Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-11243/USCOURTS-ca11-14-11243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11243

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-20607-RSR

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AIR CAPITAL GROUP, LLC and MARIO ABAD,

 Defendant-Appellants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(June 11, 2015)

Before MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,* Judge.

__________________

*Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United States Court of International Trade Judge, sitting by 

designation.

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GOLDBERG, Judge:

A vintage aircraft, a Miami executive, and a central African head of state. 

With a cast like that, one might confuse this case for a Bond film. But the matter 

before us is no work of fiction—it is the true story of an airplane maintenance 

check gone south and the weeks-long trial that followed. And the star of the show 

is not a tuxedoed spy, but the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act

(“FDUTPA”), a law that protects consumers from predatory business schemes. 

See Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201–501.23.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) sued Air Capital Group, 

LLC (“ACG”), and its CEO, Mario Abad, for breach of contract, fraud, and 

FDUTPA violations. The DRC won a jury verdict, and the defendants now appeal 

aspects of the judgment, including jurisdiction, their liability under the FDUTPA, 

and monetary damages. We reject each of these challenges, however, because the 

trial court had proper jurisdiction and correctly interpreted Florida law. We thus 

affirm and close the book on a saga that began in a Kinshasa apartment.

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BACKGROUND

A. The Workscope Agreement

Charles Deschryver had a problem.1

 As the Logistical Assistant to Joseph 

Kabila, president of the DRC, Deschryver was charged to care for the president’s 

aircraft, including a four-engine Boeing 707-100 (the “plane” or “707”). By early 

2010, the plane was due for a “C-check,” or heavy maintenance. Deschryver 

searched from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia to find a shop that would do the job, but 

without success.

Then in June 2010, Deschryver found what he thought he was looking for. 

At a flat in Kinshasa (the DRC’s capital), Deschryver met with Stavros 

Papaioannou, the CEO of Hewa Bora Airlines, and with two executives from 

ACG, Mario Abad and Jaime Sanchez. Papaioannou suggested that ACG could do

the C-check for Kabila’s 707, and Abad agreed. Deschryver was delighted by the 

news, and soon after the meeting ended, Abad and Sanchez inspected the plane at 

the airport. Abad remarked the plane was in “good shape,” and the parties agreed 

that ACG would fix the 707 in Florida.

Soon thereafter, Abad sent Deschryver a workscope agreement (the 

“Workscope” or “Agreement”). The Workscope said that ACG would perform the 

C-check, apply airworthiness directives (“ADs”) to the plane’s engines, and finish 

 1 The facts that follow represent plaintiff’s version of the evidence. See Shannon v. 

Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2002).

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other tasks for a flat fee of $2,255,872.30. Deschryver signed the Agreement for 

the “Republic Democratic of Congo,” and he stamped the seal of the Presidency of 

the Republic on the signature block.

ACG prepared its first invoice for the DRC on July 30, 2010. The DRC

requested the invoices because “they needed some sort of documentation to be able 

to go to their government and get payments” from the Ministry of Finance. The 

DRC paid the first $1 million installment on July 12, and the plane arrived in

Florida on July 31.

B. Oral Agreements to Replace Engines Three and Four

Unwelcome difficulties arose soon after the plane reached Miami. While 

doing the C-check, ACG’s “technical people discovered that one of the engines did 

not have appropriate paperwork and needed to be replaced.” Abad and Sanchez 

returned to the DRC to discuss the matter with Deschryver, and on September 10 

or 11, the parties orally agreed to replace engine number three. Deschryver asked 

that the new engine come “with all the documents, QEC [quick engine change 

equipment], all the AD and all the airworthiness directives and all the service in 

order, a 707 engine.” The price for the engine would be $250,000.

Then, when Deschryver visited Miami in late September, he learned that 

engine four also needed replacing. In its stead, Deschryver wanted “a 707 engine 

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with all the service built in, all the AD, full QEC, full overhaul with all the 

documents.” Like engine three, engine four would cost $250,000.

C. A String of Broken Promises

By October 28, 2010, the DRC had paid $4 million toward the cost of 

repairs. Just days before, ACG’s chief financial officer Antonio Neuman had 

asked for more money even though the company held over $2 million in reserve, 

allegedly to cover future charges. Deschryver was bewilderded by the mounting 

costs but paid the money anyway, and Abad reassured Deschryver that the 

replacement engines would soon arrive from Ireland. Abad added that he would 

do a test flight on December 12 and deliver the plane by December 16.

Yet nothing happened the way Abad said it would. When the engines 

arrived from Ireland, ACG learned that neither were properly documented. As a 

result, the engines were unusable, and ACG agreed with ABX Air, Inc. (“ABX”), 

to buy replacements. Antonio Neuman signed the contract with ABX, which set 

the price of each new engine at $49,500. The replacement engines, which carried 

serial numbers 645402 (“402”) and 669706 (“706”), were not serviceable upon 

delivery.

Meanwhile, the December 16 deadline for delivery slipped past. When it 

did, Abad repeated that the work would finish soon, this time by January—but 

Abad had no personal knowledge that the project was near completion. In reliance 

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on Abad’s statements, Jean Tshiumba from the DRC Civil Aviation Authority and 

technical engineer Zacharie Nakwaya departed to inspect the 707 and collect it 

from ACG.

But when Tshiumba and Nakwaya arrived in Miami on January 10, 2011, 

their hopes were dashed. As he inspected the replacement engines, Nakwaya 

found that 402 was completely disassembled and that 706 was closed and 

unserviceable. Both were choked with dust and nests. Furthermore, the engines 

were configured for a DC8 airplane, not for a Boeing 707, which meant installation 

would take longer than anticipated. And Tshiumba, for his part, reported that the 

engines were not mounted and there was “no avionics equipment installed” on the 

aircraft. The plane was unfit to fly, despite Abad’s earlier assurances.

D. The Liens and the Audit

On April 21, Abad sent Deschryver more bad news. Bonus Tech, the 

company servicing the plane’s original engines, had filed a lien on the engines for 

$147,861.42. A few weeks later, Abad reported that Commercial Jet, Inc., which 

was performing the C-check, planned to file its own lien on the plane. The news 

irked Deschryver, because the DRC had already paid $5 million for the repairs, and 

Abad kept “on telling [Deschryver] that the aircraft [was] ready.” The DRC forked 

over another $1,381,531.64 to keep the work going.

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The constant pleas for money prompted Deschryver to order an audit of the 

project. On May 27, he asked Nakwaya and Ben Kalala, a deputy logistical 

assistant, to review the project’s progress and finances. Nakwaya and Kalala asked 

for notarized invoices from each vendor to verify the amount paid for services 

provided. In response, Antonio Neuman furnished a contract between ACG and 

ABX for engines 402 and 706. Unlike the contract signed in November 2010, 

however, the contract provided in May was signed by Abad, not Neuman. And 

while the November contract said each engine cost $49,500, the May contract said 

each engine cost $57,000. Apparently, ACG had given the DRC false statements 

to inflate actual costs.

E. The Failed Flight Test and the Rejected Engines

By September 2011, President Kabila’s plane was finally ready for a test 

flight. Or so they thought. During the test, after the plane had ascended to 24,000 

feet, engine 402 stopped, or “flamed out.” Nakwaya also noticed that the plane 

was leaking fuel and that the generators were dead. In Nakwaya’s opinion, the 707 

was in worse shape now than when the plane touched down in Florida in July 

2010.

After the failed test, the parties gathered to discuss next steps. At first, Abad 

promised to fix engine 402 at his own cost, but later, after Nakwaya found 

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corrosion and other damage in the engine, the DRC chose to reject it. ACG kept

engine 402 for its inventory.

Then in December, the parties met to discuss engine 706. While moving to 

a new facility, the company servicing 706, the Turbine Engine Center, had 

misplaced the engine’s records. The DRC had requested the records since June, 

and they now threatened to reject 706 unless the documents turned up within 48 

hours. The DRC rejected the engine when ACG failed to find the records in the 

time allotted.

F. The Lawsuit

The DRC lodged a civil complaint against ACG, Abad, and others on 

February 14, 2012. Six counts were alleged, including fraudulent inducement, 

breach of contract, fraud in the purchase and repair of engines 402 and 706, fraud 

in the purchase and installation of Stage III hush kits (to quiet engine noise), a 

violation of the FDUTPA, and replevin. The trial began over a year later on July 2, 

2013.

At trial, expert witness John Zappia testified about damages. As part of his 

testimony, he presented a chart listing twenty-six line items. In lines 4 through 23, 

part of 24, and 26, Zappia recounted the costs of ACG’s alleged breach of contract. 

The estimated damages from the breach totaled $1,175,415.04.

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Zappia also testified about damages from the replacement engines, 

comprising lines 1 through 3 and 25 of the chart. Included in this estimate were:

(1) the costs of repairing engine 706 ($121,676.15); (2) the costs of repairing 

engine 402 ($151,691.92); (3) the cost of the failed test flight, which would need to 

be performed again ($85,969.66); and (4) the purchase price of engines 402 and 

706, which ACG still held ($1,178,048.50).

2

 Zappia also recommended a recovery 

of $2,204,810.45 under the FDUTPA, consisting of items 1−2, 5−15, 17−23, and 

25 of the damages summary. For each of these items, Zappia said he calculated the 

amount based on “the difference between the value of the product or service that 

DRC paid for and the value of the product or service that they received.”

At the close of the evidence, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of 

law. The court denied the motion. Then, on July 31, the court instructed the jury 

regarding liability and damages. When addressing the FDUTPA, the court 

explained that the statute allowed only actual damages, or “the difference in the 

market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered 

and its market value in the condition it should have been delivered according to the 

agreement of the parties.” The court did not instruct the jury regarding the

apportionment of damages between defendants.

 2 Zappia testified that the total damages from the replacement engines was $540,755.83. 

It is not clear where Zappia got this number, as the sum of lines 1−3 and 25 is $1,537,386.23.

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The jury returned a verdict on August 1, 2013. ACG was held liable for 

breach, and the jury awarded the entire amount Zappia recommended on that claim

($1,175,415.04). They also held ACG and Abad liable for fraud regarding the 

replacement engines. On the verdict sheet, the jury wrote that ACG had to pay

$362,707.03, plus plaintiff could “pick up [the] engines” from ACG. The jury also 

found ACG and Abad liable for a FDUTPA violation, and they awarded 

$720,848.04 from ACG on that count. The jury exacted no monetary damages 

from Abad on the fraud and FDUTPA claims.

Later that month, the DRC moved to alter the judgment. Plaintiff argued 

that although the jury demanded no damages from Abad, ACG and Abad were 

jointly and severally liable on the engine fraud and FDUTPA claims. 

Defendants filed a motion of their own, but for remittitur and renewed 

judgment as a matter of law. They argued that plaintiff could not recover under 

FDUTPA because Zappia had not established the difference between the market 

price of contracted-for services and the value the DRC actually received. They 

also claimed that the FDUTPA award constituted a double-recovery because it 

included line items from both the breach and fraud claims.

On March 19, 2014, the court granted the DRC’s motion to amend the 

judgment and denied ACG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal 

followed.

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DISCUSSION

The defendants now attack multiple components of the result below, from 

the cornerstone of jurisdiction to cupola of damages apportionment. We reject 

each argument and affirm in full.

I. The DRC Has Constitutional Standing to Bring Its Claims

To begin, defendants allege that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the 

case. Citing quotes sprinkled throughout the record, they suggest that the DRC 

government—the plaintiff here—has nothing to do with the DRC’s Office of the 

President and Joseph Kabila, who owns the 707. If this were true, then the DRC 

would lack a stake in the litigation, and the court would have to dismiss the case 

for want of constitutional standing.

3

We find defendants’ cherry-picked political theory too fragile to support the

argument. We agree, of course, that the Constitution extends the federal judicial 

power only to controversies between real parties in interest. See U.S. Const. art. 

III, § 2. Courts cannot decide claims where plaintiffs have suffered no invasion of 

a legally protected interest, or injury in fact. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560−61 (1992); Houston v. Marod Supermkts., Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 

1328−29 (11th Cir. 2013). But here, plaintiff more than proved that it suffered an 

 3 “We review de novo basic questions concerning our subject matter jurisdiction, 

including standing.” DiMaio v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008).

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injury respecting its breach, fraud, and FDUTPA claims. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

561 (holding plaintiff at final stage must prove standing with facts “supported 

adequately by the evidence adduced at trial”). A review of the record shows how.

First, the evidence establishes that the DRC is a party to the Workscope 

Agreement. The name “Republic Democratic of Congo” stands in capital letters

above the Agreement’s signature block, and the same name pervades the rest of the 

document. More importantly, the record attests that Charles Deschryver had

authority to sign the contract on the DRC’s behalf. When he approved the 

Workscope, Deschryver stamped the seal of the Office of the President over his 

name. Deschryver further testified that the president is part of the DRC’s 

executive branch, together with the prime minister and his government. As an 

agent of the state, Deschryver could enter into agreements for the DRC as long as 

the principal retained control over his actions. See Fla. State Oriental Med. Ass’n, 

Inc. v. Slepin, 971 So. 2d 141, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (outlining tests for 

actual and apparent authority of agents). We find nothing to suggest that 

Deschryver departed from his instructions when he arranged to repair the 707. As 

a consequence, the DRC was bound to the Workscope and is eligible to sue for 

breach.

Second, the parties stipulated that the DRC paid for all work performed. 

The record fully supports this fact. For instance, Antonio Neuman testified that 

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ACG billed the DRC, not the Office of the President, for tasks completed under the 

Workscope. Deschryver added that the DRC’s Ministry of Finance paid for the 

repairs. And Kalala confirmed the point, testifying that the Office of the President 

liaised with the Ministry of Finance to wire a $1.36 million tranche to ACG in May 

2011. This evidence demonstrates plaintiff’s financial stake in the claims on 

appeal.4

In response, ACG gathers snippets implying that the Office of the President 

and the DRC government are unrelated. Yet these scraps of evidence, read in 

context, do little to confirm defendants’ theory. For example, Tshiumba testified 

that President Kabila’s fleet of planes “is the same as companies like Hewa Bora,” 

the private airline. ACG cites this as proof that the Office of the President and the 

government are separate, but this is not Tshiumba’s testimony. By comparing 

presidential aviation to a private company, Tshiumba meant that the president is 

free to choose where to service his fleet, just like a private airline. ACG also 

quotes Deschryver, who said that “[he] was . . . employed not by the government, 

[but] by the Office of the President, because the Office of the President and the 

government [are] different.” But Deschryver, like Tshiumba, was not teaching 

 4 Plaintiff also touts a stipulation which supposedly confirms that the DRC was a party to 

the Workscope. While we agree that plaintiff had standing to bring its claims, the DRC reads too 

much into the stipulation. The stipulation says, “The contract for maintenance of the Aircraft 

between [ACG] and the [DRC] is dated June 21, 2010, but actually was executed in July, 2010.” 

This sentence aims to establish the date of the Workscope, not to identify the parties to the 

contract.

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civics from the stand. He distinguished between the Office of the President and the 

government to clarify who paid him when he worked at Hewa Bora, and in all 

likelihood, Deschryver used the term “government” to refer to the prime minister’s 

cabinet, not the state apparatus as a whole. None of defendants’ citations oust 

plaintiff from our jurisdiction.

Defendants also argue that because Kabila owned the 707, the DRC has no 

interest in the outcome of the dispute. In their words, “the aircraft involved in this 

lawsuit has as little to do with the [DRC] government as President Obama’s golf 

cart does with respect to governmental property.” But perhaps ACG forgets that 

people can (and often do) agree to buy services for third-party beneficiaries. Cf. 

Polo Ralph Lauren, L.P. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., 215 F.3d 1217, 1222 

(11th Cir. 2000) (“Contracts bind only named parties unless both parties to the 

contract clearly express an intent to benefit a third party.”). The DRC earned its 

berth in court by contracting for services that were never delivered, whether or not 

Kabila owned the plane.

The DRC has constitutional standing to bring its breach, fraud, and 

FDUTPA claims.

II. The DRC Has Statutory Standing to Bring an FDUTPA Claim

Next, ACG attacks plaintiff’s statutory right to bring an FDUTPA claim. 

The FDUTPA bans “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 

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trade or commerce,” see Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1), and as defendants understand the 

law, only “consumers” qualify for FDUTPA protection. Because the DRC is a 

sovereign government—not your ordinary market participant—ACG reasons that 

plaintiff is not a “consumer” entitled to FDUTPA safeguards.

5

We do not accept defendant’s restrictive reading of the law. When 

explaining the statute’s rules of construction, the Florida legislature urged courts to 

construe the law “liberally to . . . protect the consuming public and legitimate 

business enterprises from those who engage in . . . unconscionable, deceptive, or 

unfair acts.” Fla. Stat. § 501.202(2). To achieve this goal, the statute originally

extended relief to “consumers,” id. § 501.211(2) (2000), that is, any “individual . . . 

firm; association; joint venture; partnership; estate; trust; business trust; syndicate; 

fiduciary; corporation; or any other group or combination,” id. § 501.203(7) 

(emphasis added). Then in 2001, the legislature revised the statute to ensure that 

businesses received the same protections as individual consumers. Senate Staff 

 5 The DRC claims we should ignore this issue because ACG did not raise it below, and 

defendants counter that the matter is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. The DRC might be 

right. Not long ago, the Supreme Court held that statutory preconditions to suit are 

“jurisdictional” (and hence immune to waiver) only if “the Legislature clearly states that a 

threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 

546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006). A statutory limitation is not jurisdictional “when [the Legislature] 

does not rank a statutory limitation . . . as jurisdictional.” Id. at 516; see also In re Trusted Net 

Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1042−46 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding law requiring three or 

more creditors to petition for involuntary bankruptcy was not jurisdictional). Here, it seems the 

Florida legislature did not expressly condition jurisdiction on plaintiff’s consumer status, so we 

doubt ACG’s argument was unsusceptible to waiver. See Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2). We decline to 

decide the issue in any event because the briefing on the matter was thin, and because the DRC 

had a right to sue under the FDUTPA.

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Analysis, CS/SB 208, Mar. 22, 2001, at 3 (“Because the remedies under the 

FDUPTA [sic] were intended by the Legislature to be available to all persons, 

including businesses, the Legislature has several times amended the definition of 

‘consumer’ in the FDUTPA to clarify the intent to include businesses.”). The law 

now allows “a person who has suffered a loss as a result of a violation” of the 

FDUTPA to recover “actual damages, plus attorney’s fees and court costs.” Fla. 

Stat. § 501.211(2) (emphasis added).

Courts have interpreted the new provision generously, but not consistently. 

One line of cases—the more conservative view—extends FDUTPA protection only 

to persons who were deceived when buying or selling goods and services. In 

Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1348–50 (S.D. Fla. 2009), 

for example, plaintiff sued a website operator who posted lewd photos of the 

plaintiff without her consent. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing because 

she was not injured in a market transaction between the parties. Id.; see also 

Cannova v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., No. 08-81145-CIV, 2009 WL 64337, at *3 

(S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2009) (denying FDUTPA claim alleging plaintiff’s employer 

violated post-termination agreement); Goodbys Creek, LLC v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 

3:07-cv-947-J-33HTS, 2008 WL 2950112, at *8−9 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2008) 

(denying FDUTPA claim alleging defendant failed to fulfill obligations under 

performance bond); Badillo v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. 

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8:04CV591T30TWM, 2006 WL 785707, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2006) (denying 

FDUTPA claim alleging defendant used lewd photos of plaintiffs without consent).

Another line of cases, the permissive view, extends FDUTPA protection to 

any person injured by a deceptive or unfair practice, regardless of whether she 

sustained the injury in a sale or purchase. In Hinson Electrical Contracting Co. v. 

Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-598-J-32MCR, 2008 WL 

360803, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2008), for instance, plaintiff broke defendant’s 

underground lines in an excavation, and defendant overbilled plaintiff for the 

damage. The court found plaintiff had standing under the FDUTPA because he

suffered an unfair and deceptive act in the course of commerce. It did not matter

that he purchased nothing of value from the defendant. Id. *3; see also Furmanite 

Am., Inc. v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145−47 (M.D. Fla. 

2007) (denying summary judgment on FDUTPA claim alleging defendants 

resigned en masse from plaintiff’s employ).

We need not referee this interpretive tussle. Even if we adopted the former

view—that plaintiffs have FDUTPA standing only if they are injured in a purchase 

or sale—the DRC can still sue. Though it is a sovereign state, the DRC acted like 

a private airline when it contracted with ACG to perform the C-check and replace 

two engines. It signed a standard work agreement, and it paid ACG over $6 

million to do the job. We see no reason why standing should not extend to 

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government bodies when they engage in consumer transactions the way private 

actors do. Cf. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 

214−15 (1983) (denying Commerce Clause claim where city hired mostly Boston 

residents for city-funded construction projects).

The defendants rejoin that the FDUTPA precludes governments from filing 

private suits. In one provision, the statute permits the “enforcing authority” (i.e., 

the state attorney or Department of Legal Affairs) to bring an action “on behalf of 

one or more consumers or governmental entities for the actual damages caused by” 

a FDUTPA violation. Fla. Stat. § 501.207(1)(c) (emphasis added); see also id.

§ 501.203(2). Another provision lets a “person” sue for damages but does not 

expressly give governments a private right of action. Id. § 501.211(2). In ACG’s 

view, the inclusion of government bodies as interested parties in suits by Florida 

authorities, and the exclusion of government bodies as plaintiffs in private suits, 

effectively bars entities like the DRC from bringing their own FDUTPA cases.

We disagree. The interpretive maxim that ACG implies, expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius, does not block the DRC from filing FDUTPA claims. Translated 

from Latin, the phrase means “to express or include one thing implies the 

exclusion of the other.” Black’s Law Dictionary 701 (10th ed. 2014). In other 

words, if the legislature grants a right or privilege in only one situation, one may 

infer that the legislature withheld the right or privilege elsewhere. But as the 

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Supreme Court has explained, expressio unius arguments “ha[ve] force only when 

the items expressed are members of an associated group or series, justifying the 

inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not 

inadvertence.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). And here, no such inference is justified. The FDUTPA 

extends its aegis to “persons,” a cavernous term that could easily include

government bodies acting in the market. See Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2). What is 

more, the statute’s rules of construction compel courts to interpret the law liberally. 

Id. § 501.202. Given the statute’s broad language and sweeping purpose, we doubt 

the legislature meant to deny private suits by public entities.

The DRC has standing to sue under the FDUTPA.

III. The Jury Reasonably Held ACG Liable for Violating the FDUTPA

In its next challenge, ACG shifts focus from jurisdiction to the merits. At 

trial, the jury held defendants liable on a number of counts, including the FDUTPA 

claim. ACG now argues that the jury erred to do so, because the DRC’s 

representatives were too sophisticated to fall for defendants’ deceits.6

This argument builds on a flawed understanding of the statute. As noted 

before, the FDUTPA bans “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of 

any trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1). By claiming that plaintiff was 

 6 The court must uphold the jury’s verdict unless there is no “legally sufficient 

evidentiary basis to find” for the DRC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).

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too savvy to be swindled, defendants imply that the statute espouses a subjective 

standard of deceit—that is, they would hold a defendant liable only if the victim 

suffered harm in actual reliance on a deceptive act or practice. But this is not the 

law. A FDUTPA claim, unlike a claim for fraud, requires proof that defendant’s 

act would likely “mislead the [objective] consumer acting reasonably in the 

circumstances.” See PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 

(Fla. 2003) (quoting Millennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of Att’y 

Gen., 761 So. 2d 1256, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)); Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 

776 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“The plaintiff need not prove the 

elements of fraud to sustain an action under the statute.”). No proof of subjective 

reliance is needed.

The court identified an objective deception in Cummings v. Warren Henry 

Motors, Inc., 648 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). There, the defendant 

purported to sell plaintiff a car to be paid off in sixty months. In reality, defendant 

only leased the car for sixty months, and at the end of the term, the vehicle would 

not be paid off. Id. at 1233. The court held that this “bait and switch” tactic was 

unfair and deceptive under the FDUTPA. Id. Federal courts ruled similarly when

a chewing gum company wrongly claimed that its product killed germs, Smith v. 

William Wrigley Jr. Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1337−40 (S.D. Fla. 2009), when a 

manufacturer misrepresented that its vacuum cleaners were fit for use, Hill v. 

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Hoover Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263−64 (N.D. Fla. 2012), and when a 

producer misstated that its products were wheat and gluten free, Nature’s Prods., 

Inc. v. Natrol, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2013).

By contrast, the court found no deceit in Millennium Communications, 761 

So. 2d at 1263−64, where defendant told consumers that they qualified for credit 

cards with a $4000 limit. The Florida Department of Legal Affairs sued, claiming

that defendant led consumers to believe they could get a MasterCard or Visa

despite their past credit troubles. The court rejected this claim on a motion to 

dismiss, because a reasonable consumer was unlikely to conclude from defendant’s 

statements (which did not mention Visa or Mastercard) that he qualified for a Visa 

or MasterCard. Id.; see also Cold Stone Creamery, Inc. v. Lenora Foods I, LLC, 

332 F. App’x 565, 567−68 (11th Cir. 2009) (denying FDUTPA claim where 

plaintiff relied on statement by franchisee who lacked authority to speak on 

defendant’s behalf); Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Grp., Inc., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284−85 

(11th Cir. 2007) (denying FDUTPA claim where real estate reservation contract 

clearly stated that it was not a purchase agreement).

Like the courts in the cases above, we define deception objectively. We also 

find ample proof of conduct that would deceive a reasonable consumer in the 

DRC’s circumstances. In September 2010, for example, Deschryver asked Abad 

to buy two 707 engines for the plane, “with all the documents, QEC, all the AD 

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and all the airworthiness directives and all the service in order.” Abad purchased 

the engines, but they were configured for a DC8 aircraft, and neither was

serviceable upon delivery. Abad also promised to deliver the plane in December 

2010 and January 2011, but the deadlines passed without explanation. Instead, 

Abad hustled the DRC for more money and let subcontractors file liens on the 

plane, despite earlier assurances that the work was done. And perhaps worst of all, 

when Nakwaya and Kalala requested invoices from vendors, ACG furnished a 

contract listing the price of each replacement engine at $57,000. In the original 

contract with ABX, the price for each engine was only $49,500, which suggests 

that ACG kept double books to inflate the DRC’s costs. Given this record of 

misstatements, broken promises, and lies, we have little trouble holding that 

ACG’s conduct would deceive the reasonable consumer.

Defendants answer by citing Black v. Department of Legal Affairs, 353 So. 

2d 655, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), and Golden Needles Knitting & Glove Co. 

v. Dynamic Marketing Enterprises, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 421, 430 (W.D.N.C. 1991). 

They claim that these cases require subjective proof of deception to justify a 

recovery under the FDUTPA, but we do not read the cases that way. When these

opinions were published, the statute covered only consumer transactions, defined 

as “a sale . . . or other disposition of an item of goods . . . to an individual . . . that 

relate to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or 

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property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has not 

been previously engaged.” Black, 353 So. 2d at 656 (emphasis added) (citing Fla. 

Stat. § 501.203(1) (1975)). In other words, a plaintiff could not secure FDUTPA 

relief if he knew the defendant’s business well enough to manage the risk. See id.; 

Golden Needles, 766 F. Supp. at 430. But in 1993, the Florida legislature struck

this definition of “consumer transaction” and extended protection to any 

transaction in “trade or commerce,” even if plaintiff was familiar with the 

defendant’s craft. Tampa Bay Storm, Inc. v. Arena Football League, Inc., No. 96-

29-CIV-T-17C, 1998 WL 182418, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 1998). The law now 

permits recovery if the plaintiff proves she was injured by an objectively deceptive 

act or statement, and as we said before, the DRC more than satisfies this standard.7

We sustain the verdict finding defendants liable under the FDUTPA.

IV. The DRC Presented Proper Evidence of FDUTPA Damages

Defendants’ remaining arguments zero in on the damages awarded at trial. 

ACG first claims that expert witness John Zappia gave improper testimony about 

plaintiff’s losses under the FDUTPA. The statute permits parties to recover actual 

 7 Some courts have injected a subjective element into FDUTPA claims for unfair 

practices. See In re Motions to Certify Classes Against Court Reporting Firms for Charges 

Relating to Word Indices, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1277−80 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (denying certification 

because lawyers could avoid unfair court-reporting fees better than other class members);

Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Diamond, 140 So. 3d 1090, 1096−1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 

(denying certification because some class members could avoid buying easily purloined 

headlights better than other class members). We base our holding on ACG’s deceptive acts, 

however, and deception is judged from an objective point of view. See PNR, 842 So. 2d at 777.

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damages—or the difference between a product’s value under the contract and the 

market value of the product delivered—but defendants say Zappia failed to analyze 

market values to measure the loss. ACG would exclude the expert testimony and 

vacate the $720,848.04 FDUTPA award as unsupported in evidence.8

We decline the defendants’ invitation for two reasons. First, ACG waived 

its right to challenge Zappia’s testimony on appeal. In general, if defendants fail to 

make an argument in a motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), they

may not raise the argument after the verdict in a renewed motion for judgment as a 

matter of law (“RJMOL”). See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(a)−(b); Shannon v. Bellsouth 

Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 717 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002) (“If a party asserts new 

grounds in its [RJMOL] that it did not assert in its initial [JMOL], a court may not 

rely on the new grounds to set aside the jury’s verdict.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Here, ACG attacked Zappia’s damages estimate in the RJMOL but not 

the JMOL, so defendants cannot broach the issue now. Nor could they air the

grievance through a motion to alter the judgment. Parties “cannot use a Rule 59(e) 

motion to . . . raise argument[s] . . . that could have been raised prior to the entry of 

judgment,” and Zappia’s testimony was open to challenge well before the jury 

 8 Again, we sustain the jury’s verdict unless there is no “legally sufficient evidentiary 

basis to find” for the DRC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The court reviews the denial of remittitur for 

abuse of discretion. Mason v. Ford Motor Co., 307 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002).

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returned a verdict. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 

(11th Cir. 2005).

Second, contrary to defendants’ claim, Zappia’s damages estimate fully 

accorded with the law. Under Florida Statute § 501.211(2), “a person who has 

suffered a loss as a result of [a FDUTPA violation] may recover actual damages, 

plus attorney’s fees and court costs.” The statute does not define actual damages in 

detail, but Florida courts agree on the following:

Generally, the measure of actual damages is the difference in the 

market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was 

delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have 

been delivered according to the contract of the parties. A notable 

exception to the rule may exist when the product is rendered valueless 

as a result of the defect—then the purchase price is the appropriate 

measure of actual damages.

Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting 

Raye v. Fred Oakley Motors, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). In 

short, plaintiffs must marshal evidence to prove the gap in value between what was 

promised and what was delivered, unless defendant palmed off a product that was 

truly worthless. In the latter situation, plaintiff may recoup the full price he paid 

for the valueless good or service.

Rodriguez v. Recovery Performance & Marine, LLC, 38 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 2010), illustrates the general rule. In that case, plaintiff bought a jetboat from the defendant. Then one day, when plaintiff was out riding, the boat 

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“began to burn and eventually sunk.” Id. at 179. Defendant later repaired the jetboat, but plaintiff sued under the FDUTPA, requesting the return of her “down 

payment, payments on the loan, interest, [as well as the] balance on the loan.” Id. 

The court denied the claim and explained that plaintiff could recover only “the 

difference in the market value of the jet-boat as delivered and market value as it 

should have been delivered.” Id. at 181; see also Gastaldi v. Sunvest Resort 

Communities, LC, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304−06 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (excluding 

testimony where expert based damages on condo’s adjusted purchase price instead 

of market value). Because the jet-boat retained some of its value, plaintiff could 

not base damages on the purchase price.

In contrast, the court allowed plaintiff to use the purchase price as a proxy 

for damages in Tri-County Plumbing Services, Inc. v. Brown, 921 So. 2d 20, 21 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). There, plaintiff paid the defendant to fix her plumbing, 

but the repairs failed inspection, and defendant walked off the job before correcting 

remaining defects. Id. The trial court awarded damages equal to the amount 

plaintiff deposited with the defendant, and the appellate court affirmed. The court 

reasoned that defendant’s repairs did nothing to complete the work assigned, so the 

deposit price was the correct measure of FDUTPA damages. Id. at 22.

The DRC’s case falls within the Tri-County Plumbing exception to the 

general rule. We note, at the outset, that the jury compensated plaintiff completely 

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for ACG’s breach of contract. Zappia recommended $1,175,415.04 in damages for 

breach, and the jury awarded just that amount. As a consequence, the only 

damages pertinent to the FDUTPA claim are those from the purchase and repair of 

the replacement engines. To recover these losses under the statute, plaintiff had to 

prove the difference in the market value of the products as promised and as 

delivered, or to prove that those products and services were worthless. Id. at 22.

Zappia’s testimony achieved the latter. In items 1 through 2 of the damages 

summary, Zappia attributed a $273,368.07 loss to repair work done on engines 402 

and 706. The job was to update the engine’s anticorrosion ADs and extend their

useful life, yet when Nakwaya reviewed the engines’ records in June 2011, he 

found neither one had current ADs and both had only a short useful life remaining. 

Because defendants’ work added no value, plaintiff can recover the entire price it 

paid for the repairs. Id.

The DRC also gave adequate proof of damages from the purchase of the 

engines. After the September 2011 test flight, plaintiff rejected engine 402 

because it was corroded and had sustained impact damage. Abad held onto the 

engine for his inventory. Later that year, the DRC also rejected engine 706 

because its records were missing. As Sanchez testified, an engine without 

documents must be replaced, and though ACG later found the records for 706, 

defendants never gave the engine to the DRC. Because it received nothing that it 

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paid for, the DRC may collect $1,178,048.50 for the engines, as Zappia 

recommended.9

Defendants respond that Zappia erred to list “specific items and claim[] 

these as [FDUTPA] damages, without ever looking at the value difference between 

an aircraft as delivered to [plaintiff] compared to one as [plaintiff] claims should 

have been delivered.” But defendants overlook that the DRC bought only a C 

check, engines, and hush kits from ACG—not a whole airplane. Had plaintiff 

purchased an entire aircraft from ACG, and that aircraft had come with the defects 

listed in the damages summary, then the measure of damages would be the plane’s 

market value as contracted minus the plane’s value as delivered. See Rodriguez, 

38 So. 3d at 181. But here, the DRC purchased discrete goods and services from 

ACG, and we measure damages against those items and not against the plane as a 

whole.

The evidence supports the jury’s FDUTPA damages award, and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion to deny remittitur.

V. The FDUTPA Award Was Not a Double Recovery

Next, ACG argues that the FDUTPA damages awarded to plaintiff were a 

double recovery. At trial, Zappia said the DRC should get $1,175,415.04 for 

 9 It is less clear whether plaintiff could collect FDUTPA damages for the test flight. 

Though it ended in failure, the test achieved its central aim: to prove whether the 707 was 

airworthy. Assuming the test had value, plaintiff could not collect the purchase price under the 

Florida statute. The DRC could collect the price as part of the fraud award, however, so the 

error, if any, was harmless.

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breach of contract, comprising lines 4 through 23, part of 24, and 26 of the

damages chart. He also recommended a $1,537,386.49 recovery for fraud related 

to the engines, corresponding to lines 1 through 3 and 25 of the chart. In light of 

these estimates, ACG claims it was wrong to award FDUTPA damages under lines 

1−2, 5−15, 17−23, and 25. Each of these items was covered already in the breach 

or fraud counts, and defendants argue that the trial court erred to give a duplicative 

FDUTPA award.

We will not disturb the jury’s decision, because despite appearances, the 

FDUTPA award was not actually duplicative. To merit remittitur, the damages 

granted for breach, fraud, or other claims must exceed plaintiff’s actual loss. A 

court reduced an award, for example, where plaintiff proved $2,535,990.48 in 

damages for breach and fraud arising from the same incident. The jury awarded 

$1,372,700 and $2,745,400 on each count, but the court whittled the total award to 

$2,535,990.48 to ensure plaintiff did not receive more than his actual loss. See 

Novak v. Gray, 469 F. App’x 811, 812−13, 816−18 (11th Cir. 2012).

On the other hand, a plaintiff may recover damages on two claims stemming 

from the same conduct if the total does not exceed actual damages. In Coquina 

Investments v. Rothstein, No. 10-69786-Civ, 2012 WL 4479057, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 

Sept. 28, 2012), plaintiff sued defendant for fraudulent misrepresentation and for 

aiding and abetting a Ponzi scheme. At trial, plaintiff proved that it lost $37.7 

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million in the scheme. Id. at *20−21. The jury then rendered a verdict for $32 

million: $16 million for the misrepresentations, and another $16 million for the

aiding and abetting. In a motion for remittitur, defendant argued that the award 

was a double recovery because the misrepresentation and aiding and abetting 

claims comprised the same conduct. Yet the trial court refused to reduce the 

award, because $32 million was well within the total damages proven at trial. Id. 

This court affirmed. Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th 

Cir. 2014); see also Gentile v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 1991) 

(“[D]efendants do not demonstrate that a jury’s award is duplicative merely by 

noting that it allocated the damages under two different causes of action.”).

We affirm here too, because plaintiff’s recovery did not exceed its actual 

loss. As mentioned before, the DRC proved $1,175,415.04 in damages from lines 

4 through 23, part of 24, and 26 of the damages chart, and the jury awarded exactly

that amount on plaintiff’s breach claim. The DRC also proved $1,537,386.49 in 

damages from lines 1 through 3 and 25 of the chart, corresponding to the fraud 

regarding the replacement engines. Here, however, the jury granted only 

$362,707.03 in damages and added that plaintiff could “pick up” the engines from 

ACG. The latter remedy was unauthorized, though, and when instructed by the 

court to recalculate the fraud award, the jury refused to give anything more. 

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Plaintiff ultimately received a sum for its fraud claim that was $1,174,679.46 less 

than the estimate.

In light of Coquina, we hold that the $720,848.04 FDUTPA award was a 

permissible supplement to the fraud recovery. While it is possible, as defendants 

allege, that the jury found $362,707.03 in fraud damages and granted the 

$720,848.04 FDUTPA award as double damages for breach, they could just as 

easily have awarded the $720,848.04 to round out the fraud recovery. In any 

event, the total amount conferred on the breach, fraud, and FDUTPA claims 

($2,258,970.11) was less than the total loss proven at trial ($3,423,718.32). 

Because this sum stayed within range of the damages proven, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion to deny remittitur. Coquina, 2012 WL 4479057, at *1. We 

sustain the jury’s FDUTPA verdict as lawful and grounded in evidence.

VI. The Trial Court Correctly Imposed Joint and Several Liability

Finally, Abad argues that the trial court erred to hold defendants jointly and 

severally liable on plaintiff’s fraud and FDUTPA claims. On the verdict form, the 

jury wrote that both ACG and Abad were liable for fraud and FDUTPA violations. 

Yet when it came to deciding damages, the jury said only ACG had to pay the 

debt, leaving Abad with no personal obligations to the plaintiff. The court later 

shifted the damages to ACG and Abad jointly and severally, and defendants say 

this was contrary to the jury’s wishes.

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We again sustain the trial court. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(a), courts may modify a jury verdict to correct “a clerical mistake . . . in a 

judgment.” The rule does not permit the revision of a jury’s factual findings, but 

courts may adjust a verdict to comply with rules regarding the apportionment of 

damages. Stuckey v. N. Propane Gas, Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1574 (11th Cir. 1989).

Here, apportionment is governed by state law. In Florida negligence cases,

courts allocate liability among defendants based on each “party’s percentage of 

fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability.” Fla. Stat. 

§ 768.81(3). Yet in actions concerning intentional torts, the doctrine of joint and 

several liability still applies. See id. § 768.81(4); Meyer v. Thompson, 861 So. 2d

1256, 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). And when a corporate defendant is held 

vicariously liable for the intentional torts of an individual, the doctrine works with 

greater force. In such situations, it is impossible to compare fault between parties 

because the corporation is liable for all harm caused by the primary actor. See 

Grobman v. Posey, 863 So. 2d 1230, 1235−37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing 

to compare liability where HMO vicariously liable for acts of doctor).

In view of this law, the trial court did not err to divide liability jointly and 

severally among ACG and Abad. In its final instructions, the court explained the 

legal tests for fraud and FDUTPA claims, but it did not explain how to apportion

damages between the defendants. Left to their own devices, the jury distributed

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liability as they saw fit, perhaps exacting the award from the defendant best 

equipped to bear the costs. But even if that was the jury’s reasoning, the rationale 

contravened clearly established law. The court did not exceed its authority to 

correct this error on motion, reallocating the damages to the right parties in the 

right amount. 

ACG counters that the court could not modify the verdict because it was the 

jury’s “obvious, but unexpressed” intent to exempt Abad from paying damages. 

Though the jury marked Abad liable for fraud and FDUTPA infractions on the 

verdict form, they did not take damages from him; this meant, in defendants’

estimation, that the jury held Abad liable on accident. But the court did not abuse 

its discretion to take a contrary view of the evidence. By marking that Abad was 

liable on both counts, the jury probably intended to hold Abad responsible for his 

misrepresentations. That the jury required no money from Abad proves only that 

they misunderstood how Florida law allots damages from intentional torts.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing the briefs and the record with care, we affirm the judgment 

below in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

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