Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_17-cv-00536/USCOURTS-alnd-2_17-cv-00536-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ELIA A. AGUNDIS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00122-CG-B

 : 

JOHN LEON RICE, et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the Court on Defendants’ Renewed 

Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 30, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45)1. These

 1 Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Disqualify Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood and His Staff 

(Doc. 41) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Pleadings and 

Motions filed on Behalf of Defendants John Rice, Oktibbeha 

County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Steven Gladney (Doc. 

50). With respect to the motion to disqualify Mississippi 

Attorney General Jim Hood and his staff, Plaintiff has made 

vague and conclusory allegations that they provided her with 

legal opinions and accepted her confidential information; 

however, she has not provided any facts regarding the specific 

legal advice she was given or the confidential information that 

she allegedly shared with Mr. Hood and his staff. Further, there 

is nothing before the Court that indicates the context in which 

her dealings with the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office 

occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Pleadings and Motions 

filed on Behalf of Defendants John Rice, Oktibbeha County 

Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Steven Gladney (Doc. 50) is 

also denied. While Attorney Allen had not sought and been 

specially admitted to appear in this case at the time he filed 

the referenced pleadings and motions, he had sought and been 

properly admitted at the time Plaintiff filed her motion. 

Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged nor established any 

prejudice resulting from said omission. Accordingly, the

(Continued)

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motions, which have been fully briefed and are ripe for 

resolution, have been referred to the undersigned for a report 

and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. 

Ala. CivLR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon consideration of all matters 

presented, the undersigned RECOMMENDS, for the reasons stated 

herein, that Defendants’ Amended Motions to Dismiss2 be GRANTED 

as to Defendants Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Department, Judge 

Dorothy Colom, City of Columbus Police Department, Sheriff 

Steven Gladney and Chief Oscar Lewis, and that this action, 

along with Defendant John Rice’s Motion to Dismiss, be 

transferred to the Northern District of Alabama for further 

proceedings.

I. Background Facts

 

undersigned finds that the draconic sanction of dismissal is not 

warranted under the circumstances. Thus, her motion is denied. 

2 Defendants City of Columbus Police Department, Judge Dorothy 

Colom, Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Department, and John Leon Rice 

previously filed Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 6, 17, 21); however, 

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 28), which rendered 

those motions moot. See Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit 

Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that 

"[a]n amended complaint supersedes a previously filed 

complaint"); Meterlogic, Inc. v. Copier Solutions, Inc., 185 F. 

Supp. 2d 1292, 1297 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that the

plaintiff's filing of an amended complaint "rendered moot the 

parties' previous pleadings and the defendants' summary judgment 

and Daubert motions").

Case 2:17-cv-00536-JEO Document 60 Filed 02/22/17 Page 2 of 19
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Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 10, 2016 naming 

John Leon Rice (hereinafter “Rice”), Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s 

Department (hereinafter “Sheriff’s Department”), Dorothy Colom, 

Oktibbeha Chancery Court Judge (hereinafter “Judge Colom”), City 

of Columbus Police Department (hereinafter “Columbus PD”), 

Sheriff Steven Gladney (hereinafter “Gladney”), and Chief Oscar 

Lewis (hereinafter “Lewis”) as Defendants.3 Plaintiff purports 

to bring this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 13614, and asserts 

that she is a citizen of Baldwin County, Alabama, and that each 

of the individual Defendants can be located in Mississippi. 

(Doc. 28 at 1). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains fifteen 

counts5, namely the deprivation of her civil rights under the 

color of state law and denial of due process against Defendants 

Judge Colom, McQueen and Gladney (Counts 1, 2); trespass by 

Defendant Rice (Count 3); municipal liability by Defendants 

 3 Defendant McQueen was dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 

4(m) due to failure to perfect service. (See Doc. 59). 

4 § 1361 provides that districts courts “shall have original 

jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel 

an officer or employee of the United States or any agency 

thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff”. 28 U.S.C. § 

1361. Given that Plaintiff has not identified any of the 

Defendants as officers or employees of the United States, that 

provision is not applicable to this action.

5 The paragraphs in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are 

misnumbered in that the Amended Complaint does not contain a 

count 4 or count 5. (See Doc. 28 at 10). Thus, a total of 

fifteen counts are contained in the Amended Complaint.

 

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Colom, McQueen and Gladney (Count 6); assault[] and battery in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2265, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, and 18 U.S.C. § 

2262 by Defendants Judge Colom and Rice (Count 7); felonious 

injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261 by Defendants Colom and 

Rice6 (Count 8); violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights, 

equal protection rights, civil rights, and rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 sections (1), 

(2), and (3), 42 U.S.C. § 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg, and various 

Mississippi and Alabama state laws by Defendants Judge Colom, 

Columbus PD, McQueen, and Gladney (Count 9); injunctive relief 

(Count 10); interference with Plaintiff’s evidence in violation 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) by Defendants Judge Colom, Columbus PD, 

McQueen, Lewis and Gladney (Count 11); intimidation of Plaintiff 

and her witnesses by Defendant Colom in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985(2) (Count 12); exceeding jurisdiction in violation of the 

law by Defendant Judge Colom (Count 13); treason by Defendant 

Judge Colom (Count 14); violation of oath of office by Defendant 

Judge Colom (Count 15); denial of a translator during trial in 

violation of federal law and the Sixth Amendment by Defendant 

Judge Colom (Count 16); and vicarious liability under respondeat 

 6 While Plaintiff references an unnamed Oktibeha County 

Court bailiff and processor Regina Sykes in this count, there is 

no indication that either has been served; thus, they are not 

parties to this action.

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superior theory by Defendants Judge Colom, McQueen, Lewis and 

Gladney.(Count 17). (Doc. 28). 

The pertinent factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint revolve around her relationship with Defendant John 

Rice. According to Plaintiff, throughout 2012 and 2013, 

Defendant Rice would enter her home in Mississippi uninvited and 

subject her and her children to various forms of abuse and 

harassment. (Doc. 28 at 3-4). Plaintiff alleges that in early 

2013, she became pregnant after Defendant Rice sexually 

assaulted her. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, she gave birth in 

September of 2013, and in late December 2013, Defendant Rice 

filed petitions to establish paternity and to gain custody of 

the child in the Oktibbeha County Chancery Court. (Id. at 5-6; 

Doc. 44-1). 

Plaintiff and her children began moving to Alabama in late 

2013, and completed the move in January 2014. (Id. at 5-6). 

Plaintiff avers that after moving to Alabama, she obtained a 

Protection From Abuse Order; however, Defendant Rice continued 

to threaten and harass her via telephone in violation of the 

protection order. (Id. at 6). On September 4, 2014, Plaintiff 

attended a hearing before Judge Dorothy Colom regarding 

Defendant Rice’s request for visitation with his child. (Doc. 

44-3 at 1-138). Judge Colom granted Defendant Rice’s visitation 

request and issued an order setting a visitation schedule on 

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December 23, 2014. (Id. at 186-192). 

Plaintiff filed a number of motions throughout 2015 and 

2016 regarding her ongoing custody dispute with Defendant Rice. 

(Id. at 179-201, 226-237). Judge Colom denied Plaintiff’s 

motions. (Id.). Plaintiff appealed to the Mississippi Supreme 

Court and argued that Judge Colom should recuse herself from the 

case. (Doc. 44-4). On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court 

affirmed Judge Colom’s decisions, and denied Plaintiff’s motion 

for recusal. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Rice harassed her with phone calls 

and death threats throughout 2014 and 2015, and that in December 

2015, Rice, an unnamed Sheriff employee, and Oktibbeha County 

bailiff Sykes crossed state lines into Birmingham, Alabama, and 

assaulted her while attempting to serve her in conjunction with 

the Mississippi custody proceedings. (Doc. 28 at 5-8). 

Plaintiff also contends that Defendants McQueen, Lewis, 

Gladney, and the Columbus PD did not respond to her repeated 

attempts to contact them in 2012 regarding Defendant Rice’s 

behavior. (Id. at 3, 12). She also claims that the Oktibbeha 

County Sheriff’s Department refused to investigate her claims 

against Defendant Rice. (Id. at 9, 12). Plaintiff has also 

asserted many claims against Defendant Judge Colom based on her 

handling of the child custody dispute. Plaintiff contends that 

Judge Colom was biased and issued improper rulings in an effort 

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to obstruct Plaintiff’s attempts to appeal. (Id. at 6-8). She 

further alleges that Judge Colom ignored the Protection From 

Abuse Orders issued in Alabama and acted outside her 

jurisdiction by keeping the custody case in Mississippi. (Id. at 

13). 

In response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, each of the 

Defendants filed renewed Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. 30, 37, 39, 

44). Defendant Colom argues that she is entitled to absolute 

judicial immunity for the claims asserted against her in her 

individual capacity, and Eleventh Amendment immunity for 

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against her. Defendant 

Colom further argues that the Younger abstention and/or RookerFeldman doctrines prohibits this Court from enjoining any 

ongoing Chancery Court proceedings, and that this Courts lacks 

personal jurisdiction over her because she has no substantial 

(or otherwise) minimum contacts with the State of Alabama; thus, 

the claims against her are due to be dismissed under Rules 

12(b)(1), 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. (Doc. 30). 

Defendant City of Columbus PD argues that Plaintiff’s 

claims against it should be dismissed because it is not a 

political subdivision or legal entity capable of being sued, 

that Plaintiff failed to perfect proper service on it, that this 

Court lacks personal jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) as 

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the City does not have substantial minimum contacts with the 

State of Alabama, and that Plaintiff’s claims against the City 

of Columbus PD are barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 

37).

Defendant Lewis argues that Plaintiff failed to perfect 

service against him, that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction 

over him as there is no allegation that he had substantial 

minimum contacts with the State of Alabama, and that Plaintiff’s 

claims against him are barred by the statute of limitations. 

(Doc. 39). Defendant Oktibbeha City Sheriff’s Department and 

Steven Gladney argue that the Sheriff’s Department is not a 

legal entity capable of being sued, that Plaintiff failed to 

perfect proper service on these Defendants, and that this Court 

lacks personal jurisdiction over these Defendants due to lack of 

substantial minimum contacts with the State of Alabama. (Doc. 

44). Finally, Defendant Rice contends that Plaintiff failed to 

perfect proper service on him, that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 

should be dismissed due to lack of state action on Rice’s part, 

and that Plaintiff’s §1983 claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations. (Id.).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As a preliminary matter, the undersigned observes that when 

considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, a court gives them 

a liberal construction holding them to a more lenient standard 

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than those of an attorney, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 

92 S.Ct. 594, 595-596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), but it does not 

have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading 

in order to sustain an action.” GJR Investments v. County of 

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled 

on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 791, 709 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (relying on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 

S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). Furthermore, a court 

treats as true factual allegations, but it does not treat as 

true conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of 

action’s elements. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. 

In addition, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law 

and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989).

A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

“As a general rule, courts should address issues relating 

to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a 

plaintiff’s claims, as a defendant that is not subject to the 

jurisdiction of the court cannot be bound by its rulings.” Range 

Creek Holdings, LLC v. Cypress Capital II, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 23951, *8-9, 2009 WL 857533 (S.D. Ala. March 25, 

2009)(citation omitted.); Breland v. Levada EF Five, LLC, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5291 (S.D. Ala. January 16, 2015). 

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In the absence of contractual acquiescence to personal 

jurisdiction, “[w]hen a defendant challenges personal 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the twin burdens of establishing 

that personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with (1) 

the forum’s state’s long-arm provision and the requirements of 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 

Matthews v. Brookstone Stores, Inc., 469 F. Supp.2d 1056, 1060 

(S.D. Ala. 2007)(citations omitted); see also Horizon Aggressive 

Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F. 3d 1162, 1166 (llth 

Cir. 2005)(similar). In Alabama, this inquiry collapses into a 

single question because Alabama’s long-arm statute permits its 

courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent 

authorized by the Due Process Clause. See Sloss Industries Corp. 

v. Eurisol, 488 F. 3d 922, 925 (llth Cir. 2007)(“the two 

inquiries merge, because Alabama’s long-arm statute permits the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent 

constitutionally permissible”); Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten 

Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F. 3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 

2008)(“Alabama’s long-arm statute permits service of process as 

broad as the permissible limits of due process.”). Accordingly, 

the operative inquiry is whether the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over each Defendant comports with constitutional 

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safeguards7.

A plaintiff seeking to assert jurisdiction over a 

nonresident “initially need only allege sufficient facts to make 

out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” Posner v. Essex Ins. 

Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 (llth Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, the 

burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing, by 

affidavits or otherwise, that personal jurisdiction is not 

present. Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 

F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). If the defendant sustains that 

responsibility, the plaintiff is then required to substantiate

the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or 

 7 The undersigned recognizes that the Eleventh Circuit has 

held “that the applicable forum for minimum contacts purposes is 

the United States in cases where. . .the court’s personal 

jurisdiction is invoked based on a federal statute authorizing 

nationwide or worldwide service of process.” United States SEC 

v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1997)(footnote 

omitted); Steinberg v. A Analyst Ltd., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

86083 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2009)(“In cases where the court 

exercises personal jurisdiction by virtue of a federal statute 

authorizing nationwide service of process, the requirement of 

minimum contacts is inapplicable. . .In such circumstances, 

minimum contacts with the United States suffices.”). Plaintiff 

herein has cited a number of statutes; however, none of those 

that are arguably applicable, such as § 1983, provides for 

nationwide service of process. See Iraheta v. Linebarger, 

Goggan, Blair & Sampson, LLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246 (M.D. 

Georgia Aug. 5, 2015)(stating that while the RICO statute 

provides for nationwide service of process, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 

and 1985 do not; thus, court must look to the state’s long arm 

statute as a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction).

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other competent proof, and she may not merely reiterate the 

factual allegations in the complaint. Id. However, the 

allegations in the complaint still must be taken as true to the 

extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant’s affidavits. S 

& Davis Int’l, Inc. v. The Republic of Yemen, 218 F. 3d 1292, 

1303 (llth Cir. 2000). Where the parties present conflicting 

evidence, all factual disputes are resolved in the plaintiff’s 

favor, and the plaintiff’s prima facie showing will be 

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss notwithstanding the 

contrary presentation by the moving party. Id.

In a action such as this, the court "undertakes a two-step 

inquiry to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists: the 

exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state 

long-arm statute, and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 

United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (2009). As 

noted supra, because Alabama's long-arm provision, Rule 4.2(a) 

of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, is coextensive with due 

process requirements, see Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431 So. 2d 

141, 145 (Ala. 1983), the court need only consider whether the 

exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of due 

process. Oliver v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d 827, 830 (11th 

Cir. 1992). Due process requires both that the defendant have 

"certain minimum contacts" with the forum state, and if such 

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minimum contacts exist, that the exercise of jurisdiction over 

the defendant "does not offend traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice." Burnham v. Superior Court of Calif., 

495 U.S. 604, 618, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631 

(1990)(quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. 

Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)). "This two-part test embodies the 

controlling due process principle that a defendant must have 

'fair warning' that a particular activity may subject it to the 

jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Vermeulen v. Renault, 

U.S.A., Inc., 985 F. 2d 1534, 1545 (11th Cir. 1993).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: "general" and 

"specific." There is general personal jurisdiction over a party 

when "the cause of action does not arise out of ... the 

[party's] activities in the forum State," but there are 

"continuous and systematic" business contacts with the forum 

state. See Consolidated Development Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 

F.3d 1286, 1291 (llth Cir. 2000); see also Sloss Indus. Corp. v. 

Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007)("general 

jurisdiction ... can only be exercised if the defendant has 

'continuous and systematic' contacts with the forum"); Stubbs v. 

Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F. 3d 1357, 

1360 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006)("General jurisdiction arises from the 

defendant's contacts with the forum that are not directly 

related to the cause of action being litigated."). The due 

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process requirements for general personal jurisdiction are more 

stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction. Consolidated 

Development Corp., 216 F.3d at 1292.

On the other hand, specific jurisdiction “arises out of a 

party’s activities in the forum that are related to the cause of 

action alleged in the complaint.” Id. at 1291; Helicopteros

Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 at n.8, 80 L. 

Ed. 2d 404 (1983). For specific personal jurisdiction, the 

contacts at issue must satisfy the minimum-contacts test. 

"Minimum contacts involve three criteria: First, the contacts 

must be related to the plaintiff's cause of action or have given 

rise to it. Second, the contacts must involve some purposeful 

availment of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws. Third, the defendant's contacts within the forum state 

must be such that [it] reasonably anticipate being haled into 

court there." Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F. 3d 

623, 631 (11th Cir. 1996)(citation omitted).

Based upon a review of the record evidence, the undersigned 

finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that this Court has 

general jurisdiction over any of the Defendants. Taking the 

allegations of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as true, she has 

not alleged let alone demonstrated that any of the Defendants 

have “continuous and systematic” contacts with the state of 

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Alabama such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

them will not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice. All of Plaintiff’s allegations in this 

case revolve around her relationship with Defendant Rice and 

their child custody disputes. None of her allegations suggest 

any continuous and systematic contacts with the State of Alabama 

unrelated to her case. Accordingly, no general jurisdiction 

exists over the Defendants in this case.

Turning to specific jurisdiction, the undersigned finds 

that with the exception of Defendant Rice, Plaintiff has not 

alleged nor established that the other Defendants had sufficient 

minimum contacts with the state of Alabama and purposefully 

availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities 

within this state such that they should have reasonably 

anticipated being haled into court here. Accepting Plaintiff’s 

allegations as true, in December 2013, all of her claims against 

Defendant Judge Colom relate to actions Judge Colom took while 

presiding over the paternity/child custody case in Mississippi. 

Simply put, the undersigned finds that Judge Colom did not 

deliberately affiliate with Alabama, did not purposefully avail 

herself of the privilege of conducting activities in Alabama, 

and could not reasonably anticipate defending a lawsuit in 

Alabama. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Colom should be 

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

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Likewise, Plaintiff does not allege that individual 

Defendants Sheriff Steven Gladney or Chief Lewis undertook any 

activities directed at Alabama. Indeed, the gist of Plaintiff’s 

claims against these individuals as well as the Oktibbeha County 

Mississippi Sheriff’s Department and the Columbus PD is that 

they did not investigate her claims against Defendant Rice or 

take any action to punish him for alleged misconduct committed 

against her in Mississippi. In light of such, the undersigned 

finds that there is no bases for exercising personal 

jurisdiction over Defendants Gladney, the Oktibbeha County 

Mississippi Sheriff’s Department or the Columbus PD. Thus, 

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are due to be 

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.8

B. Improper Venue

While the remaining Defendant, John Rice, does not dispute 

 8 The undersigned is aware that these Defendants have raised 

a number of alternative grounds for dismissal including absolute 

judicial immunity by Defendant Judge Colom, statute of 

limitations, and failure to state a claim. Although these 

grounds appear well-founded, it is unnecessary for the 

undersigned to reach these arguments in the absence of personal 

jurisdiction. Should the District Judge find that the Court has 

personal jurisdiction over these Defendants, additional 

consideration of the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendants Sheriff Steven Gladney, Chief Lewis, the Oktibbeha 

County Mississippi Sheriff’s Department and the Columbus Police 

Department will be in order. 

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that he has minimum contacts with the state of Alabama, none of 

the actions about which Plaintiff complains are alleged to have 

occurred in the Southern District of Alabama. Thus, proper venue 

does not lie in this district. Under the pertinent provisions of 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in the judicial district in 

which any defendant resides or the judicial district in which a 

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 

claim occurred. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends 

that Defendant Rice, who can be located in Mississippi, 

committed a trespass against her in Mississippi, and assaulted 

her while she was in Birmingham, Alabama, attending a custody 

hearing. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not make clear 

which Mississippi city Defendant Rice resides in, or the 

Mississippi city in which the alleged trespass was committed. 

Plaintiff does however allege that Rice assaulted her in the 

city of Birmingham, Alabama, which lies in the Northern District 

of Alabama. Thus, this action could have been filed in that 

district since that is where the alleged assault occurred. See

28 USC § 1391(b). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), "[t]he district court of a 

district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong 

division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest 

of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in 

which it could have been brought." The undersigned finds that 

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it is in the interest of justice9 to transfer this case to the 

Northern District of Alabama for further proceedings given that 

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Stallings v. Hoffman, 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65776, 2014 WL 2040101, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 

2014) (finding that it was in the interest of justice to 

transfer a case brought in the wrong district because a pro se 

plaintiff "likely does not known the venue laws").

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that 

Defendants’ Amended Motions to Dismiss be GRANTED as to 

Defendants Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Department, Judge Dorothy 

Colom, City of Columbus Police Department, Sheriff Steven 

Gladney and Chief Oscar Lewis, and that this action, along with 

Defendant John Rice’s Motion to Dismiss, be transferred to the 

Northern District of Alabama for further proceedings. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

 9 The undersigned notes in passing that Defendant Rice 

argues that Plaintiff’s 1983 claims against him should be 

dismissed because they are barred by the statute of limitations. 

However, a closing reading of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does 

not demonstrate that her 1983 claims are directed at Defendant 

Rice. Thus, his argument is misplaced.

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to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c). The 

parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] 

party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th 

Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An 

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the 

briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 22nd day of February, 2017.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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