Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04490/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04490-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES WASHINGTON,

Petitioner,

v.

D. OLLISON, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-4490 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND SETTING DEADLINE

FOR AMENDED PETITION

INTRODUCTION

James Washington, a prisoner currently in custody at the Ironwood State Prison in Blythe,

California, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to

challenge his 2001 conviction. Now before the court for consideration is respondent's motion

to dismiss the petition as time-barred and petitioner's motion to amend. The court finds that the

petition was timely filed and denies the motion to dismiss. The court denies petitioner's motion

to amend, but will allow him to file a new motion to amend.

BACKGROUND

Washington was convicted in Alameda County Superior Court of being a felon in

possession of a firearm and was found to have suffered six prior felony convictions. He was

sentenced to a total of 28 years to life in prison. He appealed. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed his conviction on July 28, 2003, and the California Supreme Court denied his petition

for review on October 29, 2003.

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Washington filed two state habeas petitions. Washington filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on September 30, 2003, while his petition for

review was pending. The habeas petition was summarily denied on June 23, 2004. 

On August 18, 2005, Washington filed another habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court. It was denied with a citation to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (Cal. 1993), on June 28, 2006.

The current petition is apparently Washington’s third federal habeas effort. He gave his

first federal habeas petition to prison officials to mail on April 7, 2005. Either Washington or

prison officials addressed the envelope to the U.S. District Court in Eureka, California. By June

1, 2005, his family members had learned that the petition sent to the Eureka address had not been

filed; Washington learned of the problem not later than July 11, 2005. 

Washington’s second effort to file a federal petition was a petition mailed October 13,

2005 and filed as Washington v. Hall, C 05-4139 SI. That action was dismissed on May 11,

2006 because Washington's second habeas petition in the California Supreme Court was then

pending.

Washington’s third federal habeas effort is the current action. The petition in this action

was dated July 14, 2006, stamped “filed” July 24, 2006, and came to the court in an envelope

postmarked July 17, 2006. Under the prisoner mailbox rule, Washington’s petition is deemed

filed on July 17, 2006, as there is no statement he gave the petition to prison officials any earlier

than the date on which it was mailed. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir.

2001) (pro se prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed when prisoner delivers petition

to prison authorities for mailing), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214 (2002). 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the petition was

untimely filed. Washington opposed the motion to dismiss. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Respondent's Motion To Dismiss

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must

be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after

the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment

to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action

prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive

to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Equitable tolling of the limitations period is available upon a showing of extraordinary

circumstances beyond a petitioner's control which prevented him from timely filing the petition.

See Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997)

(equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of time should only be

granted if extraordinary circumstances beyond prisoner's control make it impossible for him to

file petition on time), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061, 1099 (1998), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999).

The one-year limitations period will be tolled for the "time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). No tolling is allowed under §

2244(d)(2) for federal petitions. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2001).

1. Washington's Limitations Period Started On June 24, 2004.

The one-year limitations period for Washington started on June 24, 2004. The limitations

period would have started on January 27, 2004, the date on which the judgment became final

after the conclusion of direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

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The Ninth Circuit held in 2002 that the statutory tolling ended thirty days after the

California Supreme Court's denial of the final habeas petition was filed because that was when

the denial became “final” under the former California Rule of Court 24. Allen v. Lewis, 295

F.3d 1046, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (reaffirming Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974

(9th Cir. 2001)). However, the rationale of Allen v. Lewis only applies to denials the California

Supreme Court filed before January 1, 2003. On January 1, 2003, the California Supreme Court

made clear that its orders denying petitions for writ of habeas corpus within its original

jurisdiction are final on filing. See Cal. Rule of Court 29.4(b)(2)(C).

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1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (direct review period includes the 90-day period during which the

petitioner could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari, regardless of whether he did so).

However, Washington's first state habeas petition was already pending on that date and caused

the limitations period to be statutorily tolled, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), as soon as it would

otherwise have started. Once Washington’s first state habeas petition was denied by the

California Supreme Court on June 23, 2004, the statutory tolling period ended. The limitations

period began the day after Washington’s first state habeas petition was denied. Cal. Rule of

Court 29.4(b)(2)(C);1

 see also Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (2007) (petitioner does

not receive additional time for the period when he might file a petition for writ of certiorari

following the denial of habeas petition, unlike a direct appeal). Washington’s suggestion that

the limitations period started thirty days after his “direct appeal consolidated writ” was denied

is unpersuasive because, even if there was such a rule for consolidated cases, the California

Supreme Court never consolidated Washington's petition for review and habeas petition. See

Resp. Exhs. A and B. In sum, the limitations period began on June 24, 2004 and the

presumptive deadline was June 24, 2005. 

2. Equitable Tolling For The Lost Mail

Washington receives equitable tolling for his first federal habeas effort because the lost

mail was an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control. He states that on April 7, 2005, he

sent a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the “United States District Court Northern District

of California, 518 West Clark Street, Eureka, California.” Opposition Brief, p. 1. Regardless

of whether it was Washington or the prison mail room that addressed the envelope to the Eureka

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Washington's evidence is not the only place that a Eureka branch is mentioned.

Although a different street address is now used, the Eureka branch is listed in a March 2007

directory of courts published as an insert to the Daily Journal legal newspaper as well as on the

Northern District's public web site. While a person showing up at the listed address may or may

not find anyone staffing the Eureka office on a given day, it is listed and it is an address at which

some court business is transacted on an intermittent basis. 

There is no Clerk's Office in Eureka, so it is technically improper under Local Rule 3-2(b)

to send a habeas petition there to commence a new action. However, the need to draw the

negative implication from Local Rule 3-2(b) plus the existence of a listing for a court branch in

that city convince the court that sending the petition to the Eureka address was a reasonable

mistake for a non-lawyer to make. 

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address, the petition never was filed. It either was lost in the mail or lost once it reached its

destination. 

Respondent contends that mailing the petition to the Eureka address was tantamount to

sending the petition to the wrong court and therefore should result in no tolling. Respondent's

counsel made inquiries and determined that the West Clark Street address in Eureka was that of

a fitness/health club operated by former Magistrate Judge Nord and the telephone number listed

in the directory (described in the next paragraph) was the fitness/health club's telephone number.

The bookkeeper who answered the listed telephone number when respondent’s counsel called

stated that former Magistrate Judge Nord used to receive legal mail at that address. 

Washington responded to that evidence by producing a page from a directory that did

indeed list a Eureka branch of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California at

West Clark Street – the address to which his first petition was mailed. Petitioner’s Application

For Judicial Notice, Exh. B. The address was the first of the four addresses listed for the

Northern District in the directory: Eureka, Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose. Many

lawyers would look at that directory and think that sending a package to the Eureka address was

an amateur mistake, but the simple fact is that Washington and the mail room staff at his prison

are amateurs in legal matters. 

Mailing a filing to the Eureka address was a reasonable choice for a non-lawyer.2

 This

is not a situation where mail was sent to the wrong court. This was instead a situation where

mail was lost – the same as if the envelope had been addressed to this court's San Francisco

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Although the "they lost my mail" argument succeeds here, it usually will not. This

petitioner's assertion of lost mail is believable because he presented (a) a prison mail log

showing that some mail was sent by him to this court's Eureka branch in the relevant time period,

(b) a third-party directory listing the Eureka address as a branch for this district, (c) his inmate

trust account statement showing postage for a heavy package being deducted from his account

at the relevant time, and (d) contemporaneous inmate appeals complaining about the lost mail.

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address and never arrived. The lost mail qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance beyond

Washington's control.3

The next task is to determine the amount of time that should be equitably tolled on

account of that extraordinary circumstance. Washington states that his family inquired and

learned on about June 1, 2005 that the petition had not been filed in the Northern District. He

does not state when his family member relayed the information to him, but he knew of the

problem no later than July 11, 2005, as he submitted a request on that day for a copy of his mail

log to use as an exhibit. See Opposition Brief, Exh. E (inmate request for interview has

handwritten at the top "request for copy dates sent to legal desk 7/11/05 7/13/05 8/15/" and

requests a copy of the log for his incoming and outgoing mail for the period April 15 - May 1,

2005), and Exh. D (inmate appeal dated September 20, 2005, complaining that mail room

apparently had failed to mail his petition, requesting a copy of outgoing mail log, and noting that

"[t]hree previous requests have gone unanswered.") Once Washington knew that the petition

he had sent did not get filed, the tolling ended because he then knew of the problem and could

have filed a replacement petition. His various efforts to complain to prison officials about the

problem or to track down the source of the problem do not warrant equitable tolling because

nothing that happened in the prison grievance system would change the fact that the federal

petition had not been filed. Washington apparently had a copy of the necessary documents and

did not need to start over to prepare his federal petition. See, e.g., Petition Exhibits at last page

of Exh. H (April 7, 2005 signature date), and the page before the green cover sheet of Appellant'

Opening Brief (same). No extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing a new federal

petition once he realized his first one had not been filed. Thus, the period of time for which he

will be allowed tolling was from April 7, 2005 (the date on which he put the petition in the

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prison mail) until July 11, 2005 (when he knew that his petition had not been filed in the

Northern District). By the time the tolling event started on April 7, 2005, 287 days of the oneyear period had passed. After the tolling event ended on July 11, 2005, Washington had 78 days

left in the limitations period.

3. The Second State Petition Resulted In Statutory Tolling

Washington’s second state habeas petition was filed 38 days later and tolled the

limitations period for the time during which it was pending, i.e., from August 18, 2005 through

June 28, 2006. 

Respondent argues that no statutory tolling should be allowed due to the rule that a state

habeas petition is not "properly filed" for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) if it is filed after a stateimposed time limit and does not fit within any exception to that time limit. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 498 (2005); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005).

Respondent points to the California Supreme Court's citation to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750

(1993), as evidence that the second state habeas petition was rejected as unjustifiably delayed

under state law and therefore warrants no statutory tolling. 

The problem with respondent's argument is that the citation to Clark is ambiguous

because the California Supreme Court did not cite to any particular page in the Clark opinion

when it denied Washington's second habeas petition. See Resp. Exh. B. Clark discussed more

than just the untimeliness procedural bar; it also discussed the problems of piecemeal and/or

repetitious habeas petitions. See Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 767-70, 774-81. Because it cannot be

determined whether the citation to Clark in the rejection of a second habeas petition filed within

two months of the denial of the first habeas petition was a denial for untimeliness as opposed to

a denial because it was piecemeal or repetitious litigation, this court does not accept respondent's

assertion that it was a rejection for untimeliness. Although the limitations period is tolled for

the time during which Washington's second state habeas petition was on file, it is not tolled for

the time between the denial of the first state habeas petition and the filing of the second state

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habeas petition in the California Supreme Court because they were not part of a single round of

state habeas review. See Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2003). When the

second state petition was denied on June 28, 2006, there were 40 days remaining in the

limitations period. 

4. This Action Was Filed Before The Deadline

He filed this action on July 17, 2006, 20 days later. The current action was filed within

the limitations period. The court need not determine whether Washington receives any tolling

based on the pendency of Washington v. Hall, No. C 05-4139 SI, Washington's second federal

petition, because the current petition was timely filed even without such tolling. 

B. Washington's Motion To Amend

Washington filed a motion to amend his petition. In his motion, he stated that he wanted

to demonstrate that the state court's decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence and wanted to allege additional facts to support his claims. He

did not file a proposed amended petition. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given

when justice so requires" but the court cannot make that determination without seeing the

proposed new pleading. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 374 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Obviously,

without this draft complaint, the District Court cannot evaluate the merits of a plaintiff's request

. . . [T]he court had nothing upon which to exercise its discretion.") Accordingly, the motion

to amend is DENIED without prejudice to Washington filing a another motion to amend if he

submits the proposed amended petition with the motion and explains why he did not include the

information in his original petition. (Docket # 12.) Any motion to amend must be filed and

served no later than June 15, 2007. If a motion to amend and proposed amended petition are

not filed and served by that deadline, the court will set a briefing schedule for the merits of the

petition, but it is premature to do so now in light of a potential amendment. 

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The fact that the court allows Washington time to file a new motion to amend does not

mean that it is recommending he do so. It is not clear that Washington actually needs to file an

amended petition. To he extent he wants to present further legal argument about the state court's

decisions, he may be able to include that argument in his traverse rather than in an amended

petition. Adding legal argument is not alone a sufficient reason to amend a petition, as the

petition need only set forth the claims and that has already been done. If Washington wants to

add new facts, he may do so, but is cautioned that changing the factual basis for a claim may

cause it to become an unexhausted claim. A federal petitioner must exhaust state judicial

remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest

state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim he

seeks to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). If the factual basis for his federal

claim is not the same as it was in state court, the state court may not have been given a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of it and the claim would be deemed unexhausted. Finally, if

petitioner chooses not to amend, he should inform the court as soon as possible so the court may

set a new briefing schedule on the merits of the petition.

CONCLUSION

Respondent's motion to dismiss is DENIED. (Docket # 14.) The petition was filed

within the limitations period.

Petitioner's motion to amend is DENIED. (Docket # 12.) He may file and serve a new

motion to amend, provided that it is accompanied by a proposed amended petition and is filed

and served no later than June 15, 2007.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 9, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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