Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02065/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02065-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Power Road-Williams Field LLC,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Gilbert, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-02065-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants Town of Gilbert, City of Mesa, and Maricopa County have filed a 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 7. The 

motion is fully briefed. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion in part and remand this 

case to Maricopa County Superior Court.1

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff Power Road-Williams Field, LLC brought this action in Arizona Superior 

Court on May 15, 2013. Doc. 1-1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges violations of state and federal 

law, including A.R.S. § 9-461.11(F) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants removed the 

action to federal court on October 10, 2013. Doc. 1. 

 Plaintiff owns approximately 73 acres of land located at the northwest corner of 

the intersection of Power Road and Williams Field Road in Maricopa County. Doc. 1-1, 

¶ 6. Power Road is a major arterial roadway that experiences heavy traffic, services the 

 

1

 The requests for oral argument are denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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larger metropolitan area, and serves as the common corporate boundary between Gilbert 

and Mesa. Id., ¶¶ 8-9. 

 Defendants entered into an intergovernmental agreement (“IGA”) pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 11-951, et seq., to undertake a $30 million improvement project to widen and 

realign a segment of Power Road, creating a separate one-way, three-lane road in each 

direction. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 11. The gist of Plaintiff’s complaint is that the IGA did not 

comply with A.R.S. § 9-461.11(F) and that the process mandated by statute was not 

followed. Id., ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that the Town of Gilbert staff “decided to radically 

re-design and re-align the intersection of Power Road and Williams Field Road” in order 

to “retaliate against Plaintiff and deprive it of the economically viable use of Plaintiff’s 

property” because Plaintiff had refused to cooperate with Gilbert’s plan to annex part of 

the property. Id., ¶¶ 13, 57-58. 

 The Gilbert General Plan states that arterial roads should provide reasonable levels 

of traffic services (“LOS”), that traffic signals and intersection design should create a safe 

and efficient flow of traffic to optimize travel and increase corridor capacity, and that 

public projects should reduce vehicle emissions. Id., ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that Power 

Road could have been widened to three lanes traveling in each direction by using the 

existing alignment and right of way (the “Existing Improved Alignment”). Id., ¶ 29. 

Multiple traffic impact analyses commissioned by Plaintiff and Defendants reported that 

the Existing Improved Alignment would be superior to the proposed realignment. Id., 

¶¶ 34-44. Nevertheless, the Gilbert Town staff chose to redesign the roadway 

intersection and construct an expensive and longer bridge over a floodway and canal (the 

“One Way Alignment”). Id., ¶ 30. 

 Plaintiff alleges that the One Way Alignment does not conform to the Gilbert 

General Plan and significantly reduces the value of Plaintiff’s property. Id., ¶ 45. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants adopted the IGA without (1) reviewing the economic 

impact of the alignment on development potential for surrounding land; (2) considering 

the effect on area business or tax revenues; (3) determining whether the realignment of a 

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major arterial roadway and construction of a multimillion dollar bridge would conform to 

the Gilbert Plan; (4) determining whether construction of the One Way Alignment would 

be cheaper than the Existing Improved Alignment; (5) considering the fact that the One 

Way Alignment will increase traffic wait times, reduce traffic service below acceptable 

LOS, and generate more air pollution; (6) analyzing the effect of the One Way Alignment 

design on traffic safety and intersection maintenance costs; and (7) determining whether 

the intersection design will fail before its ultimate design year due to the extremely short 

distances between signalized intersections. Id., ¶ 97. As a result of these failures, 

Plaintiff alleges that it was deprived of property without the process required by state law 

and is entitled to compensation of more than $7,100,000. Id., ¶¶ 118-19. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the 

well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Legal 

conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth, 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009), and therefore are insufficient to defeat a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 

1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the 

complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard “is not 

akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

III. Analysis. 

 Defendants argue that the complaint must be dismissed for three reasons: (1) it is 

barred by res judicata; (2) it is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) it fails to state 

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a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or A.R.S. § 9-461.11(F). Doc. 23 at 1; Doc. 7 at 2-3. 

The Court will address each argument below. 

A. Res Judicata. 

 Plaintiff instituted an action in Arizona Superior Court in March 2011, suing 

Defendants for alleged violations of A.R.S. § 11-952 and § 9-461.11(F) (the “Previous 

Action”). Doc. 22 at 1; Doc. 22-1 at 1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had violated the 

Gilbert General Plan (Doc. 22-1 at 28), failed to follow statutory procedures (Doc. 22-1 

at 32), and failed to enter into an IGA (Doc. 22-1 at 33). Plaintiff sought declaratory, 

injunctive, and mandamus relief, but no monetary relief, presumably because the 

improvements had not yet been built. The Superior Court granted Defendants’ motions 

to dismiss three of Plaintiff’s four claims for failure to state a claim and later granted 

summary judgment on the remaining claim. Doc. 22 at 2. Before final judgment had 

been entered, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that Defendants’ IGA was defective and 

adding a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state law claim for negligence. 

The Superior Court entered judgment on August 8, 2013. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals and briefing is now underway. Id. 

 “To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, federal courts look 

to state law.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citation omitted). “Under Arizona law, a claim is barred by res judicata if a court 

previously issued a final judgment on the merits involving the same cause of action with 

the same parties.” Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. 1986). 

Arizona uses the “same evidence” test for determining whether an earlier action is the 

same as the current action. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corrections, State of 

Ariz., 934 P.2d 801, 804 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). Under this test, “[i]f no additional 

evidence is needed to prevail in the second action than that needed in the first, then the 

second action is barred.” Id.; see also Rousselle v. Jewett, 421 P.2d 529, 531 (1966). 

The “same evidence” test is quite liberal, and permits a plaintiff to avoid preclusion 

“merely by posturing the same claim as a new legal theory,” even if both theories rely on 

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the same underlying occurrence. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 934 P.2d at 805. 

 The claims asserted in this case are not barred by res judicata. Although the 

claims asserted in the Previous Action arise from the same underlying dispute and within 

the same administrative and statutory framework, Plaintiff’s claims in this case are 

legally and factually distinct. The Previous Action sought redress for harms stemming 

from Defendants’ failure to enter into an IGA, failure to conform to the Gilbert General 

Plan, and arbitrary and capricious exercise of governmental powers. Doc. 23 at 3; 

Doc. 22-1 at 28-35. This case seeks redress for harms stemming from an allegedly 

deficient IGA that Defendants entered into after the Previous Action was filed, asserts a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving Plaintiff of property without due process of 

law, and claims negligent use of governmental power to retaliate against Plaintiff. 

Doc. 23 at 4-5; Doc. 1-1 at 26-31. Although the claims arise from some of the same facts 

as the Previous Action, they are new legal theories based on some additional facts and 

therefore are not barred by res judicata under Arizona law. See Phoenix Newspapers, 934 

P.2d at 805 (explaining that the same evidence test allows litigants to “implicat[e] 

somewhat different facts” and “recast their claims under new theories”). 

B. Statute of Limitations. 

 Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by a one-year 

statute of limitation. Doc. 7 at 11. Defendants assert that the state law claims accrued on 

May 10, 2012, “at the very latest,” and that Plaintiff filed its complaint on May 15, 2013. 

Id. at 11-12. Both of Plaintiff’s state law claims stem from Defendants’ execution of the 

allegedly deficient IGA. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the IGA was recorded on 

May 10, 2012, but that Plaintiff’s counsel did not and could not receive a copy of the 

IGA until May 16, 2012. Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 86-87. Plaintiff argues that the causes of action 

did not accrue until May 16, 2012, the day Plaintiff’s counsel received a copy of the IGA. 

Doc. 11 at 16. 

 In Arizona, any action against a public entity or public employee must be brought 

within one year after the accrual of a cause of action. A.R.S. § 12-821. The related 180-

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day deadline for presenting a notice of claim to the public entity, set forth in A.R.S. § 12-

821.01, provides that the cause of action accrues “when the damaged party realizes he or 

she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, 

event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. 

§ 12-821.01(B) (emphasis added). Arizona courts have applied this trigger to both the 

one-year statute of limitation and the 180-day notice of claim period for claims against 

public entities. See Long v. City of Glendale, 93 P.3d 519, 525 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) 

(reversing dismissal based on both § 12-821 and § 12-821.01); Flood Control Dist. of 

Maricopa Cnty. v. Gaines, 43 P.3d 196, 202 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (“a cause of action 

under § 12-821 does not accrue until it is ‘discovered’”). 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s claim did not accrue until it realized it had been damaged by 

Defendants’ actions. “The requirement that a claimant ‘realize’ he has been damaged is 

inconsistent with the idea that claimants can be deemed to have notice of a claim as a 

matter of law regardless of their actual knowledge of the claim. One does not ‘realize’ 

something because there is a legal presumption that he knows it.” Long, 93 P.3d at 525. 

 Arizona courts additionally have noted that although “official records may give 

constructive notice of some facts, they do so only to those who are bound to search those 

records.” Id. at 526 (citation omitted). Defendants cite no law that compelled Plaintiff to 

search public records for the content of the IGA. Thus, the Court cannot conclude as a 

matter of law that Plaintiff’s state law claims accrued on May 10, 2012 due to the 

recording of the IGA. 

 Defendants have also provided the Court with a copy of Plaintiff’s claim letter to 

Mayor John W. Lewis of the Town of Gilbert, dated November 2, 2012, which states that 

“[t]he date of the actual triggering event for the accrual of [the relevant claims] is 

Thursday, May 10, 2012. This is the date on which the IGA was recorded in the official 

records of the Maricopa County Recorder . . . . The recording of the IGA gave 

constructive notice to [Plaintiff] of the IGA[.]” Doc. 7-1 at 5. Plaintiff argues that the 

Court may not consider this letter because “[a] motion to dismiss may not rely upon 

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evidence outside the pleadings.” Doc. 11 at 17. The Court does not agree. Because 

Plaintiff’s complaint refers to the letter and Plaintiff does not question its authenticity, the 

Court may consider it in ruling on this motion. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s statement in the notice of claim letter that its 

claim accrued on May 10, 2012 is dispositive on the timeliness issue. It is not. Plaintiff’s 

claim accrued when Arizona law says it accrued, not when Plaintiff thought it accrued. 

Under Arizona law, Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when Plaintiff “realized” it had 

been damaged. Defendant has not argued or otherwise shown that Plaintiff realized it 

had been damaged before May 15, 2012. 

 C. Failure to State a Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to adopt an IGA in conformity with the 

procedural requirements of A.R.S. § 9-461.11(F) deprived Plaintiff of a protected 

property right – “a reasonable expectation that Plaintiff would be accorded certain 

procedural due process prior to the time Defendants adopted and implemented this joint 

development plan” – without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 120-21. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim alleges a “mere 

failure of Defendants to follow state law,” and that this cannot form the basis for a § 1983 

claim. Doc. 7 at 7-8. 

 The Due Process Clause forbids governmental deprivation of substantive rights 

without constitutionally adequate procedure. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 

470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). To obtain relief on a procedural due process claim, the 

plaintiff must establish the existence of “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 

Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of 

process.” Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993); see also

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). “Not every procedural requirement 

ordained by state law, however, creates a substantive property interest entitled to 

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constitutional protection.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). “A 

protected property interest is present where an individual has a reasonable expectation of 

entitlement deriving from ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an 

independent source such as state law.’” Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 

24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577)). “A reasonable 

expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the 

extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.” Ass’n of Orange Cnty. 

Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1983). “Although procedural 

requirements ordinarily do not transform a unilateral expectation into a protected 

property interest, such an interest is created ‘if the procedural requirements are intended 

to be a significant substantive restriction on . . . decision making.’” Wedges/Ledges, 24 

F.3d at 62 (quoting Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, procedural due process claims generally fail where the 

relevant law does not contain mandatory language that significantly constrains the 

decision maker’s discretion. Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1090. “Only if the governing statute 

compels a result upon compliance with certain criteria, none of which involve the 

exercise of discretion by the reviewing body, does it create a constitutionally protected 

property interest.” Id. at 1091 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For 

example, in Wedges/Ledges, the property interest at stake was a license to operate 

amusement games. Under the controlling section of the Phoenix City Code, the City 

Treasurer was required to determine whether or not a coin-operated game qualified as a 

“game of skill.” Wedges/Ledges, 24 F.3d at 63. If it did, the Code provided that a game 

license tag “shall be issued.” Id. The court concluded that the use of the imperative in 

the provision without the presence of any open-ended discretionary factors created an 

expectation and protected property interest that could form the basis of a due process 

claim. Id. 

 In Shanks, by contrast, a homeowners and community organization sued to enjoin 

construction of a duplex that it feared would devalue the neighborhood. The organization 

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alleged that it was denied a procedural due process right when the city of Spokane failed 

to enforce provisions of its zoning code intended to preserve historic districts. Shanks, 

540 F.3d at 1084. Shanks held that no protected property interest was at stake because 

the relevant law granted the city wide discretion in negotiating the content of building 

permits and because the city was directed to guide its discretion by considering “factors 

of public interest” in an unspecified way that did not mandate any outcome. Id. at 1091. 

 The statute in this case contains mandatory procedural language. See, e.g., A.R.S. 

§ 9-461.11(F)(1)(d) (“A property owner shall be afforded the opportunity at a public 

hearing . . . to present [evidence]. If on the basis of the [evidence] presented there is 

reason to believe . . . the [plan] may result in a significant [reduction in value or 

productive use], adoption or implementation of the plan shall be postponed pending 

investigation and resolution of the alleged deprivation.”) (emphasis added). The 

mandatory language does not, however, dictate any particular outcome. It merely states 

that adoption or implementation of the plan “shall be postponed” for further investigation 

and resolution. Plaintiff does not complain in this case about a lack of postponement. 

Plaintiff complains that the project went forward as planned. And yet the statue says 

nothing about whether the governing body was required to modify the project on the 

basis of evidence presented at the public hearing. On that question, the governing body 

retains discretion. The Court concludes, therefore, that A.R.S. § 9-461.11(F) creates no 

procedural entitlement that rises to the level of a property right protected under the 

Constitution. See James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To create a 

right protected by the Due Process Clause, the state law must provide more than merely 

procedure; it must protect some substantive end.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); accord Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 n.12 (1983) (“[A]n expectation 

of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 

Clause.”). 

 Additionally, even if the Court found that Plaintiff possessed a protectable 

property interest, Defendants’ conduct did not violate due process. It is the Due Process 

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Clause, not state law, which determines what process is due. Halverson v. Skagit Cnty., 

42 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994). “Ordinarily, due process of law requires [notice and] 

an opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property 

interest.” Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that it was provided 

notice of Defendants’ proposed action and that it was able to appear at multiple public 

hearings and present evidence. Even if Defendants’ conduct did not perfectly accord 

with state law, due process was satisfied by this notice and opportunity to be heard. See 

Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “if state procedures 

rise above the floor set by the due process clause, a state could fail to follow its own 

procedures yet still provide sufficient process to survive constitutional scrutiny.”) 

(internal quotations marks and citation omitted) (overruled on other grounds, Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)). 

 The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. 

 D. Remand. 

This case was removed from state court on the basis of the federal question 

presented by the § 1983 claim, with supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 

Doc. 1, ¶ 2. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the 

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has instructed that “‘if the federal claims are dismissed 

before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.’” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 

383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). While not a hard-and-fast rule, the statement has come to 

mean that “in the usual case in which all federal claims are eliminated before trial, the 

balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 

remaining state-law claims.” Id. 

 The Court concludes that this action should be remanded. With dismissal of the 

§ 1983 claim, the basis for this Court’s federal question jurisdiction no longer exists. The 

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remaining state-law claims, particularly the claim under A.R.S. § 9-461.11(F), present 

complicated questions of statutory interpretation that are best addressed by Arizona trial 

and appellate courts. Those courts have a greater interest and expertise in resolving state 

law claims and applying state statutes. Additionally, remand will benefit the federal 

system by allowing this Court to devote its scarce resources to resolving federal issues. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) is granted in part. 

 2. This case is remanded to Maricopa County Superior Court. 

 Dated this 18th day of April, 2014. 

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