Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00517/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00517-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CARLOS SOLACHE-OROZCO, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

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PAUL M. SCHULTZ, )

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Respondent. )

 )

CV F 05-0517 AWI WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 26, 1995, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine and

possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. The court sentenced Petitioner to 360 months

imprisonment and five years supervised release for each count both to run concurrently. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed his

conviction.

On August 20, 1998, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence

under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. The district court denied that motion on October 17, 2000. 

Petitioner filed a second amended motion on July 2, 2001. The district court denied that motion

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on June 11, 2002.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his

conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9 Cir.1988); Thompson v. th

Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8 Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3 1997); th rd

Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5 Cir.1981). In such cases, only the sentencing th

court has jurisdiction. Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a

federal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9 Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at

th

1162; see also United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5 Cir.1980). th

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that

sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6 Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175, th

177 (5 Cir. 1994); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2 Cir. 1991); United

th nd

States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6 Cir. 1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 th

(3 Cir. 1991); United States v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185, 186-87 (8 Cir. 1987); Brown v. rd th

United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9 Cir. 1990). th

A federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief under § 2241 if

he can show that the remedy available under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the

validity of his detention." Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-5 (9 Cir.2000); United

th

States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9 Cir.1997) (quoting § 2255). The Ninth Circuit has

th

recognized that it is a very narrow exception. Id; Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003)

(a petitioner must show actual innocence and that he never had the opportunity to raise it by

motion to demonstrate that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective); Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054,

1055 (9 Cir.1999) (per curium) (holding that the AEDPA’s filing limitations on § 2255 Motions th

does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective); Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a

court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); Lorentsen v.

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Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9 Cir. 2000) (same); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9 Cir.1988) (a

th th

petitioner's fears bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams

v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9 Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9 Cir.1956); see,

th th

United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9 Cir. 2001) (procedural requirements of th

§ 2255 may not be circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651). The burden

is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United

States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9 Cir. 1963). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that Petitioner cannot bring his

claims under Section 2241. The claims in this petition are that the sentencing court deprived

Petitioner of his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury, rather than the judge, decide facts

which affected his sentence and to have those facts determined beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Respondent contends that because these claims challenge the constitutionality of Petitioner’s

sentence, they must be brought in a Section 2255 motion. Noting that Petitioner acknowledges

that he has submitted a previous Section 2255 motion, Respondent further contends that the

present petition fails both requirements of the Section 2255 savings clause. First, Respondent

argues that Petitioner has already had the opportunity to raise this claim in his previous Section

2255 motion. Second, Respondent argues that Petitioner does not claim that he is innocent of the

charges against him or that the facts on which his sentence is based is false. 

Respondent further contends that even if Petitioner could raise his claim under Section

2241, the petition fails on the merits because Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) is not

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. In Blakely, the court prohibited upward

State sentencing guidelines adjustments based on judicial fact finding. In doing so, the Court

reaffirmed the Apprendi rule that “ ‘[o]ther than the fact of conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466,

490 (2000)).

In Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9 Cir. 2005) the Ninth Circuit held that

th

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the Apprendi rule expanded in Blakely is not retroactive and cannot be invoked by prisoners

seeking collateral review of their sentences. Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 at 1246. 

Therefore, Respondent concludes that this petition should be dismissed.

In response, Petitioner concedes that the holdings of Apprendi and Blakely are not

retroactive in collateral review. However, Petitioner states correctly that the Supreme Court has

granted certiorari in Burton v. Waddinton, 142 Fed.Appx. 297 (9 Cir. 2005), and one of the th

issues raised therein is whether the holding in Blakely is a new rule for purposes of retroactivity

analysis. Petitioner asks this court “in a sense of economic justice” to delay ruling on this case

pending the Supreme Court’s ruling in Burton. 

This court cannot delay ruling on Respondent’s clearly meritorious motion to dismiss on

the ground that the Supreme Court may, at some unspecified future time, rule the way Petitioner

hopes it will in Burton. Not only is there no way of predicting how the Supreme Court will rule,

but should the Court issue the decision Petitioner hopes for, Petitioner would still have meet the

narrow exception for seeking relief under Section 2241 instead of Section 2255. There is no

certainty that Petitioner could make the necessary showing that Section 2255 is inadequate or

ineffective to test the validity of his detention. To delay ruling on the petition under these

circumstances would be contrary to judicial economy and efficient handling of cases. 

This court finds that Petitioner has failed to make the showing necessary to challenge his

sentence through this Section 2241 petition instead of through a Section 2255 motion. Further,

this court finds that under the controlling authority of Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, the holdings

of Apprendi and Blakely are not retroactively applicable to this case.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1) that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED;

2) that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED;

3) that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this

case.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

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Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 14, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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