Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00024/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAGHVENDRA SINGH,

Plaintiff,

v.

THADD A. BLIZZARD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-0024 KJM DB PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff Raghvendra Singh is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to 

the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending 

before the court are plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The complaint alleges that the defendants “are the state 

judges,” that have “caused killings, suicides and terror . . . among minorities.” (Compl. (ECF No. 

1) at 1.) 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc). Here, plaintiff’s complaint is deficient. Accordingly, for the reasons stated 

below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without leave to 

amend.

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Case 2:23-cv-00024-DC-SCR Document 3 Filed 04/24/23 Page 1 of 6
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I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma 

pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed 

complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 

1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 

Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 

IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 

or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the 

District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 

whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, 

the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 

Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of 

poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune 

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an 

arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. 

Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a 

complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the 

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as 

true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. 

Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 

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(9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court, as explained by Rule 8 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”), are as follows:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a 

short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 

jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

II. Plaintiff’s Complaint

As noted above, the complaint alleges that the “defendants caused killings, suicides and 

terror . . . among minorities.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1.) And that the “SacDA terrorized 

minorities.” (Id.) In support of these allegations, the complaint refers to various state court cases 

involving the plaintiff, which the complaint alleges were “illegal, unconstitutional and ‘beyond 

the jurisdiction of judges.’” (Id. at 3.) 

For example, the complaint alleges that in “County of Sacramento v. Singh (Sacramento 

Superior Court Case No. 34-2013-00145898), the County requested Receiver was ordered to 

move the occupants but he did not do so.” (Id.) The “properties were burned down and 

occupants were killed.” (Id.) In “City of Placerville v. Rawat (El Dorado Superior Court Case 

No. PC20170462)” plaintiff’s “properties were taken away[.]” (Id.) In “City of Elk Grove v. 

Rawat (Sacramento Superior Court Case No. 34-2017-000216691)” the judge “did not have 

subject jurisdiction and the jurisdiction on [plaintiff] and on properties[.]” (Id.) 

Plaintiff is advised that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a federal district court is 

precluded from hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state 

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court orders and judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state 

court as well. Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 

court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also apply where the parties 

do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine prohibits a federal 

district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a 

state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a ‘de facto appeal’ 

forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 

erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 

decision.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d 

at 1164); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in 

‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the 

state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 

judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 

997, 1005-06 (1994), cert. denied 547 U .S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief 

from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also 

alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013).

[A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a 

forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court 

must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it 

must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is 

‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in 

its judicial decision.

Doe, 415 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158); see also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 286 n. 1 (“a 

district court [cannot] entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the 

state court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack [is] 

‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 

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16)); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898, 900 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“claims raised in the 

federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the 

adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to 

interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 

485). 

Here, it appears that plaintiff is a state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before this action commenced and is inviting the court to review and 

reject those judgments. Moreover, the complaint alleges that the “Defendants are the State 

Judges.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 2.) Judges, however, are absolutely immune from suit for acts 

performed in a judicial capacity. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 & 

n.10 (1993); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357-60 

(1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges are immune 

from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.”). 

III. Leave to Amend

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. The undersigned 

has carefully considered whether plaintiff may amend the complaint to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, 

prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 

1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 

701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the 

court does not have to allow futile amendments). 

Here, given the defects noted above, the undersigned finds that granting plaintiff leave to 

amend would be futile. 

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The complaint filed January 6, 2023 be dismissed without leave to amend; 

2. Plaintiff’s January 6, 2023 application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be 

denied; and

3. This action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s 

order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 24, 2023

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.pro se\singh0024.dism.f&rs

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