Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02540/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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03cv2540

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER JAMES TURGEON,

Petitioner,

v.

SILVIA GARCIA,

Respondent.

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Civil No. 03-CV-2540-L(WMc)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION;

OVERRULING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS; AND DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner Christopher James Turgeon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. In his Petition, petitioner raises two claims for relief. The Honorable William

McCurine, Jr. issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), recommending denial of the Petition. Petitioner filed objections to the R&R. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court overrules petitioner’s objections and adopts the Report in its

entirety.

Standard of Review

The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district court “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

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1 The charges against petitioner included 11 counts of robbery; one count of

conspiracy to commit a series of robberies; one count of conspiracy to commit murder of a

police officer; one count of attempted murder of a police officer; one count of assault on a police

officer with a semiautomatic weapon; and one count of unlawful taking of a vehicle.

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judge.” Id. Under this statute, “the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings

and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 238 (2003); see Schmidt

v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26 & n.5 (D. Ariz. 2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia’s

holding to a habeas corpus proceeding).

Background

As noted in the Report, petitioner was charged with seventeen counts of violations of the

California Penal Code.1

 Petitioner entered a not guilty plea and a not guilty by reason of insanity

plea. The trial was bifurcated on the issues of guilt and insanity. The jury found petitioner to be

sane and convicted petitioner on all seventeen counts and sentenced to an indeterminate 25-years

to life for conspiring to commit murder, an additional year for being vicariously armed with a

firearm during the commission of that offense; and 64 years for the robbery charges that

included the firearm enhancements, to be served consecutive to the indeterminate term of 25

years.

The present petition for writ of habeas corpus raises the same two grounds that were

raised on petitioner’s direct appeal: improper insanity instructions and improper acceptance of a

jury verdict while a jury question remained pending.

Discussion

In their return to the petition, respondents first argue that the California courts’ decisions

were not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law or the evidence presented. Respondents also argue that the jury instruction claim

concerning insanity does not present a federal question. Finally, respondents assert that the state

Supreme Court’s decision that the trial court acted properly in accepting the verdict while a jury

question was still pending is entitled to deference. 

The magistrate judge determined that the issue of the insanity instruction presented a

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federal question that permitted this court to consider the petition based on a possible violation of

petitioner’s due process rights. Nevertheless, after reviewing the full record, the magistrate

judge found that petitioner’s due process rights were not violated here because the instruction

did not “so infect the entire trial as to violate due process under United States Supreme Court

precedent.” (Report at 15). In giving the insanity instruction, the Court included petitioner’s

theory of the case, i.e., that petitioner understood the legal wrongs of his acts but acted in

accordance with a command from god that he act as he did. Id. 

In his objection, petitioner contends that the magistrate judge relied on “the erroneous

analysis and conclusion of the state court of appeal” (Obj. at 1) with respect to the trial court’s

jury instructions. 

1. Insanity Instruction

As discussed in the Report, a jury instruction is violative of due process only if the “ailing

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” 

(Report at 12 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72)).

The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC 4.00 in its entirety on the defense of

insanity along with supplemental language defining the term “wrong” as it related to the legal

and moral sense of the word. The additional language stated:

The term “wrong” as used in this instruction, refers to both legal and moral wrong.

A “legal wrong” is an act which violates the law.

A “moral wrong” is an act which violates society’s generally-accepted standards of

moral obligation.

Thus, a defendant is incapable of distinguishing right from wrong if, at the time of

the crime, by reason of mental disease or defect, he, number one, could not

understand that his act was a violation or the law, or, number two, could not

understand that his act was a violation of generally-accepted standards of moral

obligation. 

(Lodgment No.1, Clerk’s Tr. at 446).

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s instructions obviously were not full and complete as

demonstrated by the number of questions submitted by the jury to the Court during deliberations. 

Petitioner further contends that the instructions as given failed to allow petitioner to present his

“deific decree” defense to the jury, i.e., that defendant believed that he was hearing god’s voice

and obeying that voice; that defendant believed his actions were moral in the eyes of god; and

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defendant believed that society would agree with him if they had the same facts and information

provided by god. Defendant also contends that he was mentally ill at the time of the alleged

crimes. Thus, the issue is whether the insanity instruction as given was improper if it did not

permit the jury to consider petitioner’s religious beliefs in determining the question of sanity. 

Having reviewed the instruction as given, the instruction correctly stated the defense of

insanity. Moreover, the instruction by itself could not infect the trial in a manner that due

process was violated because petitioner was afforded the opportunity throughout the trial to

present his defense of “deific decree.” Nevertheless such a defense is subject to the appropriate

limitation that was provided in the supplemental instruction, i.e., that the act violated generallyaccepted standards of moral obligation. As the California Court of Appeals noted, “knowing

whether an act is morally wrong has both a subjective and objective component.” (Lodgment

No. 9, People v. Turgeon, No. D035787, slip op. at 19 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2002). The jury

instruction as given did not negate the subjective element of the wrongfulness test, nor did it

over-emphasize the objective component. 

Moreover, petitioner’s theory of the case was included in the given instruction – that

defendant suffered a mental illness that caused him to believe his act did not violate generally

accepted standards of moral obligation. 

Finally, petitioner has not shown that the jury instruction was a contrary or unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent or that the instruction so infected the entire trial so as to

violate due process under Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

habeas corpus relief on this issue.

2. Jury Question

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when the court accepted the

jury verdict while there was a question from the jury pending. The court and counsel were

considering how to answer the jury question when the jury came back with a unanimous verdict. 

The question posed in the jury note was:

1) Please review & explain the sixth paragraph of CALJIC 4.00, starting “The term

wrong as used . . . 

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2) Please emphasize the term “incapable” as related to the “moral” wrong.

(Lodgment 1 at 486).

Petitioner contends that the question was not answered prior to the verdict being

announced is proof that the jury instructions were constitutionally defective in that the modified

version of CALJIC 4.00 was in conflict with the facts and evidence presented at the trial. 

It is not improper for a trial court to accept a jury’s verdict while a question is pending so

long as the instructions given were full and complete of the questioned issue of wrongfulness. 

The court has discretion to determine that no additional explanations or definitions are needed to

satisfy the jury’s request for information. Here, because the instructions as given were full and

complete notwithstanding the lack of an answer to a jury question, it was not unreasonable to

accept the jury’s verdict and it was not constitutionally deficient to do so.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation

and overruling petitioner’s objections. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the petition for

writ of habeas corpus. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter

judgment in accordance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 26, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. WILLIAM McCURINE, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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