Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00018/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00018-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHANNON RILEY,

Petitioner,

 v.

RANDY GROUNDS, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

No. C 14-00018 TEH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner Shannon Riley, an inmate at Salinas Valley

State Prison, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the

Court for consideration of Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Petitioner has filed an opposition. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 7. 

I

On January 17, 1990, Petitioner pled guilty in Los Angeles

County Superior Court to second degree murder. Docket No. 7-1 at 2;

see Cal. Penal Code § 187. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 15

years to life. Docket No. 7-1 at 2 and Docket No. 1-1 at 3. His

minimum eligible parole date (“MEPD”) was in 2002. See Docket No. 8

at 14. 

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1

Prisoners in Privilege Group “C” have reduced privileges.

They are are not allowed to receive family visits; are allowed

only one-fourth of their maximum canteen draw; are allowed

telephone calls on an emergency basis only; have no access to

dayroom and recreational and entertainment activities; have

limited yard access; and are not allowed quarterly or special

purchase packages. Docket No. 1-1 at 25 and 7-1 at 5. 

2

On July 24, 2012, Petitioner was issued a Rules Violation

Report (“RVR”) for fighting with his cellmate Young. Petitioner was

provided with a copy of the RVR on July 31, 2012, Docket No. 1-1 at

19, and a hearing was held on August 9, 2012, Docket No. 1-1 at 20. 

According to the summary of the hearing issued by the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Petitioner

“read the RVR aloud and was able to demonstrate his understanding of

the charges relative to the RVR and the disciplinary process. Id.

Petitioner “did not request any witnesses, nor did he request any

further evidence or materials at the time of the hearing.” Id.

Petitioner “entered a plea of guilty and made no further statement

after entering his plea.” Id. Petitioner was found guilty of

“fighting,” a Division D Offense, see Cal. Code Regs. § 3323(f)(10),

based on the following preponderance of evidence: the July 24, 2012

RVR; the July 24, 2012 medical report on Young which indicated a

scratch/abrasion on his face and an active nose bleed; the July 24,

2012 medical report on Petitioner which indicated scratches on his

head and hands and a reddened area and scratch on his neck; and

Petitioner’s admission of guilt at the hearing. Docket No. 7-1 at

7. Petitioner was assessed 90 days’ forfeiture of credits and

placed on “C” privilege status1

 for thirty days. Docket No. 7-1 at

5.

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2

Petitioner claims that he and Young had been horseplaying,

not fighting. Docket No. 8 at 11. Petitioner said that he did

not intend for Young to be injured and that he immediately

stopped wrestling when he noticed Young was hurt and Young

yelled, “Stop, stop!” Docket No. 8 at 11 and Docket No. 7-1 at

16. 

3

Petitioner claims that the CDCR hearing summary is false. 

He states that at the hearing he pled not guilty and requested a

witness. Docket No. 1-1 at 5 and Docket No. 8 at 10. Petitioner

also alleges that the hearing officer did not allow him to speak. 

Docket No. 8 at 10. On September 4, 2012, Petitioner filed an

inmate appeal seeking expungement of the guilty finding. He alleged

that he was not fighting2 and that his due process rights were

violated when the hearing officer falsely reported that Petitioner

had pled guilty and had not requested witnesses. Docket No. 7-1 at

14-16. Petitioner’s claims were investigated by prison staff, and

his appeal was denied. Docket No. 7-1 at 20, 22-23. Petitioner

filed the instant habeas petition on January 2, 2014. 

II

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were

violated because the hearing officer did not allow Petitioner to

call a witness, falsely alleged that Petitioner pled guilty, failed

to act as an impartial factfinder, and failed to properly document

Petitioner’s request for a witness. Docket No. 1-1 at 5. 

Petitioner seeks expungement of the RVR from his disciplinary

record, arguing that the expungement would accelerate his

eligibility for parole. Respondent seeks dismissal of this

petition, arguing that Petitioner’s punishment did not implicate the

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Due Process Clause and did not have an inevitable effect on the

duration of his sentence. 

“‘Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on

complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28

U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,

Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the

validity of any of confinement or to particulars affecting its

duration are the province of habeas corpus.’” Hill v. McDonough,

547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749,

750 (2004)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “habeas jurisdiction

is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, where a successful challenge

to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner's

sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003);

Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004) (challenges to

prison conditions cognizable only via § 1983, and challenges

implicating the fact or duration of confinement must be brought

through a habeas petition); accord Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574

(9th Cir. 1991) (civil rights action is proper method of challenging

conditions of confinement). The Supreme Court has consistently held

that any claim by a prisoner attacking the fact or duration of his

confinement must be brought under the habeas sections of Title 28 of

the United States Code. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747

(1998); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

However, even if Petitioner were successful on his claim

of due process violation during his disciplinary proceeding, his

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3

Pursuant to Section 3041.5(b)(4), the BPT may advance the

parole hearing date after considering the views and interests of

the victim, when “a change in circumstances or new information

establishes a reasonable likelihood that consideration of the

public and the victim’s safety” allows for a shorter period of

incarceration. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(4). 

5

sentence would not necessarily be shortened. Petitioner is serving

an indeterminate sentence and his MEPD has passed. The loss of time

credits did not push back his release date or the date of his parole

eligibility. If Petitioner were serving a determinate sentence, his

claims would be cognizable in habeas because the loss of credits

would have pushed back his release date, and success on his claims

would necessarily shorten his time in custody. Or, if Petitioner

had not yet reached his MEPD, such a claim might be cognizable in

habeas because loss of time credits would push back the first date

when he would be eligible for parole and possibly obtain a release

date. However, success on his claim in the instant petition would

not “necessarily shorten” his sentence, see Ramirez, 334 F.3d at

859, and habeas jurisdiction is absent. 

Petitioner counters that an expungement of the

disciplinary finding would affect the fact or length of his

incarceration because it is likely to accelerate his eligibility for

parole. Docket No. 8 at 7, 12. Petitioner was denied parole on May

28, 2014, and his next parole hearing was set for May 28, 2021. 

Docket No. 8 at 14-15. Petitioner argues that since the Board of

Prison Terms (“BPT”) focused on his RVRs in denying parole in May

2014, expungement of the RVR would help him obtain an earlier parole

hearing.3

 Petitioner’s claim is speculative. In choosing whether

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to advance a parole hearing date, the BPT 1) considers the views and

interests of the victim and 2) evaluates whether the new information

(e.g., the expungement of an RVR) establishes a reasonable

likelihood that a shorter period of incarceration is called for. 

Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(4). By Petitioner’s own admission, his

“numerous” RVRs resulted in the May 2014 denial of parole. Docket

No. 8 at 7. In addition, the parole decision fact sheet denying

parole recommends that Petitioner work to reduce custody level, not

incur any more rule violations, stay discipline free, earn positive

chronos, get self-help, and learn a trade. Docket No. 8 at 15. 

Even if this Court were to expunge Petitioner’s July 24, 2012

disciplinary violation, the BPT might still refuse to advance his

parole hearing since he has numerous other RVRs and may have yet to

fulfill the recommendations set forth by the BPT. Success on

Petitioner’s claim would not “necessarily shorten” his sentence and

therefore habeas jurisdiction is absent. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at

859; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (finding

that the possibility of a denial of parole on the basis of

disciplinary findings is too speculative where there are a host of

other factors that inform a parole determination). Since this claim

is not cognizable in habeas, the question of whether the processing

of Petitioner’s July 24, 2012 RVR violated his due process rights

should be brought in a Section 1983 action. Calderon, 523 U.S. at

747.

//

//

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III

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown,

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Docket No. 7. 

Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that a

reasonable jurist would find this Court’s denial of his claims

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Consequently, no certificate of appealability is warranted in this

case. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 02/02/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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