Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02234/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02234-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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10cv2234 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS GENE MAYFIELD,

Petitioner,

v.

L.S. MCEWEN, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

 

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Civil No. 10-2234-LAB(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS (DOC. # 10)

I

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Gene Mayfield (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (hereinafter “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondent L.S. McEwen (hereinafter “Respondent”) has filed a Motion

to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter

“Motion to Dismiss”). Petitioner has filed an Opposition to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Opposition”).

On January 7, 2009, Petitioner appeared before a panel of the

Board of Parole Hearings, which denied him parole. Petitioner

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10cv2234 2

contends that the panel was biased, that the panel based its

decision on unchangeable factors, and that the panel had insufficient evidence to make a determination as to his dangerousness upon

release. Therefore, Petitioner argues that the Board of Parole

Hearings violated his right to due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss, and Petitioner’s Opposition. Based upon the documents and

evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth

below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

 II

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit

murder while armed with a firearm and three counts of assault with

a deadly weapon by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

(Petition at 2). On May 17, 1985, Petitioner was sentenced to a

state prison term of 22 years to life imprisonment. His minimum

parole eligibility date was September 9, 2000. Id.

On January 7, 2009, Petitioner appeared before a two member

panel of the Board of Parole Hearings. The panel members were Deputy

Commissioner Carol Bentley and Commissioner Archie Biggers. Id. The

panel denied Petitioner parole, finding that Petitioner would pose

a present risk of danger to society if released. Id. The panel took

into account several factors including the nature of the commitment

offense, the number of victims, the motive for the crime, prior

criminal behavior, Petitioner’s mental state and attitude toward the

crime, a psychological report, and several instances of serious

misconduct while he was incarcerated. Id. at 2-3. 

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28 1/ Claude Walbert, Court Blasts Officials Over Inmate Wages, Los

Angeles Daily Journal, Aug. 23, 2004.

10cv2234 3

The Petition includes exhibits showing that Deputy Commissioner Bentley’s husband was involved in the drafting of legislation

to allow companies to form joint ventures with the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (hereinafter “CDCR”)

and that Petitioner had successfully sued one of the resulting joint

ventures for wrongful termination. Exhibit 2 to the Petition is an

excerpt from the transcript of a parole panel hearing for Inmate

Willhoite. In Exhibit 2, Deputy Commissioner Bentley states that her

husband was involved in drafting the relevant legislation. Exhibit

3 to the Petition is a newspaper article reporting a successful

lawsuit against Western Manufacturing by six inmates, including one

Thomas Mayfield.1/ Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss refers to Deputy

Commissioner Bentley’s husband as “purportedly connected” to the

legislation but does not contest the validity of Exhibit 2. The

Motion to Dismiss also states that Petitioner “allegedly later sued”

but does not contest the validity of Exhibit 3.

 III

 PETITIONER’S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner raises three claims for relief. First, he argues

that the panel members from the Board of Parole Hearings were

biased. Second, he contends that the panel unconstitutionally based

its decision to deny him parole on unchangeable factors. Third,

petitioner argues that the panel failed to properly consider

evidence that purportedly showed his suitability for parole.

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A. PAROLE PANEL WAS BIASED

Petitioner argues that the Board of Parole Hearings’ panel

conducted a “bias[ed] hearing.” (Petition at 4). Specifically, he

notes that Deputy Commissioner Carol Bentley’s husband “was directly

involved in authoring the legislation to bring joint venture

programs into” the CDCR and that the Petitioner was “one of six

inmates who [successfully] sued one of the [participating joint

venture companies]. Id. Further, Petitioner contends that Commissioner Archie Biggers was also biased. Specifically, Petitioner

alleges that Commissioner Biggers reviewed confidential information

in his file for the hearing and that Commissioner Biggers does not

like ex-gang members. See id. at 11.

Therefore, Petitioner contends that Commissioner Bentley’s

and Biggers’ participation violated his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights to be heard by a fair and impartial

decision-maker. See id.; Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).

B. PAROLE PANEL INCORRECTLY CONSIDERED UNCHANGEABLE FACTORS

Also, Petitioner argues that the parole panel based its

decision to deny him parole on unchangeable factors such as the

commitment offense and did not properly consider whether Petitioner

would be a threat to society if released. (Petition at 4). Specifically, Petitioner argues that, due to the passage of time since his

conviction, the unchangeable factors in his case were no longer

indicative of a risk of danger to society. Therefore, Petitioner

contends that, by basing its decision to deny him parole on these

factors, the panel violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights. Id. at 13.

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C. PAROLE PANEL INCORRECTLY BALANCED EVIDENCE RELATING 

 TO PETITIONER’S SUITABILITY FOR PAROLE

Petitioner argues that the parole panel failed to properly

balance factors militating against his parole with those showing his

suitability for parole. Id. at 4. Specifically, Petitioner claims

that the parole panel paid only “lip service” to his achievements

while he was incarcerated and did not truly consider these factors

in its decision-making process. (Petition at 39). Petitioner points

to his stable social history, indicia of remorse, age, educational

activities, participation in self-help programs, and behavioral

record as examples of favorable parole factors that he believes the

panel did not give sufficient weight. (Petition at 39-43). Petitioner appears to contend that the panel’s purported failure to

consider the factors showing suitability for parole indicates bias

on the part of the panel and that Petitioner was therefore denied

his constitutional due process right to be heard by a fair and

impartial decision-maker. (See Id. at 4, 38-46).

 IV

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a

petition for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege

that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution,

laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a).

In habeas corpus cases, federal courts are bound by the

state’s interpretation of its own law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 68 (1991) (federal courts may not reexamine state court

determinations on questions of state law); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d

882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal courts “have no authority to

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10cv2234 6

review a state’s application of its own laws.”) However, “errors of

state law do not concern [a federal court] unless they rise to the

level of a constitutional violation”). Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877

F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989), emphasis added.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(hereinafter “AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

The Petition in this case was filed on October 26, 2010 and is

therefore governed by AEDPA. To obtain federal habeas relief,

Petitioner must satisfy either U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) or (2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000).

The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)and (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent: (1) “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from the [the

court’s] precedent.” Id. at 405-406; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 72-75 (2003). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable

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application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case,” or, “if the state court either unreasonably

extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where

it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle

to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407;

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000) (overruled in part by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74-77).

 V

 PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF

The United States Supreme Court has stated that a petitioner

may demonstrate a violation of procedural due process by showing

that: 1) a federally-protected life, liberty, or property interest

exists “which has been interfered with by the State”; and 2) “the

procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally

[in]sufficient.” Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 460 (1989).

As to a “federally protected” interest, the Supreme Court has

recognized a federally-protected liberty interest in the expectancy

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of release on parole arising from state parole statutes. See

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.

1, 12 (1979); see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-

78 (1987) (holding that mandatory language in a Montana parole

statute created “a presumption that parole will be granted,” thereby

creating a protected liberty interest.) The California parole

statute likewise “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th

Cir. 2002). Here, there is no dispute that the Petitioner has a

federally-protected liberty interest in the expectancy of release on

parole.

As to the procedures attendant upon deprivation of due

process involving the denial of parole, the Supreme Court has

recently stated that “the procedures required are minimal.”

Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862 (2011); see also Greenholtz,

442 U.S. at 12. Essentially, the federal process due a prisoner at

a parole hearing is limited to “the opportunity to be heard” and “a

statement of reasons why parole was denied”. Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at

862. “Because the only federal right at issue is procedural, the

relevant inquiry is what process [Petitioner] received, not whether

the state court decided the case correctly. Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at

863.

A. ASSERTION OF BIAS IS BASED ON INADEQUATE AND CONCLUSORY 

 ALLEGATIONS

Petitioner’s first claim for relief is based on alleged bias

of Deputy Commissioner Bentley and Commissioner Biggers. Rule 2 of

the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases requires that a petitioner

“state the facts supporting each ground” for relief. Rule 2(c)(2),

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foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereinafter “Rule 2".) Under Rule 2, “mere

conclusory allegations without the support of facts” are insufficient. Farrow v. U.S., 580 F.2d 1339, 1361-1362 (9th Cir. 1972);

Schlette v. Allen, 284 F.2d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 1960); Henderson v.

Cate, 2009 WL 3126858 at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

1. Deputy Commissioner Bentley

Petitioner alleges that Deputy Commissioner Bentley was

biased because her husband drafted legislation to bring joint

venture companies into the CDCR and that Petitioner had previously

successfully sued one of the participating joint venture companies.

The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[b]ald assertions and

conclusory allegations” are insufficient to allow a claim of bias to

lie. See Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 n. 2 (9th Cir.

1979). Here, Petitioner claims that “[t]here is no reasonable doubt

that” Deputy Commissioner Bentley’s husband’s involvement with the

CDCR joint venture programs prevented Petitioner from getting a fair

and impartial hearing. (Petition at 11). However, Petitioner does

not explain why his successful lawsuit against a joint venture

company would create bias on the part of the wife of an individual

who participated in drafting legislation that merely allowed joint

venture companies into the CDCR. Therefore, Petitioner fails to

state a prima facie case for relief that “overcome[s] a presumption

of honesty and integrity” of Deputy Commissioner Bentley. Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975); see also Stivers v. Pierce, 71

F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995). As a result, Petitioner’s contention

that Deputy Commissioner Bentley was biased is an unsupported

conclusory allegation. 

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2. Commissioner Biggers

Further, Petitioner contends that Commissioner Biggers was

biased due to a dislike of ex-gang members and because Commissioner

Biggers considered confidential information from Petitioner’s file.

Petitioner does not identify any evidence of Commissioner

Biggers’ purported dislike of ex-gang members, rendering his

argument little more than a bald assertion. As noted above, merely

stating a conclusion without stating facts that support the

conclusion does not satisfy the requirement of sufficient specificity. Wacht, 604 F.2d at 1247 n. 2.

Next, Petitioner’s claim that Commissioner Biggers considered

confidential information in Petitioner’s file appears unconnected to

Petitioner’s conclusion that Commissioner Biggers was biased.

Commissioner Biggers was required to review all information in

Petitioner’s file in determining Petitioner’s parole suitability.

Cal. Code of Reg., tit. 15, § 2402(b) (“[a]ll relevant, reliable

information available to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole.”) Petitioner does not claim, nor present

evidence, that the confidential information in his file was

irrelevant or unreliable. Petitioner does not explain how the

statutorily-required consideration of such information leads to his

conclusion that Commissioner Biggers was biased.

Therefore, Petitioner fails to state a prima facie case for

relief that “overcome[s] a presumption of honesty and integrity” of

Commissioner Biggers. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-47; see also Stivers,

71 F.3d at 741. As a result, Petitioner’s contention that Commissioner Biggers was biased is an unsupported conclusory allegation.

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Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED.

B. WHETHER THE PAROLE BOARD CONSIDERED UNCHANGEABLE FACTORS

 IS IRRELEVANT IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

Petitioner’s second claim for relief is that the parole board

relied on unchangeable factors in violation of state parole

policies. He illustrates this claim with numerous examples of

purported variations between California policies and the panel’s

determination in his parole hearing. The Court will not comment on

the materiality of the purported variations. But, the Court notes

that Petitioner’s claim appears to rest solely on the allegedly

improper application of state law by state authorities. Federal

courts “have no authority to review a state’s application of its own

laws.” Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885. More specifically, “the responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally adequate procedures

governing California’s parole system are property applied rests with

California courts, and is no part of the Ninth Circuit’s business.”

Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 863. 

The sole exception to this limitation exists when errors of

state law “rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” See

Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at 1400. Here, Petitioner argues that he suffered

a constitutional violation of his due process rights. In the case of

habeas petitions resulting from parole denials, as here, a federal

court’s due process inquiry is limited to two factors. First,

whether the petitioner “was allowed an opportunity to be heard” and

second, whether the petitioner “was provided a statement of the

reasons why parole was denied.” Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862, citing

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. 

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Petitioner claims that he was not given an opportunity to be

heard because the parole panel was biased. The Court notes that the

only federal aspect of Petitioner’s second claim for relief relies

upon acceptance of the first claim for relief (alleged bias of

Deputy Commissioner Bentley and Commissioner Biggers). This Court

has recommended that Petitioner’s first claim for relief be denied,

because it rests solely upon unsupported conclusory allegations. As

a result, the second claim for relief also fails.

In any event, Petitioner admits that he was given an

opportunity to be heard at his parole hearing and was provided with

a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. (Petition, Exh. 1,

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 5)

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED..

C. FAILURE TO CORRECTLY WEIGH FACTORS IN FAVOR OF PAROLE 

 REQUIRED BY CALIFORNIA LAW DOES NOT IMPLICATE FEDERAL LAW

Petitioner’s argues that the parole panel did not temper

factors militating against his parole with other factors that

indicated his suitability for parole. In support of this claim,

Petitioner contends that California statutory language mandates that

“[a]ll relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall

be considered in determining suitability for parole.” Cal. Code of

Reg., tit. 15, § 2402(b). However, as previously noted, a state’s

application of state law is outside the purview of federal habeas

corpus review unless a constitutional right is thereby violated. See

Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885; Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at 1400.

Further, as previously noted, Petitioner admitted that he was

given an opportunity to be heard at his parole hearing and was

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provided with a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.

(Petition, Exh. 1, Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 5)

Again, Petitioner relies on his contention that the parole

panel was biased to explain why the third claim for relief may be

heard by a federal court. Since the Court has recommended denial of

Petitioner’s bias claim as discussed supra, the Court does not find

merit in Petitioner’s arguments.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED.

Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED.

 VI

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 22, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the court and served on all parties no later than

August 5, 2011 The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

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those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 23, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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