Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-03605/USCOURTS-ca2-13-03605-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judge, joined by Judge CARNEY, dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc:

    I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, for the

reasons set forth in Judge Poolerʹs dissent, the panel decision in this case, In re

Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2015), and Judge

Levalʹs concurrence in Kiobel I, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,

149 (2d Cir. 2010).  As a member of the panel, I write to respond briefly to certain

observations in Judge Jacobsʹs concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc.

1

    Judge Jacobs writes that the panel ʺsteered deliberately into

controversyʺ by deciding the appeal on the basis of Kiobel I when it could have

affirmed ʺstraightforwardlyʺ on the basis of Kiobel II, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch

Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), or on the basis that plaintiffs failed to

sufficiently plead mens rea.  Jacobs, J., op. at 2, 4‐5. Alternatively, Judge Jacobs

contends that the appeal was subject to the ʺeasyʺ disposition of a remand to the

district court to consider the case under Kiobel II.  Id. at 2, 5.   

    First, as to affirmance, the district court dismissed plaintiffsʹ claims

under the Alien Tort Statute (the ʺATSʺ) solely on the basis of Kiobel I.  The

                                                 

1    Because he is a senior judge, the author of the panel opinion could not

vote on whether to rehear this case en banc.  Had the active judges voted in favor of such

a rehearing, however, he would have been entitled to sit on the en banc court.

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district court ruled after Kiobel II was decided, but rather than apply Kiobel II, it

ruled on the basis of Kiobel I, holding that ʺ[t]he law of this Circuit is that

plaintiffs cannot bring claims against corporations under the ATS.ʺ  Pls.ʹ Special

App. at 1.  It did not consider whether plaintiffsʹ claims touched and concerned

the United States.  Likewise, the district court did not consider the mens rea

question,2 nor did any of the parties brief the question on appeal.  It did not make

sense for the panel to delve into these factual issues in the first instance on

appeal, see Eric M. Berman, P.C. v. City of New York, 796 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir.

2015) (ʺ[I]t is this Courtʹs usual practice to allow the district court to address

arguments in the first instance.ʺ (quoting Dardana Ltd. v. Yuganskneftegaz, 317

F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2003))), when the appeal could be disposed of as a matter of

law.  If Kiobel I is indeed good law, there is no reason why we should not have

applied it as a precedential decision to obviate the need for factual inquiries and

additional briefing and litigation.

    Second, as to remand, if Kiobel I were correctly decided, this case

would be over and there would be no reason to remand.  If Kiobel I were correctly

decided, there would be no reason to ask the district court and the parties to

                                                 

2   The district court in a similar case against Arab Bank held that the

plaintiffs there met the mens rea threshold.  See Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251

(NG), 2010 WL 623636 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) (Gershon, J.).

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probe into the complex and fact‐intensive issues of corporate presence and

corporate intent, for there would be no subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.  

If the bright‐line rule is that corporations may not be sued under the ATS, there

would be no reason to remand the case for further expensive and time‐

consuming litigation, including discovery and further motions.  Moreover, if, on

remand, the district court were to conclude that the claims met the requirements

of Kiobel II, the corporate liability issue would still have to be decided, and all of

the effort on remand would have been for naught.

    Judge Jacobs also contends that there is no circuit split and that

ʺ[t]he panel opinion conjures up a circuit split.ʺ  Jacobs, J., op. at 6. The cases

speak for themselves, and they are clearly at odds with our holding in Kiobel I:   

    ●  The D.C. Circuit has held that corporate defendants are

subject to liability under the ATS, observing that ʺ[t]here are a number of

problems with the analysis in [Kiobel I]ʺ and explicitly declining to follow it, Doe

VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50, 54‐55 (D.C. Cir. 2011), although the

decision was later vacated for further consideration, in part because of Kiobel II,

527 F. Appʹx 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  

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      ●  The Seventh Circuit has held that ʺcorporate liability is

possible under the [ATS].ʺ  Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021

(7th Cir. 2011).   

    ●  The Ninth Circuit has held that ʺthere is no categorical rule of

corporate immunity or liabilityʺ under the ATS, relying on Judge Levalʹs

concurrence in Kiobel I.  Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir.

2014).3       

    ●  The Eleventh Circuit has held that ʺ[t]he text of the [ATS]

provides no express exception for corporations, and the law of this Circuit is that

this statute grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate

defendants.ʺ  Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted).

    ●  The Fourth Circuit has permitted ATS claims to proceed

against a corporate defendant.  In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., the

Fourth Circuit reviewed the district courtʹs dismissal of the plaintiffsʹ ATS claims

for lack of jurisdiction.  758 F.3d 516, 524 (4th Cir. 2014).  Applying Kiobel II, the

                                                 

3   While the Ninth Circuit did remand for the district court to consider Kiobel

II, it noted that ʺthe plaintiffs contend that part of the conduct underlying their claims

occurred within the United States.ʺ  766 F.3d at 1028.  The corporate liability issue was

squarely part of its holding in the case.  Id. at 1020‐23.  

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Fourth Circuit held that ʺthe district court erred in concluding that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction under the ATSʺ and vacated the dismissal of the ATS

claims, remanding for further proceedings.  Id. at 531.  While the Fourth Circuit

did not explicitly address the issue of corporate liability under the ATS, see id. at

525 n.5, the principal defendant was a corporation, id. at 520, 530, and clearly

there would have been no reason to remand the case for further proceedings if

jurisdiction over corporations did not exist under the ATS.4

    While it is true, as Judge Jacobs notes, that some of these cases have

been or could be resolved on Kiobel II grounds, there is no reason, again, why the

courts and litigants in these cases should be litigating the complex, factual ʺtouch

and concernʺ issues if, indeed, corporations are not liable under the ATS as a

matter of law.   

    Finally, the concurrence suggests that there is no reason for en banc

review because ʺ[t]he principle of Kiobel I has been largely overtaken, and its

importance for outcomes has been sharply eroded.ʺ  Jacobs, J., op. at 2. This

argument, it seems to me, assumes that no ATS case will present claims that

                                                 

4   See also Beanal v. Freeport–McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999)

(dismissing ATS claims against corporate defendants under Rule 12(b)(6), and to that

extent appearing to implicitly assume that jurisdiction existed over ATS claims against

corporate defendants).

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touch and concern the United States.  That is not so, as Al Shimari and Doe I v.

Nestle USA show.  There will be cases where plaintiffs can meet the requirements

of Kiobel II.  And in those cases, even assuming the claims are meritorious, in this

Circuit the plaintiffs will be precluded from seeking relief under this Courtʹs

ruling in Kiobel I that corporations categorically are not subject to suit under the

ATS.  We are the only Circuit to reach that conclusion, and we should have taken

this opportunity to reconsider the matter.   

    I would grant the petition for rehearing en banc.

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