Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01837/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01837-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Wrongful Death

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory Martinez, Sr., etc.; et al,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Avondale, etc; et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-1837-PHX-LOA

ORDER

For the second time in less than a month, the Court is called upon to resolve a

disputed case management issue. 

On March 1, 2013, the last day to file an amended pleading under the Court’s case

management order, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend Complaint. (Doc. 63) Pursuant to

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”), they request leave to file

another amended complaint to add seven Avondale police officers as defendants, in their

individual and official capacities, and to allege violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and State-law claims of False Arrest and Imprisonment. (Id., ¶ 4 at 2) 

The proposed Second Amended Complaint is attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion, indicating

the additions and deletions to the First Amended Complaint, as required by Local Rule

(“LRCiv”) 15.1. 

Defendants oppose the Motion, claiming 1) Plaintiffs unduly delayed adding these

defendants when they knew the identities of the police officers they seek to add and the

Case 2:12-cv-01837-LOA Document 75 Filed 03/22/13 Page 1 of 10
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 Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to name as defendants: Officers Albert Bates, Robert

Clement, Christopher Beckett, Reginald Sayles, Michael Unger, Edward Toxqui, and

Raymond Harris, all purportedly employed as Avondale police officers on October 28,

2011.

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factual basis of the new claims since prior to filing their original Complaint in August

2012, and 2) by allowing amendment, it “will be impossible” for the parties to complete

discovery by the Scheduling Order’s July 31, 2013 discovery deadline and the trial of this

case will be delayed. (Doc. 69 at 5)

After considering the parties’ briefing, the Ninth Circuit’s controlling, extremely

liberal policy in allowing amendments when timely made pursuant to Rule 15(a), and the

absence of demonstrated prejudice to Defendants, the Court is compelled to grant the

Motion.

I. Background

This is a 28 U.S.C. § 1983 fatal police shooting case, arising out of an October 28,

2011 9-1-1 call by the decedent’s mother, asking for police assistance with her 20-year

old son, Gregory Martinez, Jr., deceased. Because of the parties’ familiarity with the facts

and current allegations, the Court will only discuss herein the facts material to the

amendment motion.

Plaintiffs contend that, after Officer Kevin Sapp shot the decedent just outside of

the Martinez’ home, seven Avondale police officers1

unreasonably detained the decedent’s

family members “for hours.” (Doc. 63 at 1) Although several family members, including

three minors, witnessed the shooting death of their son or brother, Plaintiffs were

allegedly not permitted to comfort each other, call their pastor, seek permission to use the

restroom by seven Avondale police officers, who apparently had different roles in the

separation and detention. (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he restrictions placed on these

traumatized individuals went beyond mere detention, but transmogrified into an actual

arrest.” (Id.) Plaintiffs’ counsel represents that, “[d]uring depositions in this matter,

Plaintiffs have learned the identities of the individual officers responsible for [Plaintiffs’]

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 The parties and the Court use the children’s initials in all public filings to protect

their privacy interests as directed by Rule 5.2(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.

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wrongful detention and arrests.” (Id. at 2) Plaintiffs move for leave to amend their

complaint for a second time since removal to add the individual officers as named

defendants, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and allege the State-law intentional torts of

False Arrest and Imprisonment.

Defendants point out, and the docket confirms, Plaintiffs filed their initial

Complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court on August 2, 2012, alleging, inter alia,

§ 1983 excessive force claims against Officer Sapp, and, with leave of the Court after this

action was removed on August 29, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint

on October 30, 2012. (Docs. 1-1 at 4-10; 19) Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint added

decedent’s three minor siblings, I.M., M.M., and L.M.,2

 as plaintiffs, whose interests in

this action are represented by their parents and guardians ad litem, Plaintiffs Gregory

Martinez, Sr. and Marisol Martinez. The First Amended Complaint also added § 1983

wrongful seizure claims, alleging, among others, the police “[o]fficers with the City of

Avondale seized Plaintiffs Gregory Martinez, Sr., Marisol Martinez, I.M., M.M., and

L.M. . . . [and] refused to permit these Plaintiffs to be together or speak together; to leave

the scene; or to attend to Gregory Martinez, Jr., in the hospital . . . [which] lasted for

many hours.” (Doc. 19, ¶¶ 51-52 at 8) “This seizure was unreasonable and in violation of

the Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.” (Id., ¶ 54 at 8) 

Defendants describe as “patently false” the representation that Plaintiffs “just

recently discovered the identities of the officers who provided scene security and kept the

witnesses from speaking to each other prior to being interviewed.” (Doc. 69 at 3)

Defendants indicate that, in Plaintiffs’ October 19, 2012 Initial Disclosure Statement,

doc. 16, Plaintiffs disclosed the Avondale police reports regarding this shooting, which

Defendants surmise were obtained through a public records’ request and “[r]eflect a print

date of January 19, 2012, which is, presumably, near the date of Plaintiffs[’] public

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records request and receipt of the reports.” (Doc. 69 at 2) According to Defendants,

before they filed their State-court complaint in August 2012, Plaintiffs possessed “several

references to police officers interviewing and separating witnesses,” including: Officers

Beckett, Sayles, Unger, Toxqui, and Clement. (Id. at 3) However, absent from this list of

names are Officers Albert Bates and Raymond Harris.

Citing on Federal Ins. Co. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 823 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir.

1987) and State Distributors, Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries, 738 F.2db 405, 416 (10th Cir.

1987), Defendants contend that, because Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the

facts on which the amendment request is based “for some time prior to the filing of the

motion to amend,” leave to amend should be denied. (Id. at 4) Defendants argue

“Plaintiffs should not be able to benefit by the delay created by their failure to properly

plead their case in their original Complaint or even their First Amended Complaint.” (Id.)

In response, Plaintiffs acknowledge they had “some indication” which Avondale

police officers separated the various family members from the “heavily redacted police

reports” before commencing this litigation. (Doc. 72 at 2) Plaintiffs indicate, however,

“these raised more questions than answers,” such as, who ordered the “sequestration and

detentions,” how long did the detentions last, and under what conditions? (Id.) Plaintiffs

describe this less-than-perfect information as “informational disadvantage,”citing

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir. 1988). (Id., n. 1) 

Conceding “marginal delay” may result if new defendants are added,” id. at 2, Plaintiffs

point out that, while Plaintiffs have conducted six depositions to date, Defendants had

taken only one deposition, I.M., by mid-March 2013, and have scheduled five depositions

of Plaintiffs and their witnesses in April, suggesting Defendants will not be prejudiced by

amendment as most defense depositions have not been completed. (Docs. 69 at 5; 72 at 3)

Plaintiffs also note discovery does not close for another four months; Defendants have

been on notice of the wrongful seizure issue since it was first formally raised in the

October 30, 2012 First Amended Complaint, id. at 3; and, importantly, the amendment

request is timely and consistent with the Court’s Scheduling Order, i.e., “[m]otions to

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amend pleadings and motions to join additional parties [must be filed] by Friday, March

1, 2013.” (Doc. 17, ¶ 2 at 6) (footnote omitted). 

II. Amendment Motions

As the Court noted in its October 23, 2012 Rule 16 Scheduling Order, motions to

amend filed after the Scheduling Order’s deadline are governed, not by the liberal

provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), but instead by the more restrictive provisions of Rule

16(b) and the good-cause standard. (Doc. 17 at 6 fn. 4) Because Plaintiffs timely filed

their amendment motion on March 1, 2013, the last possible day to do so under the

Scheduling Order, the liberal provisions of Rule 15(a) apply to their motion. See Schultz

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 68 Fed. Appx. 130, 132 (9th Cir. 2003); Coleman v. Quaker

Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992).

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) instructs district courts that “leave [to

amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” “In the absence of any apparent or

declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given.” Schultz,

68 Fed. Appx. at 132 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game

of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the

principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The strong policy permitting amendment

is to be applied with ‘extreme liberality.’” Id. (quoting Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v.

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted in original). 

The Ninth Circuit strongly endorses a liberal approach to allowing amendments.

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have repeatedly stressed that

the [district] court must remain guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . to

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facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.”) (citing 

Rule 15(a)(2) and quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal

quotation marks omitted), partially superceded by statute. Leave to amend, however, is

not granted automatically. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)

(no abuse of discretion denying motion to amend complaint to allege additional causes of

action that would have required further discovery, which was to close five days after the

motion to amend was filed.) (citing Solomon v. North Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d

1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s denial of motion to amend filed

on the eve of the discovery deadline). 

District courts commonly consider the four Foman factors when determining

whether to grant leave to amend: (1) bad faith on the part of the movant; (2) undue delay;

(3) prejudice to the opposing party; and (4) futility of the proposed amendment. Lockheed

Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999); Bowles v.

Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999). These factors do not merit equal consideration.

“Prejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor.” Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387

(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971)

(district court “required” to take potential prejudice into account in deciding Rule 15(a)

motion). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors,

there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.”

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (citation omitted). “The party opposing leave to

amend bears the burden of showing prejudice.” DCD Programs, Ltd v. Leighton, 833

F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

 “A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings supports a

district court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend.” Lockheed Martin

Corp., 194 F.3d at 986; see also Johnson v. Couturier, 2009 WL 256546, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

Feb. 3, 2009) (finding prejudice where a defendant’s late addition would make it

“extremely difficult and inconvenient” for the defendant to catch up with discovery). 

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The Ninth Circuit also instructs district courts that undue delay alone is insufficient

to justify denying a motion to amend. See Bowles, 198 F.3d at 758 (“Undue delay by

itself . . . is insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.”); see also Owens v. Kaiser

Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying this rule from

Bowles and affirming leave to amend); Roberts v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 661 F.2d 796,

798 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Ordinarily, leave to amend pleadings should be granted regardless

of the length of time of delay by the moving party absent a showing of bad faith by the

moving party or prejudice to the opposing party.”) (citations omitted). A moving party

may be precluded from asserting an amendment on the basis of undue delay where the

matters asserted in the amendment were known to them from the beginning of the suit.

Komie v. Buehler Corp., 449 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that where the

moving party filed a motion to amend answer 31 months after the answer was filed, three

weeks before the trial date, and the prejudice to the opposing party was evident, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend); Mende v. Dun & Bradstreet,

Inc., 670 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of motion for leave to amend

complaint 25 months after the original complaint was filed). 

Amendment may also be denied on the basis of futility if the amended pleading

itself would be subject to dismissal. Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th

Cir. 2000) (“[F]utility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave

to amend.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] proposed amendment is

futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that

would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada County, 119

F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 2008 WL 4174918, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008)

(rejecting use of “[R]ule 15(a) as a vehicle for hearing arguments that are clearly more

properly suited to a 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) or Summary Judgment Motion.”)

III. Discussion

Because a “scheduling order controls the subsequent course of the action unless

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modified by the court[,]”) Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608 (citation omitted), Defendants offer

no authority, and this Court has found none, that a timely motion to amend filed before

expiration of the amendment deadline, which motion otherwise complies with a district

court’s local rules, should result in a finding of untimeliness and be denied. See Barker v.

Hertz Corp., 2007 WL 4410253, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2007) (denying leave to amend

where party failed to make motion to amend and attach proposed amended complaint),

affirmed by 350 Fed. Appx. 176 (9th Cir. 2009).

Assuming arguendo the truthfulness of Plaintiffs’ wrongful seizure claims and

proposed allegations, as the Court must, there is clear Ninth Circuit authority that an

unreasonable detention of a witness solely for investigative purposes or other person

without a founded suspicion of criminal activity is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Maxwell v.

County of San Diego, F.3d , 2013 WL 542756 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2013); United

States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc); Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d

1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006). At this pleading stage, Plaintiffs’ requested amendment is

not futile and Defendants have not argued that it is.

Defendants have not made a strong showing of bad faith and prejudice, much less

carried their burden of doing so. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187. While the parties have

engaged in substantial discovery to date, Defendants have only taken one deposition prior

to receiving notice of Plaintiffs’ amendment motion. Like the District Judge noted in a

recent Arizona federal case granting leave to amend, “the new allegations Plaintiffs seek

to add in their amended complaint are based on evidence Defendant had in its possession,

and arise under the same facts as the previous allegations. Thus, the prejudicial effect on

Defendants prior discovery of granting leave to amend is negligible.” Capuano v.

Kenneth Eisen & Associates, Ltd., 2012 WL 2376675, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2012).

Moreover, discovery in the case sub judice has not closed and all parties, including the

newly-added defendants, have over four months to complete all discovery by the July 31,

2013 discovery deadline, which is likely if the parties maintain their due diligence and

efforts to do so. See Canal Properties, LLC v. Alliant Tax Credit V, Inc., 220 Fed. Appx.

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699, 700–01 (9th Cir. 2007) (district court did not abuse discretion by denying leave to

amend where discovery had closed, the time for dispositive motions had passed, and was

made just a few weeks before trial). Finally, no dispositive motions have been filed and

there is no trial date set at this time.

IV. Conclusion

While “[a] litigant who ignores a case-management deadline does so at his peril[,]”

Chao v. Westside Drywall, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 651 (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2009) (citation omitted), a

litigant who timely complies with a case-management deadline to amend pleadings, even

when such motion is filed on the last authorized day to do so and is otherwise compliant

with a district court’s local rules, the Ninth Circuit instructs the motion should be

granted. The Court finds Defendants have not demonstrated prejudice, bad faith, or any

other permissible ground to overcome the presumption that Plaintiffs’ amendment

request should be allowed.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, doc. 63, is

GRANTED. Pursuant to LRCiv 15.1, as amended on December 1, 2012, Plaintiffs must

1) remove all fictitious defendants named as John and Jane Does I-X and Black Entities

I-V in the caption and body of the Second Amended Complaint; 2) remove all bolding in

the caption of the Second Amended Complaint as such bolding is not authorized by the

Local Rules; and 3) file the Second Amended Complaint, lodged at doc. 63-1 as modified

by this Order, on all parties under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within

seven (7) days of the filing of this Order and promptly serve all Defendants. See LRCiv

15.1. The Court encourages defense counsel and each newly-named defendant to consider

voluntarily waiving service of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 4(d), 

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Fed.R.Civ.P., to avoid unnecessary expenses and delay of serving the summons and

Second Amended Complaint. Rule 4(d)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P.

Dated this 22nd day of March, 2013.

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