Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00339/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on August 31, 2004. On December 10, 2004,

plaintiff filed a one page opposition to the motion to dismiss, relying primarily on a concurrently

filed motion to amend his complaint as the basis for opposing defendants’ motion. Plaintiff has

subsequently withdrawn his motion to amend the complaint, but has filed no further opposition

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON S. HARPER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0339 FCD JFM P

vs.

DENISE L. HARMON, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were violated when defendant

Harmon, a supervising cook, and defendant Correctional Officer Lewis, conspired to, and did,

falsely charge him with sexual battery on defendant Harmon, and when defendant Correctional

Lieutenant Akin improperly found plaintiff guilty of the sexual battery charges. Although the

disciplinary conviction was ultimately set aside on administrative review, plaintiff was housed in

administrative segregation for over seven months as a result of the events complained of. This

matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1

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26 to defendants’ motion to dismiss.

2

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and

resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied,

396 U.S. 869 (1969). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those

drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

As noted above, plaintiff claims that his federal constitutional rights were violated

by the issuance on October 6, 2002 of a false rules violation report charging plaintiff with sexual

battery on a staff member and by the disciplinary conviction that followed said charges. As a

result of the charges and subsequent conviction, plaintiff was placed in administrative

segregation on October 6, 2002 and retained there until approximately May 14, 2003. (See Ex. G

to Complaint, filed February 14, 2004.) On April 29, 2003, the conviction was set aside on

administrative review. (See Ex. F to Complaint.) 

Defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that (1) plaintiff has no constitutional

protection against issuance of a false disciplinary report; (2) plaintiff received adequate

procedural protections at the disciplinary hearing; (3) plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is

nullified by the subsequent administrative decision to set aside the disciplinary conviction; (4)

plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation did not constitute “atypical and significant

hardship” and therefore plaintiff has not stated a cognizable due process claim; and (5) plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim is not supported by specific factual allegations and is therefore not cognizable. 

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2

 A cognizable due process claim also requires proof of a protected liberty interest, i.e.,

that the disciplinary proceedings caused the inmate to be subjected to an “atypical and significant

hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (due process protection limited to conduct that

amounts to an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life"). 

3

 Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Harmon, the cook, did not know plaintiff’s name

and relied solely on information provided by defendant Lewis to name plaintiff as the alleged

assailant. 

3

There are two ways in which allegations that an inmate has been subjected to a

false disciplinary report and/or conviction thereon state a cognizable claim for violation of an

inmate’s federal constitutional rights. The first is when the inmate alleges that the false report or

false conviction was retaliatory. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1997). The other is

when the inmate is not afforded the procedural protections required by the due process clause in

connection with issuance and hearing of the disciplinary report. See, e.g., Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d

1395, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1994).2 On the other hand, a procedural due process claim arising out

the filing of a false disciplinary report fails if those protections were afforded to the inmate at the

disciplinary hearing. See, e.g. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949 (2nd Cir. 1986). The due

process clause requires (1) written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the

hearing; (2) the right to appear in person before an impartial hearing body; (3) the right to call

witnesses and to present documentary evidence; and (4) a written statement of reasons for the

disciplinary action taken. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

Here, there are no allegations that the allegedly false report was retaliatory. 

Plaintiff contends only that the report was false and that he was in his cell when the alleged

assault on defendant Harmon occurred.3

Plaintiff does allege procedural violations at the disciplinary hearing that resulted

in his conviction. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the hearing officer, defendant Akin, was not

impartial, and plaintiff alleges that defendant Akin denied plaintiff the opportunity to question

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defendant Lewis at the disciplinary hearing. The record reflects that defendant Lewis was the

correctional employee who identified plaintiff as the individual who assaulted defendant

Harmon, and that the disciplinary conviction was ultimately set aside because the hearing “did

not adequately address” issues related to identification of plaintiff as the perpetrator of the

offense. (See Ex. F to Complaint, Memorandum dated April 16, 2003, at 2.) 

Defendants contend that any alleged due process violations that occurred during

the hearing were cured when the disciplinary conviction was set aside on administrative appeal

and, therefore, that such alleged violations cannot support plaintiff’s claim. Defendants rely on

Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F.Supp. 1405 (C.D.Cal. 1997), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 1998) and

cases cited therein. Defendants, relying on Sandin, supra, also contend that there was no due

process violation because his seven month placement in administrative segregation did not

constitute “atypical and significant hardship.”

In Torricellas, the district court held that

where a procedural error has been corrected in the administrative

process, . . ., there has been no compensable due process violation.

The administrative appeal is considered part of the process

afforded, and any error in the process can be corrected during that

appeals process without necessarily subjecting prison officials to

liability for procedural violations at lower levels.

Torricellas, at 1414 (citations omitted). The Torricellas court specifically noted, however, that

the plaintiff in that case had not been subjected to any discipline or loss of credits as a result of

the disciplinary charges in that case. Id. 

Prison inmates have a liberty interest, protected by the due process clause, in

freedom from arbitrary placement in conditions of confinement that constitute an “atypical and

significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, at 484. In

the instant case, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation and retained there for a period

of seven months during the administrative proceedings. A determination that plaintiff’s due

process rights were violated at the disciplinary hearing and that the placement was based on a

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false allegation could support a finding that the placement was arbitrary. Moreover, plaintiff

alleges that the placement caused him to suffer a mental breakdown, and documents appended to

the complaint suggest that plaintiff had mental health issues that were not properly evaluated

prior to the first disciplinary hearing. (See Ex. A to Complaint.) Liberally construed, those

allegations are sufficient to support a contention that the placement in administrative segregation

imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on plaintiff. 

In short, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations before the

court are that plaintiff was placed and retained in administrative segregation for a period of seven

months, under conditions that caused him to suffer a mental breakdown, based on false

allegations that were not uncovered at his first disciplinary hearing because of a biased hearing

officer who refused to allow plaintiff to question the officer whose identification of plaintiff led

to the disciplinary charges. Under all of the circumstances alleged in plaintiff’s complaint, this

court finds that plaintiff has stated cognizable claims for violation of his right to due process

against all three defendants, and that those claims are not nullified by the subsequent

administrative action setting aside the disciplinary conviction.

Defendants also contend that plaintiff’s conspiracy claim must be dismissed on

the ground that plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that defendants conspired or

“were aware of each other’s actions.” (Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed August 31, 2004, at

6.) In support of this claim, defendants rely on standards applicable to a conspiracy claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1985. This action, however, is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’

legal arguments are therefore inapplicable to the action at bar. See Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849

F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1988). Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support

a claim that defendants Harmon and Lewis conspired to bring false disciplinary charges against

plaintiff. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ August 31, 2004 motion to dismiss be denied; and

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2. Defendants be directed to answer plaintiff’s complaint within ten days from the

date of any order by the district court adopting these findings and recommendations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: June 2, 2005. 

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harp0339.mtd

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