Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00519/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00519-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

FRANKIE BRYANT, as )

Administratrix of the Estate )

of Deitrick Bryant, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 7:14-CV-519-LSC

)

GREENE COUNTY, ALA., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This case concernsthe unfortunate suicide ofDeitrick Bryant (“Bryant”)in the

Greene County, Alabama jail. Bryant’s mother Frankie Bryant (“Plaintiff”) brings

claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the

Americanswith DisabilitiesAct, and the Rehabilitation Act, aswell aswrongful death

and negligence claims. Before the Court are motions to dismiss the action, filed by

Defendants Joe Benison (“Benison”), Barbara Collins (“Collins”), Jeremy Rancher

(“Rancher”),Elston Carpenter (“Carpenter”),and Athelyn Jones(“Jones”), and the

Greene County Commission. (Docs. 6,8, 10, 12, and 14.) For the reasonsstated below,

the motions are due to be granted.

I. Facts Pleaded by Plaintiff

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FILED

 2014 Jul-23 AM 10:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-00519-LSC Document 23 Filed 07/23/14 Page 1 of 26
Inevaluating a motion to dismiss,the Court confinesitself to the facts presented

in the Complaint, and takesthose facts as true. St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d

1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). According to the Complaint, Bryant, a resident of Greene

County, suffered from depression and drug addiction. He had also been the victim of

a “recent” sexual assault, though the Complaint does not reveal when the assault

occurred.

On April 3, 2012, Bryant visited the Green County Circuit Clerk’s Office to

renew his driver’s license. He was unable to do so because the county had issued a

warrant for his arrest based on his failure to appear for a traffic violation. An officer

attempted to arrest Bryant in the Courthouse, but Bryant resisted and fled the scene.

He was later found hiding in a freezer at his last known address.

When officers found Bryant, they handcuffed him with his hands behind his

back. While handcuffed, he ran from the officers who pursued him for about forty to

fifty yards before Defendant Rancher tased Bryant with anX-26 taser. Bryant was not

treated for any taser wound. Bryant was taken to Greene County Jail and searched.

During the search, officers found marijuana in his pocket. He was charged with

Assault, Possession of Marijuana, and Escape.

No bond was set for these charges, and no hearing was held between Bryant’s

incarceration on the evening ofApril 3,2012,and hissuicide approximately forty-eight

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hours later on April 5, 2012. At some point during this time, Plaintiff approached a

judge and informed him that Bryant needed medical care for depression. The judge

explained that Plaintiffneeded to arrange such care with SheriffBenison. Plaintiffthen

told Benison that Bryant needed to be admitted to a drug treatment program. 

Bryant did not receive any sort of medical treatment while incarcerated in the

Greene County Jail. During his incarceration, Bryant was kept in a holding cell

designated B-200. Cell B-200 measures fourteen feet by eight feet four inches, and

containstwo metal benches, one ofwhich serves as a bed. The ceiling is eight feet from

the floor, and six feet five inches from the tops of the metal benches. 

Bryant was placed in this cell for the safety of himself and other inmates. 

According to the Complaint, Defendants had a duty to comply with “Greene County

Jail Policies and Procedures” by monitoring and documenting Bryant’s behavior. No

documentation of Bryant’s behavior exists. Plaintiff alleges that the necessary

monitoring wasimpossible because cellB-200did not have proper operating lightsthat

would have allowed deputies to see into the cell from the control board. The

Complaint does note, however,that light from a window and from the nearby holding

area entered the cell.

TheComplaint alleges that a trustee named Evans noticed that Bryant was not

eating meals provided by the Greene County Jail. Jail trustees were instructed not to

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converse with Bryant. At some point during his incarceration, Defendant Jones

provided Bryant with pen and paper. Bryant wrote two notes,which are characterized

by Plaintiff as an apology note and a suicide note. The precise content of these notes

cannot be determined from the complaint. The Complaint also alleges that Bryant

passed a series of notes through the cell door requesting to talk to his family and

requesting bond.

On the date of his suicide, a few minutes before 5:00 p.m., Bryant notified

Defendant Jones that he needed to see a doctor because he had been raped with a

broom handle. The Complaint does not specify when or where this assault occurred.

Defendant Jones did not report this request to anyone.

At approximately 6:05 p.m. on April 5, 2012, Bryant tied his bed sheet to an

exposed ceiling beam and hanged himself. The ceiling beamsin the cellwere normally

covered with ceiling panels. These panels apparently had special screwsthat attached

them to the beams. Prior to Bryant’s incarceration, Evans found two screws on the

floor. These screwswere not put back into the ceiling. Bryant wasthus able to remove

one of the panels and gain access to the beam from which he hung himself.

Evansfound Bryant in his cell at approximately 6:40 p.m. He and Carpenter cut

down the body and checked for signs of life, but none were found. EMT personnel

arrived at 6:58 p.m. and determined that Bryant had no oxygen reading or heartbeat.

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The autopsy concluded that suicide by hanging was the cause of death. 

II. Standard of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Adefendant may move to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil

Procedure 12(b)(6)if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). “When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts

set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint ‘are to be accepted astrue and the court limits its

consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.’” Grossman, 225 F.3d at

1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th

Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, all “reasonable inferences” are to be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. St. George, 285 F.3d at 1337.

Nonetheless, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

1

“Unsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been recognized

not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th

In Twombly, the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated the oft-cited standard that “a complaint

1

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief” set forth in

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560-63. The Supreme Court stated

that the “no set of facts” standard “is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an

accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by

showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563.

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Cir. 2003) (quoting Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n. 16 (11th Cir.

2001)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a pleading that states a claim to

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). If the facts in the pleading “do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged–-but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and the

complaint must be dismissed. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted “two-pronged approach” to motions to

dismiss suggested by the Supreme Court: “1) eliminate any allegations in the

complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations,‘assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d

1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664). In evaluating whether a

claim is plausible, “courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint

‘obvious alternative explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the

unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Id. at 1295 (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 682). 

Using this framework, the Court takes care not to “unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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at 678-79. However, a plaintiff need not prove his case in the complaint; “the

plausibility standard ‘calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence’ ofthe defendant’sliability.”Chaparro v.Carnival Corp.

693 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Further, a

complaint should not be dismissed unlessthe allegations do not support any plausible

theory of relief. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369

(11th Cir. 1997).

B. Qualified Immunity

In addition to moving to dismiss the claims, Defendants also advance the

affirmative defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 43 at 22.) The Supreme Court has

stressed that qualified immunity represents an immunity from suit rather than a

defense to liability, and that it should therefore be addressed in the earliest possible

stage of a case. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). When the Defendant is

acting within his official discretion, qualified immunity servesto dismiss a claim at the

12(b)(6) stage if the Court concludes from the face of the complaint that the law

supporting the claim was not clearly established before the defendant acted. Marsh,

268 F.3d at 1023. In addressing a motion to dismiss, the Court may first determine

whether a constitutional right has been violated, and thenwhether that right had been

clearly established, or it may skip directly to the “clearly established” prong. Pearson

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v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235-236 (2009).

III. Discussion

The Court first notes that, in her reply brief, Plaintiff affirmatively abandoned

all claims against the Greene County Commission. (Doc. 22 at 1.) Therefore, the

Greene County Commission’s motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

A. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. 1983

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims can be organized into three basic categories.

First, she alleges that Defendant Rancher used excessive force in arresting Bryant.

Secondly, Plaintiff arguesthat several defendants who were present at the jail during

Bryant’s incarceration were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Finally,

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Benison and Collins enacted policies or followed

customs that violated Bryant’s constitutional rights.

1. The Excessive Force Claim

This claim is alleged against Defendant Jeremy Rancher,who is identified in the

Complaint as a Deputy for Greene County. The Complaint alleges that Rancher

“discharged an X-26 Taser hitting Bryant with multiple bursts of electrical current.”

(Doc. 1 at 5.) The use of excessive force in carrying out an arrest can constitute a

2

It is unclear to the Court whether this sentence means Rancher fired more than once or

2

whether a single discharge caused multiple bursts to hit Bryant. However, Plaintiff does not

appear to base any of her excessive force argument on multiple firings, so the Court will not

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violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and

seizure. Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir. 1998). However, an

officer of the law does have the right to use physical coercion to affect an arrest. See,

e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1968). To determine whether the particular

amount of force used was reasonable, the court must examine “the facts and

circumstances . . . including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). 

In addition,Rancher hasraised the defense of qualified immunity. Rancher has

rightfully asserted that he was acting within his discretionary authority. See Crosby v.

Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the relevant inquiry

is whether the acts are “of a type that fellwithin the employee’sjob responsibilities.”)

Making arrests falls within the job responsibilities of Deputy Rancher. The question

of whether the arrest was effectuated constitutionally does not impact whether it was

within his discretionary authority. See Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.

1994). Since it is within that authority, the Court must determine whether the

address that issue.

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complaint alleges a violation of clearly established law. Andersonv.Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 638-39 (1987).

In this case, Bryant, though handcuffed and unarmed, was in the act of fleeing

or trying to escape from the officers. Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent

escape,unlessprobable cause exists“to believe that that the suspect poses a significant

threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at

11. However, a “taser is a non-deadly weapon.” Fils v.City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272,

1276 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011)). The reasonableness of force used in effectuating the arrest

must be determined from the point of view of a reasonable officer on the scene,

without the benefit of hindsight. Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919,

924. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the excessive tasing contributed to

Bryant’s death, this cannot convert the use of the taser into deadly force because

Rancher could not have known ahead of time that it would lead to death.

The Court must therefore analyze the excessive force claim using the three

factors noted in Graham. 490 U.S. at 396. In this case, the crimes alleged against

Bryant were moderate in severity. Although officers initially tried to arrest him for

failing to pay a traffic ticket, Bryant allegedly committed both escape and assault

before he was tased. Both of these crimes are felonies. Ala. Code §§ 13A-12-06-20,

13A-10-31. The second factor, whether the suspect is a threat to officers or other

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civilians, appearsto cut in Plaintiff’sfavor, because Bryant was handcuffed and there

was no indication that he was armed. The third factor, however, favors Defendant

Rancher, because Bryant had already escaped from officers once on the date in

question and was attempting to flee at the time he was tased. 

Defendant Rancher’s conduct did not constitute excessive force. See Oliver v.

Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 906 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that tasing an unarmed suspect

once may have been justified, even where multiple tasings was excessive force). The

Eleventh Circuit has countenanced the use of a taser on a party that refused to

cooperate with police commands, even where the initial traffic stop was for an

inoperative tag light. Draper, 369 F.3d at 1278. Further, where the suspect continues

to fight or flee, the use of the taser may be reasonable even when he is in handcuffs.

Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1073 (11th Cir. 2008). Therefore, Rancher’s use

of force against Bryant was reasonable.

However, even assuming arguendo that a constitutional violation occurred,the

violation was not clearly established at the time of the arrest. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244-

45. In order for the right to be clearly established, previous case law of the U.S.

Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Alabama Supreme Court must make it

obviousto a reasonable government actor that his actions violate federal law. Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). Hope abrogated the Eleventh Circuit’s previous

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standard requiring almost identical facts to show clearly established law. However, it

remains true that the clearly established test does not apply at a high level of

generality, but rather in a more particularized sense. Id. at 741-42; see also Anderson v.

Creighton,483 U.S. 635,639-40(1987). Inother words,Defendant Rancher would have

to know that applying significant but non-deadly force to a handcuffed but not subdued

defendant who was then attempting to escape constituted a constitutional violation.

There is no such relevant case law. If anything, the existing authority clearly supports

Rancher’s conduct as reasonable. Thus, the excessive force claim against him is due

to be dismissed.

2. Deliberate Indifference Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Benison, Carpenter, and Jones were

deliberately indifferent to Bryant’s serious medical needs. Because Bryant was a

pretrial detainee, these claims are based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994).

Detainees have a right to receive medical treatment and a right to be protected from

self-inflicted injuries. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402

F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005). To make out a deliberate indifference claim, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant 1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of

serious harm, and 2) disregarded that risk; 3) through conduct that was more than

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mere negligence. Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F. 3d 980, 987 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing

McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).

When the deliberate indifference is alleged to have led to a prisoner suicide,

“[t]he mere opportunity for suicide, without more, is clearly insufficient to impose

liability on those charged with care of prisoners.” Cagle, 334 F.3d. at 986 (quoting

Tittle v.JeffersonCounty Comm’n, 10F.3d1535, 1540(11th Cir. 1994). Rather,Eleventh

Circuit precedent requires that the defendant intentionally disregarded “a strong

likelihood rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.”

Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, the

plaintiff must show that the defendant wassubjectively aware that the combination of

the prisoner’s suicidal tendencies and the feasibility of suicide in the detention

environment would likely lead to self-harm. Gish v. Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 955 (11th

Cir. 2008). Finally, the plaintiff must show that each defendant had personal

knowledge of this likelihood; respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability for

a § 1983 claim. Cook, 402 F.3d at 1115-16. Therefore, the Court must evaluate these

claims individually with respect to each Defendant.

a. Sheriff Benison

Plaintiff points to several pieces of knowledge that allegedly should have placed

Benison on notice of a strong likelihood that Bryant would harm himself. First,

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Plaintiff alleges that Benison knew of the “excessive tasing” that occurred during

Bryant’s arrest. However, Plaintiff pleads no facts to support this assertion. The

Complaint doesnot allege that Benison waspresent for the arrest, nor doesitstate that

Defendant Rancher or anyone else who was actually present informed him of the use

of the taser. In fact the complaint states that Rancher did not file the requisite report

after tasing Bryant, thus making it less likely that Benison learned of the incident.

Plaintiff also alleges that Benison should have been on notice of Bryant’s

potential suicidal tendencies because he exhibited impulsive behaviors during the

arrest, suffered from a sexual assault, and was subject to multiple felonious charges.

Again Plaintiff fails to plead facts that would lead the Court to conclude that Sheriff

Benison should have known that Bryant wassuicidal. Even if we assume that Benison

knew the charges against Bryant, which would give him some idea of Bryant’s

irrational actions during the arrest, Plaintiff pleads nothing but a bare conclusion that

Benison knew of the sexual assault, without any facts showing hewould have had such

knowledge. The Complaint contains no facts as to when the sexual assault actually

occurred, and the only Defendant alleged to have received specific information about

the assault is Defendant Jones. In addition, although Bryant failed to eat certain meals

during hisincarceration, the Complaint alleges only that Defendant Carpenter failed

to observe or report this fact. It does not provide any reason to believe that Benison

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knew about Bryant’s refusal to eat.

TheComplaint does allege that Plaintiffspoke toSheriffBenison about Bryant’s

condition, asserting that he needed treatment for depression and drug rehabilitation.

Plaintiff also expressed concern that Benison might have been questioning Bryant

about a shooting in another county. She also told Benison that Bryant had expressed

that he felt “someone was out to get him,” which caused Plaintiff to believe that

Bryant wassuffering from a severe mental illness. Additionally, the Complaint asserts

that Sheriff Benison ordered that Bryant be placed in a specific holding cell “[d]ue to

irrational and volatile actions . . . for the safety of himself and other inmates.” (Doc.

1 at 7). This statement is in quotes in the Complaint, but the source of the quotation

is never revealed. Finally, the Complaint mentions that Bryant wrote two notes, one

of which it characterizes as “a type of suicide note,” but no facts are alleged

concerning the contents of either note. (Doc. 1 at 10). 

Examining these facts as a whole, Benison may have had some idea that Bryant

resisted during his arrest, and may have known that he was arrested for multiple

felonies and was a drug user. In addition, Benison certainly had been informed by the

Plaintiff that Bryant was depressed. Applying Eleventh Circuit precedent to these

facts, the question is not whether Benison might have known that some form of

medical treatment was needed, but whether he knew there was a “strong likelihood ...

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that the self infliction of harm [would] occur.” Popham, 908 F.2d at 1563. Such

knowledge has been found to exist where the officer was both told that the prisoner

wassuicidal and had knowledge of a previoussuicide attempt. Snow ex rel. Snow v.City

of Citronelle, Ala., 420 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005).

Knowledge that the detainee is or may be mentally ill does not, by itself, provide

subjective knowledge of a strong likelihood ofsuicide. Williams v.Lee County, Ala., 78

F.3d 491, 492-93 (11th Cir. 1996)(finding no deliberate indifference where jail officials

knew that prisoner had left one mental health facility and was awaiting transfer to

another). The fact that a detainee writes notes requesting psychiatric attention was

likewise insufficient to support a finding of deliberate indifference. Cook, 402 F.3d at

1101. Similarly, information from family membersthat a detaineemay be suicidal does

not mean an officer knew of a strong likelihood of self-harm. Fowler v. Chattooga

County, Ga., 307 Fed. Appx 363, 365-66 (11th Cir. 2009). If no knowledge of such a

strong likelihood exists, jail conditions that render suicide feasible cannot support a

deliberate indifference claim on their own. Gish, 516 F.3d at 955.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges nothing from which one could plausibly conclude

that Benison believed Bryant to be suicidal or that Bryant had ever attempted suicide

in the past. The Complaint contains numerous factual and legal conclusions about

what Benison knew and whether he exhibited deliberate indifference, but lacks

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sufficient facts to make these conclusions plausible. See Twombly, 554 U.S. at 570.

Perhaps the Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendant Benison knew that Bryant

needed some sort of medical attention, but it does not plausibly allege that he knew of

a strong likelihood of suicide, as required to demonstrate deliberate indifference.

Popham, 908 F.2d at 1563. Furthermore, even if the Court were to assume Benison’s

actionsrise to the level of a constitutional violation, the case law cited above makesit

clear that this violation was not clearly established in existing law at the time of

Bryant’s death. Therefore,Benison is entitled to qualified immunity on the deliberate

indifference claim against him, which is thus due to be dismissed.

b. Defendant Carpenter

Elston Carpenter is a correctional officer who worksin the Greene County Jail. 

The Complaint alleges that he “wasresponsible for continually observing [Bryant’s]

demeanor to monitor him for suicidal tendencies. . . .” (Doc. 1 at 4). No facts indicate

why this duty fell particularly on Carpenter. The Complaint also states that, while

Carpenter wassupervising trustees on trash duty, he passed by Bryant’s cell and saw

him standing up at the front door looking at Carpenter and the trustees. The

Complaint assumes that Bryant may have requested to talk to his mother or see a

doctor at this time, which was after he had allegedly told Defendant Jones about the

sexual assault. However, it does not allege, even conclusorily, that he said anything

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specific to Defendant Carpenter. Finally, the complaint states that Carpenter was

called to assist the trustee who found Bryant’s body; Carpenter procured scissors,

helped cut Bryant’s body down, checked for signs of life, and called the Sheriff.

The Complaint relates no facts that would allow a plausible conclusion that

Defendant Carpenter had subjective knowledge of a strong likelihood of suicide. See

Popham, 908 F.2d at 1563. Therefore, the deliberate indifference claim against him

must fail. This claim is due to be dismissed.

c. Defendant Jones

Athelyn Jonesis a corporal for Greene County, and the Complaint alleges that

shewasresponsible for operating the control board at the jail. Plaintiff asserts that this

should have allowed her to observe Bryant’s demeanor and “monitor him for suicidal

tendencies.” (Doc. 1 at 3). In addition to this duty, Jones occasionally made roundsin

the jail to observe the prisoners. On one of these rounds, Jones allegedly provided

Bryant with pen and paper, which he used to write the two notes. Approximately an

hour and fifteen minutes before Bryant hanged himself, Jones visited his cell on her

rounds and wastold that Bryant needed to see a doctor because hehad been rapedwith

a broom handle. Jones did not report the alleged rape before Bryant’s suicide.

The fact that Jones was assigned to monitor the control room is only relevant

if Plaintiff plausibly alleges that she should have seen something that made her believe

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that there was a strong likelihood that Plaintiff would harm himself. Plaintiff does not

allege anything that Joneswould or should have seen that would have indicated to her

that Plaintiff was suicidal. As noted above, the conditions of confinement, including

the lighting in the cell, must combine with subjective knowledge of the likelihood of

suicide in order for a constitutional violation to exist. Gish, 516 F.3d at 955. According

to the Complaint,Bryant’snote revealing the rape,which had to have occurred before

he was incarcerated, said only that he needed medical attention and did not indicate

that he was suicidal. The fact that he hanged himself shortly thereafter does not

retrospectively give Jones knowledge that suicide was likely. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim against Jones is due to be dismissed.

3. Unconstitutional Policy Claims

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Benison and Collins created policies or

allowed customs to fluorish that led to Bryant’s death. Because respondeat superior

does not exist in § 1983 claims, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a supervisor

or government must demonstrate a policy or custom that caused her injuries. Monell

v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To survive a motion to

dismiss, a plaintiff must allege either an existing official policy or a custom. Grech v.

Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). A custom can be created

“through the repeated acts of a final policymaker.” Id. at 1329. The plaintiff must

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identify a specific policy or custom that caused her injury. Gold v. City of Miami, 151

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998)(citing Board of County Com’rs v. Brown, 520U.S. 397,

403-04 (1997).

Plaintiff does not allege any specific policies promulgated by Benison. Instead,

the Complaint makes allegations in terms of what the policies did or did not do. For

example, the Complaint alleges that the implemented policies did not provide

adequate health care for Bryant, but it does not state that Benison promulgated an

official policy of denying health care to pre-trial detainees. Nor does the Complaint

allege a custom by showing that Benison, assuming arguendo that he is a final

policymaker, had denied such health care to othersin Bryant’s position. Likewise,the

Complaint states that a policy or custom led to Bryant being placed in a dark holding

cellwith accessto the metal barsin the ceiling. However, it provides no clue astowhat

such a policy might provide. Nor does the Complaint mention any instances from

which a custom might be established. 

The Complaint also alleges that Benison should be liable for failing to

implement the recommendationsofthe AmericanCorrectional Association. Afailure

to follow the guidelines of the ACA does not automatically trigger a constitutional

violation. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 366. Plaintiff acceptsthat not every violation ofthe ACA

guidelines or the Greene County Jail Handbook (which stipulates that the jail must be

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run under those guidelines) rises to the level of a constitutional violation. (Doc. 19 at

10). She is correct that some violations of a handbook or the ACA guidelines can rise

to that level, but in order to demonstrate such violations, the plaintiff must show the

existence of a policy or custom that contravenes the guidelines in a way that causes

constitutional injury. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any official policy of breaking the

ACA guidelines. Furthermore, she does not allege a custom because the Complaint

provides no facts about any instance other than Bryant’s occurrence. Thus, it cannot

allege repeated actions by a final decisionmaker.

Plaintiff fails to allege any policy or custom promulgated or followed by

Defendants Benison or Collins. Therefore, her allegations of constitutional violation

caused by a custom or policy necessarily fail. Thus these claims are due to be

dismissed.

B. Claims Brought Under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans With

Disabilities Act

The Complaint alleges these claims solely against Greene County and the

Greene County Commission. (Doc. 1 at 18-22). Plaintiffhassince abandonedall claims

against these defendants. (Doc. 22 at 1). Therefore, these claims are due to be

dismissed.

C. State Law Claims

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Plaintiff brings state law claims for wrongful death and negligence. The Court

has jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this statute, Congress

authorized federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the state law

claims“form part ofthe same case or controversy” as claims over which the Court has

federal jurisdiction. 28U.S.C. § 1367(a). Astate law claim forms part of the same case

or controversy as a federal claim when the two claims“derive from a common nucleus

of operative fact.” Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 701

F.3d 669, 679 (11th Cir. 2012). Here all of Plaintiff’s claims derive from the same

facts surrounding Bryant’s arrest and incarceration. Thus, the Court is within its

power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

The Court is also within its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction, based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Thissubsection allowsthe district court to

decline supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims within original federal

jurisdiction,which is the casehere. District courts consider four factorsin determining

whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction:judicial economy,convenience,fairness

to litigants, and comity. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 745 (11th

Cir. 2006). Where state law is clear and this Court can dismiss without the need for

further litigation, these factors favor the exercise of jurisdiction. Where further

determination ofstate law is necessary,the litigation is best leftto the state courts, and

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jurisdiction may be declined. See Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d

1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that state,rather than federal courts,should be the

arbiter of state law).

1. Defendants Benison and Rancher

Benison and Rancherenjoy absolute immunity under the Alabama Constitution.

See Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So. 2d 1235, 1239 (Ala. 2006). “The law is clear in

Alabama that sheriffs are constitutionally established executive officers of the State of

Alabama.” Id. Sheriff Benison’s position as an executive officer of the state entitles

him to absolute immunity from against suits for money damages under Article I, § 14

of the Alabama Constitution. Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 442-43 (Ala. 1987).

This immunity cannot be affected by the question of whether state-agent immunity,

a completely separate concept, would be appropriate. Ex parte Tirey, 977 So. 2d 469,

470 (Ala. 2007). Therefore, the state law claims against Defendant Benison are due to

be dismissed.

The state immunity afforded to sheriffs extendsto deputy sheriffs acting within

the scope of their employment. Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 898 (Ala. 2011).

Deputy sheriffs enjoy such immunity because the deputy “islegally anextension ofthe

sheriff.” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala. 1994). Like

Sheriff Benison, Deputy Rancher is entitled to absolute state immunity whether he

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would be entitled to state-agent immunity or not. See Sumter Cnty., 953 So. 2d at 1239-

40. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Rancher engaged in any activities outside

the scope of his employment. Therefore, the state law claims against Defendant

Rancher are due to be dismissed.

2. Defendants Collins, Carpenter, and Jones

Defendants Collins, Carpenter, and Jones work in the Greene County Jail.

According to Defendants,Ala. Code § 14-6-1 providesthem with the same immunity

granted to the sheriff. Plaintiff, on the other hand, notes that Ex parte Shelley held that 

a jailer, unlike a deputy sheriff, cannot be viewed as a legal alter ego of the sheriff and

was not entitled to state immunity. 53 So. 3d 887, 896-97 (Ala. 2009). Shelley

mentioned Ala. Code § 14-6-1 in a footnote, solely to note that a previous case had

found unconstitutional an earlier version of the statute holding Sheriffs liable for the

acts of jailers. Id. at n. 8 (citing Parker, 519 So. 2d at 446). 

Subsequent cases have not fully clarified the relationship between Shelley and

Ala. Code § 14-6-1. This precedent does reveal, however, that a fact-intensive

determination of whether a particular jail official qualifies as a deputy sheriff or

whether he has powersto act as a peace officer is important to the Court’s decision to

grant either state or state-agent immunity. See Ex parte Burnell, 90 So. 3d 708, 711-15

(Ala. 2012); Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474, 501 (Ala. 2010). This factual

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inquiry, along with the legal reasoning required to reconcile Shelley with Ala. Code §

14-6-1, is best undertaken by an Alabama state court. Since all of Plaintiff’s federal

claims have been dismissed, this Court is within its discretion to decline to exercise

jurisdiction over the state law claims against Collins,Carpenter, and Jones. 28 U.S.C.

1367(c)(3). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are dismissed without

prejudice to being refiled in state court, should Plaintiff determine such to be

appropriate and supported by law.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim fails because clearly established law could not

make a responsible officer aware that a single use of a taser on a handcuffed but

resisting suspect violated that suspect’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference claimsfail because Plaintiff does not allege facts that plausibly show that

any of the defendants possessed knowledge of a strong likelihood ofsuicide. Plaintiff’s

claims concerning unconstitutional policies or customsfail because Plaintiff hasfailed

to plausibly allege the existence ofsuch a policy or custom. Plaintiff has abandoned all

claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff’sstate law claims against

Benison and Rancher fail because those Defendants are entitled to absolute state

immunity. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims against Collins, Carpenter, and Jones. Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s

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claims are due to be dismissed. A separate order will be entered.

Done this 23 day of July 2014. rd

 

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

174310

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