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Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 23, 2004 Decided May 14, 2004

No. 03-7063

SILBURN B. FRANCIS,

APPELLANT

v.

RODMAN LOCAL UNION 201 PENSION FUND, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02390)

St. John Barrett argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Ellen O. Boardman argued the cause for appellees. With

her on the brief were James T. Kimble, Ronald C. Gladney,

and Laurence E. Gold.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Silburn Francis filed suit against

the Rodman Local Union 201 Pension Fund to recover benefits assertedly due him under the terms of an employee

pension plan. The district court granted summary judgment

for the Fund, concluding that Francis is not entitled to the

benefits he seeks. We affirm.

I

The instant appeal arises out of litigation extensively chronicled in this court’s opinions in Berger v. Iron Workers

Reinforced Rodmen, Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (Berger I), and Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced

Rodmen, Local 201, 170 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Berger

II). The Berger litigation began in 1975, when a class of

African–American rodmen—‘‘construction workers who handle and position steel rods for reinforcing concrete and other

building materials’’ — sued Iron Workers Reinforcing Rodmen, Local 201 and the International Association of Bridge,

Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL–

CIO (collectively ‘‘the unions’’) for denying them the benefits

of union membership on account of their race. Berger I, 843

F.2d at 1405–06. Although he was not a named plaintiff,

Francis claimed to be a member of the Berger class. In

Berger I, we upheld the district court’s determination that the

unions were liable for discrimination, and in Berger II we

upheld a number of the court’s determinations with respect to

class membership and the remedies due class members.

One determination that we specifically did not uphold involved plaintiff Francis himself. The district court (in the

form of a court order adopting the report of a Special Master)

had found Francis to be a member of the plaintiff class, and it

had awarded him $166,382 in back pay and $10,000 in compensatory damages. This court, however, concluded that

‘‘[t]here was conflicting testimony and other evidence as to

whether Silburn Francis sought union membership during,

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rather than after, the liability period,’’ and that the Special

Master had ‘‘weighed this evidence according to an incorrect

TTT burden of proof.’’ Berger II, 170 F.3d at 1126. Because

we were ‘‘unable to determine whether the Master would

have made the same findings if he had applied the correct

burden of proof,’’ we remanded for a redetermination of

whether Francis was an appropriate member of the class.

Id. In so doing, we emphasized that ‘‘Francis’ award [was]

subject TTT to the outcome of the remand of his class membership.’’ Id. at 1135 n.13.

On remand from Berger II, a number of claimants settled

their claims with the unions on an individual basis. Francis,

represented by his own attorney, was one of those claimants.

In return for ‘‘the sum of $150,000.00 in damages,’’ Francis

agreed to a ‘‘full, final and complete settlement’’ of all of his

claims. Francis Settlement Agreement at 1 (Oct. 12, 1999)

(J.A. at 66).

A year later, on October 9, 2000, Francis applied for

pension benefits. The Pension Fund calculated his pension

based on the reported hours he had worked in ‘‘Covered

Employment.’’ Cicero Decl. ¶ 5 (J.A. at 256). The Fund’s

calculation excluded hours that Francis did not work, but that

he contends he would have worked but for the discrimination

charged in the Berger litigation. Unhappy with the exclusion,

Francis asked the Fund to readjust his pension to reflect

those lost hours. The Fund denied that request.

On November 16, 2001, Francis filed the instant action to

recover the disputed pension benefits from the Fund, and the

unions intervened as defendants. After briefing and argument, the district court granted summary judgment for the

defendants. This appeal followed.

II

Francis filed this lawsuit, pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B)

of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),

‘‘to recover benefits due to him under the terms of’’ an

employee pension plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The case

turns in substantial part on the meaning of a specific provision of the Rodman Local Union 201 Pension Plan. Francis

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argues that we should determine the meaning of the provision

de novo, because it incorporates the terms of a regulation

promulgated by the Department of Labor. The Fund, citing

this circuit’s decision in Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc., contends

that where, as here, a pension plan gives its trustees ‘‘discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits [and] to

construe the terms of the plan,’’ we must uphold the trustees’

construction as long as it is reasonable. 952 F.2d 1450, 1452

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). We need not resolve this

disagreement, however, because it is plain that the Fund

would be the victor under either standard of review.

Under the Plan, a participant’s entitlement to a pension is

based on his ‘‘hours of service.’’ Pension Plan §§ 5.3, 5.6

(J.A. at 261–62). The Plan defines ‘‘hours of service’’ as:

[E]ach hour for which an Employee is paid or entitled to

be paid for work in Covered Employment. The term

‘‘Hour of Service’’ also includes each hour for which back

pay, regardless of mitigated damages, is awarded or

agreed to by an Employer to the extent such award or

agreement is intended to compensate an Employee for

periods during which he would have been engaged in

Covered EmploymentTTTT Hours of Service shall be

computed and credited in accordance with Department of

Labor Regulations § 2530.200b.

Pension Plan § 1.16 (J.A. at 260) (emphasis added). The

referenced Department of Labor regulation uses virtually

identical language to define an ‘‘hour of service’’:

(1) An hour of service is each hour for which an employee is paid, or entitled to payment, for the performance of

duties for the employer during the applicable computation periodTTTT

(3) An hour of service is each hour for which back pay,

irrespective of mitigation of damages, is either awarded

or agreed to by the employer.

29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b–2 (emphasis added).

Under the terms of the Plan, there is no dispute that

Francis is entitled to pension benefits for the hours that he

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actually worked. At issue are his benefits for the hours that

he contends he would have worked but for discrimination by

the unions. Although the Plan permits hours of service to be

computed ‘‘to compensate an Employee for periods during

which he would have been engaged in Covered Employment,’’

Pension Plan § 1.16 (J.A. at 260), both the Plan and the

regulation define an ‘‘hour of service’’ as an hour for which

back pay is either ‘‘awarded or agreed to by the employer.’’

As the unions do not dispute that they are ‘‘employers’’ within

the meaning of the Plan, Appellee’s Br. at 23, both sides

agree that the crux of the matter is whether hours for back

pay were ‘‘awarded’’ or ‘‘agreed to’’ by the unions.

It is clear at the outset that Francis was not ‘‘awarded’’

hours for back pay by this or any court. If anything, our

remand in Berger II cast doubt on Francis’ status as a class

member and hence on his eligibility for such an award.

Thereafter, by entering into a ‘‘full, final and complete’’

settlement without waiting for an adjudication of his status,

Francis permanently eliminated the possibility of such an

award.

Because Francis did not receive an ‘‘award,’’ he must hang

his pension claim on the contention that, in the settlement

agreement, the unions ‘‘agreed to’’ give him back pay for

hours of service. But the settlement contained no such

agreement. The operative language states:

[I]n consideration of Francis’ full discharge of past, present and future claims TTT arising out of or related to this

lawsuit against defendants, and the underlying claims

upon which this lawsuit is based, including but not limited to claims for back pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages and individual counsel’s attorneys’ fees and

costs TTT defendants agree to pay to Francis the sum of

$150,000.00 in damages. This settlement shall apply to

all claims Francis has against defendants in this case to

the effect that this agreement shall be a full, final and

complete settlement between the parties to this agreement.

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Francis Settlement Agreement at 1 (J.A. at 66) (emphasis

added). Although the settlement did discharge Francis’

claims for back pay, the unions did not agree that Francis

was actually entitled to such back pay. Rather, they agreed

to the sum of $150,000 ‘‘in damages.’’ Nothing in the agreement allocates that lump sum to hours of service, and nothing

indicates that there was even one ‘‘hour for which back pay

TTT [was] TTT agreed to by [the] employer.’’ Pension Plan

§ 1.16. The failure of the parties to mention Francis’ pension

rights, to label the $150,000 payment back pay, or to provide

any process for determining how much of the $150,000 was

attributable to hours of service, is ‘‘evidence that they did not

intend the TTT payment to generate pension benefits.’’ Licciardi v. Kropp Forge Div. Employees’ Ret. Plan, 990 F.2d

979, 983 (7th Cir. 1993); see Anderson v. Western Conference

of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 1993 WL 413138, at *3–6

(E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that settlement distribution was not

intended as an ‘‘agreement to hours of back pay’’).

Francis could have attempted to reserve his right to additional pension benefits by including an agreement for hours of

service for back pay in the settlement that he reached with

the unions. Another claimant who settled individually, Leonard Robinson, did just that. His settlement agreement included language similar to that in Francis’, but it also provided:

Robinson may participate in settlement negotiations with

defendants and the remaining claimants concerning pension adjustments and receive any such adjustments that

may be agreed to as to Robinson either individually or as

a remaining claimant in such negotiations.

Robinson Settlement Agreement at 1 (Nov. 5, 1999) (J.A. at

229). Likewise, the settlement that the unions entered into

with the remaining class members, two months after Francis

settled individually, contained the following express language:

[E]ach claimant TTT may submit a claim to the TTT

Pension Fund TTT to determine whether he is entitled to

a pension benefit or an adjustment of a pension benefit

as a result of the hours of work determined by the

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Special Master TTT and in accordance with the hours of

work attributed to the claimant by agreement of plaintiffs and defendants.

Class Settlement Agreement at 3 (Dec. 8, 1999) (J.A. at 76)

(emphasis added). The class settlement also contained a

process for determining ‘‘the hours of work to be attributed

to each’’ of a list of specifically identified class member

claimants. Id. at 3–5, app. A (J.A. at 76–78, 83–84). But

Francis cannot take advantage of that provision because it

was part of an agreement, entered into two months after his

own, that does not include him in its list of beneficiaries. To

the contrary, because Francis intentionally opted to settle

individually rather than as part of the class, he cannot obtain

the benefit of the bargain that the class struck for its

members alone.

We, of course, do not know why Francis opted to settle for

a lump sum — in advance of a judicial decision regarding his

class membership and separately from the other plaintiffs.

Perhaps he did not want to risk the possibility that the

Special Master, applying the burden of proof required in

Berger II, might determine that he was not a member of the

class and thus not entitled to receive anything. Whatever the

reason, Francis did settle on his own, receiving $150,000 in

exchange for dropping all of his claims. Although Francis

retains the right to receive pension benefits for the hours that

he actually worked, the Fund’s trustees cannot be faulted for

refusing to grant him still further benefits. Their fiduciary

responsibility is to those rodmen who are entitled to benefits

by virtue of work, award, or agreement, and the trustees have

an obligation to husband the Fund’s resources to ensure that

it has sufficient assets to pay those benefits.

III

Because Silburn Francis has no hours of service for which

back pay was awarded or agreed to by the unions, he is not

entitled to pension benefits beyond those attributable to the

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hours that he actually worked. Accordingly, the judgment of

the district court is

Affirmed.

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