Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01840/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01840-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:0706 Judicial Review of Agency Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERTO LUCIANO GONZALEZ

TORRES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 17cv1840 JM(NLS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S.

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

SERVICES; U.S. IMMIGRATION

AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;

and U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER

PROTECTION,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Alberto Luciano Gonzalez Torres movesto enjoin the revocation of the

legal status he obtained through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)

program in order to permit him to apply for an extension of his DACA status. 

Defendants U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services(“USCIS”),U.S.Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“USCBP”) oppose the motion. Having

carefully considered the matter presented, the court record, the arguments of counsel

and, for the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion for preliminary

injunction. 

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2017, Plaintiff commenced this declaratory and injunctive

relief action seeking a declaration that the automatic termination of his DACA status,

without notice or an opportunity to contest the termination, (1) failed to comply with

the DACA Standard Operating Procedures (“DACA SOP”); (2) violated the arbitrary,

capricious, and abuse of discretion standard of the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”); and (3) violated Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process rights under the Fifth

Amendment. 

Plaintiff Obtains DACA Status

Plaintiff is a 24-year-old citizen of Mexico who was brought to the United States

by his family when he was eight years old. Plaintiff and his family entered the United

States without authorization fromthe Attorney General. Since his entry into the United

States, Plaintiff has lived in San Diego, California where he graduated from Altus

Charter High School in 2011. From 2011 to 2013 Plaintiff was unable to obtain lawful

employment due to his immigration status. Plaintiff has no criminal convictions and

had never been arrested until the 2016 detention in this case.

In June 2012, the Obama Administration created a program which allowed

certain immigrants to avoid deportation and obtain work permits for a period of two

years, renewable upon good behavior. The contours of the DACA program were set

out in a June 15, 2012 Memorandum from former Secretary of the DHS, Janet

Napolitano, and which became known as the “Napolitano Memo.” The Napolitano

Memo provided the criteria to be satisfied before an individual could be considered for

an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In broad brush, one qualified for DACA status

upon showing that the individual:

• entered the United States before their 16th birthday and prior to June 2007; 

• lived continuously in the United States during the previous five years; 

• was currently in school, a high school graduate or was honorably discharged

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from the military;

• was under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; and 

• not have been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, three other

misdemeanors, nor posed a threat to national or public safety. 

The program did not, and still does not, provide lawful status or a path to

citizenship, nor, among other things, does it provide eligibility for federal welfare or

student aid. (Pls. Exh. B).

In early 2013, satisfying all prerequisites for DACA status, Plaintiff applied for,

and was granted, DACA status. Having obtained DACA status, Plaintiff was

considered “lawfully present” in the country and granted anEmployment Authorization

Document (“EAD”) and Social Security Number, so that Plaintiff could be lawfully

employed. The approval letter issued by USCIS informed Plaintiffthat “in the exercise

of its prosecutorial discretion, [USCIS] has decided to defer action on” his case for a

period of two years. “Deferred action does not confer or alter any immigration status.” 

(Pl. Exh. I). In 2014, DHS renewed Plaintiff’s DACA status.

Upon receipt of DACA status, Plaintiff obtained full-time employment in the

airline food packaging industry and worked in that industry from2013 until May 2016,

working the 7:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. shift. The hiring process involved interviews, drug

tests, background checks, and verification of employment authorization. Plaintiff used

a portion of his income to financially support his family. In May 2016, Plaintiff’s

DACA status was purportedly revoked by the USCIS in a Notice of Action. Plaintiff

informed his employer of the loss of DACA status and was terminated. The employer

informed Plaintiff that he could re-apply for employment once he obtains work

authorization. 

Revocation of DACA Status

On May 6, 2016, Plaintiff declares that an acquaintance named Adolfo asked

him, as he had in the past, to look after his dogs while he was out of town. Plaintiff

went to Adolfo’s home, took care of the dogs, and encountered two other individuals

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at the home. Plaintiff planned to have his sister pick him up from Adolfo’s house and

drive him to work by 7:00 p.m., the shift start time. At 4:00 p.m., a few hours after

arriving at Adolfo’s house, USCBP officers knocked on the door and asked Plaintiff

if they could search the premises. He informed the USCBP officers that they needed

a search warrant to enter the home as he did not believe he “had permission to let them

in because it was not my house.” (Gonzalez Decl. ¶11). The Officers did not enter the

home, but remained outside.

Around 5:00 p.m. a man not known to Plaintiff arrived, represented that he was

the owner of the house, and asked Plaintiff to exit his home. Outside the home,

Plaintiff was interviewed by USCBP officers and informed them that he possessed

DACA status and a valid EAD. According to Plaintiff, he was then arrested,

handcuffed, and spent the next two days being “aggressively” interrogated by two

officers. The officers asked him about “wrongdoing at the house that I did not

understand. I kept asking them for details and telling them, ‘I don’t understand why

I’m being detained.’” (Id. ¶18). “No one interrogated [Plaintiff] after those first two

or three days,” or after his release from custody.

After two or three days, Plaintiff was transferred to another facility. On June 1,

2016, Plaintiff was provided with a bond hearing before Immigration Judge

McSeveney, and released two days later on a $5,000 bond. In the sixteen months since

his release, Plaintiff has not had any law enforcement contacts. At oral argument, the

court was advised the matter of Plaintiff’s removal is still pending.

To provide additional context to Plaintiff’s declaration,Defendantsrepresent that

Plaintiff (and another individual arrested at the searched house) was arrested on May

6, 2016, for harboring illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and

§1182(a)(6)(E)(i). Once the owner of the home arrived at Adolfo’s residence, the

owner consented to permit USCBP agents to search the residence (the renters were not

at home). Inside, USCBP discovered 12 illegal aliens(five from China and seven from

Mexico) hiding in the attic. The record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien documents

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indicate that three material witnesses identified Plaintiff as the individual who told

them to hide in the attic.

On May 7, 2016, USCIS issued Plaintiff a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging

him as “inadmissible” to the United States (i.e. Plaintiff was deemed unlawfully

present in the country) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i). On May 23, 2016,

USCIS provided Plaintiff with a Notice of Action informing him that his DACA status

and employment authorization had been automatically terminated as of the date of the

NTA (May 7, 2016). The Notice of Action also informed Plaintiff that an appeal or

motion to reopen/reconsider “may not be filed.” (Pls. Exh. N). 

The DACA SOP

The DACA SOP issued by DHS sets forth the procedures for adjudicating

DACA applications, renewals, and the termination of participation in DACA. In

pertinent part, the DACA SOP outlines four procedures to be followed upon

termination or revocation of DACA status. First, in the event an immigration officer

learns that DACA status was either erroneously or fraudulently issued to a DACA

recipient, the agency issues a Notice of Intent to Terminate (“NOIT”) to the recipient. 

The NOIT provides notice that, upon termination of DACA status, the recipient will

lose employment authorization. The DACA SOP provides that the NOIT must inform

the recipient that he or she has “33 days to file a brief or statement contesting the

grounds cited in the” NOIT. (Pls. Exh.F at 136). 

Second, the DACA SOP also provides that criminal offenses or public safety

concerns deemed to be Egregious Public Safety (“EPS”) cases, as defined in the

November 7, 2011 Memorandum for EPS cases (“2011 Memorandum”), may serve as

a basis to terminate DACA status. Once the underlying conduct is found to be an EPS

case, the officer then forwards the case to the Background Check Unit DACA Team

(“BCU”) who, in turn, forwards the case to ICE for application of the 2011

Memorandum. In the event ICE accepts the case and issues an NTA, the recipient will

automatically lose DACA status. Additionally, upon filing the NTA with EOIR

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(Executive Office for Immigration Review), the recipient’s employment authorization

terminates automatically. (Id. at 137). 

Third, in the event ICE does not accept the EPS case, or the underlying offense

is non-EPS conduct, BCU DACA Team is instructed to reopen the case and issue a

NOIT. The individual then has 33 days to submit a brief contesting the grounds for

removal identified in the NOIT.

Fourth, in the event USCIS determines, after consulting with ICE, that exercising

prosecutorial discretion is not consistent with DHS’s enforcement policies, and ICE

does not plan to issue an NTA, the officer refers the matter through the normal chain of

command to Headquarters Service Center Operations (“HSCO”). In the event HSCO

determines that the case warrants final termination, the DACA recipient must be

provided with DACA Form 603, and an opportunity to respond. 

In short, except in EPS cases, the DACA SOP requires notice and an ability to

contest the NOIT before DACA status may be terminated. In EPS cases, DACA status

is automatically revoked once ICE accepts the case and issues a NTA. However, as set

forth in the November 7, 2011 Policy Memorandum, an NTA can only by issued by

USCIS under limited circumstances not applicable here (in cases involving modifying

conditions of residency, denial of FormI-829, termination of refugee status, adjustment

of status denials, and asylum). (Pls. Exh. G). It is undisputed that Defendants did not

comply with any of the specified DACA termination provisions, including the referral

of the case to ICE for a decision on the issuance of an NTA. 

Recent DACA Related Events

On September 5, 2017, Defendant DHS announced a plan to eliminate DACA,

beginning in March 2018. Current DACA recipients whose status expires on or before

March 5, 2018, may apply for a two-year renewal, but renewal applications are due on

or before October 5, 2017.

In light of the numerous recent government issued memoranda concerning

modificationsto immigration policies, laws, regulations and procedures, the court notes

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that these memoranda preserve the DACA program. For example, on February 20,

2017, the Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly issued an implementing

Memorandum stating that DHS “will no longer exempt classes or categories of

removable aliens frompotential enforcement.” However, the memorandumspecifically 

left intact the DACA program. On June 15, 2017, Secretary Kelly issued a

memorandum rescinding the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful

Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), but temporarily leaving the DACA program in place. 

(Pls. Exh. A).

In light ofthe announced elimination of DACA, and the October 5, 2017 deadline

for renewals under DACA, Plaintiff seeks expedited relief to enjoin Defendants from

enforcing the termination of his DACA status in order to permit him to file a DACA

renewal application. On September 21, 2017, the court entered an Amended Scheduling

Order setting the matter for oral argument on September 28, 2017.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

To obtain preliminary or temporary injunctive relief, the party must satisfy one

of two tests: (1) a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable

harm, or (2) the party raises serious questions and the balance of hardship tips in its

favor. Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987).

"These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required

degree of irreparable harmincreases asthe probability ofsuccess decreases." Id. Under

both formulations, however, the party must demonstrate a "fair chance ofsuccess on the

merits" and a "significant threat of irreparable injury." Id; Miller v. California Pac.

Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1994 (en banc). The court also considers the

public interest in the issues raised by the parties. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008).

1

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a), the court treats Plaintiff’s motion as one for

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preliminary injunctive relief.

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Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that the jurisdictionalstripping provision ofthe Immigration

and Naturalization Act preventsthis court from reviewing Plaintiff’s claim. The statute

provides:

Except as provided in thissection and notwithstanding any other provision

of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or

any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such

title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on

behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney

General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal

orders against any alien under this chapter. 

8 U.S.C. §1252(g). The parties do not dispute that, as stated in the statute, this court

does not have jurisdiction to entertain claims “arising from the decision or action by the

AttorneyGeneral to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders

against any alien.” Id. Under this provision, the court is stripped of jurisdiction to

entertain Defendants’ ultimate discretionary determination as to Plaintiff’s DACA

status. However, Defendants misconstrue §1252(g). 

Section 1252(g) must be construed narrowly and “applies only to three discrete

actions. . . ‘to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” 

Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2004); Coyotl v. Kelly, 2017 WL

2889681 (N.D. GA. June 12, 2017) (jurisdictional stripping provision does not bar the

exercise of jurisdiction over claim that termination of DACA status occurred without

following the non-discretionary termination provisions of the DACA SOP); (United

States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004) (district court may consider

“a purely legal conclusion that does not challenge the Attorney General’s discretionary

authority, even if the answer . . . forms the backdrop against which the Attorney General

later will exercise discretionary authority”); Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001,

1004 (9th Cir. 2003) (courts “retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims, even

when those claim address [agency] discretion”). Accordingly, this provision does not

deprive the court of jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s claim that the termination of his

DACA status did not comply with the non-discretionary DACA SOP.

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Similarly, the provision related to the review of orders of removal, 8 U.S.C.

§1252(b)(9), does not prevent the court fromentertaining Plaintiff’s claims. Here, there

is no final order of removal entered against Plaintiff and no proceedings have been

commenced against Plaintiff. As noted in Sing v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir.

2007), §1252(b)(9) “appl[ies] only to those claims seeking judicial review of orders of

removal.” Here, Plaintiff brings a procedural challenge to termination of his DACA

status, an issue independent fromany removal proceedings. Accordingly, this provision

does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s claim.

In sum, the court concludes that it possesses jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s

claims.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Both Counts One and Two in the complaint seek relief pursuant to the APA, 5

U.S.C. §702, based upon Defendants failure to comply with the DACA SOP when

terminating Plaintiff’s DACA status. Under the APA, “[a] person suffering legal wrong

because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within

the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. §702. The

APA further states “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action

for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 

Id. § 704. Section 706 instructs the court reviewing agency action to “decide all

relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and

determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” Not only shall

the reviewing court compel agency action unlawfully withheld but shall also “hold

unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be – (A)

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

Id. §§706(1) and (2)(A). 

The court concludes that Defendants’ failure to follow the termination procedures

set forth in the DACA SOP is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. See U.S.

ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d

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1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) (an agency’s failure to follow its own procedures is a

sufficient ground to set aside agency action). Two of the four DACA SOP termination

procedures require the appropriate agency to provide the DACA recipient with a NOIT

identifying the grounds for termination and providing 33 days to file a brief orstatement

contesting the grounds. (Pls. Exh. F at 136-37). Defendants did not comply with this

procedure in the DACA SOP. One other means of terminating DACA status is to refer

the matter to HSCO which then determines whether the case warrants final termination. 

If so, the DACA recipient must be provided with DACA Form 603, and an opportunity

to respond. Defendants did not comply with this procedure in the DACA SOP. Lastly,

while DACA status may be terminated by ICE in an EPS case, the Notice received by

Plaintiff identified his presence in the United States without being admitted or paroled

in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as the grounds for removal. A violation of

that provision does not constitute an EPS case because the 2011 Memorandum

identifies only certain aggravated felony alien smuggling offenses (8 U.S.C.

§1001(a)(43)(N)) as disqualifying criminal conduct. Unlawful presence in violation of

§1182(a)(6)(A)(i) is not an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court concludes that

Defendants have failed to follow their own proceduresin terminating Plaintiff’s DACA

status.

Defendants broadly argue that the DHS possesses such broad prosecutorial

discretion that they need not follow the DACA SOP in terminating the status of DACA

recipients. The court categorically rejects this proposition. While Defendants are

granted broad discretion to commence, adjudicate, and execute removal orders, a

fundamental principle of federal law is that a federal agency must follow its own

procedures. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 233-35 (1974) (“[W]here the rights of

individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own

procedures.”); Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 809 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that INS

violated its own regulation in processing a non-citizen's request for immigration

records); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969) (courts must overturn

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agency actions which do not scrupulously follow the regulations and procedures

promulgated by the agency itself). In Accardi, 347 U.S. 260, the petitioner alleged that

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) failed to exercise its discretion in

determining his application for suspension of deportation. Id. at 261. Petitioner alleged

that the BIA deferred to the decision of the Attorney General and, therefore, did not

exercise its own regulatory discretion in determining his application. The BIA denied

petitioner’s application allegedly because petitioner’s name was on a list of immigrants

the Attorney General wanted deported. The regulatory scheme required the BIA to

exercise its own judgment when considering immigration appeals, and not to rely upon

the Attorney General’s determinations. The Supreme Court reversed the BIA’s denial

of the application and remanded for further proceedings because the BIA allegedly

failed to exercise its own discretion as required by its own relevant regulations. 

Defendants further contend, in essence, the NTA issued by USCBP in connection

with removal proceedings for Plaintiff was tantamount to ICE issuing a NTA

terminating DACA status pursuant to the DACA SOP. But this position isindefensible

for several reasons. First, as discussed elsewhere in this order, the NTA for removal

proceedings was predicated upon the “ground” of being illegally present, a charge that

is not an aggravated felony for purposes of EPS rules. See 8 U.S.C. §1001(a)(43)(N);

Pls. Exh. G at pp. 61-62. Second, contrary to defendants’ position that immigration

removal proceedings are the proper forum for Plaintiff to raise his DACA termination

status, an immigration judge has no jurisdiction to reinstate DACA status, or to

authorize an application for renewal of DACA status, as acknowledged by Defendants

at oral argument. Basically, Defendants’ argument that a USCBP issued NTA for

removal purposesisthe equivalent of an ICE issued NTA for an EPS case under DACA

has no basis in law. The two NTAs are not fungible, or “flip sides of the same coin,”

as advanced by Defendants at oral argument.

Here, Defendants have failed to present any evidence that they complied with the

termination of DACA status provisionsset forth in the DACA SOP. Moreover, Plaintiff

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has made a strong showing that he islikely to prevail on his APA claim that Defendants

acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused their discretion by failing to follow the

DACA SOP. 

In sum, the court concludes that Plaintiff has made a strong showing that he is

likely to prevail on the merits. 

Procedural Due Process

Because the court resolved Plaintiff’s claims based upon a statutory analysis, the

court does not reach the claimthat Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment procedural

due process rights. In any event, the court notes that the remedy for violation of the

DACA SOP - - notice and an opportunity to contest administrative action - - is an

equivalent remedy available under the due process clause.

Irreparable Harm

The court concludes that Plaintiff will suffer significant irreparable harm in the

absence of an injunction by losing his DACA status and the ability to apply for renewal

of that status. The potential harm caused by Defendants’ conduct includes the loss of

employment, a core benefit under DACA. The deprivation of employment impacts

Plaintiff’s ability to financially provide for himself and his family. See Cleveland Bd.

Of Ed. v. Laudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (loss of livelihood is a severe harm). 

The loss of DACA status also undermines one’s sense of well-being and subjects

Plaintiff to a constant threat of apprehension and possible removal from the only

country he has called home. This threatened harm far exceeds any harm suffered by the

government. This court is simply requiring Defendants to follow their own procedural

dictates for termination of DACA status by essentially giving Plaintiff a meaningful

opportunity to be heard before any determination to terminate his DACA statusis made. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s pursuit of a legal remedy 16 months after his

DACA status wasterminated undermines his claim of irreparable harm. This argument

is not persuasive. The precipitating event giving rise to the present action is the

September 5, 2017 announcement by DHS that the DACA program is being phased out

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and any DACA renewals had to be filed on October 5, 2017. Under these

circumstances, Plaintiff’s pursuit of this action is timely.

In sum, Plaintiff has demonstrated a significant threat of irreparable harm. 

The Public Interest

The court concludes that the public interest consideration is multi-faceted and

difficult to assess in light of the current political situation. There is no doubt that there

is strong interest in enforcing U.S. immigration laws effectively and consistently. On

the other hand, the public has a strong interest in the fair and even-handed treatment of

immigrants. The court also notes that (1) DACA and DACA recipients have strong

nationalsupport asreflected in numerous public opinion polls, as well as broad political

support, and (2) the political process may comprehensively address the DACA program

in the foreseeable future. 

In sum, at the present time, this factor neither strongly favors one side nor the

other. 

The Balance of Equities

Applying the Arcamuzi balancing test, Plaintiff has made a strong showing of the

likelihood ofsuccess on the merits and irreparable harm such that entry of a preliminary

injunction is warranted under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the court Grants Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction and

(1) Orders that Defendants’ May 7, 2016 revocation of Plaintiff’s DACA status

is vacated and Defendants are preliminary enjoined from enforcing the said revocation;

(2) Orders that Defendants’ termination of Plaintiff’s EAD is vacated and

Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from terminating Plaintiff’s employment

authorization;

(3) Orders that Defendants shall fully comply with the DACA SOP should

Defendants elect to reconsider Plaintiff’s DACA status; and 

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(4) Orders that Defendants accept Plaintiff’s DACA renewal application. 

Finally, this order is to remain in effect pending further Order of this court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 29, 2017

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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