Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01374/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01374-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendants do not raise a qualified immunity defense in their

motion for summary judgment.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC DUARTE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CAPTAIN TOBY WONG,

Defendant.

________________________________/

No. C 05-01374 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WONG'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

ISSUING SECOND ORDER OF SERVICE,

AND ADDRESSING PENDING MOTIONS

(Docket nos. 28, 34, 37, 38, 39)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Eric Duarte, a state prisoner incarcerated at

Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), brought this pro se civil

rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while in custody at the Santa

Clara County Main Jail (Main Jail). Plaintiff alleges that Main

Jail employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs when they delayed medical treatment for his injured foot and

forced him to walk on it unassisted, causing him unnecessary pain

and suffering. 

In an Order dated February 24, 2006, the Court found that

Plaintiff's allegations stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim

(docket no. 5). The Court noted that Plaintiff was suing

Defendants Santa Clara County Sheriff Laurie Smith and Captain Toby

Wong in their supervisorial capacities because of their failure to

ensure constitutionally adequate medical care for all those in the

Main Jail. Defendants now move for summary judgment (docket no.

28).1

 Plaintiff has filed an opposition, and Defendants have filed

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 1 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 On February 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a document entitled

"Plaintiff Eric Duarte's Objection to Evidence Cited in Defendant's

[sic] Reply Brief In Support of Defendant's [sic] Motion for Summary

[JUDGMENT]" (docket no. 53). Plaintiff repeats his allegations from

his opposition and argues that he "should have been rushed to medical

professionals as soon as possible." He also requests a stay in the

Court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment until he has

"obtained the name of the second escorting officer who was C/O Bevan's

partner that escorted Plaintiff to [Valley Medical Hospital (VMC)]."

The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for a stay because the requested

discovery has no bearing on Defendant Wong's motion for summary

judgment. Furthermore, the Court will be serving the named Doe

Defendants in this action and will be allowing discovery in accordance

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; therefore, Plaintiff may

make any discovery requests, i.e., the name of the second escorting

officer, once the remaining Defendants have been served.

3

 Defendant Smith's motion for summary judgment is terminated as

moot because all claims against Defendant Smith have been dismissed.

(June 5, 2007 Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 1.)

2

a reply.2

For reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion for

summary judgment as to Defendant Wong.3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 27, 2004, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Plaintiff

injured his left foot while playing handball. (Pl.'s Aff. at 1.) 

He immediately requested medical attention, and showed Correctional

Officer Gill a lump protruding from his left foot. (Id.) Plaintiff

informed Officer Gill that he could not walk to his cell. (Id.) 

Officer Gill handcuffed Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff's cellmate,

inmate Melecho Casarez, to assist Plaintiff in walking back to their

cell. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to complain to Officer Gill that

his foot still hurt. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Officer Gill's

response was to remove Plaintiff's handcuffs from behind him, and

Plaintiff was then "cuffed with [his] hands in front of [him]." 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he traveled approximately 100 yards

"partially walk[ing] on the hill [sic] of his foot and hopp[ing]

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 2 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

with the assistance of Mr. Casarez back to [his] cell." (Id.)

At 10:10 p.m., Officer Gill called a nurse to examine

Plaintiff's foot. (Chyorny Aff., Ex. A.) At 10:30 p.m., Plaintiff

claims a nurse named "Nurse Myrna" examined him. (Pl.'s Aff. at 2.) 

The progress notes show that the nurse assessed a possible fracture

of Plaintiff's fifth left toe. (Chyorny Aff., Ex. B.) Because

Plaintiff's injury occurred late in the evening and the Main Jail

did not provide x-ray services at that time, the nurse scheduled his

x-ray for the following morning. (Id.) She told Plaintiff to

elevate his leg and apply ice to ease the swelling. (Id.) She did

not prescribe pain medication because Plaintiff had received three

doses of Motrin earlier that day under a prescription for a previous

injury. (Chyorny Aff., Ex. D.)

Thereafter, Officer Gill sent Defendant Wong a document

entitled "Employee Report," which stated in part: 

At approximately 2130 hrs Inmate Duarte informed me

that he injured his left foot while playing handball. I

secured Inmate Duarte and Casarez and brought them back to

their cell. I then informed nurse Myrna of the injury. At

2230 hrs Nurse Myrna examined Inmate Duarte and provided him

with and [sic] ice pack to get the swelling down. As per

nurse Myrna Inmate Duarte will have an x-ray done to his

left foot. 

(Chyorny Aff., Ex. A, Employer's Report IR #04-19547 at 00162.) The

report also had a handwritten note which stated, "Recently sentenced

to 460 yrs -- security Risk if transported to VMC!" (Id.)

The next day, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff had to

walk in leg restraints, unassisted, for about 150 yards to have his

x-ray. (Pl.'s Aff. at 2.) The x-ray technician told Plaintiff

that his foot was broken. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that even though

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 3 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the correctional officer escorting him acknowledged hearing the xray technician's statement, Plaintiff was forced to walk back to

his cell unassisted. (Id.)

At approximately 2:00 p.m., Plaintiff filed a 602 inmate

appeal requesting immediate medical attention. (Id.) His

grievance was granted, and he was told to prepare for transport

to VMC. (Id.) Plaintiff was then placed in waist chains and

leg restraints, and forced to walk to the van. (Id.) He fell

forward onto his stomach as he attempted to enter the van. 

(Id.) He alleges that when entering the van, he had to put all

his weight on his injured foot, which caused him severe pain. 

(Id.) At 6:00 p.m., he was taken to the VMC Emergency

Department. (Chyorny Aff., Ex. E.) Upon arrival, the

correctional officers parked forty yards from the hospital

entrance rather than at the hospital drop-off zone, and made him

walk to the hospital. (Pl.'s Aff. at 2-3.)

At VMC, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Brendan Garrett and

Dr. David Nix. (Chyorny Aff., Ex. E.) The two doctors

consulted Dr. Ray Oshtoy, an orthopedist, by telephone. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with an oblique fracture of his fifth

metatarsal. (Id.) He was given a hard-sole shoe to wear and

crutches. (Id.) Plaintiff was also given prescriptions for

Vicodin and Motrin. (Id.) He was instructed to keep his foot

rested, iced and elevated. (Id.) He was scheduled for a

follow-up appointment for the following week. (Id.) Although

he was given crutches, Plaintiff claims that the waist chains

securing his hands to his waist and the leg shackles securing

his ankles together made any safe movement impossible. (Pl.'s

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 4 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Aff. at 3.) Plaintiff declined the crutches and requested a

wheelchair instead. (Id.) He claims that Correctional Officer

Bevan was unable to grant Plaintiff's request for a wheelchair

without authorization from the jail. (Id.) As a result,

Plaintiff had to walk back to the van in leg shackles. (Id.)

At the Main Jail, Plaintiff alleges that he had to walk back

to the medical unit to be cleared by a medical professional. (Id.) 

Plaintiff again requested a wheelchair to assist him in returning

to his cell, but his request was denied. (Id.) Plaintiff was

forced to walk back to his cell. (Id.) 

On October 29, 2004, at 6:00 a.m., Plaintiff requested a

wheelchair to go to his court hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff's request

was denied. (Id.) Plaintiff then refused to attend his hearing. 

(Id.) He filed a 602 appeal requesting a wheelchair and to be

rehoused in the medical unit. (Id.) Approximately twenty minutes

later, the floor correctional officer told Plaintiff that his

grievance "would be approved if [he] would cuff up . . . and go to

court." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges a wheelchair was then brought to

his cell door, and he decided to "cuff up" and go to court. (Id.) 

After he returned from court, Plaintiff was cleared to transfer to

the "second floor medical housing until for sick and injured

inmates." (Id.)

On November 3, 2004, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. J. Lukrich at

the Main Jail infirmary. (Chyorny Aff., Ex. F.) Dr. Lukrich's

progress notes indicate that Plaintiff did not want to be rehoused

and that he also refused casting. (Id.) Plaintiff was encouraged

to comply with the VMC orthopedist to ensure that he would regain

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 5 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

full range of motion and reduce his risk of arthritis. (Id.)

On November 5, 2004, at approximately 10:21 a.m., Dr. David

Sohn reviewed Plaintiff's x-rays during a follow-up appointment at

the VMC Orthopedic Clinic. (Chyorny Aff., Ex. G.) Dr. Sohn also

found that Plaintiff had fractured the fifth metatarsal of his left

foot. (Id.) He found an "acceptable alignment," and told

Plaintiff to wear his hard-sole shoe for five weeks. (Id.)

On November 6, 2004, an orthopedist at the Main Jail infirmary

reviewed Plaintiff's x-rays and found a minimal displacement of his

fracture. (Id., Ex. H.) The orthopedist told Plaintiff to

continue wearing his hard-sole shoe, and he also prescribed Motrin

for pain relief. (Id.)

The Main Jail infirmary did not receive any requests for

medical attention from Plaintiff related to his foot injury between

November 5, 2004 and December 5, 2004. (Chyorny Aff. ¶ 14.)

On December 5, 2004, Main Jail medical staff checked

Plaintiff's fracture. Plaintiff was "ambulatory [with] a steady

gait." (Id., Ex. H.)

On December 6, 2004, an orthopedist at the Main Jail reviewed

Plaintiff's medical chart and determined that Plaintiff could be

housed with the general population. (Id.)

After December 6, 2004, there were no further entries in

Plaintiff's medical record pertaining to his foot fracture. (Id.,

Ex. I.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 6 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 7 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d

769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). The analysis of a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs involves an examination of

two elements: (1) a prisoner's serious medical needs and (2) a

deliberately indifferent response by the defendants to those needs. 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "wanton infliction of unnecessary pain." Id. (citing Estelle,

429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a reasonable

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly

affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of

chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a

prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60

(citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir.

1990)). 

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 8 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's "fifth metatarsal fracture

was not the sort of major injury for which immediate medical

attention was required." (Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) Plaintiff

claims that his injury constituted a serious medical need,

because a reasonable patient and doctor would find it important

and worthy of treatment. The record shows that three doctors

treated Plaintiff and gave him a hard-sole shoe to wear,

prescribed pain medication and scheduled a follow-up

appointment. (Id., Ex. E.) Additionally, Plaintiff claimed

that he could not walk because of the pain resulting from his

fractured foot. (Pl.'s Aff. at 3.) Plaintiff's inability to

bear his full weight on his left foot significantly affected his

ability to walk, which is a daily activity. The Court finds

that there is a triable issue of fact raised as to whether

Plaintiff's foot injury constitutes a "serious medical need." 

Based on the evidence before it, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Plaintiff's foot injury constitutes a serious

medical need and summary judgment cannot be granted on this

basis.

B. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wong was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff sues Defendant

Wong in his supervisorial capacity. Specifically, Plaintiff claims

that Defendant Wong had knowledge that Plaintiff was treated with

deliberate indifference by Main Jail employees. He also claims

that Defendant Wong failed to train, supervise and control his

subordinates to cause them to adhere to jail policy. 

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 9 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order to

establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show a

purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and a

resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Such

indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown

in the way in which prison officials provided medical care. See

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. 

A claim of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Franklin v.

State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1130 (9th Cir. 2004);

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (mere negligence in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a

prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights); O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d

614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (repeatedly failing to satisfy requests

for aspirins and antacids to alleviate headaches, nausea and pain

is not constitutional violation; isolated occurrences of neglect

may constitute grounds for medical malpractice but do not rise to

level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain). 

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing

of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or

(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 10 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)

(citation omitted). A supervisor therefore generally "is only

liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). An administrator may be

liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, for

instance, if he or she fails to respond to a prisoner's request for

help. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). "It

has long been clearly established that '[s]upervisory liability is

imposed against a supervisory official in his individual capacity

for his own culpable action or inaction in the training,

supervision, or control of his subordinates, for his acquiescence

in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made,

or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to

the rights of others.'" Preschooler II v. Clark County School Bd.

of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted).

The record shows that Defendant Wong received a report from

Officer Gill directly after the incident. While the report

contains information that Plaintiff injured his left foot, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of

Defendant Wong's participation in, direction or knowledge of the

alleged violations. Cf. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1098 (evidence of a

prisoner's letter to an administrator alerting him to a

constitutional violation is sufficient to generate a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the administrator was aware of the

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 11 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

violation, even if he denies knowledge and there is no evidence the

letter was received). At most, Plaintiff has presented evidence

that Defendant Wong knew that Plaintiff was injured, that he was

seen by a nurse, that he needed an x-ray scheduled, and that he was

a security risk if transported to the hospital. The report did not

refer to any of Plaintiff's interactions with Main Jail staff that

he alleges were constitutional violations, such as being forced to

walk on his injured foot unassisted, or any of the events that took

place after the night of the incident. Without knowledge of the

alleged violations, Defendant Wong could not have responded to or

be held liable for failing to respond to such violations. In

addition, there is an absence of evidence of Defendant Wong's

alleged failure to train, supervise and control his subordinates to

adhere to jail policy. 

Even if Defendant Wong were liable in his supervisorial

capacity, the Court finds that he is not liable for being

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. Plaintiff

claims that the inadequate medical treatment and delay caused

significant harm. To the contrary, the evidence shows that

Plaintiff received sufficient medical treatment within a reasonable

amount of time. Within one hour of his injury, Plaintiff was seen

by a nurse in his cell. Because the Main Jail did not have x-ray

services available at the time of the injury, the nurse scheduled

an x-ray to be taken the following morning. The nurse did not

prescribe Plaintiff pain killers because he already had an

outstanding prescription. After an x-ray was taken, Plaintiff was

brought to the VMC Emergency Room, where he was treated by three

doctors, including one orthopedist. Plaintiff was given Vicodin

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 12 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

and a hard-sole shoe to wear. He was also scheduled for a followup appointment the following week. Thereafter, Plaintiff was

treated by orthopedists and the Main Jail medical staff until

December, 2004. At most, Plaintiff has alleged a claim of

negligence, which does not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. 

Accordingly, Defendant Wong is entitled to summary judgment on

the deliberate indifference claim as a matter of law. See Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

II. Named Doe Defendants and Service Order

As mentioned above, the Court found cognizable Plaintiff's

Eighth Amendment claims against several Doe Defendants. Plaintiff

has since filed an amended complaint identifying five Doe

Defendants as: (1) Correctional Officer Gill for failing to take

"steps to immediately call for medical assistance" directly after

Plaintiff's injury and forcing Plaintiff to walk back to his cell;

(2) Sergeant Csabanyi, in his supervisorial capacity, for approving

the Employee's Report written by Officer Gill; (3) "Nurse Myrna"

for failing to take "further steps to secure Plaintiff's left foot,

address the obvious pain Plaintiff was in, [or] call for emergency

medical help" after Plaintiff's injury; (4) Doctor Nguyen, who

examined the x-rays of Plaintiff's left foot, for failing to

"secure Plaintiff's foot by placing a splint or any other medical

remedy;" and (5) Correctional Officer Bevan for denying Plaintiff's

request for a wheelchair and forcing Plaintiff to walk to and from

the VMC Emergency Department while witnessing the "pain and

suffering Plaintiff was in. . . ." (Am. Compl. at 2-4.) 

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 13 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

In light of the Court's ruling on Defendant Wong's motion for

summary judgment, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not

adequately state a claim for relief against Defendant Csabanyi,

who, like Defendant Wong, is being sued in his supervisorial

capacity. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Csabanyi

are DISMISSED. 

The claims asserted against Defendants Nguyen and "Nurse

Myrna" are susceptible to resolution on the facts now before the

Court. Because the medical records concerning Plaintiff's medical

treatment for his injured foot have been submitted, further

briefing is not necessary. Summary judgment may be properly

entered in favor of unserved defendants where (1) the controlling

issues would be the same as to the unserved defendants, (2) those

issues have been briefed and (3) Plaintiff has been provided an

opportunity to address the controlling issues. Columbia Steel

Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802-03 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 178 (1995) (citing, inter alia,

Silverton v. Department of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th

Cir. 1981)). Such is the case here. Plaintiff's claims against

Defendants Nguyen and "Nurse Myrna" would require a showing that

Plaintiff was denied proper medical care. Plaintiff has had an

opportunity to present evidence on these issues. The Court has

found that Plaintiff received sufficient and timely medical care;

therefore, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claims against

Defendants Nguyen and "Nurse Myrna," and they are entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law.

The Eighth Amendment claims against the remaining named Doe

Defendants will be served.

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 14 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons,

1. Defendant Wong's motion for summary judgment (docket

no. 28) is GRANTED. Judgment in favor of Defendant Wong, as well

as Defendants Nguyen and "Nurse Myrna," shall be entered. 

2. Defendant Smith's motion for summary judgment (docket no.

28) is terminated as moot.

3. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Csabanyi are

DISMISSED. 

4. The Clerk of the Court shall mail to Defendants

Correctional Officer Gill #2528 and Correctional Officer Bevan

#1597 at the Santa Clara County Main Jail: a Notice of Lawsuit and

Request for Waiver of Service of Summons; two copies of the Waiver

of Service of Summons; a copy of the original complaint (docket no.

1); a copy of the Amended Complaint filed on July 13, 2006; a copy

of Plaintiff's Affidavit attached to his Opposition (docket no.

49); a copy of the February 24, 2006 Order of Service; and a copy

of this Order. The Clerk of Court shall also mail a copy of the

Amended Complaint and a copy of this Order to the Office of the

County Counsel in San Jose. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a

copy of this Order to Plaintiff.

5. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary

costs of service of the summons and complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4,

if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the

Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons,

fail to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of such

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 15 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and

return the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will

proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that the

waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B),

Defendants will not be required to serve and file an answer before

sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver was

sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required

if formal service of summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked

to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that

more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to

waiver of service of the summons. If service is waived after the

date provided in the Notice but before Defendants have been

personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the

date on which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days

from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

6. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The following briefing

schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than thirty (30) days from the date their

answer is due, Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment

or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by

adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they

shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly

served on Plaintiff.

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 16 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion

shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later

than thirty (30) days after the date on which Defendants' motion is

filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should

be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end

your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute

about any fact that would affect the result of your case,

the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided

in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of

defendants, your case will be dismissed and there will be

no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (party opposing

summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable

issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the burden of proving

his allegations in this case, he must be prepared to produce

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 17 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

evidence in support of those allegations when he files his

opposition to Defendants' dispositive motion. Such evidence may

include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to the

incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn

declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment

simply by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall

do so no later than fifteen (15) days after the date Plaintiff's

opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion

unless the Court so orders at a later date.

7. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant

to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

8. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be

served on Defendants, or Defendants' counsel once counsel has been

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or

Defendants' counsel.

9. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. 

10. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time

must be filed no later than seven days prior to the deadline sought

to be extended.

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 18 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 When the mental or physical condition of a party (or a person

under the custody or legal control of a party) is at issue in a

lawsuit, Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the

court to order that person to submit to a physical or mental

examination. The examination must be done by a suitably licensed or

certified examiner, such as a physician or psychiatrist. The party

who requested the examination must pay for it. In the present case,

the Court is unable to assess at this time whether a physical

examination of Plaintiff's left foot is necessary. For this reason,

his motion is DENIED as premature.

19

11. Plaintiff's pending motions including his: "Request for

Conference Between Defendants [sic] Counsel and Plaintiff" (docket

no. 34); Requests for Phone Depositions of Lt. Troy Beliveau

(docket no. 37) and Alexander Chyorny, M.D. (docket no. 38); and

"Notice of Motion and Motion for 'Order for Physical Examination'

of Plaintiff's Medical Records and Plaintiff's Left Foot" (docket

no. 39)4

 are DENIED as premature. 

12. The Clerk of the Court is directed to file the document

labeled "Amended Complaint to Add and Name Doe Defendants," and

docket the aforementioned document as Plaintiff's "Amended

Complaint." The Clerk is further directed to mark the Amended

Complaint as filed on July 13, 2006, the date it was received by

the Court.

13. This Order terminates Docket nos. 28, 34, 37, 38, and 39.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 9/24/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 19 of 20
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUARTE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SMITH et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-01374 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on September 24, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Eric Duarte T-24814

Salinas Valley State Prison

#235/L

P.O. Box 1050

Soledad, CA 93960-1060

Neysa A. Fligor F

Office of the County Counsel

70 West Hedding Street, East Wing, 9th Fl

San Jose, CA 95110

Dated: September 24, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 5:05-cv-01374-JF Document 59 Filed 09/24/07 Page 20 of 20