Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02854/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02854-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAXINE SHERARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER NICOLE CAMPBELL, as an

individual and in her official capacity,

OFFICER EDWARD KETCHAM, as an

individual and in his official capacity, and

DOES 1-50 inclusive,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 11-cv-2854-L(MDD)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [doc. # 21]

Maxine Sherard brought this action in the Superior Court of California on October 4,

2011. She asserted the following five causes of action: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through

false arrest and false imprisonment; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through excessive force;

(3) battery by a police officer; (4) false arrest and false imprisonment; and (5) violation of

California Civil Code §52.1 (“Bane Act”) through false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive

force, and battery.

Defendants removed this action to United States District Court for the Southern District

of California on December 7, 2011, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)-(c),

11cv2854

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and now move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. #21.)

The motion has been fully briefed and is considered without oral argument.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sherard was a 70-year-old former college professor at the time of the incident at

issue. (Sherard Decl., ¶2) She alleges that she allowed Martine Martin, a homeless woman, to

stay for one night in a shed in plaintiff’s backyard but then Martin refused to leave Sherard’s

property despite repeated requests. (Id., ¶4.) After Martin had been repeatedly asked to leave the

property permanently, plaintiff left Martin a note nailed to the shed door saying she could not

return unless she had Sherard’s permission. (Id., ¶5) When this too failed, plaintiff removed a

non-working lock on the shed. But Martin returned again, without Sherard’s permission, and

Martin placed her own lock on the shed. (Id.)

Eventually, on October 5, 2010, Sherard moved some of Martin’s belonging to the edge

of Sherard’s property. (Id.) During this time and unbeknownst to plaintiff, police officers,

Campbell and Ketcham, arrived at Sherard’s property while she was in the shed holding a wicker

basket. (Id., ¶8.) Sherard states in her declaration that when she heard one of the police officers

stay “put it down,” she “felt a hard, quick, forceful punch in the upper chest area of my body

which knocked me to the floor.” (Id.) The officers put Sherard’s arms behind her and placed 

handcuffs on her wrists. (Id.) Two additional officers arrived at the scene. A call was placed to

the officers’ supervisor, an African-American Sergeant, who was unable to assist in the

resolution of the incident. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that she was dragged to her front yard and transferred from one squad car

to another, while handcuffed. (Id., ¶9.) During this time, Sherard’s eye glass were knocked off.

(Id.) Sherard was taken to the Southeast substantion and later transferred to Las Colinas

Detention Center. (Id., ¶11.) For nearly five hours, plaintiff was kept in handcuffs. (Id.) Plaintiff

was kept in custody from approximately 3:00 p.m. until 4:00 a.m. the next day when she was

released. (Id.)

The police Incident Report stated that Sherard threw the wicker basket at the police

officers. The City brought charges against her for violation of Penal Code §§ 148(A)(1),

11cv2854

2

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Resisting an Officer, and 605.2, Aggravated Trespass. The charges were dropped. (Id., ¶12.)

The officers asserted that plaintiff pushed, bumped, struck, punched, hit, kicked, scratched and

attacked them. (Defendants’ Exh. A) But plaintiff states in her declaration that the officers’

statements are fabricated. (Sherard Decl., ¶13.) She further maintains that she had no telephone

conversation between any police officer and herself about the eviction process as asserted by the

defendants. (Id.) Finally plaintiff asserts that:

None of these alleged conversations that Officers Campbell and Ketcham claim to

have had with me ever occurred. There statements are complete fabrications. I was

never a danger to myself or to the police officers. I was a 70-year old senior

citizen, a retired college professor, and a long-time community servant/activist. I

knew better than to involve myself in an altercation with the police. These

accusations they have made against me are completely false.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered significant physical pain and bodily injury, mental

trauma, and emotional distress. She also states she had developed fluid around her heart, which

was non-symptomatic prior to her alleged injuries that occurred when she was “punched in the

chest area and knocked to the ground on October 5, 2010.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Ultimately, plaintiff was

hospitalized and underwent heart surgery. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material

when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of

the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

11cv2854

3

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts

will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

“The district court may limit its review to the documents submitted for the purpose of

summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San

Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the court is not

obligated “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allen, 91

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 55 F.3d 247, 251

(7th Cir. 1995)). If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary judgment

must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary

judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986);

Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The mere existence

of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient.”) (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242, 252). Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings”

and by “the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)).

When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from the

underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

587. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on

a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

/ / /

/ / /

11cv2854

4

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. DISCUSSION

A. Qualified Immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Unlawful Arrest

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability so

long as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have been aware under the circumstances. See Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity balances the need to hold public officials

accountable for irresponsible exercises of power and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability for reasonable performance of their duties. See id. Qualified

immunity analysis is two-step process: courts must determine whether a plaintiff alleges a

constitutional violation, and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Which of the two steps should be

addressed first rests in the sound discretion of the court. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under §1983 as a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or without other justification.”

Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (2001). “Probable cause for a

warrantless arrest arises when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are

sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe ‘that the suspect has committed, is committing,

or is about to commit an offense.’” Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1989)). “The ultimate conclusion of presence or

absence of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact.” United States v. Greene, 783

F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986). Qualified immunity as to unlawful arrest can apply in the

absence of probable cause, so long as a reasonable officer could have believed it existed under

the circumstances. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir.

1994). The determination of whether the right was firmly established at the time of an alleged

violation is a context-specific task that turns on whether a reasonable police officer could have

believed that the conduct in question was lawful under the circumstances. See Fuller v. M.G.

Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

11cv2854

5

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

 As noted above, summary judgment may only be granted in the absence of a genuine

dispute of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The factual circumstances surrounding Ms.

Sherard’s arrest are in diametric contradiction. Thus, whether summary judgment may be

granted depends on whether these disputed facts are genuine and whether these disputed facts

are material. Id. The determination of qualified immunity turns on whether a reasonable police

officer could have believed that Defendants’ conduct was lawful under the circumstances. See

Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1443. If a reasonable jury could draw inferences from the facts presented by

Plaintiff Sherard and render a verdict in her favor, summary judgment should not be granted.

Plaintiff declares under penalty of perjury that she “never pushed, bumped, struck,

punched, hit, kicked, scratched, or otherwise attacked any of these police officers as is claimed

in Officer Campbell’s and Officer Ketcham’s reports.” (Sherard Decl. ¶13.) This statement

contradicts those of Officers Campbell and Ketcham who stated: “[d]uring the struggle, Ms.

Sherard inflicted an approximately 1 inch cut to the top of Officer Ketcham’s left hand.”

(Campbell Decl. ¶ 10.)); and “Ms. Sherard swung the basket towards us” and “Ms. Sherard

scratched at my hand and left a 1 inch scratch on the top of my left hand.” (Ketcham Decl. ¶ ¶12,

13.) 

Further, Plaintiff asserts that she did not speak to officers over the telephone about the

eviction process. (Sherard Decl. ¶ 13.) This statement is in direct opposition to that of Officer

Ketcham:

I spoke with Ms. Sherard and told her she needed to go to the Sheriff’s

Office to file for a legal eviction. I told her the handwritten notice was not a

valid eviction. I also told her that she was not allowed to enter Ms. Martin’s

residence or remove any property from the residence unless she had

permission to enter. 

Ms. Sherard became very irate over the telephone and would not listen to

my instructions.

(Ketcham Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff asserts that she did not say that she was going to take Ms.

Martin’s belongings and throw them out of the residence. (Sherard Decl. ¶13.) This statement

completely contradicts that of Officer Ketcham: “Ms. Sherard said she was going to take Ms.

11cv2854

6

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Martin’s belongings and throw them out of the residence.” (Ketcham Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff asserts

that she never swung a laundry basket at any of the police officers. (Sherard Decl. ¶ 13.) This

statement is fully inconsistent with those of Officers Campbell and Ketcham: “Ms. Sherard

swung the large laundry basket at us” (Campbell Decl. ¶ 9.) and“Ms. Sherard swung the basket

towards us.” (Ketcham Decl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff asserts that she did not resist any of the officers,

that she did not fight back or become aggressive. (Sherard Decl. ¶ 13.) Officers Campbell and

Ketcham, in sharp contrast, state: “Ms. Sherard began to struggle and try to pull away, causing

Officer Ketcham to lose hold of her left arm . . . . she continued to resist and struggle... she

continued to resist and kick her legs and yell” (Campbell Decl. ¶ 9.); and “Ms. Sherard resisted

and pulled away from my grasp . . . . Ms. Sherard continued to fight back and resist.” (Ketcham

Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.)

Determining what conflicting evidence is the more credible is a jury function, and a

reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on these issues. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Moreover the

factual issues have significant bearing on whether a reasonable police officer could have

believed that the conduct of the officers in arresting an elderly woman on her own property was

lawful under the circumstances. Id. Because of the foregoing genuine disputes of material fact

relating to whether a reasonable officer could have believed that an arrest was lawful under the

circumstances, summary judgment is inappropriate as to Plaintiff’s cause of action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

B. Qualified Immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Excessive Force

Claims against law enforcement officers for use of excessive force must be analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The constitutional

inquiry is whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable without regard to

underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397. To determine whether the force used is reasonable

requires a nuanced balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's

interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id. at 396. This

determination “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

11cv2854

7

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. “[E]ven though reasonableness traditionally is a question of fact for

the jury, defendants can still win on summary judgment if the district court concludes, after

resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, that the officer’s use of force was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir.

1994).

Plaintiff asserts that she “felt a hard, quick, forceful punch in the upper chest area . . .

which knocked her to the floor” and that “[n]o one was in the shed except [her] and these two

police officers.” (Sherard Decl. ¶ 8.) These two statements give rise to an inference that

Defendant officers struck Plaintiff almost immediately, in pointed contrast with the statements of

Officers Campbell and Ketcham. Officer Campbell states “[a]t no time did I ever strike, punch,

hit, kick, or otherwise batter Plaintiff in any way.” (Campbell Decl. ¶ 13.) Similarly, Officer

Ketcham asserts that “[a]t no time did I ever strike, punch, hit, kick, or otherwise batter Plaintiff

in any way.” (Ketcham Decl. ¶ 17.) Thus, Plaintiff’s declaration that she was physically struck

by an officer while in her shed conflicts with Defendants’ statements that neither officer struck

Plaintiff at all. Plaintiff asserts that no police officer ever told her that she was going to be placed

in handcuffs if she did not put the wicker basket on the ground. (Sherard Decl. ¶ 13.) But Officer

Campbell who states: “I told her if she continued to refuse, I would have to place her in

handcuffs for her safety and ours.” (Campbell Decl. ¶ 9.) 

For the purposes of this motion, the court must view all inferences from the facts in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. As noted above,

genuine disputes of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff swung a laundry basket at officers and

whether Plaintiff resisted officers during the incident, each of which is relevant to the level of

force reasonable under the circumstances. Determining what conflicting evidence is the more

credible is a jury function, and a reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on these issues. Because

these issues are relevant to determining whether the officers’ use of force was reasonable under

the circumstances, granting summary judgment is inappropriate as to Plaintiff’s cause of action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

11cv2854

8

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. State Law Cause of Action for Battery

A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 242. “The elements of civil battery are: (1) defendant intentionally

performed an act that resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2)

plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury,

damage, loss, or harm to plaintiff.” Brown v. Ransweller, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 526 (2009).

Police officers are not similarly situated to ordinary battery defendants. Id. at 527. To recover

against a police officer for civil battery, Plaintiff must prove that an officer’s use of force was

unreasonable. Id.; Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1273 (1998).

Genuine disputes of fact exist as to whether and when officers punched Plaintiff, whether

officers told Plaintiff that she would be placed in handcuffs if she did not put down a laundry

basket, whether Plaintiff swung a laundry basket at the officers, and whether Plaintiff resisted

arrest. Because each of these disputed issues of fact is relevant to determining whether

Defendant officers’ use of force was unreasonable, each is material and summary judgment will

be denied as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for battery. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C); Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322.

D. State Law Cause of Action for False Arrest or Imprisonment

“False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” CAL.

PENAL CODE § 236. “All that is necessary to make out a charge of false imprisonment is that the

individual be restrained of his liberty without any sufficient complaint or authority therefor, and

it may be accomplished by words or acts which such individual fears to disregard. Temporary

detention is sufficient, and the use of actual physical force is not necessary.” Ware v. Dunn, 80

Cal. App. 2d 936, 943 (1947). False arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts, as false

arrest is merely one way of committing false imprisonment. Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15

Cal. 4th 744, 752 n.3 (1997). There is no civil liability for false arrest or imprisonment in

California for an officer who, at the time of arrest, had reasonable cause to believe that the arrest

was lawful. CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(b)(1).

As noted above, genuine disputes of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff physically attacked

11cv2854

9

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

officers, whether Plaintiff told officers that she was going to remove Ms. Martin’s belongings,

and whether Plaintiff swung a laundry basket at officers. Each of these disputed issues of fact

relates to whether Defendant officers had a reasonable cause for belief that their arrest of

Plaintiff was lawful under the circumstances. Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied as

to Plaintiff’s cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C); Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322.

E. Violation of the Bane Act

California Civil Code § 52.1 provides a cause of action for an individual whose

constitutional or statutory rights have been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with

through threats, intimidation, or coercion. Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 338 (1998).

The elements of a cause of action under the Bane Act are: (1) that the defendant interfered with,

or attempted to interfere with, the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights through violence or

threat of violence; (2) that the plaintiff reasonably believed that if she exercised her

constitutional right, she would be met with violence against his or her person or property; (3)

that the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in

causing the plaintiff’s harm. Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 882

(2007).

Defendant argues in its motion that “[t]here is no evidence of the requisite “force,

intimidation, or coercion necessary to maintain a Civil Code section 52.1 claim against

Defendant Officers.” (Def.’s Mot. p.19.) But Plaintiff provided such evidence in the form of a

declaration. (Doc. #36-2.) A genuine dispute of fact exists as to whether Defendant officers used

physical force or intimidation against Plaintiff to interfere with her constitutional rights. Thus,

this factual dispute precludes summary judgment in defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s cause of

action for violation of the Bane Act. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

or partial summary judgment. (Doc. #21.) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are directed to contact the assigned

11cv2854

10

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

magistrate judge within three days of the filing of this Order to schedule a Mandatory

Settlement Conference in accordance with the Case Management Order filed April 4, 2012. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order required by

Local Rule 16.1 (f) (6) shall be prepared, served, and emailed to the undersigned on or before

October 21, 2013. The final Pretrial Conference is scheduled for November 4, 2013 at 11:00

a.m..

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 16, 2013

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. MITCHELL D. DEMBIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

11cv2854

11

Case 3:11-cv-02854-L-MDD Document 40 Filed 09/16/13 Page 11 of 11