Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00480/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00480-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

3:17-cv-0480-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HENRY IVAN COGSWELL, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO 

COUNTY, et al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-0480-MMA-BGS 

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 

I. Procedural History

 On March 7, 2017, Henry Ivan Cogswell (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently 

incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San 

Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) 

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff prepaid the 

initial civil filing fee required to commence a civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a). (Doc. No. 4.) 

Case 3:17-cv-00480-MMA-BGS Document 8 Filed 09/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
2 

3:17-cv-0480-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On May 4, 2017, the Court found that Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state a viable 

§ 1983 claim and further found that Plaintiff was seeking monetary damages against 

immune defendants. (Doc. No. 3. at 5.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended 

pleading in order to correct the deficiencies raised by the Court in the Order. (Id.) On 

May 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 6.) 

This matter was then transferred pursuant to the “Low-Number” rule to this Court. 

(Doc. No. 7.) 

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

 As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, even though he paid the filing fee, the 

Court can conduct a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s FAC because he is “incarcerated or 

detained in any facility [and] is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 

violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, 

or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Section 1915A, enacted as part of 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner 

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 

443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). A similar screening provision of the PLRA would apply to 

Plaintiff’s FAC even if he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc). 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

Case 3:17-cv-00480-MMA-BGS Document 8 Filed 09/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
3 

3:17-cv-0480-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 

B. Heck bar 

In Plaintiff’s FAC, he alleges that his defense counsel in his state criminal 

proceedings, and later his appellate counsel, provided “ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

(FAC at 2.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages only against Robert 

Ford, the deputy public defender who represented Plaintiff during his criminal 

proceedings. (Id. at 5.) However, because Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against 

Robert Ford, who was his appointed counsel, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged 

violations of his constitutional rights, his claims amount to an attack on the validity of his 

underlying criminal conviction, and as such, are not addressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

unless he also alleges that his conviction has been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855-856 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state 

remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 . . . .’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489). 

Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-

87. A claim challenging the legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so 

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 

643 (1997). 

Case 3:17-cv-00480-MMA-BGS Document 8 Filed 09/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
4 

3:17-cv-0480-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

“When a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district 

court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the 

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court 

determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate 

the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the 

action should be allowed to proceed.” 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). 

An action barred by Heck should be dismissed for failure to state a claim without 

prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds in invalidating his 

conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649. 

 Here, to the extent Plaintiff intends to raise claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, such claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal conviction and 

continued incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In other words, were Plaintiff to succeed 

in showing that he was provided ineffective assistance of either trial or appellate counsel, 

an award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction and/or 

sentence. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed on 

ineffective assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below 

objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial 

would have been different). 

C. State actor 

 Moreover, even if Plaintiff could show that his conviction has already been 

invalidated, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must also allege that his 

appointed trial and appellate counsel acted “under color of state law” to deprive him of a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988). A person “acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when 

Case 3:17-cv-00480-MMA-BGS Document 8 Filed 09/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
5 

3:17-cv-0480-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 

312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 

 Attorneys who represent criminal defendants generally do not act under color of 

state law because representing a client “is essentially a private function . . . for which 

state office and authority are not needed.” Dodson, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De 

Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). When attorneys perform as advocates, 

i.e., meet with clients, investigate possible defenses, present evidence at trial, or make 

arguments to a judge or jury, they do not act under color of state law for section 1983 

purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Dodson, 454 U.S. at 320-

25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that 

public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 because, so long as she 

performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “h[er] function,” no matter how 

ineffective, is “to represent h[er] client, not the interests of the state or county.”). 

D. Validity of Conviction

 The main relief Plaintiff seeks in this action is the “immediate release and relief 

from incarceration.” (FAC at 6.) However, Plaintiff cannot proceed pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, for “[s]uits challenging the validity of [a] prisoner’s continued 

incarceration lie within ‘the heart of habeas corpus.’” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 856, quoting 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-99 (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and 

historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack 

the validity of his confinement” in federal court). “‘[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy 

for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his 

prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Id.; see also Nettles v. Grounds, 

830 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[C]laims ... which would ... result[] in 

immediate release if successful, f[a]ll within the core of habeas corpus and therefore 

Case 3:17-cv-00480-MMA-BGS Document 8 Filed 09/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
6 

3:17-cv-0480-MMA-BGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

[must] be brought, if at all, in habeas.”) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487), cert. denied, 

137 S. Ct. 635 (No. 16-6556) (Jan. 9, 2017). 

III. Leave to Amend

 Finally, while the Court would typically grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of 

his pro se status, it concludes that doing so under the circumstances presented by his 

pleadings in this action would be futile. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Schmier v. U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing 

“[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal without leave to amend). 

However, within thirty (30) days of the filing of this Order, Plaintiff may seek leave to 

file an amended petition in Cogswell v. Superior Court of San Diego, et al., S.D. Cal. 

Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-0118-MMA-BGS. 

IV. Conclusion 

For all the reasons set out above, the Court: 

1) DISMISSES this civil action without leave to amend based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1); and 

2) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be not taken in good 

faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 

445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is 

permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous). 

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: September 19, 2017 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

Case 3:17-cv-00480-MMA-BGS Document 8 Filed 09/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6