Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00115/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00115-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Wrongful Death

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TYRA KIRKSEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0115-WS-N

 )

SCHINDLER ELEVATOR )

CORPORATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Lay 

Opinions of Sears’ Surveillance Video (doc. 121), Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence that 

Sears Lacked Knowledge (doc. 122), Motion in Limine to Exclude “Open and Obvious” Defense 

(doc. 123), Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Escalator was Code-Compliant (doc. 

124), Motion in Limine Concerning Jakobe Kirksey’s Father (doc. 125), Motion in Limine to 

Exclude Evidence Not Disclosed in Discovery (doc. 126), and Motion in Limine to Exclude 

Evidence of Timing of Plaintiff Engaging Counsel (doc. 127). All of these Motions are ripe for 

disposition, and will be addressed sequentially.

I. Motion in Limine Regarding Lay Opinions of Surveillance Video.

As her first Motion in Limine, plaintiff, Tyra Kirksey, seeks to exclude the opinions and 

testimony of lay witnesses Jeremy Franks, Lance Deleston and Marvin Byrum concerning the 

contents of Sears surveillance video of Jakobe Kirksey’s fatal escalator fall in June 2014. 

Kirksey also requests exclusion of portions of these individuals’ written reports describing their 

perceptions of the surveillance video footage. Plaintiff reasons that all such opinions are 

inadmissible as expert opinions pursuant to Daubert principles, and are inadmissible as lay 

opinions under Rule 701, Fed.R.Evid., because they would not be helpful to the finder of fact.

The Court has already adjudicated these precise issues. This Motion in Limine 

essentially duplicates plaintiff’s earlier filed Motion to Exclude as Unreliable Lay Testimony and 

Opinions of Surveillance Video and Portions of Police Report (doc. 100). In an Order (doc. 138) 

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 1 of 11
-2-

entered on September 20, 2016, the undersigned considered and addressed the arguments 

reprised by the parties in this Motion in Limine. Specifically, the September 20 Order reasoned 

that “the lay opinions offered by Sgt. Franks, Det. Deleston and Inspector Byrum as to their 

perceptions of Jakobe’s actions in the video would not be helpful to the jury because the jury will 

be perfectly capable of watching the video and reaching an independent conclusion based on the 

evidence presented.” (Doc. 138, at 12.) Based on the Court’s finding that “these witnesses’ 

opinions about what they observed in the surveillance video would not assist the jury in 

understanding the witnesses’ testimony or determining a fact in issue[,] ... such lay opinions are 

inadmissible pursuant to Rule 701(b).” (Id.) For that reason, the September 20 Order granted 

plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude “as to any testimony or written opinions of Sgt. Franks, Det. 

Deleston or Inspector Byrum about the conduct of Jakobe Kirksey as depicted on the 

surveillance video.” (Id. at 14.)

Under the circumstances, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Lay Opinions of Sears’ 

Surveillance Video (doc. 121) is redundant and unnecessary, and is confined to issues previously 

presented and decided in this case. Accordingly, this Motion in Limine is moot.

1

II. Motion in Limine Regarding Sears’ Lack of Knowledge.

Plaintiff’s second Motion in Limine requests that, in the event Kirksey is not permitted to 

pursue a failure-to-warn claim against defendant Schindler Elevator Corporation, defendant 

Sears, Roebuck & Co. should be precluded from presenting evidence or argument that it lacked 

 1 The Court’s only elaboration on the September 20 Order in this regard is as 

follows: Here, as previously, defendants assert that these lay witnesses should be allowed to 

testify to their perceptions of the surveillance video because “[t]heir analysis of the surveillance 

video is a crucial part of their investigations,” which concluded that Jakobe’s fall was not caused 

by foul play and that the escalator was functioning normally. (Doc. 132, at 3.) The September 

20 Order observed that “having these witnesses describe their specific perceptions about what 

the surveillance video depicts with respect to Jakobe’s conduct would not be helpful to a clear 

understanding of their investigative conclusions concerning lack of foul play or escalator 

malfunction.” (Doc. 138, at 14.) Additionally, it bears noting that plaintiff has now offered to 

stipulate that “foul play” had nothing to do with Jakobe’s fall and, apparently, that the escalator 

was functioning normally. (Doc. 135, at 2-3.) The lack of any bona fide dispute as to foul play 

or operational status of the escalator further undermines defendants’ attempt to backdoor these 

witnesses’ opinions concerning the Sears surveillance video into evidence pursuant to Rule 701. 

The parties are strongly encouraged to attempt to reach stipulations as to these points (foul play, 

escalator malfunction) in order to avoid needless testimony at trial concerning topics as to which 

no genuine dispute exists.

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 2 of 11
-3-

knowledge of the risk of falls or the need for additional guarding of the subject escalator. This 

Motion is also redundant of a previously submitted motion by plaintiff. In particular, prior to 

filing this Motion in Limine, plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment Order 

(doc. 119) in which she urged the Court to revisit its summary judgment ruling that dismissed 

her failure-to-warn claim against Schindler for failing to warn Sears of the dangers associated 

with the subject escalator and the need for guarding. In her Motion to Reconsider, plaintiff 

argued that if reconsideration were not granted and her failure-to-warn claim against Schindler 

were not reinstated, then Sears should be forbidden by the doctrines of law of the case and direct 

estoppel from presenting evidence or argument at trial that it lacked such knowledge. Plaintiff’s 

Motion in Limine (doc. 122) advances precisely the same argument and seeks precisely the same 

relief as the alternative remedy requested in her Motion to Reconsider. Once again, plaintiff files 

a duplicative and unnecessary Motion in Limine.

By separate Order (doc. 141) dated October 28, 2016, the Court has denied Kirksey’s 

Motion to Reconsider and likewise denied her alternative request to bar Sears from contesting 

knowledge of the risk of danger of falls or the need for guarding. Because the issues presented 

have thus squarely been adjudicated, plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Sears 

Lacked Knowledge (doc. 122) is moot.

2

 2 Plaintiff’s arguments in her redundant briefing on the Motion in Limine 

underscore the reasons why the requested relief was denied in the ruling on her Motion to 

Reconsider. For example, Kirksey now posits that the Order on summary judgment contained a 

“factual finding that Sears – at all times – had full knowledge of the history of falls, the risk or 

danger of falls, and the need for guarding.” (Doc. 122, at 2.) This is incorrect. On summary 

judgment, the Court did not make a definitive finding on the disputed factual question of the 

state of Sears’ knowledge at any particular time. Moreover, Kirksey argues that “[e]ither Sears’ 

knowledge matched Schindler’s and thereby mooted any duty to warn, or Sears’ knowledge was 

less than Schindler’s and thereby created a duty to warn.” (Id. at 3 n.2.) Plaintiff advances a 

false dichotomy. To be sure, it is true that if Sears and Schindler had the same knowledge (as 

plaintiff pleaded in her Complaint and asserted in her summary judgment filings), then there 

could be no duty owed by Schindler to warn Sears. However, it is a legally incorrect statement 

for plaintiff to state that a duty to warn would be created if “Sears’ knowledge was less than 

Schindler’s.” As discussed in the order denying the Motion to Reconsider, that is simply not a 

valid statement of Alabama law. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in the order on the 

Motion to Reconsider, plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is not meritorious.

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 3 of 11
-4-

III. Motion in Limine Regarding “Open and Obvious” Defense.

As her third Motion in Limine (doc. 123), plaintiff requests that defendants be excluded 

from presenting any evidence or argument at trial in support of an “open and obvious” defense. 

In the Joint Pretrial Document (doc. 139), both defendants identified an “Open and Obvious 

Affirmative Defense” on the theory that Jakobe Kirksey and Tyra Kirksey were aware of the 

allegedly hazardous condition of the Sears escalator and appreciated the danger it involved, or 

would have done so had they used reasonable care. (Doc. 139, at 5.) Plaintiff’s three-pronged 

argument in support of this Motion in Limine is that (i) in light of the dismissal of her failure-towarn claim against Schindler, there can be no “open and obvious” defense; (ii) the “open and 

obvious” defense requires evidence that Jakobe subjectively knew of the danger, but defendants 

lack such evidence; and (iii) defendants cannot contemporaneously profess ignorance of the 

hazard and insist that such hazard was “open and obvious” at the time of Jakobe’s fall.

As to plaintiff’s first point, in the products liability context Alabama authorities certainly 

link the “open and obvious” defense to claims of negligent failure to warn. See, e.g., Abney v. 

Crosman Corp., 919 So.2d 289, 294 (Ala. 2005) (“In 1976, this Court adopted the open-andobvious defense as it applies in a products-liability action alleging negligent failure to warn.”). 

Plaintiff is correct that her failure-to-warn claim against Schindler has been dismissed; therefore, 

in the absence of such a claim, Schindler cannot assert an “open and obvious” affirmative 

defense at trial because there is no corresponding failure-to-warn claim to which such a defense 

might relate. Accordingly, the Motion in Limine is granted as to any “open and obvious” 

defense that Schindler might interpose.3 Schindler may not present evidence or argument at trial 

that the alleged defects in the subject escalator were “open and obvious” for purposes of negating 

any duty to warn.

That said, the “open and obvious” defense is in a different posture with respect to 

defendant Sears. It is undisputed that Kirksey is asserting a premises liability claim against 

Sears. And Alabama law is clear that “[t]he [invitor] is not liable to an invitee for an injury 

 3 Notably, defendants’ response to this Motion in Limine focuses exclusively on the 

“open and obvious” defense as it relates to defendant Sears, without responding to or attempting 

to rebut plaintiff’s contention that the defense is no longer cognizable as to Schindler. Thus, 

defendants have identified no remaining, pending claim against Schindler as to which an “open 

and obvious” defense might be available, and the Court perceives none.

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 4 of 11
-5-

resulting from a danger that was obvious.” Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So.2d 355, 362 

(Ala. 2006) (citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he entire basis of an invitor’s liability rests upon his 

superior knowledge of the danger that causes the invitee’s injuries. If that superior knowledge is 

lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the invitor cannot be held liable.” Id. (citations omitted 

and emphasis added); see also General Motors Corp. v. Hill, 752 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. 1999) 

(“It is well established, however, that an invitor is not liable for injuries to an invitee resulting 

from a danger that was known to the invitee or that the invitee should have observed through the 

exercise of reasonable care. If the danger is open and obvious, the invitor cannot be held

liable.”) (citations omitted and emphasis added). Thus, the question of “open and obvious” 

remains relevant, notwithstanding the dismissal of Kirksey’s failure-to-warn claim against 

Schindler, because it constitutes a complete defense to Kirksey’s premises-liability claims 

against Sears.

Plaintiff’s next argument is that Sears should be excluded from presenting evidence or 

argument pertaining to the “open and obvious” defense at trial because “the Defendants have 

zero evidence to show that Jakobe Kirksey subjectively knew of the danger. ... Without evidence 

of Jakobe’s subjective knowledge of the danger, the Defendants cannot make an ‘open and 

obvious’ defense.” (Doc. 123, at 2.) This is an incorrect statement of Alabama law. Time and 

time again, the Alabama Supreme Court has emphasized that “[i]n a premises-liability setting, 

we use an objective standard to assess whether a hazard is open and obvious. ... [T]he question 

is whether the danger should have been observed, not whether in fact it was consciously 

appreciated.” Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Taylor, 28 So.3d 737, 741-42 (Ala. 2009) (citations omitted); 

see also South Alabama Brick Co. v. Carwie, --- So.3d ----, 2016 WL 1077265, *7 (Ala. Mar. 18, 

2016) (“[T]he duty of a premises owner is measured by an objective standard, not the subjective 

state of the invitee’s knowledge. The question is what was objectively reasonable for the invitor 

to expect the invitee to know. ... [A]n invitor’s duty before an accident is not determined by ‘the 

invitee’s subjective state of mind’ at the moment of the accident.”) (citations omitted); Ex parte 

Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 699 So.2d 158, 161 (Ala. 1997) (in premises liability 

context, “the ‘obvious’ test is an objective one”) (citation omitted). Plainly, Sears’ lack of 

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 5 of 11
-6-

evidence that Jakobe subjectively appreciated the danger posed by the moving handrail of the 

escalator in no way compromises Sears’ ability to pursue an “open and obvious” defense.4

As a final basis for her Motion in Limine, plaintiff protests that Sears’ stated intention to 

rely on the “open and obvious” defense contradicts Sears’ stance that it was unaware of the risk 

of falls or need for guarding, such that it would be “fundamentally inconsistent and illogical” for 

Sears to make both arguments to the jury. (Doc. 123, at 3.) It is not altogether clear to the 

undersigned that such a fundamental inconsistency exists, given potential issues as to timeframe 

(i.e., during what temporal period does Sears deny knowledge?) and substance (i.e., does Sears 

deny knowledge of the dangerous condition, or does it deny knowledge of the magnitude of the 

risk and the availability of feasible guarding mechanisms?). More fundamentally, this sounds 

like a preview of plaintiff’s closing argument, rather than a persuasive basis for granting the 

Motion in Limine. If Sears denies awareness of the dangerous condition at trial, but also asks the 

jury to find that Sears should be exonerated from liability because such dangerous condition was 

“open and obvious” to users like Jakobe, then Sears may well expose itself to withering crossexamination and closing argument from plaintiff’s counsel exploiting the apparent duplicity. 

The Court does not have any information or any reason to believe at this time that allowing Sears 

to present an “open and obvious” defense would create a substantial risk of “unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues and misleading of the jury” (doc. 123, at 3), as argued by plaintiff. 

Rather, the Court is confident that plaintiff’s counsel is capable of highlighting any 

inconsistencies in Sears’ position to the jury during closing argument in a manner that 

 4 In arguing otherwise, plaintiff cites Alabama authorities for the proposition that 

whether a condition is “known” is a subjective inquiry. (Doc. 135, at 5.) Plaintiff appears to be 

laboring under the impression that the “open and obvious” defense is available only when a 

dangerous condition is both “obvious” and “known” to the invitee; however, even the Alabama 

authorities on which plaintiff relies frame these criteria in the disjunctive, not the conjunctive. 

See Ex parte Mountain Top, 699 So.2d at 161 (“A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees 

for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is 

known or obvious to them”) (citations omitted and emphasis added); see also South Alabama 

Brick, 2016 WL 1077265, at *6 (premises owner “is not liable for an injury to an invitee 

resulting from a danger which was known to the invitee or which was obvious”) (emphasis 

added). The Court therefore rejects as contrary to well-settled Alabama law plaintiff’s 

contention that a premises owner invoking the “open and obvious” defense must establish that 

the hazard was both obvious and known to the invitee at the time of the injury.

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 6 of 11
-7-

sufficiently mitigates any likelihood of prejudice or confusion to plaintiff resulting from any 

such inconsistencies.

For all of these reasons, the Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence or Argument of 

“Open and Obvious” Hazard (doc. 123) is granted as to defendant Schindler, but denied as to 

defendant Sears.5

IV. Motion in Limine Regarding Code-Compliance of Escalator.

Kirksey’s fourth Motion in Limine seeks to exclude defendants from making statements 

at trial concerning “the alleged or argued ‘fact’ that the escalator ... was code-compliant.” (Doc. 

124, at 1.) Plaintiff’s position is that, is a factual matter, it is inaccurate to characterize the Sears 

escalator as code-compliant because, for example, Lerch Bates performed a post-accident 

investigation and found the escalator to be non-compliant in multiple respects. On that basis, 

plaintiff maintains that defendants should not be permitted “to present an inaccurate 

representation of the Escalator” to the jury, and that falsely portraying the escalator as being 

code-compliant “could also mislead the jury.” (Doc. 124, at 2-3.)

The fundamental problem with plaintiff’s line of reasoning is that the facts are not as 

black-and-white as she suggests. The term “code-compliant” can mean different things to 

different people. Which code or codes are we talking about? “All” codes, as plaintiff suggests, 

or merely “all relevant codes” as defendants state (see doc. 132, at 7)? Defendants will present 

expert testimony from Davis Turner that the escalator was compliant with applicable building 

codes at the relevant times. (See doc. 101, Exh. A, § 5.2.) Plaintiff will present evidence from 

inspector Gene Shanks that he observed multiple technical escalator code violations at the 

escalator in June 2014. (See doc. 124, Exh. C.) Defendants will no doubt counter that the 

technical violations observed by Shanks (i.e., missing code data plate, broken cleats, incomplete 

 5 There is no internal inconsistency in this ruling. After all, plaintiff’s theory 

against Sears sounds in premises liability, whereas her theory against Schindler sounds in 

products liability. The “open and obvious” defense works differently in these distinct contexts. 

See, e.g., Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So.2d 649, 653 (Ala. 2002) (“This incidence of the issue 

of openness and obviousness in premises-liability cases differs from the incidence of the same 

issue in cases of claims based on the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine 

(AEMLD).”). And, of course, the duty-to-warn claim against Schindler is out of the case, 

thereby eliminating the “open and obvious” defense as to such a claim, whereas no parallel 

developments have occurred with respect to plaintiff’s claims against Sears.

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 7 of 11
-8-

start-up logs) had no bearing on Jakobe’s fall, such that the escalator remained code-compliant in 

all respects material to this case. Defendants also have evidence that the State of Alabama 

assigned a number to the escalator, that such fact means the escalator was deemed compliant 

with the state escalator code at the time of the State’s initial inspection, and that Sears was never 

cited for code violations in subsequent inspections. The Court understands that plaintiff disputes

both the veracity of and defendants’ desired inferences from this testimony.

The parties appear to be talking past each other on this issue because they mean different 

things when they say “code-compliant,” such that the Motion in Limine is, in essence, comparing 

apples to oranges.6 In the final analysis, the Court concludes that the most efficient and effective 

means of handling this “code-compliance” issue is not to forbid defendants from uttering the 

words on pain of being held in contempt, but is rather to allow this question to play out through 

the normal channels of direct and cross-examination. If a defense witness makes a blanket 

statement that the escalator was code-compliant (which is the concern animating this Motion in 

Limine) without qualifying or limiting verbiage, then plaintiff is free to explore the matter 

vigorously on cross-examination, much as she did in the Elliott and Lemmert deposition excerpts 

appended to the Motion in Limine as Exhibits A and B. To the extent that any defense witness 

uses imprecise or overbroad language to describe the code-compliant status vel non of the 

escalator, the Court is satisfied that the tried-and-true mechanisms of cross-examination and (if 

necessary) presentation of impeachment / rebuttal evidence will suffice to alleviate any 

confusion and prevent the jury from being misled as to the question of “code compliance” or lack 

thereof. Likewise, any loose language in closing arguments may be addressed most effectively 

via counterargument, rather than heavy-handed exclusion, particularly where the parties appear 

largely in agreement as to many underlying facts vis a vis code compliance or lack thereof.

 6 Indeed, once one gets past the rhetoric, the briefing suggests that the parties may 

not disagree here in any meaningful way. For their part, defendants seek only “to introduce 

evidence of code-compliance” as to particular codes, and “to argue that the subject escalator was 

compliant with all relevant codes.” (Doc. 132, at 7.) Likewise plaintiff “does not dispute that 

factually accurate, properly worded statements regarding what codes and conditions the escalator 

complied with may be appropriate for use by Defendants.” (Doc. 135, at 8.) Plainly, there is 

substantial common ground on this issue, negating the need for the kind of draconian 

exclusionary order sought by plaintiff.

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 8 of 11
-9-

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Statements that the 

Escalator was Code Compliant (doc. 124) is denied.

V. Motion in Limine Regarding Jakobe’s Father.

As her fifth Motion in Limine (doc. 125), Kirksey requests that this Court enter an order 

excluding any references by defendants to the whereabouts of Jakobe’s father, Jonathan Daniels, 

who is not a party to the case, was not present in the Sears store at the time of Jakobe’s fall, and 

is not expected to attend the trial of this matter. In support of this Motion, Kirksey posits that 

Daniels’ whereabouts are irrelevant to any claim or defense joined in this action, and that, 

accordingly, any commentary on his anticipated absence from trial would therefore be 

inappropriate. Defendants do not object. (See doc. 132, at 2 n.1.) Because the Court agrees that 

no valid purpose could be served by defendants or their counsel making statements at trial 

commenting on Daniels’ absence from the courtroom, and in light of defendants’ non-objection 

to plaintiff’s request, plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Statements Regarding 

Whereabouts of Jakobe Kirksey’s Father (doc. 125) is granted. It is ordered that all references 

to the whereabouts of Jakobe’s father, and his anticipated absence from trial, are excluded.

VI. Motion in Limine Regarding Undisclosed Evidence.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine number six (doc. 126) relates to defendants’ disclosure in 

the first incarnation of the Joint Pretrial Document (doc. 103) of witness Mike Rivers and Exhibit 

46, described as “Photos of other open atrium escalators within the State of Alabama.” 

Plaintiff’s objection is that Rivers (who is apparently a photographer) and Exhibit 46 (which is 

apparently a collection of Rivers’ photographs of other Alabama escalators) were not timely 

disclosed or produced in discovery. Indeed, plaintiff indicates that the first notice defendants 

provided her of Rivers’ status as a witness was in the Joint Pretrial Document, some four months 

after the close of discovery; and that defendants first produced the photographs that constitute

Exhibit 46 to her even later than that. In light of this allegedly untimely disclosure, plaintiff 

seeks exclusion of Mike Rivers and Exhibit 46 from trial, pursuant to Rules 26(a)(1)(A), 26(e)(1) 

and 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants’ response is straightforward, to-wit: It intends to use this evidence solely for 

impeachment purposes. On its face, Rule 26 is clear that the disclosure requirements of the 

Federal Rules Civil Procedure apply to all witnesses and evidence that a party may use to support 

its claims or defenses, “unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i)-

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 9 of 11
-10-

(ii), Fed.R.Civ.P.; see also Bearint ex rel. Bearint v. Dorell Juvenile Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 

1353 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “exempt[] parties from 

disclosing evidence they may present at trial solely for impeachment purposes ... because 

pretrial disclosure would significantly diminish its impeachment value”); Baldeo v. Dolgencorp, 

LLC, 2014 WL 4749049, *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2014) (“If the material is supplied for 

impeachment purposes only, there is no Rule 26 violation ... and Rule 37(c) sanctions do not 

apply.”). Under the plain language of Rule 26, then, defendants were under no legal obligation 

to disclose Mike Rivers and Exhibit 46 to plaintiff, either during discovery or in the Joint Pretrial 

Document.

In her reply, plaintiff concedes that she has no objection to defendants using Rivers and 

Exhibit 46 for impeachment purposes. (Doc. 135, at 8.) She nonetheless urges the Court to

exclude such evidence “for any and all non-impeachment purposes.” (Id.) But defendants have 

evinced no intention to utilize this evidence for non-impeachment purposes; to the contrary, they 

have affirmatively represented to both this Court and opposing counsel that Rivers’ testimony

and Exhibit 46 are purely impeachment evidence. In the absence of any reason to believe that 

defendants are not being forthright on this issue, plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is unfounded and 

unnecessary. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Witnesses Not Identified and 

Evidence Not Produced in Discovery (doc. 126) is denied because it is confined to a single 

witness and a single exhibit that defendants have professed an intent to use solely for 

impeachment purposes, rendering them exempt from disclosure obligations.

VII. Motion in Limine Regarding Plaintiff’s Retention of Counsel.

As her final Motion in Limine (doc. 127), Kirksey seeks to exclude defendants from 

making any reference at trial to the timing of her engagement of counsel. Plaintiff explains that 

she retained counsel shortly after Jakobe’s fall for the specific purpose of accessing Sears

surveillance video that was being withheld from her. She posits that the brevity of the interval 

between the accident and her engagement of legal counsel is not relevant to any claim or defense 

joined in this case, and that defendants should therefore be precluded from making any 

references to same at trial. Defendants respond that they do not object to this Motion. (See doc. 

132, at 2 n.1.) Because the Court concurs with plaintiff that the timing of her hiring of counsel is 

not relevant to any matters the jury will be tasked with deciding, the Motion in Limine to 

Exclude Statements Regarding Plaintiff’s Timeframe in Engaging Counsel (doc. 127) is 

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 10 of 11
-11-

granted. All statements or evidence concerning the timing of Tyra Kirksey’s retention of 

counsel in this matter are excluded from trial.

VIII. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Lay Opinions of Sears’ Surveillance 

Video (doc. 121) is moot;

2. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Sears Lacked Knowledge 

(doc. 122) is moot;

3. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence or Argument of “Open and 

Obvious” Hazard (doc. 123) is granted as to defendant Schindler, but denied as 

to defendant Sears;

4. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Statements that the Escalator was Code 

Compliant (doc. 124) is denied;

5. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Statements Regarding Whereabouts of 

Jakobe Kirksey’s Father (doc. 125) is granted;

6. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Witnesses Not Identified and Evidence 

Not Produced in Discovery (doc. 126) is denied; and

7. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Statements Regarding Plaintiff’s 

Timeframe in Engaging Counsel (doc. 127) is granted.

DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of December, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00115-WS-N Document 142 Filed 12/06/16 Page 11 of 11