Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03866/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03866-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Schuylar Ray Davis, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-3866-PHX-FJM(CRP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On December 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docket 1). Petitioner alleges the following grounds for relief:

1. That he was denied his right to compulsory process because counsel failed to

fully interview witnesses in violation of the Sixth Amendment;

2. That he was denied his right to confront adverse witnesses because counsel

failed to fully interview detectives and crime scene investigators in violation

of the Sixth Amendment;

3. That he was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment because counsel failed to

a. present during trial and sentencing evidence of his mental illness or

lengthy drug use,

b. test evidence found in his truck,

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c. fully interview witnesses, and

d. properly defend Petitioner due to his belief that Petitioner was guilty;

4. That the police threw away exculpatory evidence seized at the crime scene in

violation of the Fourth Amendment.

On February 22, 2006, Respondent filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Docket 8). Respondent argues that Petitioner's Petition should be dismissed as

untimely. Respondent further argues that even if Petitioner's Petition was timely it should

be dismissed for procedural default.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Charles R. Pyle for a report and recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends

the District Court, after independent review of the record, enter an order finding that the

Petition (Docket 1) was timely but denying the petition for failure to properly exhaust.

FACTS

After being found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder, Davis was sentenced to

an aggravated term of twenty-two years on December 7, 2001. He timely filed a direct

appeal raising two grounds: 1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence to support a thirdparty culpability defense; and 2) the trial court erred by not giving a Willits instruction

concerning the adverse inference that can be taken from the police failing to preserve

evidence. On December 17, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. No petition

for review to the Arizona Supreme Court was filed.

On December 31, 2003, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in state

court. The subsequently filed petition, prepared by appointed counsel, raised only one issue,

that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing by failing to present evidence of Davis' mental

condition in mitigation. An amended petition raised a Blakely sentencing issue. Both claims

were denied by the trial court on December 4, 2004.

Davis timely filed a pro per petition for review to the State Court of Appeals. In the

petition for review, the Blakely issue was not raised. On September 27, 2005, the Arizona

Court of Appeals denied review. Davis attempted to file a motion for reconsideration of the

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denial of the petition for review. The clerk of the court rejected the filing as non-compliant

with Rule 31.18(d), Ariz.R.Crim.P., and returned the motion to Davis in a letter dated

October 28, 2005, advising Petitioner he had until November 1, 2005, to file a petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court. No petition for review to the Supreme Court was

filed.

On November 12, 2005, Davis filed the Petition that is before this Court.

ANALYSIS

Timeliness

Respondent argues that the Petition was filed 29 days too late. This Court disagrees.

A one-year statute of limitations applies to federal habeas petitions filed by state

prisoners, and the limitations period begins to run on "the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because Davis failed to file a petition for review by the

Arizona Supreme Court on his direct appeal, the limitations period began to run the day after

the thirty days to file the petition for review expired, or January 17, 2003. Wixon v.

Washington, 264 F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1143 (2002).

The limitations period is tolled during the time in "which a properly filed application

for state post-conviction" relief is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). In this

case, 349 days passed between, and including, January 17, 2003 and December 31, 2003.

Thus, sixteen days remained in the limitations period when the notice of post-conviction

relief was filed.

Davis' Rule 32 petition was denied, first by the trial court, and then by the Arizona

Court of Appeals on September 27, 2005. If the limitations period begins to run again on

September 28, 2005, this Petition, filed on November 12, 2005, is clearly barred by the

limitations period. Two potential arguments could extend the tolling period.

First, it could be argued that the motion for reconsideration of the order of the Court

of Appeals denying the petition for review extended the tolling period. However, the

Arizona procedural rules explicitly establish that no party, without leave of court, shall file

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a motion for reconsideration of an order denying a petition for review. Rule 31.18(d)(2),

Ariz.R.Crim.P. Thus, the clerk of the court was correct in not accepting the motion for filing.

Therefore, the motion for reconsideration, which was never pending before the Court of

Appeals, did not extend the tolling period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S.Ct.

1807 (2005).

Second, if the time to file a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court is

included in the tolling period, Davis' Petition would be timely filed. Since that time period

extends the time before which the limitations period begins to run, that argument may seem

logical. However, the language concerning the starting of the limitations period, "the

expiration of the time for seeking review," differs from the tolling provision, "time during

which a properly filed application...is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). The determinative

issue in this case is whether Davis' Rule 32 proceeding was still "pending" during the time

he could have requested review by the state supreme court.

Respondent argues Davis is not entitled to tolling for those 30 days for three reasons.

First, Respondent argues the limitations period is not tolled for the ninety days the Petitioner

had to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. (Answer,

p. 10). As noted in footnote 4 of Respondent's Answer, all courts that have considered this

issue have decided the limitations period is not tolled for that ninety day period. Stokes v.

District Attorney of County of Philadelphia, 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3rd Cir.2001). Two reasons

are generally cited. First, comparing the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) with §

2244(d)(1)(A), where the latter provision explicitly exempts periods where an appeal could

have been filed, the former provision requires a "properly filed" pleading. Gutierrez v.

Schomig, 233 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir.2000); Stokes, at 542. 

Both Gutierrez and Stokes rely on Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691 (6th Cir.2000). In

Isham, the court stated that 2241(d)(1)(A) takes into account "the time during which a

petition for writ of certiorari could be filed with the United States Supreme Court." Isham,

at 695. While the distinction in language between § 2241(d)(1)(A) and § 2241(d)(2) could

be argued to apply to this situation, the courts have only raised this distinction in the context

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of tolling for the ninety day period where an application to the United States Supreme Court

could be filed.

More importantly, these cases emphasize that a petition for certiorari is "simply not

an application for state review of any kind." Isham, at 695; see also, Gutierrez, at 492,

Stokes, at 542. That reasoning does not apply to the time period in which review in the state

process is still procedurally allowed.

This Court concludes that the reasoning in Isham, Gutierrez, Stokes and many other

cases that have disallowed the requested ninety day tolling, does not apply to the issue before

this Court, whether the limitations period is tolled during the thirty days in which further

review in state court is allowed. This conclusion is supported by the several circuits that

have decided the limitations period is tolled for the period an appeal could have been sought

in state court, but have also denied tolling for the ninety day petition for writ of certiorari

time period. Compare, Serrano v. Williams, 383 F.3d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir.2004), and Rhine

v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155(10th Cir.1999); Jones v. Nagle, 3439 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th

Cir.2003), and Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227 (11th Cir.2000), cert denied 531 U.S.

1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129 (2001); Williams v. Burton, 299 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.2002), and Snow

v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035-1036 (8th Cir.2001); Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 561 (4th

Cir.1999), and Crawley v. Catoe, 257 F.3d 395, 399 (4th Cir.2001).

Respondent's second argument that tolling is not allowed for the thirty days is stated,

in total, as follows:

the exclusion of 30 days for filing a petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme Court is appropriate only on direct review

because a case is not final in Arizona until the expiration of the

right to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court.

(Answer, p.10). No authority is cited for this argument and the Court does not understand

what persuasiveness this general legal statement is supposed to have in this context.

Finally, Respondent argues that "the specific language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

provides that tolling occurs only when an application for collateral review is pending."

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(Answer, pp.10-11) (emphasis in original). This is not even argument, but rather a statement

of the issue before the Court.

There appears to be no decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit that is directly on point to this issue. The leading case in this Circuit interpreting the

term "pending" in § 2244(d)(2) is Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.1999). Nino

involved a related issue faced by many courts in interpreting the limitations statute; does the

interval between the ruling and subsequent request for review in the various levels of the

state court review process toll the statute of limitations. In agreement with all other federal

courts to consider the issue, the Court in Nino decided that these intervals in the appellate

process after a ruling and before the appeal or request for review would toll the statute of

limitations. Nino, at 1006.

In coming to this conclusion, the court quoted language from Barnett v. Lemaster, 167

F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999), as follows:

For these reasons, we join the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in

concluding that the AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for

"all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting,

through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state

court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction

application." Barnett, 167 F.3d at 1323.

Nino, at 1006. It could be argued that the language adopted from Barnett, "the time during

which a state prisoner is attempting" to exhaust state remedies,requires affirmative action by

defendant. Thus, an appeal time that passes without an appeal is not indicative of an

"attempt" to exhaust. Thus, tolling would not ensue for that time period.

This Court rejects that argument for a number of reasons. First, this is not a holding

from the Nino case, but merely the adoption of a quote from another circuit's decision. The

issue in Nino was not the same one before this Court. Secondly, as most other courts have,

the Court in Nino was construing the term "pending" broadly, to include all the time involved

in the state review process. Finally, the quoted language from the Nino decision indicates

it is adopting the reasoning of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, both of

which have decided that the time for filing appeal or review does toll the statute of

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limitations, even if no appeal or petition for review is filed. Jones v. Nagle, at 1308 (11th

Cir.); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 2000).

While there is no definitive ruling on point in this Circuit, the issue has been

considered in the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, all of which have decided that

an unused time for appeal does toll the statute of limitations. Taylor v. Lee, supra, at 561;

Williams v. Bruton, supra, at 983; Serrano v. Williams, supra, at 1185; Gibson v. Klinger,

supra, at 804; Jones v. Nagle, supra, at 1308.

The only Circuit deciding to the contrary is the Seventh. Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d

784, 789 (7th Cir.2006). In Jones, the Illinois Supreme Court, in considering Jones' state

petition for post-conviction relief, denied his petition for leave to appeal on February 5, 2003.

Id. at 788. Illinois procedure allowed Jones 21 days to file a petition for rehearing after a

ruling. Id. at 789. Jones filed his "motion for rehearing" one day late. Id. Had those twentyone days been tolled, Jones' federal petition would have been timely by two days. Id. at 788-

789. However, the Court declined to allow the time to petition for rehearing to toll the statute

of limitations, noting that:

Illinois case law also provides, however, that a judgment is final

when it is entered, and that the filing of a petition for rehearing

does not alter the effective date of the judgment unless the court

allows the petition for rehearing.

Jones, at 789 (emphasis in original). This Court does not agree that the effective date of

judgment is equivalent to when a case is "pending." Moreover, Arizona case law differs

from the Illinois law. State v. Dalglish, 183 Ariz. 188, 901 P.2d 1218 (App.1995) (appellate

ruling is final when mandate issues).

This Court agrees with other courts that the term "pending" should be broadly

construed. The facts of this case illustrate that the appeal time should toll the statute of

limitations. In Arizona, a defendant need not appeal beyond the state court of appeals to

exhaust remedies for Federal habeas purposes. Swoops v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th

Cir.1999). Therefore, in this case Davis had a strategic decision to make: proceed to review

with the state supreme court or proceed with Federal habeas review. Clearly, he should be

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allowed the time for appeal to make that decision, and during that time it should be

considered that the petitioner is "attempting to exhaust state remedies."

Based on this analysis, particularly the opinions of the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth and

Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, this Court determines that the thirty days to seek review

to the state supreme court tolls the statute of limitations, even though review was not

ultimately sought. Adding these 30 days of tolled time, the non-tolled time equals 364 days,

and the Petition was filed timely.

Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petition for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless petitioner has

"exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the state." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The

claims must be exhausted as federal claims. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-366, 115

S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995). In Arizona, except in capital cases and cases with a sentence of life

imprisonment, the claim must be presented for review to the Court of Appeals, but review

by the Supreme Court is not required for exhaustion. Swoopes, supra. Habeas petitioners

who have failed to exhaust state remedies may be procedurally barred from doing so in the

future. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-603 (9th Cir.1989).

The District Judge identified four issues raised by Davis in his Petition and

additionally identified four subparts to the third issue. (Order, Docket 3). Respondent claims

that Davis failed to exhaust state remedies on all of these issues, except 3(a).

In Davis' appeal two issues were raised. First, was it error for the trial judge to

disallow evidence of third-party culpability. This was raised as a federal claim. (Ex.D, p.18).

Secondly, was it error not to give a Willits instruction concerning the state's failure to

preserve evidence. This was not raised as a federal claim. (Ex.D, pp. 19-21).

In his amended petition for post-conviction relief in state court, Davis raised two

issues. First, Davis argued ineffective assistance of counsel in not having an expert

examination of the defendant so that testimony about his mental condition could be presented

in mitigation at sentencing. Secondly, Davis alleged the aggravated sentence was improper

under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531(2006). Both claims were

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1

Petitioner's direct appeal was final on January 6, 2003, more than a year before

Blakely was decided. The Courts have not applied Blakely retroactively, which Davis seems

to have accepted.

2

As identified in the Court's order, Docket 3. Respondent seems to identify issue 3(a)

as 3(b) in its Answer.

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summarily denied by the trial court. A petition for review by the Court of Appeals was filed

which only sought review of the first issue.1

 (Ex.K). Nothing in the Petition for Review

indicates that the claim is presented as a federal claim.

Respondent is correct that the first two issues, denial of compulsory process and right

to confrontation because defense counsel failed to interview witnesses, were never raised to

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Davis has failed to exhaust his state remedies on these claims.

The Fourth issue raised in the Petition, that police threw away exculpatory evidence

from the crime scene, was raised in the Willits instruction issue on direct appeal, but it was

not raised as a federal claim. Petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies on the fourth

issue in his Petition.

Issues 3(b); (c), and (d)2

, complain of ineffective assistance of counsel by not testing

evidence found in the truck, not fully interviewing witnesses, and not properly defending

Petitioner. None of these claims were raised in Davis' state post-conviction relief petition.

These claims were not exhausted in the State courts.

This leaves issue 3(a), the failure to present evidence of Davis' mental condition either

in mitigation at sentencing or to in some manner challenge the confession. This claim was

raised in the petition for post-conviction relief and in the petition for review to the State

court. But, in the petition for review, it was not raised as a federal claim in any manner, not

even by a broad, conclusory reference to the United States Constitution. Therefore, Davis

failed to exhaust this claim as a federal claim. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th

Cir.2005).

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All of these unexhausted claims are now procedurally barred and cannot be pursued

in state court. Rule 32.2(a)(3), Ariz.R.Crim.P.; State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112, 113, 912 P.2d

1341, 1342 (App.1995).

Nor can Davis establish cause and prejudice to avoid the impact of the procedural bar.

He was represented by counsel up to his pro per filing of the petition for review of the denial

of the petition for post-conviction relief, so cause related to the procedural default would be

difficult to establish. Moreover, it would be more difficult to establish prejudice. The crime

was particularly gruesome and senseless. Defense counsel's efforts succeeded in avoiding

a conviction for first degree murder. An aggravated sentence in these circumstances seems

unavoidable. Moreover, the trial court decision on the petition for post-conviction relief

notes:

the Court will not second guess defendant's attorney's strategic

decisions and since defendant was not tested at Duncan's

(defense counsel) request, this Court infers that counsel's

decision not to address defendant's mental status was a strategic

decision.

(Ex.A, 134). Clearly, a reasonable and competent attorney could conclude that the mental

health information could exacerbate the situation, cause greater concern in the sentencing

judge's mind concerning safety of the community, and lead to a longer sentence. In this case,

there is no cause and prejudice to avoid the procedural bar.

CONCLUSION

Because Davis did not properly exhaust his claims in the state court, or fairly present

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a federal claim, and is now procedurally barred

from raising those issues in state court, the writ should not issue and the Petition should be

denied with prejudice.

Therefore, it is the report and recommendation of this Court that the District Judge,

after his independent review and consideration, issue an order as follows:

1. Finding that the Petition was timely filed.

2. Finding that Davis failed to exhaust state remedies by not presenting the

claims as federal claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

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3. Finding that Davis is now procedurally barred from raising these claims in

state court.

4. Finding that Davis cannot show cause and prejudice to avoid the procedural

bar.

5. Ordering that the application for the writ is denied and the Petition is dismissed

with prejudice.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9 th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

If objections are filed, the parties should direct them to the District Court by using the

following case number: CV 05-3866-PHX-FJM.

DATED this 19th day of April, 2007.

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