Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02698/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02698-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFREDO RINCON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv2698-JLS (NLS)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

APPLICATION TO SCREEN FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 22.]

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

On February 22, 2011, the District Court adopted this Court’s Report and Recommendation

Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. [Doc. No. 21.] Plaintiff was given

45 days from the docketing of the Order within which to file an amended complaint. [Id.] Plaintiff

did not file an amended complaint and the case was closed.

On April 20, 2011, Defendants filed the current application requesting that the Court screen

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. [Doc. No. 22.] According to

Defendants, Plaintiff served an Amended Complaint on them on April 7, 2011. [Id. at 2.] However,

there is no such Amended Complaint on the Court’s docket, rendering the motion moot.

In any event, Defendants are cautioned that their request for the Court to sua sponte screen an

amended complaint at this juncture, and to waive their right to reply, is inappropriate for several

reasons with which Defendant should be familiar. Pursuant to the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

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and § 1915A the practice of this District is to undertake an initial screening of prisoner cases, and sua

sponte dismiss for failure to state a claim, prior to ordering service upon any Defendant. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3). If the complaint passes initial screening, the court issues

an order for the issuance of a summons and service of the complaint and summons by the United

States Marshal’s Office. Id. In this case, such an order was issued on February 22, 2010. [Doc. No.

4.] The order also instructed, as is typical, the following to Defendants:

 ...to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the time provided by the

applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Procedure 12(a). See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted

to ‘waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section

1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made

preliminary determination based on the face of the pleading alone that

Plaintiff has a ‘reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,’ the

defendant is required to respond). 

[Doc. No. 4 at 6.] In other words, Defendants have already been informed that after the initial

screening, a waiver of the right to reply is inappropriate and they are required to respond.

This is not the first time a court of this District has made the point clear. In Brooks v.

Alameida, Jr., et al., 04cv2059-H (CAB) [Doc. No. 30 at 12], Judge Stiven wrote a thoroughly

reasoned order explaining that “nothing in either 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A permits

Defendants to request the Court do anything sua sponte” and that if the court does not dismiss a

prisoner complaint either before or after service, “it does not simultaneously relieve defense counsel

from his duty to obey a Court Order or follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Judge Stiven’s

Order cited Freeman v. Lee, 30 F.Supp.2d 52, 56 (D.D.C. 1998) in stating, “a mere reading of 28

U.S.C. § 1915A dispels any notion that it provides a basis for governmental defendants to seek a

dismissal or to otherwise play a role in the screening process.” Chief Judge Gonzalez of this District

similarly noted in Sang v. Wittenberg, 03cv1176 IEG (CAB) [Doc. No. 51 at 3], that Defendants’

“Request for Screening” was “entirely inappropriate” and not authorized by the plain language of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) nor § 1915A, and should be rejected out of hand. Judge Gonzalez further stated,

“Moreover, the Court’s role is not to act as counsel for the defense but rather it has a duty to act as an

impartial decision maker.” Id.

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In sum, “[o]nce a Complaint [] survives screening and has been served upon Defendants, and

counsel has entered an appearance on Defendants’ behalf, it is defense counsel’s obligation, not the

Court’s, to defend the case.” Brooks, [Doc. No. 30 at 10] The Complaint in this case survived

screening on February 22, 2010 [doc. no. 4], was served along with the summons, and counsel

appeared on behalf of Defendants. Thus, if an amended complaint were to be filed in this Court,

counsel for Defendants would be required to defend the case by filing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)

or face a default judgment.

CONCLUSION

The Court HEREBY ORDERS:

1. Defendants’ Application for the Court to Screen First Amended Complaint is DENIED

AS MOOT.

2. Plaintiff has 20 days from the filing date of this Order within which to file and serve

his amended complaint in the proper manner.

IT SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 29, 2011

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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