Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00444/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Mawhinney, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-00444-CKJ(JCG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff filed this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner for

Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The case has been referred

to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court.

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff on

November 30, 2006 (Doc. No. 8) and a cross-motion for summary judgment filed by

Defendant on December 29, 2006. (Doc. No. 9.) Defendant responded to Plaintiff's motion

on December 29, 2006 (Doc. No. 10) and Plaintiff filed his Reply on January 12, 2007.

(Doc. No. 12.)

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review, grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 9), and deny Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 8).

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was a pilot. Due to certain medical conditions he can no longer fly. Plaintiff

filed an application for social security disability insurance benefits on December 19, 1997,

alleging that he had suffered from a disability due to vertigo since March 26, 1996. (Tr.

81-84, 94-99.)

The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application initially and again

upon reconsideration. (Tr. 62, 63.) Plaintiff requested review, and on March 10, 1999

appeared with counsel at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Norman R. Buls.

(Tr. 74, 34-60.) The ALJ found Plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or

disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social

Security Act. (Tr. 14-20.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no exertional limitations but had

a non-exertional limitation consisting of minor episodes of vertigo on an irregular basis

which limited his ability to operate machinery that required a great deal of care. (Tr. 14-20.)

The ALJ also found, based on the testimony of a vocational expert, that Plaintiff could

perform his past relevant work ("PRW") as a state senator, and in the alternative, other jobs

in the local and national economy, such as ticket agent or security guard. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ

therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 18.) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s

decision, and the Appeals Council denied review, making the decision of the ALJ the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 5-6.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981. 

Plaintiff filed a federal court action seeking judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). On April 18, 2005, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona held

that the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform the type of work he did in his PRW as a

state senator was based on the testimony of a vocational expert, but that the transcript

indicated that the vocational expert was not prepared to discuss Plaintiff's prior employment

as a state senator. The District Court therefore concluded that the ALJ's finding was not

supported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for further

proceedings. (Tr. 366.) The Appeals Council issued a remand order on June 20, 2005. (Tr.

634.) 

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In a decision dated May 25, 2006, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a full range

of exertional activity except as limited by minor episodes of vertigo on an irregular basis and

need to avoid exposure to operating machinery without a great deal of care. (Tr. 336.) The

ALJ again concluded, based on the testimony of a vocational expert, that Plaintiff could

perform his PRW as a state senator given his residual functional capacity. (Tr. 337.) The

ALJ also relied on the testimony of a vocational expert in concluding that, in the alternative,

Plaintiff could make a vocational adjustment to other kinds of work, such as telephone

solicitor or dispatcher. (Tr. 338.) The ALJ therefore concluded that, independent of

Plaintiff's ability to work as a state senator, Plaintiff was "not disabled" because Plaintiff was

capable of making a successful adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the

national economy. (Tr. 338.) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision and the Appeals Council

denied review, making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr.

323-28.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint in U.S. District Court appealing the Commissioner’s final

decision. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment on

November 30, 2006 (Doc. No. 8), challenging the ALJ's findings that: (1) Plaintiff's previous

employment as a state senator was PRW; (2) Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity

to perform his past work as a state senator; and (3) Plaintiff had transferable skills or the

ability to perform other work with only "little or no vocational adjustment." Defendant filed

a response and cross-motion for summary judgment on December 29, 2006. (Doc. No. 9.)

Plaintiff replied to Defendant’s response on January 12, 2007. (Doc. No. 12.) 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Claimant’s Work History

Plaintiff was born on May 27, 1937, and is 70 years of age. (Tr. 81.) He has 14 years

of education, including two years of college, and officer candidate school in the United States

Air Force undergraduate pilot training program. (Tr. 720.) Plaintiff was a pilot in the Air

Force from 1962 to 1966. (Tr. 38.) He worked in the airline industry from 1966 until 1996

as a pilot flight engineer and as a first officer (or co-pilot). (Id.) The last job he had was as

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1

Nystagmus is involuntary rhythmic movement of the eyes. Mosby's Medical Dictionary 1091 (4th ed., Mosby

1994).

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a first officer flying 747 airplanes from the United States to Asia. (Tr. 37.) In addition,

Plaintiff was elected and served as an Arizona state senator from 1979 to 1991. (Tr. 40.)

During this period, Plaintiff would take a leave of absence from the airlines from January to

May or June, while the Arizona legislature was in session. (Tr. 40.) The annual pay for a

State Senator at the time was $6,000 per year. Id. 

In the summer of 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) determined that

Plaintiff was disabled under its rules and regulations and Plaintiff lost his FAA certification.

(Tr. 34, 732.) Since that time, Plaintiff has not worked, although he was appointed to a

transportation board and to two water boards. (Tr. 40, 722.)

Claimant’s Medical History

In March 1996, during a flight from Los Angeles to Sydney, Australia, Plaintiff had

an acute attack of vertigo which was accompanied by nausea, vomiting and cold sweats. The

vertigo lasted for three days on this first occurrence. (Tr. 733.) Plaintiff claims that he

experiences two types of vertigo attacks. The first type consists of a sensation that the room

slides to the left or that the whole room is spinning for awhile, but then it stops. There is no

pre-cursor or indication that such an attack is about to occur. (Tr. 43.) The second type is

more severe, producing a sensation that the whole world is spinning around, and causes

nausea, chills and dizziness that may last for three or four days. (Tr. 44.)

Dr. Welsh has been Plaintiff's personal doctor since May 15, 1992. (Tr. 160, 384.)

Plaintiff saw Dr. Welsh for treatment of his vertigo in March 1996 after his first attack. (Tr.

151.) Dr. Welsh requested that Plaintiff go through a flight simulator test before returning

to work. (Tr. 151.) Plaintiff took the flight simulator test, which is designed to induce

vertigo, on June 10, 1996. It brought on vertigo, nystagmus1

 and nausea in Plaintiff after

several maneuvers and a left turn. (Tr. 144, 151, 734.) On October 21, 1996, Dr. Welsh

opined that Plaintiff's condition appeared to be permanent and that it was not safe for

Plaintiff to fly. (Tr. 151.) 

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2

Labyrinthitis is an inflammation of the inner ear canal resulting in vertigo. Mosby's Medical Dictionary 880

(4th ed., Mosby 1994).

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Dr. Welsh referred Plaintiff to Dr. Stuart Snider, a neurologist whom Plaintiff visited

three times for complaints related to vertigo. (Tr. 151, 181-184.) In April 1996, Dr. Snider

determined that Plaintiff most likely had viral irritant labyrinthitis.2

 Tests by MRI and MRA

were negative. (Tr. 182.) In July 1996, Dr. Snider concluded that Plaintiff continued to

suffer from residual viral labyrinthitis, and opined that Plaintiff should not fly in the near

future. (Tr. 181.) 

Drs. Snider and Welsh referred Plaintiff to Dr. Coulthard, an Ear, Nose & Throat

specialist. (Tr. 172.) Dr. Coulthard conducted diagnostic tests on Plaintiff on July 17, 1996,

and diagnosed him with vertigo of unknown etiology. (Tr. 171.) Dr. Coulthard noted that

Plaintiff had experienced chronic equilibrium dysfunction since March 23, 1996, that

Plaintiff's condition must be treated as permanent, and that Plaintiff should not fly. (Tr. 163.)

He recommended that Plaintiff avoid sudden movement and situations that might aggravate

the vertigo such as flying or using the simulator. (Tr. 144.) 

On December 24, 1996, the Medical Review branch of the Aeromedical Certification

Division of the FAA denied Plaintiff’s application for airman medical certification due to a

"disqualifying neurological condition." (Tr. 132.) Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the

FAA's decision. (Tr. 161.) Dr.Warren S. Silberman, D.O., a Manager of the aeromedical

Certification Division of the Civil Aeromedical Institute at the U.S. Department of

Transportation for the FAA, reviewed Plaintiff's file and affirmed the December 24, 1996

denial of medical certification for flying. Dr. Silberman referred Plaintiff to Dr. John H.

Seipel, Ph.D., M.D., J.D., a neurologist and lawyer specializing in aviation and aerospace

medicine. Dr. Seipel reviewed medical records and determined that Plaintiff had labyrinthitis

and that it may be permanent. (Tr. 145, 280.) He further opined that Plaintiff should be

denied all classes of medical certification in the future. (Id.)

Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Jerald Olson, M.D., an otolaryngologist with University

Physicians, by Dr. Coulthard. (Tr. 139.) Dr. Olson opined that Plaintiff had viral labyrinthitis

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or neuronitis, but not paroxysmal positional vertigo. (Id.) Dr. Olson indicated that the

problem might be permanent. (Id.) He recommended platform posturography followed by

vestibular rehabilitation and future evaluation for improvement. (Id.)

Dr. Coulthard also referred Plaintiff to Kathy Nichols, P.T., a Balance Disorders

Clinic Coordinator at Healthsouth Rehabilitation Institute of Tucson. (Tr. 141.) Plaintiff

complained that he was having episodes 2-3 times per week where he felt he was turning left.

(Tr. 142.) A Posturography test was performed. (Tr. 141.) The results were substantially

normal, with a few minor deviations. (Tr. 141.) Ms. Nichols recommended that Plaintiff

engage in exercises that challenge the vestibular system. (Tr. 141.) 

Plaintiff's employer, United Airlines, referred Plaintiff to the Aviation Medicine

Center at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, where he was examined by

Drs. John Calverley, Jeffrey Vrabec, Bobby Alford and Clarence Jernigan. (Tr. 184, 193.)

In addition, as part of the Aviation Medicine Center's examination of Plaintiff, Plaintiff was

examined by Beatriz C. Alvarado, M.A., an audiologist. (Tr. 133.) Audiology tests

disclosed mild, high-frequency sensorineural hearing loss in both ears. (Tr. 133.) Following

these examinations, Plaintiff's case was presented to the Aviation Medicine Board on March

4, 1997. (Tr. 185.) The Board opined that Plaintiff was experiencing benign paroxysmal

positional vertigo and was temporarily disabled from the performance of aircrew duties. (Tr.

185.) The Board recommended that Plaintiff undertake a series of repositioning exercises

and undergo re-testing in six months. (Id.) After additional treatments and examinations by

the doctors, Plaintiff's case was presented to the Board again in January, 1998. (Tr. 186-87.)

At that time, Plaintiff continued to have two or three mild episodes of vertigo per week. (Tr.

185.) He was diagnosed with post positional vertigo with a "definitive diagnosis impossible,"

although his symptoms were suggestive of phobic postural vertigo, which precluded him

from qualifying to perform aircraft flight crew duties. (Tr.187.)

A Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment completed on March 2, 1998,

concluded that Plaintiff had certain limitations:

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Exertional limitations: Occasionally lifting 50 pounds, frequently lifting 25

pounds, standing and /or walking about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sitting

about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and unlimited pushing. (Tr. 201.)

Postural limitations: Never climbing or balancing. Occasionally limited for

stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling. (Tr. 202.)

No limitations manipulatively, visually or communicatively. (Tr. 203-204.)

Environmental Limitations: avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and

hazards. (Tr. 204.)

Dr. Phillip Kramer, a neurologist, examined Plaintiff in July of 1998 to render a

"final" opinion for the Airline Pilot's Association and the United Airlines Medical

Department regarding Plaintiff's episodic vertigo. (Tr. 251.) Dr. Kramer found that symptoms

were "brought on or exacerbated by bending over, and rapid head movements" . . . but "NOT

brought on or exacerbated by turning over in bed, getting up quickly, walking in the dark,

uneven surfaces, elevators, escalators, rich and busy visual environments, loud noises,

valsalva maneuvers, exercise, meals or not eating, heat or hot showers, swallowing, alcohol

or caffeine." (Tr. 252 (emphasis in original.)) Dr. Kramer ruled out viral labyrinthitis/neuritis

and benign paroxysmal positional vertigo. (Tr. 254-255.) He also determined that MS,

migraine, epilepsy, perilymph fistula or Meniere's disease were not contributing factors. (Tr.

254.) He recommended further testing to determine a more accurate diagnosis. (Tr. 255-256.)

Dr. Kramer determined that Plaintiff had microvascular compression with a reasonable

degree of medical certainty. Dr. Kramer indicated that the condition can be treated with

Tegretol, which Plaintiff found did relieve him of episodes of vertigo. However, the effects

of the medication would prevent Plaintiff from flying. The condition is also treatable with

brain surgery, but the surgery is controversial and Dr. Kramer opined that the risks

outweighed the benefits. Dr. Kramer recommended Plaintiff not take Tegretol because "the

microvascular symptoms [were] not sufficient to interfere with his life in any other way other

than flying" and "the risk of taking Tegretol out weigh[ed] the benefits that he [would]

receive." Dr. Kramer also indicated that the microvascular compression is a permanent

condition. (Tr. 321.)

CLAIM EVALUATION

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Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations require that disability claims be

evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Baxter

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step requires a determination of

whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA). 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If so, then the claimant is not disabled and benefits are denied.

Id.

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ proceeds to step

two which requires a determination of whether the claimant has a "medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). In

making a determination at step two, the ALJ uses medical evidence to consider whether the

claimant's impairment more than minimally limits or restricts his or her "physical or mental

ability to do basic work activities." Id. If the ALJ concludes the impairment is not severe, the

claim is denied. Id.

Upon a finding of severity, the ALJ proceeds to step three which requires a

determination of whether the impairment meets or equals one of several listed impairments

that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the

claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the claimant is

presumed to be disabled, and no further inquiry is necessary. Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d

1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993). If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment, evaluation proceeds to the next step.

The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant has sufficient

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). RFC is defined as that which an individual can still do

despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. If the ALJ concludes the claimant has

sufficient RFC, then the claim is denied. Id. 

If the claimant cannot perform any past work, then the ALJ must move to the fifth step

which requires consideration of the claimant's RFC to perform other substantial gainful work

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in the national economy in view of claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4). In determining whether the claimant retains the ability to

perform other work, the ALJ may refer to the Medical Vocational Guidelines ("the grids")

promulgated by the SSA. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d

573, 576-577 (9th Cir. 1988). The grids categorize jobs according to their exertional

requirements such as sedentary work, light work, or medium work. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). Based on the claimant's exertional ability, age, education, and

work experience, the grids indicate whether or not the claimant is disabled. Id. The grids are

a valid basis for denying claims where they completely and accurately describe the claimant's

abilities and limitations. Id. at 1101-02. 

If the claimant has significant non-exertional limitations, the grids do not apply. Penny

v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958-959 (9th Cir.1993). "Non-exertional limitations are limitations

that do not directly affect a claimant's strength." Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340

(9th Cir.1988). If significant non-exertional limitations prevent the claimant from

performing the full range of work in any exertional category, the ALJ must accept the

testimony of a vocational expert to deny the claim. Id. at 1341.

If a claimant has both exertional and nonexertional limitations, a vocational expert's

testimony will be used to establish the level of work the claimant is able to perform. The ALJ

must then apply the grids to the established level and is bound by the result dictated by the

grids. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1157 (1989). Where application of the grids directs

a finding of disability, that finding must be accepted. This is so whether the impairment is

exertional or results from a combination of exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id.

“[F]or individuals of advanced age who can no longer perform vocationally relevant past

work and . . . who have only skills that are not readily transferable to a significant range of

semi-skilled or skilled work that is within the individual's functional capacity . . . the

limitations in vocational adaptability represented by functional restriction to light work

warrant a finding of disabled.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, 202.00(c). 

The ALJ's Findings

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At step one of the disability analysis, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in any

substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. (Tr. 338.) At step two, he found

Plaintiff had severe impairments: microvascular compression disorder and mild bilateral high

frequency sensorinureal hearing loss. (Tr. 339.) At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s

impairments did not meet or equal the criteria for any impairment found in the Listing of

Impairments, Appendix 1, Subpart P, of 20 C.F.R., Part 404. (Id.) The ALJ then analyzed

Plaintiff's residual functional capacity at step four. Id. He made the following finding:

Full range of exertional activity except as limited by minor episodes of vertigo

on an irregular basis and need to avoid exposure to operating machinery

without a great deal of care.

(Id.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a state

senator. (Id.) In addition, at step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering the types of work

that Plaintiff is still functionally capable of performing in combination with his age,

education and work experience, Plaintiff could be expected to make a vocational adjustment

to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such as telephone solicitor

and dispatcher. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An individual is entitled to disability benefits if he or she demonstrates, through

medically acceptable clinical or laboratory standards, an inability to engage in substantial

gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a

continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). "[A]

claimant will be found disabled only if the impairment is so severe that, considering age,

education, and work experience, that person cannot engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy." Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th

Cir. 1993) (quoting Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990)).

To establish a prima facie case of disability, the claimant must demonstrate an

inability to perform his or her former work. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.

1984). Once the claimant meets that burden, the Commissioner must come forward with

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substantial evidence establishing the claimant is not disabled. Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427,

1429 (9th Cir. 1985).

The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3). The court may overturn the decision to deny benefits "only if it is not supported

by substantial evidence or it is based on legal error." Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019

(9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not

disabled must be upheld if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and the

record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the decision. Clem v. Sullivan, 894

F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Desrosiers v. Secretary, 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir.

1988)); Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)). Substantial evidence is

defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); Winans

v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1987). The standard is less than a "preponderance of

the evidence" standard. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019.

“[I]f the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at

400). When applying the substantial evidence standard, however, the court should not

mechanically accept the Commissioner’s findings but should review the record critically and

thoroughly. Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1975). Reviewing courts must

consider the evidence that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.

Id. at 1156. A denial of benefits will be set aside if the Commissioner fails to apply proper

legal standards in weighing the evidence even though the findings may be supported by

substantial evidence. Frost v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 367 (9th Cir. 2002); Benitez v.

Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff presents three issues which challenge the Commisioner’s analysis at steps

four and five: (1) whether the finding that Plaintiff’s service as State Senator is past relevant

work is erroneous; (2) whether the conclusion that Plaintiff could perform as a state senator

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given his residual functional capacity is erroneous; and (3) whether the finding that Plaintiff

had transferable skills or the ability to perform other work is erroneous.

1. The characterization of Plaintiff’s service as a State Senator as past

relevant work was supported by substantial evidence

 As noted above, the fourth step of the analysis requires the ALJ to consider whether

the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant

work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). RFC is defined as that which an

individual can still do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. Past work is relevant

if it was done within the last 15 years, lasted long enough to learn how to do it, and was

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a). Substantial gainful activity is defined

as work that: (a) involves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties; and

(b) is done (or intended) for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.910. If the ALJ concludes the

claimant has sufficient RFC, then the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. No further

analysis is required. 

Plaintiff agrees that his past work as a state senator was relevant because the work was

performed in the last 15 years and lasted long enough to learn how to perform the work

activity. However, he contends that his service as a state senator can not constitute

substantial gainful activity because: (1) the payment he received for his services did not

constitute income and (2) his service (and possibly all legislative service) can never

constitute past relevant work. 

The Commissioner’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s earnings constituted substantial

gainful activity is supported by substantial evidence. Under the applicable regulations, if an

employee’s average monthly “countable earnings” exceed the Earnings Guidelines, the

employee will be considered to be engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.

§404.1574(b)(2)(i)(2006). For the period of 1980-1989, the Guidelines establish the amount

of $300 as the monthly average earnings demonstrating substantial gainful activity; for 1990-

1999, the Guideline amount is $500. Plaintiff testified that he earned $6000.00 for the five

to six months that he performed legislative functions from 1979 to 1990. Based on this

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Plaintiff contends that his pay did not average more than $500 per month. Plaintiff

asserts that his salary should be averaged over a 12-month period rather than over the five

to six months that he worked as a senator. Even if Plaintiff’s proposed method of calculation

is utilized, however, Plaintiff’s earnings as a state senator still equal or exceed the Earnings

Guidelines for the relevant time periods. 

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testimony, the Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff was paid on average at least $1,000 for

each of the months that he served as a State Senator. (Tr. 5.)3 Because Plaintiff’s average

monthly “countable earnings” for that time period exceed the Earnings Guidelines, the

Commissioner did not err in concluding that Plaintiff was engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 

Plaintiff suggests that his work as a state senator was not substantial gainful

employment because, although he was paid for his work, he did not perform the work for

profit or income. According to Plaintiff, the unique circumstances associated with service in

a political office are such that political service should never be considered past relevant

work; it is community service with a stipend. Plaintiff states that he undertook legislative

responsibilities due to his desire to serve the community and at a tremendous financial loss

to his personal household. In addition, Plaintiff notes that he entered the political arena not

for pay or profit but because of dissatisfaction with the representation in place and a belief

that he could do better. Plaintiff thus concludes that the court should reject the conclusion

that service and sacrifice in elected office could ever constitute past relevant work in the

disability calculus because in obtaining such a position there is not an intent to engage in

substantial activity for pay or profit. (Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 6.) 

 It is undisputed that Plaintiff actually reduced the compensation he was capable of

earning by choosing to serve part-time as a senator rather than working full-time flying

commercial aircraft. The motivation of an individual to perform a job, however, is not

considered in determining whether a job amounts to substantial gainful activity. Rather, the

regulations require consideration of whether the work activity is “the kind of work usually

done for pay or profit, whether profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b) (2004). There

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are many vocations that people enter into because of a desire to serve their community or for

other altruistic reasons, but these admirable motives do not make the work any less

substantial for purposes of determining disability. Because Plaintiff’s work as a senator was

paid, it falls within the definition of substantial gainful activity. Plaintiff’s subjective

motivation is not a basis for finding that the Commissioner erred in concluding that

Plaintiff’s work as a state legislator is the kind of work which is usually done for pay or

profit. 

Second, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erroneously determined that Plaintiff could

return to his past relevant work as an elected State Senator. (Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 3.)

The ALJ actually concluded that "claimant's impairments have not prevented him from

performing his past relevant work" and that "claimant's past relevant work as a State Senator

did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by his residual

functional capacity." (Tr. 19 ¶ 8; Tr. 339 ¶ 7) (emphases added)). The distinction between

a claimant's ability to return to or to perform PRW is an important one, because the focus of

the step four analysis is whether a person is capable of doing a job he has done in the past,

not whether he can obtain such a job. The Supreme Court has held that whether the past

work even exists in the national economy is not an issue in the step four analysis. Barnhart

v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 28 (2003). The Court reasoned: "Congress could have determined

that an analysis of a claimant's physical and mental capacity to do his previous work would

'in the vast majority of cases' serve as an effective and efficient administrative proxy for the

claimant's ability to do some work that does exist in the national economy." Id. Thus, the

step four analysis of a claimant’s past work experience is not based on an assumption that

the claimant will (or could) return to that particular job. It is a test to determine whether the

claimant is capable of doing work of the type he knows how to do. Under the Thomas

“administrative proxy” interpretation of the step four analysis, the fact that the claimant is

capable of performing valuable work is what is relevant. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding that he could return to his previous work is

erroneous because he cannot withstand the rigors of campaigning. (Plaintiff’s Memorandum

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at 7.) According to Plaintiff, his vertigo and dizziness would prohibit him from walking in

rural areas and attending the numerous events associated with campaigning. Given the

Thomas reasoning, supra, this argument must be rejected. As stated above, the analysis of

a claimant’s ability to perform past work is an administrative proxy that enables the ALJ to

conclude that the claimant is capable of doing work. It is not relevant whether the claimant

would be hired or could get the job. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b)(1), (3) and (7) (2006); 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2). In the present case, Plaintiff’s ability to campaign for a position is

analogous to applying for work. Thus, whether Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity

to campaign for a position as state senator is irrelevant; the relevant inquiry is whether,

following a successful campaign, Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform the

activity of state senator. Plaintiff does not assert that he is unable to perform that activity.

The ALJ’s decision to find that Plaintiff’s work as State Senator constituted past

relevant work was supported by substantial evidence and was not based on legal error.

Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform his past work, a finding that the Plaintiff

was not disabled was appropriate. 

Under the five-step evaluation process, if the Plaintiff is found not disabled at any

step, the inquiry ends and an analysis of the next step is not required. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520.

See also Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993); Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d

251, 255 (9th Cir. 1996). Because the ALJ did not err in concluding that Plaintiff was not

disabled at step four, a step five analysis was not necessary. Thus, the Court will not review

the ALJ’s alternative finding that Plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy.

(Tr. 339.)

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.

9), and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 8.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b), any party may file and serve written objections within 10 days after being served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, the

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party’s right to de novo review may be waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). If objections are

filed, the parties use the following case number: CV-00444-CKJ.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation

to all parties.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2007.

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