Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04052/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

RONALD W. DUDLEY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-4052

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background:

Plaintiff, Ronald Dudley, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration (hereinafter “Commissioner”), denying his applications for disability

insurance benefits (hereinafter “DIB”), and supplemental security income benefits (hereinafter

“SSI”), pursuant to §§ 216(i) and 223 of Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter "the

Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423, and supplemental security income benefits (hereinafter

“SSI”), and § 1602 of Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 1381a, respectively.

Plaintiff was 39 years of age at the time of the administrative hearing and has a twelfth

grade, special education and some vocational technical schooling (T. 766, 333, 767, 522). He

has past relevant work as: a light packer; deli meat slicer; light cleaner; forklift operator; and,

tractor operator (T. 804-805, 524). Plaintiff asserts disability due to: osteoarthritis of the spine,

left knee, ankle and wrist; history of inflammatory arthritis in his youth, either juvenile

rheumatoid arthritis or brucellsis; chest wall post-traumatic arthritis; sinus bradycardia;

malnutrition; headaches; gout; fatigue; and, depression. 

The procedural history is recounted in the parties’ appeal briefs and in the ALJ’s

decision and is not contested. However, it is noted, to some extent, as follows:

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-2-

Mr. Dudley has three separate sets of applications for a period of disability,

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income properly before

the undersigned [ALJ] for adjudication. Two by Orders of the United States

District Court, Western District of Arkansas, and one by a timely request for a

hearing. * * *

The claimant’s first set of applications was filed on April 14, 1998 and alleged

an onset date of October 15, 1996. ...The claimant then filed an appeal with the

United States District Court and, by agreement of the parties, the 1998

applications were remanded to the Commissioner on June 26, 2002 for further

consideration.

On July 24, 2000, while the 1998 applications were pending before the Court,

the claimant filed a second set of applications. These alleged an onset date of

February 3, 2000. ...After a hearing, at which the claimant and three witnesses

testified, the [ALJ] again affirmed the denial of benefits in a decision issued on

July 26, 2002. ...Following its review, the Court concluded that two issues,

credibility and alcohol abuse, had not been dealt with properly, and on January

5, 2004 remanded the case to the Commissioner for further procedures

consistent with the Order of the Court.

On November 14, 2002, the claimant filed his third set of applications for a

period of disability, [DIB], and [SSI]. In these applications he again alleged an

onset date of February 3, 2000. * * *

Because the issues related to all three sets of applications are the same, they have

been combined for adjudication and this decision will be determinative of all of

the pending applications. The undersigned [ALJ] has taken into consideration

all of the evidence and testimony submitted with each set of applications.

(T. 442-443). 

The most recent hearing was held on May 26, 2004 (T. 761-813). The ALJ rendered an

unfavorable decision on July 28, 2004 (T. 442-459). By Order entered June 20, 2005, the

Appeals Council denied the plaintiff’s Request for Review of the hearing decision (T. 434-436),

thus making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks

judicial review of that decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Each party has filed an appeal brief,

herein (Doc. #7 & 8), and this matter is now ready for consideration. 

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-3-

Applicable Law:

The Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th

Cir.2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable

mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must

be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314

F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir.2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that

supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial

evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the

Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th

Cir.2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent

positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the

decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.2000).

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the

burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted or

can be expected to last at least one year or result in death, and that prevents him from engaging

in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001);

see 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines "physical or mental

impairment" as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382c(3)(C). A plaintiff must show that his

disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-4-

The Commissioner's regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation

process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in

substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical

and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet

or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from

doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the

national economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)-

(f)(2003). Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff's age,

education, and work experience in light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy

v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir.1982); 20 C .F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

Further, the ALJ may discredit subjective complaints which are inconsistent with the

record as a whole. Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 344 (8th Cir.1993). The law on this issue is

clear. Under Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir.1984), "an ALJ must look at

five factors when determining the credibility of a claimant's subjective allegations of pain: (1)

the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; (3)

aggravating and precipitating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;

and (5) functional restrictions." Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.1995); see also

Baker v. Sec. of HHS, 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir.1992). The absence of an objective medical

basis which supports the subjective complaints of pain is just one factor to be considered in

evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain. Polaski v Heckler, 751

F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1984); see also, Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1494 (8th

Cir.1995). The ALJ must "discuss" these factors in the hearing decision. Herbert v. Heckler,

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-5-

783 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir.1986)(citing Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 948-950 (8th

Cir.1984)). Consideration must also be given to all the evidence presented related to the

claimant’s prior work history, and the observations of non-medical third parties, as well as

treating and examining physicians related to the above matters. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929; Social

Security Ruling 96-7p; Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.1984)(subsequent history

omitted).

"While the claimant has the burden of proving that the disability results from a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment, direct evidence of the cause and effect

relationship between the impairment and the degree of claimant's subjective complaints need

not be produced." Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322. 

To determine whether the ALJ properly applied the factors listed in Polaski, we must

determine whether the ALJ took into account all the relevant evidence, and whether that

evidence contradicted the claimant's own testimony so that the ALJ could discount the

testimony for lack of credibility. Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir.1987). The

ALJ's credibility assessment must be based on substantial evidence. Rautio v. Bowen, 862 F.2d

176, 179 (8th Cir.1988). 

Implicit in the ALJ’s task of making a credibility determination is the requirement that

he "discuss" the Polaski factors. Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 130 (the Polaski cases and the

Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984 require that the Commissioner set forth the

inconsistencies in the objective medical evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in

the Polaski settlement when making "credibility" determinations concerning claimant’s

subjective complaints of pain).

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-6-

In summary, the ALJ must discuss and point out the inconsistencies in the record, in

order to make a credibility determination. Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir.1991)

("it is not enough that inconsistencies may be said to exist, the ALJ must set forth the

inconsistencies in the evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in Polaski when

making credibility determinations"); Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 131 (even though

evidence with respect to Polaski factors is in the record, those factors must be discussed in the

decision). 

"Nonexertional limitations are limitations other than on strength but which nonetheless

reduce an individual's ability to work." Asher v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 825, 827 n. 2 (8th Cir.1988).

Examples include "mental, sensory, or skin impairments, as well as impairments which result in

postural and manipulative limitations or environmental restrictions." Id.; See 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §§200.00(e).

Residual functional capacity is what a plaintiff can do despite his limitations, and it

must be determined on the basis of all relevant evidence, including medical records, physician's

opinions, and the plaintiff’s description of his limitations. Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033,

1039 (8th Cir.2001); see also, Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir.1995); 20 C.F.R.

§§416.945(a). 

When a plaintiff suffers from exertional and nonexertional impairments, as asserted

here, and the exertional impairments alone do not warrant a finding of disability, the ALJ must

consider the extent to which the nonexertional impairments further diminish the plaintiff's work

capacity. Thompson v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.1988). If the claimant's

characteristics do not differ significantly from those contemplated in the Medical-Vocational

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-7-

Guidelines, the ALJ may rely on the Guidelines alone to direct a finding of disabled or not

disabled. Id. That is to say, "an ALJ may use the Guidelines even though there is a

nonexertional impairment if the ALJ finds, and the record supports the finding, that the

nonexertional impairment does not diminish the claimant's residual functional capacity to

perform the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines." Id. at 349-50. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained as follows: 

In this context, "significant" refers to whether the claimant's nonexertional

impairment or impairments preclude the claimant from engaging in the full

range of activities listed in the Guidelines under the demands of day-to-day life.

Under this standard isolated occurrences will not preclude the use of the

Guidelines, however persistent nonexertional impairments which prevent the

claimant from engaging in the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines will

preclude the use of the Guidelines to direct a conclusion of disabled or not

disabled.

Id. at 350. See also, Holz v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.1999); Foreman v. Callahan,

122 F.3d 24, 26 (8th Cir.1997); Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir.1997).

Further, since certain 1996 amendments to the Social Security Act, if alcohol or drug

abuse comprises a contributing factor material to the determination of disability, the plaintiff's

application must be denied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); 20 C.F.R § 404.1535. The relevant

statutory provision states, “An individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of

this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a

contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is

disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). The burden of proving that alcoholism was not a

contributing factor material to the disability determination falls on the plaintiff. Estes v.

Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir.2002), citing Mittlestedt v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 847, 852 (8th

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-8-

Cir.2000). However, the ALJ retains the responsibility of developing a full and fair record in

the non-adversarial administrative proceeding. 

If the ALJ is unable to determine whether substance use disorders are a contributing

factor material to the plaintiff's otherwise-acknowledged disability, the plaintiff's burden has

been met and an award of benefits must follow. See Social Security Administration Emergency

Teletype, No. EM-96-94 at Answer 29 (Aug. 30, 1996), quoted in Fastner v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d

981, 986 (8th Cir.2003). In colloquial terms, as to the issue of the materiality of alcoholism or

substance addiction, “a tie goes to the plaintiff.” Brueggemann v. Barnhart 348 F.3d 689, 693

(8th Cir.2003). 

The plain text of the relevant regulation requires the ALJ first to determine whether the

plaintiff is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a) (“ If we find that you are disabled and have

medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism, we must determine whether your drug

addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.”

(emphasis added)). The ALJ must reach this determination initially, as the ALJ did in Fastner

v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir.2003), using the standard five-step approach described

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 without segregating out any effects that might be due to substance use

disorders. The ALJ must base this disability determination on substantial evidence of the

plaintiff's medical limitations without deductions for the assumed effects of substance use

disorders. Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d at 694. The inquiry concerns strictly

symptoms, not causes, and the rules for how to weigh evidence of symptoms remain well

established. Substance use disorders are simply not among the evidentiary factors that

precedents and the regulations identify as probative, when an ALJ evaluates a physician's expert

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-9-

opinion in the initial determination of the plaintiff's disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

If the total of a plaintiff's limitations, including the effects of substance use disorders,

suffices to show disability, then the ALJ must next consider which limitations would remain

when the effects of the substance use disorders are absent. Pettit v. Apfel, 218 F.3d 901, 903

(8th Cir.2000); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(2). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit has previously noted that when the plaintiff is actively abusing alcohol or drugs, this

determination will necessarily be hypothetical and, therefore, more difficult than the same task

when the plaintiff has stopped. Pettit v. Apfel, 218 F.3d at 903. Even though the task is

difficult, the ALJ must develop a full and fair record and support his conclusion with

substantial evidence on this point just as he would on any other. 

Only after the ALJ has made an initial determination that: the plaintiff is disabled; drug

or alcohol use is a concern; and, substantial evidence on the record shows what limitations

would remain in the absence of alcoholism or drug addiction, may the ALJ then reach a

conclusion on whether plaintiff's substance use disorders are a contributing factor material to

the determination of disability. If this process proves indeterminate, an award of benefits must

follow. Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 695. 

Discussion:

The plaintiff contends that the instant matter should be remanded in that the ALJ erred,

as follows: in finding his subjective complaints are not credible to the extent alleged; 

substantial evidence does not support the decision that “when the Plaintiff’s limitations related

to his alcohol use/abuse are removed from reconsideration, he remains capable of making a

vocational adjustment to jobs that exist in significant numbers” in the economy (Doc. #7, p. 1);

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-10-

and, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s alcoholism is

a contributing factor material to the finding that he is disabled (Doc. #7, p. 2). 

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

October 15, 1996, his original alleged onset date, and that he has severe impairments including: 

alcoholism; malnutrition; mild restrictive pulmonary defect; bradycardia; low blood pressure;

gout; chronic low back pain; osteoarthritis; diminished hearing in his left ear; and, a history of

dehydration, anemia, urosepsis, pneumonia and cellulitis (T. 458). While considered severe,

plaintiff’s impairments do no meet or equal a listing, and further, his subjective complaints

were not entirely credible. Next, the ALJ found the plaintiff retained the physical residual

functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”), to perform a range of light work, and his alcoholism

further restricted that range, in that he had only a poor ability to maintain attention and

concentration or demonstrate reliability. Considering only his limitations in combination, not

related to alcohol use/abuse, the ALJ found plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work

(T. 458). 

Finding further, transferability of skills was not an issue, and when considering the

plaintiff’s limitations related to back pain, osteoarthritis, episodic gout and alcoholism, the ALJ

found plaintiff not capable of making a vocational adjustment to work existing is significant

numbers in the national economy. Remove the alcohol use/abuse, and according to the ALJ,

plaintiff remains capable of making such a vocational adjustment to jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy, as per VE testimony. Finally, the ALJ concluded:

13. The claimant has been under a disability, as defined in the Social

Security Act, since October 15, 1996 when considering his

alcohol related restrictions, but alcoholism is a contributing factor

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-11-

material to the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is

disabled and, in accordance with Public Law 104-121, benefits

may not be paid. 

(T. 459). 

The record indicates that plaintiff alleges numerous subjective complaints and

nonexertional limitations, including: joint pain due to arthritis (T. 203, 201, 202, 771-772, 516,

532, 780, 793, 804, 101, 205, 208, 243, 327, 380, 386, 419, 420, 536, 540, 555, 582, 587, 602,

630, 741); headaches (T. 523, 101, 107, 155, 247, 379); gout (T. 582, 584); and,

fatigue/malnutrition (T. 382-383, 202, 205, 119, 176, 385, 386, 404, 417, 631, 633, 521, 248,

253, 255, 346). Further, the plaintiff consistently alleges he has no money with which to pay

for medications and treatment (T. 775-776, 498, 502, 517, 531, 532, 534, 762, 778, 784, 247,

251, 345, 363, 365, 366, 537, 547, 740). Finally, he asserts his over-the-counter medications

cause side effects, such as dizziness, sleepiness and fatigue (T. 521, 242, 545). 

Certainly, the failure to follow a prescribed course of treatment may be excused by a

plaintiff’s lack of funds. Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d at 714. Medicine or treatment an

indigent person cannot afford is no more a cure for his condition than if it had never been

discovered. To a poor person, a medicine that he cannot afford to buy does not exist. Dover v.

Bowen, 784 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir.1986); Benson v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 16, 18 (8th Cir.1985);

Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711, 714 (8th Cir.1984). 

 With respect to his subjective allegations and nonexertional limitations, the ALJ finds

plaintiff’s complaints of pain not credible, in part, as follows:

The claimant has also failed to follow a course of medical treatment consistent

with that of an individual who is experiencing disabling pain in his back and

joints. Mr. Dudley has asserted that his failure to seek treatment for his arthriticCase 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-12-

type pain is due to a lack of finances. While financial inability can be

considered a good reason for failing to get appropriate medical care, in this

instance it is not. When the claimant has had serious medical emergencies, he

has obtained extensive treatment by presenting himself at the emergency room. 

In fact, after his hospitalization in July 1998, Dr. S[a]rrett was following him

without consideration of his financial status, but the claimant simply failed to

follow through with this care. (Exhibit 4F) When his fingers and toes were

bothering him due to gout, he went to the emergency room and received

treatment. (Exhibit C-3F) The claimant knew how to obtain care when he felt

he needed it. If his “arthritis” pain had been as bad as alleged, it is only

reasonable to believe that he would have gone to the emergency room on at least

one occasion to try and get help. Furthermore, even if he could not get

professional help, he could use home remedies such as a heating pad or hot

showers, but he testified that he did not do this. (1999 transcript, page 14)

(T. 453). 

The ALJ’s reasoning for discounting the plaintiff’s credibility, despite well-documented 

assertions of record as to his financial status, is inconsistent and troubling, particularly in light

of the ALJ’s clear duty to fully and fairly develop the record. The undersigned notes that the

record does not indicate whether plaintiff “failed to follow through with his care” with Dr.

Sarrett, or if finances were an issue (T. 158-163). In addition, the ALJ does not clarify on what

evidence he relied to conclude that the plaintiff “knew how to obtain care when he felt he

needed it.” (T. 453). Such conclusion infers, again, that plaintiff’s alleged lack of finances did

not enter into any decision to visit or not visit an emergency department.

Plaintiff also alleged disability due to depression (T. 775, 779, 248). The ALJ simply

discounts these allegations on the basis that he “has never sought treatment for this condition or

even made reference to it to an examining physician”, citing Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906 (8th

Cir.1996) and Brockman v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.1993) (“The Administrative Law

Judge is under no ‘obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-13-

for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability.’” (T. 455). However, here,

the plaintiff did raise the issue at the two most recent administrative hearings. And again, the

ALJ did not specifically address the plaintiff’s asserted lack of finances as it may have

pertained to his lack of mental health treatment. The undersigned concludes that the issue of a

mental limitation was not properly considered. It is also noted that pages one (1) and two (2) of

a Psychiatric Review Technique Form are missing from the record (T. 164-165). Whether

those documents are of import is unknown. However, it is suggested that a consultative mental

examination would be helpful, in that and other respects.

Finally, because of the complicated nature of this matter, and the intricacies of the

record which contains three (3) applications dating back to 1998 and other evidence, on

remand, it is strongly suggested that the Commissioner consider utilizing a medical advisor to

assist in her determination. 

The Court recognizes that the ALJ’s decision may be the same after proper analysis on

remand, but proper analysis is required. Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1239 (8th

Cir.1991). 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision denying benefits to the plaintiff is not

supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed. We further conclude that this matter

should be remanded to the Commissioner for reconsideration, to include a more thorough

analysis and discussion of plaintiff’s subjective complaints and his alleged mental impairment,

keeping in mind his asserted lack of finances, and to utilize a medical advisor, if deemed

necessary. 

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-14-

ENTERED this 6 day of July, 2006. th

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 4:05-cv-04052-BES Document 9 Filed 07/06/06 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: <pageID>