Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02318/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02318-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER LEE COLE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D.K. SISTO, et al.,

Defendants.

 

/

No. 08 CV 2318 JCW

ORDER

Cole, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He has also requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. Cole names as defendants: (1) D.K. Sisto, individually and in his official capacity as

Warden of the California State Prison-Solano (CSP-Solano); (2) V. Singh, individually and in his

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2

official capacity as Associate Warden of CSP-Solano; (3) Captain J. Neuhring, individually and in

his official capacity as a correctional officer at CSP-Solano; (4) Lieutenant M. Chirilia,

individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer at CSP-Solano; (5) Sergeant

Barocio, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer at CSP-Solano;

(6) V. Cuevas, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer at CSP-Solano;

(7) Lieutenant R. Samms, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer at CSPSolano; (8) R. Mahoney, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer at CSPSolano; (9) Sergeant McLain, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer at

CSP-Solano; and (10) “John or Jane Doe,” individually and in his or her official capacity as

Director of the California Department of Corrections.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), I am required to dismiss a case at any time if, inter

alia, I determine that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Id.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). I conclude that Cole’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, and that none of the claims can be saved by amendment. Therefore, Cole’s complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice, and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis is accordingly

DENIED as moot.

I.

In his complaint, Cole states that on February 14, 2007, he was disciplined for disobeying

the order of a correctional officer when he refused to “double-cell,” i.e., accept a cell assignment

where he would have to share a cell with another inmate. He was issued a Rules Violation Report

(RVR), which documented his misconduct. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3312(a)(3). This RVR

ultimately resulted in forfeiture of some of Cole’s time credits, and added points to his

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

3

classification score, which is used in making decisions about the level of security control an

inmate requires. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3375(d). 

Cole received another RVR on July 25, 2007, for disobeying the order of a correctional

officer by again refusing to double-cell. This resulted in another forfeiture of credits and the

imposition of additional points. 

Cole received a third RVR, dated December 3, 2007, for again refusing an officer’s order

to double-cell; this resulted in a forfeiture of credits and the imposition of additional points, as

well as 30 days’ loss of certain yard privileges and 90 days’ loss of certain canteen privileges.

Cole asserts that he was disciplined pursuant to a policy contained in an April 25, 2003

memorandum issued by the California Department of Corrections Memorandum DD58-03 (Memo

DD58-03), which provides that, with certain exceptions not at issue here, “[i]t is departmental

policy and therefore the expectation that inmates double-cell and accept housing assignments as

directed by staff.” Memo DD58-03 also authorizes prison officials to issue RVRs to inmates who

refuse to double-cell.

Cole states that Memo DD58-03 is an invalid “underground regulation” because it was

adopted without compliance with the procedures in California’s Administrative Procedures Act

(APA). Cole further asserts that Memo DD58-03 was adopted by CSP-Solano and incorporated

into certain of CSP-Solano’s own institutional policies and documents; he argues that, because

Memo DD58-03 is invalid, all of the CSP-Solano documents derived therefrom, and any discipline

imposed on him in connection with his refusal to double-cell, are likewise invalid.

Cole argues, based on the above facts, that he has suffered a violation of his rights under:

(1) the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (2) the Equal

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

4

Protection Clause; (3) the Double Jeopardy Clause; (4) the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (5) the Due

Process Clause. His complaint fails to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under any

of those constitutional protections.

II.

In determining whether a complaint states a claim, I must take all allegations of material

fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fed’n of African Am.

Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if a plaintiff fails to allege sufficiently the grounds of his

entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (dismissing civil rights complaint). “[B]are assertions . . .

amount[ing] to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’” of a claim are not

entitled to be assumed true. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When

a complaint raises an arguable question of law that is ultimately resolved against the plaintiff,

dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is proper. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989).

A.

As to Cole’s Eighth Amendment claim, that amendment does not protect inmates from

conditions of confinement that are “restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when (1) the deprivation

is “sufficiently serious” so as to result in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,” and (2) the official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Here, to the extent Cole is alleging that it is unconstitutional to force

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

5

him to share a cell with another, such claims fail for two separate reasons. First, Cole never

alleges that he was actually subjected to double-celling; indeed, the gravamen of his complaint is

that he was disciplined for refusing to double-cell. Therefore, he lacks standing to assert claims

arising out of any alleged adverse conditions of confinement caused by the practice of doublecelling, since he was not actually subjected to the practice. Second, the Supreme Court has held

that double-celling does not per se constitute cruel and unusual punishment where it does not

“lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “increase violence among

inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. 

Cole does not even attempt to argue that double-celling led to such intolerable conditions at CSPSolano. Likewise, he does not allege that double-celling would have posed a threat to his safety. 

Compare Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (prison official shows deliberate indifference in violation of the

Eighth Amendment in placing a prisoner in the general prison population, if the prison official

knew that the inmate would face a substantial risk of serious harm, and disregarded that risk). To

the extent that he argues that the particular forms of discipline imposed on him in connection with

the RVRs (the forfeiture of time credits, the adding of points to his classification score, or the

temporary loss of certain yard and canteen privileges) was so harsh as to be cruel and unusual,

such a claim is plainly frivolous.

B.

“To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show that

the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his

membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

6

Cole does not suggest that he was subjected to double-celling or to discipline on the basis of his

membership in any protected class.

C.

The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against multiple punishments for the same

offense.” United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980), quoting North Carolina v.

Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). But it “does not prohibit the imposition of all additional

sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment. . . . The Clause protects

only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.” Hudson v.

United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here,

Cole neither alleges that he has suffered any additional punishment for the original crime for

which he was convicted, nor that he incurred punishment of a criminal nature as a result of the

RVRs.

D.

The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits laws that retroactively increase the penalty for a

crime. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995). “A law violates the Ex Post

Facto Clause if it is 1) retroactive – it applies to events occurring before its enactment . . ., and

2) detrimental – it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to

the covered crimes.” Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Cole does not allege that he was subjected to any rule or

law that was applied retroactively to events that occurred before it was enacted; in short, he

alleges no facts that raise even the specter of an Ex Post Facto violation.

E.

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

7

Finally, Cole asserts that the imposition of discipline pursuant to Memo DD58-03 violates

his due process rights, because Memo DD58-03 is an invalid underground regulation that was

adopted in violation of the APA. However, even if he is correct that he was disciplined pursuant

to an underground regulation, he does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

It is true that California law provides that no state agency may issue, utilize or enforce a

rule that constitutes a “regulation” unless the rule has been adopted as a regulation using the

procedures required by the APA. Cal. Gov’t Code § 11340.5(a); see also Cal. Gov’t Code

§§ 11346-11348 (prescribing procedures for adoption of regulations, including procedures for

public notice and public discussion of proposed regulations). A “regulation” is any “rule,

regulation, order, or standard of general application . . . adopted by any state agency to

implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its

procedure.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 11342.600; see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 1 § 250(a) (defining an

“[u]nderground regulation” as “any guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order,

standard of general application, or other rule . . . that is a regulation as defined in Section

11342.600 of the Government Code, but has not been adopted as a regulation and filed with the

Secretary of State pursuant to the APA and is not subject to an express statutory exemption from

adoption pursuant to the APA”).

Cole attaches to his complaint documentation showing that Memo DD58-03 was the

subject of a February 5, 2007 decision by the California Office of Administrative Law (OAL). 

The OAL is authorized to issue determinations as to whether a given agency instruction or other

rule constitutes a “regulation” that must be adopted pursuant to the APA. Cal. Gov’t Code

§§ 11340.2, 11340.5. According to Cole’s complaint, the OAL concluded that Memo DD58-03

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

8

was an “underground regulation,” i.e., a regulation that should have been, but was not, adopted

pursuant to the APA. 

An OAL determination that an agency is using an underground regulation in violation of

the APA is not binding on courts, although it is entitled to deference. People v. Medina, 89 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 830, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). For purposes of this order, however, I need not decide

whether the OAL’s determination was correct. Even assuming arguendo that Memo DD58-03

was indeed a regulation enacted in violation of the APA, Cole cannot state a due process claim for

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The guarantees of federal due process apply only when a constitutionally-protected liberty

or property interest is at stake. Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, state a due

process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based solely on the fact that the plaintiff was subjected to a

rule that is invalid under state law. In Lone Star Security & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,

the plaintiff complained that its vehicles were towed pursuant to a city ordinance that the plaintiff

contended was preempted by state law. 584 F.3d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court of

Appeals held that, even if the ordinance was preempted and therefore invalid, that did not make

out a due process violation so as to state a section 1983 claim. Id. at 1235-37. Lone Star held

that the general rule “that state constitutions are ‘not taken up into the 14th Amendment’ such

that federal courts may strike down a statute as invalid under state law.” Id. at 1237, citing

Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23, 25 (1914). Lone Star also relied on White Mountain Apache

Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1985), which held that plaintiffs who had been

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

9

required to pay taxes under a state statute that was later determined to be preempted by federal

law did not have a due process claim cognizable under section 1983.

Lone Star then analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims under the usual rubric of due process. It

held that the city ordinance of which the plaintiffs complained “does not interfere with one of the

fundamental rights or liberty interests that enjoy heightened protection against government

interference under the substantive component of the due process clause,” and did not represent

“an abuse of power lacking any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental

objective.” Lone Star, 584 F.3d at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise here,

Memo DD58-03 does not interfere with any fundamental right to be free of a cellmate while in

prison, and it clearly is justifiable in the service of legitimate governmental objectives. Lone Star

also held that plaintiffs could not “make out a colorable procedural due process claim simply by

asserting that [the ordinance of which they complained] contravenes state law.” Id. It rejected

the notion that simply because a rule is invalid under state law, it necessarily fails to provide

sufficient notice to satisfy procedural due process. Id. Rather, Lone Star said that the relevant

question was whether the ordinance had been enacted in a way that provided sufficient notice by

“affording those within the statute’s reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves

with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements.” Id. at 1237. The

plaintiffs in Lone Star had not suggested that the ordinance was faulty in that respect. Id.

Likewise, here, Cole has not suggested that Memo DD58-03 was faulty in any way other than

that it did not comply with the APA; that alone is insufficient to state a due process claim.

“States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the

Due Process Clause. . . . But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

10

which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75

F.3d 517, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the only hardship of which Cole complains is that he has

been subjected to a rule that he says is invalid under state law. As Lone Star makes clear, that

alone is insufficient to make out a claim for relief under section 1983.

III.

District courts are “only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be

saved.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). A court may dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint with prejudice when it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint

cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); Lira

v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the sole focus of Cole’s complaint is his

position that Memo DD58-03 violates the APA. Even if that position is correct as a matter of

state law, he is entitled to no relief under section 1983, and no set of facts could be pleaded that

would change that deficiency.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Cole’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

2. Cole’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot.

DATED: June 4, 2010 /s/ J. Clifford Wallace 

J. Clifford Wallace

United States Circuit Judge

Case 2:08-cv-02318-JCW Document 11 Filed 06/07/10 Page 10 of 10