Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01278/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01278-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity - Legal Malpractice

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 The Court will deny the request for oral argument because the parties have submitted

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence and the Court concludes that

oral argument will not aid its decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer

County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHARLES W. CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DIRK L. HUBBARD, STEPHEN

JENKINS, LOWELL FINSON, JOHN

KLAMANN, COURTNEY HUESER,

Defendants.

NO. CV05-1278 PHX DGC

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Defendants Hubbard, Klamann, and Hueser’s motion

t o dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2),

(3), (4), and (5), Plaintiff’s mot ion to dismiss party Lowell W. Finson, and Defendant Lowell

Finson’s motion to dismiss. Docs. ##8, 9, 22, 24, 25. On December 12, 2005, the Court

granted Plaintiff’s request for additional time t o respond to new evidence raised in

Defendants’ reply in support of their motion to dismiss. Doc. ##35, 37, 39. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant Lowell W.

Finson and grant Defendants Hubbard, Klamann, and Hueser’s motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction.1

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 Plaintiff disputes that Defendant Hueser had no involvement in his case. He has

provided the Court with evidence she made an entry of appearance in Kansas for

Defendant Hubbard on May 4, 2004, to request document production in Plaintiff’s

Kansas case. Doc. #40. This evidence does not alter the Court’s final determination of

the present case. 

2

Factual Background

On April 29, 2005, Plaintiff, an Arizona resident, filed a comp laint against two Kansas

attorneys, two Missouri attorneys, and one Arizona attorney based on the Court’s diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. # 1. Plaintiff now requests that the Court dismiss

the claim against the Arizona at t orney. Doc. #22. Plaintiff alleges that the non-resident

attorneys were negligent in their handling of Plaint iff’s age discrimination case brought in

Kansas. Doc. #33. Plaintiff specifically alleges Kansas legal malpractice, violations of the

Kansas Consumer Protection Act, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties.

Doc. #4. 

On Sep t ember 28, 2005, three of the four named Defendants moved to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction. Doc. #8. Two of the moving Defendants, Courtney Hueser and

John Klamann, claim to have never met Plaintiff or had any involvement in his underlying

case.2

 Doc. #33 at 1. Defendant Hubbard admits he entered “into a representation contract

wit h Plaintiff in Kansas to bring Kansas and federal-based claims in the United States

District Court for the District of Kansas,” but alleges that Plaintiff’s subsequent move to

Arizona was purely fortuitous and not in any way the result of Mr. Hubbard’s

“purposefully availing” himself of the laws of Arizona. Id. 

Plaintiff responds that personal jurisdiction over the named defendants is proper

because Hubbard knew that he was “ ent ering into a contract with a client who would be a

permanent resident of Arizona.” Doc. # 28 at 9. T o show Hubbard’s knowledge, Plaintiff

states that eleven days after signing the contract in Kansas he “dropped off documents to

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Hubbard on his way to the airp ort , from where he flew to Arizona.” Id. Plaintiff further

asserts that Klamann, a law partner of Hubbard, and Hueser, co-counsel in Plaintiff’s

underlying case, are liable because they “evaded their responsibilities to plaint iff by

ignoring Hubbard’s negligent omissions of not advancing Plaintiff’s claim, and thereby

intentionally causing injury to Plaintiff in Arizona.” Id. at 10. 

Discussion

I. Diversity Jurisdiction.

The Court has diversity jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different states

involving claims greater than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The Court will grant

Plaintiff’s request to dismiss the Arizona attorney Lowell W. Finson. Doc. #22. T he

remaining Defendants are residents of Kansas and Missouri and are completely diverse

from Plaintiff, an Ariz ona resident. Plaintiff’s complaint makes a demand for damages in

excess of $75,000. Doc. #1. Diversity jurisdiction exists in this case. 

II. Personal Jurisdiction Principles.

A. Plaintiff’s burden of proof.

T he p laintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff is obligated

to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, support ing p ersonal jurisdiction over

the defendant. Cummings v . W. Trial Lawyers Assoc., 133 F. Supp.2d 1144, 1151 (D. Ariz.

2001).

Because no statutory method for resolving the personal jurisdiction issue exists, the

district court determines the method of its resolution. See Data Disc, Inc. v . Sys. Tech.

Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939)).

A dist rict court may allow discovery to help it determine whether it has personal jurisdiction

over a defendant. Id. at 1285 n.1. A district court may also hear evidence at a preliminary

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hearing to determine jurisdict ion. Id. at 1285 n.2. At such a hearing, the plaintiff must

establish the jurisdictional facts by a prep onderance of the evidence. Id. at 1285. If the

district court does not hear testimony or make findings of fact and instead permits the

parties only to submit written materials, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of

jurisdictional facts to defeat t he defendant’s motion to dismiss. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip

& Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 268 (9th Cir. 1995). Under this prima facie burden of proof,

the plaintiff need only establish facts, through admissible evidence, that if true would

supp ort p ersonal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498

(9th Cir. 1995). If t he p laintiff survives the motion to dismiss under a prima facie burden of

proof, however, the plaintiff still must prove t he jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of

the evidence at a preliminary hearing or at trial. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285 n.2.

In analyzing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s (1)

complaint, (2) Plaintiff’s response to Defendant s’ mot ion to dismiss, and (3) Plaintiff’s

newly submitted supplemental response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court has

also considered the following materials: (4) the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and reply,

including the attached exhibits; (5) the affidavits of Courtney A. Hueser, John Klamann, and

Dirk L. Hubbard. Because the Court has permitted the parties to submit only written

materials, Plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional fact to defeat

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See, e.g. Omeluk, 52 F.2d at 267.

B. Personal Jurisdiction.

Because no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction exists,

Arizona’s long-arm statute applies to this case. See Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d

555, 559 (9th Cir. 1995); Ariz . R. Civ. P. 4.2(a). Absent traditional bases for personal

jurisdict ion (i.e., physical presence, domicile, and consent), the Due Process Clause requires

that nonresident defendants have certain “minimum contacts” with the forum state such

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that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Due

Process Clause protects a defendant’s “liberty interest in not being subject to the binding

judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties or

relations.’” Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 269-70 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 471-72 (1985)). “By requiring that individuals have ‘fair warning that a particular

activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,’ the Due Process

Clause ‘gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants

to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct

will and will not render them liable to suit.’” Id. at 270 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472

(internal citations omitted)). 

“In determining whether a defendant had minimum contacts wit h the forum state such

that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend the Due Process

Clause, courts focus on ‘the relat ionship among the defendant, the forum, and the

litigation.’” Brink v. First Credit Resources, 57 F. Supp. 2d 848, 860 (D. Ariz. 1999) (quoting

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). If a court determines that a defendant’s

contacts with the forum state are sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, then the

court must exercise either “general” or “specific” jurisdiction over the defendant. See

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 nn.8-9 (1984); Ziegler,

64 F.3d at 473. The nat ure of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state will determine

whether the court’s jurisdiction is general or specific. Id. 

1. General Jurisdiction.

A court may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant’s activities

in the state are substantial or continuous and systematic, even if the cause of action is

unrelat ed t o t hose activities. Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd.,

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784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287 (citing Perkins v.

Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952)). Plaintiff does not contend that

Defendants have such contacts with Arizona.

2. Specific Jurisdiction.

Specific jurisdiction exists when a defendant ’s contacts with a state give rise to the

claims asserted. The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test : whether (1) the defendant

purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, or purposely directs conduct at the forum

that has effects in the forum; (2) the claim arises out of the defendant’s forum-related

activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdict ion is reasonable because it comports with notions

of fair play and substantial justice. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc.,

223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417

(9th Cir. 1997)); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472-76.

a. “Purposeful Availment” and “Effects” Tests.

In discussing specific jurisdiction, t he United States Supreme Court emphasized long

ago that “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant

purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denck la, 357 U.S. 235,

253 (1958) (emphasis added). More recently, the Supreme Court has held that a court may

also have specific jurisdiction over a defendant where the intended effects of the

defendant ’s non-forum conduct were purposely directed at and caused harm in the forum

state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984) (adopting “effects test” for libel, invasion

of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims where defendant’s Florida

conduct had “effects” in California, the forum state); see Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, 854 F.2d

1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he decisions of this court have interpreted the holdings of

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3 See also Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998)

(applying effects test because trademark infringement and unfair competition case was

akin to tort case); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087

(9th Cir. 2000) (declaratory judgment action involving trademark infringement).

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Calder and Burger King as modifying the purposeful availment rubric to allow ‘the exercise

of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only ‘contact’ with the forum is the ‘purposeful

direction’ of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.’”) (quot ing Haisten, 784 F.2d at

1397) (emphasis in original). 

Consistent with this precedent, the Nint h Circuit has held that a district court should

apply different specific jurisdiction t ests to contract and tort cases. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at

473; Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that in determining

whether court has specific jurisdiction over defendant, “[i]t is important to distinguish

contract from tort actions”). In cases involving certain types of torts, the Ninth Circuit has

held that courts should apply the “effects test” and t hat “jurisdiction may attach if an outof-forum defendant merely engages in conduct aimed at, and having an effect in, the situs

state.” Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473 (applying effects test because section 1983 claim “is more

akin to a tort claim than a cont ract claim”); see Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59

F.3d 126, 128 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying effects t est t o defamation, tortious interference

with business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims); Core-Vent,

11 F.3d at 1486 (libel); Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1259

(9th Cir. 1989) (defamation and tortious interference with contract).3

In cases arising out of contractual relationships, including those involving related

tort claims, the Ninth Circuit applies the “purposeful availment” test enunciated in Hanson,

which “requires that the defendant engage in some form of affirmative conduct allowing or

promoting the transaction of business within t he forum state. This focus on the

defendant’s affirmative conduct is designed to ensure that the defendant is not haled into

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court as the result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Gray & Co. v.

Firstenberg Mach. Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); see Roth, 942

F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying purposeful availment test in breach of contract

act ion); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding effect s t est

inapplicable and stat ing that, “unlike Calder and Haisten, in this case personal jurisdiction

is sought on a contract claim, not on a tort claim.”). A defendant has engaged in affirmative

conduct and thereby “purposely availed himself of the benefits of a forum if he has

deliberately ‘engaged in significant activities within a State or has created ‘continuing

obligations’ between himself and the residents of the forum.” Gray, 913 F.2d at 760

(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76); see Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417 (stating that “the

‘purposeful availment’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant has taken deliberate action

within the forum state or if he has creat ed continuing obligations to forum residents”)

(citing Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498).

“A contract alone does not aut omatically establish the requisite minimum contacts

necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. ‘Prior negotiations and contemplated

future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of

dealing’ are the factors to be considered. T he foreseeability of causing injury in another

state is not a sufficient basis on which to exercise jurisdiction.” Gray, 913 F.2d at 760

(quoting and citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 478-79).

Finally, in analyzing the purposeful availment requirement, the Ninth Circuit performs

a qualit at ive evaluation of the defendant’s contact with the forum state to determine

whet her the “‘defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum [s]tate are such that he

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1484

(quoting Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)); see Thos. P.

Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1252

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(9th Cir. 1980) (st at ing that “it is not the quantity, but rather the ‘nature and quality’ of the

defendant’s activities which determine whether extension of jurisdiction offends due

process”).

b. “Arising out of” Requirement.

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a “but for” test for det ermining whether a plaintiff’s

cause of action arises out of a defendant’s forum related activities. See Omeluk, 52 F.3d at

271. The “arising out of” requirement is met if, but for the contacts bet ween the defendant

and the forum st at e, t he cause of action would not have arisen. See Terracom, 49 F.3d at

561. In Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that: 

The ‘but for’ test is consistent with the basic function of the ‘arising out of’

requirement – it preserves the essent ial distinction between general and

specific jurisdiction. . . . The ‘but for’ test preserves the requirement that

there be some nexus bet ween the cause of action and the defendant’s

activities in the forum.

 897 F.2d at 385.

c. Reasonableness Requirement.

An unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause even if the

“purposeful availment” and “arising out of” requirements of the specific jurisdiction test

are satisfied. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (1945); Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474-75. A district

court presumes, however, that its exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant is reasonable if

the first two requirements of the specific jurisdiction test are met. See Ballard, 65 F.3d at

1500. If the first two requirements are satisfied, then the burden of proof shifts and the

defendant must “‘present a compelling case that the p resence of some other considerations

would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).

The Ninth Circuit considers seven factors when determining whether the exercise of

specific jurisdiction over a defendant is reasonable. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475 (citing

Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561); Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. These fact ors will be

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discussed below.

III. Personal Jurisdiction Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s Showing that the Court has Specific Jurisdiction

1. Purposeful Availment.

This case arises out of a contractual relationship in which Defendant Hubbard

agreed to represent Plaintiff in an age discrimination comp laint . Docs. ##1-3. Although

Plaintiff’s complaint purports to state four tort claims, Defendants’ alleged malpractice,

fraud, constructive fraud, and violations of fiduciary duties all arise out of the contract.

Accordingly, the Court must apply the purposeful availment test in determining whether

it has specific jurisdiction. See e.g., Gray, 913 F.2d at 760 (applying t he p urp oseful

availment test in cases involving the sale of used filters where plaintiff brought an action

for breach of warranty, recision, and misrepresentation). 

To det ermine whether Defendants deliberately engaged in significant activities in

Arizona, thereby purposefully availing themselves of the benefits and protect ions of its

laws, the Court must evaluate four factors: (1) the parties’ contract negotiations, (2) t he

future consequences contemplated by the contract, (3) the terms of the contract, and (4) the

parties’ actual course of dealing. Id. Plaintiff does not dispute that he initiated the first

contact between the parties – that Hubbard did not solicit Plaintiff’s business. Doc. #33.

Cont ract negotiations occurred in Kansas. Docs. ## 28, 33. On October 25, 2000, Plaintiff,

then a Kansas resident, signed a contract with Hubbard in Kansas. Doc. #28. Hubbard

testified that he was not aware Plaintiff int ended to relocate permanently to Arizona. Doc.

#33, Ex. B, ¶6. In addition, never during the parties’ course of dealings did any Defendant

travel to or solicit business in Arizona. Id. at ¶ 7, 8. 

Plaintiff argues that because Hubbard “intentionally and purposefully” entered into

a contract with an Arizona resident, it was known that any injury to Plaintiff would result

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in litigation in Arizona. Doc. #28. Plaintiff reasons that Hubbard should have know that

he was moving to Arizona permanently because he “dropped off documents to [him] on his

way to the airport, from where he flew to Arizona.” Id. Moreover, Hubbard knew, or

should have known, that he was domiciled in Ariz ona because Hubbard called him

numerous times in Arizona to discuss his p ending age discrimination case and accepted a

check for attorney fees from Arizona. Id. at 14-15. Plaint iff argues that Hubbard’s law

partners Klamann and Hueser should also be liable because “all partners are liable for

partnership obligations.” Doc. #30. Because Klamman and Hueser “elected to conduct

business, and to make money, in [t his] partnership,” Plaintiff argues, “they also agreed to

be . . . liable for a tortuous wrong or a contractual breach commit t ed within the scope, or

apparent scope of the agency by one of its members.” Id. 

“The law is clear, [however], that a contract alone is not sufficient to establish

purposeful interjection into the forum state.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478; see FDIC, 828

F.2d at 1443. Moreover, Defendants’ “foreseeability of causing injury in [Arizona] is not

a sufficient basis on which to exercise jurisdiction.” Gray, 913 F.2d at 760. The Court finds

that there was no purposeful activity by Defendant Hubbard, let alone his law partners

Hueser and Klamann, to invoke the benefits and protections of Arizona’s laws. They did

not target Plaintiff as an Arizona resident, they never traveled t o Arizona, and they never

solicited business in Arizona. At the time t he Hubbard-Campbell contract was formed,

Plaintiff was a Kansas resident. The fact that Plaintiff later moved to Arizona was

“fortuitous, not purposeful.” FDIC, 828 F.2d at 1443. The first prong of the specific

jurisdiction test is not satisfied.

 2. “Arising out of” Requirement.

Plaintiff cannot show that but for Defendants’ contact with Arizona the alleged harm

would not have occurred. Defendants’ Arizona actions did not give rise to the alleged

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harm. Defendants never traveled to Arizona, never practiced law in Arizona, and never

solicited business here. Doc #33. The second p rong of the specific jurisdiction test is not

satisfied.

3. “Reasonableness” Requirement.

An unreasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction violat es due process. See Int’l

Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474-75. Because Plaintiff has not shown

purposeful availment, a presumption of reasonableness does not apply. See Cummings,

133 F.Supp.2d at 1154. As noted above, t he Ninth Circuit considers seven factors to

determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction is reasonable. 

First , “[t]he degree to which a defendant interjects himself into the [forum] state

affects the fairness of subjecting him to jurisdiction.” Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1288. Because

Defendants Hubbard, Klamann, and Hueser’s contact with Arizona was based solely on the

unilateral move of Plaintiff, this factor weighs heavily in Defendants’ favor. 

Second, the Court considers the burden on Defendants litigating in Arizona. See

Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475. Defendants, who have no cont acts with Arizona, would be

burdened by litigat ing here. Plaintiff, now an Arizona resident, would equally be burdened

by litigating in Kansas. “Where the burdens are equal, this factor tips in favor of the

defendant because the law of personal jurisdiction is ‘primarily concerned with defendant’s

burden.’” Id. This factor weighs in Defendants’ favor.

Third, the Court considers any conflict with the sovereignty of Kansas. Id. Because

the alternative forums – Arizona and Kansas – are within the United States, “any conflicting

sovereignty interest are best accommodated through choice-of-law rules rather than

jurisdictional rules.” Gray, 913 F.2d at 761. Accordingly, this factor does not favor either

party.

Fourth, Ariz ona’s interest in the dispute is considered. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475.

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Arizona’s interest in adjudicating this dispute is not particularly great because the action

arises out of a contractual relationship formed in Kansas and Kansas law governs. See

Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The court most

competent to int erp ret the applicable law should normally try the case.”). On the other

hand, Arizona does maintain a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress

for its residents who are tortiously injured. See Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1288. This factor

weighs slightly in Plaintiff’s favor.

Fifth, the Court must evaluat e t he most efficient judicial resolution. See Ziegler, 64

F.3d at 475. Courts evaluat e judicial efficiency by looking to “where the witnesses and the

evidence are likely to be located.” Teracom, 49 F.3d at 561. The contractual agreement and

allegedly negligent conduct of Defendants all occurred in Kansas. Doc. # 28. Witnesses

and evidence of negligence will be locat ed p rimarily in Kansas. This factor weighs in

Defendants’ favor.

Sixth, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternat ive forum.

See Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1490. Plaintiff has not met this burden. This factor therefore

weighs in Defendants’ favor.

Seventh, the Court considers the convenience and effectiveness of relief. “A mere

preference on the part of [the plaintiff] for its home forum does not affect the balancing.”

Cummings, 133 F.Supp.2d at 1159. Both parties assert that they would be inconvenienced

if forced to litigate outside their forum, and Plaintiff has not shown that Arizona relief would

be more effective than that offered by the court s of Kansas. This factor does not weigh in

favor or either party.

A majority of these factors favor Defendants. Exercising sp ecific jurisdiction over

Defendants would therefore be unreasonable under the Due Process Clause and Plaint iff

has failed to satisfy the third prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis..

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IV. Conclusion.

Plaintiff fails to satisfy any of the three requirements for specific personal

jurisdiction. General personal jurisdiction is not available. T he Court accordingly will grant

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. #8) is

granted.

2. Defendant Courtney Hueser’s Joinder in Defendants Hubbard and Klamann’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #9) is granted.

3. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss party Lowell W. Finson (Doc. #22) is granted.

4. Defendant Finson’s Motion to Dismiss Part y Lowell W. Finson (Doc. #24) is

denied as moot.

5. Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction (Reasserted) (Doc. #25) is

denied as moot.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-01278-DGC Document 41 Filed 01/12/06 Page 14 of 14