Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02791/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02791-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING

ASSOCIATION, a California mutual

benefit corporation,

NO. CIV. S-06-2791 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY

TOM CACKETTE, in his official JUDGMENT

capacity as Executive Officer

of the California Air Resources

Board, 

Defendant,

and

NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC.; COALITION FOR 

CLEAN AIR, INC.; SOUTH COAST

AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT; CITY OF LONG BEACH,

Defendant-Intervenors.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Pacific Merchant Shipping Association

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Plaintiff’s originally filed this action against 1

Catherine E. Witherspoon, who has since resigned. Cackette is

automatically substituted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 25(d). 

2

(“PMSA”) brought this action against defendant Tom Cackette to 1

enjoin the adoption and enforcement of 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1 and 17

C.C.R. § 93118, and obtain a declaration that the regulations are

preempted by federal law and/or unconstitutional. Currently

before the court is plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, or

in the alternative, partial summary judgement, on the claims that

the California regulations are preempted by Title II of the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521 et seq., and the Submerged Lands Act,

43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. The Parties

PMSA is a mutual benefit corporation, organized and

existing under the laws of California, and its members include

companies that own or operate foreign and United States-flagged

ocean-going vessels. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts (Docket No. 65; Attachment 1) ## 1-3.) The

vessels of PMSA’s members use auxiliary or diesel electric

engines during navigation and when alongside a dock. (Id. # 4.) 

Defendant Tom Cackette, the Chief Deputy Executive

Officer and Acting Executive Officer of the California Air

Resources Board (“CARB”), is charged with enforcement of

regulations adopted by CARB. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 39515,

39516. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“NRDC”),

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The NRDC and CCA intervened and filed their papers 2

jointly, and will therefore be referred to jointly as NRDC/CCA.

The text of the two regulations is the same, although § 3

2299.1 is described as “emission limits and requirements” under a

chapter addressing “standards for fuels for nonvehicular

sources,” while § 93118 is described as an “airborne toxic

control measure.” 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1; 17 C.C.R. § 93118. 

Accordingly, where necessary, the court will cite to 13 C.C.R. §

2299.1, with the understanding that identical, parallel

provisions exist in 17 C.C.R. § 93118.

3

Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. (“CCA”) , South Coast Air Quality 2

Management District (“SCAQMD”), and the City of Long Beach (“Long

Beach”) intervened as defendants, pursuant to this court’s order

of April 3, 2007. (April 3, 2007 Order.) 

B. The Regulations

On October 20, 2006, CARB certified and transmitted two

regulations, 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1 and 17 C.C.R. § 93118 (the 3

“regulations”), to the California Office of Administrative Law

(“OAL”) for filing with the California Secretary of State. On

December 6, 2006, the OAL approved the regulations and filed them

with the California Secretary of State. CARB began enforcement

of the regulations on January 1, 2007, by inspecting PMSA vessels

upon arrival at California ports. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts ## 5-7.) CARB did not obtain

authorization from the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”) for either of the regulations before it adopted or

began enforcing the regulations. (Id. # 8.) 

Both regulations establish limitations for emissions of

diesel particulate matter (“PM”), sulfur oxides (“SOx”), and

nitrogen oxides (“NOx”) from the use of auxiliary diesel engines

and diesel-electric engines on ocean-going vessels. 13 C.C.R. §

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2299.1(a). The regulations prohibit any ship with an auxiliary

diesel engine (including any diesel electric engine) with

emission rates above those specified from operating within

twenty-four miles of a large portion of the California coast. 13

C.C.R. § 2299.1(d)(2), (d)(26)(F), (e)(1). In addition, vessel

owners are required to keep detailed records of the type of fuel

used in each engine operated within the regulated water, as well

as the date, time, and location of each vessel whenever entering

or exiting the regulated areas, or engaging in a fuel switching

procedure. 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1(e)(2). These rules apply to all

commercial vessels registered in, flagged in, or operating under

the authority of the United States or any other country, and

violations may be punished by injunctive relief, civil and

criminal fines, misdemeanor prosecution, and imprisonment. 13

C.C.R. § 2299.1(b), (f)(1). 

C. The Clean Air Act

First enacted in 1955 as the Air Pollution

Control-Research and Technical Assistance Act of 1955, the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (“CAA”), Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69

Stat. 322, “is one of the most comprehensive pieces of

legislation in our nation’s history.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 524

(2d Cir. 1994) (“MVMA”). The CAA makes “the States and the

Federal Government partners in the struggle against air

pollution.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. U.S., 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990). 

This partnership has not significantly changed since it was

established by the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148,

81 Stat. 485 (“1967 Act”), and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,

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1977 amendments, § 108(a)(1) (CAA, § 110(a)(2)(I)), 91 4

Stat. at 694. See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467

U.S. 837, 848-51 (1984); Citizens Against the Refinery’s Effects

Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981). 

5

Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (“1970 amendments”). Engine

Mfrs. Ass’n, ex rel. Certain of its Members v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075,

1078 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“EMA”) (further citations omitted). The

1967 Act required the states to set ambient air quality

standards. Id. The 1970 amendments transferred authority to set

the ambient air quality standards, now known as national ambient

air quality standards (“NAAQS”), from the states to the EPA. CAA

§ 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409. To achieve and maintain these NAAQS by

regulating sources of air pollution, each state is required to

submit a state implementation plan (“SIP”) to the EPA for

approval. CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). 

The statutory scheme contemplates that “the states

would carry out their responsibility chiefly by regulating

stationary sources, such as factories and power plants.” EMA, 88

F.3d at 1078-79. Indeed, many of the statutory requirements for

SIPs related to the regulation of stationary sources and

penalties for failing to attain air quality standards focused on

stationary sources. Id. at 1079 (analyzing the 1970 and 1977

amendments). 

4

Unlike regulation of pollution from stationary sources,

regulation of motor vehicles has been primarily a federal

project. See, e.g., EMA, 1078-1082; MVMA, 17 F.3d at 524-27;

Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1101-03,

1108-11, (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“MEMA”), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952

(1980). A reason for the regulatory difference was the

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Section 209(a) provides: 5

No State or any political subdivision thereof shall

adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to

the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new

motor vehicle engines subject to this part [CAA Title

II, Part A]. No State shall require certification,

inspection, or any other approval relating to the

control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new

motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to the

initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration

of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or

equipment.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 

6

difficulty of subjecting motor vehicles, which can easily move

from one state to another, to control by individual states. EMA,

88 F.3d at 1079. Additionally, the possibility of different

state regulatory regimes created the “spectre of an anarchic

patchwork of federal and state regulatory programs, a prospect

which threatened to create nightmares for the manufacturers.” 

MEMA, 627 F.2d at 1109. In 1967, just two years after Congress

first authorized federal emissions regulations, Congress

preempted states from adopting emission standards for motor

vehicles. EMA, 88 F.3d at 1079. The Second Circuit considers 5

Congress’ continued express preemption of state regulations of

automobile emissions as “the cornerstone of Title II.” MVMA, 17

F.3d at 526. 

However, there is an exception to the broad preemption

of federal motor vehicle regulation. Because California was the

“lead[er] in the establishment of standards for regulation of

automotive pollutant emissions,” Congress granted California an

exemption from CAA § 209(a) preemption in CAA § 209(b)(1)

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Section 209(b)(1) provides: 6

The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity

for public hearing, waive application of this section

to any State which has adopted standards (other than

crankcase emission standards) for the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle

engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State

determines that the State standards will be, in the

aggregate, at least as protective of public health and

welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such waiver

shall be granted if the Administrator finds that--

(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary

and capricious,

(B) such State does not need such State standards

to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,

or

(C) such State standards and accompanying

enforcement procedures are not consistent with

section 7521(a) of this title [CAA § 202(a)].

42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (1994). California is the only state that

qualifies for the waiver, because it was the only state that had

adopted emission control standards prior to March 30, 1966. EMA,

88 F.3d at 1079.

7

provided that the EPA approved California’s standards. MEMA, 6

627 F.2d at 1109 n.26 (quoting S. Rep. No. 192, 89th Cong., 1st

Sess. 5 (1965)). Accordingly, motor vehicles must be either

“federal cars” designed to meet the EPA’s standards or

“California cars” designed to meet CARB’s approved standards. 

MVMA, 17 F.3d at 526-27. Congress allowed other states to

“piggyback” onto California’s preemption exception by adopting

the California standards. Id. at 527. However, to protect

manufacturers and ensure that manufacturers would only need to

cope with two regulatory regimes rather than 51, Congress

required that “(1) an opt-in state must adopt standards that are

identical to California’s; (2) California must receive a waiver

from the EPA for the standards; and (3) both California and the

opt-in state must adopt the standards at least two years before

the beginning of the automobile model year to which they apply.” 

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Id. (citing CAA § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507).

Prior to 1990, nonroad vehicle emissions, the subject

of this action, were not specifically mentioned. However, some

states started to regulate some nonroad sources in their attempts

to meet the NAAQSs. EMA, 88 F.3d at 1080. In 1990, Congress

amended the CAA to define and regulate nonroad sources. Pub. L.

No. 101-549, § 222(b), 104 Stat. at 2502 (codified at CAA §

209(e), 42 U.S.C. 7543(e)). 

D. PMSA’s Pending Motion

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief preventing the

enforcement of the regulations, as well a declaration that the

regulations are unconstitutional and contrary to federal law. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff’s complaint contained four claims

for relief: 1) preemption by Title II of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§

7521 et seq.; 2) preemption by the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

§§ 1301 et seq.; 3) preemption by the Ports and Waterways Safety

Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.; and 4) violation of the Commerce

Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8,

clause 3. (Compl.) 

On May 7, 2007, plaintiff filed this motion for summary

judgment on its first and second claims for relief. On June 4,

2007, the parties stipulated to the filing of plaintiff’s first

amended complaint (“FAC”). (Stipulation Order (Docket No. 54)

4.) The FAC contains only two claims for relief: 1) preemption

by Title II of the CAA and 2) preemption by the Submerged Lands

Act. (FAC.) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on both of

these claims. Because, for the reasons discussed in detail

below, the court finds that the challenged regulations are

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In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act to 7

abrogate the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v.

California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), opinion supplemented by United

States v. California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947) (“California I), which

held that California had no title or property interest to lands

in the Pacific Ocean. United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32,

37 (1977) (“California II”). The Act provided that: 

(1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath

navigable waters within the boundaries of the

respective States, and the natural resources within

such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to

manage, administer, lease, develop and use the said

lands and natural resources all in accordance with

applicable State law . . . are hereby[] vested in and

assigned to the respective States . . . . 

43 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The Act also provided that “nothing in this

subchapter . . . shall affect the use, development, improvement,

or control by . . . the United States of said . . . waters for

the purposes of navigation . . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(d). 

In 1947, the generally accepted international practice

was for the adjacent nation to claim a three-mile belt of

sovereignty from the baselines over the marginal sea. California

I, 332 U.S. at 32-36. In 1988, President Reagan extended the

territorial limits of the United States to 12 nautical miles from

the baselines. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27,

1988). In 1994, President Clinton extended the “contiguous zone”

of the United States to 24 nautical miles from the baselines. 

Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (Aug. 2, 1999). 

9

preempted by Title II of the CAA, the court need not decide the

question of whether the Federal Submerged Lands Act also preempts

California from enforcing the regulations beyond three nautical

miles from the baseline. 

7

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standards

1. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

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the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon . . . mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading . . . .” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Additionally, the

court must not engage in credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence, for these are jury functions. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255. 

The plaintiff movant “must establish beyond

peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or

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defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn

Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original);

see also Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002) (“a

substantially higher hurdle must be surpassed, particularly where

. . . the moving party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion .

. . at trial”). 

2. Preemption

Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,

Congress has the power to pass legislation that preempts state

law. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign

Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“A fundamental principle

of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt

state law.”). Preemption may be either express or implied. 

Express preemption may be found where Congress has explicitly

stated “the extent to which its enactments preempt state law.” 

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (“Pre-emption

is fundamentally a question of congressional intent, and when

Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory

language, the courts’ task is an easy one.”) (internal citation

omitted)). State law is impliedly preempted where obligations

imposed by federal statute “reveal a purpose to preclude state

authority.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230

(1947).

In determining the scope of an express preemption

provision, the court is guided by two presumptions. Medtronic v.

Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). First, the court presumes that

“‘the historic police powers of the States were not to be

superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and

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manifest purpose of Congress.’” Id. (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at

230). Second, “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate

touchstone’ in every preemption case.” Id. (quoting Retail

Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). Congressional

intent is “primarily discerned from the language of the preemption statute and the ‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.” 

Id. (citation omitted). 

In the case of implied preemption, state law is also

preempted when it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment

and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 

Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987). To the

extent a state law interferes with the manner in which Congress

intended the federal law to operate, the state law is preempted

even where the state and federal laws share common goals. Gade

v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n., 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992).

B. Preemption under CAA Title II

1. Scope of Nonroad Source Preemption

Plaintiff argues, in its first claim for relief, that

the regulations are preempted by Title II of the CAA. CAA §

209(e)(2)(A) provides:

In the case of any nonroad vehicles or engines other

than those referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) of

paragraph (1), the Administrator shall, after notice

and opportunity for public hearing, authorize

California to adopt and enforce standards and other

requirements relating to the control of emissions from

such vehicles or engines if California determines that

California standards will be, in the aggregate, at

least as protective of public health and welfare as

applicable Federal standards. No such authorization

shall be granted if the Administrator finds that--

 (i) the determination of California is arbitrary

and capricious,

 (ii) California does not need such California

standards to meet compelling and extraordinary

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CAA § 209(e)(1) provides: 8

No State or any political subdivision thereof shall

adopt or attempt to enforce any standard or other

requirement relating to the control of emissions from

either of the following new nonroad engines or nonroad

vehicles subject to regulation under this Act--

 (A) New engines which are used in construction

equipment or vehicles or used in farm equipment or

vehicles and which are smaller than 175

horsepower.

 (B) New locomotives or new engines used in

locomotives.

 Subsection (b) shall not apply for purposes of this

paragraph.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(1). 

13

conditions, or

 (iii) California standards and accompanying

enforcement procedures are not consistent with

this section.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A). The parties agree that auxiliary

diesel and diesel electric engines of ocean-going vessels are

nonroad engines not governed by CAA § 209(e)(1). 

8

Unlike CAA § 209(e)(1), CAA § 209(e)(2) does not

expressly preempt any state regulation. EMA, 88 F.3d at 1087. 

However, in the leading case addressing this issue, the D.C.

Circuit held that CAA § 209(e)(2) implies preemption. EMA, 88

F.3d at 1087. In a well reasoned, 2-1 decision, the EMA court

determined that the scope of this implied preemption provision

applied to both new and non-new equipment and vehicles. Id. at

1087-93. Thus, according to the majority, the implied preemption

under CAA § 209(e)(2) for nonroad vehicles and engines is broader

than the express preemption of road vehicles and engines under

CAA § 209(a)--the latter applying only to new sources. See CAA §

209(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 

The EMA court divided solely over whether the implied

preemption provision in CAA § 209(e)(2) applied to non-new

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If the implied preemption of § 209(e)(2) applied only 9

to new nonroad sources, plaintiff’s preemption argument would

fail since the engines of PMSA’s members’ vessels are non-new

nonroad sources under the relevant statute. NRDC argues that the

court should apply the rationale of Judge Tatel’s dissent in EMA. 

(NRDC Opp’n 6 n.9.) Generally, courts in one circuit are not

bound by rulings in another circuit. See, e.g., Hart v.

Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001); Newton v.

Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994). The court would be

within its discretion to apply either the EMA majority’s or

dissent’s legal rule.

Judge Tatel disagreed with the majority’s approach to 10

ascertaining Congressional intent under Chevron step one--the

weighing of the plain meaning of the statute--because “virtually

all other evidence” in the statutory record points to the

opposite conclusion. EMA, 88 F.3d at 1100 (Tatel, J.,

dissenting) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837). Judge Tatel

concluded that Congress made a drafting error in CAA § 209(e)(2)

by inadvertently leaving out the word “new” in the phrase “any

nonroad vehicles or engines” and that the EPA’s original

interpretation so finding should not have been disturbed. Id. at

1105. 

14

nonroad sources. EMA, 88 F.3d 1087-93; Id. at 1099-1105 (Tatel, 9

J., dissenting). The EPA originally interpreted CAA §

209(e)(2)’s implied preemption to not reach non-new nonroad

sources at all, so that the states retained their historic

authority to set emission standards for these sources. 59 Fed.

Reg. 36,969, 36,973-74 (1994). 

10

The EMA majority overturned the EPA’s interpretation

and held that the implied preemption of CAA § 209(e)(2) covers

both new and non-new nonroad vehicles and engines for several

reasons. EMA, 88 F.3d 1087-93. First, the EPA’s review of

proposed California emission standards under CAA § 209(e)(2) is

not rendered nugatory by the fact that there is no federal

emission standard with which to compare it because CAA §

209(e)(2)(A) also requires that the EPA review proposed

California emission standards to ascertain whether California

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needs to adopt the regulation to meet compelling and

extraordinary conditions. EMA, 88 F.3d at 1089-90. Second, the

“regulatory gap” cited by Judge Tatel in dissent is “illusory”

because each state can still adopt its own in-use regulations. 

Id. at 1090-91. The EMA court unanimously upheld the EPA’s

interpretation that in-use regulations are neither standards nor

other requirements relating to the control of emissions so that

CAA § 209(e) did not preempt states from adopting them. Id. at

1093-94. Third, the EMA majority found that the absence of

legislative explanation cut against the EPA and Judge Tatel’s

position: “[e]ven if the final product might strike us as

unexpected given the versions passed by each House, the court

could not make the leap from such an impression to the certainty

that such a result was unintentional.” Id. at 1091. Indeed, the

competing interests inherent in such a complicated piece of

legislation “are simply too complex and multifarious to rule out

the possibility that the conference settled on the result

described by the statutory text.” Id. 

This court adopts the EMA majority and finds that CAA §

209(e)(2) preemption covers both new and non-new nonroad vehicles

and engines. This court’s conclusion is bolstered by the passage

of time since the EMA decision without Congressional action. The

D.C. Circuit decided EMA over ten years ago. Had the EMA court

incorrectly gauged Congressional intent, Congress has had more

than enough opportunity to amend the CAA. Accordingly,

California cannot promulgate any “standards or other requirements

relating to emissions” for nonroad engines unless approved by the

EPA. CAA § 209(e)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A). 

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2. Classification of the Regulations as Emission

Standards or In-Use Requirements

Plaintiff argues that the California regulations

establish emission standards. Defendants contend that the

regulations are not emission standards but rather are in-use

requirements, which the CAA did not intend to preempt. The

question turns on the meaning of the phrase “standard relating to

the control of emissions” in CAA § 209(e)(2). 

a. Definitions

i. Standards

“Statutory construction must begin with the language

employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning

of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”

Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194

(1985). In Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air

Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (“SCAQMD”), the

Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the phrase “standard

relating to the control of emissions” in CAA § 209(a), which is

the preemption provision for motor vehicles and engines. CAA §

209(e)(2) contains this exact phrase. The SCAQMD court partially

invalidated SCAQMD’s Fleet Rules, which extensively regulated the

types of vehicles that fleet operators must purchase or lease

when adding or replacing fleet vehicles. SCAQMD, 541 U.S. at

258-59. 

The district court, which the Ninth Circuit summarily

affirmed, 309 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2002), had upheld SCAQMD’s Fleet

Rules in their entirety because they regulated only the purchase

of vehicles that were otherwise certified for sale in California

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and thus were not standards within the meaning of CAA § 209(a). 

158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118-19 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Where a state

regulation does not compel manufacturers to meet a new emissions

limit, but rather affects the purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet

Rules do, that regulation is not a standard.” Id. at 1118.) 

The Supreme Court reversed, declining to read the

purchase/sale distinction into CAA § 209(a), because “[a]

command, accompanied by sanctions, that certain purchasers may

buy only vehicles with particular emission characteristics is as

much an ‘attempt to enforce’ a ‘standard’ as a command,

accompanied by sanctions, that a certain percentage of a

manufacturer’s sales volume must consist of such vehicles.” 

SCAQMD, 541 U.S. at 255. Thus, the SCAQMD court defined

“standard” as that which “‘is established by authority, custom,

or general consent, as a model or example; criterion; test.” Id.

at 252-53 (quoting Webster’s Second New International Dictionary

2455 (1945)). The SCAQMD court found that the purchase criteria

of SCAQMD’s Fleet rules were “standards” because “[t]o meet them

the vehicle or engine must not emit more than a certain amount of

a given pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of

pollution-control device, or must have some other design feature

related to the control of emissions.” Id. at 253. 

The SCAQMD court further noted that this interpretation

conformed to the use of “standard” throughout CAA Title II “to

denote requirements such as numerical emission levels with which

vehicles or engines must comply, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §

7521(a)(3)(B)(ii), or emission-control technology with which they

must be equipped, e.g., § 7521(a)(6).” Id. In MEMA, the D.C.

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CAA § 209(d) provides: 11

Control, regulation, or restrictions on registered or

licensed motor vehicles. Nothing in this part [CAA

Title II] shall preclude or deny to any State or

political subdivision thereof the right otherwise to

control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or

movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(d).

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Circuit also interpreted “standard” in the CAA § 209(a) context

to mean quantitative levels of emissions. 627 F.2d at 1112-13

(“The Senate Report on the Air Quality Act of 1967, discussing

the preemption provision, mentions ‘standards’ for hydrocarbons,

nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide in obvious reference to the

numerical limitations on those pollutants.” (citing S. Rep. No.

403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967)). 

ii. In-use Requirements

The EMA court upheld the EPA’s interpretation that a

state could regulate the “use, operation, or movement of

registered or licensed vehicles” under CAA § 209(e)(2), thus

extending CAA § 209(d) to nonroad sources. EMA, 88 F.3d at 11

1093-94. Although the EMA court found neither the EPA’s nor the

EMA’s proposed statutory interpretation entirely convincing, the

EMA court deferred to the EPA since it “could reasonably conclude

that CAA § 213(d) incorporated § 209(d) into the nonroad engine

regime, in which case the specific command of § 209(d) would

limit the general [but broadly preemptive] language of § 209(e).” 

EMA, 88 F.3d at 1094. Examples of in-use regulations permissible

under CAA § 209(d) include carpool lanes, restrictions on car use

in downtown areas, and programs to control extended idling of

vehicles, which are expressly intended to control emissions. Id. 

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(citing CAA § 108(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (requiring

administrator to make available to state and local authorities

information relating to such strategies)). 

This court follows the EMA court and defers to the

EPA’s interpretation pursuant to Chevron. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837,

844 (1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight

should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a

statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle

of deference to administrative interpretations.”). 

b. Application to the Challenged Regulations

The court must decide the difficult question of whether

the challenged regulations are in-use requirements or standards. 

For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that the

regulations are not in-use requirements, but are standards

relating to the control of emissions. The court also concludes

that the presumption against preemption is not applicable to this

situation nor would the presumption’s applicability affect the

court’s conclusion. 

i. The Regulations are Not In-Use

Requirements 

Defendants argue that the challenged regulations are

in-use requirements, specifically fuel quality specifications. 

The EMA majority cited with approval Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of

New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 468 F.2d 624

(2d Cir. 1972). Id. at 1089-90. In Allway Taxi, city

regulations that only minimally interfered with interstate

commerce were not preempted since they were “directed primarily

to intrastate activities and the burden of compliance would be on

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individual owners and not on manufacturers and distributors.” 

340 F. Supp. at 1124. 

In contrast, the challenged regulations directly affect

international commerce, a position confirmed by the EPA. 

Specifically, the EPA’s regulation of ocean going vessels

coincided with similar action of the International Marine

Organization (IMO). Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 407

(D.C. Cir. 2004). In 1997, the IMO formally adopted Annex VI to

the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto

(MARPOL), which prescribes a NOx emissions limit for certain

diesel engines. Id. Annex VI has recently been ratified by the

requisite number of IMO member countries and has taken affect. 

Id. The EPA set its regulations at same level as Annex VI. In

light of the fact that the regulations do not require the use of

low sulfur fuels, 12 C.C.R. § 2299.1(g)(1)(A), the significant

international ramifications of the regulations make it difficult

for the court to conclude that they are permissible local in-use

requirements. Accordingly, the court concludes that the

regulations are not in-use requirements. 

ii. The Regulations are Standards

The court’s conclusion that the regulations are not inuse requirements does not automatically require the court to

conclude that the regulations are standards. As discussed above,

standards include “requirements such as numerical emission levels

with which vehicles or engines must comply, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §

7521(a)(3)(B)(ii).” SCAQMD, 541 U.S. at 253. 

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The California regulations provide:

[N]o person subject to this section shall operate any

auxiliary diesel engine, while the vessel is operating

in any of the Regulated California Waters, which emits

levels of diesel PM, NOx, or SOx in exceedance of the

emission rates of those pollutants that would result

had the engine used the following fuels:

(A) Beginning January 1, 2007:

1. marine gas oil, as defined in subsection

(d); or

2. marine diesel oil, as defined in

subsection (d), with a sulfur content of no

more than 0.5 percent by weight;

(B) Beginning January 1, 2010: marine gas oil with

a sulfur content of no more than 0.1 percent by

weight.

13 C.C.R. § 2299.1(e). These regulations require that engines

emit no more pollutants than if the engines had used specified

fuels. Because marine gas oil normally contains less than 5,000

ppm (the equivalent of 0.5 percent by weight) the regulations do

not specify its sulfur level. (Milkey Decl. ¶ 21.) However,

since marine diesel oil may contain more than 5,000 ppm of

sulfur, the regulations specify that emissions must not exceed

the amount that would occur if the vessel used marine diesel with

a sulfur content of 5,000 ppm. 

CARB drafted the regulations such that a vehicle is

presumed to be in compliance if it is using the specified fuels. 

12 C.C.R. § 2299.1(e)(1)(C). Subsection (g) provides that: 

alternative emission control strategies can be

implemented in lieu of meeting the requirements of

subsection (e)(1), provided the alternative strategies

result in emissions of diesel PM, NOx, and SOx from the

auxiliary diesel engines that are no greater than the

emissions that would have occurred under subsection

(e)(1), over the applicable compliance period. 

12 C.C.R. § 2299.1(g)(1)(A). However, the regulations do not

require the use of these fuels. Subsection (g) of the

regulations specifically allows alternative compliance plans. 

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Thus, the regulations require a limitation on emissions in

accordance with 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1(e), but give vessel owners

various mechanisms to comply with the emissions limitation. 

Accordingly, the regulations, on their face, impose standards

relating to the control of emissions, and thus are preempted by

CAA § 209(e)(2). Defendants, individually and collectively,

raise several arguments why the court should not classify the

regulations as standards--none of which the court finds

convincing.

Regulations that merely govern fuel quality

characteristics are permissible under CAA § 211, which allows

California to regulate motor vehicle fuels without an EPA waiver. 

42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B). However, regardless of the

applicability of this provision to nonroad sources, defendants’

contentions that almost every affected vessel has switched to

marine gas oil or qualified marine diesel oil so that the

regulations would be allowed under CAA § 211 confuses standards

with the means of complying with those standards. See Adamo

Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (asbestos

regulation that specified procedures to be followed in connection

with building demolitions did not by its terms limit emissions;

consequentially, it was not an emission standard but a work

practice standard). Any emissions standard imposed is separate

and apart from means of compliance and requires EPA authorization

regardless of how vessel owners choose to comply. Since the

challenged regulations impose emission standards, CAA § 211 does

not save them from preemption. 

It is not necessary for regulations to set “numerical

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emission levels” to be preempted. Cackette argues that because

different vessel engines may be in compliance even though those

engines emit different levels of pollutants, the regulations do

not set “numerical emission levels.” (Cackette’s Opp’n 18.) 

However, this reading of SCAQMD elides the “such as” language

from the SCAQMD court’s opinion in which they wrote that standard

was used throughout Title II of the CAA “to denote requirements

such as numerical emissions levels with which vehicles or engines

must comply.” SCAQMD, 541 U.S. at 253. Indeed, the SCAQMD court

cited the dictionary definition of standard, which included

“criteria.” Id. at 252-53. To meet the criteria referred to in

CAA § 209(a), “the vehicle or engine must not emit more than a

certain amount of a given pollutant.” Id. at 253. Justice

Scalia, for the SCAQMD majority, wrote “[t]hat a standard is a

standard even when not enforced through manufacturer-directed

regulation can be seen in Congress’s use of the term in another

portion of the CAA.” Id. at 254 (discussing the fact that CAA §

246 specifically required state-adopted and federal-approved

restrictions on the purchase of fleet vehicles to meet clean-air

standards) (further citations omitted). The court agrees with

plaintiff that standards do not require a strict, identical

numerical test, but that numerical reductions required of

specific engines set “standards” for that particular engine. 

Nor is the court convinced by Cackette’s argument that

the mere fact that the regulations require a numerical reduction

in emissions does not mean that they are emission standards. 

(Cackette Opp’n 20-22.) In 2001, the EPA found the Texas ground

support equipment (“GSE”) rule requiring the reduction of NOx

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Cackette notes that the EPA also declined to preempt 12

the Texas GSE regulations because the fleet operator had several

alternatives to show compliance with the reductions requirement. 

“The alternative to obtain reductions from the GSE fleet itself

does not mandate a specific emissions level that the equipment

must achieve but instead provides the fleet operators flexibility

in how they obtain the reductions, including allowing

restrictions on use and operation of the equipment.” 66 Fed.

Reg. 16,432, 16,433 (Mar. 26, 2001). The challenged regulations

again are different in that they relate to each individual

engine. Further, the Texas GSE requirements conform to Allway

Taxi’s requirement that they affect primarily intrastate

commerce, which is facially different from the challenged

regulations. See Allway Taxi, 340 F. Supp. at 1124. 

24

emission by ninety percent was not a preempted emissions

standard. 66 Fed. Reg. 16,432, 16,433 (Mar. 26, 2001) (“The fact

that the level of required reductions is quantified and is

calculated based on the level of emissions generated by the GSE

fleet in-use in a prior year does not change the conclusion that

assigning a general emissions reductions obligation to a fleet

operator does not amount to an emissions standard on non-road

equipment.”) However, unlike the Texas GSE’s generalized

criteria, which are unrelated to the emissions rates or

characteristics of particular engines, the challenged regulations

adopt quantifiable maximum levels of emissions for each engine

based on the emission rates and characteristics of each

individual engine. The court does not find this argument 12

persuasive. 

 It is not a prerequisite for classification as a

standard that nonroad regulations affect manufacturers. NRDC

argues that classifying the regulations as standards ignores the

crucial distinction between preempted standards that place

burdens on manufacturers and legally permissible requirements

imposed on the operators of nonroad vehicles. (NRDC Opp’n 13.) 

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Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the regulations would have

any effect on the manufacturers, which was of great importance to

the SCAQMD court. SCAQMD, 241 U.S. at 255-56. However, the

SCAQMD court’s analysis that regulations must affect

manufacturers to be standards is inapplicable here in light of

the court’s determination that CAA § 209(e)(2) preempts both new

and non-new nonroad vehicles and engines. SCAQMD interprets CAA

§ 209(a), which while very similar in its language, only preempts

new road vehicles and engines. EMA, 88 F.3d at 1079. The SCAQMD

court’s concern that regulations have effects on manufacturers in

order to be preempted is understandable given the more limited

preemptive effect of CAA § 209(a). Since CAA § 209(e)(2)

preempts both new and non-new nonroad vehicles and engines,

regulations need not have direct effects on manufacturers to be

preempted standards. 

Nor does the EMA decision dictate a different result. 

The EMA court does suggest that to be classified as standards,

regulations must relate-back to manufacturers. EMA, 88 F.3d

1089-90. However, the EMA court’s discussion was in the context

of CAA § 209(e)(1). Id. CAA § 209(e)(1), like CAA § 209(a),

only preempts standards of specified new sources (engines used in

construction or farm equipment or vehicles smaller than 175

horsepower and locomotive engines). 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(1). 

Again, CAA § 209(e)(2) preempts California from setting emission

standards without EPA approval for both new and non-new nonroad

sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2). Accordingly, the regulations

do not need to “relate back” to the manufacturers or

significantly affect them to be considered emission standards. 

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iii. Presumption Against Preemption Does Not

Apply 

The presumption against preemption does not change the

court’s conclusion that the challenged regulations are standards

relating to the control of emissions. “[B]ecause the States are

independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long

presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law

causes of action.” Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. In preemption

cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has

“legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally

occupied,” the Supreme Court counsels that courts should “start

with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States

were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the

clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 

Defendants cite Huron Portland Cement Company v. City

of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960), for the proposition that

because emissions control is a historic police power and the CAA

gives primary responsibility for reducing air pollution to the

states, the presumption should apply. However, in 1967, just two

years after Congress first authorized federal emission

regulations, and subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Huron Portland Cement, Congress preempted states from adopting

emission standards on road sources. EMA, 88 F.3d at 1079. 

Additionally, the regulation of motor sources has been primarily

a federal project, unlike regulation of pollution from stationary

sources. See, e.g., EMA, 1078-1082; MVMA, 17 F.3d at 524-27;

MEMA, 627 F.2d at 1101-03, 1108-11. More importantly, the

challenged regulations affect the field of international maritime

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commerce, which has historically been within the purview of the

federal rather than the state government. United States V.

Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). In Locke, the Supreme Court

observed that maritime commerce is “an area where the federal

interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic

and is now well established.” 529 U.S. at 99. Indeed, during

the debates on the ratification of the Constitution, the

Federalist Papers touted the authority of Congress to regulate

interstate navigation without intervention from separate states

that would result in difficulties conducing foreign affairs, as a

primary reason for adopting the Constitution. See Federalist

Nos. 4, 6, and 22.

The presumption does not apply where “there has been a

history of significant federal presence.” Id. Even so, this

question is immaterial given the court’s conclusion that CAA §

209(e)(2)(A) preempts any non-EPA approved state standards

controlling emissions from auxiliary diesel engines. See SCAQMD,

541 U.S. at 257-58 (presumption against preemption not addressed

in determining certain state fleet rules were preempted by CAA §

209(a) and criticizing dissent; dissent began analysis with the

presumption against preemption). 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the regulations are

standards and are therefore preempted by CAA § 209(e)(2). The

regulations are not in-use requirements. Because the regulations

set numerical requirements for the reduction of emissions

relating to particular emissions rather than a fleet as a whole,

the regulations are “standards relating to the control of

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emissions.” Unlike CAA § 209(a) or CAA § 209(e)(1), standards in

CAA § 209(e)(2) do not have to “relate back” to manufacturers. 

Finally, the presumption against preemption does not save

California’s regulations. Accordingly, the court will grant

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on their first claim for

relief and enjoin defendants from enforcing the regulations. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its

first claim for relief be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; and

(2) defendants be, and they hereby are, PERMANENTLY

ENJOINED from enforcing 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1 and 17 C.C.R. § 93118. 

Should defendants receive authorization from the EPA, pursuant to

CAA § 209(e)(2)(A), they may move this court to dissolve this

injunction. 

DATED: August 30, 2007

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