Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05154/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2016 Decided August 19, 2016

No. 15-5154

YASSIN MUHIDDIN AREF, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 

STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00539)

Rachel Anne Meeropol argued the cause for appellants. 

With her on the briefs were Pardiss Kebriaei and Gregory 

Stewart Silbert. Shayana D. Kadidal entered an appearance.

William R. Stein, Scott H. Christensen, and Elizabeth C. 

Solander were on the brief for amici curiae The Legal Aid 

Society of the City of New York, et al. in support of 

plaintiffs-appellants.

Jonathan Hafetz was on the brief for amicus curiae Seton

Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice in 

support of appellants.

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Carleen M. Zubrzycki, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief 

were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and H. Thomas Byron III, Attorney. Mark B. Stern

and Joshua P. Waldman, Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: 

Appellants are three federal prisoners who spent several 

years housed in specially designated Communication 

Management Units (CMUs), a classification that meant family 

visits and communications with the outside world were 

curtailed. Appellants contend their designation to CMUs

violated their due process rights. One appellant also alleges 

his continued CMU placement was in retaliation for protected 

speech in violation of the First Amendment. Finally, 

appellants seek damages under the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (PLRA) for a variety of injuries allegedly arising out of 

their confinement in CMUs, including the denial of certain 

educational and professional programming, violations of their 

constitutional rights, and harm to familial relationships. The 

district court granted summary judgment for the government 

on each claim. 

Because we find the duration and atypicality of CMU 

designation sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest, we 

reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings 

to determine whether appellants were afforded sufficient 

process. With respect to the retaliation claim, we affirm the 

grant of summary judgment for the government because 

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appellant cannot show his First Amendment rights were 

violated. Unlike the district court, we hold appellants have 

alleged harms qualifying for compensation under the PLRA 

because their injuries were neither mental nor emotional in 

nature and so do not require a showing of physical injury. We 

nonetheless uphold the grant of summary judgment because 

we find the prison official entitled to qualified immunity. 

I.

A. Communication Management Units

The CMUs at the heart of this controversy are located at 

two federal correctional facilities in Terre Haute, Indiana, and 

Marion, Illinois. They were established in 2006 and 2008,

respectively. See Aref v. Holder, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 153 

(D.D.C. 2011). The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) designed 

CMUs in response to a problem identified by the Department 

of Justice: a “deficiency” in the monitoring of inmate 

communications that allowed several inmates with terrorismrelated convictions to communicate with extremist groups 

outside the prisons. CMUs thus house inmates who require 

communications monitoring beyond that which can feasibly

be provided in the general population. 

CMU inmates have access to more limited and less 

private communications compared to general population 

inmates. All visits—aside from attorney visits—must be 

“non-contact,” meaning a glass wall separates the inmate and 

visitor and communication takes place via a microphone. See

28 C.F.R § 540.205(a). All visits must be conducted in 

English, live-monitored, and recorded by BOP. See id. 

Although BOP regulations allow visitation to be restricted to 

four one-hour visits each month, id., BOP currently permits 

up to eight hours a month. CMU inmates are also restricted in 

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the frequency and length of their written correspondence, 

which is subject to inspection. See id. § 540.203. Finally, 

except for unmonitored attorney calls, CMU inmates can 

telephone only immediate family members, and the calls are

monitored. Id. § 540.204. Under the regulation, telephonic 

communication can be limited to no more than three fifteenminute calls per month, id., but BOP currently allows inmates 

two fifteen-minute calls per week.

Aside from these restrictions, CMUs essentially function

as “self-contained general population housing unit[s].” J.A. 

108. Inmates typically are not confined to their cells except at 

night and during security checks. They have access to 

common areas for up to sixteen hours a day, recreational 

facilities, exercise equipment, and the library. They can keep 

personal property in their cells, participate in religious 

services, receive educational and professional training, and be 

designated for work assignments.

An inmate can be designated to a CMU for several 

reasons, including having a conviction offense related to 

international or domestic terrorism; demonstrating a 

propensity for using communication channels to further 

illegal activity outside the prison or to contact victims; 

abusing approved communication methods; or presenting a 

potential threat to prison facilities or the public as a result of

unmonitored communications with persons outside the prison. 

See 28 C.F.R § 540.201.1

 Designation to a CMU begins 

when BOP becomes aware of information relevant to any of 

 1 It bears noting that both CMUs were opened before BOP 

established any written designation criteria. In April 2010, BOP 

published a proposed rule for public notice-and-comment. See 80 

Fed. Reg. 3168 (Jan. 22, 2015). The final rule entered into effect 

on February 23, 2015, almost a decade after the first CMU opened. 

Id.

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these criteria. See id. § 540.202(a). BOP’s Assistant Director 

evaluates and approves the designation if, after a review of 

the evidence, he concludes “designation . . . is necessary to 

ensure the safety, security, and orderly operation of 

correctional facilities, or protection of the public.”2 Id. 

§ 540.202(b). Once in the CMU, the inmate receives a 

written Notice of Transfer (Notice) from the Warden 

explaining that the placement allows increased 

communications monitoring, the placement is non-punitive 

and will not affect the length of incarceration, and continued 

designation will be reviewed “regularly” with both notice and 

an opportunity to be heard. Id. § 540.202(c). The inmate also 

receives “an explanation of the [Assistant Director’s] decision 

in sufficient detail,” unless the Assistant Director determines 

that providing this information would jeopardize the safety of 

the facility or the public. Id. § 540.202(c)(4). Finally, the

inmate may challenge his CMU designation through BOP’s

administrative remedy program. Id. § 540.202(c)(6).

In 2009—three years after the first CMU opened—BOP 

instituted periodic review of prisoners, allowing for potential 

redesignation every six months. See id. § 524.11(a)(2). The 

 2 Before codification of the CMU regulations, the ultimate 

decisionmaker was BOP’s Regional Director. The process 

otherwise has remained essentially the same. Initial consideration 

begins when an entity (institutional or otherwise) refers a prisoner 

to BOP’s Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU). The CTU creates a 

“designation packet” that includes a summary of the supporting 

information, a recommendation for or against, and a proposed 

Notice of Transfer. The packet is sent to the Office of General 

Counsel to be reviewed for legal sufficiency and then to the 

Correctional Programs Division. Previously, the Regional Director 

would distribute the packet to several administrators, allowing each

to comment before making his final decision. Now the Assistant 

Director makes his assessment and decision independently. 

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process begins with the inmate’s Unit Team making an initial

determination about whether continued CMU placement is 

necessary. The inmate must be given notice forty-eight hours 

before this review, which takes place in person. Id.

§ 524.11(b)(1). The recommendation considers factors like 

“whether the original rationale for CMU designation has been 

mitigated” and “whether the inmate no longer presents a risk.” 

J.A. 689. The Warden then receives the transfer 

recommendation for his review. If he agrees, the 

recommendation is sent to the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU)

for its independent assessment—which is then forwarded to 

the Assistant Director3 for a final decision. The inmate is 

informed in writing of the decision and (at least theoretically) 

provided an explanation for the result. There is no limitation

on the duration of a prisoner’s CMU placement. 

B. The Plaintiffs

(1) Yassin Aref. Aref is an Iraqi refugee convicted of 

helping a terrorist organization prepare to launch a missile 

attack on American soil by helping to finance the missile’s 

purchase. United States v. Aref, 285 F. App’x 784, 790 (2d 

Cir. 2008). He is serving a fifteen-year sentence for money 

laundering, providing material support for terrorism, 

conspiracy, and making a false statement to the FBI. Aref, 

774 F. Supp. 2d at 154. He was initially classified as a “low 

security” inmate with no disciplinary record, but he was 

transferred to the Terre Haute CMU in May 2007. Id. Within 

a day, he received a one-page Notice stating his designation 

was because of his terrorism-related conviction and because 

his “offense conduct included significant communication, 

association, and assistance to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),” a 

designated terrorist organization. Id. at 154–55. Aref 

 3 Previously, the decision-maker was the Regional Director. 

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appealed, arguing he had never made contact with any JeM 

members; he had instead unknowingly been communicating 

with an individual cooperating with the government. The 

Regional Director denied the appeal. After eighteen months, 

Aref was transferred to the Marion CMU.

In September 2010, three years after Aref’s initial 

designation, his Unit Team and the Warden recommended 

him for transfer. This request was denied after the CTU 

received confidential law enforcement information from the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force. He was notified about the denial, 

but the notification provided no explanation. He was again

recommended for transfer in March 2011, and this time the 

CTU agreed. Since April 2011, he has been housed in Marion 

Prison’s general population. 

(2) Kifah Jayyousi. In 2008, Jayyousi was sentenced to a 

152-month term for conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim 

in a foreign country and conspiracy to provide material 

support to terrorism. He and his co-conspirators were found 

to have communicated in code and posed as a charitable

organization to further these goals. See United States v. 

Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Although he was originally classified as a “low security”

prisoner, he was transferred to the Terre Haute CMU in June 

2008. Upon arrival, he received a Notice pointing to his 

terrorism-related conviction and offense conduct—which 

involved communication and association with al-Qaida—as 

the basis for his transfer. He appealed administratively, 

arguing this information was inaccurate; BOP denied his 

appeal without responding to his factual challenges.

Jayyousi was first considered for redesignation in 

December 2009, but his Unit Team recommended against it 

because of the severity of his offense. In October 2010, he 

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was transferred to the Marion CMU. His Unit Team and 

Warden recommended him for transfer in 2011 based on good 

conduct. Leslie Smith—then-Chief of BOP’s CTU—

disagreed because of a sermon Jayyousi gave as part of a 

Muslim prayer meeting in which he participated in 2008 

while at Terre Haute’s CMU. Although Jayyousi received a 

disciplinary charge for that incident, he was cleared of any 

wrongdoing years before Smith considered this request. In 

March 2013, Jayyousi was again recommended for transfer, 

which was approved by the Regional Director without 

explanation. He continues to be housed in Marion Prison’s 

general population.

(3) Daniel McGowan. McGowan was a member of the 

Earth Liberation Front, a domestic terrorist organization. 

Aref, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 155. He was sentenced to a seven 

year term in 2007 for two counts of arson. Id. McGowan was 

also originally classified as a “low security” prisoner with no 

prison disciplinary record. Nonetheless, he was transferred to 

the Marion CMU in August 2008. He received his Notice ten 

days later, which cited his offense conduct as involving arson 

and the “destruction of an energy facility,” as well as 

communicating in code and teaching others how to commit 

arson. See id. McGowan appealed, challenging the factual 

assertions in his Notice as demonstrably false—pointing out

he had never been accused or convicted of any crime relating 

to the destruction of an energy facility. BOP did not respond 

directly to McGowan’s challenge, denied his appeal, and 

directed him to his pre-sentence report, which contained no 

mention of any energy facility.

McGowan was first recommended for transfer in 2010, 

which the Regional Director denied without explanation. In 

July 2010, he was again recommended for transfer, which the 

Regional Director granted without explanation. A few 

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months later, BOP officials determined that McGowan was 

attempting to circumvent the communication monitoring 

controls imposed on the general population; he was thus 

redesignated to the CMU in 2011. He remained in the CMU 

until his release from prison in December 2012; he was fully 

released from BOP supervision in June 2013.

C. Procedural History

On April 1, 2010, seven plaintiffs filed suit against BOP, 

alleging a variety of claims related to their CMU placement: 

violation of their procedural due process rights due to 

inadequate notice and lack of opportunity to be heard; 

violation of their substantive due process and First 

Amendment rights to “family integrity”; violation of the 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 

punishment; retaliatory transfer into the CMU in violation of 

the First Amendment; and unlawful discrimination on the 

basis of religion in violation of the First and Fifth 

Amendments. See Aref v. Holder, 953 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 

(D.D.C. 2013). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive 

relief, transfer out of the CMUs, and an order requiring they

be allowed the same communication privileges as other 

prisoners. See Aref, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 157. 

The district court dismissed all but the procedural due 

process and First Amendment retaliation claims. See id. at 

161–71. In November 2012, Aref, Jayyousi, and McGowan 

filed an amended complaint adding a retaliation claim against 

defendants in their official capacities and against Leslie Smith 

in his individual capacity. Aref, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 138. At 

the motion to dismiss stage, the district court found the PLRA

barred plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claims and dismissed 

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McGowan’s equitable claims as moot because he had been 

released from BOP custody. See id. at 142–44, 147–49.4

 

Defendants then filed motions for summary judgment on 

the remaining claims: Jayyousi and Aref’s official-capacity 

due process claim and Jayyousi’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim. In March 2015, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of defendants, finding plaintiffs lacked any 

liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protections 

and that Jayyousi’s First Amendment rights were not violated. 

See Aref v. Holder, No. 10-cv-0539, 2015 WL 3749621 at *1, 

*8–*9 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2015). Plaintiffs timely appealed.5

II. 

We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. 

Fed. Trade Comm’n, 790 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In 

doing so, we must “view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, draw all reasonable

inferences in his favor, and eschew making credibility 

determinations or weighing the evidence.” Baumann v. 

District of Columbia, 795 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

We also review the district court’s dismissal of appellants’

individual-capacity claims de novo. See Kimberlin v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 318 F.3d 228, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

 4 This case was originally assigned to Judge Urbina of the district 

court. It was transferred to Judge Rothstein on November 5, 2012, 

who ruled on this motion to dismiss and the subsequent summary 

judgment motions. See Aref v. Holder, No. 10-cv-0539, 2015 WL 

3749621 at *2 n.1 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2015).

5 Leslie Smith passed away on March 16, 2015. The government 

did not file its notice of death until December 22, 2015—seven 

months later and after this appeal had begun. See Aref v. Lynch, 

Dkt. #1554923, at 45. 

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III.

Since this lawsuit’s inception, the government has urged 

at least some if not all of plaintiff-appellants’ arguments are 

moot because they were removed from the CMUs years ago. 

The parties agree McGowan’s official-capacity claims are 

mooted by his full release from BOP custody, see Aref, 953 F. 

Supp. 2d at 142–43, so we consider only whether Aref and 

Jayyousi’s transfer into general population moots their claims. 

The mootness doctrine ensures compliance with Article 

III’s case and controversy requirement by “limit[ing] federal 

courts to deciding actual, ongoing controversies.” Am. Bar 

Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 636 F.3d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). Accordingly, mootness must be assessed at “all 

stages” of the litigation to ensure a live controversy remains. 

21st Century Telesis Joint Venture v. FCC, 318 F.3d 192, 198 

(D.C. Cir. 2003). A case is moot if our decision “will neither 

presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-thanspeculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Am. Bar 

Ass’n, 636 F.3d at 645. 

The government argues that, because it has been years 

since any appellant was housed in a CMU, the appellants 

cannot identify any current injury for which this court can 

provide effective relief. While “[n]ormally[] a prisoner’s 

transfer or release from a prison moots any claim he might 

have for equitable relief arising out of the conditions of his 

confinement in that prison,” Scott v. District of Columbia, 139 

F.3d 940, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1998), appellants point to the

likelihood of redesignation from general population to a

CMU. See, e.g., Aref, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 158 (“McGowan 

was designated to a CMU, transferred back into the general 

population and then redesignated to a CMU.”). Appellants 

have also challenged BOP’s reliance on flawed information 

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used to justify their CMU designations, which remains in their 

prison files. See Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1009 (10th 

Cir. 2012) (holding prisoners’ claims not mooted by transfer 

out of maximum security facility because, “[e]ven though the 

new transfer policies may provide adequate process, the case 

is not moot if the BOP made decisions under the old policies 

that have ongoing, long-term consequences for the plaintiffs 

that could be mitigated by an award of prospective relief”). 

We need not decide that issue, however, because a

defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct 

can moot a case only if (i) “there is no reasonable expectation 

. . . that the alleged violation will recur,” and (ii) “interim 

relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated 

the effects of the alleged violation.” Am. Bar Ass’n, 636 F.3d 

at 648. The government bears the “heavy” burden of showing 

it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior 

could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the 

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189

(2000) (emphasis added). We agree with the district court 

that the government has not met this high bar. Moreover, as 

the district court observed, appellants are challenging the 

procedure used for designation—so even if new information 

would be needed to return them to the unit, they have not 

“obtained all the relief” they seek in their complaint with 

respect to the designation process. Schmidt v. United States, 

749 F.3d 1064, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2014). We therefore conclude 

the voluntary cessation exception applies and proceed to 

consider appellants’ claims on the merits.6

 6 The government also argues voluntary cessation only applies if

the cessation came about “because of” the litigation—an argument 

the district court says the government waived. See Aref, 2015 WL 

3749621, at *4 n.3. The government claims the Ninth Circuit has 

“implied” this requirement. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 

100 F.3d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996). But neither this circuit nor 

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IV.

Having found jurisdiction, we turn now to appellants’

due process claim. The Fifth Amendment ensures no 

individual is “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 

due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Appellants 

challenge as inadequate the procedures used to designate them 

to the CMUs, claiming their transfer and lengthy placement in 

the units deprived them of their liberty in violation of the 

Constitution. Outside the penal context, we simply would 

evaluate the procedures under the now familiar Mathews v. 

Eldridge balancing test: first identifying the liberty interest at 

stake, then considering the risk of erroneous deprivation 

under existing procedures, and finally weighing the 

 

the Supreme Court consistently has required a finding that the 

cessation was undertaken because of the litigation. See, e.g., 

Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 193–94 (assessing voluntary 

cessation without any indication the plant’s shutdown, years after 

the case was filed, was a response to the litigation); Am. Iron & 

Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1006–07 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(analyzing as voluntary cessation an EPA policy change announced 

before litigation began). A defendant who ceased the challenged 

conduct for reasons unrelated to the litigation may have an easier 

time showing the challenged conduct is unlikely to reoccur, but 

“the cessation of an ongoing activity pending a lawsuit may [also] 

well imply an intent to renew the activity once the court has 

dropped out.” Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 705–06 (D.C. 

Cir. 1990). We are therefore unpersuaded by the government’s 

argument that appellants must prove their transfers were “because 

of” this litigation. And even if so, circumstantial evidence indicates 

the transfers may have been motivated at least in part by the 

pending litigation: not a single prisoner was transferred back into 

general population during the first three years of the CMU, until a 

then-named plaintiff was transferred out on the eve of this 

litigation. All other named plaintiffs subsequently were transferred 

out during the pendency of this litigation. 

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government’s interest against the burdens any additional 

process would entail. See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); 

Lepelletier v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 164 F.3d 37, 45–46 

(D.C. Cir. 1999). This first step is complicated, however, by 

appellants’ incarceration, which “brings about the necessary 

withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,”

including the protections of due process. Jones v. N.C. 

Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977). 

Evaluating due process claims in this context thus 

requires us to consider two competing—but significant—

realities. First, we must “giv[e] appropriate deference to the 

decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition 

to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal 

confinement.” Id. Prison officials face the unenviable task of 

ensuring the safety and security of large populations of people 

convicted of crimes and frequently are confronted with novel 

challenges in doing so. We therefore afford them “broad 

administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions 

they manage.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983). 

At the same time, prisoners are “not wholly stripped of 

constitutional protections” once they pass through the prison 

gates. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). 

Guarantees of due process may contract, but they are not 

eliminated entirely. 

A. Liberty Interest

With these broad principles in mind, the Supreme Court 

in Sandin v. Conner articulated a new test for identifying 

liberty interests in confinement conditions. See 515 U.S. 472 

(1995). Courts previously had looked to state law to 

determine whether a liberty interest existed; under Sandin, the 

inquiry now focuses on the nature of the deprivation and its 

duration. Specifically, the Court held a liberty interest exists 

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only if the conditions amount to an “atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life.” Id. at 484. Absent a liberty interest, an inmate is 

not entitled to any process. 

In Sandin, a prisoner challenged the procedure used to 

place him in disciplinary segregation for thirty days. The 

Court held this placement did not amount to a liberty interest, 

noting “disciplinary segregation, with insignificant 

exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates 

in administrative segregation and protective custody.” Id. at 

486. The Court observed inmates in that prison’s general 

population also had “significant amounts” of “lockdown 

time.” Id. Finally, the Court found the inmate’s confinement 

would not “inevitably affect” the length of his sentence. Id. at 

487. Thus, “a comparison between inmates inside and outside 

disciplinary segregation” demonstrated his placement there 

for 30 days “did not work a major disruption in his 

environment.” Id. at 486.

(1) Precedent Applying Sandin

The Sandin Court did not define the baseline from which 

to measure what is “atypical and significant” in a particular 

prison system, so lower court assessments have diverged. See 

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005). In Hatch v. 

District of Columbia, our circuit adopted a multi-factor

approach to determining the appropriate baseline. See 184 

F.3d 846, 856–58 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But because the district 

court and both parties rely on several instructive cases from 

other circuits, we find it helpful to briefly survey the current 

state of the law before turning to our own standard. 

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The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits all generally look to 

administrative confinement as the baseline.7

 See, e.g., Griffin 

v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706–08 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding no 

liberty interest for inmate who, suspected of raping a prison 

guard, was placed in administrative confinement for fifteen

months because inmates can reasonably expect to be placed in 

administrative confinement during their sentence); Jones v. 

Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812–13 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding no 

liberty interest for inmate placed in administrative segregation 

for thirty months pending investigation for murder of a prison 

guard as segregation during investigation is not atypical and 

was justified); Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224–26

(10th Cir. 2002) (remanding to district court to compare 

conditions in disciplinary segregation to those in 

administrative segregation). 

The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has held disciplinary 

segregation can never implicate a liberty interest unless it 

“inevitably” lengthens a prisoner’s sentence, see Carson v. 

 7 The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged some inconsistency in its 

application: “[w]hen considering whether the conditions, duration 

or restrictions of confinement are atypical as compared with other 

inmates, this court has inconsistently used comparisons either with 

inmates in the same segregation or those in the general prison 

population.” Jordan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 191 F. App’x 639, 

650 (10th Cir. 2006). Notably, regardless of which baseline it has 

used, the circuit “has never held the conditions, duration or 

restrictions of the detentions presented on appeal created a liberty 

interest.” Hill v. Fleming, 173 F. App’x 664, 670 (10th Cir. 2006). 

The Tenth Circuit also uniquely considers whether the prison action 

is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Jordan, 

191 F. App’x at 652–53 (finding no liberty interest in five year 

detention in administrative segregation because “it was 

commensurate with ongoing security concerns and a pending 

investigation”). 

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Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997), and that 

administrative segregation—being an ordinary incident of 

prison life—is essentially incapable of creating a liberty 

interest, see Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31–32 (5th Cir. 

1995).8 The Seventh Circuit also has adopted a high standard, 

holding the baseline is not just the conditions of confinement 

within that particular prison, but those at the harshest facility 

in the state’s most restrictive prison. See Wagner v. Hanks, 

128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997). By contrast, the Fourth 

Circuit looks to the general population as the baseline. See 

Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997). And the 

Second Circuit requires a fact-specific determination that 

compares the duration and conditions of segregation with 

conditions in both administrative confinement and the general 

population. See, e.g., Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329, 336 (2d 

Cir. 1998); Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 48–49 (2d Cir. 

1997). As a result, the Second Circuit has found 

confinements as short as 180 and 305 days create a liberty 

interest under Sandin. See Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 

230–31 (2d Cir. 2000) (305 days); Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 

F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (180 days). In sum, divergences 

in the baseline often lead to divergences in outcome. We are 

therefore cautious about relying too heavily on out-of-circuit 

precedent in evaluating appellants’ claims, except to note that 

courts are generally hesitant to find a liberty interest in the 

confinement context.

Our circuit laid out its approach to the comparative 

baseline in Hatch. The Hatch court examined Sandin’s 

 8 The Fifth Circuit has found a liberty interest in a few 

extraordinary cases involving solitary confinement that spans 

decades. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845, 855 (5th 

Cir. 2014) (finding liberty interest for prisoner kept in solitary 

confinement for thirty-nine years given the exceptional duration 

and restrictive conditions of confinement).

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18

language and motivations to conclude a liberty interest arises 

only when the deprivation “imposes an ‘atypical and 

significant’ hardship on an inmate in relation to the most 

restrictive confinement conditions that prison officials . . . 

routinely impose on inmates serving similar sentences.” 184 

F.3d at 856 (emphasis added). Because administrative 

segregation is most routinely imposed, the court held it 

constitutes the proper baseline. Id. In doing so, though, the 

court took pains to emphasize this comparison “does not end 

our analysis.” Id. We must look “not only to the nature of the 

deprivation . . . but also to its length” in evaluating atypicality 

and significance. Id. Since Sandin noted the thirty-day 

disciplinary segregation at issue “was within the range of 

confinement to be normally expected for one serving an 

indeterminate term of [thirty] years to life,” 515 U.S. at 487 

(emphasis added), Hatch held atypicality also depends “in 

part on the length of the sentence the prisoner is serving.” 

184 F.3d at 856. 

Applying this standard, the Hatch court remanded to the 

district court for further fact-finding to determine whether the 

inmate’s segregation for twenty-nine weeks amounted to a 

liberty interest. Id. at 858. Specifically, the district court was 

to compare the conditions faced by the inmate (who was 

segregated due to a disciplinary infraction) to the usual 

conditions of administrative segregation. Id. And even if the 

district court concluded those conditions were “no more 

restrictive” than administrative segregation, it was still 

required to determine whether confinement for twenty-nine 

weeks was “atypical” compared to the length of 

administrative segregation routinely imposed on similarly 

situated prisoners. Id. 

Though our circuit may be unique in considering the 

duration of confinement relative to similarly situated 

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19

prisoners, duration itself is widely regarded as a crucial 

element of the Sandin analysis. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 

at 223–24 (considering indefinite duration of confinement and 

infrequency of review when finding a liberty interest in 

placement at a particularly harsh supermax prison); HardenBey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[M]ost (if 

not all) of our sister circuits have considered the nature of the 

more-restrictive confinement and its duration in determining 

whether it imposes an ‘atypical and significant hardship.’”). 

Duration is significant precisely because “especially harsh 

conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh 

conditions endured for a prolonged interval might both be 

atypical.” Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 

1999); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1978) 

(“[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding 

whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A 

filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘grue’ might be 

tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or 

months.”). Indeed, we have remanded a case for the sole 

purpose of determining whether “the duration of plaintiff’s 

administrative segregation . . . impose[d] an atypical and 

significant hardship,” even when it was “apparent that the 

conditions of plaintiff’s restraint” could not be considered 

atypical. Brown v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp. 2d 41, 

45–46 (D.D.C. 1999), on remand from Brown v. Plaut, 131 

F.3d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

We conclude, then, that the proper methodology for 

evaluating deprivation claims under Sandin is to consider (i) 

the conditions of confinement relative to administrative 

segregation, (ii) the duration of that confinement generally, 

and (iii) the duration relative to length of administrative 

segregation routinely imposed on prisoners serving similar 

sentences. We also emphasize that a liberty interest can

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potentially arise under less-severe conditions when the 

deprivation is prolonged or indefinite.

Having shown how our circuit’s baseline differs from 

that of our sister circuits, we now note another important 

distinction between this case and the usual penal due process 

case. Like Sandin, the vast majority of penal due process

cases involve punitive deprivations, i.e., confinement or 

privilege restriction for disciplinary purposes or while 

pending the outcome of an investigation. See, e.g., Skinner v. 

Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 487 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Skinner 

was a prisoner serving a sentence for murder who had just 

killed another inmate. It made perfect sense to isolate him 

pending further investigation.”); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 

754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Both temporary confinement and 

investigative status have been determined to be discretionary 

segregation and do not implicate a liberty interest.”); Bazzetta 

v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 804–05 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding 

no liberty interest for prisoners subjected to a permanent ban 

on visitation after two violations of the prison’s drug abuse 

policy). While an inmate can be designated to a CMU for 

abusing the prison’s communication system, most were 

transferred there to ensure prison officials could effectively 

monitor their communications—not for any punitive purpose. 

In this way, CMU designation is more analogous to 

transferring an individual to a harsher prison based on gang 

status, for instance, than it is to disciplinary segregation.

We do not think this similarity ends the inquiry, 

however. We recognize the Court held in several pre-Sandin

cases that “transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more 

restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the 

terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison 

sentence.” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468. In Meachum v. Fano, for 

example, the Court found no liberty interest even when the 

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21

transfer would “place the prisoner in substantially more 

burdensome conditions [than] he had been experiencing”

because such transfers “are made for a variety of reasons and 

often involve no more than informed predictions as to what

would best serve institutional security or the safety and 

welfare of the inmate.” 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); see also id.

at 228 (noting it does not matter if the transfer is “for 

whatever reason or for no reason at all”). Circuit courts have 

also consistently held that, “generally speaking, a prisoner has 

no liberty interest in his custodial classification.” Hernandez 

v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 2008). It follows 

then that a classification like gang status—and any 

deprivations that flow from it—cannot de facto constitute a 

liberty interest. See, e.g., id. at 563–64 (concluding lockdown 

to prevent gang-violence should be expected as an ordinary 

incidence of prison life); Adams v. Small, 542 F. App’x 567, 

568 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding no liberty interest in 

classification status as a gang member); Perez v. Fed. Bureau 

of Prisons, 229 F. App’x 55, 58 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Because 

changes in security classifications and limits on telephone 

usage are ordinary incidents of prison confinement,” no 

liberty interest existed). 

This line of pre-Sandin precedent undermines appellants’

arguments. But, most recently, the Supreme Court 

acknowledged that, while “the Constitution itself does not 

give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more 

adverse conditions of confinement,” a lesser liberty interest 

“in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise”

if Sandin’s requirements are met. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 

221–22 (emphasis added). In Wilkinson, inmates who were 

assigned to Ohio’s Supermax Prison (OSP) on the basis of 

either their convictions (e.g., organized crime) or their 

engagement in specific conduct (e.g., leading a prison gang) 

challenged their transfer as violating due process. The Court 

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concluded these inmates had a liberty interest in avoiding 

transfer to OSP because OSP prohibited almost all human 

contact and because placement there was indefinite, subject 

only to annual review, and disqualified otherwise eligible 

inmates from parole consideration. See id. at 223–24. 

A district court in our circuit also recently found a 

prisoner plausibly alleged harsh and atypical conditions 

because “he [had] been segregated from the general 

population for over six years” after he was formally classified 

as a “terrorist inmate.” Royer v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 933 

F. Supp. 2d 170, 190 (D.D.C. 2013).9 The court concluded 

that, even if the conditions alleged were “no more restrictive”

than administrative segregation, the complaint should survive 

because the conditions were permanent and intended to last 

for the remainder of his twenty-year sentence—another 

sixteen-and-a-half years. Id. In doing so, the court 

distinguished Meachum as relating to the location of an 

inmate’s confinement rather than to the atypical conditions of 

that confinement. See id. at 191. We agree. Although 

appellants’ deprivations are more akin to transfer based on a 

non-punitive classification than disciplinary segregation, the 

Sandin framework still guides our analysis of whether these 

particular conditions can be considered “atypical and 

significant.”10 

 9 The case was never resolved on its merits as it was ultimately 

dismissed as moot after the motion to dismiss stage. 

10 The Tenth Circuit has also used its version of the Sandin analysis 

to evaluate whether inmates—transferred on the basis of their 

terrorism-related offenses—had a liberty interest in avoiding 

designation to the Administrative Maximum Prison (ADX). See 

Rezaq, 677 F.3d at 1013. 

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(2) Appellants’ Due Process Claim

Having examined this legal backdrop, we turn now to 

appellants’ specific claims. Whether a liberty interest exists 

here is admittedly a close call. All parties agree CMUs are 

less extreme in terms of deprivation than administrative 

segregation. Inmates in administrative segregation must 

remain in their cells for twenty-three hours a day; they are 

unable to hold jobs or access most educational opportunities. 

Their possessions are also limited, and they can exercise only 

one hour a day, five days a week. By contrast, CMU inmates 

are allowed in common spaces with other CMU inmates for 

sixteen hours a day. They have access to educational and 

professional opportunities, can keep as many possessions as 

inmates in the general population, and have no added 

restrictions on exercise. Communication deprivations in 

administrative segregation are also harsher: those inmates can 

make only one fifteen-minute phone call per month and are 

limited to four hours of non-contact visits per month. CMU 

inmates can make two fifteen-minute calls per week and are 

allowed two four-hour non-contact visits per month. We 

therefore conclude CMU confinement involves significantly 

less deprivation than administrative segregation.

On the other hand, CMU designation is indefinite—

lasting years in appellants’ case—and atypical because even 

though several thousand inmates could be designated to 

CMUs based on their commitment offenses, only a handful 

are placed under these restrictions. The main tension, then, is 

how atypicality, indefiniteness, and the harshness of the 

depravations should be weighed.

We find three factors significant. Although CMU 

designation seems analogous to a classification, it is exercised 

selectively; the duration is indefinite and could be permanent; 

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the deprivations—while not extreme—necessarily increase in 

severity over time. An inmate placed in administrative 

segregation may be wholly unable to communicate with his 

family or the outside world, but that restriction will generally 

only last for a few weeks. Inmates housed in CMUs, by 

contrast, may spend years denied contact with their loved 

ones and with diminished ability to communicate with them. 

The harms of these deprivations are heightened over time, as 

children grow older and relationships with the outside become 

more difficult to maintain. Cf. Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F. 

Supp. 2d 654, 684 (M.D. La. 2007) (“With each passing day 

its effects are exponentially increased, just as surely as a 

single drop of water repeated endlessly will eventually bore 

through the hardest of stones.”).

Admittedly, Sandin’s metric seems more difficult to 

apply where the transfer involves non-punitive classification 

rather than disciplinary segregation; and, as Wilkinson

acknowledges, the difficulty of establishing an appropriate 

Sandin baseline has led to widely disparate conclusions about 

what constitutes an atypical and significant hardship. 545 

U.S. at 223. However, as Wilkinson makes clear, Sandin did 

not eliminate liberty interests created by prison regulations; 

instead, it focused the inquiry on the condition itself. Sandin

determines whether this lesser interest receives protection, but 

is silent as to its weight in the Mathews balance. Id. What we 

think pushes CMU designation over the Sandin threshold is 

its selectivity and duration, not its severity, and BOP’s 

recognition that some process—however de minimis—is due. 

Thus, because we find the designation meets Sandin’s 

requirements, we must consider the sufficiency of BOP’s 

response.

As a final note, we address the relevance of appellants’ 

contention that CMUs are viewed as an unusual designation 

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reserved primarily for Muslim individuals convicted of 

terrorism-related offenses—giving rise to a stigma analogous 

to sex-offender classification. Appellants rely on Neal v. 

Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997), and Chambers v. 

Colorado Department of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237 (10th 

Cir. 2000), to support their claim. But, in those cases, sexoffender classification affected the length of the inmates’ 

sentences. In Neal, parole eligibility was contingent on 

successful completion of a lengthy treatment program, 131 

F.3d at 825, and, in Chambers, full good time credits were not 

available to sex offenders, 205 F.3d at 1239. In contrast, 

CMU designation is not based on any formal status as a 

“terrorist” and not every CMU inmate is associated with 

terrorist activities. Additionally, CMU designation has no 

bearing on the length of an inmate’s sentence. Thus, we do 

not find stigma to be relevant in this context.11 

B. Process Due

We must next examine the question whether the 

assignment process used by the government is adequate. The 

district court never reached this question because it concluded 

 11 Amicus Curiae Seton Hall Center for Social Justice also alleges a 

liberty interest can be found under the Supreme Court’s “stigma 

plus” test. To prevail on this claim, appellants must show the 

government is “the source of the defamatory allegations” and the 

resulting stigma involved “some tangible change of status vis-à-vis 

the government.” Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 

1108–09 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Most important here, the reputationtarnishing statement must be false. See Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77, 

81–82 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding no viable “stigma plus” argument for 

plaintiff’s sex-offender classification because he had in fact been 

convicted of a sex offense). All three of these appellants were 

convicted of terrorism-related activity. They therefore cannot 

satisfy this test’s defamation requirement. 

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no constitutional liberty interest existed. Aref, 2015 WL 

3749621, at *9. Although both sides partially briefed the 

issue, appellants assert the deficiencies detailed in their briefs 

were “but a small piece of the voluminous and painstakingly 

detailed evidence [they] provided to the District Court to 

demonstrate the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty.” 

Appellant Reply Br. 22. We therefore remand this issue for 

resolution on a further record. We note, however, that 

appellants are challenging fundamentally predictive 

judgments in an area where administrators are given broad 

discretion and the government’s legitimate interests in 

maintaining CMUs must be accorded substantial weight. 

Because the cardinal principle in due process analysis is 

flexibility—i.e., attention to relevant context and 

consideration of competing interests—only minimal process 

is likely due. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 472. 

V.

We turn next to appellant Jayyousi’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim against Leslie Smith, then-Chief of BOP’s 

CTU, in his official capacity. Jayyousi alleges that Smith 

retaliated against him by denying his transfer out of the CMU 

in 2011 because of a sermon he gave as part of a Muslim 

prayer meeting in August 2008 while housed in the Terre

Haute CMU. The government counters Jayyousi’s language 

could reasonably have been viewed as an attempt to radicalize 

fellow Muslims, amounting to a potential security threat. To 

prevail on his retaliation claim, Jayyousi must show: “(1) he 

engaged in conduct protected under the First Amendment; (2) 

the defendant took some retaliatory action sufficient to deter a 

person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from 

speaking again; and (3) a causal link between the exercise of a 

constitutional right and the adverse action taken against him.” 

Banks v. York, 515 F. Supp. 2d 89, 111 (D.D.C. 2007). 

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Because Jayyousi’s claim fails at the first prong, we need not 

reach the final two inquiries. 

While constitutional protections do not disappear at the 

prison gate, it is well established that “a prison inmate retains 

[only] those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent 

with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological 

objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 

U.S. 817, 822 (1974). To evaluate whether Jayyousi’s

conduct was protected by the First Amendment, we look to 

the factors laid out by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley: 

(i) whether there was a “valid, rational connection between 

the prison [action] and the legitimate governmental interest 

put forward to justify it;” (ii) whether “alternative means of 

exercising the right . . . remain open to prison inmates;” (iii) 

“the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional 

right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the 

allocation of prison resources generally;” and (iv) whether 

any “ready alternative” existed. 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987).12 

These factors, taken together, allow us to assess whether the 

 12 The district court considered only the first Turner factor, finding 

“it [made] little sense” to inquire into the subsequent factors after 

finding for the government on the first. See Aref, 2015 WL 

3749621, at *11. While the first factor is widely recognized as the 

most important, precedent indicates all four factors must be 

weighed. See, e.g., Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 

2004) (stating “[t]here are four factors that courts must consider in 

determining whether a prison regulation is constitutional”); 

Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 427 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The 

district court erred in not considering the remaining three Turner

factors in the context of summary judgment.”). At least one court 

has even held a regulation violated the First Amendment because 

all but the first factor cut against the prison. See Lindell, 377 F.3d 

at 658–60. The district court’s failure to consider the last three 

factors can be remedied on appeal.

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challenged conduct was “reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests.” Id. at 89. Our circuit has cast this 

“reasonable relation” test as “very similar,” if not identical, to 

rational basis review. Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 198–99 

(D.C. Cir. 1998). This flexible standard “ensures the ability 

of corrections officials to anticipate security problems and to 

adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of 

prison administration.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 

U.S. 342, 349 (1987). 

As an initial note, appellants make much of what, in their 

eyes, amounted to “excessive deference” on the part of the 

district court to Smith’s justifications for his actions. See 

Appellant Br. 36 (“When applying this already deferential 

Turner standard, the court is not meant to also defer to a 

defendant’s assertion that there is, in fact, a valid, rational 

connection between his actions and the legitimate 

governmental interest.”). Appellants further emphasize the 

legal standard for summary judgment, which requires courts

to draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. See id. at 39–

40. The interplay between Turner and the summary judgment

standard is admittedly murky. But the Supreme Court in 

Beard v. Banks provided some guidance:

We must distinguish between evidence of 

disputed facts and disputed matters of 

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our 

inferences must accord deference to the views of 

prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to 

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of 

judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he 

cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006). But the Court also cautioned that 

Turner “requires prison authorities to show more than a 

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formalistic logical connection between a regulation and a 

penological objective.” Id. at 536. We agree with the Eighth 

Circuit that “[a] ‘reasonableness’ standard is not toothless.”

Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir. 1990). 

With these principles in mind, we turn now to the first 

Turner factor. This factor, which “looms especially large,”

asks whether the prison’s actions bear a rational connection to 

any legitimate penological interest. Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196. 

We agree with the district court that Smith could rationally 

have interpreted Jayyousi’s language during the prayer 

meeting as an attempt to “radicalize” other prisoners, thereby 

constituting a continued security risk. Although appellants 

claim Smith exaggerated the contents of the remarks, several 

portions rationally could have been considered troubling, 

particularly when Jayyousi stated “you are here because you 

are Muslim, not because you are a criminal” and cautioned “it 

is not U.S. versus Jayyousi; it is U.S. versus Islam.” J.A. 835. 

Jayyousi also asserted the CMU was created from evil, and 

that the suffering faced by Muslim inmates is “why we 

martyr.” J.A. 836. Prison staff were concerned about the 

sermon at the time it was given, as evidenced by the several 

emails and follow-ups that ensued. J.A. 1292, 1296, 1298, 

1300, 1302. That Jayyousi was cleared of any wrongdoing 

through the prison disciplinary process does not render it 

unreasonable for Smith, as the head of BOP’s CTU, to 

consider the content of Jayyousi’s statements in evaluating his 

CMU placement—especially the portions that indicated 

Jayyousi may have been continuing some of the same actions 

that led to his incarceration. The first factor weighs in favor 

of the government. 

The second Turner factor asks whether prisoners have 

any alternative means of exercising the right at stake. The 

right at issue “must be viewed sensibly and expansively.” 

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Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989). Turner and 

O’Lone are particularly instructive. In Turner, the Court “did 

not require that prisoners be afforded other means of 

communicating with inmates at other institutions, nor did . . .

O’Lone require that there be alternative means of attending 

the [Muslim] religious ceremony.” Id. Instead, the Turner

Court held “it was sufficient if other means of expression . . . 

remained available” and, in O’Lone, it was sufficient “if 

prisoners were permitted to participate in other Muslim 

religious ceremonies.” Id. at 418. Here, the second factor is 

easily satisfied; Jayyousi had other means of communicating 

his dissatisfaction still available to him, and he was not 

prohibited from giving similar sermons in the future. 

The third Turner factor looks to the impact 

accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards and 

other inmates in the prison. It is unclear, in this context, how 

BOP could have otherwise accommodated Jayyousi, as he 

was allowed to pray and free to lead similar prayer meetings

in the future. Appellants’ view of “accommodation” would 

require Smith to entirely disregard the content of Jayyousi’s 

sermon when evaluating whether he should remain in the 

CMU. But the government is not required to disregard 

potentially relevant information when making that sort of 

security assessment. Appellants additionally argue that 

Jayyousi’s sermon did not affect allocation of prison 

resources, but the number of emails generated and the need to 

conduct the disciplinary hearing undermine that assertion. 

Finally, under the fourth factor, we must consider 

whether Smith had any ready alternatives. Again we find the 

government’s position persuasive: the CMU exists precisely 

because inmates who present security risks require heightened 

monitoring. Given that charge, Smith had no real alternative 

but to consider all information available about Jayyousi—

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including the language used during the prayer meeting. And 

once Smith determined continued monitoring was necessary, 

the only option available to the government (except, perhaps 

prolonged confinement in administrative segregation) was to 

keep Jayyousi in the CMU. 

At bottom, appellants are challenging a “disputed matter 

of professional judgment” rather than disputed matters of fact. 

We do not require government officials to be perfect in their 

judgment, merely reasonable. Because all four Turner factors 

uniformly indicate Smith’s actions here were reasonably 

related to a legitimate security interest, we affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.

VI. 

Finally, we turn to Jayyousi and McGowan’s claims 

against Smith in his individual capacity. Appellants seek 

“compensatory and punitive damages” for injuries they 

suffered during their purportedly retaliatory placements in the 

CMUs. These injuries include the denial of job-related 

programming, the stigma of being designated to a “terrorist”

unit, the prolonged deprivation of First Amendment rights to 

political speech, and the undue damage to familial 

relationships caused by the CMUs’ unique communication 

restrictions. But before we address the availability of 

damages in this context, we must answer a threshold 

jurisdictional question: whether these individual-capacity 

claims survive Smith’s death in March 2015.13

 13 In its briefing, the government acknowledged “[t]here is . . . no 

defendant to respond to the individual-capacity claims, and 

government counsel does not represent any party with respect to 

those claims.” Appellee Br. 1–2. However, the government 

decided to respond to appellants’ claims against Smith as amicus 

curiae since “the United States has an interest in the proper 

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A. Mootness

Both sides agree state law determines whether a Bivens

action survives the death of a party. See Haggard v. Stevens, 

No. 2:09–cv–1144, 2010 WL 3658809, at *3–*6 (S.D. Ohio, 

Sept. 14, 2010) (undertaking an exhaustive survey of law in 

this area and concluding questions of survivorship are 

overwhelmingly decided by looking to state law), aff’d 683 

F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2012). They do not agree, however, about 

which state’s law should govern. We have several options: 

West Virginia law (where Smith was domiciled and worked), 

Indiana law (where the Terre Haute CMU is located), or 

Illinois law (where the Marion CMU is located). The starting 

point for assessing which state’s law should apply is the law 

of the forum state. See Haggard v. Stevens, 683 F.3d 714, 

718 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Malone v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 

553 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is a familiar principle 

that federal courts use the whole law of the forum state, 

including that state’s choice-of-law rules.”). 

The District of Columbia employs the “governmental 

interest” test to determine which state’s law to apply. See 

Raflo v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2001). 

This test involves a two-step inquiry: we begin by 

“identifying the governmental policies underlying the 

applicable law” and then “determin[e] which state’s policy 

would be most advanced by having its law applied to the facts 

of this case.” Id. Courts use four factors to determine which 

state’s policy is most advanced by application of its laws: “(1) 

the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the 

conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile . . . of 

 

resolution of constitutional claims against its employees.” Id. at 2. 

The government is entitled to file as amicus without the consent of 

the parties or leave of court. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.24.

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the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship is 

centered.” Id.

We need not determine which state’s law applies with 

respect to survivorship, however, because the result is the 

same under all three—appellants’ claims are not extinguished 

by Smith’s death. See Ind. Code § 34-9-3-1(a); 755 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/27-6; W. Va. Code § 55-7-8a(a). We proceed 

to the merits. 

B. Damages Under The PLRA

Jayyousi and McGowan contend they are entitled to 

compensation under the PLRA for a variety of injuries: loss of 

educational opportunity in the form of release preparation 

programming, reputational harm, violation of their First 

Amendment rights, and lasting harm to their familial 

relationships. The PLRA—in a provision entitled “Limitation 

on Recovery”—states: “No Federal civil action may be 

brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered 

while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (emphasis added). We are thus faced 

with an issue of first impression for this circuit: whether 

injuries that are allegedly neither mental nor emotional are 

compensable under the PLRA without a prior showing of 

physical injury. Our circuit has addressed Section 1997e(e) 

once before in Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 

(D.C. Cir. 1998). The government and district court both 

contend Davis controls this issue. We disagree. In Davis, the 

plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages for an 

alleged violation of his privacy after a prison official opened 

his sealed medical records and disclosed their contents 

without his consent. See id. at 1345. While the Davis court 

assumed without deciding that this intrusion on his privacy 

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34

amounted to a constitutional violation, it was careful to point 

out that Davis “alleged resulting emotional and mental 

distress, but no other injury” when it held his claims for 

compensatory and punitive damages were foreclosed by the 

PLRA.14 Id. (emphasis added). Our circuit has therefore 

never squarely addressed whether actual injuries that are

neither mental nor emotional are precluded under the PLRA 

absent a showing of physical injury. Language in Davis and 

from other circuits confirms this distinction. See, e.g., id. at 

1349 (“[Section] 1997e(e) precludes claims for emotional 

injury without any prior physical injury, regardless of the 

statutory or constitutional basis of the legal wrong” (emphasis 

added)); Cassidy v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 199 F.3d 374, 375–77

(7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing claims for mental and emotional 

harm stemming from an underlying constitutional violation 

but allowing plaintiff to pursue claims for loss of opportunity, 

loss of participation in prison activities, loss of access to 

prison programs and services, and loss of freedom of 

movement and social context stemming from the same 

violation). 

Circuits have split over the applicability of Section 

1997e(e) to claims involving constitutional violations but no 

physical injury. A majority has held that Section 1997e(e) 

precludes compensatory damages for any claim that does not 

include physical harm.

15 In doing so, these courts focus on 

the type of injury asserted. See, e.g., Thompson v. Carter, 284 

 14 But because the Davis court found other forms of relief 

(specifically injunctive and declaratory) were still available under 

Section 1997e(e), the court upheld the constitutionality of the 

statute under rational basis review. See id. at 1346, 1349. 

15 Like Davis, these circuits sidestep concerns about Section 

1997e(e) unconstitutionally foreclosing any relief by holding 

injunctive and declaratory relief remain available regardless of 

whether the plaintiff can show physical injury. 

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F.3d 411, 417–18 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding a “plaintiff cannot 

recover damages for mental or emotional injury for a 

constitutional violation in the absence of a showing of actual 

physical injury”); Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1298

(11th Cir. 2015) (“Because [plaintiff] has not alleged any 

physical injury resulting from his hospital stay, under the 

[PLRA], he cannot recover compensatory or punitive 

damages” for his Eighth Amendment claim). These cases 

necessarily imply a constitutional violation, absent physical 

harm, is necessarily a type of “mental or emotional injury.” 

See, e.g., Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(considering plaintiff’s claim of a First Amendment violation 

and concluding “the only actual injury that could form the 

basis for the award he seeks would be mental and/or 

emotional,” thus barring his claim); Searles v. Van Bebber, 

251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The statute limits the 

remedies available, regardless of the rights asserted, if the 

only injuries are mental or emotional.”). 

Several circuits have taken the opposite approach. These 

courts view alleged constitutional violations as a type of 

intangible harm wholly apart from mental or emotional injury. 

See, e.g., King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015), 

cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 794 (2016) (“The statute provides that 

a prisoner may not bring a civil action for mental or 

emotional injury . . . . It says nothing about claims brought to 

redress constitutional injuries, which are distinct from mental 

and emotional injuries.”); Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 

749 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If the suit contains separate claims, 

neither involving physical injury, and in one the prisoner 

claims damages for mental or emotional suffering and in the 

other damages for some other type of injury, the first claim is 

barred by the statute but the second is unaffected.”). 

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Both approaches involve some degree of slicing-anddicing claims: one by injury pled and one by relief requested. 

This is best illustrated by example. Take a prisoner who has 

alleged a credible violation of his First Amendment right to

free exercise but made no showing of physical harm. Rather 

than dismiss his entire action, the majority view of Section 

1997e(e) would bar his claim for compensatory damages but 

allow his claims for injunctive relief and punitive damages to 

proceed. The minority view, on the other hand, would look to 

the type of injury alleged—if, say, the prisoner claimed 

mental anguish in addition to the substantive constitutional

violation, then the first claim would be barred while the 

second would be eligible for compensatory damages. For the 

reasons laid out below, we are convinced this narrower 

reading of the PLRA is the proper one. 

While Section 1997e(e) “may well present the highest 

concentration of poor drafting in the smallest number of 

words in the entire United States Code,” John Boston, The 

Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court 

Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 434 (2001), we 

nonetheless begin with the statute’s plain language. See, e.g.,

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 

U.S. 102, 108 (1980). The government’s preferred 

interpretation would render the phrase “mental and emotional 

injury” superfluous. Had Congress intended to graft a

physical-injury requirement onto every single claim, the 

statute could simply have provided: “No Federal civil action 

may be brought by a prisoner . . . for any injury suffered while 

in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” See 

Zamiara, 788 F.3d at 213; Robinson, 170 F.3d at 749; Amaker 

v. Haponik, No. 98 CIV. 2663, 1999 WL 76798, at *7 

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999) (“If Congress had intended to apply 

§ 1997e(e)’s restriction to all federal civil suits by prisoners, it 

could easily have done so simply by dropping the qualifying 

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37

language ‘for mental or emotional injury.’”). The “mental 

and emotional” language is significant precisely because 

prisoners can allege types of intangible injury that fall outside 

that ambit. 

Courts that advocate the opposite interpretation of 

Section 1997e(e) claim the provision’s “clear mandate” is a 

focus on the type of injury pled rather than the nature of the 

underlying right. See, e.g., Searles, 251 F.3d at 876. The 

Tenth Circuit, for instance, cautioned the statute’s plain 

language forecloses “divorc[ing]” the underlying substantive 

violation from the resulting injury. Id. But our reading does 

no such thing; the focus remains on the type of injury alleged, 

with an understanding that plaintiffs can allege intangible

harms that are neither mental nor emotional, i.e., not every 

non-physical injury is by default a mental or emotional injury.

In the PLRA context, many of our sister circuits have 

awarded compensatory damages for non-mental and nonemotional injuries. See, e.g., Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 

781 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A deprivation of First Amendment 

rights standing alone is a cognizable injury.”); Cassidy, 199 

F.3d at 375–77 (allowing claims of loss of access to prison 

programs and services); Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 

1269–70 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding a prisoner entitled to 

compensatory damages for his unconstitutional placement in 

punitive segregation including for the loss of visiting, phone, 

and library privileges). Analogous Supreme Court and circuit 

precedent supports the view that there can be real harms 

separate and apart from mental or emotional injury. For 

instance, in Carey v. Piphus, the Court held that a plaintiff is 

eligible to recover damages under Section 1983 if he can

demonstrate “some actual, if intangible, injury” caused by a 

constitutional violation. 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978). Similarly, 

this court in Hobson v. Wilson instructed “intangible interests 

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must be compensated” as long as they can be shown with 

“sufficient certainty.” 737 F.2d 1, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The 

Hobson court even enumerated some examples of “First 

Amendment compensable rights” separate from any commonlaw mental or emotional harm, such as the restriction of an 

inmate’s access to books. Id. 

Indeed, courts frequently allow plaintiffs in Section 1983 

actions to recover damages for constitutional violations that 

fall outside the domain of common-law injuries. See, e.g., 

Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 808–09 (8th Cir. 1998) 

(affirming an award of compensatory damages for Eighth 

Amendment claim of paraplegic prisoners unconstitutionally 

placed in solitary confinement); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit 

Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding damages to 

be an appropriate remedy for the harm caused by fabrication 

of evidence). Courts have also consistently treated the loss of 

liberty as an independently cognizable injury, separate from 

any mental or emotional harm. See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (“[A] successful malicious 

prosecution plaintiff may recover, in addition to general 

damages, compensation for . . . loss of time and deprivation of 

the society.”); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 216, 277 (D.C. 

Cir. 1977) (affirming damage award for, among other relief,

compensation for “the duration of loss of liberty” in a Fourth 

Amendment case); Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 

128 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding a plaintiff is “entitled to be 

compensated for [his] loss of liberty” “independently of his 

claims of physical, mental, emotional, or economic injury”). 

We therefore conclude there exists a universe of injuries that 

are neither mental nor emotional and for which plaintiffs can 

recover compensatory damages under the PLRA. 

Our holding also comports with the purpose of the 

PLRA, as expressed in its legislative history. The Act’s 

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passage was precipitated by an increase in prison litigation, 

much of it frivolous.16 Examples cited by PLRA proponents 

ranged from due process cases alleging injuries like a 

defective haircut to, most famously, an inmate filing a cruel 

and unusual punishment claim after he was given chunky 

rather than creamy peanut butter. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,042

(1995) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole). But members of 

Congress also made it clear that the PLRA was not meant to 

bar serious, potentially meritorious claims. See id. at 26,553

(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“Prisoners still have the right to 

seek legal redress for meritorious claims . . . .”); see also id. at 

27,044 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (“This 

amendment will allow meritorious claims to be filed, but 

gives the judge broader discretion to prevent frivolous and 

malicious lawsuits filed by prison inmates.”).

Indeed, we find it hard to believe that Congress intended 

to afford virtual immunity to prison officials even when they 

commit blatant constitutional violations, as long as no 

physical blow is dealt.

17 It is especially difficult to see how 

 16 Notably, although there was a large increase in the absolute

number of cases filed from 1975 to 1994 (6,606 cases to 39,065 

cases, respectively), Congressional debate failed to account for the 

exponential growth in the prison population in the interim. The rate 

of inmate filings actually dropped by approximately seventeen 

percent during that time period. Jennifer Winslow, Comment, The 

Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement Bars 

Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655, 

1662–63 (2002). 

17 As noted above, circuits that have adopted the broader reading of 

Section 1997e(e)’s bar support the provision’s constitutionality by 

emphasizing the availability of alternative forms of relief: namely, 

injunctive or declaratory relief, punitive damages, and nominal 

damages. We need not consider the constitutionality question here 

but simply note the illusory nature, in practice, of such relief. 

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violations of inmates’ First Amendment rights could ever be 

vindicated, given the unlikelihood of physical harm in that 

context. Against that backdrop, and a legislative record 

indicating an intention to still allow awards for meritorious 

claims, we believe our reading of Section 1997e(e) best aligns 

with the purposes of the PLRA.

We note also that the PLRA contains several other 

mechanisms to curb the filing of frivolous suits—making it 

even less likely Congress intended the physical-injury 

requirement to bar claims for every serious but non-mental or 

emotional harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (d) (requiring the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies and capping attorneys’ 

fees for successful claims at 150 percent of damages); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (g) (compelling personal payment of 

initial filing fees and imposing a limitation on filing in forma 

pauperis after having three suits previously dismissed). And, 

of course, courts have always had the power to weed out 

claims that lack merit at earlier pleading stages, preserving 

judicial resources. Finally, we point out one additional 

limitation relevant to appellants’ claims here. Even when a 

party pleads an injury that is neither mental nor emotional, 

that harm still must “be shown with sufficient certainty to 

 

Injunctive relief is commonly moot by the time a case is heard and 

cannot provide relief for past harms. Punitive damages are never 

awarded as a matter of right, and the standard is understandably 

high—requiring evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of 

others. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51–52 (1983). Finally, 

nominal damages do little to deter repetition of the illegal conduct 

and do not provide any compensation for actual harms suffered. Cf. 

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (“In situations of 

abuse, an action for damages against the responsible individual can 

be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees.”); 

see Doe v. District of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 

1983). 

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avoid damages based either on pure speculation or the socalled inherent value of the rights violated.” Hobson, 737 

F.2d at 62. When “no value [can] reasonably be placed on the 

particular injury demonstrated,” then the plaintiff is entitled 

only to nominal damages. Id. at 63; see also Carey, 435 U.S. 

at 264 (noting plaintiffs could recover compensatory damages 

“for racial discrimination, the denial of voting rights and the 

denial of Fourth Amendment rights” assuming they could 

prove “some actual, if intangible, injury”); Kerman, 374 F.3d 

at 130 (“The present case does not involve . . . an attempt to 

vindicate an abstract societal interest. Rather, it involves an 

anything-but-abstract physical detention. And although a 

given person’s loss of time may be difficult to evaluate in 

terms of dollars, his loss of liberty is not just ‘virtually 

certain’ to occur; it is inseparable from the detention itself.”). 

Having concluded a prisoner may recover compensatory 

damages under the PLRA if he can show an actual injury—

separate from any mental or emotional harm—for which 

damages can be reasonably ascertained, we note the vast 

majority of circuits—including the majority of those that have 

adopted the broader application of Section 1997e(e)—agree 

the provision does not limit the availability of punitive 

damages provided a proper showing is made. See, e.g., 

Searles, 251 F.3d at 879–80; Allah, 226 F.3d at 252–53; 

Cassidy, 199 F.3d at 376–77; Carter, 284 F.3d at 418. Our 

circuit has uniquely held that punitive damages are 

unavailable to plaintiffs who plead only mental or emotional 

injury, without a showing of physical harm. See Davis, 158 

F.3d at 1348 (“Amicus argues that because punitive damages 

are awarded to punish the tortfeasor rather than to compensate 

the victim, they are not embraced by § 1997e(e). But 

§ 1997e(e) draws no such distinction. It simply prevents suits 

‘for’ mental injury without prior physical injury.”). We have 

no occasion to reconsider that holding here. Instead, we 

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construe Davis narrowly and hold appellants who allege 

actual harms that are neither mental nor emotional are entitled 

to punitive damages if they can show the defendant’s conduct 

was “motivated by evil motive or intent” or “involve[d] 

reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected 

rights of others.” Wade, 461 U.S. at 56. 

Finally, every circuit, regardless of its interpretation of 

Section 1997e(e), agrees that nominal damages are available 

in this context. See Carter, 284 F.3d at 418 (listing cases). 

Our court declined to reach this issue in Davis because it 

found the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead nominal 

damages. See Davis, 158 F.3d at 1349. The district court 

here also concluded these appellants waived their claim to 

nominal damages by failing to “specifically plead” them in 

their complaint. Aref, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 149. In doing so, 

the court below relied entirely on our language in Davis. 

There, the court felt it could not “strain[] to find inferences 

that [were] not available on the face of the complaint or the 

briefs submitted” because “Davis never sought nominal 

damages” nor did his “submissions to the court ever mention 

a claim to nominal relief.” Davis, 158 F.3d at 1349. But 

appellants here made a specific request for nominal damages 

in their opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss. 

Brief for Plaintiffs at 36, Aref, et al. v. Holder, et al., No. 10-

cv-539 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2013), ECF No. 102. Moreover, the 

plaintiff in Davis only requested compensatory and punitive 

damages; his pleadings did not contain any catch-all prayer

for relief. See Complaint, Davis v. District of Columbia, No.

97-cv-00092 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 1997), ECF No. 1. By contrast,

these appellants included a broad prayer for relief in their 

complaint. See Aref, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 149 (“Plaintiffs

respectfully request the Court . . . [o]rder such other relief as 

this Court deems just and proper.”). We therefore find the 

reasoning in Davis inapt.

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even indicate

“[e]very other final judgment should grant the relief to which 

each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that 

relief in its pleadings.” FED R. CIV. P. 54. Thus, we conclude

appellants here have made out a sufficient claim for nominal 

damages. And we join our sister circuits in holding that an 

inmate who cannot make out “sufficiently certain” claims for 

compensatory damages is entitled to nominal damages, 

provided he proves an injury occurred. See Memphis Comm. 

Sch. Dis. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986) 

(“[N]ominal damages . . . are the appropriate means of 

‘vindicating’ rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, 

provable injury.”). 

Overall, then, we conclude appellants are eligible to seek 

compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages under Section 

1997e(e). They have asserted the following injuries: the 

disadvantage of being denied essential reintegration 

programming provided by BOP; the stigma of being 

designated to facilities known as “terrorist units;” the 

prolonged deprivation of First Amendment rights to political 

speech and activity; and the undue damage to primary family 

relationships. The district court held these harms to be too 

speculative and abstract to provide a basis for compensatory

or punitive damages. See Aref, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 148–49. 

We need not evaluate these injuries, however, because we 

conclude infra that Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. 

We similarly decline to remand to the district court to 

consider—in the first instance—whether nominal damages 

would be appropriate.

C. Qualified Immunity

Having concluded the PLRA does not bar appellants’

claims, we turn at last to the question whether Smith is 

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entitled to qualified immunity. Appellants can prevail only if 

they show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or 

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly 

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft 

v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). For a right to have been 

“clearly established,” it must have been “clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). The 

Supreme Court has cautioned us not to define the right at too 

high a level of generality; instead, we must examine the right 

in its “particularized” context. See Reichle v. Howards, 132 

S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012). Jayyousi and McGowan allege 

their continued confinement to the CMU (and, in McGowan’s 

case, his redesignation) was retaliatory action taken in 

violation of the First Amendment. At the outset, we note “the 

right in question [here] is not the general right to be free from 

retaliation for one’s speech, but the more specific right to be 

free” from retaliation in this particular, penological context. 

Id.

Especially in the context of prison security, we cannot—

and do not—require public officials to be perfect in their 

assessments. Indeed, qualified immunity is intended to allow 

“government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 

mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Lane v. 

Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014); see also Malley v. 

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (observing that qualified 

immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”). We 

evaluate appellants’ arguments against this backdrop. 

With respect to Jayyousi’s claim, as previously 

discussed, appellants have failed to make out an adequate case 

that his First Amendment rights were violated—much less

that it would have been clear to any reasonable officer in 

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Smith’s position that denying Jayyousi’s transfer request on 

the basis of his sermon given during the prayer meeting would 

violate the First Amendment. McGowan’s claims are

similarly untenable. Appellants point first to McGowan’s 

initial placement in the CMU in 2008, contending it was 

retaliation for protected political speech. But Smith had 

several reasons for recommending the placement; most 

notably, that McGowan’s conviction involved domestic 

terrorist activity and that he continued to communicate with 

individuals outside the prison involved in extreme 

environmental advocacy. While the First Amendment may 

protect this sort of speech and association generally, those 

protections are less robust in the prison context. See Pell, 417 

U.S. at 822 (“[L]awful incarceration brings about the 

necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 

rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying 

our penal system.”). Moreover, placement in the CMU did 

not force McGowan to give up all methods of 

communication; it merely limited the frequency and amount. 

Even assuming McGowan could make out a First Amendment 

violation (an unlikely prospect), he certainly cannot show 

Smith violated any clearly established right when he 

recommended designation to the CMU. 

Appellants then point to Smith’s decision to redesignate 

McGowan to the CMU in 2011, alleging it was illegal

retaliation for McGowan’s exercise of protected speech. 

But—after being returned to the general population—

McGowan asked his wife to have his attorney send him lawenforcement sensitive documents, in an apparent attempt to 

circumvent communications monitoring. It was reasonable 

for an officer in Smith’s position to consider this attempted

end-run around the prison’s monitoring systems when 

deciding whether redesignation would be prudent. Yet again, 

even if McGowan could make out a First Amendment 

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violation here, he cannot meet the high bar of showing an 

official in Smith’s position would have known his actions 

violated a clearly established right. Smith is therefore entitled 

to qualified immunity on all of appellants’ individual-capacity 

claims.18

VII.

In sum, we hold appellants’ claims were not mooted by 

their transfer out of the CMU and they have a liberty interest 

in avoiding transfer into the CMU. We therefore reverse the 

grant of summary judgment on this claim and remand to the 

district court to determine whether the government’s 

procedures comport with due process as applied to 

appellants. 

With respect to Jayyousi’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim, we hold he failed to establish any constitutional 

violation and so cannot prevail. Appellants’ individualcapacity claims against Lieutenant Smith survive his death 

and, moreover, constitute claims for actual though intangible 

harms that are neither mental nor emotional. Although these

claims are eligible to be brought under the PLRA, they too 

fail because Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. For the 

foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on both these claims.

So ordered.

 18 Because we hold Smith is entitled to qualified immunity, and 

therefore uphold the district court’s order dismissing all claims 

against him, we need not consider the parties’ arguments regarding 

substitution of a representative for the deceased. 

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