Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00363/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00363-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGEL VILLALOBOS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 09cv00363-L (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc. No. 1]

vs.

ROBERT HERNANDEZ, Warden, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

M. James Lorenz pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After reviewing

the Petition (Doc. No. 1), Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in support thereof (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 58), and the supporting

documents and pertinent state court Lodgments, the Court RECOMMENDS the

Petition be DENIED for the reasons stated below. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 22, 2004, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of

attempted premeditated murder and two counts of mayhem in violation of California

Penal Code sections 664, 187(a), 189, 203. (Lodgment 1 at 121-28). The jury also

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determined that Petitioner used a knife in the commission of the crimes and that he

inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the attempted murders in

violation of California Penal Code sections 12022(b)(1), 12022.7(a), 1192.7(c)(23) and

1192.7(c)(8). (Id. at 7-10, 121-28). On April 7, 2005, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to serve an indeterminate term of life in state prison plus a consecutive

determinate term of four years. (Id. at 95-97, 133). On June 9, 2006, the California

Court of Appeal (Fourth District Division One) affirmed the judgment of conviction. 

(Lodgment 6). The California Supreme Court denied the petition for direct review on

August 23, 2006. (Lodgment 8). 

On February 25, 2007,1 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment 9). On April 6, 2007, the Superior Court

denied the petition. (Lodgment 10). On June 25, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District,

which was denied on August 30, 2007. (Lodgments 11, 12). On October 29, 2007,

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the California Supreme

Court. (Lodgment 13). The California Supreme Court denied the petition on April

23, 2008. (Lodgment 14). Petitioner filed the instant petition in this court on

February 23, 2009. 

On May 27, 2009, Respondent filed an amended motion to dismiss, arguing

that the petition was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(A). (Doc. No. 7). On November 12, 2009, the reviewing Magistrate Judge

recommended that the motion to dismiss be adopted. (Doc. No. 14). The District

Court remanded the recommendation on February 11, 2010, citing the need for an

evidentiary hearing to resolve disputes about Petitioner’s claims for statutory and

1

Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule,” which provides that petitions are

deemed filed upon delivery to prison officials. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar

v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 223 (9th Cir. 2001) (application of Houston’s mailbox rule to federal habeas

filings); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing same with

regard to state habeas petitions). Here, the state habeas was signed on February 25, 2007, and this

Court will therefore construe the Petition as having been filed on that date.

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equitable tolling. (Doc. No. 18). On February 1, 2011, after the evidentiary hearing,

the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the motion to dismiss because of

Petitioner’s extraordinary language barriers and limited access to prison library

materials, which prevented Petitioner from timely filing his Petition. (Doc. No. 50). 

The District Court adopted the recommendation on August 5, 2011. (Doc. No. 54). 

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed

to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.; see also Jeffries v.

Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (stating that federal courts are required to “give great

deference to the state court’s factual findings.”)) Accordingly, the following facts are

taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion:

Evidence Pertaining to the Charged Offenses

Around 7:00 p.m. on May 26, 2004, Villalobos went to the trailer where his

friend Benito Bautista resided. Villalobos showed Bautista a knife and told

Bautista that a drug dealer named “Bombari” wanted Villalobos and

Bautista killed.FN1 About 8:00 p.m., Adrian Velazquez and Oscar Chavez

knocked on the door of Bautista's trailer. According to Villalobos, Bombari

had sent Velazquez and Chavez to perpetrate the killings. When Velazquez

and Chavez entered the trailer, Villalobos surreptitiously climbed outside

through a hole in the ceiling to the top of the trailer. Bautista, Velazquez,

and Chavez stayed in the trailer and smoked methamphetamine together.

FN1. According to Villalobos, the threat from Bombari arose when

Villalobos told Bombari he wanted to stop selling drugs with him. Bombari,

who was unhappy with this decision, told Villalobos that “it was not very

easy to leave the selling of drugs.” Further, Villalobos claimed Bombari also

wanted to kill Bautista because Bombari thought Bautista was selling

drugs and stealing Bombari's customers.

About five or 10 minutes later, Villalobos reentered the trailer through the

door. 

According to Bautista, Villalobos suddenly pulled out a knife, grabbed

Velazquez, 

and repeatedly stabbed him. With Velazquez lying wounded on the floor,

Villalobos stabbed Chavez, who was sitting on the couch. The knife handle

broke while Villalobos was stabbing Chavez. Villalobos pulled a pellet gun

from the waistband of his pants and shot both Velazquez and Chavez.

Chavez fled the trailer and Villalobos chased him. Velazquez also ran out of

the trailer.

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At trial, Bautista was called to testify on behalf of the prosecution and

Villalobos 

testified on his own behalf. FN2 Both Bautista and Villalobos testified that

at one 

point during the attack, Bautista kicked Chavez and asked Chavez “who

wants to kill us?” Chavez responded that Bombari had sent them. However,

according to Bautista, neither Velazquez nor Chavez had any weapons and

they did not make any threats prior to Villalobos's attack. In contrast,

Villalobos testified that when he entered the trailer, Chavez had a gun;

Chavez told Villalobos “how easy it was ... for him to get” Villalobos and

that “he had a mission to comply with”; and Chavez advanced towards

Villalobos with the gun in his hand. Villalobos testified that Chavez

dropped the gun when he was stabbed, and thereafter another person

(whose identity was unknown to Villalobos) came to the door, picked up

Chavez's gun, and left.

FN2. The victims did not testify.

Villalobos also described visits to his residence by several individuals,

including 

Bombari and Chavez, during the two days preceding the charged offenses.

During the visits, the men made statements that Villalobos interpreted as

meaning they were looking for an opportunity to kill him. FN3 Further,

several hours before Villalobos encountered Chavez and Velazquez at

Bautista's trailer, Chavez and Velazquez had twice arrived at Villalobos's

residence, but Villalobos avoided them by staying quiet and pretending he

was not at home.

FN3. According to Villalobos, during these unwelcome visits, Bombari and

Chavez on one occasion discussed whether “it was the right time ... to take

action against” Villalobos, and on another occasion late at night the men

stated, “ ‘why not now,’ that that was the right moment.”

The day after he committed the attack at Bautista's trailer, Villalobos

talked to his 

boss (Charles Mundo), who persuaded him to turn himself in to the police.

When he was interviewed by the police, Villalobos did not mention that one

of the victims had a gun.

Villalobos apparently suffered no injuries from the incident. Velazquez was

cut 

deeply across his neck, had a gun pellet in his neck, and had lacerations on

his chest, back, and forearm. Chavez had a large laceration on his face, a

deep laceration to his arm, and a stab wound in his neck. One of the men

(apparently Chavez) had a gun pellet in his scalp. 

Uncharged Misconduct Evidence

In a motion in limine, Villalobos's counsel moved to exclude evidence

regarding a 

fight in which Villalobos was involved while in jail awaiting trial for the

current 

offenses. The prosecutor responded that he did not intend to introduce the

evidence during the prosecution's case in chief. However, the prosecutor

stated he might seek to use the evidence if Villalobos elected to testify; for

example, if Villalobos claimed his superior fighting skills explained his lack

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of injuries during the charged offenses, the prosecutor might use the

evidence of the jail fight (during which Villalobos was injured) to rebut such

a claim. The court noted that evidence about the jail fight might also be

admissible if Villalobos presented character evidence showing his peaceful

and noncombative nature. Based on the prosecutor's stated intent not to

introduce the jail fight evidence during the prosecution's case in chief,

defense counsel agreed the in limine motion was resolved.

During trial, the defense presented good character testimony from Mundo,

who had worked with Villalobos for several years. Mundo testified that

Villalobos was a peaceful person. During direct examination of Mundo,

defense counsel asked, “[I]f I were to tell you that he had got into an

altercation, a fight, with another individual in jail while he was

incarcerated for this offense, would that change your opinion about him?”

Mundo responded “[n]o.” On cross-examination of Mundo, the prosecutor

asked Mundo if his opinion of Villalobos would change if Mundo heard that

“the facts of the offense in jail were that [Villalobos] picked on somebody

else, he started it; the other guy ended up finishing him, but he started it[.]”

Mundo acknowledged that if he heard more facts, maybe he would have a

different opinion.

After Mundo's testimony was finished, Villalobos testified. During crossexamination, the prosecutor questioned Villalobos about the details of the

jail fight. According to Villalobos, he was writing while lying on his bunk,

and the inmate in the bunk above him became annoyed at the light tapping

sound he was making. The two men “exchanged words” and then engaged in

a fistfight. Villalobos denied that he swung first. Villalobos suffered a

bloody nose, and then slipped on the blood and hurt his arm. After eliciting

the details of the fight, the prosecutor asked Villalobos, “So my question for

you is this, sir: how is it that you have a one-on-one fistfight with a guy in

jail, get a bloody nose and a hurt arm, ... yet, two guys come to kill you with

a gun and you don't have a scratch?” Villalobos responded that there was a

difference “between a fight and an intent to kill somebody.” On redirect

examination by defense counsel, Villalobos testified that he did not hit the

inmate during the jail fight, no weapons were involved, he was the only one

hurt, and he had never been involved in any other fights in his life.

During closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor argued that Villalobos's

claim of self-defense was not plausible because of a variety of

circumstances, including the fact that Villalobos sustained no injuries

during his commission of the charged 

offenses. To buttress the evidentiary inferences arising from the lack of

injury to 

Villalobos, the prosecutor repeatedly pointed to the fact that Villalobos did

sustain 

injuries during the jail fight. 

FN4. For example, the prosecutor argued, “The idea that [Velazquez and

Chavez] 

raised a hand against him? No. If they had done that, we would have seen

injuries on the defendant. [¶] This is the very same man that gets into a

fight in jail after ... he gets booked into jail. There's a one-on-one fight, and

he gets a bloody nose and a hurt arm. [¶] He takes on, he says two hitmen.

One of them has a gun, and there isn't a scratch on [Villalobos].... [¶]....[¶]

... He's not Bruce Lee.... We know that because of the fight in the jail....

[¶]....[¶] [H]ow do you take on one guy one-on-one, get your nose bloodied

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and your arm hurt, and you're able to take on two, supposedly one of which

is armed, killers without a scratch to yourself?”

(Lodgment 6 at 2-6).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), provides the scope of review for federal habeas corpus

claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

When determining what constitutes “clearly established federal law” under §

2254(d)(1), federal courts look to United States Supreme Court holdings at the time

of the state court’s decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003). A state

court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court

precedent if (1) the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set

forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, but still reaches a different

result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06, 412 (2000); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

73; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled in part on other

grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63). A state court decision does not have to

demonstrate an awareness of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, so long

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as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradict such

precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from

[the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. Alternatively, an unreasonable

application may be found “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply

or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should

apply.” Id; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Murphy 331 F.3d at 1067. 

An unreasonable application of federal law requires the state court decision to be

more than incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76. Instead, the state court’s

application must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id. Petitioner bears the burden of

proving the state court acted in an unreasonable, or contrary manner. Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002).

The United States Supreme Court has held that “[w]here there has been one

reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders

upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” 

Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). “We think that presumption which

gives them no effect – which simply “looks through” them to the last reasoned

decision – most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.” Id. at

804. When a state court does not supply reasoning for a decision, an independent

review of the record is required to determine if the court clearly erred in applying

controlling federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This

independent review is not de novo. Id.

//

//

//

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V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner alleges two claims in his Petition. Both claims derive from the

admission into evidence at trial of a prison fight between Petitioner and another

inmate. In Claim One, Petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to

evidence elicited by the prosecution about the prison fight. In Claim Two, Petitioner

alleges that the trial court erroneously admitted the prison fight evidence,

prejudicing his trial and violating his right to due process.

Respondent argues that both claims fail on the merits. Respondent also

contends that Claim Two is procedurally barred from review because Petitioner

failed to make a timely and specific objection at trial. See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991). Because there is a strong preference in the Ninth

Circuit for handling habeas claims on the merits,2 the Court will first address the

merits of Petitioner’s claims, and, if necessary, proceed to the procedural bar issue. 

A. Due Process Claims

1. Prison Fight Evidence Was Admissible at Trial

If evidence is relevant to a fact of consequence, it is unlikely that a

defendant’s right to due process is violated by the introduction of that evidence at

trial. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). When conducting habeas

review, federal courts are limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the

Constitution, law or treaties of the United States; it is not their province to reexamine a state court determination on state law questions. Id. at 63. 

Here, Petitioner claims that his right to due process under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments was violated because of the improper admission of evidence

about a fight he was involved in while in prison. (Doc. 1 at 7). During the fight,

2

See Limbrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997); Franklin v. Johnson, 290

F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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Petitioner suffered a bloody nose and an injury to his arm. (Lodgment 2 at 332). 

This evidence was first adduced by the prosecution on cross-examination of

Petitioner’s witness, Charles Mundo, who provided testimony about Petitioner’s good

character. (Lodgment 2 at 215–16). The prosecutor further questioned Petitioner

about the fight in more detail on cross-examination. (Lodgment 2 at 328–32). 

 Petitioner argues that the prison evidence “was not relevant to any of the

factors specified in subdivision (b) of section 1101 for admissibility, such as motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, or identity.” (Doc. 1-1 at

3). Petitioner asserts that, under California law, “[i]mproper admission of character

evidence pertaining to a defendant requires reversal if it is reasonably probable that

but for the error, the defendant would have achieved a better result.” Id. at 5.

Petitioner contends that the evidence could only be used to “marginally show” that

he has a disposition to fight, which is an expressly prohibited use of evidence under

section 1101(b). Id. at 3. 

In California, when a defendant presents a witness who testifies about a

defendant’s good character, the prosecution may, in a limited capacity, question the

veracity of the testimony by probing the witness’s knowledge of acts by the

defendant that conflict with the witness’s opinion. Cal. Evid. Code §1102(b); People

v Ramos, 15 Cal.4th.1133, 1173 (1997). Uncharged misconduct evidence is also

admissible “when relevant to prove some fact ... other than [the defendant’s]

disposition to commit” a criminal act. Catlan, 26 Cal.4th at 145–46 (citing California

Evidence Code section 1101(b)). When used in a non-propensity capacity, uncharged

misconduct evidence is admissible if relevant to rebut a defense presented by the

defendant. People v. Terry, 2 Cal.3d 362, 396 (1970). 

On Petitioner’s direct appeal to the Court of Appeal, the court held that the

prison fight evidence elicited during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Mundo

was admissible to the extent that the evidence tested Mundo’s opinion about

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Petitioner’s good character. (Lodgment 6 at 9). The Court of Appeal further

recognized that the evidence was properly admissible on cross-examination of

Petitioner in order to rebut Petitioner’s claim of self-defense. Id. This Court agrees

with the Court of Appeal’s analysis. Evidence of the prison fight, where Petitioner

was attacked and had to defend himself, was relevant in providing the jury with a

comparable scenario to assess Petitioner’s behavior when repelling attacks. The

prison fight, in which Petitioner claimed he was attacked by an unarmed inmate,

resulted in Petitioner having a bloody nose and an injured arm. The lack of injuries

Petitioner suffered when he was allegedly attacked by two men with a gun is telling

in light of such evidence. To this extent, the prison fight evidence helped rebut

Petitioner’s self-defense claim by highlighting Petitioner’s lack of injuries during the

crime.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the prison fight evidence was relevant and

admissible at Petitioner’s trial and did not violate his right to due process. 

2. Even if Inadmissible, the Evidence Was Harmless 

For the purposes of habeas review, even when inadmissible evidence is

presented at trial, relief is granted only when the error had a substantial and

injurious effect in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993). To determine whether inadmissible evidence was substantial and

injurious, a court will look to see if the state's other admissible evidence was

“weighty,” if not overwhelming. Id. at 639. 

Even if the admission of the prison fight evidence was erroneous in

Petitioner’s case, there was no “substantial and injurious effect” because the rest of

the evidence presented during the trial overshadowed any effect the prison fight

evidence may have had. Petitioner admitted to stabbing and shooting the victims. 

(Lodgment 2 at 274–75). Petitioner told the police inconsistent stories about the

crime and did not claim that the victims had a gun until after his initial meeting

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with police. Id. at 275–81. Additionally, the jury was presented with evidence of the

violent nature of the victims’ injuries. Id. at 46. Even without the prison fight

evidence, the prosecution’s case was “weighty.” Accordingly, there is no concern that

the prison fight evidence had a substantial and injurious effect on Petitioner’s trial.

The Court recommends that Claim Two be DENIED. 

B. Petitioner Was Not Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that his counsel’s failure to object to the prison fight

evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 1). Petitioner points

to his counsel’s initial efforts to exclude this evidence in a motion in limine to

suggest that “there simply could have been no tactical reason for defense counsel to

fail to object to fight evidence at the time it was admitted by the prosecution.” (Doc.

No. 1-1 at 3). 

The right to effective assistance of counsel is denied when a defense attorney’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense. Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). In

such cases, a petitioner is required to overcome the “presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” and

must show both incompetence and prejudice. Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v.

Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). “Judicial scrutiny of a counsel’s performance

must be highly deferential” and there should be a strong presumption that counsel’s

performance falls within “the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. 

A showing of prejudice must assert with reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.

Petitioner did not challenge this evidence on his petition for writ of habeas

corpus to the Court of Appeal. On Petitioner’s direct appeal of his conviction to that

court, however, the Court of Appeal addressed the admissibility of the prison fight

evidence. Although the Court of Appeal’s analysis is not binding on federal habeas

review, the court’s application of California law to Petitioner’ case is persuasive. 

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Identifying Strickland as the governing standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel claims, the Court of Appeal held that Petitioner’s counsel was reasonable in

not objecting to the evidence because counsel likely understood the futility in

objecting to admissible evidence. (Lodgment 6 at 7). As discussed, introducing

evidence about a prison fight involving Petitioner was relevant to rebut Petitioner’s

claim of self-defense. The Court further reasoned that when the prosecutor elicited

evidence of the prison fight, defense counsel knew that the fight had already been

brought to the jury’s attention during the examination of Petitioner’s witness. Id. at

9. The Court concluded that, once the fight had been brought to the jury’s attention,

it was reasonable for Petitioner’s counsel to find it advantageous for Petitioner to

give his version of the prison fight rather than to seek to exclude the evidence. Id.

Despite broad assertions that there was “no tactical reason” for counsel to not

object, Petitioner does not refute the explanations and reasonable strategies

proffered by the Court of Appeal. Instead, Petitioner only explains how the prison

fight evidence was inadmissible to show a propensity to fight. He does not suggest

how his counsel’s objections could overcome the valid admission of the evidence as a

rebuttal to Petitioner’s self-defense claim.

Accordingly, the Court does not view Petitioner’s counsel’s actions as

unreasonable and there is little to suggest how Petitioner’s trial was prejudiced by

his counsel’s failure to object to the prison fight evidence. In light of the

overwhelming evidence against Petitioner, the prison fight was not dispositive in the

case’s ultimate outcome. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends Claim One of the Petition be DENIED.

//

//

//

//

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C. Procedural Default 

The existence of a procedural default does not bar a federal court from

reviewing a habeas claim on the merits unless the last state court to render

judgment in the case "clearly and expressly" states that its judgment rests on a state

procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). Because a procedural

default is not a jurisdictional bar to reviewing the merits, a reviewing court is not

required to address the issue sua sponte. Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997). 

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition with a

citation to In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949) and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th

464, 474 (1995). (Lodgment No. 14). These citations suggest that the court denied

the claim as “procedurally deficient for failure to comply with state rules requiring

him to ‘allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have a final

judgment overturned’ and ‘include copies of reasonably available documentary

evidence supporting the claim[s], including . . . affidavits or declarations.’” Barrera

v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., No. 09-16222, 2012 WL 1926028, at *1 (9th Cir. May 29,

2012) (interpreting Swain/Duvall citations) (internal citations omitted). Although

‘failure to comply’ deficiencies might be cured in a renewed petition, a petitioner’s

failure to file a renewed petition in the California Supreme Court does not per se

establish a failure to exhaust state remedies. Id. (citing Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d

1317, 1319 (9th Cir.1986)).

The Court need not address the merits of Respondent’s procedural bar

argument. Under § 2254 (b)(2), courts are explicitly authorized to address the

merits of a habeas claim despite a petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies. In

the Ninth Circuit, there is a strong preference for reviewing habeas corpus claims on

the merits. Limbrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997); Franklin v. Johnson,

290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002). Especially when the procedural bar issues are

complex and the petitioner’s claims clearly fail on the merits, courts are encouraged

to simply address the merits. Limbrix, 520 U.S. at 525. 

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation and (2) denying Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 10, 2012. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 24, 2012. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner

v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JULY 19, 2012

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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