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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-1910 

DAMON GOODLOE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

KUL SOOD, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 4:16-cv-4062 — James E. Shadid, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 3, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 17, 2020 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and SCUDDER,

Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Patients are often the best source 

of information about their medical condition. A physician’s 

decision to persist with ineffective treatment and ignore a patient’s repeated complaints of unresolved pain and other 

symptoms can give rise to liability—or, at the very least, raise 

enough questions to warrant a jury trial. Damon Goodloe’s 

case is a good example. 

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An inmate in the care of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Goodloe invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that his 

treating physician within the Hill Correctional Center responded to his repeated complaints of rectal bleeding and severe pain with a course of demonstrably ineffective treatment 

and undue delay in sending him to an outside specialist for 

evaluation. The discovery process revealed medical records 

and other documents corroborating many of these allegations. On the record before us, then, Goodloe has brought 

forth enough evidence to put to a jury his Eighth Amendment 

claim against his treating physician for deliberately indifferent medical care. We therefore reverse the district court’s conclusion to the contrary, while otherwise affirming the entry of 

summary judgment in all other regards. 

I 

A 

The summary judgment record supplies the facts—all of 

which we must construe in the light most favorable to Damon 

Goodloe as the plaintiff and non-moving party. See Shields v. 

Ill. Depʹt of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Goodloe arrived at the Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois in July 2013, and immediately complained of 

pain from rectal bleeding. He told a nurse that he believed his 

hemorrhoids had flared up again. Medical staff referred 

Goodloe to Hill’s medical director, Dr. Kul Sood, who prescribed hemorrhoid medication. 

Goodloe’s pain continued through the summer and fall of 

2013. In appointments with Dr. Sood in September and October, Goodloe reported acute and recurring pain. Without 

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performing a rectal exam, Dr. Sood continued Goodloe on the 

hemorrhoid medication. 

In December 2013, and in response to Goodloe’s ongoing 

complaints of severe pain during bowel movements, a nurse 

practitioner performed a rectal exam and observed anal 

condyloma—a condition marked by small warts inside and 

around the outside of the anus. This diagnosis came as no 

surprise to Goodloe, as he had the warts for at least 18 years 

and believed they had nothing to do with the excruciating 

rectal pain he continued to experience. Goodloe conveyed this 

view to Dr. Sood in a January 2014 appointment. Dr. Sood 

responded by adding a topical ointment to treat the warts. 

As Goodloe’s pain persisted, he grew exasperated with 

Dr. Sood’s treatment and believed that the cause of his ongoing suffering was an internal condition, not hemorrhoids or 

warts. He became convinced he needed to see an outside specialist and asked family members to call the Hill facility to 

echo this request. In February 2014, in the first of many written grievances, Goodloe explained that he experienced so 

much pain during bowel movements that he had to lie in bed 

for hours until the pain subsided. He also underscored his belief that the source of pain was an internal condition not yet 

diagnosed or treated, and, going even further, he requested 

that he be treated by a specialist. In a grievance submitted on 

March 15, 2014, Goodloe accused Dr. Sood of focusing on the 

external anal warts while “deliberately ignoring” repeated 

complaints about internal sources of persistent rectal pain. 

During this same period, Dr. Sood consulted with a colleague, Dr. Neil Fisher, who served as Wexford Health Services’ Corporate Director of Utilization Management, about 

Goodloe. (Wexford contracts to provide health care to inmates 

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in Illinois.) After that consult, Dr. Sood decided to condition 

Goodloe’s seeing an outside specialist on first trying to treat 

the anal warts with topical trichloroacetic acid, commonly 

shorthanded TCAA. The application of the acid treatment 

only added to his pain, leaving his rectum feeling raw and 

burned—so much so that Goodloe, as he put it, “could barely 

wipe after a bowel movement.” At no point throughout the 

spring and early summer of 2014 did Goodloe relent in his 

view that he had an internal condition (having nothing to do 

with his anal warts) that continued to cause miserable pain. 

Indeed, in appointments with Dr. Sood on May 28, June 2, and 

June 9, Goodloe renewed his complaints of untreated pain, 

each time saying he believed its source was internal. And each 

time Dr. Sood responded by staying the course and continuing with the TCAA applications, though on June 9 he did tell 

Goodloe he intended to confer with a colleague on the ongoing course of care. 

By June 17, 2014, Dr. Sood recognized that Goodloe remained in much pain and that treating the anal warts with 

TCAA was not helping. It was that same day that Dr. Sood 

consulted anew with Dr. Fisher and together they decided the 

time had come to refer Goodloe to an outside specialist for a 

colorectal evaluation. 

But no evaluation took place for another three months. 

Precisely why is not clear. It seems Goodloe was referred to 

one specialist, though that referral resulted not in a colorectal 

exam but instead an attempt to schedule surgery to remove 

the anal warts. Upon realizing around July 1 that the first specialist sought to perform surgery (rather than provide an evaluation), Dr. Sood and Dr. Fisher spoke again and cancelled 

the referral. They agreed that wart-removal surgery was not 

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the right next step and decided to give the topical acid treatment another try—a path they considered to be “conservative 

treatment.” Dr. Sood determined to undertake at least two 

more months of topical acid treatment before reconsidering 

referring Goodloe to a specialist. 

Meanwhile, Goodloe continued to suffer from severe 

bowel pain and rectal bleeding. His frustration boiled over 

during the summer of 2014, and he expressed that exasperation by filing new grievances reinforcing his complaints. In 

his July 7 grievance, for example, Goodloe exclaimed, “my 

pain and issues are INTERNAL!!!” and “my situation is getting worse with each passing day” and “I have to lay down 

for hours after[] [every bowel movement] because of the excruciating pains.” 

Approximately one month later, on August 4, in yet another complaint, Goodloe wrote, “I desperately wish somebody would listen to me about my internal pains, and please 

stop ignoring my complaints in my grievances [w]hich have 

been clear and straight to the point.” In that grievance, Goodloe reminded Hill’s medical staff that his warts had never 

bothered him in 18 years, whereas “[t]he internal pains ... 

have only started within the last year.” 

Between May 28 and July 31, 2014, Goodloe complained 

five times of ongoing, miserable rectal pain that he insisted 

was “internal” and not yet diagnosed or treated. And, all told, 

Goodloe filed four lengthy and detailed grievances on the issue during his first year at Hill. 

It was not until September 2014 that Dr. Sood again determined that Goodloe needed to be evaluated by a colorectal 

specialist. That evaluation occurred on September 22, when 

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Goodloe saw a colorectal specialist at the Order of St. Francis 

Clinic in Galesburg. The specialist immediately diagnosed an 

anal fissure—a small tear in the anal tissue lining—and arranged for prompt treatment. Goodloe underwent surgery on 

October 3 and testified that he experienced instant pain relief. 

The rectal bleeding likewise abated and in time altogether 

stopped. 

B 

In March 2016, Goodloe, proceeding pro se and under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed suit alleging a violation of his Eighth 

Amendment rights by multiple defendants, only two of 

whom are relevant here—Dr. Sood and Dr. Fisher. Goodloe’s 

complaint was as clear and precise as the grievances he submitted within the Hill Correctional Center. He alleged that 

Dr. Sood acted with deliberate indifference to complaints of 

repeated and unrelenting rectal pain, including by not only 

persisting with a course of treatment (the TCAA, in particular) that was ineffective, but also by delaying evaluation by an 

outside colorectal specialist. Goodloe further alleged that 

Dr. Fisher was deliberately indifferent for many of the same 

reasons. Separately, Goodloe contended that Dr. Sood violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him 

(by denying and delaying proper medical care) for filing multiple grievances within the Hill facility. 

Discovery ensued. The defendants then moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ 

motion on each of Goodloe’s claims, determining that 

Dr. Sood’s care reflected not deliberate indifference but a 

“measured course of treatment” designed to “alleviate the internal pain Plaintiff experienced before seeking consultation 

by [an] outside specialist.” On this reasoning, the court saw 

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no material unresolved question as to whether Dr. Sood deliberately delayed referring Goodloe to the Order of St. Francis facility for the colorectal exam. If anything, the court 

added, any delay Goodloe experienced appeared to have 

been the product of an administrative scheduling error, for 

which Dr. Sood shouldered no responsibility. 

The district court likewise found that Goodloe failed to 

uncover any evidence establishing that Dr. Fisher, who only 

consulted with Dr. Sood, deliberately failed to act in the face 

of any known risk of harm. As for the retaliation claim, the 

court saw no evidence suggesting that Dr. Sood, in response 

to Goodloe’s grievances, took any actions to deny or delay the 

provision of medical care. 

This appeal followed, and we appointed counsel to represent Goodloe. 

II 

A 

The controlling legal framework is well established. Goodloe’s claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs 

arise under the Eighth Amendment and have both objective 

and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834 (1994); see also Williams v. Shah, 927 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 

2019). The inmate must show an “objectively serious medical 

condition” that each named defendant responded to with deliberate indifference. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 

(7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Nobody disputes that Goodloe suffered from an objectively serious medical condition. His 

claims therefore turn on the subjective component and, more 

specifically, whether he has created a genuine issue of fact as 

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to whether Dr. Sood and Dr. Fisher responded with deliberate 

indifference to his persistent complaints of severe rectal pain. 

As its name implies, deliberate indifference requires 

“more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). Rather, the evidence must show that the prison official acted 

with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” meaning the official knew or was aware of—but then disregarded—a substantial risk of harm to an inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 

837; see also Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 

2015) (explaining that the official “must both be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference”).

Two lines of cases aptly fit Goodloe’s claim. First, our decision in Greeno v. Daley confirms that an inmate can establish 

deliberate indifference by showing that medical personnel 

persisted with a course of treatment they knew to be ineffective. 414 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2005). The medical defendants in Greeno failed to conduct necessary tests, ignored specific treatment requests from the inmate, and persisted in offering weak medication—all in the face of repeated protests 

that the medication was not working. See id. In reversing an 

award of summary judgment for those defendants, we underscored a point that applies with full force here: when a doctor 

is aware of the need to undertake a specific task and fails to 

do so, the case for deliberate indifference is particularly 

strong. See id. at 655. Put most bluntly, faced with an inmate 

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experiencing ongoing suffering from a serious medical condition, a prison physician cannot “doggedly persis[t] in a course 

of treatment known to be ineffective” without violating the 

Eighth Amendment. Id.

Second, our cases likewise establish that “inexplicable delay” in responding to an inmate’s serious medical condition 

can reflect deliberate indifference. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 731. 

That is especially so if that delay exacerbates an inmate’s medical condition or unnecessarily prolongs suffering. See Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2007). 

B 

Goodloe came forward with enough evidence to support 

his deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Sood under either 

theory of liability. Based on the summary judgment record, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Sood’s persistence in 

the ineffective TCAA treatment, or his delay in getting Goodloe to an outside specialist, or both, amounted to deliberate 

indifference. At the very least, Goodloe showed enough of a 

dispute on these questions to put his claim to a jury. 

Recall that Dr. Sood began the TCAA treatment in April 

2014 and continued it throughout the summer and fall. Indeed, Dr. Sood maintained that course of treatment even after 

acknowledging, as part of his June 2014 consult with 

Dr. Fisher, that Goodloe had shown “no improvement.” Even 

more, the June 2014 consult ended with Dr. Sood believing 

that the time had come for Goodloe, who continued to experience unrelenting rectal pain, to see an outside specialist for 

a colorectal exam. When that did not immediately occur, 

whether because of a scheduling error or otherwise, Dr. Sood 

resorted not to taking a step to be certain Goodloe saw an 

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outside specialist, but instead continued the TCAA treatment. 

All along Dr. Sood heard complaints from Goodloe that treating his anal warts with topical acid was providing no relief for 

the acute rectal pain. These complaints throughout the summer of 2014 mirrored the reports of unrelenting pain that 

Goodloe voiced for at least the last six months of 2013. 

The record allows a finding that, at least by June 2014, 

Dr. Sood persisted with the TCAA treatment knowing it was 

not working and that Goodloe continued to suffer from severe 

rectal pain and ongoing bleeding. See Greeno, 414 F.3d at 654–

55 (holding that an inmate had raised a jury issue by showing 

the prison medical staff knew the inmate needed to see an outside specialist yet continued to administer medications they 

knew had proved ineffective). 

Goodloe’s second and related theory of deliberate indifference based on Dr. Sood’s delay in getting him to an outside 

specialist likewise finds adequate support in the record. Go 

back to what happened in June 2014, for it was then that 

Dr. Sood, upon consulting with Dr. Fisher, decided that 

Goodloe needed more help than anyone at the Hill facility 

could offer. The TCAA and hemorrhoid treatment had not 

worked; Goodloe remained in substantial pain, and he 

needed to see a specialist. But that did not occur for another 

three months, until September 22. 

Although the district court determined that the delay in 

Goodloe’s receiving the outside evaluation reflected an administrative error, a jury could see the facts another way. Indeed, on appeal Dr. Sood has not defended the delay on the 

basis of any administrative mishap. But there is more. When 

Goodloe first realized that he was not going to see an outside 

specialist but instead would have to undergo new rounds of 

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TCAA treatment for his anal warts, he complained in no uncertain terms, exclaiming in his July 7 grievance that “my pain 

and issues are INTERNAL!!!” and “my situation is getting 

worse with each passing day.” The complaint prompted no 

action, no renewed effort to arrange for the outside consultation Dr. Sood had decided two weeks earlier was medically 

necessary. A jury could find that there was no medical justification for the delay. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 730–31; see also 

Williams, 491 F.3d at 715–16. 

In the end, Goodloe has pointed to enough evidence to 

survive summary judgment. 

C 

We turn now to Goodloe’s deliberate indifference claim 

against Dr. Fisher. While Goodloe urges us to view Dr. Fisher 

through the same evidence supporting the claim against 

Dr. Sood, we see important differences. 

On this claim, the district court properly entered summary 

judgment for Dr. Fisher. Foremost, the record shows that 

Dr. Fisher never directly treated Goodloe and instead played 

a much more limited role by consulting on three occasions 

with Dr. Sood about particular care decisions. While the record may support a finding that Dr. Fisher was aware from 

these consults of Goodloe’s unresolved pain, we do not see 

evidence permitting an inference that Dr. Fisher responded 

with deliberate indifference. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751 (explaining that deliberate indifference requires “more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing”). Nothing 

shows Dr. Fisher’s awareness of the extent of Goodloe’s suffering or persistent complaints and requests for a new course 

of treatment. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 728 (“[A] plaintiff must 

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provide evidence that an official actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.”). Nor at a more specific 

level do we see evidence that Dr. Fisher, in not approving 

Goodloe’s undergoing the wart-removal surgery in June 2014, 

did so as part of a deliberate effort to prolong Goodloe’s pain 

or otherwise withhold a known and more appropriate course 

of treatment. 

At bottom, then, we conclude that Dr. Fisher’s role and 

knowledge was too limited to create a jury question. 

III 

We close with a brief word on Goodloe’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim against Dr. Sood. Goodloe primarily rooted 

his claim in the contention that Dr. Sood retaliated against 

him for filing grievances complaining of poor medical care, 

most especially the aggressive and prolonged TCAA treatment. 

A successful retaliation claim requires proof of (1) protected First Amendment activity; (2) a deprivation likely to 

deter future protected speech; and (3) that the protected activity was “at least a motivating factor” for the alleged deprivation. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008). 

The district court was right to conclude that the record 

lacked evidence permitting a finding that Dr. Sood made any 

treatment decision in response to Goodloe’s submission of 

multiple grievances. Stated another way, on our fresh review 

of the record we see no facts allowing a jury to infer that 

Dr. Sood’s course of treating Goodloe reflected any retaliatory 

animus. Nor, contrary to Goodloe’s suggestion, do we see 

anything suspicious about the timing of his submission of any 

grievance in relating to Dr. Sood’s June and July 2014 

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decisions to continue the TCAA treatment and delay a referral 

to an outside colorectal specialist. See Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 

335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985) (observing that a “lengthy period of 

time ... greatly weakens any inference” that the action was 

retaliatory); see also Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 

(7th Cir. 2012) (determining, albeit in the employment discrimination context, that the challenged timeline was not suspicious because adverse action did not “follow[] close on the 

heels of protected expression”). 

* * * 

To avoid summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment 

claim against Dr. Sood, Goodloe had to demonstrate the existence of disputed, material issues of fact to proceed to trial. 

He did so, in no small part because of his own care and diligence while proceeding pro se in the district court and now in 

our court with the benefit of very able appellate counsel who 

with his law firm’s support has offered his services pro bono. 

We VACATE the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sood on Goodloe’s deliberate indifference 

claim and REMAND for further proceedings. We otherwise 

AFFIRM. 

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