Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01368/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01368-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMA JAY GALLON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1368 DFL DAD P

vs.

GEORGE GALAZA, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. On December 1, 2005, respondents moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it

has been filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations and that petitioner failed to exhaust state

court remedies on the claim presented to the federal court.

In the court’s February 9, 2006 order granting petitioner’s untimely request for an

extension of time to oppose respondents’ motion, petitioner was advised that his opposition

“must include proof of service on respondents’ attorney of record.” Petitioner filed his

opposition on March 9, 2006, with a proof of service that does not reflect service on respondents’

attorney. Petitioner is cautioned that the court may strike any subsequent document filed without

a proof of service showing the date on which petitioner served a copy of the document on

respondents’ counsel.

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BACKGROUND

This case was opened on July 7, 2005, when the Clerk received a habeas petition

dated May 26, 2005. The petition is presented on a state habeas form and is captioned for filing

in the Sacramento County Superior Court. On July 14, 2005, the undersigned granted petitioner

fifteen days to request return of the petition, if he mailed it to the federal district court in error, or

to request a federal habeas form with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner did

not file any response to the order. On August 26, 2005, the undersigned recommended that this

action be dismissed without prejudice. When petitioner filed a belated request for an extension

of time to file his petition on a federal habeas petition form, the undersigned vacated the findings

and recommendations and granted petitioner thirty days to file his petition on a proper form with

an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

On October 24, 2005, petitioner submitted a federal habeas petition and an

incomplete application to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner was granted a final extension of

time to file a properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis. After petitioner filed

a properly completed in forma pauperis application, the undersigned issued an order on

November 4, 2005, directing respondents to file a response to the habeas petition filed on

October 13, 2005.

THE PETITION FILED ON OCTOBER 13, 2005

Petitioner is challenging a Sacramento County Superior Court judgment entered in

2001 for which he received a sentence of forty years to life in prison after a jury convicted him of

second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner alleges that he appealed from the

judgment, that the judgment was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal for the Third

Appellate District on August 18, 2003, and that the California Supreme Court denied review on

October 29, 2003. Petitioner alleges that he raised two issues on direct appeal: (1) the trial court

gave an incorrect and misleading jury instruction; and (2) petitioner’s sentence violates the

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner alleges that he did not attack his

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conviction by filing any petitions, applications or motions other than his direct appeal. In federal

court, petitioner seeks relief on the sole ground that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel.

THE MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Respondents’ Arguments and Evidence

Respondents offer evidence of the following: judgment was imposed on

petitioner on September 7, 2001, after a jury convicted him of murder and found that he had

intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing death; petitioner received an

indeterminate state prison term of forty years to life; on August 18, 2003, the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed the judgment; on October 29, 2003, the

California Supreme Court denied review; petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in

the United States Supreme Court; petitioner did not file any state post-conviction collateral

challenges to his judgment; petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has not been

presented to any state court.

Respondents contend that petitioner’s judgment became final for purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) on January 27, 2004, upon expiration of the ninety-day period in which

petitioner could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and that the one-year period then ran

without interruption until it expired on January 27, 2005. Respondents assert that petitioner

commenced this action on July 7, 2005, more than five months after the statute of limitations

expired, and that petitioner has alleged no facts that would entitle him to a later start date for the

one-year period of limitation, to statutory tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), or to equitable tolling. 

Respondents argue that petitioner’s federal petition must be dismissed because it raises only an

unexhausted claim. Respondents argue further that the petition should be dismissed with

prejudice because the statute of limitations will bar any subsequent federal habeas proceeding

petitioner might bring after exhausting state court remedies.

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II. Petitioner’s Opposition

Petitioner does not dispute respondents’ evidence concerning his conviction and

appeal. Nor does he dispute respondents’ conclusion concerning the date on which the one-year

statute of limitations began to run for his conviction. Petitioner does not deny that his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel has not been presented to any state court.

Petitioner states that he “was late filing his writ beyond the one year statute of

limitations because of numerous lock-downs and state of emergencies at petitioner’s previous

location, Corcoran State Prison.” (Pet’r’s Opp’n at 1.) Petitioner asserts that the lock-downs

“consist of no movement at all,” that he could not control the lock-downs, and that he had no

access to the law library. (Id.) Petitioner also asserts that he did not exhaust his claims because

he “was under the impression that [his] appeals lawyer already took care of that and all [he] the

petitioner had to do was file to the federal courts.” (Id. at 2.) Petitioner cites his lack of

knowledge of the law and misinformation provided by other inmates. (Id.)

Petitioner asks the court to hold his petition in abeyance, to “delete the grounds

first,” allow him sixty days to prepare and file a state habeas petition, and allow him thirty days

after the state court’s final decision within which to return to federal court to present his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel as an exhausted claim. Petitioner suggests that “this is not only

the proper way to resolve the current cross-road but the fairest to both parties.” (Id. at 2.) 

Petitioner asserts that he “has been in the federal courts for well over 30 days and simply has no

more time under the statute of limitations to voluntarily or otherwise have this petition dismissed

and the case closed.” (Id.) Petitioner continues that “the facts of this instant case present

exceptional circumstances that would uphold this court granting petitioner’s request to hold the

petition in abeyance while unexhausted claims is presented to the state court levels.” (Id.)

Petitioner offers the following documentation concerning his law library access:

(1) a memorandum dated May 18, 2004, concerning the library schedule; (2) a program status

report dated September 30, 2003, concerning modified program conditions effective September

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11, 2003; (3) a program status report dated November 9, 2003, concerning a lockdown effective

on that date; (4) a program status report dated March 25, 2004, concerning modified program

conditions for selected inmates following a staff assault on March 12, 2004, and prison riots on

March 16, 2004; (5) a program status report dated April 2, 2004, concerning a lockdown and

state of emergency on April 1, 2004; and (6) a program status report dated April 15, 2004,

concerning an update on the April 1, 2005 lockdown and state of emergency. 

III. Respondents’ Reply

Respondents argue that petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on the basis of

prison lockdowns. Respondents note that it is petitioner’s burden to establish that he has pursued

his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in the way of his filing a

timely federal habeas petition. Respondents cite cases holding that equitable tolling should be

sparingly applied and only where extraordinary circumstances beyond the prisoner’s control

made it impossible to file a petition on time. Respondents also cite cases holding that a garden

variety claim of excusable neglect will not suffice and that even multiple prison lockdowns will

not constitute extraordinary circumstances absent a showing of how the lockdowns interfered

with the prisoner’s ability to file a petition within the one-year period of limitation.

Turning to petitioner’s documentation, respondents assert that petitioner’s

showing falls far short of what is required to invoke equitable tolling. Respondents characterize

two of petitioner’s documents, the program status reports for September 11, 2003, and November

9, 2003, as irrelevant because they concern lockdowns that preceded the commencement of

petitioner’s one-year period of limitation. Respondents point out that the May 18, 2004 status

report shows that inmates had access to the law library through the paging system. With regard

to the remaining documents, respondents note that petitioner has failed to provide documents

showing the length of each lockdown and has failed to provide specific details on how the

lockdowns prevented him from filing his habeas petition sooner. In short, respondents argue,

petitioner has not excused his six-month tardiness in filing a federal habeas petition.

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Respondents argue that the court must reject petitioner’s request for a stay of his

fully unexhausted petition because a petition containing only unexhausted claims must be

dismissed. Respondents reiterate their argument that the untimely and unexhausted petition

should be dismissed with prejudice because petitioner has not demonstrated entitlement to

equitable tolling and therefore any subsequent petition would be barred by the statute of

limitations.

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion

State courts must have the first opportunity to decide a state prisoner’s habeas

corpus claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, , 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1533 (2005) (citing Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982)). In general, a state prisoner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus will not be granted unless “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in

the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state will not be deemed to have waived the

exhaustion requirement unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting to the

highest state court all federal claims before presenting the claims to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971);

Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996).

In the present case, petitioner concedes that he has not exhausted state court

remedies on the claim alleged in his federal habeas petition. In the absence of any exhausted

claim, the court cannot delete petitioner’s unexhausted claim, as requested by petitioner, and stay

this action. Petitioner’s wholly unexhausted petition must be dismissed, and this case must be

closed. See Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that once the respondent

moved for dismissal, the district court was obliged to dismiss the petition immediately, as the

petition contained no exhausted claims); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir.

1997).

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26 The year 2004 was a leap year.

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Respondents contend that the petition should be dismissed with prejudice because

it has been filed in violation of the statute of limitations and therefore any claims presented to the

federal court at a later time would be time-barred. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate if any

later petition that might be filed would be time-barred by the statute of limitations. Jimenez, 276

F.3d at 481-82. Accordingly, the court turns to a consideration of the timeliness of this action.

II. Statute of Limitations

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), a 1-year period of limitation applies to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In most

cases, the limitation period begins to run on the date on which the petitioner’s judgment of

conviction becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

In the present case, the Sacramento County Superior Court sentenced petitioner on

September 7, 2001, petitioner’s judgment of conviction was affirmed by the California Court of

Appeal on August 18, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied review on October 29, 2003,

petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, and

petitioner did not file any habeas petitions in state court during the year after his judgment

became final. Petitioner’s judgment became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) on

January 27, 2004, ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied review on October 29,

2003. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute of limitations began to run

on January 28, 2004, and ran without interruption until it expired 365 days later on January 26,

2005. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the statute of 1

limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on which a judgment becomes final

and the date on which the petitioner files his first state collateral challenge).

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The initial petition filed in this court on July 7, 2005, is dated May 26, 2005. The

date on which the pleading was placed in the mail to the district court is unknown, as the

document does not include a proof of service and petitioner has not submitted a mail log or other

evidence to establish the date on which he delivered his petition to prison officials for mailing. 

On the present record, the court will deem the petition to have been filed three days prior to July

7, 2005. The petition was filed more than five months after the statute of limitations expired.

The doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied in cases where a party was

prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the opposing party or where

extraordinary circumstances beyond the party’s control made it impossible to file a claim on

time. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996). The AEDPA statute

of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, but “only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond

a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time’ and ‘the extraordinary

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.’” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)).

“[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, , 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814

& n.8 (2005). Equitable tolling will be unavailable in most cases. See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278

F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

The petitioner in this case has not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances

beyond his control made it impossible for him to file a federal habeas petition on or before

January 26, 2005. His evidence of periodic prison lockdowns in 2003 and 2004 does not

establish when each lockdown began and ended. Moreover, as his evidence reveals, an initial

lockdown or state of emergency is usually followed by one or more program status reports

gradually lifting program restrictions for prisoners in certain housing areas, prisoners with inmate

jobs, prisoners over a certain age, and prisoners in ethnic classifications not involved in the

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 The California Court of Appeal’s unpublished opinion filed August 18, 2003, reveals 2

that petitioner was 20 years old on February 19, 2000, when he shot the victim. (Doc. 2 lodged

by respondents on Dec. 1, 2005, at 2 & 5.)

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incident that led to the lockdown. Petitioner’s incomplete documentation precludes the court

from determining any specific periods of time during which petitioner had no access to the prison

law library. Facts concerning petitioner’s housing, his job status, and his ethnicity are not

contained in the record. Moreover, petitioner’s own evidence reveals that access to the law 2

library or to a library paging system was usually available to prisoners with court deadlines

during lockdowns. For example, the May 28, 2004 memorandum submitted as the first exhibit to

petitioner’s opposition indicates that physical access to the library was available for inmates

housed in the 3C-Gym and all inmates with verified court deadlines, except that black inmates

with court deadlines were limited to requesting books, materials, and copying by institutional

mail.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was subjected to continuous lockdown

conditions that provided no access to the law library for the fifteen-month period from October

29, 2003, to January 27, 2005. Petitioner has not offered any evidence that he made diligent

efforts to access the law library or use the paging system when those programs were available,

that he ever advised prison officials of his deadline for filing a federal habeas petition, or that he

filed any inmate appeal concerning lack of access to the law library. Petitioner has not shown

that institutional lockdowns constituted extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that were

the cause of his failure to file a timely federal habeas petition. Under the circumstances, the

court must conclude that petitioner has failed to make such a showing because he is unable to. 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently. In the initial petition filed in this action, petitioner concedes that he is presenting an

unexhausted claim and offers the following explanation: “Counsel just didn’t take it to the

highest state court. Now I must exhaust (IAC).” (Pet. dated May 26, 2005, and filed July 7,

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2005, at page numbered 18.) This explanation does not appear to be consistent with petitioner’s

more recent assertion that he “was under the impression that [his] appeals lawyer already took

care of that and all [he] had to do was file to the federal courts.” (Pet’r’s Opp’n at 2.) Petitioner

has not explained his failure to file a state habeas petition within a year after his direct appeal

was completed. Had he done so, the statute of limitations would have been tolled while he was

pursuing state court remedies. Despite petitioner’s admission on May 26, 2005, that his claim

was unexhausted, he did not file a state habeas petition at that time but instead filed a petition in

federal court. Upon finding that petitioner’s initial petition was presented on a state habeas

petition form, was captioned for filing in the Sacramento County Superior Court, and contained

an admission that the federal claim was unexhausted, the undersigned issued an order on July 13,

2005, noting that “petitioner may have intended to mail his petition to the Sacramento County

Superior Court for the purpose of exhausting state court remedies on claims that were not

presented to the state courts on direct appeal. If the petition was mailed to this court in error,

petitioner may request that the petition be returned to him for mailing to the proper court.” 

(Order filed and served July 14, 2005, at 1.) Petitioner chose to proceed with a federal habeas

petition raising the unexhausted claim.

Petitioner was provided notice that respondent sought the dismissal of this action

with prejudice on the grounds that the statute of limitations will bar any subsequent federal

habeas proceeding petitioner might bring after exhausting state court remedies as to the sole

claim presented in the pending petition. Petitioner responded to that argument and presented his

arguments with respect to tolling. Those arguments are unpersuasive and the evidence offered in

support thereof is insufficient. The undersigned finds that petitioner has not demonstrated

diligence in pursuing his unexhausted claim and that petitioner has not met his burden of

establishing entitlement to equitable tolling for any period of time. Because any subsequent

petition brought by petitioner will be barred by the statute of limitations, the undersigned will

recommend that this action be dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ December 1, 2005 motion to dismiss be granted; and

2. This action be dismissed with prejudice because the petition for writ of habeas

corpus raises only an unexhausted claim and was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file and

serve written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections

shall be filed and served within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: April 14, 2006.

DAD:13

gall1368.mtd

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