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Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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.. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

DALLAS LYLE ELLISON, 

ALICE PAULINE ELLISON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

JUN 2 8 1991 

) R.OBERT L. HOECKER 

~ Clerk 

) 

) 

) No. 90-6283 

) (D.C. No. CIV-89-650-A) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the district court 

granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6283 Document: 010110128276 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs commenced this products liability action in 

district court seeking damages for permanent injuries suffered by 

plaintiff, Dallas Lyle Ellison, allegedly as a result of his 

exposure to paint products manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff, 

Alice Pauline Ellison, sought damages for loss of consortium. 

Dallas Ellison had previously brought a workers' compensation 

action against his employer, Martin Body Shop. In that action Mr. 

Ellison signed a release which provided that he accepted $45,000 

as a 

full compromise settlement and satisfaction of, and as 

sole consideration for the final release and discharge 

of all actions, claims and demands whatsoever, that now 

exist, or may hereafter accrue against said Respondent 

and Insurance Carrier and any other person, corporation, 

association, partnership or entity charged with 

responsibility for the injury to or death of Dallas L. 

Ellison. 

Addendum to Appellants' Brief in Chief, Ex. D. 

The district court held that this release was unambiguous on 

its face. Therefore, the release reached beyond Martin Body Shop 

and its insurance carrier and provided for the release of 

defendant. The district court held that Mrs. Ellison's cause of 

action, being derivative of her husband's claim, was also barred 

by the release. 

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the release did not release 

DuPont because (1) Mr. Ellison's employer and DuPont were not 

joint tortfeasors; (2) the release of a statutory workers' 

compensation obligation does not release a third party tortfeasor; 

and (3) the court should have admitted parol evidence to assist it 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6283 Document: 010110128276 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 2 
in ascertaining the true intent of the parties to the release. 

Mrs. Ellison argues that the release executed by her husband does 

not bar her cause of action for loss of consortium. 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de 

nova, applying the same legal standard used by the district court 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. 

First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Because there is no dispute here as to the facts, we need only 

determine if the district court correctly applied the substantive 

law. Id. 

The district court held that our disposition in Mussett v. 

Baker Material Handling Corp., 844 F~2d 760 (10th Cir. 1988), was 

controlling. We agree. In Mussett, the plaintiff brought a 

products liability action after she had settled and signed a 

release with the owner of the store at which she was injured. The 

release in part read that plaintiff released and discharged "the 

said Payer and all other persons, firms, and corporations, both 

known and unknown .... " Id. at 761 (emphasis in original). We 

held that, although the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not yet ruled 

on the effect of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors 

Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 832, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's 

prior decision in Brown v. Brown, 410 P.2d 52 (Okla. 1966), 

dealing with a virtually identical release to the one found in 

Mussett, gave sufficient guidance on the issue of the scope of a 

general release. In Brown, 410 P.2d at 57, the court held that an 

unambiguous release was effective against an unnamed defendant. 

Similarly, in Mussett, we held that the release released claims 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6283 Document: 010110128276 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 3 
against all possible defendants named and unnamed. Mussett, 844 

F.2d at 762; see Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 773 S.W.2d 78, 80 

(Ark. 1989)(recognizing this court's application of the "flat bar" 

rule in Mussett). 

Plaintiffs argue that Mussett does not control here because 

Martin Body Shop and defendant were not joint tortfeasors. 

Plaintiffs assert that Martin Body Shop's liability was founded on 

a statutorily created obligation, while their claim against 

defendant sounds in tort. Plaintiffs cite no cases supporting a 

distinction based on a release of statutorily imposed liability, 

nor have we found any. 

In fact, this court accorded res judicata effect to a Kansas 

state court decision which made no such distinction in Sade v. 

Northern Natural Gas Co., 458 F.2d 210 (10th Cir. 1972). In Sade, 

we upheld an asserted cause of action in fraud against an employer 

after the Kansas state court dismissed the plaintiff's cause of 

action against the employer's employees (a third party). The 

Kansas state court had held that the release the plaintiff had 

signed in connection with his workers' compensation claim, also 

barred his action against his employer's employees in Kansas. Id. 

at 212. (This claim was statutorily barred in Oklahoma, but at 

that time Kansas still permitted actions against negligent third 

parties, including an employee of the employer. Id. at 216.) The 

plaintiff alleged in federal court that his release was obtained 

as a result of fraud on the part of his employer who had assured 

him his release of his employer under Oklahoma's workers' 

compensation law would not bar his action against his employer's 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-6283 Document: 010110128276 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 4 
... 

employees in Kansas. Id. at 212. We gave no indication that an 

unambiguous general release entered in connection with a workers' 

compensation claim could not effectively bar a cause of action 

against a third party. 

We agree with the district court that the release here is 

unambiguous. 

matter of 

contract." 

Therefore, we are required to interpret it "as a 

law and [are] precluded from looking beyond the 

Mussett, 844 F.2d at 762 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 15, 

§ 154). Plaintiff clearly released all claims against "any other 

person, corporation, association, partnership or entity charged 

with responsibility" for his injuries. Because the release is 

unambiguous, the district court properly refused to consider parol 

evidence. 

The district court held that Mrs. Ellison's claim for loss of 

consortium was also barred by reason of the release. No Oklahoma 

cases address whether the signatory to a release can, by his 

signature alone, also release a nonsigning nonparty whose claim, 

although derivative of the signatory's claim, is nonetheless, a 

separate cause of action. 

The overwhelming weight of case law supports "the position 

that a claim for loss of consortium accrues to the noninjured 

spouse alone and is not barred by the settlement and release of 

the injured spouse's personal injury claim." Manzitti v. Amsler, 

550 A.2d 537, 541 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 574 A.2d 601 (Pa. 

1990) and cases cited therein; see 

Release of Tortfeasor as Barring 

Consortium, 29 A.L.R.4th 1200 (1984), 

5 

Annotation, Injured Party's 

Spouse's Action for Loss of 

and cases cited therein. 

Appellate Case: 90-6283 Document: 010110128276 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 5 
, · 

But see Hall v. Gardens Servs., Inc., 332 S.E.2d 3, 5 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 1985)(holding that husband's claim for loss of consortium was 

barred because his right to recover was dependent upon the right 

of his wife to recover who could not recover because she had 

signed release). There is no persuasive reason why Oklahoma would 

not follow the majority position. 1 Therefore, we hold that Mrs. 

Ellison's cause of action for loss of consortium is not barred by 

the release signed by her husband. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED as to Mr. Ellison's 

claims and REVERSED as to Mrs. Ellison's loss of consortium claim. 

The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with 

this order and judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Wade Brorby 

Circuit Judge 

1 Defendant's citation to Porter v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 

643 P.2d 302 (Okla. 1982) is inapposite. In Porter, the court 

held that an insured motorist's claim for benefits under his 

uninsured motorist policy was barred by reason of his settlement 

with the tortfeasor which denied his insurer recourse against the 

tortfeasor. 

6 

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