Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02159/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02159-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Ramon Lopez,

Petitioner

-vsState of Arizona, et al.,

Respondents

CV-10-2159-PHX-JAT (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at San Luis,

Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

on November 22, 2010 (Doc. 8). On February 7, 2011, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc.

13). Petitioner has not replied.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was driving a stolen vehicle, ran from officers, ran over an officer

approaching the vehicle after it collided with a pole, drove away, dove from the moving

vehicle allowing it to crash into an apartment complex, entered an apartment and demanded

to be hidden. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted on counts of aggravated

assault, theft of a means of transportation, unlawful flight, and burglary. (Exhibit A, Mem.

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Dec. 11/6/07 at 1-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13, are referenced herein as “Exhibit

___”.) On August 4, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to a combined prison term of 31.25

years. (Id. at 4.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal arguing: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by

imposing sentences without adequate investigation; and (2) the sentencing minute entry

conflicted with the oral pronouncement of sentence as to whether the offenses were

“repetitive.” (Exhibit H, Opening Brief.) 

On November 6, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum

Decision (Exhibit A), affirming the conviction and correcting the sentencing minute entry

to reflect that the counts were non-dangerous repetitive offenses.

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied

on May 12, 2008. (Exhibit B, Order 5/12/08.) 

Petitioner asserts that he “filed” a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but it was “lost in

prison transits”. (Amend. Pet., Doc. 8 at 3.) No record of such Petition being filed has been

proffered. The undersigned finds that none was filed.

C. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On June 11, 2008, Petitioner commenced a post conviction relief proceeding by filing

his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit C). That Notice did not specify any grounds

for relief. Counsel was appointed, and eventually filed a Memorandum in Support of Petition

arguing that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. (Exhibit G).

On October 28, 2009, the PCR court denied the petition on its merits. (Exhibit D, M.E.

filed 10/28/09.) 

Petitioner then sought and obtained from the PCR court an extension until February

23, 2010 to file a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Exhibit I, M.E. 2/16/10.)

On March 26, 2010, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review (Exhibit E). That Petition

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did not set out any specific claims for review.

On April 1, 2010, Petitioner sought and obtained from the PCR court a second

extension until April 30, 2010. (Exhibit J, M.E. 4/1/10.) 

On April 7, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Review as

untimely, noting Petitioner’s ability to seek leave from the PCR court to make a late filing,

but making no mention of the second extension granted by the PCR court on April 1, 2010.

(Exhibit F.) 

Petitioner did not further seek such leave, nor file a subsequent petition for review.

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Six months later, Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his

original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 7, 2010

(Doc. 1). That Petition was dismissed with leave to amend, based upon Petition’s failure to

name his custodian as a respondent. (Order 11/4/10, Doc. 6.) 

On November 22, 2010, Petition filed his Amended Petition (Doc. 8), asserting the

following four grounds for relief:

In Ground One, he alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of

counsel at sentencing in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In

Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights were violated by the court’s refusal to grant him an

extension of time to present mitigating evidence. In Ground Three, he

alleges that he received an excessive sentence. In Ground Four, he

alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adequately

investigate facts relevant to his sentence.

(Order 1/3/11, Doc. 9 at 1-2.) Petitioner makes no argument in his Petition to excuse any

untimeliness. (Doc. 8 at 11.) 

Response - On February 7, 2011, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 13).

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s petition is untimely and barred by the statue of limitation

on state prisoner habeas petitions, and that his state remedies on his federal claims were

unexhausted and are now procedurally defaulted.

Reply - Petitioner has not replied.

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1

 While the finality of the conviction is the normal commencement date for the

habeas limitations period, the statute does provide various exceptions, including newly

recognized claims made retroactively applicable, and newly discovered factual predicates.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner does not assert any of these apply. It does not appear

to the undersigned that these have any application.

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a

1-year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and must be

dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on "the

date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1

 

It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244, "direct

review" includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari

from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a

petition. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir.1999). Rule 13, Rules of the

Supreme Court of the United States provides “90 days after entry of the order denying

discretionary review” for a petition for writ of certiorari to be filed.

Petitioner’s direct review proceeded through the Arizona Supreme Court’s order

denying discretionary review on May 12, 2008. Thus, Petitioner had until August 11, 2008

to file a petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner did not do so.

Petitioner asserts that he did file such a petition but complains that his petition was

“lost in prison transits.” (Amend. Pet. Doc, 8 at 3.) With no record to support this claim, the

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undersigned cannot find that such a petition was filed. 

Perhaps Petitioner intends to argue that it was lost before filing. Under the prison

mailbox rule, filings are deemed “filed” at the time they are delivered to prison officials for

mailing. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, however,

Petitioner makes no explicit allegation or showing that he delivered a petition to prison

officials for mailing to the courts. His terse allegations could just as likely mean that he lost

his draft while he was in transit within the prison.

Moreover, Petitioner cannot now, years later, rely upon the prison mailbox rule. In

Huizar v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the prison mailbox rule “applies even

where a prisoner’s petition is never filed by the court.” 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).

Whether or not the petition is actually placed in the mail, delivered to

the court or filed once it arrives there, are all matters beyond the

prisoner's control. A prisoner who delivers a document to prison

authorities gets the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, so long as he

diligently follows up once he has failed to receive a disposition from

the court after a reasonable period of time.

Id. Here, Petitioner makes no allegations that he diligently followed up once he failed to

receive a disposition with a reasonable time. Indeed, there is no indication that Petitioner

ever attempted to followup on his petition for writ of certiorari.

Accordingly, the undersigned concluded that no petition for writ of certiorari was filed

(either actually or by operation of the prison mailbox rule) and Petitioner’s conviction

became final after August 11, 2008, when his time to file such a petition expired.

Thus, barring any tolling, Petitioner’s one year began to run from August 12, 2008 and

would have expired on August 11, 2009, over a year prior to commencing this habeas

proceeding.

4. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

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2

 Although the Minute Entry is dated October 27, 2009, there is no indication this was

a pronouncement in open court, and it was not filed until October 28, 2009. Because it does

not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes the filing date should apply in such a

circumstance.

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Petitioner commenced his PCR proceeding by filing his PCR Notice on June 11, 2008

(Exhibit C). Petitioner’s one year had then not yet begun to run. That proceeding remained

pending at least until the petition was denied by the PCR Court on October 28, 2009.2

(Exhibit D, M.E. 10/28/09.) 

For purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), an application for state collateral review is

"pending" during "the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice

of appeal to a higher state court." Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002). However,

that only applies if the appeal is “properly filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

Here, the only such petition filed by Petitioner was dismissed as untimely. (Exhibit

F, Order 4/7/10.) When “the state court reject[s]” a petition for post-conviction relief “as

untimely, it [is] not ‘properly filed’ ” and does not toll the limitations period. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). 

In some circuits, it is clear that would not have such dire circumstances. Petitioner

had been given (by the PCR court’s second extension) until April 30, 2010 to file a petition

for review. Although this extension was granted prior to the Arizona Court of Appeals

rejection of his earlier petition for review as untimely, it was not considered by the Arizona

Court of Appeals, nor vacated. Indeed, the Arizona Court of Appeals suggested Petitioner

seek leave to file a late appeal. 

In every circuit known to have addressed the matter, his PCR proceeding would have

been pending until his time to file for review expired on April 30, 2010, regardless of the fact

that he did not again seek review. See Williams v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2002)

(“the application is ‘pending’ (and thus the limitations period is tolled) during the appeal

period, even if the petitioner does not appeal”); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th

Cir. 2000) (“regardless of whether a petitioner actually appeals a denial of a post-conviction

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application, the limitations period is tolled during the period in which the petitioner could

have sought an appeal under state law”); Cramer v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 461 F.3d

1380, 1383 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“the claim is pending regardless of whether the

inmate actually files the notice of appeal”);Williams v. Cain, 217 F.3d 303, 309–10 (5th Cir.

2000); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420–24 (3d Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557,

561 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 563 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001)

(declining to decide the issue).

One commentator has suggested that the Ninth Circuit has properly concluded that

this grant of tolling until the time to appeal expires is “inconsistent with the Supreme Court's

decisions [indicating] that if a state petition is untimely, none of the time before (or during)

the court's consideration of the petition is statutorily tolled.” See Means, Fed. Hab. Man.

§9A:57 (2010). 

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has read the Supreme Court’s decision in Pace to mean that

“if a state court denies a petition as untimely, none of the time before or during the court's

consideration of that petition is statutorily tolled.” Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th

Cir. 2005), amended on other grounds by 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2006). However, nothing

in Pace holds that the time between a state application and the expiration of the time to

appeal therefrom is excluded from statutory tolling. Factually, Pace dealt with a gap

between successive post-conviction petitions, and focused on whether the second petition

was “properly filed,” not how long it was pending. 544 U.S. at 411. Similarly, Bonner dealt

with whether a state habeas petition filed in the California trial court was untimely, and thus

none of the time from its pendency (including several levels of appeal) were tolled. Bonner

itself did not address the effect of time available for appeal after a timely but unsuccessful

petition.

The undersigned would be tempted to conclude that the comment in Bonner was dicta,

and proceed with the explicit analysis of the other circuits.

However, in Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2007), the court quoted the

aforementioned portion of Bonner and specifically held that its petitioner was not entitled to

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3

 California does not a utilize a system of petitions and petitions for review for its post

conviction relief processes. Nor does it utilize definite filing deadlines. Instead, “[i]n

California, a state prisoner may seek review of an adverse lower court decision by filing an

original petition (rather than a notice of appeal) in the higher court, and that petition is timely

if filed within a ‘reasonable time.’” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006).

4

 The Ninth Circuit opined that the ruling probably referred to the 13 month delay,

but concluded that they “need not be concerned by any ambiguity in the California Supreme

Court's order” because even if the reference was to the 21 day delay in petitioning the high

court, the result was the same. 479 F.3d at 646.

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any time after the denial of his intermediate appeal, merely because the California Supreme

Court had deemed his final appeal to be untimely.3

 

In Thorson, the petitioner sought statutory tolling for the pendency of a series of

California state habeas petitions filed successively in the trial court, California Court of

Appeal and California Supreme Court. The petitioner had delayed 114 days in filing with

the trial court after conclusion of direct review. He delayed more than 13 months after the

trial court denied his habeas petition before filing with the California Court of Appeal, who

denied review without comment. He then petitioned the California Supreme Court 21 days

later who summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. 

The Thorson court was uncertain whether the California Supreme Court’s ruling was

that the petition to the Court of Appeal was untimely (as a result of the 13 month delay) or

the petition to it was untimely (as a result of the 21 day delay).4

 The Court considered both

options, and held:

even if the California Supreme Court ruling of untimeliness applied

only to the 21-day delay in filing the petition in the Supreme Court

itself, then Thorson's petition was not “properly filed” in the California

Supreme Court. As a result, the AEDPA clock would have begun to run

again on the date the California Court of Appeal denied Thorson's

second petition and would not have stopped until he filed his federal

habeas petition.

Thorson, 479 F.3d at 646. 

Not only is the undersigned troubled by what appears to be a misinterpretation of Pace

emanating from the dicta of Bonner, and infecting the reasoning of Thorson, but by the

distinction in processes between a state like Arizona, with clearly defined appeal deadlines,

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5

 Without that reading of Thorson, the undersigned would conclude that Petitioner

was entitled to tolling until his time to seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals expired.

Under the PCR court’s second grant of extension, that time did not expire until April 30,

2010. In light of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ explicit recognition of the PCR Court’s

authority to extend the time, the undersigned does not find it relevant that the first petition

for review had been rejected as untimely, any more than a denial of a premature petition for

review would be deemed to foreclose a subsequent, timely petition.

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and the California procedures at issue in Bonner and Thorson, which simply required

“appeals” within a reasonable time. The language of Thorson, however, admits of no

distinction based upon the nature of a state’s filing deadlines. 

In sum, the undersigned concludes that under Thorson, where a state court rejects an

appeal on collateral review as untimely, there is no tolling available after the prior order

denying relief, not even for the time during which a petitioner had the right to seek further

review. 

Accordingly, the undersigned must also conclude that the denial of Petitioner’s

petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals as untimely denied Petitioner any

equitable tolling after the PCR court’s order on October 27, 2009 denying his original

petition for post-conviction relief.5

Thus, Petitioner’s one year was statutorily tolled from June 11, 2008 through October

27, 2009. Thus, Petitioner’s one year limitations period would have been tolled from the

time of its inception, on August 12, 2008, until October 27, 2009. It began running

thereafter, and would have expired on October 27, 2010.

Effect of Amended Petition - Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Amended Petition,

which was not filed until November 22, 2010, was thus untimely. However, Petitioner’s

original petition was filed on October 7, 2010, well before the statute expired. Respondents

make no mention of this fact.

Applications for habeas corpus "may be amended or supplemented as provided in the

rules of procedure applicable to civil actions." 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Further, Rule 15(c),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment of a

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pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

* * * 

(B) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set

out - - or attempted to be set out - - in the original

pleading; or

(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the

party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule

15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided

by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint,

the party to be brought in by amendment:

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not

be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would

have been brought against it, but for a mistake

concerning the proper party's identity.

Here, the claims in Petitioner’s original and amended Petition are essentially identical.

The former was dismissed because “Petitioner failed to name the state officer having custody

of him as a Respondent.” (Order 11/4/10, Doc. 6.) Thus, the only difference between the

two petitions was the shift from naming the “State of Arizona” and the “Attorney General

of the State of Arizona” (Doc. 1 at 1) to naming “Charles Ryan” and the “Attorney General

of the State of Arizona, Terry Goddard” (Doc. 8 at 1). 

Thus, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) governs the amendment. That rule requires two things for

relation back of an amendment changing a party: (1) assertion of the same claim; and (2)

notice and actual or imputed knowledge of the mistake to the real party within the Rule 4(m)

time for service of the original pleading. 

As noted above, the amended complaint asserts the same claim. In Mayle v. Felix, the

Supreme Court clarified that the relevant “occurrence” for purposes of Rule 15(c) is not the

trial or conviction, but the specific claims being asserted. “So long as the original and

amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back

will be in order.” 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005). Here more than “common core “ of facts were

asserted - - the claims were identical.

 Further, Respondent Ryan was served with the corrected, amended Petition by

certified mail, delivered January 4, 2011. (Doc. 10.) That was within the requirement of

Rule 4(m) that service be completed within 120 days of filing. That deadline would not have

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6

 Because the undersigned concludes that the Amended Petition was timely, the

undersigned does not address whether Petitioner would be entitled to equitable tolling as a

result of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ failure to take into account the PCR court’s second

grant of an extension of time to seek review.

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expired until February 4, 2011. By service of the Amended Petition, Respondent had notice

sufficient to avoid any prejudice, and actual knowledge that he was the party to the action.

See Morel v. Daimler-Chrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (notice by letter with copy

of amended pleading sufficient).

Therefore, the Amended Petition (Doc. 8) related back in time to the filing of the

original Petition (Doc. 1) on October 7, 2010. That was well before the October 27, 2010

expiration of the statute of limitations.

7. Summary

Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 12, 2008, upon expiration of his time

to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Petitioner’s one year was

tolled from its inception until the dismissal of his PCR petition on October 27, 2009. The

one year expired on October 27, 2010. Petitioner’s Amended Petition, related back in time

to the filing of his original Petition on October 7, 2010. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Amended

Petition was timely.6

B. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his state remedies on the

claims presented in his habeas petition. Respondents argue that these claims are now

procedurally defaulted, and thus must be dismissed with prejudice.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

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(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). 

b. Proper Forum

 Ordinarily, a petitioner has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement unless he has

fairly presented his claim to the highest state court. Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38

(9th Cir. 1994). In Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth

Circuit held that under Arizona law, absent a death penalty or life sentence, Arizona state

prisoners have exhausted claims presented in habeas petitions if they have been ruled upon

by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Respondents argue that presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court (not just the

Arizona Court of Appeals) is required for exhaustion, citing Baldwin v. Reese, 554 U.S. 27

(1999). (Answer, Doc. 13 at 4-5.) The Ninth Circuit's subsequent reliance on Swoopes in

Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004), notwithstanding Baldwin, dispels

this argument. Moreover, nothing in Baldwin precludes the reasoning in Swoopes. Nor does

the language cited by Respondents from State v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 117, 770 P.2d 1159,

1163 (1989), which predated the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in State v. Sandon, 161

Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (Ariz.1989), on which Swoopes is based.

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c. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,”

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d

750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal

claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was made.”

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

On the other hand, both the federal and state courts are tasked with enforcement of the

federal constitution. See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus,

"a citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as

a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue.” Id.

d. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

(1) Ground One - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - In his Ground One, Petitioner

argues that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing because counsel

failed to present expert testimony and failed to obtain an extension of time to do so.

Petitioner claims that the issue was raised on direct appeal and in his PCR proceeding. 

(Amend. Petition, Doc. 8 at 6.) 

No such claim was raised on direct appeal. Petitioner did assert that the trial court’s

failure to permit an opportunity for the expert’s opinion was an abuse of discretion. (Exhibit

H, Opening Brief at 19-29.) However, Petitioner did not assert that counsel was ineffective.

While ineffective assistance and an underlying constitutional claim are “admittedly related,

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they are distinct claims with separate elements of proof, and each claim should have been

separately and specifically presented to the state courts." Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108,

1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 5th Amendment claim not exhausted by presentation of related

ineffective assistance claim). A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court

if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which

the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003).

It is possible that Petitioner raised his federal claim for the first time in his Petition for

Review to the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents have not provided that Petition, despite

the mandate of Rule 5(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 proceedings. Nonetheless,

presentation of a claim for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court is not fair

presentation. In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to

properly exhaust a claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct review."

Id. at 916.

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas

corpus states, "Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire

direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire

judicial postconviction process available in the state." 

Id. (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (4th

ed. 1998) (emphasis added)). Thus any of Petitioner’s otherwise unexhausted claims

presented for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court, would be unexhausted.

Petitioner did argue in his PCR proceeding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to be prepared to present or obtaining continuances necessary to present expert testimony at

sentencing. (Exhibit G, PCR Mem. at 7-8.) However, no such claim (nor any other) was

raised in Petitioner’s foray to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his PCR proceedings. (Exhibit

E, Not. Pet. Rev.) Presentation to the PCR court is not sufficient. 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

remedies on claims in his Ground One. 

(2) Ground Two - Due Process - In his Ground Two, Petitioner mounts a Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process challenge based upon the trial court’s refusal to grant him an

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 As discussed hereinafter, however, Eastlack, Ake, and Smith all dealt with capital

cases. Here, Petitioner was not sentenced to death, nor even charged with a capital crime.

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extension of time to present his expert’s testimony. Petitioner again argues this claim was

presented on direct appeal and in his PCR proceedings. (Amend. Pet. Doc. 8 at 7.) 

While Petitioner raised the factual issues in his direct appeal, he made no explicit

assertion of a violation of due process. He did, however, assert that he had the

“constitutional and statutory right to the assistance of proper psychological testing and expert

assistance.” (Exhibit H, Open. Brief at 27.) Petitioner made this argument by quoting State

v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 883 P.2d 999 (1994).

“...Despite what may have been dilatory behavior on the part of defense

counsel, we hold that, under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this

case, it was improper to proceed to sentencing without providing

defendant the opportunity of expert assistance. Cf. State v. Knapp, 114

Ariz. 531, 540-41, 562 P.2d 704, 713-14 (1977). Having thoroughly

reviewed the record, we find that defendant had the constitutional and

statutory right to the assistance of proper psychological testing and

expert assistance.”

(Exhibit H, Open. Brief at 27 (quoting Eastlack, 180 Ariz. at 263, 883 P.2d at 1019).) 

Eastlack’s finding of such a constitutional right was founded upon Ake v. Oklahoma,

470 U.S. 68 (1985). Ake found a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to the assistance

of psychiatric experts in capital cases. “Under Ake [ ], when an indigent defendant places his

mental state at issue, ‘the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a

competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,

preparation, and presentation of the defense.’ This right applies not only at trial, but also in

“the sentencing phase.’ ” Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990).7

 

"[A] citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same

purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319

F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, despite Petitioner’s failure to cite to the Fourteenth

Amendment or to explicitly identify his claims as founded upon federal constitutional law,

by relying on Eastlack, Petitioner fairly presented his federal due process claim in Ground

Two.

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(3) Ground Three - Excessive Sentence - In his Ground Three, Petitioner argues he

received an “excessive sentence” because of the reliance upon prior convictions as

aggravating circumstances which were not properly established. Petitioner again argues he

raised this claim on direct appeal and in his PCR Petition. (Amend. Pet. Doc. 8 at 8.) 

It is unclear to the undersigned the exact nature of Petitioner’s constitutional claim.

It is clear, however, that Petitioner did not exhaust his state remedies on any related federal

claim.

Petitioner did assert on direct appeal that there was a discrepancy between the written

minute entry and the oral pronouncement of sentence, with the written minute entry finding

the convictions to be for non-repetitive offenses, and the oral pronouncement sentencing

Petitioner to terms applicable for repetitive offenses. (Exhibit H, Open. Brief at 30-47;

Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 15.) However, Petitioner did not assert any federal law in

connection with that claim. 

Petitioner raised no factually related claim to the PCR Court or the Arizona Court of

Appeals in his PCR proceeding. (See Exhibit G, PCR Mem.; Exhibit E, Pet. Rev.)

Accordingly, Petitioner failed to fairly present any federal claim now raised in his

Ground Three, and his state remedies on this claim are unexhausted.

(4) Abuse of Discretion at Sentencing - In his Ground Four, Petitioner argues that

the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adequately investigate facts relevant to his

sentence, i.e. expert testimony and other mitigating factors. Petitioner does not clarify the

constitutional provision or principle he believes to have been violated. Petitioner again

argues he presented these claims in his direct appeal and his PCR proceeding. (Amend. Pet.

Doc. 8 at 9.) 

To the extent that Petitioner relies upon the failure of the Court to permit expert

psychiatric testimony, this claim is essentially the same claim as that asserted in Ground

Two, and was exhausted by presentation on direct appeal. 

To the extent that Petitioner relies upon the failure of the Court to investigate and

consider other mitigating evidence, Petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies on that

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claim, having not presented such a federal claim on direct appeal or in his PCR proceeding.

(See Exhibit H, Open. Brief; Exhibit G, PCR Mem.; Exhibit E, Pet. Rev.) 

Petitioner did argue on direct appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion in

sentencing by failing to conduct an adequate investigation, citing State v. Jenkins, 193 Ariz.

115, 970 P.2d 947 (App. 1998). (Exhibit H. Open Brief at 22-23.) However, Petitioner did

not assert this as a constitutional claim, nor did the Arizona Court of Appeals address it as

one. (See Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 9.) Moreover, the discussion of the investigation or

consideration of general mitigating factors in the Jenkins case was not founded upon any

constitutional principles. Jenkins, 193 Ariz. at 121-122, 970 P.2d at 953-954. Neither were

the other state cases cited by Petitioner founded upon federal law. i.e. State v. Kelley, 126,

Ariz. 193, 613 P.2d 857 (App. 1980); and State v. Watton, 164 Ariz. 323, 793 P.2d 80

(1980). (See Exhibit H, Open. Brief at 23.)

e. Summary re Exhaustion

Petitioner failed to fairly present to the state courts his federal claims in Grounds One

and Three, and the portion of his Ground Four founded upon mitigating evidence other than

psychiatric expert testimony. Thus, his state remedies on these claims were not properly

exhausted.

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984).

Two Arizona rules commonly bar delayed presentations of claims: Arizona’s waiver

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8

 Respondents identify as applicable bars: the time limit on PCR petitions for review

and Arizona's waiver bar as to Ground Two; and the time limits on direct appeals and PCR

petitions for review and preclusion and waiver bars as to Ground Three. (Answer, Doc. 13

at 6-8.) No procedural bars are discussed with respect to Grounds One or Four. (A

preclusion bar only applies where the claim has been presented, which would imply

exhaustion.) However, the undersigned considers the effect of each applicable bar,

notwithstanding the incompleteness in Respondents' arguments.

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bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a), and its timeliness bar in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4.8

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a

subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a claim

may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that "has been waived

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). 

Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows "that the

defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding."

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show

that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights

“that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399,

166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). In coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the

Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right

to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona

Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46

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 Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type

of waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz.

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission),

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived by

omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal sentence

(waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge conflict of

interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 2008).

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P.3d at 1071.9 Petitioner’s unexhausted claim does not fit within those categories.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by waiver, Petitioner would now be barred from

raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for

post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order

and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128,

912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition

of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long

since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar waived or dilatory claims if they fall

within the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to waiver bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his

claims. Nor, does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

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f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Petitioner makes

no assertion of "newly discovered evidence" and where such evidence has previously been

presented to the state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e)

has no application. Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice

of appeal. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in

the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual

innocence, has no application to Petitioner’s procedural challenges to his sentence. See State

v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166 P.3d 945, 959 (App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where

petitioner had “ not established that trial error ...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”).

Summary - Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that review through

Arizona’s direct appeal and post-conviction relief process is no longer possible for

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Summary re Procedural Default - Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal claims in

in Grounds One and Three, and the portion of his Ground Four founded upon mitigating

evidence other than a psychiatric expert testimony, and is now procedurally barred from

doing so. Accordingly, these unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted, and absent a

showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence, must be dismissed with prejudice. 

C. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

If a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

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procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Although both "cause" and "prejudice"

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, a court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43

(1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991).

 "Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123. Petitioner

offers nothing to establish cause to excuse his procedural default or procedural bar.

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish

cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). 

Petitioner makes no pretension of establishing his actual innocence as an excuse for

a procedural default. 

Summary re Procedurally Defaulted & Procedurally Barred Claims - Petitioner

has failed to show cause to excuse his procedural default and/or the procedural bar, and has

failed to show his actual innocence to avoid them Accordingly, Grounds One and Three, and

the portion of Petitioner’s Ground Four founded upon mitigating evidence other than a

psychiatric expert testimony. must be dismissed with prejudice.

D. MERITS OF GROUNDS TWO AND PORTION OF FOUR

In his Ground Two, Petitioner mounts a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

challenge based upon the trial court’s refusal to grant him an extension of time to present his

expert’s testimony. (Amend. Pet. Doc. 8 at 7.) In the exhausted portion of his Ground Four,

Petitioner argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider such evidence.

(Id. at 9.) These two exhausted claims are essentially the same. 

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As presented via his arguments to the state courts under State v. Eastlack, Petitioner’s

federal claims are founded upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma. As noted

above, Ake found that due process mandated access to expert psychiatric testimony at

sentencing in a capital case. 

Respondents have not addressed the merits of these claims.

Because the undersigned concludes that the resolution of the matter depends upon a

question of law, rather than fact, and upon the limitations on habeas relief rather than the

theoretical merits of the claim, the undersigned has not mandated supplemental briefing on

the issue.

The Arizona Court of Appeals distinguished Eastlack as involving a defendant who

“was potentially facing the death penalty,” and on the basis that Petitioner had an opportunity

to present mitigating factors and failed to show that his proposed expert would have

produced evidence not already presented. (Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 9, n. 4.)

This federal habeas court can only grant relief if that decision was "contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), or “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

The undersigned cannot make this finding because the application of Ake at

sentencing in non-capital cases is not “clearly established Federal law.”

Although it is far from clear whether Ake should have any application outside capital

cases, at least one Ninth Circuit jurist has concluded that “[u]nder Ake, entitlement to a

psychiatric expert at sentencing is limited to defendants charged with capital crimes.” 623

F.3d 1258, 1280 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting). See McGraw, Life but Not Liberty?

An Assessment of Noncapital Indigent Defendants' Rights to Expert Assistance under the Ake

v. Oklahoma Doctrine, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 951, 966 (Fall2001) (discussing disparate treatment

on application of Ake outside capital sentencing). But see Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d

1240, 1243 (8th Cir.1987) (applying Ake to non capital case, “Nor do we draw a decisive line

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for due-process purposes between capital and noncapital cases.”). Compare Ake, 470 U.S.

at 87 (Burger, J. concurring) (“Nothing in the Court's opinion reaches non-capital cases”)

with Ake, id. (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (“the constitutional rule announced by the Court is

far too broad. I would limit the rule to capital cases”). See also U.S. v. George, 85 F.3d 1433,

1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (“assuming [arguendo] that Ake applies to noncapital cases”).

The explicit language of the holding in Ake as to provision of experts at trial did not

include a limitation to capital cases:

We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that

his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at

trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a

psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise

afford one.

Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. Indeed, the Court framed its analysis of the private interest involved on

this point without limitation to capital cases: “The private interest in the accuracy of a

criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely

compelling.” Id. at 78 (emphasis added).

However, when turning to the necessity of an expert at sentencing, the Court

repeatedly limited its analysis to the context of capital sentencing: “...in the context of a

capital sentencing proceeding...at the sentencing phase of a capital case...profound interest

in assuring that its ultimate sanction is not erroneously imposed.” Id. at 83-84. The Court’s

holding was similarly circumspect: 

In such a circumstance, where the consequence of error is so

great, the relevance of responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and

the burden on the State so slim, due process requires access to a

psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the

psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.

Id. at 84.

Given this limited holding in Ake, the undersigned cannot find that the state court

acted “contrary to” a holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in declining to find an obligation

to permit the expert testimony.

Given the divergence among reasonable jurists about whether Ake applies at

sentencing outside the capital context, the undersigned cannot find that the rejection of

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Petitioner’s claim was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.

Consequently, even if this Court could conclude that Ake did mandate expert

testimony in Petitioner's non-capital case, the limitations on habeas relief in 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) would prevent a grant of the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner's Ground Two and

the related portion of Ground Four are without merit and must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

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Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part on

the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the

reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the reasoning

set forth herein, the constitutional claims, as limited by the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), are plainly

without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds One and Three, and the

portion of Ground Four founded upon mitigating evidence other than psychiatric expert

testimony, of the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November

22, 2010 (Doc. 8) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that remainder of Petitioner's Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November 22, 2010 (Doc. 8) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

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have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise

permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed ten

(10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc),

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

DATED: June 15, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Civil Cases\Active Cases\Lopez 2-10CV2159\10-2159-008r RR 11 05 27 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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