Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02054/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02054-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Originally, Defendant also moved to dismiss the claims

against him brought by Jane Doe, Plaintiff’s daughter. Because the

Court has found that Plaintiff may not serve as his daughter’s

guardian ad litem in this action, and because the Court has not yet

appointed another guardian ad litem, Defendant’s motion is denied

without prejudice as it relates to Jane Doe.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAL BHATIA; JANE DOE, a Minor,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STEPHEN CORRIGAN; DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 07-2054 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS LAL

BHATIA’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff Lal Bhatia asserts civil rights and tort claims

against Defendant Stephen Corrigan, the assistant United States

Attorney who prosecuted him in two criminal cases. Defendant now

moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.1 Plaintiff opposes

Defendant’s motion. The matter was taken under submission on the

papers. Having considered all of the papers submitted by the

parties, the Court grants Defendant’s motion and dismisses the

claims against him.

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United States District Court

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2

Plaintiff also alleges that, in executing a warrant for his

arrest, FBI agents violated the constitutional rights of his

daughter by approaching her at school, pulling her aside and

interrogating her. Plaintiff charges Defendant with liability for

the actions of the FBI agents because he directed them to execute

the warrant. However, Plaintiff was not himself injured by this

event, and thus has no standing to bring a claim based on it. See

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1999) (a plaintiff “cannot

rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third

parties”). To the extent he attempts to assert such a claim, it is

dismissed. His daughter’s claim will be considered once the Court

appoints a guardian ad litem for her and Defendant moves to dismiss

her claim.

2

BACKGROUND

This cases arises from actions Defendant allegedly took while

prosecuting Plaintiff in two federal criminal cases. In Case No.

04-40071, which was before this Court, Plaintiff was convicted of

nine counts of mail fraud and eighteen counts of money laundering. 

In Case No. 05-334, Plaintiff has been charged with wire fraud and

money laundering. This case is still pending before Judge

Armstrong.

Although the amended complaint contains a number of

allegations, Plaintiff’s submissions in connection with this motion

make it clear that he charges Defendant with liability primarily in

connection with two events. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant

improperly moved to quash a subpoena that would have revealed the

bias of a witness against him. Second, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant attempted to secure an unreasonably high bond for his

release by misrepresenting to the court that he was a flight risk.2

A. Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s subpoena

Plaintiff alleges that he is engaged in a “family feud” with

his aunt, Krishna Kirpalani, who was one of the witnesses in his

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3

The Court takes judicial notice of the record in Case No. CR

04-40071. See Fed. R. Ev. 201; MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803

F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a court may take

judicial notice of matters of public record, including filings in

other cases). A transcript of the relevant proceedings is attached

as Exhibit A to the Corrigan Declaration.

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criminal trial before this Court. In preparing his defense in that

case, Plaintiff served his aunt with a subpoena that sought

production of, among numerous other documents, a will left by

Plaintiff’s grandfather. Plaintiff maintains that the will, which

his aunt was concealing from him, would have revealed “significant

financial bias and motive” for her to lie under oath. As the

prosecutor, Defendant moved to quash the subpoena. The Court found

that by serving the subpoena without a court order, Plaintiff had

failed to comply with Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.3 The Court also found that the subpoena, as written,

was overbroad.

Plaintiff claims that, because the subpoena was quashed, he

was deprived of his rightful portion of his grandfather’s estate. 

He asserts that by moving to quash the subpoena, Defendant

“assisted and conspired with” Ms. Kirpalani to deprive Plaintiff of

his property. He also claims that Defendant failed to investigate

adequately Ms. Kirpalani’s bias prior to calling her as a witness,

and that Defendant should not have pursued a criminal case based on

what Plaintiff characterizes as a family dispute.

B. Defendant’s representation that Plaintiff was a flight risk

Plaintiff maintains that, at his bail hearing, Defendant

“willfully and knowingly misrepresented” that Plaintiff was a

flight risk. In making such misrepresentations, Defendant

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allegedly relied on fabricated evidence. This resulted in

Plaintiff being placed under house arrest, which he claims was

excessive. Accordingly to Plaintiff, the evidence overwhelmingly

favored the conclusion that he was not a flight risk.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964

(2007).

In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a

claim, all material allegations will be taken as true and construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the court is

generally confined to a consideration of the allegations in the

pleadings, the court may also consider matters of which judicial

notice may be taken; doing so does not convert the motion into one

for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909

(9th Cir. 1993).

When granting a motion to dismiss, a court is generally

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to

amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

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would be futile, a court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his rights under the

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Amendments. He also asserts

causes of action for the common law torts of negligence,

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. In moving to dismiss, Defendant

argues that prosecutorial immunity bars Plaintiff’s constitutional

claims, which are brought against Defendant in his individual

capacity. He also argues that Plaintiff’s tort claims may only be

brought against the United States, and that under the Federal Tort

Claims Act, these claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff has

not exhausted his administrative remedies.

I. Constitutional Claims

The Supreme Court has held that absolute immunity bars claims

for damages against “judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and officials

performing ‘quasi-judicial’ functions.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 520 (1985). Absolute immunity also protects government

attorneys in administrative and civil proceedings. See Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516-17 (1978). The Ninth Circuit has held

that absolute immunity extends to prosecutors for all

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“quasi-judicial activities taken within the scope of their

authority.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986)

(en banc) (holding that a conspiracy between a judge and the

prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding,

while clearly improper, did not pierce absolute judicial and

prosecutorial immunity). Prosecutors act within their authority

when they perform a kind of act “having more or less connection

with the general matters” committed to their control or

supervision. Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723

F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir. 1984). Prosecutors are entitled to

absolute immunity from damages even if it leaves “the genuinely

wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose

malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.” Ashelman,

793 F.2d at 1075. There is no bad faith exception to the absolute

immunity of a prosecutor working within the scope of his or her

authority. Id. (citing Campbell v. Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 778 (1st

Cir. 1986)).

Plaintiff’s claims are based on Defendant’s motion to quash a

subpoena and arguments he made in connection with a hearing on

Plaintiff’s bail. These actions, like all of the actions alleged

in the complaint, were directly connected to Defendant’s quasijudicial role as the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s criminal cases. 

Thus, claims based on these actions are barred under the doctrine

of prosecutorial immunity.

Plaintiff has provided no support for his argument that, by

filing the motion to quash, Defendant “undertook to represent” Ms.

Kirpalani and therefore was acting outside the scope of his

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authority. In addition, although Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

conspired with Ms. Kirpalani to conceal his grandfather’s will and

deprive him of his inheritance, there are insufficient factual

allegations to support a conspiracy claim. The claim appears to be

based on no more than Defendant’s motion to quash and on

Plaintiff’s vague allegation that, at an unspecified time and in an

unspecified context, Defendant lied about the existence of the

will. Therefore, in addition to being barred by the doctrine of

prosecutorial immunity, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is also

conclusory, providing another ground for dismissing it. See Harris

v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In order to

survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy to

deprive them of their constitutional rights must include in their

complaint nonconclusory allegations containing evidence of unlawful

intent or face dismissal prior to the taking of discovery.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

As for Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations to the Court at

Plaintiff’s bail hearing, Plaintiff has not explained his theory

that such conduct was unrelated to Defendant’s role as a

prosecutor. The Court finds it clear that it was, and dismisses

Plaintiff’s claims based on Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff

was a flight risk.

In addition, because Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against

Defendant are inherently based on actions taken within the scope of

his role as the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s criminal cases, the Court

finds that any amendment to the complaint would be futile or would

necessarily require factual allegations inconsistent with those in

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the first amended complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff already amended

the complaint once in an attempt to address Defendant’s earlier

motion to dismiss, which raised the same issues as the present

motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are

dismissed with prejudice.

II. Tort Claims

A suit against the United States or its agencies is barred by

the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless the United States gives

prior consent to such a suit. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495,

500-01 (1940). The Federal Tort Claims Act provides a limited

waiver of sovereign immunity for certain torts, including negligent

or wrongful acts or omissions committed by government employees

while acting in the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679. In an action on such torts, the only proper defendant is

the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679; United States v. Smith,

499 U.S. 160, 163 (1991). Upon a certification by the Attorney

General that employees named as defendants were acting within the

scope of their office at the time of the relevant conduct, the

United States is substituted by operation of law as the defendant

in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). An assistant United States

Attorney has filed such a certification in this case. Although

Plaintiff disputes that Defendant’s alleged acts were in fact

within the scope of his employment, the Court has already found to

the contrary. The Court therefore deems Plaintiff’s tort claims

asserted against the United States.

The Federal Tort Claims Act requires a plaintiff to file an

administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency prior to

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4Although the parties did not brief the matter, the Court

notes that Plaintiff’s FTCA claims, which are based on the same

events as his constitutional claims, may also be subject to a

defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674;

Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting

that, in an FTCA action, the plaintiff “did not sue the AUSA, who

was protected by prosecutorial immunity”); Doe v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 59, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the United

States may raise the defense of prosecutorial immunity in an FTCA

action). If Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the United

States may move to dismiss on this ground.

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bringing a lawsuit against the United States. Courts do not have

jurisdiction over such an action until the claim is denied or six

months pass without a decision from the agency. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2675(a). The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that this ‘claim

requirement of section 2675 is jurisdictional in nature and may not

be waived.’” Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir.

1992) (quoting Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir.

1985)).

Plaintiff has not plead that he presented any claim to the

appropriate federal agency and that the agency denied his claim, 

nor does he state in his opposition to Defendant’s motion that he

did so. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims

for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and they are dismissed

with leave to amend.4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Stephen

Corrigan’s motion to dismiss the claims brought against him by

Plaintiff Lal Bhatia (Docket No. 30). Plaintiff’s claims for

violations of his constitutional rights are dismissed with

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prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to allege, if he

can truthfully do so, facts showing that he has exhausted his

administrative remedies with respect to his common law tort claims. 

His claims must be made against the United States. Plaintiff shall

not include in any second amended complaint any claims on behalf of

Jane Doe. Her claims are severed, and remain as stated in the

first amended complaint pending appointment of a guardian ad litem. 

The second amended complaint is due two weeks from the date of this

order. If Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, he must

serve it as required by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. If Plaintiff is unable to amend his complaint to allege

truthfully that he has exhausted his tort claims, they will stand

dismissed without prejudice to refiling if he is able to exhaust

them.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/12/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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