Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04377/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04377-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

---

1

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ADIL HIRAMANEK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-04377-RMW 

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND 

DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 24, 26, 27

Plaintiff Adil Hiramanek filed suit generally alleging statutory and constitutional 

violations—including a challenge to the California statute under which the Santa Clara County 

Superior Court declared plaintiff a vexatious litigant—and challenges to federal court procedures 

that, according to plaintiff, unconstitutionally interfere with his right to appellate review. On April 

22, 2016, this court screened plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed all 

of plaintiff’s claims, and ordered plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed 

with prejudice and why plaintiff should not be barred from filing further related complaints

without leave of court. Dkt. No. 24. The matter came before the court for hearing on May 20, 

2016. Having considered the papers that plaintiff submitted and his arguments at the hearing and 

for the reasons below, the court dismisses plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend and 

declares plaintiff a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff must obtain leave of the court before filing further 

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 1 of 19
2

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

actions in this court against state or federal courts, their judges, their employees, and the United 

States and its officials, with respect to the claims asserted in plaintiff’s complaint or substantially 

similar claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s complaint names numerous state and federal officials as defendants.1Plaintiff’s 

claims arise from plaintiff’s involvement in multiple state court cases and at least one federal case. 

One of the key conflicts plaintiff experienced with the California courts occurred during a marital 

dissolution proceeding initiated by plaintiff’s ex-wife in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, 

Case No. 1-09-FL-149682. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 121, 323. During that case, the family 

law judge allegedly issued a restraining order against plaintiff preventing plaintiff from having 

access to his children for fifty years. Id. ¶¶ 130, 314. The family law judge also deemed plaintiff a 

vexatious litigant under state law. Id. ¶ 124. Plaintiff was also involved in criminal proceedings in 

state court. Plaintiff pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge to avoid felony charges of forgery and 

identity theft. Id. ¶ 127. Plaintiff has apparently appealed this conviction on the grounds that the 

plea agreement was involuntary. Id. ¶ 127 n.27. Plaintiff’s complaint mentions plaintiff’s 

involvement in other state court cases as well. See, e.g., id. ¶ 155. Plaintiff is currently involved in 

at least one other federal case against state court employees, Case No. 5:13-cv-00228-RMW, 

pending in this court. Id. ¶ 151.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to File Excess Pages

The court’s April 22, 2016 order to show cause indicated that plaintiff could file a written 

 

1

The named defendants are: (1) The California Judicial Council; (2) Martin Hoshino, the Judicial 

Council’s Administrative Director; (3) California licensed court reporters Georgeann M. Wiles, 

Stacie Antonio, Melissa Crawford, and Graciela Miramontes; (4) The California Sixth District 

Court of Appeal, its Presiding Justice Conrad Rushing, and its employees Daniel Potter and Scott 

Nasson; (5) The California First District Court of Appeal; (6) The California Supreme Court; (7)

Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of California and Director of the California Judicial Council; 

(8) Steven Jahr, Administrative Director of the California Courts; (9) The United States of 

America; (10) Sidney Thomas, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; and 

(11) Loretta Lynch, the United States Attorney General.

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 2 of 19
3

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

response by May 6, 2016, not to exceed 25 double-spaced pages, addressing: (1) why the 

complaint should not be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety for failure to state a claim; and (2) 

why plaintiff should not be declared a vexatious litigant and barred from filing similar actions 

without pre-filing review. On May 6, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to exceed this page limit. Dkt. 

No. 26. Plaintiff claims, without citation to any authority, that he was entitled to file two 25-page 

responses to the court’s 18-page order to show cause—one for each topic above. Without waiting 

for a response to his motion, plaintiff filed a 37-page response to the order to show cause, Dkt. No. 

27, along with 7 pages of additional objections to the order, Dkt. No. 27-2, and hundreds of pages 

of supporting attachments, Dkt. Nos. 27-3 to 27-7. Plaintiff’s interpretation of this court’s order, 

which cited the 25-page limit imposed by Civil Local Rule 7-4(b), is unreasonable and supports 

this court’s finding that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. The court nevertheless will consider the 

arguments in plaintiff’s written submissions. 

B. Dismissal Without Leave to Amend 

This court’s April 22, 2016 order screened plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims, and ordered plaintiff to show cause why this 

case should not be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. Dkt. No. 24. 

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “should be 

freely granted when justice so requires.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a court “may exercise its discretion to deny 

leave to amend due to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 

party . . . , [and] futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 

892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (alterations in 

original).

Plaintiff filed a written response to the order to show cause on May 6, 2016. Dkt. No. 27. 

Plaintiff also filed a proposed addendum to his complaint, Dkt. No. 27-1, but the proposed 

addendum amends only Claim 6 of the complaint regarding the court reporters, not the other five 

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 3 of 19
4

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

claims. This order addresses each claim in plaintiff’s complaint.

1. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Related Claims

Claim 1 of the complaint is directed against California’s Supreme Court, First District 

Court of Appeal, Sixth District Court of Appeal, Judicial Council, and Chief Justice CantilSakauye (in her “official capacity”) and alleges that the court defendants denied plaintiff various 

disability accommodations including requests for telephonic appearances and electronic filing. 

Plaintiff’s only specific alleged disability that this court was able to identify in the complaint is 

plaintiff’s need to keep his foot elevated. See Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26, 28.

This court’s April 22, 2016 order provided multiple, independent reasons why Claim 1 of 

plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Dkt. No. 24 at 5-8. In 

response, as noted above, plaintiff filed a 37-page responsive brief and a 12-page proposed 

addendum to Claim 6 (but not Claim 1) of the complaint, and plaintiff presented oral argument. 

While plaintiff’s responses address some of the court’s reasons for dismissal, plaintiff still fails to 

explain why plaintiff’s alleged disabilities prevented him from being able to appear personally in 

court or use the state courts’ existing filing mechanisms. Plaintiff thus fails to explain how 

plaintiff suffered unlawful treatment—or any harm at all—due to his disability. 

Plaintiff’s continued failure to explain how his alleged disabilities prevented him from 

accessing the state courts is fatal to his claim. As noted in this court’s April 22, 2016 order, in 

another pending ADA case in which Hiramanek asserted a nearly identical claim, this court ruled 

on summary judgment that the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara did not violate 

the ADA by denying plaintiff’s requests for telephonic appearances or by refusing to allow 

electronic filing, despite the fact that his disability required him to keep his foot elevated. 

Hiramanek v. Clark, No. 5:13-CV-00228-RMW, 2016 WL 687974, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 

2016) (Dkt. No. 546). Because the Superior Court was wheelchair accessible and allowed filings 

by mail, this court ruled, plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing that the accommodations 

offered by the Superior Court were unreasonable in light of his disabilities. Id. In the instant case, 

Hiramanek has not alleged that the state appellate or supreme courthouses are not wheelchair 

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 4 of 19
5

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

accessible. Nor has plaintiff explained how defendants’ existing filing mechanisms are insufficient 

to accommodate his alleged disabilities. Moreover, plaintiff has not indicated in his responsive 

brief, in his proposed addendum to the complaint, or at oral argument that he could make such 

factual allegations if allowed leave to amend. The court concludes that allowing plaintiff to amend 

would be futile.

Plaintiff argues that he does not have the burden to allege that the accommodations 

requested were necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of his disabilities, Dkt. No. 27 at 2, 

but plaintiff’s argument is inconsistent with the plain text of federal regulations and with Ninth 

Circuit law. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in 

policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on 

the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications 

would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”) (emphasis added); 

Memmer v. Marin Cty. Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Because Memmer bears the 

burden of proof, she must show how the accommodations offered by [defendant] were not 

reasonable.”); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To prevail under the 

ADA, Duvall must show that the accommodations offered by the County were not reasonable, and 

that he was unable to participate equally in the proceedings at issue.”). 

Furthermore, the court concludes that allowing plaintiff leave to amend to describe 

additional alleged disabilities would be futile. Plaintiff claims that he has unspecified disabilities 

in addition to the alleged foot injury described in his complaint, but plaintiff’s submissions do not 

describe what these alleged disabilities are or explain why they prevented him from accessing the 

defendant state courts.

2

See Dkt. No. 27 at 3-4. If plaintiff were able to allege the existence of 

other disabilities, he could have described those disabilities in his proposed addendum to the

complaint, Dkt. No. 27-1, and, to the extent plaintiff is concerned about medical privacy, plaintiff 

 

2

To the extent that plaintiff claims that the undersigned judge is already aware of plaintiff’s other 

alleged disabilities from proceedings in another case, plaintiff is improperly relying on evidence 

outside of the pleadings in this case.

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 5 of 19
6

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

could have moved to file his proposed amendments under seal. Plaintiff failed to do so. 

Moreover, plaintiff’s failure to explain how denials of telephonic appearances or electronic 

filing harmed him suggests that plaintiff does not have standing to pursue his claims. Standing 

under Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires: (1) “injury in fact—an invasion of a legally 

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) causation—“there must be a causal connection between the injury 

and the conduct complained of”; and (3) redressability—“it must be likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). 

During oral argument, plaintiff struggled to remember what he was even trying to accomplish in 

the lawsuits in which the defendant courts allegedly denied his requests to appear telephonically. 

Claim 1 of plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages “estimated at no less than $9,999,999,” plus 

“exemplary damages.” Compl. ¶ 69.x. Plaintiff has not plead or otherwise explained any facts to 

suggest that the defendants’ alleged denials of his ADA requests caused plaintiff millions of 

dollars in harm. This suggests bad faith on plaintiff’s part. Nor has plaintiff explained how a 

favorable outcome in this case would remedy the harm he allegedly suffered. 

Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim or allege sufficient facts to indicate that he has 

standing, this order need not address plaintiff’s other arguments. Plaintiff has not explained how 

amendment would cure these deficiencies. Accordingly, Claim 1 of plaintiff’s complaint is 

dismissed without leave to amend. 

2. Civil Rights and Obstruction of Justice Claims

This court dismissed Claim 2 of plaintiff’s complaint against Justice Rushing and Court of 

Appeal employees Nasson and Potter because the complaint failed to adequately place defendants 

on notice of the allegations against them and because defendants were likely entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment and/or judicial immunity. See Dkt. No. 24 at 8-9. Plaintiff’s written response does not 

even attempt to address the fact that Claim 2 fails to state a claim because it lists more than thirty 

different subsections of the United States Code, California statutes, and the U.S. and California 

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 6 of 19
7

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

constitutions, most of which bear no relation to the recited factual allegations. Plaintiff’s written 

submissions make no attempt to explain his claim against each defendant in a way that would 

provide adequate notice of the allegations against them. 

Nor does plaintiff cite any Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition that judicial or quasijudicial immunity does not apply to court staff who refuse to accept filings. In directly analogous 

cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that judicial or quasi-judicial immunity applies. See Mullis v. U.S. 

Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that court clerks 

who allegedly refused to accept an amended petition were entitled to “absolute quasi-judicial 

immunity” because they “perform[ed] tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.”); 

Sedgwick v. United States, 265 F. App’x 567 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming decision that court clerk 

who refused to file premature petition was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity against due 

process claims). 

While plaintiff cites Duvall v. County of Kitsap in support of his argument that judicial or 

quasi-judicial immunity should not apply, the portion of the case that Hiramanek cites involved an 

ADA coordinator who refused to allow Duvall to use a videotext display, not a clerk who refused 

to accept a filing.3See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 2001). In any 

event, while the Duvall court found that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment in 

favor of the ADA coordinator, the Duvall court also affirmed the lower court’s decision that 

judicial immunity precluded claims against the presiding judge. 260 F.3d at 1133. To the extent 

that plaintiff attempts to distinguish Justice Rushing from the judge in Duvall by arguing that that 

plaintiff is suing Justice Rushing only in his administrative capacity, other courts have found that 

judicial immunity applies even when a judge did not personally preside over a plaintiff’s case. See

Labankoff v. Jaroslovsky, No. C 10-0089 SBA, 2010 WL 1265853, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 

 

3

The court notes that aside from judicial immunity, Congress explicitly intended to limit the 

Eleventh Amendment immunity defense that might otherwise be available in ADA cases. See 42 

U.S.C. § 12202 (providing that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment . . . 

for a violation of this Act”). Plaintiff does not allege that Potter, Nasson, or Justice Rushing were 

ruling on ADA requests; he alleges that these defendants refused to accept filings.

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 7 of 19
8

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2010) (dismissing claims against chief judge of Ninth Circuit for alleged failure to supervise 

bankruptcy court staff who refused to accept filing); Ocasio v. Kozinski, No. C 08-4820 JF (PR), 

2008 WL 5046288, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2008) (dismissing claims against chief judge and 

staff of Ninth Circuit for alleged failure to file exhibits pertaining to a complaint).

It is also unclear that plaintiff has standing in relation to the Sixth District Court of 

Appeal’s alleged refusal to accept a filing on June 11, 2015. To the extent that plaintiff claims 

injury from that incident, plaintiff has not adequately alleged that defendants’ actions caused his 

injury. As this court understands plaintiff’s allegations, it appears that the Court of Appeal did not 

reject a filing directly from plaintiff or his agents; rather, the Court of Appeal refused to accept a 

filing that had been mistakenly sent to “Susan,” a representative of “the landlord of 

DEFENDANTS’ work location.” Compl. ¶ 72. To the extent that plaintiff’s filing was sent to 

“Susan” instead of the court, plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants’ actions, as opposed to 

the actions of whoever mistakenly delivered the filing to “Susan,” caused plaintiff’s alleged injury. 

Accordingly Claim 2 of plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. 

3. Claims Regarding Referral of In Forma Pauperis Determinations to 

District Court on Appeal

This court dismissed Claim 3 of plaintiff’s complaint against the United States, the U.S. 

Attorney General, or Chief Judge Thomas on sovereign and/or judicial immunity grounds. See

Dkt. No. 24 at 9-10. While plaintiff seems to acknowledge that sovereign immunity generally bars 

suits against the U.S. government, plaintiff argues that some exception applies. This court finds 

plaintiff’s arguments unpersuasive. 

Because plaintiff now clarifies that he seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief rather 

than monetary damages, Dkt. No. 27 at 10, his citations to the Federal Tort Claims Act (including 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 and 2674) as an exception to sovereign immunity do not apply.

4

 

4

See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983) (“Not every claim invoking the 

Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must 

be one for money damages against the United States, and the claimant must demonstrate that the 

source of substantive law he relies upon can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by 

the Federal Government for the damages sustained.”) (citations omitted).

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 8 of 19
9

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff’s claims for nonmonetary relief fare no better. Plaintiff cites Glines v. Wade, 586 F.2d 

675, 681 (9th Cir. 1978) for the proposition that “on actions seeking nonmonetary relief or actions 

claiming that a government official acted in violation of the Constitution or of statutory authority,” 

district courts have jurisdiction because “in these situations Congress has either waived sovereign 

immunity or the doctrine does not apply.” Glines is distinguishable, however, because the quoted 

text explicitly relies on 5 U.S.C. § 702, which states, in relevant part: 

An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than 

money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or 

employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or 

under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief 

therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or 

that the United States is an indispensable party.

5 U.S.C. § 702. Hiramanek does not rely on this statute as a basis for jurisdiction, nor could he, 

because the definition of “agency” in the statute explicitly excludes “the courts of the United 

States.”55 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(B). “[A] waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity 

must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will be strictly construed, in terms of its 

scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (citation 

omitted).

Plaintiff asserts, without any analysis, that Mills v. United States, 742 F.3d 400, 405 (9th 

Cir. 2014) and Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1997) are distinguishable from the 

instant case. Both of these cases applied the general rule that sovereign immunity bars suits 

against the Federal Government for declaratory and injunctive relief. However, plaintiff fails to 

identify a valid exception to the general rule that applies here. The cases on which plaintiff relies 

distinguish between ultra vires activity that would waive sovereign immunity and “the situation 

where an employee acting as a government agent, commits an act that is arguably a mistake of fact 

or law.” United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, even if 

plaintiff were correct that the Ninth Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. § 47 in referring in forma pauperis 

 

5

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to avoid judicial immunity by arguing that he is suing 

Chief Judge Thomas in his capacity as the head of an administrative agency, plaintiff’s argument 

fails at least because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is not an “agency.”

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 9 of 19
10

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

applications to the district court—and the court is unaware of any authority suggesting that 

plaintiff is correct—such a mistake would not waive sovereign immunity. 

Plaintiff bears the burden to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity, Prescott v. United 

States, 973 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1992), but plaintiff fails to identify any statute or other 

authority that would grant him a private right of action for his claims. Accordingly, Claim 3 of 

plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. 

4. Claims Regarding California Vexatious Litigant Statute

This court dismissed Claim 4 of plaintiff’s complaint against California Chief Justice 

Cantil-Sakauye, the California Judicial Council, Martin Hoshino, and Steven Jahr based on 

judicial immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, failure to state a claim based on existing 

precedents, and issue preclusion. Dkt. No. 24 at 10-13. Plaintiff responds with several arguments 

for why the court should permit plaintiff’s claims regarding California’s vexatious litigant statute 

to go forward, see Dkt. No. 27 at 12-18, but, with one exception,6the court does not find 

plaintiff’s arguments persuasive. 

Plaintiff spends over four pages of his responsive brief attempting to distinguish this case 

from Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2007), a case in which the Ninth Circuit considered 

and rejected a constitutional challenge to California’s vexatious litigant statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 391.7. See Dkt. No. 27 at 14-18. While this order does not discuss each of plaintiff’s 34

purported distinctions with Wolfe v. George in detail,7the court notes that plaintiff attempts to 

draw some distinctions that are immaterial (such as plaintiff’s argument that the statute is vague);

some distinctions that are simply false (such as plaintiff’s assertion that Section 391.7 did not 

provide for a contempt penalty at the time Wolfe v. George was decided); and some distinctions 

 

6

If Claim 4 did not suffer from more serious deficiencies, the court would agree with plaintiff that 

an amendment clarifying that plaintiff is suing Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye in her administrative 

capacity as chair of the California Judicial Council and not in her judicial capacity might eliminate 

the judicial immunity issue that the court raised.

7

The court reemphasizes that Claim 4 of the complaint spans over 200 paragraphs and thus fails to 

comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s requirement to provide “short and plain” 

statements of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction and the claims at issue.

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 10 of 19
11

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

that are frivolous (such as plaintiff’s argument that his vexatious litigant status constitutes a 

disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act).

8

The main distinction that plaintiff attempts to draw with Wolfe v. George is that Hiramanek 

claims that the vexatious litigant statute prevented him from defending himself in a criminal 

matter and in a separate divorce proceeding initiated by plaintiff’s ex-wife. Plaintiff claims that the 

right to defense is fundamental. A fatal flaw with plaintiff’s argument, however, is that the text of 

the vexatious litigant statute indicates that it does not require pre-filing approval in criminal 

matters: “For purposes of this section, ‘litigation’ includes any petition, application, or motion 

other than a discovery motion, in a proceeding under the Family Code or Probate Code, for any 

order.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391.7(d) (emphasis added). Moreover, plaintiff does not argue that 

the vexatious litigant statute denied him the right to representation in a criminal matter. To the 

contrary, the closest plaintiff comes to stating a claim is his allegation that the California Supreme 

Court declined to allow him to terminate his attorney and proceed pro se in an appeal on the basis 

of his vexatious litigant status. See Compl. ¶¶ 138-39. Neither plaintiff’s complaint nor his 

responsive brief present facts or an explanation to make it plausible that the vexatious litigant 

statute prejudiced Hiramanek in his defense of a criminal matter. Nor does plaintiff plead facts to 

suggest that but for his vexatious litigant status, the result of his family law case would have been 

different. In short, even if this court were to credit plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish Wolfe v. 

George, plaintiff’s complaint would fail to state a claim and fail to show that he has Article III 

standing. 

Even if Hiramanek’s case were materially distinguishable from Wolfe’s, this court’s April 

22, 2016 order noted that another court in this district has dismissed Hiramanek’s own previous 

challenge to the vexatious litigant statute, and the Ninth Circuit has affirmed that decision. Pierce 

v. Cantil-Sakauye, No. C 13-01295 JSW, 2013 WL 4382735 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013), aff’d, 628 

 

8

In fact, that statute has provided a contempt penalty since well before Wolfe v. George was 

litigated. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391.7(a) (Deering 1999) (warning that “[d]isobedience” of a 

pre-filing order “by a vexatious litigant may be punished as a contempt of court.”)

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 11 of 19
12

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

F. App’x 548 (9th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff attempts to distance himself from that result by arguing, 

among other things that he was “not a named party” in Pierce. This court’s prior order already 

explained why that argument is misleading at best and dishonest at worst: While it appears that 

both the district court and Hiramanek’s counsel in Pierce had difficulty spelling Mr. Hiramanek’s 

name correctly, a review of the pleadings in that action indicates that Adil Hiramanek was the 

plaintiff both in that action and in the instant case. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 124, 323 (describing how a 

family court judge deemed plaintiff a vexatious litigant in case number 1-09-FL-149682 on June 

2, 2010), with Pierce, Case No. C 13–01295 JSW Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 23-24 (describing how a family 

court judge issued a prefilling order against “Adil Hiramenk” [sic] in case number 

1-09-FL-149682 on June 2, 2010). Plaintiff claims that he had no control of the Pierce filings and 

that at some point “prior to the finality of Pierce v. Cantil-Tani Sakauye 628 F. App’x 548, 549 

(9th Cir. 2016) [plaintiff] informed Pierce’s counsel on more than one occasion not to represent 

[plaintiff].” Dkt. No. 27-3 (Hiramanek Decl.) ¶ 37. However, plaintiff does not claim that he did 

not participate in the investigation or filing of Pierce; he simply argues that at some point before 

the Ninth Circuit decided the case on appeal, Hiramanek asked his counsel Mr. Cunningham not to 

represent him. Moreover, Hiramanek apparently told counsel in Pierce that “Having said that I 

will not object, nor am I legally able to object, to your using facts of my case.” Id. Plaintiff stops 

short of saying that Cunningham pursued the Pierce case without plaintiff’s consent. Even if 

plaintiff himself had not participated in Pierce, the fact remains that another court in this district 

and now the Ninth Circuit have decided, based on the facts of Mr. Hiramanek’s experience as a 

vexatious litigant, that plaintiff’s challenge to the vexatious litigant statute should fail.

Finally, Hiramanek argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude his claims 

because he is asserting a facial challenge to the vexatious litigant statute and not seeking reversal 

of the state court’s orders declaring him a vexatious litigant. The court finds plaintiff’s argument 

unpersuasive. The injunctive relief that plaintiff requests is, effectively, to prevent the state court 

from enforcing its pre-filing order against plaintiff. See Compl. ¶ 352.ii (seeking an injunction 

preventing defendants “from engaging in any practice or activity which discriminates PLAINTIFF 

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 12 of 19
13

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

and specifically from attempting to threaten PLAINTIFF or encourage others to do so directly or 

indirectly.”). Moreover, Claim 4 of plaintiff’s complaint contains multiple references to the state 

court’s specific order declaring plaintiff a vexatious litigant. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 131; 146; 148 

(“Order Considers Wrong Window of Time”); 149; 150 (referring to “the Order in question”); 

151-57. Given plaintiff’s fixation on the order issued against him, plaintiff’s denial that his 

complaint is a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court order is simply not a fair reading of his 

complaint.

For at least the reasons set forth above, Claim 4 of plaintiff’s complaint regarding the state 

vexatious litigant statute is dismissed without leave to amend. 

5. Challenge to Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

This court dismissed Claim 5 of plaintiff’s complaint against the United States and its 

Attorney General on sovereign immunity grounds. Plaintiff’s written opposition merely notes that 

he intends to amend his complaint but does not describe any specific amendments, let alone 

amendments that would overcome the court’s basis for dismissal. Dkt. No. 27 at 18. While 

plaintiff argues that the United States and the Attorney General are not immune from suit, plaintiff 

once again fails to identify any statute or other authority that would grant him a private right of 

action for his claims. Accordingly, Claim 5 of plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without leave to 

amend.

6. “Doctoring the Record” Claim

This court dismissed Claim 6 of plaintiff’s complaint against California court reporters 

because plaintiff’s allegations failed to show that plaintiff had standing and lacked sufficient 

particularity to place defendants on notice of the allegations against them. Dkt. No. 24 at 13-14. 

Plaintiff’s proposed addendum to his complaint, Dkt. No. 27-1, fails to cure these deficiencies. 

Plaintiff still does not allege that he suffered a concrete injury that can be traced to the court 

reporters’ alleged transcription errors. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations against the court reporters 

are still too vague and conclusory to provide them with adequate notice of which laws plaintiff 

claims they violated. For example, plaintiff claims that defendant Antonio “provided an 

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 13 of 19
14

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

incomplete and doctored transcript with the most important part favorable to PLAINTIFF omitted 

or marked as ‘- -’”. Dkt. No. 27-1 at 1. Plaintiff does not explain what was important or inaccurate 

in the transcript in question. In another example, plaintiff claims that several words were 

misreported in a transcript from defendant Crawford, see id. at 2, but plaintiff pleads no facts to 

suggest that these errors were material, intentional, or injurious to plaintiff. While plaintiff alleges 

somewhat more specific errors in a transcript from defendant Miramontes, id. at 8, plaintiff once 

again does not explain how these alleged errors were material, intentional, or injurious to 

plaintiff.9Plaintiff also indicates that he acknowledged to Miramontes a benign explanation for the 

alleged errors: “his accent, his asthma condition, and his telephone appearance.” Id. at 5. As to 

defendant Wiles, it is unclear from plaintiff’s proposed addendum that Wiles participated in any 

alleged alterations to any transcripts. Plaintiff’s proposed addendum also contains multiple 

paragraphs that appear to criticize not the accuracy of defendants’ transcripts but the delays and 

fees associated with these transcripts. In short, plaintiff’s proposed addendum to Claim 6 still fails 

to state a claim and show that plaintiff has standing, and Claim 6 is dismissed without leave to 

amend.

C. Plaintiff’s Vexatious Conduct

“The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides district courts with the inherent power 

to enter pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500

F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). “Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated 

because it enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to 

consider the meritorious claims of other litigants.” De Long v. Hennessy, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 

(9th Cir. 1990). A court may restrict such litigants’ future filing of actions or papers provided that 

it (1) gives the litigant an opportunity to oppose the order before it is entered; (2) creates an 

adequate record for review; (3) makes substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature 

 

9

For example, plaintiff alleges that a transcript from Miramontes misstated the date of a hearing 

as 3013 instead of 2013, omitted “plaintiff’s objection to minor counsel’s legal standing,” omitted 

a “personal service statement,” and contained instances in which “words are missing and the 

transcript purposely hides them with ‘unintelligible’ excuse.” Id. at 8.

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 14 of 19
15

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

of the litigant’s actions; and (4) drafts a sufficiently tailored order. Id. at 1145–48. To determine 

whether a litigant is “vexatious,” courts consider, among other factors, the number and nature of 

the litigant’s court filings, the litigant’s motive in submitting those filings, and whether the 

litigant’s filings have caused other parties needless expense or imposed an unnecessary burden on 

the courts or court staff. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057–58 (applying the factors from Safir v. U.S. 

Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2nd Cir. 1986)).

1. Notice and Hearing

The plaintiff has had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. He was electronically 

served with the Order to Show Cause on April 22, 2016, and plaintiff appeared telephonically at 

his request at a hearing on the instant motion on May 20, 2016. Plaintiff’s argument that notice 

was inadequate is belied by the fact that plaintiff had time to submit a 37-page written opposition, 

a 12-page proposed addendum to his complaint, 7 additional pages of objections, and hundreds of 

pages of declarations and supporting documents in advance of the hearing.

2. An Adequate Record

The record for review includes this order, the findings in the Order to Show Cause, and 

prior orders cited in the Order to Show Cause. See Dkt. No. 24 at 15-17. For example, in another 

pending case before this court, Hiramanek v. Clark, Case No. 5:13-CV-00228-RMW, Mr. 

Hiramanek and his mother Roda attempted to assert 48 claims, all but one of which were stricken, 

dismissed, or adjudicated in favor of defendants. See, e.g., Case No. 5:13-CV-00228-RMW, Dkt. 

Nos. 94-1, 19, 98, 546, 570, 708, 711. One claim remains pending.

The record for review also includes state court filings. Claim 4 of plaintiff’s complaint in 

the instant case spans over 200 paragraphs and stems from the fact that the state court has declared 

plaintiff a vexatious litigant. See Marriage of Hiramanek, No. H035887, 2012 WL 3608515, at *3 

(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2012) (describing the basis for the state court’s order finding plaintiff a 

vexatious litigant in his divorce case)). Plaintiff objects to this court’s consideration of the state 

court’s declaration that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. Dkt. No. 27 at 29. This court need not 

adopt the state court’s reasoning, however, to note the indisputable fact that plaintiff did submit 

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 15 of 19
16

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

multiple, unsuccessful filings in state court, just as he did in federal court.

The record for review also includes plaintiff’s involvement in a prior case in which another 

court in this district rejected Mr. Hiramanek’s claims against the California vexatious litigant 

statute. See Pierce v. Cantil-Sakauye, 2013 WL 4382735, at *5-7, aff’d, 628 F. App’x 548 (9th 

Cir. 2016).

Finally, the record for review includes the fact that Mr. Hiramanek unsuccessfully 

attempted to remove a state criminal case against him to federal court. The People of the State of 

California v. Hiramanek, Case No. 5:14-cv-04640-BLF.

3. Finding of Frivolousness or Harassment

a. Plaintiff’s Litigation History

The cases filed by plaintiff since 2013, including Case No. 13-CV-00228-RMW (Clark), 

Case No. 13-CV-01295-JSW (Pierce), and the instant case have named numerous defendants 

including defendants who have no connection with the conduct about which plaintiff appears to 

complain. The Clark action, like the instant case, asserted claims against the California state courts 

and their employees for alleged disability discrimination, civil rights violations, and 

conspiracies.10 While it is true that not all of the claims in the Clark action were dismissed out of 

hand and that the case remains pending, the defendants and the court had to expend excessive 

resources even to understand plaintiff’s claims well enough to adjudicate them. Cf. Molski, 500 

F.3d at 1062 (“acknowledge[ing] that Molski’s numerous suits were probably meritorious in part” 

but nevertheless finding that Molski was a vexatious litigant). The Pierce action, directed against 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Steven Jahr was, like the instant case, an unsuccessful lawsuit to 

overturn California’s vexatious litigant statute. Plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to remove a state 

criminal case against him to federal court in Case No. 5:14-cv-04640-BLF also wasted time and 

judicial resources. The court finds that these lawsuits were harassing and largely frivolous.

 

10 The court also notes that in the Clark action, plaintiff would often assert that he served his 

filings “on the designated person at the U.S. Department of Justice.” See, e.g., Case No. 

13-CV-00228-RMW, Dkt. Nos. 559, 568.

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 16 of 19
17

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

b. Plaintiff’s Motive in Pursuing Litigation

The plaintiff continues to assert baseless claims that ultimately seem to originate from the 

fact that during plaintiff’s divorce case, a state court judge: (a) issued a restraining order against 

plaintiff preventing plaintiff from having access to his children for fifty years and (b) declared 

plaintiff a vexatious litigant under state law. See Compl. ¶¶ 124, 130, 314. Plaintiff’s claims 

against the state entities and employees derive from his contact with the state court during his 

family law proceedings or related cases. Moreover, plaintiff’s claims against the federal 

defendants relate to plaintiff’s lack of success in federal court against the state officials. The 

record suggests that plaintiff’s claims are intended to harass the government defendants who 

allowed plaintiff’s children to be taken away. At best, plaintiff’s claims constitute repeated, 

improper attempts to circumvent the state and federal appellate processes. 

The large amount of damages that plaintiff seeks in the instant case also suggests that 

plaintiff’s complaint is intended to harass defendants. See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1060 n.6 (“Because 

[Molski] claimed damages far in excess of his actual injuries, his exaggerated claims of damages 

support a pre-filing order to the extent that he sought to recover more than the statutory minimum 

of damages.”). Here, Claims 2 and 6 of plaintiff’s complaint seek tens or hundreds of millions of 

dollars in damages without any allegation to suggest that plaintiff’s alleged injuries support these 

amounts.11 The record suggests that plaintiff is not motivated by the merits of his claims.

c. Whether Plaintiff Has Caused Unnecessary Expense to the 

Parties or Placed Needless Burdens on the Court

Plaintiff has attempted to force dozens of defendants to respond to his nearly 

incomprehensible claims. His complaint in the instant action spans 83 pages and close to 400 

paragraphs. Moreover, on multiple occasions in Case No. 5:13-CV-00228-RMW, Mr. Hiramanek 

filed unnecessary, unsuccessful motions that resulted in undue cost for defendants, undue 

consumption of judicial resources, or both. These motions include, but are not limited to 

 

11 See Compl. ¶ 90 (seeking $9,999,999 plus punitive damages from Justice Rushing and Sixth 

District Court of Appeal employees Nasson and Potter despite the fact that they are immune from 

money damages); id. ¶ 385 (seeking $999,999,999 from the court reporter defendants).

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 17 of 19
18

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

approximately: 4 motions to add defendants or claims to his 253-page revised second amended 

complaint,12 13 motions for review of orders by the assigned magistrate judge,13 7 other motions 

for reconsideration,14 and 12 discovery motions.15 Plaintiff also repeatedly violated rules on page 

limits,

16 just as he has done in responding to the Order to Show Cause in the instant case. Even if, 

as plaintiff argues, the orders above did not each explicitly find that plaintiff’s arguments were 

frivolous, the orders support the court’s finding that plaintiff’s litigation tactics, when viewed in 

combination, have been frivolous. 

4. Narrow Tailoring of the Order

As shown by his litigation conduct, plaintiff has a history of filing suits alleging disability 

discrimination, civil rights, or conspiracy claims against state or federal courts, their judges, their 

employees, and the U.S. Department of Justice and its officials. Any potential order needs to be 

narrowly tailored to fit the specific misconduct encountered. The court holds that the proper order 

is to require plaintiff to obtain leave of court before filing any disability discrimination, civil 

rights, or conspiracy claims against state or federal courts, their judges, their employees, and the 

U.S. Department of Justice and its officials. In light of plaintiff’s extensive litigation history, the 

fact that plaintiff is pro se does not negate this court’s finding that a pre-filing restriction is 

necessary.

III. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff Adil Hiramanek is declared a vexatious litigant. Mr. Hiramanek must obtain 

leave of court before filing any further suits in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

California alleging any disability discrimination, civil rights, or conspiracy claims against state or 

 

12 See Case No. 5:13-CV-00228-RMW, Dkt. Nos. 146, 164; 203, 208; 375, 424; 563, 570.

13 See id. Dkt. Nos. 263-64, 280; 266, 287; 276, 291; 367, 382; 535-42, 565.

14 See id. Dkt. Nos. 35, 36; 79, 80; 107, 115; 212, 215; 559, 567, 568, 571.

15 See id. Dkt. Nos. 306, 327; 323, 341, 354, 389, 390, 392, 393, 394, 451; 324, 350; 351, 353; 

381, 383.

16 See, e.g., id. Dkt. Nos. 291 at 2, 382 at 9, 565, 571.

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 18 of 19
19

5:15-cv-04377-RMW

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

federal courts, their judges, their employees, and the U.S. Department of Justice and its officials.

The Clerk of this court shall not accept for filing any further complaints filed by Mr. Hiramanek

alleging any disability discrimination, civil rights, or conspiracy claims against state or federal

courts, their judges, their employees, and the U.S. Department of Justice and its officials until that 

complaint has first been reviewed by a judge of this court and approved for filing. The pre-filing 

review will be made by the general duty judge who will determine whether plaintiff has stated a 

potentially cognizable claim in a short, intelligible and plain statement.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 31, 2016

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

Case 5:15-cv-04377-RMW Document 34 Filed 10/31/16 Page 19 of 19