Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00680/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00680-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER ANN DONOVAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J. A. PHILLIPS,

Defendant. /

No. 3:14-cv-00680-CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Officer Joshua Phillips (“Defendant”) initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by

Donna Donovan in order to perform a Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) investigation. 

Jennifer Donovan (“Plaintiff”), Donna’s partner, exited the vehicle and approached

Defendant when he made the determination to arrest Donna for a suspected DUI. Defendant

told Plaintiff to return to her vehicle and, when she refused, Defendant placed Plaintiff in a

control hold, took her to the ground, and placed her under arrest. Plaintiff’s Complaint (dkt.

1) alleges excessive force, gender discrimination, and bad-faith arrest. Now before this

Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Mot. Summary Judgment (dkt. 34). At

a hearing on December 12, 2014, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a continuance

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) to allow Plaintiff to investigate and brief specific further

evidence she alleged was necessary for a full and proper determination of the summary

judgment issues. Plaintiff has now filed a notice of intent not to submit any supplemental 

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1

 At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was a “POST-certified police officer who worked as a

State Park Superintendent I at the Department of Parks and Recreation at all relevant times.” Compl.

(dkt. 1) ¶ 6; Opp’n (dkt. 39) at 1; Donovan Decl. (dkt. 39-5) ¶ 2. 

2

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant became aggressive with Donna, prompting Donna to call for

help. Opp’n at 2. The PAS test occurred outside of the MVARS view, but the audio suggests that

Defendant did not become aggressive with Donna. See MVARS at 16:15–17:00.

2

briefing relating to additional discovery, asserting that the best and only neutral evidence was

already before the Court. See Notice of Intent Not To File (dkt. 50). Accordingly, the Court

considers the evidence and briefing and hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on all claims. 

I. BACKGROUND

On October 21, 2012, Plaintiff, an off-duty peace officer1

, was a passenger in a

vehicle driven by her partner, Donna, traveling on Route 116 near Guerneville, California. 

Compl. (dkt.1) ¶¶ 5–6. Defendant initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle, suspecting that

Donna was driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. Defendant recorded the incident on

the Mobile Video Audio Recording System (“MVARS”), with the resulting video being part

of the summary judgment evidence. See generally MVARS (dkt. 36-1).

Donna exited the vehicle and participated in a field sobriety test conducted by

Defendant outside of the view of the MVARS while Plaintiff remained in the vehicle. 

Compl. ¶ 6; see generally MVARS. Plaintiff opened the passenger side door while the test

was in progress. MVARS at 12:15. Plaintiff shut the door to the vehicle after Defendant

requested several times that she do so. MVARS at 14:57–15:08. After Plaintiff opened the

door to the vehicle, but before Plaintiff closed it, Donna refused to perform a one-leg stand

test that Defendant ordered. MVARS at 14:54. Donna finally agreed to perform an

additional test but refused to take the Preliminary Alcohol Screening (“PAS”) test. MVARS

at 15:15–16:15. Defendant explained that if Donna refused to take the PAS test, he would

have to take her to jail for a suspected DUI. MVARS at 16:15–16:55. Donna called to

Plaintiff for help. Compl. ¶ 6; MVARS at 16:59.2

 

Plaintiff exited the vehicle and took several steps forward toward Defendant and

Donovan. Compl. ¶ 6; MVARS at 17:01–17:12. Defendant told Plaintiff to get back in and

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3

 Defendant characterizes this as a “bladed” stance, which is a potentially argumentative or

combative posture. Mot. Summary Judgment at 4. Plaintiff characterizes this as an inquisitive pose.

See Compl. ¶ 6. 

3

shut the door to the vehicle several times as he approached. MVARS at 17:01–17:12. 

Plaintiff stopped and turned herself at an angle to Defendant as he approached, her hands

raised slightly at her side, palms up.3

 Id. Defendant reached Plaintiff approximately two

seconds later and placed Plaintiff in a control hold, which involved gripping Plaintiff’s right

wrist. Compl. ¶ 6; MVARS at 17:12–17:15. Defendant slowly twisted Plaintiff’s arm to his

left, which caused Plaintiff to twist her body to her right in order to avoid pain in her arm and

wrist as Defendant applied pressure. Id. Defendant, while slowly twisting, forced Plaintiff’s

arm toward the ground, which caused Plaintiff’s knees to bend as she rolled over onto the

ground. Id. Defendant’s actions resulted in Plaintiff sustaining a sprained rotator cuff. 

Compl. ¶ 6; Donovan Decl. at ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff sued Defendant, and Does 1–20, for excessive force, gender discrimination,

and bad-faith arrest. See generally Compl. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment,

arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the excessive force cause

of action. See generally Plaintiff’s Mot. Summary Judgment (dkt. 29). This Court denied

Plaintiff’s motion after reviewing the MVARS recording and determining that a reasonable

fact-finder could find for Defendant. See generally Order re Plaintiff’s Mot. Summary

Judgment (dkt. 31). 

Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all causes of action. At a hearing on

the summary judgment motion on December 12, 2014, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion

for a continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) to allow Plaintiff to investigate and brief

specific evidence she alleged was available and necessary for her gender discrimination

claims. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a notice of intent not to submit any supplemental

briefing relating to additional discovery, asserting that the best and only neutral evidence was

already before the Court. See Notice of Intent Not To File. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

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dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which

a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party, and a dispute is “material” only

if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248– 49 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to

demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute with respect to any material fact and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

A court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (relying on the facts as depicted by a

videotape, which contradicted the non-movant’s version of events).

 In order to carry its burden of production on a motion for summary judgment, “the

moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of

an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing High Tech Gays v.

Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.1990)). In order to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574). If

the moving party satisfies its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party may not

rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead must

produce evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. 

//

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 Although it sounds on the MVARS video like Plaintiff does tell Donna not to comply, the audio

is difficult to comprehend at that point in the recording. See MVARS at 14:54. 

5

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant makes two overarching arguments in his motion for summary judgment. 

First, Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first and

second causes of action, for bad-faith arrest and excessive force, because he is entitled to

qualified immunity and no genuine issue of material fact exists that could defeat his qualified

immunity defense. See Mot. Summary Judgment at 7–15. Second, Defendant argues that he

is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s third cause of action, gender discrimination,

because Plaintiff has submitted no evidence supporting her claim. Id. Plaintiff argues that

the evidence on record is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact for trial. See

generally Opp’n (dk. 39). 

A. Factual Disputes

Because the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor, the Court first

identifies all existing factual disputes. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255. The parties here largely agree on the facts and their versions of the events differ

significantly at only two points. First, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff ever told Donna

not to comply with Defendant’s orders. Compare Opp’n at 2, with Mot. Summary Judgment

at 4. Second, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff’s stance, after exiting the vehicle and

approaching Defendant, was argumentative or inquisitive. Compare Compl. ¶ 6 and Mot.

Summary Judgment at 4, with Opp’n at 2. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party where not blatantly contradicted by the record, the Court agrees that

reasonable fact-finders could dispute whether Plaintiff told Donna not to comply with

Defendant’s commands4

 and whether Plaintiff’s stance was inquisitive or argumentative;

accordingly, the Court resolves these factual disputes in Plaintiff’s favor for purposes of the

instant motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

//

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B. Qualified Immunity

Defendant’s first argument is that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s

bad-faith arrest and excessive force claims. Mot. Summary Judgment at 7–8, 10–14. 

“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A court faced with a claim of

qualified immunity considers whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury, the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (citation omitted). Where there is a “clearly

established” constitutional right, the Court must determine whether “[t]he contours of [that]

right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Id. This inquiry may be conducted in whatever sequence is most

beneficial in each particular case. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

1. Bad-faith Arrest 

Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s bad-faith

arrest claim because he had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was violating Penal Code

section 148(a)(1), “willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] . . . a peace officer . . . in

the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty,” by refusing to stay in, or return to, her car

when ordered. See Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169–70 (9th Cir.

2011)). 

In United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth

Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment allows an officer to order a passenger who has

exited an automobile during a traffic stop to reenter the vehicle. Such an order is only a

minimal intrusion upon the individual’s liberty interests “because only the passenger’s

location during the stop is affected.” Williams, 419 F.3d at 1033). “Balanced against that

limited intrusion is the important ‘value of giving officers control over the movement of

people involved in a traffic stop [in order to] limit[ ] the risk of danger to the police.” 

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 Plaintiff’s opposition suggests that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the

bad-faith arrest claim because it is a pretext for Defendant’s use of excessive force. Opp’n at 11–12.

Use of excessive force does not invalidate an officer’s probable cause to arrest. See, e.g., Smith v. City

of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 2005).

7

Young, 655 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Williams, 419 F.3d at 1034). Accordingly, “a police

officer issuing a traffic citation does not violate the Fourth Amendment by ordering” a driver

or passenger to reenter the vehicle for the duration of a traffic stop. Id. at 1169–1170. 

As in Young and Williams, the record here shows that Defendant’s order that

Plaintiff reenter her vehicle “was a lawful one that, under § 148(a)(1),” Plaintiff was required

to obey. See Young, 655 F.3d at 1170. The undisputable evidence provided by the MVARS

video demonstrates that Defendant told Plaintiff to reenter the vehicle several times, which

Plaintiff ignored and instead stopped and turned herself at an angle to Defendant as he

approached. MVARS at 17:01–17:12. Plaintiff’s only reply, without supporting evidence

and without addressing the clear sequence of events on the MVARS video, is that Defendant

arrested Plaintiff, after she was on the ground, to justify his use of force. Opp’n at 11–12. 

On this evidence, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a violation of § 148(a)(1). Plaintiff had no constitutional

right, and certainly no clearly established one, to disregard Defendant’s lawful orders or to

do so without the consequence of arrest under these circumstances.5

 Defendant is therefore

entitled to qualified immunity and has met his initial burden of negating an essential element

of Plaintiff’s claim. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201–05; Nissan, 210 F.3d at 1102. Because

there is no evidence on this record showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial, this

Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s bad-faith arrest

cause of action. 

2. Excessive Force

Defendant also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim. This Court analyzes claims for excessive force under the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures using the framework articulated in

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Young, 655 F.3d at 1161. “The reasonableness of

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a seizure turns on ‘whether . . . officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them,’” which this Court determines “by balancing ‘the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against

the countervailing governmental interests at stake.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at

396–97). 

In conducting this inquiry, the Court first assesses “the gravity of the particular

intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d

959, 964 (9th Cir.2003)). The Court then looks to “the importance of the government

interests at stake,” and finally balances “the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against

the government’s need for that intrusion to determine whether it was constitutionally

reasonable.” Id. (quoting Miller, 340 F.3d at 964). Among all the factual circumstances at

issue, the court considers “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The analysis “must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgements in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Id. at 396–97. 

If this inquiry concludes that, taking all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Defendant’s conduct amounts to a violation of a constitutional right, the

Court also must determine whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity by

assessing whether “the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant’s

alleged misconduct.” Young, 655 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223). 

i. Nature and Quality of Intrusion 

The Court first assesses the “quantum of force used to arrest [Plaintiff] by considering

the type and amount of force inflicted” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir.

2001) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “violently forced her to the

ground[,]” which “sprained [Plaintiff’s] right rotator cuff.” Compl. ¶ 6; Donovan Decl. at ¶

7. The MVARS recording shows that Defendant gripped Plaintiff by the wrist, applied

pressure, and twisted her arm, which forced her to roll onto the ground. MVARS at

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17:12–17:15. The only evidence in the record on this issue suggests that this “control hold”

maneuver is among the lowest levels of force peace officers are trained to use when a subject

does not respond to verbal commands. See Ch. 2, Force Options (dkts. 34-5, 34-6) at

DEF000071-107. No evidence in the record establishes that the force used here approaches

the severity of the intermediate, or greater, levels of force used in the cases that Plaintiff

cites. See, e.g., Young, 655 F.3d at 1165–66 (officer approached the seated plaintiff from

behind, pepper sprayed him, and struck him multiple times with a baton)). Likewise, no

evidence in the record suggests that the force used caused, or was capable of causing, grave

physical injury. Cf. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, the evidence on this record

conclusively establishes that Defendant employed a level of force that is low on the

continuum of tactics available to police officers. Cf. id. at 1279–1280 (evaluating the use of

a lead-filled, “less-lethal” shot fired from a 12-gauge shotgun). In light of the fact,

previously discussed, that Plaintiff had no legal right under § 148(a)(1) to disregard

Defendant’s orders to reenter her vehicle, and that a low level of force was used to effect

compliance, the Court concludes that the intrusion on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment interests

was minimal. 

ii. Government Interest at Stake

In evaluating the government interests at stake in an excessive force claim, the Court

ultimately seeks to determine objectively “the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). This

Court measures the governmental interests at stake by evaluating a range of factors,

including “‘(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect pose[d] an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others . . . (3) whether he [was] actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight,’ and any other ‘exigent circumstances

[that] existed at the time of the arrest.’” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Headwaters

Forest, 240 F.3d 1185, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2000)). Of these factors, “the most important is

whether the individual posed an immediate threat to officer or public safety.” Young, 655

F.3d at 1163 (citing Smith, 394 F.3d at 702). 

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 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant was required to inform her that she was under arrest before

using force. California Penal Code § 841 states that “The person making the arrest must inform the

person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him . . . except when . . . the person to be arrested is

actually engaged in the commission of . . . an offense . . . .” (emphasis added). As previously discussed,

the MVARS recording makes it clear that Plaintiff was engaged in a violation of Penal Code section

148(a)(1). MVARS at 17:01–17:15. 

10

Here, these factors decisively favor a finding that Defendant did not use excessive

force upon Plaintiff here. Even viewing the few factual disputes in Plaintiff’s favor, as

previously discussed, no evidence in the record contradicts the evidence regarding the

inherent danger of the incident as a whole. Plaintiff’s only support is a bare allegation that

she and Donna “posed no threat to anyone’s safety[,]” such that there was no “objective

justification to establish” an imminent threat. Opp’n at 8, 11; Phillips Depo. at 104. The

declaration of Roger Clark argues that Defendant had no objective basis to use force because

Plaintiff said nothing of an aggressive nature, did not take an aggressive posture, had no

visible weapons, and was “obviously in a posture of inquiry.” Clark Decl. (dkt. 39-6) ¶ 10. 

But the Court has already given Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt to the extent Clark argues

factual disputes, and Clark’s legal conclusions simply mirror Plaintiff’s arguments while

disregarding the totality of the circumstances faced by Defendant. The undisputed evidence

shows that Defendant, alone, was faced with controlling two potentially intoxicated and

unrestrained individuals refusing to comply with lawful orders on the side of a highway at

night. See generally MVARS; see also Nissan, 210 F.3d at 1102. Defendant was put in the

position of making a “split-second judgments—in [a] circumstance[] that [was] tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in [that]

particular situation.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. On this record, there is no genuine question

of material fact that Defendant had a substantial government interest in taking control of a

tense and dangerous situation to protect Plaintiff, Donna, passing motorists, and himself from

the hazards that Plaintiff and Donna created. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that no force was justified because Defendant failed to

first warn Plaintiff of his intention to use force.6

 See, e.g., Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1284

(“[W]arnings should be given, when feasible, if the use of force may result in serious injury,

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and . . . the giving of a warning or the failure to do so is a factor to be considered in applying

the Graham balancing test.”) (emphasis added). No evidence in the law or on this record

supports Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant was required to warn her before employing

any force at all to take control of this situation. In Young, the Ninth Circuit observed that the

defendant could have warned or simply handcuffed the seated plaintiff, whom had been

pulled over for failure to wear a seatbelt and whom admittedly posed no immediate threat to

the defendant or others, before employing a dangerous intermediate use of force. Id. at

1165–66. In sum, “no safety concern whatsoever appeared to have justified” the defendant

police officer’s decision in that case to employ substantial force. Id. at 1164. Here, in sharp

contrast, Defendant reasonably could have believed that Plaintiff posed a danger to herself

and others by refusing lawful orders to reenter her vehicle in the context of a highway-side

night traffic stop involving two unrestrained and potentially intoxicated individuals. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff was subjected to only a low level of force, such that the Defendant did

not bypass the number of less painful measures to control the situation that the Ninth Circuit

observed in Young. See id. at 1166 (citing Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 831 (9th Cir.

2010)).

iii. Weighing the Conflicting Interests

Ultimately, the severity of “the force which is applied must be balanced against the

need for that force.” Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052,

1057 (9th Cir. 2003); Young, 655 F.3d at 1166 (“We conclude our analysis of whether the

force used by [the defendant] was reasonable by balancing “the gravity of the intrusion on

the individual against the government's need for that intrusion.”) (citation omitted). 

“Because ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise

definition or mechanical application,’ however, its proper application requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396

(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). And the “‘reasonableness’ of a

particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

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20–22 (1968)). 

It is beyond dispute on this summary judgment evidence that the use of a control hold

was an objectively reasonable use of force here. When confronted, Defendant acted quickly,

using minimal force, to safely take control and ensure the safety of everyone involved. 

MVARS at 17:02–17:15. In Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806–07 (9th Cir.

1994), the Ninth Circuit held that the use of pain compliance techniques on non-resisting

protestors, in order to quickly disperse and remove them with the least risk of injury to the

officers or others, was objectively reasonable. Additionally, in Eberle v. City of Anaheim,

901 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit held that using a finger control hold to

remove a belligerent spectator from a potentially dangerous situation was objectively

reasonable. Like in Forrester and Eberle, the evidence about the incident now before the

Court shows a similarly dangerous and volatile situation because two non-compliant,

potentially intoxicated individuals were arguing with Defendant at night on the side of a

highway and posed a threat to themselves, Defendant, and the public. See generally

MVARS. Undisputed evidence in the record shows that: (1) Plaintiff had previously been

told, multiple times, to stay in the vehicle and shut the door; (2) Plaintiff failed to obey or

respond to Defendant’s order to return to the vehicle; (3) Plaintiff advanced toward

Defendant; (4) Plaintiff assumed a sideways stance; (5) Defendant was forced to turn his

back to Donna, whom he believed was intoxicated; (6) Defendant knew that Plaintiff was a

peace officer and that she might have a weapon; (7) the incident took place at night on the

side of a highway. See, e.g., Phillips Depo. at 64–66; MVARS at 12:15–17:12. 

Additionally, the MVARS recording shows that, while Defendant was focused on arresting

and securing Plaintiff, Donna actually wandered down the road, past the front of her vehicle,

and briefly out of sight. MVARS at 21:15. This evidence establishes that the situation was

volatile and that both Plaintiff and Donna were acting unpredictably in a way that presented a

potential danger to themselves or others. 

Against this backdrop that satisfies Defendant’s burden to show he is entitled to

summary judgment, Plaintiff offers no evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact

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for trial. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201–05; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Nissan, 210 F.3d

at 1102. Having determined that the force used against Plaintiff was low and the government

interest in the use of that force was significant, the Court concludes that, taking the facts in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the force that Defendant used was not excessive and did

not violate the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Young, 655 F.3d at 1166. The Court sees no

evidence that comes close to raising a genuine question of material fact as to whether

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. And even assuming, arguendo, that

Defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, it cannot be said that the right was so

clearly established as to put a reasonable officer in Defendant’s position on notice that his

actions were unlawful. See Hall v. Hayward Police Dep’t, No. 12-2340, 2013 WL 5313409

CRB, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201–06); Ashcroft v. alKidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”). 

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s excessive force cause of action. 

C. Gender Discrimination

Defendant’s second argument is that he is entitled to summary judgment as to

Plaintiff’s gender discrimination cause of action because, while Plaintiff has stated that she

was discriminated against because she is a woman, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence

to support her claim. Mot. Summary Judgment at 14–15; see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325

(Defendant need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint and summary judgment record contained no evidence

whatsoever to support her claim of gender discrimination. Nevertheless, at the hearing on

the instant motion for summary judgment, this Court granted Plaintiff’s request for a

continuance to enable Plaintiff to investigate and brief any evidence of citizen complaints

filed against Defendant in order to demonstrate discriminatory intent. Plaintiff represented to

this Court that a continuance would enable her to create a genuine issue of material fact

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 Plaintiff also states that in “one out of four traffic stops during which [Defendant] determined there was a

violation, he issued a verbal warning in lieu of anything further.” Id. (citing Phillips Depo at 35). However construed, this

group has little in common with Plaintiff, who was only a passenger in a car and whose driving companion was pulled over

for the serious offense of suspected DUI. 

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regarding discriminatory intent by allowing her to gather citizen complaints, which she had

reason to believe existed and would show Defendant’s proclivity to use excessive force in

similar situations, disparate treatment of women, disparate treatment of people who are, or

are suspected of being, under the influence, and/or motive, intent, opportunity, and/or

credibility. After this Court granted the continuance, Plaintiff filed a notice of intent not to

submit any supplemental briefing relating to additional discovery, asserting that the best and

only neutral evidence was already before the Court. See Notice of Intent Not To File. 

Section 1983 selective enforcement claims are evaluated in accordance with “ordinary

equal protection standards.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). To prevail,

Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s conduct had “both a discriminatory effect and a

discriminatory motivation.” Richards v. Los Angeles, No. 06-55593, 2007 WL 4513583, at

*2 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608); see also Reese

v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to establish

discriminatory effect, Plaintiff must identify the classes to be compared in order to “isolate

the factor allegedly subject to impermissible discrimination.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana,

68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). 

Here, the Complaint states only that “Plaintiff was denied equal protection because

she is a woman.” Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff argues that the MVARS recording raises genuine

issues of material fact regarding Defendant’s discriminatory intent but, beyond this mere

allegation, Plaintiff has produced no evidence that this is so. Plaintiff has also failed to

produce evidence demonstrating a discriminatory effect. In an apparent attempt to identify

the class at issue, Plaintiff states that Defendant “has pulled over numerous off-duty officers,

possibly up to 99 . . . [y]et he has only arrested two: one female ([P]laintiff) and one male

(probation officer for a DUI).”7

 Opp’n at 2 (citing Phillips Depo at 41–43). Plaintiff argues

that “[u]nlike other fellow male officers [Defendant] had stopped on the road, . . . Officer

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Phillips used force on [Plaintiff].” Id. at 13. 

The Court sees no evidence of gender discrimination in any of Plaintiff’s

unsubstantiated and self-serving allegations. Even giving the Plaintiff the benefit of the

doubt in construing Plaintiff’s proposed comparison group as “fellow male officers

[Defendant] ha[s] stopped on the road,” see Opp’n at 2, this group is not similarly situated to

Plaintiff. See Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187 (Plaintiff must identify the classes at issue in order

to establish a discriminatory effect.). Plaintiff was not pulled over, but was instead arrested

for a violation of § 148(a)(1). MVARS at 17:01–17:12. Moreover, assuming arguendo that

the suggested class is similarly situated, and that Plaintiff’s information is accurate,

Defendant has arrested exactly one male off-duty officer and one female off-duty officer. 

See Phillips Depo at 41–43. This evidence create no basis on which a reasonable fact-finder

could determine that Defendant’s actions displayed the discriminatory intent or

discriminatory effect required for Plaintiff’s § 1983 selective enforcement claims on the basis

of gender discrimination. See Richards, 2007 WL 4513583, at *2 (citation omitted). Despite

the continuance granted for this very purpose, Plaintiff was unable to muster any evidence to

support her claim or create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on all claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 4, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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