Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00159/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00159-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD STEVEN THOMPSON,

Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

/

1:10-cv-00159-AWI-DLB (HC)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK

OF JURISDICTION

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner filed the instant petition on February 1, 2010. The Court has conducted a

preliminary review of the petition and finds it is without jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides in pertinent part:

If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the

petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a

petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. A petition for

habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable

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claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9 Cir. th

1971).

B. Failure to Name a Proper Respondent

A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state

officer having custody of him as the respondent to the petition. Rule 2 (a) of the Rules Governing

§ 2254 Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996); Stanley v. California

Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the person having custody of an

incarcerated petitioner is the warden of the prison in which the petitioner is incarcerated because

the warden has "day-to-day control over" the petitioner. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d

378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992); see, also, Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions is also appropriate.

Ortiz, 81 F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. Where a petitioner is on probation or parole, the

proper respondent is his probation or parole officer and the official in charge of the parole or

probation agency or state correctional agency. Id.

In this case, petitioner names the People of the State of California as Respondent.

Although Petitioner is currently in the custody of the State of California, the State cannot be

considered the person having day-to-day control over Petitioner.

Petitioner’s failure to name a proper respondent requires dismissal of his habeas petition

for lack of jurisdiction. Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360; Olson v. California Adult Auth., 423 F.2d 1326,

1326 (9th Cir. 1970); see, also, Billiteri v. United States Bd. Of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 948 (2nd

Cir. 1976). However, in this case, the Court will give petitioner the opportunity to cure his defect

by amending the petition to name a proper respondent. See, West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026,

1029 (5th Cir.1973), vacated in part on other grounds, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.1975) (en banc)

(allowing petitioner to amend petition to name proper respondent); Ashley v. State of

Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968) (same).

C. Failure to Exhaust State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

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The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair

th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal

constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d

1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated th

his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513

U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888.

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

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Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood,

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added).

In this case, Petitioner does not indicate what claims were presented to the California

Supreme Court for review. Accordingly, the Court cannot determine whether the instant petition

contains exhausted, unexhausted, or both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Therefore,

Petitioner must amend the petition and inform the Court of all claims presented for review to the

California Supreme Court.

ORDER

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Petitioner shall show

amend the petition to name a proper Respondent and show cause as to what claims

were presented to the state’s highest court; and

2. Failure to comply with this order may result in the action be dismissed for failure

to comply with a court order. Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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