Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00431/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00431-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES McCARTY and ROBERT 

McCARTY, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

RUSSEL HUMPHREY, in his individual 

capacity, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-00431-KJM-AC 

ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF 

No. 70.) Plaintiffs claim they encountered barriers to access at a business complex in Lodi, 

California, identified as Lakeshore Plaza, and at the law office of defendant Humphrey Law 

Group, located within Lakeshore Plaza. (Pls.’ First Am. Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 29.) Defendants 

oppose the motion. (ECF No. 80.) Defendants counter there are genuine disputes of material 

facts precluding summary judgment at this stage, and, in the alternative, they argue the barriers 

have been eliminated. (Id. at 4.) 

 The court held a hearing on the matter on May 22, 2015, at which Catherine M. 

Corfee appeared for plaintiffs, and Timote F. Tuitavuki appeared for defendants. As explained 

below, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part plaintiffs’ motion. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and related California laws. (See generally First Am. Compl., ECF 

No. 29.) Plaintiffs James McCarty and Robert McCarty each are over eighty years old and 

disabled. (ECF No. 81 ¶¶ 1–10.) James McCarty describes his disabilities as “impaired mobility, 

lack of balance, need for a cane or walker, and . . . breathing impairments.” (J. McCarty Decl. ¶ 

2, ECF No. 70-4.) “One of [his] most trying issues is [his] loss of balance and . . . inability to 

step upwards, even for a few inches.” (Id.) Robert McCarty describes his disabilities as 

“impaired mobility, lack of balance, and need for a cane or walker.” (R. McCarty Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 

No. 70-6.) Defendant Russell Humphrey is an attorney, with his office located at Lakeshore 

Plaza, 1420 S. Mills Ave., Lodi, California. (ECF No. 29 ¶ 19.) The remaining defendants either 

own or lease an office at the Plaza. (Corfee Decl. ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 70-2.) 

 On March 14, 2012, plaintiffs claim they visited the Plaza, wanting to meet 

defendant Humphrey to discuss a separate case that Humphrey had filed against them. 

(J. McCarty Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8; R. McCarty ¶ 2.) During their visit, they encountered certain 

accessibility barriers and were unable to meet with Humphrey. (J. McCarty Decl. ¶¶ 12–19, 24–

26; R. McCarty ¶¶ 2–3, 7–13.) They visited the Plaza again on March 30, 2012, but again were 

unable to meet with Humphrey because of the same or similar accessibility barriers. (J. McCarty 

Decl. ¶ 8.) James McCarty “also sought to inquire about dental implants with Dr. Chao’s dental 

office.” (Id. ¶ 11.) He “also received a key to the men’s restroom . . . on the first floor.” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs intend to visit the Plaza again in the near future. (J. McCarty Decl. ¶ 29; R. McCarty 

Decl. ¶ 17.) 

 Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, the operative complaint, alleges violations of 

Title III of the ADA; the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51 (Unruh Act); and the 

Disabled Persons Act (DPA), California Civil Code § 54. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiffs move for 

summary judgment on all of those claims. (ECF No. 70.) Defendants oppose (ECF No. 77) and 

plaintiffs have replied (ECF No. 84). 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A court will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

The “threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).1 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court “that there 

is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish 

that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both parties must “cit[e] to particular 

parts of materials in the record . . .; or show [] that the materials cited do not establish the absence 

or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“[the 

nonmoving party] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts”). Moreover, “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact 

. . . . Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (emphasis in 

original). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and 

views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 

587–88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). “Where the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine 

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

 1 Rule 56 was amended, effective December 1, 2010. However, it is appropriate to 

rely on cases decided before the amendment took effect, as “[t]he standard for granting summary 

judgment remains unchanged.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Notes of Advisory Comm. on 2010 

amendments.

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A court may consider evidence as long as it is “admissible at trial.” Fraser v. 

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). “Admissibility at trial” depends not on the 

evidence’s form, but on its content. Block v. City of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). The party seeking admission of evidence “bears the 

burden of proof of admissibility.” Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2002). If the opposing party objects to the proposed evidence, the party seeking admission must 

direct the district court to “authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on attribution, 

hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the evidence in 

question could be deemed admissible . . . .” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 385–86 

(9th Cir. 2010). However, courts are sometimes “much more lenient” with the affidavits and 

documents of the party opposing summary judgment. Scharf v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 

1243 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, plaintiffs raise several evidentiary objections in their reply brief. 

(See ECF No. 84 at 1–6.) The court need not address them because it does not rely on the 

evidence to which plaintiffs object in reaching its decision on this matter. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 As noted, plaintiffs move for summary judgment on all their claims against 

defendants, seeking damages and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 70-1.) After the parties’ meet-andconfer efforts, plaintiffs have agreed to “withdraw their request for actual damages and treble 

damages, thereby limiting the motion to statutory damages.” (ECF No. 76 at 1; ECF No. 89 at 1.) 

A. Legal Framework 

1. Title III of the ADA 

 The ADA was adopted to address discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities. See Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 2014). The statute was 

enacted on the understanding that discrimination against the disabled is “most often the product, 

not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.” 

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). “Therefore, the ADA proscribes not only 

obviously exclusionary conduct, but also more subtle forms of discrimination—such as difficultto-navigate restrooms and hard-to-open doors—that interfere with disabled individuals’ full and 

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equal enjoyment of public places and accommodations.” Cohen, 754 F.3d at 694 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people “on the 

basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 

advantages, or accommodation of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 

leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 

Discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities 

. . . where such removal is readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Readily achievable 

means “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 

Id. § 12181(9). Federal regulations clarify which barrier removals are likely to be readily 

achievable and provide examples in title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 

36.304. The U.S. Justice Department has referred to these examples as “the types of modest 

measures that may be taken to remove barriers and that are likely to be readily achievable.” 

Appendix B to Part 36–Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability 

by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,546 (July 26, 

1991); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36 App. A. 

 To prevail on their Title III claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) they are disabled 

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) defendants are private entities that own, lease, or operate a 

place of public accommodation; and (3) plaintiffs were denied public accommodations by 

defendants because of their disabilities. See Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th 

Cir. 2007). The parties here do not dispute that plaintiffs are disabled within the meaning of the 

ADA. The remaining two elements of an ADA claim are addressed, if at all, under each barrier, 

as set forth below. 

 Private parties or the Attorney General may enforce the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12188. 

Specifically, private parties may utilize the remedies and procedures available under the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964. Id. § 12188(a)(1) (citing § 2000a-3(a)). While a private party may seek 

equitable relief, monetary damages are unavailable in private suits. Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. On 

the other hand, in suits brought by the Attorney General, courts may grant both equitable relief 

and monetary damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2). 

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2. California’s Disability Discrimination Statutes 

 In the disability context, the Unruh Act and the DPA incorporate ADA standards: 

“A violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of both the Unruh Act and the DPA.” 

Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s LLC, 165 Cal. App. 4th 571, 586 (2008). 

However, unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act and the DPA allow for monetary damages. The Unruh 

Act provides for statutory damages of $4,000 for each occasion a disabled person was denied 

equal access. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). The DPA, on the other hand, authorizes minimum statutory 

damages of $1,000 for each occasion a disabled person was denied equal access. Id. § 54.3(a). 

Because of the overlap between the Unruh Act and the DPA, a plaintiff cannot recover under 

both. Id. § 54.3(c) (“A person may not be held liable for damages pursuant to both this section 

and Section 52 for the same act or failure to act.”). 

B. Barriers 

1. Handicap-Accessible Parking Spaces 

 It is undisputed that there were not enough handicap-accessible parking spaces at 

the Plaza in March 2012: There were only two when three were required. (ECF No. 81 ¶ 45.) 

However, it is also undisputed that in 2013, a new handicap-accessible parking space was added. 

(Id. ¶ 39.) Accordingly, because plaintiffs can only recover injunctive relief under the ADA and 

because the barrier here has been removed, plaintiffs’ ADA claim based on an insufficient 

number of handicap-accessible parking spaces is MOOT. (ECF No. 89 (“Plaintiffs do not dispute 

the ‘sufficient number of accessible parking[.]’”).) Nonetheless, because the violations existed at 

the time of plaintiffs’ visits, plaintiffs have presented a meritorious ADA claim, which necessarily 

means plaintiffs have established a meritorious claim under the Unruh Act. See Langer v. 

Elsinore Pioneer Lumber Co., No. 14-08293, 2015 WL 420177, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015). 

 Accordingly, plaintiffs are GRANTED summary judgment as to their Unruh Act 

claim based on this barrier. Plaintiffs are awarded $8,000 each based on each of their two 

separate encounters with this barrier. As plaintiffs conceded at the hearing, they may recover 

statutory damages for each visit only and not for each barrier encountered under California Civil 

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Code section 55.56(e).2 The court thus need not address plaintiffs’ eligibility for statutory 

damages for the other alleged barriers. Accordingly, the court’s discussion below is limited to 

plaintiffs’ eligibility for injunctive relief only. 

2. Number of Van-Accessible Parking Spaces 

 Plaintiffs argue the Plaza’s parking lot did not have a van-accessible space during 

either of their visits. (ECF No. 4.) But there is no dispute that this barrier has been remedied.3 

(See ECF Nos. 70-8, 89.) Accordingly, plaintiffs’ ADA claim as to this barrier is MOOT. 

3. Cross-Slope in Excess of 2 Percent 

 Plaintiffs argue “[a] portion of the walkway directly in front of the parking lot has 

a cross-slope in excess of 2%.” (ECF No. 84 at 8.) 

 Here, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion as to this alleged barrier because it does 

not comply with the court’s prior order. (Order, ECF No. 69.) Specifically, the court has directed 

that “[p]laintiffs may only seek relief based on the barriers alleged in the . . . first amended 

complaint.” (Id. at 2 (citing Oliver v. Ralph’s Grocery Company, 654 F.3d 903, 908–09 (9th Cir. 

2011). Here, plaintiffs have not shown that this barrier was identified in their first amended 

complaint, and “the court has denied plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add new barriers 

identified . . . at the July 2, 2014 visit.” (Order, ECF No. 69 at 2.) Therefore, the court DENIES 

plaintiffs’ motion based on this alleged barrier. 

4. Tow Away Sign 

 Plaintiffs note that “the tow away sign is not in dispute as [p]laintiff[s] concede it 

is moot.” (ECF No. 89 at 1.) The court confirms plaintiffs’ concession and DENIES their motion 

for summary judgment on this alleged barrier as MOOT. 

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 “Statutory damages may be assessed . . . based on each particular occasion that the 

plaintiff was denied full and equal access, and not upon the number of violations of constructionrelated accessibility standards identified at the place of public accommodation where the denial of 

full and equal access occurred.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(e). 

3

 This is one of many “disputes” no longer alive as of the time of the hearing, reflecting 

lack of proper preparation and meaningful meet and confer with resultant wasting of the court’s 

time, and an unnecessary expenditure of attorney time to respond. 

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5. Directional Signage For the Path of Travel 

 “Plaintiffs do not dispute the directional signage for the path of travel from the public 

street right of way . . . .” (ECF No. 89 at 1.) The court confirms plaintiffs’ concession and 

DENIES their motion for summary judgment on this barrier. 

6. Directional Sign at the Stairway 

 Plaintiffs seek “injunctive relief requiring a directional sign [near the stairway] 

directing the disabled to the elevator because it is a juncture where the able bodied have access but not 

the disabled.” (ECF No. 89 at 4.) Plaintiffs, however, have not met their burden to show the absence 

of a genuine dispute that such a sign is necessary. Nor does their expert witness identify the lack of 

such a sign as a potential violation. Therefore, the court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion as to this barrier. 

7. Stairway Handrails 

 Plaintiffs argue there were non-compliant stairway handrails at the Plaza. (ECF 

No. 70-1 at 8.) Specifically, they “dispute the nosings and height” only. (ECF No. 89 at 1.) 

 Handrails must have the following features, among others: “(5) Top of handrail 

gripping surface shall be mounted between 34 in and 38 in (865 mm and 965 mm) above stair 

nosings and (7) Ends of handrails shall be either rounded or returned smoothly to . . . wall . . . .” 

ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) 4.9.4.4 “Nosings” are the edges of steps. Id. § 4.9.2–

4.9.3. Here, plaintiffs’ expert in his report provides that both of those features were absent as of 

the date of his last survey. (ECF No. 70-7, Ex. A at 9–10.) Defendants admit as much. (ECF 

No. 81 ¶¶ 48–49.) 

 Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to this ADA claim for 

statutory handrails. 

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 “Promulgated by the Attorney General to carry out the provisions of the ADA, these 

guidelines lay out the technical structural requirements of places of public accommodation.” 

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks, citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has noted, “obedience to the spirit of the ADA does 

not excuse noncompliance with the ADAAG’s requirements.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “The ADAAG’s requirements are as precise as they are thorough, and the difference 

between compliance and noncompliance with the standard of full and equal enjoyment 

established by the ADA is often a matter of inches.” Id. at 945–46. 

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8. Surface Slope 

Plaintiffs argue, “the new double disabled parking that was added in front of the 

building when facing the building from the parking lot, the new disabled parking space on the 

right of the van accessible access aisle has a surface slope in excess of 2%.” (ECF No. 89 at 5.) 

In addition, plaintiffs argue, “[t]he new third disabled access aisle surface slope located in the 

parking lot closest to S. Mills Avenue was measured at 3.9% using the same level and fails to 

meet the federal and state disabled access code requirements.” (Id.) If true, these conditions 

constitute violation of the ADA. Dodson v. Joseph Esperanca, Jr., LLC, No. 12-02132, 2013 WL 

6328274, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013) (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. D, section 4.6.3; 36 C.F.R. 

pt. 1191, App. D., section 502.4). 

 Defendants note only generally that they “are prepared to stipulate there remain 

several barriers that, arguably, remain [sic].” (ECF No. 90.) Specifically, defendants note, 

“[p]laintiffs may argue . . . that the disability parking stalls have more than a 2% grade. Either of 

these issues could be agreed upon as issues legitimately before the court.” (Id. at 1.) In their 

response to plaintiffs’ separate statement of undisputed facts, defendants admit that the surface 

slope barriers identified by plaintiffs exist; they present no evidence to the contrary. The court 

GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment based on their ADA claim as to these 

barriers. 

9. Men’s Restrooms 

 Plaintiffs state, the “side grab bar in the men’s bathroom near Suite H on the first 

floor does not extend fifty-four inches (54”) from back of wall on the first floor.” (ECF No. 81 

¶ 54.) Here again, defendants admit as much. (Id.) Plaintiffs also state the “front end of side 

grab bar in men’s bathroom near Suite H men’s on the bottom floor does not extend twenty-four 

inches (24”) minimum beyond front of toilet.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Defendants admit this as well. (Id.) 

The “rear grab bar in [the] men’s bathroom near [the] Suite H men’s restroom on the bottom floor 

does not extend twenty-four inches (24”) minimum beyond front of toilet.” (Id. ¶ 56.) 

Defendants admit this too. (Id.) Finally, the “rear grab bar in the restroom located in the dental 

office of Dr. Mark Chao, DDS, Suite D, does not extend forty-two inches (42”) from [the] side 

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wall in the restroom of Suite D, the downstairs restroom closest to Dr. Mark Chao, DDS, 

owner/tenant of Suite D.” (Id. ¶ 57.) Defendants admit again. (Id.) And if the conditions are 

accurately described, and if the restrooms are places of public accommodation, plaintiffs may 

have identified violations of the ADA. See ADAAG 4.17.6. 

 There is no dispute that “the public had access to the key to use the restrooms.” 

(Id. ¶ 53.) But at the same time, defendants claim, “[t]he bathrooms at the property are kept 

locked at all times and anyone using them needs a key to enter the locked doors. The bathrooms 

are meant for employees of the property only, not patrons.” (ECF No. 80 at 21.) While 

“[d]efendants do not dispute there were times when tenants allowed non-employees to use the 

restrooms[,] [w]hen the key was given to a patron it was in error as the bathrooms are closed to 

the public.” (Id.; accord Humphrey Decl. ¶¶ 41–42.) 

 When a portion of a facility is open to the public, “the portion that is closed to the 

public is not a place of public accommodation and thus is not subject to Title III of the ADA.” 

Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the employees-only restroom was 

not a place of public accommodation”). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

defendants as non-moving parties, the court finds there is a dispute as to whether the restrooms at 

the Plaza are open to the public or to the tenants of the Plaza only. Plaintiffs have not met their 

burden to show the restrooms are places of public accommodation. 

 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the restroom’s 

compliance with ADA is DENIED. 

C. Joint and Several Liability 

 Plaintiffs argue all of the named defendants are jointly and severally liable for the 

barriers at the Plaza. (ECF No. 70-1 at 10.) Defendants conceded this point at the hearing. The 

ADA’s prohibitions against discrimination apply to “any person who owns, leases (or leases to), 

or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The express terms of the 

ADA have been construed to hold a landlord and a tenant liable for noncompliance with the 

ADA. Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000); Gutierrez v. Leng, 

No. 14-01027, 2015 WL 1498813, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015). 

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 In Botosan, the appellate court noted the legislative history of the ADA supports 

this construction of the statute:

This [provision] makes it clear that the owner of the building which 

houses the public accommodation, as well as the owner or operator 

of the public accommodation itself, has obligations under [the 

ADA]. For example, if an office building contains a doctor’s office, 

both the owner of the building and the doctor’s office are required 

to make readily achievable alterations. It simply makes no practical 

sense to require the individual public accommodation, a doctor’s 

office for example, to make readily achievable changes to the 

public accommodation without requiring the owner to make readily 

achievable changes to the primary entrance to the building. 

Similarly, a doorman or guard to an office building containing 

public accommodations would be required, if requested, to show a 

person who is blind to the elevator or to write a note to a person 

who is deaf regarding the floor number of a particular office. 

The amendment [adding section 12182(a)] also clarifies that entities 

which lease public accommodations are covered by the 

requirements of this title. 

Botosan, 216 F.3d at 832 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 55–56 (1990).) 

 Defendants will be jointly and severally liable for the ADA violations at the Plaza. 

D. Defendants’ Request for Consideration of Newly Discovered Evidence 

 On May 15, 2015, seven days before the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment, defendants filed a “request for court’s consideration of newly discovered 

evidence in opposition to summary judgment.” (ECF No. 85.) Defendants reported, “By sheer 

luck and good fortune a contractor for Defendants, Mr. Duke, made contact with DeAnne Caron, 

the individual that did Plaintiffs’ initial ADA inspection of the property.” (Id. at 2.) Apparently, 

Mr. Duke contacted Ms. Caron “regarding her inspection report and improvements Mr. Duke was 

working on at the property.” (Id.) When defendants’ counsel learned about their conversation, he 

contacted Ms. Caron on April 8, 2015. (Id.) What he learned from her was shocking, he claims. 

(Id.) Defendants’ counsel states as follows: 

In essence, Ms. Caron reported she was tricked by Plaintiff James 

McCarty when she initially went to Defendants’ property. Plaintiff 

James McCarty, through “false pretenses”, led Ms. Caron to believe 

that he owned the property, not the Defendants whom were 

unknown to Ms. Caron, and that the inspection was for his own 

personal use. Plaintiff James McCarty asked Ms. Caron what was 

wrong with the property and she responded. As she responded 

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Plaintiff James McCarty asked her to write it all down. The result 

was the accessibility report Plaintiffs’ relied upon to file their First 

Amended Complaint. 

Ms. Caron specifically and unambiguously stated that Plaintiff 

James McCarty told her Plaintiffs were angry at Mr. Humphrey for 

representing Connie Moreno in a case against the McCartys’ 

business (Moreno Litigation). Ms. Caron further stated the reason 

Plaintiff James McCarty was at the property was because he 

was angry with Mr. Humphrey over the Moreno Litigation.

Plaintiff James McCarty contacted Ms. Caron at a later date to 

conduct a comprehensive inspection of the property. Ms. Caron 

declined to work with Plaintiff James McCarty for any purpose. 

(Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).) 

 Defendants request that the court re-open discovery so that they can take a formal 

statement from Ms. Caron and present it to the court in support of their opposition to summary 

judgment. (Id. at 4.) They argue: 

Ms. Caron’s statement is crucial to Defendants’ case and their 

response to summary judgment. Her statement provides direct 

evidence showing the bad faith engaged in by Plaintiffs and directly 

proves Plaintiffs did not go to the property as claimed in their First 

Amended Complaint. In fact, Ms. Caron’s statement is in direct 

contradiction of Plaintiff James McCarty’s declaration filed in 

support of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. 

(Id. at 6.) 

 If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it 

cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: 

 

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it; 

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or 

 (3) issue any other appropriate order. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The party seeking a Rule 56(d) continuance bears the burden of proffering 

facts sufficient to satisfy the rule’s requirements. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 

912, 921 (9th Cir. 1996). In ruling on a 56(d) motion, a district court considers: (1) whether the 

movant had sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery, see Qualls By and Through Qualls v. 

Blue Cross of Calif., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1994); (2) whether the movant was diligent, 

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see Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002); (3) whether the 

information sought is based on mere speculation, see Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 

F.3d 1424, 1436–37 (9th Cir. 1995); and (4) whether allowing additional discovery would 

preclude summary judgment, see Michelman v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 887, 892 (9th 

Cir. 2012). 

 There is no bright-line rule to follow in applying Rule 56(d) based on the timing of 

the summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux 

Tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003). A district court’s denial of 

a request for a Rule 56(d) continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Getz v. Boeing 

Co., 654 F.3d 852, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 Here, the record shows a lack of diligence on defendants’ part. Defendants have 

known about Ms. Caron since at least as early as 2013, and decided not to seek information from 

her before now. Defendants’ counsel expressly states he “did not initially intend to conduct 

discovery with Ms. Caron.” (ECF No. 85 at 10 ¶ 12.) See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit 

Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006) (continuance properly denied where counsel made 

strategic decision not to conduct discovery before cut-off date). Moreover, defendants speculate 

only and after no specific argument that additional discovery is likely to preclude summary 

judgment. The court does not infer from Ms. Caron’s purported statements to defense counsel 

that she understood plaintiffs never visited the Plaza, even if they first contacted her under false 

pretenses at the same time, plaintiffs have presented their own declarations (ECF Nos. 70-6, 70-7) 

under penalty of perjury that they went to the Plaza on two occasions and encountered the 

mentioned barriers. Defendants could have probed this threshold issue long ago, whether or not 

they learned something recently from Caron. Defendants’ request is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs are awarded $8,000 each in statutory damages in light of the court’s 

granting their Unruh Act parking space claims. Plaintiffs are directed to submit a proposed order 

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within twenty-one (21) days effecting their requested injunctive relief as consistent with this 

order. 

 In light of the court’s denial of summary judgment in part, a final pretrial 

conference is set for November 19, 2015, at which a trial date will be set. The parties shall file a 

joint pretrial statement in advance of the conference, as required by the court’s scheduling order. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 14, 2015. 

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