Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00069/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00069-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

---

WO IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JONATHAN LONGNECKER, et al., )

) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

)

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, et al., )

) No. 2:14-cv-0069-HRH

 Defendants. )

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

Motion to Proceed as Collective Action

The Named plaintiff moves for conditional certification of a collective action.1 This

motion is opposed.2 Defendants move for leave to file a sur-reply.3 This motion is

opposed.4 Oral argument was requested on both motions but is not deemed necessary on

either motion. 

1Docket No. 22. 

2Docket No. 55. 

3Docket No. 63. 

4Docket No. 65. 

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Background

The Named plaintiff is Bonita Kathol.5 Defendants are American Express Company

and AMEX Card Services Company. 

Kathol is a former employee at defendants’ Phoenix call center. In her amended

complaint, Kathol alleges that defendants have violated the Fair Labor Standards Act

(FLSA) because defendants did not pay overtime for pre-shift work and work performed

during unpaid meal breaks.6 Kathol brings her FLSA claim on behalf of herself and other

similarly situated current and former employees. 

Kathol and the former Named plaintiffs were all employed as “collections

specialists.”7 More specifically, Kathol and the former Named plaintiffs all worked in

defendants’ Global Credit Administration (GCA) business unit.8 The GCA is divided into

5Originally, Jonathan Longnecker, Erandi Acevedo, Jennifer Flynn, and Janet Seitz

were also Named plaintiffs. However, the claims of these Named plaintiffs were dismissed

pursuant to defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. Docket No. 50. 

6Kathol had also alleged that defendants failed to properly calculate herregularrate

of pay, but she has withdrawn these allegations. Docket No. 54. 

7Declaration of Bonita Kathol at 2, ¶ 1; Declaration of Erandi Acevedo at 2, ¶ 1;

Declaration of Jennifer Flynn at 2, ¶ 1; Declaration of Jonathan Longnecker at 2, ¶ 1; and

Declaration of Janet Seitz at 2, ¶ 2; all appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

8Declaration of Jeanne Stout at 1, ¶ 5, Exhibit A, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.],

Docket No. 55. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 2 of 24
two departments, Credit and Fraud; and Kathol and the former Named plaintiffs, during

the relevant time, all worked in the Credit department.9

 

Kathol avers that she had to spend approximately 15 minutes before the start of her

shift each day “pulling up” the call center’s computer system and reviewing company

memos and emails.10 The former Named plaintiffs make similar averments.11 Kathol avers

that “[i]f I had arrived at my work station at the time my shift was scheduled to begin, I

would have been unable to start the necessary programs on my work computer by my paid

start time and would have been considered late to work by American Express.”12 The

former Named plaintiffs make similar averments.13 Kathol further avers that she was told

by her supervisors “not to list any time spent performing work tasks prior to [her]

9

Id. at 1, ¶ 5 & 2, ¶ 8. 

10Kathol Declaration at 2-3, ¶ 4, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

11Acevedo Declaration at 2-3, ¶ 4; Flynn Declaration at 2-3, ¶ 4; Longnecker

Declaration at 2-3, ¶ 4; Seitz Declaration at 3, ¶ 6; all appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

12Kathol Declaration at 4, ¶ 8, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

13Acevedo Declaration at 3-4, ¶ 8; Flynn Declaration at 3, ¶ 8; Longnecker

Declaration at 3-4, ¶ 8; Seitz Declaration at 4, ¶ 11; all appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 3 of 24
scheduled shifts ... because the company would not pay for it.”

14 The former Named

plaintiffs make similar averments.15

Former Named plaintiff Janet Seitz worked in departments other than GCA Credit

during her tenure with defendants.16 She avers that 

[w]hile employed in positions other than collections specialist

at the call center, I also performed pre-shift work in order to

pull up the necessary computer programs. The only difference

in the pre-shift work performed in positions other than

collections specialist was that some of the computer programs

were different. It took approximately the same amount of time

daily to pull up the necessary computer programs and review

memos and emails priorto my scheduled shift in each position

that I had at the Phoenix call center.[17]

Kathol also avers that when she worked a shift that was 8 hours or longer, she was

given a 30-minute unpaid meal period, that she was required to “log off” the phone system

during her meal break, and that she would return to her work station on average 10

minutes prior to the end of her unpaid meal period in order to “pull[] the phone program

14Kathol Declaration at 3, ¶ 7, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

15Acevedo Declaration at 3, ¶ 7; Flynn Declaration at 3, ¶ 7; Longnecker Declaration

at 3, ¶ 7; Seitz Declaration at 4, ¶ 10; all appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

16

Seitz worked for defendants for over 13 years. Seitz Declaration at 2, ¶ 1,

appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

17

Id. at 3, ¶ 7. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 4 of 24
back up on my work computer, review[] the performance tracking program updates on the

computer, review[] company emails and memoranda, and meet[] with my supervisor.”18

The former Named plaintiffs made similar averments.19 Kathol avers that she “was

instructed to write a 30-minute unpaid meal period on all my timesheets for all scheduled

shifts 8 hours or longer, regardless of whether I worked during part of the meal period”

and that if she had “returned to [her] work station as [her] meal break was ending, [she]

would have been considered late by American Express, because [she] would not have been

able to resume fielding phone calls to customersuntil[she] completedpulling the necessary

programs back up and reviewed email updates and memoranda.”

20 The former Named

plaintiffs make similar averments.21Seitz also avers that “[w]hile employed in positions

at the Phoenix call center in addition to collections specialist I engaged in the same tasks

for approximately the same amount of time during my unpaid meal periods. The only

18Kathol Declaration at 2, ¶ 3 & 4, ¶¶ 12-14, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

19Acevedo Declaration at 2, ¶ 3 & 4, ¶¶ 12-14; Flynn Declaration at 2, ¶ 3 & 4, ¶¶ 12-

14; Longnecker Declaration at 2, ¶ 3 & 4, ¶¶ 12-14; Seitz Declaration at 2, ¶ 5 & 5, ¶¶ 15-17;

all appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

20Kathol Declaration at 4-5, ¶¶ 15-16, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as

a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

21Acevedo Declaration at 4-5, ¶¶ 15-16; Flynn Declaration at 4, ¶¶ 15-16; Longnecker

Declaration at 4-5, ¶¶ 15-16; Seitz Declaration at 5-6, ¶¶ 19-20; all appended to Plaintiffs’

Motion to Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 5 of 24
difference was that some of the programs that I had to pull up were different in different

positions.”22

Defendants, however, contend that it is not their policy to require employees to

perform off-the-clock work either pre-shift or when returning from unpaid meal breaks. 

Rather, defendants contend that it is their policy that non-exempt employees record all

time worked. InDecember 2010,defendants “began rolling out formal written timekeeping

policies (‘Timekeeping Requirements’) to different Business Units....”23Jeanne Stout,

defendants’ Director of Global Employee and Labor Relations, avers that “[a]lthough the

Timekeeping Requirements are different in several respects, they all consistently state that

employees are to record all time worked on their timesheets, employees are not to perform

any off-the-clock work, and employees are not to work during their breaks or meal

periods.”24 The Timekeeping Requirements for GCA in the Phoenix call center were rolled

out in October 2011.25 The “Clarification” that was given to Customer Care Professionals26

in the GCA Credit department instructed employees to “not perform any work during

22

Seitz Declaration at 5, ¶ 18, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

23

Stout Declaration at 2, ¶ 15, Exhibit A, Defendants’ Opposition, Docket No. 55. 

24

Id. at 3, ¶ 16. 

25

Id. at ¶ 17. 

26

“At one point, Collections Specialists were called Customer Care Professionals.” 

Id. at 2, ¶ 8. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 6 of 24
breaks”, to “not perform any work prior to the start of your shift or during meal periods

unless you receive approval from leadership”, and to “[m]ake sure that you record on your

timesheet all of the time you spend performing work-related tasks, such as taking calls,

completing paperwork, reading work-related e-mail, etc.”27 The Clarification further

provided that employees were to 

• Record on your time sheet the time that you sit down at

the scheduled beginning of your shift and start the

process of logging into your computer, this is considered your start time

• Log into your computer system and any necessary

applications and systems, including the dialer[

28

]

• When all necessary applications are open, click on “Get

Next Case”[29] 

On November 18, 2011, Kathol signed an acknowledgment that she had read and

understood the Timekeeping Requirement Clarification.30 Defendants also offer evidence

from current employees who averthat management routinely communicates and enforces

27Clarification of Timekeeping Requirements for Customer Care Professionals (On

Phones) in U.S.-Based Global Credit Administration Locations at 1, Tab 2, Stout

Declaration, Exhibit A, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

28A dialer automatically routes phone calls to an employee’s computer. Defendants’

Opposition [etc.] at 5, Docket No. 55. 

29Clarification of Timekeeping Requirements for Customer Care Professionals (On

Phones) in U.S.-Based Global Credit Administration Locations at 1, Tab 2, Stout

Declaration, Exhibit A, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

30Tab 3, Stout Declaration, Exhibit A, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 7 of 24
defendants’ policy that no off-the-clock work is to be performed.31 And, defendants

contend that the clearest evidence that they do not require employees to work off-the-clock

is that they consistently pay non-exempt employees overtime if they work more than 40

hours per week.32

Kathol avers that “[d]uring the time that I worked at the Phoenix call center, there

were approximately 7,000 employees who dealt with phone calls to and from customers. 

These employees were subject to the same policies as me with respect to having to arrive

31Declaration of Jennifer Clarke-Williams at 2, ¶ 8 (“The team leaders ... are very

strict about timekeeping. They don’t want us doing any work at all before we are on the

clock. They have definitely reinforced this with me”); Declaration of John Monty at 2, ¶

6 (“I recall reviewing and agreeing to timekeeping rules that clearly stated that I am not

allowed to do anything work-related before I log in to the system.... My team leader ...

reinforces that message in team meetings”); Declaration of Barbara Robles at 1, ¶ 4 (“When

I started with the company in 2012, I was told in training to make sure that if I come in

early, I do not log into the computer or review any emails or work until my actual start

time.... [T]hat general directive to not do anything work-related until I am getting paid has

not changed”); Declaration of Johanna Rodriguez at 1, ¶ 5 (“The team leaders make it very

clear – you do not work during lunch); Declaration of Dawn Saylor-Costello at 2, ¶ 10

(“The company periodically distributes the written timekeeping policy that applies to

Credit, and my team leader typically reviews it with the whole team”); Exhibit B,

Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

32Declaration of Tamra Crosby at 2, ¶ 8 (“I tend to sign up for overtime whenever

it is available... I always get paid for all of the time that I work”); Monty Declaration at 3,

¶ 12 (“There has been no overtime available in my segment for some time. But when I have

[worked overtime], I have always gotten paid the full amount I was owed”); Declaration

of Marcia Plante at 3, ¶ 11 (“if I get stuck on a call and have to stay a few minutes late, I just

reflect that on my timesheet, and the system automatically tabulates my overtime.... I

always get paid that time”); Exhibit B, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 8 of 24
early [and] having their lunch breaks shortened[.]”33 The other Named plaintiffs make

similar averments.34

Kathol contends that defendants also operated three other call centers during the

statutory time period: 1) the Fort Lauderdale, Florida call center, 2) the Greensboro, North

Carolina call center,

35

and 3) the Salt Lake City, Utah call center. She avers that the

employees in these other call centers “who performed the same tasks as me ... would have

been subject to the same policies as me with respect to having to arrive early [and] having

theirlunch breaks shortened[.]”36 The former Named plaintiffs make similar averments.37

However, defendants contendthat employees indifferentdepartments and business

units have varying job titles,38 have work schedules that vary widely,39 have different lunch

33Kathol Declaration at 5, ¶ 21, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

34Acevedo Declaration at 5, ¶ 21; Flynn Declaration at 5, ¶ 21; Longnecker

Declaration at 5, ¶ 21; Seitz Declaration at 6-7, ¶ 26; all appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

35Defendants closed this call center at the end of January 2011. Stout Declaration at

¶ 4, Exhibit A, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

36Kathol Declaration at 6, ¶ 22, appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a

Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

37Acevedo Declaration at 5-6, ¶ 22; Flynn Declaration at 5, ¶ 22; Longnecker

Declaration at 5-6, ¶ 22; Seitz Declaration at 7, ¶ 27; all appended to Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.], Docket No. 22. 

38Declaration of David Clendening at 1, ¶ 2 (“my job title is Customer Care

(continued...)

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 9 of 24
breaks,40 use different phone systems41

 and computer programs,42and either read emails

and memos during “idle time” between calls or during paid time off the phones.43

 

38

(...continued)

Professional TSC -T2- CFS”); Declaration of Jerry Morales at 1, ¶ 2 (“I served as a

Collections Specialist T3 in Manual Case Setups”); Robles Declaration at 1, ¶ 1 (“My job

title is Account Protection Specialist T4"); Exhibit B, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket

No. 55. 

39Monty Declaration at 1, ¶ 3 (“I work 10 hour shifts on Monday and Sundays, 6.5

hour shifts on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, and a 7 hour shift on Thursdays”); Plante

Declaration at 1, ¶ 3 (“I work from 4:55 am to 1:55 pm, Monday through Thursday, and

from 4:55 am-10:55 am on Friday”); Robles Declaration at 1, ¶ 8 (“My current schedule is

9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday”); Exhibit B, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.],

Docket No. 55. 

40Declaration of Pam Doty at 2, ¶ 7 (“I receive a 30-minute unpaid meal break”);

Declaration of Morris Mellor at 2, ¶ 8 (“I receive ... a 40-minute meal break. The meal break

consists of 30 minutes unpaid time and 10 minutes paid time”); Exhibit B, Defendants’

Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

41Crosby Declaration at 1, ¶ 2 (“I handle both inbound and outbound calls, although

I am not on a computer-based dialer”); Monty Declaration at 1, ¶ 2 (“I would estimate that

90% or more of my calls are inbound, through the dialer”); Exhibit B, Defendants’

Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

42Clarke-Williams Declaration at 2, ¶ 7 (“it can sometimes take up to 10-15 minutes”

to get computer applications, programs, and spreadsheets up and running); Clendening

Declaration at 2, ¶ 6b (“I begin to launch my computer and bring up my applications,

which takes no more than 1.5-2 minutes”); Plante Declaration at 2, ¶ 7 (“It usually takes me

about 5 minutes to get my computer up and running, and to launch the CSP servicing

platform that we use to access cardmember information”); Exhibit B, Defendants’

Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

43Monty Declaration at 3, ¶ 9 (“I manage my time well and review [CNIS] emails in

between calls, during idle time”); Plante Declaration at 3, ¶ 10 (“if I need a few more

minutes to review [CNIS emails], I can just ask my Team Leader for the time off the

(continued...)

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Kathol now moves for conditional certification of a collective action consisting of

“[a]ll present and former employees who have worked at any American Express call center

for any time period since January 14, 2011 in positions that handle calls with the public,

customers or vendors regardless of the position title.”44

Discussion

The FLSA requires employers to pay employees at least the federally-prescribed

minimum wage and one-and-a-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for hours

worked above forty hours in a workweek, unless the employee is exempt. 29 U.S.C. §§

206(a), 207(a). “Section 16(b) of [the] FLSA authorizes an employee to bring an action on

behalf of similarly situated employees, but requires that each employee opt-in to the suit

by filing a consent to sue with the district court.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile

Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000). “FLSA collective actions serve to lower the cost

of litigation forindividual claimants and promote efficiency in resolution of claims and the

use of judicial resources.” Bollinger v. Residential Capital, LLC, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1119

(W.D. Wash. 2011). “In order to make certain that potential collective class members are

43

(...continued)

phones”); Doty Declaration at 1, ¶¶ 5-6 (reads CNIS emails during the five minutes she is

given before she has to start taking calls or during idle time); Exhibit B, Defendants’

Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

44[Proposed]Notice of Lawsuit against American Express Company andAmex Card

Services Company, attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed as a Collective Action [etc.],

Docket No. 22. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 11 of 24
notified of the action and their right to take part, the courts may authorize the issuance of

notice by the named plaintiffs in an FLSA action to all other putative class members.” Id. 

“The decision to certify a collective action under the FLSA is within the discretion of the

[c]ourt.” Singleton v. Adick, Case No. CV 09–486–PHX–JAT, 2009 WL 3710717, at *4 (D.

Ariz. Nov. 2, 2009). 

“To certify a class action under the FLSA, the [c]ourt must determine whether

Named Plaintiffs and potential opt-in members are ‘similarly situated.’” Id. (quoting 29

U.S.C. § 216(b)). Courts in this district have used the two-tiered approach to analyze

whether the named plaintiffs and potential opt-in plaintiffs are “similarly situated.” Id. 

“Underthe two-tiered approach, during the early stages of litigation, the [c]ourt evaluates

the case under a lenient standardand may grant conditional certification.” Id. “The [c]ourt

then reevaluates, usually prompted by a motion for decertification, the ‘similarly situated’

question at a later stage, once discovery has produced sufficient information regarding the

nature of the claims.” Id.

This case is at the early stages of litigation, and Kathol has moved for preliminary

or conditional certification. “At this stage, the court ‘require[s] nothing more than

substantial allegations that the putative class members were togetherthe victims of a single

decision, policy, or plan.’” Wood v. TriVita, Inc., Case No. CV–08–0765–PHX–SRB, 2009

WL 2046048, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2009) (quoting Thiessen v. General Electric Capital

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 12 of 24
Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001)). “All that need be shown by the plaintiff is that

some identifiable factual or legal nexus binds together the various claims of the class

members in a way that hearing the claims together promotes judicial efficiency and

comports with the broad remedial policies underlying the FLSA.” Wertheim v. Ariz., Case

No. CIV 92–453 PHX RCB, 1993 WL 603552 at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 1993)(emphasis added). 

“Given that a motion for conditional certification usually comes before much, if any,

discovery, and is made in anticipation of a later more searching review, a movant bears a

very light burden in substantiating its allegations at this stage.” Prentice v. Fund for Public

Interest Research, Inc., Case No. C–06–7776 SC, 2007 WL 2729187, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18,

2007). 

Courts have looked to several factors in determining whether

plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of § 216(b),

including:

(1) whether there is evidence that the alleged

activity was part of an institution wide practice;

(2) the extent of the similarities among the members of the proposed collective action, in particular whether the members all are challenging the

same employment practice; and (3) the extent to

which the members of the proposed action will

rely on common evidence.

Wood, 2009 WL 2046048, at *3-4 (quoting Trinh v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 2008 WL

1860161, at *3 (S.D. Cal. April 22, 2008)). While the court does not make factual determinations at this stage, “neither the remedial purposes of the FLSA, nor the interests of judicial

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 13 of 24
economy, would be advanced if [the court] were to overlook facts which generally suggest

that a collective action is improper.” West v. Border Foods, Inc., Civil No. 05-2525

(DWF/RLE), 2006 WL 1892527 at *7 (D. Minn. July 10, 2006). 

Kathol has shown that she is similarly situated to current and former employees in

the Phoenix GCA Credit department. Her declaration and the declarations of the former

Named plaintiffs show that Phoenix GCA Credit department employees were all subject

to the same practice of not being compensated for work they were required to perform

prior to their scheduled shifts and during their unpaid meal breaks. In order for

conditional certification to be appropriate, Kathol need only allege that she and potential

opt-in plaintiffs were subject to a common plan, policy, or practice. Although defendants

had a written policy that prohibited off-the-clock work, Kathol has made a sufficient

showing that defendants had a practice of requiring Phoenix GCA Credit department

employees to perform pre-shift work and work during meal breaks for which they were

not compensated. See, e.g., Amador v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Case No. 11 Civ. 4326(RJS),

2013 WL 494020, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013) (allegations and “evidence indicating that

Morgan Stanley’s formal policy” of requiring employees “to accurately record all of their

time worked, including overtime ... was obviated by a de facto policy—known to managers

or supervisors at thirteen of Morgan Stanley’s branches”). 

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Defendants have offered the declarations of current Phoenix employees who work

in the GCA Credit department who averthat they are not required to perform unpaid preshift work and work during their meal breaks.45 But, all these declarations do is raise

factual disputes, which are premature because the court does not decide factual disputes

during the first stage of the certification process. See Thomas v. Kellogg Co., Case No.

C13–5136 RBL, 2014 WL 716152, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2014) (finding “arguments

relat[ing] to the intricacies of the specific facts surrounding the Plaintiffs’ job duties, and

its claims (on the merits) that Plaintiffs can’t meet their ultimate burden of proof on their

misclassification claims” premature); Barrera v. US Airways Group, Inc., Case No.

CV–2012–02278–PHX–BSB, 2013 WL 4654567, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2013) (“The Court

does not resolve factual disputes regarding the [employees’] job descriptions or job duties

at this first step of the certification process”). As another court in a FLSA call center case

observed, 

[a]lthough the evidence submitted by the defendants tends to

contradict the plaintiffs’ evidence and to reveal potential

weaknesses in their case, it does not preclude conditional

45Crosby Declaration at 1 ¶ 3 (“I do not perform any work-related tasks until my

[shift] start time of 12:30 pm”); Doty Declaration at 1, ¶ 3 (“No one has ever told me that

I need to get in early to prepare for work, and I perform no work duties” during the 15-25

minutes she is there priorto the start of her shift); Monty Declaration at 2, ¶ 6 (“I do not do

anything work-related before the beginning of my shift or when I am off the clock”); Plante

Declaration at 1, ¶ 5 (I don’t understand why anyone would do any work before they log

in and start getting paid. It is certainly nothing that the company has ever asked or

expected me to do”); Exhibit B, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

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certification. As explained above, the plaintiffs’ evidence

suggests, at a minimum, that some hourly employees have

performed uncompensated pre- and post-shift tasks. “Where,

as here, plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to meet

stepone’s ‘extremelylenient standard’ for conditional certification, evidence offered by the defendant purporting to show

plaintiffs are not similarly situated to absent class members,

while significant after discovery and during the step-two

analysis, does not compel denial of conditional certification.” 

Benson v. Asurion Corp., Case No. 3:10–cv–526, 2010 WL 4922704, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.

29, 2010) (quoting Gallagher v. Lackawanna County, No. 3:CV–07–0912, 2008 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 43722, at *27–28 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2008)). In addition, despite averments to the

contrary,46the declarations submitted by defendants have a “‘heightened potential for

46

In each declaration offered by defendants, the employee avers 

I am aware that a former GCA Collections Specialist filed a

lawsuit against American Express Company and AMEX Card

Services Company claiming that she and other AmEx Service

Center employees were not paid for all time worked, and that

the company did not properly calculate the regular rate of pay

used for overtime calculations. I understand that I could bring

a similar claim if I chose to do so. I have not been coerced or

threatened in any way to give the information in this declaration. I understand that I do not have to give this information;

that I may provide or refuse to provide a declaration; and that

giving the information in this declaration is not a condition of

my employment with AMEX Card Services Company. I

understand that nothing would occur relative to my job if I

refused to give this declaration. 

Clarke-Williams Declaration at 4, ¶ 14, ExhibitB,Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No.

55. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00069-HRH Document 67 Filed 08/18/14 Page 16 of 24
coercion because where the absent class member and the defendant are involved in an

ongoing business relationship, such as employer-employee, any communications are more

likely to be coercive.’” Mevorah v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., a div. of Wells Fargo

Bank, Case No. C 05-1175 MHP, 2005 WL 4813532, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2005) (quoting

Belt v. Emcare, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 664, 668 (E.D. Tex. 2003)). 

Kathol has also met her burden of showing that she is similarly situated to other

Phoenix call center employees whose primary job function is to handle phone calls with

clients, vendors, or the public. Kathol and the former Named plaintiffs all aver that other

Phoenix call center employees were subject to the same practice concerning pre-shift work

and work during meal breaks as they were. In particular, it is reasonable to infer that

Kathol, who worked for defendant for 12.5 years, “ would learn, during the normal course

of h[er] employment ... what other similar employees are doing[.]” Aguayo v. Oldenkamp

Trucking, Case No. CV F 04-6279 ASI LJO, 2005 WL 2436477, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005). 

In addition, Seitz, who has worked in other departments in the Phoenix call center besides

the GCA Credit department, avers that employees in other business units were subject to

the same unlawful practice. This evidence is sufficient to satisfy Kathol’s light burden at

this first stage of the certification process. Although defendants offer the declarations of

current Phoenix employees outside of Kathol’s business unit who aver that they are not

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required to perform unpaid pre-shift work and work during their meal breaks,47

these

declarations merely raise factual disputes that the court cannot resolve at this point. 

But, Kathol has not met her burden of showing that she is similarly situated to

employees in other call centers who have similar job functions. Kathol’s and the former

Named plaintiffs’ averments that employees in other call centers “would have been

subject” to the same policies or practices as they were are insufficient. It is not reasonable

to infer that Kathol (or the former Named plaintiffs) would have learned about other

employees in other locations, particularly in light of the evidence that defendants have

offered that suggests that employees in one call center rarely interacted with employees

in the other call centers.48In addition, former Named plaintiffs Longnecker, Acevedo, and

47Mellor Declaration at 2, ¶¶ 8-9 (“I do not perform any work during my breaks or

lunch” and “[m]y Team Leader has never asked me to start doing anything associated with

work ... during my breaks orlunch period”); Robles Declaration at 2-3, ¶¶ 11 & 14 (“I don’t

do any work whatsoever before I log into the phone” and “I don’t do any work during”

lunch break); Exhibit B, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

48Clarke-Williams Declaration at 3, ¶ 13 (“Ido not communicate with people at other

call centers other tha[n] routine business-related calls, like when a call is transferred. I do

not know anything about their timekeeping practices or policies.”); Crosby Declaration at

3, ¶ 11 (“I don’t interact much with anyone outside my immediate area. I do not know

what team leaders in other groups, or other centers like Fort Lauderdale or Salt Lake City,

instruct theirteams to do with respect to timekeeping, or what their policies are.”); SaylorCostello Declaration at 3, ¶ 12 (“[m]y only interaction with other Collections Specialists is

when we dial-transfer phone calls to another department, which may get picked up by

another service center. I have never had any conversations about any timekeeping

practices or policies with any AmEx employee from another service center.”); Exhibit B,

Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

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Flynn could not possibly have any knowledge of policies and practices at the Greensboro

call center, as they aver, because the Greensboro call center was closed prior to their

working for defendants. In short, Kathol has offered nothing more than speculation that

she is similarly situated to employees in other call centers who have similarjob duties. The

Timekeeping “Clarification” that defendants have submitted, which appears to apply to

all employees in “U.S.-Based Global Credit Administration Locations”, not just to Phoenix

call center employees,49 may be evidence that defendants apply the same written policy in

all call centers. But it is not evidence that employees in other call centers beside Phoenix

are subject to the unlawful practice concerning pre-shift work and working during meal

breaks that Kathol has alleged. 

Because the court is granting Kathol’s motion to proceed as a collective action in

part, it must consider Kathol’s requests that defendants be required, within 20 days, to

provide her counsel with the names, personnel ID numbers, addresses and email addresses

of any potential class members who have worked for defendants since January 14, 2011 and

that she be allowed to issue her proposed notice to potential class members. 

Plainly, the proposed notice cannot be issued because it defines a nation-wide class

and the class that is being conditionally certified is limited to Phoenix call center employees

whose primary job function is to handle phone calls with customers, vendors, and the

49Tab 2, Stout Declaration, Exhibit 1, Defendants’ Opposition [etc.], Docket No. 55. 

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public. In addition, Kathol agrees with defendants that any references to the former

Named plaintiffs should be removed from the notice as should any reference to the

withdrawn claim regarding regular rate calculation. The parties should be able to resolve

most of the other potential problems with the notice that defendants have identified and

the court will give them fourteen days in which to do so. However, because the parties are

unlikely to be able to resolve the arbitration issue, the court will address that issue now. 

Defendants argue that any notice should be limitedto current andformer employees

who have opted out of the Arbitration Policy.50In other words, defendants want any

individuals who signed the Arbitration Policy or failed to opt out of the Arbitration Policy 

excluded from the class definition. 

Kathol takes great exception to defendants’ suggestion that notice should be limited

to those individuals who have opted out of the Arbitration Policy. Kathol contends that

it is well-established that when arbitration agreements are in play, the court should issue

the notice and then the defendant can move to compel arbitration. Kathol cites to Mowdy

v. Beneto Bulk Transportation, Case No. C 06-05682 MHP, 2008 WL 901546 (N.D. Cal.

March 31, 2008), Krstic v. J.R. Contracting & Environmental Consulting, Case No. 09–2459,

2011 WL 1042732 (D.N.J. March 16, 2011), and Davis v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc., 408 F. Supp.

50Defendants’ motion to file a sur-reply on this issue is denied because Kathol did

not raise this issue for the first time in her reply brief. Rather, in her reply brief, she was

responding to defendants’ contention that notice should only be given to employees who

had opted out of the Arbitration Policy. 

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2d 811 (W.D. Mo. 2005), in support of this contention. In Mowdy, the defendants argued

that employees who had signed arbitration agreements should be excluded from the notice

but the court rejected this argument because “the defendants have not sufficiently

developed the record as to the nature of the arbitration agreements at issue, and it is

unclear what number of individuals have signed either a current or former version of the

agreement or whether the agreements are valid.” Mowdy, 2008 WL 901546, at *6. Thus,

“[t]he court ... reserve[d] its determination as to the validity of the arbitration agreements

until after notice [was] mailed and those receiving it ... had an opportunity to express an

interest to join the suit.” In Krstic, the court permitted notice to go to approximately 100

putative class members even though the defendant argued that most of them had signed

arbitration agreements. Krstic, 2011 WL 1042732, at *7. The court stated that “[a]t the

appropriate time,” it would “most likely subdivide similarly situated employees into two

categories: (1) one subclass for employees who have signed arbitration agreements, and

those claims will be transferred to arbitration; and (2) one subclass for employees who have

not signed arbitration agreements, and those claims will remain before this [c]ourt.” Id. 

In Davis, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that “conditional certification would

be improper ... because most, if not all, of NMI’s loan originators ha[d] signed arbitration

agreements”, in large part because the defendant had not yet moved to compel arbitration

even though the case had been pending for a year. Davis, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 817-18. 

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Both Mowdy and Davis are distinguishable because here, the court has already

determined that the Arbitration Policy is valid and defendants have already moved to

compel arbitration as to some employees. Under such circumstances, some courts have

excluded from the collective action notice any employees who are bound by arbitration

agreements. See Fischer v. Kmart Corp., Case No. 13–4116, 2014 WL 3817368, at *6, 8

(D.N.J. August 4, 2014) (court granted motion to compel arbitration and granted “motion

for conditional certification with respect to current and former Assistant Store Managers

who are not bound by the [Arbitration] Agreement, and ... den[ied] the motion for

conditional certification with respect to the current and former Assistant Store Managers,

including Opt–In Plaintiffs, who are bound”); Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc.,

838 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130, 1133 (D. Colo. 2011) (court found that arbitration provisions in

Independent Contractor Agreements were enforceable and court excluded from the

collective action notice any employees who had signed ICAs that contained arbitration

provisions). However, in Sylvester v. Wintrust Financial Corp., Case No. 12 C 01899, 2013

WL 5433593, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013), the court observed that “the enforceability of

arbitration clauses are dealt with on a case-by-case basis” and declined to limit the putative

class to individuals who had not signed arbitration agreements, even though the court

granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration as to two plaintiffs. 

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Since June 1, 2003, all of defendants’ new hires have been required to sign an

Employment Arbitration Acknowledgment Form as a condition of their commencement

of employment.51 This Acknowledgment Form binds these employees to defendants’

Arbitration Policy, which the court has determined is valid and enforceable.52 Thus, there

is no reason to give notice to any employee hired on or afterJune 1, 2003. Any FLSA claims

those employees might have must be arbitrated. However, the court will allow notice to

be given to all current and former Phoenix call center employees who were hired prior to

June 1, 2003 whose primary job duty was to handle phone calls with customers, vendors

and the public. The notice shall however advise that any pre-June 1, 2003 employees who

did not opt out of the Arbitration Policy will ultimately be excluded from the class and be

subject to arbitration proceedings. 

Conclusion

Kathol’s motion to proceed as a collective action53 is granted in part and denied in

part. The court will conditionally certify a collective action but the proposed class is limited

to current and former Phoenix call center employees who were hired prior to June 1, 2003

51Declaration of Arlene McKane at 1-2, ¶ 4, attached to Defendants’ Motion to

Compel Arbitration [etc.], Docket No. 31. 

52Order re Motion to Compel Arbitration at 12, 21 & 24, Docket No. 50. 

53Docket No. 22. 

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and with a primary job function of handling phone calls with customers, vendors, and the

public. 

The parties shall meet and confer about the notice that should be issued and shall

submit a jointly proposed notice or any disagreements as to same on or before September

2, 2014. On or before September 9, 2014, defendants shall provide Kathol with a list of the

names and addresses of all Phoenix call center employees who meet the class definition.

Defendants’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply54 is denied. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 18th day of August, 2014. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

54Docket No. 63. 

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