Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00704/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00704-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Russell Hayden Almon,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-00704-TUC-BGM 

ORDER 

 Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Russell Hayden Almon’s pro se

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State 

Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer 

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 17). Petitioner did not file a 

reply. The Petition is ripe for adjudication. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

The Arizona Court of Appeals stated the basic facts1

 as follows: 

Russell Almon was placed on lifetime probation in 1999 following a plea of 

 1

 As these state court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and Petitioner 

has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the findings are erroneous, the Court 

hereby adopts these factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007); Wainwright v. Witt, 469, U.S. 412, 

426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 102 S.Ct. 

1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). 

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no contest to a charge of child molestation. In 2010, the state filed a 

petition to revoke his probation, asserting Almon had violated A.R.S. § 13-

2310(A), fraudulent scheme and artifice, by providing the probation office 

with falsified records indicating he had completed required community 

service hours that he had not completed. The petition also asserted Almon 

had not been at home when his probation schedule required him to be. 

After a violation hearing, the trial court found Almon had violated his 

probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to a five-year prison 

term. 

Answer (Doc. 17), Ct. App. Mem. Decision 12/9/2011 at 1–2. 

A. Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On August 17, 2011, counsel for Petitioner filed an Anders2

 brief with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals.3

 Answer (Doc. 17), Appellant’s Opening Br. 8/17/2011 (Exh. “T”). 

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental appellate brief. Answer (Doc. 17), 

Appellant’s Suppl. Br. 11/2/2011 (Exh. “W”). Petitioner alleged a single claim, asserting 

that based on the “totality of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding that appellant intentionally committed fraudulent schemes and artifices[.]” 

Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “W” at 6. Petitioner cites Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 

 

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967). 

3

 The Arizona Court of Appeals has described the procedure of filing an Anders brief as 

follows: 

Under our procedure, when appointed counsel determines that a defendant's case 

discloses no arguable issues for appeal, counsel files an Anders brief. The brief 

contains a detailed factual and procedural history of the case, with citations to the 

record. See Scott, 187 Ariz. at 478 n. 4, 930 P.2d at 555 n. 4. Counsel submits the 

brief to the court and the defendant. The defendant is then given the opportunity 

to file a brief pro per. After receiving all briefing, the court reviews the entire 

record for reversible error. If any arguable issue presents itself, the court directs 

appointed counsel to brief the issue. Only after the court has ascertained that 

counsel has conscientiously performed his or her duty to review the record, and 

has itself reviewed the record for reversible error and found none, will the court 

allow counsel to withdraw. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85, 684 P.2d 

154, 156–57 (1984). We conclude that this procedure permits counsel to perform 

ethically, while simultaneously ensuring that an indigent defendant's 

constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and effective assistance of 

counsel are protected. 

State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, 2 P.3d 89, 96 (Ct. App. 1999). 

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S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), and argues that “the facts underlying the claim of 

actual innocence would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would 

have found the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., Exh. 

“W” at 8. 

 On December 9, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed “the trial court’s 

determination that Almon violated the terms of his probation, its revocation of his 

probation, and the sentence imposed.” See Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. 

Decision 12/9/2011 (Exh. “X”). As an initial matter the appellate court stated that “[t]o 

the extent [Petitioner] suggests the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding that he violated § 13-2310, he essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which 

we will not do.” Id., Exh. “X” at 3 (citing State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944 P.2d 

1204, 1217 (1997)). Regarding Petitioner’s claim of “actual innocence,” the court relied 

on Rule 27.8(b)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and State v. Russell, 226 Ariz. 

416, ¶¶ 10–12, 249 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Ct. App. 2011), finding “the law is clear that, when 

alleging a person has violated his or her probation, the state need prove those allegations 

only by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., Exh. “X” 

at 3. 

 Petitioner did not seek review of this decision with the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 7; Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Supreme Ct. Order 3/13/2012 (Exh. “Z”). 

B. The Instant Habeas Proceeding 

 On September 18, 2012, Petitioner filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner claims four (4) grounds for relief. First, Petitioner alleges that the “[c]riminal 

burden of proof unproven showing conspiracy[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Petitioner 

further alleges that the Government “engineered” the circumstances leading to the 

criminal charges and subsequent parole revocation, and that it “induced” and “entrapped” 

him. Id. at 17–18. Second, Petitioner alleges that the Government presented insufficient 

evidence to support the probation violation charged in this case. Id. at 7. Petitioner goes 

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on to attack the plea agreement(s) in his original cause of action. Id. at 19–21. Third, 

Petitioner claims that his “sentence is illegal and improper[.]” Id. at 8. Petitioner asserts 

that the statute that he was prosecuted under for the probation violation did not match the 

plea agreement presented at the revocation hearing, thereby “leaving the entire process 

defective[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 22. Fourth, Petitioner alleges “[p]rosecutorial 

misconduct causing unknowing complicity of the grand jury as to presented evidence by 

Mr. Garcia the Government agent[.]” Id. at 9. On May 28, 2013, Respondents filed their 

Answer (Doc. 17). Petitioner did not file a reply. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. In General

 The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus 

by a person in state custody: 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 

179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal 

habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute’s design is to ‘further the principles of 

comity, finality, and federalism.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct. 

2842, 2854, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 

123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet 

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and highly deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims 

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 

L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must 

“presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this 

presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court’s 

determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 

1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is 

unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles 

delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts 

before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 

L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“AEDPA requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 (quoting 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786–87) (alterations in original). 

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

 Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must 

exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 

“provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 

to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 

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455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). As such, the 

exhaustion doctrine gives the State “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged 

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 

1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he 

exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts’ role in the 

enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Rose, 

455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203 (internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine 

of comity which “teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its 

jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 

cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Id. (quoting 

Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)). 

 Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long 

as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 

procedure the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has 

been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The fair 

presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the 

presence of a federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or expecting 

the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting 

petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the 

state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal 

law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the 

federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because 

petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Furthermore, in order to 

“fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the 

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exhaustion requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct 

appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire judicial postconviction process 

available in the state.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 

1998)). 

 In Arizona, however, for non-capital cases “review need not be sought before the 

Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 

2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Additionally, the 

Supreme Court has further interpreted § 2254(c) to recognize that once the state courts 

have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for an applicant to seek collateral relief for 

the same issues already decided upon direct review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 

350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). 

C. Procedural Default 

 “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ 

to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 

650 (1991). Moreover, federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided 

by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent 

of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id., 501 U.S. at 728, 111 

S.Ct. at 2254. This is true whether the state law basis is substantive or procedural. Id.

(citations omitted). Such claims are considered procedurally barred from review. See 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difference between exhaustion 

and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been 

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that 

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In 

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim 

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applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, 

but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that 

the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. See 

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002); Beaty v. Stewart, 

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if 

the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.’”) 

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a prisoner’s habeas 

petition may be precluded from federal review due to procedural default in two ways. 

First, where the petitioner presented his claims to the state court, which denied relief 

based on independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2254. Federal courts are prohibited from review in such cases because they have “no 

power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, 

resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the 

judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Id. Second, where a “petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Thus, the 

federal court “must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently 

available state remedy.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.6 (quoting Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). 

 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see 

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also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) 

(recognizing “that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults under the same 

standards that apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). “[T]he 

existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner 

can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to 

comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 

S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner 

must show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . 

created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 

477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. at 2648 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 

Without a showing of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the 

procedural default and gain review by the federal courts. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2649. 

 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice 

standard will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary 

to correct ‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 

S.Ct. 1558, 1572–73, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice 

exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with 

a colorable showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 

S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. 

Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual 

innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a 

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered 

on the merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862. Further, in order to 

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demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). 

 In Arizona, a petitioner’s claim may be procedurally defaulted where he has 

waived his right to present his claim to the state court “at trial, on appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). “if an asserted claim is of 

sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant ‘knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently’ waived the claim.” Id., 2002 cmt. Neither Rule 32.2. nor 

the Arizona Supreme Court has defined claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” 

requiring personal knowledge before waiver. See id.; see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 

446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this 

assessment “often involves a fact-intensive inquiry” and the “Arizona state courts are 

better suited to make these determinations.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622. 

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

 As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s petition is 

barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to 

applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the 

latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

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by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “The time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Almon’s petition. The Court has 

independently reviewed the record and finds that the Petition (Doc. 1) is timely pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. Grounds One and Two: Burden of Proof and Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Petitioner alleges that the “criminal burden of proof [was] unproven showing 

conspiracy[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Petitioner further asserts that there was insufficient 

evidence to support a finding that he violated his probation under the appropriate burden 

of proof. Id. at 7. Petitioner also takes issue with the form and content of the plea 

agreements relied upon. Id. at 19–21. Respondents assert that “Petitioner did not fairly 

present these claims to the state courts as federal claims[,]” and as such they are 

procedurally defaulted. Answer (Doc. 17) at 9. 

The Court agrees with Respondents and finds that Petitioner did not “fairly 

present” these claims to the Arizona state courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 

124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his 

claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not 

indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was 

not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 

petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner 

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presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Petitioner did not assert any 

constitutional claims in his petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Indeed, the only 

case that he cited, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), 

contemplates actual innocence as a gateway to excuse procedural default and allow a 

federal habeas court to consider the petitioner’s constitutional claims. “Citation of 

irrelevant federal or state cases does not provide a state court with a ‘fair opportunity to 

apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon [a Petitioner’s] constitutional 

claim.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, [i]t is not 

enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state 

courts . . . or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 277, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (per curiam). 

As such, the Petitioner’s claims regarding the burden of proof and sufficiency of 

the evidence are unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). 

Petitioner’s first two claims are therefore procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

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1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). 

The Court notes that even if it were to find that Petitioner had properly raised this 

claim to the state court, it would still be procedurally defaulted. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals, relying on State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944 P.2d 1204, 1217 (1997), held 

that “[t]o the extent [Petitioner] suggests the evidence was insufficient to support the trial 

court’s finding that he violated § 13-2310, he essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, 

which we will not do.” Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “X” at 3. The court of appeals went on 

to state: 

Almon claims he is ‘actually innocent’ because the evidence did not 

support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court erred in 

applying a preponderance of the evidence standard. But the law is clear 

that, when alleging a person has violated his or her probation, the state need 

prove those allegations only by a preponderance of the evidence, not by a 

reasonable doubt. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.8(b)(3); State v. Russell, 226 Ariz. 

416 ¶¶ 10–12, 249 P.3d 1116, 1118 (App. 2011) (preponderance standard 

applies to probation revocation based on alleged felony). 

Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “X” at 3. In a footnote, the court of appeals also noted that 

Petitioner’s reliance on Schlup was misplaced. Id., Exh. “X” at 3 n. 2. When a Petitioner 

presents his claim to the state court, and is denied upon independent and adequate state 

grounds, this Court is prohibited from review. This is because the “state law 

determination [] is sufficient to support the judgment, [and] resolution of any independent 

federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be 

advisory.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. at 2254. Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief. 

B. Ground Three: Excessive Sentence 

 Petitioner asserts that his sentence was “illegal and improper[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) 

at 8. Petitioner also asserts that the statute cited in the charging documents related to his 

case, and those cited in his plea agreement did not match. Id. at 22–24. Respondents 

again assert that “Petitioner did not fairly present th[is] claim[] to the state courts as [a] 

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federal claim[][,]” and as such it is procedurally defaulted. Answer (Doc. 17) at 9. 

The Court agrees with Respondents, and finds that Petitioner did not address this 

claim to the Arizona state courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 

1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must 

do so “in each appropriate state court”). As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would 

now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is 

procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”).

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Petitioner’s claim as to count three is 

denied. 

C. Ground Four: Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 Petitioner alleges that “[p]rosecutorial misconduct caus[ed] unknowing complicity 

of the grand jury as to presented evidence by Mr. Garcia the Government agent.” 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. Petitioner further alleges that the prosecutor “enter[ed] into a 

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fraudulent scheme . . . in order to acquire foundation and validity to the unmerited 

claim[.]” Id. at 9, 25–28. Respondents assert that this “Petitioner’s claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct at the grand jury proceedings pertain[] to a different criminal 

matter that is not the subject of this habeas petition.” Answer (Doc. 11) at 4; see also

Petition (Doc. 1) at 40–44. Respondents further assert that “because Petitioner pled 

guilty, habeas relief is not available for alleged defects in the grand jury proceedings.” 

Answer (Doc. 17) at 5. 

As an initial matter, Petitioner did not address this claim to the Arizona state 

courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 

(2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each 

appropriate state court”). As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be 

precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Furthermore, Respondents’ assertion that 

Petitioner’s guilty plea precludes habeas relief for any alleged grand jury irregularities is 

correct. See Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 

235 (1973) (“when a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in 

fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise 

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior 

to the entry of the guilty plea.”). As such, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to 

ground four. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons delineated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1) Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a 

Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) is DENIED; 

 2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED, because reasonable jurists would not 

find the Court’s ruling debatable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; 

 3) This matter is DISMISSED with prejudice; and 

 4) The Clerk of the Court shall close its file in this matter. 

 Dated this 15th day of September, 2015. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge 

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