Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01447/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01447-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY LEE RIGGINS, Civil No. 13cv1447-GPC (RBB)

Petitioner, ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR

DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY

HEARING;

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; and

(3) DENYING MOTION FOR 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

vs.

AMY MILLER, Warden,

Respondent.

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS1

Rodney Lee Riggins (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

(ECF No. 1.) Petitioner was convicted by a San Diego County Superior Court jury of robbery,

burglary, grand theft and petty theft, and the jury found he had personally used a deadly weapon

in the commission of the robbery. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 80-83.) The trial

Although this case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks pursuant to 28 1

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court has determined that neither a Report and Recommendation nor oral argument

is necessary for the disposition of this matter. See S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 71.1(d)

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -1- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 1 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judge found, after a bifurcated bench trial, that Petitioner had suffered three prior felony robbery

convictions which constituted strikes under California’s Three Strikes law, and sentenced him

to 42 years-to-life in state prison. (CT 187-89.)

Petitioner alleges here, as he did in state court, that his federal constitutional rights were

violated because: (1) his sentence was enhanced by facts found by a judge rather than a jury;

(2) his appellate counsel failed to raise several of the claims presented here; (3) the waiver of

his right to a jury trial on the truth of the prior conviction allegations was invalid, and his trial

counsel did not properly advise him in that respect; (4) the use of his prior convictions to

enhance his sentence violated the plea bargains of those convictions; (5) trial counsel failed to

investigate and challenge the prior convictions on the basis they resulted from improperly

advised pleas; (6) trial counsel failed to adequately argue that the prior convictions should be

stricken; (7) the prior convictions were based on pleas which lacked jury findings on, or proper

admissions to, the elements of the offenses; (8) the jury was not instructed that the use of force

or fear must have been motivated by an intent to steal in order to constitute robbery; (9) trial

counsel failed to challenge the restitution fine; (10) the jury was improperly instructed on

consciousness of guilt; (11) the prosecutor committed misconduct to which trial counsel failed

to object; (12) trial counsel entered into a stipulation without Petitioner’s consent; and (13) the

use of the prior convictions to enhance his sentence violated the Contracts Clause of the United

States Constitution, and trial counsel failed to object on that basis. (Pet. at 14-128. ) 2

Respondent has filed an Answer (“Ans.”) to the Petition along with an incorporated

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support (“Ans. Mem.”), and has lodged portions of

the state court record. (ECF Nos. 18.) Respondent argues that federal habeas relief is not

available because Petitioner’s claims are without merit and any errors are harmless, and because

the adjudication of the claims by the state court is neither contrary to, nor involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans. at 2; Ans. Mem. at 12-50.) 

Petitioner has filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 38.)

When citing to documents filed with the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system, the 2

Court will refer to the pages assigned by that system. When citing to Respondent’s Lodgments, the

Court will refer to the actual pagination rather than the page numbers printed on the documents.

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -2- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 2 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner has also filed a Motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No.

12.) Petitioner states that shortly after filing the instant Petition, he sent interrogatories to his

trial counsel, who responded by sending Petitioner the trial file, including counsel’s notes, and

stated that his notes would be more reliable than his memory. (Id. at 4 & Ex. A.) Petitioner

requests an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in order to obtain

testimony from his trial and appellate counsel, or, in the alternate, discovery in order to obtain

declarations from both counsel. (Id. at 3-6.) He seeks discovery regarding his prior convictions

in order to support his allegations that the plea bargains he entered in those cases were breached

by their use to enhance his sentence, and that the prior convictions themselves were insufficient

for that use. (Id. at 6.) 

Respondent has filed an Opposition, arguing that Petitioner has not shown good cause for

discovery and is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 22 at 2-7.) Respondent argues

that Petitioner waived the attorney-client privilege with respectto communications with counsel,

and requests Petitioner be ordered to turn over counsel’s notes. (Id. at 7-8.) Petitioner thereafter

attached his trial counsel’s notes as an exhibit to the Traverse. (Traverse at 121-38.) Petitioner

has also filed a Motion for a Certificate of Appealability. (ECF No. 34.)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to discovery, that

an evidentiary hearing or expansion of the record is neither necessary nor warranted, that federal

habeas relief is unavailable, and that Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements for issuance

of a Certificate of Appealability. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion for discovery and

an evidentiary hearing, DENIES the Petition, and DENIES a Certificate of Appealability.

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

In a four-count amended information filed in the San Diego County Superior Court on

January 11, 2010, Petitioner was charged with robbery in violation of California Penal Code

section 211; grand theft of personal property in violation of Penal Code section 487(a); petty

theft with a prior in violation of Penal Code section 484; and burglary in violation of Penal Code

section 459. (CT 13-15.) The amended information alleged as sentence enhancements that

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -3- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 3 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner had personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a box cutter, during the robbery,

that he had previously been convicted of three serious felonies which constituted strikes under

California’s Three Strikes law, and that he had served three prison terms. (CT 16-18.) On May

4, 2010, Petitioner was convicted on all four counts and the jury returned a true finding on the

deadly weapon use allegation. (CT 184-85.) Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the

prior conviction allegations, and the trial judge, following a bench trial, made true findings as

to all of the allegations. (CT 178, 186-87.) On August 17, 2010, the trial judge denied a defense

motion to strike the prior convictions, and sentenced Petitioner to 42 years-to-life in state prison. 

(CT 189.) The sentence consisted of 25 years-to-life on the robbery count under the Three

Strikes law, plus three consecutive five-year terms, one for each of the three prior felony

convictions, plus a one-year term for the deadly weapon use finding and a one-year term for one

of the prison priors; terms on the remaining counts and prison priors were ordered to run

concurrently. (Lodgment No. Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 814-15.) 

Petitioner filed an appeal raising Claims 8 and 10 here, along with two additional claims

not presented in this action. (Lodgment No. 4.) The appellate court reversed the grand theft

conviction, finding it was a lesser-included offense ofrobbery, and affirmed in all other respects. 

(Lodgment No. 7.) A petition for review presenting Claims 8 and 10 was summarily denied by

the California Supreme Court on March 23, 2012. (Lodgment Nos. 8-9.) As detailed below in

the discussion of the individual claims, Petitioner filed several pro se habeas petitions in the state

courts raising the remaining claims presented here.

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion affirming

Petitioner’s conviction on direct review. This Court gives deference to state court findings of

fact and presumes them to be correct. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981).

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on April 15, 2009, Riggins entered an Adidas store at the Carlsbad Premium Outlets in San Diego County. Riggins was wearing

a jacket and holding a large duffel bag. He approached a sales associate who was

at a cash register. The sales associate handed Riggins two empty shopping bags.

[Footnote: These facts are based on a surveillance video from the store. The

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -4- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 4 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

record does not indicate why the sales associate handed Riggins the empty

shopping bags.] Riggins then went into a footwear aisle of the store, removed a

pair of shoes from a shoe box, and placed the empty box back on the shelf.

Riggins proceeded to pick up a white shirt and place it inside his duffel

bag. Riggins then placed multiple pairs of shoes into the empty shopping bags.

Riggins picked up his duffel bag and the shopping bags, which were now full, and

walked out of the store.

Riggins did not pay for any of the merchandise that he took from the

Adidas store. The total value of the stolen merchandise was $359.88. 

Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. that same evening, Riggins walked into the

Gap store at the same shopping mall. He was carrying a duffel bag that was nearly

empty, and two full Adidas shopping bags.

Before Riggins entered the Gap store,Terence Wilkerson, a loss prevention

agent for the Gap, noticed Riggins. The fact that Riggins was walking around the

mall with an empty duffel bag caught Wilkerson’s eye because, in Wilkerson’s

experience, people who shoplift tend to engage in this kind of behavior. 

Wilkerson followed Riggins into the Gap store.

Once Riggins was inside the Gap store, he entered the women’s department

and began looking at some women’s denim pants and some shirts. He placed his

bags on the floor and interacted with several of the store’s sale associates. Riggins

told the sales people that he needed help finding “something for his girlfriend or

his wife.” Riggins selected three pair of women’s pants and two women’s shorts,

and then pulled out his wallet. Riggins told a sales associate that he did not have

any money and thanked her for the assistance. He said that he would return later

to pick up the merchandise.

After the sales associate headed toward the back of the store, Riggins

picked up the merchandise that he had gathered with the associate’s help, and took

that merchandise, together with his duffel bag and the two Adidas shopping bags,

over to the men’s department of the store. Riggins set down his duffel bag and the

Adidas shopping bags behind a building fixture, and then placed the women’s

clothing on top of the duffel bag. After waiting for other shoppers to leave the

vicinity, Riggins bent down, unzipped his duffel bag, and put the women’s

clothing inside the duffel bag.

After he placed the women’s clothing in the duffel, Riggins stood up,

looked around, and headed toward a wall of men’s denimpants. Riggins “grabbed

a stack of men’s denim” and placed the merchandise on top of the duffel bag. He

again waited for other customers to leave the area, and then bent down and placed

the pants in his duffel bag.

Wilkerson had been observing Riggins from several feet away. Based on

his prior experience, Wilkerson was fairly certain that Riggins was about to leave

the store with the concealed items. Wilkerson informed the store’s management

team that he was planning to apprehend Riggins. Wilkerson then exited the store

and waited immediately outside the store, so that he could maintain an

unobstructed view of Riggins.

Riggins eventually walked past the cash registers without making any

attempt to pay for the merchandise that he had placed inside his duffel bag. As

Riggins approached the front of the store, Wilkerson was about to apprehend him

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -5- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 5 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exiting the store when a man and two children effectively “cut (Wilkerson) off.”

Wilkerson stopped abruptly, and Riggins also stopped abruptly. Riggins allowed

the man and his children to enter the store, made eye contact with Wilkerson,

turned around, and walked toward the back of the store. Wilkerson continued to

wait outside.

After walking around the store, Riggins eventuallywalked toward the front

of the store and placed his duffel bag and the two full Adidas bags on the floor,

about 15 feet away from the front doors to the store. Riggins walked outside and

started talking on his cell phone. Wilkerson overheard Riggins ask, “Where are

you at?” and “You almost here?” Riggins then ended the call and approached

Wilkerson. Riggins struck up a conversation with Wilkerson, asking himwhether

he worked in the area and what he did for work. Wilkerson did not want to “blow

(his) cover,” so he told Riggins that he worked for TaylorMade, a golf company.

Wilkerson mentioned that he was waiting for his girlfriend, and the two continued

to make small talk.

In the meantime, the store manager, who had noticed Riggins’s “very shifty

behavior” while he was in the store, had seen Riggins place the duffel bag and two

Adidas shopping bags on the floor near the entrance to the store. The store

manager started asking to whom the bags belonged, and Riggins entered the store

and said that they were his bags. Riggins then picked up all three bags and walked

out of the store.

Wilkerson approached Riggins outside the store, identified himself as the

store’s loss prevention agent, and said that they needed to talk about the

merchandise that Riggins was concealing inside his duffel bag. Wilkerson asked

Riggins if he could look inside the duffel bag to see what was in there. According

to Wilkerson, Riggins became loud and obnoxious, and started to yell. Riggins

denied that he had stolen anything and stated that the items in the bags belonged

to him.

Wilkerson tried to grab the duffel bag, but Riggins also grabbed the bag.

After trying to rip the bag from Wilkerson’s hand, Riggins reached his hand into

one of his pockets and pulled out a box cutter. Riggins told Wilkerson to back up,

while he motioned toward Wilkerson’s chest with the exposed blade. Fearing for

his safety, Wilkerson let go of the bag and said, “(I)t’s yours, take it.”

Riggins proceeded to head north, through the mall, at “a fairly high rate of

speed.” He was carrying the duffel bag, which was filled with the Gap

merchandise that he had not paid for, as well as the two Adidas shopping bags,

which were filled with the Adidas merchandise that he had not paid for.

Wilkerson called 911 on his cell phone. He explained to the operator what

had just occurred and described Riggins. While Wilkerson was on the phone with

the 911 operator, he, together with Brad Hunter, an off-duty Oceanside police

detective who happened to be in the Gap store when the events transpired,

followed Riggins through the mall, in the direction of some nearby car

dealerships. Once Wilkerson reached one of the dealerships, he no longer had

Riggins in sight and told the operator that he was unable to follow Riggins any

farther. A few minutes later, Carlsbad Police Sergeant Greg White met Wilkerson

at the car dealership. Wilkerson described Riggins’s clothing and the bags that he

was carrying. Sergeant White then drove northbound and entered another car

dealership, approximately a half mile from the shopping center.

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -6- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 6 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At that dealership, Sergeant White spotted Riggins in between some cars

in the middle of the parking lot. Riggins moved to a position behind a car where

Sergeant White could not see him. Riggins then briskly walked away from

Sergeant White and another officer, who was also pursuing him. Riggins became

distracted by the other officer, and Sergeant White was able to catch up with him.

Riggins refused to comply with Sergeant White’s order to put his hands on a car.

Riggins complied only when the other officer arrived with a taser. By this time,

Riggins had changed his appearance. He was still wearing jeans and yellow

cowboy boots that Wilkerson had seen him wearing, but he had removed a

baseball cap and glasses, and had put on a white sweatshirt.

The officers arrested Riggins. Wilkerson and Hunter positively identified

Riggins as the person who had taken the items from the Gap store without paying.

Wilkerson also identified the duffel bag and two Adidas shopping bags as the bags

that Riggins had been carrying. Officers found the bags behind one of the

dealership’s cars, in a different area of the dealership from where Riggins had

been detained. The brown jacket that Riggins had been wearing was found lying

on top of the duffel bag. Inside the duffel bag were Riggins’s North County

Transit District photo identification card, some of Riggins’s mail and bank

statements, the box cutter that Riggins had used against Wilkerson, and the Gap

merchandise that Riggins had taken.

Wilkerson and a Carlsbad police officer returned to the Gap store with the

merchandise that Riggins had placed in his duffel bag. The value of the

merchandise was $575.11.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Riggins, No. D057957, slip op. at 2-7 (Cal.App.Ct. Jan. 10, 2012).)

IV.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims do not warrant federal

habeas relief. The Court also finds that neither discovery, expansion of the record, nor an

evidentiary hearing are necessary or warranted, and that Petitioner has not satisfied the

requirements for issuance of a Certificate of Appealability. 

A. Standard of Review

As discussed below, all claims presented here, except Claim 11, were adjudicated on the

merits in state court. In order to merit habeas relief, Petitioner must demonstrate that the state

court adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(d) (West 2006). A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -7- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 7 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Supreme Court precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court

decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. Relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only if, it is so obvious that

a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded

disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07

(2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearlyestablished federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United

States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In order to satisfy section

2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which

the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the

facts, are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Even if

a petitioner can satisfy section 2254(d), or, as with Claim 11 here, it does not apply, Petitioner

must still demonstrate a federal constitutional violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22

(2007); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

B. Claim 1

Petitioner alleges in Claim 1 that his sentence was enhanced based on two facts not

admitted by him or found by a jury: (1) his identity as the person who suffered the three prior

convictions alleged in the amended information, and (2) whether theyconstituted “strikes” under

California’s Three Strikes law. (Pet. at 14-15.) He alleges that the prior convictions could only

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -8- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 8 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be used to enhance his sentence once those facts were established, and because those facts were

found by a judge rather than a jury, he was deprived of his right to a jury trial under the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments, as that right is articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000) (holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact used to increase a sentence

above the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt), Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes

is the maximum sentence permitted to be imposed solely by the jury verdict or a defendant’s

admission) and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (holding that California’s threetier determinate sentencing law violated the right to a jury trial to the extent it permitted a judge

to impose an upper term sentence in the absence of an aggravating factor established by the

jury’s verdict, a defendant’s admission, or a prior conviction). (Pet. at 14-25.)

Respondent answers that Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the truth of the prior

conviction allegations, and that in any case the right to a jury trial on the priors is a state-law

right, the denial of which does not raise a federal claim. (Ans. Mem. at 19-21.) Respondent also

contends that the Apprendi line of cases exempts prior convictions which, like those here, were

obtained in proceedings which provided the right to a jury trial and required proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. (Id. at 21.) 

Petitioner replies that his waiver was invalid, but that even if it was valid, he only waived

his state law right to a jury trial as to whether the prior convictions existed, not his federal

constitutional right to have the jury determine whether he was the person who was convicted and

whether the priors satisfied the statutory definition of “serious” or “violent” so as to constitute

strikes. (Traverse at 11-20.)

This claimwas presented to and summarilydenied bythe state supreme court. (Lodgment

Nos. 16, 18.) Petitioner presented the same claim to the state appellate court in his pro se habeas

petition, which was denied on the merits in a reasoned order. (Lodgment No. 12 at 4-7, 28-31;

Lodgment No. 13.) The Court will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court and

apply the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991) (“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -9- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 9 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same

claim rest upon the same ground.”) The state appellate court denied the claim, stating:

The rule pronounced in Apprendi does not apply to an indeterminate sentence

enhanced by prior convictions. (Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at pp.

487-490.) The holdings in Blakely v. Washington, supra, 542 U.S. 296 and

Cunningham v. California, supra, 549 U.S. 270 do not change this ruling.

(Lodgment No. 13, In re Riggins, No. D062731, order at 1-2 (Cal.App.Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).) 

Clearlyestablished federal law provides that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the proscribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. As

Petitioner points out, the Court in Apprendi recognized that the “prior conviction exception”

arose from Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and observed that “the

certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior convictions, and the reality

that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that ‘fact’ in his case, mitigated the

due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to

determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range.” 

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (“One basis

for that constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration

used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been

established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt and jury trial

guarantees.”) 

Unlike the petitioner in Almendarez-Torres, however, Petitioner here did not admit in the

instant criminal proceeding that he had suffered the prior convictions, and he challenges the

accuracy of the trial court’s findings with respect to them. In Wilson v. Knowles, 638 F.3d 1213

(9th Cir. 2011), the state trial judge found three facts in relation to two prior convictions which

were necessary to use those convictions as strikes to increase a sentence to 25 years-to-life,

including whether the petitioner had personallyinflicted bodilyinjuryon the victim, whether that

injury was great, and whether the victim was an accomplice. Id. at 1215. The Ninth Circuit

found that the petitioner did not have an incentive to challenge those facts when he entered no

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -10- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 10 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

contest pleas in the prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol, and for causing

bodily injury while driving under the influence of alcohol, because those facts were not

necessary to convict the petitioner of the prior convictions. Id. The court found that although

courts “may reasonably disagree about some of the precise boundaries of the [Apprendi]

exception,” it was an objectively unreasonable application of Apprendi for the state trial judge,

rather than a jury, to find that the victim was not an accomplice in the prior conviction and that

Petitioner had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, findings which were

necessary under state law to use the prior convictions as strikes. Id. at 1215-16; but see id. at

1216 (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting) (opining that it is has not yet been clearly established that the

who, what, when and where of a prior conviction is exempt from the jury trial requirement,

because the courts have “debated and disagreed about the scope ofthe [Apprendi] exception, and

the Supreme Court hasn’t stepped in to draw a clear line for us.”); People v. Black, 41 Cal.4th

799, 819 (2007) (holding that California and numerous other jurisdictions interpret the Apprendi

exception to encompass not only the fact that a prior conviction occurred, but other related issues

that may be determined by examining the records of the prior convictions.”); In re Richardson,

196 Cal.App.4th 647, 659 (2011) (stating that California courts are not bound by the Ninth

Circuit’s Wilson v. Knowles decision.)

Respondent relies on Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2006), in which the

petitioner had been sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law after the trial judge counted

eight strikes arising from a single conviction which involved eight robberies, but which was

obtained though a guilty plea where the petitioner was promised the conviction would count as

only one strike in any future sentencing proceedings. Id. at 958. The petitioner in Davis alleged,

as does Petitioner here, that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial

on the truth of the prior conviction allegation, and that the plea agreement in the prior conviction

was violated by its use as a strike. Id. The Davis court granted federal habeas relief on the

breach of plea agreement claim, but denied relief on the waiver claim, stating that where “only

the existence of a prior conviction is at issue,” a petitioner “has no federal constitutional right

to have a jury decide that question,” irrespective of whether he had a state law right to a jury trial

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -11- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 11 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on the prior convictions, “so long as the convictions were themselves obtained in proceedings

that required the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 963 (emphasis

added). 

A federal habeas court must apply clearly established federal law as “squarely

established” by United States Supreme Court holdings. White, 134 S.Ct. at 1702 n.2, 1706,

citing Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (“[C]ircuit precedent does

not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’ . . . [and]

cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.”), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). With

respect to the first “fact” challenged by Petitioner, whether his three prior California robbery

convictions constituted strikes, the Court need not examine the extent of clearly established

federal law regarding the Apprendi exception, because it is clear that Petitioner was not deprived

of his federal constitutional right to a jury determination with respect to that fact. Under

California law, any California robbery conviction constitutes a strike. See Cal. Penal Code

§§ 667(b)-(i) & 1170.12, and §§ 667.5(c)(9) & 1192.7(c)(19). Thus, unlike Knowles, the trial

judge here did not have to find anything other than the fact of the three prior robbery convictions

in order to find they constituted strikes. The state court’s adjudication of this aspect of Claim

1 did not involve an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Davis, 446 F.3d at 963. 

There are two reasons why the Court need not determine whether the Apprendi exception

encompasses the trial judge’s finding that Petitioner is the person who suffered the three prior

robbery convictions. First, as discussed below in Claim 3, Petitioner waived his right to a jury

determination with respect to that fact. Second, even if Petitioner’s waiver was, as he alleges,

invalid, and even if there was Apprendi error, federal habeas relief is not available because any

error is clearly harmless. 

In conducting a harmless error analysis on an Apprendi claim, relief is appropriate only

if the Court is “in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether a jury would have found the relevant aggravating

factors beyond a reasonable doubt.” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 648 (9th Cir. 2008), quoting

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). At the bench trial on the prior conviction

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -12- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 12 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

allegations here, the prosecutor proffered certified documents relating to robbery convictions

from 1991 and 1998 which contained the perpetrator’s photograph and fingerprints, along with

certified copies of documents related to a 1993 robbery conviction without a fingerprint card but

with the perpetrator’s photograph. (RT 449-50.) The documents were introduced into evidence

over defense counsel’s objection that they contained extraneous information and violated the

Confrontation Clause. (RT 450-54.) The court then heard testimony from a forensic technician

employed by the San Diego County District Attorney’s office, who was a sworn member of the

Southern California Association of Fingerprint Officers and a member of the International

Association of Identification, and who compared fingerprints fromPetitioner’s booking card for

the instant offenses to fingerprints from Petitioner’s prison packets and fingerprints contained

in the certified copies of the 1991 and 1998 robbery convictions, and had those comparisons

checked by an independent examiner. (RT 457-60.) The technician testified that in her opinion

the fingerprints were from the same person. (Id.) After cross-examination and re-direct, the

parties rested and the trial judge examined the documents in chambers. (RT 464.)

The attorneys then presented closing arguments. The prosecutor argued that all three

prior convictions satisfied the statutory definition of a strike because they were robberies, and

argued that although the certified document regarding the 1993 conviction did not contain

fingerprints, it did have Petitioner’s photograph, and the certified document regarding the 1998

conviction indicated that the sentence in that case had been enhanced by Petitioner’s 1993

conviction. (RT 463-64; CT 17.) Defense counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient

with respect to all the priors, and in particular objected to the use of the 1998 case as evidence

that Petitioner suffered the 1991 and 1993 convictions, arguing that prior conviction allegations

are not usually subject to sufficient scrutiny in such cases due to the informal nature of plea

bargaining. (RT 465.) The trial judge then stated:

I’m always frustrated in this situation because there is no question the

prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant has suffered

all these prior convictions.

But is this the best evidence they could have put on? No. So I always get

frustrated. I feel like finding him not guilty just so they will start doing it different

and better. They never listen to me anyway, so I go back to what’s my

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -13- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 13 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

responsibility here. At this point, it’s to determine the facts based on the evidence

before me.

And again, is this the best evidence? No. Is it sufficient to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt he suffered all this priors? Yes. [¶] So I find each of the

priors listed in the amended information to be true.

(RT 465-66.) 

The Court is not in grave doubt that the jury would have answered in the affirmative had

they been asked to determine whether the prosecutor had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner was the person who had suffered the three prior robbery convictions. Petitioner’s

fingerprints were compared and examined by two independent experts and found to match the

fingerprints of the perpetrator identified in the certified documents regarding the 1991 and 1998

convictions. Although the certified document regarding the 1993 conviction did not contain a

fingerprint card, it did contain a photograph of the perpetrator, and the document regarding the

1998 conviction indicated that the sentence in that case had been enhanced by Petitioner’s 1991

and 1993 convictions. The trial judge inspected those documents, which contained photographs,

and heard the expert testimony before finding that the prosecutor had proven beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner had suffered all three prior convictions. Petitioner has presented

no evidence, here or in the state courts, to challenge the finding that he was the person who

suffered the prior robbery convictions. In fact, he admits he was convicted of the 1991 and 1993

robberies in the claims addressed below where he challenges his plea bargains in those

convictions, although such an admission, alone, would likely not satisfy Apprendi. See United

States v. Cazares, 121 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, the Court denies habeas relief with respect to Claim 1 because, as discussed

immediately below in Claim 3, Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial with respect to the prior

conviction allegations. The Court alternately denies relief on the basis that the state court’s

finding that there was no Apprendi error regarding the determination of whether the priors

constituted strikes, did not involve an objectivelyunreasonable application of clearlyestablished

federal law, and assuming clearly established federal law guarantees a jury determination as to

Petitioner’s identity as the person who suffered the priors, any error is harmless. 

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -14- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 14 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Claim 33

Petitioner alleges in Claim 3 that he was denied his federal constitutional right to a jury

trial on the prior conviction allegations because his waiver of that right was invalid, and the

waiver resulted from trial counsel’s deficient performance. (Pet. at 30-36.) He alleges that the

trial judge met with defense counsel in chambers without Petitioner, where counsel indicated

Petitioner would waive his state-law right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations. (Id.

at 30.) The trial judge then asked Petitioner in open court whether he was willing to waive his

jury trial right, and “[s]urprised and caught off guard, Petitioner answered in the affirmative.” 

(Id.) He alleges counsel did not discuss the issue with him and did not make it clear he had a

say in the matter, and that he believed the issue had already been decided in chambers and he

merely agreed on the record that the right had been waived. (Id.)

Respondent answers that Petitioner has presented no evidence to overcome the strong

presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance. (Ans. Mem. at 24-25.) Respondent also argues that because Petitioner personally

waived the right on the record after being advised by the trial judge, he is unable to demonstrate

prejudice from counsel’s alleged failure to advise him. (Id.)

Petitioner replies that, as alleged in his discovery motion, he tried and failed to obtain

admissions from his trial counsel regarding counsel’s conduct with respect to the waiver, and

argues that resolution of this claim is premature before the record is expanded with a declaration

from counsel or an evidentiary hearing. (Traverse at 18.) He also contends that the trial judge’s

advisements were ineffective due to the sequence of events, that is, he believed in his mind that

the right had already been waived when the trial judge informed him that he had the right to have

a jury decide the truth of the prior conviction allegations. (Id. at 19.)

Petitioner presented Claim 3 to the state supreme court in a habeas petition, which was

summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 15

at 5; Lodgment No. 18.) The same claim was presented to the state appellate court in a habeas

Petitioner alleges in Claim 2 that his appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise Claims 3

4, 5, 6, 9 and 12 presented here. (Pet. at 26-29.) The Court will consider Claim 2 after it has addressed

these other claims.

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -15- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 15 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petition. (Lodgment No. 12 at 14-16.) The Court will look through the silent denial by the state

supreme court and apply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion, which stated:

Petitioner’s argument that his rights were violated by a waiver of the right

to a jury trial on his prior convictions is unfounded. Petitioner properly submitted

a waiver to jury trial on these allegations. His claim fails.

(Lodgment No. 13, In re Riggins, No. D062731, order at 2.)

After the jury was selected and just before testimony began, the following exchange took

place outside the presence of the jury:

The Court: Counsel, it’s my understanding that one or both of you want

to put something on the record?

Defense Counsel: Yes. I believe I discussed this with the Court in chambers. 

Should there be a conviction on any of the counts that

requires the priors, proof of the priors, my client will be

waiving jury and have those matters decided by the Court.

The Court: All right. Mr. Riggins, you understand if there were a

conviction, you would have a right to a jury trial on the issue

of your prior convictions. In other words, the same jury

would then hear evidence as to whether or not each of those

prior convictions is true or not. Your attorney indicates that

you’re willing to waive that right to have a jury decide and

have me decide on the priors. [¶] Is that what you wish to

do?

The Defendant: Yes, that’s correct your Honor.

The Court: All right. And, Mr. Stone [defense counsel], you agree with

the jury waiver?

Defense Counsel: I do.

The Court: People agree to waive jury on that issue?

Prosecutor: Yes, your Honor.

(Lodgment No. 3, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 10.)

Clearly established federal law provides that “[t]he right to a jury trial, conferred by the

Constitution, is waivable, as long as the waiver includes the consent of the government counsel,

the sanction of the court, and the ‘express and intelligent consent of the defendant.’” Crosby v.

Schwartz, 678 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312

(1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 (1970). The record

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -16- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 16 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

here clearly reflects that Petitioner was informed that he had a right to a jury trial on the prior

conviction allegations, and that he indicated he wished to waive that right. 

Although Petitioner alleges that he was taken by surprise and believed the trial judge and

defense counsel had agreed to the waiver without his input, he does not explain why he then sat

through the entire jury trial, and the bench trial on the priors, without objecting to the waiver. 

See White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that a party’s

“knowing participation in a bench trial without objection is sufficient to constitute a jury

waiver.”) After the jury was excused following the return of their verdicts, the trial judge asked

the parties how long they expected the bench trial on the priors would take. (RT 447.) When

both counsel indicated it could be done that afternoon, the trial judge stated:

It will take some time because I expect her [referring to the prosecutor] to

prove, put on proof sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to prove that this body

here in court [referring to Petitioner] belongs to whatever papers she intends to

introduce, sometimes they have a difficult time doing that. So we’ll see.

(RT 448.) 

Thus, when the trial judge indicated that he would require the prosecution to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was in fact the person who had suffered the prior

convictions alleged in the amended information, however difficult it may be and however long

it took, Petitioner stood silently by and did not object that he had been rushed into waiving his

right to a jury trial on that issue. Petitioner later addressed the trial judge at the sentencing

hearing, but did not complain about any aspect of the trial, much less the waiver. (RT 805-08.) 

The record supports a finding that Petitioner was advised by the trial judge that he had a right

to have a jury determine the truth of the prior conviction allegations, and knowingly and

intelligently waived that right in order to have the determination made by the trial judge, who

held the prosecution to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and found the allegations true in the

face of expert testimony and documentary proof that Petitioner had suffered the priors. The state

court’s finding that the waiver was valid is not contrary to, and does not involve an unreasonable

application of, clearlyestablished federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state courts.

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -17- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 17 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner also contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel did not discuss the jury trial right, or the strategy behind the decision to waive that right,

and therefore Petitioner never fully understood or appreciated the right he was waiving or the

consequences of the waiver. (Pet. at 26-32.) For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a

basis for habeas relief, Petitioner must demonstrate two things. First, he must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he must show

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that “counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Id. To show prejudice, Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result

of the proceeding would have been different absent the error. Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability in this context is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Id. Petitioner must establish both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 687. 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.

356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are both highly

deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788

(citations omitted). These standards are “difficult to meet” and “demands that state court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011). Federal habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the

state criminal justice systems,” and not simply as a means of error correction. Richter, 131 S.Ct.

at 786, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979). 

Petitioner is unable to demonstrate prejudice resulting from his counsel’s alleged failure

to fully advise him of the ramifications of the waiver because he has not shown that it is

reasonably probable that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different had

the prior conviction allegations been presented to the jury. As discussed above, Petitioner’s

fingerprints were compared and examined by two independent experts and found to match the

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -18- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 18 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fingerprints of the perpetrator identified in the certified documents of the 1991 and 1998 prior

convictions. There was also a certified document regarding the 1993 prior conviction which was

examined by the trial judge which contained a photograph of the perpetrator. Finally, the

documents showed that Petitioner’s 1998 sentence had been enhanced by his 1991 and 1993

convictions. Petitioner did not object at any time to a bench trial, and the trial judge held the

prosecutor to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s allegation that trial counsel did not properly advise him of the

consequences of waiving his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations, even if true,

fails to demonstrate he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Richter,

131 S.Ct. at 791 (“Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was denied a fair trial.”),

quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he has not

alleged an extreme malfunction in the state court with respect to the waiver of his right to a jury

trial, because the trial judge explained the right to Petitioner, who then acknowledged that right

and failed to object when the skeptical trial judge sternly ensured that the prosecutor had proven

the prior conviction allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786. 

In addition, Petitioner is not entitled to discovery in order to obtain the records of his prior

convictions or to obtain an affidavit from trial counsel regarding the waiver. Discovery under

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases is available only “for good cause,” which

is shown “where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner

may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” 

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997), quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300

(1969). Neither discovery nor an evidentiary hearing is necessary where, as here, the federal

claim can be denied on the basis of the state court record, and where the petitioner’s allegations,

even if true, do not provide a basis for habeas relief. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th

Cir. 1994). As set forth above, Petitioner’s allegations regarding his waiver, even if true, do not

establish a federal constitutional violation, and do not establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s alleged failure to properly advise him regarding the waiver. 

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -19- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 19 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Furthermore, because this claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, this Court

must make its § 2254(d) determination based solely on the evidence presented to the state court. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Petitioner can only proceed to develop additional evidence in

federal court if § 2254(d) is satisfied, which it has not been here, or, possibly, if there is new

evidence which transforms an already-exhausted claim into a new claim which has not been

adjudicated on the merits in the state court, in which case § 2254(d) arguably would not apply. 

Id. at 1401 n.10; Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner has not

identified any new evidence which, even if it was available through discovery or an evidentiary

hearing, would transform this or any other claim presented here into a new claim which has not

been adjudicated on the merits in state court. 

D. Claim 4

Petitioner alleges in Claim 4 that the use of his prior convictions to enhance his sentence

violated the plea bargains of those convictions. (Pet. at 37-44.) He states he pleaded no contest

to robberies in 1991 and 1993, and that a “condition of the agreements, implied from the law

then existing, was that each conviction would result in only a five year enhancement if Petitioner

were subsequently convicted of a new offense.” (Traverse at 21.)

Respondent answers that Petitioner is incorrect to contend that his sentences on the prior

convictions were increased, because clearly established federal law provides that punishment as

a recidivist does not violate any federal constitutional provision. (Ans. Mem. at 25-26.) 

Petitioner replies that he is not complaining that the sentences from his prior convictions were

increased, but is alleging that his current sentence contravened his reasonable expectations

arising from the prior plea agreements. (Traverse at 21.)

Petitioner presented Claim 4 to the state supreme court in his pro se habeas petition. 

(Lodgment No. 15 at 6.) The state supreme court summarily denied the petition without a

statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 18.) Petitioner did not present

this claim to any other state court, and, absent an indication otherwise, this Court must presume

that the silent denial by the state supreme court was an adjudication on the merits of the federal

constitutional claim presented. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86 (“When a federal claim has

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -20- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 20 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the

state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law

procedural principles to the contrary.”) This Court “must determine what arguments or theories

. . . could have supported the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the

holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court. Id. at 786. 

Clearly established federal law provides that “when a plea rests in any significant degree

on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement

or consideration, such a promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262

(1971). Petitioner has not alleged that his no contest pleas in the prior convictions were induced

by promises made by the prosecutor, but merely alleges that the version of California’s Three

Strikes law in effect at the time “implied” that the convictions would not be used to enhance

future sentences by more than five years. (Pet. at 37.) Petitioner has not alleged a violation of

the prior plea bargains because he has not alleged he was induced into the plea by a promise

from the prosecutor. See Davis, 446 F.3d at 961 (holding that a Santobello claim requires the

plea to be induced by a promise from the prosecutor), citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,

509-10 (1984), disapproved of on other grounds in Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 138

n.1 (2009). Any subsequent amendment of California’s Three Strikes law to permit those priors

to be used to impose a life sentence does not violate clearly established federal law. See Witte

v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (“In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes,

we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the

later offense ‘is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier

crimes,’ but instead as a ‘stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an

aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’”) As discussed below in Claim 13, Petitioner’s

allegation that then-existing pre-three strikes California law was incorporated into the 1991 and

1993 plea agreements, and those agreements were thereafter breached by the 1994 enactment

of the Three Strikes law, is without merit. See Davis, 446 F.3d at 962 (“We recognize that, in

California, contracts (including plea bargains), are ‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -21- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 21 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional

laws.’”), quoting People v. Gipson, 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1070 (2004).

The state supreme court’s silent denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, because the state court could

have reasonably found, consistent with Santobello, Witte and Davis, that Petitioner failed to

allege a violation of the plea bargains in his prior convictions. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86. 

Petitioner’s speculation that examination of those plea agreements might aid in the resolution

of this claim is insufficient to show good cause for discovery or an evidentiary hearing. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398; Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09; Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679.

E. Claim 5

Petitioner alleges in Claim 5 that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel failed to investigate and challenge the prior convictions on the basis they resulted from

no contest pleas during which he was not properly advised of the rights he was waiving or the

elements of robbery. (Pet. at 45-61.) Respondent answers that to the extent Petitioner seeks to

have this Court declare his prior convictions invalid, such a claim is foreclosed because he is no

longer in custody under those convictions. (Ans. Mem. at 26-27.) Respondent similarly argues

that Petitioner has not alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because he has not shown the

prior convictions were open to challenge at trial. (Id. at 27-28.) 4

Petitioner replies that he is not asking this Court to find that his prior convictions are

invalid, but argues that trial counsel should have challenged their use to enhance his sentence. 

(Traverse at 25.) He argues that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is cognizable on

federal habeas, and seeks discovery of the records of his prior convictions. (Id. at 25-27.)

Respondent cites LackawannaCo. Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001), where the Supreme 4

Court held that a state prisoner proceeding in a federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

generally cannot challenge the constitutional validity of prior convictions used to enhance his current

sentence where the petitioner is no longer in custody under those prior convictions. Id. at 403-04 (“[W]e

hold that once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because

the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did

so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid.”) The only exception is if the

prior conviction involved a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 404. 

Although Petitioner alleges he received inadequate advice of counsel in his prior pleas, he does not

allege he was denied counsel in connection to those pleas. Thus, even if a liberal construction of the pro

se Petition includes a challenge to the validity of the prior convictions, habeas relief is not available.

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -22- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 22 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a habeas petition which was

summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 15

at 6-8; Lodgment No. 18.) He did not present this claim to any other state court, and the Court

will presume the silent denial of the claim was an adjudication on the merits. Richter, 131 S.Ct.

at 784-86. The Court must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state

court’s decision, and “ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree” that such

arguments are inconsistent with a prior Supreme Court case. Id.

Petitioner alleged in state court, as he does here, that if his trial counsel had investigated,

he would have learned that Petitioner was not aware of the elements of robbery prior to pleading

guilty in 1991 and 1993, was not properly advised of the constitutional rights or defenses he was

giving up in pleading guilty, and that if he had been so advised he would not have pleaded guilty

in those cases and would have insisted on going to trial. (Lodgment No. 15 at 6-8.) He contends

he could have argued that the force or fear element was missing in the 1991 robbery because as

he was leaving the store with stolen goods, it was the store security agent who initiated contact

with Petitioner’s moving car as Petitioner was fleeing, and not Petitioner who initiated contact

with the security guard with his car. (Id. at 8-9.) He contends he could have made a similar

argument that he did not actually have a gun during the 1993 robbery when he told a store

security officer who had confronted him in the parking lot to stop following him because he had

a gun. (Id.) A pre-trial psychological evaluation prepared at trial counsel’s request, and

presented here by Petitioner, states in part:

Mr. Riggins has a consistent pattern of criminal charges . . . includ[ing] Robbery,

Receiving Stolen Property, Grand Theft, Petty Theft, Insufficient Funds, Checks,

Assault, Battery, Possession of Marijuana for Sale, Use/Under Influence of

Controlled Substance, and Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia. . . .

[¶] Regarding several of his earlier felony convictions, Mr. Riggins said,

“Whenever force and fear are involved they jack up the charge. Most (of my prior

convictions) were burglaries, but the force and fear bring it up to robbery. For

example, (my first felony) I was in the car with the stolen merchandise and the

security guard jumped on the car and when I backed up, he rolled off. This turned

a petty theft into a robbery. The second (felony) stemmed from me stealing a

microwave oven out of a Payless store and when employees were trying to get the

merchandise back, I refused. I told them, ‘Don’t follow me, I have a gun.’ This

was the force and fear.” 

(Traverse at 101.)

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -23- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 23 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Thus, trial counsel had a psychological report prepared which reflects Petitioner’s belief

that the force or fear element had been improperly or unfairly satisfied in his prior robbery

convictions. The state supreme court could have reasonably found that trial counsel did not fail

to investigate whether the prior robbery convictions were open to challenge on the basis that

Petitioner had not been properly advised regarding the force or fear element in those cases. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to

make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary” and such decisions

“must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavymeasure

of deference to counsel’s judgments.”) The state court could also have reasonably rejected this

claim on the basis that Petitioner could not establish prejudice from counsel’s actions because

he failed to establish a reasonable probability that counsel could have successfully challenged

the prior plea agreements on the basis that Petitioner failed to understand the elements of robbery

or the rights he was giving up by entering the no contest pleas. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04;

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (“[T]he representations of the defendant, his

lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge

accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. 

Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”)

The state court’s silent denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86;

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. Discovery and an evidentiary hearing are not available with

respect to Claim 5 because Petitioner has not alleged facts which, if true, demonstrate he

received ineffective assistance of counsel. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398; Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-

09; Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679.

F. Claim 6

Petitioner alleges in Claim 6 that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel failed to adequately argue that the trial judge should exercise his discretion to strike the

prior convictions. (Pet. at 62-71.) Specifically, he alleges counsel should have sought to strike

one or two of the priors instead of all three, failed to argue that the priors were non-violent, and

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -24- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 24 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

failed to challenge the prosecutor’s statements that Petitioner had multiple violent felony

convictions, a pattern of violence, and an affinity for weapons. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that Petitioner clearly falls within the spirit of the Three Strikes law,

and there is no reasonable probability that had counsel presented the arguments identified by

Petitioner the sentence would have been any different. (Ans. Mem. at 28-32.) Petitioner replies

that because the judge relied on the violent nature of Petitioner’s criminal record in pronouncing

sentence, the omitted arguments may have been persuasive. (Traverse at 31-33.) 

Petitioner presented this claimto the state supreme court in a pro se habeas petition which

was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No.

15 at 8-9; Lodgment No. 18.) He did not present the claim to any other state court, and the Court

will presume the state supreme court’s silent denial of the claim was an adjudication of the

merits. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86. The Court must determine what arguments or theories

could have supported the state court’s decision, and then “ask whether it is possible fairminded

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior

decision of” the Supreme Court. Id.

The prosecutor filed a sentencing memorandum in which she argued for the maximum

available sentence on the basis that Petitioner’s “criminal history is horrendous, . . . he has been

convicted of eight separate felonies,” and in two of the three strike offenses he “was personally

armed with a deadly weapon of some sort.” (RT 103.) The prosecutor argued that Petitioner’s

“performance on probation and parole has been abysmal, constantly picking up new felonies

and/or violating the terms of his probation or parole,” and that he “is clearly a violent person

with an affinity for deadly weapons who poses a significant threat to society.” (RT 104.) 

Defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum in which he presented evidence that

Petitioner had the support of his family, that his criminal history was due to his drug addiction,

and that he was a good candidate for treatment and rehabilitation in that he had already been

accepted to an addiction treatment facility. (RT 135.) Defense counsel also argued that the trial

court should exercise its discretion to strike the prior convictions and fashion an appropriate

sentence of less than life in prison, based on the remoteness of the priors, which, like the current

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -25- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 25 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

offense, for which Petitioner would be eligible for probation but for his criminal history, were

all caused by his drug addiction. (RT 136-37.) Defense counsel also argued that the priors, like

the instant offense, were simple offenses which involved small amounts of property, did not

involve anyone being seriously hurt, and were only elevated to robberies due to Petitioner’s

attempts to flee. The trial judge, in explaining his decision not to exercise his limited discretion

to strike the priors, stated:

So the first question, is this a minor felony? Well, it’s not. It’s not only a

serious felony; it’s a violent felony. So that factor goes against striking the strike.

The Court then looks at the priors. How serious were the priors? Well,

they weren’t particularly serious in the sense that - obviously to be a strike the

offense has to be a serious felony, and these I would say were all garden variety

serious felonies; on the other hand, he has three of them.

The next thing we look at is the remoteness of the priors. And the problem

is these priors are not particularly remote. He had a strike in ‘91, another in ‘93,

another in ‘98. Now, the one in ‘98, that’s some time ago. On the other hand,

when we look at one of the reasons there was such a gap is that he was sentenced

to a significant time in prison, so there really wasn’t much time when you look

from the time he got out of prison until this current offense.

Ultimately the Court has to look and see whether or not, in looking at the

current offense, the priors, the age of the priors, and his entire background, does

it appear that this defendant falls inside or outside the spirit of the three strikes

law. And the problem in this case is when you look at everything, Mr. Riggins

appears to be the poster child for the three strikes law. I can’t say that he falls

outside the spirit of the three strikes law. I would have to do some mental jujitsu

to get there. I can’t do that. There is no way you can look at these facts and his

background and say he’s not within the spirit of the three strikes law. For those

reasons, I can’t and won’t strike the priors in this case. Recognizing the Court has

the discretion, I think it would be an abuse of discretion to strike the strikes in this

case.

I understand the defendant has a drug problem. But he doesn’t just have

a drug problem. Not everyone who has a drug problem commits crimes. Not

everyone who has a drug problem and commits crimes commits violent crimes,

so he not only has a drug problem, he has a violent crime problem.

(RT 813-14.)

The state supreme court could have reasonably found that Petitioner’s allegations (that

trial counsel should have argued that the prior convictions were non-violent and for dismissal

of one or two rather than all three, and should have challenged the prosecutor’s statements that

Petitioner had multiple violent felony convictions with a pattern of violence and an affinity for

weapons), did not allege deficient performance in light of defense counsel’s arguments listed

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -26- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 26 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

above, and in light of the trial judge’s indication that he considered the prior convictions to be

garden variety serious felonies, that it would be an abuse of his discretion to strike the priors, and

that Petitioner “appears to be the poster child for the three strikes law.” See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687 (holding that deficient performance “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.”) Because such a finding would be consistent with Strickland, the state court’s

adjudication of the claim is objectively reasonable. Id.; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86. 

The state court could also have reasonably found that Petitioner had not alleged facts

which, if true, would establish prejudice, because the trial judge gave careful consideration to

the limits of his discretion to strike the priors. Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability

that had trial counsel presented additional argument, the result of the sentencing proceeding

would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that a reasonable

probabilityis “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”) Discoveryand

an evidentiary hearing are not available with respect to Claim 6 because Petitioner has not

alleged facts which, if true, demonstrate he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398; Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09; Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679.

G. Claim 7

Petitioner alleges in Claim 7 that the use of his 1991 and 1993 robbery convictions to

enhance his sentence violated Apprendi because they were based on no contest pleas which

lacked jury findings on, or proper admissions to, the elements of the offenses. (Pet. at 72-77.) 

Respondent answers that whether a counseled plea is denominated as a no contest or a guilty

plea, it constitutes an admission to the elements of the offense. (Ans. Mem. at 32-33.) Petitioner

replies that as to convictions obtained by pleas, the Apprendi exception applies only where the

waiver of the trial right was knowing and intelligent, which did not occur in those two prior

robbery convictions. (Traverse at 37-40.)

Petitioner presented this claimto the state supreme court in a pro se habeas petition which

was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No.

15 at 9; Lodgment No. 18.) Petitioner did not present this claim to any other state court. The

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -27- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 27 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state court’s

decision, and then “ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme

Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86. 

As set forth above in Claims 4 and 5, and again below in Claim 13, Petitioner has not

established that his prior robbery convictions were open to challenge at trial. His allegation that

he did not knowingly and intelligently enter the pleas in those cases is belied by the record,

which demonstrates that he had a familiarity with the criminal justice system at the time he

entered those pleas, as he had already been convicted of four felonies and three misdemeanors

before he was convicted of robbery for the first time in 1991. (RT 90-91.) “[W]hen determining

whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, a court may look to the

defendant’s background, conduct, and prior familiarity with the criminal justice system.” Baker

v. City of Blaine, 221 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000), citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

464 (1983); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 36 (1992) (“We have previously treated

evidence of a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system as relevant to the

question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights.”) Petitioner presents no evidence

to support his allegation that his prior convictions were obtained through pleas which did not

establish the elements of the offenses, or did not contain a valid waiver of his jury trial rights,

and he has not shown that his prior convictions were open to attack on that basis. Lackawanna,

532 U.S. at 403-04; Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74. 

The state supreme court could have reasonably found that Petitioner’s allegations, that

the pleas in his the prior convictions did not establish the elements of robbery and do not show

he knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, were insufficient to allege an Apprendi violation. 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86; Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488;

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74. Petitioner has not shown good cause for discovery with respect

to his prior plea agreements, and is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, because his allegations,

even if true, do not entitle him to habeas relief. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1401 n.10; Bracy, 520

U.S. at 908-09; Hayes, 301 F.3d at 1065 n.6; Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679.

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -28- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 28 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

H. Claim 8

Petitioner alleges in Claim 8 that he was denied his right to a jury trial, to present a

defense, and to the effective assistance of counsel, because the trial court failed to instruct the

jury sua sponte, and his trial counsel failed to request the jury be instructed, that in order to

constitute robbery Petitioner’s use of force or fear must have been motivated by an intent to

steal. (Pet. at 78-87.) Petitioner argues that when he brandished the box cutter at Wilkerson, he

did not know Wilkerson was a loss protection officer, because Wilkerson had said he worked

at a golf store. (Id.) Petitioner contends the missing instruction was proper because the jury

could have found that he thought he was protecting his own property from another thief when

he brandished the box cutter, rather than motivated by an intent to steal. (Id.)

Respondent answers that the evidence at trial showed Petitioner threatened Wilkerson

with a box cutter as they struggled over the bag containing stolen merchandise after Wilkerson

had identified himself as a loss protection officer for the Gap store, and that Petitioner then left

at a high rate of speed with the stolen goods. (Ans. Mem. at 33-36.) Respondent argues that

Petitioner does not dispute that evidence, and has presented no evidence to the contrary, here or

to the state court. (Id.) 

Petitioner replies that even assuming Wilkerson identified himself as a loss protection

officer prior to brandishing the box cutter, the jury could have concluded that Petitioner did not

hear him do so because he was too occupied with Wilkerson’s actions, or did not hear him over

the loud music coming from the Gap store. (Traverse at 45.) 

The aspect of this claim alleging the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury was

presented to the state appellate and supreme courts on direct appeal. (Lodgment Nos. 6, 8.) The

Court will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court and apply the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion, which stated:

Riggins contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on

the defense theory of the case, i.e., that when Riggins struggled with Wilkerson

over the duffel bag, Riggins believed he was protecting the stolen property from

another thief, as opposed to a store security officer. On appeal, Riggins asserts

that the trial court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, with CALCRIM

No. 3476, an instruction on the defense of property. [Footnote: CALCRIM No.

3476 provides, in relevant part: “The owner (or possessor) of (real/(or) personal)

propertymay use reasonable force to protect that property from imminent harm.”]

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -29- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 29 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

According to Riggins, his theory at trial was that his use of force against

Wilkerson in pulling out the box cutter was motivated not by an intent to steal the

merchandise, but, rather, by the desire to defend his own property (i.e., the

identification card, mail and other small items in the duffel bag) and/or the stolen

merchandise. Riggins acknowledges that he did not request an instruction on

defense of property but nevertheless asserts that the court should have given the

instruction because his attorney argued that Riggins did not have the requisite

intent in using force to be convicted of robbery.

We conclude that the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury, sua

sponte, on the specific defense of defense of property, since there was not

substantial evidence to support that defense. In order for Riggins to have been

entitled to a specific instruction on the defense of property, there would have had

to have been sufficient evidence to show that Riggins’s use of force against

Wilkerson was done “(t)o prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure

propertyin (Riggins’s)lawful possession.” (Pen.Code, § 693, italics added (lawful

resistance).) However, the evidence demonstrated that the property that Riggins

was purportedly defending was not property that was lawfully in his possession,

but instead, was property that Riggins had illegally taken from the stores.

Although Riggins contends on appeal that he could have been protecting

his own property that was also in the duffel bag (i.e. some mail, a transit card,

etc.), those items were mingled with property that was clearly not in Riggins’s

lawful possession. Riggins simply had no right to defend the stolen property

against someone else’s attempt to possess it. He was not entitled to an instruction

on defense of property, since that is not a defense to taking stolen property by

force or fear. The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on defense

of property.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Riggins, No. D057957, slip op. at 8-9.)

Clearly established federal law provides that in order to establish a violation of his federal

due process rights by the failure to give a requested jury instruction, Petitioner must demonstrate

that the instruction should have been given, and that its omission “so infected the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violates due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977),

quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). A state court’s “failure to correctly

instruct the jury on a defense may deprive the defendant of his due process right to present a

defense.” Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v.

Fejes, 232 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the

jury on his theory of defense provided it is supported by law and has some foundation in the

evidence.”). Where the failure to give an instruction is in issue, the burden on the petitioner is

“especially heavy.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155. Moreover, even if the trial court’s failure to give

the instruction violated due process, habeas relief would still not be available unless the error

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -30- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 30 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996).

Petitioner has not carried his “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the state court erred

when it held he “was not entitled to an instruction on defense of property, since that is not a

defense to taking stolen property by force or fear.” (Lodgment No. 7, Riggins, No. D057957,

slip op. at 9.) Federal courts “are bound by a state court’s construction of its own penal

statutes.” Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S.

74, 76 (2005) (“[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct

appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”), citing

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”) Petitioner was not deprived

of a defense by the failure to give the instruction because there was no evidence that he was

protecting only his own property, and the state appellate court’s adjudication of this aspect of

Claim 8 was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Even to the extent Petitioner could demonstrate it was error to fail to give the instruction,

any error was clearly harmless. Petitioner speculates that the jury could have found he did not

hear Wilkerson identify himself as a loss protection officer. However, Wilkerson testified that

when he identified himself as a loss protection officer, Petitioner responded, “What are you

talking about? I didn’t steal anything.” (RT 72.) Because the evidence presented at trial

supported a finding that Petitioner was protecting stolen property, and there was no evidence to

the contrary, the alleged instructional error could not have had a “substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Roy, 519 U.S. at 5.

Petitioner also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial

counsel’s failure to request the instruction. (Pet. at 78.) This aspect of the claim was presented

to the state supreme court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 15 at 10.) That petition was

summarily denied without citation or a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 18.) The Court

must determine what arguments or theories could have supported that decision, and ask “whether

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -31- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 31 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent

with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86. 

As set forth above, Petitioner has not established that the instruction should have been

given or that the failure to give the instruction deprived him of an available defense. Any

attempt by trial counsel to request such an instruction would have been futile, and Petitioner

cannot demonstrate that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to request the instruction. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that deficient performance “requires showing that counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”) Even assuming counsel did not have a tactical reason for

not requesting the instruction, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice because the instruction was

neither necessary nor appropriate. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 791 (“Representation is

constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process’ that the defendant was denied a fair trial.”), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

Accordingly, habeas relief is denied as to the ineffective assistance aspect of Claim 8.

I. Claim 9

Petitioner alleges in Claim 9 that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel made no effort to challenge the restitution fine imposed as part of his sentence. (Pet.

at 88-96.) Respondent answers that challenges to restitution orders are not cognizable on federal

habeas. (Ans. Mem. at 37-38.)

This claim was presented to the state supreme court in a pro se habeas petition and

summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 15

at 10-11; Lodgment No. 18.) This Court must determine what arguments or theories could have

supported the state court’s decision and “whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree

that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the

Supreme Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86. 

This Court is empowered to grant habeas relief only where Petitioner has shown that he

is in custody in violation of the federal constitution, laws or treaties. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

Ninth Circuit has held that claims challenging restitution fines are not cognizable on federal

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -32- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 32 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

habeas because such claims do not allege that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the

federal constitution, laws or treaties, even where the petitioner is in physical custody. Bailey v.

Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 400 (9th

Cir. 2002) (holding that claim challenging restitution fine cannot be brought on federal habeas

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The state supreme court’s silent denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

J. Claim 10

Petitioner alleges in Claim 10 that the jury was improperly instructed they were able to

draw an inference of consciousness of guilt from evidence that Petitioner fled, or tried to flee,

immediately after the crime was committed, or tried to hide evidence. (Pet. at 97-104.) He

contends that no evidence was presented to support such an instruction. (Id.)

Respondent answers that the state appellate court’s reasoned opinion rejecting this claim,

on the basis that sufficient evidence existed to support the instruction, was neither contrary to,

nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Ans. Mem. at 38-44.) Petitioner replies that the

state court’s findings are erroneous and unsupported by the record. (Traverse at 49-50.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and supreme courts on direct appeal. 

(Lodgment Nos. 6, 8.) The Court will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court

and apply the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion, which stated:

Riggins contends that the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 371,

over his attorney’s objection, because there was no showing that he hid his duffel

bag. CALCRIM No. 371 allows the jury to consider whether efforts by a

defendant to suppress or hide evidence raised an inference of consciousness of

guilt. The written instruction that the court gave to the jury was as follows: “If the

defendant tried to hide evidence, that conduct may show that he was aware of his

guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made such an attempt, it is up to you to

decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence ofsuch an attempt cannot

prove guilt by itself.”

“A defendant’s willful suppression of evidence, or willful attempt to

suppress evidence, is admissible to prove consciousness of guilt.” (People v.

Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1007, citing Evid.Code, § 413.) “‘It is an

elementary principle of law that before a jury can be instructed that it may draw

a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the

jury, will support the suggested inference. (Citation.) (¶) Whether or not any

given set offacts may constitute suppression or attempted suppression of evidence

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -33- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 33 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

from which a trier of fact can infer a consciousness of guilt on the part of a

defendant is a question of law. Thus in order for a jury to be instructed that it can

infer a consciousness of guilt from suppression of adverse evidence by a

defendant, there must be some evidence in the record which, if believed by the

jury, will sufficiently support the suggested inference.’ (Citation.)” (People v.

Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 620 (Hart ).)

On appeal, a reviewing court looks at the record to determine whether there

is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to give an instruction

on an attempt to hide evidence. (Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 620.)

Riggins contends that there was no evidence from which the jury could

have inferred that he hid or attempted to hide evidence. According to Riggins, the

fact that he did not have the bags with him at the moment he was apprehended

“does not lead to the inference that he suppressed evidence.” The bags were

found underneath the rear bumper of a car that was located toward the entrance

to the northern driveway of the car dealership lot, and Riggins was apprehended

some distance away from the bags, in an area described as the east end of the

parking lot, toward the back of the dealership. The parking lot was filled with

approximately 60 cars. This constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial

court’s decision to give the instruction regarding an attempt to hide evidence. The

jury could have reasonably inferred from the fact that Riggins placed the stolen

merchandise behind a car in the large dealership and then left the merchandise

while he headed off in another direction, that Riggins was attempting to hide that

evidence and distance himself from the stolen merchandise. The trial court thus

did not err in instructing the jury that it could infer consciousness of guilt from

Riggins’s attempt to hide evidence in this case.

. . . .

Riggins contends that because there was no evidence that he fled, the trial

court erred in instructing the jury that it could infer his guilt from his flight from

police. We disagree.

Over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury with

CALCRIM No. 372 as follows: “If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately

after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his

guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to

decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the

defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.”

Evidence that a defendant tried to hide after the crime is relevant to show

consciousness of guilt. (People v. Vu (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1030.) A

flightinstruction “‘is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed

the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated

by a consciousness of guilt.’ (Citation.)” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th

936, 982.) Further, “‘flight requires neither the physical act of running nor the

reaching of a far-away haven. (Citation.) Flight manifestly does require,

however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.’ (Citation.)” (People v.

Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 31.)

On appeal, a reviewing court determines whether there was sufficient

evidence presented from which a jury could have reasonably inferred that the

defendant fled after the crime. (People v. Lutz (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 489, 498.)

/ / /

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -34- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 34 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Riggins argues that there was insufficient evidence of flight to warrant the

flight instruction. He contends that he did not run away from the store or flee in

a vehicle, but instead, simply walked through the mall and across the street. He

also suggests that the police found him walking and standing. Contrary to

Riggins’s contentions, there was abundant evidence of flight. Wilkerson and

Hunter watched as Riggins “fled” the scene at a “fairly high rate of speed.” In

addition, Riggins went straight into a car dealership, where he maneuvered

between cars and at one point moved into a position where an officer’s view of

him was blocked by a vehicle. All of this is sufficient evidence of flight from

which the jury could reasonably infer that Riggins was attempting to avoid being

arrested.

In addition, the instruction left it up to the jury to determine whether

defendant’s conduct constituted flight and, if so, what the “meaning and

importance” of that conduct was. The jury was told that if it did not find that

Riggins’s departure from the scene of the robbery constituted flight immediately

after the commission of a crime, it should disregard CALCRIM No. 372. On the

other hand, if the jury found that Riggins was attempting to flee, the instruction

provided Riggins some amount of protection by informing the jury it could not

infer guilt from his flight, alone. It is clear that the trial court did not err by

instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 under these circumstances.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Riggins, No. D057957, slip op. at 10-13.)

In order to show a federal due process violation arising from an instructional error,

Petitioner must demonstrate that the instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. “In

a habeas corpus case, a jury instruction requires reversal only if it so offended established

notions of due process as to deprive (the defendant) of a constitutionally fair trial.” Turner v.

Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled in part

on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). “It is well

established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered

in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72,

quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. A permissive inference instruction “is constitutional so long as

it can be said ‘with substantial assurance’ that the inferred fact is ‘more likely than not to flow

from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’” United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d

294, 296 (9th Cir. 1992), quoting Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 166 n.28 (1979). 

It was objectively reasonable for the state appellate court to find that an inference of guilt

could be drawn from Petitioner’s actions of leaving the scene at a “fairly high rate ofspeed” with

stolen goods after being confronted by the loss prevention officer. The Court can say with

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -35- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 35 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“substantial assurance” that a jury could infer a consciousness of guilt by those actions. RubioVillareal, 967 F.2d at 296. The same can be said about Petitioner’s action of thereafter going

to the car dealership, where he maneuvered between cars to a position where an officer’s view

of him was blocked, and where he attempted to evade an officer who spotted him, changed his

appearance, and abandoned the stolen merchandise. Id. The state court’s adjudication of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

K. Claim 11

Petitioner alleges in Claim11 that the prosecutor committed misconduct during the bench

trial on the prior conviction allegations, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

when he failed to object to the prosecutor’s statements. (Pet. at 105-10.) Specifically, he

contends the prosecutor improperly argued that although there was no fingerprint evidence to

establish that Petitioner had suffered the 1993 robbery conviction, his admission in his 1998

robbery case that he had suffered robbery convictions in 1991 and 1993 was sufficient to prove

the truth of the 1993 prior conviction allegation. (Id.) Petitioner contends the documents did

not reflect such an admission, and that he made no such admission. (Id.)

Respondent answers that the record does not establish the prosecutor was incorrect in her

assertion, and there was therefore no misconduct. (Ans. Mem. at 44-46.) Respondent also

contends that there was no prejudice because Petitioner does not allege or show that he was not

convicted of the 1993 prior conviction. (Id. at 46.) 

Petitioner replies that the abstract of judgement for his 1998 robbery conviction, which

is attached to the Petition as Exhibit B, indicates the trial judge there found he had committed

the 1991 and 1993 convictions, not that he had admitted to having suffered those convictions. 

(Traverse at 54-55.) He argues that the trial judge here would probably have found the 1993

prior conviction allegation not true absent the prosecutor’s misrepresentation. (Id.)

Petitioner presented Claim 11 to the state supreme court in his second pro se habeas

petition filed in that court. (Lodgment No. 17.) The state supreme court denied that petition,

which contained only that one claim, with a order which stated: “The petition for writ of habeas

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -36- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 36 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

corpus is denied. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-769; People v. Duvall (1995) 9

Cal.4th 464, 474.)” (Lodgment No. 19.) 

Although Respondent contends that AEDPA deference should apply to this claim (Ans.

Mem. at 46), it is clear that it was never adjudicated on the merits in state court, because the only

state court it was presented to denied it on procedural grounds. See Pombrio v. Hense, 631

F.Supp.2d 1247, 1251-52 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (explaining that citations to Clark and Duvall point

to correctable defects and therefore render such claims unexhausted in federal court); Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (holding that a procedural default arises when “the

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurallybarred.”);Walker v.Martin, 562

U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1125-31 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness requirement

providing that a prisoner must seek habeas relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from

the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information

offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” supports a federal procedural

default). Respondent has waived the affirmative defense of procedural default by failing to raise

it in the Answer. Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997). Although the Court has discretion to

raise the procedural default issue sua sponte where “to do so serves the interests of justice,

comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency,” Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.

1998), the Court declines to do so, because under a de novo review of the claim it is clearly

without merit. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Procedural bar

issues are not infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it

may well make sense in some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the same.”)

Clearly established federal law provides that “[t]o constitute a due process violation, the

prosecutorial misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the

defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), quoting United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). The alleged misconduct must be reviewed in the

context of the entire trial. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 

/ / /

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -37- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 37 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner submits the abstract of judgment for the 1998 conviction which indicates that

he was found guilty, pursuant to a plea, of robbery, and the sentencing judge found that he had

suffered two prior convictions. (Pet. Ex. B.) He contends he did not admit to the 1991 and 1993

prior convictions when entering his guilty plea in the 1998 case, and if his trial counsel had

objected to the prosecutor’s contention at sentencing that the 1998 conviction documents showed

Petitioner had admitted to having suffered the 1993 conviction, the trial judge might have found

that allegation unproven, particularly in light of the lack of a fingerprint card for the 1993

conviction. However, the prosecutor did not argue that Petitioner had admitted to the truth of

the prior conviction allegations when entering his plea, she argued that the abstract of judgment

for the 1998 case was sufficient proof that Petitioner had been convicted of those prior

convictions because it showed that his sentence in that case had been enhanced by those prior

convictions. (RT 463-64.) Defense counsel argued that to the extent Petitioner had admitted the

two prior conviction allegations when entering his plea in the 1998 case, such an admission

should not be relied upon due to the summary and pragmatic nature of the plea bargaining

process, adding:

Give you an example, if I have a client and he has four prison priors and the offer

is plea to the low term on the prison prior, I may not as defense counsel, go over

all the prison packets and see which one is defective, I may just admit one. [¶] 

To say later on that that is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that that person

suffered that one, is little bit less than reasonable doubt.

(RT 465.) 

The trial judge had before him more than just the 1998 abstract of judgment which

showed Petitioner’s 1993 conviction had been used in the 1998 case as a sentence enhancement. 

He had the photograph of the person who had been convicted in the 1993 case, and was able to

compare it to Petitioner in the courtroom, as well as to photographs in Petitioner’s prison packet

and his 1991 and 1998 convictions. He also had expert testimony that Petitioner’s fingerprints

matched the fingerprints of the person convicted of the 1991 and 1998 priors. 

Petitioner has not alleged facts which, if true, establish prosecutorial misconduct. The

prosecutor’s argument that the records of Petitioner’s 1998 robbery conviction could be used as

evidence to support a finding that Petitioner had been convicted of the 1993 robbery, was neither

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -38- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 38 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

erroneous nor misleading and did not deny him his right to a fair trial on the prior conviction

allegations. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765. Petitioner has also failed to allege ineffective assistance of

counsel because, as set forth above, trial counsel argued against using the documents for that

purpose. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 791 (“Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if

it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was

denied a fair trial.”), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Based on a de novo review of the

record with respect to this claim, Petitioner has failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrate

prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel. 

L. Claim 12

Petitioner alleges in Claim12 that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial

counsel stipulated at the preliminary hearing, without his consent, that Petitioner had previously

been convicted of a theft related offense, rendering the petty theft charge a felony. (Pet. at 111-

16.) Respondent answers that there is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing,

and therefore no federal claim can be presented based on errors at a preliminary hearing. (Ans.

Mem. at 46-48.) Respondent also argues Petitioner cannot show prejudice because he has not

established that the prior theft related conviction does not exist, and the prosecution could have

proven its existence absent the stipulation. (Id.)

Petitioner replies that he has a Sixth Amendment right to adequate representation at a

preliminary hearing. (Traverse at 59.) He also argues that prejudice is presumed where, as here,

counsel failed entirely to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing. (Id. at 59-60.)

This claim was presented to the state supreme court in a pro se habeas petition and

summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 15

at 5; Lodgment No. 18.) Because Petitioner did not present this claim to the lower courts, this

Court must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state court’s

decision, and then “ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme

Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86.

/ / /

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -39- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 39 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At the close of testimony at the preliminary hearing, the following exchange took place:

The Court: Okay. And let me ask you: Do we have a stipulation on the

prior?

Defense Counsel: As to the petty theft with a prior?

The Court: Yes.

Defense Counsel: Yes, your Honor.

Prosecutor: I have - I was prepared to introduce - I have a certified prior

that I can introduce as an exhibit.

The Court: All right.

Defense Counsel: I just stipulated to it, your Honor. The reason why I did is I

do have an attached copy. So we’ll stipulate there was a

prior given that the court has heard this information.

The Court: Okay. I appreciate that. We’ll accept the stipulation.

(Lodgment No. 2, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 56-57.)

Thus, the prosecutor was prepared to introduce a certified copy of one of Petitioner’s six

theft-related prior convictions (see CT 90-92), and defense counsel was in possession of a copy

of that document when he stipulated. Petitioner is therefore incorrect that his counsel entirely

failed to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing, as counsel was in possession of the

document the prosecutor would have relied upon absent the stipulation, and explained on the

record that that was the reason he stipulated. The state supreme court could have reasonably

denied this claim on the basis that trial counsel’s stipulation did not amount to deficient

performance. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 791 (“Representation is constitutionally ineffective only

if it ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was

denied a fair trial.”), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The state court could also have

reasonably found Petitioner was not prejudiced by the stipulation because there is no dispute

Petitioner suffered a theft related conviction prior to the preliminary hearing in this case. Id. 

M. Claim 13

Petitioner alleges in Claim 13 that use of his prior convictions to enhance his sentence

was a violation of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, and that he received

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -40- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 40 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object on that basis. (Pet. at 117-

28.) He alleges that when the Three Strikes law was amended in 1994, it greatly increased the

potential future enhancement liability arising from his 1991 and 1993 pleas. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that the legal obligations of Petitioner’s prior plea agreements have

long since been fulfilled, and that counsel was not deficient in failing to raise such a meritless

objection. (Ans. Mem. at 48-50.) Petitioner replies that the 1994 amendment to the Three

Strikes law impaired his preexisting contracts. (Traverse at 62-66.)

This claim was presented to the state supreme court in a pro se habeas petition and

summarily denied without a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 15 at 6; Lodgment No. 18.) 

Petitioner did not present this claim to the lower courts. This Court must determine what

arguments or theories could have supported the state court’s decision, and then “ask whether it

is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent

with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86.

The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution provides that; “No state shall . . .

pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .” U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 

“Laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be

performed, enter into and form a part of it, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or

incorporated in its terms.” Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 660 (1923);

see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1987) (holding that claims that a plea

agreement has been breached are analyzed under state contract law). “Although the language

of the Contract Clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent

police power of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of its people.’” Energy Reserves

Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983), quoting Home Bldg. &

Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934). 

As discussed above with respect to Claim 1, the Ninth Circuit has found that where a

promise was made in a plea bargain to use that conviction as only one strike in any future

sentencing proceedings, that is a contractual provision entitled to protection against breach of

promise. Davis, 446 F.3d at 962-63. The Davis court, however, distinguished that type of

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -41- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 41 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

provision fromthe case here, where Petitioner alleges his plea bargain merely incorporated thenexisting law which was later amended to provide that prior convictions could be used to enhance

a sentence for a future crime. Id. at 962 (“We recognize that, in California, contracts (including

plea bargains), are ‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the

reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws.’”), quoting Gipson, 117

Cal.App.4th at 1070; see also United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“The possibility that a defendant will be convicted of another offense in the future and will

receive an enhanced sentence based on an instant conviction is not a direct consequence of a

guilty plea,” and a plea is voluntary even if defendant is not advised of that collateral

consequence.)

The state supreme court here could have reasonably rejected Claim 13 on the basis that

no contractual obligation was impaired by the use of Petitioner’s 1991 and 1993 robbery

convictions to enhance his sentence in this case, and could have reasonably found that any such

objection by trial counsel would have been futile, because the plea bargains in those cases

incorporated the reserve power of California to enact the Three Strikes law. Davis, 446 F.3d at

962-63. The state court’s adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

N. Claim 2

Petitioner alleges in Claim 2 that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because

his appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal Claims 4, 5, 6, 9 and 12 presented here. (Pet. at

26-29.) Respondent answers that the claims Petitioner contends should have been raised on

appeal are without merit, and that the appellate court’s denial of Claim 2 on that basis is

objectively reasonable. (Ans. Mem. at 22-23.)

Petitioner presented Claim 2 to the state supreme court in his pro se habeas petition,

which was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. 

(Lodgment No. 15 at 4; Lodgment No. 18.) Petitioner presented the same claim to the state

appellate court in his pro se habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 12 at 23-24.) The Court will look

through the silent denial by the state supreme court and apply the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -42- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 42 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

§ 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06. 

The state appellate court denied the claim, stating:

Petitioner also has not shown ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Counsel

is not required to bring non-meritorious claims on appeal. Petitioner’s allegations

do not state a prima facie claim for relief. (See People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th

at p. 474.)

(Lodgment No. 13, In re Riggins, No. D062731, order at 2.)

As discussed above, Claims 4, 5, 6, 9 and 12, are without merit. Thus, appellate counsel’s

failure to raise them on direct appeal was neither deficient nor prejudicial. See Turner v.

Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Strickland standard applies to

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565,

572 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that an attorney’s failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not

constitute ineffective assistance); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980)

(“There is no requirement that an attorney appeal issues that are clearly untenable.”) 

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s opinion denying Claim 2 on the basis that

appellate counsel was not required to raise meritless claims, is neither contrary to, nor involves

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is denied as to Claim 2. 

O. Motion for Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing.

As set forth throughout this Order, Petitioner’s allegations, even if true, do not entitle him

to federal habeas relief. Thus, neither discovery nor an evidentiary hearing are necessary nor

warranted. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398; Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09; Campbell, 18 F.3d at 679. 

Petitioner’s Motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

P. Certificate of Appealability

Petitioner has also filed a Motion for a Certificate of Appealability. (ECF No. 34.) “A

certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). “Where a district court has rejected

the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy section 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -43- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 43 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). A claim may also warrant a Certificate of Appealability when the

“questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983) (citation omitted), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). 

Although the Court is mindful of the “relatively low” threshold for granting a certificate

of appealability, Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002), and that “the

petitioner need not show that he should prevail on the merits,” Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d

1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n.4, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s claims do not warrant a Certificate of Appealability. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a Certificate of Appealability.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Petitioner’s

Motion for Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing [ECF No. 12] is DENIED; (2) the Petition for

a writ of habeas corpus [ECF No. 1] is DENIED; and (3) Petitioner’s Motion for a Certificate

of Appealability [ECF No. 34] is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED: August 18, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\HABEAS\13cv1447 riggins.wpd -44- 13cv1447

Case 3:13-cv-01447-GPC-RBB Document 45 Filed 08/18/14 Page 44 of 44