Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03744/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03744-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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The individual defendants, specifically, Greg Cannedy, Mike Sobek, Joseph

Kitchen, Frank Grove, and Richard Holman, have not appeared.

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By order filed December 7, 2006, the Court vacated the December 15, 2006

hearing on the motion.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL WILLINGHAM,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-06-3744 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY

OF SAN LEANDRO’S MOTION TO

DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Before the Court is defendant City of San Leandro’s (“City”) motion, filed November

6, 2006, to dismiss plaintiff Nathaniel Willingham’s Amended Complaint (“AC”) or,

alternatively, for a more definite statement, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(e),

respectively, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Plaintiff has filed opposition, to

which the City has replied. Having reviewed the papers filed in support of the motion, the

Court rules as follows:2

1. In Count One, plaintiff alleges defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by

subjecting plaintiff to an unlawful arrest and detaining him overnight. (See Compl. ¶¶ 66-

79, 90-91 (alleging officers employed by the City arrested plaintiff for public intoxication

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The City has not challenged Count One to the extent it is based on a Fourth

Amendment claim.

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without probable cause and held him overnight, and Chief of Police “reviewed the behavior

of [the arresting officers] and specifically found it to be in accordance with the San Leandro

Police Department’s policies and procedures”).) To the extent plaintiff alleges defendants’

actions deprived plaintiff of due process, Count One is subject to dismissal without leave to

amend. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (holding claim of unreasonable seizure

arises under Fourth Amendment, not Due Process Clause).3

2. Count Two, by which plaintiff alleges defendants violated § 1983 by depriving him

of due process when they arrested and detained him, is subject to dismissal without leave

to amend. See id.

3. Count Three, by which plaintiff alleges defendants engaged in a conspiracy to

“falsely manufacture evidence of [p]laintiff’s intoxication,” (see AC ¶ 112), is not subject to

dismissal for the reason offered by the City. Contrary to the City’s argument, a plaintiff

alleging a conspiracy claim under § 1983 need not plead an agreement between a private

citizen and a government actor. See, e.g., Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5

F. 3d 685, 700 (3rd Cir. 1993) (affirming decision finding municipal agency conspired with

another municipal agency to deprive plaintiff of civil rights); see also Paine v. City of

Lompoc, 265 F. 3d 975, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding claim that two police officers

conspired to fabricate evidence was “legally viable,” but further finding plaintiff failed to offer

sufficient evidence to prove fact of conspiracy).

4. Count Four, by which plaintiff alleges the City violated § 1983 by knowingly failing

to instruct its officers to refrain from committing unlawful arrests, (see Compl. ¶ 104), is not

subject to dismissal to the extent such claim is based on the Fourth Amendment. See

Fairley v. Luman, 281 F. 3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding “liability [against municipality]

may attach where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through the

execution of an official policy, practice, or custom”). To the extent plaintiff alleges the City’s

failure to provide training deprived plaintiff of due process, however, the claim is subject to

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The City offers no argument as to why Count Eight, alleging a claim for assault,

should be dismissed.

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dismissal without leave to amend. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.

5. Count Five, by which plaintiff alleges defendants violated § 1983 by engaging in

malicious prosecution, is subject to dismissal without leave to amend. To state a § 1983

malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plead that criminal proceedings were instituted

against him with the intent to deprive him of a federal constitutional right. See Usher v. City

of Los Angeles, 828 F. 2d 556, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1987). Although plaintiff alleges, in

conclusory fashion, he was subjected to “criminal proceedings,” (see AC ¶ 122), plaintiff

also alleges he was released the day after his arrest and that he was “never” given his “day

in court,” (see AC ¶¶ 91, 101), which implies no criminal charges were ever filed by the

district attorney against plaintiff. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 26500 (providing “district attorney

. . . shall attend the courts, and within his or her discretion shall initiate and conduct on

behalf of the people all prosecutions for public offenses”). To the extent the AC may be

ambiguous in such respect, however, any ambiguity is fully clarified in plaintiff’s opposition,

wherein plaintiff specifically asserts he was released by defendants “without charges” being

filed. (See Pl.’s Opp. at 4.)

6. Count Six, alleging misuse of legal process, Count Seven, alleging a claim of

false arrest, Count Nine, alleging a claim of battery, Count 10, alleging a claim of

defamation, and Count 11, alleging a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, are

not subject to dismissal based on the reasons argued by the City.4 Even if, as the City

argues, state pleading rules require such claims to be pleaded with specificity, federal

pleading rules do not so require, and the complaint gives the City sufficient notice of the

conduct of the individual defendants for which plaintiff seeks to hold the City vicariously

liable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (providing complaint need only contain “short and plain

statement of the claim”); Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2 (providing municipality “liable for injury

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee . . . within the scope of his

employment if the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of action against

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The City cites cases holding that reports made by citizens to police officers are

absolutely privileged. See Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 355

(2004); Johnson v. Symantec Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Those

cases, however, do not address the question of whether a police officer who knowingly

makes a false statement in a police report is entitled to absolute immunity, and the City

does not explain why the reasoning therein should be extended to the instant case.

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that employee”). Further, with respect to plaintiff’s defamation claim, although the City

argues that police officers are absolutely immune if they make knowingly false statements

in a police report, the City fails to offer any authority in support of such assertion.5

7. Count Twelve, alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment, is subject to

dismissal without leave to amend, because it is wholly duplicative of Counts One and Four.

8. Count Thirteen, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment, is subject to

dismissal without leave to amend. “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protections [do] not attach

until after conviction and sentence.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.6. As discussed

above, the district attorney never instituted charges against plaintiff, and, consequently,

plaintiff cannot allege he was convicted and sentenced for a criminal violation.

9. Count Fourteen, alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is subject to

dismissal without leave to amend, for the reasons stated above with respect to plaintiff’s

other claims alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 395.

10. Count Fifteen, alleging a violation of Article I, section 7 of the California

Constitution, which prohibits deprivations of due process and equal protection, is subject to

dismissal in its entirety and without leave to amend, because a private cause of action is

not available under such section. See Bradley v. Medical Board, 56 Cal. App. 4th 445,

462-63 (1997) (holding “there is [ ] no right to sue for monetary damages” under Article I,

section 7).

11. Count Sixteen, alleging a violation of Article I, section 13 of the California

Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable seizures, is not subject to dismissal. Contrary to

the City’s argument, plaintiff has provided the City sufficient notice of the basis for his claim

of an unreasonable seizure.

12. Count Seventeen, alleging a violation of Article I, section 17 of the California

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Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, is subject to dismissal without

leave to amend, because, as noted, plaintiff cannot allege he was convicted and sentenced

for a criminal violation.

13. Count Eighteen, alleging a violation of Article I, section 29 of the California

Constitution, is subject to dismissal without leave to amend. Said section, which provides

that “[i]n a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to due process

of law and to a speedy and public trial,” see Cal. Const. art. I, § 29, is inapplicable herein;

as used in § 29, “the people of the State of California” refers to the party represented by the

district attorney, not to the arrestee.

14. Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, to the extent such prayer pertains to the

City, will be stricken. Plaintiff may not seek punitive damages from a municipality under

§ 1983, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding

“municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"), or under state

law, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 818 (providing “public entity is not liable for damages awarded

under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of

example and by way of punishing the defendant”).

15. Plaintiff’s prayer for an award of attorney’s fees will be stricken, because plaintiff

is proceeding pro se. See Elwood v. Drescher, 456 F. 3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding

fees may not be awarded to pro se party).

16. The City’s alternative motion for a more definite statement will be denied,

because the remaining claims against the City are not “so vague or ambiguous that [it]

cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, City’s motion to dismiss or for a more definite

statement is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:

1. Counts One and Four are hereby DISMISSED without leave to amend, to the

extent such claims are based on a violation of the Due Process Clause.

2. Counts Two, Five, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Seventeen, and Eighteen

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are hereby DISMISSED in their entirety and without leave to amend.

3. Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is hereby STRICKEN, to the extent such

prayer pertains to the City.

4. Plaintiff’s prayer for an award of attorney’s fees is hereby STRICKEN.

5. In all other respects, the motion is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 18, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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