Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00725/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00725-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO R. MORENO, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

CIV-S-01-0725 DFL DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

This case arises from the January 2001 demolition of a

building owned by plaintiff Mario Moreno (“Moreno”). In June

2005, the case was tried to a jury on plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress claims. During the trial, defendants made

several Rule 50 motions based on their arguments that: (1) the

individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (2)

there is insufficient evidence against defendant Max Fernandez

(“Fernandez”) to justify a verdict against him; (3) both the

individual defendants and the City of Sacramento (the “City”) are

entitled to state law immunity; and (4) there is insufficient

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evidence to justify an award of punitive damages. (Mot. at 1-2.) 

The court took these motions under consideration to be decided,

if necessary, after the verdict. 

On June 10, 2005, the jury returned a verdict in favor of

Moreno and against defendants Joshua Pino (“Pino”), John Vanella

(“Vanella”), Fernandez, and the City on all claims. The jury

awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $330,000 for the

Fourteenth Amendment violation and $37,000 for the Fourth

Amendment violation. Additionally, the jury awarded $200,000 in

punitive damages based on Pino’s conduct and $150,000 based on

Vanella’s conduct. Judgment was entered in favor of Moreno on

June 13, 2005. 

Defendants filed this motion on June 29, 2005, renewing

their request for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) under Rule

50 on the grounds raised during trial. They also bring this

motion under Rule 60, arguing that the court erroneously entered

judgment before hearing additional evidence relating to the

qualified immunity defense. Finally, to support their qualified

immunity argument, defendants seek to introduce additional

testimony from the individual defendants as to their knowledge of

the relevant law.

I. 

A. Timeliness of the Motion

As an initial matter, Moreno argues that defendants’ renewed

Rule 50 motion is untimely because it was not made within ten

days of the entry of judgment, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). 

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(Opp’n at 1-3.) In the absence of a timely renewal of a motion

for JMOL, the trial judge lacks the power to grant such relief. 

Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir.

1998). This holds true even if the court takes the pre-verdict

JMOL motion under advisement. Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.

Co., 344 U.S. 48, 51-53, 73 S.Ct. 125 (1952) (rejecting argument

that trial judge’s express reservation of a decision on a Rule 50

motion relieves a party from duty under 50(b) to make a motion

for judgment after verdict); Warkentien v. Vondracek, 633 F.2d 1,

2 n.1 (6th Cir. 1980) (“[E]xpress reservation of a directed

verdict motion does not authorize a district court to direct a

verdict contrary to the jury’s decision in the absence of a

motion for a judgment n.o.v.”); 9 Moore’s Fed. Practice § 50.41

(3d Ed. 2004). 

Here, defendants filed their renewed Rule 50 motion on June

29, 2005, two days after the expiration of the ten-day period. 

While admitting that the motion was filed beyond the ten-day

period, defendants contend that this motion is more appropriately

viewed as a Rule 60 motion seeking relief from a judgment or

order and, as such, is not untimely. (Reply at 2.) 

Specifically, defendants contend that the court entered judgment

prematurely because they were denied the opportunity to present

additional evidence following trial relating to the qualified

immunity defense. (Id.) 

Given defendants’ confusion over the possibility of

introducing new evidence following trial, the court has

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discretion under Rule 60 to vacate the entry of judgment and

consider defendants’ motion. See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l,

814 F.2d 1263, 1266 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding it within the

court’s equitable power to vacate the entry of judgment arising

from mistake, and consider a motion for a new trial, where court

had ruled during trial that it would receive evidence on certain

issues after verdict was returned). However, before a court does

so, a moving party must convince the court that “vacating the

judgment will not be an empty exercise.” Local 59 v. Superline

Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1992). For the reasons

given below, the court finds that defendants’ Rule 50 motion

lacks merit and that the additional evidence they seek to present

is not relevant to the qualified immunity analysis. Accordingly,

the court declines to vacate the judgment under Rule 60 and

consider defendants’ untimely Rule 50 motion. 

B. Rule 50 Motion 

A jury verdict cannot be disturbed on a motion for JMOL if

each necessary element of the verdict is supported by

“substantial evidence.” Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177

F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “such

relevant evidence as reasonable minds may accept as adequate to

support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence.” Landes Contr. Co.

v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987). In

short, JMOL should only be granted when “the evidence . . . 

permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is

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contrary to that of the jury.” Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405

F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting White v. Ford Motor Co.,

312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The court “should review all of the evidence in the record”

to determine if substantial evidence supports each element

necessary to the jury’s verdict. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). When

examining the full record, “the court must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id.

1. Qualified Immunity

In reversing the court’s earlier grant of summary judgment,

the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of qualified immunity. 

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 2004 WL 1166530, at *1-3 (9th Cir.

2004). The Ninth Circuit found that, on the facts then before

the court, Moreno raised a triable issue as to whether his

“clearly established” constitutional rights had been violated. 

Id. The court deemed the law clearly established on both

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment seizure and Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claims. When defendants renewed their

request for qualified immunity following the Ninth Circuit’s

ruling, the court refused to revisit the issue because of the

Ninth Circuit’s ruling. (O3/01/2005 Order at 2.) 

Defendants now renew their request for qualified immunity,

relying upon nearly identical arguments to those raised in their

earlier motions. (Mot. at 2-7.) However, defendants have

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identified no evidence presented at trial that calls into

question either the jury’s finding of constitutional violations

or the Ninth Circuit’s qualified immunity ruling. Indeed, to the

extent that there were facts in dispute that might alter the

qualified immunity analysis, those facts have been determined

against the defendants. Accordingly, there is no basis for the

court to revisit the qualified immunity issue. 

Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling does not

foreclose the court from reconsidering the qualified immunity

issue. (Mot. at 2.) They assert that, even where a

constitutional violation is clearly established, the court must

still inquire as to whether a reasonable officer would understand

that to be the case on the particular facts of the case. (Id. at

3.) Accordingly, defendants argue that even though the Ninth

Circuit found violations of clearly established constitutional

law, that does not foreclose a finding by the court that a

reasonable officer would not understand that his conduct violated

the law on the specific facts presented in this case. (Id.) 

Additionally, they assert that the individual defendants’

personal knowledge of the relevant law is pertinent to this

qualified immunity inquiry. (Reply at 2.) They seek to

introduce additional testimony from Pino, Vanella, and Fernandez

on the following topics: (1) their general reliance on the city

attorney for their knowledge of the law; (2) their efforts to

keep up with developments in the law; and (3) their understanding

and reading of the relevant case law. 

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Defendants’ arguments are premised on a misunderstanding of

the qualified immunity inquiry. The qualified immunity analysis

contains only two steps: (1) was there a constitutional

violation? and (2) if so, was the violation clearly established? 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). 

Although defendants correctly note that a court must analyze

whether a reasonable officer would understand that his actions

were unconstitutional on the facts of the present case, that

inquiry is subsumed within the “clearly established” analysis. 

As the Supreme Court has held, “the relevant, dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether

it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. 

Therefore, when the Ninth Circuit held that the

constitutional violations were clearly established, it found that

a reasonable officer, confronted with the alleged facts of this

particular case, would be on notice that his actions were

unconstitutional. Accordingly, defendants’ assertion that a

reasonable officer would not have understood that his actions

were unconstitutional on the specific facts is foreclosed by the

Ninth Circuit’s ruling. 

Defendants’ request for additional testimony is equally

misplaced. The qualified immunity analysis is objective, not

subjective. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102

S.Ct. 2727 (1982). The inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable

officer would understand that what he is doing violates the

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constitution, and it incorporates “a presumptive knowledge of and

respect for ‘basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.’” Id. at

815. Thus, the individual defendants’ personal knowledge of the

law and their efforts to stay abreast of changes in the law is

irrelevant to this constitutional inquiry. In fact, the Supreme

Court rejected a subjective component of the qualified immunity

inquiry for the very purpose of preventing the need for testimony

from individual officers as to their state of mind, subjective

motivation, and knowledge of the law. Id. at 816-17. 

Accordingly, the court finds it unnecessary to hear additional

testimony from the individual defendants.

For the above reasons, defendants’ qualified immunity

arguments lack merit. 

2. Defendant Fernandez

Defendants also argue that Fernandez cannot be liable for

either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violations because: (1)

he was not personally involved in the actions leading to the

demolition or the destruction of Moreno’s personal possessions;

and (2) no reasonable jury could find Fernandez liable for his

supervision of Pino and Vanella or for his role in creating the

City’s demolition policies. (Mot. at 8.) The court disagrees.

While, as Moreno concedes, there was no evidence presented that

Fernandez personally participated in the events leading to the

demolition and seizure, there was sufficient evidence for the

jury to find Fernandez personally liable for his actions as a

supervisor. 

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A supervisor may be held personally liable under § 1983 if

there exists either: (1) personal involvement in the

constitutional deprivation; or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446

(9th Cir. 1991), quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th

Cir. 1989). A causal connection can be established by showing

that the supervisor set “in motion a series of acts by others

which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause

others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id., quoting

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus,

supervisory liability can be imposed against an official for “his

own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or

control of his subordinates,” or “for conduct that showed a

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez

v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)

(internal citations omitted). 

Here, evidence at trial showed that Fernandez did not

formally review the performance of Pino and Vanella, insure that

they received any training, or check their work on a regular

basis. (Opp’n at 17-18.) Furthermore, there was evidence that

Fernandez helped create and implement the form repair agreement

at issue in this case, but did not ensure that the agreement was

used consistently with due process requirements. (Id. at 18.) 

There was also evidence that Fernandez, Pino, and Vanella were

confused by their own procedures and that these procedures were

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applied inconsistently. In short, based on the evidence

presented at trial, a jury could find that: (1) Fernandez created

the policy that, in part, led to the violation of Moreno’s

constitutional rights; (2) the officials under his control lacked

clear direction on the City’s procedures for ensuring against due

process and Fourth Amendment violations; and (3) Fernandez failed

to provide adequate training and supervision to Pino and Vanella. 

Such evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of

liability against Fernandez. Accordingly, defendants’ argument

with regard to Fernandez is without merit. 

3. State Law Immunities

In addition to moving for qualified immunity, defendants

also renew their request for state law immunity based on: (1)

discretionary immunity under Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2; (2) law

enforcement immunity under Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.4; and (3)

public entity immunity under Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2. (Mot. at

9-10.) Defendants simply reiterate arguments the court rejected

in its March 1, 2005 summary judgment ruling. (O3/01/2005 Order

at 4-8.) Defendants provide no basis for revisiting the court’s

earlier ruling on these issues, as they do not challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim. The court finds there was

sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Pino and

Vanella acted improperly, and without due care, in the manner in

which they carried out the demolition and destroyed Moreno’s

personal possessions. Accordingly, defendants’ renewed request

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 Defendants state that they are challenging the punitive 1

damages award based upon the alleged insufficiency of the

evidence. (Mot. at 10.) However, they base their argument

entirely upon an analysis of the factors identified in BMW v.

Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996), which are used only to

determine whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally

excessive. The court will assume that defendants are challenging

the award on both the “insufficient evidence” and

“unconstitutionally excessive” grounds. 

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for state law immunity lacks merit. 

4. Punitive Damages

Finally, defendants challenge the jury’s award of punitive

damages, arguing that there was insufficient evidence at trial to

support the award. (Mot. at 10-12.) However, the court finds 1

the award is supported by substantial evidence and is not

unconstitutionally excessive. 

With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury was

instructed that, to award punitive damages, they must find that

“the conduct of the defendant under consideration was malicious,

or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” Defendants

argue that there was insufficient evidence to support such a

finding because Pino and Vanella were simply enforcing the city’s

statutes, not acting with deliberate indifference or intentional

malice. (Id. at 11.) Moreover, they note that they warned

Moreno on several occasions of their intent to demolish his

building if certain repairs were not made. (Id.) 

The court finds the evidence sufficient to support the

punitive damages award. Based on the evidence presented at

trial, a jury could reasonably have found that Pino: (1) took

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steps to demolish the building although he had never seen it and

had not inspected it; (2) demolished the building even though

Vanella, the inspector, did not recommend demolishing it and had

continued to approve repairs in the weeks prior to demolition;

(3) intentionally misled the City Attorney’s Office to gain

approval for demolishing the building by incorrectly representing

that an inspection had been done three days earlier and by

including no photographs of the building taken after 1999; (4)

told the jury that he had performed the final investigation

himself when that was not true; and (5) intentionally misled

Deputy City Attorney Wang on the day of the demolition by denying

any knowledge of the status of the demolition. (Opp’n at 12-16.) 

Likewise, a jury could reasonably have found that Vanella: (1)

destroyed Moreno’s personal property with knowledge that it

remained in the building; and (2) participated in the demolition

of the building, and thus the personal property, despite his own

belief that the building was not “dangerous.” Such facts are

sufficient to support a finding of intentional malice or

deliberate indifference against Pino and Vanella. 

For similar reasons, the punitive damages award is not

unconstitutionally excessive. The Supreme Court has articulated

three guideposts for determining whether a punitive damages award

is unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the degree of

reprehensibility of the defendants’ conduct; (2) the disparity

between harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and his

punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between this

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remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in

comparable cases. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 116 S.Ct.

1589 (1996). The most important of these factors is

reprehensibility. Id. at 575. 

Defendants base their entire argument on the

reprehensibility factor. (Mot. at 11-12.) In determining the

reprehensibility of the conduct, a court must consider whether:

the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;

the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a

reckless disregard of the health and safety of others;

the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;

the conduct involved repeated actions or was an

isolated incident; and the harm was the result of

intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere

accident.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419,

123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). Based on these factors, defendants

contend that Pino’s and Vanella’s conduct was not reprehensible. 

(Mot. at 11-12.)

However, as discussed above, sufficient evidence was

presented from which a jury could find that Pino and Vanella

acted with intentional malice. Moreover, the ratio of the

punitive damages award to the compensatory damages award weighs

heavily in favor of finding the award not excessive. For both

Pino and Vanella, the ratio is less than 1:1. While refusing to

establish a solid line, the Supreme Court has held that

single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due

process than higher multipliers. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 

Defendants have a heavy burden, therefore, of showing that a less

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than 1:1 ratio is excessive. Defendants fail to meet this

burden. 

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ Rule 50 motion and

their request to present additional evidence is without merit. 

Accordingly, the court declines to exercise its discretion to

vacate the entry of judgment under Rule 60 and consider

defendants’ untimely Rule 50 motion. Therefore, defendants’ Rule

50 and Rule 60 motions are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/19/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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