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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2005 Decided October 18, 2005

No. 04-5281

PATSY F. BENNETT,

APPELLANT

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND

DONALD H. RUMSFELD,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv02176)

Robert C. Seldon argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. Molly E. Buie entered an appearance.

Deborah Goldstock Ringel argued the cause for amici

curiae National Organization of Black Law Enforcement

Executives, et al. in support of appellant. With her on the brief

were Kenneth L. Adams and Bradley D. Wine.

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Peter D. Blumberg, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520, 524

(D.C. Cir. 1999), the court held that an adverse employment

action based on the denial or revocation of a security clearance

is not actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. This followed, the court concluded, from

Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), in which the

Supreme Court held that the Merit Systems Protection Board

lacked authority to review the substance of a decision to deny or

revoke a security clearance in the course of reviewing an

adverse employment action, because that “sensitive and

inherently discretionary judgment call . . . is committed by law

to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.” Id. at 527.

Appellant Patsy Bennett contends that the termination of her

employment was predicated on a determination of her

unsuitability for the position rather than a revocation of her

security clearance. Hence, she maintains that the district court

erred in dismissing her complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-16, for lack of jurisdiction. In her view, the court retains

jurisdiction to determine whether her employment was actually

terminated because of national security concerns even if the

court cannot review the underlying merits of that determination.

Bennett thus implicitly rejects the notion that the official reason

given by the agency for her termination encompassed national

security concerns. Because the implicit premise of her

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1 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), requires

prosecutors to disclose evidence affecting the credibility of a witness

when that witness’s reliability is likely to determine guilt or

innocence. As interpreted by DoD in the instant case, this exception

would allow DoD to disclose evidence of Bennett’s untrustworthiness

to a new employer that might have to rely on her as a witness.

contention is flawed and because the agency interposed the

defense of her inability to sustain a security clearance in

response to her allegations of discrimination and retaliation, the

trier of fact would be required to consider the merits of that

defense. Accordingly, in light of the substantial evidence in the

record that the agency’s action was premised on Bennett’s

inability to maintain a security clearance, we hold that Ryan is

dispositive and affirm the dismissal of the complaint. 

I.

Patsy Bennett was a criminal investigator employed by the

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense

(“DoD”). In August 2000, Bennett asked an investigative

assistant to search public records for the address of an individual

in a personal matter. The investigative assistant referred the

request to another researcher, who searched records limited to

official government investigations. In February 2001, DoD

proposed to terminate Bennett’s employment on the ground that

she had improperly asked the investigative assistant to search

records limited to official government investigations for a nonofficial purpose. Bennett challenged the proposal by filing an

administrative complaint of discrimination within DoD. In May

2001, Bennett and DoD entered into a Mediation Agreement in

which Bennett agreed to withdraw the complaint and resign

from DoD in a “clean paper” resignation, while DoD agreed to

expunge its proposal and decision to remove Bennett and to

refrain from disclosing them, except upon inquiry about Giglio1

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issues by a prospective federal law enforcement employer.

Bennett retained her security clearance after her resignation.

Bennett thereafter applied for a job as a criminal

investigator with the Transportation Security Administration

(“TSA”). During a job interview in April 2002, Bennett

disclosed the incident that led DoD to take action against her

and cited this incident as the reason she resigned from DoD.

However, in her signed and certified Declaration for Federal

Employment, she represented that she had not, during the last

five years, “quit [a job] after being told that [she] would be

fired” or “[left] any job by mutual agreement because of specific

problems.” After hiring Bennett subject to completion of a

suitability determination, TSA solicited information from DoD

about her employment there as part of a background check for

a security clearance. In response, DoD indicated that Bennett

had Top Secret security clearance and provided TSA with a

copy of its proposal and decision to remove Bennett. In August

2002, TSA terminated Bennett’s employment as a criminal

investigator for falsifying her Declaration for Federal

Employment, stating in a letter that the termination was “based

on [her] unsuitability for [her] position.” The letter stated that

she did not have appeal or grievance rights, but if she believed

her discharge resulted from discrimination or harassment, she

could file a report with the Office of Civil Rights. In its official

Notification of Personnel Action (“SF-50"), TSA cited a

“negative suitability determination” as the reason for

termination.

After exhausting her administrative remedies, Bennett filed

suit against TSA and DoD under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16. The complaint alleged that TSA’s stated reason for

terminating her was a pretext and that the real reasons were

discrimination and retaliation against her for filing an

administrative complaint against DoD. It also alleged that

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DoD’s disclosures to TSA were retaliatory and in breach of the

Mediation Agreement. TSA filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that its

termination of Bennett was based on her ineligibility for a

security clearance and thus was not subject to judicial review

under Title VII. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of

David Holmes, a TSA administrator who had interviewed

Bennett, stating that Bennett’s termination “was based solely on

the fact she could not sustain a security clearance.” The district

court, citing Ryan, 168 F.3d at 523-24, granted the motion upon

concluding that TSA’s decision to terminate Bennett was based

in part on denial of a security clearance. See Bennett v. Ridge,

321 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2004). 

II.

TSA requires its criminal investigators to obtain a Top

Secret security clearance. Because the authority to issue a

security clearance is a discretionary function of the Executive

Branch and involves the complex area of foreign relations and

national security, employment actions based on denial of

security clearance are not subject to judicial review, including

under Title VII. See Ryan, 168 F.3d at 523; see also Egan, 484

U.S. at 527-31. Bennett does not dispute this legal principle, but

rather contends that the district court erred in dismissing her

complaint because the stated ground for her termination was a

negative suitability determination, not a denial of a security

clearance. Both parties agree that TSA’s proffered reason for

terminating Bennett was her falsification of her Declaration of

Federal Employment. Their principal dispute is over whether

this alleged falsification formed the basis of a negative

suitability determination or a denial of security clearance.

Bennett emphasizes that determinations of eligibility for

security clearance are distinct from determinations of suitability

for federal employment. UnderExecutive Order 12,968, section

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2.1(a), 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,248 (Aug. 7, 1995),

“[d]eterminations of eligibility for access to classified

information . . . are separate from suitability determinations with

respect to the hiring or retention of persons for employment by

the government or any other personnel actions.” This distinction

is also made in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 5 C.F.R.

§ 731.101(a) (2005). As Bennett points out, the two

determinations are subject to different processes of review:

whereas suitability determinations are subject to appeals to the

Merit Systems Protection Board and subsequent judicial review,

see 5 C.F.R. § 731.501(a), security clearance denials are subject

to appeal within the agency, see Exec. Order No. 12,968, §

5.2(a), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,252. Indeed, “[a] suitability

determination shall not be used for the purpose of denying an

applicant or employee the review proceedings of [section 5.2]

where there has been a denial or revocation of eligibility for

access to classified information.” Id. § 5.2(f)(3), 60 Fed. Reg.

at 40,253. 

Nonetheless, the distinction between determinations of

eligibility for security clearances and determinations of

suitability offers no support for Bennett’s contention that the

district court erred in dismissing her complaint. First, while

Bennett maintains that her prior security clearance from DoD

must be “mutually and reciprocally accepted” by TSA, this

requirement, as TSA points out, does not apply if “an agency

has substantial information indicating that an employee may not

satisfy the standards” for a security clearance, including

“trustworthiness, honesty, [and] reliability.” Id. § 2.4(a), 60

Fed. Reg. at 40,249; id. § 3.1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,250. TSA

maintains that, based on the information provided by DoD and

Bennett’s Declaration of Federal Employment, it concluded that

Bennett could not meet its standards for a security clearance.

Thus, the fact that Bennett retained her DoD security clearance

does not refute the contention that she could not sustain a

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security clearance from TSA because of the information that

TSA obtained about her dishonesty after she resigned from

DoD. 

Second, Bennett’s contention that suitability and national

security considerations are mutually exclusive is refuted by

authority she cites. She contends that she was terminated based

on a negative suitability determination, maintaining that a

“[m]aterial, intentional false statement or deception or fraud in

examination or appointment” is a basis for determining that an

individual is unsuitable for federal employment, citing 5 C.F.R.

§ 731.202(b)(3). Such misrepresentation, however, is also a

basis for denying security clearance. Executive Order 12,968,

section 3.1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,250, states that “eligibility for

access to classified information shall be granted only to

employees . . . whose personal and professional history

affirmatively indicates loyalty to the United States, strength of

character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and

sound judgment . . . .” Thus, as TSA points out, Bennett was

unsuitable for a criminal investigator position for the same

reasons she was ineligible for a TSA security clearance. In other

words, Bennett’s alleged dishonesty could render her both

unsuitable for federal employment and ineligible for a security

clearance, even if the two determinations are distinct. In any

event, lack of “suitability” in ordinary language can encompass

lack of suitability because of ineligibility for a security

clearance, which is an additional reason for rejecting the strong

inference that Bennett would draw from the termination letter

and the SF-50. Hence, the fact that the termination letter and the

SF-50 stated unsuitability as the reason for Bennett’s

termination is not inconsistent with termination on the basis that

Bennett could not sustain a security clearance. 

Third, whether TSA followed the proper procedures to deny

or revoke Bennett’s security clearance is separate from the

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question of the effect of TSA’s invocation of a security defense

to her Title VII complaint. Bennett contends that the

termination letter and the SF-50 are the only formal documents

in the record with legal force that can serve as evidence of the

basis of her termination, and that TSA did not formally deny or

revoke her security clearance pursuant to the procedures in

Executive Order 12,968. By contrast, the cases cited by TSA

involved formal revocations or denials of security clearance,

such that there was no dispute over the basis of the employment

action. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 521-22; Ryan, 168 F.3d at 522;

Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1996); Perez v.

FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 514 (5th Cir. 1995); Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the

Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other hand, the

two cases Bennett cites -- Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1,

3-4 (D.D.C. 2004), and Delgado v. Ashcroft, Civ. A. No. 99-

2311, 2003 WL 24051558, at *1-3 & n.3 (D.D.C. May 29,

2003), involving the national security exemption in 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(g) -- are distinguishable, assuming that they are correct

applications of law, because in one there was no record

evidence of national security being considered prior to litigation,

see Jones, 321 F. Supp.2d at 8, and in the other there was

evidence specifically suggesting that national security was not

an issue, see Delgado, 2003 WL 24051558, at *6. 

There was sufficient evidence in the record of the basis for

TSA’s action even though it was not announced to Bennett at the

time of the termination of her employment. First, TSA’s letter

to DoD sought information that was relevant to determining

whether Bennett could sustain a security clearance while

employed as a criminal investigator in TSA. As a result of

DoD’s response, TSA learned that Bennett had not been truthful

in her employment application. Second, as the district court

noted, David Holmes’ sworn statement to an EEO investigator

was that Bennett’s termination was “due to her inability to

‘sustain a security clearance.’” Bennett, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 57.

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The district court recognized, however, that the affidavit is

questionable because “it was first offered during the course of

an EEO investigation and thus in anticipation of litigation.” Id.

An affidavit sworn years after taking a certain action is evidence

of why the action was initially taken. The trier of fact may

credit or reject that explanation. If other evidence supports the

affidavit, it becomes more credible. 

While Bennett claims that TSA’s security clearance

explanation is pretextual, under Ryan, 168 F.3d at 522, a court

cannot adjudicate the credibility of that claim. To do so would

require the trier of fact to evaluate the validity of the agency’s

security determination. Bennett could not challenge the

authenticity of TSA’s proffered reason — her inability to

maintain a security clearance — without also challenging the

validity of the reason, which is what Ryan prohibits. The

impossibility of proving pretext under Title VII without testing

the merits of the Executive’s decision was emphasized by the

court in joining three other circuits in Ryan, 168 F.3d at 523-24,

a case largely ignored in Bennett’s briefs on appeal. The

countervailing concern, expressed by the amici curiae, that

judicial acceptance of such explanations will allow agencies to

“immunize” themselves from Title VII actions simply by

“raising the ‘national security’ flag” at the time of litigation,

Amicus Br. at 4, ignores that “suitability”can encompass

national security and that where there is substantial evidence

that the latter was a contemporaneous reason for the agency’s

action, the interests have been resolved by this court’s precedent

in favor of executive discretion. 

Contrary to the suggestions of Bennett and amici curiae, the

Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct.

2633 (2004), does not unsettle that precedent. The Court in

Hamdi held that the government’s invocation of national

security authority – an assertion that Hamdi was an “enemy

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combatant” – could not preclude judicial review of the

lawfulness of his detention. Id. at 2650-51. Hamdi is inapposite

for two reasons. First, the Court emphasized that physical

liberty is a fundamental right that must be accorded great

weight. See id. at 2646-47. It is far from clear that the Court

would strike the same balance in the context of employment

termination. Second, Executive Order 12,968 provides

procedural protections to individuals determined ineligible for

security clearance. See Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 5.2(a), 60

Fed. Reg. at 40,252. While Bennett now challenges TSA’s

failure to follow those procedures, although access to

administrative review is not the relief sought in her complaint,

counsel for TSA appropriately acknowledged during oral

argument that equitable tolling may apply to the statute of

limitations for administratively challenging the denial of her

security clearance because TSA’s termination letter identified

Bennett’s only possible appeal as a report to the Office of Civil

Rights and did not state that she could appeal the decision

internally under 49 C.F.R. § 8.25. Cf. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).

Accordingly, in light of Ryan, we affirm the dismissal of the

complaint.

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