Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01290/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WHITTIER BUCHANAN

CDCR #K-02554,

Civil No. 08cv1290 BTM (WVG))

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

[Doc. No. 46]

vs.

E. GARZA; LUI FUGA; SILVIA

GARCIA; ELIAS CONTRERAS; RAY

BAKER; RICARDO LIMON; ANGEL

SALCEDO; GARY PEDERSON;

ANTHONY VERKOUTEREN;

JANE DOE; HODGE; STERLING;

NOLA GRANNIS; JOHN DOE; 

Defendants.

In this prisoner civil rights case, Whittier Buchanan (“Plaintiff”), is proceeding in pro se

and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Defendants Baker, Contreras, Fuga, Garcia, Garza, Limon, Pederson, Salcedo and Verkouteren

have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 46]. The remaining Defendants, Sterling, Hodge and Grannis,

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff has also named John and Jane Does as Defendants in this matter but a review of the 1

Court’s docket indicates that these Defendants have yet to be properly identified or served.

 The Court refers to the following facts based only on Plaintiff’s version of the events as set 2

forth in his First Amended Complaint.

2

were only recently served with Plaintiff’s FAC and have until August 3, 2010 to file their

Answer or a Rule 12 motion. [Doc. Nos. 55, 57, 59].1

I. Factual Background2

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the events that gave rise to this

action occurred while he was incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility

(“RJD”) from February 7, 2007 to October 23, 2007. (See FAC at 1.) In 2007, Plaintiff had a

pending lawsuit against the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) for

which he requested that Defendant Sterling, the Legal Technician Assistant, provide him with

copies of legal documents. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Sterling’s “lack of legal

assistance” caused Plaintiff to “miss his Court deadline.” (Id.) Because he claims that Sterling’s

actions “hindered his efforts to process his legal claims,” Plaintiff filed an administrative

grievance against Sterling. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that when Sterling became aware of Plaintiff’s grievances, she began to

lose or misplace Plaintiff’s legal documents and refused him access to the prison law library.

(Id.) As a result, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was dismissed. (Id.) 

Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Salcedo, Baker and Limon “were not supplying

Plaintiff with indigent envelopes” so he filed an administrative grievance against Salcedo, Baker

and Limon. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Salcedo that he had pending litigation which is why he

needed the envelopes and requested her assistance to process his legal mail. (Id.) Because

Salcedo refused to do so, Plaintiff filed another administrative grievance against Salcedo. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that “in retaliation, Defendant Salcedo conspired with Defendants’ Baker and

Limon” to not “pick up/process Plaintiff’s legal mail to the courts.” (Id.) 

Defendant Verkouteren came to Plaintiff’s cell on June 3, 2007 to interview Plaintiff with

respect to his administrative grievances regarding Salcedo, Baker and Limon. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Verkouteren had Salcedo process one piece of Plaintiff’s legal mail

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

but he also informed Plaintiff that if Plaintiff continued to file administrative grievances

regarding this issue, the Defendants would continue to refuse to process his legal mail. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that these statements also indicate a conspiracy between Verkouteren to retaliate

against Plaintiff for filing administrative grievances against Salcedo, Baker and Limon. (Id.)

On May 30, 2007, Plaintiff was standing outside of the “program office” when Defendant

Garza emerged from the office and “gave Plaintiff a direct order to ‘stop filing 602's!’” When

Plaintiff attempted to explain why he needed to file the grievances, Garza “abruptly cut Plaintiff

off yelling ‘[racial explicative], you don’t have any rights, you are a criminal, criminals don’t

have rights.’” (Id.) Garza continued to use racially derogatory language towards him. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims Defendant Garza “yanked his [stick] from his waistbelt” and ordered Plaintiff

to “get down.” (Id.) Plaintiff complied by laying down on his stomach at which time Garza

ordered Defendant Fuga and “Jane Doe” to “cuff him.” (Id.) Plaintiff informed Defendants

Fuga and Doe as they “began to jerk Plaintiff’s arms behind his back” that he had a medical

chrono indicating that Plaintiff had a disability that provided for him to be handcuffed in the

front and not behind his back due to a herniated disk. (Id.) Defendants Fuga and Doe ignored

this information and were “kneeing Plaintiff roughly in his back, neck and the lower parts” of

his body. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that a number of medical care employees and correctional

officers observed this altercation but failed to protect him from injury.

Plaintiff cried out “you’re hurting me.” (Id. at 6.) “Upon hearing this, Defendant Garza

gave Defendants Jane Doe and Fuga a direct order to ‘hurt him.’” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that

Fuga and Doe “became even more malicious and sadistic” by “jerk[ing] twice on Plaintiff’s left

arm” which resulted in an “audible popping sound.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Garza

continued to yell racial explicatives towards him and ordered Fuga and Doe to stand Plaintiff up.

(Id.) As Plaintiff was crying, he claims that Defendant Garza “saw that he had actually

‘silenced’ Plaintiff” and ordered Fuga to take Plaintiff back to his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff asked

Fuga to take him to the infirmary as he was in “extreme pain” but Fuga refused. Plaintiff

contends that Garza, Fuga and Doe entered into a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional

rights.

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

On August 16, 2007, Plaintiff claims that he was asked by Defendant Hodge to “snitch”

on another inmate. (Id.) When Plaintiff refused, Hodge took Plaintiff’s prescription sunglasses.

(Id.) Because Plaintiff continued to refuse to be a “snitch,” and due to the fact that Plaintiff filed

a grievance against him, Hodge began acts of retaliation against Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff claims

that Hodge would take personal property from Plaintiff and give them to other inmates. (Id. at

7.) Plaintiff alleges that Hodge would refuse to allow Plaintiff to attend church services or sing

in the prison’s gospel choir. (Id.) 

II. DEFENDANTS VERKOUTEREN, GARCIA, PEDERSON, SALCEDO AND CONTRERAS’

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)

The Court will first consider Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Salcedo, Pederson and

Contreras arguments that claims against them found in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

should be dismissed for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

In the case, this Court has already found that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies with respect to Defendants’ Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson, and Contreras and granted

their previous Motion to Dismiss. (See Sept. 25, 2009 Order Adopting Report and

Recommendation Granting Motion to Dismiss at 1.) The claims that form the basis of these

action have not changed with respect to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements. Thus, the Court

has already considered the arguments and evidence provided by all parties with regard to

whether or not Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to the claims against

Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson and Contreras. The Court has already issued a ruling

based on the same set of facts and case law and therefore, it is subject to the law of the case

doctrine. See United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under the ‘law of the

case’ doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded from reexamining an issue previously decided by

the same court, or a higher court, in the same case.”) (citation omitted). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

For all the reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendation issued on February 26,

2009 and this Court’s Order adopting that recommendation, the claims against Defendants

Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson and Contreras are DISMISSED for failing to exhaust

administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 

While the Court’s September 25, 2009 Order may not have been clear to Plaintiff, he

cannot amend the claims against these Defendants in this action when the dismissal is for failing

to properly exhaust administrative remedies. This is due to the fact that Plaintiff must now

properly exhaust his administrative remedies as to these Defendants which would then occur

after Plaintiff filed this action. The Ninth Circuit has held that any claims that a prisoner wishes

to bring in an action must be exhausted on the date he files his initial complaint. See Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, it is proper for this Court to dismiss all

claims against Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson, and Contreras without prejudice but

also without leave to amend in this action. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with his claims against

Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson, and Contreras he must file a separate action once

he has properly exhausted his administrative remedies. In addition, while Defendants

Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson, and Contreras have reitereated their position that Plaintiff failed

to exhaust the claims against them, they also attack the claims against them on the merits. The

Court will not consider these arguments as those arguments should be decided if and when

Plaintiff files a separate action.

Defendant Salcedo also brought a Motion to Dismiss the claims against him for failing

to exhaust administrative remedies but Defendants concede in their Reply that Plaintiff did, in

fact, exhaust his administrative remedies as to Defendant Salcedo. (See Defs.’ Reply at 2, fn.

1.) Defendants Salcedo did not claim, as the other Defendants did, in the previous Motion to

Dismiss that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the claims

against Salcedo. Thus, Defendant Salcedo’s Motion to Dismiss for failing to exhaust

administrative remedies is DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

Aside from the claims against Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson, and Contreras,

the remaining Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims contending that: (1) Plaintiff has

failed to adequate state an access to courts claim against any named Defendant; (2) Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim of conspiracy; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4)

Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of California Government Claims Act.

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v.

Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s

complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled

to relief.” Id. (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)).

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) .

In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil

rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Plaintiff’s access to courts claim

Plaintiff’s first cause of action in his First Amended Complaint is titled “retaliatory denial

of Plaintiff’s meaningful access to the courts which is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Several times throughout his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings the same claims under 3

several different Constitutional amendments. “Where an amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source

of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior,’ it is that Amendment, that

‘must be the guide for analyzing the complaint.’” Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion)). Thus, the Court will consider

Plaintiff’s access to courts and retaliation claims as arising under the First Amendment.

7

Amendments to the United States constitution. ” (FAC at 7.) Defendants move to dismiss 3

Plaintiff’s access to courts claim found in this first cause of action but fail to move with respect

to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

Prison officials who deliberately interfere with the transmission of a prisoner’s legal

papers, or deny him access to a legitimate means to petition for redress for the purpose of

thwarting his litigation may violate the prisoner’s constitutionally protected right of access to the

courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-55 (1996); Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, in order to state a claim for denial of access to the courts, Plaintiff must

allege a specific actual injury involving a nonfrivolous legal claim, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-55,

and must allege facts showing that he “could not present a claim to the courts because of the

[Defendants’] failure to fulfill [their] constitutional obligations.” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082,

1091 (9th Cir. 1994). The right of access is only guaranteed for certain types of claims: direct

and collateral attacks upon a conviction or sentence, and civil rights actions challenging the

conditions of confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Even among these types of claims, actual

injury will exist only if “a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.”

Id. at 353 & n.3. Thus, to state a claim for interference with the right of access to the courts, an

inmate must plead facts sufficient to show that prison officials have actually frustrated or

impeded a nonfrivolous attack on either his sentence or the conditions of his confinement. Id.

at 352-53. 

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement

of an access to courts claim. Plaintiff refers to a “lawsuit pending in the courts” and a lawsuit

against the “California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility” but gives no other details with

respect to these legal matters. (See FAC at 4, 7.) Plaintiff does not indicate the underlying

nature of any of these pending claims. As correctly noted by Defendants, Plaintiff must allege

the “underlying cause of action.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Plaintiff

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

alleges no facts to show that his claims are either a direct and collateral attack upon his

conviction or sentence or a civil rights actions challenging the conditions of confinement and

that it was “nonfrivolous.” See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353, 354. In fact, Plaintiff concedes in his

Opposition that he failed to allege the facts giving rise to the underlying cause of action that he

claims was dismissed by a court based on the actions of the Defendants. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 12.)

Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s access to courts

claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

C. Conspiracy claims

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff failed to state a conspiracy claim upon which relief

may be granted. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants acted in a

conspiracy to deprive him of his right to “file 602's” and bring a “lawsuit in the courts.” (FAC

at 5.) Plaintiff refers to conspiracy allegations in his factual allegations but does not set forth

a separate cause of action claiming conspiracy in his First Amended Complaint. Therefore, the

Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims to arise under § 1983.

To state a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, however, Plaintiff must allege : “(1) the

existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendant[s] ... to deprive him of his

constitutional rights, and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement.”

Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850,

853 (9th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff must allege a “meeting of the minds” to violate the constitution);

Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a

motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); Aldabe v.

Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy insufficient

to support a claim under section 1983 or 1985). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Here, Plaintiff has not properly alleged a conspiracy claim because he cannot allege an

“actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement.” Avalos, 596 F.3d at 591. As

set forth above, Plaintiff claims that there was a conspiracy to deprive him of access to the courts

but as the Court has already found, Plaintiff has failed to properly allege an access to courts

claim. Thus, because Plaintiff has not properly alleged an “actual deprivation” of his

constitutional rights, he has failed to state a conspiracy claim against any Defendant.

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also seek qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s denial of access and

conspiracy claims. Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has not adequately stated an

access to courts claim or a conspiracy claim, the Court need not reach any issues regarding

qualified immunity. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The

better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to

determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”);

see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been

violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning

qualified immunity.”).

E. California Government Claims Act and Immunity under California Law

Defendants Baker, Limon, and Salcedo seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims on the

grounds that he failed to comply with the requirements of the California Government Claims

Act. 

Defendants Baker, Limon and Salcedo argue that any state law claims other than

Plaintiff’s excessive force claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to submit

administrative claims regarding these matters as required by CAL. GOVT. CODE § 945.4. The

California Government Claims Act requires that a claim against a state employee be presented

to the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (“VCGCB”) no more than six

months after the cause of action accrues. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 945.6.

 

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

In this matter, Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff did bring such a claim as to the

excessive force issue but failed to file a claim as to any of the other state law claims Plaintiff

purports to bring in his First Amended Complaint. In support of their argument, Defendants

have supplied the declaration of Susan Antley, the Deputy Attorney General assigned to

represent Defendants in this matter. (See Declaration of Susan Antley.) In this declaration, Ms.

Antley states that the Attorney General’s office requested that the VCGCB provide

documentation of any and all claims made by Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Only one claim was found

relating to the May 30, 2007 excessive force allegations. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff argues in

response that he was not required to “name every Defendant” in his claim brought before the

VCGCB. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 20-21.) However, Plaintiff may not have to name every Defendant

but he would have to identify each claim for which he seeks compensation. Thus, it does not

appear that Plaintiff has properly alleged that he “presented” each claim to the VCGCB. 

 Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s state law claims, with exception of those found in Plaintiff’s

tenth cause of action in his First Amended Complaint relating to the claims of excessive force

are dismissed for failing to comply with CAL. GOVT. CODE § 945.4.

III. Remaining Claims and Remaining Defendants

Defendants did not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims,

Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claims or Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims. Moreover, Defendants

Sterling, Grannis and Hodge were only recently served with Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

and are due to file a responsive pleading no later than August 3, 2010. Once the parties have

fully briefed the motions that are not yet filed and the Court issues a ruling, Plaintiff will be

provided the opportunity to: (1) file a Second Amended Complaint that corrects the deficiencies

of pleading noted by the Court in its Orders; or (2) notify the Court that Plaintiff intends to

proceed with the claims that survive the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. At this time, Plaintiff

need do nothing until a hearing date has been scheduled for the upcoming Motions and he may

file an Opposition or a Notice of Non Opposition to those motions.

/ / /

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby:

(1) GRANTS Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson and Contreras’ Motion to

Dismiss all claims against them without prejudice for failing to exhaust administrative remedies

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e and for all the reasons set forth in the Court’s Order dated

September 25, 2009. Because there are no remaining claims against these Defendants, and there

is no just reason for delay, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment, without

prejudice, as to Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson and Contreras pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 54(b).

(2) DENIES Defendant Salcedo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies against Salcedo;

(3) GRANTS Defendants Baker, Fuga, Garza, Limon, and Salcedo’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s access to courts claim for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted;

(4) GRANTS Defendants Baker, Fuga, Garza, Limon, and Salcedo’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted;

(5) GRANTS Defendants Baker, Fuga, Garza, Limon, and Salcedo’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims with the exception of those found in Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause

of Action in his First Amended Complaint for failing to comply with the requirements of the

California Government Claims Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 27, 2010

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01290-BTM-WVG Document 62 Filed 07/27/10 Page 11 of 11