Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02722/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02722-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD KA’ANOI,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-2722 JKS EFB PS

vs.

DRMS DIRECTOR LT. GEN. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ROBERT T. DAIL, et al.,

Defendants. 

 /

This action, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the

undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 72-302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Presently before

the court is defendants’ motion for partial dismissal of the amended complaint, which, together

with plaintiff’s opposition thereto and defendants’ reply, were taken under submission pursuant

to Local Rule 78-230(h). Having reviewed all submitted papers, the court recommends that

defendants’ motion be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on December 17, 2007, alleging claims against the director

and employees of the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (“DRMS”), a federal agency

located at Travis Air Force Base that disposes of excess property received from the military

services. Plaintiff names DRMS Director, Lt. Gen. Robert T. Dail, and Clifford R. Kerr and

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1

 On March 25, 2008, this case was ordered related to Ka’anoi v. Kerr, 2:06-cv-2730

JKS EFB PS (closed), because both cases involve similar claims and parties. See Local Rule 83-

123(a). In the earlier case, plaintiff appeared to allege tort claims, including libel and slander,

against the same defendants. The district judge, in his order adopting this court’s findings and

recommendations, advised plaintiff that he might be able to restyle his claims against the United

States to avoid dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and explained how to pursue his

grievances at the administrative level. The district judge explained that if the administrative

claim was denied, plaintiff could return to federal court and institute a new action. The district

judge then granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and directed the Clerk to enter judgment for

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Roger Waring as defendants (referred to collectively as the “federal defendants”), all of whom

worked with or supervised plaintiff before his retirement. Although the complaint is in many

respects incoherent, plaintiff seems to allege that the federal defendants discriminated and

retaliated against him on the basis of a physical handicap (back and spinal injury) and race (i.e.,

because he is Hawaiian). See Complaint (“Compl.”), p. 2. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants

violated his civil rights by discriminating against him, and interfering with his right to freedom

of speech and his “right to equality in a public place.” Compl., p. 1. 

Plaintiff alleges that his supervisors ignored his doctors’ orders to put him on light duty. 

See Compl., pp. 1-3. He alleges that he was “forced to work in the Industrial Yard and Suffered

Physical Pain with Mental Stress and Depression. Agency Ignored Doctors Light duty Request

and at times he had to work on his knees to sort material.” Compl., p. 1. When the “Travis

Employment Office said; THEY AREN’T SUPPOSE TO BE PLAYING DOCTOR!! That’s

when I realized I was being illegally discriminated against.” Compl., p. 3 (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiff also seems to allege discrimination based on his supervisors’ accusations that he was

improperly taking leave. See Compl., p. 2; “Opposition To; [sic] For Memorandum in Support

of Federal Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal” (“Opp’n”), pp. 2-3. Plaintiff appears to

allege that such accusations were part and parcel of the alleged discrimination. Id.

Plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC regarding the alleged discrimination, which

resulted in a decision adverse to him. See Compl., p. 2. He was notified of his right to pursue a

civil action in district court, and has done so by filing the present complaint.1

 Plaintiff seeks

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the defendant. See Ka’anoi v. Kerr, 2:06-cv-2730 JKS EFB PS, doc. no. 27. Before plaintiff

could follow that procedure, he filed the present action, which, though naming the same

defendants, seems to allege discrimination claims rather than tort claims. Plaintiff also appears

to allege exhaustion of his administrative remedies as to the discrimination claims, as discussed

herein. 

2

 The federal defendants also point out that, to the extent plaintiff intends to name the

defendants in their individual capacities, service of process was not effective pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(i)(3) (requiring service in the manner prescribed in Rule 4(e), (f), or (g)). Defendants

note this deficiency and preserve their Rule 12(b)(5) motion in the event their present motion is

ultimately denied as to defendants Kerr and Waring. 

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damages in the amount of $317,876.69 for “Punitive Damages, Depression, Stress and Mental

Health, to make him Whole and Productive again!” Id. 

On April 16, 2008, the federal defendants moved for partial dismissal of the complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on grounds that plaintiff’s exclusive remedies for his

discrimination claims are Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act.2

 Specifically, they move to

dismiss plaintiff’s “constitutional claims” as well as defendants Kerr and Waring, on grounds

that defendant Dail, as director of DRMS, is the only proper defendant.

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint should only be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v.

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). Dismissal may be

based either on the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to

support cognizable legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex. Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976);

Church of Scientology of California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1984). The court construes

the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor.

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Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In a case

where plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court has an obligation to construe the pleadings

liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the

court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of a claim

that are not plead. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, “[t]he court is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted

deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

B. Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act Exclusive Remedy

The federal defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s “constitutional claims” (i.e., his claims

regarding alleged violations of his civil rights) on grounds that Title VII and the Rehabilitation

Act are his exclusive remedies for the alleged discrimination. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 825

(1976). It is the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination on these bases. Id., at

829, 834-35. In 1978, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act, making the rights and remedies

available under Title VII (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16) available to a person complaining of

employment discrimination on the basis of disability. See Boyd v. United States Postal Service,

752 F.2d 410, 412-13 (9th Cir. 1985). Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 is

the exclusive remedy for a federal employee claiming discrimination on the basis of disability. 

Id., at 413. 

Thus, plaintiff’s only remedies for his claims of discrimination on the basis of race and

disability are under Title VII and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. He cannot “tack on”

additional causes of action alleging civil rights violations arising from the alleged discriminatory

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3

 His allegations of exhaustion in the complaint appear only to refer to his discrimination

claims. 

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conduct. See White v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 652 F.2d 913, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming

dismissal of constitutional claims where Title VII was exclusive remedy for a federal employee’s

allegations of racial discrimination).

In the complaint, plaintiff does not allege a constitutional claim entitling him to a remedy

separate from Title VII. In his opposition, plaintiff seems to argue that his “constitutional” claim

is one sounding in tort for a violation of his “freedom of speech - and equality in a public

place.” Opp’n, p. 2. He refers to an incident in which defendant Kerr questioned him about

taking several months of leave when he was still able to perform musical numbers at a Vacaville

holiday event (referring to plaintiff’s picture in the newspaper, on stage and singing). See

Opp’n, p. 2 and Exh. 1. Plaintiff, however, does not clarify how this alleged conduct constitutes

a constitutional violation, and seems to allege that it is part and parcel of the alleged disability

discrimination.

Moreover, to the extent plaintiff means to allege a separate constitutional tort against any

of the defendants, he has failed to allege exhaustion of his administrative remedies with respect

to such a claim.3

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (prior to litigating a tort claim against the United

States, a plaintiff must first file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency).

Failure to allege exhaustion under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) is grounds for

dismissal. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to allege

exhaustion under the FTCA grounds for dismissal); Reynolds v. Husk, 273 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13

(D.D.C. 2002); Russo v. Glasser, 279 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (D. Conn. 2003). 

Although plaintiff has previously been advised, in detail, of the proper procedure for

pursuing tort claims at the administrative level, see n. 1, he does not assert exhaustion of his

purported tort claims either in his opposition or in any document seeking to amend the

complaint. 

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 Nonetheless, in light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the court will consider a proper motion

to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. However, the facts alleged in the complaint appear only

to relate to defendants “treating him differently” because of his disability and race. Those claims

are only properly brought under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, unless plaintiff alleges

conduct amounting to a highly personal violation. Compare Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d

1421, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1995) (Title VII did not preempt FTCA where conduct – rape by male

supervisor – constituted a highly personal violation beyond the meaning of workplace

discrimination) with Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2001)

(intentional touching and vulgar remarks did not constitute “a highly personal violation” beyond

discrimination). Here, plaintiff does not allege such “highly personal violations” and appears

instead to focus on his alleged unfair treatment in the workplace.

Accordingly, the court recommends that defendants’ motion be granted and that the

constitutional claims be dismissed. To the extent plaintiff wishes to clarify his allegations

regarding purported violations of his civil rights, he is free to move to amend the complaint

accordingly. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (amendment of complaint). To the extent plaintiff wishes

to amend the complaint to allege tort claims, he is again advised that he must allege exhaustion

of his administrative remedies under the FTCA. Failure to move to amend the complaint will be

construed as plaintiff’s intention to proceed on the original complaint.

C. Director of DRMS is Proper Defendant

As set forth above, the allegations of the complaint appear to allege discrimination

claims, which, in this case, are only properly brought pursuant to Title VII and the Rehabilitation

Act. “Title VII requires that in a civil action alleging employment discrimination by the

government, the head of the department, agency or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.” 

Vinieratos v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Similarly, the head of the department is the appropriate defendant for disability claims

made pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. See Mahoney v. U.S. Postal Serv., 884 F.2d 1194,

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1196, n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the “Rehabilitation Act simply makes available to victims

of handicap discrimination the rights and remedies embodied in Title VII” and that analysis

regarding appropriate defendant is same under both laws). Further, under Title VII, “there is no

personal liability for employees, including supervisors. . . .” Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994,

1001 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir.

1993)); White, 652 F.2d at 916-17 (holding that Title VII did not contemplate remedies for

officials acting in their individual capacities).

Morever, to the extent plaintiff wishes to amend his complaint to allege claims arising

under the FTCA, the only proper defendant in that instance is the United States. See Kennedy v.

U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). In the event plaintiff moves to amend

the complaint in that way, the court will consider an appropriate motion for substitution pursuant

to the Westfall Act. See Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 876-77 (9th Cir.

1992).

Because the complaint currently alleges discrimination claims properly brought under

Title VII (and the Rehabilitation Act), defendant Dail is the only proper defendant. Thus, the

court recommends that defendants’ motion be granted and that defendants Kerr and Waring be

dismissed from the action. However, again considering plaintiff’s pro se status and the largely

unintelligible complaint, the court recognizes that plaintiff may seek to amend in order to clarify

his allegations. In such event, he must do so through a proper motion that complies with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this court’s local rules. 

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ April 16, 2008, motion to dismiss be granted; and,

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2. The constitutional claims be dismissed together with defendants Clifford R. Kerr and

Roger Waring.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 17, 2008.

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