Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01402/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01402-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Calvin L. Jones

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1402 MCE CMK P

vs.

California Board of Prison Terms, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $12.53 will be assessed by this

order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to

collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the

Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the

preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be

Case 2:05-cv-01402-MCE -CMK Document 4 Filed 07/26/05 Page 1 of 8
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1The complaint, which contains general language and a lengthy discussion concerning the

history of the adult authority, community release board and board of prison terms, has spaces

where prisoner has typed in information pertinent to him, such as his name, the crime from which

his incarceration extends and the date of the conviction. (Compl. at ii.) 

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forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s

account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

I. Background

Plaintiff has filed a form complaint1 which states that he was convicted of First

Degree Murder in 1983. (Compl. at ii.) Plaintiff does not state when he became eligible for

parole, but he indicates that he has had seven parole suitability hearings. All seven hearings have

resulted in a finding by the Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) that plaintiff is unsuitable for

parole. Plaintiff’s most recent hearing was on April 9, 2003. 

Plaintiff challenges the Board’s denial of parole. He alleges violations of ex post

 facto laws and his right to due process arising from the Board’s alleged failure to conduct a fair

parole suitability hearing. Plaintiff stresses that he does not seek to attack the duration of his

confinement, but instead seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief. (Compl. at 4:13-17.)

II. Discussion

In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005), the Supreme Court held that 

prisoners could challenge the constitutionality of state parole procedures in a § 1983 action

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and were not required to instead seek relief exclusively

under federal habeas statutes. 

As indicated, plaintiff does not seek anything but prospective injunctive relief 

concerning the procedures to be used at his next parole eligibility hearing. Accordingly, he may

proceed with his claim under § 1983. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 1244 (stating that when success at

most would mean a new parole hearing, which would not necessarily “spell speedier release” a

plaintiff may proceed under § 1983). Plaintiff appears to claim that all his parole hearings have

been infected with the same types of constitutional errors. As plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officers or employees of a governmental entity, the court is

required to screen his complaint to ensure that he has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or

malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

A. Screening

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer

v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

///

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pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s first claim is violation of ex post facto. He asserts that the Board’s

application of the “no new parole policies and procedure of 1991 through 2004,” and the

“harsher guidelines” applied to plaintiff violate constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws. 

(Compl. 28:18-22.) The court construes plaintiff’s argument as being that the Board has adopted

a new policy of no parole for murders and this new policy constitutes a de facto change in the law

governing parole suitability determinations. 

“The ex post facto clause bars any law which ‘imposes a punishment for an act

which was not punishable at the time [the act] was committed, or any law which imposes

punishment greater than the punishment proscribed when the act was committed.’” United States

v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Here, plaintiff

argues that the Board has adopted a “new policy” which creates a defacto change in the law. 

However, plaintiff does not allege any change in the law which has been retroactively applied to

increase the punishment for which plaintiff is eligible. He fails to state an ex post facto claim.

See e.g., Dobbert v. Florida, 423 U.S. 282, 293-94 (1977) ( stating that where a law merely alters

the method of imposing a penalty and does not change the “quantum of punishment” no ex post

facto violation has occurred). Because plaintiff can point to no change in the actual parole law,

only the policy governing its implementation, this portion of the complaint neither states a claim,

nor can it be amended to state a claim. Thus, it should not be included in any amended

complaint. 

Plaintiff’s next claim is that his procedural and due process rights have been

violated by the Board’s pro forma hearings, which always result in a denial of parole suitability.

California’s statute governing parole gives rise to a protected liberty interest in release on parole. 

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to the

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process outlined by the Supreme Court in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal &

Correctional Complex,—notice, an opportunity to be heard, a statement of reasons for the

decision and a limited right to call and cross-examine witnesses. 442 U.S. 1 (1979). The

determination that petitioner is unsuitable for parole must be supported by some evidence bearing

some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 914. 

These guarantees do not exhaust plaintiff’s right to due process. The fundamental

core of due process is protection against arbitrary action. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,

527 (1884). “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary

action of government.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). Courts too numerous to

list have recognized that the right to a disinterested decision maker, who has not prejudged the

case, is a part of the fundamental guarantee against arbitrary and capricious government conduct

in the California parole context. See, e.g., In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (2003) (stating that

parole decision “must reflect an individualized consideration of the specified criteria and cannot

be arbitrary and capricious.”)

A review of plaintiff’s complaint reveals that he has included a detailed general

history of the Board. Plaintiff also makes several broad general statements concerning due

process and the denial of parole. However, plaintiff’s claims that the Board violated his right to

due process are merely cursory. Plaintiff includes almost no information about his individual

claim in his complaint. For instance, the complaint does not reveal whether plaintiff was a first

time offender or what conclusions and factors the Board relied on in finding him unsuitable for

parole. Plaintiff does not put forth a list of factors which he presented to the board which would

have weighed in favor of finding him suitable for parole. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 914. For example,

plaintiff does not allege that he has a stable social history, that he has discussed remorse for the

crime or that he has realistic plans for the future. See, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 §§ 2402(d)(2)

(stable social history tends to show suitability); 2402(d)(3) (presence of remorse indicating by

understanding of nature and magnitude of crime tends to show suitability); 2402(d) (realistic

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plans for the future or development of marketable skill tends to show suitability). Based on the

current complaint, the court is unable to determine if the requirements of due process were

satisfied in plaintiff’s denial of parole. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (stating that requirements of

due process satisfied if some evidence supports the decision). Accordingly, the plaintiff is given

leave to amend this portion of his complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must demonstrate, with specificity

how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional

rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended complaint

must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's

actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto,

633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff's second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that

an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must

be sufficiently alleged. 

Finally, the court notes that plaintiff has brought his complaint as a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 civil rights action seeking injunctive relief. Plaintiff is correct that he may elect to proceed

under § 1983, instead of bringing a properly exhausted habeas petition. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at

1244. However, the types of relief allowed under §1983 are quite different than that offered by a

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successful habeas petition. Success in a § 1983 action will allow a court to order a new parole

hearing for petitioner which is free from prejudice stemming from a gubernatorial policy against

parole for murders. If a fair hearing is once again denied, the court may only order yet another

hearing. The court could not order release on parole. However, in a habeas action, the court has

latitude to grant far greater relief. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. If the court found that there was

not sufficient evidence to support the Board’s determination of unsuitability, the court could

grant the habeas petition and order the petitioner released on parole. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $12.53. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; plaintiff must file

an original and two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in

accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

DATED: July 22, 2005

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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