Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07205/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07205-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 1996 Decided August 30, 1996

No. 95-7041

WOMEN PRISONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL., APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., APPELLANTS

Consolidated with No. 95-7205

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv02052)

Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Charles L. Reischel, Deputy

Corporation Counsel, and Garland Pinkston, Jr., Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on

the briefs, argued the cause for appellants. Lutz A. Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel,

entered an appearance.

Peter J. Nickles, with whom Caroline M. Brown, Tracy A. Thomas, and Brenda V. Smith were on

the brief, argued the cause for appellees.

Before SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

Opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: In this case, appellants raise a number of challenges to a district

court judgment ordering them to improve conditions at various District of Columbia ("District" or

"D.C.") facilities in which women are imprisoned. The district court found that the existing

conditions violated the following statutory and constitutional provisions: (1) D.C. Code § 24-442,

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which creates a tort remedy for negligence by prison officials; (2) Title IX, Education Amendments

of 1972 ("Title IX"), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 etseq., which requiresrecipients offederal aid to provide men

and women with equal access to educational programs and activities; (3) the equal protection

guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the District

through the Fifth Amendment; and (4) the Constitution's Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel

and unusual punishment.

The court's order contains provisions relating to sexual harassment; obstetrical and

gynecological care; academic, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs; general living

conditions; and fire safety. We hold that (1) the district court abused its discretion in exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under D.C. Code § 24-442, (2) Title IX and equal

protection principles are not applicable here because the male and female prisoners whomthe district

court compared were not similarly situated, and (3) certain provisions of the district court's order

provide broader relief than is necessary to remedy the violations of the Eighth Amendment. In

addition, we remand the case to the district court to determine whether other portions of its order are

inconsistent with the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Facilities

Until recently, the District maintained no facility for women serving sentences of more than

a year; all such offenders were sent to federal penitentiaries scattered throughout the country. The

District has since assumed custody of such women, and it now houses them in three facilities: the

Lorton Minimum Security Annex ("Annex"), the Correctional Treatment Facility ("CTF"), and the

CentralDetention Facility ("Jail"). The first of these facilities is located in Lorton, Virginia; the latter

two in the District.

The Annex, which is situated on the grounds of the men's Minimum Security Facility

("Minimum"), consists largely of a few converted military barracks that serve as dormitories. The

women in the Annex are escorted to Minimum at specified times to attend academic courses and use

the gymnasium. As of January 1994, there were 936 men at Minimum and 167 women at the Annex.

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In this class action, the female inmates at the Annex raise challenges involving sexual misconduct,

their general living conditions, and discrimination in access to academic, vocational, work,

recreational, and religious programs on the basis of their sex. The medical care provided to female

inmates at the Annex is governed by a separate consent decree.

CTF was designed as an 800-bed diagnostic and treatment center for offenders with special

needs. In early 1992, however, the District converted part of CTF into a facility that, as of January

1994, housed 271 general population, medium- custody female inmates. In this class action, the

female inmates atCTF present challengesinvolving sexualmisconduct, their generalliving conditions,

the quality of their obstetrical and gynecological care, and discrimination in access to academic,

vocational, work, and recreational programs on the basis of their sex.

The Jail is a mediumto maximumsecurity correctionalfacility. As of January 1994, it housed

168 female inmates who were either awaiting trial or sentencing or who were sentenced

misdemeanants. In this action, the inmates at the Jail have limited their challenges to allegations of

sexual misconduct. Medical care at the Jail is regulated by a separate consent order.

B. Procedural History

The complaint in this class action was filed on October 1, 1993. The class ("appellees"),

which is comprised of the female inmates at the Annex, CTF, and the Jail, was certified without

objection. The defendants include the District, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections

("Department" or "DCDC"), the District of Columbia General Hospital Commission, and numerous

District officials, all in their official capacities (collectively, "appellants").

Following a three-week trial, the district court issued an opinion on December 13, 1994, in

which it found multiple violations offederal and local law. Women Prisoners of District of Columbia

Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) ("Women Prisoners

I"). On the same day, the court issued an order consisting of 138 paragraphs of instructions

("Order") that were intended to correct the violations. Id. at 679-90. The defendants subsequently

moved the district court to amend the Order or stay its enforcement. The court denied the motion

to amend in its entirety, and denied the motion to stay except as to four paragraphs of the Order.

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On March 2, 1995, the District filed a motion for a stay pending appeal to this court. We

ordered that the case be held in abeyance pending additional proceedings in the district court on

appellants' motion to stay. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v.

District of Columbia, No. 95-7041 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 1995).

On remand, the District filed a revised motion to stay and/or modify the judgment. After a

review of the parties' briefs and oral argument, the district court temporarily stayed thirty paragraphs

and ordered the parties to attempt to negotiate an agreement concerning those paragraphs. The

parties eventually reached agreement asto 26 ofthe paragraphs and jointlymoved the court to amend

the Order.

On August 14, 1995, the district court issued a second opinion in which it supplemented the

legal conclusions of the first opinion and denied appellants' motion for a stay of the Order. Women

Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 899 F. Supp. 659

(D.D.C. 1995) ("Women Prisoners II"). The court also issued a second order that modified 23

paragraphs of the Order and vacated six others. Id. at 677-79.

C. The District Court's Opinions

1. Factual findings

(a) Sexual Harassment at the Jail, CTF, and the Annex

About a half dozen female inmates testified at trial that they had been sexually assaulted by

prison guards. See, e.g., testimony ofJane Doe W, Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at Volume I, page 36 ("I36"),Jane Doe Q (Tr. at I-74),Jane Doe OOO (Tr. at I-100), Jane Doe Five (Tr. at IV-66),Jane Doe

RR (Tr. at VI-124) and Jane Doe Z (Tr. at VII-64). The district court concluded from this testimony

that there had been "many incidents of sexual misconduct between prison employees and female

prisoners in all three of the womens' [sic] facilities in this case." Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp.

at 639. The court found that the level of misconduct ranged from inappropriate remarks to invasions

of privacy to violent sexual assaults. Id. at 639-40.

According to the court, one of the "most disturbing" aspects of this misconduct was "the

inadequacy of the Defendants' response to these attacks." Id. at 639. The court found that while the

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DCDC had adopted policies and procedures designed to addresssexual misconduct, "[t]hese various

policies and procedures are oflittle value because the [Department] address[es] the problemofsexual

harassment offemale prisonerswithno specific stafftraining, inconsistentreporting practices, cursory

investigations and timid sanctions." Id. at 640 (internal citation omitted). 

(b) Obstetrical and Gynecological Care at CTF

The district court found that the District had provided inadequate women's medical care,

specifically concluding that the care provided them was deficient in the following areas:

gynecological examination, testing for sexually transmitted diseases, follow-up care, health education,

and prenatal care and education. Id. at 643-48. The court was also concerned about appellants' use

of physicalrestraints on pregnant inmates when they were transported to the hospital. Id. at 646-47.

(c) Physical Conditions of Confinement

The district court also found problems with the physical condition of the buildings at CTF.

The court observed that the facility had originally been constructed as a treatment center for inmates

with special needs. Id. at 648-49. Its buildings were connected by covered walkways that created

a closed-in setting designed only for controlled movement. Id. The court concluded that CTF had

several structural flaws, including insufficient heating, a malfunctioning ventilation system, and

defective toilets. Id. at 649-50.

The court found that the Annex inmates were housed in converted military barracksthat were

not initially designed for continued residency, that renovations and preventative maintenance have

been either lax or non-existent, and that the dormitories were inadequately ventilated. Id. at 651-52.

The court also found that the dormitories were overcrowded, and that this overcrowding had created

a shortage of sanitary facilities, increased the risk of spreading infectious diseases, produced high

noise levels, and created filthy living conditions. Id.

The court further found that fire hazards existed at both CTF and the Annex. The court

identified the following difficulties at CTF: the sprinkler system was inadequately maintained; water

leakage occurred in areas of the building where electrical equipment is exposed; and fire drills were

seldom, if ever, conducted. Id. at 653-54. At the Annex, the court found that the level of fire safety

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was "grossly inadequate": its fire alarm system was "antiquated," little was done in the way of fire

drills and staff training, the dormitories contained excessive quantities of combustible materials and

inadequate compartmentalization to contain fire, and there were not enough exits to accommodate

the number of people living at the facility. Id. at 654-55. 

(d) Programs

The district court found that female inmates at CTF and the Annex did not have access to

educational, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs equal to those made available by

the District to similarly situated men. Id. at 656-62, 677-78. In reaching this conclusion, the court

compared the programs offered to the women with those available to men in facilities that had

"similar custody levels, sentence structures and purposes of incarceration." Id. at 675; Women

Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at 670-71. Specifically, the court compared the programs available to

women at the Annex with those available to the men at Minimum; and it compared the programs

available to women at CTF with those available to inmates at three men's prisons: the Occoquan

Facility("Occoquan"), theCentralFacility("Central"), and theMediumFacility("Medium"). Women

Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 656, 659, 675.

Because appellants agree that Title IX applies to the educational and vocational training

programs offered inmates at District prisons, we will only summarize the court'sfindings with respect

to those programs that, in their view, lie outside the scope of Title IX.

Work Details. The district court described work details as "support duties needed for the

running of the jail." Id. at 657. At the Annex, women could participate in a variety of such details,

including work as receptionists, housekeepers, and librarians. Id. At CTF, women could choose

among thirteen work details, including clerical, housekeeping, and culinary assignments. Id. at 661.

The court found, however, that similarly situated male inmates had access to better and more

numerous programs than the "stereotypical" ones available to the women. Id. at 677 (men at

Minimum could participate in details involving carpentry, electrical, and mechanical work); id. at

661, 678 (men at Central could participate in such work as bricklaying, mechanics, and welding).

Prison Industries. "A prison industry is a business run out of a prison where goods are

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produced with inmate labor and then sold to government agencies." Id. at 657. At the Annex,

women could work in a garment shop and a print shop; at Minimum, men could engage in agriculture

and landscape work. Id. The court found that these programs were comparable and held that the

women at the Annex and men at Minimum had equal access to industrial programs. Id. at 677. At

CTF, women could participate in only one program that was "remotely" akin to a prison industry.

Id. at 661. Because the men enjoyed access to a greater number of industries, i.e., one at Occoquan,

two at Medium, and ten at Central, id., the court found that the women at CTF had been denied an

"equivalent opportunity in the area of industries" in violation of Title IX. Id. at 678.

Recreation. At the Annex, women had access to "a recreation trailer which contains a pool

table, a ping pong table, exercise bikes and a weight machine." Id. at 658. Furthermore, the women

were escorted twice a week to recreation areas at Minimum, where they could play volleyball,

basketball, and handball. Id. The court found that the men at Minimum had greater recreational

opportunities: they had access to a gymnasium and a ball field for approximately six hours a day,

Monday through Friday, as well as for three hours on several nights each week; they could use a

weight trailerseven days a week; and they could participate in a variety of organized intramural team

sports, as well as in a "Renaissance Drama Class." Id. at 658, 677.

At CTF, women could participate in scheduled recreation for an hour a day, five days a week,

and had access to a gymnasium for two hours, three days a week; they were able to play basketball

and volleyball in a small outside area; and they could take part in "low-impact aerobics" two days

a week for an hour each day. Id. at 661-62. The district court found that the men had far greater

opportunities for recreation. For example, the men at Central could play cards or engage in sports

or other outdoor activities between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m.; those at Medium could "have recreation all

day long"; and at Occoquan, they had between five and seven hours of recreation per day, depending

on the season. Id.

Religion. While women at the Annex had "Catholic and Protestant services on a weekly basis

and a Bible Study Program," id. at 659, the court concluded that they did not have accessto the same

religious activities as the men at Minimum. Id. at 677-78 (observing that religious services at the

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Annex were not as frequent as those at Minimum). The court made no findings with respect to

religious programs at CTF.

2. Conclusions of Law

In Women Prisoners I, the district court found the following to be violations of federal or

D.C. law: (1) sexual harassment at the Annex, CTF, and the Jail (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983), id. at 665-67; (2) substandard medical care at CTF (D.C. Code § 24-442), id. at 667-68;

(3) the shackling of pregnant women (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983), id. at 668-69; (4)

"unconstitutionally intolerable risk of injury by fire" at the Annex (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983), id. at 669-70; (5) inadequate fire safety measures at CTF (D.C. Code § 24-442), id. at 671-

72; (6) intolerable living conditions at the Annex and CTF (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §

1983), id. at 670-71, 672; (7) discrimination in access to programs (Title IX), id. at 672-78.

In Women Prisoners II, the district court rejected appellants' argument that it should have

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims based on D.C. Code § 24-442. 899 F.

Supp. at 665-68. The court also concluded that the discrepancy in the programs available to male

and female inmates violated not only Title IX, but also equal protection principles as applied to the

District through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 669-72.

D. The District Court's Order

The Order, which is reported at Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 679-90, as amended by

Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at 677-79, contains 132 paragraphs of detailed instructions and

is to remain "in effect with all provisions for five years." ¶ 137. (The Order originally contained 138

paragraphs, but six were vacated in Women Prisoners II. 899 F. Supp. at 677.) The Order and its

amendments are reprinted as Appendices A and B to this opinion.

The Order consists of six parts, of which the first five are relevant to this appeal:

I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT. WW 3-19. The provisions relating to sexual harassment are

multi-faceted. First, they require the DCDC to adopt a regulation that prohibits sexual harassment

and invasions of female inmates' privacy. WW 3-4, 7. This regulation must provide that female

inmates who allege sexualmisconduct may not be subject to any disciplinary action "regardless ofthe

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merits or the disposition of the underlying complaint." ¶ 7(c). Second, the Order authorizes the

district court's SpecialOfficer to investigate allegations ofsexualmisconduct and to participate in the

establishment of penalties for prohibited conduct. WW 5, 6, 13 (in their entirety) and WW 8, 14, 15

(in part). Third, it requires the Department to comply with its own Inmate Grievance Procedure,

which establishes the mechanisms by which inmates may report misconduct by prison guards. ¶ 9.

In addition, the Order directs appellantsto employ "trainers" to instruct inmates and jailers about the

Department's policies and regulations regarding sexual harassment and to heighten their awareness

of the problem. WW 17-18, as amended.

II. OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL CARE. WW 20-62. Among many other things, these

paragraphs require appellants to hire a half-time health educator with obstetrical and gynecological

training to provide clinical and health services to the CTF population, ¶ 20, as amended; modify the

intake screening of inmates and make special inquiry about their use of contraceptives and history of

sexually transmitted diseases, ¶ 24; adopt written "protocols" with regard to gynecological problems

and the use of restraints on pregnant and postpartum women, WW 28, 35, as amended; and develop

a written protocol governing prenatal care, ¶ 36. Other provisions concern such matters as the

recording of pregnancy-related statistics, ¶ 23; Pap smears, WW 30, 32; medical staff coverage,

WW 44-45; emergency care, ¶ 46; and the scheduling of appointments and the transportation of

inmates to the hospital, WW 49-50, as amended, ¶ 51.

III. PROGRAM EVALUATION. WW 63-101. Part III requires appellants to improve the quality

of the academic, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs available to female inmates.

Its purpose isto ensure that the women have accessto the same opportunities and programs that are

available to similarly situated men at other prisons.

With regard to academic programs, appellants are ordered to provide the women with greater

access to adult education and college-level programs. WW 68-69, 70-71, as amended, ¶ 72. They

must also make a variety of vocational, pre-vocational, and work programs available to them. WW

76-93, as amended. The Order requires appellants to provide the women at CTF with 25 hours of

recreation per week, ¶ 96, as amended, and those at the Annex with access to a recreation trailer "8

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hours a day, 7 days a week." ¶ 98. Appellants must also "improve the Annex grounds by adding a

basketball court, volleyball pit, and outdoor tables." ¶ 99. Finally, appellants must provide chaplaincy

service to female inmates five days a week, including "evening hours during the week to

accommodate those women working on details, industry, or in the community." ¶ 101.

IV. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH. WW 102-124. Appellants are required to improve

environmental health at CTF and the Annex in a variety of ways. At the outset, they are ordered to

limit the number of women imprisoned at the Annex to 135. ¶ 102, as amended. They are also

directed to repair the Annex's dormitory roofs, ¶ 103; provide each inmate with "at least one vertical

locker and one footlocker," ¶ 105; "replace all torn mattresses and pillows," ¶ 106; "use cart liners

or disposable or washable laundry bags to transport laundry," ¶ 107; and provide each double-bunk

with "a minimum of 20 footcandles of prisoner-controlled light." ¶ 108. With respect to CTF,

appellants are required to improve its heating and ventilation, WW 116-17, and to "monitor the food

temperature and delivery times of all foods, including special diet meals." ¶ 121.

V. FIRE SAFETY. WW 125-136. At the Annex, appellants are required to install and maintain

fire alarm, fire detection, and sprinkler systems, WW 125-127; to ensure that bed linen and other

dormitory materials are fire retardant, ¶ 128; and to "conduct fire drills 12 times per year, 4 times

per shift, and [to] keep written documentation of all such drills." ¶ 129. At CTF, appellants must,

among other things, "maintain the storage in the culinary storage room in a manner that does not

prevent the sprinkler headsfromfunctioning adequately," ¶ 134, and test the sprinklersystemand fire

pump and conduct fire drills on a periodic basis. WW 135, 136.

E. Appellants' Challenges

Appellants characterize the relief ordered by the district court as far broader than necessary

to correct the constitutional and statutory violations that were found to exist, and they ask that we

vacate specific provisions in each of the first five parts of the Order, as follows:

I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT. WW 3-19. Although appellants concede that they have failed to

protect women from sexual abuse, they challenge the paragraphs that (1) authorize the Special

Officer'sstaff to monitor sexual harassment complaints(WW5, 6, 13 (in their entirety) and 8, 12, 14,

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15 (in part)); (2) require the DCDC to comply with its Inmate Grievance Procedure (¶ 9); and (3)

prohibit appellants from taking any retaliatory action against inmates who file complaints, even if it

is determined that the inmate's complaint was filed in bad faith (¶ 7(c)).

II. OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICALCARE. WW 20-62. Paragraphs 20-34 and 36-62, which

require appellantsto improve the qualityofthe obstetrical and gynecological care provided to inmates

at CTF, are based on D.C. Code § 24-442. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 667-68.

Appellants argue that these provisions must be set aside because the district court abused its

discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these local law claims. They do not challenge

paragraph 35 governing the use of physical restraints on pregnant women, which the court found to

violate the Eighth Amendment.

III. PROGRAMEVALUATION. WW 63-101. These paragraphs are based on alternative grounds:

(1) Title IX, which requiresrecipients of federal aid to provide men and women with equal access to

educational programs and activities, see Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 676-78; and (2)

constitutional equal protection principles, which require that men and women who are similarly

situated be treated alike, see Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at 669-72. Appellants ask that we

vacate paragraphs 64-67 and 83-99 "to the extent that they affect work details, prison industries,

work training, and recreation," Brief for Appellants at 37, because, they contend, these activities are

unrelated to academic and vocational education. They also object, as "having nothing to do with Title

IX," id., provisions governing law library hours, ¶ 64; transportation of prisoners to job interviews,

¶ 93; "large group events," ¶ 97; and religious programs, WW 100-101. In addition, appellants

argue that equal protection principles have no application to this case because the district court

compared male and female inmates who were not similarly situated. Finally, they raise a general

objection to the remedies as being far too expansive and burdensome, citing, as examples, paragraphs

71 (requiring the provision of college educations), 98 and 99 (mandating hours for the recreational

trailer and the construction of basketball and volleyballfacilities and picnic tables at the Annex), and

64 (requiring the coordination ofthe timing of activities "to maximize women prisoners' participation

in as many areas as possible").

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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH. WW 102-124. Appellants challenge paragraph 102, as

amended, which imposes a population cap at the Annex. They argue that it is not warranted and

encroaches on their ability to incarcerate convicts. They also make vague challenges to the other

paragraphs in this section, contending that they are overbroad and unduly intrusive.

V. FIRE SAFETY. WW 125-136. These paragraphs address the court's findings of violations

of the Eighth Amendment at the Annex, and of D.C. Code § 24-442 at CTF. See Women Prisoners

I, 877 F. Supp. at 669-70, 671-72. Appellants challenge those relating to CTF (WW 133-136),

contending that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

claims arising under that section.

F. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995

On April 25, 1996, following oral argument in this appeal, the Prison Litigation Reform Act

of 1995 ("PLRA" or "Act") became effective. The reforms were enacted as Title VIII, sections 801

and 802 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Stat. (Apr. 26, 1996). The Act amends 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626, which is now entitled "Appropriate remedies with respect to prison conditions." It governs

all civil litigation, whether in a federal or state court, with respect to conditions in a federal, state, or

local prison that are alleged to violate a federalright. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), (d), and (g)(2) and

(5). It applies to pending cases such as this one. Id. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(iii) & (b)(2).

In supplemental briefs submitted by the parties, appellants argue that the Act has invalidated

the great majority of the paragraphs in the Order. Specifically, they maintain that the PLRA (1)

denies federal courts the authority to order prospective relief to correct violations of local law; (2)

precludes the assigning of non-judicial functions to a court-appointed special officer; (3) prohibits

the award of relief that is not "narrowly drawn"; and (4) strips federal courts of the power to impose

population caps on prisons except under circumstances that are not satisfied here.

In response, appellees question appellants' construction of the PLRA and raise a number of

constitutional and other challenges to the Act. They also note that they had originally alleged that

the inadequate medical care and fire safety provided the female inmates at CTF violated both D.C.

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Code § 24-442 and the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, if we should find that the Act divested the

district court ofitssupplemental jurisdiction over the section 24-442 claims, they ask that we remand

those issues so that the court may consider the constitutional questions previously reserved.

We will not address appellees' objections to the Act for two reasons: First, we are able to

dispose of the majority of appellants' challenges on the basis of pre-PLRA law. Second, because the

new statute may be dispositive of the remaining challenges and may provide the basis for new ones,

we will remand the provisions we do not vacate so that the district court may review them in light

of the PLRA. Appellees will be free, at that time, to bring their various challenges to the Act and to

renew their Eighth Amendment claims with respect to medical care and fire safety at CTF.

II. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, we think it appropriate to emphasize that federal courts must move

with caution when called upon to dealwith even serious violations ofthe law by local prison officials.

As the Supreme Court observed in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990), "one of the most

important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the

integrity and function of local government institutions." This respect for local authorities is at its

zenith in the context of prison reform litigation:

"[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the

point, theyare not readilysusceptible ofresolution by decree. Most require expertise,

comprehensive planning, and the commitment ofresources, allofwhich are peculiarly

within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all

of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to dealwith the increasingly urgent problems

of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more

than a healthy sense of realism."

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 n.16 (1981) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,

404-05 (1974)). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) ("the operation of our

correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our

Government, not the Judicial"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973) ("It is difficult

to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound

up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.").

Onlyweeks ago theSupremeCourt reversed a district court order that had mandated detailed,

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system-wide changes in Arizona's prison law libraries. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).

Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia observed that, in Preiser, the Court had held that

"considerations of comity ... require giving the States the first opportunity to correct errors made in

the internal administration of their prisons," and that the district court in Lewis had "totally failed to

heed the admonition of Preiser." 116 S. Ct. at 2186 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The district court concluded that the DCDC had failed to provide adequate medical care and

fire safety at CTF in violation of D.C. law, which provides that the Department

shall have charge of the management and regulation of [D.C. prisons], and be

responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline of all

persons committed to such institutions.

D.C. Code § 24-442. Of the Order's 132 paragraphs, roughly one-third are intended to remedy

violations of this section. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 667-68; 671-72; Order at WW

20-34; 36-62; 131-32 (to the extent that they relate to CTF); 133-36. Appellants argue that the

district court's exercise of jurisdiction over these D.C. Code claims violated the supplemental

jurisdiction provisions of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).

When a federal court has an independent basis for exercising federal jurisdiction, it may, in

certain circumstances, also exercise pendent, or supplemental, jurisdiction over related claims under

state law. In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the Supreme Court

crafted a two-part test to determine when the assertion of jurisdiction over a state law claim is

appropriate. First, the district court must determine whether the state and the federal claims "derive

from a common nucleus of operative fact"; if they do, the court has the power, under Article III of

the Constitution, to hear the state claim. Id. at 725. Second, even if it concludes that it has that

power, the district court must then decide whether to exercise its discretion to assert jurisdiction over

the state issue. Id. at 726. The Supreme Court cautioned that

pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff'sright. Its justification

lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if

these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state

claims .... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of

comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a

surer-footed reading of applicable law.

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Id. A district court's decision to resolve state law claims is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

In 1990, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which provides in relevant

part:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) ..., in any civil action of

which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution ....

* * *

(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

a claim under subsection (a) if

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,

or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

* * *

(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia

....

28 U.S.C. § 1367. As we observed in Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union International and Local

689, 38 F.3d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the extent to which section 1367(c) has modified the

district's court's discretion to hear claims under local law is a matter of some dispute. In Diven, we

rejected the argument that section 1367 had restricted the district court's discretion to decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction,see id.; and we have since stated that section 1367(c) "essentially

codifies [Gibbs]," Edmondson & Gallagher, 48 F.3d at 1266.

Here, the district court clearly had the power to consider appellees' local claims under section

24-442. Their claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and Title IX were substantial enough

to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, see Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725; and the local law

claims, relating to the adequacy of the medical care and fire safety at CTF, arose from a "common

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nucleus of operative facts" asthe federal claims; namely, the District's decision to re-assume custody

of itsfemale prisoners and its alleged failure to provide for their needs. The question before us, then,

is whether the court abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the local claims.

The supplementaljurisdictionstatute providesthat district courts may decline jurisdiction over

claims that "raise[ ] a novel or complex issue of State law." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Appellants

argued below, and renew their argument on appeal, that the novelty of appellees'request for equitable

relief based on section 24-442 precluded the exercise ofsupplemental jurisdiction. Specifically, they

contend that the section merely extends the common law of tortsto local prisons. See, e.g., District

of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629, 639 (D.C. 1987). See also Toy v. District of Columbia, 549

A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1988); Hughes v. District of Columbia, 425 A.2d 1299, 1302 (D.C. 1981); Gaither

v. District of Columbia, 333 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C. 1975). Appellants point out that the statute has been

relied upon by inmates suing for monetary damages and that D.C. courts have applied ordinary tort

principles to those cases. See, e.g., Mitchell, 533 A.2d at 633; Matthews v. District of Columbia,

387 A.2d 731, 732 (D.C. 1978). Furthermore, appellants observe that the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals has relied upon cases in other jurisdictions that have held that similar laws simply permit

a common law tort action for inmate claims against prison officials. See Gaither, 333 A.2d at 60

(citing Justice v. Rose, 144 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ohio App. 1957) (Ohio statute is "simply declaratory

of the common law")). Finally, appellants note that the statute has never been interpreted to allow

inmates to seek injunctive relief such as that granted here.

The district court rejected appellants' arguments and concluded that the award of injunctive

relief under section 24-442 did not raise a novel issue of local law. It stated that "[t]he exercise of

injunctive relief ... is an unexceptionable feature of the common law." Women Prisoners II, 899 F.

Supp. at 668. We respectfully disagree with the district court's analysis. While it is true, of course,

that the common law recognized the propriety of injunctive relief in certain instances, it was never

regarded asrelief of first resort; indeed, in tort actions, the standard formulation of the common law

on this point is that equitable relief, such as an injunction, will be granted only when plaintiff's legal

remedies are inadequate. See John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 218, at

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369 (5th ed. 1941); William Q. de Funiak, Handbook of Modern Equity § 18, at 32 (2d ed. 1956).

Furthermore, courts have long stated that a varietyoffactors, including the public interest, mayweigh

against the award of an injunction. See Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334

(1933); Blair v. Freeman, 370 F.2d 229, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

We think it significant that we can find no case in which a D.C. court has awarded injunctive

relief under section 24-442; nor are we aware of any case in which injunctive relief was sought under

thissection ofthe D.C. Code, even though the inmates of D.C. prisons are no strangersto the judicial

system and have frequently sought injunctive relief in both the D.C. and federal courts. In the last

major prisoners' class action to come before usinvolving allegations of, inter alia, inadequatemedical

care and fire safety, the claims were pled solely as Eighth Amendment violations. See Inmates of

Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Occoquan"). No one seized upon the

"unexceptionable" idea of seeking alternative injunctive relief under section 24-442.

The Supreme Court has counseled that "the proper function of[a] federal court isto ascertain

what the state law is, not what it ought to be," Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.

487, 497 (1941); and we have observed that "a federal court should be reluctant to retain pendent

jurisdiction over a question for which state jurisprudence gives inadequate guidance." Financial

General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, while we will

generally defer to a district court's decision to assert supplemental jurisdiction, that deference is not

boundless. In Metzger and Doe v. Board on Professional Responsibility of the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals, 717 F.2d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1983), we held that the district court had abused its

discretion in deciding pendent claims when the local law was unsettled. We noted that " "[a]lthough

the District Court devoted considerable time, effort and care to these questions, in a completely

unsettled area of local law a federal District Court opinion is no substitute for an authoritative

decision by the courts of the District of Columbia.' " Doe, 717 F.2d at 1428-29 (quoting Metzger,

680 F.2d at 778). See also Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (because, among

other factors, the case involved an unsettled issue oflocal law, "[a]ppellees' remedy, if any, liesin the

courts of the District of Columbia"); Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 541 (10th

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Cir. 1995) (under section 1367(c), state "courts are the appropriate forum to decide [a] novel and

complex issue ofstate law"); Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 760 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994) (section 1367(c)

"counsels against the exercise ofjurisdiction when "the claimraises a novel or complex issue of State

law' ").

Our dissenting colleague contends that "[w]hatever other objections might be raised to the

district court's enforcement of local law in this case, ... it cannot be said that the court's action was

novel. See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D.D.C. 1975) (for constitutional

violation, imposing mandatory injunction that in part required local agencies to remedy violations of

local fire, building, housing, health, and food regulations at D.C. Jail) ..." Dissent at 5. In other

words, the dissent contendsthat inCampbell the district court had awarded equitable reliefto remedy

a local law violation, and therefore the district court's action in this case has a precedent. With all

respect, we think this distorts the holding in Campbell. There, the district court found that prison

conditions violated the Eighth Amendment; to remedy these constitutional violations, the district

court ordered the District to comply with local law provisions. See Campbell, 416 F. Supp. at 105.

Here, the district court suggested that the medical care at CTF might rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation, see Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at 667; nevertheless, it expressly

declined to decide the issue on constitutional grounds. See Women PrisonersI, 877 F. Supp. at 667

n.42.

Furthermore, the dissent mischaracterizes our holding when it statesthat "[t]he judges of the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia would ... be ... surprised ... to hear it suggested that they

lacked the authority to impose appropriate injunctive reliefin the face of ongoing institutionalfailure

to meet a legal duty of care." Dissent at 5 n.5. Plainly, local courts are free to interpret section 24-

442 as authorizing injunctive relief. We simply repeat our earlier point: they never have. The dissent

is quite confident that the local courts would so interpret this statute; we confess to being impressed

by the fact that they have never done so.

The intrusiveness of the reliefsought also weighs against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when "in

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exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction"). The

section of the Order relating to medical care at CTF is a case study in the judicial micromanagement

of a local prison system. The Order requires appellants, inter alia, to hire a nurse midwife to provide

additional services to the female inmates (¶ 20, as amended), establish a pre-natal clinic (¶ 22),

maintain statistics on the number of pregnancies and "birth outcomes" (¶ 23), develop and implement

detailed protocols concerning the care for a variety of diseases (¶ 28), develop protocols providing

guidelines for high-risk pregnancies involving women with histories of alcohol and drug abuse and

venereal diseases(¶ 36), arrange for obstetrical examinations of pregnant women in accordance with

a detailed schedule (¶ 37), implement "an obstetrical and gynecologicalhealth education programthat

satisfies a recognized national medicalstandard" (¶ 43, as amended), and ensure that female inmates

are transported to the hospital, even for routine procedures, "no more than 2 hours before the

scheduled time of their appointment" (¶ 50, as amended).

These may all be highly desirable measures, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned

against such detailed marching orders. See, e.g., Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2186. In Grano, asin this case,

the district court applied a D.C. statute in a novel way to assume control over local political

processes. We dissolved the injunction, explaining:

In general, principles of comity and the desirability of a surer-footed reading of

applicable law support the determination ofstate claimsin state court. Determination

by the state court is especially important where the case involves novel and unsettled

issues of state law. Here, the law in question is new, its meaning ambiguous and

sharply disputed. Moreover, the district court should notretain jurisdiction because

this case directly implicates the processes by which a locality governs itself.

Appellees' remedy, if any, lies in the courts of the District of Columbia.

733 F.2d at 169 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

By its plain terms, section 24-442 simply requires the District's jailers to exercise reasonable

care in discharging their duties. The district court and dissent would read this bland codification of

tort principles to empower federal courts to usurp control over fire safety and medical care at local

prisons. There can, of course, be no limiting principle here. Issues relating to security, sanitation,

food preparation, ventilation, etc., will all come within the court's authority. We wonder whether the

lawmakers who enacted section 24-442 intended to transfer control over the District's prisons to the

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courts (or, more likely, a small cadre of court-appointed special officers). If this be the import of

section 24-442, let the District's courts proclaim it.

Because it is not settled that section 24-442 authorizes injunctive relief, and because federal

courts are obliged to exercise restraint in the extraordinary circumstances posed by prison litigation

ofthis nature, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over these

localclaimsin violation ofthe supplementaljurisdictionstatute and thewell-established principlesthat

it has codified. We therefore vacate WW 20-34, 36-62; 131-32 (to the extent that they relate to

CTF); and 133-36.

B. The Programs

The district court found that female inmates at CTF and the Annex had not received the same

access to academic, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs that were available to

similarly situated men at other prisons. In its original opinion, the court held that this violated Title

IX. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 672-78. In Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at 669-72,

the court concluded that the unequal accessto programs also violated the equal protection principles

of the Constitution. Part III of the Order requires appellants to improve the quantity and quality of

these programs at CTF and the Annex, see WW 63-101; it also requires appellants to increase the

women's access to a law library (¶ 64) and "group events" (¶ 97) and to transport them to job

interviews (¶ 93).

Appellants do not challenge the provisions that relate to educational (academic and

vocational) programs. They ask us, however, to vacate those paragraphs of the Order (WW 83-101,

in their entirety, and WW 64-67, in part) that require them to upgrade the work, recreational, and

religious programs available to female inmates, and that relate to law library hours, group events, and

transportation to job interviews. They argue, first, that those prison activities are not "educational"

and, as a consequence, are not subject to Title IX; second, they assert that the district court's equal

protection analysis is fundamentally flawed because the women at the Annex and CTF are not

similarly situated to the men at the other facilities. We address the latter argument first because the

district court's Title IX and equal protection analyses are both predicated on its conclusion that the

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respective prison populations were similarly situated. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 675-

76; Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at 670-71.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires States to treat similarly

situated persons alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

The District of Columbia issubject to that requirement by virtue of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee

of due process of law. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Family Division Trial

Lawyers of the Superior Court-D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 697 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The

Constitution, however, " "does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated

in law as though they were the same.' " Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting Tigner v.

Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)); accord Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).

Thus, the "[d]issimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection."

Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8thCir. 1994) ("KlingerI"). The threshold

inquiry in evaluating an equal protection claim is, therefore, "to determine whether a person is

similarly situated to those persons who allegedly received favorable treatment." United States v.

Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1995). We believe the same principle should apply in Title IX

cases. SeeKlinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Services, 887 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (D. Neb.

1995) ("Klinger II").

In reviewing the district court's conclusions, we begin, as indicated above, by addressing its

assumption that the prisoners at the severalfacilities were similarly situated "by virtue of their similar

custody levels,sentence structures and purposes ofincarceration." Women PrisonersI, 877 F. Supp.

at 675. Appellants argue that these are only three of a number of factors that must be considered

when determining whether two groups of inmates are sufficiently similarly situated to render

meaningful a comparison of the programs available to each.

Two recent cases are instructive in this regard. In Kling- er I, the Eighth Circuit observed

that prison officials

must balance many considerations, ranging from the characteristics of the inmates at

that prison to the size of the institution, to determine the optimalmix of programs and

services. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85. Program priorities thus differ from prison

to prison, depending on innumerable variables that officials must take into account.

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31 F.3d at 732. A later case, Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1254-62 (S.D. Iowa 1995), aff'd,

69 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 1995), pet. for cert. filed (Apr. 8, 1996) (No. 95-8906), illustratesthe variables

that must be taken into consideration. In concluding that the female inmates were not similarly

situated to the male inmates with whom they sought to be compared, the district court in Pargo

placed particular stress on five factors: population size of the prison, security level, types of crimes,

length of sentence, and special characteristics. 894 F. Supp. at 1259-61. See also testimony of

Regina Gilmore, Acting Female ProgramCoordinator at DCDC, at Tr. IX-5-6, and ofDr. T.A. Ryan,

expert witness, at Tr. XI-38-39 (programming needs of inmates are gauged by their classification,

which takesthe following factorsinto account: custodylevel; medical, educational, and employment

histories; substance abuse information; impending factors relating to pre-release; results of

psychological testing; social services reports; and security risks).

Here, the district court acknowledged that 82 percent of women incarcerated in the facilities

operated by the District were single-parent primary caretakers, and that only seven percent were

serving sentences for violent crimes. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 656. It failed, however,

to make any findings regarding the types of crimes for which male inmates had been convicted, or

other "special characteristics" of male inmates. Compare with Pargo, 894 F. Supp. at 1254-57

(addressing the "types of crimes" and "special characteristics" of male inmates before drawing

comparison to the female inmates). Nor did it take into account the striking disparities between the

sizes of the prison populations that were being compared.

The district court found that the female inmates at the Annex were similarly situated to the

men at Minimum. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 656; Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at

670. Yet Minimum had a population of 936 prisoners in contrast to the 167 at the Annex. Women

PrisonersI, 877 F. Supp. at 656. It is hardly surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination, that the

smaller correctionalfacility offered fewer programsthan the larger one. We doubt, for example, that

tuition-paying parents who entrust their daughters to the all-women Smith College in Northampton,

Massachusetts, would raise an eyebrow (let alone accuse the college of sex discrimination) on

learning that Smith offers its 2,800 students approximately 1,000 courses while Harvard University

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provides its 6,600 undergraduates with three times as many.

Even ifthe women at the Annex had accessto a third or halfthe number of work and religious

programs asthe men at Minimum, because ofthe six-to-one difference intheir respective populations,

on a per inmate basis, the women had accessto two or three timesthe number of programs as did the

men. Cf. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1233 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (while

female inmates have accessto fewer totalnumber of programs, "[t]he women's prison has almost 21/2

times as many [programs] per prisoner as the most generous male prison"). We do not suggest that

these mechanical ratios are a test of comparability; merely that, standing alone, the difference in the

number of programs provided by prisons having vastly different numbers of inmates cannot be taken

as evidence that those in small institutions that offer fewer programs have been denied equal

protection. More than that is required.

As regards the women at CTF, the district court found that they were similarly situated to

male inmates at the Occoquan, Central, and Medium facilities. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at

659; Women PrisonersII, 899 F. Supp. at 671. While CTF is an 800-bed facility, and thus arguably

comparable in size to Central (1,373 inmates), Medium (1,016 inmates), and Occoquan (1,767

inmates), the female inmates at CTF number only 271. The district court specifically rejected a

comparison of CTF men with its women because the "men reside at CTF for either short-term

diagnostic attention or a voluntary 18-month intensive substance abuse program." Women Prisoners

I, 877 F. Supp. at 675. We note, however, that somewhere between 35 percent and 50 percent of

the women at CTF are serving sentences oflessthan two years, and the vast majority ofthe remaining

women are serving sentences of between two and four years. Id. at 675 n.50. In other words, the

women at CTF, like the men, are not being incarcerated there for an extended period of time. The

district court failed to make any findings regarding the programs available to male inmates at CTF,

and there is thus no evidence that they enjoy access to more fulfilling opportunities than the women.

The female inmates at CTF are, therefore, foreclosed from making an equal protection challenge.

The dissent contendsthat our analysis errs because we have ignored "how the prisoners came

to be segregated," with women typically assigned to smaller prisonsthan the men. Dissent at 12. As

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an initial matter, we note that the segregation of inmates by sex is unquestionably constitutional. See

Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The District's decision to imprison women in

smaller facilities than the typical male prison is the obviousresult of an undisputed fact: there are far

fewer female inmates. As of January 1994, the total number of female inmates incarcerated in all of

the District's jails was 606; this is considerably less than the total population at the smallest male

facility (Minimum, pop. 936) discussed in this case. It would be difficult for one facility to house all

these female inmates because they range from minimum to maximum custody, from those awaiting

immediate release to those serving long sentences.

Furthermore, our decision here is altogether consistent with the Supreme Court's most recent

articulation of equal protection principles in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)

("VMI"). In VMI, the Supreme Court compared the programs available at the all-female Mary

BaldwinCollege, where the Virginia Women'sInstitute for Leadership ("VMIL") islocated, with the

programs available at the all-male Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"). The enrollment at Mary

Baldwin College is 1,327 students, of whom 650 actually live on the campus, United States v.

Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 500, 501 (W.D. Va. 1994); the enrollment at VMI

is 1,124, United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1419 (W.D. Va. 1991).

Despite their comparable sizes, the two colleges offered vastly different educational and athletic

programming. The Court noted:

MaryBaldwin does not offer a VMILstudent the range of curricular choices available

to a VMI cadet. VMI awards baccalaureate degrees in liberal arts, biology,

chemistry, civil engineering, electrical and computer engineering, and mechanical

engineering. VMIL students attend a school "that does not have a math and science

focus"; they cannot take at Mary Baldwin any courses in engineering or the advanced

math and physics courses VMI offers.

VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2284 (citations omitted).

In addition, the Court noted the extreme discrepancy in the financial resources available to

Mary Baldwin and VMI. Id. at 2285. Here, while appellees have alleged that the District provides

inferior programs, they have not alleged that the District allocatesfewer resources per female inmate,

nor was any evidence apparently introduced at trial to that effect. Appellees' claim, therefore, would

appear to be that appellants have mismanaged the resources allocated to female inmates by failing to

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provide them with the identical programs offered to the men. In effect, appellees are inviting this

court to find that the District's decision to provide male (but not female) inmates with access to any

given program violates equal protection principles.

We decline this invitation. While certain programs (such as a work detail in auto mechanics)

may be available only to male inmates, other programs (such as a life skills class) may be available

only to female inmates. Under the program-by- program method of comparison embraced by the

dissent, any divergence from an identity of programs gives rise to equal protection liability. Thus,

if male inmates have access to a work detail that is unavailable to women, that violates equal

protection. If men can spend an extra hour a day in a gymnasium, that violates equal protection.

Conversely, if women had access to a parenting class unavailable to men, that violates equal

protection. Such an approach completely eviscerates the deference that federal courts are obliged

to give prison administrators. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85, 89. As the Eighth Circuit has

observed,

as between any two prisons, there will always be stark differences in programming.

Assuming that all prisons start with adequate yet limited fundingas we must here,

because plaintiffs do not claim that [the correctional facility] is subject to

discriminatoryfundingofficials will calibrate programming needs differentlyin each

prison, emphasizing in one prison programs that they de-emphasize in others. Thus,

female inmates always can point out ways in which male prisons are "better" than

theirs, just as male inmates can point out other ways in which female prisons are

"better" than theirs.

Klinger, 31 F.3d at 732. 

Finally, we note that an inmate has no constitutional right to work and educational

opportunities. Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1988). While an inmate

has a limited right to exercise, this right is violated only if "movement is denied and muscles allowed

to atrophy, [or] the health of the individual is threatened." French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255

(7th Cir. 1985). In and of itself, idleness does not violate the Eighth Amendment protection against

cruel and unusual punishment; indeed, idleness does not even constitute "punishment." See Rhodes,

452 U.S. at 348. Thus, the District could, entirely consistent with the Constitution, deprive male and

female inmates of virtually all of the programs they now enjoy. If federal courts could find equal

protection liability whenever male and female inmates have access to different sets of programs,

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budget-strapped prison administrators may well respond by reducing, to a constitutional minimum,

the number of programs offered to all inmates. As the Klinger court observed,

prison officials would be far less willing to experiment and innovate with programs

at an individual institution knowing that a federal court could impose liability on the

basis of a program [by program] comparison. Indeed, inmates would suffer because

officials would likely provide each institution with the bare constitutional minimum

of programs and services to avoid the threat of equal protection liability.

Klinger, 31 F.3d at 733.

Given these significant differences in the situations of the women at the Annex and CTF and

those of the men at the facilities with which the court compared them, and given the fact that the

court's Title IX and equal protection analyses both depend on findings that they were similarly

situated, we need not examine the programs themselves in order to vacate the program-related

provisionsthat appellants have challenged. But even though we do not address the scope of Title IX

in the prison context, we admit to grave problems with the proposition that work details, prison

industries, recreation, and religious services and counseling have anything in common with the

equality of educational opportunities with which Title IX is concerned. We therefore vacate WW

83-101 in their entirety and WW 64-67 to the extent that they do not relate to educational programs.

C. Eighth Amendment

The district court concluded that the following conditions violated the Eighth Amendment

guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment: (1) the pattern of sexual harassment at the Annex,

CTF, and the Jail, Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 664-66; (2) the use of physical restraints on

women in their third trimester of pregnancy, id. at 668; (3) the general living conditions at both CTF

and the Annex, id. at 670-71; 672; and (4) the inadequacy of the provisions for fire safety at the

Annex, id. at 669-70. The Order addresses each of these perceived violations. See WW 3-19 (sexual

harassment), ¶ 35 (physical restraints on pregnant women), WW 102-124 (general living conditions

at CTF and the Annex), and WW 125-132 (fire hazards at the Annex). (The court had originally

concluded that the "lack of child visitation and inadequate child placement counseling at CTF"

violated the Eighth Amendment, id. at 669, but it later reversed itself and vacated the relevant

paragraphs (39-42) of the Order, Women Prisoners II, 899 F. Supp. at 674-75.)

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The Supreme Court has concluded that prison conditions are subject to Eighth Amendment

scrutiny. See Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2480 (1993). "[W]hen the State takes a person

into its custody and holds himthere against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding

duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." DeShaney v. Winnebago

County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). The Supreme Court has rejected

a claimthat the double-celling ofinmates had violated the EighthAmendment, noting that the practice

"did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation[,] [n]or did it increase

violence among inmates or create other conditionsintolerable for prison confinement." Rhodes, 452

U.S. at 348. Relying on the Court's decision in Rhodes, we have stated that "the "deprivations' that

trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny are deprivations of essential human needs." Occoquan, 844

F.2d at 836 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348) (emphasis in original).

We made a further point in Occoquan, namely, that "once a right [under the Eighth

Amendment] is established, the remedy chosen must be tailored to fit the violation." 844 F.2d at 841.

Appellants have not challenged the district court's findings that the sexual harassment, living

conditions, and fire hazards rise to the level of violations of the Eighth Amendment; rather, they

assert that certain of the district court's prescriptions go beyond what is required to satisfy "the

minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," id. at 839, and instead reflect an impermissible effort

to transform prisonsinto "better places." They also complain that the court's mandates are generally

far broader than necessary to correct the constitutional violations that the court found to exist.

Because appellants have chosen not to contest the court's conclusions that they had violated

the Eighth Amendment in these severalways, our review islimited to an examination ofthe propriety

of the remedies that appellants have challenged. We discuss these alleged violations in turn.

1. Living Conditions at the Annex

The district court observed that environmental health experts retained by both parties agreed

that the Annex dormitories are overcrowded. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 651 & n.22. The

court found that this overcrowding "creates a shortage of sanitary facilities," as measured by the

standards established by the American Correctional Association ("ACA"), id. at 651-52 & n.23;

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"increases the spread of infectious disease, produces a ... noise level [in excess of the ACA standard

of acceptability]," id. at 652 & n.24 (citations to record omitted); and "creates filthy living

conditions, such as dirty floors and moldy bathrooms," id. at 652. In discussing the general

conditions at the Annex, which included many deficiencies beyond those it had identified as having

resulted from overcrowding, the court found that the living conditions were "cruel and unusual

because they combine to create an unconstitutionally high exposure to illness or injury." Id. at 670.

This case finds a close parallel in Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 650 F. Supp. 619 (D.D.C.

1986). There, the district court imposed a population cap because it believed that the crowded

conditions at the prison increased the risk of disease and produced unacceptable noise levels. Id. at

621, 634. In reversing the district court, we stated that "an approach commensurate with Supreme

Court precedent would have sought to identify the conditions causing the constitutionalviolation and

order those conditions remedied." Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 842. Characterizing a population cap as

a "last resort" remedy, id. at 843, we explained that

a population limit, or put another way, a minimum square footage requirement,

directly implicates decisions with which the political process is charged. Such

fundamental decisions as how many prisons to build and how large to build

thembasic decisions regarding the allocation of public resourcesare simply

outside the domain of federal courts.

Id. at 842-43.

The principal lesson to be drawn from Occoquan is the following: when prison conditions

are so "soul-chilling," Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring), that they implicate the

Eighth Amendment, a district court is empowered to order reliefthat isspecifically tailored to address

the violations the court has identified. For example, if ventilation is found to be grossly wanting, an

instruction to improve air quality is the appropriate remedy. Indeed, in this case many of the

environmental problems that, taken together, the court found "to raise the risk of illness and injury

to a constitutionally unacceptable level," Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 670, are addressed in

other parts of the Order. See, e.g., ¶ 104 (ordering a vermin-eradication program); ¶ 112 (ordering

improvement of ventilating system); ¶ 113 (ordering installation of drainage system to prevent

hazardous accumulations of water); ¶ 123, as amended (ordering inspection and prompt repair of

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plumbing fixtures). The court, therefore, should have determined the constitutional propriety of a

population cap at the marginthat is to say, after its instructions concerning health and safety

measures had been complied with.

The Supreme Court has counseled that

[t]he Constitution ... "does not mandate comfortable prisons," and only those

deprivations denying the "minimal civilized measures of life's necessities" are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (construing and quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349, 347)

(internal citations omitted). This suggests that standards that the ACA finds "unacceptable" may

nonetheless be constitutional. To the extent that conditions at the Annex "are restrictive and even

harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Keeping in mind that the Order includes other provisions dealing with the

hazards that it had identified as being a product of overcrowding, we see nothing in the population

density itself that can clearly be described as depriving the inmates "ofthe minimal civilized measures

of life's necessities." Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 839 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore

vacate paragraph 102.

2. Sexual Harassment

The Supreme Court has stated that "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not "part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.' " Farmer v. Brennan,

114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1964) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). In this case, the district court

found that the pattern of sexual assaults on female inmates, especially when coupled with

inappropriate remarks by DCDC employees and invasions of the inmates' privacy, rose to the level

of objective cruelty that violated the Eighth Amendment. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 664-

66. The court specifically found a pattern of "deliberate indifference" to sexual harassment at the

three facilities. Id. at 665. Part I of the Order is intended to cure these violations by requiring

appellants, in manifold ways, to eliminate incidents of sexual misconduct and to improve the

Department's response to those incidents that nonetheless occur. See WW 3-19. Appellants

challenge three aspects of the prescribed remedies.

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Special Officer. Paragraph 5 of the Order directs that one or more members of the staff of

the district court's Special Officer "monitor allegations ofsexual harassment at each facility in which

women prisoners are housed." Paragraph 8 requires that the DCDC and the SpecialOfficer establish

penaltiesfor conduct prohibited by the Department's policy on sexual harassment. Finally, paragraph

13 provides:

The monitor(s) shall ensure that each reported violation of the policy is thoroughly

investigated and documented. The monitor(s) shall submit a final written report to

the Warden of the institution; the report shall include factual findings and a

conclusion as to whether a preponderance of evidence shows that a violation of the

sexual harassment policy occurred. Within 48 hours after the Warden receives the

monitor(s)' report, the Defendants shall inform the complaining woman prisoner, in

writing, of the outcome of the investigation. The Warden shall take appropriate

action as detailed in the schedule of penalties.

Appellants argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to direct its Special Officer

to perform the non-judicial, local government function of investigating complaints of sexual

harassment, citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) ("one of the most important

considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and

function of local government institutions").

Appellees respond by likening the powers of the Special Officer and her monitors to that of

a special master, as contemplated by Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This analogy

strikes us asinexact. In unusual circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b) ("[a] reference to a [special]

master shall be the exception and not the rule"), the appointment of a special master may be useful

to oversee compliance with a court order. See National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana

Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1987) ("NORML") (approving use of monitors to

oversee compliance with court order where compliance with past orders has been sporadic); Ruiz

v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1159-63 (5th Cir. 1982) (same), vacated in part on other grounds, 688

F.2d 266 (5thCir. 1982). Nevertheless, the master's role in such cases has been limited. As the Ninth

Circuit noted in approving the use of monitors in a prison reform case,

[t]he Special Master has no authority to interfere with the operation ofthe City'sjails.

The district court appointed the SpecialMaster to investigate, report, and recommend

actions that the City could take to ensure compliance with the consent decree. The

City agreed to his appointment.

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Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 859 n.18 (9th Cir. 1992). See also

NORML, 828 F.2d at 545 ("Masters may not be placed in control of government defendants for the

purpose of forcing them to comply with court orders.") (emphasis in original).

Here, the staff of the Special Officer are monitors in name only. They do not simply oversee

the Department's compliance with the Order; rather, they perform the functions of local authorities,

such as the investigation of complaints of misconduct. Contrary to appellees' assertion that

"[D]efendants retain the ultimate authority to determine the proper disciplinary actions," Brief for

Appellees at 49, the Order provides that, based on a monitor's report, "[t]he Warden shall take

appropriate action as detailed in the schedule of penalties," ¶ 13 (emphasis added); penalties, we

might add, that the Special Officer has been given a hand in setting. See ¶ 8. The Order therefore

cabins appellants' discretion to a far greater degree than appellees represent: rather than merely

providing for the monitoring of compliance with the court's decree, the Order effectively usurps the

executive functions of the District. Accordingly, we vacate the paragraphs of the Order that relate

to the Special Officer and her monitors.

Inmate Grievance Procedure. The district court noted that the DCDC had established a

number of policies, procedures, and regulations regarding sexual misconduct, including an Inmate

Grievance Procedure ("IGP"), which allows inmates to file complaints with the authorities. See

Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 640. The court found, however, that "[t]hese various policies

and procedures are of little value because [appellants] address the problem of sexual harassment of

women prisoners with no specific staff training, inconsistent reporting practices, cursory

investigations and timid sanctions." Id. (citation omitted). To correct this deficiency, paragraph 9

of the Order commands the District to comply with the IGP.

Appellants contend that the IGP is "a provision of local law and the Court has no business

directing compliance with it." Brief for Appellants at 43. A federal court, however, is clearly in the

"business" of ensuring that violations of rights protected under the U.S. Constitution do not go

without a remedy. Appellants have conceded that they have failed to protect female inmates from

sexual abuse, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We fail to grasp, therefore, how paragraph 9

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is broader than required to remedy these violations, or how it unduly intrudes on appellants' local

government functions. Indeed, this paragraph does not impose any new burdens on appellants; it

simplyrequires appellantsto observe their own policies and proceduresin the running oftheir prisons.

In light of the foregoing, we reject appellants' challenge to paragraph 9.

Retaliation. Evidence introduced at trial indicated that women who had filed complaints

under the IGP were occasionally the victims of retaliation by DCDC employees. The district court

found that the Department did not preserve the confidentiality of those inmates who had filed

complaints, and "[b]y leaking private information prison officials coerce women prisoners and staff

into silence and insulate themselves from scrutiny." Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 666. To

prevent such abuses, paragraph 7(c) of the Order prohibits

[r]etaliation for reporting complaints of, assisting any individual in making a report

of, or cooperating in an investigation of sexual harassment, regardless of the merits

or the disposition of the underlying complaint. Retaliatory conduct includes the

following actions taken against a prisoner in response to that prisoner's complaint of

sexual harassment ...: disciplining, changing work or program assignments of,

transferring to another facility of, or placing under involuntaryprotective custody any

prisoner.

Appellants contend that this paragraph "sweeps far too broadly" and deprives them of taking any

remedial action in response to fabricated claims ofsexual misconduct. Brief for Appellants at 42-43.

In Women Prisoners II, the court addressed this specific concern. The court explained that

paragraph 7(c) "does not prevent the Defendantsfromlegitimately taking punitive action.... It simply

preventsthemfromusing disciplinarymeasuresto cover up sexual harassment." 899 F. Supp. at 676.

In light ofthis explanation, the Department isfree to discipline, without fear of being held in contempt

of court, an inmate who has fabricated a charge ofsexual harassment or otherwise acted in bad faith

in connection with such a charge. Accordingly, we reject appellees' challenge to paragraph 7(c).

3. Overbroad Relief

The district court found that general living conditions at the Annex and CTF and fire safety

at the Annex violated the Eighth Amendment, conclusionsthat appellants have chosen not to contest.

Parts IV and V of the Order require appellants to improve living conditions and fire safety at the

facilitiesin a variety of ways. While appellants have specifically challenged paragraph 102 (imposing

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a population cap at the Annex), they further contend that the remedies ordered by the district court

to addressthe Eighth Amendment violations are broader than necessary to correct the violationsthat

the court had found. Indeed, they take issue, if in passing, with paragraphs 103 (replacing roof), 104

(eradication of vermin), 108 (twenty footcandles of prisoner-controlled light per bunk) and 112

(improving ventilation), which, they say, "hardly implicate the Eighth Amendment." Brief for

Appellants at 40. We are unable to address questions of overbroad relief that appellants have aired

in so casual a manner. Nevertheless, because of the intervening passage of the PLRA and the

questions raised by both parties, in their supplemental briefs, as to the applicability of its provisions

to this case, especially its provision that a court

shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court findsthat such relief

is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

Federalright, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right,

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), we remand this question so that the district court may have the

opportunity to address this and other unresolved issues in light of the new statute as applied to the

relevant facts.

III. CONCLUSION

Because courts have little experience in the "inordinately difficult" task of running a prison,

they should give deference to prison officials where possible, Turner, 482 U.S. at 85; and because

only a state court can provide an authoritative decision in an unsettled area of state law, a federal

court should be reluctant to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over novel questions of local law.

With these principlesinmind, we have reviewed appellants' challengesto the Order and have disposed

of them as follows:

Sexual Harassment. WW 3-19. Appellants contest the paragraphs relating to the office of

the Special Officer, the Inmate Grievance Procedure, and retaliation against inmates for filing IGP

complaints. While we reject appellants' objections to the paragraphs concerning the IGP and

retaliation against inmates, we accept those relating to the Special Officer and her monitors. We

therefore vacate paragraphs 5, 6, and 13 in their entirety and paragraphs 8, 12, 14, and 15 in relevant

part as unwarranted intrusions on the functions of local government.

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Obstetrical and Gynecological Care. WW 20-62. With the exception of paragraph 35,

which appellants do not challenge, this section of the Order is based on D.C. Code section 24-442.

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

these local claims. We therefore vacate this entire section of the Order, with the exception of

paragraph 35.

Program Evaluation. WW 63-101. These paragraphs were intended to remedy inequalities

in access to programs that the district court held to violate both Title IX and the Constitution's

guarantee of equalprotection. Appellants do not challenge those paragraphs that are intended to deal

with unequal access to educational and vocational programs, but challenge all the others. Because

we disagree with the court's conclusion that the male and female inmates it was comparing were

similarly situated, and because that conclusion was an essential element in both its Title IX and equal

protection analyses, we vacate paragraphs 83-92 and 94-101 in their entirety and paragraphs 63-67

and 93 to the extent that they do not involve educational or vocational programs.

Environmental Health. WW 102-124. The only provision in this part of the Order

specifically challenged by appellants is the provision imposing a population cap on the Annex.

Because the district court failed to justify the necessity for this "last resort" remedy, we vacate

paragraph 102.

Fire Safety. WW 125-136. Paragraphs 125-130 are intended to deal with fire hazards at the

Annex, which the district court found to have violated the Eighth Amendment; paragraphs 133-136

are intended to address conditions at CTF that the court found had violated D.C. Code § 24-442;

and paragraphs 131-132 relate to fire safety at both the Annex and CTF. We again conclude that the

court abused its discretion by exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these local claims, and we

therefore vacate paragraphs 131-132 (insofar as they relate to CTF) and 133-136 (in their entirety).

Appellants have not objected to any of the paragraphs intended to address the fire hazards at the

Annex; accordingly, we express no opinion as to their propriety.

Finally, we take note of the fact that appellants have charged in very general terms that the

district court has ordered themto adopt measuresrelating to educational programs and other matters

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that the District can ill afford and which, they say, the court is without authority to impose. Because

of the generality of appellants' charges, we are not able to address these particular complaints in this

proceeding. We therefore remand these questions so that they may be resolved by the district court

in the context of the PLRA. At that time, appellees will be free to argue the unconstitutionality of

the Act. Also, in the interests of judicial economy, appellees may renew their arguments to the court

that the substandard medical care and the fire hazards at CTF violated the Eighth Amendment.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX A

ORDER FOR DECLARATORY AND

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Based upon the Court'sfindings of fact and conclusions oflaw, it is by the Court this 13th day

of December 1994, ORDERED that:

1. The Defendants' actions and inactions violated and continue to violate the Plaintiff class

members'rights under the Fifth and EighthAmendmentsto the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988), and the District

of Columbia Code §§ 24-442; and

2. The Defendants are ordered to take all action necessary to remedy and prevent the

violations ofthe Plaintiffs' above-mentioned rights. The Defendants are ordered to take the following

specific measuresin the areas ofsexual harassment, obstetrical and gynecological care, programs and

opportunities, and environmental and fire safety. All measures shall be completed and in effect within

six months of the date of this Order, unless otherwise specified.

I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT

3. Within 60 days, the Defendants shall write and follow a Department Order prohibiting

sexualharassment involvingDistrict ofColumbiaDepartment ofCorrections(DCDC) employees and

women prisoners. The Defendants shall post and circulate the Department Order in accordance with

departmental policy.

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4. Under this policy the DCDC has the obligation to take appropriate steps to prevent and

remedy sexual harassment committed by its own employees.

5. One or more members from the office of Grace M. Lopes, Special Officer of the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia, will monitor allegations of sexual harassment at each

facility in which women prisoners are housed. The monitor(s) shall log in each allegation of sexual

harassment, investigate the allegations, submit the results of the investigation to the Warden of the

relevant facility and the Director of the DCDC and keep records of the Defendants' resolution of the

matter, including disciplinary actions, of such claims.

6. The monitor(s) shall investigate all outstanding allegations ofsexual harassment and shall

submit a report on each allegation to the Warden of the relevant facility, and to the Director of the

DCDC.

7. Prohibited conduct under the policy shall be defined as:

a. Sexual harassment which includes:

(1) all unwelcome sexual activity directed by any DCDC employee at a prisoner

including acts of sexual intercourse, oral sex, or sexual touching and any attempt to

commit these acts; and

(2) all unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome

verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature directed by any DCDC employee at a

prisoner; and

b. Invasions of women prisoners' privacy by male employees without a valid penological

reason, including the failure of any male employee to announce his presence when entering

a female housing unit.

c. Retaliation for reporting complaints of, assisting any individual in making a report of, or

cooperating in an investigation of sexual harassment, regardless of the merits or the

disposition of the underlying complaint. Retaliatory conduct includes the following actions

taken against a prisoner in response to that prisoner's complaint of sexual harassment or

cooperation in the reporting or investigation of sexual harassment: disciplining, changing

work or program assignments of, transferring to another facility of, or placing under

involuntary protective custody any prisoner.

d. Any breach of confidentiality by any employee concerning any report ofsexualharassment.

e. Any interference with investigations of sexual harassment.

8. Penalties for prohibited conduct under the policy shall be worked out by the Director of

the DCDC and the Court's Special Officer Ms. Grace Lopes within 30 days of this Order.

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9. Women prisonersshallbe able to report instances ofsexualharassment through the existing

Inmate Grievance Procedure (IGP) asspecified in Department Order 4030.1D. The Defendants shall

strictly adhere to the Inmate Grievance Procedure and shall establish an Inmate Grievance Advisory

Committee (IGAC) as required by Section VII(C) of Department Order 4030.1D.

10. Women prisoners shall also be able to submit IGP's or complaints concerning sexual

harassment in any form, orally or in writing, to any DCDC employee, who must submit the

information, in writing, to the monitor(s) and Warden of the facility within 24 hours of receiving the

information. Women prisoners may also submit IGP's or complaints to an [sic] prisoner

representative to the IGAC.

11. The Defendants shall establish a confidential hot line, under the supervision of the

monitor(s), through which women prisoners can report allegations of sexual harassment.

12. Each employee shall be required to report any information, from any source, concerning

sexual harassment, in writing, to the Warden of the facility and to the monitor(s) within 24 hours of

receiving the information. Failure of an employee to report any suspected incident of sexual

harassment shall subject the employee to discipline. If a prisoner so requests, the prisoner shall be

treated as an anonymous informant.

13. The monitor(s) shall ensure that each reported violation of the policy is thoroughly

investigated and documented. The monitor(s) shall submit a final written report to the Warden of the

institution; the report shall include factual findings and a conclusion as to whether a preponderance

of evidence shows that a violation of the sexual harassment policy occurred. Within 48 hours after

the Warden receives the monitor(s)' report, the Defendants shall inform the complaining woman

prisoner, in writing, of the outcome of the investigation. The Warden shall take appropriate action

as detailed in the schedule of penalties.

14. Upon receipt of any allegation of an act of unwelcome sexualintercourse or anyallegation

of unwelcome sexual touching, the monitor(s) and the institution must notify the proper law

enforcement agency. The monitor(s) shall communicate with the law enforcement agency concerning

the status of any investigation. The monitor(s) must periodically document the status of police

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investigations. The occurrence of a police investigation does not relieve the monitor(s) of the duty

to investigate.

15. The identity of the target of the alleged sexual harassment shall be revealed only to those

who have animmediate need to know, including the monitor(s), the alleged harasser(s) orretaliator(s)

and any witnesses. All parties contacted in the course of an investigation will be advised that any

retaliation, reprisal, or breach of confidentiality is a separate actionable offense as provided in the

schedule of penalties.

16. Any prisoner who is dissatisfied with any investigation or resolution of an allegation of

sexual harassment may appeal to the Director ofthe DCDC within 15 days ofreceiving written notice

of the outcome of the investigation. The Director must respond within 15 days.

17. Within 90 days, a trainer from the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), mutually

agreed upon by the parties, shall conduct mandatory training on sexual harassment for all DCDC

employees who work with women prisoners. The trainer shall be selected within 60 days. The

monitor(s) if they so choose, may attend this training.

a. The training shall include education concerning the Defendants' policies regarding

reporting, investigating, and preventing sexualharassment, and the consequences for violating

any policy concerning sexual harassment; and

b. In addition to roll call training, formal training sessions on sexual harassment shall be

conducted on a quarterly basis for all years succeeding entry of this Court Order.

18. Within 90 days, an outside consultant, mutually agreed upon by the parties, shall develop

a sexual harassment training program and materials and conduct training on sexual harassment for

women prisonersso that women prisoners knowhow to recognize and reportsexualharassment. The

trainer shall be selected within 60 days.

a. The training materials must be included in the orientation that each woman receives upon

intake or classification at each facility; and

b. Formal training sessions for women prisoners on sexual harassment shall be conducted on

a monthly basis for the first year succeeding entry of the consent decree, and on a quarterly

basis in all years thereafter that this decree shall remain in effect.

19. The Defendants shall make necessary alterations at both the Correctional Treatment

Facility (CTF) and the Minimum Security Annex (Annex) within 60 days to ensure that women have

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privacy in their living, sleeping and shower areas.

II. OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL CARE

20. The Defendants shall hire within 60 days:

a. a nurse midwife in a half-time position who shall provide clinical and health educational

services to the entire female prisoner population; and

b. an additional nurse practitioner or physician's assistant with special training in obstetrics

and gynecology to provide clinical services to women prisoners at CTF.

21. The CTF OB/GYN Clinic shall maintain its current regularly scheduled hours.

22. The Defendants shall establish a prenatal clinic at CTF for women who receive their

primary prenatal care at CTF. This clinic shall operate at least one half-day each week. Pregnant

women shall not be required to make appointments for the prenatal clinic through the sick-call

process, but rather, shall have scheduled appointments for the clinic.

23. The Defendants shall maintain statistics on the number of pregnant women and the birth

outcomes of infants whose mothers delivered while incarcerated.

24. In addition to the general health interview and observation performed for male prisoners,

the intake screening for all women prisoners shall include specific inquiry about her use of

contraceptives or intrauterine devices, history of pregnancy, last known menstrual period, current

likelihood and history of sexually transmitted diseases and pattern of drug use (if applicable).

25. In accordance with DCDC policy, the Defendantsshall inform all women prisoners ofthe

procedure to access health services while incarcerated.

26. In addition to the health appraisal conducted for male prisoners, the Defendants shall

conduct a gynecological examination, including a pelvic examination and evaluation, a breast

examination accompanied bypatient education, a PAP smear, a chlamydia and gonorrhea culture, and

a serology for syphilis. In accordance with the CTF Operations manual and National Commission

onCorrectionalHealthcare (NCCHC) and AmericanCorrectionalAssociation (ACA)standards, this

health appraisalshalloccur within 14 days of admission into the DCDC, unlessthere is documentation

of a complete and comparable health appraisal within the previous 90 days.

27. The Defendants shall develop and implement within 90 days, an appropriate health

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appraisal form to correspond with the ordered health appraisal for women noted in paragraph 26.

28. The Defendants shall develop and implement within 90 days, detailed written protocols

concerning routine and follow-up care for common gynecological problems including syphilis,

gonorrhea, chlamydia, and pelvic inflammatory disease; PAP tests; pelvic examinations; breast

examinations; education in contraception and mammography for high-risk women, in accordance

with the standards of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG).

29. The Defendants shall provide gynecological care within the time frames and in a manner

consistent with gynecological protocols that satisfy ACOG standards unless a physician determines

that in his or her medical judgment it is not medically appropriate for such care to be provided in

accordance with the protocol, in which case the reasons for this determination shall be entered into

the patient's medical record.

30. At a minimum, the protocol concerning the provision of gynecological care shall provide

that the Defendantsshall offer and make available PAP teststo all high-risk women at CTF every six

months.

31. The Defendants shall maintain a list of abnormal PAP results and, within seven days of

receipt of an abnormal PAP result, shall notify the patient of the abnormal result and develop and

initiate a course of treatment.

32. All women who receive an abnormal PAP test result shall be scheduled for a repeat PAP

test at three-month intervals until the PAP test results are normal. Once the PAP test results are

normal, a PAP test shall take place every six months. If a culdoscopy is required, it shall be

performed in a manner and within time frames accepted as appropriate by ACOG standards.

33. The Defendantsshall implement within 60 days a tracking systemto insure that allwomen

receive appropriate preventive gynecological care at regular intervals.

34. If a pregnancytest revealsthat a woman is pregnant, routine prenatal care shallbe initiated

immediately.

35. The Defendants shall develop and implement a protocol concerning restraints used on

pregnant and postpartum women which provides that a pregnant prisoner shall be transported in the

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least restrictive way possible consistent with legitimate security reasons. Specifically, the protocol

shall provide:

a. The Defendants shall use no restraints on any woman in labor, during delivery, or in

recovery immediately after delivery.

b. During the last trimester of pregnancy up until labor, the Defendants shall use only leg

shackles when transporting a pregnant woman prisoner unless the woman has demonstrated

a history of assaultive behavior or has escaped from a correctional facility.

36. The Defendants shall develop and implement within 90 days, a detailed written prenatal

protocol for women who receive their primary prenatal care at CTF in accordance with ACOG

standards. The protocol shall also provide guidelines to define "high-risk pregnancy." High-risk

pregnancies shall be considered to include at a minimum those women with histories of alcohol and

drug abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, diabetes or anemia, older women, women with poor

obstetrical histories, and women expecting multiple births.

37. The Defendants shall arrange for each pregnant woman prisoner to see an obstetrician at

monthly intervals during the first two trimesters of her pregnancy, bi-monthly intervals during the

seventh and eighth months, and weekly intervals during the ninth month. The Defendants shall

arrange for women who are experiencing high-risk pregnancies to see an obstetrician at shorter than

routine intervals until it is determined that the pregnancy is progressing normally.

38. The Defendants shall implement a tracking system to insure that all pregnant women are

scheduled and seen regularly for prenatal care.

39. The Defendantsshall permit a woman prisoner to feed her baby at D.C. General Hospital

while the woman prisoner and baby remain at D.C. General Hospital.

40.TheDefendantsshalldevelop a routine visiting programfor womenwhose childrenremain

in D.C. General Hospital. These women shall be allowed to visit their children at D.C. General

Hospital every day.

41. In accordance with the Defendants' Department Order, pregnant women prisoners shall

receive counseling regarding child placement as soon as the pregnancy is known.

42. The Defendants shall designate a representative who shall develop and maintain contacts

with licensed child-placing agencies, including the Department of Human Services. The Defendants

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shall provide training to its social workers on the range of options available for child placement,

including third-party placement with family or friends, foster-care placement, and adoption. Each

woman shall be given information about each of the options.

43. The nurse midwife shall implement within 90 days an obstetrical and gynecological health

education program that satisfies a recognized national medicalstandard. Education material should

also be made available in the CTF library. The Defendants shall maintain adequate documentation

on the program so that it can be evaluated by the Court within 60 days after implementation.

44. The Defendants shall have at least one medical staff member available at CTF 24 hours

each day.

45. CTF medical personnel shall have telephone access to the OB/GYN physician at CTF

during evening and weekend hours.

46. If a woman prisoner is in need of emergency obstetrical or gynecological care during

evening or weekend hours, she shall be taken immediately to the emergency area in the OB/GYN

clinic at D.C. General Hospital, unless employees providing obstetrical and/or gynecological care at

D.C. General Hospital determine that the main emergency room at D.C. General Hospital would be

more medically appropriate.

47. The Defendantsshall provide each woman prisoner who is discharged from custody with

the following:

a. a supply of essential medications that will last until she may be reasonably expected to

obtain necessary follow-up care in her community; and

b. referrals to services in the community to insure continuity of care.

48. If a woman is released prior to the time that results of any gynecological or obstetrical

tests are received byCTF medical personnel, the Defendants shall forward the test results to her last

known mailing address.

49. The Defendantsshall provide sufficient resourcesto insure that prisoners are transported

to medical appointmentsin a timelyfashion, including a sufficient number ofsecuritystaffto transport

prisoners, appropriate and sufficient transport vehicles, and appropriate waiting areas.

50. The Defendants shall modify their transportation procedures so that the transportation

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system alone does not cause women prisoners to wait for more than one hour at D.C. General

Hospital before receiving medical care.

51. If a woman prisoner misses a medical appointment for any reason, the Defendants shall

reschedule the appointment for the earliest available date. The Defendants shall use their best efforts

to insure that the rescheduled appointment occurs within a medically appropriate period of time.

52. The Defendants shall comply fully with all provisions of the Memorandum of

Understanding between the DCDC and D.C. General Hospital.

53. The Defendants shall assign a physician, or a member of the medical staff at CTF, who

provides obstetrical or gynecological care, to serve as a liaison between CTF medical personnel and

D.C. General Hospital.

54. The Defendants shall maintain the content of each medical record in an orderly and

confidential manner.

55. For all pregnant women prisoners, the Defendants shall maintain a medical chart on the

POPRAS form pregnancy chart, or an equivalent form, together with a regular medical chart. All

medical visitsto or by the responsible physician or primary healthcare provider, ordersfor laboratory

tests, laboratory test results and other notes and orders relating to the medical care of pregnant

women prisoners shall be recorded on the POPRAS form or consultation form.

56. The Defendantsshall develop and implement within 90 days, a new consultation formthat

provides adequate clinicalinformationto D.C. GeneralHospitaland insuresthat adequate information

is provided by D.C. General Hospital to CTF medical personnel.

57. The Defendants shall institute, maintain and follow a system to coordinate the

implementation and tracking of physician orders so that gynecological and obstetrical care will be

provided within a timely fashion. The system shall coordinate all orders regardless of whether the

physician orders are to be filled inside or outside the facility. This system shall be reflected in written

procedural guidelines, a copy of which shall be provided to counsel for Plaintiffs within 60 days.

Orders for medication are not to be tracked under this system.

58. Documentation shall be required whenever CTF medical staff elect not to follow the

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instructions of a consulting physician at D.C. General Hospital or elsewhere. This documentation

should include the justification for not providing the therapy ordered. Only medically-based

justifications shall be permissible.

59. For allwomen prisoners who are discharged fromD.C. GeneralHospital or other medical

facilitiesto CTF, CTF medical personnelshall promptly obtain a discharge summary and maintain the

summary in the prisoner's medical record.

60. Prisoners shall receive notice of results of laboratory or diagnostic tests which are of no

clinicalsignificance within seven calendar days of the date the facility receivesthe results ofsuch test.

61. In the case of non-emergency abnormal laboratory or diagnostic test results of clinical

significance, the prisoner will be seen by the ordering physician, or if that physician is unavailable, by

the Medical Officer, within 24 hours of the time the facility receives the results ofsuch test. At such

time the physician will explain the result to the patient and order such follow-up care as is

appropriate.

62. The Defendants shall require a woman prisoner who refuses medical care to do so in the

presence of a licensed medical staff member who can answer the patient's questions and counsel the

patient concerning the consequences of a refusal. In accordance with DCDC policy regarding quality

assurance, the reasons for refusal shall be analyzed regularly as part of a comprehensive and

up-to-date quality assurance program. This quality assurance activity shall be documented.

III. PROGRAM EVALUATION

63. The Defendantsshall provide diagnostic evaluationsfor women prisonerssimilar to those

currently provided for men in the Reception and Diagnostic Unit at CTF to determine women

prisoners' needs, interests, and requirements for increased programs and opportunities in academic

and higher education, vocation, work, religion and recreation. The procedure for the needs

assessment shall be done by an approved scientific method. These evaluations shall be completed

within 30-45 days of a female prisoner's transfer to CTF or the Annex. The evaluations shall include

educational testing, vocational testing and psychological testing. The Defendants shall provide

women with the appropriate programming called for by this evaluation within 60 days of their arrival

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at the facility.

64. The Defendants shall coordinate the scheduling of academic educational classes, higher

education classes, vocational training, recreation time and activities, law library hours, and work in

prison details for women in such a manner asto maximize women prisoners' participation in as many

areas as possible.

65. The Defendants shall provide sufficient program space so that women prisoners can

participate in equal and adequate programs and services as compared to men prisoners. The

Defendants shall provide at least two additional trailers at the Annex (with functional sanitary

facilities) to allow for additional programming activities. Within 30 days, the Defendants may submit

for the Court's consideration an alternative to the 2 ordered trailers.

66. The Defendants shall develop and implement quality assurance programs for monitoring

program delivery to ensure the continued provision of equal and adequate programs to women

prisoners.

67. The Defendants shall increase the number of staff posted or detailed at the women's unit

at CTF and at the Annex to ensure that women prisoners are escorted to educational programs,

recreation, employment, and medical care asscheduled. Sufficient staff shall be provided in a manner

that does not prevent the programming staff from performing any of their duties.

68. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at the Annex with a range of academic

education programsthat is equivalent to the range of academic programs provided to male prisoners

at the Minimum Security Facility (Minimum).

69. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at CTF with a range of academic

education programsthat is equivalent to the range of academic programs provided to male prisoners

at the Occoquan, Central and Medium facilities.

70. Women prisoners at the Annex and CTF shall be provided with the opportunity for

full-time (five hours per day, five days per week) basic education to include ABE, GED, and Special

Education classes. The Defendants shall immediately provide two full-time basic education teachers

for ABE, GED, and Special Education classes at the Annex.

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71. Women prisoners at CTF shall have access to on-site higher education programs which

shall include a four-year B.A. and/or B.S. degree program, an A.A. degree program, a certification

program, and a precollege program. The bachelor and associate programs shall be offered in a variety

of fields, and at a minimum shall each offer three different areas ofstudy leading to a degree. Within

90 days, the Defendants shall at least make the University of the District of Columbia B.A. and A.A.

programs available to women prisoners at CTF.

72. The Defendants shall offer women prisoners financial arrangements for these education

programs that are the same as those arrangements available to similarly situated male prisoners.

73. The Defendantsshall immediately provide women prisoners at CTF with at least 30 hours

of access per week to the Atlantic Union computers. Women shall be scheduled to access the

computer during educational program time and during free time, including evenings and weekends.

Women prisoners shall be provided with an amount of computers sufficient to meet their needs.

74. The Defendants shall immediately process the applications for Atlantic Union in a

complete and timely manner. Women shall be provided with all books and course materials before

the start of a course. The women shall receive substantive tutorial guidance in the course work from

qualified educators.

75. The Defendants shall immediately provide appropriate substitute teachers or instructors

during absences of regular teachers or instructors of more than three working days. The provision

of a substitute teacher or instructorshall not result in consolidating two classesinto one or increasing

the class size.

76. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at CTF with a range of vocational

education programsthat is equivalent to the range of vocational education programs provided to male

prisoners at the Occoquan, Central and Medium facilities.

77. The Defendantsshall provide women prisoners at CTF with two prevocational programs

each to be at least six weeks in duration. Prevocational programs include those courses which teach

personal development skills, living skills, and/or employment skillssuch as Employment Techniques,

Awareness and Preparation (ETAP) and Lifeskills.

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78. The Defendantsshall provide women prisoners at CTFwith a minimumoffour vocational

education programs, including the one programcurrently in place (DocuTech). These programs shall

be available to female prisoners of all custody levels. A vocational education program is any program

of 12 to 24 months of duration that teaches employable skills and contains both a classroom

component and an on-the-job-training component. Two programs shall be operative within 120 days

of the entry of this Order.

79. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at CTF with at least two apprenticeship

programs as defined by Department order.

80. All prevocational programs, vocational programs, and apprenticeships added for women

prisoners at CTF shall have the potential for providing women with job skills marketable in the local

labor market. An important consideration in the Defendants' selection of programs shall be the

wage-earning capacity upon completion of the program.

81.TheDefendantsshallconduct affirmative outreachto women during the enrollment period

for vocational training. This outreach shall entail DCDC staff meeting with women at least one

month before the deadline for program enrollment to inform the women that the new programs are

available and to offer a full description of the available programs and any applicable criteria for

participation.

82. The Defendants shall ensure that all contractual programs used to provide services to

women prisoners are compatible with and fulfill the provisions of this Order.

83. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at the Annex with a range of work

opportunities that is equivalent to the range of work opportunities provided to male prisoners at

Minimum.

84. The Defendantsshallprovide women prisoners at CTFwith a range ofwork opportunities

that is equivalent to the range of work opportunities provided to male prisoners at the Occoquan,

Central and Medium facilities.

85. The Defendantsshall employ capable women prisoners on allwork details available at the

facility where women prisoners are housed. These details shall include maintenance and trades, such

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as plumbing, carpentry, and electrical.

86. The Defendants shall offer equivalent industrial opportunities by establishing at least two

industries at CTF or by transporting women prisoners from CTF to the industries at the Central

Facility to perform industrial work. Within 60 days, the Defendants shall submit to the Court plans

for the implementation of an industrial program for CTF women prisoners.

87. The Defendantsshallrevise the guidelines and practicesfor work training eligibilitywithin

30 days to take into account the different sentence structure of female offenders and to permit

women's maximum participation in work training.

88. The Defendants will immediately provide a work training programto allwomen prisoners

who are eligible under the revised guidelines, including those who are housed at CTF asstated in the

CTF Operations Manual.

89. Within 30 days of entry of this Order, the Defendants shall complete and submit work

training packets for each woman prisoner eligible for work training and expedite the approval

process.

90. The Defendantsshallsubmit required paperwork for work training approval45 days prior

to a woman prisoner's eligibility date in order to complete the process by the date of eligibility. In

the event that a woman arrives at the institution with less than 45 days until she is eligible for work

training, the Defendants shall expedite the paperwork.

91. The Defendants shall not deny a woman prisoner the opportunity to participate in work

training based on her arrival at the Annex or classification to minimum custody status within the

previous 90 days or because of her impending eligibility for half-way house placement or parole.

92. The Defendants shall provide adequate staff, including case managers and vocational

development specialists, to enable the women prisoners to be informed of their work training

eligibility and to complete the necessary paperwork in the required time frame.

93. The Defendantsshallstaff a sufficient number of vocationaldevelopmentspecialists at the

Annex in order to conduct testing, classes and counseling; completes necessary paperwork and

develop jobs, including nontraditional employment, and transport women to interviews. The

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Defendants shall provide the vocational development specialist(s) with an appropriate vehicle for

transporting women to job interviews and for performing job development activities.

94. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at the Annex with recreational

opportunities that are equivalent to the recreational opportunities provided to male prisoners at

Minimum.

95.TheDefendantsshallprovidewomen prisoners at CTF with recreational opportunities that

are equivalent to the recreational opportunities provided to male prisoners at the Occoquan, Central

and Medium facilities.

96.TheDefendantsshallimmediatelyprovide allwomen prisoners atCTF, including pregnant

prisonerssubject to medical approval, with recreation seven days per week for at least five hours per

day. Women shall have the option of going outside or to indoor recreation facilities during this time

period. This recreation schedule shall be effective at CTF within 30 days of this Order.

97. Women shall be given access to the same variety of recreation activities as are available

to men, including large group events, intramurals, arts and crafts and drama activities.

98. The Defendants shall immediately open the recreation trailer at the Annex for at least 8

hours per day, 7 days a week. Correctional officers shall open and supervise the trailer when the

recreation specialist is off duty. The recreation specialist shall not be assigned or pulled away from

her duties as a recreation specialist for the women at the Annex, except in the case of an emergency.

99. The Defendantsshall improve the Annex grounds by adding a basketball court, volleyball

pit, and outdoor tables.

100. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at the Annex with a range of religious

programs and services that are equivalent to the range of religious programs provided to male

prisoners at Minimum.

101. Within 60 days, the Defendantsshall provide chaplaincy services to women prisoners at

the Annex for 5 days per week through a staff chaplain, volunteer chaplain, or a combination of

chaplain staff members. The chaplain's hours shall include evening hours during the week to

accommodate those women working on details, industry, or in the community.

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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

102. Within one year, the Defendantsshallreduce the population of Annex Dormitories 6 and

7 so that no more than 90 women are housed in the two dormitories combined.

103. Within one year, the Defendants shall repair or replace the roofs of Annex Dormitories

6 and 7 and retain them in a watertight condition.

104. Within 90 days, the Defendants shall repair the Annex dormitories so as to prevent the

entry and refuge of vermin and shall conduct a vermin eradication program to eliminate the present

infestation of vermin. The Defendants shall thereafter promulgate and follow an effective vermin

eradication program.

105. Within 60 days, the Defendantsshall provide each woman prisoner housed in the Annex

dormitories at least one vertical locker and one footlocker.

106. Within 30 days, the Defendantsshallreplace all torn mattresses and pillows at the Annex

with clean, untorn, fire-retardant mattresses and pillows. The Defendants shall conduct a regular

inspection of allmattresses and pillows and shall, at that time, immediatelyreplace anymattressesthat

are damaged to a degree that prevents adequate cleaning.

107. The Defendantsshall immediately use cart liners or disposable or washable laundry bags

to transport laundry at the Annex.

108. For as long as the Annex dormitories are double-bunked, the Defendants shall, within

60 days, provide a minimum of 20 foot candles of prisoner-controlled light to each bunk.

109. Effective immediately, the Defendants shall ensure that all housing units at the Annex

are issued a timely, adequate and appropriate amount of cleaning supplies.

110. Within 60 days, the Defendants shall connect the toilets and handsinks in every Annex

trailer.

111. The Defendants shall continue to provide sufficient and readily accessible sanitary

facilities for women in the industries at the Central Facility.

112. Within 90 days, the Defendants shall improve the ventilation at the Annex dormitories,

the print shop and the garment shop so that the quality of air in these areas is brought up to an

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acceptable level.

113. Within 90 days, the Defendants shall install a drainage system at the Annex which will

prevent hazardous accumulations of water.

114. The Defendants shall promulgate and follow a written preventive maintenance plan for

the Annex dormitories, the Annex trailers, and the Annex grounds.

115. Three times every year, the Defendantsshall cause the District of Columbia Department

of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) to inspect the Annex for compliance with the

requirements of environmental sanitation and maintenance and food service delivery (at the main

Minimum compound). The first such inspection shall be conducted within 45 days of the date of this

Order. Within 30 days of each inspection, the Warden of Minimum shall obtain the DCRA findings.

The Warden shall repair, clean, or otherwise remedy an unsanitary, unsound, or unsafe practice or

condition identified by DCRA as soon as feasible but in no event later than 30 days following the

receipt of the DCRA report.

116. Within 90 days, the Defendants shall hire a qualified air balancing contractor to service

the CTF air handling system so that it provides an acceptable level of air quality to all areas of the

facility inhabited by prisoners.

117. In the event that the air balancing and other recent repairs to the heating system at CTF

fail to maintain a minimum cell temperature of 65EF in every cell, measured at the perimeter wall, the

Defendants shall immediately

a. cease housing women in the end cells of each tier;

b. provide each woman prisoner with two extra blankets, two pairs ofthermal underwear, and

two pairs of wool socks;

c. explore means of insulating or heating the perimeter walls of the cells; and

d. report back to the Court.

118. The Defendants shall develop and implement an effective rodent prevention program.

119. Effective immediately, the Defendants shall ensure that all housing units at CTF are

issued a timely, adequate and appropriate amount of cleaning supplies.

120. The Defendantsshall use cart liners or disposable or washable laundry bagsto transport

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laundry between CTF and the Jail.

121. Effective immediately, the Defendants at CTF shall monitor the food temperature and

delivery times of all foods, including special diet meals, delivered to the satellite kitchen.

122. The Defendants shall promulgate and follow a written preventive maintenance plan for

the CTF that includes maintenance of structures, systems, and equipment.

123. The Defendants shall ensure that the correctional officers inspect all plumbing fixtures

on each shift, and shall ensure that any plumbing fixture that requires repair will be reported

immediately upon discovery, and repaired immediately. The Defendants shall maintain logs

demonstrating compliance with this requirement.

124. Three times per year, the Defendants shall cause the District of Columbia DCRA to

conduct inspections of the CTF for compliance with the requirements of environmental sanitation,

maintenance and food service delivery. The first such inspection shall be conducted within 45 days

of the date of this Order. Within 30 days of each inspection, the Warden of CTF shall obtain the

DCRA findings. The Warden shall repair, clean, or otherwise remedy an unsanitary, unsound, or

unsafe practice or condition identified byDCRA assoon asfeasible but in no event later than 30 days

following the receipt of the DCRA report.

V. FIRE SAFETY

125. Within 120 days, the Defendantsshall install and maintain a manualfire alarmsystemand

fire detection system which covers all areas used by women prisoners at Minimum, including the

Annex dormitories. The fire detection system must include smoke detectors in all sleeping and

dayroom areas, and smoke or heat detectors in all other areas. There must be an automatic

retransmission of the above systems to a constantly attended location outside of the dormitory

buildings. There must also be a control panel to provide emergency power or to send a warning if

the system is not operational.

126. The Defendants must repair or replace the fire alarm system in the Administration

building, the cafeteria and gymnasium at the Minimum main compound.

127. The Defendants must install a sprinkler system in the Annex dormitories and provide a

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20-minute fire-rated enclosure of storage rooms located in both dormitories.

128. The Defendantsshall ensure that all bed linens, blankets, and curtains or draperiesin the

Annex dormitories are of fire-retardant material.

129. Effective immediately, in each Annex dormitory, the Defendantsshall conduct fire drills

12 times per year, 4 times per shift, and shall keep written documentation of all such drills.

130. The Defendants shall conduct and document mandatory semi-annual training on fire

safety procedures for all correctional officers.

131. Effective immediately, and in accordance with Department Order No. 2920.1A, the

Defendants shall:

a. conduct weekly inspections of all building[s] and grounds for fire hazards, and document

such inspections;

b. conduct quarterly inspections of all fire safety equipment, and document such inspections;

and

c. ensure that the Institutional Fire Marshal conducts quarterly inspections of the Facility.

132. Effective immediately, and in accordance with Department Order No. 2920.1A, the

District of Columbia Fire Department shall conduct fire safety inspections of the Annex not less

frequently than every 12 months. The Warden of Minimum shall obtain the Fire Department's report

within 10 days and promptly give a copy to the Plaintiffs' counsel. Thereafter, the Warden shall cause

any fire safety deficiencies identified in the Fire Department's report to be remedied within 30 days,

or shall provide a report to the Fire Department as to why the deficiency cannot be so remedied and

provide a plan to remedy the deficiency within a further period of time not to exceed 90 days.

133. Within 30 days, the Defendants at CTF shall repair the water leakage from rain,

particularly in the vicinity of the high-voltage electrical conduit in the culinary storage room located

in the CTF basement.

134. At CTF, the Defendants shall maintain the storage in the culinary storage room in a

manner that does not prevent the sprinkler heads from functioning adequately.

135. At CTF, the Defendantsshallmaintain the sprinkler system and test it quarterly and they

shall test the fire pump annually.

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136. At CTF, the Defendants shall conduct fire drills 12 times per year, 4 times per shift, and

shall keep written documentation of all such drills.

VI. GENERAL

137. This Order shall continue in fullforce and effect, absent modification by the Court, until

the Defendants have complied with all provisions for 5 years.

138. Plaintiffs are awarded the costs of this suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees.

APPENDIX B

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Defendants' Revised Motion to Stay and/or Modify Judgment, the

Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Motion to Stay and/or Modify Judgment, the

Defendants' Reply, the Defendants' Supplement, the Plaintiffs' Surreply, the Joint Status Motion and

Motion Proposing Modifications to the Order for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, the Plaintiffs'

Status Motion Regarding WW 79 and 96 of the Order, it is by the Court this 11th day of August,

1995

ORDERED that the portion of the Defendants' Revised Motion to Stay and/or Modify

Judgment in which Defendants seek a stay is DENIED; it is further

ORDERED that WW 73 and 74 of the Court's Order of December 13, 1994 are VACATED

due to the termination of the Atlantic Union College program at CTF; it is further

ORDERED that WW 39, 40, 41, 42 of the Court's Order of December 13, 1994 are

VACATED; it is further

ORDERED that WW 12, 17, 18, 20, 35, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 58, 60, 67, 70, 71, 75,

87, 102, 115, 123 and 124 of the Court's Order of December 13, 1994 are amended as follows:

12. Failure of an employee to report any allegation of sexual misconduct or any facts and

circumstances whichwould lead a reasonable employee to believe thatsexualmisconduct is occurring

or has occurred shall subject the employee to discipline.

17. The Department shall conduct mandatory training using certified trainers on sexual

misconduct for allDCDC employees. A consultant from the National Institute of Corrections (NIC),

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mutually agreed upon by the parties, shall develop the training plan and materials. A "certified

trainer" is defined as any person who has completed the "Train-the-Trainer" course developed by the

NIC consultant. The monitor(s), if they so choose may attend this training.

a. The training shall include education concerning the Defendants' policies regarding

reporting, investigating, and preventing sexual harassment, and the consequences for violating

any policy concerning sexual harassment; and

b. Allstaff who work with female prisonersshall be trained by certified trainers within

six months commencing no later than August 30, 1995. After the initial training of staff, the

training will be included in the pre-service training of all staff. Annual retraining shall be

conducted to refresh staff on the Department Order regarding sexual misconduct.

c. Within one year, selected employees working with female prisoners shall receive

a forty-hour training program on working with female offenders. A semi-annual,

enhancement training on special issues related to working with female offenders will be

offered to selected employees.

18. Commencing no later than August 30, 1995, the Department shall conduct mandatory

training on sexual harassment using certified trainersfor all women prisoners currently in the DCDC.

A consultant from the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), mutually agreed upon by the parties,

shall develop the training plan and materials which will instruct women prisoners on the Department

Order on sexual misconduct and how to recognize and report sexual harassment. Training sessions

for women prisoners on sexual harassment shallbe provided within a reasonable time upon a woman's

entry into the D.C. Department of Corrections.

20. The Defendants shall hire within 90 days: (a) a health educator with appropriate training

in obstetrics and gynecology in a half-time position who shall provide clinical and health educational

services to the entire female prisoner population at CTF and (b) an additional nurse practitioner,

physician's assistant with special training in obstetrics and gynecology, or nurse midwife to provide

clinical services to women prisoners at CTF.

35. The Defendants shall develop and implement a protocol concerning restraints used on

pregnant and postpartum women which provides that a pregnant prisoner shall be transported in the

least restrictive way possible consistent with legitimate security reasons. Specifically, the protocol

shall provide:

a. The Defendants shall use no restraints on any woman in labor, during delivery, or in

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recovery immediately after delivery; and

b. During the last trimester of pregnancy up until labor, the Defendantsshall use no restraints

when transporting a pregnant woman prisoner unless the woman has demonstrated a history of

assaultive behavior or has escaped from a correctionalfacility, in which case, only handcuffs shall be

used.

43. The health educatorshall implement, within 60 daysfrom the day that the health educator

is hired, anobstetrical and gynecologicalhealth education programthatsatisfies a recognized national

medical standard. Educational material should also be made available in the CTF library. The

Defendantsshall maintain adequate documentation on the program so that it can be evaluated by the

Court within 60 days after implementation.

46. If a woman prisoner is in need of emergency obstetrical or gynecological care during

evening or weekend hours, she shall be taken immediately to the emergency room at D.C. General

Hospital if she is less than 20 weeks pregnant, and to the OB/GYN admitting office if she is 20 or

more weeks pregnant, unless employees providing obstetrical and/or gynecological care at D.C.

General Hospital determine that the main emergency room at D.C. General Hospital would be more

medically appropriate.

47. The Defendants shall provide each woman prisoner for whom the DCDC has advance

notice of her discharge from custody with the following:

a. a supply of essentialmedicationsthat will last untilshe may be reasonably expected

to obtain necessary follow-up care in her community; and

b. referrals to services in the community to insure continuity of care.

48. If a woman is released prior to the time that abnormal results of any gynecological or

obstetricaltests are received byCTFmedicalpersonnel, the Defendantsshallforward the test result[s]

to her last known mailing address. Defendants shall advise women prisoners of this policy.

49. The Defendants shall ensure that prisoners are transported to medical appointments on

time.

50. The Defendants shall modify their transportation procedures so that women prisoners

arrive at D.C. General Hospital no more than 2 hours before the scheduled time oftheir appointment.

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55. For all pregnant women prisoners, the Defendants shall maintain a medical chart on an

ACOG form together with a regular medical chart. All medical visits to or by the responsible

physician or primary healthcare provider, ordersfor laboratory tests, laboratory test results and other

notes and orders relating to the medical care of pregnant women prisoners shall be recorded on the

ACOG form or consultation form.

58. Documentation shall be required whenever CTF medical staff elect not to follow the

instructions of a consulting physician at D.C. General Hospital or elsewhere. This documentation

should include the justification for not providing the therapy ordered.

60. Prisoners shall receive notice of normal results of laboratory or diagnostic tests at the

discretion of the physician or upon request by the woman prisoner.

67. The Defendants shall ensure that women prisoners are escorted to and arrive at

educational programs, recreation, employment, and medical care in a timely manner as scheduled in

a manner that does not prevent the programming staff from performing any of their duties.

70. Women prisoners at the Annex and CTF shall be provided with the opportunity for

full-time (three hours per day, five days per week at CTF and five hours per day, five days per week

at the Annex) basic education to include ABE, GED, and Special Education classes.

71. Women prisoners at CTF shall have access to on-site higher education programs which

shall include a four-year B.A. and/or B.S. degree program, an A.A. degree program, and a precollege

program. At a minimum, bachelor programs shall be offered in one area of study, and associate

programs in two different areas of study leading to a degree. Defendants shall comply with the

precollege requirement of this provision within 90 days.

75.Within90 days, theDefendantsshallprovide appropriate substitute teachers or instructors

during absences of regular teachers or instructors of more than three working days. The provision

of a substitute teacher or instructor shall not result in increasing the class size beyond acceptable

community standards for a period of time exceeding 15 consecutive school days.

79. The Defendants shall provide women prisoners at CTF with at least one apprenticeship

program as defined by Department order.

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87. The Defendants shall revise the Department of Corrections guidelines and practices for

work training placement within 30 daysto take into account the different sentence structure offemale

offenders and to permit women's maximum participation in work training.

96.TheDefendantsshallimmediatelyprovide allwomen prisoners at CTF, including pregnant

prisonerssubject to medical approval, with recreation for twenty-five hours per week. Women shall

have the option of going outside or to indoor recreation facilities during the time period. This

recreation schedule shall be effective at CTF within 15 days of this Order.

102. Within one year, the Defendants shall reduce the population of the Annex Dormitories

6 and 7 so that no more than 135 women are housed in the two dormitories combined.

115. Three times every year, the Defendantsshall cause the District of Columbia Department

of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) to inspect the Annex for compliance with the

requirements of environmental sanitation and maintenance and food service delivery (at the main

Minimum compound). If any area is shown to be in compliance after completion of an inspection,

the mid-year inspection may be an abatement inspection rather than a full inspection. At a minimum,

DCRA shall conduct full compliance inspections at the Annex two times every year. Within 30 days

of each inspection, the Warden of Minimum shall obtain the DCRA findings. The Warden shall

repair, clean, or otherwise remedy an unsanitary, unsound, or unsafe practice or condition identified

by DCRA as soon as feasible but in no event later than 30 days following the receipt of the DCRA

report.

123. The Defendants shall ensure that the correctional officers inspect all plumbing fixtures

daily, and shall ensure that anyplumbing fixture that requiresrepair willbe reported immediatelyupon

discovery, and repaired in a timely manner. The Defendants shall maintain logs demonstrating

compliance with this requirement.

124. Two times per year, the Defendants shall cause the District of Columbia DCRA to

conduct inspections of the CTF for compliance with the requirements of environmental sanitation,

maintenance and food service delivery. Within 30 days of each inspection, the Warden of CTF shall

obtain the DCRA findings. The Warden shall repair, clean, or otherwise remedy any unsanitary,

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1 Like the court, I do not reach the question, which is one of first impression in this circuit,

whether the challenged programs are subject to Title IX. Op. at 30-31. 

unsound, or unsafe practice or condition identified by DCRA assoon asfeasible but in no event later

than 30 days following the receipt of the DCRA report.

It is further

ORDERED that all deadlines shall run from the date of entry of this Supplemental Order.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Because I find no novel

question of law as would pose an obstacle to the district court's exercise ofsupplemental jurisdiction

over the prisoners' request for injunctive relieffromviolations of D.C.CODE § 24-442, I dissent from

Part II A of the court's opinion. Further, because I conclude that the court's equal protection analysis

is flawed, I would affirm the district court's ruling that the prisoners were denied their Fifth

Amendment right to due process by the District ofColumbia's giving themunequal accessto a variety

of programs on the basis of their sex, and therefore dissent from Part II B of the court's opinion.1In

other respects I concur in the court's opinion.

I.

On the basis of its identification of a novel question of District of Columbia law, the court

concludes that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the District's invitation to decline

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over the prisoners' claims arising under D.C. Code § 24-

224. While I join the court's account of the general structure of the law of supplemental jurisdiction,

Op. at 16-18, and I agree that the district court "clearly had the power" to hear the prisoners' claims

arising under D.C. CODE § 24-442, Op. at 18, I do not agree that an intolerable novel issue posed an

obstacle to the court's exercise of jurisdiction. In the terms of the supplemental jurisdiction statute,

the prisoners' local-law claims did not raise novel or complex issues of local law; nor did this case

present exceptional circumstancesin which there were compelling reasonsto decline jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1, 4) (1994).

Of course, there is some degree of novelty in applying even the hoariest of legal rules to the

facts presented in each new case; there is obviously a greater degree of novelty in construing an

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2 Thus, even when there is no shortage of authority on a question, the district court may

dismiss a local-law claim where a conflict among the authorities leaves the issue uncertain. 

Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

ambiguous phrase in a newly enacted statute. The question a district court must ask about a local-law

claim under § 1367(c)(1), therefore, is not, "Is it novel?" but, "How novel is it?" The reason for

asking this question is obvious: the more novel a local-law issue is, the more likely the federal court

is to get it wrong, in the sense of deciding the issue differently from how a local court would have

decided it. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (endorsing discretionary

dismissal of pendent state-law claims in order to "procur[e] for [the parties] a surer-footed reading

of applicable law"). The question of "novelty" is really a question of uncertainty; the issue is how

predictable the decision of the local courts would be in light of existing local-law authorities.2 Thus,

the appropriate framework for deciding the instant appeal isthe standard described in Financial Gen.

Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1982): "the degree of uncertainty in state

law is one of several factors that should guide the District Court's discretion," albeit a factor that

"should be given considerable weight."

In light of the appropriate standard, this case differs from those relied on by the court. The

local-law issues raised by the prisoners' claims are simply not novel. The sole local-law issue cited

by the court as "novel"whether local trial court hasthe power to impose injunctions when ongoing

and systemic violations of a statutorily imposed duty of care have been proved and all of the usual

conditionsfor granting injunctive relief have been met, Op. at 22is considerably further toward the

"certain" end ofthe continuumthan are issues presented by casessuch as Financial General and Doe

v. Board on Prof. Resp. of the D.C. Ct. of Appeals, 717 F.2d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).

The issue in the instant case is whether the familiar general power of the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia to award equitable relief, D.C. CODE § 11-921(a), can be applied to a statute

whose substantive content has been explicated by several authoritative decisions of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals. See Op. at 19 (collecting local cases). By contrast to this question of

institutional power, the courts in Financial General and Doe were faced with questions concerning

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3 The same is true of Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1984), also cited by the

court, in which the local ballot initiative at issue was "new [and] its meaning ambiguous and

sharply disputed." In that case, moreover, plaintiff had not even pled a claim based on local law. 

The district court had entered an injunction based solely on federal law, which this court vacated. 

This court held that it would be inappropriate to permit the plaintiff to attempt to reinstate the

injunction by adding a local-law claim on remand, now that the federal claims had been dismissed: 

"[E]ntertaining such a claim now would be somewhat like initially taking jurisdiction over a local

law issue when there is no federal claim to which it could be pendent." Id.

regulations and causes of action that had never been addressed by the local courts at all.3In

Financial General, the district court was faulted for deciding a number of difficult questions

involving an attorney's duties in complex corporate transactions when "[n]o court of the District of

Columbia has provided any guidance regarding the standards defining an attorney's fiduciary duties,

the construction of the conflict of interest provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, or

the remedies for breach." 680 F.2d at 769. Moreover, the district court abused its discretion by

reaching out to decide these questions when all of the federal claims on which original jurisdiction

was founded had been dismissed, a factor that is not present in the instant case. Id. at 769, 776. As

for Doe, this court characterized the local-law issues as "[w]hether the Board on Professional

Responsibility may subpoena records necessary to performance of its regulatory mandate and what

construction to give to Court of Appeals regulations governing the Board's exercise of its asserted

subpoena power...." 717 F.2d at 1428. Doe thus involved the construction of the grant of authority

to a particular local entity, a question that could not be answered with any certainty without a local

decision on the subject. Both Financial General and Doe stand in contrast to the purportedly "novel"

issue raised by the prisoners, which is whether well-settled remedies rules of general applicability

should be applied to their case.

Nor can there be any doubt that the law ofremediesis well-settled in the District ofColumbia.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that the local trial court enjoys broad

equitable jurisdiction pursuant to D.C. CODE § 11-921(a). Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 571

(D.C. 1992) (collecting cases); McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 748-49 (D.C. 1978). The

standards governing the exercise of equitable powers are also well-defined. Ifill v. District of

Columbia, 665 A.2d 185, 187-88 (D.C. 1995). Finally, the use of those powers to effect institutional

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4 E.g., Kelly v. Parents United for the D.C. Pub. Schools, 641 A.2d 159, 163, 165 (D.C.

1994) (affirming permanent injunction and noting that trial court considered "ordering school

closures and incarceration with work release for responsible District officials as possible

sanctions" when District failed to comply); In re Savoy, Nos. 70-4808 & 70-4714, 98 Daily

Wash. L. Rptr. 1937 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 1970) (imposing structural injunction on juvenile

detention facility); In re Savoy, Nos. J-4808-70, etc., 101 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 317 (D.C. Super.

Ct. Feb. 20, 1973) (same); Pearson v. Kelly, No. 92-CA-14030, 122 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1837

& 1849 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (appointing receiver over Department of District

government for repeated violations of federal law). See also DeNeen L. Brown & Lonnae O'Neal

Parker, Schools Again Running Afoul of D.C. Fire Code, Judge Finds, WASH. POST, July 3,

1996, at B1. Cf. In the Matter of an Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juveniles

Detained at and Committed at Cedar Knoll Institution, 430 A.2d 1087, 1093, 1101 (1981)

(Ferren, J., dissenting) (noting power of branch of Superior Court to award sweeping structural

injunction in properly pled class action). 

5 Although the District of Columbia is not a state, its local court system has enjoyed powers

commensurate with those of the states for a quarter of a century. Palmore v. United States, 411

U.S. 389, 392 n.2 (1972) ("Congress ... invested the local courts with jurisdiction equivalent to

that exercised by state courts"); id. at 409 (noting that the functions of the District of Columbia

courts are "essentially similar to those of the local courts found in the 50 States of the Union"). 

Cf. McIntosh, 395 A.2d at 749 n.10 ("Congress ... intended to transfer to the new local courts all

those local judicial powers previously exercised by the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia.") The judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia would

therefore be as surprised as the judges of any state court of general equitable jurisdiction to hear it

suggested that they lacked the authority to impose appropriate injunctive relief in the face of

ongoing institutional failure to meet a legal duty of care. 

6 The District did not appeal the district court's finding in the instant cases that general living

conditions at the Annex and CTF and fire safety at the Annex violated the Eighth Amendment. 

Op. at 32. 

change in a variety of local governmental departments and agencies is almost a commonplace in this

jurisdiction,4as it is in state courts5throughout the Nation. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES

§ 7.4(4) (2d ed. 1993) (describing prevalence ofstructural injunctions in civil rights cases, including

prison reform litigation). Whatever other objections might be raised to the district court's

enforcement of local law in this case, therefore, it cannot be said that the court's action was novel.

See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D.D.C. 1975) (for constitutional violation,

imposing mandatory injunction that in part required local agencies to remedy violations of local fire,

building, housing, health, and food regulations at D.C. Jail); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521,

544 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that no appeal had been taken fromthat portion ofthe injunction).6

The court raisesthree arguments in support of its conclusion that the district court abused its

discretion by entertaining local-law claimsthat were within itsjurisdiction. First, the court notes that

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7 History suggests an explanation for the absence of local cases in which the District of

Columbia courts have imposed injunctive relief upon finding a violation of D.C. Code § 24-442. 

Until Congress enacted the D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-

358 (July 29, 1970), 84 Stat. 473, the local courts were courts of limited jurisdiction. The

transfer of jurisdiction from the federal to the local courts was not completed until 30 months

after July 29, 1970. See id., 84 Stat. 479, citing D.C. Code § 16-2901. Litigation seeking

injunctive relief in connection with District of Columbia correctional facilities predated the

completed transfer and has a long history in the federal courts, premised on violations of the

constitution and thus necessitating no recourse to D.C. Code § 24-442. Although the court

asserts that D.C. prisoners seeking injunctive relief are no strangers to the local courts, Op. at 20,

it cites no cases, and hence there is no reason to assume that D.C. prisoners have sought

injunctive relief for violations of D.C. Code § 24-442 and the local courts have ruled that the

statute will not support injunctive relief. To suggest, moreover, that a local court would be

engaged in "usurp[ation]" were it to find violations of D.C. Code § 24-442 and to invoke its

injunctive powers under D.C. Code § 11-921, Op. at 23, goes to the merits and simply ignores the

local court's own view of the breadth of its remedial authority and its invocation of them. See

Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d at 571, and supra n.4. 

injunctions were "never regarded as relief of first resort," cites the ancient rule that equitable relief

will not lie if plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, and points out that "a variety of factors,

including the public interest, mayweigh against the award of an injunction." Op. at 20. With respect,

none of this has anything to do with novelty. Quite the opposite, in fact: the rules cited by the court

were formulated by the Chancellor long before the District of Columbia even existed. See DOBBS,

supra, at § 2.5 (reviewing history of equitable requirement of no adequate remedy at law). If the

district court was too hasty in awarding equitable relief, that would be an error on the merits of the

prisoners' claims having nothing to do with the question whether the claims should have been

entertained in the first place. The mistake would be a misapplication of well-settled law, rather than

a failure to predict the future development of an unsettled issue in the local courts.

The court's second point is that "we can find no case in which a D.C. court has awarded

injunctive relief under section 24-442."7 Op. at 20. The theory is that the local courts might classify

§ 24-442 among causes of action that apply "ordinary tort principles," rather than among those that

permit equitable relief. Id. at 19. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the local courts

would embrace the dichotomy invented by this court, because the availability of equitable reliefis an

ordinary principle of tort law, assuming that the conditions for such relief have been met.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1979). This is no less true simply because the prisoners'

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8

In an argument not relied on by the court, the District contends that because the local courts

have construed the substantive requirements of § 24-442 in light of the analogous federal statute,

18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1994), it would also limit the remedies available under the local law to those

available under federal law. See Matthews v. District of Columbia, 387 A.2d 731 (D.C. 1978)

(citing Jones v. United States, 534 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 19976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978

(1976)). Whereas the federal government has waived sovereign immunity in these circumstances

to permit money damages only, however, the municipal immunity of the District is of much

smaller scope, and local sovereign immunity law has developed independently from federal

sovereign immunity law. Graves v. District of Colum., 310 A.2d 857, 860-61 (D.C. 1973) (in

banc). The frequency with which local courts have ordered structural injunctions against District

departments and agencies bears witness to this independence. 

9

See, e.g., Bear v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 540 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Iowa 1995); Riha v. Firstier Bank,

539 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Neb. 1995); Stern v. Delphi Internet Svcs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); Ducham v. Tuma, 877 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Mont. 1994); May Dep't Stores

Co. v. State ex rel. Woodard, 863 P.2d 967, 978 (Colo. 1993); Jensen v. General Elec. Co., 623

N.E.2d 547, 553 (N.Y. 1993); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 431 S.E.2d 828,

838 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 

cause of action arises from a statute.8

[A]lthough we examine the text and history of a statute to determine whether

Congress intended to create a right of action ... we presume the availability of all

appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. This

principle has deep roots in our jurisprudence.

Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992). Ordinarily, of course, the

remedy for an isolated violation of a duty of care is money damages. Here, however, the plaintiffs

alleged persistent violations that threatened ongoing harm to them and prayed for injunctive relief

pursuant to local law, cf. Grano, 733 F.2d at 189. An injunction is the "appropriate" remedy when

such claims are proven.9

The court's holding thus resolves to this: it is intolerably novel for a district court to assume

that remedies generally applicable to persistent institutional violations of duties of care will apply to

such violations of a particular duty of care until the local courts so apply iteven when there is no

local authority remotely suggesting that the general rule would not apply. That cannot be the law.

As noted, the application of a well-settled generalrule to a current case always presentssome degree

of novelty. It is the exception, however, for the district court to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction, see 13B CHARLESALANWRIGHTETAL.,FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.3

& n.17 (Supp. 1996), and therefore the application of a generalrule in the context of a particular case

must be fairly uncertain before a local-law claim may be dismissed. To say that the local-law claims

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10 The District's challenge to the portion of the district court's remedial order addressing

medical care is limited to the assertion that supplemental jurisdiction was improperly exercised. 

The District has not challenged the scope of the relief ordered. Because of its agreement with the

District's position on supplemental jurisdiction, the court does not reach the question whether the

district court's order was properly crafted. I also express no opinion as to the propriety of the

relief ordered. 

in this case not only may but must be dismissed is to suggest that it is the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction that is the exception.

The court turns finally to another paragraph of § 1367, asserting that the "intrusiveness" of

the remedy is "[an]other compelling reason[ ] for declining jurisdiction." Op. at 22 (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(4)). Again, the court confuses the question whether the district court was correct on the

merits with the question whether the claims should have been heard at all. If the remedy is too

intrusive, contains overly "detailed marching orders," Op. at 22, or is not sufficiently connected to

proven violations of the District's duties, then this court should vacate erroneous portions of the

order, rather than permitting the District to continue illegally inflicting injuries on the prisoners by

dismissing the claims altogether.10

The court expands the scope of § 1367(c)(4) to cover ground that is already treated by other

doctrines. Section 1367(c)(4) is a catch-all provision; it permits the district court to recognize

situations unforeseen by the drafters in which it is appropriate to decline jurisdiction. By using such

words as "exceptional" and "compelling," however, Congress indicated that invocations of §

1367(c)(4) should be rare. Executive Software N. Amer., Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d

1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994). In particular, there is no "compelling" reason to decline jurisdiction

where other doctrines exist to protect the interests purportedly supporting dismissal. The Supreme

Court cases cited by the court that require caution in deciding when to impose a structural injunction

and further caution in fashioning such an injunction, for example, create a doctrine of remedies that

protects states and localities from overly intrusive and far-reaching federal oversight of local

institutions. Op. at 15-16 (citing, inter alia, Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996)). Abstention

doctrines also recognize the important interests of states in retaining control of complex matters of

local administration. E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943); Louisiana Power

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11 Local-law claims falling within the district court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to §

1367(a) do not lose their jurisdictional character simply because they meet one of the criteria for

discretionary dismissal pursuant to § 1367(c). LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1396-97

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (in banc). 

&Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959). There is no occasion to depart from the carefully

delineated boundaries of these doctrines by invoking the very general language of § 1367(c)(4).

The federal courts have an obligation to resolve claims falling within their jurisdiction.11

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1996). In a few cases, there are good

reasonsfor declining to do so. Id. at 1720-21. This is not one of them. The prisoners' claims present

a garden- variety prayer for injunctive relief that raises only limited uncertainty in the application of

local law. Further, the district court's power to grant broad relief for local-law violations is

adequately circumscribedas it is with respect to federal violationsby the doctrines governing

equitable relief in institutional reform litigation. Accordingly, as the court has done with other

portions of the order, I would remand WW 20-34, 36-62, 131-32, and 133-36 of the order so that

the district court might consider the effect of any changed factual circumstances and the intervening

passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-02 (1996).

II.

The court's equal protection analysis is also flawed. Two people commit the same crime.

Each is similarly convicted by a District of Columbia court. In all respectscriminal history, family

circumstances, education, drug use, favorite baseball teamthey are identical. All save one, that is:

they are of different sexes. Solely because of that difference, they are sent to different facilities at

which the man enjoys superior programming options. Rather than examine whether the District can

justify its separate and unequal treatment of the sexes, however, the court concludes that concludes

that equal protection principles do not even apply: these two identical prisoners are not "similarly

situated." Op. at 23-26.

Not surprisingly, there are flaws in an analysis that concludes that identical people are not

similar. The court errs because it starts in the middle, rather than at the beginning. The District

consigns similarly situated men and women to separate facilities having different characteristics,

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12 But cf. Rosemary Herbert, Note, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94

YALE L.J. 1182, 1204 (1985) (considering possible justifications for sex segregated prisons and

concluding that such prisons violate the Constitution). 

acting expressly on the basis of their sex. The court relies on the different characteristics of the

facilities to conclude that the otherwise identical men and women incarcerated therein are not

similarly situated, and on that basis holds that there can be no judicial comparison of the differences

in the treatment accorded to them. The anomalous result is that the more unequal the men's and

women's prisons are, the less likely it is that this court will consider differences in the prison

experiences of men and women unconstitutional. Indeed, by maintaining drastically unequal prisons

for the two sexes, the government could foreclose any comparison of the rehabilitative programs it

provides for the benefit of men and women. This analysis stands the concept of equal protection on

its head. The District may not treat men and women dissimilarly and then rely on the very

dissimilarity it has created to justify discrimination in the provision of benefits. I therefore dissent

from Part II B of the court's opinion.

A.

Proper analysisstartsfroma feature ofthe District's prisonsthat has not been challenged: the

physical separation of male and female prisoners. Because the prisoners have not challenged sex

segregation, the court must assume that such segregation is lawful: in other words, that this facial

sex-based classification "serves important governmental objectives and ... the discriminatory means

employed are substantially related to the achievement ofthose objectives." United States v. Virginia,

116 S. Ct. 2264, 2271 (1996) ("VMI") (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.

718, 724 (1982)).12 What should not be assumed, however, is the propriety of the very practice

challenged by the prisoners. Even if the District may properly segregate prisoners by sex, it does not

follow that it may segregate them by sex into unequal facilities. Put in doctrinal terms, the

"important governmentalobjectives" served bythe physicalseparationofthe sexes are not necessarily

served by providing different benefits to the segregated populations. Thus, to justify depriving

women of the programming choices available to men, the District must explain how the deprivation

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13 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the sex- based classification itself must

further the governmental objective. Thus, it is not enough that providing programs to men

furthers a governmental purpose; depriving women of equal treatment must also be substantially

related to that purpose. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 ("the only question is whether discrimination

on the basis of gender in jury selection substantially furthers the State's legitimate interest in

achieving a fair and impartial trial"). 

14 Constitutionally, it would be equally objectionable if the District provided the women with

construction and carpentry classes and the men with sewing and cooking classes. 

substantially relates to the achievement of an important governmental objective.13 Pitts v.

Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453-55 (D.C. Cir. 1989); West v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 847

F. Supp. 402, 406 (W.D. Va. 1994).

The court relieves the District of its constitutional obligation by ignoring how the prisoners

came to be segregated. Referring instead to the size, location, and other "physical limitations" of the

women's prison facilities, the court concludesthat womenwho inhabit those facilities are not similarly

situated to otherwise identical men who are incarcerated elsewhere. Because the District places men

and women into physically different facilities on the basis ofsex, however, the court's argument that

differences in the facilities justify the inferior treatment accorded to women is "notably circular."

VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2281.

[T]he State avoidsthe fact that all State female felons are sent to Huron Valley while

all male felons are not confined in a facility of comparable limitations. In this context,

"institutional size" is, frankly, not a justification but an excuse for the kind of

treatment afforded women prisoners.

Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Under the court's rationale, it would

almost seem that the District could send men to a country club and women to the Black Hole of

Calcutta; a difference in treatment the women received there would be ascribed to their dissimilar

situation and would require no furtherjustification. Less fancifully perhaps, the District could provide

only stereotypically feminine programming at the women's prisons, such as cooking and sewing

classes, while providing men with training in stereotypically masculine pursuits such as construction

and carpentry.

14 Or the District could simply cease providing any programming at all at the women's

prisons. See West, 847 F. Supp. at 407. In any of these cases, the court apparently would not

examine the differencesin treatment accorded to men and women. The court's holding that male and

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15 See, e.g., Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 657 (noting that work details at the Annex are

limited to such things as housekeeping and library work, while men at Minimum have access to

work details in carpentry, plumbing, and other skilled tasks); id. at 659 (women at CTF have

access to associate degree programs, while men at Central, Medium, and Occoquan can earn

bachelor's degrees). "Visiting American prisons in the 1990s is like taking a time machine back to

the high schools of the '50s, where the boys took Shop, and the girls learned cooking, baking, and

sewingglorified under the name of Home Economics." Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist

Challenge in Criminal Law, 43 PENN. L. REV. 2151, 2198 (1995). Another commentator has

observed that differences in population do not "account for the inferior quality of the

programming. Only discrimination explains why male prisoners are assigned to apprenticeships

that lead to well-paying and secure jobs outside of prison while female prisoners are relegated to

those which require little to no training." Stefanie Fleischer Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on

Behalf of Women Offenders, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (1995). 

16 As the VMI Court emphasized, even if one assumes that sex segregation is permissible, as

segregation by race once was, the government must at least meet the separate-but-equal standard: 

"In line with Sweatt [v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950),] we rule here that Virginia has not shown

substantial equality in the separate educational opportunities the State supports" at single-sex

colleges. 116 S. Ct. at 2286. 

female prisoners are dissimilarly situated would preclude constitutional comparison of programming

no matter how vast the differences in programming were.

Thisis not to suggest that population size is completely irrelevant to equalprotection analysis.

Because women comprise a fairly small(but rising) percentage offelons, it is not reasonable to expect

that the menu of programs at a women's prison will be exactly the same as that at a men's prison.

This, however, is properly accounted for in determining whether the benefits afforded to women are

substantially equivalent to those afforded to men. The court errs by using different population sizes

to avoid making a comparison at all. Nor does a "per inmate" numerical comparison suffice. See Op.

at 27. As the district court recognized, the programs available to men are often different in kind, not

only in number, from those available to women.15

The constitutional guarantee as well as Supreme Court doctrine require that when the

government confines people and segregates them by sex, it has a duty to justify not only the fact of

segregation but also any differences in the facilities into which men and women are segregated.16

Therefore, even if the District may constitutionally segregate prisoners by sex, it does not thereby

gain the right to treat men and women differently in other respects. Rather, differences in

post-segregation treatmentlike any other sex-based provision of governmental benefits and

burdensmust meet the heightened scrutiny test outlined in VMI. If a difference in programming

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17 But cf. NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

195-207 (1990) (discussing solutions to historical "inferior treatment" of women prisoners that do

not require integration of the sexes). 

18 Nor, for that matter, why a man lacking in confidence should be denied the opportunity to

take classes in self-esteem just because men in general may hold themselves in higher esteem than

do women. 

were inherent in the fact ofsex-segregated prisons, for example, then the same governmental interest

that supports sex segregation might support the programming difference.17If it were reasonably

feasible to have identical programming in sex-segregated facilities, however, then any differences

would not be substantiallyrelated to the objectivesjustifying segregation, and the District would have

to justify the difference on some other ground.

The Supreme Court'ssex discrimination cases make it clear that the government may not rely

on generalizationseven somewhat accurate onesabout women to justify different treatment of

the sexes. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2280; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427 n.11

(1994). Yet that is what the court permits the District to do, in the guise of requiring the district

court to consider "special characteristics" of the male and female prison populations as a whole. For

an idea ofwhat "special characteristics"might be, the district court should presumablyhave consulted

the opinion in Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Iowa 1995), cited with evident approval by

this court. Op. at 25. Pargo noted the following programs devoted to the "special characteristics"

of the female prison population in Iowa: "[p]rograms about domestic violence, prostitution, and

incest survivors"; "a family preservation program" apparently devoted to the needs of prisoners who

had been custodial parents; "counseling for postpartum depression"; "classes in anger management

and self-esteem"; and unspecified programs for inmates with eating disorders. 894 F. Supp. at 1261.

Assuming that the "special characteristics" identified byPargo are more common among women than

men, it is unclear why that fact should prohibit a particular woman from choosing to work on a

carpentry detail over receiving counseling for post-partum depression.18 "[E]stimates of what is

appropriate for most women[ ] no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and

capacity place them outside the average description." VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2284.

What the Constitution commands, rather, is that the District address directly the differences

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19 The District asserted that women had more acute substance abuse problems than men, but

the district court rejected the assertion as unfounded in the record. Women Prisoners I, 877 F.

Supp. at 676. As J.E.B. and VMI make clear, however, even if the assertion were true, it would

not justify using sex as a proxy for drug addiction. 

among individuals that pertain to the purposes of its prison programs, rather than using sex as a

proxy for such differences. If, for example, the purposes of prison programs would be served by

providing special programsfor prisoners with substance abuse problems, the District could offersuch

programs to drug-addicted prisoners of both sexes. It would not be permissible, however, for the

District to presume that women as a group were more likely to have such problems and therefore

offer drug-related programming only at women's facilities.19 The court's similarly-situated analysis

encourages the District to take such impermissible actions. By immunizing the District from any

comparison of programming at men's and women's prisons, the court's decision may result in having

more "woman-appropriate" programming at the women'sfacilities. Subjecting programming choices

to appropriate equal protection analysis ensures that the District meets its constitutional obligation

to give equal opportunities to male and female individuals. The court errs by exempting from

comparison the benefits the District provides to men and women prisoners, and thus exempting the

District from having to justify its different treatment of the sexes.

B.

Aside from treating the government-imposed segregation of the sexes into different facilities

asif were sui generis and of no constitutional importance, the court also misconceives what it means

for personsto be "similarly situated" for purposes of equal protection analysis. Whether two people

(or classes of people) treated differently by the government are similarly situated depends on the

purpose for which the government is acting. Cf. Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727,

734-35 (8th Cir. 1994) (McMillian, J., dissenting) (noting that men and women are imprisoned for

the same purpose and are similarly situated "with respect to the goal of rehabilitation"); Glover, 478

F. Supp. at 1081-83 (considering goals of incarceration and programming). In Rostker v. Goldberg,

453 U.S. 57 (1981), for example, the Supreme Court concluded that men and women were not

similarly situated with respect to the purpose of Selective Service registration.

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20 The epitome of the court's approach is captured in the concluding paragraph of its analysis: 

"Given these significant differences in the situation of the women at the Annex and CTF and those

of the men at the facilities with which the court compared them ... we need not examine the

programs themselves ...." Op. at 30-31. 

21 "It is well-settled that financial hardship is not a defense to sex discrimination in prisons." 

Klinger, 31 F.3d at 736 (McMillian, J., dissenting) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,

633 (1969)). See also Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1078 n.2. Cf. Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1461-63 (finding

District's attempts to ameliorate burden differentially imposed on women probative of lack of

invidious discriminatory intent, even though attempts had been frustrated by budgetary

constraints). 

22 This is not to suggest that prisoners can be excluded from programs only by reference to the

programs' purpose. Other governmental interests, such as public safety in administering a work

furlough program, could support an exclusion. 

The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops.... [W]omen

are excluded from combat.... Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on

women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or a registration for

a draft.... The exemption of women from registration is not only sufficiently but also

closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration.

Id. at 77-79 (emphasis added). In contrast, the court repeatedly states that men and women prisoners

are not similarly situated without ever mentioning the purpose with respect to which they are

dissimilarly situated.20 It is thus unsurprising that the court fixates on such irrelevancies as the size

of the various facilities, which have everything to do with the cost of administering programs and

nothing to do with determining which inmates are similarly capable of benefiting from them.21

Notably, this was not an error into which the district court fell. See, e.g., Women Prisoners I, 877

F. Supp. at 675 (finding women at the Annex similarly situated to men at Minimum with respect to

the purposes of programming because "[b]oth of these populations are preparing for release into the

community and therefore[ ] have the same need to fully prepare themselves for this stage of their

lives"). See also Klinger, 31 F.3d at 735 (McMillian, J., dissenting) (noting that men and women are

equally capable of benefiting from programs).

Determining the purpose of government action before embarking on a similarly-situated

analysis is inherent in the individual nature of equal protection rights. For example, if the District

determined that the purposes of a certain program would be better served if it were offered to

prisoners who were relatively close to release,22then to determine whether two individuals were

similarly situated with respect to the program's purpose would depend on how close each was to

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23 See Schulhofer, supra n.13, 143 PENN. L. REV. at 2201. 

24 The District did not address equal protection until its reply brief. The relevant portion of its

opening brief was devoted solely to challenging the district court's findings of Title IX violations. 

Most of that discussion concerned whether certain programs were "educational" and thus subject

to Title IX. Appellants' brief at 35-37, consisting largely of a lengthy quotation from Klinger,

added that in any event there was no Title IX violation because female prisoners were not

similarly situated to male prisoners. Only in the reply brief did the District extend its argument to

cover equal protection. 

25 But see VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.1) ("we are not

faced with the question of whether States can provide "separate but equal' undergraduate

institutions for males and females"). 

26 See, e.g., Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 677 (finding no violation with respect to

vocational training and apprenticeships because "women at the Annex and men at Minimum have

equivalent access to meager offerings"); id. (finding that the District "fail[ed] to provide

equivalent opportunity in the area of work details"); id. (finding that although the industrial

programs at the Annex and Minimum differed in content, plaintiffs "have failed to prove that

release. Asking whether members of that person's sex are generally close to release would not answer

the question whether the individual is being treated arbitrarily.23 It is only the rare situation in which

every member of a quasi-suspect class is identically situated with respect to the governmental

purpose, as in Rostker, in which a court can conclude that any individual class member's claim can

be rejected at "the threshold." In other cases, even if general differences between most men and most

women can be discerned, the government must still provide an "exceedingly persuasive" justification

for categorically treating the sexes differently. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.

The court'sfailure to consider the purposes ofthe various prison programs at issue is perhaps

understandable, inasmuch asthe District has not supplied any. It is the government's burden to come

forward with a justification for a sex-based classification, id., yet the District's brief is silent on this

point.

24 Without an explanation of the purpose of programming, the court is in no position to decide

that male and female prisoners are categorically dissimilarly situated with respect to all ofthe various

programs.

C.

Even assuming the government mayconstitutionallyprovide separate programsfor the sexes,

the programs must be substantially equivalent. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2285-86 (quoting Sweatt); Glover,

478 F. Supp. at 1079.25 The district court correctly applied this standard.26 This does not mean,

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women prisoners ... do not receive industrial opportunities equivalent to male prisoners ...."); id.

at 686 (¶ 84 of the order) (ordering the District to "provide women at CTF with a range of work

opportunities that is equivalent to the range of work opportunities provided to male prisoners at

the Occoquan, Central and Medium facilities"). 

27 In this example, medium-custody women would not be similarly situated to

minimum-custody men with respect to the program, just as women who were categorically

ineligible for combat were not similarly situated to combat-eligible men with respect to draft

registration in Rostker.

28 Thus, the court mischaracterizes the analysis of the dissent as tantamount to a conclusion

that "if male inmates have access to a work detail that is unavailable to women," or "[i]f men can

spend an extra hour a day in a gymnasium," then there is a violation of equal protection. Op. at

29. Rather, consistent with due deference to District officials that is consistent with constitutional

protections, the District must explain the governmental purpose behind such differences for

similarly situated prisoners. This imposes no liability as a result of program-by-program

comparisons, see Op. at 30, but only recognizes that District officials are subject to the

however, that all women must have accessto the programming choicesthat are available to anyman.

Rational sex-neutral criteria, applied evenhandedly to men and women, may be used to determine

eligibility for programs. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 & n.16; Op. at 26 (quoting testimony of Ms.

Regina Gilmore and Dr. T.A. Ryan). If custody level is such a criterion, for example, then

medium-custodywomen would not be entitled to programsmade available only to minimum-custody

men.27 However, if the District chooses to house minimum- and medium-custody women in the same

facility, it cannot use that fact to deny the programs to minimum-custody women. That is, the

District may not treat differently men and women who are identical but for sex, something it surely

would do by sending minimum-custody women to a facility where they are provided inferior

programming to the programming available to minimum-security men.

When the sexes are permissibly segregated, "substantial equivalence" may not require

perfectly identical treatment. Some differences may be unavoidable because of the physical

separation. Moreover, the peculiar circumstances of prison administration may require different

programsfor prisoners housed in different facilities. See Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1455. While programming

decisions are to be made by the District and not by the court, cf. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220,

1229 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Title IX to prison programs), the District must show that the

important penological interests implicated by the policies of its various facilities have a substantial

relationship to the denial of access by a female prisoner to a program available to male prisoners.28

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Constitution in its treatment of prisoners. 

29 In addition, the district court considered and rejected as factually unfounded several of the

"special characteristics" mentioned by the District. Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 675-76. 

30 For example, the District contends that medium-custody women at CTF cannot receive

equal treatment to medium-custody men at Occoquan, Central, and Medium because the District

has chosen to house the women in the same building as men who have physical impairments or

who are undergoing substance abuse treatment. 

31 The criteria mentioned by the two witnesses and considered by the district court included

"custody level," "substance abuse information," and "impending factors relating to pre-release." 

Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 675 ("[t]he Court will compare prisoners who are similarly

Cf. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). But as the court would have it, the mere

existence of peculiar circumstances at each facility would insulate the government's treatment of the

sexes from judicial comparison and the requirement to justify differences under heightened scrutiny

standards.

The district court's analysis accounted for legitimate, sex- neutral criteria in comparing the

programs available to men to those available to women. As the court notes, the district court

considered "custody levels,sentence structures, and purposes ofincarceration" ofthe prisoners. Op.

at 25 (quoting Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at 675). On appeal, the District has not shown that

the district court ignored any relevant criterion. In its opening brief, the District lists four criteria:

number of inmates at an institution, "length ofstay," classification level, and "special characteristics."

As previously explained, the first and last of these are analytically inappropriate,29 and the district

court expressly considered the other two criteria. In its reply brief, the District focuses almost

entirely on the physical differences between the facilities to which it has chosen to assign otherwise

identical men and women,30 yet such physical differences caused by the District itself cannot alone

excuse sex-based discrimination. The court, meanwhile, faults the district court for not considering

population size, other physical aspects of the sex-segregated facilities, and "special characteristics,"

which are all improper basesfor treating women differently from men. Op. at 25-28. Otherwise, the

court cites a list of criteria culled from the testimony of two witnesses, but points to no record

evidence that the populations compared by the district court differed with respect to any of them.

Id. at 26. In any event, the district court did consider at least some of the cited criteria,31and the

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situated by virtue of their similar custody levels"); id. ("[a] comparison [of women at CTF] to

CTF men would be inappropriate because the men reside at CTF for either short-term diagnostic

attention of a voluntary 18-month intensive substance abuse program"); id.(comparing women at

Minimum to men at Annex because both "are preparing for release into the community"). 

32 The court, Op. at 27, overlooks the district court's specific findings in regard to educational

opportunities, inter alia, in support of its conclusion that "women at CFT do not have reasonable

opportunities for similar studies [as men] and do not have an equal opportunity to participate in

programs of comparable quality [as are available to men]." Women Prisoners I, 877 F. Supp. at

678. 

District has not urged error based on any criterion that the district court may have overlooked. Thus,

even if one of the criteria mentioned by the witnesses were crucial to the analysis, the proper result

would be to remand for the district court to receive further evidence and consider the relevant

criterion. Pargo v. Elliot, 49 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1995).

For these reasons, I conclude that the District has demonstrated no error in the district court's

analysis. The district court correctly found that women imprisoned at the Annex and CTF receive

inferior programming because of their sex.32 None of the arguments mustered by the court can

change the inescapable fact that the District's policies would, solely on the basis of sex, send two

otherwise identical people, convicted of the same crime, facing the same sentence, and imprisoned

for the same purpose, to facilities offering substantiallyunequalprogramming. The court, byignoring

this fact, does not require the District to take even the most minimal steps to assure parity of access

to opportunities between the sexes. Equal protection requires more. Unfortunately for the prisoners,

and for theConstitution, the court has chosen to follow the example of another circuit that mistakenly

believed that the government "could provide, with fidelity to the equal protection principle, separate

and unequal educational programsfor men and women." VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2286 (reversing 44 F.3d

1229 (4th Cir. 1995)).

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from PartsII A and II B of the court's decision, and would

remand the portions of the order vacated in those parts of the opinion so that the district court could

consider the impact, if any, of the Prison Reform Act of 1995.

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