Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01170/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIAS NASIRI,

Plaintiff,

v.

T.A.G. SECURITY PROTECTIVE 

SERVICES INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01170-NC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 119

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Elias Nasiri accuses Defendants of violating California and 

federal labor laws. Although defendant T.A.G. Security Protective Services Inc. 

(“T.A.G.”) initially appeared, its attorney has since withdrawn and, because T.A.G. cannot 

represent itself in court, its answer has been stricken. See Dkt. No. 74. Nasiri now moves 

for default judgment against T.A.G. See Dkt. No. 119. Nasiri’s motion, however, fails to 

adequately explain how it arrived at its damages calculation. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Nasiri’s motion for default judgment without prejudice.

I. Background

T.A.G. provides security services. See Dkt. No. 80 (“SAC”) ¶ 11. Between June 

2015 and December 2016, Nasiri worked for T.A.G. as a security guard. See id. ¶ 12, 19. 

During his employment, Nasiri frequently worked over eight hours per day and forty hours 

per week. Id. ¶ 13. T.A.G. failed to pay premium wages for that overtime. Id. ¶ 16. 

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Nasiri was required to work split shifts and was denied meal and rest breaks. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 

Over the same period, T.A.G. required Nasiri to use his personal cell phone for work 

purposes without reimbursement. Id. ¶ 18.

On February 22, 2018, Nasiri filed suit to recover lost wages and for statutory 

penalties under California labor laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 207. See Dkt. No. 1. After T.A.G. successfully moved to dismiss the complaint 

(see Dkt. Nos. 23, 36), Nasiri filed his first amended complaint on August 18, 2018. See

Dkt. No. 41. T.A.G. answered the first amended complaint on September 4, 2018. See

Dkt. No. 44.

On February 26, 2019, T.A.G.’s counsel sought to withdraw, noting that T.A.G. had 

failed to pay expenses or attorneys’ fees. See Dkt. No. 59 at 5. The Court granted the 

motion to withdraw on April 3, 2019. See Dkt. Nos. 64, 70. Nasiri subsequently moved to 

strike T.A.G.’s answer and filed a second amended complaint naming T.A.G.’s directors as 

additional defendants. See Dkt. Nos. 72, 74, 80.

Nasiri now moves for default judgment against T.A.G. See Dkt. No. 119. All 

parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. See Dkt. Nos. 8, 21, 28, 

108, 109.

II. Legal Standard

Default may be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend an 

action and against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

After entry of default, the Court has discretion to grant default judgment on the merits of 

the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In 

deciding whether to grant default judgment, the Court considers the following factors:

(1) the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim; (2) the sufficiency of the 

complaint; (3) the sum of money at stake in the action; (4) the possibility of 

prejudice to the plaintiff; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material 

facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong 

policy favoring decisions on the merits.

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Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). The factual allegations of the 

complaint, except those concerning damages, are deemed admitted by the non-responding 

parties. Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal. 

2001); see also Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[t]he 

general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except 

those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true”).

III. Discussion

“Courts have inherent equitable powers to dismiss actions or enter default 

judgments for failure to prosecute, contempt of court, or abusive litigation practices.” 

Televideo Systems, Inc v Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir 1987) (citing Roadway 

Express, Inc v Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)). “The general rule of law is that upon 

default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of 

damages, will be taken as true.” Id. at 917–18.

Factors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the 

entry of a default judgment include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the 

plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of 

the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility 

of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, Nasiri requests judgment of $935,256.91 in damages for his overtime claim, 

meal and rest breaks claim, Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) penalties, attorneys’

fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. Nasiri, however, has not adequately proven his 

damages request.

To support his motion, Nasiri provided paystubs demonstrating his hourly rate and 

the days which he worked. See Dkt. No. 119-1 (“Nakama Decl.”), Ex. B; Dkt. No. 119-2 

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(“Nasiri Decl.”). Nasiri also provided a chart purporting to show the amount of damages 

attributable to each claim. That chart, however, fails to explain how he arrived at each 

damages amount and the Court cannot discern how he arrived at each sum.

Further, a substantial bulk of Nasiri’s damages claim is for prejudgment interest in 

the amount of $265,668.56. See Nakama Decl., Ex. A at 3. That amount more than triples 

the damages claim, which totals only $72,709. See id. As Nasiri recognizes, the legal rate 

for prejudgment interest is “10 percent per annum.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3289(b). The Court 

cannot fathom how Nasiri arrived at his prejudgment interest calculation.

Next, Nasiri also seeks PAGA penalties for failure to provide accurate wage 

statements in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226.3 in the amount of $375,000 and for failure 

to reimburse reasonable business expenses in violation of § 2802 in the amount of 

$150,000. See Dkt. No. 119 at 11–12. Both requests are based on an assumption that 

T.A.G. employed an average of 25 employees. Id. In his second amended complaint, 

however, Nasiri did not allege that T.A.G. employed an average of 25 individuals. Cf. 

Televideo, 826 F.2d at 917–18 (“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual 

allegations of the complaint . . . will be taken as true.”) (emphasis added).

Finally, Nasiri seeks $56,805 in attorneys’ fees. However, Nasiri provided no 

information justifying the hourly rates for his attorneys or whether those rates are “in line 

with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 

973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)); see 

also Civil L.R. 37-4(b)(3) (requiring fee requests to “set forth an appropriate justification 

for any attorney-fee hourly rate claimed.”).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Nasiri’s motion for default judgment.

IV. Conclusion

The Court DENIES Nasiri’s motion for default judgment. This order is without 

prejudice to a renewed motion that addresses the deficiencies discussed in this order.

/ / /

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2020 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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