Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02835/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02835-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARINA LARGE,

NO. 2:08-cv-02835-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA and EDUARDO

BLUMWALD,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This is a sexual harassment and assault action brought under

Title IX and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) by Plaintiff Marina Large (“Plaintiff”) against

Defendants The Regents of the University of California

(“University”) and Eduardo Blumwald (hereafter collectively

referred to as “Defendants”).

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) (ECF No. 58) with

respect to Plaintiff’s Title IX, FEHA, and common law tort claims

against Defendants.

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As set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The alleged sexual harassment occurred during Plaintiff’s

time as a graduate student at U.C. Davis, while working in

Defendant Blumwald’s lab. Plaintiff alleges that Blumwald

sexually harassed her by exposing her to a hostile work

environment, and that the University failed to take reasonable

and timely steps to end the abuse.

Plaintiff came to UC Davis to begin a PhD program in the

Plant Sciences Department in 2002, and in the spring of 2003 

began working as a graduate student under the supervision and

direction of Professor Blumwald. (Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF 1

No. 58-5 at 3.) Within a few months, Blumwald allegedly began

directing sexually offensive and inappropriate comments toward

Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff claims she alerted the Manager of

the Graduate Group Complex to Blumwald’s behavior but to no

avail. (Id.) In late 2004 or early 2005, Blumwald allegedly

slapped Plaintiff’s face and stated, “this is how it’s done in my

lab dear.” (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff claims she once again

reported this incident to the Manager of the Graduate Group

Complex, who claimed she would file a report. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff claims she never received any follow-up information.

(Id.)

 Unless otherwise noted, the Factual Background is taken 1

from the factual allegations laid out in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

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Plaintiff alleges that over the next few years, Blumwald

continued to verbally harass, intimidate and threaten her. (Id.) 

He allegedly commented on her weight and pinched the sides of her

waist. (Id.) He would allegedly comment on her sex life,

remarking, “if you got laid you would be much more happy and

easygoing.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Blumwald often

demeaned her professionally, calling her an “idiot,” and “not fit

to be a graduate student.” (Id.) He allegedly asked her if he

was wasting his time with her because she might choose to have

children instead of pursuing a career in science. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Blumwald threatened to ruin her academic

future, saying he would “fuck” and “screw” her at her thesis

committee meetings. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff claims that on October 18, 2007, she was standing

outside with some friends when Blumwald approached and

interrupted the conversation. (Id.) At one point, Blumwald

allegedly reached across the circle and slapped Plaintiff across

the face. (Id.) Plaintiff reported this incident to the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing on October 9, 2008, and

received a Right-To-Sue letter. (Id. at 2.) 

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her Complaint with the Yolo Superior Court

on October 20, 2008. Defendants removed the case to this Court. 

Plaintiff’s claims are as follows: (1) sexual harassment in

violation of FEHA against University and Blumwald; (2) failure to

prevent sexual harassment in violation of FEHA against

University; (3) sexual harassment in violation of Title IX

against University and Blumwald; (4) failure to prevent sexual

harassment in violation of Title IX against University;

(5) assault and battery against Blumwald; (6) false imprisonment

against Blumwald; (7) intentional infliction of emotional

distress (IIED) against University and Blumwald; (8) negligence

against University and Blumwald; and (9) intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage against Blumwald.

Defendant University moves for summary judgment as to all

claims. Defendant Blumwald also moves for summary judgment on

all claims with the following exceptions; (1) the fifth cause of

action for assault and battery to the extent it is based on an

alleged assault on October 18, 2007, (2) the sixth cause of

action for false imprisonment, and (3) the seventh cause of

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against

Blumwald. (MSJ, ECF No. 58 at 1.) Plaintiff does not contest

Defendants’ Motion as to the ninth cause of action, and therefore

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED regarding the claim for intentional

interference with prospective economic advantage. (Pl.’s Opp. to

MSJ (“Opp.”), ECF No. 59 at 1.)

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STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule

56(c).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-587 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Ser. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448,

20 L. Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen

the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more that simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87. 

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ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ FEHA Challenges

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),

Government Code § 12940(j)(1), provides that it is an unlawful

employment practice for “an employer ... or any other person,

because ... sex [or] gender, ... to harass an employee....

Harassment of an employee ... shall be unlawful if the entity, or

its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this

conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective

action.... An entity shall take all reasonable steps to prevent

harassment from occurring....” Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.,

178 Cal. App. 4th 243, 263 (2009). Further, it is unlawful for

an employer to “fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to

prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12940(k). 

In order to bring a FEHA claim, the Plaintiff must exhaust

administrative remedies by timely filing a charge of

discrimination with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(“DFEH”), and obtaining a right-to-sue letter. Romano v.

Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 492 (1996). Submissions

to DFEH must be construed liberally in favor of the complainant

and in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable

investigation. Nazir, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 268. A civil

complaint under FEHA is within the court’s jurisdiction if its

allegations are “like or related to” those contained in the DFEH

complaint.

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Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th

1607, 1615 (1995).

FEHA claims must be filed within one year of the alleged

discrimination. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960. However, an employer

may be held liable for unlawful actions occurring outside the

limitations period under the “continuing violation doctrine.” 

See Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798, 802 (2001)

(holding that an employer’s series of unlawful actions in a case

of disability harassment should be viewed as a single, actionable

course of conduct under the continuing violation doctrine). The

Richards court said that the continuing violations doctrine

should apply to a course of conduct if “(1) the actions are

sufficiently similar in kind; (2) they occur with sufficient

frequency; and (3) they have not acquired a degree of

‘permanence’ so that employees are on notice that further efforts

at informal conciliation with the employer to obtain

accommodation or end harassment would be futile.” Id. The

Richards court went on to detail the approach adopted in the

Ninth Circuit, which dispenses with the permanence factor. Id.

at 816 (“The test employed is essentially whether the separate

acts of discrimination are ‘closely enough related’ to form a

continuing violation.”) (citing Counts v. Reno, 949 F. Supp.

1478, 1484-86 (D. Hawaii 1996)). There will be no continuing

violation “when the alleged misconduct involves different types

of unlawful discrimination.” Id. (citing Green v. Los Angeles

Cty. Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1481 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s first cause of action

for sexual harassment under FEHA is barred because she allegedly

failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies, and because

her factual allegations do not support a finding of sexual

harassment as a matter of law. (MSJ at 1-2.) Defendants

challenge Plaintiff’s second cause of action for failure to

prevent sexual harassment under FEHA either because she cannot

establish that she was sexually harassed or because the

University in fact did take action to prevent harassment upon

becoming aware of the allegations. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff

responds that she pursued the requisite administrative remedies

by properly filing a complaint with DFEH, stating that she was

harassed. (Opp. at 11-12.)

1. Whether Blumwald’s Conduct Amounted to Sexual

Harassment, and Whether the Continuing Violations

Doctrine Applies to Defendants’ Conduct Are

Disputed Questions of Material Fact.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies under FEHA because she only checked a box

for harassment on the DFEH form, and the description she wrote

states only, “assaulted and battered in lab, and other.” (MSJ at

11.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s current allegations are

outside the scope of those indicated on the DFEH form, and thus

her present FEHA claim is barred. (Id. at 12.) 

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Defendants contend that the continuing violations doctrine

does not save Plaintiff’s claim because she failed to plead, and

is unable to prove, that Blumwald made any sexually harassing

comments, or engaged in sexually harassing conduct, during the

limitations period. (Id. at 13.) Defendants argue that the only

allegedly improper conduct that occurred in the one year before

Plaintiff filed her DFEH complaint are a slap and Blumwald’s

threat to “fuck her” or “screw her” at Plaintiff’s thesis

committee meetings. (Id. at 11.) Defendants contend that these

allegations do not constitute sexual harassment as a matter of

law. (Id. at 11-12.) They also argue that the comments made

over the duration of Plaintiff’s employment were insufficient as

a matter of law to serve as the basis of a sexual harassment

claim. (Id. at 15.) Defendants point out that sexual harassment

involves “the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of

sex - not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language.” 

(Id.) (quoting Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions,

38 Cal. 4th 264, 280 (2006).) 

Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff were able to prove

an act of harassment occurred within the limitations period, the

continuing violations doctrine is inapplicable because the

alleged sexually harassing comments that occurred outside the

limitations period are not similar in kind to the alleged slap. 

(Id. at 14.) Further, Defendants claim that Large’s actions

establish that she believed the harassment had acquired a degree

of permanence before the limitations period, thus barring

application of the continuing violations doctrine. (Id. at

14-15.)

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Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s “inappropriate, vulgar,

and sexually-charged behavior” created a hostile work environment

soon after she began working with him in 2002. (Opp. at 1.) She

describes a number of specific and general instances of both

physical and verbal abuse. Some of the alleged verbal abuse is

distinctly sexual in nature. For example, Plaintiff alleges that

Blumwald made explicit comments relating to her body, her sex

life, her reproductive plans, his own sex life, and her religion. 

(Id. at 1-2.) She also alleges physical abuse, including a slap

in 2004 or 2005, numerous closed-fist punches, and being grabbed

and shaken by the shoulders. (Id. at 4.) The incident that she

reported on the DFEH form allegedly occurred on October 18, 2007,

when Blumwald allegedly slapped her on the face. (Id. at 5.)

Whether Blumwald’s allegedly sexually charged comments or

his allegedly physically abusive behavior constituted

discrimination because of sex is a matter of factual dispute, and

not an issue amenable to summary judgment. Further, the alleged

conduct over the course of Plaintiff’s employment is closely

enough related to apply the continuing violations doctrine so

that it is not time barred. Both physical and verbal abuse could

potentially constitute sexual discrimination, and both of these

types of abuse are alleged to have occurred both before and

during the limitations period. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment will be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s first cause of

action for sexual harassment in violation of FEHA against the

University and Blumwald.

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2. Whether Defendant Failed to Prevent Harassment Is

a Disputed Question of Material Fact.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s failure to prevent FEHA

violations should be dismissed because she failed to establish

sexual harassment. The Court has already rejected the premise of

this argument. Defendants then argue that even if Plaintiff

could prove sexual harassment, she must show that the University

knew about the harassment and failed to take action to prevent

it. (MSJ at 17.) As explained in more detail below, whether the

University knew about the harassment and failed to take action to

prevent it is a disputed question of material fact. Therefore,

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be DENIED as to

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for failure to prevent sexual

harassment in violation of FEHA against the University.

B. Defendants’ Title IX Challenges

Title IX provides that “[n]o person ... shall, on the basis

of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program

or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681(a). Congress passed Title IX in order to prevent the use

of federal funds to support discriminatory practices in

education. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist.,

524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago,

441 U.S. 667, 704 (1979)). Title IX is enforceable through an

implied private right of action, and monetary damages are

available.

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See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public

Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (establishing that a school

district can be held liable in damages in cases involving a

teacher’s sexual harassment of a student).

The Supreme Court has established when a recipient of

federal education funding may be held liable for the acts of an

employee. In Gebser, the Supreme Court held that an institution

could not be held liable under Title IX “unless an official who

at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination

and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf

has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s

programs and fails to adequately respond. Gebser, 524 U.S. at

290. Moreover, the response “must amount to deliberate

indifference to discrimination.” Id. 

In Gebser, a teacher was arrested after a police officer

discovered him having sex with a minor high school student, and

the parents then brought suit against the school district under

Title IX. Id. at 274. The school principal had previously been

alerted by parents of the teacher’s inappropriate comments in the

classroom. Id. at 278. The principal warned the teacher but did

not inform the district superintendent. Id. The school district

was found not to be liable because the principal had insufficient

information to alert him to the possibility that the teacher was

involved in a sexual relationship with a student, the

superintendent had not been informed, and the school therefore

had no opportunity to respond to the discriminatory conduct. Id.

at 278-79.

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1. Individuals Cannot Be Sued under Title Ix.

Defendant Blumwald moves to dismiss the Title IX claims

asserted against him on grounds that individuals cannot be held

liable under Title IX. Plaintiff disagrees.

Title IX’s implementing regulations define a recipient of

federal funding under Title IX to include “any person, to whom

Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through

another recipient and which operates an education program or

activity which receives benefits from such assistance...” 

34 C.F.R. § 106.2. Plaintiff argues that Blumwald is a recipient

of federal funds, and thus can be held liable in his personal

capacity. See Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995)

(finding that individuals receiving federal funds may be held

liable in their personal capacity under Title IX).

While Plaintiff is able to cite to only one district court

case outside the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that

individuals may be held liable under Title IX, overwhelming

authority suggests that only institutions that receive funding,

and not individuals working at these institutions, may be held

liable under Title IX. The Supreme Court has noted that Title IX

has “consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit

against school officials, teachers, and other individuals.” 

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 247 (2009). 

While the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have ruled on the

issue, courts within the Ninth Circuit have consistently ruled

that “individuals may not be held personally liable under Title

IX.”

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Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D.

Cal. 1993); see also Roe ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch.

Dist., 678 F. Supp 2d 1008, 1024 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (granting

summary judgment in favor of individual defendants sued in their

personal capacity under Title IX for sexual discrimination and

harassment). Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for

violation of Title IX against Blumwald.

2. There Is a Question of Material Fact Regarding the

Position and Responsibilities of the University

Official That Plaintiff Informed of the Alleged

Harassment.

Defendants also contend that the University cannot be held

liable under Title IX because Plaintiff cannot establish that a

school official with authority to remedy the situation had been

informed of the alleged harassment. (MSJ at 7-9.) Further,

Defendants allege, Plaintiff fails to establish that the

University was deliberately indifferent to the alleged

discriminatory behavior. (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges that

her reporting of the various alleged assaults and harassment by

Blumwald presents a question of fact as the liability of the

University. (Opp. at 9.)

Plaintiff contends she reported the alleged abuse to Dawne

Shell, among others. Plaintiff maintains that Ms. Shell was a

“Director of Graduate Academic Programs,” and that the UC Davis

Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedure Manual gave “Supervisors,

managers, directors,” and others special duties with regard to

sexual harassment. (Opp. at 10.) 

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Plaintiff contends that the Manual gave Ms. Shell the authority

to “take whatever action is necessary to prevent sexual

harassment and to correct it when it occurs.” (Id.) Defendants

counter that Ms. Shell is not an “official of the recipient

entity with authority to take corrective action to end the

discrimination.” (MSJ at 8.) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290). 

Defendants contend that she was neither Blumwald’s superior, nor

was she a management level employee with any power to remedy the

alleged discrimination. (Id.) 

There is clearly a question of material fact regarding

whether or not the officials to whom Plaintiff reported the

alleged harassment had the requisite authority to act in response

to her complaints.

3. There Is a Question of Material Fact Regarding

Whether University Officials Acted with Deliberate

Indifference to the Alleged Discrimination.

Defendants allege that Plaintiff cannot show that the

University acted with deliberate indifference to the alleged

discrimination because the University purportedly took prompt

action when they were informed of the alleged harassment. (MSJ

at 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges that she told numerous officials

about the alleged harassment, and that the University took no

substantive action to remedy the situation. (Opp. at 19.) 

Specifically, she alleges that she reported to Toshio Yamaguchi,

her lab supervisor, the day that Blumwald allegedly slapped her.

(Id. at 3.) 

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Additionally, she claims that she spoke with Ms. Shell about

Blumwald’s alleged yelling and inappropriate sexual remarks. 

(Id.) She says that neither Shell nor Yamaguchi advised her that

she should complain about Blumwald’s conduct, or recommended that

she should report his misconduct to anyone else. (Id.) 

Defendants claim that they only learned of the sexual harassment

after Plaintiff had already left the lab, and that they had no

chance to remedy the situation. (MSJ at 11.) Defendants further

claim each employee who interacted with Large took some action,

which the University claims demonstrates that it did not act with

deliberate indifference. (Id. at 17.) 

As with the University’s notice claims, there are similar

questions of material fact as to whether the University acted

with deliberate indifference to the alleged discrimination, and

therefore Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED in

regard to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action for

liability under Title IX against the University.

C. Defendants’ Common Law Tort Challenges

1. Plaintiff’s Negligence and IIED Claims Against

University

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth

causes of action for negligence and IIED against the University

fail because public entities are not liable for common law torts. 

(MSJ at 18) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.) 

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Plaintiff counters that California law allows a public

institution to be held vicariously liable for injuries caused by

its employees. (Opp. at 20.)

“A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such

injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a

public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a). 

“In California, a public entity and its employees are not liable

for an injury unless there is a statute declaring them to be

liable.” Grosz v. Lassen Cmty. Coll. Dist., 572 F. Supp. 2d

1199, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2008). However, “[a] public entity is

liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an

employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment

if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given

rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal

representative.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a).

Plaintiff claims that Blumwald was acting in the course and

scope of his employment at the time of the alleged incidents of

harassment, and that both Blumwald and the University are

therefore liable under theories of direct and vicarious

liability. (ECF No. 58-5, Exh. A at 6.) Plaintiff’s IIED claims

are based solely on Blumwald’s behavior. (Id. at 11.) Her

negligence claims are based both on University’s alleged failure

to properly screen and monitor Blumwald, and on Blumwald’s own

behavior. (Id. at 12.) Based on § 815.2, the University, as a

public entity, may be liable to Plaintiff for IIED and negligence

based on injury proximately caused by Blumwald’s alleged

harassment, which was allegedly within the scope of his

employment. 

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The alleged harassment also gives rise to a claim for IIED

against Blumwald, so the claim against the University may be

brought based on Blumwald’s conduct. 

2

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with

regard to Plaintiff’s IIED and negligence claims against the

University is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim Against Blumwald

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action

for negligence against Blumwald cannot stand because the claim is

based on the allegations of intentional harassment. (MSJ at 19.) 

Defendants cite Scott v. Solano County Health and Social Services

Dept., 459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2006) for the

proposition that in the employment context, allegations that

individual defendants committed both negligence and intentional

discriminatory acts cannot succeed. Plaintiff fails to address

this argument in her Opposition. 

In Scott, the plaintiff claimed “negligent hiring,

supervising, and/or training” against both the employer, and

individual employees. Scott, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 962. 

///

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negligence based on its own failure to properly screen and

monitor Blumwald, Plaintiff fails to allege a statutory basis for

her claim, so the claim is barred under § 815(a). See

Ludavico v. Sacramento County, No. CIV. S-08-1473 FCD/JFM, 2009

WL 616868, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2009); see also Lindsay v.

Fryson, No. 2:10-CV-02842LKKKJNPS, 2012 WL 2683019, at *3-4 (E.D.

Cal. July 6, 2012) (dismissing negligent supervision, hiring, and

retention claim against public entity under § 815(a)).

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However, in this case, Plaintiff clearly is not alleging that

Blumwald negligently hired, supervised and trained himself. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint states: “Defendant BLUMWALD breached his

duty of care to Plaintiff because he continued to harass,

threaten and intimidate Plaintiff even though he knew, or should

have known, this behavior was inappropriate...” (ECF No. 58-5,

Exh. A, at 12.) Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendants breached

their duty of care to Plaintiff by failing to properly screen

Blumwald,” as well as failing to monitor him. (Id. at 12.) 

While it clearly makes no sense that Blumwald breached a duty to

screen and monitor himself, it is reasonable that Blumwald owed

Plaintiff a separate duty to provide a workplace free of

harassment and discrimination. Plaintiff is free to claim

negligence against Blumwald in the alternative to her intentional

tort claims. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

is DENIED in regard to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for

negligence against Blumwald.

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.3

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants on the following

claims: the third cause of action to the extent it alleges sexual

harassment in violation of Title IX against Blumwald, and the 

ninth cause of action for intentional interference with

prospective economic advantage against Blumwald. Summary

judgment is denied with respect to Plaintiff’s remaining claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2012

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 Because oral argument was not of material assistance, the 3

Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g). 

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