Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03100/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03100-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES TROY WALKER,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOC., et

al.,

Defendant(s).

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No. C07-3100 BZ

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS

Defendant C&H Sugar Co., Inc. (“C&H Sugar”) has moved to

dismiss plaintiff James Walker’s complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1). Having reviewed the papers submitted, the

court finds no need for argument. For the reasons set forth

below, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that C&H Sugar’s motion is DENIED

and the April 14, 2008 hearing is VACATED.

In his amended complaint, Mr. Walker brings negligence

claims for relief based on injuries he sustained while working

as a longshoreman. Mr. Walker alleges he was injured when he

was struck in the head by a heavy piece of metal while

scraping raw sugar off the hull of a ship. (Pl.’s Complaint ¶

9.) The injury was allegedly caused by the malfunction or

misuse of a backhoe operated by a Marine Terminals Corporation

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1 “[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a

judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct.

2197, 2200 (2007).

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employee. (Id.) He claims the injury occurred when C&H Sugar

was “engaged in unloading” the ship containing raw sugar. 

(Id. at ¶ 8.) 

There is original federal jurisdiction over “[a]ny case

of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).

After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S.

358 (1990), a tort action must “satisfy both a location test

and a connection test” to invoke maritime jurisdiction of the

federal courts. Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries Inc., 489 F.3d

978, 982 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, (1995). 

“A court applying the location test must determine

whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury

suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water.” 

Jerome B. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. The complaint alleges

that Mr. Walker was working on the ship at the time of the

incident. For the purpose of Rule 12, the maritime location

requirement is satisfied.1 See Solano v. Beilby, 761 F.2d

1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1985)(injury of longshoreman on ramp of

ship met “maritime locality” requirement.)

The two part maritime connection test requires an

assessment of whether: (1) “the general features of the type

of incident involved . . . has a potentially disruptive impact

on maritime commerce”; and (2) “the general character of the

activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial

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relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Jerome B.

Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 534 (internal quotations omitted). 

“The loading of cargo onto a vessel by two longshoremen falls

squarely within the ambit of traditional maritime services or

activities in furtherance of commerce.” Solano, 761 F.2d at

1371. Here, Mr. Walker alleges he was unloading cargo from a

ship so the first prong of the location test is met. 

Similarly, the unloading of cargo is substantially related to

a traditional maritime activity. See id. at 1371 - 72; see

also Christensen v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 279 F.3d 807, 815

(9th Cir. 2002)(injury occurring while tying a ship’s mooring

lines to the dock was related to a traditional maritime

activity.) Mr. Walker has pled facts sufficient to defeat C&H

Sugar’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

C&H Sugar’s reliance on Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764

F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1985) and Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. U.S.

Dist. Court, 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1938) is misplaced. 

Neither of these cases were decided on a Rule 12(b) motion to

dismiss. Both involved the issue of whether land based ship 

repair or construction workers could sue in admiralty for

employment-related asbestos-induced diseases because they were

working in shipyards or were performing repairs on board

vessels. 

It is evident to the court that Mr. Walker’s opposition

papers were prepared by someone with legal training, not by

Mr. Walker. C&H Sugar raised this point in its reply. At the

last status conference, Mr. Walker stated he was being

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2 If the ghost-writer is a paralegal or an unlicensed

attorney, the person may also be subject to discipline for

violating California Business and Professions Code sections

6125 et seq. and 6400 et seq.

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assisted by a “paralegal” and that an attorney has promised to

represent him at some point in the future. 

Regardless of whether he is receiving assistance from an

attorney or a paralegal, Mr. Walker is warned that the court

does not approve of this “ghost-writing” practice. Ghostwriting frustrates the application of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 which requires all attorneys to verify through

their signatures that there are sufficient grounds for the

arguments in their pleadings. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 768

(Bkrtcy. D.S.C. 2003). Moreover, the practice prevents the

court from examining the arguments set forth in Mr. Walker’s

papers during oral argument. This is also prejudicial to C&H

Sugar. 

Mr. Walker is admonished that if this practice continues,

the court will require him to identify the individual or

individuals ghost-writing his papers. If the ghost-writer is

admitted to the Northern District of California, the Court

will order the attorney to sign the papers thereby subjecting

him or her to discipline under Rule 11. If the ghost-writer

is not admitted to the Northern District, the court may issue 

sanctions or take other action pursuant to Civil Local Rule

11-8.2

 

Dated: April 14, 2008 Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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