Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00349/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00349-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Macho Joe Williams, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV 18-0349-TUC-RM (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in this court on July

19, 2018, by Macho Joe Williams, an inmate currently confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 1) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, the matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bowman for report and recommendation. LRCiv 72.2(a)(2).

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order denying the petition. Williams’ claims are procedurally defaulted

or not cognizable.

Summary of the Case

Williams was convicted after a jury trial of “three counts of aggravated assault, two

counts of kidnapping, and one count each of armed robbery, aggravated robbery, and weapons

misconduct.” (Doc. 16-3, p. 95) “The trial court sentenced him to a combination of consecutive

and concurrent, enhanced prison terms totaling 51.5 years.” Id. 

On direct appeal, Williams argued that the trial court erred “by denying his motions to

sever and by failing to discharge a co-defendant’s attorney who had previously represented

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Williams.” (Doc. 16-3, p. 95); (Doc. 16-3, pp. 67-78) He further argued that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions. Id. On December 23, 2013, the Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences but vacated his criminal restitution order. (Doc.

16-3, pp. 95-105)

Williams filed notice of post-conviction relief on December 30, 2013. (Doc. 16-3, p.

111) He filed his petition on June 10, 2015. (Doc. 16-3, p. 114) He argued that the trial court

erred by running some sentences consecutive to others violating A.R.S. § 13-116. (Doc. 16-3,

p. 119) He further argued “trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object to

and raise the issue [of] sentencing error concerning the imposition of consecutive sentences .

. . .” (Doc. 16-3, p. 119) The trial court granted relief in part explaining that the sentence

imposed on Count 3, “AggAsslt,” was erroneously imposed consecutive to the robbery charges

and ordering a resentencing. (Doc. 16-4, p. 75)

Williams filed a petition for review on October 31, 2016. (Doc. 16-4, p. 92) He argued

the trial court “abused its discretion and committed fundamental error in finding that some of

the Petitioner’s consecutive sentences did not violate the prohibition against double

punishment.” (Doc. 16-4, p. 93) The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied

relief on February 8, 2017. (Doc. 16-4, pp. 148-153) The Arizona Supreme Court denied

review on September 12, 2017. (Doc. 16-4, p. 155)

On July 19, 2018, Williams filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) He claims (1) the trial court failed to protect his

constitutional rights by (a) not severing his case from his co-defendant’s and (b) not

discharging his co-defendant’s attorney who had a conflict of interest because she previously

represented Williams; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to object to a false

statement that Detective Hunt made to the grand jury, (b) failing to have cases severed or the

co-defendant’s attorney removed, (c) failing to object to antagonistic defenses, and (d) failing

to object to errors in sentencing; (3) Detective Hunt lied to the grand jury saying that Williams

had admitted his guilt; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to prove Williams was the robber

in the mask. Id.

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On May 24, 2019, the respondents filed an answer. (Doc. 16) They argue “Williams’

claims are either non-cognizable, procedurally defaulted, or without merit.” (Doc. 16, pp. 1-2)

Williams filed a reply on June 25, 2019. (Doc. 19)

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If the petitioner is

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, the writ will not be granted unless prior

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“[The] standard is intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372,

1376 (2015). “‘[C]learly established Federal law’ for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] [Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Id. 

A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if that Court already confronted

“the specific question presented in this case” and reached a different result. Woods, 135 S.Ct.

at 1377. A decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent if it is

“objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Id. at 1376.

“To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the state court’s ruling on

the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Id. (punctuation modified)

If the highest state court fails to explain its decision, this court looks to the last reasoned

state court decision. See Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Federal habeas review is limited to those claims for which the petitioner has already

sought redress in the state courts. This so-called “exhaustion rule” reads in pertinent part as

follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that – (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the

State. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 

To be properly exhausted, a claim must be “fairly presented” to the state courts. Weaver

v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999). In other words, the state courts must be

apprised of the issue and given the first opportunity to rule on the merits. Id. “The state courts

have been given a sufficient opportunity to hear an issue when the petitioner has presented the

state court with the issue’s factual and legal basis.” Id.

In addition, the petitioner must explicitly alert the state court that he is raising a federal

constitutional claim. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545

U.S. 1146 (2005). The petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by

citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim

is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1087 (2000), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional

claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

 If the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a judgment imposed by the State of Arizona,

he must present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 818 (2005); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). If state remedies have not been

properly exhausted, the petition may not be granted and ordinarily should be dismissed without

prejudice. See Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). In the alternative, the court

has the authority to deny on the merits rather than dismiss for failure to properly exhaust. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

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A claim is “procedurally defaulted” if the state court declined to address the claim on the

merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state court and it is clear the

state would raise a procedural bar if it were presented now. Id. 

The procedural default rule bars consideration of the petitioner’s habeas claim if the state

procedural rule is “independent and adequate.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580-583 (9th

Cir. 2003). The rule must be independent of federal law and must be “well-established and

consistently applied.” Id.

Procedural default may be excused if the petitioner can “demonstrate cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate

that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Boyd v.

Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998). “To qualify for the fundamental miscarriage

of justice exception to the procedural default rule, however, [the petitioner] must show that a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction when he was actually innocent

of the offense.” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008).

 If a claim is procedurally defaulted and is not excused, the claim should be dismissed

with prejudice because the claim was not properly exhausted and “the petitioner has no further

recourse in state court.” Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231.

Discussion: Severance, Conflict of Interest

In Claim (1)(a), Williams argues that the trial court failed to protect his constitutional

rights by not severing his case from his co-defendant’s. 

Williams raised the issue of severance in his direct appeal. (Doc. 16-3, pp. 74-75) This

court will assume, without deciding, that William alerted the Arizona Court of Appeals of the

federal nature of this claim.

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the issue was waived because Williams failed

to timely raise his motion to sever before trial and failed to renew the motion during trial “at or

before the close of the evidence.” (Doc. 16-3, p. 98); see 32.2(a)(3) The claim is therefore

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procedurally defaulted. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). “Arizona’s

waiver rules are independent [of federal law] and adequate bases for denying relief.” Hurles

v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014).

This court notes that the Arizona Court of Appeals further analyzed this claim for

fundamental error, which can excuse a defendant’s waiver under certain circumstance, and

found none. That court’s fundamental error analysis does not nullify the state court’s

procedural bar. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Arizona’s fundamental

error review does not excuse a petitioner's failure to raise his federal claims with the Arizona

Supreme Court.”); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Under

Arizona law, fundamental error review does not prevent subsequent procedural preclusion.”);

Lopez v. Ryan, 2009 WL 3294876, at *11 (D. Ariz. 2009); Woratzeck v. Lewis, 863 F. Supp.

1079, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff’ sub nom. Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“Brought to its logical conclusion, Petitioner’s contention [that fundamental error review is not

an independent and adequate ground for default] would eliminate the utility of Arizona's

procedural rules and virtually eradicate the doctrine of procedural default in Arizona.”).

In Claim (1)(b), Williams argues the trial court failed to protect his constitutional rights

by failing to discharge his co-defendant’s attorney because she previously represented him.

Williams raised this issue in his direct appeal. (Doc. 16-3, p. 102) The Arizona Court

of Appeals, however, found this issue waived. Id. Williams failed to raise it before trial, he

failed to argue on appeal that the error is fundamental, and the court of appeals could “find no

error that can be so characterized.” Id. In fact, Williams’ attorney told the trial court that “she

had discussed the issue with Williams and he did not believe there was a conflict of interest.”

Id. This issue is procedurally defaulted. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.

2002). Williams does not “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result

of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126

(9th Cir. 1998). 

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Williams argues in his reply brief that waiver does not apply to claims of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude.” (Doc. 19, pp. 3-4), see Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 (2015) (comment) But

while that may be true of certain claims, Williams’ claims are not among those that fall within

this exception to the general waiver rule.

It is instructive to examine a case that discusses this exception to the waiver rule, Cassett

v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court

decision holding that a petitioner’s unexhausted claim was now procedurally defaulted. Id. at

620. The district court concluded that if the issue were raised now, the Arizona state courts

would find it waived and raise a procedural bar. The Ninth Circuit reversed noting that under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) a claim of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” can only be waived

“knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently,” and that the district court did not consider this

exception to the waiver rule. Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622. The Ninth Circuit unfortunately did not

explain how to identify a claim that is of “sufficient constitutional magnitude.” Id. The court

did note however that “Arizona state courts are better suited to make these determinations,

which may require both a fact-intensive inquiry, and an application of Arizona's complex case

law on waiver.” Id. 

This case is different. Here, waiver was explicitly applied by an Arizona state court –

the Arizona Court of Appeals. There is no guessing here about what the state courts would do

if they were presented with the issue. They were presented with the issue and found it waived.

Claim (1), therefore, does not present a claim “of sufficient constitutional magnitude” that it can

only be waived “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” See Scott v. Ryder, 2007 WL

505117, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2007) (Cassett’s waiver exception did not apply where “the [state] trial

court expressly held Petitioner’s Apprendi claim to be precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3).”), aff’d,

327 F. App’x 15 (9th Cir. 2009).

Williams further argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that

his claims did not constitute errors of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” for the purpose of

Rule 32.2(a)(3). This court, however, must accept state court rulings on state court issues.

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S. Ct. 602, 604 (2005) (“[A] state court’s

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interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).

Discussion: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Claim (2), Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to object

to a false statement that Detective Hunt made to the grand jury, (b) failing to have cases severed

or his co-defendant’s attorney removed, (c) failing to object to antagonistic defenses, and (d)

failing to object to errors in sentencing. (Doc. 1, p. 7) Williams asserts that he presented these

issues to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal. (Doc. 1, p. 7) He did not. In his

direct appeal, Williams raised only the issues of severance, conflict of interest, and sufficiency

of the evidence. (Doc. 16-3, pp. 67-78) In his post-conviction relief petition, Williams did

argue, in accordance with Claim (2)(d), that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

errors in his sentencing. He did not, however, raise this claim in his petition for review with the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 16-4, p. 93) In that petition, he argued the trial court erred

in imposing the sentence, but he did not argue that trial counsel or appellate counsel were

ineffective. Id.

Williams did not properly exhaust Claim (2). He did not properly exhaust Claim (2)(d)

because, although he raised it before the trial court, he failed to raise it before the Arizona Court

of Appeals. He cannot do so now. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c) (Petition for review must be

filed “[n]o later than 30 days after the entry of the trial court’s final decision on a petition . . .

.”). It is procedurally defaulted. Williams cannot return to state court and raise Claims (2)(a)-

(c) in a new post-conviction relief petition. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) (waiver), 32.4 (deadline

for filing). They are procedurally defaulted. Lopez v. Schriro, 2008 WL 2783282, at *9 (D.

Ariz. 2008), amended in part, 2008 WL 4219079 (D. Ariz. 2008), and aff'd sub nom. Lopez v.

Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, 46 P.3d

1067, 1071 (2002) (“The ground of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised

repeatedly.”). Williams does not “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a

result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims

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will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124,

1126 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Discussion: Grand Jury Testimony

In Claim (3), Williams argues that “Detective Hunt lied to the Grand Jury” by falsely

saying that Williams admitted to the crimes.

Williams does not claim that this alleged lie violated the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, this claim is not cognizable in a habeas

corpus proceeding. See also Schweder v. Ryan, 2017 WL 9690341, at *9 (D. Ariz. 2017), report

and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3145955 (D. Ariz. 2018) (“Because the right to a

grand jury has not been applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, Petitioner’s

challenge to the grand jury proceedings does not raise a question of federal law and is not

cognizable on habeas review.”).

Discussion: Sufficiency of the Evidence

In Claim (4), Williams argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he was the robber

in the mask. Id.

Williams raised this issue in his direct appeal, but he did not alert the Arizona Court of

Appeals that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. (Doc. 16-3, pp. 77-78) Claim (4)

therefore was not fairly presented to the state courts. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 910-11 (9th

Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1146 (2005).

Williams cannot return to state court and properly present his claim now. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.9(c). It is procedurally defaulted. Williams does not “demonstrate

cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998). The court finds, in the

alternative, that Claim (4) can be denied on the merits. 

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“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). On review for

sufficiency of the evidence “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99

S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) (emphasis in original). Because this issue is raised in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus, Williams is entitled to habeas relief only if the state court’s decision on this

matter was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005).

At trial, the state presented evidence that two men robbed a Tucson dry cleaner in August

of 2011. (Doc. 16-3, p. 95) The state offered eyewitness testimony from D.R., one of the

employees, and M.S., a customer. Id. One of the robbers, a masked man, entered the store

suddenly, pulled a gun, and ordered D.R. to open the safes in the back of the store. Id. The

second robber, Valenzuela, entered the store shortly after the masked robber and “began

emptying money from the cash drawer.” Id. D.R. was able to identify Valenzuela because he

had been pacing outside the store for some time before the robbery. Id. When the robbers left

with the money, D.R. ran to the front of the store and looked out the window. (Doc. 16-3, p.

96) He saw a two-door, white Mercury Cougar. Id. Valenzuela got into the back seat and the

masked robber got into the front passenger seat. Id. Police officers, in the area on unrelated

business, began following the car, and a high-speed chase ensued. Id. The Cougar was

eventually stopped by two patrol cars. Id. The driver fled but was apprehended. Id. The front

seat passenger, later identified as Williams, was also arrested. (Doc. 16-3, pp. 96, 103) Id.

Valenzuela fled on foot but was “quickly tackled to the ground.” (Doc. 16-3, p. 96) “[T]he

mask and the gun, both of which were used by the masked man during the robbery, were found

on the front passenger seat.” (Doc. 16-3, p. 103)

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence presented at trial was

sufficient to prove that Williams was the robber in the mask. (Doc. 16-3, p. 103) D.R. testified

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that the masked robber was “heavyset” and “the arresting officer described Williams as ‘big

boned’ and ‘stocky.’” Id. D.R. testified that the masked robber got into the front passenger seat

of the Cougar, and that man was later identified as Williams. Id. Also, “the mask and gun, both

of which were used by the masked man during the robbery, were found on the front passenger

seat.” Id. 

Williams argues that the state failed to present fingerprint evidence or DNA evidence

linking him to the crime, but as the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly explained, there is no

requirement that the state present such forensic evidence. (Doc. 16-3, p. 104); see also Walters

v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn

from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.”). The decision of the Arizona Court of

Appeals denying this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent.

In his Reply brief, Williams argues that even if Claim (3) or Claim (4) was not properly

exhausted, this court can still consider granting relief on Claim (1) or Claim (2). (Doc. 19, p.

9) That is true, it can. Williams, however, is not entitled to relief on Claim (1) or Claim (2).

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order Denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims

are procedurally defaulted or non-cognizable.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The Local Rules permit a response to an objection.

They do not permit a reply to a response without the permission of the District Court.

DATED this 15th day of July, 2019.

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