Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_68-cv-02709/USCOURTS-almd-2_68-cv-02709-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

TIMOTHY D. POPE, )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor, )

)

JOHNNY REYNOLDS, et al., )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenors, )

)

EUGENE CRUM, JR., et al., )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenors, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 

) 2:68cv2709-T

TOMMY G. FLOWERS, et al., ) (WO)

)

Defendants. )

)

ALABAMA STATE CONFERENCE )

OF NAACP BRANCHES, )

)

Amicus Curiae. )

ORDER

This litigation, United States v. Flowers, civil action

no. 2:68cv2709-T (previously styled United States v. Frazer,

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and still frequently known today as ‘Frazer’ or the ‘Frazer

litigation’), is before the court on the difficult issue of

what discovery, if any, the court should allow before it

decides whether Frazer’s 35-year-old ‘no-bypass rule’ should

be terminated.

I. 

Paragraph 3 of § II of the 1970 injunction in Frazer

provides as follows: 

"Defendants shall not appoint or offer a

position to a lower-ranking white

applicant on a certificate in preference

to a higher-ranking available Negro

applicant, unless the defendants have

first contacted and interviewed the

higher-ranking Negro applicant and have

determined that the Negro applicant cannot

perform the functions of the position, is

otherwise unfit for it, or is unavailable.

In every instance where a determination is

made that the Negro applicant is unfit or

unavailable, documentary evidence shall be

maintained by the defendants that will

sustain that finding." 

United States v. Frazer, 317 F.Supp. 1079, 1091 (M.D. Ala.

1970). This provision, which embodies what is now called

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the no-bypass rule, prohibits Alabama state officials from

bypassing a higher-ranked African-American applicant in

favor of a lower-ranked white applicant on a certificate of

eligibles. The rule was imposed in response to evidence

that, up until 1970, the State of Alabama was unabashedly

refusing to hire and promote African-Americans to almost any

and all non-menial positions in state government because of

their race.

On May 20, 2003, plaintiff United States of America was

joined by the defendants, who are officials of the State of

Alabama, in filing a motion to terminate the no-bypass rule.

This court granted permissive intervention to

representatives of African-American employees of the State

of the State of Alabama, and to Timothy Pope, a white

employee of the Alabama Department of Corrections who says

he was denied a promotion because of the no-bypass rule. On

January 28, 2004, Pope joined the United States and the

state defendants in their termination motion.

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This court instructed the parties to agree on a

discovery plan, but they could not do so. The United

States, the state defendants, and Pope argued that discovery

should be limited to an analysis of the data underlying the

statistical report that the original parties had submitted,

which purports to show that the no-bypass rule is no longer

necessary. The African-American intervenors wanted

discovery to be much broader, encompassing information about

specific instances of alleged discrimination across the

State government; they argued that the question of whether

the no-bypass rule was still necessary could require an

agency-by-agency or classification-by-classification

analysis.

This court initially approved the more limited proposed

discovery plan of the United States, the defendants, and

Pope. However, the court left open the possibility that it

would allow more discovery after reviewing the AfricanAmerican intervenors' rebuttal report.

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II.

The discovery dispute presented to the court is

difficult because the court is confronted with two serious

and competing concerns. On the one hand, the court is very

reluctant to foreclose further discovery by the AfricanAmerican intervenors, for the court would be essentially

ruling on the merits of the issue presented without having

given all interested parties an opportunity to develop their

case. Further discovery and court action is warranted on,

at least, the important issues presented pursuant to Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113

S.Ct. 2789 (1993).

On the other hand, the court is confronted with the

following reality: First, the no-bypass rule is a raceconscious provision and as such, must meet ‘strict scrutiny’

standards and must be ‘narrowly tailored,’ Adarand

Constructors, Inc. V. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S.Ct. 2097

(1995); if logic and common sense are to apply, the nobypass rule cannot be both narrowly tailored and

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everlasting. Second, the rule has been in effect for

approximately 35 years without an independent court review

to determine if it continues to meet legal requirements.

Because the rule cannot be everlasting, this circumstance is

impermissible; in other words, the rule simply cannot

continue without a court finding that it continues to meet

the demanding requirements for race-conscious relief. Third

and finally, the evidentiary record submitted by United

States and state defendants shows a strong likelihood that,

when all is said and done, the rule cannot continue.

Although the court recognizes that the African-American

intervenors maintain that Alabama has not progressed enough

to warrant the rule’s termination, it cannot be discounted

that the racial make-up of Alabama’s government is

dramatically different from what it was in 1970, when the

no-bypass rule was imposed.

In resolving these competing concerns, the court

concludes that it should be guided by the standards

developed for issuing a preliminary injunction. Generally,

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a preliminary injunction should be entered if the movant

clearly establishes that (1) there is a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury

will be suffered unless the injunction issues, (3)

threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage

proposed injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4)

the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the

public interest. McDonalds Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d

1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998). “Ordinarily the first factor

is most important.” Garcia-Mir v. Mease, 781 F.2d 1450,

1453 (11th Cir. 1986). This court believes that, with these

standards tailored to the circumstances of this case, the

United States, the state defendants, and Pope have met them.

As indicated above, there is not only a likelihood, but

a strong likelihood, that the United States, the state

defendants, and Pope will prevail on the merits of their

motions. In light of the substantial positive change in the

racial makeup of the government of the State of Alabama

after the uninterrupted implementation of the no-bypass rule

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for 35 years, the court believes that the record strongly

suggests that, on balance, the African-American intervenors

will not suffer substantial harm from the mere temporary

cessation of the no-bypass rule pending the resolution of

the pending substantive motions. And in light of the

Supreme Court’s strong mandate that all race-conscious

relief must be narrowly tailored, the court further believes

that the record strongly suggests that the continued

implementation of the no-bypass rule would cause irreparable

injury to all state employees and applicants for state jobs,

and thus would be against the public interest, in the

absence of an independent and compelling finding by the

court that such race-conscious relief is still warranted

after having been implemented for over a third of a century.

The court, however, recognizes that the African-American

intervenors believe that the State has not progressed enough

and, in fact, there may be evidence that some state

officials have intentionally used devices (such a

manipulation of registers and giving everyone the same

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score) so as to circumvent the no-bypass rule. But the

important question is whether the picture of race-relations

in the government of the State of Alabama has reached the

critical point where claims of race discrimination can be

adequately addressed through traditional federal remedies,

such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17, and

the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; the

current record strongly suggests that that picture, albeit

perhaps a very imperfect one, has reached that point. 

This court therefore tentatively concludes that it

should preliminarily and immediately discontinue the nobypass rule. However, because the court’s approach in this

case has not been informed by the parties (in particular,

the African-American intervenors), the court will not make

a final decision on whether the no-bypass rule should be

suspended without hearing first from all concerned.

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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that all parties show cause,

if any there be, in writing by no later than May 9, 2005, as

to the following:

(1) Why plaintiff United States of America and the

state defendants’ joint motion to terminate the nobypass rule (Doc. No. 634) and plaintiff-intervenor

Timothy Pope’s motion to modify injunction as to

the no-bypass rule (Doc. No. 659) should not be

treated as also requests for preliminary relief;

and

(2) Why said requests for preliminary relief should not

be granted as outlined in this order.

It is further ORDERED that, by no later than May 20,

2005, the court will resolve whether preliminary relief

should be granted.

In a companion order entered today the court addresses

what discovery is allowed on plaintiff United States of

America and the state defendants’ joint motion to terminate

the no-bypass rule (Doc. No. 634) and on plaintiffCase 2:68-cv-02709-MHT-CSC Document 723 Filed 04/29/05 Page 10 of 11
intervenor Pope’s motion to modify injunction as to the nobypass rule (Doc. No. 659).

DONE, this the 29th day of April, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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