Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00499/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00499-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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The Court will refer to the Order as the December 28, 2007, Order. See CJS Motions

§ 59 (“Orders are generally, if not universally, ineffective unless and until they are properly

and publicly enrolled. . . . That is to say, an order is rendered only when it is filed with the

clerk of the court.”); see also CJS Motions § 62 (if an order is formally prepared, signed by

the judge, and filed with the clerk it is “deemed to be entered”). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

ROMA O. AMOR, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-499-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Dismissed Defendant Jill Plevell (“Plevell”) has lodged a proposed judgment and has

requested this Court enter judgment in her favor and against Plaintiff Roma O. Amor

(“Amor”) pursuant to the Court’s December 18, 2007, Order.1

 Amor has responded to this

request and Plevell has filed a reply. 

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, or when multiple

parties are involved, entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims

or parties is appropriate “only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason

for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). “Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the

unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of

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overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by the pressing needs of the litigants for

an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.” Frank Briscoe Co. v.

Morrison-Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Gausvik v. Perez, 392

F.3d 1006, 1009 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“in the interest of judicial economy Rule 54(b) should

be used sparingly”). 

“The burden in on the party endeavoring to obtain Rule 54(b) certification to

demonstrate that the case warrants certification.” Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc.,

2 F.3d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993), citation omitted. A court must determine whether a

decision is final and, in determining whether there is no just reason for delay, a “district court

must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved . . .

to assure that application of the Rule effectively ‘preserves the historic federal policy against

piecemeal appeals.’” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7-9, 100 S.Ct.

1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), citation omitted. Courts can also consider “such factors as

whether the claims under review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated

and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court

would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.”

Id. at 9. Similar legal and factual issues between the parties’ claims “will weigh heavily

against entry of judgment under the rule, and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper

only where necessary to avoid a harsh and unjust result, documented by further and specific

findings.” Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989), citation omitted.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[w]e cannot afford the luxury of reviewing

the same set of facts in a routine case more than once without a seriously important reason.”

Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plevell asserts that there is no just reason for delay of entry of judgment because the

dismissal of her as a defendant is unique and separable from the other defendants. Amor

asserts that granting Plevell’s request would impose res judicata and statute of limitation

roadblocks to her efforts to pursue remedies. However, these possible roadblocks could be

resolved on appeal. Amor appears to be further arguing that, as exhibited in Beltran v. Santa

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Clara County, 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), a party’s entitlement to absolute

immunity, may be modified. However, the doctrine of absolute immunity is applicable to

Plevell. See e.g., 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 105 (2008) (absolute judicial immunity is

also afforded officials acting at the behest of a judge or as an arm of the court); see also

Morstad v. DCR, 147 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1998); Dolin on Behalf of N.D. v. West, 22

F.Supp.2d 1343 (M.D.Fla. 1998), aff’d, 207 F.3d 661 (11th Cir. 2000). The possibility of

a change in that law does not lead to a conclusion that an appellate court would have to

decide any issue more than once. Although Amor asserts that piecemeal appeals would be

an inefficient use of judicial resources, the legal issue presented by the dismissal of Plevell

is not similar to other dismissed defendants (i.e., no other defendants are alleged to have

completed a custody evaluation). Moreover, the factual allegations as to Plevell are not

comparable to allegations as to other defendants.

The decision against Plevell is final. Further, the Court finds the issue presented by

the dismissal of the claims against Plevell is separable from the other issues remaining to be

adjudicated. Further, no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than

once even if there are subsequent appeals. Nonetheless, Plevell has not presented any

pressing need for an early and separate judgment. Plevell has not made any argument,

besides one based on convenience, as to why a further delay would be a burden. The Court

finds Plevell has failed to sustain her burden to establish that this is an unusual case that

warrants Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification; this is not the rare case the justifies permitting

“piecemeal appeals.” Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED Plevell’s request for Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification

[Doc. # 138] is DENIED.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2009.

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