Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-02460/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-02460-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT L CAZET, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

TOPPA EPPS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 10-02460 JSW

ORDER DENYING

APPLICATION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER

Now before the Court is the ex parte application for a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”) filed by Plaintiffs Robert L. Cazet, Alumni Athletics USA, LLC and Alumni Athletics,

USA Inc. (“Plaintiffs”). The Court finds that this matter is appropriate for disposition without

oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Accordingly, the

hearing set for June 11, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. is HEREBY VACATED. Having carefully reviewed

the parties’ papers and considering their arguments and the relevant authority, and good cause

appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs’ TRO.

 In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, as with a preliminary injunction,

Plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in

[their] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (citations omitted). The Winter court also noted

that because injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy” it “may only be awarded upon a

clear 

Case 3:10-cv-02460-JSW Document 22 Filed 06/11/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiffs also bring a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets in their complaint,

but do not address this claim in their TRO application.

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showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 375-76 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong,

520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). Thus “[i]n each case, courts ‘must balance the

competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or

withholding of the requested relief.’ Id. at 376 (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480

U.S. 531, 542 (1987)). “‘In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay

particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of

injunction.’” Id. at 376-77 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).

Plaintiffs bring claims against Defendants Toppa Epps, Cameron Ripley, and Edward

Hayman (“Defendants”) under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, for false and misleading

advertising and cyberpiracy and claims under California law for trade name infringement, false

and misleading advertising, and unfair competition.1

 Based on Defendants’ alleged wrongful

use of Plaintiffs’ mark “Alumni Athletics USA,” Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from

using the name Alumni Athletics USA or any confusingly similar names as either a trade name

or as a domain name, including but not limited to “Alumni Athletics,” “Alumni Athletics

Association,” “Alumni Football” and “Alumni Football USA” in whole or part and from using

any videos and pictures on their website and/or promotional materials, which depict games

which were organized or sponsored by any of the Plaintiffs or having hyperlinks to any such

videos or pictures. However, to prevent Defendants from using this mark, Plaintiffs must first

demonstrate that they hold a protectable mark. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778

F.2d 1352, 1353-54 (9th Cir.1985); see also Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., – F.Supp.2d. –, 2010 WL

1473976, 12 (W.D. Wash. April 9, 2010) (“To prevail on its claims of false designation of

origin, common law trademark infringement, and unfair competition (collectively,

“infringement claims”), [Plaintiff] must show that it holds a protectable mark....”); CG Roxane

LLC v. Fiji Water Co. LLC, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“State and federal

trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution claims follow essentially the same test.

... Simply put, plaintiff must prove that it has a valid mark....). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 When faced with a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court “is not required to

make any binding findings of fact; it need only find probabilities that the necessary facts can

be proved.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir.

1984). The standards for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction are

substantially the same. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d

832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, the facts recited herein are not to be considered

final and binding on the rest of the proceedings. 

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Based on the evidence currently before it, the Court cannot find, at this procedural stage,

that Plaintiffs have obtained a protectable mark.2

 To be protected, a mark must be capable of

distinguishing one’s goods from the goods of others; in other words, the mark must be

distinctive. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047

(9th Cir. 1998). Marks are classified in one of five categories of increasing distinctiveness: (1)

generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful. Id. Descriptive marks

define qualities or characteristics of a product in a straightforward way that requires no exercise

of the imagination to be understood. See id. at 1047 n.8. Personal names are descriptive marks,

entitled to protection so long as it acquires a recognized secondary meaning. E. & J. Gallo

Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992); E. & J. Gallo Winery v.

Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 462 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Descriptive marks are not

inherently distinctive and so do not initially satisfy the distinctiveness element. However,

descriptive marks can acquire distinctiveness if the public comes to associate the mark with a

specific source. Kendall-Jackson, 150 F.3d at 1048. Acquired distinctiveness is referred to as

secondary meaning which has been defined as “association, nothing more.” Blue Bell, Inc., 778

F.2d at 1354. The basic element of secondary meaning is the “mental association by a

substantial segment of consumers and potential consumers between the alleged mark and a

single source of the product.” Id. (citations omitted).

Factors considered in determining whether a secondary meaning has been achieved

include: (1) whether actual purchasers of the product bearing the claimed trademark associate

the trademark with the producer, (2) the degree and manner of advertising under the claimed

trademark, (3) the length and manner of use of the claimed trademark, and (4) whether use of

the claimed trademark has been exclusive. Blue Bell, 778 F.2d at 1358. Although Plaintiffs do

not attempt characterize their alleged mark, the Court finds that the term “Alumni Athletics” is

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descriptive. Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that actual

purchasers of their product associate the mark with them. Nor have Plaintiffs demonstrated

sufficient advertising efforts to establish secondary meaning. In examining whether a plaintiff's

advertising efforts are sufficient, the Court must “look at the advertising’s amount, nature and

geographical scope with an eye towards how likely the advertising is to expose a large number

of the relevant consuming public to the use of the symbol as a trademark or trade name.” Japan

Telecom v. Japan Telecom America, 287 F.3d 866, 875 (9th Cir. 2002). “A large expenditure of

money does not in itself create legally protectable rights. The test of secondary meaning is the

effectiveness of the effort to create it.” First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378,

1383 (9th Cir. 1987). Other than the website that Defendants created and a single yellow pages

advertisement dated after Defendants claim they had equal use to use the name “Alumni

Athletics,” Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence to show what advertising efforts they

engaged in to establish secondary meaning, particularly before Defendants started to use the

name. Finally, although there is evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff Cazet has been using

names such as Alumni Football, Alumni Althetic Association, and perhaps, occasionally,

Alumni Althetics, over the past twenty years, the Court cannot find, based on the record before

it, that Plaintiffs have used the name Alumni Althetics consistently and broadly for a significant

period of time. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate the

existence of secondary meaning and, thus, that they have a protectable mark.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a clear showing that

they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and DENIES their TRO.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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