Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04378/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04378-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIMON LEVI

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 07-04378 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss;

Plaintiff’s Administrative Motions;

Plaintiff’s Motion to file a Second

Amended Complaint; Plaintiff’s Notice

of Dismissal

Plaintiff Simon Levi brought suit against the State Bar of California and others on August 24,

2007. Plaintiff seeks an order holding that the State Bar may not consider any future moral

character applications that Mr. Levi may file as well as a reversal of the California Supreme Court’s

order denying his application for admission into the California Bar. Now before the court are:

1) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint; 2) plaintiff’s administrative

motions asking the court to appoint an attorney, seal court records, order defendants to file

documents under seal, rename the case and proceed as John Doe and authorize e-filing; 3) plaintiff’s

motion seeking leave to file a second amended complaint; and 4) plaintiff’s notice of dismissal. The

court has considered the parties’ arguments fully, and for the reasons set forth below, the court rules

as follows.

BACKGROUND

I. Overview

Plaintiff Simon Levi brought this action against the State Bar of California, Judy Johnson,

Debra Lawson, Patrice McElroy, the State Bar Court, the Committee of Bar Examiners (the

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“Committee”) and Allen Malmquist on August 24, 2007. A month later Levi filed his first amended

complaint adding the California Supreme Court and each justice on the California Supreme Court as

defendants. Plaintiff seeks: 1) an order holding that the State Bar may not consider any future moral

character applications that Mr. Levi may file; and 2) a reversal of the California Supreme Court’s

order denying his application for admission into the California Bar. On November 5, 2007 plaintiff

dismissed the State Bar of California, the Committee, the State Bar Court, and the California

Supreme Court from this action. The remaining defendants have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

first amended complaint on the basis of, inter alia, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial

immunity.

The remaining defendants are Johnson, Lawson, Malmquist, Judge McElroy and the

individual justices of the Supreme Court of California. Johnson is the executive director of the State

Bar. She has direct oversight authority over all bar operations. Lawson is employed by the State

Bar as the moral character determination office director. Malmquist is a moral character analyst in

the moral character determinations office of the State Bar. Judge McElroy is a State Bar Court

hearing department judge. She presided over and heard Levi’s request for review of his second

application for moral character determination. She then issued a hearing department decision on

March 18, 2004 recommending that plaintiff not be admitted to the California Bar. The justices on

the Supreme Court of California declined to admit Mr. Levi to the State Bar and subsequently

denied his writ of appeal of Judge McElroy’s decision.

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff Levi graduated from San Francisco Law School, passed the California Bar

examination, and submitted his first moral character application in or about 1997.1

 The Committee

denied his first moral character application in June 1998. Levi requested review of the Committee’s

determination in the hearing department. On December 7, 1999 the hearing department issued its

decision denying Levi’s application for admission due to inadequate moral character. Specifically,

Levi had filed frivolous lawsuits against Safeway, behaved aggressively and threatening towards

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Safeway’s counsel, impersonated a police officer while working as a process server, assaulted—and

was convicted for—physically attacking a woman and pepper-spraying both her and her

five-year-old daughter while serving papers and because Levi lacked candor while presenting his

case. Levi appealed to the review department. On April 12, 2001 the review department affirmed

the hearing department’s conclusion after a de novo review.

In August 1999, Levi enrolled in an L.L.M. program at Golden Gate Law School. On

March 20, 2001 he filed his second moral character application. On June 13, 2002 the

Committee declined to certify him. On June 18, 2002 Levi requested a hearing. Judge Patrice

McElroy held a three-day hearing before filing her decision on March 18, 2004, affirming the

Committee’s conclusion due to, inter alia, Levi’s sexual harassment of fellow law student Sara

Raymond and his failure to report such conduct on his application. Levi appealed this decision.

On November 24, 2004 Levi sued the State Bar, a senior State Bar prosecutor and Abelson in

state superior court alleging various causes of action stemming from Abelson’s purported disclosure

of confidential State Bar information to Raymond. Levi voluntarily dismissed the action while the

parties were engaged in an interim appeal of the court’s decision denying in part and granting in part

defendants’ special motion to strike. The superior court made no factual determinations as to the

merits of Levi’s accusations.

On September 16, 2005, in a de novo review, the review department affirmed the hearing

department’s conclusion regrading Levi’s second application for moral character. On November 15,

2005 Levi sought review by the California Supreme Court. Levi alleged, inter alia, that the hearing

department erred by not reopening discovery regarding his sexual harassment of Raymond. He also

claimed that he had discovered that a fellow Golden Gate Law School student, Abelson, disclosed

confidential information about him to Raymond; information that Abelson purportedly obtained

while working as a law clerk for the State Bar’s disciplinary prosecution division. On January 4,

2006 the California Supreme Court denied Levi’s petition for review.

On August 24, 2007 plaintiff brought the instant suit.

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks review of a determination made by the California Supreme Court since only

the California Supreme Court has authority to grant or deny admission to the California Bar. In re

Rose, 22 Cal. 4th 430, 436 (2000). “As courts of original jurisdiction, [district courts] do not have

jurisdiction over direct challenges to final decisions of state courts, even if those challenges allege

that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” Allah v. Superior Court, 871 F.2d 887, 890–91

(9th Cir. 1989). “This rule applies even though the direct challenge is anchored to alleged

deprivations of federally protected due process and equal protection rights.” Id.; District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484–87 (1983). In Feldman, the District of

California Bar rules denied Marc Feldman permission to sit for the bar examination because he had

not attended law school. The Supreme Court held that only it could hear challenges to allegedly

unlawful judicial state court decisions and that lower district courts could hear general constitutional

challenges to state bar rules. 460 U.S. at 486. Indeed, this is a fundamental tenet of our federalist

system: Federal district courts may only exercise original jurisdiction and the United States

Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257;

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Because the complaint seeks a review of the

merits of a state court action, this district court is powerless. Specifically, in the Ninth Circuit,

“orders of a state court relating to the admission, discipline, and disbarment of members of its bar

may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari to the state court, and

not by means of an original action in a lower federal court.” MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846, 846

(9th Cir. 1969); see also Craig v. State Bar of California, 141 F.3d 1353 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff is complaining about legal wrongs allegedly committed by Dean Keane of Golden

Gate Law School—who appeared as counsel against Mr. Levi—by bribing Judge McElroy and not

disclosing his true relationship with her. Thus, plaintiff claims that Rooker and Feldman do not

apply because “a federal plaintiff [is] assert[ing] as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission

by an adverse party.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff,

however, does not explain how this warrants the relief he seeks nor does he demonstrate how the

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relief sought does not assert review of a state court decision. Mr. Keane, the one alleged to have

committed an extrinsic fraud, is not a party to this action nor was Mr. Keane an adverse party in the

underlying proceedings. Similarly, Judge McElroy was not an adverse party in the underlying

proceedings. Furthermore, no new evidence regarding Judge McElroy’s alleged improprieties was

received after Mr. Levi appealed to the California Supreme Court. Any allegations of fraud with

respect to the state court decision must be brought to the attention of the state courts and eventually

by way of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. This court therefore must defer to the

California Supreme Court’s decision regarding this purely state law matter, and that Court declined

to hear Mr. Levi’s case.

Furthermore, with respect to the individual justices on the California Supreme Court, this

civil case is barred by absolute judicial immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Their

adoption of the moral character recommendation by the State Bar was clearly a judicial function and

therefore, under Pierson, they have absolute judicial immunity with respect to that decision. It must

be noted that “[t]his immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and

corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the

benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their

functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” Id.

In light of the above discussion, it is clear that there is nothing plaintiff can do to cure the

deficiencies in his complaint with respect to the named defendants. Thus, the court dismisses

plaintiff’s first amended complaint with prejudice. For the same reasons, the court also denies

plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint.2

Since the above issues are dispositive, the court does not reach defendants’ arguments that

the court must dismiss because of: 1) the eleventh amendment bar; 2) a lack of a case or controversy;

and 3) a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Though defendants’ arguments

regarding these issues are well briefed, the court does not express an opinion on them since the lack

of jurisdiction is fatal to plaintiff’s case.

In light of the court’s ruling upon defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s administrative

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motions requesting: 1) an attorney; 2) that new evidence be submitted under seal; and 3) that he be

allowed to e-file are all denied as moot. The court now turns to plaintiff’s request that the exhibits

submitted by defendants be filed under seal. It is undisputed that the following documents are

already part of the public record due to state court proceedings: 1) State Bar Court hearing

department decision dated December 7, 1999; 2) State Bar Court review department decision dated

April 21, 2001; 3) State Bar Court hearing department decision dated March 18, 2004; and

4) California Supreme Court order denying Levi’s petition for a writ. Plaintiff, however, should be

afforded the right to maintain his privacy with respect to the State Bar Court review department

decision dated September 16, 2005 and his petition for Supreme Court writ review of that decision. 

This is further buttressed by California Business and Professions code section 6060.2, which

preserves the confidentiality of proceedings conducted by the State Bar concerning the moral

character of an applicant. The court therefore orders that exhibits four and five of defendants’

request for judicial notice be sealed. However, plaintiff’s request that the case be re-styled as “John

Doe v. Johnson” is denied because he has not presented any evidence demonstrating the need for

anonymity. Specifically, plaintiff himself filed the case with his real name and plaintiff has not

shown how section 6060.2, which relates to proceedings in front of the State Bar, is applicable.

Finally, the court declines to adopt plaintiff’s notice of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Defendants’ motion to dismiss had been submitted and

was pending at the time plaintiff filed his notice of dismissal. This fully briefed, submitted and

pending motion must be decided by this court and the plaintiff may not circumvent the court’s order

by dismissing his action. Since the disposition of defendants’ motion to dismiss makes plaintiff’s

notice of dismissal moot, the court rejects plaintiff’s notice of dismissal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint

is GRANTED with prejudice, plaintiff’s administrative motions are DENIED in part and

GRANTED in part, plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint is DENIED and plaintiff’s

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notice of dismissal with prejudice is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 28, 2007 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. See State Bar Court review department decision dated April 21, 2001, Defendants’ Request

for Judicial Notice, Exh. 2, ¶ 3. The court hereby takes judicial notice of the following documents

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201: 1) State Bar Court hearing department decision dated

December 7, 1999; 2) State Bar Court review department decision dated April 21, 2001; 3) State Bar

Court hearing department decision dated March 18, 2004; 4) State Bar Court review department

decision dated September 16, 2005; 5) Levi’s petition for Supreme Court writ review of the State

Bar Court review department decision dated September 16, 2005; and 6) California Supreme Court

order denying Levi’s petition.

2. Furthermore, the proposed second amended complaint suffers from the same jurisdictional

flaws as the first amended complaint. The proposed amendments merely assert more causes of

action and pray for further relief without specifying a legitimate jurisdictional basis for the court’s

review.

ENDNOTES

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