Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04664/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04664-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRA DICKERT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SANYO ENERGY (U.S.A.) 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-04664-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Docket No. 38

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Myra Dickert and Howard Dickert (“Plaintiffs”) bring suit against Sanyo Energy 

(U.S.A) Corporation (“Sanyo Energy”), Sanyo North America Corporation (“Sanyo NA”), and 

Panasonic Corporation of North America (“Panasonic,” and collectively “Defendants”) in 

connection with allegedly defective solar panels manufactured and marketed by Sanyo Energy. 

Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of express warranty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 

violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud 

Act, and violation of California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). 

The Court heard arguments on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) on March 7, 2019. Docket No. 38 (“Mot.”). At the hearing, it became 

apparent that ambiguity remained as to whether the Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over

Panasonic. See Docket No. 48 (“Tr.”) at 56–69. The Court accordingly ordered the parties to 

engage in limited jurisdictional discovery. Docket No. 45. Following discovery, the parties 

submitted supplemental briefing addressing Panasonic’s contacts with the state of California. See

Docket No. 60 (“Pl. Supp. Br.”); Docket No. 62 (“Def. Supp. Br.”). For the reasons discussed 

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below, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Panasonic and therefore GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. First Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs allege the following in the FAC. Plaintiffs were interested in purchasing solar 

panels for their home to “reduce their electric bills, save money, and benefit the environment.” 

FAC ¶ 81. A representative of GeoGenix, an installer of Sanyo panels, assured them the panels 

“were the best solar panels available on the market,” would have “30 years useful life,” and 

“would all but eliminate their electricity bill for 30 years.” Id. ¶¶ 64, 82, 92. Sanyo provides 

installers, including GeoGenix, with a specification (or “spec”) sheet stating that the panels come 

with a 20-year power output limited warranty and a 2-year warranty for workmanship. Id. ¶ 63. 

Based on this spec sheet, GeoGenix told Plaintiffs that Sanyo provides a 20-year power output 

warranty. Id. ¶ 65. However, Sanyo did not provide GeoGenix with Sanyo’s full, written Limited 

Warranty at any point; Plaintiffs did not see the Limited Warranty until after this lawsuit was 

initiated. Id. ¶¶ 60, 63; see FAC, Exh. A (Limited Warranty). 

Plaintiffs relied on GeoGenix’s representations about the quality of Sanyo’s solar panels 

and the terms of Sanyo’s warranties when they purchased a Sanyo solar panel system from 

GeoGenix in September 2005. FAC ¶¶ 95–96. They agreed to pay extra for what they believed to 

be a “premium” product. Id. ¶¶ 82–83. GeoGenix installed the Sanyo solar panels. Id. ¶¶ 91–94. 

“In or about 2016,” Power Overhaul, a solar energy contractor engaged by Plaintiffs, 

conducted an inspection of Plaintiffs solar panels. Id. ¶¶ 47, 97. Power Overhaul informed 

Plaintiffs that “some of their Sanyo panels were not functioning properly” and “the power 

production of the panels . . . were below the levels stated in the Power Warranty.” Id. ¶ 97. The 

failed Sanyo panels were a result of “delamination.” Id. ¶ 98. Delamination occurs when the 

laminated components of a solar panel detach because the bond between the plastics and the glass 

separates. Id. ¶ 42. This detachment allows air and moisture to come in to contact with the wires 

that conduct electricity, creating a safety and fire risk. Id. ¶ 51.

Plaintiffs submitted a warranty claim to Sanyo through GeoGenix. Id. ¶ 100. Sanyo took 

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approximately eighteen months to respond to the claim, and only agreed to replace nine of the 

thirteen delaminated panels. Id. ¶ 101. Sanyo explained the remaining four panels would not be 

replaced because Plaintiffs provided insufficient test data of power degradation to qualify for 

replacement panels. Id. Sanyo refused to conduct the necessary power output tests and required 

the Plaintiffs to obtain the test data and provide it to Sanyo. Id. ¶ 103. Plaintiffs allege that Sanyo 

put the onus on consumers to conduct power output tests on defective panels as part of a warranty 

“claims suppression strategy.” Id.

Throughout the eighteen-month period when Sanyo was processing Plaintiffs’ warranty 

claim, Power Overhaul provided additional photographs to Sanyo demonstrating “delamination 

throughout many of Plaintiff’s panels.” Id. ¶ 105. Although the FAC does not make it clear, it 

appears that this delamination manifested in panels other than the initial thirteen that Plaintiffs 

reported as defective. It also appears that Sanyo did not address these additional delaminated 

panels when it responded to Plaintiffs’ warranty claim.

On July 18, 2018, Plaintiffs sent a letter to Sanyo pursuant to the CLRA informing Sanyo

of an alleged violation of California Civil Code § 1770 as well as an alleged breach of warranty. 

FAC, Exh. D. In the letter, Plaintiffs demanded that Sanyo fix the panel defects within thirty days 

of receipt of the letter. Id. Plaintiffs then filed this suit on August 2, 2018, fifteen days after 

sending the letter. See Docket No. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint. 

Docket No. 30. Instead of litigating the motion, the parties stipulated that Plaintiffs would file an 

amended complaint. Docket No. 36. The instant motion to dismiss the FAC followed.

B. Jurisdictional Discovery

At the hearing on March 7, 2019, counsel for Defendants argued that to the extent

Plaintiffs’ claims hinged on conduct attributable to Panasonic, rather than Sanyo, Plaintiffs had 

failed to identify any “California-related activity” by Panasonic that would allow the Court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Tr. 56:9–17. Since Sanyo NA—a Delaware corporation 

whose principal place of business was San Diego, California—ceased to exist in 2015 when it was 

merged into Panasonic, any acts of alleged warranty suppression after 2015 would have been acts 

committed by Panasonic, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New 

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Jersey. FAC ¶ 9–12; see Tr. 56:11–17.

To determine whether the Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Panasonic, the 

parties were permitted to engage in limited jurisdictional discovery to determine 

(1) who at Panasonic makes decisions regarding warranty claims for 

solar panels manufactured by Sanyo Energy, including Plaintiffs’ 

warranty claims, and where those decisions were made; and (2) who 

received Plaintiffs’ July 18, 2018 letter and whether they had the 

authority to process warranty claims.

Docket No. 45 at 3. On May 8, 2019, counsel for Plaintiff deposed Hidenori Oishi, responsible 

for processing warranty claims for Sanyo solar panels on behalf of Panasonic. See Docket Nos. 

61–3, 63–1 Exh. A (“Oishi Dep.”). Mr. Oishi is based in Wilsonville, Oregon and has been 

responsible for processing warranty claims for Sanyo panels since 2014. Oishi Dep. 25:6–9. 

According to Mr. Oishi, all such warranty claims are first processed in Oregon, and then sent to 

Japan for final approval. Id. 37:15–19. No warranty documents are sent for processing to 

California, and past warranty claims are stored in Oregon. Id. at 37:15–19, 31:15–22.

Mr. Oishi explained that most warranty claims are received via email, telephone, or 

through a Panasonic support website. Id. at 50:4–7; see Docket No. 63–1, Exh. B (Panasonic 

support website showing how to reach “HIT Support” for solar warranty claims). Mr. Oishi 

testified that when Plaintiffs filed their first warranty claim in 2016, it was processed by Panasonic 

staff working in Oregon. Id. at 30:6–10. The Cupertino address had been discontinued as of 

2016, when Panasonic shifted its warranty claim operations to Oregon. Id. at 22:13–20. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs sent their July 18, 2018 letter to an address in Cupertino, California that 

Sanyo had previously used as a claim center for solar panel warranties. Id. at 22:9–20. But 

because the warranty claims operation was no longer in California, Plaintiffs’ letter was forwarded 

to the office of Panasonic Industrial Device Sales North America (“PIDSA”) in Mountain View, 

California, where it was opened by Shauna Peterson, Director of PIDSA. Id. at 16:19–17:7. Mr. 

Oishi testified that Ms. Peterson perceived the letter to be a legal matter and forwarded it to 

Panasonic’s counsel in New Jersey on July 24, 2018. Id.; Docket No. 61–1 (Ms. Peterson’s email 

to Mark Degand, Panasonic counsel). Mr. Oishi received a copy of the July 18 letter on July 26, 

2018 from his supervisor in New Jersey, who asked him to help Panasonic’s legal and risk 

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management departments with their response to the letter. Docket No. 61–2. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), and for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. at 2–3. Under Rule 12(b)(2), a plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing personal jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 

(9th Cir. 2004). “The parties may submit, and the court may consider, declarations and other 

evidence outside the pleadings in determining whether it has personal jurisdiction.” Kellman v. 

Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Doe v. Unocal 

Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Where not directly controverted, plaintiff’s version of 

the facts is taken as true for the purposes of a 12(b)(2) motion,” and “conflicts between the facts 

contained in the parties’ [evidentiary submissions] must be resolved in [plaintiff’s] favor.” 

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 922 (quoting AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 

588 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, the court may not assume the truth of allegations that are 

contradicted by the evidence. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 1977). “The plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint.” Mavrix 

Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 

In actions where there is no federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the law of the 

forum state is applied. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. Because California’s long-arm 

jurisdictional statute “is coextensive with federal due process requirements,” “the jurisdictional 

analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.” Id. at 800–01. “For a court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have at least 

‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 801 (quoting International Shoe Co. 

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 

To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

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570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability 

requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true 

and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court need not, however, 

“assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, “a Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

B. Personal Jurisdiction over Panasonic

Defendants argue for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of Plaintiffs’ entire complaint on 

several grounds, including that Plaintiffs’ warranty claims are time-barred and that Plaintiffs failed 

to provide Defendants with pre-suit notice of the breach of warranty claim. Mot. at 1–2. 

Separately, Defendants argue for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) on the ground that all of Plaintiffs 

claims are directed at Panasonic’s conduct, and the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over 

Panasonic. Mot. at 25. Because the uncontroverted evidence elicited through discovery 

establishes that Defendants’ jurisdictional argument is correct, the Court dismisses this case under 

Rule 12(b)(2).

1. Legal Framework

To satisfy constitutional requirements of due process, defendants in a civil action must 

have a requisite level of minimum contacts with the forum state. Morrill v. Scott Financial Corp., 

873 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017). “Minimum contacts are shown if the defendant has 

‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ with a forum state (general jurisdiction), or 

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if the defendant has sufficient contacts arising from or related to specific transactions or activities 

in the forum state (specific jurisdiction).” Id. at 1142 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800–

02). Plaintiffs do not argue that Panasonic is subject to general jurisdiction. Therefore, the only 

inquiry for this Court is whether Panasonic is subject to specific jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit 

has established a three-prong test for a claim of specific personal jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully 

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 

forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant's forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). The 

first prong of this test differs slightly depending on if the case sounds in contract or tort. Id. If a 

case sounds primarily in contract, the inquiry is whether the defendant “purposefully avails itself 

of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws,” such as through executing a contract within the forum state. Id. (quoting 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). If a claim sounds in tort, the first prong asks 

whether the defendant “purposefully directed his conduct toward a forum state.” Id. at 803. 

Purposeful direction “usually consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions outside the forum 

state that are directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods originating 

elsewhere.” Id. 

However, where a case arises fundamentally from a contractual relationship, personal 

jurisdiction can be evaluated under the “purposeful availment” standard even when some of the 

claims presented may be tort-based. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 

2008). For example, the plaintiff in Boschetto bought a car from defendants on an e-commerce 

auction site. Id. at 1014. Plaintiff, a California resident, arranged for the car to be delivered from 

Wisconsin, where defendants resided. Id. Soon after receiving the car, the plaintiff realized that

the defendants had misrepresented its quality and provenance, and brought claims for breach of 

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contract, violation of the California Consumer Protection Act, misrepresentation, and fraud. Id. at 

1015. Even though some of the plaintiff’s causes of action were torts, the Ninth Circuit held that 

his case as a whole “sound[ed] primarily in contract” and therefore applied the “‘purposeful 

availment’ standard.” Id. at 1016.

In this case, as in Boschetto, the majority of Plaintiffs’ claims are contractual: claims 1–3 

allege breach of express warranty based on affirmation or promise, claims 4–6 allege breach of an 

express written warranty, claims 7–9 allege breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss 

Warranty Act, and claims 10–13 seek specific performance. See FAC ¶¶ 188–322. The remaining 

claims for unjust enrichment (13–14) and for violation of state consumer protection laws (15–18) 

could stand on their own as tort claims, but are premised on the contractual relationship between 

the parties. Accordingly, the case sounds primarily in contract and a purposeful availment 

analysis is most appropriate. See, e.g., HK China Grp., Inc. v. Beijing United Auto. & Motorcycle 

Mfg. Corp., 417 F. App’x 664, 665–66 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the “purposeful availment 

analysis applies to the entire suit” involving both a breach of contract claim and a fraud claim

because “the alleged fraud [wa]s merely the representation in the contract that gave rise to the 

breach”); Ponomarenko v. Shapiro, No. 16-CV-02763-BLF, 2017 WL 1709335, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

May 3, 2017) (because plaintiff’s tort “claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, 

false promise, and unfair competition are premised on his alleged contractual relationship with 

[defendant],” plaintiff “must satisfy the purposeful availment test”).

2. Purposeful Availment

Under a purposeful availment analysis, a defendant is subject to specific personal 

jurisdiction if they “performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the 

transaction of business within the forum state.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Sher v. 

Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Plaintiffs here have not met their burden to establish personal jurisdiction. As an initial 

matter, all of the misconduct alleged in the FAC occurred after the Sanyo entities merged into 

Panasonic in 2015. See FAC ¶ 10 (“SANYO NA ceased to exist on April 1, 2015, when it was 

merged into Panasonic.”). Plaintiffs did not submit their warranty claims until 2016, so their 

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breach of warranty and related claims post-date the merger. See id. ¶ 97 (alleging that panel 

defects were first discovered “[i]n or about 2016”); Tr. 47:24–48:20 (Plaintiffs’ counsel 

acknowledging that Plaintiffs do not allege that Sanyo was aware that its solar panels were 

defective at the time of sale or that Sanyo intended to suppress warranty claims from the outset.). 

This means that the purposeful availment analysis must center on Panasonic’s conduct.

However, the evidence produced through jurisdictional discovery shows that Panasonic did 

not process warranty claims for Sanyo solar panels within California. As of 2016, all warranty 

claims for Sanyo solar panels were processed by Panasonic employees in Oregon. Oishi Dep. 

22:18–20. Mr. Oishi testified that there was no reason for warranty claims to be routed through 

any offices in California because Panasonic’s “process is in Oregon and we get the approval and 

final judgment in Japan. So there’s no connection for us to send the documents to California.” Id.

37:15–19. Panasonic’s warranty operations are connected to a limited set of localities, of which 

California is not one: New Jersey, Panasonic’s principal place of business within the United 

States; Oregon, where Panasonic processes warranty claims for Sanyo solar panels; and Japan, 

where final decisions on warranty claims are made. Unsurprisingly, then, Panasonic did not 

process Plaintiffs’ particular warranty claims in California. Plaintiffs’ 2016 claim was received in 

New Jersey and processed in Oregon by Mr. Oishi and his staff. Id. 29:12–30:24. When Plaintiffs 

attempted to mail their July 18, 2018 letter to a closed Sanyo office in Cupertino, it was forwarded 

to an active Panasonic office in Mountain View. Id. 60:6–9. The director of the Mountain View 

office “didn’t know what to do with [the] letter” and forwarded it to Panasonic counsel Mark 

Degand in New Jersey. Oishi Dep. 17:2–7. That is, Panasonic’s Mountain View office did 

nothing more than pass the July 18 letter to the appropriate recipients elsewhere within the 

Panasonic organization. 

Notwithstanding the evidence that no part of Panasonic’s warranty operations take place in 

California, Plaintiffs argue that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Panasonic under 

two more attenuated theories: (1) Panasonic inherited Sanyo’s contacts with California and is 

subject to personal jurisdiction under a successor theory, and (2) Panasonic’s decision to 

discontinue processing of Sanyo solar warranties at former Sanyo locations in Cupertino and San 

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Diego itself constituted the type of affirmative conduct within California that would confer the 

Court with personal jurisdiction. Pl. Supp. Br. at 2–3. Neither theory has merit.

Plaintiffs’ successor theory fails because the alleged warranty suppression did not take 

place until after the Sanyo entities had merged into Panasonic. “The contacts of a predecessor can 

be attributed to a successor in interest if that successor would be liable for the actions of the 

predecessor under the law of the forum.” Galen Inv. Advisors, Inc. v. Alcatel, No. C 02-2774 

MJJ, 2002 WL 31319900, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2002) (emphasis added). Personal jurisdiction 

over a successor company only obtains where (1) “the court would have had personal jurisdiction

over the predecessor” and (2) “the successor company effectively assumed the subject liabilities of 

the predecessor”. Lefkowtiz v. Scytl USA, No. 15-CV-05005-JSC, 2016 WL 537952, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Feb. 11, 2016) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any liability on the 

part of Sanyo, the predecessor, because their claims center on alleged warranty suppression 

beginning in 2016 or later. See FAC ¶¶ 97–106, 116–123; Tr. 47:24–48:20. By 2016, the Sanyo 

entities had ceased to exist and were fully merged into Panasonic’s North America division. FAC 

¶¶ 9–11. Panasonic is not subject to personal jurisdiction under a successor theory because 

Plaintiffs are unable to allege any unlawful conduct by Sanyo for which Panasonic would inherit 

liability. 

Plaintiffs’ second argument that Panasonic’s decision to close Sanyo’s California-based 

warranty processing centers amounts to purposeful availment of the forum state likewise fails. 

Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Panasonic’s decision to close the Sanyo offices was made within 

California. Indeed, the reasonable inference from the jurisdictional discovery is that such a 

decision would have been made in New Jersey or Japan. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged 

that the decision to close the Sanyo office had anything to do with the alleged warranty 

suppression policy of Panasonic. There is no causal harm to Plaintiffs. In any event, Plaintiffs’ 

argument turns the meaning of “purposeful availment” on its head. Rather than “allow[ing] or 

promot[ing] the transaction of business within the forum state,” an out-of-state defendant’s

decision to relocate operations away from the forum state does the exact opposite—it ceases the 

transaction of business within the forum state. Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016. 

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Having established that Panasonic did not purposefully avail itself of the laws of California 

in processing warranty claims for Sanyo solar panels, the personal jurisdiction inquiry ends. See 

id. (“[I]f the plaintiff fails at the first step, the jurisdictional inquiry ends and the case must be 

dismissed.” (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Order 

and close the file in this case.

This order disposes of Docket No. 38.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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