Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00775/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00775-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRANVILLE WILLIAM SMITH, IV,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. AUBUCHON, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-CV-0775-KJM-DMC-P

FINDINGS AND RECCOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgement. See

ECF No. 129.

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

This action proceeds on plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint. See ECF No. 75. On 

January 4, 2011 plaintiff was engaged in a chase with two police officers, defendants Aubuchon 

and James, who suspected plaintiff of having conducted an armed bank robbery earlier that day. 

Plaintiff was peddling on a bicycle while the officers followed on motorcycles. According to 

plaintiff, at some point officer James rode up alongside plaintiff and shoved him on the shoulder, 

causing plaintiff to fall headfirst over his bicycle. As he attempted to orient himself, plaintiff 

noticed that James was pointing a taser-gun at him while Aubuchon pointed a firearm. After this, 

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James yelled, “taser, taser, taser” and fired the taser-gun into plaintiff’s back. The taser-gun shot 

out barbs that attached to plaintiff’s body and electrocuted him. Plaintiff collapsed to the ground 

and the officers continued to point their weapons at him. According to plaintiff, he was not being 

aggressive with the arresting officers and would have easily submitted to being handcuffed 

without being struck by the taser-gun. As a result of this incident, plaintiff claims to suffer from 

excruciating pain throughout his body and requires the use of an inhaler.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 26, 2014, plaintiff filed his original civil rights complaint against 

defendants. ECF No. 1. On March 21, 2017, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave 

to amend. ECF No. 55. Multiple amended complaints and motions to dismiss followed. On June 

1, 2018, plaintiff filed his fourth amended complaint, ECF No. 75, which carries forth this current 

action. Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint made out three claims against the defendants: 

(1) deliberate indifference to medical needs; (2) failure to intervene; and (3) excessive force. Id.

On July 12, 2018, defendants submitted a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth 

amended complaint. ECF No. 78. On August 21, 2018, this Court issued Findings and 

Recommendations to the District Judge. ECF No. 81. On January 25, 2019, the District Judge

adopted in part and rejected in part this Court’s Findings and Recommendations. ECF No. 95. 

The District Judge ruled as follows: defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted only as to the 

failure to intervene claim. Id. Following the District Judge’s order, the fourth amended complaint 

survives on two claims: (1) medical indifference against defendants Aubuchon and James, and (2) 

excessive force against defendants Aubuchon and James. Id.

Regarding plaintiff’s medical indifference claims, the District Judge held:

. . . The fourth amended complaint states:

Tasered on the spinal column, upper left top and 

bottom right of the spinal. Pain was ex-cruciating –

causing life long pain in spinal, both shoulder and 

aching in both knees, needle sharp pains in bottom 

and both feet, using an inhaler. 

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Once I was injured by taser, no one was called to 

treat my injuries. Created by M. James deploying 

his taser on me. So when no medical treatment 

rendered on me, and no ambulance called; no 

hospital help of what M. James did to me, and his 

confidant B. Aubuchon. It has been hours/days 

before I received medically examination of my 

injuries. But only to just be taken to jail. 

ECF No. 75 at 3–4 (verbatim transcription). Based on these allegations, 

plaintiff has addressed the concerns raised by prior court orders. In light of 

the liberal pleading standards under Rule 12(b)(6), these allegations are 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim for indifference to plaintiff’s

medical needs. See Lolli v. Cty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citation omitted) (“[O]fficials are deliberately indifferent to a 

prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or intentionally 

interfere with medical treatment.”). Therefore, because plaintiff has met

the “facial plausibility” standard required to survive a motion to dismiss 

under 12(b)(6), see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), his claim 

for medical indifference as to defendants James and Aubuchon survives.

ECF No. 95, pgs. 2-3.

Regarding plaintiff’s excessive force claim against defendant Aubuchon, the 

District Judge held:

The facts alleged to implicate Aubuchon for excessive 

force are these: “(Aubuchon) held me at gun point”; “Aubuchon was 

looking at me face-to-face and there was with him his gun (handgun) gun 

pointed at me”; “Aubuchon by having his real gun pointed at me:

Excessive force was because of that time B. Aubuchon could’ve instructed 

M. James to just walk up on me and just hand-cuff me”; “Aubuchon 

having me at gun point eliminated me any movement at all.” ECF No. 75 

at 3 (verbatim transcriptions). . . .

The Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated, “We have held that 

the pointing of a gun at someone may constitute excessive force, even if it 

does not cause physical injury.” Tekle v.United States, 511 F.3d 839, 845 

(9th Cir. 2007); see also Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 

2013) (officers’ early morning raid of plaintiff’s residence with guns 

drawn may support a finding of excessive force). Whether an officer is 

justified in brandishing his weapon depends on his reasonable assessment 

of the danger at the scene. Robinson v. Solano Cty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 

(9th Cir. 2002). At this stage of the litigation plaintiff’s pleading that

Aubuchon’s act of standing by with gun drawn while plaintiff lay 

incapacitated from tasing is sufficient to survive dismissal.

Defendants argue, in the alternative, even if the court finds 

plaintiff has adequately pled Aubuchon administered excessive force, 

Aubuchon is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 78-1 at 5. Qualified 

immunity is analyzed through a two-prong test: (1) whether defendant’s

conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional 

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “A clearly established right is one that is 

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that 

what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308

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(2015) (citation omitted). In making such a determination, the court must 

view the facts “in the light most favorable to the party assessing the 

injury.” Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. ``In viewing the facts as alleged most 

favorably to plaintiff, the court finds that qualified immunity does not 

warrant dismissal of plaintiff’s excessive force claim. While it may

be that Aubuchon was justified in brandishing his firearm at the onset of 

the altercation, the point at which he continued to point his gun as plaintiff 

lay prone from the taser strike calls into question whether any reasonable 

officer would understand he was not infringing upon plaintiff’s

constitutional right at that moment. Given that plaintiff’s claim need only 

be “plausibly suggestive,” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009), the court finds that qualified immunity does not preclude 

plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Aubuchon at this stage.

ECF No. 95, pgs. 4-5.

As to plaintiff’s excessive force claim against defendant James, defendants never argued that the 

operative fourth amended complaint failed to state such a claim and the District Judge has 

concluded it does. See ECF No. 95, pg. 6. 

The Court now considers defendants’ motion for summary judgement, ECF No. 

129, plaintiff’s opposition, ECF No. 132, and defendants’ reply, ECF No. 136. 

III. THE PARTIES’ EVIDENCE

A. Defendants’ Evidence

Defendants James and Aubuchon’s motion for summary judgement is supported 

by their statement of undisputed material facts (UMF), ECF No. 129-3, as well as the declarations 

of Glen A. Williams, ECF No. 129-4, and Marcus James, ECF No. 129-5. According to 

defendants, the following facts are undisputed:

1. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 

2011, Plaintiff smoked a joint of marijuana and snorted a two- or threeinch line of methamphetamine.

Evidence: Plaintiff’s Deposition, Exhibit 1 to Declaration 

of Glen Williams (“P. Depo”), 70:9-71:14.

2. At approximately 2:30 p.m. on January 4, 2011, Plaintiff 

robbed First Bank at 2880 Sunrise Boulevard in Rancho Cordova.

Evidence: P. Depo, 6:19-7:25; Declaration of Marcus 

James (“James Decl.”), ¶ 6; RJN, Exhs. 3 and 4.

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3. Plaintiff then went to Cruz’s Mexican Restaurant 

(“Cruz’s”) at 11255 Sunrise Gold Circle in Rancho Cordova.

Evidence: P. Depo, 23:18-24:19; James Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. 1.

4. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Officers Aubuchon and James 

were on patrol in that vicinity when dispatch radioed there had been a 211 

(robbery) at First Bank, which on that date was located at 2880 Sunrise 

Boulevard in Rancho Cordova.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. 1 and 2.

5. Dispatch described the suspect as a black male in his late 

20s, height 5’6”, weight 150, long dreadlocks over his eyes, striped suit 

jacket with large stripes, matching grey suit pants, with a big gun tucked 

into his jacket.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. 2.

6. Dispatch indicated he had departed on foot toward Sunrise 

Boulevard and was last seen heading northbound.

Evidence: Id.

7. James drove through the area and could see a customer 

inside Cruz’s Mexican Restaurant, later identified as Plaintiff, who was a 

black male roughly matching the age, height, and weight description of the 

suspect; however, he did not have dreadlocks but had hair pulled back in a 

ponytail, and he was wearing a dark puffy jacket rather than a striped suit 

jacket.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 10.

8. Soon after, Aubuchon and James stopped their marked 

police motorcycles in the parking lot outside the restaurant.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 11-12.

9. When Plaintiff exited the restaurant with his food in a bag 

and picked up his bicycle, Aubuchon noted that his pants were striped 

gray suit pants matching the suspect description, so the defendants asked 

Plaintiff to stop and speak with them.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 11-12; P Depo 23:18-24:19, 35:1-

15.

10. Plaintiff does not recall them saying anything to him, but 

he was on his cell phone, talking with his girlfriend.

Evidence: P Depo, 35:16-36:7.

11. When he did not respond, Aubuchon used his Public 

Address system to loudly ask Plaintiff to speak with us.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 12.

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12. Plaintiff still did not respond, got his bicycle, walked it 

away from the officers towards the street over a grassy knoll, climbed onto 

his bicycle once he got to the sidewalk, and rode away.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 12; P Depo, 36:8- 37:8, 39:1-

41:6, see Exhibit 5 to P Depo.

13. Officers Aubuchon and James proceeded to ride their 

motorcycles down the grassy knoll onto the street to follow Plaintiff and 

caught up with him.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 12; P Depo 41:17- 20.

14. James drove his motorcycle in the far right lane of Sunrise 

right alongside Plaintiff riding his bicycle on the sidewalk and loudly 

asked Plaintiff to stop and talk to them.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 13; P Depo, 41:17-21, 43:3-14.

15. Plaintiff continued to pedal his bicycle quickly further up 

the sidewalk along Sunrise, crossing the roadway at the intersection of 

Citrus Road and back onto the sidewalk on the other side, tossed his lunch 

food away and kept riding.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 13; P Depo, 41:21-24, 44:15-21.

16. Then, James caught up with Plaintiff again and asked 

Plaintiff to talk to them a second time, but Plaintiff did not comply and 

kept riding.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 13; P Depo 41:21- 42:2, 45:16-5.

17. When Plaintiff did not heed the officer’s second instruction 

to stop and speak with them, Officer James reached out his right hand and 

pushed Plaintiff who fell off his bicycle in a grassy area covered with 

leaves.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 14-16; P Depo, 44:15-47:20, 

45:16-5, Exhibit 5 to P Depo.

18. Aubuchon and James parked their motorcycles in the 

nearby Chevron parking lot, dismounted, and positioned themselves 

approximately ten feet away from Plaintiff at different angles to prevent 

him from fleeing further.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 16; P Depo 54:13- 56:8.

19. After falling off his bicycle, Plaintiff regained his balance 

and stood up.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 18; P Depo, 47:21-23, 49:2-9.

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20. Officer Aubuchon had his handgun drawn, directed at 

Plaintiff, and was instructing Plaintiff to get on the ground.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 17; P Depo 54:13- 56:8.

21. Officer James had his Taser drawn, directed at Plaintiff, 

and was instructing Plaintiff to get on the ground.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 17; P Depo 54:13- 56:8, 60:17-22

22. Plaintiff’s back was facing James, who could not see his 

face, front side, or hands, much less whether or where he may have been 

carrying the large gun the suspect was reported to be carrying.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 18.

23. Plaintiff was standing on his feet and was attempting to 

look for or reach for something on the ground.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 18; P Depo, 49:2- 9.

24. Plaintiff did not respond to or obey repeated instructions 

from Defendants to get on the ground, so James shouted “Taser, Taser, 

Taser” and, on the third “Taser,” triggered his Taser to deploy its prongs 

toward Plaintiff’s back.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 19; P Depo 49:10- 23.

25. At this time, Plaintiff was wearing a baggy, puffy blue 

jacket with rows of squared cotton-filled puffs, over a t-shirt.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 10; P Depo 50:19- 22, 51:11-

53:10.

26. Because of his big puffy jacket, James was unsure if the 

prongs would attach or if the Taser deployment would be effective, but 

they attached to his jacket in the middle center-right and lower left areas 

of his back.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 19; P Depo 62:9- 12, 63:20-25, 

64:10-65:6.

27. Plaintiff fell to the ground on top of his hands, heard an 

officer say “Let me see your hands,” and lost consciousness.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 19; P Depo, 25:15-23, 72:22-

73:9.

28. Plaintiff recalls regaining consciousness later inside an 

officer’s car before being transferred to a detective’s office, and has no 

memory of anything after he fell from the Taser deployment until 

regaining consciousness.

Evidence: P Depo, 25:2-26:5, 27:8-14, 72:22-73:9.

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29. After Plaintiff regained consciousness in the car, he did not 

talk until he was taken to a detective’s office.

Evidence: P Depo, 34:5-23.

30. From the point Plaintiff regained consciousness in the car, 

he never saw, spoke with, or interacted with Defendants James or 

Aubuchon again.

Evidence: P Depo, 25:15-26:5, 27:8-14.

31. When Plaintiff fell to the ground from James’ Taser 

deployment, Officer Aubuchon holstered his firearm and he and Officer 

Baldwin, who by this time had arrived on scene, proceeded towards 

Plaintiff to handcuff him.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 18, 20.

32. James maintained his Taser trigger pull for a few seconds 

longer so they could safely approach because the officers could not see 

Plaintiff’s hands, he was reported to have a large gun, and he had already 

tried to flee.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 20.

33. In total, James’ Taser was activated for not less than five 

seconds but not more than twelve seconds.

Evidence: Id.

34. Plaintiff does not know how long Officer James had 

engaged his Taser because he lost consciousness.

Evidence: P Depo, 73:10-74:22.

35. Aubuchon handcuffed Plaintiff without

further incident.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 20.

36. Upon a search of Plaintiff’s person, officers found a .38 

Smith & Wesson revolver in a holster on his waistband.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 21; P Depo, 85:1-19.

37. The officers radioed to dispatch at approximately 2:51 p.m. 

regarding the incident, and multiple other officers and vehicles proceeded 

to arrive at the scene, including Officer Kelly Smith who also parked her 

vehicle in the Chevron lot.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 21.

/ / /

/ / /

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38. Once the search of Plaintiff was complete, officers stood 

Plaintiff up off the ground.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 22.

39. As Plaintiff was stood up, the Taser prongs fell out onto the 

ground.

Evidence: Id.

40. It is SSD and RCPD practice that Taser prongs should only 

be removed by medical personnel or by a trained officer; however, 

because the prongs fell out on their own, no such personnel were required 

to attend to Plaintiff.

Evidence: Id.

41. Plaintiff was then walked to the Chevron lot and eventually 

placed into Smith’s vehicle, which is where Plaintiff recalls returning to 

consciousness.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 23; P Depo, 25:2- 26:5, 27:8-14, 

34:5-23, 72:22-73:9.

42. James and Aubuchon did not see Plaintiff after he was 

walked away from the location he was handcuffed and had no further 

interaction with him; as traffic officers, they had little else in terms of 

duties or involvement in his case.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 23-24.

43. Following the incident, James and Aubuchon proceeded to 

the station to prepare James’ narrative supplemental report on the incident 

January 4, 2011.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 26, Exhibit 3.

44. They then proceeded to return to their duties as traffic 

officers on patrol.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 27.

45. At no time from the time James first encountered Plaintiff 

at Cruz’s to the last time Defendants saw him as he was placed into 

Smith’s vehicle did Plaintiff ever say, indicate, or give Defendants any 

reason to believe that Plaintiff was hurt or injured, or in any way required 

medical attention.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 25.

46. Plaintiff did not exhibit any visible indications of any 

physical injuries from either his fall off his bicycle or from the Taser.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 25; P Depo, 75:1-9.

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47. During the intake processing at the County Jail that 

evening, Plaintiff received medical attention from a nurse, who applied 

Band- Aids to the Taser prong entry points on his back and assured that he 

was medically cleared prior to being booked into the jail or housed.

Evidence: P Depo, 66:15-67:19.

48. This jail staff nurse was the first medical professional who 

examined or treated Plaintiff after being detained.

Evidence: P Depo, 69:1-6.

49. Prior to that time, however, Plaintiff did not tell anyone that 

he wanted or needed medical attention.

Evidence: P Depo, 69:7-20.

50. After being treated by the nurse during intake, Plaintiff did 

not seek any other medical treatment relating to the Taser wounds.

Evidence: P Depo, 77:1-9.

51. Plaintiff is currently a prisoner residing at Deuel Vocational 

Institution, having pled no contest to two counts of bank robbery 

(California Penal Code section 211), on January 29, 2014.

Evidence: P Depo, 6:19-7:25; Request for Judicial Notice 

(“RJN”) Nos. 3 and 4, Exhs. 3 and 4.

52. When arrested, he was caught with a firearm.

Evidence: James Decl., ¶ 21; P Depo 8:1-4; RJN No. 4, 

Exh. 4.

53. With two previous felony convictions and the firearm 

enhancement, Plaintiff was sentenced to 22 years in prison on February 

28, 2014, with an anticipated release date in 2029.

Evidence: P Depo, 9:10-10:5; RJN Nos. 3- 5, Exhs. 3-5.

54. Plaintiff was housed at Sacramento County jail/holding 

facilities until March 13, 2014, when he was transferred to and admitted as 

a state prisoner into Deuel Vocational Institution.

Evidence: RJN No. 5, Exh. 5.

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B. Plaintiff’s Evidence

Plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgement is supported 

solely by the following responses1to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts: 

Statements 1-11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 22, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 40, 48.

Plaintiff’s Response: Undisputed.

12. Disputed. Plaintiff was not aware he had to comply with a 

random request by law enforcement to stop and talk to them. As a citizen, 

plaintiff has the right to refuse to speak to law enforcement. 

14. Disputed. Plaintiff did not stop because there was no 

indication he was required to. There were no flashing lights or sirens 

going off at the time. 

17. Disputed. Plaintiff did not stop because he had a right to 

refuse to speak to the police. Again, there were no sirens or flashing 

indication that plaintiff was required to stop. 

19. Disputed. Plaintiff did not fall off his bicycle, he was 

pushed off. Plaintiff went head first over the handlebars and landed in 

some palm tree leaves. 

20. Disputed. Plaintiff’s memory after falling over his 

handlebars is hazy but he remembers looking for his cell phone in the 

grass and officer Aubuchon pointing his gun at plaintiff. 

21. Disputed. Defendant James did not instruct plaintiff to get 

down on the ground. All plaintiff can recall is that James yelled “taser, 

taser, taser” and that the taser barbs struck plaintiff’s back. While plaintiff 

was on the ground, he also recalls James yelling “let me see your hands.” 

23. Disputed. After plaintiff flipped over his handlebars, he got 

up off the ground and searched for his cell phone. 

25. Disputed. The Sacramento County Sherriff’s Department’s 

records do not mention a “big puffy jacket.” 

26. Disputed. Plaintiff’s knowledge of defendants’ statements 

and evidence is limited to what was disclosed to plaintiff at his deposition. 

29. Disputed. Plaintiff was unconscious. Despite defendants’ 

training, neither of them performed any medical care for plaintiff before 

placing him inside officer Smith’s vehicle. 

33. Disputed. Defendants’ claim that the taser was deployed for 

5-12 seconds was a later fabrication meant to benefit defendants. 

 

1 Plaintiff’s opposition contains multiple spelling errors. The following are 

summaries of plaintiff’s responses as best understood by the court. 

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34. Disputed. Plaintiff is only aware that defendants stated that 

they deployed the taser for an untimely amount of time. The 5-12 second 

range was a later statement made by defendants. 

37. Disputed. To the extent defendants dispatched for 

additional personnel, they did not request medical assistance for plaintiff. 

38. Disputed. Plaintiff was searched and then uncuffed to allow 

for the removal of his “puffy blue jacket”, after which his black belt was 

removed from his waist. 

39. Disputed. The taser prongs came out when defendants 

ripped plaintiff’s jacked off of his body. 

41. Disputed. Plaintiff did not walk anywhere and was 

unconscious until he was placed into Smith’s vehicle. 

42. Disputed. Defendants disregarded plaintiff’s well-being in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

43. Disputed. Plaintiff only ever received Officer James’ 

supplemental report. 

44. Disputed. Irrelevant. 

45. Disputed. Plaintiff suffered from the 1200-volt charge of 

the taser and lost consciousness. 

46. Disputed. Plaintiff was clearly injured after being pushed 

off of his bike, falling head first over the handless bars, and then being 

struck by a taser gun. 

47. Disputed. Plaintiff was not medically sound. Hours after 

being examined by a nurse, plaintiff suffered an asthma attack. Plaintiff 

was not cleared for general population at prison and was instead sent to 

the east detox housing floor. 

49. Disputed. Plaintiff was unconscious and unable to 

communicate. None of the officers called in a medical professional to 

examine plaintiff. 

50. Disputed. Plaintiff suffered from an asthma attack the 

following morning and was subsequently treated. 

51-54. Disputed. Irrelevant. 

ECF No. 132., pgs. 75-87.

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IV. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary 

adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 

standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One of 

the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the 

moving party

. . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of 

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact.

Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The 

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th 

Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record 

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taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is sufficient that “the 

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing versions 

of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen 

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 

1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the 

judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could 

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is 

imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

V. DISCUSSION

In their motion for summary judgement argument, defendants argue: (1) plaintiff’s 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) even if they were not time-barred, plaintiff’s 

claims do not establish a genuine dispute as to either his excessive force claims or medical

indifference claims; and (3) even if plaintiff did establish a genuine dispute, defendants are 

entitled to qualified immunity as to both of plaintiff’s claims. The Court finds: (1) plaintiff’s 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) plaintiff presents a genuine dispute as to his 

excessive force claims; (3) plaintiff does not present a genuine dispute as to his medical 

indifference claims; and (4) in any event, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

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A. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because they are 

time-barred. The Court agrees. 

“A federal claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the 

injury which is the basis of the action.” Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th 

Cir. 1991). § 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation, thus federal courts should borrow 

state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions in § 1983 suits. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.D. 384, 387 (2007). “The statute of limitations applicable to an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 is the personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose.” 

Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). California's statute of limitations for 

personal injury actions requires that the claim be filed within two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 

335.1. In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitation, the court should 

also borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state 

law. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). California Civil Procedure Code § 352.1(a) 

provides that when a plaintiff is "imprisoned on a criminal charge" for "a term less than life" at 

the time a claim accrues, the statute of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time of his 

imprisonment for up to two more years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). However, the 

California Appellate Court has held that a pretrial detainee in custody is not “imprisoned on a 

criminal charge.” See Austin v. Medicis, 21 Cal. App. 5th 577, 597 (2018). State law also governs 

the application of equitable tolling. See Gress v. Smith, No. 2:13-cv-0328 TLN KJN P, 2016 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 8949, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016). However, the plaintiff has the burden to plead 

facts which would give rise to equitable tolling. Hinton v. Pacific Enterprises, 5 F.3d 391, 396 

(9th Cir. 1993).

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Defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint was filed more than a year after the 

statute of limitations had run. Specifically:

Each of Plaintiff’s claims, for both excessive force and medical 

indifference, accrued on the date of the incident, January 4, 2011, when he 

knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis for the claims 

for relief. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). The twoyear limitations period would have expired on January 4, 2013. Plaintiff’s 

complaint was not filed until March 26, 2014. (RJN No. 1, Exh. 1: 

Complaint.) Therefore, his complaint and its claims contained therein 

were untimely and thus time-barred.

ECF No. 129-2, pg. 13.

Defendants also argue that plaintiff is not entitled to tolling. Specifically:

. . .Section 352.1 provides that the statute of limitations is 

statutorily tolled for up to two years when a plaintiff is “imprisoned on a 

criminal charge . . . for a term less than for life” at the time a claim 

accrues. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). However, being arrested or being 

a pretrial detainee in a county jail is not the equivalent of being 

imprisoned for a term of years. Austin v. Medicis, 21 Cal. App. 5th 577, 

597 (2018) [. . .]

* * *

Here, Plaintiff pled no contest to his charges on January 29, 2014, 

was sentenced to his 22-year prison term on February 28, 2014, and was 

transferred to and admitted into Deuel Vocational Institute as a state 

prisoner on March 13, 2014 – each event well-over a year after his statute 

of limitations ran on January 4, 2013. Thus, prisoner tolling does not 

apply, and Plaintiff’s March 26, 2014 Complaint was untimely.

ECF No. 129-2, pgs. 13-14.

As defendants note, plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date he became aware of his 

injuries, i.e. the date of the incident, January 4, 2011, and the two-year limitations period expired 

on January 4, 2013. Thus, without tolling, plaintiff’s original complaint, filed on March 26, 2014, 

is untimely. Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claims are not entitled to tolling because he was 

not “imprisoned on a criminal charge” such that relevant tolling statutes do not apply. The record 

clearly demonstrates that plaintiff was sentenced on February 28, 2014, such that he was a pretrial 

detainee throughout the limitations period and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1 should not apply. See

ECF No. 129-6, pg. 38. 

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Since it appears that defendants have demonstrated that plaintiff’s action against 

them is untimely, the burden now rests on plaintiff to counter defendants’ claims. However, 

plaintiff offers no evidentiary support for the assertion that his complaint was filed before the 

limitations period expired, or that he is entitled to tolling under any statutory provision. See ECF 

No. 132, generally. Also, plaintiff presents no argument demonstrating that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. Id. In his opposition, plaintiff states, vaguely, that the late filing date was “. . . 

no fault of my own, I kept filing the first complaint over and over until the first clerk finally filed 

it.” ECF No. 132, pg. 126. However, plaintiff does not explain what the underlying cause of the 

delay was nor why he should be granted equitable tolling. Therefore, the Court finds that 

plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and defendants’ motion for summary 

judgement should be granted. 

B. Excessive Force Claims

Assuming plaintiff’s claims are not all time-barred, the Court finds that plaintiff 

has made out a valid claim against both defendants for excessive force under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment requires that police officers use only "objectively 

reasonable" force "in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to 

their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). To 

determine whether an officer's use of force was reasonable, courts must balance the "nature and 

quality of the intrusion on a person's liberty with the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake." Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). This balancing act requires courts to "assess the quantum of force used" and 

then "measure the governmental interests at stake" by considering the following three factors: "(1) 

the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety 

of the officers or others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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Of these three factors, the most important is whether the suspect posed an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others at the time force was applied. Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396. The Graham factors, however, are not the only factors. George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 

829, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2013). In fact, courts must "examine the totality of the circumstances and 

consider 'whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed 

in Graham.'" Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. 

Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)). For instance, courts may look at "the availability of 

less intrusive alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings were given[,] and 

whether it should have been apparent to officers that the person they used force against was 

emotionally disturbed." Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s excessive force claim fails as to both defendants 

Aubuchon and James because, given the circumstances, their use of force was reasonable. 

Defendants point out the following in their statement of undisputed material facts: (1) that they 

were searching for a suspect who was described as “a black male in his late 20s, height 5’6”, 

weight 150, long dreadlocks over his eyes, striped suit jacket with large stripes, matching grey 

suit pants, with a big gun tucked into his jacket”, UMF 5; (2) that they eventually came upon 

plaintiff, who roughly matched the suspect’s description, UMF 7; (3) that upon further inspection, 

plaintiff’s clothes matched the suspect’s description, UMD 9; (4) that they asked plaintiff to stop 

and talk to them but plaintiff rode away in his bicycle, ignoring their repeated requests, UMF’s 

10-16; (5) that, in order to stop plaintiff, officer James pushed plaintiff off of his bike and onto 

the ground, UMF 17; (6) that, after falling, plaintiff attempted to stand up, UMF 19; (7) that 

officer Aubuchon had his handgun drawn, directed at plaintiff, and was instructing plaintiff to get 

on the ground, UMF 20; (8) that officer James had his taser drawn, directed at plaintiff, and was 

instructing plaintiff to get on the ground, UMF 21; (9) that plaintiff’s back was facing James, who 

could not see his (plaintiff’s) face, front side, or hands, or whether or where he (plaintiff) may 

have been carrying the large gun the suspect was reported to be carrying, UMF 22; (10) that 

plaintiff did not respond to or obey repeated instructions from defendants to get on the ground, so 

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James shouted “Taser, Taser, Taser” and, on the third “Taser,” triggered his taser to deploy its 

prongs toward plaintiff’s back, UMF 24; and (11) that after the arrest, plaintiff was found to be in 

possession of a firearm in his waistband as suspected, UMF 36.

In response, plaintiff objects to defendants’ contention that their use of force was 

reasonable. According to plaintiff, officer Aubuchon used excessive force by pointing his gun at 

him was while plaintiff was knocked off his bicycle. See ECF No. 132, pg. 25. Plaintiff also 

argues that James (1) shoved plaintiff off of his bicycle and then (2) tasered plaintiff with 1200 

volts for five to twelve seconds while still disoriented, violating his constitutional rights. Id. at

pgs. 25, 31. 

Notwithstanding defendants’ contention that any reasonable officer would use the 

amount of force the defendants employed in apprehending plaintiff, the Court disagrees, and finds 

that there is a genuine dispute as to the reasonableness of the defendants’ conduct. At the time of 

the incident, the arresting officers suspected plaintiff of possessing a firearm and James noted that 

he saw plaintiff reaching for “something”. UMF 22-23. While this testimony is strong, it is not 

unequivocal such that a reasonable trier of fact could not find that the officers’ use of force was 

excessive given the circumstances. As mentioned in their statement of undisputed facts, the 

officers recognized that plaintiff was off-balance after falling off of his bicycle and thus not an 

immediate threat. Also, officer James could not see plaintiff’s front, and did not know if plaintiff 

was in fact reaching for a weapon when he used his taser on plaintiff. The arresting officers only 

realized plaintiff was armed after completing the arrest. Also, while the defendants justify their 

use of force partly on the grounds that plaintiff matched a description of the armed suspect, they

nonetheless deemed it safe enough to ride up alongside plaintiff as he was peddling his bicycle 

down the street. Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party plaintiff, it 

is not beyond dispute that defendants’ actions could be considered unreasonable. See Estate of 

Elkins v. Pelayo, 737 F. App'x 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2018) (summary judgement denied; “[a] jury 

should be allowed to determine how much weight to give th[e] evidence [of arresting officer 

testimony that they shot a suspect because they thought he was reaching for a gun in his 

waistband].) 

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Thus, there exists a triable issue as to the appropriateness of the force used by defendants, 

and assuming arguendo the action had been timely filed, the defendants would not be entitled to 

relief from plaintiff’s excessive force claims.

C. Medical Indifference Claims

Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate 

indifference to medical needs against officers Aubuchon or James fails as a matter of law. In the 

event plaintiff’s claims are not considered time-barred, there exists a genuine dispute as to 

whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs.

"Claims of failure to provide care for serious medical needs, when brought by a 

detainee [] who has been neither charged nor convicted of a crime, are analyzed under the 

substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 

F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 

2002) (reversed on other grounds). However, "the due process clause imposes, at a minimum, the 

same duty the Eighth Amendment imposes: 'persons in custody ha[ve] the established right to not 

have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs.'" Gibson, 290 F.3d at 

1187 (quoting Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir.1996)). An injury or illness is 

sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 

injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Although disputed within the Ninth Circuit, this Court has held that a claim of 

deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s medical needs is analyzed under an objective 

standard2. Scalia v. Cty. of Kern, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 2018). Under this 

 

2

It is currently disputed in the Ninth Circuit whether a pretrial detainee’s claim for 

deliberate indifference to medical needs is analyzed under a subjective or objective standard. See

Borges v. City of Eureka, No. 15-cv-00846-YGR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10721, at *26 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) (objective standard); see also Sandoval v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 3:16-cv01004-BEN-AGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19545, at *19 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018) (subjective 

standard). However, considering that the Eastern District of California has chosen to employ an 

objective standard, this Court shall follow suit and similarly use an objective test for pretrial 

detainee medical indifference. See Scalia v. Cty. of Kern, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 

2018).

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objective standard, “[a] plaintiff must show (1) a serious medical need, (2) a purposeful act or 

failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need, even though a reasonable 

defendant in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making

the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (3) harm caused by the indifference. 

The second prong requires an intent level ‘more than negligence but less than subjective intent—

something akin to reckless disregard.’” Id. (citing Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 

(9th Cir. 2016)).

Here, defendants argue that (1) plaintiff’s medical needs were not serious at the 

time, and (2) even if they were, defendants were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical 

needs. 

1. Serious Injury

As for the assertion that plaintiff’s medical needs were not serious at the time of 

the incident, the defendants argue that: 

. . .[A]t no time from the time James first encountered Plaintiff at 

[the restaurant] to the last time Defendants saw him as he was placed into 

Smith’s vehicle did Plaintiff ever say, indicate, or give Defendants any 

reason to believe that Plaintiff was hurt or injured, or in any way required 

medical attention. Plaintiff did not exhibit any visible indications of any 

physical injuries from either his fall off his bicycle or from the Taser. 

During the intake processing at the County Jail that evening, Plaintiff 

received medical attention from a nurse, who applied Band- Aids to the 

Taser prong entry points on his back and assured that he was medically 

cleared prior to being booked into the jail or housed. This jail staff nurse 

was the first medical professional who examined or treated Plaintiff after 

being detained. Prior to that time, however, Plaintiff did not tell anyone 

that he wanted or needed medical attention. Even after being treated by the 

nurse during intake, Plaintiff did not seek any other medical treatment 

relating to the Taser wounds. Plaintiff’s alleged medical needs were 

clearly not serious enough for Plaintiff to ask anyone for medical 

assistance, so they cannot be serious enough for any acts or omissions by 

Defendants Aubuchon or James to constitute a deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights.

ECF No. 129-2, pg. 24.

/ / /

/ / /

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In response plaintiff states in his opposition that:

Plaintiff objects, neither officers are qualified doctors or 

professional medical [personnel]. Plaintiff states that no medical 

[personnel were called to] treat injuries, or even ask if there was after brief 

periods of time that plaintiff was in and out of [consciousness]. As a lay 

person plaintiff obviously should know if they were tasered all the time, 

the effects of 1200 volts would not cause any injuries. Defendants own 

admission that medical [personnel] is to be called. (See UMF page 7, 

UMF # 44).

ECF No. 132, pg. 33. 

Here, the Court agrees with plaintiff. Despite asserting that plaintiff did not 

indicate he was injured, defendants acknowledge that, after being tasered, plaintiff lost 

consciousness. See UMF 34 (“plaintiff does not know how long Officer James had engaged his 

Taser because he lost consciousness.”). A reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff suffered 

severe injury after being tasered but was unable to communicate it because he was unconscious.

Additionally, defendants do not dispute plaintiff’s claim that he suffers from excruciating pain 

throughout his body and requires the use of an inhaler as a result of the arrest. ECF No. 75, pg. 3. 

Therefore, a reasonable jury could also conclude that plaintiff’s alleged injuries were sufficiently 

serious to amount to a constitutional violation.

2. Deliberate Indifference

Defendants claim that, notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate any genuine dispute as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his 

medical needs. In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that:

Even if Plaintiff’s medical needs were serious, Defendants 

Aubuchon and James were not deliberately indifferent to his needs. 

Subjectively, Defendants were not aware he had any medical needs: 

James’ Taser’s prongs fell out on their own and did not require trained 

personnel to remove them, and Plaintiff was then taken into custody by 

other officers and placed into Officer Smith’s vehicle. Defendants never 

saw any physical indication or manifestation of physical injuries that 

would require medical attention, and within a matter of minutes from 

James’ Taser deployment, patrol officers had taken custody of Plaintiff 

from the Defendants, who were only Traffic Officers who had stumbled 

upon the fleeing suspect but who did not have the duty or authority to 

process Plaintiff’s arrest and the subsequent investigation into his bank 

robberies. Objectively, a reasonable officer in the position of Defendants 

would have no reason to – nor opportunity to – make any decision, 

intentional or otherwise, with respect to the confinement of Plaintiff once 

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detained that placed Plaintiff in any risk of serious harm, much less any 

reason or opportunity to take measures to abate the risk. (See factors 

identified supra from Gordon, 888 F.3d, at 1125.)

ECF No. 129-2, pgs. 24-25.

In response, plaintiff states in his opposition that:

Plaintiff’s short period of time [when he] was with the defendants 

should have been taking as his most important if only they had just called 

for a professional medical person [to] clear him after being tasered. That is 

a SSD and RCPD practice that defendants admit [they are supposed to] 

follow. Instead defendants just discarded plaintiff to another officer and 

now [are] passing the blame onto [the] fellow officers. [. . .]

ECF No. 132, pg. 34. 

Here, the Court also agrees with plaintiff. It is undisputed that (1) plaintiff was 

tasered to the point of unconsciousness, (2) defendants did not call for medical personnel to arrive 

at the scene, (3) defendants placed plaintiff into a separate patrol car and sent him off to the local 

police station for booking instead of a hospital, and (4) as a result, plaintiff now suffers from 

severe pain and requires the use of an inhaler. Given this, a reasonable jury could conclude that 

the plaintiff’s unconscious state after being tasered should have alerted the officers that plaintiff 

was at risk of serious medical harm and needed immediate medical attention. Similarly, a trier of 

fact could decide that the officers’ decision to not call medical personnel to the scene of an 

unconscious arrestee was deliberately indifferent. While defendants assert that “plaintiff did not 

exhibit any visible indications of any physical injuries from either his fall off his bicycle or from 

the [t]aser” (DUF 46), this position is entirely disputed by plaintiff. See ECF No. 132., pgs. 75-

87. Since, at this stage, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor, 

the Court finds this dispute to be genuine. Therefore, if the Court finds that plaintiff’s action is 

not otherwise time-barred, plaintiff’s medical indifference claim should proceed. 

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that, even if their conduct did in fact constitute excessive force, 

that they would be entitled to qualified immunity as to both of plaintiff’s claims. The Court 

agrees.

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Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their 

conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general, 

qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 

law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In ruling upon the issue of qualified 

immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the 

injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier 

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask whether 

the right was clearly established. See id. This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific 

context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id. “[T]he right the official is 

alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence 

more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citation omitted). 

Thus, the final step in the analysis is to determine whether a reasonable officer in similar 

circumstances would have thought his conduct violated the alleged right. See id. at 205. 

When identifying the right allegedly violated, the court must define the right more 

narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than the 

factual circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th 

Cir. 1995). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently 

clear that a reasonable official would understand [that] what [the official] is doing violates the 

right.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Ordinarily, once the court 

concludes that a right was clearly established, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity 

because a reasonably competent public official is charged with knowing the law governing his 

conduct. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). However, even if the plaintiff 

has alleged a violation of a clearly established right, the government official is entitled to 

qualified immunity if he could have “. . . reasonably but mistakenly believed that his . . . conduct 

did not violate the right.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001); see 

also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

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The first factors in the qualified immunity analysis involve purely legal questions. 

See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). The third inquiry involves a legal 

determination based on a prior factual finding as to the reasonableness of the government 

official’s conduct. See Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). The district court 

has discretion to determine which of the Saucier factors to analyze first. See Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). In resolving these issues, the court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. See

Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).

1. Excessive Force Claims

As discussed above, the Court finds that, taking all facts in a light most favorable 

to plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could determine that defendants used excessive force in 

subduing plaintiff. Therefore, the next steps in the Court’s qualified immunity inquiry are to 

determine whether the violated right was clearly established and, if so, whether defendants could 

have mistakenly but reasonably believed their conduct was lawful. The Court considered each 

defendant in turn.

a. Defendant Aubuchon

In support for their contention that officer Aubuchon did not violate a clearly 

established right, the defendants state:

In this case, the issue is whether a right to not have a gun pointed 

at an armed and fleeing suspect during an arrest was clearly established so 

that it would have been clear to a reasonable police officer that this type of 

conduct would be unlawful in the situation presented. It is plaintiff’s 

burden to prove that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at 

the time of the challenged act. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984); 

Romero v. Kitsap, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff will be 

unable to cite any case that would have made it clear to Aubuchon that his 

act of detaining an armed bank robber who had been evading arrest at 

gunpoint was unlawful. 

Because there is no decisional authority that would have made it 

clear to Officer Aubuchon that his conduct was unlawful in the situation 

that he confronted, Officer Aubuchon is entitled to qualified immunity as 

to plaintiff’s excessive force claim regarding his detention at gunpoint. 

Thus, Aubuchon is entitled to qualified immunity.

ECF No. 129-2, pg. 20. 

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In response, plaintiff’s opposition states:

Plaintiff object to Aubuchon detention [sic] it clearly shows 

that the Ninth Circuit stated, “the pointing a gun at someone may 

constitute excessive force, even if it does not cause physical 

injury.” Thus, Aubuchon should not be given qualified immunity.

ECF No. 132, pg. 32. 

The Court agrees with the defendants. It is initially the plaintiff’s burden to allege 

a violation has been clearly established such that the officers should have been on notice. Luna v. 

Ridge, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (“[b]road generalities in the articulation of 

the constitutional right at issue . . . are insufficient to identify a clearly established right . . .”). 

"Except in the rare case of an 'obvious' instance of constitutional misconduct . . . [p]laintiffs 

must identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [defendants] was held 

to have violated the Fourth Amendment." Sharp v. Cty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 

2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. at 552). “In other words, 

Plaintiffs must point to prior case law that articulates a constitutional rule specific enough to 

alert these deputies in this case that their particular conduct was unlawful.” Id. The preexisting 

law identified must also be "controlling—from the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court—or otherwise 

be embraced by a consensus of courts outside the relevant jurisdiction." Id. (internal citation and 

quotation omitted). “When the only cases a plaintiff cites are factually distinguishable, or provide 

‘nothing more than a general principle,’ the public official is entitled to qualified immunity . . .” 

West v. City of Caldwell, 931 F.3d 978, 983, 985 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 

503-04)

Here, plaintiff’s response in his opposition is simply a reiteration of his factual 

allegations. Plaintiff does not demonstrate that his being held at gunpoint by Aubuchon clearly

amounts to a constitutional violation. Plaintiff does state that the Ninth Circuit has held that 

pointing a gun at someone may constitute excessive force, even if it does not cause injury.

However, plaintiff does not explain what specific Ninth Circuit precedent he is referring to, nor 

does he explain how his particular circumstance is a clear violation of a constitutional right. At 

most, plaintiff highlights a general principle of the Ninth Circuit, which, as discussed above, is 

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insufficient. 

The Court acknowledges that improperly holding a suspect at gunpoint has been 

recognized as unconstitutional in the Ninth Circuit. See Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 

845 (9th Cir. 2007). However, plaintiff does not attempt to analogize this broad principle to his 

particular situation. Such analysis is essential at the summary judgement stage as "[i]t is 

important to emphasize that this inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the 

case, not as a broad general proposition." Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 125 (2004). While 

there are times the Ninth Circuit has held that pointing a gun at a suspect may amount to a 

constitutional violation, it has also held in other instances that such force may also be reasonable.

See Alexander v. Cty. of L.A., 64 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[i]t is well settled that when 

an officer reasonably believes force is necessary to protect his own safety or the safety of 

the public, measures used to restrain individuals, such as stopping them at gunpoint and 

handcuffing them, are reasonable.”) Therefore, this action is not a “rare case of an 'obvious' 

instance of constitutional misconduct”, such that plaintiff is not required to demonstrate a clearly

established right. Sharp, 871 F.3d at 911. Since it is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that a right 

is clearly established, and he has failed to do so here, defendant Aubuchon is entitled to qualified 

immunity.

b. Defendant James

In support for their contention that officer James did not violate a clearly 

established right, the defendants state:

[As to pushing plaintiff off of his bicycle,] [g]iven the existing law 

regarding the application of hands-on physical force in stopping an armed, 

fleeing felony suspect, a reasonable officer in Officer James’ position 

would not have understood his use of force in pushing Plaintiff while 

fleeing on his bicycle to be clearly unlawful, in light of the fact that the 

Defendants were pursuing an bank robbery suspect actively evading arrest 

and refusing repeated, lawful instructions to stop, while wearing a 

holstered handgun on his waistband. Again, mere citation in the Complaint 

or 4AC to “excessive force by an officer,” or even if he had cited the 

Fourth Amendment, falls well short of identifying a precedent that 

“squarely governs” the officer’s conduct in the particular factual situation 

James confronted, and that places the unreasonableness of his action 

“beyond debate.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309; al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 

Thus, when considering the totality of the circumstances, in light of the 

objective facts and circumstances that James confronted at the time, 

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James’ measured use of a lower level of force – not even punching, 

kicking or even pushing Plaintiff onto the asphalt but rather into a 

vegetated field – was a reasonable choice, which clearly established law 

would not have informed James or any reasonable officer was unlawful.

Similarly, in the case of his second use of force – Tasing Plaintiff 

for between 5 and 12 seconds after Plaintiff had gotten back up from his 

bicycle fall and ignored lawful instructions to get on the ground – no 

reasonable officer could have known from any clearly established law that 

this action could be unlawful in the context of subduing an armed and 

fleeing suspect resistant to lawful instructions. At this time in early 2011, 

clearly established law provided that, in fact, a single Tasers shock used to 

subdue fleeing suspects was constitutional. See e.g. Mattos v. Agarano, 

661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. October 17, 2011); see generally Cockrell v. City 

of Cincinnati, 468 Fed. Appx. 491 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) 

(collecting cases and concluding that as of 2009 courts had granted 

qualified immunity whenever "plaintiffs [were] tased while actively 

resisting arrest by physically struggling with, threatening, or disobeying 

officers"); Abston v. City of Merced, 506 Fed. Appx. 650 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(it was not clearly established at the time of Abston's arrest in 2008 that 

use of four, five-second Taser cycles within a span of approximately two 

minutes against a suspect who appeared unarmed, fell to the ground 

following the first Tasing and thereafter presented no real threat of escape, 

and was surrounded by three officers, was objectively unreasonable); see 

Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2015) (it was not clearly 

established in September 2010 that continuing to detain a noncompliant 

domestic violence suspect for the purpose of executing a frisk and tasing 

him when he refused to comply were unlawful). Based upon the clearly 

established law regarding the use of Tasers at the time of Plaintiff’s 

encounter with James in 2011, no reasonable officer could have known 

that his deployment of his Taser in the circumstances established by the 

undisputed material facts would have been unconstitutional.

ECF No. 129-2, pgs. 21-22.

In response, plaintiff’s opposition states that:

Plaintiff objects to giving immunity for the using [sic] of tasering 

plaintiff for 5 to 12 seconds with 1200 volts per second. Is [sic] a clear 

violation of plaintiff’s rights. 

By defendants [sic] own adminish [sic] of first using force by 

shoving plaintiff head first over handlebars of bicycle landing face first, 

plaintiff stood slightly disoriented looking around. Then was tasered, for 

untimely amount of time. Which later plaintiff claims injuries. (see 4AC).

ECF No. 132, pg. 31. 

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Importing the analysis laid out above, the Court finds that defendant James is also 

entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff does nothing more than merely recite the factual predicate 

of his complaint: that defendant James aggressively shoved plaintiff off of his bicycle onto the 

ground and then proceeded to taser plaintiff when he tried to “reach” for something (either his 

cell phone or a firearm). However, plaintiff does not offer any evidence or authority which 

demonstrates that this conduct violates a clearly established right. Since it is plaintiff’s obligation 

to do so, and he has failed, defendant James is also entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s 

excessive force claim. 

2. Medical Indifference Claims

In the event that the defendants’ conduct did constitute medical indifference, they 

are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. As discussed above, “the right the official is 

alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence 

more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

Here, again, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a violated right was clearly established. He 

simply reiterates the factual basis of his claim for medical indifference and states that his 

Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated without providing further context. Since 

plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden, defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity here.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgement (ECF No. 129) be granted; 

and

2. Judgement be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on all 

claims as a matter of law. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 

with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. 

Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 30, 2020

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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