Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00062/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00062-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 12:1461 Homeowners Loan Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 :

KARUN N. JACKSON, et al., :

 :

Plaintiffs, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-062-CG-M

 :

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, et al.,: 

 :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended 

Complaint and memorandum in support thereof (Doc. 19) under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) was referred to 

the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and 

Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the Court. 

Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 30) to which Defendant 

has replied (Doc. 33). After careful consideration of the 

record, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim against Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC1

(hereinafter “SLS”), Bank of New York Mellon (hereinafter 

“BONYM”), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 

(hereinafter “MERS”) as follows:

 1 Identified as Specialized Loan Services in the Amended Complaint.

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Counts one, two, three, four, five, eight, and nine

dismissed against Defendants, SLS and BONYM. Counts 

six, seven, and sixteen dismissed against Defendants, 

SLS, BONYM, and MERS. Counts ten, eleven, twelve, 

thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen dismissed against SLS, 

resulting in this action being dismissed in its 

entirety against SLS, BONYM, and MERS. This action

remains pending against Bank of America (hereinafter 

“BANA”) as to Counts six and sixteen. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Karun and Ursula Jackson (“Plaintiffs” or 

“Jacksons”) filed this action on January 12, 2016, against 

Defendants, Bank of New York Mellon (hereinafter “BONYM”), 

Bank of America, N.A. (hereinafter “BANA”), Specialized 

Loan Servicing, LLC (hereinafter “SLS”), and Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems (hereinafter “MERS”) in the 

Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama. Defendants 

removed the case on February 12, 2016, (Doc. 1), and on 

February 19, 2016, filed a Motion for More Definite 

Statement.2 (Doc. 6). The Court granted Defendants’ Motion 

 2 Defendants, in their Motion for More Definite Statement asserted that 

“[i]n setting forth these claims, however, Plaintiffs do not identify 

which claim is asserted against which defendant, do not clarify which 

allegations are directed at which defendant, and, for three of the 

four defendants, do not even reference the defendant anywhere in the 

body of the Complaint. Instead, Plaintiffs assert each claim against a 

‘Defendant’ or the ‘Defendants’ and base these claims on allegations 

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and Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) 

(Doc. 17) on April 12, 2016. Therein, Plaintiffs alleged 

sixteen counts against the Defendants (collectively) for 

causes of action relating to the financing, servicing, and 

foreclosing of their home by the Defendants. (Doc. 17).

More specifically, Plaintiffs have asserted claims for (1) 

Negligence;(2) Wantonness;(3) Unjust enrichment;(4) 

wrongful foreclosure;(5) Slander of title;(6) Breach of 

contract;(7) Fraud;(8) Placed in a false light;(9) 

defamation, libel, and slander;(10) Violations of the Truth 

in Lending Act (“TILA”);(11) Violations of the Real Estate 

Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”);(12) Violations of the 

Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”);(13) Violations of the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”);(14) 

Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

(“TCPA”); (15) Violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity 

Act (“ECOA”); and (16) Claim for Declaratory Relief. (See

Doc. 17, generally). Plaintiffs assert Counts One through 

 concerning a “Defendant” or the ‘Defendants,’ without ever 

differentiating between the four separate defendants named in this 

case. By indiscriminately veering in-and-out of the singular and 

plural forms in describing the defendant or defendants against whom 

Plaintiffs’ claims are asserted, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails in even

the most fundamental respect, causing unresolved confusion that can 

only be remedied through re-pled allegations.” (Doc. 6 at 2-3). After 

Plaintiffs were ordered to file an Amended Complaint and given several 

extensions of time to do the same, Plaintiffs’ filed an Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 17) that was strikingly similar to the original 

Complaint and which contains most all of the complained-of deficiencies 

identified above.

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Five, Count Eight, and Count Nine collectively against SLS 

and BONYM; Counts Six and Sixteen against all Defendants;

Count Seven against SLS, BONYM, and MERS; and Counts Ten 

through Fifteen against SLS only. (Id). The Defendants, 

SLS, BONYM, and MERS filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Complaint in its entirety.3 (Doc. 19). Plaintiffs responded 

on June 3, 2016 (Doc. 30)4 and Defendants replied on June 

13, 2016 (Doc. 33). 

Factual Background

On August 28, 2006, Plaintiffs purchased their home 

located at 26235 Jackson Circle extension, in Daphne, 

Alabama by executing a mortgage (“Mortgage”) and promissory 

note (“Note”) with First Residential Mortgage Network, Inc.

(“First Residential”) which provided for an escrow account 

for taxes and insurance. (Doc. 17 at 2). The loan was 

allegedly later transferred and sold to SLS and BONYM.5 (Id. 

at 3). From the date of purchase until September, 2012, 

Defendants accepted and cashed Plaintiffs’ monthly 

payments.6 (Id. at 4). From October, 2012, to January, 

 3 Bank of America, also a named Defendant, is not a party to the Motion 

to Dismiss currently before this Court. 

4 Plaintiff’s initial response was filed on May 20, 2016 (Doc. 24), but 

was stricken because it failed to adhere to this Court’s rules 

regarding length. Plaintiffs were given an opportunity to re-file 

their response and did so timely. This Court will only consider 

Plaintiffs’ second response for purposes of this ruling. 

5 Plaintiffs assert that the transfer was invalid. (Id. at 2). 6 Plaintiffs allege that their monthly payments were not properly 

applied to their account. (Id. at 4). 

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2014, Plaintiffs’ monthly payments were returned to 

Plaintiffs. (Id). On November 8, 2015, foreclosure 

proceedings were initiated on the Plaintiffs’ residence, 

which Plaintiffs contend was improper because they were not 

in default on their loan. (Id.) In November, 2012, 

Plaintiffs sent their monthly payment to Defendants, but it

was refused and returned without explanation. (Id. at 4). 

Thereafter, Defendants advised Plaintiffs that they would 

no longer accept payment from Plaintiffs on their account 

and that the account was being turned over for foreclosure. 

(Id.) In November and December, 2015, Defendants published 

the default and upcoming foreclosure sale of the 

Plaintiffs’ residence. (Id. at 5). On January 11, 2016, 

foreclosure proceedings were conducted. (Id. at 9). As of 

the filing of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Plaintiffs still 

reside at 26235 Jackson Circle Extension, Daphne, Alabama. 

(Id. at 2). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must first 

satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), which

provides that "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief 

must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 establishes a regime 

of "notice pleading," Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 

506, 512, 513-14, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002), 

it does not eliminate all pleading requirements.

First, the complaint must address all the elements 

that must be shown in order to support recovery under one 

or more causes of action. "At a minimum, notice pleading 

requires that a complaint contain inferential allegations 

from which we can identify each of the material elements 

necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal 

theory." Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 960 

(11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis and internal quotes omitted).

Pleading elements is necessary, but it is not enough 

to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). The rule "requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do" to satisfy that 

rule. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 

127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2009). There must, in 

addition, be a pleading of facts. Though they need not be 

detailed, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level ...." Id. That 

is, the complaint must allege "enough facts to state a 

claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id., at 

570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when 

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the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868

(2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and 

must be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to 

‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 1966 (second 

brackets in original). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 

S. Ct. at 1949. Furthermore, the court treats as true 

factual allegations, but it does not treat as true 

conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of 

action’s elements. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681, 129 S. Ct. at 

1951.

When considering whether a complaint states a claim

for relief, the Court "should assume, on a case-by-case 

basis, that well pleaded factual allegations are true and 

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief." Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 

(11th Cir. 2010). 

I. State Law Claims

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1. Pre-emption of State law claims pursuant to the 

Fair Credit Reporting Act

Defendants have asserted that Plaintiffs’ state law 

claims for Negligence (Count One), Wantonness (Count Two),

Fraud (Count Seven), False Light Invasion of Privacy (Count 

Eight), and Defamation, Libel, and Slander (Count Nine) are 

preempted by the FCRA to the extent that the claims are 

based on the allegations that Defendants reported false 

information to the credit agencies. (Doc. 19 at 18-19).

Because a determination of whether the state law claims at 

issue are pre-empted is dispositive, this Court will 

address federal preemption pursuant to the FCRA first. 

The FCRA contains two preemption provisions. The first 

provision states:

Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this 

title, no consumer may bring any action or proceeding 

in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or 

negligence with respect to the reporting of 

information against any consumer reporting agency, any 

user of information, or any person who furnishes 

information to a consumer reporting agency, based on 

information disclosed pursuant to section 1681g, 

1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information 

disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a 

consumer against whom the user has taken adverse 

action, based in whole or in part on the report except 

as to false information furnished with malice or 

willful intent to injure such consumer.

15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). The second provision provides in 

relevant part:

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No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the 

laws of any State ... with respect to any subject 

matter regulated under ... section 1681s–2 of this 

title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who 

furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.

15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F). According to Defendants, the 

second provision preempts Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims 

that are based on information provided to credit reporting 

agencies. Plaintiffs urge this Court to follow the 

decisions of other districts, where absolute pre-emption 

was not upheld. (Doc. 30 at 32-35, generally). Despite 

varying interpretations of the scope of Sections

1681t(b)(1)(F) and 1681h(e), this Court has previously

found that 1681t(b)(1)(F) is controlling and is an absolute 

bar to state actions (see Bosarge v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 

2008 WL 725017 at *4 (S.D. Ala. March 17, 2008)). The 

Northern District of Alabama has, likewise, upheld this 

conclusion, in part, due to the “growing consensus, [...] 

that tort claims based on a furnisher's alleged reporting 

of inaccurate credit information to credit agencies fall 

within the scope of section 1681t(b)(1)(F), not section 

1681h(e), and are preempted.” Bush v. J.P.Morgan Chase, 

N.A., 2016 WL 324993, at *7 (N.D. Ala. January 27, 2016).

See also Hamilton v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2015 WL 5084234, 

at *7 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 27, 2015) (finding that § 

1681t(a)(1)(F) barred the plaintiff's invasion of privacy 

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claim based on the defendant's credit reporting.”); 

Williams v. Student Loan Guarantee Found. of Arkansas, 2015 

WL 241428, at *13 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 20, 2015) (“§ 

1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts Williams's state-law claims to the 

extent they address the subject matter regulated under § 

1681-s2.”); Barnett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 

2013 WL 3242739, at *13 (N.D. Ala. June 26, 2013) (holding 

that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted the plaintiff from pursuing 

defamation, libel, or slander claims against Chase arising 

out of any false reports to credit agencies).

Based on the above, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ 

state law claims, to the extent they are based on 

Defendants’ reporting of false information to credit 

agencies, are pre-empted by the FCRA and due to be 

dismissed.7

2. Negligence and Wantonness (BONYM, SLS)8

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants, 

BONYM and SLS, were negligent because they:

[N]egligently serviced the loan made the basis of this 

suit, negligently attempted to collect sums not owed 

by the Plaintiff, negligently caused his property 

 7 This Court will still address Plaintiffs’ state law claims which are 

not pre-empted pursuant to the above analysis. 8 Plaintiffs’ Complaint repeatedly uses the term “defendants” without

any specification as to which “defendant” Plaintiffs are referring. 

However, Plaintiffs identify which claims have been asserted against 

which Defendant(s) by placing a parenthetical under each count that 

identifies the name(s) of each Defendant(s) against whom the claims are 

being asserted. This court will address each claim only with respect 

to the Defendant(s) that were identified in this manner. 

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insurance to be canceled, negligently defaulted the 

Plaintiff, negligently attempted a foreclosure sale 

on Plaintiff’s property, were negligent by failing to 

make sure that information disseminated to others 

(including the national credit bureaus and those 

credit grantors likely to use the information provided 

by those bureaus) was not false, neither libelous nor 

slanderous, and rose to the level of maximum accuracy; 

negligent by failing to properly train their employees 

on the thorough investigation of disputed accounts; 

negligent by failing to properly train, and/or 

supervise their employees and agents with regard to 

the handling of Plaintiff’s loan account and failing 

to remove the adverse reporting from Plaintiff’s 

credit once he disputed the same. 

(Doc. 17 at 6). Plaintiffs’ wantonness claim includes the 

same allegations, except they allege that Defendants’

conduct was wanton rather than negligent. (Id. at 7).

Defendants contend that these claims fail as a matter of 

law because Alabama does not recognize a cause of action 

for negligent or wanton servicing of a mortgage account. 

(Doc. 19 at 6-8). This Court agrees. 

Alabama law has established that no cause of action

for negligent/wanton servicing of a mortgage account exists

in the absence of personal injury or property damage. See, 

e.g., Blake v. Bank of America, N.A., 845 F.Supp.2d 1206, 

1210-11 (M.D.Ala. 2012) (“Alabama law does not recognize a 

cause of action for negligent or wanton mortgage 

servicing”); Webb v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2012 WL 

5906729, *7 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 26, 2012)(“under Alabama law a 

cause of action for negligent servicing of a mortgage 

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against Ocwen cannot be maintained where the damages are 

economic, i.e., lost commissions”). Indeed, “mortgage 

servicing obligations are a creature of contract, not of 

tort, and stem from the underlying mortgage and promissory 

note executed by the parties, rather than a duty of 

reasonable care generally owed to the public.” Wallace v. 

SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 

1370(S.D.Ala. 2013).

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “violated the duty 

owed to them imposed by RESPA”9 and that Plaintiffs’

“alleged dealings with the defendants that are separate and 

apart from the contract.” However, it is evident that

Plaintiffs’ negligence/wantonness claims against BONYM and 

SLS truly stem from the servicing of their Mortgage/Note.

See Bush, 2016 WL 324993, at *8 (“Bush’s negligence claim 

includes allegations that Chase negligently serviced his 

loan, attempted to collect sums he did not owe, caused his 

property insurance to be cancelled, defaulted him, and 

 9 Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not make these assertions; however, they 

were raised by Plaintiffs in their response (Doc. 30). Counsel for 

Plaintiffs made this same argument in almost exact form in Bush, 2016 

WL 324993, at *9. There the Court stated “[t]o the extent [Plaintiff] 

now contends that his negligence and wantonness claims are based on 

[Defendant’s] alleged breach of duties created by RESPA (or some other 

unidentified statute), his amended complaint does not comport with the 

Iqbal/Twombly pleading requirements because it provides no clue that he 

has been proceeding under such a theory.” Here, even if Plaintiffs’

argument that their negligence/wantonness claims stem from something 

other than the servicing of their Mortgage/Note, Plaintiffs’ claims 

would still fail as a matter of law because they did not assert such a 

claim in their Complaint.

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attempted a foreclosure sale on his property. Bush’s 

wantonness claim. . . alleges that Chase’s conduct was 

wanton rather than negligent. All of these allegations are 

based on duties arising out of the note and mortgage and 

amount to allegations that Chase negligently or wantonly 

breached its contractual servicing obligations.”) 

(citations omitted). Further, in the present action, 

Plaintiffs do not assert that they suffered personal injury 

or property damage such that their claims for negligence 

and/or wantonness should survive despite the above 

analysis. As a result, Plaintiffs’ negligent/wantonness

claims (counts one and two) fail as a matter of law10 and 

are due to be dismissed.11

3. Unjust Enrichment (BONYM, SLS)

 10 To the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims are based on SLS’ failure to 

train/supervise its employees, Plaintiffs claims will still fail as a 

matter of law. To prevail on this claim, Plaintiffs would have to show 

that “(1) the employee committed a tort recognized under Alabama law; 

(2) the employer had actual notice of this conduct or would have gained 

such notice if it exercised due and proper diligence; and (3) the 

employer failed to respond to this notice adequately.” Lawrence v. 

Christian Mission Center Inc. of Enterprise, 780 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1218 

(M.D. Ala. 2011). Plaintiffs have not pled any facts to support any of 

these required elements. Instead, Plaintiffs have simply made a 

general assertion that defendants failed to train/supervise its 

employees without providing any facts to support such an allegation,

which is insufficient. 11 Plaintiffs have requested that they be allowed to file amended 

pleadings in the event that this Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to 

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and they have made this request as to 

each of the sixteen causes of action. However, Plaintiffs have already 

filed an Amended Complaint based on Defendants’ Motion for a More 

Definite Statement and this Court unilaterally DENIES Plaintiffs’ 

request to file yet another Amended Complaint, as there is no reason to 

believe that Plaintiffs can/will cure the subject deficiencies if given 

a third opportunity. 

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Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he actions of Defendants 

in attempting foreclosure on the home of the Plaintiff in 

violation of law resulted in Defendant being unjustly 

enriched by the payment of fees, insurance proceeds and 

equity in the home.” (Doc. 17 at 8). According to 

Defendants, BONYM and SLS, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment 

claim fails as a matter of law because the claim concerns 

the same subject matter as the underlying Mortgage and 

Note. (Doc. 19 at 8-9). 

“The doctrine of unjust enrichment is an old equitable 

remedy permitting the court in equity and good conscience 

to disallow one to be unjustly enriched at the expense of 

another.” Flying J Fish Farm v. Peoples Bank of Greensboro,

12 So.3d 1185, 1193 (Ala.2008) (emphasis removed, internal 

quotation marks omitted). It does not generally apply 

where there is an express contract between the parties 

governing the same subject matter. Kennedy v. Polar–BEK & 

Baker Wildwood P'ship, 682 So.2d 443, 447 (Ala.1996). See 

also Selman v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2013 WL 838193, at *13 

(S.D. Ala. March 5, 2013) (“express written agreements 

concerning all the same subject matter as the implicit 

contract underlying unjust enrichment cause of action are 

fatal to that cause of action, as a matter of law”). 

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Here, the complained-of action, i.e., “attempted 

foreclosure” and “payment of fees, insurance proceeds, and 

equity” are governed by the terms of the Mortgage/Note. 

(See Docs. 19-1 and 19-2).12 Because Plaintiffs’ assertion 

relating to the unjust enrichment claim against Defendants 

is the “same subject matter” as the underlying Mortgage and 

Note, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim (Count Three) is 

due to be dismissed.13

4. Wrongful Foreclosure (BONYM, SLS)

Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure claim alleges as 

follows:

42. The foreclosure proceeding conducted on January 

11, 2016 by the Defendants were either negligent, 

wanton or intentional, depending on proof adduced at 

Trial. The power of sale was exercised for a purpose

other than to secure the debt owed by plaintiff, as 

the plaintiff was current on the debt at the time of 

the default and acceleration.

 12 “[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint 

and those documents are central to the plaintiff's claim, then the 

Court may consider the documents part of the pleadings for purposes of 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the defendant's attaching such documents 

to the motion to dismiss will not require conversion of the motion into 

a motion for summary judgment.” Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 

Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). 13 Of note, Plaintiffs did not respond to the legally sound arguments 

presented in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. While not the reason for 

this Court’s finding that Plaintiffs’ claim is due to be dismissed, 

Plaintiffs’ claim could also be considered abandoned. See Coal. for the 

Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 

1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to brief and argue this issue during 

the proceedings before the district court is grounds for finding that 

the issue has been abandoned.”); see also McMaster v. United States, 

177 F.3d 936, 940–41 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that a claim may be 

considered abandoned when the allegation is included in the plaintiff's 

complaint but he fails to present any argument concerning the claim to 

the district court).

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(Doc. 17 at 8-9). Defendants, SLS and BONYM, contend that 

this claim fails because Plaintiffs have not offered any 

facts showing that the foreclosure was performed for a 

reason other than to secure the loan owed by Plaintiffs.14

(Doc. 19 at 11). In response, Plaintiffs assert that “all” 

elements of a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure do 

not have to be satisfied relying on In re Sharpe, 391 B.R. 

117, 152 (Banker. N.D. Ala. 2008). (Doc. 30 at 14). 

“Alabama has long recognized a cause of action for 

‘wrongful foreclosure’ arising out of the exercise of a 

power-of-sale provision in a mortgage.” Jackson v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 90 So.3d 168, 171 (Ala.2012) (claim for 

wrongful disclosure is defined as one in which “a mortgagee 

uses the power of sale given under a mortgage for a purpose 

other than to secure the debt owed by the mortgagor”) 

(citation omitted); see also Reeves Cedarhurst Development 

Corp. v. First American Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 607 

So.2d 180, 182 (Ala.1992) (“A mortgagor has a wrongful 

foreclosure action whenever a mortgagee uses the power of 

sale given under a mortgage for a purpose other than to 

secure the debt owed by the mortgagor.”). 

 14 SLS additionally contends that this claim is due to be dismissed 

against it because SLS did not foreclose on the property; Plaintiffs do 

not appear to contest this fact in their response. 

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In the instant action, Plaintiffs conclusively state 

that the foreclosure was “for a purpose other than to 

secure the debt owed by plaintiff”. (Doc. 17 at 9). 

However, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is devoid of any facts to 

support this conclusory statement. Further, Plaintiffs

fail to offer any alleged alternative cause for the 

foreclosure such that this Court could ostensibly find that 

Plaintiffs have properly stated a claim. Instead, 

Plaintiffs only continue to dispute that they had defaulted 

on the debt prior to the foreclosure, which is not 

sufficient. See Wallace v. Suntrust Mortgage Inc., 974 

F.Supp. 2d. 1358, 1363-64 (S.D. Ala. 2013)(dismissing 

wrongful foreclosure claim because while “[plaintiff] 

alleges that ‘Suntrust initiated foreclosure against [her] 

in violation of the law’ because she ‘is not now, nor has 

she ever been in default of her mortgage loan,” plaintiff 

did not allege a purpose other than to secure her debt.) 

Because Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that 

Defendants foreclosed on their property for a purpose other 

than to secure the debt owed by Plaintiffs, their wrongful 

foreclosure claim (Count Four) is due to be dismissed. 

5. Slander of Title (BONYM, SLS)

Plaintiffs allege “[d]efendant, in attempting 

foreclosure has caused a cloud to be placed on the title of 

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the property of the plaintiff [...] [and] he was caused to 

suffer injuries and damages and claims all damages 

allowable under the law.” (Doc. 17 at 9). Defendants 

argue Plaintiffs have not stated a proper claim because 

they have not established at least three of the required 

elements of slander of title. (Doc. 19 at 12-13).

A slander of title claim has six elements:

(1) Ownership of the property by plaintiff; (2)

falsity of the words published; (3) malice of 

defendant in publishing the false statements; (4) 

publication to some person other than the owner; (5) 

the publication must be in disparagement of 

plaintiff's property or the title thereof; and (6) 

that special damages were the proximate result of such 

publication (setting them out in detail).

Merchs. Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Steiner, 404 So.2d 14, 21 

(Ala.1981) (quoting Womack v. McDonald, 121 So. 57, 59 

(Ala.1929)). In the present action, SLS and BONYM assert 

that Plaintiffs have not provided any facts from which the 

requirement of malice or disparagement could be found.

Malice does not equate with negligence. Alabama Power 

Co. v. Laney, 428 So.2d 21 (Ala.1983). Malice requires 

“proof that [the defendant] intentionally disparaged 

[the] plaintiff's title to the property slandered or 

recklessly disparaged [it] without information 

sufficient to support a bona fide belief” in the 

veracity of the disparaging statement. Harrison v. 

Mitchell, 391 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) 

(emphasis added). In other words, “if the defendant 

had probable cause for believing the statement, there 

can in law be no malice.” [Merchants Nat'l Bank of 

Mobile v.] Steiner, 404 So.2d [14] at 21 [(Ala.1981)] 

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Roden v. Wright, 646 So.2d 605, 611 (Ala.1994). Based on 

the Complaint, this Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not 

sufficiently alleged malice on the part of Defendants, such 

that their claim could survive. 

Nevertheless, assuming Plaintiffs could show malice, 

their claim still fails as Plaintiffs have not sufficiently 

pled special damages. “To satisfy the special damages 

pleading requirement, a plaintiff must allege that the 

defendant's false publication ‘interrupted, or injuriously 

affected, some dealing of the plaintiff with his property’ 

or caused the plaintiff to incur expenses ‘to relieve his 

right to the property from the damnifying effect of such 

false and malicious slander.’ Special damages must be 

‘distinctly and particularly set out’ in the complaint, and 

‘[a]n allegation of loss in general terms is not 

sufficient.’ “ Prickett v. BAC Home Loans, 946 F.Supp.2d 

1236, 1244 (N.D.Ala.2012) (quoting Ebersole v. Fields, 62 

So. 73, 75 (Ala.1913)). Typically, special damages pertain 

to failed transactions or other forms of lost profits 

relating to the property. See Norman v. Bozeman, 605 So.2d 

1210, 1214 (Ala.1992) (describing various types of losses 

that might amount to special damages).

Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that in attempting 

foreclosure Defendants have “caused a cloud to be placed on 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 19 of 53
20

the title of the property” and that as a result, Plaintiffs

“were caused to suffer injuries and damages”. (Doc. 17 at 

9). Such language falls short of Plaintiff’s burden. See 

Bush, 2016 WL 324993, at *11 (Slander of Title claim 

dismissed where Plaintiff “merely alleged that the 

Defendants ‘caused a cloud to be placed on the title of 

[his] property’ and that ‘[a]s the proximate cause of the 

... slandering of [his] title, he was caused to suffer 

injuries and damages and claims all damages allowable under 

law.’) Further, Plaintiffs failed to respond to the issue 

of special damages after it was raised by Defendants.15 

Again, Plaintiffs have simply made a general conclusory 

assertion of the claim against the Defendants without 

providing facts from which this Court could conclude that 

Plaintiffs have stated a viable cause of action.16 As such, 

this claim (count five) is due to be dismissed. 

6. Breach of Contract (all Defendants)

In Count Six, Plaintiffs assert that the allegedly 

breached contract is the Mortgage with the Lender, First 

Residential. (Doc. 17 at 9-11). Defendants, SLS, BONYM, 

and MERS, contend this claim is due to be dismissed against 

 15See FN 12. 16Plaintiffs’ claim for slander of title stemming from the foreclosure 

of Plaintiffs’ home against SLS equally fails on its face because there 

is no evidence that SLS conducted the foreclosure sale, a fact, which 

Plaintiffs do not attempt to dispute in their response. (See Doc. 30 at 

14-15). 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 20 of 53
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them as a matter of law because they were not a party to 

the Mortgage. (Doc. 19 at 14-16).

“The elements of a breach-of-contract claim under 

Alabama law are (1) a valid contract binding the parties; 

(2) the plaintiffs' performance under the contract; (3) the 

defendant's nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages.” 

Shaffer v. Regions Financial Corp., 29 So.3d 872, 880 

(Ala.2009) quoting Reynolds Metals Co. v. Hill, 825 So.2d 

100, 105 (Ala.2002). 

In order to determine whether Plaintiffs’ breach of 

contract claim is viable this Court need only look to the 

first element of the cause of action i.e., whether there is 

a contract binding the parties. As to SLS, Plaintiffs have

not alleged that SLS is a party to the Mortgage, much less 

factually supported such a claim. In fact, Plaintiffs 

repeatedly assert that SLS is the servicer of their loan, 

not their lender. Because they are not a party to the 

Mortgage, the breach of contract claim against SLS fails as 

a matter of law. 

With regard to MERS, Plaintiffs, in their response,

assert that “[i]n Count Six” they “also signed a mortgage 

with MERS acting as nominee for the lender.” (Doc. 30 at 

16). A review of Count Six, however, reveals no such 

language. Nevertheless, even if this language had been 

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22

pled as alleged, this claim would still fail against MERS 

because it is not a party to the Mortgage. Instead, the 

Mortgage specifically states “MERS is Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate corporation 

that is acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s 

successor and assigns [...]”. (Doc. 19-2 at 2). Plaintiff 

has not pled any facts that would suggest that MERS is a 

party to the contract and not just a nominee as set forth 

in the Mortgage itself. As a result, this claims fails as 

a matter of law against MERS. 

With regard to BONYM, Plaintiffs, in their response to 

the motion to dismiss, have stated “[o]bviously the 

Jacksons are asserting that assuming that BONYM has the 

rights of the Lender, it and its agents failed to follow 

the terms and provisions of the mortgage contract.” (Doc. 

30 at 16). Once again, however, Plaintiffs have not made 

such an assertion in their Complaint. Instead, Count Six 

only states that Plaintiffs entered into a contract with 

their Lender, First Residential, and the two paragraphs to 

which Plaintiffs point to allege a breach of contract 

(paragraphs 2 and 22) specifically state the terms as 

between the “borrower” and the “Lender”. (See Doc. 19-1). 

Plaintiffs have not alleged in their Complaint that BONYM 

is the Lender and but for their conclusory label of BONYM 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 22 of 53
23

as a potential invalid assignee in their response, they 

fail to actually allege in their Complaint that their

mortgage was assigned and that BONYM was the assignee. 

This Court is not inclined to assume such facts for them. 

As a result, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the breach 

of contract claim (count six) against SLS, MERS, and BONYM 

is due to be granted.

7. Fraud (BONYM, SLS, MERS)

Plaintiffs’ allegations with regard to their Fraud 

claim are as follows:

56. The Defendant misrepresented that the loan was in 

default. Further, the Defendant made false and 

misleading representations, to wit: dissemination of 

inaccurate information regarding the loan account as 

being in default and dissemination of inaccurate 

information regarding the credit history and credit of 

the Plaintiff that was known to be false. Defendants 

also falsified documents and records related to the

Jacksons mortgage loan and attempted to fraudulent 

transfer, sale or assign the loan by illegal and

fraudulent means.

57. Said misrepresentations were made negligently 

and/or willfully and/or wantonly and/or fraudulently, 

and/or recklessly with the intent to induce the 

Plaintiff to act thereon and upon which the Plaintiffs 

did in fact act to their detriment.

58. Plaintiff justifiably relied upon said 

representations made by Defendant and as a result of 

said reliance proceeded with the execution of the 

loan; at the time said representations were made the 

same were false and known by the Defendant to be false 

and/or were false and made by mistake with the intent 

for Plaintiff to rely thereon.

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(Doc. 17 at 11-12). Defendants argue that this claim is 

due to be dismissed because it fails to meet the heightened 

pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 9(b). (See Doc. 19 at 17). In reply, Plaintiffs 

have addressed the standard (discussed below) and stated as 

follows:

Plaintiff’s [sic] complaint alleges exactly what fraud 

occurred and how it occurred. These statements satisfy 

the 11th Circuit standard set out in Ziemba. Under the 

applicable Alabama law standard for pleading fraud, 

the Plaintiff also meet the minimum pleading 

standards.

(Doc. 30 at 19). Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading 

requirements provide that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, 

a party must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake.” Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

This heightened pleading rule “serves an important purpose 

in fraud actions by alerting defendants to the precise 

misconduct with which they are charged and protecting 

defendants against spurious charges of immoral and 

fraudulent behavior.” Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1370-71. 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, 

“a court considering a motion to dismiss for failure to 

plead fraud with particularity should always be careful to 

harmonize the directives of Rule 9(b) with the broader 

policy of notice pleading.” Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 

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810, 813 n.3 (11th Cir.1985). The notice pleading, Rule 8, 

directs that a complaint need only provide “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” and that averments of the complaint 

should “be simple, concise, and direct.” Rule 

8(a)(2),(d)(1).

“It has been established that Rule 9(b) is satisfied 

if the complaint sets forth the following: ‘(1) precisely 

what statements were made in what documents or oral 

representations or what omissions were made, and (2) the 

time and place of each such statement and the person 

responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not 

making) same, and (3) the content of such statements and 

the manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and (4) what 

the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.’” 

United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of 

America, Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir.2002) 

(citations omitted); see also Hill v. Morehouse Medical 

Assocs., Inc., 2003 WL 22019936, *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 

2003) (“plaintiff must plead facts as to time, place, and 

substance of the defendant’s alleged fraud, specifically 

the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, 

when they occurred, and who engaged in them.”). In other 

words, “to avoid dismissal, a complaint alleging fraud must 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 25 of 53
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plead the ‘who, what, when, where and how’ of the alleged 

fraud.” Hay v. Bank of America, 2013 WL 1339729, *12

(N.D.Ga.March 29, 2013)(citations omitted) (dismissing 

fraud claim where plaintiff failed to identify any person 

responsible for committing the alleged fraud or the time or 

place of the fraudulent act); see also American United Life 

Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1067(11th Cir.2007) 

(affirming dismissal of insurance fraud claims where 

plaintiff failed to identify the agents or corporate 

representatives who participated in the alleged fraud, 

failed to identify the dates when the agents rendered 

assistance, and failed to explain how the agents’ conduct 

furthered the commission of the fraud).

In the present action, Plaintiff does not specify 

which Defendants were allegedly involved in the fraud 

asserted, much less identify the individuals who allegedly 

made the false representations to Plaintiffs on behalf of 

Defendants. Plaintiffs do not specify, in detail, the 

precise statements made to Plaintiffs, the dates on which 

these representations were made, or the manner in which 

they were made. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to provide any 

facts that support that these Defendants (BYONYM, SLS, or

MERS) received a benefit as a consequence of these alleged 

misrepresentations. Instead, Plaintiffs only state that as 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 26 of 53
27

a result of these general assertions, Plaintiffs 

“proceeded with the execution of the loan” and none of 

these Defendants are the lender. 

Despite Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion that the 

Complaint sets forth facts that would satisfy their fraud 

claim, the same do not appear in the record. As a result, 

Plaintiffs’ fraud claim (count seven) fails to satisfy the 

heightened standard set forth by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and

is due to be dismissed. 

8. Placed in False Light (BONYM, SLS)

With regard to Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendants, 

BONYM and SLS, placed them in false light, the Complaint 

states as follows:

61. In association with the servicing of the 

loan account Defendants held Jacksons up in a 

false light and made undesirable and negative 

character and credit reputation remarks on or 

about the Jacksons by either speaking or writing 

undesirable and negative character and reputation 

remarks about Jacksons which was offensive, 

untrue, and inaccurate, and which alleged 

Jacksons was behind on his debt serviced by 

Defendants, has a bad debt with Defendants.

[...]

63. Defendants held Jacksons up in a false light 

and made undesirable and negative and credit 

reputation remarks on or about Jacksons in the 

national credit reporting media and to his [sic] 

homeowner insurance carrier. Defendants provided 

this false information to third parties.

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 27 of 53
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(Doc. 17 at 11-12)(emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiffs have 

asserted Defendants placed them in false light when they 

(1) made statements regarding their credit reputation in 

the credit reporting media or (2) made statements to 

Plaintiffs’ insurance carrier. Id. Defendants, SLS and 

BONYM, argue Plaintiffs’ claim fails because they have not 

sufficiently pled that Defendants gave “publicity” to the 

allegedly false statements. (Doc. 19 at 20-21). The 

Alabama Supreme Court has defined “false light” invasion of 

privacy as follows:

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning 

another that places the other before the public 

in a false light is subject to liability to the 

other for invasion of his privacy, if

(a) the false light in which the other was placed 

would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, 

and

(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in 

reckless disregard as to the falsity of the 

publicized matter and the false light in which 

the other would be placed.’ ”

Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 12 (Ala. 2003) 

(quoting Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 

624 So.2d 178, 180 (Ala.1993).

“[G]iving publicity” is “making a ‘matter ... public, 

by communicating it to the public at large, or to so 

many persons that the matter must be regarded as 

substantially certain to become one of public 

knowledge.’ “Publicity is a concept more difficult to 

prove than [mere] publication,” which is an element of 

a defamation claim. The “publicity” element is not 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 28 of 53
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satisfied by the “ ‘communicat[ion of] a fact ... to a 

single person or even to a small group of persons.’ ”

Regions Bank v. Plott, 897 So.2d 239, 245 (Ala. 2004).

In the present action, Plaintiffs have not stated any 

facts from which it could be determined that Defendants 

“gave publicity” to the statements allegedly made by them 

referring to Plaintiffs to either the credit media or their 

insurance carrier. Plaintiffs have not specified what

statements were made, how often they were made, to whom 

they were made, or any other details from which it could be 

inferred that such statements were either “highly 

offensive” or have become public knowledge due to the 

actions of Defendants. Plaintiffs additionally made no 

effort to respond to Defendants’ arguments to the 

contrary.17 As a result, Plaintiffs’ false light claim 

(count eight) fails as a matter of law. 

9. Defamation, Libel, Slander (BONYM, SLS)

According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he Defendant willfully, 

wantonly, recklessly and/or maliciously published and 

communicated false and defamatory statements regarding the 

Plaintiff and said statements have subjected the Plaintiff 

to the denial of credit by third parties, resulted in 

homeowner’s insurance cancellation and harmed the 

 17See FN 12.

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Plaintiff’s [sic] credit reputation.” (Doc. 17 at 13). 

Plaintiffs further contend that as a result of Defendants’ 

actions they were “caused to suffer injury to their 

reputation in the eyes of the community.” (Doc. 17 at 15). 

Defendants contend that these claims are due to be 

dismissed because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled 

special damages. (Doc. 19 at 21-22). In response, 

Plaintiffs argue that the claim should stand as Plaintiffs 

have alleged (1) they were not in default and (2) 

Defendant(s) published in a newspaper that Plaintiffs were 

in default. (Doc. 30 at 20). 

The elements of a cause of action for defamation are:

1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the 

plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that 

statement to a third party; 3) fault amounting at 

least to negligence on the part of the defendant; and 

4) either actionability of the statement irrespective 

of special harm [(actionable per se)] or the existence 

of special harm caused by the publication of the 

statement [(actionable per quod)]. 

McCaig v. Talladega Publ'g Co., 544 So.2d 875, 877 

(Ala.1989). There are two types of defamation: libel, 

which involves the use of print media to publish the 

defamatory comment, and slander, which involves the oral 

expression of a defamatory comment. Blevins v. W.F. Barnes 

Corp., 768 So.2d 386, 390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). 

In cases of libel, if the language used exposes the 

plaintiff to public ridicule or contempt, though it 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 30 of 53
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does not embody an accusation of crime, the law 

presumes damage to the reputation, and pronounces it 

actionable per se. [To] constitute slander actionable 

per se, there must be an imputation of an indictable 

offense involving infamy or moral turpitude....

This distinction, however, does not deny the right to 

maintain an action for slander founded on oral 

malicious defamation subjecting the plaintiff to 

disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt, though it 

falls short of imputing the commission of such crime 

or misdemeanor. In such case the law pronounces the 

words actionable per quod only, and the plaintiff must 

allege and prove special damages as an element of the 

cause of action.

Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 18, 114 So. 357, 359 (1927). 

“Special damages are the material harms that are the 

intended result or natural consequence of the slanderous 

statement, and the general rule is that they are limited to 

‘material loss capable of being measured in money.’” 

Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 18(Ala. 2003) (quoting 

Shook v. St. Bede School, 74 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1180 

(M.D.Ala.1999))(citations omitted). 

Plaintiffs allege a claim of libel based on the 

printing of the foreclosure sale in the newspaper and a 

claim for slander based on communications made to “credit 

reporting agencies and/or third parties” relating to the 

foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home. (Doc. 17 at 13). 

As an initial matter, for the reasons stated 

previously herein, Plaintiffs’ claims of slander based on 

the reporting of false information to credit agencies is 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 31 of 53
32

preempted by the FCRA. Second, to the extent that 

Plaintiffs have asserted a claim of libel against SLS 

(servicer), the Complaint provides no factual support that 

SLS conducted a foreclosure sale, or advertised the 

foreclosure proceedings. As a result, Plaintiffs’ libel 

claim against SLS, fails as a matter of law.18 Thus, the 

only remaining ostensible claim is one for libel against 

BONYM based on its publishing of the foreclosure notice in 

the newspaper.19 Once again, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is not 

an example of clarity and the exact content of the

allegedly defamatory statement has not been provided. 

Nevertheless, in order to proceed, Plaintiffs must provide 

facts supporting the assertion that the publication made 

was either (1) actionable irrespective of special harm or 

(2) resulted in special harm. Plaintiffs’ Complaint does 

neither. Instead, Plaintiffs only stated that Defendants 

published and communicated false and defamatory statements 

regarding Plaintiff and that such communications “harmed 

the reputation of the Jacksons and/or deterred third 

persons from associating with the Jacksons”. (Doc. 17 at 

13). With regard to damages, Plaintiffs additionally 

 18 See In re Small, 2012 WL 2132386 (June 12, 2012) (Court dismissed 

defamation claim against Defendant, mortgage servicer, where 

Plaintiff’s claim was based on publication of Notice of Foreclosure.)

19 Plaintiffs’ Complaint states this notice was printed in the Northport 

Gazette, although this, again, appears to be a typographical error. 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 32 of 53
33

stated that they “were caused to suffer injury to his [sic]

reputation in the community and the public and was subject 

to ridicule”, “were caused to be injured and damaged”, and 

that the allegedly defamatory statements “harmed the 

Jacksons’ reputation and character” which caused them to 

suffer “damages to their reputation which negatively 

affected their credit and their business20 causing monetary 

losses”. (Doc. 17 at 13-15). Plaintiff did not set forth 

any facts that the allegedly defamatory statements were 

actionable irrespective of special harm or present facts 

showing they suffered special harm, even after Defendants 

moved to dismiss this claim on those grounds. As a result, 

Plaintiffs’ claim for defamation (count nine) is due to be 

dismissed. 

II. Federal Claims

10. Truth in Lending Act (SLS)

Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant, SLS, violated 

TILA because:

[D]efendants did not provide a proper copy of the 

notices required [...]. The disclosure statement issued 

in conjunction with this consumer credit transaction 

 20 Nowhere else in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allege that they own a 

business and this Court has no reason to believe that Plaintiffs owned 

a business that lost monetary damages. Instead, this Court assumes 

that this language was copied and pasted from another document, like 

many sentences that appear in the Complaint, which refer to 

“Plaintiff”, “he”, “him”, “counter-defendant” or “Morris”, when in the 

present action, there are two plaintiffs, no counter-defendants, and no 

one named Morris. 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 33 of 53
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violated the requirements of Truth in Lending and 

Regulation Z in the following and other respects: 

(a). By failing to provide the required disclosures 

prior to consummation of the transaction [...] (b). By 

failing to make required disclosures clearly and 

conspicuously in writing [...](c). By failing to include 

in the finance charge certain charges imposed by 

defendant payable by plaintiff incident to the 

extension of credit [...], thus improperly disclosing 

the finance charge [...]. Such amounts include, but are 

not limited to the attorney fees and late fees [...]. 

(Doc. 17 at 16). SLS contends Plaintiff’s claim is due to 

be dismissed because SLS is not a “creditor” as defined by 

TILA. (Doc. 19 at 23). 

TILA is a remedial consumer protection statute 

designed to “assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms 

so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily 

the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 

uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer 

against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit 

card practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). Under TILA, a 

consumer has a private right of action against “any 

creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed 

under this part ....” 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a).

By its plain language, TILA's private right of action 

applies only to actions against “creditors.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1604(a). TILA defines the term “creditor” as follows:

The term “creditor” refers only to a person who both 

(1) regularly extends, whether in connection with 

loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise, 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 34 of 53
35

consumer credit which is payable by agreement in more 

than four installments or for which the payment of a 

finance charge is or may be required, and (2) is the 

person to whom the debt arising from the consumer 

credit transaction is initially payable on the face of 

the evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such 

evidence of indebtedness, by agreement.

15 U.S.C. § 1602(g). “The definition given in this sentence 

is restrictive and precise, referring only to a person who 

satisfies both requirements.” Cetto v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l 

Ass'n, 518 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in 

original); see also Parker v. Potter, 232 Fed.Appx. 861, 

864 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that a person must satisfy 

both prongs of the definition in order to be considered a 

creditor under TILA).

In the present action, there is no dispute that SLS 

was not the original lender on Plaintiffs’ Mortgage and/or 

Note. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have repeatedly 

acknowledged that their mortgage was executed with First 

Residential (Doc. 17 at 12) and have additionally 

identified SLS as a “servicer”. (Doc. 17 at 17). 

Plaintiffs’ response (Doc. 30) makes a series of arguments

in support of liability based on Khan v. Bank of New York 

Mellon, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (creditors 

can be held vicariously liable for damages under TILA for a 

loan servicer's failure to properly respond to a borrower's 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 35 of 53
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request for information about the loan owner)21. While 

Plaintiffs are correct that Khan and other Courts have 

addressed the issue of vicarious liability with regard to 

TILA and Regulation Z, such an analysis is not warranted in 

the present action because Plaintiffs have not asserted a 

TILA claim against a creditor for the actions of a 

servicer, like those cases to which Plaintiff cites. 

Instead, Plaintiffs have only asserted a TILA violation 

against SLS (the servicer) and have failed to offer any 

alternative theory under which a servicer, alone, is liable 

for TILA violations. Plaintiffs have, likewise, not 

offered any other alternative reasoning by which SLS could 

viably be defined as a “creditor” such that it would be 

subject to liability under TILA. Rather, based on the facts 

of this action, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to 

sustain a cause of action against SLS for a TILA violation 

 21 Of note, Khan, and those decisions of other Courts on which Khan

relied, specifically address whether vicarious liability exists when a 

servicer fails to provide information pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A § 

1641(f)(2) ([...] Upon written request by the obligor, the servicer shall

provide the obligor, to the best knowledge of the servicer, with the 

name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or 

the master servicer of the obligation.) Thus, Khan does not stand for 

the conclusion that a creditor of a loan is vicariously liable for the 

actions of a servicer for any and/or all violations of TILA and to the 

extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to make such a connection, this 

Court does not find Plaintiffs’ argument to be compelling. Nonetheless, 

because in the present action Plaintiffs have not asserted a claim 

against the creditor for the actions of the servicer, a full analysis 

of which actions a creditor may or may not be vicariously liable for is 

not warranted. 

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because SLS is not a creditor. As a result, count ten is 

due to be dismissed against SLS. 

11. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (SLS)

Plaintiffs contend that SLS is liable for violations 

of RESPA. More specifically, Plaintiffs’ Complaint, states 

as follows:

92. Defendant, SLS, is a loan “servicer” of the 

Plaintiff’s “federally related mortgage loan” [...]. 

93. The Jacksons made a Qualified Written Request 

pursuant to RESPA to Defendants on October 29, 2015

and December 15, 2015 which was sent by certified 

mail. It was signed for by Defendants acknowledging 

receipt of the QWR. Defendants never acknowledged 

receipt of the QWR request and never responded to it. 

Defendants’ failure to acknowledge and properly 

respond to the QWR request is a violation of RESPA or 

the Dodd-Frank Act. Because of said violations of 

said acts, the Jacksons were damaged because they were 

not informed of the information regarding their loan. 

Because the Defendants failed to give this information 

to the Jacksons, they were not able to stop the 

foreclosure on their home. [...]

(Doc. 17 at 17-18). Defendant, SLS, argues this claim is 

due to be dismissed either because (1) Plaintiffs have 

failed to sufficiently allege that they submitted a 

conforming QWR to SLS, or (2) Plaintiff failed to 

sufficiently allege that they suffered actual damages which 

were causally linked to the RESPA violation. In response, 

Plaintiffs make two singular statements with regard to the 

grounds for dismissal asserted by SLS. Namely, that 

“Plaintiff’s [sic] RESPA claims survive [...] against SLS to 

Case 1:16-cv-00062-CG-M Document 39 Filed 07/19/16 Page 37 of 53
38

the extent Plaintiff’s [sic] demand statutory damages” and 

“the RESPA claims against [...] SLS are due to survive the 

motion to dismiss.” (Doc. 30 at 23, 24).22

To state a RESPA claim for failure to respond to a 

qualified written request (“QWR”), a plaintiff must allege: 

“(1) the defendant is a loan servicer under the statute; 

(2) the plaintiff sent a [QWR] consistent with the 

requirements of the statute; (3) the defendant failed to 

respond adequately within the statutorily required days; 

and (4) the plaintiff has suffered actual or statutory 

damages.” Miranda v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2015 WL 

7767209 (S.D.Fla. Dec. 2, 2015) quoting Correa v. BAC Home 

Loans Serv. LP, No. 6:11–cv–1197–Orl–22DAB, 2012 WL 

1176701, at *6 (M.D.Fla. Apr. 9, 2012) (citing Frazile v. 

EMC Mortg. Corp., 382 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 (11th Cir.2010)). 

“[A] QWR is written correspondence to the servicer that 

‘(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to 

identify, the name and account of the borrower; and (ii) 

includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the 

borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in 

error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer 

 22 The remainder of Plaintiffs’ argument in support of denying the 

motion to dismiss explains that BONYM is not a “servicer”, but is, 

nevertheless, vicariously liable for the actions of SLS. However, 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not assert a claim for RESPA violations 

against BONYM, and, therefore, whether BONYM is vicariously liable is 

of no consequence in the present action. 

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39

regarding other information sought by the borrower.’” Bush, 

2016 WL 324993 at *4 quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). 

Section 2605(e) requires a servicer of a federally related 

mortgage loan to provide a written response to a borrower's 

QWR, acknowledging receipt of the request, within 20 days, 

and to take further action or provide explanation or 

clarification within 60 days. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A), 

(2).

In the present action, there is no dispute that SLS is 

a servicer. Therefore, the next inquiry is whether 

Plaintiffs have pled facts supporting that they submitted a 

QWR consistent with the statutory requirements to SLS. 

This Court finds that they have not. While Plaintiffs have 

stated that they submitted QWRs to SLS on October 29, 2015, 

and December 15, 2015, there is simply a complete lack of 

factual support that the QWRs met the statutory 

requirements. In fact, Plaintiffs wholly fail to identify 

any of the alleged content of these QWRs such that this 

Court could determine that Plaintiffs’ request contained 

the detailed information required by the statute, even 

after Defendants raised the issue in their Motion to 

Dismiss on those grounds.23 As a result, this Court finds 

that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled facts to sustain 

 23 See FN 12.

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40

their RESPA claim (count eleven) and the same is due to be 

dismissed.24

12. Fair Credit Reporting Act (SLS)

Plaintiffs assert that SLS violated the FCRA by 

“inaccurately reporting that the Jacksons were delinquent 

in their mortgage loan and in default” after Plaintiffs 

informed it of the inaccurate reporting. Plaintiffs also 

assert that they “contacted the credit national bureaus and 

informed them of the inaccurate information and disputed 

same” but “the credit reports were never changed because 

Defendants kept reporting the account as delinquent and in 

foreclosure.” (Doc. 17 at 18). SLS has asserted this 

claim is due to be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to 

allege that SLS received notice of Plaintiffs’ dispute from 

a Credit Reporting Agency (“CRA”). (Doc. 19 at 26-27; Doc. 

33 at 13.) 

 24 Additionally, even assuming that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled 

that they submitted a QWR in compliance with the statutory requirement, 

Plaintiffs still have not sufficiently pled damages. “A borrower may 

recover ‘actual damages' if the loan servicer fails to comply with 

these provisions.” Sellers v. GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc., 2008 WL 4768867, 

*2 (11th Cir. Nov. 3, 2008). A borrower's recovery is not limited to 

actual damages; rather, the statute provides for award of “an amount 

equal to the sum of ... any actual damages to the borrower as a result 

of the failure; and ... any additional damages, as the court may allow, 

in the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the 

requirements of this section, in an amount not to exceed $1,000.” 12 

U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A)-(B). In the present action, Plaintiffs have

alleged that their RESPA claim survives against SLS to the extent that 

they seek statutory damages, but they have failed to allege a “pattern 

or practice of noncompliance” sufficient to support eligibility for 

statutory damages under § 2605(f).

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“[T]he FCRA places distinct obligations on three types 

of entities: consumer reporting agencies, users of consumer 

reports, and furnishers of information to consumer 

reporting agencies.” Chipka v. Bank of Am., 355 Fed.Appx. 

380, 382 (11th Cir. 2009). “The FCRA imposes two separate 

duties on furnishers. First, [15 U.S.C.] § 1681s–2(a) 

requires furnishers to submit accurate information to 

[credit reporting agencies]. Second, § 1681s–2(b) requires 

furnishers to investigate and respond promptly to notices 

of [consumer] disputes.” Green v. RBS Nat'l Bank, 288 

Fed.Appx. 641, 642 (11th Cir. 2008). However, the FCRA does 

not provide a private right of action to redress violations 

of § 1681s-2(a). Id.; see also Peart v. Shippie, 345 

Fed.Appx. 384, 386 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statute 

explicitly bars private suits for violations of [§ 1681s2(a)].”). The FCRA does provide a private right of action 

for violations of § 1681s-2(b), “but only if the furnisher 

received notice of the consumer's dispute from a consumer 

reporting agency.” Peart, 345 Fed.Appx. at 386; Green, 288 

Fed.Appx. at 642.

In the present action, Plaintiffs have failed to plead 

any facts to support that SLS was notified of a dispute 

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42

from a CRA, even after the issue was raised by Defendants.25 

To the contrary, Plaintiffs specifically state that they 

themselves reported the insufficient information to SLS and 

to the CRAs without making any connection such that this 

Court could find that SLS was notified by a CRA. As a 

result, Plaintiffs have not met their burden and their 

claim against SLS for violations of the FCRA is due to be 

dismissed. See Rice v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank NA, 2014 WL 

3889472, at *6 (N.D. Ala. August 5, 2014)(dismissing the 

plaintiff's FCRA claim where the plaintiff failed to plead 

any facts to suggest that the credit bureaus contacted the 

furnisher regarding the dispute).26

13. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (SLS)

Plaintiffs allege that SLS violated the FDCPA by 

misrepresenting the “character, amount, or legal status of 

the debt by inflating the debt owed, including 

misrepresenting the escrow amount” in the communication SLS 

sent to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 17 at 22; Doc. 30 at 28). 

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must 

establish, among other things, that the defendant is a 

“debt collector.” Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & 

Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). The FDCPA 

 25 See FN 12. 26 Of note, the Plaintiff in Rice was represented by counsel for 

Plaintiffs in the present action. 

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defines a debt collector as “any person who uses any 

instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection 

of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to 

collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 

asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

Expressly excluded from this definition are persons 

“collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due 

or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such 

activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at 

the time it was obtained by such persons.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(6)(F). Furthermore, the FDCPA's legislative history 

suggests that a mortgagee and its assignee, including 

mortgage servicing companies, are not debt collectors under 

the FDCPA when the debt was not in default at the time it 

was assigned. See Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 

1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 3 

(1977), 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698).

Relying on § 1692a(6)(F), Plaintiffs assert that SLS is 

a “debt collector” under the FDCPA as when it began 

servicing the loan, the loan was in default and it was 

serviced as a defaulted loan. (Doc. 17 at 20). SLS argues 

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim because they have 

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44

not sufficiently pled that SLS is a “debt collector”. (Doc. 

19 at 28). 

First, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled facts to 

show that their loan was in default at the time that SLS 

began collecting the debt owed on their loan. While 

Plaintiffs have asserted this to be true in a conclusory 

fashion, the Complaint fails to offer any facts to show 

when the debt was defaulted27 or when SLS began servicing 

Plaintiffs’ account. Nevertheless, assuming Plaintiffs’ 

conclusory assertions are true, there is still a lack of 

factual content from which it could be determined that SLS 

otherwise meets the statutory definition of a “debt 

collector”. While the status of the debt is a 

consideration of whether a party is excluded under the 

FDCPA, the mere fact that a loan was in default is not 

determinative of whether a party is a “debt collector”. 

“In contrast to the exclusion at § 1692a(6)(F)(iii), the 

statutory definition of “debt collector” applies without 

regard to the default status of the underlying debt.” 

Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 

1314 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, in the instant action, in 

order to avoid dismissal, Plaintiffs must plead facts that 

 27 In fact, Plaintiffs have continuously asserted that their loan was 

not in default. 

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allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that SLS 

is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA (as defined herein 

above) and Plaintiffs have simply not met this requirement. 

To the contrary, the Complaint offers no facts to suggest 

that SLS either (1) uses interstate commerce to conduct a 

business whose principal purpose is the collection of any 

debts, or (2) regularly collects or attempts to collect, 

directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 

owed or due another.” § 1692a(6). Plaintiffs have not 

attempted to assert facts in support of either of these 

requirements, even after the issue was raised by 

Defendants28 and, therefore, the status of Plaintiffs’ loan 

at the time SLS began servicing the loan is not relevant to 

this Court’s analysis. 

Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts 

demonstrating that SLS is a “debt collector” within the 

meaning of the FDCPA, their FDCPA claim (count thirteen) is 

subject to dismissal.

14. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (SLS)

The TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), 

provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to 

make any call (other than a call made for emergency 

purposes or made with the prior express consent of the 

 28 See FN 12. 

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called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system 

... to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular 

telephone service.” In order to prevail on a TCPA claim for 

a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), a plaintiff 

must show that the defendant: (1) made a call using an 

automatic telephone dialing system; (2) the call was not 

made for emergency purposes; (3) the call was made without 

the plaintiff's prior express consent; and (4) the call was 

made to a telephone number assigned to the plaintiff's 

cellular telephone service. See Walker v. Transworld 

Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 631390, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Feb.13, 

2015); Lee v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 2014 WL 

6978760, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Dec.10, 2014).

Plaintiffs’ Complaint states as follows:

118. The Defendants used automatic telephone dialing 

systems to call the Plaintiffs’ cell phones numerous 

times from June 2013 until December 2015. The 

Plaintiffs have never given the Defendant permission 

to call their cell phones with automated dialing 

systems. As a consequence of said acts, the Defendant 

has violated the TCPA and is liable for damages 

pursuant to federal law.29

(Doc. 17 at 25). Like many other of Plaintiffs’ claims, 

this claim too, appears to simply mirror the statutory 

language of the TCPA, while offering minimal factual 

 29 Plaintiffs additionally state that their TCPA claim is further 

supported by “[t]he acts and omissions of Defendant as more 

specifically stated in the facts.” However, this Court was unable to 

identify any “facts” to which Plaintiffs are referring. 

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support. While this Court is aware that, in the instant 

circumstance, Plaintiffs’ seemingly boilerplate assertions 

are also factual assertions, this Court is not persuaded 

that Plaintiffs have provided enough factual content to 

deem their claim plausible on its face. See Duran v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 878 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 

2012)(Plaintiff who alleged in a conclusory manner that 

Defendant placed “many” non-emergency calls to his cellular 

phone did not sufficiently allege that Defendant used an 

automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or 

prerecorded voice to make any phone calls to his cellular 

telephone.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs wholly fail to present 

any argument or supporting case law as to why their 

pleading is not insufficient after SLS raised the issue. 30 

Plaintiffs made no effort to present any facts supporting 

the conclusory allegation that such calls were from 

automated telephone dialing systems, i.e., to which numbers 

they were placed, the owner of said numbers, the amount of 

times the calls were placed, the dates on which they were 

made, or the contents of said calls, such that Plaintiffs’ 

claim could rise above the speculative level. As a result,

Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the TCPA (count 

fourteen) is due to be dismissed. 

 30 See FN 12. 

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15. Equal Protection Opportunity Act (SLS)

Plaintiffs claim that SLS violated § 1691(a)(1) of the 

EPOA based on Plaintiffs’ receipt of a notice which stated

“due to the default under the terms of the mortgage or deed 

of trust, the entire balance is due and payable.” (Doc. 17 

at 26). Plaintiffs contend they attempted to determine 

whether SLS’s notices represented SLS’s termination of the 

loan modification agreement entered in to on August 29, 

2013,31 and concluded that it did, which revoked the 

Plaintiffs’ credit for purposes of § 1691(d)(6). (Id). 

Plaintiffs further allege that these actions were adverse 

to them and that SLS failed to send an adverse action 

notice to them in compliance with ECOA’s notice 

requirements. SLS argues this claim is due to be dismissed 

because SLS is not a “creditor”.32 (Doc. 19 at 31).

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) states in pertinent part as 

follows:

It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate 

against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a 

credit transaction--

(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, 

national origin, sex or marital status, or age 

 31 This is the first and only mention of a loan modification agreement 

in this action. 32 Plaintiffs’ response incorrectly classifies SLS’ argument as one 

based on the contention that Plaintiffs failed to allege “that they 

were victims of discrimination.” (Doc. 30 at 30). However, a plain 

reading of Defendants’ motion indicates otherwise and, therefore, this 

Court will not address this allegation. 

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(provided the applicant has the capacity to 

contract);

In order to find SLS liable, Plaintiffs must show that 

SLS was “(1) a creditor, (2) who took adverse action with 

respect to plaintiffs' credit request and (3) failed to 

provide written notification of its reasons for the adverse 

action.” Hunter v. Bev Smith Ford, LLC, 2008 WL 1925265, 

at *6 (S.D. Fla. April 29, 2008) quoting Madrigal v. Kline 

Oldsmobile, Inc., 423 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir.2005). The 

statute defines a creditor as an entity that “regularly 

extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who 

regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or 

continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original 

creditor who participates in the decision to extend renew, 

or continue credit.” § 1691a(e)

In the present action, Plaintiffs have not asserted 

any facts from which it could be determined that SLS is a 

“creditor” as defined by the ECOA. Instead, Plaintiffs’

Complaint repeatedly refers to SLS as a servicer of 

Plaintiffs’ account. There is a lack of factual support 

that SLS is in the business of extending, renewing, or 

continuing credit or that it is an assignee of the original 

creditor who participates in the decision to extend, renew, 

or continue credit. Plaintiffs made no such assertions in 

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their Complaint and failed to rebut in any fashion that SLS 

was, in fact, a creditor under the EOCA in their Response 

(Doc. 30).33 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim under the EOCA is 

due to be dismissed. 

16. Declaratory Relief (All Defendants)

Plaintiffs seek (1) an Order declaring that they are 

not in default of their mortgage agreement and declaring 

the notice of default is null and void 2) an order 

declaring that Defendants have no right or authority to 

foreclose on the Jacksons’ property and (3) an Order 

prohibiting Defendants from foreclosing on the Jacksons’ 

property. (Doc. 17 at 26-27). Defendants assert this 

request is due to be denied on several grounds including 

(1) because Plaintiffs have not asserted a viable claim 

based on the allegations of their Complaint, (2) because

Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the 

merits, and (3) because the subject property has already 

been sold at foreclosure. (Doc. 19 at 32). In response, 

Plaintiffs simply point to the language of the Mortgage 

which provides that Plaintiff has a right to seek 

declaratory relief. (Doc. 19-1 at ¶ 22).

Regardless of whether the Mortgage allows for 

Plaintiffs to bring suit, Plaintiffs have not presented any 

 33 See FN 12. 

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facts, or even attempted to present facts to show that 

declaratory or injunctive relief is warranted. “To obtain a 

permanent or preliminary injunction, the [Plaintiffs] must 

show either a likelihood of, or actual, success on the 

merits.” Crespo v. Caldwell Banker Mortg., 599 F.App’x 

868, 873 (11th Cir. 2014). Based on the analysis herein 

above Plaintiffs have not met their burden. Likewise, 

because they failed to state a valid claim, declaratory 

relief cannot be obtained. (Id. at 873-74)(citations 

omitted). Furthermore, an injunction is not proper in the 

instant action because the foreclosure sale of Plaintiffs’ 

residence has already taken place. (Id. at 874). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein above, it is 

recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

against SLS, BONYM, and MERS as follows:

Counts one, two, three, four, five, eight, and nine

dismissed against Defendants, SLS and BONYM. Counts 

six, seven, and sixteen dismissed against Defendants, 

SLS, BONYM, and MERS. Counts ten, eleven, twelve, 

thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen dismissed against SLS,

resulting in this action being dismissed in its 

entirety against SLS, BONYM, and MERS. This action

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remains pending against BANA as to Counts six and 

sixteen. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72(c). The parties should 

note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions if the party was informed of the time period 

for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to 

object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the 

court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in 

the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to 

be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

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Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 19th day of July, 2016. 

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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