Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03489/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 14-3087, 14-3489 & 15-1065

VENISCIA HUMPHREY, parent and next friend of Teniscia 

Humphrey-Lee,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Appeal of TERRENCE LEE

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 3327 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 19, 2015 — DECIDED MAY 22, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Veniscia Humphrey brought 

this suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of her 

daughter Teniscia Humphrey-Lee, alleging that medical 

malpractice during Teniscia’s birth in 2008 left her permaCase: 14-3489 Document: 43 Filed: 05/22/2015 Pages: 4
2 Nos. 14-3087, 14-3489 & 15-1065

nently disabled. Teniscia’s father Terrence Lee participated 

in the litigation (at least, a lawyer observed on his behalf) 

but did not ask to be joined as a party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

19. (Humphrey and Lee are not married; Teniscia lives with 

her mother, but both parents are Teniscia’s legal custodians.)

The case was settled for approximately $13 million, used to 

buy an annuity to provide care over the course of Teniscia’s 

life. Arlette Porter, who represents Lee, demanded a share of 

the 25% contingent fee that had been negotiated between 

Humphrey and her lawyer, who opposed this request, observing among other things that (a) Lee was not a party to 

the case, and (b) Porter had not performed any of the legal 

work that led to the settlement.

Settlement was reached in January 2014. Only later did 

Lee move to file an amended complaint naming himself as a 

plaintiff, apparently for the sole purpose of opening the door 

to Porter’s claim for attorneys’ fees. The district court denied 

Lee’s motion, stating that Lee not only had approved the 

January settlement but also had not filed an administrative 

claim, as the FTCA requires, and therefore could not be a 

plaintiff. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105680 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2014). 

Nine months after the settlement (and a few weeks after the 

suit had been dismissed on Humphrey’s motion), Lee filed a 

motion to intervene, again with the goal of bolstering Porter’s quest for fees. On October 24, 2014, the district court 

denied that motion as untimely. Porter then filed a motion 

seeking fees notwithstanding Lee’s non-party status; that 

motion was denied on January 7, 2015. Lee has filed three 

appeals, one from each order. The only one of these that requires discussion is the appeal from the denial of the motion 

to intervene, because if Lee is not a party then neither of the 

other orders is open to question—and neither was a final deCase: 14-3489 Document: 43 Filed: 05/22/2015 Pages: 4
Nos. 14-3087, 14-3489 & 15-1065 3

cision with respect to Lee, as 28 U.S.C. §1291 requires. (Porter might have been entitled to appeal the order denying her 

request for attorneys’ fees, but she did not do so; Lee is the 

only appellant.)

This suit was filed in 2010. Lee contends that he did not 

know about the suit until 2012. We may suppose that this is 

so and that he should have been notified earlier. (Humphrey 

contends that Lee was notified earlier, before the suit began, 

and declined to participate. We need not decide who is correct.) Still, when Porter began to monitor proceedings in 

2012, she did not ask the court to order Lee’s joinder under 

Rule 19, nor did Lee file a motion to intervene. Porter also 

neglected to file an administrative FTCA claim on Lee’s behalf. At oral argument, Porter asserted that she thought that 

Lee had become a party automatically because she attended 

depositions and judicial hearings, but that is not how federal 

litigation works. It takes a formal step—such as joinder under Rule 19 or intervention under Rule 24—to add a party.

By the time Porter realized the need for formalities, the 

case had been settled (with Lee’s approval) and the only issue concerned whether Porter would receive a portion of the 

fee provided by the contract between Humphrey and her 

lawyer. A district judge does not abuse his discretion by 

deeming untimely a post-judgment effort to intervene for 

the purpose of adding a new issue. Would-be parties cannot 

watch the litigation proceed for years and then jump in after 

its end. See, e.g., Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 

316 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2003).

If Porter has a claim to a share of the fees as a matter of 

quantum meruit, the right forum would have been state 

court. This federal suit ended when it was dismissed as part 

Case: 14-3489 Document: 43 Filed: 05/22/2015 Pages: 4
4 Nos. 14-3087, 14-3489 & 15-1065

of the settlement. Porter needed an independent basis of 

federal jurisdiction in order to continue a post-dismissal battle. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511 U.S. 

375 (1994); Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996). But 

Humphrey, Lee, and their lawyers are citizens of Illinois, 

and the allocation of fees is not a federal question just because the underlying litigation is federal. See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (discussing malpractice, but the 

principle is equally applicable to disputes about fees).

The supplemental jurisdiction sometimes permits a district court to resolve a fee dispute between the litigant and 

her lawyer, see Goyal v. Gas Technology Institute, 718 F.3d 713, 

717 (7th Cir. 2013), because the resolution affects the prevailing party’s net recovery, but here the only remaining fight 

pits one lawyer against another and cannot affect Teniscia’s 

gross or net recovery. Nor can resolution be supported by a 

retention of jurisdiction in the district court’s order dismissing the suit; there was no such retention. Cf. Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299–1301 (7th Cir. 1995). 

We have not found a decision holding that a fee dispute between counsel for a party and counsel for a non-party is part 

of the original case or controversy for the purpose of 28 

U.S.C. §1367(a). This implies that the district court could not 

have allowed intervention even on a timely motion; but, as 

the motion was denied, we need not consider how far the 

supplemental jurisdiction might stretch.

The judgment of the district court denying the motion for 

leave to intervene is affirmed. The other two appeals (Nos. 

14-3087 and 15-1065) are dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Case: 14-3489 Document: 43 Filed: 05/22/2015 Pages: 4