Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01730/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01730-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brittian Willie Young,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-01730-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

On March 3, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (“the Petition”). (Doc. 1.) Separately, on March 27, 2020, Petitioner filed 

a “Motion for Entry of Judgment/Order.” (Doc. 26.) 

On May 12, 2020, Magistrate Judge Bibles issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) concluding the Petition should be denied. (Doc. 27.) Afterward, Petitioner filed 

objections to the R&R. (Doc. 28.) For the following reasons, the Court will overrule 

Petitioner’s objections, deny his motion, adopt the R&R, and terminate this action.

I. Background

The Underlying Incident. In 2016, a Maricopa County Superior Court judge entered 

an order terminating Petitioner’s parental rights. (Doc. 27 at 2.) Several months later, 

Petitioner came to the judge’s courtroom holding “a bunch of zip ties” and some papers. 

(Id.) Near the end of a hearing, Petitioner approached the judge, told her that he had a 

warrant for her arrest, and told her that she had the right to remain silent. (Id.) The 

courtroom clerk warned Petitioner to stop, but he “seemed ‘determined’ . . . to restrain [the 

Case 2:19-cv-01730-DWL Document 29 Filed 06/11/20 Page 1 of 6
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judge] with zip ties and escort her from the courtroom.” (Id.) When a bailiff and sheriff’s 

deputies arrived to protect the judge, Petitioner stated that he was there to make a “citizen’s 

arrest.” (Id.)

Trial and Sentencing. Petitioner was charged with one count of attempted 

kidnapping with the intent to interfere with a governmental function. (Id.) Before trial, 

Petitioner moved to represent himself. (Id.) The trial judge granted the motion but 

appointed advisory counsel. (Id.)

During the two-day jury trial, Petitioner cross-examined each of the state’s 

witnesses (including the victim-judge) but chose not to testify, present any evidence, or 

call any witnesses. (Id. at 3.) The jury voted to convict. (Id.) Petitioner was sentenced to 

6.5 years’ imprisonment, which was the presumptive sentence in light of his prior 

conviction for manslaughter. (Id.)

The Direct Appeal. During his direct appeal, Petitioner raised the following three 

issues: (1) “he could not have ‘kidnapped’ [the judge] because he had the legal authority 

to arrest her,” (2) “the State lacked probable cause to charge him with attempted 

kidnapping”; and (3) “the trial court prohibited him from presenting evidence that ‘could 

easily prove [his] innocence.’” (Id. at 3-5.) Notably, during the appellate proceedings,

Petitioner “did not mention or cite to the United States Constitution, or discuss how his 

federal constitutional rights were violated in his state criminal proceedings. Nor did he 

identify any specific federal constitutional right he believed was violated during his state 

criminal proceedings. In his state appellate brief [Petitioner] cited the ‘Constitution of the 

State of Arizona,’ and the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Arizona Rules of 

Professional Conduct. The only reference to any federal constitutional right, federal law, 

or federal legal opinion cited by [Petitioner] in his state proceedings is his assertion that 

his ‘arrest’ of [the judge] was legal because, inter alia, he ‘advised her of her Miranda

Rights.’” (Id. at 9.) 

On August 16, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction 

and sentence. State v, Young, 2018 WL 4017336 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). In its decision, 

Case 2:19-cv-01730-DWL Document 29 Filed 06/11/20 Page 2 of 6
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the appellate court “did not mention the United States Constitution or any federal

constitutional right.” (Doc. 27 at 9.)

On January 25, 2019, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review. (Id. at 5.)

The Petition. In March 2019, Petitioner filed the Petition. (Doc. 1.) It asserts the 

following four grounds for relief: (1) “The State of Arizona has demonstrated actions of 

Prosecutorial Misconduct by Insufficiency of State Evidence. Which is Malicious 

Prosecution that then lead to the Unlawful and Wrongful Conviction which then lead to the 

Unlawful Imprisonment [sic]”; (2) “Violation of Judicial Code of Conduct by Lack of 

Intent In a Criminal Case”; (3) “Violation of Constitution for My Mere Presence Was 

Turned Into Criminal Case”; and (4) “Obstruction of Justice where There is No Criminal 

Intent From Defendant.” (Doc. 27 at 5-6.)

The R&R. The R&R states that, because Petitioner only presented state-law claims 

during his direct appeal, he failed to exhaust the federal claims now asserted in the Petition:

“Because [Petitioner] did not present any claim asserting his federal constitutional rights 

were violated to the state’s highest court, he failed to exhaust any cognizable basis for 

federal habeas relief in the Arizona courts.” (Id. at 10.) This lack of exhaustion, the R&R 

concludes, means that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. (Id.) Finally, the 

R&R concludes that Petitioner cannot establish cause and prejudice to excuse the 

procedural default because, inter alia, “a thorough review of the entire record in this matter,

which includes the trial transcripts, indicates there was sufficient evidence to sustain

[Petitioner’s] conviction.” (Id. at 11-12.)

II. Legal Standard

A party may file written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of being served 

with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 Rules”). Those 

objections must be “specific.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after being 

served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis added).

Case 2:19-cv-01730-DWL Document 29 Filed 06/11/20 Page 3 of 6
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

District courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no specific 

objection has been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (“It does 

not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual 

or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to 

those findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations 

de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). Thus, district judges need not review 

an objection to an R&R that is general and non-specific. See, e.g., Warling v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 5276367, *2 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Because de novo review of an entire R & R would 

defeat the efficiencies intended by Congress, a general objection ‘has the same effect as 

would a failure to object.’”) (citations omitted); Haley v. Stewart, 2006 WL 1980649, *2 

(D. Ariz. 2006) (“[G]eneral objections to an R & R are tantamount to no objection at all.”).1

III. Analysis

A. The Objections To The R&R

In his objections (Doc. 28), Petitioner largely attempts to reargue the merits of his 

defense, arguing that he lacked criminal intent, that he never made physical contact with 

the victim, and that the victim committed perjury. (Id. at 3-4, 6.) As for the R&R’s 

conclusions regarding exhaustion and procedural default, Petitioner doesn’t dispute that he 

only cited Arizona law during the state appellate proceedings. (Id. at 5.) Nevertheless, 

Petitioner appears to argue that (1) any references to the Arizona Constitution should also 

be considered references to the United States Constitution, because “the Arizona 

Constitutions violated are also U.S. Constitution written out as Amendments” (id. at 5), 

and (2) although he “didn’t mention or cite U.S. Constitution . . . I am innocent, and One 

retains all rights as U.S. citizen executing an arrest record concerning [the judge] is U.S. 

Constitutional Law” (id. at 6).

1 See generally S. Gensler, 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 

Commentary, Rule 72, at 422 (2018) (“A party who wishes to object to a magistrate judge’s 

ruling must make specific and direct objections. General objections that do not direct the 

district court to the issues in controversy are not sufficient. . . . [T]he objecting party must 

specifically identify each issue for which he seeks district court review . . . .”).

Case 2:19-cv-01730-DWL Document 29 Filed 06/11/20 Page 4 of 6
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

These objections will be overruled. As the R&R correctly states, “[f]ull and fair 

presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, 

including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that 

entitle the petitioner to relief. . . . It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support 

the federal claim were before the state court or that a ‘somewhat similar’ state law claim 

was raised. Rather, in his state court pleadings the habeas petitioner must cite to the 

specific constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. General 

appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the 

right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional 

claim.” (Doc. 27 at 8, citations omitted.) Petitioner’s objections are based on a 

misapprehension of these principles.

B. The “Motion for Entry of Judgment/Order” 

About two weeks before the R&R was issued, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Entry 

of Judgment/Order.” (Doc. 26.) Although the motion is not a model of clarity, it appears 

to be seeking the same relief as the Petition—that is, the reversal of Petitioner’s conviction 

and Petitioner’s release from custody. (Id. at 8 [“Petitioner . . . commands for the following 

‘recovery conditions’ . . . Grant mistrial and overturn conviction as well as imprisonment 

sentence.”].) Because the Petition will be denied, the motion will be denied, too.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) The reference to the magistrate judge is withdrawn as to Petitioner’s 

“Motion for Entry of Judgment/Order” (Doc. 26).

(2) Petitioner’s “Motion for Entry of Judgment/Order” (Doc. 26) is denied.

(3) Petitioner’s objections to the R&R (Doc. 28) are overruled.

(4) The R&R’s recommended disposition (Doc. 27) is accepted.

(5) The Petition (Doc. 1) is denied.

(6) A Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural 

bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has 

Case 2:19-cv-01730-DWL Document 29 Filed 06/11/20 Page 5 of 6
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(7) The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 10th day of June, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-01730-DWL Document 29 Filed 06/11/20 Page 6 of 6