Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02398/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02398-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ALLEN FRANCE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JERRY BROWN; JEFFERY BEARD; 

JOSE GARCIA; JOSEPH SINGLETON,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02398-AJB-RBB

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES 

AGAINST IMMUNE DEFENDANTS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b); and

(2) DENYING MOTION TO 

INTRODUCE PROOF OF SERVICE 

AS MOOT

I. Procedural History 

On September 21, 2016, Michael Allen France (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate 

currently incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, filed a civil rights complaint 

(“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) He sought an injunction from 

the Governor of California preventing “any further warrants of arrests to be issued on 

me,” $55,000 in compensatory damages, $14,000,000 in punitive damages and the 

termination of his parole agent, Defendant Joseph Singleton. (Compl. at 7.) 

Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) The Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 

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IFP but simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim, as 

frivolous and for seeking monetary damages against immune defendants. (ECF No. 8 at 

7-9.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading and on January 9, 2017, 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 12.) In addition, 

Plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Introduce Proof of Service” which is DENIED as moot in 

light of the Court’s Order below dismissing the entire action. (ECF No. 14.)

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

“The Court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as 

practicable after docketing,” complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP, and by 

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, 

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any 

portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek 

damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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A. Freedom of Religion1claims

The Court finds that a majority of Plaintiff’s allegations, while far from clear, are 

borderline frivolous under § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. Plaintiff objects to a number of the

parole conditions enforced by Defendants, including but not limited to, requiring Plaintiff 

to “live in a residential treatment facility for 90 days and then a sober living house for 

180 days.” (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff claims he “attempted to go to a 90 day inpatient 

treatment center 4 or 5 times” but he “had enough of their attempted indoctrination that 

would leave a person to believe that loving God and using drugs are mutually exclusive.” 

(Id. at 4.) He further alleges that his religion of “Here and Nowism” believes that 

“spiritual beings were put into chemically dependent bodies and are required to figure out 

what chemicals they can use and remain kind.” (Id. at 5.)

“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal 

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact....[The] 

term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal 

conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

325 (1989). A pleading is “factual[ly] frivolous[ ]” under § 1915(e)(2) § 1915A(b)(1) if 

“the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not 

there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 

504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the court 

need not accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual 

allegations,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, to determine whether they are “ ‘fanciful,’ 

‘fantastic,’ [or] ‘delusional,’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325-

28). 

 

1

In order to implicate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Plaintiff must show 

that his belief is “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” See Shakur v. Schiro, 514 F.3d 878, 

884 (citing Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Applying these standards to the allegations Plaintiff’s FAC, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s freedom of religion claims may be frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) § 1915A(b)(1). See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2014).

B. Absolute Immunity

Regardless of whether Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are “sincerely held,” to the 

extent that Plaintiff seeks money damages against his parole agent, or his agent’s 

supervisor for alleged constitutional violations, the Court finds the constitutional claims 

against these Defendants must be dismissed for seeking damages against defendants who 

are immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii). 

Defendants Singleton and Garcia are entitled to absolute immunity for claims of 

money damages relating to allegations of imposing unconstitutional parole conditions. 

See Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 840 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit has held 

“absolute immunity “extend[s] to parole officials for the ‘imposition of parole conditions’ 

because that task is ‘integrally related to an official’s decision to grant or revoke parole,’ 

which is a ‘quasi-judicial function.’” Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983)).

Therefore, the claims for monetary damages against Defendants Singleton and 

Garcia are DISMISSED on the grounds that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages 

against Defendants who are immune.

III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for seeking monetary 

damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b);

2) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Introduce Proof of Service (ECF No. 14) as 

moot;

3) DENIES Plaintiff further leave to amend as futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of 

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discretion where further amendment would be futile); Gonzalez, 759 F.3d at 1116 

(district court’s discretion in denying amendment is “particularly broad” when it has 

previously granted leave to amend);

4) CERTIFIES that an appeal of this final Order of dismissal would be 

frivolous and therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and

5) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to terminate this civil action and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2017

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