Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01140/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KUSHA, INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12CV1140-LAB (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

vs. DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE

INTERNATIONAL MODERN

INVESTMENT, etc., et al.,

Defendants.

In this action, Plaintiff Kusha, Inc., a California corporation, brings claims of trademark

infringement against International Modern Investment, Inc., a Michigan corporation doing

business as Liberty Wholesale (“Liberty”). Both companies used trademarks incorporating

the word “Royal” on food products. Liberty moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

and for improper venue. In response, Kusha argued for specific personal jurisdiction, but if

not, it argued general jurisdiction exists. In the alternative, Liberty argued venue is improper

in this District and seeks dismissal on that basis.

Legal Standards

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La Prairie

Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). Where, as here, the motion is based on

written materials, the plaintiff only needs to make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts

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to meet his burden. Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are to be taken as true. AT

& T v. Campagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.1996). Factual conflicts are

resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Id. 

Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a three-part test to determine whether it can exercise

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or

perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and

protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's

forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial

justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.2004) (citation

omitted). Kusha must satisfy the first two prongs, or personal jurisdiction is lacking. Id. If

Kusha satisfies the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to Liberty to present a compelling

case that exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985)).

Personal jurisdiction is normally a statewide concept; where, as here, no federal

statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, the Court applies the law of the forum state. See

Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Technologies, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9 Cir. 2011). th

California’s long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of due process. Id.

Venue, on the other hand, is specific to judicial districts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 

The fact that there may be personal jurisdiction over Liberty in California doesn’t mean this

District is a proper venue. 

Discussion

The parties each offer competent documentary evidence in the form of declarations,

documents attested to by declarations, and requests for judicial notice.

/ / /

/ / /

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Kusha’s Evidence

Kusha is a California corporation with its headquarters in Irvine, which is located in

the Central District of California. Kusha offers evidence that Liberty was a distributor of

Kusha’s products for approximately 18 months during 2010 and 2011, during which Liberty

became familiar with Kusha’s mark. Near the end of that period, Kusha learned that Liberty

was using the allegedly infringing mark.

Kusha also offers evidence Liberty operated a website on which wholesale customers

could order its products, including those bearing the allegedly infringing mark.

Liberty’s Evidence

Liberty offers evidence that it does not now have, nor has it ever had, any business

operations, offices, bank accounts, financial assets, or employees in California. Liberty offers

evidence it has never sold products in California; rather, it sells its products in Warren,

Michigan to customers who are wholesalers, and customers then make their own shipping

arrangements. Concerning the website, Liberty offers evidence that it is only accessible to

registered customers, and that it has no registered customers in California.

Discussion of Evidence

There is little dispute over the facts; the parties’ main dispute here is what their

significance is, and how the law applies to them. While it is clear Liberty operates a website

on which products bearing the allegedly infringing marks are sold, Liberty’s evidence shows

it is only used by customers outside of California. The purchases are consummated in

Michigan, and the customers, who are wholesalers, then sell the products. Some of those

products made their way to the shelves of stores in this District.

Liberty has several identifiable connections to California. First, it had a business

relationship with Kusha, which is located in California, as its distributor. The mark on

Liberty’s products is alleged to infringe a mark on Kusha’s products, so the effects of alleged

infringement were felt in California. See Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting goods, Inc.,

704 F.3d 668, 677–78 (9 Cir. 2012) (citing, inter alia, Columbia Pictures Television v. th

Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9 cir. 1997) (discussing precedent

th

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and concluding that purposeful availment prong is satisfied where defendant knew the

impact of willful infringement would be felt in the forum state). Finally, some of the products

were made their way to the shelves of some retail stores in this District.

It is primarily the “effects test” discussed in Columbia Pictures that rescues Kusha’s

personal jurisdiction argument. Kusha’s uncontroverted allegations showLiberty knew Kusha

was located in California, knew what products Kusha sold and what marks it used, and

intentionally put its products on the market with the disputed marks on them. Assuming, as

the Court must at this stage, that Liberty knew the marks on its own products infringed

Kusha’s marks, Liberty knew the effects of its infringement would be felt in the forum state. 

This is enough to establish personal availment. See Washington Shoe, 704 F.3d at 676–678

(distinguishing cases where infringement was apparently negligent and untargeted from

those where the alleged infringement was willful and the defendant knew the effect would

be felt the plaintiff was located).

Because the claims arise from Liberty’s California-related conduct, both the first two

prongs are satisfied.

Reasonableness 

Liberty doesn’t address the “reasonableness” prong in its opening brief at all. Kusha

doesn’t address this prong, except to argue that the burden falls on Liberty (Opp’n,

10:24–11:7), which is true. Liberty has therefore abandoned this argument and, because it

bears the burden of establishing unreasonableness, the Court must find this prong is met

as well. Because all three prongs are satisfied, the Court finds it has personal jurisdiction

over Liberty.

Venue

The briefing on the venue issue is limited to whether venue is or isn’t proper. If the

Court finds venue is improper, it is within the Court’s discretion whether to dismiss or

transfer, See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9 Cir. 1992). Here, neither party th

requests transfer as an alternative to dismissal. 

/ / /

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Kusha argues venue is proper under § 1391(b)(2) because a “substantial part” of the

events giving rise to its claim occurred here. Neither party is located in this District or is

alleged to have done anything here, Liberty doesn’t do business here, none of Liberty’s

wholesaler customers are located here, and Liberty didn’t aim any of its actions toward this

District. 

The only thing that happened here is that, after Liberty placed the products bearing

the allegedly infringing marks in the stream of commerce, some products eventually sold

here. The products weren’t sent here for sale by Liberty; there are no allegations or evidence

Liberty passed off its goods as Kusha’s here, or even knew they would be sold here. See 1

French Transit, Ltd. v. Modern Coupon Systems, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 22, 26–27 (S.D.N.Y.

1994) (distinguishing Sidco Indus., Inc. v. Wimar Tahoe Corp., 768 F. Supp. 1343 (D.Or.

1991)) (holding that venue for trademark infringement claims was improper where there was

evidence defendant’s products were available in the forum district, but no evidence

defendant sent them there or had anything to do with distributors selling them there). The

evidence suggests that wholesalers who bought the products from Liberty were likely the

ones who brought them into this District to sell, though it is also possible there were some

other intermediaries. The fact that some confusion or dilution is alleged to have occurred

here as the result of Liberty’s customers bringing the products into the District to sell is too

attenuated to constitute a substantial part of the claim. See also Dakota Beef, LLC v. Pigors,

445 F. Supp. 2d 917, 920–21 (N.D.Ill., 2006) (simply maintaining a website accessible to

residents of the district did not amount to a substantial part of the alleged infringement).

In short, this District has no substantial connection to the parties’ dispute, and at least

several districts—those where one of the parties is found or where the online customers to

whom Liberty reached out are located—have a much greater connection.

/ / /

 The two stores Kusha identifies as selling Liberty’s products in this District are not 1

members of large chains (see Opp’n at 3:8–23, Decl. of Sanjeev Menon, ¶¶ 6–11, and Exs.

D–I), so it is not even a reasonable inference that Liberty would have known, based on who

its customers were, that the products would end up in this District. 

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Although Kusha argues this District is proper under the “general” provision of

§ 1391(b)(3), that provision comes into play only when there are no other districts where

venue would be proper. Here, there is at least one district (and possibly more) where venue

is proper, i.e., the Eastern District of Michigan, where Liberty is located and where Liberty’s

uncontroverted evidence shows its sales of the products bearing the allegedly infringing

products occurred. § 1391(b)(1). It is also possible venue is proper in the Central District of

California, where Kusha is located.

Kusha therefore has not met its burden of showing that venue is proper in this District. 

Because the parties haven’t expressed a preference for transfer, nor briefed the propriety

of venue in the Central District of California, the Court considers it prudent to dismiss this

action rather than transfer it to Liberty’s home district.

Conclusion and Order

Liberty’s requests for judicial notice are not needed, because they go to uncontested

matters. They are therefore DENIED AS MOOT.

To the extent Liberty’s motion seeks dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction,

it is DENIED, but to the extent it seeks dismissal for improper venue it is GRANTED. This

action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All pending dates are vacated, and all

pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 21, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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