Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01350/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01350-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES G. REECE, No. CIV S-09-1350-GEB-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

TOM L. CAREY, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 16). 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

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1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

Plaintiff’s original complaint was dismissed for violation of Rule 8’s requirement

that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim. Plaintiff’s original complaint

was approximately 113 pages and referred to over 200 pages of attached documents which

purportedly supported the factual allegations against the defendants. The court found that

pleading method was insufficient, and informed Plaintiff that the court was unwilling to comb

through such a complaint to guess at his claim. Although his complaint was dismissed, Plaintiff

was provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint, which he has done. However, his

amended complaint suffers from much of the same defects the court addressed in regards to his

original complaint, in that it consists of 321 pages, including his exhibits.

As Plaintiff was previously informed, all that is required in a Federal action is a

short and plain statement of his claim. At the pleading stage, Plaintiff is not required to submit

evidence to support his claim, and the court will not act as a depository for prematurely filed

evidence. The time to support his claim with evidence is at trial or in opposition to a dispositive

motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s amended complaint will be dismissed, and he will be provided

one last opportunity to file a second amended complaint which satisfies Rule 8’s requirements. 

If he is unable or unwilling to do so, his complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend.

The court also notes that Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from other defects as well,

some of which may be curable. In his complaint Plaintiff complains that he has been denied his

due process rights during prison disciplinary proceedings. He names as defendants several

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apparently supervisory defendants. In addition to his due process violations, he also appears to

be raising an issue with the inmate grievance system. These claims are insufficient as addressed

below.

Supervisory Personnel

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The

Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on

knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government

officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct

and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). When a

defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim against an individual in his

supervisory position, and not based on his own personal involvement in violating Plaintiff’s

rights, such a claim is insufficient and the supervisory defendants will be dismissed.

Grievance Process

Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative

grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling

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inmates to a specific grievance process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance

process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly

process grievances. Numerous district courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion. 

See Smith v. Calderon, 1999 WL 1051947 (N.D. Cal 1999) (finding that failure to properly

process grievances did not violate any constitutional right); Cage v. Cambra, 1996 WL 506863

(N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that prison officials’ failure to properly process and address

grievances does not support constitutional claim); James v. U.S. Marshal’s Service, 1995 WL

29580 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing complaint without leave to amend because failure to process

a grievance did not implicate a protected liberty interest); Murray v. Marshall, 1994 WL 245967

(N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that prisoner’s claim that grievance process failed to function

properly failed to state a claim under § 1983). Prisoners do, however, retain a First Amendment

right to petition the government through the prison grievance process. See Bradley v. Hall, 64

F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, interference with the grievance process may, in

certain circumstances, implicate the First Amendment. 

To the extent Petitioner is attempting to state a stand alone claim regarding the

inmate grievance, such a claim is insufficient, and will be dismissed. 

Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to

state a claim of deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a liberty or

property interest for which the protection is sought. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672

(1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Due process protects against the

deprivation of property where there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property. See Bd.

of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577. Protected property interests are created, and their dimensions are

defined, by existing rules that stem from an independent source – such as state law – and which

secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits. See id.

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Liberty interests can arise both from the Constitution and from state law. See

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976);

Smith v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993). In determining whether the Constitution

itself protects a liberty interest, the court should consider whether the practice in question “. . . is

within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to

impose.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58; Smith, 994 F.2d at 1405. Applying this standard, the

Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution itself provides no liberty interest in goodtime credits, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; in remaining in the general population, see Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995); in not losing privileges, see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425

U.S. 308, 323 (1976); in staying at a particular institution, see Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225-27; or

in remaining in a prison in a particular state, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-47

(1983). 

In determining whether state law confers a liberty interest, the Supreme Court has

adopted an approach in which the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing on the

nature of the deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). In doing so, the

Court has held that state law creates a liberty interest deserving of protection only where the

deprivation in question: (1) restrains the inmate’s freedom in a manner not expected from the

sentence; and (2) “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 483-84. Prisoners in California have a liberty interest in

the procedures used in prison disciplinary hearings where a successful claim would not

necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 853, 859 (9th

Cir. 2003) (concluding that a due process challenge to a prison disciplinary hearing which did not

result in the loss of good-time credits was cognizable under § 1983); see also Wilkinson v.

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (concluding that claims which did not seek earlier or immediate

release from prison were cognizable under § 1983). 

/ / /

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Finally, with respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, due process requires

prison officials to provide the inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the

disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate,

and an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary

evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security;

and (3) legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff, 418

U.S. at 563-70. Due process is satisfied where these minimum requirements have been met, see

Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), and where there is “some evidence” in

the record as a whole which supports the decision of the hearing officer, see Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is

satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.” 

Id. at 455-56. However, a due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credits as a result

of an adverse prison disciplinary finding is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be raised by

way of habeas corpus. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997).

It appears Plaintiff’s main complaint is in relation to his prison disciplinary

proceedings. When drafting his second amended complaint, Plaintiff must be able to state how

his due process rights, as identified above, were violated, and by whom. 

Casual Link

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

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are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

Conclusion

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that if his second amended complaint violates Rule 8’s

brevity requirements, it will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b), and without

leave to amend. See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file a second amended complaint within the time

provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date

of service of this order.

DATED: April 26, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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