Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02071/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KEVIN LEE NORRIS, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-02071 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On or about September 24, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 8) on December 7, 2010.

Respondents contend the action for habeas relief should be

denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations. Petitioner

has not filed a reply to the answer to his petition.

 I Procedural History

In 1989, a jury convicted Petitioner on three counts of

child molestation, two counts of sexual abuse, two counts of

sexual conduct with a minor, one count of public sexual

indecency to a minor, and three counts of sexual exploitation of

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1

 Petitioner was represented by the public defender’s office

during his pretrial proceedings, by private counsel during his trial,

and by Mr. Kemper of the public defender’s office in his direct

appeal. Despite Petitioner’s plea for counsel outside the public

defender’s office, Mr. Kemper was appointed to represent Petitioner

in his Rule 32 proceedings. See Answer, Exh. F.

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a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive terms of

imprisonment totaling 171 years. See Answer, Exh. A. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. On February 18, 1992, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

in a memorandum decision. Id., Exh. C. Petitioner sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

denied review in a decision issued November 5, 1992. Id., Exh.

E.

Petitioner initiated a state action for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on May 22, 1997. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner was appointed counsel

in his Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner’s appointed

counsel subsequently filed a pleading averring that he had

searched the record and was unable to find a tenable issue to

raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. G.1

On November 19, 1997, the trial court issued an order

requiring Petitioner to file any pro se petition delineating his

claims for post-conviction relief on or before December 19,

1997. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner failed to file a petition and,

on January 7, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing

the Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. I. It appears Petitioner

appealed this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals and the

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Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on March 5, 1998.

See id., Exh. I.

 Petitioner initiated a second Rule 32 action on July

24, 2008. Id., Exh. K. In that Rule 32 action Petitioner,

relying upon Arizona v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ct.

App. 2000), claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective

because counsel failed to convince Petitioner to accept a plea

offer.

In a decision issued August 18, 2008, the state trial

court dismissed the second Rule 32 action, finding it was

time-barred pursuant to Arizona law. The Arizona trial court

also concluded that Donald was not a change in the law which

would apply retroactively to Petitioner. Id., Exh. M. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief from his convictions and sentences because he

was denied the effective assistance of counsel, i.e., his

counsel did not convince Petitioner to accept a plea offer.

Petitioner also contends he was denied his right to equal

protection of the law because he is being “unduly punished by

the State” due to counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

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F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state

prisoners whose convictions became final before April 24, 1996,

to file their petitions for habeas corpus relief from those

convictions by April 25, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The running of this one-year

statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state convictions

which became final before April 24, 1996, was suspended during

any period when “a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim [was] pending” in any state court.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4,

8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d

1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325,

327-28 (4th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final in

late 1992 or early 1993, at the conclusion of his direct appeal

proceedings, i.e., when the time expired for seeking certiorari

from the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in his direct appeal.

Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the effective date

of the AEDPA. Accordingly, Petitioner had until April 25, 1997,

to file a federal petition for habeas relief regarding his

convictions. 

Petitioner did not file a federal habeas action prior

to expiration of the statute of limitations on April 25, 1997.

Petitioner’s filing of an action pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, on May 22, 1997, could not and did

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not restart the already-expired statute of limitations for

filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v.

Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson,

234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005). See also WaldronRamsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris,

515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is “typically applied

sparingly”). The petitioner must establish a causal connection

between the alleged roadblock to their timely filing of their

federal habeas petition and the actual failure to file the

petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034; Lawrence v.

Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026;

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195

F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

Petitioner has not filed a reply to the answer to his

habeas petition, which answer contends the petition is not

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timely filed. Petitioner has not filed a pleading asserting why

he might be entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations.

III Conclusion

The section 2254 petition was not filed within the

statute of limitations specified by the AEDPA. Petitioner has

not offered the Court a basis for the equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Norris’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 20th day of January, 2011.

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