Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01330/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01330-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANKLIN ANDRADE, JR., Booking 

#1276875,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION AND 

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF No. 16]

Plaintiff Franklin Andrade (“Plaintiff” or “Andrade”), a state prisoner proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants County of San Diego (also erroneously sued as San Diego County Board of 

Supervisors, San Diego County Jail Director of Health Services, Facility Administrator of 

George Bailey Detention) (hereinafter “the County”) and Mike Barletta filed a motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) under Federal Rule of 

Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6336(b)(1)(A), 

United States Magistrate Judge Bernard Skomal submitted a Report and 

Recommendation (“Report”) to this Court recommending the Motion to Dismiss be 

granted without leave to amend. (Report, ECF No. 22.) Judge Skomal required the 

parties to file objections by September 22, 2015. The parties did not file any objections. 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 1 of 13
2

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

After careful consideration of the SAC and the Motion to Dismiss and for the reasons set 

forth below, this Court ADOPTS Judge Skomal’s Report in its entirety and GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC without leave to amend. 

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Franklin Andrade is incarcerated at George Bailey Detention Facility.

(SAC at 3, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff alleges that a doctor prescribed him the hydrocodone 

medication “Norco” approximately six months prior to his incarceration in his SAC. (Id.

at 6.) Plaintiff suffers from chronic pain due to a ligament severance of the right 

shoulder. (Id. at 4.) The prior attending physician fully informed Plaintiff of the risks 

associated with Norco and Plaintiff did not experience any ill effects from the drug. (Id.)

In October of 2013, a female attending physician at George Bailey told Andrade he 

could no longer receive Norco. (Id. at 4.) The physician instead prescribed 

“Roxycodone,” a drug which Andrade was unfamiliar with. (Id. at 5.) Andrade alleges

the doctor did not inform him the drug could cause opioid dependency or any of the side 

effects. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also contends that he did not receive “informed consent’ in 

violation of San Diego County guidelines and policies set forth in Title 15 § 1214. (Id. at 

5.) 

After two weeks Plaintiff noticed that Roxycodone’s effects wore off in a short 

period of time after ingestion and did not last after midnight. (Id. at 4.) An unnamed 

attending physician increased Andrade’s dosage to 3 times daily, distributed at 9:00 a.m., 

1:00 p.m., and 7:30 pm. (Id. at 8.) Andrade requested that the 1:00 p.m. distribution be 

moved to 2:30 a.m., but his request was denied. 

On January 19, 2014, Andrade alleges that unidentified nurses in the housing unit 

to which he was assigned stopped dispensing medication to him. (Id. at 8.) Andrade 

alleges that “even though Plaintiff was not a heroin user suffering heroin withdrawls, 

morphine based and opioid [sic] based products are in a similar family of narcotics [as 

Roxycodone]”; therefore “medical staff failed to follow their own guidelines concerning 

[the inmate] detoxification treatment policy” because they stopped administering 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 2 of 13
3

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Roxycodone without warning and failed to develop a detoxification program such as

“weaning” or to transfer him to a licensed medical facility under Title 15, (minimum jail 

standards) § 1213. (Id. at 7.)

From January 19, 2014 to January 20, 2014, Andrade submitted written and verbal

complaints to alert prison staff that once the Roxycodone medication was stopped (on

January 19, 2014), he began to feel severely ill. (Id. at 8.) On January 21, 2014, Andrade

woke up sick, was unable to eat breakfast, had coughs and sweats, and had chills upon

standing up. (Id.) He then blacked-out, fell backwards, and suffered a concussion and

contusion to the back of his head. (Id.) Andrade’s head wound was closed with nine

stitches, and he was admitted to the UCSD hospital for three days. (Id. at 8-10.)

On January 28, 2014, Andrade was transferred from the Medical Unit at George

Bailey Detention Facility to General Population. (Id. at 10.) At 9:00 a.m., Andrade lined

up to receive medication and was given a pre-measured dosage of a red liquid. (Id.) Due 

to its similarities in appearance to Robitussin cough syrup, which Andrade had been

previously prescribed, he mistook the red liquid for cough syrup and swallowed it. (Id.) 

The liquid, later discovered by Andrade to be an antiseptic called “Hibicleanse,” burned

his throat and caused him to vomit. (Id. at 11-13.) Andrade was escorted to a medical 

unit and placed into a holding cell for five hours, and was told by the attending nurse to 

keep vomiting. (Id. at 12.) Andrade stated that no medical staff remained to supervise, 

and he was later escorted back to General Population by a custody officer. (Id.)

On January 29, 2014, Andrade was escorted into an examination room for a

follow-up examination with the attending physician. (Id. at 12.) Andrade alleges that the

nurse who took his vitals was amused by his sickness and situation, made comments

about how the Hibicleanse tasted, and made Andrade feel that he “made the stupid

decision of injuring [himself].” (Id. at 12-13.) Andrade further alleges that the attending

physician also added joking remarks and asked him demeaning questions. (Id. at 13.)

When Andrade asked “what’s so “explentive” (sic) funny?” the attending physician told

the custody sheriff to take Andrade back to his cell without further treatment. (Id. at 13.)

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 3 of 13
4

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Andrade stated that, at that moment, he was still suffering from the burning sensation in

his throat, unable to eat or swallow without pain, and was still nauseous and suffering

from the effects of the concussion. (Id. at 13.)

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on May 29, 2014. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On 

June 9, 2014 the Court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court’s 

order stated:

First, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the “San Diego County Sheriff’s Department,” and 

the “San Diego Sheriff’s Department Medical Service” have violated his constitutional 

rights, his Complaint fails to state a claim because these entities are not “persons” subject 

to suit under § 1983. Neither a local law enforcement department (like the San Diego 

County Sheriff’s Office), a jail (like the San Diego County Jail), or a state agency (like the 

California Department of Corrections), are proper defendants under § 1983. See Vance v. 

County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal 

department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against 

a municipality.”) (Citation omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 

(N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s 

constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’);

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 915A(b) 

because he has failed to allege any facts which “might plausibly suggest” that either the 

County itself, or any individual County employee (a “person”), like Sheriff Gore, violated 

his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 

2012) (applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)’s pleading standards to Monell 

claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides 

for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by 

affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally 

required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights).

(Mot. Dismiss Compl. Order at 3-5, ECF No. 3.)

The Court gave Andrade leave to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Id. at 

7.) Plaintiff filed his FAC on July 8, 2014 (ECF No. 4.), which the Court again dismissed 

on August 6, 2014 for failure to state a claim with leave to amend (ECF No. 5). The 

Court stated in its order;

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might plausibly 

suggest” that the County violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. County of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 

(2009)’s pleading standards to Monell claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 4 of 13
5

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for relief only against those who, through their 

personal involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts, participation in another’s 

affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally required duties, cause the deprivation of 

plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights). Here, there are no allegations that any 

individual Defendant was acting in accordance with a County policy, procedure or custom. 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

Here, Plaintiff only alleges facts that show a difference of opinion between himself and 

unnamed medical staff regarding the course of his medical treatment. Prior to his 

incarceration, Plaintiff received a medication that the medical jail staff informed him they 

could not provide. (See FAC at 3-4.) Instead, Plaintiff was prescribed a different pain 

medication. (Id. at 4.) A mere difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical 

personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to establish 

a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

To the extent that Plaintiff claims he was left alone in his cell after becoming ill and 

“laughed at by medical staff,” he may have a deliberate indifference to a serious medical 

need claim. However, the Court cannot direct service of this claim at this time because 

Plaintiff’s pleading is completely devoid of any description or identifying factors necessary 

to effect service on an individual defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff has not named any 

individuals as Defendants in this matter. Thus, if Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this claim, 

he must file an amended pleading that provides an adequate description of these individuals 

whom he claims were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Walker v.

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly effect service under Rule 

4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the information necessary to identify 

the defendant.”). ”

(Id. at 2-6.)

On October 27, 2014, Andrade filed the SAC. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants filed a 

motion to dismiss on March 30, 2015. (ECF No. 16.) Judge Skomal issued a Report and 

Recommendation on August 8, 2015. (ECF No. 22.) Judge Skomal recommended the 

SAC be dismissed without leave to amend. 

III. Legal Standards

A. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 547(2007). A claim that is facially plausible when factual allegations permit “the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is responsible for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the nonconclusory content,’ and reasonable 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 5 of 13
6

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

inferences from the content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling plaintiff to 

relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task 

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 

Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 668. 

In addition to the liberal pleading standards set out in Rule 8, a document filed pro 

se is “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 511 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When the 

plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court affords the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2001); Karim Panahi v. Los Angeles 

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Pro se litigants “must be ensured 

meaningful access to the courts.” Rand v. Roland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1986). 

(“Pro se litigants in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably than 

parties with attorneys of record . . . it is not for the trial court to inject itself into the 

adversary process on behalf of one class of litigant”). And, in giving liberal 

interpretation to a pro se complaint, the court is not permitted to “supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. As with 

pleadings drafted by lawyers, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or 

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. W. Min. Council v. 

Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

B. Report & Recommendation 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) Review Standard

The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district 

court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which 

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When no 

objections are filed, the Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s 

findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. United States

Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 6 of 13
7

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a 

failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de novo review 

to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.” Barilla v. Ervin, 

886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 

F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983)).

IV. Discussion

A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

There are two elements to deliberate indifference. First, the plaintiff must show a 

serious medical need such that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain. Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97 (1976). Defendant’s motion to dismiss does not dispute Plaintiff can meet 

this element. (Mot. to Dismiss at 4:25, ECF No. 16.)

Second, the official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health 

or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Plaintiff must plead enough 

factual matter to show that each Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff satisfies this element when 

they can show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible 

medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id.

Finally, “the indifference to [a prisoner’s] medical needs must be substantial.” 

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105. Defendant’s conduct must amount to more than indifference, 

negligence, or medical malpractice. Id.

1. Defendant Mike Barletta

Defendant Barletta argues that dismissal is warranted because Andrade’s 

allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference. The allegations in 

the SAC against Defendant Barletta, in their entirety, are as follows: “Barletta . . . is 

employed as a Director of Health Services Authority . . . this defendant . . . flagrantly 

[sic] disregard of State law and San Diego County law and regulations, regarding 

“informed consent” of “Legend Drugs”, policy. Improperly supervising custodial 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 7 of 13
8

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

medical staff.” (SAC at 2.)

A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 

1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to 

perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the 

plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Causation 

is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 

197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized 

and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or 

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)); Berg 

v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986).

The SAC fails to identify any acts showing Defendant Barletta knew of, and 

thereafter affirmatively disregarded, an excessive risk to Andrade’s health or safety. The 

SAC merely makes conclusory allegations that Defendant Barletta is the Director of 

Health Services Authority and “flagrantly [sic] disregard of state law and San Diego 

County law, regarding ‘informed consent’ of ‘Legend Drugs’ policy. Improperly 

supervising custodial medical staff.” (SAC at 2.) Such general allegations however, fail

to state any facts from which the Court could infer that Barletta was personally involved 

or connected in some way to the decision to not give informed consent, stop providing 

Roxycodone or to the administering of Hibicleanse to Andrade. See Adams v. Johnson, 

355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir 2004).

Plaintiff also sues Barletta in his official capacity as a supervisor in his role as 

Director of Health Services Authority. (SAC at 2.) However, respondeat superior

liability is not available in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 

F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff can state a claim against a supervisor in 

their official capacity only if 1) the defendant personally acted in the constitutional 

deprivation or “2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional deprivation [exists].” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1207 (9th 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 8 of 13
9

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 2011). Plaintiff can show a causal connection if they allege facts which show the 

defendant knew or should have known of an unconstitutional practice by the employees 

but failed to stop the acts. Chavez v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2012); Starr, 

652 F.3d at 1207–08. 

Plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege sufficient facts which give rise to a cause of action 

against Defendant Barletta in his official capacity. The SAC does not assert that Barletta 

knew that an unidentified physician failed to give Andrade informed consent about the 

switch from Norco or Roxycodone, an unnamed nurse decided to abruptly stop 

administration of Roxycodone, or an unnamed prison member administered Hibicleanse 

to the defendant. Barletta cannot merely serve as a stand-in for the unknown defendants; 

he must have directed or condoned the unknown staff’s actions in some way. 

Because Plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege facts showing that Barletta 1) affirmatively 

acted with deliberate indifference or 2) knew or should have known of an 

unconstitutional practice by employees but failed to stop the acts, Defendant Barletta’s 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC for failure to state a claim as to Defendant Barletta is 

GRANTED. 

2. The County of San Diego

Andrade asserts a claim of deliberate indifference against the County of San Diego

under the theory of municipal liability. Counties can be held liable under section 1983

for violations of constitutional rights resulting from the county’s policies or customs. 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–93. Specifically, a plaintiff must show 1) he was deprived of a 

constitutional right; 2) the municipality had a policy; 3) the policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and 4) the policy is the “moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2006). “For a policy to be the moving force behind the deprivation of a constitutional 

right, the identified deficiency in the policy must be closely related to the ultimate 

injury,” and the plaintiff must establish “that the injury would have been avoided had 

proper policies been implemented.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 9 of 13
10

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(9th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff alleges that the County employee’s failure to follow certain policies gives 

rise to liability under section 1983. The first policy named in the complaint is, “Title 15, 

division 1, subchapter 4, minimum standards for local detention facilities, regarding 

‘Informed Consent’ of ‘Legend Drugs.’” (SAC at 3.) The SAC fails to state a claim 

because Andrade’s allegations do not assert an official policy is responsible for his 

injuries. Rather, Plaintiff alleges the failure of unnamed staff’s to follow the policy 

caused his injuries. (Id. at 5.) Andrade’s allegations do not stem from the policy itself, 

but from the failure of unnamed medical staff to provide him with informed consent of 

the dangers of Roxycodone in accordance with the policy. (Id.) Although the Court has 

asked Andrade to identify the person’s responsible for the deliberate indifference, the 

SAC fails to do so. (Mot. to Dismiss Order at 4:4–12.) Therefore, the County’s Motion 

to Dismiss for failure to state a claim in regard to the informed consent policy is 

GRANTED.

Andrade’s allegation that the medical staff failed to follow the inmate 

detoxification guidelines also fails to state a claim. Again, Andrade’s SAC takes issue 

with the staff’s failure to follow the County’s inmate detoxification guidelines; not with 

the detoxification policy itself. (See, e.g., SAC at 7, “even with the serious medical need 

indifference, San Diego County Jail medical staff failed to follow their own guide-lines 

concerning [inmate] detoxification policy.”) Municipal liability only occurs from a 

policy of the municipality, not from an individual act. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. 

Therefore, the County’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim in regard to the 

inmate detoxification policy is GRANTED.

B. Failure to Provide Medical Care under California Government Code

The County contends that any state law claim Plaintiff attempts to plead must be 

dismissed because public entities are immune from suit under California Government 

Code §§ 844.6 and 845.6. (Mot. to Dismiss at 8:9–20, ECF No. 16.) Section 844.6 states 

“notwithstanding any other provision of this part . . . a public entity is not liable for . . . 

(2) an injury to any prisoner.” Cal. Gov. Code § 844.6. Section 845.6 provides a limited 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 10 of 13
11

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exception, stating:

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused 

by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his 

custody; but, except as otherwise provided by sections 855.8 and 856, a public 

employee and his public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his 

employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner 

is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to 

summon such medical care.

Cal. Gov. Code § 845.6. Finally, municipalities are immune from liability under § 855.8, 

which states: “(a) Neither a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of 

his employment is liable for injury resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose that a 

person is afflicted with mental illness or addiction or from failing to prescribe for mental 

illness or addiction.” Cal. Gov. Code. § 855.8(a). 

Section 845.6 only grants an exception for failure to summon immediate medical 

care. Watson v. California, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841–42 (Ct. App. 1993). Medical 

malpractice does not give rise to liability under § 845.6. Nelson v. California, 139 Cal. 

App. 3d 72, 81 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the failure to prescribe or provide the 

correct medication is not the legal equivalent of a failure to summon medical care under 

§ 845.6.) 

In regards to the Roxycodone withdrawal incident where Plaintiff blacked out and 

suffered a contusion to the back of the head, the SAC alleges that medical staff took 

Plaintiff to the UCSD hospital where he remained for three days. (SAC at 10.) 

Andrade’s own allegations demonstrate that received immediate medical care in 

satisfaction of § 845.6 and he alleges no facts which suggest medical staff failed to 

summon the care required under the statute.

With respect to the “Hibicleanse” poisoning incident, the SAC alleges that after 

vomiting, prison staff escorted Plaintiff to a medical unit where medical staff diagnosed 

him. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that either an L.V.N or R.N. examined 

him; therefore, Plaintiff does now allege sufficient facts in the SAC to state a claim under 

§ 845.6 regarding the Hibicleanse incident.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges the County’s failure to provide medical care for 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 11 of 13
12

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

detoxification gives rise to liability under § 845.6. Plaintiff alleges in the SAC that 

“[f]rom the time of the medication stoppage, 01-19-2014, to 01-20-2014, Plaintiff 

informed through written and verbal [complaints] that an unknown cause for severe 

illness that started when the medication was stopped.” (Id. at 8.) However, Andrade 

never alleges that medical care for his condition was immediately necessary. While the 

SAC states that Title 15 requires a jail’s detoxification protocol include immediate 

transfer, relying on a transfer for detoxification brings the County into the immunity 

granted by Cal. Gov. Code § 855.8. ((Id. at 7.) At most, Title 15 requires an immediate 

transfer if an inmate undergoes detoxification; however, the SAC does not allege that 

Plaintiff alerted medical staff to anything other than an illness. (Id. at 8.) Medical staff 

would therefore have had to correctly diagnose Plaintiff of detoxification, making the 

County immune under § 855.8. See Cal. Gov. Code § 855.5(a). Therefore, the County’s 

Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Cal. Gov. Code. § 845.6 is 

GRANTED.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules:

1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim against Mike Barletta 

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED;

2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim of municipal liability 

against the County with respect to the informed consent policy and 

detoxification policy is GRANTED;

3) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under California 

Government Code § 845.6 is GRANTED.

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his complaint unless it is absolutely 

clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep’t of 

Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). “Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts 

are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are 

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 12 of 13
13

3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2000). Because Plaintiff has twice had the opportunity to 

amend his claims for deliberate indifference, and cannot cure the deficiencies in his 

complaint, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2016

Case 3:14-cv-01330-GPC-BGS Document 31 Filed 02/25/16 Page 13 of 13