Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02083/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cvp Civil Rights (Personal Property)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS CHARLES SHEPTIN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et 

al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18cv2083-LAB (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

On September 7, 2018, Plaintiff Louis Sheptin filed this action against the San Diego 

Police Department, Allied Universal Security, and Path Connections Housing, alleging that 

the Defendants failed to protect him from an assault that occurred while he was living at a 

homeless shelter. Pending before the Court is his petition to proceed in forma pauperis.

1. Background

Plaintiff alleges he was attacked by a fellow resident while he was sleeping at the 

Path Homeless Shelter in San Diego. He recalls that someone attempted to take his wallet 

and then struck him over the head with an object. He woke up at UCSD Hospital some time 

later. He was treated for seizures and ultimately discharged, but he discovered the $300 in 

his wallet was missing. Following his discharge, he requested that Path staff investigate the 

assault and report it to the SDPD, which he claims they failed to do. He also alleges that 

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he personally called the SDPD dispatch line and attempted to report the incident, but the 

SDPD refused to send an officer to his location. 

Plaintiff then filed this suit against the Defendants, asserting causes of action under

42 USC § 1983 and the Due Process Clause. Specifically, he accuses the SDPD of, among 

other things, failing to have sufficient units and failing to protect citizens. He also accuses 

Path staff of obstruction of justice and failing to discipline or remove the assailant from the 

shelter. The Complaint does not detail Defendant Allied Universal’s role in the chain of 

events, but it appears Plaintiff believes Allied provided security at the shelter. 

2. Motion to Proceed IFP

Sheptin’s IFP application states that he is unemployed and that his only source of 

income is the $900 per month he receives in Social Security benefits. He also claims that 

he suffers from a variety of medical ailments, including Type II Diabetes, which puts strain 

on his already-limited means. The Court finds Sheptin is unable to pay the filing fee; 

therefore, his motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. 

When a plaintiff is permitted to proceed IFP, the Court is required to screen the 

complaint, and to dismiss it to the extent it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or 

seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The standard for whether the plaintiff 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1915(e)(2)(B) is the 

same standard applied for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Under that standard, the 

complaint must allege enough facts that, if true, state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). In reviewing the complaint, the court will assume the facts, but not the legal 

conclusions, to be true. Id. at 679. The Court will construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings 

liberally, but will not supply elements of the claim that were not pleaded. See Byrd v. 

Maricopa County Sherriff’s Dept., 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011).

/ / /

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3. §1983 and Due Process Claims

Although Plaintiff has sued three separate defendants, the only plausible bases for 

federal jurisdiction are his claims against the SDPD under § 1983 and the Due Process 

Clause. But Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim of relief under either of those provisions. 

It is well established that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause ... requires 

the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private 

actors.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). The 

Due Process Clause serves as a “limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee 

of certain minimal levels of safety and security.” Id. There are only two exceptions to this 

general prohibition against “failure to protect” claims: “(1) when a ‘special relationship’ exists 

between the plaintiff and the state (the special-relationship exception);” and “(2) when the 

state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a 

‘known or obvious danger’ (the state-created danger exception).” Patel v. Kent School Dist.,

648 F.3d 965 at 971–72. This same general prohibition has also been applied to claims 

brought under § 1983. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cty. Of San Bernardino, 2011 WL 6288100 at *3-

6 (C.D. Cal.). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed because it alleges a general “failure to 

protect” and does not plead any facts that would give rise to an exception to that rule. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted at the Path shelter and woke up some time later with 

$300 missing from his wallet. His only allegations against the SDPD are that it (1) failed to 

send an officer to his location when he called to report this incident, (2) “fail[ed] to have 

sufficient units,” and (3) failed “to protect San Diego citizens.” Plaintiff pleads no facts that 

would show a “special relationship” existed between himself and the SDPD, nor that the 

SDPD affirmatively placed him in danger. As such, his claims against the SDPD must be 

dismissed.

Without his § 1983 and Due Process claims against the SDPD, Plaintiff’s entire 

Complaint must be dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. Path Connections Housing and 

Allied Universal are private entities not subject to claims brought under § 1983 or the Due 

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Process Clause. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph. Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Further, as pled, there is no diversity jurisdiction because the Plaintiff and at 

least one defendant (here, both the SDPD and Path Connections Housing) are California 

citizens. 28 USC § 1332. The Complaint must therefore be dismissed in its entirety. 

4. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is 

GRANTED. However, his Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to 

state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FRCP 12(b)(1) and (6). If Plaintiff 

believes he can correct the problems identified above, he may refile an amended complaint

by October 19, 2018. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9-17-18

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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