Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05079/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05079-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADOR N. NEGRETE,

Plaintiff,

v.

G. D. LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-05079-HSG (PR)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS; 

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 12, 15, 26

This is a civil rights case brought pro se by a prisoner. Defendants have filed a motion to 

revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), because 

plaintiff has brought at least three prior actions or appeals that were dismissed as frivolous, 

malicious, or for failure to state a claim. Defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim. Plaintiff has opposed defendants’ motions and filed his own motion seeking 

appointment of counsel. 

I. MOTION TO REVOKE IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS

Legal Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), enacted April 26, 1996, provides 

that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if 

the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that 

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The phrase 

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” as used in § 1915(g), “parallels the 

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 

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(9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A case is “frivolous” within the meaning of § 

1915(g) if “it is of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and omitted). A dismissal under § 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed 

with his action as a pauper under § 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claim if he pays the full 

filing fee at the outset of the action.

Analysis 

Defendants assert that two actions and an appeal brought by plaintiff are strikes pursuant to 

§ 1915(g): Negrete v. G.D. Lewis, No. 12-cv-0809-RS (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013); Negrete v. 

Adams, No. 08-cv-1284 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2009); and Negrete v. Adams, No. 09-16354 (9th Cir. 

Sept. 15, 2009).1 The Court disagrees. 

In Negrete v. G.D. Lewis, No. 12-cv-0809-RS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012), the Court 

dismissed plaintiff’s amended complaint because it failed to allege that he suffered an actual 

injury. That dismissal constitutes a strike pursuant to § 1915(g). Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, 

the allegation of an actual injury is integral to a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Silva 

v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff must allege “actual injury” to plead 

claim for denial of access to the court); Castillo v. Maddock, No. C 95-1671, 1999 WL 236723, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1999) (“Only if an actual injury is alleged has the plaintiff stated a claim 

upon which relief may be granted”). Similarly, plaintiff’s complaint in Negrete v. Adams, No. 08-

cv-1284 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2009), was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted, and plaintiff concedes this is a strike. Opposition at 2. 

However, the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the district court order in Negrete v. Adams, 

No. 09-16354 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2009), does not constitute a strike under § 1915(g). In its 

opinion, the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s judgment without an express 

finding that plaintiff’s appeal was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. See id. Although 

dismissal of an appeal may count as a separate strike under § 1915(g), that result is inappropriate 

where the affirmance simply finds no error at the district court level and does not separately 

 1 A court may take judicial notice of public records. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

689 (9th Cir. 2001).

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address the merits of the appeal. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Defendants argue that even though the Ninth Circuit did not use the exact words identified 

in § 1915(g), its observation that the issues raised by plaintiff on appeal were “so insubstantial as 

not to require further argument” constitutes the practical equivalent of a finding that the appeal 

was “frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fail[ed] to state a claim.” See Def. Br. at 5 (quoting O’Neal v. 

Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that the “use of alternative 

terminology does not change” the conclusion that a dismissal is a strike). The Court declines to 

read such a finding into the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. Summary affirmance, even where the 

appellate court notes that the issues raised were “insubstantial,” does not necessarily establish that 

the appeal was dismissed on grounds that trigger § 1915(g). See Farley v. Virga, No. 11-cv-1830, 

2012 WL 3070632, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2012) (finding that summary affirmance by the Ninth 

Circuit that noted the appeal was “insubstantial” did not constitute a strike under § 1915(g)). 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status is denied.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that on October 21, 2010, he was removed from the 

prison law library and defendants began the process to validate him as a gang member. He 

contends this was in retaliation for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus he had filed in state court 

regarding prison lockdowns. He also states that his right to due process was violated when he was 

found guilty of a rules violation.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 

(9th Cir. 2003). All allegations of material fact are taken as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007). However, legally conclusory statements not supported by actual factual allegations 

need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (courts are not bound to 

accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). “A plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Rather, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Id.

A motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not proffer enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See id. at 558-59, 574. “[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 

complaint has alleged- but it has not ‘show[n]’- ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 

1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional 

rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as 

preserving institutional order and discipline).

Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants placed him in the prison gang validation 

process in retaliation for obtaining an order to show cause in a state habeas proceeding. See

Complaint at 3. This allegation is facially implausible, as the alleged retaliation occurred almost 

three weeks before the order to show cause issued. Compare id. (alleging gang validation process 

began on October 21, 2010) with Motion to Dismiss, Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A (order to 

show cause dated November 9, 2010).2

 

In the opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff concedes that the complaint is 

incorrect, and claims that defendants began the gang validation process after they received a 

 2 The Court takes judicial notice of the superior court order. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689.

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September 29, 2010 order from the Superior Court, which requested an informal response to his 

habeas corpus petition. See Opp. at 1. Plaintiff also states that defendants were aware of the 

correct timeline. Id. However, plaintiff may not supplement the facts alleged in his complaint 

through an opposition. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In 

determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint 

to a plaintiff's moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). A complaint must stand or fall on the wellpleaded factual allegations contained therein, documents referred to in the complaint, and any 

judicially noticeable facts. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, defendants’ motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed with leave to 

amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to provide a clear statement of what occurred and 

a correct chronology of the pertinent events. Plaintiff must present sufficient allegations that 

demonstrate defendants’ actions were because of plaintiff’s protected conduct.

III.APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. A district court may ask counsel to 

represent an indigent litigant only in “exceptional circumstances,” the determination of which 

requires an evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits, and (2) the ability of the 

plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff appears able to present his 

claims adequately, and the issues are not complex. Therefore, the motion to appoint counsel will 

be denied.

IV.CONCLUSION

1. The motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status (Docket No. 12) is DENIED.

2. The motion to dismiss (Docket No. 15) is GRANTED, and the complaint is 

dismissed with leave to amend, as discussed above, within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this 

order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik 

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v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the 

prior complaint by reference. 

3. The motion to appoint counsel (Docket No. 26) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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