Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-00688/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-00688-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-07-00688 RMW

MAG/LJP

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 7/9/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MK BALLISTICS SYSTEMS and MICHAEL

KEITH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WILLIAM SIMPSON, JOHN SARSFIELD,

and COUNTY OF SAN BENITO, et al.

Defendants.

No. C-07-00688 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Re Docket No. 3]

Plaintiffs MK Ballistics Systems ("MK") and Michael Keith filed a civil action before this

court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants John Sarsfield, District Attorney for the County of

San Benito; William Simpson, an investigator for the District Attorney; and the County of San

Benito ("County"). The County, joined by defendants Sarsfield and Simpson, moves to dismiss the

action. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The court has read the moving and opposing papers and

considered the arguments of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the court grants in part and

denies in part defendants' motion to dismiss and stays the case.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant William Simpson was responsible for investigating the operations of MK. After a

preliminary investigation, Simpson obtained a court-approved search warrant to search MK's

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 The court grants defendants' request for judicial notice of the complaint and answer filed in the

underlying action. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir.

2006) ("We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.").

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-07-00688 RMW

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premises in connection with the California Department of Toxic Substances Control. During the

investigation, Simpson allegedly discovered containers of hazardous materials, for which MK did

not hold a hazardous waste permit. 

Based on the results of Simpson's investigation, defendant John Sarsfield filed a complaint

against MK and Keith in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Benito,

seeking, inter alia, civil penalties for violations of California Health and Safety Code sections

25188, 25189, 25189.2 and 25201 and California Business and Professions Code section 17200-

17208 ("underlying case").1

 MK and Keith answered by denying the allegations set forth in the

state court and challenging the search warrant obtained by Simpson. This underlying case is still

ongoing in state court.

On February 2, 2007, MK and Keith filed the instant action in this court under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Sarsfield, Simpson, and the County. Plaintiffs allege that Simpson violated plaintiffs'

civil rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure by misrepresenting facts in his affidavit to

obtain the search warrant and that Sarsfield and the County negligently hired, retained, and

appointed Simpson as a district attorney investigator in spite of his allegedly being ineligible to hold

the position. They also allege that Sarsfield and the County failed to remove Simpson from the

position, take disciplinary action against Simpson, or provide redress for Simpson's conduct. The

County, joined by Sarsfield and Simpson, moves to dismiss the action on two grounds: (1) that the

suit is barred by various doctrines of immunity and (2) that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

prevents MK and Keith from proceeding with this action until the underlying action has been

concluded.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The County argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs' complaint because Sarsfield

and Simpson are representatives of the state. While the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against

states, it does not bar suits against cities and counties, which are not arms of the state, or their

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-07-00688 RMW

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officials. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Thus,

the question is whether Sarsfield and Simpson were county or state actors for purposes of the present

action.

The question of whether a state instrumentality acts for the county or as an arm of the state,

and thus as "one of the United States" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, is ultimately

a matter of federal law, but it must be answered by considering state law that defines the entity's

character. See Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997). For a

government official, the analysis does not examine the his role "in some categorical, 'all or nothing'

manner'" but rather asks whether he acts "for the local government in a particular area, or on a

particular issue." McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997); see also Weiner v. San

Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000).

In Weiner, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a district attorney acts for the county or the

state when deciding to prosecute someone. 210 F.3d at 1026. Following the Supreme Court's

analysis in McMillian, the Ninth Circuit looked to California's constitution, statutes, and case law. 

Id. at 1029. First, it found that California's constitution lists district attorneys as county officers

elected by the county, Cal. Const. art. XI, § 1(b), but provides for direct supervision by the Attorney

General, an officer of the state, who can require them to make reports concerning investigation,

detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime and can assume all the powers of a district attorney

when it is his opinion that state law is not being adequately enforced in any county, Cal. Const. art.

V, § 13. Weiner, 210 F.3d at 1029. Turning to state law, the court again found "provisions that

weigh both for and against concluding that the district attorney is a state officer." Id. In favor of the

conclusion, it found that (1) all suits are conducted under the name of the state of California, (2)

county authority to review a district attorney's conduct specifically excludes interference with their

"'investigative and prosecutorial function,'" (3) the Attorney General has direct supervision over

district attorneys, can require written reports, and can take full charge of any investigation or

prosecution, and (4) the Attorney General can call district attorneys into conference to discuss the

duties of their office. Id. (citations omitted). Against the conclusion, it found that 

(1) district attorneys are listed as county officers; (2) counties set district attorneys'

salaries; (3) district attorneys must be registered to vote in their respective counties; (4)

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-07-00688 RMW

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counties supervise the district attorneys' conduct and use of public funds; and (5) district

attorneys can be removed from office following the same procedures as applied to

district, county, and city officers . . . .

Id. at 1029-30 (citations omitted). The court discounted these latter factors, noting that McMillian

had found them not to be controlling, and held that the district attorney had acted for the state. Id. at

1030. The court also noted that "[a]ll relevant California cases . . . have held that district attorneys

are state officers for the purpose of investigating and proceeding with criminal prosecutions." Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the present case is distinguishable because it involves a district attorney

in his investigative role, not his role as a prosecutor. In support of this argument, plaintiffs draw an

analogy to cases addressing whether a prosecutor's investigatory, as opposed to prosecutorial,

conduct is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.

259, 275-76 (1993). However, the analogy is inappropriate because the test for absolute immunity is

different from that for sovereign immunity. The test for absolute immunity involves a "'functional

approach,' which looks to 'the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who

performed it.'" Id. at 269 (citations omitted). The court then asks whether that function fits "within

a common-law tradition of absolute immunity." Id. In contrast, sovereign immunity depends on

how a particular state defines a certain office and the oversight of that office; the same function can

be performed by a state actor or county actor in different instances.

McMillian does require that an official be classified as a state or county actor based on the

particular function he is performing in a certain case. In that sense, Buckley at least suggests that

there may be a distinction between investigative and prosecutorial conduct. Upon closer

examination, however, this distinction proves unviable. With the exception of prosecuting suits

under the name of the state of California, all of the constitutional and statutory provisions the Ninth

Circuit considered in Weiner apply to both investigations and prosecutions. See also Brewster v.

County of Shasta, 275 F.3d 803, 810 (9th Cir. 2001). In distinguishing Weiner to find that a sheriff

acted for the county in conducting investigations, the court in Brewster drew the line not between

investigations and prosecutions but between sheriffs and district attorneys. Id. It found that

California law "establishes a closer relationship between the Attorney General and district attorneys

than between the Attorney General and county sheriffs," stressing that the Attorney General could

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"take full charge of any investigation or prosecution, in which case [he] would have all the powers

of a district attorney." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Cal. Const. art. V, § 13 and Cal. Gov. Code §

12550). Brewster thus implicitly accepts the proposition that Weiner applies to district attorneys

acting in both investigations and prosecutions.

Because under Weiner Sarsfield and Simpson were acting for the state in their investigation

and prosecution of MK, plaintiffs' suit against the County is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar plaintiffs' claim against Sarsfield and Simpson in

their individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). Sarsfield and Simpson argue that

they cannot be sued in their individual capacities because at all times relevant to this lawsuit they

were acting for the state. However, the Hafer court rejected the idea that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability

depends on the capacity in which the official acted rather than the capacity in which he is sued. Id.

at 27. It was precisely because the defendant in Hafer acted in her official capacity that her actions

were under color of state law within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 27-28. The court thus found

that this same official authority, standing alone, could not also shield the defendant from suit. Id. at

28, 31.

B. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

Sarsfield and Simpson argue that absolute immunity bars plaintiffs' complaint because their

actions were associated with judicial proceedings and were undertaken in their role as advocates for

the state. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Absolute immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

developed from a tradition of common-law immunity from tort claims for prosecutors performing

official functions. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124-25 (1997). Like its common-law origins,

the doctrine is motivated by an "interest in enabling [prosecutors] to exercise independent judgment

when 'deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court'" and in protecting the judicial

process. Id. at 125 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976)). "[T]he official seeking

absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in

question." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991).

In Burns, the court held that a prosecutor's "appearance in court in support of an application

for a search warrant and the presentation of evidence at that hearing are protected by absolute

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-07-00688 RMW

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immunity." 500 U.S. at 492. Kalina went further by holding that the preparation and filing of

documents to obtain an arrest warrant were also part of an advocate's function and thus protected by

absolute immunity. 522 U.S. at 129; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 ("[T]he duties of the

prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a

prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom."). However, the Kalina court found that in

personally attesting to the truth of facts in a Certification for Determination of Probable Cause, the

defendant performed the function of a complaining witness, who did not enjoy absolute immunity at

common law. 522 U.S. at 129-31.

[The defendant's] drafting of the certification, her determination that the evidence was

sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause finding, her decision to file charges, and

her presentation of the information and the motion to the court[,] . . . . even the selection

of the particular facts to include in the certification to provide the evidentiary support for

the finding of probable cause required the exercise of the judgment of the advocate.

Id. at 130. However, "[t]estifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer." Id.

Thus, while much of the conduct involved in preparing a declaration in support of an arrest warrant

is entitled to absolute immunity, the issue ultimately turns on a fact-specific, functional analysis.

Plaintiffs argue that absolute immunity does not apply to Sarsfield and Simpson because the

facts of this case are analogous to those in Kalina. Plaintiffs' central allegation is that Simpson made

misrepresentations in the affidavit he submitted to obtain the search warrant. Compl. ¶ 10; Pls.

Supp. Br. Regarding the Eleventh Amendment and Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity at 2:9-11. In

making these representations Simpson, like the defendant in Kalina, performed the function of a

complaining witness and not that of an advocate for the state. Against this conclusion defendants

cite broad language in Burns about the judicial nature of obtaining a search warrant, but they have

not shown that the specific function Simpson performed is entitled to immunity.

C. State Law Immunity

Simpson argues that state law immunity bars plaintiffs' complaint because the alleged

conduct was within the scope of his employment. California law provides that "[a] public employee

is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative

proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable

cause." Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6. However, this provision does not bar claims under 42 U.S.C. §

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 Defendants have not disputed the characterization of this lawsuit as a claim under section 1983.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-07-00688 RMW

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1983.2 County of L.A. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 212, 227-29 (2000) (finding that section

821.6, as a state law "ceiling on damages[,] is unenforceable in an action brought under section

1983" because of the federal interest in uniformity of damages); Kaplan v. Labarbera, 58 Cal. App.

4th 175, 180 (1997) ("State immunity statutes do not offer protection from actions brought under 42

United States Code section 1983."); see also Gensburg v. Miller, 31 Cal. App. 4th 512, 518-19

(1994) (finding that "any state or common law causes of action are barred by section 821.6" but one

"must look to federal law to determine the scope of immunity of governmental officials from a

section 1983 suit"); Elene H. v. County of L.A., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1445, 1451 (1990) (same).

D. Applicability of Heck

In the alternative, defendants ask the court to dismiss this case in light of Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that

in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question

by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A claim for damages bearing

that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.

Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted). An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for an alleged

illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based is barred by Heck until

criminal charges have been dismissed or the conviction has been overturned. Harvey v. Waldron,

210 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000). This rule "avoid[s] the potential for inconsistent

determinations on the legality of a search and seizure in the civil and criminal cases" and is

consistent with the strong judicial policy, emphasized by the Heck court, in favor of preserving

consistency and finality and preventing collateral attacks on convictions. Id. at 1015. However, as

plaintiffs point out, there have been no criminal convictions in the underlying case, nor are there

criminal charges pending, as the underlying action is for civil penalties under the California Health

and Safety Code and the California Business and Professions Code. 

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Although neither the court nor the parties were able to find case law applying Heck in a civil

context, it seems logical that Heck's rationale would extend to these circumstances. Even assuming

that Heck is not directly applicable, the court finds it appropriate to stay the present action so as not

to risk a result that would be inconsistent with the decision of the state court in the underlying

action.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion to

dismiss the complaint. The County is dismissed as a party. The motion to dismiss is denied as to

defendants Sarsfield and Simpson. The case is hereby stayed pending the resolution of the

underlying state court action.

DATED: 7/6/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-07-00688 RMW

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

William L. Marder bill@polarislawgroup.com 

Counsel for Defendants:

Stephan A. Barber sbarber@ropers.com

Nancy M. Battel nancy@battelaw.com

Christian B. Nielsen cbn@robinsonwood.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 7/9/07 /s/ MAG

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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