Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00730/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00730-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS DEAN, SR.,

individually; AMY HUMPHRIES, 

individually; SUSANNAH 

HARDESTY, individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, a

municipal corporation; and 

DOES 1 through 100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00730-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sacramento

County’s (“the County”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #25) Plaintiffs

Dennis Dean, Sr., Amy Humphries, and Susannah Hardesty’s 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #24)

(“SAC”).1 Plaintiffs oppose the motion (“Opposition”) (Doc. 

#35). Defendants filed a reply (Doc. #36).

//

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for April 9, 2014.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dennis Dean, Sr. is the father of Decedent Dennis 

Dean, Jr. (“Decedent”). SAC ¶ 2. Plaintiff Susannah Hardesty is 

the mother of Decedent. SAC ¶ 3. Plaintiff Amy Humphries is the 

wife of Decedent; she brings her claims as the alleged successor 

in interest to Decedent and individually. SAC ¶ 4.

On April 12, 2012, Decedent was at his home in Sacramento, 

California when narcotics officers employed by the County 

arrived. SAC ¶ 9. Decedent fled but was chased by the officers, 

who overtook Decedent, took him into custody, handcuffed him, and

placed him in a patrol vehicle. SAC ¶ 12.

The officers then began executing a search warrant of 

Decedent’s home and found a small safe located in a bedroom 

closet on the floor. SAC ¶ 12. The safe was secured with a 

fingerprint security lock, and only Decedent could open the safe.

Id. The officers ordered Decedent to open the safe, placing him 

in the closet. SAC ¶¶ 10-15. Plaintiffs allege that Decedent

was cooperative with the officers when opening the safe, but was

shot in the back at close range multiple times while his hands 

were cuffed in front of him. Id. Plaintiffs further allege

that, after the gunfire, the officers waited over two hours for a 

SWAT team’s robot to determine that the room was safe, and that 

no medical assistance was provided to Decedent during this 

period. SAC ¶¶ 19, 20. According to Plaintiffs, at no time 

prior to or during the shooting did Decedent pose a threat of 

violence to the officers. SAC ¶ 10. Decedent died as a result 

of the incident. 

Plaintiffs allege the officers failed to follow the County’s 

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“established tactical standards of care which would have resulted

in the proper and reasonable use of force.” SAC ¶¶ 17, 29.

Plaintiffs also allege that the County “has a history of using 

excessive force and to [sic] follow tactical standards of care 

for law enforcement” evidenced by the involvement of County

officers in eleven “excessive force shootings in 2012, with 

several being fatal.” SAC ¶ 22. The County allegedly failed to 

discipline or retrain the officers involved and failed to 

properly supervise them. Id.

On October 12, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) in this Court, naming the County, Sheriff Scott 

Jones, and Does 1 through 100 as defendants. The FAC included

the following causes of action: (1) “Wrongful Death” under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“§1983”); (2) “Violation of Plaintiffs’ civil 

rights to familial relationship” under §1983; (3) “Monell” claim 

for violations of §1983; and (4) “Survival Action: Violation of 

Decedent’s civil rights” under §1983. Defendants moved to 

dismiss the FAC (Doc. #18), and the Court granted the motion 

(Doc. #22). The order dismissed the §1983 claim for violation of 

Plaintiffs’ rights to familial relationship and the Monell claim

with leave to amend2 but dismissed the wrongful death and 

survival action claims without leave to amend.

The SAC was filed on February 12, 2014, naming the County 

and the unknown officers responsible for Decedent’s injuries 

(“Doe Officers”) as defendants. The draftsmanship reflected by 

2 The Monell claim was dismissed without leave to amend insofar 

as it was brought against Defendant Sheriff Scott Jones, who is 

no longer a named defendant in this matter.

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Plaintiffs’ SAC leaves much to be desired. The SAC is replete

with grammatical, spelling and typographical errors. Decedent is 

referred to as “Descendant” (¶ 25) and “Decadent” (¶ 55);

Plaintiffs are referred to as “Playoff’s” (¶ 42); and Plaintiffs 

allege there was a “safe which contained possible deadly force” 

(¶ 69). Unnecessary and vague allegations are repeated over and 

again with little sense of organization. Many of the paragraphs 

border on complete nonsense, and it is only with great difficulty 

that the Court is able to decipher what claims Plaintiffs intend

to assert. For purposes of ruling on this Motion, the Court 

understands the SAC to bring causes of action on behalf of 

Decedent against the County and Doe Officers pursuant to §1983; a

claim of Monell liability against the County by the individual 

Plaintiffs; and a claim against Doe Officers for violation of 

Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights pursuant to §1983.

II. OPINION

A. Discussion

1. Claims on Behalf of Decedent

The County moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claims insofar as 

they are brought on behalf of Decedent as exceeding the scope of 

the Court’s leave to amend. MTD at pp. 8-9.

In the previous motion to dismiss, the County challenged

whether the FAC properly alleged a §1983 survival action claim on 

behalf of Decedent. Rather than argue to the contrary or provide 

support for their claim, Plaintiffs conceded the issue; as a 

result, the Court dismissed the cause of action without leave to 

amend.

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//

Plaintiffs then proceeded to reassert claims on behalf of

Decedent in the SAC. In response to the County’s current Motion 

to Dismiss, Plaintiffs argue they are represented by new counsel 

and now do not concede the issue. The law does not work in such 

a manner. “In re-alleging this claim, Plaintiff[s] [have] failed 

to abide by the [C]ourt’s instructions. Accordingly, this 

defective claim is specious and should be stricken pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).” Allen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, CV 07-102-R

(SH), 2009 WL 666449, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The County’s 

motion to strike the claims from the SAC brought on behalf of 

Decedent is granted.

2. Monell Claims

The County contends the Monell claims found in the First and 

Third Causes of Action should be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim. It argues Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege the 

County had a policy that amounted to deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and was the moving force behind 

the constitutional violation. MTD at pp. 15-17. Plaintiffs

respond that the SAC adequately alleges a custom and policy of 

constitutional violations, which would subject the County to 

Monell liability. Opp. at p. 4.

As the Court stated in its previous order, bare allegations 

of the existence of an official policy or custom are insufficient 

to withstand a motion to dismiss, and the complaint “must contain 

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice 

and to enable the [municipality] to defend itself effectively.”

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Plaintiffs point to allegations in the SAC that are nearly 

identical to the allegations in the FAC. The SAC alleges the 

County failed to discipline or retrain its deputies and failed to 

supervise them. SAC ¶ 22. The SAC then repeats the FAC’s

recounting of past shootings. Id. These allegations in the SAC 

are no more sufficient or concrete than those the Court has 

already rejected. The remaining allegations in the “Third Cause 

of Action” are similarly conclusory, are not entitled to a 

presumption of truth, and therefore are insufficient to state a 

claim for Monell liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

680-81 (2009). Accordingly, the County’s Motion to Dismiss the 

causes of action against it are granted. However, it is not 

clear to the Court that Plaintiffs can allege no set of facts to 

properly state such a claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs will be given 

one final opportunity to amend their Complaint and the claim is

dismissed without prejudice.

3. Claim against Doe Officers

Defendants argue the claim against Doe Officers in the 

Second Cause of Action should be dismissed for failure to allege 

facts sufficient to state a claim. MTD at p. 11-12.

Plaintiffs may individually assert a Fourteenth Amendment 

claim based on a deprivation of their liberty interest arising 

out of their familial relationship with Decedent. See Byrd v. 

Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998); Provencio v. Vazquez,

258 F.R.D. 626, 640 (E.D. Cal. 2009). The standard for such a 

violation is based on substantive due process. See Moreland v. 

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 

1998). To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment claim arising out of 

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the loss of a familial relationship, a plaintiff must show that

the officers acted with a purpose to harm the decedent that is 

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Johnson v. 

Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 

2013).

The SAC alleges that Decedent was in custody and was

cooperating with Doe officers when the shooting took place. Opp. 

at p. 5; SAC ¶¶ 10-15, 54-58. According to the SAC, Doe Officers

ordered the handcuffed Decedent to open the safe; when Decedent

did as they asked, Doe Officers opened fire, inflicting at least 

thirty-two gunshot wounds. Doe Officers then left Decedent’s 

injuries unattended for two hours; Decedent later died as a 

result of those injuries. These allegations, accepted as true, 

show Doe Officers acted with a purpose to harm that is unrelated 

to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Johnson, 724 F.3d at

1168-69. Although inartfully pleaded in the SAC and not 

addressed directly in the Opposition, Plaintiffs have adequately 

alleged conduct in the “Second Cause of Action” that states a 

claim for relief under §1983 for violation of Plaintiffs’ 

Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Accordingly, the County’s motion to 

dismiss the Second Cause of Action as against Doe Officers is

DENIED.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the

County’s Motion to Strike the claims brought on behalf of 

Decedent from the SAC. The Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the 

County are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The County’s Motion to 

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Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ individual claim against Doe Officers in 

the second cause of action is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended

Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of 

this Order. Defendant’s responsive pleading is due within twenty

(20) days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 15, 2014

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