Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00168/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

SADAKA DAVIS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2:15cv168-WKW-WC 

 ) 

JAMES TALLEY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is Sadaka Davis’s Complaint (Doc. 1). On March 24, 2015, the 

District Judge entered an Order referring this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

“for further proceedings and determination or recommendation as may be appropriate.” 

Order (Doc. 5). 

Davis requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Mot. (Doc. 2), which 

obligates the court to undertake review of Davis’s Complaint pursuant to the provisions 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(applying § 1915(e) in non-prisoner action). That statute instructs the court to dismiss 

any action wherein it is determined that an in forma pauperis applicant’s suit is “frivolous 

or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary 

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

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Upon review of the Complaint, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that this 

case is due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) because it is 

frivolous and fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On March 16, 2015, Davis filed a Complaint that alleges, in its totality, as follows: 

I gave the Defendant a Security Deposit of $1,250.50 and 1st and last month 

rent up front $1350.50 in cash 10/3/13. James Talley made promises on 

repairs that he didn’t honour after the signed deal (contract). After an 

incident from kitchen fire, Talley promised to restore kitchen along the 

previous repairs that was promised upfront. The kitchen was not put back 

properly. A.C. unit failed and was not repaired, busted pipes, crack 

windows, pest problems, along with others wasn’t repaired during the 

contract, no license to do business or insurance (Bonds). Defendant 

violated U.S. Constitutional Rights doing bussiness unlawfully in the State 

of Alabama. 

Compl. (Doc. 1) at 1. Additionally, Davis seeks the following relief: 

Defendant release security deposit $1350.50 demand by state and federal 

laws. Ownership of the residence of 103 Martin Luther King St. Clanton, 

AL 35045. 

Compensatory damages, mental, pain, and suffering from total loss of 

investment with unlawfully real estate company (firm) 

Security Deposit 1350.50 and ownership of residence in this case (Total 

Damages) pain & suffering 

Id. at 2. On April 27, 2015, the court entered an Order (Doc. 6) granting Davis leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis and staying service of process pending review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e). 

In a separate action filed by Davis simultaneous to this action, Davis sued Judge 

Ben A. Fuller of the Circuit Court of Chilton County, Alabama. See Compl. (Doc. 1), 

Davis v. Fuller, Civ. Case No. 2:15-cv-169-MHT-SRW (filed March 16, 2015). Judge 

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Fuller was the presiding judge in a state court eviction action between Davis and the 

defendant, James Talley. Rec. (Doc. 10) at 1-2, Davis v. Fuller, Civ. Case No. 2:15-cv169-MHT-SRW (filed March 20, 2015). Talley sought to have Davis evicted from the 

property that is the subject of this action. Id. The court obtained a copy of the judgment 

issued in the state eviction action which reflects that, after receiving evidence and 

testimony, Judge Fuller entered judgment against Davis and in favor of Talley on 

February 19, 2014, finding (1) that Talley was “entitled to be restored to peaceful 

possession of his property located at, to wit; 103 Martin Luther King Street, Clanton, 

Alabama,” and (2) that Davis must pay Talley “$6,750.00 for past due and unpaid rent on 

the subject property and $742.63 for unpaid utility bills.” Evidentiary Submission (Doc. 

7), Davis v. Fuller, Civ. Case No. 2:15-cv-169-MHT-SRW (filed March 20, 2015). The 

state court case action summary reveals that Davis did not appeal the judgment. 

Evidentiary Submission (Doc. 8), Davis v. Fuller, Civ. Case No. 2:15-cv-169-MHT-SRW 

(filed March 20, 2015). The time for filing an appeal from the Circuit Court’s final 

judgment expired six weeks after Judge Fuller entered judgment. Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). 

Since no such appeal was filed, the state court judgment became final nearly a year 

before Davis commenced the present action. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Davis’s claims are due to be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. The court first notes that Davis has failed to establish a 

jurisdictional basis for his claims and it appears that the court lacks such jurisdiction. 

 “[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject 

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matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case.” 

Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, a federal court “should 

inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the 

proceedings” and, “once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter 

jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 

F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Davis has not established jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions 

between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Davis did not plead the citizenship of himself or Talley, and Davis 

did not plead an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 

Additionally, to the extent Davis seeks to establish federal question jurisdiction by 

asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of rights guaranteed by the 

Constitution of the United States of America, Davis still fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. 

To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, 

respondents must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation 

was committed under color of state law. Like the state-action requirement 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of § 

1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how 

discriminatory or wrongful,’” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S. 

Ct. 2777, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 

13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948)). 

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Here, Davis named only 

a private, non-state actor as a defendant and did not allege that Talley was acting under 

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color of state law. Thus, even if Davis was attempting to bring this action under § 1983, 

he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 Moreover, the court lacks jurisdiction over this matter based on the RookerFeldman doctrine. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents . . . lower federal courts from 

exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 

546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 

U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Although “Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine,” it remains 

applicable to bar Plaintiff from proceeding before this court, as this case is “‘brought by 

[a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 

rejection of those judgments.’” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. 

at 284); see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (federal 

district courts “do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in 

particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the 

state court’s action was unconstitutional.”). 

Davis and Talley were parties to a state court eviction action in which the state 

court issued a judgment in Talley’s favor. Davis’s argument is not that he did not have 

the opportunity to challenge the eviction brought against him by Talley; rather, Davis 

disagrees with Judge Fuller’s determination that Talley was entitled to possession of the 

property in question as well as the unpaid rent and utilities. With this argument, Davis is 

“[a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

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before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 

rejection of those judgments.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464. This is precisely the situation 

Rooker-Feldman bars. 

Lastly, the court notes that, while a reviewing court is required to consider pro se

complaints more liberally than those prepared by an attorney, pro se plaintiffs are 

required to follow the same procedural and pleading rules as other litigants. See Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Given Davis’s inability to establish a jurisdictional basis or state any viable claim for 

relief, the court finds that allowing Davis to amend the complaint would be futile and, 

thus, is not warranted in this instance. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is 

the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s case be 

DISMISSED prior to service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) 

because the Complaint is frivolous on its face and fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted. 

 It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before August 17, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

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District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 3rd day of August, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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