Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01357/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01357-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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1 Safeway was improperly named as “Safeway Food & Drug, Inc.” in the

summons and complaint.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darrell Proctor, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Safeway Food & Drug, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. 06-CV-1357-PHX-RCB

O R D E R

Currently pending before the court is a motion for summary

judgment brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by the defendant

Safeway, Inc.1

 (doc. 15). For the reasons set forth below, the

court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Background

On approximately November 11, 2002, plaintiff was hired as a

part-time Food Clerk. Def. SOF (doc. 16) at ¶ 1 (citations

omitted). Plaintiff retained that part-time status throughout

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his tenure with Safeway in that he never worked the number of

hours which the governing collective bargaining agreements

required to attain full-time status. Id., exh. I thereto (Decl’n

of Denise Diamond (Jan. 26, 2007)) at 2, ¶¶ 4-8. 

In any event, part of plaintiff’s training and orientation

included, in his words, a “large section on the sexual-harassment

[sic] issue.” Id. at 1, ¶ 2 (citing exh. A (Pl. Dep.) thereto at

38). In addition, during his orientation plaintiff received a

copy of Safeway’s “Employee Handbook/Store Policies” (“the

Handbook” or “the Employee Handbook”) which contained its sexual

harassment policy. Id. at 2, ¶ 5 (citing exh. A thereto at 40;

and exh. C thereto). As succinctly summarized in the 

“Policy/Rules/Employee Handbook Signoff Sheet,” which plaintiff

signed, that policy is: “Sexual harassment is wrong and will not

be tolerated in any form at Safeway.” Id., exh. C thereto. 

In its Employee Handbook, Safeway outlined its “Policy on

Harassment[,]” and provided representative definitions of what

“may” constitute “[u]nlawful sexual harassment[.]” Doc. 16, exh.

D thereto at 18. The Handbook further set forth the procedures

an employee should follow if he or she “experienced . . .

harassment[,]” which included “immediate[]” reporting to any one

of several listed “Safeway representatives[.]” Id. at 19. 

Another section of that Handbook set forth “what Safeway w[ould]

do with [a] report” of sexual harassment. Id. The procedure

began with “Safeway . . . promptly conduct[ing] a complete

investigation of [the employee’s] report.” Id. Safeway’s

Handbook is explicit: It “will not tolerate any acts of

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retaliation against [an employee] for making a report of

harassment.” Id. In fact, the Handbook goes on to state that if

an employee “feel[s] that someone is retaliating against [them]

for making a report,” the employee is instructed to inform one of

the listed Safeway representatives “so that Safeway can

investigate [the employee’s] concern and take appropriate

corrective action.” Id.

Plaintiff testified during his deposition that a statement

of Safeway’s “Policy on Harassment” was posted in the break room. 

Id., exh. A thereto at 53. That Policy was more detailed than

the one in the Handbook in that it actually listed six “Human

Resource Advisor[s]” by name and provided their telephone

numbers. Id., exh. F thereto. The posted Policy also 

identified the “SVP, Corporate Human Resources” person by name

and provided his telephone number. Id. 

According to plaintiff, he was sexually harassed on two

separate occasions by co-worker Roger Finn, a Courtesy Clerk. 

Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he “understood and

knew of [Mr. Finn’s] mental handicaps.” Id., exh. A thereto at

54. More specifically, plaintiff testified that it was his 

“underst[anding]” that Mr. Finn was “mentally retarded.” Id. 

Despite that, up until the time of the first incident plaintiff

and Mr. Finn had an amicable working relationship. 

Prior to the first incident plaintiff testified that he “had

no problems with” Mr. Finn. Id. at 54 and 55. In fact,

plaintiff thought that Mr. Finn “seemed like a nice enough guy.” 

Id. at 54. He further described Mr. Finn as “friendly, [but] a

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little withdrawn.” Id. “The entire time up until” the first

incident plaintiff “talked to” Mr. Finn, and “[j]oked around with

him.” Id. at 89. The two of them would watch television

together in the break room; and “[c]hat about whatever.” Id.

When recounting his relationship with Mr. Finn, plaintiff

repeated that he “never had a problem or incident with” Mr. Finn

before the incidents of which he is complaining in this lawsuit. 

Id.

The first incident occurred on February 3, 2005, when

plaintiff had just finished his shift. Id. at 55. Mr. Finn was

in the break room as plaintiff was “punching out.” Id. They had

been joking around, and as plaintiff left to go to the parking

lot, Mr. Finn followed him, continuing to talk as they walked. 

Id. at 56; see also id., exh. G thereto (Pl. “Statement of

Incident”). Plaintiff assumed that Mr. Finn was going to the

parking lot to “collect the carts.” Id. at 56. When plaintiff

got to his car, he “opened the door and got in.” Id., exh. G

thereto; see also id. exh. A thereto at 56. As plaintiff

indicated in his “Statement of Incident[,]” written five days

after the event, Mr. Finn then “leaned into [plaintiff’s] car and

asked[,] ‘what was wrong with [plaintiff’s] steering wheel’[.]”

Id. Evidently this remark was precipitated by the fact that

plaintiff’s steering wheel “is brittle and flaking off from heat

& wear.” Id. 

In his Statement, plaintiff further wrote that “[Mr. Finn]

took his finger and touched the worn area on [the] wheel[,] then

removed his finger and, pretending to wipe it off[,] put his

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finger on [plaintiff’s] left inner thigh and slid it up.” Id. 

When specifically asked “how far up [his] thigh” Mr. Finn touched

him, plaintiff answered: “Not very. If he got a quarter-inch it

is a miracle because my hand was right there.” Id., exh. A

thereto at 57. As to the length of time Mr. Finn’s finger was on

plaintiff’s thigh, plaintiff readily admitted that it was “not

even” two seconds. Id. at 58. When directly asked if it was for

“one second,” plaintiff replied, “I can’t give you an actual

determination of time. It was almost immediately from the time

his finger touched my leg and started moving upwards I had his

hand and threw it off of me.” Id. In response, plaintiff

“grabbed [Mr. Finn’s] hand, removed it away and told him to get

away[.]” Id., exh. G thereto. Mr. Finn “backed off

immediately[,]” and plaintiff drove off. Id., exh. A thereto at

57; and exh. G thereto. 

The next day, February 4, 2005, “at the very first

opportunity” he had, plaintiff told Jonathan Gray, the acting

store manager, about this incident. Id. at 60; and 59. This was

in response to Mr. Gray’s casual inquiry asking plaintiff how he

was. Id. at 60. Plaintiff told Mr. Gray that he needed to talk

to him “for a minute.” Id. The two then had “a very brief

conversation” with plaintiff quietly telling Mr. Gray what had

transpired in the parking lot with Mr. Finn. Id. Plaintiff’s

impression was that Mr. Gray “was quite shocked[.]” Id. Mr.

Gray assured plaintiff that he would “talk” with Mr. Finn and

that he would “get it taken care of.” Id.

The second incident occurred the next time plaintiff and Mr.

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2 Immediately after writing that Statement, plaintiff wrote another

“Statement of Incident[,]” pertaining to the first incident on February 3, 2005.

Doc. 16, exh. G thereto. 

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Finn worked together -- five days later on February 8, 2005. At

Mr. Gray’s request, plaintiff wrote a “Statement of Incident”

within less than an hour after this incident occurred.2 See id.,

exh. H thereto. As plaintiff recounts this incident in his

Statement, while he was “standing at [a] checkstand in the

bagging area[,]” plaintiff “felt, from behind,” a “tugg[ing] on

his “left shirt sleeve . . . and a brushing against [his] tricep

area.” Id.; see also id., exh. A thereto at 62. This was a

“split second incident[,]” id., exh. A thereto, lasting for

“[r]oughly[] . . . one or two seconds.” Id., exh. A thereto at

63. During his deposition, plaintiff speculated that perhaps “it

was kind of [Mr. Finn’s] way of telling [plaintiff], hey, I am

here to bag the groceries and I will takeover [sic] for you[.]”

Id., exh. A thereto at 63. In any event, plaintiff “immediately

told [Mr. Finn] to get away from [him] and to never touch [him]

again.” Id. at 62.

From there, plaintiff “went directly to the manager’s

office” and had Mr. Gray paged. Id., exh. H thereto. He also

asked a co-worker to come into the office with him to be a

witness. Id.; and exh. A thereto at 64. By his own admission,

plaintiff “unleashed a two-minute verbal tirade on [Mr. Gray]

that was nasty[,]” including the frequent use of expletives. 

Id., exh. A thereto at 51. During that tirade plaintiff

described what had just happened with Mr. Finn and then “asked if

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[Mr. Finn] had been talked to about the first incident.” Id.

Mr. Gray said the he had not yet talked with Mr. Finn, implying

that it was because “[n]either he nor [Mr. Finn] had worked

together” since the first incident. Id., exh. H thereto. A

“heated” discussion ensued about “all aspects of th[e] situation

and [plaintiff] left the office - unsatisfied and upset.” Id.

As plaintiff recalls it, “within 30 minutes after the second

incident occurred[,]” Bob Blaylock, a Safeway Human Resources

employee, came to the store and met with plaintiff for

“[p]robably 10, 15 minutes[.]” Id., exh. A thereto at 45; and

66. Plaintiff was advised that an investigation would be done

and they would “be back in touch with” him. Id. at 66. 

A few days later, on February 11, 2005, a Human Resource

Advisor and Mr. Blaylock again met with plaintiff informing him

“that they did not find any evidence to support [his] claim[]” of

sexual harassment against Mr. Finn. Id. at 46; and 81. As part

of that investigation Safeway “had talked to some people at the

Boys and Girls club where [Mr. Finn],” plaintiff “assume[d][,]”

worked as a “counselor.” Id. Safeway was advised that Mr. Finn

had “an exemplary record” there. Id.; and at 48. At that point,

plaintiff was further advised that Safeway was “dropping the

investigation[,]” and that “any punishment that [Mr. Finn] got

was already served[]” when he was sent home after the initial

interview following the second incident. Id. at 46-48. 

Plaintiff also was informed that he and Mr. Finn would not be

scheduled to work together any more. Id. at 82. Plaintiff

indicated that he was “very dissatisfied” with Safeway’s

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response. Id. Plaintiff testified that he felt “almost as if

they didn’t believe [his] story.” Id.

Following the second incident, according to Human Resources

Advisor Denise Diamond, a “Corrective Action Report” was taken

with respect to Mr. Finn. Doc. 16, exh. I thereto at 2, ¶ 26. 

Mr. Finn received a “verbal warning” and a three day suspension,

the “duration of [the] investigation[.]” Id., exh. J thereto

(“Corrective Action Report”). Under the section of that Report

entitled “corrective action required[,]” it states that Mr. Finn

“will refrain from touching any employee or customer in an

unproffessional [sic] manner.” Id. As of January 26, 2007, Mr.

Finn was still employed with Safeway and no alleged harassment

complaints have been lodged against him since the February, 2005

incidents which are the subject of this lawsuit. Id., exh. I

thereto at 3, ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff no longer is employed by Safeway, however. He was

terminated in October, 2005 after “admitt[ing] to stealing

approximately $4,4000 in cash during the course of his

employment.” Id., exh. N thereto (“Employee Investigation”

report); and exh. I thereto at 2-3, ¶ 9. Plaintiff executed a

promissory note agreeing to repay Safeway $4,400.00 for that

stolen cash. Id., exh. I thereto at 3, ¶ 10; and exh. N thereto

(copy of promissory note).

On August 31, 2005, plaintiff filed a “Charge of

Discrimination” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”). Doc. 1, exh. C thereto. In that Charge, he claimed to

have been “sexually harassed by a co-worker, Roger Finn.” Id.

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3 Finding this case suitable for disposition without oral argument,

the court denies this request. 

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Plaintiff further alleged that he had been discriminated against

“because of [his] sex, male, and in retaliation for protesting

practices made unlawful by Title VII[.]” Id. That alleged

retaliation was in the form of his supposedly being “demoted from

Full-time to Part-time status.” Id.

On January 31, 2006, the EEOC issued a “Dismissal and Notice

of Rights[.]” Id., exh. D thereto. The EEOC informed plaintiff

that “[b]ased upon its investigation,” it was “unable to conclude

that the information obtained establishe[d] violations of any

statutes.” Id. Following the receipt of that Notice, on May 1,

2006, plaintiff timely filed this action in Superior Court of

Arizona, Maricopa County. Id., exh. A thereto. Safeway

subsequently properly removed the case to this district court. 

Discussion

I. Non-compliance with LRCiv 7.2

At the outset the court is compelled to comment upon

plaintiff’s response or, more accurately, his lack of response to

the present motion. Significantly plaintiff did not file a

responsive memorandum in accordance with LRCiv 7.2©, and the time

to file and serve such a response has passed. See LRCiv 7.2©;

and App. A (“Time Chart”). Nor did plaintiff file a statement of

facts as LRCiv 56.1(b) requires. Instead, he filed a document

entitled “Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendants [sic] Motion for

Summary Judgment[,]” specifically “request[ing] oral

argument[.]”3 Doc. 18 at 1. 

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Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(I), provides in relevant

part that “if the unrepresented party . . . does not serve and

file the required answering memoranda, . . . , such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting of the

motion and the court may dispose of the motion summarily.” LRCIv

7.2(I) (emphasis added). Invoking that Rule, defendant filed a

motion “request[ing] that the Court exercise its discretion”

thereunder and grant its motion. Def. Mot. (doc. 19) at 2. The

court declines to summarily grant defendant’s summary judgment

motion based upon plaintiff’s non-compliance with Local Rule

7.2(I). See Henry v. Gill Indus., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir.

1993) (“The language of the [predecessor to LRCiv 7.2(I)] is

permissive, conferring discretion upon the district judge to

determine whether non-compliance should be deemed consent to a

given motion.”). 

Summarily granting defendant summary judgment would amount

to an abuse of discretion given the Ninth Circuit’s well-settled

view “that a nonmoving party’s failure to comply with local rules

does not excuse the moving party’s affirmative duty under Rule 56

to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” 

See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56); see also Henry, 983 F.2d at 949-50;

and Hamilton v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 539 F.2d 684, 686 n. 1

(9th Cir. 1976). Failing to ensure that the moving party has met

its burden on a summary judgment motion “turn[s] the summary

judgment rule into a mere sanction for noncompliance with local

rules[]” – a result the Ninth Circuit does not condone. See id.

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Thus, despite the Local Rule that permits summarily granting

motions for non-compliance, heeding the mandate of Martinez, this

court will analyze defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the

merits. At the same time though, as discussed below, the court

is unwilling to completely overlook plaintiff’s non-compliance

with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©, a party is entitled to

summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” It is beyond dispute that “[t]he moving

party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v.

Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

“The criteria of ‘genuineness’ and ‘materiality’ are distinct

requirements.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912,

916 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The requirement that an issue be

‘genuine’ relates to the quantum of evidence the plaintiff must

produce to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” 

Id. “There must be sufficient evidence ‘that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “As to materiality, the substantive

law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. 

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“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, . . . , the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit

or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). This “[e]vidence must be concrete

and cannot rely on ‘mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’”

Bates v. Clark County, 2006 WL 3308214, at * 2 (D.Nev. Nov. 13,

2006) (quoting O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d

1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986)). Similarly, “a mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence” is not sufficient “to defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment; instead, the nonmoving party must

introduce some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support

the complaint.’” Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125

F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249, 252). Thus, in opposing a summary judgment motion it is not

enough to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. V.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Nor is it sufficient for the nonmoving party to merely rely on

the pleadings. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

(1986). 

By the same token though, when assessing the record to

determine whether there is a “genuine issue for trial,” the court

must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inference in his favor.”

Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted). The court may not

make credibility determinations; nor may it weigh conflicting

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evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Thus, as framed by the

Supreme Court, the ultimate question on a summary judgment motion

is whether the evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.

The fact that a plaintiff is appearing pro se, such as Mr.

Proctor, does not alter the applicability of these general

summary judgment rules. See Semper v. JBC Legal Group, 2005 WL

2172377, at *1 (W.D.Wash. 2005) (“Although the rule requires that

the allegations of a pro se complaint be liberally construed in

determining whether a viable claim has been asserted and that

strict compliance with procedural/technical rules will not be

expected of pro se litigants, it does not alter the summary

judgment standard or otherwise give pro se non-prisoner litigants

multiple opportunities to present their evidence.”) The summary

judgment rules apply with equal force to pro se litigants because

they “must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other

litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987);

see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citation omitted) (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in

their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of

procedure.”) In fact, in Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th

Cir. 1986), the Court rejected the argument that pro se nonprisoner litigants are entitled to notice from the court

regarding the requirements of Rule 56. In so doing, the Court

unequivocally stated that “pro se litigants in the ordinary civil

case should not be treated more favorably than parties with

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attorneys of record.” Id. at 1364. Accordingly, although Mr.

Proctor is appearing pro se, the court will hold him to the same

standards as it would any other non-moving party on a motion for

summary judgment. 

II. Title VII

Plaintiff is alleging two separate violations of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

(“Title VII”). First, he is alleging that he was sexually

harassed during the course of his employment at Safeway. Doc.

1, exhs. A (Co.) and C (EEOC Charge) thereto. Second, he alleges

that Safeway retaliated against him for complaining of that

sexual harassment. Allegedly that retaliation took the form of

“demot[ing] [plaintiff] from full time to part time status[.]”

Id., exh. A thereto at 1; see also exh. C thereto. The court

will address each of these claims in turn. 

A. Hostile Work Environment

“Title VII . . . forbids an employer ‘to fail or refuse to

hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s . . . sex.’” Craig v. M & O

Agencies, Inc., 2007 WL 2264635, at *8 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2007)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) (emphasis added). “Title

VII’s prohibition ‘is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’

discrimination[.]’” Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1987)). Thus, “[w]hen the workplace is

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,

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. . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment, . . .” the Supreme Court has held that

“Title VII is violated.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“To make a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, a

person must show that: (1) []he was subjected to verbal or

physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2) this conduct was

unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and

create an abusive working environment.” Craig, 2007 WL 2264635,

at *5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Based

upon the plain language of Title VII, “[t]he plaintiff also must

prove that ‘any harassment took place because of sex.’” 

Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th

Cir. 2005) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,

523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)) (other citation omitted). 

Safeway contends that there are two obstacles to plaintiff’s

hostile work environment claim. The first is plaintiff’s

inability to show that the alleged sexual harassment was based

upon his gender, i.e. that it was “because of sex.” In

particular, Safeway argues that “there was no indication

whatsoever that Mr. Finn touched Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s

gender.” Mot. (doc. 15) at 8. Second, Safeway asserts that

“[p]laintiff’s evidence does not come close to satisfy[ing] the

demanding standards for severity and pervasiveness” necessary to

support a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 9. Given the

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plaintiff’s lack of a response to this motion, the court will

limit its analysis to these two relatively narrow bases for

summary judgment. When it does that, the court is easily

convinced that Safeway is entitled to summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim. 

1. “Because of Sex”

“Sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment

is actionable under Title VII[.]” Onacle, 523 U.S. at 82. Thus,

the fact that plaintiff and his alleged harasser, Mr. Finn, are

both male, does not render Title VII inapplicable here. 

Nonetheless, plaintiff cannot survive Safeway’s motion for

summary judgment on his hostile work environment claim because,

as discussed below, he has not met his burden with respect to the

“because of sex” element of such a claim. 

As noted at the outset, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work

environment must prove that “any harassment took place because of

sex.” Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034. That does not mean,

however, that a plaintiff must prove that the harassing conduct

was “motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of

discrimination on the basis of sex.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 

Rather, the Supreme Court in Onacle outlined three “evidentiary

route[s]” whereby a Title VII plaintiff can show an inference of

discrimination because of sex. The first, where such an

inference is “easy to draw,” is in a male-female sexual

harassment situation where “the challenged conduct . . .

involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity[.]” 

Id. at 80. This “same chain of inference [is] available to a

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plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible

evidence that the harasser was homosexual.” Id. Another way in

which a plaintiff who is claiming same-sex harassment may show an

inference of discrimination is if he was “harassed in such sexspecific and derogatory terms by another []man as to make it

clear that the harasser [wa]s motivated by general hostility to

the presence of []men in the workplace.” Id. “A same-sex

harassment plaintiff may also, . . ., offer direct com-parative

[sic] evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of

both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” Id. at 80-81. The Supreme

Court was emphatic in Oncale though, “[w]hatever evidentiary

route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he . . . must always prove

that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive

sexual connotations, but actually constituted ‘discrimina[tion]

. . . because of . . . sex.’” Id. at 80 (emphasis added by Oncale

Court). 

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

as it must, the court cannot find that either of the incidents of

which he is complaining “actually constituted discrimination

because of sex.” See id. The record does not support an

inference of same-sex discrimination under any of the evidentiary

theories enumerated in Oncale. There is no evidence that the

challenged conduct “involve[d] explicit or implicit proposals of

sexual activity[.]” See id. Nor is there any evidence that Mr.

Finn was homosexual. Likewise, the manner in which plaintiff was

allegedly harassed, the momentarily placement of a finger on his

thigh and brushing against his tricep area for a “split-second,”

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was not “in such sex-specific and derogatory terms as to make it

clear that [Mr. Finn] [wa]s motivated by general hostility to

[]men in the workplace.” See id. Finally, there is not any

“direct comparative evidence” in the record as to how Mr. Finn

treated members of both sexes in [that] mixed-sex workplace.” 

See id. at 80-81.

Moreover, Mr. Finn’s “put[ting] his finger on [plaintiff’s] 

inner thigh and . . . rubbing up towards [plaintiff’s]

privates[,]” perhaps “a quarter inch[,]” doc. 16, exh. A thereto

at 56 and 57, was at most conduct “merely tinged with offensive

sexual connotations[.]” See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. As the

Supreme Court made clear in Oncale, however, conduct of that type

does not support an inference of discrimination “because of sex.” 

 The second incident, where Mr. Finn allegedly tugged on

plaintiff’s shirt sleeve and brushed against plaintiff’s tricep

area was again, at the very most, conduct “merely tinged with

offensive sexual connotations[.]” See id. As the foregoing

shows, there is a complete lack of any probative evidence, let

alone “significant probative evidence[,] tending to support” an

inference of discrimination because of gender here. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added). Thus, because

plaintiff has not made a “showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an essential element” of his hostile work

environment claim, an element “on which he will bear the burden

of proof at trial[,]” summary judgment is proper. See Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322.

. . .

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 2. “Severe or Pervasive” Conduct

Assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff had raised

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Finn’s actions

constituted discrimination “because of sex” (which he did not),

still, Safeway would be entitled to summary judgment as to this

hostile work environment claim. Summary judgment is proper

because plaintiff likewise has not met his burden of showing a

genuine issue of material fact as to the third element of such a

claim. 

To satisfy the third element of a hostile work environment

claim, a plaintiff “must show that h[is] work environment was

both subjectively and objectively hostile.” Galdamez v. Potter,

415 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Harris, 510 U.S. at

20-21. “Objective hostility is determined by examining the

totality of the circumstances and whether a reasonable person

with the same characteristics as the victim would perceive the

workplace as hostile.” Craig, 2007 WL 2264635, at *8 (citing

Harris, 510 U.S. at 20-21). The totality of the circumstances

inquiry “includ[es] the frequency, severity, and nature (i.e.,

physically threatening or humiliating as opposed to merely

verbally offensive) of the conduct.” Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1023

(citation omitted). “The required severity of the conduct varies

inversely with its pervasiveness and frequency.” Id.

Significantly, “[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘simple

teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless

extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in

the terms and conditions of employment.’” Craig, 2007 WL 2264635,

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at *5 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788

(1998)). In other words, “[c]onduct that is not severe or

pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work

environment -- an environment that a reasonable person would find

hostile or abusive -- is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Oncale,

523 U.S. at 81 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). 

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, clearly he has not raised a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether the two incidents with Mr. Finn were so severe

or pervasive as to “create an objectively hostile or abusive work

environment[.]” See id. The two incidents were of extremely

short duration, and obviously infrequent. The first, as

plaintiff readily conceded, lasted “not even” two seconds. Doc.

16, exh. A thereto at 58. And the second incident plaintiff

himself described as a “split-second incident.” Id. at 63. 

Further, even plaintiff realized that the second, sleeve tugging

incident, may simply have been Mr. Finn’s way (as a

developmentally disabled person), of letting plaintiff know that

Mr. Finn was available to assist with bagging groceries. Id.

Employing the totality of the circumstances test adopted by

the Supreme Court in Harris, this case falls into the category

where “it is clear from the facts that the offensive behavior

alleged is legally insufficient to rise to the level of sexual

harassment.” See Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F.Supp.

1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1995) (citing Candelore v. Clark County,

Sanitation Dist. 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“isolated

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4 Because the court has found that the alleged harassment was not

sufficiently “severe and pervasive[,]” it need not address the issue of whether

Safeway failed to take adequate remedial measures. See Millwood v. Torrez, 1999

WL 144876, at *5, n. 2 (N.D.Cal. 1999).

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incidents of sexual horseplay alleged by [plaintiff] took place

over a period of years and were not so egregious as to render

[her] work environment hostile[]”)). In fact, the conduct

alleged herein is far less egregious than other reported cases

where courts likewise have found that the alleged harassment was

not severe enough to support a hostile work environment claim. 

See, e.g., Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 926 (9th

Cir. 2000) (single incident where co-worker touched plaintiff’s

stomach and breast under her sweater, although “highly

offensive[,]” did not rise to the level of a hostile work

environment) (and cases cited therein). Simply put, this record

does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the

“crucial” requirement of a hostile work environment claim –

conduct so severe or pervasive as to “create . . . an environment

that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive[.]” See

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 1003 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Hence, the fact that Mr. Finn’s conduct was not

sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of

plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work environment,

provides another basis for granting Safeway’s motion for summary

judgment on this particular Title VII claim.4

B. Retaliation

Title VII makes it unlawful, among other things, “for an

employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . .

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5 See Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 1510 (2001)

(Title VII retaliation claim precluded where no reasonable person could have

believed that a single incident of sexual harassment violated that statue).

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because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “In order to establish a prima facie case

of retaliation under Title VII, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate

that (1) []he engaged in an activity protected under Title VII;

(2) h[is] employer subjected h[im] to adverse employment action;

and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action.” Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379

F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). If possible,

plaintiff’s retaliation claim is even more attenuated than his

hostile work environment claim. 

Even if plaintiff Proctor engaged in a protected activity (a

highly doubtful proposition5), he cannot survive Safeway’s

summary judgment motion on this retaliation claim because he was

not subjected to an “adverse employment action” for reporting

Mr. Finn. In his complaint plaintiff alleges that Safeway “did

nothing to satisfy [his] harassment and after [his] warnings of

legal action, . . . demote[d] [him] from full time to parttime

[sic] status[.]” Doc. 1, exh. A thereto. The evidence belies

this assertion. Because he never had full time status to begin

with, plaintiff could not, as he alleges, have been “demoted.” 

The uncontroverted proof shows that in accordance with the

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collective bargaining agreements which governed the terms of

plaintiff’s employment with Safeway, a part-time employee did not

become full-time until he “worked in his . . . ‘home’ store for

forty (40) hours per week for sixteen (16) consecutive weeks[.]”

Doc. 16, exh. L thereto at 7; and id., exh. K thereto at 6, §

6(b). Plaintiff’s time records, which also are part of the

record herein, “show that he never worked a minimum of 40 hours

for 16 consecutive weeks.” Id., exh. I thereto at 2, ¶ 8; and

exh. M thereto. Consequently, because plaintiff never had fulltime status he could not have been demoted, regardless of the

reason. Without proof of an adverse employment action, which is

essential to a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim, Safeway

is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim as well. See

Smith v. Richardson, 2007 WL 270734, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 13,

2007) (granting summary judgment in employer’s favor on Title VII

retaliation claim due to a lack of evidence that employer’s

“decision not to proceed with a preliminary inquiry” as to

possible parole violations of one of employee’s offenders was an

adverse job action).

III. Breach of Contract

In addition to his Title VII claims, plaintiff purports to

be asserting a “breach of employment contract” cause of action. 

See Doc. 1, exh. A thereto. There is absolutely nothing in

plaintiff’s complaint, however, pertaining to this alleged

breach. When questioned during his deposition about this breach

of contract claim, plaintiff offered his theory that “[t]he

employee handbook and [the] sexual-harassment [sic] policy . . .

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in it” is the “contract” which forms the basis for this claim. 

Doc. 16, exh. A thereto at 144. Plaintiff posits that Safeway

breached its zero tolerance policy contained therein with respect

to sexual harassment by not “immediately” acting upon the first

incident with Mr. Finn, and thus “allowing [the] second . . . to

occur.” Id. As plaintiff made clear during his deposition, this

is the sole basis for his breach of contract claim. See id. at

145-47. 

In order to establish a breach of contract claim based upon

an employee handbook, “plaintiff must establish: (1) that the

Handbook provisions became a part of the employment contract; and

(2) that the terms of the Handbook were breached.” Thomas v.

Garrett Corp., 744 F.Supp. 199, 200 (D. Ariz. 1989) (citing

Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 254 (Ariz. 1986)), aff’d

without pub’d opinion, 904 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1990). As to the

first element, the Arizona Supreme Court in Leikvold v. Valley

View Comty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 173 (Ariz. 1984), superseded on

other grounds by statute, A.R.S. § 23-1501, et seq., “held that

representations in a personnel manual upon which employees

reasonably rely, can become terms of an employment contract and

can limit an employer’s ability to discharge employees.” Thomas,

744 F.Supp. at 200. 

At the same time, the Leikvold Court “cautioned that not all

personnel manuals became part of the employment contract.” 

Duncan v. St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center, 903 P.2d

1107, 1113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). In qualifying the

circumstances under which representations in employee handbooks

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can become part of employment contracts, the Leikvold Court

stated:

We do not mean to imply that all personnel 

manuals will become part of employment

contracts. Employers are certainly free

to issue no personnel manual at all or to 

issue a personnel manual that clearly and 

conspicuously tells their employee that the 

manual is not part of the employment contract

and that their jobs are terminable at the 

will of the employer with or without reason. 

Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174 (emphasis added). The Leikvold Court

reasoned: 

Such actions, either not issuing a personnel 

manual or issuing one with clear language 

of limitation, instill no reasonable expectations 

of job security and do not give employees any 

reason to rely on representations in the manual.

Id.

Conversely, if an employee handbook “contains contractual

statements, [it] may alter the . . . nature of an employment

relationship.” Wilkes v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 2006 WL

753161, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citation omitted). “‘A statement

is contractual only if it discloses a promissory intent or [is]

one that the employee could reasonably conclude constituted a

commitment by the employer.’” Id. (quoting Demasse v. ITT Corp.,

984 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ariz. 1999)) (other quotation marks and

citation omitted) (emphasis added by Wilkes court).

In the present case, as part of his orientation plaintiff

received the Handbook. Doc. 16, exh. A thereto at 52. The plain

and unambiguous language of that Handbook dispels any notion that

any contractual rights were created thereunder. That Handbook

unequivocally and prominently states:

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6 See, e.g., Wagner, 722 P.2d at 254; Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 173; and

Jeski v. American Express Co., 708 P.2d 110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (factual issue

as to whether employee manual modified parties’ at-will relationship where it

provided for termination “at any time[,]” but also pledged to provide employees

with “job security[]”). 

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[I]t is expressly understood that the 

contents of this handbook DO NOT CONSTITUTE 

ALL OR PART OF THE TERMS OF A CONTRACT 

OF EMPLOYMENT.

Id., exh. D thereto at 2 (emphasis in original). During his

deposition, plaintiff readily agreed that he “at least read

through” this language when he received the Handbook. Id., exh.

A thereto at 146. Moreover, similar language is found in the

“Store Policies” acknowledgment form which plaintiff signed on

November 11, 2002:

The Store Policies are not intended 

to create any contractual rights or 

obligations[.]

Id., exh. E thereto.

 “Although whether the provisions of the Handbook became part

of the contract is a question of fact,6

 where the terms of the

agreement are clear and unambiguous,” as they are here, “the

construction of the contract is a question of law for the court.” 

See Thomas, 744 F.Supp. at 201 (citation omitted) (footnote

added). Given the clear and unambiguous disclaimer language

quoted above, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the

Handbook became part of the employment agreement, if any, or that

it altered the terms of plaintiff’s employment with respect to

Safeway’s sexual harassment policy or otherwise. In the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of

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7 Under Leikvold, “in addition to the language” of an employee

handbook, “other conduct and representations of the employer are to be considered

in determining whether the Handbook became part of the [employment] agreement.”

Thomas, 744 F.Supp. at 202. Plaintiff Proctor has not, however, come forth with

any proof even suggesting that Safeway engaged in conduct or made representations

which might form the basis for a finding that the Handbook was part of his

employment contract, if any. As he testified during his deposition, the Handbook

itself and the sexual harassment policy contained therein are the sole basis for

his breach of contract claim. 

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his breach of contract claim, i.e. that the Handbook provisions

became part of an employment agreement, Safeway also is entitled

to summary judgment as to this claim.7 See Almada v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 285 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming summary

judgment in employer’s favor on breach of employment agreement

claim where employee manual contained, inter alia, “a prominent

disclaimer that [it] was ‘not a statement of contractual

rights’[]” because “no reasonable trier of fact could conclude

that the [employee] manual modified the provisions” of

plaintiff’s contract). 

Conclusion

To summarize, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the

record as presently constituted is “so one-sided that one party

must prevail as a matter of law[;]” and that one party is

defendant Safeway. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. 

In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for

summary judgment by defendant Safeway, Inc. (doc. 15) is GRANTED. 

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for the

. . . 

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defendant, Safeway, Inc., and terminate this action.

DATED this 28th day of September, 2007.

Copies to plaintiff, pro se, and counsel of record

Case 2:06-cv-01357-RCB Document 20 Filed 09/28/07 Page 28 of 28