Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00008/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN RAY RITCHIE,

Petitioner,

v.

RAFAEL ZUNIGA, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:15-cv-0008 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a federal prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Both parties consented to 

proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Petitioner filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his request for one 

year sentence credit for completion of the Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) was 

denied by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and his rights 

to due process and equal protection. Respondent filed a response to the petition, claiming the 

court does not have jurisdiction to consider the petition because it is now moot. Petitioner did not 

file a reply.1 As set forth below, the petition is dismissed as moot. 

 

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 Petitioner’s copy of the October 28, 2015 order was returned as undeliverable. As stated in that 

order, it appeared that petitioner is now located at Long Beach RRM (ECF No. 24 at 3), although 

petitioner has not filed a notice of change of address. Respondent served their response on 

petitioner at Long Beach RRM. (ECF No. 25 at 8.) The BOP inmate locator reflects that 

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II. Petition

Petitioner claims he has been denied a one-year credit to his sentence based on new rules 

promulgated in February 2009 stating that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) cases were violent and anyone 

sentenced for a gun charge after that date would not get the year off for participating in RDAP. 

Petitioner contends that he is “grandfathered in,” and entitled to the one year off of his sentence, 

because he showed an intent to be in the RDAP program in 2008, citing Arrington v. Daniels, 516 

F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007), and Crickon v. Thomas, 579 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner 

states his application was denied under the new rules, but he “showed [he] applied before that 

date and some staff . . . stated [he] should be given the consideration of Arrington, but Grand 

Prarie did not.” (ECF No 1 at 6.) Petitioner states he has been in the RDAP “3 months now, 

completing it successfully.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.)

III. Background

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Montana for 

possession of a firearm by a felon. In 2008, he was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment. The 

computation of his federal sentence began on July 23, 2008. (ECF No. 23-1 at 4.) 

The BOP is directed to make appropriate substance abuse programs available to prisoners 

determined to have a treatable condition of substance abuse. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The 

Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) is one such drug treatment program. See 28 C.F.R. 

§ 550, et seq. As an incentive for participation, Congress provided that a prisoner who 

successfully completes RDAP may be eligible for a sentence reduction of up to one year. 18 

U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).

On September 22, 2014, petitioner was placed in the RDAP. On June 30, 2015, during the 

pendency of this action, petitioner completed the residential portion of the RDAP. (ECF No. 21 

at 12.) 

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petitioner was released from the Long Beach RRM on February 2, 2016. Thus, the court does not 

direct the Clerk of the Court to serve this order on petitioner at Long Beach RRM.

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On July 30, 2015, petitioner filed a clarification contending that had the correct paperwork

been done, he would have been released on July 3, 2015, and now seeks money damages for the 

delay. (ECF No. 22 at 1.) 

On October 28, 2015, petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies was 

excused. (ECF No. 24.) However, during the pendency of this action, petitioner submitted a 

request for RDAP sentence credit to the BOP, and the RDAP sentence credit was applied on or 

about September 24, 2015. (ECF Nos. 25 at 5; 26 at 2.)

Respondent states that petitioner’s current projected release date is January 1, 2017, via 

good conduct time. (ECF No. 23-1 at 2.) It appears that petitioner was released on February 2, 

2016. 

IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit has held that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 

habeas challenges seeking “to review the BOP’s individualized RDAP determinations pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3612.” Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011). In Reeb, a federal 

prisoner brought a habeas petition claiming that he was wrongfully expelled from his prison’s 

RDAP on the grounds of exhibiting disruptive behavior in group counseling sessions. Reeb, 636 

F.3d at 1225. He sought a court order readmitting him to the program and granting him 

sentencing credit. Id. at 1226. The Ninth Circuit determined that judicial review of 

individualized RDAP determinations under the Administrative Procedures Act was precluded 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3625, and that federal habeas courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to 

review such claims. Id. at 1226-27.

In addition, federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide cases that are moot because the 

courts’ constitutional authority extends to only actual cases or controversies. Iron Arrow Honor 

Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70-71 (1983). Article III requires a case or controversy in which 

a litigant has a personal stake in the outcome of the suit throughout all stages of federal judicial 

proceedings and has suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision. Id. A petition for writ of habeas corpus becomes moot when it no longer presents a 

case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 

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479 (9th Cir. 2003). A petition for writ of habeas corpus is moot where a petitioner’s claim for 

relief cannot be redressed by a favorable decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus. 

Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 

1, 7 (1998)). A moot petition must be dismissed because nothing remains before the court to be 

remedied. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998). 

Although petitioner initially sought to have sentence credit applied, it appears that 

petitioner now seeks damages due to their delay in doing so. However, petitioner did not include 

a request for damages in his initial petition, and is not permitted to seek damages in a habeas 

action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Because petitioner has now been 

granted credit for his participation in RDAP, this court lacks jurisdiction to provide any further 

relief, and the petition is denied as moot. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is dismissed as moot.

Dated: March 23, 2016

/ritc0008.dm.2241

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