Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00760/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00760-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JON CHRIST, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

R. BLACKWELL, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:10-cv-0760-EFB P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.1 Currently pending are defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 

159), plaintiff’s motion for an order compelling prison officials to allow him more time in the law 

library (ECF No. 165), and plaintiff’s motion regarding a witness declaration (ECF No. 171). For 

the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to defendant Roszko 

only. Further, plaintiff’s motion for law library time and motion regarding a witness declaration 

are denied. 

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 The parties have consented to have the case heard by the undersigned. ECF Nos. 4, 14, 

134 

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I. Preliminary Procedural Matters 

A. Relevant Procedural History of the Case 

Plaintiff filed this action in Santa Clara County Superior Court on January 5, 2010. ECF 

No. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to the court, ECF No. 1, and it had progressed through 

discovery and the filing of pretrial statements when the court discovered that two named 

defendants – Weiglein and Roszko – had not responded to the complaint. See ECF No. 101. 

Plaintiff informed the court that he was pursuing his claims against Weiglein in a separate action 

and the court accordingly dismissed him from this case. ECF No. 106. After a lengthy process 

not necessary to recount here (see id. at 2), defendant Roszko was properly served with the 

complaint. ECF No. 135. The court then issued a revised scheduling order governing discovery 

and dispositive motions “so that plaintiff and defendant Roszko may engage in discovery and 

pretrial motions with respect to plaintiff’s claims against defendant Roszko.” ECF No. 145 at 1. 

B. Plaintiff’s Objection to the Instant Motion

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment addressing all of plaintiff’s claims 

against all defendants. ECF No. 160. Defendants did not seek relief from the schedule that 

governed all of them except Roszko, under which the dispositive motion filing deadline had 

passed. ECF No. 19 (providing a dispositive motion deadline of April 22, 2011). Plaintiff 

objects to the motion, noting that the deadline for defendants Blackwell, Broyles, Lopez, Voight, 

and Zuniga to file a motion for summary judgment is long past. ECF No. 162. Defendants 

respond that they filed a motion addressing all claims against all defendants because they “were 

unable to determine which claims or causes of actions were directed to which defendant.” ECF 

No. 161. The court has reviewed the complaint and finds this representation disingenuous. See

ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Roszko (summarized below) and the other 

defendants are easily differentiated. Because defendants Blackwell, Broyles, Lopez, Voight, and 

Zuniga have not shown good cause why they did not seek summary judgment on or before April 

22, 2011, the court will not consider their arguments at this time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A 

schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”); Johnson v. 

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a motion to modify 

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the schedule must be supported by a showing of good cause; i.e., that the schedule could not have 

been met despite the moving party’s diligence). If these defendants wish to seek summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s claims against them, they must file a motion for modification of the 

schedule, supported by a showing of good cause. The court will proceed to consider the instant 

motion only as it pertains to the claims against defendant Roszko. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for More Law Library Time

Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the court to order prison officials to allow him greater 

access to the law library. ECF No. 165. Plaintiff states that, due to the interplay between his 

work schedule and the library schedule, he can go to the library only two days per week for 

between 1.5 and 5.5 hours each day. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff asks the court to order the librarian to 

designate him a priority library user, but does not explain why he cannot adequately perform his 

legal research during the time he is currently allotted or why he has not sought preferred status 

through the ordinary administrative channels available at the prison. 

Plaintiff’s request for court intervention against persons who are not parties to this case is 

governed by The All Writs Act. That Act gives federal courts the authority to issue “all writs 

necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 

principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. 1651(a). The United States Supreme Court has authorized the use 

of the All Writs Act in appropriate circumstances against persons who, “though not parties to the 

original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a 

court order or the proper administration of justice.” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 

(1977). To obtain an order under the All Writs Act, the requested order must be “necessary.” 

This language requires that the relief requested is not available through some alternative means. 

Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999). 

Here, there is no question that an inmate has a constitutionally protected right of 

meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 820-21 (1977). However, there 

is no freestanding constitutional right to law library access for prisoners. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). Instead, law library access serves as one means of ensuring the 

constitutional right of access to the courts. See id. at 351. “[T]he Constitution does not guarantee 

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a prisoner unlimited access to a law library. Prison officials of necessity must regulate the time, 

manner, and place in which library facilities are used.” Linguist v. Idaho State Bd. of 

Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). A prisoner claiming that his right of access to the 

courts has been (or will be) violated due to inadequate library access must show that: 1) access 

was (or will be) so limited as to be unreasonable, and 2) the inadequate access caused (or will 

cause) actual injury. Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff has not shown that his current amount of access to the library is unreasonably 

limited, that the limited access will cause him injury, or that – even if his access is unreasonably 

limited and will cause injury – a court order (rather than an administrative request) is necessary to 

obtain greater access. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion is denied. 

D. Motion Regarding Phil Pappas’s Declaration

Plaintiff informs the court that one of his witnesses, Phil Pappas, has died. ECF No. 171. 

Plaintiff asks the court to receive Pappas’s declaration into evidence. Id. As the case has not yet 

advanced to trial, plaintiff’s motion is denied as premature. The admissibility of Pappas’s 

declaration can be addressed by an appropriate motion in limine prior to trial.2

Defendant Roszko’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations Against Defendant Roszko

Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Roszko arises from an allegedly false disciplinary 

report defendant Voight filed against plaintiff in 2009 for obstructing a peace officer. ECF No. 1-

1 at 8. The report alleged that plaintiff feigned sickness to delay a move to a new cell. Id. at 9-

10. Defendant Roszko served as the senior hearing officer (“SHO”) at the hearing on the 

disciplinary report. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that Roszko denied plaintiff all of his requested 

witnesses, including defendant Voight, Eddie Munoz (plaintiff’s work supervisor, who plaintiff 

alleges would have corroborated plaintiff’s claim that he had been legitimately ill on the day in 

question), and medical personnel who would have confirmed that plaintiff had been ill. Id. at 10-

11. According to the complaint, Roszko also refused to consider Munoz’s declaration, in which 

 

2

 A final pretrial order will issue that will set the schedule for such motions. 

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he attested that he had sent plaintiff back to his cell because he was sick at work. Id. at 11. 

Plaintiff alleges that Roszko refused to allow plaintiff to present these witnesses and other 

evidence in retaliation against plaintiff for plaintiff’s grievances against other defendants in this 

action. Id. 

B. Standards on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary 

judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the facts relevant 

to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient evidence for a jury 

to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 

(1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a summary judgment 

motion asks whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury. 

The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims 

or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to 

“‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Procedurally, 

under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting 

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if 

any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving 

party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is crucial 

to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party seeking 

summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When the 

opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving party 

need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See, e.g., Lujan v. National 

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters 

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-

24 (“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a 

summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is 

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a 

material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) that 

is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’). Whether a factual dispute is material is 

determined by the substantive law applicable for the claim in question. Id. If the opposing party 

is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a required element of its claim that party fails 

in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 322. 

Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine 

the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in 

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question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial on 

the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual 

claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit 

or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue 

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to 

demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such 

that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason for trial. 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s 

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See id. at 249, 255; 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the 

proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American 

Int'l Group, Inc. v. American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., 

dissenting) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at 

issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th 

Cir. 1995). On the other hand, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). In that case, the court must grant 

summary judgment. 

Concurrent with the instant motion, defendant advised plaintiff of the requirements for 

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Woods v. 

Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en 

banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

C. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Roszko deprived him of due process at the disciplinary 

hearing in retaliation for plaintiff’s grievances against other officers. These allegations support 

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two distinct constitutional claims: one for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and one 

for deprivation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court will address 

each claim in turn. 

i. Retaliation Claim 

To establish liability for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a prisoner must 

show five elements: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action against him (2) because of (3) 

his protected conduct, (4) that such action chilled his exercise of his First Amendment rights, and 

(5) that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 

408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff need not demonstrate that his speech was 

actually inhibited or suppressed, but merely that the defendant’s conduct was such as would chill 

or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. Id. at 568-69. 

Conduct protected by the First Amendment includes communications that are “part of the 

grievance process.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Defendant Roszko argues that summary judgment is appropriate on plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim against him because plaintiff has no evidence that Roszko’s conduct was motivated by 

plaintiff’s grievances against others. Roszko points to the following exchanges in plaintiff’s 

deposition, arguing that all that plaintiff has to support his charge of retaliation is “speculation”: 

Q. All right. And you believe that the violations in this complaint that you 

drafted are based on a conspiracy among the defendants; is that correct? 

A. Correct. 

*** 

Q. All right. So since May of 2008, there has been a conspiracy to deny you your 

civil and constitutional rights by CDCR personnel, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And you have no – strike that. And that’s based on your speculation; correct? 

A. Correct. 

ECF No. 160 at 26-27. 

Q. And so if I understand you, the allegations made in this complaint are based 

on what you believe to be a conspiracy to deny you your constitutional and civil 

rights; correct? 

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A. Correct. 

Q. And your evidence is based on your speculation that your rights have been 

violated as it relates to this conspiracy; correct? 

A. Correct. 

Id. at 30. In response, plaintiff states that “it was not speculation” that he was sick on the day of 

the cell move, that the disciplinary report was false, that the cell move was contrary to doctor’s 

orders, and that defendant denied his witnesses. Plaintiff fails to present any evidence, however, 

that Roszko denied the witnesses because of plaintiff’s grievances against other officers. Plaintiff 

presents no evidence from which the court could infer a retaliatory motive (e.g., evidence 

showing that that Roszko mentioned the grievances or even knew of them). Because plaintiff has 

failed to present evidence supporting this necessary element of his retaliation claim against 

Roszko, summary judgment must be granted in favor of Roszko on that claim. See Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 322. 

ii. Due Process Claim 

Prisoners are entitled to certain due process protections when subject to disciplinary 

sanctions that impinge on an interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Brown v. Or. Dep’t of 

Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). To prevail on a claim for violation of the right to 

procedural due process under the 14th Amendment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a deprivation of a 

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural 

protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A liberty interest triggering procedural protections under the Due Process Clause may 

arise from two sources: the Clause itself or state law. Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 

1062 (9th Cir. 2013). The Due Process Clause of its own force protects prisoners from conditions 

which depart from the sentence imposed on them in a way that is “‘qualitatively different’ from 

the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime [and has] ‘stigmatizing 

consequences.’” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478-79 n.4 (1995) (discussing and quoting 

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)). The 

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Clause, by itself, confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the sentence 

imposed. Id. at 480. 

A condition of confinement impinges on an inmate’s state-law-created liberty interest 

(triggering the necessity for procedural protections) if it imposes an atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life (while not departing 

from the sentence in such a manner as to trigger protection under the Due Process Clause by its 

own force). Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Brown, 751 F.3d at 987. To determine whether a liberty 

interest is at stake, the court may consider: “(1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those 

conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; (2) the duration of the condition, and the 

degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration 

of the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations 

omitted). 

The conditions imposed on plaintiff as a result of the hearing presided over by defendant 

Roszko were: (1) forfeiture of 60 days’ worktime credits (also called worktime credits, see

California Penal Code § 2933); (2) a loss of privileges to the day/night yard, dayroom, 

telephones, canteen, and quarterly packages for 30 days; (3) a 90-day suspension of Friday visits; 

and (4) plaintiff was counseled and reprimanded. ECF No. 160 at 52. Roszko argues that these 

disciplinary measures did not deprive plaintiff of a constitutionally-protected interest. 

Defendant is correct that, as a matter of law, these conditions do not impinge on a liberty 

interest created by the Due Process clause of its own force. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

557 (1974) (good-time credits); Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) 

(unfettered visitation); Davis v. Small, 595 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2014) (phone and yard 

privileges); Koerner v. Angelone, Nos. 97-15681 & 97-15799, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32181, at 

*9 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1999) (canteen). 

In addition, plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden of showing that the disciplinary 

measures imposed by defendant Roszko impinged on a liberty interest created by state law. 

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Plaintiff states simply that, “when prisoners lose good time credits because of a disciplinary 

offense, they are entitled to” procedural protections under the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 168 

at 3. The law is not so cut-and-dried. 

It is true that the Supreme Court has held that a state can create a protected liberty interest 

in a shortened prison sentence resulting from good time credits by making the revocation of such 

credits allowable only for major misconduct. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78. 

It is currently an open question in the Ninth Circuit whether California’s scheme of worktime 

credits under California Penal Code § 2933, as amended in 2010, gives rise to a liberty interest. 

Edwards v. Swarthout, 597 F. App’x 914 (9th Cir. 2014). Absent any further direction from the 

Ninth Circuit, and applying the Supreme Court’s holdings in Wolff and Sandin, the court finds 

that plaintiff here has failed to establish that the deprivation of worktime credits deprived him of a 

protected liberty interest because he has not provided any evidence that the credits revoked by 

defendant Roszko would have shortened his sentence if left in place. The liberty interest 

recognized by the Court in Wolff lay in the shortened sentence generated by the operation of the 

credit statutes, not in the credits themselves. 418 U.S. at 557; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78. It is 

undisputed that plaintiff was serving a term of 25-years-to life, plus 12 years, at the time of the 

hearing. ECF No. 160 at 9-10. Plaintiff has made no showing that he would be serving a shorter 

prison sentence if the 60-days’ worth of worktime credits had not been forfeited. Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 485-87 (finding that a prison disciplinary action did not impinge on a protected liberty 

interest where it would not inevitably affect the duration of the inmate’s indeterminate sentence); 

Harvey v. Lewis, No. No.1:12-cv-00904-AWI-DLB (HC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163667, at *5-

8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (discussing the impact of good time credits on an inmate serving both 

a determinate and indeterminate term of incarceration). Even if plaintiff were to make such a 

showing, his due process claim challenging the loss of credits would not survive in this action, as 

he would be required by the rule of Heck v. Humphrey to secure a finding that the discipline 

imposed by defendant Roszko was invalid through some other means before pursuing that claim 

in a § 1983 action for damages. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644-48 (1997). 

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Plaintiff has also failed to show that the remaining disciplinary measures – loss of access 

to some facilities, telephone, canteen, and quarterly packages for 30 days and loss of Friday visits 

for 90 days – presented an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life. See 

Koerner, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32181, at *9 (80-day suspension of canteen privileges was not 

an atypical and significant hardship); Song v. Ignacio, No. 96-15901, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 

2217, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1997) (affirming dismissal of due process claim where the plaintiff 

failed to allege how his temporary loss of access to the canteen, phone, showers, and recreation 

equipment presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of prison life). Plaintiff has 

provided no evidence from which the court can compare the disciplinary measures defendant 

Roszko imposed on him to the norms of prison life, and has thus failed to provide evidence from 

which a rational factfinder could conclude that those measures departed from those norms in such 

a significant way as to deprive him of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.3 As 

plaintiff has failed to show that he was denied procedural protections due to him under the 

Constitution, the court need not reach the question of whether the process provided by defendant 

Roszko comported with due process. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted in favor 

of Roszko on plaintiff’s due process claim. 

iii. Remaining Arguments 

Defendant Roszko also argues that plaintiff’s claim for damages against him is barred by 

the Eleventh Amendment because he was acting in his official capacity when he was the senior 

hearing officer at plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and that he should be granted qualified immunity 

from plaintiff’s claims. The court need not reach these arguments as it has determined that 

summary judgment in favor of defendant Roszko is appropriate for the reasons stated above. 

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 The court notes that the Ninth Circuit held in Funtanilla v. Campbell, No. 96-15439, 

1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22581, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1996) that California Penal Code § 2601 

created a liberty interest in prison visits by stating that such visits were a “civil right” of 

prisoners. The California legislature amended § 2601 in 1996 to delete that provision. Plaintiff 

has not offered any other source of law from which the court can conclude that California has 

created a liberty interest in prison visits. 

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II. Order 

 For the reasons provided above, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

1. Defendants’ December 30, 2014 motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 159) is 

construed as a motion for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claims against defendant 

Roszko only, and, as such, is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff’s February 23, 2015 motion for a court order regarding law library access 

(ECF No. 165) is DENIED without prejudice. 

3. Plaintiff’s March 25, 2015 motion for a court order regarding evidence (ECF No. 171) 

is DENIED without prejudice. 

DATED: August 31, 2015. 

 

 

Case 2:10-cv-00760-EFB Document 176 Filed 09/01/15 Page 13 of 13