Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56554/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEONARD AVILA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant,

and

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; COMMANDER

STUART MAISLIN,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12-55931

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-01326-

SJO-FMO

LEONARD AVILA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant,

and

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-56554

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-01326-

SJO-FMO

OPINION

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2 AVILA V. LAPD

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 6, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed July 10, 2014

Before: Barry G. Silverman and Andrew D. Hurwitz,

Circuit Judges, and C. Roger Vinson, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz;

Dissent by Judge Vinson

SUMMARY**

Labor Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment, after a

jury trial, in favor of a police officer who claimed that the Los

Angeles Police Department fired him in retaliation for

testifying in a Fair Labor Standards Act lawsuit brought by a

fellow officer.

* The Honorable C. Roger Vinson, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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AVILA V. LAPD 3

The panel held that the officer’s FLSA retaliation claim

was not precluded by the LAPD Board of Rights’

recommendation that he be terminated for insubordination in

not claiming overtime.

The officer alleged that the real reason he was fired was

not because he worked through lunch without requesting

overtime, but rather because he testified in the prior lawsuit. 

The panel held that the district court did not err in declining

to give two special jury instructions, and special verdict

questions tied to those instructions, stating that an employee

who engages in protected activity is not insulated from

adverse action for violating workplace rules. The panel held

that to the extent that the City of Los Angeles was urging that

it would have reached the same decision on terminating the

officer in the absence of his testimony in the prior lawsuit, the

district court was well within its discretion in refusing to give

the instructions because the evidence did not support the

same decision defense, nor did it support the City’s argument

that the firing was based on the content of the officer’s

testimony, and not on the mere fact that he had testified. 

Because the City did not raise the issues in its briefs, the

panel declined to address whether the district court erred in

refusing to give a “same decision” instruction and an

instruction that the officer was required to prove that his

testimony was a “motivating factor” in his termination.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in awarding attorney’s fees and liquidated

damages.

Dissenting, Judge Vinson wrote that the officer not only

testified in the prior case, but also admitted to insubordination

when he testified. Judge Vinson wrote that the district court

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4 AVILA V. LAPD

plainly erred in failing to give the “same decision”

instruction. He wrote that this issue was not waived because

it was inextricably interrelated with the issue whether the

district court erred in failing to give the special instructions. 

He also wrote that there was ample evidence to support the

same decision defense. Judge Vinson wrote that reversible

error occurred, and the case should be remanded for a new

trial.

COUNSEL

Gregory A. Wedner (argued), Mark K. Kitabayashi, and

Sloan R. Simmons, Lozano Smith, Los Angeles, for

Defendants-Appellants.

Matthew S. McNicholas and Douglas D. Winter, McNicholas

& McNicholas, LLP, Los Angeles, California; Stuart B. Esner

(argued) and Andrew N. Chang, Esner, Chang & Boyer,

Pasadena, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

Leonard Avila, a police officer, periodically worked

through his lunch break but did not claim overtime. 

According to his commanding officer, Avila was a model

officer. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD),

however, deemed Avila insubordinate for not claiming

overtime and fired him.

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AVILA V. LAPD 5

Not coincidentally, that termination occurred only after

Avila had testified in a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

lawsuit brought by fellow officer, Edward Maciel, who

sought overtime pay for working through his lunch hours. 

Avila then brought this action, claiming that he was fired in

retaliation for testifying, in violation of the FLSA antiretaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The evidence at

trial was that the only officers disciplined for not claiming

overtime were those who testified against the LAPD in the

Maciel suit, notwithstanding uncontested evidence that the

practice was widespread in the LAPD.

A jury returned a verdict in favor of Avila on his FLSA

anti-retaliation claim. On appeal, the City of Los Angeles

and the LAPD contend that the jury was not correctly

instructed. We find no reversible error and affirm.

I

In January 2008, Leonard Avila testified under subpoena

in a FLSA suit against the City of Los Angeles in the Central

District of California brought by Maciel, who sought

overtime pay under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) for working

through his lunch hour. Avila testified that he and many

other LAPD officers, including his supervisors, operated

under an unwritten policy of not claiming overtime for

working through lunch. After Avila testified, the LAPD filed

an internal investigation complaint against him and another

officer who testified at the Maciel trial, Richard Romney,

alleging that they had been insubordinate by not submitting

requests for overtime.

The officers were ordered to appear before the LAPD

Board of Rights (BOR), a disciplinary review body. Avila

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6 AVILA V. LAPD

was sworn in, entered a plea of not guilty, heard opening

statements, but resigned during the hearing’s lunch break to

accept a job with another law enforcement agency. The BOR

nonetheless proceeded against Avila in absentia. The board

found Avila guilty of insubordination and recommended

termination, and the Chief of Police then so ordered. Romney

was also fired.1

Avila then sued the LAPD and the City of Los Angeles

(collectively, the “City”) in the Central District of California,

asserting claims under the anti-retaliation provision of FLSA

(29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and California

law.2 The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that

because Avila never sought judicial review of the BOR

decision, his federal claims were precluded. The district

court denied the motion, but precluded Avila from

challenging any factual findings made by the BOR.

After Avila rested at trial, the court granted the City’s

motion for judgment as a matter of law on the state law

claims. The jury found in favor of Avila on his FLSA claim,

but against him on the § 1983 claim, and awarded damages of

$50,000. The district court entered a judgment on the jury

verdict, and later amended it to award Avila $50,000 in

liquidated damages and $579,400 in attorney’s fees. We have

1 Officer Teresa Anderson provided similar testimony in a deposition in

the Maciel case; she was fired. A California state court found her

termination retaliatory and she was reinstated. A disciplinary complaint

also was initiated against Avila’s supervisor, who testified that he

“probably” violated the overtime rules, but the supervisor was not

disciplined.

2 Commander Stuart Maislin was also named as a defendant. Avila has

not appealed the judgment that was entered below in Maislin’s favor.

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AVILA V. LAPD 7

jurisdiction over the City’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

and affirm.

II

The City first contends that the BOR recommendation

that Avila’s employment be terminated precludes his FLSA

retaliation claim. We review the district court’s rejection of

that argument de novo. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,

216 F.3d 845, 849–50 (9th Cir. 2000).

A state agency determination is entitled to preclusive

effect if three requirements are satisfied: “(1) that the

administrative agency act in a judicial capacity, (2) that the

agency resolve disputed issues of fact properly before it, and

(3) that the parties have an adequate opportunity to litigate.” 

Miller v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir.

1994) (citing United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co.,

384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)). We give state administrative

agency judgments the same preclusive effect they receive in

state court. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 799

(1986).

The dispositive question is whether the BOR actually

decided whether Avila was fired in retaliation for testifying

in the Maciel action. The City relies heavily on White v. City

of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2012), in urging issue

preclusion. The plaintiff in White was a police officer who

challenged her termination in a grievance proceeding. Id. at

922. At an administrative hearing before an arbiter, White

presented “evidence that the City’s investigation and her

termination were in retaliation” for a lawsuit she had filed

against the City. Id. at 924. The arbiter found that the City

had not demonstrated just cause for termination, but also

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8 AVILA V. LAPD

found that White had not shown that she was a victim of

retaliation. Id. After an independent review of the record, the

City Manager upheld the termination, specifically rejecting

White’s retaliation claims. Id. White’s subsequent civil

rights action against the City again raised the retaliation

claim. Id. at 925. The district court dismissed the claim, and

we affirmed, finding the administrative determination issue

preclusive. Id. at 930–31.

This case is quite different. Here, neither the BOR

decision nor the termination order addressed the issue of

retaliation. The administrative proceedings simply found

Avila guilty of the one count in the complaint: “Prior to 2008,

you, while on duty, were insubordinate to the department

when you failed to submit requests for compensation for

overtime that you had worked, as directed through

department publications.” The district court thus properly

concluded that the agency had not determined the motive for

the disciplinary action. See L.A. Police Protective League v.

Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1474–75 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that

a BOR determination “could not have preclusive effect on the

different issue the jury faced”). There is no issue preclusion.

III

Avila claimed that the real reason he was fired was not

because he worked through lunch without requesting

overtime, but rather because he testified in the Maciel

lawsuit. The City does not dispute that if Avila’s claim is

true, the termination violated FLSA, which makes it

“unlawful for any person . . . to discharge or in any other

manner discriminate against any employee because such

employee . . . has testified . . . in any [FLSA] proceeding

. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Nor does the City contend that

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AVILA V. LAPD 9

the evidence below was insufficient to support the jury

verdict. Rather, the City’s only argument on appeal is that

the jury was not properly instructed.

A.

It is important to note at the outset precisely what issues

are and are not before this court with respect to the jury

instructions. The City requested an instruction that Avila was

required to prove that his testifying at the Maciel trial was a

“motivating factor” in his termination. In contrast, Avila had

requested an instruction that he was required to prove that his

testifying was the “but-for cause” of the termination. The

district court gave the City’s requested instruction, which was

consistent with Ninth Circuit law. See Knickerbocker v. City

of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring that

retaliation be a “substantial factor” in adverse action). The

City does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in

giving the “motivating factor” instruction. See United States

v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing

invited error).3

The City did request an instruction that there was no

liability under the FLSA anti-retaliation provision if the

“same decision” would have been made had Avila not

3 While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that a “but-for”

instruction is required when the plaintiff makes “a retaliation claim under

§ 2000e–3(a),” the Title VII anti-retaliation provision. Univ. of Tex. S.W.

Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). Given the City’s

failure to raise the issue, we do not today address whether a “but-for”

instruction is now also required in FLSA retaliation cases. But see

Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

(rejecting the argument “that the breadth of Title VII’s anti-retaliation

provision dictates the construction we should give the FLSA provision”).

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10 AVILA V. LAPD

testified. Originally, developed in Title VII cases, the same

decision affirmative defense shields an employer from

liability when an adverse action is based both on protected

and unprotected activities; the employer has the burden of

“proving that it would have made the same decision in the

absence of” the protected activity. Price Waterhouse v.

Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 254 (1989); see also Knickerbocker,

81 F.3d at 911.

But, the City’s briefs on appeal do not assign as error the

district court’s refusal to give the “same decision” instruction. 

Arguments “not raised clearly and distinctly in the opening

brief” are waived. McKay v. Ingleson, 558 F.3d 888, 891 n.5

(9th Cir. 2009).

Indeed, even if, like our dissenting colleague, we were to

take up the issue sua sponte, the result would be the same. 

“There must be a sufficient evidentiary foundation to support

giving the instruction.” Gantt v. City of L.A., 717 F.3d 702,

706–07 (9th Cir. 2013). The uncontested evidence in this

case is that Avila would not have been fired had he not

testified. Indeed, an LAPD official confirmed at trial that the

only officers disciplined for the overtime violations were

those who testified in the Maciel action, and that Avila would

never have been disciplined had he not testified. The City’s

counsel also candidly conceded this at oral argument. And,

the only evidence introduced at the disciplinary hearing was

Avila’s testimony in the Maciel matter. There thus was

simply no evidentiary foundation for a same decision

instruction. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1009

(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding a district court’s failure to

give a same decision instruction harmless because “the

evidence before the jury strongly support[ed] the conclusion

that the plaintiffs were discharged in retaliation for their

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AVILA V. LAPD 11

overtime complaints and that they would not have been

discharged had they not engaged in this protected conduct”).

B.

The only issue on the merits actually raised by the City is

whether the district court committed reversible error in

declining to give the jury two requested special instructions

and to submit several proposed special verdict questions tied

to those instructions.

The proposed instructions were:

1. An employee who engages in protected

activity is not insulated from adverse action

for violating workplace rules, and an

employer’s belief that the employee

committed misconduct is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse action.

2. An employer is forbidden to discriminate

or retaliate against an employee who

participates in an activity deemed to be

protected under federal or state law. But

participation doesn’t insulate an employee

from being discharged for conduct that, if it

occurred outside the protected activity, would

warrant termination.4

The proposed special verdict questions were, as relevant

to this appeal:

4 The City requested a third special instruction, but does not contend on

appeal that the district court erred by failing to give it.

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12 AVILA V. LAPD

2. Was the City of Los Angeles’s decision to

discharge Leonard Avila based upon his

engaging in a protected activity under the

FLSA, or admitting misconduct, or both?

. . .

If your answer to question 2 is engaging in

protected activity, then answer question 3. . . . 

If your answer is both engaging in protected

activity and admitting misconduct, go to

question 4.

3. Was the Defendants’ conduct a substantial

factor in causing harm to Leonard Avila?

. . .

4. Has the Defendant proved, by a

preponderance of the evidence that the

Defendant would have made the same

decision to discharge Plaintiff even if

Plaintiff’s protected activity had played no

role in the Defendant’s decision to?

After declining the proposed instructions, the district

court read the following stipulation to the jury:

On January 16th, 2008, Plaintiff Avila

appeared in federal court pursuant to a

subpoena and gave sworn testimony at the

jury trial in the Maciel case. The giving of

this testimony is protected activity under the

Fair Labor Standards Act.

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AVILA V. LAPD 13

The district court then instructed the jury as follows:

The plaintiff seeks damages against defendant

L.A.P.D. for retaliation under the FLSA. The

plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the

following elements by a preponderance of the

evidence:

1. Plaintiff engaged in or was engaging in an

activity protected under federal law, that is he

testified in a FLSA action.

2. The employer subjected plaintiff to an

adverse employment action.

3. The protected activity was a motivating

reason for the adverse employment action.

If the plaintiff has proven all three of these

elements, the plaintiff is entitled to your

verdict. However, if the defendant has proven

by a preponderance of the evidence that the

plaintiff’s participation in a protected activity

played no role in any of the adverse

employment decisions, the defendant is

entitled to your verdict.

The City did not object to these instructions.

After the jury asked a question about protected activity,

the City renewed its requests for the supplemental

instructions and the special verdicts. The district court told

the jury to rely on its original instructions. The verdict in

favor of Avila on the FLSA claim followed.

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14 AVILA V. LAPD

C.

The City requested the special instructions in support of

its argument that it had not fired Avila because he testified,

but rather because he failed to request overtime. The City

also argues that FLSA only prohibits adverse action based on

the fact that Avila testified at the Maciel trial, not the use of

his testimony.

To the extent that the City is urging that it would have

reached the same decision on terminating Avila in the

absence of his testimony, as we have noted above, the district

court was well within its discretion in refusing to give the

supplemental instructions. There was no evidence to support

the same decision defense; the City’s own witness made plain

that only those who testified in the Maciel suit were

disciplined for failing to take overtime. It simply cannot be

argued on this record that Avila would have been fired had he

not testified.

The City’s argument that the firing was not in

contravention of the FLSA anti-retaliation clause because it

was based on the content of Avila’s testimony, not on the

mere fact that he had “testified,” fails for the same reason. 

The only evidence against Avila was his testimony in the

FLSA action, and it was conceded that only those who

testified in the FLSA action were disciplined for not seeking

overtime. We leave for another day whether use of an

employee’s trial testimony is entirely forbidden in an adverse

action when there is also other evidence of the alleged

infraction before the decision maker; no such evidence was

proffered by the City here.

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AVILA V. LAPD 15

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in telling the

jury, after it posed a question on protected activity, to rely on

the original instructions. See United States v. Romero–Avila,

210 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States

v. Alvarez–Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)

(noting that this practice avoids “possible error sometimes

found in trying to elaborate on a given instruction”). The

supplemental instructions would have done more to confuse

than to clarify. See Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 804 (9th

Cir. 2005) (noting that jury instructions “must not be

misleading”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Avila

never argued to the jury that his testimony insulated him from

adverse action or that it could not be used in a disciplinary

proceeding. Nor did he claim that he could not be fired for

failing to request overtime.5 Rather, Avila’s claim was that

the true reason he was fired was because he testified against

his employer in a FLSA action, not because he violated the

overtime rules.

Indeed, the LAPD’s representative at the BOR hearing

conceded that Avila had been investigated only because he

testified at the Maciel trial, testifying that the

investigation was conducted as a result of

sworn testimony given by [Avila and

Romney] during a civil trial surrounding

allegations of a violation of [FLSA] . . . . 

Commander [Maslin] was provided transcripts

of the testimony given by seven officers

during that court case . . . . After having

5 Because of the district court’s decision that the BOR determination had

limited preclusive effect, Avila could not contest that notseeking overtime

was a firing offense.

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16 AVILA V. LAPD

reviewed the transcripts and after due

consideration, Commander Maslin elected to

initiate a personnel complaint against Officer

Avila and Officer Romney.

More tellingly, Commander Maslin admitted that despite

uncontested evidence that thousands of officers, including

Avila’s superiors, routinely did not claim overtime for lunch,

the only officers singled out for discipline were those who

testified at the Maciel action.6 Nor was there any claim that

Avila was disciplined for anything else. When Avila

resigned, his commanding officer wrote that “Officer Avila

was a stellar employee and an individual of personal integrity

and honor. He performed his duties well, got along well with

his co-workers, and was respected by his peers. This

Department is losing a valuably trained asset.”

In short, as this case was tried, the issue for jury

resolution was not whether the LAPD could fire Avila for not

claiming overtime or whether his trial testimony could be

used in the administrative hearing. Rather, the only issue was

whether the reason given by the LAPD for the termination

was a pretext. That is precisely what the FLSA antiretaliation provision forbids. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)

(making it unlawful to discharge an employee “because such

employee . . . has testified” in a FLSA action); see also

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.

Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011) (holding that the anti-retaliation

provision makes FLSA’s “enforcement scheme effective by

6

In addition to the Maciel action, there were at least four other FLSA

actions filed against the LAPD alleging similar overtime violations. One

of the cases was brought as a collection action, in which 2,300 to 2,500

officers, sergeants, detectives, and lieutenants joined.

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AVILA V. LAPD 17

preventing ‘fear of economic retaliation’ from inducing

workers ‘quietly to accept substandard conditions’”) (quoting

Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292

(1960)). “[T]he First Amendment similarly protects a public

employee who provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled

by subpoena, outside the course of his ordinary job

responsibilities.” Lane v. Franks, No. 13-483, —S. Ct.—,

2014 WL 2765285 (U.S. June 19, 2014).

Put differently, the only issue for the jury in this case was

whether the City was telling the truth in claiming that it fired

a model employee (who was hired by another police force

even as the termination action was pending),7

for not seeking

all the pay that he might have. The district court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to give the requested

supplemental instructions. See Yan Fang Du v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 697 F.3d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Whether there is

sufficient evidence to support an instruction is reviewed for

abuse of discretion.”); Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento,

652 F.3d 1225, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that we review

formulation of instructions for abuse of discretion).

7 Avila’s resignation did not moot his retaliation claim because the BOR

proceeded against Avila in absentia.

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18 AVILA V. LAPD

IV

The City also contends that the district court abused its

discretion in awarding attorney’s fees and liquated damages.8

We disagree.

A.

FLSA authorizes an award of reasonable attorney’s fees

to a prevailing plaintiff in anti-retaliation suits. 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b). We review fee awards for abuse of discretion. 

Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th

Cir. 2008). The City does not contest that Avila was the

successful party, rather it contends that the award was too

large.

Avila originally requested $748,522.50 in fees. The

district court, in a thorough order, instead awarded $579,400. 

The court reduced the lead counsel’s requested rate,

eliminated administrative, clerical, and unproductive hours,

and deducted 30% of the time with vague billing descriptions. 

The district court also granted the City a 10% reduction in the

overall amount of the fees requested to account for time

“expended on the failed claims,” notwithstanding that these

claims were “based upon the same core set of facts and

generally related legal theories” as the successful claim. 

Given the district court’s careful explanations of its reasons

for the award, we find no abuse of discretion.

8 After the City filed its notice of appeal, the district court awarded trial

preparation costs to Avila. Because the City never filed an amended or

separate notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to review that award. 

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2007).

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AVILA V. LAPD 19

B.

FLSA also allows a successful plaintiff in an antiretaliation suit to recover liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b). We review such awards for abuse of discretion. 

EEOC v. First Citizens Bank of Billings, 758 F.2d 397, 402

(9th Cir. 1985).

The district court awarded liquidated damages because

they “would work to compensate [Avila] for a delay in

payment of wages owed and also provide an incentive for

future employees to report wage and hour violations by their

employers.” The City contends that the latter part of the

court’s statement shows that the liquidated damages award

was improperly punitive. The trial judge, however, plainly

indicated a compensatory purpose, and liquidated damages

are not rendered punitive merely because they also have an

incidental deterrent effect. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil,

324 U.S. 697, 709–10 (1945) (noting that Congress “plainly

intended” section 16(b) to have a “deterrent effect”).

V

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment.

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20 AVILA V. LAPD

VINSON, District Judge, dissenting:

This is a very troubling case that raises a number of

significant legal issues. I will limit the focus of my dissent,

however, to what I believe is the most serious and manifest

error: the jury instructions.

This is also a very important case, for retaliation claims

based on federal statutes are increasingly a major part of

employment litigation in federal courts. Recent cases from

the Supreme Court of the United States, see note 3 infra, have

highlighted new interpretations of the causation standard in

some of these cases. All parties who deal with those laws,

including employers and employees, their attorneys, district

judges, and trial juries, need more clarification and certainty

in this area. Unfortunately, the majority’s opinion does not

provide that.

I

Before turning to the jury instructions, it might be helpful

to briefly discuss the nature of the testimony at issue in this

case. The majority repeatedlystates that Avila and two fellow

officers, Romney and Anderson, were disciplined only after

they testified in the Maciel litigation. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 5

(“[The] termination occurred only after Avila had testified in

[the Maciel suit.]”); accord id. at 5 (“The evidence at trial

was that the only officers disciplined . . . were those who

testified against the LAPD in the Maciel suit[.]”). Although

technically true, the substance of their Maciel testimony is

critical, as Avila, Romney, and Anderson were also the only

officers who had openly admitted to insubordination while

they testified. Specifically, they admitted that for several

years they failed to report overtime — and failed to report

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AVILA V. LAPD 21

supervisors who allegedly told them to do so — even though

they knew it was “serious misconduct” for which they could

be fired. Accordingly, when the majority says “the only

officers singled out for discipline were those who testified at

the Maciel action”, id. at 16, it is more complete and factually

accurate to say that “the only officers singled out for

discipline were those who testified at the Maciel action and

who admitted under oath that for years they knowingly and

repeatedly violated policies that they were specifically told

would subject them to termination.” It is important to keep in

mind that Avila, Romney, and Anderson did more than

“testify” in the Maciel case.1

To the extent that the majority appears to believe that

someone who testifies in an otherwise protected hearing is,

ipso facto, immunized from the consequences of any selfincriminating admissions made during his testimony, I

disagree. There is a clear and legally recognized distinction

between the mere act of testifying on one hand and, on the

other hand, making admissions while testifying that provide

independent grounds for discipline. See Merritt v. Dillard

Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188–91 (11th Cir. 1997)

(concluding that an employee who testified in a protected

Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired

and that in “virtually every” such case the employer would be

entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of

retaliation or pretext); cf. Lane v. Franks, — S. Ct. —, 2014

1 To be clear, I am not suggesting that a jury necessarily must have

believed that Avila was disciplined for his admitted insubordination. He

could argue based on the evidence (and he did argue) that the LAPD

internal investigation and BOR proceedings were deficient, biased,

targeted, and used to retaliate against him—and a properly instructed jury

might have agreed. The problem in this case, as will be seen shortly, is

that the jury here was not properly instructed.

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WL 2765285, at *10 n.5 (U.S. June 19, 2014) (noting in a

First Amendment retaliation case: “Of course . . . wrongdoing

that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid

basis for termination or other discipline.”). Although the act

of testifying is protected, the testimony itself is not

privileged. This distinction is rooted in both reason and

common sense.2

Now to the jury instruction problem.

II

The FLSA makes it unlawful to take adverse action

against an employee “because such employee has . . .

testified” in a FLSA proceeding. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). As

this court previously explained in the Title VII context, to

prove a violation of such a statute, an employee may have

evidence from which “the only reasonable conclusion a jury

could reach is that discriminatory animus is the sole cause for

2 Perhaps this is apparent, but in reading the majority’s opinion, one

could interpret it otherwise, when it states, inter alia: “The only evidence

against Avila was his testimony in the FLSA action . . . . We leave for

another day whether use of an employee’s trial testimony is entirely

forbidden in an adverse action when there is also other evidence of the

alleged infraction[.]” Maj. Op. at 14. The clear implication is that use of

an employee’s testimonial admission is “entirely forbidden” (he is

immune from discipline) unless there is “other evidence of the alleged

infraction” (and even then it may still be forbidden). That implication is

not the law, as even Avila’s counsel recognized at oral argument, when he

agreed that an officer could be disciplined if, while testifying during a

protected hearing, he admitted to “widespread beating of civilians.”

Further, as noted infra, this issue was discussed at trial during argument

on the jurors’ questions and everyone — Avila, the City, and the trial

judge — agreed that there is a difference between the protected act of

testifying and admitting to misconduct while testifying.

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AVILA V. LAPD 23

the challenged employment action or that discrimination

played no role at all in the employer’s decisionmaking[.]” See

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir.

2002) (emphasis in original), aff’d 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct.

2148 (2003). In such “sole cause” (or “pretext”) cases, the

jury must be instructed “to determine whether the challenged

action was taken ‘because of’ the prohibited reason,” and, if

the jury finds that it was, the employee prevails. Id. If, on the

other hand, the jury determines that it “played no role at all”,

the employer prevails. Id.

However, where there is evidence of more than one

potential cause for the adverse action (so-called “mixed

motive” cases), a different instruction should be used. Thus,

if the evidence at trial “could support a finding that

discrimination is one of two or more reasons for the

challenged decision, at least one of which may be legitimate,

the jury should be instructed to determine first whether the

discriminatory reason was ‘a motivating factor’ in the

challenged action.” Id. at 856–57. If the jury answers that

question in the affirmative, the employee prevails unless the

employer can then prove that it would have made the “same

decision” even if the impermissible factor (protected activity)

had not been considered. See id. at 857; accord

Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907, 911 & n.2

(9th Cir. 1996) (holding same in the FLSA retaliation

context). In other words, if there is enough evidence to

support it, the “mixed motive” jury instruction is called for,

where the appropriate causation standard is only “a

motivating factor” but which must be coupled with a “same

decision” affirmative defense instruction.

Before trial, Avila proposed a “sole cause” instruction

under Ninth Circuit Model Instruction No. 10:3, which

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provided that he would prevail on his claim if he showed:

(1) that he engaged in protected conduct; (2) that he was

subjected to an adverse job action; and (3) that he was

subjected to that action “because of” the protected conduct.

The City objected to the instruction as it did not account for

its defense that there were valid, independent, and nonretaliatory grounds for Avila’s termination — namely, his

admitted insubordination — and that the LAPD “would have

acted as it did regardless of any protected activity by

plaintiff.” The City thus requested a “mixed motive” jury

instruction with the “motivating factor” causation standard,

along with the following “same decision” affirmative

defense:

If the plaintiff has proved all three of these

elements, the plaintiff is entitled to your

verdict, unless the defendant has proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that it would

have made the same decision even if the

plaintiff’s participation in a protected activity

had played no role in the employment

decision. In that event, the defendant is

entitled to your verdict, even if the plaintiff

has met his burden of proof on all three of the

above elements.

(Emphasis added). This “same decision” defense instruction

was taken verbatim from the “mixed motive” alternative

instruction in the then-current Ninth Circuit Model

Instruction No. 10:3.3

3 This pattern instruction, which by its very title applied to Title VII

cases, was amended last year to omit the “mixed motive” alternative on

the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in University of Texas S.W.

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The City also proposed the two special instructions that

the majority has quoted in full. See Maj. Op. at 11. The

underlying purpose of these instructions was to tell the jury

of the distinction between the act of testifying, which cannot

serve as a basis for adverse action, and admitting to

misconduct while testifying, which can.

The trial judge rejected both special instructions, but he

appeared to agree that the evidence supported a “mixed

motive” instruction. Yet, he ended up giving a combination

of a portion of the “mixed motive” and a portion of the “sole

cause” instructions.4 First, he instructed the jury that Avila

would prevail if he proved that his testimony in Maciel was

Med. Center v. Nassar, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), which had

analyzed the statutory “because [of]” language and rejected a motivating

factor test in the Title VII retaliation context. In reaching this conclusion,

the Supreme Court relied on its decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Servs.,

557 U.S. 167, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), which interpreted similar “because

of” statutory language and held that a mixed motive instruction was

improper under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Whether and

to what extent Nassar and Gross may have a bearing on retaliation claims

under the FLSA is at this point unclear, although the FLSA uses similar

statutory “because [of]” language. Nevertheless, there is, to date, Ninth

Circuit authority providing that the mixed motive/motivating factor

analysis is available to retaliation claims under that statute. See

Knickerbocker, 81 F.3d at 911 & n.2. Thus, I accept that is still the law in

this circuit (as it was at the time of trial in this case), regardless of what

the Supreme Court may decide in FLSA retaliation cases in the future.

4 The parties do not dispute on appeal that this was a “mixed motive”

case. The majority states that the trial judge “gave the City’s requested

[mixed motive] instruction,” Maj. Op. at 9, but that is not accurate. The

City requested the mixed motive instruction which included the

incorporated “same decision” affirmative defense, as set out in the pattern

instruction. The judge significantly changed that instruction, as will be

seen.

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“a motivating factor” for the challenged action, which the

court defined as “a reason that contributed to the decision to

take certain action even though other reasons also may have

contributed to the decision.” So far, so good. However, the

judge went astray by omitting the “same decision”

affirmative defense language from this circuit’s model

instruction and, instead, instructing the jury as follows on the

City’s defense:

[I]f the defendant has proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that the

plaintiff’s participation in a protected activity

played no role in any of the adverse

employment decisions, the defendant is

entitled to your verdict.

This instruction has nothing to do with the “same decision”

defense, and it mixes apples with oranges. It told the jury that

Avila would prevail if he proved that his participation in the

protected activity was “a motivating factor” (i.e., a

contributing reason among others) for the adverse action,

which could then be overcome only if the City could turn

around and prove that the protected activity “played no role”

at all. This illogical and internally inconsistent instruction

was not the same decision affirmative defense set out in the

Ninth Circuit pattern jury instructions, which the City had

requested.5

5

It appears that the “no role” portion of the instruction was, in

substance, derived from Avila’s previously (and properly) rejected “sole

cause” instruction. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 856 (describing “sole cause”

cases as those in which “the only reasonable conclusion a jury could reach

is that discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the challenged

employment action or that discrimination played no role at all in the

employer’s decisionmaking”) (emphasis added). In mixed motive cases

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On this issue, Knickerbocker is instructive. That was a

mixed motive FLSA retaliation case in which the employee

argued that the adverse employment action “should be

deemed retaliatory if the protected conduct was ‘in any way’

a part of the employer’s decision”, 81 F.3d at 911 n.2, which

is merely the inverse way of arguing that the employer, to

prevail, must demonstrate that the protected conduct “played

no role” in the decision. This circuit rejected that argument,

stating that it was “wiser” to conclude in FLSA mixed motive

cases that the employer need only prove that, although the

protected conduct “played a role,” it would have done the

same thing even if “the proper reason alone had existed.” See

id. at 911 & n.2.6

Notably, the majority opinion does not dispute that the

“no role” instruction was erroneous. Instead, it appears to

such as this, the employer has no burden to prove that the protected

activity “played no role.” See Knickerbocker, 81 F.3d at 911 & n.2. That

language is not even compatible, since in mixed motive cases it is

presumed that the activity may have “played a role,” but the employer has

the opportunity to try and prove that it would have taken the same action

anyway. See Ostad v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 327 F.3d 876,

884–85 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Knickerbocker and noting that in a “mixed

motive” case the employee must prove that the protected activity was a

“substantial or motivating” factor, after which — despite that it was a

factor — the employer will prevail if it proves that “the adverse action

would have occurred anyway”). If employers in mixed motive cases were

required to show, as here, that the protected conduct “played no role” in

the action, then no employer could ever prevail on its affirmative defense.

6 Avila maintains in his brief that the instruction the trial judge gave was

“in substance” the same as the one that the City had requested, but the two

are actually contradictory. Requiring the City to prove for its affirmative

defense that it would have made the same decision even if the protected

activity was a motivating factor is manifestly not the same as requiring the

City to prove that the protected activity “played no role.”

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suggest three reasons why that error does not warrant

reversal: waiver, insufficient evidence, and harmless error. 

A.

For its first rationale, the majority contends that the error

has been waived because the City did not clearly and

distinctly raise the issue in its opening brief. See Maj. Op.

at 9. Although the City had requested the Ninth Circuit’s

pattern “mixed motive” instruction — which included the

incorporated “same decision” affirmative defense — it did

not expressly object to the “no role” instruction that was

given.7 Rather than assign error to that instruction, the City

has instead argued that the court erred in not giving the two

special instructions that sought to explain the pivotal

distinction between taking an action because an employee

testified, and taking an action because he admitted to

misconduct while testifying. There are two reasons why

waiver does not apply here.

First, even though the City did not specifically object to

the instructions as they were originally given, we can review

jury instructions for plain error in civil cases. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 51(d)(2). Plain error is: “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and

(3) that affects substantial rights . . . . If all three conditions

are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to

notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

7 The closest the City comes to making this argument is in its reply brief,

where it points out — quite rightly — that it could not have possibly

shown that the Maciel testimony played no role in the adverse action when

the City’s entire defense was that the action was appropriate based on

Avila’s admission “during that testimony!” (Emphasis in original).

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AVILA V. LAPD 29

proceedings.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122

S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002) (quotation marks, citations, and

brackets omitted) (emphasis added). It is apparent to me that

the failure to give the “same decision” instruction that the

City had requested was plain error on the facts of this case, as

it deprived the City of its entire defense and thus seriously

affected the fairness and integrity of the trial.

To prevail on his retaliation claim, the jury was instructed

that Avila had to prove: (1) that he was engaged in protected

activity when he testified in the Maciel case; (2) that he was

then subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) that

his Maciel testimony was a “motivating factor” in the

decision to take that adverse action. This is a somewhat

unique case in that all three elements — from the jury’s

perspective — were essentially indisputable. As for the first

two, Avila obviously engaged in protected activity by

testifying in the Maciel action, after which he was obviously

subjected to adverse action. As for the third element, because

the City’s entire defense was that it took the adverse action

based upon the misconduct that Avila admitted during his

testimony, the protected activity obviously “contributed to”

the decision to take that action. The trial judge specifically

instructed the jury that: “If the plaintiff has proved all three

of these elements, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict.”

These are the first three elements of this circuit’s pattern

“mixed motive” instruction — but the judge left out the same

decision affirmative defense, which is what the “mixed

motive” instruction is all about. Consequently, the jury was

told that the only way for the City to avoid liability, per the

judge’s deviation from the pattern instruction, was if it could

somehow prove that the trial testimony in Maciel “played no

role” in the action — which, of course, it could not possibly

do. In other words, there was no way for the City to prevail

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under the instructions as given to the jury, and the outcome

of the case was predetermined. I believe this instructional

error was plain.8

Furthermore, even if the trial judge’s failure to give the

“same decision” instruction was not plain error, this issue was

not waived because that omission plus the inconsistent “no

role” instruction that was given led directly to — and

aggravated — the jury’s obvious confusion, and it cannot be

separated from the equally meritorious special instructions

argument that the City has advanced on appeal. As will be

seen, the two arguments are inextricably interrelated.

During their first full day of deliberations, the jurors (who

had deliberated only part of the day before) sent out a note

asking the following three questions:

8 The majority says “the only issue [for the jury to resolve] was whether

the reason given by the LAPD for the termination was a pretext.” See Maj.

Op. at 16 (emphasis added). But, this action was tried as a mixed motive

case, not as a sole cause case, so pretext was not an issue at trial. In

Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), this

court discussed the differences between the two types of cases and noted

“it does not make sense to ask if the employer’s stated reason for

terminating an employee is a pretext for retaliation” in a mixed motive

case; rather, in such cases the first issue is whether the protected activity

was a motivating factor in the adverse action, and the second issue is

whether the employer would have made the same decision anyway. See

id. at 1067–68. As for the first issue, as noted, Avila’s trial testimony in

Maciel clearly “contributed to” the adverse job action, and, therefore, it

was a “motivating factor” in the decision to take the action. As for the

second issue, the majority opinion makes no attempt to explain how the

jury could have possibly resolved that question in favor of the City in light

of the instruction that it was given. It couldn’t. The law that the jury was

told to follow was wrong — pure and simple — and as a result the City

was denied its entire defense, which was plain error.

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Is testimony given at an FLSA action

protected? Then, can that testimony be used as

evidence in a trial? Is the physical act of

testifying the protected activity under FLSA,

or is the testimony protected or both?

Both counsel and the trial judge agreed that the answer to the

first two questions was “yes,” but there was disagreement as

to the third. Avila’s lawyer suggested at the time that the act

of testifying and the testimony itself were both protected, but

the City’s lawyer believed that was legally incorrect because,

“obviously, there’s examples, if you admitted committing a

homicide in an FLSA proceeding, I don’t think anybody

would argue that would be protected activity.” Although the

judge could have easily answered the third question, he

ultimately decided (with both counsel agreeing) to respond by

simply re-reading a previous stipulation reflecting that Avila

had testified in the Maciel action and that “[t]he giving of this

testimony is protected activity under the [FLSA].”

The jury continued to deliberate the rest of that day. Still

confused on the third day, however, it sent out a second series

of questions:

If testimony given in an FLSA proceeding is

protected, is it legal to use that testimony

against the person testifying? If it is legal to

use that testimony against the person

testifying, then, how is that testimony

protected?

The trial judge’s following summary of these questions as he

began his discussion with counsel accurately describes the

jury’s dilemma:

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My sense is that the jury is caught in a

circular reasoning process. It would appear

that the jury should be told that a person can

testify in an FLSA proceeding, that the

testimony is protected, that in this case the

LAPD could not terminate the plaintiff . . . for

testimony — the fact that he testified in the

FLSA proceeding.

The follow-up is that they could terminate

him if the department concluded that he made

an admission in that testimony that provided

separate but good cause to terminate him.

So, they can’t terminate him for testifying, but

they can terminate him if he made an

admission that provided separate grounds for

termination that arose to good cause.

Avila’s counsel replied that he “generally agree[d] with what

the court is trying to communicate.” However, he maintained

that it was “more precisely stated” in the (erroneous)

“motivating factor/no role” instruction that had already been

given to the jury. After quoting from that instruction, Avila’s

attorney stated as follows:

So, in order for the jury to say in this case

under the law that there is not a motivating

reason, they must be able to affirmatively say

the defendant has proved by a preponderance

of the evidence that plaintiff’s testimony in

Maciel played no role in any of the adverse

employment decisions.

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Because what is incumbent upon the defense

to show is it’s not a motivating reason. And

the flip side of a motivating reason — or

should Isay the inverse of a motivating reason

is that the protected activity played no role,

which is covered in the jury instruction that

the court has given.

(Emphasis added).9 Defense counsel responded by agreeing

with what the trial judge had said at the beginning of the

discussion, i.e., that there is “a distinction between the act of

testifying . . . versus the content of the testimony[.]” He then

reminded the court: “We proposed two special instructions

that directly address this pivotal issue. Those instructions

were rejected by the court. Let me reoffer them for the court

to consider because it does seem since the jury has the

[“motivating factor/no role” instruction] they’re struggling

with it.” The judge once again rejected the two special

instructions and (over the City’s objection) decided to re-read

the erroneous instruction to the jury because, he said, “this is

getting way too complicated.” After the judge announced

what he planned to do, the City made one last attempt and

requested, in the alternative, that the judge at least give the

jury “the explanation that you provided to counsel when you

came on to the bench, the distinction between the giving of

testimony and the use and contents of the testimony.” The

court replied “that will not be done at this time.”

9 Once again, this is incorrect. The “flip side” or “inverse” of a

motivating factor is not that the protected conduct “played no role” in the

adverse job action. Instead, in mixed motive cases, the employer need

only show it would have made the “same decision” regardless of the role

that the protected activity did play. See supra note 5.

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The trial judge thus not only failed to correct the

erroneous instruction — by giving “special instructions” that

could have freed the clearly struggling jury from the “circular

reasoning process” that he himself believed it was “caught in”

— but he actually repeated and compounded the original

error by just re-reading the same erroneous instruction. This

sequence shows the inseparable overlap between the original

instructional error regarding the lack of a proper “same

decision” defense (which has not been directly raised on

appeal) and the court’s response to the jury questions and

refusal to give the special clarifying instructions (which has

been).

In sum, Avila obviously engaged in protected activity

when he testified in Maciel, but it is also obvious that he

admitted to “serious misconduct” during his testimony, which

provided a legitimate basis for discipline. Prior to trial, the

City requested special instructions to address that issue, but

they were rejected. After the jury was inexplicably told that

the City could prevail only if it proved that the Maciel trial

testimony “played no role,” the jury was clearly (and

understandably) confused about whether it could separate

Avila’s admitted misconduct as ground for discipline from

the protected act of testifying. To try and remedy the

problem, the City once again proposed — but the trial judge

once again rejected — special instructions that could have

cleared up the jury’s confusion on this point.

The majority says that the two special instructions “would

have done more to confuse than to clarify”, Maj. Op. at 15,

but it is hard to see how the jury could have possibly been

more confused than they alreadywere with the instructions as

given. To the extent the special instructions were themselves

confusingly-written, the judge could have done what the City

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AVILA V. LAPD 35

had requested as an alternative to giving those instructions:

just tell the jurors as he succinctly told the lawyers:“they

can’t terminate him for testifying, but they can terminate him

if he made an admission that provided separate grounds for

termination that arose to good cause.” That simple and

uncomplicated clarifying statement would not have confused

the jury and would have provided the answer to the problem

that had been created by the erroneous instruction.

As it was, however, the trial judge twice instructed the

jury that the City, to prove its defense, must show that Avila’s

testimony in Maciel “played no role” in the challenged action,

which was legally incorrect. Thus, once Avila quite easily

met his threshold case, the City did not have the opportunity

for the jury to even consider its defense: that it took the action

because of the admitted misconduct, and not for the mere act

of testifying. I believe this was not only plain error, but it was

so closely related to the persuasive special instructions

argument that the City has raised that the issue has clearly not

been waived.

B.

The majority next maintains that, even if the error had not

been waived, the result would not change as there was

literally “no evidence” to warrant the “same decision” jury

instruction. See Maj. Op. at 14, 10 (emphasis in original).

With this assertion (and other similar representations), the

majority appears to suggest that the evidence at trial was so

indicative of retaliation that the City basically had no

defense.10 A close and careful review of the full trial record

10 The majority states, for example, that “[t]he uncontested evidence in

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36 AVILA V. LAPD

reveals that there was ample evidence to support the same

decision defense, as the case was much closer than the

majority’s opinion suggests. The following evidence was

presented to the jury:

The LAPD is a very large municipal employer with

approximately 10,000 sworn members. At the time relevant

here, it was LAPD “official” policy that any officers who

worked through their 45-minute lunch break — generally

known as a “Code 7” — should fill out an overtime slip,

report it on their Daily Field Activity Report (“DFAR”), and

be paid accordingly. DFARs were completed at the end of

each shift, and if there were problems with the report as

submitted, a “Kick-back Sergeant” would return it the

following day to be corrected. Although this was the LAPD’s

“official” policy, there were allegations that some supervisors

adhered to an “unwritten policy” of coercing and

discouraging the officers from reporting any overtime for less

than one hour. There were multiple FLSA overtime cases

filed against the City involving this allegation, including

some large class actions that had thousands of class members.

The cases posed “big problems” for the LAPD and exposed

it to “huge liability.”

So, in March 2003, and again in June 2005, the LAPD

issued two policy memos expressly stating that there was no

“unwritten policy” of not being paid overtime and that all

overtime hours must be properly reported or the employee

would be subject to termination. The officers were further

told that if anyone felt pressure or coercion to not report all of

this case is that Avila would not have been fired had he not testified.” See

Maj. Op. at 10 (emphasis added). As will be seen, that is contradicted by

the record, including the trial testimony of Avila himself.

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AVILA V. LAPD 37

their overtime, they had the “affirmative obligation” to report

the source of that pressure or coercion, and they could do so

anonymously and outside the regular chain of command. The

failure to report all overtime and the failure to report

supervisors who encouraged such conduct was

insubordination, which was considered to be “serious

misconduct.”

At some point during this time, the Chief of Police and

“top management” made the determination and decision that

the LAPD would investigate claims of FLSA violations only

where the alleged violators were specificallyidentified. It was

thus incumbent on the individual making the charge(s) to

provide adequate information — like names, dates, and times

— to facilitate an investigation as the LAPD had limited

resources and could not do “fishing expedition”

investigations of hundreds (potentially thousands) of

unnamed officers and still function as a law enforcement

agency. The evidence presented to the jurywas that whenever

alleged violators were specifically identified, they were

investigated by Internal Affairs.

Avila joined the LAPD in 1997, and he was assigned to

patrol in the Central Division. He had the “distinct

recollection” of having received and reviewed both the March

2003 and June 2005 policy memos. On or about February 23,

2007, he joined one of the ongoing lawsuits against the City

and alleged that the LAPD had denied him overtime pay

under the FLSA. Roberto Alaniz v. City of Los Angeles, 2:04-

CV-8592-GAF (doc. 637).11

11 The majority twice refers to Avila as a “model” officer. See Maj. Op.

at 4, 17. Putting aside the evidence that he had five sustained personnel

complaints and was suspended four times (for a total of 18 days) for

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In January 2008, almost a year after he joined in the

Alaniz lawsuit, Avila testified in the Maciel litigation. Yvette

Bass, a detective with Risk Management for the LAPD, was

in the courtroom to observe the trial. While testifying, Avila

admitted under oath that for several years he and myriad

unnamed “other officers” knowingly and repeatedly violated

the FLSA and LAPD “official” policy by not reporting

overtime when they worked through their Code 7s. He

testified that he did this, even though he knew it constituted

“serious misconduct,” because he felt “intimidated” by

supervisors who “discouraged” him from requesting overtime

in that situation. He never reported any of the supervisors,

however, which he knew was separate misconduct. He further

testified that he would sometimes put missed Code 7s on his

DFARs, but the Kick-back Sergeants would give them back

to him the following day and order him to falsify the records.

He did not ever report any of the Kick-back Sergeants who

allegedly told him to do this, and he testified that he falsified

various misconduct, whether he was a good employee is irrelevant as there

has been no claim that he was fired for being a bad employee. Rather, he

was terminated only after — and allegedly because — he admitted under

oath that he committed “serious misconduct.” And, there is evidence from

which a jury could have found that is what happened here. For example,

nine months after he joined in the Alaniz lawsuit, Avila received a

performance review that said he “possesses a good work ethic” and is

“courteous and professional,” “dedicated,” “exemplary” and “consistently

outstanding.” The timing of this very (and exclusively) favorable review

would appear to undermine the suggestion that it was his mere

participation in a FLSA case against the LAPD, as opposed to his

admissions of “serious misconduct” during such case, that led to his

termination.

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AVILA V. LAPD 39

DFARs “over and over again”, even though he knew it was

even still more misconduct.12

With his trial testimony in Maciel, Avila implicated

potentially hundreds of unnamed supervisors and possibly

hundreds of unnamed officers, but he provided almost

nothing to support his claims. He readily admits that he never

provided any specific dates or times, and he admits that he

provided almost no names.13

In fact, even though he claimed

that it had been going on for years, he only identified two

supervisors who allegedly pressured him to not report

overtime: Sergeant Walker and Sergeant Miyazaki. Sergeant

Walker died years before, but Sergeant Miyazaki was still

with the LAPD, and, in fact, had also testified in the Maciel

case. During his testimony in that litigation, Miyazaki stated

that he had “probably” violated the overtime rules.

Detective Bass reported what she observed at the Maciel

trial, after which an internal complaint was brought against

both Avila and Sergeant Miyazaki. The complaint was

brought against Sergeant Miyazaki for two reasons: because

Avila specifically identified and accused him of misconduct,

and (like Avila) “because he might have implicated himself

in his own testimony.” During the investigation, Internal

12 Since Avila had admitted to knowingly and repeatedly violating policy

in three separate ways over many years, there was much more “serious

misconduct” at issue in this case than just an officer “periodically

work[ing] through his lunch break” and “not seeking all the pay that he

might have.” See Maj. Op. at 4, 17.

13 Avila was not able to name a single Kick-back Sergeant, but he was

able to provide an estimate of when they allegedly ordered him to falsify

his DFARs: sometime between 2004–2006. This did not help narrow the

field, however, as the Kick-back Sergeants change almost every day.

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40 AVILA V. LAPD

Affairs asked Avila multiple times to confirm if his Maciel

testimony had been accurate, and he agreed that it was.

Subsequently, the charge against him was sustained, as the

complaint adjudicator determined (based on his sworn

testimony) that he “was clearly aware of the FLSA policies

but violated them anyway.” The complaint against Sergeant

Miyazaki, meanwhile, was deemed to be unfounded.14 The

adjudicator found as follows with respect to Miyazaki:

Avila’s claim was self-serving. And he made

it in court as a plaintiff in a lawsuit [Alaniz]

against the City for uncompensated overtime.

Avila admitted to being trained on FLSArelated policy and his right to compensation.

Avila’s statement was unsupported by any

specific facts, such as, dates, notes, or

notifications to other supervisors for what

would have been a clear violation of policy.

14 There were some notable distinctions between Miyazaki and Avila.

Avila was unequivocal that he had knowingly committed misconduct over

several years. Miyazaki testified that he “probably” violated the overtime

policy in some manner, but it was unclear how he might have done so.

Review of his testimony in Maciel reveals that, to the extent he admitted

to violating the official policies, it was very different than what Avila had

confessed to. As supervisor, Sergeant Miyazaki had the “affirmative duty”

to make reasonable efforts to be sure that his officers were taking (or

being paid for working through) their Code 7s. He testified that, due to the

demands of being watch commander and confusion as to what his

affirmative duty required, he might have violated the policies. But, he

strongly denied that he ever discouraged officers from seeking overtime,

which the adjudicator accepted, as quoted in the text.

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AVILA V. LAPD 41

While not part of the investigation, the

adjudicator was personally aware of overtime

granted to employees for no Code 7 on a

regular basis by supervisors including

Miyazaki.

No Code 7 overtime makes up about 3 percent

of Central Area’s overtime expenditures. This

fact is inconsistent with Avila’s claim that

such overtime was routinely denied.

After the investigation, the Chief ordered Avila to a hearing

before the BOR. In response, Avila filed a complaint in state

court to stop the hearing from moving forward and, in

connection with that proceeding, he filed a sworn declaration

in which he again: (1) admitted that for years he knowingly

failed to report overtime when he worked through his Code

7s, and (2) confirmed that his Maciel testimony was accurate.

Ultimately, he lost his bid to stop the BOR from holding its

hearing.

Avila appeared at the BOR with counsel to contest the

charge. He decided to resign from the LAPD on the first day

of the hearing and did not return after the lunch break.

Pursuant to BOR procedure and written direction from the

Chief, the hearing continued without him for the next three

days, during which his attorney fully participated, examined

witnesses, lodged objections, put on evidence, and presented

his defense. After hearing the evidence, the BOR panel

assigned to the case (which was comprised of two LAPD

Captains and one civilian) found Avila guilty of “serious

misconduct” and recommended termination. He was

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42 AVILA V. LAPD

thereafter “terminated”, even though he had already resigned

and his resignation accepted.15

Avila did not appeal the BOR’s determination.

Importantly, this means, as the district court had earlier held,

that he is “bound by the factual findings of the BOR — that

he violated departmental policy and that such insubordination

was grounds for termination — and [he] cannot challenge

those findings[.]”

With the foregoing in mind, I do not agree that the City

had “no evidence” to support the “same decision” affirmative

defense. This court has said that, for the proof required to

assert this defense, an employer need only have “some

objective evidence” that it would have taken the same action

notwithstanding the protected activity. See Metoyer v.

Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted). Because the inquiry is “an intensely factual one”,

mixed motive defenses “are generally for the jury to decide.”

Id. at 940 (citation omitted).

15 The majority notes that Officers Romney and Anderson testified

adverse to the LAPD in Maciel and they, too, were sent to the BOR and

fired. See Maj. Op. at 5–6 & n.1. As stated before, both officers — like

Avila — admitted to “serious misconduct” under oath. Specifically,

Romney admitted that he knowingly failed to report overtime for almost

two decades (even after the 2003 and 2005 memos), while Officer

Anderson not only admitted to misconduct in her Maciel testimony, but

she actually pled guilty to one of the charges against her at the BOR.

Romney and Anderson identified supervisors who allegedly violated the

overtime policies as well. None of these supervisors admitted to the

misconduct (but, rather, denied wrongdoing), and they were exonerated

following internal investigations.

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AVILA V. LAPD 43

I have included these evidentiary details from the record

because the majority states “[i]t simply cannot be argued on

this record that Avila would have been fired had he not

testified.” See Maj. Op. at 14. In my opinion, the majority

fails to draw the critical distinction between the act of

testifying and admitting to insubordination while testifying.

There is no legal basis for treating the testimony as

privileged. An employee is not entitled to full use immunity

when he testifies during an otherwise protected proceeding.

He can testify without fear of reprisal unless he implicates

himself in some manner. Thus, as in this case, where there is

evidence before the jury that an employee admitted under

penalty of perjury that he was knowingly and repeatedly

insubordinate for many years, that testimony is automatically

“some objective evidence” for the “same decision” defense.

This is because, in such a case, the jury could easily

determine that the employer would have done the same thing

independent of the fact that the employee had testified (for

example, if the misconduct had been discovered in some

other way). The jury would, of course, not be required to

make such a finding — it might find that the adverse action

was retaliatory — but it could, depending on all of the

evidence in the case. Accordingly, the “same decision”

defense instruction is warranted if an employee admits to

misconduct while testifying.

Consider the facts of this case. Avila was a very good

(albeit not a “model”) police officer who received favorable

performance reviews — even after he sued the LAPD for

allegedly violating his FLSA rights. See supra note 11. There

does not appear to have been any reason for adverse action

against him before he took the stand in Maciel and testified

as he did. If the knowing and repeated “serious misconduct”

that he admitted to during his testimony is not sufficient

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44 AVILA V. LAPD

evidence to support the same decision defense in and of itself,

the logic of that position would necessarily mean that he

could have admitted to just about anything — including

“widespread beating of civilians” — and still not have been

fired as his record was mostly unblemished and did not

otherwise warrant discipline. To the extent that the majority

suggests there must be “other evidence of the alleged

infraction” separate from the admissions on the stand, see

Maj. Op. at 14, that is simply not the law, as even Avila’s

counsel conceded in the district court and on this appeal. See

supra note 2.

Moreover, even if Avila’s admissions on the stand could

not be used as the basis for the “same decision” instruction,

there was separate “other evidence” that would qualify. For

example, Avila testified in this case that he saw Detective

Bass in the courtroom before he testified in Maciel, and she

introduced herself and told him that she was there to watch

the trial for Risk Management. Very significantly, Avila has

conceded that if he had told her exactly what he was about to

testify to, she would have been “required” to report him, and

he would have “expect[ed]” to be disciplined. While that pretestimony conversation with Detective Bass never took place,

Avila confirmed the accuracy of his Maciel testimony to

investigators after he testified (and before he was fired). If a

pre-testimony admission could —according to Avila himself

— justify discipline and thus provide a foundation for a

“same decision” defense, then his post-testimony

confirmation of those admissions should as well.

Further, the majority’s statement that “[t]he uncontested

evidence in this case is that Avila would not have been fired

had he not testified”, see Maj. Op. at 10, is difficult to

reconcile with Avila’s own testimony. As just noted, he

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AVILA V. LAPD 45

expressly conceded that if he had said exactly what he

testified to in the Maciel case in any other setting then he

would have “expect[ed]” the LAPD to discipline him. That

concession by itself is sufficient evidence to support the

“same decision” defense instruction. Cf. Gilbrook v. City of

Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating “an

employee cannot use protected conduct as a shield against a

dismissal that would have occurred even in the absence of the

protected conduct”).

In addition, the sworn declaration that Avila filed to try

and stop the BOR hearing further affirmed that he knowingly

violated the LAPD’s official policy by not reporting overtime

and not reporting supervisors who allegedly told him to do so.

This evidence — separate and apart from his testimony in

Maciel — provided other grounds for the “same decision”

instruction.

Finally, Avila did not appeal or challenge the BOR’s

ruling. Consequently, as the district court held earlier in this

case, and as Avila does not dispute on this appeal, he is bound

by the BOR’s factual findings, including “that he violated

departmental policy and that such insubordination was

grounds for termination[.]” This is separate and independent

“other evidence” to support the “same decision” affirmative

defense.

Thus, even if Avila’s admitted misconduct while

testifying was not “some objective evidence” to support the

“same decision” instruction all by itself (and I believe it was),

there was considerable other evidence at trial: his posttestimony confirmation of the insubordination, his sworn

declaration, the legally binding administrative factual

findings, and his testimony before the jury in this case that he

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46 AVILA V. LAPD

would have been disciplined if he had said the exact same

thing while not testifying. Far from there being “no evidence”

to support the City’s affirmative defense, there was, in fact,

ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could have

found that the City would have made the “same decision” in

this case.

C.

As to whether the error here was harmless, both the

majority’s opinion and Avila’s brief rely on Lambert v.

Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), which held

that the district court’s failure to give a same decision

instruction was harmless. Harmless error analysis, of course,

“rests on the particular facts” of each individual case. See

United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986).

What is harmless error in one case “could well, under a

different set of facts,” not be considered harmless in another

case. See id. It is thus important to compare the facts of

Lambert to the facts presented here, and note the three

significant ways in which the cases are very different.

First, as the court recognized, the evidence in Lambert

was overwhelming, as it was a “rare” mixed motive case that

had direct evidence of retaliation (to wit, a statement from a

supervisor that plaintiff would “definitely not have a job” and

would “be fired” if she filed a FLSA claim). 180 F.3d at

1008–09. The panel said that the direct evidence “strongly

support[ed]” its harmless error finding. See id.; accord

Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1188–91 (concluding that an employee

who admits to misconduct while testifying in a protected

proceeding may be terminated and the employer will be

granted summary judgment, unless there is “direct evidence

of retaliatory motive”). There was no direct evidence here,

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AVILA V. LAPD 47

and there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a

verdict for the City.

Second, the Lambert court found it very important — and

spent two pages discussing the fact — that the jury awarded

the employee $12 million in punitive damages. See id. at

1009–10 (citing cases where it was held that “an instructional

error regarding liability [is] harmless in light of a punitive

damages award”). Not only were punitive damages not

awarded in this case, but the jury awarded Availa about 1%

of the compensatory damages that he sought.16

Third, the jurors in Lambert did not ask two sets of

multiple questions while deliberating into the third day (after

hearing only three days of evidence), strongly suggesting that

they were confused by the instructions and having a difficult

time reconciling them with the evidence. Cf. Rose v. Lane,

910 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating in a habeas case

that involved an erroneous instruction which led to follow-up

jury question: “While this question could have a variety of

implications, it indicates possible jury confusion over the

manslaughter instructions and therefore contributes to our

finding that the instructions were not harmless.”).17

16 During closing argument, Avila’s attorney had requested $230,000.00

in economic damages and 4.5 million in non-economic damages. The jury

gave him $50,000.00.

 

17 Although it is always difficult to try and infer what a jury is thinking

with its questions, on the facts of this case, the questions are telling. The

jurors astutely asked five related questions that centered on the exact

problem that was created by the erroneous instruction. The last two

questions asked whether the LAPD could “legal[ly]” use Avila’s

testimonial admission against him, and the jurors were not given the

answer. If the evidence of retaliation in this case was so overwhelming

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48 AVILA V. LAPD

In this case, the absence of the “same decision” defense

instruction and the inclusion of the “no role” instruction had

the practical effect of depriving the City of its entire defense.

This circuit and several others have held, albeit mostly (but

not exclusively) in the criminal context, that an error cannot

be found harmless if it “precludes or impairs the presentation

of [a defendant’s] sole means of defense.” United States v.

Carter, 491 F.2d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United

States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1988); United

States v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1984); accord

United States v. Evans, 728 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2013)

(concluding that trial judge’s erroneous exclusion of the

“central piece of evidence” for defendant’s “main defense”

and which went to the “very heart” of the dispute could not be

harmless, notwithstanding the “overwhelming volume and

that the error could be harmless, it is unlikely that the jury would have

asked that question on the third day of deliberations. See Thomas v.

Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2012) (referencing two

“objective clues” that “strongly suggest that the case was close”, namely,

the fact that the jurors deliberated into the fifth day and sent two requests

that “related specifically” to the issue on appeal, which suggests “the jury

actually struggled with that question”; collecting multiple cases involving

juror requests and “lengthy deliberations” between two to five days that

showed the evidence was close as “‘one would expect that if the evidence

. . . was overwhelming the jury would have succumbed much sooner’”);

see also Aguilar v. Woodford, 725 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2013)

(questions and notes over four days of deliberations showed the case was

close) (citing Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1999)

(deliberations of nine hours over the course ofthree days indicated that the

jury “did not find the case to be clear cut”); Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d

851, 855 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980) (“it does not seem possible that the jury

would have deliberated nine hours over [the course of two] days if the

jurors did not have serious questions”)); United States v. Ottersburg,

76 F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir. 1996) (nine hours of deliberations “makes clear

that this case was not an easy one for those called to serve as finders of

fact”).

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AVILA V. LAPD 49

substance of the government’s evidence”); Ashcraft & Gerel

v. Coady, 244 F.3d 948, 949, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding

that trial error in a civil case which went “to the very heart of

[the defendant’s] defense” and was “central to [his] defense”

could not be deemed harmless “in the absence of any steps by

the district court to mitigate the effects of the error”).

The error was not only not harmless, but, it seems to me,

objectively plain.

III

The FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision serves a noble

purpose. However, it does not extend so far as to immunize

an employee who takes the stand and admits to serious

misconduct. While the public interest may favor a liberal

application of retaliation statutes in some cases, it is highly

questionable whether that interest is being served here. The

inherent unfairness is that the public (i.e., taxpayers of Los

Angeles) will be required to pay about $700,000.00 in a case

where, because of an erroneous instruction that was twice

given (and special instructions that were twice denied), their

city was deprived of the chance to defend itself. That error,

based on the jury questions, appears to have been outcomedeterminative. While reasonable jurors (and judges) may

disagree on the merits of this case, what should be beyond

disagreement is that the City and its citizens were denied the

fundamental right of defense to which they were entitled

under the law. Reversible error occurred, and this case should

be remanded for a new trial.

I respectfully dissent.

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