Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-00969/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-00969-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

1. Spann asserts other claims against DynCorp.

These other claims are not at issue in this opinion.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANGELA SPANN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:04cv969-T

) (WO)

DYNCORP TECHNICAL SERVICES, )

LLC, and ARMY FLEET )

SUPPORT, LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Angela Spann filed this employment lawsuit

charging that defendants DynCorp Technical Services, LLC

and Army Fleet Support, LLC (“AFS”) retaliated against

her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through

2000e-17.1

 Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2000e-5(f)(3).

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 1 of 17
2

This case is before the court on AFS’s motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the

motion will be granted.

 I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 2 of 17
3

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

Because Spann is the nonmoving party, the court

presents the following facts in the light most favorable

to her. In February 2001, Spann began working for

DynCorp as an aircraft mechanic. She was immediately

subjected to a hostile work environment, including sexual

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 3 of 17
2. Defendant DynCorp’s evidentiary submission in

support of partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

39), Spann deposition (“Spann deposition”) (exhibit 2

part 1, p. 188).

3. Id., pp. 186, 187.

4. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), Grosvenor deposition (“Grosvenor deposition”)

(Doc. No. 48-4, pp. 11, 12).

5. Id., Jacobs deposition (“Jacobs deposition”)

(Doc. No. 48-2, p. 18), employment offer letter

(“employment offer letter”) (Doc. No. 48-5).

4

advances and sexual and demeaning comments from coworkers. In July of 2003, Spann was transferred to Knox

field at Fort Rucker, Alabama.2

 She applied for and was

promoted to the position of technical inspector.3

 

In September 2003, AFS was awarded the government

contract to perform military support services at Fort

Rucker effective December 1, 2003. AFS implemented a

policy to hire its future employees from DynCorp’s

incumbent workforce.4

 

Spann was offered a position with AFS.5

 The offer-ofemployment letter stated, in part, that, “We are pleased

to offer you this employment opportunity, which will

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 4 of 17
6. Id.

5

become effective at 12:00 a.m. on December 1, 2003.” The

letter also stated that, “If you accept this offer,

please ... initial or sign where requested, and bring the

package with you to the AFS Application Office. ... You

must return your completed documents on the following

date: November 12, 2003.”6

On or about November 9, 2003, Spann returned her AFS

employment paperwork to Susan Jacobs, a member of the

human resources team employed by a third entity separate

from AFS and DynCorp to facilitate the transition from

DynCorp’s contract at Fort Rucker to that of AFS. 

The AFS paperwork included a “minimum conditions for

hire” form, which stated that, “All offers of employment

are contingent upon ... your status as an employee in

good standing with the incumbent contractor DynCorp” as

well “upon the successful completion of your preemployment background check (if applicable), preCase 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 5 of 17
7. Exhibit A to AFS’s motion to substitute affidavit

of Tom Green (Doc. No. 41), minimum conditions for hire

letter (Doc. No. 41-2) (emphasis added).

8. Jacobs deposition, p. 13; Grosvenor deposition,

p. 16.

9. Jacobs deposition, pp. 20, 21.

10. Spann deposition, p. 48.

6

employment drug-screening (as applicable).”7

 No

background check or drug screening was ever conducted by

AFS for any incumbent employee.8

 The minimum conditions

for hire form did not state a date or time period during

which the incumbent employee had to be in good standing

for the offer to remain valid. 

On November 9, 2003, Spann met with Jacobs and

related the episodes of harassment she allegedly suffered

at DynCorp; Jacobs then contacted Tom Green, the AFS

General Manager.9

 The next day, Green met with Jacobs,

Spann, and Spann’s friend and co-worker LaRhonda McKay,

who also stated that she had suffered harassment.10

Although Green encouraged Spann to file a written

statement with DynCorp; he then called Tom Walker,

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 6 of 17
11. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), Green deposition (Doc. No. 48-3, p. 18).

12. Id., Jacob’s notes from meeting on October 10,

2003, (Exhibit two to Jacobs deposition, Doc. No. 48-2).

13. Id., termination letter, (Doc. No. 48-7).

14. Id., AFS rescission letter (Doc. No. 48-8). 

7

DynCorp’s general manager, to alert Walker to Spann’s

allegations.11 Although at that time, Spann expressed

fear that she would be fired for speaking out,12 she gave

a written statement to DynCorp on November 14, 2003,

asserting that she had suffered sexual harassment.

DynCorp subsequently investigated Spann’s allegations.

On November 24, 2003, DynCorp advised Spann that she

was being terminated,13 and two days later, on November

26, AFS notified Spann that her offer of employment was

being rescinded because she was no longer an employee in

good standing with DynCorp.14 AFS formally took over the

Fort Rucker contract on December 1. 

On December 18, 2003, in order to avoid the costs of

arbitration and the union grievance process, DynCorp

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 7 of 17
15. Spann deposition, pp. 308, 209.

16. Defendant DynCorp’s evidentiary submission in

support of partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

39), EEOC AFS Charge (Doc. No. 39-5, exhibit 21 to Spann

deposition).

17. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), AFS reply to EEOC charge (Doc. No. 48-5, p. 2).

8

rescinded its November 24 termination of Spann, with the

result that her work history file reflected a termination

date of November 30 due to “loss of contract.” Spann did

not contact AFS after learning of this decision, and AFS

did not re-extend its original offer of employment to

Spann.15

On May 13, 2004, Spann filed a charge of retaliation

against ASF with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”).16 On May 18, AFS replied to the EEOC

charge with a letter stating that the “implied

definition” of ‘incumbent workforce’ was limited to

active employees on DynCorp’s payroll as of November 30,

2003.17 AFS also asserted in this letter that it had no

knowledge of Spann’s complaint of sexual harassment

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 8 of 17
18. Id., pp. 3, 5.

19. Defendant DynCorp’s evidentiary submission in

support of partial motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

39), EEOC right-to-sue notices for DynCorp and AFS (Doc.

No. 39-5, exhibits 22 and 24 to Spann deposition).

9

against DynCorp.18 The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice

against AFS on August 26, 2004.19

Spann filed this lawsuit on October 13, 2004.

III. DISCUSSION

It is illegal under Title VII for an employer to

retaliate against an employee “because [the employee] has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice

... or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,

or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter [of Title

VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This case is governed by

the familiar burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the

McDonnell Douglas approach, the employee has the initial

burden of establishing a prima-facie case of unlawful

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 9 of 17
10

employment retaliation by a preponderance of the

evidence. Id. at 802; Young v. General Food Corp., 840

F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1988). 

If the employee establishes a prima-facie case, the

burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the

presumption by articulating legitimate, non-retaliatory

reasons for its employment action. Chapman v. AI

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). The

employer has the burden of production, not of persuasion,

and thus does not have to persuade a court that it was

actually motivated by the reason advanced. See, e.g.,

Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 247,

253-55, 258 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

Once the employer satisfies this burden of

production, “the presumption of discrimination is

eliminated and ‘the [employee] has the opportunity to

come forward with evidence, including the previously

produced evidence establishing the prima facie case,

sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 10 of 17
11

that the reasons given by the employer were not the real

reasons for the adverse employment decision.’” Chapman,

229 F.3d at 1024 (citations omitted). The employee may

meet this burden by persuading the court that a

retaliatory reason more than likely motivated the

defendant or by demonstrating that the proffered reason

for the employment decision is not worthy of belief.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Young, 840 F.2d at

828. 

To establish a prima-facie case of retaliation under

Title VII, Spann must show (1) a statutorily protected

expression; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a

causal link between the protected expression and the

adverse action. Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212

F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000). The court will assume

that Spann has established a prima-facie case.

Also, it is without question that AFS has met its

burden of coming forward with a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged action, Chapman,

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 11 of 17
12

229 F.3d at 1024: as discussed above, AFS asserts that it

withdrew its offer to Spann because she was no longer an

employee in good standing with DynCorp as of November 30,

2003, and that such status was necessary for a successful

transition into the maintenance contract at Fort Rucker.

Therefore, the critical question is whether Spann has

produced, or pointed to, sufficient evidence that AFS’s

reason is a pretext for retaliation. Spann has pointed

to four circumstances that she contends support her

argument that AFS’s proffered explanation is unworthy of

credence and pretextual: (1) AFS’s failure to rely on its

own hiring criteria; (2) AFS’s position before the EEOC;

(3) temporal proximity; and (4) AFS’s failure to

reinstate Spann’s offer. Each circumstance is discussed

in turn.

1. AFS’s Failure to Rely on Hiring Criteria: Spann

maintains the because she was an employee in good

standing when AFS made its offer and she accepted it, AFS

was obligated to honor its offer and her acceptance.

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 12 of 17
13

Spann argues that there is nothing in AFS’s hiring

conditions that required that she be in good standing

with DynCorp on November 30; the form listing the minimum

conditions for hire did not include a date or time period

during which a DynCorp employee was required to be in

good standing. 

However, it is self evident from AFS’s good-standing

requirement that the company did not want to be saddled

with an employee whom DynCorp itself had determined, for

whatever reason or reasons, valid or invalid, was not

worthy of continued employment; AFS simply did want the

headache of making individualized determinations about

employees not in good standing at DynCorp. And it

logically follows that AFS did not want a terminated

DynCorp employee irrespective of when the employee was

terminated; whether the employee was terminated two days,

two weeks, or two years before December 1 is a

distinction without significance. Therefore, AFS’s

conclusion that the employee must be in good standing on

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 13 of 17
20. In further support of its position that Spann’s

retaliation contention is wholly meritless, AFS

emphasizes that it was its own employee who brought

Spann’s complaint to the attention of DynCorp management.

21. Brief in support of defendant AFS’s motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 36, p. 14). See also

Grosvenor deposition, p. 26.

14

December 1, that is, when the employee begins work with

AFS, is not only a reasonable reading of its good-faith

requirement, it is the only reasonable one. Spann was

not such an employee.20

2. AFS’s Position before the EEOC: In its response

to the EEOC charge filed by Spann, AFS asserted that it

had no knowledge of Spann’s complaints of sexual

harassment at DynCorp, and therefore could not have acted

in retaliation based on those complaints. AFS has

subsequently admitted that it did, in fact, have

knowledge of Spann’s complaints when it rescinded its

employment offer.21 Spann argues that this inconsistency

supports her contention that AFS’s reason for her nonemployment is pretextual.

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 14 of 17
15

However, AFS’s actual reason for rescinding the offer

has remained consistent: Spann was no longer an employee

in good standing. Admittedly, whether AFS knew of

Spann’s complaints of discrimination at the time of the

rescission is not an insignificant fact, as such

knowledge is a critical element of the prima-facie case

for retaliation; but the inconsistency does not touch on

AFS’s proffered non-retaliatory reason, which has not

changed, and does not undermine the validity of that

reason in the absence of other evidence.

3. Temporal Proximity: The temporal proximity

between Spann’s complaints and AFS’s rescission suggests

the possibility of some connection between the two.

However, in the absence of other evidence of retaliation,

“temporal proximity does not amount to more than a

scintilla of evidence of retaliation,” Padron v.

BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1257

(S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding temporal proximity insufficient

to suggest pretext when offered as the only evidence

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 15 of 17
22. Plaintiff’s evidentiary submission in support of

brief in opposition to motions for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 48), Union letter (Doc. No. 48-9, p. 2).

23. Spann deposition, pp. 308, 309.

16

against an employer’s strongly supported legitimate

reason), especially when the proffered reason for the

employment decision is not only logical but fully

supported by the circumstances.

4. AFS’s Failure to Reinstate Spann: On December 3,

2003, Spann’s union sent a letter to AFS informing it

that her termination from DynCorp had been grieved and

requesting Spann’s reinstatement at AFS should she

prevail in arbitration.22 Subsequently, and after AFS had

already taken over the contract at Fort Rucker, DynCorp

rescinded its decision to terminate Spann, thereby

obviating the need for arbitration. It is undisputed

that Spann never contacted AFS or applied for a job after

learning of DynCorp’s decision.23 The union letter

contained a conditional request that Spann be reinstated

pending the outcome of arbitration, and cannot be

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 16 of 17
24. The court need not reach the interesting question

of whether Title VII prohibits an employer from

retaliating against an employee because of the employee’s

complaints made to another, prior employer about the

prior employer’s allegedly prohibited conduct.

considered an application for employment. AFS was under

no obligation to seek out Spann and offer her employment

after learning of DynCorp’s decision. Its failure to do

so is not evidence that its original rescission of her

offer was retaliatory. 

Because Spann has failed to show that AFS’s reason

for her non-employment is pretextual for retaliation, AFS

is entitled to summary judgment.24

An appropriate judgment will be entered. 

Done, this the 1st day of November, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:04-cv-00969-MHT-VPM Document 74 Filed 11/01/05 Page 17 of 17