Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01643/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01643-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

U!!ited States Cmnr of Appeals 

Tenth Gr(:.,i: 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 2 J 1989 

ROBERT L. I-IOECKER 

Clerk 

BROCK ZIMMERMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v .. 

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND 

SANTA FE RAI:LWAY COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Submitted on the briefs: 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

88-1643 

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On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The Western District _ Of Oklahoma 

(D.C. Civil No. 87-1363-P) 

Clyde Kirk of Stipe, Gossett, Stipe, Harper, Estes, McCune & 

Parks, Oklahoma ~ity, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

John J. Fleps and Joel W. Rice, Chicago, Illinois, and H. D. 

Binns, Jr., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 88-1643 Document: 01019408279 Date Filed: 10/26/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff, Brock Zimmerman, filed a petition in an Oklahoma 

state court ·against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway 

Company. Count I of the petition alleged, in pertinent part, that 

plaintiff had been discharged "in violation of protective 

agreements contained in a union bargaining agreement entered into 

between Defendant • • • and the Railroad Yardmasters of America 

.• " Count II alleged that plaintiff had been discharged in 

bad faith and with malicious motivation. We note that plaintiff's 

claims were made in connection with his demotion from the position 

of Assistant Trainmaster as his employment with defendant was not 

actually terminated. 

The action was removed to the United Stat es District Court . 

Defendant filed a motion for s ummary judgment asserting that the 

National Railroad Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction over 

this as a "minor dispute" pursuant to 45 u.s.c. §§ 151, et seg. 

(the Railway Labor Act). The district court entered an order 

granting defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff appeals 

from that order. 

In its order, the district court found that plaintiff's 

complaint was based on a letter agreement which constituted a 

collective bargaining agreement as defined in the Act, citing 

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Appellate Case: 88-1643 Document: 01019408279 Date Filed: 10/26/1989 Page: 2 
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 u.s. 320, and Hodges 

v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 414 (lOth Cir.). 

In reviewing the propriety of summary judgment, this court 

must view the case in the same manner as did the district court. 

Baker v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 650 (lOth Cir.). We 

must determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists 

and, if not, whether the substantive law was correctly applied. 

Conclusory allegations do not establish an issue of fact under 

Rule 56. The burdens on the parties are described in Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 u.s. 242. 

A basic issue is, of course, whether the trial court 

correctly found that the May 6, 1980 letter agreement constituted 

a collective bargaining agreement. It is undisputed that as of 

the date of the letter to J. J. McDaniel he was a certified union 

r epresentative of the Railroad Yardmasters of America . I n 

May 1980, he presented to the union members employed by defendant 

t he May 6, 1980 letter from F. L. E1terman, Vice PresidentPersonnel and Labor Relations, for defendant. The union members 

voted to abandon and decertify the union, and to become exempt 

personnel i n e xchange for the benefits and terms set out in t he 

letter. These facts are undisputed and the trial court was 

correct in finding the letter agreement to be a collective 

bargaining agreement for these purposes. 

We agree with the district court's determinat i on that 

plaintiff's suit was based on a collective bargaining agreement, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1643 Document: 01019408279 Date Filed: 10/26/1989 Page: 3 
but the issue remains whether under the terms of the letter a 

11minor" or "major 11 dispute was involved. Plaintiff argues. on 

appeal that the dispute is a 11major dispute 11 and, therefore, not 

subject to the Act. Although defendant submits that plaintiff 1 S 

argument should not be considered because it was not raised below ~ 

however, the question whether the dispute is major or minor must 

be considered because the Act gives the Board exclusive 

jurisdiction only for minor disputes. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 

439 U.S. 89~ (Congress considered it essential to keep so-called 

11minor" disputes within the Adjustment Board and out ·of the 

courts.) A ''minor dispute 11 has been defined in several cases in 

addition to Hodges v. Atchison , Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 

414 (lO th Cir.). It is a dispute which concerns the existence of 

rights of the parties under a labor agreement , Elgin, J . & E. Ry. 

v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, and thus the interpretation or 

application of existing agreements. A "major dispute'' is one 

wherein a party is trying to establish rights not even arguably 

contained in an agreement. st. Louis s.w. Ry~ v~ Brotherhood of 

R.R. Signalmen, 665 F.2d 987 (lOth Cir.). 

As indicated above, plaintiff asserted that he was discharged 

in violation of the protective agreements with the Railroad and in 

bad faith. More particularly this action taken by the Railroad in 

demoting plaintiff without affording him an investigatory hearing, 

as he requested, prior to his demotion violated the terms of the 

agreement set out in the letter. Plaintiff relies on paragraph 13 

of that letter in which it is stated that 11 [a}ny prior agreed-to 

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Appellate Case: 88-1643 Document: 01019408279 Date Filed: 10/26/1989 Page: 4 
protective agreement will continue to be recognized." Plaintiff's 

position is that this language incorporated the terms of a prior 

bargaining agreement under which he was entitled to the requested 

hearing: The letter at issue further provides in paragraph 15 

that "[a]ll agreements, rules, practices, interpretations, and/or 

understandings, however established, shall be abrogated; and the 

National Mediation Board will be jointly notified of such 

abrogation." In light of this language, defendant's refusal to 

afford plaintiff the investigatory hea ring he requested was at 

least arguably justified. The dispute in this case is properly 

characterized as a minor dispute. Brotherhood of Locomotive 

Eng'rs v. Burlington N. Ry., 838 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), citing 

El gin, J . & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711; Brotherhood of R.R . 

Signalmen v. Burlington N. Ry., 829 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.). It is 

well established that federal courts have no subject matter 

jurisdiction over minor disputes. Brotherhood of Locomotive 

Eng'rs. Minor disputes are within the exclusive arbitration 

provisions of the Act. 

The Supreme Court in Andrews stated that "the compulsory 

character of the administrative remedy provided by the Railway 

Labor Act • stems not from any contractual undertaking between 

the parties but from the Act itself .... " Andrews, 406 u.s. at 

323. The Andrews court also stated that alleging "wrongful 

discharge" does not save the action from the Act's mandatory 

provision for the processing of grievances. Hodges v. Atchison, 

Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 414 (lOth Cir.), is significant 

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Appellate Case: 88-1643 Document: 01019408279 Date Filed: 10/26/1989 Page: 5 
on these issues. That case concerned an asserted wrongful 

discharge case and the plaintiff urged that the action was 

basically a common law contract action. He was a nonunion 

employee. We there said in part, at 416-17 : 

"Even though Mr. Hodges alleges breach of an 

employment agreement and not the collective 

bargaining agreement itself he is still 

obliged to seek relief primarily and 

exclusively through arbitration." 

Insofar as the Andrews holding was announced under 

circumstances in which the plaintiff was no longer employed by 

defendant, and he was not seeking reinstatement to his prior 

position, the reasoning of that case is equally applicable, if not 

stronger, in the present case because plaintiff remains employed 

by defendant although he has been demoted. 

It is irrelevant that plaintiff was not a union member at the 

time he was demoted and filed the action underlying this appeal. 

In Womble v. Seaboard System R.R., 804 F.2d 635 (11th Cir.), it 

was held .that a nonunion employe e was required to pursue 

administrative remedies under the Act when she brings an action 

for benefits upon termination of her employment, citing Andrews. 

Again, the holding of Womble would be equally applicable here, 

where plaintiff's claim sterns from a demotion, rather than a 

complete termination of employment. 

The district court's order is AFFIRMED. 

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