Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02172/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02172-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARC ANDERSON, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

SEAWORLD PARKS AND 

ENTERTAINMENT, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 15-cv-02172-JSW 

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND 

DENYING, IN PART, MOTION TO 

DISMISS, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

AND SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT 

CONFERENCE 

Re: Docket Nos. 43, 69 

Now before the Court for consideration is the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended 

complaint, filed by SeaWorld Parks and Entertainment, Inc. (“SeaWorld”), and the motion for 

leave to file a second amended class action complaint, filed by Plaintiffs Marc Anderson (“Mr. 

Anderson”) and Ellexa Conway (“Ms. Conway”) (“Plaintiffs,” unless otherwise noted). The Court 

has considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it 

HEREBY GRANTS, IN PART, AND DENIES IN PART SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss the first 

amended complaint, and it grants Plaintiffs leave to amend on the terms set forth in this Order. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History. 

This case is one of four putative class actions that were filed against SeaWorld regarding 

alleged misrepresentations about its treatment of orcas, i.e. killer whales, at its various theme 

parks.1

 Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California 

 

1

 The other three cases were consolidated and were pending in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of California as Hall v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., No. 3:15-

CV-660-CAB-RBB (the “Hall litigation”). On December 23, 2015, the court in Hall granted a 

motion to dismiss the first amended complaint in that case. Hall v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-660-CAB-RBB, 2015 WL 9659911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015). On May 13, 2016, 

the court in Hall granted SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and 

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for the City and County of San Francisco. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Complaint; Dkt. No. 9-1; First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”).) SeaWorld then removed the action to this Court and asserted the Court had 

jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. section 1332(d). (Dkt. No. 

1, Notice of Removal, ¶ 3.) 

On September 18, 2015, SeaWorld filed its motion to dismiss the FAC. (Dkt. No. 43.) 

On September 24, 2015, Judge Conti denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 45.) 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to appeal that Order to the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”). (See Dkt. No. 51.) 

On October 14, 2015, Judge Conti permitted Plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration 

of his order denying remand. (Docket No. 53) On January 12, 2016, the undersigned granted, in 

part, and denied, in part Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the order denying remand and 

deferred ruling on SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss pending a ruling from the Ninth Circuit on 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal. (Dkt. No. 65.) 2

On April 7, 2016, the Ninth Circuit denied Plaintiffs’ petition for permission to appeal the 

Order denying remand. (Dkt. 71.) Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a second amended 

complaint on that same date. (Dkt. No. 69.) 

Because SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss was filed and ripe for decision before Plaintiffs 

filed their motion for leave to amend, and because the first amended complaint is the operative 

complaint, the Court shall consider that motion in the first instance. The Court has considered the 

allegations in Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint to determine whether it would be 

futile to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court DENIES, AS MOOT, the motion 

for leave to amend. 

B. Factual Background.

Plaintiffs allege that “[a]s part of a marketing campaign to induce ticket purchases, 

SeaWorld has made, continues to make, and profits off of false and misleading statements 

 

dismissed the case with prejudice. (See Dkt. No. 78, Defendant’s Statement of Recent Decision.) 

2

 This case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on Judge Conti’s retirement. (Dkt. Nos. 

55-56.) 

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concerning the welfare of [its] captive orcas.” (FAC ¶ 1.) In their proposed Second Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that SeaWorld also engaged in this marketing campaign to induce 

merchandise purchases. (Dkt. No. 77, Redline Proposed Second Amended Complaint (“Redline 

SAC”), ¶ 1.) 

Plaintiffs allege that SeaWorld represents that: (1) orca’s lifespans in captivity are 

equivalent to life spans in the wild; (2) collapsed dorsal fins are normal; (3) it does not separate 

orca calves from mothers; and (4) captivity does not harm orcas. (FAC ¶¶ 22-37; Redline SAC ¶¶ 

22-37.) Plaintiffs allege that each of these statements are false or misleading and that they were 

“exposed” to these representations in a variety of ways. (FAC ¶¶ 19-20, 24, 26-28, 30-37; Redline 

SAC ¶¶ 17-20, 24, 26-28, 30-37.) 

In sum, Plaintiffs allege that 

SeaWorld’s advertising misleadingly creates the perception that 

orcas as a species are generally benefited by SeaWorld’s 

rehabilitative programs, scientific studies, and educational activities, 

and that the individual orcas it holds in captivity are as healthy and 

as stimulated as their wild counterparts. ... 

(FAC ¶ 6; Redline SAC ¶ 6.) 

According to Plaintiffs, and two proposed plaintiffs, Kelly Nelson (“Ms. Nelson”) and 

Juliette Morizur (“Ms. Morizur”), they relied on these various representations and purchased 

tickets or merchandise, or both, from SeaWorld, which they would not have purchased had they 

known the truth. (FAC ¶¶ 19-20; Redline SAC ¶¶ 17-20.) In the proposed SAC, Plaintiffs also 

allege that 

[a]lthough SeaWorld continues to make these representations, on or 

around March 17, 2016, SeaWorld announced that it will end all 

orca breeding programs, and that the orcas SeaWorld currently has 

in captivity will be the last generation of orcas in SeaWorld’s care. 

SeaWorld also announced around the same time that it will phase 

out its theatrical orca whale shows across all of its parks. Plaintiffs’ 

inability to rely on the accuracy of these statements presents a 

continuing injury to them. 

(Redline SAC ¶ 37.) 

Based on these, and other allegations that Court shall address as necessary, Plaintiffs assert 

claims for: (1) violations of California’s false advertising law, Business and Professions Code 

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sections 17500, et seq. (the “FAL claim”); (2) violations of California’s unfair competition law, 

Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. (the “UCL claim”); and (3) violation of 

California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code section 1750, et seq. (the 

“CLRA claim”). 

ANALYSIS 

SeaWorld argues the Court should dismiss the FAC, because: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing to 

seek injunctive relief under Article III of the United States Constitution; (2) Plaintiffs fail to 

comply with the requirements of Rule 9(b); (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege economic injury or reliance 

and, thus, fail to show they have statutory standing to seek relief; (4) tickets to SeaWorld are 

neither a good nor a service under the CLRA; and (5) Plaintiffs have not complied with the presuit notice requirements under the CLRA.3

A. Applicable Legal Standards. 

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 

SeaWorld moves to dismiss for lack of Article III standing, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011); White 

v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may be 

“facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where, 

as here, a defendant makes a facial attack on jurisdiction, a court takes the factual allegations of 

the complaint as true. Federation of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 

 

3

 In its opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the second amended complaint, 

SeaWorld notes that the Hall court dismissed those plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they were based 

on omissions, and it makes the conclusory argument that “the FAC here is based on similar 

alleged omissions without any allegations sufficient to impose a duty on SeaWorld to disclose 

such facts.” (Dkt. No. 73, Opp. Br. at 4:11-12.) SeaWorld did not expand upon this argument in 

its analysis of why amendment would be futile, and it did not raise this as a basis to dismiss the 

FAC. Accordingly, the Court does not address it and expresses no opinion on the merits of the 

argument. 

 SeaWorld also moves to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the First 

Amendment. The Court cannot say, based on the face of the FAC or the proposed SAC, that the 

speech at issue would be protected. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Eli Lilly & Co., 904 F. Supp. 1153, 1156 

(D. Hawaii 1995) (motion to dismiss based on affirmative defense may be appropriate where 

affirmative defense apparent from face of complaint). Accordingly, the Court DENIES, IN 

PART, SeaWorld’s motion on this basis. SeaWorld may renew this argument at a later date. 

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1207 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the 

pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may 

suffice, for on a motion dismiss, [courts] presume that general allegations embrace those specific 

facts that are necessary to support the claim.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The 

plaintiff is then entitled to have those facts construed in the light most favorable to him or her. 

Federation of African Am. Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1207. 

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

SeaWorld also moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of statutory 

standing. A “lack of statutory standing requires dismissal for failure to state a claim,” and is 

evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6). Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067 (emphasis omitted). Under Rule 12(b)(6), 

the Court’s “inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 

580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). Even under the liberal pleadings standard of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim for 

relief will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. 

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not allege conduct that is 

conceivable but must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b). 

Claims sounding in fraud or mistake are subject heightened pleading requirements, which 

require that a plaintiff claiming fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances regarding 

fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In addition, a claim “grounded in fraud” may be subject 

to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. A claim is “grounded in fraud” if the plaintiff 

alleges a unified course of fraudulent conduct and relies entirely on that course of conduct as the 

basis of his or her claim. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements must be read in harmony with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8, which requires a “short and plain” statement of the claim. The particularity 

requirement is satisfied if the complaint “identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that a 

defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations.” Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., 

Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106. Accordingly, 

“[a]verments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the 

misconduct charged.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th 

Cir. 1997)). 

4. Amendment of Claims. 

If the allegations are insufficient to state a claim, a court should grant leave to amend, 

unless amendment would be futile. See, e.g. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th 

Cir. 1990); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th 

Cir. 1990). 

B. The Court Dismisses The CLRA Claim, with Leave to Amend. 

SeaWorld raises two procedural arguments in support of its motion to dismiss the CLRA 

claim that the Court finds are well taken. First, the CLRA provides that “[i]n any action subject to 

this section, concurrently with the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall file an affidavit stating 

facts showing that the action has been commenced in a county described in this section as a proper 

place for the trial of the action. If a plaintiff fails to file the affidavit required by this section, the 

court shall, upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, dismiss the action without 

prejudice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(d). Plaintiffs do not dispute that they failed to file this 

affidavit. Because this defect applies to the FAC and to the proposed SAC, and because this 

defect could be cured by amendment, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, SeaWorld’s motion to 

dismiss, with leave to amend. Plaintiffs must comply with this requirement if, and when, they file 

the amended complaint permitted by this Order. 

Second, the CLRA requires that “[t]hirty days or more prior to the commencement of an 

action for damages,” a consumer shall notify the defendant of the particular violations of Section 

1770 and demand that the defendant “correct, repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the goods or 

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services alleged to be in violation of Section 1770.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1782(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis 

added). Plaintiffs contend they were not required to comply with this requirement, because they 

seek restitution not damages. Courts within the Ninth Circuit are split on this issue. Compare 

Reed v. Dynamic Pet Prod., No. 15-cv-0987-WQH-DHB, 2015 WL 4742202, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 

30, 2015) (concluding notice requirement applies to restitution claims), and In re Ford Tailgate 

Litig., No. 11-cv-02953-RS, 2014 WL 1007066, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) (same) with 

Utility Consumers’ Action Network v. Sprint Solutions, Inc., No. 07-cv-2231-W (RJB), 2008 WL 

1946859, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2008). The Court finds the analysis in Reed and In re Ford

persuasive, and, for the reasons set forth in In re Ford, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs must 

comply with the notice requirement set forth in Section 1782(a). The Court GRANTS, IN PART, 

SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss on this basis, with leave to amend.4 

The Court notes it has some concerns about the viability of Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim, in 

light of their theory of liability. Specifically, the California Supreme Court has stated that the 

CLRA “is not an otherwise applicable general law.... Rather than applying to all businesses, or to 

business transactions in general, the [CLRA] applies only to transactions for the sale or lease of 

consumer ‘goods’ or ‘services’ as those terms are defined in the act.” Fairbanks v. Superior 

Court, 46 Cal. 4th 56, 65 (2009). 

Here, Plaintiffs allege that SeaWorld violated the CLRA by: (1) “[r]epresenting that goods 

or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities 

which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or 

connection which he or she does not have;” (2) “[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a 

particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of 

another; and (3) “[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.” Cal. 

Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5), 1770(a)(7), and 1770(a)(9) (emphasis added). (See FAC ¶ 74; Redline 

SAC ¶ 76.) Plaintiffs allege that the “goods” or “services” at issue are the tickets to SeaWorld. 

 

4

 The Court has previously found otherwise. See, e.g., Janda v. T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc., No. 

05-cv-3729-JSW, 2009 WL 667206, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2009). The Court declines to 

follow its prior analysis to the extent it conflicts with the above analysis. 

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(FAC ¶ 78.) The allegations in the proposed SAC also allege that the goods and or services on 

which Plaintiffs premise the CLRA claim are the tickets and the plush toys. (Redline SAC ¶ 80.) 

However, as SeaWorld notes in its motion, Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the alleged 

misrepresentations relate to the tickets or the plush toys. Rather, the representations relate to the 

manner in which SeaWorld treats its orcas. 

Although the Court may be concerned about the ultimate viability of this claim, it cannot 

say, on this record, that amendment, would be futile. If Plaintiffs amend the CLRA claim, 

SeaWorld may renew each of its alternative arguments on a subsequent motion to dismiss. 

Further, if Plaintiffs do choose to amend this claim, they must be prepared to clearly articulate the 

exact goods and services that are at issue. 

C. The Court Grants the Motion to Dismiss the UCL and FAL Claims for Lack Article 

III Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief, with Leave to Amend. 

Plaintiffs seek two forms of relief. They seek restitution on behalf of themselves, and they 

seek prospective injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and for putative class members. (FAC 

¶¶ 80.b, 80.c; Redline SAC ¶¶ 83.b, 83.c.)5 SeaWorld argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III 

standing to seek injunctive relief, because Plaintiffs now know the “truth” of the alleged 

misrepresentations and cannot plausibly allege facts that would support standing to seek injunctive 

relief. 

In order to establish Article III standing, Plaintiffs must allege that: (1) they suffered an 

“injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 

or hypothetical; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to SeaWorld’s conduct; and (3) that it is 

likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. “In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff 

meets the requirements” for standing. See Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 

(9th Cir. 2007); cf. Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Where, 

 

5

 SeaWorld does not dispute that Plaintiffs have Article III standing to seek restitution. 

The Court addresses SeaWorld’s arguments regarding statutory standing to seek restitution in 

Section E, infra. 

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as here, a plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of a class, “[u]nless the named plaintiffs themselves are 

entitled to seek injunctive relief, they may not represent a class seeking that relief.”). Plaintiffs 

also “must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (citing City of Los 

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff had standing to 

pursue damages, he lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief)). 

“Past exposure to harmful or illegal conduct does not necessarily confer standing to seek 

injunctive relief if the plaintiff does not continue to suffer adverse effects.” Mayfield v. United 

States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, in order to satisfy the pleading requirements 

for standing to seek prospective injunctive relief, at least one of the Plaintiffs must allege facts to 

show they face a “‘real or immediate threat ... that [they] will again be harmed in a similar way.’” 

Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 465 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (“Lyons”); see also Lyons, 465 

U.S. at 109 (plaintiff must show he or she is “realistically threatened by a repetition” of the 

violation to have standing to seek injunctive relief); Bates, 511 F.3d at 985. 

The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on the issue of what is necessary to allege standing for 

prospective injunctive relief in a case involving misleading advertising. There is a split of 

authority among the district courts, which centers on two issues. See, e.g., Duran v. Hampton 

Creek, No. 15-cv-05497-LB, 2016 WL 1191685, at *6-*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016) (discussing 

“divergent approaches” taken by district courts). The first issue is whether a plaintiff needs to 

allege an intent to purchase the product or service in the future. See, e.g., Larsen v. Trader Joes, 

Co., No. 11-cv-05188-SI, 2012 WL 5458396, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (plaintiff need 

not allege intent to purchase product again); Henderson v. Gruma Corp., Case No. 10-cv-04173-

AHM, 2011 WL 1362188, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (same). However, the majority view is 

that a plaintiff must allege the intent to purchase a product in the future in order to have standing 

to seek prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., Duran, 2016 WL 1191685; Lilly v. Jamba Juice 

Company, No. 13-cv-02998-JST, 2015 WL 1248027, at *3-*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015); Rahman 

v. Motts, LLP, No. 13-cv-3482-SI, 2014 WL 325241, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (“Rahman 

I”). 

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In light of Article III’s requirement that a plaintiff show a realistic threat of future injury, 

the Court finds the latter line of cases, which represent the majority view, more persuasive and 

shall follow them. In the FAC, Plaintiffs do not allege that they would consider purchasing tickets 

to a SeaWorld park in the future, and the Court concludes that they have not alleged facts that 

would give them standing to pursue injunctive relief on behalf of the class. (FAC ¶¶ 19-20.) 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss on that basis. The 

Court turns to the proposed SAC to determine whether Plaintiffs’ allegations there are sufficient 

and, if not, whether further amendment would be futile. 

The other issue on which courts have split is whether a plaintiff has standing to seek 

injunctive relief when that plaintiff alleges knowledge of the alleged misrepresentation. Some 

courts have concluded that a plaintiff’s knowledge of an alleged misrepresentation would not, on 

its own, prevent them from establishing Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. 

See, e.g., Duran, 2016 WL 1191685, at *7; Lilly, 2015 WL 1248027, at *3-*5; Rahman I, 2014 

WL 325241, at *10; cf. Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA, LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 533 (N.D. Cal. 

2012) (finding argument best addressed “as an argument directed to redressibility”).6 Other courts 

have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Medora Holdings, LLC, No. 14-cv00618-PSG, 2015 WL 4932836, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015); Garrison v. Whole Foods 

Market Group., Inc., No. 13-cv-5222-VC, 2014 WL 2451290, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2014). 

The Henderson case falls within the former line of cases. In that case, the court reasoned 

that if it were to construe Article III standing requirements narrowly, “federal courts would be 

precluded from enjoining false advertising under California consumer protection laws because a 

plaintiff who had been injured would always be deemed to avoid the cause of the injury thereafter 

(‘once bitten, twice shy’) and would never have Article III standing,” which would “thwart the 

objective of California’s consumer protection laws.” Henderson, 2011 WL 1362188, at *7-8; 

 

6

 Although the court in Rahman I still adheres to the view that a plaintiff may have standing 

to seek injunctive relief even though he or she is aware of the alleged misrepresentation, that court 

has concluded that a plaintiff must at least allege an intent to purchase the product in the future. 

Rahman I, 2014 WL 325241, at *10 n.9. 

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accord Lilly, 2015 WL 1248027, at *3; Rahman, 2014 WL 325241, at *10. Other courts have 

rejected that line of reasoning on the basis “state policy objectives cannot trump the requirements 

of Article III.” Racies v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, No. 15-cv-00292-HSG, 2015 WL 2398268, at 

*6 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015); accord, Nguyen, 2015 WL 4932836, at *7; Garrison, 2014 WL 

2451290, at *5.7 

In Lilly, the court framed the “nature of the injury suffered by the consumer” as the 

inability to rely on representations about a product or service. 2015 WL 1248027, at *3. The 

court concluded that a plaintiff would have standing to seek injunctive relief against false labeling, 

even where that plaintiff becomes aware of the alleged misrepresentation, because: 

the manufacturer may change or reconstitute its product in the future 

to conform to the representations on the label. ... In that event, the 

product would actually become the product the consumer values 

most highly and it would be labeled as such. But unless the 

manufacturer has been enjoined from making the same 

misrepresentation, our hypothetical consumer won’t know whether 

the label is accurate. And she won’t know whether it makes sense to 

spend her money on the product, since she will suspect a continuing 

misrepresentation. In fact, knowing about the previous 

misrepresentation, she probably won’t buy it – even though it is now 

precisely the product she wants above all others. 

Id., 2015 WL 1248027, at *4-5 (emphasis omitted). 

 In Duran, the court concluded that it could “discern the plausibility of repeated harm to a 

consumer who relies on labels to make choices and who might buy a product if it conformed to the 

representations on the label. ... Without injunctive relief, that consumer is harmed, probably 

because she won’t buy it because she will suspect a continuing misrepresentation (even if the 

manufacturer conforms the product to the label). ... Thus, with an ‘all natural’ claim (like that in 

Lilly) or something similar (such as an ‘organic’ claim), a plaintiff plausibly is injured in the future 

and has standing to seek relief in the form of a label change.” Duran, 2016 WL 1191685, at *7. 

 

7

 See also In re Fluidmaster, Inc. Water Connector Components Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 

No. 2575, 2016 WL 406327, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2016) (a “finding that plaintiffs who will 

never purchase the product in the future do not have standing to obtain injunctive relief does not 

thwart consumer fraud statutes because plaintiffs may be able to bring such claims in state court”) 

(internal quotations, brackets and citations omitted); accord Anderson v. The Hain Celestial 

Group, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1235 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 

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The court concluded, however, that “this possibility does not exist here. The claim is 

‘mayonnaise,’ and the product is a vegan substitute. There is no possibility of confusion to 

[plaintiff] as a consumer. He knows what the product is and will remain: a vegan spread. He 

disavowed any interest in purchasing a product that is not mayonnaise....” Id. Thus, “[t]he 

scenario of a customer who might buy a product that is labelled ‘all natural’ or ‘organic’ does not 

exist here,” and it found the plaintiff did not have standing to seek injunctive relief in the form of a 

label change. Id.8 

The courts that have reached the contrary conclusion conclude a plaintiff could not 

plausibly allege he or she would be deceived by the offending advertisement in the face of 

allegations that she would not have purchased the product if he or she had known the truth. 

Similarly, the courts have found that a plaintiff could not plausibly allege that he or she would 

consider purchasing a product that the plaintiff previously alleged the product was not wanted. 

See, e.g., Romero v. Flowers Bakeries, LLC, No. 14-cv-05189-BLF, 2015 WL 2125004, at *7 

(N.D. Cal. May 6, 2015); Anderson, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.

At the pleadings phase, the Court is unwilling to make a similar conclusion. The Court 

concurs that state policy objectives cannot trump Article III’s requirements. However, like the 

Lilly and Duran courts, it is unwilling to hold, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff could never 

pursue a claim for prospective injunctive relief under the UCL or the FAL merely because the 

plaintiff now knows the truth about the alleged misrepresentation.9 As the Duran court noted, it 

may be difficult for a plaintiff to plausibly allege facts to show he or she would be deceived in the 

future, but at the pleadings phase, the Court cannot say it would be impossible. Cf. Rahman v, 

Motts, L.P., No. 13-cv-03482-SI, 2014 WL 5282106, at *6 & n.4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2014) 

(resolving issue on motion for summary judgment). 

 

8

 Although the Duran court was skeptical that plaintiff could allege facts to show standing to 

seek injunctive relief, it granted him leave to amend. Id. 

9

 The Court has previously found otherwise. See, e.g., Castagnola v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 11-cv-5772-JSW, 2012 WL 2159385, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012). The Court declines to 

follow its prior analysis to the extent it conflicts with the above analysis. 

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In the proposed SAC, Mr. Anderson does not specifically allege that he would consider 

purchasing tickets to or merchandise from SeaWorld in the future. Therefore, the Court concludes 

he still fails to allege facts sufficient to show he has standing to seek injunctive relief. If, he can, 

in good faith allege that he would consider purchasing tickets to SeaWorld in the future, the Court 

will grant him one final opportunity to do so and to correct the other deficiencies identified in this 

Order. 

Ms. Conway alleges that she “has a reasonable but firm commitment to animal welfare, 

and does not purchase tickets to zoos, amusement parks, aquariums, circuses, or other 

organizations that do not have the facilities to properly care for their animals or that display 

animals that cannot safely and healthily be kept in captivity.” (Redline SAC ¶ 18.) Ms. Conway 

also alleges that had she “been aware that SeaWorld’s advertisements were a misrepresentation of 

the truth regarding captive orca health, she would not have purchased tickets to SeaWorld San 

Diego (or would have paid far less for them). Finally, Ms. Conway alleges that “she values the 

opportunity to enjoy the kind of animal entertainment SeaWorld provides, but given SeaWorld’s 

past practices of deceit, Ms. Conway cannot be sure about the veracity of SeaWorld’s claims. Ms. 

Conway may consider purchasing tickets to SeaWorld San Diego again in the future if SeaWorld’s 

practices were to evolve to improve the level of animal care, and to be honest about the health and 

status of the orcas.” (Id.) Ms. Morizur and Ms. Nelson, in turn, each allege that had they known 

the truth about SeaWorld’s representations, they would not have purchased tickets or a plush toy, 

or would have paid less for those items. They also claim that the cannot be sure about the veracity 

of SeaWorld’s claims, but would consider purchasing tickets or merchandise in the future. (Id. ¶¶ 

19-20.) 

Plaintiffs have alleged that SeaWorld has announced certain changes in its practices on 

orca breeding and the orca shows. Therefore, the Court finds the facts here are distinguishable 

from the facts in Duran, in that the product or service at issue may be changing to a product or 

service the Plaintiffs would want if they could rely on SeaWorld’s advertising. Accordingly, in 

light of the Plaintiffs’ allegations that they would have paid less for tickets to SeaWorld if they 

had known the truth, and taking into consideration the allegations that SeaWorld is phasing out its 

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orca breeding program, the Court concludes these three Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts in 

the proposed SAC to show they have standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of the class. 

SeaWorld is free to test these allegations by way of discovery and to renew its argument that 

Plaintiffs’ lack Article III standing to seek injunctive relief on a motion for summary judgment or 

in opposition to a motion for class certification. 

D. The Court Grants, in Part, Sea World’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply 

with Rule 9(b), with Leave to Amend. 

SeaWorld argues that Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b), and it argues 

they have failed to plead with particularity the statements on which they relied. Under Rule 9(b), 

Plaintiffs must allege “‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”10 

Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Cooper, 137 F.3d at 627); see also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 

F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing UCL claims for failure to comply with Rule 9(b) 

where plaintiff failed to allege on which materials he relied). 

In both the FAC and in the proposed SAC, Plaintiffs set forth three specific claims they 

contend are false: orca lifespans in captivity are the same as they are in the wild; collapsed dorsal 

fins are normal; and SeaWorld does not separate calves from their mothers. Plaintiffs also include 

allegations to explain why they contend those statements are false. (FAC ¶¶ 24-30; Redline SAC 

¶¶ 24-30.) As to these three statements, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have adequately alleged 

what is false and how it is false. 

Plaintiffs also allege that SeaWorld made the first two statements on its website. (FAC ¶¶ 

24-25; Redline SAC ¶¶ 24-25.) Plaintiffs did not identify where SeaWorld allegedly made the 

third statement, but Mr. Anderson alleges that he read it on SeaWorld’s website. (FAC ¶¶ 19, 29-

30; Redline SAC ¶¶ 17, 29-20.) The Court concludes Plaintiffs have adequately alleged where the 

statements were made. Finally, according to Plaintiffs, they seek to represent “[a]ll consumers 

who, within the past four years, purchased tickets to attend SeaWorld San Diego,” or who 

“purchased orca souvenirs at SeaWorld San Diego.” (FAC ¶ 38; Redline SAC ¶ 38.) Although 

 

10 SeaWorld does not argue that Plaintiffs do not adequately identify who made the 

statements at issue. 

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Plaintiffs do not clearly allege when SeaWorld made these statements, they have placed SeaWorld 

on notice of the time period at issue.11 Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding dorsal fins, orca lifespans 

in captivity, and the separation of calves from mothers satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES, IN PART, SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss the FAC on 

that basis.12

Plaintiffs also allege that “SeaWorld claims captivity in general does not harm orcas.” 

(FAC ¶¶ 31-37; Redline SAC ¶¶ 31-37.) According to Plaintiffs this allegation is based on a 

“longstanding,” “wide-reaching,” and “expansive” public relations and marketing campaign that 

was designed to “mislead[] reasonable consumers into believing that orcas are not negatively 

affected by captivity when in fact the opposite is true.” (FAC ¶¶ 31, 37.) Plaintiffs have not 

included any facts about how long SeaWorld engaged in this marketing and public relations 

campaign, the types of statements that were made during the campaign, or where such statements 

appeared. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ FAC and proposed SAC fail to satisfy the 

requirements of Rule 9(b) as to this aspect of their claims. Cf. Hall v. SeaWorld Entertainment, 

No. 15-cv-660-CAB-RBB, 2015 WL 9659911, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss on this basis. 

However, the Court concludes it would not be futile to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend to include 

additional allegations regarding the alleged marketing campaign. 

E. The Court Grants, in Part, SeaWorld’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Statutory 

Standing. 

SeaWorld also moves to dismiss the FAC on the basis that Mr. Anderson and Ms. Conway 

lack statutory standing under the UCL and the FAL. In order to have standing under the UCL and 

the FAL, a plaintiff must show that he or she has lost money or property as a result of the 

defendant’s alleged conduct. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 321 (2011). “The 

 

11 As discussed in the following section, the Court also concludes that most of the Plaintiffs 

have adequately alleged that they saw an alleged misstatement before purchasing SeaWorld tickets 

or a plush toy. 

12 Because the Court is granting Plaintiffs leave to amend, they may amend to include the 

additional allegations set forth in paragraphs 24-30 of the proposed SAC. 

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plain import of this is that a plaintiff now must demonstrate some form of economic injury.” Id. at 

323. There are many ways a plaintiff may establish economic injury to show standing under the 

UCL and the FAL, including “surrender[ing] in a transaction more, or acquir[ing] in a transaction 

less, than he or she otherwise would have.” Id. at 323, 325 (allegations of “personal, 

individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount” is sufficient to allege injury in 

fact). In addition, under the UCL and the FAL a plaintiff must allege he or she actually relied on 

the alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 326.

SeaWorld argues that Plaintiffs did not allege facts to show statutory standing, because the 

alleged misrepresentations did not relate to the price or quality of the tickets they purchased. 

SeaWorld cites no authority to support this proposition, and the Court is not persuaded that 

Kwikset and its progeny should be read so narrowly in the context of the UCL and the FAL claims. 

SeaWorld also argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate a “moral” injury, rather than the 

economic injury required under the UCL and the FAL. In support of this argument, SeaWorld 

relies on Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes, 160 Cal. App. 4th 136 (2008) (“ALDF”). 

In the ALDF case, the court dismissed a UCL claim where the plaintiffs alleged that 

defendants allegedly violated certain animal cruelty laws. According to the plaintiffs, they “lost 

money as a result of purchasing dairy products that were unlawfully, unfairly, and illegally 

produced.” Id. at 141. The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that they had not alleged 

that the defendants sold them the milk, that the milk was inferior to other milk, or that “anyone 

made any express representations about the milk, similar to express claims that dairy products are 

organic, produced by non-hormonally enhanced cows, or produced by grass-grazed cows.” Id. at 

145-46. In contrast, Plaintiffs have alleged that SeaWorld made express representations and that 

they purchased tickets based on those alleged misrepresentations. The Court finds ALDF

distinguishable on its facts. 

 Mr. Anderson alleges that he purchased tickets from SeaWorld’s website in March or 

April 2014. He also alleges that read the statements about orca life spans and calf separation on 

SeaWorld’s website. (FAC ¶ 19.) Finally, he alleges that had he “been aware that SeaWorld’s 

advertisements were a misrepresentation of the truth regarding captive orca health, he would not 

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have purchased tickets to SeaWorld San Diego.” (Id.) The Court finds that these facts would be 

sufficient to show economic injury based on the alleged statements regarding life spans and calf 

separation. However, Mr. Anderson has not clearly alleged that he saw SeaWorld’s 

advertisements before he purchased his tickets. Therefore, the Court concludes he has does not 

allege sufficient facts to show he relied on those advertisements when he purchased his tickets. 

Cf. Hall, 2015 WL 9659911, at *5. 

Ms. Conway, in contrast, does not allege that she relied on one of the specific 

misrepresentations alleged in the FAC. Rather, she alleges that she “has been exposed to 

SeaWorld’s false and misleading representations about its care for orcas in print, television 

commercials and/or on the Internet, and during a previous visit to SeaWorld.” (FAC ¶ 20.) Ms. 

Conway then alleges that SeaWorld’s “marketing campaign assured her that SeaWorld’s orcas 

were well taken care of,” and she would not have purchased her tickets had she known the 

“advertisements were a misrepresentation of the truth.” (Id.) 

The California Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff “is not required to necessarily plead 

and prove individualized reliance on specific misrepresentations or false statements where ... 

those misrepresentations and false statements were part of an extensive and long-term advertising 

campaign.” In re Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 328. To the extent Plaintiffs rely on this theory, the 

Court concludes that they have not adequately alleged sufficient facts to show that SeaWorld’s 

advertising and public relations campaign was sufficiently similar to the campaign at issue in In re 

Tobacco II. Cf. Hall, 2015 WL 9659911, at *4 (concluding that plaintiffs had failed to allege facts 

show to reliance, and noting that many of the statements “were not even made in advertisements, 

let alone as part of a pervasive advertising campaign of the sort at issue in” In re Tobacco II); 

Bronson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 12-cv-04184-CRB, 2013 WL 1629191, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 16, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of standing where plaintiffs failed to allege 

reliance on particular web or print advertising and rejecting plaintiffs’ reliance on In re Tobacco 

II, on the basis that “[a]t best, Defendants’ marketing campaign began in 2012, which is 

substantially less than the ‘long-term’ campaign at issue in Tobacco II that lasted at least seven 

years”). Therefore, the Court concludes that Ms. Conway is not excused from alleging the specific 

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representations on which she relied. Because she has not done so, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, 

SeaWorld’s motion to dismiss the FAC on this basis. 

The Court turns to whether Plaintiffs have cured that deficiency in the proposed SAC. Mr. 

Anderson now alleges that he saw the statements regarding orca life spans and calf separation on 

SeaWorld’s website before he visited the park in June 2014. Although Mr. Anderson has not 

clearly alleged that he viewed these statements before he purchased his tickets, he does allege that 

he viewed them before he purchased a plush orca toy and that he relied on the same 

representations in deciding to purchase this toy. (Redline SAC ¶ 17.) The Court concludes that 

Mr. Anderson has alleged facts to show he has statutory standing to pursue the UCL and FAL 

claims based on those representations. If Mr. Anderson can, in good faith, also allege that he saw 

these representations before purchasing his tickets to SeaWorld, he may do so. 

Ms. Nelson alleges that she saw SeaWorld’s representations regarding orca lifespans and 

calf separation before she purchased her tickets. (Id. ¶ 19.) The Court concludes that Ms. Nelson 

has sufficiently alleged that she has statutory standing to pursue the UCL and FAL claims based 

on those representations. 

Ms. Morizur alleges that she asked a SeaWorld trainer about collapsed dorsal fins during a 

visit to SeaWorld and was told that it was normal and common in the wild. She also alleges that 

while she was still at the park, she purchased a plush toy in reliance on those representations. (Id.

¶ 20.) The Court concludes that Ms. Morizur has sufficiently alleged that she has standing to 

pursue the UCL and FAL claims based on that representation. 

Ms. Conway now alleges that she was exposed to at least some of the representations 

during a prior visit to SeaWorld in 2012, and that she purchased tickets again in 2014 based on 

those representations. (Redline SAC ¶ 18.) However, Ms. Conway still fails to allege the 

particular statements on which she relied, and, for the reasons set forth above, her general 

allegations regarding reliance on the marketing campaign are not sufficient. The Court concludes 

Ms. Conway fails to allege that she has statutory standing to pursue the UCL and FAL claims. 

Because the Court cannot say it would be futile, it shall grant her one final opportunity to amend. 

The Court also concludes that to the extent each of the Plaintiffs premise their claims on 

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