Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02136/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02136-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

ROBERT JOHNSON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-2136

CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS;

THE FORT SMITH AIRPORT COMMISSION;

WILLIAM STRANDELL, individually;

JOHN R. DALLAS, individually;

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

WILLIAM HARDING, individually;

JOHN POLINSKY, JR., individually;

R. MARK HORN, individually;

KENNETH PYLE, individually;

GARY W. CAMPBELL, individually;

COLE GOODMAN, individually;

JERRY R. STEWART, individually;

JOSEPH HERMANN, individually;

RICK DERAMUS, individually, DEFENDANTS

O R D E R

NOW on this 6th day of March, 2007, the above referenced

matter comes on for this Court’s consideration of the Motion to

Dismiss First Amended Complaint by Separate Defendants, The City

of Fort Smith, Arkansas, William Harding and Gary W. Campbell

(document #87), the Motion to Dismiss of the Separate Defendants,

City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, William Harding and Gary W. Campbell

(document #114), and the various responses and replies thereto.

Having reviewed the pleadings of the parties, and all other

matters of relevance before it, the Court, being well and

sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff, Robert A. Johnson,(hereinafter either

“plaintiff” or “Johnson”) filed this action on September 12, 2005

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against the following named defendants:

* the City of Fort Smith, Arkansas (“Fort Smith”);

* the Fort Smith Airport Commission (“Airport Commission”);

* William Strandell (“Strandell”);

* John R. Dallas (“Dallas”);

* the United States of America (“U.S.A.”);

* William Harding (“Harding”);

* John Polinsky, Jr. (“Polinsky”);

* R. Mark Horn (“Horn”);

* Kenneth Pyle (“Pyle”);

* Gary W. Campbell (“Campbell”);

* Cole Goodman (“Goodman”);

* Jerry R. Stewart (“Stewart”);

* Joseph Herrmann (“Herrmann”); and 

* Rick Deramus (“Deramus”). 

This matter was originally filed on September 12, 2005; a

First Amended Complaint (document #82) was filed on August 16,

2006; and a First Amended and Substituted Complaint (document

#109) was filed on September 12, 2006. 

Plaintiff’s complaint -- as finally constituted -- contains

seven (7) separate counts: 

* breach of contract;

* intentional interference with contract or business

expectancy;

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* denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

* denial of due process under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105;

* defamation;

* civil conspiracy; and 

* age discrimination under Ark. Code Ann. § 21-3-203. 

2. Initially, separate defendants Fort Smith, Harding and

Campbell moved to dismiss (document # 87) the plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint filed herein on August 16, 2006. The separate

defendants argued that the First Amended Complaint failed to state

any allegations against them upon which relief can be granted.

The separate defendants then filed their Motion to Dismiss of the

Separate Defendants, City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, William Harding

and Gary W. Campbell (document #114). 

The Court notes that its Order dated September 12, 2006 noted

that the defendants had filed various motions to dismiss

plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (document #108). Further, the

Order ruled that to the extent that any such motions were based

upon plaintiff’s non-compliance with Local Rule 5.5(e), the

motions were denied as moot. The defendants were then allowed

time within which to supplement their pending motions to dismiss

with other bases for dismissal. The separate defendants did just

that with the filing of their Motion to Dismiss of the Separate

Defendants, City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, William Harding and Gary

W. Campbell (document #114). 

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3. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court “must

accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and all

reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in favor of

the nonmoving party.” Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623,

627 (8 Cir. 2001). Although dismissal for failure to state a th

claim can only be granted when it appears beyond a reasonable

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a

claim entitling him to relief, “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)

serves to eliminate actions which are fatally flawed in their

legal premises and deigned to fail, thereby sparing litigants the

burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity.” Young, 244

F.3d at 627.

4. Plaintiff’s alleged facts in complaint -- As background,

it is useful to examine the alleged facts as set out in

plaintiff’s ultimate complaint. According to the plaintiff’s

First Amended and Substituted Complaint (document

#109)(hereinafter referred to as “Complaint”), these are the

pertinent facts the Court should consider in connection with the

motions to dismiss under discussion:

 * that Johnson was hired by the Airport Commission and Fort

Smith as Airport Manager of the Fort Smith Airport on August 22,

1988. Complaint, ¶ 19;

* that the Airport Commission, Fort Smith, and Johnson

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entered into a written Employment Agreement, which was

subsequently amended on August 31, 2000 and January 28, 2003.

Complaint, ¶ 20;

* that, under the Employment Agreement, Johnson’s employment

could only be terminated for cause. Complaint, ¶ 21;

* that, on December 1, 1995, the Airport Commission and Fort

Smith established a Salary Reduction Plan for Johnson under 26

U.S.C. § 457(f);

* that, under the Salary Reduction Plan, Johnson would be

fully vested in his benefits under the Plan at the age of 60.

Complaint, ¶ 23-24. And, further, that Johnson was named as the

“Named Fiduciary and Plan Administrator” under the Salary

Reduction Plan. Complaint, ¶ 25;

* that, on November 6, 2003, the Airport Commission and Fort

Smith terminated Johnson’s employment, without sufficient cause.

Complaint, ¶ 26-27;

* that Johnson’s 60 birthday occurred on December 8, 2003. th

Complaint, ¶ 28;

* that Polinsky and Horn were appointed by the Airport

Commission to replace Johnson as Named Fiduciaries and Plan

Administrators under the Salary Reduction Plan. Complaint, ¶ 29;

* that Harding was the City Administrator for Fort Smith at

all times pertinent to the Complaint; and

* that Campbell was a member of Fort Smith’s Board of

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Directors at all times pertinent to the Complaint. Complaint, ¶

30, 32. 

5. Plaintiff’s claims against Fort Smith, Harding and

Campbell -- Fort Smith, Harding and Campbell now move to dismiss

the following claims set out in plaintiff’s complaint, as asserted

against them. The Court will address each challenged Count

separately. 

(a) Count I -- Breach of Contract -- Harding and Campbell

argue that Count I of plaintiff’s complaint is stated against

other defendants and not against them. Plaintiff agrees.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss will be granted in that respect

and plaintiff’s claims against Harding and Campbell in Count I of

the complaint will be dismissed. 

Fort Smith says that, although Count I alleges that Fort

Smith breached its employment contract with plaintiff, the city

was not a party to any such contract -- as shown by the Second

Revised and Updated Employment Agreement attached as Exhibit A to

plaintiff’s Complaint. 

In response, plaintiff argues that “[t]he Airport Commission

is a commission of Fort Smith, which makes Fort Smith liable

indirectly for Counts I and VII.” Further, plaintiff argues that

he has pled “that Fort Smith dealt directly with him under his

employment agreement, was liable to him under it, and breached the

employment agreement as well as discriminating against him because

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of his age.” 

The Court, viewing plaintiff’s complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, concludes that it states a claim

against Fort Smith with respect to Count I, Breach of Contract

which is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Therefore,

the separate defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied as to

plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract against Fort Smith. 

(b) Count II -- Intentional Interference With Contract or

Business Expectancy -- With respect to plaintiff’s Count II, Fort

Smith, Harding and Campbell argue that they are entitled to

immunity pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301. 

Plaintiff responds by arguing that, in Count II of his

complaint, he alleges that he had a valid Employment Agreement

with the Airport Commission and Fort Smith and a valid business

expectancy that he would remain employed by the Airport

Commission. Complaint, ¶ 49-50. He says his complaint alleges

that these separate defendants knew about the Employment

Agreement; that they intentionally and improperly interfered with

it; and that they induced the Airport Commission to terminate his

employment. Complaint, ¶ 51-52. Finally, plaintiff notes that he

has pled, alternatively, that Harding and Campbell (and others)

were both acting within the scope of their official capacity, and

acting individually. Complaint, ¶ 54-55. 

In considering this issue, the Court first notes the

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The Court acknowledges that the separate defendants argue that the courts have, 1

over a series of cases, misinterpreted Arkansas law – ultimately inaccurately morphing

it into the interpretation accepted by this Court. The Court does not agree with the

separate defendants’ argument, and finds Smith v. Brt, 2005 WL 1532426 (Ark., June 30,

2005), cited by the separate defendants, to be consistent with this Court’s

interpretation. 

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following pertinent provisions of applicable Arkansas law: 

Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301 provides:

(a) It is declared to be the public policy of the State

of Arkansas that all counties, municipal corporations,

school districts, special improvement districts, and all

other political subdivisions of the state and any of

their boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, or

other governing bodies shall be immune from liability

and from suit for damages except to the extent that they

may be covered by liability insurance. 

(b) No tort action shall lie against any such political

subdivision because of the acts of its agents and

employees. 

The Court further notes that Arkansas state courts, federal

district courts, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have

repeatedly interpreted the foregoing statute to mean that

municipal corporations are immune from tort recovery based on

negligence actions; but, that Arkansas law does not enjoin tort

recovery for intentional torts. See Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas.

Ins. Co. V. City of Pine Bluff, 354 F.3d 945 (8 Cir. 2004); th

Marley v. Crawford County, 383 F.Supp.2d 1129 (W.D. Ark. 2005);

Deitsch v. Tillery, 833 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. 1992). Further, it is 1

also well settled that the immunity provided by Ark. Code Ann. §

21-9-301 does not extend to a municipal employee for personal

liability -– as a result of actions taken in his or her individual

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“A suit against . . . [an] official in his or her official capacity is not a suit 2

against that person, but rather a suit against that official’s office.” Smith v. Brt,

2005 WL 1532426 (Ark., June 30, 2005)(citing Fegans v. Norris, 89 S.W.3d 919 (Ark.

2002)). 

The separate defendants also argue that the plaintiff fails to assert factual 3

allegations sufficient to state a claim against Harding and Campbell, individually, with

respect to Count II. The Court finds that the plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to

state a claim against Harding and Campbell in their individual capacities. 

“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading 4

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165 (1985)(citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978)). “It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in

interest is the entity.” Id. 

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capacity. Battle v. Harris, 766 S.W.2d 431 (Ark. 1989). Davis v.

Fulton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8 Cir. 1996). See also Cousins v. th

Dennis, 767 S.W.2d 296 (Ark. 1989). 

In Count II of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that Harding

and Campbell, acting alternatively in their official and 2

individual capacities, took actions that resulted in the

interference with his employment contract and future business

expectancy with the Airport Commission. Thus, because the actions

alleged are intentional actions, immunity pursuant to Ark. Code

Ann. § 21-9-301 does not extend to the Harding and Campbell.3

Therefore, the separate defendants’ motion is denied with respect

to Count II. 

(c) Court III -- Denial of Due Process, Violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 -- In Count III of plaintiff’s complaint, he

asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the

defendants, including Fort Smith (acting through Harding,

Campbell, Pyle and Goodman ), Harding, and Campbell, conspired 4

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together to violate plaintiff’s due process rights. 

On this point, the separate defendants argue that the claims

asserted under Count III should be dismissed. Specifically, with

respect to the claims against Fort Smith, they argue that the

plaintiff has not sufficiently pled an unconstitutional policy or

custom as required. 

With respect to the claims asserted against Harding and

Campbell, individually, they say that to assert a claim for

individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must

establish that Harding and Campbell acted “under color of state

law” and that they deprived Johnson of his rights, privileges or

immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law -- and that

plaintiff has not so alleged nor could he establish such. They

further argue that plaintiff’s allegations fail to indicate that

Harding and Campbell did more than merely exercise their First

Amendment rights –- and that they are immune from suit for doing

so.

The Court will consider this issue first from the standpoint

of separate defendant, Fort Smith.

(1) Fort Smith -- “Liability under §1983 requires a

causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of

[constitutionally protected] rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909

F.2d. 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). A political subdivision may be

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where the municipality’s policy

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or custom deprives persons of their constitutionally or federally

protected rights. Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658

(1978).

The separate defendants argue that plaintiff failed to

sufficiently plead that Fort Smith employs an unconstitutional

policy or custom in connection with relevant matters. According

to them, plaintiff’s complaint “fails to include any allegation,

reference, or language by which one could begin to draw an

inference that the conduct complained of resulted from an

unconstitutional policy or custom.” Separate Defendants’ brief

(document #115), p. 5. 

In response, plaintiff argues that the complaint “did not

have to specifically plead the existence of a ‘policy or custom’

in order to survive this Motion to Dismiss.” Plaintiff’s response

brief (document #126), p. 6. 

According to established law, to prove an unconstitutional

policy or custom, the plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of

a continuing widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional

misconduct by the municipality’s employees; (2) deliberate

indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the

municipality’s policymaking officials after notice of that

misconduct; and (3) that the custom was the “moving force” behind

the constitutional violation suffered. Jane Doe A v. Special

School Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8 Cir. 1990); see also Board of th

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Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997). A single incident

normally does not suffice to prove the existence of a municipal

custom. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24

(1985)(plurality opinion). 

The Court notes the following language from applicable case

law: 

(a plaintiff) need not . . . specifically plead the

existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom to

survive a motion to dismiss, . . . failure to include

any ‘allegations, reference, or language by which one

could begin to draw an inference that the conduct

complained of . . . resulted from an unconstitutional

policy or custom’ renders the complaint deficient. 

Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588 (8th

Cir. 2004)(quoting Doe v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605 (8th

Cir. 2003)). 

However, the Court also notes that in the Doe case, the Court

also said: “At a minimum, a complaint must allege facts which

would support the existence of an unconstitutional policy or

custom.” Doe, 340 F.3d at 614. 

Plaintiff argues that his complaint satisfies the pleading

requirements by asserting facts which show a pattern of activity

designed to manufacture “cause” for the plaintiff’s termination.

Specifically, he points to alleged activities and conduct over the

course of a period of time which he says all relate to him. He

also cites the Court to the Eighth Circuit case of Nix v. Norman,

879 F.2d 429 (8 Cir. 1989), in support of his official capacity th

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claims. In Nix, a panel of the Eighth Circuit stated:

To establish liability in an official-capacity suit

under section 1983, a plaintiff must show either that

the official named in the suit took an action pursuant

to an unconstitutional governmental policy or custom .

. . or that he or she possessed final authority over the

subject matter at issue and used that authority in an

unconstitutional manner.

879 F.2d at 433(citations omitted). 

Here, plaintiff asserts that he was employed by Fort Smith;

that the Fort Smith City Administrator and members of the Board of

Directors possessed final authority concerning the plaintiff’s

employment; and that they used that authority in an

unconstitutional manner. Accordingly, under the guidelines

established by the case law set forth above -- and particularly in

light of the holding of Nix v. Norman -- the Court finds that the

separate defendants’ motion should be denied with respect to the

claims asserted in Count III against Fort Smith. See Nix v.

Norman, 879 F.2d at 433. 

(2) Harding and Campbell, Individually -- As set forth

above, to establish a claim for individual liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must establish that Harding and

Campbell acted “under color of state law” and that they deprived

Johnson of his rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

Constitution or federal law. 

The separate defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint

fails to indicate that Harding and Campbell did anything more than

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exercise their First Amendment rights -- which they are privileged

to do under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 

In response, plaintiff argues that the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine does not apply to Harding and Campbell. Specifically,

the plaintiff argues that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies

only to acts by private citizens to influence legislative

activities. 

The United States Supreme Court established the so-called

Noerr-Pennington doctrine in two cases: Eastern R.R. Presidents

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and

United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

Specifically, the Noerr Court held that “[t]he right of the people

to inform their representatives in government of their desires

with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly

be made to depend upon their intent in doing so.” Noerr, 365 U.S.

at 139. In Pennington, the Supreme Court reiterated Noerr’s

protection of attempts to influence legislative activities under

the First Amendment, regardless of improper or anti-competitive

purposes. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669. Based upon the NoerrPennington doctrine, courts “have held individual defendants

constitutionally immune from liability for exercising their right

to petition.” Gorman Towers, Inc. V. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607,

615 (8 Cir. 1980). th

Based upon the controlling case law, the Court finds that

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questions of fact remain with respect to whether the NoerrPennington doctrine applies to any actions taken by Harding or

Campbell in their individual capacities -- and not as agents of

the plaintiff’s alleged employer, the City of Fort Smith.

Although immunity is important to protect private individuals from

liability for exercising their right to petition, “[t]his

exemption shall not apply, however, if the petitioning activities

in question were ‘sham’ and in fact solely intended to cause

injury to competitors rather than to obtain governmental action.”

State of S.D. v. Kansas City Southern Indust., Inc., 980 F.2d 40,

50-51 (8 Cir. 1989)(citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. V. Indian th

Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988). See also Razorback Ready Mix

Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 487 (8 Cir. 1985). th

In his complaint, plaintiff asserts that the actions of

Harding and Campbell -- and other defendants -- “were

substantially motivated by improper political and personal

concerns arising from Johnson’s acts in his official capacity as

Airport Manager of the Airport Commission within the scope of his

duties.” Complaint, ¶ 65. Based upon this allegation, the Court

finds that the separate defendants’ motion to dismiss must fail

with respect to the claims asserted in Count III against Harding

and Campbell in their individual capacities. 

(d) Court IV -- Denial of Due Process; Violation of A.C.A.

§ 16-123-105 -- In Count IV of his complaint, plaintiff asserts

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that the intentional actions of Harding and Campbell deprived him

of his property and liberty interests under the Arkansas

Constitution. Complaint, ¶73. 

The plaintiff pleads, alternatively, that separate defendants

Harding and Campbell (and others) were acting within the scope of

their official capacity and individually. Complaint, ¶ 74-75. 

The sole argument of the separate defendants with respect to

Count IV consists of their immunity argument previously analyzed

with respect to Count II. And, as with Count II, Count IV

involves intentional actions. Therefore, for the reasons

explained above, the Court finds that immunity pursuant to Ark.

Code Ann. § 21-9-301 does not extend to the separate defendants

with respect to Count IV and the separate defendants’ motion is

denied in that regard. 

(e) Court V -- Defamation -- In Count V of plaintiff’s

complaint, he asserts that defendants, including separate

defendants Fort Smith, Harding and Campbell, made false statements

to each other, to the press and to the public regarding the

plaintiff’s honesty, integrity, and professional competence.

Complaint, ¶ 77. Plaintiff argues that the statements were known

to be false when made or were made with a reckless disregard for

the truth. Complaint, ¶ 78. Again, the plaintiff pleads,

alternatively, that separate defendants Harding and Campbell (and

others) were acting within the scope of their official capacity,

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Defamation is an intentional tort. The elements include: “1) the defamatory 5

nature of the statement of fact; 2) that statement’s identification of or reference to

the plaintiff; 3) publication of the statement by the defendant; 4) the defendant’s

fault in the publication; 5) the statement’s falsity; and 6) damages.” See Dodson v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WL 564045 (Ark. March 9, 2006). 

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and individually. Complaint, ¶ 80-81. 

The separate defendants assert two arguments with respect to

Count V:

* first, that Count V should be dismissed because they are

entitled to immunity pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301; and

* second, that the claims asserted in Count V are time

barred. 

(1) With respect to the separate defendants’ immunity

claim, Count V again asserts intentional actions. And, as 5

analyzed above, the separate defendants are not entitled to

immunity for the alleged intentional actions under Ark. Code Ann.

§ 21-9-301.

(2) With respect to the separate defendants’ timeliness

claim, the separate defendants argue that plaintiff’s defamation

claim in Count V should be dismissed because, under Arkansas law,

such a claim is time-barred if not brought within one year after

the cause of action accrues. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-104.

They argue that plaintiff claims he was terminated on November 6,

2003, but did not file this action until September 12, 2005. 

Plaintiff counters that a three year statute of limitations

applies to written defamation [See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(5)];

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and that the one year statute of limitations can be tolled where

there was active concealment of the slander. See O’Mara v.

Dykema, 942 S.W.2d 854 (Ark. 1997). 

Since dismissal for failure to state a claim can only be

granted when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of a claim entitling him to

relief, and because the allegations as set forth by the plaintiff

could come within the exceptions to the separate defendants’

timeliness argument, the Court concludes that the motion to

dismiss must be denied with respect to Count V. 

(e) Court VI -- Civil Conspiracy -- In Count VI of

plaintiff’s complaint, he asserts that the defendants (including

Fort Smith, Harding and Campbell) “combined to accomplish the

wrongful acts complained of elsewhere in this Complaint.”

Complaint, ¶ 83. Further, plaintiff claims that the defendants’

“purposes were unlawful or oppressive or were accomplished through

unlawful, oppressive, or immoral means.” Complaint, ¶ 84. And,

that the “defendants committed acts in furtherance of their

conspiracy” which “resulted in monetary damages.” Complaint, ¶

85-86. Alternatively, plaintiff pleads that the separate

defendants were acting within their official capacity, and

individually. Complaint, ¶ 87-88. 

The separate defendants assert two arguments with respect to

their challenge of Count VI:

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“[C]ivil conspiracy is an intentional tort which requires a specific intent to 6

accomplish the contemplated wrong.” Faulkner v. Arkansas Children’s Hosp., 69 S.W.3d

393, 406 (Ark. 2002). 

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* first, that Count VI should be dismissed because they are

entitled to immunity pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301; and

* second, that the plaintiff has not alleged facts

sufficient to support a conspiracy claim. 

(1) With respect to the immunity claim, Count VI sets

forth a claim for civil conspiracy -– an intentional tort.6

Again, as analyzed above, the separate defendants are not entitled

to immunity for the alleged intentional actions under Ark. Code

Ann. § 21-9-301.

(2) The Court will now turn to defendants’ argument

that plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support a

conspiracy claim. 

According to established law, 

[t]o prove a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show

that two or more persons have combined to accomplish a

purpose that is unlawful or oppressive or to accomplish

some purpose, not in itself unlawful, oppressive or

immoral, but by unlawful, oppressive or immoral means,

to the injury of another. 

Faulkner v. Arkansas Children’s Hosp., 69 S.W.3d 393, 406 (Ark.

2002). Further, “a corporation cannot conspire with itself, since

that defeats the requirement of a combination of two or more

persons action to accomplish some unlawful or oppressive purpose.”

Id. (quoting Dodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 S.W.3d 866 (Ark.

2001)). Accordingly, 

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to sustain a claim for a civil conspiracy where agents

of a corporation are involved, it is necessary to show

that one or more of the agents acted outside of the

scope of their employment, to render them a separate

‘person’ for purposes of the conspiracy.

Id. 

Here, the complaint asserts that the defendants (including

Fort Smith, Harding and Campbell) “combined to accomplish the

wrongful acts complained of elsewhere in this Complaint.” As

established above, the defendants include Fort Smith, the Fort

Smith Airport Commission, the United States and various

individuals who -- according to the plaintiff -– were both acting

in their official capacities (as agents of Fort Smith, or the Fort

Smith Airport Commission) and their individual capacities. 

With respect to the individual capacity claims asserted

against Harding and Campbell, the Court finds no facts to support

the notion that Harding and Campbell were acting “for their own

personal benefit to the elimination of any benefit” for Fort

Smith. See Faulkner, supra at 407. Therefore, the plaintiff’s

civil conspiracy claim should be dismissed as to Harding and

Campbell in that respect. 

With respect to the official capacity claims asserted against

Harding and Campbell, the Court finds that the plaintiff stated

sufficient facts to support his claim for civil conspiracy.

Further, although it appears possible to the Court that, after

factual development, the City of Fort Smith and the Airport

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Commission may be found to be a single corporate entity unable to

conspire with itself absent actions by an agent outside of his or

her official scope, the entities are currently identified as

separate. Further, the United States is a separate entity with

which both Fort Smith and the Airport Commission are alleged to

have conspired. Accordingly, the separate defendants’ motion to

dismiss will be denied with respect to plaintiff’s claim of civil

conspiracy against Fort Smith and Harding and Campbell in their

official capacities. 

(f) Count VII -- Age Discrimination, Violation of A.C.A. §

21-3-203 -- With respect to Harding and Campbell, the separate

defendants argue that Count VII of plaintiff’s complaint is stated

against other defendants and not against them. Since plaintiff

agrees, the separate defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted

in that respect. 

With respect to Fort Smith, the separate defendants argue

that, although plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the Airport

Commission and Fort Smith discriminated against plaintiff by

terminating his employment based on age, Count VII fails as

against Fort Smith because he has not alleged facts to establish

that Fort Smith participated in the decision-making process in any

way which resulted in the termination of plaintiff’s employment

based on plaintiff’s age. 

In response, plaintiff argues that the complaint asserts that

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Fort Smith dealt directly with the plaintiff under his employment

contract; that it was liable to him under it; and that it breached

the employment agreement. Moreover, says plaintiff, the complaint

fairly alleges that Fort Smith discriminated against him because

of his age. 

Viewing plaintiff’s complaint in the light most favorable to

him, the Court concludes that plaintiff has sufficiently stated a

claim against Fort Smith with respect to Count VII, Age

Discrimination. Therefore, the separate defendants’ motion to

dismiss will be denied as to plaintiff’s claim for age

discrimination against Fort Smith.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Motion to Dismiss First

Amended Complaint by Separate Defendants, The City of Fort Smith,

Arkansas, William Harding and Gary W. Campbell (document #87), and

the Motion to Dismiss of the Separate Defendants, City of Fort

Smith, Arkansas, William Harding and Gary W. Campbell (document

#114) should be, and they hereby are, granted in part, and denied

in part as follows:

* Count I – the motions to dismiss are granted with

respect to separate defendants Harding and Campbell; the motions

to dismiss are denied with respect to separate defendant Fort

Smith;

* Count II – the motions to dismiss are denied;

* Count III – the motions to dismiss are denied;

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* Count IV – the motions to dismiss are denied;

* Count V – the motions to dismiss are denied;

* Count VI – the motions to dismiss are granted with

respect to the individual claims against separate defendants

Harding and Campbell; the motions to dismiss are denied with

respect to the official capacity claims against separate

defendants Harding and Campbell, and as to the claims against

separate defendant Fort Smith; and, 

* Count VII – the motions to dismiss are granted with

respect to separate defendants Harding and Campbell; the motions

to dismiss are denied with respect to separate defendant Fort

Smith. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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