Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01888/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01888-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SEAN L. ROWELL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

L.D. ZAMORA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-1888-KJM-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS ACTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE 

GRANTED 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. After a dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, he has filed an amended 

complaint.1

 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 

of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

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 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 18, 2015, but it was not signed, and 

the court informed him that the filing would be disregarded. ECF Nos. 11, 12. On May 9, 2016, 

plaintiff re-filed the complaint with his signature, but appears to have inadvertently omitted pages 

four and five. See ECF No. 13 at 3 (referencing, but not attaching, additional allegations 

“CONTINUED on Page four”). For purposes of this order, the court has referred to pages four 

and five of the December 18, 2015 complaint, because it appears as though plaintiff intended to 

refile that complaint in its entirety, on May 9, 2016. 

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relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

 In the original complaint, plaintiff alleged that he had been denied a particular treatment 

for his hepatitis C liver disease that a specialist had recommended. ECF No. 1. In dismissing that 

complaint with leave to amend, the court informed plaintiff of the following: 

To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a 

federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed 

by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 

(1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual 

defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the 

defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal 

connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 

1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff 

may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable for the 

unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 1948 (2009). Because respondeat superior liability is inapplicable to § 1983 

suits, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. It is 

plaintiff’s responsibility to allege facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 

129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiff’s allegations fail under these standards because they do not show how 

each of the named defendants, through their own individual actions, have violated 

the Constitution. 

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on the denial of 

medical care, plaintiff must establish that he had a serious medical need and that 

the defendant’s response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat the condition could 

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, delay 

or intentional interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical 

care is provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 

reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. A physician need not fail to treat an 

 

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inmate altogether in order to violate that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz 

v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently 

treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may 

constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. 

It is important to differentiate common law negligence claims of 

malpractice from claims predicated on violations of the Eight Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In asserting the latter, “[m]ere 

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of 

action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976); see also Toguchi v. 

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, plaintiff’s allegations, if taken as true, demonstrate a serious medical 

need but do not show that any particular defendant acted with the requisite state of 

mind for an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an 

amended complaint to attempt to allege a cognizable legal theory against a proper 

defendant and sufficient facts in support of that cognizable legal theory. Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district courts must 

afford pro se litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency in their 

complaints). Should plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, the amended 

complaint shall clearly set forth the claims and allegations against each defendant. 

 

ECF No. 6 at 3-5. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 13) repeats the allegation that he was denied a 

particular treatment for his hepatitis C liver disease that a specialist had recommended. He 

alleges that some of the defendants, on various dates, and in response to his administrative 

appeals, denied his request for that treatment on the grounds that he was “not eligible” or did “not 

qualify” for the treatment. In a February 4, 2011 denial attached to the complaint, defendant 

Swingle explained that plaintiff was ineligible because his “four months of hepatitis C treatment 

in 2006 and 2001 . . . demonstrated [that he was] in the class of patients known a ‘nonresponders.’” ECF No. 13, Ex. A at 9. Beginning in 2013, however, the responses to plaintiff’s 

appeals indicate that plaintiff had begun to receive treatment for his hepatitis C. See e.g., id., Ex. 

C at 1. Plaintiff bases his Eighth Amendment claim on this “delay in providing treatment for his 

hepatitis-C.” ECF No. 11 at 5. 

Once again, plaintiff’s allegations, if taken as true, demonstrate a serious medical need but 

do not show that any defendant acted with the requisite state of mind for an Eighth Amendment 

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violation. “A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner-or between medical 

professionals-concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather, the inmate “must 

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances” and that the course of treatment was chosen “in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citations omitted). Here, plaintiff alleges that he was denied a particular treatment because he 

did not qualify for it. His allegations do not demonstrate that the denials stemmed from a 

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to his health. In addition, plaintiff’s allegations fail to 

show how each defendant, through his or her own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution. Merely alleging that a defendant responded to or denied an administrative appeal 

does not demonstrate that the defendant personally participated in any underlying constitutional 

violation. For these reasons, the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief could 

be granted. 

Despite notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend, plaintiff is 

unable to state a cognizable claim for relief. Therefore, this action should be dismissed without 

further leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Lopez 

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are 

only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not 

required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.”); see also Doe v. United 

States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if 

no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not be 

cured by the allegation of other facts.”). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the amended complaint (ECF No. 

13) be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that the Clerk 

be directed to close the case. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: June 15, 2016. 

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