Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01138/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01138-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADOLFO MENDOZA; AZUCENA MENDOZA;

A.M., Jr., a Minor; R.M., a minor;

and E.M., a Minor, by and through

their guardian ad litem, Adolfo

Mendoza; and JHONNY MENDOZA;

Plaintiffs,

v.

SCOTT WHITEHOUSE, FRED DORAN, MIKE

WOOD, STEVE MIRIANI, JORGE 

GIL-BLANCO, ALDO SERRANO, JOE RIPOSA,

OFFICER STEVENS, AND DOES 2 through

50,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 07-01138 CW

ORDER GRANTING

WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND 

GIL-BLANCO'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING IN

PART WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND

SERRANO'S MOTION

TO DISMISS

In separate motions, Defendants Aldo Serrano and Jorge 

Gil-Blanco move, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to

dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violation of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs

oppose the motions. Having considered all the papers filed by the

parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant Gil-Blanco's motion and GRANTS

Defendant Serrano's motion IN PART and DENIES it IN PART. The

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Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to amend their Second Amended

Complaint.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their complaint. On

April 19, 2007, they filed their First Amended Complaint. On May

25, Defendant Serrano filed an answer. On June 13, 2007, the Court

issued a Minute Order and Case Management Order establishing a July

12, 2007 deadline for Plaintiffs to add additional parties or

claims. Pursuant to this Order, Plaintiffs filed their Second

Amended Complaint on July 12, 2007. Defendants Gil-Blanco and

Serrano filed motions to dismiss on July 16, 2007 and July 27,

2007, respectively. On August 2, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a

memorandum in opposition to Defendant Gil-Blanco's motion. On

August 15, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to

Defendant Serrano's motion. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from an operation involving officers from

several police jurisdictions -- the Benicia Police Department, the

California Highway Patrol, the Dixon Police Department, the

Pittsburg Police Department, the Solano County Sheriff's

Department, and the Vacaville Police Department -- resulting in the

alleged forced entry by officers into Plaintiffs' home. (Second

Amended Complaint (SAC) ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiffs allege the

following:

Police officers, conducting surveillance of a suspect in a

narcotics investigation, observed the suspect drive to and enter a

house at 53 Dimaggio Avenue, Pittsburg, California, and then exit

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with a large plastic bag. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) After detaining and

searching the suspect, the officers found drugs and a handgun. 

(Id. ¶ 22.) The officers learned from the suspect's companion that

53 Dimaggio Avenue was the home of a black male she knew only as

"C" and a juvenile black female. (Id. ¶ 23.)

The officers then prepared to apply for a search warrant by

driving by 53 Dimaggio Avenue, which they identified as a yellow

stucco house with white trim, a raised red brick porch, a 

U-Haul-type truck parked in front, and a vehicle under a cloth

cover in the driveway. (Id. ¶ 24.) Defendant Gil-Blanco, of the

Dixon Police Department, was one of these officers. (Id.)

Defendants Whitehouse and Miriani drafted the warrant, and

Defendant Whitehouse signed an affidavit supporting the warrant. 

(Id. ¶ 25.) But instead of listing the suspect's residence as 53

Dimaggio Avenue, they listed it as 41 Dimaggio Avenue --

Plaintiffs' residence, which was not yellow with stucco trim, a

raised red brick porch, a U-Haul-type truck parked in front, or a

cloth-covered vehicle in the driveway. (Id.) The complaint does

not allege that this description of the residence was included in

the warrant.

Between 1:30 and 2:30 a.m., officers, including Defendant

Serrano, approached 41 Dimaggio Avenue. (Id. ¶ 26.) Defendant

Serrano used a battering ram to open the door. (Id.) Six or more

officers of the Solano County Sheriff's Department and the

Pittsburg and Vacaville Police Departments then entered Plaintiffs'

residence, held Plaintiffs Adolfo and Azucena Mendoza at gun point

and hit Plaintiff Jhonny Mendoza in the head. (Id.) The officers

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realized their mistake, obtained a warrant for 53 Dimaggio Avenue,

and searched that residence, detaining Plaintiffs until it had been

searched. (Id. ¶¶ 27-29.)

LEGAL STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS

All material allegations in a complaint will be taken as true

and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). "Each averment of a pleading shall be simple,

concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are

required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). The Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts

upon which he bases his claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S.

__, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). To the contrary, all the Rules

require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that "will

give the defendant fair notice of what the [plaintiff's] claim is

and the grounds on which it rests." Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's

obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief'

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id.

The complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations "to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965. 

"Without some factual allegations in the complaint, it is hard to

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see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not

only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds'

on which the claim rests." Id. at 1965 n.3.

When granting a motion to dismiss, a court is generally

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to

amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, a court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal "without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint." 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant Gil-Blanco

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Gil-Blanco was an officer of

the Dixon Police Department, one of many officers from various

police jurisdictions who were involved in the operation underlying

this complaint. (SAC ¶¶ 10, 12.) However, concerning Defendant

Gil-Blanco specifically, Plaintiffs allege only that in the company

of other Defendants he drove by 53 Dimaggio Avenue to verify "the

residence at 53 Dimaggio Avenue as a yellow stucco house with white

trim . . . ." (SAC ¶ 24.)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a cause of action for the

'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

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the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two

essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda

County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Fourth Amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and

seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The allegations against

Defendant Gil-Blanco fail to show that his conduct was the

proximate cause of Plaintiffs' alleged deprivations of this

constitutional right. Plaintiffs allege that other Defendants --

not Defendant Gil-Blanco -- drafted the warrant (Defendants

Whitehouse and Miriani), signed an affidavit supporting the warrant

(Defendant Whitehouse), forced entry into Plaintiffs' home ("six or

more Solano County, Vacaville, and Pittsburgh [sic] [police

officer] Defendants"), held Plaintiffs Adolfo Mendoza and Azucena

Mendoza at gunpoint (same), hit Plaintiff Jhonny Mendoza in the

head (same), and detained Plaintiffs (same). (Id. ¶¶ 26-29.) 

Defendant Gil-Blanco, allegedly a Dixon police officer, is not

claimed to have participated in any of this conduct. Thus,

Plaintiffs fail to state a constitutional violation by Defendant

Gil-Blanco, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth

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Amendment.

Plaintiffs contend that the Ninth Circuit's decision in

Navarro v. Barthel, 952 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1991), supports their

argument that Defendant Gil-Blanco's alleged actions constitute

Fourth Amendment violations. However, in Navarro, it was the

officer who obtained the warrant to search the wrong house whose

actions the Ninth Circuit affirmed as triable; that is, it was for

a jury to determine whether the officer acted reasonably in writing

the wrong address on his warrant application. 952 F.2d at 332. 

Here, Plaintiffs make no allegation that Defendant Gil-Blanco

participated in obtaining the warrant that led to the alleged

violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. To the contrary, they

allege specifically that Defendants Whitehouse and Miriani drafted

the warrant and that Defendant Whitehouse signed an affidavit

supporting it.

Plaintiffs also cite United States v. Collins, 830 F.2d 145,

146 (9th Cir. 1987), a case where a search warrant did not describe

the place to be searched with particularity sufficient to comport

with Fourth Amendment requirements, for the proposition that "[a]s

the officers were reckless in preparing their affidavit, they are

not protected by good faith reliance on the warrant." But, again,

Plaintiffs allege neither that Defendant Gil-Blanco prepared a

warrant with insufficient particularity, that he was an affiant for

such a warrant, nor that he relied upon one in violating their

constitutional rights.

Defendant Gil-Blanco's driving by to verify the residence at

53 Dimaggio Avenue as a yellow stucco house, as Plaintiffs allege

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he did, cannot be construed as the proximate cause of any violation

of Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have failed to state any grounds for relief from

Defendant Gil-Blanco under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, Defendant

Gil-Blanco's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

II. Defendant Serrano

Plaintiffs allege that in participating in the execution of

the warrant Defendant Serrano used a battering ram to open their

door. Plaintiffs allege that then six or more officers of the

Pittsburg and Vacaville Police Departments and the Solano County

Sheriff's Department forcibly entered Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs

do not allege that Defendant Serrano, allegedly an officer of the

Benicia Police Department, entered Plaintiffs' home, hit Plaintiff

Jhonny Mendoza or detained Plaintiffs.

The Warrants Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that "no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

"The classic statement of the standard for testing the sufficiency

of a warrant's description [is that] '[i]t is enough if the

description is such that the officer with a search warrant can,

with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place

intended.'" United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir.

1980) (quoting Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 503

(1925)).

Plaintiffs cite the test articulated in Maryland v. Garrison,

480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987), as, "Whether the officers knew or should

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have known that a mistake had been made in designating the place to

be searched." In Garrison, officers obtained a warrant for a

building's third floor, which they mistakenly believed was single

apartment belonging to the suspect. Id. at 80. Actually, there

were two apartments on the floor, and, believing they were

searching the suspect's apartment, officers found contraband in the

suspect's neighbor's apartment. Id. The Supreme Court held,

"Plainly, if the officers had known, or even if they should have

known, that there were two separate dwelling units on the third

floor of 2036 Park Avenue, they would have been obligated to

exclude respondent's apartment from the scope of the requested

warrant." Id. at 85. Under Garrison, if Defendant Serrano knew

or should have known that the suspect's residence was a particular

one (such as 53 Dimaggio Avenue), he would have had to exclude

other residences (such as Plaintiffs') from the scope of the

warrant. But Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendant Serrano knew

or should have known that the suspect's residence was 53 Dimaggio

Avenue, not 41 Dimaggio Avenue, nor do any of the facts alleged

support such an inference.

Plaintiffs also cite Navarro, 952 F.2d 331, but, as discussed

above with respect to Defendant Gil-Blanco, although Navarro held

that the actions of the officer who obtained the warrant to search

the wrong house were triable, in this case Plaintiffs make no

allegation that Defendant Serrano participated in obtaining the

warrant that led to the alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment

rights. Indeed, according to the Second Amended Complaint,

Defendant Serrano had no involvement in events as alleged until he

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executed a warrant for a search of 41 Dimaggio Avenue at that

address.

The facts Plaintiffs allege fail to state a claim that

Defendant Serrano violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights

merely by participating in the execution of the search warrant. 

Plaintiffs note that "police officers called upon to aid other

officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that

the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information

requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable

cause." Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560,

568 (1971). Defendant Serrano, according to the facts alleged,

assisted officers in the execution of a warrant and therefore

merits this same entitlement.

However, Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Serrano,

"who had brought along a battering ram, proceeded to use it to gain

entry into 41 Dimaggio Avenue." (SAC ¶ 26.) No knock or

announcement of police presence, prior to battering the door, is

alleged.

The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated

searches and seizures -- only unreasonable ones. United States v.

Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 2005). "Whether a particular

search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing its

intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against

its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Sanchez v.

County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2006). 

"Unnecessary destruction of property or use of excessive force can

render a search unreasonable." United States v. Ankeny, 490 F.3d

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744, 751 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded on different grounds by

__ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2482059 (9th Cir. 2007).

The weighing of the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights

against legitimate government interests applies to the Fourth

Amendment's knock-and-announce rule. The rule was first

articulated by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.

927, 936 (1995), which held that although "a search or seizure of a

dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers

enter without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may

also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry." Thus,

"officers entering a dwelling pursuant to a search warrant announce

their purpose and authority and either wait a reasonable amount of

time or be refused admittance before forcibly entering the

residence. This knock and announce requirement may be excused,

however, by the presence of exigent circumstances." United States

v. Bynum, 362 F.3d 574, 579 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

Here, absent exigent circumstances, none of which are alleged,

use of a battering ram to gain entry into Plaintiffs' home, without

first knocking and announcing, would constitute unreasonable

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However,

there remains the question of whether Defendant Serrano is entitled

to qualified immunity for his alleged use of excessive force.

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

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of qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986). "Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if

the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established'

or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d

624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991).

"The entitlement [to qualified immunity] is an immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability; . . . it is

effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). A ruling

on the issue of qualified immunity should therefore be made early

in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are

avoided where the defense is dispositive. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 200 (2001). A defendant must allege qualified immunity

as an affirmative defense. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640

(1980). If the court determines that the defendant's actions, as

alleged by the plaintiff, are ones a reasonable officer could have

believed lawful, then the immunity is invoked and the court must

dismiss the claim prior to discovery. See Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) ("[T]o protect public officials from

the broad-ranging discovery that can be peculiarly disruptive of

effective government . . . we have emphasized that qualified

immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible

stage of a litigation.") (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

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A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first

determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an

actual constitutional right, then proceed to determine if the right

was "clearly established." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609

(1999); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). The threshold

question must be: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's

conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201. If there would be no violation of constitutional rights even

were the allegations established, the inquiry concerning qualified

immunity is at an end. Id. "On the other hand, if a violation

could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions,

the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established." Id. For a right to qualify as clearly established,

"the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear so that a

reasonable official would know that his conduct violates that

right." Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiffs have alleged deprivation of a clearly established

constitutional right. The constitutional right not to have police

officers break into one's home without first knocking and

announcing has been clearly established at least since the Supreme

Court decided Wilson, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). Therefore, a reasonable

officer in Defendant Serrano's situation would have known that,

absent exigent circumstances, failing to knock and announce before

using a battering ram to effect entry into Plaintiffs' home was in

violation of their constitutional rights. Thus, Defendant Serrano

cannot claim qualified immunity from suit for this alleged use of

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excessive force.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant

Serrano's motion to dismiss the claim that he violated Plaintiffs'

Fourth Amendment rights by executing the search warrant, but to the

extent that Plaintiffs state a claim of excessive force against

Defendant Serrano, his motion to dismiss is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant

Gil-Blanco's motion to dismiss and GRANTS Defendant Serrano's

motion as to Plaintiffs' claim that he violated their

constitutional rights by executing the search warrant. But to the

extent that Plaintiffs state a claim of excessive force against

Defendant Serrano, the Court DENIES his motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiffs claim that discovery is needed to determine which

officers committed which acts alleged in the Second Amended

Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiffs may conduct discovery and are

granted leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of

this order, including, if warranted, additional claims against

Defendants Gil-Blanco and Serrano.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/24/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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