Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00196/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00196-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SCOTT JOHNSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EDWARD Y. KIM, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-00196-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

Before the court are plaintiff Scott Johnson’s motion for partial summary 

judgment, ECF No. 22, and defendant Jay C. Lee’s motion to dismiss the first amended 

complaint, ECF No. 25. The court submitted the motions as provided by Local Rule 230(g). As 

explained below, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s federal claim under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, and declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law 

claims. Accordingly, plaintiff’s first amended complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety without 

prejudice to refiling in state court, and the parties’ pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Johnson is a level C-5 quadriplegic. Johnson Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 22-4; First 

Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 13 (“FAC”). He uses a wheelchair for mobility and has a specially 

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equipped van. Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 2–3; FAC ¶ 1. Mr. Johnson alleges the facilities at Eppie’s 

Restaurant, a business establishment located at 4657 West Capitol Avenue in West Sacramento, 

California, have several barriers that limit access to wheelchair users. See FAC ¶¶ 7–13; see 

Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 6–9. Plaintiff alleges he encountered the barriers when he ate lunch at Eppie’s 

Restaurant in February and June 2013, and he was deterred from patronizing Eppie’s Restaurant 

on two other occasions in 2013 due to the barriers. See FAC ¶ 11; Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14. 

Plaintiff further alleges defendants own, operate and/or lease the real property for Eppie’s 

Restaurant. FAC ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on January 22, 2014, asserting claims for violation 

of the ADA, violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53, 

violation of the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54–54.8, and negligence. 

ECF No. 1. Defendant Kim filed an answer on April 10, 2014. ECF No. 6. On July 11, 2014, 

plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, which added defendant Lee as a named defendant. ECF 

No. 13. Defendant Kim and plaintiff stipulated that Mr. Kim’s previously filed answer would be 

deemed responsive to the first amended complaint. ECF No. 14. Defendant Lee filed an answer 

to the first amended complaint on March 4, 2015. ECF No. 19. 

On May 22, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment with 

respect to defendants’ violations of the ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act. ECF No. 22. On July 

13, 2015, defendant Lee, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to dismiss the first amended 

complaint, arguing that Eppie’s Restaurant closed in January 2014; that Mr. Lee is a senior citizen 

living off of social security and does not have the means to pay the proposed settlement; and that 

plaintiff is a “professional” plaintiff. ECF No. 25. On July 28, 2015, plaintiff opposed defendant 

Lee’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 27. On November 6, 2015, defendant Kim opposed plaintiff’s 

motion for partial summary judgment and asked the court to dismiss the case for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 37. On November 13, 2015, plaintiff filed a reply in support of his 

motion for partial summary judgment. ECF No. 38. 

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II. JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL ADA CLAIM 

A. Legal Standard 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, until proven otherwise, cases 

lie outside the jurisdiction of the court. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged by either party or raised sua 

sponte by the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Ruhrgas AG 

v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–84 (1999). A jurisdictional attack may be either facial or 

factual. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the complaint 

is challenged as failing to establish federal jurisdiction, even assuming all the allegations are true 

and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Safe Air for Everyone v. 

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger provides evidence that an alleged 

fact is false resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In these circumstances, the 

allegations are not presumed to be true and “the district court is not restricted to the face of the 

pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual 

disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988). “Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual 

motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party 

opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of 

establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 

1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the controversy before it becomes 

moot. In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). “[A] case is moot when the issues 

presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 

County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 

U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). Courts have found ADA cases to be moot when the challenged premises 

have been closed with no plans to reopen or lease to a new tenant. See Johnson v. Lake Tahoe 

Partners, No. 13-2534, 2014 WL 2548830, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2014) (ADA claim moot 

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when restaurant unconditionally vacated the premises and permanently closed the restaurant on 

the property); Kohler v. Southland Foods, Inc., 459 F. App’x 617 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) 

(affirming district court’s determination that ADA action was moot when defendant closed the 

restaurant that was the subject of the ADA action); Steelman v. Hoch, No. 12-79, 2012 WL 

4513864, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 1, 2012) (ADA claim moot when defendant was selling the 

premises and the restaurant tenant was no longer in business); Balt. Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB 

Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (D. Md. 2000) (ADA claim moot when allegedly inaccessible 

model unit was closed with no plans to reopen it). 

B. Analysis 

Here, defendant Kim challenges the first amended complaint as failing to establish 

federal jurisdiction through a factual attack. Specifically, Mr. Kim has submitted a declaration 

challenging the first amended complaint’s allegation that he and Mr. Lee own or operate the real 

property identified as Eppie’s Restaurant. See Kim Decl., ECF No. 37-1. His declaration states 

that he formerly owned the subject property but sold his entire interest in it on or about May 8, 

2015. Id. ¶ 5. He further avers that Mr. Lee formerly operated the property as Eppie’s 

Restaurant, but in January 2014, Mr. Lee closed the restaurant, abandoned the property, and 

operated his business from a different location. Kim Decl. ¶ 3; see also ECF Nos. 19, 25. 

According to Mr. Kim, the building has remained vacant since January 2014. Kim Decl. ¶ 4. 

Because Mr. Kim has sold his interest in the property and Mr. Lee has vacated the premises, Mr. 

Kim argues neither has a cognizable interest in the outcome of the ADA claim, for which 

injunctive relief is the only available remedy. See ECF No. 37, at 1–3. Mr. Kim contends the 

ADA claim is therefore moot and the court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 

See id. at 2–3. 

Based on the evidence before the court, the court finds plaintiff has not met his 

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction over his ADA claim. Plaintiff has not objected 

to Mr. Kim’s declaration or submitted any evidence showing that either defendant has a 

cognizable interest in the outcome of the ADA claim. See ECF No. 38. As noted, courts have 

found ADA cases to be moot when the challenged premises have been closed with no plans to 

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reopen or re-lease, see Lake Tahoe Partners, 2014 WL 2548830, at *3, as appears to be the case 

with Eppie’s Restaurant here. In his reply brief, plaintiff acknowledges it appears his ADA claim 

has been rendered moot and will be dismissed. See ECF No. 38, at 2. Because plaintiff has not 

met his burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, the ADA claim is DISMISSED. 

III. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER STATE LAW CLAIMS 

A. Legal Standard 

This court’s jurisdiction over this case is based on the ADA claim, while the state 

law claims were brought in reliance on the court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367. Generally, “a federal district court with power to hear state law claims has discretion to 

keep, or decline to keep, them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c).” Acri v. Varian Assocs., 

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.), as supplemented by 121 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1997); see also

Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The decision whether to 

continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have 

been dismissed lies within the district court’s discretion.” (citation omitted)). One circumstance 

in which a district court may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] 

claim” is when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). That decision, however, is informed by consideration of judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity factors. See Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001. “[I]n the usual 

case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 364 n.7 (1988). 

B. Analysis 

Here, the court has dismissed plaintiff’s only federal claim, so the decision to keep 

the three remaining state law claims lies within the district court’s discretion under § 1367(c). As 

explained above, in the usual case in which all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state 

claims should be dismissed as well. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 364 n.7. Having 

considered the relevant factors, the court is not persuaded this is one of the unusual cases in 

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which the court should retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Plaintiff overstates 

the extent to which the action has been litigated before this court. The court has not expended 

substantial judicial resources familiarizing itself with the case, and has not issued any orders 

going to the merits. The only motions the parties have filed are the pending motion to dismiss 

and motion for summary judgment. As a general rule, the court has an interest in avoiding 

needless adjudication of state law claims. Although plaintiff’s California Unruh Civil Rights Act 

claim is predicated on an alleged violation of the ADA, this alone does not justify use of the 

court’s scarce resources to adjudicate the merits of the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, 

the court does not reach the merits of the pending motions insofar as they relate to plaintiff’s state 

law claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

plaintiff’s federal ADA claim and declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 

state law claims under § 1367(c). The first amended complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice 

to refiling of the state law claims in state court. Defendant Lee’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s 

motion for partial summary judgment are DENIED AS MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 19, 2016. 

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