Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01419/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01419-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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FiLED 

SEP 09 2016 

CLERK, u.s. DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALlr,?n~Nle BY C "F!:l.T, .. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CLYDE REGINALD ELLIS, 

CDCR#AB-8145, 

vs. 

OFFICER BRADY, et al. 

Plaintiff, 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 3:16-cv-1419-WQH-NLS 

ORDER: 

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[Doc. No.2]; 

2) DISMISSING SAN DIEGO 

SHERIFF'S OFFICE PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b)(1) 

AND 

3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE OF SUMMONS 

AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 

25 CLYDE REGINALD ELLIS ("Plaintiff'), is proceeding pro se and is currently 

26 incarcerated at Centinela State Prison ("CEN") in Imperial, California. He has filed a civil 

27 rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No.1), and a Motion to Proceed In 

28 Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No.2). 

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1 Background 

2 Plaintiff claims San Diego Sheriffs Department Officer Brady, the "San Diego 

3 Sheriffs Office," and several unidentified Doe Defendants, used unreasonable force 

4 against him in June 2015 at George Bailey Detention Facility ("GBDF") in San Diego, 

5 California. Plaintiff claims Defendant Brady "slammed [him] unto a wall and then onto the 

6 ground" "without reason or provocation." (Doc. No.1 at 2.) Thereafter, Plaintiff contends 

7 several unidentified San Diego Sheriffs Department Deputies (John Does 3-7) "jumped 

8 on [him]," further injured him, and caused a fracture and swelling to his thumb. (Id. at 4.) 

9 Plaintiff claims he "remains disfigured as a result of the assault," and he seeks "statutory, 

10 compensatory, general, special" and "exemplary" damages according to proof. (Id. at 4, 

11 12.) 

12 Discussion 

13 A. IFP Motion 

14 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

15 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

16 $400. 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to 

17 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

18 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

19 Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

20 proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in "increments" or "installments," 

21 Bruce v. Samuels, _ U.S. _,136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

22 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

23 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844,847 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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I In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

27 fee of$50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1,2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

28 not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP.Id.. 

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1 Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

2 "certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

3 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. 

4 § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113; 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

5 trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

6 monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

7 in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

8 assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody 

9 of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding 

10 month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

11 payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 

12 136 S. Ct. at 629. 

13 In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted copies of his Inmate Statement 

14 Report and a prison certificate authorized by a CEN official attesting to his trust account 

15 activity. See Doc. No.2 at 4-5; 28 U.S.C_ § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 

16 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show Plaintiff has had no monthly deposits to his 

17 account, has carried no balance over the six month period preceding the filing of his 

18 Complaint, and that his current available balance is zero (Doc. No.2 at 4,6). See 28 U.S.C. 

19 § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

20 civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner 

21 has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); Bruce, 136 S. 

22 Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety23 valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay ... 

24 due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered."). 

25 Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP, declines to "exact" 

26 any initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he "has no means to pay it," 

27 Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California Department of 

28 Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing 

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1 fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 

2 the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(I). See id. 

3 B. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

4 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 

5 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a pre6 answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915( e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

7 the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

8 is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

9 immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

10 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

11 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). "The purpose of [screening] is 'to ensure that the 

12 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding. '" 

13 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.l (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

14 Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680,681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

15 "The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

16 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

17 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim." Watison v. Carter,668 F.3d 

18 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113,1121 (9th Cir. 

19 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A "incorporates the familiar standard 

20 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

21 12(b)(6)"). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint "contain sufficient factual matter,accepted 

22 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

23 662,678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

24 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

25 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." 

26 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

27 [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

28 experience and common sense." Id. The "mere possibility of misconduct" or "unadorned, 

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1 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[ s]" fall short of meeting this plausibility 

2 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962,969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

3 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

4 "Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

5 color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights." Devereaux v. Abbey, 

6 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive 

7 rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." 

8 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

9 omitted). "To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation ofa right 

10 secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was 

11 committed by a person acting under color of state law." Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 

12 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 

13 B. Improper Defendant 

14 As an initial matter, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff includes the "San 

15 Diego Sheriffs Office" as a Defendant in the caption of his Complaint, his claims must be 

16 dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing 

17 to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 

18 Rhodes, 621 F .3d at 1004. A local law enforcement department (like the San Diego County 

19 Sheriffs Department) is not a proper defendant under § 1983. See Vance v. County of 

20 Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D: Cal. 1996) ("Naming a municipal department as 

21 a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a 

22 municipality.")( citation omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. 

23 Ill. 1993) ("Section 1983 imposes liability on any 'person' who violates someone's 

24 constitutional rights 'under color oflaw.' Cook County Jail is not a 'person.'''). 

25 C. Excessive Force Claims 

26 The Court finds Plaintiffs excessive force allegations against Officer Brady and 

27 John Does 3-7, however, are sufficiently pleaded to survive the sua sponte screening 

28 required by 28 U.S.C_ §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). While it is not clear whether Plaintiff 

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1 was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time he claims Brady and John Does 

2 3-7 "without provocation, reason, or justification ... slammed [him] up against a cement 

3 wall and then onto the ground," (Doc. No.1 at4), Plaintiffs Complaint contains factual 

4 allegations sufficient to survive the "low threshold" for proceeding past the sua sponte 

5 screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

6 F .3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, _ U.S. 

7 _, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee 

8 from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.") (citing Graham v. Connor, 

9 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.lO (1989)). Under Kingsley, a pretrial detainee, unlike a convicted 

10 prisoner, need not prove that the defendant subjectively knew that the force applied was 

11 excessive; that state-of-mind inquiry is "solely ... objective." ld. at 2473; Austin v. Baker, 

12 616 F. App'x 365, 366 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 

13 (1992) (When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the 

14 Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is " ... whether force was applied in a good15 faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

16 harm."). 

17 Conclusion 

18 Good cause appearing, the Court: 

19 1. GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19l5(a) 

20 (Doc. No.2); 

21 2. DIRECTS the Secretary ·of the. CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

22 Plaintiffs prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

23 payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

24 month's income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk ofthe Court each time the 

25 amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

26 SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

27 THIS ACTION; 

28 III 

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1 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

2 Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001; 

3 4. DISMISSES Defendant San Diego Sheriffs Office sua sponte based on 

4 Plaintiffs failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)(I); 

5 5. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. 

6 No.1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each 

7 Defendant.2 In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, 

8 a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve the Defendants. 

9 Upon receipt ofthis "IFP Package," Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s as completely 

10 and accurately as possible, and return them to the United States Marshal according to the 

11 instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package; 

12 6. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

13 upon the Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to him. All 

14 costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED. 

15 R. ClY. P. 4(c)(3); 

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2 Plaintiff must, of course, identify the Defendants he lists only as "John Does 1-7," by 

18 their true names and substitute those individual persons in place of each unnamed Doe by 

19 amending his Complaint to identify each of those parties before the United States Marshal 

will be able to execute service upon them. See Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F .R.D. 

20 565, 567 (1995) (Doe defendants must be identified and served within [90] days of the 

21 commencement ofthe action against them); FED.R. ClY. P. 15(c)(I)(C) & 4(m). Generally, 

Doe pleading is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637,642 (9th Cir. 1980). It is in 

22 most instances impossible for the United States Marshal to serve a party identified only as 

23 a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly 

effect service under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to "furnish the 

24 information necessary to identify the defendant."). However, the Court will not dismiss 

25 Plaintiffs claims against Does 1-7 at this time because where the identity of an alleged 

party is not known prior to filing of an action, Ninth Circuit authority permits plaintiff the 

26 opportunity to pursue appropriate discovery to identify the unknown Doe, unless it is clear 

27 that discovery would not uncover his identity, or that his Complaint should be dismissed 

for other reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing 

28 Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). 

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1 7. ORDERS the served Defendants to reply to Plaintiffs Complaint within the 

2 time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I2(a). See 

3 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to "waive the 

4 right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

5 correctional facility under section 1983," once the Court has conducted its sua sponte 

6 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a 

7 preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a 

8 "reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits," defendant is required to respond); and 

9 8. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

10 serve upon the named Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon 

11 Defendants' counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document 

12 submitted for the Court's consideration pursuant to FED. R. Cry. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must 

13 include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a 

14 certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been 

15 was served on Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. CAL. 

16 CrvLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with 

17 the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendants may be 

18 disregarded. 

19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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21 Dated: 

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HON:WlLLIAMQ. 

United States District Judge 

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