Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02909/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02909-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Delmo Figura Torrefranca, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro; and the Attorney General

of the State of Arizona, 

Respondents.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-05-2909-PHX-DGC (GEE)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Petitioner Delmo Torrefranca’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and United States Magistrate Judge Glenda

Edmond’s report and recommendation (“R&R”). Dkt. ##1, 22. The R&R recommends that

the Court deny the petition. Dkt. #22 at 19. Petitioner has filed an objection to the R&R.

Dkt. #25. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will accept the R&R and deny the

petition.

I. Background.

On February 14, 2000, Petitioner was indicted in Arizona state court on one count of

sexual conduct with a minor and two counts of sexual abuse. The alleged victim was

Petitioner’s 12-year-old stepdaughter, J.F. Petitioner was convicted by a jury on all counts

on April 11, 2001, and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and lifetime probation on

June 6, 2001.

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence. The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences on October 1, 2002. The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review on May 15, 2003.

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court on May 29, 2003.

The trial court denied the petition on September 21, 2004. The court of appeals denied

review on August 11, 2005.

Petitioner commenced this action on September 22, 2005. Dkt. #1. The petition

asserts fourteen grounds for relief. Id. Respondents filed an answer on June 8, 2006, and

Petitioner filed a reply on June 29, 2006. Dkt. ##20-21. The Magistrate Judge filed her

R&R on July 13, 2006, and Petitioner filed his objection on August 28, 2006. Dkt. ##22, 25.

II. Analysis.

A. Standard of Review.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

the Court may not grant habeas relief unless it concludes that the State’s “adjudication of the

claim – (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)-(2). Nor may the Court grant habeas relief under the AEDPA unless Petitioner

has exhausted his claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999).

B. First Ground for Relief.

Petitioner contends in his first ground for relief that the trial court’s failure to allow

Petitioner’s wife, Mercedes Torrefranca, to testify at trial through an interpreter violated his

rights under the Confrontation and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States

Constitution. Dkt. #1 at 5. The state called Mercedes as a witness during its case-in-chief.

Dkt. #20, Ex. E at 8-17. Petitioner argued that Mercedes needed an interpreter because her

English was poor. Id. The trial court questioned Mercedes outside the presence of the jury

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The court of appeals stated the following in affirming the trial court’s decision: 

We have reviewed the record, including the trial court’s interview with

Mercedes and Mercedes’s testimony. During that testimony, Mercedes

conceded that she could speak and read English and that she did so in her work

as a machine operator. While it is apparent that Mercedes is not perfectly

fluent in English, her testimony was fully comprehensible. The [trial] court

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint an additional interpreter.

 Dkt. #20 Ex. FF ¶ 12.

- 3 -

and found that she had sufficient command of English to testify without an interpreter. Id.

Mercedes testified at trial, confirming that she told the police that she once told Petitioner:

“[D]on’t do something to [J.F.], she’s your daughter now.” Id. at 156, 159. 

Petitioner contends that without the aid of an interpreter, Mercedes was unable to

adequately explain this statement and Petitioner was unable effectively to cross-examine her.

Dkt. #1 at 5-8. The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner has not, by clear and

convincing evidence, shown that the trial court’s finding that Mercedes was able to testify

without an interpreter was unreasonable. Dkt. #22 at 10-11 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

The Magistrate Judge further concludes that the court of appeals did not clearly err in

affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the request for an interpreter. Id. at 11.1

Petitioner objects to these conclusions on the ground that the Magistrate Judge

“is trying to argue, and mislead this Court to believe, that Mercedes was able to understand

and respond appropriately to the attorneys’ questions.” Dkt. #25 at 4. Petitioner states that

the Magistrate Judge “should have made a finding of fact based on the evidence presented

by Petitioner in his [petition], rather than her own arguments, while ignoring or not

considering a single fact that supports Petitioner’s claims.” Id.

Petitioner’s objection is not well-taken. The Magistrate Judge readily acknowledges

that Mercedes was not fluent in English and that she sometimes had problems expressing

herself in English. Dkt. #22 at 10-11. The Magistrate Judge concludes from all of the

evidence, however, that the trial court’s finding that Mercedes understood the questions

asked of her and responded with sufficient clarity to be understood by the jury was not

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Petitioner contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in failing to hold an evidentiary

hearing. Dkt. #25 at 5 (citing Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004)). The

trial court, however, had Mercedes take the stand and answer questions regarding her ability

to speak English and heard argument from counsel on the issue. Dkt. #20, Ex. E at 8-17.

The Magistrate Judge was thus not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Perez v.

Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, (9th Cir. 2006) (“Where a state court has already made the relevant

- 4 -

incorrect or unreasonable. Id.

The Court has reviewed the complete testimony of Mercedes and agrees with the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion. Mercedes was able to answer the vast majority of the

questions clearly and without the need for any clarification. Dkt. #20, Ex. E at 147-171. In

the few instances where she did request clarification, she appears to have understood the

question as clarified and answered appropriately. Id. Moreover, defense counsel questioned

Mercedes carefully on cross-examination and appears to have encountered no difficulty

making every point he desired. Id. In short, Petitioner has not shown that the trial judge’s

decision concerning the need for a translator was incorrect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e);

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (stating that § 2254(d) imposes a highly

deferential standard for evaluating state court decisions and demands that such decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).

The Magistrate Judge also concludes that Petitioner cannot show prejudice because

Mercedes clearly testified that she never suspected Petitioner of any wrongdoing, and

Petitioner does not explain what further testimony he would have elicited had Mercedes been

allowed to testify through an interpreter. Dkt. #22 at 11. Petitioner does not address this

issue in his objection other than by asserting that Respondents “waived their defense and

chose not to argue this claim.” Dkt. #25 at 4. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion. Mercedes testified that she never saw Petitioner touch J.F. in an inappropriate

way, that she did not suspect Petitioner of molesting J.F., that she would have moved out of

the house had she suspected molestation, and that she would not lie to protect Petitioner if

he had molested her daughter. Dkt. #20, Ex. E at 164-67. Petitioner has not shown

prejudice. The Court will accept the R&R with respect to the first ground for relief.2

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

findings of fact, district court evidentiary hearings would have no purpose if not to produce

new evidence possibly contradicting those state court findings.”). 

3

Respondents stated in their answer that they were unable to locate a copy of the

videotape. Dkt. #20 at 27 n.4. The Court ordered Respondents to notify the Court whether

the original or a copy of the tape in fact existed and, if so, to submit a copy of the tape to the

Court. Dkt. #26. On January 10, 2007, Respondents filed copies of two videotapes of

Petitioner’s interview with Sergeant Roberts. Dkt. #31 Exs. QQ & RR. One tape was

admitted at Petitioner’s Miranda and voluntariness hearing held on April 3, 2001, and the

other tape (a redacted version) was admitted at trial on April 6, 2001. Id. The Court has

reviewed the videotapes in connection with this order.

- 5 -

C. Second Ground for Relief.

Petitioner argues in his second ground for relief that his waiver of his Miranda rights

was not knowing and intelligent and that his statements to the police were involuntary under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dkt. #1 at 9-13. Following his

arrest, Petitioner was interviewed by Sergeant Mary Roberts of the Phoenix Police

Department. The entire interview was videotaped. Dkt. ##20 Ex. C, 31 Exs. QQ & RR.3

During the interview, Petitioner repeatedly denied having sexual intercourse with J.F.

Petitioner admitted, however, that he “almost had sex with her” and was tempted to do so.

Petitioner told Sergeant Roberts about an incident in his bathroom in which his penis might

have touched J.F.’s vagina. Dkt. #20 Exs. F at 41-49, G at 24; Dkt. #31 Exs. QQ & RR.

Sergeant Roberts testified at the Miranda and voluntariness hearing that she read

Petitioner his Miranda rights from a prepared card and that he waived those rights. Dkt. #20,

Ex. C at 90-93. Sergeant Roberts further testified that Petitioner did not appear to be

intoxicated or impaired when he waived his Miranda rights. Id. The trial court viewed the

videotape of the interview during a recess in the hearing. Id. at 106, 131. The trial court

found that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights:

I have read [the] briefs and some additional cases. I have considered all of the

circumstances and standards set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3988. It does not appear

to me that the defendant failed to understand his Miranda rights. There was

no physical coercion apparent, no other type of coercion that impacts the

voluntariness of [his statements] in my perception.

Id. at 134. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Dkt. #20, Ex. FF ¶¶ 21-22.

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

1. Did Petitioner Knowingly and Intelligently Waive his Miranda

Rights?

The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived

his Miranda rights. Dkt. #22 at 12. Petitioner states in his objection that the Magistrate

Judge “is trying to mislead this Court to believe that there was no government coercion” and

that she “acted as if facts supporting Petitioner’s claim did not exist at all.” Dkt. #25 at 6.

Petitioner further states that the “[s]tate court administered the proceeding with ‘an evil eye

and uneven hand’ and made its decision based on ‘whatever’ the Respondents wanted.” Id.

In short, Petitioner simply disagrees with the conclusions of the state court and the Magistrate

Judge on this issue.

The “trial court’s determination that [Petitioner] knowingly and intelligently waived

his Miranda rights is entitled to a presumption of correctness[.]” Derrick v. Peterson, 924

F.2d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Court agrees

with the Magistrate Judge that Petitioner has failed to do so. See Dkt. #22 at 12.

In determining that Petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights,

the trial court viewed the videotape of Petitioner’s interview and heard testimony from expert

witnesses and both Petitioner and Sergeant Roberts. The trial court readily acknowledged

that Petitioner had some language impediments and was not able to understand some of the

questions asked during the interview. Dkt. #20, Ex. C at 134. Similarly, the court of appeals

acknowledged that Petitioner did not speak fluent English, but concluded from the videotape

that he fully understood that he was waiving his Miranda rights:

The most important evidence was the videotape of Torrefranca’s interview

with the police. The detective read him his rights in a clear, articulate manner

and made no promises or threats. While Torrefranca does speak what could

be termed “broken” English, he appears to have understood the situation and

the great majority of the detective’s questions.

Dkt. #20, Ex. FF ¶ 20.

Having viewed the videotape of Petitioner’s interview with Sergeant Roberts, the

Court concludes that Petitioner “has failed to meet his burden of showing by ‘convincing

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

evidence’ that the [state court] . . . erroneously found that [Petitioner] was capable of

understanding the Miranda warnings. Derrick, 924 F.2d at 824; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e).

2. Were Petitioner’s Statements to the Police Made Voluntarily?

The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner’s statements to the police were made

voluntarily because there was no evidence of improper government coercion. Dkt. #22 at 12.

Petitioner objects to this conclusion on the ground that the Magistrate Judge ignored the

evidence that supports Petitioner’s claim. Dkt. #25 at 7. Petitioner argues in his petition that

Sergeant Roberts improperly coerced him into making incriminating statements by telling

him that he had to confess if “something happened” between Petitioner and J.F., by

confronting him with false medical evidence, and by threatening him with “more trouble”

if he was lying about not having sexual contact with J.F. Dkt. #1 at 9-11. Specifically,

Petitioner contends that the following statements by Sergeant Roberts constituted improper

coercion:

If something happened you’ve got to tell me because I’m gonna know because

we have these tests we do. Okay? They are medical tests. [They] will show

me what happened. And if you’re lying, Delmo, I don’t want you to get in

more trouble and have people say look [at him] he’s sitting here and lying to

us.

. . . .

[I]f your penis went inside her, I will know. There’s no doubt. It happens all

the time. The doctor will go in, she’ll see it, she’ll take pictures, and I’ll bring

it to court and I’m gonna show it to the court and I’m gonna show it to the jury

and then I’m gonna say he sat right here and lied. He told me that the 12-yearold girl was a liar, and they’ll put her up on the stand also. Okay? I mean this

is your, this is the chance. This is the chance to explain it. I mean if she did

something[,] if she came on to you, if it was an accidental thing where she’s

on top of you and it could have went inside, I need to know it now. Okay?

This is your chance to explain it.

See Dkt. ##1 ¶¶ 45-48, 20 Ex. N, 31 Exs. QQ & RR.

“[T]he ultimate issue of ‘voluntariness’ is a legal question requiring independent

federal determination.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985). In evaluating the

voluntariness of a confession, the reviewing court must determine whether “‘the challenged

confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution.’”

Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S.

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

at 112). “The test is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the government

obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so

that the suspect’s will was overborne.” United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366

(9th Cir. 1987)

In this case, there is no evidence that Petitioner’s will was overborne. Petitioner’s

interview with Sergeant Roberts lasted approximately 45 minutes. Petitioner was not

handcuffed or physically restrained during the interview, nor was he physically threatened

or promised any benefits. With respect to the interview itself, Sergeant Roberts’ statements

regarding the medical tests were based on information that Petitioner had engaged in sexual

intercourse with J.F. Sergeant Roberts merely provided Petitioner with her view that the

alleged sexual intercourse would leave some physical evidence. These statements were not

coercive. Petitioner repeatedly denied having sexual intercourse with J.F. Sergeant Roberts’

statements that Petitioner had to tell her if something happened between Petitioner and J.F.

and that it was his chance to do so were not so coercive as to render Petitioner’s statements

involuntary. See United States v. Gamez, 301 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

law enforcement agent’s comment that it would “behoove” the defendant to disclose what

he knew about a murder and that it was his “last chance” to come forward did not amount to

psychological coercion). Nor did Sergeant Roberts’ exhortations that Petitioner tell the truth

render his statements involuntary. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 56 (1895)

(“[T]elling a man to be sure to tell the truth is not advising him to confess anything of which

he is not really guilty.”); United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1975) (“‘[A]n

officer’s admonition to tell the truth . . . does not of itself measure up to a paradoxical breach

of the Constitution or coercive pressure rendering the statement involuntary.’”) (citation

omitted).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s

interview complied with Constitutional requirements. See United States v. Haswood, 350

F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant, who repeatedly denied that he

had molested a young girl, was not improperly coerced into admitting that he in fact touched

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

See also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (“Before petitioner made any

incriminating statements, he received partial warnings of his constitutional rights . . . . The

fact that the police misrepresented the statements that [the co-suspect] had made is . . .

insufficient in our view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.”);

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant’s

confession was voluntary despite the fact that he was wearing only a blanket and underwear

at the time of questioning, he was detained overnight without anything to eat or drink, and

police officers had encouraged him to tell the truth and misrepresented evidence about the

crime) (citing Frazier); Miller, 984 F.2d at 1031 (“The FBI did not deceive Miller. However,

even if it had, deception does not render [his] confession involuntary.”) (citing Frazier).

- 9 -

the girl on three occasions where the police officer accused him of lying during a polygraph

test and showed him a newspaper article that illustrated the possible consequences of lying

about sexual abuse).4

The Court will accept the R&R with respect to the second ground for relief. 

D. Third Ground for Relief.

The state’s expert witness, Wendy Dutton, testified at Petitioner’s trial that (1) child

victims are “overwhelmingly” abused by family members or someone they know, rather than

by strangers, and tend to delay disclosure of the abuse when they have a close personal

relationship with the abuser, (2) recantation by child victims is “not uncommon” when they

have been abused by family members, and (3) while false accusations do occur, “[i]t’s

generally rare.” Dkt. #20, Ex. E at 23-69. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred

in overruling Petitioner’s objection to Ms. Dutton’s testimony that child victims are

overwhelmingly abused by family members or someone they know. Dkt. #20, Ex. FF ¶ 27.

The court concluded, however, that the error was harmless and did not deny Petitioner a fair

trial because there was no evidence that someone other than Petitioner had abused J.F. Id.

¶ 29.

Petitioner contends in his third ground for relief that his right to a fair trial was

violated because Ms. Dutton improperly vouched for the veracity of children’s reports of

sexual abuse. Dkt. #1 at 14-17. The Magistrate Judge concludes that Ms. Dutton’s testimony

did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights because Ms. Dutton did not interview J.F. and

testified only about general patterns of behavior, the improper vouching was indirect and

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

isolated, the prosecutor did not draw attention to the improper testimony in his closing

arguments, and the trial court properly instructed the jury that it was the sole judge of the

credibility of witnesses. Dkt. #22 at 14 (citing Dkt. #20 Exs. E & G). Petitioner objects to

the conclusion that the improper vouching was indirect and isolated based on the fact that the

jury asked the following four questions: “How rare is lying about being abused? Why is it

rare? How rare is recanting? Why is recanting done?” Dkt. #25 at 8 (citing Dkt. #20, Ex. E

at 60). Petitioner also objects to the conclusion that the prosecutor did not draw attention to

the improper testimony in closing arguments. Id. (citing Dkt. #20, Ex. G at 88, 113).

With respect to the first objection, Petitioner cites no testimony by Ms. Dutton in

which she explicitly vouched for the credibility and reliability of J.F.’s testimony. The

Magistrate Judge is correct that Ms. Dutton did not interview J.F. (or any other witness) and

testified only about general patterns of behavior based on her training, experience, and

research. Dkt. #22 at 14 (citing Dkt. #20, Ex. E at 33). Moreover, the trial court declined

to answer the jury’s questions and instructed the jurors that they were “the sole judges of

what happened,” thereby minimizing any prejudicial effect of the alleged improper vouching.

Dkt. #20, Exs. E at 63, G at 68.

With respect to the second objection, the Court finds that the prosecutor did draw

attention to Ms. Dutton’s testimony in closing arguments. Id. Ex. G at 84-85, 88, 90, 110,

113, 115. Petitioner correctly points out that the prosecutor argued to the jury that

Ms. Dutton’s testimony “collaborat[ed] [sic] the victim’s testimony that [the] events

happened as she described.” Dkt. #25 at 8 (citing Dkt. #20, Ex. G at 88).

To obtain habeas relief, however, a petitioner must do more than show that admission

of testimony was clearly erroneous. He must show a “‘failure to observe that fundamental

fairness essential to the very concept of justice.’” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,

642 (1974) (quoting Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)). He also must show

that “‘the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be

of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d

1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Lisbena, 314 U.S. at 236). “Unless fundamental fairness

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

is abridged, federal court interference is unwarranted.” Id.; see Wainright v. Goode, 464 U.S.

78, 83 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that federal courts may intervene in the state judicial process

only to correct wrongs of a constitutional dimension.”); McCafferty v. Leapley, 944 F.2d 445,

452 (8th Cir. 1991) (“More than a finding of trial error or even of plain error is required to

justify habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary ruling. An evidentiary error violates a

defendant’s due process rights only when the error complained of is so gross, conspicuously

prejudicial, or otherwise of such magnitude that it fatally infects the trial.”) (citations

omitted).

In this case, Ms. Dutton did not testify as to the veracity or credibility of J.F. or any

other witness. Rather, she offered her opinion regarding the behavioral characteristics that

affect the veracity of sexual abuse victims in general. Dkt. #20, Ex. E at 23-60. The trial

court instructed the jury as follows:

You, as jurors, are the sole judges of what happened. . . . [I]t’s your decision

and yours alone to evaluate the credibility and believability of all the

witnesses, both expert and non-expert and the weight to be given to all

testimony. You should not rely on any expert to tell you what result you

should reach.

Id. Ex. G at 68-70 (emphasis added). To the extent Ms. Dutton did improperly vouch for

J.F.’s credibility, the trial court’s instruction mitigated the prejudicial effect of the improper

testimony. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645 (holding that the prosecutor’s improper comment

that the defendant hoped the jury would find him guilty of a crime less than first-degree

murder did not violate the defendant’s due process rights where the trial court gave a curative

instruction). Given Petitioner’s and J.F.’s statements to Sergeant Roberts, and the trial

court’s instruction to the jury that it was the sole judge of what happened, Petitioner has not

shown that Ms. Dutton’s testimony rendered his “trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny him

due process.” Id.; see McCafferty, 944 F.2d at 454 (“Neither Haugland nor Dr. Curran were

asked directly whether they believed S.F. when she described the alleged [sexual] abuse;

their statements could only have inferentially placed the ‘stamp of believability’ defendant

complains of. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the statements so tainted

defendant’s trial that his right to due process was violated.”); Adesiji v. Minnesota, 854 F.2d

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

299, 301 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the admission of expert testimony on general patterns

of credibility among children reporting sexual abuse did not violate the defendant’s due

process rights given the testimony of the victim and other witnesses and the trial court’s

instruction that the jury was the sole judge of credibility).

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the state court’s decision regarding

the admission of Ms. Dutton’s testimony was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. Dkt. #22 at 14-15; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court

accordingly will accept the R&R with respect to the third ground for relief.

E. Fourth Through Twelfth Grounds for Relief.

Respondents argue that grounds four through twelve are procedurally defaulted

because Petitioner raised them for the first time in his state court petition for post-conviction

relief. Doc. #20 at 21-22. In their response to that petition, Respondents argued that the trial

court should summarily dismiss the petition because the claims had been waived under

Rule 32.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure since Petitioner had not raised the

claims in his direct appeal. Id. Ex. LL at 4-9. Respondents argued in the alternative that the

claims had no merit. Id. The trial court dismissed the petition “for the reasons and based on

the arguments presented by [Respondents].” Doc. #20, Ex. OO. The court of appeals

summarily denied review. Id. Ex. PP.

1. Procedural Default.

The Magistrate Judge concludes that grounds four through twelve are procedurally

defaulted because the state court dismissed the claims for procedural reasons. Dkt. #22 at 15

(citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) (stating that a claim denied on

alternative grounds does not vitiate a procedural bar)). Petitioner contends that even if he

“failed to abide by a state procedural rule, the Supreme Court has held that federal habeas

review of a defaulted claim is not precluded unless the state court’s opinion contains a plain

statement clearly and expressly relying on its procedural bar.” Dkt. #25 at 10 (citing Harris,

489 U.S. at 263).

Plaintiff’s reliance on Harris is misplaced. The “plain statement” rule applies only

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

if “‘it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law[.]’”

Harris, 489 U.S. at 261 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983)); see

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 736 (1991) (“Coleman contends that [the plain

statement] rule, by its terms, applies to all state court judgments, not just those that fairly

appear to rest primarily on federal law. Coleman has read the rule out of context. . . . Harris

describes the Long presumption, and hence its own, as applying only in those cases in which

‘it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision on federal law.’”); Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991) (“[T]he Harris presumption is to be applied only

after it has been determined that ‘the relevant state court decision fairly appears to rest

primarily on federal law[.]”) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 740; alterations omitted).

Moreover, “[w]hether there is a plain statement from the state court is not the first or most

significant inquiry.” Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991). “Only where

a federal court has good reason to question whether there is an independent and adequate

state ground for the decision will the Harris presumption apply.” Id.

Unlike the state court in Harris, which simply “laid the foundation” for a procedural

bar ruling by stating that the claims “could have been raised on direct appeal,” the trial court

in this case explicitly adopted Respondents’ procedural bar argument in summarily

dismissing the petition. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 266; Dkt. #20 Ex. LL. It does not fairly

appear that the trial court rested its decision primarily on federal law, and there is no good

reason to question whether there is an independent and adequate state ground for the

decision. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that grounds four through

twelve are procedurally defaulted. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“We . . . reject Carriger’s argument that Arizona’s reliance on his procedural default was so

unpredictable and irregular that it does not provide an adequate ground for disposal of his

claims.”).

2. Cause and Prejudice.

Procedural default may be excused if Petitioner can show cause and prejudice. Cause

is defined as “some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel’s efforts

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).

“[T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or

failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for procedural

default.” Id. at 486. To show prejudice, Petitioner “must show ‘not merely that the errors

at trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Id. at 494

(emphasis in original; citation and alteration omitted).

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise

the procedurally defaulted claims on direct appeal. The Magistrate Judge concludes that

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient

as required to show cause for procedural default. Dkt. #22 at 16; see Murray, 477 U.S. at

488 (“[T]he question of cause for procedural default does not turn on whether counsel erred

or on the kind of error counsel may have made. So long as a defendant is represented by

counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established

in Strickland v. Washington, . . . we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of

attorney error that results in a procedural default.”). Specifically, the Magistrate Judge

concludes that Petitioner has not shown that “appellate counsel omitted an issue that was

‘clearly stronger than the issue that counsel did present.’” Dkt. #22 at 16-17 (quoting Smith

v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)).

“[The] process of ‘winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on’ those

more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective

appellate advocacy.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (quoting Jones v. Barnes,

463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)). Petitioner asserts that it is “very clear and obvious” that the

issues omitted were stronger than the issues presented on direct appeal. Dkt. #25 at 12.

Petitioner, however, does not present any specific facts or arguments to allow the Court to

evaluate this conclusory assertion. See Dkt. #22 at 17. The Court agrees with the Magistrate

Judge’s conclusion that Petitioner has not shown cause for the procedural default.

The Magistrate Judge also concludes that Petitioner has not shown that the alleged

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

errors in grounds four through twelve reach the level of prejudice required to excuse his

default. Dkt. #22 at 17. Petitioner asserts that there are “hundreds and hundreds of errors”

and violations of his constitutional rights that support Petitioner’s claims. Dkt. #25 at 13.

Again, Petitioner does not present any specific facts or arguments to allow the Court to

evaluate this conclusory assertion. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion

that Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice.

The Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Petitioner has not

shown that he is actually innocent of the charges against him. See Dkt. #22 at 17. Petitioner

has not shown that, “in light of new evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable

jury would have found [P]etitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” House v. Bell, 126

S. Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006) (citation omitted).

The Court will accept the R&R with respect to grounds four through twelve.

F. Thirteenth and Fourteenth Grounds for Relief.

Petitioner contends in his thirteenth ground for relief that trial counsel was ineffective

by failing to do the following: investigate the charges, challenge the indictment, assert

speedy trial rights, suppress evidence, call an expert, and object to the prosecutor’s

misconduct. Dkt. #1 at 55-57. Petitioner contends in his fourteenth ground for relief that

appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise meritorious claims. Id. at 58.

Petitioner bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). To prevail on his claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show that his counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that Petitioner was thereby prejudiced.

Id. Petitioner can establish prejudice by showing that there is a “reasonable probability” that

the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. Id.

The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner has not shown that his counsel was

ineffective under Strickland because he has not specifically explained what counsel should

have done differently or how the proceedings would have been different if counsel’s

performance had not been deficient. Dkt. #22 at 19 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

Petitioner asserts in his objection that the Magistrate Judge’s “bias” in favor of Respondents

prevents her from seeing that “there are hundreds and hundreds of established, uncontested

and proven undeniable facts supporting Petitioner’s claim[.]” Dkt. #25 at 13. Petitioner,

however, has presented no evidence to support the alleged improper bias on the part of the

Magistrate Judge. Nor does Petitioner specifically explain why the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion is incorrect. The Court accordingly will accept the R&R with respect to the

thirteenth and fourteenth grounds for relief. See Sullivan v. Schriro, No. CV-04-1517-PHXDGC, 2006 WL 1516005 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2006) (accepting R&R where the petitioner

failed to make specific objections to the proposed findings and recommendations of the

magistrate judge) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (“The district judge . . . shall make a de novo

determination . . . of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific

written objection has been made[.]”)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (same); Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (“[Section 636(b)(1)] does not . . . require any review at all . . . of

any issue that is not the subject of an objection.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation (Dkt. #22) is accepted as

set forth in this order.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied.

3. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 17th day of January, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-02909-DGC-GEE Document 32 Filed 01/18/07 Page 16 of 16