Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01329/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01329-45/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. PALMER, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:09-cv-01329-SKO (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SANCTIONS ARISING FROM 

CANCELLED DEPOSITION

(Doc. 193)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Floyd Scott (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 29, 2009. This action for 

damages is proceeding against Defendants Palmer, Rivera, and Lopez (“Defendants”) on 

Plaintiff=s claim that while he was at Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California, Defendant 

Palmer used excessive physical force against him and Defendants Rivera and Lopez failed to 

intervene, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking sanctions against Defendants arising 

from an unsuccessful deposition attempt on January 6, 2015. (Doc. 193.) Defendants filed an 

opposition on January 28, 2015, and Plaintiff filed a reply on February 9, 2015. (Docs. 196, 201.) 

The motion has been submitted upon the record without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 

230(l).

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On November 26, 2014, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to compel Plaintiff’s 

deposition, and Defendants subsequently noticed Plaintiff’s deposition by videoconference for 

January 6, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. at Plaintiff’s present institution. Plaintiff arrived for his deposition at 

8:30 a.m., but it was cancelled at approximately 10:00 a.m. after a stenographer failed to appear 

and Defendants’ counsel determined that his office inadvertently neglected to book a 

stenographer. Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $900.00, which represents six hours of his 

time at $150.00 per hour. Plaintiff also requests that any future request to depose him be denied, 

with prejudice.

1

 

II. Discussion

A. Rule 37 Sanctions

Plaintiff is not entitled to sanctions under the law as a result of the cancelled deposition. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not incur any actual attorney’s fees and as a layman, he is not 

permitted to recoup attorney’s fees for his own time. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435, 1423 

S.Ct. 1435 (1991) (even pro se litigants who are attorneys are not entitled to recover attorney’s 

fees); Elwood v. Drescher, 456 F.3d 943, 946-48 (9th Cir. 2006); Gonzales v. Kangas, 814 F.2d 

1411, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987). Lack of entitlement to attorney’s fees notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s 

argument that he is entitled to reasonable expenses because Defendants violated a discovery order 

has no merit. Plaintiff failed to cooperate at his first deposition and Defendants’ subsequent 

motion to compel his deposition was granted. (Doc. 174.) Defendants’ inability to go through 

with the deposition scheduled for January 6, 2015, due to the lack of a stenographer does not 

constitute noncompliance with a discovery order, and Rule 37 provides no basis for Plaintiff to 

seek sanctions under these circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b).

B. Sanctions Under Court’s Inherent Authority

Next, the events described do not support an award of sanctions under the Court’s inherent 

authority. Defense counsel thought his assistant booked a stenographer, as directed, but when a 

stenographer failed to appear, counsel determined that one had never been booked. (Doc. 196, 

 

1 Defendants do not intend to re-notice Plaintiff’s deposition, so that request is moot. (Doc. 196-1, Delgado Dec., 

¶11.)

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Opp., Delgado Dec., ¶¶4-6.) Federal courts have the Court’s inherent authority to sanction 

abusive litigation conduct. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (1991). 

However, because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and 

discretion, Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (quotation marks omitted), and sanctions must be supported 

by a specific finding of bad faith, or conduct tantamount to bad faith, Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 

989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Miller v. City of Los Angeles, 661 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 

2011); Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001). Neither mere negligence nor mere 

recklessness supports the imposition of sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority. In re 

Lehtinen, 564 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009); Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1478-

80 (9th Cir. 1989). As such, the circumstances of Plaintiff’s cancelled deposition provide no basis 

for sanctions and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

III. Order

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions arising out of his cancelled 

deposition, filed on January 12, 2015, is HEREBY DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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