Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_16-cv-00761/USCOURTS-almd-1_16-cv-00761-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES AMAR WOODS, ) 

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CASE NO. 1:16-CV-761-MHT 

)

MARK JOHNSON, )

 )

 Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

James Amar Woods (“Woods”), a pre-trial detainee, initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

action on September 15, 2016. In the instant complaint, Woods seeks relief from a criminal 

charge of first degree domestic violence pending against him before the Circuit Court of 

Houston County, Alabama. Specifically, Woods complains that Mark Johnson, the District 

Attorney for Houston County, previously represented him in a criminal case and argues 

that prosecution of the pending domestic violence charge by Johnson or the Houston 

County District Attorney’s Office is therefore violative of his constitutional rights. Woods 

seeks injunctive relief enjoining Johnson and all of his agents or employees from 

prosecuting the pending domestic violence case and likewise requests issuance of a 

declaratory judgment holding that prosecution of the plaintiff on this charge will constitute 

a violation his constitutional rights. Doc. No. 1 at 3. Woods also requests taxation of costs 

against the defendant and any other relief to which he is entitled. Id.

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Upon thorough review of the complaint, the court concludes that this case is due to 

be summarily dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii)1 and the Younger2 abstention doctrine.

II. DISCUSSION

A. District Attorney Mark Johnson

Woods names District Attorney Mark Johnson as the sole defendant in this cause of 

action. The claims presented by Woods arise from the fact that Johnson “once was defense 

counsel for the plaintiff” and Woods’ belief that the initiation and prosecution of his current 

domestic violence charge by Johnson and/or his office is violative of the Constitution. Doc. 

No. 1 at 2. 

The law is well-settled that “a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all 

actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate for the government.” 

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 

(11th Cir. 1999) (“A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from 

the prosecutor’s function as advocate.”); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 

(2009) (In a § 1983 action, “the immunity that the law grants prosecutors [for actions 

intimately associated with the initiation or prosecution of a criminal case] is ‘absolute.’”); 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (“[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity 

 

1

The court granted Woods leave to proceed in forma pauperis on September 23, 2016 (Doc. No. 5). A prisoner granted 

in forma pauperis status will have his complaint screened under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This 

screening procedure requires the court to dismiss the complaint prior to service of process if it determines that the 

claims raised therein are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 

damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 2

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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from § 1983 suits for damages when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.”); 

Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A prosecutor is entitled 

to absolute immunity for all actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate 

for the government.”). The absolute immunity afforded prosecutors protects against 

“impair[ing] the performance of a central actor in the judicial process.” Malley v. Briggs, 

475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986). Absolute immunity from § 1983 liability is afforded to all 

conduct of a prosecutor that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 

process,” which includes “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” 

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-431). 

The claims made by Woods relate solely to actions undertaken by District Attorney 

Johnson while he engaged in activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 

criminal process, i.e., initiating the prosecution of a criminal charge and representing the 

State before the court in pre-trial matters, conduct for which Johnson is entitled to absolute 

immunity. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Burns, 500 U.S. at 493. Thus, Woods’ claims against 

District Attorney Johnson are due to be dismissed pursuant to the directives of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).

B. Pending Criminal Charge

Woods seeks declaratory and injunctive relief which would impact his pending 

prosecution on a state criminal charge for first degree domestic violence. Specifically, 

Woods requests that this court intervene and enjoin the State from prosecuting him on this 

charge. With respect to Woods’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief, relief which 

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would require intervention by this court into criminal proceedings ongoing before the 

Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, well-established federal law requires that this 

court refrain from issuing this relief.

 In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from 

entertaining civil actions by individuals seeking to enjoin criminal prosecutions against 

them in state court. Id. at 44-45. “Attentive to the principles of equity, comity, and 

federalism, the Supreme Court has recognized that federal courts should abstain from 

exercising jurisdiction in suits aimed at restraining pending state criminal prosecutions.” 

Jackson v. Georgia, 273 Fed. App’x 812, 813 (11th Cir. 2008 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 

37). Younger therefore directs federal courts to abstain from granting injunctive or 

declaratory relief that would interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings except under 

very limited circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45. The Younger abstention doctrine 

is premised upon a fundamental “public policy against federal interference with state 

criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 43. 

“In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere with the state 

proceeding, [the court] look[s] to the relief requested and the effect it would have on the 

state proceedings. The relief sought need not directly interfere with an ongoing proceeding 

or terminate an ongoing proceeding in order for Younger abstention to be required.” 31 

Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

Abstention is required under Younger when a state judicial proceeding is pending, the 

proceedings implicate important state interests and the state proceedings provide an 

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adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics 

Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); 31 Foster Children, 

329 F.3d at 1274. 

It is clear from the pleadings filed by the plaintiff that each of the requisite elements 

for Younger abstention are present in this case. First, according to the complaint, Woods

is awaiting trial before the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on the challenged 

criminal charge. Secondly, enforcement of criminal law is an important state interest. 

Finally, Woods may raise his challenge(s) to prosecution in the pending state court 

proceedings by filing appropriate motions with the trial court. In addition, if Woods is 

convicted of the charge pending against him, he may present his claim regarding the 

District Attorney’s alleged conflict of interest on direct appeal before the state appellate 

courts. Although exceptions to Younger abstention are permitted where (1) irreparable 

injury as a result of the prosecution is both “great and immediate”; (2) the state law 

flagrantly and patently violates the Constitution of the United States; (3) there is a showing 

of bad faith or harassment; or (4) other unusual circumstances exist that require issuance 

of the requested relief, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972), none of these 

exceptions are implicated under the facts of this case. 

Initially, the court finds that the mere fact Woods must defend himself in state 

criminal proceedings does not demonstrate irreparable harm. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 

(“[T]he cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against . . . criminal 

prosecution, [is not] considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal sense of that term.”). Next, 

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the complaint fails to contain any indication of bad faith or harassment that would justify 

interference by this court in the state criminal proceedings as the charge Woods faces is 

based on an indictment issued by a grand jury. Moreover, the state law under which Woods

has been charged does not violate the Constitution nor can the court countenance the 

existence of any extraordinary circumstance entitling him to intervention by this court in 

the pending state court proceedings. 

In light of the foregoing, this court is compelled to abstain from considering the 

merits of the instant complaint. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Consequently, to the extent 

Woods requests declaratory and injunctive relief requiring this court’s interference with 

pending state criminal proceedings, equity, comity and federalism concerns require the 

court to abstain from such action. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s claims against Mark Johnson be DISMISSED with prejudice 

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).

2. The plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, which necessarily 

entail intervention by this court into pending state criminal proceedings, be DISMISSED 

without prejudice in accordance with the Younger abstention doctrine so that the plaintiff 

may pursue his claims in the state courts. 

3. The plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 1 at 3) be DENIED 

as he has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 

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4. This case be dismissed prior to service of process.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before October 20, 2016 the parties may file objections to the 

Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, 

or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the 

proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party 

from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues 

covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s 

order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain 

error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. 

Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 

F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989). 

DONE this 4th day of October, 2016.

/s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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