Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01272/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01272-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORMAN IVORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES E. TILTON, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-01272-GSA PC

SCREENING ORDER REQUIRING

PLAINTIFF TO EITHER FILE AMENDED

COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY COURT OF

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY ON

CLAIMS FOUND TO BE COGNIZABLE 

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Norman Ivory, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000) on July 20, 2009. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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II. Legal Standard

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported bymere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). “[P]laintiffs [now] face a higher

burden of pleadings facts . . ,” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), and while a

plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,”

Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of

meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 

III. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Summary of Complaint

1

At the time of the filing of this action, Plaintiff was housed at California State PrisonCorcoran. Plaintiff is currently housed at the Los Angeles County Jail, and brings this suit against

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Director James E. Tilton, Warden James

Hartley, Associate Warden Rosemary Ndoh, Correctional Captain M. V. Sexton, Correctional

Lieutenant A. Valdez, Correctional Officers M. D. Foucht and S. Meraz, and Does 1-9 for the

violation of his rights while he was housed at Avenal State Prison (ASP) in 2008 and 2009.

Plaintiff alleges that he requires a Kosher diet for religious reasons, and was harassed,

abused, and persecuted while at ASP following his submission of a group appeal in which he

addressed the failure of prison officials to meet the minimum standards for the Jewish Kosher Meal

Program and complained of the hostility he experienced when he tried to address the issue

Although Plaintiff cites to exhibits in his complaint, the Court did not receive any exhibits.

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informally. Immediately following the submission of the group appeal, Plaintiff was transferred

from Facility 1 to Facility 5, and the next month he was transferred to Facility 6, where he faced

harsh treatment.

Plaintiff alleges that following his transfer to Facility 6, he was called “Kosher boy” in front

of the general population inmates, leading to the perception that Plaintiff was a problem amongst

staff and inmates. (Doc. 1, Comp., court record p. 5, ¶12.) Plaintiff’s food was both under heated

and burned, and his meals were withheld on several occasions between December 2008 and January

2009, purportedlybecause his name was not on the list of inmates approved to receive Kosher meals. 

During the same time period, Plaintiff did not receive the eating utensils to which he was entitled

under the meal program, including a disposable tray, bowl, spoon, and cup. When Plaintiff wrote

to Defendant Ndoh to complain about the treatment, he was told to file an appeal.

On January 19, 2009, Plaintiff was standing in line for breakfast when Defendant Valdez

ordered him out of line and back to his housing unit without any breakfast. Plaintiff’s appeal of that

incident was partially granted.

On January 27, 2009 Plaintiff went to the dining hall and received his breakfast. When he

complained to Defendant Foucht that he did not receive a cup for his beverage, Foucht said, “I’m

not giving you nothing[,] Kosher boy.” (Comp., p. 6, ¶14.) Plaintiff told Foucht that it was not his

position, as a correctional officer, to grant or deny Plaintiff a cup, and that Plaintiff needed to speak

to a cook. Defendant Valdez then said, “That[’]s it[.] [Y]ou[’]re done[.] [G]et out of the chow hall.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff exited the chow hall in compliance with the order, and was then placed in mechanical

restraints and a holding cage for an hour on Defendant Valdez’s order.

When Plaintiff was released from the holding cage and his restraints were being removed by

Defendant Foucht, Foucht attempted to provoke Plaintiff by jerking Plaintiff violently and verbally

taunting him. Plaintiff kept silent and was ordered to return to his housing unit without breakfast.

Upon arrival at his housing unit, Defendant Meraz opened the door to release other inmates

for work but refused to let Plaintiff in and slammed the door in Plaintiff’s face. Plaintiff said,

“[H]ey[,] it[’]s cold out here,” and Defendant Meraz burst through the door, charged Plaintiff, and

struck Plaintiff in the chest hard enough to make Plaintiff’s head to hit the concrete wall, which

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caused Plaintiff to lose his breath in pain, become dizzy, and almost lose consciousness. (Id., p. 7,

¶16.) Defendant Meraz pointed his pepper spray canister at Plaintiff’s face the whole time, and

taunted him. Meraz then placed Plaintiff in mechanical restraints and told Plaintiff he was going to

take care of Plaintiff. Defendant Meraz filed a false report stating that Plaintiff threatened to assault

him; and stole, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of Plaintiff’s property while Plaintiff was being

transported to administrative segregation. Prior to Plaintiff’stransport to administrative segregation,

he heard Defendant Sexton state to others, including Defendants Valdez and Foucht, that this ought

to teach Plaintiff about challenging them with his inmate appeals and that Plaintiff was lucky they

did not kick his teeth in. 

B. Free Exercise of Religion and RLUIPA Claims

Plaintiff alleges that, prior to his transfer to Facility 6, he was not provided with a Kosher diet

as required by his religion, in violation of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).

“Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that

no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348,

107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The protections of the Free

Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an inmate’s

religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with

his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732,

737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. Further, RLUIPA precludes

the government from imposing a substantial burden on the religious exercise of inmates, unless that

burden is in the furtherance of a compelling government interest, and is the least restrictive means

of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 

Plaintiff alleges that prison officials failed to meet the minimum requirements of the Jewish

Kosher Meal Program, but it is not clear what their failings entailed and how they burdened the

practice of Plaintiff’s religion (e.g., was Plaintiff forced to either eat foods in violation of his

religious beliefs or go hungry, was Plaintiff given an incomplete meal, etc.?). Further, Plaintiff has

not linked this issue to any particular defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

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violation of the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA arising from the alleged failure to provide Jewish

inmates with an appropriate Kosher diet as mandated by the meal program. In addition, although

Plaintiff alleges that following his transfer to Facility 6, he was not provided a meal or appropriate

eating utensils on several occasions, it is not clear whether this was a failing of the general program

to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious diet or whether it was instead retaliatory conduct directed at

Plaintiff because of his complaints. The allegations as pled fall short of supporting a free exercise

or RLUIPA claim.

C. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Valdez, Foucht, and Meraz violated his rights under the

EighthAmendment byusing excessive force against him, and emotionallyand mentallyabusing him.

1. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of

confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). “[W]hile conditions

of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they ‘must not involve the wanton and

unnecessary infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.

2392 (1981)). “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112

S.Ct. 995 (1992). 

For excessive force claims, the issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at

7. Although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use

of force to cause harm always violates the Eighth Amendment, regardless of whether or not

significant injury is evident. Id. at 9-10.

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Meraz are sufficient to support an Eighth

Amendment claim. However, neither Defendant Valdez nor Defendant Foucht was involved in that

incident of physical force. Further, the allegation that Defendant Foucht jerked Plaintiff while 

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removing his mechanical restraints does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Therefore,

the only cognizable excessive force claim is that alleged against Defendant Meraz.

2. Other Conditions of Confinement

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Hudson at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,

only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently

grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

Verbal harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient to violate the Constitution, Oltarzewski

v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987), and threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, Defendants’ attempts to

verbally provoke or taunt Plaintiff provide no basis for the imposition of liability under section 1983.

Finally, the denial of breakfast on January 19, 2009, and on January 27, 2009, by Defendant

Valdez, and the placement in a holding cage for an hour on January 27, 2009, do not rise to the level

of Eighth Amendment violations. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006).

D. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived him of his property and libertywithout due process

of law.

1. Deprivation of Property

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974), and prisoners have

a protected interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). 

However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due

Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984) (citing Logan

v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36, 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d

1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), “[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state

employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause 

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of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available,”

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

Defendant Meraz’s wrongful theft and destruction of Plaintiff’s property constitute an

unauthorized deprivation and because Plaintiff has postdeprivation remedies available to him, he

may not pursue a due process claim. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). 

2. Deprivation of Liberty

The Due Process Clause also protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process

of law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). In order to invoke

the protection of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. Id. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process

Clause itself or from state law. Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a

liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. “[T]he touchstone of the

inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive

conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the

nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”

Wilkinson at 223 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)). Statecreated libertyinterests are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin at 484. 

The placement of Plaintiff in administrative segregation does not support a due process claim

because Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in remaining free from segregation. Id.;

also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th

Cir. 2000).

E. Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff alleges a pattern of harassment following his attempt to informally resolve prison

officials’ failure to comply with the minimum standards for the Jewish Kosher Meal Program, and

his submission of a group appeal on the issue. Further, Plaintiff alleges harsh treatment after he was

transferred to Facility 6 following the submission of the group appeal.

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“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because

of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation

against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is sufficient to support claim

under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under section 1983, Plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under color

of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. 

Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff must demonstrate

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297

F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, there is no respondeat superior liability under section

1983, and therefore, each defendant is only liable for his own misconduct. Iqbal at 1948-49.

Plaintiff’s allegations that “Defendants” in general harassed him, called him Kosher boy in

front of other inmates, both under heated and burned his food, deprived him of his Kosher meals on

several occasions, and failed to provide him with proper eating utensils are not sufficient to state any

claims. (Comp., court record pp. 5-6, ¶¶11, 12.) Plaintiff has not linked these events to any

particular defendants. Plaintiff may not simply lump all named defendants into a generic group and

assert a violation of his rights. Plaintiff must briefly but specifically allege which defendants,

identified either by name or by Doe 1, Doe 2, etc., took which adverse actions against him. Further,

Plaintiff must set forth facts indicating that the adverse action complained of was taken because of

his exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Although Plaintiff has linked Defendants Foucht, Valdez, and Meraz to the specific incidents

summarized in subsection A, Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient factual allegations supporting the

claim that because of his pursuit of his grievances, Defendants took those actions against him. Iqbal

at 1949-50. Further, Foucht’s mere statement that he was not giving anything to Plaintiff, whom he

referred to as Kosher boy, is not sufficient adverse to support a constitutional claim. Brodheim v.

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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However, Plaintiff’s allegation that immediately prior to his transport to administrative

segregation, he overheard Defendant Sexton telling Defendants Valdez and Foucht that this ought

to teach Plaintiff about challenging them with all of those appeals is sufficient to support a claim

against Sexton for involvement in transferringPlaintiffto segregation in retaliation for filing appeals. 

See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (timing of the events surrounding the alleged

retaliation may constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent). Defendants Valdez and

Foucht’s mere presence for the statement is not sufficient, though, to link them to Plaintiff’s

retaliatory placement in segregation. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

F. Claims Against Defendants Tilton, Hartley, and Ndoh

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state any claims against Director Tilton, Warden

Hartley, or Associate Warden Ndoh. Defendants may not be held liable for the actions of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior, and Plaintiff’s vague allegations that Tilton and

Hartley were responsible for promulgating policies which led to the violation of Plaintiff’s rights do

not support a claim under section 1983. Iqbal at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Plaintiff has not

identified with any specificity at all policies which caused the violation of his Constitutional rights,

or linked Tilton or Hartley to the creation or implementation of such policies.

With respect to Defendant Ndoh, neither her direction to Plaintiff to file an inmate appeal,

made in response to his written request for an interview, nor her disregard or denial of his appeals

or requests for interviews support a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s rights. The prison’s systems

made available to inmates for addressing complaints, be it a request for an interview process or the

formal inmate appeals process, do not have the effect of creating rights enforceable under federal

law. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1988); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); also Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d

1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims must be premised on the deprivation of a

constitutional or other federal right). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any specific facts supporting a claim that Defendant Ndoh was

directly involved in the violation of his rights or that Ndoh possessed knowledge sufficient to allow

imposition of liability on her for the violation of Plaintiff’s rights by other staff members. Taylor

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v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); also Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir.

2009); Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.

2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state

a claim against Defendant Ndoh.

G. Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In addition to money damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. “‘A case or

controversy exists justifying declaratory relief only when the challenged government activity is not

contingent, has not evaporated or disappeared, and, by its continuing and brooding presence, casts

what may well be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.’” Feldman

v. Bomar, 518 F.3d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land

Management, Medford Dist., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citation

omitted)). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in

clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relieffrom

the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” U.S. v. State of Wash., 759 F.2d 1353, 1357

(9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). The governmental conduct at issue in this action is past conduct

which occurred while Plaintiff was housed at ASP, and Plaintiff’s remedy is damages should he

prevail on his claim that his constitutional rights were violated. 

In addition to declaratory relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction mandating his transfer to a

prison closer to Los Angeles that has a Kosher meal program, and mandating that Defendants follow

the rules of the Jewish Kosher Meal Program. 

“[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold

requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.” 

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665 (1983) (citations omitted);

Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006). “Abstract injury is not enough.” 

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101, 103 S.Ct. at 1665. “[P]laintiff must show that he has sustained or is

immediatelyin danger of sustaining some direct injuryas the result of the challenged official conduct

and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.”

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Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The key issue is whether the plaintiff is ‘likely to

suffer future injury.’” Jones, 444 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Lyons at 105, 1667).

In addition, any award of equitable relief is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

which provides in relevant part, “Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison

conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a

particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless

the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of

the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 

Plaintiff is no longer housed at ASP and this suit is limited to seeking redress for Defendants’

past actions. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue the orders for injunctive relief sought

by Plaintiff. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable excessive force claim against Defendant Meraz and

a cognizable retaliation claim against Defendant Sexton, but fails to state any other claims upon

which relief may be granted under section 1983 or RLUIPA. 

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended

complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only against Defendant Meraz for use of excessive force

and Defendant Sexton for retaliation, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing, and his other

claims will be dismissed. Plaintiff will then be provided with two summonses and two USM-285

forms for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the United States

Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendants Meraz and Sexton.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but

must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or

other federal rights, Iqbal at 1948-49; Jones at 934. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual

allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

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Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must

be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. 

Therefore, “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an

amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand,

644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are dismissed from this action

for failure to state a claim;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in

this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and is willing to proceed only against Defendant Meraz for use of

excessive force and Defendant Sexton for retaliation; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 8, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Case 1:09-cv-01272-GSA Document 15 Filed 01/08/10 Page 12 of 12