Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00742/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00742-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MUNGUIA,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM ROBERTSON,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00742-LJO-JDP

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS PETITION

OBJECTIONS DUE IN FOURTEEN DAYS

ECF No. 1

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT 

COUNSEL

ECF No. 9

Petitioner Jose Luis Munguia, a state prisoner without counsel, seeks a writ of habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On April 30, 2019, we ordered petitioner to show 

cause why his petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim and for untimeliness. 

ECF No. 7. On May 31, 2019, petitioner filed a response and a motion to appoint counsel. ECF 

No. 8, 9. Because petitioner has failed to address the deficiencies in his petition, we recommend 

that his petition be dismissed. We deny petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel.

Failure to State a Claim

Petitioner makes one claim in his habeas petition: that the trial court erred when it 

reopened voir dire following a mistake made by the prosecutor. ECF No. 1 at 4. The prosecutor 

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confused the names of two potential jurors and so struck the wrong juror. See People v. Munguia, 

No. F069834, 2017 WL 360607, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017). The trial court granted the 

government’s request to address the mistake by reopening voir dire and allowing the prosecutor 

an additional preemptory challenge. Id. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth District, 

concluded that the trial court did not err under state law in reopening voir dire and that if any 

error had occurred, it would have been harmless. See id. at *4. The court also held that the 

alleged error did not implicate a right under the Constitution. See id. 

A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 

(2000). When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a federal court 

reviews the state court’s decision under the deferential standard of section 2254(d). Section 

2254(d) precludes a federal court from granting habeas relief unless a state court’s decision is 

(1) contrary to clearly established federal law, (2) a result of an unreasonable application of such 

law, or (3) based on an unreasonable determination of facts. See § 2254(d); Murray v. Schriro, 

882 F.3d 778, 801 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Here, petitioner does not articulate how the trial court’s decision to reopen voir dire

violated federal law, unreasonably applied federal law, or was based on an unreasonable 

determination of facts. Petitioner claims that the reopening of voir dire caused a waste of judicial 

resources, juror mistrust, and a “change in the makeup of the jury.” ECF No. 8 at 2. Although a 

claim of juror bias can give rise to a cognizable habeas claim, petitioner does not allege that a 

biased juror was empaneled. It is not enough for him to claim that a “change in the makeup of the 

jury” occurred without alleging any unconstitutional effects of that change. Petitioner’s lone 

citation to federal law does nothing to support his claim. See Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279

(1991) (declining to apply harmless error analysis to a coerced confession). Therefore, petitioner 

has failed to state a cognizable habeas claim.

Even if petitioner had stated cognizable habeas claim under federal law, any errors, either 

individually or cumulatively, would be harmless. A petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief 

only if “the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

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verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). To satisfy this standard, the court 

must have “grave doubt” as to the outcome, meaning that “in the judge’s mind, the matter is so 

evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.” See 

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995). Here, petitioner does not claim that the alleged 

error affected the verdict. Therefore, we recommend dismissal.

Timeliness

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), petitioners seeking 

habeas relief under § 2254 must comply with the statute of limitations set by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The one-year period begins on the latest of four dates:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

Id.; see also Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The statute of limitations period can be tolled in various ways. For example, a petitioner 

can obtain equitable tolling if he shows: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Williams 

v. Filson, 908 F.3d 546, 558 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 

(2010)).

We ordered petitioner to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed for failure 

to file within the statute of limitations. ECF No. 7 at 4. Petitioner failed to address the statute of 

limitations in his response to the order to show cause. ECF No. 8. Petitioner (1) failed to file his 

petition within a year of the judgement becoming final, (2) failed to show that any of the 

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provisions of § 2244(d)(1)(B-D) apply to him, and (3) failed to show entitlement to equitable 

tolling. Therefore, we recommend that the petition be dismissed as untimely.

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Petitioner moved for the appointment of counsel, stating that he lacks the financial 

resources to obtain counsel and the legal knowledge to represent himself. ECF No. 9. A 

petitioner in a habeas proceeding does not have an absolute right to counsel. See Anderson v. 

Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1958) (“The Sixth Amendment has no application 

here . . . .”). 

In habeas proceedings, there are three specific circumstances in which appointment of 

counsel is required. First, appointment of counsel is required for an indigent person seeking to 

vacate or set aside a death sentence in post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C §§ 2254 or 

2255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). Second, appointment of counsel may be required if an 

evidentiary hearing is warranted. See R. Governing § 2254 Cases 8(c). Third, appointment of 

counsel may be necessary for effective discovery. See id. at 6(a). None of these situations are

present here.

This court is further authorized to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a habeas 

corpus proceeding if the court determines that the interests of justice require the assistance of 

counsel. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). 

However, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not entitled to 

appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is 

necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. In assessing whether to 

appoint counsel, we evaluate the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits as well as the 

ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims without counsel, considering the complexity of the 

legal issues involved. See Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 

We cannot conclude that counsel is necessary to prevent a due process violation. The 

legal issues currently involved are not exceptionally complicated, petitioner is able to articulate 

his claims, and petitioner has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Accordingly, we find that appointed counsel is not necessary to guard against a due process 

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violation and that the interests of justice do not require the appointment of counsel. Petitioner’s 

motion to appoint counsel is denied.

Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute right to appeal a district 

court’s denial of a petition; he may appeal only in limited circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Rule 11 Governing Section 2254 Cases 

requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order 

adverse to a petitioner. See also Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(a); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 

1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). A certificate of appealability will not issue unless a petitioner makes 

“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This 

standard requires the petitioner to show that “jurists of reason could disagree with the district 

court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented 

are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; accord 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Here, petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

Thus, we recommend that the court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

Order

Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel is denied. ECF No. 9.

Findings and Recommendations

We recommend that the court dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim and as 

untimely. ECF No. 1.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the U.S. District Court judge 

presiding over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of 

Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of the 

service of the findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections to the findings 

and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document must be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge 

will then review the findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

No. 206.

 

 

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