Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02386/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02386-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RICKY NAPIER, )

)

Petitioner, ) 

v. ) CIV 09-02386 PHX ROS (MEA)

)

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) 

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSALIND O. SILVER:

On or about December 28, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 17) on September 13, 2010. 

Respondents filed additional pleadings on October 13,

2010. See Doc. 20. As of December 1, 2010, Petitioner has not

filed any reply to the answer to his petition.

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned March

23, 2005, charged Petitioner with one count of first-degree

murder, one count of aggravated assault, one count of

first-degree burglary, and one count of armed robbery. See

Answer, Exh. A. It was alleged Petitioner shot to death a

person who failed to provide change for Petitioner’s purchase of

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twenty dollars-worth of crack-cocaine with a fifty dollar bill.

Id., Exh. VV. 

Prior to Petitioner’s trial the state petitioned the

trial court to grant use immunity to the victim’s brother in

exchange for his testimony at Petitioner’s trial. See Petition,

Attach. & Answer, Exh. G. After conducting a hearing, the trial

court granted the requested immunity. Answer, Exhs. I–L.

Additionally, prior to trial the state alleged aggravating

circumstances other than prior convictions. Id., Exh. M. 

 At his trial Petitioner testified that he shot the

victim in self-defense and the jury was given a self-defense

instruction. Id., Exh. Z & Exh. EE & Exh. VV. Petitioner was

found guilty by a jury on March 24, 2006. Id., Exh. GG & Exh.

II. 

On April 28, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to a term

of life in prison with the possibility of parole after 25 years

pursuant to his conviction for first degree murder. Id., Exh.

MM. Petitioner was sentenced to a concurrent presumptive term

of 7.5 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for

aggravated-assault. Petitioner was sentenced to a concurrent

presumptive term of 7.5 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction for first-degree-burglary and to a presumptive

concurrent term of 10.5 years imprisonment on the armed-robbery

conviction. Id., Exhs. MM & NN. 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

his direct appeal. Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed notice

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that she had “found no arguable question of law” to raise in the

direct appeal “that is not frivolous.” Id., Exh. PP at 20. The

Arizona Court of Appeals granted an extension of time for

Petitioner to file a pro se brief and denied Petitioner’s

subsequent motion to change attorneys. Id., Exh. TT.

Petitioner’s pro se brief in his direct appeal raised

fifteen claims for relief. Id., Exhs. UU. 

1. Petitioner alleged his rights were violated because

he was forced to wear a stun vest at trial and because officers

threatened to shock Petitioner for no reason, citing to Gonzalez

v. Pliler. Petitioner also alleged that jurors observed him in

handcuffs in a courtroom hallway and that the jury observed a

courtroom office assault Petitioner.

2. Petitioner alleged he was entitled to relief from

his convictions because the victim’s brother gave perjured

testimony because he was in the country illegally; the brother

was using and selling drugs; a blood test indicated the brother

had used crack cocaine; the brother admitted while testifying at

Petitioner’s trial that he had repeatedly lied to investigators;

the brother failed to identify Petitioner as the perpetrator of

the crimes at a line-up; the brother received immunity from

potential drug possession charges arising from the incident in

return for his testimony against Petitioner; at the time of

Petitioner’s trial, there were fifteen counts of armed robbery

pending against the victim’s brother. Petitioner cites to

Pennsylvania case and Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Does

not mention the United States Constitution or reference any

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constitutional right.

3. Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief from

his convictions based on recently-passed state legislation

regarding the burden of proof in a case wherein the defendant

asserted self-defense. Petitioner argued the new burden of

proof scheme should be applied retroactively to his case.

Petitioner asserted that nothing in the United States

Constitution prohibited the application of the new legislation

to his case, citing the United States Supreme Court opinions in

Apprendi and Blakely.

4. Petitioner maintained that the judgment against him

should be modified because there was insufficient evidence

introduced at his trial to find him guilty of the charges

against him. Petitioner did not cite to the United States

Constitution or any federal case when asserting this argument.

5. Petitioner asserted the trial court erred by giving

an incorrect instruction to the jury regarding intoxication.

Petitioner alleged that Petitioner, the victim, and the victim’s

brother had all used drugs at the time of the crime. Petitioner

did not reference the United States Constitution or any federal

constitutional right in this section of his appellate brief and

cited only to state court opinions in support of this argument.

6. Petitioner asserted the trial court erred by failing

to give the jury an instruction regarding Arizona’s “invitees

law.”

7. Petitioner maintained there was insufficient

evidence to find him guilty on the charge of first-degree

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murder. Petitioner alleged that only a “scintilla” of

circumstantial evidence supported the jury’s verdicts.

Petitioner cited to In re Winship and Jackson v. Virginia when

maintaining he was entitled to relief on this basis. Petitioner

asserted that the victim’s brother’s testimony was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction because the witness was

intoxicated on crack cocaine at the time of the murder and

because the witness failed to identify Petitioner as the

perpetrator of the crimes in a line-up after the crimes. 

8. Petitioner argued that the crimes were not properly

investigated for forensic evidence. Petitioner did not cite to

any federal case law or reference any federal constitutional

right in raising this claim.

9. Petitioner alleged the trial court erred by allowing

a gruesome photo of the victim to be displayed for thirty

minutes on a large screen visible to the jury, despite the fact

that the identity of the victim was not at issue. Petitioner

asserted this error violated state law and his federal right to

due process of law.

10. Petitioner maintained the trial court erred by

limiting the cross-examination of the victim’s brother to show

this witness’ lack of credibility. Petitioner argued this error

violated his right to confront the witnesses against him, citing

Crawford v. Washington.

11. Petitioner maintained the trial court erred by

failing to instruct the jury on the lesser charge of

manslaughter. Petitioner cited only to state law in asserting

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this claim for relief.

12. “Rational Intellect of Statements”. Petitioner

alleged that at the time he was interviewed regarding the crimes

he was in withdrawal from prescribed medications for anxiety and

methadone and he had not slept in 35 hours. Petitioner did not

reference any federal constitutional right or cite to any state

or federal case when raising this claim for relief.

13. Petitioner asserted there was insufficient evidence

to sustain his conviction on the charge of aggravated assault.

Petitioner did not reference any federal constitutional right or

cite to any federal case when raising this claim for relief.

14. Petitioner asserted there was insufficient evidence

to sustain his conviction on the charge of first-degree

burglary. Petitioner cited to In re Winship and Jackson v.

Virginia when raising this claim. Petitioner asserted that the

victim’s brother’s testimony was insufficient evidence to

sustain his conviction because the witness was intoxicated on

crack cocaine at the time of the murder and because the witness

was awaiting trial on fifteen charges of aggravated robbery and

was in the country illegally.

15. Petitioner asserted there was insufficient evidence

to sustain his conviction on the charge of armed robbery.

Petitioner cited to In re Winship and Jackson v. Virginia when

raising this claim for relief. Petitioner asserted that the

victim’s brother’s testimony was insufficient evidence because

the witness’ testimony that Petitioner took money from the

victim’s pockets was contradicted by a detective’s testimony

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1 The Court of Appeals stated Petitioner had not filed a

supplemental pro per brief, which is in the record before this Court.

The Court of Appeals evaluated the seven claims for relief raised in

Petitioner’s successive motions for new counsel in his appeal, filed

after his appointed counsel had filed a pleading indicating she could

find no meritorious issues to raise on Petitioner’s behalf.

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that money was found in the victim’s pockets.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences in a memorandum decision filed June

21, 2007. Id., Exh. VV.1 The Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed

the record on appeal for fundamental error. The Court of

Appeals also specifically discussed and denied Petitioner’s

claims that his statements to investigators were involuntary;

that he was mentally insufficient to stand trial; the witnesses’

testimony was not credible; there was insufficient evidence of

his guilt to sustain his convictions; he was forced to wear a

stun belt and vest at his trial; the state was allowed to leave

a gruesome picture of the victim before the jury for a halfhour; that the recent affirmative defense legislation applied to

his case.

 The appellate court subsequently summarily denied

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision denying

relief. Id., Exhs. WW–XX. Petitioner did not seek review of

the appellate court’s denial of relief in the Arizona Supreme

Court. Id., Exh. YY.

On August 20, 2007, Petitioner initiated an action for

post-conviction relief in the Maricopa County Superior Court,

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.,

Exh. ZZ. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

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his Rule 32 proceedings. Id., Exh. AAA. In his Rule 32 action

Petitioner argued the alleged use of an anonymous jury. Id.,

Exh. AAA. 

The Maricopa County Superior Court denied relief in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, finding his argument lacked of

merit. Id., Exh. BBB– DDD. Petitioner sought review of this

decision. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review

on DATE. Id., Exh. EEE–HHH. 

On December 21, 2009, Petitioner filed a federal habeas

petition, raising seven claims for relief. Respondents contend

that Petitioner procedurally defaulted three of his habeas

claims in the state courts. Respondents assert that the other

habeas claims may be denied because the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision denying those claims was not clearly contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Reese, 541

U.S. 27, 29-30, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349-50 (2004); Robinson v.

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Schriro, 595 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub

nom., Ryan v. Robinson, 79 U.S.L.W. 3054 (U.S. Nov 08, 2010)

(No. 10-34); Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1014 (2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in cases arising in Arizona in which the sentence imposed is not

a capital sentence, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner presented his

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal

or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Paige v.

Schriro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168-69 (D. Ariz. 2009); Crowell

v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007).

Petitioner does not face a capital sentence. Accordingly, any

claim presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner’s

direct appeal or in his Rule 32 action was properly exhausted.

See Paige, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 1168-69; Date v. Schriro, 619 F.

Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 2006).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Scott, 567 F.3d at 582. The

petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial

equivalent” of the habeas claim presented in federal court.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14

(1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009),

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cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3412 (2010). 

In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court reiterated that

the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the opportunity

to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541

U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if the

petitioner did not present the federal habeas claim to the state

court as asserting the violation of a specific federal

constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state law or

a state procedural rule, the federal habeas claim was not

“fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S.

at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to

have presented the substance of his federal habeas claim to the

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional

guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner

to relief. See Scott, 567 F.3d at 582; Lopez v. Schriro, 491

F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner

need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution” to

fairly present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more than present the

facts necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982). General and

conclusory references to “due process” in a state court pleading

do not suffice to exhaust a claim that the petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights were violated. See, e.g., Casey v. Moore,

386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004).

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A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2010). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Cook v. Schriro, 538

F.3d 1000, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

1033 (2009). If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is

procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93, 126 S. Ct.

at 2387; Cook, 538 F.3d at 1025-26. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Cook,

538 F.3d at 1025-26; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th

Cir. 1988). Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner

did present a claim to the state courts, but the state courts

did not address the merits of the claim because the petitioner

failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991);

Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000); Szabo v.

Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). 

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The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100.

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Supreme Court in his direct appeal or

in his state action for post-conviction relief. See

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty

v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart

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v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002); Ortiz

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

An unexhausted claim may be considered in a habeas

action if the petitioner demonstrates cause for, and prejudice

arising from, their procedural default of their federal habeas

claim. Under the “cause and prejudice” test, Petitioner bears

the burden of establishing that some objective factor external

to the defense impeded his compliance with Arizona's procedural

rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir.

2005). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v.

Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567 (“We reiterate that counsel’s ineffectiveness

will constitute cause only if it is an independent

constitutional violation”); Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809

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(6th Cir. 2004) (“[a]ttorney error does not constitute cause to

excuse a procedural default unless counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.”). The ineffective assistance of

post-conviction counsel does not constitute cause because “the

right to counsel does not extend to state collateral proceedings

or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80

F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996).

“Cause” must be something external to the

petitioner. [] Attorney ignorance or

inadvertence is not cause, but attorney error

rising to the level of an independent

constitutional violation (in the form of

ineffective assistance of counsel) does

constitute cause. [] In several cases, we

have rejected arguments similar to Moormann’s

on the ground that, because there is no Sixth

Amendment right to counsel in state

post-conviction proceedings, there can be no

independent constitutional violation as a

result of post-conviction counsel’s

incompetence. 

Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1058 (internal citations omitted).

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

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of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses of conviction. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at

393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-

43 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325

(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1041 (2003); Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008). The “presumption of

correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court,

as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.”

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05

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(1982). See also Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1

(9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1086 (2010).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133,

141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). For

example, a state court’s decision is considered “contrary to

federal law” if the state court erroneously applied the wrong

standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008).

See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008);

Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983,

990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035-38;

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1015. However, the state court’s decision is

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

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only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S. Ct. at 1521; Carey, 549 U.S.

at 74-75, 127 S. Ct. at 653. An unreasonable application of law

is different from an incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002); Cooks v. Newland, 395

F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Furthermore, only United States Supreme Court holdings,

and not dicta or concurring opinions, at the time of the state

court’s decision are the source of “clearly established federal

law” for the purpose of the “unreasonable application” prong of

federal habeas review. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S. Ct. at

1523; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S. Ct. at 653; Ponce v. Felker,

606 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3269

(U.S. Nov. 01, 2010); Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1209-10

(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2885 (2009).

If the Supreme Court has not addressed a specific issue

in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the issue

cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881, citing Kane v.

Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006).

Stated another way, if the issue raised by the petitioner “is an

open question in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court

may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the

state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law

by rejecting the precise claim presented by the petitioner.

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1016; Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123

(9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008). The

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United States Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that

it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific

legal rule that has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1419, citing Wright, 552 U.S. at

124-25, 128 S. Ct. at 746-47. See also Vasquez, 572 F.3d at

1038.

The holdings of the Circuit Courts of Appeal are

relevant to resolution of a petitioner’s habeas claims only to

the extent they are useful in deciding whether the law has been

clearly established or that the state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court

precedent, and not with regard to what constitutes a violation

of constitutional rights. See Maxwell, 606 F.3d at 567; Bible

v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.

Ct. 1745 (2010); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1172

(9th Cir. 2003). Compare Smith v. Dinwiddie, 510 F.3d 1180,

1186 (10th Cir. 2007).

 Accordingly, a state court decision may be contrary to

a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding without being an

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent. See Kessee v. Mendoza Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 679 (9th

Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has held that when a Supreme

Court decision does not “squarely address” the issue presented

by the habeas petitioner, or if the Supreme Court principle does

not “clearly extend” to the context of the situation presented

by the petitioner, “it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is

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‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the

issue.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The Court must review the last reasoned state court

opinion on the claims raised in the habeas action. See, e.g.,

Maxwell, 606 F.3d at 568; Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035. When there

is no “reasoned” state court decision explaining the state’s

denial of a claim presented in a federal habeas petition, the

District Court must perform an independent review of the record

to ascertain whether the state court’s decision summarily

denying the claim was objectively reasonable. See Medley v.

Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 863 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 1878 (2008); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 890; Pham v.

Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). If the Court

determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent, the Court must review whether

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the

state court’s decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59

(2007); Frantz, 533 F.3d at 736-37; Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d

624, 641 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626,

640 (9th Cir. 2009); Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 924-

25 (9th Cir. 2008).

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D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner’s first claim for relief is

“involuntariness of incriminative statements (sic)”.

In the section of his habeas petition specifying facts

in support of his first claim for relief, Petitioner asserts

that he was not competent during his interrogation because he

was in extreme pain and because he is mentally deficient.

Petitioner contends that he was not competent to assist in his

own defense during his interrogation. Petitioner does not cite

to any provision of the United States Constitution that he

believes was violated by these actions.

In his direct appeal Petitioner raised a claim similar

to his first habeas claim, regarding the alleged involuntariness

of Petitioner’s statements to police officers investigating the

crimes of conviction. However, when raising this claim in his

direct appeal Petitioner did not cite to any provision of the

federal constitution.

Petitioner did not “fairly present” his first federal

habeas claim to the state courts as alleging the violation of a

federal constitutional right. Arizona’s rules regarding

timeliness and the presentation of claims bar Petitioner from

properly exhausting this claim at this time. Accordingly, the

Court should not consider the merits of this claim absent a

showing of cause and prejudice. 

Petitioner has not filed a traverse to the respone to

his petition. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of this claim. Accordingly,

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habeas relief may not be awarded on this claim. 

2. Petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial because the jury was improperly

instructed regarding the “right to use force in the defense of

property and crime prevention.”

Petitioner failed to properly exhaust this claim by

fairly presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

procedurally correct manner in his direct appeal. Petitioner

raised an arguably similar claim in his pro se brief in his

direct appeal, however, he did not cite any provision of the

federal constitution nor did he assert the trial court’s error

violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 

Petitioner did not “fairly present” his second federal

habeas claim to the state courts as alleging the violation of a

federal constitutional right. Arizona’s rules regarding

timeliness and the presentation of claims bar Petitioner from

properly exhausting this claim at this time. Petitioner has not

shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of this claim. Accordingly, habeas relief may not be

awarded on this claim. 

3. Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to relief

because the victim’s brother gave perjured testimony in exchange

for immunity.

Petitioner asserts the victim’s brother gave perjured

testimony in return for immunity. Petitioner maintains the

conclusion that the brother committed perjury is supported by

the brother’s testimony that he lied to police investigating the

crimes. Petitioner also alleges the brother gave inconsistent

statements to police during the investigation. Petitioner also

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contends that the trial court improperly prohibited the defense

from asserting that the brother’s testimony was not believable

because he had been charged with other felonies and was in the

country illegally.

Petitioner failed to properly exhaust this claim by

fairly presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

procedurally correct manner in his direct appeal. Petitioner

raised an arguably similar claim in his pro se brief in his

direct appeal, however, he did not cite any provision of the

federal constitution. Petitioner echoed some of the facts he

alleges in this claim in the state court in the context of his

argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his

convictions because this witness’ testimony was perjured or

unreliable, as discussed infra.

Petitioner did not “fairly present” his third federal

habeas claim to the state courts as alleging the violation of a

federal constitutional right. Arizona’s rules regarding

timeliness and the presentation of claims bar Petitioner from

properly exhausting this claim at this time. Petitioner has not

shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of this claim. Accordingly, habeas relief may not be

awarded on this claim. 

4. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief from his

convictions because there was insufficient evidence to find him

guilty of the crimes.

Petitioner argues that, because the state’s case

against him was predicated on the brother’s victim’s testimony,

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which he asserts was perjured, there was insufficient evidence

to find him guilty on the counts of conviction. Petitioner

contends “the State’s whole case was [based on the testimony of

Gasp[e]r” whose “credibility and reliability ... should in no

way be enough” to support Petitioner’s conviction on all four

counts. Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim,

enumerating the reasons why a reasonable jury could conclude

that Petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Answer,

Exh. VV.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination that there

was sufficient evidence to find Petitioner guilty on all the

counts of conviction was not clearly contrary to federal law. 

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,

1073 (1970). To determine whether sufficient evidence was

introduced at trial to support a habeas petitioner’s conviction,

the Court must decide if, “viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99

S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). See also McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S.

Ct. 665, 673 (2010); McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 468-469

(9th Cir. 1994). 

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Under this standard, a federal habeas court faced with

a record of historical facts that supports conflicting

inferences must presume--even if it does not appear

affirmatively in the record--that the trier of fact resolved any

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to

that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793.

See also McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 673.

[I]t is the province of the jury to resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.[] As the

Ninth Circuit has explained, The question is

not whether we are personally convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether

rational jurors could reach the conclusion

that these jurors reached.[] While mere

suspicion or speculation cannot be the basis

for creation of logical inferences...

[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences

drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a

conviction.

Atwood v. Schriro, 489 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1002-03 (D. Ariz. 2007)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the record

is so totally devoid of evidentiary support for the challenged

conviction as to violate due process. See Crow v. Eyman, 459

F.2d 24, 25 (9th Cir. 1972). Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient to support a petitioner’s guilty verdict. Jackson,

442 U.S. at 324-25, 99 S. Ct. at 2792; Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d

557, 563 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence to support

a murder conviction when the evidence was almost entirely

circumstantial and relatively weak); Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d

538, 547 (8th Cir. 2005). In reviewing a sufficiency of the

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evidence claim, a federal habeas court must defer to the trier

of fact with respect to issues of conflicting testimony, weight

of the evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses. Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.

Petitioner does not allege that he did not shoot the

victim, but asserts that he acted in self-defense. At his

trial, Petitioner testified that he acted in self-defense and

the victim’s brother testified Petitioner did not act in selfdefense. The jury heard the testimony and rendered a verdict in

accordance with its determination of credibility. Because the

issue of evidentiary sufficiency involved witness credibility,

the state court’s determination that there was sufficient

evidence to find Petitioner guilty was not clearly contrary to

federal law nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

5. Petitioner contends the trial court committed

fundamental error in his criminal proceedings because the jury

observed him wearing a stun belt and vest. Petitioner asserts

he had a constitutional right to be free of restraint during his

trial.

In his fifth habeas claim, Petitioner argues that

fundamental error occurred during his trial “because he had to

wear a stun belt and vest in front of the jury” which “took away

the defendant’s presumption of innocen[ce] until[] proven guilty

in the eyes of the jury...” Petitioner asserts that use of the

belt and vest were “in no way warranted”. Petition (Doc. 1) at

7. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the claim on the grounds that

Petitioner failed to object to the use of the belt or vest at

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trial. The appellate court also found Petitioner had not argued

or show prejudice from the alleged error on appeal. The

appellate court determined Petitioner’s ability to communicate

with counsel was not actually impacted and that the record

failed to show the jury was aware of any use of restraints.

This decision was not clearly contrary to federal law nor an

unreasonable application of federal law.

All of the federal cases which discuss habeas relief

based on a shackling claim state that, to succeed on this type

of claim, the petitioner must show that the physical restraints

‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict...” Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d

633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.

560, 568-69, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1986). To be entitled to

habeas relief on this claim the District Court must conclude

that the jury saw or was aware of the restraint and that the

restraint was not justified by state interests. See Ghent v.

Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally,

for unjustified restraint to rise to the level of a

constitutional trial error, Petitioner must establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of the restraint. See id.;

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 592-93 (9th Cir. 2004);

Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2003). See also

Dyas v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner has not established that the jury saw the

restraints, that he was unable to communicate with his counsel

as a result of the restraints, or that he was otherwise

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prejudiced by the restraints. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 592-93;

Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 583 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding no

prejudice resulted from the defendant’s leg brace when no juror

interviewed after trial remembered seeing a leg brace on the

defendant); Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.

1999). Accordingly, the state court’s conclusion that

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated by the use

of the restraints is not clearly contrary to federal law and

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

6. Petitioner argues that his right to a fair trial was

violated because “gruesome photographs of victim Carlos” were

allegedly “left on a big screen for thirty to forty minutes

during the trial[.]”

Petitioner states that, because he did not contest the

victim’s identity or the fact of the shooting, the pictures of

the victim exhibited to the jury carried “no value,” and that

the pictures were “highly inflammatory,” and, consequently, that

showing the pictures prejudiced the jury. 

Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of

state law which is not cognizable in a federal habeas

proceeding. See, e.g., Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68, 112 S. Ct.

at 479-80; Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.

1985). Standing alone, the failure to comply with state rules

of evidence is not a sufficient basis for granting federal

habeas relief, i.e., such a failure is not equivalent to a

deprivation of the federal constitutional right to due process

of law. See, e.g., Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919–20

(9th Cir. 1991). A due process violation occurs only if there

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was no permissible inferences that the jury could draw from the

evidence. Id., 926 F.3d at 920. 

To rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the

introduced evidence must be of such quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial. Id., quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda,

800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The essence of our inquiry under the Fifth,

Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, as applied to

the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, is

whether the admission of the photographs

rendered the proceedings fundamentally

unfair. See Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313,

1322 (10th Cir.) (“[D]ue process arguments

relating to the admissibility of the victims’

... autopsy photos ... will not support

habeas relief ‘absent fundamental unfairness

so as to constitute a denial of due process

of law.’” (quoting Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d

931, 934 (10th Cir. 1990)))... “[W]e approach

the fundamental fairness analysis with

‘considerable self-restraint.’ Jackson, 143

F.3d at 1322 (quoting United States v.

Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1477 (10th Cir. 1990)

(en banc)). .... Given the probative nature

of the photographs, the gruesome character of

the crime itself, and the wealth of

additional evidence supporting defendant’s

convictions, the admission of the photographs

was not so unduly prejudicial as to render

the proceedings against petitioner

fundamentally unfair. See Jackson, 143 F.3d

at 1322. Consequently, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this ground.

Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).

Although Petitioner asserts the photographs were

admitted solely to inflame the jury, there was at least one

permissible inference the jury could draw from the photographs,

i.e., premeditation. Accordingly, the admission of the autopsy

photographs did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process of

law and Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

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the merits of this claim. See Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp.

1388, 1409–10 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding the autopsy photographs

at issue were not so inflammatory or prejudicial as to render

the trial fundamentally unfair).

7. Petitioner argues that the “recent amendments to

Arizona’s affirmative defense and justification statutes apply

to his offenses, due to the circumstances of his case.”

Petitioner asserted in his direct appeal that he was

entitled to a new trial applying the recently-changed system for

allocating the burden of proof in a case wherein the issue of

self-defense was raised. In his direct appeal Petitioner

asserted federal law did not prohibit the retroactive

application of the state statute to provide relief from his

convictions. 

In response to Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the

Arizona Court of Appeals followed the Arizona Supreme Court’s

interpretation of the state law and found the statutory changes

inapplicable to Petitioner’s case:

Napier appears to argue that recent

amendments to Arizona’s affirmative defense

and justification statutes apply to his

criminal offenses which were committed before

the effective date of the new statutes. Our

supreme court has already held that these

amendments, shifting the burden of proof to

the State to disprove such defenses, do not

apply to crimes committed before the

statutory amendments’ effective date of April

24, 2006. Garcia v. Browning [(State of

Arizona)], 214 Ariz. 250, 254, ¶ 20, 151 P.3d

533, 537 (2007). Napier’s offenses were

committed on or about the [date of] March 13,

2005. The changes in the criminal code do not

apply here.

Answer, Exh. VV at 10.

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Petitioner committed the crimes enumerated in the

indictment on or about March 13, 2005, and, accordingly, his

case was not pending when the statute was changed on April 24,

2006. However, even if state law did render the statutory

changes retroactive to Petitioner’s case, an alleged violation

of a state’s own criminal law does not present a cognizable

federal habeas claim.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not exhaust some of his federal habeas

claims in the state courts. Petitioner has not shown cause for,

nor prejudice arising from his default of his claims. Because

Petitioner does not assert that he did not shoot the victim,

Petitioner cannot establish that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice will occur absent a consideration of his claims. With

regard to the claims properly exhausted in the state courts, the

Arizona state courts properly concluded that Petitioner’s

federal constitutional rights were not violated in his criminal

proceedings.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Napier’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

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court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

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constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2). 

DATED this 1st day of December, 2010.

 

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