Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02298/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02298-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of filings in this case unless otherwise

indicated.

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Torrez, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Corrections Corporation of America, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-2298-PHX-MHM (MHB)

ORDER

In this case, David Torrez and four other inmates confined in the La Palma

Corrections Center (LPCC), a Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) facility in Eloy,

Arizona, filed a joint pro se Civil Rights Complaint by a Prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc.# 1).1

 In an Order filed on January 20, 2010, the Court ordered the action severed into

new separate cases by the five inmates. (Doc.# 5.) Torrez has filed an objection and a

motion for reconsideration. (Doc.# 7.) The objection will be overruled and reconsideration

will be denied.

Generally, motions to reconsider are appropriate only if the Court “(1) is presented

with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist.

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A

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motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “to rethink what the court had

already thought through, rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon

Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). Rather, such arguments should be

directed to the court of appeals. Sullivan v. Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 305, 309

(D. Ariz. 1992). 

Torrez argues that he should have been afforded an opportunity to brief the class

certification issue before this action was severed into separate individual cases. As explained

in the Court’s prior Order:

Plaintiffs purport to bring this case as a class action. Plaintiffs have not shown

that the four prerequisites to a class action under Rule 23(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., i.e., numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation, are met

in this case. Moreover, although each Plaintiff may appear on his own behalf,

he may not appear as an attorney for other persons in a class action. McShane

v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (non-lawyer had no

authority to appear as an attorney for other persons in a purported class

action); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (plain

error to permit an inmate proceeding pro se to represent fellow inmates in a

class action). “This rule is an outgrowth not only of the belief that a layman,

untutored in the law, cannot ‘adequately represent’ the interests of the

members of the ‘class,’ but also out of the long-standing general prohibition

against even attorneys acting as both class representative and counsel for the

class.” Huddleston v. Duckworth, 97 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ind. 1983).

Accordingly, certification of this case as a class action is inappropriate. 

(Doc.# 5 at 1-2.) Further, the Court stated:

Generally, plaintiffs may join in one action if they assert any right to relief

arising out of the same occurrence or series of occurrences and if any question

of law or fact in common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 20. However, Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes

the Court to drop parties and to sever claims on just terms. See Desert Empire

Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (even if the

specific requirements of Rule 20 may be satisfied, a trial court must examine

other relevant factors to determine if joinder of a party will comport with

principles of fundamental fairness). 

Even if Plaintiffs in this action are properly joined, the Court has found

that management of pro se multi-plaintiff inmate litigation presents significant

burdens to both the parties and the Court. Plaintiffs are inmates proceeding pro

se, and, although each Plaintiff may appear on his own behalf, none may

appear as an attorney for the others. Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d

874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, during the prosecution of this action, each

Plaintiff would be required to sign and submit his own motions and notices

related to his claims in the action, and all Plaintiffs would be required to

individually sign any motion or notice filed on behalf of all Plaintiffs.

However, because of security concerns related to inmate correspondence and

face-to-face communications, Plaintiffs would have at best only a very limited

opportunity to discuss case strategy, share discovery, or even provide each

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other copies of the motions and notices they file with the Court. Thus,

continued administration of the lawsuit by the inmates is limited, if not

virtually impossible, due to the regulation of inmate-to-inmate correspondence.

Moreover, inmates are subject to transfer at any time to a facility other than the

one where they are currently incarcerated. 

(Id. at 2-3.) 

With the above concerns in mind, the Court concluded that unitary adjudication of the

Plaintiffs’ claims would result in unfairness to them, to the Defendants, and to the Court’s

goals of achieving judicial economy and maintaining efficient control of the Court’s docket,

while severance of the action would ameliorate those concerns. Thus, this case was not

severed based merely on a failure to meet the prerequisites for class action. It was also

severed because none of the Plaintiffs could represent anyone other than themselves and

because of the difficulty of administering a case with five, incarcerated, pro se plaintiffs, who

may be confined in separate facilities. Torrez does not dispute these difficulties, nor does

he demonstrate that severance in any way prejudices him or the other Plaintiffs. He

otherwise fails to demonstrate the Court clearly erred, that newly discovered evidence would

alter the analysis, or an intervening change in controlling law. Torrez’s objection will be

overruled and reconsideration denied. 

IT IS ORDERED that Torrez’s objection to severance is overruled and his motion

for reconsideration is denied. (Doc.# 7.) 

DATED this 15th day of March, 2010.

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