Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08171/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08171-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Review Agency Decision

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gregory Yount, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Sally Jewell, Secretary of the Interior, et 

al.,1

Defendants.

No. CV-11-08171-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Northwest Mining Association (“NWMA”) has filed a motion that 

Plaintiff National Mining Association (“NMA”) has joined asking the Court to enter final 

judgment on counts seven and one of their respective complaints pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Docs. 146, 147. Federal Defendants and DefendantIntervenors have filed responses in opposition (Docs. 148, 149), and NWMA and NMA 

have filed replies. Docs. 150, 151. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny 

the motion. 

I. Background. 

 On January 9, 2012, the Secretary of the Department of Interior issued a record of 

decision and public land order pursuant to subsection 203(c)(1) of the Federal Land 

Policy Management Act (“FLPMA”) withdrawing over one million acres of public lands 

in the Grand Canyon watershed from mineral location and entry subject to valid existing 

 

1

 Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell is automatically substituted as Defendant for former Secretary of the Interior Kenneth L. Salazar pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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rights. 77 Fed. Reg. 2563-01 (Jan. 18, 2012). NWMA, NMA, and a number of mining 

and municipal plaintiffs filed complaints in this now-consolidated action challenging the 

Secretary’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) for alleged 

violations of various federal laws, including the FLPMA and the National Environmental 

Policy Act (“NEPA”). NWMA and NMA additionally challenged the Secretary’s 

statutory authority to make the withdrawal because subsection 203(c)(1) of the FLPMA 

contains a legislative veto that they alleged was unconstitutional under INS v. Chadha, 

462 U.S. 919 (1983), and was not severable from the rest of the Act, making the 

Secretary’s decision without legal effect. See 12-cv-08042-DGC, Doc. 1, ¶¶ 127-145; 

12-cv-0838-DGC, Doc. 56, ¶¶ 97-107. 

 NWMA and NMA filed motions for partial summary judgment on their Chadha 

claims (Docs. 73, 90), and Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors filed cross motions for 

partial summary judgment. Docs. 101, 102. On March 20, 2013, the Court denied 

NWMA’s and NMA’s motions and granted Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenors’ 

cross motions. Doc. 130. The Court found that although the legislative veto in 

subsection 203(c)(1) was unconstitutional under Chadha, the veto was severable from the 

rest of the Act and therefore did not invalidate the Secretary’s authority to make the 

withdrawal. Id. The Court reaffirmed this finding on reconsideration. Doc. 144. 

NWMA and NMA now ask the Court to enter a final judgment on their Chadha claims in 

order to make them immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit. They argue that these 

claims are factually and legally separable from the remaining claims in the consolidated 

action, and there is no just reason for delay. 

 II. Legal Standard. 

 Rule 54(b) provides that when more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

action, or when multiple parties are involved, the district court may direct the entry of a 

final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties “only if the 

court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

“‘A similarity of legal or factual issues will weigh heavily against entry of judgment 

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under the rule, and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper only where necessary 

to avoid a harsh and unjust result[.]’” Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 776 

F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). “‘Judgments under Rule 54(b) must 

be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of 

proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by the pressing 

needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.’” 

Id.; see Gausvik v. Perez, 392 F.3d 1006, 1009 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n the interest of 

judicial economy Rule 54(b) should be used sparingly.”). 

III. Discussion. 

 NWMA and NMA (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) argue that although all of the claims 

in the consolidated action arise from the same withdrawal decision, the only fact relevant 

to their Chadha claims is the Secretary’s assertion of authority pursuant to subsection 

203(c)(1). Docs. 146 at 7, 150 at 3-4. They further argue that an appeal of these claims 

would not require review of the Administrative Record as a potential appeal of the APA 

claims would, and the constitutional issue presented here is entirely separate from the 

legal issues in those claims. Doc. 146 at 8-9. These arguments notwithstanding, appeal 

of the Court’s Chadha ruling prior to resolution of the remaining claims still presents the 

likelihood of piecemeal appeals. In such event, separate panels of the Ninth Circuit 

would have to familiarize themselves with the basic facts of the withdrawal and the facts 

Plaintiffs have asserted to show Article III standing, calling for at least some duplication 

in factual and legal analysis.2

 Separate appeals would also risk “multiplying the number 

 

2

 NMA acknowledges that Defendants could raise standing issues on appeal if the Court grants its 54(b) motion, but argues that resolution of those issues may obviate the need for the Ninth Circuit to consider them a second time. Doc. 151 at 3-4. This 

presumes that appeal of the Court’s Chadha ruling would be resolved before the remaining claims in this case are adjudicated and ripe for appeal, something that is not at all certain where appellate arguments on civil cases occur “approximately 12-20 months” after the notice of appeal, and decisions usually come months after arguments. See U.S. 

Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ content/faq.ph; Doc. 141. This Court will rule on the remaining claims in this case before any 54(b) appeal likely would be heard. See Case Management Order, April 23, 2013, Doc. 141. In addition, any second appeal might well require standing analysis for the plaintiffs in this case who would not be part of the 54(b) appeal, requiring two Ninth Circuit panels to wrestle with the standing issues in this case. 

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of proceedings and overcrowding the appellate docket.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General 

Elec. Corp., 446 U.S 1, 8 (1980). “Absent a seriously important reason . . . the interests 

of judicial administration counsel against certifying claims or related issues in remaining 

claims that are based on interlocking facts, in a routine case, that will likely lead to 

successive appeals.” Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 882-83 (2005). 

 Plaintiffs argue that allowing advance appeal of the Chadha issue would help 

“streamline the ensuing litigation,” Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 797-98 (9th 

Cir. 1991), because it could be dispositive as to the legality of the withdrawal and avert 

the need for the Ninth Circuit to consider appeals related to any remaining claims. 

Doc. 146 at 9. The Court is not persuaded, however, that separate certification will 

increase judicial efficiency because the Ninth Circuit could also uphold this Court’s 

finding on the Chadha issue, in which case it would still need to address any appeal of 

the remaining claims. Additionally, as Defendant-Intervenors argue, it is possible that 

resolution of the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s favor could eliminate the case or 

controversy required for appeal of the constitutional issue before that appeal is decided. 

Doc. 149 at 10; see Quinn v. Milsap, 491 U.S. 95, 103 (1989) (noting that a case on 

appeal must retain the essentials of an adversary proceeding). The possibility that the 

Ninth Circuit need not reach this issue on appeal weighs against separate certification. 

See Wood, 422 F.3d at 882 (reversing certification and dismissing an appeal where 

“absent certification, we may never have to decide whether Wood was constructively 

discharged as a matter of law.”). Even if, as NWMA argues, Plaintiffs would seek to 

appeal the Court’s Chadha ruling even if the Court remanded the Secretary’s withdrawal 

decision because a successful appeal of the constitutional issue would vacate that 

decision while a remand might not (see Doc. 151 at 5-6), Plaintiffs would still have the 

ability to appeal that decision once all of its claims are adjudicated, and the Court is not 

persuaded that they have presented compelling reasons to do so now. 

 Plaintiffs rely on PAETEC Commc’n, Inc. v. MCI Commc’n Serv., Inc., 784 

F.Supp.2d 542, 548 (E.D. Pa. 2011), for the proposition that previously unresolved issues 

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of widespread importance weigh in favor of immediate appeal. Doc. 146 at 9-10. 

PAETEC involved an issue of first impression of importance to the telecommunications 

industry. 784 F.Supp 2d at 548. Plaintiffs argue that the judgment they seek to appeal is 

likewise of great importance to the mining industry and has widespread ramifications. 

Doc. 146 at 10. The Court is not persuaded that this fact alone demonstrates a particular 

need for the Ninth Circuit to take immediate appeal on an issue that has not heretofore 

been raised in the nearly four decades that the Secretary has exercised withdrawal 

authority, particularly where the remaining claims are set for resolution in a matter of 

months and all appealable issues may be raised at that time. 

 Plaintiffs’ citation to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Purdy Mobile Homes, Inc. v. 

Champion Home Builders Co., 594 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1979), is also unavailing. In 

Purdy, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that there was no just cause 

for delay in entering final judgment on an interpretation of a federal act for which there 

was disagreement among the courts and reversal would likely necessitate a second trial. 

594 F.2d at 1316-17. Here, there is no judicial disagreement on the severability of the 

unconstitutional veto in subsection 203(c)(1), and even if the Ninth Circuit reverses this 

Court’s ruling, this outcome would, at most, moot Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, not 

necessitate further proceedings or require the equivalent of a second trial. 

 Plaintiffs argue that their members will suffer substantial economic harm if the 

Court does not grant their 54(b) motion because they must pay annual maintenance fees 

of $140 per claim to maintain claims in the withdrawn area even while the challenged 

withdrawal prevents them from developing these claims without first undergoing costly 

and time-consuming mineral exams. Doc. 146 at 10-11. Plaintiffs state that records in 

this case indicate that there are at least 3,000 mining claims located in the withdrawn 

area, leading to $420,000 in fees payable annually to the Department of Interior, and this 

outweighs the costs and potential for duplication that would result from separate appeals. 

Id. at 11. Defendant-Intervenors argue that these losses are exaggerated because the 

withdrawal does not preclude development of all existing claims, and, even if it does, 

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Plaintiffs do not identify how many of the asserted 3,000 claims belong to their members. 

Doc. 149 at 12, n. 5. The Court need not resolve these factual issues because Plaintiffs 

have not shown that their members would likely develop a substantial number of these 

claims during the pendency of this case even if the Court granted its motion and the Ninth 

Circuit were to reverse its finding on Plaintiffs’ Chadha claims.3

 Although the Court is 

mindful that Plaintiffs are suffering and will continue to suffer economic harm as they 

await the ability to develop their mining claims, the Court is not persuaded that, with 

final briefing on Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment set to be completed by April 

2014 (see Doc. 141), this harm is made substantially greater by having to wait to file a 

single appeal after final judgment on all claims. 

The Court will exercise its discretion and deny Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of 

judgment under Rule 54(b). See Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1522 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(district court did not err in denying Rule 54(b) request where a short trial was to begin in 

only four months and the entire case could be reviewed after trial); In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 

942, 951 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the bankruptcy court erred in entering partial final 

judgment under Rule 54(b) and warning about the “dangers of profligate Rule 54(b) 

determinations”); Sanchez v. Maricopa County, No. CV 07-1244-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 

2774528, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) (“The Court finds that this is not the rare case 

that justifies sending up piecemeal appeals to the Circuit Court. Plaintiff has not shown 

the sort of pressing needs contemplated by a grant of a 54(b) motion, and denial of his 

motion will not lead to a harsh or unjust result.”). 

 

 

3

 Defendant-Intervenors note that the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) estimated in its Final EIS that under the “no action alternative,” meaning absent the withdrawal, an estimated 30 uranium mines could be developed in the withdrawal area 

over the next 20 years for an average of 1.5 per year. See BLM, Final EIS, Northern 

Arizona Proposed Withdrawal (Oct. 2011) at 2-11 to 2-13, available at http://www. blm.gov/az/st/en/info/nepa/environmental_library/ eis/ naz-withdraw.html. 

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff NWMA’s motion for final judgment (Doc. 146) 

which Plaintiff NMA joins (Doc. 147) is denied. 

 Dated this 12th day of July, 2013. 

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