Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01372/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01372-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Johnny Edward Johnson, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro; Terry Goddard, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 05-1372-PHX-DGC (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

On May 9, 2005, Johnny Edward Johnson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for forgery in Maricopa County

Superior Court, with two historical prior felony convictions, and the court's imposition of a

presumptive 10 year prison term. In his federal petition he contends: 1) the Arizona Supreme

Court erred in denying his appeal in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments; 2) the trial court erred when it admitted "evidence extraneous to the case"

before the jury, in violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial; 3) the trial court erred

when it admitted hearsay evidence of uncharged crimes in violation of his rights to due

process, a fair trial, and confrontation of his accusers; and 4) his due process rights were

violated when the state used three prior convictions, more than 10 years old, to enhance his

sentence. Respondents contend that Johnson's petition, filed seven months after the one-year

limitations period, is untimely, and in the alternative that this claims are procedurally

defaulted. The Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The evidence considered at trial is summarized in the Court of Appeals memorandum

decision:

Johnson entered a store with a check written on the account of Sarah

and Monte Plough. The check, for $800, was completed but for the payee line.

The store clerk observed Johnson write his name on the payee line and sign the

back of the check.

The clerk asked Johnson for identification. Johnson gave him his bank

check card, which displayed his photograph. The check looked "funny,"

according to the clerk, so he looked up the Ploughs' phone number and called

them. He spoke with a woman who said the check was not valid. The clerk

then told the off-duty police officer/security guard at the store about the

incident.

Meanwhile Johnson, a longtime store customer, was talking to the

manager, whom he had known for a number of years. He made no attempt to

leave the store.

The guard arrested and searched Johnson. He found an "organizer,"

which contained checkbooks belonging to other individuals, and vehicle

registration and insurance information in the name of another person. The

organizer also contained a check that was partially completed. It was in the

amount of $600, but had no payor signature or payee name filled in.

Inside Johnson's wallet were credit cards belonging to two persons, a

cash machine card belonging to another, and two social security cards

belonging to two difference persons. None of the items had Johnson's name

on them, nor did any of the evidence belong to the Ploughs.

Johnson told the guard he found the organizer and its contents on the

way to the store. He said a woman he knew had given him one of the credit

cards to buy clothes, and that he had found the other cards two days earlier

near a trash can.

Johnson testified he obtained the check that he attempted to cash as

payment for work he had done at a house and a trailer for a woman who said

her name was "Sarah." He described "Sarah" as about 40 years old, rather

heavy set, short, and with brownish-grey hair. He said the house was near 99th

Avenue and Camelback Road, and that the trailer, Number 15, was near 51st

Avenue and Bethany Home Road.

While he worked at the trailer, Johnson saw several people he thought

were residents. One was a thin woman in her 20s, about 5'7" tall, with straight,

brown hair.

After Sarah allegedly gave him the check, Johnson went to his

neighborhood market to buy food and to cash the check. He explained he had

asked Sarah to leave the payee line on the check blank in the event he would

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need someone with better identification, such as his girlfriend, to cash it for

him.

Johnson testified he found the organizer on the way to the market. He

found two of the cards a couple days earlier near where he had found the

organizer. He said he planned to try to find the owners and return the items.

After the guard detained him at the store, Johnson called Sarah with a

number she had given him and handed the phone to the guard. The guard

identified himself as a police officer and asked the woman some questions,

including whether her name was Sarah. After a brief conversation, the woman

hung up.

Jean Lockhart testified for the defense. She was the manager of a trailer

park located at 51st Avenue and Bethany Home Road. She said two men and

a woman lived in Trailer 15. The woman was in her 20s, about 5'4" tall, with

long, brown hair. Lockhart said the woman tried to pay her with a stolen

check. Lockhart called police, who arrested the woman.

Lockhart said she had also seen another woman at trailer 15. This

woman appeared to be in her 50s, about 5'3" tall, chubby, with brown and gray

hair. Lockhart had never before seen Johnson and did not know his name.

(Doc. #9, Exh B at 3-6). 

Johnson argued to the Arizona Court of Appeals that the trial court abused its

discretion and violated his right to due process and a fair trial by admitting evidence

suggesting other crimes and bad acts by Johnson (Id., Exh A). He also contended that the

trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements of uncharged crimes in violation of

Johnson's rights under the Confrontation Clause (Id.). On July 17, 2003, the Court of

Appeals issued its memorandum decision (Id., Exh B). The Court of Appeals found that

Johnson had waived his fair trial constitutional claim; that the evidence was properly

admitted as evidence of his intent to defraud; and that Johnson had opened the door to

admission of the hearsay with his cross-examination (Id.).

Appellate counsel informed Johnson in a letter dated August 21, 2003, that she would

not file a petition seeking discretionary review from the Arizona Supreme Court, indicating

there was no reasonable probability that the court would review Johnson's case (Id., Exh C).

Counsel also informed Johnson that he had a right to seek such review, explained the process

for doing so, informed him that he had 30 days from the date of the letter to file the petition

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for review, and that she had filed a motion to extend the time for Johnson to file a pro se

petition for review (Id.). Counsel included with her letter the complete record on appeal. 

 On August 26, 2003, the Court of Appeals granted Johnson 30 days' leave to file a pro

se petition for review, indicating that "absent unforeseeable and compelling circumstances,

no further extensions of time will be granted" (Id., Exh D, E). Johnson declined to file a

petition for review, nor did he seek any further extensions; on October 2, 2003, the Court of

Appeals issued its mandate (Id., Exh F). On March 3, 2005, almost one and one half years

later, Johnson sought leave to file a delayed petition for review, on the grounds that 1)

appellate counsel "declined to pursue this cause to the Arizona Supreme Court;" and 2)

Johnson has no legal expertise or "assets to hire private counsel." He also asserted as

follows:

During this period, petitioner was transferred to Lewis Complex. Part

of his case files were lost and then the prison hostage incident froze all

movement and any attempts to write or talk to staff about legal work. During

the many shakedowns and searches, the remainder of petitioner's files were

taken or presumed lost. Any attempts to locate the files was met with one

reply. "We got more important issues to address." 

(Id., Exh G). He contends that following his transfer to ASPC Tucson, and after repeated

calls by his counselor to the Lewis Complex, in December, 2004, most of the files were

recovered. On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied his request for a delayed

petition for review (Id., Exh H). On May 9, 2005, Johnson filed his federal habeas petition.

Johnson was required to file his federal petition within one year of the date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

available to seek such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). His conviction became final

on September 22, 2003, the date upon which the time for seeking review expired. Therefore,

he had until September 22, 2004 to file his petition. His federal petition, filed more than

seven months after this date, is therefore untimely, unless he is entitled to either statutory or

equitable tolling. 

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The Court notes, however, that it was during this period between January and March,

2004, that it would have been difficult if not impossible for Johnson to file anything because

of the circumstances surrounding the hostage crisis at the Lewis Unit.

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Respondents contend that Johnson did not seek collateral review in state court, thus

allowing statutory tolling for the period of time that a properly filed petition was pending.

A more accurate statement is that Johnson did not seek collateral review in a timely manner,

and for that reason may not be entitled to tolling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Pace v.

Diguglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005). A review of the Maricopa County Superior Court

Criminal Docket #CR2002-000929 indicates that Johnson's initial Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief was withdrawn at his request in October, 2002, pending completion of direct review.

In October, 2003, upon receipt of Johnson's renewed Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, the

trial court appointed counsel, granted him two extensions of time to file his petition, and in

January, 2004, upon review of counsel's Completion of Post-Conviction Review, allowed

Johnson until March 10, 2004 to file a petition. On March 18, 2004, the trial court dismissed

the Rule 32 proceeding because of Johnson's failure to file a petition by the March 10

deadline.1

Apart from statutory tolling, Johnson must show extraordinary circumstances beyond

his control which made it impossible for him to timely file his federal petition, in order to

qualify for equitable tolling. See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). A

review of state court records indicate that as of August 21, 2003, when counsel sent Johnson

a copy of the complete record on appeal, he was already housed at the Lewis Complex. This

undercuts his argument that as part of the transfer to Lewis, he lost his court papers. In

addition, the hostage crisis occurred in January, 2004, three months after the expiration of

time for filing a petition for review. Johnson has presented no information that would

indicate that he was unable to file anything during the time period of September, 2003 to

January, 2004. Indeed, he was able to file a Notice of Post-conviction relief, and received

extensions of time to file his Rule 32 petition during this time.

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However, it appears that starting in January, 2004, his lack of access and ability to file

pleadings or receive court orders became problematic. In his Reply, Johnson asserts that his

legal records were lost for a year; and that "diligence was applied to recover enough of them

to file a Habeas Corpus to the Az. Supreme Court" (Doc. #10 at 2). Johnson is apparently

referring to his Motion for Delayed Petition for Review, filed with the Arizona Court of

Appeals in March, 2005. Even accepting Respondents' argument that Johnson could have

filed for discretionary review in September, 2003, it is still most likely that, as was the case

with his pursuit of collateral review, he was restrained by the circumstances surrounding the

hostage crisis and his later transfer to Tucson from pursuing his federal petition for a

significant portion of 2004. We believe that Johnson has established that the extraordinary

circumstances were the "but-for and proximate cause of his untimeliness." See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

It will normally be much more difficult for a prisoner to demonstrate causation

where he encounters the "extraordinary circumstances" in the beginning or

middle of the limitations period than where he encounters them at the end of

limitations period. This is the case because, if the prisoner is diligently

pursuing his habeas petition, the one-year limitations period will ordinarily

give him ample opportunity to overcome such early obstacles. 

(Id.).

In Allen, the prisoner lost access to his habeas materials for only 27 days due to his prison

transfer. In addition, the transfer occurred only one month into the limitations period.

This left Allen with the better part of the limitations period in which he could

have filed his federal petition uninhibited by the prison transfer. It is clear that

any effect the prison transfer had on the preparation of his habeas materials

was dissipated during these many months.

(Id. at 801). 

In this case, the extraordinary circumstances were both multi-layered and long-lasting. The

combination of obstacles present in both his state and federal proceedings as a result of the

hostage crisis, and the loss of his records for over a year, and not his lack of diligence, leads

the Court to conclude that this is one of those limited circumstances in which the doctrine of

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equitable tolling should apply, and allow the Court to consider his federal petition timely

filed.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust

state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-846 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement will not be

met where the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38.

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal court

may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal

court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

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prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court opinion

contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground "that is both

'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's

decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is "independent"

unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal

claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856

(2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'"

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, just as in cases

involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal habeas review of the claims

is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

In Ground I, Johnson essentially argues a denial of access to the courts, again reciting

the litany of obstacles he faced during 2004, but also emphasizing the lack of law libraries

and legal assistants (Doc. #1 at 5). Respondents are correct that Johnson has argued this for

the first time in his federal petition. More importantly, a claim of lack of access to the courts

is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding: simply put, it is a complaint concerning the

conditions of his confinement, not the legality of his confinement. For that reason, it fails.

In Ground II, Johnson argues, as he did on direct appeal, that the trial court admitted

evidence extraneous to the case before the jury, as other crimes and bad acts, depriving

Johnson of due process and a fair trial. The evidence to which Johnson is referring is the

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contents of an organizer and wallet found in his possession when he was arrested, which

contained checks, checkbooks, credit cards, and vehicle registration information in the names

of several individuals other than Johnson or the victims. However, the Court of Appeals

found that Johnson had waived his constitutional claim by his failure to assert it at the

suppression hearing, and his failure to support it on appeal with argument or case authority

(Doc. #9, Exh B at 6). In doing so, the state court found the claim to be defaulted on

procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31. The memorandum decision contains a

plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground "that is both

'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's

decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. The Court of Appeals also concluded that under a

Rule 403 analysis, the evidence was properly admitted as probative, circumstantial evidence

of Johnson's intent to defraud, and although it was harmful to Johnson, it was not unfairly

prejudicial (Doc. #9, Exh B at 7-8). Assuming Johnson could overcome the procedural

default obstacle, his claim is without merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

In Ground III, Johnson contends, as he did on appeal, that the trial court admitted

hearsay statements of uncharged crimes which denied his due process right to a fair trial and

confrontation of his accusers. Specifically, he asserts that once the above testimony was

admitted, the police were allowed to "act as expert witnesses" when there was no nexus

between the crime Johnson was convicted of and the unrelated evidence admitted at trial

(Doc. #1 at 7). In cross-examining the police officer, Johnson asked the officer if he had

spoken with any account holders. Then on redirect examination, the prosecutor asked what

information the officer received from the account holders with whom he spoke, and the trial

court overruled Johnson's hearsay objection, finding that he had opened the door by asking

the officer whether he had spoken with any account holders (Doc. #9, Exh B at 9-10). 

Johnson argued on appeal and in his federal petition that the trial court abused its discretion

and violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by permitting the police officer to

present the hearsay information. Initially, the Court of Appeals found that because Johnson

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Assuming Johnson had exhausted this claim by raising it in his Rule 32 petition -

which extraordinary circumstances may have prevented him from doing - the trial court

would have properly denied it, finding it was precluded because Johnson could have raised

it on direct appeal, and did not do so. See Rule 32.2(a)(1), Ariz. R. Crim. P.

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failed to make a constitutional claim at trial, it would review for fundamental error. It then

found the trial court did not err:

Johnson's inquiry created the inference that none of the other property

had been wrongly taken, or that any of the other checks had been forged. This,

in turn, lent credence to Johnson's testimony that he had found the organizer

and other credit cards. That evidence opened the door for the state to rebut it

by presenting contrary evidence on the same subject. 

(Id. at 12-13). 

Respondents argue that this ruling constitutes an independent state law ground barring

federal review of any underlying federal claim. It appears to the Court less complicated:

the Court of Appeals did not consider Johnson's constitutional claim; instead it determined

that the trial court ruled correctly on an evidentiary issue. Johnson's claim is without merit.

§ 2254(b)(2).

In Ground IV, Johnson argues for the first time that the state charged him with three

priors that were clearly over 10 years old, and could not be used to increase his sentence, in

violation of his due process rights. Johnson was required to fairly present all his claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal

process or through appropriate post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett; Roettgen v.

Copeland. In addition, Johnson would have no state remedy were he to return to the state

court, so this claim is procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane; White v. Lewis.

2

 Finally, he

has shown no cause or prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Johnny Johnson's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 12th day of September, 2005.

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