Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00410/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00410-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

GWENDOLYN STALLWORTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

BIBB COUNTY, ALABAMA, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 7:14-CV-410-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This matter is before the court on the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Mindy 

Goodwin and Christopher Poole (Doc. # 23)1and by Sheriff Keith Hannah (Doc. # 25). The 

Motions have been fully briefed. (Docs. # 24, 26, 28, 29 and 30). 

I. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT FACTS

This case stems from Plaintiff’s incarceration in the Bibb County Jail from December 2, 

2012 through December 3, 2012 on the charge of Failure to Appear (FTA) for a speeding ticket. 

The crux of the case is Plaintiff’s claim that she was subjected to excessive force and false 

imprisonment and that her personal property was taken from her. The Second Amended 

Complaint (Doc. # 18) asserts the following claims: (1) Count 1: Federal Constitutional 

Violations (asserting various violations of the 14th Amendment) against Defendants Poole and 

Goodwin; (2) Count 2: Federal Constitutional Violations against Defendant Hannah; and (3) 

Count 3: State tort claims against Defendants Poole and Goodwin, including assault and battery

against Poole, conversion against Poole and Goodwin, false imprisonment against Poole and

 

1 The Motion by Defendants Poole and Goodwin is a partial motion to dismiss seeking to dismiss all state 

law tort claims and all official capacity claims. (Doc. # 23).

FILED

 2014 Jul-16 AM 08:33

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-00410-RDP Document 33 Filed 07/16/14 Page 1 of 10
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Goodwin, invasion of privacy/outrage against Poole and Goodwin. (Docs. # 18, 24, 26, 28 and 

29)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Poole and Goodwin used a “rude, harsh and demeaning 

tone” to her, sprayed her with mace, strip searched her and performed a body cavity search in 

front of male inmates, put her−while naked−in a dirty cell with no furniture or toilet, refused to 

tell her the amount of her bail, and failed to return $500 of the money she had with her when she 

was arrested. Defendant Hannah is merely alleged to be the Sheriff and, therefore, responsible 

for the lack of training and supervision of Poole and Goodwin, as well as the administration of 

the Bibb County Jail. (Doc. # 18). 

Defendant Hannah has moved to dismiss all claims against him. Defendants Poole and 

Goodwin have moved to dismiss the state law claims against them, as well as the official 

capacity claims against them. (Docs. # 24 and 26). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Having said that, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that 

contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not 

meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and 

conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the 

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complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 

F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). 

In her responses to Defendants’ Motions, Plaintiff argues the wrong pleading standard. 

(Docs. # 28 and 29). Under Twombly, Plaintiff’s Complaint must present plausible theories of 

liability and allege specific facts establishing each claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’” the complaint must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plausible claim for relief requires “enough fact[s] to 

raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the claim. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

The Supreme Court has identified “two working principles” for a district court to use in 

applying the facial plausibility standard. First, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must 

assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to 

accept as true legal conclusions when they are “couched as [] factual allegation[s].” Iqbal, 129 

S. Ct. at 1950. Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a 

motion to dismiss.” Id. Application of the facial plausibility standard involves two steps. Under 

one prong, the court must determine the scope and nature of the factual allegations that are wellpleaded and assume their veracity; and under the other prong, the court must proceed to 

determine the claim’s plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is context specific and, 

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to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based on its “judicial experience and 

common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. If the court 

determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the 

claims are due to be dismissed. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Official Capacity Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff’s “official capacity” section 1983 claims against all Defendants are due to be 

dismissed because these claims are, in actuality, claims against Bibb County itself. “[O]fficial 

capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against the entity of 

which an officer is an agent.” Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472 n. 21 (1985). Suits against an 

individual acting in his official capacity impose liability on the governmental entity the official 

represents. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Because suits 

against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits are functionally 

equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local 

government officials, because local government units can be sued directly. . . .”). Because 

Plaintiff’s official capacity section 1983 claims against Defendants are claims against the 

County, they are due to be dismissed. However, Defendants Pool and Goodwin have not moved 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s individual capacity section 1983 claims against them and those claims are 

not affected by this ruling.

B. Individual Capacity Section 1983 Claims Against Defendant Hannah

Suits against municipal officials in their individual capacities are claims against the 

officials themselves as relief is sought from the person, not the governmental entity he 

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represents. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Defendant Hannah, therefore, is a 

“person” subject to suit under section 1983, when sued in his individual capacity. See Toth v. 

City of Dothan, 953 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (noting that state officials sued in 

their individual capacities are “persons” for purposes of Section 1983 and that they may be held 

personally liable for damages under Section 1983 for actions taken in their official capacities). 

However, “[i]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable 

under [section] 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat 

superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)). Supervisory liability under section 

1983 may occur “‘when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional 

violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and 

the alleged deprivation.’” Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant 

Hannah personally participated in any conduct directed toward her while at the Bibb County Jail. 

In fact, Plaintiff’s Complaint pleads no facts suggesting Defendant Hannah was even aware that 

Plaintiff had been arrested or was in custody. (See, generally, Doc. # 18). The question then is 

whether there is a sufficient causal connection between Defendant Hanna’s actions or inaction 

and Defendants Poole and Goodwin’s alleged conduct.

A causal connection may be established when: 1) a “history of widespread abuse” puts 

the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he or she

fails to do so; 2) a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to 

constitutional rights; or 3) facts support an inference that the supervisor directed subordinates to 

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act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from 

doing so. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff makes nothing more than conclusory allegations that Defendant Hannah was 

responsible for the actions of Defendants Poole and Goodwin. She alleges that Defendants Poole 

and Goodwin were acting as Hannah’s agents, according to his policies, or because he failed to 

properly train them. (Doc. # 18 at && 6-7, 28-32). Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegation 

of any prior incidents similar to the one she experienced. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts 

that could support an inference that Defendant Hannah knew that Defendants Poole and 

Goodwin would act unlawfully but failed to intervene or was deliberately indifferent. See Bd of 

Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty, Okla v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997) (deliberate indifference 

exists when supervisor disregards a known or obvious consequence of his action). Thus, 

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Defendant Hannah in his individual capacity are also due 

to be dismissed. 

Additionally, Defendant Hannah argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on 

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against him in his individual capacity. Qualified immunity is not 

only immunity from liability, but also immunity from defending the suit itself. See e.g., Behrens 

v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985). A 

qualified immunity determination requires the application of a multi-part test. First, a defendant 

must establish that he was acting within his discretionary authority as a public employee when 

the conduct in question occurred. Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1158. Next, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate “‘that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly 

established at the time of the alleged violation.’” Id. (quoting Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 

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1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)). In previous years, this two-step inquiry was to be conducted in 

sequential order. That is, the court was required to decide in the first instance whether a right 

existed (and whether it was violated) before deciding whether that right was clearly established

as of the time of the alleged violation. Now, however, courts may “‘exercise their sound 

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 

addressed first.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).

A district court may dismiss a complaint when the complaint, on its face, contains 

allegations which will support the defense. Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 

1993). Assuming Plaintiff’s factual allegations are true, as the court must, this is a case where 

qualified immunity is due to be granted to Defendant Hannah at this stage. The actions alleged 

to have been taken by Defendant Hannah were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his

duties as Sheriff and were within the scope of his authority. See Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 

1564 (11th Cir. 1988); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff’s 

claims are based on Defendant Hannah’s supervisory duties and upon the implementation and 

enforcement of the Bibb County Sheriff’s Office policies. Therefore, the actions alleged to have 

been taken by Defendant Hannah clearly fall within his discretionary authority. “[T]he 

determination that an officer was acting within his discretionary authority is quite a low hurdle to 

clear.” Godby v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390, 1401 (M.D. Ala. 1999).

As to whether Defendant Hannah’s conduct constitutes a violation of a constitutional 

right, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant Hannah personally participated in the unconstitutional 

conduct or there is a causal connection between the alleged unconstitutional conduct and 

Defendant Hannah’s actions. Harper v. Lawrence County, 592 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 

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2010). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Hannah personally participated in the alleged 

unconstitutional conduct, nor has she alleged any other incidents which may support a pattern of 

such conduct. Her allegations regarding causation and an alleged “custom or policy” are not 

plausible under Iqbal and Twombly. Plaintiff does not plead “facts” relating to Defendant 

Hannah; rather, in relation to him, she merely asserts legal conclusions couched as factual 

allegations. Therefore, Defendant Hannah is entitled to qualified immunity. To the extent 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Hannah should be liable under some form of respondeat superior 

or vicarious liability, such a claim clearly fails because no such liability exists under § 1983. 

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1315 n.24 (11th Cir. 2010); Cook ex. rel. Tessier v. Sheriff of 

Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115-16 (11th Cir. 2005). 

C. State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s state law claims are only stated against Defendants Poole and Goodwin. 

Under Alabama law, a sheriff is a state executive officer and enjoys absolute immunity under the 

Alabama Constitution. Hereford v. Jefferson Cnty., 586 So.2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991) (citing Ala. 

Const. art. I, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law 

or equity.”)); see also Ex parte Shelley, 53 So.3d 887, 891 (Ala. 2009). In 2011, the Alabama 

legislature amended Ala. Code § 14–6–1 to address Shelley and extend immunity to jailers as 

well as deputy sheriffs. Section 14–6–1 now provides:

“The sheriff may employ persons to carry out his or her duty to 

operate the jail and supervise the inmates housed therein for whose 

acts he or she is civilly responsible. Persons so employed by the 

sheriff shall be acting for and under the direction and supervision 

of the sheriff and shall be entitled to the same immunities and legal 

protections granted to the sheriff under the general laws and the 

Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as long as such persons are 

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acting within the line and scope of their duties and are acting in 

compliance with the law.”

Ala.Code § 14–6–1 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff’s own pleading makes plain that Poole and 

Goodwin were acting as deputies and/or jailers under the Sheriff’s supervision and were also 

acting in the line and scope of their employment when dealing with Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s reliance 

on Ex Parte Shelley fails to acknowledge that the relevant statute, Ala. Code § 14-6-1, was 

enacted after the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelly. Indeed, the Alabama Legislature intended 

the enactment of § 14–6–1 to correct what it perceived as an incorrect result reached in Shelley

and to legislatively overrule that decision. Thus, based upon a straight forward application of § 

14–6–1, Defendants Poole and Goodwin are absolutely immune from Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Mindy Goodwin 

and Christopher Poole (Doc. # 23), and by Sheriff Keith Hannah (Doc. # 25) are each due to be 

granted.

1. Count 1 – Plaintiff’s “Federal Constitutional Violations” claim against 

Defendants Pool and Goodwin is due to be dismissed with prejudice to the extent it seeks to 

assert official capacity claims. Plaintiff’s Federal Constitutional claims will proceed against 

Defendants Poole and Goodwin in their individual capacities.

2. Count 2 – Plaintiff’s “Federal Constitutional Violations” claim against Defendant 

Hannah is due to be dismissed with prejudice.2

3. Count 3 – Plaintiff’s State Law Tort claims against Defendants Poole and 

Goodwin are due to be dismissed with prejudice. 

 

2 The court notes that the current Second Amended Complaint is Plaintiff’s third opportunity to present her 

claims.

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4. Finally, the court notes that Plaintiff’s remaining Section 1983 individual capacity 

claims against Defendants Poole and Goodwin are due to be repled because Plaintiff’s current 

pleading of those claims constitute “shotgun” pleading. The Eleventh Circuit has discouraged 

district courts from considering “shotgun” pleadings where a plaintiff asserts multiple claims of 

relief in single counts and “it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are 

intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. 

Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Kennedy v. Bell South Telecommunications, 

Inc. (AT&T), 546 Fed.Appx. 817, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2013). When faced with a complaint like the 

one here, in which the counts incorporate by reference all previous allegations and counts, the 

district court is faced with the task of culling through the allegations, identifying the claims, and, 

as to each claim identified, select the allegations that appear to be germane to the claim. “This 

task can be avoided if the defendant moves the court for a more definite statement or if the court, 

acting on its own initiative, orders a repleader.” Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222 1239 (11th 

Cir 2011). 

DONE and ORDERED this July 15, 2014.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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