Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01877/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ERICK RIVERA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-1877 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On June 22, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on January 3, 2006. Docket No. 9.

Respondents assert Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were not

properly exhausted in the Arizona state courts and are

procedurally defaulted and, therefore, that the petition must be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

I Procedural History

In November of 1996, Petitioner pled guilty to one

count of trafficking in stolen property and one count of theft

in a case docketed by the State of Arizona as CR 1996-06242.

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Answer, Exh. A. On April 4, 1997, pursuant to his conviction on

those charges, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of six months

incarceration and placed on a term of five years probation

regarding the stolen property offense and a term of three years

probation pursuant to his conviction for theft. Id., Exh. A at

26. The conditions of Petitioner’s probation included the

requirement that he not own or possess any firearm or other

deadly weapon. Id., Exh. A at 26.

On January 3, 2001 Petitioner was charged with one

count of misconduct involving weapons, in a case docketed by the

State of Arizona as CR 2001-00119, a charge arising from events

occurring on October 1, 2000. Id., Exh. B. On October 1, 2000,

Petitioner and his brother were apprehended by a Maricopa County

law enforcement officer on state trust land next to a vehicle

containing weapons in the trunk. Id., Exh. C at 29-36, 50. The

officer testified at Petitioner’s trial that, prior to exiting

his law enforcement vehicle, he saw a firearm on Petitioner’s

person and that he believed Petitioner placed the weapon in the

trunk of the car prior to the time the officer approached the

two men on foot. Id., Exh. C at 29, 32, 34, 36, 54. 

Petitioner’s brother testified at his trial that he and

Petitioner and family members were on a picnic when the police

officer approached them and that Petitioner did not know the

weapons were in the car. Id., Exh. F at 5-6. The brother

further testified the weapons did not belong to Petitioner, nor

did Petitioner ever have control over or handle the guns. Id.,

Exh. F at 5-6. Petitioner’s counsel argued to the jury that

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there was no corroborating evidence, such as fingerprints or gun

residue test results, to support the officer’s statement that he

saw a gun in Petitioner’s possession. Id., Exh. C. 

On April 18, 2001, a jury found Petitioner guilty of

weapons misconduct, i.e., being a prohibited possessor of a

firearm, as charged. Id., Exh. B. On June 13, 2001, Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of 10 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction for weapons misconduct. Id., Exh. B.

As a result of his weapons misconduct conviction, on

June 13, 2001, Petitioner was found to have violated a term of

the probation imposed for his 1996 conviction for trafficking in

stolen property. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner’s probation was

revoked and Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of

3.5 years imprisonment for this conviction, with credit for 188

days of presentence incarceration. Id., Exh. D. The sentences

imposed in the two cases were imposed as consecutive sentences.

Id., Exh. D at 9.

On June 18, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice of

appeal with regard to both CR 2001-00119 and CR 1996-06242.

Petitioner argued the evidence presented to the jury that he had

been on probation at the time of the weapons offense was

insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of being a

prohibited possessor. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner also argued the

jury had been improperly instructed on constructive possession

of a weapon when there was insufficient evidence to suggest that

Petitioner constructively possessed a weapon. Id., Exh. F.

With regard to the revocation of his probation in CR 1996-06242,

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Petitioner asserted that the trial court’s finding that

Petitioner had violated his probation was not supported by

sufficient evidence. Id., Exh. E.

The Arizona Court of Appeals consolidated Petitioner’s

appeals in CR 2001-00119 and CR 1996-06242. Id., Exh. G. The

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence

in CR 2001-00119 and affirmed the revocation of Petitioner’s

probation and the sentence imposed in CR 1996-06242 in a

decision issued March 19, 2002. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner did

not seek review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court.

On April 8, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief with regard to both CR 2001-00119 and CR 1996-

06242. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner asserted he had been deprived

of the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel

failed to interview or call his girlfriend as a defense witness

at his trial in CR 2001-00119. Id., H. Petitioner alleged the

testimony of his girlfriend established his actual innocence of

the crime of conviction. Id., Exh. H at 9. An affidavit

attached to the petition asserted the girlfriend would have

testified she was with Petitioner and his brother on October 1,

2000, prior to and after the time the police officer encountered

them, and that she “never saw either Erick or Kenneth in

possession of a gun at the park. I never saw any guns at all at

the park. At the park, Erick did not have a gun in a holster on

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1

 The Court notes that Kenneth, Petitioner’s brother,

testified that he had a gun on him in a holster at the picnic.

Answer, Exh. F at 6.

2

 The kidnapping charge against Petitioner was dismissed

without prejudice after he was convicted on the weapons misconduct

charge; it appears Petitioner’s girlfriend moved from the state of

Arizona, and that the prosecution was unable to locate her prior to

the time of Petitioner’s trial for kidnapping. Answer, Exh. J. at 12-

16, 27, 33. The girlfriend testified at the evidentiary hearing,

conducted in November 2003, that she moved to Denver after the

kidnapping incident, in the middle of April of 2001. Id., Exh. J. at

20, 28. Petitioner’s weapons misconduct trial occurred in April of

2001.

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his hip.” Id., Exh. I at 2.1 

The Arizona Superior Court conducted an evidentiary

hearing regarding Petitioner’s claims for post-conviction relief

on November 14, 2003. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner testified at the

evidentiary hearing that he had discussed calling his girlfriend

as a witness with his counsel, who told Petitioner that, because

Petitioner was at that time [after January 2001] facing charges

for kidnapping the girlfriend, calling her as a witness would be

“like a double-edged sword. That it could open up wounds on

both sides. It wasn’t really good to be calling her as a

witness for my case cause I had other case pending.” Id., Exh.

J at 9, 12.2 

Petitioner’s girlfriend testified at the evidentiary

hearing that, on October 1, 2000, she did not see Petitioner

with a weapon, that his brother had a weapon but she did not

know where on his person the weapon was located, and that

Petitioner had a black cell phone inside of his pants on his

hip, which could have been mistaken for a gun. Id., Exh. J at

21-22. The girlfriend testified she never discussed

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Petitioner’s case with his attorney. Id., Exh. J at 22-23.

Petitioner’s trial counsel testified at the evidentiary

hearing that he had spoken to Petitioner’s girlfriend prior to

his trial. Id., Exh. J at 34. Counsel asserted he did not want

to put Petitioner’s girlfriend on the witness stand in his

weapons misconduct case if that provided the government with the

opportunity to proceed with the kidnapping charge, which

otherwise was not being prosecuted because the government could

not locate the victim, i.e., Petitioner’s girlfriend. Id., Exh.

J. at 35. Counsel also stated that the testimony of the

girlfriend would simply repeat what Petitioner’s brother

testified to at trial, i.e., that Petitioner did not possess a

weapon on his person on October 1, 2000. Id., Exh. J at 35-36,

38. Counsel testified he had discussed with Petitioner the fact

that the government had strong evidence against him on the

kidnapping charge and that he faced less chance of conviction

and a lesser sentence with regard to the weapons charge. Id.,

Exh. J at 37-38. Petitioner’s counsel filed a Supplemental

Memorandum regarding Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings on

January 22, 2004. Id., Exh. L. 

On April 15, 2004, the Arizona Superior Court denied

relief and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief,

concluding Petitioner had not been denied the effective

assistance of counsel because the decision to refrain from

calling Petitioner’s girlfriend as a witness was a strategic and

tactical decision by counsel to protect Petitioner from the

prosecution of a case wherein he was facing a more serious

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3

 The order states:

The trial court extended the time for filing a

timely petition for review to June 10, 2004. The

record reflects that the petition was not filed

until June 2004. (sic) A petitioner who seeks

appellate court review of the actions of the

trial court must file a petition within 30 days

after the final decision of the trial court.

Whether petitioner was without fault for the

untimely filing is a question of fact. The trial

court may, “after being presented with proper

evidence, allow a late filing” if it finds that

petitioner was not responsible for the untimely

filing.

Answer, Exh. O.

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charge and, therefore, that counsel’s decision was not error.

Id., Exh. L. The Superior Court also determined that, even if

counsel erred by failing to call this witness, the error was not

prejudicial because any error did not effect the outcome of the

trial. Id., Exh. L at 2.

Petitioner was allowed an extension of time, until June

10, 2004, to seek reconsideration of the trial court’s decision

or to file a pro per petition for review of the decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner signed his

petition for review of the trial court’s decision on June 8,

2004, and the petition for review was filed by the Court of

Appeals on June 16, 2004. Id., Exh. N. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as

not timely filed on June 22, 2004. Id., Exh. O.3 In the order,

the court counseled Petitioner to seek permission to file an

untimely petition for review in the Arizona Superior Court. Id.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, stating:

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I filed a petition for review [] on the 8, of

June 2004. It was [dismissed] on June 22nd

for not being filed on time.

I put to see the paralegal two weeks before

the June 8th, but was not able to get copies

and to see the paralegal until June 8th. I

would like the court to consider this

issues....

Id., Exh. P. The Court of Appeals denied the motion without

prejudice on July 1, 2004, again counseling Petitioner to file

a motion in the trial court seeking permission to file a late

petition for review due to circumstances beyond his control.

Id., Exh. Q.

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to federal

habeas relief because he was deprived of his right to the

effective assistance of counsel and because he is actually

innocent of the charge against him, i.e., his weapons misconduct

conviction. Petitioner contends he was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to

call his girlfriend as a defense witness at his trial in CR

2001-00119, and also asserts the testimony of his girlfriend

establishes his actual innocence of the crime of conviction. 

Respondents assert Petitioner procedurally defaulted

his federal habeas claims by failing to properly exhaust these

claims in the Arizona state courts. 

II Discussion

A. Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his federal

habeas claims.

A state prisoner is required to “exhaust,” in state

court, the claims raised in his petition for federal habeas

relief, before the Court must consider the merits of the

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4 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2005). 

5

 Because it is not necessary to the resolution of the

habeas petition, the Court will not address Respondents’ assertion

that Swoopes was effectively overruled by Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). In Crook v. Arizona, 2005 WL

3455110, *3 n.2 (D. Ariz.), J. Teilborg concluded:

Respondents argue that Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 124 S.Ct. 1347, [] (2004), overruled Swoopes. However, in Castillo v. Mcfadden, 399 F.3d 993,

998 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit court

directly quotes the applicable passage in

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prisoner’s application for relief. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989).4 To

properly exhaust his claims in the state courts, the petitioner

must afford the state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of

each federal constitutional claim by presenting the claim to the

state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner.

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Kim v.

Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). In 1999, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that, in Arizona, in

the context of a petitioner who is not sentenced to death or

life in prison, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his claims to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005).5

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Swoopes, and mentions Baldwin in a different

capacity. It is unclear whether Baldwin overrules

Swoopes, and this Court declines to issue an

opinion on the matter.

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A federal habeas claim is procedurally defaulted if the

petitioner did present the claim to the state courts, but the

state courts did not address the merits of the claim because the

petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g.,

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95

(1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57;

Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A state is

entitled to treat as forfeited a proposition that was not

presented in the right court, in the right way, and at the right

time--as state rules define those courts, ways, and times.

Failure to comply with the state’s procedural rules furnishes an

independent and adequate state ground of decision that blocks

federal collateral review.”). “If a prisoner has defaulted a

state claim by ‘violating a state procedural rule which would

constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review

... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a

showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Wells v.

Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v.

Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The state’s procedural bar satisfies the exhaustion

requirement and also provides an independent and adequate statelaw basis for upholding a petitioner’s convictions and

sentences. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“... the procedural default rule barring

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consideration of a federal claim applies only when a state court

has been presented with the federal claim, but declined to reach

the issue for procedural reasons”); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

1404, 1417 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the Court need not

review the merits of a petitioner’s procedurally defaulted

claims unless he can demonstrate cause for his failure to follow

reasonable state procedures for fair presentment of his claims

and prejudice arising from his procedural default of the claims.

See Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62, 116 S. Ct. at 2080; Murray, 477

U.S. at 485, 106 S. Ct. at 2643. See also Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860-61, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581-82 (2002) (concluding

that a state court’s finding that a post-conviction claim was

barred as waived, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, was a decision independent of federal law

and adequate to bar federal review of state prisoner’s federal

habeas claim on the merits).

Petitioner presented the claims stated in his federal

habeas petition to the Arizona Superior Court in his action for

post-conviction relief. The Arizona Superior Court considered

the merits of the claims, conducted an evidentiary hearing, and

denied relief. However, Petitioner did not properly exhaust his

claims in the state courts because Petitioner did not fairly

present these claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

timely-filed petition for review of the trial court’s decision

denying his petition for post-conviction relief, thereby

presenting his claims to the state’s “highest court” as required

by the AEDPA. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that

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Petitioner had not complied with a state procedural rule and

that Petitioner’s recourse was to seek leave to file an untimely

petition for review in the Arizona trial court, a remedy

Petitioner did not pursue. Therefore, Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state

courts.

B. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, his procedural default of his federal habeas

claims.

The Court should not review the merits of a habeas

petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims unless he can

demonstrate cause for his failure to follow reasonable state

procedures for fair presentment of his claims and prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claims. See Gray,

518 U.S. at 161-62, 116 S. Ct. at 2080; Murray, 477 U.S. at 485,

106 S. Ct. at 2643.

 “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from

the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate cause, a

petitioner must show the existence of some external factor which

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules.

See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.

1996). The Supreme Court has explained that “a showing that ...

some interference by officials made compliance impracticable

would constitute cause under this standard.” Murray, 477 U.S.

at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645. To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his

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actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See

also Correll, 137 F.3d 1415-16.

Petitioner contends his petition for appellate court

review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief was

not timely because the state prison delayed his filing of the

petition for review by delaying his access to a paralegal and

copying services; Petitioner does not explicitly assert that

prison authorities delayed mailing his pleadings. 

Petitioner has arguably established cause for his

failure to timely file his petition for review of the trial

court’s decision denying post-conviction relief in the Arizona

Court of Appeals. Compare Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 439

(6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that prisoner had established cause

for his procedural default of a habeas claim where prison

officials delayed mailing the inmate’s state pleadings for five

days), and Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999)

(“It is the fact of nondelivery of a prisoner’s timely and

properly mailed motion, not the reason for that nondelivery,

that constitutes cause for the procedural default.”), with

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999), and Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding a

petitioner’s contention he was denied adequate law library

facilities and access did not excuse his procedural default of

his claims). 

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However, Petitioner has not established cause for his

failure to petition the trial court for permission to seek

untimely review of the decision denying post-conviction relief,

as he was instructed to do by the Arizona Court of Appeals and,

therefore, he has not established cause for his procedural

default of the federal habeas claims raised in that state

action. See High v. Ignacio, 408 F.3d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2005);

Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106 (concluding the petitioner had not

presented sufficient evidence to support his contention that

prison officials interfered with his access to the courts where

the petitioner had access to an attorney, the address of the

state appellate court and a completed petition for one month

before the running of the statute of limitations).

Additionally, Petitioner has not established prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his claims. To establish

prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors stated in the

defaulted claims worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage and infected his trial with constitutional error.

See Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, 102 S. Ct. at 1595; Correll, 137

F.3d 1415-16.. Petitioner must prove that “but for” the alleged

constitutional violations–his counsel was ineffective and his

conviction despite his alleged factual innocence, there is a

reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of the

same crimes. See Ivy, 173 F.3d at 1141. Petitioner has not

made this “but for” showing: as discussed, infra, Petitioner’s

counsel was not constitutionally ineffective and there was

sufficient evidence on which the jury could conclude Petitioner

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was guilty of the crime charged notwithstanding the testimony of

Petitioner’s brother contradicting the officer’s testimony. The

Court concludes that Petitioner’s trial was not infected with

error of constitutional dimension and, therefore, Petitioner’s

procedural default of his claims may not be excused on the basis

of cause and prejudice.

C. Petitioner has not established a fundamental

miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse his procedural

default of his federal habeas claims.

Review of the merits of procedurally defaulted habeas

claims is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review

of the merits of his claims is necessary to prevent a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 327, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995); Murray, 477 U.S. at

485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. 

A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only when

a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477

U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979

F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual innocence is

necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, Petitioner must

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable

juror could have found him guilty of the offense. Schlup, 513

U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d

832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001). Additionally, even if Petitioner

asserts a claim of actual innocence as excusing his procedural

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default of his claims, federal habeas relief may not be granted

on this assertion absent a finding of an independent

constitutional violation occurring in the state criminal

proceedings. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, 124 S. Ct.

1847, 1852 (2004); Herrera v. FULL CITE, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01,

113 S. Ct. 853, 860-61 (1993).

D. The merits of Petitioner’s claims that his trial

involved constitutional error.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064. 

To prevail on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, [the defendant] must

demonstrate that (i) counsel’s performance

was objectively deficient and (ii) counsel’s

deficiency prejudiced the defense, depriving

petitioner of a fair trial with a reliable

result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984). To demonstrate constitutional

deficiency, [the defendant] must show that

counsel’s performance was completely

unreasonable, not simply wrong. Similarly,

to show unconstitutional prejudice, [the

defendant] must demonstrate that but for

counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the

proceedings would have been different. [The

defendant] bears a heavy burden in that he

must overcome the presumption that his

counsel’s actions were sound trial strategy,

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in the context of his case.

Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 121

S. Ct. 329 (2000) (some internal citations omitted). See also

Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1005 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 134 (2005).

“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the

extent that reasonable professional judgments support the

limitations on investigation.” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066. Therefore, with respect to the performance prong

of the relevant test, the reviewing court must determine

whether, in light of the circumstances as they existed at the

time of counsel’s actions, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.

See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

[C]ounsel’s performance is deficient if he

fails to either conduct a reasonable

investigation or provide strategic reasons

for not doing so.... Deficient performance

alone, however, is not enough to render

counsel’s representation constitutionally

ineffective. [The petitioner] must also

establish prejudice, by “show[ing] that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for

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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.”

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 873 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

Petitioner has not shown the behavioral deficiency or

necessary prejudice, pursuant to Strickland, to be granted

habeas relief based on this claim or to have his procedural

default excused on the basis of actual innocence and

constitutional error. Petitioner asserts his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to call Petitioner’s girlfriend as a

witness in his defense; the evidence in the record indicates

that this was a strategic decision by counsel made after a

reasonable investigation of the relevant law and facts, which

is, therefore “virtually unchallengeable.” Counsel’s decision

not to provide the girlfriend’s testimony at trial, at a time

when Petitioner faced charges of kidnapping this individual, was

not unreasonable and, therefore, Petitioner was not deprived of

his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner asserts he is actually innocent of the

charges against him, i.e., that he was unconstitutionally

convicted of a crime he did not commit, and that his

girlfriend’s testimony at his trial would have established his

actual innocence.

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

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charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,

1073 (1970). To determine whether sufficient evidence existed

to support a habeas petitioner’s conviction, the Court must

decide if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789

(1979). See also McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 468-469 (9th

Cir. 1994). The Court may presume a state court’s conclusion

that the conviction was supported by the evidence is correct.

See Crow v. Eyman, 459 F.2d 24, 25 (9th Cir. 1972). Petitioner

bears the burden of proving that the record is so totally devoid

of evidentiary support for the challenged conviction as to

violate due process. Id. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient

to support a jury’s guilty verdict. Jackson, 442 U.S. at 324-

325, 99 S. Ct. at 2792. 

Petitioner has not established that the record is

totally devoid of evidentiary support for the challenged

conviction. Petitioner argues the testimony of his girlfriend

establishes his innocence, however, similar testimony by his

brother was insufficient for the jury to discount the officer’s

testimony regarding Petitioner’s proximity to the weapons and

his statement that he saw a weapon on Petitioner’s person.

Additionally, the girlfriend’s proffered testimony is not

internally consistent, i.e., her affidavit and her testimony at

the evidentiary hearing do not state the exact same testimony,

and it is reasonably likely that the jury would not have

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believed her testimony. Additionally, given that she had

alleged at that time that Petitioner had committed kidnapping,

it is uncertain what testimony the girlfriend would have offered

had she testified at Petitioner’s weapons misconduct trial,

notwithstanding her statements in her affidavit and at the

evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s action for postconviction relief. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown he was

unconstitutionally convicted in an absence of evidence against

him. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his federal

habeas claims in the state courts by failing to seek review of

his claims by the state’s “highest court” in a procedurally

correct manner. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that it

could not review Petitioner’s claims because of his failure to

comply with a state procedural rule. Therefore, Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims. Petitioner

has arguably shown cause for his procedural default of his

claims, but he has not shown prejudice arising from his default

of his claims and, therefore, the merits of his claims need not

be addressed. Furthermore, Petitioner has not established that

his trial involved constitutional error or that he is factually

innocent of the crimes of conviction and, therefore, he is not

entitled to proceed notwithstanding his procedural default of

his claims on the basis that a failure to review the merits of

his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Rivera’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 9th day of February, 2006.

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