Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01850/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED ,_ United States Court of Appeaa!l Tenth Circuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 2 7 1991 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARGARITO SALMON, MAGDALENA SALMON, 

Individually and as next friend for 

MARGARITO SALMON, JR., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

MARTIN R. SCHWARZ and 

ARTURO A. GONZALEZ, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1850 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. Civil 85-1262 C) 

Freddi Lipstein, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (John R. Bolton, Assistant 

Attorney General; William L. Lutz, United States Attorney; and, 

John F. Cordes, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with him on the brief), for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Kevin J. Hanratty, Artesia, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN, Circuit Judge, and BROWN*. 

District Judge. 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge. 

* Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 1 
This is an appeal by the defendant-appellants, Arturo A. 

Gonzalez and Martin Schwarz, from the district court's denial of 

their motions for summary judgment. Both Gonzalez and Schwarz are 

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who 

claim that they are immune from suit for allegedly wrongful acts 

in obtaining and executing an arrest warrant for Margarito Salmon 

(Salmon), and resulting claims for damages by Salmon, his wife and 

son. 

I 

In early 1984 the FBI in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was 

contacted by the Detroit Division of the FBI regarding an 

investigation into narcotics laws violations by subjects in 

Detroit traveling to Artesia, New Mexico, for the purpose of 

buying heroin. I R., Doc. 91 at 2 (Gonzalez, summary judgment 

affidavit). As a result, the Bureau's Albuquerque field office 

conducted physical surveillance of several suspected narcotics 

traffickers in Artesia, New Mexico. In July 1984 the surveillance 

intensified as the FBI obtained judicial authorization to 

intercept the suspects' wire communications and to install a pen 

register on one suspect's telephone. According to the defendants 

the surveillance was complicated because the suspects spoke 

Spanish which necessitated the transfer of Spanish-speaking agents 

to Artesia from other areas. These agents found it difficult to 

identify the participants in the monitored conversations because 

they lacked prior knowledge of the suspects. 

The police logs of intercepted telephone calls show that one 

suspect, Carrera, often phoned someone called "Margarito." 

2 

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Gonzalez intercepted one such call to "Margarito" involving 

illegal drugs on August S, 1984. The police logs for that day 

merely identify the person called as "Margarito LNU" (last name 

unknown). Three days later Carrera received a call allegedly 

involving drugs from "Pepe" who resided in Juarez, Mexico. 

Immediately following this discussion, Carrera phoned the 

Plainsman Phillips 66 gas station (Plainsman 66) and asked to 

speak to Margarito. After Carrera was informed that Margarito was 

not at the station, Carrera immediately dialed another number and 

asked for Margarito. Although Carrera never mentioned Margarito's 

last name in any of the intercepted calls or gave any further 

identification evidence, this last telephone number called proved 

to be Margarito Salmon's. IR., Doc. 134; Memorandum Opinion and 

Order at 3. Salmon never received Carrera's call because he was 

not at home. Id. at 4. 

Gonzalez claims that the sequence and nature of these calls 

caused him to conclude that Salmon was the unidentified 

"Margarito" involved in illegal drug transactions. Id. at 3. 

Gonzalez' conclusion was reinforced by a physical surveillance 

report on September 12, 1984, which showed that someone fitting 

Salmon's description was observed driving a Ford pickup truck 

registered to Salmon that had been parked at Carrera's residence. 1 

Id. at 3-4. 

Subsequent entries on the wire interception logs indicate 

1 

Salmon also later acknowledged during a deposition on 

September 10, 1987, that he had associated with Carrera. III R. 

at 26-30. 

3 

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that Carrera also telephoned another Margarito, Margarito Alvarado 

(Alvarado), calling Alvarado's home 38 times and his workplace, 

the Plainsman 66, over 14 times. Id. at 4. Gonzalez also 

acknowledges that he knew that Alvarado worked at the Plainsman 66 

as of August 5, 1984. I R., Doc. 91, Ex. A~ (Gonzalez' Affidavit 

of 10/2/87 in support of his motion for summary judgment, at 5). 

On the basis of Gonzalez' affidavit of November 9, 1984, for 

an arrest warrant, a federal magistrate issued an arrest warrant 

for several of the suspects, including Salmon, on that same day. 

Salmon's arrest warrant charged him with conspiring and attempting 

"to distribute, dispense or possess a controlled substance and 

. travel[ing] in interstate commerce and us[ing] interstate 

communication facilities to facilitate" such enterprise in 

violation of 18 u.s.c.A. §§ 843(b) and 846. IR., Doc. 13, Ex. A 

at 9, 75 (arrest warrant and Gonzalez' supporting affidavit); 

Appellants' Br. at 7. 

On November 13, 1984, Salmon and his family were awakened in 

the early morning by Schwarz and others, not including Gonzalez, 

who accused Salmon of being involved in illegal drugs and then 

arrested and handcuffed him in front of his wife, Magdalena 

Salmon, and their son, Margarito Salmon, Jr., the other plaintiffappellees in the instant case. Schwarz searched Salmon's 

residence as well as his place of business, a barber shop and 

boutique known as Margarito's Styling Shop. Appellees' Br. at 6. 

Salmon admits having consented to the search of his residence; 

however, he denies consenting to the search of his shop. Id. at 

6; Appellants' Br. at 8. Gonzalez did not join Schwarz and the 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 4 
other agents in executing the arrest warrant and the related 

search. 

Subsequently the charges against Salmon were dropped. 

However, two other persons arrested in the investigation pleaded 

guilty, two fled and two were acquitted. Along with his wife and 

son, Salmon filed suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages 

from the defendants Gonzalez and Schwarz. Salmon contends that 

they violated his Fourth Amendment rights to protection against 

unreasonable search and seizure and that warrants issue only upon 

probable cause (Count I). 2 Salmon further claims he was injured 

by the defendants' tortious conduct of false imprisonment (Count 

II), trespass (Count III), battery (Count IV) and that his civil 

rights were violated (Count V). In addition, Magdalena and 

Margarito, Jr. each claim damages for the negligent infliction of 

emotional distress. (Counts VI and Count VII, respectively). 

Gonzalez and Schwarz moved to dismiss, arguing that Salmon's 

constitutional claims lacked sufficient specificity; that they 

were entitled to absolute official immunity from the Salmons' 

state law tort claims; and that as federal agents, their actions 

did not satisfy the state action requirement for applying 42 

U.S.C.A. § 1983. IR., Doc. 13 at 1-8 (Defendants' Memorandum in 

Support of Motion to Dismiss). After considering affidavits from 

both sides in support of their positions, the district court 

2 

Salmon bases his Count I claim on 

Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 

held that a Fourth Amendment violation of 

a federal action for damages against 

employee involved. 

5 

Bivens v. Six Unknown 

(1971). There the Court 

rights may give rise to 

the individual federal 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 5 
ruled that it would treat the defendants' motion to dismiss as a 

motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), as 

to the issues of immunity and probable cause. I. R., Doc. 37, 

Memorandum Opinion at 1. 

The court denied the defendants'-motion for summary judgment. 

It found that Salmon's Fourth Amendment claims were sufficiently 

specific to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether 

the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant established 

probable cause to arrest Salmon. Moreover, in light of such a 

claim of a constitutional violation, the court ruled that the 

defendants were entitled to assert "only qualified immunity, not 

absolute immunity". Id. at 3-4. The court declined to rule 

whether the affidavit and other supporting evidence constituted 

probable cause for the arrest and searches, reserving such 

questions for additional discovery and trial. Id. at 5, 9. 

The district judge also rejected the defendants' claims that 

their actions were discretionary and that they were entitled to 

absolute immunity from Salmon's common law tort claims. Instead, 

the court found that the defendants' duty to obtain warrants is 

not discretionary because police officers' actions in seeking an 

arrest warrant and in making an arrest are measured by a 

well-known standard -- probable cause. Id. at 7-8. Furthermore, 

even if their actions were discretionary, the court ruled that 

granting them absolute immunity from tort liability would 

undermine the policy of deterring police misconduct. Id. at 8. 

The district court dismissed Count V of Salmon's complaint, 

which alleged that the defendants violated his civil rights, 

6 

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giving rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The court found 

that the defendants, as federal officials, were not acting under 

of color of state law for the purpose of invoking § 1983. Id. at 

5. That ruling has not been appealed. 

Following some discovery, the defendants moved for summary 

judgment a second time. Each agent asserted the defense of 

qualified immunity to Salmon's constitutional claims and absolute 

immunity to the state law tort claims. The district court 

rejected this second motion, concluding that the "incomplete list 

of conflicting evidence clearly shows that a genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to the reasonableness of Defendants' 

actions." IR., Doc. 134 at 4. The judge also rejected the 

defendants' contentions, raised earlier by their first summary 

judgment motion, that they are entitled to absolute immunity from 

the Salmons' state law claims. Id. at 5. The court decided that 

the defendants' actions were not discretionary, but instead were 

subject to a "fixed and readily ascertainable standard" of 

probable cause. Id. Therefore, the defendants' actions were only 

subject to the doctrine of qualified immunity, and not covered by 

the defense of absolute immunity. 

II 

Defendants both vigorously claim qualified immunity as to 

Salmon's constitutional claims of Fourth Amendment violations. 

When government officials abuse their offices, actions for 

damages may of fer the only realistic avenue for vindication of 

constitutional guarantees. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 653, 

638 (1987). On the other hand, permitting damage suits against 

7 

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them can entail substantial costs, including the risk that fear of 

personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly 

inhibit the discharge of their duties. Id. The Supreme Court has 

accommodated these conflicting concerns by providing government 

officials performing discretionary functions with a qualified 

immunity. Id. The doctrine provides officials with an objective 

standard 

liability 

for anticipating when their conduct might expose them to 

for damages. It allows liability only where a 

reasonable person would have known that his conduct "violates 

'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.'" Burns 

v. Reed, U.S. ~~-' 111 s.ct. 1934, 1944 (1991) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 

The Court recently "clarif [ied) the analytical structure 

under which a claim of qualified immunity should be addressed" in 

Siegert v. Gilley, U.S. I 111 s.ct. 1789, 1793 (1991). 

The Court emphasized that qualified immunity is more than just an 

affirmative defense to liability; it is an "'entitlement ... to 

immunity from suit ... ' and 'is effectively lost if a case is 

erroneously permitted to go to trial.'" Id. (quoting Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (emphasis in original). 

Accordingly, the district court's refusal to grant summary 

judgment on the instant qualified immunity claims is an appealable 

decision under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1988). Eastwood v. Okla. 

Department of Corrections of the State of Oklahoma, 846 F.2d 627, 

629 (10th Cir. 1988). 

When the defense is raised by such a 

judgment, the judge appropriately may 

8 

motion "'[o)n summary 

determine, not only the 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 8 
currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly 

established at the time an action occurred. . '" Siegert v. 

Gilley, u.s. at , 111 s.ct. at 1793 (1991) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818). If the plaintiff is 

successful in showing that the law was clearly established and 

that the defendant's conduct violated the law, then the defendant, 

as the movant for summary judgment, must demonstrate that no 

material issues of fact remain as to whether the defendant's 

actions were objectively reasonable in light of the law and the 

information the defendant possessed at the time of his actions. 

Archer v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d 1526, 1530 (10th Cir. 1991); Coen v. 

Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 377 (10th Cir. 1988); Pueblo Neighbor 

Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

III 

A. 

We consider first the defendants' contention that they were 

entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity 

from Salmon's constitutional claim asserted in Count I. The count 

alleged that Gonzalez and Schwarz violated Salmon's Fourth 

Amendment rights by causing his arrest without probable cause. In 

analyzing defendants' immunity for this arrest, we evaluate the 

"objective reasonableness" of the defendants' actions measured 

against clearly established law at the time of Salmon's arrest. 

Burns, U.S. I 111 s.ct. at 1944 n.8; Campbell v. 

Mercer, 926 F.2d 990, 992 (10th Cir. 1991). 

9 

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We must decide whether the defendants could have believed, 

under the Burns standard of "objective reasonableness," that 

probable cause existed for the issuance of Salmon's arrest 

warrant. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1985). 3 Malley 

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 345-346, rejected the official's argument 

that he was shielded from damages liability because his act of 

applying for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable, provided 

that the officer believes that the facts alleged in his affidavit 

are true; instead, the inquiry is confined to the objectively 

ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained official 

would have known that the search was illegal despite the 

magistrate's authorization (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 

897, at 911 n.23 (1984)). For a valid warrant to issue, it must 

appear from the affidavit that "there is probable cause to believe 

that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has 

committed it II Fed. R. Crim. P. 4; Wong Sun v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 n.9 (1963) (the requirements of the 

rules derive from the Fourth Amendment). 

In Anderson the Court noted that a determination whether an 

arrest or search was "objectively legally reasonable will 

often require examination of the information possessed by the 

[arresting or] searching officials." 483 U.S. at 641, 643. Here, 

after examining the facts before Gonzalez, we are convinced that 

3 

In Malley, the Court was concerned only with a damages action 

for an officer's role in an allegedly unconstitutional arrest. 

475 U.S. 335. The Court concluded "that the distinction between a 

search warrant and an arrest warrant would not make a difference 

in the degree of immunity accorded the officer who applied for the 

warrant." Id. at 344 n.6. 

10 

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the trial judge was correct in holding there are material facts in 

dispute concerning whether probable cause existed for the arrest 

warrant; thus summary judgment was properly denied as to agent 

Gonzalez. Archer v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d at 1526, 1531. On the 

other hand, Schwarz did not participate with Gonzalez in the 

application for the arrest and search warrants, as the record 

clearly shows. III R. at 12 (Gonzalez' Deposition 11/16/87), 

16-17 (Schwarz' Deposition 11/16/87). · Therefore, he bears no 

liability for any lack of adequate probable cause to apply for the 

arrest warrant. Schwarz's only potential liability on Salmon's 

claims for damages concerns his execution of the warrant, which we 

discuss later. 

As noted by the district court, Gonzalez relies principally 

on two "isolated instances -- a phone call and a visit by Mr. 

Salmon to the home of one of the original suspects [i.e., 

Carrera]" to justify his belief that Salmon was the same 

"Margarito" who was referred to of ten in the phone call logs as 

involved with narcotics violations. I R.' Doc. 134 at 3. 4 

4 

In his affidavit in support of the second motion for summary 

judgment, Gonzalez stated: 

11. On August 8, 1984, at approximately 11:04 a.m., 

Alberto Carrera received a telephone call from "Pepe" 

who was known to reside in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico. 

Carrera advised Pepe that he would be leaving tonight; 

that Carrera wants two (2) and that another individual 

wants four (4) but needs to see if the 'motor is OK.' 

Based on my experience, training and familiarity with 

jargon used by drug traffickers, I concluded that the 

numbers two and four relate to kilos of illegal drugs 

and that 'the motor' was the illegal drugs .... 

12. On August 8, 1984, at approximately 11:05 a.m., 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

11 

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( 

Indeed, given his sixteen years' experience as an FBI agent, 

Gonzalez contends that the sequence and nature of the phone calls 

on August 8, 1984, see note 4, supra, and the later physical 

identification of Salmon's truck at Carerra's prior residence, 

resulted in a reasonably objective determination that probable 

cause existed to arrest Salmon and search his residence. I R., 

Doc. 91, Ex. A. 

(Footnote continued): 

(immediately following Carrera's conversation with Pepe) 

Carrera dialed (505) 746-9950, the Plainsman Gas Station 

and asked for Margarito (last name not given). Carrera 

is informed that Margarito is not there .. 

13. On August 8, 1984, at approximately 11:07 a.m., 

(immediately after attempting to contact Margarito at 

the Plainsman Gas Station) Carrera called (505) 

748-2696, subscribed to Margarito Salmon, 1408 Hank 

Avenue, Artesia, New Mexico. • . . I concluded, from 

the immediately preceding conversations coupled with 

this inquiry, that Salmon was likely connected in some 

way to the illegal drugs, and was probably the 

'Margarito' in the August 5 conversation with 

Carerra .... 

14. On September 12, 1984, at 12:17 p.m., an individual 

was observed driving a Ford pickup truck, New Mexico 

license plate ES 9508 which later parked at 1408 West 

Hank Avenue, Artesia. The driver was described as a 

Hispanic male, age about 37, 5'9" tall, 160 lbs., 

bearded with black, 'salt and pepper' hair. He was 

wearing a belt with the name 'Salmon' embossed on the 

back. This description matched that of Margarito 

Salmon, who lives at 1408 West Hank Avenue, Artesia. I 

was aware that this truck had been seen parked in the 

yard at 1506 North 10th Avenue, Artesia, residence of 

Alberto Carrera on at least one prior occasion. A query 

of the records of the New Mexico Department of Motor 

Vehicles at the time revealed that New Mexico license 

plate ES9508 was registered to Margarito Salmon, 1408 

West Hank Avenue. 

IR., Doc. 91, Ex. A (Gonzalez' Affidavit in Support of the 

Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment) at 5-7. 

12 

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( ' 

( 

We disagree. If the information described in Gonzalez' 

affidavit represented the only material evidence concerning 

probable cause, or presented a reasonably full account of the 

relevant events leading up to Salmon's arrest and search, a thin 

case for the warrant might exist. However, Gonzalez' contentions 

on appeal, as well as his affidavit for the warrant, ignore 

important material facts. The facts Gonzalez relies on, 

considered collectively, present an incomplete picture of the 

circumstances relevant as to whether probable cause existed for 

Salmon's arrest and search. Salmon points out that there was not 

only inherent weakness in what Gonzalez stated in his affidavit, 

but also that his affidavit made material omissions. DeLoach v. 

Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 622 (10th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. 

pending, No. 90-1818, 5/28/91, (citing Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 

400 (5th Cir. 1990) (probable cause finding undermined and 

recklessness inferred when critical facts omitted from supporting 

affidavit)). 

For example, Gonzalez admits in an affidavit dated October 2, 

1987, that he knew that Margarito Alvarado, and not Margarito 

Salmon, worked at the Plainsman 66 at least three months before 

Salmon's arrest. IR., Doc. 91, Ex. A at 5; see also III R. at 

21, 26 (Gonzalez' Deposition). In fact, Gonzalez acknowledged 

that he had no evidence linking Salmon to the Plainsman 66. 5 

5 

At his deposition, Gonzalez was questioned about the phone 

logs and his affidavit which contained some references to 

Margarito Salmon receiving phone calls at the Plainsman 66. He 

admitted that there was no evidence linking Salmon to the 

Plainsman 66: 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

13 

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Gonzalez knew that the Plainsman 66 telephone number was called 

over fourteen times and, moreover, that Margarito Alvarado's home 

phone number was called over thirty-eight times from the tapped 

phone. When asked by Margarito Salmon's attorney during his 

deposition about his reasons for not disclosing to the magistrate 

the large number of calls to Margarito Alvarado's home and 

(Footnote continued): 

Q. The references that you made in your affidavit 

to Margarito Salmon, some of which refer to Margarito 

Salmon as being contacted at the Plainsman 66, being the 

phone number 746-9950, do you agree with me now that 

that reference is incorrect and should refer to 

Margarito Alvarado? 

A. No, sir, as I told you before, I don't know. 

There's an inconsistency; the magnitude of it, I don't 

know. There is an inconsistency and whether the log is 

accurate or whether this is accurate versus the log or 

how it happened to be, I wish I could tell you at this 

moment. I don't know, sir. 

Q. You certainly agree with me that you weren't 

thinking that these phone calls going to the Plainsman 

66, they were talking to Margarito Salmon, since you 

knew he worked at Margarito's Styling Shop? 

A. What would preclude Mr. Salmon from getting a 

phone call at the Plainsman 66, regardless of where he 

worked? 

Q. Did vou have anv evidence linking Margarito 

Salmon to the Plainsman 66? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. Was that a reasonable assumption for you to 

make then, that Margarito Salmon was receiving phone 

calls at the Plainsman 66? 

A. It was not the phone calls to the Plainsman 66 

that aroused my suspicion, sir. It was, as I stated 

before, other circumstances. 

III R. at 78-79 (emphasis added). 

14 

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workplace, Gonzalez replied: "As you can see from the affidavit, 

sir, I believe that I put in only that information that I 

was pertinent to the issuance of an arrest warrant by the 

Magistrate in Albuquerque. .. 6 III R. at 25. Earlier in 

6 

Gonzalez was further questioned as follows: 

Q. All right. And in your affidavit here, nowhere do 

you point out that Margarito Alvarado had been involved 

in a conversation involving a drug transaction; isn't 

that correct? 

A. No, I didn't sav that in my affidavit, I never 

made reference to [Margarito] Alvarado. 

Q. That's what I'm asking you. Don't you feel that's 

important information, that three minutes apart one 

Margarito was calling and then the next three minutes, 

the other one was calling, in your opinion? 

A. Not for my objective. My objective was not -- I 

didn't try to make my affidavit a summary of all of the 

names of all the people and all the phone numbers and 

all the investigation that had been conducted under that 

file. My affidavit was solely in support of an 

application for search warrants and arrest warrants. My 

intent was not to inform the U.S. Magistrate of 

everything that we had obtained in the course of our 

investigation. 

Q. You don't think the logs themselves indicate that 

Margarito that had been called was not Margarito Salmon, 

but Margarito Alvarado? And it was your language that 

you put in these reports stating it was Margarito 

Salmon; isn't that correct? 

A. Yes, sir, that's why I'm saying, I wasn't trying to 

hide the fact from anyone that we were aware of Mr. 

Alvarado's involvement. I was very much aware of Mr. 

Alvarado's involvement. It was no shock to me that 

there was a Margarito Alvarado. 

III R. 34-35 (emphasis added). 

15 

felt 

U.S. 

the 

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deposition Margarito Salmon's attorney asked: "What was the basis 

for excluding the information from the magistrate at that time 

that Margarito Alvarado worked at the Plainsman 66 gas station?" 

Gonzalez answered: 

It was not a conscious thing. It was something that I 

felt that Margarito Alvarado, I know - I believed that 

Margarito Alvarado was involved in narcotics 

trafficking. I didn't feel that - it was my judgment, 

with the directive that we have for our Title 3 

coverage, as a result of conversations with the U.S. 

Attorney's Office and my own purpose for doing that 

investigation, I felt that Margarito Alvarado was way 

below the level of trafficker that the FBI had been 

mandated to investigate. I always felt Mr. Alvarado 

would eventually be a witness. 

Id. at 23-24. Thus the omission of some critical information 

clearly undermines the inferen9e that Margarito Salmon is the 

anonymous "Margarito" involved in numerous monitored phone calls. 

Additional information creating a genuine issue of fact that 

requires a refusal of summary judgment for Gonzalez here concerns 

conflicts of fact in the defendants' records. 7 Gonzalez admitted 

7 

Gonzalez' affidavit for the warrant stated that in a November 

5, 1984, conversation, Carrera asked Margarito Salmon if he had 

"half an orange" and that Salmon said he must check; that Salmon 

called back and said the "oranges are dry." IR., Doc. 13 at 67. 

Despite an inference of Salmon's involvement in drug 

trafficking that could be drawn from the foregoing exchange, on 

November 6, 1984, Gonzalez drafted a letter for the F.B.I. agent 

in charge who sent the letter to the United States Attorney in 

New Mexico. The letter says that on November 5, 1984, Margarito 

Alvarado talked to Carrera, who asked if Margarito had cashed a 

check, and was told "no"; the letter says that the same day, 

Carrera contacted "Margarito" and Carrera told Margarito "it's 

coming tomorrow," and Margarito said to let him know the moment it 

comes in and that he could be reached at the Phillips Station or 

the body shop (which the record otherwise connects to Margarito 

Alvarado). The next sentence of the letter then says Carrera 

asked "Margarito" if he had "half an orange"; "Margarito" said he 

would have to check; and then about one hour later, the letter 

says that Carrera called "Margarito" who told. Carrera the 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

16 

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that there was an inexplicable "discrepancy" concerning references 

to "Margarito LNU" between the arrest affidavit (for Margarito 

Salmon) and in the letter to Lutz (concerning Margarito Alvarado). 

III R. 36-39. Moreover, when asked to explain how he knew that 

the calls to "Margarito LNU" on November 5 involved two different 

Margaritas and that one was Margarito Salmon, Gonzalez replied: 

"I can't tell you that, sir .• How did I arrive at that? 

Sir, I don't remember how I arrived at that." Id. at 36-37. 

Another factual issue weighing against a finding of qualified 

immunity here concerns the phone calls on August 8, 1984 (see 

supra at 11, n.4). Referring to the calls, Gonzalez stated in his 

affidavit: "I concluded, from the immediately preceding 

conversations coupled with this inquiry [a call from Carrera's 

tapped phone to Salmon's phone] that Salmon was likely connected 

8 in some way to illegal drugs. . IR., Doc. 91, Ex. A at 5-6. 

However, this conclusion and the rationale for the arrest 

warrant -- are called into question by police logs attached to the 

(Footnote continued): 

"oranges" are dry. 

This letter thus does not tie the suspect discussion of 

"oranges" to Margarito Salmon. Moreover, the police logs for 

these November 5 calls merely show that Carrera spoke to a 

"Margarito LNU" (last name unknown). 

Margarito Salmon later testified that Carrera did "some work" 

on his truck and van and that he left the vehicles at his house. 

II R. at 26-28. This testimony creates a question of material 

fact as to the purpose for Carrera's only logged call to Salmon. 

8 

Salmon later testified that Carrera did "some work" on his 

truck and van and that he left the vehicles at his house. II R. 

at 26-28. This testimony creates a genuine question of material 

fact as to the purpose for Carrera's only logged call to Salmon. 

17 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 17 
affidavit that show Salmon did not receive a call from the tapped 

phone because he was not at home. 

We are convinced that the record shows a genuine factual 

issue that undermines any claim of objective reasonableness to 

support a qualified inununity summary judgment. Moreover, we 

believe the law was clearly established at the time of Salmon's 

arrest that the omission of material information from an arrest 

affidavit violated the Fourth Amendment. In Franks v. Delaware, 

438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Court ruled that if a police officer 

makes a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with 

reckless disregard for the truth in an affidavit for a warrant, 

then the false statements must be disregarded in deciding whether 

the affidavit demonstrates probable cause. We held in Stewart v. 

Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582 (10th Cir. 1990), that the Franks 

standards of "deliberate falsehood" and "reckless disregard" 

extended to cover material omissions. See United States v. Owens, 

882 F.2d 1493, 1498-99 (10th Cir. 1989). In Stewart, the 

plaintiff's arrest, like Salmon's, occurred before the Tenth 

Circuit addressed directly the question whether the Franks 

standards also applied to material omissions in the affidavit. We 

looked, nevertheless, in Stewart to other circuits' decisions 

which preceded Salmon's arrest to determine that the law was 

clearly established on the proposition that the Franks standards 

cover material omissions. 9 See United States v. Williams, 737 

9 

Stewart, 915 F.2d at 582, relied on Morfin v. Albuquerque 

Public Schools, 906 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1990). In Morfin, a 

qualified immunity case, the court was asked to decide for the 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

18 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 18 
F.2d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We acknowledge that the rationale 

of Franks applies to omissions and that several courts have 

permitted litigants to challenge affidavits on the ground that 

facts were omitted"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United 

States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115, 118 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("the 

reasoning of Franks 'logically extends . . . to material 

omissions' . " (quoting w. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.4 

(Supp. 1982))); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 

950, 959 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 

328 (5th Cir. 1980) ("allegations of material omissions [are] to 

be treated essentially similarly to claims of material 

misstatements"). Accord United States v. House, 604 F.2d 1135, 

1141 n.9 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1990). 

Moreover, in deciding whether the law was clearly established for 

these purposes, the officials concerned "are required to relate 

established law to analogous factual settings." Garcia By Garcia 

v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 

U.S. 959 (1988) (quoting People v. Three Mile Island v. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1984). 

(Footnote continued): 

first time whether the plaintiffs, teachers, had a clearly 

established right in 1985 to associate with a labor union other 

than their exclusive bargaining agent. In holding that the right 

of such association was clearly established, the court stated: 

"In the absence of contemporary Tenth Circuit precedent directly 

concerning the issue, we may look to the law of other circuits 

when deciding whether or not a right was clearly established." 

Morfin, 906 F.2d at 1439. 

19 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 19 
In DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 622 (10th Cir, 1990), we 

concluded that reckless disregard for the truth occurs whenever 

the af fiant in fact entertains serious doubts as to the truth of 

his allegations. Furthermore, recklesss disregard for the truth 

can be inf erred where the circumstances provide obvious reasons 

for doubting the truthfulness of the allegations. Id. On the 

other hand, not all errors or omissions will negate probable cause 

and defeat a qualified immunity defense, such as allegations 

grounded in negligence or innocent mistake. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 

582-83. Nevertheless, this court has recognized that a warrant 

must be voided and the fruits of a search or seizure excluded "'if 

the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by 

information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 

would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of 

the truth.'" DeLoach, 922 F.2d at 621 (quoting United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). 

We agree with the trial judge that there is a genuine issue 

of material fact whether an "officer of reasonable competence 

would have requested the warrant" for Salmon's arrest with 

Gonzalez' information. Malley, 475 U.S. at 346, n.9; See DeLoach 

v. Bevers, 922 F.2d at 623; Archer v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d at 1526, 

1531. Cf. Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273, 275-76 (10th Cir. 

1989) (question of material fact concerning officer's use of 

excessive force precluded summary judgment premised on qualified 

immunity). The denial of summary judgment for Gonzalez was not 

error. The qualified immunity defense may be asserted, of course, 

at trial. Dixon, 922 F.2d at 1463. 

20 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 20 
B. 

Schwarz and four other agents, not including Gonzalez, 

executed the arrest warrant. Schwarz stated that he did not know 

of Margarito Alvarado until after Margarito Salmon's arrest, III 

R. at 18 (Schwarz' Deposition), nor that he worked at the 

Plainsman 66. Id. at 20. Schwarz also was not present when 

Gonzalez prepared the arrest affidavit, id. at 16-17; and only 

read the affidavit the evening prior to Schwarz' arrest of Salmon. 

Id. at 46-47. Schwarz contends that because he had no role in 

preparing the affidavit, and because the warrant issued by the 

magistrate was facially valid, his execution of the warrant is 

protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. We agree. 

The Supreme Court held in Anderson that: "it is inevitable 

that law enforcement officials will in some case reasonably but 

mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have 

indicated that in such case those officials like other 

officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful --

should not be held personally liable." 483 U.S. at 641; see 

Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45; United States v. Hunt, 893 F.2d 1028, 

1031-1032 (9th Cir. 1990) (no Fourth Amendment violation where 

arresting officer relies in good faith on arrest warrant), revised 

as to other grounds of the opinion, United States v. Hunt, 925 

F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. pending; cf. United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). 

We feel that an objectively reasonable officer clearly could 

have believed that Schwarz' execution of the facially valid arrest 

warrant was proper here so that his conduct was protected by the 

21 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 21 
defense of qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 

(1982). Hence the denial of summary judgment for Schwarz was 

error and should have been granted as to the Salmon's Count I 

claim on the ground of qualified immunity. 

IV 

Under state law, Salmon requests damages for the defendants' 

allegedly tortious conduct of false imprisonment (Count II), 

trespass (Count III), and battery (Count IV). Furthermore, his 

wife, Magdalena, and his son, Margarito, Jr., claim damages for 

negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI and Count 

VII). Gonzalez and Schwarz contend that the plaintiffs' common 

law tort claims must be asserted μnder the Federal Torts Claims 

Act (FTCA), if at all, and therefore, these claims should be 

remanded for further proceedings in the district court. 28 

U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-80. See Appellants' Reply Br. 

at 3-4. We agree that Salmon's state law claims are subject to 

the FTCA and remand to the district court for further 

proceedings. 

While the defendants' appeal was pending, Congress amended 

the FTCA by enacting the Federal Employees' Liability Reform and 

Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 

(FELRTCA). FELRTCA "appl[ies] to all claims, civil actions, and 

proceedings pending on, or filed after, the date of enactment," 

November 18, 1988 and, therefore, applies here. Pub. L. No. 100-

694, § 8(b), 102 Stat. 4565; see also note following 28 u.s.C.A. 

§ 2679. FELRTCA changed the rule in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 

292, 300 (1988), which had held that the judicially created 

22 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 22 
doctrine of official immunity 

immunity to government employees 

does not provide such absolute 

unless conduct is within the 

outer perimeter of the official's duties and is discretionary in 

nature. See United States v. Smith, 

s.ct. 1100, 1103 (1991). 

--- U.S. ---' ---' 111 

In Smith, the Court recognized that FELRTCA confers such 

absolute immunity by requiring persons injured by government 

employees acting within the scope of their employment to 

substitute the government as the defendant -- "the remedy against 

the United States . . . [being] exclusive of any other civil 

action or proceeding for money damages • • • against the employee 

or the employee's estate .... " Id. at 3 n.3; see 28 u.s.c.A. 

§ 2679(b); Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1475 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 559 (1990). Substitution of the 

government as the party defendant is required upon "certification 

by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting 

within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the 

incident out of which the claim arose." 28 u.s.c.A. § 2679(b)(1). 

Upon such certification, the substitution becomes mandatory. Id. 

at § 2679(d)(1); Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (10th 

Cir. 1989); Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 136 (5th Cir. 

1990); cf. s. J. & w. Ranch Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538, 

1542-43 (11th Cir. 1990), revised as to other ruling, 924 F.2d 

1555 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). 

We noted, 

the government's 

limited by the 

however, in Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d at 1049 that 

general waiver of immunity under § 1346 is 

exceptions contained at § 2680. See also United 

23 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 23 
States v. Gaubert, U.S. ---' ---' 111 s.ct. 1267, 

1276-1280 (1991) (discretionary function exception at § 2680(a) of 

FTCA applies to federal regulators' discretionary decisions 

involving oversight of daily operations of bank); Redmon v. 

United States, 934 F.2d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 1991) (discretionary 

function exception applies regardless of whether discretion 

abused). The exception at§ 2680(h) applies to the state common 

law tort claims made by Salmon here. It provides that the 

provisions of the FTCA and § 1346(b) of title 28 shall not apply 

to: 

(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false 

imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse 

of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, 

or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, 

with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law 

enforcement officers of the United States Government, 

the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of 

this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after 

the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of 

assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 

abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the 

purpose of this subsection, 'investigative or law 

enforcement officer' means any officer of the United 

States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to 

seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of 

Federal law.10 

Thus, since Salmon's state tort claims arose before FELRTCA was 

enacted, he will be barred from recovering damages for these 

claims (Counts II, III, IV, VI and VII) under § 2680(h) if it is 

determined that the employee was acting within the scope of his 

office or employment. 

In applying§ 2680(h)'s exception to the instant case, we 

10 

The date of enactment of the "proviso" referred to in this 

portion of the statute was November 18, 1988, when this proviso 

was enacted as a part of FELRTCA. 

24 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 24 
recognize that Salmon may be completely barred from recovery for 

his state tort claims if the government is substituted as the 

party defendant pursuant to § 2679(d)(l). Nevertheless, this 

court is guided by the Court's decision in Smith where a plaintiff 

was similarly denied recovery under one of § 2680's exceptions 

when the government was substituted as the party defendant. See 

Smith, U.S. ---' ---' 111 s.ct. 1184-85 (medical 

malpractice claim involving United States military physician for 

acts of alleged negligence occurring in Italy barred by § 2680(k) 

foreign claims exception). The Court held: 

The 'limitations and exceptions' language in § 6 [28 

u.s.c. § 2679(d)(4)] of the Liability Reform Act 

persuades us that Congress recognized that the required 

substitution of the United States as the defendant in 

tort suits filed against Government employees would 

sometimes foreclose a tort plaintiff's recovery 

altogether. 

Id. at 1185. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "[w]hen 

Congress wanted to limit the scope of immunity available under the 

Liability Reform Act, it did so expressly, as it did in preserving 

employee liability for Bivens actions and for actions brought 

under a federal statute authorizing recovery against the 

individual employee." Id. at 1188-89 (citing 28 u.s.c.A. 

§ 2679(b)(2)). Consequently, while Salmon's Bivens claim for the 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights remains under FELRTCA, 

see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(b)(2)(A), his state common law tort actions 

would be barred if FELRTCA is applied on remand. 11 

11 

The Court in Smith quoted the House Committee Report as 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

25 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 25 
Magdalena's and Margarito Salmon, Jr.'s respective damage 

claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress would 

also be subject to the exclusivity and preclusion provision of 

FELRCTA. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(b); Christensen v. Ward, 916 

F.2d 1462, 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1990). Consequently, we find it 

unnecessary to address the merits of these claims and remand to 

the district court for further consideration under FELRTCA. 

The plaintiffs argue that FELRTCA12 impermissibly deprives 

(Footnote continued): 

additional support for its holding that FELRTCA was intended to 

protect governmental employees from tort liability: "[t]he 

'exclusive remedy' provision ... is intended to substitute the 

United States as the solely permissible defendant in all common 

law tort actions against Federal employees who acted in the scope 

of employment." Smith, 111 s.ct. 1180, 1189 (citing H. R. Rep. 

100-700, at 6) (emphasis added). 

12 

As the appellees correctly note, §§ 2679(b)(l) and (d)(4), 

enacted as part of FELRTCA, trigger the application of§ 1346(b). 

These sections state: 

(b)(l) The remedy against the United States 

provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for 

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death 

arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act 

or omission of any employee of the Government while 

acting within the scope of his office or employment is 

exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for 

money damages by reason of the same subject matter 

against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to 

the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any 

other civil action or proceeding for monev damages 

arising out of or relating to the same subject matter 

against the employee or the employee's estate is 

precluded without regard to when the act or omission 

occurred. 

. . . . 

(d)(4) Upon certification, any action or proceeding 

subject to paragraph (1), (2), or (3) shall proceed in 

the same manner as an action against the United States 

filed pursuant to Section 1346(b) of this title and 

shall be subject to limitations and exceptions 

applicable to those actions. 28 u.s.c.A. § 2679 (b)(l) 

& (d)(4) (emphasis added). 

26 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 26 
all claimants, who are tortiously injured by a federal employee, 

of their Seventh Amendment13 right to a jury trial by subjecting 

14 their claims to 28 u.s.c.A. § 1346(b). Appellees' Reply Br. at 

2-11. It is true that the plaintiffs' claims under FELRTCA are 

subject to § 1346(b) and that ·this section must be read in 

connection with 28 u.s.c.A. § 2402 (Jury trial in actions against 

United States) which provides that "[a]ny action against the 

United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court 

without a jury .. II Nevertheless, we cannot agree that such 

denial of trial by jury infringes Seventh Amendment rights. The 

denial of a jury trial under the FTCA does not run afoul of the 

13 

The Seventh Amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, 

where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 

right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 

jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United 

States, than according to the rules of common law." U.S. Const. 

Amend. VII. 

14 

Section 1346(b) provides: 

(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of 

this title, the district courts, together with the 

United States District Court for the District of the 

Canal Zone and the District of the Virgin Islands, shall 

have exclusive jurisdiction of civil damages on claims 

against the United States, for money damages, accruing 

on and after January 1945, for injury or loss of 

property, or personal injury or death caused by 

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 

the Government while acting within the scope of his 

employment, under circumstances where the United States, 

if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 

accordance with the law of the place where the act or 

omission occurred. 

27 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 27 
Seventh Amendment. 15 

The plaintiffs argue further that the retroactive application 

of FELRTCA would extinguish their tort causes of action under 

state law against Gonzalez and Schwarz, in violation of their due 

process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Appellees' Reply Br. at 

11-15. While we recognize that FELRTCA bars recovery on several 

state law tort claims against individual governmental employees 

acting within the scope of their duties, we disagree that 

FELRTCA's retroactive application and its effect here would 

violate the Constitution. 

Congress has enacted several statutes that preclude recovery 

against individual defendants by ~equiring the substitution of the 

United States as the party defendant. See, ~, Federal Drivers 

Act, 28 u.s.c.A. § 2679(b)-(e); the Swine Flu Act, 42 u.s.c.A. 

§ 247b(k)(3) and (5)(A) (amended in 1978); the Department of 

Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear 

Energy Authorization Act of 1985, 42 u.s.c.A. § 2212. These acts 

have withstood constitutional challenges on due process grounds 

similar to those raised here. See, ~, In re Consolidated U.S. 

Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988) (Nuclear Energy Authorization 

15 

In Re Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 

F.2d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 1987); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 

8, 15 (1st Cir. 1986); cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 

572 (1962) (plurality opinion) (suits against government in the 

Court of Claims requiring waiver of immunity are not "suits at 

common law" within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment); 

McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (Oct. Term 1880) 

(suits against the government in the Court of Claims are not 

controlled by the Seventh Amendment; they are not suits at common 

law within its true meaning). 

28 

Appellate Case: 88-1850 Document: 01019670317 Date Filed: 08/27/1991 Page: 28 
Act); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1986) 

(Nuclear Energy Authorization Act); Carr v. United States, 422 

F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (4th Cir. 1970) (Federal Drivers Act). Relying 

in part on these cases, both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as 

well as two district courts, have held that FELRTCA's substitution 

and retroactive application provisions are constitutional. Arbour 

v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1990); Sowell v. American 

Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1989); Connell v. 

United States, 737 F.Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Iowa 1990); Binning v. 

Hardin, 729 F.Supp. 637, 640-41 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 

We find the rationale in Arbour and Sowell persuasive that 

the clear language of FELRTCA mandates its application to suits 

pending at the time of its enactment and that FELRTCA's 

retroactive application is not unconstitutional because "a legal 

claim [for tortious injury] affords no definite or enforceable 

property right until reduced to final judgment." Arbour, 903 F.2d 

at 420; Sowell, 888 F.2d at 805. Accord Connell, 737 F.Supp. at 

63 (distinguishing FELRTCA tort claims from vested contract or 

statutory rights which cannot be abridged by subsequent 

legislation, citing Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 439-48 (1932)). 

Moreover, there are advantages afforded under the FTCA - the 

administrative claim procedure for more expeditious resolutions, 

and the liability of the government in lieu of the risk that 

individual defendants may be judgment proof. Binning, 729 F.Supp. 

at 641. We note that the Supreme Court, as well as this court and 

others, while not addressing due process challenges to FELRTCA, 

29 

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( 

nevertheless have recently applied FELRTCA to cases pending before 

the date of its enactment. See, ~, Smith, U.S. at , 

111 S.Ct. at 1183-85; Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1485 

(10th Cir. 1990) (FELRTCA is retroactive and codifies doctrine of 

absolute immunity) (per curiam); Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 

1462, 1472 (10th Cir. 1990); Lunsford v. Price, 885 F.2d 236, 

240-41 (5th Cir. 1989); Moreno v. SBA, 877 F.2d 715, 716-17 (8th 

Cir. 1989); Yalkut v. Gemignani, 873 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1989). 

In sum, we reject the plaintiffs' argument that the 

application of FELRTCA to cases pending on the date of its 

enactment constitutes retroactive legislation in violation of the 

Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 

v 

We AFFIRM the district court's denial of summary judgment on 

immunity grounds on the Count I constitutional claim of plaintiff 

Margarito Salmon as to Gonzalez and REVERSE the denial of summary 

judgment as to Schwarz on Count I. As to Counts II, III, IV, VI 

and VII, the case is REMANDED to the district court to conduct 

further proceedings under FELRTCA in accord with this opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

30 

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