Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00300/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00300-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO LMH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kendall Ramsey, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Oscar Cortez, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-0300-PHX-FJM (DKD)

ORDER

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner regarding excessive of use of

force. Defendants moved for summary judgment and to deem requests for admission

admitted (Doc. #17). Plaintiff did not respond. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that Defendants Cortez and McDonough, who are

City of Phoenix police officers, unnecessarily used a taser gun against him during his arrest

and denied him access to medical care (Doc. #1 at 4-5). Plaintiff also alleged that

Defendants City of Phoenix and its police department endanger citizens by allowing officers

to use tasers (Id. at 6). 

Defendants moved for summary judgment and to deem requests for admission

granted, accompanied by a statement of facts (Doc. ##17-18). They contend that: (1) neither

Officer Cortez nor McDonald tazed Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff did not appear as if he needed

medical care nor did he request it; and (3) Plaintiff’s theory of municipal liability fails

because he has not shown that a specific policy or custom caused his injury (Doc. #17).

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 The Court issued a Notice informing Plaintiff about his rights and obligations to file

a timely response to the motion (Doc. #19). Plaintiff, however, failed to respond. 

II. Legal Standard

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

When considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non-movant is “to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). These inferences are limited, however, “to those

upon which a reasonable jury might return a verdict.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co.,

68 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after

adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Rule 56(e) compels the nonmoving party to “go

beyond the pleadings” to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. Id. at 324. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 

III. Analysis 

A. Excessive Force

For a claim of excessive force during an arrest, the Fourth Amendment is violated

when the force used is not objectively reasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95

(1989). According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, during his arrest on December 17, 2004, Officers

Cortez and McDonough opened a window of an apartment and instantly shot him with a taser

(Doc. #1 at 4). In their motions, Defendants attest that they were not the officers who used

a taser (Cortez Aff. ¶ 22; McDonough Aff. ¶ 15, DSOF, Exs. 2 & 3, Doc. #18). 

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The day before Plaintiff was arrested, Officer Cortez responded to a call about a

trespasser at an apartment complex. He found Plaintiff standing near the office mailbox and

when Cortez explained that he was a police officer, Plaintiff fled (Cortez Aff. ¶¶ 7-11). The

next day, four officers responded to a call from the complex, and they were told that Plaintiff

was inside an apartment (Id. ¶¶ 14-18). Cortez and two other officers banged on the door and

ordered Plaintiff to open it (Id. ¶ 19). McDonough, who was standing on the other side of

the building, heard a window open and saw Plaintiff begin to go through it (McDonough Aff.

¶¶ 10-11, DSOF Ex. 3, Doc. #18). McDonough saw another officer use his taser and miss

(Id. ¶ 12). Only one or two probes touched Plaintiff or his clothes, and Plaintiff did not

receive any charge or stun (Id. ¶¶ 13-14). Cortez entered the apartment, asked Plaintiff to

lie on the ground, and handcuffed him (Cortez Aff. ¶¶ 23-24).

Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ requests for admission, which means that

their requests are deemed admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). The admissions include that

Plaintiff fled from Cortez on December 16, and that he attempted to flee through the

apartment window on December 17 (DSOF Ex. 4, Doc. #18). 

In light of the foregoing, there is insufficient evidence in the record from which a jury

could find that Officers Cortez or McDonough used excessive force against Plaintiff during

his arrest by tazing him. Although Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that the officers tazed

him, it is clear from the officers’ testimony that neither of them used their tasers. Plaintiff

has not submitted any evidence to rebut these assertions nor has he attempted to sue the

officer who allegedly used a taser against him. Accordingly, Defendants Cortez and

McDonough are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

B. Medical Care

The Due Process Clause requires the government to secure medical care for persons

who have been injured during their arrest. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463

U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1098-99

(9th Cir. 2006). Defendants assert that Plaintiff must be able to show that the officers were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Lolli v. County of Orange, 351

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F.3d 410, 419 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to apply a more demanding standard of care

when the plaintiff did not argue for it).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Officers Cortez and McDonough denied him

access to “immediate medical intervention” (Doc. #1 at 5). Defendants Cortez and

McDonough attest that Plaintiff did not appear to be in pain, he did not complain about any

pain or injury, and he did not ask for medical assistance (Cortez Aff. ¶¶ 23, 25-26;

McDonough Aff. ¶¶ 17-19, DSOF Exs. 2-3, Doc. #18). Plaintiff has not responded to these

allegations. Notably, there are no medical records to support his assertion that he suffered

injury during his arrest. Defendants submitted evidence that they attempted to secure

Plaintiff’s authorization for release of medical records and they also requested Plaintiff to

serve them with copies of any records that he had, but he failed to respond. Consequently,

there is insufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Plaintiff had a serious medical

need upon his arrest or that the officers were deliberately indifferent to such a need.

Defendants Cortez and McDonough are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

C. Municipal Liability

Plaintiff alleged that the City of Phoenix and its police department allow the lives of

citizens to be endangered by permitting officers to use tasers (Doc. #1 at 6). A municipality

such as the City and its police department may not be held liable unless its policy or custom

caused the constitutional injury. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence

and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell v. Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s claim cannot succeed unless

he specifies the policy or custom that is pertinent to his alleged injury, and he explains how

the policy or custom caused his injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir.)

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2864 (2006). The City contends that Plaintiff has not cited any

specific policy or custom of the City that caused the denial of his constitutional rights. The

Court agrees that Plaintiff’s vague claim that the City allows the use of tasers is insufficient

to establish municipal liability. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of

the City and its police department.

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to

Deem Request for Admissions Admitted (Doc. #17) is granted. The Clerk of Court shall

enter judgment in favor of Defendants.

DATED this 16th day of October, 2006.

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