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Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15-7028 September Term, 2015 FILED ON: FEBRUARY 12, 2016

YING QING LU, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MARK LEZELL,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-01815)

Before: BROWN, PILLARD, AND WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record and the briefs of the parties. See FED R.APP. 34(a)(2); 

D.C.CIR.R. 34(j). The court has accorded the issues full consideration and has determined that they 

do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This court reviews the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) de novo. Kim v. United States, 632 F.3d 713, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Similarly, we 

review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 

601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Claims that were not raised or preserved in the district court 

are reviewed only for plain error. See Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 

431, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“courts may take notice of ‘plain error[s]’ not preserved below”). 

The district court correctly dismissed Lu’s state-law claims. First, the district court correctly 

dismissed Lu’s breach of contract claim as time-barred: Lu discovered the breach of contract 

sometime after May 29, 2008, but did not bring an action until late 2011—several months longer 

than the three-year statute of limitations. Ying Qing Lu v. Lezell, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 

2013). Next, the district court dismissed Lu’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, noting correctly 

that Lu conceded she did not properly plead the elements of a cognizable breach of fiduciary 

duty. Id. at 6–7. After defendants moved for summary judgment, the district court also found 

Lu’s claims for civil conspiracy, negligence and fraud were time-barred. Ying Qing Lu v. Lezell, 

USCA Case #15-7028 Document #1598598 Filed: 02/12/2016 Page 1 of 2
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45 F. Supp. 3d 86, 93–95 (D.D.C. 2014). For reasons that are not immediately apparent, most of 

the state law claims were not asserted on behalf of co-plaintiffs Afshan Afsharnia and Oklahoma 

Shelf Exploration Development Corp., who alleged more recent misconduct by the defendant. 

The district court did not err in dismissing any of these claims.

Likewise, the district court did not err in dismissing a juror before deliberation. During voir 

dire, one juror requested to be excused in order to attend a funeral. When it became apparent that 

court proceedings would last past the time of the scheduled funeral, and given other foreseen 

complications from an impending snow storm, the district court presented the issue to both 

parties. At the time, Lu’s trial counsel did not raise any objection to excusing this juror. See 

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (holding that a claim may be forfeited if it is 

not timely asserted). An unpreserved claim is reviewed in our discretion only, and even then, for 

plain error. Salazar ex rel. Salazar, 602 F.3d at 437. The trial court neither committed error in 

excusing the juror, nor were Lu’s rights affected—substantially or otherwise.

The district court did not commit plain error by declining Lu’s proposed civil RICO jury 

instruction. The district court entertained proposals from both parties to modify or amend the 

proposed jury instructions. Lu’s counsel proposed several changes, including several the district 

court accepted. Appellee App. at 652. Lu’s counsel also requested the district court to instruct 

the jury that “RICO should be liberally interpreted.” Appellee App. at 653. The district court, 

however, declined this modification because it was not “appropriate in a jury instruction.” 

Id. Lu’s counsel acquiesced without objection. Id. Again, because no objection was made at the 

time, we may review for plain error. And, again, we find no plain error in the district court’s 

refusal to adopt the proposed jury instruction.

Finally, the district court did not err in refusing to send certain trial exhibits to the jury for its 

reference during deliberations because those exhibits were not admitted into evidence. “The 

general rule is that materials not admitted into evidence simply should not be sent to the jury for 

use in its deliberations.” See Baugh ex rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 701, 705 

(7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

Pursuant to D.C. CIRCUIT RULE 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any 

timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R.

41(a)(1). 

PER CURIAM

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

 Ken Meadows

 Deputy Clerk

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