Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01320/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01320-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID GARLAND ATWOOD II,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 17cv1320-LAB (WVG)

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT;

AND 

ORDER REQUIRING U.S. MARSHAL’S

SERVICE TO SERVE DEFENDANTS

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff David Garland Atwood II, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a

pleading (“Complaint”) seeking to compel this District’s U.S. Probation Office to accept

supervision of him so that he can come to San Diego for medical treatment. The Court

ordered Atwood to file supplemental briefing, which he has now done. The Court construes

both the Complaint and the supplemental briefing together as giving his position.

The Court is required to screen the complaint of a plaintiff proceeding in forma

pauperis, and to dismiss it to the extent it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or

seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Because he is proceeding pro se,

the Court construes Atwood’s pleadings liberally. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020

(9th Cir. 2001).

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Atwood’s says his local U.S. Attorney’s office and probation office do not oppose his

coming to San Diego, provided that the probation office here will accept supervision of him. 

His argument, essentially, is that this District’s probation office is arbitrarily refusing to accept

supervision, resulting in a denial of needed medical care. Because he is seeking to enjoin

Defendants in this District, and not asking the Court to modify his terms of release, it appears

this Court would have jurisdiction over any claim he might have.

The relief Atwood seeks is injunctive in nature; he is asking the Court to order the U.S.

Probation Office in this District (or, potentially, one or more officers in the office) to supervise

him. The Office therefore may be a proper Defendant. But because the United States itself

is not a proper Defendant, claims against the United States are therefore DISMISSED.

Whether Atwood’s claim has any merit depends primarily on two factors: whether his

his substantive rights are being infringed, and whether the law provides some mechanism

for enforcement of those rights. As a general matter, the government can limit Atwood’s

rights as part of his supervised release. “[P]robationers, like parolees and prisoners,

properly are subject to limitations from which ordinary persons are free.” United States v.

Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc). That being said, the

government cannot deny access to necessary medical care, even to prisoners, in a manner

that serves no legitimate purpose. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The

treatment Atwood seeks is at least arguably medically necessary to prevent him from losing

the use of his legs. 

It isn’t completely clear which law might provide for the kind of relief Atwood is

seeking. Other courts have construed 28 U.S.C. § 1361 as providing an avenue of relief,

at least where there is a clear right to the relief, where the defendant clearly has a duty to

act, and where no other adequate remedy is available. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Terenzi, 619 F.

Supp. 1186, 1189 (E.D. N.Y. 1985). Assuming there is no other law under which Atwood

might seek relief, the Complaint, construed liberally, could satisfy this standard.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint survives screening as to claims

against this District’s Probation Office. The Clerk is directed to generate a new electronic

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summons. The Court ORDERS the U.S. Marshals Service to serve a copy of the Complaint

(Docket no.1), Summons, Supplemental Briefing (Docket no. 10), and this Order on the U.S.

Probation Office for the Southern District of California, as directed by Plaintiff on U.S.

Marshal Form 285. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States. Atwood is 1

responsible for properly completing the form, so it complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)’s

requirements for service on this Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 28, 2017

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

The U.S. Marshals’ service is not required to do any more than Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) 1

requires. The service may, for example, send copies of these documents by registered or

certified mail to certain officials as permitted under the rule, and need not deliver them

personally.

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