ex. A. Plaintiffs do 

not challenge the Attorney General’s certification, and do not object to the substitution of the 

 2 Plaintiffs filed stipulations to the dismissal of Sunnyvale and the County of Santa Clara. See Dkt. 

Nos. 32, 39. Plaintiffs dropped the City of Santa Clara as a defendant by not naming the city in the 

SAC.

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United States for defendants Morgan and Fernandes as to plaintiffs’ third, fourth, and fifth claims. 

Dkt. No. 58, at 2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), after individual defendants are “deemed” federal 

actors, the United States “shall be substituted as the party defendant” for the individual defendants. 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to substitute.

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiffs’ three state law claims against the United 

States—as the substituted party for defendants Morgan and Fernandes—for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

Dkt. No. 56, at 6–7. Plaintiffs responded to the motion to dismiss by filing an FTCA claim with 

the DEA. See Dkt. No. 58-1. As defendants note, plaintiffs’ brief does not explain the effect of 

plaintiffs’ administrative claim with the DEA on the motion to dismiss. In its reply, the United 

States contends that the FTCA filing does not defeat the motion to dismiss, and that plaintiffs’ 

state law claims against the United States must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Dkt. No. 59, at 2–3. The court agrees.

The FTCA prohibits actions for money damages against the United States based on the 

negligent or wrongful conduct of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment,

unless the claimant files a claim with the appropriate federal agency and the agency denies the 

claim or fails to render a final disposition of the claim within six months, at which time it is 

deemed denied at the option of the claimant. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA thus contains two 

separate exhaustion requirements that must be met before a plaintiff may bring an action in federal 

court based on the claim. First, the claimant must present an administrative tort claim to the 

appropriate federal agency. See Warren v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 724 F.2d 776, 777–78 

(9th Cir. 1984). Second, the agency must either deny the claim, or six months must pass without 

final disposition by the agency. Id. at 778 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)); see also McNeil v. United 

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). If a plaintiff’s claim is denied, the plaintiff then has six months 

from receiving notice of final denial of the claim to file an action in federal district court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2401(b).

The FTCA requires “complete exhaustion of [administrative] remedies before invocation 

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of the judicial process.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112. “[T]he administrative claim requirements of 

Section 2675(a) are jurisdictional in nature, and thus must be strictly adhered to. This is 

particularly so since the FTCA waives sovereign immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly 

construed in favor of the United States.” Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519, 521 (9th Cir. 

1992); see also Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011). “[A]n FTCA action 

filed before exhaustion ha[s] been completed [cannot] proceed in district court even where the 

litigation ha[s] not substantially progressed.” Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1047 (9th 

Cir. 2013). “Plaintiffs bear the initial burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the 

FTCA.” Young v. United States, 769 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Oberson v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

Here, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ state law claims against the 

United States because plaintiffs have not satisfied the second administrative exhaustion 

requirement under the FTCA. Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the court has jurisdiction

over the asserted state law claims. Young, 769 F.3d at 1052. Although plaintiffs have now filed a 

claim with the DEA, satisfying the first requirement under Section 2675(a), defendants report that 

no final decision has been made by the DEA, and plaintiffs do not present any evidence suggesting 

otherwise. Dkt. No. 59, at 3. Nor has six months passed since plaintiffs filed their claim. Plaintiffs 

filed their claim on August 6, 2015, the day before filing their opposition to the instant motion to 

dismiss, and as of the date of this order only twenty-nine days have elapsed since the claim was 

filed. Because plaintiffs have failed to fully exhaust their administrative remedies under the 

FTCA, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims against the 

United States. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss the third, fourth, 

and fifth claims against the United States.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to substitute the United 

States for defendants Morgan and Fernandes as to plaintiffs’ three state law claims, and GRANTS 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims against the United States based on 

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plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the FTCA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

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