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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 14, 1993 Decided January 28, 1994

No. 93-5255

CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS; EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE

INDIANS; POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS; PUEBLO OF

ISLETA; RUMSEY RANCHERIA; SAN MANUEL BAND

OF MISSION INDIANS; SPOKANE TRIBE;

DELAWARE TRIBE OF WESTERN OKLAHOMA,

APPELLANTS

v.

NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED

STATES; ANTHONY J. HOPE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; BRUCE

BABBITT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE; JANET RENO, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE UNITED STATES,

APPELLEES

STATES OF ALABAMA, ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO,

CONNECTICUT, FLORIDA, IDAHO, KANSAS, MICHIGAN,

MISSISSIPPI, NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA,

SOUTH DAKOTA, WISCONSIN, AND WYOMING,

INTERVENORS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cv1103)

Jerome L. Levine, of the Supreme Court of California, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, and

Glenn M. Feldman argued the cause for appellants. With them on the briefs were Ben Bridgers,

Howard Dickstein, William R. Perry, Jerry C. Straus, Lamar Parrish and William J. O'Brien, II.

Philip L. O'Neill entered an appearance for appellants Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, Eastern

Band of Cherokee Indians, Poarch Band of Creek Indians, Pueblo of Isleta, Rumsey Rancheria, San

Manuel Band of Mission Indians, Spokane Tribe, and Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma. Hans

Walker, Jr. entered an appearance for appellant Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma.

Mark R. Haag, Attorney, United States Department ofJustice, argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Lois Jane Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, United States

Department of Justice, and Edward J. Shawaker, Attorney, United States Department of Justice.

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Jonathan A. Glogau, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of the State of

Florida, argued the cause and filed the brief for intervenors. Carol Jean Smith and Ronald C.

Forehand, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alabama,

entered an appearance for intervenor State of Alabama.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the order of the district court, Lamberth,

J., granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants National Indian Gaming Commission and

its Chairman, the Department of the Interior and its Secretary, and the Department ofJustice and the

Attorney General; and in favor of the fifteen States listed in the caption as intervenors. Cabazon

Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming Comm'n, 827 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1993).

Seven federally recognized Indian Tribes, each alleging that it conducted gaming activities on Indian

lands within the Tribe's jurisdiction, sued the original defendants for an injunction and a declaratory

judgment, claiming that new regulations of the Indian Gaming Commission, promulgated under the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, were invalid and that the

Commission improperly considered certain computerized games to be in a different regulatory

category than their non-computerized counterparts. An eighth federally recognized Tribe, the

Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma, later joined in the action. On September 23, 1993, a panel

of this court, over Judge Henderson's dissent, granted the Tribes' motion for an injunction, pending

appeal, forbidding the defendants from interfering with the Tribes' use and operation of certain

gaming devices. In this expedited appeal, we vacate the injunction and affirm the judgment of the

district court.

Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in the wake of the Supreme Court's

decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), holding that State

gaming laws could not be enforced on Indian reservations within States otherwise permitting such

gaming. With the objective of regulating tribal gaming operations on Indian lands, the Act established

the Indian Gaming Commission as an agency within the Department of the Interior, 25 U.S.C. §

2704(a), and conferred upon theCommission the power and dutyto monitor Indian gaming activities,

to investigate and audit certain types of Indian gaming, to enforce the collection of civil fines, and to

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1Class II gaming also includes non-banking card games otherwise permitted by the State in

which the Indian lands are located. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7). 

2A tribal ordinance or resolution may provide for ownership of class II gaming by another

person as long as certain conditions are met. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(4)(A). 

"promulgate such regulations and guidelines as it deems appropriate to implement the provisions of

" the Act. 25 U.S.C. § 2706.

The Commission's principal responsibilities relate to what the Act designates as "class II

gaming." See 25 U.S.C. § 2706(b). The Act divides all forms of gaming into three categories. 25

U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(8). "Class I gaming" consists of social games for prizes of minimal value and

traditional forms of Indian gaming. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). These are considered within a Tribe's

exclusive jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). "Class II gaming" is "the game of chance commonly

known as bingo (whether or not electronic, computer, or other technologic aids are used in

connection therewith) ... including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip

jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo,...." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A).1 Class II gaming

does not include "electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines

of any kind." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(B)(ii). Tribes may engage in class II gaming on Indian lands in

any State where such gaming is permitted for any purpose, so long as the particular form of gaming

is not otherwise prohibited on Indian lands by federal law. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). The Tribe must

be the sole owner of the class II gaming enterprise. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A).2 The Act restricts

the Tribe's use of the revenues from class II gaming and requires the Tribe to maintain a system of

controls to ensure the integrity of the gaming and the personnel operating it. 25 U.S.C. §

2710(b)(2)(B), (C) and (F). "Class III gaming" encompasses "all forms of gaming that are not class

I gaming or class II gaming." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8). Class III gaming on Indian lands is permitted

only if "such gaming is not otherwise specificallyprohibited on Indian lands by federal law"; the Tribe

entersinto a compact governing gaming with the State in which the Indian lands are located; and the

Secretary of the Interior approves the Tribal-State compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A), (d)(1) and

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3

In the District of Columbia, in any possession of the United States, and in Indian country, the

Johnson Act makes it unlawful to "possess" or "use" any "gambling device." 15 U.S.C. § 1175. 

The Johnson Act defines "gambling device" as a "machine or mechanical device" designed

"primarily" for gambling and that, when operated, either delivers money or entitles the player to

receive money "as the result of the application of an element of chance." 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a)(1)

& (2). The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(6), "repealed the applicability of

the Johnson Act for class III devices subject to an extant, effective Tribal-State compact. There is

no other repeal of the Johnson Act, either expressed or by implication," in the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act. 827 F. Supp. at 31. Judge Lamberth therefore held that the Johnson Act

remained "fully operative" with respect to class II gaming on Indian lands, which is permitted only

if "not otherwise specifically prohibited on Indian lands by federal law." 25 U.S.C. §

2710(b)(1)(A). 827 F. Supp. at 31. 

(d)(8).3

The game at issue in this case is "pull-tabs," one of the games included in the definition of

classII gaming. The most common form of pull-tabs is the paper version. Gamblers purchase a card

from a deck. The set of cards ("the deal") contains a predetermined number of winners. Upon

purchasing the card, the gambler pulls the paper tab open to find out if he is a winner. In the paper

version each gambler competes against all other gamblers in the hall playing the game. There is now

a computerized version of pull-tabs. The computer randomly selects a card for the gambler, pulls the

tab at the gambler's direction, and displays the result on the screen. The computer version, like the

paper version, has a fixed number of winning cards in each deal. The computers may be

interconnected so that each gamblersimultaneouslyplays against other gamblersin "pods" or "banks"

of as many as forty machines.

The focus on computer or video pull-tabs reflects a considerable narrowing of the case since

the parties appeared before Judge Lamberth. Invoking the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 701 etseq., the Tribesthen had challenged Commission regulations, promulgated in April 1992 (57

Fed. Reg. 12,382), defining class II gaming (25 C.F.R. § 502.3); class III gaming (25 C.F.R. §

502.4); "electronic, computer, or other technologic aid" (25 C.F.R. § 502.7); and "electronic or

electromechanicalfacsimile" (25 C.F.R. § 502.8). Judge Lamberth's cogent opinion rejected each of

the Tribes' arguments against these regulations as "either moot or meritless." 827 F. Supp. at 32.

In this appeal, the Tribes have devoted their arguments to a different question, the only one

set forth in their Statement of Issues: "Did the district court err in finding that the video pull-tab

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4

25 C.F.R. § 502.7 states:

Electronic, computer or other technologic aid means a device such as a computer,

telephone, cable, television, satellite or bingo blower and that when used

(a) Is not a game of chance but merely assists a player or the playing of a game;

(b) Is readily distinguishable from the playing of a game of chance on an electronic

or electromechanical facsimile; and

(c) Is operated according to applicable Federal communications law.

25 C.F.R. § 502.8 states:

Electronic or electromechanical facsimile means any gambling device as defined

in 15 U.S.C. 1171(a)(2) or (3). 

games at issue in this case are classIII "electronic facsimiles'rather than classII pull-tab games which

utilize "electronic, computer or technologic aids' under §§ 2703(7)(A) and 2703(7)(B)(ii) of the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and under §§ 502.7 and 502.8 of the Commission's regulations?"4

Tribes' Brief at 2. This is the question raised by the final count of the Tribes' complaint, which asks

for a declaratory judgment. 827 F. Supp. at 32. In ruling on it, we follow Judge Lamberth's carefully

reasoned opinion and agree with him that the decision is "a simple one that may be accomplished

solely by examining the statute itself (that is, without looking to the Commission's rules)." 827 F.

Supp. at 32. There is no need to consider the Tribes' general point that 25 C.F.R. §§ 502.7 and 502.8

sweep too many games otherwise within class II gaming into the category of class III gaming. For

whatever might be said about the breadth of the regulations with respect to other games, "without

any doubt" computerized pull-tab games of the type involved here "clearly are facsimiles of games

of chance and therefore are class III gaming." 827 F. Supp. at 32.

Here, asin the district court, the Tribes concede that the video version of pull-tabsisthe same

game as the paper version. Tribes' Brief at 24; 827 F. Supp. at 28 n.2, 32. Because class II gaming

does not include "electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance" (25 U.S.C. §

2703(7)(B)(ii)), this concession alone demonstratesthat the video game is not in the classII category.

"By definition, a device that preserves the fundamental characteristics of a game is a facsimile of the

game." Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 19 Indian L. Rep. 3079, 3080-81 (S.D. Cal.

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1992). As commonly understood, facsimiles are exact copies, or duplicates. Although there may be

room for a broader interpretation of "facsimile," the video version of pull-tabs falls within the core

meaning of electronic facsimile. It exactly replicates the paper version of the game, and if that is not

sufficient to make it a facsimile, we doubt, as did Judge Lamberth (827 F. Supp. at 32), that anything

could qualify.

The Tribes' contrary position is this: "the only point at which the use of electronics or other

technology could fall into the class III category is where a different gamea copy, or imitation,

something other than the genuine article; in plain English, a "facsimile'is created by such

technology." All other uses of technology, according to the Tribes, should be considered "aids"

within the meaning of § 2703(7)(A). Tribes' Reply Brief at 3-4. We view it as something other than

"plain English" to say that only electronic versions of games different from the originals are exact

duplicates. The meanings of words in a statute do not necessarily correspond with dictionary

definitions. Context matters. So often does history. Yet there are limits to how far language, written

in the formal style of a statute, may be wrenched. We would no sooner take "yes" to signify "no"

than we would take "same" to denote only "different." One might stretch "facsimiles" to cover

inexact copies, but the possibility ofsuch a construction does not assist the Tribes. Even if the stretch

were justified, the consequence would be to expand the category of games defined as facsimiles, not

to constrict it. Exact duplicatessuch as the video pull-tab games the Tribes wish to

operatewould remain covered by § 2703(7)(B)(ii). In short, we agree with Judge Lamberth that,

at the least, the Act's exclusion of electronic facsimiles removes games from the class II category

when those games are wholly incorporated into an electronic or electromechanical version.

The sentences in the Senate Committee report to which the Tribes refer do not alter our

judgment. Near the end of a lengthy paragraph discussing how separate Tribes might coordinate their

gaming businesses, the following appears: "Simultaneous games participation between and among

reservations can be made practical by use of computers and telecommunications technology as long

as the use of such technology does not change the fundamental characteristics of the bingo or lotto

games.... In other words, such technology would merely broaden the potential participation levels

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and is readily distinguishable from the use of electronic facsimiles in which a single participant plays

a game with or against a machine rather than with or against other players." S. REP. NO. 446, 100th

Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988). Pointing to the Report's caution about not using technology to change the

"fundamental characteristics" of the games, the Tribes argue that an electronic version of a game

cannot be a "facsimile" unlessit fundamentally changesthe game. While the Report is less than clear

about the distinction between electronic aids and electronic facsimiles, Judge Lamberth'sresponse is

conclusive when it comesto the Tribes' video pull-tab game. As he wrote, this portion of the Report

focuses not on how using technology might create an electronic facsimile, but on "communications

technology that might be used to link bingo playersin several remote locations." 827 F. Supp. at 33.

That sort of technology is, as the Report itself recognizes, distinguishable from electronic facsimiles

of the game itself. See Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).

To be sure, the only supposed electronic "facsimiles" mentioned in this paragraph of the Report are

those in which "a single participant plays a game with or against a machine rather than with or against

other players." Although in video pull-tabs the gambler is playing the game "with ... a machine," the

Tribes are right that, as in paper pull-tabs, the gambler is playing against other gamblers. But the

Tribes are wrong to suppose that the example mentioned in this passage must be the only type of

electronic copies Congress meant to include under § 2703(7)(B)(ii). The Report says nothing of the

sort and neither doesthe statute. An illustration given in one sentence of a committee report scarcely

excludes the possibility of other examples. Still less does it, rather than the language of the statute,

express the will of Congress.

Ambiguous statutes, the Tribes tell us, should be construed in favor of the Indians. See

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). Congress believed the Indian

Gaming Regulatory Act would benefit Indians in several ways. The Tribes focus on the Act's

objective of advancing tribal economic interests. The Act has another objective, however: protecting

tribes and their members from the dangers associated with large-scale gaming operations. Which

construction of the Act favors the Indians, the one including electronic pull-tab games under class II

gaming or the one placing this version of the game under the more restrictive category of class III?

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In this case there is no need to choose. When the statutory language is clear, as it is here, the canon

may not be employed. See South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986).

The injunction pending appeal is vacated and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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