Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02027/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02027-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYLEN ETHAN TASKER,

Booking #13704798,

Civil No. 13cv2027 GPC (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF Doc. No. 2]

(2) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS

GORE AND SAN DIEGO

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b)

AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S.

MARSHAL TO EFFECT

SERVICE OF COMPLAINT

UPON REMAINING

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT 

TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) 

& 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

WILLIAM GORE, Sheriff;

DEPUTY GONZALEZ, #7265;

DEPUTY McKELLEY, #7179;

DEPUTY LEAVITT, #2720; and 

SAN DIEGO SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

Raylen Ethan Tasker (“Plaintiff”), who is currently detained at George Bailey

Detention Facility (GBDF) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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Plaintiff claims several San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Deputies failed

to protect him from harm at the hands of fellow inmates in June 2012 at GBDF and left

him “bleeding and seriously injured with head trauma” for 45 minutes after he was

attacked a second time. See Compl. [ECF Doc. No. 1] at 3-4. Plaintiff demands a jury

trial and seeks both general and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee; instead he has filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF Doc. No. 2]. 

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a

prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the

average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average

monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 1

2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial

Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. May 1, 2013). However,

the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. 

Id.

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prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed

at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account

exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s statement shows an average monthly balance of

$.17, an average monthly deposit of $25.00, and an available balance in his account of

$1.03 at the time it was submitted to the Court for filing. Based on this financial

information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF Doc. No. 2]

and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $5.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the Watch Commander of GBDF, or his designee, shall collect this

initial fee only if sufficient funds in Plaintiff’s account are available at the time this

Order is executed pursuant to the directions set forth below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action

or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal

of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total

owed in this case shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to

the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

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criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim, or which seek damagesfromdefendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000);see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while

a plaintiff’s allegations are taken astrue, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where

the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir.

1985)), it may not, in so doing, “supply essential elements of claims that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9thCir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations” are simply not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federalrights elsewhere

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conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

B. Improper Defendant

As an initial matter, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff includes the “San

Diego Sheriff’s Department” as a Defendant in the caption of his Complaint, his claims

must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)

for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. A local law

enforcement department (like the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department) is not a 

proper defendant under § 1983. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993,

996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an

appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation

omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section

1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights

‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’”).

C. Respondeat Superior 

In addition, Plaintiff names San Diego County Sheriff William Gore as a

Defendant, but he fails to set forth any specific factual allegations with regard to

Defendant Gore in the body of his Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to

hold Sheriff Gore liable merely in his supervisory capacity over the individual Sheriff’s

Department Deputies who he claims failed to protect him from harm and failed to

provide him with medial attention after he was attacked. 

However, there is no respondeatsuperior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer

v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 676 (2009) (“[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits.”). Instead, a

plaintiff “must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own

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individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id.; see also Jones v. Community

Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even

pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least me degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). “The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,

370-71 (1976)); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly

unconstitutional violations of a subordinate if Plaintiffsetsforth allegations which show:

(1) how or to what extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s

actions, and (2) in either acting or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause

of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978); Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08. As currently pleaded, however,

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to include any “factual content that [would] allow[] the court

to draw [a] reasonable inference” in support of an individualized constitutional claim

against the Sheriff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. a 678. For this reason, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails

to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted asto Defendant Gore. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), § 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at

1004.

D. Remaining Claims

Finally, the Court does find that Plaintiff’s remaining failure to protect and

inadequate medical treatment claims are sufficiently pleaded to survive the sua sponte 2

Plaintiffinvokes the EighthAmendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments 2

as the basis of his claims, see Compl. at 3, 4, but it is not clear whether he was a convicted

prisoner or a pre-trial detainee at the time of his injury at GBDF. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 327 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment ... is specifically concerned with the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions.”). However, pretrial detainees may raise

conditions of confinement claims similar to those made by convicted persons under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979);

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440, n.7 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit

has held that the standard for analyzing the rights of pretrial detainees under the Due Process

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screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Therefore, the Court will

direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of the summons and Plaintiff’s Complaint upon

San Diego Sheriff Deputies Gonzalez, McKelley, and Leavitt on Plaintiff’s behalf. See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue

and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3)

(“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy

marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915.”). 

3

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF

Doc. No. 2] is GRANTED.

2. The Watch Commander of GBDF, or his designee, shall collect from

Plaintiff’s inmate trust account the initial filing fee assessed in this Order, and shall

forward the remainder of the $350 filing fee owed by collecting monthly payments from

Plaintiff’s account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s

income and shall forward paymentsto the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the

account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED

TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Rd., Suite 5300, San Diego,

California, 92158-0002.

Clause is comparable to that under the Eighth Amendment. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure 3

is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant]

may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Defendants William Gore and the San Diego Sheriff’s Department are

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

5. The Clerk shall issue a summons asto Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF Doc. No.

1] upon remaining Defendants San Diego Sheriff’s Deputy Gonzalez #7265, Deputy

McKelley # 7179, and Deputy Leavitt #2720, and shall and forward it to Plaintiff along

with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each of them. In addition, the Clerk shall

provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order and a certified copy of his Complaint

and the summons so that he may serve each of these Defendants. Upon receipt of this

“IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and

accurately as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the

instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. 

Thereafter, the U.S. Marshal shall timely serve a copy of the Complaint and summons

upon each Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of

service shall be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P.

4(c)(3).

6. The served Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b),

and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone

that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is

required to respond). 

7. Plaintiffshall serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered

by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other

document submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the

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original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in

which a true and correct copy of any document wasserved on Defendants, or counsel for

Defendants, and the date ofservice. Any paper received by the Court which has not been

filed with the Clerk or which failsto include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

DATED: January 17, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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