Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01160/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01160-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN B. ANDERSON, )

) CIV. S-04-1160 GEB GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

CITY OF SACRAMENTO; SACRAMENTO ) 

REGIONAL TRANSIT DISTRICT; )

M. MOORE, in his individual )

capacity as police officer of the )

City of Sacramento, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s

federal claims, arguing that if the motion is granted, Plaintiff’s

state claims should be dismissed. (Defendants’ Motion at 11.) The

motion was heard May 2, 2005. The entity Defendants essentially argue

they are not exposed to liability for Plaintiff’s federal claims

because the individually named Defendant, Officer Moore, did not

violate any of Plaintiff’s federal rights. 

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Facts 2, 3, and 4 in Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

show that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Plaintiff ran two red lights. These undisputed facts are supported by

sworn testimony, in accordance with Local Rule 56-260. 

2

Plaintiff’s claims are based upon what he alleges occurred

after he ran two red lights while riding his bicycle.1 Plaintiff was

subsequently arrested for these infractions, searched incident to the

arrest, placed in the rear of the patrol car driven by Officer Moore,

and was later released after Officer Moore determined Plaintiff could

be given a citation since he had a local California address. 

Plaintiff argues Officer Moore lacked authority to arrest

him under both state and federal law, had no authority to search him

following the arrest, and that Officer Moore illegally detained him in

the back seat of Officer Moore’s patrol car. 

Plaintiff’s counsel indicated during oral argument at the

May 2 hearing that the California statute which Officer Moore stated

was the basis for Plaintiff’s arrest was not a statute under which

Plaintiff could be arrested. But “[t]he validity of an arrest depends

upon the objective facts and circumstances of the arrest, not upon the

arresting officer’s subjective intent.” United States v. Sayetsitty,

107 F.3d 1405, 1414 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

Here, the objective facts and circumstances surrounding

Plaintiff’s arrest establish that Officer Moore had probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff for the California infraction of running a red light. 

The applicable “state law governing arrests” in the situation involved

with Plaintiff’s arrest “is relevant to assessing the

constitutionality of [Plaintiff’s arrest and the] search incident to

that arrest.” United States v. Mota, 982 F.3d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir.

1993). 

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Defendants argue that Officer Moore had discretion under

California Vehicle Code Section 40305(a) to decide whether Plaintiff

should be taken immediately before a magistrate within the county for

the infraction of running red lights prescribed in California Vehicle

Code Section 21453(a), or issued a citation and released. Section

40305(a) authorized Officer Moore to take Plaintiff to a magistrate if

Plaintiff failed to furnish "satisfactory evidence of . . . an address

within [California] at which he can be located." 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff gave Officer Moore an Oregon

driver’s license in response to Officer Moore’s request for

identification. Further, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony reveals he

admits that when he spoke to Officer Moore, he “[did not] know exactly

what [he] said” when responding to Officer Moore’s inquiry about

whether Plaintiff was just visiting California. Plaintiff testified

“I told him I wasn’t going to be here and that I was leaving”; “[that

he] wasn’t planning on staying”; and “[he] was here temporary. . . .” 

(Plaintiff’s Deposition (“Plf.’s Depo.”) at 33:11-17.) This

deposition testimony, considered along with other evidence in the

record, reveals there is no genuine issue of material fact on the

appropriateness of Officer Moore’s decision to take Plaintiff before a

magistrate rather than issue him a citation and release him. Officer

Moore’s declaration on what Plaintiff told Officer Moore before

Officer Moore made his decision to keep Plaintiff in custody reveals

that Plaintiff failed to furnish Officer Moore with satisfactory

evidence “of an address within California at which he could be

located.” (Moore Declaration (“Moore Decl.”) ¶ 12.)

Both Plaintiff’s and Officer Moore’s sworn averments reveal

that Plaintiff failed to furnish satisfactory evidence “of an address

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

within California at which Plaintiff could be located.” Officer Moore

testified he “was . . . trying to determine where [Plaintiff] was

living so that [he] could issue him a citation,” and release him “on a

citation” (Moore Depo. at 30:7-19); but Plaintiff told him he was

visiting in California. (Id. at 33:1-6.) Further, Officer Moore

testified that he asked Plaintiff questions regarding whether

Plaintiff had a local address “and [Plaintiff’s] response . . . was

really wishy-washy,” which caused Officer Moore to be “[un]satisfied

with what he was giving me.” (Id. at 58:21-23.) 

Further, Officer Moore declares when he “inquired whether

the Oregon address was Mr. Anderson’s current residence address,”

Plaintiff 

informed [Officer Moore] that he was a college

student in the State of Oregon who was working as

a delivery man for Attorney’s Diversified Services

in Sacramento for the summer vacation, and that he

was about to return to Oregon soon to resume his

studies.

[Officer Moore] then asked Mr. Anderson whether he

had an address in the Sacramento area through 

which he could be contacted, and he informed

[Officer Moore] that he did not.

(Moore Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11.)

Since Plaintiff’s deposition testimony reveals he “do[esn’t]

know exactly what he said” to Officer Moore, and Officer Moore does

remember what Plaintiff said, Plaintiff has not created a genuine

issue of material fact on what he said before Officer Moore decided to

keep him detained. Dickie v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-North

Mississippi, 146 F.3d 262, 266 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the

mere fact that a witness does not remember an alleged phone

conversation does not create a material fact about its occurrence); 

see People v. McKay, 27 Cal. 4th 601, 623 (2002) (officer was not

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 In California, “[a] peace officer . . . without a warrant, may

arrest a person whenever . . . [t]he officer has probable cause to

believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in

the officer’s presence.” Cal. Penal Code § 836(a). Further, “[c]rimes

and public offenses include . . . Infractions.” Cal. Penal Code § 16.

5

required to accept verifiable oral evidence of identity in connection

with lawful custodial arrest; statute plainly put burden of presenting

satisfactory evidence of identity on offender, and officer discharged

his entire statutory duty by making some inquiry putting offender on

notice to produce evidence of identity); see also People v. Monroe, 12

Cal. App. 4th 1174 (1993) (officer had discretion to determine what

satisfactory evidence of identity was under circumstances).

But Plaintiff argues notwithstanding the legality of the

arrest under California law, the Fourth Amendment forbids an arrest

for a minor traffic offense. Defendants rejoin that in Atwater v.

City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the Supreme Court held that

the Fourth Amendment does not forbid such arrests. The Supreme Court

stated:

[W]e confirm today what our prior cases have

intimated: the standard of probable cause

"applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to

'balance' the interests and circumstances involved

in particular situations." If an officer has

probable cause to believe that an individual has

committed even a very minor criminal offense in

his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth

Amendment, arrest the offender.

Id. at 354 (citation omitted). This holding in Atwater reveals that

Plaintiff’s position lacks merit. Further, since Officer Moore had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for violation of section 21435(a), 

Officer Moore's subsequent search of Plaintiff was a lawful search

incident to his arrest.2 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 During the May 2 hearing, counsel agreed that the reference to

1704 was Plaintiff’s Exhibit B, which is the Police Call Log, or “PCL.”

But the Police Call Log shows that the time next to narrative entries

does not reflect the actual sequence of Officer Moore’s contacts with

Plaintiff.

6

Plaintiff also argues that Officer Moore’s decision to keep

him in custody for twenty minutes following Officer Moore’s

determination that Plaintiff would be released, since Officer Moore

learned Plaintiff had a residence in California, was unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff supports this argument by

citing to an entry in the Police Call Log ("PCL"). That entry

indicates that Officer Nakamura, who had been dispatched to pick up

Plaintiff's bicycle, because Officer Moore's cruiser was not equipped

to haul it, was told he could leave the scene of the arrest at 1645,

since by then Officer Moore had determined that Plaintiff had a local

California address. Plaintiff contends he was not released until

1704, and that this 20 minute detention period violated his Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. Further, Plaintiff

points to Officer Moore’s deposition testimony for the apparent

purpose of undermining Officer Moore’s credibility about the time

information was received revealing that Plaintiff could be released. 

That deposition testimony follows:3

Q. At 1704, it looks like that you were able to

find him in the county system; is that

correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that when you determined from your

investigation that the Muir Way address was

accurate? Or what did you find in the county

system?

Maybe I’m asking too many questions here all

at once.

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

A. I found that he was in our system, that he

had no warrants, and that he had an X

reference number, which is a county

number. . . .

Q. How did you get that information; do you

know?

A. Through running his name.

Q. And when you get that information, does it

have the Muir Way address on it at all; do

you remember?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Anderson had told you

that he lived at Muir Way before the time

1704?

In other words, did he tell you that he lived

there before you learned that from the

computer?

A. He didn’t tell me that address. He told me

that he was visiting here.

Q. So up and through that 1704 period of time,

he didn’t tell you anything about Muir Way;

is that correct?

A. When he was in the back of the car, he talked

about it. But I don’t know at what point

that was, but it was later on.

(Moore Depo. at 32:7-33:11.)

Officer Moore declares that while he waited for Officer

Nakamura to arrive at the arrest scene to pick up Plaintiff’s bicycle,

Plaintiff 

began to open up and communicate more freely with

me. During the course of that discourse, he

informed me that his parents, in fact, resided in

the Sacramento area, and that it would be possible

for him to be reached through a California address

which he provided to me. 

Armed with that new information, I decided that,

upon confirmation of the local address information

which Mr. Anderson was now providing, and

confirmation that Mr. Anderson was not wanted on

any warrant of arrest in the California system, I

would cite-release him on the traffic violations.

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

With the assistance of the Sacramento Police

Department computer assisted dispatch system, I

was able to make those confirmations, and I then

prepared a citation and released Mr. Anderson from

custody when he signed the citation (albeit not on

the line provided on the citation form) promising

to appear in court on the date set forth on the

face of the citation . . . .

After Mr. Anderson was released from custody, I

spent a few minutes recording notes regarding the

21453 V.C. violations which I had observed, and

regarding my contact with Mr. Anderson, in the

computer system and on my copy of the citation,

and then “cleared” from the traffic stop and

returned to my patrol duties.

(Moore Decl. ¶¶ 14-17.)

Although it is unclear how long it took Officer Moore to

“clear” “from the traffic stop,” which is noted on the PCL as having

occurred at 1704 hours, Officer Moore’s averments that he checked the

California warrant system to see if a warrant had been issued for

Plaintiff’s arrest, and “spent a few minutes recording notes

regarding” Plaintiff’s violations after Plaintiff was released from

custody, have not been controverted. Therefore, no genuine issue of

material fact exists on the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s detention

under the Fourth Amendment.

Further, nothing in the summary judgment record supports

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that Officer Moore subjected him to

an unreasonable seizure. The PCL shows that Officer Moore perceived

Plaintiff as having “a poor attitude” about having been stopped for

running the red lights, “and [he] was questioning [Officer Moore’s]

authority.” Therefore, it was reasonable for Officer Moore to place

handcuffs on Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony concerning

some of his interaction with Officer Moore after Officer Moore told

Officer Nakamura that Plaintiff would be released indicates that

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Officer Moore just had Plaintiff sit in the back seat of the patrol

car while Officer Moore gathered information pertinent to the release

decision. Specifically, Plaintiff explains that after Officer Moore

spoke to Officer Nakamura, Officer Moore

got back in the front of the car and just sat

there for a little bit, silent like -- well, I

don’t know why. But sat there.

And then told me, “Okay, I’m going to -- I’m going

to issue you a ticket.” And he wrote me a ticket

and told me that I could get out of the car. He

got me out of the car and unhandcuffed me, wrote

me out a ticket that wasn’t filled out properly.

(Plf.’s Depo. at 21:7-15.)

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ summary judgment motion

on all of Plaintiff’s federal claims is granted.

Since all of Plaintiff’s federal claims have been decided,

it must be determined whether supplemental jurisdiction should

continue being exercised over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3).

Exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. 

City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. Of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73

(1997); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir.

2002). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim where “the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction. . . .” “[W]hen deciding whether to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh

in each case, and at every stage of litigation, the values of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago, 522

U.S. at 173 (citations omitted). 

[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law

claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine--judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity--will point

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state-law claims. 

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988);

see also Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1169

(9th Cir. 2002) (applying Carnegie-Mellon to supplemental

jurisdiction). “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided

both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties,

by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” 

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Since the federal claims have been resolved, as a matter of

comity and to allow Plaintiff to prosecute his state claims in a state 

forum, the state claims are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) as

of the date on which this Order is filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-01160-GEB-GGH Document 15 Filed 05/09/05 Page 10 of 10