Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01946/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01946-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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The Complaint was not screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian Gawlik, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona, State of, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-1946-PHX-RCB (BSB)

O R D E R

 AND 

ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL

 BRIEFING

Plaintiff Brian Gawlik, an inmate who is represented by counsel, brought this is civil

rights case against numerous Defendants regarding incidents occurring at Arizona State

Prison Complex (ASPC) Eyman. Plaintiff’s Complaint raises federal and state claims and

was initially filed in the Superior Court in Maricopa County. Defendants removed the case

to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.1

 Defendants now move to

dismiss multiple Defendants and counts on various grounds. (Doc. 4.)

The Court will grant the motion as to some claims in Count I and direct the parties to

file supplemental briefing with supporting documentation on the argument that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his remaining federal claims. The Court will

reserve decision on Defendants’ additional arguments raised in the Motion to Dismiss until

resolution of the exhaustion issue.

. . .

Case 2:12-cv-01946-JJT Document 15 Filed 01/31/13 Page 1 of 8
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I. Background

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 21, 2011, Correctional Officer Annis

“forcefully walk[ed] Plaintiff out of the dining hall, using Plaintiff’s body as a ‘battering

ram’ to slam open the heavy door on the way out of the building,” and then “took Plaintiff’s

bicep and body—maliciously, sadistically and without provocation—smashed his head facefirst, against the brick wall of the Health Care building.” (Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 50, 58.) This resulted

in a sprained foot and multiple facial fractures. (Id. ¶ 132.) Plaintiff further alleges, inter

alia, that Defendants failed to provide him medical care and ignored his requests for care.

Count I is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges an Eighth Amendment

violation by Annis for the assault (id. ¶ 197); an Eighth Amendment violation by the State,

Trujillo, and Lao for policies and practices that subjected Plaintiff to a substantial risk of

serious harm from inadequate health care and supervision of subordinates (id. ¶ 195); and an

Eighth Amendment violation by Annis, Duran, Barden, Halstead, Waits, and Hayes for

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs (id. ¶ 196.)

 Count II is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and alleges a conspiracy under color

of law by Annis, Duron, Barden, Halstead, Waits, Hayes and other unnamed officers to

deprive Plaintiff of “equal protection of the law pursuant to the Eighth Amendment” by

failing to properly report the initial assault and battery, failing to later file reports of the

incident, failing to discipline Annis, failing on numerous occasions to provide Plaintiff with

necessary and timely medical attention, failing to respond to Plaintiff’s requests for aid, and

wrongfully filing documents to reflect that Plaintiff was seen by a health care provider on

August 22, 2011, when he was not (id. ¶¶ 204-205); and a conspiracy by Annis, Duron, and

others who threatened to write-up Plaintiff for requesting medical attention and who did not

file a report about the assault (id. ¶ 206).

Count III is a state law claim for assault by Annis. 

Count IV is a state law claim for battery by Annis. 

Count V is a state-law claim for negligence, gross negligence, and professional

negligence by the State and unspecified individual Defendants for failing to exercise care,

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skill, and due diligence during “the processing, classification, housing and responses to

Plaintiff’s concerns regarding his safety. . . .” (id. ¶ 219, see also ¶¶ 221, 224).

Count VI is a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by Annis

for the assault (id. ¶ 228); by Annis, Duron, Barden, Halstead, Waits, Hayes and John and

Jane Doe Defendants for the assault and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs

(id. ¶¶ 229, 230).

Count VII is a state-law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by Annis,

Duron, Barden, Halstead, Waits, and Hayes in covering up the assault and battery and

ignoring Plaintiff’s medical needs (id. ¶ 233).

Count VIII is a state-law claim for false imprisonment by Annis because the assault

constituted unlawful restraint (id. ¶¶ 237-239.) 

Plaintiff seeks damages, including punitive damages.

II. Motion to Dismiss–Federal claims

A. Legal Standard–Exhaustion

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before bringing a federal action concerning prison conditions. See

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Exhaustion

is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002),

regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And a prisoner must complete the administrative review process

in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus,

the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement

in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the

method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).

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B. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies relating

to his § 1983 claims. (Doc. 4 at 7.) The ADC administrative remedies procedure is governed

by Department Order (DO) 802: Inmate Grievance Procedure, effective 7/13/09, as modified

by Director’s Instruction (DI) 287, effective 5/28/10. (Doc. 4 at 7, Exs. B and C, Decls. of

Aurora Aguilar and Juliet Respicio-Moriarty.) DO 802 provides that an inmate may use the

grievance process for “complaints related to any aspect of institutional life or condition of

confinement that directly and personally affects the inmate grievant including Department

Orders, Director’s Instructions, Institution and Post Order, Technical Manuals and written

instructions, procedures and the actions of staff.” (Aguilar Decl. ¶ 4.) Copies of DO 802 and

DI 287 are available to all inmates in the library of each unit. (Id. ¶ 9.) Under DO 802 and

DI 287, there is a process for nonmedical grievances and one for medical grievances. (Id.

¶ 5, Respicio-Moriarty Decl. ¶ 5.) The final step for both nonmedical and medical grievances

is an appeal to the Director. (Doc. 4 at 7.) The Director’s response is final, thus exhausting

available administrative remedies for both nonmedical and medical grievances. Defendants

contend that failure to appeal an issue through to the Director’s level constitutes a failure to

exhaust the administrative remedies.

 If an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies by appealing to the ADC Director,

there will be a record of it in the Grievance Appeal Log and the Grievance Appeal File.

(Aguilar Decl. ¶ 10.) Aguilar attests that she examined the Grievance Appeal Log and File

with regard to Plaintiff’s claims that (1) on August 21, 2011, Defendant Annis assaulted

him, (2) that he was denied medical treatment after the alleged assault, and (3) ADC staff

behaved inappropriately or failed to follow procedure with respect to the alleged assault. (Id.

¶ 11.) Respicio-Moriarty attests that she examined the Medical Grievance Appeal Log to

determine if Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to his claims that

Defendants denied him medical treatment after an alleged beating on August 21, 2011, or any

other claim related to the alleged beating. (Respicio-Moriarty Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendants note

that Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he only appealed to the Warden, not the Director.

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Plaintiff argues that he exhausted his administrative remedies and that dismissal for

failure to exhaust is without prejudice. (Doc. 8 at 8.) He further claims that he must be given

an opportunity to overcome the deficiency. (Doc. 8 at 8-9, citing Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d

1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970).) Although Plaintiff did not plead that he appealed to the

Director, he did so on August 26, 2011 and November 18, 2011. (Id. at 9, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff

asks that if the Court finds the issue of exhaustion dispositive, he be given an opportunity to

amend his Complaint to allege that he appealed to Ryan. (Id.)

 Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s inclusion of an undated and unexecuted grievance

appeal form and an inmate letter do not support his claim that he properly appealed the issues

to the Director. (Doc. 11 at 5-6.) Furthermore, Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he did

not exhaust his administrative grievances.

B. Analysis

The Court finds that Defendants have met their burden to demonstrate the availability

of an administrative remedy and that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his remedies as to

most of the claims in Count I. However on this record, the Court cannot determine if

Plaintiff exhausted remedies regarding the assault, so the Court will reserve its decision

pending receipt of supplemental briefing.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he exhausted his administrative remedies

beginning in August 2011 and went through the requisite appeals process. (Doc. 1-2 ¶ 31.)

He further asserts that he was informed on September 15, 2011 that the issue was under

administrative review; he then appealed to the warden and was subsequently informed on

April 9, 2012, that the Meadows Unit Administration “has imposed commensurate action

(disciplinary)” regarding the assault. (Id.) Neither party attaches these documents to the

pleadings. Plaintiff provides two documents addressed to the Director: one is an Inmate

Letter dated August 26, 2011, and the other is an Inmate Grievance Appeal dated as received

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Plaintiff need not amend his Complaint regarding exhaustion under the PLRA; as an

affirmative defense, exhaustion need not be alleged in a complaint. Jones, 549 U.S. at 212.

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on November 8, 2011.2 The August 26 Inmate Letter clearly does not satisfy the exhaustion

requirement because it is not a Grievance Appeal and was filed the same month or may be

the same document referred to in the Complaint as beginning the grievance procedure. Ngo

requires proper exhaustion in accordance with the applicable grievance-procedure rules.

Ngo, 548 U.S. at 92. The appeal to the Director is the last step for a non-medical claim, and

the August 26 Inmate Letter is out of sequence. 

The document dated as received on November 8 is difficult to read but states, in part

that on October 21, 2011, Plaintiff received a response to his original grievance regarding the

staff assault. (Doc. 8, Ex. 2.) The response stated that he could not file a grievance on the

matter until the investigation was completed. Plaintiff further stated in the appeal that per

policy, an inmate has 10 days to file. After no response, Plaintiff filed an Appeal to the

Complex Warden, which also received no response, so in accordance with the policy,

Plaintiff appealed to the director level. The document shows that it was received on

November 8, 2011 by a CO III, Badge # 2130. (Id.) It is unclear what happened to it after

that, and the Court does not have any other grievance documents. Exhaustion on the assault

claim may depend on the response regarding an investigation. See Brown v. Valoff, 422

F.3d 926, 936-38 (2005). On this record, the Court cannot say that Defendants have met

their burden to establish that Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies as to the

assault claim.

But the grievance appeal raises only the issue of the assault. It does not mention

failure to provide health care or anything regarding policies and practices that subjected

Plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm from inadequate health care and supervision of

subordinates. When a prison’s grievance procedures do not specify the requisite level of

factual detail, “a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which

redress is sought.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. The Court finds that the grievance appeal

about a specific assault on Plaintiff would not alert prison officials regarding the claims of

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health care or policies subjecting Plaintiff to a substantial risk of harm. Those claims will

be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As to Plaintiff’s request that he

be given the opportunity to overcome any deficiency, Potter relates only to amendment of

a deficient complaint. Potter, 433 F.2d at 1088. The PLRA mandates that an inmate exhaust

remedies before filing a lawsuit; exhausting remedies during the course of the lawsuit does

not comply with the requirement. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1120-21 (9th Cir.

2002).

 In addition, the PLRA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies regarding prison

conditions not just for claims under § 1983 but for claims under any federal law. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) ( “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983

of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); see

O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (although the

plaintiff did not bring claims under § 1983, “[b]ecause the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are

federal laws, the plain language of the PLRA requires that prisoners bringing an action under

these federal statutes challenging prison conditions must first exhaust available

administrative remedies.”). Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 are also federal claims

and are, therefore, subject to the exhaustion requirement. See Martinez v. Calif., 2009 WL

649892, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2009). It is unclear whether Defendants assert the failure

to exhaust the § 1985 claims for conspiracy. For example, Aguilar attests that she searched

for grievances complaining that ADC staff behaved inappropriately or failed to follow

procedure with respect to the alleged assault and Respicio-Moriarty searched for grievances

regarding any claim related to the alleged beating. Certainly the only document provided to

the Court that might constitute a Director Appeal—the Grievance Appeal received on

November 8, 2011—does not refer to any conspiracy or failure to properly report the assault

or failure to provide Plaintiff with necessary and timely medical attention, or threatening to

write-up Plaintiff. 

But because this issue was not clearly raised in the Motion to Dismiss and because

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further clarification is required as to exhaustion on the assault claim in Count I, the Court will

direct Defendants to file supplemental briefing, with necessary evidentiary support, on the

remaining exhaustion issues within 15 days. Plaintiff will be given 15 days to respond. The

Court will not rule at this time on the remaining arguments in the Motion to Dismiss because

if Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies on the federal claims, they will be

dismissed. At that point, the Court will decline supplemental jurisdiction on the state law

claims and remand the case to the Superior Court in Maricopa County. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 4).

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is granted in part; all claims in Count

I other than the claim for assault are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

(3) Within 15 days of the date of this Order, Defendants must file additional briefing

with supporting documentation on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies on the

assault claim in Count I and the claims in Count II. Plaintiff may file a response within 15

days of Defendants’ additional briefing, and Defendants may file a reply within 10 days of

Plaintiff’s response.

(4) The Clerk of Court must ensure that the docket reflects that the Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 4) is still pending. 

DATED this 31st day of January, 2013.

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