Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06025/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

BRITTANI STONE d/b/a

KMA DANCE CLUB PLAINTIFF

v. CASE NO. 6:05CV6025

THE CITY OF HOT SPRINGS, 

ARKANSAS DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Currently before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Docs. 14-15) and Plaintiff’s response (Docs. 21-22).

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 8) should

be dismissed as she has failed to state claims upon which relief

may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff brings

this suit pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the United

States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

and Title 42, Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987 of

the United States Code. Based on the reasons that follow,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Complaint is DISMISSED. 

Background

Plaintiff is a Caucasian female and owner of KMA Dance Club

in Hot Springs, Arkansas. Plaintiff is engaged to Lawrence

Holt, an African-American male who assists Plaintiff in her

business. Plaintiff claims that Defendant, through its elected

and appointed officials, has harassed, ridiculed, and demeaned

her and has unfairly applied city ordinances to KMA Dance Club

in an attempt to force Plaintiff out of business. Plaintiff

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further claims that Defendant’s actions were directed at her and

KMA Dance Club because of racial animus due to her engagement to

an African-American. 

Discussion

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district court must

accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and

all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in

favor of the nonmoving party. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity

Lutheran Hospital, 388 F.3d 588 (8 Cir. 2004)(citations th

omitted). Dismissal is inappropriate unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id.

A. Equal Protection

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,

Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed.2d 313

(1985)(quotations and citation omitted). The equal protection

clause protects fundamental rights and prohibits unequal

application of the law based upon suspect classification. It

also protects citizens from arbitrary or irrational state

action. See Batra v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 79

F.3d 717 (8 Cir. 1996). In order to successfully plead an th

equal protection claim, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege

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that she was treated differently than similarly situated persons

at the hands of a government official and that the treatment was

tainted by a purposeful intent to discriminate for an invalid

reason. Id. at 721-722. 

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]ther businesses owned by white

citizens not engaged to (and in business with) African-Americans

have been accused by the City of Hot Springs of being in

violation of the same ordinances plaintiff is accused of

violating, but those businesses have received preferential

treatment and have been allowed to continue business

operations.” Doc. 8, ¶ 13. This statement alone is

insufficient to state an equal protection claim. The Plaintiff

does not allege that the “other businesses” were conducting the

same business as Plaintiff, were subject to the same

restrictions, laws, ordinances, etc., as Plaintiff that would

render them “similarly situated” to Plaintiff. See Hosna v.

Groose, 80 F.3d 298 (8 Cir. 1996)(for purposes of an equal th

protection analysis, the plaintiff must be “similarly situated

to another group for purposes of the challenged government

action); Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333 (8 Cir. 1994)(the two th

groups must be similarly situated “in all relevant aspects”).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not reflect the

ordinances she or “other businesses” were charged with violating

or what kind of action Defendant took as a result of the alleged

violations. Instead, Plaintiff only makes conclusory

allegations that “other businesses” were accused of violating

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the same ordinances but received preferential treatment.

Further, the Amended Complaint contains no allegations from

which a purposeful intent to discriminate could be derived aside

from Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendant’s actions

were taken because of her fiancee’s race. Construing all of the

alleged facts in her favor, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

a constitutional injustice under the Equal Protection Clause.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

B. Title VII

Defendant contends Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title

VII as Defendant is not Plaintiff’s employer. Title VII makes it

unlawful for an employer “ to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge

any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000e. Title VII provides for claims only against an individual’s

“employer”. Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103 (8 Cir. th

1998). While Plaintiff acknowledges that Title VII only applies to

employer/employee relationships, Plaintiff contends that the

relationship between herself and her fiancee can be construed as

employer/employee as her fiancee assists her with her business and

that Defendant is her “de facto” employer. Plaintiff’s arguments are

without merit. Even if Plaintiff could be deemed her fiancee’s

employer, it is irrelevant to her Title VII claim against Defendant.

Further, KMA Dance Club is owned by Plaintiff and there is no basis

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for contending that Defendant is Plaintiff’s employer or “de facto”

employer. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as

to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides “all

persons within the jurisdiction of the United States” the same right

“to make and enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens.”

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 governs only contractual

relationships. Here, the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of

an express, formal employment contract or any other contract between

herself and Defendant. Accordingly, there is no underlying contract

upon which Plaintiff’s claim could be based.

In order to survive a motion to dismiss on a Section 1981 claim,

“ a plaintiff must specifically allege the events claimed to

constitute intentional discrimination as well as circumstances giving

rise to a plausible inference of discriminatory intent.” Plaintiff

has not specifically alleged events indicating purposeful

discrimination or circumstances giving rise to a plausible inference

of discriminatory intent. At most, Plaintiff’s complaint contains

conclusory allegations that Defendant took actions against her

because her fiancee is African-American. Additionally, a federal

action to enforce rights under Section 1981 against a state actor may

only be brought pursuant to Section 1983. See Artis v. Francis

Howell North Band Booster Assoc., Inc., 161 F.3d 1178 (8 Cir. 1998). th

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim is DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE.

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1982

42 U.S.C. § 1982 states that [a]ll citizens of the United States

shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is

enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,

hold, and convey real and personal property. To state a claim under

§ 1982, Plaintiff must specify instances where she was singled out

for unlawful oppression in contrast to those similarly situated. See

Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint is deficient as it neither shows that other “similarly

situated” businesses were treated differently, nor does it allege

events indicating purposeful discrimination or circumstances giving

rise to a plausible inference of discriminatory intent. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s § 1982 claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

E. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In order to impose liability against a municipality pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the violation of his

constitutional rights was part of a governmental custom, policy,

ordinance, regulation or decision. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff only makes conclusory

allegations that elected and appointed officials of Defendant

“systematically applied its laws and ordinances in an abusive and

unequal manner to the conduct of Plaintiff’s business...” Doc. 8,

¶11. Plaintiff’s failure to include any “allegations, reference, or

language by which one could begin to draw an inference that the

conduct complained of...resulted from an unconstitutional policy or

custom” renders the complaint deficient. Crumpley-Patterson, 388

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F.3d at 591 citing Doe v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605 (8th

Cir. 2003). At a minimum, a complaint must allege facts which would

support the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. Id.

See also, Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2d

Cir. 2004)(Where a plaintiff simply alleges “constitutional torts

committed by city employees without official sanction,” a claim for

municipal liability must fail.) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. 

F. 42 U.S.C. § 1985

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1985 which alleges a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights as Plaintiff has made only conclusory

allegations that a conspiracy existed and cannot show a “meeting of

the minds” as required. Mere allegations of conspiracy without

stating sufficient facts about a mutual understanding or meeting of

the mind do not state a claim under Section 1985. Cabal v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 1992 WL 336447 (8 Cir. Nov. 18, 1992)(citing th

Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199 (8 Cir. 1992)(conspiracy claim th

requires allegation of specific facts showing meeting of minds), cert

denied, 510 U.S. 831 (1993); Haley v. Dormire, 845 F.2d 1488 (8 Cir. th

1988)(although plaintiff need not allege direct facts regarding a

conspiracy, must at least provide some facts regarding meeting of

minds). Even under the liberal pleading standards, Plaintiff has

alleged nothing in her Amended Complaint that could be construed as

alleging a meeting of the minds.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains only two paragraphs

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alleging conspiracy. Paragraph 15 states: “Defendant City of Hot

Springs, Arkansas and others conspired to deprive Plaintiff of her

right to conduct a lawful business in violation of her rights under

the laws of the United States and the State of Arkansas as well as

the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Paragraph

17 states: “Defendant, at all times herein, conspired with others to

deny plaintiff due process and to interfere with her property

rights.” A plaintiff must allege facts, not conclusory allegations,

to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Further, the law presumes that

municipalities are incapable of entering into conspiracies. See

Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369 (5 Cir. 1998). Hence, th

municipalities cannot be liable in actions brought pursuant to

Section 1985. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

G. 42 U.S.C. § 1986

A valid Section 1985 conspiracy claim is a necessary

prerequisite to a finding of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which

governs actions for neglect to prevent wrongs covered by § 1985.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1986 claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

H. State Law Claims

Having granted the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal law

claims, we decline to retain jurisdiction on the state law claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

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Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, 42

U.S.C. § 1982 and 42 U.S.C. §1983 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

and Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §1981,

1985, and 1986 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All parties are to

bear their own fees and costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12 day of May, 2006. th

/s/Robert T. Dawson

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge 

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