Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00249/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

MACK NELSON PLAINTIFF

Case Number: 5:05CV00249GH

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ARKANSAS

SOUTH, ET AL. . DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Plaintiff filed this action alleging that defendants discriminated against him

on the basis of disability and race when he was discharged. Defendant Waste

Management of Arkansas, Inc. (“WMA”) has filed a motion to dismiss, raising a

number of issues including: (1) defendant WMA is incorrectly named in the

complaint; (2) plaintiff failed to properly serve WMA with the summons and

complaint; (3) plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because plaintiff’s charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

was untimely; (4) plaintiff’s other claims should be dismissed as being outside the

scope of the EEOC charge which alleged only discharge; and (5) the complaint fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint which corrected the name of defendant

to Waste Management of Arkansas, Inc., thereby rendering moot WMA’s first

argument. The amended complaint, in all other respects, is identical to the

original complaint which was filed on August 31, 2005.

WMA states that plaintiff failed to properly serve the designated agent for

service of process. Plaintiff mailed the summons and complaint to George Whale,

whom plaintiff contends is the managing agent for the facility located at Pine Bluff,

Arkansas. 

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WMA refutes this and argues that plaintiff has taken an inconsistent position, asserting in

his EEOC Charge that he was terminated on or about November 6, 2004. WMA’s disciplinary form

indicates that plaintiff was terminated on November 1, 2004. Plaintiff further alleges in his EEOC

charge that he was discharged on November 6th. For the purposes of this motion, the Court will

assume that plaintiff was terminated on November 9, 2004.

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Service of the summons and complaint by mail is governed by Arkansas law. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (service by mail in accordance with law of state in which

district court is located). Pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(8)(A)(I), service by mail

must be with a return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee or

the agent of the addressee. The agent “must be authorized in accordance with U.S.

Postal regulations.” 

Here, delivery of the summons and complaint was not “restricted.” Whale

is not the designated agent for WMA. WMA’s registered agent for service of

process is The Corporation Company. 

Although service was not in compliance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(d), dismissal

of the amended complaint is not mandated. The Court has discretion to dismiss

the action or retain the case but quash the service that has been made on the

defendant. Haley v. Simmons, 529 F.2d 78, 79 (8th Cir.1976). The 120 days for

obtaining service provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) has not passed and WMA will

not be prejudiced by providing plaintiff some additional time to obtain proper

service. Thus, service on WMA will be quashed. Plaintiff must effect proper

service within 20 days of the entry of this Order. Failure to do so will result in

dismissal of this action.

WMA also alleges that the complaint should be dismissed because plaintiff’s

EEOC charge was untimely. A charge of discrimination must be filed within 180

days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 

Plaintiff alleges that he was fired by WMA on November 9, 2004.1

 The EEOC

charge was signed on June 6, 2005, more than 180 days after the discharge.

Plaintiff contends that he filed his EEOC charge on April 27, 2005, within

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There is some confusion as to what date plaintiff claims as the date he filed a “charge of

discrimination.” Something was sent to the EEOC on April 18, 2005; his counsel refers to the April

18, 2005, charge of discrimination in his May 4, 2005 letter to the EEOC. The Court need not

resolve the issue of what date to use purposes of finding that plaintiff filed a timely charge, because

under any of the dates above, the charge alleging the last discriminatory act as November 9, 2004,

would be timely. See discussion infra.

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the 180 days of discharge, and that he signed the formal charge of discrimination

on June 6, 2005.2

 In support of his position, he has attached correspondence from

the EEOC dated April 28, 2005, referring to allegations of discrimination against

WMA submitted on April 27. Because plaintiff had alleged in earlier

correspondence that the last date of discrimination was September 11, 2004, the

EEOC notified plaintiff that the issues of which plaintiff’ complained were nonjurisdictional due to untimeliness. That is, the information submitted on April 27,

2005, was untimely. The EEOC advised plaintiff that he could still file a charge

against WMA but it would be dismissed because it would be untimely and a Notice

of Right to Sue would be issued. 

Plaintiff’s counsel then wrote a letter on May 4, 2005, to the EEOC stating

that the September 11th date was in error; that the date of the last discriminatory

action was November 9, 2004. The letter refers to plaintiff’s EEOC charge of April

18, 2005. The intake questionnaire which was attached to the May 4th letter is

signed by plaintiff but not dated. Plaintiff received a notice from the EEOC that

his interview was scheduled for June 6, 2005. 

The filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional

prerequisite, but is a condition precedent, and like a statute of limitations which is

subject to equitable tolling. Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 132 F. 3d 447,

451 (8th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit has held that held that an intake

questionnaire neither signed under oath nor verified does not constitute a valid

charge under Title VII. See Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F. 3d 793, 796

(8th Cir. 1998).

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Since Virginia has a state agency with authority to grant or seek relief, the plaintiff had 300

days to file with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Edelman, 535 U.S. at 109 n. 1; Tinsley v.

First Union Nat’l Bank, 155 F. 3d 435, 440-442 (4th Cir. 1998). 

4

 1601.12 Contents of charge; amendment of charge.

(a) Each charge should contain the following:

(1) The full name, address and telephone number of the person making the charge

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There is some question as to the viability of the Eighth Circuit’s position in

light of Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002) See Sifferman v. Bd. of

Regents, Southeast Missouri State Univ., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (E. D.

Mo.2003). In Edelman, the plaintiff argued that his letter to the EEOC was a

timely filed charge and that under an EEOC regulation, the verification on the

charge related back to the letter. The Supreme Court, while upholding the EEOC

regulation as a valid interpretation the statute governing the filing of charges

under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) did not address whether the letter

constituted a valid charge. 535 U.S. at 188-119.

 The plaintiff in Edelman had written a five-page, single-spaced letter on

November 14, 1997 setting forth his allegations of discrimination, and stating that

he was filing a charge of discrimination against Lynchburg College. The letter was

signed but not verified. The EEOC subsequently conducted an interview on March

3, 1998, the charge form was sent to the plaintiff on March 1998, for his signature,

and was received by the EEOC from plaintiff on April 15, 1998, which was 313

days after the June 6, 1997 date of alleged discrimination by the College.3 On

remand to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held that the November

14th letter was a valid charge to which the EEOC charge form could relate back.

Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 300 F. 3d 400, 405 (8th Cir. 2002). 

This case is similar to that of Edelman. Here, plaintiff submitted a signed 

intake questionnaire which fulfilled the regulatory requirements of a charge. 29 C.

F. R. § 1601.12. 4

 His counsel alerted the EEOC telephonically on May 3, 2005,

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except as provided in § 1601.7;

(2) The full name and address of the person against whom the charge is made, if

known (hereinafter referred to as the respondent);

(3) A clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting

the alleged unlawful employment practices: See § 1601.15(b);

(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of the respondent employer or

the approximate number of members of the respondent labor organization, as the

case may be; and

(5) A statement disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged unlawful

employment practice have been commenced before a State or local agency charged

with the enforcement of fair employment practice laws and, if so, the date of such

commencement and the name of the agency.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a charge is

sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a

written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally

the action or practices complained of. A charge may be amended to cure technical

defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify

allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts

which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the

subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first

received. A charge that has been so amended shall not be required to be redeferred..

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that the September 11th date which was used in the information form submitted on

April 18, 2005, was in error. Plaintiff submitted a revised intake questionnaire

prior to the expiration of the 180 days of the alleged last discriminatory action. 

Furthermore, EEOC’s failure to arrange for an interview until after the

expiration of the 180 days does not preclude plaintiff’s Title VII claim. See

Edelman, 400 F. 3d at 404. (“Once a valid charge has been filed, a simple failure

by the EEOC to fulfill its statutory duties regarding the charge does not preclude a

plaintiff’s Title VII claim.”) See also Lawrence, 132 F. 3d 452 (EEOC failure to

complete formal charge form and obtain plaintiff’s verification until after 180-day

period was circumstance beyond plaintiff’s control and constituted excusable

neglect)

In sum, the Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint should not be dismissed

because his charge of discrimination was untimely.

Defendant further contends that any allegations outside of plaintiff’s claim

that he was discharged on the bases of race and disability are precluded as being

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outside plaintiff’s EEOC charge. 

Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that WMA discriminated against 

him on the bases of his race and his disability in disciplining and discharging him. 

He also makes reference to retaliation, and discrimination with regard to

promotion, failure to train, discriminatory discipline and a racially hostile

environment. Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleged discrimination on the basis of race

and disability. It states: “On or about November 6,2004, I was discharged from my

Truck Driving Position. I had been employed since January 1985. Management

said I was discharged for sleeping on the job and that I was a safety hazard. I

believe that I was discharged because of my disability . . . and because of my race,

black, . . . “

”A title VII lawsuit does not have to mirror the administrative charge.

However, the sweep of any subsequent judicial complaint may be only as broad as

the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out

of the charge of discrimination. Allegations outside the scope of the EEOC charge AAA

circumscribe the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, and for that reason are

not allowed.” Duncan v. Delta Consol. Industries, Inc,. 371 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7thg

Cir. 2004)(citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Although plaintiff alleged in his intake questionnaire retaliation, as well as

racially discriminatory practices, he does not indicate so on his EEOC charge form. 

When confronted with a similar situation in Edelman, the Fourth Circuit 

found that the formal charge, which contained only the allegation of sex

discrimination, did not relate back to the religion and ethnicity claims set forth in

the unverified letter. 300 F. 3d at 405-06. (“We therefore hold that Edelman's

verification via the Form 5 charge did not relate back to the claims not asserted in

the Form 5.”) See also Bland v. Kansas City, Kansas Community College, 271 F.

Supp. 2d 1280, 1285 (D. Kan. 2003) (allegations of disability discrimination in

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The Court is not persuaded, however, that plaintiff should be barred from presenting

evidence of a racially hostile environment or racially discriminatory practices to the extent such

evidence supports his claim of discriminatory discharge. 

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unverified intake questionnaire did not satisfy exhaustion requirement on disability

claim where formal EEOC charge only alleged age discrimination). 

The Court is persuaded that plaintiff’s allegations are limited to those set

forth in the formal EEOC charge. See Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections,

153 F. 3d 681, 699 (8th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff’s claim that he was discharged in

retaliation for making internal discrimination complaints not reasonably related to

underlying discrimination claim). The general claims relating to racially

discriminatory practices do not grow out of the discriminatory discharge claim.5

WMA also contends that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court agrees that plaintiff’s

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment should be dismissed

as defendants are not state actors and the actions of defendants are not state or

federal actions. The Court, however, is not persuaded that the amended complaint

fails to provide WMA with sufficient notice. The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint

is that WMA discriminated against him on the bases of race and disability in

discharging him. The Court has already determined that the other assertions

outside the scope of the EEOC charge should be dismissed. 

Accordingly, the amended motion to dismiss (document no. 12) is granted in

part and denied in part. The original motion to dismiss (document no. 3) is denied

as moot. The motion to amend/correct complaint (document no. 8) is granted. The

motion for additional time to answer the motion to dismiss (document no. 7) is

denied as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of December, 2005.

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___________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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