Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00190/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ira Jerome Moore, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

J. T. Shartle, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-13-00190-TUC-DCB (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Ira Jerome Moore’s pro se

Petitione [sic] for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondent has filed his 

Return and Answer (“Response”) (Doc. 15). Petitioner did not file a reply. 

As an initial matter, Respondent noted that although Petitioner named Charles E. 

Samuels, Jr., the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) as the Respondent, this was 

incorrect. Response (Doc. 15) at 1 n. 1. The proper respondent in an action for habeas 

corpus is the Petitioner’s custodian, who at the time of the Response was Louis W. Winn, 

Jr. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435–36, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 

2717, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004). The Court takes judicial notice that Louis W. Winn, Jr. is 

no longer warden of United States Penitentiary–Tucson (“USP–Tucson”). The Court will 

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substitute the new Warden of USP–Tucson, J. T. Shartle, as Respondent pursuant to Rule 

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,1

 this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1). 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution – 

Williamsburg in Salters, South Carolina. See BOP Inmate Locator, available at

http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited May 18, 2015). The Court notes that 

Petitioner originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia, and United States District Court Judge Beryl A. Howell ordered the case 

transferred here, because Petitioner was incarcerated at USP–Tucson. See Order 

2/22/2013 (Doc. 2). In light of Petitioner’s incarceration at USP–Tucson in Tucson, 

Arizona at the time of the Petition’s filing, this Court retains jurisdiction to consider the 

Petition. See Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990) (“jurisdiction attaches on the 

initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner 

and the accompanying custodial change.”) (citation omitted). At the time of filing, 

Petitioner was serving a 210-month sentence with three (3) years of supervised release 

for Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371; Attempted Bank Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113; and Interstate 

1

 Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. 

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Transport of a Stolen Vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. Response (Doc. 15), 

Smithers Decl. (Exh. “A”), Public Info. Inmate Data (Attach. “1”) at 2. Petitioner’s 

projected release date is April 23, 2019. See BOP Inmate Locator, available at

http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited May 18, 2015). Petitioner filed a Petitione 

[sic] for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 22, 2013. See Petition (Doc. 1). 

 Petitioner challenges a disciplinary conviction that resulted in his loss of good 

time credits. Petitioner alleges three grounds by which his Due Process rights were 

violated, including that (1) the Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) did not provide 

him with a copy of its disposition to refer his case to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer 

(“DHO”); (2) the evidence relied on to find that he committed the prohibited act of 

possessing a weapon was insufficient, because the scotch tape box in which the weapon 

was allegedly found was not listed on his property form; and (3) BOP’s policy that 

inmates cannot possess Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) Financing Statements is 

“absolutely absurd.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 4B, 4C, 4D, 4E. Petitioner requests that the 

Court issue its Order directing BOP to dismiss Incident Report Number 2187535. Id. at 

4F. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 On July 19, 2011 at approximately 11:00 a.m., Special Investigative Service 

(“SIS”) Technician L. Hicks “searched the property belonging to Inmate Moore, Ira, 

#07866-029[,] . . . [who] is currently housed in the Special Housing Unit [(“SHU”)].” 

Response (Doc. 15), Cerney Decl. (Exh. “B”), Incident Report No. 2187535 (Attach. “1”) 

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at 1; see also Petition (Doc. 1), Attach. “10.” Technician Hicks searched Petitioner’s 

“property bins which were packed and inventoried when [he] was placed in the SHU . . . 

[and] discovered a stack of blank UCC Financing Statements (UCC1) . . . [and] opened a 

scotch tape box and discovered a razor blade hidden inside that had been removed from 

the handle.” Id. In light of Petitioner’s “having unauthorized UCC documents and 

possessing a sharpened weapon,” Technician Hicks charged him with two prohibited 

acts: (1) Code 104, Possession of a Weapon, and (2) Code 305, Possession of Anything 

Not Authorized.2

 Id. Later that same day, Lieutenant S. Valencia delivered the incident 

report to Petitioner. Response (Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” Attach. “1” at 1. Lieutenant Valencia 

also investigated the incident and advised Petitioner of his rights. Id., Exh. “B,” Attach. 

“1” at 2. During Lieutenant Valencia’s investigation, Petitioner chose not to make a 

statement and did not request any witnesses. Id. Lieutenant Valencia forwarded the 

Incident Report to the UDC for further disposition. Id.

 The following day, June 20, 2011, the UDC conducted its hearing. Response 

(Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” Attach. “1” at 3. At the hearing, Petitioner was advised of his 

rights, and stated that he understood those rights. Id. Petitioner then denied that he had 

possessed a weapon (Code 104) and admitted that he had the UCC financing statements, 

but denied that he had possessed anything unauthorized (Code 305). Id. Based on the 

 

2

 On January 20, 2011, Federal Correctional Complex (“FCC”) Allenwood Warden 

Martinez provided a memorandum to all inmates stating that they were “prohibited from 

obtaining, possessing, or creating UCC financing statements or similar forms.” Response (Doc. 

15), Exh. “B,” Martinez Memo 1/20/2011 (Attach. “2”) at 1. The memorandum further stated 

that inmates “found to be in possession of these types of documents or information without 

authorization . . . will be subject to inmate discipline, and [their] case may be referred for 

possible federal criminal prosecution.” Id. at 2. 

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severity of the alleged misconduct, the UDC referred the matter to the DHO for final 

disposition and recommended sanctions including ninety (90) days disciplinary 

segregation, loss of commissary and phone privileges and loss of Good Conduct Time 

(“GCT”). Id. The UDC also provided Petitioner with a Notice of Discipline Hearing 

Before the DHO and his rights at that hearing. Response (Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” Inmate 

Rights at Discipline Hr’g (Attach. “3”) at 1–2. Petitioner indicated that he wished to 

have a staff representative, as well as witnesses at his DHO hearing. Id., Exh. “B,” 

Attach. “3” at 2. 

 On August 24, 2011, Petitioner had a DHO hearing before DHO Todd W. Cerney. 

See Response (Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” DHO Report (Attach. “4”). DHO Cerney advised 

Petitioner of his rights before the DHO, and he indicated that he understood them. Id., 

Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 1. Petitioner’s staff representative J. Bastian appeared at the 

hearing, and stated that “in his capacity as a Counselor, he knows that there are a lot of 

razor blades in general population.” Id. Staff Representative Bastian also noted that 

there were no discrepancies in the discipline process, and that he had met with Petitioner 

in advance of the hearing to discuss the case. Id.

 At the DHO hearing, Petitioner denied the charges against him. Response (Doc. 

15), Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 1. In his defense, Petitioner stated that he had never 

received the UDC report after the UDC hearing. Id. Petitioner also denied having a razor 

blade as charged in the Incident Report; however, he noted that “[t]here are razor blades 

everywhere” and alleged that Officer “Varner never confiscated any tape box from my 

property[,] [t]here’s no tape box listed on my property form.” Id. Petitioner admitted 

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that he had razor blades in the past and used them to cut papers, and opined that it 

“seem[ed] like selective prosecution.” Id. Petitioner admitted to having seen the 

memorandum from Warden Martinez regarding not possessing UCC Financing 

Statements, but opined that this prohibition was “contrary to statutory law” and that 

“[i]nmates have a right to having them.” Id.

 Petitioner did not submit any documentary evidence for consideration at the DHO 

hearing, but did have three (3) witnesses testify. Response (Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” Attach. 

“4” at 2. The first witness was a fellow inmate, who “stated that UCC forms are on the 

computer system for inmate use.” Id. The inmate “further stated that UCC Forms are 

essential documents and can be used for a number of purposes, all legitimate.” Id. With 

regard to single edged razor blades, the inmate stated that “everybody has them.” Id. 

Petitioner’s second and third witnesses, Correctional Officers Tripp and Barlow, both 

stated “in their experience working as Correctional Officers, they have seen single edged 

razor blades as removed from shaving razors many times in general population.” Id.

 In addition to the testimony of the three (3) witnesses, DHO Cerney considered the 

Incident Report and Investigation; a hand written, July 26, 2011 letter from Petitioner to 

Captain Gabrielson; Petitioner’s Personal Property Record forms dated July 27, 2011; 

General Instructions and Procedures for Handling Inmate Personal Property Forms dated 

June 29, 2011; a photocopy of a blank UCC Financing Statement form; and an evidence 

photograph of the razor. Response (Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 2–3. DHO 

Cerney considered the witness statements and documentary evidence, weighed 

credibility, and found Petitioner guilty of the prohibited acts of Possession of a Weapon 

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(Code 104) and Possession of Anything not Authorized (Code 305). Id. DHO Cerney 

imposed sanctions totaling forty-five (45) days Disciplinary Segregation, forty (40) days 

Disallowance of Good Conduct Time, three (3) months loss of commissary privileges, 

and three (3) months loss of telephone privileges. Id., Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 3–4. On 

September 2, 2011, DHO Cerney signed the DHO report and four days later it was 

delivered to Petitioner. Id., Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 4. 

 On September 15, 2011, Petitioner filed his Regional Administrative Remedy 

Appeal regarding Incident Report Number 2187535. Petition (Doc. 1) at 4D ¶ 12. On 

October 26, 2011, Petitioner received a denial of his Regional Appeal. Id. at 4D ¶ 12 & 

Regional Appeal Response (Attach. “15”). On September 18, 2011, Petitioner made a 

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request for “all information in regard to the 

alleged Code 104 and 305 IR.” Id. at 4D ¶ 13, FOIA Request No. 2012-00356 2/3/2012 

(Attach. “12”), FOIA Request for Comprehensive Financial Accounting for Incident 

Report Charges (Attach. “16”) & United States Postal Service Track & Confirm (Attach. 

“17”). On November 15, 2011, Petitioner filed a Central Office Administrative Remedy 

Appeal to the Director, which was denied on June 22, 2012. Petition (Doc. 1) at 4D ¶ 14 

& Central Office Denial (Attach. “18”). Petitioner instituted the current proceeding on 

February 22, 2013. See Petition (Doc. 1). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Jurisdiction 

 “Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own 

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jurisdiction,’ . . . and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 

(1990), overruled in part on other grounds by City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, 

L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)). “Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence 

must be filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 

2241 in the custodial court.” Id. at 864. Therefore, a proper characterization of the 

petition is necessary to a determination of jurisdiction. Id.

 Here, Petitioner does not claim that the sentencing court imposed an illegal 

sentence, rather he seeks relief with respect to disciplinary proceedings while 

incarcerated at a federal facility. As such, Petitioner is challenging the manner, location 

or condition of the execution of his sentence. See e.g., Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 

349 (1st Cir. 1999) (section 2241 petition is appropriate vehicle to challenge the 

correctness of a jail-time credit determination, once administrative remedies have been 

exhausted); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003) (“a prisoner may seek a 

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for ‘expungement of a disciplinary finding 

from his record if expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for 

parole’”) (quoting Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989)); Tucker v. 

Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991) (a prisoner’s challenge to the “manner in 

which his sentence was executed . . . [is] maintainable only in a petition for habeas 

corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); Weinstein v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 902 F.2d 

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1451, 1452 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2241 to review a claim by a federal prisoner challenging a decision of the United States 

Parole Commission”); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d at 1269 (“Habeas corpus jurisdiction is 

also available for a prisoner’s claims that he has been subjected to greater restrictions of 

his liberty, such as disciplinary segregation without due process of law”). Such a 

challenge must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court. At the time of filing 

the Petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at USP – Tucson in Arizona. Accordingly, this 

Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Exhaustion 

1. In General 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 

[28 U.S.C. § 2241] does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust 

direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus. [Footnote omitted.] 

However, we require, as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 

available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 

2241. 

Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds 

by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006). 

“The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before filing a 

habeas corpus petition was judicially created; it is not a statutory requirement.” Brown v. 

Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 

515 U.S. 50, 54–55, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 2023–24, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995). “Nevertheless, 

‘[p]rudential limits like jurisdictional limits and limits on venue, are ordinarily not 

optional.’” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) 

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(quoting Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 

grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 

323 (2006)). 

 “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if ‘(1) agency expertise makes agency 

consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) 

relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative 

scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own 

mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.’” Id. (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. 

Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust 

administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition 

without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, 

unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 

2011) (citations omitted). Exhaustion may be excused if pursuing an administrative 

remedy would be futile. Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th 

Cir. 1993). 

 If a prisoner is unable to obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to 

appeal in a timely manner, then the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his habeas 

corpus claim. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Francis, 

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 

571 (9th Cir. 1986)). If a claim is procedurally defaulted, the court may require the 

petitioner to demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the 

alleged constitutional violation. See Francis, 894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause 

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and prejudice test is the appropriate test); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492, 106 

S.Ct. 2639, 2647–48, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to 

procedural defaults on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 

906–08 (9th Cir. 1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to pro se litigants). 

2. BOP Administrative Procedures 

 The BOP has established an administrative remedy process permitting an inmate 

to seek review of an issue relating to “any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. 

§ 542.10(a). Under that process, an inmate seeking to appeal a DHO decision shall 

submit the appeal “initially to the Regional Director for the region where the inmate is 

currently located.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(2). “An inmate who is not satisfied with the 

Regional Director’s response may submit an Appeal on the appropriate form (BP-11) to 

the General Counsel within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the 

response.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). The deadlines contained within this process may be 

extended upon request by the inmate and a showing of a valid reason for delay. 28 

C.F.R. § 542.15(a); 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b). An appeal is considered filed on the date it is 

logged in the Administrative Remedy Index as received. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. Once an 

appeal is filed, a Regional Director shall respond within 30 days; General Counsel shall 

respond with 40 days. Id. “If the inmate does not receive a response within the time 

allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate may consider the absence of a response 

to be a denial at that level.” Id.

 Here, the Petition reflects that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative 

remedies, and Respondent does not contest that allegation. See Petition (Doc. 1). 

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Review of the record supports a finding that Petitioner has properly filed appeals 

regarding the Incident Report at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 

Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies. 

C. Due Process 

 Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated because (1) the Unit 

Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) did not provide him with a copy of its disposition to 

refer his case to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”); (2) the evidence relied on to 

find that he committed the prohibited act of possessing a weapon was insufficient, 

because the scotch tape box in which the weapon was allegedly found was not listed on 

his property form; and (3) BOP’s policy that inmates cannot possess Uniform 

Commercial Code (“UCC”) Financing Statements is “absolutely absurd.” Petition (Doc. 

1) at 4B, 4C, 4D, 4E. 

 “Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives 

written notice of the charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison 

officials and the reasons for disciplinary action.” Zimmerlee v. Keeny, 831 F.2d 183, 186 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978–

79, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Additionally, “[t]he inmate has a limited right to call 

witnesses and to present documentary evidence when permitting him to do so would not 

unduly threaten institutional safety and goals.” Id. (citations omitted). “Prison 

disciplinary proceedings[, however,] are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings do[] not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 

556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975. 

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 Once the minimal procedural requirements of Wolff are met, the district court must 

ask “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion 

reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent, Mass. Corrections Inst. v. Hill, 472 

U.S. 445, 455–56, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). “[T]he requirements of 

due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 

board to revoke good time credits.” Id. “Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied 

does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. Indeed, “[t]he standard is 

‘minimally stringent’ only requiring ‘any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.’” Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 454–56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774) (emphasis added in Cato). 

1. Alleged Failure of the UDC to Provide Report 

 Petitioner asserts that he did not receive a copy of the written UDC report referring 

the matter to the DHO, and as such his disciplinary hearing was procedurally flawed. See

Petition (Doc. 1) at 4C ¶ 10. The applicable guidelines are published at 28 C.F.R. § 

541.1, et seq. (2011). Regarding the disciplinary process, the regulations provide that: 

The discipline process starts when staff witness or reasonably believe that 

[an inmate] committed a prohibited act. A staff member will issue [the 

inmate] and incident report describing the incident and the prohibited act(s) 

[he is] charged with committing. [The inmate] will ordinarily receive the 

incident report within 24 hours of staff becoming aware of [his] 

involvement in the incident. 

28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a). Once the Incident Report is delivered to an inmate, a BOP staff 

member will investigate it. 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b). The investigator will inform the 

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inmate of the charges and his or her right to remain silent, as well as ask for a statement. 

Id. 

 Once the investigation is complete the UDC will review the incident report. 28 

C.F.R. § 541.7. The inmate may appear before the UDC during its review, make a 

statement, and present documentary evidence. 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(d) & (e). “The UDC’s 

decision will be based on at least some facts and, if there is conflicting evidence, on the 

greater weight of the evidence.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(e). The UDC may find that the 

inmate committed the prohibited act charged, did not commit the prohibited act charged, 

or refer the matter to the DHO for further review. 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(a). If an inmate is 

charged with a Greatest or High severity prohibited act, the UDC will automatically refer 

the incident report to the DHO for further review. 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(a)(4). 

 If the UDC refers an incident report to the DHO, the DHO will conduct a hearing. 

28 C.F.R. § 541.8. “The DHO will be an impartial decision maker who was not a victim, 

witness, investigator, or otherwise significantly involved in the incident.” 28 C.F.R. § 

541.8(b). An inmate will receive written notice of the charge(s) against him at least 24 

hours before the DHO hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(c). An inmate is entitled to have a 

staff representative during the DHO hearing, to appear either in person or electronically, 

and to make a statement and present documentary evidence and witnesses. 28 C.F.R. § 

541.8(d), (e) & (f). Upon completion of the hearing, the DHO will find one of the 

following: (1) the inmate committed the prohibited act(s) charged in the incident report; 

(2) the inmate did not commit the prohibited act(s) charged; or (3) refer the incident 

report back for further investigation, review, and disposition. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(a). If 

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the DHO finds that an inmate committed a prohibited act(s) the DHO may impose 

sanctions, and will provide the inmate a written copy of the DHO’s decision. 28 C.F.R. § 

541.8(g) & (h). 

 Here, Petitioner argues procedural error in the UDC’s alleged failure to provide 

him with a report of its disposition. The evidence shows that Lieutenant Valencia 

delivered a copy of the Incident Report to Petitioner on July 19, 2011 and advised him of 

his rights. Response (Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” Attach. “1” at 1. On July 20, 2011, Petitioner 

appeared at the UDC hearing, was advised of his rights, and stated that he understood 

those rights. Id., Exh. “B,” Attach. “1” at 3. At that hearing, Petitioner was provided a 

Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the DHO and his rights at that hearing. Id., Exh. 

“B,” Attach. “3” at 1–2. Petitioner indicated his desire to have a staff representative, as 

well as witnesses, at his DHO hearing. Id., Exh. “B,” Attach. “3” at 2. Petitioner’s staff 

representative testified at the DHO hearing that he had met with Petitioner in advance of 

the hearing to discuss the case. Id., Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 1. Additionally, Petitioner 

was charged with Possession of a Weapon (Code 104), a Greatest severity offense. Id., 

Exh. “B,” Attach. “1” at 1; 28 C.F.R. § 541.3(a) & Table 1. 

 There is nothing in the record to support that Petitioner’s Due Process rights were 

violated due to the UDC’s alleged failure to provide him with a written copy of their 

decision. As provided by BOP policy, if an inmate is charged with a Greatest severity 

prohibited act, the UDC will automatically refer the incident report to the DHO for 

further review. 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(a)(4). Petitioner received notice that the matter would 

be referred to the DHO, as well as his rights regarding the DHO hearing, when he 

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appeared at the UDC hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner met with his staff representative 

prior to the DHO hearing to discuss the case. In light of the charges against Petitioner, 

the UDC was restricted to referring the matter to the DHO, which it did. Accordingly, 

Petitioner had written notice of the charges against him, had a staff representative 

available and present at the DHO hearing, was allowed to present witnesses on his behalf, 

and received a written copy of the DHO’s findings. This is what due process requires in 

the prison disciplinary context. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–72, 94 S.Ct. at 2978–82. 

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Petitioner asserts that the evidence relied on to find that he committed the 

prohibited act of possessing a weapon was insufficient, because the scotch tape box in 

which the weapon was allegedly found was not listed on his property form. Petition 

(Doc. 1) at 4B ¶ 5, 4C, 4D, 4E. 

 At the DHO hearing, Petitioner stated that Officer Varner “never confiscated any 

tape box from my property” and that “[t]here’s no tape box listed on my property form.” 

Response (Doc. 15), Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 3. The DHO in making his finding relied 

on a photograph of a single edged razor blade taken by SIS Technician Hicks; 

Petitioner’s personal property forms on which “no specific ‘tape box’ was noted, two 

Inmate Property Record forms cited MOORE with ‘(1) bin full legal and personal 

materials[;]’” and the credibility of Officer Hicks, stating that he believed “MOORE 

possessed the ability to avoid possible punishment by not telling the truth[,] [whereas,] 

Hicks was known to have gained nothing by falsifying the discovery in this case.” Id. 

Upon consideration of the evidence, the DHO concluded that the greater weight of the 

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evidence supported a finding that Petitioner had committed the prohibited act of 

Possession of a Weapon (Code 104). Id. The Court finds that “some evidence” supports 

the DHO’s findings and “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the 

[DHO] were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 

445, 457, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). 

3. BOP Policy Regarding UCC Financing Statements 

 Petitioner challenges BOP’s policy barring inmates from possessing UCC 

financing statements. Petition (Doc. 1) at 4B, 4C, 4E. Petitioner alleges that his 

possession of the UCC financing statements was not unauthorized, because they were 

issued by the Georgia Superior Court. Id. at 4C. Petitioner further alleges, that the 

January 20, 2011 memorandum from Warden Martinez regarding this policy is “contrary 

to statutory law” and that “[i]nmates have a right to have them.” Response (Doc. 15), 

Exh. “B,” Attach. “4” at 1. 

 At the DHO hearing, Petitioner admitted to possessing the UCC financing 

statement, but contested the legality of BOP’s policy. Id. In this regard, Petitioner is not 

challenging the due process afforded him during the DHO hearing. “[P]etitions that 

challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought 

pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 

2000). Whereas challenges to conditions of confinement must be brought through a civil 

rights action. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). As 

such, “[a] civil rights action is the ‘proper remedy’ for a prisoner ‘who is making a 

constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of 

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his custody.’” Herrera v. Sanders, 2012 WL 424378, *1 (C.D. Cal.) (quoting Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)). As such, to 

the extent Petitioner is challenging BOP’s policy barring inmates from possessing UCC 

financing statements, his proper remedy is through a § 1983 civil rights action. 

Regarding the BOP disciplinary proceeding, Petitioner received the requisite due process 

as to the charge of Possession of Anything Not Authorized (Code 305), and by his own 

admission, sufficient evidence supported the DHO’s findings. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

claim must fail. 

D. Conclusion 

 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the due process requirements as 

delineated by Wolff were met in this case. Additionally, the Court finds that the DHO 

findings were supported by “some evidence” as required by Hill. Therefore, the 

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) shall be denied. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Judge enter an order: 

(1) SUBSTITUTING J.T. Shartle, Warden, as Respondent for Charles E. 

Samuels, Jr. pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; and 

(2) DENYING Petitioner’s Petitione [sic] for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

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Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District 

Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-13-

190-TUC-DCB. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court 

shall send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties. 

 Dated this 26th day of May, 2015. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge 

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