Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07120/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 12, 1996 Decided June 4, 1996

No. 95-7111

RICHARD G. AIRD, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY AND 

LANDON G. DOWDEY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with

95-7120

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 81cv01998)

Beverly C. Moore, Jr. and John E. Price argued the causes and filed the briefs for

appellants/cross-appellees.

Carl R. Schenker, Jr., argued the cause for appellee/cross-appellant Ford Motor Company with

whom William T. Coleman, Jr., Richard C. Warmer and John Beisner were on the briefs.

Marya C. Young argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee Landon G. Dowdey.

Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The first time this case came to us, it held out the promise of

hundreds of millions of dollars in damages for a nationwide class of millions of plaintiffs. Walsh v.

Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987). The second

time, not even one plaintiff remained to prosecute the appeal. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d

1188 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The case now arrives in this court a third time, more than four years after we

put an end to litigation of the merits, with only the lawyers left to argue over costs and sanctions.

Unfortunately, after 15 years of litigation, we cannot end the case here, but must remand one final

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1 Order Concerning Costs, Civ. A. No. 81-1998-JLG (Apr. 25, 1995); Memorandum, id.

(Mar. 10, 1995); id. (May 10, 1994). 

issue to the district court. While we affirm the district court's order assessing as costs the prevailing

party'sshare ofthe specialmaster'sfees, we reverse the court's decision absolving one ofthe plaintiffs'

counsel from joint and several liability for any costs, and we remand the case for the court to

reconsider the special master's recommendation that sanctions be imposed on plaintiffs' counsel.

I.

In its earliest incarnation, this case was a class action breach of warranty suit against Ford

Motor Co. filed on behalf of owners of Ford vehicles. Plaintiffs, who brought the suit pursuant to

the Magnuson-Moss WarrantyFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss

Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., alleged a disconcerting tendency for the automatic transmissionsto

slip from "park" into "reverse". The district court ultimately denied class certification and dismissed

the claims of the individual plaintiffs, determinations that became final when this court dismissed

plaintiffs' appeal.

The district court also issued severalordersin response to the parties'motionsregarding costs

and sanctions.1 Defendant Ford and two distinct groups of plaintiffs' counsel have appealed and

cross-appealed the district court's resolution of those issues; a third member of the plaintiffs' legal

team, while satisfied with the orders, appears here as both appellee and cross-appellee. To explain

how this unusual alignment of parties came about, we set forth the eventsleading up to the plaintiffs'

defeat on the merits.

Beverly C. Moore, Jr. acted as lead plaintiffs' counsel from the outset. Moore, who

apparently had academic interest and practical experience in both class action litigation in general and

the Magnuson-Moss Act in particular, teamed up with Landon G. Dowdey, a member of the District

of Columbia bar and long-time trial lawyer. According to both men, they agreed that their

complementary skillssuggested a division oflabor: Moore would handle motions practice regarding

class certification and the Magnuson-Moss Act, while Dowdey would advise him on other areas of

strategy and practice in which Dowdey was more knowledgeable. A few months after plaintiffs

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successfully moved for class certification, Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 106 F.R.D. 378 (D.D.C. 1985),

attorneys associated with the firm of Woolsey, Fisher, Whiteaker & McDonald (collectively known

to the parties as "Missouri counsel"), who had experience in litigating "park-to-reverse" cases against

Ford, joined the plaintiffs' team and were assigned primary responsibility for handling discovery.

In September 1985, two months after Missouri counselhad entered the case, the district court

appointed a special master to oversee discovery and a few other procedural matters. The order of

reference provided that "[a]ll compensation and expensesin connection with this Order shall be paid

50% by plaintiffs and 50% by defendants." In the spring of 1986, the special master established a

schedule for discovery.

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffssuffered two major reversals. First, in August 1986, the firm

with which Missouri counsel were associated suffered a "major schism" and lost one-third of its

attorneys. The resulting turmoil, coming just when the pace of discovery was accelerating under the

master's schedule, compromised Missouri counsel's ability to handle discovery as contemplated in

their agreement with Moore. Moore attempted to enlist other firms as co-counsel to take up the

slack, but his search was hampered by a second setback. In December 1986, this court vacated the

class certification, Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S.

915 (1987), making the case much less attractive to potential plaintiffs' counsel.

In the meantime, the plaintiffs'responsesto Ford'sinterrogatories came due, and the plaintiffs

failed to respond at all to many ofthe interrogatories. Ford moved to compel responses. The special

master, while expressing sympathy for counsel's difficulties, concluded that it was too late for them

to obtain an extension of time to respond. Accordingly, on December 11, 1986, the special master

granted Ford's motion to compel and ordered the plaintiffsto respond to specified interrogatories by

January 9, 1987.

After the plaintiffs responded to the interrogatories, Ford again moved to compel discovery,

maintaining that the responses were inadequate. Ford also requested that the special master impose

discovery sanctions. The plaintiffs responded that the detailed and technical interrogatories were

"extraordinarily prolix," a contention with which the special master again showed some sympathy.

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The special master also found, however, that the "plaintiffs' responses to these interrogatories

manifest an almost studied refusal to be specific. Many of plaintiffs' answers improperly substitute

general pleading-type allegations for the detailed, fact-specific explicitness which the discovery

process requires." The special master therefore concluded that the plaintiffs had not complied with

the December 11 order compelling discovery, and issued an order onMay5, 1987, compelling further

interrogatory responses. The special master deferred consideration of Ford's request for sanctions,

however, until after the plaintiffs had an opportunity to supply satisfactory responses to the

interrogatories. On Ford's motion for reconsideration, the special master again decided, on May 28,

1987, that the plaintiffs had violated the December 11 order and directed the plaintiffsto supplement

their responses by June 4, 1987.

On July 9, 1987, the special master took up the sanctions question that he had deferred in

May. Ford sought only its expenses relating to the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the December

11 order and did not request sanctions for any alleged deficiencies in the plaintiffs' supplemental

responsesto the May orders. The special master, amplifying upon his earlier findings, concluded that

the plaintiffs had violated the December 11 order and that the violation was unjustified. Noting that

the entire plaintiffs' counsel teamMoore, Dowdey, and Missouri counselbore responsibility for

the inadequate discovery responses, the special master concluded that there was no principled way

to single out any one of them for punishment and held each of them jointly and severally liable for

sanctions. Turning to the measure of sanctions, the special master decided that the expenses caused

by the plaintiffs' noncompliance with the December 11 order were fairly measured by Ford's costs in

obtaining the two May orders requiring the plaintiffs to supplement their deficient responses. He

ordered the parties to confer and determine a reasonable award, but it appears that an amount was

never fixed. Following a series of events not fully reflected in the record, the plaintiffs appealed the

July 9 sanction order to the district court.

Throughout this period, relations among the plaintiffs' counsel deteriorated. Moore and

Dowdey began to disagree over strategy, and the disagreements became heated and personal. In

February 1987, after the plaintiffs had filed the deficient interrogatory responses pursuant to the

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December 11 order compelling discovery, Dowdey moved to have his name removed from some of

the documents because he did not "want his name associated with procedures in this case of which

he did not, and does not, approve." On October 30, 1987, Dowdey moved to withdraw as class

counsel, and the district court granted his motion in December 1987. In the spring of the following

year, Dowdey also moved for reconsideration ofthe July 9 sanction order, requesting that the special

master relieve him of liability because he was not responsible for the deficient discovery responses.

The special master held that motion in abeyance and never ruled on it.

The case lumbered on until1990, when Ford (having defeated the classrecertificationmotion)

prevailed in the district court on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

claims of the individual plaintiffs. Ford then filed a bill of costs, of which more than 70%

($24,947.77) represented the fees that it had paid to the special master pursuant to the order of

reference. On May 10, 1994, the district court addressed both the bill of costs and plaintiffs' appeal

of the special master's July 9 sanctions order. The court described the discovery sanctions issue as

"moot" in light of the termination of the litigation and declined to pursue the issue further. It also

concluded that the master's fees were properly taxed as costs, for which the plaintiffs' counsel

personally were liable by the terms of their retainer agreements. However, because of the "limited

involvement" of Missouri counsel, the court declined to tax costs against them.

Ford, Dowdey, and Moore each moved for reconsideration. By order of May 10, 1995, the

district court adhered to its decision not to pursue the issue of discovery sanctions. The court

believed that the specialmaster had not finallyconcluded that the plaintiffs had violated the December

11 order because he had given them a final opportunity to supplement their responses after the May

orders. The court also reaffirmed the amount of taxable costs, including the special master's fees.

As to Missouri counsel, however, the court reversed its earlier ruling and ruled that their role in

preparing a statistical database to be used in class certification warranted holding them jointly and

severally liable for costs. Conversely, the court relieved Dowdey of responsibility, noting that he had

withdrawn as counsel in 1987 and that his involvement in discovery was minimal.

These appeals and cross-appeals challenge the May 10, 1995 order on reconsideration. First,

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2 We do not consider Rule 54(d) as amended in 1993. Rule 54(d)(1) & (2) (1993). 

3 Section 1920 provides:

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the

following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic

transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

Moore and Missouri counsel, as appellants, contend that the special master's fees should not have

been taxed as costs. Second, they contend that in any event Dowdey should have been held jointly

and severally liable for whatever costs were properly taxed. Third, Missouri counsel alone maintain

that they should have been relieved of liability for costs, as the district court originally ordered.

Finally, Ford, as cross-appellant, contends that the district court erred in not assessing monetary

discovery sanctions on the plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to the special master's July 9 order.

II.

When Ford filed its bill of costsin 1990 under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 54(d), the rule

provided that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise

directs."228 U.S.C. App. (1988). Appellants contend that master's fees do not qualify as "costs"

within the meaning of Rule 54(d). Unanimous authority, however, including two decisions from this

court, is against them. Walutes v. Morrissette, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1201, 1202 (D.C. Cir.

1968) (per curiam); Dyker Bldg. Co. v. United States, 182 F.2d 85, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1950); National

Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 1987); Gary W. v.

Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 1979); Southern Agency Co. v. LaSalle Cas. Co., 393 F.2d

907, 915 (8th Cir. 1968); Trout v. Ball, 705 F. Supp. 705, 707-08 (D.D.C. 1989); see also 9A

Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2608 (1995). Appellants contend that

these authorities cannot be considered good law after the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford

Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), which they maintain holds that the only

"costs" that can be awarded under Rule 54(d) are those explicitly listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.3

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(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for

use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of

interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation

services under section 1828 of this title.

A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the

judgment or decree.

28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994). 

4

See, e.g., United States v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 901 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1990); 

United States v. Cline, 388 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1968). 

5

See, e.g., Johnson Fare Box Co. v. National Rejectors, Inc., 269 F.2d 348, 351 (8th Cir.

1959); National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 562 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 

Because master's fees are not among the costs enumerated in § 1920, appellants contend that

Crawford Fitting prohibits district courts from ever taxing them as costs.

We need not address appellants' Rule 54(d) contentions because the district court properly

approved Ford's request for reimbursement of special master's fees under Rule 53(a). Crawford

Fitting makes clear not only that costs not enumerated in § 1920 may be taxed ifthere is a contractual

or an express statutory source of authority to do so, id. at 439; accord West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc.

v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1991), but also leaves Rule 53(a) unscathed. Rule 53 vests the district

court with authority to allocatemaster'sfeesin favor ofthe prevailing party. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)

(1994). Under Rule 53(a), "[t]he compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court,

and shall be charged upon such ofthe parties... asthe court may direct." As this permissive language

suggests, the district court enjoys broad discretion to allocate the master'sfees asit thinks best under

the circumstances ofthe case. Aponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1220 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 430 F.2d 401, 427 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426

U.S. 935 (1976); see also Dyker Bldg. Co., 182 F.2d at 89.

While in some cases the costs might best be divided among the parties,4or charged at least

to some extent against the party that created the need for reference to the master,5the district court

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6

See, e.g., K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1974); Fulton Fed.

Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 292, 295-96 (N.D. Ga. 1991). 

7 Unlike the local rule cited in Calloway, District of Columbia District Court local rules do not

specify whether master's fees are to be taxed. Cf. D.D.C. R. 210, 214. 

has the authority in appropriate cases to tax the master's fees as costs against the losing party.

6 We

therefore agree with the only other court to consider the matter in light of Crawford Fitting, under

Rule 53(a) the court "may direct" that liability for master'sfees await the outcome ofthe case. Fulton

Fed., 143 F.R.D. at 294-96. Thus, once the district court exercised its discretion under Rule 53(a),

Ford's share of the special master's costs was properly treated as taxable costs.

Appellants separately challenge the district court's assessment of master's fees against them

on the ground that the assessment conflicted with the order ofreference, which specified that the fees

would be "paid 50% by plaintiffs and 50% by defendant," and did not expressly provide that the

prevailing party could subsequently recover itsshare as costs. The order of reference, however, does

not purport to allocate responsibility for special master's fees for all time, even after the prevailing

party has been identified at the end of the case. See Order of Reference Memorandum, Civ. A. No.

81-1998-JLG (May 10, 1994), at 5 (citing Trout v. Ball, 705 F.2d 705, 707 (D.D.C. 1989)). The

better practice might well be for the district court to advise the parties in advance that it plans to tax

master's fees as costs, either specifically in the order of reference, see, e.g., Fulton Fed., 143 F.R.D.

at 296, or generally by localrule,see, e.g., Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Grp., 111 F.R.D. 637,

652 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated in part on other grounds, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on

other grounds sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Grp., 493 U.S. 120 (1989).7

Nevertheless, the district court did not abuse its discretion here by failing to give such advance notice,

as evidenced by the apparently widespread practice of treating such fees as taxable costs.

Moore's further contention that he would not have consented to the reference of the case to

a special master had he known that he and his co-counsel would be held liable for Ford'sshare if they

lost the case misses the mark. Moore reads the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2), to

guarantee prevailing consumersbut not manufacturers like Fordrecovery of costs, including

master's fees. How this feature of the Act could affect Moore's willingness to have the case referred

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is left unexplained. Whatever the precise contours of the argument, however, it mistakes the nature

of the court's power to refer discovery matters to a master: reference does not require the parties'

consent. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(4). Particularly when the parties are embroiled in repeated,

fact-intensive discovery disputes, a district court may find it most efficient to impose on the parties,

at their own expense and without their consent, a discovery master. The court's ability to manage its

docket and enforce the discovery rulesin such a case may depend greatly on its power to allocate the

costs of reference as it deems appropriate. Cf. Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 314-15 (1920).

While the rules do not endorse the routine reference of mattersto masters, see FED.R.CIV. P. 53(b),

it is nonetheless clear that masters can enhance a district court's ability pursuant to Rule 1 to "secure

the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of suits before it, provided that the court has the

discretion to tailor the terms of reference to the circumstances of each case.

For these reasons we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by taxing the

master's fees against the plaintiffs' counsel.

III.

The question remains who among the plaintiffs' counselshould have borne the costs. Initially,

we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in holding Missouri counsel liable for

costs. Moore's retainer agreements with the individual class members provided that counsel would

pay the costs of litigation, and Missouri counsel, aware of those agreements, joined the case as

co-counsel. Moreover, Moore and Missouri counsel entered into an agreement regarding fees and

costs, which provided that Missouri counsel would reimburse Moore for one-half of the costs and

expenses of the case.

Missouri counsel nonetheless contend that their role in the case was so limited that it was an

abuse of discretion to hold them jointly and severally liable for costs. If there were ever a case in

which such an argument could be sustained, this is not it. Missouri counsel have been counsel of

record in this matter since 1985. They assumed responsibility for managing discovery, one of the

most crucial and labor-intensive aspects ofthis mammoth case. The district court could properly find

significant Missouri counsel's efforts in compiling a database of park-to-reverse incidents involving

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Ford vehicles. Their inability to discharge their discovery responsibilities may have contributed to

the plaintiffs' ultimate defeat, and regardless of whether the crippling "schism" at their law firm was

their fault, it was not the fault of anyone else involved in this litigation.

Missouri counsel fault the district court's reliance on the database on the grounds that most

of the work was done by paralegals and secretaries at their law firm. Again, it is difficult to

understand what this proves, for if Missouri counsel are not responsible for the work done by their

own employees, they have not explained who else in the case is. Finally, Missouri counsel compare

their position to Dowdey's, contending that if Dowdey is not required to pay costs given his limited

involvement in the case, neither should they. Because we conclude that Dowdey should not have

been let off the hook either, this argument evaporates.

Unlike Missouri counsel, Dowdey had the foresight to withdraw as early as 1987. He

maintains that because he was not counsel in the case when Ford became the prevailing party, and

in fact left because he foresaw that Moore's tactics would lead to defeat, he cannot be saddled with

costs that are contingent on Ford's victory. The district court agreed with this analysis, and also

credited Dowdey's account of his minimal role in the litigation. Accepting the facts found by the

district court, we nonetheless conclude that the court erred in not imposing joint and several liability

on Dowdey.

Dowdey, unlike Missouri counsel, was counselofrecord fromthe outset. He was on the brief

in the first appeal to this court, when class certification was vacated. By the time he withdrew, the

plaintiffs' case was in disarray on the eve of the crucial class recertification motion, with discovery

sanctions outstanding and a counselteamthat the specialmastersuggested wasincapable of handling

a case of this magnitude and complexity. In fairness to his colleagues, it cannot be said the case was

lost entirely after Dowdey left; this defeat was a team effort that was well underway by the time

Dowdey withdrew.

Nor does Dowdey's limited role in discovery matters alter the situation. First, during the

crucial months at the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987, it appears that none of the plaintiffs'

counsel were actually accomplishing much by way of responding to discovery. Thus, it is difficult

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8 DR 2-107(A)(2) provides: "A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another

lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless ... [t]he division is

made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each." 

9 DR 6-101(A) provides: "A lawyer shall not ... [h]andle a legal matter which he knows or

should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is

competent to handle it [nor] [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him." 

to understand how Dowdey'sinactivity distinguishes him from his erstwhile co-counsel. The special

master acknowledged asmuch in holding all counsel liable for discovery sanctions. Second, the costs

assessed by the district court involved more than just discovery. By the time Moore tried to enlist

Dowdey's assistance with discovery in 1987, the case had been active for the better part of a decade,

including a trip to the circuit court and back. Finally, if it is true that Dowdey did virtually nothing

during the six years in which he was counsel of record and could not find a way to cooperate with

his co-counsel when the case was foundering in 1987, that is hardly to his credit. We cannot put it

any better than did the special master:

Those attorneys who did not participate in preparation of these responses and papers

have not shown that they had a reasonable basis to believe that plaintiffs' discovery

obligations were or could be adequately discharged by those to whom the baton was

apparently passed. These attorneys knew, or were required to know, that plaintiffs

were not providing discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

even if they were no longer responsible for the discovery phase ofthis case, they must

still supervise and remain aware of all aspects of the instant case. There is no

evidence that these attorneys discharged that obligation. The record supports, if it

does not compel, the conclusion that these attorneys permitted, or acquiesced in and

thereby "condoned," serious discovery abuse extending over many months.

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rather than simply insisting that his name be

removed from offending pleadings, Dowdey had an obligation to the court and to his clients to see

that the case was properly litigated. Cf. D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-107(A)(3)8

(1991 edition); id. DR 6-101(A).9 He cannot escape from his share of the responsibility for what

happened any more than can Moore and Missouri counsel simply because his sins were of omission

rather than commission.

That said, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in ruling that Dowdey was not

responsible for the coststhat were incurred by Ford after Dowdey withdrew from the case. Dowdey

is jointly and severally responsible only for the costs incurred while he was counsel of record, as a

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member of the plaintiffs' counsel team. Unlike Missouri counsel, who agreed to contribute to those

costsincurred before they joined the case, Dowdey entered into no agreement to pay for costs wholly

unrelated to his duties and responsibilities as counsel.

IV. 

Finally, on the question of discovery sanctions, the district court rebuffed Ford's request to

assess monetary sanctions against the plaintiffs' counselbecause, asthe court read the specialmaster's

reports, the special master had not "finally" determined that the plaintiffs had violated a discovery

order. It is true that even after the May orders, the special master gave the plaintiffs another chance

to supplement their deficient discovery responses and never decided whether the supplemental

responses were independently sanctionable. However, it is equally clear that the special master found

that the plaintiffs violated the December 11 discovery order and that Ford was entitled to recover the

expenses it incurred as a result of that violation.

To review the chronology briefly, the plaintiffs initially failed to respond at all to many of

Ford'sinterrogatories. On Ford's motion, the special master entered the December 11 order, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a), ordering the plaintiffs to respond. The responses were

inadequate. By again failing to file adequate responses in a timely fashion, the plaintiffs violated the

December 11 order. That forced Ford to go back to the special master on May 5 and May 28 and

obtain two more orders compelling supplemental responses. As the special master recognized, even

if the supplemental responses produced in response to the May orders ultimately did satisfy the

plaintiffs' discovery duties, Ford still deserved to be compensated for its costsin forcing the plaintiffs

to make those supplemental responses. Consequently, the fact that the master gave the plaintiffs

another chance to furnish adequate responses before imposing the litigation sanctions available under

Rule 37(b)(2)(A-D) does not affect the plaintiffs' liability for monetary sanctions for the original

violation of the December 11 order.

The July 9 order shows that this is how the special master understood the situation.

"[D]isposition turns on whether plaintiffs have shown that failure to comply with the first [December

11] Rule 37 order was substantially justified.... Further discovery responses filed after entry of the

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second [May 5] Rule 37 order are relevant only insofar as those responses bear on claims advanced

to justify noncompliance with the initial order." After rejecting the plaintiffs' purported justifications,

the special master concluded:

Defendant has limited its application to the expenses reasonably attributable to the

reliefit obtained by orders entered on May 5 and 28, 1987. That is a conservative and

fully fair measure ofthe "reasonable expenses, including attorney'sfees, caused by the

failure" to comply with the December 11 order. The parties will be directed to confer

concerning the amount of a reasonable award and, if agreement cannot be reached,

to propose a schedule for evidentiary submissions addressed to remaining issues.

(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)) (other citations omitted). In an accompanying order, the special

master concluded that Missouri counsel, Moore, and Dowdey were each

jointly and severally liable to defendant for its reasonable expenses, including

attorney's fees and compensation and expenses paid under the order of reference,

caused by plaintiffs' failure to comply with the order of December 11, 1986 and

reasonably attributable to the relief defendant obtained by orders entered May 5 and

May 28, 1987.

Given these findings, the district court erroneously declined to pursue the sanctions issue.

Ford contends that the only task for the district court on remand is to calculate the amount

of the sanction. The special master's May 5 order, which the plaintiffs did not appeal, found that the

plaintiffs had violated the December 11 order. Ford maintains that the plaintiffs therefore waived

their challenge to the special master's finding that they were liable for a violation. We disagree.

While the May 5 order did find a violation, it expressly reserved decision on whether to impose

sanctions. Once the master decided to impose sanctions on July 9although he never fixed an

amountthe plaintiffs did seek district court review. We decline to hold that the plaintiffs waived

an issue by failing to take what amounts to an interlocutory appeal. Thus, on remand, the plaintiffs'

counsel may assert their claim that they never violated the December 11 order.

Loathe as we are to revisit upon the district court a case that it once described as a "trial

court's nightmare of a litigation monster," 130 F.R.D. at 277, one piece of it remainsto be addressed:

Ford'srequest for discovery sanctionsfor the plaintiffs' violation ofthe specialmaster's December 11,

1986, discovery order. On remand the district court does not necessarily have to review in detail each

ofthe interrogatories and responses, but mayevaluate Ford's counsel's challenge in light ofthe special

master's findings as well as any submissions that the court may order by either parties' counsel

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indexing or otherwise identifying material interrogatories and responses. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)

("[T]he court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous."). Any sanction

thereafter imposed, of course, cannot duplicate recovery of a portion of the special master'sfeesthat

Ford has already recovered as taxable costs.

Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court's order declining to reach the

sanctions issue and remand for a reevaluation; we otherwise affirm the order taxing as costs Ford's

share of the special master's fees except insofar as the order excused counsel Landon Dowdey from

joint and several liability with his co-counsel for costs incurred while he was counsel of record.

USCA Case #95-7120 Document #203594 Filed: 06/04/1996 Page 14 of 14