Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00975/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00975-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS GROVE, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

 v. ) Civil Action No. 2:14cv975-WKW

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is before the court on a pro se motion by Thomas Grove, Jr. (“Grove”) to vacate, 

set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. No. 1.1

I. BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2011, a jury found Grove guilty of possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 1 of the indictment); two 

counts of possession of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Counts 2 and 7); and a 

single count of possession of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Count 3). 

After a sentencing hearing on February 3, 2012, the district court sentenced Grove to 97 months 

in prison on Count 1 and to 36 months each for Counts 2, 3, and 7, with all counts to be served 

concurrently.

2

 1 Unless otherwise indicated, references to document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are to those assigned 

by the Clerk of Court to pleadings docketed in this action. Page references are to those assigned 

by CM/ECF.

2 On September 1, 2015, the district court reduced Grove’s sentence to 78 months in prison 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing 

Guidelines. See Case No. 2:06cr17-WKW, Doc. Nos. 282 and 290.

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On direct appeal, Grove argued that (1) the district court abused its discretion by denying 

his motions for a mistrial and for a new trial based on the prosecutor’s remarks during closing 

argument suggesting to jurors that they could help clean up the community’s drug problem by 

convicting Grove, and (2) the district court improperly included a two-level dangerous weapon 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) in calculating his guideline range. See United States 

v. Grove, 508 Fed. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2013). On January 2, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit Court 

of Appeals entered an opinion affirming Grove’s convictions and sentence. Id. Grove filed a 

petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 7, 2013.

On September 18, 2014, Grove filed this § 2255 motion asserting that his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by –

1) failing to object to testimony from ABC Agent Paul Hayes based on 

Hayes’s alleged conflict of interest and bias; 

2) failing to move for dismissal of the indictment based on the Government’s 

failure during discovery to provide defense counsel with a copy of a lease 

between Grove and codefendant Richard Shepard that showed Shepard as a 

lessee of the residence where drug evidence was found;

3) failing to object to the drug quantity attributed to him for sentencing 

purposes; and

4) failing to obtain a transcript of the grand jury testimony of MPD Officer 

Scotty Edwards for impeachment purposes at trial.

Doc. No. 1 at 3-10.

The Government argues that Grove’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lack merit 

and therefore entitle him to no relief. Doc. No. 14. After due consideration of the parties’ 

submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the court concludes that Grove’s § 2255 motion 

should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 

Proceedings in the United States District Courts, 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. General Standard of Review

Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal; therefore, the grounds for collateral 

attack on final judgments of conviction are limited. A federal prisoner is entitled to relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 only if the district court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or 

laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum sentence 

authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United 

States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is 

reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that 

could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete 

miscarriage of justice.’” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations 

omitted). “[A] non-constitutional error that may justify reversal on direct appeal does not generally 

support a collateral attack on a final judgment, unless the error (1) could not have been raised on 

direct appeal and (2) would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Lynn, 365 

F.3d at 1232-33 (citations omitted); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (error of law 

does not provide basis for collateral attack unless claimed error constituted a “fundamental defect 

which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice”). The “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it 

must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation “has probably resulted in the conviction of 

one who is actually innocent.”

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the standards of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1344 (11th Cir. 

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2006). Under Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) that “counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 & 694.

Scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential,” and the court indulges a “strong 

presumption” that counsel’s performance was reasonable. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 

1305, 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will “avoid second-guessing counsel’s 

performance: It does not follow that any counsel who takes an approach [the court] would not 

have chosen is guilty of rendering ineffective assistance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted). Thus, “[g]iven the strong presumption in favor of competence, the petitioner’s 

burden of persuasion – though the presumption is not insurmountable – is a heavy one.” Id.

As noted above, under the prejudice component of Strickland, a petitioner must show that 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability is 

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The prejudice prong does 

not focus only on the outcome; rather, to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that 

counsel’s deficient representation rendered the result of the trial fundamentally unfair or 

unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (“[A]n analysis focusing solely on 

mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was 

fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.”). “Unreliability or unfairness does not result if 

the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right 

to which the law entitles him.” Id. at 372.

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Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both prongs of the Strickland inquiry, 

relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, once a court decides that one 

of the requisite showings has not been made, it need not decide whether the other one has been

made. Id. at 697; Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998).

1. Failure to Object to Testimony of Agent Hayes

Grove contends that his trial counsel, Susan G. James, rendered him ineffective assistance 

of counsel by failing to object to testimony from Paul Hayes, an agent with the Alabama Alcoholic 

Beverage Control (“ABC”) Board, based on Hayes’ alleged conflict of interest and bias. Doc. No. 

1 at 3-5.

From 2003 to 2007, prior to his employment as an ABC agent, Hayes was a narcotics 

officer with the Montgomery Police Department (“MPD”). On June 8, 2005, while employed by 

the MPD, Hayes participated in a controlled buy of cocaine base from Grove that led to Grove’s 

arrest in his vehicle with 23 grams of crack in his possession. That same day, a search warrant 

was executed on Grove’s residence, where officers found additional amounts of crack and powder 

cocaine. The drugs seized from Grove on June 8, 2005, were the basis of Counts 1 through 3 of 

the indictment. Count 7 stemmed from a later (March 2006) controlled buy of cocaine base from 

Grove and another search of his residence, where more drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms 

were recovered.

In 2009, after leaving the MPD and before Grove’s trial on the federal drug charges, Hayes, 

then working as an ABC agent, investigated Grove for after-hours serving of alcohol at his 

nightclub. Agent Hayes issued Grove a citation for the offense of serving alcohol at a prohibited 

time. Grove alleges that when Agent Hayes issued the citation, he warned Grove that his conviction 

for the offense could be used against him “if he ever caught a federal charge.” Doc. No. 1 at 3. 

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At sentencing in his federal drug case, Grove received one criminal history point based on his 

misdemeanor conviction for serving alcohol at a prohibited time. Agent Hayes also testified during 

the Government’s case-in-chief about the June 8, 2005, arrest of Grove and the ensuing search of 

Grove’s residence. Grove argues that his trial counsel, James, should have sought to exclude 

Hayes from testifying because Hayes “acted in two different capacities during his investigation of 

the petitioner.” Doc. No. 1 at 4.

Grove cites no authority, and the court finds none, for his claim that a law enforcement 

witness is incompetent to testify at a criminal trial when he has participated in different 

investigations of the defendant, for unrelated offenses, in different capacities. In an affidavit 

addressing this claim, James states that she “could see no factual or legal basis” for seeking to 

exclude Agent Hayes as a witness against Grove, “as no conflict of interest existed.” Doc. No. 13-

1 at 2. Grove presents no meritorious ground upon which James might have successfully argued 

to exclude testimony from Hayes based on a conflict of interest or bias. Counsel cannot be 

ineffective for failing to raise a claim that would fail. Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th 

Cir. 2001); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992). Because Grove does 

not demonstrate deficient performance by James or any resulting prejudice, he is entitled to no 

relief based on this claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 & 694.

2. Failure to Seek Dismissal of Indictment for Discovery Violation

Grove contends that James rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move 

for dismissal of the indictment based on the Government’s failure during discovery to provide the

defense with a copy of a lease between Grove and codefendant Richard Shepard that showed 

Shepard as a lessee of the residence at which drug evidence was found. Doc. No. 1 at 5-7.

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Grove and Shepard originally were brought to trial jointly in November 2010. On the 

second day of the November 2010 trial, during cross-examination of Agent Hayes, both James and 

counsel for Shepard learned that, during the June 2005 search of Grove’s residence, police

recovered a lease showing that Shepard was a lessee from Grove in the residence. Doc. No. 14-4 

at 24-26. James and counsel for Shepard both indicated to the district court that they were unaware 

of the lease and had not received a copy from the Government during discovery. Id. at 37-38. The 

prosecutor acknowledged that the Government had inadvertently failed to provide the defense with 

a copy of the lease. Id. at 39. James argued that the lease should be admitted in evidence, while 

Shepard’s counsel argued against its admission and moved for a mistrial based on the 

Government’s failure to disclose the lease. Id. at 38-40. The district court initially stated that it 

was inclined to deny the motion for a mistrial and to exclude admission of the lease. Id. at 40-41. 

James, however, continued to argue for admission of the lease as linking the drugs found in 

Grove’s residence to Shepard and tending to suggest that Grove did not live in the residence when 

the June 2005 search was conducted. Id. at 41-49.

Ultimately, the district court found that the lease showing Shepard as a lessee from Grove 

created a conflict in their defenses. The court granted a mistrial on that basis, with both James and 

counsel for Shepard agreeing that a mistrial was the appropriate remedy. Id. at 52-53. In granting 

the mistrial, the court found no fault on the part of the Government.3 Id. The court subsequently 

granted a motion by Shepard’s counsel to sever the trials of Shepard and Grove, and the two were 

retried separately. Doc. No. 14-5. James introduced a copy of the lease into evidence at Grove’s 

2011 retrial, where, in cross-examination of Government witnesses and in arguments to the jury,

 3 Although it inadvertently failed to provide the defendants with copies of the lease, the 

Government had listed the lease on its exhibitslist and intended to introduce the lease into evidence 

in its case-in-chief. See Doc. No. 14-4 at 51-52.

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she suggested that the lease created doubt whether Grove was accountable for the drugs found in 

the June 2005 search of the residence. See Doc. No. 14-6 at 21, 92-93; Doc. No. 14-8 at 114-15; 

Doc. No. 14-9 at 39-40.

Grove argues that James, instead of attempting to use the lease as exculpatory evidence at 

his retrial, should instead have moved for dismissal of the indictment based on the Government’s 

discovery violation. Doc. No. 1 at 6-7. He contends that the Government willfully “suppressed” 

the lease in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that James’s failure to seek 

dismissal of the charges against him on this basis was professionally unreasonable and prevented 

him from obtaining a more favorable outcome. Id. 

The Supreme Court has not directly decided when, if ever, dismissal with prejudice 

is a remedy for a Brady violation. Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 252 (3d 

Cir. 2005). Indeed, “[d]ismissal of an indictment with prejudice is the most severe 

sanction possible.” United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992).

Given the harshness of this remedy, courts have indicated that factors such as 

recurring violations, willful misconduct, and prejudice are necessary preconditions 

for dismissal with prejudice. See Fahie, 419 F.3d at 253-55; United States v. Jones,

620 F.Supp.2d 163, 185-93 (D. Mass. 2009) (Wolf, J.) (collecting cases); United 

States v. Dollar, 25 F.Supp.2d 1320 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (Clemon, J.) (dismissing 

conspiracy indictment after government defied numerous court orders to provide 

Brady material).

United States v. McGregor, No. 2:10CR186-MHT, 2012 WL 235518, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 

2012).

Here, at the November 2010 mistrial, the district court expressly found no fault by the 

Government for its failure to provide the defense with a copy of the lease. No evidence suggests 

that the Government’s failure was willful. Indeed, it appears that the Government itself intended 

to introduce the lease into evidence, which undermines any suggestion of intent to suppress 

evidence. The district court was initially reluctant even to grant a mistrial, making it highly 

unlikely that the court would have granted the severe sanction of dismissal of the indictment with 

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prejudice had James moved for such a sanction. As the Government argues, it is also unclear how, 

in the end, Grove’s defense was prejudiced by the untimely disclosure of the lease, since James 

stated to the court at the November 2010 mistrial that if she had been provided with the lease 

earlier, she would have moved for a severance − the remedy the district court ultimately granted.

Because Grove demonstrates little likelihood that the district court would have granted a 

motion to dismiss the indictment by James, he fails to show deficient performance by James or 

any resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 & 694. Consequently, he is not entitled to 

relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

3. Failure to Object to Attributed Drug Quantity

Grove contends that his lawyer at sentencing, Jeff P. Manciagli, rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel when he failed to object at the sentencing hearing to the drug quantity 

attributed to Grove. Doc. No. 1 at 7-9. In particular, Grove argues that Manciagli should have 

objected to the presentence investigation report’s (“PSI”) finding that Grove was accountable for 

23 grams of cocaine base under Count 1 of the indictment although, he says, the jury found him 

guilty under Count 1 of possessing with the intent to distribute only 21.5 grams of cocaine base. 

Id. at 8. In making this claim, Grove points to the trial testimony of Bradley Fleming, a forensic 

drug chemist with the DEA, who testified that he determined Government Exhibit 9 (the cocaine 

base underlying Count 1) to have a net weight of 21.5 grams. Grove argues that Manciagli’s failure 

to pursue an objection at sentencing to the attributed drug amount resulted in an unwarranted twolevel increase in his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), which provides for a base 

offense level of 22 for attributed amounts of cocaine base of at least 16.8 grams but less than 22.4 

grams, and a base offense level of 24 for attributed amounts of cocaine base of at least 22.4 grams 

but less than 28 grams. See Drug Quantity Table, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). Grove further maintains 

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that Manciagli’s failure to challenge the attribution of 23 grams of cocaine base to him resulted in 

a violation of Alleyne v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). Doc. No. 1 at 7-9.

The record reflects that on May 4, 2011, defense counsel filed an objection to the PSI’s 

finding that Grove was accountable for 23 grams of cocaine base under Count 1, arguing that 

Grove was instead responsible for only 21 grams of the drug. See Doc. No. 14-22 at 20. It appears 

that when presentence objections to the PSI were filed, Grove was represented by James and that 

Manciagli had not yet entered a notice of appearance as Grove’s counsel. According to Manciagli, 

James filed the presentence objections, although Manciagli represented Grove at the sentencing 

hearing. See Doc. No. 11 at 2. Manciagli did not pursue the objection to the attributed drug 

amount at the sentencing hearing.

In the addendum to the PSI responding to the presentence objections by defense counsel, 

the Probation Officer explained that 23 grams of cocaine base were properly attributed to Grove, 

because:

According to the DEA laboratory report, the net weight of the cocaine base 

involved in count one is 23.0 grams, not 21 grams. The reserve weight is 21.7 

grams; however, the net weight is used for drug calculation purposes.

Doc. No. 14-22 at 20.4

Although, as Grove observes, the forensic chemist Fleming testified that he determined 

Government Exhibit 9, the cocaine base underlying Count 1, to have a net weight of 21.5 grams, 

Doc. No. 14-8 at 176-77, Fleming clarified that when the seized drugs were initially tested, the net 

weight was 23 grams, that he analyzed the drugs after they had been previously tested, and that 

 4 As the Government says, the Probation Officer’s explanation was consistent with the provision 

of the Guidelines Manual stating that “[u]nless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled 

substance ... refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 

of the controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 n.(A). 

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the weight of the drugs decreased from test to test because of “sample consumption during 

analysis.” Id. at 182-83.

Here, the DEA lab report and Fleming’s testimony, considered in its totality, established 

that a net weight of 23 grams of cocaine base was the drug amount underlying Count 1. 

Consequently, that amount was properly attributed to Grove in determining his base offense level 

under § 2D1.1(c). Pursuit of an objection to the attributed drug amount would have been 

unavailing. Therefore, Grove fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel by Manciagli.

Furthermore, even if Manciagli had somehow successfully pursued an objection to the 

attributed drug amount, the district court explicitly stated at sentencing that, based on Grove’s 

criminal history and the seriousness of his offense, a sentence of less than 97 months “would be 

unreasonable irrespective of what [Grove’s] guideline range [was].” Doc. No. 14-15 at 25-26. 

The district court also noted, in agreement with the Government, that Grove’s calculated guideline

range reflected none of the drugs giving rise to his convictions on Counts 2, 3, and 7. See id. at 

26-27. There is no reasonable probability, then, that Grove’s sentence would have been different 

had he been held accountable for only 21.5 grams, and not 23 grams, of cocaine base and had the 

PSI calculated a base offense level two levels lower than what was calculated. See Glover v. 

United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001) (§ 2255 movant seeking to establish prejudice based 

on sentencing error must show his sentence would have been lower but for counsel’s deficient 

performance). Grove’s inability to demonstrate prejudice precludes collateral relief on this claim.

As for Grove’s contention that Alleyne was violated because of the attribution of 23 grams 

of cocaine base rather than 21.5 grams, the drug amount attributed to Grove did not influence the 

mandatory minimum sentence applied in his case. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that the 

enhancers described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) – for brandishing or discharging a 

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firearm – triggering higher mandatory minimum sentences, must be treated as elements of separate, 

aggravated offenses, to be alleged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 

S.Ct. at 2151, 2155. Alleyne, however, does not prohibit the sentencing court from fact finding 

that increases a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Judicial fact finding that affects 

guidelines calculations does not fit within the category of facts required under Alleyne to be proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(“Accordingly, [after Alleyne,] a district court may continue to make guidelines calculations based 

upon judicial fact findings and may enhance a sentence – so long as its findings do not increase 

the statutory maximum or minimum authorized by facts determined in a guilty plea or jury 

verdict.”). Alleyne is inapplicable to Grove’s sentence.

4. Failure to Obtain Grand Jury Transcript

Grove contends that James rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to obtain a 

transcript of the grand jury testimony of MPD Officer Scotty Edwards to use for impeachment 

purposes at trial. Doc. No. 1 at 9-10. The record, however, reflects that James did have a transcript 

of Officer Edwards’s grand jury testimony, which she used in an effort to impeach his trial 

testimony. See Doc. No. 14-8 at 116; Doc. 13-1 at 3.

Grove specifically objects to James’s failure to impeach Officer Edwards by using his 

grand jury testimony that all three phone calls the MPD made to Grove through a confidential 

informant as part of a controlled buy of cocaine base on June 8, 2005, were recorded, when only 

the first two calls were recorded. Doc. No. 1 at 9-10. However, by the time Officer Edwards 

testified at trial, James had already thoroughly cross-examined Agent Paul Hayes regarding the 

phone calls made to Grove. Doc. No. 14-6 at 95-105; Doc. No. 14-7 at 132-33. Unlike Officer 

Edwards, Agent Hayes was physically present when the phone calls were made by the confidential 

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informant, and Hayes explained in his testimony that the third phone call to Grove was not 

recorded because it involved a last-minute change of location for the meeting with Grove to buy 

the drugs, when Hayes and the confidential informant were in a car driving to meet Grove. Doc. 

No. 14-6 at 47-49. Agent Hayes explained that the third phone call was not recorded because he 

was “in a time crunch.” Id. at 48.

Had James sought to discredit Officer Edwards − or, for that matter, Agent Hayes − with 

Officer Edwards’s erroneous grand jury testimony that the third phone call was recorded, the jury 

could reasonably have concluded that Officer Edwards was merely confused about which of the 

calls were recorded, especially since it was clear that Officer Edwards, unlike Agent Hayes, was 

not present when the calls to Grove were made and no claim had ever been made − either at trial 

or before the grand jury − that Officer Edwards was present when the calls were made. James 

could have made a reasonable strategic decision not to seek to impeach Officer Edwards on a 

matter of limited materiality. Certainly, Grove can show no prejudice arising from James’s failure 

to use Officer Edwards’s grand jury testimony in this manner.5 The decision as to how and whether 

to cross-examine a witness is “a tactical one well within the discretion of a defense attorney.” 

Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1090 (11th Cir. 1985). Grove is not entitled to any relief based 

on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion filed by Grove be DENIED with prejudice, as the claims therein entitle him to no 

relief.

 5 James did use other aspects of Officer Edwards’s grand jury testimony in an effort to impeach 

him at trial. See, e.g., Doc. No. 14-8 at 116-22, 156-57.

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The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 

and to serve a copy on the petitioner. The petitioner is DIRECTED to file any objections to this 

Recommendation on or before November 14, 2016. Any objections filed must specifically identify 

the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the 

petitioner objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of 

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on 

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon 

grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust 

Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 

790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE, on this the 28th day of October, 2016.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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