Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01763/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01763-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Petitioner filed a prior petition in this court in 2005 which was dismissed, without 1

prejudice, for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

Petitioner filed an “addendum” to his traverse (Doc. 17) and applications to 2

amend his traverse (Docs. 19, 20, and 21), with additional arguments attached. The requests to

amend the traverse are granted. All arguments made by petitioner have been considered. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY TERRELL McNEAL, No. CIV S-06-1763-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DERREL G. ADAMS, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), respondents’ answer (Doc. 12), and petitioner’s traverse (Doc. 1

15).2

/ / /

/ / /

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 3

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

Petitioner has filed a letter inquiring as to the effect of Cunningham v. California, 4

127 S.Ct. 856 (Jan. 22, 2007), on this case. He also argues in documents amending his traverse

that Cunningham affects this case. In Cunningham, the Supreme Court held that, as applied to

upper-term sentences, California’s determinate sentencing law is unconstitutional. Cunningham

is based on the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). See Fennen v.

Nakayema, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155-56 (E.D. Cal., June 14, 2007). The Ninth Circuit has

held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively on collateral review. See United States v

Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held

that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which is also based on Apprendi, does not

apply retroactively. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore,

Cunningham, which is even farther removed from Apprendi than Blakeley, cannot apply

retroactively. See Fennen, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56; see also Rosales v. Horel, 2007 WL

1852186 (S.D. Cal., June 26, 2007), Salerno v. Schriro, 2007 WL 2153584 (D. Ariz., July 24,

2007). Petitioner’s sentence became final before Cunningham was decided. 

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts3

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

On May 29, 2000, defendant molested his girlfriend’s 14-year-old

daughter. In the back seat of a car, defendant removed the victim's

clothing, touched her breasts with his hand and mouth, and (despite the

victim's resistance) moved her underwear to the side and pushed his penis

between her vagina and anus. He did not penetrate her. A sexual assault

exam revealed abrasions consistent with the victim’s story. DNA

evidence on the victim’s sanitary pad matched the DNA of defendant.

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of four counts of child molestation

and one count of sexual battery. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 18 years in state

prison. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the California 4

Court of Appeal in a reasoned opinion issued on April 20, 2004. The California Supreme Court

denied direct review without comment or citation on July 14, 2004.

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Petitioner then filed a series of post-conviction actions in state court. Petitioner

first filed a habeas corpus petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court, raising the

following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to appear at a hearing on

the prosecution’s motion to compel DNA evidence or failing to challenge the court’s ruling on

that motion; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call and/or fully examine two

witnesses – Sharita Wright and Vita Hoggard; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for

failing to refresh the recollection of witness Debbie Payne; (4) trial court error related to the

order granting the prosecution’s motion to compel DNA evidence; and (5) ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel for failing to establish that the hearing on the DNA motion was a “critical

stage” in the proceedings. On July 20, 2005, the Superior Court denied post-conviction relief. 

Petitioner’s next state court post-conviction action was filed in California Court of

Appeal, which denied relief without comment or citation on September 15, 2005. Finally,

petitioner sought further review by the California Supreme Court, which also denied relief

without comment or citation on August 2, 2006. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “re-litigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

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(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus,

under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision is “contrary to”

or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Under both standards,

“clearly established law” means only those holdings of the United States Supreme Court as of the

time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653-54 (2006). 

“What matters are the holdings of the Supreme Court, not the holdings of lower federal courts.” 

Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) (en banc). 

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a

majority of the Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A

state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by

the Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently

than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

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court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct.

1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be

found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly

erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to

give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

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habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises the following claims: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the

prosecution to amend the charging document after his initial arraignment, but not arraigning him

on the amended charging document; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appear at the

prosecution’s motion to compel DNA evidence; (3) the trial court erred by granting the motion to

compel DNA evidence; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to refresh the recollection of

witness Debbie Payne; (5) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to establish that the

motion to compel DNA evidence was a “critical stage” in the proceedings; and (6) trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to call and/or fully examine two witnesses – Sharita Wright and Vita

Hoggard.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that, considering

all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

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See id. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to

have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. See id. at 690. The federal court must

then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. See id. In making this

determination, however, there is a strong presumption “that counsel’s conduct was within the

wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in four ways: (1) by failing

to appear at the prosecution’s motion to compel DNA evidence; (2) by failing to refresh the

recollection of witness Debbie Payne; (3) by failing to call witness Sharita Wright; and (4) by

failing to fully examine witness Vita Hoggard.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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1. Motion to Compel DNA Evidence

In the instant petition, petitioner argues:

Petitioner received Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel when

Petitioner’s Counsel failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to compel

DNA Evidence thus failing to subject the Prosecution’s case to meaning

adversarial testing. 

This claim was raised on direct appeal and again in petitioner’s habeas petition to the Superior

Court. The Court of Appeal stated:

Defendant argues that after the trial court denied his Marsden

motion, his counsel was ineffective for failing to appear at two hearings. 

On August 1, 2000, the prosecutor moved to compel defendant to provide

DNA samples. The hearing on the motion was scheduled for August 10,

2000. Defense counsel did not file written opposition to the motion. [¶] . . . 

On August 10, 2000, defense counsel did not appear at the hearing . . . and

the matter was continued to August 11, 2000. [¶] On August 11, 2000,

defense counsel again did not appear. The trial court granted the

prosecutor’s motion, compelling defendant to provide DNA samples, and

directed that a message be left on defense counsel’s phone machine that the

court granted the motion. [¶] On August 14, 2000 defendant and defense

counsel appeared to set an additional appearance. There was no claim of

lack of notice of the prosecutor’s motion to compel DNA samples. 

On August 16, 2000, a technician at the jail collected a cheek

swab/sample from defendant.

Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a

result of the lack of opposition and failure of counsel to appear on the

motion to compel DNA samples. He has not shown that the result of the

prosecutor’s motion would have been different or that the result of the trial

would have been different. [¶] Defendant argues that it is “irrelevant that

the Motion to Compel likely would have been granted anyway.” He claims

that counsel abandoned him at the hearing on the motion which constituted

an “actual denial” of his right to counsel which is reversible per se.

The court then cited Gideon v. Wainwright for the rule that a criminal defendant has a Sixth

Amendment right to counsel at every critical stage in the proceedings (i.e., a stage where

substantial rights may be affected). See 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). The state court continued

its analysis as follows:

Defendant cites King v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th

929, 950 in support of his claim that a critical stage includes a pretrial

hearing on a motion. King is distinguishable. There, the trial court

determined that the defendant had forfeited his right to counsel after four

appointed counsel had withdrawn based on the defendant’s assaults and

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threats towards them. This court reversed, finding that the defendant’s due

process rights and right to counsel were violated in that appointed counsel,

instead of arguing in favor of the defendant at the forfeiture hearing,

presented evidence against the defendant and argued in favor of forfeiture. 

Here, defendant was represented by counsel except for the failure of

counsel to appear at the hearing on the prosecution’s motion to compel

samples for DNA analysis. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that

counsel’s nonappearance occurred at a critical stage in that defendant’s

counsel appeared subsequently and did not challenge the order which had

not yet been acted upon. 

In its order denying habeas relief on this claim, the Superior Court first concluded that the claim

was barred because it had been raised on direct appeal. The court added: “Regardless, petitioner

presents no reason for this court not to reach any conclusion that differs from that reached by the

Third District Court of Appeal on the appeal in the matter.” 

This court finds that the state court’s logic regarding lack of prejudice is sound. 

Specifically, petitioner was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to appear at the hearings

given that counsel was notified of the ruling and subsequently appeared in court before the DNA

evidence was collected and did not object in any way. Had counsel raised some objection or

opposition, the trial court could have considered it. As it was, counsel did not object to the

prosecution’s motion for DNA evidence. It appears that trial counsel did not argue against the

trial court’s order granting the motion because there would have been no basis upon which to do

so. Further, based on the weight of the other physical evidence, the court finds that the result of

the trial would have been the same even had counsel defeated the DNA motion. In particular,

while the DNA evidence linking petitioner to the crime was strong evidence, the prosecution’s

case was strong without it given the evidence of abrasions found on the victim which were

consistent with her story and the lack of any evidence suggesting that petitioner was not the

perpetrator of the crime. On this record, the court cannot say that the state court’s decision was

either contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Witness Debbie Payne

Petitioner claims:

. . . Petitioner was deprive of his 14th Amend right when Trial

Counsel Failed to refresh the recollection of Debbie Payne, thus rendering

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

This claim was raised in petitioner’s state habeas petition. The Superior Court stated:

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to refresh the recollection of Debbie Payne regarding her statement made to

petitioner’s investigator that she had had a conversation with the victim

after the incident, in which the victim stated that the victim was wearing

boxers at the time of the incident and always wore boxers, which would

have discredited the evidence that the victim was wearing a sanitary napkin

and panties at the time of the incident. Petitioner claims that Payne was

asked at trial whether she recalled making a statement to the investigator,

and Payne testified that she did not recall, but that trial counsel did not

follow up by attempting to refresh Payne’s recollection of the matter. 

In support, petitioner attaches Exhibit D, which is an unsworn

report by investigator Johnson, summarizing Johnson’s interview of Payne

on August 28, 2001. This is insufficient to support the allegation, not being

verified under oath by Johnson as being a true summary of the interview

(citation omitted). 

Petitioner also attached a copy of pages 549-550 of reporter’s

transcript, of a small portion of Payne’s testimony. It shows that she

testified that she did not remember what she said to an investigator in

August 2001. It also shows that the deputy district attorney began to

question Payne about whether she had ever observed the victim wearing

any form of boxers or panties. However, petitioner fails to attach the next

few pages of reporter’s transcript, that would have shown Payne’s reply to

the question. Only if Payne had answered that she personally had observed

the victim wearing boxers or panties would she have been in a position to

testify whether the victim had refused to wear underpants but instead wore

boxer shorts. Not having shown this critical portion of Payne’s testimony,

petitioner fails to meet his burden of showing ineffective assistance of

counsel. 

It is worth noting at this point that Payne testified in response to the prosecutor’s crossexamination question that she, in fact, saw the victim wearing boxers, but that she was unaware of

what, if anything, the victim wore under the boxers. The following exchange took place:

Q: Is it fair to say you never observed Alyce wearing boxers or

panties? [¶] Is that correct?

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A: No. [¶] I seen her with boxers on.

Q: Okay. Have you ever seen her wear panties before?

A: No.

Q: Now, obviously she’s always – when she is wearing boxers I

mean she’s not wearing anything over the boxers; correct?

A: She’s wearing her clothes like saggy.

Q: I see. [¶] You don’t know what she wears underneath the

boxers, is that correct?

A: Yeah. [¶] That’s correct. 

It is unclear why the Superior Court did not review the transcript itself to clarify the uncertainty it

apparently had on this issue. In any event, the Superior Court continued its analysis as follows:

Even if Payne had had her memory refreshed with the statement she

purportedly made to the investigator, petitioner still has failed to show

prejudice. Petitioner does not demonstrate that the pair of underpants that

was subjected to DNA testing and admitted at trial was not similar to others

kept by the victim in the victim’s belongings, or that was of a size that

someone else in the victim’s household had in that other person’s

belongings, so as to support a claim that the underpants belonged to

someone else in the household instead of the victim. Nor does petitioner

demonstrate that the sanitary napkin introduced at trial, that was subjected

to DNA testing, would not have been worn by the victim. And, the sanitary

napkin was the most incriminating piece of evidence against petitioner,

having found to have contained a match to his DNA sample; regardless of

whether the victim wore underpants or boxer shorts, that napkin could have

been worn in either [case], and petitioner fails to show that the napkin was

not the victim’s. And, there was physical evidence of assault on the victim,

from the tears and abrasions seen on pertinent parts of her body, that were

consistent with her version of the events. Thus, it is not reasonably

probable that a refreshing of Payne’s memory on the point now raised

would have made any difference in the outcome of the trial. 

For these reasons, this claim is denied (citation to Strickland). 

Again, the state court’s logic is unassailable. Even if the victim always wore boxer

shorts, as petitioner contends, this does not undercut the victim’s testimony that she was wearing

panties. It is entirely possible she was wearing both. In addition, any discrepancy as to whether

the victim was wearing boxers or panties or both does not indicate that she was not also wearing

the sanitary napkin. On the strength of the DNA evidence linking the sanitary napkin to

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petitioner, and the other physical evidence, all of which is consistent with the victim’s version of

events and petitioner’s guilt, any failure to refresh witness Payne’s recollection could not have

resulted in prejudice under Strickland. While the victim’s testimony may have been somewhat

impeached if she was wearing boxers and not panties as she stated, this would have been a

credibility question for the jury, and does not necessarily suggest that the result of the trial would

have been different. Therefore, the court concludes that the state court’s decision was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the law. 

3. Witnesses Sharita Wright and Vita Hoggard

Petitioner argues:

. . . Trial Counsel failed to call Sharita Wright and Vita Hoggard

Who Counsel knew or should have known would provide exculpatory

testimony. 

This claim was raised in petitioner’s state court habeas case. The Superior Court stated:

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to present testimony from Sharita Wright and Vita Hoggard, whom he

claims had knowledge of exculpatory evidence and would have testified

that during a phone conversation between Wright and the victim’s mother,

when the victim’s mother was confronted that she was trying to get

petitioner in trouble because petitioner had left her for Hoggard, the

victim’s mother stated that “I did this because he’s having an affair behind

my back. He deserves it. He’s a dog.” Petitioner claims that this was an

admission of having filed a false report of abuse and fabrication of the

charges. 

In support, petitioner presents a sworn affidavit from Vita Hoggard,

who now claims that she had heard the phone conversation between Wright

and the victim’s mother, in which the victim’s mother made the alleged

statement. Petitioner claims that he had advised trial counsel of this

conversation, but that trial counsel failed to examine either Wright or

Hoggard on the matter, even though at least Hoggard testified at trial. 

Petitioner claims that Wright also would have testified about the

conversation, but does not present any affidavit from Wright in support;

petitioner claims that he has contacted Wright on the matter, but admits that

Wright refuses to sign a declaration under penalty of perjury. Nevertheless,

petitioner claims that investigator Johnson spoke with Wright on the

telephone, and that Wright stated then that the victim’s mother had made

the alleged statement; petitioner claims that Exhibit D is a document in

support of this allegation, but the document, which consists of a report by

investigator Johnson, does not mention the matter. 

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As to Wright, the state court concluded:

Because Sharita Wright has not signed any sworn declaration or

affidavit stating that she heard the victim’s mother make any such

statement, nor has investigator Johnson signed any sworn declaration or

affidavit that Wright made any such statement, petitioner’s claim that

Wright would have testified in this manner is unsupported. (citations

omitted). 

The state court then noted that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claim

as to Hoggard and continued as follows:

Even if Hoggard was questioned on the matter at trial, the claim still

fails because petitioner fails to show prejudice.

First, the statement does not necessarily imply fabrication. It could

also be interpreted as an admission that the victim’s mother decided to go

to police over something that had actually happened, rather than to quietly

end a relationship with the petitioner and resolve the matter informally

without police intervention. It does not necessarily mean that the victim’s

mother made up the molestation. Nor does it disprove the victim’s

testimony or the physical evidence of molestation of the victim. 

Further, in her sworn declaration attached as Exhibit C, Hoggard

admits that she was having an affair with petitioner at the time. She claims

in her declaration that the victim’s mother was motivated to seek revenge

against petitioner because of Hoggard’s affair with petitioner, yet it is

Hoggard who may have had her own motivation in making her claim that

the victim’s mother made the statement. This motivation would have cut

into the credibility of Hoggard’s claim. 

Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that had

Hoggard testified at trial, it would have made any difference in the outcome

of the trial, particularly in light of the remaining evidence against petitioner,

which included the DNA evidence and physical evidence of assault on the

victim. 

For these reasons, this claim is denied. (citation to Strickland). 

As with petitioner’s other ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court finds

that the state court reached the correct result under Strickland. Specifically, as to Wright, there is

no evidence whatsoever that she would have testified to the alleged conversation with the victim’s

mother. Thus, counsel’s performance could not have been deficient in failing to call Wright as a

witness. As to both Hoggard and Wright, petitioner cannot show prejudice because the alleged

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statement made by the victim’s mother is not exculpatory. In light of all the physical evidence,

including the DNA match and abrasions found on the victim, the alleged statement would have, as

the state court observed, established only that the victim’s mother chose to take the matter to the

police – for whatever reason – rather than let it go unreported. In other words, the alleged

statement in no way establishes that the crimes never occurred. The physical evidence simply

forecloses that interpretation of the alleged statement. Additionally, given Hoggard’s motivation

to lie, this court cannot say that counsel’s performance was deficient for not exploring the issue

with her at trial. In all probability, the jury would not have believed Hoggard even had counsel

questioned her on the statement allegedly made by the victim’s mother. Therefore, the court finds

that the state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

The Strickland standards also apply to appellate counsel. See Smith v. Robbins,

528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882

F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional

right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel,

as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463

U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. 

Otherwise, the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional

evaluation would be “seriously undermined.” Id.; see also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274

n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (counsel not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary,

and is not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) Further, there is, of course, no obligation

to raise meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Thus,

counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to

demonstrate prejudice in this context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors,

he probably would have prevailed on appeal. See id. at n.9. 

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Petitioner asserts appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to establish that the

motion to compel DNA evidence was a “critical stage” in the proceedings. The Superior Court

addressed this claim in petitioner’s state habeas petition as follows:

Petitioner next claims that . . . appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to establish that the hearing on the motion to compel the DNA

sample was a critical stage of the criminal proceeding. 

Again, this was of no moment, because even if it were a critical

stage, the Third District still undertook harmless review analysis of the

matter in the appeal. Thus, this claim also is barred . . . . And, again, this

court is not presented with any reason why it should reach any conclusion

other than that reached by the Third District on the appeal. As such, this

claim is denied, as well. 

This claim is derivative of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim

related to the DNA motion. In particular, petitioner asserts that he had a right to assistance of

counsel at the hearing because it was a critical stage in the proceedings. As to appellate counsel,

he claims ineffective assistance on the theory that appellate counsel should have established that

the DNA motion hearing was a critical stage. According to petitioner’s theory of this claim, had

appellate counsel been able to establish that the DNA hearing was a critical stage, then he would

have prevailed on appeal with respect to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims (and

presumably his related trial court error claim, discussed below). Petitioner’s theory, however, is

flawed in that, even if appellate counsel had convinced the Court of Appeal that the DNA hearing

was a critical stage, the conviction would still have been affirmed because the Court of Appeal’s

decision was based on its conclusion that any error was harmless. Therefore, petitioner cannot

establish prejudice because the result of the appeal would have been the same. For this reason, the

state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the law.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / / 

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C. Trial Court Errors

Petitioner claims two instances of trial court error. Specifically, he asserts that the

trial court erred by failing to arraign him on the amended charging document. He also claims that

the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion to compel DNA evidence despite his

counsel’s absence at the hearing. 

1. Arraignment on Amended Charging Document

This claim was raised on direct appeal. As to this claim, the California Court of

Appeal stated:

Defendant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter

judgment because he did not enter a plea at his arraignment on the amended

information. We conclude that the error was harmless. 

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to four counts of lewd

conduct and denied a prior serious felony allegation in the information. 

Thereafter, the court granted the People’s motion to amend the information

– adding two counts – assault with intent to commit rape and sexual

battery. Defendant, in propria persona, confirmed that he had received a

copy of the amended information and had no objections to its filing. The

trial court did not obtain defendant’s plea to the amended information. 

Although he filed numerous motions, defendant does not claim he

demurred to the amended information or asserted lack of notice. 

Represented by counsel, he proceeded to trial on the amended information. 

On appeal, defendant does not claim lack of notice or denial of any

substantive right. He simply argues that the trial court’s failure to obtain

his plea to the amended information requires reversal of all of his

convictions, or at a minimum, the two additional counts. He primarily

relies upon People v. Monaghan (1894) 102 Cal. 229. His claim is

frivolous.

Penal Code section 1009 provides, in relevant part: “The court in

which an action is pending may . . . permit an amendment of an . . .

information, . . . for any defect or insufficiency, at any stage of the

proceedings, . . . The defendant shall be required to plead to such

amendment or amended pleading forthwith, . . . .”

“The purpose of an arraignment or a rearraignment is to inform the

accused of the charge against him and to give him fairly the opportunity to

plead to it.” (In re Mitchell (1961) 56 Cal.2d 667, 670). 

Defendant’s reliance upon People v. Monaghan is misplaced. First,

Monaghan is distinguishable on the facts. There, the defendant withdrew

his not guilty plea and demurred to the indictment. The demurrer was

overruled. The defendant did not thereafter enter a new plea immediately

but was granted time to plead later. He never entered a plea and was

convicted after a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed concluding there

was no understanding that upon the court’s overruling of the demurrer the

not guilty plea would be restored. Defendant never declined to plead and

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cannot waive the plea requirement by going to trial without objection. (012

Cal. at pp. 230-234). 

Second, Monaghan was decided prior to the adoption of the

California Constitutional provision which provides that a judgment shall

not be reversed for procedural error unless there has been a miscarriage of

justice. (People v. Sturdy (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 306, 312-313). 

Here, defendant entered a not guilty plea to four counts of lewd

conduct. The added counts, sexual battery and assault with intent to

commit rape, involved the same set of facts. The trial court’s failure to

arraign defendant on the amended information was error but resulted in no

miscarriage of justice; defendant was tried as if a “not guilty” plea was

entered and defense counsel posed no objection at the trial level. (citations

omitted). 

The error was not prejudicial and did not affect the court’s

jurisdiction. 

The court finds that the United States Supreme Court case cited by respondents in

their answer is dispositive. In Garland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that due process

does not require any particular arraignment procedure but only requires that the accused be

provided notice of the charges and an opportunity to defend himself. See 232 U.S. 642, 644-45

(1914). There can be no due process violation if the defendant had notice and was tried by a jury

as though he had entered a not guilty plea on all counts. See id. at 644. The Supreme Court

stated:

. . . A waiver ought to be conclusively implied where the parties had

proceeded as if defendant had been duly arraigned, and a formal plea of not

guilty had been interposed, and where there was no objection made on

account of its absence until, as in this case, the record was brought to this

court for review. It would be inconsistent with the due administration of

justice to permit a defendant under such circumstances to lie by, say

nothing as to such an objection, and then for the first time urge it in this

court.

Id. at 646.

As the state court noted, this case presents the same situation in that petitioner was provided

notice of the additional counts outlined in the amended charging document, had an opportunity to

object in the trial court and didn’t, and was tried on all counts as if he had entered a formal plea of

not guilty. Therefore, the state court’s decision was neither contrary to not an unreasonable

application of the law. 

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2. Motion to Compel DNA Evidence

Petitioner raised this claim in his habeas petition to the Superior Court, which

stated:

Petitioner next claims that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment and Cal. Const., art. I, § 7 rights to due process and to counsel

were violated when the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to

compel the DNA sample outside of the presence of petitioner and his

counsel. Petitioner claims that this was a critical stage of the prosecution,

and that a violation of it was prejudicial per se. 

The claim is a restatement of petitioner’s first claim, which is barred

under Waltreas. It is denied for the same reasons that his first claim is

denied. 

Further, petitioner is incorrect that denial of the right to be present

and to have counsel present is prejudicial per se. Rather, denial of the right

to be present and have counsel present has long been held to be subject to

harmless error review analysis (citations omitted), which the Third District

Court of Appeal undertook in the appeal on this case. 

For the reasons discussed above, this court finds that there was no error in counsel’s failure to

appear at the DNA motion hearing because: (1) counsel was notified of the ruling; and (2) before

the DNA evidence was colleted counsel had an opportunity to object and did not do so. 

Therefore, as with all of petitioner’s other claims, the state court’s decision was neither contrary to

nor an unreasonable application of the law. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be denied; and

2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 21, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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