Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01319/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01319-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLEN HAMMLER,

CDCR #F-73072,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. HOUGH, Correctional Officer, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01319-LAB-BLM

ORDER

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

ALLEN HAMMLER (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and while incarcerated at 

California State Prison–Sacramento (”SAC”), in Represa, California, has filed a civil 

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff claims several correctional officers at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights while he was incarcerated there on October 16, 2016, by failing to collect and 

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process his outgoing legal mail at his request.

1 Id. at 3-11. He alleges to have exhausted 

available administrative remedies before filing suit via CDC 602 Inmate Parolee Appeal 

Log No. RJD-B-16-4400, which he attaches as an exhibit, id. at 12, 16-19, and his 

Complaint is verified under penalty of perjury. Id. at 11. Plaintiff seeks $140,000 in 

general and punitive damages. Id. at 14.

Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing fee at the time of filing, but he has since filed a 

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 

2). 

///

///

 

1 Plaintiff has identified, and the Court takes judicial notice of, six separate civil rights actions he has 

filed in the Southern District of California Court over the course of the last year. See Compl., ECF No. 1 

at 13. All but one of the Southern District cases remains pending, and a preliminary review of those 

pleadings indicates that none appear related to the claims Plaintiff alleges in this case. See Bias v. 

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, 

both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters 

at issue.’”) (citation omitted). In both Hammler v. Aviles, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-01185-AJBWVG (“Aviles”) and Hammler v. Alvarez, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-01533-JAH-WVG 

(“Alvarez I”), Plaintiff alleges different sets of correctional officers at RJD used excessive force at RJD 

in late October and early November 2016—several weeks apart. See Aviles, ECF No. 1 at 1, 3-9; Alvarez

I, ECF No. 1 at 1-15. In Hammler v. Hernandez, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-00259-CABMDD, Plaintiff claims two RJD correctional officers not named as parties in Aviles or Alvarez I

retaliated against him for having filed administrative grievances related to the excessive force incidents 

at issue in Aviles. See id., ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff has since filed another case, Hammler v. Alvarez, et 

al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-00326-AJB-WVG (“Alvarez II”), in which he again accuses RJD 

officer Alvarez and others of excessive force, retaliation, and due process violations related to a third 

incident at RJD arising on November 28, 2016 and November 29, 2016. See id., ECF No. 1 at 2-14. 

Finally, in Hammler v. Kernan, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-1170-DMS-NLS, Plaintiff 

alleges CDCR and RJD classification officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 

“breaching a contract” he claims guarantees his housing on a “gang free” yard. See id., ECF No. 1 at 4-

16. Judge Bencivengo has already cautioned Plaintiff that that he may not raise duplicative claims in 

separate actions, see Hammler v. Hernandez, 18cv00259-CAB-MDD, ECF No. 5 at 5 n.2 (citing Cato v. 

United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995)), and that he is “required to pay the full amount of 

a filing fee,” for each civil action he files. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(b)(1); Bruce v. Samuels, __ 

U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 632 (2016) (“Just as § 1915(b)(1) calls for assessment of ‘an initial partial filing 

fee’ each time a prisoner ‘brings a civil action or files an appeal’ (emphasis added), so its allied 

provision, § 1915(b)(2), triggered immediately after, calls for ‘monthly payments of 20 percent of the 

preceding month’s income’ simultaneously for each action pursued.”)).

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I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

///

 

2

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his CDCR 

Inmate Statement Report. See ECF No. 2 at 4-6; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL.

CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This report shows Plaintiff has incurred 

thousands of dollars in PLRA obligations, photocopying, institutional mail, and damages 

charges while incarcerated, but has had no income, and thus, had no available balance on 

the books at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 4-6. Based on this accounting, no initial 

partial filing fee is assessed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event 

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or 

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to 

pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he has “no 

means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, but directs the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead 

collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and 

forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

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2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s factual allegations are simple: on October 16, 2016, at approximately 

6:00 p.m., he told Correctional Officer Hough that he “had legal mail to go out and would 

need tape.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4. Hough is alleged to have told Plaintiff he had 

none and walked away. Id.

When Plaintiff told Officer Nevarez, “who was collecting mail and doing the pipecheck security walk” two hours later that he had “six separate pieces of mail,” Nevarez 

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replied, “Next round.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff then claims when Hough, who “did the walk” 

during the “next round,” was again asked if he was going to “get [Plaintiff’s] mail out,” 

Hough replied, “I thought you needed tape,” and claimed “they already did mail pick up.” 

Id. Plaintiff “continued to stand at his door until he saw Sgt. Alvarez,” and complained to 

him, but Alvarez refused to accept the mail himself and said, “I’m going to send someone 

up right now.” Id. at 6.3 By “10:00 p.m. they all left,” and Plaintiff claims his mail 

remained with him until the following day, when Plaintiff refused to return a pair of 

handcuffs until his mail was collected by another officer. Id. at 8.

Based on this incident, Plaintiff claims Defendants Hough, Nevarez, Asbury, and 

Alvarez violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, retaliated against him, 

and violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Id. at 3, 8-11. He seeks 

$210,000 in general and punitive damages based on his “mental and emotional anguish.” 

Id. at 14.

C. First Amendment / Mail Claims

Plaintiff has “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail,” but prison 

regulations or policies may curtail that right if they “are reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 

Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974) (holding that prison 

officials may open, but not read, incoming legal mail in the presence of the inmate). 

Legitimate penological interests that justify regulation of outgoing legal mail include “the 

prevention of criminal activity and the maintenance of prison security.” Nordstrom, 856 

F.3d at 1272 (citing O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1996)).

///

 

3 Plaintiff also claims Sgt. Alvarez told him the next day that he sent Officer Asbury to collect Plaintiff’s 

mail the night before, but Asbury falsely noted in a CDCR 114-A Log Schedule that Plaintiff “ignored” 

him. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8.

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Thus, while allegations of stolen mail or delivery delayed for “an inordinate 

amount of time” have been held sufficient to state a claim for violation of the First 

Amendment, see e.g., Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996), the Ninth 

Circuit and other Courts of Appeal have found temporary and or isolated instances of

delay, without more, do not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. See Crofton v. 

Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 

(2d Cir. 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. 

Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Furnace v. Cope, No. 1:16-CV00420-LJO-BAM PC, 2018 WL 2198716, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) 

(recommending sua sponte dismissal of prisoner’s outgoing mail claims pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

The Court has failed to uncover any case in which a one-day delay in collecting a 

prisoner’s outgoing legal mail was held sufficient to plead a plausible First Amendment 

violation. See e.g., Crofton,170 F.3d at 961 (finding a “temporary delay in the delivery of 

Crofton’s publications, resulting from the prison official’s security inspection, does not 

violate his First Amendment rights.”); Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir.

1987) (emphasizing that “merely alleging an isolated delay or some other relatively shortterm, non content-based disruption in the delivery of inmate reading materials will not 

support ... a cause of action grounded upon the First Amendment”); Young v. Tampkins, 

No. CV 16-cv-07455-JFW-RAO, 2017 WL 2389974, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2017) (“A 

temporary delay or isolated incident of mail interference is usually insufficient to 

establish a constitutional violation.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 

2381270 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2017).

Critically, Plaintiff does not claim Defendants read, censored, opened, or inspected 

his legal mail outside his presence, see e.g., Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 

1211-13 (9th Cir. 2017), failed to accept, or even mail it altogether. In fact, Plaintiff

admits his legal mail was collected in his presence and that it was “signed” and sealed for 

///

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delivery within 24 hours of his initial request.

4 See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8. Defendants’ 

refusal or inability to do so immediately, and upon his demand—regardless of any other 

legitimate correctional goal or need for institutional order—does not by itself constitute a 

First Amendment violation. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)

(identifying security, order, and rehabilitation as governmental interests sufficient to 

justify restrictions on outgoing prisoner mail); see also Avila v. Brown, No. 1:17-CV01328-LJO-BAM PC, 2018 WL 1806624, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018) (noting that 

prisoners “do not have a constitutional right to unlimited free access to the mail,” and 

dismissing allegations that the failure to provide prisoners with “free pen fillers every 

day” violated the First Amendment).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s First Amendment mail collection claims must be dismissed 

for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

///

 

4

 CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3130, et seq., contain the CDCR’s regulations for “provid[ing] ... the 

orderly processing of inmate mail,” and “give direction to staff, inmates, and their correspondents 

concerning facility mail requirements. See id.; K’Napp v. Adams, No. 1:06-cv-01701-LJO-GSA-PC, 

2015 WL 5138237 at *17 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (finding that § 3130 and CDCR’s mail processing 

regulations “further[] the substantial governmental interest of internal order” in its penal institutions as 

required by Procunier). CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3131 (2018), further provides that “[e]ach warden or 

head of a correctional facility shall prepare and maintain a plan of operation for the sending and 

receiving of mail for all inmates housed in the facility[,]” and all newly received inmates must be 

“promptly inform[ed] ... of all department regulations and local procedures governing inmate mail.” Id.

(eff. 7-17-2008). Section 3142(d), which specifically governs the “Processing of Outgoing Confidential 

Mail,” further requires that:

Inmates shall post confidential mail by presenting the mail unsealed to designated staff. 

In the presence of the inmate, the staff shall remove the contents of the envelope upside 

down to prevent reading of the contents. Staff shall remove the pages and shake them to 

ensure there is no prohibited material, consistent with these regulations. If no prohibited 

material is discovered, the contents shall be returned to the envelope and sealed. Staff 

shall place their signature, badge number and date across the sealed area on the back of 

the envelope. Staff shall then deposit the confidential mail in the appropriate depository.

Id. § 3142(d) (eff. 7-17-2008).

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D. Access to the Courts

Because Plaintiff alleges the envelopes he wished to submit were “legal mail,” see

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4, 5, 8, the Court will also consider whether he has sufficiently 

pleaded an access to courts violation. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 

F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil 

rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any

benefit of the doubt.); see also Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027, n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(en banc).

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas 

petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may 

arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” 

(forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that cannot now be tried 

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see 

also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) (differentiating “between 

two types of access to court claims: those involving prisoners’ right to affirmative 

assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without active interference.”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual 

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the 

“inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual 

injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to 

show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 353 & n.4). In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or 

“arguable” underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of 

the underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

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pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be 

brought.” Id. at 415.

Plaintiff fails to allege the actual injury required to state an access to courts claim. 

See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. While he claims Defendants 

failed to collect his “legal mail” on October 16, 2016, he fails to include any further 

“factual matter” to show how or why a single day’s delay in processing that mail caused 

him to suffer “actual prejudice” “such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to 

present a claim,” with respect to any non-frivolous direct appeal, habeas petition, or civil 

rights action he filed, or even sought to file. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; Jones, 393 F.3d at 

936; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Actual injury is not demonstrated by the simple fact that a 

prisoner is ‘subject to a governmental institution” that he claims ‘was not organized or 

managed properly.’” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350.

For this additional reason, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead any viable 

access to courts claim against any of the named Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

E. Retaliation

Plaintiff also contends Defendants “retaliate[ed] against [him] for asserting the 

right to express his sentiments via the courts,” by failing to collect his mail on October 

16, 2016. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 9, 10.

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or 

to petition the government may support a 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 

532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995).

A retaliation claim has five elements. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th 

Cir. 2009). First, Plaintiff must allege that the retaliated-against conduct is protected. 

///

///

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Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114.5 Second, Plaintiff must allege Defendants took adverse action 

against him.

6 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). Third, Plaintiff 

must allege a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct.7

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. Fourth, Plaintiff must allege the “official’s acts would chill or 

silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Rhodes, 

408 F.3d at 568 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).8 Fifth, Plaintiff must 

allege “that the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of 

the correctional institution....”9 Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532; Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15.

Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants refused to collect his legal mail on October 16, 

2016, in order to thwart his right to “speak his sentiments freely ... via the courts.” See

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 9. By doing so, he adequately pleads the first two elements of a 

retaliation claim. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. The right to access to the court is 

 

5 The filing of an inmate grievance is protected conduct. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

6 The adverse action need not be an independent constitutional violation. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. “[T]he 

mere threat of harm can be an adverse action....” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1270.

7 Because direct evidence of retaliatory intent rarely can be pleaded in a complaint, allegation of a 

chronology of events from which retaliation can be inferred is sufficient to survive dismissal. Watison, 

668 F.3d at 1114 (citing Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“[T]iming can properly be considered as circumstantial 

evidence of retaliatory intent.”)).

8 “[A] plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered some 

other harm,” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269, that is “more than minimal,” Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568 n.11. 

That the retaliatory conduct did not chill Plaintiff from suing the alleged retaliator does not defeat the 

retaliation claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 569.

9

 Plaintiff successfully pleads this element by alleging, in addition to a retaliatory motive, that 

Defendants’ actions were arbitrary and capricious, id., or that they were “unnecessary to the 

maintenance of order in the institution.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir. 1984); 

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15. The court must “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison 

officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be 

retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). The burden is 

on Plaintiff to demonstrate “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he 

complains of.” Id. at 808.

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undoubtedly “protected conduct.” Id.; see also Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 

(9th Cir. 1995) (officials may not “punish the prisoner for exercising his First 

Amendment right to pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.”) (citing Rizzo, 778 F.2d at

532). And a correctional officer’s refusal to accept an inmate’s legal mail is sufficiently 

“adverse” to any claim an inmate might seek to pursue in a court of law. See e.g.,Uribe v. 

McKesson, No. 08CV01285 DMS NLS, 2011 WL 9640, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011)

(finding prisoner’s retaliation claims of having his legal mail rejected for processing 

“because it was not time for legal mail” was a sufficiently “adverse punitive 

response[].”); cf., Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271 (1988) (holding that a pro se 

prisoner’s notice of appeal is considered filed for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4 “at the 

time [he] deliver[s] it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk,” because 

he has “no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his notice of appeal to prison 

authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and who may have every incentive to 

delay.”).

However, Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to satisfy the three remaining 

elements of a retaliation claim. Specifically, he fails to allege that any Defendant refused 

to process his mail between the hours of 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. on October 16, 2016 because

he sought to exercise his constitutional rights. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114; Soranno’s 

Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (retaliation claims requires a

showing that Plaintiff’s protected conduct was “the ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor 

behind the defendant’s conduct.”). In fact, Plaintiff admits he told Defendant Hough he 

“needed tape” before his legal mail could be processed. See Compl., ECF No. 4-5. 

Plaintiff further fails to allege facts which plausibly show how or why a one-day delay in 

the processing of mail “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future 

First Amendment activities,” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568, and as currently pleaded, Plaintiff 

fails to claim that he “suffered some other harm,” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269, that was 

“more than minimal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n.11. Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege 

Defendants’ one-day delay in collecting his mail “failed to advance a legitimate goal of 

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the correctional institution.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532; Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15.

Indeed, Cal. Code Regs., §§ 3130 and 3142 provide for the “orderly processing” of an 

inmate’s outgoing confidential mail, and he has failed to allege any facts to plausibly 

suggest how those regulations were “arbitrary and capricious” or “unnecessary to the 

maintenance of order in the institution.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th 

Cir. 1984); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114-15; K’Napp, 2015 WL 5138237 at *17 (finding 

CDCR’s mail regulations “further[] the substantial governmental interest of 

governmental order.”).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims must also be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

F. Equal Protection

Last, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his right to equal protection by failing 

to collect his mail on October 16, 2016 but “allow[ed] other to forward their mail at the 

same time.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 9, 11.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 

(1985). An equal protection claim is pleaded by alleging that a defendant intentionally 

discriminated against the plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, Serrano 

v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 

668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or by alleging facts sufficient to plausibly show that similarly 

situated individuals were intentionally treated differently absent a rational relationship to 

a legitimate state purpose. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 

601-02 (2008); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North 

Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff does not allege he was discriminated against because he is a member of 

any protected class. Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082. He also fails to allege facts to plausibly 

show other prisoners “similarly situated” were treated differently and that any disparate 

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treatment lacked a legitimate purpose. See McCollum v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 

647 F.3d 870, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2011) (Equal Protection claims require a plaintiff to 

“articulate which [other persons] were similarly situated or how he is similar to these 

[persons].”). 

Thus, without more, Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations that Defendants 

denied him “equal protection of the laws” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 11, are also insufficient to state a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 & n.3 (2007) (“labels and conclusions” are

insufficient to state a claim for relief).

G. Leave to Amend

In light of his pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended 

Complaint in order to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order, if he can. 

See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012)).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2);

2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

///

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3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001; and

4) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter 

a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), and 

his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira 

v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage 

of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the

complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2018

_____________________________________

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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