Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00810/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\07-0810-G&D.wpd. -1- 07cv0810

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. BECKNER,

Booking #7702015,

Civil No. 07-0810 WQH (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350 BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S

TRUST ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 2]; AND

(2) DISMISSING ACTION FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1)

 vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF; SAN

DIEGO COUNTY,

Defendants.

 

Plaintiff, currently detained at the San Diego Central Jail, and proceeding pro se, has filed

a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he

has been denied access to the courts and jail officials have improperly opened legal mail outside

of his presence.

 Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead,

he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 2].

////

Case 3:07-cv-00810-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 06/12/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\07-0810-G&D.wpd. -2- 07cv0810

I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however,

remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is

ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement indicates that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay the partial initial filing fee. Based upon this

financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and assesses no

initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The remaining $350 balance shall

be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) as set forth at the end of this Order.

////

Case 3:07-cv-00810-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 06/12/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\07-0810-G&D.wpd. -3- 07cv0810

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

Case 3:07-cv-00810-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 06/12/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\07-0810-G&D.wpd. -4- 07cv0810

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that jail officials denied him adequate access to the

courts. (Compl. at 3.) Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations fall short of the

pleading standards necessary to state an access to courts claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their

grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening,

82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995).

In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right

of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing

of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate

assistance from persons who are trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).

To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts

sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions

of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a

result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual

prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing

deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir.

1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093

(9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, however, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to show that he has been

precluded from pursuing a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal

conviction or sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355

(right to access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his]

sentence[], directly or collaterally, and . . . to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”);

see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the

“underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in

the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the

litigation.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been

actually injured by any specific Defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 

Case 3:07-cv-00810-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 06/12/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\07-0810-G&D.wpd. -5- 07cv0810

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that

he was “so stymied” by Defendants’ actions or grievance processing that “he was unable to even

file a complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351;

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] . . . the predicate

claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the

‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, these claims must be

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). Because it is not altogether certain that Plaintiff would be unable

to allege any additional facts related to the conditions under which he was injured, however, the

Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his pleading in light of the standards

set forth above. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

III. Conclusion

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

2. The Watch Commander at the San Diego Central Jail, or his designee, is ordered

to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350.00 balance of the filing fee owed in this

case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount equal to twenty percent

(20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and forward payments to the

Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE

NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on Watch

Commander, San Diego Central Jail, P.O. Box 122952, San Diego, California 92112.

////

//// 

Case 3:07-cv-00810-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 06/12/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\07-0810-G&D.wpd. -6- 07cv0810

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty

five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D.

Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted

as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

1996). 

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a Court approved form § 1983 complaint

to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 12, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00810-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 06/12/07 Page 6 of 6