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Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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PlL~O 

Uoited Staie~ Couct of Appeals 

ienth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

J L 1 - 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JACKIE SEARL, an individual and 

doing business as For Sale by 

Owner Magazine and doing business 

as Limited Commission Real Estate 

Agency, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

THE OGDEN BOARD OF REALTORS; ) 

CHARLES H. ANDERSON; ROBERT PENTON;) 

JAMES MOLGARD; REALTY WORLD ABIDE; ) 

CHARLES JONES; NETWORK REALTY ) 

and BRUCE KILLIAN, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-4137 

(D.C. No. 86-NC-084J) 

(D. Utah) 

Before HOLLOWAYI Chief Judge, LOGAN, Circuit Judge, and BRETT, 

District Judge. * 

Plaintiff Jackie Searl, individually and as proprietor of For 

Sale By Owner magazine and Limited Commission Real Estate Agency 

(LCRE), brought an action alleging that defendants, realtors and 

real estate associations, conspired to induce others to boycott 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable Thomas R. Brett, United States District Judge 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 1 
plaintiff's businesses in violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 

u.s.c. § 1, and Utah's version of the Sherman Act, Utah Code Ann. 

§ 76-10-914(1). 1 Plaintiff also asserted several tortious 

interference with contract claims. The district court granted 

defendants' motions for summary judgment on all claims. 

In 1984, plaintiff began publishing For Sale By Owner. The 

magazine, which is distributed free of charge to the public, 

contains photographs and descriptions of real estate for sale in 

the greater Ogden, Utah area. Those attempting to sell real 

estate pay to advertise their property in the magazine. Businesses involved in the local real estate industry also pay to 

advertise in For Sale by Owner. 

In 1985, plaintiff organized Limited Commission Real Estate 

(LCRE), a discount real estate brokerage business. For a commission substantially below what other local brokerage firms charge, 

LCRE helps homeowners sell residential real estate. 

A great deal of animosity developed between plaintiff and 

defendants soon after she organized For Sale By Owner and LCRE. 

Defendants complained that plaintiff engaged in deceptive 

advertising practices; plaintiff complained that defendants 

intended to run her out of business. Ultimately plaintiff filed 

the instant action, alleging that defendants violated antitrust 

law by conspiring to boycott anyone doing business with her. She 

1 Utah's Antitrust Act provides that "The Legislature intends 

that the courts, in construing this act, will be guided by 

interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal 

antitrust statutes .... " Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-926. Accordingly, we construe Utah's Antitrust Act as applying the same 

standards and as forbidding the same actions as the Sherman Act. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 2 
further alleged that defendants intentionally interferred with 

contractual relations between plaintiff's businesses and their 

clients, a prospective employee and LCRE, and For Sale By Owner 

and its commercial advertisers. After the district court granted 

defendants' summary judgment motion as to all claims, plaintiff 

appealed to this court. 

I 

We review a summary judgment order de novo, applying the same 

standard applied by the district court. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). In opposing 

defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff relies heavily 

on her own affidavit and deposition. Most of the allegations 

contained in these documents, however, do not comport with the 

dictates of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Under that rule, a party opposing a well supported motion for summary judgment "must do more 

than make conclusory allegations, it 'must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Dart 

Indus., Inc. v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496, 498 (10th Cir. 1983) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities 

Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-90 (1968). Affidavits must be made 

upon personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be 

admissible in evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Accordingly, 

"[h]earsay testimony ... that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit." 6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 

1 56.22[1] at 56-743 to 56-746 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote ommitted). 

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Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 3 
After a careful review of the appellate record, we find that 

only the following allegations made by plaintiff are supported as 

required by Rule 56(e): (1) Defendants sent numerous letters 

complaining about plaintiff to the Utah Division of Real Estate; 

these letters were placed in the Ogden Board of Realtors' (OBR) 

reading file, thereby making them available to other realtors; 

(2) when asked about LCRE by a job seeker, the president of the 

OBR responded "scratch that one off your list," Addendum to Brief 

of Appellant, Ex. 10 at 64; (3) the OBR dismissed several 

complaints filed by plaintiff; (4) the other students in 

plaintiff's brokerage class refused to sit by her; and (5) Robert 

Penton convinced a real estate business not to advertise in For 

Sale By Owner. 

In reviewing whether these allegations preclude a grant of 

summary judgment in this antitrust conspiracy case, we are 

governed by the standard established in Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Under this 

standard, "if the evidence is as consistent with permissible 

independent business interests as with an illegal conspiracy, then 

the plaintiff fails to create a fact issue on the existence of a 

section one conspiracy unless the ambiguity is negated by evidence 

tending to exclude the possibility that the defendants were pursuing independent interests." Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life 

Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 639 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in 

original). Accord Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 

850 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1988); Gibson v. Greater Park City 

Co., 818 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1987). Applying this standard, 

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Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 4 
we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. 

The letters written to the Utah Division of Real Estate are 

consistent with a realtor's interest in reporting seemingly 

misleading advertisements and the OBR's desire to protect the use 

of the term "realtor. 112 The letters were placed in the OBR reading file consistent with the OBR's policy of keeping its members 

abreast of issues affecting their professional association. See 

Brief of Appellees at 30. 

Likewise, the OBR's president's remarks about LCRE and the 

OBR's handling of plaintiff's complaints are consistent with 

legitimate business interests. The OBR must be able to review and 

dispose of complaints if they are procedurally defective or they 

lack merit. The president must be able to offer his honest 

opinion, when that opinion is sought, about job opportunities in 

the local real estate market. Plaintiff has offered no evidence 

tending to exclude the possibility that defendants were pursuing 

legitimate business interests in taking the foregoing actions. 

The fact that plaintiff's brokerage classmates ostracized 

her, though not justified by legitimate business interests, 

provides no evidence of the existence of a conspiracy to boycott 

plaintiff. Several of plaintiff's classmates are defendants in 

this action, and given the friction between the parties in this 

case, it is not surprising that they were less than friendly when 

2 "Realtor" is a federally registered collective membership mark. 

Brief of Appellees at 4 n.5. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 5 
they discovered her identity. Though rude, their actions do not 

support the existence of a conspiracy to violate antitrust laws. 

Finally, we do not view Penton's statement that he forced 

Mountain View Title to cancel its contract with For Sale By Owner, 

standing by itself, to be evidence of a conspiracy to boycott 

plaintiff's businesses. As discussed in Part II below, his statement that "he was responsible for getting the ad pulled from 

Mountain View Title Company," Addendum to Brief of Appellant, Ex. 

9 at 280, undoubtedly raises an issue of fact regarding the 

intentional interference with contract claim. This statment of 

one individual's unilateral action, however, does not evince a 

"contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or 

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. 

§ 1. 3 

II 15 u.s.c. 

3 During plaintiff's deposition, she indicated that Penton took 

credit for the cancellation of Mountain View Title's advertisement. See Addendum to Brief of Appellant, Ex. 9 at 280. This 

version of accounts is corroborated by Penton's own deposition. 

See id., Ex. 8 at 65 ("I told her that I was the one that got him 

to drop the ad."). In plaintiff's affidavit, however, she states 

that Penton said, "My broker and I" caused the cancellation. Id., 

Ex. 3 at 4. In her brief on appeal, plaintiff reverts back to her 

original version and states that "The vice-president-elect of the 

OBR ... , Penton, told Searl he had caused FSBO advertiser Mt. 

View Title to cancel its advertising contract .... " Brief of 

Appellant at 27 (emphasis added). Finally, in her reply brief, 

plaintiff repeatedly states that Penton got Mountain View Title to 

cancel the advertisement. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3, 12-13, 

21-23, 25. Because the confusion on this issue was created by 

plaintiff, and because she repeatedly argues in her briefs before 

this court that Penton alone caused the cancellation of the 

advertisement, we have assumed that Penton, and not his broker, is 

alleged to have caused the cancellation of the Mountain View 

contract. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 6 
II 

Plaintiff next appeals the district court's summary judgment 

order dismissing her tortious interference claims. We affirm the 

district court's judgment on this issue as to all defendants 

except Robert Penton. 

Utah recognizes the tort of intentional interference with 

prospective economic relations. See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. 

v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). To recover damages under 

this tort, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) that the defendant 

intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 

potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 

improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id. 

Plaintiff's complaint and briefs on appeal contain numerous 

allegations of contractual interference that are not supported as 

required by Rule 56(e). Plaintiff does properly support, however, 

the allegations underlying the claim against the president of the 

OBR and Robert Penton. 

At plaintiff's behest, Brian Mason visited the president of 

the OBR ostensibly seeking advice on employment opportunities in 

the local real estate market. When Mason asked about LCRE, the 

president told him to "scratch that one off your list," Addendum 

to Brief of Appellant, Ex. 10 at 64, because LCRE did not offer 

adequate training and he knew that other "cut-rate commission 

brokerages" had gone out of business. See Brief of Appellee at 

32-33. Despite this advice, Mason went to work for LCRE. 

The record contains no evidence indicating that the OBR 

president made these remarks for an improper purpose; he merely 

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Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 7 
responded to a question with his honest opinion. Moreover, 

plaintiff does not identify any injury resulting from the 

statement--Mason had already decided that he was going to work for 

LCRE when he asked the question and the president's remarks did 

not change his mind. Accordingly, the district court properly 

granted summary judgment on this claim. 

Plaintiff's claim against Robert Penton arises out of For 

Sale By Owner's $35.00 a month advertising contract with Mountain 

View Title. After two months, Mountain View cancelled the 

contract. In plaintiff's affidavit and deposition, she testified 

that Penton told her that he caused Mountain View to cancel the 

contract. Penton admits to making this statement. Addendum to 

Brief of Appellant, Ex. 8 at 65. 

Faced with this evidence, we must reverse the district 

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Penton. Our conclusion is not altered by Penton's testimony that his statement to 

plaintiff was untrue and was made only to hurt plaintiff's feelings. Nor is it altered by the testimony of Michael Hendry, 

president of Mountain View, that no one spoke with him regarding 

his advertisement in For Sale By Owner and that he cancelled it 

because of a lack of business. IR. tab 167. Such testimony 

simply raises a genuine issue of material fact to be decided at 

trial. 

In conclusion, the district court's grant of summary judgment 

on all antitrust claims is AFFIRMED as to all defendants. The 

district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Robert 

Penton on plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with 

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Appellate Case: 89-4137 Document: 010110128874 Date Filed: 07/15/1991 Page: 8 
prospective economic relations is REVERSED and REMANDED. The 

district court's grant of summary judgment on all other tortious 

interference with contract claims is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

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