Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01383/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01383-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-1383

BRIAN K. BOULB,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois

No. 14-cv-00737 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 4, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Brian Boulb filed this petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 more than 

one year and four months after he had been sentenced and 

judgment had been entered against him. Relying on § 2255’s 

one-year statute of limitations, the district court dismissed 

his petition as untimely without holding an evidentiary 

hearing. 

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On appeal, Boulb contends the district court erred in 

dismissing his petition without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing. The district court, according to Boulb, should have 

held a hearing to take evidence and determine if the limitations period was equitably tolled on account of his purported mental incompetence. Finding no fault with the district 

court’s decision, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Unpacking Boulb’s federal habeas corpus petition is akin 

to opening a Russian matryoshka doll. It contains several 

procedural layers nested within each other. The first layer—

his 2008 Illinois state court conviction—is where we start. 

A. Boulb’s Illinois State Conviction

Boulb’s current troubles began, according to his affidavit, 

in September 2008. That is when he was charged with unlawful possession of anhydrous ammonia, unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine manufacturing materials in Richland County, Illinois. That same day, Boulb appeared in 

Richland County Circuit Court via computerized video conference and waived his right to appointed counsel. No transcript of the video conference appears in the record.

Around the same time as the hearing, Boulb alleges that

he met with an attorney named David Hyde. According to 

Boulb, Hyde was the public defender appointed to represent 

him in connection with his 1998 charge and eventual conviction for driving under the influence.1 Boulb contends that he 

 1 Boulb’s assertion that Hyde was his appointed lawyer for his 1998 case 

is dubious. A recent newspaper article indicates Hyde was an assistant 

(continued...)

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No. 15-1383 3

believed Hyde had been sent to represent him again. So, according to Boulb, when Hyde offered him a plea deal, Boulb 

thought it was his attorney discussing an offer from the 

prosecutor with him.

That, however, was not the case, Boulb asserts. In September 2008, Hyde was the Richland County State’s Attorney. This fact, according to Boulb, was unbeknownst to him 

when he met with Hyde or agreed to the plea deal.

On October 3, 2008—just over a week after being 

charged—Boulb entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one 

count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine manufacturing materials. In exchange, the Richland County State’s 

Attorney’s Office agreed to drop the other two counts and to 

a sentence of four years’ imprisonment for Boulb. The circuit 

court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced him to four 

years in prison. 

In February 2009, Boulb filed pro se motions in circuit 

court seeking transcripts and the record from his case, as 

well as permission to proceed as a poor person and for appointment of counsel. The circuit court ordered the court reporter to prepare transcripts from his October 2008 plea 

hearing and sentencing. No ruling was made on Boulb’s 

other requests. And, so far as we can tell, Boulb did not take 

any further action in connection with this case until 2013. 

 

(...continued)

state’s attorney from 1995 to 2004. Matt Courter, County board chooses 

Vaughn as state’s attorney, Olney Daily Mail, Aug. 7, 2015. 

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B. Boulb’s Federal Conviction

Nearly four years after Boulb’s state court conviction, a 

federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against 

Boulb on September 5, 2012, for the following: (1) conspiracy 

to manufacture 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846; (2) possession of 

pseudoephedrine knowing it would be used to manufacture 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2); and 

(3) possession of equipment, chemicals, or material to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843(a)(6). According to the indictment, Boulb’s involvement in the methamphetamine-production conspiracy started in November 2009—just over a year after his state-court 

conviction and sentencing—and ended in August 2012. 

Less than two months after being indicted, Boulb agreed 

to plead guilty to all counts in the indictment. On February 

14, 2013, the district court imposed a sentence of 235 months’ 

imprisonment and four years of supervised release on 

Boulb.2 According to Boulb, the district court classified him

as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on his 

two prior state court convictions, including his 2008 conviction, and sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment. Boulb 

alleges that his defense attorney did not object to the district 

court’s reliance on the 2008 conviction in determining his 

career-offender status. Judgment was entered against Boulb 

on February 20, 2013. 

 2 Boulb’s sentence was later reduced to 157 months. 

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C. Boulb’s Appeal from his 2008 Illinois State Conviction

On March 25, 2013, Boulb filed a pro se notice of appeal of 

his 2008 conviction in Illinois state court, along with a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in connection with that conviction and to vacate the judgment. The circuit court appointed him counsel for his appeal. 

In his appeal before the Illinois appellate court, Boulb argued his conviction should be reversed because the record 

did not contain a verbatim transcript of his waiver of counsel, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(b). On 

September 19, 2014, the Illinois appellate court issued an unpublished opinion dismissing Boulb’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on his failure to comply with the timeliness 

requirements set forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rules 604 

and 606. See People v. Boulb, No. 5-13-0158, 2014 WL 4673130

(Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 19, 2014). 

D. Boulb’s Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

Before the Illinois appellate court ruled on his appeal, 

Boulb filed an affidavit in his federal criminal case on June 6, 

2014. In the affidavit, Boulb laid out the allegations recounted above concerning Hyde and his interactions with Boulb, 

including Hyde’s alleged involvement in Boulb’s 1998 and 

2008 cases. 

On June 12, 2014, the district court issued an order relating to Boulb’s affidavit. After construing it as a motion filed 

pursuant to § 2255, the district court warned Boulb that if he 

did not withdraw his motion, it would be subject to the second or successive filing requirements under § 2255. 

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Boulb responded by filing his habeas corpus petition on 

June 26, 2014.3 After requesting that the district court incorporate his affidavit filed in the criminal case,4 Boulb alleged 

his 2008 Illinois state conviction could not be considered a 

predicate offense on which the district court could rely in 

classifying him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 

That is because, according to the petition, his 2008 conviction 

was procured by “[p]rosecutorial [m]isconduct and/or 

[i]neffective [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel.” The petition also stated the lawyer who represented him in his federal case and 

sentencing was ineffective for “for failing to properly investigate the state conviction in which the petitioner was not 

represented by counsel.”

Boulb also preemptively addressed the tardiness of his 

federal habeas corpus petition. According to the petition, 

Boulb’s § 2255 motion was late because he was awaiting the 

outcome of his appeal in Illinois state court. That outcome, 

according to Boulb, affected his § 2255 motion.

In the paragraph preceding this explanation, Boulb wrote 

that he wanted to “inform” the court that “he is ‘intellectual-

 3 The government states that Boulb filed his habeas corpus petition on 

June 23, 2013, pursuant to the “prison mail box rule.” That rule provides 

that a habeas corpus “petition is deemed filed when given to the proper 

prison authorities and not when received by the district court clerk.” 

Jones v. Bertrand, 171 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1999). We need not resolve 

the dispute regarding the date on which Boulb “filed” his habeas corpus

petition, as it is not outcome determinative. 

4 The district court would later file the affidavit in Boulb’s habeas corpus 

case and deny the June 6, 2014, “motion” filed by Boulb in his criminal 

case as moot. 

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ly disabled’ and that he is ‘functionally illiterate.’” He also 

stated that he was “attaching an inmate education data transcript in support of these allegations.” Boulb did attach a 

document entitled “Inmate Education Data Transcript” that 

lists courses and “High Test Scores” for “Subtest[s].”

After ordering briefing from the government on Boulb’s 

habeas corpus petition, the district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss Boulb’s petition on February 6, 

2015. It determined that Boulb’s petition was untimely because he filed it sixteen months after final judgment in his 

federal case, well beyond the one-year limitations period 

under § 2255. The district court did not evaluate or discuss 

Boulb’s allegation regarding his purported mental incompetence in its ruling. It did, however, determine in an earlier 

decision denying Boulb’s request for appointed counsel that 

Boulb was “well able to articulate the contours of his arguments and will be able to obtain justice without an attorney.”

Boulb appealed, and on July 14, 2015, this court construed his notice of appeal as an application for a certificate 

of appealability, which was then granted. We found Boulb 

had made a “substantial showing as to whether the district 

court sentenced him as a career offender based in part on a 

state conviction that was obtained in violation of his right to 

counsel.” This court also asked the parties to address the issues of equitable tolling in light of Boulb’s “alleged intellectual disability” and “waiver or procedural default in light of 

his allegation that counsel failed to investigate the predicate 

conviction during the federal sentencing proceeding.” 

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II. ANALYSIS

Boulb does not contest the district court’s finding that he 

filed his habeas corpus petition beyond the statute of limitations for such filings. Nor does Boulb appear to contest that 

his habeas corpus petition, affidavit, and inmate transcript 

formed a sufficient, stand-alone basis for the district court to 

excuse his untimely petition through equitable tolling.5

Rather, Boulb challenges the district court’s decision to 

forego an evidentiary hearing. According to Boulb, the district court should have ordered a hearing to develop a more 

fulsome record upon which to decide whether equitable tolling excused his untimely petition on account of his alleged 

intellectual disability. Boulb requests that we vacate the district court’s judgment and order the district court to hold 

such a hearing. We review decisions denying evidentiary 

hearings in a § 2255 setting for an abuse of discretion. Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010). 

 

5 We use the word “appear” because there are points in Boulb’s opening 

brief where he appears to argue that equitable tolling applies to him on 

the facts as plead in his petition. (See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 7 (“Equitable 

Tolling Should Apply To Boulb’s § 2255 Motion Because Boulb Is Intellectually Incompetent.”).) In his conclusion, however, Boulb only asks

that we reverse the dismissal of his § 2255 petition and remand his case 

to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his 

mental incompetence warrants equitable tolling. Boulb’s counsel also 

only sought the same relief at oral argument. Because we find that Boulb 

does not even merit an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his 

alleged mental incompetence interfered with his ability to timely file, we 

find he cannot meet the higher bar of qualifying for equitable tolling on 

his pleadings and supporting documents alone.

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Not every petitioner who seeks relief pursuant to § 2255 

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Cooper v. United States, 

378 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2004). A hearing is unnecessary 

when “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(b). That is why we have said that a district 

court need not hold an evidentiary hearing “if the petitioner 

makes allegations that are vague, conclusory, or palpably 

incredible, rather than detailed and specific.” Bruce v. United 

States, 256 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks 

omitted). The court should, however, conduct an evidentiary 

hearing “when the petitioner alleges facts that, if proven, 

would entitle him to relief.” Sandoval v. United States, 574 

F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 

Before deciding whether Boulb proffered enough to justify an evidentiary hearing, we must first consider the standard for the relief he seeks, which, in this case, is equitable 

tolling. Under § 2255, the statute of limitations begins to run 

from the latest of four events, with the only relevant event in 

our case being “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Section 2255’s 

“statute of limitations defense is not jurisdictional” and can 

be equitably tolled. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645, 649 

(2010) (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see also Estremera v. United States, 724 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying Holland to a § 2255 petition). To qualify for equitable 

tolling then, a petitioner must show: “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely 

filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quotation marks omitted). 

Equitable tolling is “rare” and “reserved for extraordinary 

circumstances far beyond the litigant’s control that preventCase: 15-1383 Document: 34 Filed: 04/04/2016 Pages: 14
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ed timely filing.” Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 674, 684 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). 

In Davis v. Humphreys, 747 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2014), we 

held that mental incompetence can satisfy the equitable tolling standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Holland. 

We declined, however, to articulate “[w]hat sort of mental 

limitations justify tolling.” Davis, 747 F.3d at 499–500. Instead, we remanded to the district court for an evidentiary 

hearing to determine the petitioner’s mental abilities. Id. at 

501. 

Boulb argues that we should follow Davis’s result and 

remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. According to Boulb, his case is analogous to Davis in 

that there is insufficient information in the record to determine what Boulb’s mental capabilities were and whether 

those affected his ability to timely file his § 2255 petition. 

The problem for Boulb is that the petitioner in Davis provided specific facts about those alleged mental deficiencies, 

not conclusory allegations. In Davis, the petitioner appended

a report from the Wisconsin prison system to his motion, 

which stated he had “an IQ of 49, [was] illiterate and uneducable, and cannot cope with any legal subject.” 747 F.3d at 

500. Boulb provided no such detailed report. Instead, Boulb 

attached a document to his petition entitled “Inmate Education Data Transcript.” The data transcript includes a series of 

courses he took, “High Test Scores” in various subjects, including “Number OPR,” “Reading Comp,” and “Spelling,” 

and scores for those tests. Nothing in this “transcript” explains how to interpret these scores. How could a district 

court ever divine from this “transcript” that Boulb had any 

mental deficiency? 

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As for Boulb’s allegations that he is “‘intellectually disabled’” and “‘functionally illiterate,’” those allegations are 

conclusory and insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.6 See Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th 

Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s decision to forego an evidentiary hearing where petitioner did not provide “specific 

details”). While it is true that we recognized illiteracy as one 

of many facts in Davis supporting a remand for an evidentiary hearing, it was a fact corroborated by the Wisconsin 

prison system, not asserted by the petitioner himself. Boulb 

offers no such specific details in his motion, affidavit, or 

supporting documents regarding his purported mental deficiencies. 

Boulb also did not raise to the district court the argument 

that his alleged mental deficiency affected his ability to timely file his petition, as the petitioner in Davis did. Instead, 

Boulb asserted his petition was late because he was awaiting 

the decision of the Illinois appellate court challenging his 

2008 conviction. While his failure to raise this argument—

and in fact proffering a different reason for the delay—

supports the district court’s decision to dismiss Boulb’s 

complaint without an evidentiary hearing, it is not outcome 

determinative. Cf. Coleman v. Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 818 (7th 

 

6 While Boulb’s sworn affidavit makes no mention of his alleged mental 

deficiencies, his petition specifically requested that his affidavit and petition be “enjoined.” Because we construe pro se pleadings liberally, we 

consider the statements made by Boulb in his memorandum to be incorporated into his affidavit. See Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693, 696 

(7th Cir. 2010) (finding that petitioner “properly incorporated by reference his Memorandum into his sworn petition, especially considering his 

pro se status at the time of his original filing.”)

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Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that arguments raised for 

the first time on appeal are waived.”). 

We recognize the inherent tension between requiring a 

petitioner to raise an argument and permitting mental incompetence to equitably toll the statute of limitations, for if a 

petitioner is so mentally deficient as to excuse late filing, it 

could be unfair to expect him to raise and articulate that excuse. We do not set forth a rule today that a pro se petitioner 

must under all circumstances connect his mental disability 

with his inability to timely file in his petition. Suffice it to say 

that a petitioner’s mental incompetency may be so apparent 

from his pleadings and supporting materials that a district 

court may order an evidentiary hearing on the question 

without the petitioner requesting equitable tolling on account of mental disability.

That is not, however, the situation we have here. Were 

we to adopt the rule advanced by Boulb, any petitioner who 

baldy asserts that he is “‘intellectually disabled’” and “‘functionally illiterate’” and only attaches an indecipherable prison transcript would get an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether the statute of limitations is equitably tolled on account of his or her alleged mental incompetency. Many inmates could do the same once § 2255’s statute of limitations 

runs on the inmate’s respective petition. This rule would 

prove unworkable and could have the practical effect of nullifying a district court’s ability to forego an evidentiary hearing under § 2255. We refuse to adopt such a rule.

Decisions from outside this circuit confronting the question of equitable tolling for mental incompetency are of no 

help to Boulb’s cause. See Riva v. Ficco, 615 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 

2010); Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2010); Ata 

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No. 15-1383 13

v. Scutt, 662 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2011). The courts of appeal in 

those decisions all remanded the cases back to the district 

courts for further development to determine if the petitioners’ purported mental incompetency so interfered with their 

ability to timely file that equitable tolling was warranted. 

Like Davis, however, each of the district courts in those cases

had specific facts before them relating to the petitioners’ alleged mental incompetency, not conclusory allegations. See 

Riva, 615 F.3d at 41–42 (petitioner proffered medical records 

demonstrating he “suffered from a debilitating mental illness throughout the tolling interval” along with medical expert testimony); Bolarinwa, 593 F.3d at 229–30 (petitioner 

with purported “‘psychiatric problems’” alleged she had 

been placed in psychiatric units, provided dates for her alleged placement in those units as well as a letter from a social worker at one of the hospitals describing her psychiatric 

problems); Ata, 662 F.3d at 743 (petitioner alleged he had 

been hospitalized several times because of his paranoid 

schizophrenia and continues to be medicated by the state 

prison system for that illness and other psychoses).7 As discussed above, Boulb has failed to do the same here. 

Because we find that Boulb is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his request for equitable tolling on account 

of mental incompetence and he offers no other justification 

 

7 Boulb’s reliance on Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) is also of 

no assistance, as the magistrate judge there had conducted an evidentiary hearing in the first instance to develop a more fulsome record. Id. at 

1094–96. The Ninth Circuit was reviewing that record when it reversed 

and remanded for further proceedings in light of the legal standard it 

established. 

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to excuse his late filing, his petition is time-barred. Therefore, we need not reach the question of whether his claim 

was procedurally defaulted. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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