Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00583/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00583-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Roy Bernard Engebretson, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Attorney General of the State of Arizona, et

al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 11-583-TUC-JGZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Roy Bernard Engebretson’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background of 

Engebretson’s convictions as follows:1

The evidence established that an undercover officer was introduced to 

James Moore, a known drug dealer, by another officer. The officer told 

Moore she wanted to buy methamphetamine, which Moore arranged, 

introducing the officer to Engebretson. Engebretson weighed the 

drugs, placed half an ounce into a bag, and gave it to the undercover 

officer. The officer gave Moore a portion of the drugs—“a useable 

pinch”—as payment for arranging the transaction. Engebretson was 

apparently arrested about two months later on other charges and 

subsequently charged with the instant offenses. The officer identified 

Engebretson at trial as the person who had sold her the 

methamphetamine. 

 

Ex. A, p. 2.2

 Engebretson was charged with possession of a dangerous drug for sale 

and possession of drug paraphernalia and, after a jury trial at which Engebretson 

attended only portions, the jury convicted Engebretson on both charges. Ex. A, pp. 

1-2. After his conviction, the trial court issued a warrant for Engebretson’s arrest. 

After his subsequent arrest, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent mitigated 

prison terms of 14 years for possession of a dangerous drug for sale, and three years 

 

1

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002). 

2

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 14). 

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for possession of drug paraphernalia. Ex. A, p. 2. Both sentences were enhanced by 

his prior felony convictions. Id. 

 After Engebretson’s appointed appellate counsel could find no issues for 

appeal and filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), Engebretson filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the following claims: 

1. The undercover officer’s actions in investigating the case were 

unethical and illegal and tainted the investigation and, as such, the 

evidence she obtained should not have been admitted at trial. 

2. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 

searches and seizures was violated by the introduction of Engebretson’s 

photograph for identification purposes at trial. 

3. The methamphetamine admitted at trial may have been tampered 

with, contaminated or exchanged while it was being held as evidence. 

4. The trial court erred in denying Engebretson’s motion for a 

judgment of acquittal because the State failed to meet its burden of 

proof by failing to present enough evidence to support a guilty verdict. 

 

Ex. B, p. i. On August 12, 2008, the Court of Appeals denied Engebretson’s appeal 

on the merits without requiring a response from the State. Ex. A. Engebretson did 

not seek review of the decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ex. C. 

 On September 4, 2008, Engebretson initiated state post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) proceedings by filing a notice. Ex. D. In his subsequently filed PCR 

petition, Engebretson argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) 

investigate alleged ethical and legal improprieties on the part of the investigating 

officer; (2) communicate the State’s plea offer to him; (3) provide notice of the 

commencement date of trial; and (4) object to the admission of the methamphetamine 

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at trial. Exs. E, G. The trial court denied each of Engebretson’s claims, finding 

claims (1) and (4) precluded because they had been previously raised and denied on 

direct appeal, and denying claims (2) and (3) on the merits. Ex. L. 

 Engebretson filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in explaining the statutes governing his 

case, and for failing to fully inform him about the plea agreement and the 

implications of rejecting it. Ex. I. On September 16, 2010, the court granted review, 

but denied relief. Ex. J. The Court of Appeals found that Engebretson had not raised 

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations in his original 

PCR petition filed in the trial court and had only raised it before the trial court in his 

reply. Ex. J, pp. 2-3. The court nevertheless found the claim meritless. Id., p. 2. 

The court then found that Engebretson’s claims of ineffectiveness related to police 

misconduct and admission of drug evidence were improperly found to be precluded, 

but nevertheless denied the claims on the merits. Id., pp. 3-4. 

 Engebretson sought review of the Court of Appeals’ order by the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Ex. K. By letter dated March 31, 2011, the petition was denied. Ex. 

L. 

 In the petition now before the Court, Engebretson raises three claims. In 

Ground One, he claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to promptly 

communicate and explain the plea agreement. In Ground Two, he alleges that his 

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and file appropriate pre-trial motions 

and by allowing Engebretson to be tried in absentia. In Ground Three, he alleges 

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that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of 

methamphetamine evidence at trial. Petition, pp. 6-8H. 

II. TIMELINESS 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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 The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Engebretson’s direct appeal on August 

12, 2008. Ex. A. Engebretson did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court 

and his conviction therefore became final 30 days later, on September 11, 2008. See 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (“with respect to a state prisoner who 

does not seek review in a State's highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ under § 

2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review expires”). Therefore, absent 

any tolling, the one-year limitations period would have commenced the following 

day, September 12, 2008. 

 However, the limitations period was statutorily tolled when Engebretson 

timely initiated PCR proceedings on September 4, 2008 with the filing of his PCR 

notice. Ex. A; See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). Engebretson’s 

properly filed PCR petition remained pending until March 31, 2011, when the 

Arizona Supreme Court denied relief. See Lawrence v. Florida ̧ 549 U.S. 327, 332 

(2007). Because Engebretson filed the instant petition on September 15, 2011, well 

within a year of that date, it is timely. 

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 Respondents argue that Grounds One and Two are procedurally defaulted and 

not subject to habeas review. Additionally, Respondents contend that the state court 

did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting the Ground 

Three. As discussed below, the Court agrees that a portion of Ground Two was 

procedurally defaulted, but disagrees with the Respondents and the Arizona Court of 

Appeals that Engebretson’s Ground One claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

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during pre-trial plea bargaining, and the portion of Ground Two that raises the same 

claim, is procedurally defaulted. However, none of the claims merit relief. 

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

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claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

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Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Cirm.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

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efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

 1. Ground One

 In Ground One, Engebretson claims that his trial counsel was ineffective 

because he did not adequately explain the plea agreement offered by the State. 

Addressing the claim on appeal from the trial court’s denial of his PCR petition, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals stated that: 

Although the [trial] court acknowledged that Engebretson had raised 

this claim, his petition apparently referred to counsel’s performance in 

connection with the plea only in the statement of facts, not in the 

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portion of the petition in which he identified and argued the claim he 

was actually raising. He did raise and develop this claim in his reply 

[filed in the trial court], but an issue raised for the first time in a Rule 

32 reply is not properly raised. 

Ex. J, p. 3. This is the last reasoned decision on the claim, and the procedural bar 

cited by the Arizona Court of Appeals has been determined to be adequate, 

independent and consistently applied. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860. Despite the fact that 

the claim the Court of Appeals proceeded to address the claim on the merits, it is 

nevertheless procedurally defaulted. 

 Despite his failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 32 

Engebretson can overcome the procedural default and the claim will be addressed if 

he can demonstrate both cause for his procedural default and the resulting prejudice. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 

1025 (9th Cir. 2008). Addressing cause, Engebretson contends it is established “by 

demonstrating counsel for the defense had a plea agreement, which he never was 

presented with, never read, or had the terms read to him . . . .” Reply, pp. 4-5. This 

reiteration of the claim is not the sort of external impediment sufficient to support a 

finding of cause for his failure to properly raise this claim in State court. See Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (requiring “some objective factor external to the 

defense” to support a finding of cause). 

 Although it makes no difference that the Court of Appeals proceeded to 

address the claim on the merits, Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989), even 

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assuming that this claim was not procedurally defaulted, federal habeas relief would 

not be warranted because, as discussed below, the claim fails on the merits. 

 2. Ground Two 

 Although Engebretson struggles mightily to distinguish Ground Two from 

Ground One, noting that Ground Two alleges that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to “properly advise him about state law during plea negotiations,” Reply, p. 9, 

much of Ground Two clearly overlaps with Ground One. To the extent that Ground 

Two raises additional allegations supporting Engebretson’s claim that his counsel 

was ineffective in assisting him to accept or reject the State’s plea offer, Ground Two 

is procedurally defaulted for the same reasons as Ground One. Nevertheless, the 

allegations of ineffectiveness during plea negotiations in Ground Two will be 

considered along with claims of ineffectiveness during plea negotiations Engebretson 

alleged in Ground One. That claim is addressed on the merits below. 

 However, Respondents contend that the remaining allegations of ineffective 

assistance alleged in Ground Two were not even arguably exhausted in the State 

courts. Those remaining allegations do not necessarily relate to Engebretson’s claim 

that his counsel was ineffective at the plea stage, and are comprised of allegations 

that his counsel failed to provide an office address, failed to investigate and file 

pretrial motions, chose to allow Engebretson to be tried in absentia, and refused to 

withdraw as counsel. 

 Respondents are clearly correct as to Engebretson’s claims that his counsel 

failed to provide an office address, improperly allowed him to be tried in absentia, 

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and refused to withdraw as counsel. None of these claims were identified in 

Engebretson’s list of arguments presented in his petition for review of the trial 

court’s denial of his PCR petition. See Ex. I, pp. IV-V. However, Engebretson did 

raise a claim that his counsel failed to investigate and pursue pretrial motions 

alleging his misidentification. Ex. I, p. V. However, that is different from the claim 

he raises here. In the instant petition, Engebretson claims that “it was unreasonable 

[of counsel] to fail to investigate or file any pretrial motions or to assume client had 

absconded . . . .” Petition, p. 7A. Because the claim presented in the instant petition 

does not allege the same deficiencies as the claim alleged in the PCR petition 

submitted to the Arizona Court of Appeals, it is unexhausted. See Hemmerle v. 

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are highly fact-specific). 

 Respondents contend that Engebretson is procedurally barred from now 

raising the latter portion of Ground Two in State court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 32] based upon 

any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding.”); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, the 

merits of the claim need not be addressed unless Engebretson establishes cause and 

prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred. 

 Engebretson attempts to avoid the preclusive effect of Rule 32 by citing 

Stewart v. Smith, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that his State 

procedural default was not independent of federal law and therefore it is not 

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preclusive. There are at least two problems with Engebretson’s argument. The first 

is that, unlike the case in Stewart, the State court did not make a procedural default 

ruling on these ineffective assistance claims because they were never raised in the 

Court of Appeals. More important, however, is that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Stewart was subsequently reversed by Supreme Court in Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856 (2002). In reversing, the Supreme Court found that Rule 32.2(a)(3), so long as 

its preclusive effect did not rest on a ruling on the merits, constituted a procedural bar 

independent of federal law. Id. at 860. Thus, Engebretson’s argument to the contrary 

does not support a finding of cause for his default of this portion of Ground Two. 

 B. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

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court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Grounds One and Two 

Ground One, and the portion of Ground Two that overlaps it, is based on 

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea stage of Engebretson’s 

State proceedings. Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

that extends to the plea-bargaining process. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) 

(citations omitted). “During plea negotiations defendants are entitled to the effective 

assistance of competent counsel.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The familiar Strickland test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under Strickland, Engebretson must show both 

deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation 

was ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Deficient performance is established by 

a petitioner’s showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). In the 

context of rejecting a plea offer, the question is “not whether ‘counsel’s advice [was] 

right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within the range of competence 

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demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 

“Counsel cannot be required to accurately predict what the jury or court might find, 

but he can be required to give the defendant the tools he needs to make an intelligent 

decision.” Id. at 881. 

 To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694). “In the context of pleas, a defendant must show the outcome of the plea 

process would have been different with competent advice.” Id. When applying these 

standards to a claim that ineffective assistance led to the improvident rejection of a 

guilty plea, the petitioner must show “that but for the ineffective advice of counsel 

there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the 

court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution 

would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court 

would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the 

offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that 

in fact were imposed.” Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1386. 

 Federal habeas rules also instruct that, if the state court has already rejected a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal habeas court may grant relief 

only if it finds the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standards. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 

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(2003). The review of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential” and must 

adopt counsel’s perspective at the time of the challenged decision or conduct, in 

order to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There 

is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable assistance, id., and the Supreme Court had described federal review of a 

state court’s decision on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as “doubly 

deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112-113 (2009)). 

 In his plea agreement related ineffective assistance claims, Engebretson 

alleges that his lawyer prevented him from making a reasonably informed decision to 

accept or reject the plea by failing to fully explain the plea to Engebretson, failing to 

advise him properly, failing to provide him a copy of the agreement, and by failing to 

inform him that the Arizona drug statutes did not apply to police officers acting in the 

line of duty. 

 Addressing this claim in Engebretson’s Rule 32 proceedings, the trial court 

rejected the claim, stating that “[t]he court finds from the record at the pre-trial 

conference of February 20, 2007, that the defendant was aware of the State’s plea 

offer and knowingly rejected it.” Ex. H. In turn, the Minute Entry cited by the trial 

court, in pertinent part, reflects that: 

 [Engebretson’s counsel] advises the court that the defendant is 

rejecting the plea offer. 

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 The Court questions the defendant regarding her understanding 

of the terms and conditions of the offer and the possible consequences 

should the defendant be convicted on all charges. 

 THE COURT FINDS that the defendant has been adequately 

advised of the plea offer and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 

rejects the plea offer. 

 

Ex. F, Attach. B. 

 Finally, after finding the claim procedurally defaulted, the Court of Appeals 

nevertheless addressed the merits of the claim. The court reviewed the trial court’s 

decision and quoted the findings contained in the February 20, 2007, Minute Entry. 

Based on the content of the Minute Entry, the Court of Appeals stated that, 

“Engebretson has not persuaded us he raised a colorable claim for relief on this 

ground,” and concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in rejecting 

the claim. Ex. J, p. 3. 

 The state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or constitutes an 

unreasonable application of, the Strickland standards. Based on the Minute Order, it 

was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeals to conclude that counsel explained the 

plea offer to Engebretson, that the trial court questioned Engebretson and believed 

that he understood the agreement, and that Engebretson’s rejection of the agreement 

was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. This conclusion is further supported by 

statements in Engebretson’s previous pleadings. In his PCR petition, Engebretson 

acknowledges that his trial counsel told him that the offer was “for a reduction to a 

Class Three felony alleging one prior conviction with a presumptive term of 6.5 

years.” Ex. E, p. 3. That statement belies Engebretson’s claim that he was unaware 

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of the plea and its terms. In fact, other than Engebretson’s present contentions to the 

contrary, there is nothing in the record that evidences a failure on his counsel’s part 

to inform him of the existence and nature of the plea agreement. On this record, the 

trial court’s denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

 2. Ground Three

 Engebretson’s final claim is that his counsel was ineffective by failing to 

object to methamphetamine evidence offered at trial. Engebretson first raised the 

circumstances associated with this claim on direct appeal. There, he alleged that the 

methamphetamine evidence used against him showed signs of tampering. He then 

raised the claim in his PCR proceedings and, after it was found to be barred by the 

trial court, it was resurrected by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 

determined that the trial court erred in finding that because the claim had previously 

been addressed on direct appeal it was precluded from PCR review. The Court of 

Appeals explained that “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is independent 

from the claim upon which it is based.” Ex. J, p. 4. However, the Court of Appeals 

proceeded to conclude that even if Engebretson could establish his trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient, he could not show prejudice because “as we found on 

appeal, these issues were without merit; therefore, the related claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel necessarily fail.” Id. 

 In rejecting the claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeals explained: 

 We also reject Engebretson’s contention that the 

methamphetamine he sold to the undercover officer was erroneously 

admitted into evidence because it had been tampered with before it was 

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tested and may have been contaminated or exchanged while it was held 

in evidence. When the drugs were admitted into evidence as exhibit 

four, defense counsel stated he had no objection. And Engebretson has 

not established any error occurred as a result of the admission on the 

drugs, much less error that can be characterized as fundamental. See 

[State v.] Henderson, 210 Ariz. [561], ¶ 19, 115 P.3d [601] at 

607[(2005)]. The officer identified the methamphetamine as the 

substance she had obtained on the date of the drug transaction, 

establishing a sufficient chain of custody to warrant its admission. 

Ex. A, p. 5. As the Court of Appeals concluded, the undercover officer identified the 

methamphetamine at trial. However, as Engebretson emphasizes, she testified that it 

was in a different bag. Ex. M, p. 94. But any concern about the discrepancy was 

resolved by the officer’s testimony that the original bag in which she had placed the 

methamphetamine was also in the envelope. Id. The officer then explained that the 

new bag “was probably from the Tucson Police Department Crime Laboratory when 

they probably tested it the put it into another bag and they put the actual baggie in a 

separate a [sic] bag.” Id. 

 Contrary to the Respondents’ contentions, see Answer, p. 17, n. 2, the 

officer’s speculation about the addition of the new bag was not exactly confirmed by 

the testimony of the criminalist from the TPD Crime Laboratory, Pat Lippiello. 

Lippiello testified that when he received the evidence for testing, it did not appear to 

have been tampered with. Ex. M, p. 117. He then removed the sample from the 

packaging and tested it, confirming it was in fact 13.4 grams of methamphetamine. 

Id., pp. 117-119. However, when asked what he did with the sample after he 

completed testing it, Lippiello said that he “repackaged it in the packaging, and then I 

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returned it back to the evidence department . . . .” Id., p. 120. Thus, the criminalist 

made no mention of placing the evidence into a separate bag. 

 The question then, is whether it was reasonable for the Arizona Court of 

Appeals to conclude on direct appeal that the evidence was properly admitted and in 

the PCR decision that Engebretson’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object 

to its admission. Given the deferential standards of AEDPA and the “doubly 

deferential” standards for evaluating claims under Strickland, this Court finds that the 

State court’s decisions were not unreasonable. As the record reflects, and as the 

Court of Appeals noted, the investigating officer identified the methamphetamine as 

the evidence she had placed into evidence. Ex. M, p. 93. The record also reflects 

that she additionally identified the baggie in which the evidence was originally 

submitted. Id., p. 94. The criminalist testified that when he retrieved the evidence 

for testing, there was no evidence of tampering. Id., p. 117. Additionally, the sample 

was weighed 13.4 grams, just what would be expected based on the investigating 

officer’s testimony that she purchased one-half and ounce and gave a “useable pinch” 

to James Moore. Id., pp. 83-84. 

 To establish prejudice, Engebretson must show that his counsel’s deficient 

performance resulted in a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. While there was certainly room for further exploration 

of the chain of custody of the methamphetamine, the evidence contained in the trial 

record supports the Court of Appeals finding that Engebretson was not prejudiced by 

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the lack of further inquiry. The record strongly supports the conclusion that the 

methamphetamine admitted against Engebretson at trial was in fact the 

methamphetamine he sold to the undercover officer. Other than the fact that the 

evidence was removed from its original bag for testing, Engebretson points to no 

evidence that would undermine the conclusion that the evidence had not been 

subjected to tampering. As such, the Court of Appeals’ rejection of this claim was 

not unreasonable. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Engebretson’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 11-0583-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely 

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file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 29th day of August, 2013. 

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