Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00070/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00070-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEO LERMA,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. MENDOZA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00070-AWI-SMS PC

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO FILE THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN THIRTY

DAYS

(Doc. 18)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Leo Lerma (“plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on January

19, 2006, and filed a first amended complaint on March 21, 2006. On June 6, 2006, the court

dismissed plaintiff’s first amended complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint

on June 19, 2006.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at California State PrisonCorcoran, where plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Plaintiff names R. Mendoza, E. Torrez, M.

Avila, M. Pina, B. Cooke, C. Rodriguez, B. Silva, M. M. Miller, and D. D. Ortiz as a defendants.

Plaintiff is seeking money damages. 

Plaintiff alleges that on August 10, 2005, defendants Mendoza, Torrez, and Avila retaliated

against him forfiling inmate appeals by placing himin administrative segregation (ad-seg) on a false

report. Plaintiff alleges that he did not violate any rules. Plaintiff alleges defendant Cooke approved

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the false report, defendant Rodriguez gave the order, and defendant Miller failed to provide plaintiff

with the opportunity to show that he was not guilty. Plaintiff alleges that all the events occurred

under the watch of defendant Ortiz, who was the Associate Warden.

Plaintiff alleges that on November 16, 2005, he was released from ad-seg and on November

25, 2005, he was placed back in ad-seg on another false report by defendants Mendoza, Pina, and

Torres. Plaintiff alleges the report was approved by defendant Cooke, the order was given by

defendant Rodriguez, and defendant Miller did not give him a chance to prove that he was innocent.

Plaintiff alleges that he showed defendant Silva, who was the hearing officer, the threatening note

he was accused of writing and pointed out the CDC number on the note was incorrect. Plaintiff

alleges the note disappeared and was not seen again. Plaintiff alleges he was given a five month

Security Housing Unit term for the false charge, which he contested and won dismissal of. Plaintiff

alleges he was returned back to general population on February 22, 2006.

Plaintiff alleges claims for retaliation, denial of due process, and cruel and unusual

punishment.

1. Retaliation Claim

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

///

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “‘A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning

of [§] 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits

to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established

not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in

motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause

others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Mendoza, Torrez, and Avila for placing him in ad-seg on August 10, 2005, in retaliation for filing

inmate appeals. However, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to give rise to any other retaliation

claims because plaintiff has not set forth facts linking the adverse actions complained of to any

retaliatory motive. 

2. Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v.Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, No. 04-15770, 2007 WL 400759,

at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2007). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting a claim that he was deprived of a protected

liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 230; Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th

Cir. 2000); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Myron, 2007 WL 400759,

at *1. Because plaintiff has not established that he had a protected liberty interest at stake, plaintiff

may not pursue a claim premised on the deprivation of procedural due process. This claim fails as

a matter of law. 

3. Conditions-of-Confinement Claim

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The

deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged

deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994) (citingWilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must

“know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

The allegations set forth in plaintiff’s second amended complaint do not support a claim that

plaintiff was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This

claim fails as a matter of law.

4. Supervisory Liability Claim Against Defendant Ortiz

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendant Ortiz personally participated in

the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black

at 646. The allegation that the events complained of occurred under defendant Ortiz’s watch as

Associate Warden is insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983, and the claim

fails as a matter of law. 

///

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s second amended complaint states a retaliation claim against

defendants Mendoza, Torrez, and Avila based on the August 10, 2005, incident but does not state

any other claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The court will provide

plaintiff with one final opportunity to file a third amended complaint curing the deficiencies

identified by the court in this order. Leave to amend is limited to curing the deficiencies identified

by the court is this order. Plaintiff may not add any new claims or parties in his third amended

complaint, and if he does so, the third amended complaint will be stricken from the record.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file a

third amended complaint; 

4. Leave to amend is limited to curing the deficiencies identified by the court is this

order;

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

5. Plaintiff may not add any new claims or parties in his third amended complaint, and

if he does so, the third amended complaint will be stricken from the record; and

6. If plaintiff fails to file a third amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

court will recommend that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00070-AWI -SMS Document 33 Filed 02/23/07 Page 8 of 8