Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00373/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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1 05cv373

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH BURNS McINTOSH; LOUIS

CHARLES McINTOSH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05CV373 BTM (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT

UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO AMEND

vs.

THE UNITED STATES; CEDRIC

LAMONT TATE,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant United States has filed (1) a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for

summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ contract claims, and (2) a motion to strike certain

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiffs have filed a motion to

amend the SAC by adding Mr. McIntosh as a party to Ms. McIntosh’s pending tort claims. 

For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART

AND DENIED IN PART, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED AS

MOOT, Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to

amend is DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ SAC. The Court makes no finding as

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to the truth of these allegations. 

On August 4, 2001, Defendant Cedric Tate, a Navy Seaman Recruit stationed in

Coronado, attacked Ms. McIntosh on the grounds of Fiddler’s Cove Marina. (SAC ¶¶ 3,

4.) Tate assaulted and battered Ms. McIntosh, falsely imprisoned her, and attempted to

rape her. (SAC ¶ 13.) Ms. McIntosh resisted Tate’s attack and was ultimately assisted

by other Marina residents before Tate fled. (Id.) After his escape, Tate attacked two

other females in Coronado before he was finally apprehended. (Id.)

At the time of the attack, both Mr. and Ms. McIntosh, father and minor daughter,

lived aboard a vessel moored in Fiddler’s Cove Marina under a written lease agreement

with the Navy. (SAC ¶ 11.) At all times, the Navy owned and operated the Marina. 

(SAC ¶¶ 3, 11.) Plaintiffs allege that the Navy possessed actual and constructive

knowledge that criminal acts were taking place within and around the Marina, yet failed to

maintain reasonable security. (SAC ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Navy was

required to reasonably maintain the Marina property in a safe manner under the lease

agreement. (SAC ¶ 11.)

Plaintiffs generally allege that each defendant was acting within the course, scope,

and authority of his employment or agency and that the United States ratified the acts

which damaged Plaintiffs. (SAC ¶¶ 5-8.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 24, 2005, Plaintiffs commenced this action.

On December 19, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against

the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, U.S. Department of the Navy, and Cedric Lamont Tate,

alleging causes of action for (1) negligent maintenance and security; (2) negligent

infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”); (4) breach of written contract; (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing; and (6) premises liability.

In an order filed on July 11, 2006, the Court granted in part and denied in part the

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 The United States moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for a grant of summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56. In ruling upon the United States’ motion, the Court will consider the lease agreement

submitted by the United States. However, it is still proper to treat the government’s motion

as a motion to dismiss. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003)

(explaining that a court may consider a document not attached to the complaint on a motion

to dismiss if the complaint refers extensively to the document or the document forms the

basis for the Plaintiff’s claim). 

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United States’ motion to dismiss the FAC. Among other things, the Court dismissed Mr.

McIntosh’s claims for negligent maintenance and security, NIED, IIED, and premises

liability on the ground that Mr. McIntosh had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

under the FTCA, thereby denying the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over his tort

claims. 

On August 7, 2006, Plaintiffs filed the SAC naming Tate and the United States as

defendants. Ms. McIntosh individually asserts the following causes of action: (1)

negligent maintenance and security against the United States; (2) NIED against all

defendants; (3) IIED against Tate; and (4) premises liability against the United States. 

Additionally, both Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of written contract and breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against the United States. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Sarah McIntosh’s Contract Claims

The United States argues that it is entitled to a dismissal of Ms. McIntosh’s claims

for breach of written contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing because Ms. McIntosh was not a signatory to the lease agreement. The Court

agrees.1

Generally, contractual rights and obligations of the United States are governed

exclusively by federal law. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 

Because the government consents to be sued only by those with whom it has privity of

contract, Ms. McIntosh must show she was a party to the lease agreement with the

United States. Rodriguez v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 487, 491 (2006).

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 Even were Ms. McIntosh proceeding under a theory that she was an intended third

party beneficiary of the lease agreement, which she does not contend, her claim would be

subject to summary judgment. Under federal law, a party may maintain a claim for breach

against the government if the party was an intended third-party beneficiary to an existing

contract between the government and another party. Rodriguez, 69 Fed. Cl. at 492.

However, parties benefiting from a government contract “are generally assumed to be

incidental beneficiaries, and may not enforce the contract absent a clear intent to the

contrary.” Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003). To be considered a thirdparty beneficiary, the contract must reflect an express or implied intention of the parties to

benefit that third-party. Id. The intended third-party beneficiary need not be specifically

identified within the contract, but must fall within a class clearly intended to be benefited by

the contract. Id. Furthermore, the intended beneficiary must show that the contract reflects

an intention to benefit the third party directly. Rodriguez, 69 Fed. Cl. at 493. The contract

must establish not just an intent to confer a benefit, but also an intention to grant the third

party enforceable rights. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029. There is no language in the lease that

rebuts the presumption that Ms. McIntosh was merely an incidental beneficiary and nothing

in the lease expresses an intention to directly benefit Ms. McIntosh or to grant her

enforceable rights.

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The written lease agreement before the Court was signed exclusively by Mr.

McIntosh and omits any mention of Ms. McIntosh. Ms. McIntosh does not contend that

she was a signatory to the contract and was actually a minor at the time of the lease’s

execution. Because Ms. McIntosh was not a party to the lease agreement, the Court

dismisses with prejudice her claims for breach of written contract and breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d

617, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that allowing amendment of Plaintiff’s contract claim to

plead the existence of an allegedly binding contract with greater specificity would be futile

because, among other things, the defendant never signed the document, and nothing

could cure that fatal omission).2

B. Plaintiff Louis McIntosh’s Contract Claims

The United States contends that Mr. McIntosh’s claims for breach of contract and

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are actually tort claims

masquerading as contract claims. The United States further contends that because Mr.

McIntosh has not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. The Court does not find the

United States’ argument persuasive.

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 In Rodriguez, 69 Fed. Cl. at 494-96, the Plaintiff claimed that the United States

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to conduct a complete

and thorough search of a vehicle that was sold to her at an auction. The vehicle contained

a hidden cache of illegal drugs that was discovered when her husband legally drove the

vehicle into Mexico. Her husband and the vehicle were seized by Mexican officials. The

Court of Federal Claims explained that although the Plaintiff could not recover contract

damages for the injuries suffered by her husband, she had made “general allegations of

property damages suffic[ient] to supply the court with subject matter jurisdiction over her

claims for breach of contract premised upon the Tucker Act . . . .” Id. at 495. 

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Viewing the allegations of the SAC in the light most favorable to Mr. McIntosh, Mr.

McIntosh alleges that he suffered an injury, separate and apart from the injuries suffered

by his daughter, as a result of Defendant’s breach of an express or implied term of the

lease agreement. See Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1963)

(explaining that where an action “is essentially for breach of a contractual undertaking,

and the liability, if any, depends wholly upon the government’s alleged promise, the action

must be under the Tucker Act, and cannot be under the [FTCA].”). Mr. McIntosh alleges

that he suffered “general” and “contractual” damages as a result of the alleged breach,

including relocation costs. Such generalized contractual damage allegations are

sufficient to confer the court with subject matter jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).3

 (SAC, ¶ 29, 36.)

Although there is no express term in the lease requiring the United States to

reasonably secure the Fiddler’s Cove Marina area, Mr. McIntosh has stated a claim that

the United States breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The

obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract governed by federal

law. Baccardo v. United States, 341 F.Supp. 858, 862 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Asco-Falcon II

Shipping Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 595, 604 (1994). 

In addition, Mr. McIntosh may be able to show that the United States breached an

implied term requiring the United States to keep the Fiddler’s Cove Marina area safe. For

example, under state common law, there are circumstances where the implied warranty

of habitability in a lease imposes a duty on the landlord to protect tenants against crime. 

See Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 324, 333 (1981) (holding that

landlord had a duty to repair lock on lobby door pursuant to the warranty of habitability

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implicit in the lease); But see Penner v. Falk, 153 Cal. App. 3d 858 (1984) (rejecting

proposition that every lease has an implied warranty requiring the landlord to prevent

foreseeable crime and limiting claim of breach of implied warranty of habitability to cases

where the tenant relied on a certain level of security in entering into lease). 

Federal courts “have implied warranties against the Government in numerous

cases concerning the interpretation and construction of leases and contracts.” City of

Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148, 153 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Techer v.

Roberts-Harris, 83 F.R.D. 124 (D. Conn. 1979) (implying warranty of habitability in HUD

leases). Therefore, Mr. McIntosh may have a claim that the United States breached the

implied warranty of habitability or some other implied term of the lease. 

Neither party has briefed whether the implied warranty of habitability exists in this

case and if so, what its scope is. Accordingly, the Court will allow Mr. McIntosh’s contract

claim to go forward without prejudice to the United States’ right to bring a future motion

for summary judgment.

C. Motion for Leave to Amend Mr. McIntosh’s Tort Claims

Mr. McIntosh seeks leave to file a third amended complaint, adding himself as a

plaintiff to the tort claims. The Court denies this motion.

In its previous order granting the United States’ motion to dismiss Mr. McIntosh’s

tort claims, the Court stated: “[i]f, during the course of these proceedings, Mr. McIntosh

can show that he has properly exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA,

Mr. McIntosh can seek leave to amend the complaint to reallege his tort claims.” The

purpose of this statement was to allow Mr. McIntosh to show, if at all possible, that he had

filed an administrative claim on his own behalf separate and apart from the July 1, 2002

administrative claim, which the Court found did not give adequate notice of Mr.

McIntosh’s intentions to pursue his own claims. 

In support of the proposed amendment, Mr. McIntosh simply reasserts his previous

argument that the July 1, 2002 claim sufficed to exhaust both his and his daughter’s

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 Mr. McIntosh may not seek further leave to amend his tort claims in this case unless

he presents evidence that he timely and properly exhausted his administrative remedies

under the FTCA by means other than the July 1, 2002 claim filed on behalf of Ms. McIntosh.

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administrative remedies. The Court has already rejected this contention, and, to the

extent Mr. McIntosh is seeking reconsideration of the Court’s ruling, the Court denies the

motion for reconsideration. Mr. McIntosh’s motion for leave to amend is denied.4

D. Motion to Strike Allegations in Second Amended Complaint

The United States moves the Court to strike certain allegations in the SAC

because they are contrary to the Court’s prior ruling that Mr. McIntosh did not exhaust his

administrative remedies by way of the July 1, 2002 claim. The Court grants the United

States’ motion to strike.

A party may move to strike any immaterial, impertinent, redundant, or scandalous

matter before responding to a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). As previously discussed, in

its order of July 11, 2006, the Court found that the July 1, 2002 claim did not give the

government adequate notice that Mr. McIntosh intended to pursue his own separate

claims. Accordingly, the Court held that Mr. McIntosh had failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to his tort claims. 

In the SAC, filed after the Court’s July 11, 2006 order, Plaintiffs reassert that the

July 1, 2002 claim provided the United States with adequate notice of Mr. McIntosh’s

intentions to be considered a separate claimant and allege that Mr. McIntosh has thereby

exhausted his administrative remedies. In light of the Court’s prior order, these

allegations are improper and should be stricken.

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The Court strikes the following allegations from the SAC:

 Page Matter to be stricken

Page 3, line 20 “Plaintiffs have” shall be stricken and shall be deemed to read:

“Plaintiff Sarah McIntosh has”

Page 3, line 22 “plaintiffs have received an administrative denial of plaintiffs’ claim”

shall be stricken and shall be deemed to read: “she has received an

administrative denial of her claim”

Page 3, line 23

through Page

4, line 3

Strike entire section

Page 4, lines

3-4

“Plaintiffs have consequently timely filed their Complaint For

Damages” shall be stricken and shall be deemed to read: “Plaintiff

Sarah McIntosh has consequently timely filed her Complaint For

Damages”

Page 4, line 5 “Plaintiffs have” shall be stricken and shall be deemed to read:

“Plaintiff Sarah McIntosh has”

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [39] is

GRANTED as to Ms. McIntosh’s contract claims and is DENIED as to Mr. McIntosh’s

contract claims. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice Ms. McIntosh’s claims for breach

of written contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The

Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [39] as moot. The Court also

GRANTS Defendant’s motion to strike [37] as set forth above.

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Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint adding Mr. McIntosh

as a plaintiff to the tort claims [31] is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 9, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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