Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01176/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01176-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL CHACON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROGELIO ORTEGA, M.D.,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-01176-SKO (PC)

SECOND SCREENING ORDER

DISMISSING ACTION, WITH

PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 

1983

(Doc. 16)

Second Screening Order

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Joel Chacon, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 26, 2013. On May 12, 2014, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed an 

amended complaint on June 13, 2014.

II. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen Plaintiff=s complaint and dismiss the case, in whole or in 

part, if the Court determines it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. '

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

doubt resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff=s claims must be facially plausible to 

survive screening, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation 

marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer 

possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability 

falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, 

California, brings this action against Rogelio Ortega, M.D., for violating his rights under the 

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff’s amended complaint sets forth 

significantly fewer facts than did his original complaint. While it may have been entirely 

unintentional, the factual omissions nevertheless affect Plaintiff’s claim. See Air Aromatics, LLC 

v. Opinion Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 744 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 2014) (“A 

party cannot amend pleadings to directly contradict an earlier assertion made in the same 

proceeding.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Based on the paucity of facts in 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint and the omission of relevant facts previously pled, the Court views

Plaintiff’s amended complaint through the lens of his original complaint, and the following fact 

summary is reproduced from the first screening order:

Plaintiff alleges that on or around March 20, 2013, he was seen by Defendant 

Ortega, who diagnosed him with nerve damage and prescribed Amitriptyline HCL, 

25 mcg. 

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On or around March 27, 2013, Plaintiff began having an outbreak of bleeding 

ulcers and he submitted a request for emergency medical care on April 1, 2013. 

Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Doe, who checked his open wounds and said it 

looked like it hurt. Defendant Doe prescribed Benadryl, 50 mg., and told Plaintiff 

he would be okay. Defendant Doe said she could not give him any pain 

medication.

On April 2, 2013, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Ortega, who told Plaintiff his 

mouth ulcers would go away. Defendant Ortega thought the ulcers were caused by 

the medication prescribed for the nerve damage and he prescribed Plaintiff 

Lidocaine Hydrochloride topical solution, 2%.

On April 4, 2013, Plaintiff sent another request for emergency medical care 

complaining about his mouth and stomach and stating he could not eat. 

On April 5, 2013, Plaintiff told Defendant Ortega that he had stomach pain and he 

was throwing up and defecating blood. Defendant Ortega said he could not 

prescribe anything for Plaintiff’s pain. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ortega did 

not believe him so he had Plaintiff lie down. Defendant Ortega inserted his finger 

in Plaintiff’s rectum and told the nurse to call in “Cod 2” because Plaintiff had 

blood in his stool.1 (Comp., 4:23.) Plaintiff was then taken to San Joaquin 

Community Hospital, where it was determined he had internal bleeding.

On April 7, 2013, Doctor Vu showed Plaintiff a picture of forty to fifty ulcers. 

Plaintiff was prescribed Omeprazole, 20 mg., and Metoclopramide, 10 mg., and he

was prescribed pain medication from April 8, 2013, to April 16, 2013.

(Doc. 14, Order, 2:21-3:15.)

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff names only Defendant Ortega, and he alleges that he 

saw Defendant for his mouth ulcers, but Defendant provided only an ineffective topical 

medication and did not treat Plaintiff’s extreme pain. Plaintiff alleges that only when he began to 

bleed internally was action taken, and he was sent to an outside hospital.

B. Medical Care Claim

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 

2012) ), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 

2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that 

failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

 

1

It is unclear if Plaintiff means “code 2.”

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wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain 

or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 

(citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which 

entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

Plaintiff’s allegations support the existence of a serious medical need arising out of his 

reaction to the medication prescribed for his nerve damage. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 

(9th Cir. 2000). However, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that Defendant Ortega

acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. To the contrary, Plaintiff received prompt 

medical care. The mere fact of Plaintiff’s adverse reaction to a medication does not support a 

claim under section 1983, Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122, and Plaintiff’s disagreement with the course 

of treatment rendered does not support a claim against Defendant Ortega, Snow, 681 F.3d at 987; 

Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23. Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “failed any attempt to 

diminish [his] level of obvious pain,” his allegations that his pain was ignored are belied by the 

fact that Defendant prescribed Lidocaine Hydrocortisone, which is a local anesthetic. Stanton by 

Brooks v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 1983); Gelley v. Astra 

Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 466 F.Supp. 182, 184 (D.C.Minn. 1979); Dorland’s Illustrated 

Medical Dictionary 1048 (31st ed. 2007). (Doc. 16, Amend. Comp., p. 4.) The Court does not

doubt that Plaintiff’s mouth ulcers caused him severe pain, but there is no support for his claim 

that Defendant Ortega was deliberately indifferent to his medical condition. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 

section 1983. Plaintiff was previously provided with leave to amend and based on the nature of 

the deficiencies, further leave to amend is not warranted. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 

(9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. This action is DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 

1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall enter judgment; and

3. The dismissal of this action qualifies as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. 

Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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