Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02956/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02956-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125la Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AEGIS SOFTWARE, INC. dba 

SAN DIEGO SPIRITS FESTIVAL 

and SAN DIEGO SPIRITS 

BOTTLE COMPETITION,

Plaintiff,

v.

22nd DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL 

ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15cv2956 BTM (BLM)

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 

GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

On December 30, 2015, Plaintiff Aegis Software, Inc., filed a Complaint 

against Defendant 22nd District Agricultural Association. (ECF No. 1.) On 

February 29, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) For the 

reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART 

and GRANTED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Aegis Software hosts the “San Diego Spirits Festival” (hereinafter 

“SDSF”), an annual specialty cocktail and spirits festival held in San Diego since 

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2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-10.) In preparation for the first event, Plaintiff registered the 

fictitious business name “San Diego Spirits Festival” with the San Diego County 

Clerk. (Compl. ¶ 14.) In 2014, after consecutive years of growth in both 

attendance and vendor participation, the SDSF “enjoyed approximately 3800 

attendees (a 35% increase from the prior year) and 80 ‘Spirit Brands’ (a 23% 

increase from the prior year).” (Compl. ¶ 23.)

The SDSF is marketed through a variety of online, radio, television, and 

print medias. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Local news and media outlets have covered and 

promoted the SDSF, and the SDSF has been featured in various online 

publications associated with alcoholic beverages. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Travel 

publications, including Fodor’s and Premier Traveler Magazine, have also 

featured the SDSF. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Finally, starting in 2013, the San Diego mayor 

has proclaimed a day in August each year as “San Diego Spirits Festival Day.” 

(Compl. ¶ 31.) 

In 2013, and given the success of the SDSF, Plaintiff hosted the first 

annual “San Diego International Spirits Bottle Competition” (hereinafter 

“Competition”). (Compl. ¶ 20.) The Competition takes place during the SDSF and 

features applicants from around the world that submit new spirits for competition 

and judging. (Compl. ¶ 21.) In 2013 the Competition featured 35 competitors, and 

in 2014 the Competition featured 86 competitors. (Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23.) 

A. The SDSF Mark and Competition Mark

On October 21, 2015, Plaintiff successfully registered the service mark 

“San Diego Spirits Festival” with the Secretary of State of California. (See

Certificate of Registration of Service Mark, attached to Compl. as Ex. 14, ECF 

no. 1-2, pp. 39-44.) As discussed below, Plaintiff alleges in their Complaint that 

Defendant’s actions infringed upon two of Plaintiff’s marks: the San Diego Spirits 

Festival mark (“SDSF Mark”) and the San Diego International Spirits Bottle 

Competition mark (“Competition Mark”). (Compl. ¶ 66.) Neither Mark is registered 

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with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, nor has the Competition 

Mark been registered in California. 

B. Alleged Infringement

Defendant 22nd District Agricultural Association is a public association 

formed pursuant to the California Food and Agriculture Code for the express 

purpose of “[h]olding fairs, expositions, and exhibitions for the purpose of 

exhibiting all of the industries and industrial enterprises, resources and products 

of every kind or nature of the state with a view toward improving, exploiting, 

encouraging, and stimulating them.” Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 3951(a). 

In 2013 Defendant allegedly contacted Plaintiff to discuss Defendant’s 

interest in hosting a cocktail event during the San Diego County Fair. (Compl. ¶ 

35.) Alan and Elizabeth Edwards, the principals of the SDSF, allegedly shared 

important details relating to the business and operation structure of the SDSF at 

a meeting in July 2013 to discuss the potential partnership,. (Compl. ¶ 38.) 

Following the July 2013 meeting, Plaintiff allegedly did not hear from the 

Defendant again until Plaintiff learned that Defendant intended to hold a 

competing festival at the San Diego Country Fair in 2015. (Compl. ¶¶ 41-42.) 

Defendant’s festival is named, “Distilled: San Diego Spirit & Cocktail Festival,”

and includes a spirits competition, named “Distilled: San Diego Spirit & Cocktail 

Competition.” (Compl. ¶ 42.) 

Plaintiff alleges that the SDSF has suffered as a direct result of Defendant’s 

cocktail festival. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that potential 

participants are routinely confused because of the similarity between the 

Plaintiff’s marks—the SDSF Mark and the Competition Mark—and Defendant’s 

advertisements. (Compl. ¶ 43.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges federal service mark infringement, federal 

dilution of a famous mark, violation of federal unfair competition laws, state 

service mark infringement, state service mark dilution, violations of state unfair 

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competition laws, and breach of Defendant’s fiduciary duty. Defendant moves to 

dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should 

be granted only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or 

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, 

the allegations of material fact in plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. 

v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Although detailed factual allegations are not required, factual allegations 

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A plaintiff’s obligation to prove 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more 

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 

show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 565 U.S. 662, 679 

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only a complaint that states a 

plausible claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Id.

A. Federal Claims

Plaintiff alleges infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114, dilution 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), and unfair competition pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(a). Each claim is discussed in turn.

//

//

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1. Infringement

The first cause of action alleges service mark infringement pursuant to 15 

U.S.C. § 1114. As Defendant notes, section 1114 applies to infringement of 

registered marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (“Any person who shall, without 

consent of the registrant, use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 

colorable imitation of a registered mark . . .”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not 

allege that either the SDSF Mark or the Competition Mark are federally 

registered. Plaintiff argues that the Complaint nonetheless properly alleges a 

violation of the Lanham Act pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). However, the 

sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations pursuant to section 1125(a) are addressed in 

the Court’s discussion of Plaintiff’s third cause of action, infra section II.A.3., and 

do not apply to the first cause of action.

Because neither mark is federally registered, Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is GRANTED. 

2. Dilution

Plaintiff’s second cause of actions alleges dilution of a famous mark 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). In order to bring a claim for service mark

dilution, a plaintiff must show that, “(1) the mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the 

defendant is making use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began 

after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely 

to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment.” Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, 

Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)). Here, the 

parties do not dispute that Defendant began using its marks after Plaintiff or that 

Defendant is using its marks in commerce. 

(a) Fame

Section 1125 states that, “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the 

general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 

goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). When 

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determining whether a mark is famous, courts are instructed to consider the 

following factors: 

(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and 

publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or 

third parties.

(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or 

services offered under the mark.

(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.

(iv) Whether the mark was registered . . . on the principal register.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). “[A] mark usually will achieve broad-based fame 

only if a large portion of the general consuming public recognizes that mark.” 

Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, 

the factors weigh against Plaintiff.

First, with respect to the duration, extent, and geographic reach of the 

Marks, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff’s Marks have been featured on various 

local television and radio stations (Compl. ¶ 27) and that the Marks were featured 

in an online article for Fodor’s magazine and Premier Traveler Magazine.

(Compl. ¶ 30.d.) The SDSF Mark has been advertised since 2009, while the 

Competition Mark has been advertised since 2013. Although two internet articles 

have mentioned the festival, the SDSF Mark has not otherwise been advertised 

extensively to the general consuming public. See Faegin v. LivingSocial Inc., No. 

14cv0418 WQH, 2015 WL 1198654, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015) (holding that 

a cleaning service which advertised in San Diego County failed to plead facts 

that demonstrated the company was recognized by the general consuming 

public). Publicity for the SDSF has primarily occurred on local news and radio 

networks, and the number of attendees and participation from vendors is not 

widespread enough to constitute fame. Accordingly, the first factor favors 

Defendant because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that its Marks have reached

the general consuming public. 

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Second, with respect to the amount, volume, and geographic extent of 

services offered under the Marks, the Complaint asserts that the festival has 

achieved over 3,000 attendees and eighty vendor participants. (Compl. ¶ 23.)

While this figure may be impressive locally, such participation does not 

demonstrate that Plaintiff’s Marks have extensively reached the general 

consuming public. See Pinterest, Inc. v. Pintrips, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1033 

(N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the Pinterest mark did not achieve the requisite 

level of fame even though Pinterest had approximately five million monthly users 

during the alleged dilution); but see Parts.com, LLC v. Yahoo Inc., No. 13cv1078 

JLS, 2014 WL 2573321, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2014) (holding that $5 million in 

annual revenue and tens of thousands of customers shifted the second factor in 

favor of the plaintiff). Because Plaintiff festival occurs once a year with only 3,000 

attendees, this factor weighs in favor of Defendant.

Third, with respect to the extent of the actual recognition of the Marks, the 

Complaint asserts that for five years, the San Diego Mayor has delivered a 

Proclamation greeting guests and participants, and that a day each year has 

been designated “San Diego Spirits Festival Day” beginning in 2013. (Compl. ¶ 

31.) The Complaint also notes that three celebrities have attended the event to 

promote their spirit lines. (Compl. ¶ 31.) As above, local recognition is insufficient. 

Although the San Diego Mayor has recognized the festival, the Complaint fails to 

allege any national recognition of the Marks. The Complaint alleges that the 

Marks have achieved a “variety of awards, recognition, and accolades at the 

local, national, and international levels,” but such conclusory allegations are 

supported with local examples of recognition. See Arcsoft, Inc. v. Cyberlink 

Corp., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that conclusory 

allegations of widespread recognition, without more detail, are insufficient to give 

rise to a plausible inference that a mark is nationally recognized). This factor also 

favors Defendant.

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Finally, neither Mark is federally registered. Therefore, because the factors 

weigh in favor of Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts that 

support its allegations that the Marks are famous. See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, 

Inc.,518 F.3d 628, 635 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a reasonable trier of fact 

could conclude that the “Hot Wheels” mark is famous given that the mark had 

been in use for thirty-seven years, with three billion units sold).

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege that either Mark is famous, Plaintiff’s 

federal dilution claim fails. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

second cause of action is GRANTED.

As noted below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. 

Accordingly, the following discussion is intended to guide the parties should 

Plaintiff amend its Complaint with facts sufficient to establish that its Marks are 

famous. 

(b) Likelihood of Dilution by Tarnishment or Blurring

Dilution by tarnishment is “association arising from the similarity between a 

mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous 

mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). Here, the Complaint alleges Defendant “has 

tarnished the distinctive quality of” Plaintiff’s allegedly famous Marks. (Compl. ¶ 

98.) However, the Complaint does not allege how or why Defendant’s use of its 

marks are harmful to Plaintiff’s reputation. Without more, Plaintiff fails to plead 

dilution by tarnishment. See Parts.com, LLC, 2014 WL 2573321, at *6. Even if 

Plaintiff can demonstrate its Marks are famous, Plaintiff has failed to allege that 

Defendant’s use of its mark in commerce has harmed the reputation of Plaintiff’s 

Marks.

On the other hand, dilution by blurring is “association arising from the 

similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 

distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Courts are 

instructed to consider relevant factors, including:

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(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the 

famous mark;

(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous 

mark;

(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in 

substantially exclusive use of the mark;

(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark;

(v) Whether the user of the mark . . . intended to create an 

association with the famous mark;

(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the 

famous mark.

Id.

With respect to the first factor, Plaintiff alleges that its Marks and 

Defendant’s marks are confusingly similar in that they both contain the words 

“San Diego,” “Spirit,” and “Festival.” (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 45, 95.) With respect to the 

second factor, Plaintiff alleges that its Marks are descriptive and have acquired 

secondary meaning. (Compl. ¶ 84.) With respect to the third and fifth factors, 

Plaintiff alleges that it has used the SDSF Mark exclusively since 2009 and the 

Competition Mark since 2013 (Compl. ¶ 14, 20), and that Defendant attempted to 

“pass of its services and marks in commerce as those of SDSF.” (Compl. ¶ 97.) 

With respect to the sixth factor, Plaintiff alleges that former attendees and 

participants in its festival have contacted Plaintiff with questions regarding 

Defendant’s event, thereby demonstrating actual association between the 

competing marks. (Compl. ¶ 54.)

Assuming Plaintiff can sufficiently plead fame, Plaintiff has otherwise 

properly alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for dilution by blurring.

3. Unfair Competition

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). In 

general, section 1125(a) is a federal claim for infringement of unregistered 

marks. See S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2014); 5 J. 

McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:14 (4th ed. 2016). To state a 

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claim under section 1125(a), “a plaintiff must prove two basic elements: (1) it has 

a valid, protectable []mark, and (2) [the defendant’s] use of the mark is likely to 

cause confusion.” Zaffina, 762 F.3d at 929 (internal citation and quotation 

omitted). This first element is further “comprised of two sub-parts: the mark’s 

protectability and the plaintiff’s ownership of the mark.” Id. Therefore, a proper 

claim must allege that, (a) the marks are protectable; (b) plaintiff owned the 

marks; and (c) defendant’s use of its marks is likely to cause confusion. See Id.

Here, Plaintiff’s ownership of the Marks is not in dispute.

(a) Protectability

“Whether a mark is protectable depends on its degree of distinctiveness.” 

Zaffina, 762 F.3d at 929. The five traditional categories of distinctiveness include 

generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. 

Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Marks that are suggestive, 

arbitrary, and fanciful are inherently distinctive and entitled to protection. Id.

Marks that are descriptive, however, are not inherently distinctive and are only 

protectable if the mark has acquired secondary meaning—that is, that the mark 

“has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.” Id. at 768 (citing 

15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)). 

Descriptive marks “define qualities or characteristics of a product in a 

straightforward way that requires no exercise of the imagination to be 

understood.” Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citing Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 

1042, 1047 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998)). Both the SDSF Mark and the Competition Mark 

are arguably descriptive.1 They define the characteristics of the service—a spirits

//

 

1 Because Plaintiff asserts that its Marks have achieved a secondary meaning (see Compl. ¶¶ 83-84), the Court 

interprets Plaintiff’s Complaint to allege that its Marks are descriptive marks that, although not inherently 

distinctive, are protectable because they have achieved a secondary meaning.

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festival and a spirits bottle competition—in a straightforward manner. Therefore, 

the marks require a secondary meaning in order to be entitled to protection. 

In general, secondary meaning is a question of fact that is to be decided by 

the jury. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the SDSF Mark and the Competition Mark have 

acquired secondary meaning. (Compl. ¶ 84.) The Complaint alleges that the 

Marks have been extensively advertised and publicized on the radio, in print, and 

by television news programs. At the pleading stage, such allegations are 

sufficient to satisfy the element of protectability. See Glassbaby, LLC v. Provide 

Gifts, LLC, No. C11-380 MJP, 2011 WL 2218583, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 6, 

2011) (holding that similar allegations satisfied the distinctiveness element for a 

trademark claim to survive a motion to dismiss).

(b) Likelihood of Confusion

Courts typically apply the eight factors set out in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft 

Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) to determine whether the defendant’s use of 

its mark is likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff’s mark. Rearden LLC v. 

Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012). These factors 

include: “(1) the strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of 

the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) 

type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) 

defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the 

product lines.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that consumers have already demonstrated 

confusion between the two festivals. Both Plaintiff’s Marks and the alleged 

infringing marks relate to cocktail festivals and spirit bottle competitions. 

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant began using its mark after consulting 

Plaintiff about the SDSF festival. Such allegations are sufficient to satisfy this 

element for a trademark claim at the pleading stage. 

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Accordingly, because Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third 

cause of action is DENIED.

B. State Claims

Plaintiff alleges state service mark infringement, state service mark dilution, 

violation of California’s unfair competition statute, and breach of fiduciary duty. 

The sufficiency of Plaintiff’s remaining claims are discussed in turn. 

1. Service Mark Infringement

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges infringement in violation of 

California Business and Professions Code § 14245. As Defendant points out, 

section 14245 only applies to owners of registered trademarks. See Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 14245(a) (“A person who does any of the following shall be subject 

to a civil action by the owner of the registered mark . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

Here, only the SDSF Mark is registered in California.

Claims for infringement under California law are “substantially congruent 

with federal claims and thus lend themselves to the same analysis.” Grupo 

Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(internal citations omitted). As stated above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 

claim for service mark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) for the 

SDSF Mark. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of 

actions is GRANTED as it pertains to the Competition Mark, but DENIED as it 

pertains to the SDSF Mark.

2. Unfair Competition

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges a violation of California Business 

and Professions Code § 17200, generally known as California’s Unfair 

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Competition Law (“UCL”).

2 Defendant argues that, as a Government entity, it is 

immune from liability. Defendant cites to California Government Code § 815, 

which states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute[,] a public entity is 

not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the 

public entity or a public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a).

The UCL generally prohibits the use of any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 

business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. A UCL claim may be 

brought against a “person,” which is defined in section 17201 to include “natural 

persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations 

and other organizations of persons.” Id. § 17201. Defendant argues that because 

state institutions are not included in the UCL’s definition of a person, Defendant 

cannot be sued pursuant to section 17200. The Court agrees. 

As explained above, Defendant is an agricultural district established 

pursuant to California Food and Agricultural Code § 3951. According to § 3953, 

Defendant is a state institution. See Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 3953 (“Each 

association is a state institution.”). The UCL does not include state institutions in 

its definition of a “person.” Therefore, because the UCL does not expressly hold 

state institutions liable, Defendant is immune pursuant to California Government 

Code § 815. See In re Cell Tower Litig., 807 F. Supp. 2d 928, 945 (S.D. Cal. 

2011) (holding that the city of San Diego is not a “person” within the meaning of 

the UCL), overruled on other grounds by Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego, 

763 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Tuchscher Dev. Enters., Inc. v. San 

Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1243-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 

//

 

2 Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action also references California’s false advertising statute, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 

17500. However, the heading for this cause of action in the Complaint states, “Sixth Cause of Action for State 

Unfair Competition.” Moreover, nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege that Defendant made a false or 

misleading statement, or disseminated false or misleading information. Therefore, the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s 

sixth cause of action as an unfair competition claim pursuant to section 17200.

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(holding that a port district is not a “person” within the meaning of § 17201 

because it is a government entity). 

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant was not acting in a governmental

capacity is unpersuasive. Section 3951 states that agricultural association are 

formed for the purpose of, “holding fairs, expositions and exhibitions for the 

purpose of exhibiting all of the industries and industrial enterprises, resources 

and products of every kind or nature of the state with a view toward improving, 

exploiting, encouraging, and stimulating them.” Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 3951. 

Defendant’s alleged actions include holding a cocktail festival and using service 

marks that allegedly infringe on Plaintiff’s Marks. Specifically, Defendant’s 

actions of holding a cocktail festival are within the purpose of the statute. Plaintiff 

has not cited any authority, and the Court has not found any, that supports the 

proposition that Defendant, as a state institution, can be held liable under the 

UCL.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action 

is GRANTED. 

3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Trademark Dilution Claims

As to Plaintiff’s remaining claims, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is barred 

from bringing a breach of fiduciary duty or California trademark dilution claim 

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court agrees. 

California Food and Agricultural Code § 3955 states that, “[c]laims against 

an association shall be presented to the Department of General Services . . . .”

On December 2, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a Government Claim Form which 

stated, “[Defendant] is violating federal, state, and common law by utilizing the 

name ‘Distilled: San Diego Spirit & Cocktail Festival’ and ‘San Diego Spirit & 

Cocktail Competition’ to describe its annual cocktail festival, which is confusingly 

similar to claimant’s marks . . . .” (Government Claim Form, attached to Compl. 

as Ex. 15, at 2.) The description of the specific damage or injury alleges, 

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“[t]rademark infringement and monetary damages to [Plaintiff’s] goodwill and 

branding.” (Government Claim Form 2.) 

Because the Government Claim Form only alleges trademark infringement, 

Plaintiff is precluded from asserting its claims for state trademark dilution and 

breach of fiduciary duty. See State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243 

(2004) (noting that the claim presentation requirement requires a plaintiff to 

“submit a timely claim for money or damages to a public entity in order to 

maintain an action against that entity”).3

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had asserted its fiduciary duty and dilution claims 

in the Government Claim Form, Plaintiff’s claims would nonetheless be 

dismissed. First, Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action alleges a common law claim 

for breach of fiduciary duty. As discussed above, “[i]t is a well-settled rule that 

‘there is no common law government tort liability in California; and except as 

otherwise provided by statute, there is no liability on the part of a public entity for 

any act or omission of itself, a public employee, or any other person.” Green 

Valley Landowners Association v. City of Vallejo, 241 Cal. App. 4th 425, 441-42 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Cowing v. City of Torrance, 60 Cal. App. 3d 757, 761 

(Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). This applies equally to a common law claim for breach of 

fiduciary duty. See Fidge v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. C 10-3953 CRB, 

2011 WL 1364187, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (holding that public entities are 

immune from a common law breach of fiduciary duty claim).

Second, a claim for dilution under California law is analyzed under the 

same framework as a claim for dilution under federal law. See Jada Toys, 518 

F.3d at 634. As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to 

meet the fame requirement. 

 

3 Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant had notice of the dilution and fiduciary duty claims is unavailing because the 

Government Claim Form only alleges infringement. Therefore, Defendant never had notice that Plaintiff intended 

to bring other claims, and Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

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For these reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth and 

seventh causes of action for California service mark dilution and breach of 

fiduciary duty is GRANTED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is 

DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED as to 

the third cause of action and the fourth cause of action regarding the SDSF Mark. 

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to the first, second, fifth, sixth, and seventh 

causes of action, and as to the fourth cause of action regarding the Competition 

Mark.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action are 

DISMISSED with prejudice in their entirety. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action as it 

pertains to the unregistered Competition Mark is also DISMISSED with 

prejudice. Plaintiff’s second cause of action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Finally, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its second 

cause of action. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint within twenty (20) 

days of the filing of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2016

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