Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02114/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02114-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ALLEN MAZURAK,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-2114 GEB GGH P

vs.

CA. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, et al., ORDER &

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. On May 30, 2006, this court issued an order directing defendants, in response to plaintiff’s

May 22, 2006, request for voluntary dismissal, to notify this court, within ten days, whether they

had any objection to the dismissal of this action, and, if not, stating that the matter would be

dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 

Defendants responded timely, objecting vociferously to any dismissal of this

action without prejudice, acquiescing only to a dismissal with prejudice, to which plaintiff

replied, disputing the grounds for defendants’ objections to dismissal without prejudice and

asserting that he withdraws his motion to dismiss if the court would consider the dismissal with

prejudice that defendants seek. The court will now deem plaintiff’s motion for voluntary

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Defendant California Department of Justice was dismissed with prejudice as a 1

defendant.

2

dismissal of this action without prejudice withdrawn and will proceed to consider the motions

still pending in this matter.

Pending before the court are: 1) plaintiff’s September 14, 2005, motion for

permanent injunction, to which defendants filed objection/opposition on September 16, 2005,

after which plaintiff filed a reply on September 26, 2005; 2) Defendants’ October 20, 2005,

motion for summary judgment, to which plaintiff filed an opposition, on November 17, 2005, to

which defendants filed a reply on November 28, 2005; and 3) plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, filed on October 24, 2005, to which defendants filed an opposition on November 10,

2005, after which plaintiff filed a reply on November 28, 2005. As plaintiff seeks, by way of his

motion for permanent injunction, the same relief he requests by way of his complaint, the court

will first adjudicate the dispositive motion to determine whether or not plaintiff is entitled to

such relief.

Plaintiff’s Underlying Allegations

The court herein sets forth its earlier summary of plaintiff’s claims:

Plaintiff is proceeding on a complaint, transferred to this court

from U. S. District Court of Arizona by order filed on September

23, 2003, and filed in this court on October 7, 2003. The

complaint has been modified by order filed on January 20, 2004,

adopting the November 20, 2003, findings and recommendations

of the undersigned. This action proceeds against defendants Bill 1

Lockyer, Attorney General of California at the state Department of

Justice (DOJ), and Robert Santos, Assistant Manager of the

California Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information

(BCII). Within his complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of his

constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Complaint, p. 4. Plaintiff alleges he has been

denied a fair trial and due process as a result of “erroneous

government documents.” Id. 

 

Plaintiff claims that it is the custom and practice of the DOJ to

report to public and law enforcement agencies erroneous

information, knowing that the criminal records’ information is not

accurate. Id. [] Defendant Lockyer was made personally aware by

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

plaintiff that BCII was reporting felony convictions against

plaintiff in cases that had been dismissed.... such as “arrests dated

1966, 1967, 1969, 1973, 1968,” which also includes arrests

wherein plaintiff is actually innocent. Plaintiff’s next reference to

the years 1977, 1985, and 1988 is unclear. Id. Notwithstanding

plaintiff’s having informed defendant Lockyer of the inaccuracies,

defendant failed to purge them from plaintiff’s criminal history. 

Id. 

Defendant Santos was also made aware of the erroneous records

but refused to correct them. Id. Plaintiff references exhibits

attached to his complaint, which include print-out copies of at least

a part of plaintiff’s criminal history, with plaintiff’s indications of

which convictions have apparently been dismissed but are not

noted as such. Exhibit 1 to Complaint. Plaintiff also includes a

brief portion of a reporter’s transcript, which is apparently included

to show that plaintiff’s sentence has been enhanced because of his

prior arrests and convictions. Among the remaining exhibits is a

copy of letter dated October 14, 2001, signed by defendant Santos,

referencing plaintiff’s earlier request for a new printout of his

California criminal history record because “no changes have been

made to your criminal history record regarding the dates of arrest

you have mentioned.” Id. Defendant Santos goes on to say that

there has been no agency request or court order that would change

the record that has been received and that in any case, the purging

by a law enforcement agency or court would have no bearing on

the records maintained by BCII unless a direct request is made to

BCII by the relevant agency to remove the specific criminal history

information from the record. Id. 

Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief.

See, Order, filed on 9/08/2004, pp. 1-3. 

Motions for Summary Judgment

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set

forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) is met. “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if . . .

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct., 2548, 2553 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. “[A] complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be

granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry

of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the

opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct.

1356 (citation omitted).

On December 19, 2003, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Among the several grounds defendants set forth as the basis for their motion for

summary judgment this court will reach only one because this ground implicates a threshold

issue, demonstrating that the merits of this action cannot be reached in its present posture. 

Defendants contend that even if plaintiff’s request for an injunction to compel defendants to

“correct/purge erroneous records” has a constitutional basis (a point which defendants expressly

do not concede), plaintiff cannot demonstrate the requisite irreparable injury, and the court

should, in its discretion, deny equitable relief, recognizing that plaintiff has an unexhausted

adequate state law remedy. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DMSJ), pp. 33-37.

The following facts, inter alia, are undisputed, that defendant Santos has been

employed in the Bureau of Criminal Identification & Information (BCII) of the Division of

Criminal Justice Information Services of the California Department of Justice (DOJ) since 1974,

and has been, since 1997, the BCII Supervisor of the Record Review Unit (RRU), as well as an

assistant manager of the Record Support Section of the Record Information & Services Program

of the BCII. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (DSUMF) # 2. In addition, it

is undisputed that defendant Santos is responsible for providing to the subject of state summary

criminal history (“rap sheet”) information, upon his request, a copy of the same, and to respond

on behalf of BCII to any assertions by the subject that any of his rap sheet information is

erroneous or inaccurate. DSUMF # 3. It is also undisputed that plaintiff has written to defendant

Santos, since at least 1990, asserting that various entries or portions on his BCII rap sheet are

erroneous. Plaintiff contends that he has sent letters/requests to BCII and defendants seeking

correction to his records alleged inaccuracies for at least 12 years, but has been largely ignored. 

Mazurak Declaration, p. 2, in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (PMSJ). 

Defendant Santos avers that he has researched the issues raised and responded with any necessary

corrections made. Santos Declaration, ¶ 13, in support of DSUMF # 49. The following portion

of defendants’ undisputed fact # 50, and neither implicitly or explicitly disputed by plaintiff: to

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

This subsection sets forth the steps involved in the process of administrative 2

adjudication which applies if the department or agency denies allegations of inaccuracy after a

correction to the BCII state summary of criminal history has been sought by written request but

the department denies allegations of inaccuracy. By referring to Cal. Govt. Code § 11500 et seq.,

and by declaring that the agency is a “respondent,” the Government Code tasks

plaintiff/petitioner with filing an “accusation,” or “statement of issues.” Cal. Govt. Code § §

11504, 11505.

This statute describes how, inter alia, “[a] hearing to determine whether a right, 3

authority, license or privilege should be revoked....” 

As referenced in footnote 2, this code section provides the procedure for an applicant to

4

correct inaccuracies in a criminal record, stating, inter alia, that once a request has been received,

“the department shall review the record to determine if the information correctly reflects the

source document, and if it does not, the department shall make the necessary corrections and

shall provide the applicant with a corrected copy of the record. If the accuracy of the source

document is questioned, the department shall forward it to the person or agency which furnished

the questioned information. This person or agency shall, within 30 days of receipt of the written

request for clarification, review its information and forward to the department the results of the

review.” Cal. Penal Code § 11126 (a), in part. Cal. Penal Code § 11126(b) sets forth, as follows:

“If the agency concurs in the allegations of inaccuracy or incompleteness in the record, and finds

that the error is material, it shall correct its record and shall so inform the applicant of its

correction of the record under this subdivision within 30 days. The department and the agency

shall notify all persons and agencies to which they have disseminated the incorrect record in the

past 90 days of the correction of the record and the applicant shall be informed that the

notification has been given. The department and the agency shall also notify those persons or

agencies to which the incorrect record has been disseminated which have been specifically

requested by the applicant to receive the notification of the correction of the record and the

applicant shall be informed that the notification has been given.” [Emphasis added]. As noted

earlier, § 11126(c) describes the administrative adjudication process for allegations of

inaccuracy/incompleteness when the department of agency denies the allegations. 

Cal. Penal Code § 11105 is the code section which addresses “state summary criminal 5

history information; persons or entities to which information may be furnished; furnishing federal

level criminal history information; fingerprint information.” Section 11105(a)(1) mandates that

the state Department of Justice is to “maintain state summary criminal history information.” 

Such information “means the master record of information compiled by the Attorney General

pertaining to the identification and criminal history of any person, such as name, date of birth,

7

defendant Santos’ knowledge, plaintiff has never initiated administrative adjudication of any of

his disputes, as provided for in Cal. Penal Code § 11126(c) and Cal. Govt. Code 2

§ 11503, by filing an accusation with the California Office of Administrative Hearings. Santos 3

Declaration, ¶ 13. 

Plaintiff argues that defendants have knowingly refused for decades to make the

corrections to his criminal history record, citing Cal. Penal Code §§ 11126 and 11105(h), as 4 5

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

physical description, fingerprints, photographs, date of arrests, arresting agencies and booking

numbers, charges, dispositions, and similar data about the person.” Cal. Penal Code §

11105(a)(2)(A). Section 11105(h), cited by plaintiff, states “It is not a violation of this section to

include information obtained from a record in (1) a transcript or record of a judicial or

administrative proceeding or (2) any other public record if the inclusion of the information in the

public record is authorized by a court, statute, or decisional law.” 

8

requiring authentic source documents for entries in the criminal history record. PMSJ, p. 9. 

The threshold question implicated in this case is whether plaintiff’s allegations of

erroneous entries in his criminal history implicate a federal constitutional right. Citing, inter alia,

Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S. Ct. 900, 911 (1984), for the wellestablished principle that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to order state entities and

officials to conform their conduct in accordance with state law, defendants contend that

expungement or correction of erroneous information in state records is not a right that reaches a

federal constitutional dimension. DMSJ, p. 34. Defendants cite Eutzy v. Tesar, 880 F.2d 1010,

1011 (8 Cir. 1989), a case which quotes, without analysis, a Sixth Circuit case, Duke v. White, th

616 F.2d 955 (1980), also relied on by defendants, setting forth the following conclusory

statement, equally without analysis: “‘[t]he right to expungement of state records is not a federal

constitutional right.’” In another case relied on by defendants, Fendler v. United States Parole

Commission, 774 F.2d 975, 979 (9 Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit states plainly that “[f]ederal th

courts have the equitable power ‘to order the expungement of Government records where

necessary to vindicate rights secured by the Constitution or by statute.’” Fendler, supra, quoting

Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [emphasis in Fendler]. Defendants

also cite U.S. v. Campbell, 724 F.2d 812, (9 Cir. 1984), a case which does not appear apposite th

as it speaks to expungement of all official records but the “nonpublic record” retained by the

federal Department of Justice, pursuant to a now-repealed statute which related to issuance of

certificates setting aside youthful offender convictions. 

In Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoting Sullivan v.

Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880, 94 S. Ct. 162 (1973), the D.C. Circuit stated:

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Hernandez also relied on Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983), 6

but the Supreme Court has since curtailed the focus therein on mandatory language for

determining whether a liberty interest has been created by a statute. State regulations give rise to

a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those

regulations pertain to “freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 

484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995)

In other cases, the Ninth Circuit has been equally reticent in unqualifiedly holding that 7

one has a constitutional right derived from the Due Process Clause in having incorrect records

expunged or corrected. Generally, the Ninth Circuit will find that “other courts have found”

some type of statutory or “fundamental right” or “it’s part of the same criminal case” basis to

have records corrected in extraordinary situations, but the Ninth Circuit will refrain from saying

“we find” a constitutional right exists. See United States v. G,774 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir.

1985); United States v. Sweeney, 914 F.2d 1265, 1264 (9th Cir. 1990). See also United States v.

Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (generally asserting that jurisdiction may exist to

expunge records.)

9

“The principle is well established that a court may order the

expungement of records, including arrest records, when that

remedy is necessary and appropriate in order to serve basic legal

rights.” This court, like other courts [footnote deleted], held that

unlawful maintenance of records of arrest results in “injuries and

dangers” that are “plain enough”....

The Ninth Circuit has found that Washington law provides a liberty interest in

accurate prison record information in the proper case, but a plaintiff must file a formal, written

inspection request and record challenge with the appropriate state criminal justice agency and

satisfy the procedural prerequisites under Wash. Admin. Code §§ 446-2-80, 090 and 120 (1983). 

Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318-1319 (9 Cir. 1987) (allegedly false statements in th

prison record did not deprive prisoner of due process, where prisoner is not implicating his

criminal history record information). Having found that Washington state law provided such a

liberty interest, the Ninth Circuit did not “reach the question of whether in the absence of the

statute, such a right is ‘grounded in the due process clause’ itself.” Id., citing Paine v. Baker, 595

F.2d 197, 199 (4 Cir. 1979). th 6 7

In Paine v. Baker, supra, 595 F.2d at 201, the Fourth Circuit held that “in certain

limited circumstances a claim of constitutional magnitude is raised where a prisoner alleges (1)

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

that information is in his file, (2) that information is false, and (3) that it is relied on to a

constitutionally significant degree.” That court found it to be a “jurisdictional predicate” to the

filing of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the purpose of vindicating the newly recognized

“right secured to state prison inmates by the Constitution, to have prejudicial erroneous

information expunged from their prison files....” that the inmate must have first applied for

expungement to prison authorities. Id., at 202. Although in Paine, the court goes on to describe

a procedure whereby the inmate must notify prison officials in writing of the facts as he believes

them to be regarding information in his prison file that he believes to be false, it is not enough

that plaintiff in challenging information in his criminal history, under Hernandez v. Johnston,

833 F.2d 1316, 1318-1319, has corresponded with state officials seeking to rectify the record and

alleges that he has thereafter been refused or ignored. 

Before plaintiff can assert a federal due process violation, plaintiff must have

followed the state procedures for correction of the record, the procedures as referenced above by

the defendants. Plaintiff has fairly explicitly recognized this deficiency when he sought to

voluntarily dismiss the instant case without prejudice, referring to his need first to “adjudicate”

the allegations herein, inter alia, in the Office of Administrative Hearings. See plaintiff’s

5/22/06, “Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice.” Until he has done so, the matter cannot be said

to be ripe for adjudication in federal court. In any event, as defendants state, plaintiff makes no

showing that he has even initiated administrative adjudication of any of his disputes, per

Cal. Penal Code § 11126(c) and Cal. Govt. Code § 11503, by filing an accusation with the

California Office of Administrative Hearings. The court will recommend that defendants be

granted summary judgment on this ground and, therefore, will vacate plaintiff’s (cross-)motion

for summary judgment as moot.

Motion for Permanent Injunction

Plaintiff seeks, by way of a motion for permanent injunction, the same relief

which he seeks in the instant action. In both this motion and his motion for summary judgment,

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

plaintiff complains that he is under the “draconian” restrictions of Arizona prison regulations

with regard to access to legal materials, which preclude legal assistance from a department

paralegal because his action is beyond the initial filings; also, he is indigent and unable to pay for

any form of legal assistance. He claims to be denied access to case law reporters, including U.S.

Supreme Court cases, and to be unable to obtain assistance from any other prisoner per the

regulations, thus hindering his ability to develop legal arguments (apparently, with respect to his

motion for summary judgment or to his opposition to defendants’ dispositive motion). 

The seminal case with respect to the constitutional right of access to the courts,

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1994), arose in the very state, Arizona, the prison

regulations of which plaintiff herein complains. Lewis held that a violation of such access could

only be shown if plaintiff suffers an actual injury from lack of law library access. The Lewis

Court found that “the Constitution does not require that prisoners (literate or illiterate) be able to

conduct generalized research, but only that they be able to present their grievances to the courts –

a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree of legal

assistance.” Id., at 359, 116 S. Ct. at 2184. See also Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 898 (9th

Cir. 1995) (right of access to a law library extends only to the pleading stages of a lawsuit). 

Generally, the pleading stages of a lawsuit do not extend over a period of time such that

continuous and long term access to the law library is required. Nor does plaintiff complain that

he has been unable file his lawsuit, setting forth his claims, as he plainly has been able to do so. 

In addition, plaintiff does not address the fact that his access to the law library in Arizona would

not provide him with access to California statutes or case law. 

That Arizona prison regulations with regard to law library access for prisoners

may adhere to a strict, even narrow, compliance with Lewis does not render those regulations

unconstitutional. Moreover, as noted, plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunction seeks the same

relief which he seeks in the instant action, relief to which this court has found that he is not 

\\\\\

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Judgment in this case is without prejudice to its renewal after exhaustion of state court 8

procedures. Since ripeness is involved in the granting of summary judgment, and since ripeness

implicates subject matter jurisdiction, United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 556 (9 Cir. 2006), th

the court has not reached the merits of the dispute.

12

entitled at this point. The court will recommend denial of plaintiff’s motion for permanent

injunctive relief. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s May 22, 2006, motion for voluntary dismissal of this action be

deemed withdrawn by his June 20, 2006, reply to defendants’ June 9, 2006, opposition; and

2. Plaintiff’s October 24, 2005, motion (or cross-motion) for summary judgment

is vacated as moot.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s September 14, 2005, motion for permanent injunction be denied;

and 

2. Defendants’ October 20, 2005, motion for summary judgment be granted, and

judgment be entered for defendants.

8

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 8/7/06 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009 - mazu2114.msj

Case 2:03-cv-02114-GEB-GGH Document 63 Filed 08/07/06 Page 12 of 12