Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01944/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01944-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1 U.S. Bank National Association is the successor in 

interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),

which was receiver for Downey Savings and Loan Association, F.A..

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JASON H. TUFTS,

Civ. No. S-09-1944 FCD/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DOWNEY SAVINGS AND LOAN

ASSOCIATION, F.A., FCI LENDER

SERVICES, INC., ATHOME

CONSULTING GROUP, INC. DBA

ATHOME FUNDING, RONALD G.

FAYE, JOHN JAY MANGUBA

NATIVIDAD, JEFF L. ARCE, and

DOES 1-20 inclusive,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the motions of defendants

Ronald G. Faye, John Jay Manguba Natividad, U.S. Bank National

Association,1 and FCI Lender Services, to dismiss plaintiff Jason

H. Tuft’s (“plaintiff”) first amended complaint pursuant to

Case 2:09-cv-01944-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 02/19/10 Page 1 of 3
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6). On February

12, 2010, plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition,

requesting that his claims for violations of the Truth in Lending

Act (“TILA”) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

(“RESPA”) be dismissed without prejudice. (Docket # 48.) 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s TILA and RESPA claims are dismissed. 

See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(a); Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d

1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendant’s filing of a motion to dismiss,

pursuant to FRCP 12(b), does not prevent the plaintiff from later

filing a voluntary dismissal). 

Dismissal of the TILA and RESPA claims leaves the complaint

devoid of any federal claims. The remaining claims are state law

claims for negligence, violation of the California Rosenthal Act,

breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, violation of California Business

and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., breach of contract, breach

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and

wrongful foreclosure. (Pl.’s First Am. Compl. (“Compl.”).) 

Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114

F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). The court’s decision

whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed

by values of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id.

at 1001 (citations omitted). Further, primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. 

Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial,

district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

Case 2:09-cv-01944-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 02/19/10 Page 2 of 3
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350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d

1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n the usual case in which

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”)(quoting

Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). In

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining

state law claims.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without 

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 19, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-01944-FCD-GGH Document 27 Filed 02/19/10 Page 3 of 3