Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08044/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08044-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Agwu Gibson,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-08044-PCT-DLR

ORDER 

Before the Court is the report and recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge 

Michelle H. Burns (Doc. 21) regarding Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The R&R recommends that the amended 

petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge advised the parties 

that they had fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of the R&R to file specific 

written objections with the Court. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R 

on December 31, 2019, (Doc. 22), and Respondents filed their response on March 5, 2020. 

(Doc. 28.)

The Court has considered Petitioner’s objections and reviewed the report and 

recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court 

finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the statute of limitations for 

Petitioner to file his habeas petition began running on December 13, 2017 and expired on 

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December 13, 2018. Because Petitioner filed his habeas petition on February 11, 2019,

his filing is untimely. 

Petitioner’s objection argues that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly calculated the 

beginning date of the statute of limitations and in the alternative, that she incorrectly 

determined that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. He relies on the date he received 

actual notice that the trial court denied his motion for rehearing for both arguments. 

The Magistrate Judge determined that the statute of limitations began to run on 

December 12, 2017, the date the trial court denied the motion for rehearing on his 

petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). Petitioner argues that the statute of 

limitations did not start to run on that date because he did not receive the trial court’s 

original order denying his motion. He contends the statute did not begin to run until 

sometime in March 2018, when he received the trial court’s March 21, 2018 order 

answering his request for status, explaining that his motion for rehearing had been denied 

on December 12, 2017. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) defines 

the length of the statute of limitations and the alternative methods of determining when it 

begins to run. The relevant portion of the AEDPA defines the starting date of the statute 

of limitations as: “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” The statute of 

limitations began to run on the date on which the judgment became final, not the date 

the Petitioner learned that it became final. There is no provision in the AEDPA that 

allows the interpterion advanced by Petitioner.

Petitioner’s second argument, requesting relief through equitable tolling, is not 

supported by facts. As the R&R explains, equitable “tolling is appropriate when 

‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a [petitioner’s] control make it impossible to file a 

petition on time.”’ (Doc. 21 at 7) (citing cases.) A petitioner seeking equitable tolling 

must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

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that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 418 (2005). 

Petitioner argues that the approximate three-month delay in receiving the trial

court’s ruling on his motion for rehearing is itself enough to support relief through 

equitable tolling. He argues his diligence is established by how closely he followed his 

litigation. His extraordinary circumstance is the three-month delay. It “likely stood in 

[his] way” and was a “hindrance in the proceedings of his legal litigations” (Doc. 22 at 

6.)

Petitioner has not shown that he has been diligent or that an extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way. He does not explain why the approximate nine months 

available to him after he received the trial court’s order was not enough time to prepare 

and file his Petition. He does not say what effort he made to timely file and he does not 

show that something occurred that prevented him from meeting the deadline. Nine 

months is not an insubstantial amount of time and, absent some extraordinary 

circumstance, was enough time for petitioner to prepare and file his petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that the R&R (Doc. 21) is ACCEPTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal are DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling 

debatable. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment denying 

and dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (Doc. 1) with prejudice and terminate this action.

Dated this 12th day of March, 2020.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

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