Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00025/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00025-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 Although plaintiff is no longer in custody, he was a prisoner when he filed this suit. 1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE L. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. DEERING, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-00025-LJO-SMS PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OR

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO

PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANTS DEERING,

NGUYEN, SMITH, POSNER, ADAMS, AND

OVERLY

(Doc. 27) 

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Terrence L. Davis (“plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California tort law.

Plaintiff filed this action on December 27, 2004. On April 13, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 30, 2006.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 1

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff was an inmate housed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and

State Prison (“CSATF”) in Corcoran when the events at issue in this action allegedly occurred. The

defendants named in this action are Doctors Deering and K. Nguyen, Registered Nurse Smith,

CSATF-Corcoran Health Care Administrator K. Allison, Chief Medical Officers David Moss Posner

and N. Bhatt, Warden Derral G. Adams, and Medical Technical Assistant D. Overly. Plaintiff is

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seeking money damages. The claims in this action arise from the lack of medical care plaintiff was

provided with, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. In addition, plaintiff alleges

tort claims under California law.

1. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

a. Defendants Deering, Nguyen, and Smith

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a brain tumor, disease in his

feet and ankle joints, swelling from his feet to his kneecaps, and degenerative disk disease, all of

which caused severe pain. Plaintiff also alleges he had extreme pain in his testicles, stomach, and

anus, his left shoulder and tendons would hurt when he extended his arm, he experienced grinding

pain when he rotated his shoulder, his vision was beginning to get fuzzy, and he was having dizzy

spells. Plaintiff alleges he had been prescribed pain medications to keep his pituitary gland from

swelling, which would lead to other medical problems, and he had chronos for boots on the general

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population yard, soft shoes for administrative segregation, and lower bunk-lower tier housing due

to upper and lower back pain. Plaintiff also alleges he received shots in his back for degenerative

disk disease.

Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by defendant Deering on August 20, 2002, and relayed to

defendant all of his medical problems, as set forth in the preceding paragraph. Plaintiff alleges that

he requested all of the medications he was receiving prior to his transfer to CSATF. Defendant

Deering told plaintiff he would check plaintiff’s medical files and get back to him. In the meantime,

plaintiff was prescribed only acetaminophen.

On September 3, 2002, plaintiff was again seen by defendant Deering, who had before him

only one of plaintiff’s three medical files. When plaintiff questioned how defendant Deering could

treat him without reviewing all three files, defendant flipped through the file and noted that plaintiff

had x-rays on his feet and shoulder, and nothing was wrong. Plaintiff pointed out that those x-rays

were from 2001. Plaintiff alleges that defendant refused to update his chronos for lower tier-lower

bunk housing and an extra mattress, refused to provide needed pain medication, and refused to

acknowledge plaintiff’s stomach, anus, and testicular pain.

Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal and on September 17, 2002, was seen by defendant Deering.

After telling defendant that if he continued to ignore plaintiff’s pain and continued to fail to review

plaintiff’s medical history, plaintiff was going to sue him, defendant became enraged and told

plaintiff that there was no point in him making any other orders and plaintiff could have his

complaints looked at elsewhere. Plaintiff alleges that defendant told plaintiff he would make sure

plaintiff did not receive any more medical treatment while housed there. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Smith was present during the exchange, and while he was housed in E-1 Administrative

Segregation, he received no further treatment.

Plaintiff alleges that on September 27, 2002, he was in acute pain in his abdomen and

testicular areas, and was escorted to the clinic, where defendant Deering took a cursory look at his

testicle, and told plaintiff he was sick of seeing plaintiff’s face and would see plaintiff in court.

Plaintiff alleges that he complained every day to defendant Smith and other medical personnel that

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he was in pain, but on each occasion, defendant Smith told him his files had been forgotten and she

forgot to sign him up for sick call.

Plaintiff alleges that on October 22, 2002, he was finally called to be seen by defendant

Nguyen and complained of acute stomach, testicle, head, back, neck, and foot pain, along with other

medical problems. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Smith was present and when defendant Nguyen

began to write some medical orders, defendant Smith gave him a look and told him he could not

make any orders without plaintiff’s medical files. After some initial confusion on defendant

Nguyen’s part regarding defendant Smith’s actions and another attempt by defendant Nguyen at

writing medical which orders which resulted in the same response from defendant Smith, defendant

Nguyen began repeating what defendant Smith said regarding being unable to write orders without

plaintiff’s medical files. Plaintiff alleges he was escorted out of the clinic without any medical

orders after telling defendant Nguyen that he was just going bywhat defendant Smith was telling him

and that defendant Smith was acting in collusion with another person, and asking defendant Nguyen

how he could help defendant Smith when plaintiff was in pain. Plaintiff alleges that he was only

provided with acetaminophen, which did nothing for his pain, and was not provided with any

treatment until he was released from E-1 Ad-Seg, as promised by defendant Deering.

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983

against defendants Deering, Nguyen, and Smith for acting with deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

b. Defendants Posner and Adams

Liability may not be imposed under section 1983 on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

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that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Posner and Adams were responsible for endorsing the policy

under which inmates were not allowed to have soft shoes even if they had a chrono for soft shoes.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result, he was forced to wear shoes which caused him extreme pain and led

to shooting pain from his feet up to his spine, where he had herniated disks. Plaintiff also alleges

that defendant Posner failed to authorize the treatment plan by dermatologist Dr. Susan Luu for his

adult acne, which led to worsening flare-ups and scarring. These allegations are sufficient to state

a claim against defendants Posner and Adams under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

c. Defendants Allison, Overly, and Bhatt

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link

between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff.

See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “‘A person ‘subjects’ anotherto the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning

of [§] 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits

to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established

not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in 

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motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause

others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Allison sent him a “memorandum pertaining to my alleged

(adequate) health care, . . . in conjunction with mentioned perp’s have alluded to; fraudulent false

facts of [his] medical treatment that [he] received.” (Doc. 27, Amend. Comp., court record pg. 11:6-

9.) This vague and confusing allegation does not give rise to a claim for relief against defendant

Allison.

Plaintiff’s allegations against defendants Overly and Bhatt stem from their involvement in

resolving an inmate appeal plaintiff filed. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Overly failed to do a

thorough investigation into plaintiff’s grievances, and failed to contact plaintiff concerning his

appeal. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Overly had ample time to review his files, and verify that his

appeal had merit and was based on facts regarding his medical treatment, including defendant

Nguyen’s failure to provide medication. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bhatt knowingly

participated by co-signing the appeal response.

In light of liberal federal notice pleadings standards, most recently addressed by the United

States Supreme Court in Erickson v. Pardus, No. 06-7317, 2007 WL 1582936 (Jun. 4, 2007),

plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 against

defendant Overly for failing to intervene when placed on notice that plaintiff’s medical needs were

not being treated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). However, the mere allegation that defendant Bhatt co-signed

the appeal response is simply not sufficient to support a claim that defendant Bhatt violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical

needs.

2. State Law Tort Claims

In addition to his Eighth Amendment claims, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ actions

constituted “medical malpractice, wanton infliction of pain, and intentional indifference.” (Amend.

Comp., court record pg. 4.) Since wanton infliction of pain and intentional indifference are not

recognized tort claims, the court construes those claims to be one for intentional infliction of

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emotional distress. To the extent that plaintiff disagrees with this construction, his remedy is to file

a second amended complaint. 

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the duty of the professional

to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and

exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct

and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.”

Tortorella v. Castro, 140 Cal.App.4th 1, 3 n.2 (2006); Hanson v. Grode, 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606

(1999). “The standard of care in a medical malpractice case requires that medical service providers

exercise that . . . degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members

of their profession under similar circumstances.” Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.4th 101,

108 (Cal. 1999); Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal.3d.399, 408 (1976). Under California law, the elements

of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“I.I.E.D.”) are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct

by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual

and proximate causation of the emotional distress by defendant’s outrageous conduct. Sabow v.

United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing to Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d

868 (1991)) (quotations omitted). 

In light of federal notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state

claims for relief against defendants Deering, Nguyen, Smith, Posner, and Overly for medical

malpractice, and against defendants Deering, Nguyen, and Smith for I.I.E.D. However, defendant

Adams is a warden rather than a medical professional, and therefore, no medical malpractice claim

lies against him. Further, the actions of defendants Adams, Posner, and Overly, as set forth in the

amended complaint, simply do not support a claim that they acted to intentionally inflict emotional

distress on plaintiff. Finally, plaintiff’s allegations against defendants Allison and Bhatt does not

give rise to any claims for relief under state law. 

 C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s amended complaint states cognizable claims for relief against defendants Deering,

Nguyen, Smith, Posner, Adams, and Overly for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s

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serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, against defendants Deering, Nguyen,

Smith, Posner, and Overly for medical malpractice, and against defendants Deering, Nguyen, and

Smith for I.I.E.D. However, plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state cognizable claims against

defendants Adams for medical malpractice, against defendants Adams, Posner, and Overly for

I.I.E.D., and against defendants Allison and Bhatt under the Eighth Amendment or state law.

Because plaintiff was not previously notified of these deficiencies in his claims, the court will

provide plaintiff with one final opportunity to file a second amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes

to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file a second amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding

only against defendants Deering, Nguyen, Smith, Posner, Adams, and Overly on the claims set forth

in the preceding paragraph, plaintiff may so notify the court in writing. The court will then issue

Findings and Recommendations recommending that plaintiff’s deficient claims and defendants

Allison and Bhatt be dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff six summonses and six

USM-285 forms to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will

direct theUnited States Marshal to initiate service of process on defendants Deering, Nguyen, Smith,

Posner, Adams, and Overly.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

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Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

court in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file a second amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against defendants Deering, Nguyen,

Smith, Posner, Adams, and Overly on the claims found to be cognizable by

the court; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 4, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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