Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02944/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02944-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERRYN HAYNES, an individual No. 2:06-CV-02944-MCE-EFB

doing business as "CALIFORNIA

STRAW WORKS,"

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

R. H. DYCK, INC., a California

corporation doing business as

"R. H. DYCK, INC.," et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Before the Court is the Estate of Sherryn Haynes’

(“Plaintiff”) Motion to Strike Defendants’ Substitution of

Attorney. Sherryn Haynes commenced this action in December of 1

2006. The Complaint alleges that R.H. Dyck, Inc. and other named 

defendants (“Defendants”) committed numerous violations of 35

U.S.C. § 292. 

Case 2:06-cv-02944-MCE -EFB Document 47 Filed 01/07/08 Page 1 of 6
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 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only provide for a 2

motion to strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Plaintiff’s motion falls into none of

these categories.

2

The Complaint seeks recovery of statutory fines, costs of suit,

and interest. On July 6, 2007, Ms. Haynes passed away. The

current Plaintiff, Ms. Haynes’ Estate, was substituted into this

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25.

During the pendency of Plaintiff’s motion to substitute,

Defendants entered a Substitution of Attorney which this Court

approved. Plaintiff now requests an order striking the

Substitution of Attorney and rescinding this Court’s order

approving said substitution. Although captioned as a motion to

strike, Plaintiff’s papers truly call for the disqualification 2

of Defendants’ recently substituted counsel. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court finds disqualification improper and hereby

DENIES the Motion to Strike. 

BACKGROUND

This case is but another chapter in the hotly contested saga

that began with a state court action between these parties filed

in 2002. By way of this motion, Plaintiff moves to disqualify

Defendants’ recently substituted counsel pursuant to the

advocate-witness rule. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges

sixty-six (66) violations of 35 U.S.C. § 292, the false marking

of a patent with the intent to deceive the public. 

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 Although the issue has not been fully briefed before the 3

Court, it appears the parties dispute whether a particular patent

covers a process or the resulting product.

3

As part of its case, Plaintiff wishes to prove that Defendants

were on notice that they were falsely marking their rice wattles,

a product for which Ms. Haynes allegedly held a patent.

In 2002, the Defendants in this action sued the Plaintiffs

in state court alleging claims for unfair competition and unfair

business practices under California law. As part of that action,

the Plaintiffs in this action served upon the current Defendants

requests for admissions. By way of example, Plaintiff requested

admissions that Defendants were falsely advertising to the public

that they invented patented wattles, that Defendants never owned

any patent of a wattle, and that a patent held by Defendants did

not apply to a wattle. Defendants’ recently substituted 3

counsel, Glenn Peterson, was their counsel of record in the state

court action and the affidavits of service attached to those

discovery requests indicate that they were served on

Mr. Peterson. Defendants did not respond to this discovery and

the case was voluntarily dismissed.

ANALYSIS

The thrust of Plaintiff’s argument is that because the

above-referenced discovery requests were served upon

Mr. Peterson, he will be required to testify as to whether he

received those documents and as to whether or not he forwarded

the documents to his clients. 

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4

Through this testimony, Plaintiff believes it can prove

Defendants intended to deceive the public by showing that

Defendants received notice through Mr. Peterson of their illegal

activities and continued such activities in callous disregard of

the false marking statute. Plaintiff further argues that this

testimony is not protected by the attorney-client privilege

because the crime-fraud exception applies. The only crime or

fraud put forth in this argument is the alleged violations of 35

U.S.C. § 292, which are the subject of this action.

Federal courts apply state law in determining the

disqualification of an attorney. In re County of Los Angeles,

223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Local Rule 83-180(e). 

California Rule of Professional Conduct 5-210 provides that an

attorney shall not act as an advocate in a proceeding before a

jury. The rule provides for several exceptions, one of which

includes the informed written consent of the client. In the face

of an informed written consent, a court should only disqualify an

attorney where there is “a convincing demonstration of detriment

to the opponent or injury to the integrity of the judicial

process.” Lyle v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 470, 482 (4th

Dist. 1981). This rule does not apply to situations where a

lawyer in the advocate’s firm will testify. The comment to the

rule states that it “is intended to apply to situations in which

the [attorney] knows or should know that he or she ought to be

called as a witness.” Finally, Rule 5-210 only applies to

testimony at trial and, by its own terms, does not apply to

pretrial preparation of a case. See Yee v. Ventus Capital

Services, 2006 WL 3050827, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

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5

Plaintiff’s motion fails for several reasons. First, the

motion is premature. The trial in this matter is set for January

2009, more than a year in the future. Because Rule 5-210 does

not apply to pretrial proceedings, Plaintiff cannot establish

that Mr. Peterson should be disqualified at this juncture. 

Further, because Rule 5-210 does not apply to situations where

another attorney in the firm may be testifying, one of the other

recently substituted attorneys may be able to try the case. 

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that it will be necessary for

Mr. Peterson to testify, i.e., that he ought to testify, as

discussed in the comments to Rule 5-210. The Court can imagine a

plethora of other ways to gather evidence that the Defendants

received the discovery requests at issue here. Indeed,

Plaintiff’s moving papers indicate that members of Mr. Peterson’s

staff may be able to provide the testimony necessary. Pursuant

to Rule 5-210, this would not require disqualification. Here,

Defendants have given their informed consent to this

representation and this Court will not overturn their choice of

counsel where Plaintiff has failed to show actual detriment or

injury.

Finally, the Court notes that it will not address

Plaintiff’s claim that the crime-fraud exception applies to this

case. Plaintiff seeks an order vitiating the attorney-client

privilege as to the entire case, but Plaintiff has made no

showing to support such an order. The Court finds that issues of

this nature are better dealt with as they arise in the discovery

process.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike

Defendants’ Substitution of Attorney is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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