Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02216/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Clair Squires, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-2216-TUC-DTF

ORDER 

 James Clair Squires has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the Court is the Petition (Doc. 7) and 

Respondents’ Answer to Petition (Doc. 14). The parties consented to exercise of 

jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 13.) The 

Court finds that the Petition should be dismissed on the ground that it is time-barred. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Squires pled guilty to possession of a narcotic drug and two counts of possession 

of a dangerous drug for sale. (Doc. 14, Ex. F at 1.) On April 2, 2012, he was sentenced to 

concurrent terms, the longest of which was 15.75 years. (Id., Ex. I at 10.) Squires filed a 

Notice of Post-conviction Relief (PCR) on April 9, 2012. (Id., Ex. J.) After his appointed 

counsel found no legal issue of merit, Squires filed a pro se PCR Petition on September 

18, 2012. (Id., Exs. L, M, N.) The Arizona Superior Court dismissed Squires’s PCR 

Petition on February 6, 2013. (Id., Ex. O at 4.) Squires inquired into the status of the 

Case 4:14-cv-02216-DTF Document 18 Filed 08/07/15 Page 1 of 5
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petition in July 2013. (Id., Ex. Q.) In August 2013, he received notice that the PCR 

Petition was dismissed. (Id. at 6; Doc. 7 at 11.) Squires did not seek review of the 

dismissal by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 14 at 4; Doc 7 at 5.) 

 On July 7, 2014, Squires filed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. 

(Doc. 1.) An Amended Petition was filed on August 29, 2014. (Doc. 7.) 

DISCUSSION 

 Respondents argue that Squires’s Petition is time-barred because it violates the 

statute of limitations. 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a one-year 

statute of limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period begins to run 

from the latest of: 

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

 of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

 

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

 by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

 is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

 recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

 by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

 collateral review; or 

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

 presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

Id. 

 In applying (d)(1)(A), the Court must assess when direct review of Squires’s 

convictions became final. The Arizona Superior Court dismissed Squires’s PCR Petition 

on February 6, 2013,1

 and he had thirty days to petition for review by the Arizona Court 

 

1

 The Ninth Circuit holds that an Arizona PCR petition by a criminal who pled 

guilty is a direct review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007).

Case 4:14-cv-02216-DTF Document 18 Filed 08/07/15 Page 2 of 5
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of Appeals. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). Because Squires did not petition for review, the 

judgment became final on March 8, 2013, which was the expiration of his opportunity to 

seek review. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012) (finding that when a 

petitioner does not file for review, the judgment becomes final “when the time for 

pursuing direct review” expires). The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began to 

run the following day, March 9, 2013. 

 The AEDPA statute of limitations expired one year later on March 9, 2014. 

Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 7, 2014, 120 days after the 

statute of limitations expired. Because 485 days elapsed before Squires filed in federal 

court, the Petition is statutorily time-barred. 

 Squires argues that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is not time barred 

because the delayed notification of the PCR Petition denial justifies equitable tolling. 

 Petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). To justify equitable tolling, 

petitioner must establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 

418 (2005). “The diligence required for equitable tolling is ‘reasonable diligence,’ not 

‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010)). Petitioner’s diligence is required 

to ensure the delay in filing is caused by extraordinary circumstances and not the result of 

petitioner’s inaction. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner does 

not need to provide specific dates and times to show diligence, but instead can allege 

facts that show the failure to file was caused by an extraordinary circumstance beyond his 

control. Id.

 Squires argues that the Habeas Petition was untimely filed because the PCR 

Petition dismissal notification was delayed. To determine if delayed notification by a 

state court supports equitable tolling, the Court considers when a petitioner received 

notice; whether he acted diligently to obtain the notice; and “whether the alleged delay of 

Case 4:14-cv-02216-DTF Document 18 Filed 08/07/15 Page 3 of 5
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

notice caused the untimeliness of his filing and made a timely filing impossible.” Ramirez 

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2009). In July 2013, ten months after filing the 

PCR Petition, Squires inquired into the status of the Petition. While Squires does not need 

to provide specific dates for all status inquires, he has not alleged any other effort to 

monitor the status of the PCR Petition. After receiving notification of the dismissal, 

Squires waited eleven months before filing a federal habeas petition. Both his lack of 

monitoring the PCR Petition and the eleven month delay in filing demonstrate a lack of 

diligence. Additionally, Squires has not alleged how the delayed notification, and not his 

inaction, caused a timely filing to be impossible. With approximately seven months 

remaining, Squires had ample time to file the basic form for a habeas petition before the 

statute of limitations expired.2

 Because Squires did not act with reasonable diligence nor 

allege how the delayed notification caused a timely filing to be impossible, equitable 

tolling is not appropriate.3

 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

 Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this Court 

must issue or deny a certificate of appealability (COA) at the time it issues a final order 

 

2

 If Squires miscalculated the statute of limitations as starting on the day he received 

notice of the dismissal, equitable tolling would not be appropriate. See Harris v. Carter, 

515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that failure to file a timely petition because 

of “oversight, miscalculation or negligence” on the part of the petitioner “would preclude 

the application of equitable tolling”). 

3

 Squires’s Petition also asserts that he failed to seek further review by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals because he lacked access to a law library. While Squires does not rely 

on this assertion to excuse his delay in filing the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, such 

an argument would be unsuccessful because he has not shown that the lack of access was 

the proximate cause of his delay in filing. Bartholomew v. Carey, 308 F. App’x 57, 58 

(9th Cir. 2009) (requiring petitioner to show that limited access to a law library was the 

“proximate cause of his delay in filing the federal habeas petition”). Additionally, if he 

lacked access to a law library and it was found to be an extraordinary circumstance, 

Squires did not allege that he acted diligently during the time he lacked access. Gibbs v. 

Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 892 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[D]iligence during the existence of an 

extraordinary circumstance is the key consideration.”). 

Case 4:14-cv-02216-DTF Document 18 Filed 08/07/15 Page 4 of 5
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

adverse to the applicant. A COA may issue only when the petitioner “has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This 

showing can be established by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner” or that the issues were “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 

U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable 

jurists could debate (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right, and (2) whether the court’s procedural ruling was correct. Id. The 

Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find this Court’s procedural ruling 

debatable. Therefore, a COA will not issue. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court should enter judgment and 

close this case. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a 

certificate of appealability. 

 Dated this 7th day of August, 2015. 

Case 4:14-cv-02216-DTF Document 18 Filed 08/07/15 Page 5 of 5