Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01086/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01086-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Theodore Alan May,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-1086-PHX-PGR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on May 22, 2012 (Doc. 1). On October 26, 2012, Respondents filed their Limited 

Answer (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a Reply on January 3, 2013 (Doc. 16).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On March 17, 1987, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court 

on one count of Molestation of a Child, and four counts of Sexual Conduct with a 

Minor, arising out of conduct with three different victims under the age of 15. (Exhibit 

A, Indictment.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 12, are referenced herein as “Exhibit 

___.”)

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Petitioner eventually entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit B), wherein 

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one amended count of attempted molestation of a 

child. In exchange, Petitioner was to be placed on probation, up to lifetime probation, 

and as a condition of probation was sentenced to one year in the county jail, and the 

remaining charges were to be dismissed. On April 29, 1987, Petitioner entered a plea of 

guilty pursuant to the terms of the Plea Agreement. (Exhibit C, M.E. 4/29/87.) 

On May 27, 1987, Petitioner appeared for sentencing. Imposition of sentence was 

suspended, Petitioner was placed on lifetime probation, and was ordered to serve one 

year in the county jail as a condition of probation. (Exhibit D, Sentence.) 

On June 11, 1987, the terms of Petitioner’s probation were modified to specify 

that he was to have no contact with a child under the age of eighteen without prior 

approval from the supervising adult probation officer. (Exhibit E, Modification.)

Petitioner then admitted violations of probation on February 1, 2002, December 

10, 2002, March 1, 2004, and October 5, 2006, and each time was reinstated on 

probation, albeit with additional conditions. (Exhibits E, M.E. 2/1/02; F, M.E. 2/21/02; 

G, M.E. 12/10/02; H, M..E. 1/23/03; I, M.E. 3/1/04; and J, M.E. 10/5/06.) 

On April 7, 2008, Petitioner was found by the court to have again violated his 

probation, and Petitioner was sentenced to ten years in prison. (Exhibit L, M.E. 4/7/08.) 

Petitioner signed a Notice of Rights of Review (Exhibit M), which included notice of the 

90 day deadline for filing a notice of post-conviction relief. 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

As a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 

616 (1995).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On December 14, 2009, over 20 months after his sentence, Petitioner filed an 

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“Application for Nunc Pro Tunc Order for Correction of Sentence” (Exhibit N), arguing 

inter alia that Petitioner’s sentence should be based upon the statutes in effect at the time 

of his offense, which limited his probation to five years and made him eligible to be 

released after serving 50% of any sentence.

On March 30, 2010, the PCR court construed the Application as a petition for 

post-conviction relief, and denied it as untimely. (Exhibit O, M.E. 3/30/10.)

On April 14, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Exhibit P), 

again arguing that his release date was being miscalculated. The PCR court denied the 

motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2012. (Exhibit Q, M.E. 5/21/10.)

On or about June 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals (Exhibit Q). On January 24, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarily denied review. 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 22, 2012 (Doc.1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) Petitioner’s sentence is unconstitutional.

(2) Petitioner “is eligible for release at 50% as indicated by his 

appearance before the parole board”;

(3) Petitioner’s sentence violates his right to equal protection 

because general population inmates are treated differently than sex 

offenders by the parole board; and

(4) Petitioner’s due process rights are violated by Respondents’ 

failure to calculate Petitioner’s sentence based on the rules in effect 

at the time of Petitioner’s conviction.

(Order 9/20/12, Doc. 7 at 1-2.) Service was ordered on September 20, 2012. (Id)

Response - On October 26, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 12). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are barred by the habeas 

statute of limitations, and that his claims are either procedurally defaulted or 

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procedurally barred,1and some claims are challenges to conditions of confinement not 

cognizable on habeas review.

Reply - On January 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 16). Petitioner argues 

that he only recently discover the claim concerning his early release credits and thus is 

not barred by the habeas statute of limitations. Petitioner further argues that any failure 

to properly raise his claims to the state court was the result of his pro se status and the 

lack of legal assistance and resources in the prison. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Finality - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins 

to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

For Arizona pleading defendants, their opportunity for direct review is an Arizona 

Rule 32 of-right post conviction relief proceeding. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 

(9th Cir. 2007). “Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is 

a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. 

 

1 Respondents do not attempt to analyze which claims were presented to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals and thus subject to a procedural bar, and which were not presented and 

thus merely procedurally defaulted.

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Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 

32, a plea-convicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 

days of conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a 

Petition for Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, Petitioner was finally sentenced on April 7, 2008. (Exhibit L, Sentence.) 

His first PCR proceeding was commenced on the filing of his “Application” (Exhibit N) 

which was filed on December 14, 2009, some seventeen months after his 90 days had 

expired. Thus, it did not constitute “direct review” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction became final on July 7, 2008, when his time 

to file an “of-right” PCR petition expired, his one year limitations period began running 

thereafter, and expired one year later on July 7, 2009. Without any tolling, Petitioner’s 

habeas petition, filed May 22, 2012, was almost 3 years delinquent.

Discovery - Although the conclusion of direct review normally marks the 

beginning of the statutory one year, section 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an alternative of 

“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Thus, where despite the exercise of 

due diligence a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate of his claim, the 

statute does not commence running on that claim until the earlier of such discovery or 

the elimination of the disability which prevented discovery.

Here, Petitioner claims that he did not discover his claims until being advised of 

his release date by the prison.

Petitioner did not become aware of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections (ADC) calculation of his sentence until he received 

notice of same from ADC. ADC gave Petitioner a “Release Date 

Calculation” which prompted Petitioner’s filing on December 14, 

2009.

(Reply, Doc. 16 at 2.) Petitioner does not specify when he discovery his claim, and 

proffers nothing to suggest that he exercised due diligence in trying to discover the claim 

prior to that time. (For example, Petitioner does not suggest that the prison would not 

have earlier revealed the disputed calculation had he requested a report on his expected 

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release date.) 

Even assuming Petitioner could not have earlier discovered his claim with due 

diligence, Petitioner had discovered the issue at least as of his December 14, 2009 PCR 

petition (“Application”), wherein he complained that “the plea agreement allows for the 

defendant to serve 50% of the imposed sentence before being released from custody.” 

(Exhibit N at 3.) In his motion for reconsideration, he more directly argued the point: 

The Dept. of Corrections sentence shows he is now serving 85% 

which he should be only serving 65% to his parole eligibility, and 

his parole would equal the same of the original sentence.

(Exhibit P, Motion at 2.) 

Thus, Petitioner knew of his claim based on the early release date calculation at 

least before December 14, 2009. If his one year began running then, it would have 

expired at least by December 14, 2010, and thus his Petition would have been over 18 

months delinquent.

Moreover, this would only make timely those claims which depend upon 

Plaintiff’s knowledge of the prison’s calculation of his early release date. The limitations 

period on those claims which were revealed by the sentence itself would have run from 

the finality of conviction.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Here, Petitioner’s one year began running primarily on July 8, 2008 and expired 

on July 7, 2009. It is true that Petitioner thereafter filed his PCR petition (Exhibit N) and 

Petition for Review (Exhibit R). However, the primary limitations period had already 

expired as of that time. Once the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or 

collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 

276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

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2003). 

Moreover, for a state petition to toll the statute of limitations, it must be “properly 

filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) the Court 

held that when a state post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, then it is not 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of statutory tolling. 

Here, Petitioner’s PCR petition was dismissed as untimely. (Exhibit O, M.E. 3/30/10.) 

And, this Court looks through the summary denial by the Arizona Court of Appeals to 

the “last reasoned decision,” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). which was 

the PCR court’s dismissal as untimely. Accordingly, neither the PCR petition nor the 

petition for review were “properly filed” and thus do not toll the statute of limitations 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling and his Petition is 

untimely.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

In the context of addressing his procedural default/procedural bar issues, Petitioner 

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attempts to justify his procedural failings by pointing to his limited legal experience and 

resources. Petitioner complains that he has proceeded “to the best of his abilities given 

the limited legal and law references available to him through ADC.” (Reply, Doc. 16 at 

3.) 

A prisoner’s pro se status is not an extraordinary circumstance. Felder v. 

Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000). A prisoner's “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and 

exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). Indeed, outside the realm of capital 

punishment, it is being represented in filing a habeas petition that is extraordinary.

Moreover, "ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, 

generally does not excuse prompt filing." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th 

Cir.1999). ). See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro 

se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling”).

It is true that the inadequacies of a prison law library and lack of notice of the 

AEDPA may be extraordinary circumstances. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 

(9th Cir. 2000). Here, however, Petitioner points to nothing in particular in any such 

limitations that precluded him from a timely federal filing. 

Moreover, even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for 

a time, equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing 

afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable 

diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of 

causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and 

the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. 

Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). But see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th 

Cir. 2002), McKeown, J. dissenting (arguing that equitable tolling should work a 

stoppage of the clock, with a resulting extension of the deadline). Ordinarily, thirty days 

after elimination of a roadblock should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 

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1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he showed 

diligence in the face of his limited training and resources. He was able to layout his 

claims at least as of December, 2009, and yet failed to file his federal habeas petition 

until two and one half years later.

Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show that limitation in his training or 

resources was extraordinary, that they made it impossible for him to timely file his 

petition, or that he was diligent in the face of those limitations. Accordingly, Petitioner is 

not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

5. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the statute of limitations is subject to an 

exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

6. Summary

Petitioner’s time for seeking “direct review” ended on July 7, 2008, when his time 

to file an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief expired. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

conviction was final and his one year limitations period began running after July 7, 2008, 

and expired one year later on July 7, 2009. Assuming he could not have earlier 

discovered his claims based upon the disclosure of his early release calculations, then 

arguable his one year began running at least as of December 14, 2009, when he filed his 

PCR petition based on the calculations. In that instance, his one year would have 

expired on December 14, 2010.

Petitioner had no properly filed state petitions pending during those year periods, 

and thus he is entitled to no statutory tolling. Petitioner has failed to show that in the 

face of reasonable diligence extraordinary circumstances made it impossible for him to 

file his federal habeas petition on time, and thus he is entitled to no equitable tolling. 

Therefore, his federal habeas petition, filed on May 22, 2012 is untimely, and must be 

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dismissed with prejudice. 

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted 

or were procedurally barred under an independent and adequate state ground, and that 

some are non-cognizable challenges to his conditions of confinement. Because the 

undersigned finds the Petition plainly barred by the statute of limitations, these other 

defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

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COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed May 22, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

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party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 22, 2013

12-1086r RR 13 02 19 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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