Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02733/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02733-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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Plaintiff’s claims against Ford Motor Company have been 1

settled. See Order Regarding Settlement and Disposition, March

21, 2006. Accordingly, the present Motion addresses only the

remaining claims against Defendant Future Ford.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID LANDEIS, suing

individually, and on behalf of

the general public,

2:04-CV-2733-MCE-PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FUTURE FORD, FORD MOTOR

COMPANY, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff David Landeis

(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Future Ford (“Defendant”) and Ford

Motor Company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 1

15 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq., and the California Consumer Report Act

(“CCRA”), by obtaining his credit report without a permissible

purpose.

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Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant violated the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et. seq., the

California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly

Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790 et. seq., and the Consumer Legal

Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ et. seq., by selling

him a damaged vehicle as new. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted as to

Plaintiff’s claims under the FCRA. With respect to the MMWA

claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. 

Accordingly, that claim is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s

remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2003, Plaintiff David Landeis (“Plaintiff”)

visited Future Ford auto dealership in pursuit of a new vehicle. 

Upon his arrival, Plaintiff noticed several Roush style Mustangs. 

He took one of the Mustangs for a test drive and ultimately

decided to purchase the car. He returned on Sunday, July 13,

2003, and notified the general manager of his decision to

purchase the Mustang. Plaintiff clarified repeatedly with the

staff of Future Ford that he wished to pay cash for the vehicle

and did not wish to have his credit checked. Future Ford

originally agreed to Plaintiff’s demand that his credit not be

checked in conjunction with the transaction.

While Plaintiff had repeatedly told Defendant he intended to

pay cash for the vehicle, Plaintiff could not immediately

retrieve sufficient cash to do so.

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Rather than permit Plaintiff to depart the lot without the

Mustang, Future Ford’s staff indicated they would accept his

personal check in lieu of cash. Plaintiff agreed to the

alternate form of payment and wrote Future Ford a post-dated

check in the amount of $28,134.39. Plaintiff requested and

Future Ford agreed to hold the instrument until July 17, 2003. 

Despite Future Ford’s repeated assurances that no credit check be

performed, during the closing process, Future Ford ran

Plaintiff’s credit motivating the present action.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

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The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the jury,

there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there

is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a

jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party

producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442,

448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

its opponent must do more that simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

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6

ANALYSIS

1. FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

“It is the purpose of [the FCRA] to require that consumer

reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the

needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and

other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the

consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy,

relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in

accordance with the requirements of [the FCRA].” 15 U.S.C. §

1681. In general, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b enumerates the

“permissible purposes” for which a credit reporting agency may

furnish a consumer credit report. In relevant part, a credit

reporting agency may furnish a credit report to a person which it

has reason to believe intends to use the information in

connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on

whom the information is to be furnished and involving the

extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of,

the consumer; or otherwise has a legitimate business need for the

information in connection with a business transaction that is

initiated by the consumer. Id. at 1681b(a)(3)(A),(F)(i). The

statute further provides that “[a] person shall not use or obtain

a consumer report for any purpose unless ... the consumer report

is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer report is

authorized to be furnished ....” Id. at 1681b(f)(1).

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Plaintiff urges the Court to find that Defendant obtained

his credit report without a permissible purpose and, therefore,

is liable under the FCRA. Conversely, Defendant claims it had a

permissible purpose when Plaintiff paid for his new vehicle with

a post-dated personal check and requested the instrument be held

for three days. As explained below, the Court agrees with

Defendants that Plaintiff’s credit report was obtained in accord

with the strictures mandated under the FCRA.

Plaintiff first concedes that payment by way of a negotiable

instrument does not equate legally to payment by cash. Plaintiff

further concedes Defendant originally had a legal right to obtain

Plaintiff’s credit report. Notwithstanding these concessions,

Plaintiff avers that legal right was lost when Defendant

expressly agreed not to obtain his credit report in conjunction

with the credit transaction. As support for his position,

Plaintiff points to both a Seventh Circuit decision as well as a

sister district court decision wherein those courts found that an

agreement to forego a credit check can render the underlying

transaction sufficiently inchoate to nullify any existing

permissible purpose. See Scott v. Real Estate Fin. Group, 183

F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Uhlig v. Berge Ford, Inc., 257

F.Supp.2d 1228 (D. Ariz. 2003).

In Scott, the plaintiffs sought to rent a home from the

defendant. During the negotiation of that transaction, the

Scotts agreed to rent the home on condition that their credit not

be screened. Despite that agreement otherwise, the defendant

obtained the Scotts’ credit report. The Scotts promptly filed

suit claiming an FCRA violation.

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The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Scotts’ offer to rent a

home conditioned on an agreement to forego a credit check negated

defendant’s legitimate business need under 15 U.S.C. 1681b(F)(i). 

In sum, the court concluded that

“parties to a transaction may elect to structure their

negotiations in such a way that those negotiations--no

matter how apparently detailed--constitute expressions

of interest that are too inchoate to give the landlord

a "legitimate business need for the information in

connection with a business transaction involving the

consumer” within the meaning of Section 1681b(3)(E)

[now 1681b(a)(3)(F)].

Id. at 100. 

The clear import of the court’s holding is that the

legitimacy of the business need for obtaining a credit report is

lost when the expression of interest is too “inchoate” to rise to

the level of a transaction. Based on this rationale, the court

proclaimed; “[i]n essence, the parties are free to contractually

define whether or not a ‘legitimate business need’ exists ‘in

connection with a business transaction.’" Id.

In Uhlig, the facts virtually mirrored those at issue here. 

Specifically, plaintiff purchased a vehicle from defendant with

both a trade in and a personal check. During the sales

transaction, defendant conducted a credit check despite

plaintiff’s demand otherwise and she sought legal redress. In

reliance on the Scott case, the district court explained that if

parties can contractually agree to what a “legitimate business

need” is, it could perceive no reason why they could not

contractually agree as to whether any other purpose stated in

section 1681b(a)(3) is permissible. Uhlig, 257 F.Supp.2d at

1233. This Court respectfully disagrees.

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The Scott case is quite distinguishable from the Uhlig case

and the case at bar. In Scott, the negotiation was sufficiently

inchoate to have negated the legitimacy of the business need

pursuant to 1681b(F)(i). Plaintiffs made an offer to a broker on

condition that the transaction would proceed without a credit

check. The broker proceeded to check plaintiffs’ credit prior to

the parties engaging in any credit transaction. Accordingly, the

legitimate business need set forth in 1681b(F)(i) would have been

the sole permissible purpose for obtaining the report. In light

of the uncertainty of the underlying transaction, the court found

factual issues regarding the legitimacy of the business need and

reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Conversely, here, Plaintiff actually entered into a credit

transaction pursuant to 1681b(a)(3)(A) which was clearly defined

by tendering a credit instrument in exchange for an automobile. 

While it is undisputed that Plaintiff objected to having his

credit checked, it is likewise undisputed that he proceeded with

a credit transaction securing Defendant’s right to obtain his

credit report under section 1681b(a)(3)(A).

To the extent Plaintiff is arguing his repeated objections

negate Defendant’s legal right to proceed with the credit check,

the Court finds this argument unpersuasive. The Federal Trade

Commission tasked with promulgating the FCRA’s implementing

regulations has clarified that section 1681b allows parties to

obtain credit reports without the consumer’s permission or over

their objections, as long as the report is being obtained for a

permissible purpose. 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, app. (emphasis added).

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Holding that Plaintiff’s objections negate a right expressly

granted under both the FCRA and its implementing regulations

inappropriately reads an authorization requirement into the FCRA

that Congress nor the Federal Trade Commission elected to

include. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Adjudication of Plaintiff’s FCRA claim is granted. 

2. MAGNUSON-MOSS CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT

The MMWA permits “a consumer who is damaged by the failure

of a supplier [or] warrantor . . . to comply with any obligation

under this chapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq.], or under a

written warranty [or] implied warranty” to sue in United States

district court. A consumer’s right to seek redress in federal

court is premised on the condition precedent that “the amount in

controversy is [not] less than the sum or value of $50,000

(exclusive of interest and costs) computed on the basis of all

claims to be determined in this suit.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d). The

purpose of the $50,000 minimum amount in controversy is “to avoid

trivial or insignificant actions” being pursued in federal

courts. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107 (1974), reprinted in 1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7724. Accordingly, the Court must examine

whether jurisdiction is proper based on the amount in

controversy.

While the MMWA provides a substantive right of action to

consumers, it does not specify the appropriate measure and type

of damages that are available.

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In fact, the statute expressly provides that “a consumer who is

damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service

contractor to comply with any obligation under this title or

under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract,

may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief.” 

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d). Consequently, courts, including the Ninth

Circuit, have turned to the applicable state law to determine

what remedies are available under the MMWA. See Kelly, 377 F.3d

at 1039; see also Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402

(7th Cir. 2004).

In the present action, the underlying state law is

California’s Song-Beverly Act. Pursuant to the remedies

available under that Act, Plaintiff prays for rescission of the

contract for sale; restitution of all consideration Plaintiff

paid Defendants; incidental and consequential damages; actual and

statutory damages; reasonable attorney fees; costs and expenses;

and other relief as the court deems proper. Plf.s’ Amended

Compl., p. 19. Plaintiff further alleges that as a proximate

result of the breaches of implied warranty, he has sustained, and

continues to sustain, damages in the approximate amount of

$50,000.00. Id.

As with suits in diversity, the Court looks no farther than

the pleadings to determine the amount in controversy unless “from

the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty,

that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.” Kelly v.

Fleetwood Enters., 377 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing St.

Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). 

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If it appears to a legal certainty that the claim cannot meet the

statutory threshold, the suit should be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. Id. (citing Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748

F.2d 1058, 1069 (5th Cir. 1984)(applying the legal certainty test

to a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim). The issue here is

whether Plaintiff can meet the jurisdictional minimum of $50,000.

A. Amount in Controversy

As noted above, Plaintiff is seeking rescission of the

contract for sale; restitution of all consideration Plaintiff

paid Defendants; incidental and consequential damages; actual and

statutory damages; reasonable attorney fees; costs and expenses.

It is clear that in calculating the jurisdictional amount,

the Court may not consider pendent state law claims. See Critney

v. Nat'l City Ford, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (D. Cal.

2003)(citing Donahue v. Bill Page Toyota, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d

778, 782 (E.D. Va. 2001)). Similarly, the Court may not consider

attorney’s fees and costs in calculating the jurisdictional

amount. See Romo v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1239 (D.

Cal. 2005). Consequently, the Court may only consider the actual

damages Plaintiff sustained and any civil penalties available to

him under the Song-Beverly Act. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff paid $28,134.39 for the

Mustang and could recover that sum as actual damages were he to

prevail in this action. It is likewise undisputed that Plaintiff

paid $1,898.81 to Solis Collision Center for repairs to the

vehicle. Plf.s’ Add’l. Stmt. of Undisp. Fact ¶ 41.

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This sum, too, may be considered toward the amount in

controversy. In a best case scenario, Plaintiff’s actual damages

total $30,033.20.

Plaintiff generally avers the Court should consider the

civil penalties available under the Song-Beverly Act of up to two

times the actual damages (excluding the repair cost paid to Solis

Collision Center) for a total of $84,103.17. Plf.s’ Supp. Brief

4:15-18. Predictably, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is only

entitled, at best, to three times the repair cost for a total of

$5969.43. The Court rejects both calculations finding instead

that Plaintiff cannot meet the $50,000 threshold because he

cannot include the civil penalties provided under the SongBeverly Act.

California Civil Code section 1794(c) provides in pertinent

part:

“If the buyer establishes that the failure to comply

was willful, the judgment may include, in addition to

the amounts recovered under subdivision (a), a civil

penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of

actual damages. This subdivision shall not apply ...

with respect to a claim based solely on a breach of an

implied warranty.

This provision makes clear that civil penalties are not available

in causes of action based solely on breach of an implied

warranty. Plaintiff concedes that his only remaining cause of

action against Defendant under the MMWA is for breach of an

implied warranty. Plf.s’ Supp. Brief 1:17-19.

Although Plaintiff is clearly not entitled to civil

penalties and, therefore, cannot meet the jurisdictional minimum,

he seeks leave of this Court to amend his Complaint.

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B. Leave to Amend

As Plaintiff tacitly acknowledges, the Complaint as pled

does not permit this Court to exercise its jurisdiction over his

MMWA claim. Nonetheless, Plaintiff requests leave of Court to

correct the deficiencies therein. The Court denies Plaintiff’s

request based both on the untimely nature of Plaintiff’s request

as well as the Pretrial Scheduling Order.

First, the timing of Plaintiff’s request to amend, after the

Parties have conducted discovery and a Summary Judgment Motion

has been filed, weighs against allowing leave. See Hawkins v.

Portal Publs., Inc., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citing Schlacter-Jones v. General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 443 (9th

Cir. 1991)). “A motion for leave to amend is not a vehicle to

circumvent summary judgment.” Schlacter-Jones, 936 F.2d 443; see

also Roberts v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 798 (9th

Cir. 1981) (finding no abuse of discretion where district court

denied request for leave to amend made after summary judgment

motion with benefit of discovery was pending). In addition, the

Court points Plaintiff to Paragraph II of the Pretrial Scheduling

Order (“PTSO”) which provides “[n]o joinder of parties or

amendments to pleadings is permitted without leave of court, good

cause having been shown.” The PTSO “controls the subsequent

course of the action” unless modified by the Court. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 16(e). Here, the Court declines to modify the PTO as

Plaintiff has failed to show that doing so is warranted. In

addition, the Court finds that sufficient prejudice will result

to Defendant should leave be extended at this late juncture.

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Because the MMWA $50,000 minimum amount in controversy is

“to avoid trivial or insignificant actions” being pursued in

federal courts and because Plaintiff is seeking leave to amend

solely to circumvent that jurisdictional minimum, the Court finds

insufficient cause to grant Plaintiff’s request. Consequently,

the Court finds Plaintiff cannot meet the jurisdictional $50,000

minimum destroying jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s MMWA claim.

CONCLUSION

The Court grants Summary Adjudication in favor of Defendant

on its FCRA claim. Further, the Court finds jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s MMWA claim lacking because the amount in controversy

cannot be met. Finally, because the Court has dismissed both

federal actions upon which jurisdiction was based, the Court

cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law

claims. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 14, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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