Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02246/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02246-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROMELE I. WALTON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2246 GEB EFB P

vs.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY MAIN

JAIL, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel suing for alleged civil rights violations. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s November 7, 2005, complaint alleging that

defendants violated his constitutional rights following his arrest. In particular, he alleges: (1) in

July of 2004, defendants Mulherin and Husley assaulted plaintiff and broke his wrist; and (2)

defendants Austin and Smith knew about plaintiff’s broken wrist and other conditions but

permitted them to go untreated. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief, and contends that

in addition to the individual defendants, the County of Sacramento is subject to liability. 

Pending before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons

explained below, the court finds that there is no genuine dispute over any material issue of fact

and that the defendants’ motion must be granted.

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 The magistrate judge who reviewed the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

found that plaintiff failed to state a claim against Bunce, Pederson, Hanson and Arragon. See

Order filed July 28, 2006.

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I. Municipal Liability

As a threshold matter, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against the County of

Sacramento. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates a cause of action against

persons who deprive any individual of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States while acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). 

Municipalities and their officials are “persons” for purposes of section 1983. Monell v. New

York city Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A municipality is subject to liability

for the constitutional torts of its officials if those individuals acted pursuant to an official policy

or custom, or failed to act based on a policy of inaction amounting to the knowing disregard of

plaintiff’s rights. Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Oviatt v.

Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992). Similarly, the municipality is subject to liability for

the constitutional torts of its officials if those individuals are themselves officials with final

policy making authority. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Oviatt, 954

F.2d at 1477. To state a claim against the County, plaintiff must at a minimum allege that his

rights were violated pursuant to a county policy or custom. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (1988). It is useful at this point to quote plaintiff’s allegations from the

verified complaint:

Mulherin 7/26/05 #127 Actually broke my wrist. Husley #825 participated in the

assault. Lt. Bunce # 99, Sgt. Pederson And Sgt. Hanson condones maltreatment

by not exhausting complaints on Administrative levels. Deputy Arragon Filed a

Felony Complaint Against this plaintiff that was a False charge which was

dismissed. Nurse Practitioner James Austin, Supervising Nurse T Smith and the

Asian male doctor knows about my brutality and let it as well as other serious

medical conditions go untreated. County Jail Sac. Co. Main Jail For Violation of

Legal Mail and Person Mail Codes.

Compl., at 5, 7.1

 Even construed liberally, the complaint fails to allege acts pursuant to a policy

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or custom. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted.

II. Facts

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Sacramento

County Main Jail. Defendant Mulherin held the position of Deputy Sheriff at the Sacramento

County Mail Jail, and was assigned to the “eighth floor west,” where the events occurred. Defs.’

Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Mulherin in Supp. Thereof (“Mulherin Decl.”), at ¶¶ 1-3. Defendant

Nathan Husley held the position of Deputy Sheriff, and he worked in the Property Division of

the Sacramento County Main Jail. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Husley in Supp. Thereof

(“Husley Decl.”), at ¶¶ 1, 3, 4. Defendant James Austin was a registered nurse whose job

responsibilities involved reviewing inmate medical records, making orders for the care of

patients, meeting with patients and assessing their medical needs. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.,

Decl. of Austin in Supp. Thereof (“Austin Decl.”), at ¶2. Defendant Tricia Smith was a

registered nurse with supervisory responsibilities, primarily as the grievance coordinator at the

Sacramento County Main Jail. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Smith in Supp. Thereof

(“Smith Decl.”), at ¶ 2.

Plaintiff was arrested in July 2004, and was housed at the Sacramento County Main Jail

until May 2005. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 3, Decl. of Holtberg-Riehl, Ex. A Thereto,

Deposition of Plaintiff (“Pl.’s Dep.”), at 10. On July 8, 2004, plaintiff was moved from his

initial housing assignment to a location known as, “eighth floor, west.” Mulherin Decl., ¶ 4. 

This section of the jail is reserved for inmates requiring protective housing, as determined by the

inmate’s history of “incidents in the jail” or aggression towards deputies. Id., at ¶ 5. There is no

evidence of the particular reasons for this placement.

Mulherin has submitted a declaration stating that when plaintiff arrived in the protective

housing unit, plaintiff was agitated, and seemed to be unhappy about the move. Id., at ¶ 6. 

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Mulherin asserts that plaintiff approached the control booth and attempted to get the attention of

defendant Mulherin. Id., at ¶ 7. Mulherin told plaintiff to wait a moment, whereupon plaintiff

became increasingly agitated and threw his property to the floor and laid down on it. Id., at ¶¶ 8-

9. Mulherin called another deputy to the control booth so that he could respond to plaintiff’s

needs. Id., at ¶ 9. Mulherin ordered plaintiff to stand. Id., at ¶ 10. Plaintiff still seemed

agitated, and his hands “were moving around in a quick manner.” Id., at ¶ 11. Mulherin ordered

plaintiff to put his hands down in front of him in accordance with the jail’s policy on inmates

who circulate about the facility. Id., at ¶¶ 11-12. Rather than obey, plaintiff “took an aggressive

stance towards” Mulherin. Id., at ¶ 14. Mulherin responded by placing his hand on plaintiff’s

chest and guiding him two steps backwards towards the wall in order to gain control over the

situation. Id., at ¶ 15.

 Defendant Hulsey was on the eighth floor at this time, and heard the disturbance. 

Hulsey Decl., at ¶¶ 5-6. As he approached, he saw that plaintiff was agitated and was yelling at

Mulherin. Id., at ¶ 6. Hulsey was concerned for Mulherin’s safety, and he and another deputy,

Bartilson (who is not a defendant in this action) went to assist Mulherin. Id., at ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiff

became more agitated and continued to disobey orders. Mulherin Decl., at ¶ 17; Hulsey Decl., at

¶ 10. The officers decided to handcuff plaintiff. Mulherin Decl., at ¶ 17; Hulsey Decl., at ¶ 10.

Hulsey states in his declaration that plaintiff resisted. Hulsey Decl., at ¶ 11. Mulherin states

that plaintiff began jerking his arm back and forth. Mulherin Decl., at ¶ 18. According to

Mulherin, this prompted Mulherin, Hulsey and Bartilson to “push[] Walton toward the ground

until he went to the floor so that we would not lose control of him and risk the safety to ourselves

and others.” Mulherin Decl., at ¶ 19. Defendant Hulsey described this as taking plaintiff “to the

ground in a controlled movement wherein we assisted him to the floor.” Hulsey Decl., at ¶ 12. 

Once plaintiff was down, the officers handcuffed him without incident. Mulherin Decl., at ¶ 20;

Hulsey Decl., at ¶ 13. In their declarations, Mulherin and Hulsey both assert, “[a]t no time did

any officers hit, kick or strike Walton during this incident.” Mulherin Decl., at ¶ 21; Hulsey

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Decl., at ¶ 15.

Plaintiff testified in his deposition that when he arrived at the protective housing unit, he

was told to sit down. Pl.’s Dep., at 14. He claims that he did so, but then was then told to stand

with his property. Id. He said that he was tired, and he sat. Id. Mulherin then came from the

control booth and, as plaintiff puts it, “started talking a bunch of crap basically and ended up

roughing me up and calling some other guys to come, and that’s when it happened pretty much.” 

Id. 

Following this incident, plaintiff complained of wrist pain. Id., at 20. Within about two

weeks of the incident, jail medical staff examined his wrist. Id. The first occasion was on

August 16, 2005, when defendant Austin examined plaintiff. Austin Decl., at ¶ 5. The next day,

plaintiff’s left wrist was x-rayed. Id., at ¶ 17. Medical staff prescribed pain medication and

ordered x-rays of his wrist. Pl.’s Dep., at 31-32. According to the radiological report, the x-ray

revealed no fracture to plaintiff’s left wrist, or to his left hand or forearm. Austin Decl., at ¶ 8,

Ex. A to Austin Decl.

On August 28, 2005, plaintiff returned to the medical clinic, where Austin reviewed the

radiological report and explained the results to plaintiff. Austin Decl., ¶ 14; see Pl.’s Dep., at 21. 

Plaintiff continued to complain of pain in his left wrist. Austin Decl., at ¶ 15; Smith Decl., at 

¶¶ 8, 12. He testified that when defendant Austin examined it, it “was all swollen and it was

pretty jacked up.” Pl.’s Dep., at 22. On September 2, 2005, Austin ordered a wrist brace for

plaintiff. Austin Decl., at ¶ 15. Defendant Smith is a supervisor for the Sacramento County

Main Jail medical clinic, but she does not supervise defendant Austin. Smith Decl., at ¶¶ 2-3. 

Smith herself did not treat plaintiff for his wrist injury. Id. Instead, she came into contact with

plaintiff on the question of the treatment of his wrist because as a supervisor, she acts as the

grievance coordinator. Id., at ¶¶ 2,4. Thus, she responded to plaintiff’s grievances about the

treatment of his wrist. Id., at ¶¶ 6-13. She explained that the x-rays were negative for fractures

and that ordering a wrist brace, as had been done for plaintiff, was a common treatment for the

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kind of complaint plaintiff had about his wrist. Id. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he

still suffered wrist pain and it was difficult for him to perform simple tasks, such as brushing his

hair. Pl.’s Dep., at 24.

III. Standards on Summary Judgment

 Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) avoids unnecessary trials in cases

with no disputed material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986). 

Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine

disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be determined

through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility determinations of

conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

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 On November 16, 2006, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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 The nonmoving party with the burden of proof “must establish each element of his

claim with significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Barnett v. Centoni,

31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). A complete failure of proof on an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial, and entitles

the moving party to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

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denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to overcome summary judgement an opposing party must show a dispute that is

both genuine, and involving a fact that makes a difference in the outcome.2

 Two steps are

necessary. First, according to the substantive law, the court must determine what facts are

material. Second, in light of the appropriate standard of proof, the court must determine whether

material factual disputes require resolution at trial. Id., at 248. 

When the opposing party has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the

moving party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). The moving party need only point to matters

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish

genuine material factual issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.3

 The opposing

party must demonstrate that disputed facts are material, i.e., facts that might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that disputes are genuine, i.e., the

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 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F. 3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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parties’ differing versions of the truth require resolution at trial, see T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 631. 

The opposing party may not rest upon the pleadings’ mere allegations or denials, but must present

evidence of specific disputed facts. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.4

 Conclusory statements

cannot defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d

1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249, 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the proponent must adduce

evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American Int’l Group, Inc. v.

American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322).

If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary judgment is

inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other

hand, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment.

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion, i.e., whether the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. Equally critical is that “deliberate indifference” is an

essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, to withstand defendant’s motion,

plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a

genuine issue for trial, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989), and he 

must do so with evidence upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the

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evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252. 

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. As explained below, plaintiff’s action

arises under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. To prevail at

trial, he must prove that the defendant deprived him of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights while acting under color of state law. To prove a Fourth Amendment violation, plaintiff

must show by a preponderance of competent evidence that the force used was not “objectively

reasonable under the circumstances.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). To prove a

violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must show

defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Gibson v. County of

Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). As discussed below, plaintiff has failed to

establish a genuine dispute for trial over these material issues.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff claims that defendants the Mulherin and Husley violated the Fourth Amendment

by using excessive force against him, resulting in a broken wrist. He also claims that defendants

Austin and Smith knew about plaintiff’s broken wrist and other conditions but permitted them to

go untreated, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

individual defendants contend that there is no genuine issue about whether they violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A. Excessive Force

Defendants Mulherin and Hulsey contend that plaintiff cannot submit evidence showing a

genuine issue about whether the force they used was unreasonable under the circumstances. The

Fourth Amendment governs a claim that defendants used excessive force immediately following

an arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d

804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994). The inquiry focuses on whether the amount of force used was

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“objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Jackson v. City of

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding it reasonable that one officer sprayed

plaintiff’s hair with chemical irritant and that she roughly was handcuffed when plaintiff’s

interference with lawful arrest of her adult son posed immediate threat to officer’s personal safety

and ability to control crowd of 30 to 50 people). In considering “reasonableness,” the court bears

in mind “the fact that [law enforcement] officers are often forced to make split-second judgmentsin circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. This “requires careful balancing

of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against

the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” See Id., at 396. Th court must pay "careful

attention to the facts and circumstances in each particular case, including the severity of the crime

at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. In assessing the

nature and quality of the intrusion, the court must consider “the type and amount of force

inflicted.” Jackson, 268 F.3d at 651; Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994). While

the necessity of using force is the crux of the Graham inquiry, Alexander v. City & County of San

Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994), even where some force is justified, the amount

actually used may be excessive. P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303-04 (9th Cir.1996). 

Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the events giving rise to this action, plaintiff was

an inmate in the Sacramento County Jail. Thus, his interest in being free from the use of force is

not as great as if he were wholly at liberty. The jail clearly has an interest in maintaining order

and security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-48 (1979). It is also undisputed that there was

some form of order given to plaintiff and that he did not comply. Moreover, defendant Mulherin

has submitted evidence that plaintiff was “agitated,” although there is no evidence of plaintiff’s

particular conduct in this regard. Plaintiff obeyed Mulherin’s command to stand, but remained

“agitated,” refused to “bury” his hands, and took an “aggressive” stance. Husley has submitted

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evidence that while he was also on the eighth floor, he heard a disturbance and decided to assist

Mulherin. He also describes plaintiff as having been “agitated,” and states that plaintiff was

yelling at Mulherin. Thus, Hulsey became concerned that plaintiff could become violent. 

Mulherin and Hulsey decided to handcuff plaintiff, but plaintiff resisted by jerking his arms back

and forth. In his declaration, Mulherin states that he placed his hand on plaintiff’s chest and

pushed him two steps back toward the wall, whereupon plaintiff jerked one arm around and tried

to pull it away to avoid being restrained. Thus, they maneuvered plaintiff to the ground and

handcuffed him. Both defendants deny kicking, hitting or striking plaintiff. They have submitted

a radiological report showing that his wrist was not broken.

This is the point at which plaintiff’s burden becomes crucial. Plaintiff has not submitted

any evidence that he was taken down with such force as to cause injury. He submits no evidence

that defendants kicked or hit him. Plaintiff denies that he was agitated and denies that he resisted

defendants, but does not provide any evidence about his demeanor or behavior. He merely asserts

that he was tired and so he laid down on his belongings. He does not deny yelling at Mulherin. 

He also alleges that Mulherin called others to assist him, which Mulherin does not dispute. 

However, calling for assistance, alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate he was calling for the

purpose of brutalizing plaintiff. To the contrary, is tends to support the assertion that plaintiff

was resistant and uncooperative.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that regardless

of whether plaintiff was “agitated,” he yelled at Mulherin and resisted efforts to handcuff him. 

Thus, Mulherin and Hulsey forced him to the ground and handcuffed him. No doubt this was not

a comfortable process and involved some use of force. However, even for pretrial detainees, jail

is not necessarily comfortable and circumstances often warrant the use of some force. The court

notes that whether the use of force is reasonable frequently is a jury question. But summary

judgment must be entered if, having resolved all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, the court

determines that the officer’s force was “objectively reasonable” under the circumstances. See

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 Before a person is convicted of a crime, he cannot be subjected to punishment. See

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 1173-74 (1979). Thus, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of

“cruel and unusual punishments” applies after judgment of conviction is entered. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 & n.6 (1989).

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Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Liston v. County of Riverside, 120

F.3d 965, 976 & n. 10 (9th cir. 1997). The evidence currently in the record, even in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, shows that the force used here was reasonable. Plaintiff has the burden of

demonstrating a genuine issue about reasonableness. He has not produced evidence upon which

it can be determined the force applied here was unreasonable. Accordingly, he has not satisfied

his burden and defendants Mulherin and Hulsey are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Medical Treatment

Plaintiff claims that Austin and Smith knew his wrist was broken, but failed to provide

adequate treatment. Defendants Smith and Austin contend that plaintiff cannot submit evidence

to establish a genuine issue about whether they provided adequate medical care.

A pretrial detainee claiming inadequate medical treatment must proceed under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5

 Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101,

1120 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has held that “the due process clause imposes, at a

minimum, the same duty the Eighth Amendment imposes: persons in custody ha[ve] the

established right not to have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical

needs.” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Frost v.

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) . Thus, the question is whether there is a

genuine dispute about whether defendants engaged in “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows of and disregards a risk of

injury or harm that “is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate.” See Helling v. McKinney,

509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The official must “be

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

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 The court notes that plaintiff has not filed a motion to compel production of the x-rays. 

Accordingly, there is no basis for construing this assertion as a request pursuant to Rule 56(f).

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 The court notes that plaintiff also complains that he was given a brace for his wrist in

September 2005, and that this is insufficient for a broken wrist. In September of 2005, Austin

ordered a brace for plaintiff’s wrist in response to continued complaints of pain. Whether this

treatment was appropriate for an allegedly broken wrist is immaterial because the evidence

shows that plaintiff’s wrist was not broken.

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exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference

“may be manifested in two ways. It may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally

interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians

provide medical care." Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, it is

undisputed that plaintiff complained of wrist pain after the incident with Mulherin and Hulsey. 

However, medical staff examined plaintiff’s wrist on August 16, 2005, the day after the incident. 

Plaintiff received pain medications and x-rays of his wrist were ordered. The x-rays were taken

the day after this examination. Defendants Smith and Austin have submitted a radiological report

stating that the resulting images showed no fractures or breaks. In fact, insofar as it could be

discerned, plaintiff’s soft tissues in his wrist appeared to be normal. On August 28, 2005, Austin

met with plaintiff and explained this to him.

Plaintiff disputes this report, asserting that defendants falsified the report and he was not

allowed to see the x-rays.6

 If plaintiff could support this allegation, he certainly could defeat

defendants’ motion. But he does not submit any evidence whatsoever in support of this

allegation. The court must reject conclusory assertions and “satisfy itself that there is sufficient

‘direct or circumstantial evidence’ [to establish the material fact in question] to create a genuine

issue of fact for the jury, before it can deny summary judgment . . . .” Lindsey v. Shalmy, 29 F.3d

1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994). On the evidence before the court, it cannot be said that a reasonable

jury could find in plaintiff’s favor.7

 Therefore, defendants Smith and Austin are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

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Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ April 13, 2007, motion for summary judgment be granted;

2. Plaintiff’s June 18, 2007, cross-motion for summary judgment be denied;

3. Judgment be entered in favor of defendants Mulherin, Hulsey, Austin and Smith; and

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 13, 2008.

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