Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00587/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00587-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

Defendants have requested oral argument. However, upon review of the briefs, the

Court has determined that oral argument is not required to resolve the pending motion. 

2

Plaintiff did not request leave of Court to file his Supplemental Response.

Defendants have not objected to the filing. The Court will consider the Supplemental

Response in resolving Defendants’ Motion.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael A. Leon, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Danaher Corporation; et. al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-587-TUC-DCB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss1

 (Doc. 13); (2)

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 16); (3) Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17); (4) Defendants’ Amended Reply in Support of Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Defendants’ Amended Reply”) (Doc. 22); and (5) Plaintiff’s

Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss2

 (hereinafter

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The named Defendants are the same as those named in the original complaint.

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“Plaintiff’s Supplemental Response”) (Doc. 23). For the following reasons, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2010, Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status to file his pro se

Complaint in which Plaintiff alleged this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., (hereinafter “Title VII”) and the

Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (hereinafter “ADA”) (Docs 1,

4). Plaintiff further alleged that he was the victim of racial harassment (Count I); race

discrimination (Count II); disability discrimination (Count III); and retaliation (Counts IV,

V). 

On December 20, 2010, Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff

filed a response thereto as well as a First Amended Complaint. In his First Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his action is brought pursuant to Title VII and the ADA.

(See First Amended Complaint, pp. 21, 23, 25, 28). Plaintiff alleges racial harassment (Count

I); race discrimination (Count II); disability discrimination (Count III); and retaliation

(Counts IV, V). Named Defendants are: Danaher Corporation; Pacific Scientific;

Securaplane Technologies, Inc.; Janice Williams, Power Group Manager; Lorrie Guzeman,

Human Resources Manager; Blane Boynton, Program Manager; and Dr. Michael Boost,

Chief Technical Officer.3

 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint “fails to cure the

incurable deficiencies of the previous Complaint...” and, thus, the action should be dismissed

despite the filing of the Amended Complaint. (Defendants’ Amended Reply, p. 2).

Defendants also point out that this is not the first lawsuit filed by Plaintiff concerning his

former employment. In March 2009, Plaintiff filed suit in Arizona state court against all

Defendants named in the instant action, but for Danaher Corporation and Pacific Scientific.

(See Defendants’ Motion, p. 2 & Exh. 1). The case was removed to the District Court for the

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District of Arizona on the basis that, inter alia, Plaintiffs’ references to Title VII and the

ADA in the state court complaint constituted claims arising under federal law. (See Id.).

However, the matter was remanded to the state court after Plaintiff informed the District

Court that he had not intended to allege any federal claims against Defendants, he

“eschew[ed] claims based on federal law”, and he only intended to pursue claims of

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion

of privacy, slander and defamation. (Id.; see also Amended Complaint (Doc. 1, Exh. 2) filed

in Leon v. Securaplane Technologies, Inc., et. al., CV 09-390-TUC-CKJ (JCG)). The state

action, which resulted from the remand directed in CV 09-390, was pending when Plaintiff

initiated the instant action. (See Plaintiff’s Supplemental Response, p. 4 (indicating that the

matter is set for trial in June 2011)). The record also reflects that in October 2010, Plaintiff

filed an action in Arizona state court against Pacific Scientific, Danaher Corporation, and

Securaplane Technologies, Inc. (Id.). 

II. STANDARD

A. Introduction

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In their Amended Reply,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal on the same

grounds.

B. Dismissal for Lack for Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is

appropriate when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Fed. R. Civ.

12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction involves the power of the court to hear the plaintiff’s

claims in the first place and, therefore, imposes upon courts an affirmative obligation to

ensure that they are acting within the scope of their jurisdictional power. Because federal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it is presumed that a cause lies outside the

jurisdiction of federal courts unless proven otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

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511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction

exists. Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730,

733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

“‘A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the

allegations of the complaint or may...’” attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction as

a matter of fact. National Union Fire Insur. Co. v. ESI Ergonomic Solutions, LLC., 342

F.Supp.2d 853 (D. Ariz. 2004) (quoting Thornhill Publishing Co., 594 F.2d at 733). "When

a motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer subject

matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (citing Federation of African Amer. Contractors

v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996)). Where the jurisdictional issue is

separable from the merits of the case, the court may consider the evidence presented with

respect to the jurisdictional issue, resolving factual disputes if necessary. Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733. "When the motion is a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant may

'rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the Court.'" National Union Fire

Insur. Co., 342 F.Supp.2d at 861 (citing St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th

Cir. 1989)). In the instance of a factual challenge, no presumption of truthfulness attaches

to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

court from evaluating the merits of jurisdictional claims. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733.

When a motion to dismiss is based on more than one ground, the court should

consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first because the other grounds will become moot if the

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 5 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay

Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure (hereinafter “Federal Practice & Procedure”), §1350

(3rd. ed. 2011). 

C. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

“‘To survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim], a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face;’ that is, plaintiff must ‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the

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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Telasaurus

VPC, LLC. v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S.

__, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the

court must first separate factual allegations from legal conclusions. Iqbal, ___ U.S.___, 129

S.Ct. at 1949-1950; see also Telasaurus, 623 F.3d. at 1003 (the court begins its review “‘by

identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.’” (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1950). Thus, “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Iqbal, ___ U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. After eliminating such unsupported legal

conclusions, the court will next identify “‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ which we assume

to be true, ‘and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’”

Telasaurus, 623 F.3d. at 1003 (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1950). Determining

plausibility is a “context-specific task...” that requires the court to “draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. A complaint cannot

survive dismissal where the court can only infer that a claim is merely possible rather than

plausible. Id.

As a general rule, the district court may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2002), impliedly overruled on other grounds as

discussed in Gallardo v. DiCarlo, 203 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1162 n.2(C.D. Cal. 2002). However,

the court may consider material submitted as part of the complaint, such as the EEOC

Dismissal and Notice which Plaintiff herein has attached as an exhibit to his First Amended

Complaint. Id. Further, the court may consider documents not physically attached to the

complaint if the documents’ authenticity are not contested and the plaintiff’s complaint

necessarily relies on them. Id. Moreover, the court may consider materials of which it may

take judicial notice, including matters of public record. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688-689; Shaw

v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In deciding whether to dismiss a claim

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court may look beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of

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public record.” (citation omitted)); Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1969) (taking judicial notice of EEOC proceeding). Defendants have attached to their

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s August 19, 2010 Notice of Charge of Discrimination

(hereinafter “Charge”) filed with the EEOC. (Defendant’s Motion ,Exh. 2). Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint necessarily relies on such Charge: he alleges he filed the August 2010

Charge and he attaches the EEOC’s Dismissal and Notice of Rights with regard to that

Charge. (See First Amended Complaint, p. 2 at ¶8 and Exh. A). Further the Court takes

judicial notice of the EEOC proceedings in Plaintiff’s case, including the EEOC Charge. See

Cunningham, 413 F.2d at 889 n.2. The Court also takes judicial notice of the two state court

actions filed by Plaintiff, including the attempted removal, discussed supra at I., which are

matters of public record. 

When the plaintiff is pro se, the complaint must be liberally construed in the interests

of justice. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se pleadings are held to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers...”); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally....”);

Johnson v. Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 1975)(“Pleadings should be liberally

construed in the interests of justice, particularly when a pleader is not learned in the law.”).

This is especially true when a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case. See Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, "[p]ro se litigants must follow

the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th Cir. 1995) ("pro se litigants are

bound by the rules of procedure."). 

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

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required to inform a litigant of deficiencies).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Effect of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may

amend the complaint “once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B)

if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a

responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),

whichever is earlier.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was

filed on January 10, 2011 and within 21 days after Defendants served their December 20,

2010 Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b). (See Defendants’ Motion p.10 (indicating

Motion was served on December 20, 2010 by mail and electronic means); see also

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6 (calculating time). Therefore, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is timely

under Rule 15(a)(1)(B).

An amended complaint supersedes a prior complaint as a pleading. Hal Roach

Studios, Inc., v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, once

an amended complaint is filed, any subsequent motion made by an opposing party should be

directed at the amended pleading. See 6 Federal Practice & Procedure §1476 at 637-638

(3rd ed. 2011). However, “defendants should not be required to file a new motion to dismiss

simply because an amended pleading was introduced while their motion was pending. If

some other defects raised in the motion remain in the new pleading, the court simply may

consider the motion as being addressed to the amended pleading. To hold otherwise would

be to exalt form over substance.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Jordan v. City of

Philadelphia, 66 F.Supp.2d 638, 641 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Datastorm Technologies, Inc. v.

Excalibur Communications, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 112, (N.D. Cal. 1995); Patton Electric Co.,

Inc., v. Rampart Air, Inc., 777 F.Supp. 704, 712 (N.D. Ind. 1991). 

Although Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was directed at Plaintiff’s original

complaint, which is now void in light of the filing of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint suffers from the same

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Securaplane Technologies, Inc. is “now known as

Pacific Scientific, a subsidiary of Danaher Corporation....” (First Amended Complaint, p.

2). Plaintiff names Pacific Scientific and Danaher Corporation as Defendants. Defendants

assert that “Securaplane Technologies, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DH Holdings

Corporation, which is wholly owned by Danaher Corporation.” (Defendants’ Amended

Reply, p. 7; see also Defendants’ Motion, p.1 n.1). 

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deficiencies that are addressed in their Motion to Dismiss. (See Defendants’ Amended

Reply). Subsequent to the filing of Defendants’ Amended Reply, Plaintiff filed a

Supplemental Response which the Court considers herein. On the instant record, “the Court

will consider the Motion to Dismiss to be directed [to]...the...First Amended Complaint. For

the Court to do otherwise would exalt form over substance.” Datastorm Technologies, Inc.,

888 F.Supp. at 114 (citing Patton Electric Co., 777 F.Supp. at 712; 6 Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1476 at 556-558 (2d ed. 1990)).

B. Allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and EEOC Charge

1. Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that he “is a severely disabled man over the age of 40 and of

American Indian and Hispanic origin.” (First Amended Complaint, p. 1). He also alleges

that he suffers from heart disease and has steel implants in his left wrist and forearm, left

femur bone from the knee to the upper thigh, right foot, and jaw bone, which he contends

constitute his disability. (Id. at p.5). From 2004 through 2007, Plaintiff was employed as

a Senior Electronic Technician with Defendant Securaplane Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter

“Securaplane”).4

Plaintiff alleges that in October 2006, he advised Defendants Boost, Williams and

others of his safety concerns regarding continued use of a Lithium Ion Battery in conjunction

with a power conversion system. (Id. at p.2). According to Plaintiff, no one heeded his

warning and, in November 2006, the battery exploded causing a three-alarm fire. (Id. at p.3).

Plaintiff alleges that in February 2007, Defendant Williams threatened him with

termination if he did not perform physical duties, such as moving laboratory equipment

weighing up to 300 pounds and installing lights in a new building. (Id. at pp. 5-6). While

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performing these tasks, Plaintiff collapsed. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that his requests to use his

accumulated sick time in February 2007 were denied. (Id. at p.6).

Plaintiff alleges that on March 1, 2007, he informed Defendant Boynton of a safety

defect in certain power converters and that the “converters could not be shipped to aircraft

without being reworked to eliminate this fault....” (Id.). Nonetheless, Defendant Boynton

directed Plaintiff to ship the converters. (Id. at p.7). Despite Defendant Boynton’s directive,

Plaintiff left work without shipping the converters. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that on the

evening of March 1, 2007, Defendant Williams called him at home to instruct him to ship the

converters. (Id.). When Plaintiff informed Defendant Williams of his right to use sick time,

Defendant Williams allegedly “threatened [him] not to take the day off, but to come to work

and ship the power converters in question. She further instructed Plaintiff that a written

reprimand would be waiting for him...if the Plaintiff chose to utilize one of his sick days.”

(Id.). Plaintiff did not return to work, but used sick time. (Id.). When Plaintiff returned to

work, he was reprimanded “for leaving work without shipping the power converters...as

directed by [Defendant] Blane Boynton and for using a sick day...” (Id. at p. 8). On that

same date, Plaintiff sought medical attention and was placed on medical leave for the

following three weeks. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that upon his return to work on March 26,

2007, he was disciplined for failing to ship the power converters and Defendant Guzeman

verbally instructed that do [sic] to his appearance, he fit the profile of someone

who shoots multiple people in shopping malls. This is a violation of EEOC

laws under Title VII with respect to racial, national origin discriminatory

practices. Plaintiff is of Native American and Hispanic heritage. He wears a

long braid of hair to his waist and has facial scarring which contributes to his

appearance. He also wore a leather western style duster to keep warm.

(Id. at p.8; see also id. at p. 12). 

Plaintiff ultimately shipped the power converters and, on March 30, 2007, “filed an

FAA whistle blower complaint concerning...” the matter. (Id. at p.9). 

Plaintiff also alleges that in 2007 he received reprimands for going to doctor’s

appointments and that Defendant Guzeman shared with other employees information

concerning Plaintiff’s background and health issues. (Id. at pp. 9-12).

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On April 5, 2007, Plaintiff was “sent home under the pretext of lying to fire

investigators”, and his employment was “officially terminated on May 11, 2007.” (Id. at

p.13). Plaintiff has not returned to his former work location since May 11, 2007. (Id.). 

Plaintiff alleges that in 2009, a Department of Labor proceeding occurred before an

administrative law judge with regard to Plaintiff and Defendants. (Id. at pp. 12-14). Plaintiff

alleges that in April 2010, Plaintiff had a “chance meeting at a laundry facility...” with a

former Securaplane employee who informed Plaintiff:

that during the first date of the D[epartment] O[f] L[abor] trial on March 24,

2009, Securaplane had a meeting with all employees. They were instructed to

fear for their lives and to report any sightings of Plaintiff to the newly hired

security forces that were now patrolling the grounds. He further informed

Plaintiff that there was an image of Plaintiff kept at the receptionist’s desk that

portrayed Plaintiff in a menacing and intimidating way.

(Id. at p.14). Plaintiff alleges that he was portrayed in a format characterizing him as an

“Outlaw” or “Wanted” and “as a danger.” (Id. at p.15). Employees were instructed that he

was considered to be armed and dangerous. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that in October 2010 through December 2010, his resume was sent

to Securaplane by Aerotech Aviation for several positions and that, in violation of Title VII,

he was never called for an interview despite that he “is more than qualified for...” the

positions. (Id. at p.16).

Plaintiff alleges that security measurers were increased at Securaplane in 2009 in

relation to the Department of Labor proceeding. Plaintiff alleges that officers were on the

look-out for him and his son and that his son was characterized by Defendants as a “coconspirator”. (Id. at p. 28). 

In Count I of his Amended Complaint, which is titled “Racial Harassment of

Plaintiff....”, Plaintiff claims, inter alia, that he 

was subjected to unwelcome, offensive and harassing discriminatory conduct

during his employment with Defendant Securaplane Technologies as well as

post-employment by Defendant Securaplane Technologies and its agents by

reason of his race and disability.

(Id. at p. 20). Plaintiff alleges that during his employment and post-employment, “as recent

as June 2009,...” and continuing thereafter he has been “held up to great derision and

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embarrassment with former workers, friends, members of the community and family....” (Id.

at p. 21).

In Count II, titled “Race Discrimination”, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged

in such discrimination during his employment and “as recent as June 2009,...” and

continuing thereafter, he has been “held up to great derision and embarrassment with former

workers, friends, members of the community and family....” (Id. at pp 21-22).

In Count III, titled “Disability Discrimination”, Plaintiff claims, inter alia, that in

2007 he “was repeatedly harassed while on medical leave” and although he was “seriously

ill...” he had been “subjected to an onslaught by the company for...” using medical leave. (Id.

at pp. 22-23). According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ actions violated the ADA. Further

according to Plaintiff, “as recent as June 2009,...” and continuing thereafter, he has been

“held up to great derision and embarrassment with former workers, friends, members of the

community and family....” (Id.).

In Count IV, titled “Retaliation”, Plaintiff claims that he has been retaliated against

in violation of Title VII and the ADA. (Id. at p.24). He alleges that “as recent as June

2009,...” and continuing thereafter, he has been “held up to great derision and embarrassment

with former workers, friends, members of the community and family....” (Id. at p. 25).

In Count V, also titled “Retaliation”, Plaintiff cites his activity, including the filing

of a whistleblower complaint, regarding safety issues at Securaplane. (Id. at pp. 25-28). He

claims that “the unfavorable personnel actions directed at...” him were made in retaliation.

(Id. at p.28). He alleges that as recent “as June 2009,...” and continuing thereafter, he has

been “held up to great derision and embarrassment with former workers, friends, members

of the community and family....” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts in Count V that “[t]his action is

brought pursuant to Title VII and...” the ADA. (Id.).

2. EEOC Charge

On August 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Charge of Discrimination with the

EEOC claiming retaliation and discrimination based upon race, national origin, disability and

retaliation. (Defendants’ Motion, Exh. 2). Specifically, Plaintiff claimed retaliation for filing

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a whistleblower complaint regarding “defective equipment/parts and ever since then I have

been retaliated against.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserted that “Human Resources” referred to him

as having “a profile of a violent person that shoots people in shopping malls because of my

appearance...”, and provided “bad references causing me not to obtain other employment

after my discharge in May 2007. Even to this day, the slander is ongoing and they continue

to defame my character among other employees and co-workers, this has a poisoning effect

on the small electronic community for Tucson employment.” (Id.). Plaintiff also alleged that

his February 2007 request for reasonable accommodation was denied, he was reprimanded

for taking sick time and going to medical appointments, and his medical information was

shared with employees. (Id.). Plaintiff claimed that in August 2009 through 2010,

Defendants posted at entrances to Securaplane, a poster depicting him “in a dangerous and

threatening light....” (Id.). He also claimed that “[a]fter the fire when [he]...truthfully

explained how management failed to heed his requests about faulty equipment...”

Defendants began “insisting that he had a scary appearance (long braided Indian tall–with

facial scars)....” Plaintiff further claimed that Defendant Guzeman gave perjured testimony

at the Department of Labor hearing. (Id.). 

On September 15, 2010, the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff’s claim and notified him of his

right to file a lawsuit. (First Amended Complaint, Exh. A). Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated the

instant action.

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Defendants’ Amended Reply

Defendants contend that because individual employees are not subject to liability in

their individual capacities under Title VII and the ADA, this action should be dismissed

against the individual defendants. Defendants further contend that the majority of Plaintiff’s

claims are untimely and Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the remainder of his claims.

Defendants also argue that all claims against Defendant Danaher Corporation must be

dismissed and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation.

1. Individual Defendants

Defendants are correct that neither Title VII nor the ADA impose individual liability

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In cases arising in states that are not dual-filing states, the EEOC charge must be filed

within 180 days. See Santa-Maria, 202 F.3d at 1176. The parties do not dispute that the

300-day filing period, as opposed to the 180-day period, applied to Plaintiff. (See

Defendant’s Motion, Exh. 2 (Plaintiff’s preprinted Charge of Discrimination form refers to

both the EEOC and the Arizona Attorney General’s Office Civil Rights Division)).

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on employees. Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (Title VII);

Walsh v. Nevada Dep’t. of Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2006) (Title

I of the ADA). Because individual defendants cannot be held personally liable under Title

VII and the ADA–the statutes pursuant to which Plaintiff brings this action–all claims against

Defendants Williams, Guzeman, Boynton and Boost in their individual capacities should be

dismissed.

2. Timeliness with regard to allegations of discrimination during

employment

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims arising from events allegedly occurring during

his employment should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust administrative

remedies under Title VII and the ADA.

A plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC as a prerequisite

to filing suit under Title VII and the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5; Santa Maria v. Pacific

Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. §12117(a) (ADA provision

incorporating the enforcement procedures set forth in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5)),

overruled on other grounds by Socop-Gonzales v. INS, 272 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).

Under Title VII and the ADA, an Arizona plaintiff must file the charge of discrimination

within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act(s). Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1176; Shiban

v. Intel Corp., 2002 WL 31371971, *2 n.2 (D.Ariz. Mar. 28, 2002) (in Arizona, which is a

“dual filing state[]...”, the time limit for filing a charge of discrimination is 300 days); see

also EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988).5

In the Ninth Circuit,

[t]he time period for filing a complaint of discrimination begins to run when

the facts that would support a charge of discrimination would have been

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Plaintiff is clear that his retaliation claims in Counts IV and V are brought pursuant

to Title VII and the ADA. (See Amended Complaint, p. 25 (Count IV: “This action is

brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990) (ADA).”); Id. at p. 28 (Count V: “This action is brought pursuant to Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) (ADA).”).

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apparent to a similarly situated person with a reasonably prudent regard for his

rights.

Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).

“[T]he question is when the operative decision was made, not when the decision is carried

out.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1059 (2002).

The record is clear that Plaintiff filed his EEOC Charge on August 19, 2010, nearly

three years after his employment with Securaplane ended on May 11, 2007. (Defendant’s

Motion, Exh. 2). To the extent that Plaintiff bases his Title VII and ADA claims in Counts

I and II and his retaliation6

 claims in Counts IV and V on acts occurring during his

employment with Securaplane in 2006 and 2007, Defendants are correct that such claims are

time-barred. Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that he was aware of the alleged

discriminatory conduct in 2006 and 2007. Yet, Plaintiff did not file his charge of

discrimination until 2010. 

Plaintiff’s “[f]ailure to file an EEOC charge within the prescribed 300-day period is

not a jurisdictional bar, but it is treated as a violation of a statute of limitations, complete with

whatever defenses are available to such a violation, such as equitable tolling and estoppel.”

Santa Maria, 202 F.3d. at 1176 (“this principle holds equally true for ADA suits...” and Title

VII suits). 

“Equitable estoppel focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in

preventing a plaintiff from filing suit, whereas equitable tolling focuses on the plaintiff’s

excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on lack of prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

A finding of equitable estoppel may be based on factors, including but not limited to: (1) the

plaintiff’s actual and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct or representations; (2)

evidence of improper purpose on the part of the defendant or of the defendant’s actual or

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constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct; and (3) the extent to which

the purposes of the limitations period have been satisfied. Id. (citing Naton v. Bank of Calif.,

649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1981)). Plaintiff has neither alleged nor argued that the doctrine

of equitable estoppel applies in his case.

The Court may apply the doctrine of equitable tolling 

if, despite all due diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information

bearing on the existence of his claim. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.

392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946). Unlike equitable estoppel,

equitable tolling does not depend on any wrongful conduct by the defendant

to prevent the plaintiff from suing. Instead it focuses on whether there was

excusable delay by the plaintiff. If a reasonable plaintiff would not have

known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then

equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit

until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.

Id. at 1178. See also Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

Plaintiff has neither alleged nor argued that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies in his

case. The record reflects that Plaintiff was well aware of his claims within the limitations

period. Moreover, even if Plaintiff were not aware of his claims within 300 days of the

alleged 2006 and 2007 events, his complaint filed in June 2009 in Arizona state court which

was removed to this Court and, thereafter remanded, reflects that Plaintiff was aware at that

time that Defendants’ alleged conduct implicated Title VII and the ADA. (See Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint (Doc. 1, Exh. 2, pp. 6, 11-12 filed in Leon v. Securaplane

Technologies Inc., et. al., CV 09-390-TUC-CKJ (JCG)). Yet, Plaintiff did not file a charge

with the EEOC until August 19, 2010. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. 

3. Claims of discrimination post-employment

Plaintiff’s employment with Securaplane ended on May 11, 2007. In his First

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies post-termination acts by Defendants that he claims

violates Title VII and the ADA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in 2010: he learned that

in 2009 Securaplane “instructed [employees] to fear for their lives and to report any sightings

of Plaintiff...” and that his image was posted “at the receptionist’s desk that portrayed

Plaintiff in a menacing and intimidating way” in a “‘Wanted’ or ‘Outlaw’ format....” (First

Amended Complaint, pp. 14-15); Defendants contracted with Oro Valley Police Department

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It is not clear why Aerotech Aviation, instead of Plaintiff, would have sent Plaintiff’s

resumes.

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“for security measures...to foot patrol Securaplane premises...for Plaintiff...and his son” (Id.

at pp. 17-18); and that he and his son were under surveillance (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that

on October 5, 2010, October 13, 2010, October 22, 2010, November 19, 2010, and December

1, 2010 Aerotech Aviation7

 sent his resume to Securaplane for various open job postings for

which he was qualified and he “was never called back or scheduled for a possible interview;

this shows continued discriminatory practice that is still being displayed.” (Id. at p. 16). 

Under Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision, it is an unlawful for an employer:

To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin....

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). Under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, it is unlawful “for an

employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment,...[or]

to discriminate against any individual,...because he has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter [i.e., Title VII], or because he has made a

charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation proceeding, or

hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a). The language of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision is narrower than the anti-retaliation provision and focuses on actions

that affect employment, alter the conditions of the workplace or affect the terms and

conditions of employment. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548

U.S. 53, 61-67 (2006). In contrast, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is much broader and

extends “beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.” Id.

at 67; see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000)(footnote

omitted) (“Among those employment decisions that can constitute an adverse employment

action are termination, dissemination of a negative employment reference, issuance of an

undeserved negative performance review and refusal to consider for promotion.”); O’Brien

v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1982) (permitting retaliation claim based on

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refusal to rehire and negative employment references after termination), overruled in part on

other grounds by Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Col, 810 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1987).

Like Title VII, the anti-discrimination provision of the ADA focuses on actions that

affect employment: 

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis

of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,

or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other

terms conditions and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. §12112(a). The ADA also prohibits discrimination “against any individual

because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or

because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. §12203.

The alleged posting of Plaintiff’s image, warnings about Plaintiff to other employees,

increased security at Securaplane with specific regard to Plaintiff and his son, and

surveillance of Plaintiff and his son, all which occurred after Plaintiff’s termination, in no

way affected Plaintiff’s employment, altered the conditions of his workplace, or affected the

terms and conditions of his employment. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the

anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII and the ADA.

Plaintiff also alleges post-employment retaliation under Title VII and the ADA. 

(First Amended Complaint, pp. 24-28). A liberal reading of Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint reflects that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him postemployment by the posting of his image at Securaplane, warnings about him to other

employees, increased security at Securaplane with specific regard to Plaintiff and his son, and

surveillance of Plaintiff and his son. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions were taken in

retaliation for his complaints regarding safety issues at Securaplane and his whistleblower

activities regarding same. However, “[t]he mere fact that an employee is participating in an

investigation or proceeding involving charges of some sort of discrimination...does not

automatically trigger the protection afforded by section 704(a) [i.e., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3]; the

underlying discrimination must be reasonably perceived as discrimination prohibited by Title

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Plaintiff alleges that Aerotech Aviation sent his resume to Securaplane. (First

Amended Complaint, p. 16).

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VII.” Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 42 U.S.C.

§12203 (ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual because such individual has opposed

any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or because such individual has participated

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the ADA). Here, Plaintiff

has not alleged that Defendants retaliated against him post-employment for protected conduct

under Title VII and/or the ADA. Nor can the matters about which Plaintiff complained

during his employment, which he alleges gave rise to the retaliatory acts, be construed as

protected activity under Title VII and the ADA. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

post-employment retaliation with regard to the posting of his image and security measures,

including warnings to employees, allegedly taken by Defendants with regard to Plaintiff and

his son.

With regard to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants discriminated against him and/or

retaliated against him in violation of Title VII and the ADA by not contacting him upon

receipt of his resume for job openings at Securaplane for which he was qualified in October,

November, and December 2010, Defendants point out that Plaintiff did not file an EEOC

charge of discrimination concerning such a claim. (Defendants’ Amended Reply, p.5). 

Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge makes no mention of his unsuccessful attempts to seek

employment with Securaplane after his termination. (See Defendants’ Motion, Exh. 2).

Additionally, the dates on which Plaintiff’s resume was sent to Securaplane8

 occurred after

Plaintiff filed his EEOC Charge in August 2010. 

The administrative exhaustion requirements set out in Title VII and the ADA apply

to claims of retaliation. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5; 42 U.S.C. 12117(a). Allegations of

discrimination not included in the plaintiff’s EEOC charge “may not be considered by a

federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained

in the EEOC charge.” Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d

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1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court’s

jurisdiction extends only to allegations that fall “within the scope of the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an ‘EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of

the charge of discrimination.’” Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Farmer Bros.

Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.

1990))(emphasis in original); see also Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569,

571 (9th Cir. 1971) (“judicial complaint...may encompass any discrimination like or

reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge, including new acts occurring

during the pendency of the charge before the EEOC.”). In determining whether a plaintiff

has exhausted allegations that he did not specify in his EEOC charge, the Court may consider

such factors as the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified

within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge, any locations at which

discrimination is alleged to have occurred, and the extent to which plaintiff's judicial claims

are consistent with the plaintiff's original theory of the case. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept.,

276 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and/or retaliation based on his 2010 attempts to

seek employment at Securaplane are factually distinct from the claims advanced in his EEOC

charge. Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge, in pertinent part, focused on Defendants’ alleged conduct

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s whistleblower activity regarding “defective equipment/parts....”

(Defendants’ Motion, Exh. 2). Plaintiff asserted that “ever since...” his whistleblower

activity he has 

been retaliated against. I was accused by Human Resources of having a profile

of a violent person that shoots people in shopping malls because of my

appearance. I was given bad references causing me not to obtain other

employment after my discharge in May 2007. Even to this day, the slander is

ongoing and they continue to defame my character among other employees

and co-workers, this has a poisoning effect on the small electronic community

for Tucson employment.

(Id.). The allegations in Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge are not like or reasonably related to the

instant allegation that Securaplane itself has refused to consider rehiring Plaintiff based on

discriminatory and/or retaliatory motives. 

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9

No possible reading of Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge would support the conclusion that

the allegations in the Charge are like or reasonably related to the allegation in the First

Amended Complaint that Securaplane refused to interview Plaintiff in 2010 in violation of

the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII or ADA. 

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Moreover, even if the EEOC Charge could remotely be read to encompass Plaintiff’s

recent retaliation claim,9

 Plaintiff never alleged in his EEOC Charge nor does he allege in

the First Amended Complaint that Defendants retaliated against him because he engaged in

protected activity under Title VII or the ADA. Plaintiff’s theory is that he was retaliated

against post-employment because he “filed a whistleblower complaint because I reported

defective equipment/parts....” (Id.; see also First Amended Complaint, pp. 24-28). Because

Plaintiff’s most recent allegation of retaliation in his First Amended Complaint is not based

upon his involvement in opposing discrimination prohibited by Title VII and/or the ADA,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under Title VII and/or the ADA. See Learned, 860

F.2d at 932 (Because the plaintiff never alleged that he opposed any discrimination based

upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, he could not reasonably have believed that

he was discriminated against in violation of Title VII, and because the plaintiff did not allege

discrimination prohibited by Title VII in underlying state agency investigation, he cannot

claim that he was retaliated against for opposing discrimination or participating in an

investigation or proceeding involving charges of Title VII discrimination). Thus, even if the

Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 2010 retaliation claim for refusal to interview him,

such claim is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See id.

4. Dismissal

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be dismissed

as time-barred with regard to claims arising up to and including his May 11, 2007

termination. Additionally, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be dismissed for

failure to state a claim with regard to Plaintiff’s allegations of post-employment retaliation

consisting of the posting of his image and security measures, including warnings to

employees, allegedly taken by Defendants concerning Plaintiff and his son. Further,

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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies with regard to Plaintiff’s post-employment claim of discrimination

and retaliation concerning allegations that Securaplane refused to contact him after receipt

of his resume for job openings in 2010. Alternatively, with regard to allegations that

Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by refusing to contact him after receipt of his resume

for job openings in 2010, the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to

state a claim. 

In the Ninth Circuit a plaintiff must be given leave to amend his complaint unless it

is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded in part by 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern Calif. Collection Serv.,

911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We have held that in dismissals for failure to state a

claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation

of other facts.”). 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint after receipt of Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. The record is clear that Plaintiff’s claims arising during his employment up to and

including his May 11, 2007 termination are time-barred and, thus, cannot be cured by further

amendment of the complaint. Additionally, amendment of the First Amended Complaint

could not cure Plaintiff’s claims of post-employment discrimination given that: (1) his claims

concerning the posting of his image at Securaplane and other security measures do not fall

within the purview of the anti-discrimination and/or anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII

and the ADA; and (2) he has not exhausted administrative remedies concerning his claim that

Securaplane’s failure to contact him upon receipt of his resume in 2010 was discriminatory

or retaliatory, thus rendering the Court without jurisdiction over such a claim. Alternatively,

even if the EEOC Charge somehow encompassed Plaintiff’s claim of post-employment

retaliation, further amendment of the complaint cannot cure the deficiencies regarding such

claim given Plaintiff’s contention that the alleged retaliation was based upon his involvement

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in whistleblower activity and complaints all regarding safety issues and not activity protected

under Title VII or the ADA. Under the instant circumstances, further amendment of

Plaintiff’s complaint would be futile. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448

(citing Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend.

Because dismissal of Plaintiff’s action without leave to amend is warranted for the

above-stated reasons, the Court need not address Defendants’ other arguments in support of

dismissal.

5. Sanctions

In their Amended Reply, Defendants request that the Court impose sanctions pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1927 and the Court’s inherent authority. Defendants contend that the instant

lawsuit is frivolous and that the instant action and Plaintiff’s state court actions “are intended

solely for the purpose of harassment....” (Defendants’ Amended Reply, p.8).

Under 28 U.S.C. §1927, the Court may require an attorney or pro se plaintiff “who

so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously....to satisfy

personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such

conduct.” 28 U.S.C. §1927; see also Wages v. Internal Revenue Serv., 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-

36 (9th Cir. 1990) (section 1927 sanctions may be imposed against a pro se plaintiff). A

vexatious multiplication of the proceedings occurs when the party acts recklessly or with bad

faith. B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1107. Before a court imposes sanctions under section 1927, the

offending party must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc.

v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 638 (9th Cir.1987). 

Additionally, the Court may impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent powers. See

Primus Automotive Financial Services Inc., v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, (9th Cir. 1997). “‘[F]or

purposes of imposing sanctions under the inherent power of the court, a finding of bad faith

does not require that the legal and factual basis for the action prove totally frivolous; where

a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides, the assertion

of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of attorney's fees.’” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1091

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10The parties’ briefs indicate that the other two actions are presently pending in state

court. (See Defendants’ Amended Reply, p. 3 n.2 (one action has been pending since March

2009, and the other was filed in October 2010); Plaintiff’s Supplemental Response, p. 4

(same)).

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(quoting Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). While it is true that this is the third lawsuit initiated by Plaintiff with regard to his

employment at Securaplane, it appears that this is the first instance in which Plaintiff has

tested his theory regarding alleged EEOC and ADA violations.10 That Plaintiff chose not to

advance such claims in his earlier lawsuit does not, alone, render him subject to sanctions in

the instant action under either section 1927 or the Court’s inherent powers. Defendants

contend that Plaintiff’s submission of his First Amended Complaint after the filing of their

Motion to Dismiss constitutes ongoing harassment. (See Defendants’ Amended Reply, p.3).

Although submission of the First Amended Complaint did not cure the deficiencies pointed

out in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff was entitled to file an Amended Complaint

as of right pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B). This is not a case wherein Plaintiff has

multiplied the proceeding by repeatedly filing papers that did not materially differ from

papers which the court had already concluded were insufficient. See Wages, 915 F.2d at

1235-36. Further, although it is clear that Plaintiff believes he has been wronged by

Defendants relating to his former employment, at this juncture in the instant proceeding, the

record does not support the conclusion that Plaintiff’s actions are substantially motivated by

vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides. Accordingly, sanctions are not warranted at this

time.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

Because the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint cannot be cured by further

amendment, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be dismissed without leave to

amend. Additionally, Defendants’ request for sanctions should be denied as unsupported

by the instant record at this time.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) and dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint without leave to amend.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case

number: CV 10-587-TUC-DCB.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 29th day of June, 2011.

 

 

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