Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02316/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02316-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD MEZA,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL PALLARES,

Respondent.

No. 2:20-cv-2316 JAM KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a state prisoner, proceeds pro se with an application for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this action alleging the 

petition was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations. Petitioner filed an opposition; 

respondent did not file a reply. As set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the motion 

be granted.

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standards Governing Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. . . .” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss as a request for the court to dismiss under 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

(1991). Accordingly, the court reviews respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

II. Statute of Limitations

A. Legal Standards

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which became 

law on April 24, 1996, imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. This statute of limitations provides that:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody, pursuant to the judgment of 

a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable 

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1).1

B. Chronology 

For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this case is 

as follows:

1. Petitioner was convicted in the Sacramento County Superior Court of false 

imprisonment and various sex offenses against a child, and was sentenced on April 8, 2011, to an 

indeterminate state prison term of 42 years-to-life. (ECF No. 10-1.)

////

1

 As set forth above, the limitations period may begin running later under certain specified 

circumstances, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), & (D); none of these circumstances apply here.

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

2. Petitioner filed an appeal. On July 19, 2012, the California Court of Appeal for the 

Third Appellate District reduced the felony false imprisonment conviction to misdemeanor false 

imprisonment and remanded for resentencing, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (ECF No. 

10-2 at 2.)

3. Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on 

September 26, 2012. (ECF Nos. 10-3, 10-4.) 

4. On November 14, 2012, petitioner was resentenced. The Sacramento County Superior 

Court noted that petitioner’s April 8, 2011 sentence remained as imposed with the following 

exceptions: the false imprisonment conviction was deemed a misdemeanor, the prior felony false 

imprisonment conviction was vacated, and petitioner was sentenced to one year for misdemeanor 

false imprisonment, and such sentence was stayed. (ECF No. 10-5.)

5. Petitioner did not appeal the new sentence.

6. Following his resentencing, petitioner did not file any post-conviction collateral actions 

in state court.

7. On November 5, 2020, petitioner constructively filed the instant federal petition. See

Rule 3(d) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

C. Calculation of Limitations Period

For purposes of calculating the limitations period in this case, § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies. 

Petitioner was resentenced on November 14, 2012. Because petitioner did not file an appeal, the 

judgment became final on January 14, 2013.2 Cal. R. Ct. 8.38(a); Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 

951 (9th Cir. 2012). The limitations period began the next day, January 15, 2013. Patterson v. 

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (the AEDPA limitations period begins to run on the 

day after the triggering event pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Thus, the one-year limitation 

period commenced on January 15, 2013, and, absent tolling, expired on January 15, 2014. 

2

 Sixty days after the resentencing was January 13, 2013, which fell on a Sunday. Accordingly, 

the time for seeking review was extended to the next business day. See Cal. R. Ct. 1.10(a) (“The 

time in which any act provided by these rules is to be performed is computed by excluding the 

first day and including the last, unless the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or other legal holiday, 

and then it is also excluded.”).

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

D. Statutory Tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A properly 

filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules governing filings,

including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).

State habeas petitions filed after the one-year statute of limitations expired do not revive 

the statute of limitations and have no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has 

ended before the state petition was filed”); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, petitioner filed no state post-conviction collateral actions before the limitations 

period expired, and therefore is not entitled to any statutory tolling. Rather, the federal 

limitations period expired on January 15, 2014. Petitioner did not file the instant petition until 

November 5, 2020, exceeding the limitations period by over six years and nine months. Thus, 

absent equitable tolling, this action is time-barred. 

III. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner does not claim his petition was timely, but rather seeks equitable tolling.

A. Petitioner’s Arguments - Petition

Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because of the following circumstances 

he claims are extraordinary and beyond his control: 

1. Petitioner is only semi-literate, with a 6.2 reading TABE score (sixth grade reading 

level). (ECF No. 1 at 20.) 

2. Petitioner had difficulty maintaining his legal materials: (a) prison officials lost 

petitioner’s legal materials when he was transferred out to court in 2013; petitioner did not know 

about the deadline until appellate counsel advised him of the deadline after the deadline had 

passed; (b) following an assault by a cellmate due to petitioner’s sex offender status, petitioner’s 

legal materials were distributed to other inmates on the tier and lost a second time (no dates

////

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

provided); (c) finally, in August 2020, petitioner secured a third set of his legal materials, after 

diligently attempting to obtain them earlier. (ECF No. 1 at 20.) 

3. While petitioner had his legal paperwork in his cell, he feared for his life due to his sex 

offender conviction; his sex offender status interfered with his ability to obtain inmate assistance 

and to access the law library due to sex offender animosity and potential violence. (ECF No. 1 at 

21-22.) 

4. Petitioner suffered restrictions due to COVID-19, confined in the modified program 

since February 2020, with no law library access, just walk-up copies and legal supplies. (ECF 

No. 1 at 22-23.) 

Petitioner further contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether extraordinary circumstances warrant equitable tolling “due to potential for violence or 

death from inmates who harbor deep resentment toward sex offenders.” (ECF No. 1 at 15, 23.)3

 

Petitioner provided his own declaration, as well as the declaration of inmate Stan Solvey 

who assisted petitioner in filing this action. (ECF No. 1 at 32-38.) 

B. Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent counters that the circumstances described by petitioner are not extraordinary 

and were not the cause of his untimeliness. (ECF No. 9 at 3.) First, the assessment of petitioner’s 

reading ability in 2016 does not prove that his reading level is an extraordinary circumstance that 

prevented him from timely filing his federal petition for over six years. (ECF No. 9 at 4.) In 

addition, respondent points out that the well-written federal petition and declaration show 

petitioner has sufficient reading and writing skills; the record reflects petitioner wrote his attorney 

numerous times about the appellate record (ECF No. 1 at 20), wrote the clerk of court (ECF No. 1 

at 48), and submitted written requests to prison officials for the return of his paperwork and legal 

documents (ECF No. 1 at 52-61). 

////

3

 Petitioner also stated that if he is granted equitable tolling, he will “only raise 1 of the 4 

exhausted claims, the Miranda violation.” (ECF No. 1 at 19.) However, the petition that was 

filed only raises one claim -- the Miranda violation.

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Second, petitioner did not provide the date he obtained the first replacement documents, 

but it appears the documents were likely sent to petitioner again on January 15, 2013, just two 

days after the limitations period began. (ECF No. 9 at 6, citing ECF No. 1 at 42-45.) Appellate 

counsel advised petitioner to tell the court about the missing documents. (ECF No. 1 at 45.) 

Nevertheless, that petitioner may have been without his legal materials for a short period at the 

beginning of the limitations period does not rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling. In addition, petitioner’s sole claim in his federal petition is that his 

conviction was obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, the same claim he 

raised on direct appeal. Thus, once he received his legal materials, petitioner failed to explain the 

over six-year delay in bringing that same claim. Petitioner fails to show he was diligent 

throughout the limitation period. Smith v. Davis, 953 f.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2020). 

Third, petitioner’s difficulties in obtaining inmate assistance due to the sensitive nature of 

his crimes are unavailing in light of multiple authorities to the contrary. (ECF No. 9 at 5.) 

Finally, petitioner’s reliance on COVID-19 restrictions is unavailing because state 

restrictions due to COVID-19 did not occur until March of 2020, over six years after the 

limitation period expired on January 13, 2014. 

C. Petitioner’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

In his supporting declaration, petitioner claims that the documents provided with his 

opposition will demonstrate the delay he sustained in accessing his legal property. Petitioner 

reiterates that he has no education skills to evaluate the law, and seeks an evidentiary hearing to 

hear from CCI Webb (ad seg counselor) as to petitioner’s unanswered requests for his property; 

CCI Gonzalez (building counselor) as to the unanswered letters and requests; Edwin Valencia 

(inmate at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) as to the disposition of the federal habeas 

corpus petition Mr. Valencia completed for petitioner and the appellate record and the dates 

involved; and the appellate attorneys as to why they did not respond to petitioner’s request for a 

third set of replacement legal documents. (ECF No. 19 at 1-2.) 

In an attached handwritten document, petitioner reiterates that his conviction causes him 

constant fear for his safety while in prison, and his low grade level makes him incompetent to 

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

pursue his habeas claims. (ECF No. 19 at 24-25.) Petitioner returned from being out to court for 

resentencing on November 18, 2012, but did not receive his stored property at that time. (ECF 

No. 19 at 26.) Despite repeated requests, petitioner’s property was not returned. Petitioner sent 

another request on February 7, 2013. (ECF No. 19 at 29.) 

Meanwhile, petitioner found an inmate (Edwin Valencia) who would help prepare the 

federal habeas petition. But on February 20, 2013, petitioner was placed in ad seg and his 

property was then packed. Mr. Valencia called petitioner’s aunt, who wrote petitioner to tell him 

Mr. Valencia would still work on the petition, but they had to do so by writing to and from 

petitioner’s aunt. Petitioner continued requesting his legal property, but never received a 

response. (ECF No. 19 at 30.) Mr. Valencia wrote again, informing petitioner that Mr. Valencia 

finished the habeas petition and dropped petitioner’s legal work off in a yard at 2 Building 

Counselor (Mr. Gonzales). Petitioner would have to write another request to Mr. Gonzales to 

have the materials delivered to ASU Counselor Webb so petitioner could get the papers as soon 

as possible and file the habeas petition. (ECF No. 19 at 31-32.) 

In addition, in response to attorney Kotler’s letter, petitioner wrote the federal defender for 

assistance, but the federal defender responded that their office could not assist unless appointed 

petitioner’s counsel. (ECF No. 19 at 33-34.) 

“Almost eight months went by.” (ECF No. 19 at 34.) Mr. Webb “came to the door and 

appointed me to meet with committee.” (Id.) Petitioner saw the committee, and after he was sent 

to D yard, petitioner finally received his property, but papers were missing. (ECF No. 19 at 34.) 

When petitioner was transferred from PVSP, petitioner asked for his legal documents to be sent to 

his aunt so petitioner’s case could be looked over by a criminal lawyer “before the deadline 

ended.” (ECF No. 19 at 35.) However, the documents never arrived at his aunt’s home. (ECF 

No. 19 at 35, 37.) 

When petitioner arrived at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), he had no legal property. 

Eventually, petitioner saw a notice on the dayroom wall that inmate Stan Solvery was a legal 

worker. (ECF No. 19 at 39.) Time passed, and petitioner told his sister about Solvery, and 

petitioner’s sister encouraged petitioner to talk with Solvery. (ECF No. 19 at 40-41.) Initially, 

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Solvery wanted to look into the case before deciding whether to help petitioner. Solvery 

explained equitable tolling, and that it would be a problem of how many years had passed since 

the deadline expired. (ECF No. 19 at 41.) Petitioner saw his request forms for the return of his 

legal property as extraordinary circumstances, and was “being oppressed by the court’s thinking 

that [he] knew law.” (ECF No. 19 at 42.) Petitioner contends his request forms demonstrate that 

PVSP staff withheld petitioner’s legal property the entire time petitioner went out to court on 

November 13, 2012; then after February 20, 2013, to November 7, 2013, while petitioner was in 

ad seg. (ECF No. 19 at 43.) He contends his legal property was unlawfully held in storage for 

“approximately 1 year.” (ECF No. 19 at 46.) 

D. Petitioner’s Exhibits

Petitioner’s exhibits (petition and opposition) are listed in chronological order below:

August 22, 2012 letter to petitioner at PVSP from appellate counsel Kotler providing a 

copy of the petition for review she was mailing to the California Supreme Court that day;

advising petitioner that any federal petition must be filed within one year and 90 days from the 

ruling on the petition for review; and providing the address of the U.S. District Court. (ECF No. 

1 at 42-43.)

October 26, 2012 letter from attorney Kotler sending petitioner another copy of the 

petition for review, the order of the CA Supreme Court denying review (September 26, 2012), 

opinion of the Court of Appeal, and her August 22, 2012 letter re deadlines. (ECF No. 1 at 44.) 

Ms. Kotler warned petitioner she could not continue to send duplicate copies.

2013

First page of January 15, 2013 letter from Balin & Kotler, stating they received 

petitioner’s January 6, 2013 letter, and advising that petitioner had now missed the deadline for 

filing his federal habeas petition and suggesting that petitioner “attempt to file the habeas petition 

and ask the federal district court for equitable tolling of the deadline.”4 (ECF No. 1 at 45; 19 at 

20.) Counsel would also contact the federal public defender, explain what took place, and see 

4

 Petitioner did not provide a copy of any additional pages or the signature page for a letter dated 

January 15, 2013. (Id.)

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

whether they would assist petitioner. If they would not, counsel provided the standards for

equitable tolling, and recommended petitioner include such argument in his federal petition, along 

with a declaration explaining what petitioner told counsel. (Id.) Counsel noted they were 

returning to petitioner his inmate request to include with his habeas petition. (Id.) 

Page two of a January 16, 2013 letter from attorney Eileen S. Kotler: “I hope you move 

quickly to get this resolved because the federal district court will consider the efforts you made to 

take care of this problem.” (ECF No. 19 at 5.) 

On January 21, 2013, while petitioner was housed at PVSP A2-101, petitioner submitted a 

CDCR 22 form stating it had been two months since petitioner returned from out to court when 

all of his legal property was put into storage by Building 2 staff, and now Building 2 staff claimed 

R&R had petitioner’s stored property and R&R claims Building 2 had the stored property. (ECF 

No. 1 at 53; 19 at 16.) Petitioner wrote that he had legal filing deadlines and had submitted more 

than several requests for release of his property and the non-delivery was interfering with such 

filings. (Id.) On January 21, 2013, staff member J. Andrade forwarded the request to Building 2 

staff, but no further response is on the form. (Id.)

On February 5, 2013, still housed in A2-101, petitioner submitted a CDCR 22 writing that 

it had been three months since he returned from court and still had not received his legal papers 

back from storage, and asked to check into this matter, noting “Need immediately!” (ECF No. 1 

at 54; ECF No. 19 at 17.) Staff noted the CDCR 22 form was received and forwarded to CCI on 

February 6, 2013. (Id.) No further staff response is noted. 

On February 7, 2013, still housed in A2-101, petitioner submitted a CDCR 22 again 

noting his legal deadline and requesting the release of his legal property for appeal deadline; staff 

received the form and forwarded it to R&R supervisory staff on February 7, 2013. (ECF No. 1 at 

55; ECF No. 19 at 18.) No further staff response is noted.

February 20, 2013 rules violation report, resulting in petitioner’s placement in the 

administrative segregation unit (“ad seg” or “ASU”). (ECF No. 19 at 7-8.) 

////

////

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

An inmate property inventory receipt dated February 20, 2013, for property stored due to 

petitioner’s placement in ad seg.5 (ECF No. 19 at 22.)

First page of a March 28, 2013 letter from federal defender (responding to petitioner’s 

“recent letter”) advising petitioner that the federal defender cannot represent individuals unless 

appointed by a federal court. (ECF No. 1 at 51.) Advised petitioner that he can file a motion for 

appointment of counsel with his federal petition, or any time after he filed his federal petition, and

provided petitioner with three forms, including a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id.)

On August 7, 2013, while housed in ad seg (ASU 8-177), petitioner signed a CDCR form 

asking Counselor Webb whether anyone dropped off legal papers for petitioner at A yard. (ECF

No. 1 at 58; 19 at 10.) No staff delivery or response is noted, although “(Counselor) Staff Webb” 

is handwritten in the “if forwarded to” box. (Id.) 

Petitioner provided another CDCR 22 form while housed in ASU C-129, but both the date 

and text are illegible. (ECF No. 1 at 59; 19 at 13.) No staff delivery or response is noted. (Id.)

On September 29, 2013, while housed in ASU/C-129, petitioner completed a CDCR 22 

form noting petitioner would be transferred to Kern Valley State Prison and asked Counselor 

Gonzalez to have petitioner’s legal documents and transcripts sent there or, if Gonzalez had the 

legal materials “right now” have them sent as soon as possible. (ECF No. 1 at 56, 60; ECF No. 

19 at 11, 14.) Staff Counselor Webb responded on September 30, 2013: “Your paperwork was 

placed in your ASU property on 9/27/13.” (Id.) 

On September 29, 2013, petitioner completed a CDCR 22 form directed to Counselor 

Gonzalez, stating petitioner had left his original documents and transcripts for inmate Valencia, 

who was supposed to help finish the habeas petition, and inquired whether Gonzalez had the 

documents. Although the delivery box appears marked, there is no staff signature or date. (ECF 

No. 1 at 61; 19 at 12.) “A Yard Staff Counselor Gonzalez” is handwritten in the “if forwarded” to 

box, but there is no date or method marked. (Id.)

5

 The cover page claims “Bed Assignments of Ronald Meza from 8-29-12 to 12-10-14 indicating 

when he was in ad seg and transferred,” but the only document appended was the property 

receipt. (ECF No. 19 at 21-22.)

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

2019

An August 22, 2019 second level appeal response noting he had a reading grade point 

level above 4.0. (ECF No. 19 at 4.) 

2020

Rehabilitative Case Plan, dated April 8, 2020, reflecting TABE reading score 6.2; math 

7.1. (ECF No. 1 at 39.) No high school diploma or GED. (Id.)

July 29, 2020 letter from attorney William Balin, forwarding to petitioner “briefs from 

computer files” of Ms. Kotler, now retired and inactive. (ECF No. 1 at 46.) Mr. Balin noted that 

in 2012, Ms. Kotler advised petitioner to first file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and then, 

as part of that petition, to ask the court to appoint an attorney to assist in any further habeas 

proceedings. (ECF No. 1 at 46.) Mr. Balin noted that petitioner first asked the federal defender 

to assist petitioner before petitioner filed his petition, but Balin informed petitioner that he must 

first file the petition, and ask the court to appoint the federal defender. (ECF No. 1 at 47.) Mr. 

Balin reminded petitioner that there are strict time deadlines for filing a federal habeas petition, 

and because his appeal ended in 2012, counsel suspected that the deadline had expired. (ECF No. 

1 at 47.) Mr. Balin recommended that petitioner seek the advice of a different attorney to see if 

the deadline could be extended, or if petitioner could establish factual innocence. (ECF No. 1 at 

47.) 

On October 19, 2020, petitioner wrote a letter to the U.S. District Court, E.D. Cal. (Fresno 

Div.) seeking forms for filing a habeas petition and a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF 

No. 1 at 48.)

E. Governing Standards

A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

only if the petitioner shows: “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). A 

petitioner must have “been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an 

impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as 

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal court.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 599 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 878 (2020). In other words, “[w]hen external forces, rather than a 

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citations omitted). “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable 

diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and 

some quotation marks omitted).

Extraordinary circumstances need not be an “actual impossibility; rather, equitable tolling 

is appropriate where ‘it would have technically been possible for a prisoner to file a petition, but a 

prisoner would have likely been unable to do so.’” Grant v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 918 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (quoting Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 (9th Cir. 2014)). That said, equitable 

tolling should be applied sparingly. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (“To apply the doctrine in ‘extraordinary circumstances’ necessarily suggests the 

doctrine’s rarity. . . .”). Petitioner must “show that that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were 

the cause of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) (“petitioner entitled to equitable 

tolling ‘since prison officials’ misconduct proximately caused the late filing.’”) “[I]t is only when 

an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from 

making a timely filing that equitable tolling may be the proper remedy.” Davis, 953 F.3d at 600; 

see also Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 257 (2016) (Such 

circumstance must be “both extraordinary and beyond [the petitioner’s] control.”). 

Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. 

at 418; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). “A habeas 

petitioner . . . should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that 

would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 

2006) (emphasis added in Roy) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003)).

////

////

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

F. Discussion

The undersigned finds that petitioner failed to meet his burden, for the following reasons.

1. Access to Legal Materials

Petitioner contends he had difficulty maintaining his legal materials at different times: (a) 

prison officials lost his legal paperwork while he was transferred out to court, and withheld while 

housed in ad seg; (b) when petitioner transferred from PVSP (on an unidentified date), 

petitioner’s legal materials were mailed to his aunt, but never arrived; (c) subsequently, on

another unidentified date when petitioner was assaulted, petitioner’s legal materials were 

distributed to other inmates on the tier and lost a second time; (d) in August 2020, petitioner 

secured a third set of his legal materials, after diligently attempting to obtain them earlier. 

a. 2012-2013

Petitioner was resentenced on November 14, 2012, and returned from court to PVSP on 

November 18, 2012, prior to the beginning of the federal limitations period. Petitioner does not 

make clear on what date he first received his legal materials, but at some point he received his 

legal materials because while he was awaiting their return, he found an inmate (Edwin Valencia) 

to help petitioner organize the habeas corpus writ. Indeed, petitioner acknowledges that he 

received a letter from Mr. Valencia who had finished the habeas writ and dropped it off in A Yard 

to Counselor Gonzalez. (ECF No. 19 at 31.) Petitioner’s CDCR 22 form confirms that on 

September 29, 2013, petitioner sought return of the “legal materials and transcripts” that Mr. 

Valencia had dropped off. (ECF No. 19 at 14.) Staff responded that the materials were placed in 

petitioner’s ad seg property on September 27, 2013. ECF No. 1 at 56, 60; ECF No. 19 at 11, 14.) 

The limitations period began to run on January 15, 2013. It appears petitioner did not 

have his property on February 7, 2013, because he wrote a CDCR 22 seeking its return, and the 

request was routed by prison staff. On February 20, 2013, petitioner was placed in ad seg, and 

petitioner maintains that he was deprived of his legal property while he was in ad seg. In his 

opposition, petitioner clarified that he was housed in ad seg from February 20, 2013, to 

November 7, 2013 (ECF No. 19 at 43), just over eight and a half months. Petitioner received his 

property after his release from ad seg and transfer to D yard, but “papers came up missing 28 

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

U.S.C. § 2254.” (ECF No. 19 at 35-36.) Petitioner did not provide the date he transferred away 

from PVSP. 

It appears petitioner had his legal materials at some point early in the limitations period, 

after his return from court, and before he was put in ad seg, because he was able to provide Mr. 

Valencia with transcripts referenced in petitioner’s CDCR 22 form. Petitioner also had some of 

his legal property after his release from ad seg, prior to his transfer to KVSP. 

Petitioner’s failure to provide specific dates makes it difficult to calculate the time 

remaining on the limitations clock. Moreover, the involvement of Edwin Valencia in preparing 

petitioner’s writ calls into question petitioner’s claim that his legal materials were withheld or lost 

by prison officials. In addition, it appears petitioner wrote to the federal defender while housed in 

ad seg. On the other hand, the failure of prison officials to respond to any of petitioner’s CDCR 

22 forms is equally concerning. But, as explained below, no evidentiary hearing concerning such 

matters is required because even if petitioner was deprived of his legal materials while he was 

housed in ad seg, the record fails to demonstrate petitioner was diligent once he was released 

from ad seg. “[I]t is not enough for a petitioner seeking an exercise of equitable tolling to attempt 

diligently to remedy his extraordinary circumstances; when free from the extraordinary 

circumstance, he must also be diligent in actively pursuing his rights.” Davis, 953 F.3d at 599. 

Despite his release from ad seg on November 7, 2013, petitioner fails to set forth what efforts he 

made after such release to file his federal petition. At that time, petitioner still had until January 

15, 2014, in which to file the federal petition. 

Moreover, despite appellate counsel’s early notice about the statute of limitations 

deadline, of which petitioner concedes he was aware (ECF No. 11 at 33), and then subsequent 

advice that petitioner file a federal habeas petition, and act quickly, petitioner instead chose to 

contact the federal defender. Then, once petitioner was to be transferred, rather than file a federal 

habeas petition (having been twice warned about the limitations period), petitioner opted to mail 

his legal materials to his aunt purportedly so that a lawyer could review the documents. Petitioner 

could have had the legal materials forwarded to KVSP so that he could then file his federal 

petition. Such choices fail to demonstrate reasonable diligence.

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

Thus, even assuming the court found that the deprivation of legal materials during 

petitioner’s housing in ad seg constituted an extraordinary circumstance, and that his multiple 

CDCR 22 forms demonstrated his diligence during such period, and granted equitable tolling for 

an entire year, such tolling is insufficient because petitioner did not file his federal petition until 

November 5, 2020. Such lengthy delay fails to meet the required diligence prong. 

b. No Demonstrated Diligence Following Release from Ad Seg

Petitioner also contends that he was assaulted and he lost his legal materials a second 

time. But he does not indicate when or where such assault occurred, or when the documents were 

lost. Moreover, he claims that, after diligently attempting to obtain them earlier, he did not secure 

a third set of his legal materials until sometime in August 2020, but he provided no facts or 

evidence to demonstrate his diligence since his release from ad seg at PVSP or following his 

transfer to KVSP. Indeed, petitioner fails to specifically demonstrate he was diligent from 2014 

to February 2, 2020, when he wrote appellate counsel. He claims appellate counsel delayed 

sending petitioner the additional materials, but provided no copies of letters sent or received in 

connection with any request prior to February 2, 2020. Rather, he provided a letter dated July 29, 

2020, responding to petitioner’s letter of February 2, 2020, and such letter made no mention of 

any prior request. (ECF No. 1 at 46.) Such vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to 

demonstrate petitioner’s diligence following his release from ad seg at PVSP. 

Petitioner’s additional contentions about not having his legal materials following his 

transfer to KVSP are also unavailing. Unless a petitioner is raising a sufficiency of the evidence 

claim, which petitioner is not, “petitioners are not required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or the Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases to attach to their petitions, or to file separately, state-court records.” 

Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 232 (2004). Petitioner’s sole claim was that his Miranda rights were 

violated when he was placed in the patrol car. Aside from his personal knowledge of the facts 

surrounding such claim, this was the same claim petitioner pursued on direct appeal. (ECF No. 

10-4.) Petitioner fails to explain why he could not present such claim when he had possession of 

his legal materials, or after his transfer to KVSP. 

////

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

2. Sensitive Nature of Underlying Conviction

Petitioner strenuously argues that his conviction and sex offender status entitle him to 

equitable tolling due to the risk of physical harm, including death, if other inmates discover such 

information. He contends that the “inmate population’s animosity to sex offenders is a unique 

issue not published in precedent, and is a prevailing problem” in state prisons. (ECF No. 1 at 18.) 

He argues that this is a “unique extraordinary circumstance that is the ultimate hardship as it 

deflates a petitioner’s diligence in preparing and timely filing” a petition. (ECF No. 1 at 22.) 

Respondent contends that petitioner’s difficulties in obtaining inmate assistance due to the 

sensitive nature of his crimes are unavailing in light of multiple authorities to the contrary. (ECF 

No. 9 at 5) (citing multiple district court cases). 

Petitioner is correct that there are no published cases addressing petitioner’s argument. 

However, one unpublished Ninth Circuit case rejected the prisoner’s claim that he was entitled to 

equitable tolling because “he feared accessing materials from the prison’s library because of his 

status as a sex offender.” Bunyard v. Knowles, 119 F. App’x 172 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 

Bunyard “failed to identify any specific threats he faced that prevented him from using the law 

library in the prison.”) District courts, including this one, have found that a prisoner’s “status as a 

sex offender, and in turn his fear of other prisoners due to that status, is not an extraordinary 

circumstance that justifies equitable tolling.” Mendoza v. Pollard, 2021 WL 2588155, at *6 (S.D. 

Cal. June 24, 2021) (collecting cases). Another district court noted that there is no exception for 

sex offenders in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, and that the prisoner’s “decision to remain silent about his 

case demonstrates a lack of diligence and precludes a finding of diligence.” Zavala v. Diaz, 2013 

WL 440638, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013) (citations omitted). 

Here, as in Bunyard, petitioner articulated no specific threats based on his sex offender 

status; rather, he identifies fear based on the inmate population’s animosity to sex offenders. 

Petitioner seeks equitable tolling based solely on his underlying conviction and sex offender 

status. The undersigned is persuaded that the nature of petitioner’s underlying conviction does 

not constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting the application of equitable tolling. 

Mendoza, 2021 WL 2588155, at *6. 

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

3. Lack of Inmate Assistance or Law Library Access 

Petitioner contends that while he had his legal paperwork in his cell, his sex offender 

status interfered with his ability to obtain inmate assistance and to access the law library due to 

sex offender animosity and potential violence. But petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling 

merely because he needed to rely on the assistance of another inmate. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 

F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding petitioner’s pro se status and reliance on inmate helpers 

not to be extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling); Martinez v. Ryan, 133 F. 

App’x 382, 382-83 (9th Cir. 2005) (limited education, reliance on other prisoners to file petition, 

and lack of access to legal materials and assistance due to custody status do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances); De Adams v. Hedgpeth, 2015 WL 114163, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 

2015) (“as a matter of law, petitioner’s need to rely on [a fellow inmate] does not constitute an 

extraordinary circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling”). Petitioner’s circumstances are 

similar to those of the majority of incarcerated prisoners attempting to file habeas petitions. His 

inability to access inmate assistance or the law library is not an extraordinary circumstance 

preventing petitioner from preparing a pro se habeas petition.

4. Limited Education/Ignorance of the Law

Petitioner contends he is entitled to equitable tolling because he is only semi-literate, with 

a 6.2 reading TABE score (sixth grade reading level). Such claim is also unavailing. See Baker 

v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 484 F. App’x 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Low literacy levels, lack of legal 

knowledge, and need for some assistance to prepare a habeas petition are not extraordinary 

circumstances to warrant equitable tolling of an untimely habeas petition.”); Payne v. Valenzuela, 

2016 WL 304294, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016) (finding prisoner’s lack of legal sophistication 

and limited ability to read and write are not extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling.). 

Even an inmate’s illiteracy is insufficient. Beltran v. Foulk, 2015 WL 1268322, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 

March 16, 2015) (“A prisoner’s weak educational background or lack of literacy is not enough to 

establish an extraordinary circumstance”); Jimenez v. Hartley, 2010 WL 5598521, at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. Dec. 6, 2010) (allegations that petitioner was uneducated, illiterate, and indigent insufficient 

to warrant equitable tolling), adopted 2011 WL 164536 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011); cf. Hughes v. 

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Idaho State Bd. Of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (illiteracy and pro se status 

insufficient cause to avoid procedural default). As argued by respondent, the record reflects 

petitioner’s ability to write letters both to the court and to his appellate counsel, as well as 

multiple CDCR 22 forms. In light of such evidence, as well as the cited authorities, petitioner 

fails to demonstrate how his low reading score prevented him from earlier filing his petition. 

Petitioner also argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because he “did not know about the 

deadline until appellate counsel advised him of the deadline after the deadline had passed,” (ECF 

No. 1 at 20), apparently referring to counsel’s January 15, 2013 letter. Such argument fails to 

acknowledge counsel’s August 22, 2012 letter advising petitioner that any federal petition must 

be filed within one year and 90 days from the ruling on the petition for review (ECF No. 1 at 42), 

as well as his own declaration attesting to such knowledge (ECF No. 1 at 33 ¶ 13). But in any 

event, it is well established that a prisoner’s ignorance or confusion about the law is not an 

extraordinary circumstance and does not equitably toll the limitations period. See Ford v. Pliler, 

590 F.3d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 2009) (the petitioner’s confusion or ignorance of the law does not 

satisfy the extraordinary circumstance standard), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 843 (2010); Rasberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is 

not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). 

5. COVID-19 Restrictions

Finally, petitioner’s reliance on COVID-19 restrictions is unavailing because COVID-19 

was not identified or confirmed until early 2020, long after the limitations period expired. The 

California Department of Public Health first announced two confirmed cases of the novel 

coronavirus in California on January 26, 2020.6 7 On March 19, 2020, as a result of the threat of 

6

 <https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR20-001.aspx> accessed October 8, 2021.

7

 The court may judicially notice a fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it “(1) is 

generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and 

readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b). Judicial notice is proper for public records whose accuracy is not in dispute. See

Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A court] may take judicial notice 

of records and reports of administrative bodies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

COVID-19, Governor Newsom issued an executive order ordering all individuals living in the 

State of California to stay home or at their place of residence.8 Because the statute of limitations 

expired on January 15, 2014, any restrictions imposed on petitioner as a result of COVID-19 

could not have impacted his timely filing.

G. Conclusion

The limitations period expired on January 15, 2014, yet petitioner failed to file the instant 

petition until November 5, 2020, and failed to demonstrate that he was diligent throughout the 

limitations period. Davis, 953 F.3d at 582. Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted, 

and petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing be denied. 

IV. Recommendations

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (ECF Nos. 1, 19) be denied; 

2. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) be granted; and

3. This action be dismissed with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” In his objections petitioner may address 

whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment 

in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

Where, as here, a habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability 

“should issue . . . if the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the petition states a valid claim for the denial of a constitutional right, and [2] that jurists 

 

8

 Cal. Exec. Order N-33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020), <https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/03/19/governorgavin-newsom-issues-stay-at-home-order/>, accessed October 13, 2021.

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 478 (2000)). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen 

days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: October 22, 2021

/meza2316.mtd.hc.sol

Case 2:20-cv-02316-DAD-CSK Document 24 Filed 10/22/21 Page 20 of 20