Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02161/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hilario Aguirre,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-14-2161-PHX-GMS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Kingman, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on September 26, 2014 (Doc. 1). On January 28, 2015, Respondents filed their 

Limited Answer (Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a Reply on March 2, 2015 (Doc. 14). On 

June 17, 2015, Respondents filed a Supplemental Answer (Doc. 16).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On October 19, 2010, Petitioner was indicted in Pinal County Superior Court on 

charges of conspiracy, illegally conducting an enterprise, possession of marijuana for 

sale, and transportation of marijuana for sale. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) (Exhibits to the 

Answer, Doc. 13, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) The charges arose out of the 

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investigation of a drug smuggling operation, including surveillance resulting in 

observations of Petitioner going to and leaving a rural property in his name on which

some five thousand pounds of marijuana were later found after a man doing yard work 

on the property consented to a search. (Exhibit I, Mem. Dec. at 2-4.)

Counsel filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (Exhibit K) arguing that the search 

of the property was not supported by a warrant or valid consent. The trial court 

conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion, made factual findings, heard arguments 

of counsel, and denied the motion. (Exhibit L, M.E. 3/27/12.) 

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted on all but the transportation for 

sale charges. (Exhibit I, Mem. Dec. at 2.) Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent, 

aggravated sentences, the longest of which were 20 years. (Id.; Exhibit D, Sentence.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing: (1) the motion to suppress had been 

wrongly denied; and (2) Petitioner’s sentence was improperly aggravated upon factors 

which were essential elements of the offense. (Exhibit F, Opening Brief.) The Arizona 

Court of Appeals rejected both claims and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. (Exhibit I, Mem. Dec.) Petitioner did not seek further review, and the 

appellate court’s mandate was issued on May 29, 2013. (Exhibit J, Mandate.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit M). Counsel was 

appointed, who ultimately filed a Notice of No Colorable Claim. (Exhibit P, order 

12/2/13 at 2.) Petitioner then filed his Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit N). Petitioner argued: 

(1) (a) illegal search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and other 

authorities; (b) failure to prove Petitioner’s possession of the marijuana in 

violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 

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other state authorities; and (c) denial of the right to an impartial jury under the 

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and other state authorities. (Exhibit N, 

PCR Pet. at 4, et seq.); 

(2) violation of due process under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 

Constitution and other state authorities by: (a) an unauthorized search and (b) 

multiplicitous charges in violation of double jeopardy (id. at 9 et seq.);

(3) illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 

other state authorities based upon (a) an unauthorized protective sweep, and (b) 

information from a confidential informant who Petitioner was not permitted to 

confront (id. at 12 et seq.);

(4) violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and 

other state authorities based upon a sentence to an aggravated term (id. at 14 et 

seq.);

(5) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and other state 

authorities based upon: (a) the prosecution’s failure to disclose the absence of 

Petitioner’s fingerprints; (b) denial of expert witnesses; and (c) improper 

admission of hearsay (id. at 16 et seq.); and 

(6) violations of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and other state 

authorities based upon the denial of a fair and impartial jury (id. at 17 et seq.).

In disposing of Petitioner’s PCR petition, the PCR court identified the following 

list of claims:

The Petitioner's issues set forth in his pro-per petition consist of the 

following:

1. There was an unlawful search of the property.

2. That the jury was not impartial because one juror saw him 

being escorted by the Sheriff's deputy.

3. Law Enforcement Officers lied on the stand about their 

interview with the Petitioner.

4. That tenant-guest law invalidated the consent.

5. The indictment was multiplicitous.

6. There was an improper finding of aggravating factors.

7. The court improperly denied his motion for directed 

verdict.

8. The State concealed evidence that no fingerprints of the 

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Petitioner were found on any of the marijuana which he designates 

as newly discovered evidence.

(Exhibit P, Order 12/2/13 at 2.) The PCR court found that the arguments in 1 through 7 

“are precluded as either having been decided by the. Court of Appeals or by the 

Petitioner's failure to raise them in the Court of Appeals.” (Id. at 3.) The PCR court 

rejected the eighth argument on the merits. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a Motion for Review and Reconsideration, which was denied on 

July 15, 2014. (Exhibit Q, M.E. 7/15/14.)

On August 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a “Notice of Filing Petition for Review and 

Request for Extension of Time” (Exhibit R). That filing simply provided: “Comes noaw, 

Hilario Aguirre, pro per, and hereby gives notice of filing Petition for Review in the 

Arizona Appellette [sic] Court, and request for extension of time to file Petition.” (Id. at 

1.) The plain import of this filing was to seek an extension of time to file a petition for 

review, not that the filing itself amounted to such a petition. Petitioner asserted in the 

instant habeas petition that he sought review of his first PCR petition by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Pet. Doc. 1 at 5.) Respondents assert that no Petition for Review was 

ever filed with the PCR court or the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 4.) 

Petitioner does not oppose that contention in his reply. “The allegations of a return to 

the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge 

finds from the evidence that they are not true.” 28 U.S.C. § 2248. The undersigned 

finds no reason to reject Respondents allegation that no petition for review was filed, and 

thus accepts the allegation as true.

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 26, 2014 (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) the trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights by not dismissing the case 

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when a juror committed misconduct (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6);

(2) the trial court violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights by imposing an excessive 

sentence as a result of failure to consider mitigating circumstances (id. at 7);

(3) the search of the Petitioner’s property without a warrant violated his constitutional 

rights (id. at 8); and

(4) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to 

suppress the evidence and failed to move to dismiss based on juror misconduct 

(id. at 9). 

Response - On January 28, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 13). Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his 

state remedies on Grounds 1, 2, and 4, and they were either procedurally barred or are 

now procedurally defaulted. Respondents argue that Ground 3 is an exclusionary rule 

claim, barred from habeas review under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 

Reply - On March 2, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14). Petitioner argues 

that he fairly presented his claims to the state courts, any failure to do so was caused by 

his untrained, pro se status, language barrier, or the ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel. Petitioner further argues that his claims are meritorious.

Supplements – On June 4, 2015, the Court observed that although vaguely 

worded, Ground 1 appeared to have been presented in “Colorable Claim 6 in Petitioner’s 

PCR petition, and the PCR court found that the claim was or could have been raised 

before, resulting in exhaustion. Respondents were directed to supplement their Answer 

to address the issues, and the merits of Ground 1. A deadline for a supplemental reply 

was set. (Order 6/4/15 Doc. 15.) 

Supplemental Answer - On June 17, 2015, Respondents filed their Supplemental 

Answer (Doc. 16) addressing the merits of Ground 1, asserting that the record 

demonstrated the defendant was not observed shackled, and Petitioner fails to show 

prejudice from any purported brief observance, particularly in light of the curative 

instructions to the jury.

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Supplemental Reply – On June 26, 2015, Petitioner file a Motion for Extension 

of Time (Doc. 17), seeking to extend the time to file a supplemental reply. The motion 

was granted and Petitioner given through July 20, 2015 to file his supplemental reply. 

(Order 7/2/15, Doc. 18.) That time has passed, and Petitioner has not supplemented his 

reply.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL BAR, and PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that most of Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally 

defaulted or were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state grounds, and 

thus are barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

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Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

13 at 7.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

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32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

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purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

It is true that Petitioner filed a motion to extend the time for a petition for review 

(Exhibit R), but Petitioner makes no argument that such motion was granted, or that, if 

granted, the extended time has not long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

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application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. 

Review of Existing PCR Proceeding – Petitioner filed a PCR petition with the 

PCR court, but did not seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Under Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c), petitions for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

must be filed within thirty days of the trial court’s decision on the PCR petition. That 

time has long since passed. 

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

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Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

a. Ground One - In Ground One of his Petition, Petitioner argues the trial court 

violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights by not dismissing the case when a juror 

committed misconduct. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner asserted that this claim was 

raised on direct appeal and in his first PCR proceeding. (Id.)

Respondents argue that Petitioner raised in his PCR petition a claim of juror 

misconduct based upon one juror seeing Petitioner being escorted by the sheriff’s 

deputy. However, Respondents argue that the PCR court dismissed the claim as 

“precluded because Aguirre could have raised it on direct appeal.” (Answer, Doc. 13 at 

7.) 

Petitioner replies to these contentions directly only by asserting that his claims 

were presented to the PCR court.

Indeed, this claim was not one of two claims presented by Petitioner on direct 

appeal. (See Exhibit F, Opening Brief.) However, in “Colorable Claim 6” in his PCR 

petition, Petitioner did assert a Sixth Amendment violation based upon the juror seeing 

Petitioner being placed in handcuffs and escorted away. (Exhibit N, PCR Pet. at 17-18.) 

To the extent that Petitioner now asserts that same claim in his vaguely worded 

Ground 1, the claim was fairly presented. To the extent that Petitioner now asserts a 

different claim, it was not fairly presented, and for the reasons discussed in subsection 2, 

hereinabove, the claim is now procedurally defaulted.

Respondents argue that even if the claim now presented is that in Petitioner’s 

PCR claim 6, it was procedurally barred by the PCR Court as having been waived by 

failure to present it on direct appeal and thus is now barred from habeas review. 

However, the PCR court did not so hold. To the contrary, the PCR court found the claim 

in Colorable Claim 6 to be “precluded as either having been decided by the. Court of 

Appeals or by the Petitioner's failure to raise them in the Court of Appeals.” (Exhibit P, 

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Order 12/2/13 at 3.) The PCR court did not elucidate which applied to which claims. 

A finding of preclusion, i.e. that the claims have been raised before, “does not 

provide a basis for federal courts to apply a procedural bar.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 

1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996). Where an Arizona Court asserts both conditions apply to a 

group of claims without delineating which applied to which, it “did not clearly base its 

decision on independent and adequate state law grounds.” Id. See also Calderon v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of California (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 

1996); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774-75 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2002) (“By failing to 

specify which claims were barred for which reasons, the Nevada Supreme Court ‘did not 

clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.’”); and Koerner 

v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2003). To avoid habeas review, a state 

court decision must “clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state 

ground.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991).

This Court cannot look beyond the pronouncement of the PCR Court, to the briefs 

and decision on direct appeal before the Arizona Court of Appeals, and conclude that the 

true decision was one that the claims had not been raised, were thereby waived, and thus 

procedurally barred on that ground. In Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009), the Court was 

faced with a state appellate decision which disposed of a federal claim on the mistaken 

basis that it had been previously presented. The record reflected that the claim had 

clearly not been presented or passed on in any prior proceeding. Nonetheless, the 

Supreme Court held: “When a state court declines to review the merits of a petitioner's 

claim on the ground that it has done so already, it creates no bar to federal habeas 

review...When a state court refuses to readjudicate a claim on the ground that it has been 

previously determined, the court's decision does not indicate that the claim has been 

procedurally defaulted.” 556 U.S. at 466-67. The Court further rejected the state’s 

request to treat the rejection as a procedural bar based upon the state’s waiver rule. 

“Although we have an independent duty to scrutinize the application of state rules that 

bar our review of federal claims, we have no concomitant duty to apply state procedural 

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bars where state courts have themselves declined to do so. The Tennessee courts did not 

hold that Cone waived his Brady claim, and we will not second-guess their judgment.” 

556 U.S. at 468-69.

It is true that in his dissent in Koerner, Judge Beezer argued that the reference to 

an ”ambiguous” order “should be understood in light of the state court opinion and the 

record in that case, rather than looking solely to the face of the state court’s opinion.” 

328 F.3d 1039, 1056 (Beezer, J. dissenting). However, Judge Beezer’s dissent plainly 

acknowledged the import of the majority decision in Koerner:

Today's opinion holds that a federal court may only look to the state 

court opinion at issue in determining whether a state court opinion 

relies on a procedural default. If a state court opinion is ambiguous 

on its face, today's opinion makes it impossible to find a procedural 

default because any such state court opinion does not “clearly and 

expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.” 

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir.2002) (citation 

omitted).

Koerner, 328 F.3d at 1056 (Beezer, J. dissenting). Thus the portion of Judge Beezer’s 

dissent referencing consideration of the record was not a statement of what the law in the 

Ninth Circuit is, but Judge Beezer’s assertion of what it ought to be. But see McElyea v. 

Schriro, 2009 WL 222375, CV-06-0884-PHX-SMM(HCE) (D. Ariz. 2009) (looking 

beyond state court opinion, based on pre-Koerner 9th Circuit cases doing so, citing 

Koerner, but without noting Beezer’s dissent). The undersigned knows of no authority 

permitting this Court to reject Judge Beezer’s analysis of the majority’s holding in 

Koerner, nor the effect of that holding.

The opinion of the PCR court is ambiguous on its face, proposing two mutually 

exclusive reasons for disposing of the claim. According to Cone and Koerner, this Court 

is not free to look beyond that ambiguity and attempt to ascertain the true basis for 

disposing of the claim.

Accordingly, under the decision of the PCR court, this Court must assume that 

Petitioner’s claim in “Colorable Claim 6” was presented on direct appeal to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, and thus Petitioner’s state remedies on that claim have been 

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adequately exhausted.

b. Ground Two – In his Ground 2, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated 

Petitioner’s constitutional rights by imposing an excessive sentence as a result of failure 

to consider mitigating circumstances. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) The Petition makes no 

explanation of Petitioner’s presentation of this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Id.)

Respondents argue that Petitioner presented a different state law claim on direct 

appeal, and that the PCR court deemed a similar claim precluded. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 

9.) Petitioner does not reply on these contentions.

Not Fairly Presented on Direct Appeal - Indeed, Petitioner’s challenge to his 

sentencing on direct appeal was based not upon a failure to consider mitigating 

circumstances, but upon a reliance on improper aggravating circumstances. While new 

factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994). The shift in claims from challenging aggravating factors to mitigating factors 

is a fundamental alteration. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal was founded solely upon state law 

arguments. Failure to so alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the claim will 

amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. at 366. While 

the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 

(9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim 

were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was made.” 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

Thus the current claim in Ground 2 was not fairly presented to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals on direct appeal.

Presented but Procedurally Defaulted in PCR Proceeding - In his “Colorable 

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Claim 4” to the PCR court, Petitioner argued violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and other state authorities based upon a sentence 

to an aggravated term. (Exhibit N, PCR Pet. at 14 et seq.) In arguing that claim, 

Petitioner asserted that the trial court “did not address all of the mitigating factors that 

defendant was entitled to, that supported a presumptive sentence.” (Id. at 15.) Petitioner 

further argued that he was denied a mitigation hearing. (Id.) Petitioner also argued that 

the trial court improperly used his prior offense as an aggravating factor. (Id. at 15-16.) 

In responding to this claim, the state ignored the arguments concerning 

mitigation, and cast the claim as only a challenge to the aggravating factors and argued it 

had been decided on direct appeal. (Exhibit O, PCR Resp. at 8.) The PCR court 

appears to have followed suit, recognizing only a claim that “[t]here was an improper 

finding of aggravating factors.” (Exhibit P, Order 12/2/13 at 2.) The PCR court then 

applied its ambiguous finding that the claims were or could have been raised on direct 

appeal.

But the claim now raised by Petitioner is not a challenge to the aggravating 

factors, but to the mitigating ones (or the lack of their consideration). That claim was 

neither recognized nor ruled upon by the PCR court. Thus the claim cannot be deemed 

exhausted by virtue of the PCR court’s ambiguous ruling. Instead, it appears that the 

current claim was fairly presented to the PCR court, and simply overlooked.

Had Petitioner proceeded to seek review from the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

this PCR claim, his state remedies would be deemed exhausted. But he did not. And, 

for the reasons discussed in section 2 hereinabove, Petitioner may not now do so. 

Accordingly, this claim is procedurally defaulted. 

c. Ground Three – Respondents do not argue that Ground Three was 

procedurally defaulted.

d. Ground Four – In his Ground 4, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to suppress the evidence and failed to 

move to dismiss bases on juror misconduct. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9). Petitioner argues 

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that Ground 4 was presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his first PCR 

proceeding. (Id.) 

Respondents argue that no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was raised in 

Petitioner’s direct appeal or PCR proceeding, and that at best Petitioner asserted the 

claims underlying his claims of ineffective assistance. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 11.) Thus, 

Respondents argue Petitioner’s state remedies on this claim are procedurally defaulted 

and the claim is barred from habeas review.

Indeed, Petitioner did not raise any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on 

either direct appeal or in his PCR petition. To the extent that Petitioner asserted the 

underlying claims (e.g. the failure to suppress and juror misconduct), the presentation of 

those claims would not serve to fairly present the related claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. “While [the ineffective assistance and underlying constitutional claim are] 

admittedly related, they are distinct claims with separate elements of proof, and each 

claim should have been separately and specifically presented to the state courts.” Rose v. 

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005).

For the reasons discussed in subsection 2 hereinabove, Petitioner is now 

precluded from returning to state court on his claims of ineffective assistance, his state 

remedies are procedurally defaulted, and this ground for relief is barred from habeas 

review.

e. Summary Re Exhaustion – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner properly exhausted his remedies as to the portion of Ground 

One based upon a juror seeing Petitioner being placed in handcuffs and escorted away.

Also based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted on: (1) the remainder of Ground One, (2) Ground Two, and (3) 

Ground Four. 

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

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procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural 

defaults based on: (1) his untrained, pro se status, and language barrier, and (2) the 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 5, et seq.)

Pro Se Status and Language Barrier – Petitioner argues he “is a lay person in 

the law; does not speak or write English, nor is he a United States citizen that has been 

educated in the knowledge as to the Constitution of the United States or its complex 

laws.” (Reply, Doc. 14 at 5.) 

The “cause and prejudice” standard is equally applicable to pro se litigants, 

Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Idaho State Board 

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986), whether literate and assisted by 

“jailhouse lawyers”, Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988); illiterate 

and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 

867 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989). 

Moreover, at the time Petitioner’s state remedies were being procedurally 

defaulted, e.g. on direct appeal, and in his PCR proceeding, he was represented by 

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counsel, and thus not dependent upon his own legal prowess or linguistic abilities.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel - Petitioner argues he 

“has fairly presented the issues his defense counsel and direct appeal attorney failed to 

claim due to their ineffective assistance.” (Reply, Doc. 14 at 5.) “Both defense trial and 

appeal attorneys were ineffective in their work and was a constitutional violation of 

defendant’s /petitioner’s rights.” (Id. at 6.) 

Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, “[t]o constitute cause for procedural default of a 

federal habeas claim, the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

first have been presented to the state courts as an independent claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 

333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003.) Petitioner has not properly exhausted any claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. 

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

6. Actual Innocence as Cause

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

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innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here Petitioner proffers no new evidence of actual innocence. Accordingly his 

procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred claims must be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

7. Summary re Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Based upon the foregoing the undersigned has concluded that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted his state remedies on the claims raised in Grounds One (except 

the portion based upon a juror seeing Petitioner being placed in handcuffs and escorted 

away), Two and Four, and these claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. MERITS OF GROUND 1: SHACKLING

Arguments - In Ground 1, Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were 

violated by juror misconduct. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) In the Court’s Order filed June 4, 

2015 (Doc. 15), the Court construed this as re-asserting his claim that his federal rights 

were violated when a juror observed Petitioner being placed in handcuffs and escorted 

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away. 

Respondents argue this claim is without merit because the record reflects the juror 

did not observe Petitioner shackled, and any such occurrence was brief, the trial court 

issued curative instructions, and Petitioner has failed to show actual prejudice. (Supp. 

Answer, Doc. 16.) 

Petitioner has not replied to address the merits of this claim.

Factual Background – On the second day of trial, the court summoned counsel 

and addressed an assertion that a juror had seen the Petitioner being led away through the 

courtroom toward a door beyond which the holding cells were located.

THE COURT: ...Defendant, counsel are present. The 

jury is not yet present. 

Counsel, it is my understanding you've been advised 

that inadvertently the -- the defendant was apparently seen by one 

juror being led from court to back to the jail yesterday. And I 

wanted to put the issue on the record to see if either of you want to 

make a record or inquiry further. 

Mr. Conti? 

MR. CONTI [prosecutor]: No your. Honor. I didn't 

even notice it, when he came in. And, I spoke with Ian, my intern, 

who’s taking a test this morning, he said, it seemed to him he didn’t 

even notice what was going on because there was a bunch of people 

standing around. And he walked in, grabbed his stuff and left. I just 

know he was in here as they were bringing him back there, and I 

don't know that they necessarily know - -

THE COURT: You mean taking him from here back 

there? 

MR. CONTI: Taking him to the courtroom to the 

hallway, I guess, to the cell or whatever. 

THE COURT: Okay. Is that your understanding of 

what happened, Mr. Green? 

MR. GREEN [defense counsel]: Your Honor, all I 

know, as we walked in there, the guard said: Oh, my God, that's a 

juror. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

MR. GREEN: So I didn't see the juror, I didn't see 

what he did, where he went. 

THE COURT: Was he handcuffed yet or -- 

MR. CONTI: No. 

MR. GREEN: No, no, he was still in street clothes. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

MR. GREEN: And I was wa1king back with him 

and-- 

THE COURT: Do you see any issue? 

MR. GREEN: You know, I'm not sure that the jurors 

know that's the jail. I mean, it could be a conference room for 

attorney and client --

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(Supp. Ans., Doc. 16, Exhibit, R.T. 3/28/12 at 4-6.) The trial court and counsel 

discussed whether the jury were or were not aware that Petitioner was in custody, 

whether the incident would be communicated to other jurors, and whether a curative 

instruction was appropriate. The parties agreed that the jury would be reminded of the 

admonitions to not discuss the case prior to deliberations, to base their decision solely on 

the evidence, and that the instruction indicate it was not based upon any incident. (Id. at 

6-9.) The trial court then admonished the jury:

THE COURT: ...Before we begin today, I want to 

again advise the jury of the portion of the admission [sic], and I'm 

not suggesting any of this occurred, I'm just affirming that -- to -- to 

advise you that you are not to discuss the case with each other until 

you've been given the final instructions and given a directive to go 

back in the jury room to deliberate. And also you are to base your 

verdict solely on the evidence, the testimony, and the instructions of 

law; all right?

(Id. at 10-11.) 

Applicable Law – “[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of 

physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of 

its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck 

v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). In the absence of a particularized determination 

that shackling is justified, visible shackling in the courtroom is “ ‘inherently 

prejudicial.’” Id. at 635 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)). That is, 

“where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that 

will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out 

a due process violation. The State must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

shackling error ... did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Id. at 635 ((quoting 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that “visible shackling outside 

the courtroom—at least when the viewing is brief and accidental—is not inherently 

prejudicial; instead, a due process violation occurs only if the criminal defendant

demonstrates actual prejudice.” Wharton v. Chappell, 765 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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We explained long ago the reasons for the distinction 

between shackling in open court and shackling during 

transportation. Even the most unsophisticated juror knows that 

defendants may have to post bail and that some lack the resources to 

do this. Under these circumstances we cannot think that the 

emotional impact of seeing the defendant in custody is necessarily 

hostile-it may be quite the reverse. It is a normal and regular as well 

as a highly desirable and necessary practice to handcuff prisoners 

when they are being taken from one place to another, and the jury is 

aware of this.

The distinction is also consistent with the Supreme Court's 

more recent reasoning in Deck. Unlike shackling in the courtroom, 

shackling during transport does not affect the defendant's ability to 

assist counsel during trial. Nor does it have any effect on the dignity 

of the courtroom; indeed, it could be perceived as increasing the 

dignity of the courtroom because a prisoner's shackles are removed 

for open-court proceedings. Admittedly, visible shackling during 

transportation might affect the jury's perception of the presumption 

of innocence, but that concern is mitigated greatly by the reasons 

discussed above—jurors know that, as a matter of routine, some 

defendants are in custody during trial and that security needs during 

transport demand restraints. 

Wharton, 765 F.3d at 965 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Ghent v. 

Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Mar. 11, 2002) (actual 

prejudice required when defendant only seen in handcuffs in the hallway or entering the 

courtroom and not while court in session). 

Application of Law to Facts – Here, there is nothing to show that Petitioner was 

seen shackled by a juror. At most, there was testimony that he may have been seen by 

the lone, returning, juror while being led toward the exit from the courtroom which led 

toward the holding cells. This was not while court was in session, and there is nothing to 

suggest that the juror would have been aware of the reason for the departure through that 

exit, nor even to show that he had observed the defendant at all.

Moreover, Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest actual prejudice. The incident 

occurred after court had been adjourned. Thus, there was no interference with 

Petitioner’s right to counsel, nor any denigration on the dignity of the court proceeding. 

Even if it were assumed that the juror could discern the custodial purpose behind the 

separate exit, the viewing was brief, isolated, and merely a part of Petitioner’s transport. 

Further, the jury was aware Petitioner had been arrested, and could be presumed to 

conclude that he might be in custody. Thus, there is no reason to presume any impact on 

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the presumption of innocence.

Petitioner fails to show a denial of his due process rights, and Ground 1 must be 

denied.

C. MERITS OF GROUND 3: WARRANTLESS SEARCH

Arguments – In Ground 3, Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were 

violated when evidence seized during a warrantless search of his property was admitted 

in evidence.

Respondents argue that consideration of this claim on habeas review is barred 

under the limits on the exclusionary rule under Stone v. Powell.

Petitioner did not address the merits of this claim or the application of Stone in his

Reply. 

 Applicable Law - Petitioner seeks to enforce the exclusionary rule, calling for 

the barring from trial any evidence seized in violation of the Constitution. “Exclusion is 

‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned 

by an unconstitutional search. The rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to 

deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). 

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that habeas 

proceedings are so far removed from the offending conduct that any deterrent effect is 

outweighed by the societal cost of ignoring reliable, trustworthy evidence and the 

judicial burden of litigating collateral issues. Thus, the Court held that “where the State 

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a 

state prisoner may not be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence 

obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 494. 

Application to Petitioner – Petitioner’s attempts to rely upon the exclusionary 

rule are barred under Stone. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that there was not an 

opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim. The record 

reflects there was. Counsel filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (Exhibit K) arguing that 

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the search of the property was not supported by a warrant or valid consent. The trial 

court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion, made factual findings, heard 

arguments of counsel, and denied the motion. (Exhibit L, M.E. 3/27/12.) Petitioner 

fails to suggest what, besides a contrary outcome, was necessary to a full and fair 

hearing. "The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his 

claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided." 

Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, this claim is barred from consideration, and must be denied.

D. SUMMARY

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner failed to 

properly exhaust his state remedies on the claims raised in Grounds One (except the 

portion based upon a juror seeing Petitioner being placed in handcuffs and escorted 

away), Two and Four, those state remedies are now procedurally defaulted, and 

Petitioner fails to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to avoid the procedural 

default. Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

Also based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that the portion of 

Ground One based upon a juror seeing Petitioner being placed in handcuffs and escorted 

away), and Ground Three are without merit and must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

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detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on the merits, and in part on 

procedural grounds. Under the reasoning set forth herein, the constitutional claims 

addressed herein on the merits are plainly without merit, and for claims addressed on 

procedural grounds, jurists of reason would not find the procedural rulings debatable. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground One (except the portion 

based upon a juror seeing Petitioner being placed in handcuffs and escorted away), 

Ground Two and Ground Four of the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

filed September 26, 2014 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed September 26, 2014 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and that this 

action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: August 18, 2015

14-2161r RR 15 05 27 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-02161-GMS Document 19 Filed 08/18/15 Page 26 of 26