Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01469/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01469-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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,. 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CURTIS J. TALLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

AUG -91996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

LOU HESSE, BEN GRIEGO, 

ARISTEDES ZA VARAS, CHRIS 

CLEMENTS, KARL GILGE, 

WARRENT T. DIESSLIN, DONICE 

NEAL, IRVING JACQUEZ, 

No. 95-1469 

Defendants-Appellees, 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 93-K-2055) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Curtis J. Talley, Pro Se. 

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, and Laura M. Maresca, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-1469 Document: 01019279013 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 1 
Curtis J. Talley, a prose prisoner, brought this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 

against officers and employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections. Mr. 

Talley alleged numerous constitutional violations arising from disciplinary 

proceedings conducted against him. The district court adopted the report of a 

magistrate judge recommending that Mr. Talley's claims be dismissed. Mr. Talley 

appeals and we affirm. 1 

I 

Mr. Talley was charged under the penal discipline code with rape in the prison 

and with possession of dangerous contraband. After a disciplinary hearing, Mr. 

Talley was placed in administrative segregation and ultimately in a maximum 

security facility. In the present lawsuit, Mr. Talley asserts numerous constitutional 

violations, including allegations that he was denied due process in his disciplinary 

and segregation hearings, and in the revocation of his good time credits. After the 

district court determined that Mr. Talley's complaint was not subject to dismissal as 

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), discovery proceeded. Defendants subsequently 

filed a motion for summary judgment. Counsel was appointed to represent Mr. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 1Oth Cir. R. 

34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1469 Document: 01019279013 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 2 
Talley, and he filed an amended complaint. 

By the time the case was ready for a ruling on whether summary judgment was 

appropriate, the Supreme Court had decided Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 

(1995). The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Talley's due process claims were 

without merit under Sandin, that the remaining claims were not supported, and that 

defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. The district court 

adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and dismissed the 

complaint with prejudice. 

II 

As an initial matter, we observe that Mr. Talley did not file written objections 

to the magistrate judge's recommendations. This circuit has adopted a firm waiver 

rule under which a party who fails to make timely objection to the magistrate's 

findings and recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal 

questions. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (lOth Cir. 1991). This 

rule does not apply, however, when the ends of justice dictate otherwise or when the 

magistrate's order does not clearly apprise a pro se litigant of the consequences of 

a failure to object. Id. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1469 Document: 01019279013 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 3 
While the report here does inform Mr. Talley that his failure to file written 

objections may bar him from appealing the factual findings of the magistrate judge, 

the report does not state that a failure to object waives appellate review of legal 

questions as welJ.2 The magistrate judge recommended summary judgment be 

granted on the basis that no factual disputes existed and that defendants were entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Since the report does not inform Mr. Talley that his 

failure to object would bar review of these legal issues, we conclude that application 

of our waiver rule is not appropriate in this case. We therefore turn to the merits of 

the appeal. 

III 

Mr. Talley contends on appeal that the magistrate judge erred in applying the 

decision in Sandin retroactively, and that under prior Supreme Court decisions he 

was denied procedural due process. On the issue of retroactivity, the Supreme Court 

has held: 

"When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, 

that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be 

given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and 

2 The magistrate report states: "[T]he failure to file written 

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within ten days 

after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing 

the factual findings of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by 

the District Court." Rec., vol. I, doc. 94 at 12 (emhasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 95-1469 Document: 01019279013 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 4 
as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate 

our announcement of the rule." 

Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); see also Reynoldsville 

Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 (1995). 

In Sandin, the Court held that the plaintiffs discipline in segregated 

confinement was not the sort of atypical, significant deprivation that would give rise 

to a liberty interest entitled to due process protection. 115 S. Ct. at 2300. The Court 

further held that because the disciplinary action would not inevitably affect the 

duration of plaintiffs sentence under state parole regulations, procedural due process 

protection was not required. Id. at 2302. Significantly, the Court applied these 

holdings to the parties in that case. Under these circumstances, we agree with our 

sister circuits that Sandin is to be given retroactive application. See Samuels v. 

Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Domimique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 

1156, 1160 n.6 (1st Cir. 1996); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F .3d 931, 932 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1995) (per curiam). The magistrate judge thus did not err in applying Sandin to Mr. 

Talley's due process claims. 3 

Sandin makes clear that placement m administrative segregation such as 

occurred here does not gtve nse to a liberty interest. As a consequence, the 

procedures involved need not comply with procedural due process. Mr. Talley's due 

3 Mr. Talley does not dispute the magistrate's determination that the 

due process claims are without merit under Sandin. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1469 Document: 01019279013 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 5 
process claims are therefore foreclosed. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Judge Kelly concurs in the 

result only. 

Appellate Case: 95-1469 Document: 01019279013 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 6