Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01331/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 871
Nature of Suit: IRS 3rd Party Suits 26 USC 7609 (U.S. plaintiff)
Cause of Action: 26:7609 IRS: Petition to Quash IRS Summons

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAETAN PELLETIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

Commissioner of Internal 

Revenue, Megan Harris, Revenue 

Agent, and Marilyn Winters, Group 

Manager,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-1331-BTM 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

[ECF Nos. 1, 5, 8] 

Pending before the Court is Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss, as 

well as Plaintiff Gaetan Pelletier’s Motion to Quash the IRS summons, stay the 

summons, sanction Defendants, and move the contested audit from the San 

Marcos IRS Office to the downtown San Diego Office. (ECF Nos. 1, 5, 8). 

Plaintiff also requests oral argument. (ECF No. 8). 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED, (ECF Nos. 

1, 8) and the United States’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (ECF No. 5). 

//

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I. BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2018, Plaintiff Pelletier, proceeding pro se, moved to “quash 

all administrative summons issued by the San Marcos, CA IRS office to Wells 

Fargo and to whichever other banking institutions presently unknow[n] to 

Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 1 at 1). In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court to move 

the audit out of the San Marcos IRS Office and to the downtown San Diego IRS 

Office. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that he has been audited numerous times 

without revealing any tax liabilities, and that the request for an audit of taxes from 

2015 is yet another example of the San Marcos IRS office’s efforts to harass 

Plaintiff through bad faith summonses. (ECF No. 1). 

On July 27, 2018, Defendant United States filed a Motion to Dismiss 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff’s response included a motion requesting a 

stay on the summons, sanctions on Defendant, oral argument, and removal of 

the audit from the San Marcos IRS Office to the downtown San Diego IRS Office. 

(ECF No. 8).

II. DISCUSSION

The United States asserts that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the doctrine of 

sovereign immunity and the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421, depriving the 

Court of jurisdiction over the matter. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff opposes, arguing that 

pro se litigants are entitled to leniency and that the Court has jurisdiction over 

“matters that pertain to tax payers being harassed by [the] IRS.” (ECF No. 8 at 

5). Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. The Court will address each in turn.

A. Jurisdiction

The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash. Plaintiff’s suit 

seeks injunctive relief against the United States, and therefore operates against 

the United States rather than the individually named IRS employees. See Gilbert 

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v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating “a suit against IRS 

employees in their official capacity is essentially a suit against the United States” 

and holding “to the extent [the IRS employees] were sued in their official capacity 

. . . the claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity”). Given that 

the United States is the defendant, Plaintiff must contend with sovereign 

immunity.

The United States is immune from suit except when it consents to be 

sued. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990). A waiver of sovereign 

immunity cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed. Gilbert, 756 

F.2d at 1458. The taxpayer bears the burden of showing an unequivocal waiver 

of immunity. Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The timing of Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash bears on whether the United 

States waived sovereign immunity. Upon the IRS giving notice of a summons to 

a third party, the taxpayer has twenty days to move to quash the summons. See

26 U.S.C. § 7609(a), (b)(2)(A). This 20-day filing requirement “is a condition 

precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Ponsford vs. United States, 771 

F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); but see Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 

U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (allowing for equitable tolling in suits against the United 

States). In relevant part, the statute provides that “notice of the summons shall 

be given to [the person identified in the summons] within 3 days of the day on 

which such service is made.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 7609(a)(1). The notice is sufficient 

if, among other methods, it was mailed to the person’s last known address. 26 

U.S.C.A. § 7609(a)(2). The person identified in the summons “shall have the 

right to begin a proceeding to quash such summons not later than the 20th day 

after the day such notice is given.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 7609(b)(2)(A). The 20 days 

runs from the date the notice is mailed to the taxpayer. See, e.g., Shipley v. 

United States, 1994 WL 731541 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1994) (citing Stringer 

v. United States, 776 F.2d 274, 275-276 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding notice is “given 

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on the date it is mailed” and noting courts “unanimously have rejected the 

argument” that “the requisite notice is not ‘given’ until its receipt” by the 

taxpayer)). 

Here, the IRS sent the summons to Wells Fargo on May 24, 2018. (ECF 

No. 5-2, Exh 1.). The IRS also sent Plaintiff a copy of the summons by certified 

mail on May 24, 2018, satisfying the notice requirements in 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7609(a)(2). (ECF No. 5-2, Exh. 2). Plaintiff moved to quash the summons on 

June 19, 2018, exceeding the twenty-day filing limit set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 

7609(b)(2). (See ECF No. 1). Plaintiff does not contest the adequacy of notice or

that the Motion to Quash was untimely, nor does he proffer any persuasive 

arguments for equitable tolling. See Ponsford, 771 F.2d at 1309; Irwin, 498 U.S. 

at 95-96. The Court finds that notice was sufficient and Plaintiff’s motion was 

untimely. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction because the United States has

not unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity. 

B. Anti-Injunction Act

The other relief Plaintiff seeks is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 

U.S.C. § 7421. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that, with limited statutory 

exceptions not applicable here, “no suit for the purpose of restraining the 

assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any 

person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 

assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). The Act’s purpose is to permit the government 

to assess and collect taxes it determines to be owed without judicial 

intervention. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). 

“Courts have interpreted the Anti–Injunction Act broadly, applying it not only to 

the assessment and collection of taxes, but also to activities that may culminate 

in the assessment or collection of taxes.” Sterner v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Agency, 467 

F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1027 (S.D. Cal. 2006). This includes attempts to thwart 

examination that may culminate in tax assessment or collection. Id. (citing 

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Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 2003)). In other 

words, if the “primary purpose of [the] lawsuit is to prevent the Service from 

assessing and collecting income taxes,” then it falls within the Act’s 

ambit. Sterner, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 

U.S. 725, 738 (1974)). 

The alternative relief Plaintiff seeks—staying the summons, sanctioning 

Defendants, and moving the audit from San Marcos to the downtown San Diego 

IRS Office—all appear to be designed to restrain the examination and 

assessment of Plaintiff’s taxes. There is no evidence of harassing behavior in 

connection with the 2015 tax audit. The IRS reasonably determined that the 

audit should take place in San Marcos, which is 5 miles from Plaintiff’s last 

known address, whereas the downtown San Diego office is approximately 40 

miles away. (ECF No. 5-2 ¶ 4). The IRS employees in San Marcos had nothing 

to do with the decision to audit Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff confuses the repeated 

notices from Wells Fargo with communications from the IRS; the IRS has issued 

only one summons for the 2015 tax audit. (See ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s chief 

complaint with the San Marcos IRS Office seems to be that the office thoroughly 

audited him in the past, consuming much of his time. (See ECF No. 8). This 

complaint cannot overcome the Anti-Injunction Act’s mandate.

As for Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants’ counsel made representations 

about moving the audit in settlement discussions, the Court sees no grounds for 

sanctions. Plaintiff states he has previously availed himself of internal IRS 

processes to transfer the audit from San Marcos to downtown San Diego, with 

success. (ECF No. 8 at 3-4). The relief Plaintiff seeks falls within the ambit of the 

Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition against lawsuits that seek to restrain how the IRS 

may assess taxes. Judicial intervention is not only inappropriate but is also 

unnecessary. (ECF No. 8 at 3). The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s requests for

alternative relief are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. 

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The statutory and judicial exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act do not apply

here. The Supreme Court has construed the Anti-Injunction Act as including an 

equitable exception under which the plaintiff taxpayer can file an action upon 

showing that “under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail.” 

Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7. Defendant persuasively argues that the United States 

could prevail upon showing “the 2015 audit was not initiated as retaliation for 

prior conflicts with the IRS San Marcos office, given that the personnel in that 

office were not involved in selecting Plaintiff’s 2015 tax year for audit.” (ECF No. 

9 at 5). Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief under this theory.

Nor is Plaintiff entitled to relief for lack of adequate remedy at law. See

Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Payment of the tax 

followed by a suit for refund constitutes an adequate remedy at law.”). Plaintiff 

could have contested the summons within the 20 day filing window under 26 

U.S.C § 7609, and may still bring a suit for a refund after paying the tax. See id.

Given the foregoing, the Court lacks jurisdiction, both because the motion 

was untimely and because Plaintiff’s complaint for other relief is barred by the 

Anti-Injunction Act. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2019

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