Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02223/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02223-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICHARD MITZELFELT, Director of ) 

the Environmental Improvement ) 

Division of the New Mexico Health ) 

and Environment Department, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FI LED 

United States Courc of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

M/W 21 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

No. 89-2223 

DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) __________________ ) 

) 

COLORADO, TEXAS, KENTUCKY, ) 

WASHINGTON, MISSOURI, INDIANA, ) 

MICHIGAN, NEBRASKA, WYOMING, ) 

LOUISIANA, KANSAS, HAWAII, ) 

MINNESOTA, ARIZONA, MAINE, ) 

ILLINOIS, UTAH, CALIFORNIA, ) 

MONTANA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NEW ) 

JERSEY and OHIO, ) 

) 

Arnicus Curiae. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. 88-1535-M) 

Felicia L. Orth, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

General Counsel, Health and Environment Department, Santa Fe, New 

Mexico, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jeffrey P. Kehne, Attorney, Land & Natural Resources Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Lt. Colonel Richard 

B. Lotz, Of Counsel, Headquarters USAF/JACE, Bolling Air Force 

Base, Washington, D.C., Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney 

General, David J. Kaplan and Jacques B. Gelin, Attorneys, Land & 

Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 

Washington, o.c., with him on the brief), Attorneys for DefendantAppellee. · 

Appellate Case: 89-2223 Document: 010110560502 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 1
Duane Woodard, Attorney General, Charles B. Howe, Deputy Attorney 

General, Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, and Michael R. 

Hope, Deputy Attorney General, CERCLA Section, Denver, Colorado, 

on the brief for Amici Curiae. 

Before ANDERSON, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

The sole issue in this appeal is whether section 6001 of the 

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA''), 42 u.s.c. 

§ 6961, waives all federal sovereign immunity from state civil 

penalties. We hold that it does not. 

This case arose when the State of New Mexico notified the 

United States Air Force that Cannon Air Force Base was violating 

the State's hazardous waste laws. After all but one of the violations was corrected, the State ordered the Air Force to remedy the 

situation and assessed a $5,000 civil penalty. The Air Force corrected the remaining problem but refused to pay the fine. New 

Mexico sued to collect the penalty. The district court dismissed 

the action on the grounds of federal sovereign immunity. 

Section 6001 of RCRA provides that every federal department, 

agency, and instrumentality 

"shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, 

State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and procedural (including any requirements for 

permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive 

relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court 

to enforce such relief), respecting control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste disposal .... " 

* Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Sr. Judge, U.S. District Court for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-2223 Document: 010110560502 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 2
42 u.s.c. § 6961. Courts and commentators have split on the question of whether or not this provision waives federal sovereign 

immunity to state-imposed monetary penalties, with the majority 

holding that it does not. Compare United States v. Washington, 

872 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1989) and California v. United States 

Dep't of Defense, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,023, 

21,024 (E.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, No. 88-2912 (9th Cir. June 26, 

1989) and McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. 

Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 603 (E.D. Cal. 1986) and Meyer v. 

United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221, 222-23 (E.D.N.C. 

1986) and Florida Dep't of Envtl. Reg. v. Silvex Corp., 606 F. 

Supp. 159, 164 (M.D. Fla. 1985) and Donnelly & Van Ness, The 

Warrior and the Druid--The DOD and Environmental Law, 33 Fed. Bar 

News 37, 39 (1986) with Maine v. Department of the Navy, 702 F. 

Supp. 322, 330 (D. Me. 1988) and Ohio v. United States Dep't of 

Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 764 (S.D. Ohio 1988), appeal docketed, 

No. 89-3329 (6th Cir. Apr. 20, 1989) and Note, How Well Can States 

Enforce Their Environmental Laws When the Polluter Is the United 

States Government?, 18 Rutgers L.J. 123, 131 (1986). 

"As sovereign, the United States, in the absence of its 

consent, is immune from suit." Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 

U.S. 310, 315 (1986). "[A] waiver of the traditional sovereign 

immunity 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.'" 

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United 

States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); Soriano v. United States, 

352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)). "Waivers of immunity must be 

'construed strictly in favor of the sovereign' and not 'enlarge[d] 

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-2223 Document: 010110560502 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 3
beyond what the language requires.'" Ruckelshaus v. Sierra 

Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983} (quoting McMahon v. United States, 

342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 

U.S. 675, 686 (1927)) (emphasis added}. Applying these 

principles, we hold that the penalty New Mexico seeks to exact 

from the Air Force is not a "requirement(] ..• respecting 

control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste disposal," 

42 U.S.C. § 6961. Therefore, federal sovereign immunity bars New 

Mexico's claim. 

First, the word "requirements" in section 6001 does not unambiguously include civil penalties. While interpreting an 

analogous statute, the Supreme Court rejected the argument "that 

. whatever is required by a state implementation plan is a 'requirement.'" Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 183 (1976). The word can 

reasonably be interpreted as including substantive standards and 

the ·means for implementing those standards, but excluding punitive 

measures. See Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 

1988}; California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1984). 

"[E]ven when Congress clearly provides that federal facilities are 

to comply with state requirements, states may not impose sanctions 

for noncompliance--either civil or administrative--absent express 

Congressional authorization." Donnelly & Van Ness, supra, 33 Fed. 

Bar News at 38 (citing Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 

554, 563-64 (1921}) (emphasis added}. 

Second, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of RCRA 

do not show a clear intention to waive federal sovereign immunity 

to state civil penalties. The legislative history is quite 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-2223 Document: 010110560502 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 4
general and makes no reference to such measures, see S. Rep. 988, 

94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. 32,599, 33,817 

(1976), but New Mexico argues that section 6001 must be read 

expansively because it was a rejoinder by Congress to the Supreme 

Court's decisions in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. at 198, and 

Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water 

Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 227 (1976), that the word 

"requirements" in the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act did 

not include state permit requirements. The Court noted that the 

statutes required federal installations to comply with state 

requirements, but not with "all" state requirements. Hancock v. 

Train, 426 U.S. at 182 (emphasis in original). The Court also 

drew a distinction between substantive requirements and procedural 

requirements. Id. at 183. Congress reacted by using the following language in RCRA: "all Federal, State, interstate, and local 

requirements, both substantive and procedural," 42 U.S.C. § 6961 

(emphasis added). 

However, the fact that the RCRA language was a response to 

these decisions does not compel the conclusion that the waiver of 

sovereign immunity extends to civil penalties. Congress continued 

to waive immunity only to "requirements," rather than something 

broader. In contrast, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and 

the Safe Drinking Water Act were amended in response to Hancock 

and Environmental Protection Agency to waive sovereign immunity to 

"requirements, administrative authority [or authorities], and 

process and_sanctions." See 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a); 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1323(a); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(a) (emphasis added). Also, the 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-2223 Document: 010110560502 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 5
House of Representatives version of RCRA, which was discarded in 

favor of the current language, specifically subjected federal 

agencies to civil penalties. See H.R. 14496, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 

(1976). Congress knew how to indicate an intent to waive federal 

sovereign immunity to state civil penalties, and it did not do so 

when it enacted RCRA. 1 The legislative response in RCRA to 

Hancock and Environmental Protection Agency was narrow, and did 

not extend the waiver far beyond what had been waived in previous 

statutes. United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992, 997 (6th Cir. 1983), 

cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984); Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 

F.2d 835, 854 n.36 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456 

U.S. 305 (1982); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. 

Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 1988). 

Finally, we find unpersuasive the argument that we should 

defer to the posi.tion of the Environmental Protection Agency 

(''EPA") that RCRA subjects federal instrumentalities to civil 

penalties. The EPA regulations for the administration of RCRA 

define "person'' to include federal agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 270.2. 

1 Subsequent Congresses have interpreted section 6001 as 

waiving federal sovereign immunity from state civil penalties. 

See H.R. Rep. No. 141, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989); H.R. Rep. 

253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 3124, 3335. However, the views of later 

Congresses are of little value in ascertaining the intent of the 

Congress which passed the legislation. Consumer Product Safety 

Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) (quoting 

United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)); International 

Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977); 

United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968) 

(quoting, e.g., Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 

(1958); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.7 (1968)); 

United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 

(1963). 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-2223 Document: 010110560502 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 6
The regulations also authorize states to impose civil penalties 

upon violators. 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(3). These provisions can 

be read to stand for the proposition that federal entities are 

subject to state-imposed fines, 2 but they hardly constitute a 

deliberate statement of EPA policy on the matter. 

Moreover, even if the EPA had clearly stated such a position, 

we would not be bound by it. For one thing, administrative regulations cannot waive the federal government's sovereign immunity. 

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1983). Also, 

courts should defer to the judgment of an administrative agency 

only with reference to topics within the agency's area of 

expertise. Racine v. United States, 858 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 

1988); Petrou Fisheries, Inc. v. ICC, 727 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 

1984); H.W. Wilson Co. v. United States Postal Service, 580 F.2d 

33, 37 (2d Cir. 1978). The EPA's expertise is in environmental 

matters, not on the subject of sovereign immunity. Cf. Lodges 743 

and 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 

F.2d 422, 452 n.48 (2d Cir. 1975) (court would not defer to NLRB's 

judgment that certain Supreme Court decisions applied retroactively), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976). 

Because the waiver provision of RCRA is at best ambiguous as 

to whether or not Congress intended to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from state civil penalties, it does not 

accomplish that purpose. The judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

2 Such an interpretation is not mandatory, however, for nowhere 

do the regulations specifically subject all "persons" to such 

penalties. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-2223 Document: 010110560502 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 7