Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01114/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01114-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAUREEN POLSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

U•:lllcd Sr.1r.e-:; (ou.i:i: of App~i.ib 

T('nd: Ci!'~:_.•.i~ 

~EB G 1QQO 

ROBERT L. HOECY..ER 

Clerk 

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No. 87-1114 

JERRY DAVIS, in his individual 

and official capacity as an 

employee of the City of Kansas 

City, Kansas, and THE CITY OF 

KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 84-2211-0) 

James L. Crabtree, Overland Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Daniel B. Denk (Douglas M. Greenwald with him on the brief) of 

McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, Kansas City, Kansas, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 1 
In this appeal we must decide whether Kansas courts would 

recognize certain causes of action plaintiff Maureen Polson 

asserts in connection with her discharge from employment, whether 

the district court erred in jury instructions, whether Title VII 

claims can be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and whether 

certain alleged misconduct at trial prejudiced plaintiff's§ 1983 

case which plaintiff lost before the jury. The facts of this case 

are set out in detail in the district court's pretrial opinion, 

reported as Polson v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Kan. 1986), and 

in the district court's memorandum and order. II R. tab 119. We 

will recount only the most pertinent facts. 

Plaintiff was hired as an "Employment Supervisor" by 

defendant Kansas City, Kansas. Her employment was confirmed in a 

letter from her immediate supervisor, defendant Jerry Davis. The 

district court concluded, and plaintiff does not challenge here, 

that the circumstances of her hiring reflected employment "at 

will." Id. at 1140-41, 1149. 

Plaintiff's duties included reviewing employment applications 

and making recommendations to various city departments regarding 

which applicants were most suitable for their hiring needs.· 

Throughout the term of her employment, plaintiff's relationship 

with defendant Davis gradually deteriorated. It is plaintiff's 

contention that this deterioration was caused by her continuing 

objections to the defendants' hiring policies, which she viewed as 

discriminatory. It is defendants' contention that plaintiff was 

abrasive and insubordinate, which quickly soured her relationship 

with her supervisor. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 2 
Defendants terminated plaintiff's employment, effective 

June 20, 1983. Davis had notified her, a month prior to that, 

that she was being terminated for "unprofessional conduct." Since 

her termination, this information has been made public by 

defendant Davis, and by plaintiff herself in that she has informed 

potential employers of the reason cited for her termination. In 

addition, plaintiff authorized review of her personnel notebook by 

the press. 

I 

Defamation 

Polson claims that the defendants, in particular defendant 

Davis, defamed her in publishing the reasons for her termination, 

and that the trial court erred in its jury instruction on this 

issue. 1 Specifically, plaintiff argues that the trial court 

should have instructed the jury oh the theory of defamation per 

se, which does not require proof of actual damages. 

It is true that Kansas once followed the common law in 

dividing defamation into two types: defamation per se and 

defamation per quod. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 649 P.2d 

1239, 1242 (Kan. 1982). Defamation per se, which included, inter 

alia, statements that impugned the defamee's competence in her 

trade or profession, did not require proof of actual damages for a 

1 Neither party has alleged error in the district court's 

determination that both defendant Davis' discussion of the 

plaintiff's firing with other city employees, and plaintiff's own 

disclosure of the purported reasons for her. firing to other 

prospective employers who inquired, constitute "publication'' by 

the defendants for the purposes of defamation liability. See 

Polson, 635 F. Supp. at 1130. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 3 
finding of liability. Instead, damage was presumed from the 

nature of the statement. Polson, 635 F. Supp. at 1147. On the 

other hand, defamation per quod required proof of actual damages 

for a finding of liability. The parties do not dispute, as a 

matter of law, that the statements at issue here fall into the 

traditional defamation per se category. So the issue that remains 

is whether Kansas still recognizes defamation per seas a separate 

type of defamation. 

Plaintiff has failed to persuade us that the district court 

erred in its interpretation of Kansas law. In Gobin, the Kansas 

Supreme Court abolished the distinction between defamation per se 

and defamation per quod. Citing Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 

U.S. 323 (1974), the court stated, "Damages recoverable for 

defamation may no longer be presumed; they must be established by 

proof, no matter what the character of the libel." Gobin, 649 

P.2d at 1242. 

As the plaintiff correctly notes, the United States Supreme 

Court restricted the rule of Gertz after Gobin was decided. In 

Gertz, the Court held that, absent proof of malice, a defamation 

defendant cannot be held liable for presumed damages. 418 U.S. at 

349. Later, however, the Court restricted the scope of Gertz to 

actions against media defendants and actions involving public 

issues. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 

U.S. 749 (1985). In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court read Gertz's 

requirement of actual damages narrowly and attributed the holding 

to the fact that the Court was forced to balance the defendant's 

First Amendment freedoms and the benefits of discussion of public 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 4 
issues against a state's right to regulate tort law. When the 

issues involved are not matters of public concern or the defendant 

is not a member of the media, the Court saw no constitutional 

reason to restrict plaintiff's recovery under state defamation 

law. Id. at 757-61. 

Plaintiff argues that because Dun & Bradstreet has revealed 

Gobin to be a needlessly overbroad reading of Gertz, this court 

should ."correct" the law in Kansas to reflect the Supreme Court's 

later decision. We disagree. The Supreme Court's decision in Dun 

& Bradstreet is purely permissive--it holds only that it is not 

unconstitutional to use presumed damages against nonmedia 

defendants or in cases that do not involve issues of public 

concern. The decision does not require the presumption of damages 

in all such cases as a constitutional matter. And the Kansas 

Supreme Court, although recognizing the opportunity in Turner v. 

Halliburton, 722 P.2d 1106 (Kan. 1986), has declined to reexamine 

the scope of its Gobin holding. Id. at 1115. Consequently, we 

reject plaintiff's contention that the jury instructions on the 

defamation claim were in error. 

II 

Retaliatory Discharge 

Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment to defendants on her state·law retaliatory 

discharge claim~ The court based its ruling on the Kansas 

employment-at-will doctrine, which it read to preclude tort 

damages for retaliatory discharge. Polson, 635 F. Supp. at 1149-

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 5 
50. Plaintiff argues that Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186 

(Kan. App. 1981), created a public policy exception to the general 

rule that all employees are employed at will and may be discharged 

for no reason or for any reason whatsoever; and that this public 

policy exception is properly invoked in the instant case. We 

disagree, and hold that plaintiff's remedies under Kansas 

statutory law preclude recovery under the tort of wrongful 

discharge. 

Murphy involved an employee who was fired because of his 

filing of a worker's compensation claim. The Kansas Court of 

Appeals held that to allow a worker· to be fired for filing a claim 

would undermine the purpose of the program, which was to 

compensate workers in the most expeditious and efficient manner 

possible. Id. at 192. Therefore, the court recognized a limited 

exception to the employment-at-will rule in the interest of 

validating the public policy embodied in the worker's compensation 

statutes. The public policy exception has been read by Kansas 

courts to cover retaliation for opposing illegal conduct of an 

employer, for exercising rights under labor-management relations 

statutes, for refusing to submit to polygraph examination, and for 

serving on a jury. See Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 

645, 648 (Kan. 1988). 

The federal district courts sitting in Kansas are split on 

whether the public policy exception should be extended to cover 

conduct like that at issue here, which allegedly transgresses the 

Kansas Acts Against Discrimination, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1001, et 

~- (RAAD). In Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 6 
F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984), Judge Theis concluded that the public 

policy exception should apply in cases in which a worker's 

termination is alleged to stem from conduct proscribed by KAAD. 

But Judges O'Connor and Rogers have held that the availability of 

remedies under the KAAD precludes expanding the remedies available 

at common law. Polson, 635 F. Supp. at 1149-50; Robinson v. Colt 

Indus. Operating Corp., No. 84-2471, slip op. at 7-8 (D. Kan. 

March 5, 1986) (opinions of Judge O'Connor); Tarr v. Riberglass, 

Inc., No. 83-4234, slip op. at 4-6 (D. Kan. February 3, 1984) 

(opinion of Judge Rogers). 2 

The issue is further clouded- by recent Kansas Supreme Court 

cases regarding the scope of the public policy exception. 

Reversing the earlier case of Cox v. United Technologies, 727 P.2d 

456 (Kan. 1986), the· court held that workers covered by collective 

bargaining agreements could bring tort actions against their 

employers for wrongful or retaliatory discharge if the 

circumstances of their discharge violated a public policy of the 

state. Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645, 651 (Kan. 

1988); see also Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988) 

(recognizing protection of "whistleblowers" under public policy 

exception). In deciding Coleman, the court focused on the 

inadequacy of arbitration to compensate employees for torts 

committed by employers. The Coleman holding, however, does not 

2 There appears to be no dispute, and we accept, that discharges 

-in violation of KAAD are contrary to the public policy of the 

state. KAAD recites in its purpose section that it .is "the policy 

of the state of Kansas to eliminate and prevent discrimination in 

all employment relations .... " Kan. Stat; Ann. § 44-1001. The 

dispute therefore centers around whether the remedies available 

under KAAD are exclusive. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 7 
extend as far as Judge Theis' holding that the fact the various 

remedies might differ is sufficient to require recognition of a 

state common law remedy~ Instead it appears that we must 

investigate the adequacy of the alternative remedy before 

classifying a situation as being under the public policy exception 

to the employment-at-will doctrine. 

Faced with the need to decide, we believe, as did the 

district court, that the Kansas Supreme Court.would adopt the view 

that KAAD provides an adequate and exclusive state remedy for 

violations of the public policy enunciated therein. Polson, 635 

F. Supp. at 1150. There is no evidence that the remedies provided 

for in KAAD are constitutionally inadequate to compensate 

plaintiff, or so inadequate to enforce the stated public policy as 

to require bolstering by a common law cause of action. Thus, we 

hold the district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

on the retaliatory discharge claim. 

III 

Negligent Supervision 

Plaintiff alleges, as a common law tort, that defendant City 

was negligent in supervising her immediate superior, defendant 

Davis, thereby allowing him to violate her civil rights. The 

district court granted summary judgment to defendants on this 

claim based on its conclusion that this cause of action does not 

exist in Kansas. Polson, 635 F. Supp. at 1151. Plaintiff has 

cited no cases, in Kansas or elsewhere, recognizing such a cause 

of action. She merely argues on logic that because the city has a 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 8 
duty not to discriminate,. it also has a duty to properly supervise 

its agents. 

We note that the Nebraska Supreme Court,· when faced with the 

choice, declined to recognize negligent supervision as a common 

law tort. See Alford v. Life Savers, Inc., 210 Neb. 441, 315 

N.W.2d 260 (1982). We also observe that this cause of action, 

once recognized, would necessarily arise any time a middle level 

supervisor engaged in discriminatory conduct. We think it 

unlikely that the Kansas courts would adopt a liability rule with 

such broad implications. 

This inventive cause of action appears to be nothing more 

than an attempt to circumvent the strictures of the employment-atwill doctrine by implying a duty that exposes higher level 

supervisors to liability for actions for which her immediate 

supervisors are not liable. We affirm the district court's entry 

of summary judgment on this issue. 

IV 

Title VII Violations as§ 1983 Claims 

Plaintiff has asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging that her termination violated her rights under the First 

Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2 et ~-

Plaintiff's First Amendment claim was submitted to the jury, which 

returned a verdict for defendants. She does not apreal this 

decision. Her Title VII-based claim was rejected by the district 

court on the ground that the enforcement provisions expressly 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 9 
created in Title VII provide the exclusive remedy for employment 

discrimination suits premised solely on its violation. We agree. 

The precisely drawn, detailed enforcement structure of the later 

statute must be deemed to preempt the earlier general remedial 

statute. See Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 

1203-04 {6th Cir. 1984); cf. Brown v. General Services 

Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 835 {1976) {dismissing 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981 claim because Title VII ''provides the exclusi~e judicial 

remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment"); 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489, 500 {1973) {federal 

prisoners may not bring § 1983 action to challenge length of 

imprisonment due to availability of specific writ of habeas corpus 

remedies). 

We also agree with the court below, however, that "a 

plaintiff may base a section 1983 claim on actions proscribed by 

Title VII where those actions also violate the United States 

Constitution." Polson, 635 F. Supp. at 1140. See,~' Grano v. 

Department of Dev., 637 F.2d 1073 {6th Cir. 1980) {employee 

allowed to sue employer under both Title VII and§ 1983 when same 

·employer conduct allegedly violated both Title VII and Fourteenth 

Amendment). Under ordinary circumstances this would require us to 

consider whether plaintiff has alleged a cognizable claim premised 

on the Equal Protection Clause. In this case, however, we see no 

need to do so. It is clear that the facts necessary to prove a 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause arising out of 

plaintiff's termination, if in fact that clause comprehends such a 

claim, are identical to the facts considered by the jury in 

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( 

deciding· the plaintiff's First Amendment claim. Both claims 

ultimately turn on an issue of fact--whether Polson was terminated 

because she objected to discriminatory policies of defendants. 

The jury determined that she was not, and its conclusion 

necessarily resolves both claims. We therefore affirm the 

district court's directed verdict on this issue. 

V 

Defense Misconduct 

Plaintiff alleges that two incidents of improper testimony 

inflamed the jury, depriving her of a fair trial, and that the 

district court erred in refusing to grant her a new trial. We 

view the district court's actions as proper in all respects and 

reject plaintiff's argument. 

The decision whether misconduct in a trial has been so 

egregious as to require retrial is largely left to the discretion 

of the trial court. Our review on appeal is constrained by our 

ability to review only the written record and, thus, we give great 

deference to the district judge who observed the trial. We will 

reverse only for a clear abuse of discretion. Rodgers v. Hyatt, 

697 F.2d 899, 901-902 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Plaintiff complains of two separate instances of improper 

testimony. In the first, defendant Davis testified that plaintiff 

allegedly stated to another individual, "I fornicate a lot." In 

the second instance, testimony was elicited regarding plaintiff's 

cohabitation with a local attorney. In both cases the district 

judge sustained objections to the remarks, and gave curative 

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Appellate Case: 87-1114 Document: 010110155317 Date Filed: 02/06/1990 Page: 11 
instructions to the jury. In addition, in the first instance the 

judge reprimanded the witness and defense counsel in front of the 

jury and offered a mistrial to the plaintiff, who rejected it, 

apparently for economic reasons. 

We agree with the trial court that the statements made, given 

the curative instructions, did not deny substantial justice to the 

plaintiff sufficient to justify a new trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; 

Beacham v. Lee-Norris, 714 F.2d 1010;· 1014 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Also, the plaintiff is barred by her earlier refusal of a mistrial 

from seeking a new trial on the basis of the "fornication" 

statement. See American Universal Ins. Co. v. Falzone, 644 F.2d 

65, 67 (1st Cir. 1981) (appellant may not object to improper 

argument following adverse decision where he voluntarily withdr~w 

motion for mistrial); Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 

740 F.2d 59, 69 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[A] party may not wait and see 

whether the verdict ~s favorable before deciding to object."). 

AFFIRMED. 

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