Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00091/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00091-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shawn D. Catz, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Susan R. Chalker, et al.,

Defendants. 

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CV 03-91-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendants Karp and Everlove’s (“Defendants”) Brief re:

Amount of Fees Attributable Solely to Karp and Everlove’s Representation filed on August

31, 2009. (Doc. No. 212.) The Brief is supported by a Notice re: Filing Unredacted

Attorneys’ Fees Billing filed pursuant to Court Order on October 13, 2009. (Doc. No. 230.)

Plaintiffs Jason and Robert Catz filed Oppositions to the Brief on October 30, 2009. (Doc.

Nos. 231, 232 & 234.) Defendants filed a reply on November 23, 2009. (Doc. No. 245.)

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate

Judge Guerin for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 249.) The Magistrate

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an Order

awarding Defendants $53,697.45 in attorneys’ fees.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The preliminary facts of this case are set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Catz v. Chalker,

142 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 1998), as amended in 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001):

Catz and Chalker, lawyers and former law professors, were married in 1980

and they had one child born of this marriage. On April 10, 1989, while Catz

was living in Ohio and Chalker was living in Florida, Catz filed for divorce in

Ohio. When Chalker did not answer, Catz was awarded a judgment of divorce

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by default. Chalker alleges that she was never served with the divorce

summons and complaint because Catz sent them to a mailing address in Florida where they would be intercepted by Catz's friend and not delivered to

her. She asserts that she did not learn of the Ohio divorce decree until late

1994. Whatever accounted for Chalker's absence, the Ohio court, after

determining that the couple had not intermingled their personal property,

awarded Catz his personal property located in Ohio and awarded Chalker her

personal property then in her possession. (The judgment entry contained no

mention of the financial assets now at issue.) The court declined to adjudicate

custody of the child.

After the Ohio divorce decree, Catz and Chalker continued to see one another,

and, according to Chalker, comported themselves as a married couple by

applying as such for insurance and club memberships. Catz, however, alleges

that during this period Chalker indicated that she was divorced on tax and

student-loan forms. Whatever their marital status, in 1993 they moved to

Arizona together.

On November 4, 1994, Chalker filed for divorce in the Pima County, Arizona,

Superior Court, and on December 1, moved ex parte for a temporary

restraining order barring the transfer of funds, claimed by her as community

property, that were invested with entities including (to name those that are

parties to the present actions) TIAA/CREF, Waterhouse Securities, and a

number of mutual funds in the Fidelity group. In support of the motion,

Chalker filed affidavits by herself and by a friend of the couple averring that

Catz had vowed to put the assets out of Chalker's reach. The court granted

Chalker's motion the same day the affidavits were filed.

Catz claims that he did not receive notice of Chalker's divorce action until

December 14, 1994, over five weeks after it was filed and two weeks after the

TRO. He then immediately filed an “emergency motion” to dismiss in the

same court, on the grounds that the Ohio divorce decree, including its division

of property, had to be given full faith and credit. Catz further alleged that the TRO freezing his assets would cause him severe hardship, including the

destruction of his business as a concert promoter and bar owner, and render

him unable to pay rent and other personal obligations.

The Arizona court initially scheduled a hearing on Catz's motion for December

19, 1994, but then-according to Catz, as a result of collusion between the

court's chief judge and Chalker's counsel, a pro tempore judge of the

court-continued the hearing until January 11, 1995.

On December 19, Catz filed a notice of removal of the divorce action in the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging federal

jurisdiction based on the divorce action's purported collateral attack, on federal

equal protection and due process grounds, on the Ohio divorce decree. On

January 12, 1995, that federal court remanded the case to state court, reasoning

that it was a domestic relations controversy over which it would be

inappropriate to exercise federal jurisdiction. (On March 14, 1995, Catz filed

a second notice of removal in the district court; on March 31, the court

remanded and ordered the clerk not to accept further pleadings from Catz

without permission of the court.)

Also on December 19, 1994, Catz filed in the district court a § 1983 complaint

(“the first Arizona federal action”) alleging that Chalker's resonantly-named

divorce attorneys, Annette Everlove and Leonard Karp, had deprived him of

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 In two previous orders, the District Court took judicial notice of the pleadings, briefs,

memoranda and motions filed in the underlying and related litigation. (Doc. Nos. 122 & 123.)

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due process “by invoking the machinery of the State of Arizona to effect an ex

parte seizure of his property after they were aware of the possible existence of

a prior controlling state court judgment.” Catz's complaint also alleged that

Chalker and her lawyers had fraudulently concealed the existence of the Ohio

divorce decree from the Arizona court. In April 1995, for reasons unexplained,

Catz filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action.

On December 20, 1994, Catz separately filed, in the same court, an action

(“the second Arizona federal action”) against Chalker seeking a declaratory

judgment that Chalker had been properly served in the Ohio divorce

proceeding. This action also included a § 1983 claim against Chalker similar

to the one alleged in the first Arizona federal action against Chalker's

attorneys. On April 10, 1995, he filed a motion for voluntary dismissal without

prejudice in the second action, too. Chalker, however, filed a brief in

opposition, and the district court, adopting by reference the reasons stated in

Chalker's brief, dismissed the case with prejudice on June 8, 1995.

Meanwhile, claiming that the freezing of his accounts had left him destitute

and homeless, Catz left Arizona in early 1995 for Nashville, Tennessee, to take

refuge with his sons, Shawn and Jason. Thus, he was not in Arizona during the

remainder of the ongoing divorce proceedings in Pima County Superior Court.

Catz claims that he sent a change of address form to that court, showing that he had moved to Nashville, but that the court refused to receive this form,

which Catz suggests contributed to his receiving notices of deposition and

hearing dates only after they occurred. After Catz failed to appear at a

February 9, 1995 deposition, Chalker moved for sanctions. Catz claims that the

hearing on that motion was held without notice to him. Nevertheless, the court

found that Catz's failure to appear was part of a pattern of “unreasonable,

groundless, abusive, or obstructionist conduct,” held him in contempt, and

barred him from filing further pleadings, answers, or from introducing

evidence.

On March 14, 1995, the Pima County court, again with Catz absent, ruled that

Catz had fraudulently obtained his Ohio divorce, and refused to give the Ohio

divorce decree full faith and credit. In light of Catz's failure to appear, the court granted Chalker's petition of divorce by default. The decree awarded

Chalker all the funds frozen by the TRO, $1,000 per month in maintenance,

and $700 per month in child support. Catz submitted a motion to vacate these

orders, but the clerk did not file his motion, and returned it to Catz only after

the time to file a notice of appeal had expired. He attempted to file a special

appeal, but the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction, and

the Arizona Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Catz filed a petition for

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Catz v.

McDonald, 520 U.S. 1168, 117 S.Ct. 1433, 137 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997).1

Id. at 281-83. 

On July 27, 1995, Catz filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio against Defendants Karp, Everlove & Chalker and sought a

temporary restraining order against the financial institutions holding the assets awarded to

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 Plaintiffs’ action consists of two complaints which were consolidated in the Tennessee

district court and remained consolidated upon transfer to this jurisdiction; the complaints are

essentially identical but for the fact that one complaint seeks damages and one complaint seeks

equitable relief. (Doc. Nos. 51, 52.) 

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Chalker by the Pima County court to bar them from disbursing those funds. Catz, 142 F3d.

at 283-84. The Ohio district court dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at 284. Catz also

filed an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee; that

action was also dismissed. Id. at 290. Catz appealed both dismissals, which were

consolidated before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 282. The

Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Ohio district court, and

reversed and remanded the decision of the Tennessee district court. Id. at 290, 295.

Following remand, the Tennessee action was transferred to this Court on February 4, 2003,

giving rise to the present action. (Doc. Nos. 1, 31.)

Following the transfer of Plaintiffs’ action to this Court, Plaintiffs were ordered to file

amended complaints2

 that eliminated allegations and claims that were barred in light of the

Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Catz. (Doc. No. 50.) On February 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed

amended complaints against Defendants Karp & Everlove, Chalker, TIAA-CREF, Fidelity

Investments, and Waterhouse Securities alleging a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

as well as claims for negligence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, abuse of process, wrongful attachment and “constructive trust for

equitable disgorgement of misbegotten grossly excessive attorneys’ fees.” (Doc. Nos. 51 &

52.) Karp, Everlove & Chalker filed a single motion to dismiss the First Amended

Complaints on May 5, 2005. (Doc. No. 69.) The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ action

on September 19, 2006 on the ground that Plaintiffs’ claims were precluded by previous

litigation, with the exception of a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. (Doc. No. 123.)

 The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for failure to state

a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., on the ground that Defendants were not

state actors. 

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 In a companion appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of Chalker’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief, which named Chalker as a

defendant and TIAA-CREF as a stakeholder defendant. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit found that

Plaintiffs had not filed a § 1983 claim against Chalker and therefore Chalker was not entitled to

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

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Shortly after the judgment was entered, Defendants moved for award of their fees

incurred in defending the action. At all times relevant to this Report & Recommendation,

Chalker, Karp & Everlove were jointly represented in the pending litigation by the law firm

of Broening, Oberg, Woods & Wilson. On October 26, 2007, the District Court adopted a

Report & Recommendation issued by the undersigned Magistrate regarding the Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees filed by Defendants Karp, Everlove & Chalker, as well as a Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees filed by Defendant TIAA-CREF. (Doc. No. 163.) Specifically, and in

relevant part, the District Court adopted the Magistrate’s findings that Defendants Karp,

Everlove & Chalker were entitled to fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“§ 1988"), which

permits a prevailing party defendant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to recover fees if the party

demonstrates that the plaintiff’s actions were frivolous, vexatious or meritless. (Id.) The

District Court also adopted the Magistrate’s findings that Defendants Karp, Everlove &

Chalker were entitled to fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“§ 1927"), which provides that

“any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or

any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and

attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” The District Court awarded

Defendants Karp, Everlove & Chalker $66,126.00 in attorneys’ fees. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s Order and on May 13, 2009, in an unpublished

memorandum decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated and remanded in part

the District Court’s decision. (Doc. No. 196.) The Ninth Circuit reversed the award of fees

to Chalker but affirmed the award of fees to Karp & Everlove. The Ninth Circuit noted that

Chalker could not recover fees under §1988 because she was not a prevailing party to a

§1983 action.3

 (Id.) The Ninth Circuit also held that Plaintiffs had pursued against Chalker

a claim left open to them by the Sixth Circuit’s decision, and therefore Chalker was not

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 The Ninth Circuit also remanded for consideration as to whether Karp & Everlove’s

attorneys’ fees may be imposed on Shawn Catz; on August 28, 2009 the parties stipulated that

Shawn Catz would not be liable for those fees. (Doc. No. 211.) The stipulation was granted on

September 2, 2009 (Doc. No. 213) and therefore that issue has been resolved.

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entitled to fees pursuant to § 1927. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding

that Defendants Karp & Everlove were entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to both §1988 and

§ 1927. The Ninth Circuit noted that Plaintiffs never disputed the reasonableness of the fees

submitted by the attorneys for Karp, Everlove & Chalker, and therefore Plaintiffs had

“waived any claim on that score.” (Id.) The Ninth Circuit held that Defendants Karp &

Everlove were entitled to “all reasonable attorneys’ fees.” The Ninth Circuit further held that

because Chalker, Karp & Everlove were jointly represented by the same attorneys, and the

grant of fees to Chalker had been reversed, it was appropriate to remand to the District Court

“for consideration of the amount of fees attributable solely to [representation of Karp &

Everlove].”4

 (Id.) In so holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that “where frivolous claims are

combined with non-frivolous claims, a court may award the fees for defending against the

frivolous claims even though the claims arise from the same operative facts.” (Id., citing

Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2006.)). 

Following remand, Plaintiffs requested that the issue of Defendants’ attorneys’ fees

be re-referred to the Magistrate. (Doc. No. 247.) The District Court granted the request and

on December 2, 2009, referred this matter to the Magistrate “for the limited purpose of

issuing a Report & Recommendation pertaining to the post-remand dispute regarding

attorneys’ fees reflected in ‘Defendant Karp & Everlove’s brief re: amount of fees

attributable solely to Karp and Everlove’s representation.’” (Doc. No. 249.) 

DISCUSSION

On October 13, 2009, attorneys for Defendants filed unredacted copies of their billing

statements related to their representation of Chalker, Karp & Everlove. (Doc. No. 230.) The

billing statements are divided into ten Invoices containing 598 separate time entries.

Defendants highlighted on each of the Invoices those fees that were arguably attributable

solely to representation of Chalker. After taking deductions for the Chalker fees, Defendants

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 Specifically, Defendants agreed with Plaintiffs’ assertions that: (1) entries 96 and 104

on Invoice Four, entry 185 on Invoice Five, entries 392 and 407 on Invoice Six and entries 427,

434, 438, 447 and 449 on Invoices Seven-Ten are solely attributable to representation of

Chalker; (2) Defendants were unable to reconcile a $561.50 discrepancy in Invoice Six; and (3) the $3,760.05 previously garnished from Jason Catz’s wages should have been subtracted from

the total fee award.

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 Because Plaintiffs have broadly stated their objections to Defendants’ requested fees in

their Oppositions, the Magistrate has determined that the most efficient and expeditious method

of addressing the pending fee issue is to consider the eight major categories of Plaintiffs’

objections. To the extent Plaintiffs have submitted to the Court color/number-coded, marked-up

copies of Defendants’ invoices and expect the Magistrate to cross-reference those exhibits in

order to consider each of Defendants’ 598 time entries individually, the Magistrate declines to do

so.

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contended that, of the $66,126.00 originally awarded to Chalker, Karp & Everlove,

$59,513.50 was attributable to representation of Karp & Everlove. 

Plaintiffs Robert and Jason Catz filed separate Oppositions to Defendants’ Brief,

raising numerous arguments challenging the $59,513.50 requested by Defendants and

arguing that Defendants were entitled to no more than $3,730.00 in attorneys’ fees. In their

Reply, Defendants conceded a few errors5

 noted by Plaintiffs and amended their fee request

to $54,379.95.

Plaintiffs present eight objections to the remaining $54,379.95 in fees requested by

Defendants: (1) Defendants are entitled only to those fees solely attributable to their

representation of Karp & Everlove; (2) Defendants’ fee statements do not meet the standards

of specificity required by LRCiv. 54.2(e); (3) Defendants failed to support their request for

fees with an affidavit required by LRCiv. 54.2(d)(5); (4) Defendants cannot recover fees

incurred before the filing of the First Amended Complaint on February 7, 2005; (5)

Defendants’ counsel represented Chalker prior to September 27, 2004; (6) the invoices

supporting Defendants’ pending Brief included an additional $1,034.58 in fees that were not

included in their original Motion for Attorneys’ Fees; (7) Defendants unreasonably billed for

duplication of effort and non-compensable tasks; (8) the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars

Defendants from any award of fees.6

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1. Defendants are entitled to all fees attributable to their representation of Karp & Everlove.

In submitting their request for $54,379.95 in fees, Defendants argue that they are

entitled to any fees which involved representation of Karp, Everlove and Chalker, because

those items were necessary for the representation of Karp & Everlove, regardless of the

representation of Chalker. In other words, Defendants have excluded from their total fees

those time entries solely attributable to Chalker. Plaintiffs object, arguing that any time

entries involving the representation of Karp, Everlove and Chalker should be excluded from

the fee calculation. In other words, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are only entitled to

fees solely attributable to Karp & Everlove. The distinction matters because, according to

Plaintiffs, Defendants spent only $3,730 on tasks related solely to the claims against Karp

& Everlove. (Doc. No. 231, pg. 10.)

The language used by the Ninth Circuit in its decision is not clear on this issue. On

the one hand, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the District Court “for consideration of the

amount of fees attributable solely to [representation of Karp & Everlove].” However, the

Ninth Circuit also held that the Defendants were entitled to fees under both statutory

provisions, stating: “the filing of the amended complaint against Karp & Everlove was

‘frivolous’ and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Karp &

Everlove under [§1988];” Karp & Everlove were entitled to “all reasonable attorneys’ fees”;

and that “where frivolous claims are combined with non-frivolous claims, a court may award

the fees for defending against the frivolous claims even though the claims arise from the

same operative facts.” 

The Magistrate concludes that the most reasonable construction of the Ninth Circuit’s

decision, given the applicable statutes and the equitable considerations at stake, is that

Defendants are entitled to an award of all attorneys’ fees incurred in defending the meritless

claims against Karp & Everlove, regardless of whether the work done on behalf of Karp &

Everlove might have also benefitted Chalker.

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 Although the Ninth Circuit cited Tutor-Saliba in support of its direction to the District

Court to “weigh and assess the amount of fees attributable to the frivolous claims” it did not

comment on whether the claims against Karp, Everlove and Chalker were interrelated. 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Tutor-Saliba and Quintana (Doc. No. 231, pgs. 7-8) is misplaced, given

that both cases involved distinct, rather than interrelated, frivolous and non-frivolous § 1983

claims. See Tutor-Saliba, 452 F.3d at 1064 n.4 (“Because we conclude that Tutor's claims were

not intertwined, we do not reach the question of whether a district court may award partial

attorney's fees where frivolous claims are combined with non-frivolous claims and the claims are

not sufficiently distinct.”).

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a. Award of fees pursuant to § 1988.

In determining a fee award for a defendant who successfully defends a frivolous §

1983 action that also involves non-frivolous claims, the Court must first evaluate whether the

frivolous and non-frivolous claims were interrelated. Claims are interrelated if they arise

from “a common core of facts” or are “based on related legal theories.” See Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). In the present case, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’

§ 1983 claim against Karp & Everlove was interrelated with Plaintiffs’ equitable relief/due

process claim against Chalker. The complaints filed against all three defendants presented

identical factual allegations. (Doc. Nos. 51 & 59.) The § 1983 claim against Karp &

Everlove was based on a “judicial collusion” theory that was closely related in facts and legal

theory to Plaintiff’s equitable relief/due process claim against Chalker. Defendants filed one

motion to dismiss on behalf of Karp, Everlove & Chalker arguing that all three defendants

were entitled to dismissal on res judicata grounds, and the District Court dismissed on those

grounds. See Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2006)

(noting that claims are distinct if the merits of each claim can easily be evaluated separately

and are argued separately throughout the proceedings).7

Where frivolous and non-frivolous claims are interrelated, the United States Supreme

Court has indicated that the fee award should bear a relationship to the extent of the

prevailing party’s success:

Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a

fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably

expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an

enhanced award may be justified. In these circumstances the fee award should

not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every

contention raised in the lawsuit. . . . Where a lawsuit consists of related

claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney's

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 Moreover, the Court notes that Defendants were successful in defending Karp &

Everlove against all claims brought against them, and that all such claims were determined to be

frivolous.

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fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention

raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court

should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the

results obtained. 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 440. Although Hensley discusses an award of fees to a prevailing

§ 1983 plaintiff, its reasoning applies with equal force to a defendant who successfully

defends a frivolous § 1983 action. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 455-56 (1st Circuit

1993) (rejecting argument that defendant who prevails on defeating frivolous § 1983 claims

interrelated with non-frivolous § 1983 claims is not entitled to any fees; “frivolous civil

rights claims waste judicial resources that would otherwise be used for legitimate claims. .

. . Accordingly, a district court should not deny fees for defending frivolous claims merely

because calculation would be difficult.”), cited with approval by Ninth Circuit in

Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). In the present case,

Defendants were completely successful at obtaining dismissal of the § 1983 claim alleged

against Karp & Everlove.8

 Because Defendants obtained “excellent results” they are entitled

to a “fully compensatory fee.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. Plaintiffs are not entitled to a

reduction in that fee simply because some of the time spent defending Karp & Everlove

against a frivolous § 1983 claim was also related to defending Chalker against a nonfrivolous due process claim. As Defendants point out, the work performed on behalf of Karp

& Everlove was necessary to defending Karp & Everlove against a frivolous § 1983 claim,

regardless of the representation of Chalker. 

Moreover, the Court notes that the rationale behind limiting § 1988 fees for frivolous

claims that are combined with non-frivolous claims is to honor Congress’ intent to promote

the enforcement of plaintiffs’ civil rights. See Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th

Cir. 2005). This rationale has no application here: as the Ninth Circuit has made clear,

Plaintiffs did not pursue a § 1983 claim against Chalker. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not

entitled to any of the special protections afforded to § 1983 plaintiffs. Furthermore, as the

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court in Quintana noted, “it would . . . undermine the intent of Congress to allow plaintiffs

to prosecute frivolous claims without consequences merely because those claims were joined

with unsuccessful claims that were not frivolous.” Id. 

 Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ citation to SCHWARTZ AND KIRKIN,

SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, STATUTORY ATTORNEYS FEES, VOL. 2, pg. 482 (1997). That

treatise states that “if frivolous and nonfrivolous claims are closely related because of shared

facts, evidence or legal theories, or because the attorney time spent on the different claims

is inseparable, the defendant is not entitled to § 1988 fees for time expended in defending

against the frivolous claim.” In support of that conclusion, however, the treatise cites to

Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1985). In Jensen, the Ninth Circuit reversed

the lower court's award of attorneys fees to defendants in a civil rights action against the City

of San Jose and individual police officers. Id. at 819. The Court found that the plaintiff's

claim against the individual officer was not frivolous and reversed the fee award as to that

officer. The Court also reversed the award to the City of San Jose, even though plaintiff's

claim against the City may have become frivolous after discovery failed to produce evidence

supporting plaintiff's claims. The Court did so, however, because the defense attorney

admitted to spending “the bulk of his time defending [the nonfrivolous claim]” and conceded

the “city's fee claim would rise and fall with the [officer's] claim.” See id. Thus, Jensen is

factually distinguishable from the present case. 

b. Award of fees pursuant to § 1927

Regardless of what portion of their fees Defendants are entitled to recover pursuant

to § 1988, they are entitled to the full amount of their fees pursuant to § 1927. An award of

fees pursuant to § 1927 is “penal in nature.” Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir

1991); see also Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). When the entire course of

proceedings were unwarranted and should neither have been commenced nor persisted in,

an award under § 1927 may shift the entire financial burden of an action's defense.

Browning, 931 F.3d at 344. In the present case, Plaintiffs pursued claims for violation of

due process, negligence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional

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distress, abuse of process, wrongful attachment and “constructive trust” against Defendants.

The District Court concluded, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that each of these claims was

clearly precluded by prior court orders. (Doc. No. 196-1, pg. 5.) In addition, all of Plaintiffs

claims against Defendants were dismissed as early as possible in the proceedings – in the

granting of a motion to dismiss. The fact that the claims against Defendants were found

meritless at the outset of the proceedings demonstrates that all of the fees incurred by

Defendants were related to the defense of vexatious claims and therefore excessive. See id.

at 345 (noting, conversely, that in a case that proceeded through discovery, past summary

judgment, and past motions to dismiss “[o]ne might well wonder how a case could be so

frivolous as to warrant sanctions if it has sufficient merit to get to trial.” (citation omitted));

United States v Associated Convalescent Enterprises Inc, 766 F2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1985)

(district court reduced amount of sanctions sought by plaintiff where it found defense

attorney's conduct did not cause loss of all time and money expended in trial preparation).

The penal goal of § 1927 is best served in the present case if Defendants are awarded

all of the fees incurred in defending the meritless claims against them, regardless of whether

those fees would also have been incurred in defending Chalker. All of the work performed

by defense counsel on behalf of Defendants was necessitated by Plaintiffs’ actions in

unreasonably multiplying the proceedings against Defendants. Had Defendants and Chalker

been represented by separate counsel, it would be clear that Defendants were entitled to all

of the fees incurred in defending Plaintiffs’ vexatious and meritless claims. The fact that

Chalker was represented by the same counsel as Defendants should not affect the award of

fees pursuant to § 1927. If Defendants were awarded only those fees that were in no way

related to Chalker’s defense, Plaintiffs would essentially avoid the penalty of § 1927.

Accordingly, the Magistrate recommends that Defendants be awarded the full amount of the

fees related to their defense.

2. Plaintiffs have waived any claim that Defendants’ fee statements do not meet the standards of specificity required by Local Rule 54.2(e).

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants time entries fail to meet the standards of specificity

required by LRCiv. 54.2(e). Plaintiffs had an opportunity to object to Defendants’ fee

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statements when they were submitted on October 5, 2006. (Doc. No. 129.) See LRCiv

54.2(b) (setting forth the procedure for filing objections to motion for attorneys’ fees). As

the Ninth Circuit concluded, Plaintiffs “never disputed the reasonability of the individual

items billed, and have thus waived any claim on that score.” (Doc. No. 196, pg. 6.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot assert a challenge to Defendants’ fee statements arising under

LRCiv. 54.2(e).

3. Defendants supported their request for fees with an affidavit required by LRCiv. 54.2(d)(5).

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have failed to support their fee statements with an

affidavit as required by LRCiv. 54.2(d)(4). However, Defendants submitted the required

affidavit when they submitted their fee statements as part of their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

filed on October 5, 2006. (Doc. No. 129-1.) Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

4. Defendants are entitled to fees incurred before the filing of the First Amended Complaint on February 7, 2005.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are not entitled to fees incurred before the filing of

the First Amended Complaint on February 7, 2005. However, the District Court already

approved, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, a fee period beginning on March 27, 2003. The

District Court’s Order granting Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees awarded Defendants

$66,126, an amount based on fee statements submitted by Defendants in support of their

Motion and covering services provided from March 27, 2003 through May 31, 2006. (Doc.

Nos. 163 & 129.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed that fee award except on the issue of which

portion of the $66,126 was attributable to services benefitting Karp & Everlove. Plaintiffs

had an opportunity to object to the time period identified by Defendants when they responded

to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. As stated in Section 2, above, arguments which Plaintiffs

failed to raise regarding the reasonableness of Defendants’ fees have been waived.

5. There is no evidence before the Court suggesting that Defendants’ counsel represented Chalker prior to September 27, 2004.

In response to Defendants’ assertion that all fees incurred by Defendants prior to

November 4, 2004 – when counsel for Defendants undertook representation of Chalker – are

attributable solely to Karp & Everlove, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ counsel represented

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 The $66,126.00 originally granted by the District Court was based on the amount

requested in the affidavit of Donald Wilson, submitted in support of Defendants’ October 5,

2006 Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. No. 129-1, pg. 2.) Review of the fee statements

attached to the affidavit indicates that the total fees incurred by Defendants actually totaled

$68.137.79. It is unclear why Defendants requested only $66,126.00 of this amount.

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Chalker prior to November 4, 2004. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs cite to two time

entries: entry # 32, which states “11/4/2003: preparation of email to S. Kleczynski RE

Chalker” and entry # 38, which states “11/21/2003: Review email from C. McElroy RE draft

response for defendant Chalker (.1) review draft response for defendant Chalker (.3).” The

Court finds nothing in these entries to suggest that counsel for Defendants was representing

Chalker in November, 2003. At best, the entries suggest that counsel for Defendants may

have been coordinating defense strategy with other defense counsel. The Court notes that

counsel for Defendants filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Chalker on November 4,

2004. (Doc. No. 45.) Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Defendants represented

Chalker prior to that date.

6. The invoices supporting Defendants’ pending Brief include an additional $682.50 in fees that were not included in their original Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants claimed an additional $1,034.58 in Invoice 10 of

the fee statements submitted on October 13, 2009 that was not included in the fee statements

submitted on October 5, 2006. The Magistrate’s review of the fee statements submitted by

Defendants indicates that a charge for $1,034.38 appears on Invoice 9, not Invoice 10, of the

October 13, 2009 fee statements. The Court’s review further indicates that a statement for

$1,034.38 was included in both fee statement submissions. (Doc. No. 129-10, pg. 3; Doc.

No. 230-9, pg. 4.) The totals for each Invoice in the October 5, 2006 submissions and the

October 13, 2009 submissions are identical with one exception: the Court notes that Invoice

10 of the October 13, 2009 fee statements does not appear in the October 5, 2006 statements.

Invoice 10 of the October 13, 2009 fee statements seeks a total of $682.50 in fees.

Accordingly, the Court recommends a $682.50 deduction in the $54,379.95 requested by

Defendants.9

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7. Plaintiffs have waived any claim that Defendants unreasonably billed for duplication of effort and non-compensable tasks.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants excessively billed for attorney services that had

already been performed by Tennessee counsel, as well as for non-compensable tasks in

violation of LRCiv 54.2. As stated in Section 2, above, Plaintiffs have waived their

opportunity to object to the reasonableness of Defendants’ fees, and cannot challenge

Defendants’ fees on this ground.

8. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to bar Defendants from any award of fees.

Plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Defendants from any

award of fees in this matter. Although this argument is not coherently stated, Plaintiffs

appear to be claiming that it was improper for Defendants to request fees for representation

of Karp, Everlove and Chalker in their initial fee motion, but then limit their fee request to

fees incurred in representing Karp & Everlove in the pending matter. This argument is

without merit. Defendants have changed their position with respect to the requested fees

only insofar as Defendants have complied with the Court’s Order to limit their fee request

to fees related to Karp & Everlove.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate recommends the District Court, after its

independent review of the record, enter an order awarding to Defendants their attorneys fees

in the amount of $53,697.45 (calculated as $54,379.95 requested by Defendants less $682.50

in fees not originally included in the October 5, 2006 Motion for Fees).

//

//

//

//

//

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Any objections

filed should use the following case number: CV 03-91-TUC-FRZ. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

DATED this 17th day of March, 2010.

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