Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04695/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04695-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SONIA BAREKZAI,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-4695 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S AND

DEFENDANT'S

MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND

FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Sonia Barekzai moves for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, for remand. Defendant Jo Anne Barnhart in her

capacity as Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(SSA) opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

denies the motions for summary judgment, and grants Plaintiff's

motion to remand.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 14, 2003, Plaintiff filed an application for

supplemental security income benefits (SSI) under Title XVI of the

Social Security Act, alleging disability as of that day. (Hearing

Transcript (Tr.) at 15). Plaintiff's application and subsequent

request for review were denied. (Tr. at 24 and 30). Plaintiff

filed a timely request for a hearing before an administrative law

judge (ALJ). (Tr. at 35).

On January 20, 2005, a hearing was held before an ALJ. 

Plaintiff appeared, and was represented by counsel. (Tr. at 15). 

On March 16, 2005, the ALJ issued an opinion finding that Plaintiff

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

(Tr. at 15-21). On September 23, 2005, Plaintiff's request for

administrative review by the Appeals Council was denied. (Tr. at

5). Plaintiff then initiated the instant action for judicial

review under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c), seeking an award of benefits or,

in the alternative, remand to the Commissioner for further

proceedings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Education and Work History

At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified, through a

translator, to the following facts. Plaintiff was born on August

2, 1959 in Afghanistan. (Tr. at 209). After finishing high

school, she completed one extra year of school there, which enabled

her to become a teacher. (Tr. at 209). She taught for

approximately six months before leaving Afghanistan. (Tr. at 211). 

At the end of 1985, she moved to the United States (Tr. at 209),

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1

Zoloft is an anti-depressant. Physician's Desk Reference, 2581 (60th ed. 2006).

2

Valium is indicated for management of anxiety disorders or

for the short-term relief of symptoms of anxiety. Id. at 2822. 

3

and has not worked in this country (Tr. at 212). She cannot speak

English. (Tr. at 212).

II. Medical History

A. Dr. Hsu

Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Hwei-Jung Hsu, M.D., her treating

physician, on October 20, 2002. (Tr. at 117-130 and 173-178).

Dr. Hsu's notes of Plaintiff's reported symptoms include back

pain (Tr. at 127), chest pain, (id.,) pain in both heels and feet

(Tr. at 120), pain in her back and right leg (Tr. at 174), pain in

both ankles (Tr. at 129), low back pain (Tr. at 176) and neck pain

(Tr. at 178).

Dr. Hsu diagnosed Plaintiff with a lumbar disc problem (Tr. at

125 and 129), lumbar strain (Tr. at 126), arthritis (id.,) lumber

disc disease (Tr. at 129), plantar fasciitis (id.,) a boil on the

lower abdomen (Tr. at 130), and tendonitis in the left arm (id.). 

Dr. Hsu prescribed medication regularly for Plaintiff's physical

problems. (Tr. at 174). Dr. Hsu also administered acupuncture,

vitamin shots and B-complex shots. (Tr. at 215).

In addition, Dr. Hsu diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from

depression. (Tr. at 174). He prescribed various medications that

are typically used for depression or anxiety, Zoloft1

 on January

27, 2003, (Tr. at 127), and Valium2 on July 1, 2004, (Tr. at 174). 

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3

 A residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment "measures

the claimant's capacity to engage in basic work activities . . ." 

This means "what the claimant can still do despite his or her

impairment." Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir.

1991).

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B. Dr. Johnston

On June 2, 2003, Dr. Bruce Johnston, M.D., a psychiatrist,

performed a psychiatric consultative examination of Plaintiff,

apparently at the request of the SSA.

Dr. Johnston observed that Plaintiff complained about physical

problems, suffered from chronic and disabling somatic pain and

experienced inconsistent sleep and appetite. (Tr. at 134). He

noted that Plaintiff's upbringing in Afghanistan was substantially

different from living in the United States, making a shift toward a

working life in this country highly unlikely. (Tr. at 134).

He found that Plaintiff had no cognitive or memory defects,

and no psychological abnormalities. Id. He diagnosed Plaintiff

with chronic pain pattern, moderate depression, and post-traumatic

stress reaction. Id.

C. State Agency Physicians

On June 10, 2003, State agency physicians reviewed Plaintiff's

record and determined the following mental residual functional

capacity (RFC).3 First, Plaintiff was moderately limited in her

ability to understand, remember and carry out detailed

instructions, in her ability to maintain attention and

concentration for extended periods and in her ability to interact

appropriately with the general public. (Tr. at 136-137). 

Plaintiff was diagnosed as having affective disorders, anxietyCase 4:05-cv-04695-CW Document 16 Filed 03/20/07 Page 4 of 20
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4

Anhedonia is defined as the inability to experience pleasure. 

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 58 (1979).

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related disorders (Tr. at 140), sleep disturbance (Tr. at 143),

moderate depression (Tr. at 143) and elements of post-traumatic

stress disorder (PTSD) (Tr. at 145). As a result, Plaintiff was

mildly functionally limited in her activities of daily living, 

maintaining social functioning, and maintaining concentration,

persistence or pace. (Tr. at 150).

D. Dr. Rahmany

On November 18, 2004, Dr. Khalil Rahmany, Ph.D., Licensed

Clinical Psychologist, wrote a psychological evaluation of

Plaintiff. He explained that Plaintiff was referred to his clinic

by Dr. Hsu for evaluation and treatment of depression. (Tr. at

169). 

In his evaluation, Dr. Rahmany wrote that Plaintiff reported

experiencing insomnia, anhedonia4 and preoccupation with internal

stimuli, nightmares and distressing dreams, memory impairment,

psychomotor retardation, irritable mood and frequent crying spells,

inability to concentrate, low frustration tolerance and anger

outbursts, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, and passive

suicidal ideation. Id. He also noted that her symptoms of

depression had worsened during the previous two years. Id. 

His diagnosis was major depressive disorder that was

recurrent, severe and without psychotic features. (Tr. at 171). 

He opined that Plaintiff's problems were chronic and long-standing. 

Id.

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III. Hearing Before Administrative Law Judge

 A. Plaintiff's Testimony at Hearing

Plaintiff testified that, as of the hearing date, she saw

psychologist Dr. Rahmany every month for approximately the previous 

year for therapy and treatment of emotional problems. (Tr. at

215). She slept only intermittently through the night because of

her pain and nightmares. (Tr. at 215 and 216). She kept to

herself during the daytime. (Tr. at 216). She sometimes slept a

bit during the day, watched television and read. She could take a

whole day to read one or two chapters in a book because she could

only read for three to four minutes at a time. (Tr. at 216). Any

activities involving bending, pushing, pulling or walking made her

pain worse. (Tr. at 217). She could not walk five blocks. (Tr.

at 217). She could not stand for long periods. (Tr. at 217 and

218). Sitting in one place made her back pain increase; to avoid

this, she needed to stand up and move around periodically. (Tr. at

218). 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Hsu every month for medication, acupuncture,

vitamin shots and B-complex shots. (Tr. at 215). She was

unemployed because she experienced extreme pain that shot up and

down between her legs and her back, and she had severe arthritis

and pain in her fingers. (Tr. at 213). She did limited household

work. (Tr. at 214). She took medication for her pain daily. (Tr.

at 214). Six years prior to the administrative hearing, she had

bone corrective surgery on one of her legs. (Tr. at 214). After

surgery, she suffered from a pinched nerve in her leg. Because of

the pinched nerve and her back pain, Plaintiff needed the

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5

SVP refers to specific vocational preparation level. Using

skill level definitions in 20 CFR §§ 404.1568 and 416.968, an SVP

of 1 or 2 corresponds to unskilled work which needs little or no

judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a

short period of time.

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assistance of a cane for walking. (Tr. at 214). 

B. RFC and Vocational Expert's Testimony

The ALJ asked the Vocational Expert (VE), Mr. Malcolm

Brodzinsky, appearing on behalf of the SSA, whether a hypothetical

claimant such as Plaintiff could perform any unskilled work. 

First, the hypothetical claimant had no past relevant work

experience, had not worked in the United States for the past

fifteen years, had worked as a teacher in Afghanistan more than

fifteen years ago, had thirteen years of education in Afghanistan,

spoke no English, only Farsi, and was forty-three years old when

she asserted her disability began. Second, because of orthopedic

issues, the individual was unable to perform the full range of work

at all exertional levels, but could perform light work and

occasionally stoop or crouch. Third, this individual needed to use

a single-pointed cane for walking long distances and on uneven

terrain. The ALJ excluded any mental limitations in the

hypothetical claimant. (Tr. at 218-220).

Mr. Brodzinsky responded that the hypothetical claimant

described by the ALJ could perform several unskilled jobs. (Tr. at

218-220). Mr. Brodzinsky concluded that a person with almost all

of the hypothetical claimant's physical limitations could perform

the tasks of a small products assembler, which is an unskilled

position with an SVP5

 of 2 and light physical demands. He

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testified that there are approximately 3,000 of these positions in

the San Francisco Bay area, and approximately 250,000 such

positions nationally. (Tr. at 220). He added that many

individuals who do this work do not speak English, and can be shown

how to perform the job by demonstration. Id. Mr. Brodzinsky added

that a person with the hypothetical claimant's limitations could

perform several sedentary jobs, such as a jewelry stone setter, of

which between 750 and 1,000 positions exist in the San Francisco

Bay Area, and approximately 30,000 nationwide, (Tr. at 221) and

semiconductor bonder in electronics, of which approximately 4,000

positions exist in the San Francisco Bay Area, and approximately

150,000 nationwide. Id. Counsel for Plaintiff asked Mr.

Brodzinsky whether the claimant's need to use a cane for walking

would affect the number of unskilled light work jobs available. 

Mr. Brodzinsky responded that it would affect approximately

seventy-five percent of all available light work and approximately

ten percent of all available sedentary work. (Tr. at 221 and 222). 

V. Administrative Law Judge's Decision

In his decision denying Plaintiff's claim, the ALJ applied the

five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 14, 2003. (Tr.

at 16). 

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had physical

impairments that were severe under the Social Security Regulations. 

Id. However, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff's assertion of a

mental impairment was not supported by objective evidence or by her

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treatment history, and that her daily activities did not seem

limited by mental impairments. In support of his finding of no

severe mental impairment, the ALJ cited Plaintiff's written

statement, noting that her daily activities included shopping, some

cooking, cleaning, laundry and ironing. Moreover, the ALJ observed

that these activities appeared largely normal, and mostly limited

by physical problems. (Tr. at 17). The ALJ gave greater weight to

the opinion of Dr. Johnston, a psychiatrist who evaluated Plaintiff

once, than to that of Dr. Rahmany, her treating psychologist, in

finding that Plaintiff's difficulties with employment were largely

due to cultural differences rather than to medically determinable

mental impairments. Id. 

The ALJ did not address the opinions of the state agency

physicians. Id.

At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff's

impairments either individually or in combination met or equaled in

severity and duration the criteria of any listed impairment. Id. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no relevant

past work experience; and that she had the residual functional

capacity to perform a reduced level of light work. (Tr. at 20). 

He cited the Social Security Regulations in noting that light work

involves standing or walking for several hours per day, lifting up

to ten pounds frequently and lifting up to twenty pounds

occasionally. Id.

Finally, at step five, the ALJ stated that the Vocational

Expert testified that Plaintiff's need for a cane would eliminate

only twenty-five to seventy-five percent of all stone setter jobs. 

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He concluded, though, that the total number of jobs Plaintiff could

perform was still significant. (Tr. at 20). Specifically, he

found that Plaintiff could perform the jobs of small products

assembler and electronics bonder as well as stone setter. (Tr. at

21). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits 

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ's

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F. 3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger,

514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

 To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not just

the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the

ALJ's conclusions and that which does not. Martinez v. Heckler,

807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986).

 If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be upheld even

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when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Sec'y of Health,

Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), or when the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If

supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the ALJ as to

any fact will be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris,

637 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act 

To determine whether a plaintiff is disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Regulations

set out a five-step sequential process. Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The burden of

proof is on the plaintiff in steps one through four. Sanchez v.

Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In step one, the claimant must show that she or he is not currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). 

In step two, the claimant must show that he or she has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly

limit his or her ability to work. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1290 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant does

not, he or she is not disabled. Otherwise, the process continues

to step three for a determination of whether the impairment meets

or equals a "listed" impairment which the regulations acknowledge

to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 

Yuckert v. Bowen, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). 

If this requirement is met, the claimant is conclusively presumed

disabled; if not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. At step

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four, it must be determined whether the claimant can still perform

"past relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(e). If the claimant can perform such work, he or she is

not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner for step five. At step five, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work

that exists in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(f).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that, at step two of the sequential process,

the ALJ's finding that she had no mental impairment was improper 

because it was contradicted by the medical evidence. Plaintiff

also argues that the ALJ failed to assess the severity of the

combined impact of all of her physical and mental impairments on

her residual functional capacity. Finally, she claims that she

automatically qualifies for disability because she fits that

definition under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. She argues

that the ALJ erroneously relied upon a mischaracterization of the

testimony of the VE to find that she could perform other jobs

existing in significant numbers in the national economy and thus

was not disabled.

I. ALJ's Step Two Finding of No Mental Impairment

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ's conclusion that she had no

mental impairment is not supported by the record. 

The ALJ must give more weight to the opinions of treating

medical sources than to either examining or non-examining medical

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sources, because treating sources usually provide "a detailed,

longitudinal picture" of a claimant's medical impairments. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761

(9th Cir. 1989). Treating source means the claimant's physician,

psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides, or

has provided, the claimant with medical treatment or evaluation and

who has, or who has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with the

claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. In order to reject the

uncontradicted opinion of a treating source, the ALJ must set forth

clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923

F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1991). Where there are contradictions between

the opinion of the treating source and others, the ALJ must detail

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence

to reject the opinion of the treating source. Lester v. Chater, 81

F.2d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A. Dr. Rahmany's and Dr. Johnson's Opinions

Plaintiff points out that the ALJ purported to accept the

opinion of consultative psychiatrist Dr. Johnston over the opinion

of treating psychologist Dr. Rahmany. Plaintiff argues that the

ALJ erred because both doctors diagnosed Plaintiff with depression

and concluded that Plaintiff was unable to engage in gainful

employment. 

The ALJ relied upon Dr. Johnston's opinion that Plaintiff's

difficulties with employment would be largely due to cultural

differences, not to medically determinable impairments. The ALJ

stated that both practitioners examined Plaintiff only once, and

that Dr. Johnston examined her more extensively than Dr. Rahmany

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did. (Tr. at 17). 

Contrary to the ALJ's finding, Plaintiff testified that she

had seen Dr. Rahmany for psychological counseling every month for

approximately one year. (Tr. at 215). The ALJ did not make a

finding that this testimony was not credible, and no evidence

contradicted it. Furthermore, Plaintiff's testimony was supported

by Dr. Rahmany's report that Plaintiff was referred to him for

evaluation and ongoing treatment. Therefore, the ALJ's conclusion

that Plaintiff saw Dr. Rahmany only once is not supported by the

evidence and it was improper for the ALJ to reject his opinion for

this reason.

Further, Plaintiff is correct that both Dr. Rahmany and Dr.

Johnston diagnosed Plaintiff with depression, although the doctors'

opinions differed in that Dr. Johnston characterized Plaintiff's

depression as moderate (Tr. at 134) and Dr. Rahmany described her

as having a major depressive disorder that was recurrent and severe

(Tr. at 171). In addition, Dr. Johnston diagnosed Plaintiff with

symptoms of post-traumatic stress reaction (Tr. at 134), which is

consistent with Dr. Rahmany's opinion. 

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that the ALJ

did not meet his burden of setting forth specific, legitimate

reasons for giving Dr. Johnston's opinion more weight than that of

Dr. Rahmany, or for not giving Dr. Rahmany's opinion special weight

as treating physician.

B. Dr. Hsu's Opinion

Plaintiff also points out that Dr. Hsu, her treating

physician, diagnosed her with depression.

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Evidence in the record indicates that Dr. Hsu diagnosed

Plaintiff with depression on more than one occasion. On January

27, 2003, Dr. Hsu prescribed Zoloft to Plaintiff, (Tr. at 127), and 

on July 1, 2004, he prescribed Valium, (Tr. at 174). As explained

previously, Zoloft is commonly used as an anti-depressant, and

Valium is commonly used to manage anxiety disorders. On September

8, 2004, Dr. Hsu listed depression as a diagnosis in his progress

notes for Plaintiff. (Tr. at 174). On November 18, 2004, Dr.

Rahmany wrote in his report that "Mrs. Barekzai was referred to the

clinic by her family physician for evaluation and subsequent

treatment of depression." (Tr. at 169).

 The ALJ did not account for the fact that Dr. Hsu, Plaintiff's

treating doctor, diagnosed and treated her for depression, but he

concluded that she was not being treated for depression. The ALJ's

comment at the hearing that Dr. Hsu's prescription of Zoloft served

to calm Plaintiff down is insufficient to discount that Dr. Hsu was 

treating her for depression. (Tr. at 16). The ALJ did not account

for the Valium that Dr. Hsu prescribed for Plaintiff, which also

indicates that he was treating her on an ongoing basis for

depression, or for the fact that Dr. Hsu referred her to a

psychologist for further treatment. (Tr. at 169). Therefore, the

ALJ improperly disregarded Dr. Hsu's opinion, and erred in his

finding that Plaintiff did not seek or receive treatment for

depression. 

C. Opinions of State Agency Physicians

Plaintiff argues the ALJ recognized that the state agency

physicians concluded that she suffered from depression, but

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rejected their conclusions with inadequate reasoning. 

The state agency physicians reviewed Plaintiff's record on

June 10, 2003, before Dr. Rahmany's examination of her on November

18, 2004. Nevertheless, even without Dr. Rahmany's opinion, the

state agency doctors realized that Plaintiff suffered from

depression.

In light of the record as a whole, the ALJ failed to set forth

specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding the opinions of Dr.

Hsu, Dr. Rahmany, Dr. Johnston and the state agency physicians. 

II. Step 3, 4 and 5 Analysis Regarding Combination of Impairments

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to assess the severity of

the combined impact of all of her impairments, including

depression, on her functioning. 

In spite of the errors in his determination that Plaintiff had

no mental impairment, the ALJ found that she suffered from severe

physical impairments at step two and thus proceeded to step three. 

However, because he had erroneously found at step two that

Plaintiff had no mental impairment, he failed to weigh her

combination of mental and physical impairments at step three to

determine whether this combination met or equaled a listed

impairment. Furthermore, the ALJ continued this error by failing

to include Plaintiff's mental disability in his RFC so that he did

not examine whether her mental impairment significantly limited her

work abilities. Finally, the error infected the ALJ's 

hypothetical to the VE, which did not include the effect

Plaintiff's mental impairment, individually or in combination with

other impairments, would have on her work abilities.

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III. Vocational Expert's Testimony and Physical Impairment

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ misinterpreted the testimony of

the VE and, as a result, concluded erroneously that someone with

Plaintiff's physical RFC could perform a significant number of jobs

in the national economy.

Work which exists in the national economy means work which

exists in significant numbers either in the region where the

claimant lives or in several regions of the country. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(2)(D)(2)(A). Where over 2,300 sedentary jobs exist in a

region and 64,000 exist nationwide, such jobs exist in significant

numbers within the region so as to meet the requirements of 42

U.S.C. § 423(2)(D)(2)(A). Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th

Cir. 1995).

In answering the ALJ's hypothetical question about what jobs a

person with Plaintiff's physical limitations could perform, the VE

responded that the hypothetical claimant could perform one

unskilled job, small products assembler, which required light

physical demands, of which there were approximately 250,000 in the

national economy, and 3,000 in the San Francisco Bay area. The VE

added that Plaintiff could perform two sedentary jobs. The first

job, semiconductor bonder, comprises approximately 150,000

positions nationally and 4,000 positions in the San Francisco Bay

area. The second job, jewelry stone setter, comprises an estimated

total of 30,000 positions in the national economy, and between 750

and 1,000 positions in the San Francisco Bay area. (Tr. at 220 and

221). 

After the VE answered the ALJ's hypothetical question,

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Plaintiff's counsel asked the VE whether Plaintiff's need to use a

cane for walking would affect the availability of unskilled light

work jobs. Id. The VE responded that such a limitation would

reduce by seventy-five percent all available light work positions

and by approximately ten percent all sedentary positions. (Tr. at

222). In his opinion, however, the ALJ stated that the VE

testified that Plaintiff's need to walk with a cane would erode

only twenty-five percent to seventy-five percent of the total

number of stone setter jobs available. (Tr. at 20). This was

incorrect. 

Nonetheless, even with the cane limitation, the VE's testimony

establishes that Plaintiff could perform approximately 224,500

existing jobs nationwide, including 62,500 light work jobs and

162,000 sedentary jobs. Moreover, Plaintiff could perform between

5,025 and 5,250 total jobs in the San Francisco Bay area, including

750 light work jobs, and between 4,275 and 4,500 sedentary jobs.

This is an adequate number of sedentary jobs in the economy. 

See Moncada, 60 F.3d at 524. However, if Plaintiff has a mental

impairment, as discussed above, the cumulative effect of that along

with her physical impairment may alter the VE's conclusion on

remand. 

IV. Automatic Finding of Disability

Plaintiff points out that the Medical Vocational Guidelines

would direct a finding of disability if she were limited to

sedentary work. Defendant responds that Plaintiff's RFC allowed

her to perform a reduced range of light work, so that the sedentary

grid rules do not apply.

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The Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart

P, Appendix 2 Section 201.00(h)(1) provide, in part, that 

a finding of "disabled" is warranted for individuals age 45-49

who: (i) Are restricted to sedentary work, (ii) Are unskilled

or have no transferable skills, (iii) Have no past relevant

work or can no longer perform past relevant work, and (iv) Are

unable to communicate in English, or are able to speak and

understand English but are unable to read or write in English.

Plaintiff meets requirements (ii)-(iv) for disability under 

§ 201.00(h)(i). As discussed above, Plaintiff could perform few

available light work jobs, and this conclusion, too, could be

altered by consideration of the cumulative effect of her mental

impairment. On remand, the ALJ should consider whether Plaintiff

qualifies as disabled under the Medical Vocational Guidelines.

V. Reversal or Remand 

The decision whether to remand a case or simply to award

benefits is within the discretion of the court. Swenson v.

Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989). The "general rule

[is] that the decision of whether to remand for further proceedings

turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings." Harman v.

Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted). 

The Court exercises its discretion to remand so that the ALJ

can consider in the first instance the issues raised in this order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion is granted. Plaintiff's

and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied. The ALJ

should address at step two whether Plaintiff suffers from a severe

mental impairment, and at step three whether Plaintiff's

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impairments either individually or in combination meet or equal in

severity and duration the criteria of any listed impairment. If

not, the ALJ should then re-address steps four and five. 

Furthermore, the ALJ must consider whether Plaintiff meets the

requirements for disability under Medical Vocational Guidelines, 20

C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 2 § 201.00(h)(1). 

Judgment shall enter accordingly. Plaintiff shall recover her

cost of suit from Defendant. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/20/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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