Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06027/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06027-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GREG A. WOOLRIDGE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FI LED 

Uniced Stit ·11 C.ourt of Appeals 

tenth Circuit 

JUL 1 o 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 91-6027 

STEPHEN W. KAISER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) (D.C. No. CIV-90-1314-T) 

) (W. D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Petitioner Greg Allen Woolridge appeals from the denial of 

his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2254. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6027 Document: 010110128877 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner is currently serving a twenty-year sentence 

imposed by the district court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma, in 

case No. CRF-87-881. However, in support of his request for 

habeas relief, petitioner directed his attack on a fully expired 

conviction entered against him following a guilty plea in the 

district court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, in case No. 

CRF-81-5303. Petitioner alleged that the conviction in case No. 

81-5303 was invalid for the following reasons: 

GROUND ONE: "Petitioner was denied due process when 

he was not advised of his right to appeal the judgment 

of conviction and sentence in CRF-81-5303." 

GROUND TWO: "Petitioner was denied due process, equal 

protection of the law and his constitutional right to be 

informed when the amended information was void as not 

stating a public offense due to its failure to list all 

the elements of unlawful possession of a controlled 

dangerous substance (dilaudid)." 

GROUND THREE: "The guilty plea entered by Petitioner in 

CRF-81-5303 was involuntarily entered. The plea is 

involuntary under the constitutions of the United States 

and State of Oklahoma, as no one advised Petitioner of 

the rens ma (sic) elements of the offense and the trial 

court failed to esta-(sic) Petitioner's competence and 

that there was a factual basis." 

The district court denied habeas relief on two alternative 

grounds. First, the district court, citing Maleng v. Cook, 490 

U.S. 488 (1989), concluded that petitioner did not meet the "in 

custody" requirement under section 2254 because he was not in 

custody pursuant to the conviction in case No. 81-5303. 

at 492. ("[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has 

completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction 

are not themselves sufficient to render an individual 'in custody' 

for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it."). According to the 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-6027 Document: 010110128877 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 2 
district court, petitioner failed to raise an issue for habeas 

relief because he did not explicitly allege that the sentence he 

was presently serving in case No. 87-881 was illegally enhanced by 

the conviction in case No. 81-5303. See Gamble v. Parsons, 898 

F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir.)("As we read Maleng ... the attack must 

be directed toward the enhanced sentence under which the defendant 

is in custody [I]f the attack is so directed, the 

defendant may argue that his present sentence is improper because 

it has been enhanced by a prior unconstitutional conviction."), 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 212 (1990). Second, the district court 

concluded that even if 

requirement, his alleged 

substantive merit. 

petitioner satisfied 

grounds for habeas 

the "in custody" 

relief lacked 

On appeal, respondent urges that we affirm the district court 

on the ground that petitioner fails to satisfy the "in custody" 

requirement. However, although petitioner did not in his petition 

explicitly list his present sentence as the one under attack, he 

did make it clear in his "Response to Motion to Dismiss" that his 

current sentence had been enhanced by the prior conviction he 

sought to challenge. Rec. doc. 15 at 2-3. In our view, 

petitioner's habeas petition, when construed with the deference to 

which he is entitled as a prose litigant, should be read as 

asserting a challenge to his present sentence to the extent that 

it has been enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior conviction. 

See Gamble, 898 F.2d at 118. As such, petitioner satisfies the 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-6027 Document: 010110128877 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 3 
"in custody" requirement of section 2254. Therefore, we will 

address the substantive merits of petitioner's alleged grounds for 

habeas relief. 

As his first claim, petitioner alleges that he was not 

advised of his right to appeal in case No. 81-5303 by either the 

state trial court or his counsel. This claim is easily resolved. 

The state trial court was not constitutionally required to inform 

petitioner of his right to appeal. See Barber v. United States, 

427 F.2d 70, 71 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970); 

Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284, 285 (10th Cir. 1968). Thus, 

the alleged failure of the state trial court to so inform 

petitioner does not state a claim for habeas relief. Similarly, 

"[a]n attorney has no absolute duty in every case to advise [the] 

defendant of his limited right to appeal after a guilty plea." 

Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Therefore, the failure of counsel to notify petitioner of his 

right to appeal was not in and of itself ineffective assistance 

warranting habeas relief. Id. at 1188. 1 

1 Petitioner did not allege that he ever asked or directed 

counsel to file an appeal or that he had been assured by counsel 

that an appeal would be filed. This omission is significant, as 

"counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal when so instructed 

by the client constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel for 

purposes of [28 U.S.C. §] 2255." Estes v. United States, 883 F.2d 

645, 648 (8th Cir. 1989); see,~, Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 

1553, 1558 (10th Cir. 1988)(claim for relief stated under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 where petitioner alleged that counsel failed to file 

an appeal after informing petitioner that he would do so); United 

States v. Winterhalder, 724 F.2d 109, 110-12 (10th Cir. 

1983)(relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 appropriate where defendant 

was deceived into believing counsel was pursuing appeal, which 

appellate court eventually dismissed for failure to prosecute). 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-6027 Document: 010110128877 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 4 
As his second claim for habeas relief, petitioner asserts 

that the amended indictment he pled guilty to in case No. 81-5303 

was fundamentally defective because it failed to list all the 

elements of the crime he was charged with (unlawful possession of 

a controlled substance, namely Dilaudid). The district court 

denied habeas relief concluding that 

sufficient. On appeal, petitioner has 

arguments challenging this determination. 

disturb the district court's rejection 

claim for habeas relief. 

the indictment was 

not made any specific 

Therefore, we will not 

of petitioner's second 

Petitioner's final claim for habeas relief, liberally 

construed, raises two challenges to the validity of his guilty 

plea in case No. 81-5303. First, petitioner contends that his 

guilty plea was involuntary because he did not understand the 

nature of the charge against him. Petitioner maintains that his 

incomprehension stems from the failure of the state trial court to 

explain the exact nature of the crime he was charged with. 

Specifically, petitioner contends that he was never informed that 

his possession of Dilaudid must have been "knowing," "voluntary," 

and "unlawful" to constitute a criminal act. 

In order for a guilty plea to be voluntary in a 

constitutional sense, a defendant must have a complete 

understanding of the charge against him. Marshall v. Lonberger, 

459 U.S. 422, 436 (1983); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 

n.13 (1976). However, a specific inquiry by the trial court into 

the formal legal elements of the charged offense is not required. 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-6027 Document: 010110128877 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 5 
; 

Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1988). "[I]t 

may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel 

routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail 

to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit." 

Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. 

This presumption is clearly applicable to petitioner's guilty 

plea in case No. 81-5303. Although we do not have a transcript of 

the state trial court's acceptance of petitioner's guilty plea, 

the record does include a form which contains questions that were 

submitted by the state trial court to petitioner and answers 

inserted in blanks either by the state trial judge or a courtroom 

clerk. The completed form is signed by petitioner, his attorney, 

the district attorney, the state trial judge, and a courtroom 

clerk. The form is somewhat exhaustive. Specifically, the form 

inquires into whether petitioner and his attorney received a copy 

of the charge prior to pleading guilty, whether petitioner talked 

over the charge with his 

pleading guilty because 

attorney, 

he did 

and 

the 

whether 

charged 

petitioner was 

act. Petitioner 

answered yes to each of these questions. Petitioner's 

declarations carry a strong presumption of verity. See Blackledge 

v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 

Petitioner attempts to overcome his answers on the form by 

asserting that they were given pursuant to the instructions of his 

attorney, and he was not fully informed of the nature of the 

charge against 

allegation fails 

him. In our view, petitioner's conclusory 

to overcome the "formidable barrier" to 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-6027 Document: 010110128877 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 6 
collateral relief thrown-up as a result of his contrary 

representations on the record regarding his understanding of the 

nature of the charge against him. See id. (although "not 

invariably insurmountable," defendants' representations in open 

court "constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent 

collateral proceedings . [Thus,] subsequent presentation of 

conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to 

summary dismissal."); see,~, Worthen, 842 F.2d at 1183-84 

(applying Blackledge's principle and rejecting collateral attack 

on plea premised on allegations inconsistent with representation 

made at plea hearing). Under the circumstances, petitioner can be 

presumed to have understood the nature of the charge against him 

in case No. 81-5303. See generally, Worthen, 842 F.2d at 1183. 

As the second challenge to the validity of his guilty plea in 

case No. 81-5303, petitioner alleges that the state court failed 

to determine whether there was a factual basis for his plea. This 

claim, however, does not demonstrate a basis for habeas relief. 

In order to state a claim under section 2254, petitioner must 

allege a constitutional violation. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 may 

dictate that a factual basis for a plea be established in federal 

court, but such a requirement is not constitutionally mandated so 

that the failure to comply is correctable in a federal habeas 

proceeding. Freeman v. Page, 443 F.2d 493, 497 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971). Only when the defendant claims his 

innocence while pleading guilty have state courts been 

constitutionally required to establish a factual basis for a plea. 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-6027 Document: 010110128877 Date Filed: 07/16/1991 Page: 7 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-39 (1970). Here, 

petitioner did not protest his innocence while pleading guilty in 

case No. 81-5303. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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