Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55681/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55681-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALAN G. GIMENEZ,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

J.T. OCHOA, Warden; KAMALA D.

HARRIS, Attorney General,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 14-55681

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-01137-

LAB-BLM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 22, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed May 9, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski, Sandra S. Ikuta

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kozinski

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2 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Alan

Gimenez’s second habeas corpus petition challenging his

conviction for the second degree murder of his infant

daughter based on the prosecution’s theory that his daughter

was a victim of shaken baby syndrome.

The panel held that Gimenez’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, which concerns errors primarily related to the

use of expert testimony, is barred as successive because his

arguments don’t present a claim for relief that is distinct from

the claim raised in his first petition.

The panel held that Gimenez can’t obtain relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) on the theory that the

prosecution introduced false testimony by incorrectly

interpreting key hospital records in violation of his due

process rights, where Gimenez simply presents a battle

between experts who have different opinions about how his

daughter died. The panel held that the district court properly

found that he didn’t demonstrate the requisite “constitutional

error” under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

Gimenez also argued that new scientific evidence

undermines the prosecution’s theory that his daughter was a

victim of shaken baby syndrome and thus shows that he’s

actually innocent of her murder. The panel held that habeas

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 3

petitioners can allege a constitutional violation from the

introduction of flawed expert testimony at trial if they show

that the introduction of this evidence undermined the

fundamental fairness of the entire trial. The panel concluded

that Gimenez isn’t entitled to relief. The panel explained that

Gimenez failed to show that permitting the prosecution’s

experts to testify based on a triad-only theory of shaken baby

syndrome was so extremely unfair that it violated

fundamental conceptions of justice, and that he presented

literature revealing not so much a repudiation of triad-only

shaken baby syndrome, but a vigorous debate about its

validity within the scientific community.

The panel wrote that Gimenez could not obtain relief if

the panel were to decouple his claim of actual innocence from

any due process violation and repackage it as a freestanding

“actual innocence” claim. The panel noted that this court has

only assumed, but not held, that petitioners may bring such a

freestanding innocence claim. The panel explained that

Gimenez’s “new” evidence doesn’t undermine the

prosecution’s case so much as beef up the theory that the jury

already rejected: that his daughter suffered from health

problems at birth that caused her subdural hematoma, brain

swelling, retinal hemorrhage and eventually her death.

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4 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

COUNSEL

George L. Schraer (argued), San Diego, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Kevin Vienna (argued), Supervising Deputy Attorney

General; Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant AttorneyGeneral;

Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Kamala

D. Harris, Attorney General, San Diego, California, for

Respondents-Appellees.

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:

Two decades after being convicted of murdering his

infant daughter, Alan Gimenez seeks federal habeas relief for

the second time. We consider whether Gimenez’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are barred as successive. We

also consider whether he may advance a due process claim on

the ground that expert evidence presented at trial has been

undermined by subsequent scientific developments.

I. Background

A. Medical History

Gimenez’s daughter, Priscilla, was seven weeks old when

she died. During her short life, she vomited on multiple

occasions after being fed. She also had seizures. On one

occasion when Gimenez was at home alone with Priscilla, he

saw her shaking and having difficulty breathing. Gimenez

performed CPR and called 911. Paramedics took Priscilla to

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 5

the hospital, where she stayed for three days; she was

diagnosed with epilepsy.

Hours after Priscilla was discharged, Gimenez’s wife,

Teresa, left for work and Gimenez fed Priscilla. Almost

immediately, Priscilla vomited forcefully and experienced

another seizure. Gimenez administered medicine as he was

instructed by Priscilla’s doctors and called Teresa. The

couple rushed back to the hospital with Priscilla, where they

remained for three days until her death. Gimenez was

charged with her murder.

B. Trial

Gimenez and the government offered competing

narratives at trial. The prosecution theorized that Gimenez

had caused Priscilla’s death by forcefully shaking her on at

least two occasions. The defense argued that Priscilla was a

sickly baby with birth injuries that worsened over time and

eventually killed her.

Prosecution witnesses testified that Priscilla experienced

a fairly normal birth, did not have a misshapen head, fed well

and displayed normal vital signs in the days after she was

born. Pediatrician Dr. Gooding testified that she discovered

a suspicious fresh tear of Priscilla’s frenulum1 when she

examined Priscilla upon her first hospital visit. Dr. Gooding

commented that the injury usually results from “fairly

vigorous trauma to the oral cavity.” At the hospital, Gimenez

accused an emergency-room doctor of tearing Priscilla’s

frenulum during an examination, but at trial he testified that

1 The frenulum is the tissue underneath the tongue that anchors it to the

mouth. 

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6 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

he’d inadvertentlycaused the injurywhile cleaning Priscilla’s

mouth. The jury also heard that Gimenez accused Teresa of

infidelity, slapped her and pushed her during an argument late

in her pregnancy, causing her to fall.

Experts provided the linchpin for the prosecution’s theory

that Priscilla was a victim of shaken baby syndrome (SBS). 

Radiologist Dr. Hilton analyzed x-rays of Priscilla’s ribs and

concluded that she was born without any bone damage but

had a rib fracture at the time of her death. Coroner Dr. Eisele

estimated that the rib fracture was about two weeks old when

Priscilla died. He also testified that Priscilla had a subdural

hematoma, or hemorrhage between the lining of her skull and

the surface of the brain. Dr. Eisele also observed

hemorrhaging in Priscilla’s retinas and that her brain was

“severely swollen.” He concluded that Priscilla had been

shaken.

Pediatrician Dr. Alexander testified that the hallmarks of

SBS include subdural hematoma, brain swelling and retinal

hemorrhage. He also noted that rib fractures are extremely

uncommon in infants. He attributed Priscilla’s two hospital

admissions to separate shaking episodes.

Gimenez’s experts countered with evidence that Priscilla

was born with serious ailments that ultimately caused her

death. Obstetrician Dr. Kerley testified that Teresa needed a

C-section because she was in labor for more than 24 hours

without achieving full dilation. He opined that the prolonged

pressure of the narrow pelvic canal on Priscilla’s skull may

have caused molding or deformation of Priscilla’s head.

Forensic pathologist Dr. Guard concluded that Teresa’s

strenuous labor caused Priscilla’s subdural hemorrhage,

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 7

pointing to doctors’ notes from the delivery room

documenting molding in Priscilla’s head. He explained that

Priscilla’s hemorrhage likely clotted, healed and re-bled in an

uncontrollable “chain reaction” in the weeks following her

birth, causing brain swelling and retinal hemorrhages. He

explained that Priscilla’s vomiting and seizures were an

expected outward manifestation of re-bleeding as her brain

healed. Finally, Dr. Guard attributed Priscilla’s broken rib to

physicians grasping her firmly while lifting her from the

uterus during the C-section.

Neurologist Dr. Tiznado-Garcia analyzed Priscilla’s

hospital records and CT scans and concluded that she died

from complications caused by a brain bleed that began at

birth. Dr. Tiznado-Garcia ruled out SBS as a cause,

explaining that brain bleeds caused by shaking are acute,

while Priscilla’s was chronic. Radiologist Dr. Harvey,

however, conceded on cross-examination that Priscilla’s

injuries were consistent with non-accidental trauma.

The jury found Gimenez guilty of murder in the second

degree. He was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of

fifteen years to life.

C. Previous Habeas Proceedings

In his first federal habeas petition, Gimenez alleged that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to gather

Priscilla’s entire medical record. The missing documents

suggested that Priscilla suffered from a congenital blood

disorder with effects that mimic those of SBS. He also

claimed that his counsel was ineffective by failing to consult

a hematologist or question the experts he did retain about

whether Priscilla had a blood disorder.

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8 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

The district court determined that Gimenez suffered no

prejudice from any deficient use of expert testimony or

failure to obtain medical records: The prosecution’s case

would have been just as strong, and the evidence wouldn’t

have enabled the defense to overcome Gimenez’s credibility

problems. We affirmed in a memorandum disposition. 

Gimenez v. Alameida, 135 F. App’x 20 (9th Cir. 2005).

In 2009, Gimenez filed a habeas petition in the Superior

Court of California nearly identical to the federal petition at

the heart of this case, which the California courts denied. 

Gimenez then filed a second federal habeas petition with this

court’s permission. The district court granted the state’s

motion to dismiss, which Gimenez appeals.

II. Discussion

Gimenez’s second federal habeas petition presents three

grounds for relief: (1) his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance; (2) he was convicted based on false expert

testimony; and (3) his due process rights were violated when

he was convicted based on flawed scientific evidence even

though he was innocent. Gimenez must clear the high

hurdles erected by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for obtaining relief on

any of these grounds.

A. Ineffective Assistance Claim

Gimenez’s ineffective assistance claim concerns errors

primarily related to the use of expert testimony.

2 We must

2 Specifically, Gimenez claims that his attorney rendered deficient

performance eight ways by: (1) hiring an incompetent pathologist, Dr.

Guard, to testify that Priscilla suffered from a recurring brain bleed that

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 9

dismiss this claim if it is identical to the one raised in his first

habeas petition—that is, if the two share the same “legal basis

for granting . . . relief.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,

14–16 (1963); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).

The standard for “distinguishing repetitious claims from

new ones is the ‘substantial similarity’ rule” used to

determine whether a claim has been exhausted in state court. 

See Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas

Corpus Practice & Procedure § 28.1 n.8 (6th ed. 2011). 

Under the exhaustion test, a petitioner can introduce

additional facts to support a claim on federal habeas review

so long as he presented the “substance” of the claim to the

state courts. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257–58

(1986). That the additional facts provide more sophisticated

or reliable support is of no moment where the information

does not “fundamentally alter the legal claim already

considered.” Id. at 260. A claim in a successive petition is

barred when its “basic thrust or gravamen” is the same as a

claim that’s already been raised, even if it’s supported by new

factual allegations or legal arguments. Babbitt v. Woodford,

177 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.

began at birth; (2) failing to call a radiologist to testify that Priscilla’s rib

fracture appeared at birth and that her brain bleed began before her final

hospital stay; (3) hiring radiologist Dr. Harvey, who admitted that

Priscilla’s brain bleeds were consistent with an SBS theory; (4) suffering

neurologistDr. Tiznado-Garcia to testifythat Priscilla’s CT scans revealed

an older, recurring brain bleed instead of employing a radiologist to do so;

(5) not relying on experts more qualified than Dr. Guard and Dr. TiznadoGarcia to present the alternate theory of Priscilla’s death; (6) failing to

subpoena Priscilla’s complete medical records and provide them to

defense experts; (7) failing to better prepare Dr. Kerley to testify that

Priscilla’s head underwent “molding”; and (8) not bolstering the

alternative theory of Priscilla’s death with available medical records.

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10 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1998)); accord

Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 997 (9th Cir. 2013).

Our cases characterize ineffective assistance “claims” at

a fairly high level of generality. In West v. Ryan, we equated

an allegation that counsel failed to present mitigation

evidence with an allegation that counsel failed to invalidate

petitioner’s aggravating factors by presenting the same

evidence. 652 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011). And in

Cooper v. Brown, an ineffective assistance claim based on

counsel’s failure to introduce photographs of hair was barred

where the district court already considered counsel’s

deficiencies in utilizing forensic evidence. 510 F.3d 870,

874, 930–31 (9th Cir. 2007).

Gimenez essentially concedes that he previously raised at

least one argument: Trial counsel was ineffective for “failing

to subpoena all of Priscilla’s medical records and provide

them to the defense’s expert witnesses.” Gimenez maintained

in his first petition that his case would have been stronger if

trial counsel had reviewed, “with the assistance of appropriate

medical experts, all medical records.” It makes no difference

that Gimenezmaynow have additional documentssupporting

his argument that counsel was deficient in failing to locate all

of Priscilla’s records. The “basic thrust or gravamen” is the

same. Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 997; see also Cooper,

510 F.3d at 931.

Nor can Gimenez succeed by faulting his counsel for

failing to use all available medical evidence. Any criticism

of counsel’s failure to obtain complete records would be

meaningless if counsel weren’t expected to employ favorable

undiscovered evidence in support of his case. These

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 11

arguments are “two sides of the same coin.” West, 652 F.3d

at 1077.

Gimenez’s six remaining arguments echo the same

grounds for relief he presented to the district court in his first

habeas petition: Counsel should have used better experts. In

disposing of his first petition, the district court considered

whether trial counsel was deficient for failing to consult the

proper experts to “present a different, more effective

defense.” This time around, Gimenez explains in more detail

why different experts would have improved his case. But a

federal court already denied relief after considering whether

Gimenez suffered prejudice from the failure to present

adequate expert evidence in support of the defense’s theory

of the case. Because the impact of counsel’s deficiencies in

utilizing experts “has already been adjudicated,” Gimenez’s

new arguments don’t present a distinct claim for relief. 

Cooper, 510 F.3d at 988.

B. Due Process Challenge Based on False Testimony

Gimenez argues that the prosecution’s experts incorrectly

interpreted key hospital records and thus offered false

testimony at trial, violating his due process rights. 

Accordingly, Gimenez claims that he alleged the requisite

constitutional error that would entitle him to proceed on his

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). That section

permits relief to petitioners who can show by “clear and

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found [them] guilty.”

To dismiss a second or successive petition, a district court

must determine that the record “conclusively shows” that the

petitioner failed to meet section 2244’s requirements. United

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12 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1164–65 (9th Cir.

2000). After conducting a thorough review of Gimenez’s

new petition, the district court properly found that he didn’t

demonstrate “constitutional error” under section

2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) from the introduction of false testimony. 

Gimenez presents affidavits from new experts that either

repeat testimony from his trial experts or fail to contradict the

prosecution’s theory.

3

 To the extent that this new testimony

3 First, Gimenez claims that the prosecution’s experts erroneously

determined that Priscilla’s brain bleeds occurred just before her death. 

New experts Dr. Wolfe and Dr. Plunkett provide affidavits

concluding—just like Dr. Tiznado-Garcia did at trial—that Priscilla’s

brain bleed was chronic and began soon after her birth. Second, Gimenez

presents affidavits from multiple experts who conclude that Priscilla had

a blood clot that formed before her death—just like Dr. Tiznado-Garcia

testified at trial. Third, Gimenez presents affidavits from two experts who

believe that Priscilla’s retinal hemorrhages were no more than 72 hours

old. Thus, they may have formed during her final hospital stay from

August 10 to August 13—not as a result of any shaking incidents when

she was alone with Gimenez on August 10. This evidence is consistent

with the prosecution’s theory that Priscilla was violently shaken on the

afternoon she returned to the hospital—three days before her death. 

Fourth, Gimenez claims that two new experts conclude that Priscilla

suffered from a blood coagulation disorder which led to her death. 

However, one of the experts notes that “head trauma in and of itself” may

resultin abnormal coagulation patterns, “rendering it virtually impossible”

to determine which came first, as “appears to be the case [here].” And the

other expert found “no medical records to indicate” blood disorders. 

These findings are also consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the

case. Fifth, Gimenez introduces an affidavit from a radiologist who

concludes, based on an x-ray taken immediately after Priscilla’s birth, that

she likely had a rib fracture at that time. This testimony supports that of

defense expert Dr. Guard, who testified that doctors likely broke

Priscilla’s rib by accident during her birth. Sixth, Gimenez points to

additional medical records documentingPriscilla’s head “molding” during

her traumatic birth. This merely amplifies the testimony of defense

experts Dr. Kerley and Dr. Guard at trial. Finally, Gimenez points to a

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 13

contradicts the prosecution’s expert testimony, it’s simply a

difference in opinion—not false testimony. See, e.g., United

States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1996);

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1524 (9th Cir. 1991) (as

amended); cf. Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 675 & n.7

(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (overstating the conclusions of a

study was not a lie). We have found due process violations

from the introduction of false testimony only where a fact

witness told lies (even unknowingly so) or the prosecution

relied on phony documents. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ornoski,

673 F.3d 1168, 1183–86 (9th Cir. 2012); Maxwell v. Roe,

628 F.3d 486, 506 (9th Cir. 2010); Hall v. Dir. of Corr.,

343 F.3d 976, 981–85 (9th Cir. 2003). Neither is the case

here.

Gimenez presents a battle between experts who have

different opinions about how Priscilla died. Introducing

expert testimony that is contradicted by other experts,

whether at trial or at a later date, doesn’t amount to suborning

perjury or falsifying documents; it’s standard litigation. 

Accordingly, Gimenez can’t obtain relief under section

2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) on the theory that the prosecution

introduced false testimony at trial.

C. Claims Based on Changes in Scientific Knowledge

Finally, Gimenez argues that new scientific evidence

undermines the prosecution’s theory that Priscilla was a

recent publication suggesting that patterns of hemorrhage from accidental

trauma “may be the same as . . . or completely different from the pattern

seen in [abusive head trauma].” That statement is not inconsistent with

the prosecution’s theory that the patterns of hemorrhage were attributable

to SBS.

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14 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

victim of SBS and thus shows that he’s actually innocent of

her murder. Gimenez claims that the prosecution’s experts

rested their SBS diagnosis on a triad of symptoms—subdural

hematoma, brain swelling and retinal hemorrhage. He points

to a number of articles supporting his claim that medical

knowledge surrounding SBS has changed in the years since

his conviction. In his view, no longer do forensic

pathologists diagnose SBS simply by noting the presence of

the telltale triad of injuries. Now, the medical community

requires evidence of impact injuries before diagnosing SBS. 

Because Priscilla didn’t exhibit head or neck injuries,

Gimenez argues that she couldn’t have been the victim of

SBS.

Based on this new evidence, Gimenez argues that he’s

entitled to bring a claim under section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and

under caselaw permitting habeas relief for petitioners who are

actually innocent of any crime.

1. Relief Under Section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)

Gimenez argues that if his new evidence is credited, “no

reasonable factfinder” could have found him guilty. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). But section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)

also requires petitioners to state a predicate “constitutional

error.” See Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1032 (10th Cir.

2013); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (11th Cir. 2009). The

Supreme Court has never recognized “actual innocence” as a

constitutional error that would provide grounds for relief

without an independent constitutional violation. See Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315–16 (1995); Herrera v. Collins,

506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 15

Gimenez maintains that he did suffer the required

predicate constitutional error: The prosecution deprived him

of due process by introducing expert testimony about the

discredited triad theory of SBS. The district court couldn’t

find any authority for the proposition that “a conviction based

on the most up-to-date knowledge in the past transforms to a

violation of due process when that knowledge is modified in

ensuing years.” But courts have long considered arguments

that the introduction of faulty evidence violates a petitioner’s

due process right to a fundamentally fair trial—even if that

evidence does not specifically qualify as “false testimony.” 

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68–70 (1991); Dowling

v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352–53 (1990); McKinney v.

Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1993); Kealohapauole v.

Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465–66 (9th Cir. 1986).

Nothing compels a different rule for a challenge brought

in a successive petition to expert testimony about discredited

forensic principles or other junk science. Indeed, recognizing

such a claim is essential in an age where forensics that were

once considered unassailable are subject to serious doubt.4

 

4

 In 2009, the National Research Council submitted a comprehensive

report to the U.S. Department of Justice critiquing the state of forensic

science. See Committee on Identifying the Needs ofthe Forensic Sciences

Community, National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science

in the United States: A Path Forward 57 (2009), available at

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (“In some cases,

substantive information and testimony based on faulty forensic science

analyses may have contributed to wrongful convictions of innocent

people.”). The popular press and legal academia have regularly reported

research breakthroughs debunking or seriously undermining forensics

disciplines once thought to be scientifically sound. See, e.g., Brandon L.

Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony &

Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2009) (reviewing trial records to

determine the incidence of experts overstating the probative value of

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16 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

And it’s particularly important to permit claims of

constitutional error grounded in faulty science in a second or

successive petition. After all, flawed analytical methods may

not be debunked until well after the expiration of a

various forensic disciplines); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent

Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7

Law, Probability& Risk 127 (2008); Kelly Servick, Reversing the Legacy

of Junk Science in the Courtroom, Science (Mar. 7, 2016),

http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/reversing-legacy-junk-sciencecourtroom (hair analysis, bite mark analysis, fingerprint comparisons);

NPR Staff, Arson Forensics Sets Old Fire Myths Ablaze, National Public

Radio (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/19/142546979/arsonforensics-sets-old-fire-myths-ablaze (arson and burn pattern analysis);

John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, Wash. Post (Nov. 18,

2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/

11/17/AR2007111701681_pf.html (comparative bullet-lead analysis). 

Other sub-fields have been roundly criticized for relying on questionable

methodology or for overstating the probative value of forensic analysis. 

Michael Hall, False Impressions, Tex. Monthly (Jan. 2016),

http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/false-impressions/ (bite mark

analysis); Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Exoneration Underscores Mounting

Challenges to Bite-Mark Evidence, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/va-exonerationunderscores-to-mounting-challenges-to-bite-mark-evidence/

2016/04/08/55bbfe98-fd9a-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html

(reporting the exoneration of a sailor convicted of rape and murder based

on bite-mark analysis); Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair

Analysis Over Decades, Wash. Post (Apr. 18, 2015),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hairmatches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-

e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html?tid=a_inl (“The Justice

Department and FBI have formally acknowledged that nearly every

examiner in an elite FBI forensic unit gave flawed testimony in almost all

trials in which they offered evidence [about hair matches] against criminal

defendants over more than a two-decade period.”); Adam Liptak, You

Think DNA Evidence is Foolproof? Try Again, NewYorkTimes (Mar. 16,

2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/16/weekinreview/the-nation-youthink-dna-evidence-is-foolproof-try-again.html.

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 17

petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a habeas petition under

AEDPA.

The Third Circuit permits petitioners to seek relief from

convictions based on flawed forensic evidence. In Albrecht

v. Horn, the court suggested that a petitioner may claim that

scientific evidence introduced at trial violated his due process

rights if he could show that the evidence “infect[ed] his entire

trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” 485 F.3d 103,

124 n.7 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.

478, 494 (1986)). Such a petition for relief is not a “freestanding innocence claim,” but a due process claim. Lee v.

Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (interpreting

Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012)). Relying

on this rule, the Lee court granted habeas relief to a petitioner

whose conviction rested on flawed arson forensics, which the

government conceded had been rendered invalid by

subsequent scientific developments. Id. at 167. The

remaining evidence at his trial wasn’t sufficient to show that

the petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at

169.

We join the Third Circuit in recognizing that habeas

petitioners can allege a constitutional violation from the

introduction of flawed expert testimony at trial if they show

that the introduction of this evidence “undermined the

fundamental fairness of the entire trial.” Id. at 162. Yet

Gimenez isn’t entitled to relief. He failed to show that

permitting the prosecution’s experts to testify based on a

triad-only theory of SBS was “so extremely unfair that it[] . . .

violate[d] fundamental conceptions of justice.” Dowling,

493 U.S. at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted). Gimenez

presented literature revealing not so much a repudiation of

triad-onlySBS, but a vigorous debate about its validitywithin

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18 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

the scientific community. In 2006, one textbook

acknowledged that “there is a dispute of whether inflicted

subdural hematomas can occur from shaking alone.” In 2011,

the triad theory of SBS was characterized merely as being

under challenge. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 10

(2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (commenting on the shift in

scientific opinions about SBS). The debate continues to the

present day. See Debbie Cenziper et al., Shaken Science: 

Prosecutors Build Murder Cases on Disputed Shaken Baby

Syndrome Diagnosis, Wash. Post (Mar. 20, 2015),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/s

haken-baby-syndrome/.

In any case, Gimenez can’t prove by “clear and

convincing evidence” that “no reasonable factfinder” would

have found him guilty but for the introduction of purportedly

flawed SBS testimony. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); see

Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015). That

inquiry requires courts to examine the alleged constitutional

violation “in light of the evidence as a whole” at a petitioner’s

trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d

825, 845 (9th Cir. 2013). A juror could still have concluded

that Priscilla was shaken to death based on her numerous

suspicious injuries, Gimenez’s inconsistent statements about

Priscilla’s torn frenulum and his admitted violent behavior.

Even assuming the prosecution’s experts couldn’t testify that

the triad alone establishes SBS, the evidence Gimenez

presents isn’t enough to show by clear and convincing

evidence that “no reasonable factfinder” would have found

him guilty. Jones, 733 F.3d at 845; Gage, 793 F.3d at 1168.

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GIMENEZ V. OCHOA 19

2. Freestanding Actual-Innocence Claim

Nor could Gimenez obtain relief if we were to decouple

his claim of actual innocence from any due process violation

and repackage it as a freestanding “actual innocence” claim. 

See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. For one, we have only

assumed, but have not held, that petitioners may bring such

a freestanding innocence claim. Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d

1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2014). And our cases suggest that relief

would be available, if at all, only in very narrow

circumstances. Gimenez must “go beyond demonstrating

doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is

probably innocent.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

Gimenez’s “new” evidence doesn’t undermine the

prosecution’s case so much as beef up the theory that the jury

already rejected: Priscilla suffered from health problems at

birth that caused her subdural hematoma, brain swelling,

retinal hemorrhage and eventually her death. Introducing a

superior version of the same evidence supporting the theory

doesn’t “affirmatively prove that [Gimenez] is probably

innocent.” Id. The evidence falls far short of a persuasive

alibi, exculpatory physical evidence or a credible confession

from another suspect—all of which are types of new evidence

that we have suggested could meet this demanding standard. 

Id. at 477.

* * *

We acknowledge that AEDPA’s requirements make it

extremely difficult to reexamine convictions based on

scientific theories that are presently in flux. But challenges

to flawed expert testimony are cognizable in successive

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20 GIMENEZ V. OCHOA

habeas petitions. While Gimenez may not meet the exacting

prerequisites for obtaining relief from his conviction, he and

others may be able to do so in the future as forensic science

continues to evolve.

AFFIRMED.

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