Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01853/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01853-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNY CHASE, 

 Plaintiff,

 v.

J. LOPEZ,

 Defendant.

1:14-cv-01853-EPG-PC

 

SCREENING ORDER

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE 

TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

(EFC No. 11.) 

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. BACKGROUND

Kenny Chase (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge in 

this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and no other parties have made an appearance. 

(EFC No. 5). Therefore, pursuant to Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern 

District of California, the undersigned shall conduct any and all proceedings in the case until 

such time as reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix A(k)(3).

Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on November 3, 2014 as part of a 

purported class action brought by a fellow inmate and multiple co-plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1). The 

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Court1severed the co-plaintiffs’ claims, opened new cases for each of the co-plaintiffs, and 

ordered each plaintiff to file an amended complaint in his own case. (EFC No. 2). Therefore, 

Kenny Chase is now the only plaintiff in this action. On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed his 

own First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4).

The Court screened Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and entered an order on 

January 21, 2016, dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. 

(EFC No. 10). On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, which is 

now before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 11).

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names only one defendant, Officer J. 

Lopez (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intentionally left his flashlight where a 

riot was ensuing so that other prisoners could use it as a weapon. Plaintiff alleges this caused

him injury, harm, and psychological trauma. Plaintiff asks for compensatory and punitive 

damages.

After screening Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds that it fails to 

state any cognizable claims under § 1983 against Defendant Lopez.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

 

1 The prior order was issued by Magistrate Judge Austin.

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not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are 

taken as true, Courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id. 

III. SUMMARY OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lopez fled the scene of an ensuing racial riot among 

prisoners. Upon leaving, Defendant looked at Plaintiff, smiled, picked up his tools, and 

knowingly left his flashlight. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant’s sole purpose in leaving 

the flashlight was so that the prisoners of Defendant’s nationality, Latino, could procure it and 

use it as a weapon against Plaintiff, an African prisoner. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Lopez violated his Eighth Amendment right against 

cruel and unusual punishment because Defendant failed to enforce a policy or take other 

reasonable steps when he knew the threat of violence was substantial. Plaintiff claims that as a 

result, he suffered injury, harm, and psychological trauma. Plaintiff asks for compensatory and 

punitive damages.

IV. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

A. Legal Standards

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners against 

cruel and unusual punishment. Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials are ... prohibited 

from being deliberately indifferent to policies and practices that expose inmates to a substantial 

risk of serious harm.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Helling v. 

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (prison 

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official violates Eighth Amendment if he or she knows of a substantial risk of serious harm to 

an inmate and fails to take reasonable measures to avoid the harm). “Deliberate indifference 

occurs when ‘[an] official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of 

serious harm.’” Solis v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841).

“The second step, showing ‘deliberate indifference,’ involves a two part inquiry.” 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). “First, the inmate must show that the 

prison officials were aware of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ to an inmate's health or 

safety.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). To prove knowledge of the risk, however, the 

prisoner may rely on circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be 

sufficient to establish knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 

1077 (9th Cir. 1995). “Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no 

‘reasonable’ justification for the deprivation, in spite of that risk.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 844 (“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety 

may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably.”)).

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s factual allegations are that 

Defendant gathered his tools, smiled in Plaintiff’s direction, left a flashlight behind, and fled 

the scene of a riot. (EFC No. 11 at 1). Taking these allegations as true, the facts do not indicate 

that Defendant Lopez knew that Plaintiff was subject to a substantial risk of harm, or that 

Defendant acted with deliberate indifference against Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations that 

Defendant “purposely left his flashlight behind” so that Latino inmates could retrieve it and use 

it as a weapon against Plaintiff, an African inmate, are speculative and conclusory, unsupported 

by facts. (ECF No. 11 at 11:7-11.) 

Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant had no “reasonable” justification for 

leaving his flashlight behind when he fled the scene of the riot. Finally, Plaintiff claims he was 

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injured, harmed, and psychologically traumatized as a result of Defendant’s actions. However, 

Plaintiff does not describe how he was injured or what injuries he suffered.

The Court is aware that Plaintiff’s Complaint was initially brought as part of a class 

action and that other inmates involved in the same or related events have plead facts sufficient 

to pass screening. But the Court can only screen Plaintiff’s Complaint as complete in itself. In 

an amended Complaint, the Court will look for additional facts that indicate: (1) that Defendant 

was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff’s health and safety, (2) that 

Defendant acted with deliberate indifference against Plaintiff despite his knowledge of such a 

risk, (3) that Defendant had no “reasonable” justification for his actions, in spite of the risk, and 

(4) what injuries or harm Plaintiff suffered.

V. EXHAUSTION

A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement

Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) provides that 

“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any 

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners 

are required to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 

549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief 

offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion 

requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 

532 (2002). 

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff indicates on his complaint that he has not exhausted his administrative 

remedies. He has checked the box “No” in response to the form question “Have you filed an 

appeal or grievance concerning ALL of the facts contained in this complaint?” (ECF No. 11 at

2). In response to the question “If your answer is no, explain why not,” Plaintiff responds that 

he is not familiar with the appeals process. He then quotes from the Order dismissing his First 

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Amended Complaint wherein the Court noted that “exhaustion is an affirmative defense under 

the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in 

their complaint.” (EFC No. 10, p. 7) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). The 

Court adheres to that law and will not dismiss the complaint for that independent basis at this 

time, but Plaintiff should consider this issue in deciding whether to file an amended complaint. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under the Eighth Amendment against 

Defendant Lopez. 

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “leave to amend shall be 

freely given when justice so requires.” Therefore, the Court will provide Plaintiff with time to 

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000).

The Third Amended Complaint should be brief, but must state what each named 

defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Under § 1983 there is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable 

for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in 

the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints).

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 

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amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Finally, the amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “Third Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of 

perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on February 16, 2016, is 

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file 

a Third Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in 

this order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “Third Amended Complaint” and 

refer to the case number 1:14-cv-01853-EPG-PC; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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