Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02169/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02169-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JEFF MICHAEL WELCH, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES RYAN, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-2169-PHX-NVW-CRP

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Jeff Welch (“Welch”), presently an inmate of the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1). Welch asserts that his

ten, consecutive, 17-year sentences for possessing ten separate images of child pornography

violate his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The

Government contests the Petition asserting that the sentences individually are not

disproportionate to the crime and that there is no constitutional right to have sentences for

separate offenses run concurrently. (Docs. 15, 20, 25).

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This Court concludes that the consecutive sentences here are constitutional and that

a sentence of 17 years is not “grossly disproportionate” to the crime of sexual exploitation

of a minor. It is therefore the Report and Recommendation of this Court that District Judge

Wake deny the Petition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In August 2001, Robert Pargmann, the human resources manager at Welch’s work,

Thrifty Car Rental, discovered that Welch had been visiting internet child pornography sites

during the graveyard shift. (Doc. 16-3, Ex. N, p. 26). When Pargmann confronted Welch

about his findings, Welch did not deny the accusation. (Id. at 29). Pargmann then fired

Welch. (Id.). On August 30, 2001, the police seized three computer systems from Welch’s

former workplace. (Id. at 55). 

Several months later, on November 23, 2001, the police searched Welch’s home

pursuant to a search warrant and seized ten printed images of child pornography. (Doc. 7-1,

Ex. C, p. 18). The state charged Welch with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor.

(Id.) At trial, a pediatrician testified that the children in the images were under the age of 15.

(Doc. 16-2, Ex. M, pp. 87-104). On March 19, 2003, based on this evidence, the jury

convicted Welch of all ten counts and also found that each picture contained a person under

the age of 15. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. A, pp. 4-6). In a separate case, Welch was convicted of two

counts of sexual molestation of a child. (Doc. 17, Ex. V, p. 99). The children in that case

were nine and four years old, respectively. (Doc. 17, Ex. S, p. 55).

Welch was sentenced for both the molestation case and the exploitation case at the

same time, on May 16, 2003. (Doc 17, Ex. Q, p. 5). The court sentenced him to two

consecutive, aggravated 35-year sentences for the molestation convictions because Welch

admitted that he had previously molested a six-year-old child in Tennessee. (Id. at 28-29).

The court then sentenced Welch to the presumptive sentence of 17 years for all ten counts

in the exploitation case, with the sentences to run consecutively. (Id. at 30). The court noted

that it found no reason to impose the aggravated sentences for the exploitation offenses

because, given the length of the aggregate sentences, there was no need. (Id.).

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence

on September 14, 2004. (Doc. 7, Ex. C). The Arizona Supreme Court denied Welch’s

request for review on February 23, 2005. (Doc. 7, Ex. C). While his petition for review was

pending, Welch also filed a notice of post-conviction relief on October 19, 2004. (Doc. 7,

Ex. D). In May 2005, appointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion asserting she found

no colorable claims. (Doc. 7, Ex. E).

Welch then filed, pro se, a Petition For Post-Conviction Relief (“Rule 32 Petition”)

on June 20, 2005, raising four grounds to vacate the conviction and sentence. (Doc. 7, Ex.

F). Welch argued (1) inadmissible evidence was admitted at trial; (2) witness credibility; (3)

the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-3553; and (4) Welch’s sentences were unconstitutional

as unreasonably harsh. (Doc. 7, Ex. F). Welch also complained of ineffective assistance of

counsel but did not specifically assert that claim. (Doc. 7, Ex. F). In responding to Welch’s

unreasonably harsh sentence argument, the State cited State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 (2003),

in which the defendant argued his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc.

7, Ex. G, p. 5).

The trial court denied Welch’s Rule 32 Petition. (Doc. 7, Ex. I). In its denial, the trial

court characterized Welch’s claim of an unreasonably harsh sentence as a claim of cruel and

unusual punishment and found it was without merit. (Doc. 7, Ex. I, p. 3). Welch filed a

petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on January 5, 2006. (Doc. 7, Ex. J).

In his petition, Welch reasserted the same claims he brought to the trial court, including a

more specific claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 7, Ex. J). The Arizona Court

of Appeals denied his petition on November 16, 2006. (Doc. 7, Ex. K). Welch timely filed

this federal Petition on November 7, 2007. (Doc. 1).

In his petition to this Court, Welch asserted two grounds for relief. Ground I asserted

that A.R.S. § 13-3553 was unconstitutionally broad and violated the First Amendment

because it did not include an exception for possessing pornographic photos that only

appeared to contain children, but were not actually real children. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Ground II

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asserted that his punishment violated the Eighth Amendment because it punished possessors

of child pornography more than murderers, rapists, and kidnappers. (Id. at 6). The

Government contested both grounds, arguing that the state statute was not overbroad and not

unconstitutionally applied to Welch, and further that Ground II was procedurally defaulted.

(Doc. 7, p. 11, 12). On November 13, 2009, this Court submitted a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) to the District Court recommending that it deny Welch’s Petition

on both Grounds I and II. (Doc. 10, p. 10). In that R&R, this Court found Ground I failed

on the merits; the statute was not overbroad. (Id. at 5). This Court then found Ground II was

not procedurally defaulted but did fail on the merits. (Id. at 10). On December 14, 2009, the

District Court accepted the R&R with respect to Ground I but remanded the case to this

Court with respect to Ground II and ordered briefing on the merits. (Doc. 11, p. 2).

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

A. TIMELINESS

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners filing federal habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review; (2) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).

The Government does not allege the Petition is untimely and it does not appear to be

untimely. Welch pursued direct review of his conviction and sentences and while that review

was still pending with the Arizona Supreme Court, he filed his collateral Rule 32 petition.

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The collateral appeal immediately tolled the AEDPA’s limitations period. Petitioner filed

his habeas petition within the permitted one-year period after the Arizona Court of Appeals

denied his collateral review.

B. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

The State argues that Welch’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment for the sentences

he received is procedurally defaulted because in the state courts Welch claimed only that his

sentence was unconstitutional as “unreasonably harsh.”

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted available

state-court remedies. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). A state prisoner in

a federal habeas action must exhaust his claims in the state courts “by invoking one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process” before he may submit those claims

in a federal habeas petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Arizona,

it is sufficient for a state prisoner to fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals;

he does not have to appeal those claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes v. Sublett,

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order to

give the “State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’

federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal citations omitted).

A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing specific

provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is “selfevident.” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner may also cite

state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim. Peterson v. Lampert,

319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). A claim may also be exhausted if the State’s

highest court expressly addresses the claim, whether or not it was fairly presented.

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376-377 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Welch’s Pro Per Petition For Post-Conviction Relief filed in Maricopa County

Superior Court, he argued his sentence “was unconstitutional as unreasonably harsh (170

years).” (Doc. 7-1, Ex. F, p. 34). In responding to that claim, the State cited State v. Davis,

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206 Ariz. 377 (2003), a case in which the state court analyzed whether a defendant’s

sentence violated the Federal Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

(Doc. 7-1, Ex. G, p. 42). The trial court, although denying Welch’s claims, addressed the

unreasonably harsh argument as an argument against cruel and unusual punishment. Then,

in his petition for review, Welch specifically argued this claim as cruel and unusual

punishment. The state courts addressed Welch’s claim. Welch has exhausted his federal

cruel and unusual punishment claim.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2)

“the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406. The state court’s application of Supreme Court law must be

more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the

‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court ....” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th

Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized the comity

interests inherent in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), leaving the state courts responsible for their own

criminal prosecutions unless “a state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Woodford

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 26 (2002).

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1 The Circuit Courts reviewing a federal statute that bears a substantial similarity to the

Arizona one have found no Eighth Amendment violation. The federal statute provides for penalties

related to the use of guns in drug trafficking. That statute provides, in pertinent part:

[N]o term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently

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B. GROUND II - CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “Excessive bail

shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

inflicted.” In Ground II, Welch contends the Arizona sentencing laws that led to the 170-

year aggregate sentence violate his Eighth Amendment rights. In doing so, he argues that

murderers, rapists and serial killers can receive a shorter sentence than someone who

possesses child pornography. His argument embodies two separate ideas. First, that

separate, consecutive sentences for one instance of possessing ten photographs is

unconstitutional. Second, that a sentence of 17 years is grossly disproportionate to the crime

of sexual exploitation of a minor and is therefore unconstitutional. He is incorrect on both

points.

1. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 

Welch argues that the Court should analyze his sentences in the aggregate, as 170

years, rather than on an individual basis. However, Eighth Amendment analysis “focuses

on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence.” United

States v. Aiello, 864 F2.d 257, 265 (2nd Cir. 1988). As the Supreme Court has long made

clear, if the defendant 

has subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because

he has committed a great many such offenses. It would

scarcely be competent for a person to assail the

constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punishment for

burglary on the ground that he had committed so many

burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him,

he might be kept in prison for life.

O'Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892). Even if this Court did consider

Welch’s sentence in the aggregate under a proportionality analysis, the result would be

the same.1

 Mandatory consecutive sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s

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with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of

imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the

firearm was used, carried, or possessed.

18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (West 2010). The Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth

Circuits have all passed their judgment on the constitutionality of the mandatory consecutive

sentences imposed by this statute. In each case, they have upheld the statute against attack under

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Yousef, 327

F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge to a prison

term of 240 years plus a consecutive term of life imprisonment for offenses related to the 1993

bombing of the World Trade Center, including two mandatory consecutive 30-year terms); United

States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 82-83 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding 55-year mandatory consecutive

sentence not violative of proportionality principle); States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 494-95 (4th Cir.

2006) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to sentences of 120 months, 300 months, and life

imprisonment imposed consecutively pursuant to § 924(c)(1)); United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d

516, 536-37 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting proportionality challenge to a sentence of 71.5 years, mostly

mandated by violations of § 924(c)(1), even though defendant had no felony history); United States

v. Arrington, 159 F.3d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding Eighth Amendment did not prohibit 65-

year mandatory consecutive sentence imposed for four violations of § 924(c)(1)); United States v.

Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that 155-year cumulative

consecutive sentence for seven violations of § 924(c)(1) violated the Eighth Amendment); United

States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 888-

month sentence that included 780 months for four violations of § 924(c)(1) charged in the same

indictment). Based on this precedent, there is no constitutional issue presented when a legislature

specifically authorizes – or mandates – consecutive sentences for multiple violations of a statute.

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prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. So long as the legislature explicitly

provides for the punishment, there is no constitutional issue. Carter v. McClaughry, 183

U.S. 365, 394 (1902). The United States Supreme Court has held on a number of

occasions and in several contexts that consecutive sentences do not pose a constitutional

problem where the legislature has specifically provided for them. See Carter, 183 U.S. at

394 (“Cumulative sentences are not cumulative punishments, and a single sentence for

several offenses, in excess of that prescribed for one offense, may be authorized by

statute.”); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958) (holding that Congress clearly

has the power to determine separate sentences for separate offenses); Whalen v. United

States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) (noting that it is fully within the power of Congress to

provide cumulative punishments, the only question was whether or not it had done so).

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2

 “The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects not only against

a second trial for the same offense, but also “against multiple punishments for the same

offense.” Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717

(1969)).

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There is also no constitutional right to receive sentences concurrently; rather, the

“specification of the regime for administering multiple sentences has long been

considered the prerogative of state legislatures.” Oregon v. Ice, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct.

711, 717 (2009). In Arizona, the legislature has mandated consecutive sentences for the

dangerous crimes against children for which Welch was convicted. A.R.S. § 13-

604.01(K) (West 2001). Because of the legislature’s determination, Welch’s consecutive

sentences are constitutional.

Although Welch has not explicitly stated this in his Petition, this Court infers that

he is also contesting his separate convictions based on each image, a gradation that led to

his 170-year aggregate sentence. Although this argument falls more properly under the

Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy clause,2

 this Court assumes that the imposition of a

punishment in an order of magnitude higher than what the legislature actually authorized

would violate the Eighth Amendment as well. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. at

689 n.4 (noting that the “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however,

would presumably prohibit state courts from depriving persons of liberty or property as

punishment for criminal conduct except to the extent authorized by state law”). The

punishment would be more than what is authorized by the Arizona legislature only if the

legislature did not intend each photograph to constitute a separate crime. This Court

accordingly turns to the Arizona statute in question to determine if the Arizona legislature

intended for possession of each photograph to constitute a separate offense. In

undertaking this analysis, the Court is mindful that “state courts are the ultimate

expositors of state law . . . and that [this Court is] bound by their constructions except in

extreme circumstances.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975). The statute

provides, in pertinent part:

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3 There are several occasions where the history suggests the legislature did not

consider each image to be a separate offense. For example, a representative from the Pima

County Attorneys Office stated that criminalizing the “possessing of pictures of minors”

would be helpful to prosecuting child molesters. Ariz. Sen. Jud. Comm., Minutes of

Committee on Judiciary: Hearing on H.B. 2127, 36th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (March 29, 1983).

Later, in 1996, senators expressed concern over “how the statute could be applied to parents

who have nude pictures of their babies.” Ariz. Sen. Jud. Comm., Minutes of Committee on

Judiciary: Hearing on S.B. 1050, 42nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (January 16, 1996) (emphasis

added). In response, another senator explained that the “prosecution would have to show

beyond a reasonable doubt the pictures were used exploitively.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Again in 1999, it appears the legislature considered multiple images to be a single

offense under the statute; the final fact sheet the senate released on amendments to sex crimes

stated that they “[expand] the current prohibition to produce, exhibit, sell or purchase visual

depictions of minors...” Ariz. Sen. Conf. Comm., Final Revised Fact Sheet on S.B. 1279,

44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (June 10, 1999) (emphasis added). And the next year the legislature

also provided immunity and affirmative defenses to anyone “who upon discovery and in

good faith reports the discovery of visual depictions of sexual exploitation of a minor.” 

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A. A person commits sexual exploitation of a minor by

knowingly:

. . .

2. Distributing, transporting, exhibiting, receiving,

selling, purchasing, electronically transmitting, possessing or

exchanging any visual depiction in which minors are engaged

in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct.

. . .

C. Sexual exploitation of a minor is a class 2 felony and

if the minor is under fifteen years of age it is punishable

pursuant to § 13-604.01.

A.R.S. § 13-3553 (West 2001) (emphasis added). Subsection (A)(2) makes the

possession of “any visual depiction” an offense. The plain language of the statute appears

to make the possession of one visual depiction a single offense under the law. What is

not clear from the statute is what happens when a person possesses more than one visual

depiction. The statute does not explicitly provide for different units of prosecution based

on the number of images possessed. This ambiguity could support reading the statute as

criminalizing the ongoing act of possessing any one or more visual depictions. The

legislative history of the statute would certainly support this interpretation.3

 On the other

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Ariz. H.B. 2428, 44th Leg., 2nd Reg. sess. (April 5, 2000).

4

 With its enactment of the statute in 1978, the legislature enumerated a number of

findings that provided some background for its decision to enact the statute. 1978 Ariz. Sess.

Laws, ch. 200, § 2. Among these findings, the legislature noted the harms to the child

victims depicted in the pornography, including that the distribution of the pornography is “a

continuing cause of harm to the child participants and that it further develops the climate

encouraging the sexual exploitation of other children.” Id. at § 2(A)(6). They also found that

“[p]ornographic materials depicting children as participants are frequently utilized to lure

other children into sexual conduct.” They further noted that one of the public policies behind

the statute was to “protect all children of this state from being sexually exploited.” Id. at §

2(B)(1). 

The Arizona legislature has also had several other occasions to consider the scope of

the statute. Before the amendment in 1983 passed, criminalizing possession of child

pornography, a senator questioned “how anyone would know whether a person in a photo

is a minor.” Ariz. Sen. Jud. Comm., Minutes of Committee on Judiciary: Hearing on H.B.

2127, 36th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (March 29, 1983) (emphasis added). The senator clearly

contemplated that a single photo would constitute a violation of the statute. Eighteen years

later, the Senate Judiciary Committee considered an amendment to A.R.S. § 13-3553; in the

minute entry on H.B. 2223, the research analyst explained the amendment would “[define]

minor in the sexual exploitation statute as a person or persons who were under 18 years of

age at the time the visual depiction was created, adapted or modified.” Ariz. Sen. Jud.

Comm., Minutes of Committee on Judiciary: Hearing on H.B. 2223, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.

(April 10, 2001) (emphasis added). Once again, the legislature considered the singular nature

of offensive material that would constitute a violation of the statute.

Considering that each pornographic image of a child stands to be a “continuing cause

of harm” to the child and could also be used to “lure other children into sexual conduct” and

thus undermine the public policy of “[protecting] all children of this state from being

sexually exploited,” it is logical to conclude that the legislature intended each such image to

constitute a separate offense under the statute. 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § 2(A)(5)-(6),

(B)(1).

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hand, the history would also support finding that the legislature intended each image to

count as a separate offense.4

 This Court need not reach the question of legislative intent,

for the Arizona Supreme Court has passed judgment on this very issue. 

In State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473 (2006), the Arizona Supreme Court considered an

appeal substantially similar to the one here. In that case, the petitioner had been

convicted of 20 separate counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of § 13-

3553 for possessing 20 separate images of child pornography. Id. at 474. In denying his

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Eighth Amendment claim, the court noted that the petitioner could not contest the

charging of twenty separate counts as improper because “each count was based on a

different video or photo image, the images involved some fifteen different child victims,

and [he] had accumulated the images over a six-year period.” Id. at 478. With Berger

the Arizona Supreme Court determined each image of child pornography constitutes a

separate offense under § 13-3553.

Although this Court might have decided the issue differently in light of the

ambiguity in the statute and the legislative history, the question before this Court is not

whether the Arizona court was correct in its interpretation of state law. Rather, the Court

must consider only whether Arizona’s interpretation was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of the federal law as established by the Supreme Court. Federal law requires

state courts not impose sentences unauthorized by state legislatures. See e.g., Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004); Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 n. 4. In concluding that

each pornographic image is a separate offense, the Arizona Supreme Court thoroughly

analyzed the statute’s legislative history. Berger, 212 Ariz. at 478. This Court cannot say

that the court’s conclusion was an unreasonable interpretation, nor was it contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor can this Court

conclude the state court interpretation is an “extreme circumstance” warranting federal

review. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691.

This Court therefore concludes, in light of the plausible interpretation of the

statute’s plain language, the legislative history, and the Arizona Supreme Court’s

interpretation, that the intent of the legislature was to criminalize the possession of each

image of child pornography. The federal judiciary does not sit as a super-legislature to

rewrite state law that seems, in our opinion, unsound or unfair. Our concern is only with

ensuring compliance with the Federal Constitution. Because the Arizona legislature

intended for each image to count as a separate offense, there is no constitutional issue

under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments with Welch’s separate convictions and

consecutive sentences. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82-83 (1955).

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5

 These Justice’s opinions are the controlling precedent in these cases because they

represent the views of the Justices concurring in the judgment on the narrowest grounds. See,

e.g., Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).

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2. PROPORTIONALITY OF THE SENTENCE

The Court next turns to the second idea embodied in Welch’s claim: that 17 years

is a grossly disproportionate sentence for the crime of sexual exploitation of a minor. The

Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences. The Supreme Court

has, for more than a quarter-century, explicitly acknowledged that the Eighth Amendment

embodies a narrow proportionality principle. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983)

(holding that “[t]he final clause [of the Eighth Amendment] prohibits not only barbaric

punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed”). The

contours of this principle have been the subject of much debate among the members of

the Supreme Court. As Justice O’Connor noted, “our precedents in this area have not

been a model of clarity.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). There is,

however, a basic framework that this Court can follow, as laid out by Justice Kennedy in

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) and employed by Justice O’Connor in Ewing

v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).5

 Five principles undergird the proportionality

principle:

(1) Establishing a relationship between a crime and a sentence involves a

penological judgment that is inherently a legislative, not judicial function; 

(2) The Eighth Amendment does not mandate any one penological theory;

(3) The federal structure assures variation in underlying penological

theories and the sentences chosen for specific crimes;

(4) Proportionality review should be informed by objective factors as much

as possible.

(5) The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality. It only

prohibits sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001. The Court bears these principles in mind as it evaluates

Welch’s sentence.

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Additionally, under Supreme Court precedent, this Court recognizes that

substantial deference is owed to the State legislature. Therefore, at the outset the Court

determines whether the Arizona legislature had a “reasonable basis” for believing that a

17-year sentence for possession of child pornography “advance[s] the goals of [its]

criminal justice system in any substantial way.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (alterations in

original). This Court concludes that it did. The Supreme Court has noted a State’s

interest in criminalizing child pornography: 

It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in

‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is

‘compelling.’ ... The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment found in

relevant literature, is that the use of children as subjects of pornographic

materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of

the child.

Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,

756-758 (1982)). Indeed, the Court found it understandable that a state would try “to

stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.” Id. at 110. The Court further

noted that child pornography’s “continued existence causes the child victims continuing

harm by haunting the children in years to come” and that “evidence suggests that

pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.” Id. at

111.

The Arizona Supreme Court also explicitly held that the Arizona legislature had a

reasonable basis for enacting A.R.S. § 13-3553. State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 478

(2006). In that case, the court found that the legislature was concerned with “a series of

harms to child victims” and that prosecutors advocated for the 1983 amendment

criminalizing possession because it would “aid in prosecuting child molesters.” Id. The

court also noted the legislature targeted possession of child pornography because it was

one of a number of “dangerous crimes against children” under A.R.S. § 13-604.01 that

would entail a “lengthy [period] of incarceration ... intended to punish and deter those

predators who pose a direct and continuing threat to the children of Arizona.” Id.

(quoting State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 102 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Given the United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of state interest in

criminalizing child pornography, the legislative history of the Arizona statute, and the

Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute, this Court concludes that the

Arizona legislature had a reasonable basis for believing that a 17-year sentence would

advance the goals of Arizona’s criminal justice system. 

This Court next analyzes the proportionality between Welch’s crime and his

sentence. In weighing the gravity of the offense with the severity of the sentence, this

Court does not consider his sentence in the abstract. Rather, the Court “must place on the

scales not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. Any

other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find

expression in the legislature’s choice of sanctions.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 1189-1190. In

addition, a showing that a state’s choice of punishment is the harshest in the Union does

not support an inference of gross disproportionality. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,

282 (noting that “[a]bsent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional

notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular

offenders more severely than any other State”). Except in truly extreme situations, “the

length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.” 

Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982). Therefore, “successful challenges to the

proportionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.” Id. at 374. 

A brief review of precedent reveals that the Supreme Court considers more serious

sentences for less serious crimes to be consistent with the Eighth Amendment. In

Rummel v. Estelle, the petitioner sought habeas relief for receiving a life sentence with

possibility of parole for a third felony conviction - “obtaining $120.75 by false

pretenses.” 445 U.S. at 266. The Court affirmed his sentence. Id. at 285. In Hutto v.

Davis, the petitioner sought habeas relief for receiving consecutive 20-year sentences for

possessing nine ounces of marijuana. 454 U.S. at 371. The Court affirmed his sentences. 

Id. at 373. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the court affirmed a sentence of life imprisonment

without possibility of parole for a first time offender convicted of possessing 672 grams

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6

 Cadena temporal is an old Spanish form of punishment which required “those

sentenced . . . [to] labor for the benefit of the state. They shall always carry a chain at the

ankle, hanging from the wrists; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and shall

receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution.” Weems, 217 U.S. at 364. 

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of cocaine. 501 U.S. at 961. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that “[f]ew

problems affecting the health and welfare of our population, particularly our young,

cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances.” Id. at 1003

(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment)) (emphasis added). Finally, in Ewing v. California,

the Court affirmed a sentence of 25 years to life pursuant to California’s “three strikes”

law for a man who stole three golf clubs valued at just under $1200. 538 U.S. at 30-31.

There have only been three times in the last century when the Supreme Court

invalidated a sentence. The first was Weems v. United States., 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910),

where the Court invalidated the punishment of cadena temporal6

 for the crime of

falsifying a public record. The next was in Solem v. Helm, where the petitioner received a

sentence of life without parole for uttering a “no account” check for $100 because he was

a recidivist offender. 463 U.S. at 281. The Court placed significant weight on the lack of

violence in Helm’s criminal history and the relatively minor nature of the crimes in

deciding that his sentence was grossly disproportionate. Id. at 297. Finally, in May of

this year, the Court invalidated a sentence of life without parole for a recidivist offender

who committed a non-homicide crime as a juvenile. Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___,

130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).

Here, Welch’s sentence does not support an inference of gross disproportionality. 

Welch does not have a clean record. In 1987 he was convicted of felony aggravated

sexual battery against a 6-year-old girl. Shortly before he was convicted of possessing

these ten photos, he was also convicted of molesting a 3-year-old and 6-year-old girl. 

This history demonstrates Welch is exactly the type of sexual predator that the Arizona

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 “Child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing child victims. A

child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose for sexually

explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children having ‘fun’

participating in the activity.” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (quoting 1 Attorney General’s

Commission on Pornography, Final Report 649 (1986)).

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legislature hopes to protect society against through its laws criminalizing possession of

child pornography. 

Nor does Welch argue his crime, a “dangerous crime against children,” is not

serious. Indeed, his actions directly oppose a compelling State interest - protecting

children. The State’s interest in protecting children is so strong that it can, with due

process, terminate parental rights. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-754 (1982). 

That Arizona wishes to severely penalize possessors of child pornography, a group of

felons the Supreme Court has noted are likely to be child molesters themselves,7

 comports

with the Federal Constitution. 

The serious nature of the crime involved here also weighs against an inference of

disproportionality. The photographs of children exploited for sexual purposes continue to

damage the children depicted. They may be used to lure more children into child

pornography or molestation. There is evidence that victims of molestation may grow up

to be molesters themselves. See Sherry L. Scott, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of

Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 Hous. L.

Rev. 1729, 1745 (1999). In short, these photographs stand to inflict generations of

damage on the people of Arizona. Arizona takes this threat seriously, and has chosen to

implement one of the harshest punishments for possessors of child pornography in the

nation. However, the relative harshness of Arizona’s law is not enough to show that the

sentence at issue here is grossly disproportionate. The gravity of Welch’s offense is

serious. His sentence, though severe, is not enough to give rise to an inference of gross

disproportionality.

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Courts need not consider an intra- or inter-jurisdictional analysis of comparable

crimes and punishments unless there has been an initial inference of gross

disproportionality. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. When the crime in question is a serious

one, such an analysis is especially unnecessary. Id. at 1004. Because Welch has not

made an initial inference of gross disproportionality and his crime is a serious one, this

Court concludes it need not engage in a protracted analysis of comparable crimes and

punishment within and among the states and the federal government.

The state courts’ determination that Welch’s ten, consecutive, 17-year sentences

for possessing ten images of child pornography was constitutional is not contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of federal law. The Arizona legislature had a reasonable

basis for enacting its law. Welch’s individual sentences do not give rise to an inference

of gross disproportionality. His sentences are constitutional. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

As Justice Hurwitz and Justice Berch recognized in State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. at

484, 488-89 (Hurwitz, J., concurring, and Berch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part), there is intuitive support for the premise that a 170 year sentence for possessing ten

images of child pornography is extraordinarily long, potentially violative of the Eighth

Amendment. However, United States Supreme Court decisions are not supportive of

Welch’s position. Any change to that jurisprudence cannot take place in a habeas action

such as this one, where relief can only be granted when the state courts have misapplied

“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). No such finding can be made in this case. Relief must be denied.

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review and analysis, enter an order DENYING the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any part may serve and file written objections

within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that

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any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV 07-2169-

PHX-NVW.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to

Petitioner and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 16th day of July, 2010.

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