Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00643/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00643-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARILYN K. FREEMAN,

CDC # X-10599,

Civil No. 06-0643 IEG (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION FOR

RECONSIDERATION 

[Doc. No. 20-1]

AND 

(2) CERTIFYING THAT IFP 

APPEAL WOULD NOT BE 

TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

vs.

PETER C. DEDDEH, San Diego Superior

Court Judge; ROBERT F. O’NEILL, San

Diego Superior Court Judge; DAWN

DAVISON, Warden, California Institution

for Women; BILL LOCKYER, Attorney

General of the State of California, et al.,

Defendants.

Marilyn Kaye Freeman (“Plaintiff”) filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 on March 22, 2006, while incarcerated at the California Institution for Women

(“CIW”). On June 9, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”), but simultaneously granted Defendant Deddeh and O’Neill’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6), dismissed sua sponte Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants Davison and Lockyer for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

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1

 However, Local Rule 7.1(I) does permit motions for reconsideration. Under Local Rule

7.1(I)(1), a party may apply for reconsideration “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition

for any order or other relief has been made to any judge and has been refused in whole or in part....”

S.D.CAL.CIVLR 7.1(I). The party seeking reconsideration must show “what new or different facts and

circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application.”

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and Temporary Restraining Order. (See June 9, 2006 Order [Doc. No. 18] at 15-16.) Because

the Court found further amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint futile, it dismissed the action

without leave to amend. (Id. at 16.)

Specifically, the Court found: (1) Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendant San

Diego Superior Court Judges Deddeh and O’Neill were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, id.

at 6-7; (2) Judges Deddeh and O’Neill were entitled to absolute judicial immunity, id. at 7-8; (3)

Plaintiff’s § 1983 action was barred because a writ of habeas corpus is her exclusive remedy to

the extent her pleading seeks “immediate release from custody,” id. at 8-9 (citing Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005)); (4)

Plaintiff’s request for damages was not yet cognizable because her claims “necessarily implied”

the invalidity of her criminal conviction and/or sentence and she did not allege facts sufficient

to show that conviction or sentence had previously been invalidated, id. at 9-10 (citing Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)); (5) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants CIW Warden

Davison and California’s Attorney General Bill Lockyer required sua sponte dismissal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because her Complaint failed to allege facts to show

that either of them personally caused her constitutional rights to be violated, id. at 13-14, and

finally, (6) Plaintiff was not entitled to a TRO or Preliminary Injunction because she failed to

demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits or the immediate irreparable injury

which is required under FED.R.CIV.P. 65. (Id. at 15.) 

On July 3, 2006, Plaintiff filed an “Application for Reconsideration” of the Court’s June

6, 2006 Order [Doc. No. 20]. On July 28, 2006, Defendants Deddeh and O’Neill filed an

Opposition [Doc. No. 22].

Application for Reconsideration– Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for

reconsideration.1

 However, a motion for reconsideration may be construed as a motion to alter

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Id. Local Rule 7.1(I)(2) permits motions for re consideration within “30 days of the entry of the ruling.”

2

 Rule 59(e) motions must be filed “no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.”

FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e). Here, Plaintiff’s Application for Reconsideration was accepted for filing by the

Clerk on July 3, 2006, but signed by her on June 29, 2006. Thus, even if Plaintiff is given the benefit

of the prisoner “mailbox rule,” her Application is untimely under FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e), because it is

deemed “filed” more than 10 days after the Court’s June 9, 2006 judgment. See Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988). Under Rule 60(b), however, a motion for “relief from judgment or order” may

be filed within a “reasonable time,” but usually must be filed “not more than one year after the

judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” FED.R.CIV.P.60(b). Reconsideration under Rule

60 may be granted in the case of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence; or (3) fraud; or if (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or

(6) for any other reason justifies relief. FED.R.CIV. P. 60(b). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

Motion for Reconsideration is timely under both Rule 60 and S.D.CAL.CIVLR7.1(I)(2) because it was

filed within 30 days of this Court’s June 6, 2006 Order. The Ninth Circuit has held that a timely filed

motion for reconsideration under a local rule should be construed under the provisions of Rule 59(e).

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Bestran Corp. v. Eagle Comtronics,

Inc., 720 F.2d 1019, 1019 (9th Cir.1983) (A “timely filed motion for reconsideration under a local rule

is a motion to alter or amend a judgment under FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e).”). 

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or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).2 See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489

U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir.

1994). In Osterneck, the Supreme Court stated that “a postjudgment motion will be considered

a Rule 59(e) motion where it involves ‘reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a

decision on the merits.’” 489 U.S. at 174 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employ’t

Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). Under Rule 59(e), “[r]econsideration is appropriate if the

district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the

initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.

There may also be other, highly unusual, circumstances warranting reconsideration.” School

Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has provided the Court with no newly discovered evidence, failed to show

how the Court committed clear error or rendered a manifestly unjust decision, and has further

failed to identify any intervening changes in controlling law that would demand a different

result. School Distr. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Instead, Plaintiff merely claims the Court “made

a clear error of fact” when it found Defendants Deddeh and O’Neill entitled to judicial

immunity. (See Pl.’s App. for Recons. at 1-2.) Plaintiff claims the Court misinterpreted her

allegations against the Judges as a challenge to their decision not to recuse themselves. (Id. at

2.) Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration arguing that Judges Deddeh and O’Neill did recuse

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themselves, but nevertheless thereafter “took judicial action against her” “without any

jurisdiction.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff’s distinction, however, makes no legal difference. No matter

how she wishes to parse her claim, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Judges Deddeh and O’Neill

violated her constitutional rights during state criminal proceedings because they were

“prejudiced” and “biased” against her, and yet ultimately decided, after being asked repeatedly

by Plaintiff to remove themselves from presiding over her matter, that recusal was not warranted.

(See Compl. at 3-4, 57, 60, 62-63.) Plaintiff has offered no new evidence in this regard, nor has

she pointed to any authority to support her contention that Defendants Deddeh and O’Neill acted

“in the absence of all jurisdiction” when refusing to recuse. School Distr. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263.

 In fact, this Court can find only authority which supports its initial decision. In every

case of which this Court is aware, a failure to recuse has been held to be a “judicial act” for

purposes of absolute immunity. See Callahan v. Rendlen, 806 F.2d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1986);

Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961, 973 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Seto v. McMahon, 862 F.Supp.

255, 257 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Shepherdson v. Nigro, 5 F.Supp.2d 305, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Schiff

v. Dorsey, 877 F.Supp. 73, 76 (D. Conn. 1994); Sato v. Plunkett, 154 F.R.D. 189, 191 (N.D. Ill.

1994); Font v. Dapena Yordan, 763 F.Supp. 680, 682 (D.P.R. 1991); Iseley v. Bucks County, 549

F.Supp. 160, 164-65 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Schafer v. Buhl, 1994 WL 669688, *2 (W.D.

Mich. 1994) (decisions regarding recusal are “indisputably” judicial acts).

Moreover, even if Judges Deddeh and O’Neill were not entitled to absolute judicial

immunity, the Eleventh Amendment still bars Plaintiff’s claims for damages, a § 1983 suit

seeking both damages and injunctive relief in the form of court-ordered release is still not

cognizable under Preiser, Heck and Wilkinson, and Plaintiff has still failed to show that the

remaining two Defendants, Warden Davison and Attorney General Lockyer, personally caused

a violation of any identifiable constitutional right. (See June 9, 2006 Order at 8-14.) Finally,

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration offers no new evidence, and does not point to any

intervening change in the law which might suggest that the Court’s June 9, 2006 denial of her

Motion for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction was “manifestly unjust.” School Distr. No. 1J,

5 F.3d at 1263. 

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Thus, without more, and because reconsideration is not warranted merely because

Plaintiff is unhappy with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the facts to

binding precedent or because she disagrees with its ultimate decision, Plaintiff’s Application for

Reconsideration must be DENIED. See 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller Federal

Practice & Procedure 2d § 2858 (citing Edwards v. Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504, 507 (D.C. Wis.

1956)). 

Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for

Reconsideration [Doc. No. 20-1] is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that an IFP appeal from either this Order or the Court’s

June 6, 2006 Order would be frivolous and therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner

v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on

appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

DATED: September 13, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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