Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01422/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01422-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Hosam Kaddoura (“Plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 21, 2012, the 

Court issued an order dismissing certain claims and defendants from this action and directing Plaintiff 

to either file an amended complaint or notify the Court that he wished to proceed on the cognizable 

claims against Defendants Calhoun and Darbi. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, 

filed on November 8, 2013, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 38.)

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief 

HOSAM KADDOURA,

 Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:11-cv-01422-LJO-BAM PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

(ECF No. 38)

Case 1:11-cv-01422-LJO-BAM Document 39 Filed 01/29/14 Page 1 of 8
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. 

United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges as follows:

April 8, 2010 Incident

On April 8, 2010, Officer Bickell assaulted Plaintiff while he was in handcuffs on Yard II. 

Officer Bickell wanted to move Plaintiff to an upper tier dorm, but Plaintiff could not move due to his 

medical condition, which was documented in medical chromos recommending lower tier, lower bed 

accommodation. Plaintiff showed the chronos to Officer Bickell, but Officer Bickell insisted on 

moving Plaintiff. Officer Bickell ordered Plaintiff to turn around. When Plaintiff complied, Officer 

Bickell handcuffed Plaintiff, pushed Plaintiff down and then landed his knees very hard on Plaintiff’s 

back. As a result, Plaintiff suffered two fractured ribs, displacement of rib cage, and knee and back 

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injuries. Plaintiff claims that the incident was caught on surveillance tape, which was sent to the DA. 

The DA declined to prosecute Plaintiff. 

May 14, 2010 Incident

After the assault on April 8, 2010, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation with an 

inmate named Raymond Rodriguez. Inmate Rodriguez was in administrative segregation because he 

broke another inmate’s nose. Plaintiff requested removal from the cell because Inmate Rodriguez was 

mentally unstable, dangerous and threatening. Plaintiff made his request for removal to Captain 

Calhoun during an Institutional Classification Hearing on April 15, 2010. Plaintiff also made his 

request to Sergeant Darbi several times. Plaintiff’s requests were denied. 

On May 14, 2010, Inmate Rodriguez attacked Plaintiff and injured Plaintiff’s head. On May 

17, 2010, Plaintiff still had pain in his head. The duty nurse examined Plaintiff and filled out a form 

showing an injury on the left ear. On that same date, Sergeant Darbi moved Plaintiff to another cell. 

October 8, 2010 Incident

On October 8, 2010, Officer Bergthold and an unknown officer assaulted Plaintiff while he 

was in handcuffs in the medical plaza. Plaintiff was in the medical clinic when four officers came in, 

surrounded Plaintiff and started cussing at Plaintiff to provoke him. The officers claimed that Plaintiff 

had ignored the plaza officer’s instructions. The officers then took Plaintiff outside, searched him and 

then handcuffed him. Plaintiff complied with their instructions. 

As Officer Bergthold was escorting Plaintiff to the unit office, Officer Bergthold pushed 

Plaintiff very hard. Plaintiff turned around and told Officer Bergthold not to push him. Officer 

Bergthold then took Plaintiff down very hard. While Plaintiff was on his stomach, the officers turned 

Plaintiff around under the staircase and one of the officers twisted Plaintiff’s leg. As a result, Plaintiff 

suffered a fractured ankle, a fractured fibula and severe knee and back injuries. This incident also was 

captured on video surveillance tape. 

After the assault on October 8, 2010, Dr. Bangi briefly examined Plaintiff’s leg. Plaintiff was 

not able to walk or to put any weight on his leg, but Dr. Bangi did not order an x-ray or prescribe any 

pain medication. 

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The officers then took Plaintiff to administrative segregation. By the time Plaintiff reached 

administrative segregation, his leg was very swollen and he was in pain. Plaintiff asked to see a doctor 

or a nurse and submitted his request in writing. Plaintiff’s request was denied. During his one-week 

stay in administrative segregation, Plaintiff begged for pain pills, but his requests were denied. After 

repeated requests to see a doctor or a nurse, Nurse Doe came to see Plaintiff about four or five days 

after his leg injury. Nurse Doe promised that she would authorize pain and anti-inflammation 

medications and order an x-ray. Plaintiff did not get an x-ray for several days and did not get pain 

medication until October 18, 2010. 

March 2011

In March 2011, Plaintiff attended a reclassification hearing with Ms. Spatola and Captain 

Calhoun. Plaintiff had a medical endorsement to be moved to San Quentin prison due to breathing 

problems. Although the Assistant Medical Chief and other doctors recommended the transfer, Captain 

Calhoun cancelled the endorsement and endorsed Plaintiff to the same prison where he had breathing 

problems. Captain Calhoun went against doctor recommendations and put Plaintiff in danger because 

of his health conditions. 

Plaintiff asserts claims for the following: (1) excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment against Officer Bickell, Officer Bergthold and the unknown (doe) officer; (2) deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Nurse Doe and 

Captain Calhoun; and (3) failure to protect Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment against 

Captain Calhoun and Sergeant Darbi.

III. Discussion 

A. Improper Joinder

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not comply with Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 18. Rule 18 states that “[a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, 

or third-party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an 

opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim 

A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated 

claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a 

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multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s] but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required 

filing fees--for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals 

that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

Here, Plaintiff attempts to bring suit against multiple defendants for different incidents 

occurring at different times. For example, Plaintiff alleges excessive force by Officer Bickell arising 

out of an incident on April 10, 2010, while simultaneously alleging deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs by Captain Calhoun in March 2011. Plaintiff may not pursue multiple unrelated claims 

against different defendants in a single action. Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants 

only if (1) the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and 

occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. 

Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 

623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). In other words, Plaintiff cannot pursue a claim against Officer 

Bickell for excessive force arising out of an incident on April 10, 2010, and a claim against Captain 

Calhoun for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs arising out of events in March 2011 in the 

same action.

The Court previously determined that this action should proceed against Defendant Calhoun on

those claims properly joined against Defendant Calhoun under Rules 18 and 20. Indeed, the Court 

also determined that the claims arising from the April 8, 2010, and October 8, 2010 incidents are not 

properly joined in this action. The Court therefore dismissed, without leave to amend, Plaintiff’s 

excessive force claims against Defendants Bicknell, Bergthold and the unknown Doe officer and 

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Nurse Doe based 

on improper joinder. (ECF Nos. 23, 25.) 

Despite the Court’s previous determinations and orders, Plaintiff has continued in his efforts to 

pursue the improperly joined and dismissed claims against Defendant Bicknell, Defendant Bergthold, 

Defendant unknown Doe Officer and Defendant Nurse Doe. As a result, further leave to amend shall

not be granted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court therefore finds that 

this action should proceed solely on the claims involving Defendant Calhoun. 

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B. Claims Against Defendant Calhoun

1. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Calhoun and Sergeant Darbi failed to protect Plaintiff from an 

assault by his administrative segregation cellmate, Inmate Rodriguez. Under the Eighth Amendment, 

“prison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994 ) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). However, “not ... every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of 

another ... translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” 

Id. at 834. A prison official may be held liable for an assault suffered by one inmate at the hands of 

another only where the assaulted inmate can show that the injury is sufficiently serious, id. at 834 

(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991 )), and that the 

prison official was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm, id. at 837. To be deliberately 

indifferent, the “official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against 

Defendants Calhoun and Darbi for failure to protect Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

2. Eighth Amendment – Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Calhoun was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical 

needs by cancelling an endorsement of Plaintiff to San Quentin despite medical recommendations and 

by endorsing Plaintiff to the same prison where he had breathing problems. 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 

(9th Cir.2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 

(1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious 

medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir.2012).

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Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and fails 

to adequately respond. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1018. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” 

Id. at 1019; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. The prison official must be aware of facts from which he could 

make an inference that “a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he must make the inference. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against 

Defendant Calhoun for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendants Calhoun 

and Darbi for failure to protect and a cognizable claim against Defendant Calhoun for deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, the Court 

finds that the remaining claims and defendants are improperly joined in this action and should be 

dismissed. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Calhoun and Darbi for failure 

to protect and against Defendant Calhoun for deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and 

2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed as improperly joined in this action under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days 

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

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Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2014 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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