Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00900/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00900-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY A. BAUSMAN, 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION,

 Defendant.

1:14-cv-00900-AWI-GSA-PC

 

SCREENING ORDER

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO EITHER:

 (1) FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT 

 NOT EXCEEDING 25 PAGES, OR

 (2) NOTIFY THE COURT OF HIS

 WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

 ONLY ON THE RLUIPA CLAIM 

 FOUND COGNIZABLE BY THE

 COURT

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, FOR LACK OF 

JURISDICTION

(Doc. 3.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY 

COURT

I. BACKGROUND

Barry A. Bausman ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 and The Religious Land Use 

and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (ARLUIPA@), 42 U.S.C. ' 2000cc-1. On June 12, 

2014, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action, which is now before the court for 

screening. (Doc. 1.)

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

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The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 

(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal 556 U.S. 

at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id. 

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 

and State Prison in Corcoran, California, in the custody of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), where the events at issue in the Complaint allegedly 

occurred. Plaintiff names the CDCR as the sole defendant and proceeds against the CDCR in 

its official capacity. 

The gravamen of Plaintiff‟s Complaint is that the CDCR implemented a Notice of 

Change of Regulations 13-01 (“NCR 13-01”) on December 10, 2013, which he contends is 

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unconstitutional because it violates Plaintiff‟s and other Native American inmates‟ First 

Amendment rights to practice their Native American religion, by disallowing the possession 

and/or acquisition of religious artifacts and other items integral to participation in daily Native 

American cultural, traditional, ceremonial, and spiritual life. Plaintiff also claims that NCR 13-

01 violates the Fourteenth Amendment‟s equal protection clause, because it favors

conventional religions, such as Christianity and Islam, and one alternative religion, Wicca, that 

is predominately Caucasian in membership. In further violation of equal protection, Plaintiff 

alleges that NCR 13-01 fails to incorporate a grandfather clause for previously approved and 

acquired religious artifacts, whereas it grants such protection for inmates possessing nonreligious items. Plaintiff also claims that NCR 13-01 violates the cruel and unusual punishment

clause of the Eighth Amendment, because it allows institutional staff to threaten and instigate 

the confiscation and/or destruction of religious artifacts, items, and/or property. 

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief via a court order finding NCR 13-01 unconstitutional, 

and ordering the state to rescind NCR 13-01 and amend it.

IV. PLAINTIFF=S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). 

A. Free Exercise Claim – First Amendment

AInmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive 

that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.@ O=Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 

342, 348 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The protections of the Free 

Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an 

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inmate=s religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is 

consistent with his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman v. 

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to practice his religion. Cruz v. Beto, 

405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The Constitution does not require prison officials to immediately 

accede to every request for accommodation that happens to be based in religion. “„Lawful 

incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, 

a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.‟” Id. (quoting Price v. 

Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). “In order to establish a free exercise violation, [a 

prisoner] must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion, by preventing him 

from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” Freeman, 125 F.3d at 736. “In order to reach the level of a 

constitutional violation, the interference with one‟s practice of religion „must be more than an 

inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is 

central to religious doctrine.‟” Id. at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th 

Cir. 1987)). 

Plaintiff fails to allege that the CDCR has no justification for the implementation of 

NCR 13-01 and in fact, Plaintiff‟s own exhibits show that the CDCR does have justification, as 

follows in the written statement of reasons for the changes to NCR 13-01:

1

“The Department weighed institutional security concerns against 

the interests of inmates in order to determine reasonable 

religiousproperty standards. Reasons for the religious property 

standards include, but are not limited to: (1) providing statewide 

standardization concerning allowable religious items for inmates, 

(2) compliance with existing court mandates, (3) reducing 

potential inmate litigation, (4) reducing the ability for inmates to 

barter or trade religious property, and (5) ensuring security and 

safety in the institutions.” (Exh. M to Complaint at p. 114.)

///

 

1 The court is not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by 

documents referred to in the complaint. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); Steckman v. 

Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998).

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For these reasons, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable First Amendment 

claim for violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

B. RLUIPA Claim

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (ARLUIPA@) 

provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . , 

even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 

unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden 

on that personB

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

 government interest.

42 U.S.C. ' 2000cc-1. To state a RLUIPA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating 

that a defendant substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. 

Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). In any RLUIPA claim, one must first 

identify the Areligious exercise@ allegedly impinged upon, and then must ask whether the prison 

regulation at issue Asubstantially burdens@ that religious exercise. Greene v. Solano County 

Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit recently decided that a RLUIPA 

claim may not be maintained against prison officials in their individual capacities. Wood v. 

Yordy, No. 12-35336, slip opinion at 3 (9th Cir. June 3, 2014).

The court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable RLUIPA claim against defendant 

CDCR.

C. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 

(1985); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891. An equal protection claim may be established by showing 

that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on his membership in a 

protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 

702-03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of 

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Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, 

Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village 

of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. 

Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 

478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff claims that NCR 13-01 violates the Fourteenth Amendment‟s equal protection 

clause, because it favors conventional religions, such as Christianity and Islam, and one 

alternative religion, Wicca, that is predominately Caucasian in membership. Plaintiff also 

alleges that inmates who possess religious items are being treated differently from inmates who 

possess non-religious items such as keyboards, TVs and typewriters, because inmates with nonreligious items are allowed to keep items that were procured before being disallowed, whereas 

NCR 13-01 does not incorporate a “grandfather clause” allowing inmates to keep previously 

approved religious artifacts and items. 

Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that he was intentionally discriminated 

against on the basis of his membership in a protected class, or that he was intentionally treated 

differently than other similarly situated inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate 

state purpose. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief for violation of his right to 

equal protection.

D. Conditions of Confinement -- Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, 

and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life=s necessities are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim 

for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a 

claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the 

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plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 

152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The circumstances, nature, and duration of the 

deprivations are critical in determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough 

to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 

(9th Cir. 2006). A[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting@ does not rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation. Id. at 731. 

Here, the harm to Plaintiff does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim. 

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to show that the CDCR implemented NCR 13-01 while knowing 

about, and deliberately disregarding, a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Therefore, 

Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

E. Violation of State Law

Plaintiff brings state law claims against the CDCR for “establish[ing] and enforc[ing] a 

deadline that is prior to the rule-making hearing by which comments may be submitted for 

them to be considered by the agency.” (Complaint, Doc. 1 at 15:26-28). Plaintiff is informed 

that violation of state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under ' 1983. To state a 

claim under ' 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. 

See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although the court may exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has 

original jurisdiction, the district court Ashall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

controversy under Article III [of the Constitution],@ with specific exceptions. "Pendent 

jurisdiction over state claims exists when the federal claim is sufficiently substantial to confer 

federal jurisdiction, and there is a 'common nucleus of operative fact between the state and 

federal claims.' " Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gilder v. PGA 

Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir.1991)). A[O]nce judicial power exists under ' 1367(a), 

retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.@ 

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Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has 

cautioned that Aif the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be 

dismissed as well.@ United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

In this instance, the Court has found a cognizable RLUIPA claim against defendant

CDCR. Therefore, at this juncture, the Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff=s state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff=s 

cognizable federal claims.2

IV. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff brings a motion for a “temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and 

protective order,” which the court construes as a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (Doc. 

3.) The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo if the balance of 

equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to intervene to secure 

the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of Texas v. 

Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). A preliminary injunction is available to a plaintiff who 

Ademonstrates either (1) a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable 

harm, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in its favor.@ 

Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F. 2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987). Under either 

approach the plaintiff Amust demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable injury.@ Id. Also, an 

injunction should not issue if the plaintiff Ashows no chance of success on the merits.@ Id. At a 

bare minimum, the plaintiff Amust demonstrate a fair chance of success of the merits, or 

questions serious enough to require litigation.@ Id.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as a preliminary matter, the court 

must have before it an actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 

102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665 (1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation 

of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 757-58 (1982); Jones v. City of 

 

2At this stage of the proceedings, the court makes no determination about the viability of 

Plaintiff=s state law claims.

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Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006). If the court does not have an actual case or 

controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in question. Id. Thus, A[a] federal 

court may issue an injunction [only] if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject 

matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not 

before the court.@ Zepeda v. United States Immigration Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 

1985). 

Plaintiff seeks a court order enjoining the CDCR from enforcing NCR 13-01 or

threatening, confiscating, or destroying Plaintiff‟s religious property. Plaintiff also requests the 

court to require the CDCR to rescind NCR 13-01 and maintain the previously approved policies 

and procedures for Plaintiff to order and receive religious property and artifacts. At this early 

stage of the proceedings, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant CDCR in this

case, because the CDCR has not been served with process or made an appearance in this action. 

The court may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court. Therefore, 

Plaintiff‟s motion for preliminary injunctive relief must be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court has found that Plaintiff‟s Complaint states a RLUIPA claim against 

defendant CDCR. However, Plaintiff fails to state any other claims upon which relief may be 

granted under § 1983. 

Plaintiff shall be required to either file a First Amended Complaint, or notify the court 

of his willingness to proceed only on the RLUIPA claim found cognizable by the court. Should 

Plaintiff choose to proceed only on the cognizable RLUIPA claim, the Court will begin the 

process to initiate service upon defendant CDCR.

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, the First Amended Complaint should 

be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter . 

. . to >state a claim that is plausible on its face.=@ Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her 

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own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis 

added). Plaintiff should state clearly, in his own words, what happened and how each 

defendant‟s actions violated the particular right described by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purposes of adding allegations of events occurring or claims arising after June 12, 2014. 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). In 

addition, Plaintiff should take care to include only those claims that were administratively 

exhausted before he filed the initial Complaint on June 12, 2014. 

Given that Plaintiff must comply with Rule 8(a), which requires a complaint to contain 

Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,@ and 

based on the nature of Plaintiff‟s claims, twenty-five pages is more than sufficient for Plaintiff 

to identify his claims and set forth specific facts in support of those claims. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff =s First Amended Complaint may not exceed twenty-five pages in length, and it will be 

stricken from the record if it violates this page limitation. 

With respect to exhibits, while they are permissible, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), they are not 

necessary in the federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Court strongly 

suggests to Plaintiff that they should not be submitted where (1) they serve only to confuse the 

record and burden the Court, or (2) they are intended as future evidence. If this action reaches 

a juncture at which the submission of evidence is appropriate and necessary (e.g., summary 

judgment or trial), Plaintiff will have the opportunity at that time to submit her evidence. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that it is not the duty of the court to look through all of his exhibits to 

determine whether or not he has cognizable claims. Rather, the court looks to the factual 

allegations contained in Plaintiff=s complaint to determine whether or not Plaintiff has stated a 

cognizable claim for relief. 

If Plaintiff decides to file a First Amended Complaint, he is reminded that an amended 

complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 3d 896, 907 

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n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without reference to the 

prior or superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the 

original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must 

be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled AFirst

Amended Complaint,@ refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

penalty of perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk=s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

either:

(1) File a First Amended Complaint not exceeding twenty-five pages, curing 

the deficiencies identified in this order, or

(2) Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is instead willing to proceed only on the cognizable 

RLUIPA claim discussed above; 

3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint AFirst Amended Complaint@ and refer to the case number 

1:14-cv-00900-AWI-GSA-PC; 

4. Plaintiff‟s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, filed on June 12, 2014, is 

DENIED; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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