Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00247/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00247-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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1

 Defendants Tyler D. Francis and D. Tyler Francis are the same person. Brian R.

Decker, Assistant United States Attorney, was originally named as a Defendant in the

Complaint. A Notice of Substitution was filed substituting the United States of America as

Defendant in place of Defendant Decker. (Doc. 3). The District Court has filed an Order

granting Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 55, Order). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tony Nixon,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Tyler D. Francis, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-15-00247-TUC-JGZ (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff proceeding pro se and previously confined in the Federal Correctional

Institution in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a Complaint naming as Defendants D. Tyler Francis,

Tyler D. Francis, and Ellinwood and Francis, L.L.P. (“Francis Defendants” or “Defendants”).

(Doc. 1-3, Compl.).1

 This case was removed from the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County,

Arizona. (Doc. 1). The Francis Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c), A.R.S. § 12-2602, and Heck v.

Humphrey (Doc. 39, Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss) and a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

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Respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 56, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

Respond). This case has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation. (Doc. 11, Order). For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Respond (Doc. 56) should

be granted and Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39) should be granted and the

Complaint summarily dismissed without prejudice. In the alternative, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39) should be granted and

that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Respond (Doc 56) should be denied as

moot.

I. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff has filed a Complaint seeking money damages as a result of actions involving

the taking of depositions of material witnesses in relation to criminal charges filed against

him in United States v. Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668-TUC-DCB (District of Arizona).

Plaintiff has asserted as “claims” breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach

of implied in fact contract, breach of written contract, negligence, pain and suffering, pain

and unusual punishment, false incarceration, danger to Plaintiff’s health, life, and safety due

to false incarceration, and loss of personal property due to false incarceration. (Compl.).

Plaintiff also has asserted “claims” described as “100% Percent Effective Assistance of

Counsel and Breach of Implied In Fact Contract (Verbal) to Represent Tony Nixon Fair and

Right According to the Law;” False Incarceration Due to the Breach of Attorney Agreement

to Uphold the Law;” “Loss of Plaintiff Tony Nixon Personal Property Due to False

Incarceration and Bad Representation and Bad Attorney;” and, “Refusal to Present Evidence

in Plaintiff Tony Nixon Case and Call Witnesses.” (Id.). Based on allegations in the

Complaint, Mr. Decker served as the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s criminal case. Plaintiff’s

appointed defense attorney in the criminal case was Defendant Francis of Defendant

Ellinwood and Francis, LLP. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Mr. Decker and Mr.

Francis conspired to engage in unlawful tactics by taking video depositions of material

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witnesses and then allowing the witnesses to return to Mexico without being charged.

Plaintiff further alleges a conspiracy to deprive him of his rights and his vehicle.

II. The Francis Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

The Francis Defendants contend in their Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff’s

Complaint should be dismissed based on several grounds, including that Plaintiff is

attempting a collateral attack on his criminal conviction which is precluded until such time

as he can demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction. (Doc. 39, Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss).

Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss. The Francis

Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Respond seek dismissal of the

Complaint because Plaintiff failed to file a response to their Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss.

(Doc. 56, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Respond). 

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Respond

The Francis Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on August 24, 2015. (Doc.

26, Answer). Following a telephonic Status Conference on November 19, 2015 at which

Plaintiff and counsel appeared (Doc. 35), the Magistrate Judge filed an Order on November

23, 2015 consistent with rulings made at the Status Conference. (Doc. 36, Order). The Court

set December 10, 2015, as the deadline for the Francis Defendants to file any motions under

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered that Plaintiff’s response was

due to be filed within 30 days after receipt of Defendants’ motion. (Id.). Defendants filed

their Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss on December 9, 2015. (Doc. 39). Plaintiff did not file a

response within the time allowed by the Court. On January 29, 2016, the Court filed an

Order that allowed Plaintiff an additional 30 days to file a response to Defendants’ Rule 12

Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 44, Order). The Court in this Order warned Plaintiff that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss sought to have his case dismissed and that a motion to

dismiss, if granted, would end his case. The Court further warned Plaintiff regarding the

consequences of failing to timely respond to all motions:

You must timely respond to all motions. The Court may, in its discretion,

treat your failure to respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as a

consent to the granting of that Motion without further notice, and

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judgment may be entered dismissing this action without prejudice

pursuant to Rule 7.2(i) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. See Brydges

v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

(Doc. 44, Order at 3) (emphasis in original). The Court directed the Clerk to mail to Plaintiff

along with the Order a copy of the Francis Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss. (Id.).

Plaintiff has not filed a response as allowed by the Court. Defendants thereafter filed their

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Respond. (Doc. 56). 

Because Plaintiff was warned regarding his responsibility to respond to Defendants’

Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss, the Court may deem Plaintiff's failure to respond as consent to

the granting of the Motion. See LRCiv 7.2(i); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir.

1995). Rule 7.2(i) provides in part that “such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to

the ... granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” 

Before granting dismissal of an action under Rule 7.2(i), the Court considers five

factors: (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, (2) the Court's need to

manage its docket, (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants, (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits, and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. See

Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (citing Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The first factor favors dismissal. “[T]he public's interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th

Cir.1999). The court’s need to manage its docket generally favors dismissal. Wanderer v.

Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir.1990). The Magistrate Judge has held Status

Conferences in this case at which Plaintiff appeared and was heard by the Court. (Doc. 21,

35). Plaintiff has filed numerous motions and motion/responses in this case. The Court has

heard argument from Plaintiff as to the various motions he has filed and entered several

rulings. Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion has had an effect on the

Court’s management of its docket. As for the third factor, there is no risk of prejudice to

Defendants to grant their motion and this factor favors dismissal. Regarding the fourth factor,

public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, so this factor weighs against

dismissal. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir.2002). The final factor requires

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the Court to consider the availability of less drastic sanctions. Plaintiff was afforded ample

time to respond to Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss, which was filed several months

ago. The Court explicitly warned Plaintiff that failure to respond could result in the granting

of the Motion. Plaintiff failed to respond when given a second opportunity to do so and did

not move for an extension of time. Dismissal without prejudice is an available and less

drastic sanction in this case. The five-factor analysis supports dismissal for failure to respond

to Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss.

The Magistrate Judge recommends that in the exercise of discretion, Plaintiff’s failure

to respond should be treated as consent to the granting of Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 39). It is further recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to Respond (Doc. 56) should be granted.

B. Alternative Consideration of The Francis Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss

In the alternative, the Court has considered the merits of Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion

to Dismiss. (Doc. 39). Defendants contend in their Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss that the

Complaint should be dismissed because Arizona does not recognize a civil action for

conspiracy, the conspiracy claim lacks a legal and factual basis sufficient to state a claim for

relief, and Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged harm. (Doc. 39, Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is attempting a collateral attack on his conviction which is

precluded until such time as Plaintiff can demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction, citing

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Id.). 

1. Standards of Review

“‘To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face;’ that is, plaintiff must ‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Telesaurus

VPC, LLC. v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on the “lack of a cognizable

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”

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Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011). The court “cannot

assume any facts necessary to [the plaintiffs’]...claim that they have not alleged.” Jack

Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir.

2005). The court will assume “‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ ...to be true, ‘and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Telesaurus, 623 F.3d

at 1003 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The allegations of a pro se plaintiff are liberally

construed. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007).

“After the pleadings are closed -- but early enough not to delay trial -- a party may

move for judgment on the pleadings.” Rule 12(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A

motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) “is properly granted when, taking all

the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. Cnty. of L.A., 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999).

See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1989)(“The principal

difference between motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c) is the time of filing.

Because the motions are functionally identical, the same standard of review applicable to a

Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog.”). 

2. Analysis. 

The allegations Plaintiff has asserted in the Complaint are related to Plaintiff’s

criminal proceedings and conviction in United States v. Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668-

TUC-DCB. The Court may take judicial notice of “matters of public record”without

converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Lee v. City of L.A.,

250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court therefore may take judicial notice of the

pleadings and documents filed in United States v. Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668. The

docket in this criminal case shows that the court appointed “CJA” (Criminal Justice Act)

attorney Francis to represent Plaintiff on March 11, 2014, that Plaintiff was indicted on April

9, 2014 on charges of transporting illegal aliens for profit and was found guilty after a bench

trial on February 26, 2015, and that on September 14, 2015, he was sentenced to 18 months

in prison. (See Doc. 7, 27, 113, 158 in Case No. CR-14-00668-TUC-DCB). Plaintiff filed

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a notice of appeal on September 15, 2015. (See Doc. 159, Case No. CR-14-00668-TUCDCB). 

To the extent that Plaintiff has alleged in the Complaint a violation of a constitutional

right involving defense counsel’s representation, Plaintiff has not asserted a federal basis for

his claims. An attorney appointed to represent a defendant in a criminal case pursuant to a

federal statute is not a federal official for purposes of a claim for violation of constitutional

right under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Cox v.

Hellerstein, 685 F.2d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 1982); Christian v. Crawford, 907 F.2d 808, 810

(8th Cir. 1990). 

Even if appointed counsel is considered a federal official, a Bivens civil rights action

cannot be maintained where the resolution of the claims could imply the invalidity of a

federal conviction until after the plaintiff first seeks and obtains relief from his convictions

by an appropriate remedy, such as appeal or on post-conviction review. Plaintiff has not

shown that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. The

Supreme Court has held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-88 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See Martin v. Sias, 88

F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (the rationale of Heck has been extended to cases brought

under Bivens). 

Plaintiff cannot cure these defects by amending the Complaint. The Magistrate Judge

recommends the finding that Plaintiff has not asserted a cognizable federal claim for relief

in the Complaint. 

To the extent that Plaintiff has asserted state law claims against the Francis

Defendants, because Plaintiff has not asserted a federal cause of action, it is within the

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Court’s discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Carlsbad

Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639-40 (2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). When all

federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to

dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was removed.

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). 

To the extent that Plaintiff has asserted violations of state law against the Francis

Defendants, Plaintiff’s suit is based on counsel’s representation of Plaintiff in the federal

criminal case. As explained in Meisner v. Rosenquist, CV-09-8048-PCT-DGC (ECV), 2009

WL 1856639, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2009), any such claims have not accrued and must be

dismissed:

Under state law, a prerequisite to a legal malpractice claim for representation

in a criminal case is reversal of the conviction. Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26,

83 P.3d 26, 35 (Ariz.2004) (“a malpractice claim, even one arising from

actions or omissions early in the representation, does not accrue until all

appeals are complete.”) Because Plaintiff's conviction has not been reversed

and his direct appeal is pending, any claim against appellate counsel in his

criminal proceedings for malpractice has not yet accrued and will be

dismissed.

Id.

The Magistrate Judge recommends that, upon consideration of the interests of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness and comity, the District Court should exercise supplemental

jurisdiction and dismiss the state law claims, to the extent asserted against the Francis

Defendants. The Magistrate Judge further recommends that Defendants’ Rule 12 Motion to

Dismiss should be granted. 

III. Recommendation 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to Respond (Doc. 56) should be granted and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c), A.R.S. § 12-2602, and Heck v.

Humphrey (Doc. 39) should be granted and the Complaint summarily dismissed without

prejudice. In the alternative, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c), A.R.S. § 12-2602,

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and Heck v. Humphrey (Doc. 39) should be granted and the Complaint dismissed as to the

remaining Defendants D. Tyler Francis, Tyler D. Francis, and Ellinwood and Francis, L.L.P.;

and that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Respond (Doc. 56) should be denied

as moot. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and LRCiv 7.2(e) of the Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within Fourteen (14) Days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within Fourteen (14) Days after being served with a copy.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case

number: CV- 15-00247-TUC-JGZ.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

DATED this 19th day of July, 2016.

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