Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02510/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02510-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steve Galeazzi,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-16-2510-PHX-ROS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Red Rock Correctional Center at Eloy,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 

22, 2016 (Doc. 1). On October 27, 2016 Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 9). 

Petitioner filed a Reply on November 14, 2016 (Doc. 12).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On January 17, 2012, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court 

on 16 counts of discharging a firearm at a structure (class 2 dangerous felonies), one 

count of attempt to commit second degree murder (class 2 dangerous felony), and one 

count of threatening or intimidating (class 6 dangerous felony). (Exhibit F, Indictment.) 

(Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 9, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

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An evaluation of Petitioner’s competency to stand trial was conducted pursuant to 

Rule 11, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Exhibit G, M.E. 1/24/12; Exhibit H, 

M.E. 2/1/12.) Petitioner was eventually deemed competent to stand trial. (Exhibit I, 

M.E. 3/22/12.) 

On July 19, 2012, Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit J), 

wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count of discharge of a firearm at a structure

(class 2 dangerous felony), and one amended count of aggravated assault (class 3 

dangerous felony), with an agreement for concurrent prison terms, and other conditions. 

The Plea Agreement reflected that the discharge of a firearm count had a sentencing 

range of 7 to 21 years, with a presumptive sentence of 10.5 years, and the aggravated 

assault had a sentencing range of 5 to 15 years, with a presumptive sentence of 7.5 years. 

Petitioner entered his plea pursuant to the Plea Agreement on July 19, 2012 

(Exhibit K, M.E. 7/19/12.) In the course of the plea colloquy, Petitioner related his use 

of psychiatric medications:

THE COURT: All right. Sir, I need to know if you have 

taken any psychotropic drugs, in other words, drugs for ongoing 

mental health or psychiatric conditions, have you in the last 24 

hours? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 

THE COURT: And do those medications affect your ability 

to understand what is going on here? 

[The Defendant]: No.

THE COURT: In other words, are you thinking clearly? 

THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely.

THE COURT: And you understand what is going on? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 

THE COURT: Are you on any kind of pain medication?

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Duncan [defense counsel], I know 

you said you met with him this morning and you feel comfortable 

that he can go forward this morning? 

MR. DUNCAN: I do. I have had a lengthy discussion with 

Mr. Galeazzi this morning, I believe he is, he understands these 

proceedings and the Court's questions.

(Exhibit L, R.T. 7/19/12 at 5.) 

The State filed a Sentencing Memorandum (Exhibit M), recommending that 

Petitioner be sentenced to an aggravated, effective term of 18 years in prison. 

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Petitioner filed a Sentencing Memorandum (Exhibit N), seeking a mitigated 

sentence of 7 years in prison, citing his “long history of medical conditions and mental

health deficiencies” (id. at 1), including a childhood diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyper 

Activity Disorder, hallucinations, behavioral disorders, ensuing drug usage, and 

contracting HIV. Petitioner argued the offenses were the result of an “addled mind.” 

(Id. at 4.) 

The Presentence Report recommended sentences “greater than the presumptive.”

(Exhibit O at 10.)

On August 31, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated sentence of 18 

years on the discharge of a firearm, and a concurrent aggravated sentence of 12 years on 

the aggravated assault, for an effective sentence of 18 years in prison. (Exhibit P, 

Sentence.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2; Exhibit A, Docket.) 

Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 

614, 616 (1995).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On November 5, 2012, Petitioner commenced a post-conviction relief proceeding 

by filing his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit T). Counsel was appointed 

(Exhibit U, M.E. 11/8/12), but eventually filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit V), 

evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Counsel was ordered to remain in an 

advisory capacity, and Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per petition. (Exhibit 

W, M.E. 4/17/13.) 

Petitioner then filed his pro per PCR Petition (Exhibit X), asserting a coerced 

confession, ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty plea, and illegal 

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sentence, all based on factual allegations that counsel refused Petitioner’s request for a 

jury trial and offered wrong advice as to the prison term that would be imposed under the 

guilty plea. The State responded, arguing that the petition was not supported with 

sufficient facts. (Exhibit Y, PCR Response.)

On July 2, 2013, Petitioner moved to withdraw the petition and submit an 

untimely amended petition. (Exhibit Z.) The request was granted. (Exhibit CC, M.E. 

8/16/13.)

Petitioner then submitted an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit DD), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel in advising Petitioner about the 

sentence to be expected under the plea agreement, failing to request a mitigation hearing 

based on Petitioner’s mental health, and advising Petitioner he would lose at trial. He 

also argued his plea was knowing and voluntary because of his mental health condition 

and medications. The State again responded. (Exhibit EE.)

On July 27, 2014, the PCR Court dismissed the Petition, finding it to be without 

merit. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit D, Exhibit 2, M.E. 1/27/14.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review, labelled “Motion to File Opening Brief” 

(Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit B.) Petitioner argued inter alia that counsel was ineffective for 

misadvising Petitioner about his sentence, failing to request a mitigation hearing, and 

arguing that due to his medications his plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. The court 

affirmed the PCR court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance and 

voluntariness of the plea. The Court declined to reach issues raised for the first time to 

it, including claims that he should have been advised about potential aggravating factors, 

and that the trial court, prosecutor and his counsel all had a conflict of interest. (Exhibit 

KK, Mem. Dec. 8/10/15.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit LL, Mandate.)

/ /

/ /

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D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 22, 2016 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following two grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner claims his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to request a 

hearing for “medical and [psychological] reasons” and failed to 

have experts testify at sentencing. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges 

counsel advised him to accept the plea agreement but never 

discussed aggravating factors with Petitioner.

(Order 10/4/16, Doc. 4.) In addition to the foregoing, Ground Two argues that counsel 

misadvised him about the sentencing under the plea agreement.

For clarity, the undersigned delineates the claims as follows: 1(a) ineffective 

assistance re hearing; 1(b) ineffective assistance re experts; 2(a) ineffective assistance re 

sentencing prediction; and 2(b) advice re aggravating factors. 

Response - On October 27, 2016, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 9). Respondents argue that Ground 1(a) (ineffective assistance re hearing) is 

waived by failing to adequately support it (id. at 21-22). Respondents argue that Ground 

1(b) (ineffective assistance re experts) is waived by failing to adequately support it (id. at 

23), the claim is procedurally defaulted (id. at 23-24), and the claim is without merit 

because not adequately supported with information about the available evidence or 

witnesses (id. at 24).

Respondents argue that Ground 2(a) (ineffective assistance re sentencing 

prediction) is without merit (id. at 24-27), and Ground 2(b) (ineffective assistance re 

aggravating factors) was procedurally barred (id. at 27-28) and is without merit (id. at 

28-31).

Respondents filed a Notice of Errata (Doc. 11) on November 10, 2016, correcting 

the page number of a pin cite, and the date on the Answer and Certificate of Service.

Reply - On November 14, 2016 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc.12). Petitioner 

argues the merits of his claims, his struggles with mental health, and his contrition.

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that Ground 1(b) (IAC re experts at sentencing) is 

procedurally defaulted and Ground 2(b) (regarding aggravating factors) was procedurally 

barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and thus are barred from federal 

habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

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before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

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For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Proper Mode - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim to a 

state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that 

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

9 at 23.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

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direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, as 

a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file any direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

Proc. 17.1(e); Montgomery, 181 Ariz. at 258, 889 P.2d at 616.. Accordingly, direct 

appeal is no longer available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

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Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

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guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

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including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

Waiver Bar - Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that Rule 32.2(a) is 

not an independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal habeas review of 

claims a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. The federal courts have 

routinely held that it is. “Arizona's waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 

(2014). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 861 (2002) (Arizona’s waiver rule is 

independent of federal law); and Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(adequate because consistently and regularly applied).

Timeliness Bar – Similarly, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that 

Rule 32.4 is not an independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal 

habeas review of claims a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. The 

district courts in Arizona have held that it is. See e.g. Morgal v. Ryan, 2013 WL 655122, 

at *16 (D. Ariz. Jan. 18, 2013) report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 645960 

(D. Ariz. Feb. 21, 2013).

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Respondents argue that Grounds 1(b) (IAC re experts) and 2(b) (IAC re 

aggravating factors) are procedurally defaulted.

a. Ground 1(b) – IAC re Experts

In Ground 1(b) of his Petition, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to have experts testify at sentencing.

Petitioner alleges Ground 1 was presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his PCR 

proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.)

Respondents argue this claim was never presented to the state courts and is now 

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procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner replies only on the merits of this claim. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 1.) 

Petitioner’s only foray to the Arizona Court of Appeals was in his PCR 

proceeding. He did not assert in that proceeding any argument that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to call experts at sentencing. At best, Petition argued ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and asserted counsel should have set a mitigation hearing, which is 

the substance of Ground 1(a). (See generally Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit B, Pet. for Rev.)

However, ineffective assistance claims are highly fact dependent and not fungible. 

See Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982) (presentation of 

“additional facts of attorney incompetence” transformed claim into one not presented to 

state court); and Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 

argument that presentation of any claim of ineffectiveness results in fair presentation of 

all claims of ineffective assistance).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground 1(b) was not fairly presented and for the reasons 

discussed hereinabove in Section III(A)(2), it is now procedurally defaulted. 

b. Ground 2(b) – IAC re Aggravating Factors

In Ground 2(b), Petitioner argues that prior to entry of his plea he was not advised 

by counsel regarding aggravating factors. Petitioner alleges he raised this claim to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in his second PCR petition, which the undersigned construes 

to refer to his petition for review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Respondents argue this claim was procedurally barred on an independent and 

adequate state ground, and thus is barred from federal habeas review; or alternatively, 

that it was not fairly presented because not presented to the PCR court, and is now 

procedurally defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 9 at 27-28.) 

Petitioner does not address the exhaustion of this claim in his Reply (Doc. 12).

In his Petition for Review, Petitioner argued:

Also the court should take into consideration, there was no 

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conversation about aggravating factors in this plea agreement, the 

court must advise the defendant of any aggravating factors before a 

plea can be effectively established.

(Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit B, Pet. for Rev. at 3 (typographical corrections not reflected).)

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the claim:

On review, Galeazzi restates the claims made below, argues for the 

first time that he should have been advised about potential 

aggravating factors, and suggests that the trial court, the prosecutor, 

and his counsel had a conflict of interest. ... As to Galeazzi' s new 

claims, we do not address claims raised for the first time on review. 

See State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (App. 

1980); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(l)(ii) (petition for review 

should contain "issues which were decided by the trial court and 

which the defendant wishes to present to the appellate court for 

review").

(Exhibit KK, Mem. Dec. 8/10/15 ¶ 4.) 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that the court failed to advise him about 

aggravating factors was rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals on state law grounds, 

based on Petitioner’s failure to raise the claim in the PCR court. If that was the claim 

that Petitioner raised here, it would be barred from habeas review as procedurally barred 

on state grounds.

But here, Petitioner’s claim is not that the court failed to advise him, but that 

counsel did so. That claim was not raised in the state courts. “While [the ineffective 

assistance and underlying constitutional claim are] admittedly related, they are distinct 

claims with separate elements of proof, and each claim should have been separately and 

specifically presented to the state courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, Ground 2(b) was not fairly presented to the state courts, and for the 

reasons discussed in Section III(A)(2) is now procedurally defaulted.

c. Summary Re Exhaustion

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted on Grounds 1(b) (IAC re expert) and 2(b) (IAC re aggravating 

factors).

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5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner makes no argument in his Petition or Reply that he has cause to excuse 

his procedural defaults. Petitioner does reference his mental health problems in 

connection with his pleas of contrition. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 1.) 

“[A] pro se petitioner's mental condition cannot serve as cause for a procedural 

default, at least when the petitioner on his own or with assistance remains ‘able to apply 

for post-conviction relief to a state court.’” Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir.1986)). While circuit precedent does not “necessarily foreclose the possibility 

that a pro se petitioner might demonstrate cause in a situation where a mental condition 

rendered the petitioner completely unable to comply with a state's procedures and he had 

no assistance... they do prevent us from excusing a procedural default where a mental 

defect had less of an adverse effect on the petitioner's ability to comply with state 

procedures than illiteracy would have had.” Id. at 1154. 

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Here, Petitioner had the benefit of counsel in his PCR proceeding before the trial 

court, where the exhaustion of his procedurally defaulted claims first occurred. 

Moreover, Petitioner was able to adequately raise other similar claims of ineffective 

assistance both to the PCR court and on review thereof, despite whatever impediment his 

mental health created, indicating that his mental health did not prevent him from raising 

his procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance.

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has failed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

6. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

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is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner makes no assertion of actual innocence. At most, he argues that 

he “snapped” as a result of “[t]he voices in my head,” and that he “never tried to kill” the 

victim. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 1-2.) But Petitioner proffers no argument that either 

contention would render him factually innocent of the charges to which he pled guilty, 

discharge of a firearm at a structure and aggravated assault. 

Despite his references to his mental health, Petitioner makes no contention that he 

was legally insane under Arizona law at the time of the offenses. The applicable Arizona 

statute, “limit[s] the availability of the insanity defense to a person who, at the time of 

the criminal act, was ‘afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the 

person did not know the criminal act was wrong.’” State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, 986 

P.2d 914 (App. 1999) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-502(A)). In Tamplin, the court 

concluded that despite the defendant’s contention that he “believed he was committing 

the offenses under coercion from hallucinatory voices and therefore believed that he was 

acting “rightly” by his own subjective standards,” there was no viable insanity defense 

because Petitioner knew his conduct was objectively wrong. 195 Ariz. at 247, ¶ 5, 986 

P.2d at 915. Petitioner makes no suggestion that he was incapable of knowing his 

conduct was objectively wrong. 

Moreover, "[i]n cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges in 

the course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also extend 

to those charges." Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). Petitioner does not 

establish his actual innocence of the additional charges of discharging a firearm at a 

structure, or attempted second degree murder, foregone by the prosecution as part of the 

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plea agreement. Although Petitioner argues he did not intend to kill the victim, under 

Arizona law, “[t]he offense of attempted second-degree murder under §§ 13–1001(A)(2) 

and –1104(A)(2) does not...require an intent to cause death. The culpable mental state of 

knowingly causing the death of another is sufficient.” State v. Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. 539, 

541, 81 P.3d 330, 332, n.1 (App. 2003). 

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to make a showing that no reasonable juror would 

have found him guilty. Therefore, his procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred 

claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. MERITS OF GROUND 1(A) – IAC RE MITIGATION

1. Parties Arguments

In Ground 1(a), Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

request a mitigation hearing for “medical and psychological reasons.” (Petition, Doc. 1 

at “6”, physical page 38.) 

Respondents argue that this claim is conclusory, and inadequately argued, and 

that the rejection of this claim on the merits by the state court is not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. (Answer, Doc. 9 at 17-22.)

Petitioner does not address the merits of this claim in his Reply.

2. Standard of Review on Habeas

Standard Applicable on Habeas - While the purpose of a federal habeas 

proceeding is to search for violations of federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in 

custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every 

error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

/ /

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3. Factual Background

At sentencing, trial counsel filed a Sentencing Memorandum (Exhibit N), in 

which he argued for a mitigated term “because Mr. Galeazzi has a long history of 

medical conditions and mental health deficiencies.” (Id. at 1.) Counsel detailed cranial 

surgery as an infant, diagnosis at 4 years old with severe Attention Deficit Hyper 

Activity Disorder, unsuccessful placement in a convent school, failure from special 

education classes, drug and alcohol usage, HIV, limited employment and limited IQ. (Id.

at 1-3.) He argued that prior to the charges, Petitioner could hear, smell and feel 

“demons” and “spirits” and had a “ ‘very organized delusion of ‘a cause’ given’ to him 

[about] ‘witches and sorcerers’ who live across the street.” (Id. at 3.) Counsel 

referenced and quoted the psychiatric reports prepared about Petitioner. Counsel 

summarized:

In short, Mr. Galeazzi is a 48-year-old with behavioral disorder, 

mental impairment, limited education, HIV, and a long history of 

polysubstance abuse. He requires a cocktail of medication in order 

to stay alive wider the best circumstances. Mr. Galeazzi's 

harassment of [the victim] comes at the tail end of a life marked by 

hallucinations, near-illiteracy, and self-medication with drug abuse. 

Mr. Galeazzi told Dr. Mogrovejo that "I regret, I shouldn't have 

done it to my neighbor." Given that Mr. Galeazzi's medical 

conditions mean that almost any sentence of length will be a death 

sentence, he respectfully requests that this court consider the totality 

of his health circumstances and sentence him to seven years.

(Id. at 4.) 

At sentencing, counsel presented testimony from Petitioner’s mother and sister, 

who described Petitioner’s declining mental health. (Exhibit R, R.T. 8/31/12 at 37-44.) 

Counsel argued Petitioner’s mental health, hallucinations, etc. (Id. at 45.) Counsel 

summarized the history and expert opinions:

This is a mentally ill person. He had his brain scraped when 

he was 4 years old. He has never been right. He has been in Special 

ED. He is illiterate. 

He has doctors that State points out the one doctor that 

doesn't believe his hallucinations, well, that is a bad doctor. That 

doctor doesn't know what they're talking about. 

The other one does. He has got that legitimate, that is why 

they put him on psychotropic drugs, he has got a cocktail going on, 

but not having hallucinations, are you kidding me? This is one of 

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the most sickest, mentally ill defendants we can have in this 

courtroom without him being Rule 11. 

And to come in here and villainize a mentally ill person is I 

understand why it happened, but there is two sides to every story, no 

one should go through what the victim went through, no one, no 

neighborhood should. I am not justifying but asking this Court to 

put this in context. This is someone who is really ill, the defendant.

(Id. at 46-47.) 

In pronouncing sentence, the trial court acknowledged Petitioner’s physical and 

mental health issues: 

It is clear to the Court that the defendant's mental health 

apparently started deteriorating within the last three years. 

I will note that the State asserts, apparently proven with 

letters of support for the victim -- for the defendant, that apparently 

he was able to have very normal, positive relationships with a lot of 

people in the neighborhood. 

And so this didn't appear to be a mental health issue, that is 

just affected all of this human interaction. Apparently was just 

directed at [the victim]. 

But when he has apparently a mental health condition that is 

deteriorating and it appears to be directed toward one person and 

those actions toward that person continued to escalate, there is some 

duty to get some help, there is just some duty to get some help. 

And if he was incapable of doing it, his family certainly was 

around and clearly must have seen this deterioration that 

deteriorated to the point where he picked up an aggravated 

harassment charge against this victim over a year before this, 

December 26th, 2010. The time to move out of State was then.

* * * 

I note in trying to formulate what the appropriate sentence is 

that if the defendant does suffer from hearing voices and that is a 

tragic situation. And must be something that is very difficult to live 

with, but it can be treated through medication and structured 

services. 

Like I said, there was an advanced warning, in three years 

that condition was deteriorating and certainly to [the victim] and his 

interactions with her. So is there an ample opportunity to seek help?

(Id. at 57-58.)

4. State Court Ruling

Petitioner raised this claim in his PCR proceeding, both to the PCR court (Exhibit 

DD, PCR Petition, Exh. 1, Affidavit at 1-2), and to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

(Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit B, PFR at 1-2). The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the 

proceedings in the PCR court:

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Galeazzi then filed a pro se petition claiming his trial counsel had 

been ineffective by ...failing to request a mitigation hearing to raise 

Galeazzi' s mental health issues...The trial court summarily denied 

relief, concluding ... that counsel had presented sufficient 

information about Galeazzi's mental health issues.

(Exhibit KK, Mem.Dec. at ¶ 3.) In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the trial court referenced 

On review, the court held: “As to the claims Galeazzi raised below, we have reviewed 

the record and conclude the court clearly identified and correctly rejected them in its 

minute entry, which we accordingly adopt.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

5. Applicable Law

a. Waiver by Guilty Plea

Petitioner pled guilty. A guilty plea breaks the chain of events that proceeded it in 

the criminal process. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Once a defendant 

enters a valid guilty plea, he can no longer raise a claim of violation of constitutional 

rights that arose prior to the plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 

character of the guilty plea. Id. at 267; United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508, 510 (9th 

Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court has stated that where “a defendant is represented by 

counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . . [A] defendant who pleads 

guilty upon the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character 

of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was 

[ineffective].” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Claims of ineffectiveness arising after entry of the plea, for example in the course 

of sentencing, on appeal, etc., are not waived by a guilty plea. See e.g. U.S. v. ReyesPlatero, 224 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2000). Conversely, a guilty plea forecloses a claim of 

pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel, which is unrelated to the plea itself. See 

Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir.1994). 

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b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

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omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 

679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In arguing that counsel was ineffective for failing to present additional evidence, a 

petitioner may not leave the court to speculate about what the evidence might be. For 

example, a petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness’ testimony might 

have been, but must adduce evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby v. 

Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a 

putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the 

witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have 

been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” 

U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991).

More generally, conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts do 

not merit habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.1994). Moreover, 

"[m]ere conclusory allegations do not warrant an evidentiary hearing." Shah v. U.S., 878 

F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989).

6. Application of Law

Here, Petitioner’s claim concerns post-plea ineffective assistance of counsel, and 

thus is not waived merely by virtue of Petitioner’s guilty plea. 

The record shows that not only did Petitioner’s trial counsel present Petitioner’s 

physical and mental condition to the court at sentencing, but did so sufficiently that the 

trial court accepted the proposition that Petitioner suffered from those conditions. On this 

basis, the undersigned cannot find deficient performance by counsel.

Petitioner argues that a separate mitigation hearing should have been scheduled, 

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presumably to present additional testimony on these issues. However, Petitioner fails to 

suggest what that evidence would have been, why counsel was deficient for failing to 

present it, or why it would have altered the outcome. Such conclusory allegations are 

not sufficient. 

Even if this court could find some merit to Petitioner’s claim, Petitioner fails to

show how the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or was contrary to or an unreasonable determination of Supreme Court law. 

Accordingly, Ground 1(a) is without merit, and must be denied. 

C. MERITS OF GROUND 2(A) – IAC RE SENTENCING PREDICTION

1. Parties Arguments

In Ground 2(a), Petitioner argues that trial counsel advised Petitioner prior to 

entering into the plea agreement that he would be given a 7 to 10 year sentence, and that 

was based on counsel’s experience. (Petition, Doc. 1 at “7”, physical page 39.) 

Respondents argue this claim is without merit, and the decision of the state court 

that it was of no merit was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme 

Court law. (Answer, Doc. 9 at 24-27.) 

Petitioner does not reply on the merits of this claim.

2. Factual Background

Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement which reflected that the 

discharge of a firearm count had a sentencing range of 7 to 21 years, with a presumptive 

sentence of 10.5 years, and the aggravated assault had a sentencing range of 5 to 15 

years, with a presumptive sentence of 7.5 years. (Exhibit J at 1.) Petitioner initialed that 

provision of the plea agreement. (Id.)

At the change of plea hearing, Petitioner advised the court that he had read and 

signed the plea agreement, and initialed each of the paragraphs, and that it “contain[ed] 

everything that [he had] agreed to with the State.” (Exhibit L, R.T. 7/19/12. at 7.) 

THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything other that 

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what is contained in the plea agreement to get you to plead guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: No.

(Id. at 9.) The court then reviewed the sentencing range and presumptive sentences for 

the offenses. (Id. at 10.) 

THE COURT: Your agreement with the State is that you go 

to prison on each count and they will run concurrently so do you 

understand you face basically between 7 and 21 years in prison? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Id. at 11.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated sentence of 18 years on the discharge 

of a firearm, and a concurrent aggravated sentence of 12 years on the aggravated assault, 

for an effective sentence of 18 years in prison. (Exhibit P, Sentence.)

3. State Court Ruling

Petitioner raised this claim in his PCR proceeding. (Exhibit DD, PCR Pet., Exh. 

1, Affidavit at 1.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the PCR court’s ruling:

Galeazzi then filed a pro se petition claiming his trial counsel had 

been ineffective by ... informing him he would receive only a 

seven- to ten-year prison term...The trial court summarily denied 

relief, concluding Galeazzi had not demonstrated counsel fell below 

prevailing professional norms ... [and] noted that, even if counsel 

gave Galeazzi incorrect advice about the possible prison term, the 

court had nonetheless correctly advised Galeazzi during the plea 

colloquy. 

(Exhibit KK, Mem. Dec. at ¶3.) As with the claim in Ground 1(a), the Arizona Court of 

Appeals adopted the PCR court’s determination. (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

4. Applicable Law

At the outset, it must be noted that there is nothing wrong with defense counsel 

advising a client of the possible consequences of a case. See United States v. Ulano, 468 

F. Supp. 1054, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, 

in U.S. vs. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1990) the Ninth Circuit held that an 

erroneous prediction of a sentence by a defense attorney did not rise to the level of 

constitutional deficient representation, and thus did not render a plea based upon such 

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erroneous prediction involuntary.

Cases both prior to and since Garcia have differentiated between simple errors in 

predictions and a gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome. For example, in U.S. 

vs. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1994) the Ninth Circuit recognized that the court has 

“held that ‘an erroneous prediction by defense attorney concerning sentencing does not 

entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty plea,’ although an exception might be made in 

a case of ‘gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome.’” Michlin, 34 F.3d at 899 

(citations omitted). 

In Iaea vs. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861(9th Cir. 1986) defense counsel represented to the 

defendant that a guilty plea would give him a chance to receive probation. That advice 

was defective because of mandatory minimum sentences which resulted in his receiving 

life sentences. The court found that such a gross mischaracterization (probation v. life 

sentences) established defective performance by counsel and remanded the case for a 

determination on the prejudice component of the ineffective assistance claim. Id. at 865-

66. See also Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 499 U.S. 940 (1991)(no ineffectiveness where actual sentence was three years 

longer than attorney predicted). 

In contrast, in Womack v. Del Papa, 487 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2007), counsel had 

predicted a sentence upon pleading guilty of 30 to 40 years, and instead the defendant 

received eight life terms without parole. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Iaea, and found 

the plea nonetheless voluntary.

5. Application of Law

Here, Petitioner’s Ground 2(a) relates to counsel’s advice in the course of 

inducing Petitioner to enter in to the guilty plea. Thus, if found meritorious, it could 

render Petitioner’s plea involuntary. Thus, it is not waived merely by virtue of 

Petitioner’s guilty plea.

However, to the extent that Petitioner intends to argue that counsel advised him 

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that he could only be sentenced to a maximum of ten years, such a contention is in direct 

opposition to the written terms of the Plea Agreement, which Petitioner acknowledged 

reading, signing and initialing, and to Petitioner’s own statements at the plea colloquy. 

Petitioner posits no reason that this court should credit his current contrary assertions to 

his earlier representations. “In assessing the voluntariness of the plea, statements made 

by a criminal defendant contemporaneously with his plea should be accorded great 

weight. Solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” 

Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9

th Cir. 1986).

Rather, Petitioner’s real argument seems to be that counsel simply offered a 

prediction that Petitioner would be sentenced to 7 to 10 years. Counsel was not deficient 

in offering such a prediction, and the difference between counsel’s prediction (7 to 10 

years) and Petitioner’s actual sentence (18 years) was not a gross mischaracterization, 

but simply an erroneous prediction. Accordingly, it does not render Petitioner’s guilty 

plea involuntary. See Michlin, 34 F.3d at 899. 

Even if this court could find some merit to Petitioner’s claim, Petitioner fails to 

show how the state court’s ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or was contrary to or an unreasonable determination of Supreme Court law. 

Accordingly, Ground 2(a) is without merit, and must be denied. 

D. SUMMARY

Grounds 1(b) and 2(b) of Petitioner’s Petition are procedurally defaulted, and 

must be dismissed with prejudice.

Grounds 1(a) and 2(a) of Petitioner’s Petition are without merit and must be 

denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

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when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds 1(b) (IAC re expert) and 

2(b) (IAC re aggravating factors) of the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

filed July 22, 2016 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed July 22, 2016 (Doc. 1), including Grounds 1(a) (IAC re 

mitigation) and 2(a) (IAC re sentencing prediction), be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 23, 2017

16-2510r RR 17 03 08 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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