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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 2005 Decided February 3, 2006

No. 04-5221

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS,

APPELLANT

v.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL.,

APPELLEES

No. 04-5222

NATIONAL STONE, SAND AND 

GRAVEL ASSOCIATION ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL.,

APPELLEES

USCA Case #04-5224 Document #947344 Filed: 02/03/2006 Page 1 of 11
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No. 04-5223 & 04-5224

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION;

NORTH CAROLINA WILDLIFE FEDERATION; SIERRA CLUB,

APPELLANTS

v.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv00274)

(No. 01cv00320)

Rafe Petersen argued the cause for the joint appellants,

National Association of Home Builders and National Stone,

Sand and Gravel Association et al. Lawrence R. Liebesman,

Virginia S. Albrecht, Karma B. Brown, Duane J. Desiderio and

Felicia K. Watson were on brief. Ethan Arenson entered an

appearance.

John A. Bryson, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellees, United States

Army Corps of Engineers et al. Greer S. Goldman, Angeline

Purdy and Ronald M. Spritzer, Attorneys, United States

Department of Justice, were on brief.

Howard I. Fox argued the cause for the environmental

appellees/cross-appellants, National Wildlife Federation et al.

M. Reed Hopper was on brief for amicus curiae Pacific

Legal Foundation in support of the appellants. Robin L. Rivett

entered an appearance.

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1

The Corps has jurisdiction under CWA section 404, 33 U.S.C. §

1344, over discharge of dredged and fill material; EPA has jurisdiction

under CWA section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, over discharge of other

pollutants.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellant

organizations, the National Association of Home Builders,

National Stone, Sand and Gravel Association, American Road

and Transportation Builders Association and the Nationwide

Public Projects Coalition, (collectively, Industry) brought these

actions in the district court to challenge a regulation jointly

promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers

(Corps) to implement the Clean Water Act (CWA). See Further

Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of

“Discharge of Dredged Material,” 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4575 (Jan.

17, 2001) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.3 and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2).1

Section 404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Corps to issue permits

to discharge “dredged or fill material” into navigable waters. 33

U.S.C. § 1344(a). Under the Corps’ regulations, permits are

“required for the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters

of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(a). The challenged

portions of the regulation provide that the Corps will “regard the

use of mechanized earth-moving equipment” in waters as

resulting in such “a discharge” (requiring a permit) unless

“project-specific evidence” shows that the dredging results in

“only incidental fallback” and defines “[i]ncidental fallback” as

“redeposit of small volumes of dredged material incidental to

excavation activity” if the material “falls back to substantially

the same place as the initial removal.” Id. § 323.2(d)(2)(i), (ii);

see also 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(2)(i), (ii). Industry objects to the two

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cited provisions of section 323.2 on the grounds that (1) the first

creates an impermissible rebuttable presumption that all

dredging results in unlawful discharge and (2) the second

defines “incidental fallback” in terms of volume and thereby

exceeds the scope of the Corps’ authority under CWA section

404. The district court dismissed the actions for lack of

ripeness. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of

Eng’rs, 311 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2004). Reviewing the

district court’s dismissal de novo, Battle v. FAA, 393 F.3d 1330,

1332 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d

634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we conclude Industry’s challenge to

the regulation is ripe for review and, accordingly, reverse and

remand to the district court.

I.

Section 301 of the CWA generally prohibits “the discharge

of any pollutant,” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which is defined in

relevant respect as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable

waters from any point source,” id. § 1362(12). The Congress

created an exception to the general prohibition for a discharge

that is “in compliance with [section 1311] and sections 1312,

1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of [Title 33].” Id. § 1311(a).

Section 404 of the CWA (referenced in the statutory exception

as section 1344 of Title 33) provides that the Corps “may issue

permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings[,] for

the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable

waters at specified disposal sites.” Id. § 1344 (alteration added).

In 1986 the Corps issued a regulation which defined “discharge

of dredged material” as “any addition of dredged material into

the waters of the United States” but stipulated that “[t]he term

does not include de minimis, incidental soil movement occurring

during normal dredging operations.” Final Rule for Regulatory

Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,

41,232 (Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)).

Thus, a permit was required only for dredging activity that

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The amended regulation did provide an exemption for “any

incidental addition, including redeposit, of dredged material associated

with any activity that does not have or would not have the effect of

destroying or degrading an area of waters of the United States.” 58

Fed. Reg. at 45,036 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(4)(i) and 40

C.F.R. § 232.2(3)(i)). 

resulted in a “discharge” under this definition. In 1993, as part

of a settlement agreement in North Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v.

Tulloch, No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C.) (stipulated

dismissal Mar. 4, 1992), the Corps and EPA amended the

regulation to define “discharge of dredged material” as “any

addition of dredged material into, including any redeposit of

dredged material within, the waters of the United States,”

without the de minimis exception. Clean Water Act Regulatory

Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,035 (Aug. 25, 1993)

(codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1);

emphasis added).2 This expanded definition of “discharge” in

the regulation, commonly called the “Tulloch Rule” or “Tulloch

I,” broadened the scope of activity for which a dredging permit

was required. 

Industry trade associations immediately filed an action

challenging the amended definition and the district court issued

a decision invalidating the regulation. Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997). On

appeal, this court affirmed the district court, concluding that “the

straightforward statutory term ‘addition’ cannot reasonably be

said to encompass the situation in which material is removed

from the waters of the United States and a small portion of it

happens to fall back.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps

of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We explained

that, “[b]ecause incidental fallback represents a net withdrawal,

not an addition, of material, it cannot be a discharge” and

questioned “how there can be an addition of dredged material

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when there is no addition of material.” Id. at 1404 (emphasis

original). 

In 2000 the Corps and EPA proposed a new rule which

added the following language to the definition: 

A discharge of dredged material shall be presumed to

result from mechanized landclearing, ditching,

channelization, in-stream mining, or other mechanized

excavation activity in waters of the United States. This

presumption is rebutted if the party proposing such an

activity demonstrates that only incidental fallback will

result from its activity. 

Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition

of “Discharge of Dredged Material,” 65 Fed. Reg. 50,108,

50,117 (Aug. 16, 2000) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. §

323.2(d)(2) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(i)). In 2001 the Corps and

EPA issued a final rule, known as “Tulloch II,” which replaced

the rebuttable presumption framework with the following

provision:

The Corps and EPA regard the use of mechanized

earth-moving equipment to conduct landclearing,

ditching, channelization, in-stream mining or other

earth-moving activity in waters of the United States as

resulting in a discharge of dredged material unless

project-specific evidence shows that the activity results

in only incidental fallback. This paragraph (i) does not

and is not intended to shift any burden in any

administrative or judicial proceeding under the CWA. 

66 Fed. Reg. at 4575 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(i) and

40 C.F.R. § 232.2(2)(i) (emphasis added)). The final rule

further added a definition of “incidental fallback” (with

examples):

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The intervenor-appellees, three environmental organizations,

contend the district court lacked jurisdiction under the APA because

section 323.2(d)(2) implements section 301(a) rather than section 404

of the CWA and therefore exclusive jurisdiction to decide a challenge

lies with the courts of appeals under CWA section 509(b)(1)(E), 33

U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E) (vesting jurisdiction in courts of appeals for

“[r]eview of the Administrator’s action . . . in approving or

promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section

1311 [of Title 33]”). “Tulloch II,” like “Tulloch I,” plainly

implements section 404 in prescribing when a permit is required and

is therefore properly challenged in the district court under the APA, as

occurred in National Mining Ass’n. See 145 F.3d at 1404 (discussing

district court’s ability to enjoin application of “Tulloch I”).

Incidental fallback is the redeposit of small volumes of

dredged material that is incidental to excavation activity

in waters of the United States when such material falls

back to substantially the same place as the initial

removal. Examples of incidental fallback include soil

that is disturbed when dirt is shoveled and the back-spill

that comes off a bucket when such small volume of soil

or dirt falls into substantially the same place from which

it was initially removed. 

Id. (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(ii) and 40 C.F.R. §

232.2(2)(ii) (emphasis added)).

On February 6, 2001 Industry filed this action under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., (APA)

challenging “Tulloch II” as exceeding the Corps’ and EPA’s

statutory authority.3 In a decision dated March 31, 2004, the

district court (treating the agencies’ summary judgment motion

as a motion to dismiss) granted the motion, concluding that

Industry’s challenge was not ripe because (1) the issues would

not be fit for review until the Corps actually applied them in

concrete factual situations and (2) delaying review would

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impose no hardship on Industry members. Industry filed timely

notices of appeal of the order of dismissal. 

II.

“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the

courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision has been

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.’ ” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of

Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)); accord Ohio Forestry

Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1998).

“Determining whether administrative action is ripe for judicial

review requires us to evaluate (1) the fitness of the issues for

judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n,

538 U.S. at 808 (citing Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149). As we

recently restated:

Under the [ripeness] doctrine’s first prong, “we look to

see whether the issue is purely legal, whether

consideration of the issue would benefit from a more

concrete setting, and whether the agency’s action is

sufficiently final.” Clean Air Implementation Project v.

EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal

quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom.

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 527 U.S. 1021 (1999).

And under the second, we consider “not whether [the

parties] have suffered any ‘direct hardship,’ but rather

whether postponing judicial review would impose an

undue burden on them or would benefit the court.”

Harris [v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2004)];

see also Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S.

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726, 733 (1998); AT&T v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 700, 702

(D.C. Cir. 2003). 

Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114, 1120 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (emphasis original; alterations added; parallel citations

omitted).

The district court acknowledged that the issues raised are

“purely legal” and “[f]inality is not a problem” but concluded

Industry’s challenge was not fit for review because “both the

court and the agencies would benefit from letting the questions

presented here ‘arise in some more concrete and final form.’ ”

311 F. Supp. 2d at 97-98 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). In so

concluding, the district court adopted the defendants’ position

that “determining what is a regulable discharge will require

project-specific, case-by-case analysis,” 311 F. Supp. 2d at 98,

as alluded to in the “Tulloch II” preamble:

[T]he determination of whether an activity results in a

regulable discharge of dredged material or produces only

incidental fallback involves consideration of the location

and the amount of the redeposit. Because of the

fact-specific nature of the assessment of these factors,

and their interrelated nature, we do not believe it to be

feasible or appropriate to establish hard and fast cut-off

points for each of these factors. Rather, the totality of

the factors will be considered in each case.

66 Fed. Reg. at 4553. We conclude that the district court’s

reasoning does not support postponing review for lack of

ripeness. 

While the final determination of whether to require a permit

in a given case will, as is usual in an agency adjudication, rest

on case-specific findings, this fact does not diminish the fitness

of “Tulloch II” for review. Industry objects to two features of

the regulation: (1) the decision to “regard” any earth-moving

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activity in United States waters “as resulting in a discharge of

dredged material unless project-specific evidence shows”

otherwise, which Industry claims simply restates (rather than

deleting) the allegedly impermissible rebuttable presumption

framework included in the proposed rule, and (2) the focus on

volume to determine whether or not activity resulting in fallback

is “incidental,” cf. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1404

(“Because incidental fallback represents a net withdrawal, not an

addition, of material, it cannot be a discharge.”). All agree that

the issues raised are “purely legal.” “[A] purely legal claim in

the context of a facial challenge, such as [Industry’s] claim, is

‘presumptively reviewable.’ ” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 1272, 1282 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 757

(D.C. Cir. 2003)). The legality vel non of the two challenged

features will not change from case to case or become clearer in

a concrete setting. As in National Mining Ass’n, Industry’s

objection is to the “faithful application” of the regulation, 145

F.3d at 1408 (emphasis original), which Industry claims facially

exceeds the agencies’ statutory authority, and is not “intertwined

with how the Commission might exercise its discretion in the

future,” Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 331 F.3d 952, 954 (D.C. Cir.

2003). As in National Mining Ass’n, the ripeness doctrine is

inapplicable because Industry’s claim rests not “on the

assumption that the agency will exercise its discretion

unlawfully” in applying the regulation but on whether “its

faithful application would carry the agency beyond its statutory

mandate,” 145 F.3d at 1408 (internal citation omitted; emphasis

original).

 Turning to the hardship prong of the ripeness test, we find

that it poses no obstacle to Industry. It is true that if the court

“ ‘ha[s] doubts about the fitness of the issue for judicial

resolution,’ ” it will “ ‘balance the institutional interests in

postponing review against the hardship to the parties that will

result from delay.’ ” Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752,

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756 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. United

States, 896 F.2d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Nonetheless,

where, as is the case here, “ ‘there are no significant agency or

judicial interests militating in favor of delay, [lack of] hardship

cannot tip the balance against judicial review.’ ” Id. at 756-57

(quoting Consol. Rail Corp., 896 F.2d at 577). Moreover, it is

obvious that Industry will face hardship if review of its

challenge is denied for, if left intact, section 323.2(d)(2) will

subject to the permitting process every party that engages in

dredging which results in more than “incidental” fallback, as

determined using the regulation’s allegedly unlawful framework

and volume determinant. Each such dredger therefore faces the

choice of applying for a permit for activities Industry claims are

outside the scope of the Corps’ and EPA’s authority under

section 404 or face civil or criminal enforcement penalties for

failing to do so, see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c), (d). Thus, the

regulation is reviewable as “ ‘a substantive rule which as a

practical matter requires the [appellants] to adjust [their]

conduct immediately.’ ” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n, 538 U.S.

at 808 (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891

(1990)). 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Industry’s

challenge is ripe for review. Accordingly, we reverse the district

court’s order of dismissal and remand for review of the merits

of Industry’s challenge. 

So ordered.

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