Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02708/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02708-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

INFORMATION CENTER, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-02-2708 JCS

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DISMISSING

ACTION AS MOOT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Following the withdrawal of the 2005 Fire Management Plan for the Six Rivers National

Forest, the Forest Service asserts that this action is moot and should be dismissed. Plaintiff

Environmental Protection Information Center (“EPIC”) takes the position that the voluntary

cessation exception to the mootness doctrine applies and, therefore, it is entitled to injunctive relief

notwithstanding the withdrawal of the 2005 Fire Management Plan. For the reasons stated below,

the Court concludes that this action is moot. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is

denied and the action is dismissed. 

II. BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2003, the Court ruled in favor of EPIC in this environmental action, holding

that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when it issued the

2001 Fire Management Plan for Six Rivers National Forest (“Six Rivers”) without preparing an

Environmental Evaluation (“EA”) or Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). See Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law re Liability (“the Liability Order”). The Court’s ruling was based on

its finding that the 2001 Fire Management Plan was not a purely operational document, but rather

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contained fire management direction that went beyond the 1995 Land Resource Management Plan

(“LRMP”) for Six Rivers. After deciding the Liability Order, the Court directed the parties to meet

and confer regarding an appropriate remedy.

In the two years that followed, the Forest Service did not complete an EA or EIS on the 2001

Fire Management Plan as a whole. Instead, it revised the fire plan, removing all of the “new

decisions” cited as examples by the Court in its Liability Order. As to one of these, Port Orford

Cedar (“POC”), the Forest Service completed an EA and issued a Decision Notice. In addition,

Defendant’s counsel has represented to the Court that the Forest Service conducted an “exhaustive

review” of the fire plan in an effort to remove any other new decisions. 

Following the issuance of the new fire plan (the 2005 Fire Management Plan), EPIC brought

a motion to enforce, arguing that it did not comply with the Court’s Liability Order because it, like

the 2001 Fire Management Plan, contained decisions that required completion of an EA or EIS. The

Forest Service argued strenuously, both in its briefs and at oral argument, that the 2005 Fire

Management Plan contained no “decisions” that required NEPA process and therefore, that it was in

compliance with the Court's Liability Order. In addition, at the March 10, 2006 case management

conference, the Forest Service made clear that while it was attempting in good faith to comply with

the Court's order, it continued to believe that the Six Rivers fire plan never did contain any decisions

that required NEPA process and that to the extent the Court might order that an EA or EIS be

completed as to the 2005 Fire Management Plan, the Forest Service would likely appeal the Court's

Liability Order and seek a stay on any order requiring Defendant to complete an EA or EIS. 

In an order dated April 6, 2006 (“the Compliance Order”), the Court held that the 2005 Fire

Management Plan, like the earlier fire plan, contained new decisions and therefore was required to

undergo NEPA process. The most prominent of these decisions was a prohibition on Wildland Fire

Use (“WFU”). WFU is a a fire management tool that was to be permitted, according to the 1995

LRMP, under circumstances that were to be spelled out in the fire plan. 

Subsequently, in the parties’ May 17, 2006 Joint Status Report, the Forest Service notified

the Court that it had decided to withdraw the 2005 Fire Management Plan. It also informed the

Court that the Chief of the Forest Service had granted a waiver to Six Rivers of the policy requiring

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 Plaintiff requests the following specific language:

It is ORDERED that Defendant United States Forest Service is

permanently enjoined from issuing a Fire Management Plan or other

document that contains decisions or programmatic policies for the

management of fire on the Six Rivers National Forest unless and until

Defendant fully complies with NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., as set

forth in this Court’s September 3, 2003 and April 6, 2006 orders.

Plaintiff’s Brief at 5.

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each National Forest to maintain a fire management plan. Defendant’s Notice Regarding Fire Plan,

Ex. 1. In the Joint Status Report, the Forest Service stated that fire management at Six Rivers would

be governed by the LRMP “for the foreseeable future.” It stated further that it “intends to review

whether there should be a fire plan for Six Rivers [National Forest] at all, and, if so, what should be

included in the fire plan.” The Forest Service also requested that the Court dismiss the action as

moot and issue a final judgment that could be appealed.

The parties have now filed briefs addressing the mootness issue. EPIC asserts in its brief that

because the Forest Service withdrew the fire plan in response to this litigation, the withdrawal makes

the case moot only if the Forest Service can “demonstrate that it is absolutely clear that the . . .

wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Plaintiff’s Brief at 2 (quoting

Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66 (1987)). EPIC further

asserts that the Forest Service has not met that burden, pointing to the Forest Service’s statement in

the May 17, 2006 Joint Status Report that it had not yet decided if a fire plan was necessary, and if it

was, what it should contain. EPIC also points to the requests for a waiver of the fire plan

requirement by the Active Forest Supervisor and the Regional Forester, and the waiver granted by

the Chief of the Forest Service, noting that they contain no explanation of the reasons for waiving

this requirement and therefore offer no assurance that the waiver won’t be revoked once this case is

dismissed. EPIC requests that the Court, rather than dismissing the action as moot, enter a final

remedy order and judgment “that embodies the Court’s prior rulings by permanently enjoining

Defendant from issuing a decisional FMP in violation of those rulings.” Plaintiff’s Brief at 5.1

The Forest Service asserts that the case is moot because in the face of the withdrawal of the

2005 Fire Management Plan, the Court can provide no effective relief. Further, it asserts that in

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applying the voluntary cessation doctrine, the Court should presume that government officers

“discharge their duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.” Defendant’s Brief at 5 (quoting

Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Applying that standard, the Forest Service

argues, it has met its burden of showing there is no reasonable likelihood it will engage in the

challenged conduct in the future. In support of this position, the Forest Service points to a

declaration by William Metz, Acting Forest Supervisor for Six Rivers, in which he states as follows:

As documented in my May 23, 2006 letter to the Regional Forester, I

have withdrawn the 2005 Fire Management Plan for the Six Rivers

National Forest. I have no intent to issue any Fire Management Plan

to replace the 2005 Fire Plan. While Forest Service Policy generally

requires that each National Forest with burnable acres have an

approved Fire Management Plan, the Six Rivers National Forest has

been exempted from that policy. Therefore, there is no longer any

Forest Service Manual Requirement for a Fire Plan for the Six Rivers

National Forest. The withdrawal of the Six Rivers Fire Management

Plan and the waiver of the Manual requirement to have such a plan do

not affect the existing fire management direction found in the Six

Rivers National Forest LRMP.

Should I, my successor, or one of my superiors determine in the future

that a Fire Management Plan that contains fire management direction

beyond what is in the forest plan is necessary for the Six Rivers

National Forest, such a Fire Plan would be issued consistent with the

Court’s liability order in this case issued in September 2003, unless a

supervening legal change allows otherwise. That is, if the Six Rivers

National Forest decides to issue a new Fire Management Plan that

contains fire management direction that may significantly affect the

quality of the human environment, and that direction has not

previously gone through NEPA process, such direction will only be

issued after the appropriate NEPA process has been completed. 

Declaration of William Metz in Support of Defendant’s Brief in Support of Finding of Mootness

(“Metz Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-3. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

The primary foundation of mootness jurisprudence is Article III of the United States

Constitution, which grants federal courts jurisdiction where there is a “case or controversy.” See

Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n. 3 (1964). Under Article III, “voluntary cessation of

allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e.,

does not make the case moot.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). The

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Court in W. T. Grant explains that because a defendant is “free to return to his old ways,” a

“controversy remains to be settled in such circumstances.” Id. at 632. Accordingly, where the

defendant voluntarily ceases to engage in the challenged conduct, the case becomes moot only if the

defendant meets the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that “there is no reasonable expectation that

the wrong will be repeated.” Id. (citations omitted).

Courts sitting in equity have also declined historically to issue an injunction where the court

concludes that no effective relief can be granted. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (holding

that where, as a result of changing circumstances, it is impossible for the court to grant “any

effectual relief whatever,” it is proper for court to dismiss the action as moot rather than proceeding

to a formal judgment). While this doctrine has sometimes loosely been referred to as “discretionary”

mootness, it is in practice an inquiry into whether injunctive or other equitable relief should be

ordered using traditional equitable principles. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Indus. Welfare Comm’n of

California, 473 F. Supp. 537, 539 (noting that “[c]ourt decisions dealing with the mootness doctrine

have not produced clear distinctions between mootness as a constitutional matter and mootness as a

discretionary matter reflecting remedial considerations. It is recognized, however, that the courts

possess discretion in certain cases to withhold injunctive relief on the ground of mootness although a

constitutional case or controversy does exist”). 

These principles are illustrated in United States v. W. T. Grant Co. In W. T. Grant, the

Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the action where the defendants had

voluntarily ceased to engage in the alleged wrongful conduct. First, the Court concluded that the

case was not moot, because the defendants had not met the burden of showing that there was no

reasonable expectation the wrong would be repeated. 345 U.S. at 633. Nonetheless, the Court

concluded that the case was correctly dismissed. Id. At 635-636. The Court explained that even

though the defendants’ disclaimers of any intent to resume the challenged conduct were not

sufficient to show there was no reasonable expectation the wrong would be repeated, they were “one

of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of granting an injunction against

the now discontinued acts.” Id. at 633. The Court went on to hold that the district court’s denial of

the plaintiff’s request for an injunction enjoining future violations was proper because the plaintiffs

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did not show that there was a need for such relief. Id. at 636; see also Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.

Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1245-1246 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that in determining whether a case is

moot, “the question is not whether the precise relief sought at the time the application for an

injunction was filed is still available [but rather] whether there can be any effective relief”). 

In this case, EPIC asserts that the case is not moot because the Forest Service has not met the

heavy burden that is applied in cases involving voluntary cessation. The Forest Service, on the other

hand, asserts that it has met that burden and moreover, the case is moot because no effective relief

remains to be granted. The Court concludes that although the Forest Service has not established that

there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated, there also is no effective relief

available under the circumstances and therefore, the case is moot.

B. Voluntary Cessation

In cases involving voluntary cessation of challenged conduct by public officials, courts

generally find that the burden set forth above is met where the cessation of challenged conduct is

accompanied by circumstances indicating the change is a “genuine” act of “self-correction.” See

Magnuson v. City of Hickory Hills, 933 F. 2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1991); see also 13A Charles Alan

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.7 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that while

“[c]ourts are more apt to trust public officials than private defendants to desist from future violations

. . . the tendency to trust public officials is not complete . . . nor is it invoked automatically”). On

the other hand, where the defendant has ceased to engage in the challenged conduct only for

practical or strategic reasons – such as avoiding litigation – the cessation does not make the case

moot. See United States v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that

where Government of Virgin Islands withdrew from challenged contract just before litigation was

initiated and governor offered only general reason that withdrawal was in the “best interest” of the

Virgin Islands, voluntary cessation was likely only a strategic move to avoid litigation and therefore

case was not moot).

Among the factors courts have considered in determining whether there is reasonable

likelihood the challenged conduct will recur are: 1) whether the defendant has shown that a change

was the result of serious deliberation and was made for convincing reasons (other than the desire to

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avoid litigation); 2) the extent to which the defendant has committed not to engage in the challenged

practice in the future and the degree to which any promises made are likely to be binding; and

3) whether the cessation is based on external circumstances that have made a recurrence of the

challenged conduct impossible or impractical.

1. Reasons for Cessation

To understand the motivations of the defendant – and thus to determine the likelihood of a

future recurrence of the challenged conduct – courts often consider whether the defendant has

offered convincing reasons for its policy change or at least, has engaged in “serious deliberation.” 

See, e.g., Jews for Jesus v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 162 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 1998)

(holding that defendant airport authority was not likely to revert to previous policy of prohibiting

distribution of free literature at airport where change in policy allowing plaintiffs to distribute free

literature was the result of “serious deliberation” and had been consistently applied for three years).

Where a defendant has offered only conclusory reasons for the cessation of challenged conduct – or

reasons that are not persuasive – courts often decline to find an action moot. See, e.g., United States

v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that defendant did not establish

mootness where Government of Virgin Islands withdrew from challenged contract just before

litigation was initiated and governor offered only general reason that withdrawal was in the “best

interest” of the Virgin Islands). 

 Where a defendant has not conceded that its past conduct is illegal, courts are less likely to

find a cessation of challenged conduct makes the case moot. See Armster v. United States Dist.

Court for the Cent. Dist. of California, 806 F.2d 1347, 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that where

Justice Department did not concede that challenged conduct was illegal, bare assertion that it would

not recur was insufficient to establish mootness because “[i]t has long been recognized that the

likelihood of recurrence of challenged activity is more substantial when the cessation is not based on

a recognition of the initial illegality of that conduct”); see also Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290,

291-292 (7th Cir. 1999).

In Sasnett, the plaintiffs were prisoners who challenged a regulation that prohibited them

from possessing crosses under the United States and Wisconsin constitutions and under the

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Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 197 F.3d at 291. The district court held that the

regulation violated the RFRA and did not consider the plaintiffs’ other claims. Id. In response, the

defendant replaced the challenged regulation with a new regulation allowing crosses. Id. 

Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional and the case

was remanded to the district court to consider the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. Id. The district

court held that the prohibition on crosses did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the

plaintiffs appealed. Id. On appeal, the court considered whether the change in the regulation

following the first round of litigation made the case moot. Id. The court concluded that it did not,

reasoning as follows:

Even after the new regulation was in force, the defendants continued

to pursue the litigation by asking the Supreme Court to review our

decision invalidating the old regulation. So they didn't think the suit

had been mooted by the adoption of the new regulation, which implies

that they wanted to go back to the old one. Maybe they just wished to

have the latitude to do so if circumstances changed; and in their briefs

and at argument their lawyer told us that the state has no present

intention of reinstating the old regulation if the district court's decision

dismissing the suit is affirmed. But that is far from being an assurance,

or even a prediction, that the state will not do so. The state vigorously

defends the old regulation as justified by security concerns, and if this

defense is sincere, as we have no reason to doubt that it is, it implies a

high likelihood of returning to the old regulation unless that regulation

is enjoined.

Id. 

Acknowledgment on the part of the defendant that the challenged conduct is illegal or

unconstitutional may be sufficient to establish mootness, although, if the reviewing court does not

agree that conduct is clearly barred, such an acknowledgment may not be sufficient show that the

challenged conduct will not recur. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir.1988). 

In Ragsdale, the plaintiffs were physicians and women desiring to obtain abortions who sued the

Illinois Department of Public Health, challenging three Illinois statutes and a related licensing

scheme regulating the provision of abortions. 841 F.2d at 1360. The defendant asserted that the

challenge was moot as to two provisions that were not being enforced. Id at 1363. As to one of

these provisions, relating to a requirement that second term abortions be performed in hospitals, the

court agreed. Id. at 1366. As to another, relating to reporting requirements, the court concluded

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there was a reasonable likelihood that the provision might be enforced in the future, and thus, the

claim was not moot. Id. at 1366. 

The court in Ragsdale distinguished between the two provisions on the basis of the reasons

offered by the defendant for their non-enforcement: as to the hospitalization requirement, there was

“clear Supreme Court precedent” barring its enforcement and the defendant had presented an

internal memorandum, circulated at the time the relevant Supreme Court decisions were issued,

expressing the opinion that the provision was unconstitutional; as to the reporting requirement, in

contrast, the defendant justified its non-enforcement on the basis of a district court decision that the

court concluded did not bar enforcement of the provision. Id. at 1365. In particular, the court stated,

“we have reviewed that decision and cannot find anything in it which remotely supports the

conclusion that the requirement under challenge here was enjoined.” Id. The court also noted that

in contrast to the provision discussed above, “the State produced no pre-existing documentation of

the policy.” Id. The court concluded, “[w]e share the district court’s concern that the State’s

position on this provision is asserted only in this litigation.” Id.; see also Rhode Island Ass’n of

Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 34-36 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that “conclusory” assertion by

attorney general that “he did not presently believe” that challenged statute applied to plaintiffs’

conduct was not sufficient to render action moot).

The likelihood of recurrence of challenged conduct may be found to be less where there is

evidence that the defendant’s shift in policy is consistent with longstanding plans that predate the

litigation. See Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). In Wilderness

Watch, the plaintiffs challenged the National Park Service’s practice of transporting visitors by

motor vehicle across the wilderness area on Cumberland Island, Georgia, arguing that the Park

Service had not conducted the investigation and analysis of this practice required under NEPA. Id.

at 1087. During the course of the litigation, the Park Service discontinued the practice and instituted

a policy of transporting tourists by boat only. Id. at 1090 n. 6. The court held that this change made

the action moot, rejecting the voluntary cessation exception on the basis of evidence in the record

that the Park Service had “always intended to shift from land service to boat service so long as the

latter proved feasible.” Id.

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2. Nature of Promise Not to Resume Challenged Conduct

Another consideration, closely related to the one discussed above, is the nature of the

guarantees offered by the defendant that it will not engage in the challenged conduct in the future. 

Promises to “vigorously” defend a new policy in the future may be sufficient to convince the court

that there is no reasonable likelihood of recurrence. See, e.g., Quincy Oil v. Fed. Energy Admin.,

620 F.2d 890, 895 (Em. App. 1980) (holding that where agency issued ruling adopting plaintiff’s

position and promised it would “vigorously defend” the new policy against attack, possibility of

recurrence was speculative and case was moot). On the other hand, where defendants leave open the

possibility that they might resume the challenged conduct, courts tend to find that the voluntary

cessation doctrine applies. See, e.g., Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 370 n. 2 (3d Cir.

1998) (holding that where city had discontinued challenged policy but had reserved the right to

resume the challenged policy in the future and had not conceded that former policy was

impermissible, case was not moot).

Promises of future compliance with laws alleged to have been violated have often been found

insufficient to establish mootness. For example, in Group Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v.

United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 665 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1981), plaintiffs challenged a regulation

promulgated under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 on the basis that it excluded “fugitive”

emissions. Subsequently, the EPA informed the court that it had decided to revise the regulation to

include fugitive emissions and argued the case was therefore moot. Id. at 1291. At the time of the

decision, the EPA had not yet issued the proposed regulation but projected it would be issued within

the next several months. Id. The court concluded that the EPA’s promise to revise the regulation

was not sufficient to establish mootness because issuance of the proposed regulation had been

delayed already and it was not clear it would be issued even by the new projected date. Id.; see also

New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 327 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that

letter of commitment citing changes that had been made as well as those that would be made in the

future to bring defendant into compliance with environmental law was insufficient to show that there

was no reasonable possibility of recurrence of challenged conduct). 

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 The court in Forest Service Employees also emphasized that if the Forest Service were to

decide in the future to authorize a new sale of the trees, that decision would be required to go through

the administrative process again such that a challenge to the sale would give rise to a “different lawsuit

and administrative record.” Id. at 919. This point goes to whether the court should exercise its

discretion to grant injunctive relief in light of the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of the remedy

that is sought, discussed below.

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3. Changes in External Circumstances

Where there has been a change in external circumstances that makes the original conduct

impossible or which eliminates the original reasons for the conduct, a defendant’s voluntary

cessation of the challenged conduct is likely to result in mootness. See, e.g., Forest Serv. Employees

for Envtl. Ethics v. United States Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 916 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 

In Forest Service Employees, the plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service’s proposal to sell

for logging some trees in Six Rivers that had been damaged by fire, arguing that the Forest Service

had not properly conducted an environmental assessment with respect to the plan and therefore, it

should be enjoined. Id. at 917. The Forest Service urged the court to rule quickly on the plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction, informing the court that the plan could not go forward if

logging did not begin by June 30, 2005 because the trees were rapidly deteriorating and soon would

have little value as timber. Id. On June 27, 2005, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and issued

a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Forest Service from going forward with the sale. Id. Soon

thereafter, the Forest Service withdrew the decision memorandum approving the sale that had been

the subject of the challenge and asked the court to vacate the injunction on the basis that the case

was moot. Id. at 917-918. The court concluded the case was moot, citing extensively to evidence

offered by the Forest Service that made a “compelling case that the . . . sale [was] no longer

economically feasible.”2

 Id. at 919. 

4. Likelihood of Recurrence in this Case

In order to determine the likelihood that the Forest Service will return to its “old ways,” the

Court must, as a preliminary matter, define what “old ways” it is concerned about. See Clarke v.

United States, 915 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that “[t]he more broadly we define the

wrongful conduct . . . the greater the likelihood of repetition”). An extremely narrow definition of

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 In drawing this conclusion, the Court does not impute to the Forest Service any bad faith or

nefarious plan to secure a dismissal on mootness grounds simply in order to evade this Court’s review.

To the contrary, the efforts made to comply with this Court’s order were clearly made in good faith.

Similarly, the Court has no reason to doubt that the Forest Service’s continued adherence to the position

that the 2001 and 2005 Fire Management Plans did not contain decisions requiring NEPA review is in

good faith. Nonetheless, the Forest Service’s position makes the likelihood of recurrence higher than

it would be if the withdrawal of the fire plan represented a genuine act of “self-correction.” 

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the relevant conduct would limit the inquiry to the likelihood that the Forest Service would reissue

the exact fire plan that was the original focus of the lawsuit, the 2001 Fire Management Plan. The

Supreme Court has rejected such a narrow approach, however. See Ne. Florida Chapter of

Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 661 (1993) (holding that

where challenged statute had been amended in some ways, changes did not make the case moot and

noting that “City of Mesquite does not stand for the proposition that it is only the possibility that the

selfsame statute will be enacted that prevents a case from being moot; if that were the rule, a

defendant could moot a case by repealing the challenged statute and replacing it with one that differs

only in some insignificant respect).” At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Court could define the

wrongful conduct broadly as issuance of the fire plan without complying with NEPA requirements. 

This definition, however, would encompass a great deal of conduct that was never at issue in this

lawsuit and thus, is almost certainly overbroad.

The Court concludes that a reasonable middle ground frames the mootness inquiry in terms

of the likelihood that the Forest Service will issue another fire plan for Six Rivers that contains

decisions that require NEPA review. Indeed, the Court implicitly adopted this approach when it

concluded that the 2005 Fire Management Plan did not comply with the Liability Order because it

replaced decisions in the 2001 Fire Plan with new decisions that also required NEPA process.

Applying the case law described above, the Court concludes that the Forest Service has not

met the “stringent” test that is applied when a defendant voluntarily ceases to engage in challenged

conduct. First, there is no evidence that the withdrawal of the 2005 Fire Management Plan

represents a “genuine” change in policy rather than merely a strategic move in response to the

litigation.3

 Indeed, the Forest Service in this case has made no pretense that its actions represent a

shift in thinking, in contrast to the facts in many of the cases discussed above. Rather, it has

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consistently taken the position that neither of the fire plans that was presented to the Court in this

action contained fire management direction that required NEPA process. Even as the Forest Service

argued the case was moot, in fact, it requested that the Court issue a judgment that would allow the

Forest Service to pursue an appeal. Nor does the one-line statement by the Chief of the Forest

Service waiving the fire plan requirement for Six Rivers offer any evidence that the waiver reflected

a genuine shift in the Forest Service’s thinking, either as to the importance of fire plans or their

content. In short, it is clear that the 2005 Fire Management Plan was withdrawn for the sole reason

that the Court found that it did not comply with its Liability Order. 

Second, the declaration of the Acting Forest Supervisor of Six Rivers, William Metz, does

not offer the sort of assurance that might make “absolutely clear” that there is no reasonable

possibility of recurrence. In particular, while Metz states that he has no “intent” to replace the 2005

Fire Plan with a new fire plan, he leaves open the possibility that he may decide in the future that it

is necessary to issue a new fire plan containing fire management direction. This is consistent with

counsel’s representation in its May 17, 2006 Joint Status Report that it intends to “review whether

there should be a fire plan for Six Rivers [National Forest] at all, and if so, what should be included

in the fire plan.” Further, Metz states that if the Forest Service issues a new fire plan containing fire

management direction, the Forest Service will conduct appropriate NEPA process, consistent with

this Court’s order. Again, while the Court does not question the Forest Service’s good faith in

making this statement, such a conclusory promise of future compliance does not carry a great deal of

weight, especially in light of the fact that the Forest Service failed to achieve this objective despite

“exhaustive” efforts, when it issued the 2005 Fire Management Plan.

Finally, there has been no change in external circumstances that makes it clear the challenged

conduct will not recur. In contrast to the facts in Forest Service Employees for Environmental

Ethics, there is no evidence that Six Rivers no longer needs a fire plan or that issuance of a fire plan

is no longer possible. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Forest Service has not met the

heavy burden of showing that there is no reasonable likelihood that the challenged conduct will

occur again.

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The cases cited by the Forest Service do not support a contrary result. First, while the Forest

Service is correct that public officials are presumed to discharge their duties in good faith, the cases

cited by the Forest Service on this point do not stand for the proposition that a promise to refrain

from challenged conduct in the future is, by itself, sufficient to meet the stringent test that is applied

in voluntary cessation cases. See Coral Springs St. Sys. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.

2004); Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358,

1365 (7th Cir. 1988). 

One of these decisions, Frizelle, referred to the “strong but rebuttable presumption that

administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge their duties correctly, lawfully,

and in good faith.” 111 F.3d at 177. However, that case did not involve a question of mootness,

much less, how such a presumption might be applied where the defendant voluntarily ceases to

engage in the challenged conduct. Ragsdale, as discussed above, shows that notwithstanding any

presumption of good faith that may be applied to public officials, courts do not take assurances by

public officials regarding future conduct at face value, but rather, look beyond these statements to

determine whether or not they are persuasive.

Coral Springs is distinguishable. In Coral Springs, the court addressed whether the

amendment of a challenged sign ordinance before the case was initiated made the case moot. 371

F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff had applied for a sign permit from the city and the

application had been denied. Id. In response to the denial, the plaintiff’s counsel wrote a letter to

the city complaining that the ordinance violated the First Amendment. Id. at 1326. Within sixteen

days, and before the plaintiff sued the city, the city amended the statute “with nary a whimper of

protest.” Id. The plaintiff did not reapply before bringing a legal challenge to the statute. Id. The

court held that the case was moot because there was no reasonable expectation that the wrong would

be repeated. Although it pointed out that “[c]ourts are more apt to trust public officials than private

defendants to desist from future violations,” it also went on to distinguish the facts from other cases

in which voluntary cessation by public officials well after they had been sued did not render actions

moot. Id. In particular, the court emphasized the city’s prompt amendment of the challenged statute

in response to “a single letter” from the plaintiff and the fact that it responded before the lawsuit had

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even been filed. Id. Here, in contrast to Coral Springs, the withdrawal of the 2005 Fire Plan

occurred only after years of litigation in which the Forest Service has consistently maintained the

correctness of its approach, and continues to do so. 

C. Effective Remedy

While this case is not moot as a constitutional matter, the court may decline to hear the

matter where no effective relief can be granted. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). Where

past actions have been withdrawn and there is only a “possibility” that they will recur, courts are

generally reluctant to grant injunctive relief enjoining future violations, even where there may be a

constitutional case or controversy. See W. T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633. This is particularly the case

where the future conduct at issue is agency action. See Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149

(1967) (noting that “[t]he injunctive and declaratory judgment remedies are discretionary and courts

traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to administrative determinations unless these arise in

a context of a controversy “ripe” for judicial resolution”); see also Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl.

Ethics, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 918, 919 (holding that finding of mootness was supported in part by fact

that “any subsequent decision to proceed with the sale would need to pass through the administrative

process once again . . . [and] a court reviewing a future sale of the trees covered by this Court's

preliminary injunction would likely face a different lawsuit and administrative record than what this

Court has considered”).

The concern about ripeness where future agency action is at issue can be seen in Sierra Club

v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1319 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the plaintiff challenged the adequacy

of (already completed) environmental evaluations by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)

regarding certain mining operations and sought an injunction staying the mining operations until the

BLM had complied. Id. at 1317. The plaintiff and the BLM entered into a settlement under which

the BLM agreed to prepare new evaluations that complied with the relevant environmental laws

before authorizing any mining for the 1986 mining season and the plaintiff withdrew its motion for

an injunction. Id. The stipulation was to expire on December 31, 1986, but the mining season

ended around August or September. Id. The plaintiff brought a motion for compliance in July and

the court found that it was moot. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court concluded that to the

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extent the mining season for 1986 was already over, an order requiring compliance for the 1986

mining season would be meaningless, as the mining that had already occurred could not be undone. 

Id. The court also held that the district court had properly denied a motion by the plaintiff for a

permanent injunction requiring that the BLM comply with the relevant environmental laws in

completing future environmental evaluations. Id. at 1318. The court found that the plaintiff’s claim

was not ripe, explaining its reasoning as follows:

We fail to see how BLM's actions have presented an issue fit for

judicial decision. In this record, we find nothing to show what BLM's

policy will be in future years. It would be a mistake for us to assume

that because an EA was inadequate in the past, BLM will not comply

with NEPA in the future. . . . The adequacy of the EA's involves a

question of fact, and facts are not found in this record. Our review of

Sierra Club's contentions would be assisted by a factual record. “Any

party . . . aggrieved by a decision” of the BLM has the right to pursue

an administrative appeal up through the Board of Land Appeals. 43

C.F.R. § 3809.4(f). Under the administrative review procedure, Sierra

Club can present facts which show a NEPA violation. Once this

procedure is exhausted, a record for review would be established. We

presently have no reason to believe judicial review is necessary.

Should we not assume that the Board of Land Appeals will thoroughly

review the adequacy of the EA's? If an EA is shown to be inadequate,

the Board will order the appropriate remedy and Sierra Club will be

granted relief without resorting to judicial review. Sierra Club's claim

is not ripe for judicial review. When an inadequate EA is contested as

a matter of fact, review should then proceed through the administrative

process and a question of adequacy can be resolved. With the claim

ripe for review and the administrative appeals exhausted, Sierra Club

can then seek judicial relief.

Id. at 1319.

Here, the Court concludes that even if there may be an active case or controversy, it is

appropriate for it to exercise its discretion to deny the injunctive relief sought by EPIC. The fire

plan that originally was the subject of this action was abandoned long ago. The Forest Service has

also represented to the Court that it will not reissue the 2005 Fire Management Plan and will rely on

the guidance in the LRMP for the foreseeable future. While these assertions are not sufficient to

establish that the action is moot under the voluntary cessation doctrine, the Court does consider them

to be significant in determining an appropriate remedy. In particular, there is, at most, a possibility

that the Forest Service will issue another fire plan for Six Rivers containing decisions that require an

EA or EIS. If it does, it will be the product of a new administrative process and likely will raise new

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issues that have not been addressed in this lawsuit. Such a remote and undefined future set of events

is not an appropriate subject for an injunction. Indeed, even EPIC could not come up with a

proposed injunction that would require or forbid any specific contemplated actions by the Forest

Service: the proposed language would require that the Forest Service comply with NEPA before it

issues a future Fire Plan. This is essentially a proposed injunction to comply with the law,

something the Forest Service is obligated to do regardless of the outcome of this case. Thus, the

harm from which EPIC seeks protection is simply too vague and remote to justify entry of injunctive

relief at this time. Therefore, the Court concludes that the action is moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

The case is DISMISSED. The Clerk is ordered to close the file in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2006

__________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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