Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01538/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01538-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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Case No. 19-CV-01538-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION WITH LEAVE TO 

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LEGALFORCE RAPC WORLDWIDE 

P.C.,

Plaintiff,

v.

GLOTRADE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-CV-01538-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 51

LegalForce RAPC Worldwide, P.C. (“Plaintiff”) sued eighteen defendants, including 

WTMR, LLC (“Defendant”), for alleged violations of the Lanham Act, California’s False 

Advertising Law, and California’s Unfair Competition Law, as well as a claim for intentional 

interference with prospective economic advantage. ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss.1 ECF No. 18. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant 

law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss with leave to 

 

1 Defendant’s motion to dismiss contains a notice of motion that is separately paginated from the 

memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion. See Mot. at 1-2. Civil Local 

Rule 7-2(b) provides that the notice of motion and points and authorities should be contained in 

one document with a combined limit of 25 pages. See Civ. Loc. R. 7-2(b).

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amend. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a California professional corporation with a principal place of business in 

Mountain View, California and a law office located in Tempe, Arizona. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18 

(“Compl.”). Plaintiff “offers services including trademark preparation and prosecution, patent 

preparation and prosecution, copyright registration and counseling, international trademark and 

patent filings, and corporate formation and stock and equity structuring.” Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff “has 

clients for intellectual property services in all 50 states and more than 300 cities and towns across 

America.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that companies, termed “Mailer Defendants,” “use publicly available 

trademark filer information to send targeted ‘solicitations’ to . . . trademark applicants.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 

43. The “‘solicitations’ are constructed to [deceptively] make the trademark applicant believe that 

an official U.S. government agency or the [United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”)] 

itself is sending a letter to them, raising fear among the unsuspecting public that they must pay 

large amounts of money or forfeit trademark rights.” Id. ¶ 2. These “Mailer Defendants” provide 

no real services and “result in no value to trademark owners.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Mailer Defendants “appear to originate . . . [in] countries outside the 

United States (most frequently from eastern Europe).” Id. ¶ 3. As relevant to the instant motion to 

dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is one such “Mailer Defendant,” and that Defendant lists a 

Washington, D.C. address for its business, but is actually located in Hungary. Id. ¶¶ 59-63.2 

 

2 Defendant filed a supporting declaration from Richard Popovics, the President of WTMR, LLC, 

who noted that Defendant is “a privately owned publishing company, incorporated in Delaware 

. . . [with] a current address at 601 13th Street, NW Suite 900 South, Washington, D.C. 20005.” 

ECF No. 52 ¶ 3 (“Popovics Decl.”). Popovics also explained that Defendant is not registered to 

do business in California and has no offices, employees, subsidiaries, or agents in California. Id. 

¶ 9. Furthermore, Defendant does not maintain any bank accounts or financial accounts in 

California, and Defendant does not own or lease any real or personal property in California. Id.

¶¶ 10-11.

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Defendant allegedly sends out unsolicited offers and directs recipients to pay a $980 registration 

fee to have the recipients’ trademark listed in Defendant’s publication. Id. ¶ 65. The unsolicited 

offer, however, fails to mention that trademark applications are a matter of public record and, once 

approved, trademark applications are published in the USPTO’s Official Gazette. Id. ¶ 66. 

Instead, the unsolicited offer is “deliberately constructed to deceive recipients into thinking the 

unsolicited offer is a bill so the recipient will send a check as a payment for something they think 

is already owed to protect a trademark.” Id. ¶ 80. Plaintiff alleges that it “has received over 40 

unsolicited offers from [Defendant] in the past year, directed to both RACP’s clients and to 

individuals employed by RAPC.” Id. ¶ 73. Defendant acknowledges that some trademark owners 

who received Defendant’s unsolicited offer “may reside in California,” Popovics Decl. ¶ 8, but 

that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege whether it received Defendant’s unsolicited offers at its 

California office or its Arizona office or whether Plaintiff’s clients received Defendant’s 

unsolicited offers in California or out-of-state.3 

As a result of the Mailer Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff asserts that “significant business” 

was deceptively diverted to Mailer Defendants. Id. ¶ 198. Plaintiff also alleges that Plaintiff’s 

business reputation was harmed because Plaintiff “received inquiries from its clients confused 

about the unsolicited actions by the Mailer Defendants and worried that [Plaintiff’s] services to the 

clients were somehow deficient.” Id. ¶ 199. Plaintiff claims that it spent “valuable time and 

expenses to investigate the facts to appropriately advise its clients.” Id. ¶ 200.

B. Procedural History

On March 25, 2019, Plaintiff sued eighteen defendants and alleged the following causes of 

action: (1) violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (2) violations of California’s False 

Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500; (3) violations of California’s Unfair 

 

3 Plaintiff attached a redacted copy of one of Defendant’s offers to the Complaint as Exhibit 13. 

See ECF No. 1-1, Ex. 13. According to Defendant, Exhibit 13 was sent to Arizona, not California. 

Popovics Decl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff never contests that Exhibit 13 was sent to its Arizona office and not 

its California office. Plaintiff also fails to proffer any evidence that its clients received 

Defendant’s unsolicited offer in California.

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Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; and (4) intentional interference with 

prospective economic advantage. Compl. ¶¶ 203-61. The eighteen defendants fell into two 

categories: “Mailer Defendants,” which are entities that directly engaged in the allegedly false 

advertising; and “Logistics Enablers,” which are companies that provided domestic mailing 

addresses to the foreign “Mailer Defendants” that facilitated the allegedly fraudulent conduct. Id.

¶ 1; see generally id. ¶¶ 203-61. 

To date, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed six of the seven “Logistics Enablers” and three 

of the eleven “Mailer Defendants.” ECF Nos. 16, 25, 28, 33, 42, 48, and 72. The final “Logistic 

Enabler” defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction, and the Court granted 

the motion with leave to amend on October 23, 2019. ECF No. 82. Six of the “Mailer 

Defendants” were served but did not appear, and the Clerk entered default against them. See ECF 

Nos. 47, 64, and 66. 

Of the two Mailer Defendants, one filed an answer (ECF No. 78), and the other one, 

Defendant, filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 22, 2019. ECF No. 51 (“Mot.”). Defendant 

contends that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring this suit, personal jurisdiction over 

Defendant is absent, venue is improper in this district, and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 

Plaintiff filed an opposition on August 5, 2019, ECF No. 57 (“Opp.”), and Defendant filed a reply 

on August 12, 2019, ECF No. 63 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In the instant motion, Defendant raises four grounds for dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint: 

(1) lack of Article III standing, under Rule 12(b)(1); (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, under Rule 

12(b)(2); (3) improper venue, under Rule 12(b)(3); and (4) failure to state a claim, under Rule 

12(b)(6). Because Article III standing implicates constitutional limitations on our power to decide 

a case, the Court addresses Defendant’s standing argument first. Friery v. Los Angeles Unified 

Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As standing implicates Article III limitations on 

our power to decide a case, we must address it before proceeding to the merits.”). The Court then 

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turns to Defendant’s personal jurisdiction argument. Because the Court resolves the case by 

addressing only Article III standing and personal jurisdiction, the Court confines its review of the 

applicable legal standards to those under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2).

A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests whether the 

court has subject matter jurisdiction. While lack of “statutory standing” requires dismissal for 

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), lack of Article III standing requires dismissal for want 

of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Nw. Requirements Utilities v. F.E.R.C., 

798 F.3d 796, 808 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unlike Article III standing, however, ‘statutory standing’ does 

not implicate our subject-matter jurisdiction.” (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014)); Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2011). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone 

v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are 

insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. The court “resolves a facial attack as 

it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the court determines whether the 

allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 

749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“[I]n a factual attack,” on the other hand, “the challenger disputes the truth of the 

allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for 

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving such an attack, unlike with a motion to dismiss under 

Rule (12)b(6), a court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion 

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Moreover, the court “need not presume the 

truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. Once the defendant has moved to dismiss for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the 

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court’s jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 

2010).

B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)

In a motion challenging personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(2), the plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court, has the 

burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 

F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). When the motion to dismiss constitutes a defendant’s initial 

response to the complaint, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that personal 

jurisdiction exists. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.

1977). While a plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, 

uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true [and] [c]onflicts between parties 

over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger, 

374 F.3d at 800 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

C. Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to 

amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose 

of Rule 15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should 

grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that 

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing 

amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 

moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 

(9th Cir. 2008).

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III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of Article III standing, lack of 

personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. Mot. at 11-26. Because the 

Court must address jurisdictional concerns first, the Court begins its analysis with Defendant’s 

argument that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Friery, 448 F.3d at 1148 (“As standing 

implicates Article III limitations on our power to decide a case, we must address it before 

proceeding to the merits.”). The Court then turns to Defendant’s contention that personal 

jurisdiction is lacking. As explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff alleges Article III 

standing but that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Consequently, the Court 

does not reach Defendant’s remaining arguments.

A. Article III Standing

“From Article III's limitation of the judicial power to resolving ‘Cases’ and 

‘Controversies,’ and the separation-of-powers principles underlying that limitation, we have 

deduced a set of requirements that together make up the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of 

standing.’” Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 125 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992)). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements:” (1) an 

injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant; and (3) that is 

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. “The party 

invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements . . . with the manner 

and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. at 561. “At the 

pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may 

suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific 

facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Id. (quotation marks and internal alterations 

omitted).

At the outset, the Court notes that Defendant conflates Article III standing and “statutory 

standing.” See Mot. at 11-15. Defendant contends “[t]here is no Case or Controversy” between

the parties, but then proceeds to argue that Plaintiff’s suit does not come within the zone of 

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interests for a Lanham Act false advertising claim and that Plaintiff’s injuries are not proximately 

caused by violations of the statute. Id. at 11. The “zone of interests” and “proximate causality”

inquiries are relevant for “determin[ing] the meaning of the congressionally enacted provision 

creating a cause of action”—that is, whether a plaintiff has “statutory standing.” Lexmark, 572 

U.S. at 128-29.

As the United States Supreme Court explained in Lexmark, “statutory standing” is a 

“misleading” term because “the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subjectmatter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” 

Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4. Rather, “statutory standing,” insofar as courts continue to use the 

term, is simply a shorthand for determining, “using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, 

whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 

127. “In other words, we ask whether [a plaintiff] has a cause of action under the statute,” and this 

inquiry is entirely separate from whether a plaintiff has standing under Article III. Id. at 125-26, 

128.

Nonetheless, because Defendant characterizes its argument as one involving Article III 

standing and because “standing implicates Article III limitations on our power to decide a case,”

the Court construes Defendant’s argument as one contending that Plaintiff has not adequately 

alleged an injury in fact. See Friery, 448 F.3d at 1148. Additionally, Defendant’s argument is 

best construed as a facial attack whereby “the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient 

on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The court 

“resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the 

plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the 

court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s 

jurisdiction.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121.

“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a 

legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 

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conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), as revised

(May 24, 2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it must 

affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, 

“[a]n injury in fact must also be ‘concrete’ . . . that is, it must actually exist.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sends out deceptive, unsolicited offers and directs 

recipients to pay a $980 registration fee to have the recipients’ trademark listed in Defendant’s 

publication, even though trademark applications are a matter of public record and, once approved, 

are published in the USPTO’s Official Gazette. Compl. ¶¶ 65-66. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant’s unsolicited offer is “deliberately constructed to deceive recipients into thinking the 

unsolicited offer is a bill so the recipient will send a check as a payment for something they think 

is already owed to protect a trademark.” Id. ¶ 80. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff 

asserts that “significant business” was deceptively diverted to Mailer Defendants. Id. ¶ 198. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Plaintiff’s business reputation was harmed because Plaintiff “received 

inquiries from its clients confused about the unsolicited actions by the Mailer Defendants and 

worried that [Plaintiff’s] services to the clients were somehow deficient.” Id. ¶ 199. Plaintiff 

claims that it spent “valuable time and expenses to investigate the facts to appropriately advise its 

clients.” Id. ¶ 200.

Under Lexmark, “allegations of lost sales and damage to . . . business reputation” are 

sufficient to “give [a plaintiff] standing under Article III to press [a] false-advertising claim.” 572 

U.S. at 125. Plaintiff’s allegations are admittedly general, but they sufficiently allege damage to 

business reputation caused by Defendant’s alleged false advertising. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561

(“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s 

conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace 

those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” (quotation marks and internal 

alterations omitted)). According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s unsolicited offers “confused” clients and 

led them to believe that Plaintiff’s “services . . . were somehow deficient,” thereby leading to 

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reputational injury. Compl. ¶ 199. At this stage, that is enough, especially as the Court must 

“[a]ccept[] the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's 

favor.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121; see also Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Sharkninja Operating 

LLC, 2016 WL 4154676, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2016) (holding that allegations that a 

defendant’s false advertising damaged the reputation of a plaintiff’s products in the mind of 

consumers and retail buyers were sufficient to allege an injury in fact).

Accordingly, Plaintiff adequately alleges an injury in fact at this stage of the litigation and 

therefore has Article III standing to pursue its false advertising claim. The Court thus DENIES 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court now turns to 

Defendant’s personal jurisdiction argument.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to allege personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 

“Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at

800. “Where, as here, the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, 

the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. In such cases, we only 

inquire into whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and affidavits make a prima facie showing of 

personal jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

To determine the propriety of asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Court 

examines whether such jurisdiction is permitted by the applicable state’s long-arm statute and 

comports with the demands of federal due process. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & 

Clements, Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining scope of California’s long-arm 

statute and examining federal due process requirements). California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 410.10, is coextensive with federal due process requirements, and therefore the 

jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process merge into one. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 410.10 (“[A] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with 

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the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 

647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) (“California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 410.10, is coextensive with federal due process requirements, so the jurisdictional analyses 

under state law and federal due process are the same.”). For a court to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with due process, that defendant must have “certain 

minimum contacts” with the relevant forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 316 (1945) (quotation marks omitted). In addition, “the defendant’s ‘conduct and connection 

with the forum State’ must be such that the defendant ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled 

into court there.’” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).

Courts “recognize[] two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ (sometimes called ‘allpurpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) (quoting 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011)). General 

jurisdiction exists where a defendant is physically present or where a defendant’s activities in the 

state are so “continuous and systematic” such that the contacts approximate physical presence in 

the forum state. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (citation omitted). “A court with general 

jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the 

claim occurred in a different State,” “[b]ut only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will 

render a defendant amenable to general jurisdiction in that State.” Id. at 1780. Plaintiff does not 

allege that general jurisdiction is proper here.

Rather, Plaintiff contends that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendant. Opp. at 

7-12. Specific jurisdiction is proper when a suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414

n.8 (1984). Whether a court has specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant “focuses on the 

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relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,” and “the defendant’s suit-related 

conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 

(2014). “When there is no such connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent 

of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781; see 

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 931 n.6 (“[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not 

justify the exercise of jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those sales.” (emphasis added)).

1. Specific Jurisdiction

For specific jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a three-prong test that requires the 

plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum 

or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum; (2) the plaintiff’s 

claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction is 

reasonable and fair. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. It is the plaintiff’s burden to plead 

allegations satisfying the first two prongs. Id. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the 

defendant to show why the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not be reasonable and fair. Id.

The parties contest the first two prongs of the specific jurisdiction test. Mot. at 16; Opp. at 

8 n.2. The Court holds that specific jurisdiction—and therefore personal jurisdiction—is absent

here because Plaintiff fails to allege that the claims arise out of or relate to Defendant’s forumrelated activities. Because the Court resolves this case on the second prong of the specific 

jurisdiction inquiry, the Court declines to address the arguments pertaining to the first prong.

a. Arise Out of Defendant’s Forum-Related Activities

Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate, and specifically, 

that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to Defendant’s forum-related activities. 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800, 802. The Ninth Circuit applies a “but for” test to analyze the 

“arises out of” requirement. Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). Under this 

inquiry, a “plaintiff must show that ‘but for’ the defendant’s forum-related conduct, the injury 

would not have occurred.” San Diego Cty. Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, 

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325 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff, in a single sentence, asserts that it satisfies the “arises out of” requirement 

because Defendant “directly sends mail to California residents and would then receive ill-gotten 

checks from California residents.” Opp. at 11. Plaintiff, however, never alleges any of the 

California residents who received Defendant’s unsolicited offers were Plaintiff’s clients. Nor does 

Plaintiff allege that it received Defendant’s offer in California as opposed to in Arizona. See

supra n.3; Compl. ¶ 18 (noting that Plaintiff has offices in Mountain View, California and Tempe, 

Arizona and that Plaintiff has clients “in all 50 states and more than 300 cities and towns across 

America”).

This defect is fatal for Plaintiff’s personal jurisdiction argument. The United States 

Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that it is “the defendant’s suit-related conduct [that] must 

create a substantial connection with the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. “When there is no such 

connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected 

activities in the State.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781; see also Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 931 n.6 

(“[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction 

over claims unrelated to those sales.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, Bristol-Myers is particularly 

instructive to this case.

In Bristol-Myers, “[a] group of plaintiffs—consisting of 86 California residents and 592 

residents from 33 other States—filed eight separate complaints in California Superior Court.” 137 

S. Ct. at 1778. The California Supreme Court held that specific jurisdiction was proper over both 

residents and nonresidents alike because “the strength of the requisite connection between the 

forum and the specific claims at issue [could be] relaxed [because] the defendant ha[d] extensive 

forum contacts that [were] unrelated to [the nonresidents’] claims.” Id. at 1781. The United 

States Supreme Court reversed and concluded that “[f]or specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s 

general connections with the forum are not enough,” and that rather, “there must be an affiliation 

between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that 

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takes place in the forum State.” Id. (quotation marks and internal alterations omitted). A contrary 

holding, the United States Supreme Court held, would conflate specific and general jurisdiction

and elide important distinctions between the two. See id. (“Under the California [Supreme 

Court’s] approach, the strength of the requisite connection between the forum and the specific 

claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to those 

claims. Our cases provide no support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious 

form of general jurisdiction.”).

Here, the only evidence Plaintiff proffered was a redacted copy of one of Defendant’s 

offers that Plaintiff received. See ECF No. 1-1, Ex. 13. According to Defendant, however, that 

offer was sent to Arizona, not California, Popovics Decl. ¶ 14, and Plaintiff never contests 

Defendant’s assertion. Furthermore, Plaintiff also fails to proffer any evidence that its clients 

received Defendant’s unsolicited offer in California. Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to allege 

that any California residents who received Defendant’s solicitations were Plaintiff’s clients—or 

that Plaintiff received solicitations in California versus Arizona—Defendant’s forum-related 

activities cannot be characterized as a but-for cause of Plaintiff’s claims and injuries. Plaintiff’s 

claims and injuries did not arise because Defendant may have sent unsolicited offers to California 

residents unconnected to Plaintiff or this lawsuit. “[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to 

adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes 

jurisdiction.” Bristol-Meyers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quotation marks omitted); see Goodyear, 564 

U.S. at 931 n.6 (“[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise 

of jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those sales.” (emphasis added)). Those residents who 

received Defendant’s unsolicited offer in California may be able to assert personal jurisdiction 

over Defendant, but with the facts as currently pled, Plaintiff may not. In other words, in the 

instant case, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Nonetheless, because granting Plaintiff an additional opportunity to amend the 

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complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Defendants, and Plaintiff 

has not acted in bad faith, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend. See Leadsinger, Inc., 512 

F.3d at 532.

2. Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiff makes a request for jurisdictional discovery in the event the Court determines that 

Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts to support personal jurisdiction. Opp. at 12-13. 

“[D]iscovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of 

jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Laub 

v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). A 

court can deny jurisdictional discovery, however, “when it is clear that further discovery would 

not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction,” Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. 

GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks omitted), or where the 

request for discovery is “based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally 

relevant facts,” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008). Because discovery 

could demonstrate facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction, see Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 877 F.2d at 801, 

the Court therefore permits jurisdictional discovery.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction with leave to amend and GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional 

discovery. Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within 30 days of this Order. Failure to file 

an amended complaint within 30 days or failure to cure the deficiencies identified herein or in 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss will result in dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant with 

prejudice. Plaintiff may not add new causes of action or parties without a stipulation or leave of 

the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 14, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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