Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00978/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00978-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LAWANA PORTER,

NO. CIV. S-00-978 FCD/JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Lawana Porter’s

(“plaintiff”) motion to re-open non-expert discovery in this

sexual harassment and retaliation action.1 Pursuant to the Ninth

Circuit’s decision on August 5, 2005, reversing this court’s

grant of summary judgment to defendant California Department of

Corrections (“defendant”), this case was remanded for trial. 

Porter v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885 (9th Cir.

2005). The court issued an Amended Status (Pretrial Scheduling)

Case 2:00-cv-00978-FCD-JFM Document 97 Filed 01/06/06 Page 1 of 4
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Order on November 21, 2005. Said order re-set the dates for

expert disclosures, the final pretrial conference and trial but

retained the previously set date of December 28, 2001 for the

close of non-expert discovery. The court, however, indicated

that either party could move to re-open discovery under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 16. (Am. Status Order at 1 n. 1.) 

Plaintiff now so moves, arguing that discovery should be reopened because in the four years since the close of discovery,

“significant changes” have occurred including: (1) plaintiff has

retired from defendant’s employ and (2) plaintiff has retained

new counsel who have a “different assessment of the evidence and

believe additional percipient witnesses . . . should be deposed.”

(Pl.’s Mem. of P.& A., filed Dec. 1, 2005, 2:15, 20-21.) On this

basis, plaintiff seeks an order re-opening discovery to allow

supplemental written discovery responses and to permit the

depositions of additional percipient witnesses. Defendant

opposes the motion, arguing that good cause does not exist to reopen discovery as the case and its parameters have been

previously established by the parties’ discovery prior to the

original discovery cut-off date.

Under Rule 16, a pretrial order “shall not be modified

except upon a showing of good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). 

The district court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot

reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the

extension.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604,

609 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, advisory

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2 Plaintiff’s reliance on U.S. ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes

Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1526 (9th Cir. 1995) for the

applicable standard is misplaced. While the case involved the

propriety of re-opening discovery, it did not address the

standard under Rule 16.

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committee’s notes (1983 amendment)).2 The “good cause” standard

set forth in Rule 16 primarily focuses upon the diligence of the

party requesting the amendment. “Although the existence or

degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might

supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the

inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking

modification.” Id. 

Here, the crux of plaintiff’s motion is her new counsel’s

desire to have a “second bite at the apple.” Plaintiff’s intent

is made clear in the motion: “While plaintiff’s original counsel

had conducted discovery based on its own evaluation of the case,

plaintiff’s new counsel, with guidance from the Ninth Circuit’s

decision, has identified some additional percipient witnesses who

should be deposed prior to this case proceeding to trial.” 

(Pl.’s Mem. of P.& A. at 5:2-5.) Neither the retention of new

counsel nor a Ninth Circuit remand decision constitutes good

cause to re-open discovery under Rule 16. The party’s diligence

in seeking discovery must be demonstrated. Johnson, 975 F.2d at

609 (“If [the] party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.”) 

Here, plaintiff simply asserts that her new counsel believes, in

light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, that additional percipient

witness depositions are necessary. Importantly, plaintiff fails

to describe the nature of this discovery, including the

witnesses’ names and their relationship to the issues presented

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in this case, and why said discovery could not have been obtained

previously. Absent this showing, relief under Rule 16 is not

warranted.

With respect to plaintiff’s retirement, plaintiff argues

that discovery is necessary regarding her “damages claims.” 

Clearly, any relevant discovery pertaining to plaintiff’s damages

is well within plaintiff’s own custody and knowledge. Defendant

does not seek additional discovery from plaintiff as a result of

her retirement, and thus, there is no basis to modify the court’s

order as a result of plaintiff’s retirement.

Finally, the court notes that to the extent plaintiff seeks

supplemental discovery responses, an order of the court is

likewise unnecessary. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(e), parties are under a “duty to supplement” or to

“seasonably [a]mend” previous disclosures or responses if the

party “learns that in some material respect the information

disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or

corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the

other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) and (2). 

For all of these reasons, plaintiff’s motion to re-open

discovery is DENIED. The court’s Amended Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Order, filed November 21, 2005, is affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: January 6, 2006

 /s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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