Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_03-cv-00240/USCOURTS-almd-1_03-cv-00240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The victim of these crimes was Chapman’s estranged wife.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

OTIS ARLEN CHAPMAN, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:03-CV-240-F

) WO

)

TERRANCE MCDONNELL, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Otis Arlen Chapman (“Chapman”), a state inmate, filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition

for habeas corpus relief on March 3, 2003, challenging convictions for first degree rape and

first degree sodomy imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama,

on December 14, 2000.1

 

Chapman filed a direct appeal of his convictions in which he “argue[d] that the trial

court’s refusal to allow him to present evidence of the victim’s alleged extramarital affairs

was an unconstitutional application of Rule 412 [of the Alabama Rules of Evidence,

Alabama’s “rape shield” law, formerly § 12-21-203, Ala. Code 1975] because, he says, it

violated his constitutional right to due process of law, namely, to confront his accuser

through cross-examination and to present a defense.” O.A.C. v. State, 851 So.2d 146, 147

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(Ala.Cr.App. 2002). On April 26, 2002, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

Chapman’s rape and sodomy convictions. Id. The relevant portion of this decision reads as

follows: 

The evidence introduced at the trial indicated, in pertinent part, that the

appellant cut the telephone line to the victim's house, broke open the door, and

entered the house, where he cursed, threatened, raped, sodomized, and severely

beat the victim. The appellant admitted to cutting the telephone line, to

breaking into the victim's house, to striking the victim repeatedly with his open

hand, and to having vaginal intercourse with the victim. However, the

appellant disputed certain aspects of the victim's testimony, including her

testimony that the intercourse was nonconsensual and that he had sodomized

her during the assault.

The appellant presents only one issue on appeal: he argues that the trial court

erred in not allowing him to present evidence indicating that the victim had

had extramarital affairs because, he says, those extramarital affairs were the

motive behind the victim's making false rape and sodomy allegations against

him.

Before trial, the State made an oral motion in limine, pursuant to Alabama's

“rape-shield” law, formerly § 12-21-203, Ala.Code 1975, now Rule 412,

Ala.R.Evid., to prevent defense counsel from questioning the victim about any

extramarital affairs and to prevent the appellant, if he chose to testify, from

testifying as to whether the victim had had sexual relationships with anyone

other than him while she and the appellant were married. In opposition to the

motion, the appellant argued that the rape-shield law should not apply to a

husband and wife, and that to prevent him from cross-examining the victim,

and from testifying himself, about the victim's alleged extramarital affairs

would prevent him from presenting his defense-i.e., that the victim had made

up the allegations of rape and sodomy in order to “get him out of the house to

have him incarcerated” so that she could obtain custody of their children and

continue with her affairs unhindered. (R. 9.) The trial court granted the State's

motion in limine.

During the trial, the appellant asked the court to reconsider its grant of the

State's motion. In addition to his previous arguments, the appellant argued that

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evidence of the victim's extramarital affairs would be admissible in relation to

the assault charge because, he said, it tended to show his mental state at the

time of the crimes; specifically, he argued that he had been provoked into

assaulting the victim when he learned of her extramarital affairs. The appellant

then made an offer of proof regarding the evidence he wanted to present. The

appellant testified that on the day of the crimes, the victim admitted to him that

she had had extramarital affairs with two different men. He denied that he was

beating the victim when she made the statements. However, the appellant

admitted that during the victim's deposition in connection with their divorce

proceedings, she stated that she had admitted to having extramarital affairs

only because the appellant was beating her at the time. As part of the proffer,

the victim testified that on the day of the crimes she told the appellant that she

had had extramarital affairs with two men because the appellant was beating

her and had threatened to kill her if she did not confirm the names of the

people he thought she was having an affair with. The victim stated that the

appellant suggested the names of two men, only one of which she recognized.

After the offer of proof, the trial court again granted the State's motion in

limine.

The appellant argues that the trial court's refusal to allow him to present

evidence of the victim's alleged extramarital affairs was an unconstitutional

application of Rule 412 because, he says, it violated his constitutional right to

due process of law, namely, to confront his accuser through cross-examination

and to present a defense.

Rule 412 provides, in pertinent part:

“(b) In any prosecution for criminal sexual conduct or for assault with

intent to commit, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit criminal

sexual conduct, evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the

complaining witness ··· shall not be admissible, either as direct evidence

or on cross-examination of the complaining witness or of other

witnesses, except as otherwise provided in this rule.

“(c) In any prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, evidence relating

to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness shall be

introduced if the court, following the procedure described in section (d)

of this rule, finds that such past sexual behavior directly involved the

participation of the accused.”

We note, initially, that this Court has repeatedly rejected constitutional

challenges to Alabama's rape-shield law. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 593 So.2d

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176, 177 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); Fairchild v. State, 505 So.2d 1265, 1269-70

(Ala.Crim.App.1986); and Hall v. State, 500 So.2d 1282, 1286-87

(Ala.Crim.App.1986); see also Ex parte Dennis, 730 So.2d 138, 140

(Ala.1999).

However, in Dennis, the Alabama Supreme Court held that Rule 412 does not

necessarily preclude all evidence of the past sexual behavior of the victim. In

Dennis, the appellant was convicted of the first-degree rape of his then 11-

year-old daughter. Testifying for the prosecution, a medical doctor “stated

unequivocally that, in his opinion, [the victim's] condition was caused by

recurrent penetration rather than by a one-time occurrence.”730 So.2d at 139.

In an attempt to rebut that testimony and to establish his innocence, the

appellant sought to introduce evidence indicating that someone else had had

sexual intercourse with the victim. Specifically, the appellant sought to

introduce testimony from C.M., who testified out of the presence of the jury

that she had seen another adult male engaging in sexual contact-and possibly

intercourse-with the victim. The trial court ruled that C.M.'s testimony was

inadmissible under Rule 412 because either it was not probative or its

prejudicial effect and tendency to confuse the jury substantially outweighed

any probative value it might have. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the

trial court's ruling that the evidence was inadmissible, finding, among other

things, that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative

value. However, in doing so, the Court noted the following:

“[W]e conclude that to read Rule 412 as requiring an absolute exclusion

of all evidence of past sexual activity between the victim and third

persons could, in some cases, violate a criminal defendant's

constitutional rights. See Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama

Evidence, § 32.01, p. 143 (5th ed. 1996) (‘It would appear, however,

that such an absolute exclusion would be inapplicable when to enforce

it would violate a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.’).

Therefore, we hold that when Rule 412 is applied to preclude the

admission of particular exculpatory evidence, the constitutionality of

its application is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Accord

Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir.1993). To the extent that

cases previously decided by this Court or the Court of Criminal

Appeals are contrary to this holding, they are overruled.

“····

“··· [O]ther states and the federal courts, perhaps anticipating a

constitutional argument similar to Dennis's, have made express

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exceptions permitting the introduction of evidence of the victim's sexual

history where it is offered to rebut or to explain away scientific or

medical evidence offered by the prosecution in a rape case.

SeeFed.R.Evid. 412····

“Moreover, the exception in Rule 412, Fed.R.Evid., was apparently

included in the federal rule because of the outrage over this State's now

infamous prosecutions of the ‘Scottsboro nine’ in the 1930s. See21

Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and

Procedure § 5388, pp. 590-598 (1980) (hereinafter ‘Wright &

Graham’). In fact, the exception in the federal rule is known as the

‘Scottsboro exception,’ or a recognition of the ‘Scottsboro rebuttal.’ Id.

at 590-91. The trials of the Scottsboro nine serve as an excellent

reminder of the need for such an exception.

“In the ‘Scottsboro cases,’ nine black men were accused of raping two

white women on a freight train while it was traveling through northern

Alabama. A key piece of circumstantial evidence offered on behalf of

the prosecution in the defendants' first trial was medical testimony

indicating that small amounts of semen had been found in the vagina of

each woman. The defendants attempted to offer evidence in rebuttal to

prove that these women had had sex the night before the alleged rapes,

and, therefore, that the defendants were not the source of the semen.

This rebuttal evidence was important because the small amount and the

nonmotile condition of the semen found in the women was inconsistent

with their account of a ‘gang rape’ that the women had alleged had

occurred on the day they were examined, and because the only other

evidence in the trial was the testimony of the alleged victims. The trial

court, however, excluded the rebuttal evidence on its own motion and

scathingly chastised the defendants' lawyer for attempting to introduce

it. Several of the defendants were later found guilty. Some of the

defendants' convictions were overturned, and other defendants were

released when it was later determined that the women were lying about

the rape to cover up for their own ‘hoboing.’ ···

“ We agree with the other jurisdictions that the ‘Scottsboro exception’

is not only wise, but is constitutionally required in some cases in which

the prosecution offers evidence to show that a physical injury or

condition of the victim indicates that the defendant committed the

offense of rape. To the extent that cases previously decided by this

Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals are contrary to this holding,

they are overruled.

“ Of course, the ‘Scottsboro rebuttal’ evidence would not be relevant

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in a prosecution in which the defendant claims that the victim

consented to intercourse, because, in such a case, the defendant admits

to being the source of the physical condition. Also, the evidence is

admissible only to rebut physical evidence offered by the prosecution;

it is not freely admissible by the defendant. In addition, the evidence

offered by the defendant to rebut the prosecution's evidence cannot be

‘reputation’ or ‘opinion’ evidence that would be prohibited by Rule

412, Ala.R.Evid., and it must satisfy the other applicable rules of

evidence.”

Id. at 141-42 (emphasis added).

In Ex parte Griffin, 790 So.2d 351 (Ala.2000), the Alabama Supreme Court,

addressing a different issue, stated:

“The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant has a right

to put on a defense and that that right includes the opportunity to

present evidence proving that another person committed the offense for

which he has been charged. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,

93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.

14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). However, this right is not

absolute; instead, the trial court will have to consider the admissibility

of such evidence in conjunction with other legitimate interests involved

in the trial process. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295; see also Guam v.

Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir.1993). As a result, the trial court is

presented with a balancing test in order to determine whether the

evidence of a third party's culpability is properly admissible.”

790 So.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In Griffin, the question was

whether the appellant should have been permitted to introduce hearsay

evidence tending to show that someone else had pleaded guilty to

committing the crime for which the appellant was on trial. The Supreme

Court answered the question in the affirmative, concluding that the

appellant's constitutional right to present a defense superseded the

hearsay rule.

Similarly, in Adams v. State, 821 So.2d 227 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 821

So.2d 227 (Ala.2001), this Court held that the trial court had unconstitutionally

prevented the appellant from presenting a defense. In Adams, the appellant was

pulled over because the light that illuminated her tag was not working. The

arresting officer took the appellant's driver's license information and then

placed the appellant in the back of his patrol car because he believed she was

a “flight risk.” Id. at 228. After determining that the appellant's driver's license

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had been suspended, the arresting officer removed the appellant from his patrol

car and had her stand on the sidewalk while he removed his backseat and

searched his patrol car. He claimed to have discovered a bag of crack cocaine,

and the appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. At

trial, in an attempt to show that she had been set up and targeted by the police,

the appellant sought to introduce evidence indicating, among other things, that

approximately three months before the traffic stop, she had filed a rape

complaint against another police officer who worked in the same precinct with

the arresting officer. The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to

exclude this evidence. This Court reversed, holding that the trial court had

abused its discretion and had deprived the defendant of her right to present a

defense:

“ ‘The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources

in several provisions of the Constitution. It is one of the rights that “are

essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.” Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45

L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth

Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty without

due process of law include a right to be heard and to offer testimony:

“ ‘ “A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and

an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are

basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a

minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer

testimony, and to be represented by counsel.” (Emphasis added [in

Rock].) In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed.

682 (1948).

“ ‘ See also Ferguson v. Georgia, [365 U.S. 570, 602, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5

L.Ed.2d 783 (1961) ] (Clark, J., concurring) (Fourteenth Amendment

secures “right of a criminal defendant to choose between silence and

testifying in his own behalf”).

“ ‘The right to testify is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause

of the Sixth Amendment, which grants a defendant the right to call

“witnesses in his favor,” a right that is guaranteed in the criminal courts

of the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388

U.S. 14, 17-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1922-1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

Logically included in the accused's right to call witnesses whose

testimony is “material and favorable to his defense,” United States v.

Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73

L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is

in his favor to do so. In fact, the most important witness for the defense

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in many criminal cases is the defendant himself. There is no

justification today for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to

offer his own testimony. Like the truthfulness of other witnesses, the

defendant's veracity, which was the concern behind the original

common-law rule, can be tested adequately by cross-examination. See

generally Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L.Rev.

71, 119-120 (1974).

“ ‘Moreover, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S., at 819, 95 S.Ct., at

2533, the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment

“ ‘ “grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is

the accused, not counsel, who must be ‘informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation,’ who must be ‘confronted with the witnesses

against him,’ and who must be accorded ‘compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor.’ ” (Emphasis added [in Rock].)

“ ‘Even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of selfrepresentation, which was found to be “necessarily implied by the

structure of the Amendment,” ibid., is an accused's right to present his

own version of events in his own words. A defendant's opportunity to

conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may

not present himself as a witness.

“ ‘····

“ ‘Just as a State may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to

exclude a material defense witness from taking the stand, it also may

not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand, but

arbitrarily exclude material portions of his testimony····

“ ‘ Of course, the right to present relevant testimony is not without

limitation. The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate

other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” [ Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).]’

”

821 So.2d at 234-235, quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 55, 107

S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (last emphasis added).

The common theme running throughout the Alabama Supreme Court's

opinions in Griffin and Dennis, and this Court's recent opinion in Adams, is the

necessity of applying a balancing test. In determining whether the exclusion

of evidence violates an accused's constitutional right to present a defense, the

trial court and this Court must balance the right of an accused to present a

defense against other interests in the trial process. In this case, we must

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balance the right of the appellant to present his defense that the accusations

against him were false against the policy of this State to protect victims of

sexual crimes from being “ ‘harass[ed] and humiliat[ed]’ ” in attempts to “

‘divert the attention of the jury to issues not relevant to the controversy.’ ”

Moseley v. State, 448 So.2d 450, 456 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), quoting People v.

Cornes, 80 Ill.App.3d 166, 175, 35 Ill.Dec. 818, 825, 399 N.E.2d 1346, 1353

(1980).

We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in preventing the appellant from

questioning the victim about whether she had had extramarital affairs or from

testifying himself that the victim had admitted to him that she had had

extramarital affairs. In this respect, we note that the appellant did not proffer

evidence to “rebut physical evidence offered by the prosecution,” as discussed

in Dennis, and he did not proffer evidence suggesting that a third party had

committed the charged offenses, as was the situation in Griffin. Moreover, the

victim testified that she told the appellant she had had affairs with two men

only because the appellant was beating her at the time and had threatened to

kill her if she did not confirm the names of the people he thought she was

having an affair with. The appellant denied that he was beating the victim

when she made the statement. The victim further testified that the appellant

suggested the names of two men, only one of whom she recognized. The

appellant denied suggesting any names to the victim. However, no evidence

was proffered as to whether one of the men, G.K. (whose name was provided

either by the victim, with no suggestion from the appellant, or by the appellant,

depending on which version of the events is believed) even exists, and no

evidence was proffered as to whether the two men alleged by the appellant to

have engaged in extramarital affairs with the victim actually did so. Likewise,

the appellant offered no explanation as to what efforts, if any, he had made to

identify and locate either man for questioning. Therefore, with the record in

this posture, we conclude that the appellant failed to make the necessary

threshold showing that the evidence he sought to introduce was sufficiently

probative with respect to his claimed defense, so as to tip the balance in favor

of admitting the evidence on the basis of his constitutional right to present a

defense. The Alabama Supreme Court noted in both Dennis and Griffin that

not in every case will the defendant's right to present his defense be

paramount. In Griffin, the Court specifically stated that the constitutional right

to present a defense “will supersede [the hearsay rule] only in those cases that

··· have a probative alternative theory of culpability and not an alternative

theory that is merely speculative and meant only to confuse the jury.” 790

So.2d at 355. The testimony proffered by the appellant with respect to the rape

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and sodomy charges was speculative, at best. In our view, this kind of

inconclusive evidence that, in effect, tends to be confusing and to raise more

questions than it answers, falls squarely within the protective policy

considerations of the rape-shield law-to protect victims of sexual crimes from

being harassed and humiliated in an attempt to divert the attention of the jury

to issues not relevant to the controversy. Furthermore, the victim's testimony

on cross-examination would clearly have been detrimental to the appellant in

that she would have testified that she had stated that she was having

extramarital affairs only because she was being severely beaten at the time she

made the statement.

The appellant relies on Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102

L.Ed.2d 513 (1988), as support for his claim that evidence of the victim's

alleged extramarital affairs should have been admitted to show a motive for

her making allegedly false allegations. In Olden, the United States Supreme

Court held that the appellant should have been permitted to question the victim

of the rape as to whether she was living with a man at the time of the trial in

order to show that she may have had a motive to lie about the rape in order to

protect that relationship. However, the evidence the appellant sought to

introduce in Olden, unlike the evidence proffered in the present case, was

undisputed and clearly probative with respect to the victim's credibility. We

also note the appellant's reliance on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct.

1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In Davis, like Olden, the United States Supreme

Court was required to balance the petitioner's constitutional right to

confrontation (cross-examination) against the State of Alaska's policy of

protecting a juvenile offender. In Davis, the witness's juvenile record was

undisputed and clearly probative with respect to the witness's possible bias

against the petitioner. Based on the particular circumstances presented, the

Court struck the balance in favor of the petitioner's right to cross-examination,

stating:

“Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his

family by disclosure of his juvenile record-if the prosecution insisted

on using him to make its case-is outweighed by petitioner's right to

probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial

identification witness.”

415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105.

Although Olden and Davis are similar to the present case in the sense that they

illustrate the tension between the right of confrontation and a state's policy of

protecting a witness, they are distinguishable, we think, based upon the

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strength of the evidence that was proffered by the accused. We find neither

Olden nor Davis to control the present case.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the victim and in restricting the

appellant's testimony with respect to the victim's statements concerning

extramarital affairs. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in

granting the State's motion in limine.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

O.A.C. v. State, 851 So.2d at 146-153.

Chapman filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on March 3, 2003. In this federal

habeas petition, Chapman again challenges the trial court’s application of Rule 412, Alabama

Rules of Evidence, to exclude evidence indicating that the victim had engaged in “adulterous

affairs [which] was relevant to an evaluation of her motives for making the allegations

against Chapman.” Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief at 3-4. 

II. DISCUSSION

In their answer, the respondents assert that Chapman’s claim challenging the trial

court’s decision to exclude evidence of extramarital affairs by the victim entitles him to no

relief in this court as the state courts properly adjudicated this claim on the merits. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-405, 120 S.Ct. 495, 1518- 1523 (2000). As support

for this assertion, the respondents maintain that the decision of the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals on this issue was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the

state courts. Respondents’ Answer - Court Doc. No. 5 at 7-10. In his response to the answer,

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Chapman argues to the contrary. Petitioner’s Response to Answer - Court Doc. No. 7 at 10-

11.

Upon review of the § 2254 petition, the answer of the respondents and Chapman’s

response to the answer, the court concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required and that

the petition is due to be denied in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(a), Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

The petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as

amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518 (2000); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638, 123 S.Ct.

1848, 1852 (2003) (“A habeas petitioner whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state

court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d).”). Under the requisite provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with respect to a claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal habeas relief from a state court judgment may

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

In Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413 (2000), the Supreme Court held that:

Under the “contrary to” clause a federal court may grant the writ

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if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application”

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.

The Court explained that habeas relief is appropriate when a petitioner demonstrates

“that a decision by a state court is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established [Supreme Court] law

if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s]

cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]

precedent.’ Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed. 2d 389

(2000).” Price, 538 U.S. at 640, 123 S.Ct. at 1853 (2003). Additionally, federal review in

a habeas action “is limited to whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable

in the light of clearly established federal law. Williams, [529 U.S. at 409],120 S.Ct. at 1521.”

Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831,

835 (11th Cir. 2001), citing Williams, supra (“[F]ederal habeas relief [is] available under the

‘unreasonable application’ standard only if the state court’s application of clearly established

federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”). A federal district court is not to decide “the

correctness per se . . . of the state court decision” but only the “objective reasonableness”

of such decision. Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, “an

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal

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law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (emphasis in original). “Under §

2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the

writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. 

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court based

its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s determinations of

fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a question of law, this court is not

authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo rather than through the lens of §

2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852. The Supreme Court admonishes that

such evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) . . .” 538 U.S. at 636, 123 S.Ct. at 1851. The record establishes that the state

courts addressed the merits of Chapman’s challenge to the evidentiary ruling. On direct

appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals adjudicated this claim adversely to the

petitioner on the merits. Specifically, after lengthy analyses of both state and federal law,

including relevant decisions of the United States Supreme, and upon application of the

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“In determining whether the exclusion of evidence violates an accused’s constitutional right to present

a defense, the trial court and this Court must balance . . . the right of the [petitioner] to present his defense

. . . against the policy of this State to protect victims of sexual crimes from being ‘“harassed and humiliated”’

in attempts to ‘“divert the attention of the jury to issues not relevant to the controversy.”’” O.A.C. v. State,

851 So.2d at 151 (citation omitted). 

15

pertinent balancing test,2 the appellate court found “no abuse of the trial court’s discretion

in preventing the [petitioner] from questioning the victim about whether she had had

extramarital affairs or from testifying himself that the victim had admitted to him that she had

had extramarital affairs.” O.A.C. v. State, 851 So.2d at 152. In making this determination,

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned as follows: 

. . . [T]he appellant did not proffer evidence to “rebut physical evidence

offered by the prosecution,” . . . and he did not proffer evidence suggesting

that a third party had committed the charged offenses . . . Moreover, the

victim testified that she told the appellant she had had affairs with two men

only because the appellant was beating her at the time and had threatened to

kill her if she did not confirm the names of the people he thought she was

having an affair with. The appellant denied that he was beating the victim

when she made the statement. The victim further testified that the appellant

suggested the names of two men, only one of whom she recognized. The

appellant denied suggesting any names to the victim. However, no evidence

was proffered as to whether one of the men, G.K. (whose name was provided

either by the victim, with no suggestion from the appellant, or by the appellant,

depending on which version of the events is believed) even exists, and no

evidence was proffered as to whether the two men alleged by the appellant to

have engaged in extramarital affairs with the victim actually did so. Likewise,

the appellant offered no explanation as to what efforts, if any, he had made to

identify and locate either man for questioning. Therefore, with the record in

this posture, we conclude that the appellant failed to make the necessary

threshold showing that the evidence he sought to introduce was sufficiently

probative with respect to his claimed defense, so as to tip the balance in favor

of admitting the evidence on the basis of his constitutional right to present a

defense. The Alabama Supreme Court noted in both Dennis and Griffin that

not in every case will the defendant's right to present his defense be

paramount. In Griffin, the Court specifically stated that the constitutional right

to present a defense “will supersede [the hearsay rule] only in those cases that

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··· have a probative alternative theory of culpability and not an alternative

theory that is merely speculative and meant only to confuse the jury.” 790

So.2d at 355. The testimony proffered by the appellant with respect to the rape

and sodomy charges was speculative, at best. In our view, this kind of

inconclusive evidence that, in effect, tends to be confusing and to raise more

questions than it answers, falls squarely within the protective policy

considerations of the rape-shield law-to protect victims of sexual crimes from

being harassed and humiliated in an attempt to divert the attention of the jury

to issues not relevant to the controversy. Furthermore, the victim's testimony

on cross-examination would clearly have been detrimental to the appellant in

that she would have testified that she had stated that she was having

extramarital affairs only because she was being severely beaten at the time she

made the statement.

The appellant relies on Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102

L.Ed.2d 513 (1988), as support for his claim that evidence of the victim's

alleged extramarital affairs should have been admitted to show a motive for

her making allegedly false allegations. In Olden, the United States Supreme

Court held that the appellant should have been permitted to question the victim

of the rape as to whether she was living with a man at the time of the trial in

order to show that she may have had a motive to lie about the rape in order to

protect that relationship. However, the evidence the appellant sought to

introduce in Olden, unlike the evidence proffered in the present case, was

undisputed and clearly probative with respect to the victim's credibility. We

also note the appellant's reliance on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct.

1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In Davis, like Olden, the United States Supreme

Court was required to balance the petitioner's constitutional right to

confrontation (cross-examination) against the State of Alaska's policy of

protecting a juvenile offender. In Davis, the witness's juvenile record was

undisputed and clearly probative with respect to the witness's possible bias

against the petitioner. Based on the particular circumstances presented, the

Court struck the balance in favor of the petitioner's right to cross-examination,

stating:

“Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his

family by disclosure of his juvenile record-if the prosecution insisted

on using him to make its case-is outweighed by petitioner's right to

probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial

identification witness.”

415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105.

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Although Olden and Davis are similar to the present case in the sense that they

illustrate the tension between the right of confrontation and a state's policy of

protecting a witness, they are distinguishable, we think, based upon the

strength of the evidence that was proffered by the accused. We find neither

Olden nor Davis to control the present case.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the victim and in restricting the

appellant's testimony with respect to the victim's statements concerning

extramarital affairs. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in

granting the State's motion in limine.

O.A.C. v. State, 851 So.2d at 152-153. Chapman filed an application for rehearing which the

appellate court denied on June 21, 2002. On December 13, 2002, the Alabama Supreme

Court likewise denied Chapman’s petition for writ of certiorari. This Court must therefore

review the instant claim for habeas corpus relief in accordance with the directives contained

in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Price, 538 U.S. at 638-639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852 (2003);

Williams, 529 U.S. at 402, 120 S.Ct. at 1518. 

In denying Chapman relief on his evidentiary claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals did not apply “a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]

cases” nor did the state court “confront[] a set of facts . . . materially indistinguishable from

a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrive[] at a result different from

[Supreme Court] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1519-1520. This

court will therefore assess whether the state court’s rejection of Chapman’s claim “resulted

in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals applied decisions of the United States

Supreme Court and determined that Chapman failed to establish that the trial court erred in

not allowing the introduction of evidence with respect to the victim’s alleged extramarital

affairs. This court’s inquiry is limited to “whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law was objectively reasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct.

at 1521. Upon thorough review of the record in this case, it is clear that the state appellate

court’s rejection of Chapman’s claim was objectively reasonable. This decision likewise

constituted a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Chapman is therefore due no relief from this court. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Otis Arlen Chapman be denied and that this case

be dismissed with prejudice. It is further 

ORDERED that on or before June 30, 2005 the parties shall file objections to the said

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

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Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.)

Done this 17th day of June, 2005.

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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