Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01694/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01694-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE MAURICE MARTIN,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary, et

al.

Respondents. 

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Civil No. 14cv1694 DMS(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION

TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 14]

Petitioner Lawrence Maurice Martin, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 17, 2014 [ECF

Nos. 1, 7].1 On December 18, 2014, Respondent Jeffrey Beard, the

secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation ("CDCR"), filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (the "Motion to Dismiss") along with a Notice

of Lodgment [ECF Nos. 14, 15]. Respondent moves to dismiss the

Petition as untimely under the statute of limitations as set forth

1 The Court will cite to all documents using the page numbers

assigned by the Court's electronic case filing system.

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by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. (Mot.

Dismiss 3-9, ECF No. 14.) 

Martin filed an Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 16] (the "Opposition")

on January 23, 2015. The Court noted that some of the attachments

to the Opposition were missing. (See Mins., Feb. 18, 2015, ECF No.

17.) In response, Petitioner provided the missing attachments on

March 13, 2015 [ECF No. 18]. The Court, on March 18, 2015,

requested supplemental documents and a reply from Respondent [ECF

No. 19]. Beard filed the supplemental papers on April 6, 2015 [ECF

No. 21], and his Reply to Petitioner's Opposition ("Reply") on

April 14, 2015 [ECF No. 23]. 

The Court has reviewed the Petition, the Motion to Dismiss,

the lodgments, the Opposition, the Reply, and the supplemental

documents provided by both parties. For the reasons discussed

below, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 14] should be

GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 26, 2012, Petitioner was involved in a physical

altercation with another inmate and was charged with battery

resulting in serious injury. (Lodgment No. 6, In re Martin, No.

D064732, order at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2013).) Martin was

found guilty and lost 360 days of post-conviction credits as a

result. (Lodgment No. 2, Rules Violation Report -- Part C at 2,

[In re Martin] (June 13, 2012) (log number FD-12-03-032).) He was

also referred to the Institutional Classification Committee to

determine if he should be placed in a secured housing unit. (Id.) 

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Martin administratively appealed the decision and his final

administrative appeal was denied on November 5, 2012. (Lodgment

No. 3, Third Level Appeal Decision, In re Martin, TLR Case No.:

1202739 (Nov. 5, 2012).) He constructively filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court on June

13, 2013; the petition was later transferred to the Imperial County

Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 4, In re Martin, No. 13CRWR681554

(Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 20, 2013) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus at 8-9); Lodgment No. 5, In re Martin, No. 13CRWR681554

(Cal. Super. Ct. July 2, 2013) (order at 1-2).) On August 12,

2013, the superior court denied the petition. (Opp'n 13-15, ECF

No. 16.) Petitioner then filed a petition in the California Court

of Appeal, which was denied on October 30, 2013. (Resp't's

Supplemental Notice Lodgment Attach. #1 Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus 1,

ECF No. 21; Lodgment No. 6, In re Martin, No. D064732, order at 1.) 

On March 9, 2014, Martin constructively filed a petition with

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 7, In re Martin, No.

S217309 (Cal. filed Mar. 24, 2014) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus).) The California Supreme Court denied his petition on May

14, 2014. (Lodgment No. 8, California Appellate Courts: Case

Information, [http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select

"Supreme Court," search using the supreme court case number, then

select "Docket")] (visited Sept. 18, 2014).) Martin filed his

Petition in this Court on July 17, 2014 [ECF No. 1].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Martin's federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was dated

and placed in the mail on July 13, 2014, and filed on July 17,

2014. (Pet. 1, 22, 29, ECF No. 1.) Under the mailbox rule, a

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petition is filed on the date a petitioner hands it to prison

authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276

(1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2010);

see Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, foll. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006). Under this rule, the Court considers

the Petition filed on July 13, 2014, the date Petitioner signed and

mailed it. 

Because Martin filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, it is

subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

("AEDPA") of 1996. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d

714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991). In 1996, Congress "worked substantial

changes to the law of habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d

261, 263 (9th Cir. 1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained "in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." See id. § 2254(a). Petitioner must allege that the state

court violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed v.

Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719;

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) — whether a state court decision is contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

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Federal law." Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The "novelty" in § 2254(d)(1) is "the reference to 'Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

"explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court decision may not

be overturned on habeas review, for example, because of a conflict

with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. 

"[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is 'contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' an

authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." Id.; see Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); Childress v. Johnson,

103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d

1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

[A] state court decision is "contrary to [the Supreme

Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in [the Court's] cases" or "if the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from . . .

precedent."

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000)). A state court unreasonably applies federal law if

its application is "objectively unreasonable," which is "more than

[being] incorrect or erroneous." Id. at 75.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. AEDPA's One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent Beard argues that the Petition is untimely. (Mot.

Dismiss 3-9, ECF No. 14.) The statute of limitations for federal

habeas corpus petitions is set forth in § 2244(d), which provides

in relevant part:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1) (West 2006).

A federal petition for writ of habeas corpus may be dismissed

with prejudice when it was not filed within AEDPA's one-year

statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482-83 (9th

Cir. 2001). The statute of limitations is a threshold issue that

must be resolved before the merits of individual claims. See White

v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002).

In most cases challenging a conviction or sentence, the

limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner's

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judgment became final because direct review had concluded or the

time for seeking direct review had expired. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Where, however, "a habeas petitioner challenges

an administrative decision affecting the 'fact or duration of his

confinement,' AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations runs from

when the 'factual predicate' of the habeas claims 'could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.'" Mardesich v.

Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D)). Typically, the factual predicate is the denial

of an administrative appeal. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d

1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the statute of limitations

begins to run when the petitioner's administrative appeal was

denied); Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding that the Board of Prison Term's denial of an inmate's

administrative appeal was the "factual predicate" of the inmate's

claim that triggered the commencement of the limitations period).

Respondent maintains that the factual predicate for Martin's

federal claims arose on November 5, 2012, when the final

administrative appeal challenging the investigation was concluded. 

(Mot. Dismiss 4-5, ECF No. 14 (citing Lodgment No. 3, Third Level

Appeal Decision, In re Martin, TLR Case No.: 1202739).) The

limitations period, Beard asserts, began to run the next day,

November 6, 2012. (Id. at 5 (citing Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 2001)).) Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),

Petitioner had one year from that date, or until Monday, November

7, 2013, to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C) ("[I]n computing any time period

specified . . . in any statute . . . include the last day of the

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period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day

that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday."); see Patterson,

251 F.3d at 1246 (holding that the statute of limitations is to be

calculated according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Martin brought this

action on July 13, 2014, approximately eight months after the

limitations period had expired. Absent any applicable tolling, the

Petition is untimely. 

B. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is tolled during

periods in which a "properly filed" habeas corpus petition is

"pending" in the state courts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2). The

statute specifically provides, "The time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection." Id.; see Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410

(2005). "[A]n application is 'properly filed' when its delivery

and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)

(explaining that typical filing requirements include all relevant

time limits). 

The interval between the disposition of one state petition and

the filing of another may be tolled under "interval tolling." See

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). "[T]he AEDPA statute

of limitations is tolled for 'all of the time during which a state

prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

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particular post-conviction application.'" Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) overruled on other grounds by Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barnett v.

Lamaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)); see Carey, 536

U.S. at 219-20. The statute of limitations is tolled from the time

a petitioner's first state habeas petition is filed until state

collateral review is concluded, but it is not tolled before the

first state collateral challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479

F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). 

"The period that an application for post-conviction review is

pending is not affected or 'untolled' merely because a petitioner

files additional or overlapping petitions before it is complete." 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated

on other grounds as recognized by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729,

733 (9th Cir. 2008). 

As stated above, the limitations period began to run on

November 6, 2012. Martin's state petition for a writ of habeas

corpus was constructively filed in Fresno County Superior Court on

June 13, 2013. (See Lodgment No. 4, In re Martin, No. 13CRWR681554

(petition for writ of habeas corpus at 8-9).)2 This 220-day span

is not statutorily tolled and counts toward the one-year

limitations period. See Thorson, 479 F.3d at 646. The superior

2 Even though Martin did not file his superior court petition

in the proper court, he should still be given the benefit of the

June 13, 2013 constructive filing date. See Griffin v. Foulk, No.

2:14–CV–00837 TLN AC P, 2014 WL 4546018, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Sept.

12, 2014); Daniels v. Swarthout, No. CIV S-10-3347 KJM DAD P, 2011

WL 4048529, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2011).

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court denied the petition on August 12, 2013. (Opp'n 13-15, ECF

No. 16).

Martin next filed a petition with the California Court of

Appeal that was denied on October 30, 2013. (Lodgment No. 6, In re

Martin, No. D064732, order.) He then waited 130 days, until March

9, 2014, to file his petition with the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 7, In re Martin, No. S217309 (petition for writ of

habeas corpus).) Respondent argues that the unexplained delay in

filing Martin's petition with the state supreme court is

unreasonable, and he should not be entitled to gap tolling for this

period. (Mot. Dismiss 6-7, ECF No. 14.) 

Statutory tolling applies to "intervals between a lower court

decision and a filing of a new petition in a higher court . . . ." 

Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. A petitioner is thus entitled to statutory

tolling, "not only for the time that his petitions were actually

under consideration, but also for the intervals between filings,

while he worked his way up the ladder[,]" Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d

1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 223), as long

as the filings were timely, Carey, 536 U.S. at 225-26. 

In California, a petition for collateral review is timely if

filed within a "reasonable" amount of time; this contrasts with

states that specify a time limit, usually thirty or forty-five

days. Carey, 536 U.S. at 222–23. Martin waited 130 days after the

court of appeal denied his petition to file with the California

Supreme Court. The petition to the higher court was not filed

within a "reasonable time," presumptively thirty to sixty days. 

See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192-93 (2005). "[I]f the

successive petition was not timely filed, the period between

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petitions is not tolled." Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 969 (9th

Cir. 2010). The 130 days between the denial by the court of appeal

and the filing with the state supreme court is not statutorily

tolled and must be counted toward the limitations period. See

Livermore v. Sandor, 487 F. App'x 342, 343-44 (9th Cir. 2012)

(concluding that delay of seventy-six days between state habeas

petitions was unreasonable); Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964,

968 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding delays of eighty-one and ninety-one

days were unreasonable).3 

The habeas corpus petition Martin filed with the California

Supreme Court was denied on May 14, 2014. (Lodgment No. 8,

California Appellate Courts: Case Information, [http://

appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select "Supreme Court," search

using the supreme court case number, then select "Docket")].) "The

statute of limitations period is . . . not tolled after state

post-conviction proceedings are final and before federal habeas

proceedings are initiated." Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). A decision of the

California Supreme Court becomes final upon filing. Phelps v.

Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 724 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004); Burton v. Cate, No.

10–1797–WQH(WVG), 2011 WL 4529664, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Cal. June 17,

3 The Court notes that fifty-two days elapsed between the

time the superior court denied the petition and the date Martin

constructively filed his petition in the California Court of

Appeal. (See Opp'n 13-15, ECF No. 16 (showing that Petitioner's

superior court petition was denied on August 12, 2013); Resp't's

Supplemental Notice Lodgment Attach. #1 Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus 12,

ECF No. 21 (showing that Martin constructively filed his petition

in the California Court of Appeal on or around October 3, 2013).) 

Fifty-two days is a presumptively reasonable amount of time for

purposes of statutory tolling; this period is tolled. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 192-93.

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2011). Thus, the time period from the denial of Martin's petition

by the California Supreme Court to the filing of his federal habeas

petition is not statutorily tolled. Petitioner constructively

filed his federal petition on July 13, 2014, or sixty days after

the California Supreme Court denied his petition. This period must

be counted against the one-year limitations period. 

The statute of limitations in this case was running for 220

days before Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition, 130

days between the court of appeal's denial of Martin's petition and

the filing of the next petition with the California Supreme Court,

and 60 days between the date the California Supreme Court denied

his petition and Martin constructively filed his federal habeas

petition. The three periods when the limitations period was not

tolled total 410 days, which exceeds AEDPA's one-year statute. See

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling.

C. Equitable Tolling

In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent Beard asserts that Martin

is not entitled to equitable tolling because he fails to show that

he has proceeded diligently or that "extraordinary circumstances

prevented him from filing the Petition in a timely manner . . . ." 

(Mot. Dismiss 9, ECF No. 14.) Indeed, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations is appropriate when the petitioner can show

"'(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' . . . ." Holland

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 632 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at

418); see Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007) (same). A

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA's one-year

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statute of limitations where "'extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner's control made it impossible'" to file a timely petition. 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)).

"'[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.'" 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of

external forces, not the result of the petitioner's lack of

diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

"Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a

'fact-specific inquiry.'" Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (quoting Frye

v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

"'[A] prisoner's lack of knowledge that the state courts have

reached a final resolution of his case can provide grounds for

equitable tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently in the

matter.'" Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citations omitted). To determine if a petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling on this basis, courts must consider (1) the date

the petitioner actually received notice, (2) whether the petitioner

acted diligently in obtaining notice and (3) "whether the alleged

delay of notice caused the untimeliness of his filing and made a

timely filing impossible[.]" Id. at 998. 

1. Delay in filing superior court petition

In the Opposition, Martin insists that he was delayed in

filing his petition in superior court because he had limited access

to the law library. (Opp'n 3, ECF No. 16.) Yet, Petitioner does

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not explain how this limited access made it impossible for him to

file a timely petition. Martin's conclusory assertions fail to

show that he is entitled to equitable tolling on this basis. See

Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998 (holding that petitioner was not entitled

to equitable tolling due to restricted library access while in

administrative segregation); Frye, 273 F.3d at 1146 (rejecting

argument that lack of access to library materials automatically

qualifies as grounds for equitable tolling); Bravo v. Neotti, Civil

No. 12-CV-0571-DMS(PCL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106670, at *12 (S.D.

Cal. June 5, 2013) ("Where prison lockdowns and restrictive

policies regarding hours of library access provided a petitioner

with limited access to the law library, he was still not granted

equitable tolling because he failed to establish how the limited

access interfered with his ability to file a federal petition on

time." (citing Shoots v. Lamarque, 86 F. App'x 323, 324 (9th Cir.

2004).)

2. Delay in filing petition with California Supreme Court

Next, Petitioner provides two reasons why he is purportedly

entitled to equitable tolling of the time period between the

California Court of Appeal's denial of his petition and the filing

of his petition in the California Supreme Court. (Opp'n 4-5, ECF

No. 16; see id. at 29.) First, he argues that he transferred

prisons after filing his petition in the court of appeal and

therefore did not receive the appellate court's opinion until over

four months after it was issued. (Id. at 4-5.) Second, he insists

that he was delayed in filing because some of his personal property

was temporarily lost due to the prison transfers. (Id. at 4.)

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a. Delayed receipt of court of appeal's opinion

Martin contends that the delay in filing his petition with the

California Supreme Court was partly due to the fact that he did not

receive the California Court of Appeal's October 30, 2013 denial of

his petition until March of 2014. (Id. at 5.)4 After filing his

petition with the appellate court, Martin was transferred from

Ironwood State Prison ("Ironwood") to another facility. (Id. at

4.) He returned to Ironwood on January 30, 2014, and on February

19, 2014, he sent a letter to the court of appeal inquiring about

the status of his case. (See id. at 26.) On March 3, 2014, the

court responded by notifying him that his petition had been ruled

on earlier. (Id. at 24; see id. at 29.) Martin constructively

filed a petition with the California Supreme Court six days later,

on March 9, 2014. (See Lodgment No. 7, In re Martin, No. S217309

(petition for writ of habeas corpus).)

In the Reply, Beard concedes that according to Ramirez v.

Yates, 571 F.3d at 997, a delay in receiving a court's ruling may,

under some circumstances, be grounds for equitable tolling. (Reply

3-4, ECF No. 23.) Respondent urges that Ramirez is

distinguishable, however, because in that case, "the petitioner's

late notice was due to no fault of his own, and instead was because

the state appellate court was late in sending out its order." (Id.

at 4 (citing Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997).) Here, Respondent argues

that Martin caused the delay by failing to notify the California

4 Petitioner's statement that he received notice of the

California Court of Appeal's ruling in March of 2015 -- rather than

March of 2014 -- appears to be a typographical error. (See id.) 

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Court of Appeal that his address had changed after transferring to

a different facility. (Id.) 

Beard asserts that Ramirez is also distinguishable because it

may only allow for equitable tolling due to delay in receiving "the

state court's 'final resolution'" of a case. (Id.) For Martin,

that would have been the California Supreme Court's ruling. (Id.) 

Because the delayed opinion in this case was from the court of

appeal, Beard maintains that Ramirez does not extend to the

"intermediary state court ruling." (Id.) 

Even assuming Ramirez applies, Respondent claims that Martin

is not entitled to tolling. (Id. at 4-6.) The secretary of the

CDCR contends that Petitioner failed to act diligently in obtaining

notice from the court of appeal because he did not notify the court

that his address had changed. (Id. at 4-5 (citing Ramirez, 571

F.3d at 997-98).) Beard also alleges that Petitioner has failed to

prove, as required under Ramirez, that the delay in receipt of the

California Court of Appeal's opinion made the timely filing of his

federal petition impossible. (Id. (citing Ramirez, 571 F.3d at

997-98).) Respondent insists, "[N]otwithstanding his purportedly

late notice of the appellate court order, Martin's California

Supreme Court action was completed with at least 15 days remaining

before the statute of limitations elapsed during which time he

could have filed his federal petition in a timely manner." (Id. at

6.)

Finally, as a general matter, Beard contends that Petitioner

has not diligently pursued his claims. (Id.) Because Martin

waited 220 days before filing his petition in Fresno County

Superior Court and 130 days before filing with the California

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Supreme Court, he failed to proceed diligently. (Id.) According

to Beard, Martin's lack of diligence is further evidenced by the

fact that he waited sixty days after the California Supreme Court's

denial to seek habeas corpus relief in this Court. (Id. at 7.)

Petitioner was incarcerated at Ironwood when he mailed his

petition to the California Court of Appeal on October 3, 2013. 

(See Opp'n 4, ECF No. 16.) On the first page of the petition, he

provided the court with his Ironwood address. (See Resp't's

Supplemental Notice Lodgment Attach. #1 Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus 1,

ECF No. 21.) Shortly thereafter, on October 15, 2013, Martin was

transferred to the California Institute for Men. (See Opp'n 4, ECF

No. 16.) Then, on October 24, 2013, he was moved to Santa Clara

County Main Jail where he remained until January 30, 2014, when he

returned to Ironwood. (Id. at 4, 26.) During this period of time,

the California Court of Appeal attempted to send its decision to

Petitioner on four separate occasions. See Appellate Courts Case

Information, California Courts,

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ (select "Fourth Appellate

District Div 1," search using case number D064732, then select

"Docket").5

It was not until after Petitioner returned to Ironwood that,

on February 19, 2014, he sent a letter to the court of appeal

inquiring about the status of his petition. (See Opp'n 5, 26, ECF

5 The Court sua sponte takes judicial notice of the

California Court of Appeal's docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 201(c)(1)

("The Court may take judicial notice on its own."); Harris v. Cnty.

of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012) ("We may take

judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including

documents on file in federal or state courts.") (citations

omitted).

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No. 16.) In the letter, he noted that he did not file a notice of

change of address because he did not know his case number. (Id. at

26.) On March 6, 2014, Martin received a response from the

appellate court notifying him that his petition had been ruled on. 

(See id. at 24; Pet'r's Notice Lodgment 5, ECF No. 18.) He filed a

petition with the California Supreme Court on March 9, 2014. (See

Lodgment No. 7, In re Martin, No. S217309 (petition for writ of

habeas corpus).) 

Respondent suggests, and this Court agrees, that there is some

question about the applicability of Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997, to

this case. In Ramirez, as noted, the Ninth Circuit held that "'a

prisoner's lack of knowledge that the state courts have reached a

final resolution of his case'" may provide a basis for equitable

tolling. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997 (emphasis added) (quoting

Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001)). The

term "final resolution" may imply that equitable tolling is not

available for rulings from appellate courts where the state supreme

court or United States Supreme Court subsequently reviewed the

state habeas corpus petition. 

Yet, Ramirez was remanded to the district court to consider

the circumstances surrounding the delay in petitioner's receipt of

the ruling from the superior court, which implies a more broad

applicability of the rule. See id. at 996, 998; see also Dominguez

v. Brazelton, No. C 12-6288 LHK (PR), 2014 WL 94324, at *4 (N.D.

Cal. Jan. 9, 2014) (describing Ramirez as a case where the "state

superior court failed to give notice of its decision"); Banks v.

Walker, No. 2:07-CV-02022-AK, 2010 WL 5200920, at *2 (E.D. Cal.

Dec. 15, 2010) (same). Some courts have noted the limited scope of

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Ramirez. See Retano v. Janda, No. CV 12-8214-GW (OP), 2013 WL

6499702, at *4 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013); Thomas v. Gonzalez,

No. EDCV09-01736AG(SS), 2010 WL 1266773, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Feb.

19, 2010). Other courts have interpreted Ramirez broadly. See

Niebla v. Janda, No. CV 12-4263-CAS(E), 2013 WL 1688346, at *8

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013) (applying Ramirez to delayed receipt of

superior court's ruling but concluding that petitioner failed to

show that delayed notice caused the untimely federal petition);

accord Walker v. Brazelton, No. 1:11-CV-00585-AWI-SKO-HC, 2013 WL

71779, at *10-11 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013); Aguilera-Guerra v. Ryan,

No. CV-12-258-PHX-NVW (BSB), 2012 WL 6765589, at *4-5 (D. Ariz.

Dec. 7, 2012). 

Without discussing Ramirez, in Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d

777, 783 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit addressed a set of

facts analogous to those in this case. There, the petitioner

argued that he was entitled to tolling because he did not receive

the California Court of Appeal's denial of his petition in a timely

manner. (Id.) The court did not have a correct address for the

petitioner after he transferred to a different prison. Id.

Because Nedds did not notify the court of his change of address,

the Ninth Circuit held that the delayed notice of the court ruling

did not entitle him to statutory or equitable tolling for that

period of time. Id. ("'An . . . unrepresented party whose address

. . . changes while a case is pending must promptly serve and file

a written notice of the change in the reviewing court in which the

case is pending.'".) (alterations in original) (citing Cal. R. Ct.

8.32(b)(1)). Nedds was, however, entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute for other reasons not applicable to Martin.

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In this case, Martin's responsibilities are clear. Under Rule

8.23(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court, "An attorney or

unrepresented party whose mailing address, telephone number, fax

number, or e-mail address changes while a case is pending must

promptly serve and file a written notice of the change in the

reviewing court in which the case is pending." Cal. R. Ct.

8.23(b)(1).

Martin was away from Ironwood from October 15, 2013, until

January 30, 2014. (See Opp'n 4, 26, ECF No. 16.) Under Rule

8.23(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court, Nedds, and Ramirez,

Martin had a duty to act diligently. The mail logs provided show

that even though the California Court of Appeal denied Martin's

petition on October 30, 2013, he did not receive notice of a ruling

until March 6, 2014. (See Opp'n 24, 29, ECF No. 16; Pet'r's Notice

Lodgment 5, ECF No. 18.) The delay, however, appears to be due to

the fact that Petitioner did not notify the court of appeal that

his address had changed. See Appellate Courts Case Information,

California Courts, http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ (select

"Fourth Appellate District Div 1," search using case number

D064732, then select "Docket"). Martin's failure to notify the

California Court of Appeal of his change of address is not

consistent with a finding of diligence. See Nedds, 678 F.3d at 783

n.4; see also Lozada v. Cripps, No. 09 CIV. 8897(DAB)(THK), 2010 WL

7113583, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2010) (finding that petitioner

had not proceeded diligently where he failed to notify the court

that he had been transferred to a new facility, delaying receipt of

the court's ruling) (citing Spaulding v. Stewart, 13 F. App'x 494,

496 (9th Cir. 2001)); McGuinness v. Pepe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235

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(D. Mass. 2001) (finding that because petitioner did not leave a

forwarding address with the prison after he was released from

custody, he was not entitled to equitable tolling due to delay in

receipt of court's ruling). 

Petitioner's claim that he did not know his case number does

not excuse his delay in contacting the court. On February 14,

2014, when Martin eventually wrote to the appellate court, he still

did not know his case number. (See Opp'n 26-28, ECF No. 16.) The

court was nonetheless able to respond to his inquiry. (See id. at

24.) Furthermore, in his letter, Martin appears to acknowledge

that he was responsible for notifying the court of his change of

address. (See id. at 26.)

Even under Ramirez, Petitioner has to prove that the "delay of

notice caused the untimeliness of his filing and made a timely

filing impossible[.]" See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998 (emphasis

added). One hundred thirty days passed between the time the

California Court of Appeal denied Martin's habeas petition and when

he filed his petition with the California Supreme Court. This left

him with 235 days to bring his claims under AEDPA. But Martin had

already delayed 220 days before filing his first habeas petition in

superior court and then waited 60 days after the California Supreme

Court ruling before filing his Petition in this Court. If he had

not delayed filing the state petitions, he would have been able to

meet AEDPA's statute of limitations, even with the delayed receipt

of the appellate court's ruling. Thus, the belated receipt of the

opinion was not the sole cause of the untimeliness of a federal

petition. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997; Niebla, 2013 WL 1688346,

at *8. Martin is not entitled to equitable tolling on this basis. 

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b. Prison transfers and loss of personal property

Next, Martin claims that due to the above-described prison

transfers, he was without his property and legal materials from

approximately October 15, 2013, to May 15, 2014. (Opp'n 4, ECF No.

16.) Despite not having his personal property during this time,

Petitioner was still able to file his petition with the California

Supreme Court. (Id.) In the Reply, Respondent argues that

transferring between prisons does not qualify as an extraordinary

circumstance justifying equitable tolling. (Reply 3, ECF No. 23.)

As a general matter, prison transfers do not constitute

grounds for equitable tolling. See Johnson v. Hill, 224 F. App'x

641, 641 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying request for equitable tolling

where petitioner failed to demonstrate that frequent prison

transfers constituted an extraordinary circumstance that made it

impossible to file a timely petition); Ranteesi v. Swarthout, No.

2:13-cv-2482 KJM CKD P, 2014 WL 7150245, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15,

2014) (finding that prison transfer did not constitute

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling). 

Moreover, while lack of access to legal materials may provide

a basis for tolling, see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924 (9th

Cir. 2002), Martin has failed to provide any evidence showing that

the circumstances under which he was incarcerated prevented him

from timely filing his habeas corpus petition. See Ramirez, 571

F.3d at 998 (finding that equitable tolling may apply where a

complete lack of access to legal materials made timely filing

impossible). Here, Martin filed his petition in the California

Supreme Court during the time he was purportedly without his

personal property and legal material. (See Opp'n 4, ECF No. 16.) 

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This undermines the argument that without these items, it was

impossible to file his federal petition. See Reyes v. Martel, No.

08-CV-0791-JLS (PCL), 2009 WL 857010, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30,

2009) (denying claim that petitioner was entitled to equitable

tolling in light of fact that he was able to file petition with the

California Supreme Court raising the same claim as in his federal

petition, despite lack of access to legal materials). Petitioner

fails to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the time

period prior to filing his petition in the California Supreme

Court. 

3. Delay in filing federal petition

Finally, Petitioner insists that he was delayed in filing his 

Petition in this Court because he was busy investigating his

claims. (Opp'n 5, ECF No. 16.) He contends that prison transfers

impeded his investigation and caused some of his personal property

to become lost or stolen. (Id.) Yet, Martin does not explain what

he needed to investigate or how he acted diligently in his

investigation. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (describing

diligence); Perdigone v. Davis, 584 F. App'x 850, 851 (9th Cir.

2014) (finding that difficulty of investigating claims while in

prison did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance that

prevented a timely filing). Further, Martin does not explain what

materials were lost or stolen or why they were necessary for him to

file his Petition. See Farmer v. Biter, No. CV 12-6557-DMG (CW),

2013 WL 3989447, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) ("Petitioner does

not suggest what, if any, particular items he needed but was unable

to access and for how long, or show that lack of access to his

personal property precluded a timely filing.").

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Martin, on the other hand, was able to constructively file a

state habeas petition with the California Supreme Court on March 9,

2014, presumably with the same burdens he recounts here. (See

Lodgment No. 7, In re Martin, No. S217309 (petition for writ of

habeas corpus at 13).) On July 13, 2014, his Petition was

constructively filed in federal court. (Pet. 22, ECF No. 1.) The

claims raised in the federal petition mirror those raised with the

California Supreme Court. (Compare Pet. 6-8, ECF No. 1 (describing

three grounds for relief), with Lodgment No. 7, In re Martin, No.

S217309 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 5-7) (describing the

same three grounds for relief in nearly identical language).) 

Martin has not shown that he was unable to file a federal petition

because of lost property, a need to investigate, or any other

reason. As a result, he is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Respondent Beard's Motion to

Dismiss should be GRANTED. This Report and Recommendation will be

submitted to the United States District Court Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties on or before June 15, 2015. The document

should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any

reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before June

29, 2015. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

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district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 14, 2015 _____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

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