Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03108/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03108-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J.O. CHISOM,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALLEN BRISCO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-03108-LAB-BGS

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; AND (2) DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO 

STATE A CLAIM

J.O. Chisom (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, 

has filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1). 

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 8).

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 

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Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the full 

entire fee in “increments,” see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), 

regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & 

(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the . . . six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the 

Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust 

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. Andrews, 

398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account activity which shows 

he has a current balance of $0.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay [an] initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available.”). 

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Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 8) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fee owed must be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA 

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by 

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, 

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, 

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are simply not 

“sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

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C. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was a witness to an altercation between two other inmates 

on November 1, 2015. (See Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff attempted to intervene to help one of 

the inmates. (Id.) Correctional officers “shot a 40mm projectile aiming at the assailant” 

but the “shot hit Plaintiff in the left leg thigh.” (Id.) Plaintiff was “escorted to MHSDS 

Building” where Defendant Brisco, a “Psyche Tech,” medically evaluated Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims Defendant Brisco told him that he would be examined by a nurse and 

treated for his wound. (Id.) Despite being told that he would be seen by a nurse the 

following day, “days began to pass” while Plaintiff’s wound “began to cause him extreme 

pain.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims he did receive treatment for the wound on November 6, 

2015. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff has a “visible round scar” on his left thigh that requires 

“cosmetic surgical procedures.” (Id. at 6.) 

Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 104 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “A determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two 

elements: (1) the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and (2) the nature of the 

defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 

1997) (en banc) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 

First, “[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access 

to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment 

violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), 

citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-104. “A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat 

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 914 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104). “The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important 

and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 

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significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 

substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for 

medical treatment.” Id., citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 

1990); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff alleges to have suffered a wound which the Court finds sufficient to plead 

an objectively serious medical need. McGuckin, 914 F.2d at 1059. However, even 

assuming Plaintiff’s medical needs are sufficiently serious, his Complaint still fails to 

include any further “factual content” to show that Defendant Brisco acted with 

“deliberate indifference” to his needs. Id. at 1060; see also Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Specifically, the only claims pertaining to Defendant Brisco are the allegations that 

Brisco told Plaintiff that he would be seen by a nurse the day after the incident and 

Plaintiff was not seen until five days after the incident. (See Compl. at 3-6.) There are 

no other allegations that Defendant Brisco had any other involvement in Plaintiff’s 

medical treatment. In addition, there are no allegations that Defendant Brisco was at all 

aware that Plaintiff was not seen by a nurse the following day.

While Plaintiff concludes Defendant acted with “deliberate indifference’ by failing 

to provide treatment in a quicker fashion, his Complaint lacks sufficient factual 

allegations which demonstrates any Defendant’s “purposeful act or failure to respond to 

[his] pain or possible medical need,” and any “harm caused by [this] indifference.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 

1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). This is because to be deliberately 

indifferent, Brisco’s acts or omissions must involve more than an ordinary lack of due 

care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. “A difference of opinion between a physician and 

the prisoner–or between medical professionals–concerning what medical care is 

appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987 (citing 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23. 

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Instead, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “show that the course of treatment the 

doctor[] chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the 

defendant[] chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” 

Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, contains no facts sufficient to show that Brisco

acted with deliberate indifference to his plight by “knowing of and disregarding an[y] 

excessive risk to his health and safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Delays in receiving treatment do not by themselves show deliberate indifference, unless 

the delay is alleged to be harmful. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada 

Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, Plaintiff’s own 

admission that he has a small scar that requires cosmetic surgery is not indicative of a 

harmful delay in treatment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state an Eighth 

Amendment inadequate medical care claim against Defendant Brisco, and that therefore, 

it is subject to sua sponte dismissal in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1).

D. Conspiracy claim’

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Brisco engaged in a “conspiracy” on the 

grounds that Defendant Brisco prepared a “fraudulent and fabricated” chrono. (Compl. at 

7.) However, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for conspiracy 

under section 1983, because it offers only “naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to show the existence of an agreement or a 

meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, or any actual deprivation of 

those constitutional rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. 

Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001)

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E. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, and he has now been provided 

with notice of his Complaint’s deficiencies, the Court will grant him leave to amend. See 

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012)).

III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 8).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

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& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

5. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

Dated: March 9, 2017

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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