Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02506/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02506-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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2 FILED

3 APR 1 1 2017

CLERK. U.'S. DJSTRiCT COURT

SOUTHERN DlffflCT OF CALIFORNIA

DEPUTY

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BY

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 JORDANA BAUMAN, Case No.: 16cv2506-MMA (JMA)

11 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

12 v.

13 HARBOR VIEW HOME OWNERS

ASSOCIATION; CASTLE

BRECKENRIDGE MANAGEMENT

PARTNERS; JOHN C. KALAS;

MARQUIS HUNTSMAN; SHERI

WHITE-NEWTON; VLADY

DMYTRENKO; EPSTEIN GRINNELL

& HOWELL, INC.; DEBORAH

ZUMWALT; and ELISA M. PEREZ,

Defendants.

14 GRANTING MOTION TO FILE

UNDER SEAL; 15

16 SUA SPONTE DISMISSING CIVIL

ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)

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21 PlaintiffJordana Bauman, proceedingpro se, has filed the instant action against

Defendants Harbor View Home Owners Association, Castle Breckenridge Management

Partners, John C. Kalas, Marquis Huntsman, Sheri White-Newton, Vlady Dmytrenko,

Epstein Grinnell & Howell, Inc., Deborah Zumwalt, and Elisa M. Perez. See Doc. No. 1.

Plaintiff also moves for leave to proceed in this action informapauperis (“IFP”), and

moves to seal financial records and medical records that she attached to her motion to

proceed IFP.

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1 Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe

United States, except an application for writ ofhabeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to

prepay the entire fee only ifshe is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in

forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.

1965). A party need not be completely destitute to proceed informapauperis. Adkins v.

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). Plaintiffs IFP application

details her net monthly income and her monthly expenses. Based thereon, the Court

concludes that Plaintiffshould be allowed to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs

submission demonstrates that she lacks the financial resources to pay the costs of

commencing this action. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to proceed

IFP, and, because ofthe sensitive nature ofPlaintiffs medical and financial records,

GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to seal. See A.B. ex rel. W.F.B. v. San Francisco Unified

Sch Dist., No. C 07-4738 PJH, 2007 WL 2900527, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007).

Screening Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. 81915(EV2¥B1

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19 1. Legal Standard

When a plaintiffproceeds IFP, the complaint is subject to mandatory screening and

the Court must order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious,

failing to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted, or seeking monetary relieffrom

a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not

limited to prisoners.”). “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court

must accept as true all allegations ofmaterial fact and must construe those facts in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000). In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe apro se plaintiffs

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1 pleadings. See id. In giving liberal interpretation to apro se complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” See Ivey

v. Board ofRegents ofthe University ofAlaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if, taking all wellpleaded factual allegations as true, it does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to

reliefthat is plausible on its face.” See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031,

1034 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiffpleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citation omitted).

2. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges causes of action for willful violations of a bankruptcy stay and a

violation ofthe Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

i. Willful Violations ofthe Bankruptcy Stay

“Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic

stay prohibiting creditors from attempting to collect pre-petition debts against the

debtor.” In re Dingley, No. 14-60055, 2017 WL 1208454, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2017);

11 U.S.C. § 362; In re Ozenne, 337 B.R. 214, 218-19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006)

(“The filing of a petition for bankruptcy relief automatically stays both the continuation

ofproceedings against the debtor and the commencement of any act to obtain possession

of, or enforce a lien against, property ofthe debtor or ofthe estate.”). The Bankruptcy

Code also “creates a statutory remedy for individual debtors who are injured by a

violation ofthe automatic stay.” See In re Bertuccio, 414 B.R. 604, 611 (Bankr. N.D.

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27 i Plaintiffincludes a “cause of action” for “emotional distress,” but upon review ofPlaintiffs pleadings,

the Court concludes that Plaintiffs “cause ofaction” is a request for emotional distress damages, and

not a separate claim ofliability. See Compl. 63-71. 28

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Cal. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(l). Section 362(k)(l) states that “an individual

injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual

damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may

recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(k)(l). “A party seeking damages for

violation ofthe automatic stay must prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence that (1) a

bankruptcy petition was filed; (2) the debtor is an individual; (3) the creditor received

notice ofthe petition; (4) the creditor’s actions were in willful violation ofthe stay; and

(5) the debtor suffered damages.” See In re Bertuccio, 414 B.R. at 611.

Plaintiff alleges she filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on July 5, 2011, which

commenced an automatic bankruptcy stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. Plaintiffstates

that the bankruptcy court erroneously dismissed her bankruptcy action on September 10,

2012. Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges she appealed the bankruptcy court’s order of dismissal

to the United States District Court for the Southern District ofCalifornia. According to

Plaintiffs pleadings, on August 30, 2013, the district court determined that the

bankruptcy court had violated Plaintiffs statutory and constitutional due process rights

by failing to afford her notice and a hearing prior to dismissing her Chapter 13 petition,

and thus, the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing her case was void. See Compl. Exh. D.

The district court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for

further proceedings. See Compl. Exh. D. Plaintiff contends Defendants violated the

automatic bankruptcy stay in the interim by filing a lawsuit against her in December 2012

in which they sought to foreclose on her home.

Typically, an automatic stay terminates upon dismissal of a bankruptcy case, and

while reinstatement ofthe bankruptcy case restores the automatic stay, it does not do so

retroactively. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c); In re Sewell, 345 B.R. 174,179 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.

2006); In re Williams, No. A12-00620-GS, 2013 WL 1089262, at *2 (Bankr. D. Alaska

Mar. 13, 2013) (“The reinstated stay ... does not generally attach retroactively to void

acts taken in the gap period between dismissal and reinstatement.”). However, where a

court finds that a prior order dismissing a bankruptcy case is “void for lack of due

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process,” a “stay [is deemed to have been] continuously in effect from the time ofthe

filing ofthe petition.” See In re Krueger, 88 B.R. 238, 241 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988); In re

Slyman, 234 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Sillman, No. 2:14-CV-00587-MCE,

2015 WL 1291427, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015) (“As a legal nullity, the erroneous

dismissal order did not terminate the automatic stay so as to terminate either the

automatic stay or the debtor’s legal rights.”).

Here, the district court found the bankruptcy court’s order ofdismissal was void

for lack of due process and vacated the order, meaning that the automatic stay continued

to be in effect in December 2012 when Defendants allegedly filed a lawsuit against

Plaintiffin state court. Accordingly, taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, the state court

lawsuit violated the automatic stay. However, in order to state a claim for willful

violation ofthe automatic stay, Plaintiffmust plead facts alleging Defendants’

willfulness. In order to constitute a willful violation, a defendant need not have “specific

intent to violate the automatic stay.” See In re Sillman, 2015 WL 1291427 at *4. Rather,

a defendant need only know ofthe automatic stay and take intentional actions that violate

the stay. See id; In re Campion, 294 B.R. 313, 318 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). Even assuming

that Defendants acted intentionally when filing the lawsuit, it cannot be said that any of

the defendants knew ofthe automatic stay. After all, the bankruptcy court had dismissed

Plaintiffs bankruptcy case and vacated the automatic stay. See In re Townley, 2011 WL

6934444, at *6 (“Upon dismissal of debtors’ case, the automatic stay terminated by

operation oflaw.”). Thus, insofar as Plaintiffbases her claim for willful violation ofthe

bankruptcy stay on any conduct occurring between the bankruptcy court’s dismissal order

and the district court’s vacation ofthat order, Plaintifffails to state a claim because such

conduct cannot have been willful. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs claims

arising out of conduct occurring during that time period with prejudice and without

leave to amend.

The Court turns to Plaintiffs remaining allegations. After the district court

vacated the bankruptcy court’s dismissal order, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to

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dismiss their lawsuit, which she alleges constitutes a willful violation ofthe bankruptcy

stay. “A party violating the automatic stay, through continuing a collection action in a

non-bankruptcy forum, must automatically dismiss or stay such proceeding or risk

possible sanctions for willful violations pursuant to § 362(h).” See Eskanos & Adler,

P.C. v. Leetien, 309 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, in order to state a claim for

willful violation, Plaintiffwould have to allege that Defendants neither dismissed nor

stayed the state litigation. However, Plaintiffs allegations are unclear and contradictory

regarding the basic timing and facts underlying her claim. For example, Plaintiffmakes

the following allegations:

• “[T]hese defendants refused to stop their state law suit in September or October

or November or December 2013.” See Compl. 23.

• “[TJhese defendants refused to dismiss the state court action after August 31,

2013 for 3 weeks, and refused to dismiss the state court action for 3 months.”

See Compl. 24.

• “It is now 3 years later, after they knew the bankruptcy stay was in force in

2012 through 2016 and they still refuse to dismiss their state action now.” See

Compl. Tf 24.

Accordingly, it is unclear whether, when, or ifDefendants dismissed the state court

action.

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20 Further, as noted above, Defendants were not required to dismiss the lawsuit to

avoid liability for willful violation ofthe bankruptcy stay so long as they stayed the

action. Plaintiff does not allege Defendants did not stay the action. In fact, as part ofher

Complaint, Plaintiffprovides a list ofthe docket entries in the state court action as of

August 8, 2016, which includes a docket entry dated April 16, 2013 and titled “Notice of

Stay of Proceedings (Participant) filed by Harbor View Villa Homeowners Association.”

See Compl. Exh. B. Thus, Plaintiffs pleadings indicate that the state court action was

stayed prior to the district court’s August 2013 order. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing,

Inc., 143 F.3d 1293,1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[Courts] are not required to accept as true

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1 conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the

complaint.”).

Plaintiffs remaining allegations are likewise insufficient, and fail to put

Defendants on notice ofher claims and their grounds. Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure

8(d) requires that plaintiffs file “simple, concise, and direct” pleadings. See McHenry v.

Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,1179 (9th Cir. 1981). Pleadings must “give the defendant fair

notice ofwhat the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” BellAtlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff alleges her bankruptcy case was

erroneously dismissed a second time, on January 9, 2014, and that the order of dismissal

was void “because the bankruptcy judge had no power to dismiss the case until it first

obeyed the BAP appeals court Order.” See Compl. 39. Thus, Plaintiff claims, the

automatic stay was continuously in effect and remains so presently. Plaintiff alleges

Defendants “have refused again to dismiss the state law suit after debtor’s brother sent a

letter to them on September 19, 2016 notifying them that they may be liable personally

for all these contempt charges.” See Compl. ]f 45. Further, Plaintiffstates that she filed

another Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on January 25, 2016, but Defendants “still

refused to dismiss the state law suit.” See Compl. 148. Plaintiff also alleges “these

defendants took action to retaliate against the debtor to push her out ofher home” by

“disconnect[ing] her water and sewer facilities” at various times in 2011, 2013, and 2016,

which she alleges constitutes willful violation of a bankruptcy stay. See Compl. ^fl[ 47,

48. Plaintiffseeks “an award of damages against each defendant for all of 2104 [sic] and

all of2015 and all of2016.” See Compl. f 45.

However, it is unclear what “the BAP appeals court Order” required, as Plaintiff

does not describe any appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel or include a copy ofthat

order. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that any court found that the bankruptcy court’s

2014 order of dismissal was void, and thus, Plaintiff’s does not plausibly allege that the

bankruptcy stay triggered by Plaintiffs bankruptcy petition filed in 2011 continued after

it was dismissed in January 2014. Also, again, Defendants were not necessarily required

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to dismiss the litigation ifthe litigation was stayed. According to the state court docket

entries, the case appears to have been stayed off and on over its course. Thus, it is

unclear whether and when any automatic stay was in effect and whether and when the

state court action was stayed.

Without further clarity, the Court cannot determine whether this action is

“frivolous, malicious, [or fails] to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted, or

seek[s] monetary relieffrom a defendant immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Gonzales v. Cate, No. 2:1 l-CV-3196 GEB EFB, 2012 WL

3205359, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (“As drafted, the complaint is so prolix and

convoluted that the court cannot reasonably discharge its screening responsibility under §

1915A until plaintiff complies with the pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8.”).

While the Court construes Plaintiffs Complaint liberally, the court may not “supply

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

Lastly, regarding the Complaint generally, it does not satisfy Rule 8 for Plaintiffto

lump her allegations against all nine defendants together. See Gonzales, 2012 WL

3205359 at *2 (stating that where a complaint repeatedly referred generally to

“defendants,” it failed to provide the defendants with fair notice ofthe plaintiffs claims);

Allen v. Howard, No. 115CV001283BAMPC, 2016 WL 6217044, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct.

24, 2016) (“A plaintiffsuing multiple defendants must allege the basis ofhis claim

against each defendant to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).”). Plaintiff alleges all ofthe defendants

are liable for all causes of action, but fails to delineate any specific conduct by any

individual defendant, which does not suffice to provide each defendant with notice ofthe

claims against them. Also, the cover page ofthe state court complaint that Plaintiff

includes with her Complaint lists only Harbor View Villa Homeowners Association as

the plaintiff, contradicting Plaintiffs allegations that all ofthe defendants commenced the

litigation. “Conclusory allegations that an indistinguishable group of defendants

essentially engaged in identical misconduct... are insufficient to show that plaintiff is

entitled to relieffrom any individual defendant.” See Sanchez v. Riverside Cty. Code

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Enf’t Agency, No. EDCV 15-2493 SJO(JC), 2016 WL 6810798, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,

2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. EDCV 15-2493 SJO(JC), 2016 WL

6808130 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2016).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs remaining claims for willful violations ofthe bankruptcy

stay do not survive screening as currently pleaded, and the Court DISMISSES those

claims without prejudice, and with leave to amend.

A. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

Section 1983 creates a means for redressing violations ofsubstantive rights created

by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

137,140 (1979). It states, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen ofthe United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereofto the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The purpose of § 1983 is to

deter state actors from using the badge oftheir authority to deprive individuals oftheir

federally guaranteed rights and to provide reliefto victims ifsuch deterrence fails.”

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-257

(1978)). To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiffmust allege (1) he or she was

deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or federal laws, and (2) the

deprivation was caused by a person acting under color ofstate law. Parratt v. Taylor,

451 U.S. 527, 535, (1981) (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)).

In limited circumstances, private citizens may be liable as private persons under

section 1983 so long as “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation ... [is] fairly

attributable to the State.” See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982);

see also Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“When addressing whether a private party acted under color oflaw, we therefore start

with the presumption that private conduct does not constitute governmental action.”).

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“Courts have used four different factors or tests to identify what constitutes [government

action]: (1) public function, (2) joint action, (3) governmental compulsion or coercion,

and (4) governmental nexus.” Sutton, 192 F.3d at 835-36. However, regardless ofthose

factors or tests, “contemporary decisions stress the necessity of a close nexus between the

state and the challenged conduct rather than application of a mechanistic formula,” and

all cases should be decided based on their particular facts. See id. at 836 (internal

alteration omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “because all the defendants used a state instrument and

state actors including a state judge, to further this scheme offraudulent claims and

emotional distress, they have also violated the civil rights ofthe victim and their acts

were done under color ofstate law.” See Compl. 73. Accordingly, Plaintiffinvokes the

“joint action” theory ofprivate liability, which requires that the private party defendant

be “a willful participant in joint action with the State.” See DeGrassi v. City ofGlendora,

207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000). “A private person is liable under this theory, however,

only ifthe particular actions challenged are inextricably intertwined with those ofthe

government.” See Mathis v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 75 F.3d 498, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1996).

Plaintifffails to describe how any ofthe defendants acted in concert with the state court

judge or any other state actors. Plaintiffmerely alleges that the defendants commenced

litigation in state court. But, “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning

side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.”

See Hansen v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 166 F. App’x 907, 908 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980)); see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 956, n.21

(“[W]e do not hold today that a private party’s mere invocation ofstate legal procedures

constitutesjoint participation or conspiracy with state officials satisfying the § 1983

requirement of action under color oflaw.”); see Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 552 F.3d

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648, 651 (8th Cir. 2008). Thus, Plaintiffs sole reliance on the invocation oflegal

proceedings does not suffice.2

Accordingly, even construing Plaintiffs allegations liberally, Plaintifffails to

allege joint action. Even when disregarding the traditional factors or tests, the Court

finds Plaintifffails to allege facts illustrating a close nexus—or any nexus—between the

state and challenged conduct such that any ofthe defendants’ conduct could be fairly

attributed to the state. Because “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies ofthe [claim]

could not be cured by amendment,” the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs section 1983 claim

with prejudice and without leave to amend. See Franklin v. Murphy, 245 F.2d 1221,

1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984).

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11 Conclusion

12 Based on the foregoing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to proceed IFP;

2. GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to file under seal;

3. DISMISSES Plaintiffs claims for willful violation of a bankruptcy stay, as set

forth above; and

4. DISMISSES Plaintiffs section 1983 claims, as set forth above.

The Court further ORDERS that Plaintifffile a First Amended Complaint, if any, on or

before May 26.2017. IfPlaintiffwishes to file a First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

may not reallege claims that have been dismissed with prejudice. Any Amended

Complaint must be complete in itselfwithout reference to the superseded pleading. See

S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1(a). IT IS SO ORDERED.

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24 DATE: April 10, 2017

HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO

United States District Judge 25

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2 Plaintiff does not, for example, allege this is a case involving prejudgment attachment, see Lugar, 457

U.S. at 939, n.21, or a conspiracy with and bribery of a state courtjudge, see Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28. 28

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