Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 46:741 Shipping

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LT. RICHARD T. GENGLER and

LT. DANIEL S. McSEVENEY,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THROUGH

ITS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND

NAVY; and SECRETARY DONALD C.

WINTER, 

 Defendant.

1:06-CV-00362 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision is an application for a

temporary restraining order “for immediate discharge” from the

Navy of Plaintiffs Lt. Richard T. Gengler and Lt. Daniel S.

McSeveney. (Doc. 15, filed July 25, 2006.) Plaintiffs also seek

an immediate hearing on their underlying petition for habeas

corpus. (See id. at 2.)

II. BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiffs Richard T. Gengler and Lt. Daniel S. McSeveney

are Naval Officers and Aviators who are currently stationed with

the Operational Test Evaluation Squadron Nine (VX-9) in China

Lake, California. They are assigned as Operational Test

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Although the Agreement also contains language requiring 1

Plaintiffs to serve eight years as a Reserve Officer upon

acceptance of a commission, that language appears not to be an

issue here. Plaintiffs accepted commissions in October 1996 as

Ensigns, well over eight years ago. Plaintiffs suggest and

Defendants do not dispute that this satisfies Plaintiffs’ eight

year Reserve Officer obligation.

The so-called “winging” orders do not appear in the 2

record, but Defendant acknowledged during oral argument that the

documents were not signed by Plaintiffs. 

2

Directors for the F/A-18C-F weapons system programs and currently

are on “detachment” in Key West, Florida, performing operational

tests on a radar system. (Doc. 16 at 1; Pltfs’ Decls. at ¶7;

Gunter Decl. at 3.) 

Plaintiffs both entered the Navy in April 1996, after

signing separate “Aviation Officer Candidate Program Service

Agreements (the “Agreements”). The Agreements were drafted by

the Navy and signed on the Navy’s behalf by another Naval

Officer. Among other things, the Agreements state that each

consented to “serve on active duty as a commissioned officer for

a period of seven years from date of designation as a Naval

Aviator.” (Pltfs’ Decls. Ex A, at ¶2.) 

1

Plaintiffs successfully completed their flight training and

were designated as Naval Aviators in February 1999 (Gengler) and

April 1999 (McSeveney), respectively. The Navy asserts that

Plaintiffs confirmed their eight year term of duty when

Plaintiffs were given their “winging orders,” a document both

Plaintiffs received without question in 1999. (Doc. 25, Gunter

Decl. at ¶2). Plaintiffs assert, however, that the seven year 2

commitment term contained in their service Agreements was

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Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested at oral argument that the 3

Student Control Officer directly responded to the contents of

Plaintiffs’ winging orders and, essentially, told them “not to

worry about it.” This representation, however, is not evidence. 

Plaintiffs’ own declarations make no direct link between the

winging orders and the representations made by the “Student

Control Officer.” For example, Lt. Gengler states:

On April of 1999 I received orders to report to my next

command, Strike Fighter Squadron 125, for follow-on

training in the F-18 Hornet. Shortly thereafter, I

spoke to the Student Control Officer at my training

squadron’s administration department (VT-22, NAS

Kingsville, TX), who verbally reaffirmed the seven year

term contained in the Agreement. 

(Doc. 17 ¶6.) 

3

confirmed orally by a “Student Control Officer” in April 1999. 

(Plaintiffs’ Decls. at ¶6.) 

3

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have served with

distinction since 1999. Each pilot logged more than 150 hours in

combat situations and each received numerous medals for valor

during combat. (Doc. 16 at 4.) 

When their contractual seven-year term of active duty

approached its end, both Plaintiffs notified their Commanding

Offices that they would be requesting release from active duty

(“RAD”). (Pltfs’ Decls. at ¶8.) The Navy denied Plaintiffs’

requests, however. (Id.) Plaintiffs appealed the denial to (a)

their Commanding Officer, (b) the Naval Personnel Department, (c)

the Board for Correction of Naval Records (“BCNR”), and (c) the

Secretary of the Navy. (Id. at ¶¶9-13 & Ex. I-S.) All these

appeals were rejected, and the Navy informed Plaintiffs that

their administrative remedies had been exhausted. (Id. at Ex.

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E.) 

The seven year termination dates for Plaintiffs Gengler and

McSeveney were April and February 2006, respectively. Plaintiffs

assert that being required to serve beyond the seven-year

contractual period constitutes irreparable harm in and of itself. 

Plaintiffs also point out that there is the potential for even

more severe hardships if they are deployed outside the

Continental United States. At the time the habeas petition in

this case was filed, Plaintiff’s were on “shore duty” assigned to

a “non-deployable” unit in California. Plaintiffs believe that

it is likely that their status will change. According to Lt.

McSeveney:

The Navy gives orders to its sailors and officers in

approximately three-year blocks, typically alternating

between “sea duty” and “shore duty.” A sea tour

typically lasts 36 months, while a shore tour lasts 33

months. During a sea tour, Navy personnel are assigned

to an operational unit such as an aircraft squadron,

destroyer or submarine, and are expected to deploy

either on a set schedule or as needed, dictated by

operational necessity. While on a shore tour,

personnel are assigned to a non-deployable unit, such

as a training squadron, test unit or recruiting office,

and are not expected to deploy in an operational

capacity. This alternating rotation is designed to

ensure that Navy sailors and officers are able to spend

adequate time with their families away form the

stresses of operational duty. By refusing to honor my

contract and delaying the administrative process for

two years, the Navy has put me in an administrative

limbo between shore duty and sea duty. According to my

contract, my time in the Navy should have been complete

last month, February 2006. My current set of orders

for shore duty end[ed] March 2006. Since the Navy is

attempting to keep me in for an eighth year, this will

leave me with eleven months of service to complete. 

The Navy will not issue Permanent Change of duty

station (PCS) orders for members with less than twelve

months of service remaining since the cost of moving an

entire family is prohibitive for that small amount of

time, so my current shore tour orders will be extended. 

The effect of that eleven-month extension, however, is

to change my duty status from non-deployable to

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 Plaintiffs claim that the same deployment framework 4

applies to Gengler, except that his shore duty ended n May 2006. 

(Gengler Decl. at ¶15.) 

5

deployable to locations outside the Continental United

States (“CONUS”). Like many active duty Navy personnel

on sea duty with a limited amount of time remaining in

their service, it is highly likely that this change in

status will result in my being deployed to Iraq, where

I will augment U.S. ground forces in hard-to-fill

billets. In other words, the Navy is not attempting to

keep me in service to take advantage of my extensive

training and tactical expertise as a strike fighter

pilot, but simply to use me as a body to fill the

position of an Army officer the Army failed to recruit

or entice to stay in the service. The navy has never

made a request of me to serve any extra time in my

trained capacity as a strike fighter pilot. in fact,

the Navy currently has a surplus of officers as

evidenced by the Involuntary Release from Active Duty

(IRAD) policy, which resulted in the released of more

than 400 officers in December 2003 and another 120 in

May of 2004. 

(McSeveney Decl. at ¶15.)4

According to Lieutenant Commander Jeremy W. Gunter,

assignment of Plaintiffs overseas is “unlikely at this point”

I am [] responsible for filling Individual Augmentee

(IA) assignments for six to twelve month deployments to

Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places where additional

manpower for the Global War on Terror may be needed. 

These billets are located all over the world and

included some in the Continental United States. While

I do not have overall control of the selection process

for officers who fill IA billets, I do coordinate the

orders for officers under my assignment who are

selected for such deployments. Neither LT Gengler nor

LT McSeveney is currently under orders to deploy as an

IA. While it is possible that their Commanding Officer

may select one or both of them for such an assignment

if he were asked to provide officers, it is my opinion

that it is unlikely at this point. 

(Gengler Decl. at ¶4.)

Plaintiffs highlight several other aspects of their personal

situations in an attempt to demonstrate hardship. First, Lt.

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McSeveney recently purchased a home in Denver, Colorado, which

his family planned to occupy in December 2005. (McSeveney Decl.

at ¶16.) Instead, the house sits empty “and the mortgage payment

is rapidly eating into [his family] savings.” (Id.) He has also

been forced to cancel numerous aviation-related job interviews

pending the outcome of this case. (Id.) Finally, McSeveney

states that his wife scheduled an in-vitro fertilization attempt

for this summer and that these plans would be disrupted if the

Navy chooses to deploy him. (Id.)

Lt. Gengler has been accepted for admission to the

University of Chicago Business School. His acceptance, however,

is contingent upon his attending classes in August 2006. 

Additionally, Gengler believes that his ability to obtain a

deferment of admission may be adversely affected by his age. He

is currently 33 years old and the oldest student accepted at

Chicago Business school this year was 35. (See Gengler Decl. at

¶16.)

Plaintiffs allege that the Navy approved the discharge

requests of as many as eight other fixed-wing jet pilots with the

same service Agreements as Plaintiffs after they served only

seven years of active duty. The Navy responded to this

allegation at oral argument by explaining that those pilots had

less exemplary service records and were selected for discharge on

those grounds. However, the Navy has yet to produce any evidence

regarding these cooperator pilots.

Moreover, in a supplemental declaration filed on July 25,

2006, Lt. Gengler describes a recently enacted reduction in force

policy issued by the Navy. Specifically, Gengler asserts that

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Navy has acknowledged it is “overmanned with pilots and is

looking to remove 300 of them by September 30, 2006 presumably in

advance of the next fiscal year.” (Doc. 21.) 

Because the pilots in question have not

volunteered to retire, the Navy would have to pay them

a severance package to force them out. I believe this

severance package basically equates to two years salary

by law. 

In a cost saving effort, the Navy has decided to

implement the [Voluntary Separation Pay] program (see

attached Exhibit A). They have identified some target

population within each different job type that they

want to reduce, and have offered those candidates the

opportunity to participate. This target group consists

of more than the actual number of candidates [than] the

Navy is looking for, in order to allow for competition

among the candidates. 

The concept is simple and works as follows: Each

participant is allowed to bid on an amount that they

would be willing to take to leave the Navy by September

30, 2006. The Navy will then grant separation,

starting with the lowest bidders and working higher,

until they have reached their desired level of

separations. In our community (pilots), the number of

individuals they are looking to separate is

approximately 300. In fact, one of our friends, who

left our squadron about one year ago, is a candidate

even though he does not want to separate from the Navy. 

He is an F/A 18 pilot just like co-plaintiff McSeveney

and myself, and could do any job for the Navy that

either McSeveney or I could do. The Navy will

literally pay him money to separate prior to September

30, 2006, while at the same time refusing [to let us]

leave. 

(Id.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 31, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, which

contains five causes of action. The first is a breach of

contract action brought pursuant to the Contracts Disputes Act

and Suits in Admiralty Act. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶25-32.) The second is

a claim for equitable estoppel based on the allegation that the

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Navy made “misrepresentations regarding the applicable [service]

period to invoke Plaintiff’s reliance.” (Id. at ¶¶33-40.) The

third is a claim brought under the Administrative Procedures Act,

alleging that the Navy’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ discharge

requests was “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise contrary to law...” (Id. at ¶¶41-42.) The fourth

claim is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting

discharge from the Navy. (Id. at ¶¶43-48.) Finally, the fifth

cause of action is for declaratory relief and requests, among

other things, a declaration that “Defendant’s position throughout

this dispute was not substantially justified...” and that

“Plaintiffs [are] prevailing panties] entitled to costs and

attorneys fees accrued throughout this dispute as allowed by the

Equal Access to Justice Act.” (Id. at ¶¶49=50.) Plaintiffs seek

specific performance of the Agreements and attorneys fees and

costs. (Id. at ¶¶51-52.) 

On the same day the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs filed an

ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, requesting the

entry of an order “preventing Defendants from changing

Plaintiffs’ status from non-deployable to deployable or otherwise

sending them to Iraq or any location outside [the Continental

United States.” (Doc. 2 at 2, filed March 31, 2006.) A few days

later, the parties reached an agreement as to the requested

injunctive relief. The Navy promised that Plaintiffs would

remain on non-deployable status until July 10, 2006 in exchange

for Plaintiffs withdrawing their request for a temporary

restraining order. On June 1, 2006, the parties extended the

duration of the agreement until August 9, 2006, pending further

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internal discussion by the Navy regarding Plaintiffs’ discharge

request. Subsequently, the Navy notified Plaintiffs that they

would not be discharged. Plaintiffs filed the instant ex parte

motion for a temporary restraining order on July 25, 2006. (Doc.

15.) Defendants were afforded an opportunity to oppose on July

27, 2006. (Docs. 24 & 25.) A hearing on the motion was set for

August 4, 2006. (Doc. 26.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Threshold issues: Service and Notice.

1. Notice - Temporary Restraining Order.

The United States asserts that Plaintiffs did not provide

adequate notice to the Defendants when they filed their ex parte

temporary restraining order.

Defendants concede that the Plaintiffs’ attorney Timothy

Lord (“Lord”) submitted the required certification, stating among

other things, that he specifically notified Assistant United

States Attorney Kimberly Gaab of his intention to file the motion

on July 21, 2006. Defendants assert, however, that the

information contained within the certification is untrue because:

1) Lord [Plaintiffs’ counsel] never provided Ms. Gaab

with prior notice of the motion, and filed it when he

knew Ms. Gaab would be out of town.

2) Lord had the opportunity to tell Ms. Gaab he would

be seeking a TRO in their 20 minute conversation on

July 24, 2006, but failed to do so. 

(Doc. 25 at 2.) Defendants assert that such false statements

should not be tolerated by the Court, and therefore the TRO is

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not an appropriate remedy.

Plaintiffs’ respond that:

1) The stipulations alone made in the order to stay the

injunction from April 5, 2006 to August 9, 2006, should

put the Defendants on notice that at any time the

request for injunctive relief could be renewed.

2) On July 5, 2006, Lord sent an email to Ms. Gaab

informing her that a request for injunctive relief will

be filed unless settlement can by effected by July 13,

2006. Ms. Gaab acknowledged by her email response. 

Declaration by Timothy Lord (hereinafter Lord Decl.)

para. 5 and Exhibit C

3) On July 12, 2006, Lord repeated the above

contention, and explained that maybe he could hold off

until Monday but cannot promise. Lord Decl. para. 6

and Exhibit D. On the same day, Gaab responded that

should Plaintiffs file for any other relief in her

absence, another attorney would be able to attend to

the matter. Lord Decl. para. 7.

4) On Monday, July 14 (sic), Lord sent an email

regarding the timing of the hearing for preliminary

injunction. Lord Decl. para. 8 and Exhibit E.

5) On July 24, 2006, in a scheduling Conference, Lord

reiterated that Plaintiffs would seek all possible

means of relief.

(Doc. 27 at 3.) Plaintiffs contend that the above actions,

accompanied by the stipulation, put Defendants on notice that a

request for injunctive relief could be renewed to take effect

after August 6, 2006.

Although the above communications did not provide specific

notice to Defendants that a temporary restraining order request

would be filed against them on July 25, 2006, Defendants had

notice that a preliminary injunction or other remedies could be

sought at any time. As a practical matter, it is also worth

noting that Defendants were afforded an opportunity to respond in

writing prior to a public hearing on the motion. 

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2. Service of Process.

Defendants also object that Plaintiffs did not adequately

serve Defendants with a copy of the complaint in this case. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(I) states in relevant part

that when serving the United States, service shall be effected:

(A) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the

complaint to the United States attorney for the

district in which the action is brought...and

(B) by also sending a copy of the summons and of the

complaint by registered or certified mail to the

Attorney General of the United States at Washington,

District of Columbia, and

(C) in any action attacking the validity of an order of

an officer or agency of the United States not made a

party, by also sending a copy of the summons and of the

complaint by registered or certified mail to the

officer or agency.

Fed. Rules Civ. Pro. 4(I). In this case, Plaintiffs needed to

serve the United States Attorney General, the Secretary of the

Navy, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern

District of California.

Defendants asserted in their opposition that service was not

made on the Attorney General and Secretary of the Navy. (Doc. 25

at 5.) However, according to the declaration submitted by

Plaintiffs’ counsel, service was effected on all required parties

by certified mail on July 31, 2006. (Lord Decl. Ex. A and B.)

B. Applicable Standard for Temporary Injunctive Relief.

The generally-applicable legal standard for granting a

temporary restraining order (TRO) is substantially similar to the

standard for a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales

Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir.

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2001). The standard for granting a preliminary injunction

balances Plaintiff’s likelihood of success against the hardships

to the parties. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of L.A., 340

F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the traditional test, a

plaintiff must show

1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits,

2) the possibility of irreparable harm to the

plaintiff if injunctive relief is not granted,

3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and 

4) advancement of the public interest (in certain

cases).

Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir.

2005). Alternatively, a court may grant an injunction if a

plaintiff “demonstrates either a combination of probable success

on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that

serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips

sharply in his favor.” Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in

original). These two formulations of the injunctive relief test

are not separate tests but rather two points on a sliding scale,

in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the

probability of success decreases. Id. (citations and quotations

omitted).

However, a mandatory injunction, one that compels action

(rather than a prohibitory injunction which forbids action) goes

beyond simply maintaining the status quo and is disfavored. LGS

Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes, 434 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th

Cir.2006) (citing Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320

(9th Cir. 1994)). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to

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Other circuits have applied similarly heightened 5

standards to requests for mandatory preliminary injunctive

relief. See, e.g., Sunward Electronics, Inc. v. McDonald, 362

F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring a showing of “clear or

substantial likelihood of success where the injunction sought is

mandatory”).

13

maintain the relative positions of the parties until a trial on

the merits is held. Id. District courts should deny mandatory

injunctions “unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving

party.” Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320 (internal quotations omitted).5

Usually, mandatory relief is unnecessary where “it will not

further the purpose of a preliminary injunction, which is merely

to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial

on the merits can be held." LGS Architects, 434 F.3d at 1158. 

A threshold question is whether the preliminary injunctive

relief sought by Plaintiffs is prohibitory (requiring the

standard showing) or mandatory (requiring a heightened showing). 

In the Ninth Circuit, mandatory relief is defined as such relief

that goes beyond maintaining the “status quo pendente lite.” See

Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1319. This refers “not simply to any

situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last

uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy."

GoTo.com, Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir.

2000). Here, Plaintiffs’ last uncontested status preceding the

pending controversy was as active duty Naval Aviators. 

Plaintiffs now request emergency relief in the form of an

immediate discharge from the Navy. This would not return the

parties to the status quo pendente lite. It would go far beyond

that. Accordingly, this motion is subject to the heightened

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standard, barring the requested relief “unless the facts and law

clearly favor the moving party.”

 

C. Probability of Success on the Merits.

1. Habeas/Contract Claim.

Plaintiffs argue that by the terms of their Agreement, they

should only have to serve seven years of active duty. (See Docs.

4 & 5, Ex. A, Agreement ¶ 2.) The government contends that

federal statutes trump contrary terms of a service agreement when

the two conflict. Specifically, 10 U.S.C. § 653(a) provides that

fixed wing jet pilots such as Plaintiffs have a minimum service

obligation of eight years of active duty. The government

contends that it is the statute, not the Agreement, that

controls.

The government cites Antonuk v. United States, 445 F.2d 592

(6th Cir. 1971), for the proposition that federal statutes always

supersede service agreement terms. In Antonuk, an Army Reservist

was ordered to serve active duty pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 673a

(now 10 U.S.C. § 12303) as a sanction for having more than five

unexcused absences from scheduled training drills over a one-year

period. Id. at 593-94. Title 10 U.S.C. § 673a (now § 12303)

provides that any Reservist who is not assigned to or

participating satisfactorily in his reserve unit may be assigned

to active duty for 24 months. Antonuk claimed that this statute

did not apply because his enlistment terms stated that if he

failed to perform satisfactorily, he would only have to serve 45

days on active duty. Antonuk, 445 F.2d at 598. The court found

that “reservists may be activated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 673a,

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notwithstanding clauses in their enlistment contract to the

contrary.” Id. at 599. To a certain extent, Plaintiffs’

situation is distinguishable from that in Antonuk. Antonuk

enlisted on February 4, 1965. Id. at 553. Congress first

enacted the operative statue as part of the Department of Defense

Appropriation Act of 1967, 80 Stat. 980, § 101(a), and made the

provision permanent by the Military Selective Service Act of

1967, Pub. L. 90-40. Accordingly, the enlistment contract

preceded the statute. The Antonuk court held that Congress,

under its constitutional power to raise armies, could abrogate

the terms of its Reserve enlistment contracts. Id. at 599. 

Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs’ service Agreements explicitly

contradict a pre-existing statute and there is no indication that

the Navy (or Congress) acted to abrogate the terms of Plaintiffs’

service agreements subsequent to their formation.

The government also cites to United States v. Larionoff, 431

U.S. 864 (1977), and Beckering v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 30

(1990) for the proposition that service members are subject to

all applicable federal law, whether or not set forth in their

service agreement. In Larionoff, seven Navy plaintiffs sued for

their re-enlistment bonus money, which was denied to them after

they re-enlisted. 431 U.S. at 865. Congress passed a statute

that provided a bonus for these plaintiffs, but this statute was

later repealed. Id. at 866-68. The United States Supreme Court

recognized that “a soldier’s entitlement to pay is dependent upon

statutory right.” Id. at 869 (citing Bell v. United States, 366

U.S. 393, 401 (1961)). Thus, statute, not ordinary contract

principles, should govern situations involving entitlement to

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10 U.S.C. § 12305 provides in pertinent part: 6

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during any

period members of a reserve component are serving on active

duty pursuant to an order to active duty under authority of

section 12301, 12302, or 12304 of this title, the President

may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion,

retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the

16

pay. Id. Beckering v. United States similarly held that

“benefits owing to a military service member are governed by

statutes and regulations, and not by general principles of

contract law.” Beckering, 22 Cl. Ct. at 32 (citing Larionoff,

431 U.S. at 869).

But, the subject matter -- military pay and benefits -- at

issue in Larionoff and Beckering is an exception to the general

rule that service agreements are subject to traditional

principles of contract law. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 554 n.4

(noting that exceptions to the general rule have been carved out

for the areas of military pay or benefits due to the “unique

nature and characteristics of military service”); see also Bell,

366 U.S. at 401 (“common-law rules governing private contracts

have no place in the area of military pay”). Here, Plaintiffs

are not seeking benefits or pay, but rather specific performance

of the durational terms of their service agreements. The

government does not point to an exception to the general rule

that traditional contract principles should apply.

The United States next cites Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980

(9th Cir. 2006), which concerned a conflict between an enlistment

contract and a Presidential “stop-loss” order issued pursuant to

10 U.S.C. § 12305. In Doe, the plaintiff had enlisted for a 6

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armed forces who the President determines is essential to

the national security of the United States.

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one-year term in the National Guard. Doe, 435 F.3d at 983. 

During his second one-year enlistment, Doe’s unit was ordered to

active duty for a period that was eleven months longer than his

enlistment contract provided. Id. Doe’s contract contained the

express provisions that (1) future enacted statutes and

regulations could affect the terms of his contract and that (2)

in times of national emergency, the President may order Doe to

active duty and extend his enlistment. Id. at 983. In Doe’s

case, the contract provision regarding times of national

emergency was triggered by the President’s use of his authority

under § 12305 to extend Doe’s enlistment. See id. at 984-85. 

Doe filed a habeas corpus petition which was denied. Id. at 983. 

The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision, citing to

Santiago v. Rumsfeld as governing in the Doe case. Id. at 988-

89.

Santiago involved a very similar conflict between am

enlistment contract and a stop-loss order. Santiago enlisted in

the National Guard on June 28, 1996 for an eight-year term. 

Santiago, 425 F.3d at 553. Shortly before his term was about to

expire, his enlistment was extended by a stop-loss order when his

unit received a mobilization alert prior to being ordered to

active service. Id. Santiago filed a writ of habeas corpus,

which was denied by the district court. Id. at 554. The Ninth

Circuit affirmed. Id. at 552.

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The Ninth Circuit first held that enlistment contracts are

subject to general contract law, with exceptions not relevant in

Santiago. Id. at 554. The court found that Santiago’s contract

contained terms that specifically anticipated and allowed for the

application of current and future statutes. One section

contained a passage stating that

Many laws, regulations and military customs will

govern my conduct and require me to do things a

civilian does not have to do. The following

statements are not promises or guarantees of any kind. 

They explain some of the present laws affecting the

Armed Forces which I cannot change but which Congress

can change at any time.

Santiago, 425 F.3d at 555. The Ninth Circuit interpreted this

term to mean that the parties understood and intended that

“subsequently enacted, as well as pre-existing, law would

apply.” Id. Because § 12305(a) was enacted in 1983, it was one

of the federal laws to which Santiago’s enlistment was subject

when he enlisted in 1996. Id. Santiago’s contract contained

another term that explicitly stated:

Laws and regulations that govern military personnel

may change without notice to me. Such changes may

affect my status, pay, allowances, benefits, and

responsibilities as a member of the Armed Forces

REGARDLESS of the provisions of this

enlistment/reenlistment document.

Id. The stop-loss order which authorized suspension of

separation laws qualified as a change in the law. Id. at 555-

56. By the provisions of Santiago’s enlistment contract,

Santiago had his enlistment properly extended.

The government maintains that 10 U.S.C. § 653 (requiring

fixed-wing pilots to serve eight years in active duty) likewise

trumps any contrary contractual terms. But, unlike in Doe and

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Santiago, where the contracts both incorporated pre-existing law

and anticipated the incorporation of subsequent orders in times

of national emergency, Plaintiffs service Agreements do no such

thing. Gengler and McSeveney’s Agreements do have a clause that

allows for subsequent changes in law to apply to pre-existing

service Agreements. (Doc. 4 & 5, Ex. A, Agreement ¶ 1(g).) 

That federal statutes and pertinent regulations

applicable to personnel in the United States Navy may

change without notice and that such changes may affect

my status as an Aviation Officer Candidate or a

commissioned officer and obligations to serve as such.

(Agreement at g (emphasis added)). This is an express

acknowledgment that future changes in federal law could affect

Plaintiffs’ obligation to serve as aviation officers. However,

unlike in Doe and Santiago, Plaintiffs’ Agreements do not

provide that pre-existing laws trump the terms of their service

agreements, nor has the United States pointed to any caselaw

that so holds, absent language to that effect in the service

agreement. Here, the pre-existing law is 10 U.S.C. § 653, which

provides a minimum eight-year term of active duty for pilots

like Plaintiffs. This directly conflicts with paragraph 2 of

their service Agreements, which provide that the parties agree

Plaintiffs will serve a seven year term of active duty. 

Although the cases cited by the government are

distinguishable, Plaintiffs have not cited to a single case that

is directly on point, nor have they pointed to any authority in

which the relief they seek was granted. In other words, neither

the facts nor the law clearly demonstrate that Plaintiffs will

prevail. Therefore, the requested mandatory injunction is not

justified on a contract theory. 

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2. Estoppel Claim.

Plaintiffs assert that equitable estoppel should apply

here. Equitable estoppel “precludes a party from claiming the

benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid

the burdens that contract imposes.” Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436

F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he party claiming estoppel

must have relied on his adversary’s [misleading] conduct in such

a manner as to change his position for the worse, and than

reliance must have been reasonable in that the party claiming

the estoppel did not know nor should it have known that its

adversary’s conduct was misleading.” River City Ranches #?1 Ltd

v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 401 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005). The

Ninth Circuit applies a two-prong test to determine when it is

appropriate to apply equitable estoppel against the government. 

First Plaintiff must demonstrate “affirmative conduct [by the

government] going beyond mere negligence,” Purcell v. United

States, 1 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1993), and second that the

“government’s wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and

the public’s interest will not suffer undue damage” if the

requested relief is granted. United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d

at 1411 n.12. 

In the context of ruling on an equitable estoppel claim

brought against the government, the Ninth Circuit held that

“[n]either the failure to inform an individual of his or her

legal rights nor the negligent provision of misinformation

constitute affirmative misconduct.” Suilt v. Schiltgen, 213

F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs assert, however, that

the Navy’s conduct went beyond mere negligence, citing Watkins

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v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), for the

proposition that the government’s conduct in this case is

actually affirmative misconduct. In Watkins, the Army was well

aware from the time of Watkins’ initial enlistment in 1967 that

he had “homosexual tendencies,” to which he admitted on several

occasions. At that time, engaging in homosexual acts with other

servicemen was considered a crime under military law. Watkins

was investigated several times by the Army for allegedly

committing sodomy and his fitness for duty was questioned on

several other occasions. But, until 1981, he was always cleared

of all wrongdoing and allowed to reenlist on several separate

occasions because of his excellent performance. Id. at 702. In

1981, the Army promulgated a regulation which mandated the

discharge of homosexuals regardless of merit. Soon thereafter

an Army Board convened and determined that Watkins should be

discharged. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit held that equitable estoppel could be

invoked against the government in Watkins because the Army

repeatedly represented over a 14-year period that Watkins was

qualified for reenlistment. The court noted that the government

“acted affirmatively in admitting, reclassifying, reenlisting,

retaining, and promoting Watkins.” Id. at 708. Furthermore,

the defendant’s conduct “involve[d] ongoing active

misrepresentations by Army officials acting well within their

scope of authority.” Id. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found

the Army’s conduct to be “affirmative misconduct.” Id. 

Plaintiffs attempt to compare the facts of this case to

Watkins, asserting that ongoing misrepresentation occurred when

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the Navy drafted Plaintiffs’ Agreements, presented the

Agreements to Plaintiffs, signed the Agreements (through a

Lieutenant in 1996), and then, in 1999 again represented to

Plaintiffs that the seven-year term applied. (See Doc. 16 at

12.) But, there is absolutely no evidence that the drafting,

presenting, and signing of the Agreements containing a sevenyear term was anything other than negligence (i.e., a mistake).

Plaintiffs submitted no evidence of any wrongful conduct by the

government when they entered into their service contracts. By

contrast, the earlier incidents in Watkins, where the Army

effectively ignored a de facto policy against homosexuals for

more than a decade in continuing to allow Watkins to reenlist,

despite his admissions that he was homosexual. 

At best, there is evidence that a single “Student Control

Officer” orally confirmed Plaintiffs seven year commitment in

April 1999, shortly after Plaintiffs received their “winging

orders,” which indicated an eight-year service obligation. 

(Plaintiffs’ Decls. at ¶6.) Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested at

oral argument that the Student Control Officer directly refuted

the contents of Plaintiffs’ winging orders by, essentially,

telling them “not to worry about it.” The record evidence is

not so clear. Plaintiffs’ own declarations make no direct link

between the winging orders and the representations made by the

“Student Control Officer.” For example, Lt. Gengler states:

On April of 1999 I received orders to report to my

next command, Strike Fighter Squadron 125, for followon training in the F-18 Hornet. Shortly thereafter, I

spoke to the Student Control Officer at my training

squadron’s administration department (VT-22, NAS

Kingsville, TX), who verbally reaffirmed the seven

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year term contained in the Agreement. 

(Doc. 17 ¶6.) In any case, this conduct is far from the ongoing

and repeated representations made by the Army in Watkins. The

record currently before the court does not clearly indicate that

Plaintiffs’ will prevail on their equitable estoppel claim. 

3. APA Claim.

In addition to their claim for entitlement to a writ of

habeas corpus, Plaintiffs also seek relief pursuant to the

Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702-706. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the Navy’s rejections of

Plaintiffs’ discharge requests were “arbitrary and capricious,

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law...” (Id.

at ¶¶41-42.) Plaintiffs summarize the factual and legal

theories offered by the Navy during the administrative process

as follows:

1. The seven year term in the Agreements was

“erroneous” or “misinformation;”

2. The Secretary of the Navy has the authority to

grant Plaintiffs’ RAD requests but the BCNR “was

not persuaded that such authority should have

been exercised;”

3. The BCNR found no compelling harm to Plaintiffs

as a result of having to serve an extra-year of

active duty;

4. Plaintiffs did not present evidence to “establish

the existence of probable material error or

injustice;”

5. Defendants granting previous RAD requests of

Naval Aviators with identical agreements by

others in similar circumstances did not entitle

Plaintiffs to similar relief; 

6. “[N]otwithstanding the errors found [in the

Agreements] or any other documents or promises

made by government officials and agents to fixed

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wing jet pilots entering service after Oct 1990,"

there is no waiver or exception to the eight-year

minimum service requirement for fixed wing pilots

contained in 10 U.S.C. § 653.

7. Review of “federal case law interpreting

situations in which government officials gave

erroneous information to individuals about

governing programs [determined that the]... U.S.

Supreme Court has ruled that misinformation by a

government authority does not form the basis or

justification for violating a statute. [Footnote

to O.P.M. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990)].”

8. “The bottom line is that the Navy does not have

authority to grant RAD requests for fixed wing

jet pilots.” 

(Doc. 16, at 4-5.) 

Plaintiffs appear to recite the Navy’s reasoning in an

attempt to demonstrate that the denial of their discharge

requests was “arbitrary and capricious.” But, at its core, the

relief sought by Plaintiffs, through their APA claim and the

other claims in the suit is specific performance of the terms of

the Agreements. But, the APA does not waive sovereign immunity

for such a suit. See North Star Alaska v. United States, 14

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In North Star Alaska v. United States, 9 F.3d 1430 (9th

Cir. 1993)(en banc), the Ninth Circuit considered a claim

brought by North Star Housing Corporation seeking reformation of

a contract it entered into with the Army. North Star argued

that the district court could assert jurisdiction over the case

under either APA § 702 or the Little Tucker Act. Section 702

limits the APA’s sovereign immunity where other statutes

impliedly forbid the relief sought:

Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on

judicial review or the power or duty of the court to

dismiss any action or deny relief on any other

appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers

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authority to grant relief if any other statute that

grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids

the relief which is sought.

5 U.S.C. § 702. The Ninth Circuit in North Star reasoned that

the Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act prohibited the relief

sought by North Star if North Star’s claim was grounded in

contract, rather than statute.

The Tucker Act, which waives sovereign immunity and

provides for claims court jurisdiction over certain

claims, states:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall

have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any

claim against the United States founded either

upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or

any regulation of an executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the

United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated

damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Under the “Little Tucker Act,”

the district court has concurrent jurisdiction with

the claims court for actions not exceeding $10,000. 28

U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2); Price v. United States Gen. Serv.

Admin., 894 F.2d 323, 324 (9th Cir.1990) ( Price ).

Generally speaking, the Tucker Act does not permit the

claims court to grant equitable or declaratory relief

in a contract dispute case. [citations] Similarly, the

Little Tucker Act does not specifically authorize the

district court to grant declaratory or equitable

relief against the United States in contract cases.

Price, 894 F.2d at 324; [citations] However, the

district court does have jurisdiction to hear claims

for equitable relief which “rest [ ] at bottom on

statutory rights.” [citations] 

Id. at 1432. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the

panel for them to determine whether the claim was grounded in

contract or statute. Id.

The panel held that:

If a plaintiff's claim is “concerned solely with

rights created within the contractual relationship and

has nothing to do with duties arising independently of

the contract """ [the] claim is ‘founded """ upon [a]

""" contract with the United States' and is therefore

within the Tucker Act and subject to its restrictions

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This conclusion, reached in the context of a motion for 7

injunctive relief, does not dispose of Plaintiffs’ APA claims,

which are the subject of a pending motion to dismiss. 

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on relief.”

14 F.3d at 38. 

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish North Star by arguing

that this is not a claim for damages based on contract,

suggesting that the Little Tucker Act therefore waives sovereign

immunity and allows jurisdiction in the district court. 

However, the en banc opinion specifically noted that the Little

Tucker Act does not authorize injunctive relief as a remedy in

contract claims brought against the government in district

court. 9 F.3d at 1432. Moreover, it is well settled law that

“the APA does not waive sovereign immunity for claims that arise

out of a contract and that seek specific performance of the

contract as relief.” Robbins v. United States Bureau of Land

Management, 438 F.3d 1074, 1082 (10th Cir. 2006); see also

Tuscon Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 647

(9th Cir. 1998)(APA does not waive sovereign immunity with

respect to claims for specific performance of a contract).

Plaintiffs do not assert that their claim is grounded in

statute. Accordingly, on the present record, Plaintiffs’ APA

claim has little merit. Even if the APA did waive sovereign 7

immunity for such a lawsuit, the current state of the record

(e.g., no administrative record has been filed) does not permit

a determination that the facts and law clearly favor the moving

party. 

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D. Balance of the Hardships.

1. Hardship to Plaintiffs.

First, it cannot be disputed that the loss of liberty

Plaintiffs are experiencing as a result of being required to

serve beyond their contractual commitment is a hardship. But,

the only relief sought from that hardship is discharge, the

ultimate remedy that is unavailable at this stage. 

In addition, Plaintiffs place great weight on the asserted

hardship of possible deployment overseas. Although the Navy

asserts that deployment overseas is “unlikely,” the Navy is

unwilling to rule out the possibility that the current situation

might change. For example, six months from now, the global

security situation might warrant the deployment of greater

numbers of pilots than is currently expected. Plaintiffs

contend that this uncertainty is a hardship. But, the Navy

correctly pointed out during oral argument that there is

currently no “imminent threat” that Plaintiffs will be deployed

overseas. Absent such a threat, Plaintiffs cannot obtain

injunctive relief to prevent deployment. However, in order to

ensure that Plaintiffs have ample opportunity to seek injunctive

relief should the Navy decide to deploy them before this case is

resolved, the Navy shall provide Plaintiffs at least twenty (20)

days notice prior to changing their deployment status. 

Plaintiffs also assert other personal hardships. 

Specifically, Lt. McSeveney recently purchased a home in Denver,

Colorado, which his family planned to occupy in December 2005. 

Instead, the house sits empty “and the mortgage payment is

rapidly eating into [his family] savings.” (McSeveney Decl. at

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McSeveney stated in his March 31, 2006 declaration that 8

he and his wife scheduled an in-vitro fertilization attempt for

this summer and that these plans would be disrupted if the Navy

chooses to deploy him. (Id.) As of the filing of the renewed

motion for a temporary restraining order on July 25, 2006, it is

no longer clear that this concern is still relevant.

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¶16.) He has also been forced to cancel numerous aviationrelated job interviews pending the outcome of this case. (Id.) 

But, again, nothing short of immediate discharge would alleviate

these purported hardships.8

Lt. Gengler has been accepted for admission to the

University of Chicago Business School. His acceptance, however,

is contingent upon his attending classes in August of this year. 

Additionally, Gengler believes that his ability to obtain a

deferment of admission may be adversely affected by his age. He

is currently 33 years old and he oldest student accepted at

Chicago Business school this year was 35. (See Gengler Decl. at

¶16.) Again, only discharge would permit him to enroll in

business school this fall. Moreover, as the United States

points out, Gengler only speculates that Chicago Business School

would deny him admission at the age of 34, particularly given

the unique circumstances causing his delayed matriculation. 

Finally, the government asserts that the public interest

would be harmed if Plaintiffs were released from active duty. 

Specifically, Lt. Commander Gunter states that the current

manning of Plaintiffs’ test squadron unit (VX-9) is at 81% and

that releasing Plaintiffs from their current “billet” would

result in a coverage gap which would be a detriment to the

unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. (Gunter Decl. at ¶3.)

All eligible officers who could be assigned to take Plaintiffs’

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places within VX-9 are currently under other orders until

January 2007. (Id.) 

Most of the hardships articulated by Plaintiffs can only be

alleviated if Plaintiffs obtain the ultimate relief sought on

the merits in this case. It is not appropriate to give such

relief in the context of a motion for interim injunctive relief. 

Plaintiffs are not in imminent danger of deployment overseas, so

the Navy cannot be enjoined from altering their deployment

status. The purported hardship caused by the uncertainty of

potential deployment overseas can be addressed by requiring the

Navy to give Plaintiffs ample notice prior to altering their

deployment status. Should such notice be given, Plaintiffs may

apply for injunctive relief, and the Navy will have an

opportunity to justify the changed status under the

circumstances presented. 

E. Request for Hearing on Habeas Petition.

In their ex parte motion, Plaintiffs also requested a

hearing on the merits of their habeas petition. (Docs. 15-16.)

Plaintiffs now suggest that they actually requested habeas

relief (not just a hearing) in their ex parte motion and that

“Defendants completely ignore[d]” that request and “[a]s such,

the proposition is unopposed and should be decided in favor of

Plaintiffs.” Insofar as Plaintiffs are asserting that the Navy

has conceded the merits of this lawsuit, this assertion is

misplaced. Plaintiffs plainly were requesting a hearing on the

merits, and even suggested that the court set a briefing

schedule for the merits issues. (See Doc. 22, Prop’d Order, at

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2.) A minute order issued on July 26, 2006, set a briefing

schedule on “plaintiffs ex parte application for a TRO and

Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. 24.), while a subsequent minute

order issued on July 28, 2006 set August 8, 2006 as the date for

a hearing on “plaintiffs application for a TRO.” No briefing

schedule or hearing date has yet been set regarding the merits

of this case. Defendants failure to address the merits is

completely consistent with these prior orders and cannot be

interpreted as a failure to oppose on the merits.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) The United States’ objections to the hearing of

this motion on notice and service of process

grounds are not well-founded and are DENIED;

(2) Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining

order in the form of discharge from the Navy is

DENIED; and 

(3) The Navy shall provide Plaintiffs with at least

twenty (20) days notice prior to changing their

deployment status. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 23, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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