Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00039/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Lamont Moton,

Petitioner,

v.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-00039-PHX-SPL (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

This matter is on referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Rules 

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a report 

and recommendation. (Doc. 3) Thomas Lamont Moton (“Petitioner”) filed his Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (NonDeath Penalty) (“Petition”) on December 13, 2018

1

. (Doc. 1 at 11)

2

 Respondents filed 

their Answer on June 13, 2019. (Doc. 8) Petitioner filed his Reply on July 5, 2019. (Doc. 

9) As is explained below, undersigned recommends the Petition be denied and dismissed 

1 Petitioner placed the Petition in the prison mailing system on December 13, 2018. (Doc. 

1 at 11) The Clerk of Court filed the Petition on January 3, 2019. There is no dispute over 

timeliness of the Petition.

2 Citationsto the record indicate documents as displayed in the official electronic document 

filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case Number CV-19-00039-

PHX-SPL (DMF).

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with prejudice because Grounds Two is procedurally defaulted without excuse and 

Grounds One and Three lack merit.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s indictment, trial, and sentence

On June 4, 2012, the grand jurors of Maricopa County charged Petitioner on Count 

One of the first degree murder of Takesha Barnes on or about May 25, 2012. (Doc. 8-1 at 

16) Petitioner was also charged on Count Two of the indictment of possession of a firearm 

while being a prohibited possessor. (Id.) On the first day of trial, the State moved to 

dismiss Count Two without prejudice, which the superior court granted. (Id. at 19) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals provided the following factual basis3for Petitioner’s prosecution 

and conviction in its December 2014 memorandum decision on Petitioner’s direct appeal 

of his conviction and sentence:

At trial, the state presented evidence of the following facts. [Petitioner] and 

T.B. had an ongoing romantic relationship that led to the birth of their first 

child about 20 years ago. They lived together in Phoenix for some time and 

eventually had a second child. Ultimately, T.B. moved out, and she and 

[Petitioner] maintained an on-and-off relationship. [Petitioner] and T.B. had 

an informal agreement that [Petitioner] would have “custody” of their 

youngest child, son D.B., during the week, and T.B. would have “custody” 

on the weekends. Eventually T.B. began seeing another man; she planned to 

move to Texas with him without telling [Petitioner], taking her three 

children, including D.B. In the days leading up to the shooting, tensions 

escalated between T.B. and [Petitioner].

. . . 

Three days before the shooting, [T.B.’s daughter] L.B. was graduating from 

high school. [Petitioner] was not going to allow D.B. to attend the 

graduation. To get around [Petitioner], T.B. and L.B. went to D.B.’s school 

and signed him out without [Petitioner’s] permission so he could attend. For 

the next two nights, T.B. and her children stayed with friends and did not 

3 The appellate court’s stated facts are entitled to the presumption of correctness. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (“In habeas 

proceedings in federal court, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be 

correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument 

that the statement of facts in an Arizona Supreme Court opinion should not be afforded the 

presumption of correctness).

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inform [Petitioner] of their whereabouts. T.B. never returned D.B. to school 

or to [Petitioner]; she was going to keep D.B. with her so he could also attend 

the eighth-grade promotion of T.B.’s middle daughter, C.B. T.B. planned on 

driving to Texas with all three children immediately after the promotion.

The eighth-grade promotion, and ultimately the shooting, took place at 

Westview High School in Avondale. T.B. was nervous about going to the 

promotion, believing [Petitioner] might try and find her there, so she decided 

they would leave right after C.B.’s name was called. After C.B.’s name was 

called, the family walked out of the ceremony and T.B. asked a security guard 

from the school to escort them to the car. Meanwhile, [Petitioner] had driven 

to the school, parked his motorcycle, and waited on one of the athletic fields 

with a view of the parking lot. As T.B. and the rest of the family walked 

through the parking lot towards the car, [Petitioner] was seen crouching 

down and apparently trying to conceal himself from view. Once the family 

got closer to T.B.’s car, [Petitioner] ran towards them. The security guard 

who had been walking with the family spotted [Petitioner] and pointed him

out. The family ran to the car; T.B. got into the driver’s seat, D.B. into the 

backseat. [Petitioner] stood in front of the car and pointed a gun at T.B

through the windshield. She tried to start the car but it did not start.

[Petitioner] moved to the driver’s side window, yelled “give me my fucking 

son,” shot T.B. at least three times, and fled. T.B. died at the scene due to 

massive blood loss from these injuries.

For his case, [Petitioner] did not testify nor did he present any evidence. He 

did not dispute that he shot the victim; instead he argued that the killing was 

not premeditated, and therefore, he should not be convicted of first-degree 

murder.

(Doc. 8-1 at 5-7)

The jury’s verdict form permitted them to find Petitioner guilty of first degree 

murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter. (Id. at 28) On September 5, 2013, the 

jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder. (Id.) In October 2013, the superior 

court sentenced Petitioner to a sentence of natural life with presentence incarceration credit 

of 503 days. (Id.)

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a brief advising the court she had searched the 

record pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 

297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969) and had not identified any “arguable question of law that is not 

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frivolous.” (Id. at 39-46) Petitioner filed a supplemental appellate brief pro per alleging:

(1) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for new counsel; (2) the trial court 

abused its discretion when it precluded from evidence an order of protection obtained by 

the victim against Petitioner; (3) prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecution failed to 

disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (4) denial of his speedy trial rights; (5) the 

trial court abused its discretion by allowing into evidence gruesome photographs of the 

victim; and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing Petitioner by using aggravators not found 

by a jury. (Id. at 57-77) In its December 30, 2014, memorandum decision, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. (Id. at 4-13) Petitioner 

filed a motion for reconsideration (Id. at 80-90) which the court of appeals summarily 

denied (Doc. 8-2 at 2). The Arizona Supreme Court also summarily denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review. (Id. at 33) 

C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

Petitioner filed his notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in August 2015 (Doc. 

8-2 at 35-37) and the superior court appointed counsel (Id. at 39-40). Appointed counsel 

advised the superior court that Petitioner had informed him he wished to proceed pro per 

and file his own PCR petition. (Id. at 42-43) The superior court granted appointed 

counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed him instead to serve in an advisory capacity. 

(Id. at 46-47)

Petitioner timely filed his pro per PCR petition claiming ineffective assistance of 

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. (Id. at 49-75) The superior court rejected 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits and held that his claim 

of prosecutorial misconduct was procedurally barred because he could have brought this 

claim on appeal. (Doc. 8-3 at 11-16) In its September 2017 memorandum decision, the

Arizona Court of Appeals granted review of Petitioner’s petition for review of the superior 

court’s order dismissing his PCR petition and denied relief for the reasons set forth in the 

superior court’s order. (Id. at 60) In an order dated January 23, 2018, the Arizona Supreme 

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Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the court of appeals’ 

memorandum decision. (Id. at 83)

D. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in the Petition. (Doc. 1 at 6-8) Ground One 

alleges ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), contending that Petitioner’s trial counsel 

intentionally provided Petitioner with false information about a protective order having 

been excluded from his trial. (Doc. 1 at 6, Doc. 1-1 at 5-9) In Ground Two, Petitioner 

alleges prosecutorial misconduct, contending the prosecution had been aware of the 

protective order against Petitioner, but “also excluded it from trial.” (Doc. 1 at 7, Doc. 1-

1 at 10-13) In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion to change counsel. (Doc. 1 at 8, Doc. 1-1 at 13-14)

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Exhaustion of Remedies and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court 

may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Arizona’s “established appellate review processes” consist of a direct appeal and a PCR 

proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31, et. seq. and Rule 32, et. seq.; see also Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“To exhaust one’s state court remedies in 

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his 

conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.”).

To be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and 

the specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to 

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establish exhaustion.”). A claim may be subject to an express or implied procedural bar. 

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural bar exists 

if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural bar “that is both 

‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s 

decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 

(2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal law because 

they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits”); Johnson v. 

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist when a state strictly or 

regularly follows its procedural rule). An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not 

fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); 

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

This Court may review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or (2) a 

miscarriage of justice/actual innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 

(1986). “Cause” is something that “cannot be fairly attributable” to a petitioner, and a 

petitioner must show that this “objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts 

to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice a “habeas petitioner must show 

‘not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 

U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original)). “Such a showing of pervasive actual

prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other than a showing that the 

prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.” Id.

The miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default “is limited to those 

extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his [actual] innocence and establishes that 

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the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.” Johnson v. Knowles, 

541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). To pass through the actual

innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish his or her factual innocence of the 

crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); 

Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner “must show that 

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 399 (2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327)). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations 

of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 569 

U.S. at 399 (2013) (explaining the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting 

new evidence”). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the 

allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 

982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Under clearly established Federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance was both objectively deficient and 

also caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under 

federal habeas review, this results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s 

performance. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (explaining that in a 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 case, deference is due both to defense counsel’s performance and to the state 

court’s ruling). The Court has discretion to determine which Strickland prong to apply 

first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998). A habeas court reviewing 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must determine “whether there is a reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard, such that the state court’s 

rejection of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not an unreasonable application 

of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could disagree that the state 

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court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted).

C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition – Merits Standard of Review

On habeas review, this Court may grant relief if the petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim on the merits in state court either: “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

This is a “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings’ which demands 

that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)).

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the 

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... case” or 

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context 

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context 

where it should apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). For a federal court 

to find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 

2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect 

or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

To make a determination pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), the Court first identifies the 

“clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on 

habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of the holdings of the United 

States Supreme Court which existed at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction 

became final. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 

410 (emphasis in original). Under AEDPA, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim 

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lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 

(2011). Accordingly, to obtain habeas relief from this Court, Petitioner “must show that 

the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination 

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the 

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

340 (2003). A “state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the 

federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood 

v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, to find that a factual 

determination is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2), the court must be “convinced that an 

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 

1000 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 

(9th Cir. 2014). “This is a daunting standard—one that will be satisfied in relatively few 

cases.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Ground One claim of IAC fails on the merits

Petitioner contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when counsel 

allegedly falsely told Petitioner that “the trial court has excluded use of the order of 

protection from being introduced into evidence or even mentioned in trial.” (Doc. 1 at 6) 

Petitioner explains that, based on what defense counsel had told him, he argued on direct 

appeal that the trial court had erred by not admitting the protective order. (Doc. 1-1 at 5)

Petitioner explains that the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the “trial court did not 

exclude [the] order of protection from trial and counsel never even attempted to have it 

introduced.” (Id.) Because of defense counsel’s alleged “intentional false” statement, 

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Petitioner argues he decided not to testify in his defense case because without the existence 

of the protective order in evidence, he could not adequately explain the series of events 

leading to the shooting. (Id. at 6) Further, Petitioner states that if it were a strategic choice 

by defense counsel not to introduce the protective order, there would have been no reason 

for counsel to tell him the trial court had excluded the order. (Id. at 7)

Petitioner contends he suffered prejudice resulting from defense counsel’s actions. 

(Id. at 9) Although he does not claim actual innocence, Petitioner believes that if he had 

testified he could have explained why his shooting of the victim was not premeditated and 

presumably thus not eligible for conviction on first degree murder. (Id.) Petitioner argued 

this claim in his pro per PCR petition, and also claimed defense counsel was ineffective for 

not introducing a second protective order obtained against him by the victim in 2008. (Doc. 

8-2 at 61-70) Among Petitioner’s many other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

the PCR court held that trial counsel was not ineffective for declining to introduce the 

protective orders because such a decision was tactical or strategic. (Doc. 8-3 at 12-13) The 

superior court explained that:

With respect to the first Strickland prong, Arizona courts have long 

recognized that “matters of trial strategy and tactics are committed to defense 

counsel’s judgment, and claims of ineffective assistance cannot be predicated 

thereon.” State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 250, 762 P.2d 519, 537 (1988) (other 

citations omitted). In addition, “disagreements as to trial strategy or errors 

in trial will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as long as 

the challenged conduct could have some reasoned basis.” State v. Meeker, 

143 Ariz. 256, 260, 693 P.2d 911, 915 (1984); see also State v. Denz, 232 

Ariz. 441, 45, 306 P.2d 98, 102 (App. 2013) (“Strategic decisions are 

‘conscious, reasonably informed decisions made by an attorney with an eye 

to benefitting his client.”’) (quoting Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 218 (2d 

Cir. 2001)); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 335, 916 P.2d 1035, 1051 (1996) 

(determinations as to what witnesses to call are normally a strategic decision 

to be made by counsel).

(Id. at 13) Addressing specifically Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel should have 

attempted to admit the protective orders into evidence, the superior court stated that:

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[Petitioner] further contends that his counsel should have tried to admit 

orders of protection that T.B. had taken out on him. He spends approximately 

eight pages of his Petition addressing the orders of Protection, claiming that 

they were “the heart of the entire case,” and that without them, he “could not 

possibly have testified in his defense about the true facts of this case.”

[Petitioner] claims that admission of the orders would have refuted the 

State’s suggestion that [Petitioner] made threats to T.B. because while he had 

not been served with the order of protection, he was aware of it and 

presumably would not have violated it. He also wanted to use at least one of 

the orders “to show the character of T.B. but mainly to show that she had a 

history of committing perjury.”

First, it is doubtful that the orders of protection would have been 

admissible due to lack of relevance, hearsay and Rule 403. Second, under 

no circumstances would the orders be admissible to show T.B.’s bad 

character or that she “had a history of committing perjury.” Finally, whether 

or not to pursue admission of the orders of protection is the kind of tactical 

decision that is left to the judgment of counsel.

(Id. at 14)

In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas court looks through summary 

opinions to the “last reasoned” state court decision. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 

1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the last reasoned decision is that of the PCR court.

The United States Supreme Court instructs that:

[a]n attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding 

“important decisions,” including questions of overarching defense strategy. 

Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688. That obligation, however, does not require 

counsel to obtain the defendant's consent to ‘every tactical decision.” Taylor 

v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–418 (1988) (an attorney has authority to 

manage most aspects of the defense without obtaining his client's approval). 

But certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are 

of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate.

A defendant, this Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine 

“whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or 

take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 

L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93, n. 1, 97 S.Ct. 

2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (Burger, C. J., concurring). Concerning those 

decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain 

consent to the recommended course of action.

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Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). Decisions counsel may make without the 

defendant’s consent and without violating the defendant’s right to due process “primarily 

involve trial strategy and tactics,” such as “what evidence should be introduced, what 

stipulations should be made, what objections should be raised, and what pre-trial motions 

should be filed.” United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1992). When 

assessing a habeas claim of ineffective assistance, counsel's tactical decisions are “virtually 

unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Under the circumstances of this case, counsel's tactical decision regarding not to

attempt to introduce the May 21, 2012, protective order in support of Petitioner’s defense 

was well within the wide range of professional assistance. Further, the trial court observed 

that after Petitioner had sent the victim threatening text messages, Petitioner “took a loaded 

gun to a school parking lot where he knew [the victim] would be, hid until she appeared, 

then accosted her and shot her at point-blank range.” (Doc. 8-3 at 15) The superior court 

concluded that none of the evidence Petitioner argued defense counsel should have tried to 

introduce at trial, including the protective orders, would have “change[d] or ameliorate[d] 

this evidence” and that the evidence “clearly support[ed] the jury’s finding that the murder 

was premeditated.” (Id.)

As for Petitioner’s argument that he could not reasonably have testified without the 

admission into evidence of the May 2012 protective order, the superior court concluded 

Petitioner had “failed to identify any testimony that would [he] would have given to create 

a reasonable probability that the jury would not have found the murder premeditated.” (Id.)

Thus, the superior court held that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s representation was 

neither objectively deficient nor caused him prejudice. (Id. at 12-15) The state courts’ 

resolution of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not result “in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law” or in a decision “based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground One claim fails on the merits.

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B. The Ground Two claim of prosecutorial misconduct is procedurally 

barred, without excuse

Petitioner’s Ground Two argument is that the State engaged in prosecutorial 

misconduct “by not disclosing exculpatory evidence and/or impeachment material in trial.”

(Doc. 1-1 at 10) Petitioner says the undisclosed evidence was the May 2012 protective 

order his victim obtained shortly before Petitioner shot her and argues that the order cast

his victim in a negative light and showed the victim “escalated the situation with Petitioner” 

by taking physical custody of their son, and suggests the victim used the order of protection 

“as cover” in her attempt to take their son and move out of state. (Id.) Petitioner also 

contends that the jury should have been made aware that the victim ignored conditions of 

the order of protection. (Id. at 11) Further, Petitioner asserts that without the order of 

protection in evidence, he felt he could not testify in his own defense because without the 

order it would have been impossible for him “to piece together for the jury the whole 

complete and honest truth” particularly “since the reason Petitioner was upset with [the 

victim] was because she used the order of protection to steal physical custody of their son

. . .” (Id.) Petitioner argues that the shooting and killing of the victim was not premeditated 

because “while confronting [the victim] about stealing [their son] away from [Petitioner], 

using the order of protection as cover, that he snapped in the heat of the moment and shot 

[the victim] by mistake.” (Id.)

Petitioner did not raise this issue on direct appeal in his pro per supplemental brief. 

(Doc. 8-1 at 57-77) Instead, he argued that the trial court had abused its discretion when it 

precluded admission of the order of protection into evidence. (Id. at 68-70) On appeal, 

Petitioner had alleged “prosecutorial misconduct in not disclosing exculpatory evidence 

and/or impeachment material,” but this claim did not encompass the protective order. (Id.

at 70-72) When Petitioner raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct for “conspiring 

with defense counsel to exclude or preclude orders of protection from trial” in his PCR 

petition (Doc. 8-2 at 70-72), the superior court held this claim was “barred by Rule 

32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (Doc. 8-3 at 16) Rule 32.2(a)(3)

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provided that a claim would be precluded from relief if it was waived at trial or on appeal, 

with certain exceptions not applicable to Petitioner’s case. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2, 32.1(d)-

(h).

An express procedural bar occurs when the petitioner has presented his claim to the 

state courts and the state courts have relied on a state procedural rule to deny or dismiss 

the claim. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). To permit a 

procedural bar to federal habeas review, the state procedural rule must be “both 

‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s 

decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) 

determinations are independent of federal law because they do not depend upon a federal 

constitutional ruling on the merits.” Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. at 859-60; Hurles v. Ryan, 

752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Arizona waiver rules are independent and adequate 

bases for denying relief.”).

Construing Petitioner’s reply liberally, he argues that his defense counsel’s 

ineffectiveness establishes cause for his failure to argue his Ground Two claim on direct 

appeal because he alleges counsel told him the court had excluded the May 2012 protective 

order. (Doc. 9) Relying on convoluted logic, Petitioner also asserts that since his trial 

counsel allegedly falsely told him the trial court excluded the protective order from 

evidence, “[i]t could only mean that the State took it upon itself to exclude [the] order of 

protection from trial.” (Doc. 1-1 at 12) He goes on to explain that since he “had reason to 

believe that it was the trial court who was responsible” for excluding the protective order 

from trial, at the time he file his appeal he had “no reason to suspect the State for any 

wrongdoing pertaining to this issue at the time.” (Id. at 13)

The existence of cause for a procedural default “must ordinarily turn on whether the 

prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 

(1986). Ineffective assistance of counsel is cause for procedural default, but “[a]ttorney 

error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause.” Id. at 492. There 

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is no basis in the evidence for Petitioner’s argument of cause for the procedural default of 

this claim. As is discussed in Section III(A) above, Petitioner fails to establish that his 

counsel was ineffective for not attempting to admit the May 2012 protective order into 

evidence. Instead, under all of the circumstances, defense counsel’s decision to not seek 

to admit the order reasonably was one of sound strategy, and Petitioner does not establish 

otherwise. And, as the Arizona Court of Appeals observed, the record does not show the 

trial court excluded the May 2012 protective order. (Doc. 8-1 at 8) Thus, there is no 

evidence to support Petitioner’s wholly speculative conclusion that the State must have 

conspired with defense counsel to keep the protective order out of evidence.

Further, Petitioner is unable to establish prejudice because there is no reasonable 

probability that but for counsel’s error, the result of the trial would have been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner does not argue he was actually innocent.

It is Petitioner’s burden to establish either cause for the default and prejudice 

resulting from the alleged violation of federal law or that the habeas court’s failure to 

consider his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750. Petitioner has not met this burden. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground Two is 

procedurally defaulted without excuse.

C. Petitioner’s Ground Three claim of trial court error lacks merit

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues the state superior court erred by denying his 

motion to substitute counsel. (Doc. 1 at 8, Doc. 1-1 at 13-14) At a pre-trial complex 

management conference on May 6, 2013, Petitioner’s counsel advised the court that 

Petitioner had handed him a motion to change counsel that morning. (Doc. 8-3 at 101, R.T. 

05/06/2013) The court and Petitioner’s counsel engaged in the following colloquy:

THE COURT: Why is it you want a new attorney?

[PETITIONER]: Because of the irreconcilable differences and incompetent 

litigation during an active case and I refuse to move forward in this case with

my current counsel.

THE COURT: And just so you understand, you are saying you refuse to 

move forward. That’s my decision, unless you want to represent yourself, 

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and you are always entitled to represent yourself. So I just want you to know 

that it’s up to me to determine whether there are irreconcilable differences or 

not. Just because you say there are doesn’t mean that I’m going to find that. 

Okay?

So in order to have irreconcilable differences, there has to be an absolute and 

complete breakdown in your communication. And I was here during the 

settlement conference and I didn’t sense that at all. And in terms of [defense 

counsel’s] representation of you, it’s clear that he’s working on this case.

He’s working with [the prosecutor] to set up interviews. He was very 

familiar with your case when we went to the settlement conference, so I don’t 

- - I don’t see a basis just on what I’ve seen, what I’ve witnessed, that he’s 

not providing you with adequate representation.

What specifically is your concern? Do you feel he’s not talking with you 

enough or meeting with you enough?

[PETITIONER]: Both of those. And this is a complex case and [defense 

counsel] has not looked out for my best interest, and he admitted to me that 

this case is too much for him to handle and he would like to bring in some 

help a month before the trial date.

THE COURT: Okay, Well, that’s normal to bring in help a month before 

trial. [Counsel]?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’ve never communicated to my 

client that this case is too much for me to handle. And yes, I’ve consulted 

with another attorney in my office, which is standard practice on cases.

THE COURT: In fact, that’s a good thing that he’s talking to another lawyer, 

because he’s getting more support to represent you at trial. So based on what 

you’ve told me, I can’t find any ineffective assistance of counsel or 

inadequate representation with you.

[PETITIONER]: I ain’t trying to get into all the details that he’s made lies 

to me for a while, you know. Just ongoing things.

THE COURT: Okay. That’s very vague and I have no evidence whatsoever 

that [defense counsel] has lied to you, so I don’t know why you wouldn’t be 

able to continue to communicate with [defense counsel], based on everything 

that I’ve seen. He’s representing you adequately and, I’d say, more than 

adequately at this point. I don’t know, obviously, what your communications 

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are and it’s not something that I would recommend that you talk explicitly 

about it in court.

[PETITIONER]: Right.

THE COURT: Because I want you to understand that while you and I are 

talking today, anything you say - - because we’re not in a settlement 

conference - - can be used against you later, so I don’t want you to [say] 

anything that could possibly incriminate you, but I don’t see any basis for me 

to give you a new lawyer at this time, so I’m going to go ahead and deny the 

motion for new counsel.

And anything else?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.

(Id. at 102-104)

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner’s Ground Three claim on 

Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Doc. 8-1 at 4-13) The court of appeals denied Petitioner’s 

claim, providing the following background facts and substantive law:

Two months before his trial for first-degree murder, [Petitioner] filed a 

motion with the court to change counsel. The trial court asked [Petitioner]

why he wanted new counsel, and he cited “irreconcilable differences and 

incompetent litigation” as his reasons. The court explained that it was not up 

to [Petitioner] to determine whether there were irreconcilable differences, 

and stated that there has to be an absolute and complete breakdown in 

communication for that to be the case. When the trial court asked [Petitioner]

if he could be more specific about his concerns, [Petitioner] stated that his 

counsel had not looked out for his best interest and that his case was too much 

for his counsel to handle. The court replied that [Petitioner's] counsel was 

representing him more than adequately and that counsel was very familiar 

with [Petitioner’s] case. Ultimately, the trial court found that [Petitioner]

was being very vague and that there was no basis to give [Petitioner] a new 

lawyer at that time.

“A trial court's decision to deny the request for new counsel will not be 

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 

186, ¶ 27, 119 P.3d 448, 453 (2005). A defendant is not “entitled to counsel 

of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” State v. 

Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 507, ¶ 11, 968 P.2d 578, 580 (1998); see Morris v. 

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1983). However, “[t]he presence of an 

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irreconcilable conflict or a completely fractured relationship between 

counsel and the accused ordinarily requires the appointment of new counsel.” 

Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186, ¶ 29, 119 P.3d at 453. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying [Petitioner’s] motion to change counsel. The 

court conducted an adequate inquiry into why [Petitioner] wanted to change 

counsel, [Petitioner] was unable to demonstrate any real conflict between 

himself and counsel, and from the record, none is discernable. The motion 

was properly denied.

(Doc. 8-1 at 7-8)

A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. United 

States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1998). However, not every conflict between 

a defendant and counsel implicates the Sixth Amendment. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 

1027 (9th Cir. 2000). For example, the right to counsel does not guarantee “a right to 

counsel with whom the accused has a ‘meaningful attorney-client relationship.’” Morris 

v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1983). When a defendant has indicated dissatisfaction with his 

counsel, a trial court must generally conduct a thorough inquiry into whether the situation 

is depriving the defendant of an adequate defense. Witek, 218 F.3d 1024-25. To determine 

whether the trial court judge erred in denying Petitioner’s motion, the Court may consider 

the extent of the alleged conflict, whether the trial judge appropriately inquired into the 

extent of that conflict, and the timeliness of the motion to change counsel. Daniels v. 

Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2005). As evidenced in the transcript set forth 

above, the trial court’s hearing on Petitioner’s motion demonstrates that the trial judge 

made an appropriate inquiry into the alleged conflict and reasonably found that Petitioner 

had not established there were irreconcilable differences between Petitioner and his trial 

counsel.

Petitioner does not establish that the superior court’s decision on his claim “was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner’s Ground Three claim fails on the merits.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the District Judge find 

that Ground Two of the Petition is procedurally defaulted without excuse and that Grounds 

One and Three fail on the merits. Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in 

the District Judge’s judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural grounds 

for Ground Two and on the merits for Grounds One and Three. Undersigned recommends 

that a certificate of appealability be denied because reasonable jurists would not find it 

debatable whether the District Judge was correct in his procedural ruling regarding Ground

Two and because Petitioner has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and jurists of reason would not find the 

Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s constitutional claims “debatable or wrong,” regarding 

Grounds One and Three. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Thomas Lamont Moton’s Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (NonDeath Penalty) (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because dismissal of Ground Two of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and 

reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and because as to 

Grounds One and Three of the Petition, Petitioner has not “made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and jurists of reason would 

not find the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s constitutional claims “debatable or wrong,” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

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to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 20th day of April, 2020.

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