Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04593/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04593-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

San Francisco Division 

JOHN BAUER, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF PLEASANTON, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:19-cv-04593-LB 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

Re: ECF No. 15 

INTRODUCTION 

In August 2019, police officers responded to a call about Jacob Bauer, who allegedly was 

causing a disturbance at a grocery store in Pleasanton, California.1 The officers allegedly 

restrained Jacob, put a spit mask over his mouth, used a stun gun and a taser, and — after he was 

fully restrained — hit him with a baton and “stomped on his chest several times.”2

 Jacob, who was 

unarmed and suffering from a mental illness, died on the scene after the police “did not provide or 

summon timely medical attention,” even though Jacob was “unresponsive and turning blue.”3

Jacob’s parents, and the plaintiffs in this lawsuit, are John and Rose Bauer, and they sued the City 

1

 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 4 (¶ 14). Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); 

pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 

2 Id. 4–5 (¶¶ 15–16). 

3 Id. at 4–5 (¶ 16–20), 6 (¶¶ 22, 24). 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 1 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 2

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

of Pleasanton and its police chief, Dave Spiller, for (1) excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (2) deliberative indifference to the 

provision of emergency medical care, in violation of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) a 

deprivation of their right to familial association, in violation of $ 1983 and the Fourteenth 

Amendment, (4) municipal liability (against the City of Pleasanton) under Monell v. New York 

City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); and (5) similar claims under state law.4

The defendants moved to dismiss the Monell claim, a negligent hiring/supervision claim, and a 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).5 The court can decide the motion 

without oral argument, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 7-1(b), and grants the motion. 

STATEMENT 

Before the events that resulted in their son’s death, the plaintiffs “were desperate to get help 

for their son and contacted Pleasanton Police no less than four times to notify them of their son’s 

condition and to try to get their son committed for mental health evaluation and treatment.”6

“Because Jacob was not a danger to himself or others, Pleasanton Police told Mr. and Mrs. Bauer 

that there was nothing they could do.”7

On August 1, 2018 (based on the plaintiffs’ knowledge and belief), Chief Spiller and other 

police officers “were dispatched” to a grocery store (a Raley’s store) in Pleasanton, California, to 

respond to an alleged disturbance by Jacob Bauer.”8 The police officers “restrained Jacob’s hands 

and legs, placed a spit mask over his mouth, and used a stun gun and taser on him several times.”9

4 Id. at 7–23 (¶¶ 26–118). 

5

 Mot. – ECF No. 15 at 10–20. The defendants also moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims (to the 

extent that they are predicated on their survival claim) for failure to file the required affidavit under 

Cal. Civ. P. Code § 377.32. Mot. – ECF No. 15 at 9. The plaintiffs filed the required affidavit. 

Affidavit – ECF NO. 16. The defendants do not contend otherwise. Reply – ECF No. 21. The motion 

to dismiss on this basis is moot. 

6

 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 2. 

7 Id. 

8 Id. at 4 (¶ 14). 

9 Id. (¶ 15). 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 2 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 3

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

After restraining Jacob, who was unarmed, the defendants “hit Jacob with a baton and stomped on 

his chest several times.”10 Jacob became unresponsive and turned blue, but the police officers did 

not provide medical care and prevented medical personnel on the scene from rendering care.11 As 

a result, Jacob suffered injuries (including “contusions and severe emotional distress”) and died.12

The plaintiffs plead the following to support their Monell claim: 

21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the Pleasanton Police Department has a 

custom and/or policy of failing to use de-escalation tactics or other appropriate police 

intervention tactics and instead regularly employs unconstitutional excessive force against 

disabled individuals. Examples of this include, but are not limited to, the July 5, 2015 fatal 

shooting of 19 year old John Deming Jr who was experiencing a mental health crisis and 

the May 20, 2017 fatal shooting of Shannon Edward Estill who was experiencing a mental 

health crisis at the time of his interaction with Pleasanton Police. The death of Jacob Bauer 

makes three fatalities of mentally ill individuals in three years by officers of the Pleasanton 

Police Department. 

22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the Pleasanton Police 

Department failed to investigate and remedy the shooting deaths of these mentally disabled 

individuals and failed to conduct adequate training following these events thereby ratifying 

the custom and policy of using excessive, unconstitutional force against people in mental 

crisis. 

23. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the City of Pleasanton 

does not have civilian oversight of the police department and this custom, policy and 

practice of the police overseeing themselves contributes to the unconstitutional use of force 

against the mentally ill and other disadvantaged groups. 

24. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the Pleasanton Police 

Department’s response to Jacob Bauer and other fatalities involving mentally disabled 

people was so lacking that it amounted to a ratification and/or evidence of a custom and 

practice of disregarding the constitutional rights of the mentally disabled and use of 

excessive force against them and other disadvantaged groups. The lack of adequate 

training, disciplinary action or other corrective measures taken before and after the death of 

John Deming Jr. and again after the death of Shannon Estill directly contributed to the 

death of Jacob Bauer. Such failure to act amounts to a ratification of the unconstitutional 

use of excessive force. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that 

following the death of Jacob Bauer the Pleasanton Police Department continues to lack 

civilian oversight and has not taken any corrective training measures or taken disciplinary 

action against any officer involved.13

10 Id. at 5–6 (¶ 16). 

11 Id. at 6 (¶¶ 19–20). 

12 Id. (¶ 17). 

13 Id. at 5–6 (¶¶ 21–24). 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 3 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 4

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

The plaintiffs’ claims are as follows: (1) state-law battery for the wrongful death; (2) 

negligence for the wrongful death (from the use of force and failure to provide medical care); (3) 

excessive force in violation of § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment; (4) deliberative indifference to 

the provision of medical care, in violation of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) 

deprivation of the parents’ right to familial association, in violation of § 1983 and the Fourteenth 

Amendment; (6) a Monell claim; (7) a violation of California’s Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 

(based on the excessive force and the failure to provide medical care); (8) negligent hiring and 

supervision of the police officers; and (9) IIED.14 

The defendants moved to dismiss claims six (the Monell claim), claim eight (the negligent 

supervision claim), and claim nine (the IIED claim), and they also ask to dismiss Chief Spiller on 

the ground that the claims against him duplicate those against the City.15

All parties have consented to magistrate jurisdiction.16

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 

which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a claim for relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which 

when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

14 Id. at 7–23 (¶¶ 26–118). 

15 Mot. – ECF No. 15 at 2, 6, 9–20. 

16 Joint Case-Management Statement – ECF No. 25 at 7; Order – ECF No. 28. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 4 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 5

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557). 

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 

848 F.3d 1161, 1183 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

ANALYSIS 

1. The Monell Claim 

The plaintiffs claim a Monell violation in the form of the City of Pleasanton’s (1) policy of not 

using de-escalation techniques for persons who are mentally ill (shown by two prior incidents also 

involving deaths of mentally ill persons), and its resulting failure to train its officers in the use of 

de-escalation techniques, and (2) ratification of the use of force (also shown by the prior 

incidents).17 The City moves to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs have not met the Monell

standard.18 The court grants the motion to dismiss because the allegations are too conclusory to 

establish Monell liability. 

Local governments can be sued directly under § 1983 only if they maintain a policy or custom 

that results in a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. To 

impose Monell entity liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must 

show that (1) the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right and was deprived of that right, (2) the 

municipality had a policy, (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s 

17 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 5–6 (¶¶ 21–24); Opp’n – ECF No. 17 at 9–17 (characterizing the claim). 

18 Mot. – ECF No. 15 at 9–17. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 5 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 6

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

constitutional right, and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 

Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained how a policy may be established: 

There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by showing “a 

longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of 

the local government entity;” (2) “by showing that the decision-making official was, as a 

matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 

to represent official policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “by showing that an official with 

final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 

subordinate.” 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ulrich v. City and Cty. of 

San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2002)); accord, e.g., Parker v. City of Pittsburg, 

No. 17-cv-01563-LB, 2017 WL 2986225, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2017) (applying standard on a 

motion to dismiss). The practice or custom must consist of more than “random acts or isolated 

events” and instead, must be the result of a “permanent and well-settled practice.” Thompson v. 

City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443–44 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Bull 

v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010); see City of St. Louis v. 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Thus, “a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not 

sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless” there is proof that the incident “was caused by 

an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy. . . .” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 

823–24 (1985). 

A police chief “may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his or 

her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Supervisors can 

be held liable for: 1) their own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of 

subordinates. . . .” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 

The plaintiffs claim a Monell violation based on (1) a long-standing practice and custom, 

including a failure to train, and (2) ratification of the officers’ actions. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 6 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 7

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

1.1 Practice and Custom 

To plead a Monell claim through a “longstanding practice or custom,” the “practice or custom 

must consist of more than ‘random acts or isolated events’ and instead, must be the result of a 

‘permanent and well-settled practice.’” Parker, 2017 WL 2986225, at *5 (citing Thompson v. City 

of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443–44 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. 

City and Cty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010)). “[T]he custom must be so 

‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled city policy.” Leon v. 

Hayward Bldg. Dep't, No. 17-cv-02720-LB, 2017 WL 3232486, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2017) 

(some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 

1233 (9th Cir. 2011)). “‘Isolated or sporadic incidents,’ by contrast, will not support Monell 

liability against a municipality.” Id. (quoting Hunter, 652 F.3d at 1233). 

“‘In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain employees about 

their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government 

policy for purposes of § 1983.’” Heyward v. BART Police Dep’t, No. 3:15-cv-04503-LB, 2016 

WL 730282, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2016) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 

(2011)). “‘A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a 

claim turns on a failure to train.’” Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). “‘To satisfy [§ 1983], a 

municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact.’” Id. 

(internal brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). “Only then ‘can such a shortcoming be properly [thought] of as a city 

policy or custom that is actionable under § 1983.’” Id. (some internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (1989)). 

“‘Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor 

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. (internal brackets and some 

internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). 

“‘Thus, when city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in 

their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 7 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 8

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.’” Id.

(quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). “‘The city’s policy of inaction in light of notice that its 

program will cause constitutional violations is the functional equivalent of a decision by the city 

itself to violate the Constitution.’” Id. (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (1989)). “‘A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim 

would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities[.]’” Id. (some internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389). “Thus, ‘a pattern of similar 

constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate 

indifference for purposes of failure to train.’” Id. (internal brackets and some internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). “‘Policymakers’ continued adherence to an 

approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may 

establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action — the deliberate 

indifference — necessary to trigger municipal liability.’” Id. (some internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). “‘Without notice that a course of training is deficient 

in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training 

program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.’” Id. 

The plaintiffs contend that there is a “custom and/or policy” of “unconstitutional excessive 

force” and “failing to use de-escalating tactics” based on Jacob’s death and two fatal shootings of 

other persons suffering from mental-health crises in three years.19 The defendants counter that 

plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and do not sufficiently show a persistent and widespread 

practice.20 

The plaintiffs do not allege facts that plausibly plead a failure to train that amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons such as Jacob. They contend that the following 

examples show an unconstitutional policy: “the July 5, 2015 fatal shooting of 19 year old John 

Deming Jr[.] who was experiencing a mental health crisis and the May 20, 2017 fatal shooting of 

19 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 5–6 (¶ 21). 

20 See Mot. – ECF No. 15 at 10–14; Reply – ECF No. 21 at 2–7. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 8 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 9

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Shannon Edward Estill who was experiencing a mental health crisis at the time of his interaction 

with Pleasanton Police.”21 These conclusory allegations do not show that the incidents are 

factually similar or plausibly show a “persistent and widespread” custom (as opposed to “isolated 

or sporadic” incidents). See, e.g., Sweiha v. County of Alameda, 19-cv-03098-LB, 2019 WL 

4848227, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) (plaintiff’s allegations of five other incidents do not 

show a custom or policy where the incidents “have markedly different facts”); Estate of Mendez v. 

City of Ceres, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (“If [the] alleged prior instances are 

sufficiently similar to [plaintiff’s circumstances] . . . and the instances constitute a pattern of 

violations rather than isolated incidents to which policymakers failed to respond or inadequately 

responded,” then the plaintiff sufficiently stated a Monell claim). 

The court dismisses the claim with leave to amend. 

1.2 Ratification 

The plaintiffs claim that ratification is shown by the lack of any corrective or disciplinary 

action for any of the three shooting incidents involving mentally ill decedents.22 

To plead a Monell claim through ratification, “a plaintiff must show that the ‘authorized 

policymakers approve[d] a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.’” Dasovich v. Contra Costa 

Cty. Sheriff’s Dep't, No. 14-cv-00258-MEJ, 2014 WL 4652118, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) 

(quoting Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004)). “The policymaker must have 

knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve of it.” Id. (citing Lytle, 382 F.3d at 

987). “A mere failure to overrule a subordinate’s actions, without more, is insufficient to support a 

§ 1983 claim.” Id. (citing Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987); accord, e.g., Estate of Adomako v. City of 

Fremont, No. 17-cv-06386-DMR, 2018 WL 2234179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2018) (“A police 

department’s ‘mere failure to discipline its officers does not amount to ratification of their 

allegedly unconstitutional actions.’ ”) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Sheehan v. City and 

21 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 5–6 (¶ 21). 

22 Opp’n – ECF No. 17 at 14–17. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 9 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 10

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Cty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert. dismissed in part, 

135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015)). 

First, the plaintiffs do not identify a final policymaker. They allege only that “at all times 

relevant herein, Spiller and DOES 30 through 50 were supervisors and policy makers for PPD 

[Pleasanton Police Department.]”23 

Second, their ratification theory relies on the other incidents, and so the claim fails for the 

reasons that the failure-to-train theory fails. See Sweiha, 2019 WL 484227 at *5 (plaintiffs did not 

state a ratification claim based on other dissimilar incidents). 

Third, their other allegations are conclusory. They allege that “Defendants Spiller and DOES 

30–50 ratified the conduct” by maintaining an unconstitutional policy of excessive force use and 

failing to train or discipline the officers accordingly.24 This does not plausibly plead how any final 

policymaker ratified the conduct at issue here. Cf. Slusher v. City of Napa, 15-cv-02394-SBA, 

2015 WL 8527411, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015) (dismissing Monell ratification claim where 

“[t]here are no allegations specifying the particular actions at issue or how and by whom they were 

ratified”); Dasovich, 2014 WL 4652118 at *6 (plaintiff’s complaint “contain[ed] no [] allegations 

of affirmative action by [the] Sheriff” to ratify the challenged conduct and thus did not state a 

ratification claim). 

The court dismisses the claim with leave to amend. 

1.3 Chief Spiller

The plaintiffs do not state a claim against Chief Spiller. They do not allege his personal 

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation or a causal connection (such as his own 

culpable action in training and supervising his subordinates). Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207; 

Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1292 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The court dismisses the claim with leave to amend. 

23 FAC – ECF No 7 at 3 (¶ 8); see also id. at 3 (¶ 6), 15 (¶ 78). 

24 Id. at 14–15 (¶ 77). 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 10 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 11

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

2. Negligent Hiring, Retention, Supervision or Training 

The plaintiffs’ eighth claim is for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training.25 The 

defendants move to dismiss the claim on the grounds that (1) there is no cause of action under 

state law for direct-liability claims for negligent hiring and supervision, and (2) there is no 

vicarious liability.26 The court grants the motion to dismiss. 

Under California law, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury” unless “otherwise provided 

by statute.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815(a). “One such statutory basis for liability is California 

Government Code section 815.2(a), which extends liability to a public entity ‘for injury 

proximately caused by . . . an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if 

the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” Hardin 

v. Mendocino Coast Dist. Hosp., 17-cv-05554-JST, 2018 WL 2984834, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 

2018). 

To the extent that the plaintiffs are alleging a theory of direct liability for negligent hiring or 

supervision, they have not identified a statute providing for the defendants’ direct liability. See 

Ottolini v. City of Rohnert Park, 19-cv-02851-LB, 2019 WL 3254231, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 

20190 (“California courts of appeal have held that no statutory basis exists for a claim of direct 

liability based on a public entity’s negligent hiring, policymaking, and supervision”) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted); see also Shoval v. Sobzak, 09-cv-01348-H (JMA), 2009 WL 

2780155, at *4 (S.D. Cal. August 31, 2009) (“California courts have repeatedly held that there is 

no statutory basis for direct claims against a public entity for negligent hiring and supervision 

practices”) (citing California cases). In their opposition, the plaintiffs do not dispute that they 

cannot bring a direct claim for negligent hiring or supervision against the defendants.27

The plaintiffs contend that “[m]unicipal governments may be vicariously liable for negligent 

hiring and supervision pursuant to Government Code section 815.2.”28 Courts in the Ninth Circuit 

25 Id. at 19–21 (¶¶ 97–108). 

26 Mot. – ECF No. 15 at 15–17. 

27 See Opp’n – ECF No. 17 at 17–18. 

28 Id. at 17. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 11 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 12

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

have rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., Herd v. County of San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 3d 

1157, 1171–72 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting, in an excessive-force case, the plaintiffs’ argument 

that the municipal defendants can be vicariously liable under § 815.2 for negligently failing to 

train officers on the use of deadly force); Hardin, 2018 WL 2984834 at *9 (“Section 815.2(a) does 

not apply to a negligent supervision, hiring, and retention claim because ‘liability for negligent 

supervision and/or retention of an employee is one of direct liability for negligence, not vicarious 

liability’”) (citing Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 815 (2006)); cf. Munoz v. 

City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1113–14 (2004) (rejecting argument that citydefendant’s alleged negligent hiring or supervision is based on vicarious liability because such 

argument “would render the distinction between direct and vicarious liability completely 

illusory”), overruled in part on other grounds by Hayes v. Cty. Of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622 

(2013)). 

The plaintiffs cite to the California Supreme Court’s decision in C.A. v. William S. Hart Union 

High School District to contend that a public entity can be vicariously liable for negligent hiring 

and supervision if there is a “special relationship” between the plaintiffs and the defendants.29 53 

Cal. 4th 861, 877 (2012). The court in William found that a school district could be vicariously 

liable for negligently hiring, retaining, and supervising a guidance counselor who abused the 

plaintiff. Id. at 865. The court based its holding on finding that there is a “special relationship” 

between school districts and students. Id. at 877. “Absent such a special relationship, there can be 

no individual liability to third parties for negligent hiring, retention or supervision of a fellow 

employee, and hence no vicarious liability under section 815.2.” Id. 

The plaintiffs contend that they sufficiently alleged a special relationship because they 

“notified Defendants four times that Jacob was suffering a mental health crisis.”30 They cite no 

cases to support that theory. Their allegations do not plausibly plead a special relationship. The 

court gives leave to amend for the plaintiffs to allege more facts. See Hardin, 2018 WL 2984834 

29 Id. at 17–18. 

30 Id. at 17. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 12 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 13

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

(dismissing negligent supervision claim against public entity with leave “[a]lthough it is not clear 

that [the plaintiff] will be able to cure this claim by amendment”). The court doubts that the 

deficiencies can be cured (but gives that opportunity to allow a full record). For many reasons, no 

matter how detailed the reports to the police, a special relationship cannot be established in 

circumstances such as these. There is an established framework for analyzing excessive-force 

cases, both under federal or state law. The criteria for special relationships — which turn on 

factors such as foreseeability of harm, the consequence to the community of imposing a duty, and 

burden — do not fit cases involving a police response to a call for assistance. Put another way, a 

school’s relationship with its students (who are in loco parentis) is different than a police 

department’s relationship to the community. Both have a duty, but the nature of the relationship 

imposes different responsibilities. 

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) 

The plaintiffs claim IIED as a survival claim.31 The defendants move to dismiss.32 The court 

grants the motion. 

In California, “[a] cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when 

there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering 

severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 

distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Kelley v. Conco Cos., 196 Cal. App. 4th 191, 215 

(2011). “A defendant's conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that 

usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The plaintiffs do not allege any acts directed at them. Burns v. City of Concord, 14-cv-00535-

LB, 2014 WL 5794629, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014) (dismissing IIED claim because plaintiffs 

“do not allege that Defendants directed their conduct at either of [the plaintiffs]”); see also Lopez 

31 Id. at 19. 

32 Mot. – ECF No. 15 at 18–19. 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 13 of 14
ORDER – No. 3:19-CV-04593-LB 14

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

v. County of Los Angeles, 15-cv-017450-MMM, 2015 WL 3913263, at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 

2015) (same). The plaintiffs also cannot allege a survival IIED claim on behalf of Jacob because 

“emotional distress damages do not survive the death of the person who suffered them.” Burns, 

2014 WL 5794629 at *17; see also Copeland v. County of Alameda, 12-cv-04286-JST, 2014 WL 

1266198, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 21, 2014) (citing Berkley v. Dowds, 152 Cal. App. 4th 518, 530 

(2007)).33

The court dismisses the claim with prejudice as to any survival claim and without prejudice as 

to any claim that the parents can assert on their own behalf. 

CONCLUSION 

The court grants the motion to dismiss with leave to amend (except the court dismisses the 

survival IIED claim with prejudice). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 26, 2020 

______________________________________ 

LAUREL BEELER 

United States Magistrate Judge 

33 Damages in survival actions include pre-death pain and suffering. Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 

751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Case 3:19-cv-04593-LB Document 32 Filed 03/26/20 Page 14 of 14