Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00009/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SACRAMENTO VELASQUEZ MORALES, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 08-01103 PHX ROS

v. ) CIV 10-00009 PHX ROS (MEA)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Plaintiff/Respondent )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

Mr. Sacramento Velasquez Morales (“Movant”) is in the

custody of the Federal Correctional Institution in Terra Haute,

Indiana. On or about January 4, 2010, Movant filed a Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255, regarding a criminal conviction and sentence entered by

the Court. Respondent filed a Response to Motion to Vacate

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 23, 2010. See

Docket No. 5. Movant has not filed a reply to the response to

his petition.

I Procedural History

On September 23, 2008, Movant was indicted on a charge

of illegal reentry after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §

1326(a) as aggravated by subsection (b)(2). See Criminal Docket

No. 9. At that time Movant was on supervised release in a

separate criminal matter, and the government filed a Notice of

Case 2:10-cv-00009-ROS Document 6 Filed 06/08/10 Page 1 of 6
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1 Movant stated as the factual basis for his plea agreement that

he was removed from the United States on July 15, 2008, at San Ysidro,

California, and that he was voluntarily present and found in the

United States near San Luis, Arizona, on or about August 6, 2008.

Movant also acknowledged he had been convicted in 1987 by the State

of Washington of delivery of a controlled substance for which felony

he had served 15 months imprisonment. 

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Related cases, regarding a petition to revoke Movant’s

supervised release filed in CR 04-590 PHX ROS. See Criminal

Docket No. 11. 

On November 21, 2008, Movant entered a guilty plea to

the charge stated in the indictment and also admitted to the

supervised release violation. See Criminal Docket No. 18.1 On

February 17, 2009, Movant was sentenced to a term of 71 months

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for violation of section

1326. The sentence was imposed to run consecutively to the term

of imprisonment imposed for violation of supervised release in

CR04-590- PHX ROS, to be followed by a term of three years of

supervised release. See Criminal Docket Nos. 20 & 21. The plea

agreement provided that Movant was waiving a direct appeal of

his conviction and sentence. 

In his section 2255 action Movant asserts he is

entitled to relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant

to section 2255 because he was denied the effective assistance

of counsel during his plea proceedings and because his guilty

plea was not knowing and voluntary.

II Analysis

The plea agreement signed by Movant expressly waived

his right to collaterally attack any matter pertaining to

Movant’s conviction and sentence if the sentence imposed was

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consistent with the written terms of the agreement. See

Response, Exh. A. The sentence imposed on Movant was consistent

with the terms of the plea agreement. Because the sentence

imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement, the plea

agreement is valid. Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea

agreement’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action challenging his sentence the section 2255 motion may

normally be summarily denied. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.

504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2546-47 (1984) (“It is well

settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by

an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel,

may not be collaterally attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in

the context of a direct appeal wherein the defendant waived his

right to directly appeal or collaterally attack his conviction

and sentence in a plea agreement); United States v. Bolinger,

940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1991). 

However, a plea agreement which waives the defendant’s

right to collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable

if the waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at

1156 (concluding the court did not have jurisdiction to consider

the appeal of a defendant who had waived this right in a plea

agreement because the agreement was knowing and voluntary on its

face, stating: “A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is

enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his

right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is

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knowingly and voluntarily made”); United States v. White, 307

F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). A collateral attack alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a plea

agreement may be brought notwithstanding a waiver of this right

in the agreement, but only if the agreement was involuntary or

unknowing, or if the court relied on an impermissible factor

such as race, or where the agreement is otherwise unlawful. See

United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.

2001); Bridgeman v. United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir.

2000).

However, Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding

his understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight

in determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. Cf. United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding in a section 2255 case);

United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th Cir. 1998)

(holding, in a section 2255 case, that “a straightforward and

simple ‘Yes, your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a defendant to

[the] consequences [of a plea agreement].”). Because he was

adequately informed of the consequences of his plea by the

Court, Movant’s guilty plea can be considered voluntary and

knowing. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct.

1709, 1712 (1969). The undersigned concludes Movant’s guilty

plea was voluntary and made intelligently. See Chizen v.

Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.

Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

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the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we doubt that a plea agreement could

waive a claim of ineffective of assistance of counsel based on

counsel’s erroneously unprofessional inducement of the defendant

to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain.”).

III Conclusion

Movant has not established that he was deprived of his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel

because he offers no evidence his counsel’s performance was

deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Velasquez Morales

motion for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

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response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 4th day of June, 2010.

 

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