Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00854/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00854-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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Clay originally styled his motion as one for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(4). 1

However, he later moved to amend his pleading, stating that he had erroneously cited Rule 60(b)(3)

instead of Rule 60(d)(3) in his original motion. (See Doc. No. 103.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CLARENCE CLAY, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:05cv854-MHT

) (WO) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is Clarence Clay’s (“Clay”) pro se motion for relief from judgment

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) and 60(d)(3). (Doc. No. 99.) By his motion, Clay 1

purports to seek relief from this court’s judgment of May 23, 2008, denying a 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 motion filed by Clay.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2003, a jury found Clay guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute

and possess with intent to distribute 4 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride, 50 or more grams

of cocaine base, and 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1) and 846, and with unlawful use of a communication facility, a telephone, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). On April 14, 2003, the trial court sentenced Clay to 50

months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count and to 6 months’ consecutive imprisonment

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 1 of 10
 Clay raised the following issues on direct appeal: 2

1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that the prosecutor’s

comments before the grand jury did not substantially influence the

grand jury’s decision to return the superseding indictment in this

case?

2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Clay’s conviction for

the unlawful use of a communication facility, to wit, a telephone, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)?

3. Whether drug quantity becomes an element of the offense under

federal drug trafficking statutes only when it may be used to impose

a sentence above the applicable statutory maximum?

United States v. Clay, 376 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11 Cir. 2004). th

2

on the communications count, for a total term of 56 months. Clay appealed to the Eleventh

Circuit, and on July 15, 2004, the appellate court affirmed his convictions and sentence.2

United States v. Clay, 376 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11 Cir. 2004). th

On September 2, 2005, Clay filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct and

ineffective assistance of counsel and also alleged that his sentence was improper under

United States v. Booker, 540 U.S. 220 (2005). (Doc. No. 1.) This court denied Clay’s

§ 2255 motion in a judgment entered in March 2007. (See Doc. No. 57 [Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation]; Doc. Nos. 62 and 63 [District Court’s Order and Final Judgment].) Clay

appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case with directions for this court to

address Clay’s substantive Booker claim. (See Doc. No. 76.) After the Magistrate Judge

entered a supplemental recommendation finding that Clay’s Booker claim lacked merit (Doc.

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 2 of 10
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No. 84), the district court, on May 23, 2008, adopted the Magistrate’s Judge’s initial and

supplemental recommendations and entered a final judgment denying Clay’s § 2255 motion

(Doc. Nos. 89 and 90). Clay appealed from the denial of his § 2255 motion, and on July 31,

2008, the Eleventh Circuit denied his application for a certificate of appealability. (See Doc.

No. 96.)

Clay’sinstant motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) and

60(d)(3) was filed on November 24, 2009. (Doc. No. 99.) He presentsthe following claims

in his motion:

1. This court, when denying his § 2255 motion in 2008, failed to

correct a “structural error” and obvious violation of his right to

trial by jury, where the record shows that the trial court

determined the amount of drugs attributable to him at

sentencing despite the jury’s inability to reach a unanimous

agreement in its verdict.

2. The trial court’s entry of a judgment of conviction in his

criminal case “represent[ed] a fraud being perpetrated on the

Court by the Court,” because the jury was unable to reach a

unanimous agreement in its verdict.

3. This court “violated the § 2255 statute” by failing to hold an

evidentiary hearing on his § 2255 motion.

 

(Doc. No. 99 at pp. 4-20.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 60 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides a basis, but only a limited basis, for a

party to seek relief from a final judgment in a habeas case.” Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 3 of 10
 Rule 60(b) provides, in sum, the following six bases for relief: (1) mistake, inadvertence,

3

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or (6) any other reason justifying relief

from the operation of the judgment

 Rule 60 was restructured effective December 1, 2007, to provide at 60(d)(3) that, “[t]his rule 4

does not limit a court’s power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Previously, such

claims were brought under 60(b).

4

1290, 1293 (11 Cir. 2007). Rule 60, like all Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, apply only th

to civil actions and proceedings in the United States District Court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1.

Thus, it is well settled that Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 does not provide a vehicle for relief from a

judgment in a criminal case. See United States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317 (11 Cir. 2003); th

United States v. Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11 Cir. 1998). th

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a litigant to move for relief from an

otherwise final judgment in a civil case for a number of reasons, including “fraud (whether

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing

party,” or where the judgment is void. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(4). Such 3

motions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1). However,

under recently enacted Rule 60(d), no limitations period limits “a court’s power to (1)

entertain an independent action to relieve a party froma judgment, order, or proceeding; [or]

... (3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d). 4

B. Gonzalez v. Crosby and Successive § 2255 Motions

In the context of motions under Rule 60, a party’s label is not binding on the court,

and a court may discard an inappropriate label to render a decision based on the motion’s

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 4 of 10
 Gonzalez addressed this issue in the context of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus 5

relief. However, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes that “the principles developed in habeas cases also

apply to § 2255 motions.” Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n.1 (11 Cir. 1987). Moreover, th

the Eleventh Circuit has stated that the holding and rationale of Gonzalez apply equally to § 2255

and § 2254 habeas proceedings. See El-Amin v. United States, No. 05-1276, 172 Fed.Appx. 942

(11 Cir. Mar. 28, 2006); United States v. Terrell, No. 02-14997, 141 Fed.Appx. 849 (11 Cir. Jul. th th

19, 2005).

 The Supreme Court in Gonzalez described a “claim” as “an asserted federal basis for relief from 6

a ... court’s judgment of conviction.” 545 U.S. at 530. The Court further explained that

[t]he term “on the merits” has multiple usages. We refer here to a determination that

there do not exist grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief under 28

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substance. Smith v. United States Parole Comm’n, 721 F.2d 346, 348 (11 Cir. 1983). th

When a pro se petitioner brings a motion under Rule 60, the district court may appropriately

construe it as a § 2255 motion, and, if applicable, treat it as an unauthorized second or

successive motion. See Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293-95. If construed as a second or

successive motion, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1295.

In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 531-32 (2005), the Supreme Court provided

guidance asto how prisoner claims under Rule 60 should be construed. If the motion seeks 5

to add a new ground for relief from the underlying judgment of conviction or sentence, or

otherwise attacks the district court’s resolution of any original § 2255 claims on the merits,

then the court should construe the Rule 60 action as a second or successive § 2255 motion

and dismiss it accordingly. Id.; see also Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293-94. By contrast, “when

a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court’sresolution of a claim on

the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,” courts should

not treat the Rule 60 action as a successive § 2255 motion. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532-33; 6

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 5 of 10
U.S.C. § 2254(a) and (b). When a movant asserts one of those grounds (or asserts

that a previous ruling regarding one of those grounds was in error) he is making a

habeas corpus claim. He is not doing so when he merely asserts that a previous

ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error – for example, a denial

for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.

Id. at 532 n.4 (citations omitted). 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides that, to file a second 7

or successive § 2255 motion in the district court, a petitioner must first move in the appropriate court

of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the motion. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3)(A). The appellate court, in turn, must certify that the second or successive § 2255 motion

contains “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a

whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable

factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶8. 

6

see also Williams, 510 F.3d at 1294. Such actions are properly brought under Rule 60 and

can be ruled on by the district court without the pre-certification from the court of appeals

that is ordinarily required for a second or successive § 2255 motion. Id. at 538. 

7

C. Clay’s Claims

1. Trial Court’s Infringement upon Jury’s Duties and Violation of Right to

Trial by Jury 

Clay claims that this court, when denying his § 2255 motion, failed to correct a

“structural error” and obvious violation of his right to trial by jury, specifically, the trial

court’s alleged infringement upon the duties of the jury by determining the amount of drugs

attributable to him despite the jury’s inability to reach a unanimous agreement in its verdict.

(Doc. No. 99 at pp. 4-12 and 18-19.) In this regard, Clay also asserts that he raised this

claim in his § 2255 motion, but that this court neglected to address the issue. (Id. at 10-11.)

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 6 of 10
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In its response to Clay’s instant motion, the government correctly observes that Clay

did not present such allegations as a stand-alone substantive claim in his § 2255 motion.

(See Doc. No. 102 at p. 7.) Rather, he argued that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to challenge the trial court’s infringement on the role of the jury by determining

the amount of drugs attributable to him. (See Doc. No. 1 at pp. 4-6; Doc. No. 2 at p. 5.)

This court, when ruling on Clay’s § 2255 motion, fully addressed Clay’s claims that his

counsel was ineffective in this regard, and found the claims to lack merit. (Doc. No. 57 at

pp. 9-12 and 14-17; Doc. No. 84 at pp. 8-9.)

Moreover, to whatever extent Clay’s current allegations could possibly be construed

as presenting a substantive claim under United States v. Booker, 540 U.S. 220 (2005), this

court fully addressed such a claim in the Magistrate Judge’s supplemental recommendation.

(Doc. No. 84 at pp. 2-11.) Therefore, Clay is either raising a new ground for relief from his

underlying conviction or he is reasserting a claim (as that term is defined in Gonzalez, supra)

that he raised in his original § 2255 motion and that was determined on the merits by this

court. In either case, a Rule 60 motion is not the proper vehicle for advancing such a “merits

related” claim, and the claim is, in substance, part of a second or successive petition as

defined in Gonzalez. See Williams, 510 F.3d at 1294. Because Clay has not received

certification from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider

a successive § 2255 motion, this court lacks the jurisdiction to consider this claim.

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293-95. See also Farris v. United States,

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 7 of 10
 See Rule 60(d)(3); see also Rule 60(b)(3). 8

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333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11 Cir. 2003). th

2. Entry of Judgment of Conviction as “Fraud on the Court”

Clay claims that the trial court’s entry of the judgment of conviction in his criminal

case “represent[ed] a fraud being perpetrated on the Court by the Court,” because the jury

was unable to reach a unanimous agreement in its verdict. (Doc. No. 1 at pp. 4-5 and 12-

17.) Although cloaked in the rubric of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, this claim is self-evidently not a 8

ground for relief asserting a defect in the integrity of the proceedings on Clay’s original

§ 2255 motion as defined in Gonzalez. Instead, the claim attacks the substance of Clay’s

conviction and sentence. As such, the claim is not properly asserted in a motion under Rule

60 and is, in substance, part of a second or successive § 2255 motion – one filed without

pre-certification from the appellate court. Therefore, this court lacks the jurisdiction to

consider this claim. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32; Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293-94. 

3. Failure to Hold Evidentiary Hearing on Original § 2255 Motion

Clay claims that this court “violated the § 2255 statute” by failing to hold an

evidentiary hearing on his § 2255 motion. (Doc. No. 1 at pp. 5 and 19-21.) Although this

claim asserts a “defect in the integrity” of the proceedings on Clay’s original § 2255 motion,

see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532, and thus may be properly raised in a Rule 60 motion, the

claim does not entitle Clay to any relief, because it is meritless. The facts relevant to the

claims presented in Clay’s original § 2255 motion were adequately developed in the record,

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 8 of 10
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and it could be conclusively determined from the record – without a hearing – that Clay’s

claims did not entitle him to any relief. See Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1238-39

(11 Cir. 2004); Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11 Cir. 1989). th th

A 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing if (1) the petitioner’s

allegations, if accepted as true, would not entitle petitioner to relief; or (2) the allegations

cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, are inherently

incredible, or are conclusions rather than statements of fact. Engelen v. United States, 68

F.3d 238, 241 (8 Cir. 1998). See Holmes, 876 F.2d at 1553 (evidentiary hearing not th

required where petitioner’s claim is “based upon unsupported generalizations”) Upon that

standard, Clay was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his original § 2255 motion.

Therefore, there is no merit to his claim under Rule 60.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Clay’sinstant motion be dismissed as a successive § 2255 motion to the extent that

Clay collaterally attacks his conviction and sentence by claiming (1) that the trial court

infringed upon the duties of the jury and violated his right to a trial by jury and (2) that the

trial court’s entry of the judgment of conviction in his criminal case represented a fraud on

the court; and

2. Clay’s instant motion for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) and 60(d)(3)

be denied to the extent Clay claims he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his original

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 9 of 10
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§ 2255 motion; and 

3. The judgment denying Clay’s original § 2255 motion stand.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before March 25, 2011. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See th

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc). th

Done this 11 day of March, 2011. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00854-MHT-CSC Document 104 Filed 03/11/11 Page 10 of 10