Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01235/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

PILED 

UNITED S':L'ATES COURT OF APPEALS Uaircd St~tr,j§ OJ~rr ~f Appeals 

Tench C1ram 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

PHILLIP L. FOREMASTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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AUG 3 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1235 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Utah 

(O.C. No. 85-1181) 

Brian M. Barnard, Salt Lake City, Utah; R. Clayton Huntsman, St. 

George, Utah; C. Dane Nolan, Utah Legal Clinic Foundation, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

T.W. Shumway, St. George City Attorney, St. George, Utah; Steven 

E. Snow, Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake, St. George, Utah; James 

E. Mitchem, Mitchem & Mitchem, Denver, Colorado, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, WRIGHT* and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

WRIGHT, Circuit Ju.dge. 

* Honorable Eugene A. Wright, United States Senior Judge for the 

Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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' ' 

We consider here the legality of a· subsidy given by a 

municipal utility tq a Mor~on temple and the legality of a pity's '. 

use of a logo depicting the Mormon temple. 

BACKGROUND 

With a population of 11,350 in 1980, St. George is the 

largest city in southern Utah. Local tradition holds that Brigham 

Young dedicated the spot where the St. George Temple of the Church 

of Latter Day Saints now stands. 1/ This was the first Mormon 

temple completed in the Wes~. Its lightened sandstone color and 

interesting architecture add a "striking feature" to the 

landscape. James E. Talmage, The House of The Lord (1976) at 179. 

A visitors center is located on the public grounds surrounding the 

Temple. 263,291 persons toured the center in 1985. 

Since 1942, the Utility Department. of the city has 

helped defray the cost of exterior lighting of the Temple. Each 

month the City issued a credit on the temple's electric bill, in 

effect paying for its late night illumination. In later years 

this credit was approximately $180 per month. 

The City also has used an official logo depicting the 

temple. The upper half contains a setting sun, a cluster of 

grapes and the motto "Where the Summer Sun Spends the Winter." 

The lower half contains a hill with the word "Dixie", a golf 

course and a skete,h of the temple. ( See Appendix). The Ci.ty. 

displays the logo on a plaque in the main foyer of City Hall, on 

1 Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 

are commonly referred to as "Mormons" or members of the "LOS" 

faith. · -2-

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two directional signs near the public parking lot of the building, 

and on about 85 or two-thirds of its vehicles. 

' 

In October 1985, Foremast,r.brought this action alleging 

that the s~bsidy and logo violated the Establishment Clause of the 

First Amendment. To reduce tension in the community~ the City 

Council terminated the electric subsidy in November 1986. Finding 

that he lacked standing, the district court dismissed the portion 

of Foremaster's complaint that addressed the sub~idy. 21 It also 

denied his motion for attorneys fees. Foremaster v. City of St. 

George, 687 F. Supp. 548, 5~1-52 (D. Ut~h 1987~. 

In February 1987, the court denied his motion for 

sununary judgment on the logo issue. Foremaster v. City of St. 

George, 655 F. Supp. 844, 852 (D. Utah 1987). In December, it 

dismissed his complaint on the use of the logo, finding that it 

did not violate the Establishment Clause. 687 F. Supp. at 549. 

Foremaster appeals the court's ruling that he lacked 

standing to challenge the electric subsidy and the denial of his 

request for attorneys fees. He also appeals the court's finding 

that the use of the logo does not violate the Establishment 

Clause. We have jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. S 1291. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Electric Subsidy 

2 The court consolidated Fore~ster's complaint with a suit 

brought by an alliance of non-Mormon ministers. It dismissed the 

alliance's complaint on mootness grounds, finding that it was 

filed after the City.terminated the subsidy. The alliance did not 

appeal. 

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We decide first whether the plaintiff Phillip Foremaster 

had standing to challenge the subsidy and, if so whether he 

prevailed for purpo~es of ~ttorneys fees under 42 u.s.c. S 1988. ; .I, 

A. Standing 

Article III requires that a litigant have standing to 

bring a federal claim. See Valley Forge Christian College v. 

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 

u.s. 464, 471 (1982). At a minimum, a plaintiff must establish a 

personal stake in the outcome sufficient to assure the "concrete 

adverseness" of the issue. ·saker v. Carr, 369'0.S. 186, 204 

(1961). 

To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must allege actual 

or threatened personal injury, fairly traceable to the defendant's 

unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable 

decision of the court. Allen v. Wright, 46~ U.S. 737, 751 (1984); 

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Bell v. Little Axe Ind. School 

Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1398 (10th Cir. 1985). 

In addition to the Article III requirements, the Court 

demands that the plaintiff assert his own rights, not those of a 

third party; his claim not be a "generalized grievance more 

appropriately addressed in the representative branch"; and his 

complaint fall within the zone of protection intended by the law. 

Allen, 468 u.s. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75. 

The alleged injury must. be an II injury in fact' economic 

or otherwise." Assoc. of Data Processing Service Org. Inc. v. 

Camp, 397 u.s. 150, 152 (1969). It must be "distinct and 

palpable," Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 

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100 (1978) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)), and 

"real and immediate," not abstract, conjectural or hypothetical. 

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 46I U.S. 95, 10~-02 (1983). 

Foremaster alleged that he suffered economic injury 

because the subsidy caused him· to pay higher rates for electricity. The district court found that because he did not have an 

electric utility account with the City he could not have suffered 

economic harm. We disagree. 

He· suffered a "distinct and palpable" injury. Rev·enue 

from the iale of electricity helped subsidize the lighting of the 

Mormon temple. To the extent that·this ,subsidy diminished .total 

revenues for the City's Utility Department, the Utility Department 

and the purchasers of municipal electricity are less well off and 

those purchasers may very well pay higher rates. 3/ 

Foremaster bought electric power. For over two years 

before April 1985, he maintained an electric utility account with 

the City. From April 1985 to June 1986, he lived in a mobile home 

in the City and paid a monthly rental fee that included 

electricity. He then lived in an apartment until August 1987, 

paying his roommate half of the electric bill. He also leased 

office space for his law practice which included payments for 

electricity. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1975) 

(physicians have standing to challenge constitutionality of 

abortion regulati6ns because regulations had an economic impa~t on 

their pr~ctice). Foremaster suffered an economic injury. 

3 The Utility Department relies solely on revenues from the 

sale of power and receives no supplement from the City's tax 

revenues. The City Council controls the Department, however. 

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The alleged injury must also be fairly traceable to the 

challenged action, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 

' 

426 u.s. 26, 38, 41 · (1975); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499; that 

is, standing requires a showing of causation. Allen, 468 u.s. at 

752.· Foremaster's injury can be traced to the subsidy. Had the 

City collected the cost of free electricity provided to the 

temple, the revenues of the Utility would have been enhanced, 

eliminating the need for purchasers of electricity, including 

Foremaster, to pay for the amount used by the temple. 

Standing requires.that a favoiable c~urt ruling would 

likely result in actual relief from the ·injury. Allen, 468 U.S. 

at 751, 753 n.19; Simon~ 426 U.S. at 38,-41. An injunction to 

stay payment of the City's subsidy would have redressed 

Foremaster's injury. 

We conclude that he suffered economic harm from the 

City's electric subsidy to the temple and had standing to 

challenge it. 41 

B. Attorneys Fees 

Forty-two u.s.c. § 1988 provides attorneys fees to a 

"prevailing paity." Even though there was no final judicial 

determination, Foremaster requested fees because the City 

terminated the subsidy. The district court found incorrectly that 

he did not prevail because he lacked standing. 

A plaintiff may prevail in the absence of a judicial 

determination on the merits. Maher v. Gagne, 448 u.s. 122, 129 

4 Because we find standing due to direct 

need not address Foremaster's arguments for 

taxpayer status and non-economic injury. 

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economic injury we 

standing based on 

Appellate Case: 88-1235 Document: 01019830736 Date Filed: 08/03/1989 Page: 6 
I 

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(1979). In such circumstances, we have adopted the catalyst test 

to determine prevailing party status for attorneys fees. A 

plaintiff must show 1"(1) .. tbat [the] lawsuit is causally linked to ; .. 

securing. the relief obta~ned, and (2) that the defendant's conduct 

in response to the lawsuit was required by law." J & J Anderson, 

Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing 

Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978)); Luethje v. 

Peavine School Dist. of Adair County, 872 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 

1989). 

The lawsuit need riot have been the sole reason for 

prompting the City to .terminate the electric subsidy but must. have 

been a "substantial factor or a significant catalyst." Supre v. 

Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962 (10th Cir. 1986); Luethje, 872 F.2d at 

354 (defendant's change in policy was "to quell the disharmony 

caused by plaintiff's complaints"). The district court found 

specifically that the City Council terminated the subsidy to 

reduce tension in the community and to save time and expense of 

litigating Foremaster's lawsuit. The finding was not clearly erroneous. 

The catalyst test also requires that Foremaster show 

that he would have prevailed on the merits. He alleged that the 

electric subsidy violated the Establishment Clause. We review de 

ill2!!Q the legal basis for terminating the subsidy. See Ricketts, 

792 F.2d at 961. 

The Establishment Clause mandates complete government 

neutrality toward religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 

(1985). It proscribes "sponsorship, financial support, and active 

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( 

involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." School Dist. 

of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) (citing 

i ·, . 

Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. • q 

756, 772 (1973)); ~~Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 

.• 

15-16 (1946) (no state "can pass laws which ~id one religion, aid 

all religions or prefer one religion over another"). 

Constitutional scrutiny requires that we apply the 

thre~-part test first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 

602, 612-13 ·( 1971). The government's action is permissible only 

if it meets three condition~: (1) it must have'a secular pur~ose; 

(2) its primary effect must be one that ·"neither advances nor 

inhibits" religion; and (3) it must not foster an excessive 

governmental entanglement with religion. Id.; Bell, 766 F.2d at 

1402; Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernallilo County, 781 

F,2d 777, 780 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1169 

(1985). 

We need not consider the first and third parts of the 

Lemon test because the electric subsidy fails the second 

requirement. In Grand Rapids, the Supreme Court held that a 

schoo.1 district'' s program to supplement teaching in non-public 

schools impermissibly subsidized religious institutions. 473 U.S. 

at 392. A governmental subsidy directed at religious institutions 

and not required by the Free Exercise Clause conveys a message of 

endorsement. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 s. Ct. 890, 899-

900 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (state sales tax exemption for 

periodicals published or distributed by a religious faith violates 

Establishment Clause). Cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 s. Ct. 2562, 

-aAppellate Case: 88-1235 Document: 01019830736 Date Filed: 08/03/1989 Page: 8 
. ' 

2577, (1988) (statute authorizing government subsidy to religious 

organizations for non-religious social services does not violate 

Establishment Clause). 

The electric subsidy ·given by the City impermissibly 

subsidized a religious institution. The City gave no other church 

such a subsidy. It conveyed a message of City support for the LDS 

faith. See Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 397. 

Because we conclude that the Constitution required the 

City to terminate the electric subsidy, Foremaster prevailed for 

purposes of attorneys fees tinder 42 u.s~c. S 1988. 

II. Municipal Logo 

We next consider the legality of the city's use of a 

logo depicting the local Mormon temple. Before reaching this 

issu~, we must determine if Foremaster· has standing to challenge 

the constitutionality of the logo. We find that he alleged 

sufficient non-economic injury to confer standing and that his 

move from St. George did not cause a loss of standing. 

A. Standing 

Again, we consider the constitutional requirement that 

the plaintiff allege an actual or threatened personal injury. 5/ 

Standing under the Establishment Clause may be predicated on noneconomic injury. Valley Forge, ~54 U.S. at 486; see e.g., United 

States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-687 (1973) (discouraging use of 

recyclable materiils and adversely affecting the environment 

5 We need not discuss taxpayer·standing 

not allege misuse of municipal funds. See 

U.S. 83, 102 (1968); Freedom from Religion 

1463, 1470 (7th Cir. 1988). 

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because Foremaster did 

Flast v. Cohen, 392 

v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 

... 

Appellate Case: 88-1235 Document: 01019830736 Date Filed: 08/03/1989 Page: 9 
sufficient harm); Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. 

Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-154 (1970) (recognizing that "aesthetic, 

i .• 

conservational, and ·recreational" i~j4ry is sufficient) • . . 

When alleging ~on-economic injury, the Supreme Court 

requires th&t the plaintiffs be "directly affected bt the laws and 

practices against which their complaints are directed." Valley 

Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22 (quotin~ Abington School District v. 

Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963)). 

In' Valley Forge, the petitioners claimed that the 

government's conveyance of property to a Christian college 

violated the Establishment Clause. The ·petitioners were residents 

of Maryland and Virginia who learned of the transfer through news 

releases. None alleged that t~ey would use the property located 

in Pennsylvania, but they contended that the transfer deprived 

them of the fair use of their tax dollars. The Court found that 

they lacked standing because they "fail[ed] to identify any 

personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged· 

constitutional error, other than the psychological consequences 

presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one 

disagrees," Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis in original). 

The circuit courts have interpreted Valley Forge in 

different ways. The Seventh Circuit requires that a plaintiff 

allege that a municipality's action offends him and that he has 

altered his behavior as a consequence of it. See e.g., Freedom 

From Religion v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988) (residents 

had no standing to challenge Ten Commandments display in city park 

because they did not allege a change in behavior); ACLU v. City of 

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St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 

(1986) (mere fact that display of lighted cross on public property 

' i 

offends plaintiff could not confer ~t~nding; he must allege that 

he altered his behavior to avoid the cross). 

In contrast, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits find 

standing based on an allegation of direct personal contact with 

the offensive action alone. See e.g., Saladin v. City of 

Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987) (standing because 

plaintiffs were confronted directly by presence of word 

"Christianity" on city seal); Hawley v. ·city o~ Cleveland, 773 

F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986), 

(standing because plaintiffs alleged sectarian use of public 

property that impairs their use and enjoyment of property); ACLU 

v. Rabun County, 698 F.2d_l098 (11th Cir. 1983) (although 

\ 

plaintiffs' underlying motivation could be described as a 

spiritual belief or a commitment to separation of church and 

state, they had demonstrated an individualized injury other than a 

mere psychoiogical reaction). 

We find particularly persuasive the Sixth Circuit's 

reasoning in Hawley. There, the plaintiffs claimed that the City 

violated the Establishment Clause by leasing space to a church for 

an airpor~ chapel. The plaintiffs alleged that "the presence of a 

sectarian chapel impair[ed] their use and enjoyment of the public 

facility." Hawley, 773 F.2d at 739. In contrast to Valley Forge, 

the court found that the plaintiffs used the airport frequently 

and resided either in the city or county where it was located. 

Interpreting Rabun it said: "[a] plaintiff challenging sectarian 

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use o+ ~ublic property for impairing his actual use and enjoyment 

of that property has standing to challenge the impermissible 

'' ' activity." Hawley, 773 F.2d at 740T ,, 

Although we have not decided if a plaintiff must allege 

a change in his behavior to find standing, two of out cases are 

helpful. In an opinion before Valley Forge, Anderson v. Salt Lake 

City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 

879 (1973), residents sought to remove a granite monument of the 

Ten Commandments from the grounds of the city-county courthouse. 

We found standing to challenge the use of public property for· 

religiotls purposes and did not require that the plaintiffs ·allege 

a change in their behavior. Id. 

In Bell v. Little Axe Ind. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 

1391, 1398 (10th Cir. 1985)f we found that parents had standing to 

complain of religious meetings at their children's school. 

Relying on Valley Forge, we required that they allege a direct, 

personal injury, but did not require a change in behavior. Id. 

Foremaster's allegations of direct, personal contact 

suffices as non-economic injury. He claimed that "the visual 

impact of seeing that Temple on a daily basis as part of an 

official emblem ••• has and continues to greatly offend, 

intimidate and affect me." Although he did not contend he 

changed his behavior, he did allege that the presence of the 

religious logo in the City Hall offended and intimidated him. His 

direct personal contact with offensive municipal conduct satisfied 

Valley Forge. 

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We next consider if Foremaster lost his standing by 

moving from St. George. I.n Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 

F. 2d 687 (11th Cir. :1987), · the plai~t~f~s claimed that the city 

seal with the word ''Chri~tianiiy" denigrated them. Regardless of 

the fact that some plaintiffs lived outside the city~ the court 

found standing because they received city stationery with the seal 

and were "directly affronted by the presence of the allegedly 

offensive word on the city seal." Id. at 693. 

Although Foremaster lives outside the city, he has 

frequent and close connectidn with it. ·ae works within the city 

and his affidavit indicates that he is directly confronted .by the 

logo on a daily basis, given the city's display of the logo on 

many of its vehicles, its stationery and within the nearby City 

Hall. Given this pervasive contact,!!!. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 

782, his current residence outside the city does not defeat his 

standing~ 

B. Establishment Clause 

Because the district court relied on material outside 

the pleadings, we treat its dismissal as a summary judgment. See 

Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 550 F.2d 1255, 1257 

(10th Cir, 1977). 

Again, we address the second prong of the Lemon test 

inquiring if the primary effect of the City's logo is to advance 

or inhibit religi;n, The district court found that the 

illustration of the St. George te~ple on the City's logo did not 

have the primary effect of endorsing the LDS church. Foremaster, 

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655 F. Supp. at 852. Finding a genuine issue of material fact, we 

remand for trial on the question of the logo's primary effect. 

The effec~s pr~n~ asks "w~e~her, irrespective of the 

government's actual purp~se, the practice ••• conveys a message 

of endorsement or disapproval." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. 

"Implicit symbolic benefit is enough, it need not be material and 

tangible advancement." Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781. We inquire 

what an average observer would perceive when viewing the action of 

the City. See Alleghenyt 1989 U.S. Lexis 3467 at 31; Friedman, 

781 F,2d at 781. 

In Allegheny, the Supreme Court's most recent decision 

discussing the effects prong of the Lemon test, the Court focused 

on the "particular physical setting" of the object. 61 Allegheny, 

Lexis 3467 at 17. The Court stated that its task was to determine 

whether the display in its "particular physical setting" had the 

effect of endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs. Allegheny, 

Lexis 3468 at 17. It also considered the availability or nonavailability of secular alternatives. Id. at 30. 

We find a genuine issue of material fact as to what an 

average observer would perceive when viewing the City logo. 

Mormon temples are central to both religious beliefs and 

proselytizing efforts. Foremaster v. City of St. George, 655 F. 

Supp. 844, 847-48 (D. Utah 1987). The Washington Coμnty 

Ministerial Alliance claimed that the "representation of the LDS 

6 The majority op1n1on endorse~· the Lemon test, but Justice 

Kennedy's dissent, with Justices Rehnquist, White and Scalia 

joining, questions the test's utility and proposes an alternative 

analysis. Allegheny, 1989 u.s. Lexis 3467 at 51-53. 

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Temple of the city logo/seal lends the power, prestige, 

endorsement and financial support of ·the city of St. George to one 

church to the exclu~ion ~f-others." Foremaster v. City of St. 

George, 655 F. Supp. 844~ 848 (D. Utah C.D. 1987). It also 

claimed that the other churches in the City are "attractive, 

beautiful, sacred" and visited by tourists. & Foremaster 

contended that "[t]he St. George LDS Temple is the universally 

identified symbol of Mormonism as practiced in the St. George 

area." 

The LDS Church News says: 

These buildings, different from the th6usands 

of regular church houses of worship scattered 

over the earth, are unique in purpose and 

function from all other religious edifices. 

It is not the size of these buildings, or 

their architectural beauty that makes them so. 

It is the work th~t goes on within their 

walls. 

In contrast the affidavit of Sharon Isom states: 

[the Mormon temple] is not considered to be a 

trademark or religious symbol that is 

synonymous with that church or its beliefs, it 

is noted for its striking beauty and 

nineteenth century architecture and is more 

likely to be identified with the history and 

scenery of southwest Utah than anything else. 

Foremaster, 655 F. Supp. at 849. Karl Brooks' affidavit states 

that the temple "necessarily plays a central role in any 

considerat~on of the area's history, culture, roots and tradition 

whether that consi.deration be secular or otherwise." Id. at .849. 

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

the ·depiction of the temple in the context of the official St. 

George logo conveys primarily a message of governmental 

endorsement and advancement of the Mormon religion. 

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REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A CALCULATION OF ATTORNEYS 

FEES AND REMANDED FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE PRIMARY EFFECT OF THE 

LOGO. FOR.EMSTER IS ALLOWED BIS COSTS ON THIS APPEAL. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK 

~ttitrb jtates Qfourt of J\ppeaf s 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

August 4, 1989 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 88-1235 

Foremaster v. City of St. George 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

CFTS) 564·3157 

The court has made the following correction in its opinion which 

was filed August 3, 1989. 

Page 13, second paragraph, 5th line down should read as follows: 

'' ••• many of its vehicles, its stationery and within and 

nearby City ... " 

Appellate Case: 88-1235 Document: 01019830736 Date Filed: 08/03/1989 Page: 18