Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07188/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07188-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 28, 2001 Decided December 21, 2001

No. 00-7188

Second Amendment Foundation, et al.,

Appellants

v.

United States Conference of Mayors, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv03181)

Richard E. Gardiner argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellants.

Joseph M. Sellers argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief was Richard S. Lewis. Jack D. Maistros,

Keith Vernon, Laurie A. Holmes, James B. Meyer, William

A. Walker and Peter M. Kelley entered appearances.

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Before: Edwards, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: In this action, firearm consumers

and others, alleging deprivation of their First, Second, and

Ninth Amendment rights, bring civil conspiracy claims

against the mayors of twenty-two cities that filed damage

actions against gun manufacturers and dealers. The question

presented in this appeal is whether the mayors, none of whom

resides in the District of Columbia, subjected themselves to

suit here by discussing their litigation at a meeting held in

the District. Because we agree with the district court that

attending the meeting was insufficient to trigger the District

of Columbia long-arm statute, we affirm its dismissal of the

complaint.

I.

Beginning in 1998, cities across the country, including

Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco, filed suits

charging firearm manufacturers and dealers with creating

and maintaining a public nuisance. According to the cities,

the manufacturers and dealers "knowingly and recklessly

market, distribute, promote, design and/or sell firearms in

ways that facilitate the criminal use of firearms; circumvent

federal, state and local laws; deceive the public about the

dangers of firearm possession; fail to incorporate reasonable

firearm safety features and warnings; and inadequately disclose the risks associated with firearms." Appellees' Br. at 3.

Appellants, the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., the

Shooters Committee on Political Education, Inc., and several

firearm consumers and licensees who are members of one or

both of these organizations--throughout this opinion, we shall

refer to appellants as "SAF"--filed suit under 42 U.S.C.

s 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia against the mayors of the cities that had sued gun

manufacturers. SAF alleges that the mayors "conspired

together" to bring these suits "for the purpose of bankrupting

and otherwise harming" the manufacturers and dealers "as a

result of the litigation costs of defending such civil actions."

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Amended Compl. p 10. SAF further alleges that the lawsuits

caused the manufacturers and dealers to raise prices or

curtail sales of firearms, thereby violating SAF's First, Second, and Ninth Amendment rights, as well as its "right to

engage in, and obtain the benefits of, interstate commerce."

Amended Compl. p p 15, 17, 19.

The mayors, pointing out that none of them lives in the

District of Columbia, moved to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction. In response, SAF asserted that the district

court had jurisdiction under the District of Columbia longarm statute, which accords jurisdiction over persons who

"transact[ ] business" in the District "directly or by an

agent[.]" D.C. Code Ann. s 13-423(a)(1) (1995). As evidence

that the mayors transacted business here, SAF pointed to the

United States Conference of Mayors' web site, which reports

that at the Conference's 67th Winter Meeting, held in the

District of Columbia, the mayors discussed their litigation

against gun manufacturers. According to the web site, "[i]n a

session closed to the public, Philadelphia Mayor Edward

Rendell led mayors in a discussion of gun-related legislative

and litigation strategies." USCM 67th Winter Meeting, Mayors Exchange Information on Guns Issues, http://www.us

mayors.org/USCM/meeting/jan27.htm (last visited Nov. 16,

2001). Mayor Rendell chairs the Conference's Gun Violence

Task Force. 1999 Winter Meeting, Mayors Keep Focus on

Gun Safety and Industry Responsibility, http:

//www.usmayors.org/USCM/us_mayor_newspaper/documents/

02_08_99/wintermeeting/8gun.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).

In another session, the mayors "focused on lawsuits previously brought against the gun industry by the cities of New

Orleans and Chicago, and two new suits filed by Miami-Dade

County and Bridgeport...." Id. The web site identifies

four of the twenty-two mayors sued in this case as having

participated in this session. Id.

Concluding that SAF's allegations fell "far short" of "the

prima facie showing necessary to carry the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction," the district court dismissed the

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(2). 3/13/00 Mot. Hr'g Tr. at 21. SAF now appeals.

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Because the underlying facts are undisputed, this appeal

presents only legal issues, so our review is de novo. See U.S.

Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d

135, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating rule for review of Rule

12(b)(2) dismissal).

II.

In addition to defending the district court's dismissal for

lack of personal jurisdiction, the mayors argue that SAF lacks

Article III standing to maintain this action. Applying the

principle that "there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy," Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578

(1999), we begin and end with personal jurisdiction.

Under the District's long-arm statute, "[a] District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,

who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief

arising from the person's ... transacting any business in the

District of Columbia[.]" D.C. Code Ann. s 13-423(a)(1)

(1995). SAF relies on the "conspiracy theory" of personal

jurisdiction, an application of long-arm jurisdiction pursuant

to which a defendant's contacts with the forum consist of the

defendant's conspiratorial activities. See Jungquist v. Sheik

Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1030-31 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (applying conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction

to long-arm statute's "transacting business" provision); Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d

415, 424-425 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discussing application of conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction to long-arm statute's

"causing tortious injury in the District" provision). Persons

who enter the forum and engage in conspiratorial acts are

deemed to "transact business" there "directly"; coconspirators who never enter the forum are deemed to

"transact business" there "by an agent." D.C. Code Ann.

s 13-423(a)(1) (1995); see Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1030-31

(discussing theory that defendants satisfied either "transacting business" or "contracting to supply services" provision by

conspiring to defraud plaintiff and breach contract, and by

performing overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy, in the

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District, and discussing extension of jurisdiction to coconspirators who did not enter the District); First Chicago

Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (discussing theory that defendants satisfied "transacting business" provision by directing checks and wire transfers

into and out of the District in furtherance of a check-kiting

conspiracy, and discussing extension of jurisdiction to coconspirator who did not enter the District).

"[T]he general rule ... that a plaintiff must make a prima

facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts[ ]" applies to

conspiracy-based jurisdiction. Id. at 1378. To prevail on its

jurisdictional theory, therefore, SAF must make a prima facie

showing of civil conspiracy. In the District of Columbia, civil

conspiracy has four elements: "(1) an agreement between two

or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful act, or a

lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury caused by an

unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the

agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in

furtherance of the common scheme." Halberstam v. Welch,

705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Since the "bare allegation

of conspiracy or agency is insufficient to establish personal

jurisdiction[,]" "a plaintiff must allege specific acts connecting

[the] defendant with the forum[.]" First Chicago, 836 F.2d at

1378 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

According to SAF, the four mayors who attended the 67th

Winter Meeting and the eighteen absent mayors whose cities

also filed suit transacted business in the District within the

meaning of the long-arm statute because they "conspired

together" to "bankrupt[ ] and otherwise harm[ ]" gun manufacturers and dealers. Even assuming that suing manufacturers in order to bankrupt them would be unlawful, SAF has

alleged no "specific acts" showing that the mayors agreed to

file suit, let alone with such a purpose. The allegation that

the mayors "conspired together" represents nothing more

than a legal conclusion, which we have held "does not constitute the prima facie showing necessary to carry the burden of

establishing personal jurisdiction." Naartex Consulting

Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding

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conspirators" was insufficient "conclusionary statement").

The web site report that Mayor Rendell "led mayors in a

discussion of legislative and litigation strategies" adds nothing. That the mayors discussed these strategies fails to

show, as SAF must, that the mayors agreed to file lawsuits

with an unlawful objective. Were we to conclude otherwise,

people would be unable to meet in the nation's capital to

discuss issues of concern without subjecting themselves to the

jurisdiction of D.C. courts.

SAF also argues that the fact that multiple cities filed suit

shows that the mayors entered into a conspiratorial agreement at the 67th Winter Meeting. Although SAF offered this

argument in the district court and here at oral argument, it

failed to do so in its opening brief, so we need not consider it.

See, e.g., Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 259 F.3d 731, 739 n.13

(D.C. Cir. 2001). In any event, the argument is unpersuasive.

To begin with, some cities filed suit before the 67th Winter

Meeting occurred. Moreover, the fact that the cities filed

suit does not support an inference either that the mayors

agreed to do so or, more to the point, that they reached any

such agreement at a particular time and place and for the

purpose of bankrupting gun manufacturers.

For all these reasons, we agree with the district court that

SAF has failed to make a prima facie showing of the first two

elements of civil conspiracy: "(1) an agreement ... (2) to

participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful

manner." Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477. We thus need not

consider the mayors' argument that SAF failed to meet its

burden as to the remaining elements of conspiracy, see id.,

nor their claim that exercising personal jurisdiction over them

would violate principles of due process, see First Chicago, 836

F.2d at 1377 (observing that long-arm statute's "transacting

business" provision "has been interpreted to be coextensive

with the Constitution's due process limit").

III.

SAF next argues that even if it failed to establish a prima

facie case, the district court erred in dismissing its suit before

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SAF had an opportunity to take jurisdictional discovery.

Certainly, "[a] plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction is entitled to reasonable discovery[.]"

El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). To get discovery, however, one must ask for it.

SAF's only mention of jurisdictional discovery occurred during the hearing on the mayors' motion to dismiss. Asked by

the district court if SAF had evidentiary support for its

allegation of a conspiratorial agreement, counsel responded:

"[A]fter discovery ... we fully expect that there will be

evidence developed that there was an agreement between the

parties.... I believe we will get that information in discovery." 3/13/00 Mot. Hr'g Tr. at 9, 13. But SAF neither moved

for an opportunity to serve jurisdictional discovery nor defended against the mayors' motion to dismiss on the ground

that it had not yet taken such discovery. Not surprisingly,

the district court never entered a discovery order. Under

these circumstances, we will not consider SAF's argument

that the district court somehow erroneously denied jurisdictional discovery. See, e.g., Tomasello v. Rubin, 167 F.3d 612,

618 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, the

court of appeals is not a forum in which a litigant can present

legal theories that it neglected to raise in a timely manner in

proceedings below." (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

So ordered.

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