Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01267/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01267-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROCKY MEL CONTRERAS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-1267 - IEG (CAB)

ORDER:

(1) SUA SPONTE SCREENING THE

COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING IN

PART WITH PREJUDICE, and

(2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL

SERVICE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §

1915(d) AND FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).

vs.

OMAR VAZQUEZ; and

USCG Sector San Diego,

Defendant.

Plaintiff commenced this action on June 10, 2009, alleging that Defendants Omar Vazquez

(acting in his individual and official capacities) and United States Coast Guard, Sector San Diego

violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. [Doc. No. 1]. On September 2, 2009, the

Court sua sponte dismissed with leave to amend Plaintiff’s claims against the U.S. Coast Guard and

Omar Vazquez in his official capacity. [Doc. No. 7]. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint, filed on September 21, 2009. [Doc. No. 8]. Having considered Plaintiff’s

arguments and for the reasons discussed below, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES IN PART with

prejudice Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.

I. Subject matter jurisdiction

The Court dismissed in part Plaintiff’s original complaint because of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction over the claims against the U.S. Coast Guard and Omar Vazquez in his official capacity.

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1

 It is unclear which sub-section of Section 1343 Plaintiff relies on. The First Amended

Complaint states that jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to “28 USC Sec. 1343(a)(1)(3),” which is not

a valid sub-section. Rather, it seems that Plaintiff is proceeding under sub-section 1343(a)(3), which

is the jurisdictional grant for Section 1983 causes of action. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City

of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 n.4 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.

600, 607-08 (1979).

- 2 - 09cv1267-IEG (CAB)

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff re-alleges that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 13431

(“Section 1343”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). These attestations, however, are insufficient

to overcome the problems that the Court noted when it sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s original

complaint.

First, the Court notes that Section 1983 is not a jurisdictional grant. See Cervoni v. Sec’y of

Health, Ed. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 1010, 1019 (1st Cir. 1978). Rather, the grant of jurisdiction for courts

to hear cases under Section 1983 is found in Section 1343(a)(3). See Golden State Transit Corp. v.

City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 n.4 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441

U.S. 600, 607-08 (1979). Specifically, Section 1343(a)(3) provides district courts with original

jurisdiction over:

any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ... [t]o redress the

deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United

States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons

within the jurisdiction of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, by its specific language, Section 1343(a)(3) provides

a jurisdictional basis only over claims against state officials, and not against federal officials or

agencies. See Redd v. Lambert, 674 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Chapman, 441 U.S. 600);

Cervoni, 581 F.2d at 1019 (“[N]either § 1983 nor its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3),

constitutes an applicable basis for jurisdiction since they do not concern actions against federal

officers.” (citation omitted)). Therefore, Section 1343(a)(3) cannot be the basis for Plaintiff’s claims

against the U.S. Coast Guard and Omar Vazquez in his official capacity.

Second, the Court reiterates that Plaintiff’s claims against the U.S. Coast Guard and Omar

Vazquez in his official capacity fail because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. “Absent a waiver,

sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “Any waiver of immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed,’ and any

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limitations and conditions upon the waiver ‘must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not

to be implied.’” Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lehman v. Nakshian,

453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981)). The doctrine of sovereign immunity extends equally to federal agencies

and federal employees acting within their official capacities. Id.

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to cite to any authority from which a waiver of

immunity may be found with respect to his constitutional claims. Notably, Section 1343 does not

constitute a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States. See Salazar v. Heckler, 787 F.2d

527, 528 (10th Cir. 1986); Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1972). The Court therefore

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over and DISMISSES with prejudice the claims against the U.S.

Coast Guard and Omar Vazquez in his official capacity. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558,

560 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The question whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity

against suits for damages is, in the first instance, a question of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

II. Failure to state a claim

Moreover, as the Court indicated when it dismissed in part Plaintiff’s original complaint, the

Court is under a continuing duty to dismiss an in forma pauperis case “any time” the Court determines

that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In the present case, on the facts alleged, the Court finds that there is no claim for monetary damages

that Plaintiff can state against the U.S. Coast Guard and Omar Vazquez in his official capacity. Even

if the Court construes Plaintiff’s § 1983 action as a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that cause of action for monetary

damages is not available against a federal agency or a federal official acting in his official capacity.

See FDIC, 510 U.S. at 485-86; Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice the claims against the U.S. Coast Guard and Omar

Vazquez in his official capacity for failure to state a claim.

III. Service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

Because Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint appears to state a valid claim under Bivens

against Omar Vazquez in his individual capacity, this claim survives the sua sponte screening under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915(A)(b). See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(en banc). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all

duties in [in forma pauperis] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that “the

sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, not a substitute for, any subsequent

Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d

1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES IN PART with prejudice

Plaintiff’s complaint with regard to the U.S. Coast Guard and Omar Vazquez in his official capacity.

The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf with regard

to the remaining claim against Omar Vazquez in his individual capacity. Accordingly, the Court orders

as follows:

(1) The Clerk of Court shall issue summons as to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

[Doc. No. 8] upon Defendant Omar Vazquez (sued in his individual capacity) and shall forward it to

Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with

a certified copy of this Order and a certified copy of his First Amended Complaint and the summons

for purposes of serving Defendant. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to

complete the Form 285 as completely and accurately as possible, and to return it to the U.S. Marshal

according to the instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP Package.

Thereafter, the U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the First Amended Complaint and summons upon

Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on the Form 285s. All costs of service shall be advanced by the

United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).

(2) Defendant Omar Vazquez (sued in his individual capacity) is thereafter ORDERED

to reply to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint within the applicable time under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(a).

(3) Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant or, if appearance has been entered by counsel,

upon Defendant’s counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for

consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the

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Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of any

document was served on Defendant, or counsel for Defendant, and the date of service. Any

paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include

a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 7, 2009

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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