Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05030/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this

suit.

The ALJ issued a previous written decision finding plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 14- 2

22), but that decision was reversed and remanded by the District Court for further

proceedings (Tr. 363-67.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JEANNIE G. SCOTT PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-5030

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jeannie G. Scott brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

denying her claim for disability insurance benefits under the

provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act). Both

parties have filed appeal briefs and the matter is now ripe for

review. The Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and

orders as follows with respect thereto: 

BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on

September 20, 2001, alleging that she became disabled on May 1,

2001, due to fibromyalgia, arthritis, chronic pain, and swelling

of her hands and knees. (Tr. 80-82, 92.) 

2. In a written decision dated October 19, 2005, the ALJ 2

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found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis, avascular necrosis of the left knee,

hypertension, and “heart condition status postoperative for ...

coronary angioplasty.” (Tr. 337.) The ALJ concluded, however,

that plaintiff was not disabled, as she retained the residual

functional capacity to perform her past relevant sedentary work as

an inventory specialist or general clerk. (Tr. 342-43) Plaintiff

seeks judicial review of this decision.

APPLICABLE LAW

3. Our review of the Commissioner's determination is

limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's role is to

determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Siemers v.

Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence

means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, it means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993). In

deciding whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence, the Court must consider the evidence that

supports the Commissioner's decision, along with evidence that

detracts from it. Siemers, 47 F.3d at 301; Barrett v. Shalala, 38

F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1994).

4. To be eligible for DIB benefits, a claimant has the

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burden of establishing the existence of a disability under the

Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). To meet this burden, the claimant

must show:

* that she has a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for at

least one year;

* that she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful

activity; and

* that this inability results from the impairment.

See Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8 Cir. 2001); see th

also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

5. The Commissioner follows a familiar five-step process to

determine whether a claimant is disabled:

(1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing her claim; 

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to

perform basic work activities; 

(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a presumptively

disabling impairment listed in the regulations; 

(4) whether the claimant has the residual functional

capacity – that is, what she can do despite her limitations -- to

perform her past relevant work; and

(5) if the claimant cannot perform her past work, the burden

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then shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform given her

age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920; see also Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217. 

DISCUSSION

6. The Court first addresses the ALJ’s assessment of

plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The ALJ is required to take

into account the following factors in evaluating the credibility

of a claimant's subjective complaints: (1) the claimant's daily

activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the

pain; (3) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication;

(4) precipitating and aggravating factors; and (5) functional

restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984).

The ALJ found that plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain

were not credible. In making this finding, the ALJ relied on a

disability supplemental interview outline dated October 18, 2001,

in which plaintiff indicated that she was able to care for her own

personal needs, perform most household chores, shop, run errands,

prepare some meals, etc. (Tr. 109-110, 339.) The ALJ concluded

that plaintiff’s ability to perform these activities were

inconsistent with her subjective complaints.

The Court is troubled by the ALJ’s reliance on a

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supplemental interview outline that was dated four years prior to

the issuance of the ALJ’s decision. In a subsequent supplemental

interview outline, dated December 11, 2004, plaintiff indicated

that her activities were much more restricted. Specifically,

plaintiff stated that she was not able to take care of her own

personal hygiene needs, was not able to perform any household

chores, was not able to shop, etc. (Tr. 422-23.) The ALJ did not

address the restrictions plaintiff identified in her more recent

supplemental interview outline.

The Court is also troubled by the ALJ’s finding that

plaintiff had “shown to experience no significant and

substantiated side effects from her medications which negatively

impact her ability to perform work-related activities.” (Tr.

339.) The medical evidence indicates that plaintiff was on

numerous medications, methadone and oxycodone for pain. Plaintiff

testified that these medications caused her drowsiness, confusion,

and difficulty concentrating. (Tr. 548.) Dr. Cygnet Schroeder,

who conducted an independent medical examination of plaintiff in

November 2004, noted that plaintiff “appear[ed] to be impaired

[in] concentration and memory,” possibly due to her “narcotic

usage [or] chronic pain.” (Tr. 448-49.) Plaintiff’s treating

physician, Dr. James Baker, noted that plaintiff was on “high

doses of narcotic pain medication.” (Tr. 462.)

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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ did

not properly evaluate plaintiff’s subjective complaints and that

remand is therefore warranted.

7. Remand is warranted on other grounds as well. The

medical evidence in this case indicates the following:

* In Dr. Schroeder’s independent medical examination of

plaintiff in November 2004, she summarized plaintiff’s medical

history as follows:

Her past medical history is quite significant. She has

had a known history of fibromyalgia for some 14

years.... In 2000, she suffered a myocardial

infarction, two-stent placement. She developed left

knee discomfort, eventually was found to have avascular

necrosis ... [and] underwent an elective total knee

arthroplasty in the hopes that this would improve her

overall pain relative to her knee. Her surgery was not

beneficial for this.

(Tr. 447.) Dr. Schroeder also noted that plaintiff appeared to be

“profoundly depressed.” (Tr. 448.) Dr. Schroeder opined:

I am doubtful at this time that the claimant would be

able to maintain any kind of employment. Cognition may

limit her employment as far as being able to complete

the tasks required. I feel that [her] functional

limitations are based on her multiple medical comorbidities, coronary artery disease, most likely

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic

fibromyalgia, chronic pain secondary to her avascular

necrosis.

(Tr. 449.)

* Dr. Baker, plaintiff’s treating physician, noted that

plaintiff’s pain syndrome was difficult to control and stated that

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she had limitations in “most activities,” including standing,

walking, sitting, lifting, etc. (Tr. 457-61.) Dr. Baker also

noted that plaintiff suffered from clinical depression, for which

she required medication. (Tr. 462.) In May 2004, Dr. Baker

opined that plaintiff “needs to be off work till further notice.”

(Tr. 459.)

* Dr. Mark Powell, plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon, never

released plaintiff to return to work following her kneereplacement surgery. (Tr. 463-71.)

8. In concluding that plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity to perform her past work, the ALJ relied on an

orthopedic consultative examination and a psychological

consultative examination. In light of the medical evidence

outlined above, these consultative examinations cannot be said to

constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. See

Jenkins v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 922, 925 (8 Cir. 1999) (the opinion of a th

consulting physician who examines a claimant once does not

generally constitute substantial evidence). The Court therefore

believes that remand is necessary so that the record can be

further developed regarding plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity.

CONCLUSION

9. Based on the foregoing, this case is hereby remanded to

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the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On remand, the ALJ is directed:

* to re-evaluate plaintiff’s subjective complaints in

light of the evidence noted above regarding her restricted

activities and the side-effects of her medication;

* to address interrogatories to plaintiff’s treating

physicians – including Dr. Baker, Dr. Powell, Dr. Wayne Brooks (a

pain specialist who treated plaintiff), and Dr. Charles Inlow

(plaintiff’s cardiologist) – asking the physicians to review

plaintiff’s medical records, to complete a residual functional

capacity assessment regarding plaintiff’s capabilities during the

time period in question, and to give the objective basis for their

opinions; 

* to have a rheumatologist evaluate plaintiff and complete

a similar residual functional capacity assessment; and

* to have another psychological evaluation conducted and

have the examiner complete a mental assessment of plaintiff’s

ability to perform work-related activities.

With the above evidence, the ALJ should then re-evaluate

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and specifically list in

a hypothetical to a vocational expert any limitations that are

indicated in the residual-functional-capacity assessments and

supported by the evidence.

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IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of March 2007.

/S/JIMM LARRY HENDREN 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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