Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05423/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05423-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Respondent also argues that any equal protection claim and contract claim brought

by Petitioner should be dismissed. Petitioner concedes in his Opposition Brief that the

FAP’s reference to the Equal Protection Clause was made in error and is not relevant to

Petitioner’s case. Petitioner concedes in his response to the Order to Show Cause that he is

not bringing a contract claim in this petition. Any reference to equal protection claims and

contract claims in the FAP is accordingly stricken.

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT BRUMETT,

Petitioner,

 v.

 ANTHONY P. KANE,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-05423 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

This matter comes before the Court on consideration of Respondent Anthony P. Kane’s

(“Respondent”) motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner Scott

Brumett (“Petitioner”). Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and the relevant

authority, the Court hereby GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2005, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (“FAP”) for writ of habeas

corpus seeking to compel California’s Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) to conduct a parole

consideration hearing and order him released from prison. The Board denied parole once

following Petitioner’s conviction for second-degree murder. (FAP at 5.) Respondent moves to

dismiss the FAP on two grounds.1

 First, Respondent argues that Petitioner has no federally

protected liberty interest in parole and thus does not allege a federal question. Second,

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Respondent argues that Petitioner has not exhausted all of his state judicial remedies. Petitioner

has requested that the Court hold the petition in abeyance pending the exhaustion of his state

judicial remedies if this Court finds Petitioner has failed to exhaust.

ANALYSIS

A. Petitioner Has a Federally Protected Liberty Interest in Parole.

In general, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of 

Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, “a state’s statutory scheme, if it

uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when or

unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty

interest.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bd. of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).

The California statutory provision at issue provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he panel or

the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses . . . is such that consideration of the public safety requires

a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual and that a parole date, therefore,

cannot be fixed . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis added). This “shall-unless”

language is similar to the statutes that were at issue in Allen and Greenholtz. See Allen, 482

U.S. at 376 (“Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole . . . any

person confined in the Montana state prison or the women’s correction center . . . when in its

opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the

prisoner or the community.”) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201 (1985) (emphasis added

and in original); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (“[w]henever the Board of Parole considers the

release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release

unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred . . . .”) (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. §

83-1,114(1) (1976)) (emphasis added).

Recognizing the similarity between California’s statutory scheme and the statutory

scheme at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, the Ninth Circuit has held that “California’s parole

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scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. The scheme creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are

made.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902 (internal quotations and citations omitted). That court 

reiterated its holding in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that

‘California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.’”)

(quoting McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902). 

Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), undermines the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Biggs and McQuillion, and

Respondent relies in part on Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975

(E.D. Cal. 2005), in support of this argument. This Court disagrees with the Sass court’s

conclusion that the holding in Dannenberg clearly demonstrates California’s parole scheme is

not mandatory. The issue presented in Dannenberg was whether the Board was required to set

uniform parole dates under Section 3041(a) before it determined whether a particular inmate

was suitable for parole under 3041(b). See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1069, 1077. It

concluded the answer to that question was no. Id. at 1096. However, the Dannenberg Court

used language throughout the opinion which suggests that it presumed an inmate retained a

protected liberty interest in the possibility of parole. See, e.g., id. at 1094 (noting continued

reliance on commitment offense “might thus also contravene the inmate’s constitutionally

protected expectation of parole”), 1095 n.16 (“well established principles” regarding parole

discretion with deferential judicial oversight “define and limit the expectancy in parole from a

life sentence to which due process interests attach”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, California

courts addressing the issue following Dannenberg continue to assume a protected liberty

interest exists. See In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th 573 (2005); In re DeLuna, 126 Cal. App. 4th

585 (2005).

Accordingly, this Court finds itself in agreement with a majority of courts that have

considered the impact of Dannenberg on this issue and cannot find that the Dannenberg opinion

represents a clear holding that California’s parole scheme is not mandatory. See, e.g.,

Blankenship v. Kane, No. C 04-5450, 2006 WL 515627, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2006) (citing

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 Petitioner derives the “Apprendi-Blakely doctrine” from Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). These cases

establish, in the context of sentencing, that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see

also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.

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cases). Accordingly, under the holdings of McQuillion and Biggs, Petitioner has a federally

protected liberty interest in parole, and thus, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. 

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is denied on this basis.

B. Petitioner Has Not Exhausted All State Judicial Remedies.

Respondent argues that Petitioner failed to exhaust his claim that the Board’s decision to

deny parole violates the “Apprendi-Blakely doctrine” because the Board’s decision was based

upon facts not found by a jury.2

 Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in

federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to

exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by

presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each

and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). Requiring exhaustion of claims provides state courts with “the first

opportunity to correct federal constitutional errors and minimizes federal interference and

disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Id. at 514. If the petition combines exhausted and

unexhausted claims, the district court must dismiss the entire habeas petition without reaching

the merits of any of its claims. Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if the federal claim (1) has been “fairly

presented” to the state courts, see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Crotts v. Smith,

73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996) overruled on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2244, or (2) no

state remedy remains available, see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). To

fairly present a federal claim to the state court, a petitioner must “include reference to a specific

federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to

relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 271). A

petitioner must make more than “a general appeal” to a broad constitutional guarantee. Gray,

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3 The Court notes that no copy of Petitioner’s submission to the California Court of

Appeal is present in the record of his federal habeas appeal. Without this filing, the Court

cannot determine whether Petitioner’s Apprendi-Blakely claim was presented to the

California Court of Appeal. Regardless, Petitioner failed to exhaust his claim by attaching

the court of appeal petition to his supreme court petition. 

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518 U.S. at 163. Specific reference to the federal constitution and citations to federal authority

discussing the constitutional provision sufficiently alert the state courts to the federal nature of a

petitioner’s claim. See, e.g., Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Petitioner argues that he exhausted his claim regarding the Apprendi-Blakely doctrine by

discussing the circumstances of the Board’s denial of his parole and why his due process rights

were violated. (Opp. at 11.) In his petition before the California Supreme Court, Petitioner did

not apply the holdings of Apprendi or Blakely to the facts or even to cite these cases when

addressing his alleged due process violations. Petitioner’s general invocation of “due process”

in his petition to the California Supreme Court was insufficient to exhaust his claim based on

the Apprendi-Blakely doctrine. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 163 (noting that “mak[ing] a general

appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process” was insufficient to exhaust).

Alternatively, Petitioner argues that he exhausted “by incorporating by reference the

lengthy petition filed in the court of appeals.” (Opp. at 11.) However, California Rules of

Court provides that:

[n]o incorporation by reference is permitted except a reference to a petition, an answer, or a

reply filed by another party in the same case or filed in a case that raises the same or

similar issues and in which a petition for review is pending or has been granted.

Cal. R. Ct. 28.1(e)(2) (emphasis added). The plain language of California Rule of Court 28.1

explicitly precludes incorporation by reference by a party from his or her own pleading. Cf.

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (“ordinarily a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a

claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar

document)”). 

Petitioner argues that even if he were not allowed to incorporate arguments by reference,

the court of appeal petition was attached to his supreme court petition, and that such attachment

was sufficient to present the arguments within it to the state supreme court.3

 The California

Rules of Court state that “[n]o attachments [to a habeas petition] are permitted except an

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opinion or order from which the party seeks relief and exhibits or orders of a trial court or

Court of Appeal that the party considers unusually significant . . . .” Cal. R. Ct. 28(e)(1)

(emphasis added). Thus, the habeas petition from the court of appeal may not be attached to

Petitioner’s supreme court submission. Petitioner may not rely on his attachment of the court of

appeal petition to demonstrate that he fairly presented his Apprendi-Blakely claim to the

California Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies and

grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

C. Petitioner Has Not Established That a Stay is Warranted.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year

statute of limitations to file a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus concerning a state

court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). However, exhaustion of all state remedies is a

prerequisite to the petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose, 455 U.S. at 510. The interplay of

these two requirements created a problem for petitioners filing mixed petitions because the

statute of limitations often precluded petitioners from obtaining federal review of the

unexhausted claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275 (2005). 

In Rhines, the Supreme Court resolved this problem by approving a procedure whereby

a district court, in its discretion, could “stay [a] petition and hold it in abeyance while [a]

petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his previously unexhausted claims.” Id. However,

because a stay and abeyance has the potential to frustrate AEDPA’s dual purposes of

encouraging finality of state court judgments and creating incentives for petitioners to seek

relief in state court first, the Supreme Court also stated that the “stay and abeyance should be

available only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 277-78.

Thus, under Rhines, the stay and abeyance of a mixed petition is appropriate when the

district court determines: (1) “there was good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims

in state court;” (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless;” and (3) “reasonable time

limits are placed on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Id.

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District courts within the Ninth Circuit have found “good cause” to require at a

minimum a showing of some “circumstance over which [petitioner] had little or no control” that

prevented the petitioner from asserting the unexhausted claim in the state courts. Ringer v.

Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (E.D. Nev. 2006); see also Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F.

Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (adopting the “good cause” standard of procedural

defaults in which “a petitioner ordinarily must show that the default resulted from an objective

factor external to the petitioner which cannot fairly be attributed to him.”). 

The Supreme Court decided Apprendi June 26, 2000. The Supreme Court decided

Blakely on June 24, 2004. Petitioner filed his petition with the California Supreme Court on

September 20, 2004. Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that good cause exists because “the ink

was barely wet on the Blakely decision.” (Petitioner’s Response to Order to Show Cause at 3.) 

Petitioner further argues that it was not clear that the holdings of Apprendi and Blakely were

applicable to parole decisions until the California Supreme Court opinion in Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1078, 1080. Dannenberg does not address Apprendi or Blakely, or restrict the Board

from considering facts that were not determined by a jury. In fact, the court in Dannenberg

specifically references statutes that require the Board to consider statements and

recommendations submitted by local officials connected to the inmate’s conviction, including

the judge, and statements by the victims or next of kin regarding their views of the crime and of

the inmate. Id. at 1084. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated good

cause for his failure to exhaust.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Petitioner did demonstrate good cause, the

Court finds that Petitioner’s claim based on the Apprendi-Blakely doctrine is plainly meritless. 

Apprendi and Blakely address the ability of a judge to increase a maximum sentence based on

facts that are not found by a jury or stipulated to by the defendant. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at

490 (holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis added); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (noting that “the

‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose

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solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict to admitted by the defendant”)

(emphasis omitted). Here, Petitioner was already sentenced to fifteen years to life. Thus, his

maximum sentence is life. By determining whether or not to grant parole, the Board is not

increasing his penalty beyond the statutory maximum. Apprendi and Blakely are inapposite to

Petitioner’s challenge to the Board’s parole determination. 

The Court therefore declines to exercise its discretion to stay the petition and hold it in

abeyance while Petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his claim. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at

275 (2005).

CONCLUSION 

In accordance with the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Respondent’s

motion to dismiss. This ruling is without prejudice to filing an amended petition containing

only Petitioner’s exhausted claims. In the alternative, Petitioner may request dismissal of the

entire petition without prejudice and complete exhaustion of his unexhausted claim in state

court. He can then file a new federal petition presenting all of his claims, assuming that the

petition would not be barred by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner

must file and serve no later than thirty days from the date of this order a notice in which he

states whether he elects either to (1) dismiss the unexhausted claim and file an amended petition

with only the remaining exhausted claims; or (2) terminate this action and return to state court

to complete the exhaustion of all of his claims before returning to federal court to present his

claims in a new petition. If Petitioner fails to comply with this order, this action will be

dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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