Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-01907/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-01907-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN HILL, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

R+L CARRIERS, INC.; R+L CARRIERS

SHARED SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-1907 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT SHARED

SERVICES’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR

CONDITIONAL CLASS

CERTIFICATION AND

APPROVAL OF HOFFMANLA ROCHE NOTICE

(Docket Nos. 50, 61)

Defendant R+L Carriers Shared Services, LLC moves for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment

(Docket No. 50). Plaintiff Glenn Hill opposes the motion and moves

for conditional class action certification and approval of his

Hoffman-La Roche notice (Docket No. 61). Defendant opposes

Plaintiff’s motion. The motions were heard on December 17, 2009. 

Having considered oral argument and all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion and GRANTS Plaintiff’s

motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Glenn Hill is a former employee of Defendant R+L

Carriers Shared Services, LLC. Defendant provides operations and

administrative employees to transportation services companies that

operate under the R+L Carriers brand. Plaintiff was employed by

Defendant between September, 2007 and December, 2008. At all times

during his employment, Plaintiff was classified by Defendant as

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exempt from overtime pay requirements and, accordingly, was not

paid overtime compensation. 

Plaintiff worked at Defendant’s San Lorenzo terminal. He

claims that his job title was “City Dispatcher,” although Defendant

asserts that he held the position of “First Shift Supervisor/City

Dispatcher.” See Hill Decl. ¶ 4; see also Nelson Decl. Ex. 2,

58:1-5; Fishpaw Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s job entailed dispatching

drivers to pick up and deliver various types of freight. Defendant

claims that Plaintiff’s duties included: (1) conducting daily

meetings with “the management team;” (2) conducting daily meetings

with drivers; (3) scheduling delivery appointments; (4) addressing

and resolving driver staffing issues; (5) ensuring that daily

equipment inspections were completed; (6) monitoring drivers’

progress in completing scheduled deliveries and employing

discretion to make adjustments when necessary; (7) receiving

customer inquiries for pickups; (8) instructing drivers on the most

efficient way to complete their scheduled pickups; (9) monitoring

each driver’s performance and disciplining or recommending

disciplinary action to the Service Center Manager as necessary; and

(10) addressing and resolving customer complaints. Defendant

maintains that, among other things, Plaintiff exercised discretion

and independent judgment in performing these duties sufficient to

warrant his exemption from overtime pay requirements. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that he scheduled delivery

appointments; took customers’ orders; dispatched drivers for pickup requests based upon computer-generated assignments; and, on rare

occasions, handled customer complaints. He disputes, however,

Defendant’s characterization of the extent of his discretion and

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1 Plaintiff and Defendant disagree about the title held by the

individual who has overall management duties over a terminal. 

Plaintiff maintains that the individual’s title was “Terminal

Manager” during his employment with Defendant. Without deciding

which title is factually accurate, the Court refers to this

position as “Service Center Manager” for the purposes of clarity. 

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maintains that the Service Center Manager,1 not the City

Dispatcher, handled many of the duties described above. He asserts

that his discretion and authority were in fact limited. In

particular, he claims that he could not deviate from the

instructions contained in the Terminal Services Operation Manual,

which delineated his duties. And, to the extent he had discretion,

he was required to seek approval from the Service Center Manager

before taking action. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant unlawfully mischaracterized

him as exempt from overtime pay requirements. In addition, he

alleges that Defendant failed to provide meal and rest breaks, and

did not keep and provide adequate work and payroll records as

required by law. He brings claims under the federal Fair Labor

Standards Act (FLSA), California’s wage-and-hour laws and

California Business and Professions Code § 17200. 

He intends to move to certify two subclasses for this action. 

His complaint defines the nation-wide sub-class as: 

All persons who worked for any period of time in the

United States, but outside of California, who were

classified as Dispatchers (including “City Dispatchers”

and any other position(s) who are either called, or

work(ed) as, dispatchers) in the three years prior to the

filing of this Complaint.

First Am. Compl. (FAC) ¶ 27. His California sub-class is defined

as:

All persons who worked for any period of time in

California who were classified as Dispatchers (including

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“City Dispatchers” and any other position(s) who are

either called, or work(ed) as, dispatchers) in the four

years prior to the filing of this Complaint, up through

the final disposition of this action.

FAC ¶ 27.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

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Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party’s prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party’s

“burden of contradicting [the moving party’s] evidence is not

negligible.” Id. This standard does not change merely because

resolution of the relevant issue is “highly fact specific.” See

id.

B. Analysis

1. Summary Judgment Based on Exemption from Overtime

Pay Requirements

Under the FLSA and California law, employees must ordinarily

be paid overtime compensation if they work more than forty hours in

one week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Cal. Lab. Code § 510. Both

federal and state law exempt from this rule employees who work in

executive and administrative capacities. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1);

Cal. Lab. Code § 515; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11090(1)(A)(2)

(codifying California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No.

9-2001, which pertains to employees in the transportation

industry). Also exempt from overtime coverage are certain

employees of motor carriers covered by the federal Motor Carrier

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Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 782.2; Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 8, § 11090(3)(L). 

Employers have the burden of proving that an employee is

exempt from federal and state overtime pay requirements. See Gieg

v. DDR, Inc., 407 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2005); Gomez v.

Lincare, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 508, 515 (2009) (citing Sav-On

Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 338 (2004)). 

Courts construe exemptions narrowly against employers. Klem v.

County of Santa Clara, California, 208 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th. Cir.

2000); Gomez, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 515. The determination of

whether an exemption applies requires a fact-intensive inquiry. 

See Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 945 (9th

Cir. 2009) (citing Tumminello v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 693, 697

(1988) (“The determination of whether an exemption applies to a

given individual . . . is a very fact-specific exercise.”). 

Defendant claims that it is entitled to summary judgment

because Plaintiff was properly classified as an exempt employee. 

It asserts that he was subject to the administrative, executive,

motor carrier and “combination” exemptions under federal and state

law. Because Defendant would bear the burden at trial to prove

that Plaintiff was an exempt employee, it must show that there is

no genuine issue of material fact concerning each element of an

exemption in order to prevail on summary judgment. 

a. Administrative Employee Exemption

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant does not show, as a matter of

law, that he exercised sufficient discretion and independent

judgment to qualify as an administrative employee. 

Both federal and state law exempt administrative employees

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2

 Federal law provides additional guidance in determining

whether an employee exercises sufficient discretion and independent

judgment. Employees exercise discretion and independent judgment

“even if their decisions or recommendations are reviewed at a

higher level.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c). “The fact that an

employee’s decision may be subject to review and that upon occasion

the decisions are revised or reversed after review does not mean

that the employee is not exercising discretion and independent

judgment.” Id. 

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from overtime pay requirements. A component common between the

federal and state exemptions is the purportedly exempt employee’s

exercise of discretion and independent judgment. Under federal

law, the employee must have a “primary duty” that “includes the

exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to

matters of significance.”2 29 C.F.R. § 541.200. The California

analog exempts an employee who “customarily and regularly exercises

discretion and independent judgment.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8,

§ 11090(1)(A)(2)(b). 

Plaintiff provides testimonial and documentary evidence that

contradicts Defendant’s assertion that he exercised sufficient

discretion and independent judgment to be exempt. He states that

drivers’ assignments were generated by computer and that his role

was limited to distributing these assignments to drivers. Nelson

Decl., Ex. A 96:11-97:19; see also Fishpaw Decl., Ex. C at

RLC000520 (explaining that there is a “default driver” assigned to

each “destination area”). Further, Plaintiff states that when he

was confronted with imbalances in drivers’ workloads, he would

first ask the Service Center Manager whether he could make

adjustments. Nelson Decl., Ex. A 99:25-100:11. 

The Terminal Manual corroborates Plaintiff’s position. For

many duties, including modifying drivers’ work schedules or calling

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in an additional driver, the Manual instructs a City Dispatcher

first to seek the Service Center Manager’s approval. See Fishpaw

Decl., Ex. C at RLC000503, RLC000506. With regard to driver

discipline, the Manual provides that the City Dispatcher may not

take action without first consulting the Service Center Manager

because the “Service Center Manager is responsible for dealing with

discipline issues.” Fishpaw Decl., Ex. C at RLC000570. Further,

contrary to Defendant’s assertion, City Dispatchers do not contact

customers when a driver misses a scheduled pickup; instead, this

duty is given to the Service Center Manager. Fishpaw Decl., Ex. C

at RLC000548. 

The mandatory consultation of the Service Center Manager

suggests that Plaintiff did not exercise discretion or independent

judgment on “matters of significance” or “customarily or

regularly.” Instead, the Manual implies that Plaintiff’s role was

limited to identifying problems and reporting them to the Service

Center Manager. In turn, the Service Center Manager ultimately

decided how to resolve these issues. Indeed, much of the Terminal

Manual prescribes, in substantial detail, how to perform the duties

of the City Dispatcher, most of which appear ministerial in nature. 

This suggests that discretion was not a central component of

Plaintiff’s job. 

Citing Vinole, Defendant asserts that the Court should

consider an employer’s realistic expectations to determine whether

Plaintiff was an exempt employee. See 571 F.3d at 945. However,

an employer’s expectations do not determine whether an employee

performs exempt duties. As Vinole states, in the context of

analyzing whether a California exemption applies, a court first

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“examines in an individualized fashion the work actually performed

by the employee to determine how much of that work is exempt.” Id.

Then, the court turns to whether “the employee’s work was

consistent with the employer’s expectation and whether those

expectations were realistic.” Id. Here, Defendant’s expectations,

as embodied by the Terminal Manual, are consistent with Plaintiff’s

description of his work. Defendant’s testimonial evidence, to the

extent that it suggests Defendant had even higher expectations of

Plaintiff, creates a genuine issue of material fact that must be

resolved at trial. 

Plaintiff’s testimonial and documentary evidence contradicts

Defendant’s evidence that Plaintiff exercised discretion and

independent judgment with respect to matters of significance in his

job as a City Dispatcher. Because this creates a triable issue on

whether Plaintiff was an exempt administrative employee, summary

judgment on this ground is not warranted. 

b. Executive Employee Exemption

Plaintiff maintains that Defendant does not show that he

satisfied all the requirements necessary to qualify as an exempt

executive employee. For employees to qualify as exempt executive

employees under federal and state law, they must, among other

things: (1) manage the enterprise in which they work or a

“customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof,” and

(2) have authority to hire or fire other employees or, in the

alternative, have particular weight given to their suggestions and

recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or

any other status change of other employees. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100;

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11090(1)(A)(1). 

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Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff’s primary duty was

dispatching. As noted above, Plaintiff testified at his deposition

and the Terminal Manual states that Plaintiff first had to seek

leave of the Service Center Manager before taking many substantive

actions. These facts allow a reasonable inference that, in

contrast to Defendant’s assertion, Plaintiff did not have

management responsibilities. 

Even if Plaintiff had managerial duties, he did not have the

requisite influence over personnel decisions. Defendant concedes

that Plaintiff lacked authority to hire or fire drivers. Nelson

Decl., Ex. 1 at 170:6-10; Nelson Decl., Ex. 2 at 244:8-9, 268:12-

14. And with regard to the influence of his recommendations,

Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to contradict

Defendant’s assertion that his suggestions were given particular

weight. Federal law provides factors to consider in determining

whether “particular weight” was afforded, including “the frequency

with which such suggestions and recommendations are made or

requested” and “the frequency with which the employee’s suggestions

and recommendations are relied upon.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.105. 

Plaintiff testified that he was not asked for recommendations, and,

to the extent that he gave any, they were ignored. Nelson Decl.,

Ex. A, 131:21-23, 170:8-10. Defendant did not provide contrary

evidence to show that any of Plaintiff’s recommendations resulted

in substantive personnel action. Thus, a jury could reasonably

infer that Plaintiff did not sufficiently influence Defendant’s

personnel decisions. 

Thus, summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff was an

exempt executive employee is unwarranted because there is a triable

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3

 Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was also exempt from

state overtime pay requirements under California’s motor carrier

exemption. However, it does not make a prima facie showing that

this state exemption applies to Plaintiff. The California

exemption applies to employees whose hours of service are subject

to 49 C.F.R. §§ 395.1-395.13. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8,

§ 11090(3)(L). However, these federal regulations relate to “hours

of service for drivers.” 49 C.F.R. pt. 395; see also 49 C.F.R.

§ 395.1(a)(1) (stating that part 395 applies to “all motor carriers

and drivers”). Because Defendant has not provided evidence that

Plaintiff was a driver subject to these regulations, it is not

entitled to summary judgment that Plaintiff was exempt under the

California motor carrier exemption. 

4 Defendant cites McIntyre v. FLX of Miami, Inc., 2008 WL

4541017 (S.D. Fla.), for the proposition that dispatchers can be

exempt under the motor carrier exemption. There, the plaintiff’s

responsibilities included “checking the vehicles for tire safety,

adequate oil, and verifying the vehicle was in safe operation

before the driver left FLX’s facility for deliveries.” Id. at *7. 

(continued...)

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issue on whether Plaintiff performed executive duties and had the

requisite influence over personnel decisions.

c. Motor Carrier Exemption

To qualify as an exempt employee under the federal motor

carrier exemption, the employee must, among other things, “engage

in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of

operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public

highways of passengers or property in interstate or foreign

commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 782.2(a).3 Generally, dispatching is not considered work that

affects the safety of motor vehicle operation. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 782.2(f); cf. id. § 782.6(c)(1) (discussing the applicability of

the exemption to mechanics, and stating that activities “which do

not directly affect such safety of operation include those

performed by employees whose jobs are confined to such work as that

of dispatchers . . . .”).4 

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4(...continued)

Thus, in that case, the dispatcher had duties related to safety

that extended beyond mere dispatching. Here, Defendant has not

proffered uncontested evidence that Plaintiff played a similar

role.

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Plaintiff provides evidence contradicting Defendant’s showing

that his duties directly impacted vehicle safety. He stated at his

deposition that he did not conduct truck inspections or otherwise

handle truck safety. Nelson Decl., Ex. 1 at 141:25-142:2. 

Instead, he stated that he was instructed that he “was to be no

part of it,” and that safety was under the purview of the Service

Center Manager and the Safety Manager. Nelson Decl., Ex. 1 at

142:2-4. Also, Plaintiff stated that, if a driver experienced a

mechanical malfunction on the road, the driver would call the

“Breakdown Department,” which, in turn, would provide Plaintiff

with information concerning towing the truck back to the terminal. 

Nelson Decl., Ex. 1 at 133:24-134:2. These statements support a

reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s duties did not directly

affect the safety of Defendant’s vehicles. 

Thus, there is a triable issue on whether Plaintiff was exempt

from overtime pay under the motor carrier exemption, and summary

judgment based on this exemption is not warranted. 

d. Exempt through Combination of Exemptions

Under federal law, “an employee whose primary duty involves a

combination of exempt administrative and exempt executive work may

qualify for exemption.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.708. California appears

to recognize a similar “combination” exemption. See Cal. Div. of

Labor Standards Enforcement Opinion Letter of May 23, 2003, at 5.

As noted above, Defendant has not proffered uncontroverted

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evidence that Plaintiff’s work primarily consisted of

administrative or executive tasks or both. Thus, summary judgment

on this basis is not warranted. 

2. Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Other

Claims

Defendant asserts that if the Court grants summary judgment

that Plaintiff was exempt, summary judgment would be warranted on

his claims for recordkeeping violations, failure to pay wages and

unfair business practices. Because the Court does not find that

Defendant has shown that Plaintiff is exempt from overtime pay, the

Court denies summary judgment on these other claims. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification and Approval

of Hoffman-La Roche Notice 

A. Legal Background

The FLSA authorizes workers to sue for unpaid overtime wages

on their own behalf and on behalf of “other employees similarly

situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike class actions brought under

Federal Rule of Procedure 23, however, collective actions brought

under the FLSA require that individual members “opt in” by filing a

written consent. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a

party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in

writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the

court in which such action is brought.”). 

In Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169

(1989), the Supreme Court held that, “in appropriate cases,”

district courts should exercise their discretion to authorize and

facilitate notice of a collective action to similarly situated

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5 Although Hoffmann-La Roche involved claims brought under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), because ADEA

incorporates § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act into its

enforcement scheme, the same rules govern judicial management of

collective actions under both statutes. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Farm

Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 1992).

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potential plaintiffs.5

As noted above, the FLSA provides for a collective action

where the complaining employees are “similarly situated.” 29

U.S.C. § 216(b). But the FLSA does not define “similarly

situated,” nor has the Ninth Circuit defined it. As noted by the

Tenth Circuit, there is little circuit law defining “similarly

situated.” Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095,

1102 (10th Cir. 2001).

Although various approaches have been taken to determine 

whether plaintiffs are “similarly situated,” district courts in

this circuit have used the ad hoc, two-tiered approach. See Wynn

v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1082 (C.D. Cal.

2002) (noting that the majority of courts prefer this approach);

see also Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102-03 (discussing three different

approaches district courts have used to determine whether potential

plaintiffs are “similarly situated” and finding that the ad hoc

approach is arguably the best of the three approaches); Hipp v.

Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001)

(finding the two-tiered approach to certification of § 216(b)

opt-in classes to be an effective tool for district courts to use). 

Under this approach, the district court makes two determinations,

on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. The court first makes an initial

“notice stage” determination of whether plaintiffs are similarly

situated, deciding whether a collective action should be certified

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for the purpose of sending notice of the action to potential class

members. See, e.g., Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102. For conditional

certification at this notice stage, the court requires little more

than substantial allegations, supported by declarations or

discovery, that “the putative class members were together the

victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Id. The standard

for certification at this stage is a lenient one that typically

results in certification. Wynn, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. 

The second determination is made at the conclusion of

discovery, usually on a motion for decertification by the

defendant, utilizing a stricter standard for “similarly situated.” 

Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102. During this second stage analysis, the

court reviews several factors, including the disparate factual and

employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; the various

defenses available to the defendant which appear to be individual

to each plaintiff; fairness and procedural considerations; and

whether the plaintiffs made any required filings before instituting

suit. Id. at 1103.

Notably, collective actions under the FLSA are not subject to

the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

for certification of a class action. Id. at 1105. “The requisite

showing of similarity of claims under the FLSA is considerably less

stringent than the requisite showing under Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. All that need be shown by the plaintiff

is that some identifiable factual or legal nexus binds together the

various claims of the class members in a way that hearing the

claims together promotes judicial efficiency and comports with the

broad remedial policies underlying the FLSA.” Wertheim v. Arizona,

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1993 WL 603552, at *1 (D. Ariz.) (citations omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Conditional Certification

As noted above, the standard for certification at the notice

stage is a lenient one. Plaintiff has met his burden of showing

that all City Dispatchers are similarly situated for the purposes

of conditional class certification: all City Dispatchers do not

receive overtime pay, work similar schedules and perform similar

duties. Plaintiff has submitted his own deposition testimony and

that of James Fishpaw, one of Defendant’s vice-presidents of human

resources, as well as documentary evidence, including Defendant’s

Terminal Manual and advertisements soliciting applicants for

dispatcher positions, all of which support the allegations

contained in his complaint and in the current motion. This showing

satisfies his initial burden at the notice stage. 

Defendant proffers fifteen declarations by individuals who

currently hold the “First Shift Supervisor/City Dispatcher” or

“City Dispatcher” positions. At this stage, these declarations do

not negate the showing Plaintiff has made for conditional

certification. Defendant may resubmit these declarations as part

of a decertification motion, after discovery is complete. At that

time, the Court will apply the more stringent standard discussed

above. 

2. Proposed Notice and Opt-in Form

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed notice, as modified

and attached, provides putative class members with sufficient

information about their rights and obligations. The notice shall

be provided to putative class members who were employed by

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Defendant within three years of the date of this Order. The Court

sets a seventy-five day deadline for potential class members to

return their consent forms. The parties appear to agree on a

third-party administrator to distribute the notices; the parties’

agreed-upon administrator shall distribute the notices through

first-class mail. Any website providing information on this action

shall include the Court’s approved notice. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to order Defendant to provide his

counsel with contact information for all putative class members so

that counsel can monitor the distribution of notices. He claims

that Defendant is “attempting to hide putative class members.” 

Reply at 12. Plaintiff points to the discrepancy between Mr.

Fishpaw’s deposition and his declaration filed in opposition to

Plaintiff’s conditional certification motion. In the former, Mr.

Fishpaw estimated that Defendant has over 400 City Dispatcher

positions, Nelson Decl., Ex. 6 at 52:19-25, and, in the latter, he

states that Defendant “currently employs 128 City Dispatchers,”

Fishpaw Decl. ¶ 7. This discrepancy warrants disclosing

information about the putative class members to Plaintiff’s

counsel. Defendant shall disclose to Plaintiff, subject to a

protective order if necessary, the number, location and actual job

titles of persons who are classified as dispatchers. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary

judgment. (Docket No. 50.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion

for conditional collective action certification and authorization

of a Hoffman-LaRoche opt-in notice (Docket No. 61). The Court

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conditionally certifies Plaintiff’s nation-wide sub-class and

approves his proposed opt-in notice, as modified and attached. 

Notice shall be provided to putative nation-wide sub-class members

who worked for Defendant within three years from the date of this

Order. These class members have seventy-five days from the date

the notice is mailed to return their consent forms. Defendant

shall, within two weeks of the date of this order, produce to the

mutually agreed-upon third-party administrator the names,

addresses, alternate addresses, email addresses, social security

numbers and telephone numbers of all prospective members of the

class. Notice shall be mailed two weeks from the date that the

third-party administrator receives the data. In addition,

Defendant shall, within two weeks of the date of this order,

disclose to Plaintiff the number, location and actual job titles of

persons who are classified as dispatchers. 

A further case management conference is scheduled for April

29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

January 22, 2010

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