Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01283/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Knowles, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

U.S. Foodservice, Inc., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-01283-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 69). For the

reasons discussed, the Motion will be granted. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion

for a Continuance to Conduct Further Discovery (Doc. 89) and Motion to Strike (Doc. 93),

which will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint alleging he was

discriminated against because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), was wrongfully

terminated in violation of the Arizona Employment Protection Act, and was wrongfully

terminated under common law. 

Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was a truck driver for Defendant U.S.

Foodservice, Inc. for approximately 28 years. In September 2007, Defendant’s manager

asked Plaintiff about an accident at a school. Plaintiff told the supervisor he was unaware

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The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant reported to DES that Plaintiff was

“terminated” and was “not terminated.” (Doc. 27 at ¶¶ 54, 56). These allegations appear

contradictory. The Court presumes Plaintiff’s used the term “terminated” in paragraph 54

to simply mean that Plaintiff’s employment came to an end, and not to mean that Defendant

fired him, as Plaintiff uses that term in paragraph 56. 

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of any such accident. In December 2007, Plaintiff was told the company was considering

disciplining him for the accident, and Plaintiff was shown a video purporting to show

Plaintiff being involving in the accident. Plaintiff reiterated that he was unaware of being

in any such accident. On December 13, 2007, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated,

ostensibly based on the unreported accident. Plaintiff was 52 years old at the time he was

terminated. Plaintiff claims he was terminated because of his age, and not because of the

purported accident or his failure to report it. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant falsely

reported to the Department of Economic Security (“DES”) that he was terminated for failing

to report an accident. Plaintiff alleges Defendant falsely reported to DES that Plaintiff was

not terminated, and instead voluntarily resigned, which would prevent Plaintiff from

receiving unemployment benefits charged to Defendant’s unemployment account.1

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact” and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). To

enter summary judgment, the Court must examine all evidence and find no dispute

concerning genuine issues of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255-256 (1986). The evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed, and all

reasonable inferences drawn in its favor. See id. “[A] party seeking summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal citations omitted). However, if the non-moving party bears

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the burden of proof at trial, the moving party’s summary judgment motion need only

highlight the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party’s claims. See Devereaux

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25).

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must produce evidence sustaining a

genuine issue of disputed material fact. See id.

DISCUSSION

I. ADEA Claim

A. Prima Facie Case and Burden Shifting Framework

Plaintiff alleges he was discriminated against because of his age in violation of the

ADEA. To analyze age discrimination claims based solely on circumstantial evidence (as

is often the case), courts apply variants of the burden shifting framework articulated in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). First, the court determines whether the plaintiff

can make a prima facie case of discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. If the plaintiff does,

the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for its employment decision. Id This burden is merely one of production; the

defendant is under no burden to persuade the trier of fact that its proffered reason is credible.

Id. Once the employer produces “sufficient evidence” to support a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff has the burden of showing the alleged reason is a

pretext for the employer’s discriminatory motive. Id. 

To establish a prima face case of disparate treatment (in the form of being terminated)

based on age using circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must show he was (1) a member of

a protected class (at least 40 years of age); (2) performed his job satisfactorily; (3) was

discharged; and (4) was replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior

qualifications. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001).

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B. Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence that his age was a “but-for”

factor in his termination. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2351

(2009), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under the ADEA

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (either direct or circumstantial) that age was

the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse action. The Supreme Court thus foreclosed

“mixed-motive” ADEA claims, under which an employer could be held liable if the plaintiff

could prove age was at least a substantial factor motivating the employment decision.

Although holding that mixed-motive cases are not available under the ADEA, the Court did

not hold that the McDonnell Douglas framework used by courts to analyze discrimination

cases based on circumstantial evidence does not apply to ADEA claims. Thus, to determine

whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of age discrimination to overcome

summary judgment, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was over 40 and was discharged, thus

satisfying the first and third elements of a prima facie case. Defendant argues Plaintiff fails

to establish the fourth element by showing evidence he was replaced by a younger employee.

Defendant contends it assigned John Breidt, who is 57 years old, to Plaintiff’s former shuttle

route. In response, Plaintiff argues Defendant did not replace Plaintiff with any driver.

Plaintiff cites testimony from Alvin Cramer, who stated, “There was no replacement for Mr.

Knowles.” (Doc. 77, Ex. 4 at 51-52). Although Plaintiff argues he was not replaced by any

new driver, he does not dispute that Defendant assigned his route to John Breidt, who is 57

years old. Plaintiff points out that his duties were initially absorbed by a driver who was

under the age of 40, citing an interrogatory submitted to Defendant. But the interrogatory

only provides evidence that a younger driver assumed Plaintiff’s route for the week

immediately following Plaintiff’s termination. (Doc. 70, Ex. 24 at 3). The same interrogatory

evidences that after that week, Plaintiff’s route was assigned to 57 year old John Breidt. As

noted, Plaintiff has not disputed that his route was permanently assigned to John Breidt, who

was older than Plaintiff. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff cannot

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Plaintiff argues that in cases in which there is no replacement, a plaintiff may show

other circumstantial evidence of discrimination to establish a prima facie case. Plaintiff cites

Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. Parternship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). In Diaz,

the court noted that the prima facie case changes somewhat in cases involving a reduction

in workforce, in which there may be no replacement. Plaintiff does not allege he was

terminated in the context of a general reduction in workforce. Although Diaz found the

circumstances in the case, in which the employer was undergoing a general reduction in

workers, presented cause for an exception, it also noted: “Generally, an employee can satisfy

the last element of the prima facie case only by providing evidence that he or she was

replaced by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.” Diaz,

521 F.3d at 1207 n.2. Plaintiff has not shown this case to be one in which this general

requirement should not apply. 

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establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing he was

replaced by a substantially younger driver.2

 

In addition to seeking a continuance of discovery (as discussed below under Part V),

the parties recently submitted a discovery dispute in which Plaintiff requests that Defendant

be ordered to supplement its responses to discovery requests. Plaintiff contends he has

reason to believe that after discovery closed and summary judgment briefing finished,

Defendant hired a driver who is under 40 to absorb Plaintiff’s former route. As will be

discussed in a separate order considering the discovery dispute, Plaintiff has not shown good

cause to re-open discovery. Even if it is true Defendant recently hired a younger driver to

assume Plaintiff’s former route, that would not provide evidence Plaintiff was discriminated

against based on his age in December 2007. In requesting further discovery, Plaintiff appears

to suggest a far-fetched scheme in which Defendant waited a lengthy time to replace Plaintiff

with a younger driver in order to avoid the appearance of age discrimination. Defendant will

be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADEA claim.

II. ACRA Claim

The Arizona Supreme Court has held that federal case-law on Title VII is persuasive

authority for reviewing ACRA claims. Higdon v. Evergreen Intern. Arilines, Inc., 673 P.2d

907, 910 n.3 (Ariz. 1983). Age discrimination claims under the ACRA are analyzed under

the same McDonnell Douglas framework as age discrimination claims under the ADEA. See

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Love v. Phelps Dodge Bagdad, Inc., 2005 WL 2416363, *7 (D. Ariz. 2005) (citing Timmons

v. City of Tucson, 830 P.2d 871, 875 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)). Accordingly, Defendant will

be granted summary judgment on the ACRA claim for the same reasons as the ADEA claim.

III. Arizona Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”)

Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully terminated in violation of the AEPA. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant misrepresented that Plaintiff resigned in order to avoid Plaintiff receiving

unemployment benefits, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2310, A.R.S. §§ 23-601 et. seq., and

A.R.S. §§ 13-2702, 2407. Defendant argues these are criminal statutes that do not provide

Plaintiff with civil remedies, which Plaintiff concedes. Plaintiff’s only claim is therefore for

wrongful termination under the AEPA.

The AEPA provides a cause of action when an “employer has terminated the

employment relationship of an employee in violation of a statute of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-

1501(3)(b). If the statute violated provides its own remedy to the employee, however, the

remedy provided by the statute is the exclusive remedy available. Id. If the statute does not

provide a remedy to the employee, the “employee shall have the right to bring a tort claim

for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy set forth in the statute.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Arizona criminal statutes by falsely representing to DES

that Plaintiff resigned. 

Defendant argues that AEPA implies a causal connection between the termination and

the employer’s statutory violation and that no connection exists here. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant misrepresented to DES that Plaintiff resigned in violation of a

statute, not that Defendant terminated Plaintiff in violation of a statute. Defendant will be

granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s AEPA claim.

IV. Common Law Wrongful Termination

Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy.

Defendant argues this common law claim is precluded by AEPA, which provides that where

a “statute provides a remedy to an employee of the statute, the remedies provided . . . are the

exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or public policy set forth in or arising out

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of the statute . . . .” A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b). Defendant argues Plaintiff’s common law claim

is precluded under AEPA because the ACRA already provides a remedy for the claim. 

Plaintiff argues his wrongful termination claim is not premised on the public policy

in the ACRA, but on the public policy associated with A.R.S. §§ 23-1310, 23-601 et seq.;

A.R.S. §§ 13-2703, 2407. Plaintiff thus reasserts his claim for wrongful termination under

AEPA as a claim for wrongful termination under common law. His common law claim fails

for the same reasons as his AEPA claim. Defendant will be granted summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claim for common law wrongful termination.

V. Motion for Continuance of Summary Judgment to Permit Further Discovery

Plaintiff moves for a continuance of the motion for summary judgment to permit him

to conduct further discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) permits the court to order

a continuance to enable further discovery to be undertaken by a party opposing a motion for

summary judgment. The party seeking a continuance, however, has the burden of showing

what material facts would be discovered that would preclude summary judgment. Klingele

v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1988). “If further discovery could not elicit

evidence that would raise genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment would be

appropriate.” Id. Plaintiff seeks an opportunity to depose Paul Torres, a former employee

of Defendant. Plaintiff claims he has reason to believe Mr. Torres was terminated due to his

age, and that deposing him regarding the circumstances of his termination would allow

Plaintiff to gather further evidence of Defendant’s age-based animus. Even if Plaintiff were

to acquire such evidence, however, Plaintiff would still not meet his burden of establishing

a prima facie case of age discrimination. As discussed above, there is no genuine issue of

fact that Plaintiff was not replaced by a substantially younger driver. Deposing Mr. Torres

would not change that. The Motion for a Continuance will be denied.

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VI. Motion to Strike

Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s objections to evidence presented by Plaintiff, or

in the alternative, response to such objections. The Court did not need to consider

Defendant’s objections to resolve the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion to Strike

is therefore moot and will be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 69) IS

GRANTED.

FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion for a Continuance (Doc. 89) IS DENIED.

FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 93) IS DENIED as moot.

 The Clerk shall terminate this case.

 DATED this 9th day of September, 2010.

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