Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00588/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00588-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

N. KENNEDY, et al.,

Defendant.

No. 2:16-cv-0588 DB P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that officers Kennedy and Carlisle

failed to take appropriate action when plaintiff attempted suicide in August 2015. On June 27, 

2016, the court ordered service of the complaint on those officers. 

Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison – Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”) in the 

“CTC” unit, which plaintiff describes as a crisis bed for suicidal inmates. On September 7, 2016, 

plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. Therein, plaintiff complains that CSPSAC custodial officers have not fed him, forced him to stand up in a cage all night, and peppersprayed him. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff asks that CSP-SAC “cease and desist this ungodly 

treatment” by taking him off “custody watch only” status. 

On September 9, 2016, the court ordered Supervising Deputy Attorney General Monica 

Anderson to respond to the allegations in plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. 
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She has done so. (ECF No. 18.) Based on the declarations of doctors treating plaintiff and of an 

associate warden, which are attached to Ms. Anderson’s response, this court will deny plaintiff’s 

September 9 motion for injunctive relief.

On October 3, 2016, plaintiff filed motions to appoint counsel and for a preliminary 

injunction. Plaintiff states he requires counsel because he is taking psychotropic medications and 

he is not allowed access to the library or his legal materials when he is on suicide watch, which is 

frequent. (ECF No. 20.) In his October 3 request for injunctive relief, plaintiff alleges he was 

denied “toilet” by P. Ybarra and C. Rodrigues and then given a sharp piece of metal and 

“taunted” apparently to kill himself. He requests immediate removal from the “custody watch 

only” list and a referral to Napa or Coalinga State Hospital. (ECF No. 21.) The court further

finds below that plaintiff has failed to show extraordinary circumstances justifying the 

appointment of counsel or the injunctive relief requested on October 3. Accordingly, those 

motions will be denied as well. 

MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

I. Legal Standards

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 

may impose without notice to the adverse party only if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 

movant “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 

Local Rule 231(a) states that “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of circumstances, no temporary 

restraining order shall be granted in the absence of actual notice to the affected party and/or 

counsel[.]” In the absence of such extraordinary circumstances, the court construes a motion for 

temporary restraining order as a motion for preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Aiello v. One West 

Bank, No. 2:10–cv–0227–GEB–EFB, 2010 WL 406092, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010).

The party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to succeed 

on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that 

the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The propriety of a request for injunctive relief 
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hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean 

Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the plaintiff 

demonstrates the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and can show that an injunction is in the 

public interest, a preliminary injunction may issue so long as serious questions going to the merits 

of the case are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor. Alliance for 

the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the 

“serious questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable 

after Winter).

The principal purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the court’s power to 

render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits. See 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947 (3d ed. 2014). Implicit in this required showing is 

that the relief awarded is only temporary and there will be a full hearing on the merits of the 

claims raised in the injunction when the action is brought to trial. For the same reason, an 

injunction against individuals not parties to an action is strongly disfavored. Zenith Radio Corp. 

v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969). In cases brought by prisoners involving 

conditions of confinement, any preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no 

further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the 

least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

II. Discussion

The basis for plaintiff’s placement on “custody watch only” status is explained in Ms. 

Anderson’s response and the accompanying declarations of Dr. Heitkamp, the Chief of Psychiatry

at CSP-SAC; B. Forsterer, the Associate Warden of Health Care Services at CSP-SAC; and P. 

Houston, the Senior Psychologist Supervisor for the CTC at CSP-SAC. Plaintiff was transferred 

from CSP-Corcoran on July 29, 2016 to the Mental Health Crisis Bed (MHCB) Unit of the 

Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) at CSP-SAC. Plaintiff has a long history of serious selfinjurious behavior and has been admitted to MHCB housing 45 times since he was committed to 

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CDCR custody in 1999. (ECF No. 18-2, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also has a history of indecent exposure 

while incarcerated. (Id.) 

Dr. Heitkamp explains plaintiff’s placement on “custody watch only” status. (ECF No. 

18-2, ¶¶ 5,6.) During a previous admission to the MHCB at CSP-SAC, on June 16, 2014, an 

Interdisciplinary Treatment Team met to discuss plaintiff’s treatment plan. The team found that 

plaintiff had demonstrated a pattern of engaging in potentially serious self-injurious behavior in 

order to secure a female nursing-observer to watch him while he was under suicide watch. It was 

felt that plaintiff was using suicide watch as an opportunity to engage in conversation with the 

nursing-observers. The treatment team concluded that these unstructured, unsupervised 

conversations were harmful to plaintiff. Accordingly, the treatment team recommended that any 

suicide watch of plaintiff while at in CSP-SAC MHCB housing should be done by custody staff 

only. Since that time, plaintiff has not indecently exposed himself. However, the court notes that 

plaintiff has exhibited self-injurious behavior since then. According to Dr. Houston, plaintiff 

swallowed a razor blade on September 18, 2016. It was successfully removed at a hospital that 

same day. (ECF No. 18-3.) In addition, plaintiff’s recent motion for injunctive relief shows that 

plaintiff cut his arm on September 27, 2016. (ECF No. 21 at 1, 3.) 

In his declaration, Associate Warden Forsterer states that records are kept of all the times 

an inmate is given a meal and all the times he refuses a meal, of any placement of an inmate in a 

standing holding cell, and of any use of force against an inmate. Records show that plaintiff has 

been provided three meals a day since his admission to CSP-SAC MHCB housing on July 29, 

2016. Records show that plaintiff has not been placed in a standing holding cell for a period of 

longer than four hours during this time period. Finally, records do not show any use of force, 

including any use of pepper spray, on defendant during his current admission to CSP-SAC 

MHCB. (ECF No. 18-1, ¶¶ 5-7.) 

Plaintiff does not specify when he was not fed, forced to stand up all night, or peppersprayed. The sworn statements of Drs. Heitkamp and Houston and of Associate Warden 

Forsterer show that those incidents, if any, likely did not occur during plaintiff’s recent 

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admissions to CSP-SAC MHCB. The court thus finds plaintiff is not in imminent danger of 

irreparable harm based on the allegations in plaintiff’s September 7 motion. 

With respect to plaintiff’s October 3 motion, the medical report attached to plaintiff’s 

motion belies his claim that he was given a sharp object by prison staff and “taunted” to kill 

himself. Rather, the medical report states that plaintiff told staff that he cut himself because he 

was not given enough toilet paper. (ECF No. 21 at 3.) Plaintiff does not show that medical staff 

did not address his self-inflicted injury adequately or that he otherwise is in immediate danger of 

irreparable harm. 

Finally, the court notes that plaintiff does not allege that the defendants in this case, 

Officers Kennedy and Carlisle, are the same as the custodial officers he complains of in his 

motions for injunctive relief. Injunctions against individuals not parties to an action are strongly 

disfavored. Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 110. 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require 

counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 

U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the 

voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood 

of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th 

Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances common to 

most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish 

exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel.

The court is sympathetic to the limitations plaintiff faces when he is on suicide watch. The 

court also notes that despite apparently taking psychotropic medications, plaintiff has been able to 

file documents with the court that make his wishes known. Therefore, the court does not find the 

required exceptional circumstances in this case. Plaintiff is advised that he may seek an extension
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of time to respond to a motion or court order if he is unable to prepare legal documents based on 

restrictions imposed upon him. 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s September 7, 2016 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 14) is 

denied.

2. Plaintiff’s October 3, 2016 Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 21 ) is denied.

3. Plaintiff’s October 3, 2016 Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 20) is denied.

Dated: October 11, 2016

DLB:9

DLB1/prisoner-civil rights/harr0588.tro