Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00481/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00481-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David A. Aronson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-481-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment pertaining to the

denial of disability benefits by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in his case. Also

pending before the Court is Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion

to Remand regarding the same denial of disability benefits. 

United States Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall issued a Report and Recommendation

which recommended denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, denying

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and granting Defendant's Motion to

Remand. The Report and Recommendation indicated that any party could file written

objections. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, and Defendant filed

a response to those objections; Defendant did not file any separate objections. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for clear error the

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As the Report and Recommendation throughly discussed the relevant facts and law, the

Court will not repeat that entire discussion; rather, the Court will only discuss these issues as

necessary to resolve the specific objections filed by Plaintiff. 

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unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp.,

170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204

(D. Or. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION1

 OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS

A. Award of Benefits or Remand

Plaintiff primarily argues that based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff has

established a clear disability and therefore benefits should be immediately awarded. Plaintiff

argues that the Report and Recommendation improperly relied on an unpublished case in

deciding to remand the case. Plaintiff also argues that as this is his second civil action, the

Commissioner of Social Security should not have another opportunity on remand to litigate

issues pertaining to his alleged disability. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that one of his treating

physicians opined that Plaintiff was restricted to part-time work, and therefore a finding of

disability is warranted on the record. 

A district court has discretion to remand for further proceedings or to award benefits.

See McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1989). A reviewing court should

credit improperly rejected evidence and remand the matter for an award of benefits only

when: "(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such

evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of

disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to

find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited." Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,

1178 (9th Cir. 2000)(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir.1996)).

Generally, a remand for an "award of benefits [is appropriate only] in cases where no useful

purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings." Id. at 1399 (citation and

internal quotes omitted). It is "the unusual case in which it is clear from the record the

claimant is unable to perform gainful employment in the national economy" justifying an

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immediate award of benefits. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). This

is not one of those unusual cases. The Report and Recommendation correctly determined

that additional issues needed to be addressed on remand before a final determination of

disability could be resolved, and addressed this issue as follows:

 Aronson asserts that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's

conclusion that he had transferrable skills to work in an unskilled job as a

surveillance system monitor, or in the semi-skilled jobs of information clerk

or telephone solicitor. Additionally, Aronson argues that even if he can work

as an unskilled surveillance system monitor, such a job is not available in

significant numbers in Arizona.

In his decision, the ALJ stated that "the vocational expert identified the

following skills the claimant possesses from his past relevant work: basic

computer skills (keyboarding, logging information), and clerking skills such

as filing and telephone answering." (Tr. 396). Aronson contends it was

improper for the VE to conclude that he had transferable skills based on his

use of a computer in a "school" and his ability to play computer solitaire. In

fairness to the ALJ, Aronson also testified that he spent a significant period of

time after his second surgery doing light duty work at the mine, which

included performing clerical tasks and logging data on a computer. (Tr. 527

& 529). As Aronson testified, he worked in this position from December 1998

through April 1999. (Tr. 431, 442). However, a review of the record in its

entirety establishes that Aronson's computer skills were rudimentary at best.

He testified that he worked "one key at a time . . . ," and that he had never sent

or received an e-mail. (Tr. 543-44). He described Google as "something

playing on the computer." (Tr. 544). The ALJ neither provided this

information in the hypothetical posed to the VE, nor discounted this testimony

in his decision. That leaves the record in an incomplete state and renders it

impossible to evaluate whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's

decision as it relates to the finding that Aronson had skills transferrable to the

semi-skilled (information clerk and telephone solicitor) jobs identified by the

VE . . . The ALJ is better suited to address the credibility of Aronson's

testimony regarding his computer and clerical skills. The ALJ will then, if

necessary based on the credibility determination, offer a new hypothetical to

the VE. In fact, coupled with the stipulated fact that the ALJ applied an

erroneous "substantial evidence" standard to the decision as a whole, this case

clearly warrants remand. See Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988) (“outstanding issues that must

be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made.”).

See Report and Recommendation at 7-9. In addition to the credibility issues pertaining to

Aronson's computer and clerical skills, the Report and Recommendation also found that the

ALJ was better suited to evaluate whether there was a significant number of jobs available

to Plaintiff if he did not retain any skills transferrable to semi-skilled jobs. As the Report and

Recommendation appropriately found that additional issues needed to be resolved on

remand, Plaintiff's objections pertaining to an immediate award of benefits are denied.

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B. Remand and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT")

Plaintiff argues that the Report and Recommendation should not have affirmed the

ALJ's decision with respect to the DOT. The Report and Recommendation addressed this

issue as follows:

Once it is determined that a claimant cannot perform his past relevant work,

the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant has skills that

are transferable to other jobs in the national economy. Beecher v. Heckler, 756

F.2d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1985).

Aronson asserts that, because SSR 00-4p was ignored, the ALJ did not satisfy

this burden. SSR 00-4p provides that when there is an apparent unresolved

conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT, the ALJ must

clarify the discrepancy. In Aronson's case, the ALJ presented the following

hypothetical to the VE:

I'd like you to assume an individual of the

claimant's education and work background, and

age being 43 years, not his present age. And

assume that the individual is limited to

performing sedentary work, requires a sit/stand

option. And the individual has vision in only –

has good vision in only one eye. And has partial

deafness in one ear. With those limitations, could

– are there any jobs that exist in substantial

numbers that that individual could perform?

(Tr. 538-39). In response to the hypothetical, the vocational expert identified

three jobs that she believed Aronson could perform: information clerk,

surveillance system monitor, and telephone solicitor. (Tr. 539-40). The

problem, as Aronson points out, is that each of these jobs is described in the

DOT as "sedentary" and do not, at least as categorized in the DOT, allow the

sit/stand option as proposed in the hypothetical. Under SSR 00-4p, the ALJ

was thus obligated to explore this inconsistency with the VE. Johnson v.

Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1995) (the DOT acts as a rebuttable

presumption which can be rebutted by the testimony of a vocational expert).

In rebutting the presumption as to the classification of a job, the

Commissioner "may take administrative notice of any reliable job information,

including . . . the services of a vocational expert." Id. at 1435 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). If the testimony of the vocational expert

contradicts the DOT, the ALJ may rely on that testimony,“but only insofar as

the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation.” Id. Here,

the VE explained that, although the jobs are considered sedentary, 

it's my understanding from seeing those jobs

performed, that you can stand as long as you stay

in proximity to your, you know, to your work

station.

(Tr. 540). Although it would have been helpful if this explanation of the

deviation would have been further developed, it is sufficient to rebut the

classification of the jobs identified by the VE and constitute "persuasive

evidence" to support the deviation. While each of the identified jobs involves

activities that are normally completed more comfortably while sitting, they are

also readily performed standing. The Court will not second guess the ALJ's

failure to more fully explore the basis for the VE's "understanding" of these

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jobs when the basis is patently obvious. The VE's testimony therefore

constitutes persuasive evidence supporting the deviation.

See Report and Recommendation at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that the DOT classifies the three

jobs of information clerk, surveillance system monitor, and telephone solicitor as "sedentary"

jobs which require an employee to sit for prolonged periods of time. As Plaintiff's alleged

disability requires a sit/stand option, the Vocational Expert's opinion that Plaintiff is capable

of performing the three sedentary jobs in question are inconsistent with the DOT, and

therefore the Vocational Expert's explanation (i.e., "it's my understanding from seeing those

jobs performed, that you can stand as long as you stay in proximity to your, you know, to

your work station") was insufficient. Plaintiff also argues that these jobs may require him

to both view a monitor and type at the same time, and that his need to periodically stand

makes it more difficult to perform these jobs. The Court finds that further examination of

this issue is warranted, and therefore this issue shall also be further developed on remand

consistent with SSR 00-4p.

C. Remaining Issues

As to the remaining issues that were not objected to by the parties, the Court has

reviewed the entire record and concludes that Magistrate Judge Marshall’s recommendations

are not clearly erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Johnson v. Zema

Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203,

1204 (D. Or. 1998). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

(1) United States Magistrate Judge Marshall's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #35) is

accepted and adopted in part and rejected in part.

(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #14) is denied.

(3) Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and it's Motion to Remand

(Doc. #26) is granted. 

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(4) This case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings

in accordance with this Order and the adopted portions of the Report and Recommendation.

(5) The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file in this

matter. 

DATED this 9th day of May, 2007.

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