Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01301/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01301-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dalton-Ross Homes, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Daryl J. Williams, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-1301-PCT-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff Dalton-Ross Homes, Inc. filed this action under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.

§§ 101et seq., claiming that defendants infringed a copyright it holds on architectural floor

plans. Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of breach of contract, unfair competition,

conversion, and intentional interference with business expectancy. The court has before it

defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 74), plaintiff’s response (doc. 92), and

defendants’ reply (doc. 97). For the following reasons, we grant defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (doc. 74).

I

Defendants Daryl Williams and Cynthia Hadden are officers and directors of

defendant WW Homes, Inc., an entity previously in the business of constructing and selling

single-family homes in Lake Havasu City, Arizona. WW Homes built several different

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models of homes, including the Villa del Mesa model–a three bedroom, two bath, split floor

plan (“VDM plan”). 

On January 3, 2000, WW Homes entered into a license agreement with Gregg and

Karen Noel, assigning all of its rights, title, and interest in the VDM plan to the Noels in

exchange for a payment by the Noels of $2,000 for each residence constructed using the

VDM plan. Shortly thereafter, the Noels formed a corporation known as Dalton-Ross

Homes, Inc., plaintiff in this case. On May 9, 2003, WW Homes registered the VDM floor

plan with the United States Copyright Office, and on December 3, 2003, licensed the

copyright to Dalton-Ross. 

In 2000, Dalton-Ross entered into a contract with George and Chris Link for the

construction of a residential home (the “Link plan”). Draftsman Sam Brindis was hired to

draft plans for the home. Using a computer-aided drafting software program, Brindis used

the original VDM plan as a base and edited that plan according to the specific needs of the

Links. Dalton-Ross paid WW Homes the $2,000 royalty payment as required under the

license agreement. In early 2002, Dalton-Ross constructed a home for Brian and Silvia

Conway (the “Conway plan”). Again, Sam Brindis was engaged to draft plans for the home.

A dispute exists as to whether Brindis drafted the Conway plan using the VDM or Link plan

as a base, or whether he used original sketches as a starting point.

In January 2005, defendant Daryl Williams, through WW Homes, hired Brindis to

prepare plans for a spec house to be constructed on Latrobe Drive (the “Latrobe Home”).

The Latrobe Home is the subject of the instant copyright action. Defendants acknowledge

that they based the Latrobe Home design largely on the Conway plan. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants’ unauthorized use of the Conway plan in the design of the Latrobe Home violated

its exclusive rights under the Copyright Act. 

II

Under the Copyright Act, an “architectural work” is statutorily defined as “the design

of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building,

architectural plans, or drawings,” and “includes the overall form as well as the arrangement

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and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual

standard features,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, such as “common windows, doors, and other staple

building components,” H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, at 6949 (1990). 

To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership of a valid

copyright, and (2) copying by the defendant of protected elements of the copyrighted work.

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994). Copying may

be established by showing that the defendant had access to plaintiff’s work and that the two

works are “substantially similar.” Id. 

It is undisputed that Dalton-Ross holds a valid copyright to the VDM plan and that

defendants had access to that plan. Moreover, defendants acknowledge that they “copied”

the Conway plan in designing the Latrobe Home. The dispute between the parties lies in

whether Dalton-Ross has a protectable copyright interest in the Conway plan. Dalton-Ross

argues on the one hand that the Conway plan is a derivative of the VDM plan and that

defendants’ unauthorized use of the Conway plan constitutes infringement. Defendants

contend that the Conway plan is their own original design, based largely on defendant Daryl

Williams’ own house plans, DSOF ¶¶ 32-35, and that they merely incorporated generic

elements from the VDM plan into the Conway design. They claim that because the Conway

plan is not a derivative of the VDM plan, it is not entitled to protection. 

A derivative work is defined as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works,”

which consists of “editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications

which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. A work is

not derivative unless it “incorporate[s] in some form a portion of the copyrighted work.”

Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984). The owner of a copyright has

the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” 17

U.S.C. § 106(2). One who reproduces a derivative work without the authorization of the

preexisting work’s registered owner “violates . . . the exclusive rights of the copyright owner

as provided by [section 106(2)] . . . [and] is an infringer of the copyright.” Id. at § 501(a).

Dalton-Ross’ infringement claim, premised on defendants’ copying of the Conway

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1

The parties dispute whether the Conway plan is a “derivative” of the VDM plan as

that term is defined in the Copyright Act. We assume, without deciding, for purposes of the

present motion that the Conway plan is a derivative of the VDM plan. 

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plan, an unregistered derivative,1

 raises an important jurisdictional issue. The owner of an

exclusive right under a copyright, including the right to prepare derivative works, “is entitled,

subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that

particular right.” Id. at § 501(b) (emphasis added). Section 411(a) provides that “no action

for infringement . . . shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright

claim has been made.” This registration requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the

right of the holder to enforce the copyright in federal court. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,

Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 710 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC

Communications, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2001). 

The registration requirement in § 411(a) makes no distinction between derivative and

original works. Whether a separate registration of a derivative work is a prerequisite to an

action for infringement of that derivative work is a question of first impression in this circuit.

However, we are persuaded that separate registration of the derivative work is required. See

Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2003)

(“registration of a claim on an original work does not create subject matter jurisdiction with

respect to a suit for infringement of the original’s unregistered derivative”); Murray Hill, 264

F.3d at 632 (6th Cir.) (“before an infringement suit can be sustained based on the derivative

work, that derivative work must be registered”); Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1292

(11th Cir. 1999); Creations Unlimited, Inc. v. McCain, 112 F.3d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1997);

cf. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 (“[t]o constitute a violation of section 106(2) the infringing

work must incorporate in some form a portion of the copyrighted work”). These multi-circuit

authorities, coupled with a plain reading of section 501(b) in conjunction with section 411(a),

indicate that in order to file an action for infringement of a derivative work, the plaintiff must

first register the copyright of that derivative work.

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Nevertheless, copying an unregistered derivative may give rise to liability based upon

copyright registration of the underlying original work contained in the derivative. See, e.g.,

Lifetime Homes, Inc. v. Walker Homes, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2007);

2 Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16[B][2][b] (concluding that the owner of a registered

underlying work that is part of an unregistered derivative work should be able to maintain

a copyright infringement action against a defendant who reproduces the derivative work–and

thus the underlying work contained therein); cf. Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th

Cir. 1979) (“[t]he established doctrine prevents unauthorized copying or other infringing use

of the underlying work or any part of that work contained in the derivative product so long

as the underlying work itself remains copyrighted”). In Montgomery, 168 F.3d at 1292-93,

the court concluded that it had jurisdiction over an infringement action based on an

unregistered derivative, where the derivative incorporated significant protectable elements

of a registered original work. The court held that by copying the unregistered derivative, the

defendants infringed original elements of the underlying registered work.

Therefore, in order to successfully assert an infringement claim based on the

unregistered Conway plan, Dalton-Ross must show that in copying the Conway plan,

defendants also copied protectable elements of the registered VDM plan. Dalton-Ross,

however, does not argue that the Latrobe plan incorporated original, protectable elements of

the VDM plan. Instead, it simply argues that the Latrobe plan is a derivative of the Conway

plan, which in turn is a derivative of the Link plan, which in turn is a derivative of the

Halterman plan, which in turn is a derivative of the registered VDM copyright. Plaintiff’s

Response at 1-2. This is insufficient to establish infringement of the VDM copyright. 

To prove that the Latrobe plan infringes the VDM copyright, plaintiff must show

copying by the defendants of protected elements of the VDM plan. See Apple Computer,

35 F.3d at 1442. In other words, plaintiff must show that the Latrobe and VDM plans are

“substantially similar,” which requires “a detailed comparison of the allegedly infringing and

infringed works.” Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356. 

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2

Dalton-Ross argues that the derivative nature of the Conway plan is established by

circumstantial evidence such as the Conway home construction proposal, which calculated

the cost of the Conway home by adjusting the “Base Price for Villa del Mesa w/ 3-Car

Garage,” and the building construction contract, which describes the Conway Home as a

“Customized Villa del Mesa.” This evidence, however, is not probative of whether the

Conway plan is a derivative of the VDM plan, or whether the Latrobe plan infringed the

VDM plan. Rather, “to prove infringement, one must show substantial similarity.”

Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984). This is accomplished with a

“detailed comparison of the allegedly infringing and infringed works.” Id. at 1356. 

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Because only protected elements of a work can be compared when deciding

substantial similarity, analytic dissection of the work is appropriate to determine “the scope

of copyright protection before works are considered ‘as a whole.’ ” Apple Computer, 35

F.3d at 1443. Features that are “as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in

the treatment of a given idea” are not protected by copyright. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.,

323 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). “When the range of protectable and

unauthorized expression is narrow, the appropriate standard for illicit copying is virtual

identity.” Apple Computers, 35 F.3d at 1439. 

Our comparison of the Latrobe and VDM plans reveals very little similarity. The

locations of the dining rooms and kitchens are different. The Latrobe plan does not include

a breakfast nook. The Latrobe’s second bedroom has a sitting room, walk-in closet, and its

own bathroom, none of which are present in the VDM plan. The configuration of the

Latrobe master bedroom and bath is drastically different from that of the VDM plan. The

Latrobe master bedroom has a larger, differently shaped sitting area. Its master bath is larger,

has a tub, and a large walk-in closet. The layout of the two living rooms is also different.

The VDM plan has a fireplace in the corner, while the Latrobe plan has a wet bar and a

fireplace in the middle of a wall. In sum, the distinguishing features of the VDM and Latrobe

floor plans, namely the size, type, and arrangement of rooms; the placement of various

components within each room; as well as the “expression of the VDM plans, taken as a

whole,” Plaintiff’s Response at 14, are vastly different. 2

 After viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to Dalton-Ross, we conclude that no fact finder could reasonably find

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substantial similarity between the Latrobe and VDM plans. See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d

1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, no infringement of the VDM copyright has occurred.

III

Dalton-Ross also asserts state law claims for breach of contract, unfair competition,

conversion, and interference with business expectancy. The Copyright Act specifically

preempts “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within

the general scope of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). The rights protected under the Act

include the rights of reproduction and preparation of derivative works. Id. at § 106(1), (2).

If a state law claim includes an “extra element” that makes the right asserted qualitatively

different from those protected under the Act, the state law claim is not preempted. Altera

Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005). Dalton-Ross alleges no

“extra element” with respect to any of the state law claims that serves to “transform the

nature of the action.” Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006).

Instead, each of Dalton-Ross’ state law claims is premised on the alleged unlawful copying

of the VDM plan or its derivatives. See Complaint ¶¶ 58, 61, 65, 71. Because the state law

claims primarily concern the subject matter of copyright, they are preempted by the

Copyright Act. 

IV

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (doc. 74). The clerk shall enter final judgment. 

DATED this 29th day of August, 2007.

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