Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00798/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00798-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 28:1331cv Fed. Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARBARA MANU, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 19-cv-00798-BAS-KSC

ORDER DISMISSSING CASE

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

v.

CITY OF OCEANSIDE 

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 

COMMISSION (HOUSING 

DIVISION), et al., 

Defendants.

Following this Court’s order granting her motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) and dismissing the original single-sentence complaint without prejudice, 

Plaintiff Barbara Manu has filed a thirteen-page amended complaint. (ECF No. 4.) 

This amended complaint is subject to a mandatory screening given Plaintiff’s IFP 

status. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 

(9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 

prisoners.”). Conducting this screening again, the Court finds that Plaintiff has still 

not provided sufficient factual allegations that would show she is entitled to any 

relief based on the alleged conduct.

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DISCUSSION

Under §1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss a case if the court determines that 

the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief 

against persons immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). The purpose of 

[screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear 

the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 

2012)). Under Rule 8, “a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a 

short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) 

a demand for the relief sought[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A district court may dismiss 

a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 when the complaint fails to provide 

the defendant fair notice of the wrongs allegedly committed. See McHenry v. Renne, 

84 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996). The pleading must also set forth sufficient 

facts to show a plausible claim for relief. “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

In her original single-sentence May 1, 2019 complaint, Plaintiff brought suit 

against the Defendants for “Neighborhood Services Department Housing 

Division[’s] refusal to inspect unsanitary apartment and threatening to terminate my 

Section 8 program.” (ECF No. 1.) In her May 16, 2019 Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiff now alleges that the Division in fact inspected her apartment on May 10, 

2019 after she requested an inspection on March 7, 2019 due to multiple issues, 

including lack of a toilet and not having water in the kitchen. (ECF No. 4 at 2–3.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that she and the apartment owner had agreed that the owner 

would “keep $1,995 deposit to cover April and May 2019” rent. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff 

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alleges that the City “disagreed” and sent her a notice of termination of her Section 

8 voucher because she “withheld the rent money.” (Id. at 5.) The Amended 

Complaint contains contradictory allegations that apartment owner said she will 

renew the lease after May 31, 2019, but also said she will not renew the lease after 

it ends on May 31, 2019. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that she gave the apartment 

owner “30 days notice of vacating the apartment after the lease ends on March 7, 

2019,” but the owner refused to accept the document as evidenced by a returned mail 

receipt. (Id. at 4, 8 (IRS notice of mail misdirected).) Plaintiff otherwise attaches 

various documents, including: (1) an undated document from the City of Oceanside 

Community Development Commission regarding a right to request an informal 

hearing for an intended action with respect to Section 8 Rental Assistance, (id. at 

11); (2) a single-page of a “Housing Assistance Payments Contract” through the 

“Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistance Housing Choice Voucher Program,” showing 

that Plaintiff owed initial rent of $1,995, she would receive initial housing assistance 

in a monthly payment of $1,206 to the owner, and have an initial monthly tenant rent 

of $789, (id. at 12); (3) an excerpt from a lease document that fails to identify the 

property leased, but which shows a rent increase occurring on June 1, 2019, (id. at 

15–16); and (4) a series of handwritten documents regarding an intent to vacate the 

apartment, including a document dated March 7, 2019 referring to a May 31, 2019 

lease expiration, (id. at 17–18). 

Having considered these allegations, it is simply not clear to the Court what 

claim for relief Plaintiff intends to raise based on these allegations, nor it is clear to 

the Court that Plaintiff has any claim. First, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the 

initial lack of an inspection, it would appear that any claim for injunctive relief is 

moot since inspection occurred. Plaintiff does not otherwise request monetary relief, 

nor is it clear to the Court on what basis she could receive such relief. Second, 

although Plaintiff indicates that the City of Oceanside intended to take some action 

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with respect to her Section 8 voucher, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual allegations 

showing when she received notice of the intended action or that her Section 8 

voucher has in fact been terminated. Plaintiff identifies no concrete harm related to 

the Section 8 voucher for which she can seek a remedy from this Court. Third, it is 

unclear what claim Plaintiff seeks to press regarding her notice of intent to vacate 

her apartment as of May 31, 2019. Because Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint 

on May 16, 2019, she could not plausibly allege that she faced any harm from the 

apartment owner’s purported refusal of Plaintiff’s March 7, 2019 notice, such as 

incurring additional rent charges. In short, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has 

provided sufficient allegations that show she is entitled to any form of relief based 

on the conduct alleged. 

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Amended Complaint 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is provided with leave to file an amended 

complaint that corrects these deficiencies no later than August 26, 2019. This case 

will remain closed if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to correct 

the identified deficiencies in any amended complaint

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 12, 2019

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