Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00106/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00106-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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28 * Defendant Jerry Harper has been dismissed from this

action. See infra Part V.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CANDI A. EBY, )

) 2:05-cv-106-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER

v. )

) 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF )

YOUTH AUTHORITY; YSUS ALI,* )

 )

Defendants. )

)

Defendants Ali and California Department of Youth Authority

(“CYA”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Family Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). 

Ali also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motions to dismiss and, in the

alternative, requests leave to amend her complaint. Furthermore,

Defendant Harper is dismissed from this action sua sponte under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 

Case 2:05-cv-00106-GEB-DAD Document 37 Filed 09/02/05 Page 1 of 9
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1 “The standards applicable to [motions to dismiss] are

well known, see e.g., Rodgers v. County of Yolo, 889 F. Supp.

1284 (E.D. Cal. 1995), and need not be repeated here.” Reitter

v. City of Sacramento, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1042 (E.D. Cal.

2000).

2

DISCUSSION1

I. Title VII

CYA and Ali argue that the behavior alleged in Plaintiff’s

complaint is insufficiently severe or pervasive to state a hostile

work environment claim under Title VII. (CYA Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot.

Dismiss (“CYA P. & A.”) at 7; Ali Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Dismiss

(“Ali P. & A.”) at 8.) To state a viable hostile work environment

claim under Title VII, the alleged behavior “must be sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment

and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 

Plaintiff alleges her hostile work environment claim is

viable since Ali told a group of incarcerated young men that “women

were merely sex objects on the one hand, and nurse maids on the

other.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges

Ali used the words “p-whipped” and “breast to suckle” and “slapped

Plaintiff on the back” and said “you can handle the language, can’t

you?” (Pl.’s 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also alleges that on one

occasion when Plaintiff was required to give Ali a ride, Ali

reaffirmed his earlier opinion about women and dismissed Plaintiff’s

protests against such characterizations. (Id. ¶ 16). 

Since Plaintiff need only provide fair notice of her claims

to Defendants, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim is denied. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48

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2 Ali’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the

Rehabilitation Act and FMLA is granted since “Plaintiff concedes

that Ali is not a proper defendant with respect to disability

issues.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 3.)

3

(1957) (the complaint need only give defendant fair notice of

plaintiff’s claims.)

II. FMLA2

CYA seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s FMLA claim, arguing that

Plaintiff “fails to allege that she requested a leave or that leave

was denied.” (CYA P. & A. at 9.) Plaintiff, however, alleges that

CYA ultimately terminated her in violation of FMLA based, in part, on

her “requests for medical leave.” (Pl.’s 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) 

Therefore, CYA’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied. 

III. Rehabilitation Act of 1973

CYA argues Plaintiff’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act is

barred for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction because

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. (CYA 

P. & A. at 5.) To establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under

the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff must first have exhausted her

administrative remedies by filing a discrimination charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and receiving a

right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d

891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994). “The jurisdictional scope of the

plaintiff's court action depends on the scope of the EEOC charge and

investigation.” Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Although “the district court has jurisdiction over any charges of

discrimination that are ‘like or reasonably related to’ the

allegations made before the EEOC, as well as charges that are within

the scope of an EEOC investigation that reasonably could be expected

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to grow out of the allegations . . ., [a] decision that an EEOC

complaint with no mention whatsoever of disability is ‘like or

reasonably related to’ [Plaintiff]’s disability claim would reduce the

exhaustion requirement to a formality.” Id. at 1121-22. 

Since Plaintiff failed to indicate on her administrative

complaint form that her disability was a “cause of discrimination,”

Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies with regard to

her claim under the Rehabilitation Act, and CYA’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act is granted. (CYA Notice

Mot. Dismiss 2d Am. Compl., Ex. 1.) 

IV. Section 1983

Ali argues “the [42 U.S.C. § 1983] claim against [him] is

barred by the statute of limitations and should be dismissed.” 

(Ali P. & A. at 13.) Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Ali

“engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful sex discrimination by

subjecting Plaintiff to disparate treatment, retaliation and unwelcome

sexual harassment” and that this conduct “operated to deprive

Plaintiff of her constitutional rights under the 4th, 12th, and 13th

Amendments of the United States Constitution all in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Pl.’s 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff further

alleges the § 1983 claim is “based on the overlapping conduct by

Defendant which deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights,

including but not limited to the failure to provide due process [under

the Fourteenth Amendment], the discriminatory enforcement of official

policy, and the failure to protect plaintiff from retaliation.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts supporting a

violation of her rights under the Fourth, Twelfth, or Thirteenth

Amendments. Further, a two-year statute of limitation period governs

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Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim since California law states

that “action[s] for injury to . . . an individual caused by the

wrongful act or neglect of another” have a two-year statute of

limitation period. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; see also Wilson v.

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (holding that state law provides the

statute of limitation for violations of § 1983).

Plaintiff argues that “continuing violation and delayed

investigation, both operate as an equitable basis for tolling the

statute of limitations period.” (Pl’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 4.) 

However, Plaintiff must demonstrate that at least one act occurred

within the statute of limitation period and that the harassment at

issue is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of

intentional discrimination.” Morgan v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 64 (2000). Plaintiff has not alleged any

harassment or violation of § 1983 by Ali after July 12, 2001. (Pl.’s

2d Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Since Plaintiff filed this action April 5, 2004,

more than two years after the last alleged harassment act by Ali (id.

¶¶ 12, 16), Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred by the statute of

limitation. 

V. Defendant Harper

Defendant Harper is dismissed as a party in this action sua

sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) since Plaintiff

failed to show good cause why Harper should not be dismissed from this

action under Rule 4(m), as required by the Order filed June 9, 2005. 

Harper was named in the initial complaint on April 5, 2004, and has

not yet been served. (Compl. at 1; Alexander Decl. filed 6/17/05, at

2.) Rule 4(m) requires Plaintiff to serve Defendants with the

complaint “within 120 days after the filing of the complaint,” unless

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“plaintiff shows good cause for the failure [to serve defendants

within 120 days].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); McGuckin v. United States,

918 F.2d 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff had 120 days

from the filing of the amended complaint to serve the new defendant

named in the amended complaint); see generally Del Raine v. Carlson,

826 F.2d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that the “purpose of

allowing complaints to be amended is to enable the pleading to be

conformed to the developing evidence rather than to extend the time

for service indefinitely”).

In response to the June 9 Order, Plaintiff’s counsel

declares that the delay in service was because “[he] was told by

Deputy Attorney General, Peter W. Thompson, then attorney of record

for [CYA] that [Thompson] was in the process of determining if he

and/or [CYA] would be tendering a defense on behalf of defendants Ali

and Harper and he would inform [Plaintiff’s counsel] once he had made

said determination”; and that after receiving notice from CYA of its

new attorney of record on April 8, 2005, “it became clear that neither

she or [CYA] would be representing defendants Ali and Harper, and

[Plaintiff’s counsel] would therefore need to have both individuals

personally served.” (Alexander Decl. Supp. OSC ¶ 5.) Further,

Plaintiff’s counsel declares: “Upon learning such, [he] immediately

attempted service on . . . Harper . . . . However, . . . Harper has

moved with no forwarding address. After extensive investigation, 

Mr. Anderson[, a private investigator,] believes Mr. Harper may be in

Huntington Beach, California.” (Id. at 2.) In support of this

argument, Plaintiff’s attorney provides the private investigator’s

declaration of due diligence dated June 17, 2005, in which 

Mr. Anderson declares:

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[A]ttempts have been made to locate . . . Harper.

. . . [S]ervice was first attempted at the CYA

Headquarters . . . . Casual information obtained

indicated he had moved to Southern California,

possibly the San Diego area. Further computer

searches, utilizing a data base with more than 6

billion records, [indicated] that Mr. Harper may

be in the Huntington Beach area of Southern

California. However, a phone number that was also

developed was found to be no longer in service.

(Id. Ex. B.) 

Providing detail about service attempts is required because

“good cause” encompasses a showing that reasonable diligent efforts

have been expended to effect service on Defendant. Quann v.

Whitegate-Edgewater, 112 F.R.D. 649, 659 (D. Md. 1986) (discussing

good cause in the context of Rule 4(j), which has been amended and is

now Rule 4(m)). As revealed in Putnam v. Morris, 833 F.2d 903 (10th

Cir. 1987), even where there is a showing that a process server

attempted to serve defendant at his home every day, this showing is

insufficient where it does not include an attempt to let the defendant

know about the attempted contacts by leaving a card or message about

the attempts. When upholding the dismissal of the defendant from the

lawsuit in Putnam, the appellate court noted that “it is trial

counsel’s responsibility to monitor the activity of the process server

and to take reasonable steps to assure that a defendant is timely

served.” Id. at 904; see also Cox v. Sandra Corp., 941 F.2d 1124

(10th Cir. 1991). 

In this action, since Plaintiff’s counsel does not explain

when the investigator’s searches were conducted, or whether they were

conducted within the 120-day service period, he has not shown good

cause under Rule 4(m). Blind faith reliance upon the representations

of private process servers and investigators is inappropriate and does

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not constitute good cause. See Cox, 941 F.2d at 1125; Lovelace v.

Acme Mkts., 820 F.2d 81, 84-85 (3d Cir. 1987).

Even though Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause,

the court has discretion under Rule 4(m) to permit an extension of

time to perfect service on Defendant despite this failure. The

running of the applicable statute of limitation is a factor to be

considered when deciding how to exercise this discretion. Mann v. Am.

Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (indicating

considerations should be given to the possibility that the statute of

limitation would bar re-filing of the suit). But “the running of the

statute of limitations does not require the district court to extend

time for service of process.” Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger,

GMBH Ausdereitungsanlagen, 46 F.3d 1298, 1306 (3d Cir. 1995). Since

Plaintiff has failed to effect service of Harper since April 5, 2004;

has provided a conclusory explanation for that failure in response to

the Court’s June 9 Order; and has failed to indicate the statute of

limitation would bar refiling, this Court refuses to grant a

discretionary enlargement of time for service.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Harper is dismissed from this

action. CYA and Ali’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim

and CYA’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FMLA claim are denied. CYA’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim and Ali’s

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim are granted. 

Further, Plaintiff’s request to amend her Second Amended

Complaint is denied since Plaintiff has not shown that good cause

justifies her request for leave to amend, and the Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Order filed June 9, 2005, states that “No further joinder

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of parties or amendments to pleadings is permitted except with leave

of Court, good cause having been shown.” 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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