Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_24-cv-08038/USCOURTS-azd-3_24-cv-08038-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alexander Greer Williams,

Petitioner,

v.

Ryan Thornell, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-24-08038-PCT-KML (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE KRISSA M. LANHAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

This matter is on referral to the undersigned for further proceedings and a report and 

recommendation pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure 

(Doc. 4 at 4).

1

On February 20, 2024, Petitioner Alexander Greer Williams (“Petitioner”), who is 

confined in the Central Arizona Correctional Facility in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se 

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody 

(Non-Death Penalty) (“Petition”) (Doc. 1).2 The Petition challenges Petitioner’s 

1 Citation to the record indicates documents as displayed in the official Court electronic 

document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No. CV-24-

08038-PCT-KML (DMF).

2 The Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on February 26, 2024 (Doc. 1). The 

Petition contains a declaration by Petitioner that he placed the Petition in the prison mailing 

system on February 20, 2024 (Id. at 11). This Report and Recommendation uses February 

20, 2024, as the operative filing date. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison

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convictions in Yavapai County Superior Court, case number CR 2001-0891, for attempted 

child molestation, sexual conduct with a minor, attempted sexual conduct with a minor, 

and influencing a witness, which resulted in consecutive sentences totaling over fifty years 

of imprisonment (Doc. 1 at 1-2; Doc. 4 at 1 ). 

The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition (Doc. 4 at 2-3). Petitioner’s 

reply deadline was set as thirty (30) days from the date of service of the answer (Id. at 3). 

On July 3, 2024, Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Answer”) (Doc. 14). On the same date, Respondents mailed a copy of the Answer to 

Petitioner at his address of record (Id. at 19). The time for reply has passed without 

Petitioner filing a reply. 

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that that these proceedings be 

dismissed with prejudice as untimely, that the Clerk of Court be directed to terminate this 

matter, and that a certificate of appealability be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Charges, Convictions, and Sentences

On November 29, 2001, Petitioner was indicted by a Yavapai County grand jury in 

case number CR 2001-0891 (Doc. 14-1 at 4-8). The indictment charged Petitioner with

eight counts of indecent exposure, two counts of attempted child molestation, three counts 

of sexual conduct with a minor, three counts of child molestation, one count of furnishing 

harmful items to a minor, and one count of influencing a witness (Id.). The state alleged 

that at the time of the commission of the charged offenses, Petitioner had been convicted 

of prior felony offenses, including endangerment, two drug offenses, and a weapons 

offense (Id. at 10-11). The state also alleged that two of the prior felony convictions were 

officials for mailing.”); Melville v. Shinn, 68 F.4th 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming 

that the prison mailbox rule “applies to pro se federal habeas petitions” on the date a 

petitioner signs, dates, and attests the petition was placed in the prison mailing system); 

see also Rule 3, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (stating petition is timely if deposited 

in prison mailing system on or before last day for filing, which may be shown by 

“declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement”).

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predicate felonies under Arizona law due to the prior felonies involving “the use or 

threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or instrument” (Id. at 15). The state further

alleged that Petitioner was on probation at the time of the commission of the charged 

offenses (Id. at 10-11). In addition, the state alleged that the charged offenses were multiple 

offenses not committed on the same occasion, but that the charged offenses were 

consolidated for trial purposes (Id. at 13). Also, the state alleged that the victim in Counts 

XI through XVI of the indictment was twelve (12) years of age or younger (Id. at 18). 

On July 2, 2002, with representation of counsel,3 Petitioner entered a plea agreement 

and pleaded guilty to one count each of sexual conduct with a minor, attempted sexual 

conduct with a minor, attempted child molestation, and influencing a witness (Id. at 20-25, 

27). The plea agreement contained agreements for dismissal of the remaining charges, 

dismissal of any allegation of prior felony convictions, dismissal of any allegation of age 

of victim twelve years or younger, any allegation of multiple offenses, and any allegation 

of prior predicate felony (Id. at 23; see also Id. at 31). The superior court accepted 

Petitioner’s guilty pleas on July 2, 2002 (Id. at 27). On September 16, 2002, Petitioner was 

sentenced to aggravated, consecutive sentences of imprisonment totaling fifty-nine and a 

half years followed by community supervision (Id. at 20-32). At the sentencing, Petitioner 

was “provided written notice of rights of post conviction relief” (Id. at 31). 

B. First Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) Proceedings

On October 3, 2002, Petitioner filed a Request for Preparation of Post-Conviction 

Record and a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR petition”) (Id. at 34-36, 38-

54). The PCR petition was prepared on a form to which Petitioner made handwritten 

additions (Id. at 38-42). The PCR petition raised multiple issues and included several

attachments, including copies of legal authorities (Id. at 38-54). 

On April 23, 2003, Petitioner’s PCR counsel filed a notice which informed that after 

3 Petitioner was later represented by the same counsel at his sentencing (Id. at 29). In a 

post-conviction filing, Petitioner referenced two different lawyers having represented him 

during the superior court proceedings leading to his sentencing (Id. at 41).

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his review of the record, he could not “find any colorable claims for relief to raise in this 

post-conviction proceeding” (Id. at 56-59).

4 On April 25, 2003, the superior court granted 

Petitioner sixty days from the date of the order within which to file a petition for postconviction relief (“PCR Petition”) and ordered that Petitioner’s PCR counsel “continue to 

be available to [Petitioner] should his services be needed” (Id. at 61-62). In July 2003, and 

after the passage of sixty days from April 25, 2003, the superior court issued an order 

stating that Petitioner had not filed any additional pleadings (Id. at 64-65). In the same 

order, the superior court recounted that it had reviewed Petitioner’s pro se PCR petition

initiating the PCR proceedings and “searched the record for any basis for post-conviction 

relief[,]” but found no basis for post-conviction relief (Id.). The superior court concluded 

based on “the pleadings and the information in the [c]ourt’s file” that “there are no claims 

presenting a material issue of fact or law which would entitle [Petitioner] to relief under 

Rule 32 and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings” (Id.). The superior 

court dismissed the PCR proceedings (Id.). Petitioner did not seek review of the dismissal 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals.5 

C. Second & Third PCR Proceedings

Over nine years later, in November 2012, Petitioner filed a second pro se PCR 

petition (Doc. 14-1 at 67-70). Regarding his previous PCR proceedings, Petitioner wrote 

that his “mom was doing a Rule 32 for” him “but she died befor[e]” Petitioner knew “what 

do with it” and that Petitioner did not know if his mom “put it in for [him] or not” (Id. at 

69). In an order filed on November 19, 2012, the superior court noted that Petitioner was 

sentenced on September 16, 2002, and that Petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction 

relief was dismissed on July 9, 2003 (Id. at 72). The superior court found that the time for 

4 PCR counsel was not either of the previous two attorneys who had represented Petitioner 

(see Id. at 41, 56).

5 Pursuant to Rule 5(d) of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases required Respondent to file 

any brief submitted by Petitioner in appeal in PCR proceedings, and no such materials are 

included as to Petitioner’s first PCR proceedings (Doc. 14-1 at 1-2). Further, in his 

Petition, Petitioner admits that he did not seek review of the superior court’s dismissal of 

his first PCR proceedings (Doc. 1 at 5). 

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filing a notice of post-conviction relief had expired, found that “the reasons offered by 

[Petitioner] as to why he might be eligible for relief are precluded pursuant to Rule 

32.2(a),” and denied post-conviction relief (Id.).

Years later, in 2017, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal (Id. at 75-76). The Arizona 

Court of Appeals construed the notice of appeal as a petition for review (Id. at 100-101). 

On April 27, 2017, the court of appeals found that “[t]he petition for review was not filed 

within 30 days of the [post-conviction] court’s final decision disposing of the petition for 

post-conviction relief proceedings,” and thus, was “untimely” (Id. at 100). The court of 

appeals stated that “[w]hether petitioner was without fault for the untimely filing is a 

question of fact,” and that “[t]he trial court may ‘after being presented with the proper 

evidence, allow a late filing’ if it finds that [Petitioner] was not responsible for the untimely 

filing.” (Id.) (citation omitted). The court of appeals dismissed the proceedings as untimely 

(Id.).

At the time that Petitioner filed the 2017 notice of appeal, which was construed by 

the court of appeals as a petition for review and dismissed as untimely, Petitioner also filed 

a pro se “Motion for Post-Conviction Relief (Rule 32)” in the superior court (Id. at 78-98). 

Petitioner’s motion attached documents which included a 2002 court ordered evaluation 

report as well as 2002 and 2003 letters authored by Ronald A. Peterson, Ph.D. (Id.). The 

letter with the evaluation report was addressed to the superior court judge who ordered the 

evaluation report and later sentenced Petitioner (Id. at 90-96). The evaluation report 

reflected Dr. Peterson’s professional assessment and opinion that Petitioner was not 

mentally ill and was competent (Id.). From their contents, the 2003 letters appear to have 

been sent to Petitioner in 2003 (Id. at 87-88). In May 2017, the superior court dismissed 

the “Motion for Post-Conviction Relief (Rule 32)” as untimely (Id. at 103). Neither party 

has submitted any record reflecting that Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals of the May 2017 dismissal.

D. Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth PCR Proceedings

On February 2020, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR notice (Id. at 105-108). Later in 

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February 2020, the superior court dismissed the PCR notice and proceedings, finding the 

PCR notice untimely filed (Id. at 110). Neither party has submitted any record reflecting 

that Petitioner filed a petition for review regarding the dismissal.

In 2021, Petitioner filed in the superior court a notice of appeal citing Rule 32.1, 

which was the applicable post-conviction relief rule at the time (Id. at 112-113). Petitioner 

also filed a pro se “Motion for Post-Conviction Relief (Rule 32)” in the superior court (Id.

at 115-131). In a November 2021, order, the superior court construed the filings as one or 

more requests for post-conviction relief, found the filings untimely, and denied relief on 

the filings (Id. at 133). Neither party has submitted any record suggesting that Petitioner 

filed a petition for review regarding the superior court’s order.

In June 2023, Petitioner filed another pro se PCR petition in the superior court (Id.

at 135-141). In August 2003, the superior court summarily dismissed the PCR petition and 

proceedings, finding that the PCR petition was untimely and that the issues contained 

within the petition were precluded (Id. at 143-144). In doing so, the court addressed 

Petitioner’s argument that the untimeliness was not his fault and determined that Petitioner 

previously raised the same arguments in prior postconviction proceedings, including those 

filed in October 2002 and in 2017 (Id. at 143). The superior court concluded that the PCR

petition “d[id] not demonstrate how the untimeliness is not the fault of [Petitioner]” and 

found that “the issues [were] precluded” (Id.). The court summarized that the PCR petition 

“fail[ed] to raise any colorable claim” and Petitioner “presented no viable argument 

warranting relief” (Id. at 144). The superior court summarily dismissed the PCR petition 

(Id.). Neither party has submitted any record indicating that Petitioner filed a petition for 

review regarding the superior court’s order.

II. THESE HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner raises one ground in the Petition, which Petitioner characterizes as an

illegally imposed sentence because Petitioner did not understand that he had the right to 

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reject his plea agreement (Doc. 1 at 6).6 Petitioner avers that he neither read his plea 

agreement nor understood “what [he] was signing” due to his low level of education and 

lack of knowledge about the legal system (Id.). Petitioner asserts that he “only went 

through the 7th grade[,]” that he had a third grade reading level, and that he had “no 

knowledge of legal procedure” (Id.). Petitioner states that his trial counsel read the plea 

agreement to Petitioner and told Petitioner that he “would get life[-]time probation or up 

to 27 [years] in prison” (Id.). Petitioner contends that prior to sentencing, Petitioner

requested to “take [the case] to trial,” but was told, “no,” without explanation, after which 

Petitioner signed the plea agreement, not knowing that he could reject the plea agreement 

(Id.). Regarding state court proceedings, Petitioner represents that he “did not know” that 

he was “able to appeal due to not having access to a paralegal” (Id. at 5). Petitioner left 

blank the section of the Petition for explanation of any untimeliness of these proceedings 

(Id. at 11). Petitioner asks the Court to reopen the Yavapai County Superior Court case for 

trial so that “all evidence can be brought to the attention of a jury” and so that Petitioner 

“can prove [his] innocence by having the witnesses on the stand” (Id.). Attached to the 

Petition are letters and documents dated and/or appearing to have been prepared in 2002 

and 2003 (Doc. 1-1). 

Respondents assert that the Petition was untimely filed without excuse, that the 

Petition’s claim is not cognizable because no violation of federal law is alleged, and that 

the Petition’s claim is procedurally defaulted without excuse (Doc. 14).

Petitioner was served with the Answer (Id. at 19), but Petitioner did not file a reply.

III. TIMELINESS

Respondents raise the affirmative defense of untimeliness (Doc. 14). Therefore, the 

threshold issue for the Court is whether these habeas proceedings are time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

6 Petitioner represents that this is his first petition, application, or motion in federal court 

regarding the convictions challenged (Doc. 1 at 10). 

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921-22 (9th Cir. 2022). As discussed below, the Petition was untimely filed and is timebarred.

A. AEDPA’s One Year Limitations Period and Statutory Tolling

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs 

Petitioner’s habeas proceedings because he filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). For AEDPA statute of limitations 

purposes, this Report and Recommendation uses February 20, 2024, the date Petitioner 

placed his Petition in prison mail, as the applicable filing date for the Petition.7 

Under AEDPA, there are four possible starting dates for the beginning of its oneyear statute of limitations period:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The latest of the applicable possible starting dates is the operative 

start date. Id. 

Because the Petition’s claim arises from a final judgment and sentence, AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations start date is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) unless 

a later start date applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D). Here, the record 

does not present any basis for a later start date pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), 

7 See supra note 2.

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or (D). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period 

runs from when the judgment and sentence became “final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Yet, AEDPA also expressly 

provides for statutory tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral review petition is “properly 

filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with state rules governing filings. 

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). This includes compliance with filing deadlines. 

Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007).

A state post-conviction relief petition not filed within the state’s required time limit 

is not “properly filed,” and the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling during those 

proceedings. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction 

petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 

2244(d)(2).” (quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)); Allen, 552 U.S. at 6 

(finding that inmate’s untimely state post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” 

under AEDPA’s tolling provision, and reiterating its holding in Pace, 544 U.S. at 414). 

Once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do not restart 

the clock. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

In Melville v. Shinn, the Ninth Circuit held that a PCR petition ceases to be pending 

“when the time for [Petitioner] to seek further relief in the state courts expired.” 68 F.4th 

1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 2023). The Ninth Circuit concluded that “a PCR application is 

pending as long as a state avenue for relief remains open, whether or not a petitioner takes 

advantage of it.” Id. at 1156. Thus, whether the state collateral review process is pending 

“requires looking to the relevant state’s law and procedural rules.” Id. at 1160.

The superior court sentenced Petitioner on September 16, 2002 (Doc. 14-1 at 30-

32). As Respondents recognize (Doc. 14 at 6), Petitioner had ninety (90) days thereafter, 

or until December 16, 2002, within which to file a notice of post-conviction relief in order 

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to have a “properly filed” application for state post-conviction review and to toll AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations. As Respondents also recognize (Id. at 6-7), Petitioner 

timely initiated PCR proceedings within this deadline. On July 9, 2003, the superior court 

dismissed the PCR proceedings. Petitioner had thirty days, until Friday, August 8, 2003, 

to file a petition for review in the court of appeals. See former Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) 

(requiring filing of petition for review within thirty days after the final decision of the trial 

court on the petition for post-conviction relief or the motion for rehearing).

Because Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the court of appeals, Petitioner 

is entitled to statutory tolling through August 8, 2003, the date on which the last state 

avenue for relief expired. AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period commenced to 

run on August 9, 2003, and the period for Petitioner to file a habeas petition expired on 

Monday, August 9, 2004.

8 See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“Excluding the day on which [the prisoner’s] petition was denied by the Supreme Court, 

as required by Rule 6(a)’s ‘anniversary method,’ [AEDPA’s] one-year grace period began 

to run on June 20, 1997 and expired one year later, on June 19, 1998.”). Petitioner filed 

these habeas proceedings on February 20, 2024, over nineteen years after the expiration of 

AEDPA’s limitations period.

Because an untimely PCR notice does not statutorily toll AEDPA’s limitations 

period, Pace, 544 U.S. at 414, Petitioner’s untimely subsequent PCR notices and 

proceedings did not toll the limitations period. Indeed, the state court dismissed 

Petitioner’s subsequent PCR proceedings as untimely and successive. Moreover, because 

Petitioner’s subsequent PCR proceedings were filed after AEDPA’s limitations period 

expired in August 2004, Petitioner’s subsequent PCR proceedings could not restart 

AEDPA’s limitations period. See Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482; Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. 

8 Respondents assert that AEDPA’s limitations period expired on July 12, 2004 (Doc. 14

at 7). However, Respondents do not account for thirty days for Petitioner to file a petition 

for review of the superior court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s first PCR proceedings. See 

Melville, 68 F.4th at 1156 (holding that PCR proceedings remain pending while avenue for 

relief remains open, whether or not petitioner took advantage of the avenue for relief).

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Accordingly, Petitioner’s first PCR proceedings tolled AEDPA’s limitations period 

through August 8, 2003, after which no state avenue for relief remained open. AEDPA’s 

one-year limitations period expired on August 9, 2004. These proceedings, which 

Petitioner initiated on February 20, 2024, over nineteen years after the expiration of 

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period, are untimely unless Petitioner demonstrates that 

equitable tolling and/or the actual innocence gateway apply to render these proceedings 

timely filed.

B. Equitable Tolling

The U.S. Supreme Court has held “that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). AEDPA’s limitations 

period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar.

Id. at 645-46. Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling is warranted.

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our 

precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is 

appropriate.”).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 

limitations period “only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting 

with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 600 

(9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Put another way, for equitable tolling to apply, Petitioner must 

show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). To meet the first prong, 

Petitioner “must show that he has been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only 

while an impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before 

and after as well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal court.” Smith, 953 F.3d at 

598-99 (expressly rejecting the “stop-clock” approach to equitable tolling). The second 

prong is met “only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with 

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reasonable diligence from making a timely filing.” Id. at 600.

“The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not 

maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “is ‘highly fact-dependent,’ 

and [the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 

equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule” 

(alteration in original) (citations and internal emphasis omitted)).

In addition, there must be a causal link between the extraordinary circumstance and 

the inability to timely file the petition. Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“[E]quitable tolling is available only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time and the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of [the prisoner’s] untimeliness.”) (second alteration in 

original) (citations and internal emphasis omitted). A literal impossibility to file, however, 

is not required. Grant v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that 

equitable tolling is appropriate even where “it would have technically been possible for a 

prisoner to file a petition,” so long as the prisoner “would have likely been unable to do 

so.” (internal citations omitted)). “The grounds for equitable tolling ‘are highly factdependent.’” Id. (quoting Sossa, 729 F.3d at 1237).

Nevertheless, a petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, ignorance of the law, or lack of 

representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154 (“[A] pro 

se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling.”); Ballesteros v. Schriro, No. CIV 06-675-PHX-EHC (MEA) 

2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (finding a petitioner’s pro se status, 

ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and 

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temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). A prisoner’s 

“proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those 

bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000); see 

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009); Gutierrez v. King, 

No. EDCV 13-1676-TJH (RNB), 2014 WL 879618, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014). 

Further, the Ninth Circuit has “rejected the argument that lack of access to library 

materials automatically qualifie[s]” for equitable tolling. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 

1146 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, a petitioner must establish that due to circumstances beyond 

the petitioner’s control that the petitioner could not have filed “a basic form habeas 

petition” within the limitations period, despite exercising reasonable diligence. WaldronRamsey, 556 F.3d at 1014 (denying tolling when a petition was 340 days late because, for 

three years, the petitioner “had access to all of the documents necessary for his Faretta [v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),] self-representation claim. He could have developed that 

argument, outlined the other arguments and the facts underlying those arguments on the 

form habeas petition, and then sought to amend his petition when he got more 

information.”). Even if a petitioner faces difficulties in accessing legal materials, the 

petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling absent credible allegations that the petitioner 

was denied access to a particular document when needed. Id.; see also Ford v. Pliler, 590 

F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding lack of legal materials does not entitle a petitioner 

to equitable tolling when the petitioner knows the factual bases of his claims). 

After careful review, Petitioner’s arguments and the circumstances reflected in the 

record do not demonstrate that any extraordinary circumstance prevented Petitioner from 

timely bringing the present habeas claim in this Court. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

the diligence towards filing a habeas petition required for application of equitable tolling.

As reviewed above, a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, or lack of legal 

sophistication does not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. 

See Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154; see, e.g., Baker v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 484 F. App’x. 130, 

131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Low literacy levels, lack of legal knowledge, and need for some 

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assistance to prepare a habeas petition are not extraordinary circumstances to warrant 

equitable tolling of an untimely habeas petition.”). 

Petitioner’s assertions that he had a third grade reading level and only went to the 

seventh grade do not establish equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit has held that a petitioner 

asserting equitable tolling based on a mental impairment must meet a two-prong test:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control [...] by demonstrating 

the impairment was so severe that either

(a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally understand 

the need to timely file, or

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a 

habeas petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to the 

extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it 

impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis removed). Under the 

second prong of the test, the Court “considers whether the petitioner’s impairment was a 

but-for cause of any delay.” Id. at 1100. “The ‘totality of the circumstances’ inquiry in 

the second prong considers whether the petitioner's impairment was a but-for cause of any 

delay.” Id.; see also Milam v. Harrington, 953 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating 

that equitable tolling due to a mental impairment does not require a literal impossibility, 

but instead only a showing that the mental impairment was a but-for cause of any delay). 

“With respect to the necessary diligence, the petitioner must diligently seek assistance and 

exploit whatever assistance is reasonably available.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1101. “[E]ven in 

cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must still demonstrate diligence.” Yow Ming 

Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014); see Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 959 

(9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he petitioner must show diligence in seeking assistance with what he 

could not do alone.”); Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100 (“The petitioner . . . always remains 

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accountable for diligence in pursuing his or her rights.”). 

Here, Petitioner meets neither prong of the Bills test.

Regarding the first prong, the record does not support a severe mental impairment. 

Petitioner attached a 2002 psychological evaluation to his Petition (Doc. 1-1 at 1-8). As 

part of the evaluation, the psychologist administered tests which reflected that Petitioner 

lacked any signs of neurological deficits and that Petitioner’s intellectual functioning was 

at the low end of average (Id. at 5). In August 2002, the psychologist reported that “[b]oth 

tests of intelligence place [Petitioner] in the low end of the average range of general mental 

ability” (Id.). The psychologist opined that while Petitioner was “experiencing emotional 

turmoil[,]” Petitioner was “not mentally ill and he is competent” (Id. at 6). 

Further, Petitioner has not shown that he was unable to rationally or factually 

understand the need to timely file or that his mental state rendered him unable to personally 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing. Indeed, the record reflects that Petitioner 

had sufficient comprehension and ability to file timely first PCR proceedings raising 

multiple claims as well as make several filings after expiration of AEDPA's limitation 

period and before filing these habeas proceedings. Petitioner's filings in his state court 

PCR proceedings and in this matter reflect understanding of legal issues, capacity to write 

clearly about factual matters, and ability to articulate legal arguments sufficiently to fill out 

a timely habeas petition and file such with this Court. 

Regarding the second prong, Petitioner has not established that he has been 

diligently pursuing his rights. These habeas proceedings were filed over nineteen years 

after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired. Even Petitioner’s state court filings 

were sporadic over the years after dismissal of his first timely PCR proceedings. Indeed, 

the statements Petitioner makes and the documents he submits in support of his Petition 

are redundant to arguments and exhibits he presented in state court years ago. Neither 

Petitioner’s arguments nor this record establish the requisite diligence for equitable tolling.

In sum, Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling 

applies to excuse the over nineteen years late filing of these proceedings. Thus, these 

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proceedings were untimely filed unless the actual innocence gateway applies to excuse 

Petitioner’s late filing of these proceedings. 

C. Actual Innocence

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391-396 (2013), the Supreme Court held 

that the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that applies to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 

(holding that petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

To pass through the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish 

his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. 

U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003); 

see also Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To meet [the Schlup 

gateway], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented 

at trial.’” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324)). A petitioner “must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). “To be credible, 

such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new 

reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 

653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399 (2013) (explaining the 

significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). Because of “the 

rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been 

summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

Attached to the Petition are letters and documents dated and/or appearing to have 

been prepared in 2002 and 2003 (Doc. 1-1). All of these materials were previously attached 

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to Petitioner’s state court PCR filings (see, e.g., Doc. 14-1 at 87-96, 121-131). In his 

Petition, including its attachments, Petitioner does not present new reliable evidence that 

would more likely than not prevent a jury from convicting him. Nor does the record 

otherwise contain such evidence. Petitioner has not shown and the record does not support

application of the actual innocence gateway to excuse Petitioner’s late filing of these 

proceedings. 

IV. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, the Petition which initiated this matter was untimely filed more 

than nineteen years after AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired, and neither equitable 

tolling nor the actual innocence gateway apply to excuse the untimely filing. Due to the 

untimeliness of the Petition, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed with 

prejudice and that the Clerk of Court be directed to terminate this matter. Because of the 

Petition’s untimeliness and the corresponding recommendation for dismissal, undersigned 

has not addressed Respondents’ other arguments regarding non-cognizability and 

procedural default.

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s 

judgment, the undersigned recommends that a certificate of appealability be denied 

because dismissal is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not 

find the procedural ruling debatable. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) be dismissed with prejudice and that the Clerk of 

Court be directed to terminate this matter.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

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recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 1st day of November, 2024.

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