Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-05550/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-05550-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RIVERBEND RANCH GOLF COURSE, )

et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

COUNTY OF MADERA, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-97-5550 REC/DLB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

AND EXPENSES

On June 27, 2005, the court heard defendants' Motion for

Attorneys' Fees and Expenses.

Upon due consideration of the record and the arguments of

the parties, the court issues its ruling as set forth herein.

Defendants County of Madera and Leonard Garoupa move the

court for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount

of $321,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Rule 11, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants prevailing in civil rights actions may be awarded

Case 1:97-cv-05550-REC -DLB Document 439 Filed 12/30/05 Page 1 of 6
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attorney's fees only upon a finding that the plaintiff's action

was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though

not brought in subjective bad faith. Christianburg Garment Co.

v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). The plaintiff’s action must

be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without

foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his

case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the

assessment of fees. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 15 (1980). 

An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or

fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Rule 11(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:

By presenting to the court (whether by

signing, filing, submitting, or later

advocating) a pleading, written motion, or

other paper, an attorney ... is certifying

that to the best of the person’s knowledge,

information, and belief, formed after inquiry

reasonable under the circumstances, -

(1) it is not being presented for any

improper purpose, such as to harass or to

cause unnecessary delay or needless increase

in the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal

contentions therein are warranted by existing

law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the

extension, modification, or reversal of

existing law or the establishment of new law;

(3) the allegations and other factual

contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, are likely to

have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or

discovery .... 

The Ninth Circuit has explained the standards governing

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resolution of a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2) as

follows:

It is obvious from the text of the Rule that

the pleader need not be correct in his view

of the law. Thus the granting of a motion to

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim, or the granting of a summary judgment

against the pleader is not dispositive of the

issue of sanctions. The pleader, at a

minimum, must have a ‘good faith argument’

for his or her view of what the law is, or

should be. A good faith belief in the merit

of a legal argument is an objective condition

which a competent attorney attains only after

‘reasonable inquiry.’ Such inquiry is that

amount of examination into the facts and

legal research which is reasonable under the

circumstances of the case. Of course, the

conclusion drawn from the research undertaken

must itself be defensible. Extended research

alone will not save a claim that is without

legal or factual merit from the penalty of

sanctions.

... [W]e affirm that Rule 11 sanctions shall

be assessed if the paper filed in district

court and signed by an attorney ... is

frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without

factual foundation, even though the paper was

not filed in subjective bad faith.

Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-831 (9 Cir. th

1996). “The word ‘frivolous’ does not appear anywhere in the

text of the Rule; rather, it is a shorthand that this court has

used to denote a filing that is both baseless and made without a

reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting

Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9 Cir. 1990). Rule 11 sanctions th

may be imposed even if a pleading is frivolous only in part. 

Burnette v. Godshall, 828 F.Supp. 1439, 1447 (N.D.Cal. 1993),

aff’d, 72 F.3d 766 (9 Cir. 1995). th

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The court concludes that defendant has not established that

it is entitled to attorneys’ fees under either Section 1988 or

Rule 11.

Defendant asserts that plaintiff has employed dilatory

tactics by not being responsive to discovery, not providing the

records evidencing the fact that Riverbend Ranch had conveyed

title to the property prior to commencement of the action,

repeatedly sought continuances, and cited totally irrelevant

cases.

However, plaintiff has been sanctioned for certain of the

delays in this action. Furthermore, delays in providing

discovery and seeking continuances is not a basis for concluding

that the standards under Section 1988 or Rule 11 have been

violated.

Furthermore, resolution of the causes of action for denial

of substantive and procedural due process and equal protection

was based on hotly disputed legal and factual issues with respect

to which the court issued lengthy rulings. While the court did

not accept plaintiff’s legal or factual positions, the court

cannot agree with defendant that the cases cited by plaintiff in

support of their various positions were “totally irrelevant”. 

The court cannot conclude that those causes of action were

frivolous or baseless even though plaintiff did not prevail.

Plaintiff did prevail in part on the Tenth Claim for Relief for

declaratory judgment. With regard to the issues concerning

Riverbend’s inaccurate pleading that it owned the golf course,

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while this incorrect pleading resulted in additional discovery

and motions concerning the standing of Riverbend Ranch to bring

this lawsuit, the court eventually ruled that Riverbend Ranch had

standing because of contractual terms. Even if Riverbend’s

Complaint had been correctly pleaded, there still would have been

discovery and issues concerning standing. Therefore, although

there may be argued that a violation of Rule 11 occurred with

regard to the allegation in the Complaint concerning ownership,

it cannot be said that additional attorneys’ fees were incurred

because of this inaccuracy. It is clear that nine causes of

action were abandoned by plaintiff at summary judgment. The

causes of action for violation of substantive and procedural due

process and equal protection under California law necessarily had

to be conceded after the court ruled in defendant’s favor with

respect to those alleged violations under federal law. Six

causes of action were abandoned by plaintiff without any attempt

to support them on summary judgment. Two of those causes of

action, the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth, were allowed to be

included in an amended complaint after plaintiff made

representations to the court in support of leave to amend to

include them. When questioned at oral argument about these six

causes of action, current counsel for plaintiff essentially

stated that he did not know why these causes of action were

included or why they were abandoned at summary judgment. 

Nonetheless, the court concludes that defendants are have not

shown that attorneys’ fees should be awarded for the fees

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incurred in defending these causes of action, given the court’s

conclusion that fees should not be awarded in the case in

general. The court is frequently faced with causes of action

alleged because it is anticipated that discovery will support the

allegations. The court is frequently faced with statements of

non-opposition to specific claims at summary judgment. Given the

circumstances of this action, including the number of different

attorneys who represented plaintiffs, the court cannot conclude

that the inclusion of these causes of action justifies an award

of attorneys fees under Rule 11 or Section 1988.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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