Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05278/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05278-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

CITY OF TURLOCK, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:04-CV-05278 OWW DLB

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES (Doc.

224)

I. INTRODUCTION

Prevailing Defendants, the City of Turlock and the Turlock

City Council (collectively, “the City” or “Turlock”), move for an

award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiffs,

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust

(collectively, “Wal-Mart”), oppose the motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case has been discussed at

length in several previous decisions. For the purposes of this

motion, only a brief summary of facts, most of which where

undisputed throughout the litigation, is necessary. 

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Wal-Mart alleged that its representatives originally began

negotiations with the City in December 2002 to establish a WalMart Supercenter in Turlock; that these negotiations appeared

likely to succeed as late as July 2003, when Wal-Mart purchased

the real property for the prospective Supercenter; and that, at

about that time, local grocery store owners learned of Wal-Mart’s

plans, and began lobbying the Council to exclude Wal-Mart from

Turlock in order to protect themselves from Wal-Mart’s

competition.

On December 16, 2003, and January 13, 2004, the Turlock City

Council adopted Ordinance Nos. 1015-CS and 1016 (the

“Ordinance”). The Ordinance amended the City’s Zoning Code and

Northwest Triangle Specific Plan, and was codified in Sections 9-

1-202 and 9-3-302 of the Turlock Municipal Code. The Ordinance

created three new categories of commercial retail land uses:

“Discount Stores,” “Discount Clubs,” and “Discount Superstores.” 

“Discount Stores” are:

stores with off-street parking that usually offer a

variety of customer services, centralized cashing, and

a wide range of products. [“Discount Stores”] usually

maintain long store hours seven (7) days a week. The

stores are often the only ones on the site, but they

can also be found in mutual operation with a related or

unrelated garden center or service station. Discount

stores are also sometimes found as separate parcels

within a retail complex with their own dedicated

parking. 

A “Discount Club” is:

a discount store or warehouse where shoppers pay a

membership fee in order to take advantage of discounted

prices on a wide variety of items such as food,

clothing, tires, and appliances; many items are sold in

large quantities or bulk. 

 

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A “Discount Superstore” is: 

a store that is similar to a “Discount Store” . . .

with the exception that [it] also contain[s] a fullservice grocery department under the same roof that

shares entrances and exits with the discount store

area. Such retail stores exceed 100,000 square feet of

gross floor area and devote at least five percent (5%)

of the total sales floor area to the sale of nontaxable merchandise....These stores usually offer a

variety of customer services, centralized cashing, and

a wide range of products. They typically maintain long

store hours seven (7) days a week. The stores are

often the only ones on the site, but they can also be

found in mutual operation with a related or unrelated

garden center or service station. Discount superstores

are also sometimes found as separate parcels within a

retail complex with their own dedicated parking.

In Turlock, discount stores and discount clubs are permitted

conditional uses in the C-C, C-H, and C-T commercial zones. 

Discount superstores are not permitted uses, conditional or

otherwise, in any City zone. The Ordinance prohibits Plaintiffs

from siting a Wal-Mart Supercenter (a “Discount Superstore”) in

Turlock.

The Ordinance’s Preamble makes the following findings: 

• WHEREAS, the [City] General Plan (including, but not

limited to, policies 2.4-a, 2.4-g, 2.4-h, 2.4-j, 2.4-k)

establishes locational requirements for the [regional

and neighborhood] retail centers: encouraging a number

of neighborhood centers equally dispersed throughout

the [C]ity while encouraging a concentration of

regional shopping centers along the Highway

99/Countryside Drive corridor; and 

• WHEREAS, General Plan policies promote and encourage

vital neighborhood commercial districts that are evenly

distributed throughout the city so that residents are

able to meet their basic daily shopping needs at

neighborhood shopping centers; and 

***

• WHEREAS, given the changes in the retail sector and the

evolution toward ever-bigger stores, it is necessary

that the zoning ordinance be amended to regulate larger

retail establishments appropriately and to afford them

adequate review; and 

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• WHEREAS, the [City] zoning ordinance (Title 9 of the

[City] Municipal Code) has not kept pace with the

evolution of the retail sector and fails to adequately

distinguish the size, scale and scope of various retail

activities;

***

• WHEREAS, the establishment of discount superstores in

Turlock is likely to negatively impact the vitality and

economic viability of the [C]ity’s neighborhood

commercial centers by drawing sales away from

traditional supermarkets located in these centers; and 

• WHEREAS, industry and academic studies indicate

discount superstores rarely add any retail services

currently not provided within a community, and that the

majority of sales growth at a discount supercenter

comes from a direct shift of dollars from existing

retailers within a community, primarily from grocery

stores; and 

• WHEREAS, discount superstores compete directly with

existing grocery stores that anchor neighborhoodserving commercial centers; and 

• WHEREAS, smaller stores within a neighborhood center

rely upon the foot traffic generated by the grocery

store for their existence and in neighborhood centers

where the grocery store closes, vacancy rates typically

increase and deterioration takes place in the remaining

center; and

• WHEREAS, discount superstores adversely affect the

viability of small-scale, pedestrian-friendly

neighborhood commercial areas, contributing to the

blight in these areas; and 

***

• WHEREAS, the [Ordinance’s proposed zoning changes] are

intended to preserve the [C]ity’s existing

neighborhood-serving shopping centers that are

centrally located within the community ...; and

• WHEREAS, the [C]ity’s current distribution of

neighborhood shopping centers provides convenient

shopping and employment in close proximity to most

residential neighborhoods in Turlock, consistent with

the Turlock General Plan; and

• WHEREAS, this distribution of shopping and employment

creates a land-use pattern that reduces the need for

vehicle trips and encourages walking and biking for

shopping, services, and employment. 

On January 26, 2005, Doucet & Associates, Inc., an

engineering firm, filed with the City on Wal-Mart’s behalf a

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Wal-Mart also filed an action in state court against 1

the City, Case No. F047372. In a decision issued April 5, 2006,

the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District

upheld the Ordinance, rejecting Wal-Mart’s challenges that the

City unconstitutionally exceeded its police powers and failed to

comply with the California Environmental Quality Act: 

(1) a city may exercise its police power to control and

organize development within its boundaries as a means

of serving the general welfare, (2) [the] City made a

legitimate policy choice when it decided to organize

development using neighborhood shopping centers

dispersed throughout the city, (3) the [O]rdinance was

reasonably related to protecting that development

choice, and (4) no showing was made that the

restrictions significantly affected residents of

surrounding communities. Accordingly, the restrictions

in the ordinance bear a reasonable relationship to the

general welfare and, thus, [the] City constitutionally

exercised its police power.

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document entitled “an application for entitlements for a Wal-Mart

Supercenter proposed for development in Turlock.” On April 15,

2005, Wal-Mart filed with the City a revised application. By

letter dated May 9, 2005, City Planning Manager Michael I. Cooke

rejected the revised application because the operation of a

Discount Superstore is barred by the Ordinance.

On February 11, 2004, Wal-Mart filed this lawsuit in federal

court alleging that City’s expressions of concern for air

quality, traffic flows, and urban blight are pretextual, and that

the City’s true motive is to protect local retailers from

competition in violation of the Commerce Clause and Equal

Protection Clauses of both the United States and California

Constitutions. Wal-Mart also argued the Ordinance is void for

vagueness under the United States Constitution’s Due Process

Clauses.1

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Wal-Mart v. City of Turlock, 138 Cal. App. 4th 273, 279 (2006). 

The district court’s conclusion that Save Mart had not 2

shown Wal-Mart’s claim to be frivolous or meritless applies

exclusively to the Commerce Clause claim. Wal-Mart’s suggestion

that the district court’s decision on the motion for

reconsideration applies to the other claims in the case is

misplaced. Although the district court did acknowledge that the

requested discovery might be relevant to the other claims in the

case and briefly summarized the nature of those claims, the

district court did not further discuss the other claims. (See

Doc. 80 at 5.) 

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The City did not file any challenges to the pleadings. In

late November 2004, Wal-Mart filed a motion to compel Save Mart

Supermarkets, a non-party, to produce certain discovery

concerning the Commerce Clause claims. (Doc. 12.) Magistrate

Judge Dennis L. Beck granted the motion and ordered Save Mart to

provide information and documents concerning communications

between Save Mart, the City, and other third parties relating to

the Ordinance. (Doc. 30 at 6; Doc. 80 at 5.) Save Mart moved

for reconsideration. (Doc. 25, filed Feb. 25, 2005.) The

request for reconsideration was denied by the district court on

June 1, 2005. (Doc. 80.) Among other things, the district court

reasoned:

Save Mart’s contention that the Ordinance in no way

implicates the Commerce Clause is mistaken. As the

magistrate judge noted, state legislation may

constitute economic protectionism on the basis of

discriminatory purpose or effect. See Baccus Imps., 468

U.S. at 270. Save Mart has not shown that Wal-Mart’s

claim that the Ordinance is discriminatory in effect is

frivolous or meritless.

(Doc. 80 at 27 (emphasis added).)2

On March 29, 2005, the City moved for summary judgment. 

(Doc. 50.) The City supplemented its motion on October 11, 2005.

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Wal-Mart attaches too much importance to the fact that 3

the district court granted the parties leave to file supplemental

briefs. Wal-Mart suggests that this is somehow indicative of the

merit of their claims. (Doc. 229 at 6-7.) It is not. It is

simply indicative of the district court’s attempt to fairly

administer justice in an adversarial system. 

7

(Doc. 152.) Wal-Mart filed opposition on November 2, 2005 (Doc.

155) and the city replied on December 12, 2005 (Doc. 190). Oral

argument on the motion was heard February 6, 2006 (Doc. 203), at

which time the court granted the parties leave to file

supplemental briefs concerning the issues of ripeness and

exhaustion of administrative remedies in connection with the

equal protection claim. (Doc. 204. at 1.) Wal-Mart filed a

supplemental brief on February 21, 2006 (Doc. 204), and the City

filed a supplement on February 27, 2006 (Doc. 207). On July 3, 3

2006, the district court granted the City’s motion for summary

judgment in its entirety. (Doc. 219.)

On August 23, 2006, the City filed the instant motion for

attorneys fees (Doc. 224), along with supporting declarations.

(Docs. 226, 227 & 231.) Wal-Mart opposed. (Doc. 229, filed on

Sept. 29, 2006.) The City replied. (Doc. 230, filed Oct. 6,

2006.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Framework.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n

any action or proceeding to enforce...[42 U.S.C. §] 1983...the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party...a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” A prevailing

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defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to an attorneys fee

award under § 1988 only if the plaintiff’s claims were

“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Hughes v.

Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980)(citing Christiansburg Garment Co v.

EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). 

Because Congress intended to promote vigorous enforcement of

civil rights laws, “a district court must exercise caution in

awarding fees to a prevailing defendant in order to avoid

discouraging legitimate suits that may not be ‘airtight.’” See

EEOC v. Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1993)

(quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court

warned in Christiansburg against the “temptation to engage in

post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did

not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or

without foundation.” Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d at 290 (quoting

Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22). Accordingly, a prevailing

defendant is not entitled to attorney’s fees merely because the

defendant prevailed on the merits. For example, a Title VII

complaint that makes out a prima facie showing of disparate

treatment but ultimately fails on the merits should not be deemed

“clearly frivolous.” See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d

439, 444 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Courts should be cautious when considering an award to a

prevailing defendant where the lawsuit was initiated by a party

with limited financial resources or one who is appearing pro se. 

See Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619

(9th Cir. 1987). Courts have expressed more willingness,

however, to award attorneys fees against “corporate-type

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plaintiffs who present meritless civil rights claims,” because

“[s]aid group of plaintiffs is certainly well equipped to finance

a civil rights suit.” Goldrich, Kest & Stern v. City of San

Fernando, 617 F. Supp. 557, 564 -565 (D.C. Cal.1985)

For the Court, the chilling effects of an award of

attorney's fees to prevailing defendants as against a

corporate-type plaintiff is de minimus. At the very

least, courts should not hesitate to award attorney's

fees against corporate civil rights plaintiffs when the

Christiansburg standard has been met

Id. 

Turlock cites several cases in support of its request for

attorney’s fees. First, the City places great emphasis on a

First Circuit case, Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38

(1st Cir. 1985), asserting that Raskiewicz presents an “analogous

factual pattern.” (Doc. 230 at 2.) But, Raskiewicz is less

analogous than the City suggests. In Raskiewicz, the plaintiff,

a developer, alleged that the Town of New Boston had deprived him

of his civil rights and violated the Sherman Act by refusing to

grant him a permit to remove gravel from his property. Id. at

43. The district court granted defendants’ motions for summary

judgment and for attorney’s fees. Id. The plaintiff appealed

both rulings. 

The factual circumstances of Raskiewicz are complex, but,

essentially, the developer alleged that the Town exhibited bias,

bad faith, and malice in repeatedly refusing to approve his

development plans. The First Circuit began its review of the

merits of the case by noting that “federal courts do not sit as a

super zoning board or a zoning board of appeals.” Id. at 44

(citations omitted). The Raskiewicz court relied upon a First

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 The Raskiewicz court reached a similar conclusion with 4

respect to plaintiff’s Sherman Act claims. 754 F.2d at 45. 

10

Circuit rule that generally “prohibit[s] ordinary land use

disputes from being litigated under § 1983.” Id. at 44. 

Raskiewicz argued that this rule should be ignored where “bias,

bad faith, and other ‘opprobrious epithets of malice’” are

alleged. But the First Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning

that such allegations of bias and bad faith are “commonplace in

cases of this nature.” Id. (citations omitted). 

If all that were required to secure federal

jurisdiction were loose claims of conspiracy and

corruption, virtually any case of this type could be

brought into the federal court. Here, even

assuming-which is unclear-that Raskiewicz, in alleging

bias and conspiracy, is implicitly alleging actual

corruption on the part of the Board and Redimix, and

that sufficiently serious, supported, assertions of

this type could make out a due process claim under

section 1983 (a matter we do not now decide), the

record falls far short of creating a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to such a claim.

Id. The Raskiewicz court next examined the factual record and

found “nothing that supports an inference of actual bias, let

alone corruption,” in part because the Town Board “did in fact

twice offer Raskiewicz a permit although it was not required by

the ordinance to do so.” Id. at 45. The First Circuit held 4

that Raskiewicz's federal claims were “totally frivolous and

unwarranted” and affirmed the award of attorneys' fees and costs

to the defendants. 

Raskiewicz does not provide helpful guidance here. First,

the case analyzes and applies various lines of First Circuit

authority that appear to have no direct parallels in the Ninth

Circuit. Second, the fact that the Raskiewicz court was

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unimpressed by the plaintiff’s allegations of bias only

underscores the fact-specific nature of the Christiansburg

inquiry. 

More helpful is Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452

F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). In that case, the municipal defendant

refused to allow plaintiff permission to land his private jet at

the local airport because the jet violated the airport’s preexisting weight restrictions. Id. at 1058. Plaintiff filed

suit, alleging both constitutional and statutory grounds for

relief. Id. at 1059. The district court deemed all of

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims to be frivolous. The district

court then granted defendants’ motion for fees in part as to the

fees incurred defending against the frivolous claims, but denied

the motion as to fees incurred defending against several nonfrivolous statutory claims. Id.. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,

reasoning that Tutor’s constitutional claims were indeed

frivolous: 

Although Tutor cites various cases which he contends

demonstrate that his claims were not frivolous, as we

explain below, we conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion when it found that Tutor

lacked a factual and legal basis for his constitutional

claims at the outset of the litigation.

Id. at 1061. For each constitutional claim, the Ninth Circuit

inquired whether the plaintiff had a “factual and legal basis for

his constitutional claim[] at the outset of the litigation.” For

example, with respect to plaintiff’s procedural due process

claim, the Ninth Circuit reasoned: 

To establish a violation of procedural due process a

plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected liberty or property

interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural

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protections. Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood

Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998).

As noted above, Tutor was not deprived of a liberty or

property interest because he was able to access his

vacation home by use of another aircraft. Accordingly,

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

found that Tutor knew that this claim was frivolous

from the outset of the litigation.

Id. at 1061 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning with

respect to the plaintiff’s equal protection claim was similar: 

It is clear that aircraft weight is not a suspect

classification, and there is no fundamental right to

land an aircraft at any particular airport. See Hager

v. City of West Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 872 (7th Cir.

1996) (“Access to real property does not rise to the

level of a fundamental right such that its denial

merits heightened scrutiny.”). Therefore, rational

basis review applies.

Under rational basis review, the Equal Protection

Clause is satisfied if: (1) “there is a plausible

policy reason for the classification,” (2) “the

legislative facts on which the classification is

apparently based rationally may have been considered to

be true by the governmental decisionmaker,” and (3)

“the relationship of the classification to its goal is

not so attenuated as to render the distinction

arbitrary or irrational.” Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11

(citations omitted).

Tutor's arguments do not overcome the obvious rational

basis for the weight limitation. Since the weight

restriction is closely related to the defendants'

interest in preserving the condition of the runway, and

Tutor had no factual basis to support his contention

that the defendants permitted other aircraft exceeding

the 95,000 pound maximum take-off weight to operate at

the airport, the district court did not abuse its

discretion when it concluded that Tutor knew or should

have known that this claim was frivolous.

Id. at 1061-62 (emphasis added)(parallel citations omitted). The

same result was reached regarding Tutor’s Commerce Clause claim

Tutor argued that defendants' ban on dual-wheel

aircraft with a maximum take-off weight in excess of

95,000 pounds is an impermissible burden on interstate

commerce. To prove a Commerce Clause violation, Tutor

had the burden of showing that defendants' restriction

has the effect of discriminating against out-of-state

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interests as compared to instate interests, or was

imposed with the primary purpose of regulating

interstate commerce. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,

336 (1979). Tutor, however, merely asserted that he

believed the ban was an impermissible burden on

interstate commerce without offering any evidence to

support the claim. Tutor offered no evidence indicating

that the ban had anything more than an incidental

effect on interstate commerce or that the weight

restriction was imposed for an impermissible purpose,

rather than the obvious purpose of promoting the safety

of the airport by preventing deterioration of its

runways. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse

its discretion when it found that Tutor knew or should

have known that this claim was frivolous from the

outset of the litigation.

Id. at 1061-62 (emphasis added)(parallel citations omitted). 

Wal-Mart argues that Tutor-Saliba is distinguishable because

here “the allegations underlying Wal-Mart’s constitutional

challenges had extensive factual support” and “the legal theories

underlying this action enjoyed extensive support in the case

law.” (Doc. 229 at 20.) Whether Wal-Mart is correct in this

assertion is discussed in detail below. In general, however,

Wal-Mart does not take issue with the general approach taken in

Tutor-Saliba – that fees are warranted where the plaintiff “knew

or should have known that [a] claim was frivolous from the outset

of the litigation.” 

The City next cites Goldrich, Kest & Stern v. City of San

Fernando, 617 F. Supp. 557 (D.C. Cal. 1985), which concerned a

developer who alleged that the City of San Fernando violated his

constitutional rights by failing to rezone property so as to

allow the developer to subdivide his land. The developer sued

the City of San Fernando, alleging that the City’s conduct (1)

constituted a taking; (2) exceeded the City’s police powers; and

(3) violated plaintiff’s equal protection rights. Ultimately,

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the Goldrich court awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant

because 

the defects of Developer's suit were of such magnitude

that the plaintiff's ultimate failure was clearly

apparent at some significant point in the proceedings. 

Id. at 565 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

The plaintiff in Goldrich had filed a parallel lawsuit in

state court, raising state procedural challenges to the City’s

actions. The state court ruled in favor of the defendants while

the federal case was still in its early stages. The Goldrich

court found this to be significant in its determination that a

fee award was justified. 

The State Decision, based on identical facts and

discovery, acts as a “significant point in the

proceedings.” By this date, Developer must have

realized the ill-founded nature of its federal claims.

Evidence produced at trial proved unconvincing to a

Superior Court judge, yet Developer continued on,

seeking to proffer the same proof to this Court.

On January 29, 1985 this Court dismissed Developer's

second amended complaint; this action coincides with

the State Decision of January 14, 1984. At the hearing

the Court alerted plaintiff of the perilous course that

[its suit] may be taking due to an increasingly

apparent lack of support for its claims. This Court's

oversight now provides a point of reference for

awarding fees. In sum, by January, 1984 it should have

been patently obvious to Developer that this action was

meritless, grounded on baseless, unsubstantiated

allegations. This Court finds that the continued

prosecution of the federal claims by Developer was

frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.

Id. at 565 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Wal-Mart asserts that Goldrich is not helpful to the City

because, at the outset of the Goldrich litigation, the district

court granted two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim

and repeatedly warned the developer that his case had no merit. 

(Doc. 229 at 21.) Nothing in the record indicates that the

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district court issued similar warnings to Wal-Mart in this case. 

There is, in fact, evidence to the contrary with respect to WalMart’s Commerce Clause claim. The decision denying Save Mart’s

motion for reconsideration states that “Save Mart has not shown

that Wal-Mart’s claim that the Ordinance is discriminatory in

effect is frivolous or meritless.” (Doc. 80 at 27.) This at

least suggests that Wal-Mart’s Commerce Clause claim was not

meritless from the outset.

As discussed, the Goldrich court also emphasized that the

developer “had previously lost a state court action involving

identical claims.” (Id.) Wal-Mart also brought a parallel state

court action against the City, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of

Turlock, 138 Cal. App. 4th 273, 299 (2006). Although no federal

constitutional challenges were raised in that action, the state

court decision did address the question of whether, under the

California Constitution, the Ordinance exceeded the police power

of the city. (Id. at 299.) In analyzing that claim, the state

court found that the Ordinance was rationally related to a

legitimate public purpose, noting “that the administrative record

is replete with evidence of the city's concerns with traffic and

urban/suburban decay that might arise from the development of

discount superstores.” Id. (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The state court’s reasoning is relevant: 

Wal-Mart does not argue that its Supercenters do not

have significant environmental effects, or even that

they do not produce the results City fears-to wit,

urban/suburban decay, increased traffic, and reduced

air quality. Instead, Wal-Mart argues the lack of a

rational relationship between those concerns and the

Ordinance is demonstrated by the fact that, while the

Ordinance bans superstores entirely, it permits the

development of alternative multitenant shopping centers

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which, according to the evidence, have even greater

negative environmental effects. The alternative

developments to which Wal-Mart refers are those

discussed in the TJKM report of November 20, 2003, all

of which include a grocery supermarket of 60,000 square

feet or more. It is clear from the record, however,

that City decision makers did not ignore either the

TJKM report, the statistics it presented, or the idea

Wal-Mart sought to convey before enacting the

Ordinance. Rather, they appear to have agreed with

City's planning staff that “[w]hile any large-scale

retail store can draw customers with low prices and a

wide selection of goods, the big box grocers present a

unique threat because of the inclusion of discount

retail and full-service grocery under a single roof.”

Further, it must be noted that City does have planning

control, through the CUP process, over the prospective

development of discount stores, discount clubs, and

supermarkets of 60,000 square feet or more. And City

has placed on record its view that the development of

large grocery supermarkets in regional shopping centers

raises environmental concerns and is undesirable.

Wal-Mart cites no authority to support the proposition

that a municipality must address all similar concerns

related to the general welfare by the same means or in

the same way.

Id. at 301-302. In addition, the state court rejected Wal-Mart’s

argument that “the Ordinance was enacted for the purpose of

targeting Wal-Mart.” Id. at 302. 

The Ordinance does not single out Wal-Mart but,

instead, prohibits all discount superstores within

City's boundaries. The record demonstrates, to be sure,

that Wal-Mart's prospective competitors, and some of

its detractors, did lobby City officials regarding

enactment of the Ordinance. As City points out,

however, it is well-established that courts must

“eschew inquiry into what motivated or influenced those

who voted on...legislation.” (Board of Supervisors v.

Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1616, 1623, 38

Cal.Rptr.2d 876.) “[T]he validity of legislative acts

must be measured by the terms of the legislation

itself, and not by the motives of, or the influences

upon, the legislators who enacted the measure.” ( City

and County of San Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 13 Cal.3d

898, 913, 120 Cal.Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403; see also

Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, supra, 68

Cal.App.3d at p. 478, 137 Cal.Rptr. 304.)

Further, the simple fact that Wal-Mart was the first

company to feel the effect of the Ordinance is not

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sufficient to establish that Wal-Mart was targeted in

any unconstitutional manner. If that fact were enough

to require a finding that a local governmental entity

had exceeded its police power, then local government

could never react to new situations brought to its

attention by a specific proposal without having that

reaction invalidated under the claim that it “targeted”

the specific proposal. In short, local governments need

the flexibility to react to specific proposals for a

new kind of development not previously contemplated

where such a development will or may have harmful

consequences to the locality's legitimate planning

objectives.

Id. at 302. Unlike in Goldrich, where the state court decision

was issued early during the federal litigation, the state court

decision in Wal-Mart was issued on April 5, 2006, after oral

argument was heard on the motion for summary judgment in the

federal case. Goldrich does not present a parallel factual

circumstance.

In sum, the Christiansburg inquiry is highly fact-specific,

and Tutor-Saliba provides some general guidance, standing for the

proposition that fees are warranted where the plaintiff “knew or

should have known that [a] claim was frivolous from the outset of

the litigation.”

B. Application to the Claims in this Case. 

1. Wal-Mart’s Purported As-Applied Claim.

Initially, it was not clear whether Wal-Mart sought to bring

only a facial challenge to the ordinance, or whether the lawsuit

also included an as-applied challenge. After the City moved for

summary judgment on only the facial challenge, Wal-Mart continued

to insist that the complaint also raised an as-applied challenge. 

But, Wal-Mart’s purported as-applied claim could not withstand

scrutiny. While the operative complaint was filed on February

11, 2004 (Doc. 1), the City did not deny Wal-Mart’s application

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until May 9, 2005 (Doc. 191). Accordingly, the district court

ruled:

The February 11, 2004, complaint could not have, and

did not, allege the City violated Wal-Mart’s

constitutional rights in applying the Ordinance to deny

Wal-Mart’s Supercenter permit application, because the

City did not apply the Ordinance to Wal-Mart’s

Supercenter supplemented application until May 9, 2005. 

The complaint does not allege facts regarding the

specific application of the Ordinance to Wal-Mart’s

Supercenter permit application. 

***

The complaint solely presents a facial challenge to the

Ordinance.

(Summary Judgment (“SJ”) Decision at 14.) 

Alternatively, even if the complaint had asserted an asapplied challenge, the district court analyzed whether any such

claim could be maintained. This analysis was suggested by

Defendants’ own memorandum in support of its motion for summary

judgment, which preemptively attacked Wal-Mart’s ability to

maintain an as-applied claim, arguing that any such claim would

not be ripe for review, that the futility exception would not

apply, and that the statute of limitations operated as a bar. 

(Doc. 51 at 21-24.) The applicability of the futility exception

and the statute of limitations issue were resolved in Wal-Mart’s

favor. The district court ruled that the facial challenge would

have subsumed any as-applied claim because the Ordinance left the

City no discretion to approve any Supercenter. 

Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe

Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064 (9 Cir. th

2003), holds no as-applied challenge can be asserted

where a statute grants no discretion to the

administering agency:

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As the district court recognized, this is

essentially a facial challenge to the inherently

unequal criteria for moving the IPES Line

contained in the 1987 Plan. The 1987 Plan

enshrined the differential triggering requirements

for the vacant lot equations of California and

Nevada; the Agency had no discretion to deviate

from the Plan’s provisions. In 1999, the Agency

did not apply equal terms unequally – it applied

inherently unequal terms in equal fashion. If the

Association thought the inequality unlawful, its

quarrel was with the terms of the 1987 Plan

itself.

Tahoe Sierra, 322 F.3d at 1080 n.15; see also Levald,

Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 689 (9th

Cir. 1993).

(SJ Decision at 27-28.) 

Wal-Mart suggests that the as-applied claim should not be

considered frivolous because the district court devoted almost

16-pages to its discussion of the as-applied claim and related

issues. (See SJ Decision at 16-28.) Wal-Mart cites Hughes v.

Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15-16 (1980), which held that “[e]ven []

allegations that were properly dismissed for failure to state a

claim” were not meritless in the Christiansburg sense” where they

“deserved and received the careful consideration of both the

District Court and the Court of Appeals.” 

Allegations that, upon careful examination, prove

legally insufficient to require a trial are not, for

that reason alone, “groundless” or “without foundation”

as required by Christiansburg.

Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15-16. This argument is persuasive. 

Although the district court ultimately found that no as-applied

claim had been asserted, whether any such claim could be

maintained was a debatable question that the district court

discussed at length. Hughes suggests that a fee award is not

appropriate under such circumstances.

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2. Constitutional Challenges.

Wal-Mart alleged that the Ordinance is unconstitutional on

three grounds: (1) it deprives Wal-Mart of the equal protection

of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the

California Constitution; (2) it discriminates against interstate

commerce, in violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the

United States Constitution (the “Commerce Clause”); and (3) it is

unconstitutionally vague. 

a. Equal Protection Challenges.

(1) Federal Equal Protection Challenges.

With respect to Wal-Mart’s federal equal protection

challenge, the district court first concluded that “[b]ecause the

Ordinance involves social and economic policy, and neither

targets a suspect class nor impinges on a fundamental right, it

is reviewed according to the ‘rational basis’ standard.” (SJ

Decision at 29 (internal citations omitted).) 

Under this test, statutes are generally presumed to be

valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn

by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate

state interest. Fields v. Legacy Health System, 413

F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2005). A legislative

classification under rational basis review must be

wholly irrational to violate equal protection. Id.

The challenger bears the burden of negating every

conceivable basis which might support the legislative

classification, whether or not the basis has a

foundation in the record. Id. A legislative choice is

not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based

on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or

empirical data. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315. 

(Id.) 

The City advanced a number of bases for the Ordinance, both

in the Ordinance’s preamble and in subsequent declarations from

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City planners. Critically for the purposes of this motion, a

number of independent studies were cited in the Ordinance’s

legislative record, including: 

• A study commissioned by the City of Oakland that

shows the traffic impact of a discount superstore

is greater than the traffic impact of a

supermarket, a discount club, or a discount store. 

It also shows discount superstores cause blight

and an increase in air pollution.

• A study by VRPA Technologies, Inc., that shows

Wal-Mart Supercenters generate 34.5% more vehicle

trips than had been previously estimated by the

Institute of Transportation Engineers. 

• A report for the City of Fremont that shows

discount superstores generate more vehicle trips

than discount clubs.

• A study by Strategic Economics that discusses the

store closures and negative effects on the City of

Fremont’s business district the study stated would

be caused by a discount superstore opening in the

City of Fremont.

• A Contra Costa County study that shows discount

superstores are likely to cause blight and

increased traffic.

• A Mississippi State University study that

discusses the economic impacts of discount

superstores on existing businesses.

• An Oklahoma City report that describes the

relationship between urban blight and Wal-Mart

Supercenters. 

• A Business Week article that discusses store

closures caused by Wal-Mart Supercenters.

Wal-Mart should have known about these various bases for banning

Supercenters advanced in these sources at the outset of this

litigation.

The district court deemed all of the interests protected by

the Ordinance to be legitimate state interests, over Wal-Mart’s

unfounded objections. For example, Wal-Mart’s argued that the

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Specifically, Wal-Mart argued: 5

The City’s explanation for the cause of blight or decay

is erroneous. The City has it backwards. “Blight” is

not caused by new development; rather, blight results

from economic and community deficiencies which have

resulted in a decline in employment, income, and

wealth. The resulting loss of consumer demand can

result in failures of neighborhood businesses, which

may result in under-maintained or vacant buildings if

appropriate re-tenanting does not occur. In short,

losses of community vitality, and not any commercial

“use,” cause blight. 

(Doc. 155, 19.) 

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prevention of urban blight is not a legitimate state interest

(Doc. 155 at 18), despite a body of binding contrary authority. 5

See Hispanic Taco Vendors of Washington v. City of Pasco, 994

F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1993) (Commerce Clause); Burlington

Northern R.R. Co. v. Department of Public Serv. Regulation, 763

F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[t]he standard for judging the

constitutionality of a statute...which regulates economic

activity, is the same under the...[E]qual [P]rotection or

[C]ommerce [C]lauses”). 

Wal-Mart also questioned the distinctions drawn in the

Ordinance between discount superstores, which are prohibited, and

other retail formats. Wal-Mart argued that this distinction

bears no rational relationship to any legitimate interest. (Doc.

155 at 19-27.) The City, in its memoranda in support of its

motion for summary judgment, pointed out that the legislative

history was filled with evidence that a discount superstore has

uniquely detrimental impacts on a community.

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[S]tudies in the legislative record showed [] Discount

Superstores cause more traffic than Discount Stores,

Discount Clubs, or supermarkets, and this provides a

rational basis for prohibiting them. There was

evidence in the record that people shop for groceries

2-3 times a week – more often than they visit a

Discount Store or a Discount Club. [citation] Although

Discount Clubs sell groceries, because they sell in

bulk, the number of customer trips is less. [citation]

Although Supermarkets are similar to Discount

Superstores in that they generate more trips per week

than Discount Stores and Discount Clubs, they do not

attract customers from as large a trade area as

Discount Superstores, which because of their size and

the synergy between their supermarket and discount

store components draw customers from a larger area and

therefore cause more vehicle miles to be driven.

[citation] This increased traffic also causes more air

pollution. [citation] 

The record also included evidence that competition from

a Discount Superstore would threaten the viability of

existing neighborhood centers by causing the closure of

the supermarkets that anchor those centers, thereby

causing blight. This also provides a rational basis

for prohibiting Discount Superstores. [citations] With

regard to Turlock specifically, the City Council

received information that one Discount Superstore

opening in Turlock would likely cause two or three

supermarkets to close. [citation] This would mean two

or three neighborhood shopping centers would lose their

anchors and those shopping centers would then likely

slip into decay. 

(Doc. 51 at 26-27.) Wal-Mart knew or should have been aware of

the bases that would be advanced by the City prior to filing its

lawsuit because the bases were articulated in the Preamble to the

ordinance. Wal-Mart submitted evidence suggesting that the

evidence upon which the City relied was erroneous, but such

evidence is of no legal consequence:

It is well established a legislative choice is not

subject to courtroom fact-finding on rational-basis

review, and may be based on rational speculation

unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Judicial

review is at an end once the court identifies a

plausible basis on which the legislature may have

relied. Rui One Corp., 371 F.3d at 1155; accord,

SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta,

309 F.3d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 2002); Jackson Water Works,

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Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of State of Cal., 793

F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[a]ll that is needed

to uphold the state’s classification scheme is to find

that there are ‘plausible,’ ‘arguable,’ or

‘conceivable’ reasons which may have been the basis for

the distinction”); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. SarasotaManatee Airport Authority, 825 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir.

1987) (“the federal courts do not sit as arbiters of

the wisdom or utility” of economic legislation) (citing

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,

469 (1981)). 

(SJ Decision at 33-34.) 

Wal-Mart placed greatest emphasis on its final allegation:

that the ordinance violated equal protection because it was the

result of collusion between local economic interests (owners of

the neighborhood grocery stores and union representatives of

those who worked in them) and the Council, acting with the

improper legislative motive of protecting local merchants and

unions from Wal-Mart’s “foreign” competition. (Doc. 155 at 17.) 

The district court found that, even if true, such improper

motives did not require the invalidation of the Ordinance under

an equal protection analysis: 

Even an improper motive, without more, does not affect

constitutional review of legislation: 

According to the Supreme Court, “it is entirely

irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the

conceived reason for the challenged distinction

actually motivated the legislature.” Beach

Communications, 508 U.S. at 315. The First

Circuit has specifically rejected a claim that an

environmental ordinance violated the Equal

Protection Clause because its challengers alleged

that its passage was motivated by a desire to

restrict a business’s power in dealing with

unions. 

Rui One Corp., 371 F.3d at 1155 (citing Int'l Paper Co.

v. Town of Jay, 928 F.2d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 1991)).

In International Paper, a paper company sued to

invalidate and enjoin enforcement of a municipal

ordinance regulating emission of pollutants by

industries and businesses, including plaintiff. Int’l

Paper, 928 F.2d at 481-82. The company argued the

ordinance unduly restricted its bargaining power in a

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labor dispute with striking unions. Int’l Paper, 928

F.2d at 482. The town’s board of selectmen, most of

whom were striking union employees, authorized the

drafting of the ordinance, and proposed it be put to a

public referendum, and it passed. Id. After ruling

the ordinance was a facially valid exercise of the

town’s power to enact economic legislation, the court

refused to “delve into the motivations of the Board

members who proposed and drafted the [o]rdinance”:

[W]hile courts may look to legislators’ motives

where a suspect or quasi-suspect classification is

subjected to discrimination or a fundamental right

is infringed [citations], absent these

circumstances, we will not strike down an

otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of

an alleged illicit legislative motive. 

Int’l Paper, 928 F.2d at 485. 

(SJ Decision at 37-38.) 

Although the district court rejected all of Wal-Mart’s

arguments, the critical question is whether the equal protection

claim had a legal or factual basis at the outset of the

litigation. Wal-Mart cites a number of cases in support of its

assertion that “the equal protection claim was well-grounded in

fact and constitutional jurisprudence, including Romer v. Evans,

517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). In Romer, the Supreme Court applied a

version of the rational basis test to conclude that a Colorado

Constitutional amendment that prohibited all legislative,

executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual

persons from discrimination “lacks a rational relationship to

legitimate state interests,” id. at 632, in part because a

“desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a

legitimate governmental interest.” Id. at 634. Wal-Mart

maintained that, under Romer, where a statute singles out a group

of persons because of a particular trait, an otherwise legitimate

state interest may be overcome if there is evidence of animus

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The Cleburne/Romer approach is sometimes referred to as 6

“rational basis with bite.” See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note,

Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other

Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779 (1987).

26

toward that corporation. Applying this principle to their own

situation, Wal-Mart argued that, where there was evidence that

the City singled out Wal-Mart because of its use of a particular

retail format, the Supercenter, the City’s stated interests could

be overcome.

Although the district court did not adopt this application

of the rational basis test, it cannot be said that the theory

underlying its claim was totally without merit. Prior to the

filing of this lawsuit on February 11, 2004, Wal-Mart’s theory

had not been addressed, directly or indirectly, by any court of

appeals or the Supreme Court. Moreover, whether the “higherorder rational basis review,” utilized by the Supreme Court in 6

Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (applied to homosexuals), and City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)(applied

to mentally retarded), is broadly applicable in other contexts is

far from clear. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th

Cir. 2004)(discussing three competing interpretations of the

Cleburne/Romer approach). 

By July 2006, at least one other district court from another

circuit had rejected a very similar argument in a case brought on

Wal-Mart’s behalf. See Retail Industry Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder,

435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 501 (D. Md. 2006). In Retail Industry

Leaders, an association (of which Wal-Mart was a member)

challenged a Maryland statute imposing a tax upon large, forCase 1:04-cv-05278-OWW -DLB Document 236 Filed 03/13/07 Page 26 of 35
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profit employers that spend less than certain percentage of total

wages paid to employees in the state on health insurance costs. 

It was anticipated that only Wal-Mart would be affected by the

statute. The association argued that the statute violated the

Equal Protection Clause because it intentionally targeted WalMart. But, the district court rejected this argument, explaining

that “antipathy” was only relevant in the equal protection

context in cases involving “politically vulnerable groups”:

Unless there is a reason to “infer antipathy” from the

targeting of a particular group or person, “[t]he

Constitution presumes that...even improvident decisions

will eventually be rectified by the democratic process

and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted

no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch

has acted.” Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 314, (quoting

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). It is only

in cases involving politically vulnerable groups that

the Supreme Court has appeared to rely, at least in

part, on legislative antipathy when invalidating a law

under the rational basis test. See Romer v. Evans, 517

U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado constitutional

amendment that prohibited the state and local

governments from passing laws to protect persons from

discrimination based on their sexual orientation); City

of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.

432 (1985) (invalidating zoning ordinance that

authorized a denial of a special use permit for

mentally retarded persons to live together in a group

home). Wal-Mart does not contend that it is similarly

situated to the plaintiffs in Romer and Cleburne, and

the fact that it is the only entity subject to the

spending requirement of the Fair Share Act is not

itself sufficient to make out a viable equal protection

claim. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,

306 (1976) (expressly overruling Morey v. Doud, 354

U.S. 457 (1957)). 

Id. at 501. This analysis is persuasive. However, this case was

decided after the filing of this lawsuit. Moreover, it is nonbinding authority. 

In sum, although the district court ultimately rejected WalMart’s equal protection argument, Wal-Mart’s animus argument was

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not totally without foundation at the outset of the litigation. 

b. California Equal Protection Claim

Wal-Mart also invoked the Equal Protection Clause of Article

I, Section 7, of the California Constitution, which is

essentially interpreted as being equivalent to the federal equal

protection clause. See Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th

537, 572 (2002); Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th 472, 481-82

(2000). The district court rejected the California

Constitutional equal protection claim for the same reasons it

rejected the federal equal protection claim, noting that all are

“equally enjoined from establishing a discount superstore in

Turlock.” (SJ Decision at 40.) Yet, for the same reasons that

the federal equal protection claim was not frivolous, neither was

the California equal protection claim. 

c. Commerce Clause Claim. 

Wal-Mart next contended that the Ordinance violated the

dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits the states from enacting

laws which impede the flow of interstate commerce. Edgar v. MITE

Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982). In fact, as discussed above,

discovery related to the Commerce Clause claim was the subject of

a motion to compel. The district court, ruling on a non-party’s

motion for reconsideration of the magistrate’s ruling granting

Wal-Mart’s motion to compel, reasoned that the non-party had

failed to establish that Wal-Mart’s Commerce Clause claim was

meritless or frivolous. (Doc. 80 at 27.) Wal-Mart was entitled

to rely on this determination in pursuing its Commerce Clause

claim. 

Moreover, although the district court eventually ruled in

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favor of defendants on the Commerce Clause issues, Wal-Mart’s

claim was not totally unreasonable from the outset of the

litigation. Wal-Mart advanced a number of legal arguments that

were not wholly baseless. For example, in support of its

argument that a statute may violate the Commerce Clause if it is

the intent of the legislature to discriminate against interstate

commerce, Wal-Mart cited Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.

263 (1984), in which the Supreme Court stated:

A finding that state legislation constitutes “economic

protectionism” may be made on the basis of either

discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect[.] 

Id. at 270 (citations omitted). The district court did not find

this language controlling, however, reasoning that “the Bacchus

Imports Court did not hold the statute was unconstitutional

solely because of its intended purpose.” (SJ Decision at 46.) 

Bacchus Imports cited Hunt for the proposition that a

state statute may be invalidated based on its apparent

purpose. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 270. However,

Hunt does not stand for the proposition that alleged

discriminatory purpose alone will invalidate a statute. 

See Hunt, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977) (“[a]s the

[d]istrict [c]ourt correctly found, the challenged

statute has the practical effect of not only burdening

interstate sales of Washington apples, but also

discriminating against them”) (emphasis added).

(Id. at 46-47.) The district court distinguished the cases cited

by Wal-Mart and ultimately rejected Wal-Mart’s argument. But to

now find the argument to be frivolous would be to succumb to the

“temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that,

because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must

have been unreasonable or without foundation.” Bruno's

Restaurant, 13 F.3d at 290 (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at

421-22.) Wal-Mart advanced other legal theories in support of

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its Commerce Clause claims that, although ultimately

unsuccessful, cannot be deemed frivolous in hindsight,

particularly in light of the fact that the district court

previously indicted that Wal-Mart’s Commerce Clause claims were

not frivolous. Defendants are not entitled to recover attorney’s

fees incurred defending against this claim.

d. Vagueness 

Finally, Wal-Mart argued that the Ordinance is

unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. (Doc. 155, at 48-50.) 

This claim was rejected outright because “[v]agueness challenges

to statutes that do not involve First Amendment violations must

be examined as applied to defendant.” United States v. Jae Gab

Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2006)(citing Village of

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,

495 n.7 (1982)). Because Wal-Mart had not asserted an as-applied

challenge to the Ordinance, the vagueness claim was meritless. 

In the alternative, assuming, arguendo, that the complaint had

asserted an as-applied challenge, the district court found that

the vagueness challenge necessarily failed because the Ordinance

clearly prohibits Wal-Mart from establishing a Wal-Mart

Supercenter in Turlock. (SJ Decision at 62.) 

Wal-Mart suggests that it had a non-frivolous basis for

arguing that the Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague as to

what uses are permitted. For example, Wal-Mart suggested that if

it “sought to build two stores next door to one another -- a

discount store and a grocery store -- where each store was less

than 100,000 square feet, the Ordinance would not provide a clear

ascertainable standard for Wal-Mart (or any other applicant) to

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determine whether such a project would be permitted.” (Doc. 229

at 18.) However, Wal-Mart never pled or presented any evidence

that it filed any application, complete or otherwise, with

Turlock regarding anything other than a Supercenter. Therefore,

there could never have been any as-applied vagueness claim based

on the Ordinance’s failure to clearly delineate whether WalMart’s hypothetical two-store plan would be permissible. 

The vagueness claim was frivolous from the outset of the

litigation. Defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney’s

fees incurred defending against the vagueness claim. 

C. Reasonable Attorney’s Fees.

“In determining what a reasonable attorney’s fee entails,

the district court must apply the hybrid approach adopted in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 [] (1983).” United

States v. $12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 1513, 1520 (9th Cir.

1992). “The most useful starting point for determining the

amount of a reasonable fee is [1] the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation [2] multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate.” Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir.

2001)(relying upon Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The resulting

figure is known as the “Lodestar.” 

To determine what qualifies as reasonable attorney’s fees,

the Ninth Circuit has adopted the twelve Lodestar Factors as

“guidelines [and] as appropriate factors to be considered in the

balancing process required in a determination of reasonable

attorney’s fees:” 

(1) the time and labor required, 

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(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly,

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, 

(5) the customary fee, 

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, 

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances,

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, 

(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, 

(10) the “undesirability” of the case, 

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client, and 

(12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 71 (9th Cir.

1975). 

1. Wal-Mart’s Objections

Wal-Mart only raises two objections to the amount of fees

requested. First, Wal-mart argued that the City has failed to

provide evidentiary support for its request for $25,000 in fees

for bringing the instant motion. In response to this objection,

the City filed further billing documentation along with its reply

brief. (See Doc. 231, Jarvis Decl., Ex. B.) These supplemental

billing records sufficiently document the City’s fees on fees

request. 

Second, Wal-Mart notes that the City’s attorneys placed a

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cap on the amount of fees the City would need to pay in this

case. Wal-Mart objects to any fee award that exceeds the cap. 

Specifically, Wal-Mart argues:

Wal-Mart has learned...that the City will not have to

pay $25,000 for bringing this motion. The City and its

attorneys have a deal by which the City need only pay

“an agreed not-to-exceed figure, with the understanding

that, if the motion is successful, [City’s] attorneys

may recover any amounts billed in excess of this notto-exceed figure as part of the ultimate award of

fees.”... In other words, if the City wins the motion,

Wal-mart pays $25,000, but if the City loses, it pays

its attorneys a lesser sum. Wal-Mart should not have

to pay more than the City itself would have to pay if

the motion were denied. This, Wal-Mart’s liability, if

any, for fees incurred by the City in connection with

the motion should be capped to the currently

undisclosed ceiling figure and the City should

disclosed [sic] the cap in its reply.

(Doc. 229 at 24.) Notably, Wal-Mart cites no legal authority to

support this argument. In fact, the bulk of legal authority

suggests exactly the opposite. It is well-settled that

prevailing parties may be awarded fees under § 1988 even if they

were represented free of charge by a nonprofit legal aid

organization. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1984). 

This is because § 1988 makes the “party, rather than the lawyer,”

eligible for a discretionary award of attorney's fees. Venegas

v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1990)(emphasis added). 

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 The total amount of fees claimed for the Equal Protection 7

claim ($71,456.90), the as-applied claim ($12,255.00), and the

vagueness claim ($4,181.29) is $196,737.96. The fee expenses

incurred by Turlock ($4,181.29) on the vagueness claim amount to

2.13 percent of $196,737.96.

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2. The City’s Request.

The City has endeavored to separate its request for fee

reimbursement according to each claim as follows:

Equal Protection Claim: $71,456.90

Commerce Clause Claim: $108,844.07

As Applied Claim: $12,255.00

Vagueness Claim: $4,181.29

Fees-on-Fees: $20,937.50

Total Request: $217,674.76

As discussed above, the City is entitled to reimbursement

for expenses incurred defending against the vagueness claim only,

in the amount of $4,181.29. 

Turlock also requests reimbursement for fees incurred

preparing its fee petition. Turlock’s total fees-on-fees request

is $20,937.50. Because Turlock is entitled to fees for only the

vagueness claim, a minor issue in this very complex case, 7

Turlock should only receive a small portion of its fees-on-fees

request. Having reviewed all of the briefs and supporting

documents submitted by Turlock in support of its fee petition, it

is reasonable to award Turlock twenty percent (20%), one-fifth of

its fees-on-fees request, a percentage that roughly reflects (a)

the amount of time dedicated to argument on the frivolity of the

vagueness claim and (b) a portion of time spent presenting

general background information and law in the fee petition.

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The court has also reviewed the Declaration of Benjamin Fay,

filed in support of Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. 

(Doc. 227.) His declaration explains that all legal services

were provided by the law firm of Jarvis Fay & Deporto, LLP. Work

on this matter was provided primarily by Mr. Fay and his partner

Rick Jarvis, each of whom have considerable litigation experience

in similar matters. (See Exhibits A & B to the Fay Decl.) Mr.

Fay and Mr. Jarvis each billed the City at the standard discount

rate of $225 per hour for partners, while associates billed at

$175 per hour, and paralegals at $100 per hour. These are

reasonable rates to bill a public entity. Wal-Mart interposes no

objection to these hourly rates. 

Also attached to the Fay Declaration is a detailed billing

spreadsheet, indicating the specific tasks performed for each

unit of time billed, and allocating portions of the hours billed

to each of the four claims in the case. The bills are reasonably

detailed and do not indicate excessive or wasteful billing

practices. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Turlock is entitled to a

fee award for expenses incurred defending against the vagueness

claim ($4,181.29) and for twenty percent (20%) of its fees-onfees request ($4,187.50) for a total fee award of ($8,368.79). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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