Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02272/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02272-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TONY MARTINEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HOME DEPOT USA, INC. dba HOME 

DEPOT #1003, 

 Defendant. / 

No. Civ. S-04-2272 DFL DAD 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiff Tony Martinez filed this action against Home 

Depot alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA) and multiple California statutes.1 Martinez seeks to amend 

his complaint. Both parties move for summary judgment. For the 

following reasons, the court denies the motion to amend, denies 

Martinez’s motion for summary judgment as untimely, grants Home 

Depot’s motion for summary judgment on all forty-two alleged ADA 

 

1

 California Health and Safety Code § 19955, the Unruh Act 

(Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq.), the Disabled Persons Act (Cal. 

Civ. Code § 54 et seq.), the Unfair Business Practices Act (Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.), and Negligence Per Se (Cal. 

Civ. Code § 1714). 

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violations, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Martinez’s remaining state law claims. 

I. 

Martinez, a disabled individual, alleges that he was denied 

access to Home Depot Store No. 1003 in Sacramento on January 1 

and 6, 2004 due to forty-two barriers in the store’s parking 

lot, aisles, checkout counters, and restrooms. Martinez alleges 

that he would visit the store again but for the future threat 

that Home Depot will deny him “full and equal access” to the 

store. Martinez seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages, 

punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. 

Martinez filed his original complaint on October 24, 2004. 

Home Depot answered on December 6. The court issued a 

scheduling order on January 20, 2005, stating that “no further 

. . . amendments to pleadings [are] permitted, except with leave 

of court, good cause having been shown.” The order closed all 

discovery on June 2, 2006 and required dispositive motions to be 

filed by July 12. Martinez filed a motion to amend on May 16, 

2006, but withdrew the filing on the same day. On June 21, 

Martinez filed the present motion to amend. On July 12, Home 

Depot filed a motion for summary judgment. On July 24, the 

court granted Martinez’s request for a site inspection “for the 

limited purpose of determining whether [defendants] have 

remedied the alleged violations.” The court instructed that 

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“[t]he site inspection shall not be the basis for new claims” 

unrelated to the remedial actions. On September 15, Martinez 

filed a joint opposition to summary judgment and cross motion 

for summary judgment. 

II. 

A. Motion to Amend 

Martinez seeks to amend his complaint to add “newly 

discovered barriers.” A party attempting to amend a pleading 

after the date specified in a scheduling order must satisfy 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)’s “good cause” standard. 

See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th 

Cir. 1992). “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which 

focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an 

amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s 

‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the 

party seeking the amendment.” Id. at 609. Analysis under Rule 

16(b) focuses “upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 

modification.” Id. at 609. 

Martinez provides no explanation as to why, more than two 

years after the visits to Home Depot that triggered this action, 

he must amend the complaint to allege new barriers. Rather, he 

alleges only that the new barriers were discovered after the 

filing of the complaint and that allowing the amendment would 

further judicial economy. These assertions do not demonstrate 

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good cause, particularly when the proposed amendments are so 

disruptive to the longstanding schedule for this case. Martinez 

next asserts that he has been diligent in the course of 

litigation. The record does not support this claim. The expert 

report submitted by Martinez to document the newly encountered 

barriers was completed by January 23, 2006. Martinez filed his 

motion initially on May 16, 2006 but immediately withdrew it. 

He refiled the motion on June 21, more than six months after 

receipt of the expert report notifying him of the additional 

barriers and more than two weeks after the June 2 close of 

discovery. Such delays are not consistent with diligence. See

Schwarzer et al., Civil Procedure Before Trial, 8:405.1, 406, 

417 (2006). Martinez does not answer Home Depot’s claim that 

allowing an amended complaint at this point in the litigation 

would be prejudicial to its interests. For these reasons, 

Martinez’s motion to amend is DENIED for failure to demonstrate 

good cause. The remainder of this order addresses only barriers 

Martinez alleged in the original complaint. 

B. Martinez’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Home Depot argues that Martinez’s motion, filed jointly 

with the opposition to Home Depot’s summary judgment motion, was 

untimely and should be disregarded. Martinez filed the joint 

opposition and cross-motion on September 15, 2006, more than two 

months after the court’s deadline for dispositive motions. 

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Martinez responds that the cross-motion was timely under Local 

Rule 78-230(e),2 which he argues allows such a motion to be filed 

with a timely opposition despite the already-passed deadline for 

dispositive motions. This argument lacks merit. Neither the 

language of the rule nor any authority suggests that Local Rule 

78-230(e) supersedes the court’s scheduling order deadlines. 

The Local Rule is directed to the situation in which no such 

deadlines are implicated. Moreover, Rule 16(b) states that “[a] 

schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good 

cause and by leave of the district judge.” The court did not 

grant Martinez leave to file the late cross-motion for summary 

judgment. The cross-motion, therefore, is untimely and the 

court treats Martinez’s motion as an opposition to Home Depot’s 

motion for summary judgment. 

C. Home Depot’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Martinez concedes in his summary judgment papers that a 

majority of the forty-two alleged barriers do not violate the 

 

2

 “Any counter-motion or other motion that a party may desire 

to make that is related to the general subject matter of the 

original motion shall be served and filed with the Clerk in the 

manner and on the date prescribed for the filing of opposition. 

In the event such counter-motion or other related motion is 

filed, the Court may continue the hearing on the original and 

all related motions so as to give all parties reasonable 

opportunity to serve and file oppositions and replies to all 

pending motions.” Local Rule 78-230(e). 

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ADA. The court addresses the conceded claims first, then those 

still disputed by the parties.3 

1. Conceded Claims 

The court grants summary judgment for the defendant on the 

following claims, for the reasons explained below. 

For Claims 4 and 5, concerning the location of disabled 

parking spaces, Martinez concedes that Home Depot has relocated 

the disabled parking spaces from the side lot to the main 

entrance of the store. Since Martinez based both claims on the 

prior location of the spaces, Home Depot’s alteration renders 

Martinez’s federal claim for injunctive relief moot. Martinez, 

however, objects to Home Depot’s removal of the spaces and 

restates his claim as to barriers between the removed spaces and 

the store entrance. ADAAG § 4.6.2 requires only that accessible 

parking spots be “located on the shortest accessible route of 

travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance.” 

Because Home Depot’s newly added spaces comply with this 

section, neither the removal of the originally challenged, more 

distant spaces nor the continued presence of barriers between 

those spaces and the store violates the ADA. 

For Claims 8 and 9, concerning parking spaces not outlined 

in white and missing painted “No Parking” warnings in the access 

 

3

 The claim numbers correspond to the barriers listed in 

Martinez’s Preliminary Site Accessibility Report. 

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aisles, Martinez concedes that Home Depot has remedied the 

alleged violations.4 

For Claim 10, concerning stop signs at crossings, Martinez 

concedes without elaboration that there is no ADA violation. 

For Claims 13 through 15, concerning exterior route of 

travel signs and international symbols of accessibility (ISAs) 

at store entrances, Martinez concedes without elaboration that 

there are no ADA violations. 

For Claims 20 through 28, concerning restroom signs, 

latches, and doors, Martinez concedes without elaboration that 

there are no ADA violations. 

For Claims 30 through 33, concerning placement of the 

toilet paper dispenser, the lavatory, drainpipes under lavatory, 

and the towel dispenser in the men’s restroom, Martinez concedes 

that Home Depot has removed the alleged barriers. 

For Claims 35 through 42, concerning alleged barriers in 

the women’s restroom, Martinez concedes that he lacks standing 

to raise the claims. 

2. Disputed Claims 

 

4

 The additional violations concerning parking spaces alleged 

in Martinez’s joint opposition and cross-motion go beyond the 

scope of the original complaint and do not state a claim under 

the ADA due to their reliance on a source - the Manual for 

Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”) - not incorporated 

into the ADA’s requirements. See Sanford v. Del Taco, Inc., No. 

Civ. S-04-2154, 2006 WL 2669351, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2006).

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Home Depot argues that the ADAAG provides the only 

regulations relevant to Martinez’s ADA claims. Martinez 

misinterprets this argument, assuming that Home Depot is arguing 

that “it need only comply with the ADAAG,” not other standards 

such as the California Building Code or Vehicle Code. Home 

Depot does not dispute that California law may provide relief, 

but argues that violations of state law cannot create federal 

violations under the ADA. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.103(c) (stating 

that ADA does not invalidate other state remedies, but making no 

mention of incorporation of state standards). Ample authority 

supports Home Depot’s position. See, e.g. Sanford, 2006 WL 

2669351, *2 (“compliance with the ADAAG, and not another 

standard, constitutes compliance with the ADA requirements”); 

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, No. Civ. S-04-1339, 2006 WL 1686511, 

*7 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2006) (“the ADAAG constitutes the 

exclusive standards under Title III of the ADA”). Therefore, in 

determining whether Martinez states a federal claim, the court 

considers only the ADA and the ADAAG. For the reasons explained 

below, the court grants summary judgment for the defendant on 

the remainder of Martinez’s federal claims. 

For Claims 1 through 3, concerning tow-away sign 

requirements, Martinez does not allege that Home Depot violates 

the ADAAG. Instead, he relies upon MUTCD and other state 

regulations. However, “[t]he MUTCD does not establish the 

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guidelines for a violation of the ADA, and the ADAAG does not 

require tow-away signs.” Sanford, 2006 WL 26669351, *2. 

Although the parties dispute whether Home Depot posted the 

proper tow-away signs in an adequate manner, no ADA violation 

would result if Martinez’s allegations were true.5

For Claims 6 and 7, concerning improper parking signs, 

Martinez concedes that Home Depot removed the disabled parking 

spaces where it had posted the objectionable signs. He now 

alleges, however, that the remaining disabled parking signs 

violate the ADA because they (1) are not R99 and R7-8b signs and 

(2) contain the word “handicapped.” Plaintiff improperly relies 

on MUTCD and misstates ADA requirements. The ADA does not 

require separate signs or signs of a specific size. Although 

ADAAG § 4.6.4 states that spaces “shall have an additional sign 

‘Van-Accessible’ mounted below the symbol of accessibility,” 

courts have not read this language as requiring two physically 

 

5

 Martinez also argues that Home Depot created new violations 

by posting ISA path of travel signs in place of the tow-away 

signs. Martinez argues that one ISA sign is misleading because 

it could misdirect disabled customers. He provides no legal 

basis for concluding that the alleged confusion resulting from 

the sign would violate the ADA. The court does not address the 

claim because Martinez did not raise it in the original 

complaint. Moreover, Martinez lacks standing to challenge these 

ISA signs because they are only superficially related to the 

originally alleged, actually encountered tow-away sign barriers. 

See Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., No. Civ. S-03-1843, 

2005 WL 2072013, *4 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2005)(discussing standing 

limitations for ADA claims based upon unencountered barriers). 

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independent signs. White v. Divine Investments, Inc., No. Civ. 

S-04-0206, 2005 WL 2491543, *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2005) (holding 

that Justice Department’s guidelines cited by plaintiff 

expressly allow a single sign containing required language). 

Moreover, although the ADA uses the term “disabled” rather than 

“handicapped” because it is the “terminology most in line with 

the sensibilities of most Americans with disabilities,” it does 

not make the use of the word “handicap” a violation. See

Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 

Disability by Public Accommodations, “Section 36.104 

Definitions,” 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. B (explaining the 

disfavored status of “handicapped”). Therefore, even accepting 

as true Martinez’s factual allegations, the court finds that he 

fails to state an ADA violation based upon improper parking 

signs. 

For Claim 11, Martinez alleges that the route of travel 

from the property border is not accessible because of (1) a 

slope in the direction of travel exceeding 8.1% and (2) gaps in 

the path exceeding 0.5 inches without a means of circumvention. 

Martinez argues that these barriers exist on the route from the 

property’s eastern border. Home Depot, however, alleges that an 

accessible route exists from the property’s southern border. 

ADAAG 4.3.2(1) requires “[a]t least one accessible route.” 

Since Martinez does not challenge the accessibility of the 

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southern route, the court grants summary judgment for Home 

Depot, regardless of any barriers that may exist in the 

alternative route of access. 

For Claim 12, Martinez argues that no exterior route of 

travel exists from the parking lot to the store due to blocked 

access aisles. He also disputes Home Depot’s claims of a clearpath policy based upon contradictory evidence found during his 

store visits. Martinez relies upon ADAAG §§ 4.1.2, 4.3, and 4.4 

in his original claim. These sections, however, contain 

specific requirements for width, slope, and obstructions. 

Martinez fails to support his allegations with sufficiently 

specific evidence to create disputes of material fact under the 

cited ADAAG sections. He does not allege that Home Depot lacks 

a parking access aisle under 96 inches, §4.1.2(5)(b), a pathway 

with minimum clearance less than 36 inches, § 4.3.3, or 

protruding objects violating the various specified allowances, 

§ 4.4.1.6 Merely arguing generally that a “route” was “blocked” 

 

6 Martinez argues that Home Depot’s remedial efforts created 

new barriers to access. Specifically, Martinez alleges that two 

of the newly installed accessible parking spaces have access 

aisles that do not align with required curb cuts. These 

allegations alone, however, do not state an ADA violation. 

ADAAG § 4.6.3 states that “[t]wo accessible parking spaces may 

share a common access aisle.” Although Martinez’s photos show 

that the final access aisle in a row of parking spaces is 

blocked by a curb, Home Depot’s photos show that there is an 

aisle with ADA-compliant curb cuts on the opposite side of the 

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provides Home Depot with insufficient notice of the facts 

underlying his ADA claim, even if the allegations are accepted 

as true. 

For Claims 16 to 18, concerning check-out counters, 

Martinez initially argued that Home Depot lacked an accessible 

check stand, an appropriately sized self-service counter, and an 

ATM paypoint within proper reach. He now concedes that Home 

Depot lowered a check stand to the accessible height and 

installed an ISA. However, he continues to argue that the 

check-out counters are inaccessible due to (1) the lack of 

appropriate verbiage on ISAs, (2) the closure of the accessible 

stand during his visit, and (3) the placement of card-readers at 

39 and 45 inches. These arguments fail. First, ADAAG § 4.30.7 

does not require the verbiage Martinez alleges is absent from 

Home Depot’s ISA. Second, ADAAG § 7.3 does not require 

accessible check stands to be open at all times. Third, ADAAG 

§ 4.34 regulates only ATMs, not “card-readers at the selfcheckstand.”7 Readers posted at 39 and 45 inches violate neither 

 

relevant parking spaces. Under the ADA, this aisle provides a 

sufficient path to an accessible route.

 

7 Even if the court treats the card-readers as ATMs, Martinez 

has not stated an ADA violation. The required height for an ATM 

varies based upon the reach required to access it. Although 

Martinez initially argued that the reach depth exceeded 10 

inches for card-readers, his failure to specify how far over 10 

inches makes it impossible to determine whether he states a 

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the general forward reach, §4.2.5, nor side reach, § 4.2.6, 

height limits. 

For Claim 19, concerning the width of merchandise aisles, 

Martinez argues that Home Depot’s store contains multiple aisles 

with points of insufficient width. Home Depot responds that 

Martinez never specifies which aisles are narrower than the 

required 36 inches and that subsequent pictures of narrow aisles 

appear to be the result of temporary and movable obstructions. 

Moreover, even if there are points narrower than 36 inches, Home 

Depot argues that such allegations alone do not state an ADAAG 

violation. 

Martinez states that he “had a hard time getting around 

once inside the store” because “[s]everal aisles had merchandise 

stored and piled up in the aisle which made it impossible for 

[him] to get through the aisle.” These allegations are 

sufficiently specific. However, the ADA only applies to 

“architectural barriers,” 28 C.F.R. 36.304(a), not temporary or 

movable barriers such as merchandise. Martinez’s merchandise 

allegations, therefore, do not state a claim for denial of an 

accessible route under ADAAG §§ 4.3.2 or 4.3.3. 

Martinez also alleges that aisles in the store’s gardening 

department, among others, are narrower at certain points than 

 

height violation under § 4.34.3 (parallel approach reach range 

and height restrictions for ATMs). 

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the required 36 inches. ADAAG § 4.3.2(3) states that “[a]t 

least one accessible route shall connect accessible building or 

facility entrances with all accessible spaces.” ADAAG § 4.3.3 

sets the minimum clearance of an accessible route at 36 inches. 

However, a store with an aisle narrower than 36 inches does not 

violate these ADAAG sections when other aisles are wider than 36 

inches, allowing other routes of access through the store.8 

White, 2005 WL 2491543, *7. Martinez responds that interpreting 

the section to require only one accessible route would deny him 

“full and equal enjoyment” of the store. Although Martinez’s 

argument has force in theory, his fear that architecturally 

narrow aisles would require disabled individuals “to take 

different routes and go to extreme lengths . . . to obtain the 

same access that is available to the non-disabled patron” is a 

speculative injury unsupported by the record. Martinez fails to 

demonstrate a material dispute of fact as to aisle width. 

 

8

 Martinez produces numerous photos of points in aisles 

narrower than 36 inches. However, even if an aisle is narrower 

than 36 inches at a point, it may not constitute an ADA 

violation. ADAAG § 4.3.3. requires a minimum of 36 inches of 

clearance in an aisle. As explained in ADAAG Figure 8(e), 

however, a structure may protrude up to 4 inches deep into an 

aisle for a length of up to 24 inches. Therefore, to state an 

aisle-width violation under § 4.3.3, Martinez must allege that 

the aisle is narrower than 36 inches for a length longer than 24 

inches. His photos of aisle width at a single point 

unaccompanied by explanation are insufficient to demonstrate 

such a barrier. 

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For Claim 29, concerning the toilet paper dispenser, 

Martinez argues that ADAAG § 4.16.6 mandates that the leading 

edge of the dispenser be within 36 inches of the back wall.9 

Home Depot responds that the ADAAG does not contain such a 

requirement. Section 4.16.6 states that “[t]oilet paper 

dispensers shall be installed within reach, as shown in Fig. 

29(b).” The figure indicates that there must be a 17 to 19-inch 

space between the toilet seat and the toilet paper’s leading 

edge. ADAAG Fig. 29(b). The only figure comment concerning the 

toilet paper dispenser states that “the toilet paper dispenser 

shall be mounted at a minimum height of 19 inches.” Id. 

Nothing in the figure states a maximum distance from the back 

wall. Therefore, Martinez fails to demonstrate an ADA violation 

as to the placement of the toilet paper dispenser. 

For Claim 34, Martinez argues that ADAAG § 4.13.10 mandates 

automatically closing doors on accessible restroom stalls. Home 

Depot argues that § 4.13.10 applies only if a door has a closer. 

Home Depot states the proper standard under ADAAG. Because 

Martinez does not allege that the accessible stall door has a 

closer, § 4.13.10 does not apply. The ADA does not require 

accessible stalls to have automatic doors. 

 

9

 ADAAG § 4.16.6’s only mention of a 36-inch requirement is 

in reference to the grab bar height range of 33 to 36 inches. 

See ADAAG Fig. 29(b). 

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Because Martinez has failed to demonstrate a material 

dispute of fact as to any of the original 42 claims, the court 

GRANTS Home Depot’s motion in its entirety.10 

D. Supplemental Jurisdiction over State Claims 

Martinez also alleges numerous violations of state law, 

independent of his ADA claims. Home Depot did not seek summary 

judgment on these claims. However, since none of the alleged 

ADA violations survive Home Depot’s summary judgment motion, the 

action is now bereft of any federal claim. The court declines 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 

law claims. See Sanford, 2006 WL 2669351, *7 (dismissing state 

claims substantially predominating over remaining ADA claims). 

III. 

For the above-stated reasons, the court: 

 

10

 Martinez alleges barriers in his opposition not contained 

in the original complaint. To possess standing to allege an ADA 

violation, however, “the plaintiff must, at a minimum, know of, 

or have reason to know of, and be deterred by, the barrier at 

the time the complaint is filed in order to allege an injury 

from that barrier.” Martinez, 2005 WL 2072013, *4. Beyond 

Martinez’s failure to demonstrate good cause for amending his 

complaint and the untimeliness of his cross-motion for summary 

judgment, he does not allege that he knew of, or had reason to 

know of, and was deterred by the barriers raised in postcomplaint pleadings. Martinez lacks standing to address 

barriers omitted from the original complaint, with the exception 

of barriers both related to those originally alleged and created 

by Home Depot’s remedial efforts. The close relationship 

between such barriers and those originally alleged is sufficient 

to satisfy the standing requirements of knowledge and actual 

deterrence. 

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 (1) DENIES plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint; 

 (2) DENIES plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment; 

(3) GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as 

to all 42 alleged ADA violations; and 

 (4) DISMISSES plaintiff’s remaining state claims 

without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 26, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

Case 2:04-cv-02272-JAM-DAD Document 63 Filed 03/27/07 Page 17 of 17