Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06246/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

SEP 1 1 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6246 

CLAUDE FRANKLIN BOWIE, JR. 

(W. D. Okla.) 

(D.C. No. CR-85-289-P) 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before McKAY, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Bowie appeals the denial of his motion to vacate, set 

aside or correct sentence which he filed under and pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 2255. 

Mr. Bowie was indicted and tried in federal court on several 

criminal charges. During the sixth day of his trial Mr. Bowie, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6246 Document: 010110042152 Date Filed: 09/11/1990 Page: 1 
• 

who was represented by counsel, changed his plea and entered a 

guilty plea to all charges. There was no plea bargain. Mr. Bowie 

was subsequently sentenced in April 1986. Mr. Bowie never filed 

an appeal. 

Three years later, in March 1989, Mr. Bowie filed his motion 

under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. Mr. Bowie raised four claims. The 

district court granted the relief requested in his claim number 

three. Mr. Bowie appeals the denial of relief sought as to the 

remaining three grounds. We commence our discussion of this 

appeal by noting that Mr. Bowie did not file a direct appeal. 1 A 

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not a substitute for appeal. 

Errors of law or fact are generally excluded from relief under the 

statute. If a claimed error is not constitutional or 

jurisdictional, relief is warranted only if the defect is so 

fundamental that a miscarriage of justice or a due process 

violation results. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 

(1962). 

I. 

Mr. Bowie first attacks his guilty plea. He alleges that he 

and the government entered negotiations to arrive at a plea 

bargain and after he committed himself the government elected to 

withdraw from the plea bargain negotiations. Mr. Bowie therefore 

1 We would encourage district courts, in a case such as this, 

to initially consider whether or not a claim may be procedurally 

barred by the doctrine of deliberate bypass. We do not address 

this issue as the district court dismissed this petition on an 

alternative ground with which we agree. 

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.. 

asserts that he was effectively coerced or entrapped into entering 

a guilty plea. 

The district court reviewed the transcript and found that the 

files and records conclusively show that Mr. Bowie was not 

entitled to relief and denied Mr. Bowie an evidentiary hearing. 

On appeal, Mr. Bowie asserts that the government had agreed 

"in principle to the terms of a possible plea-agreement. Even 

going as far as to discuss those terms with the trial judge and 

solicit his assistance and support." He asserts this conduct 

"served to promulgate an effective, if subtle form of coercion 

which so completely misled the defendant that it succeeded in 

firmly entrapping him within the boundaries of a plea that he 

would not have otherwise made." 

He alternatively contends that there was a plea agreement and 

that this plea agreement is proven by "the circumstances and 

discussions surrounding the defendant's willingness to plead 

guilty." He also argues that the trial judge failed to ensure 

that the guilty plea was voluntarily given and states that the 

reasons for this failure was that the judge was exasperated with 

an already flawed trial. He furthermore asserts that the judge 

had agreed to honor the ten-year sentencing provision "as outlined 

in the initial agreement." 

There are several flaws to Mr. Bowie's arguments. First, the 

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transcript of the proceedings held when Mr. Bowie pleaded guilty 

affirmatively show there was no plea bargain. This transcript 

likewise shows there had been unsuccessful attempts to arrive at a 

mutually satisfactory plea bargain; however, these clearly were 

not successful. The prosecutor, in open court at the time of Mr. 

Bowie's guilty plea and in the presence of Mr. Bowie and his 

counsel, stated to the court: "[T)here's no deal whatsoever with 

the Government " Because plea negotiations did take place, 

Mr. Bowie is of the opinion that an agreement may have been 

reached. His assumption and assertion is erroneous and without 

merit. The actions of the district court in denying Mr. Bowie an 

evidentiary hearing and in denying him relief were correct. 

II. 

Mr. Bowie next asserts that the assistance provided by his 

counsel was ineffective in that his defense counsel had a conflict 

of interest by representing more than one defendant during the 

proceedings. 

The facts reveal that defense counsel, 

represented Mr. Bowie and two other defendants. 

Mr. Porter, 

In Mr. Bowie's 

original motion, the only alleged error by counsel took place at 

the sentencing phase where his counsel said: "Judge, the 

defendant, Lee Juan Bowie, has never had any prior trouble with 

the law. This is a first offense for him. I think the record 

shows that Claude Bowie has previously had some trouble .... " 

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Mr. Bowie can hardly argue that a correct statement of fact 

at the sentencing hearing constitutes an ineffective 

representation by retained counsel. 

Mr. Bowie on appeal and for the first time points to other 

alleged errors committed by his retained counsel. In Mr. Bowie's 

words: 

The record of proceedings as well as the 

defendant's post-trial motion, effectively details the 

failure of the defense attorney to inform the defendant 

of the obvious procedural errors with respect to the 

violation of his right to a speedy trial and the trial 

judge's improper and highly demanding ruling in front of 

the jurors (both of which were fundamental 

constitutional violations), which most assuredly would 

have resulted in an eventual reversal had the defendant 

subsequently been convicted. 

There is no record of the attorney ever objecting 

to these errors or of ever having proposed any motions 

in attack of these violations. As a consequence, the 

preservation of these appealable grounds were 

effectively lost with the defendant's guilty plea. 

Again, Mr. Bowie's arguments are flawed. Looking at the 

transcript of the guilty plea proceedings, we find the court first 

asking Mr. Bowie if he understands the rights which the court has 

explained and that he is waiving and giving these up if he accepts 

the guilty plea. The court specifically warned Mr. Bowie that "if 

I made a mistake (as to any of the rulings objected to by counsel] 

and you plead guilty, you waive any errors." We then find Mr. 

Bowie responding that he understood the rights that he was waiving 

and that he still wished to maintain his guilty plea. It is clear 

that Mr. Bowie waived the purported errors which allegedly 

transpired during the trial when he pled guilty to all charges. 

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With respect to a guilty plea, the defendant who challenges 

his guilty plea based upon an ineffective representation by 

counsel must show that counsel's advice was not within the range 

of competence demanded by attorneys in criminal cases. Mr. Bowie 

has not made the requisite showing. With respect to the other 

alleged errors of Mr. Bowie's defense counsel, there is no showing 

that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). We cannot say that counsel's performance was 

deficient given the facts of this case. Mr. Bowie has failed to 

overcome the presumption that counsel's challenged conduct is 

professionally reasonable. 

Appellant's motion for leave to proceed in forrna pauperis is 

granted. 

AFFIRMED. 

The decision of the district court is in all respects 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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