Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02166/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02166-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARCHIE OVERTON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02166-EMC 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Docket Nos. 24-25

Plaintiffs request leave to file a motion for reconsideration of this Court‟s order denying 

their motion for a temporary restraining order because of a “manifest failure by the Court to 

consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court.” Local 

Civ. R. 7-9(b)(3). They make two principal arguments, discussed below.

First, Plaintiffs argue the Court erroneously imposed an “irreparable harm” requirement on 

their request for preliminary relief because the Federal Motor Carrier Act (“FMCA”), 49 U.S.C. 

§§ 13101, et seq., contains no such requirement.

1

 The FMCA provides that “[a] person may 

provide transportation as a motor carrier . . . or service as a broker for transportation . . . only if the 

person is registered under this chapter to provide such transportation or service.” 49 U.S.C. § 

13901(a). In relevant part, the FMCA provides that “[i]f a person provides transportation by 

motor vehicle or service in clear violation of [inter alia, the FMCA‟s registration provisions], a 

person injured by the transportation or service may bring a civil action to enforce any such 

section.” 49 U.S.C. § 14707(a). 

Plaintiffs are correct that, under § 14707(a), they would not be required to show 

 

1

 For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes without deciding that Uber is subject to the 

FMCA‟s jurisdiction, although that point is disputed by Uber. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 13501-13508.

Case 3:18-cv-02166-EMC Document 29 Filed 04/26/18 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

“irreparable harm” at the end of the case to secure an order requiring Defendant‟s compliance with 

the FMCA‟s various registration provisions (provided that Plaintiffs satisfy all other requirements 

to obtain such relief2). However, at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining 

order/preliminary injunction. Both forms of interim relief require a showing of “irreparable 

injury” or “irreparable harm.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A) (a temporary restraining order 

requires the applicant “to clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition”); Winter v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary 

injunction must establish . . . that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief[.]” (emphasis added)). That is because “[t]he intended function of a preliminary 

injunction is to preserve the status quo pendent lite,” or, in other words, to protect a party to 

litigation from irreparable harm that may occur before the lawsuit takes its course and reaches a 

final adjudication. Mercury Motor Exp., Inc. v. Brinke, 475 F.2d 1086, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973) 

(where plaintiffs alleged defendant unlawfully operated as freight forwarder without permit, 

district court properly denied preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to show irreparable 

injury and defendant had “been continuously providing transportation services of the same 

nature . . . and would suffer irreparable injury if required to terminate such operations”). Thus, 

just like in every other case, Plaintiffs must demonstrate “irreparable harm” to obtain a 

preliminary injunction under the applicable cause of action, here FMCA § 14707(a). In Aspen 

Limousin Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Mauntain Exp., Inc., 891 F.Supp. 1450, 1455 (D. Colo. 1995) the 

district court rejected the argument that FMCA authorizes issuance of preliminary injunction 

“without proof of the normal criteria . . . under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.” 

Reconsideration is thus not warranted on this basis. 

Plaintiffs also argue that, in rejecting their “dilution of available fares” theory of 

 

2

 A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under the FMCA must still satisfy the requirements for 

Article III standing. See Rivas v. Rail Delivery Serv., Inc., 423 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(affirming dismissal of request for injunctive relief under FMCA because defendant‟s violation of 

a statute, which did not cause harm to plaintiff, was insufficient to confer Article III standing).

Case 3:18-cv-02166-EMC Document 29 Filed 04/26/18 Page 2 of 4
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United States District Court

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irreparable harm, the Court erroneously focused on their state law claims without addressing the 

FMCA claim. The Court held:

[E]ven if Plaintiffs‟ theory [of irreparable harm] is correct—that 

Uber is a TNC and TCP and thus must register and pay the requisite 

fees—it does not logically follow that an injunction shutting down 

Uber is the proper remedy. Uber could comply with the law simply 

by obtaining the requisite permits and paying the fees—precisely 

what the proposed CPUC decision recommends. That remedy 

would not address the „dilution‟ problem posited by Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs do not show that if Uber is required to register and pay 

fees, it will simply abandon the market or reduce the number of 

rides. In light of this missing link in the causal chain, Plaintiffs 

cannot show that an injunction would actually redress the harm.

Docket No. 23 at 5. Although the Court did not refer explicitly to Plaintiffs‟ FMCA claim, the 

same rationale applies to it. An injunction under § 14707(a) would permit the Court to “enforce” 

the registration requirements, e.g., require Uber to register. As with the state claim, Plaintiffs have 

not presented any evidence that Uber would abandon the market or reduce the number of rides 

arranged through its service if required to register under the FMCA or comply with its other 

provisions (e.g., liability insurance requirements). Nor have they presented evidence that Uber is 

incapable of obtaining such registration.3 Thus, even if a preliminary injunction is issued, 

Plaintiffs will continue to face competition from Uber. A preliminary injunction is unwarranted 

because it would not redress the alleged irreparable injury. This holding does not preclude 

Plaintiffs from obtaining an injunction requiring registration at the end of the case if they prevail

on the merits.

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs‟ request for reconsideration. The Court 

urges Plaintiffs to consult the Northern District of California‟s Legal Help Center, which provides 

 

3

 Plaintiffs state that their complaint was modeled on LaHood v. Tierra Santa, Inc. et al., Case 

No. 2:10-cv-01659-SJO-JAW (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 8, 2010). In that case, the government sought 

an injunction requiring the defendants to cease and desist from providing interstate transportation 

services because they had not obtained the requisite registration. A critical distinction between 

LaHood and this case, however, is that the defendants had in fact applied for operating authority, 

but the application was dismissed by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration “because 

Defendants failed to provide information and documentation demonstrating they satisfied the 

requirements for registration and were able and willing to comply with applicable Federal statutes 

and regulations. Despite FMCSA‟s dismissal, Defendants nevertheless continue to conduct 

interstate and foreign motor carrier transportation operations without federal operating authority.” 

Id., Docket No. 1 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs have not alleged that Uber applied for and was denied operating 

authority, yet continues to operate anyway. 

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free information and limited assistance to pro se litigants. Plaintiffs may schedule an appointment 

in the San Francisco courthouse at 415-782-8982 or the Oakland courthouse at 415-782-8982 or 

may obtain more information at the Court‟s website: https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/legal-help. 

Plaintiffs may also wish to review the Court‟s pro se handbook, Representing Yourself in Federal 

Court: A Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which explains the litigation process. See 

https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbook. 

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 24 and 25.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2018

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-02166-EMC Document 29 Filed 04/26/18 Page 4 of 4