Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01055/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01055-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1055

RENEE D. GUSTAFSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM ADKINS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11‐cv‐05852 — John Z. Lee, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2015

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. In May 2007, defendant‐appellant

William Adkins, a detective at the Jesse Brown Veterans Af‐

fairs (“VA”) Medical Center in Chicago, installed a hidden

surveillance camera in the ceiling of an office used by female

officers as a changing area. The camera captured images of

female officers dressing and undressing. VA personnel dis‐

covered the covert surveillance equipment during a renova‐

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2 No. 15‐1055

tion of the VA Medical Center in September 2009, at which

time Renee Gustafson first learned that the camera had cap‐

tured images of her changing from early 2007 through April

2009. Gustafson filed suit against Adkins on August 24, 2011,

alleging an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. Adkins appeals the district court’s denial of

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified

immunity grounds. We affirm.

I. Background

Renee Gustafson served as a police lieutenant supervisor

at the Jesse Brown VA Medical Center in Chicago from Sep‐

tember 2007 through April 2009. During this period, William

Adkins worked as a detective for the Police and Security

Service at the Medical Center. Adkins reported to the Chief

of the Police and Security Service, Myron K. Thomas.  

At all times relevant to the events in question, the Medi‐

cal Center did not house a designated female locker room for

Police and Security Service personnel. Female officers used

an office, commonly referred to as the “old supervisors’ of‐

fice,” to change into and out of their work uniforms before

and after shifts. The old supervisors’ office was also in active

use as a supervisors’ office. From 2007 through September

2009, four supervisors, two female and two male, had keys

to and made use of the old supervisors’ office.  

Gustafson attests that it was common knowledge that

female personnel used the office as a changing room. Ac‐

cording to Gustafson, both Adkins and Thomas observed

her and another female officer entering the old supervisors’

office in street clothes and exiting in uniform (or vice versa),

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No. 15‐1055 3

and thus must have known that the room was used to

change into and out of clothing.

On or around May 18, 2007, Chief Thomas instructed

Adkins to install a hidden surveillance camera in the ceiling

of the old supervisors’ office. Adkins asked why the camera

was being installed and Thomas explained that surveillance

was needed to identify supervisors who were sleeping in

that office while on duty. Adkins, who was hesitant to install

a camera in an area where female supervisors changed their

clothes, contacted two sources to inquire about the legality

of the instruction: the VA’s Office of the Inspector General

Investigator and Assistant Chief Cherrylynn Seals. Both

sources informed Adkins that the use of a surveillance cam‐

era in the old supervisors’ office would be illegal.1 Adkins

relayed this information to Chief Thomas and asked whether

Thomas had obtained authorization for placement of the

camera. Thomas told Adkins “not to worry about that” and

to “just install the surveillance camera.”  

Later in May, Adkins installed covert video surveillance

equipment in the ceiling tiles of the old supervisors’ office.

The camera captured images of female officers dressing and

undressing. These images were sent to Chief Thomas’s office

for viewing.

VA personnel discovered the covert surveillance equip‐

ment during a renovation of the VA Medical Center in Sep‐

tember 2009. On September 2, 2009, Gustafson learned that

                                                  1 Under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/26‐4 (2012), which is entitled

“Unauthorized Video Recording and Live Video Transmission,” it is a

crime to videotape any person in a “locker room” or “changing room”

without consent.

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4 No. 15‐1055

the surveillance camera had captured images of her chang‐

ing her clothes in the old supervisors’ office from early 2007

through April 2009.

Gustafson filed suit against defendants Thomas, Adkins,

and the United States on August 24, 2011. Her complaint al‐

leged that Thomas and Adkins performed an unconstitu‐

tional search, and that their employer, the United States, tor‐

tiously invaded her privacy. On March 13, 2013, the district

court dismissed the United States as a defendant because the

Office of Workers’ Compensation Program accepted Gus‐

tafson’s Federal Employees’ Compensation Act claim.  

The district court denied Thomas and Adkins’s motion to

dismiss on August 27, 2013. Adkins then moved for sum‐

mary judgment asserting qualified immunity from Gus‐

tafson’s claims.2 The district court denied Adkins’s motion

on December 16, 2014. Adkins appeals.

II. Discussion

Adkins appeals the district court’s denial of not only his

motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qual‐

ified immunity, but also his earlier motion to dismiss. He

again raises arguments that were unsuccessful at the motion

to dismiss stage, namely that Gustafson’s Bivens claim is pre‐

cluded by the “comprehensive remedial scheme[s]” laid out

in the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) and the Federal

Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”).  

We review the district court’s denial of the motions. Alt‐

hough Adkins’s appeal arises out of the denial of his motion

                                                  2 Thomas neither moved for summary judgment nor moved to join

Adkins’s motion.

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No. 15‐1055 5

for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, we

also have jurisdiction to consider the question raised in Ad‐

kins’s motion to dismiss: whether Gustafson’s complaint

states a cause of action cognizable under Bivens v. Six Un‐

known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).3 See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 197–98 (7th Cir.

2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013) (holding

that the Court had jurisdiction to address the merits of

Bivens claims brought against defendant, even though appel‐

late jurisdiction was based on the district court’s denial of a

qualified immunity defense to those claims).

A. Gustafson’s Bivens Claim Is Not Precluded by Either

the CSRA or FECA

We first turn to Adkins’s argument that Gustafson’s

Fourth Amendment Bivens claim is precluded by the “com‐

prehensive remedial scheme[s]” laid out in the CSRA and

FECA.4 In Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Supreme Court held that

a Bivens remedy is not available where the design of a gov‐

ernment program indicates that Congress has provided what

it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for any constitu‐

tional violations that may occur. 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988). We

review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Adkins’s mo‐

tion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

                                                  3 Bivens was the first time the Supreme Court recognized that a vic‐

tim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal employees had a non‐

statutory claim for damages.

4 As noted by the district court, there are two situations where Bivens

remedies are not available. The first is where Congress has designed a

comprehensive remedial scheme. The second is when there are “special

factors” that suggest a court should hesitate before authorizing a new

kind of federal litigation. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).

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12(b)(6), accepting as true all the factual allegations in the

complaint. Vinson v. Vermilion Cnty., 776 F.3d 924, 925, 928

(7th Cir. 2015).

1. Gustafson’s Claim is Not Precluded by the CSRA

Adkins argues that the CSRA constitutes a “comprehen‐

sive system” to address prohibited personnel practices re‐

garding federal employees, including violations of federal

employees’ constitutional rights. He contends that the CSRA

covers Gustafson’s Fourth Amendment claim, and that a

Bivens remedy is therefore unavailable. However, the plain

language of the CSRA and the relevant case law reveal that

Adkins’s conduct is not a “personnel action” within the am‐

bit of the statute.

The CSRA establishes a “framework for evaluating ad‐

verse personnel actions against [federal employees].” United

States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443 (1988) (alteration in origi‐

nal) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

CSRA defines “personnel action” for which a claim under

the CSRA may be raised to include: (i) appointment; (ii)

promotion; (iii) disciplinary or corrective action; (iv) detail,

transfer, or reassignment; (v) reinstatement; (vi) restoration;

(vii) reemployment; (viii) performance evaluation; (ix) deci‐

sion concerning pay, benefits, or awards; (x) decision to or‐

der psychiatric testing or examination; (xi) implementation

or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agree‐

ment; and (xii) any other significant change in duties, re‐

sponsibility, or working conditions. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). The

CSRA may preempt federal claims that fall within its scope

even when its remedy is not perceived as equally effective.

Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Col‐

lins v. Bender, 195 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he

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No. 15‐1055 7

CSRA can preclude Bivens actions even where the CSRA

does not provide an alternative remedy.”).

Under the plain language of the statute, the term “per‐

sonnel action” does not encompass Adkins’s conduct. Ad‐

kins claims that installing the hidden camera was a “disci‐

plinary or corrective action” within the scope of the CSRA

because the intent was to catch officers sleeping on duty or

deter them from doing so. Yet, construing the facts in the

light most favorable to Gustafson, there is scant evidence

that the camera was put in place for this purpose. Moreover,

we question why Chief Thomas and Adkins failed to secure

proper authorization for their purported investigation of of‐

ficers sleeping in the old supervisors’ office. We also ques‐

tion the need for hidden surveillance equipment, if the goal

was to deter officers from sleeping in the office.

The case law suggests that Adkins’s conduct is closer to a

warrantless search outside the scope of the CSRA than a

“disciplinary or corrective action.” In Bush v. Lucas, the Su‐

preme Court identified actions by supervisors against feder‐

al employees that would not be defined as “personnel ac‐

tions” under the CSRA, such as wiretapping or warrantless

searches.5 462 U.S. 367, 385 n.28 (1983). Various circuit courts

                                                  5 Bush involved an action brought by an aerospace engineer against

the director of a federal space flight center to recover for an alleged First

Amendment violation. 462 U.S. at 369–70. The Supreme Court held that

because petitioner’s claims arose out of an employment relationship

governed by “comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions

giving meaningful remedies against the United States,” namely the

CSRA, the Court could not provide a new non‐statutory damages reme‐

dy. Id. at 368. However, the Court noted that “certain actions by supervi‐

sors against federal employees, such as wiretapping ... [or] warrantless

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have considered the distinction between CSRA‐precluded

“personnel actions” and Bivens claims that fall outside the

purview of the CSRA. For instance, in Orsay v. Dep’t of Jus‐

tice, the Ninth Circuit held that the CSRA precluded plain‐

tiffs’ complaints about the punishment imposed on an em‐

ployee because this conduct constituted “disciplinary or cor‐

rective action.” 289 F.3d 1125, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2002), abro‐

gated on FTCA grounds by Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

1441 (2013). By contrast, the Ninth Circuit determined that

aiming a loaded gun at employees did not fit any of the

CSRA’s definitions of “personnel action.” Id. at 1131; see also

Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding

that an illegal search by federal agency employees of plain‐

tiff’s private documents pertaining to a discrimination com‐

plaint she had filed was not a “personnel action” covered by

the CSRA); Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1424–25 (9th

Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff’s claims involving rape and

sexual assault did not fit within the category of “personnel

action”). We therefore conclude that Adkins’s installation of

a hidden camera in a female changing area is not a “person‐

nel action” covered by the CSRA.  

Even assuming, arguendo, that Adkins’s conduct was a

“personnel action” under the CSRA, we would still find that

it requires a judicial remedy. We have interpreted Bush as

allowing employees to seek a judicial, rather than an admin‐

istrative, remedy in actions involving “criminal and outra‐

geous conduct” by a supervisor. Moon v. Phillips, 854 F.2d

147, 150 (7th Cir. 1988). The installation of covert surveil‐

lance equipment in a changing area used by female officers

                                                                                                             

searches ... would not be defined as ‘personnel actions’ within the

[CSRA].” Id. at 385 n.28.

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No. 15‐1055 9

is “criminal and outrageous” such that we may adjudicate

Gustafson’s Bivens claim.6 At a minimum, Adkins’s conduct

extends beyond the bounds of “personnel action,” as defined

by the CSRA, and is thus not precluded by it.  

As a result, we find that the district court properly reject‐

ed Adkins’s argument that the CSRA precluded Gustafson’s

Bivens claim at the motion to dismiss stage.

2. Gustafson’s Claim is Not Precluded by the FECA

Adkins also contends that Gustafson’s Bivens action is

precluded by the FECA. According to Adkins, the FECA’s

comprehensive remedial scheme bars Gustafson’s Fourth

Amendment claim. We find that the district court properly

dismissed this argument in the first instance.

The FECA provides the exclusive remedy against “the

United States or an instrumentality thereof” to compensate a

federal employee for a work‐related “injury,” defined as “in‐

jury by accident [and] disease proximately caused by the

employment.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101(5), 8102(a), 8116(c). But the

statutory scheme recognizes that a federal employee may

sue parties other than the United States for work‐related in‐

juries and provides for an adjustment of benefits following

                                                  6 Adkins’s installation of the hidden camera, despite knowing that

doing so was illegal, presents a fact pattern that is more insidious than

the conduct in cases he claims are analogous. See Saul v. United States, 928

F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the CSRA’s definition of “per‐

sonnel action” applied to supervisors who seized and opened federal

employee’s personal mail at the office); Hill v. Dep’t of Air Force, 884 F.2d

1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the CSRA precluded a Bivens

remedy where a supervisor eavesdropped on a civilian military employ‐

ee’s personal telephone conversations, even though such conduct “is not

an allegation of a violation of a listed prohibited personnel practice”).

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recovery from such parties. 5 U.S.C. § 8132. Various circuit

courts have concluded that the FECA does not bar a federal

employee’s suit against individual co‐employees. See, e.g.,

Salazar v. Ballesteros, 17 F. App’x 129, 130–31 (4th Cir. 2001)

(holding that FECA does not prohibit suits against fellow

employees (citing Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559, 563 (5th

Cir. 1962))); Heathcoat v. Potts, 790 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir.

1986) (following Allman, and noting that FECA “is silent on

the matter of co‐employee suits”); Bates v. Harp, 573 F.2d 930,

935 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that “[e]ven though we are not

persuaded that co‐employee suits are advisable as a matter

of policy, in light of the overwhelming authority in support

of such suits, absent an explicit statutory bar, we feel con‐

strained to follow the holding of Allman ....”); Davis v. Har‐

rod, 407 F.2d 1280, 1282 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting that un‐

der the FECA appellant could sue her co‐employee, but not

her employer).  

Given the FECA’s silence on the matter of co‐employee

suits, and the fact that the illegal installation of covert sur‐

veillance equipment that resulted in Gustafson’s alleged in‐

juries is not easily characterized as an “injury by accident” or

a “disease proximately caused by employment,” we agree

with the district court that the FECA does not bar Gus‐

tafson’s Bivens claim against Adkins.

B. Adkins is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity  

Adkins also argues that the district court erred in deny‐

ing his motion for summary judgment based on the defense

of qualified immunity. Specifically, he claims that his actions

did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of

which a reasonable law enforcement officer in his position

would have known. We review de novo the district court’s

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denial of summary judgment ruling on qualified immunity,

construing the facts in the light most favorable to Gustafson.

Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2013).

The doctrine of qualified immunity “‘protects govern‐

ment officials from liability for civil damages when their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or con‐

stitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Id. at 632 (quoting Humphries v. Milwaukee Cnty.,

702 F.3d 1003, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012)). In considering whether

Adkins can invoke the defense of qualified immunity, we

must inquire: “(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a

constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”

Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d 906, 914 (7th

Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“To be clearly established at the time of the challenged con‐

duct, the right’s contours must be sufficiently clear that eve‐

ry reasonable official would have understood that what he is

doing violates that right, and existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond de‐

bate.” Rabin, 725 F.3d at 632 (quoting Humphries, 702 F.3d at

1006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have jurisdic‐

tion to consider appeals from denials of qualified immunity

where the denial is based on an issue of law.7 Id.

                                                  7 “[I]nstant appeal is not available ... when the district court deter‐

mines that factual issues genuinely in dispute preclude summary adjudi‐

cation.” Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011) (quoting Johnson v. Jones,

515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)); see also Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1009

(7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e do not have jurisdiction to review an order deny‐

ing qualified immunity on summary judgment if the issue on appeal is

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Adkins contests the district court’s finding as to the sec‐

ond Hernandez inquiry: that Gustafson’s constitutional right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Adkins argues that the district court erred in concluding that

there existed, at the time he installed the covert surveillance

equipment, a clearly established constitutional right of

which a reasonable official in his position would have

known. Adkins relies primarily on O’Connor v. Ortega, a case

that involved a state hospital employee’s claim that authori‐

ties improperly searched and seized personal items from his

office. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). The case centered on whether the

employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his of‐

fice, as well as on the appropriate Fourth Amendment

standard for a search conducted by a public employer in ar‐

eas in which an employee has a reasonable expectation of

privacy. Id. at 711–12. The Court was divided on the out‐

come. In Shields v. Burge, we interpreted the O’Connor

Court’s plurality opinion:

[A] work‐related “workplace” search is lawful

if the search is “reasonable [ ] under all the cir‐

cumstances.” The plurality explained that a

search is reasonable if it is “justified at its in‐

ception” and if it is “reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances” that justified it. A

workplace search to investigate work‐related

misconduct ordinarily is “justified at its incep‐

tion” if reasonable grounds exist to suspect

                                                                                                             

whether the record contains sufficient evidence to create a ‘genuine’ is‐

sue of material fact.”). For this reason, we do not consider Adkins’s claim

that the district court erred in finding a factual dispute precluding sum‐

mary judgment. We lack jurisdiction to address this issue.

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No. 15‐1055 13

that the search will turn up evidence of the

employee’s misconduct.  

874 F.2d 1201, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted)

(quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26). By contrast, Justice

Scalia wrote in a concurring opinion that he “would hold

that government searches to retrieve work‐related materials

or to investigate violations of workplace rules—searches of

the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the

private‐employer context—do not violate the Fourth

Amendment.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concur‐

ring).

Adkins argues that O’Connor did not produce a settled

analytical framework for when a search violates the Fourth

Amendment. For this reason, he contends that his conduct

did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. He

emphasizes that there was “no opinion of the Court” in

O’Connor because the judgment was delivered by a four‐

justice plurality. He also cites City of Ontario v. Quon, for the

proposition that the scope of an employee’s Fourth Amend‐

ment rights is unclear. 560 U.S. 746, 757 (2010) (“In the two

decades since O’Connor ... the threshold test for determining

the scope of an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights has

not been clarified further.”).  

We find that the relevant case law does not support Ad‐

kins’s contention. “[T]o determine if a right was clearly es‐

tablished at the time of the violation, we look first to control‐

ling precedent on the issue from the Supreme Court and to

precedent from this Circuit.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600

F.3d 770, 781 (7th Cir. 2010). Both the Supreme Court and

this Court have long held that a controlling holding may be

gleaned from a plurality opinion. Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of

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14 No. 15‐1055

Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 719 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Because the plu‐

rality’s decision offers the narrowest ground for the Su‐

preme Court’s holding ... we find the reasoning of that opin‐

ion to be controlling” (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.

188, 193 (1977))). The O’Connor plurality test is narrower

than Justice Scalia’s test and is, therefore, the Court’s “least‐

common‐denominator holding.” Shields, 874 F.2d at 1204.  

More to the point, we have already held that the

O’Connor plurality opinion controls because Justice Scalia

did not articulate a different standard than the plurality’s

reasonableness test. Id. at 1203–04. In Shields, we articulated

the governing legal standard: “The essential principle that

[O’Connor] teaches is that an employer’s workplace search

must be reasonable. Reasonableness depends upon the cir‐

cumstances presented in a given situation and upon balanc‐

ing the public, governmental, and private interests at stake

in that situation.” Id. at 1204. Accordingly, the Supreme

Court and this Circuit had clearly established the right of

employees to be free from unreasonable employer searches

by the time Adkins installed the hidden surveillance equip‐

ment in 2007.

Adkins also claims that Gustafson failed to satisfy her

burden of setting forth “existing precedent [that] placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Rabin,

725 F.3d at 632 (citation and internal quotation marks omit‐

ted). The Supreme Court has made clear that where broad

and general constitutional standards are concerned, the in‐

quiry normally requires identification of factually analogous

case law. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004).

However, a broad constitutional test, such as the O’Connor

plurality’s reasonableness test, is sufficient to clearly estab‐

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No. 15‐1055 15

lish the law “in an obvious case ... even without a body of

relevant case law.” Id. Because this is an obvious case that

presents a flagrant Fourth Amendment violation, identifica‐

tion of a body of relevant case law is unnecessary.  

In sum, we find that O’Connor clearly established the

contours of the Fourth Amendment violation Gustafson al‐

leges. Therefore, the district court properly denied Adkins’s

motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified im‐

munity.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.  

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