Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02259/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02259-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDE CARR,

CDCR #E-22561,

Civil No. 14-CV-2259 H (JLB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[Doc. No. 1] 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1)

AND

(3) GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

vs.

J. TORQUATO, Corrections Officer;

WARDEN, Calipatria State Prison,

Defendants.

Claude Carr (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at California State Prison’s

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran, California, and proceeding

pro se, lodged a civil rights complaint against Correctional Officer J. Torquato and an

unnamed warden (“Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Central District of

California on August 4, 2014, together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 1, 3.) On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

amend the complaint in order to correct the spelling of Defendant Torquato’s name. 

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(Doc. No. 5.) For the reasons below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed in

forma pauperis, denies Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend as moot, and sua sponte

dismisses the complaint for failing to state a claimpursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

and § 1915A(b)(1).

Background

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Central District of California claiming that

Defendant Torquato violated his constitutional rights at Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”)

in November 2013. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Torquato made false and libelous

statements on a CDC Form128-B “chrono” related to Plaintiff’s alleged attempts to copy

pornography in violation of institutional mail procedures. (Doc. No. 3 at 5.) 

On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint because he noticed Defendant Torquato’s last name was misspelled as

“Torguato” on the Court’s docket. (Doc. No. 5.) Plaintiff does not seek leave to amend

his pleading; instead he seeks leave merely to correct the docket so that it reflects the

proper spelling of Defendant Torquato’s name.

On September 22, 2014, the Court in the Central District transferred the case to

this Court for lack of proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), and vacated the

order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and declined to rule on Plaintiff’s pending

motion to amend so that the transferee court could resolve both matters. (Doc. No. 7 at

2–3.) 

Discussion

I. Request to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after 1

May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a),

(b); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May

1, 2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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entire fee only if the court grants him leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a

prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution

having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of

the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds

$10, and forwards them to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows no monthly

deposits or balance and a current available balance of zero at the time he submitted it for

filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial

partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as

a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure

to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available”). 

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The Court therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP (Doc. No. 1), and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The $350 balance of the

filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) will be collected and forwarded to the Clerk

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA also

requiresthe Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those,

like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a complaint, or any portion of a complaint,

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeking damages from defendants

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d

1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaintstates a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

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veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998) (noting that section 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Nevertheless, the reviewing court need not accept “legal

conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009). The court “ha[s] an obligation

where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir.

1985)). But a court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are

not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Respondeat Superior and Individual Liability

Plaintiff has included an unidentified Warden at CAL as a defendant, seeking to

sue him in his official capacity as the facilitator of CAL at the time that Defendant

Torquato allegedly violated his rights. (Doc. No. 3 at 3.) 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must

plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

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actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Cmty.

Redevelopment Agency of City of L.A., 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se

plaintiffs must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in” to state a claim).

Plaintiff’s complaint contains no specific factual allegations directly related to the

Warden and it includes no details as to what the Warden did, or failed to do, to violate

his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that

“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). Plaintiff alleges only that the Warden was the

“facilitator of [the] prison at the time [the] violation occurred.” (Doc. No. 3 at 3.)

Plaintiff’s pleading must include sufficient “factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the [Defendant is] liable for the misconduct

alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and describe personal acts by the Defendant that show

a direct causal connection to a violation of specific constitutional rights. Maxwell v.

Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983

claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The

inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities

of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). 

A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if

the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and

with deliberate indifference failed to prevent them. Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1086. Because

Plaintiff’s allegations rest entirely on the Warden’s role as a “facilitator” of the entire

prison, they are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. The Court therefore dismisses them

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

D. “False” and “Libelous” Statements

As to Defendant Torquato, Plaintiff alleges he generated a CDC-128B chrono2

which contained false and libelous statements regarding Plaintiff’s prior attempts to copy

pornographic material. (Doc. No. 3 at 5.) Plaintiff concedes he was found guilty of a

rules violation for possessing pornographic material. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Torquato falsely included information in his prison file which suggested he

had tried to copy pornographic material or circumvent institutional mail policy. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Torquato relied on this false statement to request that

Plaintiff be removed from his job. (Id.)

Even when alleged to have occurred under color of state law, defamation alone

does not amount to a constitutional violation unless it is accompanied by harm to “some

more tangible interests.” See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Therefore, a §

1983 plaintiff must allege the loss of a constitutionally protected property or liberty

interest in addition to an injury to his reputation. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520,

1532 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 963 F.2d 1220, 1235 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). This is

the “defamation-plus” test. See id.

“A § 1983 ‘defamation-plus’ claim requires an allegation of injury to a plaintiff’s

reputation from defamation accompanied by an allegation of injury to a recognizable

property or liberty interest.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 444 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1532). “‘There are two ways to state a cognizable

§ 1983 claim for defamation-plus: (1) allege that the injury to reputation was inflicted

Pursuant to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s 2

(“CDCR”) Operations Manual, correctional staff use “CDC Form 128 series (chronos)

. . . to provide progress reports on inmates.” See CDCR Operations Manual §§ 72010.6

(2014). A CDC-128B chronos records “matters of classification, parole, or social

service,” including “behavior, personal cleanliness, general attitude, and personality,”

and a CDC Form 128B-1 “is initiated when an adverse classification action may occur

or a major program change is anticipated.” See id. §§ 72010.7, 72010.7.1.

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in connection with a federally protected right; or (2) allege that the injury to reputation

caused the denial of a federally protected right.’” Id. (quoting Herb Hallman Chevrolet

v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645 (9th Cir. 1999)). In other words, “[d]efamation, by

itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most states, but not a constitutional

deprivation.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Torquato generated the chrono

“in connection with” Plaintiff’s federally protected rights, or that it caused the denial of

such rights. Crowe, 608 F.3d at 444. Plaintiff enjoys no constitutional right to prison

employment or any specific job or work assignment within the prison. See Vignolo v.

Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting inmates have no constitutional right

to work); Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989) (no constitutional

right to continued participation in work release programsufficient to implicate a property

interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276, 279

(8th Cir. 1987) (inmates have no constitutional right to be assigned a particular job). 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for

relief against Defendant Torquato upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, and

dismisses his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. Grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

(Doc. No. 1.)

2. Ordersthe Secretary of the CDCR or his designee to collect fromPlaintiff’s

prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case and to garnish monthly

payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income

and forward them to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account

exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS

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ACTION.

3. Directs the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this order on Jeffrey A.

Beard, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. Dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failing to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). The Court grants Plaintiff

forty-five (45) days leave to file an amended complaint that cures all noted deficiencies

of pleading. Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference 3

to his original pleading. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading

supersedes the original.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation

omitted) (“All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in

an amended complaint are waived.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: November 12, 2014 ________________________________

HON. MARILYN L. HUFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint in order to

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correct the spelling of Defendant Torquato’s last name. (Doc. No. 5.) The transfer order from the

Central District of California contained the correct spelling of Defendant Torquato’s last name, and the

spelling is currently correct on the docket. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is moot. 

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