Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00738/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00738-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN SANDOVAL, on behalf of himself 

and all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

PHARMACARE US, INC., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:15-cv-0738-H-JLB 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO RETAX COSTS OR 

STAY AWARD PENDING APPEAL 

[Doc. No. 93] 

 

On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that Defendant violated 

various federal and state statutes through the marketing of its product, IntenseX. (Doc. 

No. 1.) On July 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint. (Doc. 

No. 9.) On August 30, 2016, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Defendant, (Doc. No. 84), and the Clerk’s Judgment issued on August 31, 2016, (Doc. 

No. 85). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 87.) On September 8, 2016, 

Defendant filed a bill of costs, seeking to recover $3,366.44. (Doc. No. 86.) Plaintiff 

filed an objection to the bill of costs, (Doc. No. 91), and, after a hearing, the Clerk of the 

Court concluded that only $1,950.10 should be taxed in favor of Defendant, (Doc. No. 

92). On October 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to retax costs or stay payment pending 

appeal. (Doc. No. 93.) On October 24, 2016, Defendant filed a response in opposition to 

Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. No. 95.) 

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DISCUSSION 

I. RETAXING COSTS 

“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—

other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(d)(1); see also CivLR 54.1(a) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the court, or stipulated 

by the parties, the prevailing party is entitled to costs.”). This rule creates a presumption 

in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 

1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999); Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 

F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003). District courts have the discretion to overcome this 

presumption, but may only do so in cases that are “extraordinary” and it would be 

“inappropriate or inequitable to award costs.” Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. 

State of California, 231 F.3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2000). “Proper grounds for denying costs 

include (1) a losing party’s limited financial resources; (2) misconduct by the prevailing 

party; and (3) the chilling effect of imposing . . . high costs on future civil rights litigants, 

as well as (4) whether the issues in the case were close and difficult; (5) whether the 

prevailing party’s recovery was nominal or partial; (6) whether the losing party litigated 

in good faith; and (7) whether the case presented a landmark issue of national 

importance.” Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Champion Produce, Inc., 342 F.3d at 1022) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(abrogated on other grounds by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S.Ct. 2459 

(2014)). “[W]hether to award costs ultimately lies within the sound discretion of the 

district court.” Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-73 (2013). The Court 

finds no reason to deviate from the presumption of Rule 54(d). 

Plaintiff argues that his limited financial resources support the denial of costs. 

(Doc. No. 93 at 4.) However, the cases Plaintiff cites do not support such a finding here. 

In Hunter v. City & County of San Francisco, 2013 WL 6088409 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 

2013), the plaintiff seeking a denial of costs had an outstanding Internal Revenue Service 

debt of $11,000, had been unemployed for nearly three years, and due to “mental health 

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issues and criminal history” would have difficulties obtaining future full-time 

employment. Id. at *2. Similarly, in Washburn v. Fagan, 2008 WL 361048 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 11, 2008), the plaintiff showed financial hardship going beyond anything Plaintiff 

has alleged here. Id. at *2 (“As Plaintiff argues, he lives ‘hand to mouth’ and, in his 

appeal of this case, the Ninth Circuit approved his application to proceed in forma 

pauperis.”). In contrast to the financial hardship in the cases Plaintiff cites, Plaintiff 

currently works as a consultant on a contractual basis. (Doc. No. 93 at 4.) This is not 

enough. See Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1248 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(“Costs are properly denied when a plaintiff ‘would be rendered indigent should [he] be 

forced to pay’ the amount assessed.”) (quoting Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1080). 

Plaintiff also argues that the Court should deny costs to avoid chilling public 

interest litigation. (Doc. No. 93 at 5-6.) When listing this consideration in Quan, the 

Ninth Circuit described the chilling only in the context of civil rights litigation. Quan, 

623 F.3d at 888-89 (“the chilling effect of imposing . . . high costs on future civil rights 

litigants”). Plaintiff cites one case, Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Grantham, 

2013 WL 3283490 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2013), for the proposition that district courts have 

applied the same logic to “public interest cases not involving civil rights laws.” (Doc. 

No. 93 at 5-6.) But this case does not help him. Although the Klamath court considered 

a similar argument, the Court ultimately found that “costs in the amount of $2,752.70 are 

neither excessive nor chilling.” Klamath, 2013 WL 3283490, at *2. Because the amount 

at issue here is even less, $1,950.10, and given the positions of the parties, the Court does 

not find it would chill litigation. 

Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s additional arguments that have no case 

support. In sum, all of Plaintiff’s arguments are insufficient in light of the record. See 

Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 593 (denying costs only appropriate 

in “extraordinary” cases). 

/// 

/// 

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II. STAY OF AWARD 

“Except as otherwise provided by law, costs will be taxed on the date set 

notwithstanding the fact that an appeal may have been filed.” CivLR 54.1(g)(5). “In 

assessing whether to issue a stay pending appeal, courts consider (1) whether the stay 

applicant has made a strong showing he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the 

applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will 

substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceedings; and (4) where the 

public interest lies.” Waine-Golston v. Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/New 

House P’ship, 2013 WL 1899928, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2013). 

Plaintiff asks the Court, in the alternative, to stay either consideration of this 

motion or payment of costs pending appeal. The Court sees no reason to deviate from the 

general rule established by Civil Local Rule 54.1 and denies Plaintiff’s request for a stay. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to retax costs or stay 

the award of costs. (Doc. No. 93.) 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 2, 2016 

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff 

 United States District Judge 

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