Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00538/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00538-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carla G. Young, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-538-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees under the Equal

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 31.) Plaintiff filed this action for review of the final

decision of the Commissioner for Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(b). On June

13, 2012, this Court reversed the Commissioner’s final decision and remanded this case to

the Commissioner for further administrative action pursuant to sentence 4 of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). As the prevailing party, Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees

in the amount of $7,024.95. Defendant does not contest the reasonableness of the amount

of fees submitted but opposes the motion for fees on the basis that the government’s position

was substantially justified. (Doc. 32.) 

Legal Standard

Pursuant to the EAJA:

[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees

and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than

cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 34 Filed 11/06/12 Page 1 of 4
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action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction

of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The phrase “fees and other expenses” includes reasonable

attorney’s fees. Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).

A prevailing party in an action against the United States is entitled to an award of

attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA unless the government’s position was

“substantially justified.” Under the EAJA, substantial justification means that the

government’s position must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“In this circuit, we apply a reasonableness standard in determining whether the

government’s position was substantially justified for purposes of the EAJA.”). The

government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. See

Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Discussion

Disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step procedure. In this case, at

Step Two, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that the Plaintiff’s medically

determinable impairments were not severe. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1572(c). Step Two is

regarded as “a de minimis screening device used to dispose of groundless claims.” Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). 

This Court overturned the decision of the ALJ at Step Two because the decision to

reject Plaintiff’s disability application at step two was based on legal error and not supported

by substantial evidence. (See Doc. 27 at 13.) Circuit precedent specifically describes the

requirement of a sufficient explanation when the ALJ is crediting the opinions of the nonexamining physicians and rejecting the assessment of the examining physicians regarding

physical limitations. The ALJ did not comply. Such a failure to comply constitutes legal

error. See Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ

acknowledged that if she were to accept the opinion of Plainitiff’s treating physicians then

her opinion would come down in Plaintiff’s favor. (Id. at 8.) This Court specifically found

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that the “ALJ failed to provide any explanation why she was crediting the evaluation of the

non-examining medical consultants beyond stating that their opinions on severity were given

significant weight.” (Id. at 11.) The Court further indicated that the ALJ failed to properly

consider Plainitiff’s record of disability in arriving at her decision that the medical evidence

clearly established that Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments were not medically

severe. (Id. at 9-13.) Consequently, the Court found that the opinions of the non-examining

consultants did not constitute substantial evidence for rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s

treating physicians. (Id. at 11.) 

Based on this record, the government’s contention that its position was substantially

justified is not well-taken. The government has not met its burden of showing that the

position of the United States was substantially justified. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an

award of fees under the EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)-(B); Astrue v. Ratliff, 130

S. Ct. 2521, 2525–29 (2010). 

Plaintiff’s counsel requests $7,024.95 in attorney’s fees for 38.9 hours of work

performed in 2011 and 2012. (Doc. 31 at 1; Doc. 31-1 at 6-7; Doc. 33.) EAJA provides for

an upward adjustment of the $125 rate contained in the statute, based on cost of living

increases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th

Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the EAJA and Thangaraja v. Gonzalez, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th

Cir. 2005), the Court will award Plaintiff’s counsel a cost of living increase for billed hours.

Counsel will be compensated at the requested statutory rate of $180.59 per hour for work

performed in 2011 and 2012. (Doc. 31 at 1.)

Plaintiff’s counsel moves that EAJA fees be paid directly to him based on Plaintiff’s

assignment dated June 30, 2012. (Doc. 31–1 at 13.) This assignment, however, runs afoul

of the Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b), which forbids the assignment of

claims against the United States government until after those claims are actually allowed.

Accordingly, the Court will not order the Commissioner to issue payment directly to

Plaintiff’s attorney. See Ames v. Astrue, No. CV 11-163-TUC-LAB, 2012 WL 4040284 (D.

Ariz. Sept. 13, 2012). The Court will direct payment of fees payable to Plaintiff. 

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Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney’s

Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Docs. 31, 33.) Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s

fees in the amount of $7,024.95. This payment shall be made payable to Plaintiff and shall

be paid by the Agency.

DATED this 5th day of November, 2012.

Case 2:11-cv-00538-SMM Document 34 Filed 11/06/12 Page 4 of 4