Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01164/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01164-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

D/B/A POWERNET GLOBAL

COMMUNICATIONS, an Ohio

Corporation,

NO. CIV. S-10-1164 FCD/EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PAC-WEST TELECOMM, INC., a

California Corporation,

Defendant.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the motion of defendant

Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. (“Pac-West” or “defendant”) to dismiss

plaintiff PNG Telecommunications, Inc.’s (“PNG” or “plaintiff”)

complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6). In connection with its motion, defendant also

requests that the court take judicial notice of several

documents. Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

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The court heard oral argument on the motion on August 6, 2010. 

For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion is DENIED

insofar as the court finds that it has subject matter

jurisdiction over the case. However, prudential considerations

lead the court to stay the case while the parties present the

issues raised herein to the California Public Utilities

Commission (“CPUC”). 

BACKGROUND

PNG, an Ohio corporation, entered into a Master Services

Agreement (the “MSA”) with Pac-West, a California corporation and

authorized carrier of local exchange and interexchange

telecommunications services within California and other states. 

(Compl., filed May 11, 2010, ¶¶ 4-6.) Pursuant to the MSA, PacWest agreed to provide PNG various inbound and outbound

interstate and intrastate telecommunications services, including

Internet access and services. (Id. ¶ 6.) The rates Pac-West

would charge PNG for these services were set forth in rate

declarations that were periodically amended under the terms and

conditions of the MSA. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)

PNG alleges from September 1, 2008 through March 1, 2009,

Pac-West charged PNG an amount in excess of the rates dictated by

the applicable rate declarations. (Id. ¶ 8.) PNG was unaware of

these excess charges until March 2009 and paid the amounts

invoiced by Pac-West. (Id. ¶ 9.) As a result, PNG alleges that

it overpaid Pac-West by $489,668.74. (Id.) In April 2009, PNG

notified Pac-West of the overpayments and requested a

reimbursement or credit. (Id. ¶ 11.) Pac-West issued a credit

in favor of PNG in the amount of $208,044.81, but refused to

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reimburse PNG or credit its account for the remainder of the

alleged overpayment. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.)

PNG filed its complaint on May 11, 2010, asserting seven

claims for relief: (1) violation of the Federal

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; 

(2) breach of contract; (3) promissory estoppel; (4) unjust

enrichment; (5) conversion; (6) common counts--money paid by

mistake; and (7) declaratory relief. 

STANDARDS

I. Judicial Notice

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule

of Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d

646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of

U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Rule 201

permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact

“not subject to reasonable dispute” because the fact is either

“(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the

trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The court can take judicial

notice of matters of public record, such as pleadings in another

action and records and reports of administrative bodies. See

Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988).

“Even if a document is not attached to a complaint, it may

be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff

refers extensively to the document or the document forms the

basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” United States v. Ritchie, 342

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F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). “The defendant may offer such a

document, and the district court may treat such a document as

part of the complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are

true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” 

Id. The policy concern underlying the rule is to prevent

plaintiffs “from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by deliberately

omitting references to documents upon which their claims are

based.” Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998),

superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Abrego

Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2006).

II. Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

a party may by motion raise the defense that the court lacks

jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1). It is well established that the party seeking to

invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court bears the burden of

establishing the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Scott v.

Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). 

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the

standards the court is to apply vary according to the nature of

the jurisdictional challenge. A motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of

jurisdiction contained in the complaint as insufficient on their

face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction (a “facial

attack”) or may be made as a “speaking motion” attacking the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact (a “factual

attack”). Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &

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Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). 

If the 12(b)(1) motion constitutes a facial attack, the

court must consider the factual allegations of the complaint to

be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.

1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. If the motion constitutes a

factual attack, however, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to

plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material

facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for

itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). 

In situations “[w]here a jurisdictional issue is separable

from the merits of a case,” the court “may consider the evidence

presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue and rule on

that issue, resolving factual disputes if necessary.” Thornhill,

594 F.2d at 733. If, however, 

the jurisdictional issue and substantive

issues are so intertwined that the question

of jurisdiction is dependent on the

resolution of factual issues going to the

merits, the jurisdictional determination

should await a determination of the relevant

facts on either a motion going to the merits

or at trial.

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). 

In ruling on a jurisdictional motion in which factual issues also

go to the merits, the court should apply the standard used to

determine motions for summary judgment brought pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id.

ANALYSIS

Pac-West moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule

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12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed June 10, 2010, at 2.) 

Regarding Rule 12(b)(1), Pac-West argues that: (1) the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff’s claims are

subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the CPUC; (2)

the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction under the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3) the court should

decline to exercise jurisdiction under abstention doctrines. 

(Id.) Because the court finds that prudential considerations

favor deferring this case until the CPUC has passed on the issues

raised herein, and therefore stays this case, the court does not

reach Pac-West’s abstention or Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Pac-West asserts that the MSA constitutes an

“interconnection agreement” implementing obligations it has to

PNG under 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) and § 251(b)(1). (Def.’s Mem. P.

& A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (“Def’s. Mem.”), filed June 10, 2010,

at 2.) Pac-West contends that under the regulatory scheme of 47

U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252, disputes pertaining to interconnection

agreements are subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of

the applicable state commission--in this case, the CPUC. (Def’s.

Mem. at 2.) Thus, Pac-West argues, the court lacks jurisdiction

because PNG has not first brought a claim to the CPUC. (Id. at

6.) Pac-West has attached a copy of the MSA to its motion. 

(Def’s. Mem., Attachment A.) Because PNG relies on the MSA as

the basis of all of its claims, the court treats the MSA as part

///

///

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1 Because the contents of the MSA are also relevant to

Pac-West’s factual attack on the court’s jurisdiction, the court

may also consider the MSA on that basis. See Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733. 

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of the complaint. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908.1 

In addition, Pac-West has itself brought a related complaint

against PNG with the CPUC, filed May 11, 2010. (Def.’s Mem. at 2

(CPUC Case No. 10-05-011).) An administrative law judge has

scheduled a pre-hearing conference in that case for August 27,

2010. (Def.’s Reply, filed July 30, 2010, at 3.) Pac-West has

filed a request for judicial notice of several documents,

including Pac-West’s complaint filed with the CPUC (Def.’s

Request for Judicial Notice (“RFJN”), Ex. C) and an

Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling Extending Time for Filing of

Answer and Scheduling Pre-Hearing Conference (Def.’s Second

Request Judicial Notice (“Second RFJN”), Ex. J). The court takes

judicial notice of the these documents as records of an

administrative agency. See Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1198.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted “to promote

competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices

and higher quality services for American telecommunications

consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new

telecommunications technologies.” Preamble, Telecommunications

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-404, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Sections

251 and 252 of the Act concern the obligations of different kinds

of telecommunications carriers, including “local exchange

carriers” (“LECs”) and “incumbent local exchange carriers”

(“ILECs”). 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252. A local exchange carrier is

defined as “any person that is engaged in the provision of

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telephone exchange service or exchange access.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 153(26). Incumbent local exchange carriers are “companies that

traditionally provide local phone service.” Core Communications,

Inc. v. Verizon Penn., Inc., 493 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 2007). 

The general duties of telecommunications carriers include “to

interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and

equipment of other telecommunications carriers.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 251(a)(1). LECs are additionally subject, inter alia, to

“[t]he duty not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or

discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of

[their] telecommunications services.” Id. § 251(b)(1). 

The Act imposes additional obligations on ILECs, which must

“provide ‘interconnection’ to newer local exchange carriers.” 

W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Quest Corp., 530 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.

2008). “Interconnection allows customers of one [local exchange

carrier] to call the customers of another, with the calling

party’s [local exchange carrier] . . ., transporting the call to

the connection point, where the called party’s [local exchange

carrier] . . . takes over and transports the call to its end

point.” Id. (citing Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Peevey, 462 F.3d 1142,

1146 (9th Cir. 2006)) (alteration and ellipses in original). An

ILEC has the duty to negotiate an interconnection agreement with

a requesting carrier to provide “for the transmission and routing

of telephone exchange service and exchange access” according to

“rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and

nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms and conditions of

the agreement” and the requirements of the Act. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 251(c)(1), § 251(c)(2)(A),(D). 

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Section 252 establishes a procedural framework for

negotiation of § 251 agreements involving ILECs. An ILEC and a

requesting carrier may conduct voluntary negotiations and enter

an interconnection agreement. Id. § 252(a)(1). During

negotiations, either party may ask the applicable state

commission with regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications

carriers “to participate in the negotiation and to mediate any

differences.” See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(41), 252(a)(2). Either party

may also petition the state commission for compulsory arbitration

regarding an interconnection agreement. Id. § 252(b)(1). “Once

an interconnection agreement has been adopted either by

negotiation or after compulsory arbitration, it must ‘be

submitted for approval’ to the state commission, which must

either ‘approve or reject the agreement.’” W. Radio, 530 F.3d at

1190-91 (quoting § 252(e)(1)). The Act further provides that

“[i]n any case in which a State commission makes a determination

under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may

bring an action in the appropriate Federal district court to

determine whether the agreement or statement” meets the

requirements of §§ 251 and 252. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6). 

Here, PNG disputes Pac-West’s contention that the MSA is an

interconnection agreement negotiated pursuant to § 251, instead

characterizing the MSA as merely a “services contract,” and this

case as “a straight-forward breach of contract dispute that

happens to involve two competitive local exchange carriers.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n, filed July 23, 2010, at 2.) Because, as set forth

below, the court finds that prudential considerations support

deference to the CPUC, the court need not decide at this stage in

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2 The court observes that while plaintiff’s counsel has

asserted in the opposition and at oral argument that the MSA is

not an interconnection agreement, a Joint Status Report, filed

July 12, 2010, stated that the parties “entered into an

interconnection agreement known as a Master Services Agreement”

(emphasis added). This inconsistency strengthens defendant’s

contention that the CPUC is best situated to address in the first

instance the complex and technical issues raised by this case,

including whether or not the MSA is properly characterized as an

interconnection agreement. (See Def.’s Reply at 5-10.)

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the litigation whether the MSA is an interconnection agreement.2

However, even if the MSA were an interconnection agreement, the

express terms of 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252 would not preclude the

court from exercising original jurisdiction. See Core

Communications, 493 F.3d at 340 (“the Act is simply silent as to

the procedure for post-formation disputes.”). 

Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s assertions, while the

case law it cites to the court suggests that deference to the

CPUC may be appropriate, these precedents do not establish that a

dispute involving an interconnection agreement belongs to the

exclusive original jurisdiction of the applicable state

commission. Defendant relies on Core Communications, in which

the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding requiring

an LEC to exhaust its administrative remedies by bringing a claim

against an ILEC for breach of an interconnection agreement to the

state commission that had approved the agreement before

litigating the matter in federal court. 493 F.3d at 344. 

Defendant also relies on an unpublished California Court of

Appeal decision citing, in dicta, Core Communications on this

issue. See Cox California Telecom, LLC v. Global Naps

California, Inc., No. A124213, 2009 WL 3298158, *5 (Cal. App.

Oct. 14, 2009). Neither of these non-binding cases assert much

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less hold that this court lacks jurisdiction. Indeed, the only

Ninth Circuit case defendant cites makes it clear that deference

to state commissions is based on prudential, not jurisdictional,

grounds. See W. Radio, 530 F.3d at 1200 (requiring an LEC’s

claim against an ILEC to be brought first before the relevant

state commission, but emphasizing that “[t]his requirement . . .

is a prudential limitation on adjudication, not a statutory or

jurisdictional one.”). 

Moreover, not only does Pac-West fail to establish that the

CPUC has exclusive original jurisdiction over PNG’s claim, its

argument is undermined by Western Radio. In that case, the Ninth

Circuit considered whether 47 U.S.C. § 207 afforded a LEC a

private cause of action in federal court against an ILEC to

enforce the good faith negotiation requirements of § 251 and 

§ 252. W. Radio, 530 F.3d at 1196. The Ninth Circuit held that

any finality or exhaustion requirement under the Act “[did] not

affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court in

this case,” and concluded that the district court had general

federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at

1193.

At oral argument, defendant’s counsel attempted to

distinguish Western Radio, which involved ILEC obligations under

§ 252, from the instant case which involves only LECs. Counsel

characterized the precise issue here--whether a federal district

court has original jurisdiction over a dispute concerning an

alleged interconnection agreement implementing LEC obligations

under § 251 of the Act--as an issue of first impression. 

However, while unlike Western Radio no party here is an ILEC,

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thus rendering § 252 inapplicable, defendant fails to cite any

precedential authority to establish that such a distinction

somehow deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. In

fact, the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that “there is nothing

in the [Telecommunications] Act that limits federal question

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Pac. Bell v. Pac-West

Telecomm, Inc., 325 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, PNG adequately alleges federal question jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 207, as well as

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Compl. ¶ 2, 10.) 

Contrary to defendant’s assertions, nothing in the Act or the

caselaw precludes the court from exercising subject matter

jurisdiction.

II. Primary Jurisdiction

The prudential considerations Pac-West raises, however, are

relevant to its contention that the court should decline to

exercise jurisdiction over this matter in favor of proceeding

first to the CPUC. (Defs.’ Mem. at 7-10.) 

“Primary jurisdiction is not a doctrine that implicates the

subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Syntek

Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775,

780 (9th Cir. 2002). “Rather, it is a prudential doctrine under

which courts may, under appropriate circumstances, determine that

the initial decisionmaking responsibility should be performed by

the relevant agency rather than the courts.” Id. Primary

jurisdiction may apply where “a court determines that an

otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and policy

questions that should be addressed in the first instance by the

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agency with regulatory authority over the relevant industry

rather than by the judicial branch.” Clark v. Time Warner Cable,

523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The application of the doctrine is within the court’s

discretion and is appropriate where a case presents “(1) the need

to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within

the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory

authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or

activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4)

requires expertise or uniformity in administration.” Syntek, 307

F.3d at 781. 

In Western Radio, the Ninth Circuit considered the

applicability of primary jurisdiction to a claim brought by an

LEC against an ILEC for alleged failure to negotiate in good

faith pursuant to the requirements of § 251 and § 252. 530 F.3d

at 1200. The plaintiff LEC had filed a petition with the Oregon

Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) seeking arbitration of its

efforts to negotiate an interconnection agreement with an ILEC. 

Id. at 1189. When an arbitrator found in the defendant’s favor

on most issues and directed the parties to submit an

interconnection agreement consistent with his decision to the PUC

for approval, the plaintiff refused to sign the agreement

prepared by the defendant and filed suit in federal court. Id.

Applying the factors set forth in Clark, the Ninth Circuit

found that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was “not a

perfect fit” for the Telecommunications Act. Id. at 1200. The

court observed that “the agency with ‘regulatory authority’ in

this context, in the sense of having the authority to promulgate

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substantive regulations, is the F.C.C., not the state

commissions,” and noted that the Ninth Circuit had previously

questioned whether primary jurisdiction doctrine permits a case

to be referred to a state agency rather than a federal agency

(citing Cost Management Services, Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas

Co., 99 F.3d 937, 949 n.12 (9th Cir. 1996)). Id.

Nonetheless, the Western Radio court found that while “the

established contours” of primary jurisdiction doctrine “[did] not

quite apply, the basic concerns” underlying the doctrine were

applicable, and thus, that the “only sensible conclusion” in the

case was to require the plaintiff’s claim to be brought first to

the state commission. Id. The court reasoned that (1) “the

federal statutory scheme specifically grants authority to a state

agency to interpret and enforce the provisions of §§ 251 and

252”; (2) the policy consideration of relying on agency expertise

supported deference because the PUC had already dealt with the

issues, having arbitrated the interconnection agreement and

issued an order; (3) failing to require the plaintiff to await an

agency determination would produce “an extremely inefficient

bypass of an administrative remedy”; (4) requiring the plaintiff

to await an agency decision was consistent with the intent of §

251 and § 252; and (5) deference was “consistent with the general

principle that we attempt to strike a balance between the rights

of parties to bring their private causes of action in federal

court and a statutory scheme providing an alternative means of

resolution before an agency.” Id. at 1200-02 (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

///

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Applying the prudential considerations elaborated in Western

Radio to the instant case, the court finds it appropriate to

defer to the CPUC. Like Western Radio, this case allegedly

concerns interpretation of LEC obligations under § 251, and the

statutory scheme specifically grants state commissions the

authority to interpret § 251. See W. Radio, 530 F.3d at 1200. 

Furthermore, the CPUC has expertise in resolving interconnection

disputes and in the highly technical field of telecommunications,

an area beyond the ordinary experience of district courts. See

Rural Telephone Serv. v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., No. 08-2052-

JWL/JPO, 2008 WL 2169444, *6 (D. Kan. May 23, 2008). Morever, as

the issues raised in this case are already pending before the

CPUC, deference would avoid “an extremely inefficient bypass of

an administrative remedy.” W. Radio, 530 F.3d at 1201 (internal

quotations omitted). 

The court finds the case of Rural Telephone Services v.

Alltel Communications to be instructive here. Alltel concerned

claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust

enrichment arising out of a dispute over the alleged breach of an

interconnection agreement. 2008 WL 2169444 at *1. The Alltel

court found that “the parties’ dispute [was] permeated with

issues concerning intercarrier compensation obligations that are

not within the conventional experience of judges,” including

whether the agreement between the parties was an interconnection

agreement, whether the dispute was within a state commission’s

jurisdiction, and whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to

compensation pursuant to the agreement between the parties. Id.

at *6. All these issues are similarly present in the instant

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3 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pac. Bell v.

Pac-West Telecomm., Inc., 325 F.3d at 1126 provides support for

defendant’s position. There, the court recognized that the

Telecommunications Act of 1996 “granted the state commissions

limited defined authority over interstate traffic under §§ 251

and 252 of the Act.” Id.

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case. The Alltel court concluded that “the most prudent course

of action [would be] to stay further action on [the plaintiff’s]

claims in this case pending resolution of the issues that can and

should be determined by [the state commission] in the first

instance.” Id. at *7. The court finds the Alltel court’s

reasoning persuasive here. 

Finally, plaintiff also suggests that the CPUC may not

afford it adequate relief because this billing dispute involves

multiple states. (See Pl.’s Opp. at 3-4.) This assertion, both

in plaintiff’s opposition and during oral argument, is jejune and

lacking sufficient detail or any authority for the court to

evaluate its merits. Furthermore, defendant disputes plaintiff’s

assertion, arguing that the CPUC can exercise jurisdiction over

interstate disputes.3 (Def.’s Reply at 9.) In light of the

technical complexity of this case, where the parties dispute the

nature of the MSA and the services provided pursuant to that

agreement, the court finds that the CPUC is best situated to

determine in the first instance whether and to what extent it has

the authority to resolve the issues raised. Accordingly, the

court finds that the prudential considerations articulated in

Western Radio and Alltel Communications, on balance, support

deference to the CPUC.

Where a court defers to an administrative agency under the

primary jurisdiction doctrine, the court “has discretion either

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to retain jurisdiction or, if the parties would not be unfairly

disadvantaged, to dismiss the case without prejudice.” Reiter v.

Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1993). Here, the court denies

defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), finding

that it has subject matter jurisdiction, but will stay the case

pending disposition of the issues before the CPUC. Because

prudential considerations lead the court to defer to the CPUC,

the court does not reach Pac-West’s abstention or Rule 12(b)(6)

arguments. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint is DENIED. However, the court will stay

this case while the parties present the issues raised herein to

the CPUC for determination. The Clerk of the Court is directed

to enter a STAY of this case pending further order of the court.

The court directs the parties to file a joint status

conference statement within 30 days of any disposition by the 

CPUC. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 11, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:10-cv-01164-KJM-EFB Document 21 Filed 08/11/10 Page 17 of 17