Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01836/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01836-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OTONIEL TYLER PENNINGS,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15cv1836-CAB-BGS

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [Doc. No. 19] 

AND DENYING PETITION 

Otoniel Tyler Pennings (“Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. [Doc. No. 1.] This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Bernard 

G. Skomal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Magistrate Judge Skomal issued a 

Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommending the Court deny the petition. 

[Doc. No. 19.] Petitioner filed objections to the Report. [Doc. No. 20.]

Following de novo review of Petitioner’s claims, the Court finds the Report to be 

thorough, complete, and an accurate analysis of the legal issues presented in the petition. 

For the reasons explained below, the Court: (1) adopts the Report in full; (2) rejects 

Petitioner’s objections; (3) denies the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; and (4) denies 

a certificate of appealability.

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BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The Report contains an accurate recital of the facts as determined by the California 

Court of Appeal, and the Court fully adopts the Report’s statement of facts. As Judge

Skomal correctly noted, the Court presumes state court findings of fact to be correct.

II. State Procedural Background

The Report contains a complete and accurate summary of the state court 

proceedings, and the Court fully adopts the Report’s statement of state procedural 

background.

III. Federal Procedural Background

On August 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

challenging his San Diego County Superior Court conviction. [Doc. No. 1.] On 

December 9, 2015, Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition, and lodged portions of 

the state court record. [Doc. Nos. 8 and 9.] On April 13, 2016, Petitioner filed a Traverse. 

[Doc. No. 16.] 

On February 2, 2017, Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal issued a Report 

recommending that the petition be denied. [Doc. No. 19.] On February 27, 2017, 

Petitioner filed an Objection to the Report. [Doc. No. 20.] In his objection, Petitioner 

argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that the state court did not make an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Petitioner also requests an evidentiary 

hearing. Because Petitioner has objected to the Report in its entirety, the Court reviews 

the Report de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1022 

(9th Cir. 2004).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

The Report sets forth the correct standard of review for a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d):

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(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403, 412-13 (2000). 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established 

federal law if the state court (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this 

Court on a question of law” or (2) “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable 

from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. A state court's decision is an “unreasonable application” if the 

application was “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 

(2003).

Under § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is not available due to a state court's 

“unreasonable determination of the facts” unless the underlying factual determinations 

were objectively unreasonable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see 

also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds 

reviewing the record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively 

unreasonable).

II. Petitioner's Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

In his Petition, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. Section 2254(e) 

“substantially restricts the district court's discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja 

v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir.1999). Section 2254(e)(2) provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State 

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

claim unless the applicant shows that-

(A) the claim relies onCase 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 21 Filed 03/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
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(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

As the magistrate judge correctly noted, it does not appear that Petitioner 

developed the factual basis of the claims in state court or requested an evidentiary hearing 

in state court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (“Diligence will require 

in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state 

court in the manner prescribed by state law.”). Moreover, there is a sufficient factual 

basis in the record to resolve Petitioner’s claims. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 

657, 669-670 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, the magistrate judge correctly deferred to the state 

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“[A] determination of a factual issue made 

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct” and a petitioner has “the burden of 

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). Petitioner 

does not challenge the accuracy of any particular facts as set forth by the appellate court 

or explain what facts he would seek to develop at a hearing. The Court therefore 

DENIES Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing.

III. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner raises four claims in his Petition, all based on the denial of continuances 

of his criminal trial: (1) Denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel [Doc. No. 1 at 6]; 

(2) Due Process violation based on lack of time to prepare [Doc. No. 1 at 7]; (3) Due 

Process violation based on denial of continuance motions [Doc. No. 1 at 8]; and (4) Due 

Process violation by Court of Appeal for assumptions made [Doc. No. 1 at 9].

A. Claim One: Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Petitioner argues that the trial court abused its judicial discretion by granting a 

Faretta motion on the eve of trial but denying any reasonable continuances even though 

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it was evident Petitioner needed more time to prepare. [Doc. No. 1 at 6; Doc. No. 16 at 1-

4.] As Judge Skomal correctly noted, Petitioner’s right to counsel was not violated by 

being allowed to proceed without counsel, especially after being advised of all of the 

risks by the trial court. [Doc. No. 19 at 10-11.] Judge Skomal also correctly noted that 

Petitioner’s arguments regarding needing more time to prepare had been addressed by the 

trial court and reasonably denied. [Doc. No. 19 at 5-6.] In his objections, Petitioner 

states that his claim is not based on not being granted a reasonable continuance. [Doc. 

No. 20 at 5.] Rather, his “claim is based on not having been afforded his ‘pro per 

privileges.’” Id. However, as noted by the state appellate court, the trial court made a 

reasonable inquiry into what discovery Petitioner needed, ordered the prosecutor to 

provide the discovery, and granted a two-day continuance so Petitioner could review it. 

[Lod. 5 at 8-10.] The state appellate court concluded that, under the circumstances, a 

two-day continuance was reasonable. Id. The state appellate court’s determination was 

reasonable. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and denies the petition as to this 

claim.

B. Claims Two and Three: Due Process Violation -- lack of time to prepare and 

denial of continuance motions

Similarly, in Claims Two and Three, Petitioner argues that he did not have enough 

time to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, and this was a violation of his due process 

rights. [Doc. No. 1 at 6-8.] As Judge Skomal correctly noted, the Court of Appeal’s 

decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law because its conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Petitioner’s requests for continuances was reasonable. [Doc. No. 19 at 15.] In his 

objections, Petitioner discusses events that are the subject of another civil rights lawsuit 

regarding his incarceration at the George Bailey Detention Center and which allegedly 

occurred after October 14, 2014 – more than two years after his conviction. [Doc. No. 20 

at 6-7.] These allegations are irrelevant to whether Petitioner’s due process rights were 

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violated at the time of trial. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and denies the 

petition as to Claims Two and Three.

C. Claim Four: Due Process violation -- Court of Appeal assumptions

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal erred in agreeing with Respondent’s 

argument on appeal that he was seeking continuances for purposes of delay, because that 

was not the basis for the trial court’s denial of a continuance. [Doc. No. 1 at 8.] As 

correctly noted by Judge Skomal, the Court of Appeal’s inclusion of the language 

regarding delay appears to be a reasonable inference from the circumstances of the case, 

but was not the basis for the Court of Appeal’s opinion finding no abuse of discretion.

[Doc. No. 19 at 19-21.] In his objections, Petitioner states that he had other potential 

witnesses he wanted to interview but chose not to disclose them to the trial court in front 

of the prosecutor. [Doc. No. 20 at 8.] Regardless of Petitioner’s motivations, this merely 

confirms that, given the information provided to the trial court, the denial of further 

continuances was reasonable. Petitioner’s other arguments regarding lack of access to 

the law library and access to the investigator were presented to the trial court and 

reasonably denied. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and denies the petition as to 

this claim.

D. State law issues.

Throughout his petition and traverse, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s denials of 

continuances violated California Penal Code §§1049 and 1050(a). As noted by Judge 

Skomal, these are issues of state law and are not cognizable on federal habeas review. 

[Doc. No. 19 at 21 and 22.]

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A petitioner complaining of detention arising from state court proceedings must 

obtain a certificate of appealability to file an appeal of the final order in a federal habeas 

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2007). The district court may issue a certificate 

of appealability if the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To make a “substantial showing,” the petitioner 

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must “demonstrat[e] that ‘reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of 

the constitutional claims debatable[.]’ ” Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 984 (9th 

Cir.2002) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Petitioner has not 

made a “substantial showing” as to any of the claims raised by his petition, and thus the 

Court sua sponte denies a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Petitioner has not established that the appellate court's decision was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state courts. The Court hereby: (1) adopts the Report in full; (2) rejects 

Petitioner's objections; (3) denies the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; and (4) denies a 

certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2017

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