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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐1836  

CHESTER O’QUINN,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

TOM SPILLER,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 12‐cv‐00746‐DRH‐CJP — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 28, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 25, 2015

____________________

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In late October 1997, Chester

O’Quinn was charged in Illinois state court with murdering

his girlfriend’s one‐year‐old daughter. Forty‐two months lat‐

er his case proceeded to trial and a jury found him guilty. Af‐

ter exhausting his state appeals, O’Quinn filed a federal ha‐

beas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising multiple claims

of constitutional error. Only one is relevant here: O’Quinn

contends the pretrial delay violated his Sixth Amendment

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2 No. 14‐1836

right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the habeas

petition but granted a certificate of appealability on this sin‐

gle issue.

On O’Quinn’s direct appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court

found the 42‐month delay presumptively prejudicial but

nonetheless rejected his speedy‐trial claim after concluding

that the delay was attributable to continuances requested by

his lawyer and did not impair the defense. That was a rea‐

sonable application of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),

the controlling Supreme Court precedent for Sixth Amend‐

ment speedy‐trial claims. Accordingly, we affirm the denial

of habeas relief.

I. Background

On October 31, 1997, O’Quinn was arrested and charged

with first‐degree murder for shaking his girlfriend’s thirteen‐

month‐old daughter to death. On November 5 his counsel

filed a speedy‐trial demand. Between his arrest and trial,

however, there were 28 continuances, 23 of which were re‐

quested solely by O’Quinn’s counsel. The trial finally began

on April 2, 2001, three years and five months after O’Quinn

was charged.

Twice during this pretrial delay O’Quinn sent pro se let‐

ters to the court complaining that his counsel had requested

the continuances against his wishes. O’Quinn’s letters sought

removal of his counsel and reasserted his demand for a

speedy trial. The record does not show whether his counsel,

the court, or the prosecutor responded to these letters in any

way.

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No. 14‐1836 3

A jury convicted O’Quinn and he was sentenced to

70 years in prison. On direct appeal he argued, among other

things, that the long pretrial delay violated his Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial. Applying the test estab‐

lished in Barker, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that

because O’Quinn’s counsel was responsible for the delay, it

was attributable to O’Quinn himself. People v. O’Quinn,

791 N.E.2d 1066, 1071–72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). The state court

also concluded that the delay did not prejudice O’Quinn’s

defense. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to ap‐

peal.

After exhausting state post‐conviction remedies,

O’Quinn petitioned for federal habeas relief under § 2254.

He raised 11 claims, including a reprise of his Sixth

Amendment speedy‐trial claim. The district judge consid‐

ered and rejected each argument, but he also certified the

speedy‐trial issue for appeal. O’Quinn appealed, and we ap‐

pointed counsel to assist him.1

II. Discussion

As we’ve noted, the sole issue on appeal is whether

O’Quinn’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was vio‐

lated. We’re not concerned, for example, with whether the

numerous continuance requests by O’Quinn’s trial attorney

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The scope of

our review is further limited by the deferential standard for

federal review of state‐court convictions under § 2254. We

                                                 

1 The court thanks Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., David J.B. Froiland, and Ryan

N. Parsons, of Foley & Lardner LLP, for accepting the pro bono appoint‐

ment. They have ably discharged their duties.

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4 No. 14‐1836

ask only whether the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an

unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), (2).

The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment,2 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Barker

provides the framework for evaluating claimed violations of

the right. The Court in Barker identified four factors that bear

on the question whether a particular defendant has been de‐

prived of the right: the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the

delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to

the defendant.” 407 U.S. at 530. No factor is “a necessary or

sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the

right.” Id. at 533. Rather, “they are related factors and must

be considered together with such other circumstances as

may be relevant.” Id. This ad hoc, fact‐sensitive balancing

test gives state courts significant latitude to reach reasonable

decisions based on the specific circumstances of each case.

See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91 (2009) (“[T]he balance

arrived at in close cases ordinarily would not prompt this

Court’s review ... .”).

                                                 

2 In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prose‐

cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public tri‐

al ... .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a

speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions is a fundamental right incorpo‐

rated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klopfer v.

North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).

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No. 14‐1836 5

The first factor in the Barker test is the length of the pre‐

trial delay. This is a double inquiry. First, the length of the

delay operates as a trigger—a delay longer than one year

triggers the full Barker analysis. Second, the length of the de‐

lay is an independent factor—the longer the delay, the more

the presumption of prejudice against the defendant intensi‐

fies. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992).

Here, the Illinois Appellate Court correctly recognized that

the 42‐month delay met the trigger and proceeded to apply

the full Barker analysis. O’Quinn, 791 N.E.2d at 1071–72.  

Barker’s second factor examines the reasons for the delay.

This obviously is a highly case‐specific inquiry, but Barker

established a few general principles. 407 U.S. at 531. For ex‐

ample, “[a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to

hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the

government.” Id. At the other end of the spectrum, “[a] more

neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts

should be weighted less heavily[,] ... [and] a valid reason,

such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropri‐

ate delay.” Id.

O’Quinn argues that his case falls somewhere in the

middle of this spectrum because the State was negligent in

allowing the 28 continuances. This argument overlooks the

basic principle that the actions and decisions of defense

counsel are attributable to the defendant, see Brillon, 556 U.S.

at 92, and in O’Quinn’s case almost all of the delay resulted

from continuances requested by his own lawyer. O’Quinn

apparently disagreed with his attorney’s continuance re‐

quests, but that doesn’t transfer the responsibility for the de‐

lay to the State. Unless the State is responsible for the delay

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in bringing the defendant to trial, there can be no speedy‐

trial violation. Id. at 93–94.  

O’Quinn correctly notes that the Illinois Appellate Court

mistakenly attributed the entire period of delay to the de‐

fense. The court stated that “[t]he record clearly establishes

that defense counsel caused all the pretrial delay, and there‐

fore, the delay must be attributed to [the] defendant.”

O’Quinn, 791 N.E.2d at 1073 (emphasis added). As the par‐

ties now agree, 156 days of delay—approximately five

months of the 42‐month total—were attributable to the pros‐

ecution. So the state court overstated O’Quinn’s responsibil‐

ity for the delay. But this mistake of fact cannot support ha‐

beas relief unless O’Quinn can show that the state court’s de‐

cision was based on it. See § 2254(d)(2) (stating that relief

should not be granted unless the proceedings “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding”) (emphasis added); see also Byrd v. Workman,

645 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2011); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1270 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the continuances re‐

quested by O’Quinn’s lawyer accounted for almost all of the

pretrial delay—about 90% of the total—it cannot reasonably

be argued that this modest factual mistake had any mean‐

ingful effect on the state court’s decision. The factual error

had no constitutional significance.

There’s no controversy about the third factor in the Barker

analysis: O’Quinn asserted his right to a speedy trial in two

pro se letters objecting to the continuances. The state court

correctly accounted for this factor. O’Quinn, 791 N.E.2d at

1073.

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The fourth and final factor looks to whether the defend‐

ant was prejudiced by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. In

this context, prejudice is not limited to effects on a defend‐

ant’s trial strategy. Barker explained that the Sixth Amend‐

ment’s speedy‐trial guarantee protects several interests: (1) it

guards against “oppressive pretrial incarceration”; (2) it min‐

imizes the “anxiety and concern of the accused”; and (3) it

“limit[s] the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”

Id. But the “most serious [of these] is the last[] because the

inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews

the fairness of the entire system.” Id.

The Illinois Appellate Court mentioned the intrinsic di‐

mensions of prejudice, noting that O’Quinn “spent a lengthy

amount of time” in pretrial incarceration, which caused

“unnecessary anxiety and concern.” O’Quinn, 791 N.E.2d at

1073–74. But the court’s prejudice analysis focused primarily

on whether the lengthy delay impaired his defense. Id.

O’Quinn had argued that the delay prevented him from call‐

ing his estranged wife as a witness because she died before

trial. The court considered and rejected this argument. The

record revealed that O’Quinn’s attorney had ruled out the

estranged wife as a witness because she would have been

decidedly unhelpful to the defense. Id. (explaining that the

defense attorney had moved to exclude evidence that

O’Quinn had been investigated for abusing his estranged

wife’s children).

O’Quinn doesn’t quarrel with the state court’s reasoning

on this point. He argues instead that the court gave insuffi‐

cient weight to the presumed prejudice arising from a delay

of this length. Although the length of delay both establishes

and intensifies the presumption of prejudice, “the presumed

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prejudice flowing from a long delay is ‘insufficient to carry a

speedy trial claim absent a strong showing on the other Bark‐

er factors.’” Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 753 (7th Cir. 2014)

(quoting United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir.

2007)). A strong showing of prejudice does not appear in this

record. As important, the vast majority of the pretrial delay

was properly attributed to O’Quinn.

In short, the state court’s decision was not an unreasona‐

ble application of federal law. As such, habeas relief is un‐

warranted.

   AFFIRMED.

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