Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00890/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00890-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK LEWIS,

Petitioner,

Case No. 14cv890-LAB (JLB)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Frank Lewis (“Lewis”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, arguing that the Petition is barred

by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 6.) Lewis filed an Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss, arguing that although his Petition is time-barred on its face, he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 16.) Respondent filed a Reply. 

(ECF No. 15.)

The Court, having reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,

Lewis’ Opposition, Respondent’s Reply, and the lodgments presented therewith, finds

that Lewis is not entitled to the relief requested and that the Petition is barred by the

statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 15, 2009, a San Diego Superior Court jury found Lewis guilty ofsecond

degree murder in violation of California Penal Code § 187(a), attempted murder in

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violation of California Penal Code § 664 and § 187(a), and shooting at an occupied

vehicle in violation of California Penal Code § 246. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2

at 194-195.) The jury found that Lewis intentionally and personally discharged a

firearmin violation of California Penal Code § 12022.53(d). (Id. at 194.) The jury also

found that Lewis caused great bodily injury and death to a person, and that he

personally discharged a firearm in violation of California Penal Code § 12022.53(c). 

(Id.) Outside the presence of the jury, Lewis pled guilty to possession of a firearm by

a felon, a violation of Penal Code § 12021(a)(1). (Id.) Lewis admitted to having a

prior strike for attempted robbery (California Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12, and

668), a prior prison term (California Penal Code § 667.5(b)), a prior probation denial

(California Penal Code § 1203(e)(4)), and a prior seriousfelony conviction (California

Penal Code §§ 667(a), 668, and 1192.7(c)). (Id.) 

On November 5, 2009, Lewis was sentenced to a term of 103 years to life. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 633-34.) Lewis appealed his convictions to the

California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3.) On May 9, 2011, the

Court of Appeal affirmed Lewis’ convictions. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6.) 

Lewis appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision to the California Supreme Court. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.) His appeal was denied on August 17, 2011. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8.)

On August 9, 2012, Lewis constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9.) On

September 26, 2012, the Superior Court denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 10.)

On November 17, 2012, Lewis filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11.) On January 24, 2013,

the Court of Appeal denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgement No. 12.)

On October 1, 2013, Lewis constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgement No. 13.) On

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January 21, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition. (Respondent’s

Lodgement No. 14.) On April 6, 2014, Lewis filed the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus that is now before this Court. (ECF No. 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Statute of Limitations

Inasmuch as the Petition was filed after the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214

(1996), the provisions of AEDPA apply to this case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 336 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner generally must file a federal

petition for habeas corpus within one year of the underlying judgment becoming final. 

The relevant provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), states that:

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized bythe Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

The record reflects that Lewis did not seek review in the United States Supreme

Court following the denial of his direct appeal by the California Supreme Court on

August 17, 2011. Accordingly, for AEDPA purposes, the process of direct review of

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Lewis’ conviction concluded on November 25, 2011, when the ninety-day period for

filing a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court expired. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158–59 (9th Cir.1999). The limitations period for seeking federal habeasrelief

expired one year later, on November 26, 2012. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Unless

tolling applies, the instant Petition, filed on August 6, 2014, is time barred.

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that neitherstatutory nor equitable tolling applies in this case. 

(ECF No. 6.) Respondent contends that there is insufficient statutory tolling under the

AEDPA to save Leiws’ Petition because the amount of time between Lewis’ state court

filings was unreasonable. (Id.) Respondent also asserts that Lewis is not entitled to

equitable tolling because Lewis has failed to show that some extraordinary

circumstance prevented him from filing timely. (Id.) 

Lewis does not contend that the Petition is timely on its face. Rather, he argues

that he is entitled to equitable tolling. (ECF No. 16 at 6.) Lewis claims that he did

everything he could to file his applications for post-conviction relief in a reasonable

amount of time, and was delayed by the National Association of Legislative Review

(NALR), which allegedly agreed to represent him but failed to do so. (Id.) 

A. Statutory Tolling

1. Standard

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is tolled during periods in which a

“properly filed” habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2244(d)(2). The statute specifically provides, “The time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under thissubsection.” Id.; see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410

(2005). “[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531

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U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (explaining that typical filing requirements include all relevant time

limits).

The interval between the disposition of one state petition and the filing of

another may be tolled under “interval tolling.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223

(2002). “[T]he AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of the time during which

a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust

state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.’” Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167 F.3d

1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219–22. The statute of

limitations is tolled from the time a petitioner’s first state habeas petition is filed until

state collateral review is concluded, but it is not tolled before the first state collateral

challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Nino,

183 F.3d at 1006). “The period that an application for post-conviction review is

pending is not affected or ‘untolled’ merely because a petitioner files additional or

overlapping petitions before it is complete.” Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 820

(9th Cir. 2003).

2. Analysis 

The limitations period began to run in Lewis’ case on November 25, 2011, when

his direct appeal was complete. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d at 1158-59. He

constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego County

Superior Court on August 9, 2012. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9.) This 258–day

span is not statutorily tolled and countstoward the one year limitations period, because

Lewis’ state collateral review had already been completed. See Thorson, 479 F.3d at

646. Lewis’ superior court petition was denied on September 26, 2012. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 10.) Lewis then waited 52 days, until November 17, 2012, before

constructively filing his appellate habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11.)

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Statutory tolling applies to “intervals between a lower court decision and a filing

of a new petition in a higher court . . . .” Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. A petitioner is thus

entitled to statutory tolling, “not only for the time that his petitions were actually under

consideration, but also for the intervals between filings, while he worked his way up

the ladder[,]” provided that his filings are timely. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045,

1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 223).

In California, a petition for collateral review is timely if it is filed within a

“reasonable” amount of time; this contrasts with statesthatspecify a time limit, usually

30 or 45 days. Carey, 536 U.S. at 222–23. A petition to a higher court must be filed

within a “reasonable time,” presumptively 30-60 days. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S.

189, 192–93 (2006). “[I]f the successive petition was not timely filed, the period

between petitions is not tolled.” Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Lewis waited 52 days after his superior court habeas petition was denied to file

a petition with the appellate court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11.) Because thisfits

within the presumptive 30-60 day window, interval tolling applies to the period

between the denial of Lewis’ superior court petition and his constructive filing of the

next petition with the California Court of Appeal. 

The California Court of Appeal denied Lewis’ habeas petition on January 24,

2013. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 12.) Lewisfiled a habeas corpus petition with the

California Supreme Court on October 1, 2013. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 13.) The

time period between these two state petitions was 250 days. As 250 days greatly

exceeds the 30-60 day presumptive window that qualifies for statutory tolling, this

period counts towards the one-year limitation period. 

The California Supreme Court petition was denied on January 21, 2014

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 14.) “The statute of limitations period is . . . not tolled

after state post-conviction proceedings are final and before federal habeas proceedings

are initiated.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2)); Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. A decision of the California Supreme Court

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becomes final upon filing. Phelps v. Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal.

R. 8.532(b)(2)(C). Thus, the time period after the denial of Lewis’ petition by the

California Supreme Court and before the filing of his federal habeas petition is not

statutorily tolled. Lewis constructively filed his federal habeas petition on April 6,

2014, 82 days after the California Supreme Court denied his petition. This 82-day

period counts toward the one-year limitation period.

The AEDPA statute of limitations period was running in the instant case for 258

days before Lewis filed his state habeas petition, 250 days between the state appellate

court’s denial of Lewis’ petition and his filing of the next petition with the California

Supreme Court, and 82 days between the date the California Supreme Court denied his

petition and the date Lewis constructively filed his federal habeas petition. These three

periods — when the statute of limitations was not tolled — amount to a total of 590

days, which exceeds the AEDPA’s 365 day limit. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Accordingly, Lewis is not entitled to statutory tolling.

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3. Review of Timeline

Event Dates Tolled or

Running

Days Left

Under

AEDPA

Explanation

Period for

California

Supreme Ct.

denial of review

08/17/2011-

11/25/2011

Tolled 365 + 90 Decision not final until

passage of 90 days

Lewis has to file

certiorari.

Time to file cert

petition passed;

no petition

pending

11/25/2011-

08/09/2012

Running Started at

365 days

and ended

at 107

days

Took 258 days to file

after direct appeal

process complete; no

tolling during this time.

Petition filed

and pending in

Superior Ct. 

08/09/2012-

09/26/2012

Tolled 107 Tolled while awaiting

review.

Petition in

Superior Ct.

denied and no

petition pending

09/26/2012-

11/17/2012

Tolled 107 Took 52 days to file,

which was tolled, as it

falls within the 30-60

day presumptive

window for gap tolling.

Petition filed

and pending in

California Ct. of

Appeal

11/17/2012-

01/24/2013

Tolled 107 Tolled while awaiting

review. 

Petition in

California Ct. of

Appeal denied

and no petition

pending

01/24/2013-

10/01/2013

Running Started at

107 days

and

exceeded

the

remaining

time

Took 250 days to file,

which cannot be tolled

and which exceeded the

107 days Lewis had

remaining. 

Petition filed

and pending in

California

Supreme Ct.

10/01/2013-

01/21/2014

Would

toll, but

time

already

expired

0

Petition in

California

Supreme Ct.

denied and no

petition pending

01/21/2014-

04/06/2014

Running,

but time

already

expired

0 Petition is untimely.

Took an additional 82

days to file, which was

also not tolled.

Filed petition in

United States

District Ct.

04/06/2014 0 Petition untimely. Took

a total of 590 untolled

days, which exceeds the

AEDPA’s 365-day

limit.

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B. Equitable Tolling

In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Lewis does not argue that his

Petition is timely. Rather, he argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to

extraordinary circumstances. (ECF No. 16.)

1. Standard

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate when the petitioner

can show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. . . .” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,

632 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S.

327, 335 (2007); Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 548 F.3d 871, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.

2000). The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of external forces, not the

result of the petitioner’s lack of diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). “Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a ‘fact-specific

inquiry.’” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (quoting Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d

1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

2. Analysis

Lewis argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he pursued his rights

diligently but was misled by the National Association of Legislative Review (NALR),

which allegedly agreed to represent Lewis. (ECF No. 16, Exhibit B.) Respondent, in 1

turn, argues that there is no constitutional right to counsel for habeas petitions. (ECF

No. 6 at 8). The Ninth Circuit has held that “the protections of the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel do not extend to either state collateral proceedings or federal habeas

 Respondent asserts that Lewis’ exhibit that purports to be an acceptance letter from the NALR

1

does not appear to be genuine, due to the letter’s grammatical errors and strange phrases. (ECF No.

6 at 7.) Having reviewed the letter, the Court has grave doubts as to its legitimacy. However, because

the Court finds that Lewis is not entitled to equitable tolling regardless of whether the NALR agreed

to represent him or not, the Court need not rule on the letter’s authenticity. 

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corpus proceedings.” Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1993). However,

“[r]egardless of whether a constitutional right to counsel exists, a petitioner who is

represented by counsel when a petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed has a right to

assume that counsel is competent and is presenting all potentially meritorious claims.”

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 780, 855 (1993). Assuming that the NALR did in fact

agree to represent Lewis and file a petition on his behalf, Lewis had a right to rely on

their statements. However, even if Lewis had a right to rely on his counsel, the

NALR’s actions must amount to “extraordinary circumstances” for equitable tolling to

apply. 

As a general rule, ordinary attorney negligence is not a sufficient basis for

applying equitable tolling, but attorney misconduct, if it is “sufficiently egregious,”

might be. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). In Spitsyn v. Moore,

the Ninth Circuit held that attorney conduct issufficiently egregious where an attorney

who was retained nearly a year in advance of the AEDPA deadline failed to file the

petition despite repeated requests that he do so, and retained the case file despite the

client’s request for it, making a pro se filing “unrealistic.” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 800-02.

In Frye v. Hickman, however, the Ninth circuit held that the petitioner’s attorney’s

failure to file a petition within the AEDPA’s limitations period did not amount to an

extraordinary circumstance beyond the petitioner’s control. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d

at 1145. Rather, the attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period and his

negligence in general constituted ordinary attorney negligence. Id. Ordinary attorney

negligence will not justify equitable tolling. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d at 800;

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d at 1068.

Here, the NALR’s alleged failure to file a petition on behalf of Lewis would

constitute ordinary negligence. The NALR’s purported failure to follow through with

the filing is unfortunate, but does not evidence the same degree of abandonment as in

Spitsyn. In Spitsyn, the attorney was retained nearly a year in advance of the AEDPA

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deadline. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 801. Lewis’ alleged relationship with his attorney, in

contrast, commenced over a year after his direct appeal concluded. (ECF No. 16 at 5.)

In Spitsyn, the petitioner made repeated requests that his attorney file his

petition. Id. Here, Lewis attempted to make contact with the NALR only three times

over a period of nine months. (ECF No.16 at 5.) Moreover, Lewis received only a

single communication from the NALR; it was not a continued representation over a

period of time, nor was the attorney officially retained like in Spitsyn. Id; Spitsyn, 345

F.3d at 798. Finally, the court in Spitsyn held that the petitioner could not reasonably

file his federal claim without the return of his documents. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 801. 

Here, Lewis did file his federal claim without the return of his documents, as he never

alleges that the NALR mailed back his case file. (ECF No. 16.) Ultimately, Lewis

bears the burden of showing that his attorney’s conduct was “sufficiently egregious”

to serve as the basis for equitable tolling. He has failed to do so.

Lewis also argues that the reason he did not immediately file his Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court after the denial of his Court of

Appeal Petition was that he believed the Court of Appeal decision was still pending. 

(ECF No. 1 at xv.) Lewis claims that the Court of Appeal only addressed two of his

issues, and therefore he was waiting on the adjudication of the remaining issues. (ECF

No. 16 at 5.) However, the Court of Appeal did in fact make a complete and final

decision regarding Lewis’ Petition. The Court of Appealstated that because the claims

in the habeas petition were identical to the claims already decided by the Court of

Appeal in Lewis’ direct appeal, the habeas petition was denied. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 12.) Lewis’ ignorance of the law is not grounds for equitable tolling. 

Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a petitioner’s confusion

or ignorance of the law is not enough to satisfy the standard for equitable tolling). 

Lewis has failed to meet his burden of establishing that “extraordinary circumstances”

were the proximate cause of his untimeliness. See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799.

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lewis is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. As such, Lewis’ Petition is untimely. 

IV. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter, the Court findsthat Lewis has

failed to comply with the AEDPA’s statute of limitations and that he is not entitled to

equitable tolling. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS thatRespondent’s Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 2, 2015, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 17, 2015. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 9, 2015

JILL L. BURKHARDT

United States Magistrate Judge

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