Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00818/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-00818-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order of Service; Partial Dismissal Order

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT KELLY WALTERS, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, et. al., 

Defendants. 

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No. C 04-0818 RMW (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE;

PARTIAL DISMISSAL

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On May 23, 2006,

the court directed plaintiff to file a notice of intent to prosecute, because plaintiff had not

communicated with the court for over two years. Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to prosecute on

June 12, 2006. On July 7, 2006, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, a motion for temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction with exhibits, and an application to expedite the

screening of his amended complaint and motion. In a separate written order, this court granted

plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, denied plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining

order without prejudice and granted plaintiff’s application to expedite review of the motion and

the amended complaint. The court will review plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1915A.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is serving a state prison sentence at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”). In April

2003, plaintiff attended a hearing before the Unit Classification Committee (“UCC”). Plaintiff

was assisted by Correctional Officer S. Preston, acting as a staff assistant, due to plaintiff’s

participation in mental health treatment. Plaintiff receives treatment under the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Mental Health Services Delivery

System (“MHSDS”). During the hearing, prison staff asked plaintiff whether he was willing to

notify staff immediately of any enemy concerns. Plaintiff was confused by the question and

responded, “No, I’m not willing to.” Captain S. Wheeler responded that plaintiff should be

locked up in administrative segregation, however, plaintiff was already housed in the “ad seg”

unit. Plaintiff then explained that he wanted to participate in prison programs without problems,

wanted to work, and did not want to cause problems for anyone, but that he was concerned about

agreeing to notify prison staff of enemy concerns. If plaintiff agreed to the condition, plaintiff

knew that the prison would issue a “CDCR-128G Chrono” with this information. If other

inmates found out about plaintiff’s willingness to report on his enemy, it would place plaintiff’s

life at risk and he would be known as an informant. Counselor Lucarelli stated that this was not

a big deal, that this was the way it was done at PBSP and that inmates that did not agree to this

condition were placed in administrative segregation. Plaintiff expressed his fears and concerns

again, but the committee did not change its position. Eventually, plaintiff agreed to this

condition out of his fear that he would be placed in administrative segregation. See Complaint at

5-6. 

On April 30, 2003, prison officials delivered plaintiff’s CDCR Chrono 128G to another

inmate. Plaintiff’s statement at the hearing, expressing his fear of notifying staff of enemy

concerns, was included in the CDCR Chrono. Plaintiff believes that PBSP staff were aware of

plaintiff’s concerns and fears of being a known informant and disregarded these concerns in

order to obtain plaintiff’s consent to the condition. Plaintiff maintains that this policy was

required by PBSP officials in order to limit PBSP’s liability for inmate assaults by known

enemies. See Complaint at 6-7. 

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Plaintiff names the following defendants in his amended complaint: California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Edward Alameida, Director of CDCR

in April 2003; Joe McGrath, PBSP Warden; Lethal Polk, PBSP Associate Warden; PBSP

Correctional Couselor M.J. Nimrod; PBSP Correctional Counselor T.D. Lucarelli; PBSP Captain

S. Wheeler; PBSP Correctional Couselor J. Browman; and PBSP Correctional Officer S.

Preston. Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ violated his Eighth Amendment right to personal

safety and to be free of foreseeable harm, his right to due process, and his right to equal

protection. Additionally, plaintiff alleges state tort claims that prison officials acted negligently

in breach of mandatory duties (Cal. Civil Code § 1714) and negligent misrepresentation (Cal.

Civil Code §§ 1572, 1710) which placed him at risk of injury and caused plaintiff to suffer

emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.

 DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,

and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Eighth Amendment 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants McGrath, Alameida, Polk, Nimrod, Wheeler, Lucarelli,

Browman and Preston were deliberately indifferent to his safety after plaintiff expressed his fear

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and concerns for his safety if he agreed to the condition to inform on known enemy concerns at

PBSP. 

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular,

prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id.

at 833; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d

1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). The

failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous

conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1)

the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is,

subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hearns, 413 F.3d

at 1040-41. 

A prisoner need not wait until he is actually assaulted to state a claim and obtain relief. 

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845; Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973); Stickney

v. List, 519 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D. Nev. 1981). If the court finds the Eighth Amendment’s

objective and subjective requirements satisfied, it may grant appropriate relief. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 845-46; Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). But cf. 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(e) (requiring physical injury in order to bring claim for mental or emotional injury).

A prisoner may state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison officials

only where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or

injury to an inmate by another prisoner, see Berg, 794 F.2d at 459; see also Valandingham v.

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (deliberately spreading rumor that prisoner is

snitch may state claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in state custody). 

A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate

humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. See id.

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However, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to

act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or

failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. at 842; see also

Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (bystander-inmate injured when

guards allegedly used excessive force on another inmate need not show that guards intended to

harm bystander-inmate). This is a question of fact. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 

Allegations in a pro se complaint sufficient to raise an inference that the named prison

officials acted with deliberate indifference – i.e, that they knew that plaintiff faced a substantial

risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it –

states a “failure-to-protect” claim. Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1041-42. 

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations that defendants provided a copy of his CDCR

Chrono containing his statement that he would report on known enemy concerns to another

inmate states a cognizable failure to protect claim. The court will order service of this claim. 

2. Due Process

Plaintiff maintains that defendants violated his state and federal right to due process by

requiring him to agree to notify staff of any enemy concerns or forfeit his liberty interest in his

placement in the PBSP general population and be retained in the segregated housing unit. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Wheeler, Lucarelli and Browman violated his right to due

process when they knowingly asked questions that required an advisement and waiver of

plaintiff’s right against self-incrimination. Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his right to

due process by failing to classify plaintiff’s agreement to this PBSP policy to notify staff of

enemy concerns as confidential. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant S. Preston violated his

right to due process based upon Preston’s failure to intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf and

communicate Plaintiff’s concerns to the hearing committee, as plaintiff’s staff assistant. Plaintiff

was a mental health care inmate at the time of the April 2003 hearing. 

Plaintiff’s due process claim concerning his privilege against self-incrimination is not

cognizable. The Fifth Amendment privileges an individual not to answer official questions put

to him in any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might

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incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976). 

“The central standard for the privilege’s application has been whether the claimant is confronted

by substantial and ‘real,’ and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.” 

Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). Here, plaintiff does not state a claim for

relief because the facts alleged do not present a substantial and real potential for plaintiff’s selfincrimination. Plaintiff describes his situation as a “catch 22” that he must report known enemy

concerns and face being labeled as an informant, or be placed in segregation. However, plaintiff

is not required to incriminate himself in these two choices. Furthermore, plaintiff does not allege

that he has reported any enemy concerns to PBSP officials, nor made any self-incriminating

statements. He has simply agreed to report known enemy concerns to prison staff. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for violation of the privilege against selfincrimination and the court finds that amendment would be futile. Accordingly, this portion of

plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff claims that his inmate classification hearing concerning his willingness to report

on enemy concerns or face placement in administrative segregation violated his right to due

process. Plaintiff also alleges that his assigned staff assistant, defendant S. Preston, did not assist

plaintiff during the hearing. 

The Supreme Court has held that prisoners have no constitutional right or interest

independently protected by the Due Process Clause to be free from placement in administrative

segregation. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). Allegations by a prisoner that he was

denied due process in connection with the decision to administratively segregate him present a

constitutionally cognizable claim if: (1) prison officials are narrowly restricted by state statutes

or regulations to impose the specific deprivation at play, for example, an indeterminate term of

segregation in the SHU, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-487 (1995). A liberty interest of “real substance” generally will be

limited to freedom from (1) restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will

inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487.

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California statutes and prison regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to

administratively segregate prisoners. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1098 (9th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). In Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394-95

(2005), the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s indefinite placement in a “supermax” facility,

where they are not eligible for parole consideration, imposes an “atypical and significant

hardship within the correctional context.” Because indefinite placement in California’s SHU

generally renders inmates ineligible for parole consideration, it appears that California prisoners

also have a liberty interest in not being placed indefinitely in the SHU. Accord id. at 2395

(necessity of harsh conditions in light of danger that high-risk inmates pose to prison officials

and other inmates does not diminish conclusion that conditions rise to a liberty interest in their

avoidance).

The court notes that plaintiff was not actually housed in administrative segregation, based

on his agreement to follow the PBSP policy and report enemy concerns. However, liberally

construed, plaintiff has alleged a cognizable due process claim for defendants’ actions in

allowing a copy of his CDCR Chrono to be delivered to another inmate and the resulting failure

to keep the contents of the hearing confidential. The court will order service of this claim. 

Plaintiff’s due process claim based upon defendant Preston’s alleged failure to assist

plaintiff, a mental health inmate, in his classification hearing is not cognizable. Plaintiff

maintains that defendant Preston did not intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf at the hearing, 

communicate plaintiff’s fears to the UCC committee, and inform plaintiff of his rights. 

However, Plaintiff alleges that he did communicate his concerns and fears to the hearing

committee, but that they did not accept his concerns. As set forth in his amended complaint,

plaintiff’s ability to articulate his concerns was memorialized in the CDCR Chrono. Plaintiff

does not allege that he failed to understand his rights at the hearing, but rather that he was

compelled to agree to the PBSP policy, after he expressed his concerns and fears about his

agreeing to do so. The court concludes that any amendment would be futile and will DISMISS

plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant S. Preston for failure to assist plaintiff at his

classification hearing with the UCC. 

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3. Equal Protection

Plaintiff claims that defendants McGrath, Alameida, Polk, Nimrod, Wheeler, Lucarelli,

and Browman violated his right to equal protection because they treated plaintiff differently than

other PBSP inmates. Plaintiff maintains that other similarly situated inmates were not required

to agree to the policy to inform PBSP officials of enemy concerns, or face placement in

administrative segregation. 

 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 

457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). When challenging his treatment with regard to other prisoners,

courts have held that in order to present an equal protection claim a prisoner must allege that his

treatment is invidiously dissimilar to that received by other inmates. More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d

269, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1993) (absent evidence of invidious discrimination, federal courts should

defer to judgment of prison officials); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990)

(same). Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations state a cognizable equal protection claim. 

The court will order service of this claim. 

4. State Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ requirement that he report on enemy concerns violates

various provisions of California constitutional, statutory and tort law. The federal supplemental

jurisdiction statute provides that “‘district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they

form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.’” 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the statutory requirement. 

Accordingly, the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. 

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5. Named Defendants

a. Defendants CDCR and E. Alameida, in his official capacity

Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

and Edward Alameida, the former Director of the CDCR, as liable for actions taken in his

official capacity as the director of the State prison system. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars from the federal courts suits against a state by its own

citizens, citizens of another state or citizens or subjects of any foreign state. See Atascadero

State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985). This Eleventh Amendment immunity also

extends to suits against a state agency, see, e.g., Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d

822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not subject to suit);

Bennett v. California, 406 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir.) (California Adult Authority and CDC not

subject to suit), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969), and to suits for damages against state officials

acting in their official capacities, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 97-121 (1984). Such immunity includes state law claims brought against a state in federal

court under the supplemental jurisdiction statute. See Raygor v. Regents of the University of

Minnesota, et al., 534 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2002). 

However, a state official may be sued for prospective injunctive relief from continuing or

impending state action which violates the federal constitution or a federal statute. See Kentucky

v. Graham, 472 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908);

Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 Plaintiff’s suit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR) is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff’s claim for damages against E.

Alameida in his official capacity as the former director of the California Department of

Corrections is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as is plaintiff’s claim against defendant

Alameida for prospective injunctive relief, because Alameida is no longer in a position to

provide injunctive relief. Accordingly, all claims against defendants CDCR and Edward

Alameida in his official capacity are dismissed with prejudice. 

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b. Individual capacity

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations regarding the following individuals’

involvement are sufficient to support his claims of individual and/or supervisory liability: E.

Alameida, in his individual capacity; Joe McGrath, PBSP Warden; Lethal Polk, PBSP Associate

Warden; PBSP Correctional Couselor M.J. Nimrod; PBSP Correctional Counselor T.D.

Lucarelli; PBSP Captain S. Wheeler; PBSP Correctional Couselor J. Browman, and PBSP

Correctional Officer S. Preston. Accordingly, the court will order the complaint served on these

defendants.

6. Damages

Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of injunctive relief and requests general, compensatory,

and punitive damages for mental and emotional distress. 

“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other

correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Failure to allege and establish an

appropriate physical injury is ground for dismissal, see Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318,

1321-35 (S.D. Ind.) (dismissing action for damages because no plaintiff developed physical

injury by exposure to asbestos while in prison), aff;’d, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997). Section

1997e(e)’s bar on these suits by prisoners is a permissible restriction on prisoners’ ability to

recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and does not violate equal protection or separation of

powers doctrine. See Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 461-64 (7th Cir. 1997).

Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are unaffected by § 1997e(e); therefore, the

statute “does not nullify the Eighth Amendment by leaving violations of it without a remedy.”

Zehner, 133 F.3d at 464; accord Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999); Davis v.

District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Similarly, § 1997e(e) does not bar

claims for compensatory damages premised on other injuries sustained from the alleged

constitutional violation. See Oliver, 289 F.3d at 630 (§ 1997e(e) inapplicable to claims for

compensatory damages not premised on mental or emotional injury); see also Robinson v. Page,

170 F.3d 747, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1999) (only the claim for damages for mental or emotional injury

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should be dismissed). Nor does it bar claims seeking nominal or punitive damages that are not

premised on any specified injury. See Oliver, 289 F.3d at 630 (§ 1997e(e) inapplicable to claims

for nominal and punitive damages not premised on mental or emotional injury); Doe v. Delie,

257 F.3d 309, 314 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that nominal and punitive damages claims are

unaffected by § 1997e(e)). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages based

upon his mental and emotional distress are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 CONCLUSION 

1. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and E. Alameida, in 

his official capacity, are DISMISSED as defendants from this action.

2. Plaintiff’s due process claim for the violation of his right against self 

incrimination, his due process claim against defendant S. Preston for failure to assist plaintiff at

his classification hearing with the UCC, and his claims for compensatory damages based upon

his mental and emotional injury are all DISMISSED with prejudice. 

3. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, copies of the amended complaint in this matter (docket no. 12), all

attachments thereto, and copies of this order on the following defendants: E. ALAMEIDA, in his

individual capacity, CDCR in Sacramento, California; JOE MCGRATH, PBSP Warden;

LETHAL POLK, PBSP Associate Warden; M.J. NIMROD, PBSP Correctional Couselor; T.D.

LUCARELLI, PBSP Correctional Counselor; S. WHEELER, PBSP Captain; J. BROWMAN,

PBSP Correctional Couselor, and S. PRESTON, PBSP Correctional Officer. The clerk shall also

serve a copy of this order on plaintiff. 

4. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendants shall

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or shall notify the court that

defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by such a motion. The motion shall

be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

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Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If defendants are of the opinion that this

case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the court prior to the

date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served on plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the court

and served on defendant no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendant’s motion is filed. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by

which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if

granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect

the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other

sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show

that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (holding party opposing

summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on

every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by plaintiff to the

granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th

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Cir. 1994). 

c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date. 

5. All communications by the plaintiff with the court must be served on defendants,

or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the

document to defendant or defendants’ counsel.

6. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court

and the parties informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

7. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16-1 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2/13/2007 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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This is to certify that on 2/14/2007 , a copy of this ruling was

mailed to the following:

Robert Kelly Walters

E-01047

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95531-7500

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