Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06694/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06694-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN C. GUZMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06694-SVK 

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 22

Plaintiff appeals from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying 

his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) disability benefits. For the reasons 

discussed below, the Court remands the case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for SSI disability benefits in 2014, alleging disability 

beginning November 12, 2014. See Dkt. 16 (Administrative Record (“AR”)) 67, 218. An 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and issued an unfavorable decision on 

September 7, 2017. AR 25-47. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, 

diverticulitis, hepatitis C, obesity, and major depressive disorder. AR 31. The ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 

one of the listed impairments. Id. The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) limited him to light work with additional limitations. AR 33. The ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because, although he was unable to perform his past 

relevant work as a laborer, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy 

that he can perform, such as swatch clerk, mail sorter, and bench assembler. AR 41, 42. 

After the Appeals Council denied review, Plaintiff sought review in this Court. Dkt. 1 

(Complaint). In accordance with Civil Local Rule 16-5, the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment (Dkt. 21, 22), which are now ready for decision without oral argument.

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II. ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1. Did the ALJ properly evaluate the medical evidence?

2. Did the ALJ properly evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility?

3. Is the ALJ’s finding at step 5 supported by substantial evidence?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court is authorized to review the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability benefits, 

but “a federal court’s review of Social Security determinations is quite limited.” Brown-Hunter v. 

Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Federal courts “leave it to 

the ALJ to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the 

record.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or if it is based on the application of improper legal standards. Id. at 492. “Under the 

substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether 

it contains sufficient evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations,” and this threshold 

is “not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, -- U.S. --, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation 

marks, citation, and alteration omitted); see also Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 

996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Substantial evidence” means more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court “must 

consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 

detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1002 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s findings if supported by inferences reasonably 

drawn from the record. Id. 

Even if the ALJ commits legal error, the ALJ’s decision will be upheld if the error is 

harmless. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. But “[a] reviewing court may not make independent 

findings based on the evidence before the ALJ to conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless” and 

is instead “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

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citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Issue One: Evaluation of Medical Evidence

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s weighing of the medical evidence, specifically the medical 

opinions of examining physician Elizabeth Whelchel, Ph.D. and treating psychiatrist Nang Du, 

M.D. In social security disability cases, “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.” 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Generally, the opinion of a treating 

physician is entitled to more weight than the opinion of an examining physician, and more weight 

is given to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining physician. Ghanim v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014). Where a treating physician’s opinion is “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not 

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the record, it must be given controlling weight. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence, for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of treating physicians. Ghanim, 763 

F.3d at 1160; see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that ALJ 

can reject uncontradicted treating physician’s opinion “by setting out a detailed and thorough 

summary of the facts and conflicting medical evidence, stating his own interpretation thereof, and 

making findings”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where contradicted, the 

opinion of treating physicians may be rejected only for “specific and legitimate reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1160. 

1. Dr. Whelchel

The ALJ stated that he gave the opinion of examining physician Dr, Whelchel “full 

weight.” AR 39. The ALJ explained that Dr. Whelchel’s opinion was “consistent with the 

medical record.” Id. However, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because “the ALJ’s RFC 

finding did not accurately capture all of the moderate limitations Dr. Whelchel assessed.” Dkt. 21 

at 8. In other words, according to Plaintiff, “the ALJ erred in failing properly to translate all of the 

limitations Dr. Whelchel assessed into concrete restrictions in the RFC finding.” Id. at 9. An 

argument such as Plaintiff’s “could be framed either as a failure to provide sufficient reasons for 

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rejecting part of an examining physician’s opinion or as a failure to incorporate all relevant 

limitations into the RFC.” Panziera v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-02719-LHK, 2018 WL 278623, at *19 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018). 

Insofar as medical opinions relate to a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ’s RFC “that fails to take 

into account a claimant’s limitations is defective.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has held that “an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant 

adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment 

is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony.” See Stubbs-Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “the Ninth Circuit and district courts in 

the Ninth Circuit have held that Stubbs-Danielson does not control in cases where the limitations 

relate to functional areas other than concentration, persistence, and pace, such as social 

functioning and attendance.” Panziera, 2018 WL 278623, at *20. 

Consistent with these principles, courts in this District have found error where the ALJ’s 

RFC determination does not address all areas of functional limitation identified by a medical 

source. For example, in Panziera, medical providers opined that the claimant had physical 

limitations in her ability to lift/carry and stand/walk; limitations in maintaining concentration, 

persistence, or pace; epilepsy-related limitations that required her to avoid odors, extremes of 

temperature, stress, and magnetic devices; and social- and attendance-related limitations. 2018 

WL 278623, at *19, *21. A court in this District held that although the ALJ did not err in 

accounting for the physical and concentration/persistence/pace limitations, the ALJ erred in 

addressing the epilepsy-based limitations “either because the ALJ failed to offer a specific, 

legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence for rejecting these limitations or because the 

ALJ assigned an RFC that did not include these limitations.” Id. at *19. In addition, the ALJ 

erred by not accounting for the social- and attendance-related limitations in the RFC. Id. at *21. 

Similarly, in De Bruin v. Saul, a court in this District found error where the ALJ’s RFC 

determination failed to adequately address, without any explanation, a medical opinion that the 

plaintiff would have difficulty in keeping a regular work schedule without interruptions from 

psychiatric symptoms. 18-cv-03802-VKD, 2019 WL 4751890, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2019).

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Here, by contrast with Panziera and De Bruin, the ALJ’s RFC determination addressed 

every category of limitation identified by Dr. Whelchel. Compare AR 600 (Whelchel opinion) 

with AR 33 (RFC determination). Dr. Whelchel opined that Plaintiff can manage simple and 

complex instructions (AR 600), and the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of simple, repetitive 

tasks and complex and detailed tasks (AR 33). Dr. Whelchel opined that Plaintiff has moderate 

restrictions in concentration/persistence/pace; in his ability to interact with co-workers and the 

public; and in his need for supervision. AR 600. The ALJ found that Plaintiff can maintain 

attention for two hours at a time, can occasionally interact with others, needs supervisors to 

remind him of work duties at least once every three months, and cannot perform work requiring 

high production roles, sch as those paid by the piece. AR 33. Dr. Whelchel opined that Plaintiff 

has moderate limitations in his ability to maintain regular attendance (AR 600), and the ALJ found 

that he is likely to miss work one day every three months (AR33). The ALJ supported his RFC 

findings with an extensive discussion of the medical record and evidence of Plaintiff’s ability to 

perform basic daily activities. See AR 33-41. 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s approach to the RFC determination, arguing that “the ALJ’s 

translations of [moderate] limitations are not equivalent from category to category,” e.g., “[i]f a 

moderate limitations in social interaction means that Guzman can interact with each category of 

person only on an occasional basis (up to 1/3 of the work day), then it would be reasonable to infer 

that a moderate limitation in maintaining regular attendance and performing work activities on a 

consistent basis would mean that Guzman could do those things only on an occasional basis (up to 

1/3 of the work day) as well.” Dkt. 21 at 8. Plaintiff cites no legal support for the proposition that 

the ALJ must translate medical findings into RFC limitations in such a formulaic way.

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the restrictions imposed by the ALJ failed to capture 

the restrictions found by Dr. Whelchel. The Court concludes that the ALJ’s RFC determination 

adequately takes into account Dr. Whelchel’s findings, to which he gave “great weight.”

2. Dr. Du

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s decision to give “little weight” to the opinion of his 

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Du. Dr. Du, who first saw Plaintiff on April 9, 2014, completed a 

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medical source questionnaire on August 11, 2015 opining that Plaintiff had experienced various 

limitations identified in the questionnaire since his brother died in 2011. AR 621. The ALJ 

offered two reasons for discounting Dr. Du’s opinion: (1) “Dr. Du’s opinion as to when described 

limitations first applied is based on claimant’s history, with no indication that Dr. Du 

independently reviewed medical psychological records prior to April 2014”; and (2) the form 

Dr. Du used for his report described “moderate” symptoms as impairing effective performance of 

tasks between 11 to 20 percent of an eight-hour workday, which was a “misleading” definition 

because “such a limitation would preclude all work and therefore marked rather than moderate 

(sic)”. AR 41.

The first reason offered by the ALJ does not justify his decision to discount Dr. Du’s 

opinion under the facts of this case. The ALJ inferred that Dr. Du’s opinion that Plaintiff’s 

limitations began in 2011 was based on Plaintiff’s history. An ALJ may properly discount a 

doctor’s assessment that is based on the claimant’s own accounts of his symptoms and limitations. 

See Flaten v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463-1464 (9th Cir. 1995). 

However, Dr. Du, as well as other practitioners at San Mateo County Behavioral Health and 

Recovery Services, saw Plaintiff numerous times before Dr. Du completed the medical source 

questionnaire. See AR 474-585. The ALJ fails to adequately explain why, based on this record, 

he concluded that Dr. Du’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s own accounts of his condition, rather 

than the actual treatment of Plaintiff by Dr. Du and others in his practice. Moreover, the ALJ’s 

conclusion that Dr. Du’s opinion is deficient because of his alleged failure to review the medical 

record prior to April 2014 is not a valid reason to discount Dr. Du’s opinion. The issue to be 

decided by the ALJ in this case was not whether Dr. Du was correct that Plaintiff’s limitations 

began in 2011, but whether Plaintiff’s alleged disability began on November 12, 2014, the alleged 

onset date. AR 67. The alleged onset date was more than five months after Dr. Du began treating 

Plaintiff and nine months before Dr. Du completed his medical source questionnaire. The ALJ

failed to adequately explain how Dr. Du’s alleged failure to review the pre-April 2014 medical 

record justified rejection of his opinion regarding Plaintiff’s symptoms as of the alleged onset 

date. 

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The Court next considers whether the second reason identified by the ALJ, which

concerned the definition of the term “moderate” in the form used by Dr. Du, is an adequate reason 

to discount Dr. Du’s opinion. AR 41. Dr. Du opined that Plaintiff had moderate and marked 

limitations in a number of areas. AR 619, 620. The form Dr. Du used defined “moderate” as 

involving “limitations that impair the effective performance of the task incrementally for a total 

between 11% to 20% of an 8-hour workday or 40-hour workweek” and defined “marked” 

limitations as those causing impairment “for a total of more than 20% of an 8-hour work day or 

40 hour workweek,” AR 619. The ALJ did not explain why these definitions were inappropriate, 

but the Court notes that the Social Security listings regarding mental disorders state that a 

“moderate” limitation means that a person’s functioning in an area is “fair” whereas a “marked” 

limitation is one that “seriously limit[s]” such functioning. App. 1 to Subpart P of Part 404, § 

12.00(F)(2).

A medical source’s use of a definition of “marked” impairment that differs from that used 

by the Social Security Administration can constitute a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting 

that medical source’s opinion, at least if combined with other appropriate reasons. See Gideon v. 

Astrue, No. CV-08-296-JPH, 2010 WL 148387, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2010). However, 

Dr. Du’s use of a form containing the above-described definition of “moderate” is not by itself a 

specific and legitimate reason for rejecting his opinion under the circumstances of this case. The 

ALJ did not cite any evidence that Dr. Du was in fact misled by the definition. If the ALJ was 

uncertain as to what Dr. Du’s entries on the form meant, the ALJ had a duty to further develop the 

record. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If the ALJ thought he needed 

to know the basis of [physicians’] opinions in order to evaluate them, he had a duty to conduct an 

appropriate inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the physicians or submitting further questions to 

them.”). Although the ALJ might have believed that Dr. Du’s opinion that Plaintiff had moderate 

or marked limitations, as those terms were defined in the form, was inconsistent with the medical 

record, the ALJ did not identify such inconsistencies in his discussion of Dr. Du’s opinion. 

As a result, the ALJ failed to identify specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence for discounting Dr. Du’s opinion.

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B. Issue Two: Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of his credibility. Plaintiff complained of

“depression, auditory hallucinations, and high blood pressure [that] prevents him from working.” 

AR 33. The ALJ found that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to produce his alleged symptoms, and the ALJ made no finding of malingering. 

AR 34. The question is therefore whether the ALJ identified specific, clear and convincing 

reasons for his conclusion that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 

evidence in the record” and that therefore “these statements have been found to affect the 

claimant’s ability to work only to the extent they can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the 

objective medical and other evidence.” Id.; see Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

The ALJ based his credibility finding in part on an alleged inconsistency between 

Plaintiff’s complaints and “the medical evidence.” AR 34. As discussed above, the ALJ erred in 

his evaluation of Dr. Du’s opinion, which is part of the medical evidence in this case. 

Accordingly, on remand the ALJ must reevaluate Plaintiff’s credibility based on a proper 

reevaluation of the medical evidence, including Dr. Du’s opinion.

C. Issue Three: Step 5 Finding

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at Step 5 of the sequential disability analysis by posing 

hypotheticals to the vocational expert who testified at the hearing that “omitted [Plaintiff’s] 

credible allegations and the limitations assessed by [Plaintiff’s] examining doctor, Dr. Whelchel 

and treating doctor, Dr. Du.” Dkt. 21 at 15. The Commissioner may carry his burden at Step 5 of 

identifying specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform by “eliciting the testimony of a vocational expert in response to a hypothetical that 

sets out all the limitations and restrictions of the claimant.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 

1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Plaintiff’s assertion of error with respect to Step 5 derives from his arguments addressed 

above concerning the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions of Drs. Whelchel and Du and his 

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evaluation of the credibility of Plaintiff’s pain and symptom complaints. Because, as also 

discussed above, the ALJ erred with respect to the evaluation of Dr. Du’s opinion, thus requiring 

reevaluation on remand of the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s credibility, on remand the ALJ 

must also consider whether the hypotheticals posed to the vocational expert need to be revised to 

correctly reflect Plaintiff’s limitations and restrictions.

V. DISPOSITION

The Social Security Act permits courts to affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision “with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014). “[W]here the record has been developed 

fully and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the district court 

should remand for an immediate award of benefits.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th

Cir. 2004). However, “[r]emand for further proceedings is appropriate where there are 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be made, and it is 

not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if all the 

evidence were properly evaluated.” Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2018)

(citations omitted).

As discussed above, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence, which may 

have affected the ALJ’s weighing of the medical evidence, his evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility, 

and his overall step 5 determination. As a result, remand for further proceedings is warranted. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, 

DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and REMANDS this case for further 

proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 26, 2019

SUSAN VAN KEULEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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