Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00210/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Henderson Jordan, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 11-0210-PHX-DKD

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Henderson Jordan filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 1, 2011,

challenging his 1994 convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for manslaughter, use

of narcotic drugs, use of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court

sentenced Jordan to an aggravated 30-year prison term on the manslaughter count, and

aggravated terms for the drug offenses, the longest being 8 years, to be served concurrently

to one another and consecutively to the sentence for the manslaughter conviction. Jordan

raises seven grounds for habeas relief, arguing improprieties in the indictment and

sentencing, and the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Respondents argue that the

petition is untimely and Jordan is not entitled to equitable tolling, and that Jordan’s claims

are procedurally defaulted. The Court agrees that the petition is untimely, that Jordan is not

entitled to any statutory or equitable tolling, and recommends that the petition be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

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BACKGROUND

The facts surrounding the charged offenses are summarized in the court of appeals

memorandum decision:

The Defendant was involved in an automobile accident

that caused a death. He was taken to the hospital, and he

ultimately tested positive for drug use. He was subsequently

charged with manslaughter, use of a narcotic drug, use of

marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The

Defendant acted as his own counsel with the assistance of

advisory counsel. At trial, he argued that he was not driving the

truck when the accident occurred. Nonetheless, the jury found

him guilty on all counts and concluded that the manslaughter

was a dangerous offense. The Defendant was sentenced to the

maximum term for each count plus an additional two years on

each count because the offenses were committed while the

Defendant was on release. He received a total of thirty-eight

years in prison.

(Doc. 10, Exh A).

Following the judgments of conviction and sentencing, on September 14, 1994, Jordan

filed a timely notice of appeal, and appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, raising two

arguable issues related to the trial court’s denial of two motions for mistrial (Id., Exh K). On

November 30, 1995, Jordan filed a pro se supplemental brief, raising the following issues:

(1) ineffective assistance of appointed counsel; (2) ineffective assistance of advisory counsel;

and (3) the trial court’s abuse of discretion in denying several defense motions (Id., Exh M).

On February 27, 1996, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, declining

to decide the ineffective assistance issues because of inadequate information in the record.

In addition, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying defense motions (Id., Exh A). Jordon did not file a pro per motion for

reconsideration or a petition for review (Id., Exh N).

On January 16, 2009, almost 13 years after the court of appeals affirmed Jordan’s

convictions and sentences, he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief (Id., Exh O).

He alleged that the petition was based on “newly discovered evidence and materials of facts

[sic] not known before this petition” (Id.). Jordan argued that the trial court erred or

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exceeded its authority as follows: (1) improperly applying A.R.S. § 13-604 in imposing

sentence for the drug offenses; (2) using a historical prior for sentence enhancement under

§ 13-604; (3) not allowing a jury to decide the quantity of drugs for sentence enhancement;

(4) allowing Jordan to admit to having one prior felony conviction when he was misled or

in doubt about the use of the prior conviction; (5) using a motor vehicle as a dangerous

instrument for sentence enhancement when it had already been used to make it a dangerous

offense; (6) considering a prior charge for which Jordan was acquitted as an aggravating

circumstance; (7) amending the indictment for impeachment and sentence enhancement; (8)

using information in the presentence report as an aggravating factor when Jordan had not

reviewed the report or been allowed to make objections; and (9) sentencing Jordan outside

of the statutory range (Id.).

On April 21, 2009, the trial court ruled that the claims could not be raised in an

untimely petition. Jordan had argued that he was excused from the timeliness requirement

because the failure to timely file was without fault on his part. The trial court rejected this

argument because it was not an “of right” petition, and Jordan was therefore not entitled to

relief. The trial court also determined that Jordan’s claim of newly discovered evidence was

without merit because he had failed to show that the evidence was discovered after trial

although it existed before trial; that it could not have been discovered and produced at trial

through reasonable diligence; that the evidence was material; and that it would have changed

the verdict. The trial court also ruled that Jordan had failed to allege what newly discovered

facts entitled him to relief (Id., Exh P). Finally, the trial court rejected Jordan’s Blakely

argument, noting that Blakely does not apply retroactively to final convictions in Arizona

(Id.). On June 2, 2010, the court of appeals denied review; on December 6, 2010, the

supreme court denied review (Id., Exh T, V). Jordan filed his federal petition on February

1, 2011 (Doc. 1).

Jordan was required to file his federal petition within one year of the “date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

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for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct.

681, 685 (2009). Jordan’s conviction became final on March 29, 1996, 30 days after the

court of appeals issued its memorandum decision. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069,

1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007). Because his conviction became final before the enactment of the

AEDPA, Jordan had a one-year grace period, until April 24, 1997, in which to file his habeas

petition in federal court. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). In the

absence of statutory tolling, the limitations period expired on April 24, 1997. Jordan filed

nothing in superior court that would have tolled the one-year limitations period. “[A]

properly and timely filed petition in state court only tolls the time remaining in the federal

limitation period.” See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 538

U.S. 949, 123 S.Ct. 1627, 155 L.Ed.2d 492 (2003). Jordan’s petition filed following the

expiration of the limitations period does not afford him any tolling. There can be no tolling

following the expiration of the limitations period because “there is no period remaining to

be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

991 (2000). Finally, Jordan’s petition for post-conviction relief, filed 13 years after the

expiration of the limitations period, does not revive the expired limitations period. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

In addition, Jordan is not entitled to equitable tolling. He has not demonstrated that

he had been pursuing his rights diligently and the existence of any extraordinary

circumstances which prevented him from timely filing his petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 418-19 (2005). He has also not shown that an external impediment caused his

untimely filing, and not his lack of diligence. Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056,

1061 (9th Cir. 2007).

In his reply, he does not present any legal argument related to the timeliness of his

petition, addressing only Respondents’ contention that his claims were procedurally

defaulted. However, he attached to his reply an affidavit stating as follows:

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I Henderson Jordan hereby avow, attest and certify that

under penalty of perjury that under the guidelines of Rule

32.1(e)(3), I filed my first motion of Rule 32 within 100 days of

discovering that my sentence may be in violation of state law by

my assigned C.O. 3 after reviewing my AIMS file and release

dates not being in order by comparison to other sentence within

30 days of each other. Stating that the calculations were

different and shouldn’t be - thus becoming aware of sentencing

violation and filing Rule 32, and asking for an evidentiary

hearing to explain what I now know to be ex post facto rather

than misapplication of 13-604 and 702.

(Doc. 11, Exh 7). 

Jordan has not established either of the two requirements necessary for the application of

equitable tolling. Jordan does not demonstrate that the information about his sentence was

in fact newly discovered and not available at the time of sentencing or at the time of his

appeal, or why he did not pursue his post-conviction petition in a timely manner following

the court of appeals memorandum decision. Jordan does not allege nor does the record

reflect that he was diligent in pursuing his rights. In addition, he has not shown an external

impediment caused his untimely filing, and not his lack of diligence. Bryant. His ignorance

of the law is not an extraordinary circumstance. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1155

(9th Cir. 2006).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Henderson Jordan’s petition for writ

of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

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days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 12th day of July, 2011.

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