Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07040/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 20, 2024 Decided October 8, 2024 

No. 23-7040 

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, 

APPELLANT

v. 

45COMMITTEE, INC., 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:22-cv-01115) 

Molly E. Danahy argued the cause for appellant. With her 

on the briefs were Adav Noti, Kevin P. Hancock, Alexandra 

Copper, and Allison Walter. 

Brinton Lucas argued the cause for appellee. With him on 

the brief were Brett A. Shumate, E. Stewart Crosland, and 

Charles E.T. Roberts. 

Brett R. Nolan was on the brief for amicus curiae Institute 

for Free Speech in support of appellee. 

USCA Case #23-7040 Document #2078919 Filed: 10/08/2024 Page 1 of 25
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Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, CHILDS, Circuit Judge, 

and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN. 

SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: In 2018, Campaign Legal 

Center filed an administrative complaint with the Federal 

Election Commission. The complaint alleged that 

45Committee, Inc., had violated the Federal Election 

Campaign Act by failing to register as a political committee. 

Almost two years went by and the Commission took no 

discernible action on the complaint. Campaign Legal Center 

then sued the Commission, seeking a declaration that the 

Commission’s failure to act on the complaint was “contrary to 

law.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). The court agreed and granted 

that relief. 

Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, if the 

Commission failed to “conform with” that contrary-to-law 

declaration within thirty days, Campaign Legal Center could 

bring a citizen suit against 45Committee to try to enforce the 

allegations in the administrative complaint. Id.

§ 30109(a)(8)(C). Thirty days came and went with no apparent 

action from the Commission. The court that issued the 

contrary-to-law decision then entered an order finding that the 

Commission had failed to conform, clearing the way for 

Campaign Legal Center to bring this citizen suit. 

Shortly after the initiation of the suit, however, it came to 

light that the Commission in fact had taken a previously 

unknown action in the thirty-day period following the court’s 

contrary-to-law determination. Specifically, the Commission 

had held a vote on whether to investigate the allegations in 

Campaign Legal Center’s administrative complaint. The vote 

failed, so no Commission investigation ensued. 

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After learning that the Commission had held that vote in 

the thirty-day window following the contrary-to-law 

determination, the district court dismissed this citizen suit. The 

court reasoned that, by holding the vote, the Commission had 

conformed with the determination that its prior inaction was 

contrary to law, and that conformance precluded the bringing 

of a citizen suit. 

Campaign Legal Center now appeals. It argues that the 

district court should not have second-guessed the previous 

determination that the Commission had failed to conform with 

the contrary-to-law determination. And it further argues that, 

regardless, the Commission’s unsuccessful vote on whether to 

initiate an investigation did not amount to an action that 

conformed with the contrary-to-law determination and that 

thereby foreclosed this citizen suit. 

We disagree on both scores. We conclude that, after 

learning of the previously unknown vote held by the 

Commission, the district court was free to consider afresh 

whether the Commission had conformed with the contrary-tolaw determination. We further conclude that the Commission’s 

holding of the vote did constitute conformance with the 

contrary-to-law determination so as to preclude this citizen 

suit. 

I. 

A. 

1. 

Congress established the Federal Election Commission to 

“administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate 

policy with respect to” the Federal Election Campaign Act 

(FECA). 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a), (b)(1). The Commission 

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comprises six voting members, no more than three of whom 

“may be affiliated with the same political party.” Id. 

§ 30106(a)(1).

The Commission has “exclusive jurisdiction with respect 

to civil enforcement” of FECA. Id. § 30106(b)(1). Any 

“decision[] of the Commission” to “exercise [] its duties and 

powers” must, at minimum, “be made by a majority vote of” 

Commissioners, id. § 30106(c), which can be as few as three 

given that four Commissioners can make up a quorum. Fed. 

Election Comm’n, Commission Directive No. 10 at 1 (June 8, 

1978, amended Dec. 20, 2007), https://perma.cc/7ZMKTYWS. FECA imposes a higher bar for the Commission to 

wield investigatory or enforcement powers: four or more 

votes—a bipartisan majority of the Commission—are required 

to initiate an investigation into violations of FECA or to 

authorize any enforcement measures against a violator. See id. 

§ 30106(c); id. § 30107(a)(6), (a)(9); id. § 30109(a)(2), (a)(4)–

(6). 

That four-vote requirement plays a recurring role in 

FECA’s stepwise enforcement scheme. “Any person who 

believes a violation” of FECA “has occurred” can file an 

administrative complaint with the Commission. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(1). Upon receiving a complaint, the Commission 

votes on whether there is “reason to believe” the complaint’s 

allegations. Id. § 30109(a)(2). If four or more Commissioners 

vote to find that there is reason to believe a violation has 

occurred or will occur, the “Commission shall make an 

investigation of such alleged violation.” Id. Following any 

investigation, the Commission votes on whether there is 

“probable cause to believe” a violation has been or will be 

committed. Id. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). If four or more 

Commissioners vote to find probable cause, the Commission 

may then pursue an escalating series of enforcement steps, each 

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of which requires four votes to initiate. See id. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(5)(C), (a)(6)(A). 

Rather than initiate an investigation, the Commission at 

any time can dismiss a complaint. Id. § 30109(a)(1), (a)(8). 

Importantly, a dismissal differs from a failed reason-to-believe 

vote—that is, a vote on whether to find “reason to believe” that 

fails because fewer than four Commissioners so find. The 

Commission can properly dismiss a complaint—or 

“terminate[] the proceedings,” 11 C.F.R. §§ 111.9(b), 

111.20(a)—in two relevant ways. First, four or more 

Commissioners can vote to find that there is “no reason to 

believe” a violation has occurred. Id. §§ 111.9(b), 111.20(a) 

(emphasis added). Such a vote occasions dismissal of the 

complaint, whereas a failed “reason to believe” vote does not. 

Second, a majority of sitting Commissioners can vote to 

“dismiss” the matter. See 52 U.S.C. § 30106(c); Doe v. FEC, 

920 F.3d 866, 871 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Citizens for Resp. & 

Ethics in Wash. v. FEC (New Models), 993 F.3d 880, 891 n.10 

(D.C. Cir. 2021); End Citizens United PAC v. FEC, 90 F.4th 

1172, 1180 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2024). In doing so, the Commission 

dismisses a complaint without rendering a four-vote decision 

on its merits. 

The Commission often pursues that second option when it 

is deadlocked—that is, when no bloc of four Commissioners 

votes to find either reason to believe or no reason to believe. 

Because a reason-to-believe vote resulting in a deadlock will 

give rise to a dismissal only if a majority of Commissioners 

separately votes to dismiss the complaint, the phrase we 

sometimes use—“deadlock dismissal,” see, e.g., Common 

Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 448–49 (D.C. Cir. 1988); New 

Models, 993 F.3d at 894—is perhaps a convenient shorthand 

but should not be misunderstood to mean a deadlocked vote 

constitutes or automatically occasions a dismissal. 

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If the Commission does not dismiss the complaint after a 

failed reason-to-believe vote, the case remains open. In that 

circumstance, the Commission may hold further reason-tobelieve votes, and there may be no public disclosure of those 

votes or any other actions taken by the Commission with 

respect to the complaint. Rather, until the Commission 

dismisses the complaint, the Commission cannot publicly 

disclose the complaint or any investigation or votes related to 

it (unless the target of the complaint consents to disclosure). 

See 11 C.F.R. § 111.21; 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(12)(A). When 

the complaint is dismissed, the Commission makes public, 

among other things, the votes taken with respect to the 

complaint. See Disclosure of Certain Documents in 

Enforcement and Other Matters, 81 Fed. Reg. 50702, 50703 

(Aug. 2, 2016); 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii); 11 C.F.R. 

§§ 111.9(b), 111.20; see also id. §§ 4.4(a)(3), 5.4(a)(4). (One 

district court in this circuit has held unlawful the Commission’s 

practice of not disclosing failed reason-to-believe votes absent 

a subsequent dismissal, Heritage Action for Am. v. FEC, 682 

F. Supp. 3d 62, 73–76 (D.D.C. 2023), but that question is not 

before us in this appeal.) 

2. 

As a general matter, an executive agency’s decision not to 

pursue enforcement is presumptively unreviewable. Heckler v. 

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33 (1985). FECA, however, 

contains an unusual provision that sometimes allows for 

judicial review of Commission nonenforcement decisions, and 

that also authorizes citizen suits against the alleged violator in 

certain conditions. 

Under that provision, “[a]ny party aggrieved by” the 

Commission’s “dismissal” of a complaint or by its 

“failure . . . to act on such complaint during the 120-day 

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period” after receiving it may sue the Commission, seeking a 

court “declaration” that the dismissal or failure to act is 

“contrary to law.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). The 

Commission’s failure to act within that 120-day period or any 

other timeframe is not per se contrary to law. Instead, FECA 

provides a “failure to act” cause of action to the complainant 

that ripens after that 120-day period, id. § 30109(a)(8)(A), and 

courts analyze the lawfulness of the Commission’s challenged 

inaction under a set of factors laid out in Common Cause v. 

FEC, 489 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1980), and 

Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 

F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (TRAC). See FEC v. Rose, 806 

F.2d 1081, 1084 & n.6, 1091–92 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 

If a court finds the Commission’s failure to act on a 

complaint (or its dismissal of a complaint) is contrary to law, it 

“may declare” as much and, further, “may direct the 

Commission to conform with [that] declaration within 30 

days.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). If the Commission does 

not so conform, the original complainant can file a citizen suit: 

specifically, she can bring “a civil action” in her own name 

against the subject of the complaint, “to remedy the violation” 

alleged “in the original complaint.” See id. 

There are thus two preconditions to a citizen suit: (i) a 

court must declare that the Commission’s failure to act on a 

complaint (or its dismissal of a complaint) is contrary to law 

and must order the Commission to conform with that 

declaration; and (ii) the Commission must fail to timely 

conform with that declaration. See id. Unlike the predicate 

contrary-to-law action, a citizen suit is brought against the 

subject of the complaint, not the Commission, and it resolves 

the merits of the complaint’s allegations, not the lawfulness of 

the Commission’s failure to act on (or rationale for dismissing) 

the complaint. 

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B. 

1. 

In August 2018, Campaign Legal Center (CLC) filed an 

administrative complaint against 45Committee, Inc. CLC 

alleged that 45Committee had violated FECA by raising and 

expending funds in connection with the 2016 presidential 

election without registering as a political committee. Almost 

two years later, in March 2020, CLC brought a contrary-to-law 

suit alleging a failure by the Commission to act on its 

administrative complaint. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). 

The Commission did not appear in court to defend against the 

allegation that its evident inaction on CLC’s administrative 

complaint was contrary to law.

Unbeknownst to the court, CLC, or 45Committee, the 

Commission had held five votes related to CLC’s 

administrative complaint on a single day in June 2020. See 

Amended Certification at 1–2, Fed. Election Comm’n MUR 

7486 (Aug. 14, 2020) (June 2020 Certification), 

https://perma.cc/NW87-4UBK (J.A. 234–35). Among those 

votes was a reason-to-believe vote that failed 2-2 on a partyline basis. Id. at 1 (J.A. 234). The Commissioners also 

deadlocked 2-2 on whether to authorize the General Counsel to 

defend against the contrary-to-law suit, so the Commission 

never participated in the litigation. Id. (J.A. 234). 

Additionally, the Commission held several votes on whether to 

dismiss the matter (which would have occasioned public 

disclosure of the various votes), but each also failed on party 

lines. See id. at 1–2 (J.A. 234–35). 

The court ultimately entered a default judgment against the 

Commission. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 20-CV-0809, 

2021 WL 5178968 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2021). It held that, under 

the Common Cause factors, the Commission’s failure to act at 

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all on the complaint was contrary to law, id. at *5–6, and that 

the TRAC factors weighed in favor of granting mandamus 

relief, id. at *6–9. The court ordered the Commission “to act 

on the complaint within thirty days pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(C).” Id. at *9. 

The Commission did not respond to that contrary-to-law 

decision, nor did it notify CLC or the court of any action taken 

during the thirty-day period. See Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 

No. 20-CV-0809, 2022 WL 2111542, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 

2022). So, on December 9, 2021, thirty-one days after the 

contrary-to-law decision, CLC asked the court that issued that 

decision to enter an order finding that the Commission had 

failed to conform with the contrary-to-law determination, see 

id. at *1–2, a finding which would pave the way for a citizen 

suit, 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). 

While CLC’s request was pending, 45Committee gained 

leave to participate as an amicus in the case. Campaign Legal 

Ctr., 2022 WL 2111542, at *2. By then, 45Committee had 

obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request a 

partially redacted record of the votes the Commission had 

taken in June 2020. The redactions indicated that multiple 

votes of some kind had taken place, but details of only one 

vote—the aforementioned vote on whether to defend the 

contrary-to-law suit—were unredacted. 45Committee urged 

the court to infer that the Commission had indeed taken 

“action” on the complaint and that it “likely voted against 

enforcement action,” meaning the Commission had not in fact 

engaged in inaction that was contrary to law. Id. The court 

declined to so “speculat[e],” and thus “ordered” that CLC “may 

bring an action to enforce [] FECA against” 45Committee 

pursuant to FECA’s citizen-suit provision. Id. at *2–3

(capitalization altered).

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After the court denied 45Committee’s subsequent request 

to intervene, Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 20-CV-0809, 

2022 WL 2111560, at *6 (D.D.C. May 13, 2022),

45Committee appealed, seeking review of that denial and of 

the district court’s decision that CLC could bring a citizen suit 

against it. This court summarily affirmed the denial of 

intervention and, because 45Committee therefore was not a 

party, dismissed the appeal. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, Nos. 

22-5164, 22-5165, 2022 WL 4280689, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 

14, 2022). 

2. 

In April 2022, CLC filed this citizen suit against 

45Committee. After commencement of the suit, the parties and 

the district court obtained previously unreleased records that 

changed the picture in important ways. Those records became 

available because, in August 2022, the Commission voted to 

dismiss the complaint and close the file. Certification at 1, Fed. 

Election Comm’n MUR 7486 (Aug. 29, 2022), 

https://perma.cc/9656-8FAV (J.A. 243). That dismissal 

triggered disclosure of all prior votes held with respect to the 

complaint. Significantly, the records showed that in December 

2021—within the thirty-day period after the contrary-to-law 

order issued—the Commission held a reason-to-believe vote. 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. 45Committee, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 3d 1, 

4 (D.D.C. 2023). That vote (like the earlier one in June 2020) 

failed: three Commissioners voted for finding a reason to 

believe, two voted against, and one abstained. Id.; Certification 

at 1, Fed. Election Comm’n MUR 7486 (Dec. 7, 2021), 

https://perma.cc/5ZNK-ESKT (J.A. 237). 

In light of that December 2021 reason-to-believe vote, the 

district court dismissed this citizen suit. 45Committee, 666 F. 

Supp. 3d. at 5–7. The court held that the vote counted as acting 

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on the complaint, meaning the Commission had conformed 

with the contrary-to-law decision arising from a failure to act 

within thirty days, precluding the bringing of a citizen suit. See 

id. at 5. CLC now appeals. 

II. 

In this appeal, CLC seeks to overturn the district court’s 

dismissal of its citizen suit. CLC’s arguments in part arise from 

the interplay between the two district court decisions that 

addressed whether FECA’s prerequisites for bringing a citizen 

suit are satisfied. 

The initial decision came from the contrary-to-law court—

i.e., the court that considered CLC’s contrary-to-law suit 

against the Commission and held that the Commission’s 

evident inaction on CLC’s administrative complaint for over 

two years was contrary to law. That court subsequently held—

at a time when the Commission’s December 2021 reason-tobelieve vote remained undisclosed—that the Commission 

failed to conform with the contrary-to-law determination 

within thirty days, enabling CLC to bring a citizen suit. 

Campaign Legal Ctr., 2022 WL 2111542, at *2–3. The second 

relevant decision came from the citizen-suit court—i.e., the 

court below, which considered CLC’s ensuing citizen suit 

against 45Committee. That court learned of the Commission’s 

December 2021 reason-to-believe vote, and held that the 

Commission, by holding that vote, had taken action to conform 

with the contrary-to-law determination within FECA’s thirtyday window, precluding the bringing of a citizen suit. 

45Committee, 666 F. Supp. 3d. at 5–7.

CLC presents two arguments for overturning that decision. 

First, CLC contends that the citizen-suit court could not revisit 

the contrary-to-law court’s determination that FECA’s 

prerequisites for bringing a citizen suit are satisfied. Rather, in 

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CLC’s view, the citizen-suit court was bound by the contraryto-law court’s holding that the Commission had failed to take 

action conforming with the contrary-to-law determination 

within FECA’s thirty-day window. CLC’s second argument 

is that, even assuming the citizen-suit court could consider the 

issue afresh, the Commission’s failed reason-to-believe vote 

did not constitute the kind of conformance with the contraryto-law determination that precludes a citizen suit. We disagree 

with both of CLC’s arguments. 

A. 

We begin with whether the contrary-to-law court’s 

determination that FECA’s citizen-suit preconditions are 

satisfied was binding on the citizen-suit court below. We 

consider that question in two steps. First, are FECA’s citizensuit preconditions jurisdictional, such that the citizen-suit court 

below could—and indeed had to—consider anew whether they 

are satisfied? Second, even if the preconditions are 

nonjurisdictional, did the citizen-suit court still have discretion 

to revisit whether they are satisfied here? We conclude that 

FECA’s citizen-suit preconditions are nonjurisdictional, but 

that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the district court 

nonetheless was not bound to stick with the contrary-to-law 

court’s conclusion that the preconditions were satisfied. 

1. 

The district court understood the inquiry into whether 

FECA’s citizen-suit preconditions are satisfied to consist of 

two “prong[s]”: (i) there must be a determination that the 

Commission acted contrary to law (here, by inaction); and (ii) 

the Commission must fail to conform with that contrary-to-law 

determination within FECA’s thirty-day window. 

45Committee, 666 F. Supp. 3d at 4–6. The court concluded 

that CLC’s citizen suit failed on “prong two”: by holding the 

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December 2021 reason-to-believe vote, the Commission, in the 

district court’s view, had taken conforming “action” within 

thirty days of the contrary-to-law order. Id. at 5. 

While the contrary-to-law court had previously held that 

the Commission had not taken conforming action, that court 

had not known about the Commission’s December 2021 

reason-to-believe vote. In concluding that it could depart from 

the contrary-to-law court on that score, the district court below 

relied on our decision in Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 

1996) (per curiam). There, we observed that FECA’s judicialreview provisions set out in 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a), which 

include the citizen-suit preconditions, are “jurisdictional.” Id. 

at 559. In that light, the district court believed it had an 

“independent obligation to ensure” satisfaction of those 

preconditions and could not “ignore new evidence that was not 

before” the contrary-to-law court. 45Committee, 666 F. Supp. 

3d at 5–6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The district court understandably considered Perot

binding precedent on whether FECA’s citizen-suit 

preconditions are jurisdictional. But today, we overrule Perot

as incompatible with intervening Supreme Court decisions. 

We conclude that FECA’s judicial-review requirements—

including the citizen-suit preconditions—are 

nonjurisdictional.*

*

 “One three-judge panel” of this court “does not have the 

authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court.” 

LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

“That power may be exercised only by the full court,” either through 

an en banc decision or a so-called Irons footnote. Id. “In an Irons

footnote, named after the holding in Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 

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“Congressional statutes are replete with directions to 

litigants that serve as preconditions to relief,” including the 

kind of preconditions to suit at issue here. MOAC Mall 

Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 297 

(2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Those 

sorts of preconditions can be “mandatory” but still 

nonjurisdictional. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). A statutory rule is jurisdictional only if it “sets the 

bounds of the court’s adjudicatory authority”; 

“nonjurisdictional rules,” by contrast, “govern how courts and 

litigants operate within those bounds.” Santos-Zacaria v. 

Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023) (cleaned up). 

Since our decision in Perot, the Supreme Court has 

adopted a clear-statement rule to differentiate jurisdictional 

rules from nonjurisdictional ones. Id. (citing Arbaugh v. Y & 

H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006)). A statutory rule 

qualifies as jurisdictional only if it is “unmistakably” clear that 

Congress intended that result. Id. at 416–17. That is a high 

bar: while “Congress need not use magic words to convey its 

intent that a statutory precondition be treated as jurisdictional,” 

267–68 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the panel ‘seeks for its proposed 

decision the endorsement of the en banc court, and announces that 

endorsement in a footnote to the panel’s opinion.’” Oakey v. U.S. 

Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan, 723 F.3d 227, 232 n.1 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013) (cleaned up) (quoting U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the D.C. 

Cir., Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions 

at 1 (Jan. 17, 1996), https://perma.cc/86UC-M6GM). Our holding 

today—overruling Perot and establishing that FECA’s preconditions 

are nonjurisdictional—has been approved by the en banc court and 

therefore constitutes the law of the circuit. Cf. Robinson v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec. Off. of Inspector Gen., 71 F.4th 51, 55–58, 56 n.1 

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (overturning through an Irons footnote, in light of 

intervening Supreme Court decisions, a circuit decision that had 

deemed a statutory rule jurisdictional). 

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“it is insufficient that a jurisdictional reading is plausible, or 

even better, than nonjurisdictional alternatives.” MOAC, 598 

U.S. at 298 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

And a statutory precondition is jurisdictional only if it 

“purports to govern a court’s adjudicatory capacity” by 

speaking directly to “a court’s authority” over claims brought 

under the statute. See id. at 299 (cleaned up). 

FECA contains no language expressing with the requisite 

clarity that its judicial-review provisions are jurisdictional. In 

Perot, our court reasoned that § 30106(b)(1) and § 30107(e) 

made the “requirements” in § 30109(a)(8)—which include the 

preconditions to bringing a citizen suit—jurisdictional. 97 F.3d 

at 557–58. In relevant part, § 30106(b)(1) provides that “[t]he 

Commission shall . . . seek to obtain compliance with” FECA 

and “shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to [its] civil 

enforcement.” 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). Similarly, § 30107(e) 

specifies that, except insofar as FECA permits citizen suits, 

“the power of the Commission to initiate civil actions . . . shall 

be the exclusive civil remedy for the enforcement of the 

provisions of this Act.” Id. § 30107(e) (citing id. 

§ 30109(a)(8)). 

Neither provision limits the jurisdiction of the federal 

courts: rather than address a court’s adjudicatory authority, 

those provisions “take[] as a given” that federal courts will 

have subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions under FECA,

see MOAC, 598 U.S. at 299, and serve only to specify who can 

bring a civil action and when. Perot thus deemed § 30109(a)’s 

requirements jurisdictional by relying on statutory language 

addressed to the Commission’s authority to prosecute civil 

actions. As the Supreme Court has since clarified, though, a 

statutory requirement is jurisdictional only if it speaks to 

courts’ authority to adjudicate actions. 

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 What about paragraphs (8) and (9) of § 30109(a), the 

judicial review provisions central to this case? First, 

subparagraph (8)(A) requires contrary-to-law suits to be 

brought only in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 

See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). Though that subparagraph 

mentions federal courts, it does not “refer in any way to the 

jurisdiction of the district courts.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 

(emphasis added) (citation omitted). That provision takes for 

granted that federal courts would have subject-matter 

jurisdiction over contrary-to-law claims and simply channels 

contrary-to-law suits to a specific district court. Next, 

paragraph (9) specifies that district court judgments in 

contrary-to-law actions, citizen suits, and Commissioninstituted civil enforcement actions can be appealed to the 

relevant court of appeals. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(9); see also id. 

§ 30109(a)(5)–(6), (8). One might read paragraph (9) to grant

federal courts appellate jurisdiction over actions brought 

pursuant to FECA; but it is at least as plausible that the 

paragraph presupposes appellate jurisdiction actions and 

simply clarifies that parties have a right to appeal and those 

appeals will be heard by the relevant circuit (rather than, say, 

consolidated in this circuit). 

Finally, consider subparagraphs (8)(A) and (8)(C). As we 

have explained, subparagraph (8)(A) establishes that the party 

who submitted an administrative complaint may bring a 

contrary-to-law suit if she is “aggrieved by” the Commission’s 

dismissal of the complaint or failure to act on it within 120 days 

of its filing. See id. § 30109(a)(8)(A). Subparagraph (8)(C) 

then provides that in such a contrary-to-law suit, the court “may 

declare” that the Commission’s dismissal or failure to act was 

“contrary to law,” and “may direct the Commission to conform 

with such declaration within 30 days.” Id. § 30109(a)(8)(C). 

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Those subparagraphs should be read as nonjurisdictional 

limitations. They closely resemble the judicial-review 

provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 

action . . . , is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); id.

§ 706(2)(A) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and 

set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law[.]”). And those APA provisions are 

nonjurisdictional: rather than grant a court subject-matter 

jurisdiction, they “provide a limited cause of action for parties 

adversely affected by agency action,” and a court hearing an 

APA claim has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 524–25 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Subparagraphs (8)(A) and (8)(C) of § 30109(a)(8) 

mirror those nonjurisdictional cause-of-action-granting 

provisions in the APA, and thus are best understood as likewise 

nonjurisdictional. 

2. 

We turn now to considering whether, in light of our 

conclusion that FECA’s citizen-suit preconditions are 

nonjurisdictional, the district court erred by reconsidering the 

contrary-to-law court’s prior decision that the preconditions 

had been satisfied in this case. We conclude that, in the specific 

circumstances of this case, the district court was free to revisit 

whether the preconditions are met after it learned about the 

previously undisclosed December 2021 reason-to-believe vote. 

Our decision in Campaign Legal Center v. Federal 

Election Commission (Heritage Action), 68 F.4th 607 (D.C. 

Cir. 2023), compels that conclusion. There, like here, the 

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object of the administrative complaint—Heritage Action for 

America—unsuccessfully tried to intervene in a contrary-tolaw suit against the Commission. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 

No. CV 21-406, 2022 WL 1978727 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022). 

And there, again like here, the Commission failed to make an 

appearance, and the contrary-to-law court entered a default 

judgment that the Commission’s failure to act was contrary to 

law. Id. at *1. As in our case, the contrary-to-law court then 

found that the citizen-suit preconditions were satisfied because 

the Commission failed to conform with the contrary-to-law 

decision within thirty days. Id. And—again like in our case—

after the default contrary-to-law decision, Heritage Action filed 

a FOIA request with the Commission seeking information 

about any Commission action taken on the administrative 

complaint against it. Id. at *1, *2. (Unlike in our case, that 

FOIA request was still pending at the time of the district court’s 

decision on intervention. Id. at *2.) 

Our court affirmed the contrary-to-law court’s denial of 

intervention to Heritage Action. Heritage Action, 68 F.4th at 

610–11. We relied on the notion that issue preclusion would 

not preclude revisiting whether the citizen-suit preconditions 

were satisfied. See id. at 611. We explained that, because 

“Heritage Action was not a party to the default judgment in [the 

contrary-to-law suit] against the Commission,” it “would not 

be prevented from arguing” in the citizen suit that the 

preconditions “ha[d] not been met.” Id. (citing 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(C)). We also invoked two Supreme Court 

decisions addressing issue preclusion. See id. We cited the 

portion of the Court’s decision in Herrera v. Wyoming in which 

the Court observed that “an exception” to issue preclusion 

“may be warranted if there has been an intervening change in 

the applicable legal context,” including when the “controlling 

facts” have changed. 587 U.S. 329, 343 (2019) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). And we cited a section of 

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the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. California that 

explained that default judgments do not have preclusive effect. 

530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000). 

In Heritage Action, then, we indicated three reasons why 

the contrary-to-law court’s determination that the citizen-suit 

preconditions were satisfied would not be preclusive on the 

citizen-suit court. See 68 F.4th at 611. All three factors are 

also present in our case: (i) 45Committee was not a party to 

the proceedings in which the contrary-to-law court decided that 

the Commission had failed to conform with its contrary-to-law 

order; (ii) that decision was a default judgment; and (iii) new 

facts materially bearing on the issue became known after the 

decision. In those pivotal respects, the preclusion question 

before us is indistinguishable from the one in Heritage Action. 

That decision’s conclusion that there is no preclusion thus 

governs here as well. See LaShawn A., 87 F.3d at 1393 (“[T]he 

same issue presented in a later case in the same court should 

lead to the same result.” (emphasis omitted)). 

For those reasons, the citizen-suit court below was not 

bound by the contrary-to-law court’s prior decision that the 

Commission had failed to timely conform with its contrary-tolaw determination. The citizen-suit court thus could take into 

account pertinent information that had been unknown to the 

contrary-to-law court: that the Commission had held a reasonto-believe vote within thirty days of the contrary-to-law 

determination. If the Commission’s holding of that reason-tobelieve vote constituted conformance with the contrary-to-law 

determination, FECA’s citizen-suit preconditions would be 

unmet and CLC could not bring its citizen suit. That is what 

the district court below decided, and we now turn to assessing 

the merits of that conclusion. 

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B. 

By way of a brief refresher, recall that a contrary-to-law 

decision can arise either from the Commission’s “dismiss[al] 

[of] a complaint” or from its “failure . . . to act on such [a] 

complaint.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). And recall further 

that the citizen-suit preconditions are unmet if the Commission 

“conform[s] with” a contrary-to-law decision within thirty days 

of having been “direct[ed]” to do so by the contrary-to-law 

court. Id. § 30109(a)(8)(C). Here, the Commission’s failure to 

act on CLC’s complaint against 45Committee was deemed 

contrary to law, but within thirty days of that decision, the 

Commission held a reason-to-believe vote. 45Committee, 666 

F. Supp. 3d at 3–4. That vote failed to garner the four votes 

necessary to either find reason to believe (and thus initiate an 

investigation) or find no reason to believe (and thus dismiss the 

complaint). Id. at 4. And while the Commission voted later 

that same day on dismissing the complaint, that vote, too, failed 

to gain a majority, so the complaint remained pending at the 

end of the thirty-day period. Id. 

The issue we face is whether the Commission’s holding 

the failed reason-to-believe vote constituted conformance with 

the contrary-to-law determination. If so, the district court 

correctly dismissed CLC’s citizen suit. The parties agree that, 

to conform with a declaration that its failure to act on an 

administrative complaint was contrary to law, the Commission 

must act on the complaint. They disagree, however, about 

what counts as action, much less about what constitutes 

conforming action. 

CLC contends that, following a contrary-to-law suit 

resulting from a failure to act, only a majority-supported 

decision can count as conforming action because, under FECA, 

the Commission can act only through majority vote. In CLC’s 

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view, then, only two outcomes can constitute conforming 

action: a successful reason-to-believe vote (i.e., a four-vote 

decision to pursue an investigation), or a majority decision to 

dismiss the complaint. As a result, says CLC, because the 

reason-to-believe vote here failed and the Commission did not 

dismiss the complaint within the thirty-day window, there was 

no conformance and CLC can bring its citizen suit. 

We are unpersuaded. The Commission’s need to conform 

followed a determination that its “failure to act” on an 

administrative complaint was contrary to law, see 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8) (emphasis added), not that its failure to render an 

ultimate decision on the complaint was contrary to law. When 

a contrary-to-law decision arises from the Commission’s 

failure to act on a complaint at all, the Commission conforms 

by holding a reason-to-believe vote, regardless of the vote’s 

outcome. That conclusion follows from two propositions 

derived from FECA’s text and structure. First, what counts as 

conforming action depends on what action the contrary-to-law 

plaintiff was entitled to compel. Second, when the contrary-tolaw suit is based on the Commission’s failure to take any action 

at all on a pending complaint, the plaintiff seeks to compel the 

Commission to take at least some cognizable enforcement step 

under the statute, and holding a reason-to-believe vote counts 

as such a step. 

With regard to the first of those propositions, the parties 

agree that what counts as conforming action depends on the 

type of contrary-to-law determination with which the 

Commission must conform. What constitutes conformance, in 

other words, necessarily turns on the kind of Commission 

action the contrary-to-law plaintiff was entitled to compel by 

bringing her contrary-to-law suit. And what the plaintiff can 

compel is the action whose nonperformance by the 

Commission “aggrieved” her. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A), 

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(C). That is, she can compel the action that, had it been 

performed, would have left her without the ability to bring (or 

win) her contrary-to-law suit. 

So what is that action? In the case of a contrary-to-law suit 

alleging that the Commission has failed to take any action at all 

on a pending complaint, we think that holding a reason-tobelieve vote is an action that would enable the Commission to 

prevent (or prevail in) the suit. 

As an initial matter, to “act” on a pending complaint, in 

this context, means to take some enforcement step recognized 

by the statute. To be sure, the enforcement provision of 

FECA—§ 30109—does not use “act” (or “action”) so 

consistently that the term refers to precisely the same conduct 

throughout. For example, § 30109 uses “action” to describe 

conduct undertaken by both the Commission and nonCommission actors. Compare, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(B)(i), with id. § 30109(c). That said, in the 

provisions specifically discussing Commission enforcement, 

“action” denotes a step in FECA’s enforcement scheme. See, 

e.g., id. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i) (“A conciliation agreement, unless 

violated, is a complete bar to any further action by the 

Commission, including the bringing of a civil 

proceeding . . . .”); id. § 30109(b) (“Before taking any action 

under subsection (a) against any person who has failed to file a 

report . . . .”). 

Moreover, a failure by the Commission to act at all on a 

pending complaint means a failure to take some cognizable 

enforcement step under the statute in response to the complaint. 

And holding a reason-to-believe vote is such a step. Consider 

the provision of FECA that prescribes the initial process that 

follows submission of an administrative complaint: 

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Within 5 days after receipt of a complaint, the 

Commission shall notify, in writing, any person 

alleged in the complaint to have committed such 

a violation. Before the Commission conducts 

any vote on the complaint, other than a vote to 

dismiss, any person so notified shall have the 

opportunity to demonstrate, in writing, to the 

Commission within 15 days after notification 

that no action should be taken against such 

person on the basis of the complaint. 

Id. § 30109(a)(1) (emphasis added). By forbidding the 

Commission from “conduct[ing] any vote on the complaint[] 

other than a vote to dismiss” until the alleged violator can 

respond to the allegations, the statute manifests that 

“conduct[ing]” a reason-to-believe vote is a cognizable 

enforcement step. See id. (emphasis added). 

The broader enforcement scheme reinforces that 

understanding. If a failure to act on a pending complaint meant 

a failure to find reason to believe—as opposed to a failure to 

conduct a reason-to-believe vote—then a contrary-to-law suit 

challenging a failure to act and one challenging a dismissal 

following a failed reason-to-believe vote would ultimately 

complain about the same thing: a failure to find a reason to 

believe. But collapsing those two kinds of contrary-to-law 

suits in that manner would make no sense under the statute, 

which treats a failure to act and a dismissal as distinct. E.g., id. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A) (“Any party aggrieved by an order of the 

Commission dismissing a complaint . . . or by a failure of the 

Commission to act on such complaint . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

So, too, does this court: we review a dismissal by considering 

the rationale offered by the Commissioners who voted against 

enforcement, whereas we review a failure to act by considering 

the factors laid out in Common Cause and TRAC. See Citizens 

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for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434, 437–38 

(D.C. Cir. 2018); FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d at 1084 & n.6. 

In short, when a complainant brings a contrary-to-law suit 

based on a failure by the Commission to act at all on a pending 

complaint, the Commission’s conduct of a reason-to-believe 

vote would conform with a decision finding that its failure to 

act was contrary to law. Whether the vote succeeds or fails 

does not matter: a reason-to-believe vote that fails 3-3 or 0-6, 

or one that succeeds 4-2 or 5-1, are all equivalent for purposes 

of conforming with the failure-to-act decision. That is because 

what the contrary-to-law plaintiff claims as the reason for her 

“aggrieve[ment],” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8), is not the 

Commission’s failure to vote in favor of finding reason to 

believe, but instead is the Commission’s failure to hold such a 

vote at all. FECA entitles her, through a contrary-to-law 

action, to compel the Commission’s engagement with the 

merits of her administrative complaint through such a vote; it 

does not entitle her to a particular vote outcome. 

While CLC urges us to require more of the Commission, 

forcing the Commission to engage with the merits of a 

complaint is significant in itself: it prods into motion FECA’s 

judicial-review and enforcement scheme. To conform with a 

decision that declares the Commission’s failure to act at all on 

a complaint contrary to law, the Commission can hold a reasonto-believe vote. If the Commission does not conform, the 

complainant can bring a citizen suit. If the Commission does 

hold a reason-to-believe vote and finds reason to believe a 

violation has occurred, an investigation follows. If the 

Commission fails to find reason to believe and then dismisses 

the complaint, the complainant can potentially bring another 

contrary-to-law suit—this time, based on the Commission’s 

dismissal. 

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Returning to this case, for the Commission to conform 

with the declaration that its failure to act on the complaint was 

contrary to law, it needed to hold a reason-to-believe vote 

within thirty days of being directed to do so. Unbeknownst to 

the contrary-to-law court, the Commission did that. The 

Commission thereby conformed with the contrary-to-law 

decision, rendering the preconditions for a citizen suit 

unsatisfied. We thus affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

CLC’s citizen suit, although we do so on the ground that CLC 

failed to state a claim, rather than for lack of jurisdiction, see 

EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 

(D.C. Cir. 1997), because we hold that the citizen-suit 

preconditions are nonjurisdictional. 

* * * * * 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed. 

So ordered. 

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