Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-02711/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-02711-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WILLIAM THOMPSON,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. _______________________________________

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No. C 03-2711 SBA (PR)

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for Stay and Abeyance [Docket

No. 21]. 

BACKGROUND

 Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in Humboldt County Superior Court on

March 13, 1989. The victim was Verl Patton, a homeless person who was shot once through the

head with a .22 caliber bullet. Patton was found on an abandoned warehouse dock known as the

Pigeon Coop, in the Old Town section of Eureka. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years to

life in prison. According to Petitioner, the case against him had three principal components: (1) his

admissions to his ex-wife and step-daughter that he shot the victim; (2) his statements to the police;

and (3) circumstantial evidence. Motion at 4.

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in part

because his attorney failed to present the testimony of an eyewitness, Ernest Turtle. According to

Petitioner, Turtle would have testified that he observed the shooting of Verl Patton by Ruben

Fragoso, aka "Chopi," and that Petitioner was not the shooter. Motion at 4. The California Court of

Appeal expressed the view that trial counsel was probably deficient. Specifically, counsel’s failure

to make greater efforts to locate Ernest Turtle prior to trial, and to make a motion to suppress

Petitioner’s statement to the District Attorney’s investigator, fell below the standard of

reasonableness. Baxter Decl. Ex. A. However, the court denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim on the ground that Petitioner was not prejudiced: Turtle was heavily intoxicated

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when he witnessed the murder and likely would not have been a credible witness, and the statement

that should have been suppressed amounted to “a complete denial of any involvement in the

shooting,” so its admission probably did not affect the outcome of the trial. Id. at 24. More

importantly, the case against Petitioner was very strong. In addition to his admissions to Thompson

and Johnson, he was seen in the days preceding the shooting carrying a rifle, which he destroyed

after the shooting and which was the same caliber as the weapon that killed the victim. Further,

another witness, Connie Cummings, testified that Petitioner called her house the night of the

shooting and asked her to bring him his rifle. Baxter Decl. Ex. B. Thus, there was no reasonable

probability that counsel’s errors affected the outcome of the trial. The Superior Court of Humboldt

County, reviewing Petitioner’s state habeas petition, made a similar determination. Baxter Decl. Ex.

B. 

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition. The first petition was dismissed for

failure to state cognizable federal grounds and for untimeliness. Petitioner filed an amended petition

on May 20, 2004, raising the following claims: (1) that he was denied the opportunity to present his

affirmative defense through the testimony of Ernest Turtle, and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. 

On March 3, 2006, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the petition should not be granted. 

The Order stated that Petitioner had raised claims cognizable in a § 2254 petition, and that he had

fully exhausted his remedies with respect to each of the claims. With respect to timeliness, the

Court found that Petitioner had alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that he may be entitled to

equitable tolling. 

On May 2, 2006, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the habeas petition as untimely. In

June 2006, Joseph Baxter substituted in as Petitioner's counsel. After receiving an extension of time

to file an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner filed the instant Motion to Stay and Abey

on August 3, 2006 (rather than filing an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss).

LEGAL STANDARD

 The general rule is that a district court must dismiss a federal habeas petition containing

claims that were not exhausted in state court. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). 

However, district courts have authority and discretion to stay mixed petitions to allow the petitioner

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to exhaust claims in state court. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005). Stay and abeyance

should be used only in limited circumstances. "Because granting a stay effectively excuses a

petitioner's failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate

when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his

claims first in state court. Moreover, even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district

court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are

plainly meritless." Id. at 277. "On the other hand, it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a

district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good cause for his

failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that

the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics." Id. at 278. A mixed petition

should not be stayed indefinitely; the district court should "place reasonable time limits on a

petitioner's trip to state court and back." Id.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a stay based on newly discovered evidence. This

evidence consists of two declarations, one from Petitioner's ex-wife Eva Thompson, and one from

his step-daughter Eva Marcia Johnson Barber. Both of them testified against Petitioner at his trial.

Ms. Thompson's declaration states, in relevant part: "I did not want to testify since I had very

little information to offer. However, Keith Taylor, the manager of the Humboldt County Indian

Justice Project (I am a Native American) would not accept all that I truthfully told him and coerced

me to testify against John Thompson." Thompson Decl. at ¶ 4. She states that Petitioner

consistently refused to talk to her about the "incident," but that she was harassed by the police and

by Mr. Taylor after it occurred. Id. at ¶¶ 5-8. Thompson states that Taylor threatened to have her

children taken away if she did not testify against Petitioner, and threatened to press charges against

her daughter Eva Johnson. Id. at ¶ 10. According to Thompson, “[a]t a certain point, it all became

too much,” and she agreed to testify against Petitioner. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12. However, she maintains,

Petitioner never admitted to her that he killed Verl Patton. Id. at ¶ 13. Thompson states her belief

that Ruben Fragoso (aka Chopi), not Petitioner, killed Verl Patton, but this belief is based on the

testimony of Ernest Turtle, not on anything Petitioner told her. 

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Ms. Johnson’s declaration states that Keith Taylor put intense pressure on her and her mother

to testify against Petitioner. Johnson Decl. at ¶ 2. She states that she did not want to be separated

from her mother, and that she wanted to see Petitioner arrested because she did not like the way he

treated her and her mother. Id. at ¶ 4. She says, “I know very little about the incident which led to

the charges against John Thompson. The little I knew was mostly from my mom.” Id. at ¶ 3. 

However, she also says that “[a]t no time did my stepfather John Thompson ever say that he shot or

killed somebody. On the contrary, on the only occasions he talked about the incident, he said that

Chopi shot the victim. who I later learned was Verl Patton.” Id. at ¶ 6.

These declarations were obtained by Petitioner’s counsel in July 2006, shortly after he began

representing Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the declarations constitute newly-discovered

evidence, because although “he may have known that [Thompson and Johnson] testified falsely in

court, he had absolutely no way of proving it.” Motion at 7. Petitioner states that he did not know

until receiving the declarations that Johnson and Thompson were pressured to testify; he states that

he has had very little contact with these witnesses while incarcerated. John Thompson Decl. at ¶¶ 1-

3. It was only due to the efforts of counsel that these two witnesses have recanted their trial

testimony. 

The first question is whether or not the petition is now “mixed.” The stay and abeyance

procedure only applies to petitions with some exhausted claims and some unexhausted claims. 

When a federal habeas petitioner presents new evidence “such as to place the case in a significantly

different and stronger evidentiary posture than it was when the state courts considered it, the state

courts must be given an opportunity to consider the evidence.” Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881, 883

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Dispensa v. Lynaugh, 826 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 1987)). However, if the

new evidence does not “fundamentally alter” a claim already presented to the state courts, but

simply provides additional support for the claim, then there is no failure to exhaust. Landrigan v.

Schriro, 441 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). The Court finds that the new evidence

Petitioner seeks to present should be considered first by the state courts – recantations of key

prosecution witnesses is more than mere support for existing claims. Instead, Petitioner is making a

new claim of actual innocence. Thus, the petition is now mixed, and a stay should be granted if the

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Arguably, this is an exhausted petition to which Petitioner wishes to add an unexhausted claim

(not a mixed petition). The Ninth Circuit had, before Rhines, adopted a three-step procedure in which

unexhausted claims were dismissed, the exhausted petition was held in abeyance while the unexhausted

claims were exhausted, and the petitioner was then allowed to amend the petition to reinsert those

claims. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2005). “The two approaches are distinct:

Rhines applies to stays of mixed petitions, whereas the three-step procedure applies to stays of fully

exhausted petitions and requires additional steps – the amendment of the original mixed petition and a

second amendment to add the newly exhausted claims.” Id. at 661. The Ninth Circuit has not decided

whether the standard articulated in Rhines applies to the three-step procedure, but it did comment that

the three-step procedure seems unnecessarily cumbersome and may fall into disuse after Rhines. Id. Rhines articulated the standard district courts should use in deciding whether or not to grant stays in

habeas cases and that standard should apply whether this is viewed as a mixed petition or an exhausted

petition to which new claim will be added after it is exhausted. 

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Rhines test is met.1

Accordingly, the Court must decide whether there is good cause for Petitioner’s failure to

exhaust. There is little case law on what constitutes “good cause,” but the Ninth Circuit has held

that an “extraordinary circumstances” test should not be applied. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661

(9th Cir. 2005). Respondent argues that Petitioner did not exercise “due diligence to obtain the

declarations” he now seeks to present to the state court, because he admits that he knew all along

that the two witnesses had testified falsely at his trial. Petitioner claims that although he may have

believed that they testified falsely, he was unable to conduct an investigation and obtain evidence of

that until after he obtained counsel. Respondent contends that pro se status is no excuse. It is true

that in the context of the “cause and prejudice” standard for overcoming a procedural bar to a habeas

petition, a pro se petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the law does not constitute cause. See Hughes v.

Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). But the “cause” standard for

overcoming a procedural bar is not necessarily the same as “good cause” for obtaining a stay. At

least one court in another district of this circuit has held that they are the same, see Hernandez v.

Sullivan, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1206-07 (C.D. Cal. 2005). However, another court has articulated a

standard under which good cause is shown if “a justifiable, legitimate reason exists which warrants

the delay of federal proceedings.” Briscoe v. Scribner, 2005 WL 3500499 at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 

This Court finds the latter standard to be persuasive. There may be any number of reasons why the

witnesses did not recant their trial testimony until now, which have nothing to do with Petitioner’s

lack of diligence. Thus, the Court finds that there was good cause for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust. 

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2 In hisreply brief, Petitioner also arguesthat the new declarationsformthe basisfor a new claim

of violation of Brady v. Maryland, 375 U.S. 83 (1963), which holds that the prosecution must disclose

material exculpatory evidence to the defense. However, Petitioner offers absolutely no factual support

for the assertion that the prosecution knew that the two witnesses testified falsely and failed to disclose

that to the defense. Thompson and Johnson state that they were pressured to testify by Keith Taylor;

they do not claim that Taylor was acting on the instructions of the district attorney or that they were

pressured directly by anyone on the prosecution team. They do not say that the prosecution knew that

their testimony was false, either at the time of trial or anytime thereafter. Thus, unless Petitioner has

some other evidence, his Brady claim is not colorable. 

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Respondent makes a conclusory accusation that Petitioner’s failure to ask the two witnesses

to recant their trial testimony constitutes intentional delay, but offers no factual or legal support for

its assertion. The Supreme Court’s concern about dilatory tactics in Rhines was primarily directed to

prisoners facing the death penalty: “not all petitioners have an incentive to obtain federal relief as

quickly as possible. In particular, capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to

prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the sentence of death.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-

78. Petitioner is not on death row; he has every incentive to have his habeas petition reviewed on

the merits quickly. Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner has not engaged in intentionally dilatory

litigation tactics. 

However, the more difficult question remains: is Petitioner’s unexhausted claim potentially

meritorious? Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to a stay because his actual innocence

claim is “is not cognizable on federal habeas review.” Opposition at 4 (citing Hererra v. Collins,

506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993)). However, this is an overstatement. Herrera actually said that, in noncapital cases, “[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been

held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation

occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” 

Petitioner is not attempting to establish a “free-standing” actual innocence claim in

contravention of Herrera. Rather, as Respondent acknowledges, the new declarations and claim of

actual innocence are intertwined with Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.2

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noted, the state courts indicated that Petitioner’s counsel was most likely deficient, but rejected his

ineffective assistance claim because there was no prejudice. The prejudice calculus may be altered

by the fact that Thompson and Johnson now recant their testimony. 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner must show that “the newly discovered evidence

probably would have resulted in his acquittal” in order to merit habeas relief. Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5

F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1993). “Evidence which suggests only that some other individual

might have committed the crime rather than showing that the defendant did not commit the crime is

insufficient to meet the ‘probability of acquittal’ standard.” Id. Petitioner asserts that, “while the

evidence is still in conflict, the weight of the evidence now points to actual innocence." Motion at 8. 

However, even taking into account Turtle’s testimony that another man killed Verl Patton, the

Thompson and Johnson recantations, and the exclusion of Petitioner’s statement the District

Attorney’s investigator, Petitioner admits that there remains circumstantial evidence against him. Id.

at 9. In particular, the fact that Petitioner was seen with a rifle before the shooting, asked for his

rifle on the night of the shooting, and destroyed the rifle after the shooting is strong circumstantial

evidence of his guilt.

However, Rhines simply asks whether the unexhausted claim is “plainly meritless.” 544 U.S.

at 277. Although the Court doubts that the new declarations will probably result in Petitioner’s

acquittal, his claim of actual innocence combined with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

is not plainly meritless. The new declarations certainly add strength to the prejudice prong of his

ineffective assistance claim. Accordingly, the state court should have the opportunity to decide

Petitioner’s claims in light of the new evidence. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s actual innocence claim has no likelihood of success

because it is untimely, just as the rest of his habeas petition is untimely. Opposition at 2. As noted

in the Order to Show Cause, Petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling because he retained an

attorney to pursue a federal habeas petition in 1997, and the attorney failed to file anything. See

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that equitable tolling was appropriate

where an attorney was retained to prepare a petition and failed to do so). In addition, AEDPA

provides in relevant part that the one-year limitations period runs from "the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). As discussed, it appears that the facts at issue here were

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Further, the new claim may “relate back” to the original claims. An amended habeas petition

filed after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations may still be timely if it relates back to the original,

timely-filed petition. The Supreme Court has held that, “[s]o long as the original and amended petitions

state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.” Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). It is also worth noting that the Ninth Circuit has suggested that, where a

petitioner makes a sufficient showing of actual innocence, the AEDPA statute of limitations may be

overridden. Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2002).

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undiscovered until this late date for reasons other than Petitioner's lack of diligence.3 Accordingly,

the Court finds that there is a reasonable possibility that Petitioner's unexhausted claims are timely,

and thus they "potentially meritorious." The Rhines test is satisfied.

Finally, Petitioner requests that the Court appoint counsel, as he is unable to continue paying

Mr. Baxter. John Thompson Decl. at ¶ 4. The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel does not apply in

habeas corpus actions. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479

U.S. 867 (1986). However, a district court is authorized to appoint counsel to represent a habeas

petitioner whenever "the court determines that the interests of justice so require" and such person is

financially unable to obtain representation. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The decision to appoint

counsel is within the discretion of the district court. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987); Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. Appointment is

mandatory only when the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is

necessary to prevent due process violations, see Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196, and whenever an

evidentiary hearing is required, see Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; United

States v. Duarte-Higareda, 68 F.3d 369, 370 (9th Cir. 1995); Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1234. The Court

finds that the appointment of counsel is not necessary at this time. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance is GRANTED. 

Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Petitioner shall pursue state court remedies within 30

days after the stay is entered. Petitioner shall notify this Court within 30 days after state court

proceedings are complete. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 (quoting Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 381

(2d Cir. 2001) (stating that such a timeline is normally appropriate)). 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the clerk shall administratively close this case. The

case will be reopened and the stay vacated upon notification by Petitioner that state court

proceedings are complete. See Aguro v. Woodford, 2006 WL 889473 at *2 (N.D. Cal. April 5, 2006)

(Hamilton, J.) (granting stay and ordering the clerk to administratively close the case). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:_9/29/06 ______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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