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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BLACK MESA WATER COALITION;

DINE HATAALII ASSOCIATION; TO

NIZHONI ANI; DINE ALLIANCE; CAQUIFER FOR DINE; SIERRA CLUB;

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, in her official

capacity as U.S. Secretary of the

Interior,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-16980

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-08122-

GMS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 21, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed January 26, 2015

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2 BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Paul J. Watford, Circuit

Judges, and Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Gould

SUMMARY**

Fees and Costs

The panel reversed in part, and vacated in part, the district

court’s judgment in an action for costs and expenses brought

by a plaintiff group of environmental and community

organizations against the federal Office of Surface Mining

Reclamation and Enforcement after plaintiff participated in

a successful challenge to OSM’s grant of a coal mining

permit revision.

Plaintiff petitioned the agency under the Surface Mining

Control and Reclamation Act’s administrative fee-award

provision to recover costs and expenses from OSM. The

administrative law judge dismissed the fee petition based on

the conclusion that plaintiff was not “eligible,” and was not

“entitled” to costs and expenses, under 43 C.F.R. § 4.1294(b).

The panel held that its review of the agency’s “eligibility”

determination was de novo, and its review of the

 

*

 The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL 3

“entitlement” determination was for substantial evidence. 

The panel concluded that plaintiff was “eligible” for fees

because it showed some degree of success on the merits, and

the agency’s contrary conclusion was error as a matter of law. 

The panel vacated the portion of the district court’s decision

as related to the question of entitlement. The panel declined

to reach the issue whether plaintiff was “entitled” to fees, and

remanded for the agency to consider the issue. Finally, the

panel rejected plaintiff’s argument that the Secretary of the

Interior had waived a challenge to the reasonableness of any

award amount that the agency might grant on remand for

costs and expenses reasonably incurred for plaintiff’s

participation in the proceedings at the agency level.

COUNSEL

Brad A. Bartlett (argued), Western Energy Justice Center,

Durango, Colorado; Matt Kenna, Public Interest

Environmental Law, Durango, Colorado; Walton D. Morris,

Jr., Morris Law Office, P.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Paul A. Bullis (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, District of

Arizona; Mark S.Kokanovich, Deputy Appellate Chief,

Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellee.

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4 BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Black Mesa Water Coalition, et al. (Black Mesa), a group

of environmental and community organizations, sought costs

and expenses, including attorney’s and expert witness fees,

from the Federal Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and

Enforcement (OSM) after Black Mesa participated in a

successful challenge to OSM’s grant of a coal mining permit

revision. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Black

Mesa’s fee request, and the Interior Board of Land Appeals

(IBLA) affirmed. Upon review, the district court affirmed the

agency’s final decision. Black Mesa appeals the district

court’s decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand to the

district court with instructions to remand to the agency for

further proceedings on the question of “entitlement.”

I

Black Mesa, Kendall Nutumya, and others challenged a

coal mining permit revision that OSM granted to Peabody

Western Coal Company(Peabody)for coal mining operations

in northeastern Arizona. The ALJ consolidated ten separate

challenges to the permit revision, includingBlack Mesa’s and

Nutumya’s, because “they involve[d] common questions of

law or fact.” See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1113. The ALJ granted one

of Nutumya’s two motions for summary decision, concluding

that OSM violated the National Environmental Protection Act

of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2010), by failing

to prepare a supplemental NEPA analysis and by failing to

include an adequate range of alternatives to the proposed

action in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 

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BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL 5

The ALJ vacated OSM’s decision to grant Peabody’s permit

revision and remanded to OSM. The ALJ denied the other

parties’ motions for summary decision as moot, including the

motion filed by Black Mesa, stating that “[e]ach applicant

sought to vacate OSM’s decision, which has now been done. 

Since I can give no additional relief, their motions are now

moot.”

Black Mesa petitioned the agency under the Surface

Mining Control and Reclamation Act’s (SMCRA)

administrative fee-award provision to recover costs and

expenses from OSM, including attorney’s and expert witness

fees, “reasonably incurred” as a result of Black Mesa’s

participation in the consolidated administrative appeal of

OSM’s permit revision decision. See 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e). 

OSM moved to dismiss Black Mesa’s fee request, contending

that Black Mesa was neither “eligible” for nor “entitled” to

fees under the regulation governing agency fee awards under

SMCRA. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1294(b). The ALJ agreed with

OSM and granted its motion to dismiss Black Mesa’s fee

petition.

The ALJ reasoned that Black Mesa was not “eligible”

under 43 C.F.R. § 4.1294(b) because (1) the consolidation of

the proceedings did not mean that one party’s success should

be attributed to another, or in other words “does not

demonstrate that the [o]ther [p]etitioners prevailed in any part

or achieved any degree of success on the merits of their own

requests for review”; (2) Black Mesa could not have achieved

success on the merits, because its motions were dismissed as

moot; (3) the fact that Black Mesa argued similar NEPA

failures on OSM’s part as Nutumya had argued was

insufficient to show eligibility, because the ALJ relied on

additional arguments by Nutumya and no argument by Black

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6 BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL

Mesa; and (4) the public policy of encouraging good faith

actions by the public is not advanced “simply because [Black

Mesa] challenged a government action that another person

succeeded in having remanded.” The ALJ also reasoned that

Black Mesa was not “entitled” to costs and expenses under 43

C.F.R. § 4.1294(b) because (1) its coordination allegations

did not show that Black Mesa and Nutumya “pool[ed] all the

NEPA issues” and divided them up, but instead showed that

the parties remained free to choose which arguments to make

in motions for summary decision; (2) although Nutumya’s

NEPA motion included some of Black Mesa’s discovery

materials as an exhibit, the arguments on which the ALJ

granted Nutumya’s motion did not rely on those materials;

and (3) Black Mesa “did not cause the determination of the

issues” that the ALJ reached.

Black Mesa appealed the ALJ’s dismissal of its fee

petition to the IBLA, which affirmed on substantially similar

grounds to those stated by the ALJ. Regarding “entitlement,”

the IBLA added that no “causal nexus” supported a finding of

“entitlement,” and observed that “[o]ut of the 1,065 hours

[Black Mesa’s] counsel documented as having spent litigating

OSM’s decision, they spent a total of 5.33 hours conferring

with Nutumya’s legal team about NEPA issues.” Black Mesa

sought review of the agency’s final decision in district court,

and the district court affirmed the agency’s “entitlement”

determination as supported by “substantial evidence in the

record,” declining to reach “eligibility.”

II

Ordinarily, we review IBLA decisions on the legal merits

of a proceeding to determine whether they are arbitrary,

capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, or contrary

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BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL 7

to law. Akootchook v. United States, 271 F.3d 1160, 1164

(9th Cir. 2001); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). However, the standard of

review for agency fee decisions under SMCRA’s

administrative fee-award provision at 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) is

a question of first impression for our court. Black Mesa

argues that we review the agency’s fee “eligibility”

determinations de novo and “entitlement” determinations for

abuse of discretion. The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)

argues that a fee-award decision by the agency under

30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) is reviewed under the Administrative

Procedure Act’s (APA) deferential standard that agency

action may only be set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law

. . . even though it involves costs and expenses (including

attorney’s fees).”

The SMCRA fee-award provision at issue here states:

Whenever an order is issued under this

section, or as a result of any administrative

proceeding under [SMCRA], at the request of

any person, a sum equal to the aggregate

amount of all costs and expenses (including

attorney fees) as determined by the Secretary

to have been reasonably incurred by such

person for or in connection with his

participation in such proceedings, including

any judicial review of agency actions, may be

assessed against either party as the court,

resulting from judicial review or the

Secretary, resulting from administrative

proceedings, deems proper.

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8 BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL

30 U.S.C. § 1275(e). Under this statute, the Secretary has

issued regulatory guidance for when costs and expenses,

including attorneys’ fees, may be awarded “to any person . . .

who initiates or participates” in an agency proceeding under

SMCRA. 43 C.F.R. § 4.1294(b). A person may receive a fee

award from OSM if that person is eligible for, i.e., “prevails

in whole or in part, achieving at least some degree of success

on the merits,” and entitled to a fee award, i.e., “upon a

finding that such person made a substantial contribution to a

full and fair determination of the issues.” Id.

A helpful circuit court case on reviewing agency feeaward decisions under 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) is West Virginia

Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Norton, 343 F.3d 239 (4th

Cir. 2003). There, the Fourth Circuit held that agency

decisions under the “eligibility” prong of its fee award

regulation are legal determinations reviewed de novo, because

whether a party achieved some degree of success on the

merits is an interpretation based on general common law

principles and not on expertise in the agency’s particular

field. West Virginia Highlands, 343 F.3d at 245–46. We

have, in other contexts, treated similar questions about party

success on the merits as questions of law reviewed de novo. 

Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712, 715 (9th

Cir. 2013) (reviewing de novo “prevailing party” status under

attorney’s fees provision for § 1983 actions). Although the

agency has included language about party success on the

merits within its two-prong regulation for fee-award decisions

and SMCRA’s administrative fee-award provision allows the

Secretary of the Interior to award fees resulting from

administrative proceedings if the Secretary deems such an

award proper, we agree with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in

West Virginia Highlands and conclude that whether Black

Mesa “prevail[ed] in whole or in part, achieving at least some

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BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL 9

degree of success on the merits” is properly reviewed de

novo.

However, the “entitlement” determination, i.e., whether

a person who participated in a SMCRA administrative

proceeding “made a substantial contribution to a full and fair

determination of the issues” in substance is a factual

determination. 43 C.F.R. § 4.1294(b). The agency’s feeaward regulation supports this conclusion by noting that

“upon a finding” of entitlement, the agency may award fees. 

Id. (emphasis added). West Virginia Highlands also

concludes that a determination of “entitlement” is a factual

finding made by the agency, and we conclude that the Fourth

Circuit’s reasoning is persuasive on that point as well. West

Virginia Highlands, 343 F.3d at 248. Because the

“entitlement” determination is a factual finding made at the

agency level, we review it under the “substantial evidence”

standard. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152–61 (1999)

(rejecting the “clearly erroneous” standard of review for

judicial review of agency fact-findings and reaffirming

“substantial evidence” as the appropriate standard); E. Bay

Auto. Council v. N.L.R.B., 483 F.3d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 2007).

In summary, on the standard of review applicable here,

we hold that review of the agency’s “eligibility”

determination is de novo and its “entitlement” determination

is reviewed for substantial evidence.

III

Reviewing the agency’s “eligibility” determination de

novo, we conclude that Black Mesa is “eligible” for fees

because it showed some degree of success on the merits. The

governing rule is set forth by regulation in 43 C.F.R.

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10 BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL

§ 4.1294, governing who may receive an award of attorney

fees. With respect to eligibility, it provides that appropriate

costs and expenses, including attorney fees, may be awarded

from OSM to any person who initiates or participates in any

proceeding under the Act, and who prevails in whole or in

part, “achieving at least some degree of success on the

merits.” 43 C.F.R § 4.1294 (b).

The issue on eligibility for such an award of fees from

OSM is whether Black Mesa achieved “some degree of

success on the merits.” Addressing that issue on de novo

review, we are persuaded that Black Mesa did achieve a

degree of success on the merits. For one thing, Black Mesa

raised the NEPA arguments for which Nutumya prevailed at

summary decision in both Black Mesa’s Request for Review

before the agency and during the public comment period for

the Final EIS. Whether or not raising those arguments at

those stages was necessary to preserve the issues throughout

the administrative appeal process, as Black Mesa contends

and the Secretary disputes, is not crucial to our analysis. 

Rather, making those arguments early in the merits stages of

the administrative proceedings shows “participation” in those

proceedings regarding the NEPA issues and supports the

conclusion that Black Mesa achieved some degree of success

on the merits. For another thing, the relief given on

Nutumya’s NEPA motion was congruent with the relief that

Black Mesa sought, a reason the ALJ gave for dismissing

Black Mesa’s motion for summary decision as moot. We

disagree with the Secretary that, based on case captions and

docket numbers, the consolidated requests for review had a

“separate, distinct character” sufficient to overcome

requirements for fee “eligibility.” The actions were separate

but related, especially on the relief sought. Moreover, we do

not think it is correct to say that whenever the agency

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BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL 11

dismisses one party’s motion as moot because the relief it

requested was already granted upon another party’s motion,

then the former party’s enjoyment of relief gained on motion

of another means that it achieved no success on the merits. 

That would negate the permissive quality of both SMCRA’s

administrative fee-award statute and the agency’s regulatory

guidance for it. See West Virginia Highlands, 343 F.3d at

244 (characterizing SMCRA’s administrative fee-award

statute as a permissive, “whenever appropriate” type feeshifting provision). We hold that Black Mesa is “eligible” for

fees, and the agency’s contrary conclusion was error as a

matter of law.

IV

In light of our decision on “eligibility,” we decline to

reach whether, on this record, Black Mesa was “entitled” to

fees. Instead, that issue should be remanded for the agency

to consider, because we cannot be sure how the agency will

view substantial contribution when told that Black Mesa was

in fact eligible for fees, contrary to the agency’s prior

rationale. Also, while we are not reaching and deciding the

issue of substantial contribution, we have a degree of

discomfort with the possibility that unless parties sit down

and agree to fight a fully-coordinated battle, then they must

duplicate one another’s arguments in each of their individual

briefs to preserve entitlement to fees. Under the agency’s

rationale, this would appear to require increased litigation

costs and expenses before parties could seek to recover their

requested award amounts, forcing the agency, if unsuccessful

on the merits of an administrative appeal, to pay for more

extensive briefing, if in the end the agency awarded fees. It

is more sensible to recognize that once a party has gained

some degree of success on the merits, it may then be awarded

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12 BLACK MESA WATER COALITION V. JEWELL

fees only if it made a substantial contribution to a full and fair

resolution of the issues, and that the amount of any fee award

will be commensurate with its contribution to the result. We

vacate this portion of the district court’s decision as related to

“substantial contribution” and the question of entitlement. 

We remand to the district court with instructions that it

remand to the agency to allow it to determine anew, in view

of our decision on eligibility, whether Black Mesa has shown

an “entitlement” to fees by making a substantial contribution

to the full and fair resolution of issues. Further, we reject

Black Mesa’s argument that the Secretary has waived a

challenge to the reasonableness of any award amount that the

agency might grant on remand for costs and expenses

reasonably incurred for Black Mesa’s participation in the

proceedings at the agency level. Should the agency award

fees to Black Mesa on remand, the Secretary may still

challenge the award’s reasonableness, and, if there was

substantial contribution to a full and fair determination of the

issues, the agency would be able to award fees in any amount

that is reasonable under the circumstances.

REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

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