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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 16, 2007 Decided November 23, 2007

No. 06-5305

ABHE & SVOBODA, INC.

APPELLANT

v.

ELAINE CHAO, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv01973)

Maurice Baskin argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Thomas R. Davies was on the brief for amicus curiae

Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. in support of

appellant.

Benton G. Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

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cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal concerns four

challenges by a government contractor to the withholding of

contract payment for violation of the Davis-Bacon Act, 40

U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. Although the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to review challenges to the correctness of the

Secretary of Labor’s wage determinations under the Act, see

United States v. Binghamton Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 177

(1954), we are aligned with our sister circuits in holding that we

have jurisdiction to review procedural challenges. We hold,

upon de novo review, that the district court correctly dismissed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the

contractor’s claims of estoppel, failure to follow Department

regulations, and denial of due process by failing to give fair

consideration to the contractor’s challenges to the job

classification determination. However, because the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over the contractor’s claim that a

limited area practice survey was not supported by substantial

evidence, we dismiss that claim pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). We affirm the grant of summary

judgment to the Secretary on the contractor’s claim that the

Department violated due process by failing to give fair notice of

the requirement to abide by local practices regarding job

classifications. Although the Secretary’s wage determination

did not expressly so state, administrative and judicial decisions

and the Act itself provided adequate notice to the Company,

particularly in light of Department regulations affording a means

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of obtaining clarification of wage determinations and the job

classifications that they require. 

I.

The Davis-Bacon Act is “a minimum wage law designed for

the benefit of construction workers,” Binghamton, 347 U.S. at

178, “‘protect[ing] local wage standards by preventing

contractors from basing their bids on wages lower than those

prevailing in the area,’” Univs. Research Ass’n v. Coutu, 450

U.S. 754, 773 (1981) (quoting H. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,

87TH CONG.,LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT

1 (Comm. Print 1962)). The Act requires that covered

contractors pay employees “minimum wages . . . based on the

wages the Secretary of Labor determines to be prevailing for the

corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on

projects of a character similar to the contract work in the civil

subdivision of the State in which the work is to be

performed . . . .” 40 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The Federal-Aid

Highway Act, which authorized the highway projects at issue,

provides that employees “shall be paid wages at rates not less

than those prevailing on the same type of work on similar

construction in the immediate locality as determined by the

Secretary of Labor” under the Davis-Bacon Act. 23 U.S.C. §

113(a).

Pursuant to the Department’s regulations, see 29 C.F.R. pts.

1, 5, 7, the function of issuing wage determinations is delegated

to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. Id.

§ 1.1(a). The Administrator typically promulgates general wage

determinations at the county level, id. § 1.7(a), determining local

prevailing wages based, for example, on survey data of actual

wages paid or local collective bargaining agreements, see 40

U.S.C. § 3142(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1.3(b). A government agency,

including a State highway department, 29 C.F.R. § 1.2(d), need

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1

 For instance, the general wage determination includes the

initials PAIN0011C to indicate that wages for “Painters (Bridge

Construction)” were based on the wages established in a collective

bargaining agreement signed by District Council 11 of the

International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades. See Decl. of

William Gross ¶ 6.

not notify the Department before incorporating a general wage

determination into bid solicitations for a federally funded project

so long as “questions concerning its use shall be referred to the

Department of Labor . . . .” Id. § 1.5(a). While the wage

determinations may not include detailed information about the

duties covered by each job classification, the Department’s

regulations provide that “[a]ll questions relating to the

application and interpretation of wage determinations (including

the classifications therein) . . . shall be referred to the

Administrator for appropriate ruling or interpretation.” Id.

§ 5.13; see also Univs. Research Ass’n, 450 U.S. at 760-61. 

Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. is a construction company primarily

engaged in the repair of large infrastructure, like bridges and

dams. In 1993 and 1994, the Company was the winning bidder

on three bridge repainting projects sponsored by the State of

Connecticut Department of Transportation (“CTDOT”).

Because the projects involved federal funding, CTDOT provided

the Company with a copy of general wage determinations that

listed applicable wages for all classifications of workers for

“Building Construction Projects” and “Heavy and Highway

Construction Projects” in the relevant counties. Under these

general wage determinations, the wages for painters, laborers,

and carpenters were each based on union collective bargaining

agreements; the relevant unions were noted in the wage

determinations by their initials.1

 At least three of the wage

determinations provided to the Company expressly noted that an

“‘SU’ designation [not used for carpenters, laborers, or painters

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2

 Chapter 15, § 15f05(c)(2) of the Field Operations Handbook

provides in pertinent part that: 

If the applicable [wage determination] reflects union

rates for the classifications involved, the unions

whose jurisdiction the work may be within should be

contacted to determine whether the respective union

performed the work in question on similar projects in

the county in the period one year prior to the

beginning of construction of the project at issue. If

so, each union should be asked how the individuals

classifications] means that rates listed under that identifier do

not reflect collectively bargained wage and fringe benefit rates.

Other designations indicate unions whose rates have been

determined to be prevailing.” Further, the Company does not

contest that the wage determinations indicated that they were

based on collective bargaining agreements. Upon winning the

bid, the Company made inquiries of several other contractors

about the job classifications they had used on similar projects

but made no effort to contact the relevant unions noted in the

wage determinations. Based on these inquiries, its “nationwide

experience,” and its own “tools of the trade” analysis, the

Company determined that its employees functioned as painters,

laborers, and carpenters depending on the duties they performed

and paid them accordingly at different wage rates.

In 1996, the Wage and Hour Division began an

investigation of the Company’s classification practices,

conducting a “limited area practice survey” in accordance with

the “Field Operations Handbook” to determine the practice of

the union signatories to the collective bargaining agreements

that were the source of the wages included in the general wage

determinations. See Wage & Hour Division, Field Operations

Handbook, ch. 15, § 15f05 (1990), available at

www.dol.gov/esa/whd/foh.2

 The Division contacted the unions

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who performed that work were classified. . . . In

addition, the information provided by the unions

should be confirmed with collective bargaining

representatives of management (e.g., contractors’

associations such as local chapters of the Associated

General Contractors of America . . . ). If all parties

agree as to the proper classification for the work in

question, the area practice is established.

that represented the painters, laborers, and carpenters, as well as

the President of the Connecticut Construction Industries

Association. All agreed that the painters union claimed all work

performed on bridge painting projects. The Administrator found

that this was the area practice and, therefore, that the Company

had misclassified its employees when it had paid some of them

as laborers and carpenters. As the prime contractor, the

Company was subject to the withholding of contractual

payments of $1.3 million. See 40 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(3). 

The Company requested review of the Administrator’s

findings, see 29 C.F.R. § 5.11(2), and, after a forty-nine day

hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) agreed that the

Company had misclassified its employees and rejected the

Company’s argument that the Department was equitably

estopped from seeking back wages. The Company appealed to

the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), which upon de novo

review, see 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), affirmed the ALJ’s decision. In

the course of a 30-page discussion, the ARB rejected the

Company’s arguments that the ALJ’s decision should be set

aside because he had adopted the findings and conclusions of the

Administrator’s post-hearing brief virtually verbatim, and that

the Department had failed to provide adequate notice that all

employees on the bridge painting projects should be paid as

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painters. The Company then sued the Secretary in federal

district court, alleging that the Department: (1) was estopped

from applying its wage determination regarding the scope of the

painters classification because CTDOT had approved of the

Company’s practice; (2) had violated the Company’s due

process right to fair consideration by affirming ALJ findings that

adopted the findings in the Administrator’s post-hearing brief;

(3) had failed to provide fair notice of the requirement that the

Company classify its employees according to union practice;

and (4) had conducted the limited area practice survey in an

arbitrary and capricious manner by failing to include non-union

contractors and by making findings that were not supported by

substantial evidence. The district court dismissed the claims

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim except for

the fair-notice claim, on which it granted summary judgment for

the Secretary. The Company appeals.

II. 

As a threshold matter, the Secretary contends that under

Binghamton, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

three claims that were dismissed by the district court. While not

analyzing the issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the district court ruled

that Binghamton disallows three of the Company’s claims

because the complaint made a “substantive demand for relief,”

seeking to have the court order the Secretary to release $1.3

million in withheld payments. We agree with the Secretary that

the Binghamton bar should be analyzed through the lens of

subject matter jurisdiction, see Mistick PBT v. Chao, 440 F.3d

503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and hold that the court has subject

matter jurisdiction over the Company’s procedural claims,

notwithstanding the type of relief sought. 

Consistent with the grant of jurisdiction to federal courts

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over claims “arising under” federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “only

upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary

legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial

review,” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)

(quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380 (1962)),

abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.

99, 105 (1977). The Davis-Bacon Act provides that the

minimum wages federal contractors pay their employees “shall

be based on the wages the Secretary of Labor determines to be

prevailing . . . .” 40 U.S.C. § 3142(b). In Binghamton, the

Supreme Court held that Congress intended the Act to preclude

judicial review of wage determinations, stating that the Act

“direct[s] the Secretary of Labor to determine, on the basis of

prevailing rates in the locality, the appropriate minimum wages

for each project. The correctness of the Secretary’s

determination is not open to attack on judicial review.” 347

U.S. at 177. 

In light of the “clear and convincing evidence” requirement

of Abbott Laboratories, the Binghamton bar should be narrowly

drawn to shield only the substance of wage determinations from

judicial review, the contents of which the Act entrusts to the

Secretary alone. This court has held that under Binghamton the

court retains subject matter jurisdiction over Department

regulations interpreting the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act, see

Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v. Reich, 24 F.3d 1447 (D.C. Cir.

1994), and the Department’s application of its conformance

procedures, see Mistick, 440 F.3d 503. We now join our sister

circuits in holding that Binghamton does not limit the court’s

jurisdiction over procedural challenges to wage determinations

themselves. See N. Ga. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.

Goldschmidt, 621 F.2d 697, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1980); Fry

Brothers Corp. v. HUD, 614 F.2d 732, 733 (10th Cir. 1980) (per

curiam); Virginia ex rel. Comm’r, Dep’t of Transp. v. Marshall,

599 F.2d 588, 592 (4th Cir. 1979). We hold that the court has

USCA Case #06-5305 Document #1081835 Filed: 11/23/2007 Page 8 of 16
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subject matter jurisdiction over the Company’s estoppel claim

because it does not challenge the correctness of the

Department’s determination of the local practice of classifying

the duties of painters but rather whether that determination can

be applied in light of the Company’s asserted reliance on

CTDOT approval of its practice. Likewise, the court has

jurisdiction over the Company’s Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”) claim that the Wage and Hour Division failed to follow

Department regulations in conducting the limited area practice

survey and its two due process claims that the Department failed

to provide fair consideration of the Company’s arguments or fair

notice of the job classifications. The fact that the Company

seeks release of the $1.3 million withheld from its contract

payment does not convert these procedural claims into a

substantive attack on the wage determinations; not only does the

complaint seek “any such other and further relief as [the] Court

deems proper,” but a prayer for substantive relief does not

automatically transform a claim challenging procedure into one

challenging substance. Cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324,

1328-29 (1995). 

However, we hold that the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the Company’s claim that the findings in the

limited area practice survey that determined the locally

prevailing practice of classifying jobs are not supported by

substantial evidence because this represents a challenge to the

substantive correctness of the Secretary’s wage determinations.

Wage determinations implicitly include the locally prevailing

practice of classifying jobs. See Fry Brothers, 614 F.2d at 733-

34; Framlau Corp. v. Dembling, 360 F. Supp. 806, 809 (E.D. Pa.

1973); cf. United States ex rel. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local

Union No. 38 v. C.W. Roen Constr. Co., 183 F.3d 1088, 1093-94

(9th Cir. 1999). Where collective bargaining agreements form

the basis of wage determinations, the practice of local signatory

unions is conclusive under Department precedent. See Fry

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Brothers Corp., WAB Case No. 76-6, 1977 WL 14823 at *6

(1977); see also Field Operations Handbook, ch. 15, § 15f02.

Thus, the challenge to the substance of the Secretary’s

determination of the proper job classifications of the Company’s

employees runs afoul of the Binghamton bar and must be

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). 

III.

Turning to the merits of the Company’s claims over which

the court has jurisdiction, this court reviews de novo both the

dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the grant of

summary judgment. See Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1

(D.C. Cir. 1996). “In determining whether a complaint states a

claim, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters

of which it may take judicial notice.” Stewart v. Nat’l Educ.

Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Three of the

Company’s claims can be readily rejected for failure to state a

claim; only its claim involving fair notice requires extended

discussion.

The Company’s estoppel claim is that CTDOT “officials

followed a deliberate course of conduct, on which [the

Company] . . . relied, by affirmatively stating that various

workers on the projects were properly classified as laborers

and/or carpenters.” Compl. ¶ 24. Even assuming principles of

equitable estoppel could be applied against the federal

government as an affirmative claim, see Heckler v. Cmty. Health

Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984); ATC Petroleum, Inc. v. Sanders,

860 F.2d 1104, 1111-13 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the alleged

independent actions of a state government agency fail to

demonstrate “affirmative misconduct” by the federal

government, Heckler, 467 U.S. at 67 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)

(quoting INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973)). Therefore, this

USCA Case #06-5305 Document #1081835 Filed: 11/23/2007 Page 10 of 16
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claim was properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The

Company’s claim that the ARB violated its due process rights by

affirming an ALJ decision that adopted the findings and

conclusions of the Administrator’s post-hearing brief is contrary

to relevant precedent, see, e.g., United States v. El Paso Nat’l

Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964), and ignores the fact that it

is the ARB’s decision, which reviewed the ALJ’s decision de

novo and discussed each of the Company’s arguments, that is

before the court. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of this claim was

therefore also appropriate. And in claiming that it was arbitrary

and capricious and contrary to Department regulations to rely on

an area practice survey limited to one segment of the industry,

the Company cannot deny that, under Department precedent,

where a wage determination is based on a collective bargaining

agreement, the proper classification of employees is determined

exclusively by the practices of the signatory unions. See Fry

Brothers, WAB Case No. 76-6; Field Operations Handbook, ch.

15, § 15f05(c)(2). The Company neither identifies a regulation

to the contrary nor disputes that the relevant wage

determinations indicate that the wages for carpenters, laborers,

and painters were based on collective bargaining agreements.

The wage determinations are “public records subject to judicial

notice on a motion to dismiss.” Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958,

965 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Because they rely on collective

bargaining agreements, only the practice of the signatory unions

was relevant to the Department’s investigation, and therefore

this claim was properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

 The Company’s fair notice claim is not so readily disposed

of. Because the general wage determinations did not indicate

the proper method of classifying employees, the Company

contends that the Department failed to provide fair notice that it

had to pay its employees at the painter’s wage, rather than the

carpenter or laborer wage, or that it had a legal obligation to

base its job classifications on locally prevailing union practice.

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The Company maintains that the Department’s application of an

unstated requirement violates the Due Process Clause under

which a regulation must provide “fair warning of the conduct it

prohibits or requires” before “penal sanctions” can be applied.

Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHA, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986);

see Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

As the court observed in General Electric, “[i]n the absence of

notice — for example, where the regulation is not sufficiently

clear to warn a party about what is expected of it — an agency

may not deprive a party of property by imposing civil or

criminal liability.” 53 F.3d at 1328-29. However, the fact that

the wage determination did not itself explain that the Company

had to base its job classification on the practice of the relevant

unions does not end the inquiry. “[P]arties dealing with the

government ‘are expected to know the law,’” ATC Petroleum,

860 F.2d at 1111 (quoting Heckler, 467 U.S. at 63), and “there

is no grave injustice in holding parties to a reasonable

knowledge of the law,” id. at 1112. Existing administrative and

judicial decisions and the Davis-Bacon Act itself put the

Company on fair notice of what was required.

The first source of notice to the Company is the decision by

the Wage Appeals Board (“WAB”), the predecessor to the ARB,

in Fry Brothers. While this case is not officially published, its

inclusion in a commercial reporter and its treatment in

subsequent judicial and administrative cases provide adequate

notice that contractors must use the job classifications of

signatory unions when wage determinations are based on

collective bargaining agreements. In Fry Brothers, WAB Case

No. 76-6, at *6, the WAB explained:

If a construction contractor who is not bound by the

classifications of work at which the majority of

employees in the area are working is free to classify or

reclassify, grade or subgrade traditional craft work as

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3

 The passage quoted is: 

If a construction contractor who is not bound by the

classifications of work at which the majority of

he wishes, such a contractor can, with respect to wage

rates, take almost any job away from the group of

contractors and the employees who work for them who

have established the locality wage standard. There will

be little left to the Davis-Bacon Act. Under the

circumstances that the Assistant Secretary determined

that the wage determinations that had been issued

reflected the prevailing wage in the organized sector it

does not make any difference at all what the practice

may have been for those contractors who do and pay

what they wish.

The WAB therefore found that the contractor had misclassified

its workers by failing to follow the practice of the local unions.

Id. at *5.

Fry Brothers was included in Labor Law Reports, a weekly

newsletter published by Commerce Clearing House that

identifies new developments in labor law. See CCH Online

Store, http://onlinestore.cch.com (follow “Business and

Corporate” hyperlink; then follow “Employment Law”

hyperlink). It was subsequently upheld by the Tenth Circuit,

614 F.2d 732, which does not fully explain the WAB’s decision,

but does indicate that Fry Brothers involved a dispute about the

“wage scale required for a certain group of workers,” id. at 732,

thus providing public notice of the relevance of this decision to

the determination of job classifications. Further, the relevant

portion of Fry Brothers was quoted at length in Building &

Construction Trades’ Department v. Donovan, 543 F. Supp.

1282, 1285 (D.D.C. 1982).3

 The same passage was again quoted

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employees in the area are working is free to classify

or reclassify, grade or subgrade traditional craft work

as he wishes, such a contractor can, with respect to

wage rates, take almost any job away from the group

of contractors and the employees who work for them

who have established the locality wage standard.

There will be little left of the Davis-Bacon Act. 

543 F. Supp. at 1285.

4 Miller Insulation Co., WAB Case No. 91-38, 1992 WL

515931, at *5 (Dec. 30, 1992); Iron Workers II, WAB Case No. 90-26,

1992 WL 465692, *2-6 (Mar. 20, 1992); More Drywall, Inc., WAB

Case No. 90-20, 1991 WL 494732, at *1-2 (Apr. 29, 1991); Van Den

Heuvel Elect., Inc., WAB Case No. 91-03, 1991 WL 523862, at *3

(Feb. 13, 1991) (Rothman, Senior Member, dissenting).

in Tele-Sentry Security, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, No. 90-0912,

1991 WL 178135, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1991), an unpublished

decision that was included in Labor Law Reports, 119 Lab. Cas.

P. 35,534, and Government Contracts Reports, 37 Cont. Cas.

Fed. P. 76,166. Additionally, the Department has incorporated

the principle of Fry Brothers into Chapter 15, § 15f05(c)(2) of

its publically available Field Operations Handbook. See also id.

at ch. 15, § 15f05(b). Fry Brothers was also frequently relied on

by the WAB prior to 1993, including in four opinions in 1991

and 1992, the two years immediately prior to the Company’s

submission of its bids.4 As a Company admittedly engaged in

hundreds of government contracts requiring Davis-Bacon Act

compliance, it follows that the Company should have known

about the requirement first enunciated in Fry Brothers and

incorporated into a broad array of administrative and judicial

decisions. 

The Davis-Bacon Act also should have alerted the Company

to the fact that it could not apply its own methodology of

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classifying jobs. From start to finish, the focus of the Act is on

local practice. The Act protects the wages “prevailing on the

same type of work on similar construction in the immediate

locality . . . .” 23 U.S.C. § 113(a). Long before the contracts at

issue, the court invalidated Department regulations that

permitted employers to use job classifications that deviated from

those locally prevailing. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades’ Dep’t v.

Donovan, 712 F.2d 611, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Company’s

inquiries of other contractors indicate that it knew that local

practice was relevant to classifying its employees. However, the

Company did not fulfill its obligations. As the ARB observed:

[a]lthough [the Company president] professed to be

fully conversant with [Davis-Bacon and related

statutes], wage determinations and the concept of

prevailing wages, . . . he failed to accept the actual

governing principle in [Davis-Bacon and related

statutes] classification cases: the rate to be paid for

particular tasks is the rate found to be prevailing in the

locality for that work, regardless of which tools the

workers were using. 

The Company’s position that it has a right to apply its own

job classifications based on a national “tools of the trade”

analysis, on which it claimed to have relied in over 500

government contract jobs across the country, see Appellant’s Br.

at 10-11, is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the

Davis-Bacon Act that local practice should control government

contracts. The Department’s regulations further underscore that

contractors do not have the authority to determine the scope of

job classifications based on their own methodologies, providing

a means for contractors to obtain clarification from the

Department about the proper scope of jobs under wage

determinations. 29 C.F.R. § 5.13; see also Univs. Research

Ass’n, 450 U.S. at 760-61. 

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In the face of Fry Brothers and its progeny, and the purpose

of the Davis-Bacon Act, the Company urges the court to

construe Fry Brothers narrowly to require only that contractors

abide by known union practices. Here, the relevant union

signatories were noted in the wage determinations and although

the Department might have provided more explicit guidance that

would have further forestalled a fair notice challenge, a

company engaged in work subject to the Davis-Bacon Act

cannot reasonably ignore the obvious. The Company offers no

explanation for not contacting the relevant unions or inquiring

of the Department if it was unclear about the local practices for

classifying jobs. In any event, the discussion in Fry Brothers

and the principle that underlies it do not suggest that federal

contractors may exercise less than a reasonable effort to

determine the practice of signatory unions when wage

determinations are based on collective bargaining agreements.

Whatever might be the legal effect where a signatory union

stonewalls an inquiring federal contractor, the Company made

no effort to ascertain the practices of the unions noted in the

wage determination. The objection by amicus Associated

Builders & Contractors, Inc. that the Department places too

onerous a burden on federal contractors because “they cannot

break through the union wall to adequately and clearly

determine their invariably unwritten practices and rules,”

Amicus Br. at 13, therefore rings hollow and ignores the

administrative channel for clarification provided by the

Department’s regulations in 29 C.F.R. § 5.13. 

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to

the Secretary on the fair notice claim and we affirm the

judgment of dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the other

claims except for the substantial evidence challenge, which we

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

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