Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00142/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE WILSON, III,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFF WRIGLEY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 07-00142 LJO DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN

CLAIMS AND DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO AMEND PETITION

[Docs. 1, 6]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition on January 26, 2007. On March 28, 2007, Petitioner

filed a motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental petition. (Court Doc. 6.) 

Petitioner is currently in custody of the Bureau of Prisons at the Taft Correctional

Institution located in Taft, California. Petitioner contests the outcome of a 2005 disciplinary

hearing and contends that the institution failed to conduct a disciplinary hearing in the proper

time frame. As a result Petitioner lost twenty-six (26) days of good conduct time.

In his motion to amend the petition, Petitioner contests the outcome of a 1995

disciplinary hearing. 

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

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petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that

the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4,

pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. 

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the federal petitioner

can demonstrate that he "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3). A habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a

prisoner to challenge “the very fact or duration of his confinement,” and where “the relief he

seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). In contrast, a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of

that confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499.

Any deprivation that does not affect the fact or duration of a prisoner’s overall confinement is

necessarily a condition of that confinement. Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir.1999). In

other words, if a successful conditions of confinement challenge would not necessarily shorten

the prisoner’s sentence, then § 1983 is the appropriate vehicle. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544

U.S. 74 (2005). 

First, Petitioner contends that the institution failed to conduct the initial hearing within

three (3) working days in violation of 28 C.F.R. 541.15(b). Section 541.15(b) states:

Each inmate so charged is entitled to an initial hearing before the UDC, ordinarily

held within three work days from the time staff became aware of the inmate’s

involvement in the incident. This three work day period excludes the day staff

became aware of the inmate’s involvement in the incident, weekends, and

holidays.

 

Petitioner’s claim is plainly without merit. Initially, the regulation states that the hearing

given to the inmate is “ordinarily held within three work days.” Therefore, the government

acknowledges that there may be situations when the hearing is not held within three working

days. Further, Petitioner has not shown any prejudice for the government’s failure to conduct the

hearing within three working days. Moreover, Petitioner is not afforded the full panoply of rights

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in a disciplinary hearing. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners cannot be

entirely deprived of their constitutional rights, but their rights may be diminished by the needs

and objectives of the institutional environment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 555. Prison

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, so a prisoner is not afforded the

full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a prisoner’s due process rights are

moderated by the “legitimate institutional needs” of a prison. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267,

1269 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-455 (1984).

However, when a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time

credits, due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at least 24

hours of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety

and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and

(3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567. In addition, due process

requires that the decision be supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, citing United

States ex rel. Vatauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)

 Second, Petitioner contends that the government brought false charges without any proof

of violence. Construed liberally this claim states a due process claim that the incident report is

not supported by “some evidence.” 

Third, Petitioner contends that he was denied a request to be transferred to a different

institution. Petitioner is advised that there is no constitutional right to imprisonment in a specific

prison. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1013-1014 (9 Cir. 2004). Additionally, this claim th

does not impact the duration of Petitioner’s confinement. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas corpus relief, and this claim is not cognizable via section 2241. 

Fourth, with regard to Petitioner’s challenge to the 1995 disciplinary hearing, it is barred

by the statute of limitations. On the form petition, Petitioner indicates that his first

administrative appeal was denied in 1996. (Court Doc. 1, at 2.) In a situation such as this where

the petitioner is challenging a disciplinary hearing, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is

concluded and the statute of limitations commences when the final administrative appeal is

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denied. See Shelby v. Barlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9 Cir.2004) (holding that the Board of th

Prison Term’s denial of an inmate’s administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the

inmate’s claim that triggered the commencement of the limitations period); Redd v. McGrath,

343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9 Cir.2003) (same). Therefore, the limitations period commenced the day th

after Petitioner’s appeal of the 1995 decision was denied. Under Section 2244(d)(1)(D),

Petitioner had one year from that date, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Although Petitioner did not provide the specific dates of the

actual administrative decision, it is immaterial for resolution of this issue because Petitioner

states it was denied in 1996 and therefore the statute expired sometime in 1997. Petitioner did

not file his federal petition until January 26, 2007, which is several years after the limitations

period had expired. Petitioner provides no basis for tolling of the limitations period. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus proceed only on Petitioner’s due process

claim regarding the 2005 disciplinary hearing;

2. All other claims be DISMISSED for failure to allege grounds that would entitle

Petitioner to habeas corpus relief; and

3. Petitioner’s motion to amend the petition be DENIED as the claim raised therein

is not cognizable.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District

of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)©. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 9, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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