Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00283/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00283-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNA JOHNSON, et al., CASE NO. CV F 07-0283 LJO DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS AND TO STRIKE

vs. (Docs. 22, 24.)

GMRI, INC., et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this purported class action alleging unfair wage claims, defendants GMRI, Inc. and Darden

Restaurant’s, Inc. (collectively “defendants”) seek to dismiss claims and strike allegations which this

Court dismissed and struck from plaintiffs Anna Johnson (“Ms. Johnson”) and Landon Brinkman’s

(“Ms. Brinkman’s”) original complaint. Defendants further seek to dismiss Ms. Johnson and Ms.

Brinkman’s (collectively “plaintiffs’”) money had and received common count. Plaintiffs contend that

a recent California Supreme Court decision revives their dismissed claims and struck allegations. This

Court considered defendants’ motions to dismiss and to strike on the record and VACATES the May

25, 2007 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below, this

Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss and to strike.

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BACKGROUND

Original Order To Dismiss And To Strike

Defendants operate the Bakersfield Olive Garden restaurant where plaintiffs worked as food

servers. Plaintiffs pursue this action for themselves and other food servers and bartenders employed by

defendants. Plaintiffs contend that common questions exist whether defendants:

1. Paid plaintiffs and class members a bonus hour required by California Code of

Regulations (“CCR”), Title 8, section 11050.4(C) (“CCR 11050.4(C)”)when they were

required to work a split shift during a work day; and

2. Caused plaintiffs and class members to pay for cash shortages and walkouts as proscribed

by CCR, Title 8, section 11050.8 (“CCR 11050,8").

Defendants filed their motions to dismiss and to strike portions of plaintiffs’ original complaint.

This Court’s March 29, 2007 order (“March 29 order”):

1. Dismissed plaintiffs’ (first) cause of action for failure to pay split shift premiums in

violation of CCR 11050.4(C);

2. Dismissed plaintiffs’ (second) cause of action for requiring payment for cash shortages

in violation of CCR 11050.8;

3. Granted plaintiffs leave to amend their first and second causes of action “to allege

claim(s) for violation of a fundamental public policy” and “in compliance with this

order”; and 

4. Struck requested relief, including penalties under California Labor Code sections 203 and

558 and unfair competition law of California Business & Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.

(“Unfair Competition Law”), attorney fees, punitive damages and disgorgement of profits.

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

On April 12, 2007, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint which is virtually identical to

their original complaint except that it adds a (third) money had and received common count. The first

amended complaint makes no attempt to allege claims for violation of fundamental public policy and

includes the requested relief stricken by the March 29 order. The original complaint’s dismissed first

and second causes of action and stricken relief appear word-for-word identical in the first amended

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Section 226.7(a) provides: “No employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or rest period 1

mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission.” Section 226.7(b) continues that: “If an employer

fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare

Commission, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation

for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.”

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complaint. The first amended complaint’s (fourth) unfair competition cause of action mirrors the

original complaint’s third cause of action and alleges that defendants violated California Labor Code

provisions and engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices to violate the Unfair Competition Law.

Recent California Supreme Court Decision

On April 16, 2007, after plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, the California Supreme

Court issued Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 1094, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 (2007).

In Murphy, 40 Cal.4th 1094, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at 883, the California Supreme Court addressed whether:

1. Whether the one additional hour of pay under California Labor Code section 226.71

(“section 226.7") constitutes a wage/premium or a penalty to determine application of

a three-year vs. one-year limitations period; and

2. A trial court, conducting a de novo trial, can consider additional wage claims not

presented in administrative proceedings before the California Labor Commissioner.

The California Supreme Court held that the California Legislature “intended section 226.7 first and

foremost to compensate employees for their injuries” and that section 226.7's additional hour of pay is

not a penalty to invoke a shorter one-year limitations period. Murphy, 40 Cal.4th 1094, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d

at 892, 895. Noting that an employee seeking a wage-related claim may file a civil action or first pursue

administrative relief with the California Labor Commissioner, the California Supreme Court held that

a trial court may consider additional, but related, wage claims during the de novo trial. Murphy, 40

Cal.4th 1094, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at 883, 896.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Like the original complaint, the first amended complaint alleges a (first) split shift premiums

cause of action that defendants violated CCR 11050.4(C) because defendants required plaintiffs and

class members routinely to work second “split” shifts but failed to compensate plaintiffs and class

/ / /

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CCR 11050.4(C) provides: “When an employee works a split shift, one (1) hour’s pay at the minimum wage

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shall be paid in addition to the minimum wage for that workday, except when the employee resides at the place of

employment.

CCR 11050.8 provides: “No employer shall make any deduction from the wage or require any

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reimbursement from an employee for any cash shortage, breakage, or loss of equipment, unless it can be shown that the

shortage, breakage, or loss is caused by dishonest or willful act, or by gross negligence of the employee.”

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members an additional hour for that work. Like the original complaint, the first amended complaint 2

alleges a (second) cash shortages cause of action that defendants violated CCR 11050.8 because

defendants required plaintiffs and class members to reimburse defendants for shortages from customers

who did not pay although shortages were not caused by plaintiffs or class members’ dishonest or willful

acts or gross negligence.3

Unlike the original complaint, the first amended complaint’s (third) money had and receive

common count alleges that plaintiffs were induced to give money which plaintiffs have not received as

compensation from defendants. 

With their current motion to dismiss, defendants seek to dismiss the first amended complaint’s:

1. Split shift premiums (first) and cash shortages (second) causes of action on grounds that

this Court lacks jurisdiction over them and that they fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted in that there is no private right of action for violation of CCR

11050.4(C) and 11050.8; and

2. Money had and received common count (third cause of action) on grounds that it lacks

facts to establish elements of the cause of action. 

Motion To Dismiss Standards

Defendants may challenge this Court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of plaintiffs’

complaint under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint as a

whole, it appears to lack jurisdiction “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel.

& Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979). th

Fundamentally, federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular

case unless the contraryaffirmativelyappears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F. 2d 1221,

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1225 (9 Cir. 1989). Limits on federal jurisdiction must neither be disregarded nor evaded. Owen th

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). A plaintiff bears the

burden to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396.

This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading sufficient allegationsto show a proper basis

for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over an action. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance

Corp., 298 U.S 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936); F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1).

The United States Supreme Court in Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459, 46 S.Ct. 338

(1926) explained:

A plaintiff suing in a federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and

distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction, and, if he does not

do so, the court, on having the defect called to its attention or on discovering the same,

must dismiss the case unless the defect be corrected by amendment.

When a defendant challenges jurisdiction “facially,” all material allegations in the complaint are

assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the

face of the pleading. Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Telephone Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th

Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3 Cir. 1977); Cervantez v.

rd

Sullivan, 719 F.Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9 Cir. 1992). th

A defendant may also attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction apart from the pleadings.

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. In such a case, a court may rely on evidence extrinsic to the pleadings and

resolve factual disputes relating to jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9 Cir.), th

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 541 (1989); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 Cir. th

1987); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1983). In this case, defendants’ motion th

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a facial challenge to the first amended complaint, and

this Court need not address extrinsic evidence.

Defendants further seek dismissal of the (first) split shift premiums and (second)cash shortages

causes of action under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismissis a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the

complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any

evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether

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a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either th

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of th

Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must (1) construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996).

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ first,

second and third causes of action.

Private Right Of Action

Defendants challenge plaintiffs’ (first) split shift premiums and (second) cash shortages causes

of action on grounds that no private right of action exists for violations of CCR 11050.4(C) and 11050.8.

The March 29 order noted that the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement is “empowered

to enforce California’s labor law,” includingCCR 11050.4(C) and 11050.8. Tidewater Marine Western,

Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 561, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997). With

the March 29 order, this Court found “the existence of an administrative remedy precludes a private

action.” This Court granted plaintiffs leave to amend their first and second causes of action “to allege

claim(s) for violation of a fundamental public policy” and “in compliance with this order.” 

Plaintiffs contend that the California Supreme Court in Murphy held that a California Industrial

Welfare Commission (“IWC”) wage order “will support a private civil action by an aggrieved

employee.” Plaintiffs rely on the following from Murphy, 40 Cal.4th 1094, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d at 896:

The Labor Commissioner “has broad authority to investigate employee

complaints and to conduct hearings in actions ‘to recover wages, penalties, and other

demands for compensation . . .’ . . . The statute [California Labor Code section 98.2]

provides for three alternatives: the commissioner may either accept the matter and

conduct an administrative hearing [citation], prosecute a civil action for the collection

of wages and other money payable to employees arising out of an employment

relationship [citation], or take no further action on the complaint. [Citation.]”

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The California Supreme Court in Murphy, 40 Cal.4th 1094, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at 897, further explained

proceedings under California Labor Code section 98.2:

‘A hearing de novo [under Labor Code section 98.2] literally means a new hearing, that

is, a new trial.’ [Citation.] The decision of the commissioner is ‘entitled to no weight

whatsoever, and the proceedings are truly “a trial anew in the fullest sense.”’ [Citation.]

. . . Review is of the facts presented to the trial court, which may include entirely new

evidence. [Citations.]”

Plaintiffs acknowledge the absence of a “specific Labor Code section which gives employees a

cause of action to split shift premiums and reporting time pay.” Plaintiffs appear to argue that CCR

11040.4's one-hour split shift wage is compensation. Plaintiffs contend that California Labor

Commissioner’s broad powers permit the Commissioner to “adjudicate issues relating to employees

paying for cash shortages in violation of CCR 11050.8.” Plaintiffs conclude that under Murphy, wage

orders “give employees individual rights of action.”

Defendants contend that plaintiffs “have misrepresented” Murphy in that “Murphy says

absolutely nothing about a private right of action for violation of a Wage Order.” Defendants point out

that the claims in Murphy were “based on alleged violation of Labor Code provisions for which there

is an express private right of action.” Defendants argue that theCalifornia Labor Commissioner’s ability

to bring a civil action for a California Labor Code violation does not equate to a private action for a wage

order violation.

The first amended complaint fails to allege claims for violation of a fundamental public policy

in that it merely repeats the (first) split shift premiums and (second) cash shortages causes of action

which this Court dismissed. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that or how Murphy converted their split shift

and cash shortages causes of action into private rights of action. In Murphy, the California Supreme

Court addressed the applicable limitations period to a meal and rest period statute and de novo trial court

proceedings. The California Supreme Court did not address CCR 11040.4(C) or 11050.8 or similar

wage orders. Particularly troubling is that plaintiffs filed their amended complaint four days before

Murphy was issued. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Murphy to file their amended complaint cannot be taken

seriously. Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the March 29 order to attempt to maintain their (first)

split shift premiums and (second) cash shortages causes of action. A further attempt at amendment is

unwarranted based on how plaintiffs proceeded with their first amended complaint. Plaintiffs’ (first)

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split shift premiums and (second) cash shortages causes of action are dismissed with prejudice. 

Money Had And Received 

As a reminder, the first amended complaint adds a (third) money had and received common

count that plaintiffs were induced to give money which plaintiffs have not received as compensation

from defendants. Defendants contend that the third cause of action fails to state sufficient facts.

In the common law action of general assumpsit, plaintiffs customarily plead an indebtedness

using “common counts.” Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin, 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 707,

715 (1997). The essential allegations of a common count are (1) a statement of indebtedness in a

“certain sum;” (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc.; and (3) nonpayment. Zerin, 53

Cal.App.4th at 460; 61 Cal.Rptr.2d at 715. A cause of action for money had and received is stated if it

is alleged the defendant “is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum ‘for money had and received by the

defendant for the use of the plaintiff.’” Schultz v. Harney, 27 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1623, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d

276 (1994).

Defendants argue that the third cause of action does not allege “the threshold element of the

claim – that Defendants owed them a certain sum.” (Italics in original.) Defendants characterize

plaintiffs’ allegations of alleged loses as “estimates.” Defendants point to Ms. Johnson’s allegation that

she “has no records setting forth the actual amount of money owed by Defendant to her during the

approximately two years and two months that she was employed in California but she estimates that she

had to pay more than $2000 for cash shortages and walkouts which were not the result of any dishonest

or willful act or by her gross negligence.” Defendants further note Mr. Brinkman’s allegation that he

“has no records setting forth the actual amount of money owed by Defendant to him during the

approximately six months he was employed in California but he estimates that he had to pay more than

$450 for cash shortages and walkouts which were not the result of any dishonest or willful act or by his

gross negligence.” The first amended complaint also alleges that “servers and bartenders are sometimes

unaware of the shortages” and “[p]laintiffs and Class members usually didn’t realize that they were

making up Defendant’s shortages.” Defendants conclude that “[p]laintiffs’ admitted inability to plead

a sum certain owed to them dooms their common count for money had and received.”

Plaintiffs respond that they were induced to give money and provide labor to defendants in

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unknown sums because they were not compensated the one-hour wage for working split shifts and paid

defendants cash shortages due to defendants’ malicious and oppressive conduct. Plaintiffs appear to

argue that they need only estimate their damages and the burden shifts to defendants to rebut such

estimates. Plaintiffs rely on a quote from Rains v. Arnett, 189 Cal.App.2d 337, 344, 11 Cal.Rptr. 299,

303 (1961), that: “Technically, an action for money had and received lies in cases where one person has

in his possession money which in equity and good conscience he ought to pay over to another.”

Plaintiffs fail meaningfully to challenge that they must allege a sum certain. Plaintiffs fail to

demonstrate that their mere estimates substantiate their (third) money had and received common count.

Without more from plaintiffs, an attempt to amend their (third) money had and received common count

is unwarranted. Their (third) money had and received common count is dismissed with prejudice.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

As they did with plaintiffs’ original complaint, defendants seek to strike from the first amended

complaint:

1. The prayer “[f]or compensatory damages for not receiving compensation after having

worked split shifts”;

2. The prayers for California Labor Code section 203 and 558 penalties;

3. The request for attorney fees from the (first) split shift premiums cause of action and

prayer for attorney fees;

4. The (second) cash shortages cause of action’s allegation to support punitive damages and

prayer for punitive damages; and

5. The disgorgement of profits allegation in the (fourth) unfair competition cause of action.

Defendants note that the March 29 order struck identical allegations and prayers of relief from the

original complaint and that the new money had and received common count does not support the

stricken allegations and prayers for relief. Plaintiffs assert that Murphy “substantiates” their first

amended complaint and addresses issues subject to the March 29 order. 

Motion To Strike Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 12(f) empowers a court to “order stricken from any pleading . . . any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Motions to strike may be granted if “it is clear that the

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matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” LeDuc v.

Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., 814 F.Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems,

Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). “[T]he function of a [F.R.Civ.P.] 12(f) motion to strike

is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9

th

Cir. 1983); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9 Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds,

th

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023 (1994).

An “immaterial” matter has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or

defenses pleaded. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527; Gilbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 116, 120,

n. 5 (D. P.R. 1972); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 180 F.Supp. 717 (D. Pa. 1958). An “impertinent”

allegation is neither responsive nor relevant to the issues involved in the action and which could not be

put in issue or given in evidence between the parties. Gilbert, 56 F.R.D. at 120, n. 6; Burke v. Mesta

Mach. Co., 5 F.R.D. 134 (D. Pa. 1946). An “impertinent” matter consists of statements that do not

pertain and are unnecessary to the issues in question. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527. Matters may be

stricken to reduce trial complication or if challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claims to

be unworthy of consideration as a defense and their presence in the pleading will prejudice the party

seeking to strike matters. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527.

With these standards in mind, the Court turns to the matters which defendants seek to strike from

the first amended complaint.

California Labor Code Section 203 Penalties

Defendants seek to strike the prayer for California Labor Code section 203 penalties because they

are applicable only to payment of wages upon termination, a claim missing from the first amended

complaint. The March 29 orderstruck the original complaint’s prayer for California Labor Code section

203 penalties with dismissal of the (first) split shift premiums and (second) cash shortages causes of

action.

Again, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate the viability of the (first) split shift premiums and (second)

cash shortages causes of action. The prayer of California Labor Code section 203 penalties is again

stricken. 

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California Labor Code Section 558 Penalties

Defendants seek to strike the prayer for California Labor Code section 558 penalties because they

are applicable only to specified hours and days of work provisions of the California Labor Code, a claim

missing from the first amended complaint. The March 29 order struck the original complaint’s prayer

for California Labor Code section 558 penalties because plaintiffs acknowledged they were not entitled

to them.

Plaintiffs again acknowledge that they are not entitled to California Labor Code section 558

penalties. The first amended complaint’s prayer for California Labor Code section 558 penalties is

stricken.

Attorneys Fees

Defendants seek to strike the first amended complaint’s reference to and prayer for attorney fees

on grounds that attorney fees are not recoverable under CCR 11050.4(C) or 11050.8 or the Unfair

Competition Law. The March 29 order struck the original complaint’s reference to and prayer for

attorney fees with dismissal of the (first) split shift premiums and (second) cash shortages causes of

action and because plaintiffs acknowledged theywere not entitled to them under the Unfair Competition

Law. 

Plaintiffs assert that they trigger a California Labor Code section 1194 attorney fees award

because “servers are traditionally paid the legal minimum wage” and “failure to pay a wage for split shift

premiums drops the server below the minimum wage.” Defendants respond that even if they had failed

to make the required split shift payment, there is no showing that plaintiffs earned less than minimum

wage to support an attorney fees claim.

Again, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate availability of attorney fees given the failure of their (first)

split shift premiums and (second) cash shortages causes of action and absence of applicable authority

for attorney fees. The first amended complaint offers nothing to invoke a California Labor Code section

1194 attorney fees award, and plaintiffs make no effort to substantiate their assertion that servers are

traditionally paid minimum wage, let alone plead as much. The first amended complaint’s reference to

and prayer for attorney fees is stricken.

/ / / 

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Punitive Damages

Defendants seek to strike the (second) cash shortages cause of action’s allegation to support

punitive damages and the prayer for punitive damages on grounds that punitive damages are not

recoverable under CCR 11050.4(C) or 11050.8 or the Unfair Competition Law. The March 29 order

struck the punitive damages allegation and prayer as non-recoverable under the Unfair Competition Law.

Plaintiffs point to no viable avenue for punitive damages, especially given the failure of the

(second) cash shortages cause of action. The (second) cash shortages cause of action’s allegation to

support punitive damages and the prayer for punitive damages are stricken.

Profits Disgorgement

Defendants seek to strike the profits disgorgement allegation in the (fourth) unfair competition

cause of action on grounds that profits disgorgement is unavailable under the Unfair Competition Law.

The March 27 order struck the profits disgorgement allegation with dismissal of the (first) split shift

premiums and (second) cash shortages causes of action and because plaintiffs acknowledged that they

are not entitled to profits disgorgement under the Unfair Competition Law, which limits plaintiffs to

restitution.

Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate they are entitled to profits disgorgement under the Unfair

Competition Law, especially since they acknowledged they are not entitled to such in response to

defendants’ original motion to strike. In an Unfair Competition Law action, “[p]laintiffs are generally

limited to injunctive relief and restitution,” not profits disgorgement. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 29 4 1134, 1144-1145, 131 Cal.Rptr. 29 (2003). The profits disgorgement allegation th

in the (fourth) unfair competition cause of action is stricken.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES with prejudice the first amended complaint’s (first) split shift premiums

and (second) cash shortages causes of action and (third) money had and received

common count;

2. STRIKES from the first amended complaint:

a. The words “reasonable attorney fees and” from paragraph 23 (page 5, lines 21-

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22);

b. Entire paragraph 42 (page 9, lines 14-18); and

c. The words “and/or including but not limited to, disgorgement of profits which

may be necessary to restore Plaintiff and the Class members to the financial place

they would have been but for Defendant’s conduct as set forth herein” from

paragraph 54 (page 11, lines 12-14);

3. STRIKES from the first amended complaint’s prayer:

a. “1. For compensatory damages for not receiving compensation after having

worked split shirts.” (page 11, lines 18-19);

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b. “2. For penalties pursuant to LC §203 for Plaintiff and all Class members whose

employment was terminated prior to the filing of this complaint.” (page 11, lines

20-21);

c. “3. For civil penalties pursuant to LC §558 for $50 for each violation and $100

for each subsequent violation for each pay period the Defendant violated

Plaintiffs and Class members rights pursuant to CCR 11050.8 and CCR

11050.4(C).” (page 11, lines 22-24);

d. “5. For punitive damages for fraud, malice and oppression pursuant to CC

§3294.” (page 11, line 27); and

e. “6. An award of attorney fees.” (page 11, line 28); and

4. ORDERS defendants, no later than June 6, 2007, to file and serve a responsive pleading

to the first amended complaint’s remaining claims and allegations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 21, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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