Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05054/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05054-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HYPERION SOLUTIONS CORP,

Plaintiff,

v

HYPERROLL, INC, et al,

Defendants. /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

 /

No C-04-5054 VRW

Consolidated with

C-05-2431 VRW

ORDER

Defendant/counterclaimant HyperRoll Israel Ltd

(“HyperRoll”) owns United States Patent Nos 6,385,604 (“the ‘604

patent”) and 6,434,544 (“ the ‘544 patent”). Plaintiff/

counterdefendant Hyperion Solutions Corp (“Hyperion”) seeks a

declaration that these patents are invalid or alternatively that

Hyperion has not infringed any valid claims in these patents. Doc

#50 (SAC) ¶¶ 16-22. HyperRoll denies these invalidity and noninfringement contentions and, inter alia, counterclaims that

Hyperion has infringed these patents. Doc #162-1 ¶¶ 16-22, 82-89.

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On April 19, 2006, the court held a claim construction

hearing pursuant to Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 517 US 370

(1996), for the disputed terms in these patents. Based on the

parties’ submissions to the court and their arguments at the

hearing, the court issues the following claim construction order. 

As the court writes principally for the parties, it will not

discuss the details of the inventions or define terms well-known to

those skilled in the art, except as is necessary to construe the

patent claims.

I

The construction of patent claims is a question of law to

be determined by the court. Id at 384. The goal of claim

construction is “to interpret what the patentee meant by a

particular term or phrase in a claim.” Renishaw PLC v Marposs SpA,

158 F3d 1243, 1249 (Fed Cir 1998). In doing so, the court looks

first to the claim itself:

The claims of the patent provide the concise formal

definition of the invention. They are the numbered

paragraphs which “particularly [point] out and

distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the

applicant regards as his invention.” 35 USC § 112. 

It is to these wordings that one must look to

determine whether there has been infringement. 

Courts can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to

give the patentee something different than what he

has set forth. No matter how great the temptations

of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework

claims. They only interpret them.

EI Du Pont de Nemours & Co v Phillips Petroleum Co, 849 F2d 1430,

1433 (Fed Cir 1988).

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“The claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the

claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases

with the actual words of the claim.” Renishaw, 158 F3d at 1248. 

“The words used in the claim are viewed through the viewing glass

of a person skilled in the art.” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v Intuitive

Surgical, Inc, 326 F3d 1215, 1220 (Fed Cir 2003) (citing Tegal Corp

v Tokyo Electron Am, Inc, 257 F3d 1331, 1342 (Fed Cir 2001)). 

“Absent a special and particular definition created by the patent

applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and

accustomed meaning.” York Prods, Inc v Central Tractor Farm &

Family Ctr, 99 F3d 1568, 1572 (Fed Cir 1996). The court may, if

necessary, consult a variety of sources to determine the ordinary

and customary meaning of a claim term, including “the words of the

claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the

prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant

scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the

state of the art.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc v Safari Water, 381 F3d

1111, 1116 (Fed Cir 2004).

The court begins its construction of claim terms by

consulting intrinsic evidence of the meaning of disputed claim

terms, which includes the claims, the specification and the

prosecution history (if in evidence). Lacks Industries, Inc v

McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc, 322 F3d 1335, 1341 (Fed Cir

2003) (citation omitted). “If upon examination of this intrinsic

evidence the meaning of the claim language is sufficiently clear,

resort to ‘extrinsic’ evidence * * * should not be necessary.” 

Digital Biometrics, Inc, v Identix, Inc, 149 F3d 1335, 1344 (Fed

Cir 1998). “[I]f after consideration of the intrinsic evidence,

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there remains doubt as to the exact meaning of the claim terms,

consideration of extrinsic evidence may be necessary to determine

the proper construction.” Id. Although extrinsic evidence such as

expert and inventor testimonies, dictionaries and learned treatises

can shed useful light on the relevant art, extrinsic evidence is

“less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the

legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips v AWH Corp,

415 F3d 1303, 1317 (Fed Cir 2005) (quoting C R Bard, Inc v United

States Surgical Corp, 388 F3d 858, 862 (Fed Cir 2004)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

“[A] court may constrict the ordinary meaning of a claim

term in at least one of four ways[:]” (1) “if the patentee acted as

his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the

disputed claim in either the specification or prosecution history;”

(2) “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee

distinguished [the] term from prior art on the basis of a

particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or

described a particular embodiment as important to the invention;”

(3) “if the term chosen by the patentee so deprives the claim of

clarity as to require resort to the other intrinsic evidence for a

definite meaning;” or (4) “if the patentee phrased the claim in

step- or means-plus-function format,” then “a claim term will cover

nothing more than the corresponding structure or step disclosed in

the specification, as well as equivalents thereto * * *.” CCS

Fitness, Inc v Brunswick Corp, 288 F3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed Cir 2002)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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Limitations from the specification, such as from a

preferred embodiment, cannot be read into the claims unless

expressly intended by the patentee. Teleflex, Inc v Ficosa North

Am Corp, 299 F3d 1313, 1326 (Fed Cir 2002) (“The claims must be

read in view of the specification, but limitations from the

specification are not to be read into the claims.”). And “a

construction that excludes a preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if

ever, correct.’” C R Bard, 388 F3d at 865 (citing Vitronics Corp v

Conceptronic, Inc, 90 F3d 1576, 1583 (Fed Cir 1996)).

With these legal principles in mind, the court now

construes the disputed claim language in the patents.

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6

II The ‘604 patent

A. “Relational database management system (RDBMS)

“Relational database management system,” or RDBMS,

appears in the preambles of independent claims 1 and 15 and

dependent claims 2-14. The term also appears in the body of

dependent claim 20, which indirectly stems from independent claim

1, and dependent claims 21-22, which stem from independent method

claim 15. HyperRoll contends that construing the term is

unnecessary because “[t]he body of independent claim 1 defines a

complete invention * * *.” Doc #194-1 (HyperRoll Br) at 4. If

construed, HyperRoll proposes, “[A] database that is organized and

accessed according to relationships between data items.” Doc #198,

Ex A (Joint Cl Const) at 3.

Hyperion counters that RDBMS should be construed because,

based on the title of the invention, specification and prosecution

history, “it is clear that the claims only have meaning in light of

the context of an RDBMS and that integration within an RDBMS is a

fundamental characteristic of the claim invention that is properly

construed as a limitation of the claim itself.” Doc #193 (Hyperion

Br) at 8. Hyperion proposes a lengthy construction: “a software

program in which (1) the data is perceived by the user as stored

exclusively in tables; and (2) the operators (i e, queries)

available to the users generate new tables.” Joint Cl Const at 3.

The Federal Circuit has noted that determining whether a

preamble limits claim scope requires a “review of the entire[] * *

* patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually

invented and intended to encompass by the claim.” Catalina

Marketing Intl v Coolsavings.com, Inc, 289 F3d 801, 808 (Fed Cir

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2002) (quoting Corning Glass Works v Sumitomo Electric USA, Inc,

868 F2d 1251, 1257 (Fed Cir 1989). In general:

[A] preamble limits the invention if it recites

essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary

to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim. 

Conversely, a preamble is not limiting where a

patentee defines a structurally complete invention in

the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a

purpose or intended use for the invention.

Id (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although “[n]o

litmus test defines when a preamble limits claim scope,” id at 808-

09, the Federal Circuit has identified certain “guideposts” to help

determine the preamble’s effect on claim scope. For example, the

preamble may limit claim scope if: (1) A claim depends on a

preamble phrase for antecedent basis, id at 808; (2) “[T]he

preamble is essential to understand limitations or terms in the

claim body,” id; (3) The preamble “recit[es] additional structure

or steps underscored as important by the specification,” id or (4)

The patentee “clear[ly] reli[ed] on the preamble during prosecution

to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art,” id. On

the other hand, a preamble does not limit claim scope merely

because it “extol[s] benefits or features of the claimed invention”

or “describ[es] the use of an invention.” Id at 809.

Based on these considerations, the court concludes that

RDBMS need not be construed. Hyperion argues that although RDBMS

is in the preamble, the term further limits the scope of the claims

because an RDBMS is central to the present invention, as

demonstrated by the title, specification and prosecution history of

the ‘604 patent. Hyperion Br at 8. But this argument misses the

mark. The centrality of the RDBMS to the present invention is not

the issue; rather, the question is whether the body of a claim

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recites sufficient structure to define an RDBMS. This requires

comparing the claimed structure to the embodiments described in the

specification; if the body of the claim covers an embodiment of an

RDBMS described in the specification, the body has recited

sufficient structure and no additional structure need be inferred

from the preamble.

Claim 1, which appears to be the primary disputed claim

on this point, states:

1. A relational database management system (RDBMS)

comprising:

a relational data store storing fact data;

an aggregation module, operatively coupled to

the relational data store, for aggregating the fact

data and storing the resultant aggregated data in a

non-relational multi-dimensional data store;

a query servicing mechanism, operatively coupled

to the aggregation module, for servicing query

statements generated in response to user input, said

query servicing mechanism comprising:

a reference generating mechanism for

generating a user-defined reference to

aggregated fact data generated by the

aggregation module; and

a query processing mechanism for processing

a given query statement, wherein, upon

identifying that the given query statement is on

said user-defined reference, communicates with

said aggregation module over an interface

therebetween to retrieve portions of aggregated

fact data pointed to by said reference that are

relevant to said given query statement.

‘604 patent at claim 1. The components described in this claim

generally mirror those depicted in FIG 6A, which shows a relational

data store, a multi-dimensional data aggregation module and some

type of query processing or support mechanism. Compare id at claim

1 with id at FIG 6A. Because the patent describes FIG 6A as “a

schematic representation of a generalized embodiment of an RDBMS of

the present invention,” id at 8:46-47, the RDBMS in claim 1 appears

structurally complete based on the body of the claim alone. This

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is not to say that claim 1 or any of the other claims are limited

to the embodiment depicted in FIG 6A. Rather, the court simply

notes that because the body of claim 1 roughly parallels the

embodiment in FIG 6A, there is no need to read in additional

limitations based on the preamble.

Still, the court observes that the bodies of dependent

claims 20-22 add other limitations to the “RDBMS.” See, e g, id at

claim 21 (“The method of claim 15, wherein said RDBMS is used as an

enterprise wide data warehouse that interfaces to a plurality of

information technology systems.”). This usage of RDBMS in these

dependent claim bodies suggests that the term might serve as an

additional limitation in independent claims 1 and 15, even though

those claims mention “RDBMS” only in their preambles. See Catalina

Marketing Intl, 289 F3d at 808.

But even if RDBMS did limit independent claims 1 and 15,

Hyperion’s proposed construction would be problematic because of

its heavy and unnecessary reliance on an extrinsic source, C J

Date, An Introduction to Database Systems, Addison-Wesley, Seventh

Edition, 2000 (“C J Date”). The Federal Circuit has suggested that

the specification includes sources that are incorporated by

reference. See AquaTex Industries, Inc v Techniche Solutions, 419

F3d 1374, 1378, 1381 (Fed Cir 2005). Although the patent cites to

different portion of C J Date and incorporates these sections by

reference, Hyperion’s construction relies on an uncited portion of

that book. Hyperion Br at 9-10. Hyperion counters that the patent

actually incorporated the entire book by reference and therefore

this uncited portion constitutes intrinsic evidence. But this

argument makes little sense given that the patent cites to

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different portions of C J Date on three separate occasions and each

time states that the source is “incorporated by reference in its

entirety.” See ‘604 patent at 4:6-11; 12:47-52; 12:60-64. If the

patent had actually incorporated the entire book, then it would not

have done so three times. Rather, the multiple incorporations

indicate that the patent only incorporated the particular sections

of the book that were relied upon. Hyperion’s construction

therefore primarily rests on extrinsic evidence and is disfavored.

In sum, the court rejects Hyperion’s proposed

construction and declines to construe RDBMS.

B. “Query statement”

This term appears in claims 1-3, 5, 11, 15, 16, 18 and

24. Hyperion contends that “[t]he ‘604 Patent distinguishes

between a ‘query’ and a ‘query statement.’” Hyperion Br at 10. In

particular, Hyperion posits that “[a] query is received by the

query interface (either directly from the user, or from a client

machine operated by the user)” but “[a] query statement * * * is

generated by the query interface in response to the query, and used

in examining the user-defined reference to aggregated fact data.” 

Id at 11 (emphasis omitted). Hyperion further asserts that “since

the DBMS is relational, the query statement is a relational

database language request.” Id. HyperRoll counters that

construction of this term would be inappropriate because Hyperion

“did not assert that the term ‘query statement’ needed construction

in its original Pat[] L R 4-1 contentions served on October 7,

2005.” Joint Cl Const at 20. If the term is construed, HyperRoll

proposes the definition, “a search question that tells the program

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what kind of data should be retrieved from the database.” Id at

20-21.

Putting aside Hyperion’s purported procedural default, a

rigid distinction between “query” and “query statement” is not

supported by the specification. “Query statement” appears only

twice in the specification and on each occasion, the patent uses

the term interchangeably with “query.” Id at 10:66-11:2 (“The

query interface and query handler service user-submitted queries

(in the preferred embodiment, SQL query statements) forwarded, for

example, from a client machine over a network as shown.” (emphasis

added)); id at 11:40-43 (“The SQL handler of the MDD Aggregation

module services user-submitted queries (in the preferred

embodiment, SQL query statements) forwarded from the query handler

of the RDBMS.” (emphasis added)). Hence, this usage indicates that

contrary to Hyperion’s construction, “query” and “query statement”

can be synonymous with one another.

Moreover, although dependent claims 11 and 24 distinguish

between “query statements” and a “natural language query,” this

indicates that, at best, a “query” and a “query statement” can be

different. Nowhere do the specification or claims demand the

unbending distinction that Hyperion proposes.

Additionally, Hyperion’s proposed definition

unnecessarily limits query statements to those made in a

“relational database language.” This definition impermissibly

incorporates limitations from a preferred embodiment depicted in

FIGS 6A-6B of the specification. See Teleflex, 299 F3d at 1326. 

Because the court agrees with HyperRoll that “[t]he patent uses

‘query’ and ‘query statement’ according to common meanings,”

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HyperRoll Br at 15, the court declines to construe either of these

terms.

C. “User-defined reference to aggregated fact data”

This term appears in claim 1. Hyperion proposes that the

term means a “link from a relational database language request to

data in a multidimensional data store.” Hyperion Br at 11. 

HyperRoll instead contends that the term means a “user-defined

pointer to aggregated fact data.” HyperRoll Br at 16.

Hyperion’s proposed construction is problematic for many

reasons. First, Hyperion seeks to incorporate implicitly its

proposed construction for “query statement” (“relational database

language request”), which is a construction the court has already

rejected. Second, Hyperion’s proposed construction improperly

reads out the requirements that the reference be “user-defined” and

that the fact data be “aggregated.”

Morever, Hyperion improperly limits the definition of

this term based on a disclosed embodiment in the specification. 

Hyperion relies on the steps shown in the flow chart in FIGS 6C1

and 6C2 to contend that “[t]he ‘604 Patent itself describes the

‘user-defined reference to aggregated fact data’ as providing a

link from a relational database language request to data in a

multidimensional data store.” Hyperion Br at 11. But even if this

were true, it would be improper to limit the claim based solely on

this disclosed embodiment, as the court has already explained.

Additionally, Hyperion’s construction improperly limits

the term “reference” to a “link.” In describing an exemplary

embodiment of a “reference,” the patent notes:

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This reference is preferably defined using the Create

View SQL statement, which allows the user to: i)

define a table name (TN) associated with the MDD

database stored in the MDD Aggregation Module, and

ii) define a link used to route SQL statements on the

table TN to the MDD Aggregation Module.

Id at 12:39-44 (emphasis added). This description indicates that

at least in some embodiments, a reference may be more than just a

link and may also include a “table name” associated with the MDD

database.

Hyperion correctly notes that during reexamination,

HyperRoll distinguished this patent over a prior art reference by

noting that the user-defined reference “allows a user of the RDBMS

to query aggregated fact data stored in a multidimensional data

store that is separate from the relational data store.” Hyperion

Br, Ex G at 27-28. But contrary to Hyperion’s suggestion, it would

be redundant to import any of these limitations into the definition

of “user-defined reference to aggregated fact data” because claim 1

already includes these limitations. ‘604 patent at claim 1 (A

“user-defined reference” is used “to retrieve portions of

aggregated fact data” stored “in a non-relational multi-dimensional

data store” that is part of an “aggregation module” separate from a

“relational data store.”).

The court agrees with HyperRoll that the term “userdefined” and “aggregated fact data” do not need additional

construction, as their plain meaning corresponds with their usage

in claim 1. The court, however, declines to follow HyperRoll’s

proposed construction of a “reference” as a “pointer.” A “pointer”

is a specific and well-known term of art in computer science. See,

e g, Microsoft Computer Dictionary 348 (4th ed 1999) (“pointer * *

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* “[i]n programming and information processing, a variable that

contains the memory location (address) of some data rather than the

data itself”). Although the court does not dispute that in some

embodiments a “reference” might be a “pointer,” the court does not

read claim 1 as requiring a “reference” to be limited necessarily

to just a pointer. Moreover, the meaning of “reference” is clear

from its usage in claim 1 and no further construction is needed.

In sum, the court rejects both parties’ proposed

constructions and declines to construe this term.

D. “Interface therebetween”

For this seemingly simple term, Hyperion proposes a long

and complicated construction: a “component that maps the data types

of a relational database request (or a standard data type used to

represent the relational database request) into the data types used

in a multidimensional database aggregation module.” Joint Cl Const

at 27. HyperRoll counters that any construction of this term would

be inappropriate because Hyperion “did not assert that the term

‘interface therebetween’ needed construction in its original Pat[]

L R 4-1 contentions.” Joint Cl Const at 27. If the term is

construed, HyperRoll proposes the definition, “an interface between

the aggregation module and the query processing mechanism.” Id at

27-28.

Hyperion contends that “the ‘interface’ HyperRoll argued

to the PTO was obviously different than the traditional

‘interface.’” Doc #197 (Hyperion Reply Br) at 6. In particular,

Hyperion points to a specific embodiment of the interface described

in the specification and contends that FIG 6A was “amended by

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HyperRoll to depict the SQL Interface in order to convince the PTO

to allow the claims.” Hyperion Br at 13.

First, Hyperion is incorrect in contending that HyperRoll

amended the drawings to distinguish the invention from the prior

art. The examiner had stated “that the applicants need to ensure

that the interfaces are supported in the specification, claims, and

Figures.” Doc #193, Ex C at 2. In response, the applicants added

the “SQL Interface” to FIGS 6A and 13 and added the “over an

interface therebetween” language to claim 1. Id at 4, 7, 19. The

prosecution history does not suggest that this claim limitation

only encompassed the SQL Interface depicted in the exemplary

embodiments shown in FIGS 6A and 13.

More importantly, Hyperion’s proposed construction

impermissibly limits this term to an exemplary embodiment and fails

to recognize that the specification states that a variety of

interface types can be used:

The SQL handler of the MDD Aggregation module may

communicate with the query handler of the RDBMS over

a standard interface (such as OLDB, OLE-DB, ODBC,

SQL, API, JDBC, etc.). In this case, the support

mechanisms of the RDBMS and SQL handler include

components that provide communication of such data

over these standard interfaces. Such interface

components are well known in the art.

‘604 patent at 11:43-50. Although the “standard interfaces”

described here apparently are SQL interfaces, this broad language

indicates that the “interface” need not be as limited as Hyperion

suggests.

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Moreover, Hyperion’s proposed construction would render

superfluous dependent claims 13 and 14, which specify respectively

that the “interface” in claim 1 can be a “standard interface” and

that the “standard interface is selected from the group consisting

of OLDB, OLE-DB, ODBC, SQL, JDBC.” By requiring the “interface” to

handle relational database requests, Hyperion’s proposed

construction would violate “[t]he doctrine of claim

differentiation[, which] ‘creates a presumption that each claim in

a patent has a different scope.’” Free Motion Fitness, Inc v Cybex

Intl, 423 F3d 1343, 1351 (Fed Cir 2005) (quoting Comark

Communications, Inc v Harris Corp, 156 F3d 1182, 1187 (Fed Cir

1998)).

On the contrary, HyperRoll’s simpler construction mirrors

the language in claim 1, as the “interface therebetween” is

described as an interface between the query processing mechanism

and the aggregation module. ‘604 patent at claim 1. Accordingly,

the court adopts HyperRoll’s proposed construction.

E. “Integrated aggregation module”

“Integrated aggregation module” appears in independent

claim 15. Hyperion contends the term means a “module, performing

aggregation, that is contained within an RDBMS program.” Joint Cl

Const at 33. HyperRoll instead contends that the term should be

construed as a “software module that aggregates fact data and that

works with an RDBMS.” Id. Accordingly, the primary dispute here

appears to be whether the module is contained within the RDBMS or

instead whether it merely works with the RDBMS.

//

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Hyperion contends that the prosecution history supports

its construction because a patent examiner stated in a summary of

an October 16, 2001, interview that “[t]he difference between the

invention and the prior art is the approach that integrates the

MDDB into an RDBMS in order to gain the benefits from each while

overcoming the limitations of each.” Doc #197, Ex B at 1. 

Hyperion’s argument does not even get off the ground because “it is

the applicant, not the examiner, who must give up or disclaim

subject matter that would otherwise fall within the scope of the

claims.” Sorensen v ITC, 427 F3d 1375, 1379 (Fed Cir 2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). But even if the

applicant had made the statement that Hyperion relies upon, the

language is ambiguous enough to support either HyperRoll’s or

Hyperion’s constructions. See id at 1378-79 (“Disclaimers based on

disavowing actions or statements during prosecution * * * must be

both clear and unmistakable.”).

Moreover, Hyperion’s claim construction is problematic

because it introduces the term “contained within,” whose meaning is

unclear. Indeed, Hyperion itself provided varying definitions of

“contained within” in its opening brief and its reply brief. In

its opening brief, Hyperion explained: “[C]omputer code that makes

up the ‘aggregation module’ is contained within the computer code

that makes up the RDBMS program. If they are separate pieces of

software, they are not be [sic] integrated.” Hyperion Br at 13-14. 

In its reply brief, however, Hyperion proposed a somewhat different

definition: “If the module cannot operate independently of the

RDBMS program, [the module] is ‘contained within’ the RDBMS program

and thus integrated within it. If [the module] can operate

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independently of the RDBMS program, then [the module] is not

integrated within it.” Hyperion Reply Br at 7. Hence, Hyperion

has provided two different definitions of “contained within:” the

first focuses on the location of the software module’s code whereas

the second focuses on the functionality of the module. 

Accordingly, Hyperion’s proposed construction would not clarify the

meaning of the term “integrated aggregation module.”

Moreover, at no point does the specification require that

software code for the “integrated aggregation module” be physically

located in the same software code for the RDBMS. Rather, the

specification appears to describe the relationship between the

“integrated aggregation module” and the components in the RDBMS in

functional terms. See ‘604 patent at FIG 6A and accompanying

discussion. Common sense also suggests that the patentees did not

intend to require the code for the “integrated aggregation module”

to be located physically within the RDBMS, given that it would be

trivial to design around such a claimed invention; for example, a

software designer could link the “integrated aggregation module” to

the RDBMS to avoid including the module’s code within the RDBMS but

to achieve the same result.

Nonetheless, HyperRoll’s definition also is problematic

because it unnecessarily imports functional limitations into the

definition of “integrated aggregation module.” The claim language

already describes the functional relationship between the

“integrated aggregation module” and the other components in the

RDBMS. See ‘604 patent at claim 15 (“providing an integrated

aggregation module, operatively coupled to the relational data

store, for aggregating the fact data and storing the resultant

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aggregated data in a non-relational multi-dimensional data store”). 

Hence, it would be superfluous to interpret “integrated aggregation

module” as containing these functional limitations.

Although the court presently declines to construe

“integrated aggregation module,” it flags two issues that might

become relevant later. First, although not raised by either party,

the court notes that the term “integrated aggregation module”

appears to be used in claim 15 in almost the identical manner in

which “aggregation module” is used in claim 1. Compare ‘604 patent

at claim 1 (“an aggregation module, operatively coupled to the

relational data store, for aggregating the fact data and storing

the resultant aggregated data in a non-relational multi-dimensional

data store”) with id at claim 15 (“providing an integrated

aggregation module, operatively coupled to the relational data

store, for aggregating the fact data and storing the resultant

aggregated data in a non-relational multi-dimensional data store”). 

This suggests either that the term “integrated” adds a separate

limitation in claim 15 that does not exist in claim 1 or that the

patentees are essentially using “aggregation module” and

“integrated aggregation module” interchangeably. If necessary,

this issue could be revisited at a later stage in these

proceedings.

Additionally, it is conceivable, as Hyperion suggests,

that the claim language sweeps too broadly and encompasses “clearly

disparate programs [that should not] be considered ‘integrated’ in

an RDBMS.” Hyperion Reply Br at 7. The proper time for Hyperion

to raise this argument is at the summary judgment stage, at which

time it may argue that the patent is invalid in light of the prior

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art.

At the present time, however, because the meaning of

“integrated aggregation module” is sufficiently clear based on the

claim language, the court declines to construes this term.

F. Terms for which the parties dispute whether 35 USC § 112(6)

applies

For each of the following terms, the parties dispute

whether they should be interpreted as means-plus-function terms

under 35 USC § 112(6). Hyperion contends that all of these terms

should be interpreted under that provision. Moreover, Hyperion

asserts that the specification does not recite sufficient structure

to perform the claimed function for any of these terms and

therefore they are indefinite and the claims in which they appear

are invalid. Hyperion Br at 14-18. HyperRoll, not surprisingly,

disputes all of these contentions. HyperRoll Br at 20-24.

In essence, the disputes surrounding these terms appear

to center on whether the term “mechanism” implicates 35 USC §

112(6). Compare Toro Co v Deere & Co, 355 F3d 1313, 1325 (Fed Cir

2004) (finding that the term “control mechanism” was a means-plusfunction term). “A claim limitation that actually uses the word

‘means’ invokes a rebuttable presumption that § 112(6) applies. By

contrast, a claim term that does not use ‘means’ will trigger the

rebuttable presumption that § 112(6) does not apply.” CCS Fitness,

288 F3d at 1369 (citation omitted). Because the word “means” does

not appear in the term, a rebuttable presumption exists that 

§ 112(6) does not apply. As the party seeking to invoke § 112(6),

Hyperion can overcome this presumption by showing, by a

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preponderance of the evidence, that the claim limitation “fails to

recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites a function

without reciting sufficient structure for performing that

function.” Apex Inc v Raritan Computer, Inc, 325 F3d 1364, 1372

(Fed Cir 2003) (quotations omitted).

The threshold issue “is whether the term itself connotes

sufficient structure to one of ordinary skill in the art to perform

the functions identified by each limitation.” Id at 1373; see also

Greenberg v Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc, 91 F3d 1580, 1583 (Fed Cir

1996) (“What is important is not simply that [the term] is defined

in terms of what it does, but that the term, as the name for

structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art.”). 

It is appropriate to consult dictionaries in connection with this

inquiry. Linear Technology Corp v Impala Linear Corp, 379 F3d

1311, 1320 (Fed Cir 2004); see also Apex, 325 F3d at 1373.

Because Hyperion has not stated the level of ordinary

skill in the art, the court adopts HyperRoll’s proposed expertise

level, which the court believes is reasonable. See HyperRoll Br at

4 (“A person of ordinary skill in the relevant art has an

undergraduate degree in computer science, computer engineering,

management information sciences, or the equivalent, and three to

five years experience as a database programmer or analyst.”). 

Nonetheless, the court notes that its analysis for each of these

terms would not change appreciably if the court were to adopt a

somewhat higher or lower expertise level for one skilled in the

art.

//

//

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1. “Query servicing mechanism, operatively coupled to the

aggregation module, for servicing query statements

generated in response to user input”

The court concludes that the term “query servicing

mechanism” as used in claims 1, 3 and 5 would connote sufficient

structure to enable one skilled in the art to create that

component. First, technical dictionary definitions contemporaneous

with the filing of the patent application suggest that the term

itself connotes some structure. See IBM Dictionary of Computing

549 (10th ed 1994) (“query: (1) a request for data from a database,

based on specified conditions”). Cf Microsoft Computer Dictionary

404 (4th ed 1999) (“service: * * * (3) In networking, a

specialized, software-based functionality provided by network

servers —— for example, directory services that provide the network

equivalent of ‘phone books’ needed for locating users and

resources.”). Moreover, the claim describes at least some

structure, noting that the “query servicing mechanism” is

“operatively coupled to the aggregation module” and that the

mechanism services “query statements.”

But perhaps most persuasive is that as a practical

matter, the court believes that a person of ordinary skill in the

art would be able to build a “query servicing mechanism” given that

databases and querying are, after all, well-known and ubiquitous

technologies. See, e g, IBM Dictionary of Computing 549 (10th ed

1994) (citing as an example of querying “a request for availability

of a seat on a flight reservation system”). And in any event,

Hyperion has not shown that it is more likely than not that one of

ordinary skill would be unable to build this component. 

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function construction and declines to construe this term.

2. “Query processing mechanism for processing a given query

statement, wherein, upon identifying that the given query

statement is on said user-defined reference, communicates

with said aggregation module over an interface

therebetween to retrieve portions of aggregated fact data

pointed to by said reference that are relevant to said

given query statement”

The analysis for the previous term also applies to the

term “query processing mechanism,” which appears in claims 1, 2 and

13. Technical dictionaries, the claim language and common sense

indicate that one having ordinary skill would be able to design a

software component that, in essence, identifies a particular kind

of query and if appropriate, communicates with another module over

an interface and retrieves certain data. See Microsoft Computer

Dictionary 359 (4th ed 1999) (“processing * * * “The manipulation

of data within a computer system. Processing is the vital step

between receiving data (input) and producing results (output) ——

the task for which computers are designed.”). Hence, the court

rejects Hyperion’s proposed means-plus-function construction and

declines to construe this term.

3. “Reference generating mechanism for generating a userdefined reference to aggregated fact data generated by

the aggregation module”

The court concludes that the term “reference generating

mechanism” as used in claim 1 would connote sufficient structure to

one skilled in the art to construct that component. As with the

previous terms, technical dictionaries suggest that generating

“references” is something that a person of ordinary skill in the

art could do. Cf Microsoft Computer Dictionary 378 (4th ed 1999)

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(“[to] reference * * * “To access a variable, such as an element in

an array or a field in a record”). And again, the claim language

provides some structure to guide a would-be programmer. Moreover,

as mentioned earlier, a “reference” may simply be a “pointer” in

some embodiments; common sense indicates that at least in these

situations, one skilled in the art would be capable of creating a

program that generates something as basic as a pointer. 

Accordingly, the court reject Hyperion’s proposed means-plusfunction construction and declines to construe this term.

4. “Data loading mechanism for loading at least fact data

from the relational data store”

For the same reasons as for the previous terms, the court

concludes that the term “data loading mechanism” as used in claims

4, 5, 17 and 18 would connote sufficient structure to one skilled

in the art to build that component. Accordingly, the court rejects

Hyperion’s proposed means-plus-function construction and declines

to construe this term.

//

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III The ‘544 patent

A. “Data aggregation server” and “stand-alone data aggregation

server”

The term “data aggregation server” appears with the

modifier “stand-alone” only in the preamble of independent claim 1

and in the preambles of its dependent claims. As used in claim 1,

it is apparent that “data aggregation server” and “stand-alone data

aggregation server” refer to the same structure. See ‘544 patent

at claim 1 (“A stand-alone data aggregation server” later referred

to as “the data aggregation server comprising”). Hence, although

these terms were briefed separately, the court construes them

simultaneously.

Hyperion contends that “data aggregation server” means a

“computer system programmed to perform data aggregation functions

and not analysis or graphical user interface functions.” Joint Cl

Const at 48. Hyperion further contends that a “stand-alone data

aggregation server” is a “data aggregation server that is external

(self-contained) and operable independently from an OLAP server.” 

Id at 51.

HyperRoll contends that both of these terms should not be

construed because Hyperion did not assert they needed construction

in Hyperion’s original Pat L R 4-1 contentions. Id at 48. 

Hyperion also contends that these terms do not need to be construed

because they appear in only the preamble of the claims. HyperRoll

Br at 4, 7. To the extent the court does construe these terms,

HyperRoll defines “data aggregation server” as a “system or

computer program for performing data aggregation functions” and

“stand-alone data aggregation server” as a “data aggregation server

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that works with an independently operable OLAP server.” Joint Cl

Const at 48, 51.

First, the preamble of independent claim 1 appears to

limit claim scope because limitations in the bodies of various

claims derive their antecedent basis from the preamble. Compare

‘544 patent at claim 1 preamble (“A stand-alone data aggregation

server for use with any one of a plurality of different OLAP

servers * * *.” (emphasis added)) with id at claim 1 body (“the

interface receiving requests communicated from any one of said

plurality of differe[nt] OLAP servers”) and id at claim 2 body

(“wherein the plurality of different OLAP servers comprise a

plurality of different OLAP servers distributed by different

vendors”). See also Catalina Marketing Intl, 289 F3d at 808

(“[D]ependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for

antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a

reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed

invention. Likewise, when the preamble is essential to understand

limitations or terms in the claim body, the preamble limits claim

scope.”).

Turning to construction of the term, the crux of the

dispute between the parties appears to center on two issues: (1)

whether the data aggregation server can perform “analysis or

graphical user interface functions” or whether it is limited to

performing “data aggregation functions” and (2) whether the data

aggregation server is “external (self-contained) and operable

independently from an OLAP server” or whether the server merely

works with an independently operable OLAP server.

//

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Regarding the first issue, the court finds that

Hyperion’s construction improperly limits the functions that a data

aggregation server can perform. This is evident based on dependent

claim 5, which states: “The stand-alone data aggregration [sic]

server of claim 1, wherein computational tasks performed by the

aggregation engine is [sic] restricted to data aggregation

operations.” Because Hyperion’s proposed construction would render

this claim superfluous, it conflicts with the doctrine of claim

differentiation and is disfavored. See Free Motion Fitness, 423

F3d at 1351 (Fed Cir 2005) (quoting Comark, 156 F3d at 1187). On

the other hand, HyperRoll’s proposed definition for “aggregation

server” is consistent with the specification and claim language. 

See, e g, ‘544 patent at 10:17-21 (“[T]he stand-alone Aggregation

Server [in FIG 6A] performs aggregation functions (e g summation of

numbers, as well as other mathematical operations, such as

multiplication, subtraction, division etc) and multi-dimensional

data storage functions”); id at claim 1 (the “data aggregation

server” includes an “aggregation engine” that “perform[s] data

aggregation operations”).

Regarding the second issue, HyperRoll appears to

interpret the modifier “stand-alone” as requiring the OLAP server

to be “independently operable.” But “stand-alone” does not modify

“OLAP server;” “stand-alone” modifies “aggregation server,” thereby

suggesting that the aggregation server must be the claim element

that is able to stand by itself.

//

//

//

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But what does it mean to “stand alone?” The

specification uses the term “external” interchangeably with “standalone.” See ‘544 patent at 6:52-53 (“novel stand-alone (i e,

external) data aggregation server”). The specification also

teaches that a stand-alone aggregation server could be physically

external to an OLAP server. See, e g, id at 13:19-27 (“[T]he

Aggregation Server 603 can be plugged into (e g interfaced to) OLAP

Servers (two shown as 605’ and 605”) of different users or vendors.

* * * This dramatic move discontinues the restricting dependency

of aggregation from the analytical functions of OLAP * * *.”). But

the specification further teaches that a “stand-alone” aggregation

server need not be physically external to the OLAP server, as

demonstrated by one embodiment in which the data aggregation server

“shares the same hardware platform and operating system (OS) that

[is] used to run the [OLAP server].” Id at 15:44-46. Hence,

“standing alone” does not necessitate physical separation between

the aggregation server and the OLAP server.

Rather, the specification consistently describes the

“stand-alone” aggregation server as functionally separate from, but

working with, an OLAP server. See, e g, FIGS 6A, 6E, 7A, 7B. It

would appear that, at a minimum, this would require the software

module for the stand-alone aggregation server to be “separate” from

the software module for the OLAP server; otherwise, the “standalone” limitation would be meaningless. This usage fits with

Hyperion’s proposed construction, which requires the “stand-alone

aggregation server” to be “external [to] and operable independently

from an OLAP server.” Relevant technical dictionaries also support

Hyperion’s construction. See Webster’s New World Computer

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Dictionary 354 (10th ed 2003) (“standalone * * * [s]elf-sufficient;

not requiring any additional component or service”); IBM Dictionary

of Computing 644 (10th ed 1994) (“stand-alone * * * [p]ertaining to

operation that is independent of any other device, program, or

system”); Microsoft Computer Dictionary 421 (4th ed 1999) (“standalone or standalone * * * [o]f, pertaining to, or being a device

that does not require support from another device or system, for

example, a computer that is not connected to a network”). 

Accordingly, it appears that for an “aggregation server” to “stand

alone,” the aggregation server must be able to operate, at least to

some extent, independently of the OLAP server.

In sum, the court adopts HyperRoll’s definition of an

“aggregation server” as a “system or computer program for

performing data aggregation functions.” The court adopts a blend

on the parties’ constructions for a “stand-alone aggregation

server,” which is “an aggregation server that could operate

independently from, but works with, an OLAP server.”

B. “OLAP server” and “for use with any one of a plurality of

different OLAP servers”

“OLAP server” appears in claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 12 and 13 of

the ‘544 patent and “for use with any one of a plurality of

different OLAP servers” appears in claim 1 of that patent. 

Although the parties briefed these terms separately, the court

construes them at the same time. Hyperion contends the term “OLAP

server,” while known in the art, is indefinite because “HyperRoll *

* * elected to use two separate and contradictory definitions of

‘OLAP Server’ in the ‘544 Patent.” Hyperion Br at 14. Hyperion

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further contends that “for use with any one of a plurality of

different OLAP servers” means “capable of being used concurrently

with more than one OLAP Server.” Id at 13.

HyperRoll instead asserts that one of ordinary skill in

the art would know that the “OLAP server” is the OLAP server of the

prior art, i e, a “system or program that accesses data stored in

data stores to provide decision support.” HyperRoll Br at 10. 

HyperRoll asserts that “for use with any one of a plurality of

different OLAP servers” means “capable of being used with different

OLAP servers.” Joint Cl Const at 57.

The dispute between the parties on these terms boils down

to two issues: (1) Is the term “OLAP server” indefinite? (2) Does

“for use with any one of a plurality of different OLAP servers”

require the stand-alone data aggregation server to be capable of

being used concurrently with more than one OLAP server?

First, Hyperion asserts that the conventional, prior art

use of an OLAP server is a server that performs aggregation

functions. Hyperion Reply Br at 14. Hyperion contends that the

patent uses this definition for OLAP server in the background

section, but then the patent “describe[s] an embodiment where the

aggregation functionality is moved from the OLAP server to a standalone data aggregation server. This removes what is considered to

be the essential functionality of an OLAP server from the OLAP

server. * * * [O]nce the aggregation functionality is removed from

an OLAP server, it is no longer an OLAP server, it is something

else.” Hyperion Br at 23.

Hyperion is correct that the patent uses the term “OLAP

server” both to refer to the prior art server that included

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aggregation functionality and the present invention in which the

aggregation functionality is moved to a separate, stand-alone data

aggregation server. But this does not render the term indefinite. 

Contrary to Hyperion’s contention, the prior art OLAP server as

described in the patent could perform some functions other than

aggregation. See, e g, FIG 1B (showing a prior art

“multidimensional OLAP server” containing an “aggregation access

and retrieval module,” an “application logic module” and a

“presentation module”). A person of ordinary skill in the art,

having read the patent and the claims, would conclude that the

“OLAP server” as described in claim 1 retains at least some of

these other functions, even if the aggregation functionality had

been “outsourced” to the data aggregation module. Accordingly, the

term “OLAP server” as used in the claims and explained in the

specification is not “insolubly ambiguous” and therefore is not

indefinite. See Invitrogen Corp v Biocrest Manufacturing, LP, 424

F3d 1374, 1383 (Fed Cir 2005).

Next, Hyperion argues the term “for use with any one of a

plurality of different OLAP servers” means that the stand-alone

data aggregation server must be “capable of being used

concurrently with more than one OLAP server.” But the intrinsic

evidence does not support this construction.

First, the plain language of the term does not suggest

that the aggregation server must be capable of being used with more

than one OLAP server concurrently. The natural meaning of “for use

with any one of a plurality of different OLAP servers” is that the

aggregation server could be used with any one of the servers, but

not necessarily with more than one server at the same time.

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Hyperion also relies on HyperRoll’s amendments to the

drawings and claims, contending that these amendments illustrate

that the stand-alone data aggregation server must be capable of

operating concurrently with a plurality of different OLAP servers. 

Hyperion Br at 22. But Hyperion misreads the prosecution history. 

The patent examiner stated in a summary of an October 16, 2001,

interview, “The applicants agreed to provide numbering of the

figures, and to resolve an inconsistency between Figures 6B and 7A

and also showing a plurality of OLAP servers[] and display a

plurality of OLAP servers.” Doc #197, Ex B at 1. Plaintiffs

subsequently filed an amendment on October 23, 2001, adding, inter

alia, FIG 6E and noting in the specification:

[FIG 6E shows] “the Aggregation Server can be plugged

into (e g, interfaced to) OLAP Servers (two shown as

605’ and 605”) of different users and vendors. As

shown, the Aggregation Server 603 is operably plugged

into (e g, interfaced to) OLAP Server 605’ of one

user or vendor, yet it is also capable of being

operably plugged into OLAP server 605” of another

user or vendor, as indicated by the dotted lines. 

This dramatic move discontinues the restricting

dependency of aggregation from the analytical

functions of OLAP * * *.

The patent never says anything about requiring the aggregation

server to be capable of connecting to the two OLAP servers

concurrently. If anything, the dotted line in FIG 6E suggests that

although one could switch the OLAP server to which the aggregation

server connects, the aggregation server in that embodiment does not

connect to more than one OLAP server at a time. This

interpretation is consistent with the claim language and with

HyperRoll’s proposed construction.

//

//

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Accordingly, the court rejects Hyperion’s contention that

“OLAP server” is indefinite and its proposed construction for the

term “for use with any one of a plurality of different OLAP

servers.” The court adopts HyperRoll’s construction for this term: 

“capable of being used with different OLAP servers.” The court

declines to construe further the term “OLAP server” given that its

meaning is clear in the relevant claims.

C. “aggregation engine * * * storing the resultant aggregated

data in a multidimensional data store”

This term “aggregation engine” appears in claims 1, 5 and

7-10 of the ‘544 patent. Hyperion contends here, as it did for

numerous terms in the ‘604 patent, that “aggregation engine” should

be interpreted as a means-plus-function term under 35 USC § 112(6). 

Hyperion asserts that the specification does not recite sufficient

structure to perform the claimed function for an “aggregation

engine” and therefore the term is indefinite and the claims in

which it appears are invalid. Alternatively, Hyperion contends

that the specification has not enabled one of ordinary skill to

make and use the invention because “HyperRoll has failed to

describe an aggregation engine that would be capable of storing the

resultant aggregated data in a multidimensional data store.” 

Hyperion Br at 25.

The court first addresses Hyperion’s means-plus-function

argument. Hyperion contends that the “aggregation engine does not

connote sufficient structure to perform the storing function[;] at

best it only connotes sufficient structure to perform the

aggregation function.” Hyperion Reply Br at 15. But this argument

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misses the point. The relevant question is whether the claim

recites sufficient structure such that one of ordinary skill in the

relevant art, having read the claim, could build an aggregation

engine. Just because an engine is an “aggregation” engine does not

preclude that engine from also performing some other function, such

as storing data. And common sense dictates that storing data in a

multidimensional database is not a particularly complicated action

that would befuddle one of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly,

such a person likely could read the claim and build an aggregation

engine that also stores data.

Moreover, Hyperion’s enablement argument is without

merit. Contrary to Hyperion’s contention, the specification

describes aggregation engines that store data. See ‘544 patent at

7:37-40 (“[T}he aggregation engine carries out a high-performance

aggregation algorithm and novel storing and searching methods

within the MDDB.”); id at 10:64-11:6 (“[A] stand-alone Aggregation

Server of the present invention, having an integrated aggregation

engine and MDDB * * * the stand-alone Aggregation Server performs

aggregation functions * * * and multi-dimensional data storage

functions * * *”). And as described above, because storing data in

a multidimensional database does not appear to be a particularly

difficult action for one skilled in the art, the court concludes

that the ‘544 patent has satisfied the enablement requirement for

this term.

Accordingly, the court rejects Hyperion’s proposed

construction and declines to construe this term.

//

//

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IV

In sum, the court has construed many of the disputed

terms in the ‘604 and ‘544 patents according to the intrinsic

record. The court declined to construe some terms in these patents

because their meaning was already sufficiently clear.

Additionally, the parties are instructed to appear on

October 3, 2006, at 9:00 AM for a further case management

conference to discuss what issues, if any, remain to be resolved in

these cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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