Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03196/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03196-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENEDICT MENSAH,

NO. CIV. S-09-3196 LKK/EFB

Plaintiff,

v.

 O R D E R

GMAC MORTGAGE, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff brings claims against nine defendants relating to

plaintiff’s home loan. Four separate motions to dismiss are

pending in this case, as is a motion to strike. Plaintiff’s

counsel, Sharon Lapin, has repeatedly failed to file oppositions

or non-oppositions to these motions. For the reasons explained

below, the court dismisses this case with prejudice, sanctions

plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $150, refers this matter to

the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar of California, and

orders plaintiff’s counsel to show cause why a further sanction of

$500 should not issue.

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I. Background

A. History of This Case

Plaintiff filed suit in this court on November 17, 2009. Four

groups of defendants, each represented by counsel, filed separate

motions to dismiss. 

Defendant GMAC Mortgage’s motion (Dkt. No. 12) was noticed for

the earliest hearing, for February 8, 2010. E.D. Cal. Local Rule

230(c) obliged plaintiff to file an opposition or statement of nonopposition no later than January 25, 2010. Prior to this deadline,

on January 22, 2010, plaintiff filed a status report in preparation

for the Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 scheduling conference. (Dkt. No. 27).

The court reviewed this status report on the day it was filed,

noticed that this status report indicated plaintiff’s ignorance of

GMAC’s pending motion, and therefore called plaintiff’s counsel on

January 22 to remind plaintiff of the impending deadline.

Notwithstanding this reminder, plaintiff failed to file an

opposition or statement of non-opposition. On January 28, 2010,

the court continued hearing on GMAC’s motion to February 22, 2010,

ordered plaintiff to file an opposition or statement of nonopposition by February 8, 2010, and ordered plaintiff to show cause

why sanctions should not issue, including dismissal of this case

and/or a fine of $150. (Dkt. No. 29).

The next noticed hearing was for the motion to dismiss and

motion to strike filed by PNC National Association, as successor

to defendant National City Bank. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 17). These

motions were initially noticed for hearing on February 22, 2010.

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Accordingly, plaintiff’s oppositions or statements of nonopposition to these motions were also due on February 8, 2010.

On February 8, plaintiff’s counsel filed a response to the

court’s January 28 order to show cause. The court quotes this

response in full:

After receiving the January 28, 2010, Order to

Show Cause, I checked my calendar and realized

that the preparation date of the opposition

slipped through my calendar. As the Court may

be aware, this case is one of a large number

of “predatory lending” cases which have been

filed in the Eastern District Court on behalf

of my clients. The staff working on these

cases have been overwhelmed with work.

Additional staff have now been hired to

address these calendaring issues, and

hopefully this type of mistake will not occur

again.

Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause (Dkt. No. 34).

Although plaintiff filed this response by the deadline set by the

court’s January 28 order, plaintiff again failed to file an

opposition or statement of non-opposition to GMAC’s motion, and

plaintiff also failed to respond to PNC National’s motions.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint two days after this

deadline, perhaps in an attempt to moot the pending motions. This

amended complaint is untimely. Pursuant to the amendments to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15 that took effect on December 1, 2009, Rule 15(a)(1)

now provides that:

A party may amend its pleading once as a

matter of course within:

(A) 21 days after serving it, or

(B) if the pleading is one to which a

responsive pleading is required, 21 days after

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 Moreover, a Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 scheduling conference was 1

held in this case on February 1, 2010, and the scheduling order

issued on pursuant to that conference provides that no amendments

will be permitted without leave of the court, such leave to be

granted only upon a showing of good cause. Order of Feb. 4, 2010,

2 (Dkt. No. 33). Plaintiff have neither sought leave nor attempted

any showing of good cause.

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service of a responsive pleading or 21 days

after service of a motion under Rule 12(b),

(e), or (f), whichever is earlier.

In this case both the complaint and the Rule 12 motions were served

after the effective date of the amendment, so it is clear that the

amended rule applies. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 32). The latest-filed Rule

12 motion was filed on January 7, 2010, and the latest service of

the complaint was completed on December 16, 2009 (Dkt. Nos. 17,

32). The right to amend as a matter of course thus expired before

February 11, 2010. Accordingly, the court disregards plaintiff’s 1

amended complaint.

B. Other Cases Brought by Sharon Lapin

Unfortunately, Lapin’s conduct in this case appears typical

of her conduct in dozens of other cases currently pending in this

district. The court takes judicial notice of the filings in these

cases. Fed. R. Evid. 201. By rough estimate, Lapin has

represented plaintiffs in nearly 70 mortgage filed cases in this

district within the past year. Six of these cases have been before

the undersigned. Beyond the above-captioned matter, Lapin has

failed to timely respond to Rule 12 motions in Mejia et al. v.

Countrywide Loans et al., 2:09-cv-02346 and Borja et al. v.

Countrywide Home Loans et al., 2:09-cv-02393. In another case she

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timely responded to a motion to dismiss only by filing a notice of

voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i). Toburen v.

Bank of America, N.A., 2:09-cv-03237. In the two remaining cases

no deadlines have yet passed--thus, the lack of misconduct in these

cases is not evidence of good behavior. Tran et al. v. Washington

Mutual Bank et al., 2:09-cv-03277, Tran et al. v. Indymac Federal

Bank et al., 2:10-cv-00078.

Lapin has not shown any greater respect to the court, her

clients, or defendants in her suits before the other judges of this

district. A thorough review of these missed deadlines is beyond

the scope of this order. The court notes, however, that the

explanation offered here has been repeatedly offered to other

judges in response to similar failures. See, e.g., Peay v. Midland

Mortgage Co., No. 2:09-cv-02228, Declaration of Sharon Lapin Re:

Order for Sanctions, Feb. 11, 2010 (Dkt. No. 54); Topete v. HSBC

Mortgage Servs. Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02367, Declaration of Sharon

Lapin Re: Order for Sanctions, Feb. 4, 2010 (Dkt. No. 34). 

II. Discussion

A variety of authorities impose obligations on attorneys who

appear before this court, and each authority carries with it a

separate enforcement power.

Here, Lapin violated Local Rule 230(c) by failing to file a

timely opposition or statement of non-opposition. Lapin then

violated this court’s January 28 order by failing to file a

response by the extended deadline. Local Rule 110 provides that

“Failure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules or

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with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the

Court of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or

within the inherent power of the Court.” Violation of this rule

and the court’s order warrants dismissal, imposition of a monetary

sanction, and referral to the State Bar of California for

investigation into possible attorney misconduct.

A. Lapin’s Failure Is Unexcused

Lapin states, in essence, that she failed to respond to GMAC’s

motion because she has filed more cases than she can handle. The

present situation is unlike the one Lapin faced last fall, where

the undersigned found that Lapin’s failure to file timely responses

in other cases was excused by the death of her father in law on

November 1, 2009. Borja, No. 2:09-cv-02393, Order of Nov. 16, 2009

(Dkt. No. 14), see also, e.g., Cempa et al. v. Saxon Mortgage

Services, Inc. et al., No. 2:09-cv-02235, Minute Order of Jan. 4,

2010 (Dkt. No. 24) (Damrell, J.). Unlike the prior situation in

these other cases, Lapin does not attribute her present failure in

this case to any unpredicted circumstance. Moreover, the complaint

in this case was filed after the events which excused Lapin’s prior

failures.

An attorney has a duty to represent his or her clients

competently. This duty is embodied by Rule 3-110 of the California

Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California,

“Failing to Act Competently.” These rules are made applicable to

practice before this court by E.D. Cal. Local Rule 180(e). Rule

3-110 provides in full that 

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(A) A member shall not intentionally,

recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform

legal services with competence.

(B) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in

any legal service shall mean to apply the 1)

diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3)

mental, emotional, and physical ability

reasonably necessary for the performance of

such service.

(C) If a member does not have sufficient

learning and skill when the legal service is

undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform

such services competently by 1) associating

with or, where appropriate, professionally

consulting another lawyer reasonably believed

to be competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient

learning and skill before performance is

required.

If Lapin knowingly took on more cases than she could competently

handle, she violated Rule 3-110. See Woodfin Suite Hotels, LLC v.

City of Emeryville, No. C. 07-1719, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20306,

*25 (N.D. Cal. March 14, 2008).

At this juncture, the court does not decide whether Lapin in

fact violated this rule. Instead, the court notes that Lapin’s

proffered excuse does not actually excuse her conduct, and the

court refers the matter to the State Bar of California for

investigation. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 184(a) (“In the event any

attorney subject to these Rules engages in conduct that may warrant

discipline . . . the Judge or Magistrate Judge may refer the matter

to the disciplinary body of any Court before which the attorney has

been admitted to practice.”). This referral is an investigation,

and not itself discipline. As such, Due Process does not require

that Lapin be provided with notice and opportunity to respond prior

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to referral. Price v. Lehtinen (In re Lehtinen), 564 F.3d 1052,

1059 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Dismissal

The Ninth Circuit has held “Failure to follow a district

court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.” Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). “Before dismissing the

action,” however, “the district court is required to weigh several

factors: ‘(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk

of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases of their merits; and (5) the availability of

less drastic sanctions.’” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779

F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Because the public policy favoring resolution on the merits

will always indicate against dismissal as a sanction, the court

looks to whether the remaining factors are sufficient to overcome

this policy. In this case, the first three factors heavily weigh

in favor of dismissal. As Lapin herself admits, she has filed “a

large number” of similar cases in this district. While this is not

per se objectionable, Lapin’s consistent failure to timely litigate

these cases heavily interferes with the court’s ability to manage

it’s docket, prolonging both Lapin’s cases and others. The rules

at issue here are not merely technical requirements designed to

smooth the litigation process. Lapin’s failure brings this case

to a halt; it will be difficult if not impossible for the case to

proceed unless Lapin responds to the pending motions. Moreover,

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defendants in this case may face a stronger than normal risk of

prejudice, as this suit may interfere with defendants’ ability to

collect on the loan that is the subject of this suit.

The fifth factor also supports dismissal. The court has

already continued the hearing on GMAC’s motion, offering Lapin an

opportunity to cure her initial failure. In this case and others,

lesser sanctions and the threat thereof have proven inadequate to

ensure compliance.

The policy favoring resolution on the merits is therefore

outweighed by the other factors. The repeated failure to respond

to noticed motions in this case harms the court and defendants.

Lapin has failed to respond three times in this case alone, despite

warnings from this court. Because such warnings have proven

ineffective, and absent an adequate excuse for these failures,

dismissal is appropriate.

C. Monetary Sanctions

The court further finds that a monetary sanction of $150 is

warranted by Lapin’s initial failure to comply with Local Rule

230(c) with respect to GMAC’s motion. Lapin is ordered to show

cause why an additional sanction of $500 should not issue for

Lapin’s subsequent failure to comply with this court’s order

directing her to respond to GMAC and Lapin’s separate failure to

respond to PNC National Association’s motion. The court notes that

monetary sanctions for failure to comply with local rules and court

orders may be issued even absent bad faith. Zambrano v. City of

Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1989).

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III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as a

sanction for plaintiff’s failure to comply with Local

Rule 230(c) and this court’s order of January 28, 2010.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), this dismissal shall

operate as an adjudication on the merits.

2. Plaintiff’s counsel is SANCTIONED in the amount of one

hundred and fifty ($150.00) dollars. This sum shall be

paid to the Clerk of the Court no later than twenty-one

(21) days from the date of this order. Counsel shall

file an affidavit accompanying the payment of this

sanction which states that it is paid personally by

counsel, out of personal funds, and is not and will not

be billed, directly or indirectly, to the client or in

any way made the responsibility of the client as

attorneys' fees or costs.

3. Plaintiff’s counsel is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing

why further sanctions should not issue in accordance

with Local Rule 110, including a fine of $500, for

counsel’s violation of the January 28, 2010 order and

for counsel’s failure to comply with Local Rule 230(c)

with respect to the motion filed by defendant PNC

National Association. Counsel shall file a response to

this order to show cause no later than twenty-one (21)

days from the date of this order.

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4. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this order

on the State Bar of California at the following address:

Intake Unit

The State Bar of California

1149 South Hill Street

Los Angeles, California 90015

5. Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order,

counsel for plaintiff shall deliver a full copy of this

order to her client, and counsel shall file an affidavit

with this court stating that this order has been so

delivered.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 23, 2010.

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