Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00543/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00543-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 “As a general rule, the filing of a notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction over

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1997).

Tthe district court, however, does retain jurisdiction to adjudicate post-judgment matters such as

post-judgment motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 402-03 (1995).

-1- 11cv0543

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM JOHN DAUGHTERY,

Petitioner,

Case No. 11cv0543 H (JMA)

ORDER DENYING:

(1) MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION (ECF No.

5) AND 

(2) SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(ECF No. 8)

vs.

TERRI GONZALES Warden, et al.,

Respondent.

On March, 17, 2011, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. On April 25, 2011, the Court issued an Order granting the request to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismissing the petition. (ECF No. 4.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration

of that Order. (ECF No. 5.) On the same day, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. (ECF No. 7.)1

Petitioner then filed a supplemental request for reconsideration on July 15, 2011. (ECF. No. 9.)

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00543-H-JMA Document 10 Filed 07/19/11 Page 1 of 3
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-2- 11cv0543

 In this its April 25, 2011 Order, the Court dismissed the Petition because Petitioner is no

longer in custody pursuant to the conviction he challenges. As discussed in the Order, ““Subject

matter jurisdiction under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), is limited to

those persons ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State.’” Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887,

889 (9th Cir. 1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It is a jurisdictional requirement that, at

the time a habeas petition is filed, “the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or

sentence under attack.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2241(c)(3) & 2254(a)); see Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)). In the Petition,

Petitioner challenges the 8 year sentence he received in 1985, which Petitioner acknowledges

has “expired.” (See Pet. at 2.)

In his Motion and Supplemental Motion, Petitioner argues that his Petition should not

have been dismissed for failure to satisfy the custody requirement. Petitioner, however, fails to

indicate whether the Motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60.

The Ninth Circuit has noted that “highly unusual circumstances” or the necessity of

“prevent[ing] manifest injustice” may warrant the granting of a motion for reconsideration under

Rule 59(e)). See McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

(per curiam). Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from judgment for: (1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud or other

misconduct; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) any other reason

justifying relief from operation of the judgment. FED.R.CIV.PRO. 60(b). 

Petitioner claims that his Petition should not have been dismissed because the sentence

he is currently serving (suffered in 2007) was enhanced due to his prior 1985 conviction. (See

Motion at 7; Supp. Motion at 3.) He cites Lackawanna Co. Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394

(2001) and Maleng, 490 U.S. 488, among other cases, as support. (See e.g. Motion at 2-3, 7;

Supp. Motion at 3.) However, neither case supports Petitioner’s argument. In Maleng, the Court

held that the respondent was not “in custody” the conviction he challenged had been used to

enhance a subsequent sentence. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493-94. Further, in Lackawanna, the Court

held that a habeas petitioner may not collaterally challenge a prior conviction which is “no

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-3- 11cv0543

longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right,” unless “there was a failure to appoint

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment [and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

(1963)].” Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04. 

Here, Petitioner does not dispute that he is no longer in custody pursuant to the 1985

conviction he challenges. Moreover, Petitioner does not allege that he was denied counsel in

that case. Rather, he merely makes vague claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See

Motion at 5-6.) Therefore, Petitioner has failed to satisfy Rule 59(e) or 60(b). Accordingly,

Petitioner’s motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2011

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:11-cv-00543-H-JMA Document 10 Filed 07/19/11 Page 3 of 3