Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01065/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01065-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Leslie Feldman, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Arizona Secretary of State's Office, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-16-01065-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

 Plaintiffs are Leslie Feldman, Luz Magallanes, Mercedez Hymes, Julio Morera, 

and Cleo Ovalle, Democrats and registered voters in Maricopa County, Arizona; Peterson 

Zah, former Chairman and First President of the Navajo Nation, and a registered voter in 

Apache County, Arizona; the Democratic National Committee; the Democratic Senatorial 

Campaign Committee; the Arizona Democratic Party (ADP); Kirkpatrick for U.S. Senate, 

a committee supporting the election of Democratic United States Representative Ann 

Kirkpatrick to the United States Senate; and Hillary for America, a committee supporting 

the election of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton as President of the United States. 

Plaintiff-Intervenor is Bernie 2016, Inc., a committee that supported the election of 

former Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders as President of the United States. The 

Court will refer to these parties collectively as “Plaintiffs.” 

 Defendants are the Arizona Secretary of State’s Office; Arizona Secretary of State 

Michele Reagan, in her official capacity; the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors; 

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Denny Barney, Steve Chucri, Andy Kunasek, Clint Hickman, and Steve Gallardo, 

members of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, in their official capacities; the 

Maricopa County Recorder and Elections Department; Maricopa County Recorder Helen 

Purcell, in her official capacity; Maricopa County Elections Director Karen Osborne, in 

her official capacity; and Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich, in his official 

capacity. Defendant-Intervenor is the Arizona Republican Party (ARP).1

 

 At issue is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction of H.B. 2023. (Doc. 84.) 

Also before the Court is the Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum 

and Reply Exhibits filed jointly by Defendants and the ARP. (Doc. 167.) The motions 

are fully briefed, and the Court heard oral argument on August 3, 2016. For the 

following reasons, both motions are denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 In addition to voting at polling places on Election Day, Arizona permits both inperson and absentee early voting during the 27 days before an election. A.R.S. § 16-541. 

For those who prefer to vote in person, all Arizona counties operate at least one on-site 

early voting location. (Doc. 153-1 at 9, ¶ 15.) Arizonans may also vote early by mail 

either by requesting an early ballot on an election-by-election basis or by joining the 

Permanent Early Voting List (PEVL). A.R.S. §§ 16-542, 16-544. Permanent early 

voters automatically receive early ballots for every election by mail no later than the first 

day of the early voting period. To be counted, an early ballot must be received by the 

county recorder by 7:00 pm on Election Day. A.R.S. § 16-548. Voters may return their 

early ballot by mail at no cost, but they must mail it early enough to ensure that it is 

received by this deadline. Additionally, some counties provide special drop boxes for 

early ballots, and voters in all counties may return their ballots in person at any polling 

place without waiting in line. (Doc. 153-1 at 10, ¶¶ 16-17.) 

 In 2016, Arizona enacted H.B. 2023, now codified at A.R.S. § 16-1005(H)-(I), 

 1

 Arizona lawmakers Debbie Lesko and Tony Rivero, Phoenix City Councilman Bill Gates, and Scottsdale City Councilwoman Suzanne Klapp also intervened as 

Defendants, but did not participate in the instant motion. (Doc. 151.) 

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which limits who may possess another’s early ballot. H.B. 2023 provides: 

H. A person who knowingly collects voted or unvoted early ballots from another person is guilty of a class 6 felony. An election official, a United States postal service worker or any other person who is allowed by law to transmit United States mail is deemed not to have collected an early ballot if the official, worker or other person is engaged in official duties. 

I. Subsection H of this section does not apply to: 

1. An election held by a special taxing district formed pursuant to title 48 for the purpose of protecting or providing services to agricultural lands or crops and that is authorized to conduct elections pursuant to title 48. 

2. A family member, household member or caregiver of the voter. For the purposes of this paragraph: 

(a) “Caregiver” means a person who provides medical or health care assistance to the voter in a residence, nursing care institution, hospice facility, assisted living center, assisted living facility, assisted living home, residential care institution, adult day health care facility or adult foster care 

home. 

(b) “Collects” means to gain possession or control of an early ballot. 

(c) “Family member” means a person who is related to the voter by blood, marriage, adoption or legal guardianship. 

(d) “Household member” means a person who resides at the same 

residence as the voter. 

A.R.S. § 16-1005(H)-(I). Subsequently, Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit challenging H.B. 

2023 under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 and the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 12; Doc. 53.) Specifically, they 

argue that H.B. 2023 violates § 2 of the VRA because it disparately burdens the electoral 

opportunities of Hispanic, Native American, and African American voters as compared to 

white voters. (Doc. 85 at 12-15.) They also argue that H.B. 2023 violates the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments by unjustifiably burdening voting, generally, and the 

associational rights of organizations that collect ballots as part of their get-out-the-vote 

(GOTV) efforts. (Id. at 15-18.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that H.B. 2023 violates the First 

and Fourteenth Amendments under a “partisan fencing” theory because the law allegedly 

was intended to suppress Democratic voters. (Id. at 18-20.) Plaintiffs now move to 

preliminarily enjoin Arizona from enforcing the law pending the outcome of this 

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litigation. (Doc. 84.) 

THRESHOLD ISSUES 

I. Standing 

 As a threshold matter, the ARP argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge 

H.B. 2023 because “no individual Plaintiff or member of an associational Plaintiff asserts 

any reliance on ballot collection to vote.” (Doc. 152 at 2, n.1.) Standing derives from 

Article III of the United States Constitution, which limits federal courts to resolving 

“Cases” and “Controversies.” To have standing, a plaintiff “must have suffered or be 

imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ that is fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a 

favorable judicial decision.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., --- 

U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560-61 (1992)). Only one plaintiff needs to have standing when only injunctive 

relief is sought. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 

2007), aff'd, 553 U.S. 181, 189 n.7 (2008). 

 The ADP alleges that collecting early ballots has been an integral part of its 

GOTV strategy since at least 2002 and that, as a result of H.B. 2023, it “will have to 

devote resources that it otherwise would have spent educating voters about its candidates 

and issues, to assisting its voters in overcoming the barriers the challenged voting laws, 

practices, and procedures impose[.]” (Doc. 12, ¶ 28; Doc. 157, ¶¶ 6-9.) Additionally, the 

ADP alleges that H.B. 2023 will reduce the likelihood that its voters will timely return 

their ballots, thereby reducing the likelihood that the ADP will be successful in electing 

Democratic candidates. (Doc. 12, ¶ 28; Doc. 157, ¶ 5.) These allegations are sufficient 

to establish a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is fairly traceable to H.B. 

2023 and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling on Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction 

motion. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951 (“Thus the new law injures the Democratic Party 

by compelling the party to devote resources to getting to the polls those of its supporters 

who would otherwise be discouraged by the new law from bothering to vote.”); One 

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Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v. Nichol, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 15-CV-324-JDP, 2016 WL 

2757454, at *6 (W.D. Wis. May 12, 2016) (finding expenditure of resources for 

educating voters about how to comply with new state voter registration requirements 

sufficient to establish standing). Because the ADP has standing to challenge the validity 

of H.B. 2023, it is unnecessary to assess whether the other Plaintiffs have standing. 

II. Motion to Strike 

Defendants and the ARP have moved to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ reply 

memorandum and reply exhibits. (Doc. 167.) Specifically, they have moved to strike: 

(1) portions of the rebuttal report of Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Allan Lichtman; (2) 

declarations from Sheila Healy, Steven Begay, Ernesto Teran, and Carmen Arias; (3) the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) preclearance file for S.B. 1412, an early effort by Arizona to 

regulate ballot collection; and (4) those portions of Plaintiffs’ reply memorandum that 

rely on the offending exhibits. (Id. at 2.) Having reviewed the objected-to portions of 

Dr. Lichtman’s rebuttal report, the Court finds that they respond to arguments raised by 

the ARP’s expert witnesses. Likewise, the additional declarations respond to the ARP’s 

standing arguments. Finally, Plaintiffs have shown good cause for the delayed disclosure 

of the DOJ preclearance file. Despite requesting a copy of the file through a Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA) request, Plaintiffs did not receive a readable version until the day 

before the response briefs were due. Although Defendants and the ARP fault Plaintiffs 

for not disclosing the file at that time, they fail to explain how they have been prejudiced 

by the delay. Neither Defendants nor the ARP articulate what they would or could have 

done differently had they received the DOJ file the day before their response brief was 

due. Moreover, oral argument provided Defendants and the ARP with an opportunity to 

respond to this new evidence. Lastly, the Court must assess the likelihood that Plaintiffs 

with succeed on the merits of their claims. It would disserve that end for the Court to 

blind itself to evidence that eventually would be presented in a summary judgment 

motion or at trial. For these reasons, the motion to strike is denied. 

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MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. 

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

 A. Section 2 of the VRA 

Section 2 prohibits states from imposing any voting qualification, prerequisite, 

standard, practice, or procedure that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 

citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color[.]” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 

“A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that 

the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 

subdivision are not equally open to participation” by racial minorities, in that they “have 

less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 

process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

Although proving a violation of § 2 does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, only discriminatory results, proof of a causal connection between the challenged voting practice and a prohibited result is crucial. Said otherwise, a § 2 challenge based purely on a showing of some relevant statistical disparity between minorities and whites, without any evidence that the challenged voting qualification causes that disparity, will be rejected. 

Gonzales v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). 

 In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court cited a list of non-exhaustive factors 

that courts should consider when determining whether, under the totality of the 

circumstances, a challenged voting practice interacts with social and historical conditions 

to cause a disparity between the electoral opportunities of minority and white voters.2

 

 

2

 These factors are sometimes called the “Senate Factors” because they derive from the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the VRA. 

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478 U.S. 30 (1986). These factors include:

1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 

2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 

3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 

4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 

5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as 

education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 

6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; [and] 

7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to 

public office in the jurisdiction. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982)). Courts also 

may consider “whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected 

officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group,” and “whether 

the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, 

prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.” Id. “[T]here is no 

requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them 

point one way or the other.” Id. at 45. 

 Accordingly, a § 2 claim has two essential elements: (1) the challenged voting 

practice must impose a disparate burden on the electoral opportunities of minority as 

compared to white voters, and (2) “that burden must in part be caused by or linked to 

social and historical conditions that have or currently produce discrimination against 

members of the protected class.” League of Women Voters of N. C. v. North Carolina, 

769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The first 

part of this two-prong framework inquires about the nature of the burden imposed and 

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whether it creates a disparate effect[.]” Veasey v. Abbott, --- F.3d ---, No. 14-41127, 

2016 WL 3923868, at *17 (5th Cir. July 20, 2016). Drawing on the Supreme Court’s 

guidance in Gingles, “[t]he second part . . . provides the requisite causal link between the 

burden on voting rights and the fact that this burden affects minorities disparately 

because it interacts with social and historical conditions that have produced 

discrimination against minorities currently, in the past, or both.” Id. Stated otherwise, 

“the second step asks not just whether social and historical conditions ‘result in’ a 

disparate impact, but whether the challenged voting standard or practice causes the 

discriminatory impact as it interacts with social and historical conditions.” Ohio 

Democratic Party v. Husted, --- F.3d ---, No. 16-3561, 2016 WL 4437605, at *14 (6th 

Cir. Aug. 23, 2016) (alterations omitted); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (“The essence of a 

§ 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and 

historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and 

white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”) The court need not reach the 

Gingles factors and totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, however, unless the plaintiff 

proves the existence of a relevant disparity between minority and white voters at step 

one. See Ohio Democratic Party, 2016 WL 4437605, at *13 (“If this first element is met, 

the second step comes into play, triggering consideration of the ‘totality of the 

circumstances,’ potentially informed by the ‘Senate Factors’ discussed in ‘Gingles.’”). 

 Based on the current record, the Court finds Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on 

their § 2 claim because there is insufficient evidence of a statistically relevant disparity 

between minority as compared to white voters. H.B. 2023 is facially neutral. It applies 

to all Arizonans regardless of race or ethnicity. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that H.B. 

2023 disparately burdens Hispanic, Native American, and African American voters as 

compared to white voters because these groups disproportionately rely on others to 

collect and return their early ballots. Plaintiffs, however, provide no quantitative or 

statistical evidence comparing the proportion of minority versus white voters who rely on 

others to collect their early ballots. To the contrary, Sheila Healy, Executive Director of 

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the ADP, testified that she has “no way of knowing if and how many voters could be 

impacted by [the ADP’s] inability to offer to mail their ballot for them.” (Doc. 153-1 at 

79-80.) The Court is aware of no case—and Plaintiffs cite none—in which a § 2 

violation has been found without quantitative evidence measuring the alleged disparity 

between minority and white voters. 

 Plaintiffs argue quantitative evidence is not needed because no case has expressly 

held that such evidence is necessary to prove a § 2 violation. (Doc. 156 at 9.) The 

standards developed for analyzing § 2 cases, however, strongly suggest that proof of a 

relevant statistical disparity is necessary at step one, even though it is not alone sufficient 

to prove a § 2 violation because of the causation requirement at step two. See Gonzales, 

677 F.3d at 405; see also Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *17 (noting that “courts regularly 

utilize statistical analyses to discern whether a law has a discriminatory impact”). 

Further, in other contexts courts have “recognized the necessity of statistical evidence in 

disparate impact cases.” Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 

2008) (Fair Housing Act); Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 716 (11th Cir. 

2004), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006) 

(Title VII); Rollins v. Alabama Cmty. Coll. Sys., No. 2:09-CV-636-WHA, 2010 WL 

4269133, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 2010) (Equal Pay Act); Davis v. City of Panama City, 

Fla., 510 F. Supp. 2d 671, 689 (N.D. Fla. 2007) (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Plaintiffs offer no compelling reason why the method by which the Court determines 

whether a relevant disparity exists should change simply because this case arises under 

the VRA. 

 Disparate impact analysis necessarily is a comparative exercise. To determine 

whether a voting practice disparately impacts minorities, the Court must know 

approximately: (1) how many voters will be impacted by the law, and (2) the racial and 

ethnic composition of those voters. Without this information, the Court cannot compare 

the impact of the law on different demographic populations, nor can it determine whether 

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the differences, if any, are statistically relevant.3 

 Assuming, arguendo, that a § 2 violation could be proved using non-quantitative 

evidence, Plaintiffs’ evidence is not compelling. In lieu of quantitative evidence, 

Plaintiffs offer anecdotal observations from Arizona Democratic lawmakers and 

representatives of organizations that have collected and returned ballots in past elections. 

These non-expert declarants claim, based on their experiences, that Hispanic, Native 

American, and African-American communities rely most on ballot collection. (Doc. 86, 

¶¶ 5, 18; Doc. 90, ¶ 8; Doc. 91, ¶ 9; Doc. 92, ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 93, ¶¶ 2-4, 10; Doc. 95, ¶¶ 4, 8-

9; Doc. 96, ¶¶ 3, 14-15; Doc. 97, ¶¶ 3, 10, 20; Doc. 98, ¶¶ 3, 11, 14; Doc. 99, ¶¶ 3, 10; 

Doc. 100, ¶¶ 4, 20, 23; Doc. 127-1, ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 158, ¶¶ 3-5.) But these declarants 

predominately are Democratic partisans and members of organizations that admittedly 

target their GOTV efforts at minority communities. The Court has no way of knowing 

whether the experiences of these declarants are attributable to their selective targeting or 

to statewide ballot collection trends.4

 Notably, many types of voters can benefit from ballot collection. According to 

Healy: 

There are many barriers that impede voters from being able to return a ballot in time. For example, some voters—particularly those in underprivileged and rural areas—lack access to home delivery and must drive to a post office to receive or send mail. In underprivileged neighborhoods, it is common for residents to receive incoming mail in a centralized location in the community but to lack access to an outgoing 

3

 Plaintiffs assert that H.B. 2023’s impact cannot be quantitatively measured because Arizona does not collect the necessary data, but they do not explain why Arizona bears that burden. (Doc. 156 at 9.) Nor may Plaintiffs avoid their burden of proof simply because surveying the relevant population might be difficult. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 439, 476 (2015) 

(“It can be difficult to document the racial composition of those who use a voting opportunity . . . , given that election and other public records often do not include racial or ethnic data. There is no getting around this problem. But given that § 2 forbids the denial or abridgement of the vote on account of race, it is reasonable that plaintiffs be required to make a threshold showing they are disproportionately burdened by the challenged practice, in the sense that it eliminates an opportunity they are more likely to use or imposes a requirement they are less likely to satisfy.”). 

4

 Although there is some evidence that Democratic-leaning organizations use ballot collection more effectively, it is undisputed that “groups from all ideological backgrounds use ballot collection.” (Doc. 86, ¶ 18.) 

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mailbox, which makes returning early ballots a challenge. Many voters prefer to wait until Election Day to decide who to vote for, particularly in elections of national importance like the presidential election. Others lack the physical mobility to put their ballot in the mailbox, and must rely on caretakers, family, friends, or volunteers to ensure that their ballot is 

postmarked in time or taken to the polls. Many voters mistakenly assume that the ballot is timely if it is postmarked by Election Day rather than actually received. Many of our voters work two or three jobs, take care of a 

family, and travel to work on public transportation. 

(Doc. 100, ¶ 21.) Many of these circumstances apply equally to minority and white 

voters. There is no evidence, for example, that minority voters are more likely to be 

elderly or homebound, to prefer to wait until Election Day to cast consequential votes, or 

to forget to mail their ballots. Plaintiffs highlight the challenges faced by voters in rural 

areas without home mail delivery and reliable transportation, but both minority and white 

voters live in rural areas. As of 2010, the rural communities of Somerton and San Luis 

were 95.9% and 98.7% Hispanic or Latino, respectively. (Doc. 101-12 at 2.) 

Conversely, the rural communities of Colorado City, Fredonia, Quartzite, St. David, Star 

Valley, and Wickenburg were 99.5%, 89.1%, 92.5%, 92.1%, 91.4%, and 90.5% white, 

respectively. (Doc. 152-14 at 2-7.) Although Plaintiffs provide evidence that Somerton 

and San Luis residents lack home mail delivery, (Doc. 95, ¶¶ 15, 17), they offer no 

comparable evidence for rural white communities. Nor do they provide evidence of the 

number of voters in communities like Somerton and San Luis who choose to vote early 

by mail, despite the lack of mail service.5

 

 Plaintiffs also cite legislative testimony from the debates on H.B. 2023, but the 

testimony provides no new information. Several Democratic lawmakers who spoke out 

against H.B. 2023 during the legislative debates also submitted declarations in support of 

Plaintiffs’ motion, and the remaining legislative testimony is largely duplicative. For 

example, many lawmakers expressed concerns that H.B. 2023 would impact rural 

communities, working families, and the elderly. (Doc. 101-9 at 6-7, 13-14; Doc. 101-10 

at 29-30; Doc. 101-11 at 17-18; Doc. 101-12 at 7, 9-11.) As noted, however, there are 

 

5

 The Court also notes that, to the extent some voters rely on caretakers or family members to deliver their early ballots, H.B. 2023 has no impact. 

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rural communities that are predominately minority and rural communities that are 

predominately white, there is no evidence that minorities are disproportionately elderly, 

and both white and minority voters can have multiple or time consuming jobs. 

 Next, Plaintiffs argue that certain declarations submitted by the ARP effectively 

concede that minority voters disproportionately rely on ballot collection. Plaintiffs, 

however, take portions of these declarations out of context. For example, they cite to the 

declaration of Kevin Dang, President of the Vietnamese Community of Arizona, who 

stated that minority groups are “especially vulnerable to manipulation by groups who 

harvest ballots. Those who want to manipulate the system can take advantage of 

minorities like the Vietnamese who do not speak English and who do not understand the 

process.” (Doc. 152-12, ¶¶ 3, 8.) Likewise, Sergio Arellano, President of the Tucson 

Chapter of the Arizona Latino Republican Association, declared that “[m]any people in 

the Latino population, particularly the elderly, are being taken advantage of by groups 

that collect ballots and misrepresent themselves as government or election officials. 

Many of the people that these groups target do not speak English and are particularly 

vulnerable to such groups.” (Doc. 152-7, ¶¶ 3, 5.) These are not admissions that 

minority voters disproportionately rely on ballot collection. Instead, these declarations 

reflect the lay opinions of two individuals who believe ballot collection creates an 

opportunity for fraud, and that minorities are targeted by ballot collectors with nefarious 

purposes because they are less educated about the process and often do not speak or 

understand English well. 

 Lastly, Plaintiffs cite portions of the DOJ preclearance file for S.B. 1412. 

Assuming that the DOJ preclearance file is admissible for purposes of the instant 

motion,6

 it does not prove a relevant disparity between minority and white voters. The 

DOJ file contains what appear to be summaries of telephone conversations between a 

DOJ attorney and various persons concerning S.B. 1412. For example, an unknown 

 

6

 Defendants and the ARP object to the admissibility of this evidence on the basis 

that it contains multiple levels of hearsay, lacks foundation, and has not been authenticated. 

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Yuma County Recorder’s Office employee reportedly said that, in her experience, Yuma 

County: 

does not experience a great deal of traffic from persons returning large numbers of vote by mail ballots by mail in groups of ten or more. That 

could be, of course, because people just put the ballots in the mailbox and 

no one notices. The exception to that is the City of Marin, where people do tend to bring up vote by mail ballots in groups. It is a smaller city of about 15,000 persons, but it is near the border with Mexico and almost everyone is Hispanic. 

(Doc. 161-1 at 104.) Notably absent is similar information about ballot collection in 

Arizona’s other counties. That most Yuma County residents relying on ballot collection 

might be Hispanic does not mean that most Arizonans relying on ballot collection are 

minorities. Moreover, the employee discussed only persons returning ten or more ballots 

at once and said nothing about the delivery of smaller quantities of early ballots.7

 Additionally, then-Arizona Elections Director Amy Bjelland reportedly said that 

“S.B. 1412 was targeted at voting practices in predominately Hispanic areas in the 

southern portion of the state near the Arizona border,” and Senator Don Shooter, the 

bill’s sponsor, was “mainly concerned about practices in San Luis, which is a border 

town in Yuma County[.]” (Id. at 111.) Plaintiffs isolate this quote, but ignore the context 

in which it was made. Bjelland elaborated that: 

[t]he event that spurred [S.B. 1412] involved a dispute that arose in San 

Luis, a small city in Yuma County located in what is called “south county,” on the border with Mexico. A large majority of the population of the city [is] Hispanic[]. Two Hispanic women who had previously worked on campaigns together had a bitter falling out. One of the women wrote a 

letter to a local council member named David Luna, in which she accused 

the other woman of engaging in voter fraud, and admitted doing so herself when they worked together. Luna forwarded the complaint . . . to the Secretary of State’s office, who forwarded it on to the FBI. 

Both the FBI and the Secretary of State’s office looked into the matter and 

found no evidence of wrongdoing. . . . However, the allegations were picked up by Tea Partiers and Republican candidates in the area, and the issue received a lot of press attention. 

 7

 Evidence shows that not all ballot collectors deliver large quantities of ballots. (See Doc. 88, ¶ 8 (three to four ballots collected and delivered).) 

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(Id.) The DOJ summary then reports: 

[Bjelland] does not know how widespread the problem is, but in her opinion “it is part of life in San Luis of how things have been run for 

years.” She thinks the problem may result “from the different way that Mexicans do their elections.” She says that there is corruption in the government and the voting process in Mexico, and that people who live close to the border are more impacted by that. 

(Id. at 111-12.) In context, this report describes the “practice” targeted by S.B. 1412 not 

as ballot collection, generally, but as voter fraud perpetrated through ballot collection, 

which Bjelland believed was more prevalent along the border because of perceived 

“corruption in the government and the voting process in Mexico,” and the fact that 

“people who live close to the border are more impacted by that.” (Id.) 

 In sum, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their § 2 claim because they have 

provided insufficient evidence of a cognizable disparity between minority and white 

voters. The current record shows that certain civic organizations collect ballots as part of 

their GOTV efforts, that some selectively target minority communities, and that some 

minority voters give their ballots to collectors. But there is no evidence quantifying the 

number of voters who rely on ballot collection or comparing the proportion of those 

voters that are minorities to the proportion that are white. Because Plaintiffs are not 

likely to carry their burden at step one, it is unnecessary to reach the second step 

causation inquiry regarding H.B. 2023’s interaction with social and historical conditions. 

See Ohio Democratic Party, 2016 WL 4437605, at *14 (concluding that the second step 

causal inquiry was immaterial because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving a 

disparate impact at step one); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(resolving § 2 vote denial claim at step one). 

B. First and Fourteenth Amendments

 Although the Constitution empowers states to regulate the times, places, and 

manner of elections, U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, this power is not absolute. It is “subject 

to the limitation that [it] may not be exercised in a way that violates other . . . provisions 

of the Constitution.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968); see Washington State 

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Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008). As relevant 

here, the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect against unjustified burdens on voting 

and associational rights. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Anderson 

v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).

 Not all election regulations, however, raise constitutional concerns. “[A]s a 

practical matter, there must be substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and 

honest and if some order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.” 

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). Moreover, all elections regulations 

“invariably impose some burden upon individual voters.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. 

Thus, when an election law is challenged a court must weigh the nature and magnitude of 

the burden imposed by the law against state’s interests in and justifications for it. See

Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). This framework is commonly 

referred to as the Anderson-Burdick test, named after the two Supreme Court cases from 

which it derives. 

 When applying Anderson-Burdick, the court considers the state’s election regime 

as a whole. See Ohio Democratic Party, 2016 WL 4437605, at *5. “[T]he severity of the 

burden the election law imposes on the plaintiff’s rights dictates the level of scrutiny 

applied by the court.” Nader, 531 F.3d at 1034. A law that severely burdens the right to 

vote is subject to strict scrutiny, meaning it must be narrowly tailored to serve a 

compelling state interest. Id. at 1035. On the other hand, a state’s important regulatory 

interests are generally sufficient to justify laws that impose lesser burdens. See 

Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 452; Nader v. Cronin, 620 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Laws that do not significantly increase the usual burdens of voting do not 

raise substantial constitutional concerns. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198. 

 Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to H.B. 2023. “Facial challenges are disfavored 

for several reasons.” Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450. First, “[c]laims of 

facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of 

premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.” Id.

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(internal quotations and citation omitted). Such claims “also run contrary to the 

fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question 

of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of 

constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Lastly, “facial challenges threaten to short 

circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from 

being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.” Id. at 451. Thus, 

Plaintiffs “bear a heavy burden in demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success[.]” 

League of Women Voters of Florida v. Browning, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 

2008); see also Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200 (“Given the fact that petitioners have 

advanced a broad attack on the constitutionality of [the election regulation], seeking relief 

that would invalidate the statute in all its applications, they bear a heavy burden of 

persuasion.”). 

i. Voting Rights 

 H.B. 2023 does not significantly increase the usual burdens of voting. It does not 

eliminate or restrict any method of voting, it merely limits who may possess, and 

therefore return, a voter’s early ballot. Early voters may return their own ballots, either in 

person or by mail, or they may entrust their ballots to family members, household 

members, or caregivers. It is unlawful, however, for a person who does not fall into one 

of these categories to possess another’s early ballot. Thus, the burden imposed by H.B. 

2023 is simply the burden of returning an early ballot personally or through a family 

member, household member, or caregiver. 

 Plaintiffs argue that this burden is more severe for “voters who would otherwise 

have great difficulty in returning their early ballot in time for it to be counted, such as the 

voters in rural and Native American communities who do not have mail service[.]” (Doc. 

85 at 16.) They also highlight the challenges faced by elderly, homebound, and disabled 

voters, as well as those who work multiple jobs. Arizona’s election regime, however, 

alleviates many of the burdens H.B. 2023 might impose on the types of voters Plaintiffs 

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have described. 

 First, voters who have great difficulty timely returning their early ballots need not 

vote by mail. These voters may vote in person at polling places on Election Day or at an 

on-site early voting location during any one of Arizona’s 27 early voting days. In fact, 

when asked whether the ADP encourages voters in rural areas without reliable 

transportation or access to secure outgoing mail services to nonetheless sign up for the 

PEVL, Healy explained: “It depends on the area that they live. For example, on the 

Navajo Nation where folks do not have reliable transportation or access to a post office or 

a service to receive mail we do not encourage them to sign up for the [PEVL].” (Doc. 

152-13 at 4.) Instead, the ADP encourages these voters to vote in person. (Id.) 

 Arizona also accommodates disabled voters and those who work on Election Day. 

All counties must provide special election boards for voters who cannot travel to a 

polling location because of an illness or disability. A.R.S. § 16-549. If an ill or disabled 

voter timely requests an accommodation, the county recorder must arrange for a special 

election board to deliver a ballot to the voter in person. For working voters, Arizona law 

requires employers to give an employee time off to vote if the employee is scheduled to 

work a shift on Election Day that provides fewer than three consecutive hours between 

either the opening of the polls and the beginning of the shift, or the end of the shift and 

the closing of the polls. A.R.S. § 16-402. An employer is prohibited from penalizing an 

employee for exercising this right. If voters nonetheless feel uncomfortable requesting 

time off, they have a 27-day window to vote in person at an on-site early voting location. 

Finally, voters may entrust their ballots to family members, household members, or 

caregivers.8

 

 Evidence indicates that many voters who entrust their ballots to collectors do so 

not out of necessity, but for convenience or because they prefer a trusted volunteer to 

deliver their ballots. (See, e.g., Doc. 100, ¶ 21.) Voters’ minimization of the value of 

 

8

 Several of Plaintiffs’ declarants erroneously contend that H.B. 2023 will prevent them or others from delivering ballots on behalf of family members, despite the law’s clear language to the contrary. (See Doc. 88, ¶¶ 8, 11; Doc. 89, ¶ 12; Doc. 91, ¶ 10.) 

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their votes also plays a role. Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from Randy Parraz, cofounder and former president of Citizens for a Better Arizona (CBA), a non-profit 

organization that operated from 2011 to 2014 with a special focus on GOTV efforts, who 

discussed CBA’s ballot collection activities. (Doc. 90.) When asked during his 

deposition why voters typically failed to return their early ballot by mail, Parraz testified: 

One, they didn’t think their vote mattered. Two, [it] was inconvenient. 

Three, they would forget. Those are some of the main reasons they did it. But I think the primary thing was that they didn’t feel their vote mattered. So whether mail-in ballot or going to show up at the polls, the election didn’t have much meaning to them. 

(Doc. 153-1 at 222.) For these voters, H.B. 2023’s impact results from a matter of 

preference or choice rather than a state-created obstacle, and therefore is not a substantial 

burden. Frank, 768 F.3d at 749. Moreover, the Constitution does not demand 

“recognition and accommodation of such variable personal preferences, even if the 

preferences are shown to be shared in higher numbers by members of certain identifiable 

segments of the voting public.” Ohio Democratic Party, 2016 WL 4437605, at *7. Nor 

does the Constitution prohibit Arizona from regulating the manner in which early ballots 

may be returned simply because some voters are disengaged and choose not vote unless a 

third party convinces them to do so and delivers the ballot for them. 

 Plaintiffs also argue that H.B. 2023 will burden voters who forget or are mistaken 

about the relevant deadlines. For example, Ernesto Teran, a Maricopa County Democrat, 

stated that he voted by mail in the last two elections. (Doc. 159, ¶ 3.) During the last 

election, volunteers from the ADP came to his house and asked if he had mailed in his 

early ballot. (Id., ¶ 4.) He told the volunteers that he “was certain that [he] had done so,” 

but decided to check again to confirm. (Id.) He then discovered that he had forgotten to 

mail his ballot it. (Id.) He thought about delivering the ballot himself, but decided 

instead to entrust it with the ADP volunteers. (Id.) Carmen Arias, another Maricopa 

County Democrat, stated that she votes by mail and typically is able to mail in her ballot 

before Election Day. (Doc. 160, ¶¶ 2, 4.) Sometimes, however, she “has forgotten to do 

so before it’s too late,” and in those situations she has entrusted her ballot to an ADP 

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volunteer. (Id., ¶ 4.) The Constitution, however, does not require states to prioritize 

voter convenience above all other regulatory considerations. Ohio Democratic Party, 

2016 WL 4437605, at *6 (“It’s as if plaintiffs disregard the Constitution’s clear mandate 

that the states (and not the courts) establish election protocols, instead reading the 

document to require all states to maximize voting convenience.”). To the extent H.B. 

2023 places a greater imperative on remembering relevant election deadlines, it “does not 

qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant 

increase over the usual burdens of voting.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198. 

 Given the severe burdens Plaintiffs allege H.B. 2023 will place on rural voters 

without reliable transportation or access to secure outgoing mail, it is telling that they 

have not produced a single declaration from a voter who fits this profile.9

 Such voters 

might exist, but Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence that these voters (1) 

choose to vote early by mail despite the difficulties they face; (2) lack family members, 

household members, or caregivers who can deliver a ballot for them; and (3) cannot avail 

themselves of the many other voting opportunities and accommodations Arizona 

provides. It therefore “is not possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on 

this narrow class of voters or the proportion of the burden imposed on them that is fully 

justified.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200. Accordingly, the Court finds that H.B. 2023 

imposes only minor burdens not significantly greater than those typically associated with 

voting. 

Because H.B. 2023 imposes only minimal burdens, Arizona must show only that it 

serves important regulatory interests. Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 452. 

Arizona advances two justifications for H.B. 2023. First, it claims that H.B. 2023 is a 

prophylactic measure intended to prevent absentee voter fraud by creating a chain of 

custody for early ballots and minimizing the opportunities for ballot tampering. Second, 

Arizona argues that H.B. 2023 eliminates the perception of fraud, thereby preserving 

 

9

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his personal residence, but he did not claim to have difficulty either voting in person or returning an early mail ballot. (Doc. 97, ¶ 22.) 

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public confidence in the integrity of elections. (Doc. 153 at 12-13.) Fraud prevention 

and preserving public confidence in election integrity are important state regulatory 

interests. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (“Confidence in the integrity of our 

electoral process is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy. Voter 

fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our 

government.”); see also Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195 (“There is no question about the 

legitimacy or importance of the State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible 

voters. . . . While the most effective method of preventing election fraud may well be 

debatable, the propriety of doing so is perfectly clear.”). Plaintiffs do not argue 

otherwise. Instead, they argue that H.B. 2023 is unjustified because there is no evidence 

of verified absentee voter fraud perpetrated by ballot collectors, or of widespread public 

perception that ballot collection leads to fraud. (Doc. 156 at 23.) 

 Many courts, however, have recognized that absentee voting presents a greater 

opportunity for fraud. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 225 (noting that “absentee-ballot fraud . 

. . is a documented problem in Indiana”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1131 (7th 

Cir. 2004) (“Voting fraud . . . is facilitated by absentee voting.”); Qualkinbush v. Skubisz, 

826 N.E.2d 1181, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“It is evident that the integrity of the vote is 

even more susceptible to influence and manipulation when done by absentee ballot.”). 

Moreover, Arizona “need not show specific local evidence of fraud in order to justify 

preventative measures.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2013). 

For example, Crawford upheld Indiana’s voter identification requirement as a measure 

designed to prevent in-person voter fraud even though “[t]he record contain[ed] no 

evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.” 553 

U.S. at 195. Similarly, in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, the Supreme Court upheld a 

Washington law requiring all minor party candidates for partisan office to receive at least 

1% of all votes cast during the primary election in order to appear on the general election 

ballot. 479 U.S. 189 (1986). Washington argued that the law prevented voter confusion 

from ballot overcrowding by ensuring candidates appearing on the general election ballot 

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had sufficient community support. Id. at 194. In upholding the law, the Supreme Court 

explained: “We have never required a State to make a particularized showing of the 

existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidates 

prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access.” Id. at 194-95. 

Rather, “[l]egislatures . . . should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the 

electoral process with foresight rather than reactively[.]” Id. at 195; see also Lee v. 

Virginia State Bd. of Elections, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 3:15CV357-HEH, 2016 WL 

2946181, at *26 (E.D. Va. May 19, 2016) (“Outlawing criminal activity before it occurs 

is not only a wise deterrent, but also sound public policy.”). 

In sum, Arizona has proffered two important state regulatory interests that are 

rationally served by H.B. 2023. Though Plaintiffs argue that there are no verified cases 

of absentee voter fraud perpetrated by ballot collectors in Arizona, the Court must 

scrutinize Arizona’s justifications less severely because Plaintiffs have not shown H.B. 

2023 imposes more than minimal burdens on voting. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not 

likely to succeed on their Fourteenth Amendment challenge. 

 ii. Associational Rights 

 Plaintiffs also argue that H.B. 2023 burdens the associational rights of groups that 

encourage and facilitate voting through ballot collection. (Doc. 85 at 16-17.) The 

Anderson-Burdick framework applies to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. Timmons v. 

Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997). As the party invoking the First 

Amendment’s protection, however, Plaintiffs bear the additional, threshold burden of 

proving that it applies. Voting for Am., 732 F.3d at 388. 

The First Amendment extends “only to conduct that is inherently expressive.” 

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006). 

Relying on Project Vote v. Blackwell, Plaintiffs argue that ballot collection is expressive 

activity. 455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006). In that case, civic organizations 

challenged certain Ohio regulations on voter registration that, among other things, made 

it a felony for someone other than the person who registered the voter or the voter herself 

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to submit a voter registration form. Id. at 702, 705-06. The court concluded that 

“participation in voter registration implicates a number of both expressive and 

associational rights which are protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 700. Finding 

that the challenged Ohio regulation “severely chills participation in the voter registration 

process,” and served no legitimate state interest, the court concluded that it likely violated 

the First Amendment rights of those who participate in voter registration drives. Id. at 

705-06. Plaintiffs argue that there is no principled distinction between returning voter 

registration forms and returning early ballots. 

 Defendants rely on Vote for America v. Steen, which reached the opposite 

conclusion. That case involved a challenge to various Texas laws that regulated the 

receipt and delivery of completed voter registration applications. Vote for Am., 732 F.3d 

at 385-86. The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that collecting and delivering voter 

registration applications were inherently expressive activities protected by the First 

Amendment. Id. at 392. In doing so, the court agreed that “some voter registration 

activities involve speech—‘urging’ citizens to register; ‘distributing’ voter registration 

forms; ‘helping’ voters fill out their forms; and ‘asking’ for information to verify 

registrations were processed successfully.” Id. at 389. It found, however, that “there is 

nothing inherently expressive about receiving a person’s completed [voter registration] 

application and being charged with getting that application to the proper place.” Id. at 

392 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 The Court finds the Fifth Circuit’s analysis more persuasive. Though many 

GOTV activities involve First Amendment protected activity, there is nothing inherently 

expressive or communicative about receiving a voter’s completed early ballot and 

delivering it to the proper place. Thus, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their First 

Amendment claim because they have not shown that ballot collection is protected First 

Amendment activity. 

 Assuming, arguendo, that H.B. 2023 implicates protected associational rights, it 

does not impose severe burdens. Nothing in H.B. 2023 prevents Plaintiffs or other civic 

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organizations from encouraging, urging, or reminding people to vote, informing them of 

relevant election deadlines, helping them fill out early ballots or request special election 

boards, or arranging transportation to on-site early voting locations, post offices, county 

recorder’s offices, or polling places. See Vote for Am., 732 F.3d at 393 (noting that voter 

registration volunteers remained “free to organize and run the registration drive, persuade 

others to register to vote, distribute registration forms, and assist others in filling them 

out”); League of Women Voters, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (“[The challenged law] does not 

place any restrictions on who is eligible to participate in voter registration drives or what 

methods or means third-party voter registration organizations may use to solicit new 

voters and distribute registration applications. Instead, [it] simply regulates an 

administrative aspect of the electoral process—the handling of voter registration 

applications by third-party voter registration organizations after they have been collected 

from applications.”). H.B. 2023 merely regulates who may possess, and therefore return, 

another’s early ballot. In light of the minimal burdens H.B. 2023 imposes on GOTV 

activities, Arizona’s aforementioned regulatory interests in preventing absentee voter 

fraud and preserving public confidence in elections are sufficient justifications. 

 iii. Partisan Fencing 

Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that H.B. 2023 “was intended to suppress the vote in 

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibit discrimination based 

on partisan affiliation or viewpoint.” (Doc. 85 at 18.) This so-called “partisan fencing” 

theory derives from Carrington v. Rash, in which the Supreme Court found 

unconstitutional a Texas law prohibiting any member of the armed forces who moves her 

home to Texas during the course of military duty from voting. 380 U.S. 89, 95-96 

(1965). In striking down the law, the Supreme Court explained that “‘[f]encing out’ from 

the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is 

constitutionally impermissible.” Id. at 94. The theory found renewed support decades 

later in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case in which the 

Supreme Court held that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable. 541 U.S. 

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267 (2004). Writing only for himself, Justice Kennedy wrote “[i]f a court were to find a 

State did impose burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their views, 

there would likely be a First Amendment violation, unless the State shows some 

compelling interest.” Id. at 315. 

 Since these decisions, however, no special framework for analyzing partisan 

fencing claims has developed. Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt the framework 

established in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 

Corporation for analyzing claims of invidious racial discrimination. 429 U.S. 252 

(1977). Under the Arlington Heights framework, the Court first examines whether the 

challenged law was motivated by an “invidious discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 266. In 

doing so, the Court considers factors such as (1) whether the law has a disparate impact 

on a particular group; (2) the historical background and sequence of events leading to 

enactment; (3) substantive or procedural departures from the normal legislative process; 

and (4) relevant legislative history. Id. at 266-68. If the Court concludes that the law was 

intended, at least in part, to discriminate against a particular group, the burden shifts to 

the state to prove either that the challenged law has no discriminatory effect, or that it 

would have been enacted even without the discriminatory motive. Id. at 270 n.21. 

 Recent cases, however, have approached partisan fencing claims skeptically. In 

Lee v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the district court concluded that “[a] careful 

reading of the Carrington opinion would seem to reveal that the term ‘partisan fencing’ 

does not create an independent cause of action aside from a typical First Amendment and 

Equal Protection Clause claim.” 155 F. Supp. 3d 572, 584 (E.D. Va. 2015); see also 

Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:15-CV-1802, 2016 WL 

3248030, at *48 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2016), reversed on other grounds by Ohio 

Democratic Party, 2016 WL 4437605 (“Carrington and its progeny do not, however, 

appear to create a separate equal protection cause of action to challenge a facially neutral 

law that was allegedly passed with the purpose of fencing out voters of a particular 

political affiliation.”). Instead of applying to party affiliation “the level of scrutiny that 

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the Constitution requires for laws that discriminate on the basis of race or any other 

suspect class,” One Wisconsin, 2016 WL 2757454, at *12, these courts analyzed partisan 

fencing claims under the Anderson-Burdick framework. 

 The Court finds these cases persuasive, especially considering the dearth of 

authority for treating party affiliation as a suspect class. Accordingly, the Court will 

apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework to determine whether the burdens 

imposed by H.B. 2023 are justified.10 For substantially the same reasons the Court 

articulated in its analysis of Plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims, H.B. 2023 places only 

minor burdens on voting and associational rights. Because H.B. 2023 does not impose 

severe burdens, the Court’s scrutinizes Arizona’s justifications less severely. Arizona’s 

important regulatory interests in preventing absentee voter fraud and preserving public 

confidence in elections are sufficient to justify H.B. 2023 under this less exacting 

standard. 

II. Irreparable Harm 

Because Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, they have 

not shown that H.B. 2023 will likely cause them irreparable harm. See Hale v. Dep’t of 

Energy, 806 F.2d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 1986). Moreover, at this juncture Plaintiffs’ belief 

that H.B. 2023 will prevent certain people from voting is speculative, as representatives 

of the ADP admit that they have no way of knowing if any voters will be impacted by the 

limitation on ballot collection. “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a 

possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the] characterization of injunctive 

relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 

plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 

 

10 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have not provided evidence that H.B. 2023 

will have a cognizable disparate impact on Democrats as compared to voters of other political affiliations. As the Court explained in its analysis of Plaintiffs’ § 2 claim, the anecdotal observations of Plaintiffs’ declarants are not sufficient to prove a disparate impact. Thus, even if the Court were to apply the Arlington Heights framework, 

Plaintiffs have not shown that H.B. 2023 likely will impose greater burdens on Democrats as compared to similarly situated voters of other political affiliations. 

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III. Balance of Hardships/Public Interest 

 Some authority indicates that a state “suffers a form of irreparable injury” 

whenever it “is enjoined from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its 

people[.]” Maryland v. King, --- U.S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). Moreover, 

the issue of likelihood of success on the merits has subsumed within it the 

other relevant factors. In other words, if the Court concludes that the 

regulations challenged by Plaintiffs unduly impinge upon constitutionally protected rights, the Court also can easily conclude that the public interest is served by an injunction prohibiting such impingement. Similarly, if the Court concludes that the challenged regulations fail to further any legitimate state interest, or are not sufficiently narrowly tailored in their effort to do so, the Court also can easily conclude that the balance of 

hardships tips in favor of the injunction Plaintiffs seek. 

Project Vote, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 702. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs are not likely to 

succeed on their claims, the balance of hardships and public interest weigh against 

preliminary injunctive relief. 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, and based on the current record, Plaintiffs have not shown that 

H.B. 2023 likely will disparately impact minority voters. Nor have they shown that the 

law more than minimally burdens voting and associational rights. Deference to the 

judgments made by Arizona’s elected representatives in exercising their constitutionally 

prescribed authority to regulate elections is, therefore, required. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Reply 

Memorandum and Reply Exhibits filed by Defendants and the ARP, (Doc. 167), is 

DENIED. 

// 

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// 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

of H.B. 2023, (Doc. 84), is DENIED. 

 Dated this 23rd day of September, 2016. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge 

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