Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00494/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00494-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS RHODES,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADAMS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:16-cv-00494-TLN-KJN

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR REMAND

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff Dennis Rhodes’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion 

for Remand to State Court. (ECF No. 7.) Defendant Adams & Associates, Inc. (“Defendant” or 

“Adams”) opposes Plaintiff’s motion. (Opp’n, ECF No. 9.) The Court has carefully considered 

the arguments raised by the parties’ briefing. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Remand to State Court (ECF No. 7) is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is an employment claim brought by Plaintiff against her former employer, Defendant 

for claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Plaintiff filed this 

action with the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Sacramento on 

December 14, 2015. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) age 

discrimination; (2) race and national origin discrimination; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to hire in 

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violation of public policy; (5) failure to prevent discrimination; and (6) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) On March 9, 2016, Defendant removed this action to 

the United States District Court, Eastern District of California, alleging diversity jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1332 and 1441(b). (Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed 

the instant motion asserting that Defendant has not met its burden in showing diversity, 

specifically that Defendant is domiciled in Nevada and not California. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) Plaintiff 

also alleges that Defendant’s removal was untimely. (ECF No. 7 at 5.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A civil action brought in state court, over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 

may be removed by the defendant to federal court in the judicial district and division in which the 

state court action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The district court has original jurisdiction 

over civil actions between citizens of different states in which the alleged damages exceed 

$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 

proving diversity. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Resnik v. La Paz Guest 

Ranch, 289 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1961)). Diversity is determined as of the time the complaint 

is filed and removal effected. Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 

(9th Cir. 2002). Removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal. Gaus v. Miles, 

Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

The amount in controversy is determined by reference to the complaint itself and includes 

the amount of damages in dispute, as well as attorney’s fees, if authorized by statute or contract. 

Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005). Where the complaint does not 

pray for damages in a specific amount, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 

398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996)). If the amount is not facially apparent from the complaint, the Court 

may “require parties to submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in 

controversy at the time of removal.” Id. (citing Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 

1335–56 (5th Cir. 1995).

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Removal based on diversity requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff be diverse from 

the citizenship of each defendant (i.e. complete diversity). Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 

68 (1996). For purposes of diversity, a limited liability company (LLC) is a citizen of every state 

in which its “owners/members” are citizens. Johnson v. Columbia Prop. Anchorage, LP, 437 

F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts are to treat LLCs like partnerships, which 

have the citizenships of all of their members). A corporation is a citizen of any state in which it is 

incorporated and any state in which it maintains its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(c)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

Here it is undisputed that Plaintiff is a citizen of California and that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000. Thus, the Court is left to determine Defendant’s citizenship in 

order to decide whether the parties are diverse and whether removal was untimely.

A. Diversity

 Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s Notice of Removal is insufficient because Defendant 

has not provided the required information to determine its corporate citizenship, such as: “(1) the 

number of employees it has in each state; (2) the percentage of its sales originating in each state; 

and (3) the percentages of its assets held in each state.” (ECF No. 7 at 7‒8.) Defendant argues 

that Plaintiff has applied the wrong legal test for corporation citizenship and asserts that it is a

citizen of Nevada. (ECF No. 9 at 2‒5.) This Court agrees.

“The federal diversity jurisdiction statute provides that ‘a corporation shall be deemed to 

be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its 

principal place of business.’” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(c)(1)). The Supreme Court has concluded that “the phrase ‘principal place of business’

refers to the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the 

corporation’s activities. Lower federal courts have often metaphorically called that place the 

corporation’s nerve center.’” Id. at 80‒81. 

Defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada

and has been since September 25, 1990. (See Am. Decl. of Tiffinay Pagni in Supp’t of Def’s 

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Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at ¶ 2.) Defendant holds annual stockholder and Board of Directors 

meetings, usually in the first quarter of the year. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 2.) These meetings take place 

at Defendant’s corporate office in Reno; Defendant’s twice-annual meetings for its Job Corps 

Center Directors during which Directors meet with corporate staff for training, evaluation and 

strategic planning also take place in Reno. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 2.) As for Defendant’s high level 

officers, Defendant alleges as follows:

All but one of Adams’ top executives are based out of the Reno 

office, including President Roy Adams, Secretary and Vice 

President of Administration Leslie Adams, Treasurer and Executive 

Director Dan Norem, Vice President of Finance Magdalena 

Cleveland, Vice President of Information Technology Dino Cabal 

and [General Counsel and Vice President of Human Resources, 

Tiffinay Pagni]. The single exception, President of Operations 

Susan Larson, currently resides in Maryland but spends 30 percent 

of her time at the Reno office. Ms. Larson has purchased a home in 

Reno and will soon relocate there permanently.

(ECF No. 12 at ¶ 4.) Defendant further alleges that although each of Defendant’s Job Corps 

Centers has its own local administrative departments for day-to-day operations, “policy decisions 

for the entire company are made by the executives resident [sic] in the Reno corporate office. All 

job descriptions, personnel policies, employee terminations, benefits plans, retirement plans and 

insurance policies are reviewed and approved in the Reno corporate office.” (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 3.) 

The Court finds that these facts are sufficient to support removal because Defendant is 

incorporated in Nevada and has its principle place of business in Nevada. 

B. Timeliness of Removal

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was served with the initial pleadings, including summons 

and complaint, on January 14, 2016. (ECF No. 7 at 5 (citing Bowen Dec. ¶5).) Defendant 

removed this matter to this court on March 9, 2016. Plaintiff asserts that 55 days passed after the 

initial service prior to Defendant filing their removal, and thus Defendant was well beyond the 

30-day period authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 

In response, Defendant argues that the time for removal was never triggered because 

Plaintiff never effectively served the complaint on Defendant. (ECF No. 9 at 8.) 

The Proof of Service states that service was made on Van Taylor (“Taylor”) on behalf of 

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Defendant pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 416.10. (See Proof of Service 

of Summons, Ex. A to the Decl. of William L. Bowen in Supp. of Motion for Remand, EDF No. 

7-2). California Code of Civil Procedure § 416.10(b) authorizes personal service upon a 

corporation only by serving a copy of the summons and complaint “[t]o the president, chief 

executive officer, or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant 

secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial officer, a general 

manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process.” Van Taylor 

was not employed by Defendant as he is a security guard who works at the Sacramento Job Corps 

facility at which Defendant provides subcontracted services. (See ECF No. 12 at ¶ 6.) Taylor is 

employed by another company that provides security services to that facility. (See ECF No. 12 at 

¶ 6.) Therefore, Taylor was not authorized by Defendant to receive service of process. As such, 

because service of process was not effectively served on the January 2016 date as alleged by

Plaintiff and because Plaintiff has failed to allege any further facts in support of his claim that 

removal was untimely, the Court finds that Defendant’s removal was not untimely. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant has met its burden of showing 

that the parties are diverse within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and that removal was not 

untimely in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand to State 

Court (ECF No. 7) is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 24, 2016

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