Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05444/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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*

Senior Circuit Judge Edwards was in regular active service

at the time of oral argument.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 31, 2005 Decided December 27, 2005

No. 04-5444

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,

APPELLEE

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00348)

Steve Frank, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Peter D.

Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S.

Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman, Attorney.

James F. Peterson argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief was Paul J. Orfanedes.

Before: ROGERS, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS*

 and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #04-5444 Document #939117 Filed: 12/27/2005 Page 1 of 10
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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellee, Judicial

Watch, Inc. (“Judicial Watch”), brought this action under the

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 &

Supp. II 2002), seeking, inter alia, disclosure of documents

relating to the United States’ participation as amicus curiae in

Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir.

2002). As the case proceeded before the District Court, the

subject of the parties’ dispute finally focused on nine emails,

totaling 13 pages, withheld by the Government pursuant to the

deliberative process privilege and the attorney work-product

doctrine under Exemption 5 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 

It is uncontested that all nine emails involve

communications between Department of Justice (“DOJ”)

officials, containing discussions about whether DOJ should file

an amicus brief in the Boim litigation and what the Department’s

position should be if such a brief were filed. See Supplemental

Decl. Pustay ¶ 4, reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 118-19.

“Each of these e-mails was written by and/or to attorneys in

relation to the Boim case or other litigation involving designated

foreign terrorist organizations.” Decl. Pustay ¶ 22, reprinted in

J.A. 40. On March 31, 2004, following an in camera review of

the disputed documents, the District Court held that the emails

“were properly withheld under Exemption 5, as the documents

are protected by both the deliberative process privilege and the

attorney work-product doctrine.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ,

CA No. 02-348, Order at 2 (Mar. 31, 2004).

Although the District Court concluded that the emails were

properly withheld under Exemption 5, it agreed with Judicial

Watch that, under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), the Government was

obligated “to disclose any ‘reasonably segregable portion’ of the

documents.” Id. at 2. Finding that the Government “[had] not

made a good faith effort to provide [Judicial Watch] with a

USCA Case #04-5444 Document #939117 Filed: 12/27/2005 Page 2 of 10
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‘reasonably segregable portion’ of each document,” the District

Court ordered DOJ to “file with [Judicial Watch] and the Court

appropriately redacted versions of each document by no later

than April 12, 2004.” Id. at 3. Pursuant to this decision, the

District Court granted in part and denied in part the parties’

respective motions for summary judgment. 

On April 5, 2004, the Government moved for

reconsideration of the March 31 Order, or, in the alternative, for

a stay pending appeal. The Government contended that, given

the trial court’s finding that the emails were properly withheld

under the work-product doctrine, segregability was not required.

In the Government’s view, “the work product doctrine protects

all materials prepared in reasonable anticipation of litigation,

whether factual or deliberative in nature.” Br. for Appellant at

6. On April 8, 2004, the District Court issued an Order staying

the court’s March 31 Order pending resolution of the

Government’s motion for reconsideration. 

On September 2, 2004, the District Court denied the

Government’s motion for reconsideration, holding that “[t]he

plain language of FOIA states that ‘[a]ny reasonably segregable

portion of the record shall be provided to any person requesting

such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.’”

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 337 F. Supp. 2d 183, 185 (D.D.C.

2004) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)) (final alteration in original).

The District Court reinstated its March 31 Order,

“emphasiz[ing] that it is not dictating what, or even how much,

information must be released.” Id. at 187. Rather, the trial court

rejected DOJ’s argument “that defendants need not even attempt

to separate factual material from documents protected by the

work-product privilege.” Id. The District Court granted the

Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal, and the

Government filed a timely notice of appeal on October 27, 2004.

________________________________

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As a preliminary matter, Judicial Watch argues that,

because the District Court’s Orders of March 31 and September

2 “do not require the government to disclose the records in

dispute in this case until they first undertake certain actions, the

outcome of which is not known, the orders are not final and,

therefore, subject to appeal.” Br. for Appellee at 1. Because we

find that the District Court’s Orders are final and appealable, we

reject Judicial Watch’s suggestion that we lack jurisdiction to

consider this matter.

The District Court’s March 31 Order held that the

Government “[had] not made a good faith effort to provide

[Judicial Watch] with a ‘reasonably segregable portion’ of each

document,” and ordered the Government to “file with [Judicial

Watch] and the Court appropriately redacted versions of each

document by no later than April 12, 2004.” Order (Mar. 31,

2004) at 3 (emphasis added). In other words, the March 31

Order compelled the Government to disclose particular

documents. The District Court’s subsequent September 2 Order,

denying the Government’s motion for reconsideration, did not

in any way negate the March 31 Order, or its requirement that

DOJ release redacted versions of the nine emails. The District

Court knew that the Government’s principal argument was that

there was nothing to release, because every document, in its

entirety, was “work product” and thus exempt from disclosure.

The District Court nonetheless reaffirmed its March 31 Order,

and then granted a stay pending appeal. 

On this record, there is no doubt that the Government’s

appeal is not premature. “In a[] FOIA case a ‘final decision’ is

an order by the District Court requiring release of documents by

the Government to the plaintiff . . . .” Green v. Dep’t of

Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980). That is

precisely the situation here. The trial court unequivocally

rejected the Government’s legal position regarding the

substantive protection afforded by the attorney work-product

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doctrine under Exemption 5 of FOIA, and ordered the

Government to disclose materials for which it claimed

exemption. In these circumstances, the Orders of the District

Court are final and appealable. “To hold otherwise would be to

force the government to let the cat out of the bag, without any

effective way of recapturing it if the district court’s directive

was ultimately found to be erroneous.” Irons v. FBI, 811 F.2d

681, 683 (1st Cir. 1987).

_________________________________

On the merits, our review of the grant of summary judgment

is de novo, applying the same standards as the District Court.

See Schrecker v. DOJ, 349 F.3d 657, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 2003);

Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), states that FOIA “does

not apply to matters that are . . . inter-agency or intra-agency

memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to

a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”

FOIA’s “reasonably segregable” provision, under 5 U.S.C. §

552(b), states:

Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be

provided to any person requesting such record after

deletion of the portions which are exempt under this

subsection. The amount of information deleted shall be

indicated on the released portion of the record, unless

including that indication would harm an interest

protected by the exemption in this subsection under

which the deletion is made. If technically feasible, the

amount of the information deleted shall be indicated at

the place in the record where such deletion is made.

The dispute in this case requires us to explain how these two

provisions work in conjunction.

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FOIA Exemption 5 incorporates the work-product doctrine

and protects against the disclosure of attorney work product.

The work-product doctrine shields materials “prepared in

anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by

or for that other party’s representative (including the other

party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or

agent).” FED.R.CIV. P. 26(b)(3); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d

607, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1997). And, as the Supreme Court has made

clear, the doctrine should be interpreted broadly and held largely

inviolate:

Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is

bound to work for the advancement of justice while

faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In

performing his various duties, however, it is essential that

a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from

unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.

Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he

assemble information, sift what he considers to be the

relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories

and plan his strategy without undue and needless

interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in

which lawyers act within the framework of our system of

jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients’

interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,

statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental

impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible

and intangible ways – aptly though roughly termed by the

Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the “work product

of the lawyer.” Were such materials open to opposing

counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in

writing would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts,

heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency,

unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in

the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for

trial. The effect on the legal profession would be

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demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause

of justice would be poorly served. 

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).

After reviewing the disputed documents in camera, the trial

judge found that all nine emails were prepared in anticipation of

litigation, protected by the attorney work-product doctrine, and

thus properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 5,

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Having reviewed these documents in

camera, we agree and affirm the District Court’s judgment that

the documents are attorney work product. We also note that the

District Court never suggested that any of the documents were

only partially work product. Our review of the documents

confirms this. Each of the nine documents, in its entirety, is

work product. There are no non-work product parts of the

emails. In other words, there are no segregable parts. In light

of these findings, we reverse the judgment of the District Court

compelling the Government to provide Judicial Watch with

reasonably segregable portions of each document.

The District Court ruled that the segregability language of

§ 552(b) requires DOJ to disclose “any ‘reasonably segregable

portion’ of documents” withheld under the attorney workproduct doctrine. See Order (Mar. 31, 2004) at 2. DOJ responds

that FOIA’s segregability requirement only provides that an

agency must disclose “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a

record . . . to any person requesting such record after deletion of

the portions which are exempt under this subsection.” See Br.

for Appellant at 9 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)). Thus, according

to the Government, where a document is withheld pursuant to

the work-product doctrine, “there simply are no ‘reasonably

segregable’ portions . . . to release ‘after deletion of the portions

which are exempt.’” Id. The Government’s view is on the

mark.

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Judicial Watch counters that “[i]t is quite possible that the

documents contain specific facts that are segregable because

they are of a nature that does not implicate the work-product

doctrine.” Br. for Appellee at 8-9. Judicial Watch further

argues that the District Court must have assumed as much,

having found the emails to be work product and yet ordering the

Government to make a good faith effort to provide Judicial

Watch with reasonably segregable potions of each document. 

There is no doubt that the District Court thought the “widereaching protection for attorney work-product runs headlong

into FOIA’s broad disclosure and segregability requirements,”

337 F. Supp. 2d at 186, and that “the law in this Circuit on the

interaction between FOIA’s segregability requirement and the

attorney work-product protection is unclear,” id. Facing this

perceived confusion in the case law, the District Court, relying

on Army Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Air Force, 998

F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1993), concluded that “[a] distinction can

be drawn between material that is deliberative in nature and that

which is merely factual” in determining what material must be

disclosed under Exemption 5. 337 F. Supp. 2d at 186.

However, this confuses the deliberative process privilege, which

was at issue in Army Times Publishing, and the attorney workproduct doctrine, which is at issue here.

The circuit’s case law is clear that “[t]he work-product

doctrine simply does not distinguish between factual and

deliberative material.” Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, 819

F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Tax Analysts, we

explained that “[a]ny part of [a document] prepared in

anticipation of litigation, not just the portions concerning

opinions, legal theories, and the like, is protected by the work

product doctrine and falls under exemption 5.” 117 F.3d at 620.

In other words, factual material is itself privileged when it

appears within documents that are attorney work product. If a

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document is fully protected as work product, then segregability

is not required. 

Judicial Watch, echoing a view expressed by the District

Court, see Order (Mar. 31, 2004) at 3, argues that it is well

settled that “[t]he ‘segregability’ requirement applies to all . . .

documents and all exemptions in the FOIA.” Schiller v. NLRB,

964 F.2d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). When taken out of context, this

language from Schiller does indeed suggest that a document that

is clearly covered by the work-product doctrine may be

segregable. But that is not what Schiller says, nor is it consistent

with the law of the circuit. There were five documents at issue

in Schiller, at least three of which contained attachments. The

court found that one of the documents was not attorney work

product, but held that the remaining documents fell “within the

attorney work-product privilege and, therefore, within

exemption 5.” Id. at 1208. The court then remanded the case

for the District Court “to enforce FOIA’s requirement that

agencies disclose reasonably segregable portions of withheld

documents.” Id. at 1210. The decision can thus be read to

suggest that the court remanded for a determination as to

whether any portions of the attorney work-product documents,

say, possibly the attachments, included nonprivileged materials.

Or the court may have inadvertently referred to “documents”

when it intended only to remand for a segregability analysis for

the one document that was not attorney work product. The

opinion is simply unclear on this point.

What is clear about Schiller is that it does not purport to

undercut the court’s decision in Martin, and the holding there

that “the work-product doctrine simply does not distinguish

between factual and deliberative material.” Martin, 819 F.2d at

1187. Indeed, Martin is not even cited in Schiller. Nor is there

any doubt about the continuing force of the holding in Martin

after the decision in Schiller. Tax Analysts, which was decided

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after Schiller, reaffirms the principles set forth in Martin and

says nothing to suggest that Schiller established a new line of

precedent with respect to the application of the attorney workproduct doctrine under Exemption 5.

As indicated above, the District Court’s principal error was

in conflating the deliberative process privilege and the attorney

work-product doctrine. It is clear that the privilege and the

doctrine are not coterminous in their sweep. See Martin, 819

F.2d at 1185-86. Factual material is not protected under the

deliberative process privilege unless it is “inextricably

intertwined” with the deliberative material, see In re Sealed

Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam), whereas

no such showing is required under the attorney work-product

doctrine, see Martin, 819 F.2d at 1184-87. “[T]he deliberative

process privilege, not the work-product privilege, is the source

of the fact/deliberative process distinction, and . . . factual

elements can ‘seldom’ be segregated from attorney work

product.” Id. at 1186 (quoting Mervin v. FTC, 591 F.2d 821,

827 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam)). As the Government notes,

the District Court’s “blurring of the two privileges led it to hold

in its September 2 order that ‘defendants do have a duty to

release segregable information – that is, information that is not

inextricably intertwined with protected information.’” Br. for

Appellant at 19 (quoting 337 F. Supp. 2d at 187). 

____________________________________

In conclusion, we hold that, because the emails at issue in

this case are attorney work product, the entire contents of these

documents – i.e., facts, law, opinions, and analysis – are exempt

from disclosure under FOIA. We therefore reverse the judgment

of the District Court.

So ordered.

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