Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00822/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00822-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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07cv0822

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABNER HAYNES LISTER,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES TILTON, Secretary, 

et al.,

Respondents. 

 

 

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Case No. 07-CV-0822-BEN (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

Abner Haynes Lister (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the

“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San

Diego Superior Court conviction in case number SCD 189393. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”), at 195-196.) Petitioner contends that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that his federal constitutional right to an impartial

jury was violated. (See Petition, Grounds One and Two.)

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The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the supporting documents submitted

by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented

in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

[¶] On March 1, 2005, at about 4:00 p.m., San Diego

police officers conducted a “buy-bust” operation on C

Street in downtown San Diego. Detective Philip

Schneider, while wearing a wire and being watched by

another officer, made eye contact with Lister from

across the intersection of C Street and Fourth Avenue.

Hand signals were exchanged indicating Lister could

furnish cocaine base to Schneider. Lister motioned for

the officer to cross the street. The officer met with

Lister, who spoke first, asking, “What do you need?”

that is, what quantity of cocaine base Schneider

wanted. Schneider told him he wanted $20 worth. Lister

asked if Schneider had the money with him. Schneider

said he did and asked if Lister had the drugs on him.

Lister said no, that they would have to go down the

block to a “sister girl.” Lister then asked if Schneider also wanted some marijuana. Schneider indicated he

was interested. Lister took out a small baggie of

marijuana and tucked it into the officer's shirt

pocket, telling Schneider he could hold onto it and

after they got the “20 piece,” they “could primo it

up.” Sometimes marijuana is smoked together with cocaine base, which is referred to as a “primo.” Schneider thought Lister was selling him the marijuana and

asked the price, but Lister just told him to hold it

until after they got the cocaine base.

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[¶] Lister asked for money for the cocaine base,

telling Schneider that he could stay close to him, but

should not look like he was with Lister. Schneider

handed Lister a twenty dollar bill that had been previously photocopied. Lister first unsuccessfully tried to

get cocaine base from some people inside a restaurant.

He then approached a woman at a nearby bus stop. He

handed the woman some money and she handed him a small

object. When the police later arrested her, the photocopied twenty dollar bill Schneider had given to Lister

was found in her possession.

[¶] Lister told Schneider he had the rock cocaine.

Schneider several times asked Lister for it, but Lister

refused to give it to him. As they were walking, Lister

asked Schneider if he had a pipe for smoking the cocaine. Schneider said he did. They walked to a parking

lot, which was a common area for people to use drugs

because it is largely hidden from the street, and they

sat down on the small concrete barriers used to delineate the front edge of the parking spaces. Lister asked

for the pipe, which Schneider handed to him. Lister

then opened his hand, revealing a rock of cocaine base.

Lister chipped small pieces off the rock and put the

pieces in the pipe. At Lister's request, Schneider gave

him the marijuana. As Lister proceeded to heat the

small pieces of cocaine in the pipe with a lighter,

Schneider gave the arrest signal.

[¶] When Lister was arrested, he told the police that

his name was Calvin Smith.

[¶] On cross-examination, Detective Schneider testified this buy-bust operation was a little different

from the routine situation because no one had ever

given him marijuana before to act as collateral after

he had handed over his money.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 2-3.)

III. Procedural Background

The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an

Information charging Abner Haynes Lister with selling and furnishing a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine base, in violation of California Health and Safety Code (“Health and Safety

Code”) section 11352(a); possession of a controlled substance, to

wit: cocaine base, in violation of Health and Safety Code section

11350(a); and giving false information to a peace officer, in

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violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) section 148.9. 

(CT at 1-3.) The Information further alleged that Petitioner had

suffered numerous probation denial priors (Penal Code §

1203(e)(4)) and two prison priors (Penal Code §§ 667.5(b) & 668). 

(CT at 3-4.) A jury found Petitioner guilty of selling or

furnishing a controlled narcotic substance and giving false

information to a peace officer. (CT at 195-196.) The court

dismissed the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance. (CT at 146.) Petitioner subsequently admitted the alleged priors and was sentenced to a six (6) year term. 

(CT at 194, 201.) 

On June 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging his conviction and sentence in the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos.

3-4.) In an unpublished opinion dated December 29, 2006, the

California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence. (Lodgment No. 5.) On February 7, 2007, Petitioner

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 6.) That court denied the Petition for Review

without comment. (Lodgment No. 7.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on May 7, 2007. [Doc. No.

1.] The original Petition raised four grounds for relief, but

the petition form indicated that Petitioner had failed to exhaust

his state court remedies as to Grounds Three and Four of the

Petition. (Petition at 13-14.) This Court issued a Notice

Regarding Possible Dismissal of Petition for Failure to Exhaust

State Court Remedies, informing Petitioner that he had filed a

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petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims and

setting forth his options. [Doc. No. 3.] After determining that

Petitioner had formally abandoned the unexhausted claims raised

in the original Petition, this Court issued an Order confirming

Petitioner’s abandonment of Grounds Three and Four and finding

that “the Petition consists ONLY of Grounds One and Two.” [Doc.

Nos. 8 and 9.] Respondent filed an Answer on September 27, 2007,

and Petitioner filed a Traverse on October 22, 2007. [Doc. Nos.

12 and 13.]

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus

on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

& (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis

for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by

Lockyer v. Andrade, supra, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving claims

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1

The Court will conduct an independent review of the record on

this issue because Petitioner has presented his claim in his federal

Petition differently than in his direct appeal in state court. In

state court, Petitioner claimed on appeal that the trial court erred

in denying his motions to substitute counsel. (Lodgment Nos. 3 and

6.) In this Court, Petitioner directly asserts a violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. (Petition

at 7.) Because the state court did not analyze Petitioner’s claim on

appeal using law pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, the state court of appeal’s opinion does not furnish a basis

for disposition of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim as presented in this Court, and this Court must therefore

conduct an independent review of the record.

7 07cv0822

presented on direct or collateral review. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel was violated when the state court

denied his motions to appoint new counsel. (Petition, Ground

One.) Petitioner contends that his trial counsel, John R.

Fielding, was constitutionally ineffective because there was a

“total breakdown in communication” and Mr. Fielding “acted as an

advocate against” Petitioner. (Petition at 8-10.) Petitioner

raised these claims in a Petition for Review in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6 at 9-14.) That court denied the

petition without comment. (Lodgment No. 7.) Because the California Supreme Court did not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,”

this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

law.1

 See Delgado v. Lewis, supra, 223 F.3d at 982; accord Himes

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v. Thompson, supra, 336 F.3d at 853.

Under clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show: (1)

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness” and (2) there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688,

690, 692, 694 (1984). The Court must review counsel’s performance deferentially. Additionally, a wide measure of deference

must be given to counsel’s tactical decisions. Indeed, Strickland notes that “counsel’s tactical decisions are virtually

unchallengeable.” Strickland at 690; see also, Furman v. Wood,

190 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner “must overcome

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland

at 689 (citations omitted).

Petitioner claims that Mr. Fielding’s representation could

not have been “effective” because he refused to speak with

Petitioner, resulting in a total breakdown in communication. 

(Petition at 8-10.) Petitioner contends that Mr. Fielding ceased

to function as an advocate on his behalf, and the state court

should have appointed substitute counsel. (Id.) Petitioner

argues that the conflict between him and Mr. Fielding had escalated to the point that, by failing to appoint substitute counsel, the court constructively denied him the effective assistance

of counsel in violation of his federal constitutional rights. 

(Petition, Ground One.)

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The Ninth Circuit has stated that “to compel [an accused] to

go to trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has

become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of

the effective assistance of counsel.” Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d

1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970). This does not mean that a court is

required to provide an indigent defendant with the attorney of

his choice. Id. Rather, a court presented with a motion to

substitute counsel is required to make an appropriate inquiry

into the grounds for the motion to determine whether the alleged

conflict prevented effective assistance of counsel. Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, Petitioner made two separate motions in which he

requested that the trial court appoint new counsel. (Lodgment

No. 5 at 4-5.) Under California law, these are referred to as

“Marsden motions.” See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970). 

Following each motion made by Petitioner, the trial court held a

hearing in which it inquired into Petitioner’s grounds for

requesting substitute counsel, in order to determine whether

Petitioner was receiving ineffective assistance in violation of

his Sixth Amendment rights. (See Lodgment No. 2 (“RT”), Vols. 1

and 2.) Each hearing was confidential, with only Petitioner, Mr.

Fielding and the court present. (1 RT at 1 and 2 RT at 101.) 

During these hearings, Petitioner listed his reasons for

requesting new counsel, which were summarized by the California

Court of Appeal as follows:

[¶] In April, 2005, about two weeks after the

preliminary hearing, Lister made a Marsden motion. He

complained his attorney had a hearing problem and did

not hear his request for a continuance; failed to visit

him before the preliminary hearing; failed to discuss

weaknesses in the evidence or Lister's strategy; failed

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2

The California Court of Appeal recited these facts in analyzing

Petitioner’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to

appoint new counsel to represent him after there had been a total

breakdown in communication with Mr. Fielding. (Lodgment No. 5 at 4-8.) 

Petitioner’s claim of trial error, although distinct from the Sixth

Amendment violation Petitioner asserts in his federal Petition,

necessarily requires similar discussion and analysis. Thus, the

language and reasoning of the relevant portion of the Court of

Appeal’s unpublished opinion is referenced herein. 

10 07cv0822

to ask more questions at the preliminary hearing; and

failed to obtain a good plea bargain. Lister admitted

his counsel had told him about a plea offer from the

district attorney, which required a prison term. Lister's counsel explained he received almost daily calls

from Lister before the preliminary hearing and spoke

with him “numerous times on the phone.” He stated

Lister had presented him with a list of questions for

the preliminary hearing and he had asked all the questions that were appropriate. He had discussed a plea

bargain with the prosecutor but they were insisting on

a prison term, which Lister did not want. The court

denied the motion.

[¶] On June 30, 2005, Lister made another Marsden

motion. Lister stated that he and his attorney “disagree upon a lot of things” and had “been arguing from

day one.” He complained he wanted a motion to sever his

case from his codefendant (the woman who sold him the

cocaine base); his attorney had “never really discussed” with him what had happened but only knew what

was in the police report; his attorney misinformed him

about being on probation and parole at the same time;

and his attorney had not obtained a plea bargain or an

alternative of entering a rehabilitation program.

Lister also complained he had not been given copies of

all the transcripts. Lister told the court, “I really

don't have anything bad to say about [Mr. Fielding].

It's just we disagree upon a lot of things, the way I

want it done. You know, I know he's a professional but,

you know, I'd rather be for sure than to take a risk.”

(Lodgment No. 5 at 4-5.)2

As noted above, Petitioner’s complaints in the first Marsden

hearing centered on his dissatisfaction with the amount of

discussion he had with Mr. Fielding about the case and his

perception that Mr. Fielding did not ask the right questions at

the preliminary hearing. (1 RT at 3-4.) In finding that the

trial court appropriately denied Petitioner’s request for new

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counsel, the California Court of Appeal noted that a defendant

does not have a “right to have an appointed counsel pursue a

particular trial strategy.” (Lodgment No. 5 at 7.) This interpretation is consistent with Strickland, which recognizes that

there is a strong presumption that counsel’s tactical decisions

and strategic choices fall within the range of reasonably effective assistance. Strickland at 690-91. 

Petitioner’s second Marsden hearing included complaints

against Mr. Fielding for failure to obtain a plea bargain and,

generally, that Petitioner “disagree[d] with counsel on a lot of

things.” (2 RT at 101.) After hearing Petitioner’s grievances

against Mr. Fielding, the trial court heard from counsel, who

explained that he had attempted to work out a plea bargain, but

that the District Attorney’s Office would not offer a deal that

Petitioner was willing to accept. (2 RT at 108-109.) Counsel

further stated that, although he believed the case was defensible, he agreed with Petitioner that the communication between

them had broken down to the point that counsel was limiting the

number of calls that he would accept from Petitioner because

Petitioner regularly harassed and abused counsel by screaming and

yelling at him and his staff. (2 RT at 109-110.) The court

subsequently denied the motion, noting that although there

appeared to be abusive behavior coming from Petitioner directed

at Mr. Fielding and his staff, there was no indication that Mr.

Fielding was unwilling to present Petitioner’s case or that

counsel had committed any misconduct. (2 RT at 109-110.) The

court further stated that, if the court were to grant the motion,

it would essentially “give all defendants the complete freedom to

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fire an attorney by choosing to be abusive with them,” and the

law does not sanction that result. (2 RT at 110-111.) 

The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

does not guarantee a “meaningful relationship between an accused

and his counsel.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). In

this regard, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[a] defendant’s

refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel is no basis for a

claim of inadequate representation.” Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d

1204, 1207 (2008). Accordingly, not every conflict or disagreement between an accused and his counsel implicates Sixth Amendment rights. Schell v. Witek, supra, 218 F.3d at 1027. The

critical issue is whether the alleged conflict “prevented effective assistance of counsel” or resulted in “an attorney-client

relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth

Amendment.” Id. at 1026. Applying the test laid out in

Strickland, Petitioner must show that the conflict was so substantial that defense counsel’s representation “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland at 688. 

In denying Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred by

denying his Marsden motions, the California Court of Appeal noted

that “a defendant is not entitled to newly appointed counsel on

the basis he does not like his counsel and does not think highly

of his counsel.” (Lodgment No. 5 at 6-7.) The Court of Appeal

correctly stated that a defendant is required to make a substantial showing that “such an irreconcilable conflict has developed

between himself and the attorney that ineffective representation

is likely to result.” (Id. at 6.) Although the trial court

found that there was some evidence of a communication breakdown,

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much of the problem appeared to be the result of Petitioner’s

abusive conduct towards Mr. Fielding. (2 RT at 110.) Moreover,

despite the apparent conflict, the trial court found that Mr.

Fielding was able to develop a reasonable trial strategy. 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 7.) The trial court even noted that Petitioner’s attorney was one of the best criminal defense attorneys

in San Diego. (2 RT at 111.) 

After an independent review of the record, it is clear that

the trial court held the appropriate hearings to inquire into the

grounds for Petitioner’s requests for new counsel and appropriately determined that Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with his

attorney did not impair Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner has failed to show that any

conflict between Petitioner and defense counsel resulted in

representation that was objectively unreasonable. Thus, the

California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, and the claim

should be denied.

C. Right to Trial by Impartial Jury

Petitioner contends that his federal constitutional right to

a trial by impartial jury was violated when the trial court

refused to grant him a new trial after one of the jurors engaged

in misconduct. (Petition, Ground Two.) Petitioner contends that

because one juror conducted Internet research regarding possible

penalties and discussed his findings with the other jurors during

deliberations, Petitioner was denied the right to a fair trial

before an impartial jury. (Petition at 11.) On this issue, the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review

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without comment. (Lodgment No. 7.) Thus, this Court must “look

through” to the California Court of Appeal’s decision underlying

that denial as the basis for its analysis. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, supra, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

The alleged misconduct in this case occurred during jury

deliberations and after the court had properly instructed the

jury regarding its duties and obligations. (5 RT at 356-373.) 

The jurors were told that they “must decide all questions of fact

in this case from the evidence received in this trial and not

from any other source.” (CT at 100, 5 RT at 358.) The jury was

further instructed not to “discuss or consider the subject of

penalty or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect

your verdict.” (CT at 135, 5 RT at 372.)

Shortly after beginning deliberations, the trial court

received a note from the jury that one of the jurors had conducted online research regarding possible penalties for the

charges involved in the case. (CT at 192, 5 RT at 408.) The

court decided that the best way to handle this was to interview

each of the jurors individually, beginning with the foreperson,

to determine the circumstances leading to the jury’s note and to

determine if each juror could be fair and impartial. (5 RT at

408.) Finding that Juror No. 2 did in fact research penalties

online, the trial court excused him and replaced him with an

alternate. (5 RT at 416.) As to the remaining eleven jurors,

the court individually questioned each one as to whether he or

she could disregard the outside information revealed by Juror No.

2 and decide the case based only on the evidence presented at

trial. (Lodgment No. 5 at 9.) Each of the remaining eleven

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jurors stated that he or she would be able to disregard the

information and deliberate fairly and impartially. (5 RT at

432.) 

Mr. Fielding subsequently moved for a mistrial, arguing that

the extrinsic information was presumptively prejudicial and could

not be disregarded by the remaining jurors. (6 RT at 434.) The

court denied the motion, stating that it was “reassured by the

emphatic nature of each and every response that they could start

all over . . . and absolutely disregard the information from the

one juror.” (6 RT at 439-440.) The court did, however, reinstruct the jury about the importance of not considering penalty

and punishment and confirmed with the jurors that they would be

able to disregard any extraneous information and decide the case

fairly and impartially. (6 RT 442-443.)

Petitioner contends that not all of the jurors could be

impartial after hearing information about the penalties he might

be facing if convicted. (Petition at 11-12.) Petitioner further

argues that the receipt of extrinsic information regarding

possible penalties was inherently prejudicial and that, as a

result, he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by

a panel of impartial jurors. (Petition at 11-12.) 

A criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial by a panel of

impartial jurors is one of the most priceless safeguards of

individual liberty and is a basic requirement of due process. 

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961). Although the right

to an impartial jury is explicitly guaranteed to the criminally

accused under the Sixth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has

noted that “[i]mpartiality is not a technical conception. It is

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a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude

of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no

particular tests . . . .” U.S. v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46

(1936). For this reason, trial courts are given significant

discretion in determining whether a jury can be impartial, and

such findings of impartiality will be overturned only when

prejudice is “manifest.” Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 723

(citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878)). 

Under clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law, the right

to a trial by impartial jury “means a jury capable and willing to

decide the case solely on the evidence before it.” Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). However, because it is

virtually impossible to shield jurors from every influence that

may affect their vote, due process does not require a new trial

every time a juror has been potentially influenced or compromised. Id. Rather, determinations regarding a juror’s ability

to fairly and impartially deliberate may properly be made at a

hearing in which the trial court assesses the impact of the

information received and whether it was prejudicial. Remmer v.

United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954); Smith v. Phillips,

supra, 455 U.S. at 217.

At Petitioner’s trial, the court applied the standard for

impartiality required under Smith by individually questioning

each juror about the information received and confirming that all

of the jurors could deliberate “only on the evidence” presented

at trial. (5 RT at 408-432.) See Smith, supra 455 U.S. at 217. 

By speaking with the jurors individually, the trial court had the

opportunity to adequately assess the impact of the information

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and determined that the jury could decide the case fairly and

impartially. (5 RT at 432.) The jurors were also given the

weekend to contemplate their responses and, when asked again,

none of the jurors indicated that they would be anything less

than impartial. (5 RT at 432, 6 RT at 442.) Petitioner contends

that the trial court should not have based its determination that

the jurors could be impartial on the jurors’ own statements and

reassurances. (Petition at 12.) However, in hearings regarding

juror impartiality, juror testimony should not be viewed as

inherently suspect because “one who is trying as an honest man to

live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say

whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.” Smith,

supra, 455 U.S. at 217, n.7, quoting Dennis v. United States, 339

U.S. 162 (1950). The record indicates that the trial court’s

determination of impartiality was entirely consistent with the

due process requirements set forth in Smith. 

The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim

that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial based

on the presumptively prejudicial effect of the jury’s exposure to

the extrinsic information. (Lodgment No. 3 at 13-16.) In

denying this claim, the Court of Appeal employed a strikingly

similar rationale to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court in

setting forth the principles for determining juror impartiality. 

Most notably, the Court of Appeal borrowed language from the U.S.

Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith when it defined an impartial

jury as “one in which no member has been improperly influenced

and every member is ‘capable and willing to decide the case

solely on the evidence before it.’” (See Lodgment No. 5 at 10;

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Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at 217.) The Court of Appeal also stated

its rationale in substantially similar language to the Smith

Court, noting that “it is impossible to shield jurors from every

contact that may influence their vote.” (See Lodgment No. 5 at

11; Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at 217.) The Court of Appeal went on

to state that the trial court is “vested with considerable

discretion” in determining juror impartiality. (Lodgment No. 5

at 11.) Indeed, trial courts are given significant discretion in

determining whether a jury can be impartial, and a state court’s

findings regarding juror impartiality are presumptively correct. 

Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at 218.

This Court finds that the California Supreme Court reasonably applied the Smith standard in denying Petitioner’s claim

that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial by an impartial

jury. Thus, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court Law. Therefore, the claim should be

denied. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner could successfully prove that 

the state court’s finding of jury impartiality amounted to a

constitutional error, Petitioner’s claim would nonetheless fail

because, in any event, the state court’s determination meets the

harmless error standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Under Brecht, “the

standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted is

whether the . . . error had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 623. 

Applying the Brecht harmless error analysis to Petitioner’s

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case requires an assessment of whether the extrinsic information

regarding penalty had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. The Ninth

Circuit, applying the “substantial and injurious” standard to a

case involving jury receipt of improper extrinsic material, has

noted that “jury exposure to facts not in evidence deprives a

defendant of the rights . . . embodied in the Sixth Amendment.” 

Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1995). The court

recognized several relevant factors in determining whether a

jury’s exposure to extrinsic information “substantially and

injuriously” affected the verdict. These factors include:

[¶] (1) whether the extrinsic material was actually received, and if so, how; (2) the length of time

it was available to the jury; (3) the extent to which

the jury discussed and considered it; (4) whether the

material was introduced before a verdict was reached,

and if so, at what point in the deliberations it was

introduced; and (5) any other matters which may bear on

the issue ... .

Lawson, 60 F.3d at 612.

Applying the first Lawson factor to Petitioner’s case, Juror

No. 2's receipt of the information via the Internet was contrary

to the trial court’s instruction, and he was accordingly excused

for this misconduct. (5 RT at 416.) It is apparent from the

record that the rest of the jury, having heard the results of

Juror No. 2's research, immediately recognized that the extrinsic

information should not be considered and notified the trial judge

of Juror No. 2's conduct in violation of her instruction. (6 RT

at 439.)

Applying the second factor, the record indicates that the

length of time the information was available to the jury was

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extremely short, as the jurors notified the court within five

minutes of Juror No. 2's announcement of his Internet findings. 

(5 RT at 412.) Applying the third Lawson factor, the extent to

which the jury discussed the information before notifying the

court was minimal, as they were all aware that discussion of such

information was contrary to the trial judge’s instruction. Some

of the jurors, in fact, did not even hear the substance of Juror

No. 2's “findings.” (5 RT at 410-412.)

Applying the fourth Lawson factor, Juror No. 2's announcement of his findings was made ten to fifteen minutes into the

deliberations, well before a verdict was reached. (5 RT at 411.) 

The trial judge was able to take reasonable steps to ensure that

the information received did not substantially or injuriously

affect the jury’s deliberations or its verdict. After replacing

Juror No. 2 with an alternate, the trial court gave the jury the

weekend before returning to start deliberations anew. (5 RT at

433.) The trial court interviewed each of the remaining jurors

and confirmed that they could be impartial and that each of them

was willing and able to disregard the extrinsic information

regarding penalty or punishment. (5 RT at 432.) The court then

reinstructed the jurors about the importance of not considering

penalty and punishment. (6 RT at 442.) After commencing deliberations, the jury reached a verdict in just over one hour. (CT at

193.)

It is important to note that Ninth Circuit law places great

weight on the nature of the information received in assessing

prejudice claims in juror misconduct cases. Lawson, supra, 60

F.3d at 612. Specifically, the question is whether “the extrinCase 3:07-cv-00822-BEN-JMA Document 14 Filed 04/09/08 Page 20 of 22
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sic information directly related to a material issue in the

case,” and whether there is a “direct and rational connection

between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion.” Id. Consequently, in finding that the trial court

correctly denied a mistrial, the California Court of Appeal

properly based its decision partly on the fact that the information received was not inherently prejudicial to Petitioner. 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 12.) Information about penalty or punishment

does not relate to a material issue in the jury’s determination

of Petitioner’s guilt or innocence, and has no rational connection to the allegation of a prejudicial jury conclusion. See

Lawson, supra, 60 F.3d at 612-13; accord, U.S. v. Bagnariol, 665

F.2d 877, 884-87 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, the dismissal of the

juror who conducted the independent research and the trial

court’s thorough investigation of the incident further support

the state court’s finding that the extrinsic information did not

substantially or injuriously affect the jury’s verdict. (5 RT at

409-432.) See Brecht, supra, 507 U.S. at 623.

This Court finds that the trial court properly addressed

each of the factors set out by the Ninth Circuit in Lawson and

that the record supports the finding that the information received by the jury did not have a substantial and injurious

effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Id. Thus, the state

court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Brecht. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

claim should be denied.

///

///

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V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and

that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that not later than May 9, 2008, any party may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report

and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed not later than May 23, 2008. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 9, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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