Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05139/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05139-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 2007 Decided November 23, 2007

No. 06-5139

HENRY W. SEGAR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

MICHAEL MUKASEY,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 77cv00081)

Laurie Weinstein, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellants. With her on the briefs were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and John Henault,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Rebecca J.K. Gelfond argued the cause for appellees. With

her on the brief were David S. Cohen and Steven F. Cherry.

Before: GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: In 1984, this circuit affirmed a

finding by the district court that the Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) had engaged in racially discriminatory

employment practices, in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. To remedy those violations, the parties

agreed on a set of stipulated procedures governing the

promotion of DEA special agents to positions in the agency’s

Senior Executive Service (SES). The text of the stipulation

requires each candidate for such a position to file an application,

provides that an SES selection panel will rate the candidates and

develop a list of those who are best qualified, and states that the

DEA Administrator “will make his selection . . . from the list of

candidates provided” or from current members of the SES.

In 2003, the Administrator promoted an agent who was not

then a member of the SES, and who had neither filed an

application nor been placed on the list of those best qualified for

the position. The plaintiffs then sought a temporary restraining

order barring the DEA from making promotions without

complying with the stipulated procedures and, in particular,

from promoting agents who were not on a best-qualified list.

Notwithstanding the text of the stipulation, the district court

found that a footnote to the document rendered it ambiguous.

The court further found that there was no meeting of the parties’

minds regarding the meaning of the footnote and that, as a

consequence, the stipulation was unenforceable. On that

premise, the district court entered an interim injunction,

effective “until such time as the parties are able to agree on a

binding consent decree or this dispute is otherwise resolved.”

The injunction bars the DEA from making any off-list

promotion without thirty days’ notice and approval by the court.

We conclude that the district court erred in its interpretation

of the stipulation agreed upon by the parties. The document is

not ambiguous, is not invalid, and means what the plaintiffs say

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3

it means: the Administrator of the DEA may not promote to an

SES position a non-SES agent who is not on the list of bestqualified candidates generated by the stipulated procedures. The

Administrator does, however, retain the discretion to decide

which candidate to select from that list (or, instead, to choose a

current SES employee as a lateral transfer). Because the district

court entered the interim injunction on the basis of an erroneous

premise, we direct the court to vacate the injunction and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

In January 1977, African-American DEA agents filed a

class action against the DEA under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The complaint alleged

that the agency had engaged in racially discriminatory practices

in six areas of employment. In 1981, following a bifurcated trial

on the issue of liability, the court found that the DEA had

discriminated against African-American special agents with

respect to salary, grade at entry, work assignments, supervisory

evaluations, discipline, and promotions. Segar v. Civiletti, 508

F. Supp. 690, 712-15 (D.D.C. 1981). The court ordered the

DEA to “cease such discrimination forthwith” and to

“immediately commence validity studies in order to implement

effective, non-discriminatory supervisory evaluation, discipline,

and promotion systems.” Id. at 715. It also ordered the parties

to address “what action is necessary to remedy the

discrimination in salary and grade at entry and further remedy

the discrimination in promotion.” Id.

Following its determination that the DEA had violated Title

VII, the district court addressed the question of specific relief.

Segar v. Smith, No. 77-0081, 1982 WL 214 (D.D.C. Feb. 17,

1982). Among other things, the court awarded backpay to class

members and established various “promotion goals and

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1

In 1988, Congress authorized the Attorney General to establish

by regulation a “personnel system for senior personnel” within the FBI

and DEA to be known as the “FBI-DEA Senior Executive Service.”

Act To Amend Title 5, United States Code, To Authorize the

Establishment of the FBI and DEA Senior Executive Service, Pub. L.

No. 100-325, § 1, 102 Stat. 579 (1988) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §

3151(a)). The Attorney General issued a rule “formally establishing

an FBI-DEA SES” in 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 31,314 (July 15, 1992)

(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.157).

timetables” for African-American agents. Id. at *4-8. The court

retained jurisdiction over the case until “such time as the Court

concludes that the rights of plaintiffs have been accorded and

satisfied by defendants.” Id. at *10. 

On appeal, this circuit affirmed the district court’s “liability

determination in its entirety.” Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,

1259 (D.C. Cir. 1984). With respect to the district court’s

remedial order, the circuit’s opinion affirmed the use of a classwide backpay remedy, but it vacated the district court’s specific

backpay formula as well as “the part of the . . . remedy that

mandates promotion goals and timetables.” Id. The case was

remanded to the district court “for further consideration of

appropriate remedies.” Id. “On remand,” this court said, “we

encourage the District Court to consider other remedial options

to ensure that black agents attain their rightful places at the

upper levels of DEA.” Id. at 1295.

Thereafter, the parties began negotiating a series of

stipulations to resolve the remedial issues remaining before the

district court. In March 2002, the parties submitted for the

court’s approval the stipulation that is the font of this appeal.

That stipulation implemented a promotion process for selecting

DEA criminal investigators for positions in the DEA’s Senior

Executive Service (SES).1

 The stipulation states:

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The parties submit this Stipulation for the Court to

order the implementation of a non-discriminatory

selection process for selecting [DEA] Criminal

Investigators for positions in the Senior Executive

Service. . . . The attached SES Special Agent Selection

Process developed by the DEA, once ordered by the

Court, will enact a system developed and constructed

to provide DEA with a valid, non-discriminatory

mechanism for selecting DEA special agent executives

and to provide agency selection officials with the

highest quality candidates from which to choose.

Stipulation Implementing a Promotion Process for Selecting

DEA Criminal Investigators for Positions in the Senior

Executive Service at 1, Segar v. Ashcroft, No. 77-0081 (D.D.C.

Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Stipulation]. 

The attachment referenced in the Stipulation, consisting of

an executive summary and seven single-spaced pages, describes

an application and selection process for SES special agent

positions. See Review of Applications from Staff for SES

Special Agent Positions, Segar v. Ashcroft, No. 77-0081 (D.D.C.

Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Stipulated Procedures]. The text of

the document establishes the following procedures: each

candidate for promotion to the SES must submit his or her

application to the candidate’s SES-level supervisor; the

supervisor must complete a recommendation and evaluation

form for the candidate; the application must be reviewed by an

“SES selection panel,” which will develop and submit a list of

“best qualified” candidates to the DEA’s Deputy Administrator;

the Deputy Administrator will review the list and may remove

candidates based on professional responsibility or disciplinary

considerations; and the DEA Administrator will then make his

or her selection from the list of candidates provided by the

Deputy Administrator, or by lateral transfer of a current SES

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2

Because Administrator Tandy later replaced Special Agent

Cooper with another agent selected in accordance with the Stipulated

Procedures, the request for rescission is no longer at issue. J.A. at

408.

member. Id. at 1-3. The title of the document includes a

footnote, which reads as follows:

These procedures are meant to systematize the process

of selecting individuals for Special Agent SES

positions. However, nothing in these procedures are

meant to reduce the authority of the Administrator in

selecting persons to fill DEA positions.

Id. at 1 n.1. 

The Stipulation was signed by counsel for the parties and

approved by the district court on March 12, 2002. Stipulation at

2. Thereafter, then-DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson made

a number of promotions to the SES, in each case selecting a

candidate who had applied and been rated and ranked pursuant

to the process described in the text of the Stipulated Procedures.

On August 28, 2003, however, Hutchinson’s successor,

Administrator Karen Tandy, promoted Special Agent Mary

Cooper to the SES. It is undisputed that Cooper was not then a

member of the SES and “had not submitted an application or

been rated and ranked and placed on the list sent to the

Administrator.” Segar v. Ashcroft, 422 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125

(D.D.C. 2006).

On March 12, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order to rescind Cooper’s promotion and

bar the DEA from promoting to the SES any special agent who

had not applied for promotion through the Stipulated

Procedures.2

 The plaintiffs argued that the parties intended

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those procedures to be the sole method of promotion to the SES.

The footnote, plaintiffs said, was intended only to make clear

that the Administrator retained the authority to select which

specific agent to promote from among those on the bestqualified list produced by the procedures (as opposed to a

requirement that the Administrator select the highest-ranked

applicant) or, instead, to select an agent who was already a

member of the SES as a lateral transfer. By contrast, the DEA

argued that the footnote reserved to the Administrator the

authority to select a non-SES agent -- like Special Agent Cooper

-- who had neither applied for the position nor been rated

pursuant to the Stipulated Procedures. 

After a hearing, the district court found that the meaning of

the footnote was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence of the

parties’ subjective intent was necessary to resolve the issues

presented by the plaintiffs’ motion. 422 F. Supp. 2d at 125. The

court then conducted a bench trial, at which the parties presented

evidence regarding their understanding of the footnote and the

circumstances surrounding the development and implementation

of the Stipulated Procedures. Id. at 126. On the basis of that

evidence, the court concluded “that there was no meeting of the

minds with respect to the footnote and whether the

Administrator could promote a Special Agent to the SES who

had not applied for such a promotion.” Id. at 157. Because

“[w]ithout a meeting of the minds, there is no enforceable

contract,” id. at 154, the court declared the Stipulated

Procedures “void,” id. at 155.

In the district court’s view, the consequence of this decision

was to put the parties “back in the position they were in before

the Stipulated Procedures were entered.” Id. at 157. This meant

that the “DEA must satisfy the Court that it has complied with

[the District] Court’s order of February 6, 1981, affirmed by the

Court of [A]ppeals . . . , to ‘implement effective, nonUSCA Case #06-5139 Document #1081831 Filed: 11/23/2007 Page 7 of 21
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discriminatory . . . promotion systems.’” Id. (quoting Segar, 508

F. Supp. at 715). “To that end,” the court ruled -- sua sponte --

as follows:

[U]ntil such time as the parties are able to agree on a

binding consent decree or this dispute is otherwise

resolved, the Court will require defendant DEA to

inform the Court and plaintiffs thirty days prior to any

SES promotion of its intent to promote to the SES

anyone who has not applied and been rated and ranked,

and placed on a list of qualified applicants provided to

the Administrator. Furthermore, in order to ensure

compliance with this Court’s . . . order, and the

mandate of the Circuit Court, DEA shall not make any

such promotion without prior approval from the Court.

Id. The court announced that it would hold a status conference

in two months to consider “craft[ing] a remedy to address

DEA’s past discrimination against black agents.” Id. at 120.

The DEA now challenges the district court’s order on two

grounds. It contends both that the court erred in finding the

Stipulated Procedures ambiguous and that the court abused its

discretion in issuing an interim injunction barring the DEA from

making an off-list promotion without thirty days’ notice and

prior court approval. We address the DEA’s contentions in

Parts II and III below. Although we agree with the agency that

the Stipulated Procedures are not ambiguous, we draw the

opposite conclusion about what they unambiguously require. In

our view, the Stipulated Procedures plainly compel the DEA to

follow those procedures in making promotions. Because the

interim injunction thus rests on a misapprehension regarding the

Stipulated Procedures’ validity, we direct the district court to

vacate the injunction. We therefore need not resolve the DEA’s

other challenge.

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3

In analyzing the Stipulated Procedures, the district court applied

District of Columbia contract law. 422 F. Supp. 2d at 150. We do so

as well because neither party has objected to application of D.C. law,

and because the principles of contract construction that we apply are

unexceptional and are urged in the briefs of both parties.

II

We begin with the dispute over the meaning of the

Stipulated Procedures.

A

As the district court held and the parties agree, “[a] consent

decree, such as the stipulation implementing DEA’s SES

promotion procedures, is essentially a contract.” 422 F. Supp.

2d at 126; see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935,

945 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch,

718 F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Appellant’s Br.

10; Appellees’ Br. 36. Accordingly, “construction of a consent

decree is essentially a matter of contract law.” Gorsuch, 718

F.2d at 1125; see United States v. Mahoney, 247 F.3d 279, 285

(D.C. Cir. 2001).3

As the district court also correctly held, to establish a

contract, “there must be a ‘meeting of the minds’ with respect to

the material terms.” 422 F. Supp. 2d at 126; see Ekedahl v.

COREStaff, Inc., 183 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Davis v.

Winfield, 664 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C. 1995). To determine whether

there was such a meeting, however, a court may not look to

extrinsic evidence of the parties’ subjective intent unless the

document itself is ambiguous. Christacos v. Blackie’s House of

Beef, Inc., 583 A.2d 191, 194 (D.C. 1990); see Republican Nat’l

Comm. v. Taylor, 299 F.3d 887, 891-92 (D.C. Cir. 2002);

Bennett Enters., Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 497

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(D.C. Cir. 1995). The “question whether a contract provision is

ambiguous is a question of law, which this court reviews de

novo.” Bennett, 45 F.3d at 497; see Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v.

Babbitt, 202 F.3d 349, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2000); LTV Corp. v. Gulf

States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 969 F.2d 1050, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

And if we determine that a contract is not ambiguous,

interpretation of its plain language is also a question of law

subject to our de novo review. LTV, 969 F.2d at 1055; see

Republican Nat’l Comm., 299 F.3d at 892.

“Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for

enforcement purposes basically as a contract, reliance upon

certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other

contract.” United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223,

238 (1975). One such aid is particularly important here: it is a

“cardinal principle of contract construction[] that a document

should be read to give effect to all its provisions and to render

them consistent with each other.” Mastrobuono v. Shearson

Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995). Hence, in

ascertaining the meaning of the Stipulated Procedures, we may

not read the text or footnote in isolation but must consider each

in the context of the other. See Fort Sumter Tours, 202 F.3d at

358; BWX Elecs., Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 929 F.2d 707, 711

(D.C. Cir. 1991); accord Appellant’s Br. 23 (“Ultimately, the

Court must read ‘the contract as a whole, interpreting all parts

of the contract together,’” and “must ‘give[] all provisions a

reasonable, lawful, and/or effective meaning.’” (quoting Kass v.

William Norwitz Co., 509 F. Supp. 618, 624 (D.D.C. 1980))). 

 Finally, we note that a contract provision “is not ambiguous

merely because the parties later disagree on its meaning.”

Bennett, 45 F.3d at 497. It is ambiguous only “if it is reasonably

susceptible of different constructions.” Id. We therefore

proceed to consider the reasonableness of each party’s

construction of the Stipulated Procedures.

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B

According to the plaintiffs, the text of the Stipulated

Procedures establishes a process that DEA agents must follow

in applying for an SES position, and that both the applicants’

superiors and the final decisionmaker (the Administrator) must

follow in selecting agents for such a position. The culmination

of that process is the generation of a list of the agents who are

best qualified for the position and the selection by the

Administrator of an applicant from that list. In the plaintiffs’

view, the role of the footnote is to make clear that the

Administrator retains discretion to decide which candidate to

select from that list (or, instead, to choose a current SES

employee as a lateral transfer). The Administrator is not

constrained, for example, by a requirement to select the highestranked applicant on the list.

The text of the document is completely in accord with the

plaintiffs’ position that, with the exception of lateral transfers,

only those candidates who have risen through the levels of

review in the Stipulated Procedures are eligible for promotion.

The text states that a candidate “must apply for the SES Merit

Promotion Process to be considered for an SES Special Agent

position,” and it specifies the content of that application.

Stipulated Procedures at 2. Next, the “candidate’s SES manager

must complete a recommendation for promotion to the SES.”

Id. The “SES selection panel will [then] rate and rank

candidates.” Id. at 2-3. In doing so, the panel “will measure

leadership qualifications against established criteria” set out in

the Stipulated Procedures. Id. at 3. Thereafter, the “Panel will

develop a best qualified list of candidates based on its evaluation

of candidate qualifications.” Id. The Deputy Administrator may

then remove a candidate’s name for professional responsibility

or discipline considerations. Id. Finally, “[t]he Administrator

will make his selection or non-selection from the list of

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candidates provided by the Deputy Administrator.” Id.

(emphasis added). The only textual exception to the

requirement that the Administrator choose from the list is that

“vacant SES positions also may be filled by lateral transfers of

current SES employees.” Id. at 1.

The footnote to the text is also reasonably read as the

plaintiffs suggest. The footnote’s first sentence is plainly

consistent with the plaintiffs’ view: “These procedures are

meant to systematize the process of selecting individuals for

Special Agent SES positions.” Id. at 1 n.1. The only dispute

involves the second sentence, which states: “However, nothing

in these procedures are meant to reduce the authority of the

Administrator in selecting persons to fill DEA positions.” Id.

But it is not inconsistent with that language to read “the

authority of the Administrator” there referenced as the

Administrator’s authority to select from among those on the

best-qualified list -- an authority that is not “reduce[d]” by the

plaintiffs’ reading. Moreover, such a reading makes sense

within the context of the document as a whole, the text of which

states: “DEA’s policy is to fill each SES position by selecting

among those candidates who are judged to be the best qualified

for the job.” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Stipulation

that the parties submitted to the district court expressly advises

that “[t]he attached SES Special Agent Selection Process” --

consisting of both the text and the footnote to which it is

appended -- “will enact a system developed . . . to provide

agency selection officials with the highest quality candidates

from which to choose.” Stipulation at 1 (emphasis added). 

The DEA does not dispute the plaintiffs’ interpretation of

the text of the Stipulated Procedures, conceding that it

establishes a process that the agency must follow. But while the

DEA concedes that the agency must follow that process, it

simultaneously contends that the process does not bind the

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4

At one point in the oral argument, the DEA suggested that it

interprets the footnote’s reservation of authority for off-list promotions

as limited to “rare” cases. Oral Arg. Recording at 18:24-18:28. But

as plaintiffs’ counsel aptly responded, the text of the footnote does not

impose any such limitation on the “authority” to which it refers. Nor

did the DEA advance this interpretation in its briefs.

5

See also Stipulated Procedures at 2 (stating that “[o]nly those

employees who meet the above minimum qualifications . . . will be

considered,” and listing those qualifications as including the

requirements that “[c]andidates must apply during open application

periods” and that “[t]he candidate’s SES manager must complete a

recommendation for promotion” (emphasis added)).

Administrator’s decision in any way. Oral Arg. Recording at

13:52-14:00. Specifically, the DEA argues that the footnote

reserves to the Administrator the authority to select a candidate

who never submitted an application (and is not a current SES

employee), whose application was never reviewed and rated by

the candidate’s superior or the SES selection panel, and whom

the panel never put on the list of best-qualified candidates.4

 This

is not a reasonable reading of the contract as a whole.

The DEA essentially construes the footnote as saying

“never mind” to the seven single-spaced pages that establish a

process for evaluating and selecting SES candidates. In the

agency’s construction, notwithstanding the text’s declaration

that “[e]ach interested employee must apply for the SES Merit

Promotion Process to be considered for an SES Special Agent

position,” Stipulated Procedures at 2 (emphases added),5

 a

candidate may still be considered even if he or she does not

submit the required application. Similarly trumped are the text’s

express requirements that the candidate’s supervisor “must”

complete a promotion recommendation and that the SES

selection panel “will” rate and rank candidates and develop a

best-qualified list. Id. at 2-3. Most important, the DEA’s

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6

The DEA argues that its reading is supported by the fact that the

footnote is to the document’s title, which the agency asserts is an

indication that the footnote modifies the entire agreement. This

argument does nothing, however, to mitigate the fact that the DEA’s

reading deprives the document’s text of meaning. Moreover, the

footnote’s placement is perfectly consistent with the plaintiffs’

interpretation: it indicates that, although the procedures that follow in

the text are intended to generate the list of candidates for promotion,

they do not limit the Administrator’s discretion in selecting which of

the listed candidates to promote.

interpretation effectively deletes from the document the textual

promise that the Administrator “will” make his or her selection

from that list. Id. at 3.

This “reading of the two [provisions] violates [the] cardinal

principle of contract construction” noted above: “that a

document should be read to give effect to all its provisions and

to render them consistent with each other.” Mastrobuono, 514

U.S. at 63. That principle bars us from attributing to the

footnote a meaning that would require “us to read the [seven

pages of text] out of the contract.” Fort Sumter Tours, 202 F.3d

at 358; see BWX, 929 F.2d at 711 (holding that the plaintiff’s

interpretation of a contractual provision failed because it

“completely ignore[d]” and was “flatly inconsistent with the rest

of” the document). Yet that is what the DEA asks us to do.6

 

The government’s reading is also inconsistent with the

stipulated purpose of the consent decree. Cf. Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 202(1) & cmt. c (1981) (stating that

contractual language is interpreted in light of, inter alia, the

principal purpose of the contract). The footnote itself states that

“[t]hese procedures are meant to systemize the process of

selecting individuals for Special Agent SES positions.”

Stipulated Procedures at 1 n.1. The text states that “[t]he

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essence of this approach is to evaluate a person’s achievements

in accordance with a standard set of criteria.” Id. at i (executive

summary). And the Stipulation to which the procedures are

attached advises the court that they “will enact a system

developed and constructed to provide DEA with a valid, nondiscriminatory mechanism for selecting DEA special agent

executives.” Stipulation at 1. In short, as government counsel

stated at oral argument, the purpose of the Stipulated Procedures

is “to provide transparency to the process” of promotion to the

SES, in order to foster confidence that such promotions are

made on the basis of merit rather than race. Oral Arg.

Recording at 16:01-16:04.

But a reading that permits the Administrator to ignore the

written process and choose whomever the Administrator wishes

does not “systematize the process” of selection. A reading

under which a candidate need never formally apply, and need

never have his or her qualifications reviewed by the selection

panel, does not establish a transparent process by which a

person’s achievements are “evaluate[d] . . . in accordance with

a standard set of criteria.” Nor does such a reading implement

a “non-discriminatory mechanism” -- or any mechanism at all --

for selecting DEA special agent executives. 

The DEA contends that any ambiguity in the footnote

should be construed against the plaintiffs because they were

“consciously ignorant” of its meaning -- that is, they were aware

that the footnote might be susceptible of more than one meaning

yet chose not to seek clarification from the DEA. As plaintiffs’

counsel correctly noted at oral argument, in this case that

contention is in direct conflict with the rule that any ambiguity

in a contractual provision must be construed against the drafter.

See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62; Hunter-Boykin v. George

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7

It is undisputed that the DEA drafted both the text and the

footnote of the Stipulated Procedures. See Stipulation at 1 (“The

attached SES Special Agent Selection process [was] developed by the

DEA . . . .”); Segar, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 127 n.4 (“DEA does not

dispute that it alone drafted the language in the footnote, although,

inexplicably, DEA cannot identify the person at DEA who actually

supplied the language in the footnote.”).

8

In light of our resolution of this point, we need not consider

whether the kind of “mistake” arguably at issue here -- a mistake

regarding an opposing party’s understanding of a contractual

provision, rather than a mistake regarding facts external to the contract

-- would come within the defense.

Washington Univ., 132 F.3d 77, 82 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1998).7

Moreover, it misperceives the role of the doctrine of “conscious

ignorance.” That doctrine is not a rule for resolving contractual

ambiguity. Rather, it provides a potential response to the

defense of mistake, a defense that under some circumstances

permits a party to avoid a valid contract -- unless the mistake at

issue was the consequence of conscious ignorance. See Harbor

Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 45 F.3d 499, 501-02 (D.C. Cir. 1995);

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(b) & cmt. c. If we

were to construe the Stipulated Procedures as having the

meaning the DEA proffers, and if the plaintiffs thereafter

attempted to interpose the defense of mistake, the DEA might

then argue that the plaintiffs’ alleged conscious ignorance

vitiated that defense. But since we have construed the contract

in the plaintiffs’ favor, they have no reason to interpose the

defense of mistake, and thus the doctrine of conscious ignorance

is irrelevant.8

Moreover, applying the DEA’s version of “conscious

ignorance” here would come close to assuming that the

government had negotiated in bad faith. Cf. Fort Sumter Tours,

202 F.3d at 358 & n.9 (noting the government’s duty of good

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faith and fair dealing in contract matters). To do so, we would

have to accept that the agency drafted a specific set of

procedures creating transparency in the promotion process, and

then inserted a vague footnote to vitiate those procedures. We

will not lightly assume that the government intentionally

negotiated with its employees in bad faith.

In sum, the plaintiffs’ construction of the Stipulated

Procedures “harmonize[s]” the text and the footnote,

Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63, gives effect to both, and is faithful

to the document’s stipulated purpose. By contrast, the DEA’s

construction is not one of which the document is “reasonably

susceptible.” Bennett, 45 F.3d at 497. Accordingly, there is no

residual ambiguity and no warrant to consider extrinsic evidence

of the parties’ subjective intent. See id. We therefore find --

contrary to the district court -- that the document evidences a

meeting of the parties’ minds and hence is a valid contract. The

plain meaning of that contract is that both candidates and the

DEA must follow the stipulated application and rating

procedures, and that the Administrator must then make his or

her final choice from among those candidates who have

advanced to the best-qualified list (or who are already members

of the SES). The Administrator retains, however, the discretion

to choose which candidate to promote from that list.

III

As discussed in Part I, the district court entered an interim

injunction that ordered the DEA not to “promote any special

agent to the SES who has not applied, been rated and ranked,

and placed on a list of qualified applicants provided to the

Administrator, without 30 days’ prior notice to this Court and

without prior approval of this Court.” 422 F. Supp. 2d at 157.

The order directed that the injunction remain in effect “until

USCA Case #06-5139 Document #1081831 Filed: 11/23/2007 Page 17 of 21
18

such time as the parties are able to agree on a binding consent

decree or this dispute is otherwise resolved.” Id. 

The court thought the injunction necessary in light of its

conclusion that, because “there was no meeting of the minds”

with respect to the meaning of the Stipulated Procedures, there

was no enforceable contract and hence no “binding, enforceable

consent decree.” Id. “As a result,” the court said, “the parties

are back in the position they were in before the Stipulated

Procedures were entered, and DEA must satisfy the Court that

it has complied with this Court’s order . . . , affirmed by the

Court of [A]ppeals in [Segar, 738 F.2d 1249], to ‘implement

effective, non-discriminatory . . . promotion systems.’” Id.

(quoting Segar, 508 F. Supp. at 715). “To that end,” the court

entered the injunction “to ensure compliance” with its previous

order. Id.

The DEA seeks vacation of the injunction for two reasons:

(1) the injunction rests on the erroneous premise that the

Stipulated Procedures are ambiguous, did not constitute a

meeting of the minds, and are therefore void; and (2) even if the

Stipulated Procedures are void, entry of the injunction was an

abuse of discretion. As noted in Part II, we agree with the DEA

that the Stipulated Procedures constitute an unambiguous and

enforceable contract between the parties, albeit one with the

meaning proffered by the plaintiffs. That being so, the court’s

injunction does indeed rest on an erroneous legal premise and

must be vacated. See National Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 835

F.2d 305, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“We should overturn the district

court’s decision [to grant or deny a preliminary injunction]

‘when it rests its analysis on an erroneous premise . . . .’”

(quoting White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Watt, 717

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9

Because we do no more than grant the relief (vacatur of the

interim injunction) sought by the DEA -- although on different

grounds -- a cross-appeal by the plaintiffs was not required. Further

relief for the plaintiffs, including reinstatement of the Stipulated

Procedures, must await the proceedings on remand, over which the

district court has continuing jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

(providing that generally, “any order . . . which adjudicates fewer than

all the claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims

. . . , and the order . . . is subject to revision at any time before the

entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims”); Segar, 1982 WL 214,

at *10 (retaining jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ lawsuit until “such

time as the Court concludes that the rights of plaintiffs have been

accorded and satisfied by defendants”). There is certainly no

unfairness to the DEA in our considering the proper construction of

the Stipulated Procedures: the agency’s own briefs squarely raise the

issue, and we cannot resolve it without stating the construction that we

believe to be correct -- even if that is not the construction the DEA

would have preferred. Indeed, government counsel agreed that,

because appellate review of a contract’s plain meaning is de novo, the

court may address whether the plaintiffs’ construction is plain. Oral

Arg. Recording at 5:07-5:13. 

F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1983))); Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974,

988 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same).9

Because the interim injunction must be vacated in any

event, we need not consider whether issuing it might also have

constituted an abuse of discretion on the procedural and

substantive grounds urged by the DEA. We do, however, reject

the DEA’s suggestion that the injunction -- or the Stipulated

Procedures, for that matter -- is invalid because limiting the

Administrator’s hiring discretion “in any way” is inconsistent

with 5 U.S.C. § 3151. Appellant’s Br. 12. That provision, the

DEA insists, “essentially gives the Agency unfettered

discretion” to “promote anyone to the SES.” Id. 12-13. 

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Section 3151(b) states that, “[e]xcept as provided in

subsection (a), the Attorney General may . . . appoint, promote,

and assign individuals to positions established within the FBIDEA Senior Executive Service without regard to the provisions

of this title governing appointments and other personnel actions

in the competitive service.” 5 U.S.C. § 3151(b)(2). But that

provision does not grant the Attorney General (or his designee,

the Administrator) “unfettered discretion” over promotions.

Section 3151(b) is expressly subject to section 3151(a), which

requires that the FBI-DEA SES regulations “meet the

requirements set forth in section 3131.” Id. § 3151(a). Section

3131, in turn, directs that the SES “shall be administered so as

to . . . ensure compliance with all applicable civil service laws[,]

. . . including those related to equal employment opportunity.”

Id. § 3131(11). Moreover, just as “[w]e cannot find any

indication in the Civil Service Reform Act that Congress

intended to insulate the SES from Title VII remedies in the

event of discrimination,” including remedies that restrict

management flexibility, Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 158

(D.C. Cir. 1989), we cannot find any such indication in section

3151(b). At most, section 3151(b) authorizes the Attorney

General to act “without regard to [certain] provisions of this

title” of the U.S. Code -- namely, Title 5. Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act, however, resides in Title 42 of the Code.

Finally, we take note of the DEA’s contention that it has

ended racial discrimination in its employment practices and that

the district court’s jurisdiction over the selection of the agency’s

SES positions should therefore be terminated. There is, of

course, considerable case law discussing the conditions under

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10See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992); Rufo v.

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384, 391 (1992);

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2002); NLRB v.

Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d 32, 34-36 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir.

1995); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 

which a district court may dissolve or modify a consent decree.10

But the place to litigate that issue first is in the district court.

In fact, the DEA did raise the issue in the district court. On

January 4, 2005, just prior to the conclusion of the trial

regarding the meaning of the Stipulated Procedures, the DEA

filed a motion to terminate the court’s jurisdiction. See Motion

To Terminate Jurisdiction Relating to SES Selections, Segar v.

Ashcroft, No. 77-0081 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2005). The motion

contended that “[i]t has been nearly 22 years since the Court

entered the original remedial Orders in this case” and that the

circumstances justifying the Stipulation no longer exist. Id. at

1. Although the district court ruled that it would be

“inconsistent with the fair administration of justice to embark on

discovery and briefing” on “the eve of the conclusion of a

lengthy trial,” the court “informed the parties that it would turn

to the defendants’ motion once the plaintiffs’ motion was

resolved.” 422 F. Supp. 2d at 120 n.1. On remand, the court

should turn to the DEA’s motion as soon as possible.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we direct the district court to

vacate the interim injunction, and we remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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