Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00354/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00354-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Seth W Sebert, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-16-00354-PHX-ROS (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is the Court’s Order (Doc. 94) and Putative Defendants 

Moody and O’Neil’s Motion to Quash Service (Doc. 95). The parties have responded to 

the Court’s order to show cause, and Putative Defendants’ Motion to Quash Service is 

fully briefed and deemed submitted for decision. The determination of the undersigned is 

dispositive of some of Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the 

following Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). 

I. DISCUSSION

On September 30, 2016, the Court issued an Order (Doc. 94) requiring the 

Plaintiff to show cause (i) why the Court should not dismiss Defendants Moody and 

O’Neil from the action for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. 

Civ. P., and (2) why the Court should not dismiss Defendant’s Corizon, LLC and Corizon 

Health of New Jersey, LLC from the action for Plaintiff’s failure to serve pursuant to 

Case 2:16-cv-00354-ROS Document 103 Filed 11/15/16 Page 1 of 10
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Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P. and Rule 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Plaintiff responded (Doc. 97) and State Defendants and Putative Defendants 

Moody and O’Neil replied and objected (Doc. 98).

Plaintiff agrees that Defendants Corizon LLC and Corizon Health of New Jersey, 

LLC should be dismissed from this action without prejudice. The Magistrate Judge will 

recommend dismissal of Defendants Corizon LLC and Corizon Health of New Jersey, 

LLC from this action without prejudice.

The Plaintiff objects to dismissal of all claims regarding Defendants Moody and 

O’Neil because Plaintiff believes these Defendants were properly served and have 

appeared as “State Defendants” in the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13). As the Motion to 

Dismiss has been fully briefed, the Plaintiff asserts that she has prosecuted her case as to 

Defendants Moody and O’Neil. However, putative Defendants Moody and O’Neil have 

filed a Motion to Quash Service (Doc. 95), which asserts that Defendants Moody and 

O’Neil were never properly served. In addition, putative Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s belief that Defendants Moody and O’Neil have appeared through State 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is incorrect and unsupported by the record. 

The Magistrate Judge agrees.

In State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13 at 1), defense counsel clearly 

defines “State Defendants” as “[t]he Arizona Department of Corrections (‘ADC’), State 

of Arizona, and ADC Director Charles Ryan (collectively the ‘State Defendants’) . . . .” 

Defendants Moody and O’Neil are not mentioned in the Motion. Furthermore, the 

Magistrate Judge notes that Defendant Villavicencio filed his own Motion to Dismiss and 

Joinder with the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 14). Defendants Moody and 

O’Neil did not appear as a State Defendant, nor did they file their own motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff’s erroneous belief that they were included in State Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is not supported by the record.

Putative Defendants Moody and O’Neil further argue in their Motion to Quash 

Service (Doc. 95 at 2-4) that they were not properly served with Plaintiff’s Second 

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Amended Complaint. A review of the docket reflects that Affidavits of Service by a 

Private Process Server (Docs. 80-81) were filed reflecting that service of process as to 

Defendants Moody and O’Neil was effectuated on May 16, 2016 by delivering the 

summons and Second Amended Complaint to a female adult working in the Attorney 

General’s office located at 1275 W. Washington Street, Phoenix, AZ. Defendants 

Moody and O’Neil are alleged to be employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections

(the “ADC”), not the Office of the Attorney General. Though the Attorney General 

represents the ADC, no waiver of service was filed as to either Defendant Moody or 

O’Neil by counsel for the ADC. Therefore, personal service upon Defendants Moody 

and O’Neil is required pursuant to Rule 4(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. The Magistrate Judge finds 

that Plaintiff has not effectuated service of process as to Defendants Moody and O’Neil 

in substantial compliance with Rule 4(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. and Rule 4.1(d), Ariz. R. Civ. P. 

Defendants Moody and O’Neil were never served with the original Complaint or 

Amended Complaint, therefore service on defense counsel of the Second Amended 

Complaint pursuant to Rule 5(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., is not appropriate as urged by Plaintiff. 

Nor does service on ADC as an entity constitute personal service on Defendants Moody 

and O’Neil as individuals. The Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Motion to 

Quash (Doc. 95) be granted.

The Magistrate Judge further finds that the time within which service was required 

to occur has expired. See Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Order (Doc. 12). “Rule 4(m) . . .

requires a district court to grant an extension of time when the plaintiff shows good cause

for the delay. Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Mann v. Am. 

Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). In the absence of good cause, the 

Court in its discretion may grant an extension of time for service; “[h]owever, no court 

has ruled that the discretion is limitless.” Id. at 1041. The Court may consider such 

factors as “a statute of limitations bar, prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a 

lawsuit, and eventual service.” Id. (quoting Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 

381, 383 (7th Cir. 1998)).

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Plaintiff urges the Court to accept service of process upon the Attorney General’s 

office for Defendants Moody and O’Neil on the basis of an email dated May 12, 2016 

from defense counsel which states in pertinent part: “First, I appreciate that your office 

respects the security implications at stake when it comes to service of process on law 

enforcement officials. I am thankful that you chose to list only the Attorney General 

address for most of these officials, for example . . . . [P]lease do not have any process 

server look up and show up to an ADC official’s personal residence. That step would 

require disclosing the address to a private process server. Unlike federal marshalls [sic] 

and county sheriff employees, private process servers are not always vetted for security.”

(Doc. 99-2 at 2). Read in context with filings appearing on the docket, the Magistrate 

Judge notes each summons for Defendants Moody and O’Neil listed for an address the 

Attorney General’s Office. (Docs. 69-70). From the above email, Plaintiff concluded

that defense counsel accepted service of process for Defendants Moody and O’Neil at the 

Office of the Attorney General. However, this conclusion is directly contradicted by 

Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that, although requested, “[a]cceptances and waivers were 

not given.” (Doc. 99 at 3). Plaintiff alternatively moves for an order granting an 

enlargement of time for service should the Motion to Quash be granted. However, 

Plaintiff has not set forth good cause for an extension of time to serve Defendants Moody 

and O’Neil pursuant to Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P.

The Magistrate Judge next considers whether in its discretion such an extension of 

time should nevertheless be granted. Here, actual notice of the lawsuit has been given. 

In addition, there is no indication in the record that Defendants Moody and O’Neil are no 

longer employed by ADC. Service therefore could be accomplished at their place of 

employment, if not their residences. A Rule 16 Scheduling Conference has not been set 

due to the filing of dispositive motions by the Defendants who have appeared. Therefore, 

prejudice to Defendants Moody and O’Neil for this six month delay in service is not 

great. Plaintiff’s counsel’s confusion over service of process as explained is sincere. The 

Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court, in its discretion, grant Plaintiff an 

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extension of time of sixty (60) days from the filing of this Order to effectuate service of 

process upon Defendants Moody and O’Neil.

Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff properly served Defendants Moody and 

O’Neil on May 16, 2016, Plaintiff has not shown good cause for failing to prosecute her 

case against them. Defendants Moody and O’Neil did not answer or otherwise respond 

to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. The time to do so has long since passed. 

Plaintiff did nothing to move her case against Defendants Moody and O’Neil forward to 

conclusion.

A federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for 

failure to prosecute. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962); Ghazali 

v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). In appropriate circumstances, the Court 

may dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute even without notice or hearing. Id. at 

633. In determining whether Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the 

case against Defendants Moody and O’Neil, the Court must weigh the following five 

factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s 

need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 

sanctions.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Henderson v. 

Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The first two of these factors favor the 

imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the fourth factor cuts against a default or 

dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and availability of lesser 

sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990).

A. Factors One and Two: Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution of 

Litigation and the Court’s Need to Manage its Docket

“[T]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 

dismissal.” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff 

originally filed her Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 1-5 at 5) on November 9, 

2015 in the Maricopa County Superior Court. After Plaintiff filed her Amended 

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Complaint (Doc. 1-4 at 2) on January 5, 2016, Defendant ADC filed a Notice of 

Removal Under 28 U.S.C.§ 1441(b) (Doc. 1), initiating proceedings before the U.S. 

District Court. Plaintiff thereafter filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 6), naming 

Defendants Moody and O’Neil on February 19, 2016. The Court ordered that Plaintiff 

serve the Second Amended Complaint within 90 days of the filing of the Second 

Amended Complaint or 60 days of the filing of the Order, whichever was later. (Doc. 12 

at 2). Defendants ADC, State of Arizona, Ryan, and Villavicencio have filed Motions to 

Dismiss (Docs. 13-14). Defendants Wexford Health Sources Inc. and Caron Grant-Ellis 

have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 17). Defendants Corizon 

Health, Inc. and Corizon Inc. have filed a Motion for More Definite Statement Per 

F.R.C.P. 12(e) (Doc. 74). The motions are fully briefed. The case has now been 

pending for a year. Plaintiff has failed to move the case forward as to Defendants Moody 

and O’Neil. Plaintiff’s conduct has adversely affected the Court and public’s interest in 

judicial efficiency and the prompt resolution of cases. Further, the Court’s interest in 

controlling its docket supports the dismissal of this action that Plaintiff effectively 

abandoned as to Defendants Moody and O’Neil. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the “district courts’ power to manage their dockets 

without being subject to the endless vexatious noncompliance of litigants . . . .”). For 

these reasons, factors one and two weigh in favor of dismissing this case as to Defendants 

Moody and O’Neil.

B. Factor Three: The Risk of Prejudice to Defendants

“To prove prejudice, a defendant must establish that plaintiff's actions impaired 

defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision 

of the case.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Malone v. 

United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff alleges that she 

has sustained significant physical and emotional injuries arising from Defendants’ 

actions. Plaintiff’s delay negatively impacts Defendants Moody and O’Neil’s ability to 

conduct timely discovery and prepare a defense. “[T]he law presumes injury from 

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unreasonable delay.” States Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 804 

(9th Cir. 1970). “Delay in serving a complaint is a particularly serious failure to 

prosecute because it affects all the defendant[s’] preparations.” Anderson v. Air West, 

Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Pearson v. Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 28 (9th

Cir. 1965)). Plaintiff rebuts this presumption by asserting that Defendants Moody and 

O’Neil have notice of the lawsuit and defense counsel. The Magistrate Judge further 

notes that discovery has not yet begun due to pending dispositive motions. The 

Magistrate Judge finds that the risk of prejudice to Defendants is not great if this case is 

not dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and obey the Court’s orders. Factor 

three weighs in favor of allowing the case against Defendants Moody and O’Neil to 

proceed.

C. Factor Four: Public Policy Favoring Disposition of Cases on their Merits

Public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits. Though Plaintiff's delay 

in prosecuting her case against Defendants Moody and O’Neil defeats this goal, the delay 

has not been great. Plaintiff has failed to timely serve Defendants Moody and O’Neil. 

Even assuming proper service of process, Plaintiff failed to move for default judgment 

when Defendants failed to appear by responsive pleading. No good cause has been 

shown for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the case with reasonable diligence. See id. at 

524-25 (one year delay in service of process resulted in prejudice to defendants where 

death of litigants prevented significant contribution to defense planning). Plaintiff’s 

conduct in this case, however, does not overcome the public policy that weighs against 

dismissal. Factor four weighs in favor of not dismissing the case as to Defendants 

Moody and O’Neil.

D. Factor Five: The Availability of Less Drastic Sanctions

The Court may pursue remedies that are less drastic than dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

suit. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 131-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (before dismissing a case as a 

sanction, a district court must first consider the impact of the sanction and the adequacy 

of less drastic sanctions). Plaintiff was explicitly warned that the Court may dismiss this 

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action if Plaintiff failed to timely serve Defendants. See Estrada v. Speno & Cohen, 244 

F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a court’s warning to a party that the failure 

to obey a court order will result in dismissal can meet the requirement that the court 

considered alternatives). Despite the Court’s warning, Plaintiff failed to timely serve her 

Second Amended Complaint on Defendants Moody and O’Neil. Plaintiff was 

represented by counsel during the time period for service and responsive pleading 

imposed by the Court and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s belief that

Defendants Moody and O’Neil were included in the “State Defendants” who appeared to 

in the Motion to Dismiss was not reasonable under the circumstances. Nevertheless, 

service of process is readily possible, and the Defendants are aware of the litigation. Less 

drastic sanctions than dismissal of the lawsuit are available. Factor five weighs in favor 

of not dismissing the lawsuit as to Defendants Moody and O’Neil.

Having weighed all the factors, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s failure to 

prosecute does not warrant dismissal of Defendants Moody and O’Neil from this action. 

In addition, because the Court issued its Order to show cause on the Court’s own motion, 

an award of attorney’s fees is not required. Plaintiff is now unrepresented. The 

Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court in its discretion issue no sanctions for 

Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the case as to Defendants Moody and O’Neil.

II.CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Putative Defendants’ Moody and 

O’Neil’s Motion to Quash Service (Doc. 95). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court direct the Clerk of Court to 

mail Plaintiff a copy of this Order and service packets for Defendants Moody and O’Neil.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order Plaintiff to complete 

and return the service packets to the Clerk of Court within ten (10) days of the date of

filing of the Court’s Order. The United States Marshal will not provide service of

process if Plaintiff fails to comply with the Court’s Order.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Plaintiff an additional 

sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of its Order to complete service of the 

summons and Second Amended Complaint on Defendants Moody and O’Neil. If 

Plaintiff fails to complete service of the summons and Second Amended Complaint on 

Defendants Moody and O’Neil within the time ordered, the action may be dismissed as to 

each Defendant not served. Defendants must answer the Second Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 6) or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the 

applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court find that Plaintiff has 

responded to the Order to show cause (Doc. 94) and that the Court in its discretion not

dismiss the action as to Defendants Moody and O’Neil for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss without prejudice 

Defendants Corizon LLC and Corizon Health of New Jersey, LLC from this action.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court make the following orders:

1. The United States Marshal shall retain the Summons, a copy of the Second 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

2. The United States Marshal shall notify Defendants Moody and O’Neil of the 

commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to 

Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants shall include 

a copy of this Order. The Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or 

requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a

waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned by 

Defendants within twenty days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the 

Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, Second Amended Complaint, 

and this Order upon Defendants pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure; and

(b) Within ten days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

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service for Defendants, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service 

of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon 

Defendants. The costs of service shall be enumerated on the return of service form 

(USM-285) and shall include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying 

additional copies of the Summons, Second Amended Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service 

will be taxed against the personally served Defendants pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 

3. If Defendants agree to waive service of the Summons and Second Amended

Complaint, he or she shall return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff. 

EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should 

not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen 

days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file 

specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 

72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143,1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 15th day of November, 2016.

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