Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01855/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01855-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GONZALO M. TORRES,

Petitioner,

v.

B. CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS [DOC. NO. 9]

Petitioner Gonzalo M. Torres, a prisoner proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc.

no. 1] on September 13, 2006, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner claims he is entitled to habeas relief because (1) he

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) he was

convicted on insufficient evidence; (3) the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied his motion to substitute counsel; and (4)

he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Pet. 5-

7.) 

On January 12, 2007, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss

[doc. no. 9] with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a

Notice of Lodgment. Respondent alleges that the Petition must be

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 1 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations, and

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. (Resp’t’s Mem. 3-

9.) On March 5, 2007, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause for

Torres’s failure to file an opposition to the Motion [doc. no. 11]. 

Petitioner filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause [doc. no.

16] on May 21, 2007. Torres asserts that his Petition should not

be dismissed because he is entitled to statutory and equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations, and he can demonstrate cause

and prejudice to excuse any procedural default. (Pet’r’s Resp. 2-

8.)

This Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Motion 

and Memorandum in Support of the Motion, the lodgments, and

Petitioner’s Response to the Order to Show Cause. For 

the reasons expressed below, the Court recommends that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 17, 1998, Gavin Redar and a group of friends were at

a Jack in the Box restaurant in Carlsbad, California. (Lodgment

No. 15, People v. Torres, No. D034689, Appellant’s Opening Br. 3

(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2001).) They were approached by Torres and

another man outside the restaurant. (Id.) Petitioner and Redar

got into a fight, during which Torres stabbed Redar five times: 

three times in the abdomen, once in the neck, and once in the face. 

(Id. at 3-4.) Petitioner then ran from the scene. (Id. at 4;

Lodgment No. 1, People v. Torres, No. D034689, Order 1-2 (Cal. Ct.

App. Jan. 23, 2001).)

Torres was tried and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon

inflicting great bodily injury. (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Torres,

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 2 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

No. D034689, Order 1-2.) The court found that Petitioner had one

prior prison term, two prior serious felony convictions, and two

prior strike convictions. (Id. at 2.) He was sentenced to a term

of twenty-five years to life, with an additional three-year term

for the great bodily injury enhancement, one year for the prison

prior, and ten years for the serious felony priors. (Id.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Torres appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal, which affirmed the judgment on January 23, 2001. (See

Lodgment No. 15, People v. Torres, No. D034689, Appellant’s Opening

Br.; Lodgment No. 1, People v. Torres, No. D034689, Order 1.) 

Petitioner asserts that he filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, although the court’s records show that no

petition for review was filed. (See Pet. 3; Lodgment No. 2, Decl.

of Joseph Cornetta ¶¶ 2-3 (Jan. 8, 2007).) 

Torres filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego County Superior Court on July 24, 2002, claiming he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel; there was insufficient

evidence to convict him; and the trial court erred in denying his

motion to substitute counsel. (See Pet. 4; Resp’t’s Mem. 2 & n.2;

Lodgment No. 3, In re Torres, No. HCN 0663, Order to Show Cause 2

(Cal. Super. Ct. May 13, 2003).) The court issued an order to show

cause, after which a return to the petition and a traverse were

filed. (Lodgment No. 3, In re Torres, No. HCN 0663, Order to Show

Cause; Lodgment No. 4, In re Torres, No. HCN 0663, Return (Cal.

Super. Ct. May 13, 2003); Lodgment No. 5, In re Torres, No. HCN

0663, Traverse (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13, 2003).) Petitioner’s

petition was denied on May 13, 2003. (Lodgment No. 6, In re

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 3 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

Torres, No. HCN 0663, Order Denying Pet. 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13,

2003).) Torres filed a request for reconsideration, which was

denied on September 24, 2003. (Lodgment No. 7, In re Torres, No.

HCN 0663, Request for Reconsideration (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 24,

2003; Lodgment No. 8, In re Torres, No. HCN 0663, Order 4 (Cal.

Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2003).) 

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the California

Court of Appeal on September 28, 2004, raising the same three

claims that he presented to the superior court and also claiming

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 

(Lodgment No. 9, In re Torres, No. D045135, Pet. for Habeas Corpus

1, 3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2004).) The petition was denied on

October 29, 2004. (Lodgment No. 10, In re Torres, No. D045135,

Order 2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2004).) 

On January 18, 2005, Torres filed a habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 11, In re Torres, No.

S130855, Pet. for Habeas Corpus (Cal. Dec. 21, 2005).) Petitioner

filed a second petition in the California Supreme Court on February

14, 2005. (Lodgment No. 12, In re Torres, No. S131448, Pet. for

Habeas Corpus (Cal. Dec. 21, 2005).) Both petitions raised the

same claims that were raised in the appellate court. (See Lodgment

No. 11, In re Torres, No. S130855, Pet. for Habeas Corpus 3-4;

Lodgment No. 12, In re Torres, No. S131448, Pet. for Habeas Corpus

3-4.) The supreme court denied both petitions on December 21,

2005, with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780, 959

P.2d 311, 316, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 158 (1998). (Lodgment No. 13,

In re Torres, No. S131448, Order 1 (Cal. Dec. 21, 2005); Lodgment

No. 14, In re Torres, No. S130855, Order 1 (Cal. Dec. 21, 2005).)

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 4 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

Torres filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[doc. no. 1] in this Court on September 13, 2006. Respondent was

granted an enlargement of time to respond to the Petition [doc.

nos. 7, 8], and a Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 9] was filed on

January 12, 2007, with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a

Notice of Lodgment. Respondent claims the Petition should be

dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations and

because Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. (Resp’t’s

Mem. 3-9.) Torres was authorized to file an opposition to the

Motion by February 5, 2007. (Order Granting Enlargement 1 [doc.

no. 8].) The Court issued an Order to Show Cause [doc. no. 11] on

March 5, 2007, for Petitioner’s failure to file an opposition. 

Torres subsequently filed a Motion for Extension to Time to Respond

[doc. no. 12], which the Court granted [doc. no. 13]. Petitioner

filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause [doc. no. 16] on May

21, 2007. The Court construes Torres’s Response as an opposition

to the Motion to Dismiss. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Torres filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, it is

subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006). AEDPA sets forth

the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Hernandez v. Ylst, 930

F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991).

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 5 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006). Petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed

v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719;

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 6 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for

example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” 

Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.

1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 7 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

IV. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues the Petition should be dismissed as timebarred because it was filed over four and one-half years after the

expiration of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and Torres

is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. (Resp’t’s Mem.

3.) Also, Respondent contends that the Court is precluded from

reviewing the merits of Petitioner’s claims because they are 

procedurally barred. (Id. at 7.)

A. The Petition is Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Warden Curry asserts that Torres’s Petition is time-barred

under AEDPA’s one-year period of limitations. (Resp’t’s Mem. 3-6.) 

The relevant part of the statute states:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –-

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d) (West 2006).

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 8 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

Petitioner alleges that the running of the statute of

limitations should be calculated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(B) -- the date a state-created impediment was removed. 

(Pet’r’s Resp. 3.) Torres appears to allege that he had a conflict

of interest with his court-appointed attorney in state court, and

this conflict was a state-created impediment to the timely filing

of his Petition. (Id.) It is not clear whether Petitioner is

claiming it was his counsel on direct appeal, his counsel on habeas

review in the superior court, or both, whose conduct constitutes a

state-created impediment to filing a federal habeas petition, but

this argument is unavailing. (See Pet’r’s Resp. 2-3.) Torres’s

general allegations about his attorneys do not establish the “State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States” that is necessary under § 2244(d)(1)(B). See Lawrence v.

Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, __ U.S. __,

127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (stating that incompetent state-provided

counsel “is not the type of State impediment envisioned in §

2244(d)(1)(B)”). Accordingly, the running of the statute of

limitations for Petitioner’s federal Petition will be calculated

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A).

The court of appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on

January 23, 2001. (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Torres, No. D034689,

Order 1.) Torres did not seek further direct review of his

conviction in the state supreme court. (Lodgment No. 2, Decl. of

Joseph Cornetta ¶¶ 2-3.) Thus, the superior court’s judgment

became final on March 4, 2001, forty days after the court of

appeal’s decision. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th

Cir. 2002); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999)

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 9 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

(stating that a state judgment becomes final when the time for

seeking further direct review ends); Cal. Ct. R. 8.264 (stating

that an opinion of the court of appeal is final thirty days after

filing); Cal. Ct. R. 8.500(e) (stating that the period for filing a

petition for review of a court of appeal opinion is ten days). The

statute of limitations began to run the next day, March 5, 2001.

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)

to the calculation of the limitations period under AEDPA). Absent

statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) or equitable tolling, March 4,

2002, was the last day on which Petitioner could file a timely

federal habeas petition. Id. 

1. Statutory Tolling

Under AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during

periods when a petitioner has a properly filed application for

collateral review pending in state court. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) states: 

The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2) (West 2006). 

In addition, the interval between the disposition of one state

petition and the filing of another may be tolled under “interval

tolling.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). “[T]he

AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of the time during

which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state

court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 10 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d

1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-22. 

An application for state collateral review is pending “as long as

the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’–-

i.e., ‘until the completion of’ that process. In other words,

until the application has achieved final resolution through the

State’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains

‘pending.’” Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-20. 

A state habeas petition must be “properly filed” to toll the

statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “‘Properly filed’

means the petition’s ‘delivery and acceptance are in compliance

with the applicable laws and rules governing filings’ in that

state.” Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005),

amended, 439 F.3d. 993 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 132

(2006) (quoting Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)). A

petition that is dismissed by the state court as untimely is not

“properly filed” under AEDPA, so it will not toll the statute of

limitations. Id. at 1149; see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198

(2006).

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled from the time a

petitioner’s first state habeas petition is filed until state

collateral review is concluded, but it is not tolled before the

first state collateral challenge is filed. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. 

Torres’s conviction was final on March 4, 2001, but he did not file

a habeas petition in the state superior court until July 24, 2002. 

(Pet. 4; Resp’t’s Mem. 2.) The statute of limitations on his

federal habeas petition, however, had already expired on March 4,

2002. A subsequently filed petition for state collateral relief

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 11 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

cannot revive an expired statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice,

276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001,

1003 (9th Cir. 2000). Because the statute had already run by the

time Torres sought state collateral review, statutory tolling will

not save his Petition.

Even if Petitioner were entitled to tolling for the time

preceding the filing of his first state habeas petition, his

federal Petition is still untimely because he did not proceed

diligently through the state courts. Torres is only entitled to

interval tolling for a “reasonable” period of time between a lower

court’s denial and the filing of a petition in a higher state

court. Evans, 546 U.S. at 200. The statute of limitations was

tolled from July 24, 2002, when Torres filed a habeas petition in

the superior court, until September 24, 2003, when his request for

reconsideration of the court’s opinion was denied. See Carey, 536

U.S. at 219-22 (holding that the statute is tolled while a properly

filed state petition is pending). But after the court denied his

request for reconsideration, Petitioner waited twelve months before

filing a petition in the California Court of Appeal on September

28, 2004. 

Petitioner appears to argue that he acted reasonably and is

entitled to interval tolling for this period, because the attorney

that was appointed to represent him in the superior court habeas

proceedings did not file the subsequent petition in the court of

appeal in a timely manner. (Pet’r’s Resp. 4.) This argument is

without merit. After issuing an order to show cause, the superior

court appointed attorney Robert James to represent Petitioner in

filing a denial to the government’s return to his petition and in

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 12 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

any further proceedings in that case. (See Lodgment No. 5, In re

Torres, No. HCN 0663, Traverse Attach. 1-2 (Order Appointing

Counsel); Lodgment No. 8, In re Torres, No. HCN 0663, Order Denying

Request to Reconsider 2.) The court did not provide Torres with an

attorney to file subsequent habeas petitions. Petitioner’s

appointed counsel was not responsible for filing a petition in the

court of appeal. Torres is left with an unexplained delay of

twelve months before he filed his petition in the appellate court. 

This delay is unreasonable, and accordingly, the statute of

limitations will not be tolled. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 201

(finding an unexplained six-month delay to be unreasonable).

Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling

for the period after his court of appeal petition was denied on

October 29, 2004, until he filed his federal Petition on September

13, 2006. Although Torres filed two habeas petitions in the state

supreme court that were pending between January 18, 2005, and

December 21, 2005, this time is not tolled because the petitions

were not properly filed. Both of his petitions were denied by the

California Supreme Court as untimely. (See Lodgment No. 13, In re

Torres, No. S131448, Order 1; Lodgment No. 14, In re Torres, No.

S130855, Order 1); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir.

2007) (stating that a citation to page 780 of Robbins is a clear

indication the state court applied the timeliness rule to bar

review). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state

law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of §

2244(d)(2).” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005)

(quoting Carey, 536 U.S. at 226). Because Torres’s petitions to

the state supreme court were untimely, they were never “properly

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 13 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

filed” and will not toll the federal statute of limitations. Id.;

Thorson, 479 F.3d at 645. 

The statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas

petition expired before he sought state collateral review. 

Additionally, Torres did not proceed diligently through the state

courts. The unexplained delay of twelve months between the

superior court and appellate court levels of review is not tolled. 

Also, the time Petitioner’s supreme court petitions were pending is

not tolled; over twenty-one months elapsed between the denial of

his petition in the appellate court and his filing in this Court. 

Unless he is entitled to equitable tolling, Torres’s Petition will

be time-barred.

2. Equitable Tolling

In some cases, a Petitioner may be able to toll the

limitations period by demonstrating a basis for equitable tolling. 

To justify equitable tolling, Torres must establish extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control that made it impossible for him to

file his Petition on time. Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199,

1202 (9th Cir. 2003); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). The failure to file a timely petition must be the

result of external forces, not the result of the petitioner’s lack

of diligence. Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107. 

Petitioner has the burden of establishing the existence of

extraordinary circumstances that warrant equitable tolling. 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1218 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Equitable tolling is justified in few cases. “[T]he threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high,

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 14 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. at 1066 (quoting United

States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

“Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a ‘factspecific inquiry.’” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.

2001)). 

Torres contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling

because his appellate counsel abandoned him during the pendency of

his direct appeal. (Pet’r’s Resp. 2-4.) Petitioner alleges that

Mr. Hendricks, an attorney with Appellate Defenders, Inc. who was

appointed to represent Torres on his direct appeal, did not file a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court after Torres’s

appeal was denied by the California Court of Appeal. (Id. at 2;

see Lodgment No. 9, In re Torres, No. D045135, Pet. for Habeas

Corpus 5.) Hendricks did not contact Petitioner to inform him that

a petition for review would not be filed. (Pet’r’s Resp. 2.) 

Hendricks also allegedly failed to provide Torres with copies of

trial transcripts. (Id.; see also Pet’r’s Resp. Ex. 1 at 1 (Letter

from Leslie Ann Rose to Gonzalo Torres (June 11, 2001).) 

Petitioner tried to contact Hendricks but was unable to locate him. 

(Pet’r’s Resp. 2.) Torres subsequently filed a complaint against

Hendricks with the State Bar of California in April 2001. (Id.;

Pet’r’s Resp. Ex. 2 at 1, Ex. 3 at 1.)

An attorney’s mistake or ordinary negligence is not sufficient

to justify equitable tolling. See Lawrence v. Florida, __ U.S. __,

127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d at 1146.

But “where an attorney’s misconduct is sufficiently egregious, it

may constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting equitable

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 15 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d at 800 (citing Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1106 (9th Cir.

2003)). 

Petitioner’s appeal was denied by the appellate court on

January 23, 2001. (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Torres, No. D034689,

Order 1.) A petition for review of the court’s decision had to be

filed within ten days. Cal. Ct. R. 8.500(e). Torres’s appointed

attorney, Mr. Hendricks, did not file a petition for review on

Petitioner’s behalf and did not communicate this to Torres. (See

Pet’r’s Resp. 2.) Although this does provide an explanation for

why Petitioner waited to seek further review of his conviction, it

does not explain the extent of Torres’s delay. 

Torres knew of Hendricks’s disappearance in April 2001 when

Petitioner filed a complaint against him with the state bar, and it

was confirmed in June 2001 when he received a letter from a staff

attorney at Appellate Defenders that stated Hendricks had

“dropp[ed] out of touch with everyone . . . .” (See Pet’r’s Resp.

Ex. 1 at 1, Ex. 2 at 1.) Yet Torres waited until July 24, 2002,

over a full year later, to file his habeas corpus petition in the

state superior court. Petitioner does not provide any explanation

that would justify the length of this delay. See United States v.

Saro, 252 F.3d 449, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding the petitioner

was not entitled to equitable tolling for the time after he learned

of his attorney’s malfeasance). Torres has not met his burden of

establishing the existence of extraordinary circumstances.

Petitioner’s only other justification for the delay is that he

“had no understanding of the law or procedure . . . .” (Pet’r’s

Resp. 2.) This is not an extraordinary circumstance beyond his

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 16 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

control that would warrant equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia,

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). “[I]t is well established

that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se

petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v.

Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fisher v.

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999)). Torres does not

provide any facts showing he was denied access to legal materials

or could not otherwise learn AEDPA’s requirements. Cf. Mendoza v.

Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that denial of

access to Spanish-language legal materials and inability to obtain

a translator could justify equitable tolling); Whalem/Hunt v.

Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that

unavailability of AEDPA in prison law library could constitute

grounds for equitable tolling). Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling, and accordingly, his Petition is time-barred

under AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The district court should

GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss because the Petition was filed

after the statute of limitations expired.

B. Torres’s Claims Are Not Procedurally Barred.

Respondent also argues that Torres’s Petition should be

dismissed with prejudice because Petitioner procedurally defaulted

all of his claims by failing to timely present them to the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Mem. 7.) Torres contends that

the Court should not dismiss his claims as procedurally defaulted

because California’s timeliness rule is not adequate, and

Petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for any default due to

the ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel. (Pet’r’s

Resp. 5-8.)

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 17 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal court “‘will

not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if

the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment.’” Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126,

1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729 (1991)); see also Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 789 (9th Cir.

2003); LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001); Park

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal habeas

review of that claim is precluded unless the petitioner “can

demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice as a result of the

alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also High v. Ignacio, 408

F.3d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750);

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The respondent has the burden of pleading an adequate and

independent procedural bar as an affirmative defense. Bennett v.

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden of proof

then shifts to the petitioner to place that defense in issue, for

example, by asserting factual allegations demonstrating the

inadequacy of the state procedure, including citations to case

authority that show an inconsistent application of the state rule. 

Id. at 586. If the factual allegations are made, the burden shifts

back to the respondent to demonstrate the bar is applicable. Id.

The California Supreme Court denied both of Torres’s habeas

corpus petitions with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770,

780, 959 P.2d 311, 317-18, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 159-60 (1998). 

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 18 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

(Lodgment No. 13, In re Torres, No. S131448, Order 1; Lodgment No.

14, In re Torres, No. S130855, Order 1). A citation to Robbins

indicates that the petition was denied as untimely. Thorson, 479

F.3d at 645 (discussing the Robbins timeliness rule). California’s

untimeliness rule bars habeas petitions that were filed after

“substantial delay” without significant justification. King v.

Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). 

1. Independence of the Rule

“For a state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state

law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal

law.” LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1040-41 (1989)); see also Park, 202 F.3d at 1152. “‘A state

law ground is so interwoven if the state has made application of

the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law

[such as] the determination of whether federal constitutional error

has been committed.’” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581 (quoting Park, 202

F.3d at 1152); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the timeliness bar of Robbins

is not interwoven with federal law, and thus it is an independent

state procedural ground. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581. Petitioner

argues, however, that the Robbins rule is not adequate to bar

federal review. (Pet’r’s Resp. 5.)

2. Adequacy of the Rule

A state procedural rule is “adequate” when the rule is “firmly

established and regularly followed” at the time of the purported

default. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citations and quotations omitted) overruled on other grounds by

Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 19 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 583 (citing Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573,

577 (9th Cir. 1999)). The state procedural rule must also be clear

and consistently applied at the time of petitioner’s default. 

Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted). To determine whether a procedural rule has been

consistently applied, the Court must look at both published an

unpublished state cases decided at the time of the purported

default showing actual application of the rule. Powell v. Lambert,

357 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2004).

Respondent has met his initial burden under Bennett by

pleading procedural default as an affirmative defense. (See

Resp’t’s Mem. 7); Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. The burden then shifts

to Petitioner to place the defense in issue. Id. Here, Torres has

alleged that the Robbins bar is not adequate to foreclose federal

habeas review because under California law there are no standards

for determining what constitutes “substantial delay” in noncapital

cases, and California’s timeliness rule is uncertain and

inconsistently applied. (Pet’r’s Resp. 5.) 

Ordinarily, a habeas petitioner fulfills his burden under

Bennett by asserting “specific factual allegations that demonstrate

the inadequacy of the state procedure” including case citations

demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule. Bennett, 322

F.3d at 586. Petitioner has not provided the Court with specific

facts or case citations demonstrating inconsistent application of

the timeliness rule at the time of his alleged default. (See

Pet’r’s Resp. 5-8.) But “[o]nce [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] found a

state procedural rule to be inadequate, petitioners may fulfill

their burden under Bennett by simply challenging the adequacy of

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 20 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

the procedure; the burden then shifts back to the government to

demonstrate that the law has subsequently become adequate.” King

v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2006); see Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d at 967-68, the Ninth Circuit

found that because the court had previously found California’s

timeliness rule to be inadequate in Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d

1387 (9th Cir. 1996), it was the government’s burden to prove the

“substantial delay” standard had subsequently become sufficiently

clear and consistently applied. See Morales, 85 F.3d at 1391

(finding that before 1993, California’s “substantial delay” rule

was uncertain, but declining to decide whether it had subsequently

become adequate). The same is true here. The Ninth Circuit

previously found that California’s timeliness rule was ambiguous

and inconsistently applied, and thus not adequate to bar federal

review. It has not yet issued an opinion on whether the rule has

since become adequate to bar federal review. Because Petitioner

challenged the adequacy of this rule, it is Respondent’s burden to

demonstrate that the rule has become clear and consistently

applied. 

Respondent claims that the timeliness bar has been regularly

and consistently applied by the California Supreme Court since

1993. (Resp’t’s Mem. 8.) “Not a single published decision

undercuts the rule’s adequacy, and the California Supreme Court has

expressly stated that it is enforced.” (Id.) Respondent cites In

re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 703, 981 F.2d 1038, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d

899 (1999), in which the California Supreme Court stated that it

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 21 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

“enforce[s] time limits on the filing of petitions for writs of

habeas corpus in noncapital cases.” (Resp’t’s Mem. 8.) 

“Because the California Supreme Court set out to create a rule

that would be consistently applied, however, it does not follow

that the rule in historical fact has been so applied.” Bennett,

322 F.3d at 583. The state supreme court’s declaration that it

applies the timeliness rule consistently does not demonstrate that

the rule is applied consistently in practice. Demonstrating the

consistent application of the rule is Respondent’s burden under

Bennett and King. King, 464 F.3d at 968; Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

A conclusory statement in Respondent’s memorandum is insufficient

to satisfy that burden. The Respondent’s failure to discuss

unpublished decisions also undermines his argument. See Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d at 879.

“[B]ecause it is the State who seeks dismissal based on the

procedural bar, it is the State who must bear the burden of

demonstrating that the bar is applicable –- in this case that the

state procedural rule has been regularly and consistently applied

in habeas actions.” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Respondent has not

met its burden of proving that California’s timeliness rule was

regularly and consistently applied at the time of Torres’s

purported default. The district court should not dismiss Torres’s

petition as procedurally defaulted.

3. Cause and Prejudice

Petitioner asserts that even if his claims are procedurally

barred, the Court should still review his Petition on the merits

because he can show cause and prejudice for the default. (Pet’r’s

Resp. 7-8.) Torres contends that the ineffective assistance of

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 22 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel caused his

default. (Id.) 

For the Court to review the merits of defaulted claims,

Petitioner must demonstrate cause and prejudice:

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his

federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent

and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review

of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as

a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S.

446, 451 (2000).

Torres first argues that any procedural default should be

excused because his appointed counsel on appeal, Mr. Hendricks,

“abandoned petitioner at one of the most crucial times possible.” 

(Pet’r’s Resp. 7.) Petitioner alleges it was his attorney’s

failure to file a petition for discretionary review in the state

supreme court that caused his procedural default. The actions of

Torres’s appellate counsel, however, do not establish cause. In

Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 2004), the court was

presented with the argument Petitioner makes here that appellate

counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to file a petition for

review should excuse a state procedural default. The court

rejected the claim because the petitioner did not have a

constitutional right to counsel on discretionary review, so any

errors committed by counsel could not establish cause for a

default.

It is well-established that criminal defendants have no

constitutional right to counsel beyond their first appeal

as of right, and hence no right to counsel in a

discretionary appeal to the State’s highest court.

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 23 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause to

excuse a procedural default only if the petitioner had a

constitutional right to counsel in the proceeding in

which the default occurred. Any errors committed by

Smith’s counsel in seeking (or not seeking) discretionary

review from the Idaho Supreme Court during the direct

appeal thus cannot constitute cause under Coleman.

Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted). This is true even where the

state has appointed counsel to represent a petitioner on direct

review. Id. at 357 (citing Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578

(9th Cir. 1999)); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir.

1993). Accordingly, Torres’s claim is without merit and will not

establish cause for a default.

Petitioner also alleges that the ineffective assistance of his

trial counsel should excuse any default. He claims his trial

attorney had a conflict of interest that resulted in the denial of

his rights to due process and to be free from double jeopardy. 

(Pet’r’s Resp. 8.) Torres does not explain, however, how his trial

counsel’s actions had any bearing on his procedural default in this

case –- the untimeliness of his habeas petitions to the state

supreme court. (See id.) Petitioner has not established cause for

default and prejudice resulting from it. As discussed above,

however, Torres’s claims should not be dismissed as procedurally

defaulted because Respondent has failed to meet its burden of

establishing applicability of the procedural bar. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED as barred by the

statute of limitations.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 24 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\TORRES1855\R&R.wpd 25 06cv1855 WQH(RBB)

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the district court and serve a copy on all parties

on or before September 10, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 20,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 22, 2007

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Hayes

All parties of record 

Case 3:06-cv-01855-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 08/23/07 Page 25 of 25