Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01402/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01402-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACOB THOMAS DEMASTERS,

Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-1402 DLB HC

ORDER DENYING AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND

Following jury trial in the Tulare County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of two

counts of kidnaping for carjacking with personal use of a firearm, vehicle theft and resisting an

officer. Petitioner was sentenced to state prison for concurrent life terms on the kidnaping

counts, plus ten years for the firearm use, and two years for the vehicle theft. A one-year

sentence for resisting an officer was ordered to run concurrently. (CT 238-240.) 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. On July 1, 2005, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 4.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc.

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28 The Court finds the Court of Appeal correctly summarized the facts in its July 1, 2005, opinion. Thus, the 1

Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 

2

No. 5.) The petition was denied on September 21, 2005. (Lodged Doc. 5.)

Petitioner did not seek habeas corpus review in the state courts.

The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on April 5, 2006. (Court

Doc. 1.) Petitioner filed an amended petition on April 5, 2006. (Court Doc. 9.) 

On June 9, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as a “mixed” petition

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. (Court Doc. 12.) On August 10, 2006, the

undersigned granted Respondent’s motion, but granted Petitioner leave to delete the unexhausted

claims and proceed on the single exhausted claim. (Court Doc. 17.) On August 21, 2006,

Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the unexhausted claims, which was granted on August 31,

2006. (Court Docs. 18, 19.)

Respondent filed an answer to the amended petition addressing the single exhausted

claim, on September 27, 2006. (Court Doc. 21.) Petitioner filed a traverse on April 5, 2007. 

(Court Doc. 27.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

On the morning of September 2, 2003, Officer Brian Clements attempted

to pull over a black Ford Thunderbird for speeding. The driver failed to pull over

and Clements pursued, resulting in the Thunderbird crashing. The driver and two

passengers escaped on foot, but Clements clearly observed the driver, whom he

later identified as [Petitioner]. Clements subsequently learned the car had been

reported stolen and the car was dusted for fingerprints.

That same morning, near the scene of the crash, Leanna Perez was

approached by an unknown man while starting her car to take her son to school. 

Through the passenger side window the man asked her to take him to a nearby

hospital. Perez saw the man seemed fine and told him she had to take her son to

school. For one to two minutes the man argued with her until finally he entered

via the passenger door, pointing a gun at Perez and demanding she take him where

he wanted to go.

Perez and the man left her house with her seven-year-old son in the back

seat, driving in the direction the man indicated. Frightened, she did not look

directly at him again and did as the man asked, taking him to the Tavcam Inn

approximately five minutes away. Perez contacted the police after leaving her son

at school.

Later that same morning Detective Rose Olmos contacted Perez about the

kidnapping and took her description of the kidnapper. Perez told Olmos her

kidnapper was approximately five feet six inches tall, 130 pounds, with dark hair,

a thin moustache, and wearing a gray shirt with black stripes. Olmos showed

Perez seven 6-pack photographic lineups, including a photo of DeMasters. Perez

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selected two photos, indicating they resembled her kidnapper, but failed to select

DeMaster’s photo.

On September 3, 2003, Olmos took photographs of two anonymously

reported suspects in the stolen Thunderbird investigation and included them in

two additional six-pack photographic lineups for Perez to view. Perez stated only

one of the suspects resembled her kidnapper, but she would be better able to

identify the individual in person.

On September 4, 2003, Olmos took Perez to a field show-up identification

where [Petitioner] and two other men were being detained for a traffic violation. 

Olmos informed Perez that she suspected one of the individuals being detained

was her kidnapper. Perez first observed a Caucasian male by himself but did not

recognize him. Perez then identified [Petitioner] upon viewing him with an older

Hispanic male. Upon [Petitioner’s] arrest, his palm prints matched those found on

Perez’s car.

(Lodged Doc. No. 4, at pp. 2-3.)

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Admission of Identification Evidence

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude the

identification testimony as inherently unfair and tainted by an unnecessarily suggestive field lineCase 1:05-cv-01402-DLB Document 28 Filed 10/31/07 Page 4 of 9
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 California Evidence Code § 402 provides: 2

(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence shall be determined as

provided in this article.

(b) The court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or

hearing of the jury; but in a criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the question of the admissibility of a

confession or admission of the defendant out of the presence and hearing of the jury if any party so requests.

(c) A ruling on the admissibility of evidence implies whatever finding of fact is prerequisite thereto; a

separate or formal finding is unnecessary unless required by statute.

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up. 

1. Background 

Prior to trial, Petitioner moved in limine to exclude evidence of Leanna Perez’s in-field

identification of Petitioner on the basis that the line-up was unduly suggestive and the

identification unreliable, denying him his constitutional rights. (CT 98-105; RT 19-21.) The

trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to California Evidence Code section 402. 

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Victim, Leanna Perez testified that on September 4, 2003, two days after the offenses

were committed, Detective Olmos transported her to a location to identify a possible suspect. 

(RT 235.) The detective specifically told her that she did not have to pick anyone out if she was

unable to make an identification. (RT 235.) There were three individuals at the location and

each was viewed individually. (RT 235-236.) Ms. Perez positively identified Petitioner as her

kidnaper after viewing him for approximately 15 to 20 seconds. (RT 236-237, 240.) Likewise,

in court, she positively identified Petitioner both as the person shown to her by Detective Olmos

and as the person who kidnaped her. (RT 238.) At the time of the identification she was not

aware that Petitioner’s photograph had been included in some of the photo lineups she had seen

previously from which she was unable to identify a suspect. (RT 238.) 

Detective Olmos testified at the hearing that on September 4, 2003, he transported Leanna

Perez to a location where three men had been detained by another officer in order for her to

possibly identify a Michael Breckenridge as a possible suspect in her kidnaping. (RT 246-247,

251.) Mr. Breckenridge was detained along with Petitioner and a third man, Albert Alvarez. 

(RT 248.) The field lineup took place during daylight hours at a store parking lot, and Leanna

viewed the men from approximately 20 to 25 feet away. (RT 247, 249.) Leanna stated that

Breckenridge was not the kidnaper. (RT 248.) She was then shown Alvarez and Petitioner, and

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she immediately identified Petitioner as the kidnaper. (RT 249, 252.) 

Afer hearing argument by both counsel, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to

exclude Leanna’s out-of-court identification of Petitioner and allowed her to identify Petitioner

in court before the jury. (RT 272.) In making its finding, the trial court took it as a given that the

single person show up was unduly suggestive. (RT 270.) The court found that in reviewing the

totality of the circumstances, the ultimate identification was not unreliable. The court found Ms.

Perez had ample opportunity to view Petitioner at the time of the crime, the degree of Ms.

Perez’s attention on the perpetrator at the time of the crime favored admissibility, Ms. Perez’s

verbal description of the perpetrator following the crime was neutral, her level of certainty at the

time of the in-field identification was very high, and the time between the crime and the in-field

identification was short, only two days, favoring admissibility. (RT 271.) Based upon these

circumstances, the trial court concluded that Petitioner had failed to met his burden of

demonstrating a substantial likelihood of misidentification. (RT 272.)

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held, in part, as

follows:

We concur with the trial court’s assessment that the show-up identification

was suggestive. (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 571-572.) [Petitioner]

was one of three suspects shown to Perez by Olmos, but was one of only two

Hispanic men, the other being 20 years older. While identification can involve

only one suspect, placing an individual fitting Perez’s description of the suspect

with those who did not indicates suggestiveness. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19

Cal.4th 353, 413.) “A procedure is unfair which suggests in advance of

identification by the witness the identity of the person suspected by the police.”

(People v. Slutts (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 886, 891.)

Once determined to be unduly suggestive, the identification of the

defendant must be deemed reliable to be admitted. (Manson v. Brathwaite, supra,

432 U.S. at p. 114.) The factors comprising reliability include (1) the witness’s

opportunity to view the defendant; (2) the degree of attention given the defendant

at the time; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the defendant; (4)

the level of certainty demonstrated at the identification; and (5) the length of time

between the crime and the identification. (Id. at pp. 114-115.)

Here, Perez’s opportunity to view the suspect was significant, as he was

just outside the front passenger window bending down to talk to her for one to

two minutes. While a mere few seconds may not be considered enough time to

identify a suspect (People v. Caruso (1969) 68 Cal.2d 183, 188 [witness obtained

no more than a fleeting glance at the suspect, favoring inadmissibility]), one to

two minutes of direct conversation is sufficient. (Manson v. Brathwaite, supra,

432 U.S. at p. 115 [witness viewed the suspect’s face for two to three minutes,

favoring admissibility].) Further, Perez’s direct attention to the suspect began

when he approached her car, continuing at least until he entered the passenger

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side.

The third factor, the accuracy of Perez’s prior description, does not support

admissibility as strongly. Perez’s failure to identify [Petitioner’s] photo from

those given to her by Olmos is explainable under the circumstances. Olmos

testified [Petitioner’s] hair was long and messy at the show-up identification, but

was shaved in the photo shown to Perez. In addition, the photo lineups were

composed of similar looking persons, increasing the difficulty for Perez of

identifying her kidnapper with certainty. While Perez’s recollection of the suspect

may not have been perfect, it is properly left to the jury to determine how much

credence to give an identification, suggestive or otherwise. “We are content to

rely upon the good sense and judgment of America juries, for evidence with some

element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill.” (Manson v.

Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 116.)

Fourth, the level of accuracy Perez demonstrated when identifying

[Petitioner] at the show-up identification reinforces admissibility. She viewed

[Petitioner] for 15 or so seconds before claiming with certainty he was the

suspect. Finally, the fact the identification took place two days after the crime

occurred favors admissibility as well. (Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at

p. 116) [11 days between the crime committed and arrest for identification found

reliable].)

In addition, [Petitioner’s] palm prints found on the outside of the

passenger door of Perez’s car support admissibility. While this by itself is not

indicative of [Petitioner] as the kidnapper, it does reinforce Perez’s show-up

identification. Similarly in Manson, the court found the fact that the identified

drug seller was arrested at the place the sale was reportedly made appeared to

corroborate the reliability of the identification. “Although it plays no part in our

analysis, all this assurance as to the reliability of the identification is hardly

undermined by the facts that respondent was arrested in the very apartment where

the sale had taken place, and that he acknowledged his frequent visits to that

apartment.” (Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 116.)

(Lodged Doc. No. 4, at pp. 5-6.) 

2. Analysis of Claim

“[C]onvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial

identification by photograph will be set aside . . . only if the photographic identification

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). The court

reviews the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged procedure for improper

suggestiveness. United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492 (9 Cir. 1985). If the court th

concludes that the procedure was not impermissibly suggestive, the inquiry ends. Id. However,

if the court concludes otherwise, it must determine whether the identification was nevertheless

reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. 

 In order to determine whether the admission of identification evidence violates a

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defendant’s right to due process of law, the court considers (1) whether the identification

procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself

was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account such factors

as the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s

degree of attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the

suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of time

between the offense and the identification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104-107, 114

(1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). 

The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an

unreliable identification procedure. [Citations.] “The question is whether anything

caused defendant to ‘stand out’ from the others in a way that would suggest the

witness should select him.” [Citation.] ¶ Moreover, there must be a “substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification” under the “‘ “totality of the

circumstances”’” to warrant reversal of a conviction on this ground. 

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 104-107; see also Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th

Cir. 1995). 

Respondent takes issue with the trial court’s initial finding that it was a given that the

identification procedure in the field was unduly suggestive. Like the state courts, even if this

Court assumed it was suggestive, in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the state courts’

determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, and this Court need not determine that issue. See e.g. Van

Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9 Cir. 1986) (reviewing court may assume suggestiveness th

and review reliability first.) 

The evidence produced at trial established that Ms. Perez viewed Petitioner in broad

daylight from close range for approximately a “couple of minutes” during the crime. (RT 183-

184, 186.) Specifically, Petitioner bend down to look through the window to talk with Ms. Perez

from approximately two or three feet for a couple minutes. (RT 224-225.) Although she was

frightened for herself and her son and did not look directly at Petitioner during the five minute

drive to the hotel, as Respondent submits, she unquestionably payed close attention to him as he

pointed the gun at her and repeatedly directed her to take him to a hospital. (RT 183-184, 186,

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191.) In turning to Ms. Perez’s description of Petitioner, although there were some

inconsistencies and it was general in nature, it was properly characterized and balanced by the

trial court as being “neutral.” (RT 271.) Ms. Perez made the identification within two days after

the crime occurred weighing in favor of the reliability of the identification. (RT 234-236.) 

Lastly, Ms. Perez stated unequivocally that Petitioner, and not the other two individuals, was her

kidnaper after viewing him for approximately 15 to 20 seconds, immediately stating “that’s him.” 

(RT 249-250.) Moreover, the other evidence demonstrating Petitioner’s involvement in the

crime strengthens the conclusion that there was not a substantial likelihood of misidentification. 

As observed in Manson,

Although it plays no part in our analysis, all this assurance as to the

reliability of the identification is hardly undermined by the facts that [the

defendant] was arrested in the very apartment where the [crime] had taken place,

and that he acknowledged his frequent visits to that apartment.

432 U.S. at 116. Likewise, here, the strong evidence of Petitioner’s palm print on Ms. Perez’s

car, and his incriminating statements following his arrest, definitely do not weaken the

determination of the reliability of the identification in this case.

The five factors as outlined in Manson, on balance, weigh in favor of admissibility of the

in-field identification, and there is no showing that the identification procedure gave rise to a

“substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” As the state appellate court properly

identified and did not unreasonably apply established Supreme Court authority, Petitioner’s claim

fails under § 2254(d)(1). 

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 31, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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