Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04091/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NOV 18 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

90-4091 

SIERRA CLUB, a non-profit ) 

corporation, NATIONAL PARKS ) 

AND CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, ) 

a non-profit organization, ) 

SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ) 

ALLIANCE, a non-profit ) 

corporation, and THE ) 

WILDERNESS SOCIETY, ) 

a non-profit corporation, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

MANUEL LUJAN, in his 

capacity as Secretary of the 

United States Department of 

the Interior, THE DEPARTMENT 

OF THE INTERIOR OF THE 

UNITED STATES, THE BUREAU 

OF LAND MANAGEMENT, and 

GARFIELD COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State 

of Utah, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The District Of Utah 

(D.C. No. 87-C-0120A) 

Wayne G. Petty of Moyle & Draper, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah 

(Michael F. Heyrend, Salt Lake City, Utah, Lori Potter, Sierra 

Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc., Denver, Colorado, and William J. 

Lockhart, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief), for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, Department of Justice, Land and 

Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. (Myles E. Flint, 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C., Dee v. 

Benson, United States Attorney, Joseph w. Anderson, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Edward J. 

Shawaker, Attorney, Department of Justice, Land and Natural 

Resources Division, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for 

Defendants-Appellees Manuel Lujan, Secretary of the Department of 

the Interior, Department of the Interior and Bureau of Land 

Management. 

Appellate Case: 90-4091 Document: 010110097411 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 1 
Ronald w. Thompson of Thompson, Hughes & Reber, St. George, Utah 

(Wallace A. Lee, Garfield County Attorney, Panguitch, Utah, 

Barbara G. Hjelle of Thompson, Hughes & Reber, St. George, Utah, 

with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Garfield County. 

Before TACHA and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge*. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

In this appeal we revisit the Burr Trail in southern Utah for 

a second look at Garfield County's proposal to widen the western 

twenty-eight miles of the road. In Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 

1068 (10th Cir.), we determined that there was major federal 

action and ordered the district court to remand the case to the 

Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for an environmental assessment 

(EA) to be prepared followed either by a finding of no significant 

impact (FONSI) or an environmental impact statement (EIS). The 

action on this remand was to be taken within very narrow limits 

described in the mandate. On remand, BLM conducted an EA and 

issued a FONSI. BLM's action so far as it was relevant to this 

lawsuit was affirmed by the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 

Based on the IBLA's decision, the district court lifted its 

*Honorable Howard C. Bratton, United States District Judge for the 

District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

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injunction against construction on areas bordering the Wilderness 

Study Areas (WSAs) on the western twenty-eight miles of the road. 

A brief review of the facts pertinent to our earlier decision 

is necessary. The Burr Trail connects the town of Boulder, Utah 

with the Bullfrog Basin Marina at Lake Powell. The trail travels 

sixty-six miles through rugged terrain, crossing or bordering 

unreserved federal lands, state lands, two WSAs, the Capitol Reef 

National Recreation Area and the Glen Canyon National Recreation 

Area. Garfield County has used and maintained the Burr Trail 

since the early 1940's. This use created a right-of-way under 

R.S. 2477. (43 u.s.c. § 932, repealed by Federal Land Policy 

Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), § 706(a), Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 

Stat. 2793). 

In the earlier appeal, the Sierra Club and other 

environmental groups (collectively referred to as Sierra Club) had 

brought suit over Garfield County's contract with Harper 

Excavating Company (the Harper contract) to improve the western 

twenty-eight miles of the Burr Trail (segment 1) from an 

essentially one-lane dirt road to a two-lane gravel road. 

Segment 1 runs from the town of Boulder to the border of the 

Capitol Reef National Park. Sierra Club there claimed the 

proposed action exceeded the County's right-of-way and violated 

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321 

et seq. 

The district court initially held that the scope of Garfield 

County's R.S. 2477 right-of-way was sufficient to accommodate the 

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proposed changes. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp 594 

(D. Utah). The district court also found that BLM's involvement 

in the project constituted major federal action triggering NEPA, 

but that NEPA's requirements were sufficiently satisfied by facts 

developed during the trial before the district court. 

We affirmed the district court's holding regarding the scope 

of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way. We held that the district court 

was correct in deferring to Utah state law to determine the 

existence and scope of the right-of-way and in applying Utah's 

"reasonable and necessary" use standard to the Harper contract. 

Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1083. However, we reversed as 

to the trial court's determination that NEPA's procedural 

requirements had been satisfied by the proceeding to that point. 

As mentioned, the case was remanded under a narrow and 

closely defined mandate holding that BLM's duty under FLPMA 

§ 603(c) was to prevent unnecessary degradation of the WSAs along 

the portion of the Burr Trail at issue. we held: 

"We order the district court to remand to 

BLM for an environmental assessment, followed 

by either a finding of no significant impact 

or an environmental impact statement. 

Whatever the shortcomings of the previous 

studies, on remand BLM will be required to 

address environmental issues affecting only 

those areas in which, under the law of the 

case, it still has authority to act .•.. 

BLM's authority is limited to what is relevant 

to its duty to prevent unnecessary degradation 

of the WSAs." 

848 F.2d at 1096. 

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The required action by the Department of Interior on remand 

was thus specifically limited to the consideration of the impact 

(unnecessary degradation) of the road changes on the WSAs. The 

geographical area was so limited, and the consideration was 

necessarily to be within the authority of the County under its 

right-of-way. The only actual work under consideration by the 

County was the Harper contract. As stated, the scope of BLM's 

considerations which would be necessary in this case were so 

described and required. 

Whatever other considerations were made by the BLM were of no 

consequence to this litigation. It was thus through the mandate 

to the district court that BLM was required to proceed under NEPA, 

was required to prepare an EA, and was required to make its 

examination within the rulings as to the scope of the County's 

right-of-way. This was basically a fact question. The BLM 

decided that the matter could be decided in the EA and did so. 

We also directed on remand that the district court review the 

impact of the proposed road improvements on areas not bordering 

the WSAs and lift the injunction on these areas if it was 

determined that the road improvement project would not affect the 

WSAs. On December 2, 1988 the district court dissolved the 

injunction on areas of the road not affecting the WSAs. With the 

lifting of the injunction the parties also stipulated that work 

could begin on the state section traversed by the road. 

BLM commenced its review under the mandate with a Draft 

Environmental Assessment. This was followed by a comment and 

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public hearing period. BLM's Cedar City District Office issued 

the "Boulder to Bullfrog Road Improvement Project (Burr Trail) 

Final Environmental Assessment (EA): A Supplement to Paving the 

Boulder-to-Bullfrog Road EA (1985), EA# UT-040-89-6." 

Both the Draft EA and the Final EA considered environmental 

impacts beyond those which might arise through implementation of 

the Harper contract and the remand. BLM reasoned that given the 

County's long-range plans "it would be in the best interests of 

BLM to evaluate all anticipated road improvements." Affidavit of 

David Everett at 3. This policy decision to go beyond the remand 

resulted in BLM asking Garfield County to submit an additional 

"proposal" covering other segments of the road. 

BLM's conclusions reflect its expanded scope of review. The 

agency found that paving the Harper segment and another segment in 

areas bordering the WSAs would be better than gravel and also 

suggested using colored pavement on the sections of road adjacent 

to the WSAs as a mitigating measure. "It is our finding that a 

proposed road construction project to pave segments 1 & 3 adjacent 

to all WSAs/ISAs and gravel or pave the remaining public lands 

administered by BLM would not create any significant undue or 

unnecessary impacts to the wilderness study units except as noted 

above." EA at 7. 

BLM's decision to expand the scope of the EA resulted in two 

FONSis--one for segment 1 (the Harper contract) and one for 

segment 3. The Harper contract FONS! found that "[t]he decision 

to allow the proposed action would not result in any undue or 

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unnecessary environmental degradation to the Steep Creek WSA and 

North Escalante Canyon/The Gulch ISA." The FONSI further stated 

that the Final EA reconfirmed the finding in the 1985 EA that 

there were no significant impacts for the total 66-mile road 

improvement project. 

Sierra Club appealed to the IBLA. BLM and Garfield County 

sought to bifurcate the appeal before the Board arguing that the 

initial Harper contract proposal should be reviewed separately 

from BLM's action related to the remainder of the road. The Board 

rejected this argument. However, the IBLA stated that "[a]lthough 

we have not bifurcated these appeals for purposes of review, it is 

clear that the parties and this Board are bound by the ruling of 

the court with respect to those aspects of the BLM decisions which 

implement the judicial remand." 111 IBLA 122, 130. The Board 

then conducted a two-part review of BLM's action, basically 

accepting BLM's conclusion as to the Harper contract and setting 

aside and remanding the remainder of the decision which was 

outside the remand. 

The Sierra Club in its appeal to the IBLA also asserted for 

the first time that sources outside the Department of Interior 

improperly influenced the decisiorunaking process of BLM. In an 

Order filed February 2, 1990, the Board rejected both arguments. 

Regarding the separate consideration of the Harper contract 

the Board stated: 

"The key to understanding the Board's 

resolution of this issue is the distinction 

between the nature of the project as 

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originally developed and remanded by the 

courts (the Harper contract to improve segment 

1), on the one hand, and the subsequent 

proposal to improve and pave the length of the 

Burr Trail as considered by BLM in the 1988 

draft EA and the 1989 EA's. We found the 

environmental analysis performed by BLM 

adequate to support the FONS! for the project 

to improve (but not pave) segment 1 of the 

Burr Trail. However, we found the analysis 

inadequate to the extent it was cited to 

support a FONS! for the enlarged and expanded 

scope of the project considered therein. The 

proper scope of the environmental analysis for 

the Harper contract to improve segment 1 of 

the Burr Trail was an issue in the litigation 

in the courts and this Board and the parties 

are bound by the courts' rulings in this 

regard." 

IBLA Order denying Petitions for Reconsideration at 4. 

On the question of undue influence, the IBLA found that 

Sierra Club's evidence of alleged impropriety did not warrant an 

additional evidentiary type hearing. 

Garfield County thereafter petitioned the district court for 

dissolution of the preliminary injunction on areas of the road 

bordering the WSAs. The injunction was lifted. Although this 

court temporarily stayed the district court's ruling, on July 17, 

1990 we denied a stay pending appeal and reinstated the district 

court's order. This appeal followed. 

While Sierra Club's arguments in the earlier litigation of 

this case focused in large part on the scope of the right-of-way, 

an issue which was decided, the thrust of Sierra Club's current 

challenge is on the scope of review after the remand. It contends 

that the IBLA and the district court erred by relying on what it 

describes as the "law of the case" doctrine to limit the analysis 

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to the western segment of the road. Sierra Club argues that the 

original "proposed action" was significantly expanded after remand 

which requires environmental analysis of the full length of the 

Burr Trail. 

In our view, the IBLA properly and clearly divided the BLM 

consideration into two separate and distinct matters. The first 

was, of course, the Harper contract area as considered by this 

Court on the first appeal, which was the sole subject of the 

mandate on remand; and second, the rest of the Burr Trail, the 

second matter having been added by the BLM. 

There can be no serious challenge to the determinations made 

on the first appeal as to the scope of the right-of-way, described 

above, and the statutory limits imposed on the BLM. As mentioned, 

the mandate was specific and the action to be taken by the BLM was 

described as was the geographical area. This was an affirmative 

direction to the BLM to take action required by statute and to 

exercise its discretion within the stated limits. The BLM could 

not under the mandate expand the scope of the litigation. There 

was no reason however why it could not consider at the same time 

other matters which were interesting to it but which were of no 

significance to the litigation. In our view, the IBLA properly 

and clearly divided BLM's consideration into the two separate and 

distinct matters. 

We review de novo the district court's decision to affirm the 

IBLA applying the same standard of review applicable in the 

district court. Our prior cases, including our earlier decision 

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in this case, applied a "reasonableness" standard of review to an 

agency's threshold NEPA determinations. In Sierra Club I, we 

stated that "[t]he agency's findings on the threshold NEPA issues 

of major federal action and significant impact 'must be reasonable 

in the light of the mandatory requirements and high standards set 

by the statute.'" Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1089 (quoting Wyoming 

Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th 

Cir.)). We further stated that "[r]easonableness is essentially a 

legal conclusion, and thus we review de novo the district court's 

ruling except to the extent the ruling turns on subsidiary factual 

findings." Id. See also Park County Resource Council v. U.S. 

Dept. of Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir.). 

We hesitate to again refer to the limitations on the BLM 

action by the remand and the right-of-way statute (RS 2477), and 

the geographical area within the WSAs, but this is a factor on the 

nature of our review as the case comes back to us. The court on 

the first appeal considered the "threshold NEPA determinations," 

and applied the reasonableness standard of review. Those disposed 

of, we are on this second review down to factual matters derived 

from the limited scope of the BLM action. Under the opinion on 

the first appeal we consider that our concerns are with 

"subsidiary factual findings," as mentioned above. 

There is another significant factor which has been provided 

by the decision of the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Oregon Natural 

Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, decided after our earlier 

decision in this case. In Marsh, the Supreme Court rejected the 

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Ninth Circuit's use of a "reasonableness" test to review an 

agency's decision to prepare a supplemental EIS. The Court held 

that an agency applied a "rule of reason" to determine whether 

agency action affects the human environment in a significant 

manner. However, since the agency's decision there "involves 

primarily issues of fact" a court reviews under the arbitrary and 

capricious standard of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 u.s.c. 

§ 706(2)(A). Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377. The Court also stated that 

it was limiting its holding to review of the "narrow question" of 

whether an existing EIS should be supplemented. However, the 

Court said at 374: 

"Application of the 'rule of reason' thus 

turns on the value of the new information to 

the still pending decisionmaking process. In 

this respect the decision whether to prepare a 

supplemental EIS is similar to the decision 

whether to prepare an EIS in the first 

instance: If there remains 'major Federal 

actio[n]' to occur, and if the new information 

is sufficient to show that the remaining 

action will 'affec[t] the quality of the human 

environment' in a significant manner or to a 

significant extent not already considered, a 

supplemental EIS must be prepared. Cf. 42 

U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). 11 

And at 375-76: 

"We conclude that review of the narrow 

question before us whether the Corps' 

determination that the FEISS need not be 

supplemented should be set aside is controlled 

by the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of 

§ 706 ( 2) (A) • " 

Following Marsh, some courts have rejected the 

"reasonableness" standard in several circumstances. In Goos v. 

I.C.C., 911 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.), the court stated: 

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"Marsh establishes that when an agency 

determines not to prepare an EIS based on its 

review of the environmental impact of a 

project, as when it has already prepared an EA 

and issues a finding of no significant impact, 

a reviewing court reviews that determination 

under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 

Our cases which have reviewed a similar 

question under the reasonableness standard, 

are therefore incorrect." 

Id. at 1292. The Goos court limited Marsh's arbitrary and 

capricious standard of review to factual questions made under the 

assumption that NEPA applies. According to the Eighth Circuit, 

Marsh did not overrule use of the reasonableness standard for 

threshold questions of NEPA applicability such as whether major 

federal action exists. 

In North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1538 

(11th Cir.), the Eleventh Circuit found as follows: 

"In Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 

Council, the Supreme Court considered the 

question of judicial review under NEPA and 

explicitly rejected the reasonableness 

standard .... We, therefore, adopt the 

arbitrary and capricious standard when 

reviewing agency action in NEPA cases; if the 

agency action was not arbitrary and 

capricious, it should not be set aside." 

We feel compelled by Marsh and the previous opinion in this 

case to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to this 

segment of the case. Again we note the unique circumstances 

before us and do not consider this to be a departure from Park 

County Resource Council v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 817 

F.2d 609 (10th Cir.). Furthermore, we are mindful in these 

circumstances of the Supreme Court's statement that "the 

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difference between the 'arbitrary and capricious' and 

'reasonableness' standards is not of great pragmatic consequence." 

Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377, n.23. 

Throughout the course of this litigation, Garfield County has 

openly stated that its long-range aims include paving the full 

length of the Burr Trail. Long-range aims, however, are quite 

different from concrete plans and specific undertakings such as 

the Harper contract submitted for purposes of environmental 

analysis under NEPA. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 

410. NEPA does not require an agency to consider the 

environmental effects that speculative or hypothetical projects 

might have on a proposed project. 

Recognizing this principle, both the district court and this 

Court have been clear in limiting the scope of judicial review to 

the actual proposal at issue--the Harper contract. The district 

court stated in its initial opinion "[i]t is undisputed that the 

county plans eventually to pave the road. • The court wishes 

to emphasize, however, that the current proposal does not call for 

paving. That issue is not before the court and is not decided in 

this case." Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp at 596, n.2. We 

subsequently acknowledged that "[t]he County plans eventually to 

improve the entire sixty-six-mile trail, as well as to pave it. 

These plans are not part of the current proposal." Sierra Club v. 

Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1073, n.2. 

In its petition for rehearing of the earlier appeal, Sierra 

Club made its first attempt to expand the scope of our remand. It 

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argued that the Secretary of Interior had a "duty under FLPMA 

§ 302(b), 43 u.s.c. § 1732(b), to prevent unnecessary or undue 

degradation of all public lands." Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1100. 

We rejected the argument because it was an issue not raised in the 

original appeal and therefore was not proper in a petition for 

rehearing. Id. at 1101. 

In this appeal, Sierra Club asks us to ignore the limitations 

specifically defined in the earlier appeal and mandate and to 

expand the case and scope of our review to include the entire 

road. We again decline the invitation. 

Under our earlier holding, BLM's NEPA responsibilities were 

limited. BLM cannot prevent improvements to Garfield County's 

R.S. 2477 right-of-way, Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1090, provided 

the improvements are "reasonable and necessary to ensure safe 

travel." Id. at 1084. This includes "improving the road to two 

lanes." Id. BLM's duty under FLPMA § 603 further limits its 

authority under NEPA to reviewing the County's road improvement 

projects which affect WSAs. 

The argument is made that Garfield County submitted a 

proposal (after the remand) to BLM to have the entire road 

considered, and this has some significance. This however was made 

at the request of BLM, and again was no more than part of BLM's 

decision to expand the hearings, and is not a factor on this 

appeal. The case before us for review involves only the actual 

proposal challenged in the district court--the Harper contract. 

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The remaining question is whether the EA and FONS! relevant 

to the Harper contract satisfy NEPA. In the last appeal we stated 

that "'[t]he party challenging the agency's decision shoulders the 

burden' of proving unreasonableness." Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 

1089 (quoting Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States 

Department of Agriculture, 817 F.2d at 621). 

After reviewing the briefs and hearing oral arguments in this 

appeal it is apparent that Sierra Club's challenge to the specific 

findings in the EA relevant to the Harper contract is without 

merit. 

Sierra Club contends that BLM's finding that paving would be 

the least degrading alternative to graveling somehow faults the 

conclusions as to segment 1. Sierra Club does not argue that BLM 

failed to study the environmental impacts of implementing the 

Harper contract. The Board after review of the record concluded 

that the Harper contract would not cause "any unnecessary or undue 

degradation of any WSA which would give rise to a significant 

impact." Thus no EIS was required. The IBLA did not discuss the 

finding that paving would be a less degrading alternative than 

gravel because it concluded that paving was outside the scope of 

the Harper contract and outside the judicial remand. We agree. 

After reviewing the record, we are convinced that the 

Department of Interior's NEPA review relevant to the Harper 

contract was thorough. NEPA§ 102(2)(C) required BLM to consider 

"environmental impact[s], unavoidable adverse effects, 

alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship between 

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short-term uses and long-term productivity, and irreversible 

commitments of resources called for by the proposal." Sierra 

Club, 848 F.2d at 1093. The final EA issued by BLM addressed each 

of these elements. 

The agency considered environmental impacts and unavoidable 

adverse effects. It found that portions of the WSAs adjacent to 

segment 1 would lose wilderness status with the improvement of the 

road. BLM concluded that this loss was reasonable particularly in 

light of the County's right-of-way. The width of the road was 

analyzed in light of the perceived uses of the County. The EA 

states that a 24-foot-wide road, designed to a non-commercial 

standard, was the least degrading alternative. 

After careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the 

agency took a "hard look" at the impacts of the proposed Harper 

contract on the WSAs in segment 1 of the Burr Trail and that the 

decision to forgo an EIS was not arbitrary and capricious. 

Sierra Club also contends that BLM officials issuing the 

final EA and FONSI were influenced by "external pressures". 

Sierra Club argues that the IBLA and district court erred by not 

conducting a hearing on the asserted ex parte pressures. 

The pertinent evidence centers on the affidavit of Joseph 

Jarvis. BLM contracted with Jarvis' consulting firm, JBR 

Consultants Group, to conduct the environmental analysis relevant 

to Garfield County's proposal. The Draft EA prepared by JBR 

considered impacts over the entire length of the trail, and thus 

analyzed potential impacts under the assumption that the County 

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eventually planned to pave the full length of the Burr Trail. 

After public comment on the Draft EA, Jarvis states that he was 

told by David Everett of BLM's Cedar City District, that BLM 

planned to conduct the Final EA. Jarvis states that Everett told 

him that the "external pressures were too great for BLM to make a 

finding of 'significance,' as might be indicated by the 1988 draft 

EA. Specifically, he [Everett] stated that the BLM would prefer 

for others to push for an EIS." Affidavit of Joseph Jarvis at 5. 

The Appellees respond citing affidavits from BLM officials 

involved in the environmental assessment process. The David 

Everett referred to by Jarvis stated that "at no time did any 

person attempt to influence me to perform the environmental 

assessment based upon improper considerations." Affidavit of 

David Everett at 2-3. Gordon R. Staker, District Land Manager for 

BLM's Cedar City District who signed the Harper contract FONS! 

stated specifically in his affidavit "[n]o external pressures were 

ever applied to me directly or indirectly, to act on the basis of 

any influence other than the laws and regulations pertinent to BLM 

in conducting its environmental assessment and in the ruling by 

the Tenth Circuit Court. 11 Affidavit of Gordon R. Staker at 1. 

The IBLA considered the Jarvis affidavit in its Order of 

February 2, 1990 denying Sierra Club's Petition for 

Reconsideration. It rejected Sierra Club's argument that this 

statement demonstrates ex parte pressure on the decisionmaking 

process for two reasons. First, the Board cited its de nova 

review of the administrative record. It stated that absent 

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allegations of improper pressure on the Board itself, de novo 

review ensured a fair decision. Second, the Board also rejected 

Sierra Club's assertion that the Jarvis affidavit warranted 

further examination into alleged ex parte conduct. The Board 

stated "[t]he motivation for the decision of BLM is simply not an 

issue in decisions such as those involved in these appeals. 

Virtually every EA or EIS which the Board must review on 

administrative appeal is related to a use of the public lands or 

their resources which is advocated either by a private party 

applicant or the agency itself." IBLA Petition for 

Reconsideration, February 2, 1990, at 3. 

After reviewing the affidavits we find that the Board's 

decision against conducting additional evidentiary review was not 

arbitrary and capricious. We agree with the district court that 

the Board's de novo review does not automatically solve the 

problem of asserted ex parte conduct involving BLM officials; 

however, the evidence of alleged misconduct does not warrant a 

remand. The Jarvis affidavit does not state that ex parte 

contacts occurred. It merely states that David Everett was 

subject to external pressures. As the Board noted in its Order 

Denying Reconsideration, such external pressures are commonplace 

in EA and EIS preparation. Based on the several affidavits the 

trial court's decision and the Board's decision to reject 

Appellants' claims of undue influence was correct. 

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{ 

\ 

' i) 

Because of our disposition of the earlier issues in this 

case, we do not address Sierra Club's final argument regarding an 

order requiring reclamation. 

The decision of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. 

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