Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05824/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05824-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Fair Credit Reporting Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fayez Daghlawi, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Juilin Hung, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-05824-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to voluntarily dismiss their Fair Credit 

Report Act (“FCRA”) claim without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, while retaining their other claims. (Doc. 11 at 1.) Plaintiffs 

assert that they recently received information that undermined their good-faith basis for 

bringing the federal claim. (Id. at 2.) The Court will grant the motion to dismiss the FCRA 

claim.

This case was removed from state court on December 13, 2019, “based on a federal 

question”—the FCRA claim. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Now that the FCRA claim has been voluntarily 

dismissed, the remaining claims are state-law claims.

“[A] district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving 

pendent [state-law] claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the 

case would be inappropriate.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). 

“The discretion to remand enables district courts to deal with cases involving pendent 

claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and 

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comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Id. “[I]n the usual case in which 

all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered 

under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 

claims.” Id. at 350 n.7; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [pendent state-law claim] if . . . the district 

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).

The Court has considered the factors and finds that they favor remand. This case 

has been pending before the Court for only one month, and the Court’s involvement with 

this case has been limited to granting a motion for a one-day extension of time to file the 

state-court record (Doc. 9) and filing two standard orders, the Court’s preliminary order 

(Doc. 8) and order requiring the parties to file a Rule 26(f) report (Doc. 10). The Maricopa 

County Superior Court is as convenient a forum as this Court, as the parties and their 

counsel are located in and around Phoenix. (Doc. 1-3 at 1; Doc. 1 at 1.) Most important, 

considerations of federalism and comity are best served by allowing the Arizona state 

courts to address state-law claims. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 

726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity 

and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of 

applicable law.”); see also Roundtree v. Atl. Dev. & Inv., 2009 WL 2132697, *1-3 (D. Ariz. 

2009) (dismissing federal claim and then declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over remaining state-law claims: “The Court is mindful that the exercise of supplemental 

jurisdiction may serve the values of judicial economy and convenience . . . but these values 

are outweighed by the interests of comity and federalism.”); Floyd v. Watkins, 2015 WL 

5056036, *6 (D. Or. 2015) (“The Court closely examined the sole federal law claim [under 

§ 1983] and resolved it in favor of Officer Watkins. State court is a convenient forum for 

the parties, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction respects the values of 

federalism and comity.”). 

There is nothing unusual about this case that would tilt the balance of factors toward 

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retaining jurisdiction. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 357; see also Gini v. Las Vegas 

Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (proper to decline to exercise 

jurisdiction where the case is not “in any way unusual”). Therefore, for reasons of comity 

as well as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness, the Court will decline to exercise 

jurisdiction over the pendant state-law claims and will remand this matter to the state court.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to voluntarily dismiss their FCRA claim 

without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while 

retaining their other claims (Doc. 11) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall remand this case to 

the Maricopa County Superior Court and then terminate this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consent motion for extension of time (Doc. 

12) is denied as moot.

Dated this 14th day of January, 2020.

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