Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06339/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Ual 

RONALD DANIEL KELLY, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

JACK COWLEY, Warden; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, State of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

JUL151 0 

.&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6339 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-740-P) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. We grant the motion for leave to 

appeal in forma pauperis. 

Petitioner Ronald D. Kelly was convicted of first degree 

murder in Oklahoma state court and sentenced to death, but his 

conviction was reversed on appeal. On remand, petitioner pleaded 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6339 Document: 010110038732 Date Filed: 07/25/1990 Page: 1 
guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to thirty-five 

years imprisonment pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution. 

Petitioner's first application for post-conviction relief in state 

court was denied, and petitioner's appeal was rejected as untimely 

filed. Petitioner's second application for post-conviction relief 

in state court raised the same grounds as his first application 

plus additional grounds. The Oklahoma district court found that 

petitioner's failure to timely appeal from the initial application 

was not excusable and denied the application on the remaining 

grounds pursuant to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1086, which 

requires all available grounds for challenge to be joined in the 

first application. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed and directed the court clerk to accept no more 

applications from petitioner. 

Petitioner then came to the United States District Court for 

the Western District of Oklahoma under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising 

four additional challenges, the most significant of which is that 

a witness at petitioner's first trial perjured himself at the 

instigation of the prosecution. This was supported by the 

witness' sworn affidavit to that effect. The district court held 

that by virture of the state rule on procedural default petitioner 

lost the right to challenge his guilty plea on any ground not 

raised in his original petition for post-conviction relief, see 

Harris v. Reed, 57 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4226-27 (U.S. February 22, 1989) 

(No. 87-5677); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), and that 

failure to appeal his guilty plea was a deliberate bypass of state 

appellate processes, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6339 Document: 010110038732 Date Filed: 07/25/1990 Page: 2 
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This is clearly true with respect to the petitioner's first 

three challenges to his guilty plea, which were all available on 

appeal or in his first state application for post-conviction 

relief. In addition, on collateral attack of a guilty plea, "the 

inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was 

both counseled and voluntary." United States v. Broce, 109 S. Ct. 

757, 762-63 (1989). There is no question but that the guilty plea 

here was both counseled and voluntary; therefore, petitioner also 

waived these grounds for attack. 

Petitioner may not have lost his right to challenge based 

upon use of perjured testimony by procedural default or deliberate 

bypass, since he alleges that he had no knowledge of this claim 

until after his second application in state court. But perjury 

alone does not undermine the voluntariness of a plea, see Franklin 

v. United States, 589 F.2d 192, 194-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 

441 U.S. 950 (1979), unless the government is threatening to 

prosecute for an offense it has no basis to believe the defendant 

committed, see United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th 

Cir. 1988). Here, there was abundant evidence of petitioner's 

involvement in the crime charged apart from that of the nowrecanting witness. Therefore, petitioner's challenge must fail on 

this basis also. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6339 Document: 010110038732 Date Filed: 07/25/1990 Page: 3