Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00860/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00860-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY TAYLOR,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-0860 DFL GGH P

vs.

C. EVANS, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction and Summary

Respondent moves to dismiss on account of one allegedly unexhausted issue – an 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because counsel did not raise on appeal

petitioner’s contention that Juror 4 knew a witness in the case and even talked to the witness

about the case. Respondent correctly concedes that the parallel “straight” juror misconduct claim

(unfiltered through an assertion of ineffective assistance) was exhausted. 

The court finds that the issue is not exhausted, but that the unexhausted claim

should be stricken, as opposed to requiring dismissal of the entire petition. The outcome here

may seem surprising to petitioner’s counsel given the court’s strong, tentative views for the

opposite outcome expressed at hearing. However, the undersigned was wrongly focused on the

“look through” doctrine of Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991), which

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presumes for a merits or procedural default ruling that a “silent denial” of a higher court relied on

the explicated reasoning of a lower court’s opinion. Ylst presumes, however, that the claim(s) at

issue were clearly exhausted in a petition for review or petition for habeas corpus. On the other

hand, for exhaustion purposes, i.e., in determining the claims raised, the Supreme Court has held

that the state’s highest court is not to be tasked with reviewing the decisions of the courts below. 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 124 S. Ct. 1347 (2004). 

Discussion

The undersigned will dispense with a blow-by-blow description of all the issues

raised in the various state appeals/petitions and the federal petition. Only the above described

claims are in issue, and the time of their presentation is not material to the outcome of the

exhaustion motion. Thus, the undersigned will set forth only the presentation of the claim at

issue.

By virtue of a habeas corpus petition filed in the state supreme court (Lodged

Document 11), petitioner claimed: “Petitioner’s rights to a jury trial by a fair and impartial jury

and Due Process were violated....” Specifically:

(1) The trial court erred in not excusing Juror Number 4, after a

hearing where it was revealed Juror Number 4 had a conversation

with the states (sic); it was also revealed that Juror Number 4 knew

the states (sic) witness prior (sic) Petitioner[‘]s trial; which

violated Petitioner[‘]s right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. 

Guaranteed under the 6 and 14 Amendments of the Federal th th

Constitution;

Lodged Document 11 at Table of Contents.

Respondent concedes that the “straight” juror misconduct claim was exhausted. 

Petitioner filed this claim on a standard form provided by the state courts. 

Petitioner did not brief any claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. At paragraph 10

on the form, petitioner was asked: “If your petition makes a claim regarding your conviction ...

that you or your attorney did not make on appeal, explain why the claim was not made on

appeal.” Petitioner wrote: “Appellate counsel was ineffective.”

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 Perhaps counsel reasoned that the California standards for juror bias were more 1

favorable to petitioner than the federal “straight” standards. Alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel would enable petitioner to claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not urging

the California standard in state appellate court.

3

In the operative federal petition filed March 9, 2006, an express claim for

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was made: 

[P]etitioner was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of

counsel when his court appointed counsel failed to argue on appeal

that [the] trial court erred when it denied trial counsel’s motion to

dismiss Juror No. 4 from the jury on the ground that he was biased

by his contact with witness Christopher Howell...

Petitioner dropped from his operative petition the “straight” claim of juror bias that petitioner had

exhausted.1

There is no doubt in the court’s mind that the issue of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel was not fairly presented to the California Supreme Court. 

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner

must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1),

thereby giving the State the “‘”opportunity to pass upon and

correct” alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d

865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). To provide the State

with the necessary “opportunity,” the prisoner must “fairly present”

his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme

court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that

court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366,

115 S.Ct. 887; O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119

S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). 

Baldwin v. Reese 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

In his state petitions, petitioner carefully segregated his actual claims. 

Responding to a question on another part of the form asking why a claim was not, in essence,

procedurally defaulted, does not itself state a substantive claim. Ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel was not briefed or otherwise referenced in the discussion about the claims

made. Such cannot be a “fair presentation” of claims made.

\\\\\

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However, petitioner challenges this outcome by pointing to the decision of the

Superior Court which, when viewing the very same form and briefing, had deciphered a claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Superior Court did reach the merits of this

supposed claim, and ruled upon it. See Lodged Documents 9 and 10. 

Nevertheless, the fact that petitioner was lucky in the Superior Court to have such

a claim recognized does not mean that its continued hidden status should have been recognized

by the higher courts. Baldwin itself held that exhaustion was not satisfied simply because a

lower court may have referenced or ruled upon the claim at issue; the higher courts would not be

expected to review the decisions of the lower courts in order to decipher claims. Baldwin, 541

U.S. at 31, 124 S. Ct. at 1350. The fact remains that answering a question about procedural

default on a form does not mean that a claim was substantively made – such a claim is not “fairly

presented.”

Conclusion 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion of one claim, should be

construed as a motion to strike the unexhausted claim. The undersigned finds that petitioner’s

claim regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is unexhausted, and should be 

stricken.

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss filed

on June 5, 2006, for petitioner’s failure to exhaust the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claim, construed as a motion to strike the unexhausted claim, be granted and this matter proceed

on the remaining claims.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

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shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 11/7/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035

tayl0860.fr

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