Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-02168/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-02168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. 

BILLY JOE HUNT,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COCHISE CONSULTANCY, INC., d/b/a 

COCHISE SECURITY,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 5:13-cv-02168-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on (1) Defendant Cochise Consultancy, Inc.’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. # 35), and (2) Defendant The Parsons Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 

50). In their Motions, Defendants have moved to dismiss Billy Joe Hunt’s (“Relator Hunt”) 

Complaint under the statute of limitations applicable to the federal False Claims Act found at 31 

U.S.C. § 3731(b).1 The Motions have been fully briefed. (Docs. # 48, 49, 51, 59 and 60).2 

I. Background

Relator Hunt’s Complaint alleges that Parsons and Cochise fraudulently agreed for a 

government subcontract to be awarded to Cochise on February 21, 2006. The Complaint alleges 

that, as a result of that fraudulent scheme, Parsons and Cochise caused the United States 

Government to pay false claims between February 2006 and September 2006. The Complaint 

 

1 Defendants also move to dismiss on the basis that, they argue, Relator Hunt has failed to allege his claims 

with sufficient particularity. Relator Hunt is correct that dismissal on this basis would be inappropriate without 

allowing him an opportunity to replead. (Doc. # 59 at 2). 

2 On January 29, 2015, the United States notified the court of its election to decline intervention. (Doc. # 

9).

FILED

 2016 Apr-28 PM 04:10

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-02168-LCB Document 63 Filed 04/28/16 Page 1 of 6
2

further alleges that Parsons and Cochise continued the same fraudulent conduct to continue 

receiving subcontracts until early 2007. (Doc. # 1). 

II. The Applicable Statute of Limitations

The FCA provides that:

(b) A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought—

(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is 

committed, or

(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are 

known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States 

charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 

10 years after the date on which the violation is committed,

whichever occurs last.

31 U.S.C. § 3731(b).

Relator Hunt’s Complaint was filed on November 27, 2013, over six years after the 

occurrence of the conduct that Relator Hunt claims is fraudulent. (Doc. # 1). Defendants have 

moved to dismiss Relator Hunt’s Complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations 

found at 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b). Relator Hunt concedes that his Complaint is barred under the sixyear statute of limitations found in § 3731(b)(1),3

but argues that the Complaint should still be 

deemed viable under the alternative three-year statute of limitations provided for in section

3731(b)(2). (Docs. # 48 and 59).

Relator Hunt’s Response to Cochise’s Motion makes clear that he first notified officials 

of the United States of the fraud allegations discussed in his Complaint on November 30, 2010. 

(Doc. # 48 at 3). However, his Response to both Motions avoids discussing in any detail the 

undisputed allegation that he was at least aware of, if not involved in, the fraudulent scheme as it 

 

3 He further concedes that Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (“WSLA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3287, does not 

operate to toll statutes for civil actions such as those under the FCA. Kellog Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 

135 S. Ct. 1970, 1975-78 (2015).

Case 5:13-cv-02168-LCB Document 63 Filed 04/28/16 Page 2 of 6
3

was occurring in 2006. (Doc. # 48-1 at 25). Indeed, he reported as much to the Federal Bureau 

of Investigations on or about November 30, 2010. (“On February 14, 2006, Hunt was called into 

Army Corps of Engineers Program Manager Wayne Shaw’s (Shaw) office. Shaw told Hunt to 

make sure the security contract was awarded to Cochise or Hunt could get out of Kuwait.”)

4

(Doc. # 48-1 at 25). 

Defendants’ statute of limitations arguments require this court to interpret the relevant 

limitations provisions of the FCA. Federal courts have three differing interpretations of the 

FCA’s statute of limitations. The first interpretation holds that section 3731(b)(2) simply does 

not apply to relators. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Griffith v. Conn, 117 F. Supp. 3d 961, 985 (E.D. Ky. 

2015); U.S. ex rel. Bauchwitz v. Holloman, 671 F.Supp. 2d 674, 693-94 (E.D. Pa. 2009). The 

second provides that section 3731(b)(2) applies to qui tam relators/plaintiffs, but the limitations 

period runs from the date the relator/plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the facts 

material to the right of action. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 1218 

(9th Cir. 1996). And, under the third interpretation, relators are entitled to the ten-year outer 

limit of section 3731(b)(2), and the tolling clock does not begin to run until the government 

knew or should know about the right of action. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Ven-A-Care v. Actavis Mid 

Atl. LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 262, 274 (D. Mass. 2009). 

The Eleventh Circuit has not weighed in on whether a Relator is entitled to take 

advantage of the FCA’s three-year statutory tolling provision in a published decision.

5

 But other 

Circuits have addressed the issue. In a case involving the FCA’s statute of limitations, the Third 

 

4

In another matter around this same time, Hunt reported to the FBI that he “received approximately 

$300,000 in kickbacks” from another contractor. (Doc. # 48-1 at 15). On or about May 8, 2012, Relator Hunt 

pleaded guilty to one violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud and to Engage in 

Unlawful Kickbacks) and one violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (Filing a False Tax Return). (Case No. 5:11-cr00382-AKK-TMP, Docs. # 13, 21). 

5 But see Foster v. Savannah Commc’n, 140 Fed.App’x. 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying only the sixyear statute of limitations to the relator’s claim without discussing § 3731(b)(2)).

Case 5:13-cv-02168-LCB Document 63 Filed 04/28/16 Page 3 of 6
4

Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Malloy v. Telephonics Corp., stated (in dicta) that the point in time when 

the relator became aware of the defendant’s alleged fraud “is important, because it determines 

whether we apply the six year statute of limitations in § 3731(b)(1), or the three year limitation in 

§ 3731(b)(2).” 68 Fed.App’x. 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2003). After Malloy, the Supreme Court 

considered an issue in the FCA context involving different appellate filing deadlines when the 

government is a “party” versus when the government is not involved. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. 

City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 936 (2009). The Court found that the United States is not a 

party to a privately initiated FCA suit when it declines to intervene, and that private relators are 

therefore not entitled to a longer appellate filing deadline. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 937. District 

courts in the Third Circuit have applied Eisenstein’s reasoning to the FCA’s statute of limitations 

provision and found that section 3731(b)(2) does not apply when the United States has declined 

to intervene. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Bauchwitz v. Holloman, 671 F.Supp.2d 674, 693–94 (E.D. Pa.

2009) (analyzing Malloy and Eisenstein to conclude that a private relator cannot “take advantage 

of a tolling provision applicable only to the government”). 

There is a split among the Circuit courts which have decided that particular issue. 

Compare U.S. ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(holding that the statute of limitations in section 3731(b)(2) only applies in cases where the 

United States is a party); U.S. ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 

F.3d 702, 725 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); U.S. ex rel Erskine v. Baker, 213 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 2000) 

(unpublished table opinion) (same) with U.S. ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 1216 

(9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e conclude that Congress did not intend to restrict the tolling provisions of 

the Act to apply to suits brought by the Attorney General alone, but intended the tolling 

provision to apply to qui tam plaintiffs as well.”).

Case 5:13-cv-02168-LCB Document 63 Filed 04/28/16 Page 4 of 6
5

For obvious reasons, Relator Hunt argues, as he must, that the third interpretation should 

prevail here. Under the first interpretation, Relator Hunt is right out. And if this court adopted 

the second interpretation -- that relators are entitled to take advantage of the longer limitations 

period provided under section 3731(b)(2), but that the limitations period runs from the date the 

relator/plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the facts material to the right of action

-- his claim would be time-barred. According to his own Complaint, Relator Hunt had 

knowledge of the alleged fraudulent scheme more than six years before his Complaint was filed. 

In hanging his hat on the third interpretation of section 3731(b)(2), Relator Hunt argues 

that the three-year statute of limitations begins to run when the requisite government official 

knew (or should have known) of the FCA violation. He contends this analysis should apply

regardless of (1) when the violation occurred and (2) his (i.e., the relator’s) knowledge, so long 

as the complaint is ultimately filed within ten years of the violation. Notably, however, no 

Circuit has accepted this tortured interpretation of section 3731(b)(2). After all, it would extend 

the limitations period in qui tam actions regardless of how long the relator has known of the 

material facts. To be sure, at least one court has held that such a rule is indefensible:

A statute of limitations that allows the allegedly bound party to extend that period 

at its whim creates another bizarre result. In every case in which the government’s 

knowledge comes from the relator, the relator would have an extra three years, up 

to ten years after the violation, to file suit. Thus, the relator could always wait 

until year seven to alert the government (assuming the government’s knowledge 

comes only from the relator) and then file suit in year ten. As the Fourth Circuit 

explained, such a resolution would render the six-year limitations period 

“superfluous in nearly all FCA cases”—violating the “duty to give effect, if 

possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” [United States ex rel. Sanders v. 

N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2008)] (quoting Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001)).

Griffith, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 986; see also Hyatt, 91 F.3d at 1218 (“Hyatt cannot have it both 

ways. If he accepts the benefits of the tolling statute, he must be subject to its restrictions. His 

duty to act must be triggered by his own knowledge, not the knowledge of others. This 

Case 5:13-cv-02168-LCB Document 63 Filed 04/28/16 Page 5 of 6
6

interpretation comports with the legislative scheme of the Act, the purposes of statutes of 

limitations and the FCA tolling provisions.”).

This court finds this reasoning persuasive and for similar reasons rejects Relator Hunt’s 

proposal that this court adopt the third interpretation of section 3731(b). The court need not 

decide which of the other two interpretations applies6here because Relator Hunt’s claim is 

barred under either interpretation. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court holds that Relator Hunt’s claims are barred by the 

FCA’s statute of limitations. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b).

A separate order will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this April 28, 2016.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

6 The court also finds the reasoning of those courts which have held that the plain text of the FCA supports 

limiting section 3731(b)(2) to cases in which the government has intervened to be well-founded. See United States 

v. Cephalon, Inc., 2016 WL 398014, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2016); United States ex rel. Shemesh v. CA, Inc., 89 F. 

Supp. 3d 36, 53 (D. D.C. 2015) (“the Court will follow the majority view that the tolling provision of 31 U.S.C. § 

3731(b)(2) does not apply to qui tam relators.”); United States ex rel. Silver v. Omnicare, 2014 WL 4827410, at *8 

(D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2014) (“A plain reading of the statute compels the conclusion that a FCA claim must be filed 

within six years, or if the U.S. government intervenes, the limitations period is extended for three years”); United 

States ex rel. Simpson v. Bayer Corp., 2014 WL 1418293, at *12 (D. N.J. April 11, 2014) (applying only the six year 

limitation period to qui tam action); United States ex rel. Bauchwitz v. Holloman, 671 F.Supp.2d 674, 694–95 (E.D. 

Pa. 2009) (“we conclude that the three-year tolling period in § 3731(b)(2) does not apply in cases where the 

government does not intervene.”). These cases have followed the logic of the Supreme Court in Eisenstein, which 

held that, for the purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, the United States is not a party to a qui tam 

FCA action unless it chooses to intervene. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 937. 

Case 5:13-cv-02168-LCB Document 63 Filed 04/28/16 Page 6 of 6