Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01097/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01097-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Upon screening, the Court dismissed 21 other named Defendants (Doc. #5).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward Charles Johnson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-1097-PHX-MHM (GEE)

ORDER

Plaintiff Edward Charles Johnson brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Ball, a Correctional Officer (CO) IV with the Arizona Department of

Corrections (ADC) (Doc. #1).1

 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim (Doc. #22). Plaintiff

failed to respond. 

The Court will grant Defendant’s motion. 

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claim arose during his confinement at the Arizona State Prison ComplexLewis Barchey Unit (Doc. #1 at 1). Plaintiff alleged that in response to his grievances,

Defendant attempted to endanger Plaintiff’s personal safety by forcing Plaintiff to enter ADC

protective custody (id. at 4). Plaintiff claimed that Defendant knew that Plaintiff’s safety

would be in danger in protective custody, yet displayed malice in forcing the protective

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The Court dismissed Counts I, III, and IV for failure to state a claim (Doc. #5).

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custody assignment. He further claimed that another officer—CO III Martyn—placed

Plaintiff in danger after he filed a grievance and Defendant failed to take action in response

to Martyn’s actions (id.).2

 

The Court screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and ordered service on Defendant (Doc. #5).

Defendant filed an Answer (Doc. #9), and the Court issued a Scheduling Order (Doc. #10).

Then, on March 4, 2009, Defendant filed her Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim (Doc. #22). 

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Defendant’s Contentions

In her motion, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

(id.). In support, Defendant submits the affidavit of CO III Golder, the Barchey Unit

Grievance Coordinator (id., Ex. A, Golder Aff. ¶¶ 1-2). Golder explained that the ADC

inmate grievance system is governed by Department Order (DO) 802—Inmate Grievance

System (id. ¶ 5; Attach. 1). Golder attested that a copy of DO 802 is available to inmates in

each prison unit’s library (id. ¶ 7). Golder stated that under DO 802, inmates may grieve

issues related to among other things, staff, visitation, mail, institutional procedures, medical

care, and conditions of confinement (id. ¶ 6). 

Golder described the steps in a staff grievance: (1) within 10 days of a specific

problem, an inmate submits an inmate letter to his assigned CO III to attempt to informally

resolve the complaint; (2) if the inmate is not satisfied with the CO III’s response, he may

file a formal grievance to the Grievance Coordinator, in which he must describe his attempt

at informal resolution; (3) the Grievance Coordinator logs the staff grievance and then

forwards it to the Warden, Deputy Warden, or Administrator for review and response; (4) if

the inmate is not satisfied with the response, he may submit a grievance appeal to the ADC

Director, whose response is final (id. ¶ 8). 

Golder attested that the Grievance Coordinator maintains a record of all processed and

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unprocessed inmate grievances (id. ¶ 10). According to Golder, a review of the Barchey Unit

grievance records reflects that since his confinement began in February 2008, Plaintiff filed

three inmates letters: (1) one dated March 28, 2008, which complained about the conduct of

CO III Martyn (id. ¶ 14); (2) one dated April 7, 2008, which addressed three separate issues

in violation of DO 802’s policy limiting each inmate letter to one issue (id. ¶ 16); and (3) one

dated April 30, 2008, which claimed that Golder violated Plaintiff’s civil rights in his

capacity as a Grievance Coordinator (id. ¶ 17). 

Golder stated that Plaintiff filed just one inmate grievance on April 23, 2008 (id. ¶ 18).

This inmate grievance claimed that Defendant failed to take action in response to the abuse

of authority, unprofessionalism, and threat to personal safety that arose from CO III Martyn’s

conduct (id. ¶ 12). Golder explained that in this grievance, Plaintiff failed to provide any

documentation of his attempts at informal resolution, i.e. a copy of his inmate letter (id.).

Golder stated that because Plaintiff failed to complete the first step and provide a copy of his

inmate letter and because more than 10 days had passed since the date of the subject incident,

he returned Plaintiff’s grievance as “unprocessed” on April 25 (id.). 

Defendant argues that because Plaintiff failed to follow the procedural rules with

respect to the single grievance concerning Defendant—the April 23, 2008

grievance—Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his available administrative remedies and his

claim should be dismissed (Doc. #22 at 6). Defendant further argues that even if Plaintiff’s

March 28, 2008 inmate letter was construed as a complaint against Ball, Plaintiff’s April 23

inmate grievance on the subject was untimely. Under DO 802, the CO III had 10 work

days—until April 11—to respond to the inmate letter and Plaintiff then had 10 calendar

days—until April 21—to file his inmate grievance (id. at 7). Defendant concludes that the

April 23 inmate grievance was therefore untimely and constitutes a failure to properly

exhaust (id.).

As to Plaintiff’s other two inmate letters, Defendant contends that they did not comply

with the DO 802 requirement that all inmate letters begin with the statement, “I am

attempting to informally resolve the following problem” (id. at 8). 

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Notice required under Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Defendant also contends that Plaintiff failed to file any appeals to the ADC Director

with respect to any complaint against Defendant (id.). Defendant proffers the affidavit of

Aurora Aguilar, an ADC Hearing Officer assigned to the Central Office in Phoenix (id., Ex.

B, Aguilar Aff. ¶ 1). Aguilar attested that upon review of the Grievance Appeal Log for the

period of Plaintiff’s confinement, she found that there were no grievance appeals to the ADC

Director from Plaintiff concerning Defendant’s conduct (id. ¶ 3).

Defendant proffers a copy of DO 802 (id., Ex. A), and copies of Plaintiff’s inmate

letters and grievances (id., Attachs. 2-7). 

In the alternative to nonexhaustion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to state a

constitutional claim because he failed to allege that Defendant actually harmed him and he

failed to allege that he was physically injured (Doc. #22 at 8-9). Defendant notes that there

may be claims of injury in the Complaint outside of Count II or they may not be clear due

to Plaintiff’s poor handwriting, in which case, Defendant moves the Court for a more definite

statement under Rule 12(e) (id. at 9). Otherwise, Defendant seeks dismissal for failure to

state a claim (id.).

B. Plaintiff’s Response

The Court informed Plaintiff of his obligation to respond and the evidence necessary

to successfully rebut Defendant’s contentions (Doc. #24).3

 Plaintiff did not file a response.

Upon review of Defendant’s motion, the Court noted that Defendant’s certificate of

service reflected that the motion was addressed to Plaintiff at the Barchey Unit; however, the

address included the incorrect prisoner number (see Doc. #22 at 10). Further, Plaintiff had

since been released from ADC custody. The Court therefore directed Defendant to resend

a copy of the motion to Plaintiff’s current address and provided an additional 30 days for

Plaintiff to respond (Doc. #28). 

Defendant filed his Notice that he resent a copy of the motion (Doc. #29). Plaintiff

still did not file a response. The time for responding has expired, and the motion is ready for

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ruling.

III. Exhaustion

A. Legal Standard 

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing a federal action concerning prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin v.

Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Exhaustion is required for all suits about

prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered

through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And a

prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable

rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus,

the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement

in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method

to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).

B. Analysis

As stated, Defendant bears the burden of proving lack of exhaustion and therefore

must demonstrate that there were remedies available to Plaintiff. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119; see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendant submits

evidence that a grievance system was available at the jail for Plaintiff’s claims (Doc. #22, Ex.

A, Golder Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; Attach. 1). Defendant also proffers copies of Plaintiff’s inmate letters

and an inmate grievance, which demonstrate that Plaintiff was aware of the ADC grievance

procedures (id., Attachs. 2-7). 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff indicated that administrative remedies were available, that

he submitted a request for relief on this claim, and that he appealed it to the highest level

(Doc. #1 at 4). Plaintiff attached to his Complaint a copy of an inmate letter form dated April

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20, 2008, and addressed to the Director; this form includes an ADC stamp indicating that it

was “received” in the Director’s Office (id., Attach.). Plaintiff wrote on the form that this

was an appeal to the Director pursuant to DO 802, and he complained about the due process

violations connected to his parole status hearing (id.). There are no other grievance forms

attached to the Complaint.

Assuming that the form submitted by Plaintiff constitutes an appeal to the Director,

it concerns an issue unrelated to the claim against Defendant and, therefore, does not

demonstrate exhaustion. 

The grievance documents submitted by Defendant also support a finding that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust his claim against Defendant. Although Defendant’s presentation of these

documents is confusing, on their faces, the documents illustrate the following:

(1) Plaintiff submitted a March 28, 2008 inmate letter complaining about Martyn’s

conduct and that it endangered Plaintiff (Doc. #22, Ex. A, Attach. 4). 

Plaintiff followed this inmate letter with a inmate grievance on April 23, 2008, in

which he stated that after the incident with Martyn, Defendant was called and informed of

the situation (id., Attach. 2). Plaintiff further stated that Defendant advised Plaintiff to

submit an inmate letter, which Plaintiff did on March 28, 2008, but Defendant failed to

comply with DO 802.08, which requires the CO III to investigate the complaint and respond

to the inmate (id.).

(2) Plaintiff submitted an April 7, 2008 inmate letter complaining about the lack of

a response to his Director’s Appeal concerning due process violations at his parole hearing

(id., Attach. 5). In this inmate letter, Plaintiff also requests a Notice of Claim form (id.).

(3) Plaintiff submitted an April 20, 2008 inmate letter complaining about Martyn’s

and Defendant’s conduct and claiming that Defendant attempted to threaten, harass, and

intimidate Plaintiff (id., Attach. 7).

As to the first inmate letter and subsequent inmate grievance, assuming that these

documents satisfy the first two steps in the grievance process (even though Plaintiff failed

to mention Defendant in the inmate letter), the inmate grievance failed to attach a copy of the

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inmate letter as required under DO 802, and there is no record that Plaintiff appealed the

inmate grievance response (Doc. #22, Ex. A, Attach. 3). Further, as argued by Defendant,

after the 10 work days expired for the CO III to respond to the inmate letter, Plaintiff had just

10 calendar days to file his inmate grievance (id., Attach. 1 (DO. 802.08 § 1.3.2 & 802.09

§ 1.1.2)). His inmate grievance was filed 12 calendar days after the response date expired;

thus, it was untimely. 

With regard to the April 7 inmate letter, it has no connection to the claim against

Defendant.

Finally, the April 20 inmate letter referred to Defendant and the claim raised in this

action; however, there is no record that Plaintiff proceeded past the first step of the grievance

process, and Defendant submits evidence that no appeal to the Director was filed (Doc. #22,

Ex. B, Aguilar Aff. ¶ 3).

In failing to respond to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff did not refute the evidence

showing that he failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies for his claim against

Defendant. Defendant’s motion will therefore be granted, and the Court need not address

Defendant’s failure-to-state-a-claim argument.

IV. Failure to Respond

Alternately, the Court has the discretion under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i)

to deem Plaintiff’s lack of response as a consent to the granting of Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss. Plaintiff was warned of this possibility (Doc. #24 at 2). The Ninth Circuit has

upheld a dismissal based on a failure to comply with a similar local rule in the District of

Nevada. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). Before dismissal on this

basis, the Court must weigh “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation;

(2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less

drastic sanctions.” Id. at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.

1986)). 

The first factor “always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983,

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990 (9th Cir. 1999). The second factor usually favors dismissal, and this case is no

exception. See Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). There is no risk

of prejudice to Defendant to resolve the motion in his favor, and judicial efficiency also

favors resolution of this action. Public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, so

the fourth factor weighs against dismissal. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir.

2002). For the fifth factor, dismissal without prejudice is the least drastic sanction. 

In sum, the five-factor analysis weighs in favor of dismissal. The Court will therefore

deem Plaintiff’s failure to respond as a consent to the granting of the motion. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. #22).

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #22) is granted; Plaintiff’s action is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust or, alternately, for failure to respond. 

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment of dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2009.

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