Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01447/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01447-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HELEN LE, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

KENNETH EDWARD AZNOE, 

RICHARD EDWARD McGREEVY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-1447 JAM AC (PS) 

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiffs are proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the 

undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 302(c)(21). On July 13, 2016, the court denied 

plaintiffs’ request to proceed in forma pauperis because their application did not contain sufficient 

information. ECF No. 4. The request was further denied because the complaint did not comply 

with the “short and plain statement” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 8, and because the 

portions of the complaint that could be understood either did not state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted, or asserted claims against defendants who were immune from suit. Id. 

 Plaintiffs have renewed their request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and have 

submitted an affidavit that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 6. The 

court will therefore screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

 

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I. SCREENING 

 Where “plaintiff’s claim appears to be frivolous on the face of the complaint,” the district 

court may “deny[] plaintiff leave to file in forma pauperis.” O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 

617 (9th Cir. 1990). As the court has already advised plaintiffs, they must assist the court in 

making this determination by drafting their complaint so that it complies with the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). 

 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and 

plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 

court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiffs are 

entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiffs, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the 

relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiffs’ claims must be set forth simply, concisely and 

directly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 

court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 

are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiffs’ favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 

Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, the court need not accept as true, legal conclusions cast in the form of factual 

allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Western 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may 

only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 

of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 

2014). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an 

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opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 A. The Complaint 

 The amended complaint is extremely difficult to read. See Complaint for Civil Case 

Declaratory (“Complaint”) ECF No. 5. The allegations contain many partial or indecipherable 

sentences. The court has, once again, nevertheless extracted as much information as it can from 

the Complaint, and sets forth the alleged facts as best it can. The allegations are presumed to be 

true only for purposes of this screening. 

 As best the court can tell, an insurance company failed to pay a claim without a reasonable 

basis for denial. Complaint at 5 ¶ III(A). Two insurance company employees are named as 

defendants, namely, Richard E. McGreevy, alleged to be an attorney at “Anchor General 

Insurance,” and Jaime Tamayo, alleged to be the President and CEO of “Mapre Insurance 

Commerce West.” Complaint at 2 ¶ I(B). The remaining defendants appear to be state court 

judges and justices who ruled against plaintiffs, and other state court personnel. Complaint at 2-3 

¶ I(B). 

 It appears that plaintiffs took their case against the insurance company or companies to 

state court, where they lost at the Superior Court, then at the Court of Appeal for the Third 

District, then at the California Supreme Court. See Complaint at 6-8. Plaintiffs have now 

brought their case to this court. As best the court can tell, plaintiffs are complaining about the 

treatment they received in the state court proceedings, and the losses they suffered there. 

 B. Analysis 

 This Complaint should be dismissed for lack of federal court jurisdiction. 

 1. No diversity jurisdiction 

 Plaintiffs allege “diversity” jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). However, the 

allegations of the complaint show that plaintiffs are domiciled in, and therefore presumed to be 

citizens of, California, having lived here for at least the past nine (9) years. See Complaint at 4 

¶ II(B); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989) (“[i]n order to be a 

citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must both be a 

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citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State) (emphasis added); Anderson v. 

Watts, 138 U.S. 694, 706 (1891) (“[t]he place where a person lives is taken to be his domicile 

until facts adduced establish the contrary”). The Complaint lists California addresses for almost 

all the defendants, and there is no allegation in the Complaint from which the court could infer 

that those defendants are not California citizens. Therefore, plaintiffs have not met their burden 

to show that diversity jurisdiction exists. Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 187 

(1990) (“[s]ince its enactment, we have interpreted the diversity statute to require ‘complete 

diversity’ of citizenship”). 

 2. No federal question jurisdiction 

 Plaintiffs also allege “federal question” jurisdiction, citing “ADA law.”1 See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. However, the Complaint contains no allegations that plaintiffs were discriminated 

against because of a disability, nor how they were discriminated against, nor any other allegation 

relating to the ADA. The claim is sufficiently insubstantial that it fails to confer federal question 

jurisdiction. Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“a federal court may dismiss a federal question claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” 

where the claim is “‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’”) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 

682-83 (1946)). 

 3. Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar & immunity 

 Plaintiffs also cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that plaintiffs’ Due Process rights were 

violated. However, the only apparent basis for this claim is that plaintiffs did not receive enough 

opportunities to make their case, and lost in state court. Specifically, they were thrown out of 

court, and were not given live hearings on their claims. However, this district court has no 

authority to review such proceedings of the state courts. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 

F.3d 855, 858–59 (9th Cir. 2008) (federal district courts have no authority to directly or indirectly 

review state court decisions) (citing the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine);2 Cooper v. Ramos, 704 

 

1

 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213. 

2

 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 

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F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[t]he doctrine bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not 

only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent’ of 

such an appeal”). Plaintiffs’ remedy, having lost their case at the state court level, was to seek 

review by the United States Supreme Court. Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 

602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005) (“state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by filing 

a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States”). In addition, it 

appears that plaintiffs are suing, among others, state judges and justices for their judicial actions. 

Such claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)). 

II. CONCLUSION 

 Plaintiffs, to their credit, have somewhat clarified the jurisdictional and substantive 

allegations in the amendment to their original complaint. However, the clarifications make it 

even clearer that there is no diversity jurisdiction here, and that any federal claim is 

jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, another attempt at 

amending the complaint in this court would be futile. Moreover, plaintiffs’ additional motions 

and requests are therefore moot, and should be denied. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ request to proceed in forma 

pauperis (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED. 

 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. This action should be DISMISSED, without prejudice, for lack of federal jurisdiction; 

and 

 2. Plaintiffs’ remaining “Requests” and “Motions” (ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12), should be 

DENIED, as moot. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one (21) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written 

objections with the court. Such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Local Rule 304(d). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

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ob

M

DA

bjections wit

Martinez v. Y

ATED: Sep

thin the spec

lst, 951 F.2d

ptember 9, 20

cified time m

d 1153 (9th C

016. 

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may waive th

Cir. 1991). 

he right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

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