Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01651/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01651-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JWB

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Dean Carter, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-1651-PHX-DGC (MEA)

ORDER

In this civil rights action brought by a former county jail inmate, Defendant moved

to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for lack of exhaustion (Doc. # 11). Plaintiff

failed to respond, although he was informed of his right and obligation to do so (Doc. # 12).

Defendant has also moved for summary disposition of the motion to dismiss (Doc. # 13).

The Court will grant the motion to dismiss, deny the motion for summary disposition as

moot, and dismiss this action without prejudice.

I. Background

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that in November 2005 he was denied medical care

for injuries sustained in a fall from his bunk (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff also claimed that the denial

of such care and his subsequent placement in solitary confinement posed serious threats to

his safety and constituted retaliation for seeking medical care. Plaintiff specifically alleged

that Defendant Arpaio implemented and promoted policies that resulted in the violations

alleged (id. at 2, 4-6). And while Plaintiff acknowledged that a grievance procedure existed

at the jail, he claimed that he had been placed in solitary confinement, denied a pencil and

Case 2:08-cv-01651-DGC Document 14 Filed 04/14/09 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence were dismissed (Doc. # 6 at 4). 

- 2 -

grievance forms, and was seriously ill (id.). The Court required Defendant Arpaio to answer

Counts I through III (Doc. # 6).1

 Defendant Arpaio moves to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for lack of

exhaustion. Specifically, Defendant Arpaio argues that because Plaintiff’s claims accrued

in November 2005 and he did not file his Complaint until September 2008, his claims are

barred by the two year statute of limitations. Alternatively, Defendant Arpaio contends that

Plaintiff failed to file a single grievance as to the claims in his Complaint (Doc. # 8 at 6). 

Plaintiff was issued an order containing warnings regarding his obligation to respond

and the potential consequences for failing to do so (Doc. # 12). He was specifically informed

that if Defendant showed that he failed to exhaust, his action would be dismissed unless he

produced controverting evidence (id. at 2). 

I. Legal Standard - Statute of Limitations

In § 1983 actions, the applicable statute of limitations is the forum state’s statute of

 limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 274-76 (1985);

Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). The Arizona statute of limitations

for personal injury actions is two years. See A.R.S. § 12-542(1); Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa

County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Vaughan, 927 F.2d at 478. 

The Court must also apply any state rule for tolling to actions brought under § 1983.

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 544 (1989); Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 650,

653 (9th Cir. 2000); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Arizona

law, the limitation period is tolled during mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies.

See Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Dougherty, 29 P.3d 862 (Ariz. 2001); Third & Catalina

Assoc. v. City of Phoenix, 895 P.2d 115, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); see also A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(c) (cause of action required by law or contract to be submitted to administrative

review process does not accrue until process exhausted). 

///

///

Case 2:08-cv-01651-DGC Document 14 Filed 04/14/09 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The Court takes judicial notice of the Maricopa County Jail’s Grievance Procedure

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) (Doc. # 11, Ex. A, Attach. 1). The time to fully

exhaust the jail’s grievance procedure does not exceed 90 days. 

- 3 -

III. Analysis

Defendant Arpaio argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff states in his Complaint that Defendant Arpaio’s policies resulted in a denial of

medical care, retaliation, and threats to Plaintiff’s health and safety when he was placed in

solitary confinement in November 2005. Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he was not

able to seek administrative remedies because of his placement in solitary confinement.

Because Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not utilize the grievance procedure, there is no

time to toll during exhaustion. Consequently, Plaintiff had two years from November 2005

to file his claim. Plaintiff filed his Complaint in September 2008, rendering it untimely by

10 months. But even if the Court were to toll the time where Plaintiff could have exhausted

his administrative remedies,2

 Plaintiff’s claim is still untimely by at least several months.

And in failing to respond to Defendant Arpaio’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has failed to

offer any other argument in favor of tolling. Consequently, this action is barred by the statute

of limitations and this action must be dismissed. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s are

barred by the statute of limitations, the Court need not reach Defendant Arpaio’s argument

regarding exhaustion.

IV. Lack of a Response

Alternately, the Court has the discretion under Rule 7.2(i) of the Local Rules of Civil

Procedure to deem Plaintiff’s lack of response as consent to Defendant Arpaio’s motion to

dismiss. Plaintiff was warned of this possibility (Doc. # 12). The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has upheld a dismissal based on a failure to comply with a similar local rule in the

District of Nevada. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). Before

dismissal on this basis, the court must weigh (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution

of litigation, (2) the court’s need to manage its docket, (3) the risk of prejudice to the

defendants, (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and (5) the

Case 2:08-cv-01651-DGC Document 14 Filed 04/14/09 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

availability of less drastic sanctions. Id. at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421,

1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). If the court does not consider these factors, the record may be

reviewed independently on appeal for abuse of discretion. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. 

The first three factors do not favor Plaintiff, particularly in light of the fact that he has

ostensibly lost interest in prosecuting his action. There is no risk of prejudice to Defendant

to resolve the motion in his favor, and judicial efficiency also favors resolution of this action.

The fourth factor of favoring disposition of cases on their merits weighs in favor of Plaintiff,

and for the fifth factor, dismissal without prejudice is the least drastic sanction. In light of

the overall five-factor analysis weighing in Defendant’s favor, the Court will deem Plaintiff’s

lack of a response as a consent and dismiss the action without prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendant Arpaio’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 11) is granted. 

(2) Defendant Arpaio’s Motion for Summary Determination (Doc. # 13) is denied as

moot. 

(3) Plaintiff’s action is dismissed without prejudice as barred by the statute of

limitations or alternately, for failure to respond. The Clerk of Court shall enter a judgment

of dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 14th day of April, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01651-DGC Document 14 Filed 04/14/09 Page 4 of 4