Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05278/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05278-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAL-MART STORES, INC., a

Delaware corporation, and WALMART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST,

a Delaware statutory trust, 

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

CITY OF TURLOCK, TURLOCK CITY

COUNCIL, and DOES 1 through 10,

inclusive,

 Defendants.

1:04-CV-05278 OWW DLB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Fed.R.Civ.P. 56) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants the City of Turlock and the Turlock City Council

(collectively, “the City”) move for summary judgment against

Plaintiffs Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Wal-Mart Real Estate

Business Trust (collectively, “Wal-Mart”). Wal-Mart opposes the

motion. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The complaint was filed on February 11, 2004. Doc. 1,

Compl. The City moved for summary judgment on March 29, 2005. 

Doc. 50, Mot. for Summ. J.; Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp. Wal-Mart

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filed opposition on November 2, 2005. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp. 

The City responded on December 12, 2005. Doc. 190, Resp. in

Supp. Oral argument was heard on February 6, 2006, during which

leave was granted to supplement the pleadings regarding whether

Wal-Mart’s putative as-applied challenge to the Ordinance is

ripe. Wal-Mart filed its supplemental response in opposition to

summary judgment on February 21, 2006. Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in

Opp. The City replied to the supplemental response on February

27, 2006. Doc. 207, Reply to Suppl. Mem. in Opp. Wal-Mart filed

its second supplemental response in opposition to summary

judgment on March 24, 2006. Doc. 216, Suppl. Mem. 2d in Opp. 

III. BACKGROUND

Wal-Mart states: “This litigation involves collusion between

Defendants the City of Turlock and the Turlock City Council . . .

and local supermarkets and local producers of goods by amending

the Turlock Zoning Code . . . and the City’s Northwest Triangle

Specific Plan[.]” Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 1. On November 20,

2003, the City Planning Commission (Commission) conducted a

public hearing regarding “proposed amendments to the [City]

zoning ordinance and the Northwest Triangle Specific Plan” that

would: (a) “Define and classify large-scale (‘big box’) retail

stores”; (b) “Require a Conditional Use Permit for certain largescale retail stores (‘discount stores’ and ‘discount clubs’)”;

and (c) “Prohibit ‘discount superstores’ which are large-scale

(greater than 100,000 square feet) retail stores that also devote

more than 5% of sales floor area to non-taxable (grocery) items –

typically such stores contain a full service grocery department.” 

Doc. 191, Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts in

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Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [hereinafter, “Def.’s RSDF”;

undisputed unless otherwise noted] #90. On November 20, 2003,

after public comment, the Commission voted to recommend the

proposed ordinance to the Council. Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF #91. 

On December 16, 2003, and January 13, 2004, the Council

adopted Ordinance Nos. 1015-CS and 1016 (the Ordinance). Doc.

165, Pl.’s Objections and Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed

Facts in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [hereinafter “Pl.’s

RSUF”; undisputed unless otherwise noted] #1. The Ordinance

amended the City’s Zoning Code and Northwest Triangle Specific

Plan, and was codified in Sections 9-1-202 and 9-3-302 of the

Turlock Municipal Code. Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #3. 

The Ordinance created three new categories of commercial

retail land uses: “Discount Stores,” “Discount Clubs,” and

“Discount Superstores.” Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #30. “Discount

Stores” are:

stores with off-street parking that usually offer

a variety of customer services, centralized

cashing, and a wide range of products. [“Discount

Stores”] usually maintain long store hours seven

(7) days a week. The stores are often the only

ones on the site, but they can also be found in

mutual operation with a related or unrelated

garden center or service station. Discount stores

are also sometimes found as separate parcels

within a retail complex with their own dedicated

parking. 

Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #31.

A “Discount Club” is:

a discount store or warehouse where shoppers pay a

membership fee in order to take advantage of

discounted prices on a wide variety of items such

as food, clothing, tires, and appliances; many

items are sold in large quantities or bulk. 

 

Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #33.

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A “Discount Superstore” is: 

a store that is similar to a “Discount Store” . .

. with the exception that [it] also contain[s] a

full-service grocery department under the same

roof that shares entrances and exits with the

discount store area. Such retail stores exceed

100,000 square feet of gross floor area and devote

at least five percent (5%) of the total sales

floor area to the sale of non-taxable merchandise.

. . . These stores usually offer a variety of

customer services, centralized cashing, and a wide

range of products. They typically maintain long

store hours seven (7) days a week. The stores are

often the only ones on the site, but they can also

be found in mutual operation with a related or

unrelated garden center or service station. 

Discount superstores are also sometimes found as

separate parcels within a retail complex with

their own dedicated parking.

Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #32. See also Ordinance No. 1016 (set forth

in Decl. of Michael I. Cooke [hereinafter, “Cooke Decl.”], Ex. B,

6). The Ordinance definitions of “Discount Store,” “Discount

Club,” and “Discount Superstore” closely resemble the definitions

of these terms in Trip Generation (6 ed. 1997), a publication th

of the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE). See Cooke

Decl., Ex. G; see also Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF ##39-41 (undisputed

as to the ITE definitions of these terms). 

In Turlock, discount stores and discount clubs are permitted

conditional uses in the C-C, C-H, and C-T commercial zones. Doc.

165, Pl.’s RSUF ##34, 35. Discount superstores are not permitted

uses, conditional or otherwise, in any City zone. Doc. 165,

Pl.’s RSUF #36. The Ordinance prohibits Plaintiff from siting a

Wal-Mart Supercenter (a “Discount Superstore”) in Turlock. Doc.

165, Pl.’s RSUF #105. 

The Ordinance’s Preamble makes the following findings: 

• WHEREAS, the [City] General Plan (including, but

not limited to, policies 2.4-a, 2.4-g, 2.4-h, 2.4-

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j, 2.4-k) establishes locational requirements for

the [regional and neighborhood] retail centers:

encouraging a number of neighborhood centers

equally dispersed throughout the [C]ity while

encouraging a concentration of regional shopping

centers along the Highway 99/Countryside Drive

corridor [Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #5 (Preamble text

undisputed)]; and 

• WHEREAS, General Plan policies promote and

encourage vital neighborhood commercial districts

that are evenly distributed throughout the city so

that residents are able to meet their basic daily

shopping needs at neighborhood shopping centers

[Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #6 (Preamble text

undisputed)]; and [¶] ... 

• WHEREAS, given the changes in the retail sector

and the evolution toward ever-bigger stores, it is

necessary that the zoning ordinance be amended to

regulate larger retail establishments

appropriately and to afford them adequate review

[Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #7 (Preamble text

undisputed)]; and 

• WHEREAS, the [City] zoning ordinance (Title 9 of

the [City] Municipal Code) has not kept pace with

the evolution of the retail sector and fails to

adequately distinguish the size, scale and scope

of various retail activities; and [¶] ... 

• WHEREAS, the establishment of discount superstores

in Turlock is likely to negatively impact the

vitality and economic viability of the [C]ity’s

neighborhood commercial centers by drawing sales

away from traditional supermarkets located in

these centers [Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #9 (Preamble

text undisputed)]; and 

• WHEREAS, industry and academic studies indicate

discount superstores rarely add any retail

services currently not provided within a

community, and that the majority of sales growth

at a discount supercenter comes from a direct

shift of dollars from existing retailers within a

community, primarily from grocery stores [Doc.

165, Pl.’s RSUF #10 (Preamble text undisputed)];

and 

• WHEREAS, discount superstores compete directly

with existing grocery stores that anchor

neighborhood-serving commercial centers [Doc. 165,

Pl.’s RSUF #11 (Preamble text undisputed)]; and 

• WHEREAS, smaller stores within a neighborhood

center rely upon the foot traffic generated by the

grocery store for their existence and in

neighborhood centers where the grocery store

closes, vacancy rates typically increase and

deterioration takes place in the remaining center

[Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #12 (Preamble text

undisputed)]; and [¶] ... 

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• WHEREAS, discount superstores adversely affect the

viability of small-scale, pedestrian-friendly

neighborhood commercial areas, contributing to the

blight in these areas [Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #13

(Preamble text undisputed)]; and 

• WHEREAS, the [Ordinance’s proposed zoning changes]

are intended to preserve the [C]ity’s existing

neighborhood-serving shopping centers that are

centrally located within the community ... [Doc.

165, Pl.’s RSUF #15 (Preamble text undisputed)];

and

• WHEREAS, the [C]ity’s current distribution of

neighborhood shopping centers provides convenient

shopping and employment in close proximity to most

residential neighborhoods in Turlock, consistent

with the Turlock General Plan [Doc. 165, Pl.’s

RSUF #16 (Preamble text undisputed)]; and

• WHEREAS, this distribution of shopping and

employment creates a land-use pattern that reduces

the need for vehicle trips and encourages walking

and biking for shopping, services, and employment

[Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #17 (Preamble text

undisputed)]. 

See also Cooke Decl., Ex. A (Ordinance No. 1015-CS); Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 138 Cal.App.4th 273, 283-84

(2006).

Between January 1, 2003, and January 26, 2005, Wal-Mart did

not file an application with the City for a development permit. 

Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #95. On January 26, 2005, Doucet &

Associates, Inc., an engineering firm, filed documents with the

City on Wal-Mart’s behalf that the firm referred to as “an

application for entitlements for a Wal-Mart Supercenter proposed

for development in Turlock.” Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #96. 

Defendants claim that the application was incomplete in that it

did not include a floor plan, and the City could not determine

whether the Ordinance would permit the proposed development or

not. Id., Pl.’s RSUF #97; see also id., Pl.’s RSUF #98 (citing

City Municipal Code Section 9-5-102: “An application for a permit

. . . shall be accompanied by maps, drawings, and data as

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necessary to evaluate the proposed request for conformance with

the General Plan and the provisions of this chapter”). Wal-Mart

alleges that the January 26, 2005, application “contained all

information required in the City’s application.” Id., Pl.’s RSUF

#97 (response). 

On April 15, 2005, Wal-Mart filed a revised application with

the City. The revised application included revisions of several

of the documents originally submitted to the City. Doc. 191,

Def.’s RSDF #121. City Planning Manager Michael I. Cooke

responded to Plaintiff’s April 15, 2005, revised application on

May 9, 2005, by letter, stating that the “revised application you

provided contains the information I need to determine how the

ordinance applies to your project.” Id., Def.’s RSDF #123. The

letter states that, based on the sales floor area figures, the

project “is defined by [the City’s] large-scale retailer

ordinance as a ‘Discount Superstore.’ Therefore, it is

prohibited and I am returning your application fees herewith.” 

Id., Def.’s RSDF #124. See Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 2. 

Wal-Mart alleges its representatives originally began

negotiations with the City in December 2002 to establish a WalMart Supercenter in Turlock, Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF #1 (Response:

“irrelevant”); that these negotiations appeared likely to succeed

as late as July 2003, when Wal-Mart purchased the real property

for the prospective Supercenter, id., Def.’s RSDF ##9, 10

(Response: “irrelevant”); that about that time, local grocery

store owners learned of Wal-Mart’s plans, and began lobbying the

Council to exclude Wal-Mart from Turlock in order to protect

themselves from Wal-Mart’s competition, id., Def.’s RSDF ##11-65

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 “[The] City . . . acknowledges that, in August 2003, 1

representatives of unions and existing local supermarkets began

meeting with and lobbying members of the [ ] Council to prevent

the development of ‘big box’ stores containing grocery

departments.” Wal-Mart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 280.

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(Response: “irrelevant”) ; and that their efforts were rewarded 1

with the Ordinance, Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 8-11. 

Wal-Mart claims the City’s expressions of concern for air

quality, traffic flows, and urban blight are pretextual, and the

City’s true motive is to protect local retailers from competition

in violation of the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause

of the United States Constitution, and the Equal Protection

Clause of the California Constitution. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp.,

12-48. Wal-Mart also argues the Ordinance is void for vagueness

under the United States Constitution’s Due Process Clauses. Id.,

48-50.

In a case brought by Wal-Mart in state court against the

City, Case No. F047372, the California Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Appellate District recently upheld the Ordinance, rejecting

Wal-Mart’s challenges that the City unconstitutionally exceeded

its police powers and failed to comply with the California

Environmental Quality Act: 

(1) a city may exercise its police power to

control and organize development within its

boundaries as a means of serving the general

welfare, (2) [the] City made a legitimate policy

choice when it decided to organize development

using neighborhood shopping centers dispersed

throughout the city, (3) the [O]rdinance was

reasonably related to protecting that development

choice, and (4) no showing was made that the

restrictions significantly affected residents of

surrounding communities. Accordingly, the

restrictions in the ordinance bear a reasonable

relationship to the general welfare and, thus,

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[the] City constitutionally exercised its police

power.

Wal-Mart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 279. Wal-Mart did not raise, nor

did the state court decide, its federal or state equalprotection, Commerce Clause, or void-for-vagueness claims. WalMart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 299 n.21. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cal.

v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, to

defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must

show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists and (2) that this

factual issue is material. Id. A genuine issue of fact exists

when the non-moving party produces evidence on which a reasonable

trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a

whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that

party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216,

1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are “material” if they “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The non-moving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001). The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon

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motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to the party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to

any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

non-moving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

V. ANALYSIS

The complaint asserts seven claims for relief. Doc. 1,

Compl., ¶¶ 28-63. The first alleges Wal-Mart Supercenters are

situated similarly to a range of other retail formats – Discount

Clubs, multi-roof shopping centers that offer goods and services

similar to those available in a stand-alone Wal-Mart Supercenter,

large-scale grocers, and Discount Stores – for purposes of

preserving traffic flows and air quality and preventing urban

blight, id., ¶¶ 29-32, but the Ordinance prohibits Wal-Mart

Supercenters in Turlock and allows the other retail forms, in

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violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States

Constitution. 

The second claim for relief alleges the disparate treatment

alleged in the first claim for relief also violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the California Constitution. Id., ¶¶ 36-40.

The third claim for relief alleges Wal-Mart is an out-ofstate corporation, and is the only retailer doing business in

California that operates or plans to operate a Discount

Superstore; the Ordinance only operates to impose restrictions on

Wal-Mart, an out-of-state company; and the Ordinance therefore

discriminates in purpose and effect in favor of in-state

interests and against out-of-state interests, resulting in an

unlawful burden on interstate commerce, in violation of the

Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Id., ¶¶ 42-

46. 

The fourth claim for relief alleges the Ordinance is

unconstitutionally vague and uncertain, in that it: (1) provides

prospective retailers no guidance regarding their categorization

under the City’s zoning ordinances; (2) confers on the City

almost unlimited discretion to determine how a large retailer

should be classified; and (3) would inevitably lead to

inconsistent application of the Ordinance. Id., ¶ 50. The

Ordinance is also claimed to be vague and uncertain because the

definition of “food and beverage sales,” on its face, places

absolutely no restrictions on supermarkets or grocery stores,

even though supermarkets and grocery stores may expand over

100,000 square feet, and devote more than 5% of their floor-space

to non-taxable goods. Id.

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The fifth claim for relief alleges deprivation of

constitutional and federal statutory civil rights under color of

state law, and seeks damages under Title 42, Section 1983, of the

United States Code. Attorneys’ fees are also sought under

Section 1988. Id., ¶¶ 54-56. 

The sixth claim for relief seeks a declaration that the

Ordinance is void, reasserting the California and federal equalprotection, Commerce Clause, and void-for-vagueness claims. Id.,

¶¶ 57-60.

The seventh claim for relief requests a temporary

restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent

injunction against enforcement of the unlawful Ordinance. Id.,

¶¶ 61-63.

The City moves for summary judgment as to all of Wal-Mart’s

claims. Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 

A. Facial Versus As-Applied Challenge

1. Complaint Asserts Only Facial Challenge

Wal-Mart claims it has asserted both facial and as-applied

challenges to the Ordinance. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 12-14; Doc.

216, Suppl. Mem. 2d in Opp., 3-4. Wal-Mart argues the City has

moved for summary judgment only as to Wal-Mart’s facial

challenges, not its as-applied challenges, and summary judgment

regarding the as-applied challenges is improper, even if summary

judgment regarding the facial challenges is granted. Doc. 216,

Suppl. Mem. 2d in Opp., 2, 4-10. 

The complaint was filed on February 11, 2004. Doc. 1,

Compl. The City did not deny Wal-Mart’s entitlement application

until May 9, 2005. Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF #123. Wal-Mart has not 

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amended its complaint. Wal-Mart argues “[t]he [c]omplaint

contains more than sufficient allegations to state a claim that

application of the Ordinance to Wal-Mart violated the [E]qual

[P]rotection [C]lauses in the federal and state constitutions.” 

Doc. 216, Suppl. Mem. 2d in Opp., 3. 

Wal-Mart alleges [] it was “ready and able” to

build a Supercenter in Turlock (Complaint ¶¶ 25-

27) and [] the actions of the City, based on the

Ordinance, prevented its development plan. 

Complaint, ¶ 25. What is more, Wal-Mart alleges

[] it is similarly situated to other business

entities that are treated differently (Complaint

¶¶ 29-32, 36-39), [] there is no rational basis

for this differential treatment[,] and the reasons

for the discriminatory treatment are

impermissible, including because the City acted

with animus and bad faith toward Wal-Mart. 

Complaint ¶[¶] 11-24, 29-32, 36-39. These

allegations are sufficient to state an as[-]

applied claim.

Id., 4. 

An “as applied” challenge is a claim that the operation of a

statute is unconstitutional in a particular case, while a

“facial” challenge alleges the statute may rarely or never be

constitutionally applied. When faced with a claim that

application of a statute renders it unconstitutional, a court

must analyze the statute as applied to the particular case, i.e.,

how it operates in practice against the particular litigant and

under the facts of the instant case, not hypothetical facts in

other situations. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187. 

[A]n as-applied challenge claims [] the

government’s conduct as permitted by a statute

violated the defendant’s rights. The violation is

specific to the facts of the defendant’s case, and

the statute is flawed only to the extent it

permitted the government to act in that case. In

contrast, a facial challenge claims [] the

defendant was acted upon pursuant to a statute

that itself was constitutionally improper. The

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harm claimed is not a direct violation of the

defendant’s constitutional rights, but rather a

more abstract claim that the defendant was acted

upon pursuant to a statute that has some kind of

constitutional defect. 

Orrin S. Kerr, Congress, the Courts, and New Technologies: A

Response to Professor Solove, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 779, 787 n.50

(2005) (emphasis added).

The February 11, 2004, complaint could not have, and did

not, allege the City violated Wal-Mart’s constitutional rights in

applying the Ordinance to deny Wal-Mart’s Supercenter permit

application, because the City did not apply the Ordinance to WalMart’s Supercenter supplemented application until May 9, 2005. 

The complaint does not allege facts regarding the specific

application of the Ordinance to Wal-Mart’s Supercenter permit

application. The complaint alleges animus, bad faith, and

impermissible discrimination only in the City’s enactment of the

Ordinance, not its application to Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart’s sixth

claim, for declaratory relief, alleges only facial challenges to

the Ordinance:

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists

between Wal-Mart . . . and [the City] . . .

relative to their respective rights and duties in

the project in light of the course of conduct

hereinbefore set forth and described. Wal-Mart

contends [], in view of all attendant facts and

circumstances, [the City] unlawfully adopted the

Ordinance. Wal-Mart asserts [] [the City] cannot

adopt the Ordinance because . . . the Ordinance

does not treat similarly situated retailers alike. 

Wal-Mart also asserts [] the Ordinance unlawfully

and arbitrarily discriminates against out-of-state

interests and . . . violates the Commerce Clause. 

Wal-Mart further contends the Ordinance is

unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. 

Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 58 (emphasis added). The complaint solely

presents a facial challenge to the Ordinance.

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Nor has the City consented, either expressly or by

implication, to try Wal-Mart’s putative as-applied Ordinance

challenges. Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides in relevant part:

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried

by express or implied consent of the parties, they

shall be treated in all respects as if they had

been raised in the pleadings.

Rule 15(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. Faustin v. City and County of Denver,

Colo., 423 F.3d 1192 (10 Cir. 2005), held a complaint was th

impliedly amended to include facial challenges because Defendants

never contested the characterization of Plaintiff’s developing

claims as a facial challenge to Denver’s policy during

proceedings in the district court. Faustin, 423 F.3d at 1196. 

Here, the City has consistently objected to and argued Wal-Mart

cannot assert an as-applied challenge to the Ordinance. See Doc.

51, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., 21-24; Doc. 207, Reply to

Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 1-6. 

Wal-Mart relies on Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F.Supp.2d 1265

(N.D. Cal. 2005), to argue that under federal notice pleading

standards, the complaint sufficiently alleges facts to support

as-applied challenges to the Ordinance. Doc. 216, Suppl. Mem. 2d

in Opp., 4. In Williams, an elementary-school teacher alleged

defendants allowed “similarly situated” teachers to include

religious expression in their lessons and supplemental handouts,

did not require them to submit their lesson plans and

supplemental materials in advance, and did not limit their

choices in the same way defendants limited plaintiff’s. 

Plaintiff alleged defendants discriminated against him because of

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his religious beliefs in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. Williams, 367 F.Supp.2d at 1270. The court rejected

defendants’ argument that “similarly situated teachers” did not

sufficiently identify the class of persons referred to for an

equal-protection claim, because the allegation was sufficient to

put defendants on notice. 

In both Williams and Kiser v. Naperville, 227 F.Supp.2d 954

(N.D. Ill. 2002), the courts considered the adequacy of notice

provided by allegations that a claim had already arisen. Here,

Wal-Mart’s complaint alleges constitutional deprivations only in

the enactment, not application, of the Ordinance. No as-applied

claim could be asserted when the complaint was filed, as the City

had not taken action on Wal-Mart’s application. Wal-Mart could

have amended the complaint to assert as-applied claims after May

9, 2005, when the Ordinance was applied to deny Wal-Mart’s

Supercenter application, but did not. Wal-Mart’s complaint does

not assert an as-applied challenge to the Ordinance. 

2. Wal-Mart’s Putative As-Applied Challenge to the 

Ordinance

a. Ripeness

Even assuming, arguendo, an as-applied challenge had been

asserted, the City argues Wal-Mart’s putative as-applied

challenge was not ripe because Wal-Mart did not file a “complete”

application for a permit to site a Supercenter in Turlock. Doc.

51, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., 21-24. On April 15,

2005, Wal-Mart filed a revised Supercenter permit application

with the City. Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF #121. This application was

denied on May 9, 2005. Id., Def.’s RSDF #124. The City’s

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February 27, 2006, reply to Wal-Mart’s supplemental memorandum

states the City:

reserves briefing the issues of ripeness and claim

preclusion, as those issues relate to the April

15, 2005, application. Given [] Wal-Mart has not

moved to supplement its complaint to bring facts

relating to that application before the [c]ourt,

it is premature for the City to attempt to address

such claims. Obviously, the City’s March 29,

2005, motion for summary judgment could not and

did not address the question of whether City

staff’s subsequent denial of the April 15, 2005,

application rendered Wal-Mart’s “as-applied”

claims adequately ripe, or whether Wal-Mart should

be excused from appealing staff’s denial to the

Planning Commission or the City Council. 

Doc. 207, Reply to Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 5. 

Wal-Mart contends the City Planning Manager’s denial on May

9, 2005, of Wal-Mart’s April 15, 2005, Supercenter permit

application, and futility of further pursuit of a Supercenter

permit, make ripe its putative as-applied claim. Doc. 204,

Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 3-5. 

Ripeness requirements are imposed only on “as-applied”

challenges, not to facial challenges. A constitutional challenge

to land use regulations is ripe when a property owner or

developer has received the planning commission’s final,

definitive position regarding how it will apply disputed

regulations to the particular land in question. A final decision

by the government agency that inflicts a concrete harm on the

landowner is required. Before a decision is final the landowner

must have submitted one formal development plan and sought a

variance from any regulations barring development in the proposed

plan that have been denied. Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17

F.3d 1227, 1232 (9 Cir. 1994). A landowner may avoid the final th

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decision requirement if attempts to comply with that requirement

would be futile. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567,

569 (9 Cir. 1988). A property owner cannot rely on the th

futility exception until he or she makes at least one meaningful

application. Id. The same ripeness standard applies to takings,

equal protection, and substantive due process claims. Id. 

i. Denial of Wal-Mart’s Supercenter Permit

Application

Between January 1, 2003, and January 26, 2005, Wal-Mart did

not file any application with the City for any development

permit. Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #95. On January 26, 2005, Doucet &

Associates, Inc., an engineering firm, filed documents with the

City on Wal-Mart’s behalf the firm described as “an application

for entitlements for a Wal-Mart Supercenter proposed for

development in Turlock.” Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #96. Defendants

claim the application was incomplete in violation of Turlock

Municipal Code Section 9-5-102, because it did not include a

floor plan, and the City could not determine whether the

Ordinance would permit the proposed development. Id., Pl.’s RSUF

#97; see also id., Pl.’s RSUF #98 (citing City Municipal Code

Section 9-5-102: “An application for a permit . . . shall be

accompanied by maps, drawings, and data as necessary to evaluate

the proposed request for conformance with the General Plan and

the provisions of this chapter”). Wal-Mart alleges the January

26, 2005, application “contained all information required in the

City’s application.” Id., Pl.’s RSUF #97 (response). 

On April 15, 2005, Wal-Mart filed a revised application with

the City. The revised application included revisions of several

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of the documents originally submitted to the City. Doc. 191,

Def.’s RSDF #121. City Planning Manager Michael I. Cooke

responded to Plaintiff’s April 15, 2005, revised application on

May 9, 2005, by letter, stating the “revised application you

provided contains the information I need to determine how the

[O]rdinance applies to your project.” Id., Def.’s RSDF #123. 

Based on the sales floor area figures, the letter states the

project “is defined by [the Ordinance] as a ‘Discount

Superstore.’ Therefore, it is prohibited and I am returning your

application fees herewith.” Id., Def.’s RSDF #124. See Doc.

204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 2. 

ii. Futility Exception

The Turlock Municipal Code provides for administrative

review of the City’s Supercenter permit denial, and a varianceapplication procedure affording administrative review of denials. 

Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., 23. Turlock

Municipal Code Section 1-4-01 provides: 

Any action or decision of the Planning,

Development Engineering, or Building and Safety

Division of Community Development Services may be

appealed to the Planning Commission. Any action

or decision of the Planning Commission may be

appealed to the City Council.

Cooke Decl., Ex. F, 1. Wal-Mart did not appeal, to the Planning

Commission or the City Council, the City Planning Manager’s

denial of its Supercenter permit application. It did not seek a

variance to permit the establishment of a Supercenter in Turlock. 

Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 2. Wal-Mart argues its as-applied

challenge is nonetheless ripe because it was futile either to

appeal the denial or to seek a variance. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp.,

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13-14; Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp, 5-6. 

First, no City decisionmaking body has the authority to

permit a Supercenter in Turlock. Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp.,

5-6. It is undisputed Superstores are “completely prohibited

within the City of Turlock.” Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF #127. 

Second, “the summary judgment record leaves no doubt [] the City

of Turlock . . . is dead set against a Superstore in Turlock.” 

Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 6. Hoehne v. County of San

Benito, 870 F.2d 529 (9 Cir. 1989), reviewed the dismissal for th

lack of ripeness of a suit alleging inverse condemnation and

violations of substantive and procedural due process in the

county’s denial of a development permit. Hoehne, 870 F.2d at

531. Plaintiffs proposed dividing their sixty-acre parcel into

four lots with an average size of fifteen acres per lot, a use

which zoning permitted. Hoehne, 870 F.3d at 530. The county

planning commission nonetheless denied the application. Hoehne,

870 F.3d at 531. Plaintiffs appealed to the county board of

supervisors, who affirmed the denial after a closed meeting. Id.

The county subsequently amended its general plan land-use

designation and zoning maps to impose a forty-acre minimum lot

size on the Hoehne’s parcel. Id. The county’s motion for

summary judgment was granted because the case was not ripe, since

the board’s decision was not final and plaintiffs had not sought

compensation under state law. Id.

The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the “uncontroverted

facts demonstrate [] [the county] had reached a final decision on

[plaintiffs’] application . . . . We are persuaded [] the

[c]ounty has drawn the line, clearly and emphatically, as to the

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sole use to which [plaintiffs’] parcel may ever be put.” Hoehne,

870 F.2d at 533. 

It would have . . . been futile for [plaintiffs]

to seek a conditional use permit or a more

favorable rezoning because in actually rezoning

the tract to further restrict development, the

supervisors themselves sent a clear and, we

believe, final signal announcing their views as to

the acceptable use of the property. [I]t would

have been futile for [plaintiffs] to seek a

[g]eneral [p]lan amendment in their favor, because

the supervisors had amended the [g]eneral [p]lan

in a manner clearly and unambiguously adverse to

the application of the landowners.

Hoehne, 870 F.2d at 535. 

Here, the City amended the Northwest Triangle Specific Plan

by the Ordinance, Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #3, to generally prohibit

discount superstores, and the City admits the Ordinance

absolutely prohibits a Wal-Mart Supercenter in Turlock. The

Ordinance was enacted in direct response to Wal-Mart’s attempt to

establish a Supercenter in Turlock. This is a “clear and

unambiguous” signal of the City’s intention to exclude discount

superstores from Turlock. See Hoehne, 870 F.2d at 535. Any

appeal by Wal-Mart of City Planning Manager Cooke’s denial of the

Supercenter permit application had to be made to the Turlock

Planning Commission and City Council. Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp. of

Mot. for Summ. J., 23. The record establishes such an appeal

would be an idle and futile act. Id. 

Before the futility exception applies, Wal-Mart was required

to submit at least one application for a variance. Manufactured

Home Communities, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1035

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 Wal-Mart claims “[t]he futility exception does not require 2

both a rejected development plan and a variance application; it

requires only one rejected application.” Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem.

in Opp., 3 & n.1 (emphasis omitted) (citing Herrington v. County

of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1496 (9 Cir. 1987) op. amended and th

reh’g denied 857 F.2d 567 (9 Cir. 1988); Hoehne v. County of th

San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 534-35 (9 Cir. 1989)). In both th

Herrington and Hoehne, the Ninth Circuit excused plaintiffs’

failure to apply for a variance because, as here, a variance

could not legally be granted. Herrington, 857 F.2d at 569-70 &

n.2; Hoehne, 870 F.2d at 534-35. 

22

(9 Cir. 2005). 

th 2

It is undisputed Wal-Mart has not applied to the City for a

variance. Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 3-9. Wal-Mart argues

it cannot obtain a variance because: (1) variances cannot be

granted for a use or activity which is not otherwise expressly

authorized by the zoning regulation governing the parcel of

property, Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 5 (citing California

Government Code Section 65906); and (2) a project must be

consistent with any specific plan adopted to further the

objectives of a general plan, and here the Northwest Triangle

Specific Plan, which the Ordinance amended, prohibits discount

Superstores in Turlock, id., 6. 

California Government Code Section 65906 provides:

Variances from the terms of the zoning ordinances

shall be granted only when, because of special

circumstances applicable to the property,

including size, shape, topography, location or

surroundings, the strict application of the zoning

ordinance deprives such property of privileges

enjoyed by other property in the vicinity and

under identical zoning classification.

Any variance granted shall be subject to such

conditions as will assure that the adjustment

thereby authorized shall not constitute a grant of

special privileges inconsistent with the

limitations upon other properties in the vicinity

and zone in which such property is situated.

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A variance shall not be granted for a parcel of

property which authorizes a use or activity which

is not otherwise expressly authorized by the zone

regulation governing the parcel of property. The

provisions of this section shall not apply to

conditional use permits. 

Cal.Gov.Code § 65906 (emphasis added); see also Cooke Decl., Ex.

A (text of Ordinance 1015-CS), 22 (“‘[v]ariance’ shall mean a

permit which grants a property owner relief from development

standards to the zoning regulations of this Code when, because of

[a] particular physical or topographical condition of the

property, compliance would result in undue hardship to the owner

(as distinguished from a mere inconvenience or desire to make

more money)”). 

It is undisputed there are no zoning districts in Turlock

where discount superstores are permitted. Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF

#36; Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF #128. California Government Code

Section 65906 expressly prohibits the City from granting a

variance to Wal-Mart for its application, because a discount

superstore is not an authorized use under any Turlock zone

regulation governing the property. See Milagra Ridge Partners,

Ltd. v. City of Pacifica, 62 Cal.App.4th 108, 118-19 (1998);

Riggs v. City of Oxnard, 154 Cal.App.3d 526, 528-29 (1984). 

Application for a variance is not a legally viable option. See

Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570; Hoehne, 870 F.2d at 535. The

futility exception excuses Wal-Mart from applying for a variance. 

Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570 & n.2. It has not been suggested

that a conditional use permit could have been obtained. 

b. Exhaustion of State Court Mandamus Review

The City further asserts Wal-Mart’s putative as-applied

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challenge is not ripe due to Wal-Mart’s failure to seek judicial

mandamus review of the City’s denial of Wal-Mart’s application

under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5. Doc.

190, Resp. in Supp., 19; Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 9. 

It is well established Section 1983 has no exhaustion-ofstate-remedies requirement. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,

649 (1997); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982);

American Consumer Pub. Ass’n, Inc. v. Margosian, 349 F.3d 1122,

1129 (9 Cir. 2003). There is no exhaustion-of-state-remedies th

requirement for Wal-Mart’s equal-protection, Commerce Clause, or

due-process challenges under Section 1983. 

c. Res Judicata Effect of the Denial of Wal-Mart’s

Application

Wal-Mart’s April 15, 2005, revised application to site a

Wal-Mart Supercenter in Turlock was denied by the City on May 9,

2005. Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF ##121, 123, 124. The City argues

Wal-Mart’s federal causes of action are barred by the res

judicata effect of the City’s denial of Wal-Mart’s application. 

Doc. 190, Resp. in Supp., 19. 

“‘Res judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of a final

judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion,

prevents re-litigation of the same cause of action in a second

suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. 

‘Collateral estoppel,’ or ‘issue preclusion,’ precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. 

Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an

action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be

asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant

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serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of

action.” Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-97

(2002). 

Res judicata may be applied to administrative agency actions

when: (1) an administrative agency acts in a judicial capacity;

(2) resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it; (3)

which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate. 

See Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Federal

Emergency Management Agency, 371 F.3d 701, 708 (9 Cir. 2004). th

If these requirements are satisfied, the federal courts give the

state agency’s decision the same preclusive effect the decision

would have in that state’s courts. Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d

1083, 1086 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Under California law, failure to challenge an agency’s

decision rendered in its judicial capacity entitles that decision

to preclusive effect in all subsequent actions. Johnson v. City

of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 69 (2000). An administrative

agency decision has collateral estoppel effect when the decision

and the agency’s prior proceedings possess a judicial character. 

Indicia of proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity include

a hearing before an impartial decision maker; testimony given

under oath or affirmation; a party’s ability to subpoena, call,

examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary

evidence, and to make oral and written argument; the taking of a

record of the proceeding; and a written statement of reasons for

the decision. Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources

Control Bd., 37 Cal.4th 921, 944 (2006) (citations omitted).

The City Planning Manager was not acting in a quasi-judicial

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capacity when he, for the City, denied Wal-Mart’s Supercenter

permit application without a hearing. The City Planning Manager

denied Wal-Mart’s application after considering only the written

application materials submitted by Wal-Mart on April 15, 2005. 

Doc. 191, Def.’s RSDF ##123, 124. There was no hearing, no

testimony, no opportunity to call or examine witnesses, or any

other indicia of judicial capacity. The City’s denial of WalMart’s application is not entitled to res judicata effect in the

federal courts. FEMA, 371 F.3d at 708. Moreover, the futility

exception excuses Wal-Mart’s failure to pursue state judicial

mandamus. 

d. Statute of Limitations

The City argues Wal-Mart cannot assert an as-applied

challenge to the Ordinance because the limitations period has

expired. Doc. 190, Resp. in Supp., 19; Doc. 207, Reply to Suppl.

Mem. in Opp., 4.

The limitations period for Section 1983 challenges to local

government ordinances is two years. De Anza Properties X, Ltd.

v. County of Santa Cruz, 936 F.2d 1084, 1085 (9 Cir. 1991) th

(citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)); Maldonado v.

Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9 Cir. 2004) cert. denied sub th

nom. Kempton v. Maldonado, 544 U.S. 968 (2005). The Ordinance

was enacted on December 16, 2003, and January 13, 2004. Doc.

165, Pl.’s RSUF #1. The complaint was filed on February 11,

2004. Wal-Mart’s facial and putative as-applied equal-protection

and due-process Section 1983 challenges are timely. 

The City claims Wal-Mart cannot assert an as-applied

Commerce Clause challenge to the Ordinance under Section 1983,

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and consequently any as-applied Commerce Clause challenge is

barred by California Government Code Section 66499.37, which

provides a ninety-day limitations period for as-applied

challenges to denial of development permits. Doc. 207, Reply to

Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 4 (citing Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8

Cal.4th 1, 21-28 (1991)). White Mountain Apache Tribe v.

Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9 Cir. 1984), cited by the City, states th

in dicta that Commerce Clause challenges cannot be brought under

Section 1983. Williams, 810 F.2d at 849 (“[j]ust as the

Supremacy Clause does not secure rights within the meaning of

[Section] 1983, neither does the Commerce Clause”). However,

Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991), holds alleged state

violations of the Commerce Clause may be challenged under Section

1983. Dennis, 493 U.S. at 440; Southwest Air Ambulance, Inc. v.

City of Las Cruces, 268 F.3d 1162, 1177 (10 Cir. 2001). If, th

arguendo, the complaint asserts an as-applied Commerce Clause

challenge to the Ordinance, the challenge is timely and

assertable under Section 1983. 

e. Facial Challenge

The City claims if, arguendo, the complaint asserts an asapplied challenge, the outcome of the facial challenge will

control the result of the as-applied claim because, as Wal-Mart

concedes, the Ordinance left the City no discretion to approve

any Supercenter. Doc. 207, Reply to Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 3.

Wal-Mart states:

The denial of the Wal-Mart application was based

exclusively on the Ordinance, which was intended

to bar Wal-Mart from operating a Supercenter in

Turlock. The Ordinance does not permit any

discretion. It dictates an outright ban on

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Supercenters. 

Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp., 13 (emphasis added); see also Doc.

165, Pl.’s RSUF #105.

Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064 (9 Cir. 2003), holds no as- th

applied challenge can be asserted where a statute grants no

discretion to the administering agency:

As the district court recognized, this is

essentially a facial challenge to the inherently

unequal criteria for moving the IPES Line

contained in the 1987 Plan. The 1987 Plan

enshrined the differential triggering requirements

for the vacant lot equations of California and

Nevada; the Agency had no discretion to deviate

from the Plan’s provisions. In 1999, the Agency

did not apply equal terms unequally – it applied

inherently unequal terms in equal fashion. If the

Association thought the inequality unlawful, its

quarrel was with the terms of the 1987 Plan

itself.

Tahoe Sierra, 322 F.3d at 1080 n.15; see also Levald, Inc. v.

City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 689 (9 Cir. 1993). th

The facial challenge subsumes Wal-Mart’s putative as-applied

challenge as a matter of law, because the Ordinance prohibits the

operation of a Wal-Mart Supercenter in Turlock. 

B. Equal Protection Challenge

1. Fourteenth Amendment 

Wal-Mart argues the Ordinance is unconstitutional on three

grounds: (1) it deprives Wal-Mart of the equal protection of the

laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the California

Constitution, Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 11-30; (2) it discriminates

against interstate commerce, in violation of Article I, Section

8, Clause 3, of the United States Constitution (the “Commerce

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Clause”), id., 31-48; and (3) it is unconstitutionally vague,

id., 48-50. 

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Because the Ordinance involves

social and economic policy, and neither targets a suspect class

nor impinges on a fundamental right, it is reviewed according to

the “rational basis” standard. Rui One Corp. v. City of

Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1156 (9 Cir. 2004) (citing FCC v. th

Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). Under

this test, statutes are generally presumed to be valid and will

be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Fields v.

Legacy Health System, 413 F.3d 943, 955 (9 Cir. 2005). A th

legislative classification under rational basis review must be

wholly irrational to violate equal protection. Id. The

challenger bears the burden of negating every conceivable basis

which might support the legislative classification, whether or

not the basis has a foundation in the record. Id. A legislative

choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based

on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical

data. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315. 

a. Interests Allegedly Served by Ordinance

The City claims as rational bases for the Ordinance: (1) to

maintain Turlock’s neighborhood shopping area structure set forth

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in Turlock’s General Plan, and to avoid (2) increased traffic

impacts and (3) blight that Defendants anticipate a discount

superstore would cause. Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.

J., at 11. 

The City’s General Plan calls for small

neighborhood shopping areas throughout the City

and larger regional shopping areas on the

periphery. The neighborhood shopping areas are

intended to address the daily shopping needs of

residents. The City relies on supermarkets to

serve as anchor tenants for these neighborhood

shopping centers. The neighborhood shopping

centers are intended to cater to daily shopping

needs and are located so as to be easily accessed

by foot or bicycle as well as by car from the

residential areas. They are only intended to draw

their customers from the nearby neighborhoods. 

The large regional shopping areas are intended to

draw their customers from a much larger area and

are not intended for daily shopping. The regional

shopping areas are intended for big-box retail

stores, such as Target, Wal-Mart, or Costco, which

customers will visit [less] frequent[ly]. The

regional shopping areas are located on the

periphery of the City, next to State Route 99, to

provide easier access for customers coming from a

greater distance, not just from Turlock itself,

but also from the larger trade area beyond

Turlock. The Ordinance furthers these General

Plan policies. 

Cooke Decl., ¶ 4. The General Plan was adopted in March 1993 and

revised in June 2002. Id., ¶ 2. The legislative objectives are

broader than only air quality, traffic, and blight, on which WalMart’s complaint focuses. The neighborhood shopping areas’

preservation and the encouragement of foot and bicycle traffic

over automobile use are state legislative objectives in the

findings supporting the Ordinance and were recognized by the

state appeals court. See Wal-Mart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 279. 

The City’s stated concerns about a discount superstore,

which combines general merchandise with an extra-large grocery

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store, inside Turlock are that it would: (1) draw customers away

from the anchoring neighborhood supermarkets, resulting in chainreactive urban blight as they succumb to discount superstore

competition; (2) cause traffic congestion by increasing traffic

flows in streets which were not designed to accommodate high

traffic volume; and (3) increase automobile use and air

pollution. Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 7-18. 

Various independent studies are cited in the Ordinance’s

legislative record: 

• A study commissioned by the City of Oakland shows

the traffic impact of a discount superstore is

greater than the traffic impact of a supermarket,

a discount club, or a discount store. It also

shows discount superstores cause blight and an

increase in air pollution. Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF

#68 (admitted only that this study was entered

into the record). 

• A study by VRPA Technologies, Inc., shows Wal-Mart

Supercenters generate 34.5% more vehicle trips

than had been previously estimated by the

Institute of Transportation Engineers. Id., Pl.’s

RSUF #69 (admitted only that this study was

entered into the record).

• A report for the City of Fremont shows discount

superstores generate more vehicle trips than

discount clubs. Id., Pl.’s RSUF #70 (admitted

only that this study was entered into the record).

• A study by Strategic Economics discusses the store

closures and negative effects on the City of

Fremont’s business district the study stated would

be caused by a discount superstore opening in the

City of Fremont. Id., Pl.’s RSUF #71 (admitted

only that this study was entered into the record).

• A Contra Costa County study shows discount

superstores are likely to cause blight and

increased traffic. Id., Pl.’s RSUF #72 (admitted

only that this study was entered into the record).

• A Mississippi State University study discusses the

economic impacts of discount superstores on

existing businesses. Id., Pl.’s RSUF #73

(admitted only that this study was entered into

the record).

• An Oklahoma City report describes the relationship

between urban blight and Wal-Mart Supercenters. 

Id., Pl.’s RSUF #74 (admitted only that this study

was entered into the record).

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• A Business Week article discusses store closures

caused by Wal-Mart Supercenters. Id., Pl.’s RSUF

#75 (admitted only that this article was entered

into the record). 

b. State Interests Allegedly Served Are Legitimate

Wal-Mart erroneously argues the prevention of urban blight

is not a legitimate state interest. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 18. 

Blight prevention is a legitimate state interest. Hispanic Taco

Vendors of Washington v. City of Pasco, 994 F.2d 676, 679 (9th

Cir. 1993) (Commerce Clause); Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v.

Department of Public Serv. Regulation, 763 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th

Cir. 1985) (“[t]he standard for judging the constitutionality of

a statute . . . which regulates economic activity, is the same

under the . . . [E]qual [P]rotection or [C]ommerce [C]lauses”). 

See also Cuno v. Daimler-Chrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 748 (6th

Cir. 2004) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992)

(“[t]he State has a legitimate interest in local neighborhood

preservation, continuity, and stability”)). The other interests

the City claims the Ordinance promotes are also legitimate state

interests. See Nelson v. City of Selma, 881 F.2d 836, 839 (9th

Cir. 1989) (prevention of traffic congestion); Dodd v. Hood River

County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1229-30 (9 Cir. 1998) (prevention of air th

pollution).

Wal-Mart argues the promotion of domestic business within a

State, by discriminating against foreign corporations that wish

to compete by doing business there, is not a legitimate state

purpose. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 18 (citing Metropolitan Life

Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985)). Turlock’s Ordinance

does not discriminate against foreign corporations. No retailer,

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whether local or foreign, can site a discount superstore in

Turlock. Discount superstores, without regard to the identity of

their owners or operators, are prohibited within Turlock. 

c. The Ordinance is Rationally Related to Legitimate

State Interests

Wal-Mart questions the rationality of the relationship

between the Ordinance and its claimed purposes:

The City’s explanation for the cause of blight or

decay is erroneous. The City has it backwards. 

“Blight” is not caused by new development; rather,

blight results from economic and community

deficiencies which have resulted in a decline in

employment, income, and wealth. The resulting

loss of consumer demand can result in failures of

neighborhood businesses, which may result in

under-maintained or vacant buildings if

appropriate re-tenanting does not occur. In

short, losses of community vitality, and not any

commerical “use,” cause blight. 

Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 19.

It is well established a legislative choice is not subject

to courtroom fact-finding on rational-basis review, and may be

based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or

empirical data. Judicial review is at an end once the court

identifies a plausible basis on which the legislature may have

relied. Rui One Corp., 371 F.3d at 1155; accord, SeaRiver

Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 680

(9 Cir. 2002); Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities th

Comm’n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9 Cir. 1986) th

(“[a]ll that is needed to uphold the state’s classification

scheme is to find that there are ‘plausible,’ ‘arguable,’ or

‘conceivable’ reasons which may have been the basis for the

distinction”); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport

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Authority, 825 F.2d 367, 370 (11 Cir. 1987) (“the federal th

courts do not sit as arbiters of the wisdom or utility” of

economic legislation) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery

Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981)). 

Wal-Mart argues the Ordinance’s distinctions between

discount superstores, which are prohibited, and other retail

formats bears no rational relation to any legitimate interest,

and for that reason the Ordinance is invalid. Doc. 155, Mem. in

Opp., at 19-27. According to Wal-Mart, the City has not offered

a rational explanation of how the Ordinance’s distinctions

advance the City’s stated goals of maintaining neighborhood

shopping areas and proper traffic flows, and minimizing air

pollution and urban blight. Id., 20. “[T]he City must provide a

rational basis for differentiating between Discount Superstores

and other permitted uses.” Id. 

The City sets forth its rational basis for the Ordinance’s

distinctions in the memorandum in support of its motion for

summary judgment:

[S]tudies in the legislative record showed []

Discount Superstores cause more traffic than

Discount Stores, Discount Clubs, or supermarkets,

and this provides a rational basis for prohibiting

them. There was evidence in the record that

people shop for groceries 2-3 times a week – more

often than they visit a Discount Store or a

Discount Club. [citation] Although Discount Clubs

sell groceries, because they sell in bulk, the

number of customer trips is less. [citation]

Although Supermarkets are similar to Discount

Superstores in that they generate more trips per

week than Discount Stores and Discount Clubs, they

do not attract customers from as large a trade

area as Discount Superstores, which because of

their size and the synergy between their

supermarket and discount store components draw

customers from a larger area and therefore cause

more vehicle miles to be driven. [citation] This

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increased traffic also causes more air pollution.

[citation] [¶] The record also included evidence

that competition from a Discount Superstore would

threaten the viability of existing neighborhood

centers by causing the closure of the supermarkets

that anchor those centers, thereby causing blight. 

This also provides a rational basis for

prohibiting Discount Superstores. [citations] With

regard to Turlock specifically, the City Council

received information that one Discount Superstore

opening in Turlock would likely cause two or three

supermarkets to close. [citation] This would mean

two or three neighborhood shopping centers would

lose their anchors and those shopping centers

would then likely slip into decay. 

Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp., 26-27; see also id., 11-13 (quoting

Ordinance Preamble), 13-18 (quoting legislative record). 

The City summarizes its offered rational basis again in its

response in support of the motion for summary judgment:

Evidence in the record shows [] people shop for

groceries two or three times a week, more

frequently than they shop at Discount Stores

(which do not have groceries) or Discount Clubs

(which sell items in bulk and are therefore

visited less frequently). For this reason,

Discount Stores and Discount Clubs cause less

traffic and less air pollution than Discount

Superstores [citing Doc. 51, Mem. in Supp., 26]. 

Evidence in the record also shows [] although

supermarkets attract customers with the same

frequency as a Discount Superstore (each customer

shopping two to three times per week), a Discount

Superstore, because of the synergy between its

supermarket and Discount Store components, draws

customers from over a greater distance, thereby

resulting in more vehicle miles being driven for

each visit, and thereby generating more traffic

and the attendant air pollution than a

supermarket. [citing id.] This rationale also

distinguishes a Discount Superstore from a

supermarket in a shopping center. [¶] Moreover,

because a Discount Superstore draws its customers

from over large distances, and therefore would

draw grocery shoppers from all over the City in a

way [] a regular supermarket would not (thereby

altering local commute patterns), a Discount

Superstore would threaten the viability of the

neighborhood shopping centers that are the core of

the City of Turlock’s General Plan. Extensive

evidence in the record, including evidence of the

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actual experiences of other communities, showed []

for each Discount Superstore that opens, two or

three supermarkets close. Such closures would

threaten the survival of the neighborhood shopping

centers anchored by those supermarkets and would

lead to urban blight. The other classifications

do not have this effect. Other supermarkets (or

shopping centers with supermarkets) do not have

this effect because they do not draw customers

over such large distances and therefore would not

draw customers from more distant supermarkets. 

Discount Stores do not have this effect because

they would not draw grocery shoppers away from the

neighborhood-serving supermarkets. And Discount

Clubs do not have this effect because they sell in

bulk, making them an occasional destination for a

household, and not one that would replace the two

to three shopping trips made on a weekly basis for

groceries. 

Doc. 190, Resp. in Supp., 3-4.

It is well established a legislative choice is not subject

to courtroom fact-finding on rational-basis review, and may be

based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or

empirical data. Judicial review is at an end once the court

identifies a plausible basis on which the legislature may have

relied. Rui One Corp., 371 F.3d at 1155; accord, SeaRiver

Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 680

(9 Cir. 2002). The City’s offered basis for the Ordinance’s th

distinctions is rational. 

Wal-Mart vigorously disputes the City’s rationale for

discount superstores’ adverse impacts on neighborhood centers,

traffic, and air quality. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 21-22. WalMart questions the City’s interpretation of and reliance on the

ITE manual in drafting the Ordinance. Id., 21. Inquiry into the

basis of a legislative choice is sharply limited on rationalbasis review. Rational-basis review in equal-protection analysis

is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or

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logic of legislative choices. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S.

312, 319 (1993) (citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508

U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). Because the court is not a superlegislature that sits in judgment of the wisdom or desirability

of legislative policy, there is a strong presumption that

governmental classifications do not violate the Equal Protection

Clause unless they burden a suspect class or a fundamental

interest. McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 n.7 (9 Cir. th

1991) (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303

(1976)). Rational-basis review does not require the government’s

action actually advance its stated purposes, but merely that the

government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it

did. Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 732 (9 Cir. 2004). th

Here, the City’s legislative objectives are lawful, legitimate,

and protectable under the law. The prohibition of discount

superstores as the means of achieving the state legislative

objective is not irrational. 

d. Allegedly Improper Legislative Motives

Wal-Mart further alleges the Ordinance resulted from

collusion between local economic interests (owners of the

neighborhood grocery stores and union representatives of those

who worked in them) and the Council, acting with the improper

legislative motive of protecting local merchants and unions from

Wal-Mart’s “foreign” competition. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., at 17. 

Wal-Mart alleges Council members opposed Wal-Mart’s plans only

after the Council met with Wal-Mart’s competitors, and shortly

afterwards drafted and passed the Ordinance. Id., 2-11; see WalMart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 302 (“[t]he record demonstrates . . .

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that Wal-Mart’s prospective competitors, and some of its

detractors, . . . lobb[ied] City officials regarding enactment of

the Ordinance”). Even an improper motive, without more, does not

affect constitutional review of legislation: 

According to the Supreme Court, “it is entirely

irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the

conceived reason for the challenged distinction

actually motivated the legislature.” Beach

Communications, 508 U.S. at 315. The First

Circuit has specifically rejected a claim that an

environmental ordinance violated the Equal

Protection Clause because its challengers alleged

that its passage was motivated by a desire to

restrict a business’s power in dealing with

unions. 

Rui One Corp., 371 F.3d at 1155 (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Town

of Jay, 928 F.2d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 1991)).

In International Paper, a paper company sued to invalidate

and enjoin enforcement of a municipal ordinance regulating

emission of pollutants by industries and businesses, including

plaintiff. Int’l Paper, 928 F.2d at 481-82. The company argued

the ordinance unduly restricted its bargaining power in a labor

dispute with striking unions. Int’l Paper, 928 F.2d at 482. The

town’s board of selectmen, most of whom were striking union

employees, authorized the drafting of the ordinance, and proposed

it be put to a public referendum, and it passed. Id. After

ruling the ordinance was a facially valid exercise of the town’s

power to enact economic legislation, the court refused to “delve

into the motivations of the Board members who proposed and

drafted the [o]rdinance”:

[W]hile courts may look to legislators’ motives

where a suspect or quasi-suspect classification is

subjected to discrimination or a fundamental right

is infringed [citations], absent these

circumstances, we will not strike down an

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otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of

an alleged illicit legislative motive. 

Int’l Paper, 928 F.2d at 485. 

Zoning law cannot be used solely to safeguard

local merchants against competition from new

development. But it is also axiomatic that

reviewing courts regard legislative motive as

irrelevant except in cases of heightened scrutiny,

usually involving allegations of discrimination

based on race, gender, or ethnicity. In all other

situations, there are good reasons why courts

should ignore legislative motives. The motives of

official decision-makers are seldom clearly

discernible and could often be easily hidden or

disguised. Most telling of all, to speak of the

“motives” of a legislative body is to attribute

human characteristics to an inanimate construct,

the body politic. It has no motives because it is

not a person.

George Lefcoe, The Regulation of Superstores: The Legality of

Zoning Ordinances Emerging from the Skirmishes Between Wal-Mart

and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 58 Ark. L. Rev.

833, 861 (2006).

Here, the Ordinance neither discriminates on the basis of a

suspect or quasi-suspect classification, nor infringes on a

fundamental right. The Ordinance is rationally related to the

legitimate state interests of preventing traffic congestion and

urban blight, and minimizing air pollution. The Ordinance does

not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. 

2. California Constitution

Wal-Mart also invokes the Equal Protection Clause of Article

I, Section 7, of the California Constitution. 

When the California Supreme Court interprets a provision of

the California Constitution that is similar to a provision of the

United States Constitution, it does not depart from the United

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States Supreme Court’s construction of the similar federal

provision unless given cogent reasons to do so. Edelstein v.

City and County of San Francisco, 29 Cal.4th 164, 168 (2002). 

The standard of review under the California Constitution’s Equal

Protection Clause is the same as that under the United States

Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. See Manduley v. Superior

Court, 27 Cal.4th 537, 572 (2002); Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th

472, 481-82 (2000). The Ordinance is valid under the California

Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause for the same reasons it is

valid under the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection

Clause. 

Wal-Mart argues Hernandez v. City of Hanford, 137

Cal.App.4th 1397 (2006), supports its argument that there was no

rational basis for the Ordinance’s distinction between discount

superstores and equivalent multi-tenant developments. Hernandez

held a zoning amendment that allowed department stores over a

certain size to sell furniture on a limited basis while

prohibiting furniture sales by smaller retailers violated the

smaller retailers’ equal protection rights. The disparate

treatment of the retailers was not rationally related to the

purpose of the amendment. Hernandez, 137 Cal.App.4th at —. The

recent state court Wal-Mart decision distinguished Hernandez for

the reason that “the Ordinance is reasonably related to

furthering a legitimate policy choice for organizing development

within [the] City.” Wal-Mart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 303 n.25. The

fact that “no equal protection claim [was] raised in this case”

was “[a] less important difference.” Id. Here, all are equally

enjoined from establishing a discount superstore in Turlock. No

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valid equal-protection concern is here presented under the state

or federal Constitutions. 

C. Commerce Clause 

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution

provides, in relevant part:

Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate

Commerce ... among the several States. 

U.S. Const. Art. I., § 8, cl. 3. Congress’s authority to

regulate commerce pursuant to the Constitution prohibits the

states from enacting laws which impede the flow of interstate

commerce. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (citing

Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1852)). 

This authority, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, provides

protection from state legislation inimical to the national

commerce even where Congress has not acted. Barclays Bank PLC v.

Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994). The

dormant Commerce Clause “limits the power of the States to erect

barriers against interstate trade.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.

439, 446 (1991). This limitation on state power is not absolute. 

In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, the states

retain authority under their general police powers to regulate

matters of legitimate local concern, although interstate commerce

may be affected. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,

36 (1980); Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9 Cir. th

2005). The Commerce Clause applies to the actions of

municipalities as well as to those of states. On The Green

Apartments LLC v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9 Cir. th

2001). 

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 Professor Tribe summarizes Commerce Clause analysis as 3

follows:

[A] state law must, in the first instance, concern

a legitimate state end. Second, even if they have

a legitimate aim, state regulations that

discriminate against interstate or out-of-state

commerce are subject to rigorous scrutiny that

approaches per se invalidity. Finally, even if a

regulation does not discriminate against

interstate commerce, it must be struck down if the

burden it imposes on interstate commerce is

clearly excessive in relation to the putative

local benefits.

1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-5, pp. 1050-

51 (3d ed. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

42

In reviewing challenges to local regulations under the

Commerce Clause, the Ninth Circuit follows a two-tiered approach:

When a state statute directly regulates or

discriminates against interstate commerce, or when

its effect is to favor in-state economic interests

over out-of-state interests, we have generally

struck down the statute without further inquiry. 

When, however, a statute has only indirect effects

on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly,

we have examined whether the State’s interest is

legitimate and whether the burden on interstate

commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. 

 

S. D. Myers, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d

461, 466 (9 Cir. 2001) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. th

N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). 

3

1. First-Tier Scrutiny: Facial Discrimination Against

Interstate Commerce

a. Exxon

The City relies chiefly on Exxon Corp. v. Governor of

Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), to argue the Ordinance does not

discriminate either facially or in effect against interstate

commerce. There, a Maryland statute provided a producer or

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refiner of petroleum products could not also operate a retail

service station within the state, and had to extend all

“voluntary allowances” uniformly to all service stations it

supplied. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 119-120. Among other claims,

plaintiff asserted the statute violated the Commerce Clause in

three ways: it discriminated against interstate commerce; it

unduly burdened interstate commerce; and it imposed controls on a

commercial activity that is not amenable to state regulation. 

Exxon, 437 U.S. at 120, 125. 

The Court rejected these arguments. First, it held the

Maryland statute “plainly” did not discriminate against

interstate goods or favor local producers or refiners: 

[T]he Act creates no barriers whatsoever against

interstate independent dealers; it does not

prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added

costs upon them, or distinguish between in-state

and out-of-state companies in the retail market. 

The absence of any of these factors fully

distinguishes this case from those in which a

State has been found to have discriminated against

interstate commerce. 

 

Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126. 

Like the Maryland statute in Exxon, Turlock’s Ordinance does

not erect barriers against interstate commerce. The Ordinance

prevents any retailer, whether in-state or out-of-state, from

establishing the discount superstore marketing format in Turlock. 

See Wal-Mart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 302 (“[t]he Ordinance does not

single out Wal-Mart but, instead, prohibits all discount

superstores within [the] City’s boundaries”). This leaves the

market open to all local or foreign retailers of all local or

foreign products, except in the discount superstore format. The

Commerce Clause does not protect the particular structure or

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methods of operation of a retail market. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127. 

Nor does it “give an interstate business the right to conduct its

business in what it considers the most efficient manner,” for

“the Constitution protects the interstate market, not particular

interstate firms.” Valley Bank of Nevada v. Plus System, Inc.,

914 F.2d 1186, 1193 (9 Cir. 1990) (citing Exxon, 437 U.S. at th

127-128). 

The Ordinance does not discriminate against interstate

commerce because any retailer can locate and do business in

Turlock, with any employees or managers, offering any products,

except in the legislatively defined discount superstore format. 

There is no constitutional right to do business in a retailer’s

optimally profitable store configuration, if the resulting

operation burdens environmental, traffic-pattern, economicviability, and land-use-planning interests of the host

municipality. There is no suggestion any out-of-state retailer

cannot successfully do business marketing out-of-state goods in

Turlock if it is not permitted to do so as a discount superstore. 

Wal-Mart disputes the City’s interpretation of Exxon,

arguing such a result is contrary to the holding in Hunt v.

Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Doc.

155, Mem. in Opp., 33. Exxon distinguished Hunt on the grounds

that, in Hunt, “the challenged state statute raised the cost of

doing business for out-of-state dealers” in relation to those

from within the state, and “in various other ways, favored the

in-state dealer in the local market.” Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126. 

Here, the Ordinance deals evenhandedly with in-state and out-ofstate retailers: none may establish a discount superstore in

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Turlock. See Valley Bank, 914 F.2d at 1193 (“[a]n [a]ct that

applies evenhandedly certainly passes muster under the [C]ommerce

[C]lause”). Wal-Mart provides no evidence to show doing business

in its non-discount superstore formats is more costly or

burdensome than the expense of doing business incurred by other

discount and grocery retailers in Turlock, or is otherwise

discriminatory against out-of-state businesses. Compare Hunt,

432 U.S. at 351. 

b. Intention versus Effect

Wal-Mart contends Exxon holds a statute violates the

Commerce Clause if it discriminates against interstate commerce

in either intention or effect. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., at 32. 

This overstates Exxon’s holding, which focused on the effects of

the statute, not the alleged motives of those who enacted it. 

Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125-128; see also Healy v. Beer Institute, 491

U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (“critical inquiry” is whether the practical

effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond boundaries

of state); Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S.

641, 654-655 (1994) (Commerce Clause analysis focuses on whether

the challenged statute is discriminatory in effect); Gerling

Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 746

(9 Cir. 2001) (Commerce Clause seeks to prevent th

extraterritorial economic effects, not purposes). Alliance of

Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 36 (1 Cir. 2005) notes: st

there is some reason to question whether a showing

of discriminatory purpose alone will invariably

suffice to support a finding of constitutional

invalidity under the dormant Commerce Clause. See

Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther,

Constitutional Law 275 (15th ed. 2004)

(recognizing the analytical difficulty that arises

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because “a law motivated wholly by protectionist

intent might fail to produce significant

discriminatory effects”).

Gwadosky, 430 F.3d at 36 n.3; see also United States v. O’Brien,

391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (effects, not motives, determine whether

an exercise of legislative power is constitutional); Palmer v.

Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (same); Note, 119 Harv. L.

Rev. 258, 265-66 (2005) (focus on legislative motives unique to

Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Susan E. Stokes & Christy

Anderson Brekken, The Eighth Circuit Grants Corporate Interests a

New Weapon Against State Regulation in South Dakota Farm Bureau

v. Hazeltine, 49 S.D. L. Rev. 795, 800-801 (2003-2004) (“[t]he

Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have stated in dicta that a

discriminatory purpose can trigger strict scrutiny, but in no

case has discriminatory purpose alone been sufficient”). 

In no Commerce Clause case cited or disclosed by research

has a statute or regulation been invalidated solely because of

the legislators’ alleged discriminatory motives. For example, in

Bacchus Imports the Court stated:

A finding that state legislation constitutes

“economic protectionism” may be made on the basis

of either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory

effect[.] 

Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 270 (citations omitted). However,

the Bacchus Imports Court did not hold the statute was

unconstitutional solely because of its intended purpose:

“[l]ikewise, the effect of the exemption is clearly

discriminatory[.]” Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 271. Bacchus

Imports cited Hunt for the proposition that a state statute may

be invalidated based on its apparent purpose. Bacchus Imports,

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468 U.S. at 270. However, Hunt does not stand for the

proposition that alleged discriminatory purpose alone will

invalidate a statute. See Hunt, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977) (“[a]s

the [d]istrict [c]ourt correctly found, the challenged statute

has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate sales

of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them”)

(emphasis added).

c. Practical Effect 

The Ordinance is facially neutral. No retailer, whether instate or out-of-state, can establish a discount superstore in

Turlock. 

i. The Ordinance Does not Prohibit Any

Retailer’s Operations

Wal-Mart argues the Ordinance discriminates against

interstate commerce in practical effect because “only out-ofstate companies, such as [P]laintiffs, are affected by the

Ordinance,” and the Ordinance “prohibits the operations” of outof-state businesses like Wal-Mart. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp, at 45. 

This is not true; here, no company, whether in-state or out-ofstate, can establish a discount superstore in Turlock. The

Ordinance does not prohibit any local or foreign retailer from

selling any local or foreign goods using any marketing format

other than the discount superstore. The Commerce Clause does not

protect retail formats. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127. Wal-Mart

continues to operate a Wal-Mart store in Turlock. Doc. 165,

Pl.’s RSUF #101. 

ii. Disparate Impact

Wal-Mart argues the Ordinance discriminates against

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interstate commerce in practical effect because:

Only Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target have specific

formats consisting of stores in excess of 100,000

square feet of gross floor area with more than 5%

of the sales floor area devoted to the sale of

non-taxable merchandi[s]e. Importantly, none of

the above retailers [is] incorporated within the

State of California, or maintain their princip[al]

place of business within the State. In contrast,

the four local supermarkets which the Ordinance

seeks to protect . . . are all local, California

companies. All four supermarket operators

maintain their princip[al] place of business only

a short distance from Turlock. The Ordinance

therefore has no effect on existing local grocers,

while the only interests burdened are located

out[]of[]state.

Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 44-45. An analogous argument was

rejected in Exxon:

No facial inequality exists; [Sections] (b) and

(c) preclude all refiners and producers from

marketing gasoline at the retail level. But given

the structure of the retail gasoline market in

Maryland, the effect of [Sections] (b) and (c) is

to exclude a class of predominantly out-of-state

gasoline retailers while providing protection from

competition to a class of nonintegrated retailers

that is overwhelmingly composed of local

businessmen.

Exxon, 437 U.S. at 137 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Wal-Mart’s

argument that the Ordinance can be invalidated because of the

Council’s alleged discriminatory motives, Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp.,

46, has already been rejected. 

iii. Discrimination Against Goods in Interstate

Commerce

Wal-Mart argues the Ordinance discriminates against

interstate commerce in practical effect because “the evidence

demonstrates [] the Ordinance was enacted to protect local

producers and suppliers of goods from having to compete with outof-state goods sold by Wal-Mart. For example, Councilperson

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Lazar testified [] he saw it as a ‘negative’ that, unlike locally

based supermarkets, the suppliers to Wal-Mart would not be local,

and that ‘Wal-Mart ships everything in from other communities.’” 

Id., 37, 48 (poultry). No evidence is furnished to show that

retail marketing format affects wholesale or retail poultry

prices in a way that discriminates against out-of-state

producers. No evidence is offered to show Wal-Mart’s national

scope and size afford it any less purchasing power to obtain

advantageous wholesale prices from in- or out-of-state producers

or suppliers of poultry or any other products, that are not

explained by market forces having nothing to do with the

marketing format in which Wal-Mart operates in a given community. 

The Ordinance does not prevent Wal-Mart from acquiring poultry

products or goods from anywhere in the United States or abroad at

the best prices obtainable. 

Exxon holds: 

If the effect of a state regulation is to cause

local goods to constitute a larger share, and

goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a

smaller share, of the total sales in the market –

as in Hunt [v. Washington State Apple Advertising

Comm’n], 432 U.S. [333,] 347 [] and Dean Milk [Co.

v. City of Madison], 340 U.S. [349,] 354 [] – the

regulation may have a discriminatory effect on

interstate commerce. 

Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126 n.16. 

In Hunt, a North Carolina statute required all closed

containers of apples sold, offered for sale, or shipped into the

state to bear “no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or

standard.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 335. The statute effectively

prohibited the display of Washington State apple grades on

containers of apples originating in Washington State. Id.

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Washington State’s grading system was “the equivalent of, or

superior to,” the grades and standards adopted by the United

States Department of Agriculture, due to “a stringent, mandatory

inspection program, administered by [Washington State’s]

Department of Agriculture.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 336. The Court

found the statute had “the practical effect of not only burdening

interstate sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating

against them.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350. The statute accomplished

this in three ways: (1) it raised the Washington apple growers’

costs of doing business in North Carolina relative to their North

Carolina counterparts’ by forcing the Washington apple growers to

alter their packaging in order to sell in North Carolina,

something no North Carolina apple grower had to do, Hunt, 432

U.S. at 351; (2) it “stripp[ed] away from the Washington apple

industry the competitive and economic advantages it has earned

for itself through its expensive inspection and grading system,”

id.; and (3) it allowed inferior North Carolina apples to be

placed in the same category with superior Washington apples, and

“[s]uch downgrading offers the North Carolina apple industry the

very sort of protection against competing out-of-state products

that the Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit,” Hunt, 432

U.S. at 352. All these effects would have reduced the share of

Washington apples in the North Carolina market. Hunt, 432 U.S.

at 347; Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126 n.16. 

Like the Maryland statute in Exxon, and unlike the North

Carolina statute in Hunt, Turlock’s Ordinance does not increase

the cost of doing business for out-of-state businesses relative

to their local competitors. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126

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(distinguishing Hunt). The Ordinance does not impose added costs

on Wal-Mart, or any other out-of-state retailer, to establish a

retail outlet in Turlock. The statute does not downgrade or

discriminate against any out-of-state product. Nor does the

Ordinance by its own operation have any effect on the share of

local goods compared with out-of-state goods in the local market:

even if, arguendo, Wal-Mart Supercenters are stocked with more

out-of-state goods than are Wal-Mart’s other retail formats, this

is Wal-Mart’s choice, and is not dictated by the Ordinance. Id. 

In Dean Milk, the Court struck down a Madison, Wisconsin,

ordinance that prohibited the sale within the city of pasteurized

milk unless bottled at an approved pasteurization plant five

miles or less from Madison’s central square. Dean Milk, 340 U.S.

at 350, 353. The ordinance effectively prevented plaintiff, an

Illinois milk distributor, from selling milk in Madison. Dean

Milk, 340 U.S. at 352. The Court held:

In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a

major local industry against competition from

without the State, Madison plainly discriminates

against interstate commerce.

Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354.

Here, the Turlock Ordinance erects no “economic barrier”

against out-of-state goods. The Ordinance does not prohibit WalMart from stocking its existing Turlock discount store with goods

from anywhere in the world. The Ordinance does not limit WalMart’s choice of producers, processors, or suppliers. 

Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), abrogated an

Oklahoma law requiring in-state coal-fired electric generating

plants to burn a mixture including at least ten percent OklahomaCase 1:04-cv-05278-OWW -DLB Document 219 Filed 07/03/06 Page 51 of 65
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mined coal. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455:

[T]he Act expressly reserves a segment of the

Oklahoma coal market for Oklahoma-mined coal, to

the exclusion of coal mined in other States. Such

a preference for coal from domestic sources cannot

be characterized as anything other than

protectionist and discriminatory, for the Act

purports to exclude coal mined in other States

based solely on its origin. 

Id. The Turlock Ordinance does not set a minimum quantity of instate or local goods in Wal-Mart’s Turlock stores. The Ordinance

does not prohibit Wal-Mart from supplying the discount store it

currently operates in Turlock entirely from out-of-state

suppliers, nor require all or any portion of goods stocked for

sale to be in-state. The Ordinance does not discriminate against

the movement of goods in interstate commerce. 

iv. Heightened Costs for Out-of-State Operators

Atlantic Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F.Supp 893 (E.D. N.Y.

1989), cited by Wal-Mart, Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 36, held

unlawful a New York statute that prohibited commercial fishing in

vessels which were longer than ninety feet. Atlantic Prince, 710

F.Supp. at 894. The statute was “clearly neutral on its face,”

but nevertheless failed first-tier scrutiny because it

discriminated against interstate commerce in “practical effect.” 

Atlantic Prince, 710 F.Supp. at 895-96.

Like the City, the State argued its legislation was not

discriminatory because it applied evenhandedly to all: the

statute “prohibit[ed] all commercial fishers, regardless of state

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origin, from using boats over 90 feet long to catch food fish in

New York waters.” Atlantic Prince, 710 F.Supp. at 895. The

court found, however, the statute was discriminatory in practical

effect, because it “b[ore] disproportionately . . . on out-ofstate fishers.” Atlantic Prince, 710 F.Supp. at 896 (citing

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76

(1981)):

At the time [the statute] was enacted . . . there

was, at most, only one New York commercial fishing

vessel exceeding 90 feet in length. [citation] In

contrast, this year the [administering state

agency] has received [] applications for New York

fishing licenses from ten out-of-state vessels

over 90 feet in length (including plaintiff’s). 

Atlantic Prince, 710 F.Supp. at 897. The ultimate effect was to

keep larger out-of-state fishing boats out of New York waters,

while permitting all but one New York commercial fishing boats to

operate. 

Unlike the New York statute, the Turlock Ordinance does not

deny out-of-state interests (as Wal-Mart claims it is, Doc. 155,

Mem. in Opp., 38-40) access to Turlock’s market. See Ampro

Fisheries, Inc. v. Yaskin, 606 A.2d 1099, 1105 (N.J. 1992)

(distinguishing Atlantic Prince). Owners of fishing vessels more

than ninety feet long had to purchase smaller boats or be

excluded from New York waters. This cost fell disproportionately

on out-of-state interests, because all New York fishing boats,

except one, were smaller than ninety feet long. See Exxon, 437

U.S. at 126. By contrast, although evidence submitted shows that

only Wal-Mart and Super K-Mart use the discount superstore format

as defined by the Ordinance, Wal-Mart now operates, and both

merchants are free to operate, in discount and smaller retail

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formats. Here, the Ordinance does not impose any extra cost on

out-of-state interests. Wal-Mart has not established a discount

superstore in Turlock that the Ordinance will shut down; Wal-Mart

already operates a discount store in Turlock. There is no

evidence Wal-Mart’s discount store is not profitable, or that the

Ordinance will in any way interfere with its continued successful

operation. Wal-Mart does not show it cannot successfully operate

in any format except as a discount superstore. The Ordinance

prevents Wal-Mart from using its favored retail format in

Turlock; all other formats remain available to it. See Exxon,

437 U.S. at 127; Valley Bank, 914 F.2d at 1193. The Ordinance

does not discriminate against interstate commerce either facially

or in practical effect.

2. Second-Tier Scrutiny: Pike

Wal-Mart argues, Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 46, there is a

triable issue of fact under the second tier of Commerce Clause

analysis:

When . . . a statute has only indirect effects on

interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we

have examined whether the State’s interest is

legitimate and whether the burden on interstate

commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. 

S. D. Myers, Inc., 253 F.3d at 466. This balancing test was

first set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142

(1970). Under Pike, if a legitimate local purpose is found, then

the question becomes one of degree. The extent of the burden

that will be tolerated depends on the nature of the local

interest involved. Even in dormant Commerce Clause analysis,

however, the Supreme Court has frequently admonished courts

should not second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers

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concerning the utility of legislation. For a facially neutral

statute to violate the Commerce Clause, the burdens of the

statute must so outweigh the putative benefits as to make the

statute unreasonable or irrational. S.D. Myers, Inc., 253 F.3d

at 471. A challenge to the legislative judgment must establish

that the legislative facts on which the classification is

apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by

the governmental decision-maker. Spoklie, 411 F.3d at 1059

(quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, Inc., 449 U.S. 456,

464 (1981)). 

Here, the Ordinance’s putative benefits – avoidance of

traffic congestion, prevention of urban blight, minimization of

air pollution, and preservation of land-use objectives as to

location and character of economic zones within Turlock – are not

so outweighed by any burden on interstate commerce as to render

the Ordinance unreasonable or irrational. Wal-Mart has provided

nothing to suggest the Ordinance imposes any disparate or other

burden upon interstate commerce. 

Wal-Mart cites Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50 (1 Cir. st

2005). Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 34. In Walgreen, plaintiff

challenged a Puerto Rico law requiring pharmacies to obtain a

“certificate of need” prior to opening a new pharmacy. Walgreen,

405 F.3d at 52-53. Once an applicant applied to the Secretary of

Health for a certificate, notice of the new pharmacy’s

application had to be sent to all “affected persons,” including

existing pharmacies within a one-mile radius of the new store. 

Existing pharmacies regularly objected to the proposed stores,

which, by virtue of simply filing an objection, could hold up the

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development of the new stores for years. Walgreen, 405 F.3d at

53-54. This legislation violated the Commerce Clause by

discriminating against interstate commerce in purpose and effect. 

The court rejected Puerto Rico’s argument that the law applied

neutrally to both in-state and out-of-state companies. Walgreen,

405 F.3d at 56-58. The legislature exempted existing pharmacies

when it enacted the statute in 1979. At that time, 92% of

existing pharmacies were locally owned, compared with 94% in

2001. Additionally, 

[o]ver fifty percent of out-of-Commonwealth

entities have been forced to undergo the entire

administrative process compared to less than

twenty-five percent of local applicants. Of those

applicants forced to endure the hearing process,

the Secretary has granted certificates to ninety

percent of the local applicants but only to fiftyeight percent of out-of-Commonwealth applicants. 

Id. The court also found, “in practice, the Act permits an

existing pharmacy to object simply because it fears additional

competition.” Id. 

In Walgreen, evidence showed the Act favored local

pharmacies over out-of-Commonwealth pharmacies: the great

majority of local pharmacies were locally owned, and so any

competition seeking market entry was likely to be from outside

Puerto Rico; and the Act’s procedural obstacles to market entry

operated most often against foreign applicants. Here, the

Ordinance treats all retailers the same, whether they are foreign

or local: none may establish a discount superstore in Turlock. 

Foreign companies whose sole business was operating pharmacies

were prevented by the Act from doing so in Puerto Rico. Here,

the Ordinance does not prohibit Wal-Mart or any other retailer

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from operating in Turlock in any retail format other than the

discount superstore; unlike the Puerto Rico Act, the Ordinance

does not protect any existing retailer. There is no evidence any

local or out-of-state discount superstore has even done business

in Turlock. No existing discount superstore’s business is

protected by the Ordinance. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127; Valley

Bank, 914 F.2d at 1193 (citing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127-128). 

Wal-Mart argues Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Jim’s Motorcycle,

Inc., 401 F.3d 560 (4 Cir. 2003), shows the City’s reliance on th

Exxon is misplaced. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 35. In Yamaha, a

Virginia statute allowed any existing franchised motorcycle

dealer to protest the establishment of a new dealership for the

same motorcycle brand anywhere in the Commonwealth. Yamaha, 401

F.3d at 563. The statute’s second paragraph provided in relevant

part:

No new or additional motorcycle dealer franchise

shall be established in any county, city or town

unless the manufacturer [or] distributor . . .

gives advance notice to any existing franchised

dealers of the same line-make. The notice shall

be in writing and sent . . . at least forty-five

days prior to the establishment of the new or

additional franchise. Any existing franchise

dealer may file a protest within thirty days of

the date the notice is received. The burden of

proof in establishing inadequate representation of

such line-make motorcycles shall be on the

manufacturer [or] distributor[.]

Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 563-64. The second paragraph expanded the

economic protection given to motorcycle dealers by the statute’s

first paragraph, which authorized protests of new dealerships

only within an existing dealer’s “relevant market area,” defined

as a seven- to twenty-mile radius around the existing dealer,

depending on population density. Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 563. 

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The Commonwealth sought to justify the added protection on

the grounds that, 

in contrast to automobile dealerships, which make

roughly ninety-five percent of their sales within

a twenty-mile radius, motorcycle dealerships,

which are fewer [ ], typically sell within a

forty-mile radius. Moreover, the [s]econd

[p]aragraph was enacted at a time of record

motorcycle sales nationwide. Many dealerships

were complaining to manufacturers that they were

not sufficiently supplied with the top-selling

models, and there is some evidence that the

[s]econd [p]aragraph also aims to avert any

reduction in production allocation for existing

motorcycle dealerships. 

Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 564. 

Yamaha sued the Virginia DMV Commissioner and a protesting

dealer in federal court seeking a declaration that the second

paragraph violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Yamaha, 401 F.3d

at 565. The district court upheld the statute, and the Fourth

Circuit reversed. The Fourth Circuit ruled the second paragraph

was neutral on its face, and had a legitimate general purpose:

“to protect existing motorcycle dealers in Virginia from unfair

practices by manufacturers (regardless of their location) in the

establishment of new dealerships.” Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 568. The

court then turned to the Pike balancing test:

A statute that does not discriminate against

interstate commerce may still be struck down under

Pike balancing if “the burden imposed on such

commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the

putative local benefits. If a legitimate local

purpose is found, then the question becomes one of

degree.”

Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 569 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 

Although, like the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit

normally defers to legislative determinations of “legitimate

local purpose” and “putative local benefits,” id. (citing CTS

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Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92-93 (1987)),

“[t]he unnecessary and excessive breadth of the [s]econd

[p]aragraph persuad[ed]” the court “that the statute’s burdens

clearly exceed its benefits,” Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 573:

As for benefits, the district court could only

approximate that “some number of existing

dealers,” who are outside the relevant market area

protected by the First Paragraph but “serve the

geographic market area of a hypothetical

prospective dealer in a not insignificant way,”

might receive some protection on their investment

and advertising “should the hypothetical dealer

actually open.” Weighed against this weak benefit

is a substantial burden, a barrier to market

entry, that is unparalleled in scope. The

Commonwealth has erected this barrier in the

absence of evidence that protection in the form of

statewide protest rights for every motorcycle

dealer was needed. The Commonwealth’s only

explanation for expanding the protection afforded

by the First Paragraph is that motorcycle

dealerships tend to sell within a forty-mile

radius, which is beyond the First Paragraph’s

“relevant market” protection of a radius up to

twenty miles. The Second Paragraph, of course,

did not limit protest rights to dealers within a

forty-mile radius of a proposed dealership; it

imposed no limit at all. The Pike inquiry

requires us to consider whether the Second

Paragraph’s benefits could have been achieved with

a less restrictive alternative. We conclude that

it could have. The Second Paragraph could have

imposed some rational geographic limit on protest

rights, but it did not. Under the Second

Paragraph as it stands, an existing dealer at one

end of Virginia can protest a proposed dealership

some 500 miles away at the other end of the state. 

That is overreaching in the extreme. If we were

to uphold the blanket statewide protection of the

Second Paragraph, we would be giving Virginia the

green light to extend similar protection to

automobile dealers and franchisees of other

product lines, thereby turning Virginia into an

island of economic protectionism. 

Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 573-74.

Here, the Ordinance’s putative benefits are much more

substantial, and its burdens on interstate commerce much less,

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than the Virginia statute’s. Unlike the Commonwealth in Yamaha,

the City has provided evidence that the Ordinance will serve the

legitimate goals of maintaining neighborhood shopping areas and

proper traffic flows, and minimizing air pollution and urban

blight. See Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF ##68-75. The state court in

Wal-Mart held:

[T]he police power empowers cities to control and

organize development within their boundaries as a

means of serving the general welfare. [The] City

legitimately chose to organize the development

within its boundaries using neighborhood shopping

centers dispersed throughout the city. The

Ordinance is reasonably related to protecting that

development choice.

Wal-Mart, 138 Cal.App.4th at 303. A local legislative choice to

protect land-use-planning goals and the environment, and to

minimize urban blight, is entitled to deference from the courts. 

See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987);

Spoklie, 411 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf

Creamery, Inc., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)).

Unlike the Commonwealth statute, the Turlock Ordinance

erects no barrier to market entry. The Ordinance does not

prevent Wal-Mart, or any other retailer, from doing business and

competing in Turlock against the existing stores. There is no

showing that doing business in neighbor retail, discount store,

or discount club formats in any way burdens Wal-Mart more than

any other retailer, whether local or foreign. Though Wal-Mart’s

favored form of retail store, the discount superstore, is

prohibited in Turlock, this form is prohibited to all retailers

alike, and the dormant Commerce Clause does not protect the

particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market. 

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See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127. There is no evidence any discount

superstore has even been located in Turlock, so none is

protected. Nor is there any evidence of any measurable burden on

interstate commerce. Absent a burden, or even if arguendo two

retailers cannot use the discount superstore format, no Pike

balancing weighs against the Ordinance. There is no need for

further evidence for additional Pike balancing. Turlock’s

Ordinance is valid under the Commerce Clause. 

D. Void for Vagueness

Wal-Mart argues the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague

and ambiguous. Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 48-50. 

The fundamental problem with the Ordinance in

terms of vagueness is that it allows the City to

take whatever position it wants regarding grocery

uses. While the Ordinance was specifically

targeted toward Wal-Mart, it vests in the City

absolute discretion to allow similar uses for

favored retailers. Thus, although the City has

prohibited the planned Supercenter, the Ordinance

could be read to allow any other comparably-sized

grocery store. 

Id.

It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is

void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. 

Vague laws that do not infringe upon First Amendment rights have

two principal evils: (1) they do not give a person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,

so that he or she may act accordingly; and (2) they encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by not providing

explicit standards for policemen, judges, and juries. United

States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 941-42 (9 Cir. 2006). If th

a statute is not sufficiently clear to provide guidance to

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citizens concerning how they can avoid violating it and to

provide authorities with principles governing enforcement, the

statute is invalid. Vagueness challenges to statutes that do not

involve First Amendment violations must be examined as applied to

defendant. If Wal-Mart’s actions clearly fall within the

statute, it cannot make a void for vagueness challenge. Id.

The complaint does not assert an as-applied challenge to the

Ordinance. See Order, supra, 12-16. Even assuming, arguendo,

the complaint asserts an as-applied challenge, the challenge must

fail because the Ordinance clearly prohibits Wal-Mart from

establishing a Wal-Mart Supercenter in Turlock. See Doc. 165,

Pl.’s RSUF #105 (there is no uncertainty as to whether the

Ordinance prohibits Wal-Mart from operating a Wal-Mart

Supercenter in Turlock); see also Doc. 204, Suppl. Mem. in Opp.,

13. 

Finally, the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague. 

Wal-Mart argues:

The fundamental problem with the Ordinance in

terms of vagueness is that it allows the City to

take whatever position it wants regarding grocery

uses. While the Ordinance was specifically

targeted toward Wal-Mart, it vests in the City

absolute discretion to allow similar uses for

favored retailers. Thus, although the City has

prohibited the planned Supercenter, the Ordinance

could be read to allow any other comparably-sized

grocery store. 

Doc. 155, Mem. in Opp., 48-50.

This is a horrible that need not be paraded. Wal-Mart

misreads the Ordinance. The Ordinance specifically defines

“Discount Superstore”: 

a store that is similar to a “Discount Store” . .

. with the exception that [it] also contain[s] a

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full-service grocery department under the same

roof that shares entrances and exits with the

discount store area. Such retail stores exceed

100,000 square feet of gross floor area and devote

at least five percent (5%) of the total sales

floor area to the sale of non-taxable merchandise.

. . . These stores usually offer a variety of

customer services, centralized cashing, and a wide

range of products. They typically maintain long

store hours seven (7) days a week. The stores are

often the only ones on the site, but they can also

be found in mutual operation with a related or

unrelated garden center or service station. 

Discount superstores are also sometimes found as

separate parcels within a retail complex with

their own dedicated parking.

Doc. 165, Pl.’s RSUF #32. See also Ordinance No. 1016 (set forth

in Cooke Decl., Ex. B, 6). The absolute size of a given store is

not the sole determinant; rather, the critical factor for the

Ordinance is the percentage of floor space devoted to the sale of

grocery items (“non-taxable merchandise”). On this point, the

Ordinance is specific and unambiguous: a discount store larger

than 100,000 square feet, at least five percent of which (i.e.,

5,000 square feet) is devoted to the sale of groceries, is

defined as a “Discount Superstore,” and may not be established in

Turlock. 

Wal-Mart argues:

if the City received an application from a favored

local grocer for a 100,001-square-foot “grocery

store,” the Ordinance would permit the City to

make whatever classification it wanted.

Id. If by “grocery store” Wal-Mart means a store that sells only

groceries (non-taxable items), the Ordinance does not prohibit a

grocery store larger than 100,000 square feet within Turlock. A

“Discount Superstore” is a “Discount Store” larger than 100,000

square feet, where at least five percent of the floor space is

devoted to grocery sales. A “Discount Store” “offers a variety

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of customer services, centralized cashing, and a wide range of

products.” A store that sells only groceries cannot qualify as a

“Discount Store” because it does not sell a “wide range of

products,” and cannot for that reason be a “Discount Superstore.” 

Moreover, Wal-Mart’s example applies to a farmers market that

could encompass a much larger area. The alleged political favor

or disfavor in which an applicant is held does not determine its

success, under the Ordinance. The Ordinance is not void for

vagueness. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The Ordinance violates none of Wal-Mart’s constitutional or

other rights. For the foregoing reasons:

(1) The City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Wal-Mart’s facial challenges to the Ordinance under the Equal

Protection Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution (Wal-Mart’s first and third claims for relief), the

Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution (second

claim for relief), and as to Wal-Mart’s void-for-vagueness due

process claim (fourth claim for relief); Wal-Mart has not

asserted as-applied challenges to the Ordinance in the complaint. 

(2) The City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Wal-Mart’s fifth claim for relief, because the City did not

deprive Wal-Mart of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

(3) The City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Wal-Mart’s sixth claim for relief, because the Ordinance does not

violate the Equal Protection Clause of the California

Constitution, or the Equal Protection Clause or Commerce Clause,

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of the United States Constitution, and is not unconstitutionally

vague. 

(4) The City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Wal-Mart’s seventh claim for relief; no bases for injunctive

relief exist because the Ordinance does not infringe Wal-Mart’s

constitutional or other rights.

Judgment shall be entered for Defendants, the CITY, against

Plaintiff, WAL-MART. The CITY shall submit a proposed judgment

within five (5) days following service of this decision by the

clerk. 

SO ORDERED

DATED: July _3__, 2006.

_/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER_______

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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