Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00714/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00714-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

VICTOR BRADSHAW, GDC-327970, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-714-TMH

) [WO]

)

EUFAULA POLICE DEPT., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This civil action is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Victor

Bradshaw [“Bradshaw”], an inmate currentlyconfined at the WheelerCorrectional Facility

in Alamo, Georgia, on September 25, 2013. In this complaint, Bradshaw challenges the

1

constitutionality of his extradition from Alabama to Georgia in June of 2010.

Upon initiation of this case, Bradshaw filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of FeesDoc. No. 2. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) directs that a prisoner is not allowed to bring

Although the Clerk of this Court stamped the complaint “received” on September 30, 2013, Bradshaw

1

verified execution of the complaint on September 25, 2013. The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s complaint

is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272

(1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780

th

(11 Cir. 1993). “Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court] must

th

assume that [the instant complaint] was delivered to prison authorities the day [Bradshaw] signed it...” Washington

v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11 Cir. 2001). In light of the foregoing, the court considers September 25,

th

2013 as the date of filing.

Case 2:13-cv-00714-TMH-TFM Document 4 Filed 10/07/13 Page 1 of 6
a civil action or proceed on appeal in forma pauperis if he “has, on 3 or more occasions,

while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the

United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent

danger of serious physical injury.”

2

II. DISCUSSION

The records of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia

establish that Bradshaw, while incarcerated or detained, has on at least three occasions had

civil actions or appeals dismissed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as

frivolous, malicious, for failure to state a claim and/or for asserting claims against

defendantsimmune from suit. The actions on which this court reliesin finding a § 1915(g)

violation by the plaintiff are: (1) Bradshaw v. Governor of Georgia, et al., Case No. 4:12-

CV-11 (CDL) (M.D. Ga. 2012); (2) Bradshaw v. Doe, Case No. 5:11-CV-362 (CAR)

(M.D. Ga. 2011); (3) Bradshaw v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, Case No. 4:11-CV-121

In Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 978, 119 S.Ct. 27 (1998), the Court

2

determined that the “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which requires frequent filer prisoner indigents

to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their cases and appeals, “does not violate the First

Amendment right to access the courts; the separation of judicial and legislative powers; the Fifth Amendment right to

due process of law; or the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, as incorporated through the Fifth

Amendment.” In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007), the Supreme Court abrogated Rivera but

only to the extent it compelled an inmate to plead exhaustion of remedies in his complaint as “failure to exhaust is an

affirmative defense under the PLRA ... and inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion

in their complaints.” 549 U.S. at 216, 127 S.Ct. at 921.

2

Case 2:13-cv-00714-TMH-TFM Document 4 Filed 10/07/13 Page 2 of 6
(CDL) (M.D. Ga. 2011). As Bradshaw has “three strikes” related to prior federal civil

3

actions, he cannot proceed in forma pauperis unless he qualifiesfor the “imminent danger”

exception to § 1915(g).

In the instant complaint, Bradshaw alleges that the defendants violated his

constitutional rights with respect to his extradition from Alabama to Georgia in June of

2010. Bradshaw assertsthat the mere fact of hisincarceration,standing alone, renders him

in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3 (“I am currently

incarcerated in prison. I am currently at any time around inmates with serious offenses.

The prison is placed on lock down very often about incidents within the prison. It is not

ever known exactly what could or would happen, any place within the prison.”). This

purely speculative claim of possible future injury utterly and completely fails to

demonstrate that Bradshaw was, in fact, “under imminent danger of serious physical

injury” at the time he filed this cause of action as is required to meet the exception to

application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11 Cir.

th

1999) (A prisoner who has filed three or more frivolous lawsuits and seeks to proceed in

forma pauperis must allege a present “imminent danger of serious physical injury” to

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia relied on these same three cases in

3

dismissing a similar complaint filed by Bradshaw as violative of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Bradshaw v. Georgia Dept. of

Corrections, et al., Case No. 4:13-CV-73 (CDL) (M.D. Ga. April 4, 2013). The Georgia court further noted that

“[i]n each of the above cases, [Bradshaw] challenged his arrest or extradition from Alabama. As there exists two

independent reasons for dismissal of the instant lawsuit, the Court need not consider whether res judicata or

collateral estoppel bars this lawsuit or Plaintiff's claims.” Id. - Order of Dismissal at 2 n.2.

3

Case 2:13-cv-00714-TMH-TFM Document 4 Filed 10/07/13 Page 3 of 6
circumvent application of the “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).). Based

on the foregoing, the court concludesthat Bradshaw’s motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is due to be denied and that this case is subject to summary dismissal without

prejudice as Bradshaw failed to pay the requisite filing fee upon initiation of this cause of

action. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11 Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)

th

(“[T]he proper procedure isfor the district court to dismissthe complaint without prejudice

when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to the provisions

of § 1915(g)” because the prisoner “must pay the filing fee at the time he initiates the

suit.”).

In addition, “[e]ven if [Bradshaw] had not incurred three strikes prior to filing this

lawsuit, his complaint would be subject to dismissal [as untimely filed]. The length of the

statute of limitations for filing a section 1983 action is controlled by state law. Wilson v.

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1985).” Bradshaw v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections, et al.,

Case No. 4:13-CV-73 (CDL) (M.D. April 4, 2013) - Order of Dismissal at 3. In Alabama,

the statute of limitations for a section 1983 action is two years. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d

1168, 1173 (11 Cir. 2008) (“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort

th

actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state

where the § 1983 action has been brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76, 105

S.Ct. 1938, 1946-47, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). [The plaintiff’s] claim was brought in

4

Case 2:13-cv-00714-TMH-TFM Document 4 Filed 10/07/13 Page 4 of 6
Alabama where the governing limitations period is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones

v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11 Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in order

th

to have his claim heard, [the plaintiff is] required to bring it within two years from the date

the limitations period began to run.”). The tolling provision of Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a) is

unavailing. Because Bradshaw initiated this cause of action more than three years after

4

his extradition, the claims raised herein are barred by the applicable two-year period of

limitation.

5

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by Victor

Bradshaw (Doc. No. 2) be and is hereby DENIED. Additionally, it is the

RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case be dismissed without

prejudice for the plaintiff’s failure to pay the full filing fee upon the initiation of this case.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before October 22, 2013 the parties may file objectionsto the

This section allows tolling of the limitation period for an individual who “is, at the time the right accrues ...

4

insane....” Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a). The complaint demonstrates that Bradshaw was not legally insane at the time of the

challenged events or at any time thereafter so as to warrant tolling under Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a).

Unquestionably, the statute of limitations is usually a matter which may be raised as an affirmative defense.

5

The court notes, however, that in an action proceeding under section 1983, it may consider, sua sponte, affirmative

defenses that are apparent from the face of the complaint. Clark v. Georgia Pardons and Parole Board, 915 F.2d

636, 640 n.2 (11 Cir. 1990); see also Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438 (5 Cir. 1990). “[I]f the district court sees that an

th th

affirmative defense would defeat the action, a section 1915[(e)(2)(B)(i)] dismissal is allowed.” Clark, 915 F.2d at

640. “The expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense the existence of which warrants dismissal

as frivolous. See Franklin [v. State of Oregon], 563 F.Supp. [1310] at 1330, 1332.” Id. at n.2.

5

Case 2:13-cv-00714-TMH-TFM Document 4 Filed 10/07/13 Page 5 of 6
Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 7 day of October, 2013.

th

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

6

Case 2:13-cv-00714-TMH-TFM Document 4 Filed 10/07/13 Page 6 of 6