Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00700/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00700-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Phillip Meril Griffet,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-19-0700-PHX-DJH (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

on February 1, 2019 (Doc. 1). The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. 

Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and 

recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was convicted at trial in the Maricopa County Superior Court on a charge 

of sexual conduct with a seven -year old minor. (Exh. F, M.E. 4/5/16; Exh. K, Mem. Dec. 

at ¶ 2, 6.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 18, are referenced herein as “Exh. ___.”)

Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release for 35

years. (Id.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, raising claims of insufficient evidence and juror 

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misconduct. (Exh. I, Opening Brief; Exh. K, Mem. Dec. at ¶ 1.) In a decision issued June 

20, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s claims and affirmed his 

conviction and sentence. (Exh. K, Mem. Dec. at ¶ 14.) Petitioner did not seek 

reconsideration or file a petition for review, and on August 9, 2017, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals issued its Mandate (Exh. L.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Some 89 days later, on November 6, 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exh. M). Petitioner argued his delayed filing was caused by appellate 

counsel, and asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered facts, 

and actual innocence. The PCR court denied Petitioner’s request for appointment of 

counsel and dismissed the Notice, finding the Petition untimely, and that the Notice failed 

to sufficiently substantiate his claims to come within the exceptions to the timeliness 

requirement. (Exh. N, M.E. 12/13/17.) Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 5; Answer, Doc. 18 at 8.) 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition – Some 415 days later, Petitioner commenced the current case by filing 

his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 1, 2019 

(Doc. 1). Petitioner was at the time and is presently incarcerated in the Arizona State 

Prison Complex at Florence, Arizona. Petitioner’s Petition asserts three grounds for relief:

“he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the State’s witness’s testimony was 

perjurious, and his sentence is ‘in excess of Arizona statutes.’” (Order 5/7/19, Doc. 10 at 

2.) 

Response - On August 1, 2019, Respondents filed their Limited Answer (Doc. 18). 

Respondents argue the Petition is untimely and Petitioner’s state remedies were not 

properly exhausted and are now procedurally defaulted. 

Reply – On August 16, 2019, Petitioner filed a document (Doc. 20), which the 

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Court construed as a reply noting Petitioner’s ability to seek reconsideration of that 

construction. (Order 8/21/19, Doc. 21.) Petitioner has not sought reconsideration of that 

construction. Petitioner argues the merits of his claims.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending at least through June 20, 2017, 

when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his appeal. (Exhibit K.) Thereafter, Petitioner 

had 30 days to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 

31.21(b)(2). Based on this, Respondents’ calculate the finality of Petitioner’s conviction 

as July 20, 2017. (Answer, Doc. 18 at 4-5.)

However, in 2017 Arizona applied Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 to 

extend “the time to file an appeal by five days when the order appealed from has been 

1 Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly recognized 

constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner proffers no argument that any of these apply.

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mailed to the interested party and commences to run on the date the clerk mails the order.”2 

State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990). Here, there is no indication 

that the Memorandum Decision was delivered to Petitioner or his counsel by any means 

other than mailing. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes Petitioner’s time to seek 

review by the Arizona Supreme Court expired 35 days after the appellate court decision, 

or on Tuesday, July 25, 2017.

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244, “direct review" includes the period within which 

a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, 

whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 

134, 150 (2012). The Supreme Court “can review, however, only judgments of a ‘state 

court of last resort’ or of a lower state court if the ‘state court of last resort’ has denied 

discretionary review.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 154 (2012) (citing U.S. Sup.Ct. 

R. 13.1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)). Here, Petitioner did not seek direct review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. Accordingly, the time for seeking a writ of certiorari with the 

U.S. Supreme Court cannot be considered in determining when Petitioner's judgment 

became final. Id.

For purposes of counting time for a federal statute of limitations, the standards in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) apply. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 

(9th Cir. 2001). Rule 6(a)(1)(A) directs that the “the day of the event that triggers the 

period” is excluded. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(applying “anniversary method” under Rule 6(a) to find that one year grace period from 

adoption of AEDPA statute of limitations, on April 24, 1996, commenced on April 25, 

1996 and expired one year later on the anniversary of such adoption, April 24, 1997). 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s conviction became final on Wednesday, July 

25, 2017, upon expiration of his time to file a petition for review, his one year commenced 

2 On August 31, 2017 Rule 1.3 was amended to except “the clerk's distribution of notices, 

minute entries, or other court-generated documents” from the time after mailing rule. 

However, that amendment was not effective until January 1, 2018. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

Proc. 1.3 (eff. 1/1/18); Arizona Supreme Court Order, Az Order 0010 (8/31/17).

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running thereafter, and without any tolling expired on July 25, 2018. 

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed on February 1, 2019. 

However, the Petition contains a declaration that it was “placed in the prison 

mailing system on 1-24-2019.” “In determining when a pro se state or federal petition is 

filed, the ‘mailbox’ rule applies. A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner 

hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 

(9th Cir. 2010). Respondents offer nothing to counter this declaration, and the Petition is

deemed “filed” as of that date.

As determined in subsection (2) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period expired no later than July 25, 2018, making his January 24, 2019 

Petition six months (183 days) delinquent.

4. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, such tolling only results 

from state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005).

Here, Petitioner’s only post-conviction application was his PCR Notice. However, 

the PCR Court found that Petitioner’s notice was untimely. Although Petitioner argued 

for application of exceptions to the timeliness Rule, the PCR court rejected those assertions 

as unsupported by sufficient allegations. 

Assuming arguendo that the failure to adequately support a request for application 

of an exception to the timeliness rule precludes the petition itself from being untimely (as 

opposed to the claim simply being untimely), this PCR proceeding would result in no 

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tolling. 

Even if it were assumed that the petition remained timely (despite the failure to 

adequately show entitlement to the exception), Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was only 

pending from November 6, 2017 through December 13, 2017. Even if the PCR Notice 

were deemed filed as of the signature date, November 1, 2017, this would at best result in 

37 days of tolling, still leaving Petitioner’s habeas petition was at least 146 days 

delinquent.

3

 

Consequently, Petitioner’s habeas petition was at least 146 days delinquent.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available 

in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control 

make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were 

the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition on 

time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is 

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for a time, 

equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing 

3 Although a state may direct that the prison mailbox rule does not apply to filings in its 

court, see Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 2014), Arizona has applied 

the rule to a variety of its state proceedings. See e.g. Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245, 

908 P.2d 56, 59 (App.1995) (notice of direct appeal); State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 

987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999) (PCR notice); State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 23, 106 P.3d 

1035, 1038 (App. 2005) (petition for review to Arizona Supreme Court).

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afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence 

in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation 

between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the 

extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. Stinson, 

224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, thirty days after elimination of a roadblock 

should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not proffer any grounds for equitable tolling, and the undersigned 

finds none.

It is true that Petitioner alleged to the PCR court that his PCR Notice was delinquent 

because counsel failed to timely file it. (See Exh. N, M.E. 12/13/17 at 2.) Even if this 

could amount to equitable tolling, Petitioner was aware of this failing at least as of the 

signing of his filed PCR Notice (Exh. M) on November 1, 2017. Even if it were assumed 

that Petitioner were reasonably diligent in pursuing a delinquent PCR proceeding, 

Petitioner would have been aware as of his receipt of the December 13, 2017 PCR court 

ruling that this was futile. Thus, assuming arguendo that Petitioner was entitled to 

equitable tolling through December 13, 2017, he still did not file his habeas petition until 

January 24, 2019, over thirteen months later. 

Thus, there is no basis for a finding of equitable tolling that would be sufficient to 

make his habeas petition timely.

6. Actual Innocence 

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

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petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 

1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner 

“’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995)). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not 

presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of 

cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

Petitioner makes no claim of actual innocence based on new credible evidence, and 

the record reveals none. At best, Petitioner alleged in his PCR Notice that he had evidence 

of his innocence. (Exh. M at 3.) But Petitioner has never adduced anything to support 

this conclusory claim.

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Petitioner’s one year habeas limitations period commenced running on July 26, 

2017, and expired July 25, 2018, making his January 24, 2019 Petition 183 days 

delinquent. Petitioner has shown no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for 

equitable tolling or actual innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the 

Petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is plainly barred by 

the statute of limitations, and consideration of the procedural default would likely require 

addressing issues concerning allegations that Petitioner’s procedural default was caused 

by counsel’s failures, Respondents other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that 

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in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention 

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in 

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a 

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the reasoning 

set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was 

correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this 

Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

(A) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

(B) To the extent the foregoing findings and recommendations are adopted in the District 

Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: March 30, 2020

19-0700r RR 20 03 26 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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