Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06057/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.. ?,i;·:,.,',·~:· ' .. · .. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LARRY K. RAY, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

vs. 

JACK COWLEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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SEP 2 5 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKI:f~ Clerk . 

No. 92-6057 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-646-W) 

( W. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Petitioner Larry K. Ray appeals from the denial of his prose 

habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. S 2254, and seeks a certificate 

of probable cause, Fed. R. App. P. 22(b), and leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis. Id. 24(a); 10th Cir. R. 24.1. Petitioner 

contended below that he was denied his right under state law to a 

bifurcated trial in a recidivist proceeding, see Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 22, § 860 (West 1986), and that he was denied his Fourteenth 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-6057 Document: 010110392284 Date Filed: 09/25/1992 Page: 1
Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial due to prosecutorial 

comment on his prior convictions during voir dire. The district 

court referred the petition to a magistrate who liberally 

construed the petition to include an allegation of ineffective 

assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. The magistrate, 

without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, reached the merits 

of Petitioner's claims and recommended that the petition be 

denied. The district court adopted the magistrate's report in its 

entirety and dismissed the petition on the merits and denied 

Petitioner's request for a certificate of probable cause and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis. On appeal, Petitioner again 

contends that he was denied effective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel, and argues that he was denied his right against 

self-incrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

see Ray v. Cowley, No. 92-6057 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1992), and our 

review is de novo. Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 888 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

Petitioner was charged in Oklahoma state court with 

unauthorized use of a vehicle, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 4-102 

(West 1988), after two or more felony convictions. Id. tit. 21, 

§ 5l(B) (West 1983). Petitioner had ten prior felony convictions. 

Because he was charged as a recidivist, Petitioner had a statutory 

right to a bifurcated trial at which his guilt or innocence of the 

auto theft charge would be determined at the initial phase without 

reference to the prior convictions except as permitted by the 

rules of evidence, and, if Petitioner was found guilty, the jury 

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would be presented evidence of his prior convictions at a second 

phase and would determine the fact of the priors and the sentence. 

See id. tit. 22, § 860 (West 1986). 

Petitioner was represented by the Oklahoma Public Defender's 

Office. Prior to trial, Petitioner told his attorney that he 

wanted to testify on his own behalf despite counsel's advisement 

against doing so. Petitioner's counsel informed him that if he 

testified, his prior felony convictions would be admitted. 

Petitioner's trial counsel conveyed Petitioner's desire to testify 

to the trial court and the prosecutor at a pretrial conference. 

During voir dire and opening statement, the prosecutor told 

the jury that Petitioner had ten prior felony convictions, that he 

was on house arrest at the time he committed the alleged crime, 

that he was "gambling and drinking," and that "the state has gave 

[sic] this man enough chances." Petitioner's counsel did not 

object to these statements by the prosecutor. 

The evidence against Petitioner at trial consisted entirely 

of the testimony of the arresting officer who identified 

Petitioner as the driver of a stolen car. Petitioner testified on 

1 his own behalf, denying that he was the driver of the car. On 

direct examination, Petitioner admitted that he had ten prior 

felony convictions. On cross-examination, the trial court 

permitted the prosecutor to question Petitioner, over defense 

1 Petitioner also presented three witnesses to corroborate his 

alibi defense each of whom had their credibility impeached with 

prior felony conviction(s). 

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counsel's objection, about the circumstances surrounding these 

convictions in greater detail . 

Because Petitioner admitted to the ten prior convictions, the 

trial court did not bifurcate the proceeding. The jury found 

Petitioner guilty of the auto theft charge and sentenced 

Petitioner to a forty-year term of imprisonment. 2 See id.§ 51(B) 

(West 1983) (twenty year minimum for felony conviction with two or 

more prior felony convictions within past ten years). The 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner's 

conviction on appeal. Ray v. State, 788 P.2d 1384 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1990). Petitioner's subsequent state court petition for 

post-conviction relief was denied by the Oklahoma state district 

court and this denial was affirmed on appeal. Ray v. State, No. 

PC-91-66 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 1991). The present petition 

for federal habeas corpus relief followed. 

Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance 

of trial and appellate counsel due to his trial counsel's failure 

to object to the prosecutor's comments regarding his prior 

convictions during voir dire and opening statement and his 

appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. 

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

Petitioner must show that "counsel's representation fell below an 

2 Under Oklahoma law, the jury is charged with assessing 

punishment. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 926 (West 1986). See 

also Reddell v. State, 543 P . 2d 574, 581 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) 

(defendant may not waive his right to have jury assess 

punishment). Although the recidivist statute carries a mandatory 

minimum sentence, there is no statutory maximum sentence. 

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objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and that "there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 

We "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 

within the range of reasonable professional assistance . . " 

Id. Under Oklahoma law, a court or prosecutor's reference to the 

defendant's prior conviction or introduction of evidence to that 

effect in the initial stage of a§ 860 bifurcated proceeding is 

reversible error unless the prior conviction is an element of the 

charged offense. Gamble v. State, 751 P.2d 751, 753 (Okla. Crim. 

App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988). As Gamble was clearly 

the law in Oklahoma at the time of Petitioner's trial, we will 

assume without deciding that counsel's failure to object to the 

prosecutor's comments was objectively unreasonable. However, 

"[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does 

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if 

the error had no effect on the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

691. While Oklahoma courts have recognized the inherent 

prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of prior convictions at 

the initial stage of a bifurcated recidivist proceeding, see 

Gamble, 751 P.2d at 753; Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 187, 194 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1962.), we believe that the prosecutor's comments in the 

present case were rendered harmless when Petitioner took the 

stand, contrary to the advice of defense counsel, and admitted to 

the prior convictions on direct examination. Indeed, the Oklahoma 

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Court of Criminal Appeals noted in Petitioner's direct appeal that 

he waived his statutory right to a bifurcated trial and the 

procedural protections thereby afforded him when he admitted to 

the priors on direct examination. Ray. 788 P.2d at 1386-87. 

Petitioner has not alleged that, but for the improper 

prosecutorial comment, he would have refrained from testifying. 

Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (to establish 

prejudice of alleged ineffective assistance in context of guilty 

plea, defendant must prove that, but for counsel's errors, there 

was a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded 

guilty). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to affirmatively 

prove prejudice, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; therefore, his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim falls short. 

Petitioner next contends that he was denied his right against 

self-incrimination. As we understand Petitioner's argument, he 

claims that after he took the stand and admitted to the priors on 

direct examination, the trial court compelled him to testify to 

the finality of the priors on cross-examination which took the 

issue of the fact of the priors away from the jury. Despite our 

liberal construction of Petitioner's pleadings, we cannot 

reasonably discern this argument from either the petition or 

traverse filed in the district court. Therefore, we do not 

consider this argument on appeal. See Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 

F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 

Petitioner did argue below, in the context of his claim that 

he was denied his statutory right to a bifurcated trial, that his 

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admission to the prior convictions was effectively a guilty plea 

to the recidivist charge, and that the trial court should have 

expressly advised him, prior to permitting him to testify, that he 

was waiving his right to a jury trial, right against 

self-incrimination, and right to confrontation. To the extent 

that we can read his present self-incrimination argument as 

reiterating this argument, we find it to be without merit. 

Whether a state provides criminal defendants with a separate trial 

for the determination of prior convictions is a matter of state 

law and not federal due process. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 

448, 452 (1962). A fortiori, it is a matter of state law whether 

Petitioner validly waived his right to a bifurcated trial under 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 860(b) (West 1986). 3 Errors under 

state law are not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Davis v. Reynolds, 890 

F.2d 1105, 1109 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989). While state law errors 

which render the trial as a whole fundamentally unfair may entitle 

a habeas petitioner to relief, Tapia v. Tansey, 926 F.2d 1554, 

1557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 115 (1991), we cannot 

say that the trial court's failure to inform Petitioner that he 

would waive his right to a bifurcated trial rendered the 

proceeding fundamentally unfair given that Petitioner was informed 

3 Oklahoma law does not require trial courts to inform 

defendants in§ 860 proceedings that they will waive their right 

to a bifurcated trial and to have the jury determine the fact of 

the prior convictions if the defendant admits under oath to the 

prior convictions. See Ray, 788 P.2d at 1386. 

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by his attorney that if he testified the prior convictions would 

be admitted, and Petitioner testified against the advice of his 

own counsel. 

Petitioner's request for a certificate of probable cause and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. In all other 

respects, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of the petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-6057 Document: 010110392284 Date Filed: 09/25/1992 Page: 8