Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01347/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01347-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH COCCHI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-1347 JCS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF

DEFENDANT CIRCUIT CITY

[Docket No. 56]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Joseph Cocchi, filed this wrongful termination action against his former employer,

Circuit City, and his supervisor, James McGrath. Remaining in the case are two claims against

Circuit City for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The first claim is based on

article I, § 1 of the California Constitution, guaranteeing a right to self-defense (“the Self-Defense

Claim”). The second claim is based on California Labor Code § 6310, governing safety complaints

in the work place (“the Section 6310 Claim”). Defendant Circuit City now brings a Motion for

Summary Judgment (“the Motion”) in which it asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment as to

both claims. A hearing on the Motion was held on Friday, March 17, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. For the

reasons stated below, the Court concludes that Circuit City is entitled to summary judgment on the

Section 6310 Claim, but that it is not entitled to summary judgment as to the Self-Defense Claim.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Joseph Cocchi was employed by Circuit City in San Mateo in the car audio installation and

sales department from November 2001 to January 14, 2004. Complaint at ¶¶ 6, 10, Motion at 3-4

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 The parties did not provide the Court with a joint statement of undisputed facts. Instead,

Circuit City has provided a list of facts that it characterizes as “undisputed.” Plaintiff has responded by

disputing many of these “undisputed facts.” The Court relies on the facts that it finds are actually

undisputed, and, where there is conflicting evidence, draws all reasonable inferences in favor of

Plaintiff, as required on summary judgment.

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 In his deposition, Cocchi was asked if he had ever made any safety complaints, and Cocchi

responded that he had not. See Berry Decl., Ex. B at 119. Later, Cocchii clarified that he had

understood the question to refer to formal, written complaints. See Declaration of Joseph Cocchi in

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Cocchi Decl.”) at ¶ 34.

2

(Defendant’s Undisputed Facts”).1

 On January 6, 2004, an altercation between Cocchi and a group

of customers occurred in Cocchi’s department. Motion at 4 (Defendant’s Undisputed Facts). 

According to Cocchi’s account, four customers entered the department at around 7:45 p.m. asking to

purchase a part. Declaration of Darrell Berry in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of

Defendant Circuit City Stores, Inc. (“Berry Decl.”), Ex. B (Cocchi Depo.) at 70-71. When Cocchi

told them he could not sell them the part because it was locked in the installation bay, which was

already closed, the customers became upset. Id. at 71. One of the customers hit Cocchi in the face

and Cocchi put his hand up and “pushed his chest back as self defense.” At least two of the

customers began to “crowd” Cocchi. Id. at 72-73. At that point Cocchi was telling the customers to

“do something or just leave,” using a loud voice to attract the attention of another manager. Id. at

73. At the same time, he had his hand up “as a defense” and was backing into a corner. Id. Another

manager, Nick Lyles, then entered the department, at which point the four customers left. Id.

After the incident, Cocchi wrote a statement describing the incident, at the instruction of

Nick Lyles. Id. at 84 & Depo. Ex. 9. In addition, some of the events were captured on videotape by

a Circuit City security camera. Berry Decl., Ex. E.

Some time later, Cocchi told supervisors Rich Margado and Guillermo Rodriguez that he

“didn’t feel safe on the floor, and it would have been a better situation if there was more employees,

if there was more management on the floor, and it wouldn’t have got as hasty as it did.” Berry

Decl., Ex. B (Cocchi Depo.) at 131. 2

A day or two after the incident, Cocchi was placed on administrative leave pending

investigation of the incident. Id. at 112. One week later, Cocchi received a call from Rodriguez

asking him to come in to meet with supervisor McGrath. Id. at 113-114. Cocchi met with McGrath,

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3

 Rodriguez disputes that he was asked to participate in the investigation. O’Brien Decl., Ex.

5 (Rodriguez Depo.) at 31. However, he states in a declaration filed in support of Plaintiff’s opposition

that he participated in a meeting on January 7, 2004 with McGrath and another manager to review the

store surveillance tape. O’Brien Decl., Ex. 6 (Declaration of Guillermo Rodriguez) at ¶ 7. In the

declaration, Rodriguez states that in the meeting he expressed the opinion, based on the videotape, that

Cocchi appeared to be acting in self-defense. Id. According to Rodriguez, McGrath “did not seem to

want to hear my perception of the video [and] insisted that Mr. Cocchi started the fight and that the four

individuals did not act in a threatening manner.” Id. At oral argument, Plaintiff conceded that there is

no evidence in the record that Rodriguez was a decision-maker in the decision to terminate him and

stipulated that he is not contending that Rodriguez is a decision-maker for the purposes of the Motion.

4

 It is not clear from the record what statement this testimony refers to. The record contains two

statements by Rodriguez. See Exhibits A and B to Declaration of Guillermo Rodriguez (“Rodriguez

Decl.”), attached as Exhibit 6 to O’Brien Decl. Both declarations address statements purportedly made

by Plaintiff after the altercation. Neither statement refers to any safety complaint made by Plaintiff.

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who gave Cocchi an envelope with a paycheck and told him he was terminated. Id.at 114. When

Cocchi asked the reason, McGrath told him he was being terminated for bad customer service. Id. 

Cocchi testified in his deposition that he did not know who made the decision to terminate

him. Id. at 120. McGrath, however, testified that the ultimate decision was made by district

manager Ron Kennedy. Berry Decl., Ex. C (McGrath Depo.) at 63-64. According to McGrath, his

own role in the investigation was to gather facts about the incident. Declaration of Anthony O’Brien

in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“O’Brien Decl.”), Ex. 3 (McGrath

Depo.) at 49. McGrath testified that he also asked Rodriguez to participate in the investigation

because Rodriguez was Cocchi’s supervisor. Id. at 53.3 According to McGrath, he reviewed

Cocchi’s written statement, watched the videotape of the incident several times, and spoke to Nick

Lyles about the incident Id. at 50-51. In addition, he testified that he had reviewed a written

statement by Rodriguez.4

 Id. at 50. On the basis of these materials, he recommended to Kennedy

that Cocchi be terminated. Id. at 64. 

Although there is evidence in the record that Cocchi had received up to three written

reprimands while employed at Circuit City, see Berry Decl., Ex. B (Cocchi Depo.) at 63-65, 

McGrath testified that his recommendation that Cocchi be terminated was based solely on the fact

that “there was a physical altercation between the employee and a customer and a written

statement.” Id. He also testified that there was a “consensus” among McGrath, Human Resources

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5

 It is not clear in the record whether Ostander played a role in the termination. According to

Jen West, the only individuals involved in the decision to terminate Cocchi were herself, James

McGrath and Ron Kennedy. Berry Decl., Ex. D (West Decl.) at 31-32.

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representative Jen West, and an individual named Chris Ostander on this issue.5

 Berry Decl., Ex. C

at 62. Similarly, Jen West testified that the sole reason she and McGrath recommended termination

was that Cocchi was involved in an altercation with a customer that involved touching a customer. 

Id. at 40. West testified that Cocchi’s actions were inconsistent with Circuit City policy because he

should have removed himself from the situation. Id. at 94. 

Ron Kennedy, who made the decision to terminate Cocchi, states in his declaration that

Circuit City has a “consistent policy of terminating Associates who become involved in altercations

with customers or co-workers, regardless of who initiates the dispute.” Declaration of Ron Kennedy

in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Circuit City Stores, Inc. (“Kennedy

Decl.”), ¶ 6, attached as Exhibit A to Berry Decl. Kennedy states that “Associates are expected to

walk away from the dispute or call a manager for assistance with the customer or co-worker.” Id. 

According to Kennedy, he agreed with West and McGrath that Cocchi should be terminated based

on his participation in the altercation. Id., ¶ 7. Kennedy also states that when he approved the

termination, he was unaware of any comments made by Cocchi regarding safety. Id., ¶ 8.

B. The Motion

Circuit City asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on both of Cocchi’s remaining

claims. First, it argues that under California law there is no claim for termination in violation of

public policy based on the right to self defense. In support of this point, Circuit City points to the

requirement that a wrongful discharge claim based on violation of public policy must be based on a

policy that inures to the benefit of the public. Circuit City argues that the right of self-defense does

not meet this requirement because it benefits only the individual that engages in self-defense and not

the public at large. Circuit City further asserts that the right to self-defense is not clearly delineated

in the California Constitution or firmly established.

Second, Circuit City asserts that Cocchi’s Section 6310 Claim fails because there is no

evidence that Cocchi made a safety complaint, and even if he did, there is no evidence any

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 The Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections regarding the Kennedy Declaration and the West

deposition testimony. In both cases, the testimony is based on the first-hand recollections of the

witnesses and is admissible.

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complaint was considered in making the decision to terminate Cocchi. Circuit City cites first to

Cocchi’s testimony in his deposition that he had not made any safety complaints. See Berry Decl.,

Ex. B at 119. It asserts further that Cocchi’s statement to Margado and Rodriguez that he did not

feel safe was too vague to qualify as a safety complaint. Finally, Circuit City argues that there is no

evidence of any causal connection between Cocchi’s statements and his termination. 

In his Opposition, Cocchi asserts that public policy based on the right to self defense is

clearly delineated in the constitution, fundamental and well-established, and inures to the benefit of

the public. In support of this position, Cocchii emphasizes the particular circumstances of this case,

in which retreat, he asserts, was not possible and calling a manager would have required Cocchi to

let his guard down, thus making him vulnerable to another attack by his assailant. With respect to

the Section 6310 Claim, Cocchi argues that his statements were sufficient to qualify as a safety

complaint. He also points to evidence that McGrath had a history of prior disagreements with

Cocchi and that McGrath never talked to Cocchi about the incident in support of his position that

there is a jury question with respect to the Section 6310 Claim. Finally, Cocchi objects to

Kennedy’s declaration on the basis that it contains statements that are not based on personal

knowledge and Kennedy does not identify the evidence on which his opinions are based. Similarly,

Cocchi asks that testimony in West’s deposition regarding Circuit City’s policies and other cases in

which employees have been terminated for altercations with customers be stricken on the basis of

the best evidence rule.6

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the absence of a

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genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim,

or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden persuasion at trial. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this showing, the burden

then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to designate “specific facts showing there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 323. On summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable factual

inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

B. Self-Defense Claim

Cocchi asserts a claim against Circuit City for termination in violation of public policy,

pointing to the right to self-defense contained in the California Constitution. See Cal. Const. art. I,

§ 1. Circuit City takes the position that the right to self-defense does not give rise to a public policy

claim under California law. There are no published California cases that directly address this issue. 

Therefore, the Court must predict, based on existing California precedent, what the California

Supreme Court would hold. See Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir.1986),

modified at 810 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir.1987). The Court concludes that a public policy claim based on

the right to self defense, while narrow in scope, is consistent with California law. Further, the Court

concludes that there is a factual dispute as to Cocchi’s Self-Defense Claim that precludes summary

judgment. 

In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178 (1980), the California Supreme

Court held that an employee may be entitled to a tort remedy for wrongful discharge where the

termination “contravenes public policy.” In that case, the plaintiff, who was an at-will employee,

sued his former employer after he was terminated for his refusal to participate in an illegal scheme to

fix retail gas prices. Id. at 172. Rejecting the defendant’s assertion that the wrongful discharge

claim sounded only in contract, the court explained that “an employer's obligation to refrain from

discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any express or

implied promise[s] set forth in the [employment] contract . . . but rather reflects a duty imposed by

law upon all employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies” of the state. Id. at

176. This duty applies regardless of whether or not the employee is an at-will employee. See Foley

v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 667 (1988).

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7

 Semore was decided before Stevenson and does not address the issue in the framework of

Stevenson’s four part test. However, the considerations articulated in Semore are consistent with the

factors listed in Stevenson.

7

While Tamany involved a situation in which an employee was terminated for refusing to

violate a statute, public policy claims may also arise where an employee is terminated for exercising

a constitutional or statutory right. Green v. Ralee Eng’g, 19 Cal. 4th 66, 76 (1998). A four-part test

is applied to determine whether a particular policy supports a wrongful discharge claim:

The policy must be (1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory

provisions; (2) public in the sense that it inures to the benefit of the

public rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3)

well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and

fundamental.

Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880, 900 (1997) (citations omitted).

The court’s analysis in Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087 (1990), addressing the right to

privacy as the basis for a public policy claim, is instructive.7

 In Semore, the plaintiff was terminated

because he refused to submit to a pupillary reaction eye test administered by his employer to

determine if he was under the influence of drugs. Id. at 1092. The plaintiff sued for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy, citing to article I, § 1 of the California Constitution. Id. 

That provision lists privacy as an “inalienable right.” Cal. Const., art. I, § 1. The court first held that

the constitutional right to privacy applies not just to the government but also private employers:

“[s]ince privacy can be invaded by government agencies, businesses or individuals, the court and

commentators agree that the constitutional provision provides at least some protection against nongovernmental action.” Id. The court went on to address whether the right to privacy serves a public

interest. Id. at 1096. In addressing this issue, the court balanced the employee’s privacy

expectations against the employer’s interests in limiting privacy. Id. The court rejected the position

of the dissent that the right not to participate in the drug test benefitted the employee alone, noting

that privacy is a fundamental interest of our society and the assertion of the right by individuals

benefits all Californians. Id. at 1097. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that it doubted a

contract requiring an employee to forego his right to privacy would be enforceable. Id. The court

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concluded by holding that the plaintiff stated a public policy claim based on the alleged violation of

his right to privacy. Id.

In contrast, in Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice, 120 Cal. App. 4th 72 (2004), the court held that

the plaintiff’s public policy claimed based on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution

failed. There, the plaintiff was fired because she was a member of an organization of which the

employer disapproved. Id. at 78. The plaintiff asserted a wrongful termination claim based on the

First Amendment. Id. The court rejected the claim, however, concluding that because the First

Amendment protects only against government conduct and not that of private employers, the

constitutional provision on which the plaintiff relied did not adequately delineate the public policy at

issue. Id. at 80. The court noted that a contrary result would be unreasonable because it would

require employers “to realize they must comply with requirements from which they are exempt or

suffer the possibility of tort liability.” Id. at 81-82. The court went on to distinguish Semore and the

right of privacy:

The First Amendment free speech rights are distinguishable from the

California constitutional right to privacy because the privacy right is

"an inalienable right which may not be violated by anyone" including

private parties. . . . As the right to privacy extends to acts of private

employers, it provides "a fundamental principle of public policy"

sufficient to state a cause of action for wrongful termination against a

private employer.

Id. at 82 (citations omitted).

Here, as in Semore, Cocchi relies on article I, § 1 of the California Constitution, which

provides as follows: 

§ 1. Inalienable rights

Section 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have

inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and

liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing

and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

Cal. Const. art. I, § 1. The right to “defend[] life” is listed along with privacy as an “inalienable

right” and on that basis, the Court concludes that this right is fundamental and well-established. See

also Cal. Civ. Code § 50 (providing, in part, that “[a]ny necessary force may be used to protect from

wrongful injury the person or property of oneself . . .”); Cal. Penal Code § 693 (permitting

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“resistance sufficient to prevent [an] offense by the party about to be injured . . .[t]o prevent an

offense against his person”).

A more difficult question is whether the right to self-defense is clearly delineated. It is clear

from the plain language of the California Constitution that the right to self defense, unlike the First

Amendment right to free speech, applies to private employers as much as it does to public entities

and thus, Grinzi is not on point. Circuit City, however, argues that nonetheless, the parameters of

the right to self-defense are not sufficiently delineated to put an employer on notice that it could be

subject to liability for a policy that imposes a blanket prohibition on employees regarding physical

contact with customers. Circuit City points to the absence of any California case in which a public

policy claim based on self-defense has been permitted in support of its position.

The Court does not take Circuit City’s argument lightly. The Court recognizes that the

public policy exception is exceedingly narrow. As Circuit City correctly argues, the public policy at

issue must be sufficiently described in the law or constitutional provision at issue “to enable an

employer to know the fundamental public policies that are expressed in that law.” Sequoia Ins. Co.

v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1472, 1480 (1993). The test, however, is not whether there is a

California case that has recognized the right. Rather, this Court must predict how the California

Supreme Court would rule. The Court concludes that under article I, § 1 of the California

Constitution, an employee, at a minimum, has a fundamental right to defend himself from physical

injury where it is not possible to avoid the altercation, either by retreating or summoning help. Any

other reading of the California Constitution would amount to holding that employers may deprive

their employees of their right to self-defense altogether. Such a holding cannot be squared with the

fact that the right to self-defense is enshrined in the California Constitution as a fundamental right. 

Therefore, the Court concludes the right to self-defense is sufficiently delineated, under the very

specific facts of this case, to put Circuit City on notice of the public policy at issue.

The next question the Court must address is whether the right to self-defense inures to the

public benefit. It is in this context that California courts have addressed the balance between the

needs of the individual, the needs of the employer and the interests of the public. In conducting this

balancing, courts ask, among other things, whether a private agreement between an employer and

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employee whereby the employee waived the right at issue would be unenforceable as violating

public policy. See Semore, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1097; Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 667 n. 7. Applying this

approach, the Court concludes that the right to self-defense, at least under the circumstances here,

where there is evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that it was not possible for

Cocchi to retreat or call a manager, inures to the public benefit.

In support of this conclusion, the Court looks to California Civil Code § 3513, which

provides as follows:

Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his

benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be

contravened by a private agreement.

Thus, in order for the Court to hold that Cocchi’s Self-Defense Claim fails as a matter of law, it

would have to conclude that his right to self-defense is for purely private benefit and therefore, is

waivable. In Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

14 Cal. 4th 814 (1997), however, it is evident that the California Supreme Court did not view the

right to self-defense as purely private. See 14 Cal. 4th at 829. 

In that case, a robber held up a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant (“KFC”) by pointing a

gun at one of the patrons and demanding cash. Id. at 819. The cashier did not immediately

cooperate, causing the robber to become agitated. Id. The patron later sued KFC, asserting that

cashiers have a duty to comply with the robber’s demands to protect patrons. Id. The court

disagreed, finding that there was no such duty. Id. at 829. In reaching this conclusion, the court

cited with approval to case law from numerous other jurisdictions in which courts have held that the

right to self-defense is in the public interest. See, e.g., id. at 824-825 (quoting Indiana appellate

decision: “There is and must continue to be, a great public interest in the prevention of crime and in

the speedy apprehension of criminals. To that end the victim of a crime, as vicious as armed

robbery, during the course of such criminal act, is excused, justified and to be held privileged from

ordinary resistance which might otherwise cause actionable damage”). The court concluded by

stating that “[i]t is enough to observe that recognizing a duty to comply with an unlawful demand to

surrender property would be inconsistent with the public policy reflected in article I, section 1 of the

California Constitution and Civil Code § 50.” Id. at 829.

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While Kentucky Fried Chicken involved a somewhat different set of circumstances, the

California Supreme Court made clear in that case that it views the right to self-defense as inuring to

the public benefit – even where the employee’s actions arguably endangered a third party. In this

case, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s actions put any third party in jeopardy. Thus,

taking the approach of the California Supreme Court in Kentucky Fried Chicken, the public policy

supporting the right to self-defense arguably is stronger under the facts here than in that case. For

that reason, the Court concludes that an employer may not require an employee to completely waive

his right to self defense. In particular, an employer may be liable for termination in violation of

public policy where the termination is based on the employee’s exercise of his right to defend

himself where it was not possible for the employee to avoid physical injury to his person by

retreating or summoning help. Because there are material issues of fact regarding whether Plaintiff

can establish such a claim, summary judgment is denied as to the Self-Defense Claim.

C. Section 6310 Claim

Circuit City asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Cocchi’s Section 6310 Claim

because Cocchi did not make any safety complaints and, even if he did, there is no evidence that his

termination was based on those complaints. The Court concludes that there is no evidence from

which a jury could reasonably conclude that Cocchi’s termination was a result of his statements

concerning safety and therefore, the Circuit City is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See

Turner v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1258 (1994) (holding that summary judgment was

proper where evidence was not sufficient to support reasonable inference of causal nexus between

employee’s past complaints about employer’s illegal activities and employee’s subsequent

termination).

The only evidence in the record regarding safety complaints is Cocchi’s testimony that he

told Rodriguez and Margado that he would have felt safer if there were more associates on the floor. 

There is no evidence, however, that these statements were ever passed on to Kennedy, West, or

McGrath. Indeed, the only evidence in the record that connects Cocchi’s statements about safety to

his termination is the evidence that McGrath asked Rodriguez to participate in the investigation and

that Rodriguez met with McGrath to view the videotape. There is no testimony by Rodriguez or

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anyone else, though, that Rodriguez ever mentioned the statements to anyone. Nor is there any

evidence that Rodriguez had any decision-making authority regarding Cocchi’s termination, as

Plaintiff conceded at oral argument. Therefore, the Court concludes that Cocchi has failed to meet

his burden on summary judgment as to this claim.

The Court rejects Cocchi’s reliance on Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 4th 95

(2004). In that case, the court rejected a defendant employer’s assertion that it was entitled to 

summary judgment on the basis that the individual who made the ultimate decision to terminate the

plaintiff did not know about the plaintiff’s safety complaints. Id. at 107. Rather, it held that

“ignorance of a worker's protected activities or status does not afford a categorical defense unless it

extends to all corporate actors who contributed materially to an adverse employment decision.” Id.

at 109. It went on to hold that there was evidence that the supervisor to whom the safety complaints

were made had played a material role in the decision to terminate the employee and therefore,

summary judgment was not proper. Id. at 110.

Here, Cocchi does not even attempt to argue that Rodriguez or Margado played a “material”

role in the decision to terminate him, nor is there evidence from which a jury could reasonably

conclude these individuals played such a role. Instead, Cocchi points to the fact that he had a history

of disagreements with McGrath, citing to the written reprimands he had received while at Circuit

City. He also points to evidence of what he asserts was an inadequate investigation of the facts

surrounding the altercation that led to his termination. This evidence, however, does not establish a

causal nexus between Cocchi’s safety complaints and his termination. Therefore, Circuit City is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Self-Defense

Claim. Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Section 6301 Claim. The case is referred

Case 3:05-cv-01347-JCS Document 72 Filed 04/03/06 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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to Magistrate Judge Edward Chen for a settlement conference within the next 45 days, or as is

convenient for Judge Chen. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2006

______________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01347-JCS Document 72 Filed 04/03/06 Page 13 of 13