Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06490/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06490-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL NEVEAU,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipality;

JERRY DYER, individually;

MICHAEL GUTHRIE, individually;

GREG GARNER, individually;

DARREL FIFIELD, individually;

MARTY WEST, individually;

ROGER ENMARK, individually; and

DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

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1:04-cv-06490 OWW JLD

AMENDED

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’

(1) MOTION TO DISMISS

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6);

(2) MOTION FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e);

AND

(3) MOTION TO STRIKE

PORTIONS OF THE SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil rights action by a City of Fresno police

officer against the City of Fresno and several individual members

of the City of Fresno Police Department. Michael Neveu

(“Plaintiff”) brings a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and under two California state “whistleblower” statutes. 

Defendants CITY OF FRESNO, JERRY DYER, MICHAEL GUTHRIE, GREG

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GARNER, DARREL FIFIELD, MARTY WEST, and ROGER ENMARK

(“Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 41 Defs.’ Mot.; Doc. 42, Defs.’ Mem.) 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. 47, Pl.’s Opp.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on November 1, 2004. 

(Doc. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff filed the operative Third Amended

Complaint on July 25, 2005. (Doc. 39, Third Am. Compl.) 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint contains three claims, all

which arise out of Plaintiff’s complaint that Defendants

retaliated against him for having reported sexual misconduct,

racial harassment, and cheating on police department promotional

exams: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (first amendment retaliation);

(2) Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 (whistleblower retaliation); and

(3) Cal. Gov. Code § 53298 (whistleblower retaliation). 

Defendants seek to dismiss various claims and to strike

allegations contained in the Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 42,

Defs.’ Mem.) Plaintiff filed opposition on September 16, 2005. 

(Doc. 47, Pl.’s Opp.) Defendants replied on September 26, 2005. 

(Doc. 48, Defs.’ Reply)

Oral argument was heard on October 3, 2005. Michael A.

Morguess, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Joseph D.

Rubin, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants. 

III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

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28 1 Plaintiff has since been reinstated to duty.

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This civil rights action is brought by a Fresno City police

officer against the City of Fresno, the Fresno Police Chief, and

five individual Fresno City Police officers. Plaintiff brings

his § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of his first

amendment right to freedom of expression. Plaintiff claims he

was retaliated against for reporting to his superiors a number of

incidents of sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and

cheating on police department exams. The allegations in the

complaint are taken as true for the purpose of this motion to

dismiss.

Plaintiff alleges two adverse employment actions. First,

from June 1997 through December 2002, Defendants WEST, FIFIELD,

GUTHRIE, and GARNER failed to promote him despite his high

qualifications and performance. Second, in March 2004,

Defendants DYER, ENMARK, and GUTHRIE placed Plaintiff on

administrative leave and required Plaintiff to undergo

psychological examinations to determine his fitness for duty. 

Despite the recommendations of three psychologists that he was

fit for duty, Defendants refused to reinstate him to duty in July

2004.1

Plaintiff claims he was retaliated against for four

allegedly protected first amendment activities. These

allegations are addressed in greater detail in the July 2005

order granting in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 35,

“July 2005 Order”) First, Plaintiff reported alleged sexual

misconduct by Richard Mata, a suspended police department

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official who was under investigation for improper sexual behavior

towards a minor. Plaintiff alleges that Internal Affairs asked

Plaintiff to report to their office in writing any information he

obtained regarding Mata. WEST instructed Plaintiff not to put

any information regarding Mata in writing or report any

information to Internal Affairs. Instead, WEST instructed

Plaintiff to report such information verbally to his chain of

command. Second, Plaintiff alleges that he reported to his

immediate supervisors in writing racial discrimination against

Southeast Asian police officers. Third, Plaintiff submitted an

end-of-the year report involving the “banking” of overtime hours. 

Fourth, Plaintiff testified at an administrative hearing

regarding cheating on police promotional exams.

Plaintiff’s complaint also contains allegations regarding

the CITY’s “policies, customs, practices and decisions” regarding

promotions and administrative leave (“employment policies”). 

(Id. at ¶ 54) Plaintiff alleges that Chief DYER had policymaking authority over the employment policies and that “DYER used

the...FRESNO policies in retaliatory fashion to deprive NEVEU of

his rights as specifically alleged.” (Id.)

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is

disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

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no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In deciding whether to

grant a motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] all factual

allegations of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations

that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For

example, matters of public record may be considered under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 201, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed

with the court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981). 

V. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Plaintiff States a Monell Claim Against the

CITY Under § 1983.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the

CITY should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s factual allegations

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are insufficient to support Monell liability under § 1983.

Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Svcs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a local

government is liable under § 1983 for its policies that cause

constitutional torts. See also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520

U.S. 781, 785 (1997). A suit against a local official in his

“official capacity” is the same as a suit against the local

governmental entity itself. Id. at 785 n. 2; Doe v. Lawrence

Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (“a suit

against a state official in his official capacity is no different

from a suit against the [official’s office or the] State itself”

(citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71

(1989))); Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3

(9th Cir. 1999). 

A litigant can establish a Monell claim in one of three

ways: “(1) by showing a longstanding practice or custom which

constitutes the standard procedure of the local governmental

entity; (2) by showing that the decision-making official was, as

a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in

the area of decision; or (3) by showing that an official with

final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to,

or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Menotti v. City of

Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations

omitted) (quoting Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308

F.3d 968, 985-86 (9th Cir. 2002)).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s allegations against Chief

DYER and his allegations regarding the CITY’s policies, customs,

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and/or practices are confusing. Paragraph 54 of Plaintiff’s

complaint alleges that:

Chief DYER’S actions, as alleged herein, were

taken as an official policy maker, and with

the accompanying authority to which DEFENDANT

FRESNO delegated its governing powers in the

subject matter areas in which these policies

were promulgated or decisions taken or

customs and practices followed. The acts and

omissions of DEFENDANT DYER, as alleged

herein, manifested or conformed to official

policies, customs, practices, or decisions of

DEFENDANT FRESNO, in that FRESNO delegated to

DYER its policy making authority in all

matters of employment relations within the

DEPARTMENT, and/or DEFENDANT FRESNO, with

knowledge of the afore said [sic] policies,

customs, practices and decisions of DEFENDANT

DYER, approved, ratified and adopted said

policies, customs, practices and decisions. 

More specifically, DYER, as the Chief of

Police, has final official policy making

authority with respect to promotions within

the Police Department, as well as placing

officers on administrative leave and

subjecting them to a fitness for duty

examination. Moreover, DEFENDANT DYER acted

pursuant to FRESNO’s policies on promotions

as well as FRESNO’s policy in placing

employees on administrative leave pending a

fitness for duty examination, to which

DEFENDANT DYER was delegated final official

policy making authority over. In doing the

things it is alleged DEFENDANT DYER has done,

DEFENDANT DYER used the aforementioned FRESNO

policies in retaliatory fashion to deprive

NEVEAU of his rights as specifically alleged.

(Doc. 37, Third Am. Compl. ¶ 54) It is not clear, based upon

these allegations, whether Plaintiff attempts to allege a claim

against the CITY for “a longstanding practice or custom” that led

to the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or

whether Plaintiff attempts instead to allege a Monell claim

through one of the other two means, i.e., the constitutional

violation was caused by the act of an official with final

policymaking authority or by the ratification of unconstitutional

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conduct of subordinates by an official with final policymaking

authority. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations appear

to be an attempt to allege a Monell claim in all three ways.

As to the first variation of a Monell claim, Defendant

argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting the

existence of a policy. Plaintiff’s response is that he does

allege the existence of a policy, referring to the allegations

“in paragraph 54 of the Third Amended Complaint that Fresno

maintained policies on promotions as well as placing individuals

on administrative leave.” (Doc. 47, Pl.’s Mem. 5) 

However, alleging that the CITY maintained official

employment policies is not a sufficient basis on which Monell

liability can be established. Plaintiff does not describe what

these specific policies are (such as denying promotions to

officers who speak out), or how they were used to deprive

Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s Monell

claim against FRESNO in his Second Amended Complaint was

dismissed for the same deficiency. (Doc. 35, July 2005 Order 30)

However, it can be inferred from Plaintiff’s allegations

that he attempts to plead the existence of a custom or practice

of retaliation (i.e., one that is different from the CITY’s

official employment policies). Although Plaintiff does not make

this argument, such an attempt can be inferred from his

allegation that defendants WEST, FIFIELD, GUTHRIE, and GARNER

purposefully prevented Plaintiff from being promoted and that

they “had done similar ‘black listing’ to other officers who

spoke up.” (Doc. 37, Third Am. Compl. ¶ 43) One isolated

reference to blacklisting is not sufficient; however, the claim

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that other officers had been “blacklisted” for speaking out,

although general, is adequate to put defendants on notice of the

claim. Plaintiff claims that blacklisting was a custom or policy

of the police department.

Plaintiff’s complaint also contains various other factual

allegations that could be construed as constituting a custom or

practice. For example, the complaint alleges: 

(1) After Plaintiff informed Captain WEST that he was

going to report all sexual allegations or

improprieties in writing to Internal Affairs, WEST

told Plaintiff that “if [Plaintiff] wanted ‘to

play it that way,’ and ‘not be a team player’ with

them, that was his choice but there would be

consequences.” (Doc. 37, Third Am. Compl. ¶ 28) 

The complaint does not describe what the

“consequences” are and does not allege that the

consequences were part of a custom or practice.

(2) Sergeant Montejano advised Plaintiff that “he

should not have documented the racial harassment

because it caused staff at the Police Activity

League to become upset, including retired Deputy

Chief Lee Piscola, and that ‘pissing off a retired

Chief is a bad career move.’” (Id. at ¶ 29) 

Again, there is no further explanation as to

Retired Chief Piscola’s involvement in or

relationship to the purported retaliation against

Plaintiff. There is no allegation connecting

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Sergeant Montejano’s comment to any purported

custom or practice.

(3) Chief DYER stated publicly “that he wanted control

over who was promoted” and subsequently introduced

a “practical phase” to the promotions process. 

Plaintiff alleges that the “practical phase”

included giving the answers to promotional exams

to those sergeants whom Chief DYER wanted

promoted. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33) Plaintiff further

alleges the complaints of other candidates

regarding this practice led to a hearing before

the Civil Service Commission at which Plaintiff

testified. The defendants are required to draw

the inference that such cheating on the

promotional exams was part of the Chief’s alleged

custom or practice in failing to promote Plaintiff

and others who were considered undesirable.

Neither the Defendants nor the court should be required to

guess or add allegations to divine the substance of the policy,

custom, or practice that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s Monell

claim. General notice pleading under Rule 8(a) requires only a

short and plain statement of the facts. A complaint must, at the

very least, allow Defendants to adequately respond to the

allegations against them. Plaintiff’s complaint contains

references to the CITY’s official employment policies, as well as

to Plaintiff’s circumstantial encounters with various defendants,

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and to “blacklisting” employees, these conclusory allegations

barely describe any policy, custom, or practice that is

implemented to effect constitutional inquiry.

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that his complaint

sufficiently alleges a municipal liability claim against DYER

under the second variation by which a Monell claim can be

alleged, i.e., based on a single decision by an official with

final policymaking authority. A litigant can establish a Monell

claim based upon a single action by a decision-making official

with final policymaking authority, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1986). 

Plaintiff’s allegations relating to DYER’s final policymaking authority include the following circular sentence: 

The acts and omissions of DEFENDANT DYER, as

alleged herein, manifested or conformed to

official policies, customs, practices, or

decisions of DEFENDANT FRESNO, in that FRESNO

delegated to DYER its policy making authority

in all matters of employment relations within

the DEPARTMENT, and/or DEFENDANT FRESNO, with

knowledge of the afore said [sic] policies,

customs, practices and decisions of DEFENDANT

DYER, approved, ratified, and adopted said

policies, customs, practices and decisions.

(Doc. 37, Third Am. Compl. ¶ 54) This requires defendants to

search for the underlying alleged “customs or policies.” With

respect to the CITY’s official administrative leave policy,

Plaintiff alleges that “DYER used the aforementioned FRESNO

policies in retaliatory fashion to deprive NEVEU of his rights as

specifically alleged.” (Id.) 

Defendants are left to infer that Plaintiff was deprived of

his first amendment constitutional rights by DYER’s alleged

discriminatory placement of Plaintiff on administrative leave,

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which became the CITY’s policy because it was implemented by a

department head with policy-making authority. Plaintiff alleges

that two officers in addition to DYER are responsible for having

placed Plaintiff on administrative leave, including ENMARK (the

deputy chief) and GUTHRIE (a lieutenant). (Doc. 37, Third Am.

Compl. ¶ 45)

Plaintiff also argues that he states a Monell claim under

the variation, i.e., based on delegation of authority. Plaintiff

alleges that the CITY delegated authority to DYER; but offers no

explanation how this is distinguishable from the allegation that

DYER had final policymaking authority for the CITY. The third

variation of a Monell claim involves the situation where final

decision-making authority was delegated to subordinates. See

Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1147. Plaintiff’s complaint contains no

allegations that DYER delegated final decision-making authority

to a subordinate. Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a Monell

claim in the third way.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim

against the CITY is DENIED.

B. Whether Plaintiff States a Claim under Cal. Labor Code

§ 1102.5.

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5

was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that

Plaintiff failed to allege that he exhausted available

administrative remedies, included but not limited to filing a

complaint with the Labor Commissioner. (Doc. 35, July 2005 Order

33-35) Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint contains a claim

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2 Plaintiff’s argument that there is no procedure in place

in the Labor Commissioner’s office to file such claims is

irrelevant. The phone call placed by Plaintiff’s counsel to the

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under Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5. Defendants argue that their

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1102.5 claim was granted without

leave to amend, and that Plaintiff brings this claim again in

violation of a previous court order.

Plaintiff argues that the court’s order was ambiguous as to

whether leave to amend was allowed. Defendants are correct in

that the July 2005 Order did not grant Plaintiff leave to amend. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s opposition will be construed as a

request for leave to amend this claim.

Plaintiff argues in his opposition that “this Court

misapplied the ruling in Campbell v. Regents of the Univ. of

Cal., 35 Cal. 4th 311 (2005). Plaintiff misinterprets the

court’s previous holding. The July 2005 Order stated “Plaintiff

does not allege that he exhausted available administrative

remedies, including bringing a complaint before the Labor

Commissioner, before bringing suit.” (Doc. 35, July 2005 Order

35) Campbell held, among other things, that despite § 1102.5's

silence on the issue whether a claimant must exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit, California’s

administrative exhaustion requirement nevertheless applies. 35

Cal. 4th at 329-30. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint did not

allege that he exhausted any administrative remedies as to

§ 1102.5, including filing a claim with the Labor Commissioner,

which is a remedy that is expressly available under Cal. Labor

Code § 98.7.2 (See Doc. 23, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-58)

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Labor Commissioner’s office is not properly judicially noticeable

under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Whether a phone call took

place and the substance of the phone call consists of the

personal knowledge of counsel. Such evidence is not “generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction” of this court, and is

also not “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort

to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned,”

either of which are required by FRE 201.

14

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint does contain an

allegation that he exhausted all available administrative

remedies. While Plaintiff does not allege he filed a claim with

the Labor Commissioner, he does allege he filed a tort claim

pursuant to Cal. Govt. Code §§ 910, et seq. Furthermore, he

alleges that the CITY has no internal administrative remedies

available that cover claims for retaliation under § 1102.5 and

that filing a government tort claim did exhaust all available

administrative remedies. (Doc. 37, Third Am. Compl. ¶ 58)

While Defendant is technically correct that Plaintiff was

not granted leave to amend its § 1102.5 claim to allege

compliance with the exhaustion requirement, a policy underlying

federal civil procedure is that, absence prejudice to the

Defendant, leave to amend should be freely granted. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a) (“leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so

requires”); see also Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316

F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff is therefore

granted LEAVE TO AMEND his § 1102.5 claim. Whether Plaintiff’s

allegation that there were no adequate administrative remedies

for § 1102.5 claims (including but not limited to the practical

unavailability of filing a claim with the Labor Commissioner) is

a question of fact for the fact-finder. At the pleading stage,

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Plaintiff’s allegation that there were no adequate internal

administrative remedies and that he exhausted the only available

administrative remedy (i.e., the filing of a government tort

claim), is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1102.5 claim is

DENIED.

C. Whether Plaintiff States a Claim Under Cal. Govt. Code

§ 53298.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

against GARNER, FIFIELD, and WEST under Cal. Govt. Code § 53298. 

Plaintiff does not address this argument in his opposition. At

oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged this claim should

be dismissed. Cal. Gov. Code § 53298(a) establishes liability

for any local agency officer, manager, or supervisor who

retaliates against any employee for filing a complaint with the

local agency reporting “gross mismanagement, a significant waste

of funds, an abuse of authority, or a specific and substantial

danger to public health or safety.” Cal. Gov. Code §§ 53298(a),

53296(c); see also LeVine, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 212 (discussing

§ 53298 in dicta). The written complaints that are the basis of

Plaintiff’s § 53298 claim are (1) written report(s) of sexual

molestation by a former police officer; and (2) written report(s)

of racial harassment. (Doc. 37, Third Am. Compl. ¶ 60) The only

act of retaliation alleged in Plaintiff’s § 53298 claim is

placing Plaintiff on administrative leave. (See id.) Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs’ § 53298 claim should be dismissed as to

WEST, FIFIELD, and GARNER, since they are only alleged to have

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played a role in the failure to promote Plaintiff and are not

alleged to have had a role in placing Plaintiff on administrative

leave. Plaintiff does not dispute this argument. Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1102.5 claim as to WEST, FIFIELD,

and GARNER is GRANTED.

D. Defendants’ Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) provides that “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken from any

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[M]otions to strike should

not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken

could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the

litigation.” Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp.

1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citation omitted). Defendants argue

that several allegations should be stricken from the Third

Amended Complaint.

First, Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations in

paragraph 44 that the statute of limitations is tolled based upon

the continuing violations doctrine is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s

argument based on the tolling of the statute of limitations based

on the continuing violations doctrine was rejected. (Doc. 35,

July 2005 Order 21-25)

Second, Defendants’ motion to strike the allegation in

paragraph 54 (18:11) that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment rights is GRANTED. Any claim based upon an

alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights has

been dismissed. (Id. at 32-33)

Third, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s § 1102.5

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claim in paragraphs 55-58 is MOOT, as Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1102.5 claim is denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons Defendants’:

(1) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against

the CITY is DENIED; 

(2) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 claim

is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 

(3) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Cal. Govt. Code § 53298 claim 

as to WEST, FIFIELD, and GARNER is GRANTED;

(4) Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is MOOT;

(5) Rule 12(f) motion to strike is GRANTED as to the allegations

in paragraphs 44 and 54 (18:11), and is DENIED as to all

other allegations.

Any amended complaint shall be filed within 20 days from

service of this order.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 12, 2005. 

/s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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