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Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 25a0008n.06

Case No. 24-3379

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DAVID O. SIMON, Chapter 7 Trustee for the 

Bankruptcy Estate of Yazmin Torres-Duqum,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS CLEVELAND 

MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE NORTHERN 

DISTRICT OF OHIO

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE, WHITE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. 

COLE, Circuit Judge. Yazmin Torres-Duqum (“Torres”) was employed by University 

Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center (“University Hospitals”) as a physical therapist. Following a 

miscarriage, Torres—suffering from PTSD, anxiety, and depression—requested to transfer to a 

position at another University Hospitals location. University Hospitals did not accommodate her 

request. Eventually, Torres filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee of her estate sued University 

Hospitals, alleging violations of Ohio law and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The trustee stipulated to the dismissal of the claims under Ohio law. After 

the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of University Hospitals on the ADA claims. We conclude the district court 

erred by limiting its analysis to the major life activity of working, so we reverse the district court’s 

judgment on the failure to accommodate claim under the ADA.

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I.

In May 2011, Torres began working as a licensed physical therapist for University 

Hospitals. From 2014 until taking medical leave in February 2016, Torres worked at the

University Hospitals Rehabilitation Sports Medicine Mandel Jewish Community Center (“JCC”)

location in Beachwood, Ohio. Torres had a history of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), 

depression, and anxiety caused by the premature birth and loss of her son in 2006. On February 

10, 2016, Torres suffered a miscarriage. The miscarriage triggered Torres’s anxiety and PTSD, 

causing her to suffer from panic attacks. She requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave 

Act (“FMLA”), which University Hospitals granted. She had not informed University Hospitals 

or her supervisor of her pregnancy and did not immediately inform them of her subsequent 

miscarriage. 

Torres told two JCC coworkers and a former JCC coworker about the miscarriage a few 

days later. That weekend some of her coworkers and her former coworker gathered for dinner 

outside of work hours. The former coworker reached out to Torres to inform her that her coworkers 

were speculating about her absence from work. Specifically, the group speculated that Torres had 

called off work to attend her child’s gymnastics meet that weekend, not for an emergency, and 

spread rumors about her medical history and pregnancy. 

Because her coworkers’ gossip was causing her anxiety and PTSD to spiral, Torres reached 

out to her supervisor shortly after the weekend work event. She informed her supervisor of the 

miscarriage and asked him to transfer her to a different work location because “he was not stopping 

anything from the rumors and stuff from happening.” (Torres Dep., R. 43-1, PageID 959.)

According to her supervisor, Torres expressed that she could no longer work at the JCC location 

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and needed to be transferred because of “the people and the environment in the JCC.” (Tekavec 

Dep., R. 42-1, PageID 794.)

Over the following months, Torres’s well-being generally improved, and her anxiety and 

depression were managed through therapy and medication. But she still suffered from panic and 

anxiety attacks when she thought about returning to the JCC location. Accordingly, Torres began 

applying to open positions at other University Hospitals sites. In May 2016, Torres spoke with

Lisa Edgehouse, the University Hospitals employee who coordinated FMLA leave and gathered 

information related to employees’ medical restrictions. Torres notified Edgehouse that she never 

received the ADA paperwork she requested. After Torres received the paperwork, her medical 

provider submitted an ADA request in June 2016 asking that Torres transfer work locations. Later 

that same month, University Hospitals denied her request. An administrator testified that

University Hospitals—as a general policy—does not transfer employees to available positions as 

an accommodation. 

Torres’s approved leave ended July 1, 2016. When Torres still had not returned to work 

on July 15, 2016, University Hospitals told Torres it would terminate her employment “due to job 

abandonment effective July 29, 2016,” if she did not submit “paperwork . . . that would support 

[her] continued absence from work” by July 25, 2016. (Edgehouse Dep., R. 50-4, PageID 1372.) 

Torres responded by email on July 21. And she submitted an updated return-to-work authorization 

that said that she was “[u]nable to return to [the] JCC location.” (Id. at PageID 1374.) In response, 

University Hospitals told Torres that she had no more job-protected FMLA leave (during which 

University Hospitals would leave her position unfilled) remaining, but that she could remain “in 

medical leave status.” (Id.) 

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Torres continued applying to open positions and eventually secured another job at a 

different University Hospitals location in December 2016. The parties dispute whether Torres 

ever worked in this position. And Torres secured another position at a different University 

Hospitals location in August 2017. (Torres Dep., R. 43-1, PageID 913.) She eventually left that 

position in December 2017 because she did not get additional hours. (Id.)

In May 2018, Torres filed for bankruptcy protection, and a trustee was appointed to manage

her bankruptcy estate. In May 2020, the trustee filed this action, alleging four counts against 

University Hospitals: (1) disability discrimination under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112; 

(2) disability discrimination under the ADA; (3) retaliation under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 

4112; and (4) retaliation under the ADA.1 

In September 2021, Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of the first and third claims—both 

claims under Ohio law without prejudice. The district court approved the stipulation. Following 

the close of discovery, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, limiting his request to count 

two of the complaint, failure to accommodate under the ADA. University Hospitals moved for 

summary judgment on both remaining ADA claims. 

The district court granted University Hospitals’ summary judgment motion, denied 

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff now 

appeals. 

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 464 

(6th Cir. 2022). A district court may grant summary judgment only when there is no genuine 

1 Since the initial trustee filed suit, trusteeship over Torres’s bankruptcy estate changed multiple times. (See Notice 

of Substitution, R. 24, PageID 125; Order, R. 69, PageID 1695.) The changes in trusteeship are irrelevant to this 

action. For ease of reference, we use “Plaintiff” rather than referring to the trustee by name.

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dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). Generally, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party and decline to assess the evidence’s credibility or weight during this stage in the proceedings. 

Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Henschel v. Clare Cnty. 

Rd. Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 2013), and Rorrer v. City of Snow, 743 F.3d 1025, 

1038 (6th Cir. 2014)).

III.

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding only the claim 

for failure to accommodate under the ADA. The ADA prohibits covered entities from, among 

other things, engaging in employment discrimination against “qualified individual[s]” because of 

a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA’s definition of discrimination includes “an 

employer’s failure to grant a reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee.” Tchankpa v. 

Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 811 (6th Cir. 2020).

“In failure to accommodate cases, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of making out a 

prima facie case. If the plaintiff makes this showing, then the burden shifts to the employer to 

show that the accommodation would cause undue hardship for the employer.” King v. Steward 

Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). To establish a 

prima facie claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA, Torres must show that: (1) she has 

a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she was “otherwise qualified” for her job, “with 

or without reasonable accommodation”; (3) University Hospitals “knew or had reason to know 

about her disability”; (4) “she requested an accommodation”; and (5) University Hospitals “failed 

to provide the necessary accommodation.” Id. (quoting Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville 

Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 669 (6th Cir. 2020)). 

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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of University Hospitals, reasoning 

that the failure to accommodate claim failed because Plaintiff did not raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether Torres qualified as “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. 

Therefore, at issue on appeal is the first element of Torres’s failure to accommodate claim—

whether Torres has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 

The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 

one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “[M]ajor life 

activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, . . . eating, 

sleeping, . . . concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 

We construe the definition of disability broadly. Id. at § 12102(4)(A). 

An impairment that is episodic falls within the definition of disability “if it would 

substantially limit a major life activity when active.” Id. at § 12102(4)(D). In Hostettler, this court 

considered whether a person who suffered from postpartum depression and separation anxiety, 

manifesting in panic attacks that lasted for several minutes, was disabled under the ADA. 895 

F.3d at 853–54. We reasoned that because she “was substantially limited in her ability to care for 

herself, sleep, walk, or speak” when she was experiencing her depression and anxiety, the episodic 

nature of her panic attacks did not preclude us from finding that she was disabled. Id. at 854.

Here, the district court concluded that “‘working’ at the JCC was the only alleged major 

life activity that was limited by Torres’[s] asserted disability.” (Op. and Order, R. 62, PageID

1639.) Analyzing the major life activity of “working,” the district court correctly concluded that 

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Torres’s impairment limited her “ability to perform a class or 

broad range of jobs.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the district court erred by failing to analyze 

Torres’s limitations regarding other major life activities. We agree.

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The district court acknowledged that, immediately following the miscarriage, “Torres was 

limited in one or more major life activities.” (Id.) But because Torres’s medical provider largely 

failed to detail the major life activities outside of working impacted by her disability in her 

University Hospitals leave-and-accommodation-request paperwork, the district court concluded 

that, by the time Torres requested an accommodation, the only limitation she asserted was not 

returning to work at the JCC. (Id.) On the request paperwork, Torres’s provider checked the box 

indicating that Torres had a “disability that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 

(Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., R. 44-6, PageID 1183, 86, 89.) The provider described the 

disability—anxiety and panic attacks—but her description of the way Torre’s disability limits

major life activities was somewhat cursory. For example, she indicated that the disability “limits

[Torres’s] focus,” and said that Torres needs to be able to “think clearly” to do her job. (Id. at 

1183.) And she added that Torres “works with patients and that requires concentration and 

supervision (of others) that she is currently struggling with—with her ongoing panic disorder” and 

that “[Torres] does not feel able to function in her present environment at the high level she is used 

to.” (Id. at 1183, 89.) 

This paperwork is not dispositive of Torres’s failure to accommodate claim. Our review 

of the record shows that Plaintiff asserted limitations on Torres’s major life activities other than 

working. Like the plaintiff’s panic attacks in Hostettler, Torres’s panic attacks are episodic in 

nature. Accordingly, we must consider whether the panic attacks “would substantially limit a 

major life activity when active.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). 

Plaintiff alleged that Torres’s PTSD and depression “substantially limit . . . her major life 

activities, including . . . working, interacting with others, concentrating, thinking, caring for 

herself and her children, sleeping, eating[,] and performing routine daily tasks.” (Compl., R. 1, 

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PageID 4, ¶ 18.) Torres attested that when her condition “flares up,” her major life activities of 

“working, thinking, concentrating, caring for [herself], and interacting with others” are 

substantially limited. (Torres Aff., R. 44-1, PageID 1078.) She recounted that, following her 

miscarriage, she could not sleep, “function,” or care for her children. (Torres Dep., R. 43-1, 

PageID 941.) And she stated that she continued to suffer from panic attacks when she thought 

about returning to work at the JCC. 

University Hospitals did not refute these allegations, and in reviewing a grant of summary 

judgment, we generally do not weigh the evidence or assess its credibility. See Hostettler, 895 

F.3d at 852. Therefore, the district court erred by limiting its analysis to only the major life activity 

of working and failing to consider Torres’s limitations on her other stated major life activities.

As relevant here, University Hospitals argues on appeal that Torres is not disabled because

a personality conflict is not a disability for the purposes of the ADA. This argument does not 

persuade because, like the district court, University Hospitals limits its analysis to the major life 

activity of working. True, mere personality conflicts and similar workplace stress issues are not, 

on their own,substantial limitations on the major life activity of working. See Fricke v. E.I. Dupont 

Co., 219 F. App’x 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Personality conflicts, workplace stress, and being 

unable to work with a particular person or persons do not rise to the level of a ‘disability’ or 

inability to work for purposes of the ADA.”). But as discussed above, the district court erred by 

not analyzing the asserted limitations on Torres’s major life activities other than working. 

Moreover, Torres testified that the building itself, not just specific coworkers, triggered debilitating 

anxiety. This argument therefore does not change our analysis.

In the alternative, University Hospitals argues that, even if we conclude Torres has a 

disability, summary judgment was appropriate because her requested accommodation was 

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unreasonable and would cause undue hardship to University Hospitals. The district court found 

that Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case and ended its analysis with the first prong of a

failure to accommodate claim—whether Torres has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 

The district court, therefore, did not consider the reasonableness or undue hardship arguments in

the first instance, and we see no exceptional reason why we should reach those issues here. See 

St. Marys Foundry, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 332 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 2003).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

University Hospitals on the failure to accommodate claim and remand this claim for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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