Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01339/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01339-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Isiah Romont Hill, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

William White, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-10-1339-PHX-PGR (LOA)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Disqualification or

Recusal. (Doc. 44) After consideration of this matter, the motion for disqualification or

recusal will be denied. 

I. Background

On June 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and a request to expedite his

case. (Docs. 1, 3, 4) On July 29, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend to add Ground

Five. (Doc. 8) On September 1, 2010, the Court granted Petitioner in forma pauperis status

and granted his motion to expedite his case to the extent that the State was required to

answer the Petition within forty days. (Doc. 9) The Court also granted Petitioner leave to

amend to add Ground Five to his Petition. (Id.) Between September 7 and 22, 2010,

Petitioner filed a Motion for Release Order, Amended Motion for Release Order, Motion for

Special Action, Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Motion to Expedite Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Docs. 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17) On September 24, 2010, the Court

Case 2:10-cv-01339-PGR Document 46 Filed 04/04/11 Page 1 of 7
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 1 Although Petitioner does not specifically identify the motions at issue, he appears to refer

to Doc. 33 - Motion for Default Judgment; Docs. 35, 37, 39 - Motion for Summary Judgment

and Amended Motions for Summary Judgment; and Doc. 31 - Motion to Suppress State’s

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denied these motions, without prejudice, noting that they raised the same issues as his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and advising Petitioner that it would consider the

Petition after it was fully briefed. (Doc. 18) 

On October 13, 2010, Respondents moved for an extension of time to file an Answer. 

(Doc. 21) On October 19, 2010, the undersigned granted the motion and extended the

deadline for Respondents to file an Answer to November 24, 2010. (Doc. 25) 

Petitioner, in the meantime, filed several more motions: Motion for Summary

Judgment, Motion for Dismissal/Expedited release, Motion to Expedite, and Motion for

Default Judgment. (Docs. 21, 22, 23, 24) On October 25, 2010, the undersigned

recommended that the motions be denied on the grounds that Respondents were not in

default, noting that motions practice is not favored in habeas corpus proceedings. (Doc. 27) 

The Report and Recommendation was adopted on November 3, 2010. (Doc. 29)

On November 24, 2010, Respondents filed an Answer to the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 30) Petitioner filed a Reply on November 30, 2010. (Doc. 32) 

Despite having been advised that a motions practice is not favored in habeas corpus

proceedings, between November 30, 2010 and March 1, 2011, Petitioner filed an additional

ten motions. (Docs. 33-40, and 42) On February 23, 2011, the undersigned granted

Petitioner’s Motion for Status, doc. 40, advising him that a ruling on the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus would be issued as the Court’s calendar allowed. (Doc. 41) On March 30,

2011, the Court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Strike/Suppress State’s Answer and Motion to

Deny State’s Answer. (See Docs. 31, 36, 43) 

 On March 30, 2011, Petitioner filed yet another motion, the pending Motion for

Disqualification/Recusal. (Doc. 44) Petitioner asserts that the undersigned’s failure to rule

on his unopposed motions for “summary judgment/default/suppress” in a “timely fashion”

indicates judicial bias against him.1

 On April 4, 2011, the undersigned issued a Report and

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Answer. These motions were filed between November 30, 2010 and December 14, 2010. 

 2 Title 28 U.S.C. § 144 reads:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely

and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,

such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned

to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or

prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of

the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for

failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any

case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it

is made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 144 (emphasis added). 

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Recommendation, recommending that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the

remaining motions be denied. Thus, as of the date this Order is filed, there are no pending

motions in this case. As discussed below, Petitioner’s motion for recusal/disqualification

will be denied. 

II. Analysis 

A party may move to disqualify, or recuse, a judge from presiding in a given case.

Motions to disqualify a federal judge fall under two statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 144

and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455. Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a timely and sufficient affidavit

averring that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice

either against the party or in favor of an adverse party. The affidavit must state the facts and

reasons for such belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 144.2

 A judge finding the motion timely and the

affidavits legally sufficient must proceed no further and another judge must be assigned to

hear the matter. See id.; United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980).

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On the other hand, § 455 provides broader grounds for disqualification and is

self-enforcing on the part of the judge. In particular, § 455 requires a judge to disqualify

himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28

U.S.C. § 455(a). The test for personal bias or prejudice is the same under §§ 144 and 455.

Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868. Specifically, under both statutes recusal is appropriate where “a

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1044

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Consequently, recusal will be justified either by actual bias or the appearance of bias. Id. In

nearly all cases, the source of any alleged bias must be extrajudicial. Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540, 544-56 (1994). Judicial bias or prejudice formed during current or prior

proceedings is insufficient for recusal unless the judge’s actions “display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 541; Pesnell,

543 F.3d at 1044. Judicial rulings will support a motion for recusal only “in the rarest of

circumstances.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th

Cir. 1994); Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the alleged

prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source; a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not

sufficient cause for recusal).

As an initial matter, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s affidavit does not comply

with 28 U.S.C. § 144. See Grimes v. U. S., 396 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1968). Section 144

provides:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely

and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,

such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned

to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or

prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning

of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be

shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such

affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of

record stating that it is made in good faith.

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28 U.S.C. § 144 (emphasis added). “An affidavit filed pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 144] is not

legally sufficient unless it specifically alleges facts that fairly support the contention that the

judge exhibits bias or prejudice directed toward a party that stems from an extrajudicial

source.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868. (emphasis added). Section 144 “must be given the utmost

of strict construction to safeguard the judiciary from frivolous attacks upon its dignity and

integrity . . . and to prevent abuse and to insure orderly functioning of the judicial system . . .

.” Rademacher v. City of Phoenix, 442 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Ariz. 1977) (internal citations

omitted). Petitioner’s Affidavit merely states that:

Petitioner submits this as truth/fact to the best of his ability/knowledge 

and without bias[.] [I]t seems that Hill’s interests for life, limb, liberty

is of no importance. State’s motion requesting [an extension] to answer

Petitioner’s Petition was granted in less than a week. Than was suppressed

was the answer (sic). 

(Doc. 44 at 2) Petitioner does not present any facts indicating that the undersigned exhibited

bias or prejudice toward Petitioner stemming from any extrajudicial source. Rather, when

read in conjunction with Petitioner’s Motion, Petitioner suggests that because the Court

ruled on Respondents’ motion for extension of time in less than a week, but took longer to

rule on Petitioner’s motions for summary judgment, default judgment, and to suppress

Respondents’ answer, the undersigned is biased against Petitioner. Petitioner’s arguments

are based solely on the length of time, approximately four months, taken to issue rulings on

several motions in this case. Judicial bias or prejudice formed during current or prior

proceedings is insufficient for recusal unless the judge’s actions “display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”Liteky, 510 U.S. 540 at

541.

Here, Respondents’ motion for extension of time was a simple request which did not

concern any substantive issues. On the other hand, Petitioner’s motions raised many of the

same issues asserted in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and, therefore, were

appropriately considered in conjunction with the Petition itself. See Gordon v. Duran, 895

F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that federal courts do not favor the use of default

judgment to grant habeas relief without reaching the merits of the claims). Thus, the mere

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difference in the length of time in issuing rulings on those motions and on Respondents’

motion for extension of time does not indicate bias or impartiality against Petitioner, much

less “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” Id. The undersigned recently issued a Report

and Recommendation addressing the merits of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, recommending that the Petition be denied, and that Petitioner’s pending motions be

denied as moot. Because Petitioner’s various motions concerned issues which were also

raised in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the undersigned addressed the motions and

the Petition simultaneously to conserve judicial resources and because doing so was

appropriate in view of the nature of habeas corpus proceedings. Because of the peculiar and

unique nature of habeas proceedings, as a general rule, summary judgment motions under

Rule 56 are not particularly appropriate. See Cardenas v. Adler, 2010 WL 1727923, * 3

(E.D.Cal., April 27, 2010) (citing Anderson v. Butler, 886 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1989)

(modern habeas corpus procedure has the same function as an ordinary appeal); O’Neal v.

McAnnich, 513 U.S. 440, 442 (1995) (federal court’s function in habeas corpus proceedings

is to “review errors in state criminal trials.”) (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, motions for

summary judgment are unnecessary because petitions may be decided immediately by the

Court following submission of the pleadings provided no material issues of fact exist.

Cardenas, 2010 WL 1727923, at * 3 (citing 1 J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice

and Procedure, § 17.3 (1988)). Petitioner’s complaint regarding the several months he

waited for the undersigned’s rulings on his motions does not indicate that the undersigned

was biased or impartial. 

In view of the foregoing, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s motion and affidavit

insufficient to warrant forwarding this matter to another judge for further review pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 144. See Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867; 28 U.S.C. § 144. Likewise, the undersigned

finds no basis for recusal under § 455. The undersigned cannot conclude that the grounds

advanced by Petitioner for disqualification, waiting several months for rulings on motions

pertaining to his habeas corpus petition, are such that would cause a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the relevant facts to question the impartiality of the undersigned magistrate

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judge. See Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States

v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

III. Summary

In summary, Petitioner is displeased with the amount of time he had to wait for

rulings on several motions in his case. The time taken in this case was reasonable and does

not provide a basis for recusal or disqualification. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (stating that

judicial rulings will support a motion for recusal only “in the rarest of circumstances.”);

United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 1994). The undersigned declines to

recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455, and finds Petitioner’s motion and affidavit insufficient to

warrant forwarding this matter to another judge for further review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

144. See Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867; 28 U.S.C. § 144. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Disqualification or Recusal, doc. 44,

is DENIED. 

DATED this 4th day of April, 2011.

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