Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01844/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01844-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sherry Lynn Larson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-01844-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the Administrative Law 

Judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of 

the Social Security Act. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On May 29, 2009, Plaintiff Sherry Lynn Larson filed a Title II application for a 

period of disability and disability insurance benefits with the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), alleging that her disability began on 

October 15, 2006. (Record Transcript (“TR”) 28). Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially 

on September 17, 2009, and upon reconsideration it was denied again on March 9, 2010. 

(Id.). 

 Following the denials, on March 25, 2010, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing 

with an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.). Plaintiff appeared and testified before 

the ALJ on January 4, 2011. (Id.). On March 11, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding 

that Plaintiff suffered from severe fibromyalgia and dysthymic disorder and was unable 

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to perform past relevant work. (TR 30; TR 36). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

was not disabled under the Social Security Act because she retained the ability to do 

other work performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 

(TR 37-38). 

 Following the ALJ’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim, on March 28, 2011, Plaintiff 

requested review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council, Office of Hearings and 

Appeals, Social Security Administration. (TR 22). On July 13, 2012, the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review stating the Council had “considered the 

reasons [Plaintiff] disagrees with the decision” and “this information does not provide a 

basis for changing the [ALJ’s] decision.” (TR 1-2). The Appeals Council adopted the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. (TR 1). 

 On August 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Complaint with this Court for judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her claim, which is the subject of this 

appeal. (Doc. 1). On February 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed an opening brief (the “Brief”) 

seeking judicial review of her claim for disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 16). In the 

Brief, Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate the ALJ’s decision and award benefits 

because the ALJ’s decision contains legal error as it lacks substantial justification to 

support the ALJ’s conclusions. (Id. at 27). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is more than a 

mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th 

Cir. 1998). 

 “The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as 

would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant 

v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). In determining 

whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, this Court considers the 

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record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusions and 

the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. 

“Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s 

conclusion which must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to 

draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 

(citations omitted). If there is sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s 

determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 

911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in 

medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before this 

Court, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm 

it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). 

A. Definition of Disability 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show, among other things, that she is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 

“The mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability.” Matthews v. 

Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 

642–43 (9th Cir. 1982)). Disability has “a severity and durational requirement for 

recognition under the [Social Security] Act that accords with the remedial purpose of the 

Act.” Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Svcs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A). A person is “under a disability only if h[er] physical or mental impairment 

or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work 

but cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other 

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kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. at § 

423(d)(2)(A). 

 “A claimant bears the burden of proving that an impairment is disabling.” 

Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680 (quoting Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Thus, “[t]he applicant must show that [s]he is precluded from engaging in not only h[er] 

‘previous work,’ but also from performing ‘any other kind of substantial gainful work’ 

due to such impairment.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). 

B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721 

(describing the sequential process). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the 

sequential process will end the ALJ’s inquiry and the claim will be denied. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but the 

burden shifts to the ALJ at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

 The five steps are as follows: 

 First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

 Second, if the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ determines whether the 

claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the 

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. at § 404.1520(c). 

Basic work activities means the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs.” Id. at § 

404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either be expected “to result in death” or “to 

last for a continuous period of twelve months.” Id. at § 404.1509 (incorporated by 

reference in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a de minimis 

screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

 Third, having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 

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impairment “meets or medically equals the criteria of any of the listings in the Listing of 

Impairments in appendix 1, subpart P of 20 CFR part 404 (appendix 1).” SSR 12-2p, 

2012 WL 3104869 at *6 (July 25, 2012). If so, the claimant is found disabled without 

considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520(d). 

 Fibromyalgia (“FM”), however, cannot meet a listing in appendix 1 because FM is 

not a listed impairment. At step 3, therefore, the ALJ determines whether FM medically 

equals a listing (for example, listing 14.09D in the listing for inflammatory arthritis), or 

whether it medically equals a listing in combination with at least one other medically 

determinable impairment. SSR 12-2p at *6. 

 When a claimant’s impairments does not meet or equal a listed impairment under 

appendix 1, the ALJ will assess a claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. 

The ALJ bases the RFC assessment on all relevant evidence in the case record. Id. The 

ALJ considers the effects of all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, 

including impairments that are not severe. Id. For a person with FM, the ALJ will 

consider a longitudinal record whenever possible because the symptoms of FM can wax 

and wane so that a person may have bad days and good days. Id. 

 At steps 4 and 5, the ALJ uses the RFC assessment to determine whether the 

claimant is capable of doing any past relevant work (step 4) or any other work that exists 

in significant numbers in the national economy (step 5). Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). If 

the person is able to do any past relevant work, the ALJ will find that he or she is not 

disabled. Id. If the person is not able to do any past relevant work or does not have such 

work experience, the ALJ determines whether he or she can do any other work. Id. The 

usual vocational considerations apply (age, education, and work experience). Id.; 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, then she 

is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, she will be found disabled. 

As previously noted, the ALJ has the burden of proving the claimant can perform other 

substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

 With regard to steps 1-5 in this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff: (1) had satisfied 

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the first step and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 15, 2006 

(TR 30); (2) had fulfilled the second step and shown that she had the following severe 

impairments: FM and dysthymic disorder (id.); (3) with regard to the third step, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

specifically listed in the regulations (TR 30-32), and therefore the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform less than the full range of light work as defined by the 

regulations (TR 32); (4) as a result of this analysis, the ALJ found at the fourth step that 

Plaintiff is “unable to perform any past relevant work” as a corporate recruiter, office 

manager, human resources associate, traffic manager, inventory control manager, 

receptionist, or as an optician (TR 36). At the last step (5), however, the ALJ found that 

given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC that Plaintiff is capable of 

making a successful adjustment to other work and performing jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy. (TR 37-38). Thus, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. (TR 38). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff makes three arguments for how the ALJ committed legal error and for 

why the Court should exercise its discretion and remand Plaintiff’s claim for a 

determination of disability benefits. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ erred 

by rejecting the assessment of Plaintiff’s treating physician (Doc. 16 at 15-20), (2) that 

the ALJ failed to properly weigh Plaintiff’s subjective complaints (id. at 20-25), and (3) 

that the ALJ failed to properly weigh third party testimony (id. at 25-27). The Court 

addresses each of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn. 

A. Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed the Medical Assessment of 

 Plaintiff’s Treating Physician 

 First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical source 

opinion evidence. Plaintiff had medical assessments performed by her treating physician 

and state agency physicians on both her physical and mental conditions. Based on these 

assessments and the record as a whole, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was only limited 

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to a range of sedentary to light work and not disabled as defined under the Social Security 

Act. (TR 35). 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical assessment of her 

physical condition done by her treating rheumatologist, Joseph W. Nolan, M.D. (“Dr. 

Nolan”). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ gave too much weight to the medical assessments 

of state agency physicians Michael Peril, M.D. (“Dr. Peril”) and William Backlund, M.D. 

(“Dr. Backlund”). (Id. at 15-20). 

 The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the 

ALJ’s decision to give more credence to the assessments done by the state agency 

physicians. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical record. Benton 

v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Those physicians with the most significant clinical 

relationship with the claimant are generally entitled to more 

weight than those physicians with lesser relationships. Lester 

v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(d), 416.927(d). As such, the ALJ may only reject a 

treating or examining physician’s uncontradicted medical 

opinion based on “clear and convincing reasons.” Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830–31. Where such an opinion is contradicted, 

however, it may be rejected for “specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.” Id. 

Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). As stated 

above, see supra Section II, substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less 

than a preponderance. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. Accordingly, because Dr. Nolan’s 

assessment was contradicted, the Court looks to whether the ALJ articulated specific and 

legitimate reasons for disregarding Dr. Nolan’s assessment, supported by such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See id. 

 Dr. Nolan found Plaintiff’s pain symptoms are moderately-severe and her level of 

fatigue was also severe. Dr. Nolan opined that Plaintiff’s pain seriously affects her 

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ability to function to the point where she is extremely impaired due to pain. Dr. Nolan 

also found that Plaintiff’s symptoms would frequently interfere with her abilities to 

sustain concentration, attention, and persistence and would render her unable to sustain 

work on a regular and continuing basis. (TR 35). 

 The ALJ explained three specific and legitimate reasons why he “assign[ed] very 

low weight to the opinions of Dr. Nolan.” (TR 35). First, “[t]he limitations asserted by 

the doctor [were] inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] treating records.” (Id.). Second, 

Plaintiff’s limitations were not justified by the clinical evidence, including Dr. Nolan’s 

own progress notes indicating Plaintiff’s FM is “stable.” (Id.). Finally, Dr. Nolan’s 

“own reports fail[ed] to reveal the type of significant clinical and laboratory 

abnormalities one would expect if [Plaintiff] were in fact disabled, and [Dr. Nolan] did 

not specifically address this weakness.” (Id.). 

 Contrary to Dr. Nolan, the state agency physicians found based on the objective 

findings in the treating notes and the consultative examiners that Plaintiff “would have 

the capacity to perform a range of light exertional work.” (TR 36). The ALJ recognized 

that these physicians were “non-examining” and that their opinions “do not as a general 

matter deserve as much weight as those of examining or treating physicians.” (Id.). 

However, the ALJ explained that greater weight was given to the opinions of the state 

agency physicians because they were more consistent with the entire case record. See

(TR 32, 36). 

 The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s symptoms, the medical opinion evidence, the 

treating records, and the objective medical evidence in arriving at his conclusion. The 

objective evidence explicitly cited by the ALJ included the consultative examination 

performed by Ruben Aguilera, M.D., and the physical assessments performed by Doctors 

Peril and Backlund. (TR 34-36). Further, the objective evidence in the “record as a 

whole,” aside from these assessments, showed Plaintiff was diagnosed with FM in 2006, 

yet there are no records of any hospitalizations or emergency room visits for the 

condition. (TR 34). Plaintiff also failed to follow-up with her doctor as recommended. 

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(Id.). Dr. Nolan’s treatment record for Plaintiff is infrequent and rare. (Id.). The ALJ 

cited progress notes from Dr. Nolan that revealed Plaintiff’s FM is active, but stable. 

(Id.). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s physical examinations showed that while she 

exhibited tender points of FM, there are no reports of any neurological deficits or 

synovitis and that Plaintiff reported that she felt her FM was about the same with no 

worsening or significant changes. (Id.). Social Security Ruling, SSR 12-2P, 2012 WL 

3104869 (July 25, 2012), states, 

[a]s with any claim for disability benefits, before we find that 

a person with an MDI of FM is disabled, we must ensure 

there is sufficient objective evidence to support a finding that 

the person’s impairment(s) so limits the person’s functional 

abilities that it precludes him or her from performing any 

substantial gainful activity. 

SSR 12-2p at *2. 

If objective medical evidence does not substantiate the 

person’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and 

functionally limiting effects of symptoms, [the 

Commissioner] consider[s] all of the evidence in the case 

record, including the person’s daily activities, medications or 

other treatments the person uses, or has used, to alleviate 

symptoms; the nature and frequency of the person’s attempts 

to obtain medical treatment for symptoms; and statements by 

other people about the person’s symptoms. 

Id. at *5. This is exactly the type of objective evidence that the ALJ relied on in making 

the determination that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

 In addition to the objective evidence throughout the record that was consistent 

with the state agency physician’s assessments, the fact that Dr. Nolan’s opinion was 

inconsistent with his treating records and not justified by the clinical evidence also 

influenced the ALJ’s decision. (TR 35). 

 The Court finds the evidence cited by the ALJ was at the very least susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation. Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld. See Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (citations omitted). 

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B. Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 

 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh her subjective 

complaints. (Doc. 16 at 20-25). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ must give clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony and that the ALJ merely rejected her 

testimony in this case because the ALJ claimed it was not consistent with Plaintiff’s RFC 

assessment. (Id. at 20-21). However, to reject the subjective testimony of a claimant, the 

ALJ must make specific findings based on the record. The District Court of California 

has addressed this issue in a well-reasoned opinion and this Court has adopted that 

Court’s reasoning before in concluding that, to the extent there is actually any principled 

distinction between the two standards, the ALJ must make specific findings supported by 

the record to explain his credibility evaluation.1

 

1

 The District Court of California set forth its reasoning as follows: 

In Bunnell, the court addressed confusion regarding the 

standard for evaluating the credibility of subjective 

complaints and endorsed the standard set forth in Cotton v. 

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir.1986), Varney v. Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 583–584 (9th 

Cir.1988) and Gamer v. Secretary of Health and Human 

Services, 815 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1987). Bunnell, 949 

F.2d at 345. The so-called “Cotton standard” requires the 

claimant to produce objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment that is reasonably likely to be the 

cause of the alleged pain. Once that evidence is produced, the 

adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints 

based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence fully 

corroborating the alleged severity of the pain. Bunnell, 949 

F.2d at 343, 345 (citing Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407). Rather, 

the adjudicator must “specifically make findings which 

support this conclusion. These findings, properly supported 

by the record, must be sufficiently specific to allow a 

reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the 

testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily 

discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.” Bunnell, 

949 F.2d at 345–46 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

Some subsequent decisions have stated that, unless there 

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is affirmative evidence that a claimant is malingering, the 

ALJ must articulate “clear and convincing” reasons for 

rejecting subjective complaints. See, e.g., Morgan v. 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 169 F.3d 

595, 599 (9th Cir.1999); Regennitter v. Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration, 166 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th 

Cir.1999); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Light, 119 F.3d at 792; 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.1995); Smolen, 80 

F.3d at 1284; Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th 

Cir.1995); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th 

Cir.1993). Other decisions state that the ALJ must make 

specific findings based on the record, but do not use the 

“clear and convincing” formula. See, e.g., Meanel v. Apfel, 

172 F.3d 1111, 1113–14 (9th Cir.1999); Sousa v. Callahan, 

143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.1998); Chavez v. Department of 

Health and Human Services, 103 F.3d 849, 853 (9th 

Cir.1996); Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 641–42 (9th 

Cir.1995); Moncada, 60 F.3d at 524; Orteza v. Shalala, 50 

F.3d 748, 749–50 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam); Flaten v. 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 

(9th Cir.1995). 

The “clear and convincing” language appears to have been 

derived from Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683 (9th 

Cir.1989), which states that “[t]he Secretary’s reasons for 

rejecting excess symptom testimony must be clear and 

convincing if medical evidence establishes an objective basis 

for some degree of the symptom and no evidence 

affirmatively suggests that the claimant was malingering.” 

Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687 (citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 

1450, 1455 (9th Cir.1984)). In Gallant, however, the court 

did not hold, or even affirmatively state, that an ALJ is 

required to provide “clear and convincing” reasons for 

rejecting excess pain testimony whenever there is no evidence 

of malingering. Instead, the court merely observed that no 

witness had testified that the claimant was malingering, that 

“[n]o clear and convincing reasons were provided by the 

ALJ” for his rejection of the claimant’s testimony, and that 

the evidence relied on by the ALJ for his credibility 

evaluation was “insubstantial.” Gallant, 753 F .2d at 1455, 

1456. 

Bunnell did not cite either Gallant or Swenson, and neither 

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 Turning to the ALJ’s decision in this case, the Court finds the ALJ did in fact 

make specific findings supported by the record in explaining why he disregarded 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. First, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective complaints 

were not supported by the medical evidence. (TR 34). While an ALJ may not reject a 

claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on lack of objective medical evidence to 

fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain, see Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856-57; Fair, 885 

F.2d at 602, the lack of objective medical evidence supporting the claimant’s claims may 

support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant is not credible. See Batson v. Comm’r of the 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003). While Plaintiff was diagnosed 

with FM in 2006, there are no records of hospitalization or emergency room visits due to 

the condition. (TR 34). Progress notes from her treating physician show Plaintiff’s FM 

is active, but stable. (Id.). While her physical examinations show she does exhibit tender 

points of FM, there are no reports of any neurological deficits or synovitis. (Id.). 

Further, Plaintiff also reported that she feels her FM is about the same, with no worsening 

or significant changes. (Id.). 

 

Bunnell nor the cases it did cite with approval (that is, Cotton, 

Varney, and Gamer) use the “clear and convincing” formula. 

It thus appears that the “clear and convincing” standard is an 

unwarranted elaboration of the substantial evidence standard 

of review, and that it was not part of the Cotton test adopted 

in Bunnell, where the en banc court attempted to clarify the 

law. Any difference between the standards may be more 

apparent than real. There does not appear to be any 

principled distinction between the two standards as they have 

been applied. To the extent that there is or may be a conflict, 

however, Bunnell must control since it was an en banc 

decision. Accordingly, this Court will adhere to Bunnell’s

requirement that the ALJ make “specific findings” supported 

by the record to explain his credibility evaluation, rather than 

imposing the arguably more exacting “clear and convincing” 

requirement suggested by Morgan and its predecessors. 

Ballard v. Apfel, No. CV 99-2195-AJW, 2000 WL 1899797, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 

2000). 

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 Second, the ALJ also found Plaintiff was noncompliant with treatment 

recommendations. (TR 34). “[U]nexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek 

treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment” is a relevant factor in assessing 

credibility of pain testimony. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir.1991); see 

also Meanal v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ may consider Social 

Security disability claimant’s failure to follow treatment advice as a factor in assessing 

Social Security disability claimant’s credibility). After being diagnosed with FM, Dr. 

Nolan recommended that Plaintiff follow-up with him in six months. (TR 34). Plaintiff 

waited a year for one follow-up and fifteen months for another follow-up evaluation. 

(Id.). 

 Third, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s daily activities undermined her subjective 

complaints (TR 33). See Matthews, 10 F.3d at 679-80 (Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

upheld ALJ’s rejection of claimant’s subjective complaints where ALJ found claimant’s 

performance of daily activities like housecleaning, light gardening, and shopping 

undermined claimant’s assertion of disabling pain.). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff “is 

independent in self-care and hygiene, prepares simple meals, drives, does light household 

chores, such as laundry, washes dishes, surfs the internet, uses the computer for e-mail to 

chat with family, goes to the grocery shopping, and reads. Her hobbies also include 

playing video games and watching television.” (TR 33). The ALJ explained that 

Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of disabling pain were undermined by her ability to 

spend a substantial part of the day engaged in activities involving the performance of 

various physical and mental functions. (Id.). 

 Fourth, the record also contained evidence of exaggeration. In weighing 

credibility, the ALJ may consider evidence that a claimant exaggerated her symptoms 

when evaluating the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain. See Hall v. Astrue, No. 

CV 12-3494 JC, 2012 WL 3779080, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012); Jones v. Callahan, 

122 F.2d 1148, 1152 (8th Cir. 1997). As the ALJ expressly noted in his decision, 

Plaintiff’s “activities suggest that the she has better physical and mental capacities than 

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she has stated in testimony and written statements, as her impairments do not appear to 

significantly limit her daily functional abilities.” (TR 33). 

 Fifth, as the ALJ noted `(id.), medications were effective. “Impairments that can 

be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining 

eligibility for [disability] benefits.” Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 

1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004)); 

Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1987); Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 

(9th Cir. 1983) (affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments 

were responsive to medication)). 

 The Court finds the ALJ’s credibility finding was a “reasonable interpretation” of 

the evidence and was supported by substantial evidence in the record, accordingly, “it is 

not [the Court’s] role to second-guess it.” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d 

at 604). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

C. Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed Third Party Testimony 

 Finally, Plaintiff argues that he ALJ failed to properly weigh the testimony of 

Plaintiff’s spouse. (Doc. 16 at 25-27). When an ALJ discounts the testimony of lay 

witnesses, “he or she must give reasons that are germane to each witness.” Valentine v. 

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dodrill v. Shalala, 

12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

 The ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s spouse’s testimony (TR 153-160) was primarily 

rejected because it was similar to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (TR 36). The 

limitations Plaintiff’s spouse reported were not credible for the same reasons that 

Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible—the testimony was inconsistent with the 

“preponderance of the opinions and observations by medical doctors in this case.” (Id.). 

 In Valentine, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the ALJ gave germane 

reasons for discounting the testimony of a claimant’s spouse by rejecting the spouse’s lay 

testimony for the same reasons the ALJ rejected the claimant’s own subjective 

complaints. The Court of Appeals explicitly made this finding because the spouse’s 

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testimony was similar to the testimony given by the claimant. 574 F.3d at 693-94. The 

Court of Appeals explained that because the ALJ provided valid reasons for rejecting 

claimant’s own subjective complaints, and “[the spouse’s] testimony was similar to such 

complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting the spouse’s 

testimony” by rejecting that testimony for the same reasons. Id. at 694. 

 In this case, as discussed above, see supra Section II.B, the ALJ gave valid 

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s own subjective complaints and the ALJ referenced those 

reasons as the basis for also rejecting Plaintiff’s spouse’s testimony. See (TR 36). 

Therefore, the ALJ gave germane reasons for rejecting the lay statements of Plaintiff’s 

spouse and did not err in how he rejected that testimony. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning the Social Security Act. 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is 

AFFIRMED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. The judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court. 

 Dated this 24th day of June, 2013. 

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