Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07025/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07025-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In this order, all references to “Defendants” apply to these

two Defendants only.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ILENE P. KING,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CIGNA CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-7025 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR RECOVERY OF

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Plaintiff Ilene P. King moves to recover attorneys’ fees

incurred in prosecuting this action. Defendants Connecticut

General Life Insurance Company and Alltel Telephone Services Long

Term Disability Plan oppose Plaintiff’s motion.1 The matter was

taken under submission on the papers. After considering all of the

papers filed by the parties, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion,

but awards her less than the total amount of fees sought.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action under the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act (ERISA) challenging Defendants’ denial of her

long-term disability benefits. In an order dated August 7, 2007,

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the Court granted judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her claim for

benefits. However, it denied Plaintiff’s claims for breach of

fiduciary duty and statutory penalties. It also dismissed all

claims against CIGNA Corporation, which is neither Plaintiff’s

disability plan nor her plan’s sponsor, fiduciary, or

administrator.

Plaintiff now seeks recovery of attorneys’ fees in the amount

of $106,071.25 against Defendants. In support of this request,

Plaintiff submits the declaration of her attorney, Julian M. Baum,

detailing the hours he and other attorneys spent on the case, and

providing information to support Plaintiff’s contention that these

attorneys’ hourly rates are reasonable.

DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion

As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

motion should be denied because it was filed untimely. Pursuant to

Rule 54(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion

for attorneys’ fees must be filed “no later than 14 days after

entry of judgment,” unless otherwise provided by statute or court

order. Judgment in this case was entered on August 24, 2007, and

directed Plaintiff to file her motion for attorneys’ fees within

fourteen days, corresponding to a deadline of Friday, September 7,

2007. Plaintiff filed her motion on that date, but did not file

the accompanying Baum declaration until the next court day,

September 10, 2007. Plaintiff attributes the delay to difficulties

using the court’s electronic filing system.

Defendants are correct in noting that the declaration should

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have been filed with Plaintiff’s motion on September 7, 2007. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s motion was filed by the deadline, and

Defendants have not shown that they were prejudiced by the delay of

one court day in filing the supporting declaration. Accordingly,

the delay provides no basis for denying Plaintiff’s motion.

II. Plaintiff’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees

ERISA provides that “the court in its discretion may allow a

reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29

U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]his

section should be read broadly to mean that a plan participant or

beneficiary, if he prevails in his suit under § 1132 to enforce his

rights under his plan, should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee

unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust."

Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984)

(internal quotation marks omitted). This is in line with ERISA’s

broad remedial purpose “to protect employee rights and to secure

effective access to federal courts.” Id.

In determining whether special circumstances exist warranting

the denial of attorneys’ fees, a court may consider: (1) the degree

of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability

of the opposing party to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an

award of fees against the opposing party would deter others from

acting in similar circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting

fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an

ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding

ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. 

Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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No one of these Hummell factors is decisive, and some may not be

pertinent in a given case. Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v.

Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, they reflect

a balancing, and not all must weigh in favor of a fee award. 

McElwaine v. U.S. West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999).

A consideration of the Hummell factors in this case reveals a

lack of special circumstances to warrant denying Plaintiff’s

motion. While the Court has not found that Defendants acted in bad

faith, bad faith is not required for an award of attorneys’ fees. 

Smith, 746 F.2d at 590. And from a legal perspective, Defendants

are “culpable” in that they were found to owe Plaintiff a legal

duty that they were not fulfilling.

It is not disputed that Defendants have the ability to pay the

fees sought. In addition, even though this lawsuit seeks primarily

to benefit Plaintiff, an award of attorneys’ fees could serve to

deter other plan administrators from denying meritorious disability

claims. This could indirectly benefit other individuals.

As for the relative merits of the parties’ positions,

Plaintiff succeeded on her claim for benefits. While it is true

that her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and statutory

penalties were dismissed along with her claims against CIGNA, this

does not constitute a basis for denying her motion. Smith held

that attorneys’ fees should not be denied “simply because the

plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the

lawsuit. Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal

grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or

failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for

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reducing a fee. The result is what matters.” 746 F.2d at 591

(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). 

Accordingly, the fifth Hummell factor also supports awarding

Plaintiff attorneys’ fees.

III. Amount of Recoverable Fees

In the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys’ fees are

determined by first calculating the “lodestar.” Jordan v.

Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). “The

‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the

prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a

reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d

359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). There is a strong presumption that the

lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Jordan, 815 F.2d at

1262. However, the court may adjust the award from the lodestar

figure upon consideration of additional factors that may bear upon

reasonableness. Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir. 1975).

Determining a reasonable hourly rate is a critical inquiry. 

Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

n.11 (1984)). In establishing the reasonable hourly rate, the

court may take into account: (1) the novelty and complexity of the

issues; (2) the special skill and experience of counsel; (3) the

quality of representation; and (4) the results obtained. See

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir.

1988). These factors are subsumed in the initial lodestar

calculation, and should not serve as independent bases for

adjusting fee awards. Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64. The reasonable

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rate inquiry should also be informed by reference to the prevailing

market rates in the forum district. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d

1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992).

The Supreme Court has recognized that, while it is appropriate

for the district court to exercise its discretion in determining an

award of attorneys’ fees, it remains important for the court to

provide “a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee

award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Hall v.

Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985) (in computing an award,

the district court should provide a “detailed account of how it

arrives at appropriate figures for ‘the number of hours reasonably

expended’ and ‘a reasonable hourly rate’”) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S.

at 898).

A. Hourly Rate

Plaintiff’s seeks an hourly rate of $450 for Mr. Baum, the

lead attorney on her case, $425 for Robert C. Weems, his partner,

and $400 for Thomas J. Fuchs, an associated attorney. Defendants

do not argue that Mr. Baum’s or Mr. Weems’ rates are unreasonable,

but they do argue that there is insufficient evidence to justify

Mr. Fuchs’ rate.

Mr. Baum’s declaration details the three attorneys’

professional backgrounds. According to the declaration, Mr. Baum

has practiced law for approximately twenty years, working on a

variety of complex cases. He also has significant experience

litigating ERISA actions. His 2007 billing rate for ERISA matters

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Some of the work billed by Mr. Baum’s law firm was performed

in 2006. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that when an

attorney’s payment is delayed, the district court may compensate by

applying the attorney’s current rate to all hours billed. Fischel

v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1010

(9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court uses the attorneys’ 2007 rates

for all applicable calculations in this case.

7

is $450 per hour.2

 Mr. Weems graduated from law school in 1990 and

also has extensive experience litigating complex lawsuits,

including lawsuits involving disputes between policyholders and

insurers. His 2007 billing rate for ERISA matters is $425 per

hour. Mr. Fuchs graduated from law school in 1987 and served for

seventeen years as a law clerk in the United States Bankruptcy

Court. Additionally, he has a doctorate in clinical psychology. 

His 2007 billing rate for ERISA matters is $400 per hour.

Mr. Baum states in his declaration that he is familiar with

the prevailing market rates for experienced ERISA attorneys in the

Bay Area, and that the above rates are typical of the market. This

accords with rates found reasonable in other cases. For instance,

in a 2006 case, this Court found that Mr. Baum’s and Mr. Weems’

hourly rates of $415 and $400, respectively, were reasonable. 

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Application for an Order to Show Cause

and Granting Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees, dated June 30,

2006, King v. GE Fin. Assurance Co., No. C 05-3478. Mr. Baum

states that his firm’s rates have increased since the King case. 

In other ERISA cases, courts have found similar rates to be

reasonable for attorneys with an amount of experience roughly

equivalent to Mr. Baum’s and Mr. Weems’. See Farhat v. Hartford

Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2521571, at *7 (N.D. Cal.)

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(finding the rate of $435 reasonable for a law firm partner with

significant ERISA experience and noting that “[t]he declarations

and relevant case law establish a range for experienced partners

from approximately $400/hour to $495/hour”); May v. Metropolitan

Life Ins., 2005 WL 839291, at *3 (N.D. Cal.) (noting evidence that

the prevailing rate for partner-level ERISA attorneys in the Bay

Area is between $425 and $450 per hour); Fenberg v. Cowden, 2006 WL

83053, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal.) (approving a rate of $400 per hour for

an ERISA attorney who lived outside the Bay Area and had

“significantly less” than twenty years of ERISA litigation

experience). Given Mr. Baum’s and Mr. Weems’ level of experience,

their rates appear to be within the prevailing rate range. 

Considering also that Defendants do not assert that these

attorneys’ rates are unreasonable or provide any evidence

demonstrating as much, the Court finds the rates to be reasonable.

Defendants correctly note that there is less evidence

supporting the reasonableness of Dr. Fuchs’ rate of $400 per hour. 

Mr. Baum’s declaration states that Dr. Fuchs has twenty years of

legal experience and possesses a doctorate in clinical psychology,

but says nothing of his expertise in ERISA matters or in mediation,

for which his services in this case were primarily used. However,

Plaintiff has provided information about the prevailing rates of

other attorneys in the community, albeit attorneys with somewhat

different professional backgrounds. “[T]he Ninth Circuit has

implied that defendants cannot simply disagree with this evidence,

but should ‘support their arguments with any affidavits or evidence

of their own regarding legal rates in the community.’” Farhat,

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In her reply, Plaintiff seeks $1,350 for the three hours Mr.

Baum spent drafting it. Because this request is not supported by a

declaration, the Court will award Plaintiff only $450 for the time

spent preparing the reply, representing one hour's worth of Mr.

Baum’s fees.

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2006 WL 2521571 at *7 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps

Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990)). Given the

evidence presented, the Court concludes that Dr. Fuchs’ hourly rate

of $400 is reasonable.

B. Number of Hours

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees should be

reduced by $18,036.25 because an excessive number of hours were

billed. Specifically, Defendants assert that: 1) the time spent

researching discovery issues was unjustified; 2) they should not be

held responsible for the time spent researching the issues

underlying CIGNA’s request for a voluntary dismissal; 3) Mr. Baum’s

review in preparation for the case management conference was

redundant and unnecessary; 4) research related to Dr. Gerstenblitt

was excessive and unnecessary; 5) Plaintiff cannot recover charges

for the services of Mr. Baum’s paralegal; and 6) it was

unreasonable for two attorneys to attend the mediation on

Plaintiff’s behalf.

The Court has reviewed the itemized charges submitted in

connection with Plaintiff’s motion, and concludes that the number

of hours charged is reasonable except as noted below. A reduction

of $5,956.25 from the amount of fees sought is appropriate, leading

to a total award of $100,565, including $450 for Mr. Baum's time

spent preparing Plaintiff's reply on this motion.3

 This amount is

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also consistent with awards of attorneys’ fees in other ERISA

cases. See Baum Dec. Ex. C.

1. Research on discovery issues

Mr. Baum billed Plaintiff for 12.7 hours of legal research and

analysis concerning discovery issues. Defendants argue that

because no discovery was involved in this case, these charges are

unreasonable.

Plaintiff notes that on February 28, 2007, Mr. Baum spent 5.3

hours researching cases construing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Insurance Co., 458 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.

2006), which changed the law on the standard of review in ERISA

cases. Abatie’s holdings also impacted the right of ERISA

plaintiffs to obtain discovery. See Shemano-Krupp v. Mutual of

Omaha Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3365595, at *9 (N.D. Cal.); Toven v. Metro.

Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2713579, at *1 (C.D. Cal.). Given that

Abatie was decided only recently, it was not unreasonable for Mr.

Baum to spend 5.3 hours researching the case’s effect on subsequent

law, even considering his expertise on ERISA matters. Nor was it

unreasonable for him to spend 3.1 hours analyzing these issues on

February 23, 2007 in preparation for the Court’s case management

conference.

Mr. Baum also spent 4.3 hours on April 13, 2007 researching

other cases in which CIGNA had been required to produce discovery. 

Because this research pertained solely to CIGNA, which was

dismissed from the action, Defendants should not be required to pay

for it. Accordingly, these 4.3 hours are deducted from the

allowable time billed, and Plaintiff’s award is reduced by $1,935.

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2. Research on claims against CIGNA

Defendants object to paying for charges incurred in connection

with the 6.7 hours Mr. Baum spent on March 15, 2007 researching the

legal issues underlying CIGNA’s request that Plaintiff voluntarily

dismiss it from the action. As noted above, the Court granted

CIGNA’s motion for judgment, finding that because CIGNA did not

issue Plaintiff’s policy, administer Plaintiff’s claim or

participate in the denial of Plaintiff’s benefits, it could not be

held liable under ERISA. It would be unfair to charge Defendants

for Plaintiff’s research on CIGNA’s liability, in that the subject

matter of the research did not concern them, but rather another

party that ultimately prevailed. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request

for fees is further reduced by $3,015, corresponding to 6.7 hours

of Mr. Baum’s time.

3. Preparation for the case management conference

Defendants object to the two hours of time Mr. Baum spent

reviewing the case file in preparation for the Court’s case

management conference. They assert that because Mr. Weems, not Mr.

Baum, attended the conference, Mr. Baum’s work was redundant and

unnecessary. Mr. Baum represents that, after reviewing the file,

he created a memo that Mr. Weems read before reviewing the file

himself. The Court is not persuaded that this charge is

unreasonable, and will allow Plaintiff to recover it.

4. Research on Dr. Gerstenblitt

Mr. Baum spent 8.5 hours searching medical databases and case

law for information about the credentials, reputation and

experience of Dr. Gerstenblitt, the physician on whose report

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Defendants relied in denying Plaintiff’s claim. Defendants object

to the charge for this research, arguing that Plaintiff never

sought to introduce extrinsic evidence about Dr. Gerstenblitt. 

This may be true, but the fact that Plaintiff was not able to

uncover evidence raising serious doubts about Dr. Gerstenblitt’s

abilities does not mean that the search for such evidence was

unreasonable. Defendants relied heavily on Dr. Gerstenblitt’s

report in their decision to deny Plaintiff’s benefits. Plaintiff

was entitled to look into his professional background, and 8.5

hours is not an unreasonable amount of time to spend looking.

5. Paralegal charges

Defendants also object to Mr. Baum’s charge for 8.05 hours of

paralegal services at an hourly rate of $125. In supporting the

reasonableness of this charge, Plaintiff correctly points out that

paralegal fees may be included in an award of attorneys’ fees. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that:

If the attorney’s hourly rate already incorporates the

cost of work performed by non-attorneys, then courts

should not compensate for these costs as an additional

reasonable attorney’s fee. The key . . . is the billing

custom in the relevant market. Thus, fees for work

performed by non-attorneys such as paralegals may be

billed separately, at market rates, if this is the

prevailing practice in a given community. Indeed, even

purely clerical or secretarial work is compensable if it

is customary to bill such work separately, though such

tasks should not be billed at the paralegal rate,

regardless of who performs them. . . . [T]he district

court may properly insist that the [moving party] show

that it is the custom in the relevant community to bill

separately for work performed by the non-attorneys at

issue . . . .

Trustees of Constr. Indus. and Laborers Health and Welfare Trust v.

Redland, 460 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

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marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff has provided no evidence of the prevailing practice

in the Bay Area legal community with respect to billing clients for

paralegal services, nor has she provided information demonstrating

that an hourly rate of $105 for paralegal services is reasonable. 

Even if she had, she still would not be able to recover this rate

for purely clerical services performed by the paralegal. At least

one charge seems to be based on no more than copying legal

authorities for review by attorneys. Baum Dec. Ex. A at 7. For

these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to recover fees

for paralegal services, and her award is reduced by $1,006.25.

6. Mediation charges

At the Court-ordered mediation in this case, Plaintiff was

represented by two attorneys: Mr. Baum and Dr. Fuchs. Defendants

argue that it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to send two attorneys

to the mediation, because Mr. Baum is highly skilled in ERISA

matters and should have been able to handle Plaintiff’s

representation himself. However, “the participation of more than

one attorney [at a mediation] does not necessarily constitute an

unnecessary duplication of effort.” Mardirossian v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049-50 (C.D. Cal. 2006)

(quoting Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1435 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989));

see also Fleming v. Kemper Nat’l Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d

1000, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Lopez v. S.F. Unified School Dist.,

385 F. Supp. 2d 981, 993-94 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

The mediation in this case represented a significant

opportunity to resolve the dispute at an early stage, and it was

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not unreasonable for Plaintiff to enlist the services of two

attorneys with different backgrounds and perspectives to attend it. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Dr. Fuchs’ fees are recoverable.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion

for attorneys’ fees and awards her $100,565, to be paid forthwith,

jointly and severally by Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/13/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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